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French and British Approaches to India in the Eighteenth Century

IN his recent article in *Bengal Past and Present* which contrasted French and British views on India in the eighteenth century Mr. Frank D. Van Aalst raised a very interesting problem,¹ even if his attempts to resolve it seem to be open to various objections. The theme of Mr. Van Aalst's article appears to be that British contact with India was so firmly controlled by the East India Company that only commercially minded men were permitted to go to India and thus their portrayal of India and its civilisation to a wider British public was inevitably limited in scope and distorted. Mr. Van Aalst believes that the narrowness of contact through the East India Company is reflected in the superficial treatment which he considers that British writers gave to India throughout the eighteenth century. Frenchmen in India, on the other hand, are said to have been drawn from a much wider range of French society, who were able to spread a 'more sympathetic and more broadly based' appreciation of India when they returned home.²

The argument that English contact with India was seriously constricted by the survival of the East India Company's monopoly with its nominal power of determining who should or should not go to the East seems to rest on two assumptions: that the Company only gave permission to insensitive, philistine merchants, and that the Company could effectively prevent other Englishmen travelling to India without its consent. Neither assumption seems to be true. Nomination to all posts in India certainly lay with members of the Court of Directors of the Company, but whatever criteria they may have applied in making their nominations, commercial expertise does not generally seem to have been high among them. A candidate for a 'writership' was required to produce a certificate that he had 'learned the method of merchants' accounts throughout',³ but he was usually much too young to have had any

practical experience. His success clearly depended to a great extent on the social and political standing of his family. The majority of applications for writerships during the eighteenth century seem to have come from within the English or Scottish financial or commercial world, but the prospects of a fortune had always attracted men from other walks of life. When these prospects seemed to be dramatically enhanced by the conquest of Bengal, the number of such applicants increased rapidly. The system of nomination by the Directors gave any upper-class Englishman who had a mind to go to India and a modicum of influence behind him a reasonable chance of doing so. Sons of the clergy were well represented in the Company's service,⁴ and it is easy to pick men at random who had scholarly or literary connexions. Joseph Fowke was a close friend of Dr. Johnson; Henry and George Vansittart were the younger brothers of the Regius Professor of Civil Law; Edmund Maskelyne was the brother of the Astronomer Royal; a Bengal servant called Herbert Harris was the son of a Fellow of Eton; both Sir Joshua Reynolds and Lord Mansfield had nephews in India. The range of literary talent represented among eighteenth-century Englishmen in India varies from that of Sir William Jones to that of John Cleland, author of *Fanny Hill*, who presented a series of miniatures obtained at Surat to Alexander Pope.⁵ At least eleven of the Fellows of the Royal Society elected from 1750 to 1780 either had or were to have Indian experience.⁶

The way in which the character of the Bengal civil service was ceasing to be a 'mercantile' one and becoming an 'administrative' one as early as 1770 is described in an interesting letter by a young Scottish Writer.

You ask, my friend, what kind of education I would recommend for a young gentleman nine or ten years old intended for the East Indies. I have often reflected with some concern on the wrong turn that was given to my own studies, owing to a very common but mistaken notion my friends entertained that a knowledge of the various branches requisite for forming a merchant was the chief qualification necessary for a Company's servant; in consequence of this opinion, after I had made a considerable progress in the mathematicks, and the French and Latin languages, I was sent to be compleated at an Academy—from what time my attention was diverted

to writing and accounts and my former studies were neglected and contemned. Experience has since taught me that a man may be a valuable and useful servant to the Company without understanding merchants' accounts, and no great knowledge in that way is necessary for the managing of his own private affairs: on the contrary, if he has had a classical education and a talent for writing, he cannot fail of making himself usefull to his superiors and consequently of making his fortune. . . .

The Company's civil establishment in Bengal may rather be called an administrative than a mercantile society, and as the many employments under them vary widely in their nature, so there are few arts or sciences of which a man in their service cannot make his knowledge turn out to their advantage.⁷

The Company sometimes gave special permission to men to go to India who had no commercial purpose there and could contribute nothing to its service. At least nineteen painters were licensed to practise in India in the last decades of the eighteenth century.⁸ Those who could not obtain the Company's permission were still not effectively debarred from going to India. There were many loopholes available. Enlistment in the Company's European regiments followed by desertion in India or desertion from the crew of an East Indiaman were possible means for the hardy. Taking passage in a foreign ship was more comfortable but more expensive. The number of unlicensed painters known to be in India shows how easy evasion must have been.⁹ The Company's government in India rarely tried to deport the unlicensed or to enforce residence in the Presidency towns, mandatory for all Europeans without special permission under an Act of 1781.¹⁰ As Mr. Van Aalst points out, Harry Verelst did try both to confine Europeans to Calcutta and to send home those who had made themselves obstreperous. But the consequences were a warning to future Governors. Actions were brought against him in England, and although the courts generally found in his favour, £7,200 in damages were awarded against him in one case and the costs of the litigation are said to have ruined him.¹¹ Hastings was much more circumspect, writing: 'I would by no means desire nor would I consent to exercise

the rigour of the Company's orders on every unlicensed person who may be found in India and has demeaned himself peaceably and quietly to the inhabitants of the country. . . .¹²

It would be quite unrealistic to expect that the mass of eighteenth-century Englishmen in India should have shown any high degree of awareness of their surroundings, let alone of sensitivity to them. Some men of considerable educational attainments did go to India, but most of the Company's servants were too young to have been to an English university if not to a Scottish one. On the other hand, some of them had been subjected to the rigorous classical education given in schools such as Westminster¹³ or Harrow, which produced William Jones, Nathaniel Halhed and John Shore. Once in India, a significant minority did develop serious intellectual interests. The linguistic, literary and religious studies of those who were to be the first members of the Bengal Asiatic Society have recently received much attention; the achievements of Charles Wilkins, Nathaniel Halhed, Francis Gladwin, William Davy, Jonathan Scott or Alexander Hamilton under the patronage first of Hastings and then of Jones do not need to be recited again.¹⁴ The scientific accomplishments of the eighteenth-century servants are perhaps less well known.¹⁵ As the great geographer James Rennell wrote, 'Whatever may be imputed to the managers of the Company, the neglect of useful science, however, is not among the number.' He was amazed 'that so much geographical matter should be collected in so short a period'; with the result that 'the soundings of the coast of Bengal, are better known than those in the British channel'.¹⁶ The place of Alexander Dalrymple of the Madras service in Pacific exploration is now fully recognised.¹⁷ Samuel Davis, first translator of the *Surya Siddhanta*, was the most active astronomer among the members of the Asiatic Society after its formation in 1784, but accounts of Indian astronomy written by Sir Robert Barker and John Call had already been published in the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Society.¹⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kyd founded the Botanical Gardens at Calcutta in 1786. Work was begun in 1769 on the *Indian Zoology* which was later to appear under Thomas Pennant's name. The second edition of 1790 included a classified list of Indian fauna, animals, birds and insects, first drawn up by the German naturalist Johann Reinhold Forster, but later much expanded by two British

zoologists.¹⁹ Animals were regularly sent home ; nilgai by Clive,²⁰ a yak and 'shawl goats' by Hastings.

This activity was certainly not unique to the English. Rennell paid tribute to the achievement of Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville, who had published maps of India in 1751 and 1753 and continued to work on Indian geography.²¹ Guillaume Le Gentil de la Galaisiere, sent to India in 1760 by the Académie des Sciences in 1760 to observe the passage of Venus, was clearly a more accomplished astronomer than any Englishman who went to Asia at this time, and succeeded in producing a comprehensive account of Hindu astronomical techniques.²² During a long stay in India Pierre Sonnerat collected botanical and zoological specimens but also wrote detailed accounts of Indian society and religion.²³ Whether the French or the English made the greater contribution to European knowledge of India is not a very profitable question to put, but it is clear that any theory about broad French interests contrasting with narrow English ones cannot be sustained ; their interests were very similar.

The Court of Directors in London gave active encouragement to the gathering of scientific and cultural knowledge about India. The Company undertook the publication in 1776 of the compilation from the *dharma shastras* translated by Nathaniel Halhed as the *Gentoo Code*. It made Robert Orme its Historiographer with a salary of £400 a year ; Dalrymple was appointed the Company's Hydrographer ; and Rennell was given a pension. Charles Wilkins was given a grant of £200 towards the costs of the publication of his translation of the *Gita*.²⁴ Other authors received large subscriptions: the Company were willing to take a hundred copies of John Richardson's proposed translation of the Persian section of Meninski's *Thesaurus Linguarum Orientalum*,²⁵ and ordered fifty copies in advance of Thomas Maurice's *History of Hindostan*.²⁶

Ineffectual as its attempts to regulate the residence of Englishmen in the East generally were, the East India Company could at least exclude one category of persons: British Christian missionaries were not allowed to practise in areas under the Company's control before 1813. British contact with India was undoubtedly impoverished by this restriction, whereas French missionaries, notably the Jesuits, produced some of the most widely publicised accounts of India then available. But even here the contrast can be too sharply drawn. Eighteenth-century Britain

was not entirely cut off from information on India received through missionary sources. From 1710 the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge contributed financial support to the nominally Danish Lutheran mission in South India and published missionary letters with descriptions of Indian society and religion in pamphlets²⁷ and in its annual *Account of the Origins and Designs of the Society*. The point is also worth making that the number of French missionaries in India was very small: there were only eighteen French Jesuits in India when the Indian missions were wound up in 1776 and the Société des Missions étrangères who succeeded them could only send out ten more priests before 1792.²⁸ Even the small group of Jesuits spoke with very diverse voices. Some Jesuit letters, such as those written in 1740 by the remarkable Jean-Francois Pons,²⁹ were extremely well informed and dispassionate accounts of Hinduism. Others, such as those of Jean Bouchet, had a dominantly propagandist purpose. Bouchet and a number of others were determined to portray the Hindus as having deviated from the true path but being ripe for conversion back to it by stressing what seemed to them to be the underlying similarities between Hindu and Jewish and Christian beliefs.³⁰ Still others wrote of Indian religion and society with a hatred, and contempt which the agents of a commercial company would have found hard to match. A Jesuit at Chandernagore in 1753 found the Bengalis 'given up from their earliest childhood to all the vices which degrade human nature. . . . In general they are cowards, liars, bigots, and above all thieves'.³¹

Mr. Van Aalst appears to believe that French writers in the eighteenth century showed more awareness of India than did their English counterparts.³² Meaningful comparisons again seem to be hard to make, but again the picture seems to be much less onesided than Mr. Van Aalst suggests. On the French side he mentions Raynal and Voltaire. In the last years of his life Voltaire certainly took a very lively interest in Hinduism. A visitor found the octogenarian Voltaire 'eager and ardent in this matter as if he was not thirty'.³³ He evidently believed that what he had been told of the great antiquity of Hinduism and of its pure ethical doctrines made it a most valuable weapon in his unrelenting struggle against Christianity, and he frequently referred to it in his later polemical writing and in his correspondence.³⁴ The articles on Indian

subjects in the *Encyclopédie* are apparently attributable to d'Holbach.³⁵ Montesquieu read missionary accounts carefully and referred to the unchanging nature of Hinduism in '*Esprit des Lois*'.³⁶ Jean-Sylvain Bailly treated Indian astronomy and the origins of the peoples of India at length in a number of books.³⁷

But English writers were also curious about India. 'Travels' and 'voyages' occupied a very large place in John Locke's library with books about the East Indies strongly represented among them.³⁸ Dr. Johnson corresponded with Hastings, although he admitted that he did not know enough about India to ask him sensible questions,³⁹ and he even contemplated going to India, later regretting that he had not done so.⁴⁰ Anyone inclined to dismiss this as an absurd fantasy on his part should remember the hazards and discomforts to which he was willing to expose himself in the Hebrides. Gibbon's library seems to have contained everything of significance published on India in his lifetime, however esoteric,⁴¹ and his statement that he once intended to write a book on India was obviously no idle boast.⁴² Bentham studied Halhed's *Gentoo Code* with care.⁴³ Horace Walpole was unable to get through the outlandish names in Dow's *History of Hindostan*,⁴⁴ but he had strong views on the Company's government, as did William Cowper.⁴⁵ William Blake's writings suggest that he 'knew something of Indian philosophy',⁴⁶ and he did a drawing (now lost) of 'Mr. Wilkin translating the Geeta'.⁴⁷ Finally, there are those authors who actually wrote on India: Cambridge (whom Mr. Van Aalst notes), Burke and William Robertson, the historian.

The eighteenth-century English reading public consumed accounts of strange peoples and places as avidly as did readers in other countries.⁴⁸ By the middle of the century there had been a boom in the publication of collected editions of voyages whose popularity is said to have been exceeded only by theological writing.⁴⁹ In these collections a number of seventeenth-century accounts of India were reprinted, not only those originally in English such as Henry Lord's *Display of Two Forraigne Sects in the East Indies* or Sir Thomas Roe's Indian journal, but also translation from the French of Bernier, Tavernier or Thévenot, and from the Dutch of Baldaeus. English authors were as anxious as French ones to press this new knowledge of the world into theories which would embrace all human history, religion or politics and to construct a new

science of human nature based on recorded observation.⁵⁰ Whatever their relative readability to the twentieth century, Voltaire's *Essai sur les Moeurs*, Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois* or Raynal's *Histoire des Indes* have no lack of English competitors, such as Warburton's *Divine Legation of Moses*, Jacob Bryant's *New System of Ancient Mythology*, John Richardson's *Dissertation on the Languages, Literature and Manners of Eastern Nations*, or indeed Sir William Jones's essays, especially that on the *Gods of Greece, Italy and India*. The English *Universal History*, published in twenty-three volumes from 1736 to 1765 is an attempt to catalogue this new knowledge in the spirit of the *Encyclopédie* or of the *Cérimonies et coutumes religieuses des peuples idolâtres*, published from 1723 to 1748 in Amsterdam.

Mr. Van Aalst several times in his article describes French views as being more 'sympathetic' to India than those of the British. If 'sympathy' means concern at abuses of European power in India, it is once again difficult to see how any standard of comparison can be set up, but once again Mr. Van Aalst's judgement seems to be very onesided. Against obvious preoccupation of the French Enlightenment with the common humanity of all men and therefore with justice for all men must be set a British public opinion which hounded Clive and Rumbold, sent Hastings to trial, and reviled 'nabobs' in the press and on the stage. Whatever may be thought about his judgement or about the practical effects of his zeal, Burke's courage and tenacity in the virtually single-handed pursuit of his Indian 'delinquents' can hardly have been exceeded by any campaigner for a cause at any time. Mr. Van Aalst no doubt has good grounds for his statement that 'financial gain' was a 'partial reason for Burke's humanitarian concern for India',⁵¹ but it would be interesting to have his evidence. If John Wesley with his vast popular following regarded Englishmen in India as 'consummate villains . . . , devils incarnate . . . utter strangers to justice, mercy, and truth, to every sentiment of humanity', it is unlikely that his views were not widely shared.⁵²

Mr. Van Aalst finds what he calls a 'non-commercial' or 'anti-colonialist' element in French writing about India which he believes is absent in British accounts. But it is hard to see that these terms have any meaning at all in an eighteenth-century context. For instance, Anquetil Duperron, whom Mr. Van Aalst quotes as a 'non-commercial' observer,

in fact strongly advocated the extension of French settlement and trade in India in his later writing, such as his *L'Inde en rapport avec l'Europe* of 1798. Far from being 'non-commercial', he and Raynal, like all other 'enlightened' eighteenth-century writers, believed in the liberating and civilising effects of international trade and hoped to see it developed to its utmost extent, free of all restrictions, although Anquetil Duperron was in favour of a monopoly company to conduct Indian trade. English critics of the East India Company shared the same point of view. They believed in the mutual benefits of a properly conducted trade between Asia and Europe.⁵³ Attacks on both sides of the Channel were directed not at trade itself, but at the use of force by Europeans to impose unequal conditions on Asians. This was thought to be ultimately self defeating, bringing both sides to disaster whatever might be its short-term advantages to the Europeans. The tiny minority who objected to all contact between Asia and Europe were represented in England as well as in France. Bernard de Saint-Pierre (whom Mr. Van Aalst cites)⁵⁴ was matched by the highly respected Yorkshire M.P., Sir George Savile, who was 'against the whole system of India affairs', believing that the trade was 'destructive' and the conquests 'public robberies'.⁵⁵

Mr. Van Aalst's criteria for 'sympathy' evidently also include the receptiveness of Europeans to Indian values. In the eighteenth century only a few individuals were receptive to such values to the extent that their lives on their return to Europe were significantly influenced by them. Yet again those so influenced were not confined to one side of the Channel. In his *Interesting Historical Events, relative to the Provinces of Bengal . . . As also the Mythology and Cosmogony, Fasts and Festivals of the Gentoos*, published in three parts from 1765 to 1771, and his *Dissertation on the Origin, Nature, and Pursuits of Intelligent Beings* of 1786, John Zephaniah Holwell produced an increasingly elaborate pastiche of Hinduism and Christianity. Among other things, Holwell believed in fallen angels, transmigration of souls, and vegetarianism and abstinence from alcohol as the most effective cures for the ills of the world. Nathaniel Halhed returned from India in 1785 with a large collection of Persian translations from Hindu texts. Study of Dara Shukoh's *Upanishads* convinced him that 'the three great angels' of Hinduism were 'personifications of matter space and time'.⁵⁶ From

'unwearied attention' to the writings of 'the old Hindus', Halhed turned his gifts for interpretation to the Bible,⁵⁷ and in 1795 announced to the House of Commons that he believed in the divine inspiration of Richard Brothers, who was prophesying the imminent ending of the world. Both tragic and ludicrous as this episode may have been, the connexion between Halhed and Brothers is one of considerable potential interest, since William Blake was also attracted by Brothers.⁵⁸ It is at least possible that the greatest of all English mystics may have been provided with Indian material through the agency of Halhed and Brothers.

All attempts to make neat distinctions between an eighteenth-century French view of India and an eighteenth-century English view of India break down. There are no great differences between the kinds of Frenchmen or Englishmen who went to India, between what they thought worthy of study once they had got there, between what they reported to a wider public at home, or between the ways in which their reports were interpreted and commented upon in France or England. In fact, the similarities are very much greater than the disparities. It would be truer to speak of an Anglo-French or, more accurately, of a European view of India than to make distinctions. The degree of similarity is hardly surprising. Eighteenth-century Europeans shared the same intellectual preoccupations to a great extent and pooled their knowledge of the non-European world. For instance, Johann Niekamp's history of the Danish mission in South India first appeared in German but was translated into French and Latin. All English intellectuals read French and many French intellectuals read English. For those who did not, translations were freely available. In the early eighteenth century selections from the French Jesuit letters from India appeared in English,⁵⁹ as did Bernier's, Tavernier's and Thévenot's accounts, and in 1762 one of Anquetil Duperron's papers about his discoveries among the Parsis.⁶⁰ In mid-century more knowledge was clearly passing from France to Britain than was going from Britain to France. This was no doubt a reflection of the state of British Oriental studies, as were Duperron's withering comments on those scholars that he met in Oxford or London in 1762,⁶¹ or as was the failure of Warren Hastings's scheme, presumably of the mid-1760s, for a Professorship of Persian at Oxford.⁶²

By the end of the decade, however, the flow of information was

beginning to go in the opposite direction. Much English material began to appear in French translations and French writing on India became increasingly indebted to English sources. Deservedly or not, the English came to be acknowledged as the most authoritative interpreters of India to Europe well before the founding of the Asiatic Society in Calcutta in 1784. Luke Scrafton's *Reflections on the Government of Indostan* of 1763, Holwell's *Interesting Historical Events*, especially the second part published in 1767, and Alexander Dow's *History of Hindostan* with its 'Dissertation concerning the Customs, Manners, Language, Religion and Philosophy of the Hindoos' appearing in 1768 were all acclaimed in Europe. They were reinforced in 1776 by Halhed's *Gentoo Code*. Holwell and Halhed appeared in French and German translations and Dow in two French ones. Voltaire freely acknowledged that his picture of Hinduism, which had at first been largely based on the famous Jesuit forgery, the 'Ezour Vedam', had been transformed by recent English accounts. He described the alleged *shastra* reproduced by Holwell and Dow as 'The only monument of any age which remains on earth . . . It took the persevering English to seek it out and to make it understood'.⁶³ 'It is above all from MM. Holwell and Dow that one must be taught', he added on another occasion.⁶⁴ Long passages from Holwell, Dow and Scrafton can be identified in Raynal's *Histoire des Indes*.⁶⁵ Some French critics showed a well founded scepticism about Dow's and Holwell's work,⁶⁶ but by the end of the century English superiority was beyond question. Alexander Hamilton was welcomed to Paris in 1803 as an emissary of the new learning of the Bengal Asiatic Society.⁶⁷

Sharing common cultural interests and common sources of information, French and British interpretations of India in the eighteenth century were basically similar. Nevertheless, differences of tone and emphasis are apparent, which seem to be related to conditions within the two societies. In eighteenth-century France writers were more often in conflict with authority and existing conditions than was the case in contemporary England. This gave some French writing on non-European subjects an overtly propagandist edge. Comment on 'Oriental despotism' could be a vehicle for criticism of European politics, and discussion of Eastern religions could be a means of discrediting Christianity. In some Jesuit accounts similarities between Hinduism and Old Testament history

or Christian beliefs had been pointedly drawn to prove that Hinduism was in fact a corrupted version of a sacred original.⁶⁸ Voltaire and Raynal happily accepted the similarities while also accepting Hindu claims to an antiquity much greater than Biblical history allowed, thus implying that Jewish and Christian doctrines were corrupted versions of Hindu originals. This line of attack became more strident during the Revolution. Louis Langlès, keeper of the Oriental manuscripts at the Bibliothèque Nationale, described Hinduism as the basis of all the world's religions.⁶⁹ The Comte de Volney, traveller in the Near East and author of abrasive radical pamphlets, suggested that Christ and the 'Hindoo god, Chris-en, or Christna' were embodiments of the same myth.⁷⁰ English writers were certainly aware of the potentially explosive issues likely to be raised by any discussion of a non-European religion. But by the second half of the eighteenth century tension between the orthodox and unbelievers was much less acute than in France, and English writers showed less inclination to exploit their material in controversial ways (this would not of course have been true had Gibbon written his promised book on India). Most English comment on Hinduism, including that of Sir William Jones, seems to have been written from a generally conventional Christian point of view on the delicate questions of dating and the priority of beliefs, although there were some exceptions, such as Holwell whose opinions were wildly heterodox.

At the opposite extreme to the propagandist élan of Voltaire and Raynal was the rigour of French academic scholarship. Two of the most distinguished members of the Académie royale des inscriptions et belles lettres turned their attention on India. In a series of articles published in the *Mémoires* of the académie the abbé Etienne Mignot and Joseph de Guignes subjected the new material from India to close scrutiny.⁷¹ Their methods were the traditional ones of eighteenth-century historical scholarship: the collation of every scrap of evidence with the accepted Greek and Biblical chronology, philological comparisons, and attempts to interpret apparent similarities of customs in present-day societies as indicative of common origin in the past. A very notable authority on China, de Guignes was also able to collate Chinese and Indian sources and he had access to one genuine Hindu text, a translation into French from a Tamil version of the *Bhagavat Purana*. The

mastering of Sanskrit literature and later of Sanskrit epigraphy by the Bengal Asiatic Society left little scope for traditional scholarship,⁷² but at the time they were written the articles of de Guignes and Mignot were much more thorough than anything attempted in England. Eighteenth-century French voices when speaking of India could be more raucously strident or more rigorously academic than English voices, but both Frenchmen and Englishmen were talking about the same things.

P. J. MARSHALL.

¹ Vol. lxxxviii (1969), 90-102.

² *Loc. cit.*, 101.

³ W. Foster, *John Company* (London, 1926), pp. 211-13.

⁴ J. M. Holzman, *The Nabobs in England* (New York, 1926), pp. 41-2.

⁵ W. Davy, *Institutes political and military . . . , by the Great Timour*, ed., J. White (Oxford, 1783), p. xxv.

⁶ J. Z. Holwell, Clive, John Walsh, Alexander Dalrymple, General Carnac, Sir William Jones, Sir Robert Barker, Sir William James, John Call, John Stewart, William Fullarton.

⁷ D. Anderson to W. Collow, 19 Nov. 1770, British Museum, Add. MS. 45438, ff. 17-18.

⁸ W. Foster, 'British Artists in India 1760-1820', *The Nineteenth volume of the Walpole Society* (Oxford, 1931).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ 21 Geo. III, c. 65, sec. 28.

¹¹ Reports of Cojamaul v Verelst, Nichol and Davie v Verelst, Rafel v Verelst (*The English Reports*, ii. 276-91, xcvi. 579-81, 621-3, 628-9, 751-6).

¹² Cited in P. J. Marshall, 'Private British Investment in Eighteenth-century Bengal', *Bengal Past and Present*, lxxxvi (1967), 34.

¹³ William Hickey dined with 26 Old Westminsters in Calcutta in 1784. The inability of the company to produce an accurate Latin inscription does, however, raise doubts about their erudition (*Memoirs of William Hickey*, ed., A. Spencer (London, 1913-25), iii. 246).

¹⁴ The most recent accounts are those of D. Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance* (Berkeley, 1969), S. N. Mukherjee, *Sir William Jones* (Cambridge, 1968), and R. Rocher, *Alexander Hamilton* (New Haven, 1968).

¹⁵ But see H. Furber, *John Company at Work* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 340-1.

¹⁶ *Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan*, 2nd ed. (London, 1792), pp. iv-v.

¹⁷ V. T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire* (London, 1952-64), i. 34-6.

¹⁸ For Barker's 'Account of the Bramin's Observatory at Benares' see *Philosophical Transactions*, lxvii (1777); for Call's letter to the Astronomer Royal, *ibid.* lxiii (1772).

¹⁹ See the 'Advertisement' to the 2nd edition of 1790.

²⁰ *Annual Register*, 1772, pt. ii. 88.

²¹ Rennell, *Memoir*, p. 8. See d'Anville's *Eclaircissements géographiques sur la carte de l'Inde* (Paris, 1753).

²² His work first appeared in *Mémoires de l'Académie royale des sciences*, 1772, pt. ii, and later in his *Voyage dans les Mers de l'Inde* (Paris, 1779-81), 2 vols.

²³ *Voyage aux Indes orientales et à la Chine* (Paris, 1782), 2 vols.

²⁴ India Office Records, Court Minutes, B/101, pp. 118-19.

²⁵ Richardson, *A Specimen of Persian Poetry* (London, 1774), pp. v-vi.

²⁶ Maurice, *The Indian Antiquities* (London, 1793-1800), i. p. xiv.

²⁷ Eg. *Propagation of the Gospel in the East* (London, 1710), parts; *Several Letters relating to the Protestant Danish Missions at Tranquebar in the East Indies* (London, 1720); *An Account of the Religion, Manners and Learning of the People of Malabar*, trans. J. T. Phillips (London, 1717).

²⁸ A. Launay, *Historie des Missions de l'Inde* (Paris, 1898), i. 61, 78.

²⁹ *Letters édifiantes et curieuses*, xxvi (1743), 233 seq.

³⁰ Eg. *Ibid.*, ix (1730), 241 seq.

³¹ *Ibid.*, xxxii (1774), 108.

³² *Bengal Past and Present*, lxxxviii, 94-5.

³³ G. de Beer, 'Voltaire's English Visitors', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth century*, xxi (1957), 116.

³⁴ Voltaire's Indian interests are analysed in A. Debidour, 'L'Indianisme de Voltaire', *Revue de Littérature comparée*, iv (1924); F. J. Carmody, 'Voltaire et la renaissance indo-iranienne', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth century*, xxiv (1963), 345-54; and J. H. Brumfitt's Introduction to *La Philosophie de l'histoire*, *ibid.*, xxviii (1963), 54-5, 295-6.

³⁵ J. Lough, *Essays on the Encyclopédie of Diderot and d'Alembert* (London, 1968), pp. 124-5.

³⁶ R. Shackleton, *Montesquieu* (Oxford, 1961), p. 340.

³⁷ *Lettres sur l'origine des sciences, et sur celle des peuples de l'Asie* (Paris and London, 1777); *Traité de l'astronomie indienne et orientale* (Paris, 1787); see E. B. Smith, *Jean-Sylvain Bailly, Astronomer, Mystic, Revolutionary*, (Philadelphia, 1954).

³⁸ J. Harrison and P. Laslett, *The Library of John Locke* (Oxford, 1965), especially pp. 25-7.

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⁴³ *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, ed., T. L. Sprigge (London, 1968), ii. 62-3.

⁴⁴ *The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole's Correspondence*, ed., W. S. Lewis (London, 1937-), xvi. 306.

⁴⁵ *The Letters of William Cowper*, ed., J. G. Frazer (London, 1912), i. 274-5.

⁴⁶ P. F. Fisher, *The Valley of Vision* (Toronto, 1961), p. 23.

⁴⁷ *The Complete Writings of William Blake*, ed., G. Keynes (London, 1966), p. 583.

⁴⁸ French interest in the non-European world is perceptively analysed by R. Pomeau, 'Voyages et lumières dans la littérature française', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth century*, lvii (1967).

⁴⁹ G. R. Crone and R. A. Skelton, 'English Collections of Voyages and Travels', *Richard Hakluyt and his Successors* (London 1946), p. 78.

⁵⁰ Pomeau, *Studies on Voltaire*, lvii. 1288-9.

⁵¹ *Bengal Past and Present*, lxxxviii. 97.

⁵² *The Works of John Wesley* (London, 1872), iv. 89.

⁵³ This was the view of Burke in the 9th Report of the Select Committee of 1783 (*Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke* (Bohn's British Classics, London, 1854-89), iv. 51).

⁵⁴ *Bengal Past and Present*, lxxxviii. 96-7.

⁵⁵ L. Namier and J. Brooke, *The History of Parliament. The House of Commons, 1754-1790* (London, 1964), iii. 407.

⁵⁶ Halhed's Preface to an unpublished translation, dated May 1787, British Museum, Add. MS 5658, f. 19.

⁵⁷ *Testimony to the Authenticity of the Prophecies of Richard Brothers* (London, 1795), p. 10.

⁵⁸ R. Todd, *Tracks in the Snow* (London, 1947), chap. ii.

⁵⁹ *Travels of the Jesuits, into various parts of the World*, trans. J. Lockman (London, 1743), 2 vols.

⁶⁰ *Annual Register*, 1762, pt.ii.

⁶¹ *Zend-Avesta, ouvrage de Xoroastre* (Paris, 1771), l. pp. cccclx-cccclxi, cccclxix.

⁶² W. H. Hutton, 'A Letter of Warren Hastings on the Civil Service of the East India Company', *English Historical Review*, xlv (1929), 440.

⁶³ *Voltaire's Correspondence*, ed., T. Besterman (Geneva, 1953-65), xcii. 170-1.

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⁶⁵ For the identification of passages from Sraffton I am indebted to Mr. Simon Digby.

⁶⁶ Eg. the Introduction and notes to *L'Exour Vedam, ou ancien commentaire du Vedam* (Yverdon, 1778).

⁶⁷ Rocher, *Alexander Hamilton*, pp. 34 seq.

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⁶⁹ *Fables et Contes indiens* (Paris, 1790), p. x-xiii.

⁷⁰ *The Ruins: or a Survey of the Revolutions of Empires* 3rd ed. (London, 1796), pp. 292-3.

⁷¹ Mignot's five articles 'Sur les anciens philosophes de l'Inde' appeared in vol. xxxi (1761-3); de Guignes wrote three articles called 'Recherches historiques sur la religion indienne' in vol. xl (1773-6), 'Reflexions sur un livre indien intitulé Bagavadam', vol. xxxviii (1770-2), 'Observations historiques et géographiques sur le récit de Pline concernant . . . les Indiens', xlv (1780-4).

⁷² Mukherjee, *Jones*, pp. 102-11.

Significance of Shawl-Wool Trade in Western Himalayan Politics

THE second quarter of the nineteenth century forms quite an interesting period in the annals of Western Himalayan politics. It was during those fateful years that the kingdoms of Ladakh and Baltistan lost their independence and became a part of the Sikh state under Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Further, in 1841-42, when the Dogra Raja Gulab Singh, a feudatory of the Maharaja, invaded Western Tibet, it caused deep concern not only to the British and Chinese Governments but greatly alarmed other Western Himalayan states such as Nepal, Kumaon, Garhwal and Bashahr. One of the chief causes which disturbed the political equanimity of this region was shawl-wool trade. The narrative proposes to trace the old and well-frequented routes of shawl-wool trade in the Western Himalayas. Secondly, it is intended to discuss the various pulls and pressures exercised in the first half of the nineteenth century by the interested powers—the British Indian Government, the Lahore Durbar and the Dogra Raja Gulab Singh—to import this commodity into areas within their respective spheres of influence.

I

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the opening years of the nineteenth, because of the exertions of Clive, Hastings, Cornwallis and Wellesley, the English East India Company eliminated French and Portugese influence from India and defeated many native rulers. By 1809, the British acquired an extensive empire in India, whose boundary extended upto the river Sutlej in the north. After the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16, the Company's Government annexed Kumaon and Garhwal, and also established a protectorate over Bashahr and many other adjacent hill states (later christened as Simla Hill States). This brought British possessions contiguous to Ladakh and Western Tibet.

On the other side of the Sutlej, no less spectacular events were taking

place. In 1799 Maharaja Ranjit Singh captured Lahore—the Imperial City of the Punjab—and laid the foundations of Sikh monarchy. Soon after he adopted a plan of conquering the hill states in the north and north-east of the Punjab simultaneously with the Punjab plains. In the Kangra hills,¹ he had to reckon with the powerful chieftain, Sansar Chand Katoch who for some time opposed the Maharaja. However, in May 1809, the Katoch Chief surrendered the Kangra fort to the Sikhs and thereafter Ranjit Singh made and unmade the map of the hill states as he pleased. He conquered Guler in 1813-14 ; Jaswan and Nurpur in 1815 ; Datarpur in 1818 and Kulehr in 1825². The Rajas of Kulu, Suket and Mandi also became his tributaries. In the Jammu hills³, the Maharaja defeated the confederated Muslim chiefs of Akhnur, Rajouri and Bhimbar in 1812 and then annexed Jammu.⁴ In 1819 the Maharaja conquered Kashmir.

Although Jammu had been annexed to the Sikh kingdom and many other adjoining hill chieftains subdued, yet, uprisings against the Lahore Durbar in the Jammu hills did not cease. For establishing peace in this area, the Maharaja appointed Gulab Singh Dogra, a collateral of the ruling family of Jammu and one of his lieutenants. In 1820 Ranjit Singh gave Jammu in *jagir* to the Dogra chieftain. Two years later, the Maharaja entrusted the administration of the Jammu hills to Gulab Singh and granted him, and his successors, the principality of Jammu with the hereditary title of 'Raja'. His younger brothers, Dhian Singh and Suchet Singh were also given the titles of 'Rajas' and granted *jagirs* around Jammu. The Dogra brothers, as they came to be known, made a common cause and consolidated their power in the hills. Raja Gulab Singh soon conquered Mankot, Behandrata, Chaneni and Kishtwar, thereby extending his possessions up to Ladakh and Kashmir. Normally, these conquests and annexations were made in the name of the Sikhs and as extensions of the kingdom of Lahore, but in reality Gulab Singh was practically independent⁵.

II

These powers (the British, Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the Dogra Raja Gulab Singh), after acquiring territories in the Western Himalayas, became interested in the commercial potentialities of Ladakh and West

Tibet. As known in Kashmir, Pashmina or shawl-wool, the fine undercoat of Tibetan sheep and goats, was the important article of trade in this region. It was used for the manufacture of the famous Kashmiri shawl, which is known for its fine texture, embroidery, charm of colour and attractive shades. It appears that the shawl industry received great patronage and encouragement from the Mughal emperors and improved in quality and fineness of texture.

Chang Thang or the northern arid wastes of Tibet, with the districts of Rudok and Gartok, is the most important shawl-wool producing area⁶. Because of its elevation and aridity, the area is coated with short and succulent grass which provides excellent pasturage for sheep and goats⁷. Under the peace treaty, concluded after the Tibeto-Ladakhi-Mughal War (Ca. 1681-84 A.D.), Tibetan authorities undertook to supply the entire wool of this region to Ladakh⁸. At the same time, Ladakh, under a separate treaty with the Mughals, further undertook to supply all this wool, alongwith its indigenous produce⁹ to Kashmir¹⁰. This practice appears to have been followed throughout the eighteenth century. Thus, it was under strict treaty rights, and not as a result of custom or usage, as a recent writer on this region has said¹¹, that Ladakh got the monopoly of West Tibet's shawl-wool.

From time immemorial, Kashmir was the only manufactory where shawls were produced and its looms were fed with the wool procured as above from West Tibet and Ladakh. In due course, shawls became the chief manufacture and export article of Kashmir. On the other hand, shawl-wool was an important article in the imports and exports of Ladakh and was a lucrative source of income to its kings and other high state officials. Hence the Ladakhis maintained a well-guarded monopoly on the shawl-wool produced in West Tibet, and any attempt to export this article to areas other than Ladakh was severely punished by the Ladakhi and Tibetan authorities. Any dislocation in the flow of this commodity from the aforementioned old and well-frequented route was bound to affect adversely the economies of both Ladakh and Kashmir.

III

After becoming a territorial power, John Company had become interested in the trans-Himalayan trade, and because of its obvious

value, shawl-wool had attracted the notice of the British. In 1774, while commissioning George Bogle¹² to Tashilhunpo, Warren Hastings, the then Governor-General, had requested him "to send one or more pair of the animals called Tus, which produce the shawl-wool¹³."

In 1799 the recently appointed Board of Agriculture in Great Britain also asked the Court of Directors, if they could secure samples of shawl-bearing sheep of Tibet with a view to breeding it in England. The Court instructed the Bengal Government to procure specimens, with precise directions as to the care of the animals during their long voyage to England¹⁴. In the opening years of the nineteenth century when the British were fighting the Napoleonic wars, the manufacturing coalition of the continent was dead-set against Britain¹⁵, and the acquisition of shawl-wool was very much desirable to the Company.¹⁶

Though Bogle¹⁷, and later Samuel Turner¹⁸ had given some information about shawl-wool,¹⁹ much was not known till 1812, when William Moorcroft, a resourceful and intelligent young employee of the Company, penetrated into West Tibet and visited Gartok, the then principal centre of shawl-wool trade. While at Gartok, Moorcroft was told that shawl-wool of West Tibet was also to the Ladakhis only.²⁰ In 1810 a British merchant, Mr. Gillman of Bareilly, through some middle-men purchased a small quantity of shawl-wool but when the Ladakhis came to know about it they protested to the Tibetan Governor of Gartok, who issued an edict forbidding the sale of shawl-wool to any but the Ladakhis, on pain of death.²¹ Later on, probably by giving many presents such as those of broadcloth and coral beads—things very much liked by the Governor²²—and also by offering little more money than the Ladakhis would have given for the same quantity, Moorcroft purchased a small quantity of shawl-wool, and in his account of this journey, published in the *Asiatic Researches* in 1816 observed:

I consider this day as the epoch at which may be fixed the origin of a traffic, which is likely to be extremely beneficial to the Hon'ble Company.²³

In the early years of the nineteenth century, because of the oppression of the Afghan Governors in Kashmir, many skilled workers were compelled to leave that valley. A large number of shawl-manufacturers took

refuge in Amritsar, Nurpur, Ludhiana and adjoining hills, carrying along with them their families and the wherewithal and their professional skill.²⁴ The influx of the Kashmiri artisans was bound to promote and facilitate the work of manufacturing shawls in the Indian plains. In 1818 Shoogan Chand, a rich banker and treasurer of the Delhi Residency, started a venturesome project of manufacturing shawls under his personal inspection getting the workmen and material from Kashmir.²⁵

In 1815, when Bashahr came under British protection, the Company retained possession of Kotgarh,²⁶ a small Bashahri village on the Sutlej, from where to tap the lucrative shawl-wool of West Tibet into the Company's territory was easy. Soon after, with a view to purchase wool from Tibetan traders and also to divert the wool trade from Kashmir into territories under British control, a factory was established here.²⁷ Rampur, the capital of Bashahr, also began to develop into a shawl-wool trading centre. For the convenient transit of wool, it was thought necessary to have good roads in Kinnaur, the north-eastern part of Bashahr, which is conterminous with Ladakh and Tibet. Tracks, which in 1818 could be used by travellers with great difficulty were repaired and within two years the Bashahris started bringing sheep, laden with wool to Rampur.²⁸ The wandering shepherds of Tibet, when unwatched could easily be induced to part with their wool for more money and merchandise of the plains; due to the encouraging attitude to British officials, the residents of Kinnaur though not allowed to purchase shawl-wool openly, began to smuggle "it in small quantities of two and three pounds each to a person."²⁹ This situation may be summed up in the words of Alexander Gerard:

. . . . Since the British have thought it worth their while to buy it [shawl wool] the Chinese (cis) have not been so scrupulous, and they now sell it to the highest bidder. Last year one person from Namgea Lache, a country on the bank of the Brahmapootra, eighteen days journey S.E. of Mansurowur, brought about twelve hundred weights of it, and the trade is on the increase.³⁰

In Kumaon also, the traders were active in bringing shawl-wool from Western Tibet and in the eighteen-twenties this commodity formed an important item in the imports of Kumaon.³¹

Thus, the arrival of the English in the Western Himalayas upset the

long-established commercial frame-work of this area, and shawl-wool of western Tibet started flowing into channels other than the old and customary ones. This was bound to cause anxiety to the rulers of Kashmir and Ladakh.

Shawl-wool trade, lucrative as it was, had also attracted the attention of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He encouraged the shawl-weavers to settle at Nurpur and Amritsar. At the latter place, many thousand shawl manufactories were opened,³² which were fed partly by the wool imported from Tibet and partly from Bokhara.³³ An attempt was also made to manufacture shawls at Lahore.³⁴ Desa Singh Majithia, the Sikh *Nazim* of Kangra hills, was said to be busy in building a city called Tilokhpur, not far from Kot Kangra, where he had already established one hundred shops of shawl workmen.³⁵ Soon after the conquest of Kashmir in 1819, Ranjit Singh appointed one Jawahir Mal, a native of Shikarpur, who collected duties on shawls and other articles of merchandise imported, exported, or manufactured in Kashmir. He undertook to pay the Maharaja a fixed amount every year. Under his judicious management there was rapid increase in the number of shawl manufacturers,³⁶ and shawl goods brought to the state exchequer an income of about twelve lakhs rupees which was expected to increase to rupees thirteen and a half lakhs in 1821.³⁷

In 1821 the supply of shawl-wool from West Tibet into Ladakh decreased. It was said that about 150 horse-loads of this commodity had been smuggled into areas other than Ladakh. This caused great anxiety to the King of Ladakh, his ministers and Kashmiri traders.³⁸ This diminished supply of wool was bound to have its effect on the looms of Kashmir. Hence, the Sikh *Nazim* of Kashmir despatched a special envoy to Ladakh to investigate the causes of the decrease in shawl-wool imports.³⁹ It was suspected that the fall was due to the activities of William Moorcroft who, at that time was sojourning in Ladakh. The Maharaja also wrote to Mir Izzet Ullah, Assistant to Moorcroft:

"Since the duties of the district of Kashmir are chiefly derived from the import of shawl wool and thread and it has been lately stated to me that from some cause or other, the transport of shawl wool from Tibet into Kashmir has fallen off very much . . . apprise me . . . what may be the cause of deficiency in the import of shawl wool and thread from Tibet."⁴⁰

Moorcroft, on behalf of Izzet Ullah, replied that decrease in shawl-wool was due to the breaking out of an epidemic among the cattle, in which lakhs of shawl goats of Ladakh and Chang Thang had died.⁴¹ The English traveller further assured the Maharaja that his object in coming to Ladakh was not to purchase shawl-wool for the Company.⁴²

The third power in the Western Himalayas—Raja Gulab Singh—also was not slow to grasp the potentialities of shawl-wool trade. By the establishment of shawl manufactories at Amritsar and Nurgpur, wool was in great demand in the plains. The shawl-manufacturers of these places would not like to get their supply of wool through a circuitous and expensive route via Kashmir and Ladakh. So, as the chronicler of the Lahore Durbar tells us, Raja Gulab Singh had started to draw the wool direct through Kishtwar from Ladakh into territories under his control. In November 1834, Miha Singh, the Sikh Governor of Kashmir, complained to Maharaja Ranjit Singh that the shawl-wool was going from Ladakh to Jammu and that "on account of the inattention of the Maharaja, Kashmir had become absolutely deserted and its affairs had gone from bad to worse."⁴³ The Governor of Kashmir had previously made repeated representations to the Maharaja in this connection but, Bhai Ram Singh, Minister-in-Waiting, out of regard for Raja *Kalan* (Dhian Singh), never made a report to the Maharaja.⁴⁴ Ranjit Singh rebuked Raja Dhian Singh for all this, and there the matter appears to have rested. But Raja Gulab Singh was not to remain content with importing a part of the Ladakhi shawl-wool only; he was eager to subdue completely Ladakh and the neighbouring areas, ostensibly for the Maharaja, but actually for himself.

IV

From 1834 to 1841, Zorawar Singh, General of Raja Gulab Singh, was first busy in conquering Ladakh and Baltistan⁴⁵ and then quelling various revolts in this region. His frequent expeditions and resultant disturbances, threw out of gear the entire commercial life of this area. Now the shepherds of Western Tibet found it insecure to dispose of their shawl-wool to the Ladakhis. Consequently, trade of Western Tibet with Bashahr and other British-protected hill states increased enormously, albeit to the detriment of that with Ladakh and Kashmir. In 1837, the

first year for which statistics are available, the quantity of shawl-wool imported from Western Tibet into Bashahr was 1080 maunds, which rose to 1548 maunds in 1840.⁴⁶ The total trade of Bashahr in 1837 was valued at Rs. 55,529; in 1840 this figure increased to Rs. 109,807,⁴⁷ thus in four years registering a steep increase of nearly two hundred per cent.

These developments spelt the doom of shawl industry of Kashmir. Raja Gulab Singh, by his conquest of Ladakh and Baltistan had surrounded Kashmir from north-east and south and after the demise of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1839, had set his eyes on the beautiful valley. He was, therefore, now interested in its prosperity and would not tolerate any decrease in its trade. In a bid to secure the usual flow of shawl-wool into Kashmir, in the spring of 1841, Zorwar Singh invaded Western Tibet and by September occupied all territory up to the Mayum Pass.⁴⁸ This resulted in a sudden fall in the exports of West Tibet into Bashahr: in 1841, the quantity of shawl-wool imported fell to 169 maunds,⁴⁹ and the total trade was valued at Rs. 19,679.⁵⁰ J. C. Erskine, British Political Agent at Subathu, reported that Sikhs were determined to stop all trade between Western part of Tibet and Bashahr.⁵¹ By occupying Spiti and adjacent areas the invaders had already cut the tracks on one hand between Bashahr and Ladakh, and on the other between Bashahr and other countries to the north and west of Ladakh. It was also reported that Zorawar Singh had issued an order prohibiting the export of shawl-wool and borax from Western Tibet to Bashahr.⁵² Five Bashahri traders who defied this order were put to death and many others were robbed of their property and imprisoned.⁵³

All this was very much disquietening to British rulers-cum-traders. Lord Auckland, the then Governor-General, appointed a special envoy⁵⁴ to this area and desired George Russel Clerk, his Agent at the Lahore Durbar, to ask the Maharaja to restrain Zorawar Singh from molesting the trade and territory of Bashahr.⁵⁵ In this connection, in reply to an order issued by the Lahore Government, Zorawar Singh observed:

The fact is that a quantity of pusham for shawls and of tea was usually imported to Cashmere, but it was since a year or two that the merchants purchased these commodities very dear and imported these to Hindoostan and thereby greatly injured the shawl manufacture of Cashmere.⁵⁶

The British Government was incensed at this reply and immediately wrote to Clerk that the explanation offered by Zorawar Singh of his reasons for interfering with the course of trade beyond the frontiers of Bashahr was quite inadmissible. It further stated that if the object of Dogra encroachments along the northern line of the Western Himalayan range was to establish for themselves a monopoly of trade of that region, such a measure was quite deleterious to the British-protected hill states.⁵⁷ The Governor-General, therefore directed his Agent to insist upon the immediate withdrawal of all road restrictions imposed on trade by the Dogras, and impress on the Maharaja that

in the peculiarly intimate relations which subsist between the British and Lahore Governments and such pleas as that advanced by Zorawar Singh are of a kind which ought not to be admitted by either of the allied parties and certainly ought not to be communicated with any semblance of concurrence and support, the justification of an unfriendly and almost hostile proceedings.⁵⁸

The Maharaja was further told that it was impossible "for the British Government to hear without displeasure of outrages of this atrocious nature against its subjects or those of its dependents,"⁵⁹ and that if Zorawar Singh were not restrained, the long-standing Anglo-Sikh amity would be irreparably damaged. Fort William brought heavy pressure to bear on the Sikh ruler to recall Zorawar Singh and his troops within the former boundaries of Ladakh, and set a deadline (December 10, 1841), for the withdrawal of his forces.⁶⁰ Fortunately for the British, a large Tibetan army moved down from Lhasa, defeated and killed Zorawar Singh on December 12, 1841, and expelled the invaders from Western Tibet.

Under these changed conditions, the British were anxious to restore the recently developed commercial traffic of Bashahr with Western Tibet. J. D. Cunningham, British Commissioner, who had been deputed on special mission and was then sojourning near the frontier where active Tibeto-Dogra hostilities were going on, wrote to Kalon Surkhang, the Tibetan Commander, that in order to promote shawl-wool trade between Bashahr and Tibet, no impediments should be put by the Tibetan authorities.⁶¹ Sukhang's reply, however, was that if the people of Bashahr proved in the presence of the Ladakhis that in the past they (Bashahris) traded

in these commodities, then they will be permitted to carry trade, but if it was otherwise and the people of Bashahr "took advantage of the disturbances consequent of Zorawar Singh's arrival to trade in shawl-wool, they cannot be allowed to continue this trade according to the present orders of the Lhasa rulers to me."⁶² In reply to another communication from Cunningham on the same subject, Sukhang's rejoinder was that although throughout Western Tibet there was profit on the trade of shawl-wool, it was not the practice of the Tibetan rulers to interfere with any old custom.⁶³

In September 1842, the Chinese and Sikhs signed peace treaty, under which, *inter alia*, it was decided that in conformity with ancient usage "tea and Pusham shawl wool shall be transmitted by the Ladakh road."⁶⁴

The British were quite unhappy over it and would have liked to get the relevant trade clause of the treaty amended in their own favour, but the signatories to the treaty then being independent, could not be pressurised.

However, in 1846, when after the first Anglo-Sikh war, Gulab Singh was made the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir state, and the British became a paramount power vis-a-vis the Dogras, Lord Hardinge, the then Governor-General, made a special effort to get the relevant trade clause amended. On August 4, 1846, he wrote to "the Vizeer of Lassa and Gartope".

I have deemed it expedient that certain portions of the treaty between the Chinese authorities and those of Lahore should be cancelled,⁶⁵ these were in their nature highly injurious to the interests of the British Government and its dependents. I have accordingly determined that the 2nd Art. of the aforesaid treaty by which it is provided that the entire trade should pass through Ladakh be cancelled.⁶⁵

There was no response from the Chinese authorities. Thus, on diplomatic level, attempts of the Company's Government to break the Kashmir hegemony on the shawl trade of Western Tibet failed.

From the above it is clear that shawl-wool was an important article of trade in the Western Himalayas. Though mainly produced in the western part of Tibet and Ladakh, it was exported to Kashmir, where shawl

industry had developed. Shawls had become the chief manufacture and export article of Kashmir and thus its economy and prosperity was deeply inter-linked with shawl industry. That explains as to why the rulers of this valley, be it the Mughals, Afghans or Sikhs, steadfastly clung to the monopoly of wool trade and strongly opposed any diversion in its flow from Western Tibet and Ladakh to Kashmir.

Shawl-wool trade was invariably an important factor to be reckoned with in the relations among various powers in the Western Himalayas and it was undoubtedly an important contributory factor to the political upheaval that shook this region in the late thirties and early forties of the nineteenth century.

C. L. DATTA.

Unless otherwise stated all MS. references are to records, Foreign, and Political Department, National Archives of India, New Delhi.

¹ In the Kangra hills between the Sutlej and the Ravi, there were fourteen states-Kangra, Guler, Gaswant, Datarpur, Siba, Kutlehr, Shahpur, Kulu, Mandi, Suket, Bangahal, Nurpur, Kotila, and Chamba. This political group of the states was also known as Jullundur Group. See H. R. Gupta, *History of the Sikhs* (Lahore, 1944), III, p. 21.

² G. C. Barnes, *Report of the Land Revenue Settlement of the Kangra District* (Lahore 1889), pp. 10-13; see also, *Kangra District Gazetteer*, 1883-84, I, pp. 40-45.

³ In the Jammu hills between the Ravi and the Jhelum, there were twenty-two states. For details, see Gupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

⁴ Though the Raja of Jammu had tendered his submission to the Maharaja in 1801, it was not till about 1812 that the Raja was deposed and Jammu given in *Jagir* to Prince Kharak Singh.

⁵ J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel, "History of Jammu State". *Journal of the Punjab Historical Society*, Vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 134.

⁶ *Foreign Department Political Proceedings* (referred et. seq. as *F. D. Pol. Progs.*), 10 October 1823, No. 21.

⁷ J. B. Hennessey (Ed.), "Report of Pandit Kishan Singh's Explorations in Great Tibet and Mongolia (1879-82)", *Survey of India Records* (Dehra Dun, 1915), Vol. VIII, Pt. 2; p. 224.

⁸ For details, see L. Petech, "The Tibetan-Ladakhi-Mogul-War 1681-83", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (September, 1947), p. 192.

⁹ In Ladakh, Shawl-wool was mainly produced in the steppes between the rivers Shayok and the Indus. Cf. J. D. Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs*, (Delhi, 1955, edition), pp. 1-2.

¹⁰ Cf. Petech, *loc. cit.*, p. 192.

¹¹ See A. Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa, 1767 to 1905* (London, 1960), pp. 58.

¹² For details of Bogle's mission to the Panchen Lama, see C. Markham, *Narratives of the Mission of the George Bogle to Tibet and of the journey of*

Thomas Manning to Lhasa (London, 1876); see also, S. Cammann, *Trade through the Himalayas* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 27-81.

¹³ Markham, *Narratives*, p. 8.

¹⁴ Bengal Despatches, Vol. 34, Bengal Commercial Despatch of 31st October, 1799, quoted in Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

¹⁵ Moorcroft to Trail, Letter No. IV, *Asiatic Journal*, Vol. XXI, p. 217.

¹⁶ *Foreign Department Political Consultations* (referred hereafter as *F.D.P.C.*) 20 September 1822, No. 67.

¹⁷ Bogle reported that shawl-wool came from goats in the regions of Western Tibet and was an important item of export to Kashmir. (Markham, *Narratives*, p. 126).

¹⁸ After Bogle's mission and death, in 1783, Warren Hastings, commissioned Turner to Tashilhunpo. For details of his mission, see S. Turner, *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet* (London, 1800); see also, Cammann, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-101.

¹⁹ Turner attempted to bring out some shawl goats and later tried to send them to England, but he was not much successful. (Cammann, *op. cit.*, p. 84, fn. 11).

²⁰ *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XII (1816), p. 451.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Mr. Webb, who for sometime carried survey work in the Western Himalayas, tells us that when the authorities in Lhasa came to know about the visit of Moorcroft to Gartok, they dismissed the Governor from service and summoned him to Lhasa, where, probably he was given more punishment. *Historical Records of the Survey of India*, collected and compiled by R. H. Phillimore (Dehra Dun, 1954), Vol. III, p. 451.

²³ *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XII, p. 456.

²⁴ *F. D. Pol. Progs.*, 10 October 1823, No. 27; *Foreign Department Secret Consultations*, (referred hereafter as *F.D.S.C.*), 22 November 1841, No. 25. See also, W. Moorcroft and G. Trebeck, *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Panjab, in Ladakh and Kashmir etc.* (London, 1841), Vol. I, pp. 110-111.

²⁵ *Punjab Government Records, Delhi and Ludhiana Residency and Agency* (Lahore, 1911), Vol. I, p. 168.

²⁶ *Punjab States Gazetteer*, 1910, Vol. VIII, No. 2, pt. A, p. 8.

²⁷ G. Lloyd. (Ed.) *Narrative of a Journey from Gaunpoor to the Boorendo Pass in the Himalaya Mountains etc. by Major Sir W. Lloyd and Captain Alexander Gerard's account of an attempt to penetrate by Bekhur to Garoo and the Lake Mansarowara etc.* (London, 1840), I, p. 174.

²⁸ A. Gerard, *Account of Koonawar etc.*, Ed. G. Lloyd (London, 1841), pp. 115-16.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

³⁰ *Idem.*

³¹ Cf. G. W. Trail, "Statistical Sketch of Kumaon", *Asiatic Researches*, XVI (1828), p. 194.

³² *F. D. Pol. Progs.*, 10 October 1823, No. 27.

³³ Moorcroft, *Travels*, I, p. 111.

³⁴ *Punjab Government Records, Delhi and Ludhiana Residency and Agency* (Lahore, 1911), Vol. I, p. 168.

³⁵ *F. D. Pol. Progs.*, 10 October 1823, No. 27.

³⁶ The number of shawl manufactories in 1819, before Ranjit's occupation of Kashmir was 6,000; it rose to 16,000 in 1821. (*F. D. Pol. Progs.*, 10 October 1823, No. 28).

³⁷ *F. D. Pol. Progs.*, 10 October 1823, No. 27.

³⁸ *F. D. Pol. Progs.*, 10 October 1823, No. 28.

³⁹ Moorcroft to Trail, letter No. 3, *Asiatic Journal*, XXI, (Sept.-Dec. 1836), p. 143.

⁴⁰ English Translation of Persian Letters Received from January, 1822 to June, 1822, Register No. 70, pt. I, letter No. 131 (6) B.

⁴¹ English Translation of Persian Letters Received from September 1821 to December, 1821, Register No. 69 A, letter No. 263.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Sohan Lal Suri, *Umdat-ut-Tawarikh*, Daftar III, (Tr.) V. S. Suri (New Delhi, 1961), p. 213.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* See also, Mohammad Ul-Din Fouq, *Mukammal Tarikh-i-Kashmir* (Urdu), (Lahore, 1912), III, p. 39.

⁴⁵ For details about the Dogra conquest of Baltistan, see C. L. Datta, *Punjab History Conference Proceedings*, (Second Session: Oct. 28-30, 1966, Patiala) pp. 143-48.

⁴⁶ Cunningham to Clerk, 14 December 1841: *F.D.S.C.*, 24 January, 1842, No. 20.

⁴⁷ Same to same, 27 May, 1842: *F.D.S.C.*, 22 June 1842, No. 36.

⁴⁸ For a detailed account of this Dogra invasion, see the present writer's article: "Zorawar Singh's Invasion of Western Tibet", *Journal of Indian History*, XLIV. Pt. II, (August, 1966), pp. 529-36.

⁴⁹ Cunningham to Clerk, 14 December 1841: *F.D.S.C.*, 24 January 1842, No. 20.

⁵⁰ Same to same, 27 May 1842: *F.D.S.C.*, 22 June 1842, No. 36.

⁵¹ Erskin to Hodgson (British Resident in Nepal), 20 July 1841: *F.D.S.C.*, 23 August 1841, No. 65.

⁵² *F.D.S.C.*, 27 December 1841, No. 37.

⁵³ Raja of Bashahr to Erskine, 6 September 1841: *F.D.S.C.*, 25 October 1841, No. 23; see also, *Foreign M.sc.* No. 334, pp. 284, 286.

⁵⁴ He was J. D. Cunningham, the future historian of the Sikhs. For details about his this mission, see C. L. Datta, "Zorawar Singh: Political Mission of J. D. Cunningham, 1841-42", *Bengal Past and Present*, Vol. LXXXVIII, Pt. I, (Jan.-June, 1969), pp. 82-89.

⁵⁵ *F.D.S.C.*, 6 September 1841, No. 42.

⁵⁶ Wazir Zorawar Singh to Lahore Government, *F.D.S.C.*, 6 September 1841, No. 43.

⁵⁷ Government to Clerk, 6 September 1841: *F.D.S.C.*, 6 September 1841, No. 44.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *F.D.S.C.*, 1 November 1841, No. 38.

⁶⁰ Bhandari Family Archives Papers, S. No. 329, Register A. Pt. III, Letter dated 19 October, 1841 from Clerk to Maharaja Sher Singh (Persian Mss. Punjab State Archives, Patiala).

⁶¹ Cunningham to Surkhang, 6 July 1842: *F.D.S.C.*, 31 August 1842, No. 65, enclosure No. 1.

⁶² Surkhang To Cunningham, 20 July 1842; *F.D.S.C.*, 5 October 1842, No. 75.

⁶³ Same to same, 16 August 1842: *F.D.S.C.*, 12 October 1842, No. 84.

⁶⁴ *F.D.S.C.*, 24 May 1843, No. 62. K. M. Pannikar (*The Founding of Kashmir State*, London, 1853, P. 85), who quotes *Gulab Nama*, writes that the wording was "we will carry on the trade in Shawl Pusham and tea as before by way of Ladakh".

⁶⁵ *F.D.S.C.*, 26 December 1846, No. 1836.

The Early History of the Coal Mining Industry in India : 1774-1833

THE first attempt to exploit the mineral resources of India, commercially on modern lines, was made by two civil servants of the East India Company. They were John Sumner and Suetonius Grant Heatly.¹ They sent an application with "Proposals for working coal mines and selling coal in Bengal" to the Council of Revenue at Calcutta on the 11th August, 1774. They claimed to have discovered six coal mines in Panchet and Birbhum, and they promised that they would work those mines in cooperation with the local people of the area and for the good of all. Their proposals contained the following²:

- (1) That an exclusive right of working coal mines and selling coal in Bengal and her dependencies for eighteen years, and of supplying coal to the Government at the market price might be granted ;
- (2) In case they discovered any copper, lead or any other mineral, except iron, while engaged in coal mining, they might have the proprietary right over them and that they would pay a fifth part of the produce to the Government. In case iron was found, the Government would be notified to settle the terms of agreement for extraction of the mineral ;
- (3) That they would supply the Government with ten thousand maunds of coal every year (provided sufficient quantity of coal was mined) for five years to come at the price of two Arcot rupees and twelve annas per maund (of 80 sicca weight to the seer), and after the expiry of five years at the market price ; and that they might be allowed to export coal outside Bengal after meeting the requirements of the Government ;
- (4) That some uncultivated land contiguous to the mines might be granted to them because coal seams were extended over a large area with possible faults in the veins ;

- (5) That some contiguous cultivated lands, to the extent of having an annual rent of about six thousand rupees, under the Provincial Council at Burdwan, might be granted to them to induce the labourers to settle permanently in the mining area ; this would prevent the miners from trespassing into Government or private lands, and enable them to produce the necessary articles for themselves locally and to start a market in the area ;
- (6) That they might be allowed to employ European miners for whose good behaviour the firm of Messrs. Sumner and Heatly would give undertaking ;
- (7) In case they failed to extract coal from the six mines they had discovered, they might be permitted to dig other mines in other parts of the Damodar Valley.

The Council of Revenue at Calcutta on persual of the application from Messrs. Sumner and Heatly, approved of the proposals except the one relating to the grant of cultivable land, and found the request made under the seventh article premature. A letter was also sent to the Provincial Council at Burdwan to obtain its opinion on the subject.³

The Provincial Council of Burdwan on the 15th August, 1774, sent the reply which was placed before the Council of Revenue at Calcutta on the 23rd August, 1774. The Provincial Council was ready to accept the proposals of Messrs. Sumner and Heatly provided the latter equitably adjusted the revenue of the lands with the existing farmers ; that they did not force people to work for them ; that they did not set up new markets at such places so as to ruin the existing ones ; that the undesirable elements among the European employees could be removed without difficulty ; and that the Europeans did not lend their support to unruly and defaulting ryots.⁴ On receipt of the report from Burdwan, the Council of Revenue at Calcutta resolved to grant a lease to Messrs. Sumner and Heatly on the terms recommended by the Provincial Council and made the firm subject to the control and decisions of the Provincial Council at Burdwan without any right to appeal, and accordingly passed orders.⁵

Messrs. Sumner and Heatly did not commence their mining operation immediately, for in a letter dated the 30th September, 1774, we find that they addressed the Secretary to the Revenue Department notifying

that they had accepted Redfearne, another civil servant, as a partner, and requested the Secretary that their efforts might be communicated to the Court of Directors in England. On the 4th October, 1774, the Council of Revenue at Calcutta agreed to recognise Messrs. Sumner, Heatly and Redfearne as joint proprietors of the lease, and the Provincial Council was informed. The lawyer to the Government was also asked to modify the lease papers according to this change.⁶ At this period the partners were employed on active service by the Government: Sumner at the head of a Commission, Heatly to quell some serious disturbances at Mirzanagar in the Jessore district, and Redfearne, who was a sleeping partner, was stationed at Nadia.⁷

At length, in September, 1775, John Sumner writing for Messrs. Sumner, Heatly and Redfearne informed the Government that they had brought 2500 maunds of coal from Panchet to Calcutta, and that the consignment was ready for delivery to the Government at two Arcot rupees and twelve annas per maund. The Council of Revenue at Calcutta ordered that the coal might be delivered to the Military Store Keeper at Fort William, and that the latter should report its quality to the Government.⁸ Evidently, the Military Store Keeper did not take any notice of the order, and the coal brought to Calcutta lay where it had been dumped.

In the mean time Sumner was deputed to examine the Hijli Salt Accounts and he remained fully busy there. Heatly was posted as Collector of the united districts of Ramgarh, Palamau, Chota Nagpore and Ghatkondory where he had little time for business speculations.⁹ During his tenure in the united districts of Ramgarh, Palamau, Chota Nagpore and Ghatkondory, Heatly was employed in examining the resources of the country under his charge with a view to its settlement. It is hardly possible that Heatly could have overlooked the coal resources of Ramgarh and Palamau although the unsettled condition prevailing in the districts and the pressure of official duties might have prevented him from devoting any serious attention to that. Nevertheless, he applied for a surveyor to prepare a map of the districts under his charge. Lieut. Ranken was accordingly deputed to carry out the task. The map prepared by Ranken, however, did not mention a word about the existence of coal in the area, and the mention of a coal mine situated on the bank of the river Koil, a little below Palamau, in Rennell's map of South Bihar

strongly suggests that Heatly, who was an intimate friend of Rennell, the then Surveyor General, must have communicated to him the occurrence of coal in Palamau.¹⁰

In November, 1777, both Sumner and Heatly having returned to Calcutta, reminded the Government that the first consignment of coal had been lying for more than two years in Calcutta, and that it might be received into the Government Store.¹¹ The coal was subsequently received and examined at the arsenal of Fort William, and was found of inferior quality. On this report dated the 20th January, 1778, from John Green, Commissary of Stores, the Government ordered that the consignment of coal was to be returned to the proprietors. The coal sent to the Government Store, had been obviously scratched from the surface or from very shallow pits, and the Government advised Messrs. Sumner, Heatly and Redfearne to dig deeper for better quality of coal for which they were promised all possible aid from the Government.¹²

Shortly after this Sumner retired to England. Heatly alone remained in the Presidency. According to the local tradition in the mining area and the tradition in the family of Heatly, trained European miners were employed by the firm but they died of a destructive fever.¹³ As the Government declined to accept coal of the quality sent, the certainty of a regular customer was gone. But at this very time new purchasers suddenly appeared on the spot. In December, 1777, Messrs. Farquhar and Motte¹⁴ addressed the Government for permission to bore cannon and to cast shots and shells for the Government. But the firm of Messrs. Farquhar and Motte did not thrive, and the market it posed to the mining speculation of Messrs. Sumner, Heatly and Redfearne, was closed. Heatly was subsequently appointed the Chief of Tirhut and Purnea, and called away from the scene of his business activity.¹⁵

From this period there is a wide gap in the development process of the coal mining industry. In order to tighten the revenue earning resources Warren Hastings by an order of July, 1781, prohibited the civil servants from engaging themselves in private speculations. The next Governor-General, Cornwallis also discouraged farming and commercial activities of the Europeans in India. He was fresh from the American War of Independence, and his experience was probably that the commercial activities of the Europeans would ultimately lead to their settling in

India and to a demand of self-rule in future.¹⁶ Nevertheless, fresh news of discoveries of coal deposits in Bengal and Bihar started appearing. In 1808 Williamson wrote about "vast abundance of fuel" in Ramgarh and that transport difficulties "occasion that valuable commodity to be neglected. The India Company indeed find it easier to send coal from England, as ballast, to their arsenals abroad, where quantities are occasionally used in fusing metals for casting ordnance."¹⁷

It was a happy coincidence that at this very period the Court of Directors in England found it indeed difficult to send coal to India. They pointed out to the Government in India the enormous expense they had to incur in sending coal from England. They also wanted to know the purpose for which such huge quantity of coal was required annually; whether charcoal available in India would not serve the purpose; and if no remedy could be devised, the Government in India should transfer its ordnance works to England.¹⁸ The Earl of Minto was then the Governor-General, and he drew the attention of the Military Board to the points raised by the Court of Directors.¹⁹

The Military Board replied that adequate supply of charcoal was not available; that an ample supply of pit-coal from England was actually a saving of expense; and that the Court of Directors in its letter dated the 12th July, 1805, had particularly wanted that pit-coal should be regularly indented from England.²⁰ The Board also requested the Government to inform it about the quality and the possibility of the supply of coal from Birbhum, and provide them with a sample of the Birbhum coal for trial at its Agency Yard.²¹

The Government, however, did not consult the previous records, and the Governor-General in Council directed the Collector of Birbhum to procure and forward to the Commissary of Stores about 100 maunds of coal from the district, along with relevant information regarding its quality and source of supply.²² The reason for this inquiry was to ascertain by experiment whether the coal reportedly found in abundance in extensive mines of the Birbhum district and its neighbourhood could be advantageously used as a substitute for the coal annually imported from England.

On the 17th February, 1809, a specimen of Panchet coal, obtained from a mine discovered near the village Chinakuri close to the Damodar

river, and which was stated to be available in abundance, was forwarded to the Military Board.²³ The Collector of Birbhum in his reply said that the coal mine had been discovered in the "zemindaree of Jerrea [Jharia]"; that the beds of coal were superficial and had never been worked, the local people being entirely ignorant of the nature and quality of coal.²⁴ He further stated that the coal was slaty in appearance but burned to white ashes without leaving any cinder ; that it might be transported to Calcutta by road at an expense of eighty-five rupees per hundred maunds but by boats during rains only at twelve rupees per hundred maunds.²⁵ But this specimen of Panchet coal was also scratched from the surface or from shallow pits and was of poor quality. The Military Board this time too found the coal unsuitable for their arsenal. The Government, however, suspended passing any final order on the subject, and resolved on the 6th June, 1809, to depute a professional mining expert at a convenient opportunity to the coal producing areas to make further enquiries into the nature and situation of the coal in question.²⁶

The question of exploring and mining coal remained shelved for next five years. In 1814, under the spirited administration of the Marquis of Hastings, the file on the subject was dusted and placed before the Governor-General. Referring to the suspension of final orders on the subject, the Governor-General stated his anxiety over the question whether the Panchet coal was of a quality suitable for the purposes of the forge ; whether the surface coal was of poor quality in India as in England where some of the pits reached the depth of 600 feet before proper coal was found ; and whether a qualified person could not be sent with necessary equipments to survey the coal producing area as soon as possible.²⁷ The Military Board replied that their information was too limited to permit them passing an opinion. They suggested that the Collectors of Panchet and Burdwan were the suitable authorities to point out the places where search for good quality coal should be made. They also wanted that the person deputed to make the enquiry should examine the possible areas of supply, and submit his plan of arrangements and details for opening coal mines to Government before commencing the actual boring operation.²⁸

It was well-known at this time that Mathew Smith, an eminent ship-wright in Calcutta, used large amount of Panchet coal in his forges.

Government, therefore, asked him to supply the necessary information. On the 14th March, 1814, Smith replied that he had never been to the coal mines in Panchet, but he believed that coal was found in abundance in the area of "Jarrea Cottra [Jharia]", about sixty miles from Bankura; that the coal was collected from the surface and, therefore, too slaty and bituminous to be used effectively in the forge; that he had occasionally come across coal of very good quality, and he was certain that good quality coal could be found if pits were dug deeper. Smith had used Panchet coal along with charcoal in his forges, and had brought several thousand maunds of Panchet coal at eleven annas per maund. He also stated in his reply that he had obtained rails locally manufactured by the iron-smelters of Panchet with the help of the pit-coal of the area.²⁹ At the end Smith recommended one Mr. W. Jones³⁰ of Calcutta to the notice of the Government, as a person conversant with mines and collieries and one "who from his great knowledge of mechanics, could ascertain if better coal would be found lower in the earth".³¹ Jones was accordingly appointed on the 16th April, 1814, on an allowance of Rs. 600/- per month to examine the coalfields and to submit his report and recommendations to the Government.³²

Jones sent his first report on the 20th June, 1814, to G. Dowdeswell, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in which he said, "I saw nothing to indicate the existence of coal in the district of Burdwan: the article sold as Burdwan coal takes its name from the coal you will trace on the 7th section of Rennell's chart beyond Ruggoonauthpoor. It is called by the natives Jurwah, but on the chart Jurigur". This content of the report tallies with Smith's estimated distance of his source of supply from Bankura, as "Juriagur" marked on Rennell's map of the 14th October, 1779, as a town of some size, is exactly sixty miles away from Bankura and corresponds to modern Jharia.³³

Jones in his "Description of the North West Coal District stretching along the River Damooda, from the neighbourhood of Jeria or Juriagerh, to below Sanampur, in the Pergunnah of Sheargarh, forming a line of about sixty-five miles" says about coal mines, and availability of iron ores in the Damodar valley.³⁴ On the 1st December, 1815, he sank the first shaft for coal in this area to a depth of nine feet. At that depth he stopped boring, but gave his opinion that the quality of coal improved

as he went deeper. He compared the coal from this top seam with coal brought from England and found the Jharia coal to be nearly as good as the English coal.³⁵

In his recommendations to Government, Jones stated that coal mines in the Jungle Mahals under the Rani of Burdwan could profitably be worked and transported to Calcutta at a cheap rate. He wanted that mines should be opened on a cheap and simple plan. The coal was to be carried to the bank of the Damodar and loaded in boats during the dry season. On the start of the monsoon when the river was full, coal should be carried by boats as quickly as possible to Amtah (Howrah district) on the Damodar. The empty boats would then return with grain and other articles of use for the miners. He hoped that the transport of coal by boats would provide encouragement to the boat-building industry.³⁶

From the middle of 1816 Jones himself turned into a prospector of coal. He acquired 99 bighas of land for his mining operation and built six large huts to accommodate his staff. This area (around Majhiah) was in the Jungle Mahals in the zamindari of Rani of Burdwan, and Jones took out a "pattah" (deed of lease) in his own name.³⁷ Jones had hitherto been working on a monthly stipend as an agent of the Government. Now it became necessary for him to raise capital to develop his mining project further. He applied for a loan from the Government. In view of the keen interest taken by Lord Hastings, a loan of Rs. 40,000 was granted to him at a low interest (in those days) of six per cent on the security of Messrs. Alexander & Co. of Calcutta. Apart from Jones's own account of the opening of his colliery, no records are available to show the progress of his undertaking during the next few years. But it is certain that by 1820 he had failed in his enterprise, and by 1822 he was dead.³⁸ Although his mining speculations had proved a costly failure, Jones can truly be called the father of the coal mining industry in India, and the direct result of his proposals was the opening of coal mines in the Raniganj³⁹ and the Jharia fields wherefrom regular supply of coal to Calcutta started.⁴⁰

As Jones's venture met with a failure, Messrs. Alexander & Co., as guarantors of the money advanced to him by the Government, had to step in to work his lease. From 1823 they started to have the lease

worked by various agents: by one Mr. Betts in 1823, by Messrs. Jessop & Co. at Damalia also in 1823, and by one Mr. Homfray at Chanch in 1830. By 1835 Messrs Alexander & Co. themselves failed, and the leases held by them passed on to Messrs. Carr Tagore & Co.,⁴¹ the principal partner of which was Prince Dwarkanath Tagore.

The opening of coal mines in those days was chiefly determined by the proximity of river transport, so that the coal could be loaded in boats with minimum handling on the surface and at less cost. This factor caused the first coal mine to be worked along the banks of the Damodar river and the Nunia Jore nullah. The Ajoy river was dangerous for navigation for a long distance, and carting of coal to a safe point on the river for loading in boats was expensive.⁴²

In 1829 the project of establishing steam boats on the Ganges was first broached. But the difficulty was with the regular supply of coal and forming depots of coal at suitable distances along the course of the river.⁴³ It became, therefore, a question of great interest to find out the sources of supplies of coal so situated as to convey the mineral to Calcutta conveniently at a cheap rate. The question engaged a good deal of attention in many parts of the country. A. Princep, Registrar of the Zilla Court of Ramgarh, not only offered a reward to any one who would be successful in discovering new coal mines but himself sent a man to the place near Palamau referred to in Rennell's map as the site for a coal mine, and specimens of coal were brought in. Report of this find excited much interest in Calcutta.⁴⁴

The members of the Asiatic Society of Bengal wanted to engage one Captain Franklin, who had earlier reported his geological findings to the Society, to survey the countryside for coal. They asked for the services of Captain Franklin from the Government, and it was decided that he would be remunerated by the Society. The Government was at first reluctant to allow its army officers for appointment by a public organisation. But finding the general interest and the growing demand for coal in the Calcutta market, Government granted leave of absence for six months to Captain Franklin, and he was issued with separate instruction by the Government to visit, examine and report on the deposits of coal.⁴⁵

On the 24th April, 1829, Captain Franklin submitted his report on the coal mine brought to notice by A. Princep. Soon after this his health

failed, and he proceeded to England. The Asiatic Society maintained that the future of coal industry in India was bright, and that Government should undertake proper search for the precious mineral.⁴⁶

At this time the interest in coal trade had grown so much that individuals in their private capacity began exploring the countryside in search of coal.⁴⁷ Captain Sage, Executive Officer at Dinapore, accompanied by a small party, consisting of his barrack sergeant, a corporal and three men of the 13th Light Infantry, who had been colliers in England, proceeded to Singraha (Palamau) on the 13th January, 1830, to examine the coal resources there. He found that the Singraha coal "makes a most cheerful fire in an open grate".⁴⁸ On the 17th January Captain Sage went to examine the coal mine mentioned in Rennell's map. Although the inhabitants on being questioned showed their ignorance about the occurrence of coal in the area, he found outcrop of coal near the village "Hotar" (Hutar).⁴⁹ Thus the Hutar coalfield was discovered. Captain Sage found the Koel, a tributary of the Sone, navigable during the rainy season; the rocks in the river bed could be removed in the dry season by blasting at a small expense. The Singraha coal, transported on bullock carts, cost him twelve annas a maund at Dinapore, and it was expected that with river transport the coal would not cost more than six annas per maund at Dinapore. Even if carted upto Bandarghat on the Sone and then transported from there by boats during the rains to Dinapore, Captain Sage calculated that the price of coal would not exceed seven to nine annas per maund.⁵⁰

In the early period of its history the coal mining industry faced a number of difficulties. The early entrepreneurs did not have lavish funds for their work. Although the cost of living was extremely cheap and rice sold at Rs. 2/- per maund,⁵¹ the prospectors of coal were always in need of funds and investment was not forthcoming. The administrative and superintending cost of mines was also heavy. The Europeans employed to conduct and supervise mining operations had to be paid high salaries. Consequently, the cost of production was high.⁵² The people of India were ignorant of the modern methods of mining, and the mine-owners had no alternative but to employ European miners and supervisory staff.

The transport of coal to Calcutta was the greatest of all difficulties. Transport by boats was the cheapest. Coal depots were situated at Amtah on the Damodar river, and from there coal was carried by the river Hooghly to Calcutta. But, to reach Amtah one had to use the rivers, the Barakar, the Ajoy and the Damodar which were navigable only during the monsoon and that only for about ten weeks. It, therefore, necessitated the mine owners to engage a large fleet of boats to carry as much quantity of coal as possible during that brief period of ten weeks. For this large stocks of coal had to be built up and sufficient number of boats laden with coal stationed at different ghats on these rivers. The mines, therefore, had to be kept open and working throughout the year. Boats were also hired for the whole year, but had to be kept idle at the ghats for about nine months in a year. Many mine owners possessed their own fleet of boats. It must have been a pretty sight to see when during the monsoon a line of coal boats departing by the Damodar extended frequently six miles in length. Yet, every year a large number of boats with their precious cargoes were lost by falling foul of each other to an irrecoverable depth in the quicksand.⁵³

There was yet another difficulty faced by the coal mine owners. There was no government road of any description in the mining area, and the mine owners had to pay a toll to the landlord through whose estates the carts of coal passed. This factor unnecessarily raised the price of the Indian coal at a time when it had to compete with the English coal at the Calcutta market. In the 1830's the coal mines of Bengal and Bihar were only working, and coal was sold at Calcutta at six annas per maund or about 20 shillings per ton. But the mine owners had to remain satisfied with 16 shillings per ton, the price quoted by the stockists at Calcutta. Then again, the coal before its delivery to the stockists at Calcutta remained exposed to the weather for about a year at the ghats, and for another year in the godowns of the stockists, and by the time it was sold it had lost much of its original properties as fuel. Therefore, the annual demand of the Indian coal was not more than 40,000 tons. And, the necessity of constructing railroad or canal for the supply of such a small quantity of coal did not receive any serious attention of the Government.⁵⁴ The coal mining industry of India had to wait for its full development till the cotton and the jute mills were set up, and the railway was opened

and extended to the coalfields when the railway itself became the largest single consumer of coal in India.

PABITRA BHASKAR SINHA

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ Heatly, S.G.T., "Contributions towards a History of the Mineral Resources of India", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (JASB)*, vol. XI, Pt. II, (1842), pp. 813-15, 822.

There is nothing to indicate that Messrs. Sumner and Heatly had any previous knowledge or experience of mining.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 816.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 816-17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 817-18.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 818-19.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 819.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 823-24; also, Rennell, J., *Map of the Conquered Provinces on the south of Bahar*, published June 24, 1779.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 819; letter dated November 15, 1777.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 820-22.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 822, 834-35.

In 1802 Lieut. Delamain visited the area of mining operations by Messrs. Sumner, Heatly and Redfearne, and in 1814 Jones visited the area, and collected the traditions.

¹⁴ Thomas Motte was the Commissioner of Police in Calcutta and an intimate friend of Warren Hastings. John Farquhar was a well-known merchant of Calcutta. Motte was a sleeping partner. He was brought in the speculation by Farquhar obviously to gain official favour. See, Heatly, S.G.T., "A History of the Mineral Resources of India" (Iron in Bengal), *JASB*, vol. XII, Pt. II, (1843), pp. 545-52.

¹⁵ Heatly, S.G.T., *loc. cit.*, *JASB*, Vol. XI, Pt. II, (1842), p. 823.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 823-24.

¹⁷ Williamson, *Wild Sports in the East*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁸ General Letter dated April 8, 1808.

¹⁹ Heatly, S.G.T., *loc. cit.*, *JASB*, Vol. XI, Pt. II, (1842), p. 824.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 825. Messrs. Sumner and Heatly were of the opinion that they had been unfairly dealt with, and that their consignment of coal was refused because of strong interest made by the coal contractors in England.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 825-26. Letter from the Military Department to the Military Board, dated September 19, 1808.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 825.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 826.

²⁴ Nevertheless, the following place names, Angar-pāthara (fire stone), Barakar (big mine), Damodar (fire in the stomach), suggest that the local people at some period of history knew the nature and properties of coal.

²⁵ Heatly, S.G.T., *loc. cit.*, JASB, Vol. XI, Pt. II, (1842), p. 832, Letter of the Collector of Birbhum to the Board of Revenue, dated June 2, 1809.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Proceedings of the Board of Revenue, Govt. of Bengal, dated June 6, 1809.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 834.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 834-35.

³⁰ In Peterson's Gazetteer of the Burdwan district (1910), W. Jones has been confused with one T. Rupert Jones who wrote paleontological papers. This error has apparently arisen out of a mistake in the publication of W. Jones's reports in the Asiatic Researches of 1829-33 where the author was mentioned merely by the name "Mr. Jones".

³¹ Heatly, S.G.T., *loc. cit.*, JASB, Vol. XI, Pt. II, (1842), p. 835.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ C. B. Taylor of Messrs. Carr Tagore & Co. writing to William Princep from Raniganj in 1838, said that the existence of coal at Jharia had been well-known, "but not worth our looking after owing to the intricacy of navigation".

³⁴ Asiatic Researches, Vol. XVIII, Pt. I, (1829), pp. 163-170.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-66.

³⁶ Gleanings in Science, Vol. I, (1892), pp. 281-86.

³⁷ It is interesting that Jones thought it necessary to take a mining lease from the Burdwan Raj as well. Sumner and Heatly had also been in similar doubt whether the right to minerals vested in the Government or in the zamindars, since they too had taken a "sanad" from the Raja of Panchet in addition to the concessions from the Government, before starting their mining operations in 1774.

³⁸ Evidently this portion of the career of Jones had appeared in Vol. XIX of the Asiatic Researches. But I was unable to obtain a copy of the volume for reference in spite of my best efforts. However, the following references may be consulted.

(a) McClelland, J., Reports of A Committee for investigating the Coal and Mineral Resources of India, Calcutta, 1838, pp. 19, 23 (foot note), 60-64.

(b) Memoirs of the Geological Survey of India, Vol. V, 1866, p. 333.

(c) Gleanings in Science, Vol. I, (1829), pp. 285-86.

³⁹ After the Rani of Burdwan, Rani Joy Kumari. See, Homfray, J., "A Description of the Coal Field of the Damoodah Valley", JASB, Vol. XI, Pt. II, (1842), pp. 728-29.

⁴⁰ Gleanings in Science, Vol. I, (1829), p. 286.

⁴¹ Homfray, J., *loc. cit.*, JASB, Vol. XI, Pt. II, (1842), pp. 727-29.

Messrs. Carr Tagore & Co. was formed on the 4th October, 1834—for details see Samvatpatre Sekaler Katha (in Bengali), edited by B. N. Banerjee, Vol. II, pp. 246-47, and Vol. III, p. 289.

⁴² Homfray, J., *loc. cit.*, JASB, Vol. XI, Pt. II, (1842), pp. 727-28.

⁴³ Gleanings in Science, 1831, p. 217.

The first steamship from England reached Calcutta on the 9th December, 1825. See, Samvatpatre Sekaler Katha (in Bengali), Vol. I, pp. 193-94.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 218-19.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁴⁷ Even the grounds of Fort William was dug for coal without any practical consequence.

⁴⁸ Gleanings in Science, 1831, p. 219.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Banerjee, B. N. (ed), Samvatpatre Sekaler Katha (in Bengali), *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 108.

⁵² Homfray, J., *loc. cit.*, JASB, Vol. XI, Pt. II, (1842), p. 735.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 736-39.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 738-39.

Shahzada Firuz Shah

(Continued from previous issue)

E. FINAL PHASE OF OPERATIONS.

ON the 1st December 1858 the Awadh insurgents were defeated at Biswa 50 miles North-West of Lakhnau, by Brigadier Troup.* Ismail Khan and his followers surrendered, but to avoid being rushed into Nepal Firuz Shah, together with a small force of cavalry and camp followers which increased to over 2,500 persons by the 11th December, turned back and "was making when last heard of for the Ganges intending to cross near Kanauj and enter Bundelcund and join Tantia Tope":¹ "In the Doab the event of the week has been the escape across it of the Shahzada Firuz Shah and his party from Oude . . . Firuz Shah, supported by Mohsun Ali Khan of Mow Shamsabad, one or two leading resaldars of Irregular cavalry and the two fanatic Moulvies Goolab Shah and Lukkur Shah."² As they were crossing the Etawah district Firuz Shah obtained one of his rare 'victories' defeating the Etawah levies and Lieutenant Doyle and Magistrate Hume near Harchandrapur on the 8th December.³ However, it is more than likely that the credit should go to the 'general' of the force at that time, Alidad Khan, a Mewati dacoit of Etawah.⁴ The rebel 'army' consisted largely of groups of about 20-50 members 'from almost every irregular cavalry regiment which had mutinied together with some Afghan mercenaries.'⁵ "On the 17th December Sir R. Napier's force beat and pursued with slaughter the rebels under Firuz Shah",⁶ and when Firuz Shah finally met Tantia Topi at Indargarh on the 13th January 1859 the combined force only amounted to some 2,000 men. After the defeat at Sikar on the 21st January the leaders again split up, Firuz Shah for some time hiding in the Sironj jungles with Rao Sahib (nephew of Nana Sahib). This period of skirmishes, attempts to negotiate favourable surrender terms, and attempts to evade

the encircling British columns in Central India and Eastern Rajputana is described at some length in most standard works but has little importance beyond the spectacular as far as the insurgents were concerned.⁷ The so called 'guerilla tactics' were merely a quest for survival, in a largely apathetic countryside, bearing no strategic relation to the main conflict which had already come to an end, and the involvement of large British forces in the clearing up operation did not materially assist any flicker of rebellion elsewhere. Indeed, it is probable that Firuz Shah went southwards not to engage in such a futile struggle but because of rumours of successes achieved by Tatyā Topi.⁸

Certainly the collapse of his ambitions and the constant desertion by his followers⁹ in no way lessened his pretensions. In January a proclamation appeared at Alwar in his name declaring himself to be the sole heir to the dignities and territories of the House of Timur.¹⁰ His parwana to his erstwhile supporter Wazir Khan respecting conditions to be granted in return for a surrender begins in equally august fashion "from the Lord of the World and mankind, the son of the holy preceptor of the Universe and its inmates, Mirza Muhammad Firuz Shah Bahadur to his confidential servant Maulvi Muhammad Wazir Khan dated 3 Zilkab 1275 (4 June 1859)"¹¹ a factor annoying the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India. "He adopts all the titles of a prince of the House of Timur Shah : . . . he makes many stipulations (Freedom of movement, suitable provision for future maintenance and his personal followers to be allowed to retain their weapons) that are altogether inadmissible."¹²

Certainly there was still considerable anxiety on the part of British officials regarding the problems posed by the rebel concentration in Central India, but it was realised that the situation was now of provincial rather than national importance.¹³ The British successes meant that no new potential source of support for the rebels would be forthcoming, and the significance of the latter was to be measured more in terms of local depredations than of widespread security. The victory of Brigadier Honner at Kushana 10-11 February 1859 effectively dispersed the remaining forces under Firuz Shah and Rao Sahib,¹⁴ and the last recorded action involving Firuz Shah was on August 2nd when Colonel Nott defeated his following of 500 at Putrai (4 miles North-West of Marhūt) in the Balabhat jungle of Saugor.¹⁵ Even more than at Delhi, it was

here in Central India with the defeat of Shahzada Firuz Shah that the Mughal phantom was dissipated.

F. EXILE.

By April 1859 sustained military operations between British troops and insurgents had ceased, and on the failure to secure acceptable terms for a surrender Shahzada Firuz Shah contrived to escape from India, reaching Kandahar in 1860, via Sind.¹⁶ The concluding phase of his career has been melodramatically described as "the hounding to death of another scion of the Mughals, the worthy Firuz Shah, for political reasons";¹⁷ but in reality although British intelligence reports continue to mention his activities no attempt was made to interfere with his movements. Many earlier secondary works assumed that he was last heard of in 1866, either as a beggar in Arabia¹⁸ or as a pilgrim at Kerbela in Persia;¹⁹ it was also believed that he lingered in India until 1864, a fugitive in the forests of Sironj.²⁰ However, from official records it appears he spent several years wandering around Central Asia and Persia.²¹ Whether he was merely hoping for some charity from the Muslim rulers or instead attempting to inspire a pan-Islamic invasion of India remains obscure. Certainly it was not an auspicious time for such adventures. The Amir of Bukhara, whom he visited in 1861 and 1863 (and was presumably the reason for his visit to Samarkand some years later) was fully occupied with the Russian advance and succession wars in the neighbouring state of Khokand. The Shahzada was also an inconvenient guest at Kabul in 1868, whose Amir was easily responsive to British displeasure. While he was at Teheran in 1862 an enquiry was made as to whether a ransom would be paid for his arrest, but the British authorities in India decided he was no longer of sufficient importance to be worth annoying the Persian authorities for.²²

In October 1872 he was reported residing in Constantinople by the British Ambassador. It is evidence of his diminished prestige that he was not linked to the other anti-British Indian Muslims at that time congregating around the Bosphorous. In July a report from Captain Hunter of the Foreign Service stated that Firuz Shah had left for Mecca, and the final chapter was reported by the Acting Consul at Jiddah "Haji Feros bin Sultan Mirza Bakht, well known at Mecca as a member

of the ex-Royal family of Delhi connected with the Mutiny arrived here in June 1875 and died 17th December 1877. It appears that he was in a state of poverty and almost dependent on an allowance made by the High Sheriff of Mecca. He also received assistance from Indian Shaikhs and people. The only relation he has left at Mecca is a wife".²³ Political scheming was probably of little relevance to the Shahzada in the last eighteen months of his life, but in 1878 a bizarre rumour was current in India that Nana Sahib was also in Mecca and had been engaged in plotting with Firuz Shah the previous year.²⁴

His widow, Nawab Tukhlakha Sultan Zamani Begam made an attempt to secure a pension from the Indian government in 1878 but was refused.²⁵ In 1881 the decision was reconsidered and five rupees a month allowed from November 10th.²⁶ On the 31st March the following Lord Ripon sanctioned a monthly pension of 100 rupees ('because the prestige of the Indian government was at stake amongst the inhabitants of Mecca') provided the Begam did not return to Delhi.²⁷

The somewhat eulogistic attitude of Sen²⁸ towards Firuz Shah may appear exaggerated but it provides a welcome corrective to the impression given in many standard works that he was a mere auxiliary in the service of more well-known leaders, first as a cavalry commander subordinate to the Maulvi of Faizabad and the Begam in Awadh, and then junior partner to Tatyā Topi in guerilla tactics in Central India. In this paper an attempt has been made to redress the excessive attention paid to the final disintegration of rebel forces in Central India as relating to the career of Firuz Shah, by giving due significance to the Malwa episode May—November 1857 and by stressing the Muslim and Mughal aspects of his career rather than the more general anti-British and military exploits amalgam usually presented about his life, in the hope of qualifying, if only slightly, the statement made by Ashraf "unfortunately only few details are available about this valiant Moghul prince."²⁹

G. FIRUZ SHAH and THE 'WAHABIS'.

Although it is somewhat extreme to state that the Wahabis in India remained quiescent during the Indian Mutiny because they were in favour of a purely Islamic movement,³⁰ it is true that the Wahabi community as a whole did not identify itself with the revolt of 1857.³¹ Nevertheless the

Wahabi intelligence system and organisation network was used by various rebel leaders notably Bakht Khan in Delhi, and many individual Wahabis engaged in the struggle as part of their continuous anti-British campaign.³² Certain influential Wahabi maulvis were included among the followers of Firuz Shah,³³ especially during his career in Awadh, but their presence attests more to the prestige and piety connected with the Shahzada than to any commitment on his part to the Wahabi movement. The view that in Malwa he was "dependent for support on the Wahabi Pathan contingent who had joined him after being discharged from the service of Maratha princes"³⁴ is, in the face of evidence regarding the nature of his following, only true if the term Wahabi is used in the loosest sense of Muslim zeal. During his post-mutiny wanderings Firuz Shah again came into contact with the Wahabis when he arrived on the Indian frontier at Swat in 1868. He remained sometime with the Wahabi community at Bajkatta,³⁵ and also used Wahabi messengers to send some letters via his brother (Mirza Izad Bakhash) in Delhi in the hope of persuading some "Rajas of the Deccan" to join him by the river Oxus in preparation for an attack on the British.³⁶ This embryonic conspiracy was brought to light by the 1868 government enquiry into the Wahabi movement³⁷ and if nothing else illustrates the optimism and persistence of Firuz Shah in his campaign to drive the British out of India.

APPENDIX 1.

The career of Shahzada Firuz Shah is given added importance and significance by the general incompetency and lack of initiative displayed by the other scions of the Mughal dynasty. The Azimgarh proclamation of September 1857, issued in the name of Bahadur Shah II, optimistically reported extensive activity by the mirzas "several princes belonging to the Royal family of Delhi have dispersed themselves in the different parts of India, Iran, Turan and Afghanistan one of the aforesaid princes at the head of an army from Afghanistan has made his appearance in India".³⁸ Similarly the evidence of Mukund Lal at the trial of the king suggested the existence of a Shiah conspiracy by several princes resident in Lakhnau with a view to obtaining Persian assistance citing a visit by Mirzas Najaf and Bulaki in 1855-6.³⁹ Hakim Ahsanullah corro-

borated the evidence as to this visit⁴⁰ but rejected the idea of any conspiracy,⁴¹ and no valid evidence to prove him wrong has appeared.

In Delhi itself several of the kings, sons and grandsons, and some of the salatin (more distant relatives) received army commands⁴² but the records show little more than military incompetence, mismanagement and extortion of funds, and exceptional dedication, to paperwork on the most trivial of matters.⁴³ Also the princes made various attempts to open negotiations with the British forces⁴⁴ but the only one to have any success was Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh,⁴⁵ whose belated zeal on behalf of the British (somewhat magnified by later accounts) was manifest in his persuading the king to surrender on the 21st September, and three princes on the following day.⁴⁶ It is ironical that this Mirza was the stepfather of Shahzada Firuz Shah,⁴⁷ and it is interesting to compare the rewards of co-operation with those of determined opposition.⁴⁸

The other princes were less fortunate. Mirzas Mughal, Khizr Sultan and Abu Bakr⁴⁹ (two sons and a grandson of the king)⁵⁰ were shot on the 22nd September.⁵¹ Those who were given the dubious benefits of a trial were eliminated equally rapidly.⁵² Several of the princes fled to Lakhnau but the only one whose movements are recorded is Mirza Kuchuk Sultan, a younger son of Bahadur Shah II.⁵³ He accompanied the insurgents under Firuz Shah in Awadh and Rohilkhand,⁵⁴ and was last reported in Nepal.⁵⁵ The British authorities obviously considered the Mirzas as important instigators and directors of the Mutiny⁵⁶ but their largely passive role is emphasised by their eclipse after the fall of Delhi. Only Firuz Shah who had already established his position as an insurgent leader, was able to rival the entrenched regional leaders of revolt. Only one other prince appears as the leader of a district revolt, and this occurred while Delhi was still held by the insurgents, and was in adjacent territory. Hissar was, on the 29th May⁵⁷ "suddenly attacked by a large assemblage of Ranghur villagers whose number I estimate at 2,000 with a good many sepoys of the Hurriana light infantry and 400 sowars, for the most part irregular cavalry, all led by the Shahzada Mahomud Azeem, whose family were in Hissar at that time".⁵⁸ Already on the 26th May a petition for aid had been received at Delhi from Shahzada Mirza Muhammad Azim Bahadur.⁵⁹ In August he was obviously in Delhi since he was ordered on the 6th to go and collect the revenue at

Hissar,⁶⁰ and on the 10th to go to Hansi.⁶¹ On the 23rd there was a report he had been hung after the British capture of Hissar,⁶² but on the fall of Delhi to the British, he is reported there still in command of some troops.⁶³ However, this isolated incident in no way qualifies the fact, that with the exception of Firuz Shah, Mughal leadership was nominal and titular only. The illusion, however, persisted as when in 1944 the Japanese sponsored Indian National Army marched past Bahadur Shah's tomb in Rangoon.

Chronology of events during the "Mutiny" and afterwards connected with career of Shahzada Firuz Shah (referred to as F.S.).

- 1855 leaves Delhi for pilgrimage to Mecca.
- 1857 May—arrives back in India—lands at Bombay.
 - June—arrives at Sitamanu.
 - 1st July—revolt at Indore.
 - July—rebellious Gwalior troops temporarily occupy Mandasur.
 - 17th July—Muslim uprising Haidarabad.
 - August—F.S. at Khachrod, proclaims jihad.
 - 25th August—placed on Masnad at Mandasur by Muslim zealots and out of work mercenaries.
 - 31st August—Dhar mercenaries seize citadel.
 - 26th Sept.—F.S. at Mathura.
 - reported at Gwalior & Dholpur various times from 31st July to October, assumes leadership of Indore rebels from Sa'adat Khan.
 - 5th Oct.—leaves Gwalior to attack Agra.
 - 10th Oct.—defeated by Greathed near Agra.
 - 22nd-31st Oct.—Dhar taken by Durand.
 - 22nd-23rd Oct.—Mandasur rebels attack Jiran.
 - 8th November—retreating Dhar rebels defeat Major Timmins at Mahidpur but are defeated by Major Orr at Rawal on the 13th.
 - 8th-22nd Nov.—Mandasur rebels besiege Nimach. Recalled on 22nd by F.S. because of British advance.
 - 23rd-24th Nov.—Durand defeats Mandasur forces at Guraria.
 - 24th—F.S. evacuates Mandasur with 2,000 followers & escapes to Nangarh.
- 1858 29th Jan.—F.S. escapes from Rathghar fort as it is captured by Sir Hugh Rose. Reported to be at Jhansi sometime between 3rd January and 22nd February. Also reported at Fatehgarh between end November 1857—2nd January 1858.
- February—Moves into Awadh.

- 17th Feb.—Proclamation issued in name of F.S. at Bareilly (Rohilkhand).
 18th March—retreats from Lakhnau.
 12th April—reported at Bareilly.
 22nd April—raid on Muradabad.
 24th April—defeats Rampur troops.
 27th April—retreats from Muradabad.
 5th May—retreats from Mirganj (near Bareilly) on advance of Brigadier Jones.
 5-6th May—Bareilly recaptured by British forces.
 14th May—Joins Begam Hazrat Mahal and Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah in attack on Shahjahanpur.
 24th May—Begam, Maulvi and F.S. retreat from Muhamdi on advance of Campbell.
 10th June—At Bangarmau with Narpal Singh of Ruayya.
 16th July—F.S. and Lakkar Shah attack Mohan and Malha.
 29th July—defeated at Rahimabad by Kavanagh.
- 1858 7th August—Second attack on Mohan.
 11th August—Defeated at Sandila by Kavanagh.
 18th Sept.—With other Delhi princes at Naurangabad (N.W. Khairabad division).
 September—October. In Sitapur with other major leaders.
 9th Nov.—F.S. and Narpal Singh defeated at Minaoli.
 18th Nov.—F.S. and Lakkar Shah at Khairabad.
 1st Dec.—Insurgent army defeated at Biswah. F.S. escapes southwards with 1,500 followers.
 5th Dec.—Crosses Ganges at Akum Ghat.
 8th Dec.—Defeats Itawah contingent under Collector Hume at Harchan-drapur.
 9th Dec.—Crosses the Jumna.
 17th Dec.—Defeated by General Napier at Ranod.
 20th Dec.—Reported at Tehri.
 22nd Dec.—Defeated at Sarpur by Captain Rice.
- 1859 January—Issues proclamation near Alwar.
 13th Jan.—F.S. links up with Taty Topi, and Rao Sahib at Indragarh, combined force 2,000.
 14th Jan.—Insurgents defeated at Daosa (Dewasa) by Brigadier Showers.
 21st Jan.—Defeated at Sikar (Jaipur state) by Holmes. Rebel forces split up.
 10-11th Feb.—R.S. and F.S. defeated at Kushana by Brigadier Honner. Escape into Sironj jungles.
 19th Feb.—Send emissaries to negotiate terms.
 1st March—F.S. and R.S. at Paron.

- 5-6th April—Rebel forces dispersed by columns under Colonels de Sails and Rich, and Captain Bolton at Tinsia.
 2nd June—F.S. back in Sironj jungles.
 4th June—Sends Parwana to Wazir Khan (supporter who had surrendered in February) concerning terms for surrender.
 14th June—F.S. at Guna.
 2nd August—F.S. with 500 followers in Balabhat jungles near Saugor.
 1860—Reaches Kandahar via Sind.
 November—to 1861 in Bukhara.
 1862—in Teheran.
 1863—Reported in Harat and Bukhara.
 1868—Joins Wahabis at Bajkatta near Swat.
 1868—Kabul—Badakhshan—Samarkand.
 1872 October—Reported at Constantinople.
 1875 June—Arrives in Mecca.
 1877 17th December—Dies in Mecca.
 1881 November—Widow given pension by India Government.

TABLE I. TO ILLUSTRATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRUZ SHAH & MIRZA ILAHI BAKHSH.




TABLE 2. TO ILLUSTRATE OTHER MUGHAL PARTICIPANTS




TABLE 3. THE SONS OF BAHADUR SHAH II

Muhammad Zahir-ud-din, Mirza Mughal, Commander-in-Chief, May-July 1857, murdered 22 Sept. 1857

Abu'l Hasan Muhammad, Colonel of the 20th N. I. Regiment

Khizr Sultan, Colonel of an Infantry Regiment murdered 22 Sept. 1857

Bakhtawar Shah, 19th May 1857 Colonel of the 74th Regiment shot 13 Oct. 1857

Kuchuk Sultan, Colonel of an Infantry Regiment in Bareilly Jan-April 1858 in Nepal, by 1860

Shah Abbas, exiled to Rangoon with his father

Gawan Bakht, Wazir May-Sept. 1857 surrendered, died in Rangoon 1884

In the footnotes all works are referred to by the name of the author, with the exception of the following:-

Parliamentary Papers: P.P.

Bhargava & Rizvi—The Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh: U.P.

Punjab Government Records: P.G.R.

District Gazetteers: D.G.

Certain books used for only one reference are given in full in the relevant footnote and not mentioned in this bibliography.

1. Documents:

- (i) Parliamentary Papers 1857-1858 Volume XLIV
The Mutinies in the East Indies Parts I, III & IV
- (ii) Punjab Government Records 1911
Vol I: Delhi Residency & Agency Records 1807-'57
Vol VIII: Mutiny Correspondence Parts I & II
- (iii) Selections from the records of the Government of the Punjab and its dependencies New Series Vol. 7
The Trial of Bahadur Shah II 1858 (1870)
- (iv) G. W. Forrest—Indian Mutiny—Selections from Papers, Despatches etc. presented in the Military Department of the Government of India Volume 4 Central India, 1912
- (v) W. Muir (edited by W. Coldstream)—Indian Mutiny, 1857
North West Provinces Intelligence Records 2 Volumes, 1902
- (vi) M. L. Bhargava & S. A. A. Rizivi—The Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh—Source Material 6 Volumes 1957-'61 particularly
Volume II: Awadh 1857-1859 (1958)
Volume III: Bundelkhand & adjoining territories 1857-9 (1959)
Volume V: Western Districts & Rohilkhand 1857-9 (1960)

2. Reference Works:

- E. de Zambaur—Manuel de Genealogieet de Chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam (1927)
- T. W. Beale (ed. by H. G. Keene)—Oriental Biographical Dictionary 2nd Edition (1894)
- C. E. Buckland—Dictionary of Indian Biography (1906)
- G. L. Chopra (Editor)—Chiefs & families of note in the Punjab Volume I (1940)
- Burgess—The Chronology of Modern India 1494-1894 (1913)
- C. E. Luard—Bibliography & Chronology of the Central India Agency (1908)
- Mitra (Editor)—Press List of the Mutiny Papers 1857 (1921)
- District Gazetteers United Provinces, 1910-11
- District Gazetteers Punjab—Volume 4 Delhi, Volume 13 Hissar (1883-4)

3. Books on particular aspects of the 1857-9 period:

- W. Forbes Mitchell (ed. by M. Edwardes)—The Relief of Lucknow (1962)
- T. Lowe—Central India during the rebellion 1857-8 (1860)
- C. T. Metcalfe (translator)—Two native narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi (1898)
- C. L. Showers—A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny (1888)
- K. L. Srivastava—The Revolt of 1857 in Central India-Malwa (1966)

4. General studies of the period 1857-9:

- Charles Ball—History of the Indian Mutiny 2 volumes 7 parts (1858-9)
 S. B. Chaudhuri—Civil Rebellion in the Indian Mutinies 1857-9 (1957)
 S. B. Chaudhuri—Theories of the Indian Mutiny 1857-9 (1965)
 M. Edwardes—Battles of the Indian Mutiny (1963)
 G. W. Forrest—History of the Indian Mutiny reviewed and illustrated from original documents. 3 volumes (1904-1912)
 P. C. Joshi (editor) Rebellion 1857—A Symposium especially K. M. Ashraf "Muslim Revivalists and the revolt" (1957)
 J. W. Kaye & G. B. Malleson—History of the Indian Mutiny 6 vols. New Edition (1897)
 J. J. MacLeod-Innes—The Sepoy Revolt—A Critical Narrative 2nd Edition (1897)
 G. Macmunn—The Indian Mutiny in Perspective (1931)
 R. C. Majumdar—History of the Freedom Movement in India Vol. I (1962)
 R. C. Majumdar—The Sepoy Mutiny & the Revolt of 1857 (2nd Ed.) (1963)
 T. Rice-Holmes—History of the Indian Mutiny 5th Edition (1898)
 S. N. Sen—Eighteen fifty seven (1857)
 E. Thompson—The Other Side of the Medal (1925)
 V. D. Savarkar—The Indian War of Independence, Edition of 1947

5. Other works used:

- Q. Ahmad—The Wahabi Movement in India (1966)
 J. Dickinson—Last Counsels of an unknown Counsellor (1877)
 H. M. Durand—Sir Henry Durand Life & Letters 2 Voles (1883)
 H. Fraser—The Nizam—Our faithful ally (1864)
 S. C. Macpherson (ed by W. Macpherson)—Memorials of Service in India (1865)
 H. D. Napier—Lord Napier of Magdala (1927)
 J. Raines—The 95th Derbyshire Regiment in Central India (1900)
 E. Thompson & G. T. Garrat—The Rise & Fulfilment of British Rule in India (1934)
 E. Thompson—The Making of the Indian Princes 1943
 T. H. Thornton—General Sir Richard Meade & the feudatory states of Central and South India.

ROLF H. THORPE.

* Ball p. 546-7, U.P. V p. 807-9 (see footnote 2).

¹ U.P. Vol. III p. 663 Letter 5053 6th Dec. 1858. Secretary to Govt. to Deputy Commissioner at Hamirpur.

² U.P. Vol. V p. 807-9 Narrative Events Etawah week ending 11th Dec. 1858.

³ Forrest (Hist. Ind. Mut.) Vol. III p. 324. (& see footnote 2).

⁴ U.P. V. p. 820 Letter Magistrate Hume to Sec. Govt. NWP Dec. 12th, 1858.

⁵ U.P. Vol. V p. 820 in letter Humie (Magistrate Etawah) to Sec. Govt. NWP Dec. 12th, 1858.

⁶ U.P. Vol. V p. 835 Telegraphic Message Macpherson (Gwalior) to Reade etc. 18th Dec. 1858.

⁷ Kaye & Malleson V pp. 251-263, Sen pp. 373-7, Forrest (Hist. Ind. Mut.) Vol. III pp. 611 f. Edwardes (Passim) etc. Showers p. 140. See also chronology Appendix to this paper.

⁸ Kaye & Malleson V p. 250.

⁹ In February Pir Zahur Ali, Maulvi Wazir Khan and Abdul Sattar Khan of Jaura (all long term supporters surrendered. The only important early ally left by April 1859 was the Ambapani Nawab. 29th February 300 Muslim cavalry (from Bareilly & Kanpur) in his service surrendered.

Forrest III p. 611 f. U.P. Vol. III p. 666 Showers Meywar Agent. 5 March 1859.

¹⁰ Ball pp. 573-4.

¹¹ U.P. III p. 669 & Sen p. 377.

¹² U.P. III p. 669 Col. R. Shakespear (Agent Central India) 15th June 1859.

¹³ U.P. III p. 525-7 28 Feb. 1859. Plowden, Commissioner Nagpur to Under Secretary Foreign Dept. Govt. India referring to "21 Dec. 1858 probability of a force under Firuz Shah crossing the Nerbudda East of Hoshangabad"—"Undoubtedly this province was most concerned and most threatened by the movement of a force under Tantia Tope and Rao Sahib across the Nerbudda and attempts by forces under Adil Muhammad Khan (the surviving Ambapani Nawab) and afterwards under Firuz Shah to follow it and effect a junction with it".

¹⁴ Forrest (Hist. Ind. Mut.) III p. 612 f.

¹⁵ U.P. III Letter F 568 Punkey Commissioner of Jhansi (Police Report 1859) to Sec. Govt. N.W.P. sent 8th June 1860.

¹⁶ Sen p. 379. U.P. III p. 661 Extracts Notes. Political & Secret. Dept. Ind. Office 24 May 1877.

¹⁷ H. Mukerjee 'India's struggle for freedom' p. 57 (3rd Ed. 1962).

¹⁸ Thompson (Other Side) p. 104. Beale p. 138 (reported in Arabia by Haidarabad Arab merchants).

¹⁹ Buckland p. 146 Kaye & Malleson Vol. V p. 253 ("in Kurbahla").

²⁰ Thompson & Beale (as footnote 3).

²¹ U.P. III pp. 661-671 Sen. p. 379.

²² above is based Extracts in U.P. III. 661-671 & on Sen 378-380.

²³ Letter 7th Sept. 1878 from Beyts (Acting Consul Jiddah) to Political Resident Aden U.P. III p. 670.

²⁴ P. C. Gupta Nana Sahib & the rising at 'Caunpore' p. 202.

²⁵ Foreign Political Proceedings B. Jan. 1879 44-6).

²⁶ Foreign Dept. Proc. Financial B. Nov. 1881 28-30) U.P. III.

²⁷ Foreign Dept. Proc. Fin. B. April 1882 32-3) p. 671.

²⁸ espec. Sen p. 380-1.

²⁹ Joshi/Ashraf p. 97 footnote 55.

³⁰ Majumdar Freedom Movement I p. 278.

³¹ Sen. pp. 245-8.

³² Ahmad passim. Joshi/Ashraf 82-92.

³³ U.P. V pp. 583-4 Office Memo. Assist. Sec. W. Gov. N.W.P. 27th May 1859. Copies of Trial of Kutub Shah—Wahabi (teacher at Bareilly College) "he did accompany FS's force on its march to Moradabad as deputy".

³⁴ Joshi/Ashraf pp. 86-7.

- ³⁵ Ahmad p. 310.
- ³⁶ Ahmad p. 286 (letter 52, 13 Feb. 1869. Dep. Inspect. Gen. Police to Inspect Gen.).
- ³⁷ Ahmad p. 286 & 293.
- ³⁸ Ball Vol. II p. 630.
- ³⁹ Trial B. S. II. p. 149.
- ⁴⁰ Trial B. S. II. p. 139.
- ⁴¹ Trial B. S. II. pp. 246-9.
- ⁴² Trial B. S. II Diary of Chuni Lal p. 168, & Mainuddin (Metcalf) Nat. Naw) p. 58 give 18th May. U.P. V p. 969 evidence of Gulab gives 15th May.
- ⁴³ cf. Native Narratives & evidence at Trial. Also Press list Mutiny Papers p. 183-193 and 224-9. Also p. 101—Mirza Khizr Sultan and pressure on the bankers. p. 3. Mirza Mughal dismissed as general 26th Aug. p. 68. No. 765 "Adjutant Ganga asks whether to obey C. in. C. or Mirza Qaumas". etc.
- ⁴⁴ Muir I pp. 144-5 27th Aug. "Mr. Greathed has received two or three messages from the Shahzadas tendering their services and vowing a strong attachment to our cause.
- ⁴⁵ Muir I pp. 141-2 "Greaded on the 17th August received a letter from Shahzada Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh asking what he could do for us". Also Press List Aug. 27th. p. 10. No. 36 & Jivan Lal 24th July 'M.I.B. suggested negotiations'.
- ⁴⁶ Punjab Chiefs I. Pp. 1-2, Mainuddin (Metcalf) p. 71. Rice Holmes pp. 382 & 386. Sen pp. 95-6, 102 & 9.
- ⁴⁷ Buckland p. 146.
- ⁴⁸ Ilahi Bakhsh was made head of the Mughal family, given a pension of 22,830 rupees p.a., 114, 376 compensation, in 1861 a jagir worth 5,000 p.a. and in 1866 additional revenue of 2,226 p.a. Punjab Chiefs Vol. I. p. 2. The widow of Firuz Shah a belated grant of 100 rupees per month.
- ⁴⁹ Abu Bakr was made 'King for a day' by the sepoys because of their grievances against Bahadur Shah. (Diary Jivan Lal May 17th).
- ⁵⁰ Some sources say A—B was a son of Mirza Mughal (e.g. Zambaur) but it is more likely he was a son of the late heir-apparent. W. H. Fitchett Tales of the Great Mutiny p. 338. J. Cave Browne Punjab & Delhi 1857 II footnote p. 193.
- ⁵¹ C. J. Griffith (ed. H. J. Yonge) Narrative of the Siege of Delhi (1910) p. 203.
- ⁵² Mirzas Bakhtawar Shah & Mandu, sentenced 12th Oct. shot 13th. Muir I p. 199, U.P. V p. 1017. P.P. 44 1857-8 part III p. 192 Narrative Events. Dec. 1857 Delhi "24 inferior members of the Royal Family executed 20th November by order of Military Commission before whom tried". cf. Sen. p. 111 & footnote 21 Mirzas hung.
- ⁵³ according to Andrews, "Zakaullah of Delhi" he fled to Jaipur.
- ⁵⁴ U.P. V p. 434. Bulletin 13th April 1858.
- ⁵⁵ U.P. IV p. 289. Evidence of Meghar Singh 27th Nov. 1860 at Banaras Court.
- ⁵⁶ P.P. 44 1857-8 part IV p. 901. Narrative sent Jan 9th 1858. "Some of the most notable rebels including many members of the royal family have been executed. Also evident is importance attached to news of their capture "The Thannahdar of Husseerpore reports he arrested last night (28th May) Dara Shikuh & Haji Shikuh, 2 princes of the Delhi family. U.P. V p. 526 P.P. 44 1857-8 part IV p. 162.
- ⁵⁷ N. Chick Annuals p. 719 (quoted in Chaudhuri Civil Reb. p. 237).

⁵⁸ P.G.R. VIII part I says 19th August p. 435-6 D. G. Hissar 1883/4 emphasises role of Muslim population, Rajput Bhatti tribes & Haryana light infantry.

⁵⁹ Trial B.S. II page 176.

⁶⁰ Diary Jivan Lal (in Metcalfe).

⁶¹ Press List Bundle 16 p. 4 No. 4.

⁶² Diary Jivan Lal (in Metcalfe).

⁶³ Journal of Ahsanullah quoted p. 216-7 T.G.P. Spear Twilight of the Mughals (1951).

Revolt of Sobha Singh : A Case Study

(Continued from previous issue)

THE question that crops up is why romantic legends regarding Sobha Singh's end had grown up when the contemporary Europeans could ascertain the actual facts from as far off places as Chandernagore and Chutanuttee. Also, there is an interesting fact that the legend was started by one of the historians who was connected with the official class and the nobility, writing within a relatively short span of time after the event. It should be noted here that the legend in which the sexual passions of the fallen rebel predominated occurred in the cases of other rebels of this area, notably Raja Pratapaditya around 1612 and Raja Sitaram Ray nearly a century later, i.e. even a few years after the episode of Sobha Singh. Both of these rebel leaders have been accused of sexual excesses, which have been cited by posterity, as one of the factors of their downfall.⁴¹ This could be an attempt of the Hindu society to absorb their wayward sons into the cosmic order by explaining their incongruities of rebellion, as well as their departure from the traditions, on which rested the caste distinctions and the superiority of certain groups. A rebellion, particularly of lowcaste origin and with Muslim participation, as had been seen in these three cases, tended to obliterate these divisions and therefore should, according to orthodox views, be taken back into the fold by pointing out certain processes of hidden laws over which the all-powerful rebels had no control and to which they must succumb in the long run—an inevitability over which individual initiative would be bound to falter. Or, could this be a severe criticism by the orthodox section of the society who saw their menace in the success of the rebels?

On the other hand, from the point of lower classes themselves, the glorification of these rebels could be seen by the fact that legends were circulated about their mysterious deaths or disappearances to show that they were beyond the ordinary run of events. Alternatively, it might show a tendency among the low class, ordinary people to create a stage for

their reappearance and revival, reflecting the desire to go back into a happy past, independent of vexations and oppressive authority, and under the leadership of some one with whom they have shared, to some extent, the zeal of power and authority. This loyalty to the local leaders is essentially secular in nature and should not be equated with messianic movements such as the Mahdi movement, where the religious bond dominates, thereby preventing the participation of the major groups in the upheaval. The chief feature, in these movements, lies in making an image of public organisation where nobility is not based on either blood or money and a challenge is thrown to the centre with its exuberant appeal of independence. In the case of Sobha Singh, however, this appeal was very limited due to the shortness of his career, unfortunately cut short by an accident.

Maha Singh (not Himmat Singh as stated by Sarkar), new general of the rebels, crossed the river around 26th July 1696. On 30th July, he tried to force the passage through Bandel, where the Portuguese had their quarter and they resisted the effort. As a result, Maha Singh by-passed Bandel and arrived before the fort of Hughly on 31 July 1696.⁴² According to Salimulla, the faujdar of West Bengal, Nurulla Khan, a rich merchant, being afraid, shut himself in the fort and asked help from the Dutch while Sarkar writes that the faujdar, without giving battle, escaped at night. The English letter, however, clearly mentioned that the faujdar of Hughly (also the commander of the fort) was so overcome with fear that he himself opened the fort and invited the rebels to enter.⁴³ In any case, it would be a strange thing to see, that a formidable fort like Hughly, full of goods and money, yielding to a handful of rebels, without any fight, particularly at a time when the attack was expected, reminding us of a similar incident at Surat when Sivaji looted it without any resistance at all. The panic of the local population, including rich merchants and wealthy nobles, who took refuge in the Dutch town of Chinsurah might well betray the attitude of people towards the Mughal authority. But the reason of the panic showed that these rich people were afraid lest they might fall a victim to those 'savage hordes' of the countryside—the low class 'chasas'—thus revealing the huge gap that existed between different classes and areas—a gap that was fostered by sophisticated urbanity of of Muslim culture with terraced houses, watery gardens and a different rhythm of living—an appalling gap of rural and urban India in

the late 17th century.⁴⁴ Nearly fifty years later Maratha hordes showed that these panics were not without foundation.⁴⁵ Under these circumstances, one would be tempted to note the fatalistic apathy mingled with hopelessness of an indifferent people towards the tottering empire in its last days of decadence.

From the French and the English letters, it is clear that the Dutch sent 300 soldiers (Indonesians referred to in the document as Macassars) to relieve the fort, while their ships moved up and bombarded them. The rebels possessing a very small force (around 100 horse and 200 or 300 soldiers) fled through the backdoor which the Dutch had deliberately kept free for them.⁴⁶ This lip service to the rebels, by allowing them to escape, revealed the Dutch policy of maintaining the opposition to the Mughals, and it was deliberately fostered by other European companies, namely the English and the French. This attracts our attention to the complexities of the situation and relations between various powers.

The rebels, after successfully plundering the city, retired in good order with a few wounded, carrying with them 60 to 70 thousand rupees of the Customs, which the Mughals had kept in a secure place. The rebels retired just behind the line of fire towards some houses, not very far from the fort.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, a detachment of the rebels, about 100 horsemen, attacked a village near Govindapur. The English, so far maintaining a cordial relation with the rebels and not willing to break that friendship, raised their flags in their factories while some neighbouring zamindars vigorously attacked the rebels and pushed them with heavy losses to the rebels. Although the English help to these zamindars was concealed, thus not jeopardising their good relations with the rebels, the news of their help reached the Nawab who sent them presents.⁴⁸

The retiring rebels from Hugly attacked another Mughal post (not named in the documents) on 25th August 1696 in which they were repulsed with loss and were pushed very close to the French factory at Chandernagore. The rebels, now furious with losses, set fire to some villages near Chandernagore, which would have engulfed the French factory, had not the French come out of the fort to dislodge them. According to French letters, if the French had not defended their fort, the rebels would have taken it by assault. The French had two killed on

their ship "Acueil", anchored near by, and one seriously wounded.⁴⁹ In the absence of any detailed account of the battle, we might conclude that it must have been a very close one, the deciding factor was the ship, which could fire from a safe distance. This attack of the rebels on the French factory without any provocation showed the lack of proper communication between two levels of command of the rebels and a contradiction of the friendly policy with the foreigners laid down by the higher command. As the revolt would progress, this gap was to widen still further.

In these four successive actions, the absence of Mughal arm, excepting in one case, was complete. It was clear that only the armed and active interference of the foreigners would save the authority. One could almost read the future of Mughal rule in the eighteenth century from these haphazard actions, where only a handful of determined rebels could seize the most important Mughal post and obliterate the authority.

On 26th August 1696, the Dutch sent representation to the French and the English companies with a view to conclude a pact or alliance against the rebels and to advise the rebels to resist their attacks against the companies. The English and the French accepted the offer, but the Dutch did not follow it up.⁵⁰ It would be difficult to hazard an opinion on the reasons of the Dutch offer. They might have been afraid after the attack of the rebels on 25th on a Mughal post. Another reason, which tallies better with our earlier interpretation, could be that the Dutch did not want to crush the rebels but merely to stave off the attacks in their own factory by frightening them. That the Dutch were expecting another attack was certain, as Martin wrote that the Dutch fortified their factory with a strong pallisade and guns. This once again showed that the effective power had slipped from the Mughal hands as the rebels had the initiative and that this power was shared by the rebels and the European companies.

Throughout September, the rumour of a much stronger attack on Hugly spread. There were several skirmishes without any tangible result as the rebels failed to retake Hugly which proved finally one of the factors of their downfall.

At this time, however, this failure did not show itself. The rebels, on the contrary, seemed to be acquiring more power as they occupied

the rural areas and seemed to plunder 'at depths' or imposed taxes on the peasants.⁵¹ This looting, burning and plunder of the environs of Hugly, probably due to a sense of frustration, alienated the merchants and other classes more and more, leading to the cancellation of the plan of normalisation which the high command of the rebels wanted. But this "imposed" plunder, probably destined to frighten the foreign companies and the Mughal government, reflected the contradiction which seemed to emerge in the revolt.

The English, on their part, began to understand more clearly that their friendship with the rebels would not work; as a matter of fact they were expecting an attack on their own factory. Thinking that their present forces were not sufficient, they built a strong and high wall and demanded 8 or 10 guns around 14' or 16' which were very difficult to "procure" there.⁵² As we know, at the end of 17th century medieval India, a cannon gave a sense of security because not only it helped to keep the rebels at a distance but also it gave a kind of superiority in technique which the "unruly mob" was not supposed to possess.

The projected attack materialised in case of the French, when a detachment of soldiers, led by a captain, advanced very close to the French factory at Chandernagore, forcing the French to open up their guns and send a detachment of their soldiers to resist. At the same time, the French complained to the commander of the troops (probably Maha Singh, but not named here) and the rebels promptly withdrew.⁵³

Towards the end of November 1696, the rebels put fire to several different places around Chutanuttee, established a few posts and menaced the English with very "scurvy letters". The English also got information from the Armenian merchants that the rebels were planning to attack the Thanna fort, opposite Calcutta. The English sent a frigate to the fort, more to save themselves than to protect the Mughal fort. This discouraged the rebels so much that they did not advance any further.⁵⁴

Having failed in this zone, the rebels proceeded to the areas where there were no foreign companies to help the local effort of resistance. They suddenly appeared before Murshidabad, completely surprised the local garrison, looted and plundered the city and what was more important, prevented a junction of the remnants of the Mughal forces with those of Zuberdust Khan, son of Ibrahim Khan, who was coming with

an army from Dacca.⁵⁵ This brilliant manoeuvre, was crowned with success by annihilating part of the Mughal forces and keeping them isolated, reflected at least the effectiveness of the military intelligence, since the rebels must have heard of the move of Zubberdust Khan, and increased the popularity of the rebels among the local chieftains. This could be seen from the effective disposition of the rebel troops, which had now increased to 10,000 horse and an equal number of infantry. This was due to the fact that some local zamindars had joined the revolt, while the prospect of plunder must have been too tempting, by sending as many as 1000 horsemen against Zubberdust Khan.⁵⁶

It would be improper to assert, however, that these zamindars were against the Mughal Empire. It seemed that they were merely opportunists trying to reap the harvest at the right time. With the progress of the revolt, we would find this attitude repeating itself. The equal number of infantry and cavalry would probably suggest the policy of occupation with higher mobility in opening up areas, in contrast to the policy of the Marathas who came four decades later with only mobile columns of horsemen intent on plundering and retreating in time, thus averting a direct confrontation with the main force of the enemy. The rebels, on the contrary, had both the alternatives and we would see which course they would take.

Basing on Salimulla, Sarkar stated that the commander of the troops of this victory was the Pathan, Rahim Khan. This might be true, but we hear of the Pathans for the first time in the English letter of 19th October 1697. This would suggest that the Pathans joined after the fall of Murshidabad when the morale of the rebels was at its height and the prospect of plunder brighter than ever. In one victory, the rebels had become masters of a vast territory, which gave them an income of Rs. 60 lakhs a year. This permitted the rebels to recruit a large number of followers to whom they paid double the sum.⁵⁷ From the military point of view, the rebels had only two main forts to reduce—Hughly and Thanna—while Dacca remained ungarded with the Mughal force positioned halfway between the capital and Murshidabad. Naturally a strong rumour of an immediate attack on Dacca was circulating, with whose fall the Mughal position would be very precarious in Bengal.

While the route to Dacca was still open, the merchants, expecting

the attack and the consequent plunder, refused to send money and goods to Dacca. This tendency to plunder, appeared from the fact that at Murshidabad the rebels plundered Rs. 110,000 from the treasury of the city which profoundly surprised the Nawab. The rebels then sent a detachment of soldiers to Rajmahal, a mint-town of the Mughals. The detachment appeared very close to Rajmahal about 25th November.⁵⁸

At the same time, another strong detachment led by Maha Singh appeared before Cassimbazar, another open city full of merchandise. But the merchants escaped plunder by paying a huge ransom. The rebels then blocked the Dutch factory and asked to have a few lakhs of rupees, demanding at the same time, that in their next attack on Hugly, the Dutch should be neutral.⁵⁹ The absence of plunder, here, showed unmistakably the policy of higher command, as Maha Singh was present here, and the wide gap that existed between the levels of command.

By 9th December, the rebels fortified their position at Murshidabad and increased their force to 12,000 horsemen and 30,000 infantry,⁶⁰ confirming once again their policy of occupation. Their power was so established that the merchants now requested their permission to reopen commerce, even while the English were full of apprehensions as several small guardposts of the rebels had plundered their merchandise. By 30th December, 1696, the merchants had obtained the flag and the 'Dastak' of the rebels for free passage of their boats upto Hugly while the rebels assured the merchants of Cassimbazar their protection for continuing the commerce.⁶¹ The revolt was gradually getting normalised while two authorities were legally operating in Bengal with effective power gradually passing into the hands of the rebels.

About 16th January 1697 (and not in March 1697 as stated by Sarkar) Rajmahal was sacked by the rebels who got 20 lakhs of rupees. They then plundered their own governor, Gujarat Khan. But it seemed that the rebels were now finding it difficult to procure arms and ammunitions as they blocked the English factory at Rajmahal and demanded arms and powder from the two English agents² Sheldon and Teshmaker; they, unable to comply with the rebel demands, were manhandled and imprisoned. The rebels finally plundered the factory. The information reached the English at Chutanuttee around early March and they attempted to effect

their freedom by writing to the widow of Sobha Singh, who was supposed to have influence over Rahim Khan and the Pathans.⁶² It seemed that at this moment, the Pathans were controlling the revolt, keeping aside their general, Maha Singh. This had important consequence in shaping the course of the revolt and determined its later character, since the Pathans, as we would see later, had only one objective—to plunder as much as possible in the shortest span of time. Most of them, being adventurers and vagabonds, they wanted to make hay while the sun was shining.⁶³

According to Salimulla, Rahim Khan took the title of "Shah" (in imitation of the Mughals?) obviously to legalise his position as a collector of revenue. This assumption of title, for the sake of a cloak of legality, would be an interesting pointer to the psychology of the peasants in medieval India, where they would always point, after the fall of the rebel to the fact that they had paid only to a king—and had, in effect, only approved the transfer of power that had effectively changed hands. Or, would this reflect the surging difficulties of the revolt—difficulties of money, ammunition etc., whose supply would continue only in commerce and trade, in the normalisation of the revolt? In the absence of this normalisation, there remained only one course—to get as much money and arms, as quickly as possible, namely, by plunder. Since they were paying more than double to the soldiers, they had to get money quickly and in a very short time, with as little overhead operative investments as possible, and without alienating the countryside, in contrast to the Marathas, who would hover around, almost the entire crop season, carry on unrestrained plunder, and only then go back.

By 23rd January 1697,⁶⁴ the rebels appeared a second time before Cassimbazar and plundered it, a fact which Sarkar, basing himself on Salimulla, did not mention. They once again blocked the Dutch and the French factories and demanded Rs. 40,000 from the first and Rs. 9000 from the second, which did not reflect the relative prosperity of the two companies. The French agent, Fonneville, had already fled by 16th January 1697 leaving a French and an Indian, who categorically refused to pay on the simple ground that they did not have the money. They, however, agreed to write to Chandernagore which did not satisfy the

rebels, who whipped them. The Dutch had 12 or 14 men in their factory who remained blocked in the house.

The plunder of Cassimbazar, despite the ransom of Rs. 40,000 and the promise of the rebel chief, unmistakably showed the tendency to plunder and the increasing difficulties of the revolt. The two principal Mughal forts, along with the capital, remained safe while the Mughal forces were increasing day by day. It was becoming clear that the rebels would try to pin down the Europeans in their factories and run through other areas, which remained undefended. With this object in view, the rebels maintained a detachment close to Chandernagore and launched a vigorous attack against the Portuguese at Bandel, obviously with the ulterior aim of attacking Hughly. The Portuguese resisted bravely and repulsed the attack with heavy loss to the rebels, thus earning the gratitude of countless men and women, whose children they might have taken as slaves not a long time ago. It would be difficult to venture an opinion, or search for reasons why the rebels did not by-pass Bandel, which they had done, the previous time. It is possible that the rebels decided to knock off the foreign powers before dealing with the Mughals, or thought they would not be able to hold Hughly with the Portuguese bastion so close at their heels. If such had been their plan, it was doomed to be a failure. The foreign companies were almost secure in their main factories with ships ready to blast off anything within its range and also had wide rooms to fall back on. Moreover, the European companies were not interested in the "sovereignty" of other areas, except their immediate surroundings. As a result they could always bring their resources within their well-protected factories and hold the rebels for months with the sea route open to them. The value of the seapower, with improved means of technology, begins to show its effectiveness, against a landpower.

After the fall of Rajmahal, the Mughals began to mint coins at Hughly while the rebels started also to mint at Burdah⁶⁵ as an attempt to proclaim their sovereignty. The rebels now declared free trade at Radanagar to attract the merchants but, by now, they had lost their chance of stabilising the revolt.

Their other objective, if we are right in guessing, to attack other

places without defence and without Europeans, succeeded brilliantly. They plundered Malda, a place full of artisans and merchandise, where the Mughal mansabdar, Muhammed Taqui (Tuckey) was repulsed with heavy loss.⁶⁶ On a sudden spur of high mobility, the rebels appeared before Nadia. It is doubtful, after the panegyric of Bharatchandra, the court poet of the Raja of Nadia, that the rebels were defeated.⁶⁷ There was no doubt of the fact, however, that the rebels disturbed the entire countryside in that region. In another place, they were quite successful. The rebels appeared before Balasore and plundered the city and retired soon after.⁶⁸

The tide of success began to turn slowly against the rebels who had several non-decisive skirmishes with the forces of Zubberdust Khan. This led Maha Singh, by 4th March, to pull back his scattered resources to concentrate in one place and to offer combat to Zubberdust Khan, whose forces were increasing day by day. A rumour was circulating, which later proved to be true, that he was waiting for the reinforcements from North India.⁶⁹ The concentration of forces robbed Maha Singh of the chances of surprising the enemy and thus robbed the initiative, which formed so far his *raison d'être*. It is to be noted that, in the case of Rajputs and Marathas, when they were fighting against the Mughals they moved with small groups, mobile with the active support of the local population, with a higher rate of striking power from unsuspected positions. This proved the main cause of their success. Here, in Bengal, the same thing did not happen, thus revealing a different structure of the revolt in this case.

Maha Singh continued to attack Hugly till April where the Europeans bravely led by the Portuguese, helped the Mughals. The French twice came out of Chandernagore to repel the attacks of the rebels, shooting high with their guns. The rebels keeping themselves beyond the line of fire, put fire to a village, which the French had taken as a 'ferm'. The fire seemed to engulf their factory also.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the English tried again to liberate their agents imprisoned at Rajmahal, through the intervention of the widow of Sobha Singh; but they had very little hope to effect the liberation since the Pathans were the masters of the revolt. The success was however superficial as many Pathan captains began to leave and return to their homes, probably due to Aurangzeb's

order to seize their families in Oudh, Bihar and other parts of India, which lowered the morale of the rebels.

At the end of May, Muhammed Yusuf, the Mughal ex-faujdar of Rajmahal, completely surprised the rebel captain, killed him and retook the town. Hearing of this, the rebel forces at Cassimbazar fled, abandoning all their conquest. A little later (probably beginning of June), the rebel forces were dispersed at Bhagawangola by Zubberdust Khan. The rebels withdrew to their own territory while Zubberdust Khan encamped near Burdwan waiting for reinforcements as well as to pass the rainy season.⁷¹

At this point we would like to point out some discrepancies between our reconstruction of the revolt with that of Sarkar, although these were of little significance to the course of the revolt. According to Sarkar,⁷² Emperor Aurangzeb heard of the revolt at this time and immediately dismissed Ibrahim Khan. We would like to say that by 23rd April 1696, the Emperor had already reproached the Nawab for failing to establish peace; or it would be difficult to accept that the news reached the durbar one year later, particularly when we know that by the end of December 1696, the revolt assumed a serious proportion. The inaction of Ibrahim Khan incited the curiosity of the foreigners and we would be justified to conclude that this delay to punish the rebels was due to his liaison with the rebels.

On another point also we would differ from Sarkar (p. 306), who stated that Zubberdust Khan equipped the army quickly. The French and the English letters repeated times without number, that from the beginning of the revolt, Zubberdust Khan was preparing too slowly. One could say, that he attacked at the most favourable moment which proved his military abilities. The slowness of the preparation was partly due to the intention of the Nawab and partly to the difficulty of recruiting soldiers at a time when the rebels were paying double, while the soldiers were attracted by the prospect of a quick and rich plunder. Another reason of Zubberdust Khan's hesitation was the lack of training of the new soldiers⁷³ and a defeat suffered at this time (March 1697 to May 1697) would have been disastrous for the Mughals. He therefore wanted to avoid any frontal combat committing all his forces—a situation in which Maba Singh would be happy to see him i.e. to come out from his ent-

renched position. Under the circumstances, Zuberdust Khan tried to tie up as many of the enemy as could be occupied at Murshidabad area to protect Dacca and Hugli till the arrival of reinforcements. Regarding the decisive battle of Bhagawangola, it is curious to note that none of the contemporary European sources, otherwise so detailed, took more than passing notice of it. On the other hand, they suggested that the victory at Rajmahal did force the rebels to retire from Murshidabad, occasionally making allusions to a battle, which virtually decided the fate of the revolt. Even then one should not consider the battle as a climax of the revolt as Sarkar basing himself on Salimulla had done. The following events will bear us out.

At the end of May, the news came of the arrival of Prince Azim-us Shan, grandson of Aurangzeb, with important reinforcements. The Prince arrived at Burdwan around November 1697.⁷⁴ After a while Zuberdust Khan had a quarrel with the Prince and left for Deccan with his father, Ibrahim Khan,⁷⁵ to fade out from the history of Hindustan rather ignominiously after halting the decay of the Mughal arms for a brief interlude.

Towards the beginning of June 1697, the inaction of Zuberdust Khan had encouraged the rebels to advance and plunder. They placed a few posts to stop the riverine traffic, particularly below Wooleberia (Uluberia) and signally defeated the Subadhar of Orissa, Kamdar Khan, who had advanced upto Burdah to claim a victory and to win name. A few survivors trickled back to court along with Kamdar Khan to tell the story.⁷⁶ Evidently the days of the rebels were not yet over.

Controversy seemed to have arisen even among the contemporaries regarding the inaction of Zuberdust Khan. One reason which the French gave was that the Prince Azim prevented Zuberdust Khan from taking any action merely to acquire as much money as possible, while the other view was that Zuberdust Khan wanted to keep the rebels waiting in the hope of alluring their men to his camp which was inevitable owing to prolonged inaction of the rebels. One thing was, however, very clear. Prince Azim was out to hoard as much money as possible in the quickest span of time for the impending struggle of succession after the death of Aurangzeb.

The situation remained still very delicate. Although the route to Rajmahal, Dacca and Murshidabad was open, the merchants dared not bring out either goods or money. The destruction of Murshidabad, including the mulberry trees,⁷⁷ which affected the production of silk for some time, not only witnessed the vandalism of the rebels but revealed the significant fact that the revolt was now being dominated by a class of people who had no connection with the productive processes of the country.

The rebels instead of attacking the Prince, attempted to make a compromise, knowing the nature of the Prince, by offering him to make him the King of Bengal⁷⁸ as the expected death of Aurangzeb was approaching. The French made it clear that the Prince pacified Bengal by making a pact with the rebels "according to the oriental custom",⁷⁹ while Salimulla stated that, Rahim Shah, in the midst of the negotiation killed the best general of the Prince. This forced the Prince to break off the negotiation. He traversed the river Damodar and passed on to the offensive in the enemy territory. In the battle that followed in front of the fort of Chandrokona, Rahim Shah (and probably Maha Singh also) was killed at the moment of victory.⁸⁰ The revolt lingered for some time as the Prince continued the negotiation with the defeated power for the simple reason that in the impending struggle, it was necessary not only to have money but also to have sturdy and experienced followers.⁸¹ It was finally settled by the new energetic Dewan Murshid Kuli Khan in 1702.⁸²

The rapid success of the revolt showed the absence of any effective power in the province, thus providing a vacuum as the Europeans were not willing to come in and wield that power. The rebels merely tried to fill up the vacuum. The uniqueness of this revolt lies in the fact that it tended to envelop quickly the entire province and obliterate the Mughal authority, which till then formed the legal power. In the case of other preceding revolts of the province, the chief feature was the containment within a few districts, giving them the status of semi-independent chieftainship which other chiefs possessed. After a decade of development, when these chiefs began to show signs of independence, the revolts were put down with much fanfare normal to any spectacular development of kingly power and authority like the Mughals. The case of Sobha Singh therefore can be claimed to be distinct from the run of revolts so fami-

liar in India, which might account, to some extent, for the surprise and slow preparation of the Mughals.

Two explanations might be offered. One would be that the revolt originated in the horizontal movement of the lower class of the population while the second one, which could be complementary to the first, would assert that the revolt turned gradually into a vertical movement with all the paraphernalia of kingship and downward pull, which grafted itself on the movement and dominated it till the end. Unless more facts about the origin of the revolt come out, the first explanation will remain a guesswork.

This grafting and the quick enveloping attempt, however, was due to the efforts of the Pathans, which created a superstructure instead of an infra-structure, hastening the alienation between different sectors of the society, thus proving the main cause of its fall. It must be remembered that the Pathans created this downward 'pull' which brought the contradiction within the revolt, leading to the absence of a long-term military policy and military organisation. This is seen clearly in their military blunder of neglecting to attack Dacca and Hughly and embroiling unnecessarily with the Europeans, particularly the Dutch and the Portuguese, who bore the main brunt of their earlier attacks. But, then they were suffering from a contradiction not only within themselves but also within the composition of the Bengali society of late seventeenth century, which was beyond their power to solve.

This case study of an uprising in rural India shows that there are more dimensions to understanding their origins and consequences than is available from the simple model of religious discontent and breakdown of administration, given by Sir J. N. Sarkar, or even from the more sophisticated model of agrarian crisis and jagirdari exploitation leading to peasant and jagirdari revolt that is associated with the work of Dr. Irfan Habib.

ANIRUDDHA RAY

⁴¹ For legends of Raja Pratapaditya and Raja Sitaram Ray, see *Mitra*, S.C.; Jasohar Khulner Ithihas, Calcutta, 1922 (Bengali). Earliest of these interpretations was given by *Basu*, Ram Ram.: *Pratapaditya-Charita*, Fort William, 1801 (Bengali).

⁴² *Loc. Cit.*, 39. *Sarkar's* statement of 22 July (p. 305) is obviously wrong.

⁴³ *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 2 July 1697.

⁴⁴ *Goetz, Herman*: *The Crisis of Indian Civilization*, Calcutta, 1938, pp. 1-23. For a curious incident revealing this attitude, see *Sarkar, J.N.*: *House of Sivaji*, Calcutta, 1955, pp. 138-9.

⁴⁵ For a contemporary account, see *Dutt, Gangaram*: *Maharashtra-Puran*, 1751, (Bengali), tr. in English by *Gupta, P.C. & Dimmock, E.*, Hawaii, 1965.

⁴⁶ *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 25 August 1696.

⁴⁷ *Loc. Cit.*, 39.

⁴⁸ *Loc. Cit.*, 46.

⁴⁹ *Loc. Cit.*, 39.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 176.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 3 September 1696 to Fort St. George.

⁵³ *Loc. Cit.*, 39, f. 176.

⁵⁴ *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 25 November 1696.

⁵⁵ (i) *Ibid.*

(ii) *A.C.*, f. 245: Letter of Martin, Deslandes, 16 January 1697.

⁵⁶ *Loc. Cit.*, 54.

⁵⁷ *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 9 December 1696. It should be stated that the number of rebel troops had gone upto 12,000 horsemen and 30,000 infantry—strong enough to beat the existing Mughal army by sheer number.

⁵⁸ *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 30 December 1696.

⁵⁹ *Loc. Cit.*, 64. Also see, *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 23 February 1697, where the amount of ransom was stated.

⁶⁰ While both the French and English sources mentioned 30,000 infantry, *Sarkar*, without indicating the source, gave it as 60,000 (p. 306).

⁶¹ *Loc. Cit.*, 58.

⁶² (i) *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 19 March 1697 (See also 25 January 1697).

(ii) *B.L.*, Chutanuttee, 25 March 1697 to Ralph Sheldon.

(iii) *O.C.*, f. 6408, Fort St. George, 3 June 1697.

⁶³ (i) *B.L.*, Chutanuttee, 16 March 1697 to Ralph Sheldon at Rajmahal: "We plainly find these rebel forces are wholly bent on robbing and plundering. . . ."

(ii) *Ghulam Husain Salim* (Riaz) stated that they were "a large number of low and ignorant Badmashes. . . ." (pp. 232-233).

⁶⁴ *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 23 February 1697.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 4 March 1697.

⁶⁷ *Bharatchandra*, the legendary poet of Bengal, writing in 1752-3, stated categorically in *Annada Mangal*, that the Raja of Nadia defeated Sobha Singh, which in view of poet's obvious "glorification" should be taken with caution. From a contemporary source, we have found only one allusion to the revolt spreading to the areas around Nadia. See, the Letter of *Pierre Martin*, Missionnaire de la Compagnie de Jésus au Pere de Vilette de la même Compagnie, Balasor, 30 January 1697 (Father was at Nadia at that time learning Sanskrit) published in *Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses*, Paris, 1780-83, 26 Vols., Vol-X, pp. 39-40.

⁶⁸ *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 8 April 1697.

⁶⁹ *Loc. Cit.*, 66.

⁷⁰ *A.C.*, f. 248: Lettres de Martin et Deslandes à Ougly, 19 October 1697.

⁷¹ (i) *F.R.*, Chutanuttee, 27 May 1697.

- (ii) O.C., f. 6425, Fort St. George, 7 August 1697.
- (iii) A.C., f. 260, Mémoire de Martin et des Marchands du comptoir d'Ougly, December 1697.
- ⁷² Sarkar, p. 306. He put it in the middle of 1697.
- ⁷³ F.R., Chutanuttee, 19 March 1697.
- ⁷⁴ (i) B.L., 29 December 1697 to Nat Walsh.
- (ii) A.C., f. 260, Mémoire, op.cit., December 1697.
- ⁷⁵ O.C., f. 6485, Chutanuttee, 6 January 1698.
- ⁷⁶ F.R., Chutanuttee, 12 June 1697.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid.
- ⁷⁸ Loc. Cit., 75.
- ⁷⁹ A.C., 65, Deslandes à Ponchartrain, 4 January 1700, f. 115.
- ⁸⁰ Sarkar, p. 308, footnote quoting Akhbarat of Prince Azim-us Shan dated 11 September 1698.
- ⁸¹ Loc. Cit., 79.
- ⁸² Sarkar, p. 304. footnote.

The Results of the Christian Missionary Activities in Bengal (1793-1833)

THE protestant missionary movement in India started when William Carey of the Baptist Missionary Society came to Calcutta in 1793. Altogether eight Missionary Societies worked in Bengal during the first forty years (1793-1833) namely-the Baptist Missionary Society (B.M.S.), the London Missionary Society (L.M.S.), the Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.) the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (S.P.C.K.), the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (S.P.G.), the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (W.M.M.S), the Established Church of Scotland (E.C.S.) and the Netherlands Missionary Society (N.M.S.).

The activities of christian missionaries in Bengal from 1793 to 1833 form a significant aspect of modern Indian history. Many questions relating to this subject have been better raised than answered. With what main object in view did the missionaries visit India? Did they succeed in attaining their main object?

The main object of the missionaries was to convert the people to christianity. In order to gain that object they adopted three methods—namely preaching, translation of the Gospel and education. How far were the missionary methods of preaching, translation and education successful in gaining converts? What was the social background of the Indian converts? What was their behaviour after conversion? These are some of the important questions which may be discussed in order to form an estimate of the actual results of the missionary activities in Bengal upto 1833.

THE NUMBER OF CONVERTS

There are, however, some difficulties involved in answering these questions. These difficulties arise from the very nature of the source

material. Firstly, the reports and accounts of different missionary societies are vague about the number of their converts. Secondly, the missionaries made conversions from various racial groups—Europeans, Eurasians, Armenians, Portuguese, Indians and others—without distinguishing one from the other. It is therefore impossible to separate the Indians in such cases from the rest. Thirdly, some Societies, reported about their converts under a general heading “North India” which included areas outside Bengal. This makes it difficult to ascertain the number of converts from Bengal only.

Carey came to Serampore from north Bengal without a single Indian convert to his credit. He and his friends made the first Indian convert at Serampore in 1800. The earlier *Periodical Accounts* of the B.M.S. gave a detailed description of their Indian converts. In a joint letter to the Committee in 1806, the Serampore missionaries claimed that “The number of native members . . . is 75”.¹ They also claimed to have another 25 European members, the total thus amounted to 100 in 1806. Lord Minto doubted their claim of having 100 converts. He wrote “The Danish Mission says their flock is composed of about one hundred, some allowance must be made for the exaggeration of men partial to their own pursuits”.² In the preface of the *Periodical Accounts* volumes 3 and 4, the B.M.S. published a list of persons converted upto 1808. The list gives some details about the converts, such as names, date of conversion, caste or relation, residence, and present situation or employment. This is the only detailed list of its kind given by any missionary Society during the whole period under survey. The list contains 147 names, but the missionaries could not furnish any details about 12 persons, and simply stated them as “Natives and Europeans”.³ Of the remaining 135, 105 appear to be Indians. The list includes the converts who were under suspension and also those who went back to their original religion. The number of such persons was about 20. This leaves one with 85 who may be considered bonafide converts.

After 1808, the number of converts was stated in approximate figures. This inevitably led to a certain vagueness in the writings of the missionaries in their occasional, ambiguous, overlapping and even contradictory statements. In a letter to Fuller on the occasion of

the thirteenth anniversary of the Serampore Church in 1813, Carey wrote, "the number baptized in more than five hundred".⁴ Nothing was said as to how many of them were Indians. Rev. J. Hough calculated in 1845 the total number of B.M.S. converts up to the end of 1814 as "seven hundred and fifty six".⁵ He stated that 300 more converts were made in 1814-1816. This he considered as a fair aggregate based on the B.M.S. report of 1817 which gave the figure for the preceding two years as "somewhat between four hundred and ten and four hundred and forty".⁶ Thus Hough calculated a grand total of "between ten and eleven hundred"⁷ B.M.S. converts in 1817 after a period of 16 years of labour in Bengal. He tried to explain the reason for the vagueness in the statements of the B.M.S. missionaries, about the number of their converts. The missionaries, he argued, could not ascertain the exact number due to great distance between their outer stations. He put the blame on the Indian teachers who, according to him "are not always very accurate or punctual in transmitting their reports".⁸ Hough maintained that the total figure never correctly indicated the progress of Christianity, because it included many persons who were already Christians. Conversion of Christians from one denomination to another, in his opinion, should not be taken into account in calculating the real progress of Christianity in India. For the purpose of ascertaining the real progress of Christianity he tried to calculate the number of Indian converts and stated "as these cannot be precisely ascertained they may perhaps be reckoned at five hundred for the whole period".⁹ The B.M.S. in their review for the year 1817, stated that their total converts, including Indians and others, were "nearly one thousand and two hundred".¹⁰ In 1819 the B.M.S. reported about their total Indian converts that "they have the pleasure of baptizing about six hundred natives".¹¹ Carey, in one of his letters to Ryland in 1820, used the terms "a good number", "several", "a great number", or only "additions"¹² to indicate the number of converts. Ward, in order to give a total picture of their progress in Bengal, wrote in a letter in 1821, that "six hundred Hindoos have renounced their gods".¹³ In the same letter he stated again that the converts amounted to "nearly seven hundred natives".¹⁴ The Serampore missionaries calculated their total number of converts up to December 1821, which "as nearly as they can ascertain . . . was one thousand four hundred and seven".¹⁵ The missio-

naries further added that "in ascertaining how many of these have been natives, they have been less successful, as the natives have not in every instance been distinguished from Europeans".¹⁶ They, however, calculated roughly that "nearly seven hundred, if not a greater number, have been native converts".¹⁷ They tried to be more specific and stated that they had about 469 Indian converts in all their stations, of whom about 29 were from outside Bengal. The total for Bengal thus amounted to about 440 in 1821.

Adam, in his replies to H. Ware's queries about converts, explained first the difficulties with the missionary reports. The reports, he said, always used the words "nearly", "about", before the figures. He asked whether their numbers included only the adult baptized or included even the young and unbaptized descendants of the former, and whether it included those who had died or been excluded or gone back to their former faith, or only those who were then alive and in full communion with their churches. As it was found difficult to get any satisfactory answer to these questions, Adam made his own calculation from various sources in 1824 and stated "The result of my own observation . . . that the number of native converts properly so called, now living and in full communion with one or other of the Protestant Missionary Churches does not exceed three hundred".¹⁸ Adam's calculation was thus a great challenge to the missionary claims. Curiously enough the Serampore missionaries, in an article in *The Friend of India*, did not dispute the figure given by Adam, but defended it as an achievement on their part: "In the conversion of three hundred immortal beings, from darkness to light and from the power of Satan unto God, an object has been realised".¹⁹ There is no independent source to ascertain the number of Indian converts. The figures according to missionary sources vary from 300 at one end to nearly 600 at the other.

An article entitled "*Results of the Missionary Labour in India*" appeared in "*The Calcutta Review*" in 1851. Although the name of the writer was not given, the style of writing shows that he was a missionary.²⁰ The writer states: "A Statistical Paper, laid before the Missionary Conference in Calcutta, a few years ago, showed that in Lower Bengal,

exclusive of Krishnaghur (Krishnagar), the accessions of native converts to the Christian church had been

From	1793 to 1802	27
"	1803 to 1812	161
"	1813 to 1822	403
"	1823 to 1832	675
"	1833 to 1842	1045 . . ." ²¹

According to these figures the total number of Indian converts in 1832 was 1266. During 1832-33 the reports of all the missionary Societies together show that the total Indian converts amounted roughly to 140, including 5 from Krishnagar.²² The mass conversion at Krishnagar started after 1833. The total number of Indian converts, therefore, would be about 1406 in 1833 according to the available figures given by the missionaries. The number was very insignificant when compared to the vast mass of the Indian population. The missionaries themselves acknowledged this fact.

THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONVERTS

The first convert, named Krishna Pal, made by the Serampore missionaries in 1800, was a carpenter. Another person who rejected his caste with him was a distiller, another low caste. An analysis of the B.M.S. list would give a fairer idea of the social background of the Indian converts. As this is the only document which gives a somewhat detailed description only up to 1808, the analysis would necessarily seem to be sketchy.

The list contained 9 Brahmins.²³ The missionaries mentioned the surname of only one of them. From the surname he appears to be a Kulin Brahmin, baptized in 1807. There is nothing in the missionary writings which indicates that he was from a respectable family. They simply stated that he was an old man and "very poorly".²⁴ Of the remaining 8, one was reported to be "excluded", another as of a "doubtful character", the other as "gone back", and two employed as Bengali compositors at the Serampore Press.²⁵ The missionaries claimed none of them to be coming from any respectable family. They mentioned about 12 of their converts as "Kaist" and two as "writer cast" (sic).²⁶ It is not known what

was the distinction, if any, between these two, as the missionaries never stated the method of their classifications. The Kayastha class contained many sections, both high and low, so without any other descriptions, it is not possible to find out the social status of these converts. In many cases the missionaries simply mentioned the convert as a "Hindoo", "A Hindoo widow", "A Hindoo woman"²⁷ which indicates nothing as to their caste. Where the missionaries mentioned the caste, the majority of them belonged to the lowest class, such as "Carpenter", "Soore", "Dhobe", "Kaibarta", "Jogge", "Tili", and others.²⁸ By profession these people were respectively, distillers, washermen, fishermen, weavers and oilmen. A large number was mentioned as "Byraggees"²⁹ who lived on begging. Of seven Muslims mentioned in the list,³⁰ one was employed "as Persian compositor" in the Serampore Press. Of the remaining six one was "suspended", two "not heard of lately" another described as "A Musselman having lost cast (sic) by marriage with a Feringu".³¹ The remaining three were stated simply as "Musselman".³² The descriptions tend to confirm that most of the Muslim converts also did not belong to any respectable family. It appears that one of the Muslim converts was a personal servant of Ward.³³ Incidentally, there is no other description of the Muslim converts in the missionary writings of the whole period under review. The analysis thus confirms the view expressed by Lord Minto that the converts were mostly "these outcasts, who have taken refuge in the Society of Christians, from the scorn of their countrymen".³⁴

That this trend continued is well corroborated by the writings of both the missionaries and others. In a report on Indian stations dated 23rd June 1813, there is a statement about the rise of a new class of people in Bengal, which the writer believed to be favourable for the progress of Christianity. The report states that "large bodies of Hindoos have left the ancient forms of idolatry, and formed different sects among themselves, ranging themselves under some one leader, called their goroo".³⁵ The writer was telling about the synchromatic sect of the "Kartabhajas", composed mainly of Hindu and Muslim half-castes and outcastes. The first convert of the Serampore Mission was a disciple of Ramdulal the "Guru" of this sect. Most of the "Byragi" converts belonged to this sect. The C.M.S. missionaries made a large number of converts from this sect at Krishnagar after 1833.

Ram Mohan Roy expressed his opinion in 1824, that the Indian converts were "generally of the most ignorant class".³⁶ In 1829 Pearson, the L.M.S. missionary, confessed that the Indian converts mostly belonged to "the lower and poorer class".³⁷ In 1832 the C.M.S. Record quoted a Journal of one of their missionaries from Bengal, stating that they had baptized some adults whose occupation was fish catching.³⁸ Pascoe, in his history, mentioned that the majority of the S.P.G. converts at Howrah in 1832 "of the peasant class",³⁹ and of Tollygunge in 1833, were "entirely of the poded and teore castes".⁴⁰

During 1832-33 Duff converted four brilliant young students of the Hindu College.⁴¹ They were Mahesh Chandra Ghosh, Gopinath Nandi, Krishna Mohan Bandopadhyaya, and Ananda Chandra Mazumder, all from most respectable families of Bengal. Krishnamohan was a Kulin Brahman of the highest order. Christianity for the first time, thus made a penetration in the upper class society in Bengal.

J. Richter, commenting on the achievement of Duff wrote, "It was wholly new—no longer to see orphan children picked up anywhere, out-castes, beggars and cripples becoming members of the Christian Church".⁴² This was of course a great achievement for hitherto the candidates for baptism had been "poor down trodden individuals belonging to the lowest castes".⁴³ K.S. Latourette, commenting upon the missionary position in Bengal, at the time of Duff's arrival, stated "conversions had admittedly not been numerous and the larger proportion of them had been from members of the lower social strata".⁴⁴

THE MOTIVES OF CONVERSION

The missionaries in Bengal always considered the question of providing shelter and employment to their Indian converts, as an essential part of their duty. Carey was glad to be appointed as Superintendent of the indigo-factory at Madnabati, for it gave him enough opportunity to offer "employment" to anyone who "lose cast (sic) for the Gospel".⁴⁵ Ward wrote in his journal that they had purchased land on which they were building a hut for two of their converts.⁴⁶ Enough concern was shown for the employment of the first convert Krishna.⁴⁷ When the number of converts grew it became difficult to find employment for all. Ward

commented "We are exceedingly puzzled about the employment of the new converts",⁴⁸ who mostly lived on begging. In 1805 the Serampore missionaries decided to employ more Indian converts as preachers of the Gospel.⁴⁹ The gradual expansion of the missionary work, and the Serampore press, created opportunities for the employment of the Indian converts.

The practice of giving employment to the converts produced a widespread belief among the common people that those who came forward for conversion would be given shelter and employment by the missionaries. There was also a wide spread rumour that an Indian on conversion would be given Rs. 1000 and a wife or mistress. Ward recorded: "This day a man came . . . having heard that we give 1000 Rupees & (and) a mistress to those who would lose cast (sic)".⁵⁰ A man at Hugly asked a Serampore convert whether it was true that the Serampore missionaries gave money and mistresses "to each person who would lose cast?"⁵¹ The Serampore missionaries acknowledged that the idea was widely prevalent from the very beginning of their missionary activities in Bengal. In Jessore in 1806 a man was murdered and robbed immediately after his return from a visit to Serampore Mission for, the murderers "having heard that he had been at Serampore, . . . imagined he must have obtained a sum of money there, an idea which has been circulated from the beginning".⁵² The idea was current throughout the whole period under present survey. Ram Mohun Roy testified that such a rumour prevailed.⁵³ The L.M.S. missionary Hill wrote in 1833 that while on tour in the neighbourhood of Berhampore he was frequently told by the villagers that "a missionary has promised to any who would become Xn (Christian) 1000 Rupees and an English wife".⁵⁴

Those who were poor and in debt seem to have been tempted by the material gains of conversion. Ward recorded in his journal that an Indian came to Serampore Mission for conversion but went away soon after when he found that his hope of paying off his debts by becoming Christian might not be fulfilled.⁵⁵ Ward feared that the Indian converts might have been primarily influenced by worldly expectations.⁵⁶ That such material rewards were sometimes offered by the missionaries is shown by a letter of Forsyth to Carey in which the writer charges the Serampore

missionaries with having used "underhand means" to convert people.⁵⁷ Ward acknowledged that "Having lent some money to three of our friends . . . several others of the newly baptized have been asking to have money lent them".⁵⁸ Ward explained that many converts were "incensed at us for excluding them & refusing to employ them".⁵⁹ According to Lord Minto, the majority of the converts were "attracted by little gains and in their employment at the printing press".⁶⁰

Mardon, a B.M.S. missionary from his station at Goamalty in north Bengal, reported that he had taken 30 bighas of land, so that "I can find employment for my brethren or for enquirers who may want employment".⁶¹ Some converts of the Serampore Mission, in a joint petition to the Bishop of Calcutta, Middleton, complained that they were "seduced . . . by hope of support and protection",⁶² the promise which they alleged, the Serampore missionaries were neglecting to fulfil. Ram Mohan Roy commenting on the above petition wrote, "the greater number have been allured to change their faith by other attractions than by a conviction of truth and reasonableness of those dogmas, as we find nearly all of them are employed or fed by their spiritual teachers . . . and in case of neglect are apt to manifest a rebellious spirit".⁶³ Adam also expressed similar opinion that the converts were "employed as domestic servants, . . . as compositors . . . in printing office, and . . . as itinerant preachers, at a rate of salary not more than a domestic servant or compositor receive".⁶⁴ He emphatically expressed his conviction that "a considerable proportion of them have not been influenced by love of truth".⁶⁵

The missionaries themselves expressed great doubts about the sincerity of their own converts. The L.M.S. reported in 1830, "That some persons have applied from an unworthy motive, few acquainted with the subject will be disposed to deny".⁶⁶ When Ramhari, the first convert of the L.M.S., went over to the Baptists, E. Roy a L.M.S. Missionary commented: "I fear his main object was to better his worldly circumstances".⁶⁷ The same missionary admitted that all other missionary societies gave each adult and their children a set of new clothes after conversion, and shelter and food to all who come as candidates for baptism or enquirers of Christianity. The money which each of these people received, according to E. Roy, was equal to a labourer's daily wage. Thus many, in his

opinion, simply came for food and shelter, spent a few days or even months and then went away without becoming Christians.⁶⁸

The Serampore Account commenting on the motives of their converts at Baruipore Station states that "the motives of some of them in professing to believe the Gospel were wholly of a worldly character".⁶⁹ The Account further admits that these persons were engaged in an old dispute with their landlord, and that they expected to obtain victory at the court by associating themselves with the Europeans and also pecuniary support in conducting their litigation.⁷⁰

In 1832, Lacroix and Piffard, L.M.S. missionaries, commented: "We have likewise reason to fear that some hasty baptism that had taken place, especially at Gangree of characters whom events have proved not to have been sincere, have much contributed to retard the progress of the work. Persons of this description, it would seem by their subsequent confession, had an infinite idea that they would be benefitted in a temporal point of view by making a profession of Christianity".⁷¹ He also explained that some of these converts went over from one Society of missionaries to another with the expectation of gaining better pecuniary return. Some people came to the Baptists in 1833, and stated that they had lost their crop by saline water, and wanted to become Christians in order to borrow a considerable sum of money. They made it absolutely clear that if they did not get enough money from the Baptists, then they would go to another Society.⁷²

The C.M.S. missionary J. J. Weitbrecht wrote in 1833 about some enquirers that "they know the civilians . . . are my friends, so there is a general opinion that if they get my favour, they will succeed in obtaining good employment".⁷³ More often the C.M.S. missionaries found the real object of the enquirers and the converts "was the hope, by such a change of religious profession, to improve their temporal circumstances".⁷⁴

From these comments on the motives of the converts made by both the individuals and the missionaries it may be inferred that those Indians who embraced Christianity did so primarily for material gains rather than for spiritual regeneration. The missionaries on their part were fully aware of "the evil arising from baptizing individuals of whose conversion there is not the most satisfactory evidence".⁷⁵

THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE CONVERTS

The most important aspect of conversion, however, was not the number of the converts, their social background, or even their motives, but their behaviour after conversion to Christianity. The desire of the missionaries to remedy all the "miseries" of the Indian people through Christianity, was only possible if conversion could (as the missionaries firmly believed) bring a revolutionary change in the character, attitude and behaviour of their converts.

The letters and journals of the Serampore missionaries described everything in detail about their Mission. From these accounts which cover roughly the first ten years of the Serampore Mission (1800-1810), a vivid picture about the behaviour of the converts may be gathered. The missionary writings, after 1810, hardly mentioned anything in detail about the behaviour of the converts. The official reports of all the Missionary Societies were marked with caution and the true accounts of the behaviour of the converts were either suppressed or produced in modified form. Under these limitations the subject can possibly be best discussed by first examining the reliable materials, which in this case happen to be the private accounts of the missionaries in Bengal, and then to compare these accounts with the official report to find out the pattern followed by the latter in censoring the private accounts.

Krishna Pal, the first convert and his family, occupy a large part in the early writings of the Serampore missionaries. Ward recorded in his journal that "we have been unhappy this week" because of a quarrel between Krishna's family and Unna, a converted widow "who lived with them (Krishna's family) as servant".⁷⁶ After conversion, Unna "got it into her head that as she was holy sister, it was not right to be Creshnoo's (Krishna's) servant".⁷⁷ After the quarrel she left Krishna's house and started living in the house of Gokul—another convert. One evening Gokul came to Ward and asked him "whether it was right that he should always have his mind on Xt's (Christ's) death. He said by always keeping his thoughts on that, his mind got dried & (and) exhausted".⁷⁸ In connection with Unna, there was a continuous quarrel between the families of Krishna and Gokul. The quarrel reached a climax when "Gokul (Gokul) . . . behaved in the most irregular & (and) imprudent manner:

His conduct is like that of a person insane. He and his wife & (and) Unna are full of passion against us & (and) Creshoo's (Krishna's) family. We are very uneasy".⁷⁹ They were excluded from the Church, but did not leave the two huts, which the missionaries had built for them. Another day Gokul came with a stick and "stamped upon the testament".⁸⁰ The same evening he abused some converts. Ward commented: "We fear he takes hemp which has an intoxicating effect. You will conceive how much these circumstances affect us".⁸¹

Marshman wrote that the missionaries had a serious conversation with Krishna "relative to some work he had done for us, in which we apprehend he had charged us 15 or 20 percent above the Calcutta price".⁸² He also described in the same letter, a serious quarrel between Krishna and Petumber, another convert. Petumber had lived at Krishna's house for about three months. Krishna sent his servant to demand money for lodging from Petumber. Petumber was offended because Krishna had not told him about the charges before, and the result was a quarrel. During this quarrel Krishna used against Petumber "reproachful language in presence of many people . . . I leave you to guess the state of our minds. The aggressor our first convert".⁸³ The missionaries specially advised their women converts "to cultivate love and harmony and avoid particularly all back-biting, tale-bearing and enlarging on other's faults".⁸⁴ Women converts manifested more often "a looseness of speaking and coldness in attending upon divine things".⁸⁵

The relationship between the converts was tinged with jealousy. When Petumber was appointed as a preacher, Krishna became disgusted with the missionaries and started preaching separately in his house. Most of the Indian converts joined him. Marshman commented: "The schism of Krishno (Krishna) has filled us with a sensation of grief and fear, which I can hardly describe".⁸⁶ Ward's comment on Krishna's action was—"We have this day had a more dreadful schism amongst us than at any former time".⁸⁷ After about three months Ward wrote again, "Creshno (Krishna) has been dissatisfied with our allowance to him & (and) seems to think we have used him hardly. He has said some hardish words to Bro. (Brother) M. (Marshman) on this subject".⁸⁸ The missionaries decided then to appoint Krishna as an itinerant preacher with a fixed salary.

The values and morals of the Indians hardly changed after conversion. Haladhar who after his conversion had been forcibly taken away by his father was one day brought back to the Serampore Mission by some Indians who demanded money for their service. It was later found that these men were acting on the instructions of Krishna's wife. Krishna's family was found guilty of encouraging an illicit relationship between Haladhar and Goloke, Krishna's married daughter.⁸⁹ Apart from being a heavy gambler, Bhyrub, a Brahman convert who married Krishna's third daughter, turned out to be a professional forger. Ward wrote: "This day I caught Bhyrub in a fraud. He had been trying to get money from the Sirkar (Sarkar) by presenting a forged bill in our name. This led to a discovery of more than a dozen other forgeries whereby he had got from the Sirkar at different times more than 60 rupees".⁹⁰ He was excluded from the Church. After restoration he was again found "forging a receipt to get money from us. He lately stole from our house a silver spoon".⁹¹ The missionaries carried the matter to the Magistrate who gave Bhyrub "a thorough flogging". On hearing this "Kreeshnoo (Krishna) has been in a dreadful passion with us . . . He declared that he would sell his all & (and) wander about the country to warn people against becoming Xns. (Christians)".⁹² Another convert Mohan (husband of Krishna's first daughter Goloke) was suspended for indulging in gambling and prostitution.⁹³ Ward brought to the notice of the missionaries "a practice too much followed by Kreeshnoo (Krishna) & (and) a few more of our native brethren, viz, the smoking of an intoxicating herb called Ganja".⁹⁴

Chamberlain in 1804 wrote to Ryland "Kreeshnoo (Krishna) and his family have behaved in a most unlovely manner . . . acted in opposition, . . . have quarrelled and disgraced themselves and others in the open world".⁹⁵ He wrote elaborately about Krishna that "his self-conceit and indolence are his misery and ruin. From the former proceeds uncommon anger & (and) stubbornness and the latter produces extravagance and poverty. . . . He was so idle . . . so little attentive to truth in his engagements, so unjust in his charges, that nobody gave him work, and Brethren find that a heathen does better by far than he did".⁹⁶

But the editor who presented Krishna's memoir written by Ward to the British people, declared him in 1823 "a Hindoo Christian, who for

upwards of twenty years, 'adorned the doctrine of God our Saviour', by denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, and living soberly, righteously, and godly, in the midst of the corrupt native population of idolatrous India".⁹⁷

Stealing and falsehood were the common vices of the convert community "I fear our native friends are far from having renounced falsehood. Oh! how discouraged am I sometimes by accusations, differences & (and) apparent falsehoods".⁹⁸ Likewise Carey commented: "The state of things among us is in some respects painful . . . I fear that there is a (very) great decline in the vital power of religion among some of our Hindoo friends".⁹⁹

The missionary writings are full of frequent references to cases of adultery and co-habitation. Once the missionaries rescued a girl from a prostitute house and converted her. She was then allowed to marry a person of her choice among the converts. Soon after her marriage she was found "in a state of adultery".¹⁰⁰ The missionaries wanted to regularise the cases of long co-habitation by marriage, but not always with success. Some were ashamed of marriage because of advanced age, "tho' (though) not too old to be cohabited with".¹⁰¹ The question of marriage arose only when one was living with a particular woman for a long time. The missionaries frequently suspended those converts who lived with different women at different times or visited "bad women's house". One of their woman converts, Ward reported "has been ill of (the foul disease)".¹⁰² One of the converts when suspended became a Muslim. Ward said, "This is the first instance of any of our excluded becoming Mussalman".¹⁰³

The official reports of the missionaries mentioned the cases of suspension or exclusion without giving the precise reasons. Instead vague terms such as "improper conduct", "un-Christian conduct", "irregular conduct", and "conduct unbecoming the Gospel", were used. For example, the official report on the exclusion of three converts—John, Golamee and Ananda (Krishna's second daughter) mentions "for conduct unbecoming the Gospel" as the reason for their exclusion.¹⁰⁴ It is, however, from the journal of Ward, one finds that John and Golamee were excluded for prostitution, and Ananda, the wife of Krishna Prasad,

the first Brahman convert of the Serampore Mission, for committing adultery.¹⁰⁵

With the increase in the irregularities of the conduct of the converts the missionary reports stopped even disclosing the names of the sinners. It appears that most of those who were excluded went back to their old faith.¹⁰⁶

Since conversion to Christianity was held out by the missionaries as a sure guarantee for good conduct the Bengali Newspapers hardly failed to seize on a case of misconduct and ridicule the missionary pretensions. Thus when a convert beat his wife so severely that she had to report to the police station covered with blood, the Bengali *Sambad Timira Nashak* commented, "If this be the manner in which Christians subdued their evil passions, then what is preached on the highways that people having overcome them should become Christians, is a mere pretence".¹⁰⁷

The other Societies reported very briefly on the misconduct of their converts. The C.M.S. 'Records' give two cases where the converts "were dismissed for misconduct".¹⁰⁸ J. J. Weitbrecht wrote from Burdwan that "The Hindoo has a natural apathy and indolent manner which are in some degree to be observed in all converts".¹⁰⁹ Two Christian families at Bankura quarrelled for a long time, and peace was restored only when "I had excommunicated a woman".¹¹⁰ The journal of Weitbrecht gave a detailed account of cheating by one of their converts who had "more than common talents and particular gifts".¹¹¹ He lamented that it was "painful to discover such a wretched individual among those who have lately been added to the visible Church and confess the name of Christ".¹¹² Another C.M.S. missionary from Calcutta wrote to the Secretary that "there is not one convert . . . in whom the missionaries have any confidence, . . . many of them idle, quarrelsome & (and) proud to a degree".¹¹³

A. F. Lacroix reported in 1830 from his station that the year before he had to suspend two of his converts "on account of immoral conduct".¹¹⁴ In 1832 two more were excluded "on account of improper conduct".¹¹⁵ The W.M.M.S. missionary Hodson commented in a letter that "The Gospel has affected the hearts of a few . . . the alert missionaries find difficulty in laying their hands on a real convert".¹¹⁶ The S.P.G. inform-

ed that two of their converts "have been subjected to temporary exclusion in consequence of misconduct".¹¹⁷

The missionaries always wanted their real achievement to be judged from the conduct and character of their converts. Ward claimed that a "striking" change "in the views and character"¹¹⁸ of a man takes place, when he is converted to Christianity. It is for this reason that the missionaries felt frustrated and grieved at the misconduct of their converts and obliged either to suppress the news or to report in a modified form. Realising the failure of Christianity in curing these human beings from their vices the missionaries often put the blame on the country and religion of the Indians. Thus Marshman in his journal, while discussing the vices of the converts, commented that "this nation is peculiarly addicted"¹¹⁹ to those vices. On another occasion while discussing "stealing" he commented that this was "disrespectful" but not "wonderful in such a country as this".¹²⁰ Ward, reporting a quarrel between their converts commented "heat & (and) passion are here national sins".¹²¹

These sins were by no means typically Indian. It may, however, be repeated here that most of the Indian converts came from the lowest strata or from the fringes of the Indian society and they were by no means representative of the whole Indian society. It is unfortunate that the missionaries came in closest contact with this section of the Indian community, for these limited acquaintances influenced their opinion about the Indians as a whole.

THE FAILURE AND FRUSTRATIONS OF THE MISSIONARIES

The number of Indian converts, as already noticed, was very insignificant compared to the vast population. The majority of them were from the lowest strata of the Indian society, outcastes, half-castes and even beggars. Their behaviour after conversion scarcely reflected any change in their character or way of life. Thus the missionaries failed to achieve their main object. The missionaries of different Societies working in Bengal, were very conscious of this, and frequently acknowledged their failure.

W. Carey (J) of the B.M.S. wrote from Cutwa in 1822 that "It is more I think, than 12 years that I have been labouring here, but alas

not one was brought to the truth through my instrumentality".¹²² The Secretary of the B.M.S. had complained that their missionaries in India were backward in correspondence. Pearce explained that "when the success of missionary labours in the East and West Indies is compared, our tardiness may easily be accounted for. It is no pleasing thing to be always telling you of our discouragements. . . . I have hitherto met with little to cheer me from the success of my labours".¹²³ The Serampore missionaries confessed in 1833, "We do not disguise the fact that there are stations in our Mission, where not a soul . . . have been turned to God, that there are converts in whom we have no Joy, and that there are Churches sunk almost to nothing".¹²⁴

The L.M.S. missionaries at Calcutta "seriously and painfully impressed with little success which has hitherto attended their labours",¹²⁵ decided in 1820 to set apart "the first Monday of this month as a day of humiliation, fasting and prayer".¹²⁶ Mundy from Chinsurah wrote in 1826, "We have to lament the want of success amongst the heathen".¹²⁷ L.M.S. missionaries from Calcutta wrote in 1829, "For 12 years the Missionaries of this Society laboured in Calcutta without reaping any fruit".¹²⁸ Hill from Berhampore wrote to the Society in 1831, "My greatest reason yet remains viz. want of success among the Heathen. In this I am confident of your sympathy for though success belongs to God, I am the subject of most painful feelings, [for] the object dearest to my heart is so long deferred . . . Were I to pen my feelings for your information every day . . . you would monthly have an octavo volume of disappointments, regrets & (and) unavailing lamentations. . . . This, my dear Sirs, has been the greatest impediment to my regular correspondence".¹²⁹ Lacroix came to the conclusion in 1833 that "the number of individual connections made hitherto when compared with the immense population may appear small".¹³⁰

Jetter reported to the C.M.S. Secretary in 1821, "with regard to the effect . . ., I am not able to give you such cheering and encouraging accounts, as you are frequently favoured with from your missionaries in other parts of the globe".¹³¹ The C.M.S. "Record" after giving a general view of their mission in Bengal, commented in 1830 that although their missionaries had been labouring for the last eleven years, "the effects may appear insignificant".¹³² J. J. Weitbrecht, a C.M.S. missionary after long

work in Bengal, commented that a European after travelling through the length and breadth of Bengal "would very probably receive the impression that Christianity has exercised little or no effect".¹³³

The W.M.M.S. missionary Hodson, in a letter to the Society in 1833, acknowledged that "India has not yielded to us fruit in proportion to the money and men bestowed upon it".¹³⁴ Percival of the same Society also admitted that "Calcutta does not allow high coloured statements respecting the progress of Xianity (Christianity)".¹³⁵

Rev. James Byrce, the Scottish Chaplain in Calcutta, in a sermon in 1820 said, "Zeal . . . and diligence . . . have not been spared by the Christian missionary in his pious attempt to convert the natives of India. But alas! it may be doubted, if at this day he boasts a single proselyte to his creed over whom he is warranted to rejoice".¹³⁶

Abbe Dubois, the Roman Catholic missionary, after 32 years of work in South India, expressed his opinion that there "is no human possibility of converting the Hindoos to any sect of Christianity".¹³⁷ His opinion roused a storm of protest from the protestant missionaries.

Ram Mohan Roy in reply to H. Ware's questions wrote in 1824 that "no denomination of Christians has had any real success in bringing natives of India over to the Christian faith".¹³⁸

Charles Lushington, who was for a long time Government Chief Secretary, while giving evidence before the Parliamentary Committee in 1832, was questioned whether there was any progress made in Bengal in the conversion to Christianity? He replied "I am afraid very little".¹³⁹

Writers of later periods also pronounced similar judgements. G. Smith, a B.M.S. missionary during the last part of the nineteenth century commented: "The first fact forced on Duff was, that, as against the Brahmanized Hindoos, the prevailing missionary methods had failed".¹⁴⁰ K. S. Latourette, wrote "when Duff landed in India, (1830) Christian missions, particularly Protestant missions, were still being sharply questioned. In the years immediately preceding and succeeding his arrival, severe criticisms were circulated in Europe by those having first hand knowledge of the country. Protestant missions were declared a failure".¹⁴¹

All these writings pronounce without any reserve, the failure of the missionaries in Bengal, in their main task of converting the people to Christianity, during the period under present survey.

KANTI PRASANNA SEN GUPTA

¹ B.M.S. MSS. Carey, Marshman, Ward and others to the B.M.S. Committee Dec. 25, 1806.

² Minto papers (M. 209) Lord Minto to E. Parry Dec. 2, 1807.

³ B.M.S. *Periodical Accounts* vol. IV preface (Nos. 130-141).

⁴ B.M.S. MSS. Carey to Fuller May 5, to May 12, 1813.

⁵ Hough, J. *The History of Christianity in India* vol. IV, p. 427.

⁶ B.M.S. P.A. vol. VI, p. 334.

⁷ Hough *The History etc.* p. 427.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 428.

¹⁰ B.M.S. P.A. vol. VI, p. 334.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, A.R. p. 51, 1819.

¹² *Ibid.*, MSS. Carey to Ryland, April 25, 1820.

¹³ Ward *Farewell Letters*. p. 150, April 6, 1821.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Reply of the Serampore Missionaries to the attack made on them.* p. 11.

A pamphlet.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Adam *Replies to H. Ware's queries etc.* p. 41-42.

¹⁹ *The Friend of India* p. 512, quarterly series. (vol. IV, 1826).

²⁰ The writer comments "Even in their fewness, we learnt a fact most encouraging in relation to the future".

The Calcutta Review vol. XVI, p. 255.

²¹ *The Calcutta Review* vol. XVI, p. 255. According to E. Storrow this table was prepared by B.M.S. missionary G. Pearce. Storrow, E. *India and Christian Missions* p. 74.

²² Total arrived at—calculating mainly from:

Serampore Mission P.A. (Supplement) 1833.

B.M.S. A.R. 1833, 1834.

C.M.S. *Record* 1833.

The Missionary Register 1833, 1834.

²³ B.M.S. P.A. vol. III and IV Preface. A list of converts.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ B.M.S. MSS. Marshman's Journal, Jan. 11, 1803. He described "A Byragge is a man who forsakes his family on pretence of great devotion and goes about begging. They are often joined in a kind of community and Goroo, who generally

furnishes them with a female companion in lieu of a wife. . . . The generally exceed the Hindoos in imprudence and vice".

³⁰ B.M.S. P.A. vol. III and IV. Preface. A list of converts.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ B.M.S. MSS. Ward's journal, June 26, 1801. Conversation of Ward with his servant Buxoo (a Muslim) who was converted in 1804, B.M.S. P.A. vol. III, preface.

³⁴ Minto Papers (M.209) Lord Minto to E. Parry. Dec. 2, 1807.

³⁵ B.M.S. MSS. "Report on Indian Station" June 23, 1813. p. 22-23 probably written by Fuller.

³⁶ Roy, R. M. *The English works* vol. 2, p. 89. Replies to H. Ware.

³⁷ C.M.S. *Record* p. 165, 1832.

³⁸ L.M.S. MSS. Pearson to the Secretary, May 16, 1829. Box. 2 Fol. 4, Jack. B.

³⁹ Pascoe *Two hundred years of the S.P.G.* p. 477.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Smith *The life of A. Duff* vol. 1, p. 158-163.

⁴² Richter *A History of the Missions in India* p. 184.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁴⁴ Lataurette, K. S. *A History of Expansion of Christianity*, vol. VI, p. 115-6.

⁴⁵ B.M.S. MSS. Carey to B.M.S. Aug. 5, 1794.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Ward's journal. Aug. 25, 1801.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Carey to Fuller. Aug. 4, 1801.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Ward's journal. Feb. 26, 1802.

⁴⁹ Marshman *The life and times etc.* vol. 1, p. 229.

⁵⁰ B.M.S. MSS. Ward's journal Dec. 6, 1802.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1803.

⁵² *Ibid.*, Carey, Marshman and others to the B.M.S. Committee. Dec. 25, 1806.

⁵³ Roy, Ram Mohun *The English works* vol. 1, p. 256.

⁵⁴ L.M.S. MSS. M. Hill's journal. Dec. 23, 1833.

⁵⁵ B.M.S. MSS. Ward's journal. April 12, 1808.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1802.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, March 2, 1805.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1805.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 6, 1806.

⁶⁰ Minto papers (M. 209) Lord Minto to E. Parry. Dec. 2, 1807.

⁶¹ B.M.S. P.A. vol. IV, p. 143-4. Mardon to Serampore. June 11, 1810.

⁶² Bowen *Missionary incitement and Hindoo Demoralisation* p. 76 quoted the petition, June 17, 1817.

⁶³ Roy, Ram Mohun *The English works* vol. 2, p. 90.

⁶⁴ Adam *Replies to H. Ware's queries* p. 46.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁶⁶ L.M.S. *Report* p. 33, 1830.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, MSS. E. Ray's Letter. Jan., 1830. Box. 3, Fol. 1, Jack.C.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ S.M. P.A. (Supplement) p. 4, 1830.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ L.M.S. MSS. Lacroix and Piffard to the Society. Aug. 9, 1832. Box. 3, Fol. 3, Jack.C.

⁷² S.M. P.A. (Supplement) p. 8, 1833.

⁷³ C.M.S. *Record* p. 175, 1833. Weitbrecht's journal April 14, 1833.

- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4, 1834.
- ⁷⁵ L.M.S. *Report* p. 28-29, 1833.
- ⁷⁶ B.M.S. MSS. Ward's journal. Aug. 29, 1801.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1801.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1802.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, April 5, 1802.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁸² B.M.S. MSS. Marshman's letter in the form of a journal April 29, 1802.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*, May 19, 1802.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, May 21, 1802.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Ward's journal May 21, 1802.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, Marshman's letter Jan. 4, 1803.
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Ward's journal Jan. 2, 1803.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, May 5, 1803.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, June 25, 1803 also Marshman's letters June 25 and Aug. 30, 1803.
- ⁹⁰ B.M.S. MSS. Ward's journal Aug. 6, 1804.
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1806.
- ⁹² *Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1806.
- ⁹³ *Ibid.*, May 31, 1805 and Sept. 1, 1806.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1804.
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Chamberlain to Lyland. Oct. 3, 1804.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁷ Ward. *Brief Memoir of Krishna Pal* p. IV Advertisement to the second edition. 1823.
- ⁹⁸ B.M.S. MSS. Ward's journal. Aug. 16, 1803.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, Carey to Fuller. Feb. 27, 1804.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Ward's journal. Feb. 7, 1808.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1805.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1805.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1806.
- ¹⁰⁴ B.M.S. P.A. vol. III, p. 246 Carey Marshman, Ward and others to the Society. June 24, 1806.
- ¹⁰⁵ B.M.S. MSS. Ward's Journal. May 2 and 26, 1806.
- ¹⁰⁶ S.M. P.A. (Supplement) p. 4, 1832 also B.M.S. A.R. p. 13, 1833
- ¹⁰⁷ *Selections from Calcutta Gazette* vol. VI, p. 230 Sept. 24, 1827. ed. A. C. Das Gupta from "*Sambad Timira Nashak*".
- ¹⁰⁸ C.M.S. *Record* p. 36, 1830.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11, 1832.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25, 1833.
- ¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, MSS. Weitbrecht's journal. Jan. 20, 1833.
- ¹¹² *Ibid.*
- ¹¹³ C.M.S. MSS. Latham to the Secretary. Mar. 29, 1828.
- ¹¹⁴ L.M.S. MSS. Lacroix to the Secretary. May 1, 1830. Box. 3, Fol. 1, Jack.C.
- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Report* p. 26-27, 1833.
- ¹¹⁶ W.M.M.S. MSS. Hodson to the Secretary. Nov. 3, 1830.
- ¹¹⁷ S.P.G. *Report* p. 52, 1833.
- ¹¹⁸ Ward *Farewell letters* p. 211 "on the striking nature of the changes wrought in the views and character of a converted Hindoo".
- ¹¹⁹ B.M.S. MSS Marshman's Journal. May 21, 1802.

- ¹²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹²¹ *Ibid.*, Ward's Journal. May 19, 1802.
- ¹²² B.M.S. MSS. W. Carey (J) to his father. Sept. 23, 1822.
- ¹²³ *Ibid.*, Pearce to Dyer. Oct. 12, 1829.
- ¹²⁴ S.M. P.A. (Supplement) Introduction. 1833.
- ¹²⁵ L.M.S. Reports p. 49-51, 1823.
- ¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, MSS. Townley.—General Report. May 31, 1820 Boxi, Fol. 3, Jack.C.
- ¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, Mundy to the Secretary April 11, 1826 Box. 2, Fol. 2, Jack.D.
- ¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, Gogerly and Adam to Rev. Omre June 9, 1829, Box. 2 Fol. 4, Jack.D.
- ¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, Hill to the Society Aug. 18, 1831. Box. 3, Fol. 1, Jack.D.
- ¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, Lacroix to the Society Oct. 19, 1833. Box. 3 Fol. 4 Jack.D.
- ¹³¹ C.M.S. MSS. Jetter to the Secretary, May 1, 1821
- ¹³² *Ibid.*, Record p. 222, 1830.
- ¹³³ Weitbrecht, J. J. *Protestant Missions in Bengal* p. 297-8, 1844.
- ¹³⁴ W.M.M.S. MSS. Hodson to the Secretary March 26, 1833.
- ¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, Percival to the Society. July 24, 1832.
- ¹³⁶ B.M.S. A.R. p. 33, 1820. Appendix No. 1—Sermon preached at Calcutta on March 18, 1820.
- ¹³⁷ Buboïs, J.A. *Letters on the state of Christianity in India* p. 2, 1823.
- ¹³⁸ Roy, Ram Mohun *The English works* vol. 1, p. 256.
- ¹³⁹ *Parliamentary Reports* vol. IX p. 100 1831-2.
- ¹⁴⁰ Smith *The life of A. Duff* vol. I, p. 107.
- ¹⁴¹ Latourette, K. S. *A History of Expansion of Christianity* vol. VI, p. 115-6.

Book Reviews

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BENGAL, 1793-1848, N. K. Sinha (Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyah, Calcutta, 1790), pp. viii + 172, Rs. 20/-.

Professor Narendra Krishna Sinha has now given us the third and purportedly the last volume of his most substantial and significant work. He had written an account, in his previous volumes, of the economy of Bengal from Plassey to the Permanent Settlement. This book carries the story from the Settlement to the commercial crisis of 1847-48 when, according to its author, Bengali business men turned from trade to land. Although it is the last volume in a trilogy and ought by all convention produce a sense of a completed achievement, it is in reality a new book, a foray into the unknown, incomplete, daring and important.

In the first two chapters Professor Sinha runs quickly through the tales of unrest, the destruction of Bengali handicraft (which he prefers to call a process of de-industrialization), the drain of wealth (which he refuses to label as such because of a generous impulse to avoid controversy) and the development of the triangular India-China-Britain trade based on opium. The point is forcefully made that Bengal and India suffered because of British iniquity which took the form of discriminatory legislation and taxes. One can only hope that the broadside here delivered will not touch off another spree of counter-factual conditional analysis among scholars who feel this thesis to be wrong but lack the data to controvert it.

Professor Sinha is among the wisest of historians but he comes into his own only when he forgets the battle of Plassey. Fortunately through the rest of the book he traces in the main the rise and decline of a class of Bengali business men of whom we knew little. There is a chapter which explores the development of inter-regional trade, where he suggests the important conclusion that due to the proliferation of custom houses along the overland routes and the humiliation that class-four employees of the East India Company inflicted upon tradesmen, respectable Bengalis

would have nothing to do with this branch of commerce. The Marwaris rushed in to fill the vacuum and then they stayed. The other important point Professor Sinha makes in this connexion is that the long-range networks of overland trade which had spanned the sub-continent under the Mughals had disintegrated in this period. Trade had become regional and fragmented. This was due partly to the political breakdown in the 18th century and partly to British commercial policy. One notices a certain incongruity between the section where he maintains this proposition and the later chapter where he discusses the networks of some Indian bankers, especially the India-wide operations of the family of Manohardas (pp. 46-47 and pp. 79-81). This would seem to be a matter of emphasis but in view of the significance of the proposition a clearer statement and a closer analysis would undoubtedly be welcome.

There is a feast of delectable information, undisturbed by any distant cannonade, in Professor Sinha's chapters on indigenous banking and Indian business in Calcutta. Diligently gleaned from the records of the Supreme Court, these provide the body of the book, its strength and its flavour. Professor Sinha traces for the first time the decline of the House of the Jagat Seths of Murshidabad after the battle of Plassey and examines in particular the fortunes of this once great clan under Jagat Seth Harukhchand and his sons in the first decades of the 19th century. He matches this with a fascinating account of the development of the banking networks first established by Gopal Das (d. 1784) and expanded by his sons Manohar Das, Gopal Das, Ramchand and Motichand. A Bengali family established itself in the world of indigenous banking in the second half of the 18th century. Founded by one Joymoney Sen, it carried on important business for three generations. There were other such Bengalis in the field, but they were all confined within Bengal in their operations. Only the upcountry *seths* who had settled in Bengal would have wider networks.

Similarly there is a fascinating account of the family of Krishna Kanta Nandi gathered from judicial records. Along with Krishna Kanta, Professor Sinha traces the fortunes of some of the later trading giants like Ramdulal Dey, Radhamadhab Banerjee, Motilal Seal and of course Dwarkanath Tagore. Most of these men left wills at their death

and Professor Sinha gives us exact information about the size of their impressive fortunes. Most of their descendants went to law about their inheritance. Professor Sinha deplors the tendency and gleefully gathers in a rich harvest. We may say that in this little book he has rescued a lost generation, a great service to scholarship.

In dealing with the reasons why this generation of giants who traded so largely left sons who did not trade at all, Professor Sinha blames their growing litigiousness, their religiosity and above all the sense of insecurity created by the failure of the great Union Bank in 1848. There is a chapter on European banking rather oddly placed in the middle of the book which should properly come in to explain the panic caused among the Bengalis by the instability of European trade and finance. Bengalis felt strongly that land was the only form of secure investment and, unlike the Parsis of the west coast, they withdrew upon themselves. British capital flowed in to fill the vacuum in the second half of the 19th century.

These explanations will doubtless be discussed in years to come. It is difficult to measure the loss through litigation. There is virtually no way of forming an estimate of the proportion of wealth devoted to religion. The only case cited by Professor Sinha that of Mohini Mohan Tagore (d. 1828) where such an opinion can be formed suggests no more than 8%, although the provisions of the will are not very clear. (10% was usually spent in *Sradh* p. 99). Above all, we must still wait to learn about the process by which business men acquired landed estates in the 19th century. The remarkable fact about this study is that it does not mention agriculture. Professor Sinha himself appears to be in two minds as to when this rush to land started. At one point he seems to be thinking of 1818 (p. 130) but states often and unequivocally that Bengali business men lived adventurously throughout the first half of the 19th century. There is an unwritten volume on the economic history of Bengal here which, alas, we shall never have from Professor Sinha, who regards his trilogy as complete. He writes still with a healthy contempt for methodology and a certain impatience for any conventional system of notation. There are references in this volume which are clearly beyond pursuit and a considerable amount of subterranean thought. But Professor Sinha, with half-a-dozen books behind him is still a pioneer, continuously ex-

panding the horizons of knowledge. There cannot be any doubt that to the last sentence he writes he will live dangerously in virgin country.

ASHIN DAS GUPTA

BRITISH ORIENTALISM AND THE BENGAL RENAISSANCE, DAVID KOPF, FIRMA
K. L. MUKHOPADHYAY, CALCUTTA, 1969.

A new arrival in the field of Bengal Renaissance studies at first arouses some scepticism. Is it going to repeat the good old respectable theme in the expected manner? Dr. Kopf appears to be aware of the risk of repetition and chooses a problem, which, despite its obvious importance, has so far received little attention.

Dr. Kopf's book is the first systematic study of British Orientalism in Bengal. The most substantial part of the book is the history of the Fort William college in the setting of the emerging city of Calcutta. He does not, however, present a mere factual survey of the college. He places the college in broader perspective and treats it as a part of the institutional complex, particularly in its interaction with the Asiatic Society and the Serampore Mission. This portion of the book is documented from both English and Bengali sources.

The sub-title and the introduction of the book make it quite clear that Dr. Kopf will not hesitate to draw conclusions and apply theoretical formulations. It is difficult to disagree with Dr. Kopf when he states the general usefulness of Malinowski's theory that "the institution is the real isolate of cultural analysis" and that organization is a key to understanding cultural behaviour. It seems, however, that his enthusiasm for 'institution' or 'organization' as a key factor in social and cultural situation has carried him rather too far as when he describes the Dharma Sabha as representing 'the next stage in the Bengal Renaissance' after the Orientalist rediscovery. Here Dr. Kopf somehow fails to spell out the actual functions of the Sabha. In view of the very different image of the Sabha in our minds a clarification on this point would have been helpful and also consistent with the logic of 'functionalism' to which Dr. Kopf seems to be committed.

Again, while this reviewer agrees that the historian can no longer sit in the ivory tower, watching the stream of other disciplines flowing on, he also feels that an overt commitment to sociological or social scientific interpretation may lead to overstatements about patterns, structures and comparative aspects. Analysis is not foreign to history and should not be so. Dr. Kopf is often delightfully fresh when he uses simple historical analysis but seems occasionally to overstate a case when he resorts to sociological tools. This may not be Dr. Kopf's personal failing but may well be a weakness inherent in some social scientific theories. The theme of modernization seems to be overstated in Dr. Kopf's work and this has to be said even though this reviewer agrees with Dr. Kopf that the historian should come to grips with problems and questions of contemporary relevance.

Dr. Kopf's work quite rightly subjects the conventional 'renaissance' concept to analytical scrutiny. It is also expected that a scholar from abroad, studying a 'foreign' culture, would be more concerned to look for comparable and conceptual elements than a scholar studying his own culture from within. Dr. Kopf's book bears the stamp of hard work and sincerity.

PRADIP SINHA

INDIA TRADE UNDER THE DANISH FLAG 1772-1808, Ole Feldbaeck (Scandinavian Institute of Asian studies Monograph Series No. 2) December 1969 pp. 359, 45-75 (Studentpris 38:40).

It is a pleasure to read and review this book. It is based entirely on unpublished primary sources. The archive material is to us intractable. We should be grateful to the author for so much reliable historical data. The subject is covered in unparalleled detail. Quantification is very convincing.

This period—1772-1808—has been described as the high watermark of Danish India trade. Tranquebar was the centre of Danish Trade in India for quite a long time. Serampore displaced it from this position until in the last decade and a half Serampore was practically the only centre of Danish trade in India. So long as Tranquebar was important the

Danish East India Company brought to India metals, maritime stores, munitions and silver. Muskets had a very ready sale in south India because during the years 1772-1782 there were so many wars in the south among Indian powers and between the British and the Indians. The rulers of Travancore and Cochin were much more ready to purchase muskets brought by the Danes than Haidar Ali. Haidar would not take these inferior pieces many of which were rusty and split when fired. With "insulting precision" he would tell the Danes that he was not interested in their products.

The Danish company sent 68 ships to India during this period and it is relevant to note that the nautical skill of the Danish seamen was so remarkable that the company lost only one on the voyage.

Anglo-Indian remittance capital played the most important part in financing the trade of the Danish company and the Danish private traders. Every one of the five chapters of this book contains two sections—the Asiatic company, the private trade. In the illegal British Indian trade through Ostend two Copenhagen merchant houses also acted as agents. During years of war the neutral enclave in Serampore legalized private British trade and Anglo-Indian trade with European countries under Danish flag. Decline of piece goods trade helped the decline of traditional trade. The Danish Asiatic company as also Danish private traders could not trade successfully in bulk goods with commodities like indigo, coffee, cotton etc.

The British East India Company's monopoly of trade with Europe forced this remittance and trade under foreign flag. It was a secondary export channel. Direct expeditions were on Anglo-Indian account and return expeditions were on Anglo-Indian loans. The most thriving period ended in 1798. There was a short break in 1801. After this there was a modest Danish Indian trade on private account up to 1807.

Dr. Feldbaeck supports Professor Holden Furber's thesis that Danish trade was the safety valve for remittance and trade of the Anglo-Indian community. But he does something more. He succeeds in extracting actual figures, period by period, 1772-1778, 1779-1783, 1784-1792, 1793-1801, 1802-1808. He comes to the very definite conclusion that capital and goods to the value of about 55 million current rupees were transported to Europe abroad ships under the Danish flag. Cornwallis's dictum—

"Depression of all foreign European nations in India should be made the principle of our policy"—became successful some time after him. Illicit remittance was a necessity and the Anglo-Indians had no intention of remitting capital on disadvantageous terms. Danish Indian trade practically ended in 1807 and the special circumstances that raised Danish trade to its height could not return even after Serampore was restored to the Danes in 1815. East India company's monopoly had ended.

Danish contact with the Indian community was modest and connection with the Anglo-Indian community particularly with Palmer and Co. was closer. But Tilluck Ram Mullick, Golak Ch. Roy and Raghubir Goswami, Indian suppliers of Danish East India company and Danish private traders, did not fail to fulfil their contracts and a statement is made here that the permanent Indian suppliers were not demanding creditors. In the annals of Indian trade under the Danish flag they appear as very reliable suppliers of return goods and as obliging creditors. English East India Company's records present a different picture.

This publication is one of the most valuable contributions to our economic history.

N. K. SINHA.

DIE NORDWESTGRENZE IN DER VERTEIDIGUNG INDIENS 1900-1908 UND DER WEG ENGLANDS ZUM RUSSISCH-BRITISCHEN ABKOMMEN VON 1907—
West Deutscher Verlag, Cologne and Opladen, 1968.

The problem of the north-west frontier of India 1900-1908 in the series—Contribution to colonial and oversea history, Band 3 is written by a German scholar, Mr. Horst Jaeckel. He describes at some length the conditions in which India found herself placed among the countries of the world before independence and the explosive process of her geographical settings. During the British-Russian conflict when in 1801 Czar Paul I ordered his forces to attack British India, the offensive character of Russian politics became obvious, long before Russian expansionism had become as evident in Asia as it is today.

In this conflict Afghanistan naturally held a key position and it is obvious also that Britain started here her diplomatic activities or policy-

making process. Rawlinson attempted to justify British activities and intervention on the ground that these were demanded in the interest of peace of moral and material improvement and even suggested that interference in Afghanistan has now become a duty and that any moderate outlay or responsibility we may incur in restoring order at Cabul will prove in the sequel to be true economy. But as it happened the situation turned out to be fatal to British prestige in Afghanistan and dangerous to interests in India, and the Russians took advantage of the situation. The problems of Indian defence could be solved only in a political way; this was specially true with respect to the neighbouring countries. The end was the great political partnership between Britain and Russia.

The study was published in 1968, sixty years after the struggle had ended. Such distance of time is essential to achieve historical objectivity and to put in proper perspective the bitterness and prejudices of memoirs.

HANS FILZ

BULLETIN OF THE VICTORIA MEMORIAL, Vol. II, 1968 edited by Dr. A. P. Dasgupta, Secretary & Curator.

The first annual bulletin of the Victoria Memorial to be printed is an attractive production. It incorporates a report on activities and acquisitions during 1968, several articles presumably based on papers read on aspects of 18-19th century Calcutta and book reviews. Of particular interest is the Descriptive Catalogue of Oil Paintings by the the Daniells—Thomas and William—now in the custody of the Memorial. The photographs in 8 plates to illustrate the articles and the catalogue has added to its attraction.

N. R. RAY.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CALCUTTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR 1969

I have much pleasure in presenting the Report for the sixty-second year of the Society ended in December, 1969.

The Society's main activities in 1969, as in the last several years, were concerned with the publication of its two journals. *Bengal Past And Present* served a total of 307 subscribers of whom 162 are institutions, the rest individuals, both here and abroad. You will be glad to learn that we include in the list of our subscribers academies in U. K., France, Holland, Germany, Denmark, U.S.A., Canada, Newzealand, Australia, Japan, Hong-Kong, Singapore, besides Nepal and Pakistan. The well-known dealers in journals and periodicals, Messers. Blackwell's, Oxford, have put in the name of our journal in the catalogue of periodicals with world-wide circulation. But the number of Indian universities and academies subscribing to the journal continues to be static, though we had reasons to hope for substantial increase in their quota. Unfortunately the number of journals, exclusively devoted to history, is very limited and none, excepting one or two, is older than ours; and yet we have not been able to enlist more than 27 university subscribers in India so far, even though the number of Indian universities had been steadily on the increase until recently.

In the year under review subscriptions actually received on account of *Bengal Past And Present*, amounted to Rs. 4,848.33 p, showing that a sum of Rs. 2,810.00 approximately due for the year is yet to be collected. Reminders have been sent and we hope to receive the major portion of the amount still due from subscribers. Coming to individual subscribers we notice a decline in our number, compared to the number of members enlisted in the Diamond Jubilee and following year. This is partly because a Jubilee is not an annual event and partly because a sizeable number of members enlisted in 1967 and 1968 have left India, and their places are yet to be filled.

Itihas presents a decidedly dismal picture. It has been a heavy liability since it made its appearances four years ago. In our books we have entries of 330 names as subscribers, but we have not been favoured with subscription by more than 32% of the total strength, so far, and this after we sent two reminders to each defaulter. We were compelled, in the circumstances, to reduce the number of issues from 4 to 3, as a measure of economy, but even then we find the cost of publication on account of *Itihas* to be well in excess of its income. In the year ended 31st Dec. 1969 our expenditure for printing and despatch of 4 numbers of *Itihas* totalled Rs. 2,687.95, leaving us with a deficit in the neighbourhood of Rs. 2,000/-. To make matters still worse for us, we have not received the renewal of the Special Grant made last year by the Govt. of West Bengal towards publication of *Itihas*. Incidentally, we are yet to receive the modest recurrent State

Govt. Grant of Rs. 1,000/- for the current financial year towards publication of Bengal Past And Present, inspite of the Government in the Department of Education, informing us that the usual grant has been sanctioned. Even now, with hardly two weeks before the financial year is due to expire, we can only await the green signal from the office of the Accountant-General, West Bengal.*

The excess expenditure on account of Itihas, the mounting printer's Bill and the near-exhaustion of the stock of back numbers of Bengal Past And Present whose disposal through sale in course of the last five years brought us nearly Rs. 15,000/-—pose for the Society a very serious financial problem. I wonder, if we can afford, in the circumstances, to have three issues of Itihas in the coming years.

The preparation of Index to Vol. 39 and up-to-date of Bengal Past and Present is yet to be undertaken. The delay has been due partly to (a) inadequacy of funds and (b) the suggestion that instead of having a set of 2 or 3 companion volumes of Index to the three already published, and long out of print, we should better bring out in one complete and handy volume a properly arranged list of articles published in all the 88 volumes of the journal. This will serve the same purpose as a detailed Index, involve much less expense, avoid the need of re-printing the out-of-print volumes of Index and offer the additional advantage of making available relevant information in one single volume, on the articles appearing in Bengal Past And Present since its inception. As decided at the last Annual General meeting we have kept a sum of Rs. 4,000/- as a Reserve Fund for the purpose.

In the year under review, the Society, I regret to say, was unable to organise any lectures, seminars or discussions, consistent with the aims and objectives of the Society. Finances are hardly a problem here. I would request the members to kindly take effective steps so that the Society may live up to its objectives and the Annual Report, in future, may deal with items other than the journals which have so far monopolised all its activities.

I offer my grateful thanks to all my colleagues in the service of the Society and recall, in particular, the active interest taken by some of the members, whose names I refrain from mentioning as I know them to be allergic to formal acknowledgements. But I may be permitted to make an exception, for I owe it to myself to express my personal sense of gratitude to our President, His Grace The Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan, whose guidance and generous help made it possible, so long, to have the Society's office in the premises of the institution to which I belonged as one of its resident staff, much to the benefit of the Society and the convenience of its Hony. Secretary.

31st March 1970

N. R. RAY.
Hony. Secretary

* Both these grants, we are glad to note, have since then been received.

CALCUTTA HISTORICAL

*Statement of Receipts and Payments***RECEIPTS**

To Balance as at 1st January, 1969		
Cash in hand	160.81	
Cash in hand A/c 'Itihas'	425.73	
With the Mercantile Bank Ltd.		
On current Account	6,366.88	
On Fixed Deposit	1,000.00	7,953.42
Subscription for 1967	212.00	
" " 1968	1,095.98	
" " 1969	4,848.33	
" " 1970	312.40	
" " Life Member	750.00	7,218.71
Subscription on A/c 'Itihas'		694.00
Sale of Old copies of Journals		2,413.94
Sale of 'Itihas'		131.70
Grant from Government of West Bengal 1968/69	1,000.00	
'Itihas'	1,500.00	2,500.00
Interest on Fixed Deposit for 1968 and 1969		112.00
Sale proceeds of House of Jagat Seth		944.69
Income from Advertisement		40.00

Rs. 22,008.46

AUDITORS' REPORT

We have examined the above Statement of Receipts and Payments of the Calcutta Historical Society, for the year ended 31st December, 1969, with the books and vouchers of the Society and have found it to be in accordance therewith.

26th February, 1970.
Calcutta,

LOVELOCK & LEWES
Chartered Accountants

SOCIETY

for the year ended 31st December 1969.

PAYMENTS

By Printing Charges—Journals		5,111.53
Printing Charges—Itihas		2,577.85
Bank Charges		122.45
Postage	611.74	
Stationery and Printing	381.64	
Conveyance	33.71	1,027.89
Postage (Itihas)		110.10
Auditors' Fee		100.00
Establishment Charges		650.00
Furniture		125.70
Balance as on 31st December, 1969		
Cash in hand	87.42	
Cash in hand A/c 'Itihas'	165.38	
With the Mercantile Bank Ltd.		
On Current Account	7,930.94	
On Fixed Deposit	4,000.00	12,183.74

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AN ANNOUNCEMENT

The July-December (1970) issue of Bengal Past and Present will appear as Sir Jadunath Centenary Volume to mark the occasion of the hundredth birth anniversary of the eminent historian.

Statement about ownership and other particulars about Newspaper
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Date 10-5-70

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The Calcutta Historical Society	

Some Unpublished Records of the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-1816)¹

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IN view of the proximity of Bihar to Nepal the Company's Officers in Bihar, both civil and military, had to be quite vigilant during the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-1816. A large body of troops had to be posted by the Company's Government at Majorgang near Mallai. Prinsep has narrated some details about British military activities on the Saran frontier, first under the command of General Marley and then under his successor Major General George Wood.

Under orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Major Edward Roughsedge, Commanding Ramghur Battalion, proceeded to take part in the Anglo-Nepalese War with a detachment under his command consisting of six companies of infantry and two four pounders with camp followers of *Bangywallas*, the total number being 3,500 persons. He wrote to Henry Douglas, Judge-Magistrate of the City of Patna on the 31st October, 1814 that he would encamp with his Detachment at Munnorra on the banks of the river Poonpoo on the 9th November and at Bankipur on the 10th November and requested him for "giving the customary orders for the provision of supplies on those places on the days mentioned".² He also sent letters to C. J. Sealy, Magistrate of Tirhut, and to H. Parry, Collector of Tirhut, informing them of the march of the battalion and requesting them for "the usual number of supplies". After reaching Muzaffarpur he sent a communication to Lt. Col. Fagan on the 20th November, 1814, with a requisition for a Regiment of Cavalry and with a suggestion to enlist support of the local Rajas of Bettiah,

¹ Based on Ranchi and Saran Collectorate Records, now preserved in the Bihar State Central Archives, Patna.

² Correspondence of Edward Roughsedge relating to the Nepal War, 1814-1816, preserved in the Bihar State Archives, Patna, *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, 1958 session,

Darbhangha and Purnea. Next day he wrote to General Marley reiterating the demand for cavalry. It is stated in a letter of Major Edward Roughsedge to Major Bradshaw, dated camp at Dacca, the 26th November, 1814, that a detachment of the Ramghur Battalion under Lt. Hering marched from there that day with a guide and two horse-men, to join the troops under Major Bradshaw at Burharwa, situated on the right bank of the Bagmati. We know from one letter of Major Edward Roughsedge to Lt.Col. Fagan, dated 30th November, 1814, from his camp at Buspeeta, that at Burharwa, Major Bradshaw "destroyed three companies" of Nepalese, probably on the 25th November. The Terai was immediately evacuated by the Goorkhas, and occupied and annexed pro-tempore, by proclamation, to the British possessions".

After making some arrangements for the defence of the Terai till the arrival of General Marley, Major Bradshaw placed Major Roughsedge "for the present in charge of the protection of the Zillah of Tirhoot from the possible attempts of the enemy to plunder the district". So Major Roughsedge called on the Raja of Darbhanga and "the other great malguzars" in that frontier "to assemble a portion of their dependents in arms in the neighbourhood of the position" he might take up. He wrote to the Magistrate of Tirhut on the 30th November: "I have to request the favour of your countenancing with your influence and authority my requisitions on these persons, and in general that you will be pleased to give orders to the officers subject to your command to yield a zealous and prompt compliance to all calls from me connected with the due performance of the duty to which I have been appointed". After reaching Janakpur Major Roughsedge addressed a letter to Major Bradshaw on the 8th December, 1814, which contained a detailed account of the measures he proposed to adopt for further success. He complained that he did not get any assistance from the neighbouring *zamindars* for the protection of Tirhut. He suggested the "expediency of the establishment of some forces which...should if possible be composed of cavalry, along the northern frontier from the Bhagmati to the Coosah" (Kosi) Major Roughsedge utilised the help of some local men to collect necessary information. By the 23rd December, 1814, Major Roughsedge was at Rattoo Sudder, by the 4th January, 1815, he was near Pusta and by the 16th January he was at Buragurhee. He informed Captain Watson,

Adjutant General, in a letter dated the 19th March, 1815, and also to Major General George Wood how the villages in the Nepalese Tarai were brought under British control by the middle of March, 1815.

Major General G. Wood, Commanding Sarun Division of the 1st Army, wrote to Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw, Political Agent to the Governor-General, in that month: "As the Gorkha Troops Regular and Irregular, appear to have for this season entirely evacuated the Teraee and cannot, it may be fairly inferred almost under any circumstances, return in any force, till the breaking up of the ensuing rainy season, I would with every deference to your better judgement in such matters suggest the expediency of the Civil authorities of Government being enacted to take immediate possession of the several portions of it bordering on and contiguous to the districts over which they at present exercise a Judicial and Revenue authority.

"As far back as the line or frontier I have been tracing in my present route towards Jenekpore (Janakpur) I think they may without fear of hinderance or molestation from the enemy and the inhabitants appear to be a defenceless inoffensive people and have no doubt will be easily conciliated.

"At any rate I am of opinion that establishing *Thanas* would greatly contribute to the much desired purpose so forcibly urged by His Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander in chief of effectually depriving the Gurkhas of the resource of this extensive tract as they would pervade every village easily ascertain the quantity of grain concealed in any about each, and after making a due allowance for the subsistence of the inhabitants of the Teraiee convert the superabundance into resources on account of Government as the inhabitants all concur in stating that the Goorkha Government have not made any collection from them this season and I trust are not now enabled to enforce any while the detachment under my personal command continues its movements on the skirts of the forest.

"I conceive then that the inhabitants should be invited if not compelled to send their grain to the southward for sale which would enable them to pay their Revenue to our Government.

"In fact from observation this manner of disposing of their surplus grain seems to be their only resource and that it is generally followed up

as from almost every viillage along the frontier grain was boarding on Hackeries for the purpose of being transported to the southward and great number of Bunjaree cattle loaded with it, crossed our line of march in that direction.

"All the villagers concur in stating that the Goorkhas Government collect their revenue in cash and never take anything in kind and that their army tho' they may subsist on their villages while without the skirts of this forest or immediately hovering within them do not remove any quantity of grain with them when they retire."

H. Middleton, Acting Collector of Sarun, communicated as follows to Richard Roche, Acting President and Members of the Board of Revenue, at the time: "I do myself the honor of forwarding copies of a letter I received from Lt. Col. P. Bradshaw and of one addressed by that Gentleman to the Magistrate of this Zillah who forwarded the same for my information and guidance.

"I have taken the necessary steps for establishing authority of Government in the Terrai of Nepaul by appointing acting Tehsildars and Aumeens, who will proceed as soon as I have engaged the whole number that will be required for the execution of the duty particularized in the enclosed correspondence. The particulars and names of the persons so nominated will be forwarded for the sanction of the Board in a few days.

"The Board in their letter to me of the 27th December last, were pleaed to direct that I should hold myself in readiness to proceed to the spot so soon as I received notice of my presence being required. None of the letters, (Copies of which are enclosed) state the necessity of that measure and I consequently shall await the orders of the Board on this subject.

"Should the Gentlemen of the board think proper and depute me to the Terrai, for the purposes above stated, shall with great readiness immediately set out but on consideration of the responsibility of the duties of the office, I did not deem it prudent, to leave the sudder station without first receiving a final orders from the Board to that effect".

H. Middleton informed Lt. Colonel Bradshaw on the 4th April, 1815: "I have the Honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo.

"On your Communication reaching me I took measures for engaging

Native Officers and others for the purpose of receiving possession of the Terrai, and there establishing the authority of Government for some days I could not prevail on any persons to engage since notwithstanding all my efforts to convince the people to the contrary, a report had obtained currency, that the service on which these officers were to be deputed was likely to be a dangerous one.

"I have now the pleasure to acquaint you of my having this day appointed Actg. Tuhseeldars Acting Mohurrirs whom I have directed to proceed to you, and commence upon the duty with which each may be entrusted.

"I have annexed a memorandum of the names and profession, of the Officers, who have proceeded to the Terrai, and should a further number be in your opinion necessary I will immediately appoint them: On the 29th of the last month I forwarded to the Board of Revenue Copies of all the Correspondence on the subject of Establishing the authority of Government in the Terraie of Nepaul, and those greatmen will determine whether my personal attendance on the spot be requisite or not. Should their reply be in the affirmative I shall of course immediately proceed and in the near time I shall feel myself much obliged, if you will be good enough to direct such advice and instructions to be given by your officers to mine, as they may appear to be in need of.

"As I am totally unacquainted with the country at the foot of the Hills, I have left the distribution of the persons whom I have deputed, to your better Judgement, and they will (I trust) act in exact Conformity to the Orders you may be pleased to give them".

In reply to this letter Lieut. Bradshaw wrote to H. Middleton, Acting Collector of Sarun, from his camp near Belwa on the 11th April, 1815: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th Instant on the subject of deputing Tehseeldars into the Teraiee, enclosing a list of the names of 8 persons of that description whom you have appointed to act, and leaving their number and distribution to my discretion.

"The number of the Tehseeldars appointed by you I should think sufficient. When they arrive in my camp I will direct the people who have acted in similar capacities under my orders to give them all the information and which their previous Employment may enable them to supply.

“Connected with this subject I have to observe that it would, in my opinion, be useful towards introducing the British authority in the new territory were two or more places of security established for the residence of some of the Thanehdars and Tehseeldars. There may not, perhaps be any real danger in their situation without such provision for their security but as many of the inhabitants under the influence of some of the fugitive Officers of the late Government might be disposed to disturb our establishments, and that at all times the Nepaulese make use of exaggerated reports to terrify our people, some walled places like the Gunjes in the North West Provinces, or little Gurkees such as the Teraiee exhibits many traces of, might be used with advantage. In the southern part of Rutchut the little Gurkee of Kurrerbunna has enabled my people to maintain themselves, and that Tuppeh has in consequence been better retained in subjection and yielded more than any of the rest. There is a little Gurkee near Aloo which might be put into repair at a small expense and rendered fit for the above purpose. And the famous enclosure of Simroun offers another situation of security if the jungles which surround it were destroyed. It might, perhaps, for this purpose be worth while to encourage people to cultivate within that space which from its situation between two rivers and possessing numerous tanks, offers inducements to persons disposed to settle there.”

The Board of Revenue in Calcutta informed H. Middleton, Acting Collector of Sarun, on the 14th April, 1815: “With reference to the correspondence which has passed on the subject of Establishing the British authority in the Teraie, I am directed to acquaint you that it is the intention of Government to make some special arrangement for the accomplishment of the object above alluded to and that in the meantime it will be sufficient on your part to depute persons to collect the revenue and to make such other temporary arrangements as may appear to be necessary.

“The Board approve of the Establishment of Officers entertained by you (as reported in your letter of the 6th Instant) and authorise you to charge the amount in your accounts for the present.”

Arrangements were soon made by the Company's Government to assert their authority over the Nepalese Tarai. J. Adam, Secretary to the Government at Fort William, sent the following correspondence to

H. Middleton on the 29th April, 1815: "It having appeared to His Excellency the Governor General and to the Hon'ble the Vice-President in Council on a mature consideration of the subject, to be expedient to vest the charge of the Police and Revenue of the Terraie in the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Bradshaw the Political Agent of the Governor General for the affairs of Nepal, until it shall be practicable and convenient to introduce the Laws and Regulations of the British Government into the Terraie, I am directed to desire that you will transfer the charge of the Revenue of the Terraie to Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw, who has received authority and instructions to receive it from you.

"You will be pleased to correspond with Lieutenant Colonel Bradshaw and to afford to that Officer every aid in your power in the execution of the duties now assigned to him".

Necessary instructions to the following effect were communicated to Lt. Col. Bradshaw, Political Agent in Nepal, on the same date: "On a mature consideration of the circumstances in which the Terraie will continue to be situated until the permanent annexation of that tract of country to the British territory shall be confirmed by a regular Treaty of Peace between the British Government and the state of Nepaul, it has appeared both to the Governor General and to the Vice-President in Council that the most advisable arrangement for conducting the affairs of the Terraie for the present will be, to vest the management of them in your hands. His Lordship has accordingly relinquished the intention announced to you in my letter of the 22nd ultimo, of appointing a Civil Officer to that special duty, and has determined to avail himself of your abilities, zeal, and knowledge of the country, combined with the peculiar advantages resulting from your exercise of Political powers in that quarter, for the introduction of the British authority in the conquered territory of the formation and execution of such temporary arrangements of Police and Revenue as it shall seem expedient to adopt preparatory to the establishment of a system of a more permanent nature.

"You will accordingly be pleased to receive charge of the administration of the Terrai from the Magistrates and Collectors of Tirhoot and Sarun respectively, and to enter without delay on the execution of the duties assigned to you conforming to the following general informations.

"The immediate introduction in the conquered territory of a

permanent system for the administration of Civil and Criminal justice or the settlement and Collection of Revenues, would obviously be premature in the present circumstances of that country and must necessarily be postponed until the Government shall be prepared to form a satisfactory judgment on the subject founded on the result of practical experience and accurate local information.

"The object of immediate attention therefore will be confined to the following points:

"1st. to maintain the tranquility of the country by adequate Police arrangements and Establishment.

"2nd. to secure the Balances of Revenue which were not realized by the Gorkhas when their authority ceased to prevail.

"3rd. to conclude such temporary settlements with the land holders and others as may secure to Government the regular receipt of the revenue until a permanent arrangement shall be effected.

"4th. to collect and arrange all attainable information of a nature calculated to assist the Government in forming a future settlement of the country.

5th. The Governor General reposes entire confidence in the application of your zeal, industry, integrity, and ability, to the accomplishment of these objects. Unpossessed of that degree of local information which would be necessary to enable the Government-General to furnish you with detailed instructions on each of the above points, His Lordship must necessarily limit them to a few general observations, and directions which I now proceed to communicate to you.

6th. The arrangement with regard to the number and disposition of Police Thannahs and the extent of the establishment of Officers and Burkundauzes as concerted between you and the Magistrates of Sarun and Tirhoot, appears to the Governor-General to be efficient and satisfactory and the charge attending that arrangement is sanctioned. The Governor-General observes that in the difficulty experienced by the Magistrate of Saran as to procuring persons properly qualified and at the same time disposed to accept the office of Darogah in the Terrai, that Gentleman deputed some of the established Thanahdars in his own district into the Terrai, an arrangement which, under the circumstances represented by Mr. Elliot, appears to be judicious. No objection will

probably exist to the continuance of that arrangement should it be deemed necessary under the transference to your authority of the charge of the Police of the Terraie. The employment however both in the Department of Police and of Revenue of fixed inhabitants of the country and of persons heretofore in the service of the Nepalese Government, appear to be an expedient plan and likely to be at once conciliatory and efficient. His Lordship observes with satisfaction therefore, that this method has been pursued by the Acting Magistrate of Tirhoot and His Lordship recommends the adoption of it throughout your jurisdiction, to such extent as you may deem to be practicable and safe ; it is superfluous to observe that in the selection of persons of this class caution will be requisite in ascertaining how far their fidelity may be relied upon.

“In signifying to you his approbation of the arrangements actually made and in progress, it is not His Lordship’s intention to confine you to a strict adherence to those arrangements. It is on the contrary the wish of his Lordship that you should exercise under a general reference to the spirit of the instructions, a perfect discretion on this head, reporting to me, for His Lordship’s previous sanction or subsequent confirmation, as the nature of the case may suggest, any variation which you may judge it expedient to introduce.

“An important part of your duty will be the cognizance and punishment of offences against the public peace, which must, to a certain extent be exercised by the authority on the spot. You are empowered to take judicial cognizance of such offences, and breaches of the peace, as may require the immediate interposition of authority and to inflict slight Corporal punishment or imprisonment for a limited time, on person convicted of such offences.

“You will bear in mind, that as the British Regulations are not to be immediately introduced into the Terraie, it must, until that shall take place, be regarded as a conquered Country, and subject to Martial Law, or such other law as the conqueror may think fit to impose. It will be perfectly competent therefore to the Officer Commanding the Troops to inflict summary punishment on gross and violent infractions of the public peace, but excepting in cases requiring an early and striking example, it is the desire of the Governor General, that all cases of magni-

tude should be reserved for the ultimate orders of the Government ; when outrage and violence occur in such a form as to require immediate suppression for the restoration of public Tranquillity or the maintenance of the authority of the Government, the necessary application for military aid must be made by you to the Officer Commanding the Troops who will be prepared to act as circumstances may render necessary.

“The events which have occurred since the first introduction of our authority into the Terraie of Chumparun, consequent to the success attending our arms at Burhurwa and the time which has elapsed have probably either left so small a portion of the public revenue to be realized on account of the past season or have involved the reciprocal claims of the Government and the Landholders in such obscurity as to make any attempt to ascertain what is yet due, of very doubtful success. Your own judgment and knowledge of the actual state of the case will form the best guide with respect to this point.

“With regard to the settlement and realization of the Revenues of the Conquered Territory for which it will now be necessary to make provision, the Governor General directs me to desire that you will on no account, form any arrangements for the payment of the Public Revenues for a period extending beyond the term of one year ; arrangements for a more extended period might materially obstruct the settlement which it is hoped may be hereafter made on a more durable basis through the medium of the regular authorities in the Revenue Department.

“It is impracticable for the Governor General to prescribe any precise rules or even any general principles altogether satisfactory for the guidance of your conduct in the settlement of the Revenues ; the object in view being simply to realize for the benefit of the Hon’ble Company the full amount of Revenues derivable from the territories acquired by its arms until a permanent arrangement shall be carried into effect ; it appears to His Lordship that the most effectual and prudent method will be to frame the new settlement (limited as above stated to the term of one year) on the basis of the engagement subsisting between the late Government and the proprietors or farmers of the land.

“It will be your attention and efforts to encourage return into the Terraie of such of its inhabitants as may have fled from it during the late disturbed state of affairs, either to the Hon’ble Company’s old posses-

sion or to the territories of the Nepalese within the Hills, and you are authorized with this view to hold out an assurance in the name of the Government, that no person will be molested or called to account for the conduct which he may have pursued during the period of uncertainty that preceded the establishment of the British authority in the conquered lands. His Lordship is not aware of the necessity for making any exception to this general act of oblivion, but if there are any cases which in your opinion were marked with such a degree of treachery or deceit as to render it expedient to exclude them from the benefit of the declaration, you are at liberty to modify it as relating to them by rendering the pardon subject to the ultimate pleasure of the Governor-General and you will state the particulars of each case to me for His Lordship's consideration and orders.

"The zeal, application and industrious research directed by judgment already manifested by you on various occasions, render unnecessary to enjoin the unremitted employment of your efforts to collect and methodize information calculated to facilitate future arrangements for the settlement of the country of which you will have the charge.

"You are authorized to entertain such establishment as may be necessary for assisting you in the details of the duty now assigned to you, submitting to me for the sanction of the Governor-General, a statement of the Establishment which you may find it requisite to engage under the separate Heads of Police and Revenue. His Lordship relies on your approved zeal for the public interest for every practicable attention on your part to the principles of economy in the formation of these Establishments.

"You will report to me for the information and orders of the Governor-General your proceedings in the execution of the duties assigned to you by these Instructions submitting to the Acting Secretary to the Government in the Revenue and Judicial Department, for the information of the Vice-President in Council, copies of all your reports and dispatches.

"I am directed to inform you that the charge of the land situated East of the Coosah (Kosi) from which the enemy has been expelled, has been vested in Captain Latter."

The Mutiny and Revolt of 1857— A Survey in Retrospection

N. K. SINHA

SO much has been written on the events of 1857-'58 that it is very difficult to read all that has been written even if one knows the gentle art of skipping. There was a sudden and massive growth of historical literature on the subject fifteen years ago but even now many articles on the Mutiny are published. Some of these articles are fruits of patient research. The Mutiny appears to be an overworked mine but nuggets are still to be found.

The Descriptive List of Mutiny papers in the Bhopal archives (Vol. III)* does not add very much to our knowledge of the subject. But there are some significant details. The greased cartridge was everywhere one of the causes of the outbreak. But the sugar sold at Sahore had some particles of bone-dust in it. This is said to have added to the fury of the people there. The discontented Sepoy leaders were Wali Shah Risaldar and Mahavir Kotha-Havildar. Even in Bhopal it was a hindu-muslim combine. British sack of Delhi was compared by people in Bhopal to Nadir's sack of the city. In Bhopal also the discontent was not confined to the Sepoys. The Jagirdars were a disaffected lot. The common man was also anti-British. As events moved very fast, wild rumours were widespread. Some of them are recorded. The Begam's firm loyalty to the British kept the rebellious elements in check. As late as 1857 we notice the activity of roving Pindaris.

This is all the information we could collect from this descriptive list of Mutiny papers in Bhopal. Like all local history "a tenth is perhaps worth glancing through, a hundredth worth keeping." But I take this opportunity to draw attention to some distinctive features of the events

* *Descriptive List of "Mutiny Papers"* in the National Archives of India, Bhopal, Vol. III, National Archives of India. Price (inland) Rs. 10.50, (foreign) 24s.6d. or \$3.78.

of 1857-'58 to which we may not attach due importance in the vast accumulation of words on the occurrences of these two years.

The suddenness of the Mutiny took everybody by surprise. It was the first great challenge to the British on an extensive scale. It was thus very different from the localized mutinies before the Mutiny. But there was definitely no large-scale deliberate conspiracy and no prior preparation. The risings were generally uncoordinated and in many places isolated. The contagion spread and there was one microbe in common: "There was hatred in their eyes." Henry Lawrence who came to Oudh three months before the Mutiny had the most perceptive mind among British administrators of those days. He could not fail to notice angry looks. This explains why the military uprising became also a rural revolt.

The Meerut outbreak might have been "sudden and short-lived like a summer gale" but some other spark—not the Enfield rifle and the greased cartridge—would have started a conflagration not long after. There were certain portents in 1857 but the British were like men in an upstairs room, secure, cut off. Only the Bengal army was involved in the Mutiny. It comprised 150,000 men of whom only 23,000 in distant cantonments were Europeans. Most of these Indian troops were high-caste Hindus and nearly 1/3 of them came from Oudh. They were inclined to exaggerate their role in recent British victories and they were very much aware of British disgrace in the Afghan campaign. They had many specific grievances regarding pay, pension rights, terms of service etc. Such grievances had been accumulating but the aggregate of all these could not have produced such an uprising. S. N. Sen has pointed out that about 30,000 Sepoys remained loyal to the end. A like number was disarmed or deserted and 70,000 Sepoys were involved in the Mutiny at different times. If they had risen simultaneously the Mutiny might have become a much more dangerous threat to the British. Like an impetuous torrent they could have swept the British to the sea, if instead of marching from Meerut to Delhi, they had marched to Calcutta gathering all the mutineers on the way.

The revolt originated in the army. But what made it the greatest outburst of discontent in British Indian history? Educated Indians of those days did not support the rebels. The revolt occurred in the region in which there was the largest stockpile of discontent—the extensive area

from Meerut to Shahbad as also Jhansi and Gwalior. But even where there was no open revolt few Indians could suppress a wish to see the British humiliated. In Canning's first proclamation only six talukdars in Oudh were listed as friendly. Between 1819 and 1822 the talukdari settlement had been replaced by a detailed village survey settlement. Large estates were broken up. Old rights, almost forgotten, were revived. Were the cultivators, who were oppressed by the talukdars, so very happy under this new arrangement? It is relevant to note that one of the first acts of the rebels was to drive off the auction purchasers and to return to the previous system of landholding. The peasants returned to their position as tenants and joined those talukdars who fought against the British. The changes introduced in agrarian relations were much too rapid and sudden. The assessment was too high. In 1853 as many as 110,000 acres in the western districts were under hammer. The landholders who escaped sale fell under the clutches of the local bania. Usurious moneylending was regarded as a consequence of the new system of administration. It introduced a new element of extortion in rural areas and the British were indirectly exposed to the odium. The people rejected the benefits of British rule. Even the lowest stratum was shaken up. This is the general picture. There might have been exceptions in certain areas. We forget that at times mass psychology is a basic factor in history.

The deposition of Wazid Ali, King of Oudh, who was always surrounded by eunuchs and singers, could not possibly inspire any popular movement. But there was emotion over the annexation of Oudh. 40,000 unemployed soldiers and retainers of the King of Oudh were thrown adrift. British administrators did not know that the art of administration could be effective only if it recognised certain realities. In the affected areas there was the greatest estrangement between the rulers and the ruled. Lala Hanumant Singh, Talukdar of Dharampur, told those Englishmen whom he escorted to safety: "Sahib, your countrymen came into this country and drove out our King. You sent your officers round the districts to examine the titles of estates. At one blow you took from me lands which from time immemorial had been in my family. I submitted. Suddenly misfortune has befallen you. *The people of the land rose against you.* You came to me when you had been despoiled. I have

saved you but now I march at the head of the retainers in Lucknow and drive you out of the country”.

Canning's view that the revolt was neither Hindu nor Muslim in character was absolutely correct and, as it has been observed, the prejudice against the Muslims was based upon a priori deductive reasoning. In early January 1857 Debendra Nath Tagore, father of Rabindranath, was travelling leisurely in northern India by a boat which touched the sands of the river bed in Delhi. He wrote, "I saw a great crowd collected up above. The Badshah of Delhi was flying kites there. There was nothing else to occupy him now. What was he to do?". This old, almost infirm, kite-flying emperor was suddenly called upon to lead men to defend the city against the British who besieged it. The British army on the ridge expected a tumult, a hindu-muslim riot on the Id day, of which they wanted to take the fullest advantage. Bahadur Shah ordered that no cows were to be killed within the city during the festival of the Id day and if any Muhammadan should do so he would be blown away from a gun. Bahadur Shah himself set the example by sacrificing a sheep at the Idgah. The old emperor thus rose to the highest level of political leadership. This is a fine shade of his character which critics miss and their emphasis is on his debility.

It cannot be denied that superstition and prejudice dominated Indian social consciousness. But this aspect should not be emphasised to the exclusion of others. The placing of Mysore under British rule by Bentinck, the annexation of Coorg in 1834 and of seven states in seven years by the Doctrine of Lapse, sent a cold shiver through the spine of many chiefs. The plight of the talukdars of Oudh touched an emotional chord in the heart of the common people. Feudal attachment was in those days very much a reality. The shock that the British gave to the fabric of Hindu superstition by various social reforms did not perhaps create as much discontent as the pervasive evangelical atmosphere. Evangelical denunciation of Hinduism was regarded as one of the forces of darkness. The greased cartridge only confirmed prevalent suspicion. There were other complicating factors. The swaggering Anglo-Saxon perhaps contributed more to the outbreak than economic or social dislocation. Wood and Macaulay were justified in their assertion made in 1853 that even the character of the Governor-General was less important

than the character and spirit of the servants by whom the administration was carried on. Sleeman had deplored as early as 1843 that "there was no longer that sympathy between the people and the agents of the Government, that the European officers did not show that courtesy towards the middle and higher classes and that kindness towards the humbler which characterised them. The native officer imitated or took advantage of the conduct".

It has been pointed out that the leaders, the 'national' heroes, were not honest, anti-British patriots. They were "discontented potentates and landholders". Some of them were heroes against their will. Mommsen refers in one place to "the very respectable gift of hating". Hatred of the British and boiling courage enabled Tantia Tope to sustain an unequal conflict for so many months. In the court martial he was charged with "waging war with the British government from January (?) 1857 to December 1858 and especially at Jhansi and Gwalior". No charge of murder was brought against him. Kumar Singh, with his passionate attachment to his estate, joined the rebels when he found that the British would not help him out of his financial difficulties. But as a rebel he had the most untarnished record of heroic fighting. How many great fighters in lost causes were guided by unalloyed impersonal motives? Too much has been made of Rani of Jhansi's unwillingness to join the rebels. But when she ultimately joined, her heroic resistance and soldier's death won universal admiration. It was in the last phase of the revolt—the phase of despair—when British victory was a certainty—that the revolt reached a grandeur which touched a responsive chord in the minds of succeeding generations. Failure does not make it inglorious.

The rebels failed though many of them fought resolutely. They had the advantage of surprise and number. But they lacked leadership. Nana Saheb was no trained soldier, nor Kumar Singh, nor Lakshmi Bai, not even Tantia Tope. They enjoyed popular support but how much was the support of a rabble worth in the military sense? In the British army no Sepoy had risen above the rank of a subadar or Jamadar. They were confined to a dead level. The Sepoys' plans of attack were at times excellent but there was no competent military leadership anywhere except in the guerilla movements of Tantia Tope. Their weapons were crude.

At Lucknow they were firing bullets of wood, pieces of iron, copper coins and bullock horns. Sen writes, "If the Enfield rifle caused the Mutiny it helped to overthrow the mutineers". Wars are not won by such *militias*.

Dinkar Rao succeeded in holding in check the army of Gwalior and when they revolted it was too late. The rulers of Patiala, Jind and Kythai enabled the British in Delhi to maintain communication with their base at Ambala. The big Zamindars of Bihar—Dumraon, Darbhanga and Hatya—did not join Kumar Singh. Jang Bahadur helped the British most effectively. In some districts the territorial magnates held down tumultuous peasant rebels. The Begam of Bhopal was very active on the British side. But this support which the British received should not make us forget the real character of the revolt, the environment, circumstances and emotional background. "There was hatred in their eyes".

Stephen said, "I think of the great competitive examination which lasted for just 100 years of which the first paper was set upon the field of Plassey and the last (for the present) under the walls of Delhi". Such statements show ridiculous unawareness of the forces that shape movements in history. Ellenborough—always flamboyant—drew pointed attention to the haughty superciliousness of the British, the absence of a foundation in the hearts of the people. He said, "It is maintained only by the fidelity of the army. I wish to fix it in the hearts of the princes, chiefs and peoples as well as those of the sepoys. I can make it as strong as it ever was in the days of Akbar but then I must act as Akbar". This was said some years before the Mutiny. But the Mutiny and the revolt of 1857 led to a virtual reconquest. Even after 1858 British administration remained associated only with military success, political management and material prosperity for the few. It remained unsupported by any principle of loyalty. One single example will show how much the spirit of British administration differed from that of Akbar. Shahzada Firuz Shah, one of the leaders of the revolt, died in exile in Mecca. His widow applied for a compassionate allowance to the government of India. In November 1881 a compassionate allowance of rupees five only was granted to her on condition that she should never return to Delhi. Ripon

raised it to Rs. 100/- per month. Ellenborough's reference to the generous spirit of Akbar looks so ridiculous in this context.

If the rebels had succeeded the Mutiny and Revolt of 1857-'58 would have been an anomalous chapter in history, a victory of "stationaryism" as the *Hindu Patriot* would put it. It was fortunate that the British empire subsided into history books not in 1857, but ninety years later. The occurrences were vividly remembered in the affected areas for two generations. It was a traumatic experience for the British. A year of racial warfare left increasing racial aloofness as its legacy. Its last swell was perhaps the Amritsar massacre.

Towards a Primary Source Bibliography for the Study of the Indian Coal Mining Industry c. 1843-c. 1947

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THE almost total absence of a critical Secondary Literature on the Indian Coal Mining Industry is somewhat surprising¹ in view of its endogenous stature² as well as its more (socially) significant exogenous forward input services to the economy as a whole. One of the distinguishing characteristics of mining³, as opposed to manufacturing activity is the former's irreplaceable wasteing resource-asset nature. In the specifically Indian context the very limited reserves of Metallurgical Coal (vis-a-vis the targeted iron and steel growth rate⁴ and the relative abundance of the other raw-material constituents of the Blast Furnace) has recently resulted in measures being taken for a total re-structuring of the Industry in the Jharia Field⁵. A consideration of how past extractive methods⁶ have conditioned and constrained present productive potential is a revealing exercise in how Adam Smith's "invisible hand" simply does not work': In this industry the dictum of private gain and social loss has been in evidence, par excellence; the recent Ordinance taking over the Coking Coal Mines is a clear, however belated, recognition that the pattern of organisation and mining technique, existent in Jharia almost from the first opening-up of the Field in the 1890's was quite incompatible with socially efficient operational and conservational goals. Contemporary interest in this one aspect of the Coal Industry, viz. the "irrational"⁸ and (avoidably) wasteful system of mining that has taken place, may invoke academic enquiry into the many interesting other facets of this major industry. This bibliography is an attempt to draw attention to the richness of the primary-source data available.

In due deference to both the size and the geographical dispersion of this Industry, the search for primary-data has, necessarily, been very

selective. Hence the Outer-Lying Tertiary fields have been ignored⁹ and within the Gondwana Measures, attention has been focussed upon Raniganj, Jharia and Giridih to the virtual exclusion of Peninsular India and even the more Western Deposits of Bihar such as Bokaro-Ramghur, Palamau-Daltonganj and Karanpura¹⁰.

On the eve of Independence, the Industry approximated to what the economist terms a classical "Eel-Shaped" Oligopoly. That is, there was a numerical minority of firms controlling a greatly disproportionate share of the total product at the one extreme, the converse at the other and, in between there was a great variety of scale-sizes comprising the largest group of enterprises. The statistics (for 1942¹¹) graphically illustrate this structure. Of the 774 working collieries (only) 30 were responsible for approx. 38% of the total output for that year, whereas at the "other end" (as many as) 337 collieries produced a bare approx. 3% proportion. I have found it analytically convenient to examine this oligopoly along the following lines:

I. Those J. S. Co's whose share capital was held in the main (but by World War II, by no means exclusively¹²) by British Investors. Invariably these Cos. were under the management of one of the large Calcutta agency houses. A useful demarcation can be made within this first category between—

A. Those veritable "giant" Co's. at the apex which not surprisingly for mineral economics¹³ were among the earliest concerns in their respective regions, consisting of:

In the Raniganj Field

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. The Bengal Coal Company | (A. Yule) |
| 2. The Equitable Coal Company | (Macneills) |
| 3. The New Beerbhoom Coal Company | (Balmer-Lawrie) |

In the Jharia Field

- | | |
|------------------------------------|------------|
| 4. The Burrakur Coal Company | (Birds) |
| 5. The East India Coal Company | (Jardines) |
| 6. The Raneegunje Coal Association | (Kilburns) |

In 1944 these "Giant Six" Cos. accounted for approx. 23% of the total output of the above Fields.¹⁴ This figure moreover is a startling

under-estimate of their relative importance since they produced a much higher proportion of the better grades of coal.¹⁵

B. Attached to the Agencies mentioned¹⁶ a constellation of smaller (not in the absolute sense) sized Cos. existed. In many cases the satellite concerns originated from the property holdings of the "senior" Coal Co. of the Group and the link was maintained via, amongst other things, common directorships and share subscribers.¹⁷

Most of the Cos. of the (A) and (B) types were members of the I.M.A., the predominantly European Lobby.¹⁸ The combined importance of I can be thus gauged quite easily. In 1944 the I.M.A. was responsible for approx. 70% of the year's output, once again an under-estimate of the real locus of power since their Members monopolised the best grades.

II. Those Collieries owned and operated by Indians, and whose collective interest were served by the I.M.F. (for Raniganj) and the I.C.O.A. (for Jharia). A great variety of scale differentiation is here in evidence ranging from the large J. S. Co. down to the humblest of single proprietorship. Numerically the latter were predominant, the "typical" enterprise producing very small outputs of inferior coals from the out-crop or from very shallow depths and marketing on a forward-contract basis to the Railways (not having a selling establishment of their own many disposed of their output to non-Railway Consumers by middlemen¹⁹ or via the sales department of one of the larger Concerns.²⁰) From the very earliest time, this type of firm had been precariously existing on the periphery of the Industry, their numbers rising and falling, often spectacularly with the prevailing selling price.²¹

In terms of output criteria the fewer, but larger enterprises are of much more macro significance. It is helpful to break down such a category on the basis of regional differences of ownership with its correspondingly differing scale sizes over time. Before the 1925 depression set in, the Bengalis²² with a sprinkling of Armenians²³ were predominant, and it was they who were responsible for the creation of the I.M.F. in 1913. During the subsequent Inter-War years however, Marwaris²⁴ Punjabis²⁵ and the Gujeratis²⁶, or rather Kutchis²⁷ displaced the Bengali (Indian) hegemony, in many instances taking over the Bengali concerns which had been dependent upon them for borrowed capital.²⁷

N.B. After Independence all the Indians gained by the declining British presence entrepreneurial as well as investing, including some Bengalis. Undoubtedly however the lion's share found its way into the hands of the latter three groups, joined by some incoming Sindhis.

III. Those vertically integrated units whose output was generally not placed upon the open-market, but was internally consumed by the "mother" enterprise in whose interests the collieries were acquired. These are appropriately termed the "captive collieries".

The two Iron and Steel producers, TISCO and IISCO along with the British Inland Steam Navigation Co. BISNCO were the largest captive owners in the private sector. In 1945 the 6 TISCO Collieries (with an annual output of 950,000 tons, the three IISCO ores (350,000 tons p.a.) and the single BISNCO Unit (425,000 tons p.a.) had a combined approx. 8% of the total output for that year.²⁸

IV. Those Collieries owned by and worked for individual Railway Cos. This organisational form is similar to III above in being "captive", but because of the important Government influence on the way in which such collieries were operated (true even before the Cos. were taken over by State, either their management or share capital) it is useful to differentiate them from the private enterprise group. Moreover unlike III the contracts of the Railway Collieries expressly forbade sales to the open market (except to clear "surplus" and low-grade rausings²⁹) This was a constraint upon the Railway Collieries that had considerable implications with reference to their pre-ton costs, since it meant that such collieries were consistently operating at a significantly less than full-capacity ratio.³⁰

A point of considerable economic significance arises when comparison of motivational differences between the captive and the non-captive sectors is made. A priori, unit profit maximisation and hence marginal cost pricing is the appropriate assumption for the latter (market collieries) and output maximisation and concomitantly average cost pricing for the former. The rationale here is the fact that the captive units being only part of a larger organisation for which profit maximisation may hold as a whole but not necessarily on a departmental-by-departmental basis.³¹ Moreover, the captive units might have had access to correspondingly greater financial resources (on very favourable terms) by the same argu-

ment. Before any implications from such a distinction can be made however, the presence of the Managing Agency System has to be taken into account.³² Coal was only one of many interests the large Agencies possessed and there is reason to believe that control over such a pre-requisite raw material input affected the way in which an individual Colliery enterprise was run with reference to its own independence. In the words of the R.I.C.I. (1946, Vol. 1, p. 140): "Many Managing Agents of Coal Companies also control other industrial units which are large consumers of coal. It may not be considered essential that the Colliery Cos. should get the best price for their coal under these conditions."

While it is true that each J. S. Coal Co. was responsible to its shareholders as a first priority (the Agencies themselves had only a minority holding.) it is certainly true that the voice of the Agencies was generally decisive in almost all matters and they were in a position, at any rate, to manipulate within limits the interests of their managed concerns.³³ It is clear then that no such simple differentiation of the *modus operandi* of the two sets of grouping in terms of marginal versus average costing can be made.

Turning now to the surviving Co. archives; in order to avoid needless repetition, where the following records coincide in form and content type I(A) i. will be used as the typical formulation.

I. (A) i. The Bengal Coal Company (B.C.C.)

Records in Sanctoria, Calcutta and London.

This is the oldest and largest of the Coal J. S. Cos. and which possesses, by far, the most extensive data for the 19th century. Established as a Company in 1843³⁴ with a capital of 11 lakhs the mines that formed the nucleus of the B.C.C. could boast of an eventful pre-Corporate history stretching back to the very first recorded European coal mining attempts in India in the 1770's³⁵ and, which included the Carr-Tagore era of control from 1836 to 1847.

It was not until the year 1908 that A. Yule became the Managing Agents; the B.C.C. had been independent of such a management type since Messrs. Gordon, Stuart's failure during the 1867 collapse.³⁶

N. B. Whilst writing, the last of the English held Ordinary (not significant) and Preference (quite extensive) shares are in the process of

being sold³⁷ to an Indian party, thus finally ending the European involvement.³⁸

The available records of the B.C.C. can be classified under the following heads:

1(a) Reports of the Board of Directors to the Shareholders.

These half-yearly³⁹ printed Reports are available from 1844 (to the present day) and are inclusive of the prescribed Accounts ; lists of Shareholders are appended occasionally for the 1850's and regularly from the 1860's (down to 1920). As the per-capita share distribution is not given, reliance upon other sources⁴⁰ has had to be made in order to precisely establish the structure of ownership and its changing pattern over time.

Analysis of the Reports yield a great deal of both quantitative and qualitative information. Statistics of raisings, despatches, stock-levels, costs, dividends and the profit and loss position are readily obtainable. With some care it is also possible to determine the all-important re-investment and depreciation rates.⁴¹

The statements (and speeches 1908-42) proceeding the Accounts, especially for the early years throw interesting light on many facets of the economic development of this part of the mofussil. For example, as Bruce Mitchell has similarly demonstrated for the U.K.⁴², the impact of the introduction of the railroad on freight (hence cost) competition with river (read 'Canal' for U.K.) transport was not immediate despite the very uncertain and highly seasonal Damodar and Ajay networks serving the Collieries at that time.

1.(b). Directors Minute Books.

The surviving Mss Volumes cover the following years ;

1844 — 1852 (Nov.)

1852 (Dec.)—1855

1866 — 1868

1875 — 1876

1882 — 1884

1889 — 1891

1898 — 1906

1934 to the Present.

These volumes, despite the gaps, are quite invaluable since the most important issues of policy are discussed at length therein. Unlike other

concerns with active managing agents being responsible for decision working, the B.C.C. throughout most of the 19 had to rely upon the co-directors very heavily. This fact renders these deliberations of the periodic Directors' Meetings with much more significance than would typically be the case. One example may suffice to illustrate the nature of the resolutions emanating from these Minute-Books. In the early years, before the Railways were laid, competition for the rather limited markets was restricted and the B.C.C. was in a position to greatly influence the market selling price by alterations in its own supply. Estimations of the year's demands were formulated by the Directors and consequent instructions were given to Raneegeunge to adjust output and stocks accordingly; in order to keep the prices up, on several occasions the Directors instructed restriction. Such (near monopolistic) adjustments of course became more inappropriate and more difficult following the upsurge in demand from the end of the 1850's.

1.(c) Minutes of the General Meetings of Shareholders.

Only two volumes in Mss. have so far been unearthed covering the years from Nov. 1841 to June 1860 and in the modern period from July 1937 down to the present day. The long gap between 1860—1937 is naturally disheartening and the researcher has to rely only upon snippets of such meetings reproduced in the Half-Yearly Reports. The First Volume clearly shows a conflict between a largely conservative majority of shareholders opposing expansion and diversification (the experiments of the early 1850's were largely negated by a too small appropriation of funds) and a thrusting group of Directors (who, strangely enough consisted primarily of lawyers rather than full-time business-men.)

The complete financial history of the B.C.C. may be scrutinised from the following bound Mss. volumes:

CASH BOOKS	...	1843-1940
LEDGERS	...	1849-1936
Journals	...	1857-1941
Invoice Books	...	1876-1878
Bill Registers	...	1917-1937

As every item of expenditure and receipt is recorded herein, an exhaustive examination of this material would greatly add to our knowledge of

exactly how they co-operated.⁴³ Of much interest, merely to choose one item from many is the Wage Rate series available from October 1843.⁴⁴ This may well be the earliest and most continuous collation of industrial wages that is obtainable for the modern period.

III. Bundles of Letters to and from the Collieries 1834-1892.

There are approx. 17,500 surviving letters which now unfortunately are in the throes of rapid decay. Not all the years are covered equally; thus in 1841 there is a single survivor only, but in the following year there are 140, and in 1875 there are 2,726 but one year later only 9.

This correspondence ranges over a multifarious number of topics relating to the operation of the Collieries. For example, in the Carr-Tagore period the letters graphically highlight the first major "spurt" of coal demand⁴⁵—emanating from the introduction of steamships for inland navigation. In this period one of the chief problems facing the Firm (and the industry on the whole) was associated with the difficulties of delivering coal on a regular schedule basis to the Calcutta and Amta depots (for both the Marine department and private demand) on account of the supply irregularities inherent in relying upon those River Routes previously mentioned.

This example of the correspondence subjects cannot be regarded as representative, rather it is illustrative of the extraordinary richness to be found.

IV. ZAMINDARY Records.

All of the (larger) Cos. possessed, for a variety of reasons⁴⁶, extensive surface in addition to underground property rights. By the end of the 19th century, the B.C.C. had amassed such rights to some 80,000 acres of both coal and non-coal bearing lands.

The exact history, extent of and rights to each Mouza has been ably compiled by H.D.G. Humphreys (the ex-Zamindary Manager) in his Memo "Properties of A. Yule in the States of Bengal and Bihar." This is a useful introduction to the wealth of data the Co. has on this "Industrial Zamindary".⁴⁷

In the "Cash", "Law", (in English), "Thoka" and "Jamabandi" (in Bengali) Books we have complete statistical information of every plot of land owned, leased and sub-leased. In the Mouza Books and the (chests of) Mouza documents, there is on the one hand complete information on

all the deeds, leases, rents, royalties and salamis with (due to) the superior landlords, and on the other, all the agreements made with the tenants, agriculturists and coal-enterprises on sub-leases.⁴⁸

The 1918-21 Cadestral Survey compelled the Cos. to provide detailed information on all their tenants. These records (in Bengali) allow a precise quantifiable estimate of the thorny question of service-tenancies. Such agreements, the closest thing to a compulsive feudal labour arrangement, though certainly on the wane by this date, have a long and important history.⁴⁹

V. Surviving Files.

These may be divided into roughly two groups—

1. Calcutta Office—Colliery Files.

As these deal with essentially routine matters, usually financial, such as cross-checking of invoices and store receipt purchases they are only of use when deployed in conjunction with I(A)ii.

N.B. It was hoped that a sales destination set of accounts (via Calcutta) along with the corresponding prices would have been found. This would have provided information on the already alluded to practice of price discrimination that might have come into effect post the A. Yule management. The Yule group contained many heavy coal consumers⁵⁰ (Jute, Tea and Steamships) and the terms at which they obtained their requirements would have told us a lot about the Agency nexus. In the B.C.C., the evidence such as it is⁵¹, points to supply security rather than any price advantage accruing to the Group.

2. Miscellaneous Files.

Because of the diversity of such Files, it would be misleading to make any content generalisation. Individual examples, such as the 1917 labour File may be mentioned since it provides an insight into one of the really crucial problems facing the Co. (and the Industry), namely, how to secure an adequate, settled non-seasonal labour force.⁵² Other Files of importance deal with the very vexed issue of the brick-making Industry⁵³, and several decisive Court Cases.⁵⁴

VI. Other Material.

There is a useful Co. history in Mss. edited by H.D.G. Humphreys which gives a general but highly simplified picture of the main historical events of the Co. down to 1960.

The various Articles of Association and the details of the post—1908 Managing Agency Agreements are obtainable from the Registrar of J. S. Cos., Calcutta. These are of obvious importance.

Mention must be made of T. Oldham's writings on the affairs of the B.C.C. which deal with two very interesting issues namely the Great Raneegunge Fire and Subsistences of 1864-65⁵⁵ and the lawless state of the Colliery areas in these early years. In fact there is a considerable literature on this latter point, and which indicates the lengths to which the B.C.C. went in order to achieve a monopoly position.⁵⁶

Both Mr. L. J. Barraclough and Mr. H.D.G. Humphreys have written informative and well-researched contributions⁵⁷ to the history of the Co., and in addition have collected a great deal of useful historical information.⁵⁸ Oral interviews with them and other B.C.C. officers of the past have given much supplementary insight.

I. (A) 2. Equitable Coal Co. Records at Dishergarh and Calcutta.

Incorporated from inception in 1863, Equitable is the second oldest of the Coal J. S. COs. In terms of its size of output and employment, Equitable came the closest to rival the B.C.C. Equitable was always under the management of the Macneill Agency, and like the B.C.C. though most of its mines were located in Raniganj there were important holdings across the Barrakar River too. In Feb. 1972, Equitable came, indirectly, under the control of the GOI via the I.R.C.I. after sustaining very heavy losses for a number of years.

A summary of the Records are as follows:

- (i) Reports of the Directors, together with the Accounts and Shareholders Lists for 1864-1971.
- (i) Articles of Association and the Managing Agency Agreements.
- (iii) Complete Zamindary Records (Mouza, Cadestral and Administrative).

Mr. K. P. Chatterjee, the old Zamindary Manager, has compiled a precis of all the property rights, rents *et al.*

- (iv) Surviving Files.

As with the B.C.C., a great number of subjects are covered. Mention of Mr. G. George's copious Reports for 1923-29, and the Files dealing with the economics of introducing coal-cutters and mechanical loaders are of special importance.

(v) Other data.

There is an excellent and perhaps unique collection of photographs covering all aspects of Colliery working and social life. There are some well detailed surface and geological maps, which surpass the B.C.C.'s in both scope and historical longevity. Oral interviews with the old officers of the Co⁵⁸ have again proved to be of use in elucidating some issues that the literature is inadequate upon.

I.(A) 3. New Beerbhoom Co. (N.B.C.) Records at Sanctoria and Calcutta since the N.B.C. was acquired by A. Yule in 1955 from Balmer-Lawrie.

Though incorporated in 1873, the N.B.C. was founded upon the mines belonging to the Old Beerbhoom Co., which in turn had taken over the properties of one of the very first coal entrepreneurs, Mr. W. Erskine.

The holdings of the N.B.C. comprise the following—

- (i) Directors Reports with Appended Accounts 1873-1971, and the lists of Shareholders from 1873-1902.
- (ii) Complete Zamindary Records.
- (iii) Articles of Association and the various Managing Agency Agreements.
- (iv) Correspondence between the Collieries and Balmer-Lawrie.
This is a scattered source and only fragments of what must have been a very considerably important archival record remain.

This completes the data for the Raniganj Field; it is most unfortunate that the Jharia area, despite its more recent development, is not nearly so well blessed with surviving documentation.

I.(A) 4. The Barrakur Coal Co.

Incorporated in 1875, Birds took over the Managing Agency from MacAllisters in 1878. The Co. grew very quickly, and being one of the first entrants into Jharia, managed to secure rights to some of the very best coking-Coals.⁵⁹

There are few surviving Co. records in India today on account of the in-toto destruction that took place in the mid-1960's.⁶⁰ The (unusually for this genre) informative Bird's Centenary History⁶¹, constantly refers to what must have been a wealth of extensive material from the

beginning. This Book, together with some surviving Director's Reports (in London) is all the written documentation left.

I. (A) 5. East India Coal Co.

Incorporated in 1892⁶², East India was a Sterling Co. with Jardines the Managing Agents from the outset. This Co. had all of its very extensive properties in the very heart of the Jharia Field.

Great difficulties of access have prevented a thorough search being made of the Jardine Record Godowns⁶³, and the recent Ordinance taking over all the collieries has further complicated matters. To date, therefore, apart from some miscellaneous data, only some of the Directors Reports and Accounts have been unearthed (Also available in the U.K.).

I. (A) 6. Raneeganj Coal Association.

The R.C.A. was founded in 1873 with Kilburns the Managing Agents till their voluntary retirement in 1947.⁶⁴ Originally the Mines of the R.C.A. as implied, were located in the lower Field, but, very quickly realising the opportunities of Jharia, the Co. acquired some very valuable properties there. The coal mined by Kilburns contained such excellent caking properties that the Kustore Colliery became the premier supplier to TISCO from 1913.⁶⁵ In fact the fortunes of Kilburn Collieries soon became closely tied to the ups and downs of steel demand—and right up till W.W. II Kustore⁶⁶, the main R.C.A. Mine had a long term contract to supply Jamshedpur.

Much of the data on the R.C.A. comes from the TISCO archives, since a Warehouse Fire destroyed the Records of the Co. proper—only the Directors Reports (from 1930) and the Articles of Association remaining in tact.

I. (B) Those smaller sized Cos. under the management of one of the Agency Houses.

Selection of the Yule and the Macneill groups has been made, the criteria simply being the easy availability of their records ; as well, those 2 Cos. had, between them, a very large stake in this category, and the fact that they had a giant concern each makes their holdings of "lesser" Cos. all the more interesting.

The floatation of such Cos. was motivated by a variety of considerations, which until the Papers of the Agencies per se are thrown open to scrutiny can only be roughly guessed at. Two obvious factors were

firstly, the sheer administrative awkwardness of running many non-contiguous mines as a single unit and secondly the undoubted desire to tap the capital market for a broader base of funds.

A very close association between the very large Cos. and the small or offshoots can be postulated. For example in many cases the land of the latter might once have belonged to the former—thus Equitable “sold” some property to establish Hurriladih Coal Co. which, in turn, repeated the process creating Mundulpoor Coal Co. Common directorships and personnel (usually senior) were other links.

Such a constellation of differing sized Collieries loosely centred around a large principle one, provides an interesting structural form to analyse. The records of the two mentioned Groups consist of the following :

I.(B) 1.A. Yule

Coal Co.	Cash Books	Journals	Cash Abstracts	Bill Registers	Ledgers	Sales Journals	Sales Hajri
North West	1912-41	1930-39					1930-32
Sudamdih	1922-34		1924-27		1907-31		
Burra-dhemo	1908-37		1915-30		1908-12		
Bengal-Nagpur	1909-39		1911-32			1936-39	
Minto	1930-35		1911-30		1933-36		
Scebpore	1893-1936		1911-39		1893-1924		
Khatras Jheeria			1893-1933	1898-1939			
Deoli	1917-39			1925-30			
Kalapahari	1913-38						
Bengal-Bhatdee	1916-30				1917-40		
Burrajarh	1912-16						1919-30
Industry			1911-21				
Bengal Giridih	1910-29				1914-20		
Girimint	1925-30	1926-31	1923-30	1923-30	1926-31		
Adjat		1927-30	1893-1930		1895-1916		
„ 2nd	1925-33						
„ Valley	1924-39	1924-40			1920-32		

For most of these Cos. the $\frac{1}{2}$ Yearly Reports with Accounts are available, though not for all years. Also the Zamindary and Mouza details have been preserved.

I. (B) 2. The Macneill Group.

The complete set of the $\frac{1}{2}$ Yearly Reports and Accounts are available for the following Cos. (by no means the total number under Macneills).

1. Dhemo Main from its 1916 inception
2. Hurriladih „ „ 1903 „

3. W. Jumuria „ „ 1919 „
4. Mundulpoor „ „ 1908 „

N.B. The first two Cos. above, achieved very sizeable outputs very quickly ; Hurriladih may even be considered one of the "Giants" since it produced a greater output than the R.C.A. by WWII. The Articles of Association, Managing Agency Agreements and the complete Zamindary Records are also available.

II. Indian Owned and Operated Collieries.

It has not been possible to obtain very much written material for both the larger and the smaller firms at the unit level. This is hardly surprising with reference to the latter,⁶⁷ but clearly it is a no small gap in relation to the larger enterprises—dashing any hopes of building up an analytical series of case studies. Reliance upon the general literature⁶⁸ enables only an overview of this sector's growth to be construed. As regards the rise (and fall) of particular firms it has been possible to gather only essentially oral accounts from the surviving family members ; obviously this is an unsatisfactory methodology but it is the result of the absence of any documentation whatsoever.

From the very outset of the Industry's history, an Indian entrepreneurial presence is to be noted.⁶⁹ In 1859 for example⁷⁰, of the 15 Coal working concerns, 10 were Indian of which one, that of Gobin Pundit had an output second only to the B.C.C.⁷¹ The majority of the indigeneous (Bengalis) sector produced only very tiny returns, anticipating the future structure of the Trade.

The period commencing from the decided shift to the right of the demand curve for Indian Coal beginning in the early 1890s⁷² down to the onset of the Post 1925 Depression, saw the flowering of Bengali enterprise and capital investment. Information, of only a descriptive kind however, has been collected from the leading Bengali entrepreneurs (see NOTE 23). Probably the two most outstanding firms were those of Laik-Banerjee and N. C. Sircar—R. Bernard (later N. C. Sircar and Sons.) and fortunately it has been possible to gather an outline of their role in the Industry in some detail.⁷³

After the period of Bengali hegemony had ended sometime after the 1925 Slump, there was a significant switch in indigeneous ownership as has been already indicated. This is where the real gap in the Indus-

try's historiography appears, and it has only been possible to obtain the records of a handful of the new forces.⁷⁴ B. P. Agarwalla and Sons, perhaps the most dominant of the Inter-War Jharia Owners, have been the only Firm giving access to such data. The significant structural shifts that took place during the Inter-War, and which were to be greatly accentuated and consolidated after W. W. II is relatively an undocumented process in terms of surviving Company or individual holding records.

III. A.1. TISCO

The TISCO archives at Jamadoba, Jamshedpur and Bombay exceed even the B.C.Co.'s in comprehensiveness, but since the oldest of their 6 Collieries (Bhelatand) was acquired only in 1906, the long historical sweep is perforce absent. Nonetheless, as every event and policy decision, both of minor and major importance is recorded and preserved along with an extensive statistical coverage, a clear picture of this form of enterprise emerges upon inspection.

A fundamental problem facing all Steel Plants is the organisation of their raw material inputs. The *security* of supply of high-grade coking coals at *reasonable prices* naturally has occupied the minds of the TISCO management from the outset. Tatas have experimented with all types of permutations before, only recently, adopting the characteristically American and German solution of total self-sufficiency by the creation of a Colliery Establishment.⁷⁵ This "solution" of course, although ensuring security may well conflict with the "reasonable price" objective and thus the former may be the price of the latter (depending as well upon the opportunity costs of working operations in addition to primary capital charges which must be discounted against any long run cost advantages.)

In addition to obtaining a (variable) percentage of their coal needs from owning their own collieries⁷⁶, TISCO made a series of long and medium-term forward contracts with a number of large Companies. During and immediately after W.W.I. when coal-prices shot up to unprecedented heights these contracts seemed to be a sound policy; however after the slump of 1925 TISCO was having to honour these contracts and buy at a very much higher-than-the market level. This was certainly one important factor leading to greater self-reliance.

By appointing Messrs Kilburns as Managing Agents for their collieries, TISCO no doubt hoped to avoid the expenditure of starting

and maintaining a Colliery working establishment. However complications arose and the Agency Agreement was bitterly contested in the Courts, TISCO becoming desirous from the mid-1930's of managing their own Collieries.

These issues, pertinent to all Steel Concerns are supplemented by particular circumstantial curiosity relating to the actual running of the Collieries themselves. For instance the TISCO mines were widely regarded to be the most forward looking in terms of mechanisation, conservation and labour welfare.⁷⁷ Whether this policy emanated from the non-competitive⁷⁸ nature of the output supply conditions or the fact that the resources available were proportionately greater to TISCO because the mines were only part of a huge organisation whose profit-making departments could subsidise the others, is a subject that will have to be worked out by further analysis as already indicated.

The vastness of the Archives precludes or rather makes difficult a satisfactory summary; a rough sort of indication is attempted below:—

(1) Files: These voluminous papers relate to every conceivable subject matter both routine and 'special'. All aspects of the Collieries are dealt with, e.g. administration, mining methods, costs, labour-supply, and mechanisation etc. etc.

(2) Deeds and Tiles of Ownership, showing royalties and leases.

(3) Complete statistical guide to Output, despatches, unit costs, reserves, O.M.S. and "profit and loss" figures amongst other variables.

(4) Correspondence. Between Jamshedpur and the Coalfields, with really decisive issues being referred to the Managing Agents of TISCO in Bombay (e.g. the strikes of 1938 led by S. C. Bose.)

(5) Director's Minute Books. Cover all matters relating to the Collieries of special significance involving authorisation of large expenditures.

(6) Technical Memos relating to the testing of the different types of Coal experimented for use in the process of Steel Making.

(7) Accounts. Complete series relating to all expenditure and income separate for the Collieries. N.B. A *general* depreciation allowance was always in vogue based on an average figure computed for the TISCO Establishment as a whole,

(8) The Early Contracts for Outside Coal Supplies with the major Coal Producers, esp. Birds, Kilburns, A. Yule and Turner-Morrison.

(9) Early Prospecting Notes and Reports, edited and mainly compiled by C. Perin.

III.A.2. Indian Iron and Steel Co.

The records of the TISCO and its predecessors⁷⁹ are unfortunately only fragmentary with reference to the Collieries, and certainly very meagre in comparison with TISCO. A comparative exercise is therefore completely out of the question, for even basic information like output and employment per Captive Colliery is not surviving.⁸⁰

It has only really been in the post W.W.II years that IISCO (like TISCO) have been placing a strong emphasis upon generating internally greater coal supplies. Hence, the Chasnalla Colliery, despite very difficult working conditions has undergone a major expansion, and the laying of the immense 40 mile ropeway linking it to Burnpur is fully operational now.

In 1945 IISCO's 3 Working Collieries did not meet anything like the the Kulti-Burnpur consumption requirements, and thus "outside" coal was purchased to make good the deficiency.

III.3. The British India Steam Navigation Co.

The Eastern Coal Co. of Mackinnon and Mackenzie incorporated as a Sterling Co. in 1900 had extensive properties containing excellent Jharia Coal. Its function was to provide an assured supply of steam coal to the Brace-Bridge-Hall Depot; thus the Eastern was totally "captive". Though the BISNCO never achieved total coal self-sufficiency, the Eastern conferred upon the Co. a regular quantity of "suitable"⁸¹ fuel which could and did act as a sort of bargaining device in negotiating with the market. After WWII the Eastern was transferred to Macneills since steamships had become obsolescent; the Colliery became a market one.

The following records have neither the detailed scope nor the sufficient continuity to build up a real picture of exactly how this captive-colliery differed from the market type. Like TISCO's Mines (and perhaps this is a significant empirical point) the records indicate a progressiveness that is generally absent from the latter group. For instance sand-stowing⁸² and coal-cutting machinery were introduced very early on.

The Records of the BISNCO consist of the following:

(1) Complete Zamindary and Mouza Records. There is in addition a printed list of the property holdings of the Eastern (1933) along with the appropriate histories of leases, rents and royalties.

(2) The detailed legal Agreements of the Articles of Association and the Managing Agency Pacts.

(3) A Privately Published Book compiled by Mr. J. Mackie (1934), Superintendant of the Eastern from the 1920s, giving a comprehensive history of the Colliery, ably backed up with statistics. This book includes:

- (i) A Mine-by-Mine analysis of working methods.
- (ii) The history of each Mine and each seam.
- (iii) Information on the Health and Labour Welfare Schemes.
- (iv) The degree of mechanisation in progress.

IV. Railway Collieries

Only the EIR Giridih Colliery has here been considered on account of its age (properties acquired in 1863, and first worked systematically from 1873) its size (Giridih producing the greatest quantity of Railway Colliery output) its seams (by far the best coking coal in India⁸³) and its vast literature.

Due to the Government's intimate connection with the EIR since its inception, much of the documentation is of the Official or demi-official kind. Thus the records now in Giridih itself or in Ranchi⁸⁴ and with the Coal Controller⁸⁵ are only part of a voluminous set.

Three issues of outstanding interest may be identified; first there was the (only) successful pre-W. W. II establishment of a permanent non-seasonal and adequate labour force⁸⁶, secondly the actual viability of the enterprise adopting market criteria⁸⁷ and thirdly the precise terms of the Contracts between the EIR and GOI regarding the sale of coal to the "open" market.⁸⁸

The following is a summary of the available data:

(1) The various Establishment Contracts, Deeds of Operation and the rents and royalties payable.⁸⁹

(2) Yearly Accounts, including costsheets (not all are surviving however).

(3) Annual Reports on the working of the Mines in Mss. (from the 1870s down to 1911).

(4) Detailed statistics of output, employment etc.

(5) A succession of pamphlet-styled rules for labour welfare, especially education⁹⁰ and Provident Fund.

(6) Correspondence between the EIR, the GOI, the Central Railway Authorities and the private sector.

In a short bibliographical essay it is naturally quite impossible (even if legitimate) to dwell on all the areas of key importance that the literature throws light upon. The export-trade, the raising-contractor system, the controls and decontrols during the two world wars, problems fuel/power substitutions, the vital transport network and the living condition of the miners⁹¹ are just some of the subjects requiring full analysis and which are barely touched upon here. Moreover since emphasis has been placed upon the individual unit's separate holdings per se, other documentation has only been given cursory mention. The Reports, files and correspondence of bodies such as the I.M.A., the I.M.F., the G.S.I., the C.I.M., the Mines Boards of Health and the Association of Mine Managers are all of great value. The various Commissions, Committees, Departmental Proceedings and the Correspondence of the Governments of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and the GOI give much more than the "Official view and interest" only. *Capital, Commerce* and the *India Investors Year Book* are obvious sources for the later years, as indeed are the *Hindoo Patriot*, *Bengal Hurkuru* and the *Englishman* for the earlier. The list can be extended of course, but it is sufficient to be illustrative of the richness of the sources that can be tapped for a study of this neglected industry.

ABBREVIATIONS

C.I.M.	Chief-Inspector of Mines
G.O.B.	Government of Bengal
G.O.I.	Government of India
G.S.I.	Geological Survey of India, Memoirs and Records
I.C.O.A.	Indian Colliery Owner's Association
I.C.S.	Indian Coal Statistics
I.I.Y.B.	Investor's India Year Book
I.M.A.	Indian Mining Association
I.M.F.	Indian Mining Federation
J.S.Co.	Joint Stock Company

R.C.M.C.	Report of the Coal Mining Committee
R.C.L.	Royal Commission of Labour, 1929-31
R.I.C.C.	Report of the Indian Coalfields Committee
Trans. M.G.M.I.	Transaction of the Mining Geological and Metallurgical Institute of India

NOTES

¹ I echo the sentiments of Prof A. B. Ghosh who has remarked upon the paucity of academic interest (as distinct from the purely technical side) in this subject despite there being some half a dozen Universities in close proximity to the Coal Fields. *Economics of Coal Washing* (1966), Preface.

² Mining, one of the two "classical" Industries of Colonial enterprise (Plantations, the other, has been relatively well covered in the literature) was one of the earliest of the large-scale organised sectors. Being highly labour intensive the coal industry offered employment opportunities to a substantial non-urbanised, and in the early stages predominantly tribal, population. By 1944, the 994 mines were manned by almost a quarter of a million people, 60,000 of which were women.

³ Another unique feature of mining (with a non-export demand) is the relative extremity of its fluctuations—being hyper-sensitive to the general up and down swings of the economy and also on account of the perennial wagon supply uncertainties.

⁴ Once full-capacity is achieved in both public and private sectors and the demands of the 3 newly commissioned steel plants in Southern India (Salem, Hospet and Vijaynagar) become substantial, coking coal needs will soar. See N.C.E.A.R. "Demand for steel in 1975 and 1980" N. Delhi Dec. 1971.

⁵ All the coking coal mines have been put under the management of the Government from the 17th October 1971, vide "The Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provision) Ordinance. This measure is obviously preparatory to full nationalisation which will be effected once the "amount for compensation" amendment to the Constitution has been passed, and will thereby avoid the U.K.'s lesson of burdening the new enterprise with crippling compensation liabilities.

The disquieting feature of the Ordinance is the inherently dis-incentive effects upon fresh investments in the unaffected sector. Under-capitalisation and its resultant, the slow pace of mechanisation, has always been a productivity depressant (the 1948 and 1958 Industrial Policy Resolutions which caused a great deal of uncertainty) and despite recent Ministerial assurances to the private collieries about their future it is difficult to imagine the necessary confidence for long gestational investments to exist (see for e.g. "The Statesman" 28.4.72 "Coal Shares Sluggish")

⁶ The still dominant technique is the "Pillar and Stall" Method. Introduced on account of the thickness of the Indian Seams it suffers from some major disadvantages compared with the now almost universal "Long-Wall" Method. A good discussion of the (mostly) "Cons" and (few) "Pros" of this method can be found in an early article by C.H.McCale "Pillar Working in Raniganj" in Trans. M.G.M.I. Vol.7 1912 Pp 42-69, and also in the R.C.M.C. 1937 Vol. 1 Pp 10-14.

It was not only the method of working that affected rational extraction but, also, the manner in which the Zamindars granted leases (the rights to

sub-soil minerals being vested with the land-lords since the permanent settlement). The fragmented holdings and irregular boundaries resulting from the Zamindari desire to maximise Salami revenues detrimentally affected sound workings. For an excellent illustration of the criss-crossed patterns ensuing see R.I.C.C. (1946) Vol. 1 Appendices XV to XVIII.

⁷ The Pillar and Stall method if worked properly (i.e. not too much coal is extracted at first working, and, when the pillars are shorn the goafed area be stowed with an incombustible material such as sand) may not be inherently wasteful, though it is inefficient. However, the Indian Collieries have, with few exceptions, not been so worked and a literally enormous quantity of coal has been avoidably wasted. Time and again warnings have been given on the seriousness of such losses. See for e.g. Mr Bathgate "Presidential address" Trans M.G.M.I. (1918) Vol. 12; the whole of Mr T. Rees' Report on Mining Methods, GOI Press 1919; and Mr. N. Barracrough "Coal Resources of Jharia" R.G.S.I. Vol LXII Pp 337-384 (1929).

The precise circumstances governing the adopted methods are not difficult to determine; to take one instance, the "slaughter mining" of the 1930's was, as the term suggests, particularly rapacious, coincided with the slump-level prices then prevailing (R2—A8 per ton of selected Dishergarh in 1934/35 I.C.S. 1936). A vicious circle of higher outputs to achieve lower unit costs, thereby exacerbating the supply-demand balance even further and resulting in lower prices set off the spiral again since the only real way to compete, i.e. reducing costs, was to increase output even more. (as early as 1924, Mr. A. Bray, Chairman of the I.M.A. hinted at this circle, see I.M.A. Annual Report Vol. 33 Pp 3-5). This explanation is only partial of course and other influences were at work. For instance the poverty of the piece-rated wages inevitably led to dangerous pillar robbing. Also reliance upon the raising-contractor system (a clear abdication of managerial responsibility) also ensured that coal working would not be scientifically achieved.

⁸ Though the guilty firms, the great majority, probably maximised their (private) short-run profits, or rather, minimised their short-run costs and therefore behaved "rationally" by adopting such methods as have been described above, much is said of the environment in which they worked allowing wholesale destruction of a scarce national resource.

⁹ Many extremely interesting problems/areas have therefore been ignored. The Assam Fields for instance, opened up in the 1880's were producing appx. 350,000 tons p.a. by W.W.I. Very difficult mining conditions and the apparent reluctance of the local Tribes to work below the surface posed problems for the pioneer concern "The Assam Railways and Trading Co." (at Makum). At one time, very early in the 19th Century it was widely believed that Assam would become India's major coal producing area on account of its apparently (erroneously) high grade coal deposits and its position on the Bramaputra (see the various Reports of the Coalfield Committee 1837-1845). Though this never materialised of course, the Collieries were locally of some importance given the problems of transporting such a bulky product to the Tea Garden Factories; coal was also used in the steamship and railways carrying the tea to the Calcutta auctions.

The Railway-Colliery of khost in Baluchistan is of similar local importance given its great distance from the Gondwana's (for a very revealing picture

of this colliery see A. Mort "Coal Mining at Khost" Trans M.G.M.I. Vol. 7 (1912) Pp 294-317).

¹⁰ The omitted Gondwana areas are much more important quantitatively than the Tertiary. The Central Provinces (British India) together with the Hyderabad and Rewa Princely States, had by the end of W.W.I sizeable individual output. At present I am examining the Shaw-Wallace holdings in the Pench Valley and elsewhere within these Central regions—given their almost monopoly position—in order to conduct a comparative exercise with the Bengal/Bihar Fields.

The development of the more Western areas of Bihar mentioned in the text, is really an "adjunct" story to their more Eastern neighbours. Karanpura, for e.g., was wholly prospected and developed by Birds in the early 20th Century, with the initial costs coming from their Burrakur Coal Co.

¹¹ RICC 1942 P 142/43

¹² There was always some Indian (mainly Bengali with a few Parsi) names in the 19th Century shareholding lists. However, their collective importance was always slight. After W.W.I there was a sizeable increase in Indian (not new primarily Bengali) participation, but in no company did this consist of anything like a majority holding (with the very exceptional case of H.V.Low) but it did mean that more directorships (not necessarily too powerful on account of the Agency System) went to Indians than hitherto.

¹³ By obtaining extensive property rights, invariably on 999 Year leases, the early starters were in a very strong position. See NOTE 45.

¹⁴ Calculated from the I.I.Y.B. 1946-47 statistics.

¹⁵ It is an almost impossible task to precisely estimate this truer figure. There is good reason to put it at appx. 75% of the total 1st and selected grades produced. See the Coal Grading Report for 1938.

¹⁶ Apart from those mentioned, almost all of the Managing Agencies had some coal interests at one time or another—the list gathering great momentum after the 1907/08 Boom.

¹⁷ See elsewhere in this paper.

¹⁸ Though there were always some Indian Members, the bias of the I.M.A. was avowedly oriented towards the large (largest in fact) Joint Stock Co's producing 1st Class coal. Dissatisfaction with the policy of the I.M.A., especially their line on wagon distribution led the foremost Indian Members to break away and form their own lobby. See the 1st Annual Report of the I.M.F. 1913-14.

¹⁹ The I.M.A. Annual Reports from 1925 onwards give such statistics. Also see R.I.C.C. 1946 Vol. 1 P 137.

²⁰ See R.I.C.C. Vol. 1 P. 254.

²¹ This is the reason why there is such a large discrepancy in the statistics of despatches and inventory changes). From very early on "bought coal" figures quite importantly in the accounts of the B.C.C. the Equitable and the N.B.C.

²² This represented an unstable element often discussed in the literature in a highly bitter tone. See for e.g. J. B. Ross, "Presidential Address" Trans M.G.M.I. Vol. 36 1940 Pp 4-10, and A.A.F. Bray "Presidential Address" I.M.A. Annual Report 1926 Pp 4-6.

²³ Some leading Bengali entrepreneurs were Laik Banerjee, W. C. Banerjee, N. N. Mookerjee, J. C. Dutt, L. R. Ghose, A. C. Banerjee and the mercurial N. C. Sircar,

²⁴ The Armenian Firm of Messrs Apar & Co. had a very long history (they were also very progressive, see F. Agabeg "Presidential Address" M.G.M.I. Vol. 7 1908) going back to the early 1860's. Their long serving Managers, the Agabegs, began their own enterprise just before W.W.I.

²⁵ Examples of the leading Marwaris are the Goenka, Karnarni (who took over the European firm of H. V. Low) B. P. Aggarwalla and Poddar Families. The Marwaris were generally either bankers or traders (see NOTE 75) who established a small footing in the colliery areas prior to W.W.I. They were in a strategic position with the onset of the 1925 depression to buy up Bengali enterprises at a fraction of their "true" asset value.

²⁶ The outstanding Punjabi family to acquire Coal holdings in this period was K. C. Thapar, later joined by Wali Ram Taneja.

²⁷ The kutchies established a position in the industry as a result of their being coal merchants and distributors. The Ojha Family stands out, but Chanchani & Worah are names that also begin to crop up.

²⁸ Thus Karnarni took over the entire holdings of N. C. Sircar in 1927. Karnarni was Sircar's banker.

²⁹ R.I.C.C. 1946 Vol. 1 Pp 192-197.

³⁰ There were several heated exchanges (of letters) between the Private Co's, especially from the B.C.C. & R.C.A., and the Railway and Government authorities on this point. In 1881 for example—it was no coincidence that this was a Year of Depression—many representations were made to even the Secretary of State as a result of an alleged Giridih sale contract on the open market. This led to a very protracted debate on the definition of "surplus" raisings in the terms of the original EIR contract of 1854.

³¹ During the Depression Years Post 1925 there occurred in the Legislative Assembly several demands by the interested parties to prevent these collieries from working at all. Pressure by the Bengal Chamber, the IMA and the IMF eventually led the Railway Member to direct a curtailment of the level of production in the Railway collieries. Along with the constraint mentioned in NOTE 28, this restriction ensured a less than full capacity working, which inevitably drove up unit costs. This was certainly a factor in the oft repeated claim (by the private interests) that such collieries were "uneconomic".

³² The State Railways of course, were run on "strict commercial principles" upto W.W.II.

³³ In relation to the last point about financial access it is worth quoting the views of the R.I.C.C. 1946 Vol. 1 P. 139.

"It is suggested that the mechanism (the agency system) is a convenient device through which many other substantial benefits accrue. THE MOST IMPORTANT of them is the financial backing which an Agency provides for the individual collieries under its charge".

³⁴ Blair Kling has postulated a reverse sort of relationship to that mentioned in that he suggests that in the case of Carr-Tagore, the coal consuming parts of this "first" Managing Agency were used to boost the colliery interest. See *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, Nov. 1966, "The Origin of the Managing Agency System".

S. K. Basu is the strongest advocate of the inter-relationships within the Agency System with regard to coal; he thus states:

"Although such a marked preference for coal Co's is quite natural in view of the large external market, in a number of cases the setting up

of a Coal Co. is motivated by the desire to avoid shortages in respect of one of the basic raw materials. Thus, Williamson—Magor and Octavius Steel have each one Coal Co. since coal is required for generating power for the 10 Tea Cos, under the former and the 13 Tea and an Electric Supply Co's under the latter". *The Managing Agency System* (1958) P. 32.

³⁵ See the letter from a Mr Mackenzie to a Mr Macpherson, both B.C.C. employees, dated 13.3.1845, housed in the B.C.C. archives which has given the most authoritative account of the formation of the Co. Petersons Burdwan Gazetteer of 1910 also gives some useful information in the Chapter on the "Ranigunge Coal Field" (Industries).

³⁶ See L. J. Barraclough "History of the development of the Coal Mining Industry" M.G.M.I. Vol: 47 P 3 1951, and S.G.T. Heatly "Contribution towards the history of the development of the Mineral Resources of India Coal" in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol. XI, 1842.

³⁷ Though since 28 May 1859 Gordon, Stuart (the Successors of Carr Tagore) had been restricted to clerical as against Managerial functions. See the $\frac{1}{2}$ Yearly Report of the B.C.C. 1859 (1).

³⁸ Owned by Lord Catto's daughter.

³⁹ The largest single owner is the GOI (via LIC) now.

⁴⁰ Yearly till 21 June 1854.

⁴¹ Notably the Registrar of J.S. Co's Calcutta, and the High Court archives.

⁴² The "New Stock Account" item can be properly equated with the re-investment rate since it is defined as "The cost of all new acquisitions of land and other properties, and of all new mines, Machinery, pits, shafts and buildings".

The vital depreciation rate may be identified as the "Wear and Tear Account". Out of the profits of the Co. in every $\frac{1}{2}$ year before any dividend is declared, a % of not less than 1.25 of the capital of the Co. was to be set aside to defray their costs. This account covers

- (1) all ordinary & extra-ordinary repairs
- (2) Replacement of all plant, machinery and buildings
- (3) the sinking of all new shafts and pits to replace those existing.
- (4) The maintaining of proper ways, leads and approach to any shift or pit.

See the $\frac{1}{2}$ Yearly Report 31 Oct 1858

⁴³ Economic History Review, 2nd Series 1964, "Railways and Economic Growth".

⁴⁴ Analysis of this data would naturally be expedited by the use of a computer. The problem would be to select those categories of major importance from the purely routine "petty" things.

⁴⁵ This series was later on used to form the coal contribution to the GOI Publication "Prices and Wages in India".

⁴⁶ Well brought out by Dr D. McClelland in his "Report of a Committee for investigating the coal and mineral Resources India" (1) 1838, Introductory Chapter.

⁴⁷ There being firstly the desire to avoid paying compensation for subsistences resulting from de-pillaring operations, secondly, the desire to control as much coal bearing land as possible in order to restrict competition and, thirdly, to provide labour with some agricultural land as an investment to work in the

mines. Both T. Oldham and D. H. Williams in the early 1850's representing the impartial G.S.I. had occasion to write about this second motive, severely deprecating such actions by the large Co's.

Oldham, for instance refers to this practice of the B.C.C. in the 1850's in the following terms:

"The Ranigunj Railway Station lies on the properties of the B.C.C., and that Co. have carefully so contrived their holdings so as to cut off any direct communication with the terminus (as the station then was) from most other collieries. Virtually this gives them an advantage of no little amount. As an instance, the pits at Munglepoor are not more than 2 miles in a direct line from the station, but carts conveying coal are compelled to proceed along the G.T.R., and then by Government road, making the distance 6 miles." (in Report on the Ranigunge Coal Field with special reference to the proposed extension of the Railway" P. 7. 1859) As cartage costs were very expensive, this was an effective weapon.

Williams makes the same point, though he does not specifically mention the B.C.C. in his "Report of the Hymore Hills" P. 88 1848.

⁴⁸ An interesting comparison between this type of Zamindary and the "normal" one might be of interest.

⁴⁹ A profitable source of income accruing to the B.C.C. was derived from the royalties and rents from the leased out lands on which smaller colliery enterprises existed.

⁵⁰ This type of labour arrangement was fairly common in the 19th Century; this was explicitly stated in the R.C.L. Vol. IX 1929-31 Appendix XII. It is not yet quite clear how this mechanism operated. In the Settlement Record of Rights 1920/21 for Burdwan, commutation of mining work days per bigha held was insisted upon.

⁵¹ W. C. Banerjee in a speech to the IMA in 1932 Pp. 4-6 suggested (not confirmed) that the Yule Group need not fear about the Depression "so much" as non-group collieries, since the enterprises of the Yules annually took about 10 lakhs worth of coal from the B.C.C. It has been so far impossible to test this.

⁵² Oral interviews with Mr. W. Catto (ex-Managing Director) and L. J. Barradough (ex-Chief Mining Engineer in the U.K.) corroborating information from another "Group Colliery", that of the New Beerbhoom of Balmer Lawrie, via Mr. G. Strong (ex-Manager) may also be mentioned.

⁵³ There is no doubt that this was a key issue given the labour-intensive technology. There is no lack of references to this problem, the $\frac{1}{2}$ Yearly Reports consistently year-in year-out mention such difficulties.

⁵⁴ i.e. the Ranigunj Brick field File of July 1933.

⁵⁵ i.e. The Musulidih Case File, Oct. 1911.

⁵⁶ The 2 Reports submitted by Oldham to the Co.—very far sighted indeed, even advocating machine cutting at this early stage—are reproduced in the April $\frac{1}{2}$ Yearly Report for 1865.

⁵⁷ Oldham, in a thinly disguised reference to the B.C.C. (as is clear from the reaction of the Co. to his Report, see the $\frac{1}{2}$ Yearly Co. Report Oct. 1859) states:

"I cannot conclude this report without urging the most serious attention to the terrific drawback to the full development of this most

valuable Field which exists in the very lawless and disgraceful manner in which some of the larger proprietors of this Field, and more especially one firm, seek to obtain their objects by force. If a boundary be disputed, if a roadway be required the first appeal with these parties is by no means the Courts of Law. The ground in dispute is forcibly taken possession of, often with loss of life. I myself heard of one of the earliest proprietors in the Field state that they had during the earlier years, spent 1.2 lakhs solely in fighting for the possession of their undoubted rights. While in that neighbourhood I heard of more than one affray with loss of life. Shortly before the agent of one Co. was stopped in the open roadway and attacked by the bludgeon men of a rival Co., his horse speared, and he only just escaped. (T. Oldham was not the man to exaggerate or take notice of idle rumor) See "Report on the Ranigunge Coal Field with special reference to the proposed extension of the railroad" 1859 P. 17-18.

See also N. K. Sinha *Economic History of Bengal*, Vol. III, P. 118; W. F. Ferguson and others versus J. Humphreys, 1846 High Court Archives; Mr. Williams *Report on the Kymore Hills* P. 88, and for a very interesting example of the B. C. Co's more questionable methods the *Hindoo Patriot* and *Englishman*, Jan. 14—Feb. 11.

⁵⁸ See the Golden Jubilee Edition of the M.G.M.I. 1955 for an article each by Barraclough and Humphrey. Barraclough's longer essay on the early development of the B.C.C. is to be found in Trans. of the M.G.M.I 1951 Part I Presidential Address.

⁵⁹ i.e. Mr. R. Wright (former Managing Director), Mr. H. Milner (of Macneills) Mr. K. P. Chatterjee (ex-Zamindary Manager), Dr. R. Chatterjee (former C.M.O.) and Mr. R. Sengupta (former Chief Accountant).

⁶⁰ It was part of the (ironic) folk lore of Calcutta in the early 1890's, that Sir E. Cable head of Birds and Sir D. Yule (a director and large shareholder of the B.C.C., who even at that time perhaps envisaged his firm taking a closer part in the B.C.C.) came to an unofficial understanding that as their respective coal interests were constantly clashing (the first H.Q. of the Burrakur Co. was just on the other side of the Barrakar River near Chanch) a demarcation of spheres of influences on either side of the River was called for. The Jharia Field was still more or less virgin then, and as a direct result of this agreement, Bird's were tremendous beneficiaries. (Yule thinking that as the land was "unknown" and as there were no railways, he and the B.C.C. obtained the best of the deal) Birds began prospecting and found not only the best quality coals, but many of the valuable mineral deposits that were soon to be in great demand after the erection of a large steel industry. The whole of Karanpur was opened up, too, as a result of this bias. (source for this has been Mr. Prem Prashad, Chairman of Birds, and Sir Biren Mookerjee of IISCO).

⁶¹ A necessary (SIC) expedient taken by the present Chairman as a result of the investigations (into Under-invoicing) by the GOI.

⁶² by G. Harrison (1964) privately published.

⁶³ This Co. bears no relationship to the old East Indian Coal Co. that was an 1840's-50's rival of the B.C.C.

⁶⁴ I am convinced after lengthy discussion with some long serving clerical employees that a very comprehensive amount of material still exists in good condition.

⁶⁵ When the Jewish Firm of B. N. Elias were appointed the agents.

⁶⁶ On favourable (to Kilburns) long-term contracts.

⁶⁷ During the later-War period, there was a growing tension between TISCO & Kilburn, the former maintaining that Kurtore coal of an inferior sort (higher ash) was being sent to the Steel Plants. The dispute reached very serious proportions, it eventually had to be settled in the Privy Council.

⁶⁸ For example, the 133 "Wagon Mines" operating in 1942 had a total annual out put of less than 1000 tons each; because many were really only surface workings they did not come under the 1901 or 1923 Acts and therefore didn't in law have to furnish returns to the C.I.M. (R.I.C.C. Vol 1 P 143 (1946))

⁶⁹ Especially see the IMF Records.

⁷⁰ The contribution of Dwarkanath Tagore in developing the Ranigunge collieries, and later of course the birth of the B.C.C. was a very notable one.

⁷¹ T. Oldham *ibid* "Report on the Ranigunge Coal Field" Tabular statements.

⁷² The production of Pandit's (he was a full time deputy Collector of 24-Parganas) Searsole Mine—or rather quarry was 18 lakh maunds in 1859, compared with 34 of the B.C.C. and 12½ of the third largest concern, the Eqsikines.

Eleven years later the GSI statistics (Vol. 8 Part I. P. 7 Memoirs) showed that Pandit had retained 2nd place with a large increased out put (24.3 lakh maunds). In the 1870's however, he was ousted and thought the Searsole property contains to be mentioned in the returns, it is bereft of his name. (Revenue Dpt Proceedings, G.O. Bengal, Miscellaneous Branch, Geology and Minerals, B 4-32 Files, May 1879).

⁷³ The growth in Industrial and Railway demand spurred at a time very fortuitous to Indian coal, since in the early years of the 1890's British (Welsh) imports into E. India suffered a price disadvantage owing to the very largely enhanced freight prices.

⁷⁴ A. Laik and J. L. Banerjee were petty clerical employees of the B.C.C. In 1878 they formed a partnership and began prospecting and opening up collieries, especially in the Jharia Field. Early Members of the IMA, the firm become more interested in renting/leasing out their collieries and Coal lands and living off the royalties. Thus their enterprenural contribution was rather less than their prospecting/opening-up/leasing functions. In 1911, the firm now controlled by the first sons of the original partners quarrelled and the property rights were sold off. A substantial documentation exists, for this Firm, especially on the Laik side, consisting of original leases (at one time the firm controlled appx. 40% of the total Jharia Field) and their subsequent investments into Zamindaries.

The astonishing career of N. C. Sircar is also covered by certain surviving documents now with a surviving son. Once a R. 6 per month partner of the B.C.C., Sircar at his zenith, just after WWI, controlled 8 large J.S.Co's, one of which Baraboni, which was totally subscribed by English investors was producing an out-put of nearly 700,000 tons (of which a good half was 1st class coal) and employed a large number of English Managers (one of whom Mr. Bernard, was formerly his original partner, or even before this was his superior in the B.C.C. before both decided to start as coal distributors). The firm was taken over, in-toto, by S. K. Karnani in 1927).

⁷⁵ The grandfather B. P. Agarwalla settled in Jharia Town around the

end of the last Century engaged in cloth marketing and subsequently money-lending.

N.B. The Marwari traders who moved into the colliery areas as petty shop-keeper (at first) were the subject of a strong attack by the IMA in 1921 following the strikes of that year emanating from the holding of the 2nd A.I.T.U.C. Congress at Jharia (Nov. 30th-Dec. 2nd). The substance of the IMA attack on the tertiary community was that because they charged excessively high prices, the miners become very discontented, indeed it was even seriously argued by Mr. Patterson, the IMA Chairman, that the Marwaris were themselves "behind" the strikes so that once greater wages were offered, the collieries would have to spend it all in their shops. The IMA, therefore, urged its members to set up Fair Trade Shops—with due care that the servants of the Marwaris did not buy up in mass all the produce, to re-sell at higher prices as was alleged they had done before.

(See Chairman's Speech to IMA Annual Report for 1922). Agarwalla began acquiring mines in Jharia before WWI but it was only after 1925 that their business really substantially increased.

⁷⁶ The Colliery Expansion Scheme began in 1966.

⁷⁷ Fluctuating between 30-40% during the Inter-War Period.

⁷⁸ See, for example, the Deshpande Report of 1946 "Labour Enquiry Committee—Coal" Sections on Welfare and Employment.

⁷⁹ Opportunity cost losses on coal prices would naturally have to be borne somewhere in the Organisation.

⁸⁰ The Bengal Iron & Steel Co., formed in 1892 on the site of the Government (Ripon inspired and Von Schwartz run) Barakar Iron Works, merged in 1937 with the Indian Iron and Steel Co. which had been started in 1918. The old Barakar Iron Works possessed its own Colliery (See W. McFarlane in Trans MGMI Vol. I (1907) "The Barakar Iron Works") the "ancient" Ramnagar one near Kultie later takenover by BISCO.

⁸¹ Fortunately Sir Biren Mookerjee has a good memory, especially, in this context, in relation to his Father's Martin & Co. Agency with large Colliery interests after W.W.I.

⁸² The word "suitable" is highly spurious since it was—from the national interest—quite unnecessary to use best quality Jharia for steam raising.

⁸³ When the 1937 "stowing Committee" was set up, the IMA issued a statement to the effect that Mr. Mackie of Eastern should not be allowed to serve, despite his great experience of stowing, since the Eastern not being a market colliery could not properly be representative of the general views of the trade. (See IMA correspondence on the subject of the Coal Committee IMA Annual Report 1938).

⁸⁴ The same point (made above in Note 32) about economy-in-use applies with more force with Giridih then almost with anywhere, given the important say by Government here. Millions of tons of the very best coal were dissipated in boilers even as late as the end of the 1940's—only a comparatively little quantity of the output being turned into hard coke in the Giridih Cokeovens.

⁸⁵ Since the N.C.D.C. took over all the Railway Collieries with its establishment in 1956.

⁸⁶ Office in Calcutta.

⁸⁷ This was clearly a result of the dual policy of:—(a) providing the

family of all employees with plots of land adjacent to the colliery thereby internalising the seasonal migration problem, the miners being able to tend their crops after work. The Private Collieries, of course also tried this inducement but, much less successfully. See REVENUE PROCEEDINGS (MISCEL) G.O.B. APRIL 1892 "B" Files Nos. 11-17 and 22-23. "Allotment of lands to Pitmen", (b) the relatively advanced labour welfare schemes, started a long time before anywhere else. (See W. Saisé's Memorandum to the C.I.M., in the first Report of CIM 1894.)

⁸⁸ This is a very difficult thing to assess if only because market prices varied so much; in 1920-22 the Railways were being asked to pay around Rs. 8 per ton, whereas in 1932/33 only Rs. 2.

The IMA exercise conducted in 1933 attempted to quantify the losses being accrued by the Railways as a result of their not buying market coal. An attempt was made to show that if "normal" accounting methods were adopted in assessing costs per ton for Giridih, especially in regard to a commercial rate of depreciation allowance, Giridih costs were definitely higher than the market ones similar coals. This is disputable if only due to the year of comparison when the lowest prices for market coal were being quoted. (See letter from the IMA to the GOI Railway Department (Railway Board) No. 891-R 18 July 1933.)

This matter was detailed at great length and with some acrimony in the Legislative Assembly and finally eliminated by the setting up of the Dickinson Committee. See E. R. S. Iyer and L. A. Nateson "The Railway Collieries" from the Railway Accounts and Finance of Oct 1933.

⁸⁹ See Notes 30 and 31.

⁹⁰ The property was first in private hands before the GOI purchased it and rented to the EIR.

⁹¹ Giridih was unique in both providing and making obligatory primary education for miners' children from as early as the 1890's.

EDITORIAL NOTE : Despite the imperfect nature of the manuscript and the consequent printing mistakes, for which we apologise, we are publishing Mr Simmons's paper for its obvious importance.

Diarchy in Bhutan : The Dharma Raja-Deb Raja System

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THE papers on British political relations with Bhutan in the period 1772-1865 are replete with references to chronic instability and civil strife in the Himalayan principality. These papers can be conveniently divided into two categories. First, there are the reports of envoys sent to Tibet or Bhutan and second, the official papers consisting of proceedings of Government (India and Bengal) letters, memoranda, minutes, despatches, and also telegrams resorted to with great advantage in the days of the Duar War (1864-65).

The earliest British envoy George Bogle (1774), associated with Warren Hastings' Tibetan Design, has recorded the events of the reign of Deb Judhur, the dethroned Bhutanese ruler, and the "rooted enmity" and "opposition of interests" between the ruler and a "Junta of priests" led by one Lama Rimbochay. The conflict resulted in a "revolution" which, combined with the failure of Deb Jundhur's Cooch Behar expedition, led to the flight of the latter to the neighbourhood of Lhasa.¹ Messrs. Mercer and Chauvet, entrusted with the task of enquiry into the disturbances in Cooch Behar (1788), spoke of a "late revolution" and subsequent "tranquility" in Bhutan in a letter to Government.² In 1815 Krishna Kanta Bose was sent to Bhutan to settle boundary disputes and has "left us an intelligent account of the country".³ In this account he noted that "the Deb Raja after a time is liable to be thrust out ; on some such pretence as that of his having infringed established custom ; and unless he has Tongsa or Paro Penlop on his side he must, if required to do so, resign his place or risk the result of Civil War."⁴ R. B. Pemberton in his celebrated Report (1838) has narrated how Bhutan was convulsed by the excesses of opposing factions since 1830 in which the dramatic personae were Durzee Namdee (the Tongsa Penlop), Sujee Gasse, Deb Tile and

Daka Penlop. Each one of them aspired for the Deb Rajaship and achieved the object of his ambition.⁶ Ashley Eden before his departure for Bhutan collected information that the country was "thrown into a state of anarchy and general confusion by one of the frequent periodical struggles for Deb Rajaship".⁶ The Tongsa Penlop emerged triumphant in this struggle. When he, smarting under the loss of the Assam Duars, humiliated the Envoy in open Darbar the Deb Raja "was frightened and did not speak".⁷

One series of papers consisting of correspondence between British frontier officials with Government relate that the Bengal Duars of Bhutan knew no peace from early 1830's right upto the outbreak of the War with Bhutan in 1864. In the first instance rivalry between powerful landholders in the plains who were also Bhutan officials was responsible for ceaseless disturbances. The story of a prolonged contest between Durgadev Raikat, a Zemindar of Bykanthpur, and his formidable rival Hurgovind is on record. The latter was a Bhutea official (Katma) with his centre at Mynaguri in the Duars.⁸ It centred round the possession of a stretch of territory known as Kyranti⁹ and passed on as a legacy to their successors. More than the story the official view of its origin compels attention. It was noted that "all the disturbances arise out of the contention of factions in Bhutan". One Deb Raja gave charge of the "mehal called Kyranti" to Hurgovind. Another set up Durgadev in the same district and the latter claimed "hereditary right".¹⁰ The pattern of Bhutanese administration in the Duars was that there were two governors of eastern and western divisions of Bhutan known as the Tongsa and Paro Penlops. Under them there were a number of Subahs in charge of different Duars who had under them a host of minor officials. The Katma was the pivot of Bhutanese administration in the plains of Bengal Duars. In a great majority of cases they were directly appointed by the Sunnad (Title deed) of the Deb Raja. At times they could pose a threat to the central Bhutanese authority. The career of Hurgovind Katma shows how he set at defiance the authority of the Bhutanese Government and carved out for his family a sizable portion of the Duars.¹¹ Some Zamindars received title deeds from both Deb and Dharma Rajas.¹² The records reveal that the Subhas were often loyal to one authority against another. In 1853 one Chaia Penju claimed that he had been

appointed Subahs of Buxa Duar by the Dharma Raja. This was to reinforce the legitimacy of his appointment as, theoretically, the Dharma Raja was the head of the Bhutanese State. But this new Subahs was an ardent supporter of the Deb Raja. He came down to Mynaguri under the latter's order and engaged in a protracted conflict to oust the protege of the Dharma Raja. He did all the could "to destroy the authority and injure the revenue of the Dharma Raja".¹³ Kham Jhampe (?) a loyal servant of the Dharma Raja arrived by way of Madari, encountered the forces of Chaia Penju and took possession of Mynaguri. Chaia Penju "fought him for three days and at last turned the scale in his favour".¹⁴ Kham Jhampe stated that the object of Chaia Penju's forays in British protected territory was to involve "his country and sovereign" in a quarrel with the Company which would lead to the annexation of Dharma Raja's land and open advancement of the Deb Raja and his followers. British officials also suspected that Chaia Penju's aim was "to get the Dharma Raja embroiled in a dispute with the British government".¹⁵

An appraisal of the cause of political instability in Bhutan throws light on three aspects of its policy. First, in the period under review the office of the Deb Raja had gained much in power and esteem. It became the object of legitimate ambition among the secular aristocracy and powerful families. Secondly, the Dharma Raja who was the head of the order of priests was also theoretically the head of the State and was recognised as such in Bhutan. The history of the institution of the Dharma Raja shows that ever since the days of the first Dharma Raja the incumbents concerned themselves with religious obligations. But the office still had throughout the 19th century sufficient impact and influence in mundane affairs as to unsettle a fait accompli. This is one reason why the secular aristocracy regarded the Dharma Raja's support as invaluable. It also shows that very often the religious hierarchy crossed the path of aristocratic ambition.

Thirdly, the system of 'diarchy' in Bhutan did not ensure political harmony. The tension between the Deb and Dharma Rajas at times easily degenerated into armed conflict among their followers causing misery in the hills. It also turned the fertile plains of the Bengal Duars into a cockpit for factional fights.

An examination of these three features would perhaps explain, in a

manner, the unrest in Bhutan and the Duars under its control, recorded with such distinction in British official papers.

Comparing the legends collected by Krishna Kanta Bose (1815) with the "traditional account furnished by Cheboo Lama" Surgeon Rennie observes that these two accounts agree so far as to "specify the people of Cooch Behar as those who originally possessed Bhutan" and to indicate Tibet as the place from which the first Dharma Raja came".¹⁶ The first Dharma Raja came to Bhutan "two to three hundred years ago", took possession of Punakha displacing the Cooch prince and devoted himself to the task of "introducing law in lawless Bhutan". He sent "armed men to roam over mountains and forests, rocks and caves" to hunt down "robbers" and "thieves".¹⁷ This was the beginning of a sedentary pattern of settlement in the Bhutan hills. Instead of setting himself on the throne and exercising the temporal authority "he sent to Lhasa for a Tibetan".¹⁸ He made him his prime minister and called him Deb Raja. He occupied himself "entirely with the cares of religion and contemplation of the Deity".¹⁹ The first Deb Raja whom Eden calls Dupgein Shepton made Bhutan "a land of security so that even an old woman might carry a load of gold in safety".²⁰ Thus the Deb Raja who was entrusted with secular affairs and "executive part of the Government" extended his grip more and more in the 17th and 18th centuries. In 1774 "his authority in the internal government of the country appears to be very complete".²¹ An account of the perquisites of Deb Raja's office is an impressive reading. He used to receive "customary tributes" from the different governors of districts and "disburse the established charges" of the state. Secondly, when a person was appointed penlop or Zimpe (Councillor) or to any office of the State he used to present something to the Deb Raja. Thirdly he received the "whole revenue" of the lowland estates of Mynaguri and other tracts, "about rupees thirty thousand per annum." Fourthly, he received a fine in all cases of murder and homicide. Fifthly, he traded with a capital of "about rupees forty thousand". Sixthly, he was entitled to the property of all servants of government on their demise unless "they may have been dependents of the Dharma Raja who in that case succeeded to their property". Lastly, he presented horses, silk, salt and hoes to petty landholders and farmers and received "much more than the value in return".²² Evidently, the Deb Raja had

extraordinary powers of patronage, the keystone in widening the area of effective political support. Further, he could not "deviate in the smallest degree from the observance of established customs".²³ Thus it was cutsm that the office of the Deb Raja was tenable for three years. An ambitious person who could muster the support of powerful chiefs could however ignore the time limit. Pemberton recorded that Sujee Gasse retained the office "for nine years instead of three".²⁴ The Tongso Penlop (Durjee Namdee) revolted and in the emergency applied to Lhasa for assistance²⁵ and got himself installed as Deb Raja. This ushered in "one of the most protracted rebellions that has taken place for many years".²⁶

George Bogle's remarks about the importance of the office of the Deb Raja determined British protocol in the 19th century. In their correspondence with Central Bhutanese authority approaches were made almost invariably to the Deb Raja. One interesting fact is knowledge of Bhutanese polity was far from perfect as late as 1857. A despatch to the Court of Directors runs: "we did not know where the jurisdiction of the different subordinate rulers along our frontier begins and ends. Col. Jenkins stated that the contention for the supreme Government which appeared to have existed for many years among the principal families of the country still continued; but that he was not certain how far the authority of the Dharma Raja and Deb Raja (who seemed to be colleagues with co-ordinate powers) extended. He was not sure that there were not two Deb Rajas".²⁷ However, consciously or not the British worked towards upgrading and recognising the de facto ruler, the temporal authority or the Deb Raja.

The first Dharma Raja had withdrawn from the task of governing. His concern for things spiritual and his position as the head of the priestly order raised him in popular estimation. He came to be regarded as a high incarnation. One observer noted in 1815 that "he was the spiritual guide, incarnate Deity and Sovereign Prince".²⁸ In Bhutanese eyes the Deb Raja always held a subordinate position. One Zinkaf (a subordinate Bhutanese official) sent from Bhutan on deputation to the Governor General's Agent in 1833, gave information which have a peculiar relevance of its own as emanating from an internal source. The Zinkaf stated that in Bhutan the Dharma Raja was called "Meha Lama, Noa Namdee and Theboo Rimbochay;" that there were twelve hundred gylongs with

the Dharma Raja at the monastery at Talo where "prayers are offered up day and night;" that all "important matters of the country are reported to the Dharma Raja" whose "principal employment however is in religious rites;" that "Tipa is the title given to the person in office at Hassa (Lhasa) whose duty it is to carry on the affairs of the country as the Deb Raja does under the Dharma Raja in Bhutan".²⁹

The image of the Dharma Raja portrayed here is that of a learned recluse held in high veneration to which the Deb Raja could never aspire. Along with the Dharma Raja flourished an institution (that of the Deb Raja) with two hundred years' antiquity, as is evident from the foregoing statements.

Again, eminence of the priestly order in Bhutan had a bearing in non-spiritual sphere recognised by the powerful secular aristocracy.³⁰ Perhaps it is relevant at this point to elucidate this "bearing" in terms of certain earthly features. The titles and attributes of the Dharma Raja in his seal describe him as the "Spiritual and temporal Chief of the realm" and "above all the Lamas of the Dookpa creed".³¹ It is on record that the Zamindars in the Duars had their title deeds both from the Deb and Dharma Rajas though there were exceptions. One account says that the "Dharma Raja possesses lands in the low country South of the hills of the annual value of seven or eight thousand rupees and traded with a capital twentyfive or thirty thousand rupees. . . . The Deb Raja has no authority over the Dharma Raja's people".³²

The revenues from the Assam Duars were used to defray the expenses of the priestly order under the Dharma Raja. One representation to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal runs: "Sometime ago you seized our seven talooks in Assam from which the provisions for the Dharma Raja's puja were brought and you paid some rupees in exchange which we consenting reserved them".³³

It would seem that the Dharma Raja had the resources, power and patronage to unleash a civil strife and at times to play a decisive role. Perhaps such conditions led Col. Jenkins, the Governor General's Agent to think that the Dharma and Deb Rajas "seemed to be colleagues with co-ordinate powers."

This study was not intended to produce a neat balance-sheet of power between the Deb and Dharma Rajas. It suggests, however, that the

equilibrium arrived at between the two institutions was eminently unstable. The social and political milieu in Bhutan and its economic backwardness rendered the operation of prescriptive rules nugatory. Tribal loyalty, aristocratic ambition, preeminence of priesthood, ethnic peculiarity and foreign intervention are among the multiple forces that determined Bhutan's destiny in the 19th Century. And it is these forces that rendered the harmonious functioning of an uncrystallised diarchy impossible. R. B. Pemberton very pungently observed: "The form of government is in itself, if fairly administered, sufficient to produce far more favourable results to the people than are now perceptible".³⁴

NOTES

¹ Markham (C. R.) *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet and the journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa*, Trubner, London, 1876. Reprint 1971, pp. 37-41.

² Dated 10th June 1788. Misc. Records. Revenue Deptt., p. 18.

³ *Friend of India*, March 16, 1865.

⁴ *Some Account of the country of Bhutan*, Krishna Kanta Bose (1815) Translated into English by David Scott. *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XV, p. 150.

⁵ Pemberton (R. B.)—'Report on Bootan'. *Indian Studies Past and Present Reprint*, 1961, p. 91.

⁶ NAI Foreign Political A, No. 3 dated Darjeeling, 10th Nov. 1863, A. Eden to Col. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India.

⁷ Eden to Durand No. 45, dated Darjeeling, the 21st April 1864.

⁸ The place is located on the left bank of the river Teesta in the Duars.

⁹ The place was in Dalimkote, the westernmost of the Bengal Duars.

¹⁰ Governor General's Agent to the Offg. Secretary, Government of India, 22 Aug. 1840.

¹¹ The story of Hurgovind is recorded in a series of papers in Foreign Deptt. Files. It is also mentioned by Pemberton in his Report and William Griffiths in his Journal.

¹² (i) NAI, Foreign Political Sept, 1840, No. C4, 14th Sept/1840. Entry under 20th Dec.

(ii) The Dharma Raja is an Indian term. In Bhutan he was known as Shepton (Eden), Subdoon (Pemberton), Shap-Trung Rimbochay (Bell). There were other titles.

¹³ NAI, Foreign Political, Oct. 21, 1853, No. 153, Dec. 22, 1853.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ NAI, Foreign Political, April 28, 1854. Letter from W. Dampier to Cecil Beadon, dated Patna 17th January 1854, No. 115 para 5.

¹⁶ Rennie Surgeon, *Bhotan and the story of the Dooar War* (1866) 1970, p. 41.

¹⁷ Bell, Charles, *People of Tibet*, Reprint Oxford 1968, p. 145. Quoting from the Bhutanese history Lho-hi Cho-jung.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

- ¹⁹ Bose, Krishna Kanta. 'Some Accounts. . .', *Asiatic Researches* Vol. XV, p. 145.
- ²⁰ Bell, *People of Tibet*, p. 145.
- ²¹ *Narratives*, p. 36.
- ²² *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XV, p. 134.
- ²³ *Ibid.*
- ²⁴ Pemberton, *Report*, p. 91.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 92.
- ²⁷ Despatch to the Court of Directors, No 56, 8th Sept. 1857, para 187.
- ²⁸ *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XV, p. 131.
- ²⁹ NAI, Foreign Political, Dec. 12, 1833, No. 76, 12 Dec., 1833. Conversation between Cheety Zinkaf and Lt. Inglis.
- ³⁰ The cause of the Tongso Penlop who revolted against the Deb Raja was espoused by the Dharma Raja and the priests, Pemberton, *Report*, p. 91.
- ³¹ (i) Hookar J. D., *Himalayan Journal*, Vol. I, Murray, London, 1854, p. 372.
(ii) Dookpa/Drukpa. All Bhutanese monks and Clerics estimated at 4000 to 5000 belong to the Drukpa branch of the Red-Hat Group. Karan P. P., Bhutan Lexington/1967, p. 73.
- ³² *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XV, p. 132.
- ³³ Bhutan Political Proceedings, Nov. 1864, No. 5069, dated simply "Chand Ke Tarikh."
- ³⁴ Pemberton, *Report*, p. 57, para 22.

Abanindranath in Government School of Art

ARAVINDA GUHA

ABANINDRANATH served in the Government School of Art, Calcutta, for over ten years. An account of his service under the Government should be of considerable interest from the historical point of view. This collection of contemporary Government records (mainly unpublished), may shed some light on a comparatively less known chapter of Abanindranath's life.

Abanindranath Tagore joined as Vice-principal of the Government School of Art, Calcutta in the forenoon of 15 August 1905. "Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore is appointed to be Vice-principal of the School of Art, Calcutta, and substantively *pro tempore* to class V of the Provincial Education Service." (Appointment Department Proceedings Nos. B 1029-31, August 1905.)

"On the recommendation of the Principal of the Government School of Art and the Director of Public Instruction, Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore appointed to be the vice-principal of that school on probation for one year on a pay of Rs. 300 a month." (Education Department Proceedings Nos. B 76-90, August 1905.)

"Mr. E. B. Havell, Principal, Government School of Art, and Keeper of the Art Gallery, Calcutta, is allowed combined leave for nine months, viz., privilege leave for three months from the 12th February 1906 and furlough for the remaining period.

"Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore, Vice-Principal, Government School of Art, Calcutta, is appointed to act as Principal of that institution and as Keeper of the Art Gallery during the absence of Mr. E. B. Havell, or until further orders". (Appointment Department Proceedings No. B 483-88, February 1906.)

An extract from a letter dated 9 October 1907 from E. B. Havell to A. Earle, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, is given below;

"I certainly think it would be an advantage to the School of Art to have Mr. Tagore confirmed as Vice-Principal. From some work of his pupils he has sent me I think he has done remarkably well in teaching the higher classes. He has undoubtedly very great and unusual artistic ability himself, and no Indian School of Art has ever secured any Vice-Principal at all approaching him in this respect. Nor would the Calcutta School be at all likely to find another like him even if double or treble the pay were given. With regard to his administrative capacity I can of course say nothing, except that during the time he worked under me everything went on far better than it had done with his predecessor.

"He took up the offg. Principalship under great disadvantages. I had intended to let him practise the office work under my guidance for a month or two before I left, but owing to my sudden illness this was prevented, and he had to take over the whole work at the busiest time without any preparation or experience. After all as Vice-Principal he will not have much to do with the office work. It is far more important that he should be an artist and be able to teach."

A. Earle, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal forwarded a copy of the extract, with his letter No. 20726 dated 25 November 1907 to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal and recommended:

"I have the honor to invite reference to Government Notification No. 3509 A-D., dated the 24th August 1905, appointing Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore as Vice-Principal of the Government School of Art, Calcutta, on probation for one year and subsequently *protempore* to class V of the then Provincial Educational Service, on a salary of Rs. 300 a month.

"2. As reported in this office No. 14204, dated the 25th September 1905, Mr. Tagore joined his appointment on the forenoon of the 15th August 1905. He therefore completed the probationary period of his service on the 15th August 1906. The question of his confirmation has, however, been kept pending on account of Mr. Havell's absence on leave.

3. I have now consulted Mr. Havell on the subject of Mr. Tagore's confirmation as Vice-Principal. I forward an extract from his reply for the information of Government. Mr. Tagore has been officiating as Principal of the School of Art since the 12th February 1906, on which date Mr. Havell proceeded on furlough, and in that capacity he has done as well as could be expected. In view of what Mr. Havell says and of

the work done by him as officiating Principal, I recommend that Mr. Tagore may be confirmed as Vice-Principal of the School of Art and in Class VI of the reorganised Provincial Educational Service, with effect from the 15th August 1906." (Appointment Department Proceedings No. 353, January 1908.)

H. C. Streatfeild, Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, on 17 January 1908 stated: "Babu Abanindra Nath Thakur, Vice-Principal, Government School of Art, Calcutta (on probation), is confirmed in that appointment, with effect from the 15th August, 1905, and in class V (Rs. 300) of the Provincial Educational Service, as constituted prior to its reorganisation, from the 15th August, 1905, to the 9th September, 1905, and in class VI (Rs. 300) of the reorganised Provincial Educational Service, from the 10th. September, 1905." (Appointment Department proceedings No. B 354, January 1908.)

"Babu Abanindra Nath Thakur, Class VI, is promoted substantively *pro tempore* to class V, with effect from the 15th May 1908, vice Mr. J. V. Francies, confirmed." (Appointment Department proceedings No. B 449-53, December 1908.)

G. W. Kuchler, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, in his report for 1907-08, stated:

"Mr. A. N. Tagore officiated as Principal throughout the year. The strength of the Institution was maintained.

"Mr. E. B. Havell, the Principal, who was at home on sick leave, has been pronounced by the Medical Board unfit for further service in India. Proposals have been submitted for the appointment of his successor." (Report on Public Instruction in Bengal for 1907-08, p. 26.)

H. R. James, officiating Director of Public Instruction, Bengal reported on 29 October 1909: "Mr. A. N. Tagore continued to officiate as Principal for the greater part of the year. Mr. Percy Brown, Superintendent of the School of Art, Lahore, has now been appointed permanent Principal, and took charge of the school on January, the 12th. . ." (Report on Public Instruction in Bengal for 1908-09, p. 36.)

The Governor General of India in Council, in his letter No. 106 dated 13 May 1909 to the Secretary of State for India, proposed:

"We have the honour to forward for your Lordship's consideration

a proposal submitted by the Government of Bengal to raise the pay of Mr. A. N. Tagore, Vice-Principal of the School of Art, Calcutta.

"2. This proposal is the outcome of the arrangements made for filling the post of Principal of the School of Art, Calcutta, which became vacant on the retirement from the service of Mr. E. B. Havell, the permanent incumbent of that appointment. The Government of Bengal represented that the functions of the School of Art were of much wider nature than that of an institution designed merely for the teaching of painting ; and that its importance as a centre for the development of the industrial arts could not be neglected. The Lieutenant-Governor accordingly expressed a desire to develop the industrial side of the school, which had been neglected in the past, and recommended the appointment as Principal of an officer with special qualifications, who would be able to take charge of the school both in its Fine Arts and industrial departments.

"3. The question whether Mr. A. N. Tagore, who has been officiating as Principal of the school for some time past, should be confirmed in the appointment has been fully considered. The Lieutenant-Governor, while recognizing Mr. Tagore's qualifications as an artist and teacher of painting, was unable to recommend him for the post as he was not qualified to supervise the industrial section of the school, the development of which is at the present time of special importance. He therefore asked for the services of Mr. Percy Brown, Principal of the School of Art, Lahore, as Principal of the School of Art, Calcutta. This arrangement has been accepted and given effect to, and we shall address you separately, if necessary, regarding a successor to Mr. Brown at the School of Art, Lahore.

"4. With regard, however, to Mr. Tagore the Government of Bengal considers some change in his position and duties to be now inevitable, while that officer has himself raised the question of the inadequacy of his present pay. The Government of Bengal, in recognizing Mr. Tagore's eminent position as an artist and teacher of painting, desires to place him practically in charge of the Fine Arts section under the general supervision only of the Principal, and it considers that for such a position and for a man of Mr. Tagore's attainments and status as an artist a salary of Rs. 300 a month is altogether too small. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore proposes that Mr. Tagore should be granted a personal salary

of Rs. 500-25-750 a month, and that the appointment of Vice-Principal of the School of Art, Calcutta, should be excluded from the cadre of the Provincial Educational Service. The extra cost involved in this proposal, as shown from the proposition statements enclosed, amounts to Rs. 452-12-5 a month.

"5. We support the proposals of the Government of Bengal and recommend them for your Lordship's sanction. We should have been pleased to have supported Mr. Tagore's appointment as Principal of the School of Art if he had been fully qualified for the post. But he has himself admitted his inability to take charge of or develop the industrial side of the school while it would have been impossible to secure the services of a Vice-Principal qualified in this respect, who would have been willing to work under him as Principal. We understand that Mr. Tagore himself is quite willing to accept the present proposals of the Local Government." (Education Department Proceedings, No. 43, August 1909.)

The Secretary of State for India, in his despatch No. 101-Public dated 9 July 1909 to the Governor-General of India in Council, sanctioned the proposal: "Having considered in council the letter of your Excellency's Government in the Finance Department, No. 106, dated the 13th May 1909, I sanction your proposal that the post of Vice-Principal of the School of Art, Calcutta, should be excluded from the cadre of the Provincial Educational Service, and that Mr. A. N. Tagore, the present incumbent, should receive a personal salary of Rs. 500-25-750 a month." Education Department Proceedings, No. 44, August 1909.)

W. R. Gourlay, officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in his letter No. 1457 T-G dated 12 September 1910 to the Secretary to the Government of India, stated: "Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore, Vice-Principal, Government School of Art, Calcutta, was allowed extraordinary leave without allowances under article 339, Civil Service Regulations, for a period of one month, with effect from the 14th March 1910. . . . Mr. Tagore's pay is purely personal and does not represent the pay of the appointment which he holds." (Education Department proceedings No. 44, December 1910.)

G. W. Kuchler, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, in his report for 1909-10, stated: "The Vice-Principal was on leave during the months

of November and December in 1909 and March and April 1910. . . .” (Report on Public Instruction in Bengal for 1909-10, p. 31.)

The Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, in his note dated 17 January 1913 to the General Secretary, stated:

“Will you kindly refer to your Notification No. 126, dated 7th January, 1913, granting an extension of leave to Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore, Vice-Principal, School of Art, Calcutta, and to the correspondence on which the orders in the Notification proceeded. If Mr. Tagore had availed himself fully of the leave granted him under these orders, it would have carried him up to 4th March 1913.

“2. But on receipt of the telegram from India asking whether there was any objection to the extension of Mr. Percy Brown’s leave, Mr. Tagore was asked whether he was prepared to extend his leave beyond 4th March 1913. He at once called at this office, and expressed his desire to return to his duties as offg. Principal of the School of Art without further delay i.e. before the expiry of the leave already granted him. He also agreed to take over charge of the Art Gallery which he was required to do in view of the fact that the Principal, School of Art, is ex-officio curator of the Art Gallery. Verbal permission was given, and he was asked to forward without delay formal application for permission to return. Such an application has now been received, together with a report that Mr. Tagore returned to duty on 6th January 1913. I accordingly recommend that the unexpired portion of leave granted him under the orders referred to may be cancelled. . . .” (Education Department Proceedings, No. 358-67, Notes and Orders, March 1914.)

The Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in his letter No. 2226 dated 25 March 1913 to the Secretary to the Government of India, stated:

“I am directed to submit the following case for favourable consideration and orders.

“2. The Government of India are aware that Mr. Percy Brown, Principal of the Government School of Art, Calcutta, has been granted by the Secretary of State for India an extension of furlough up to the 1st October, 1913. As Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore, the Vice-Principal of the School was on leave, the Head Master of the school, an officer in the P.E.S., was appointed to act as Principal during the earlier portion of Mr. Percy Brown’s leave, and was allowed to draw in addition to his

grade-pay an allowance of Rs. 100 per mensem, under Article 139 G.S.R. On his return to duty, on the 6th January, 1913 Mr. Tagore was appointed to act as Principal with effect from that date for the remaining period of Mr. Percy Brown's leave. Under the orders conveyed in the Secretary of State's despatch No. 101—Public, dated the 9th. July, 1909, the post of Vice-Principal of the School of Art has been excluded from the cadre of the P.E.S., and a personal pay of Rs. 500-25-750 a month has been sanctioned for Mr. Tagore. As the post of Principal of the School of Art is included in the I.E.S., carrying a special pay of Rs. 1,000 a month, the appointment of Mr. Tagore to act as Principal requires the sanction of the Secretary of State. I am accordingly to request that the Secretary of State may be moved to confirm the orders of this Government in appointing Mr. Tagore to act as Principal of the School. I am also to request that, in consideration of the increased work and responsibility thus devolving on him, both in the School of Art and in connection with the Indian Museum, as Ex-officio curator of the Art Gallery, Mr. Tagore may be granted an allowance of Rs. 100 per mensem for the period during which he may act in the I.E.S. as Principal of the School". (Education Department proceedings, No. B 358, March 1914.)

L. Porter, Secretary to the Government of India, in his letter No. 884 dated 15 May 1913 to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, stated: "In reply to your letter No. 2226, dated the 25th March 1913, I am directed to say that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, the Government of India sanction the appointment of Mr. A. N. Tagore, Vice-Principal, School of Art, Calcutta, to officiate as Principal of that institution from the 6th January 1913 to the 1st October 1913, and the grant to him of an acting allowance of Rs. 100 a month during this period." (Education Department Proceedings, No. B 359, March 1914.)

The Secretary of State, in his Despatch No. 176 (public) dated 18-July 1913, confirmed the action of the Government of India "in sanctioning the appointment of Mr. A. N. Tagore, Vice-Principal, School of Art, Calcutta, to officiate as Principal of that institution from 6th January 1913 to 1st. October 1913, and the grant to him of a personal allowance of Rs. 100 a month for that period." (Education Department Proceedings, No. B 363, March 1914.)

It may not be out of place to quote here the Government notification

No. 764 dated 16 February 1914: "Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore, Vice-Principal, Government School of Art, Calcutta, continued to act as Principal of the School and in the Indian Educational Service, up to the 26th October 1913, *vice* Mr. Percy Brown, on leave." (Education Department Proceedings, No. B 366, March 1914.)

"Mr. A. N. Tagore allowed leave for one month, under article 271 of the Civil Service Regulations with effect from the 9th March 1914. . ." (Education Department Proceedings, No. B 253, April 1914.)

W. W. Hornell, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, in his letter No. 218/4A-10-16 dated 29 March 1916 to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, stated: "I have the honour to invite reference to Government letter No. 4390, dated the 6th December 1915, accepting the resignation tendered by Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore of his appointment as Vice-Principal, School of Art, Calcutta, with effect from 15th. September 1915. . ." (Education Department Proceedings, No. B 235, June 1916.)

Percy Brown, Principal, Government School of Art, Calcutta, on 14 July 1917, stated: "In 1915 Mr. A. N. Tagore who had been vice-Principal since 1905 was compelled to resign on account of ill-health." (The Quinquennial Report on the Government School of Art, Calcutta, for 1912-13 to 1916-17, p. 1.)

Percy Brown prepared a statement of application for the post of Vice-Principal which was vacated by Abanindranath. The statement contained names of twelve applicants: D. Dutt; Hurry Narain Bose; A. Chatterjee; Jamini P. Ganguli; Asit Kumar Halder; Santosh Kumar Das; Barada Kanta Dutta; Ishwari Prasad; Hironmoy Roy Choudhuri; Samarendra Nath Gupta; Feroz-ud-Din; C. Dutt. (Education Department Proceedings, No. B 236, June 1916.)

W. W. Hornell, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, in his letter No. 218-4A-10-16 dated 29 March 1916 to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, proposed:

"I have to refer to the Secretary of State's Despatch No. 101 Public, dated 9th July 1909, in terms of which the post of Vice-Principal of the School of Art, Calcutta, was excluded from the cadre of the Provincial Educational Service, and Mr. A. N. Tagore, the then incumbent, was

granted a personal salary of Rs. 500-25-750 a month. In these circumstances no salary has been attached to the above post since Mr. Tagore resigned it, and I have to propose, in consultation with the Principal, School of Art, that a pay of Rs. 300-40-500 a month may henceforth be attached to the post. This rate of pay, it is understood, is allowed to the Vice-Principal of the School of Art at Lahore and to the Assistant Superintendent of the School of Art at Madras.

“As regards the appointment of Mr. Tagore’s successor on the rate of pay proposed above, I have to forward a statement of particulars regarding the applicants, and to state that in Mr. Brown’s opinion, which I endorse, Mr. Jamini Prakash Ganguli is the best. Mr. Ganguli is reported to be an accomplished artist, popular with all classes of art patrons. He is conversant with both the aspects of Fine Art now practised in India. He is broad in his views and adaptable to any conditions which may present themselves. I accordingly recommend that Mr. Jamini Prakash Ganguli may be appointed on probation for one year with effect from the date on which the School of Art re-opens after the next summer vacation, to be the Vice-Principal of the School on the rate of pay proposed in the above paragraph. . . .” (Education Department Proceedings, No. B 235, June 1916.)

The Government of Bengal decided that the pay of the Vice-Principal’s appointment should be higher than that proposed. L.S.S. O’Malley, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in his letter No. 162—T.G. dated 23 May 1916 to the Director of Public Instruction, Bengal accepted the proposal for the appointment of J. P. Ganguli and stated:

“I am directed to refer to the correspondence resting with your letter No. 218, dated the 29th. March 1916, in which you submit proposals for filling up the post of Vice-Principal of the School of Art, Calcutta, which has been vacated by Mr. Abanindra Nath Tagore. You propose that a pay of Rs. 300-40-500 a month be attached to the post and that Mr. Jamini Prakash Ganguli be appointed to it in succession of Mr. Tagore.

2. In reply I am to say that Government have decided that the pay of the Vice-Principal’s appointment should be higher than that proposed

and that it should be fixed at Rs. 350-40-550 per mensem. I am accordingly to communicate sanction to the creation of a post on Rs. 350-40-550 a month, outside the grades, for the purpose. The post held by Mr. A. N. Tagore is abolished with effect from the date of his resignation.

"3. I am further to say that Government accept your recommendation for the appointment of Mr. J. P. Ganguli to the post now sanctioned. . ." (Education Department Proceedings, No. B 237, June 1916.)

Role of Durgadas Rathor in the Politics of Marwar, 1693-1697

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THE period under study is a significant one for understanding changes in the internal politics of Marwar and in the nature of the Mughal-Rathor relations. The broad political developments in Marwar during the period may be set down briefly. After his arrival from Deccan Durgadas could not secure the support of some of the prominent Rathor sardars, while his relations with Ajit Singh soon became strained.¹ At the same time the Mughal-Rathor relations also entered a new phase. Shujaat Khan, who was appointed the Faujdar of Jodhpur after the death of Inayat Khan in 1687 A.D., tried to win over the Rathor sardars by granting them their old pattas or by granting them imperial mansabs. He also sanctioned *chauth* of the *rahdari*² of the area to the Rathor sardars.³ But he failed to maintain peace in the area. Therefore, in 1693, following the order of Aurangzeb, Safi Khan invited Ajit Singh to conclude an agreement. However, nothing came out of it.⁴

It was after this failure to conclude any peaceful settlement with Ajit Singh that the Mughals initiated talks with Durgadas in 1694.⁵ It is said that Aurangzeb was getting worried about his grandson and grand-daughter who were with Durgadas, and therefore he initiated the talks with him.⁶ In 1697 Durgadas accepted an imperial mansab, and he was appointed Faujdar of Sorath.⁷

Except for a few stray references we do not have any details explaining the background of the developments above and the motives of Durgadas in accepting a royal *mansab*. The general charges made by a number of historians that Ajit Singh behaved in an ungrateful manner towards

Durgadas must be studied against the background of Durgadas's relations with the Mughals from 1693 A.D. onwards.

A number of extant letters which are summarised below throw a flood of light on Durga Das's negotiations with Aurangzeb and the resulting strain in his relations with Ajit Singh.

(1) A letter dated *Jeth Sudi 3*, (Friday, 17th May 1694) written by Tej Singh and Mukanddas to Kani Ram, diwan of Jai Singh states that the news of the arrival of Shahzada Akbar at *Bahadmer* is not true, and that some imposter has assumed the name of Akbar and started rebellious activities in his name. He has collected 300 to 400 *sawars* from pargana Sojat and Godwarh and is holding his camp in Devsuri pass. Other persons are also joining him and supplying him *rasad*. No well known person seems to have joined him. The letter goes on to say that a communication from Prince Akbar had informed Durgadas that he was coming to Hindustan. According to the programme, some of the followers of Durgadas had gone to the Deccan to receive him.

(2) Another letter dated *Asad Vadi 6*, (Friday, 23rd May 1694) written by Rathor Kanhim Ram to Hari Singh Khangarot informs that he made an enquiry about the arrival of Akbar. "About the false Akbar I have been informed that he has been camping between the valley Devsuri and Someswar. He is camping in the land of the Rana with his 1000 followers. He (Akbar) plundered a village of the Rana and charged Rs. 900/- as *peshkash*. One Bania was feeding his men. He is staying there with the consent of the Rana. Durgadas and the Champawats have been reconciled."

(3) There is a letter dated *Asad Sudi 2, 1753* (Friday, 10th June 1697) written by Gaj Khangarot a leading sarkar of Amber to Rathor Durgadas. It says that Thakur Hari Singh had received a *nishan* from Shahzada Akbar (from Iran). "You are well aware about the *arzadasht* sent in reply. The day has come which we have longed for. I am ready with my forces or retainers (*jamiyat*). I shall join you as soon as I hear from you, and I shall not ask for any money for expenditure from you." The author adds "We should not miss this opportunity. May god grant that day soon when Sultan Akbar ascends the throne and our fortunes rise."

(4) Another letter, *Asad Sudi 13, 1753* (Tuesday 22nd June 1697) written by Khanzada Ramchand to Maharaja Bisan Singh gives further information of the growing bond between Durgadas and the Khangarots—the son of Hari Singh Khangarot, had written a letter to Sujan Rathor whose son was married to a daughter of Gaj Singh. It seems that Sujan Singh had sent reinforcement to Gaj Singh. A letter from Gaj Singh to Durgadas Rathor intercepted by Ramchandra's men, made a reference to Durgadas's alliance with Prince Akbar.

The first two letters⁹ of the year 1693-4 A.D. mentioned above indicate that in 1694 A.D. the rebellion of the fake Akbar was the result of the failure of the arrival of Prince Akbar, who was expected to come to India according to his own letter written to Durgadas. It is worthy to note that the man who raised rebellion professing himself as Prince Akbar, against Aurangzeb, was getting support of the local inhabitants of Sojat and Godwarh and also from the Rana. But the rebellion was crushed in a very short time by Muhammad Kazim, the naib of Shujjaat Khan.⁹ It is not certain whether Durgadas had any sympathy with the rebellion of the bogus Akbar. It could be said that he was not giving him any support directly.

Two letters of the year 1697 A.D. mention that apart from Durgadas, the Khangarot *sardars* were also having correspondence with Shahzada Akbar.¹⁰ The Khangarots too had an understanding with Durgadas and they were jointly preparing for war. We also notice that even after entering into negotiations with the Mughals, Durgadas himself was writing to Prince Akbar and expecting his arrival.

The above information along with the contemporary accounts would throw valuable light on the nature of the role of Durgadas during the period 1693 to 1697 A.D.

From the contents of the letters mentioned above it is obvious that Durgadas was waiting for Akhbar even after 1694 A.D. when the attempts for negotiation had started. We should also note that apart from continuing correspondence, Durgadas was also making efforts for strengthening his position and consolidating his power in Marwar. In 1693 he had secured the support of the Champawats and other important sardars of

Marwar¹¹ and the support of Khangarot sardars of Amber. The contents of letter No. 4, show that Khangarots were preparing for war under the command of Durgadas. We also find that due to the efforts of Durgadas, peace was established in Mewar and Rana Jai Singh was raised to the throne.¹² He had also helped the Hadas by establishing cordial relations between Anurud Singh and Durjan Singh.¹³

Thus it could be said that in the early years of the last decades of the 17th century,, the power and position of Durgadas was increasing day by day. Of this the Mughal commanders were fully aware. Possibly Aurangzeb also wanted to avoid the expected danger which might have arisen after the arrival of Prince Akbar. Aurangzeb might have also thought that by winning over Durgadas in his favour he would be able to crush the rebellious activities of the Rathors and create dissension between Durgadas and Ajit Singh.

Therefore it seems that Mughal negotiations in 1694 were due to the political problem rather than the anxiety of Aurangzeb for getting hold over the sons and daughter of Prince Akbar.

For Durgadas it was quite a favourable opportunity. It seems that after 1694 he was not certain about the arrival of Akbar, and at the same time might have been conscious of the limitations of his strength against the Mughals. Thus he adopted a favourable attitude towards the Mughals, though he continued to strengthen his power. It seems that Durgadas was playing a dual role. On the one hand he was consolidating his power by securing the support inside and outside Marwar and awaiting for Prince Akbar to rise in revolt against Aurangzeb. On the other hand he continued negotiations with Aurangzeb.

It is difficult to say as to what extent Durgadas was confident about his preparation for the war against Aurangzeb if Akbar had arrived. But it is obvious that as soon as he received the mansab, he accepted the faujdari of Soreth and left Marwar in a state of uncertainty. He also accepted the terms of Aurangzeb for presenting Akbar in the court.¹⁴ That the agreement was favourable to Durgadas is obvious from the following table showing the *mansab* granted to the various Rathor Sardars including Durgadas and Ajit Singh.¹⁵

MANSAB GRANTED BY AURANZEB¹⁶*Durgadas and His Family
Members.**Ajit Singh and Other Rathor
Sardars.*

1. Durgadas S/o Askaran ...	3000/2000	Ajit Singh ...	1500/ 500
2. Tejkaran S/o Durgadas ...	500/ 300	Mukand Singh S/o Sujan Singh ...	600/ 300
3. Mahkaran S/o Durgadas ...	500/ 300	Raghnath Singh S/o Sujan Singh ...	500/ 300
4. Abhai Keran S/o Durgadas ...	400/ 200	Bhati Dada Chand Bhan ...	300/ 100
5. Anup Singh S/o Tejkaran ...	300/ 200	Rathor Maha Singh	200/ 100
6. Dalkeran S/o Tejkaran ...	400/ 200	Mohokam Singh ... Rathor Prem Singh	200/ 100 150/ 50
TOTAL ...		5100/3200	3450/1450

On the basis of the above it could be safely said that Durgadas succeeded in securing very high mansab for himself and his family members while the mansabs bestowed on Ajit Singh and other Rathor Sardars were comparatively considerably lower. This created a problem in the politics of Marwar. By granting the unusually high mansab to Durgadas, Aurangzeb neglected the authority of Ajit Singh and other Rathor sardars. Rathor sardars who had made equal sacrifice in the war against Aurangzeb were disappointed and started criticizing Durgadas.¹⁷ Ajit Singh could not remain satisfied with such a low mansab.

Moreover a large number of Rathor sardars who were followers of Ajit Singh were not given *mansabs*. Ajit Singh's own mansab was too small to enable him to accommodate his followers out of the *jagir* granted to him against his *mansab*. Hence most of Ajit Singh's followers remained discontented and unhappy with this arrangement.¹⁸

Some of the sardars left Ajit Singh and went to their *thikanas* where they started paying some money to the Mughal officers to keep peace in their area.¹⁹

Hence this development also weakened the Rathor power in Marwar and the Rathors were now no longer in a position to force Aurangzeb to accept their demands.

NOTES

¹ Although Durgadas always claimed that he was faithful towards Ajit Singh, there are references that on more than two occasions, he worked against the desire of Ajit Singh.

(1) In 1692 when Ajit Singh was proceeding towards Ajmer, at the invitation of Shafi Khan, Durgadas did not participate with negotiation. *Ajit Vilas* 74.

(2) In 1693, when Sujaat Khan and his commanders were plundering the Centres of Rathor powers, (Bahir-Mokalsar etc.) Ajit Singh made complaint about the non participation of Durgadas in his favour.

² One fourth of transit duties. Here the word *chauth* does not meant the *chauth* levied in Maratha Rajya.

³ *Ajit Singh ri Khyat* (Oriental Research Institute, Jodhpur I, 271, *Rathora-ri-Vanshavali*, (O.R.I.) p. 200. *Ajit Vilas*, 64.

⁴ *Ajit Singh ri Khyat* II, 189-90.

⁵ *Ajit Vilas*, Text. (Shodh Sansthan, Jodhpur) 233/96. *Ajit Singh ri Khyat*—II, 297.

⁶ Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, Vol. V, 227.

⁷ *Ajit Singh ri Khyat*, II, 304-6, *Marwar ke Pathora ki Khyat* (Shodh Sansthan), 75.

⁸ Khatoot Ahalkaran, Register (letter) No. 100 and Register No. 178. Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

⁹ *Akhbarat San* 38, Jikad 16. (29th June 1694). *Ajit-Vilas*, 79.

¹⁰ Copy available at the collection of Diggi Records, Diggi House—Jaipur

¹¹ Letter No. 1. Also see *Rajroopak*.

¹² *Ajit Singh ri Khyat* II 273-4, *Rathora-ri-Vanshavali* (O.R.I.J.) p. 200 *Ajit-Vilas*, pp. 66-71.

¹³ *Jodhpur Rajya ki Khyat* II, 83-4.

¹⁴ Farman, 10 Rajab, San 42. Copy available in the personal collection of Prof. Satish Chandra.

¹⁵ *Jodhpur Rajya ki Khyat*, II, pp. 94-5. *Marwar ke Rathoro ki Khyat*, p. 75. *Ajit Singh ri Khyat*, II, pp. 304-6.

¹⁶ *Marwar ke Rathodi-ki-Khyat*, 75 *Ajit Vilas* (Text) 235/98. *Ajit Singh ri Khyat*, 304-5. *Vir-Vinod*, 833.

¹⁷ *Ajit Vilas*, 88.

¹⁸ *Jaswant Singh ri Varta* (O.R.I.J.) 121/36. *Jodhpur Rajya ki Khyat*—II, 96

¹⁹ *Jodhpur Rajya-ki-Khyat*, II 96. Rathor Udai Singh who had served under Ajit Singh as a leading sardar also left him and went into the Rana's service. For the Act of Jalor see. *Ajit Vilas*—87.

A Note on Sugar Industry in Modern Bihar

B. K. SINHA

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SUGAR is the most important industry depending on agriculture.

Sugar cane is the principal cash crop of Bihar, which happened to be properly cultivated by European planters who made white sugar direct from cane. But the ordinary peasants followed the antiquated system as elsewhere in India. They had no regular method of rotation except in the irrigated tract of south Bihar where cane generally followed rice. On planters' estates cultivation was more advanced than on farmers' lands.¹

Cultivation of sugar was introduced into Champaran from Gorakhpur in the beginning of the 19th century.² Soon afterwards sugar refining industry began to flourish in Bettiah sub-division.³ Rotation of crops was not generally practised except in Patna district where it was never grown in the same field in two successive years.⁴ Sugar happened to be one of the chief manufactures in Saran and Shahabad. During 1872-73 there were as many as 58 sugar mills in Shahabad where the output was estimated at 965 tons, valued at £28,350. Nasriganj and Jagdishpur were the chief centres of production.⁵ The cultivation of sugar cane received more attention after the decline of indigo industry towards the close of the 19th century. A company acquired in 1900-1 the indigo estates of Athar and Agrial in Muzaffarpur and Siraha in Champaran district for the purpose of cultivation of sugar cane. Cane-crushing mills and sugar refining plant of the most modern type were erected at those places and also at Barhoga in Saran. The sugar turned out was of the best quality and ready sale for it had been found in the towns of north India.⁶ In

Darbhangha the chief centre of sugar production was Madhubani sub-division.

With the opening of the 20th century more attention began to be paid to the cultivation of sugar-cane. The total area under the crop in 1910-11 was nearly 2,65,500 acres as hereunder:—

Bhagalpur Division	...	47,200 acres
Patna Division	...	1,02,200 acres
Tirhut Division	...	72,600 acres

By this time iron mills had come into almost universal use for the extraction of cane juice and their use resulted in diminishing the cost of manufacturing sugar. Madhubani in Darbhanga and Nasriganj in Shahabad contained a large number of refineries and carried on a large trade in sugar though the trade suffered greatly owing to the competition with imported bounty-fed sugar. Several factories under European management were started in Champaran, Saran and Tirhut.⁷ But in 1914-15 as the first world war began there was a decline of nearly 30% in the outturn of sugar.⁸

The high prices of sugar during the war, which reached a record figure in 1920, considerably stimulated the production of sugar cane in India. Though these prices steadily fell during the next decade the area under sugar-cane did not materially diminish. At the close of the war the total outturn of sugar produced by the sugar refineries in Tirhut division and in Shahabad, Monghyr and Bhagalpur was 550,597 maunds, as against 491,803 maunds in the previous year. The sugar refineries generally worked well and the prices obtained were profitable. A considerable quantity of cane grown in Bihar found its way to mills in Gorakhpur in U.P.⁹

Owing to the rise in imported sugar not only the cultivation of sugar cane but also the manufacture of sugar received great impetus. The decline in indigo production led many planters in North Bihar to exchange its cultivation for sugar cane and factories started springing up in that part of the province for the manufacture of refined sugar. In view of

the growing importance of the crop the Agriculture Department took up its study in all forms.¹⁰ For boosting up production still further a sugar cane research station was opened at Sipeya while experiments in drainage for cane produced valuable results at Ranchi which materially increased yield in many parts of the province. The visit of the Sugar Committee in 1919 also stimulated interest and led to the establishment of many new sugar factories.¹¹

Consequently Bihar soon became the chief centre of modern sugar industry in India. Out of 23 factories making sugar direct from the cane in 1925-26 ten were situated in Bihar and Orissa. 23,000 tons of white sugar was produced in the province. It was an increase of 60% over the previous year's figure. Even during the lean years of 1929-30 there was expansion of sugar industry. Sugar prices were more stable than those of other agricultural products. New factories sprang up in north Bihar and by absorbing the larger and better crop provided cultivators with cash resources amounting to 85 lakhs of rupees. The crop was estimated at 99% of the ten years' average. North Bihar alone manufactured nearly half the cane sugar in India and the industry made rapid strides.¹²

The most remarkable thing about the industry was that the prevailing economic depression had no adverse effect upon it. On the other hand, there was expansion in the manufacture of white sugar from sugar-cane. Sugar prices were more stable than those of other agricultural products. During 1931-32 new factories sprang up in north Bihar and by absorbing the larger and better crop provided cultivators with cash resources amounting to Rs. 80 lakhs. The number of factories during the year stood at 13.¹³ The sugar cane crop was estimated at 99% of the 10 years average. With a view to further increasing the production a research station was started at Musahri near Muzaffarpur. North Bihar then happened to produce about half of the cane sugar in India. The most interesting feature of the crop grown in that area was that unlike any other cane tract in India it was cultivated without any artificial irrigation.¹⁴

The cultivation of sugar-cane continued to increase steadily in the following years. The growing importance of the sugar industry in south Bihar led to the establishment of a sub-station of research at Patna in

November, 1933. The research work was directed mainly to the production of improved varieties of cane.¹⁶ Consequently, there was marked increase in the cultivation of sugar in the districts of Gaya, Shahbad, Champaran, Muzaffarpur and Purnea. The outturn of sugar-cane was estimated at 97% of the normal against 95% in the preceding year.¹⁶

Sugar industry thus became the most promising industry and it gave employment to a large number of labourers and became a source of immense benefit to the agriculturists. Cane became the principal cash crop of Bihar and there was a substantial increase in the area of its cultivation—an increase of nearly 55.1%. During 1935-36 there were 34 sugar factories in Bihar which gave employment to over 16,000 persons and crushed 76 million maunds of sugar cane. The price of sugar cane was roughly five annas (31 paise) per maund and the agriculturists were benefitted to the extent of over 2 crores of rupees. The sugar industry thus provided not only direct employment to a large number of men but also did a lot in improving the economic condition of the agriculturists.¹⁷ By now Bihar became the second largest sugar producing province of India, the first place being taken by the U.P.¹⁸

During 1936-37 there was much increase in the area under cultivation. Besides, cane crop was also much above normal. These two factors contributed to bring almost a glut of sugar cane. The imposition of sugar excise duty and fall in price of sugar caused some uneasiness among the factory owners, who, however, did their best to deal with the situation by crushing a good deal more of sugar-cane (nearly 36 lakhs tons) than they did in normal years.¹⁹ Therefore, there was a set back in the following year. The Indian Sugar Syndicate was formed in 1936-37 when sugar prices began to fall rapidly below the economic level and it helped to stabilise them.²⁰ The growth of the industry in Bihar was remarkable as it began to produce 23.91% of India's total output of sugar. But this phenomenal growth of the industry and its imposition in the agricultural economy of the province gave rise to several problems and Bihar government, in collaboration with the U.P. government passed Sugar Factories Control Act. This was perhaps the first piece of legislation in India providing for planned production and rational distribution not only of the raw materials, but also the finished product, sugar.²¹

The following table will show the prosperity of sugar industry during the 1930s.

Year	No. of factories	Area under cultivation (acres)	Total production
1931-32	...	13	282,000
1932-33	...	19	307,700
1933-34	...	33	418,000
1934-35	...	34	444,700
1935-36	...	34	465,300
1936-37	...	35	493,600
1937-38	...	35	360,500
1938-39	...	35	375,300

NOTES

¹ Ghosh, H. H., *Sugar in India, Its Cultivation, Manufacture and Trade*, pp. 118-20.

² Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1885, Vol. X, p. 243.

³ Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908, Vol. X, p. 143.

⁴ Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1886, Vol. XI, p. 101.

⁵ Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1887, Vol. XII, p. 332.

⁶ Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908, Vol. XIII, p. 101.

⁷ Report on the Administration of Bihar and Orissa, 1911-12, p. 13.

⁸ Report on the Administration of Bihar and Orissa, 1914-15, p. 58.

⁹ Report on the Administration of Bihar and Orissa, 1919-20, p. 50.

¹⁰ Bihar and Orissa First Decennial Review (1912-22), p. 16.

¹¹ Report on the Administration of Bihar and Orissa, 1919-20, pp. iii-iv.

¹² Bihar and Orissa in 1931-32, pp. 20 and 99-100.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

¹⁵ Bihar and Orissa in 1933-34, pp. 97-98.

¹⁶ Bihar and Orissa in 1934-35, p. 129.

¹⁷ Bihar and Orissa in 1935-36, pp. 137-38.

¹⁸ Report of the Unemployment Committee, Bihar, 1935-36, p. 69.

¹⁹ Bihar and Orissa in 1936-37, p. 118.

²⁰ Report of the Panel on Sugar, Alcohol and Food Yeast Industries, 1946, p. 10.

²¹ Bihar and Orissa in 1937-38, p. 129.

KALIKA RANJAN QANUNGO

KALIKA Ranjan Qanungo was born in the year 1895 in the village of Kanungopara, district Chittagong, now in Bangladesh. His ancestors migrated to Chittagong in the days of Shaista Khan, who was Mughal Governor of Bengal from 1664 to 1678.

Kalika Ranjan Qanungo's early career has no noteworthy event to record. He read for four years in Rajshahi College. He passed his B.A. examination with distinction. He took his M.A. in history in 1916. He also passed the law examination and thought of becoming a lawyer in Burma. His maternal uncle, Professor Bibhuti Bhusan Dutta, author of the *History of Hindu Mathematics*, later Swami Vidyaranyaaji of Pushkar, introduced him to Professor Jadunath Sarkar. That was the turning point of his life. In August 1919 Kalika Ranjan Qanungo went to Cuttack with Professor Jadunath Sarkar and there he completed his research study which led to the publication of *Sher Shah* (1920). He wrote in his preface, "what a son owes to his father, I owe to my master Professor Jadunath Sarkar. He placed at my disposal all the materials of this history, collected in his splendid library, rich in rare Persian Mss., books of reference, learned journals, maps and district gazetteers—in short everything that a researcher may possibly require." In 1920 he joined Ramjas College, Delhi. His first work brought him almost universal recognition. H. Beveridge wrote, "It is a cheerful evidence that the spirit of research is abroad among the Bengalees".

In Delhi Professor Qanungo's Jat students induced him to write a *History of the Jats*. The author had to stay for long among the Jats of the Haryana region, shared their meal, slept in their company in the *deohri* where they also kept their cattle. In the foreword Sir Jadunath Sarkar wrote, "Here is a first class contribution to the critical study of the fall of the Mughal Empire".

From 1923 to 1926 Kalika Ranjan Qanungo served as an Assistant Professor of History in the University of Lucknow, and then went back to Ramjas College. From Delhi he went to Dacca as Reader in History in 1927. He was appointed Professor and head of the History department of Dacca university in 1937. He completed his work on *Dara Shukou*

after seven years of intensive research work. It was published in 1935. The University of Calcutta admitted him to doctorate degree. A second edition of the book was published in 1952. In Dacca Dr. Qanungo made a thorough study of the early history of the Muslim conquest of Bengal and contributed three chapters to the Dacca University *History of Bengal* Vol. II published in 1948. It was edited by Sir Jadunath Sarkar.

Dr. Qanungo joined the Lucknow University in July 1948 as Professor and Head of the department of History. He began to write a *History of the Baronial House of Diggi* (Jaipur state) whose ancestors played an important role in medieval India under the Ambar Raj. A copy of the work in manuscript is preserved in Dr. Raghbir Singh's library at Sitamau. His six lectures on the history of Rajasthan which were delivered in the University of Calcutta (R. P. Nopany Lectures) were published in a volume entitled *Studies in Rajput History* in 1959. His work *Rajasthan Kahini* (in Bengali) won him the Rabindra prize awarded by the Government of West Bengal in 1969. He was also awarded the Rampran Gupta Medal by the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad (1945) and Sir Jadunath Sarkar gold medal by the Asiatic Society (1952). Dr. Qanungo's *Historical Essays* was first published in 1958 and an enlarged edition was published in 1968. In his essay *History on the Cross-roads* he gives us his views on historiography. His work *Sher Shah and His Times*, 'an old story retold from a fresh standpoint' was published in 1965. The second volume of *Sher Shah and His Times* is awaiting publication. Dr. Qanungo's *Islam and its Impact on India* was published in 1968. It is a reassessment of the earlier works of Dr. Tarachand and Professor Humayun Kabir.

Dr. Qanungo avoided footlights. He was elected President of the Indian History Congress in 1968 but he preferred to avoid this limelight. He died on April 28, 1972.

This distinguished historian, trained in the school of Sir Jadunath Sarkar, combined deep scholarship with a fine historical sense. He had a thorough knowledge of Persian, Marathi and Rajasthani. His Bengali historical writings have a rare literary grace.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON RAM MOHAN ROY

By Ramesh Chandra Majumdar
The Asiatic Society, Calcutta,
1972, 67 pp. Rs. 12.00 ; \$2.00 ;
18s. net

Dr. R. C. Majumdar delivered these two lectures as Bimanbehari Majumdar Memorial Lecturer for 1971 in the Asiatic Society—(1) the Date of the Birth of Raja Ram Mohan Roy (2) Raja Ram Mohan Roy's Contribution to the Renaissance of Bengal in the nineteenth century.

Raja Ram Mohan Roy was born in the last third of the eighteenth century. But the controversy over the date of his birth has all the features of a discussion of the date of Kanishka. Ultimately, however, two dates emerge for consideration—1772; 1774. The balance of evidence appears to favour the date 1774. But the snag is in the words "about" and "most probably". On the cemetery at Bristol they could not possibly put either of these two words before 1774. His son Ramaprasad Roy is reported to have said in 1858: "My father was born in the month of May 1772". Asked about the date he is reported to have said, "This I cannot say without consulting the horoscope which at the distance

of time is not easy to find." This is the only reference to a horoscope. It adds some substance to the statement. Against this there is a debating point—perhaps not a small one—that very few persons can give the correct date of the birth of their father. The family tradition cannot therefore be regarded as of much consequence. To a student of history 1772 or 1774 does not matter much. But to those who celebrate the bi-centenary the exact date is important.

The lecture on Ram Mohan Roy's Contribution to Renaissance in the nineteenth century exposes what Dr. Majumdar regards as the Ram Mohan myth. He shows the hollowness of the argument of those who regard him as the founder of the Hindu College. But everybody now knows that he was not directly associated with its foundation and cannot therefore be regarded as a founder. It would be improper for me to point out to the doyen of Indian historians some limitations of the evidence of records. Many things happen which leave no record. But well disciplined imagination which follows the facts helps us to come to certain conclusions with some amount of certainty. Sir Hyde

East, the recorded founder of the Hindu College, wrote: "Talking with several of the company before I proceeded to open the business of the day I found that one of them in particular, a Brahman of good caste and a man of wealth and influence was mostly set against Ram Mohan Roy . . . He expressed a hope that no subscription would be received from Ram Mohan Roy. I asked, why not? 'Because he has chosen to separate himself from us and to attack our religion' ". The words omitted are significant—"son of a pattanidar under the Raja of Burdwan". The Raja of Burdwan was one of the promoters of the scheme and the most important subscriber to the project. He was very hostile to Ram Mohan Roy as the spate of litigation in the twenties was to show. This reference to the son of a pattanidar under the Raja of Burdwan as the credential of Ram Mohan Roy raises a suspicion that the Raja had indirectly a hand in this exclusion. Orthodoxy no doubt, had much to do with it.

Let us see what Ram Mohan Roy was doing during the years 1815-1816 to prepare the ground for such a project. Alexander Duff—he was well acquainted with Ram Mohan Roy and David Hare—said in his evidence before the Parliamentary Committee of 1853: "English education was in a manner forced upon the British government . . . The system of

English education commenced in the following very simple way in Bengal. There were two persons who had to do with it. The one was Mr. David Hare. The other was a native Ram Mohan Roy. In the year 1815 they were in consultation one evening with a few friends as to what should be done with a view to the elevation of the native mind and character. Ram Mohan Roy's proposition was that they should establish an assembly or convocation in which what are called the higher or purer dogmas of Vedantism or ancient Hinduism might be taught. Mr. David Hare was a watch-maker in Calcutta but being a man of great energy and strong practical sense he said the plan should be to institute an English school or college for the instruction of the native youth". In a despatch of 1814 the Directors had definitely rejected the method of founding colleges "upon a plan similar to those that have been founded at British Universities." Alexander Duff's evidence was official. It harmonizes with the character of Ram Mohan Roy and David Hare. They were not persons who would indulge in empty talk and a plan must have been put on paper. Derozio, who was so well acquainted with David Hare, said later that a paper was actually prepared. Whether it was handed over to Sir Hyde East is immaterial in this context. It was certainly talked about in 'native' circles in Cal-

cutta and some members of Ram-mohan's Atmiya Sabha, who were closely associated with the foundation of the Hindu college, must have been very much aware of its contents. There were schools in Calcutta giving rudimentary instruction in English. They trained copyists and book-keepers. Ram Mohan Roy and David Hare wanted education in English learning. They very naturally wanted opulent Indians to be interested in the scheme. As it was discussed in Calcutta among leading members of the Hindu and European communities opposition to Ram Mohan Roy must have been freely expressed by orthodox Hindus. Ram Mohan Roy as also his friend David Hare did not therefore attend the meeting in which the proposal took concrete shape.

R. C. Mitra wrote in his chapter on education in *History of Bengal (1757-1905)*, published by the University of Calcutta in 1967, that "the Hindoo College was the brain child of David Hare and Ram Mohan Roy". He did not associate them with its foundation. Dr. Majumdar comments: "The Hindoo College is described in a university publication in 1967 as the 'brain child of David Hare and Rammohan Roy'. One despairs of the triumph of historical truth over blind faith, propaganda and prejudice in this country. A cat has nine lives, but it seems a historical error concerning a great

man has one hundred lives." I may be excused if I point out that this is the language of aggressive controversy.

The cherished ideas of Ram Mohan Roy found their expression in this institution. The name gave satisfaction to the orthodox. Beyond this it did not connote anything*. We are told by Dr. Majumdar that the Hindu College was "conceived by the orthodox Hindus and established by the orthodox Hindus for the orthodox Hindus". This is perhaps an unnecessary exaggeration. The sponsors of the Hindu College wanted secular education for their children. It has been argued that Ram Mohan Roy was opposed to a system of mere secular education and the absence of moral instruction. But in his celebrated letter to Lord Amherst, in which he praises the laudable desire of Government to improve the natives of India by education, he wanted instruction in mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, anatomy and other useful sciences. There is no reference to moral instruction. Adam gave a lecture on Ram Mohan Roy in which he said, "He employed no direct means, no argument of

* In government records (General Committee of Public Instruction, Correspondence and Proceedings, 20.9.1823—9.12.1841, Disbursements) it was *Vidyalaya* until 30 Nov. 1826. After that it was Hindu College.

authority, no expostulation or entreaty to turn his sons from idolatrous practices and belief, in which they had been educated by the female members of his family and by the Brahman priests. He gave them a good education; by his personal demeanour he secured a place in their esteem and affection . . . before his father's death [his eldest son] with his younger brother abandoned the superstition of the country and zealously cooperated with his father." Ram Mohan Roy appears to have full faith in secular western education.

Dr. Majumdar seeks to minimize the importance of Ram Mohan's role in the anti-Sati movement. The British government was doing all that it could by regulation. Mrityunjoy Vidyalankar had recorded his views in an official capacity before Ram Mohan Roy and had anticipated most of his arguments. It was the Governor-General who decided to abolish it by legislation. So Ram Mohan Roy is left high and dry. No one is perhaps inclined to give Ram Mohan Roy a monopoly of credit for the success of this movement. He had been agitating since 1818 in which year his first tract appeared. This was followed by a second tract. He used to go to burning ghats to dissuade priests and victims. The propaganda continued. He was regarded in official circles as the enlightened "native" champion of the anti-Sati movement. Lord

Bentinck therefore consulted him before coming to any decision. His advice was that "the practice might be suppressed quietly and unobservedly by increasing the difficulties and by the indirect agency of the police". But Ram Mohan Roy succeeded in convincing him that Sati was "nowhere enjoined by the religion of the Hindus as an imperative duty". This emphatic declaration of the regulation appears to be Ram Mohan's contribution. But where he hesitated Lord Bentinck struck. Ram Mohan Roy helped the Governor-General, who was a man of action, to come to his decision. He led the moral revolt against inhumanity but he had an intellectual temper of mind.

Dr. Majumdar also refutes the statement that "the first really powerful Bengali prose came from the pen of Raja Ram Mohan Roy". According to him the credit should go to others—Carey and the pandits of Fort William. Mrityunjoy Vidyalankar, Ram Ram Basu or Rajiblochan Mukhopadhyay wrote better prose. Exception has been taken to the statement that "he was the first writer of Bengali prose outside of text books". All this is perhaps largely irrelevant. Like other religious reformers in other ages and other climes—Wycliffe, Luther, Cranmer, Calvin—he should be regarded as a maker of the popular language in which he wrote. He translated *Vedānta*

Sūtra from original Sanskrit into Bengali. He also translated several of the Upanishads into Bengali. Translation of religious literature into the current language of the country is an achievement for which recognition is due to him as a 'pioneer'.

The climax in this disputation is reached when Dr. Majumdar tries to give us an idea of the colossal failure of Ram Mohan Roy's religious mission. He writes, "The reply is writ large in blazing letters upon the illuminated gates of two thousand Durga puja pandals in Calcutta where loud speakers and *Dhak* proclaim in deafening noise the failure of Ram Mohan." It is very difficult to believe that Dr. Majumdar has written this sentence. Durga puja which we now see in Calcutta is a riotous revelry. Ram Mohan Roy's impact was on nineteenth century history, on Bengali renaissance. What has that to do with this symptom of present degeneration? May I point out to the great historian that the controversy has been perhaps unnecessarily exacerbated.

N. K. SINHA

INDIA'S GREEN REVOLUTION: ECONOMIC GAINS AND POLITICAL COSTS

By Francine R. Frankel
Oxford-University Press, 1971
232 pp. Rs. 50.00

AGRARIAN STRUGGLE IN BENGAL 1946-47

By Sunil Sen
People's Publishing House, 1972
111 pp. Rs. 15.00

Dr. Frankel's book may at first make the reader sceptical. The title she has chosen for her book has become too much of a catch word. Would not 'New Agriculture' or something like that be better? Moreover thumbing through the pages one may get a fleeting impression that there is too much reliance on statistical data but too little on subjective forces and interaction between tradition and change of which the green revolution is a part. The complex setting in which the green revolution is happening in India—threat of famine, drought and flood—the continuity of traditional framework of caste, class and rural commerce—is not intended to be analysed in this book.

But, given these limitations, Dr. Frankel's work is important and interesting. The range of her study is very wide, comprising Ludhiana in Punjab, West Godavari in Andhra Pradesh, Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu, Palghat in Kerala and Burdwan in West Bengal. She is deeply conscious of differences in regional setting, e.g., polar difference between a Ludhiana and a West Bengal village, and studies the interaction between politics and agricultural

development. This undoubtedly is her subject—that is, the phenomenon of political conflict—and she gives a competent, though brief, account of this aspect of the rural situation.

From the point of view of contemporary history, her book traces the changes in rural public opinion under the combined influence of parliamentary democracy and transformation of agricultural techniques. The growing political consciousness of the landless labourers and the traditionally deprived Harijan castes might have incalculable influence on general political trends in the country. That the green revolution has benefited the big farmers more than any other group might already have enlarged the disparities between the rural rich and the rural poor, despite some social and psychological gains on the part of the traditionally deprived agricultural workers. Dr. Frankel should be given full credit for not being obsessed with the western model or the Ludhiana model. This flexibility is commendable and is not always to be found in western observers and even in some Indian planners.

What needs to be stated with particular emphasis is that Dr. Frankel treats an economic and political phenomenon without resorting to abstruse formulations, which often serve as a barrier to communication between technical

and non-technical social studies. She uses a methodological tool that has certain inevitable limitations, like leaving some complex features, historical and environmental, out. But she succeeds in giving a general picture of agricultural changes with accompanying social and political costs and gains. And she makes us think about alternatives to the orthodox methods of green revolution in regions like West Bengal where agricultural holdings are exceptionally small.

Dr. Sunil Sen's book is based on a theme related to the subject of Dr. Frankel's work so far as it is concerned with the lot of agricultural workers *vis-a-vis* owners of relatively large landed properties. Written by a professional historian and a participant in the events described, the book gives a vivid picture of the emergence of sharecroppers on Bengal's social and political scene just on the eve of independence. One is tempted to speculate how this intensely secular agrarian movement, if it followed its logic, might have influenced the political fate of the sub-continent. In spite of his undoubtedly emotional attachment to this movement, Dr. Sen checks this temptation and only gives a bare hint in this direction. That the long neglect of the problem of sharecroppers and agricultural labourers had been one of the negative features of our national movement and of the programmes

formulated by the urban middle class, in general, is forcefully brought out in this book.

The 'agrarian' struggle, which Dr. Sen describes, occurred mainly in north Bengal, an exclusively agricultural region, rich in the quality of its soil (producing jute and tobacco), but singularly backward in its economy even in the context of under-development and traditionally inhabited by a people having some peculiar ethnic and social features. They are the Rajbansis. That the Muslims of the region belong to the same ethnic stock is evident to any observer. The Rajbansi dialect has now merged into Bengali, though in some outlying areas and in some 'pockets' a number of dialectical variants, not easily comprehensible to the average Bengali speaker, are spoken. Along with their Muslim brethren the Rajbansis form an agrarian society which appears to have been stratified comparatively recently. The stratification within the Rajbansi-Muslim society has been between the *jotdars* and the large number of agricultural workers and sharecroppers. Distinct from them stood (in 1946-'47 but not now) a mainly high-caste Hindu zamindar class, settled from the late 18th century onwards generally in the towns of north Bengal.

The *Tebhaga* struggle of 1946-'47 grew out of the dichotomy in the Muslim-Rajbansi society but

pointed forcefully to a basic feature of Bengali agrarian society—the presence of a large class of *Bargadars* or sharecroppers on whom depended, either for their riches or for their subsistence, a class of rural landowners and a segment of urban middle class. Under the guidance of the Kisan Sabha, dominated by the communists in 1946-'47, the sharecroppers started a movement, demanding two-thirds share of the crop grown with seed, plough and other inputs supplied by them. Dr. Sen ably brings out the fact that class-demands, a distinctly rational force, can at times dominate over forces of communal and caste separatism which need not, as a rule, underlie all social developments in a so-called 'plural society'. Tribal communities—especially, the Santals—were particularly receptive to the programme of the *Tebhaga* movement and proved to be most militant in the end. The internal structure of tribal communities, while normally keeping them in a certain isolation, helped a forceful response to movements with broad economic and social issues, which tended to counteract the 'plurality' of communal, tribal and other social groupings in a particular region, in this case, north Bengal. The potentiality of rational economic demands for counteracting communalism was, however, tragically checked by political developments on the Indian sub-

continent leading to communal riots and partition.

PRADIP SINHA

INDIAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

By Dharmpal. Impex India.
282 pp. Rs. 65/-

Mr. Dharmpal gives some contemporary European accounts with an introduction. Thirteen plates illustrate the subject matter of this book. There are six chapters on science—Observatory at Benares (1777), Astronomy of the Brahmans (1790), Hints concerning the Observatory at Benares (1783), Six Satellites of Saturn (1783), A Proof that the Hindoos had Binomial Theorem (1790), Hindu Algebra (1817).

Part II—Technology is divided into ten sections. It contains such interesting articles as Operation of Inoculation of the Small-pox as Performed in Bengal (1731), the Method of Making the Best Mortar at Madras in S. India (1732), Iron works at Ramanakapettah (1795), Aspects of Technology in Western India (1790-1901) and other articles. The appendices give us sources and biographical notes on authors.

These articles, collected by Mr. Dharmpal, give us a vivid picture of traditional Indian science. The author quotes in a footnote the

assertion made by Maine, "Except the blind forces of nature nothing moves in this world which is not Greek in its origin". Mr. Dharmpal has evidently been inspired by Needham's works on Chinese science and technology and he proves how absurd is this nineteenth century dictum. But what exactly inhibited the growth of science here in India? Modern science was generated in Europe and not in China or India. The social and economic milieu could not generate a break-through. Technological elements were spread throughout the length and breadth of India but scientific elements were not so widespread. But astronomy thrived and calendaric astronomy was specially well-developed.

Mr. Dharmpal intends to continue his work and we hope to have varied information in his second volume.

N. K. SINHA

CALENDAR OF PERSIAN CORRESPONDENCE 1794-1795. Vol. XI.

Ed. by A. I. Tirmizi
National Archives of India
433 pp ; Rs. 25/-

Students of Indian history will rejoice to find another volume of Calendar of Persian Correspondence, an indispensable source book of Indian history. It gives

us details of the passing away of the old order. This correspondence volume has vary naturally a pervasive eighteenth century quality.

On p. 23 is recorded the necessity of adjustment in the Nizamat pensions "as the qibla (widow) of Siraj-ud-daula has passed away". Suraj Narayan Rai, Qanungo of Bengal, was in distress because of the abolition of the office of Qanungo from May, 1793. The last fouzdar of Hughli wrote his last letter. Peshwa's grandmother was touring northern India as a pilgrim with 7,000 persons in her entourage. Manohar Das Sahu, the big banker of Benares and Calcutta, wrote that the very fact of his appearance before a court of law, even as a witness, was derogatory to his status and would bring distress to him in his profession and his business. Daulat Rao Sindhia wrote, "As the planet Venus is in her descent a seal in the name of the writer has not been cut and consequently the seal of the late Mahadji Sindhia is applied to the letter". The Raja of Assam was glad that after the coming of the British forces "the cows and Brahmans have found security". The Raja of Nepal thought it culpable to put any zamindar or fakir to death, whether hindu or muslim, except in war. The Nawab of Arcot's very interesting personality emerges from one of his letters. "If the condition of the country con-

tinues to be disturbed it is bound to affect his resources to discharge liabilities. States that he is not Jesus Christ to work wonders. This is a world of causes and effects and means must be found out to remedy the situation". It has been said that the Nawab owed money to everybody and as he could not pay off all his creditors he thought that it was the best policy to pay none. He used to convey his excuses in Persian letters of exquisite politeness. This letter is only a specimen of his letter writing technique.

This Calendar gives us some details of the Nizam-Peshwa dispute leading ultimately to the battle of Kharda. It appears from the Nizam's letters that the Poona mutsuddies were very powerful. We would expect the Marathi records in Poona to give us some idea of the power which was wielded by the central secretariat at Poona. Arjunji Nathji, whose family had been carrying on hundi business for one and a half century, expressed his desire to settle in Benares for the rest of his life appointing somebody to carry on business at Poona and Surat. It is no wonder that during Jonathan Duncan's administration in Benares 20,000 new houses were built in the city of Benares alone. On Sino-Nepalese war of 1792 some letters throw a new light. The Chinese army fell back after inflicting a

crushing defeat on the Nepalese. But when the emperor's minister who had gone to war with Nepal returned to Peking he was dismissed from his ministership and degraded to the position of Shin-fu (governor), even though he was the emperor's nephew and son-in-law. So great had been the distress of the Chinese army that with a view to ensuring discipline, the minister who led the army had cut off the noses of some and killed some Chinese officers and soldiers. The nobles therefore raised a clamour in Peking. The Nepalese had no knowledge of the distress of the Chinese army. They might not have otherwise yielded.

In its last decades eighteenth century India was redolent with the fragrance of the piety of two very pious widows—Ahalya Bai and Rani Bhavani. Their devotion to gods and Brahmins was very much consistent with the spirit of the age but their extensive charities benefited others also. Ahalya Bai died on 14th August, 1795. Rani Bhavani died in 1806. She was in retirement devoting her wealth to religion and benevolence.

In the Calendar of Persian Correspondence we never expected to find passages that would be amusing but there is one to which attention should be drawn though at the risk of being charged with frivolity. After the battle of Kharda Azam al-Umara was a pri-

soner of the Marathas. Information was received "that as he was in need of being shaved he sent a message to Nana Farnavis to send his barber to him, but he did not comply with his request and replied that this was no such occasion and that he should wait for two or three days patiently". The unkempt appearance of Azam al-Umara perhaps gave some satisfaction to Nana Farnavis whose own figure did not certainly delight the sight, if his portraits do not do him injustice.

N. K. SINHA

JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF INDIAN
HISTORY, Vol. I, 1971-72

Dept. of History, Jadavpur University, 110 pp. Price not stated.

This journal has been published under the editorship of Dr. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar. It contains six articles—our *Purbasuris*; the concept of Dharma, Danda, Artha, Niti and their bearing of Hindu political thought; the Sikh War of independence; Sir Charles Warre Malet at the court of Poona; towns in Mughal India; indigo trade in Bengal. "Towns in Mughal India" and "Indigo Trade in Bengal" are two research-oriented articles. The paper on Sir Charles Malet is perhaps a chapter of a dissertation. If a university department publishes

such a journal once a year it would encourage members of the department carrying on research.

N. K. SINHA

ISLAM IN BENGAL

By Jagadish Narayan Sarkar
Ratna Prakasan ; pp. 92 ; price
Rs. 6/-

Dr. Sarkar has written on various aspects of medieval Indian history. In 1967 he contributed a chapter on "Islam in Bengal" to the *History of Bengal (1757-1905)* published by the University of Calcutta. This book is an expanded version of that chapter. Part one describes in outline political Islam in Bengal from thirteenth to eighteenth century. Part two gives us socio-religious factors: transformation and reformist and revivalist movements in Islam. This book bears the stamp of Dr. Sarkar's usual meticulous scholarship.

N. K. SINHA

THE CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES IN BENGAL, 1793-1833

By K. P. Sen Gupta ; Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1971 ; xvi + 245 pages, including appendices, bibliography, index and a map ; price not stated.

Whether or not Indians experienced a rebirth in the nineteenth century is a debatable issue, but if any people needed a rebirth

it was the Indians. The eighteenth century in Indian society was relatively one of gloom, whatever praise may be wasted upon it by some of our brighter historians. That Dr. K. P. Sen Gupta does not belong to the bright set may be taken as a virtue in him, but then he also accepts the traditional view regarding the regenerative role of the British Raj and the Christian missionaries in India.

The Company and the missionaries held different views of the Indian malady, though both were no doubt shocked by the spectacle of thugs murdering the unwary traveller in the name of Kali. Whereas some of the higher-ups in the Company's service, Charles Grant for example, prescribed English education and Christianity as remedies, the Directors chose not to stir up trouble and shut up shop before they had built an empire 'in a fit of absence of mind'. In Calcutta the Governor-General promised in 1793 to go by the Shaster and the Koran, while Carey could only find room in Danish Serampore, a few miles up the river. It was not until the Maratha menace had been removed that the policy of go-slow was cheerfully thrown to the winds and the social policy of the Company converged with the religious policy of the missionaries: from 1833 the missionaries could come out to India without a licence. The zealous Duff founded his college 'to kill Hinduism by

striking it at its brain, Calcutta', whereas the rash Macaulay, supported by his Benthamite master, fathered a race of brown *sahibs* who were later to be damned by Kipling as '*bandarlog*' or the simian *bhadralok*. The two thus anticipated Dalhousie and conspired together to bring about the Mutiny and its posthumous child, Extremist Hindu nationalism. Neither Church nor State had reckoned with the elusive nature of Hinduism or with the power wielded by tradition on the masses who knew little or no English. Neither realised that educational and religious innovations were meaningless unless accompanied by a corresponding modernisation of the socio-economic structure. Thus, though the Kulin belief in many wives came to be ridiculed, the Hindu belief in many gods never went down. Hinduism not only survived the efforts of Carey and Duff; in the hands of Swami Vivekananda, its first missionary, it also took on an 'aggressive' character. At the turn of the century it looked as if the British had been safe so long as the Marathas, not Hinduism, threatened their existence.

Dr. Sen Gupta however affirms that the missionaries 'played a significant role' in the Bengal renaissance and that 'a great revolution'—greater even than its European prototype—'took place in their [the Bengali students'] world of ideas, particularly in their ideas

of religion' (pp. 182, 189). Not that Sen Gupta is not aware of the failure of the missionaries. Indeed, he has a whole section on this point (pp. 164-67), but somehow he has chosen to draw conclusions which do not lead from his own data.

Dr. Sen Gupta's great merit is the lucidity with which he unravels the thesis which earned for him his London doctorate. Chapter I sets the scene: the eighteenth century in England and Bengal. Chapter II describes the various missionary organisations and ably disproves Ingham's (*Reformers in India*, Cambridge, 1956) theory by exposing their rivalries. In chapters III and IV, which are spiced with interesting examples from original sources, we see the missionaries at work. In chapter V an attempt is made roughly to estimate the number of converts and describe their social background. Though some belonging to the upper castes were bagged, most of the converts came from the lower and poorer castes. Some hoped to secure jobs, some to marry into English society; few had any conviction of truth.

It is a pity that Dr. Sen Gupta, who has contributed so much to our knowledge of the missionaries, is tripped up now and then by his own inconsistencies: missionary education is supposed to have aimed at both destroying and reviving Hinduism (p. 193); the missionaries are both faulted and

praised for the 'unnatural' and 'lively' style of their Bengali writings (pp. 96, 122-26); Carey seems at once to discourage and encourage *suttee* (p. 23); and the Serampore trinity, Mrityunjay Vidyalankar and Ram Mohun—all seem to have initiated the anti-*suttee* movement (pp. 168-70, 191). The book also teems with vague and imprecise terms like 'true Hinduism', 'conservatives', 'the people', etc. Nowhere, except towards the end (p. 190), does the author care to explain what sort of missionaries he is writing about or why he starts at 1793 and stops at 1833. Nor does he define the cultural or geographical extent of Bengal in his period. Faults of a minor nature abound. Thus Moravia is shown in Germany (p. 5); the Charter Act of 1813 is mentioned as providing a million-rupee educational grant (p. 112); Warren Hastings is confused with Lord Hastings (p. 56); sentences repeat themselves (pp. 168, 191); and points are tediously made in the 'firstly-secondly' manner. The publisher contributes his share by printing Bodleian as Bodlein and Ram Mohun as Braja Mohan; by not allowing pagination to tally with the list of contents; by using capital letters liberally; by putting titles of books within inverted commas as well as italicising them; and, above all, by not stating the price of the book.

HIREN CHAKRABARTI

STUDIES IN JUDICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA

Bhawani Sankar Chowdhury,
Eastern Law House Pvt. Ltd.,
Calcutta., 1972, Pp. 264 & 82.
Price Rs. 15.00.

In the Introduction the author states that the present work is the outcome of his desire to find out if in the conflict between the Supreme Court of Elijah Impey and the Council of Warren Hastings, Indian national or popular interest lay on one side or the other. This led him on to the further query—why the Council, the British subjects in Calcutta and 'the entire personnel of the E.I. Company' (to quote the author) were united against the Supreme Court. These queries led him on to study the origin and working of the British Indian judicial system in its early stages, judicial administration by the Company's courts and the British courts in Calcutta. Mr. Chowdhury does not remain content at that. He has attempted to analyse the motives of the English conquerors, who, in his opinion, wanted to "deprive the conquered Indians of the benefits of English law and legal system for maintaining a racial superiority of status for themselves in the country". He disputes the validity of Ormond's plea for the extension of the Original Side jurisdiction at least up to the municipal limits of the town and concludes that the

Original Side was meant in the interest of the European British subjects of the old settlement and not for the business community. He has taken pains to trace the history of the acquisition of sovereignty, political status of European settlements in India, British settlements and Indian states, English settlements in the East, besides the idea of a Blue Water Empire, motives for the formation of the E. I. Company etc. The author's sojourns into the province of political history, he claims, have enabled him to solve 'the unknown and unknowable' mystery of the transformation of the company of merchants into that of sovereign rulers. This process, according to him, began with the victory of Captain Best over the Portuguese and the appointment of the English as the sea-police of Jehangir. The work, as such, is a combination of the history of judiciary with that of empire-building. The former is a better performance compared with the latter.

N. R. RAY

RENASCENT BENGAL 1817-1857, PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR ORGANISED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY, BENGAL, THE ASIATIC SOCIETY, CALCUTTA, 1972, Pp. 86, Price Rs. 10.00.

The treatise is the outcome of a two-day seminar held under the

auspices of the Asiatic Society, with a view to analysing "the currents and cross-currents of the Renaissance movement" and assessing "the quantum of the interaction of its contributing forces". It is a collection of seven papers dealing with six topics—the political frame-work, social change, economic transition in Bengal, trends in literature, religious ferment in Bengal and the Young Bengal. Understandably enough, the contributors have chosen to travel freely both beyond and ahead of the time limit of 50 years prescribed for them. A single paper whose contents are limited to an average of less than ten pages in print cannot be expected to be of a highly critical standard, specially if the contributor (as in some cases) cannot get rid of the idea that his readers (or to be more precise, his audience) are mostly uninitiated people. Some of the papers have given more space to factual survey than to critical analysis of the currents and cross currents, though there are notable exceptions too. The last two chapters deal with a topic which has till now attracted more notice than attention. The reviewer shares the hope of the chairman of the seminar, Dr. R. Majumdar, expressed in his Foreword that the two papers on this subject would lead to "a further endeavour to make a fuller and more critical assessment of the part played by them in introduc-

ing the new spirit in our national life”.

N. R. RAY

SLAVERY IN BRITISH DOMINION : DWARKANATH GANGULI

Compiled by K. L. Chattopadhyay and edited by S. K. Kunda, Jijnasa, Calcutta, 1972, Pp. 102, Price Rs. 16/25sh./\$3.50.

This book is a collection of 13 articles contributed by Dwarkanath Ganguli to the columns of the *Bengalee* between September 1886 and April 1887. It also reproduces the well-known pamphlet bearing the headlines 'Justice Murdered in India—The Papers of the Webb Case—Recording the sacrifice of a daughter of India to the lust of an Anglo-Indian, presented to the Electors of Great Britain and Ireland by the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj. Mr. K. L. Chattopadhyay, to whom credit is due for collecting and compiling the articles from

not too easily available sources, has added an Introduction besides a life-sketch of Dwarkanath. The collection not only reveals the inhuman sufferings caused to the Indian labourers in the tea-plantations of Assam and racial arrogance of the ruling classes but also records the reaction felt in the circle of enlightened middle-class leaders against the exploitation and degradation of fellow-men belonging to the category of the proletariat. Among those who gave leadership to the movements on behalf of the toiling masses, the compiler claims, quite a few were Brahmos. It remains to be seen if this was more than casual. The Editor's observation on the existence of slavery in other parts of the British dominions concurrently with its prevalence in Assam is difficult to appreciate. It is, however, encouraging to know that the publishers intend to bring out reprints of old records in book forms in the Series—India: Past and Present—in continuation of this book, the first in the series.

N. R. RAY

NOTES FOR OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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Dr N. K. Sinha,
Editor, *Bengal Past and Present*,
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
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We do not presume to advise our contributors on *points of style*, but of course we welcome articles that are at once scholarly, original and readable.

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