GAZETTEER

OF THE

PERSIAN GULF,

'OMĀN,

AND

CENTRAL ARABIA.

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PERSIAN GULF,

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AND

CENTRAL ARABIA

BY

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HISTORICAL

PART I

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INTRODUCTION.

THE Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Omān and Central Arabia consists of two volumes, the first volume being a history of the Persian Gulf Region and its surrounding countries, the second a geographical dictionary covering the same area.

The second volume was published in 1908. The first volume had been all but completed for the Press by the late Mr. Lorimer at the time of his death in the beginning of 1914, the only portions in fact of the work then remaining to be written being the "Introduction and the Table of contents." These have been prepared and the volume completed for the Press by the undersigned.

The explanation of the "system of transliteration" referred to in the last paragraph of the introduction to the second volume, has for convenience of binding been formed into a separate note and will be found as Appendix S at page 2737 of Part II of this volume.

A full explanation as to the division and contents of the second volume has been given by Mr. Lorimer in the introduction to that work and it only remains therefore to give a similar explanation in regard to Volume I.

Volume I has been divided into twelve chapters geographically: Chapter 1 deals with the Persian Gulf region as a whole and the remaining chapters with each of the main political divisions in turn into which that region is divided, commencing with 'Oman, continuing with the States on the Western shores of the Gulf, Central Arabia, Turkish Iraq, the Persian districts on the eastern shores of the Gulf and ending with the chapter on Makrān.

Each of the above chapters has been sub-divided into certain definite "periods" covering in some cases the reign of a Shāh or Sultān, the rule of a Shaikh, the regime of a Viceroy, and in others arbitrary divisions of time based on outstanding land-marks in the history of the State concerned.

Each of these "periods" follows similar though not identical lines, referring in turn to the topics most prominent during the particular "period" under review.

Under such a system it follows necessarily that a topic of considerable prominence during one period may have no sequel in the period immediately following though it may possibly be, and often is, continued in a later one.

In order therefore to enable the reader to follow up the thread of any one particular subject a "detailed table of contents" has been prepared on the following lines.

The various "periods" in each chapter have been given a number. Each period has again been sub-divided into "subject headings" each of which has been lettered.

When any particular subject is continued in a later period an entry to that effect in italics immediately below the "subject heading" concerned has been made, giving the number of the "period" and the letter of the "subject heading" in which the continuation will be found.

It should be noted however that though the above system has been found capable of application in the majority of chapters and periods, instances occur throughout the volume in which special subjects (especially British policy and relations) are so inextricably woven into the general history of the State under review that no definite sub-division of its "periods" into "subject headings" is possible and in such cases the sequel to a particular subject can only be traced by a careful perusal of the general text.

In addition to the twelve chapters referred to above Volume I includes a number of Appendices, also written by the late Mr. Lorimer dealing separately with subjects of special importance or interest in the Persian Gulf Region, and also a series of genealogical trees of the ruling families of States in the same area.

A table of chapters, annexures, appendices and genealogical trees will be found at page 5 and the "detailed table of contents" at page 9.

For convenience of binding Volume I has been divided into three parts.

Part I consists of the first nine chapters, *i.e.*, the General History of the Persian Gulf Region, the Histories of 'Oman, of the Arab States on the western shores of the Persian Gulf, of Central Arabia and of Turkish 'Iraq, in fact of what may conveniently be termed the "Arabian" portion of the Volume.

Part II consists of the remaining three chapters, *i.e.*, of the Histories of 'Arabistan, of the Persian Coast and Islands, and of Makran, in other words of the "Persian" section of the work and of the Appendices.

For facility of reference, the "Introduction," the "Table of chapters" and the "detailed table of contents" have been prefixed to both Parts I and II

Part III consists of a portfolio containing genealogical trees, maps, etc.

L. BIRDWOOD.

SIMLA;
10th October 1914.

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HISTORICAL GAZETTEER

OF THE

PERSIAN GULF,

'OMĀN,

AND CENTRAL ARABIA.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE APPEARANCE OF THE PORTUGUESE THERE IN 1507 TO THE FOUNDATION OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN 1600.

The Persian Gulf first became known to the nations of Europe through the efforts of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century to wrest from the Arabs of the Mediterranean and the Middle East a monopoly which they enjoyed as middle-men in the trade between Asia and Europe.

Arab domination of the trade routes between Asia and Europe till 1498.

Commerce between East and West had from early times followed two principal routes,—that of the Red Sea and Egypt and that of the Persian Gulf and Syria, both of which were equally under Arab control. These routes were sometimes closed by political difficulties and disputes; and, when both were shut simultaneously, the supply of Oriental luxuries to Europe was cut off except in so far as it could be maintained by arduous and uncertain communication across Central Asia. The European states trading most extensively with the East at the beginning of the 15th century were Venice and Genoa; but Genoa lost her position in Oriental commerce through the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, and ere long the hostility of the Mamlūks of Egypt deprived Venice of the advantages which remained to her. It was evident that the discovery of some untrammelled line of access to India would confer great wealth and prestige on a nation able to profit by it; and the country which most earnestly devoted itself to the quest of a new way thither was Portugal.

Progressive discoveries of the Portuguese, leading to the establishment of the Cape route to India in 1498.

The eyes of the Portuguese were early turned towards the East. It may even have been by Dom Henrique (1394-1460) known as "The Navigator" whose blood was half English, that the idea of reaching India by circumnavigating Africa was first formed; but, if so, it remained sterile until after his death.

Dom Pedro's Mission, 1416.

In 1416, before the traditional overland routes to the East had been blocked by Turkish conquests, Dom Pedro, another half English son of Dom João I of Portugal, brother of Dom Henrique, proceeded "to the Court of the Grand Turk, and to that of the Grand Sultan of Babylonia, where he met with a magnificent reception."

Expeditions and Missions of De Diaz, Rabbi Abraham, and de Covilhão, 1486-87.

It was only under Dom Affonso V (1443-81) and Dom João II (1481-95), however, that the Portuguese began to push successfully southwards and eastwards. Dom João II was anxious to contract an alliance with "Prester John," a Christian potentate in the East whose existence was by some deemed fabulous, in reality the ruler of Abyssinia, a land as yet unknown to Europeans; it was his pious desire to extend the bounds of Christendom; and it was no less his ambition to open a new commercial highway to India and to discover the lands whence were brought pepper, cinnamon, and other spices. With these objects in view the King of Portugal sent abroad various expeditions and Missions. In 1486 Bartholomeu de Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope, but without becoming aware that he had turned the southern point of Africa. In 1487 João Peres de Covilhão and Affonso de Paiva set forth in search of the spice countries. Parting from his companion at Aden, Covilhão found his way to Cannanore, Calicut, Goa, Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Zaila, and Safah; ultimately he returned so far westwards as Cairo. At Cairo he fell in with Rabbi Abraham of Beja, who under Portuguese Royal patronage, had lately travelled to Baghdád and Persia with Joseph of Lamego and had reported on the island of Hormúz. Covilhão and the Rabbi then re-visited Hormúz in company, after which Covilhão came again to Aden; ultimately having found "Prester John" in Abyssinia, he settled permanently in that country.

Da Gama's voyage by the Cape to India, 1497-99.

At last in August 1498 Vasco da Gama who had sailed from Portugal in 1497, reached India *viâ* the Cape. His cruise, one of the most momentous in history, ended at Lisbon in September 1499. Its almost instantaneous result was a revolution in the trade of Europe and a great accession of importance to Portugal, whose Kings thenceforth described themselves as "Lords of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of India, Ethiopia, Arabia, and Persia,"—a style presently confirmed by the Pope.

De Almeida's Indian Governorship, and alarm of the Turks and Arabs, 1505-09.

In 1505 Manoel I of Portugal, the first to bear the proud title, resolved to overthrow the commercial supremacy of the Arabian Nations once for all by seizing Aden, Hormūz and Malacca. With this design he despatched Francisco de Almeida to India as Governor of the Portuguese settlements in the East; De Almeida made Cochin his principal residence. In 1506 a Turkish and Arab armament arrived on the Indian coast to help a Muhammadan prince against the intrusive Portuguese, but the Portuguese defeated it, asserting for the first time their superiority at sea over Orientals.

De Albuquerque's proceedings in the Persian Gulf, 1507-08.

Meanwhile in the same year 1506, Affonso de Albuquerque had sailed for the East carrying with him a royal letter of appointment to the Viceroyalty and Governorship of Portuguese India, which he in the beginning kept secret, but which was given him to enable him to supersede De Almeida. His first care, however, was to secure points of vantage in the seas to the west of India. With this idea he seized the island of Soqotrah, but, finding the acquisition useless, very soon left it on an expedition to Hormūz.

De Albuquerque on the Coast of 'Omān.

Having destroyed every native vessel met with by the way he at length reached Kalhāt on the Coast of 'Omān, where he was well received. On the 22nd August 1507 he left Kalhāt for Quryāt which he took by assault. No opposition was offered to him at Masqat when he arrived there; but large forces having begun to collect on shore, evidently with hostile intent, he disembarked and defeated them, afterwards burning the town and its shipping. Sohār though protected by a great fort, surrendered to him without resistance; and at Khor Fakhān where the attitude of the inhabitants was defiant, he landed and severely punished the place.

Portuguese occupation of Hormūz, 1507.

At last he reached Hormūz, to the "King"—doubtless the Shaikh—of which place, named Saif-ud-Dīn, the towns and villages already visited on the coast of 'Omān were tributary. The "king" or Shaikh when

summoned, refused to make submission; and De Albuquerque accordingly gave battle with his small squadron to a huge fleet, partly Indian by which the island was defended. He gained a complete and easy victory. In September 1507 a treaty was concluded by which Shaikh Saif-ud-Dín became a vassal of the Portuguese Crown; and in the following month he even hoisted a flag bearing a cross over his palace, while the Portuguese began to build a fort for themselves which they named "Nossa Senhora da Victoria." A demand made after this on the Shaikh by an officer of Shāh Ismā'il, the sovereign of Persia, was rejected under the orders of De Albuquerque, who added a haughty message of his own for delivery to the Shāh.

Misconduct of De Albuquerque's officers and Portuguese abandonment of Hormūz.

Early in 1508, the Portuguese fleet being then still at Hormūz the Commanders of most of the ships combined to defy the authority of De Albuquerque and though the latter was able to bombard the town in which some Portuguese deserters were harboured, his position at Hormūz became untenable. He sailed accordingly and in November of the same year arrived in India; but De Almeida, who had already repudiated his action at Hormūz, refused to hand over the government to him, and the dispute between them was referred home to Portugal for settlement.

In November 1509 De Albuquerque became Viceroy of Portuguese India, and later he received missions from the Shāh of Persia and the Shaikh of Hormūz at his capital of Goa. Turkish attacks from the Red Sea on the Portuguese possessions in India were frequently threatened during his Viceroyalty and provoked counterdesigns, but De Albuquerque considered the recovery of Hormūz, which had been lost more necessary than the capture of Aden.

Indian Viceroyalty of De Albuquerque, 1509-15.

Recovery of Hormūz by the Portuguese, 1515.

In February 1515 a fleet carrying 1,500 Portuguese, 600 Malabaris, and 300 galley slaves sailed for Hormūz; De Albuquerque in person accompanied the expedition. The Ruler of Hormūz was said to be now a native of Persia who had come to power by murdering his predecessor and was in danger of meeting a similar fate at the hands of his own nephews. The island was found in a state of revolution, and no naval or military action by the Portuguese was needed for its recovery. The fort on shore was reoccupied on the 1st April.

Perso-Portuguese negotiations.

Later an Ambassador from Shāh Ismā'il of Persia arrived with various requests, some of which were granted; it was proposed by him

inter alia, that Portuguese shipping should be supplied* to the Persians to enable them to invade Bahrain and Qatif, that the Portuguese should help the Shāh to suppress a rebellion in Makrān by taking Gwadur for him, and that an alliance against Turkey should be formed between Persia and Portugal. On the 20th October De Albuquerque, who had fallen seriously ill, appointed his nephew Pero to be Captain of the Fort of Hormūz. He then left to India, but died on board ship at Goa without having disembarked.

tiations, and death of de Albuquerque, 1515.

Relations of the Portuguese with local powers and their struggles with the Turks in the Persian Gulf, 1515-1600.

After the death of De Albuquerque trouble recurred at the Portuguese stations in Persia and Arabia; and the danger to the Portuguese from the Turks, whose power at sea was growing rather than diminishing, not only continued to increase in Indian waters but began to extend to the Persian Gulf.

Native revolts against the Portuguese and hostilities between the Turks and the Persians, 1522.

In 1522 the appointment of Portuguese officials to the custom houses of Hormūz, Bahrain, Sohār, Masqat, and Quryāt having caused discontent among the indigenes, a simultaneous attack by land and sea upon all those places was organised by the Shaikh of Hormūz, who thought the opportunity favourable for casting off the Portuguese yoke. Much loss of life occurred among the Portuguese, whom this sudden revolt seems to have taken by surprise. The Shaikh of Hormūz himself, after setting fire to his town, retired to Qishm; but he was murdered there by his own dependents. A Portuguese fleet soon came from India under De Menezes, which, after destroying Sohār, relieved Hormūz then governed by Coutinho. A treaty signed at Mināb on the 23rd July 1523, was then imposed on the new Shaikh of Hormūz by the Portuguese Commander; it placed Hormūz not only under the protection, but also under the strict control, of Portugal.

In 1526 there were fresh native risings at Masqat and Kalhāt, due to the excesses of De Mello, who commanded at Hormūz, and to the machinations of one Rāis Sharafu, who seems to have been the Chief adviser of the Shaikh of Hormūz. They were suppressed by Lobo Vaz, who brought a fleet from India, and who at the same time recovered

1526—29.

* There is a ludicrous similarity between this and what happened in 1820. See page 23 *post*.

arrears of tribute due by the ruler of Hormūz. In 1529 Nono da Cunha, Governor of the Portuguese possessions in India, visited Hormūz and, under orders from the King of Portugal, deported Rais Sharafu and sent him to Portugal. Bahrain revolted against the Shaikh of Hormūz; and a Portuguese expedition was sent against the islands, but failed through being insufficiently equipped.

First Portuguese expedition to Basrah, about 1529.

It was about this time that the name of the Turks began to be heard in the Persian Gulf. The ruler of Basrah—probably an Arab—having undertaken to prevent the Turks from trading there if the Portuguese would help him against a neighbouring chief in Mesopotamia, Melchior Tavarez de Sousa went to his aid and ascended the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. The Basrah Ruler however refused to fulfil his promises of impeding Turkish trade; and De Sousa in revenge burned two "towns" at his departure.

Turkish descent on the Coast of India, 1538.

Perhaps as a reply to Portuguese action in the Red Sea, whither the Portuguese authorities in India from time to time sent expeditions, and in the Persian Gulf, a huge Turkish fleet fitted out and commanded by Sulaimān Pāsha, Governor of Egypt, arrived on the coast of India in 1538. Desperate efforts were made by it, during more than a month to capture Diu from the Portuguese, but they were not successful.

Friction between the Portuguese and the Shaikh of Hormuz, 1542

The period following was one of incessant struggles between the Portuguese and the Turks in the Persian Gulf. The relations of the Portuguese with their vassal, the King of Hormūz, were far from satisfactory; and in 1542, the latter being unable or neglecting to discharge arrears of tribute which were due from him, the Portuguese assumed direct control of his custom houses and satisfied their claims themselves.

Expulsion of the Turks from Qatif. Portuguese second expedition to Basrah, and retaliatory cruise of Pir Baig, 1550.

Open conflict between the Portuguese and the Turks in the Persian Gulf began about 1550. In that year the people of Qatif, renouncing it would seem an allegiance to Hormūz, placed themselves under the protection of the Turks, who had only recently taken possession of Basrah. The Shaikh of Hormūz was greatly chagrined by the defection of Qatif; and the late ruler of that district, who had been expelled, appealed for help to the Portuguese. In these circumstances an armament of 19 ships, carrying 1,210 men, was fitted out in India and despatched under Dom Antonio de Noronha to Qatīf, from which, with the help of the adherents of the Shaikh of Hormūz, the Turks were quickly driven out. The expedition visited Basrah also; but the Commander fearing treachery did not remain long or undertake operations there.

The Turks replied to the Portuguese attack by sending a "pirate" named Pir Baig to cruise in the Persian Gulf with a large fleet. This

Commander captured Masqat, from which he deported the Portuguese garrison, made a demonstration against Hormūz itself and plundered the town of Qishm.

In 1551 Pīr Baig was beheaded at Constantinople on a charge of having exceeded his instructions. His successor was Murād Baig, who had previously failed to hold Qatīf against the Portuguese, and who now made a desperate but unsuccessful attempt to retrieve his reputation by engaging a Portuguese fleet off the Persian Coast.

Cruise of Murād Baig against the Portuguese, 1551.

In 1553 the Turkish fleet in the Gulf was taken from Murād Baig and entrusted to 'Alī, Chalabi, an arrant boaster. On the 25th August Dom Fernando de Noronha fell in with him at sea near Masqat and took six of his ships, driving him with the remainder to Surat where he hemmed him in.

Defeat of a Turkish fleet under 'Alī, Chalabi, off Masqat by the Portuguese, 1553.

In 1556 the Shaikh of Hormūz asked the help of the Portuguese against the Turks, and Dom Alvaro da Silveira was sent to his assistance, but the Portuguese fleet was disabled by a storm after its arrival at Basrah, whither it proceeded, and returned with no achievement to its credit.

Third Portuguese expedition to Basrah, 1556.

Three years later a Turkish fleet of 2 galleys and 70 barques, with 1,200 Turks and Janissaries on board, proceeded against Bahrain. Rās Murād, who commanded there on behalf of the Shaikh of Hormūz, appealed for aid to his master and to the Portuguese; and a Portuguese fleet immediately proceeded to the scene of action. The Portuguese on their arrival, assisted by Rās Murād and by 300 well armed Persians attacked the Turks, whom they found besieging the principal fort, but were drawn into an ambush and suffered severely, about 70 Portuguese being killed. Ultimately, the allies having received reinforcements from Hormūz, the Turkish forces in Bahrain were obliged to surrender. They were allowed to leave the islands after delivering up their prisoners, their artillery, their arms and horses, and a sum of 10,000 ducats.

Invasion of Bahrain by the Turks and their expulsion by the Portuguese, 1559.

In 1580 Portugal was annexed to Spain and did not recover her independence until 1640.

Annexation of Portugal to Spain, 1580.

The year 1581 was signalised by a descent on Masqat organised by 'Alī Baig, a Turkish marauder, with three galleys; the place was surprised by sea and by land; and the Portuguese garrison had to retire temporarily into the interior. A Portuguese expedition was then sent out from Hormūz to chastise 'Alī Baig, but it destroyed instead the ports of Gwādar and Tīs on the coast of Makrān.

Temporary seizure of Masqat by the Turks, 1581.

In 1582 the Khān of Lār, whose family had once lorded it over the Shaikhs of Hormūz but were now regarded by the latter as their vassals,

Demonstration against Hormūz by

the Persians at Lār, 1582.

occupied Shamīl and blockaded the island of Hormūz. The Shaikh and the Portuguese however disembarked a force on the mainland, recaptured the fort of Shamīl, and drove the Lāris with slaughter out of the district.

Journey of the Englishmen Fitch Newberie, Deedes, and Story down the Euphrates, Tigris, and Persian Gulf, 1583.

The year 1583 was remarkable for an adventurous journey* made by four Englishmen, Ralph Fitch and John Newberie, merchants, William Deedes, jeweller, and James Story, painter, from Tripoli in Syria Brejik, thence by the Euphrates to Fallūjah, and so by Baghdād, the Tigris, Basrah, and the Persian Gulf to Hormūz, where they were arrested by the Portuguese authorities on suspicion of being here ties and spies. From Hormūz they were sent as prisoners to Goa and there remained in captivity for some time. Newberie had made the journey *viâ* Aleppo and Basrah once before in 1581.

Portuguese disaster at Nakhīlu, 1585.

In 1585 the Portuguese suffered a serious reverse at Nakhīlu, upon the Persian Coast, in attempting to punish the place for obstructing the despatch of supplies to Hormūz. Taken unawares after landing they were driven to their ships with a loss, native auxiliaries probably included, of 250 men.

Fort erected at Masqat by the Portuguese, 1586.

In the following year warned by experience, the Portuguese erected a strong fort at Masqat.

General situation in 1600.

The general situation in the Persian Gulf, as it existed at the close of the 16th century, may now be described in a few words.

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* See annexure 1 to chapter IX. The original account of the journey there given bears witness to the extraordinary unchangeableness of life and travel in the East.

NOTE.—The sources affording information in regard to the history of the Persian Gulf from 1600 to 1722, the latter part of the period during which Persia was ruled by the Safavi dynasty, are very numerous; we shall confine ourselves to an enumeration of the more important only.

The following authorities treat of events from an English and more or less official standpoint: Mr. W. Foster's *Letters received by the East India Company from their Servants in the East*, 6 volumes, 1896-1902, covering the period 1602-17; *Calendar of State Papers, East Indies*, for 1513-1616, 1617-21, 1622-24 and 1625-29, 4 volumes; do. *East Indies and Persia*, for 1630-34, 1 volume; Bruce's *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, 3 volumes, 1810, covering the period 1600 to 1708; and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600-1800*, printed in 1908, which contains (page ii) an account of the huge mass of Bombay records from which the Selections are taken.

In the *History of the Indian Navy*, 1874, by Lieutenant C. R. Low, late I. N., the naval and military operations of the English in the Persian Gulf during the whole

Position of the Portuguese, at this time subjects of Spain.

Portugal was still the only European nation represented in the Persian Gulf, where the Portuguese power had first as we have seen, been established in 1507, and where the Portuguese flag was as yet supreme at sea. Portuguese fortified stations existed on the islands of Hormúz and Bahrain, at Qishm, at Masqat, and probably at other places in 'Omán, the administrative headquarters being Hormúz, which remained the chief emporium of trade for a large part of the world. The power of Portugal, however, had begun to show symptoms of decline. By some an explanation of this fact has been sought in the "Sixty Years Captivity" to Spain, which, as already mentioned began in 1580 and did not end until 1640; for the Spanish Government of the day, by which Portuguese foreign policy was controlled, was centralised, partial and unwise, and, in accordance with economic theories prevalent at the time, was inclined to sacrifice every other object to the accumulation of specie.

Position of the Dutch.

The Dutch had not yet, in 1600, made their appearance in the Persian Gulf; but, emboldened by success in their long struggle for independence of Spain, they had begun to turn their attention to the East Indies. The foundations of the Dutch East India Company, not regularly constituted till 1602, were laid at Amsterdam in 1595; and, in 1596 or 1597, there "came first into India the scourge of the Portuguese pride and covetousness," in the shape of two Dutch vessels.

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period are described; and the following works of private or semi-official writers contain useful information with reference to particular incidents: *The Three Brothers*, anonymous, 1825, which deals with the proceedings of Sir A. and Sir R. Sherley from 1599 to 1628; Mr. W. Foster's *Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe*, 1899, for the period 1615-19; *Purchas his Pilgrimes*, Volume X (reprint of 1906), which contains a *Relation of the late Ormuz Businesse* from Monnox's Journal, 1621-22; Herbert's *Some Yeares Travels*, 1677, relating to Sir D. Cotton's Embassy to Persia in 1627-28; Fryer's *New Account of East India and Persia*, 1698, referring to the years 1677-78; and Hamilton's *New Account of the East Indies*, 1739, based on personal experiences between 1688 and 1723. Writings of some European travellers, not English, cast considerable light on special events and situations, among them being: the *Travels of Pedro Teixeira*, English translation 1902, referring to 1604; the *Travels of Sig. Pietro della Valle*, English translation 1665, for the years 1623-25; Mandelslo's *Voyages Célèbres et Remarquables*, 1727, referring to 1638; and Tavernier's *Travels*, English translation of 1684, relating to 1652.

The chief authorities on Portuguese affairs are: Manuel de Fariary Sousa's *Portugues Asia*, English translation by Stevens 1695, bringing events down to 1640; Colonel S. B. Miles' *Portuguese in Eastern Arabia*, contained in the Persian Gulf Residency Administration Report for 1884-85 and extending to 1651; and Mr. F. C. Danvers' *Portuguese in India*, 1894, covering the whole period.

Malcolm's *History of Persia*, 1815, Volume I, and Professor E. S. Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, 1856, will be found useful to connect events in the Persian Gulf with the general course of affairs in Persia and Turkey.

Position of the English, and incorporation of the English East India Company.

In England, too, which had obtained national security by the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, and which now stood forth as the greatest free and Protestant state in Europe, an epoch of enterprise and activity had begun; and on the last day of 1600 an English East India Company was incorporated, under Royal Charter, as the "Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies." The number of the original subscribers was 217, and the amount of the subscribed capital £68,873. The commercial position in the East had before this, to some extent, been reconnoitred by individual Englishmen, among them Newberie, Fitch and their companions, whose journey in 1583 has been described.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN 1600 TO THE EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE FROM HORMŪZ IN 1622.

Events preceding the establishment of the first English Factories in the Persian Gulf, 1600-16.

Such being the general situation in 1600, we may briefly review the course of events which ended in the establishment, in 1616, of a British Factory in the Persian Gulf.

Proceedings of Sir Anthony Sherley in Persia and his mission to Europe, 1599-1601.

A conspicuous part in the introduction of English influence into Persia was played by the Sherleys, a pair of adventurous brothers belonging to a good Sussex family, whose loyalty to their country or at least to their sovereign may not have been entirely above suspicion, but whose exploits were on the whole creditable, and in the end advantageous, to the English name in the East. In 1599 Sir Anthony Sherley, who had been knighted in 1597, proceeded under the advice of the Earl of Essex, but without official instructions, to the court of Shāh 'Abbās I of Persia; his principal objects were to induce the Shāh to make common cause with the Christian powers of Europe against the Turks, and to arrange for the establishment on a satisfactory basis of English commerce in the East. Accompanied by his younger brother Robert and others, he travelled to Persia by land *viâ* Baghdād and was first received by the Shāh at Qazvīn. As a result of Sir Anthony's representations the Shāh seems to have dismissed, with an unfavourable answer, a Turkish Ambassador who had come to arrange a peace between Persia and Turkey; and a Farmān

issued by Shāh 'Abbās, whereby he threw Persia open to Christian merchants of all nations, exempted them from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Persian authorities, and provided for the safe custody of their property in case of death, appears to have been obtained from him by Sir Anthony Sherley.* Sir Anthony returned to Europe with a general mission—probably suggested by himself—from the Shāh to all the princes of Christendom, in the discharge of which he visited Russia, Germany, Italy and Spain, but not, apparently, England; his proceedings, however, had no solid result. A Persian, whom Shāh 'Abbās had associated with him in the mission, gave Sir Anthony much trouble from time to time by claiming to be himself the real ambassador; but this individual, having returned from Rome, was put to death by his royal master on his arrival in Persia. Sir Anthony Sherley, whose fidelity seems to have been doubted by his own Government, settled in Spain on the conclusion of his mission; and there he resided, neglecting to comply with an order to return to England, until his death in 1630.

Proceedings of Robert Sherley in Persia and his mission to Europe, 1600-13.

After the departure of his elder brother for Europe, Robert Sherley remained at the court of the Shāh, apparently as a hostage. After a time the Shāh, not having received any news of Sir Anthony's embassy, began to regard Robert Sherley with less favour than in the beginning; but the Englishman, by signal services against the Turks, succeeded in regaining the Shāh's good graces and was able to secure the punishment, as already described, of the Persian commissioner who had been sent with Sir Anthony to Europe. At length, in 1608 or 1609, Shāh 'Abbās despatched Robert Sherley himself to Europe, in the same manner as he had sent his brother, to establish and confirm relations of friendship between Persia and the European powers and to announce the Shāh's intention of utterly destroying the Turks and of bringing the frontiers of Persia into contact with those of Christendom. After visiting Poland and Germany in 1609 and Italy in 1610, Robert Sherley proceeded to Madrid, where he propounded a scheme for diverting the Persian silk trade, then carried on overland to the advantage of the Turks, to Hormūz or some adjacent port in the Persian Gulf; but the scheme was coldly received by the Spanish court. He then came to England, and, on the 2nd October 1611, had an audience of King James at Hampton Court, where he exhibited his commission and delivered letters signifying "the Persian's great love and "affection unto His Majesty, with hearty desire of amity with the King

* The date of this Farmān has been conjectured to be 1599; but, if it was obtained by Sir A. Sherley, the date is more likely to have been 1600. See *Calendar of State Papers (East Indies), 1513-1616*, page 103; but the substance of the grant will be found more fully given in Malcolm's *History of Persia*, Volume II, pages 538-6.

"of Great Britain, with frank offer of free commerce unto all His "Highness's subjects throughout all the Persian's dominions, etc." During his stay in England, Sherley's wife Teresia, a Circassian lady received by him in marriage from Shah 'Abbás, gave birth to a son; and to this child the Queen of England became godmother and Prince Henry godfather. His political negotiations, however, failed; there was some doubt as to the validity or scope of his commission; the East India merchants were opposed to his projects, which they apprehended might disturb the trade with Turkey; and in the end Sherley, who had become Sir Robert Sherley, left England without having effected anything. Sir Thomas Roe, who was soon afterwards to play a distinguished part in the development of English commerce in the East, was a witness of Sherley's manœuvres, and formed of him the unfavourable opinion that "as hee is dishonest, soe hee is subtile." Finally in January 1613, Sherley, accompanied by Sir Thomas Powel who held a military command under the Shah, left Dover for Persia in the Company's ship "Expedition," on which he had been provided with a passage by King James's orders; he was furnished apparently with royal letters, but only of courtesy, to Shah 'Abbás. The voyage was protracted by bad weather, which detained the ship for 28 days off Dhufár on the coast of Southern Arabia; circumstances made it inconvenient to disembark at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, as has been intended; a plot to seize the ship by the local governor of Gwádar, who was then in rebellion against the Shah, was very nearly successful; but at last, in September 1615, Sherley landed on the coast of Sind, and, after visiting the Mughal Emperor Jahángir at Ajmír, returned by land to the capital of Shah 'Abbás.

Establishment of a position in India by the English East India Company, 1600-13.

Meanwhile the English East India Company had begun to acquire for themselves a commercial footing in India, and, between 1600 and 1612, twelve trading fleets or "Voyages" were despatched to the East by merchant subscribers belonging to the Company. In 1608 the first English ship arrived at Súrat, and the commander, William Hawkins, who brought a letter of recommendation from King James, was at first well received by the Great Mughal; but he was again virtually dismissed in 1611, in consequence of Portuguese intrigues; and in the same year permission to trade at Súrat was refused to Sir Henry Middleton, the commander of the Sixth Voyage, who consequently took Hawkins away with him and made reprisals upon Súrat traders in the Red Sea. In 1612 Thomas Best, arriving with another fleet, succeeded in obtaining a trading agreement from the local authorities at Súrat, which was confirm-

ed in general terms by a Farmān of the Mughal Emperor; and shortly afterwards, apparently in January 1613, an English trading Factory was established at Sūrat in charge of Thomas Aldworth.

Mission of Steel and Crouther to Persia, 1615-16.

The local demand in India proving insufficient to relieve the Sūrat Factory of an excessive quantity of broadcloth which had been ordered from England, Aldworth was obliged to seek another market, and his attention was directed by his enquiries to Bahrain and to Persia. His principal informant appears to have been one Richard Steel, a trader in Persia, who had come to India in pursuit of a runaway debtor; but Aldworth may have been influenced also by Sir Robert Sherley, who told Kerridge, one of the Company's servants, that, "if the English did not come to Persia, he would bring the Dutch." Accordingly, in 1615, Steel himself and a Factor named John Crouther, having been furnished with funds for their journey and with letters of introduction to Sir Robert Sherley, left for Isfahān by land, *viâ* Ajmīr, partly to procure further information in regard to Persian trade and partly to solicit a Farmān from the Shāh "for the fair and peaceable entertainment of our men, ships and goods in all such ports as they shall arrive at;" and it was apparently intended that special arrangements should be requested for trade at the port of Jāshk. These two pioneers of English commerce were successful in their mission; they obtained a Farmān from Shāh 'Abbās, of which a copy reached Ajmīr on the 10th of February 1616, directing the governors of seaport towns in Persia to receive and assist any English vessels that might present themselves; and they remained in Persia, and continued to correspond with the Company, during a part at least of the year of 1616.

Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, 1615-18.

While this preliminary mission was in progress, an important step of a different kind was taken by the East India Company in London. Experience had convinced them that their commercial interests in India would be served by the residence of a diplomatic representative of the King of England at the court of the Great Mughal; they accordingly suggested that Sir Thomas Roe, a gentleman of eminent capacity with some experience of travel and of courts, might be accredited by King James as Ambassador to the Mughal Emperor; and their request was at once granted. Sir Thomas Roe, whose instructions precluded him from interference in purely mercantile matters, arrived at Ajmīr in December 1615; and the copy of the Farmān of Shāh 'Abbās, mentioned above, together with letters from Steel and Crouther which accompanied it, were opened by him there, as there was no Factor of the Company at hand.

Affairs of the Portuguese

The prestige and power of the Portuguese in the East, where—as already explained—they represented Spain as well as their own country,

and Spaniards, 1600-16.

were now decidedly upon the wane. In 1604, when Teixeira voyaged up the Persian Gulf, the Portuguese were in bad odour along the whole Persian coast on account of the raids committed by their vessels, and their merchant ships could not obtain supplies there; Nakhīlu and Rīg were places particularly hostile to them. They still, however, retained some of their authority; and native boats running from Rīshehr to Rīg sometimes took Portuguese passes. In 1612 and 1615 their fleets were defeated by the English in encounters off Sūrat, and their inferiority at sea began to be suspected by the Mughal government. In the Persian Gulf, likewise, their naval credit began to decline. About 1602 they were dislodged from Bahrain by the Shāh of Persia; and about 1608 their settlement on Hormūz was blockaded by the Shāh's forces and was reduced to considerable straits.

In 1613 the Khān of Lār tried to recover Bandar* 'Abbās, which the Portuguese had apparently seized and fortified in the previous year as a precaution against a blockade of Hormūz from the mainland. A force proceeded to attack the Lāris, but the ship carrying the Portuguese commander took fire and blew up; his successor in the command, however, continued the operations and in the end defeated the enemy. Ultimately the Shāh apologised to the Viceroy of Portuguese India for the action of the Khān of Lār, which he asserted to have been unauthorised. The Portuguese retained Bandar 'Abbās only until 1615, when they were expelled by the Persians after a siege of some duration.

In March 1616 the Portuguese, helped by a neighbouring tribe, attacked and took Sohār on the Bātinah Coast of 'Omān. Their object was to destroy a port which competed with Masqat and Hormūz and injuriously affected the Portuguese revenue from customs. Muhammad, the ruler of Sohār, was killed in action; and his brother, having been taken prisoner, was put to death. The Portuguese further violated the terms of the capitulation by falling on the garrison as they evacuated the place.

While fighting proceeded between the Persians and the Portuguese in the Gulf, embassies continued to be interchanged between the courts of Isfahān and Madrid. In 1613 Dānish Baig, a Persian ambassador to

* Bandar 'Abbās takes its name from Shāh 'Abbās I, by whom it was founded about this time, probably as a check upon Hormūz. To Europeans, in the 17th and 18th centuries, it was generally known as "Gombroon," "Gammaron," "Comoran," etc.; this name, according to Hamilton (see his *New Account of the East Indies*, I. 72), was first applied to it in derision by the Portuguese, being taken from a word in their language meaning a "shrimp." A different conjecture connects it with Gumruk, the Persian word for "customs."

Spain, returned to the East and was received at Goa by the Portuguese authorities and forwarded on his way to Persia with every honour; but the results of his mission must have been disappointing to the Shāh, for that monarch caused him to be put to death immediately on his arrival. A bishop from Spain had accompanied Dānish Baig to the East to propagate Christianity in Persia; but, having apparently foreseen unfortunate consequences from the failure of the Persian embassy, he wisely remained at Hormūz. Some time after this, Shāh 'Abbās, who apparently hankered after a special arrangement with some European nation in regard to the silk trade, suggested that a Spanish gentleman of note should be sent to negotiate with him instead of ecclesiastics, as hitherto, "for he should know better how to treat with such a one, and God and "His Majesty would be better served, because a religious man out of his "cell was like a fish out of water;" and in response to his invitation a certain Don Garcia de Silva Figueroa was despatched from Madrid with costly presents and a magnificent retinue. This Ambassador, however, on account of the hostilities which Shāh 'Abbās continued to commit against the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, and particularly of his expulsion of the Portuguese from Bandar 'Abbās in 1615, did not, so far as can be ascertained, proceed beyond Goa until the following year.

Relations of Persia and Turkey.

During the earlier part of the reign of Shāh 'Abbās prior to 1600, a considerable part of Persia was in possession of the Turks, who held Tiflis, Tabrīz and even Nihāvand to the east of Kirmānshāh. After 1600 however, the Shāh addressed himself with much success to the recovery of the lost provinces: in 1602 he took Nihāvand; in 1603 he dislodged the Turks from Tabrīz, which they had occupied for 18 years; in 1605 he invested Erivan and Baghdād; and finally in the same year, having purposely withdrawn his troops from the siege of Baghdād, he completely defeated the Ottoman forces in the field at a great battle, in which Sir Robert Sherley, fighting on the Persian side, received three wounds. Isfahān was at this time the capital of Persia, and the Shāh had a garrison at Rishehr in the Persian Gulf.

Establishment of the first English Factories in Persia, 1616-17.

The arrival of the Farmān obtained by Steel and Crouther provoked an immediate discussion as to whether, and if so in what manner, the commercial privileges conceded by the Shāh should be turned to account by the East India Company.

Cautious policy of

Before the receipt of the Farmān, but after the question of opening a trade with Persia had been mooted, Sir Thomas Roe had enjoined

Sir T. Roe, 1615-16.

caution, had proposed a thorough inquiry into the conditions of commerce in Persia, and had suggested that he himself should visit Isfahān, under a commission from King James, to arrange matters personally. The arrival of the Farmān did not alter his opinion, for he regarded the document as of little value, chiefly because it made no provision for a fortified port in the Gulf and because it contained no assurance that trade would be directed to Jāshk or to any other port with which the English might have to do. He further considered the time to be inopportune for a venture in Persia, inasmuch as Sir Robert Sherley had recently left Persia as Ambassador from the Shāh to the King of Spain with instructions to arrange, if possible, that the Portuguese and Spaniards, on being granted permission to occupy and fortify Bandar 'Abbās and other places on the coast, should purchase there all the Persian merchandise brought down for export and should send a yearly fleet to the Gulf with spices, pepper and Indian linen; the outcome of Sherley's mission could not, he thought, be predicted; and, if it were successful, the undertaking of the Company's servants would be completely frustrated. In these circumstances Roe sought to dissuade the Factors from taking any decisive step; but at the same time, by way of counteracting Sherley's designs, he wrote a letter to the Shāh, in which he thanked him for the Farmān given to Steel and Crouther, pointed out that the Shāh's negotiations with Spain were inconsistent with the terms of the Farmān, whereby freedom of trade was guaranteed to all Christian merchants, and hinted that the grant of a monopoly to another nation might oblige the English to resort to arms and so to disturb the tranquillity of the Gulf.

Decision and action of the Factors in opposition to the views of Sir T. Roe, October 1616.

The Factors at Sūrat, however, who evidently considered the question to be a commercial one not falling within the province of Sir Thomas Roe, took a different view. They regarded the opportunity as favourable, inasmuch as Sherley, who would be either a troublesome enemy or an expensive friend, was absent from Persia; the continuance of war between Turkey and Persia and the consequent interruption of intercourse with Europe led them to believe that silk must at the moment be superabundant, and cloth scarce, in Persia; and Jāshk, though they were aware of the insignificance of the place itself, appeared to them to afford an advantageous opening for the disposal of the surplus stocks at Sūrat, yet without any extraordinary expense to the Company. Roe's adverse opinion they dismissed with the remark, that, "in regard "his Lordship in other particulars of his said letter is far transported (in "error of opinion) concerning merchandising and merchants' affairs in "these parts, makes us assured that he is no less transported from and

"concerning this Persian employment;" and they accordingly proceeded, in anticipation of the sanction of the Company, to place Edward Connock* in charge of a commercial mission to Persia by which a factory or factories should forthwith be established in that country. Their instructions to Connock contemplated a landing at Jāshk; but cargo disembarked there was to be at once removed to a place of greater security from the Portuguese; and Connock himself, taking with him a letter from King James and suitable presents, was to travel with all speed to the Shāh at Isfāhan and there endeavour to obtain a grant of privileges. The Sūrat Factors reached this momentous decision in October 1616; and no time was lost by them in carrying it into execution.

Despatch of a mission in the "James" to Jāshk, November 1616.

On the 8th November 1616 the ship "James," Captain Alexander Child, sailed from Sūrat for Jāshk, carrying a considerable cargo of goods and the staff of the Company's mission to Persia, namely, Edward Connock, the leader of the expedition, Thomas Barker, the next in seniority, and George Pley,† Edward Potters, William Bell, William Tracye ‡ and Mathew Pepwell, Factors. The "James" having cast anchor at Jāshk on the 4th of December 1616, the mission proceeded to Mīnāb; the Shāh's Farmān was exhibited to Zulfiqār Khān, the local Persian Governor; and the goods of the Company, disembarked at Jāshk, were transported by land to Mīnāb on camels supplied by the Governor, and under his protection against the Portuguese. On the 20th of January 1617 the "James" left for Sūrat, Connock and his companions remaining in Persia to prosecute their enterprise. The value of the Company's capital brought by them to Jāshk was £6,333-15-11, including £550 in ready money.

Action of Sir T. Roe, 1616-17.

Sir Thomas Roe, much to his credit, though he entirely disapproved of the action of the Sūrat Factors and made no secret of his opinion, did his best to prevent the failure of the enterprise. With this purpose, on the 3rd January 1617, he interviewed the Persian Ambassador at the Mughal court, to whom he "generally propounded the settling of a "trade, the conditions we required, the Comoditye to his Master, and our "forwardness in sending a ship this year to Iasques upon his Masters "*firmaen*;" and he also persuaded the Ambassador to warn the Shāh of the danger which might result from an exclusive agreement with Spain. A few days later he wrote to his correspondent at Isfahān, an English jeweller named William Robbins,§ asking him to explain to the Shāh

* Also Connok and Cannocke, and by Roe spelt "Connaught." The orthography of the time was unsettled, even in the matter of proper names.

† Or Plea.

‡ Or Tracy.

§ Or Robin.

that the object of the mission to Jāshk was not to form a settlement at the place, but to show the readiness of the Company to take up the Persian trade; he apologised for the poorness of the cargo sent; and he explained that the requirements of the English were (1) a port open to themselves alone, or to all nations indifferently, where they might land their goods under the privileges granted in such cases, (2) some arrangement for fixing the prices of the imports and exports to be exchanged there, and (3) the establishment of a "staple mart" on or near the coast, to which, for convenience of trade, the Shāh's silks should be brought down. Already, before the departure of the "James" from Sūrat, Sir Thomas had written apprising the authorities in England of the line he intended to take, and had suggested a warning to Spain, to the effect that any attempt on her part to exclude other nations from the Persian Gulf trade would be treated by England as a *casus belli*. About October 1617 Roe received instructions from the Company in London, authorising a cautious line of procedure very similar to that which he had himself proposed, also a letter from King James, approving of his endeavours to open commercial relations with the Shāh and empowering him "to perfect and conclude, or cause to be perfected and concluded, a "treaty of Commerce betwixt the said great Sophy and us, for the mutual "good of the subiectes and dominions of us both, without attending from "hence any further directions then a confirmacion only of that treaty, "which shall be by us foorthwith ratified, according as you shall in our "name undertake the same."

Journey of the mission to Shīrāz, January-April, 1617.

After the departure of the "James" the mission were detained for some time at Mīnāb by the corrupt governor of that place, who, after accepting their presents, seems to have taken bribes from the Portuguese to prevent their going further. Connock, however, pressed on to Shīrāz to interview the superior authorities; and the mission, having at length been allowed to proceed, reached Lār on the 11th of March. On the 2nd of April they arrived at Shīrāz, where they were well received by the Governor; but meanwhile Connock had left for Isfahān in search of the Shāh.

Establishment of a Factory at Shīrāz, and dissensions in the mission, April-May, 1617.

As Shīrāz appeared to be a suitable place for a Factory, and as the case was provided for in the instructions of the mission, Barker established himself there with Bell, and professed to consider himself for the future independent of Connock's authority. From this time onwards there was serious friction between the two senior Factors; and Barker, who was supposed to stand well with Sir Thomas Roe, apparently set himself to thwart the leader of the mission by every means in his power. A majority of the Factors, however still adhered to Connock.

Early in June 1617 Connock was at Isfahān with three of his party, where a second Factory was opened; and at the end of that month he was ready to leave Isfahān for the Shāh's camp. It was not, however, until the beginning of August that he reached the presence of the Shāh, whom he found somewhere upon the Turkish frontier at a distance of 25 days' march from Isfahān; Connock was now accompanied only by Robbins, the English jeweller; but Tracye followed him, bringing gifts for the Shāh. King James's letter to the Shāh, though genuine, was old, and the body of it had apparently been written in India over the royal signature or seal,—a circumstance which seems to have occasioned Connock some anxiety; nevertheless, in spite of doubts cast on its genuineness by a Spanish friar from Isfahān, who had managed to anticipate Connock in the Shāh's camp,* the letter was accepted by the Shāh; and the Englishmen met with a very cordial reception. The Persian monarch even went so far as to style King James "his elder brother," to drink his health in a large bowl of wine, and to promise that Jāshk or any other port which they might require should be given to the English. The "grant of privileges," which Connock had been sent to negotiate, was obtained in a highly satisfactory form.

Establishment of a Factory at Isfahān and journey of Connock to the Shāh's camp, June-August, 1617.

The Shāh's Farmān † provided for the perpetual residence of an English Ambassador at the Persian Court, and for the despatch, should circumstances make it desirable, of a Persian Ambassador to England; the right of buying and selling freely in the Persian dominions was conferred on all English subjects; they were to be protected in the exercise of their religion; they were authorised to possess arms and to use them, if necessary, in self-defence; a power of appointing Agents and Factors in Persia,—who should be treated with respect and assisted by the Persian authorities,— might be exercised by the English Ambassador, when he should arrive; in criminal cases Englishmen were to be punished by their own Ambassador; and in civil suits between English and Persians, if the value of the subject matter exceeded 20 Tūmāns, the decision must be pronounced by the English Ambassador, apparently with the concurrence of Persian judges, while in smaller cases justice should be done upon the spot by the Persian legal authorities. At the time of granting this Farmān, Shāh 'Abbās also wrote "a very noble letter" to King James.

Farmān of Shāh Abbās I, 1617.

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* Connock seems to have attributed the proceedings of this individual to the machinations of Barker.

† The text of this Farmān does not appear to be extant, but its substance is embodied in a later Farmān (1629) of Shāh Safi. (See *Letters received by the East India Company*, Vol. VI, pages 293-7.)

Proceedings of Sir T. Roe.

Meanwhile, in India, Sir Thomas Roe continued to disapprove of the Persian mission, as conducted by Connock, probably in consequence of information received from Barker; he deplored the diversion of the Company's best goods to Persia; and he depreciated the advice given by Connock, whom he did not regard as a "sober" man and whom he suspected to be on the way to Popery or even to Muhammadanism. The chief charge against Connock appears to have been that he styled himself "Ambassador," and it seems that he did actually pose as a sort of royal messenger from a belief, as he himself explained, that the Shāh would not condescend to negotiate, in matters of peace and amity, with a mere mercantile Factor representing the East India Company. He was also accused of wasting the Company's goods. The suspicions against Connock were no doubt strengthened by the non-receipt of news from him, for the letters which he wrote from Isfahān in May 1617 did not reach India until 1618. In October 1617, Roe proposed to send a ship to obtain news of Connock; he also issued a commission, authorising Connock, Barker, Pley and Bell to conclude a commercial treaty with the Shāh on lines specified, and he advised the Sūrat Factors, among whom * Thomas Kerridge was now the chief, not to send any more goods to Persia while the success of the mission remained uncertain.

Fresh commission despatched through Monox, November, 1617.

Sir Thomas Roe's commission was entrusted to Edward Monox,† who left Sūrat for the Gulf on the 14th of November in the "Bee." On arrival at Jāshk on the 6th of December Monox found Connock and Tracye there; but Pley had died four days previously. Connock, on hearing that a downward silk caravan had been detained at Mināb, hurried off in that direction; but he took ill and died at Gatān in Biyābān; and a few days later Tracye also expired. In the manner of his death Connock curiously verified one of Sir Thomas Roe's objections against him, for at the last he avowed himself a Roman Catholic. The "Bee" returned to Sūrat in January 1618 and the authorities in India were thus at length apprised of the results of the mission.

Proceedings of the Portuguese during these events, 1616-17.

While the English mission was establishing itself in Persia, the Portuguese were engaged in fruitless attempts to propitiate Shah 'Abbās, whom already they suspected, with very good reason, of a design to expel them from Hormūz; and the Shāh, on his part, continued to treat with the Portuguese in regard to a monopoly of the Persian silk trade. In 1616 Sir Robert Sherley arrived in India as a representative of the Shāh, concluded a peace with the Viceroy at Goa, and left for Spain

*, Or Kerridge.
† Also Monnox and Monoxe.

about the end of the year to settle the question of the silk monopoly; but, though he remained at Madrid until 1622, his mission was barren of results. The formal restoration of peace enabled the Ambassador Don Garcia de Silva, who had been waiting at Goa since 1615, to proceed on his way; in April 1617 he passed through Hormûz, his approach causing much uneasiness to Connock, whose negotiations were not then begun; and later he was honourably received by the Shâh. His embassy however failed in its principal object, which was to divert Shâh 'Abbâs from his designs upon Hormûz.

The Portuguese, in endeavouring to conciliate the Persians, did not neglect to oppose and obstruct the English. Some of the petty devices by which they, or their sympathisers, sought to frustrate the English mission have already been noticed above; and a large fleet had been despatched from Goa to intercept the "James" on her first voyage, but, failing in its object, had returned *viâ* Masqat. The Portuguese soon stood at a disadvantage, in the matter of popularity, as compared with their English rivals, one of whom after a few months' experience of Persia remarked: "We have more courteous use of the common people "than ever they had and more respect of the great ones."

Events preceding the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormûz, 1618-22.

Proceedings of the English Factors in Persia.

In Persia the representatives of the English East India Company, now headed by Barker and Monox, proceeded to turn to advantage the privileges secured by Connock; but regrettable factions still prevailed among them. In India Sir Thomas Roe, furnished with additional powers and not insensible of the value of the concessions granted by the Shâh, directed that Connock should be avowed "to have beene a Messin-"ger sent from the King, though not with absolute Power as Ambassa-"dor to treate and Conclude;" and he ordered that negotiations should be undertaken with a view to obtaining a safe dépôt on the coast, a staple mart at Shîrâz, and an arrangement with the Shâh for a supply of silk, partly on payment and partly in exchange for goods. From these facts it is clear that Roe was in favour of systematic as opposed to desultory trade; and it further appears that there was a difference of opinion between him and some of the servants of the Company, for, while he was in favour of free trade and a peaceful understanding with

Spain, there were others who thought that the Shāh should be encouraged to drive the Portuguese out of Hormūz, and that the aim of English policy should be to establish a monopoly of Persian trade in favour of the East India Company. In 1618 some further concessions of a minor character were obtained by the Company's servants in Persia; and the Shāh "apparently" agreed that all silk leaving Persia should in future be sold to the English, and that none should be sent to Europe by way of Turkey or disposed of to the Spanish or the Portuguese. Early in 1619 Sir Thomas Roe, having finished his work in India, left for England. In the course of the following summer a letter from the King of England was delivered to Shāh 'Abbās with much ceremony; and in November of the same year Barker died in Persia. Trade continued to be carried on satisfactorily; but no new Factories were established, though King James, in 1620, wrote to Shāh 'Abbās to suggest the grant of a site and privileges near Jāshk.

Proceedings of the Portuguese, 1618-23.

By the successful operations of the English the prosperity of Hormūz was seriously affected; and the arrival of a fleet of five English trading vessels at Jāshk, still used by the East India Company as their port in Persia, produced consternation in Hormūz, where buildings were demolished and other preparations made for defence. In 1619 or 1620 the Portuguese were expelled by the Persians, assisted by an Arab levy, from a *position which they occupied on the Arabian coast at or near Rās-al-Khaimah; and the † watering of Hormūz, which a Persian force now threatened from the mainland, became a matter of difficulty. In November 1620 the "Hart" and "Eagle," two of the Company's ships, having been prevented from entering the port of Jāshk by a Portuguese fleet under Admiral Ruy Freire, returned to Surat, were reinforced by the "London" and "Roebuck," and eventually entered Jāshk after an inconclusive encounter between the fleets on the 17th of December. A few days later the Portuguese squadron, after a visit to Hormūz, to refit, reappeared in greater strength off Jāshk, and on the 28th December an obstinately contested action was fought, which resulted in a victory for the English, not however without the death of their Commodore, Captain Andrew Shillinge, who died on the 6th January 1621 of a wound in the shoulder.

* Probably Ras-al-Khaimah itself. The position lost is called "Julfar" with reference to which the article "Sir" in Vol. II of this Gazetteer (page 1826) may be consulted.

† The name of the watering place on the main land is given as "Dola."

Expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormūz, 1622.

Arrangement between the Persians and the English, 1622.

In 1621 Shāh 'Abbās I was ready to undertake the expulsion of the Portuguese from their stronghold at Hormūz, the existence of which he regarded as prejudicial both to the honour and to the prosperity of his country. His claims to Hormūz were advanced through Qambar Baig Khān of Lār, who asserted that the island had been tributary to Lār before the coming of De Albuquerque. The difference between the Persians and the Portuguese in regard to the silk trade had become acute, and the commercial operations of the Portuguese were being harassed by the Persians, who had even seized some of their merchants A final victory over the Turks near Tabrīz in 1618 had removed all danger to Persia on that side; and the power of the Shāh for external offensive action was now so great that about 1620 he easily made himself master of Qandahār. For the capture of Hormūz, however, a naval force was necessary; and Shāh 'Abbās, as he possessed none, was obliged to have recourse to the English. The East India Company, it would seem, at first hesitated to embroil themselves in the affair; but eventually, towards the end of 1621, the President and Council of Factors at Sūrat issued a commission to Captains Blythe and Weddell, who were then bound for Jāshk with the ships "London," "Jonas," "Whale," "Dolphin" and "Lion" and the "pinnaces"* "Rose," "Robert," "Richard" and "Shillinge," authorising them, in view of the depredations and threats of the Portuguese, to capture the ships of that nation and even, if a council of officers should consider it feasible, to attack them in their ports. On the 23rd December 1621 the English squadron arrived at Kūhistak on the coast of the Mināb district; they had apparently been prevented by the Persians, who demanded their assistance against Hormūz, from doing business at Jāshk; and, further to constrain the English to take part in the operations, one of their trading caravans from Isfahān was detained at Mīnāb under orders from Imām Qulī Khān, Governor of Fārs, to whom the task of capturing Hormūz had been committed by the Shāh. The Governor of Fārs, on his arrival at Mīnāb, was waited on by Monox and Bell, the former being now the Company's principal representative in Persia, who propounded to him the several conditions on which the Company were willing to co-operate with him against

* The "pinnace" of that day was a schooner-rigged vessel of 2 or 3 masts, also propelled by oars, it was mounted with guns and used in war.

Hormûz, the principal among these being: (1) that half the booty taken should belong to the Persians and half to the English; (2) that of the prisoners those who were Christians should belong to the English, those who were Muhammadans to the Persians; (3) that the existing fort of Hormûz with all its ordnance, arms and munitions should be made over to the English, but that the Persians should be at liberty to build another for themselves; (4) that the customs (of Hormûz) should in future be equally shared by the Persians and English; and (5) that the English trade (at Hormûz) should for ever be duty free. These terms were accepted by the Governor of Fârs with the modification that, until the Shâh's pleasure was known, the Portuguese Governors of Qishm and Hormûz should be the prisoners of the Persians, and the existing fort of Hormûz be occupied by the Persians and the English jointly; also that in the future the goods of the Shâh and those of the Governor of Fârs should be exempted from customs as well as those of the English.* The arrangement as modified by the Persian Governor was apparently concluded at Minâb on the 9th of January 1622. The ships' companies at first refused to serve against the Portuguese, apparently from a fear that the expedition might be considered irregular, but they were eventually talked over by their commanders.

Position of the Portuguese at Qishm and Hormûz.

At this juncture the Admiral of the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf was Dom Ruy Freire de Andrade, a man "more politic than conscientious" and "rather feared than beloved;" he had many enemies among his own countrymen, and, immediately before the present crisis, he had been disappointed of the Governorship of Hormûz, which was his due, and to which Simão de Mello, one of his adversaries, was instead appointed. Ruy Freire had recently built a new fort at Qishm, which he had garrisoned with 300 Portuguese and a number of Arab auxiliaries; and, strong in the possession of this work, he now ravaged the Persian coast westwards by Khamîr as far as Nakhilu, destroying 4 ships, 80 "great Barques" and 400 other vessels. According to the Spanish historian the new Governor of Hormûz, disregarding the remonstrances of Ruy Freire, made no adequate dispositions for the defence of that place.†

* The writer has been unable to find precise corroboration of Fryer's statement, made more than fifty years after the event, that the English undertook to "keep two "Men of War constantly to defend the Gulf" (*New Account of East India and Persia*, pages 222 and 352). It will be seen however, from a later paragraph in the text, that at some time or another an engagement was apparently given by the English to the effect that they would keep the Gulf open and bear half the cost of doing so.

† This statement is to some extent corroborated by the number of guns found unmounted at Hormûz after its fall; but possibly the garrison had as many mounted as they could use.

Before the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian agreement, while the Governor of Fārs was yet on his way from the interior to the coast, the Persians had begun to attack Qishm and had lost a large number of men without making any impression on the fort. On the 22nd of January 1622 the British squadron anchored off Hormūz, in the hope of bringing about an engagement with the enemy's fleet there, which consisted, apparently, of 5 galleons and 15 or 20 so-called "frigates;" but the Portuguese did not accept the challenge. On the 23rd, assisted by the Persians, the English began operations against the fort of Qishm, where Ruy Freire commanded; and on the 1st of February, no help having been sent from Hormūz, the garrison were obliged to capitulate. Ruy Freire would have set fire to the fort and died honourably in a sortie, but his men refused to follow him and began to desert, jumping from the walls. Only two Englishmen lost their lives in the siege of Qishm; but one of these was Master William Baffin, the discoverer of Baffin's Bay, who acted as pilot to the fleet and was killed on shore in taking ranges with his instruments for the guidance of the artillery. Seventeen guns and about 1,000 prisoners were captured, the latter including the Portuguese Admiral, who was not made over, as he should have been under the agreement, to the Persians. On the 4th of February the squadron moved over to Bandar 'Abbās, whence* Ruy Freire and four of his principal officers were sent as prisoners to Sūrat: the "Lion" and two "pinnaces" having been detached on this duty, there remained only four ships and two pinnaces to carry out the attack on Hormūz.

Siege and capture of Qishm by the English and Persians, 22nd January—1st February, 1622.

On the 9th of February 1622 the English squadron took up a position off Hormūz; and on the next day a large Persian force, landed from a fleet of 200 native vessels, entered and took possession of the town, almost without opposition. Operations against the fort were then commenced from the landward side, but their progress was slow; and the Portuguese garrison, notwithstanding scarcity and disease, made a brave and persevering defence. On the 24th of February the Portuguese flagship "San Pedro" was set on fire by the English and destroyed. On the 17th of March a Persian mine made a practicable breach in a salient angle of the fort, but the Persian storming party led by Shāh Quli Baig, were repulsed with loss by the defenders. The town was then burned by the besiegers to prevent the Persian forces from skulking in it. By the 23rd of March two more Portuguese vessels had been sunk by the fire of the English ships; and one or two others soon shared the same fate. The

Siege and capture of Hormūz by the English and Persians, 9th February—23rd April, 1622.

* He escaped from the "Lion" at Sūrat, returned to Hormūz to find the place fallen, and then he took himself to Masqat.

Persian forces were miserably armed and equipped; they suffered severely from want of water and provisions, due to inefficient arrangements; and their commander was guilty of various breaches of faith towards the English, especially in holding separate communication with the Portuguese, which cannot have conduced to the success of the joint operations. On the 2nd of April two more mines were exploded by officers from the English ships, but the Persians refused to attack the breaches thus opened; the garrison, however, were by this time in great distress. On the 14th and 17th of April, fresh breaches having been effected by means of mines, the besiegers made an assault in great force; but a mere handful of Portuguese and negroes sufficed to repulse them to a barricade, where the Persians "the whole day stood flocking together in the Sunne "without either meat or drink, which was sufficient to have killed halfe "of them." According to Monox the Persian "Soldiers hang in a "cluster upon the breach just as a swarme of Bees upon a tree or bush "that want a Hive; or like a flocke of Sheepe at a gappe, where none is "so hardie to enter, and the Portugals to put them out of that paine "gleaneth away foure, five, sixe, sometimes more at a shot; insomuch "that I cannot but pittie them to see it." On the 18th another assault was made and failed; but on the 19th the Persians gained possession of the whole enceinte, and the Portuguese retired into some of the inner works.

At last on the 21st of April, the Portuguese, thinking it unwise to rely on Persian good faith and preferring to deal with Christians, made overtures to the English, who undertook that their lives should be spared; and a truce of two days was arranged through Monox and the captains of the ships. On the 23rd of April the Portuguese* surrendered on condition that they should be removed from the country; the same day they began to march out, to the number of 2,600 persons, the English protecting them to the best of their ability, but not with entire success, against injury and insult by the Persians; and on the 27th they were despatched in English vessels to Masqat. Meanwhile Saiyid Muhammad Shāh, the native ruler of Hormūz, had been taken by the Persians; he was subsequently deported to Shīrāz, where he remained as a political détenu for some years. A number of Indian traders also fell into their hands.

*Another account says the Capitulation was on the 22nd May, but is probably wrong. According to the Portuguese authorities a surrender was first arranged by Luis de Brito, who commanded the fort, and Simão de Mello, the Governor, then pretended to oppose the idea but afterwards incited the soldiers to mutiny and so capitulated. The same authorities make the number of Portuguese who left Hormuz 2,000 of both sexes and all ages.

No orderly division of the spoil of Hormûz, as contemplated in the Anglo-Persian agreement, ever took place; but on the contrary there was indiscriminate pillage by the allies, beginning on the 24th of April, in which the Persians were supposed to have secured the lion's share of the plunder. The number of captured guns assigned to the English was apparently 165; but their value was estimated at only one-third of those retained by the Persians.

Simão de Mello was subsequently sentenced to death by the courts of his own nation for the loss of Hormûz; but, as he had escaped to a foreign country, the punishment was inflicted on him in effigy only. Ruy Freire was exonerated from blame for the surrender of Qishm chiefly, it would seem, because his services were required; his name was a terror to the Arabs.

Immediate results of the capture of Hormûz.

The participation of the English in the attack upon Hormûz was evidently irregular from an international point of view,* for England and Spain were at peace when it was made. Complaints were addressed by the Spanish to the English Crown, and at first hopes of redress were held out by King James; and it even seemed possible that the Company's action might be repudiated, and their servants treated as pirates, by the English Government. The Company, however, resolved "to stand on their innocency," and various grounds of defence were suggested by Monox, who had meanwhile returned to England in the "Lion,"—principally "His Majesty's commission to defend and offend," the aggressions of the Portuguese on English commerce in the Gulf, and compulsion by the Shâh, who had not hesitated to place an embargo on English trade in Persia. In the end satisfaction was refused to the King of Spain; but the Company, probably in consideration of the behaviour of their representatives being condoned, were obliged to pay £10,000 to King James and the same to the Duke of Buckingham as Lord High Admiral. As the English share of the spoil of Hormûz, apart from what may have been secreted and carried off by individuals, was estimated at £20,000 to £25,000 only, it appears that the expedition against Hormûz, of which the expenses were no doubt considerable, must have resulted, in the first instance, in financial loss to the company. But, on the other hand, the position of the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf had been totally destroyed by the fall of Hormûz, while the English had obtained a free port, and one more convenient than Jâshk, for the prosecution of their trade. The Shâh, moreover, now confirmed the Farmân

* Equally so, however, was the Portuguese attack on Shillinge's fleet at Jâshk in 1620.

which he had granted to Connock in 1617, and issued new and special orders for the protection and encouragement of the English silk trade in his dominions.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE FROM HORMŪZ TO THE FIRST WAR BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH, 1622-53.

Events from the fall of Hormūz to the embassy of Sir Dodmore Cotton to Persia, 1622-26.

Efforts of the Portuguese to retake Hormūz, 1623-25.

A number of the Portuguese deported from Hormūz at its fall settled at Masqat, which was now the only station of importance belonging to their country in the Gulf region; and with them came a nephew of the late native ruler of Hormūz, whose hereditary claims they may have hoped to turn to account. The Persians were anxious to follow up their success at Hormūz by taking Masqat also, but without the assistance of the English, which was withheld, they were unable to do so; they succeeded, however, in occupying Sohār and Khor Fakkān on the 'Omān coast. Under Ruy Freire de Andrade, however, who had escaped from his captivity with the English, the Portuguese once more assumed the offensive against the Persians, drove them from Sohār and Khor Fakkān, destroyed places on the Persian coast between Jāshk and Bandar 'Abbās, harried Persian shipping, and began to annoy the Persian garrison of Hormūz, whose supplies they tried to cut off; but the means at Ruy Freire's disposal did not admit either of a continuous blockade of Hormūz or of a direct attack upon the place. The desultory operations of the Portuguese Admiral continued throughout a part of 1623 and the whole of 1624; but they terminated at length in a series of engagements, fought off Bandar 'Abbās in February 1625, between a fleet under his orders and some English and Dutch ships. The Portuguese squadron commanded by Nuno Alvarez Botello, consisted of 8 galleons and 16 "frigates," while on the opposite side the English ships "Royal James," "Eagle," "Jonas" and "Star" and four Dutch vessels were engaged. Three separate actions took place, on the 1st, 3rd, and 14th of February, and were very hotly contested; the English fired some 20,000 rounds from their guns, and the "Royal James" was struck by no less than 405

Portuguese shot, some of which were nearly 9 inches in diameter. In the final action the Portuguese were severely handled and to a great extent dismasted; but the English and Dutch, for want of ammunition, were unable to follow them when they drew off. Ruy Freire at first retired to the Arabian mainland opposite, where a few * days after the battle he was seen by the Italian traveller Pietro della Valle, probably at Khor Quwai. The English had 29 killed in all, and the Dutch a similar number including their commodore, while the Portuguese lost two captains and about 40 men in the last encounter, besides Botello and others in those that preceded. The general result must have been unfavourable to the Portuguese, for after this they made no more attempts to recover Hormûz.† In 1625 they made a peace with the Persians by which the transfer of Hormûz and Qishm to Shah 'Abbás was confirmed, but a moiety of the customs of Kung, near the modern Lingeh, was assigned to them; it was probably at this time that Básidu also, which they had formerly held, passed out of their possession. In 1625 the Portuguese were as unpopular as ever on the coasts of the Gulf. It was observed by the Italian traveller Pietro della Valle that they could not safely land on the Bátinah coast; and boats sent ashore for water from the Portuguese vessel in which he journeyed were repulsed with musket shots by the inhabitants of Bardistán.

Precarious condition of English trade in Persia, 1624-25.

Soon after the destruction of Hormûz, where, though accounts differ, it would seem that little except the fort now remained, the representatives of the East India Company settled at Bandar 'Abbás. Permission was granted them by the Shâh, in 1623 or 1624, to occupy two houses there; but they were not allowed to erect any building of their own, lest they should turn it into a castle. In 1624, owing to a combination among Persian dealers to raise the price of silk, the Company's business came to a standstill. The Factory at Isfahân was on the point of being closed, when Shah 'Abbás intervened and by means of timely concessions induced the Factors to remain until the pleasure of the Company should be known. At Bandar 'Abbás, likewise, little or no business was done; and in January 1624, the Company in London, though not yet aware of the point that matters had reached on the spot, instructed Kerridge, who was on leave at home and whom they now appointed to the charge of the factory at Sûrat, to act as their agent in "re-settling or dissolving"

* The 8th February (O. S.) would correspond to the 21st February (N. S.).

† The Spanish historian claims the victory for the Portuguese, who, he says, sank 3 of their adversaries' ships and chased the remainder, besides inflicting on the allies a loss of 1,000 men. On the other hand, an English captain, who was present in the fight claimed that 800 Portuguese had been killed.

their Persian trade, after making, if possible, a personal inspection in Persia. Apparently at the beginning of 1625 Kerridge arrived at Bandar 'Abbās, where he was present during the naval engagements with the Portuguese fought in February of that year; and, presumably on his advice, the Company's establishments in Persia were maintained.

Other difficulties of the English in Persia, 1624-25.

In addition to commercial difficulties, the Company's representatives had to contend with dishonesty and unreasonable demands on the part of the local Persian officials. No redress could be obtained in respect of the spoil of Hormūz, the Persian share of which had apparently been reported by the Khān of Shīrāz to his sovereign as amounting to 60,000 Tūmāns or over £180,000, nor in regard to the unfair division of the guns taken; and the Company were obliged to be content with three months' pay for their ships, which had in fact, from first to last, been employed for eight months in the Persian service. The Persians apparently agreed that the English should receive half the customs of Bandar 'Abbās in lieu of those of Hormūz, the trade of which had ceased to exist; but the proceeds received by the Company were disappointingly small, and, whereas the former customs of Hormūz had amounted to $180,000 * a year, the Company's moiety at Bandar 'Abbās seems to have been only 225 Tūmāns (£675) in 1624 and 300 Tūmāns (£900) in 1625.

Persian requisitions for English naval assistance.

Frequent requisitions by the Persians for aid against the Portuguese were, however, the greatest cause of friction. Though not included in the Anglo-Persian agreement of 9th January 1622, some undertaking to the effect that "English shipping should clear the passages of this Gulf and sustain the moiety of the charge" had apparently been given to the Persians,† who took advantage of it to demand the co-operation of the English against the Portuguese at Masqat and in the direction of Basrah; but the request in regard to Masqat was ultimately evaded, and the other was directly refused.‡ The Persians had meanwhile fortified Bandar 'Abbās and improved the defences of Qishm, and at first they held the Hormūz fort also with a garrison of 200 to 300 men; but the latter post, till the final overthrow of the Portuguese fleet by the English and

* Probably not less than £20,000, and possibly a good deal more. One contemporary authority estimated the annual value of the Portuguese customs at Hormūz at £400,000; but this seems an impossible figure.

† See in particular *Calendar of State Papers (East Indies) 1625-29*, page 2.

‡ Fryer—see footnote on page 24 *ante*—seems to connect the failure of the English to obtain a fair share of the Bandar 'Abbās customs with their supposed default in protecting the Gulf; but this theory seems contrary to the evidence.

Dutch in 1625, was constantly attacked and in danger of being lost; and after that event, its occupation being no longer necessary, it seems to have been abandoned. The materials of Hormūz were largely utilised by the Persians to build the town which had begun to spring up at Bandar 'Abbās, but some of them were carried off by the Dutch to Batavia.

Proceedings of the Dutch.

The Dutch, whose position in the East was now becoming strong, took advantage of the fall of Hormūz to establish a trade at Bandar 'Abbās, and, as we have seen, they co-operated with the English in finally defeating the Portuguese; but their intentions were much distrusted by the English Company's servants. One of the reasons given by Kerridge and his council for maintaining the English Factories in Persia was that the Dutch had intruded themselves and "scandalised our intendments unto the Sophy."* It was strongly suspected that the Dutch were intriguing with the Persians to obtain possession of the deserted settlement of Hormūz for themselves, or that they might attempt to seize it by force; and fear of being supplanted by the Dutch made the English very cautious in declining to meet Persian demands for naval assistance. Further, the Dutch declined to pay customs at Bandar 'Abbās and, though dunned by the English Factory, persisted in their refusal.

Increasing power of Shāh 'Abbās.

Meanwhile the power of Shāh 'Abbās I continued to increase, and his frontiers to extend, chiefly at the expense of Turkey. In 1623 the Persian armies overran 'Irāq and took Baghdād, of which the Persians remained in possession until 1638; Kādhimain, Karbala and Najaf with their Shi'ah Shrines, as also Hillah, came under the Shāh; but Basrah seems to have been successfully defended by its Turkish governor with the help of the Portuguese, who in 1625, a Persian army being then in the neighbourhood, kept five ships at Basrah to help the Turks. On the 23rd of March 1625, the Persians suddenly abandoned their attack on Basrah.

The embassy of Sir Dodmore Cotton to Persia, 1626-28.

Proceedings of Sir Robert Sherley and embassy of Naqdi 'Ali Baig to England, 1623-27.

Sir Robert Sherley's mission to Spain having ended in failure notwithstanding a sojourn of five years in Madrid, or the fall of Hormūz having caused him to change his views, he proceeded to England in 1622 or 1623. On the 28th of January 1624, and again on the 13th of April 1625, he had audiences of the King, at which he

* That is the Shāh of the day, from the name of the Safavi dynasty to which he belonged.

appeared habited as a Persian and was received with much ceremony. Meanwhile, however, perhaps at the suggestion of the Company's servants in Persia, Shāh 'Abbās had despatched a Persian gentleman as Ambassador to England; this was a certain Naqdi 'Ali Baig, who left Sūrat in April 1625 but did not reach England until February 1626, some time after the "Star," in which he sailed, had been given up for lost. A singular collision occurred in London between the Shāh's two ambassadors, of whom Naqdi 'Ali Baig apparently enjoyed the countenance of the East India Company. Sir Robert Sherley, having gone with the Earl of Cleveland and others to visit Naqdi 'Ali Baig at his lodgings, was violently assaulted and knocked down by the Persian and his son; and Naqdi 'Ali Baig declared Sherley to be an impostor and his letter of credence a forgery. On the 6th of March 1626 the Persian had an audience of King Charles and presented a letter from the Shāh, in which it was stated that Naqdi 'Ali Baig had been sent "to desire nothing but "His Majesty's love, and that he would command his merchants and all "his people to come freely into his country to buy or sell or do what they "pleased, and none should dare to force any bargain upon them."

Despatch of an English embassy to Persia under Sir D. Cotton.

The English court, though inclined to trust Sir Robert Sherley, were unable to decide between the two disputants, and ultimately the King decided to send Sir Dodmore Cotton as Ambassador to Persia to reciprocate the friendly sentiments of the Shāh, to place the English trade in Persia, which as we have seen was in a depressed state, upon a better footing, and also to ascertain whether Sir Robert Sherley had really been accredited to him by the Shāh. Sherley was to accompany the mission, and the East India Company were requested to arrange for the conveyance of the Ambassador and his party to Persia. This last demand the Company sought to evade, as they wished neither Cotton nor Sherley to be brought into their affairs, but their objections were overruled. Cotton was instructed, however, not to interfere in the Company's mercantile business.

Voyage of the English embassy to India, 1627.

The Company's fleet, carrying the English Ambassador, his staff,—including Sir Thomas Herbert, the chronicler of the mission,—and the rival Persian Ambassadors, sailed from England on Good Friday 1627 and reached Sūrat on the 30th of November in the same year. On the day of sighting the Indian coast, Naqdi 'Ali Baig, on whom the fear of his master's displeasure had begun to weigh,* committed suicide by

* He had turn up a commission which Sherley alleged to be the Shāh's and he had also been guilty of some irregularities in money matters. Shāh 'Abbās subsequently declared that, "if he had not thus prevented it, at his coming to the Court his Body "should first have been hackt in pieces, and then in the open Market-place burnt with "Dogs-turds."

swallowing opium. His body was sent ashore for burial, and eleven guns were fired by the "Mary," the ship on which he died.

Journey of the English embassy in Persia, 1628.

On the 17th of December the Ambassador and his suite left Sūrat for Persia in the "William," accompanied by the "Exchange," "Hart" and other gallant ships; and on the 10th of January 1628 they landed at Bandar 'Abbās under a salute of 100 guns from the fleet, to which the Persian land batteries replied with ten salvoes. From Bandar 'Abbās the embassy proceeded by way of Lār to Shīrāz, then the second city in Persia, where they arrived at the beginning of March and were well entertained for more than three weeks by "the merry duke," Imām Qulī Khān. On the 10th of April a triumphal entry was made into Isfahān, some Hindus being observed among the crowds that turned out to welcome them; an entertainment also was given in their honour on the fourth day by Mr. Burt, the head of the English Factory, "a very accomplished Merchant." On May Day they set forth on their way to the Persian court, which was then at Ashraf in Mazandarān.

Proceedings of the English embassy at Ashraf, May 1628.

The embassy reached Ashraf on the 21st of May and four days later Sir Dodmore Cotton had an audience with the Shāh. He explained that the object of his journey was to congratulate the Shāh on his victories over their common enemy the Turk, to promote trade, to obtain for Sir Robert Sherley an opportunity of vindicating himself from the charges of Naqdī 'Alī Baig, and "to desire that a perpetual "League of friendship might be continued 'twixt the two powerful "Monarchs of Great Britain and Persia." Shāh 'Abbās, rising from his seat to reply, disparaged the power of the Turks but expressed a wish that the dissensions of the princes of Christendom, by which the Turks profited, might cease; in regard to trade, he promised that the King of England should receive 10,000 bales of silk every January at Bandar 'Abbās in exchange for English cloth of equal value; he expressed, in general terms, his satisfaction with Sherley and his disapproval of the conduct of Naqdī 'Alī Baig; and, finally, he cheerfully embraced the proffered league of friendship and made the Ambassador himself heartily welcome, adding "and seeing you have done me that honour none of "my predecessors ever had before, for you are the first Ambassador "that ever came from Great Britain in that quality to my country, you "may deservedly challenge the more respect; yea, as I account your "Master chief of the worshippers of Jesus, so do I of yourself in a "superior degree to any other Ambassador now present." After the audience, in another apartment, the Shāh called for a bowl of wine and drank to King Charles's health, whereupon "the Ambassador stood up and

"uncovered his head, which being noted by the Pādshāh, the more to "oblige he lifted up his turban, and, after an hour's entertainment, "dismissed him with much satisfaction."

Conclusion of the embassy.

After this favourable reception matters began to go ill, in consequence of an enmity borne by Muhammad 'Ali Baig, the Shāh's favourite, to Sir Robert Sherley; and Sir Dodmore Cotton could not obtain another interview with the Shāh. The Persian court soon afterwards moved to Qazvīn, whither the English embassy followed to receive their congé; but at this place Sir Robert Sherley died on the 13th of July, and Sir Dodmore Cotton followed him on the 23rd of the same month. A letter from the Shāh to the King was eventually granted to the survivors of the mission, among whom was Herbert, and with it they returned to England. The explanation of the partial failure of this embassy may perhaps be found in a remark of the Company's Factors at Isfahān, that Sir Dodmore Cotton's "extreme want in things exteriorly befitting so "high a minister caused him much disrespect, of which he was very "sensible, blaming Sir Robert Sherley and his own unadvisedness."

Internal and external affairs of Persia from Sir Dodmore Cotton's embassy to the first war between England and Holland, 1628-53.

Before proceeding to trace further the history of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf, it is necessary to take a brief survey of Persian affairs during that period.

Shāh Safi, 1628-41.

Shah 'Abbās I continued to reign until 1628, towards the close of which year—or possibly at the beginning of 1629—he died and was succeeded by his grandson, Shāh Safi. Among the numberless victims of the cruelty and caprice of the new ruler was Imām Qulī Khān, the erstwhile governor of Shīrāz and captor, with English aid, of Hormūz. In the time of Shāh Safi, Qandahār was appropriated by the Mughal Emperor of India; the relations of the Persian and Indian courts became unfriendly; and in 1639 Mughal subjects were prohibited by the Emperor from trading to Bandar 'Abbās. In 1638 Baghdād was recovered from Persia by the Turks; and the greater part of 'Irāq, containing the Shī'ah holy places, which had been controlled by the Persians since 1623, came once more under Ottoman domination. In 1639 a Treaty defining, in somewhat general terms, the Perso-Turkish frontier was concluded between the two powers; it formed the basis of all later discussions of the subject.

Shāh 'Abbās II, the son and successor of Shāh Safi, ruled from May 1641 until after the close of the period with which we are now concerned. Peace with Turkey was maintained unbroken throughout his reign; but between 1648 and 1650 the Shāh was at war with the Mughal Emperor, from whom he succeeded in once more wresting Qandahār. According to Tavernier the wall of Bandar 'Abbās town was built about 1650.

Shāh 'Abbās II, 1641-66.

Relations of the East India Company with the Persian Government, 1628-53.

On the death of Shāh 'Abbās I, the fact, of which they were not unaware, that commercial and similar concessions in Persia expired with the sovereign by whom they were granted and must be renewed by his successor, was brought home to the East India Company. Renewal* of Shāh 'Abbās's Farmān of 1617 was obtained from Shāh Safi without much difficulty in July or August 1629, but not without an undertaking on the part of the Company's agents that they would take from the Shāh annually 20,000 Tūmāns' worth of silk, paying for one-third of the same in cash; and, to ensure observance of the Farmān after issue, it was further found necessary to disburse about £1,500 a year in presents to the Shāh and his courtiers. The exigencies of the Khān of Shīrāz, though of a different character, were so serious that in 1832 the Company's representatives in Persia pressed for permission from their masters to "occupy," that is apparently to seize and fortify without the consent of the Shāh, a place upon the Persian coast to which they might retire in an emergency; but leave does not seem to have been granted.

Renewal and grant of Farmāns, 1628–53.

Most of the privileges of the Company were renewed by Shāh 'Abbās II not long after his accession; but in 1644 some necessary Farmāns of a subsidiary character were refused on the ground that the English had diminished their purchases of silk,—a fact which could not be denied, and which, as we may remark in passing, was due to the ascendancy at the time of Puritanical influences in England.

The yield of the English shares of the customs at Bandar 'Abbās continued to be disappointingly small. In 1629 heavy loss was occasioned by the proceedings of a Mughal Ambassador from India, who, having

History of the English moiety of the Bandar 'Abbās Customs, 1628–53.

* For the terms in which the Farmān was renweed, see *Letters received by the East India Company*, Vol. VI, page 293

been conveyed in an English vessel to Bandar 'Abbās, insisted on landing two-thirds of the cargo of the English fleet there as presents to the Shāh, and consequently duty-free. In 1630-31 the Company's revenue from the customs was 550 Tūmāns,* in 1632-33 only 242 Tūmāns, and in 1633-34, apparently, 341 Tūmāns. In 1639-40 arrears to the amount of 200 Tūmāns were with difficulty recovered from the Persians, and it was hoped that 500 Tūmāns would be received on account of the current year; in 1640-41 the recoveries amounted to 700 Tūmāns. In 1643-44 the Company obtained 600 Tūmāns and in the next year 616 Tūmāns; in 1647-48 their share was 635 Tūmāns, and in 1650-51 it rose to the unprecedented figure of 750 Tūmāns, or more than £2,250, and was even described as the principal item of profit in the Company's dealings with Persia.

In some years the smallness of the amounts received was due partly to bad trade; but the frauds and negligence of the Persians, and even of the Company's own servants, and refusal of payment by the Dutch were factors of greater importance. About 1630 Captain Weddell, being accused of a serious fault in some other connection, pled that he had saved the Company £2,000 at Bandar 'Abbās by setting a guard to watch the customs, and about 1633 the position was somewhat improved by the energy and integrity of a Factor named Loftus; but in 1637-38, on the other hand, when the return was poor, it was reported that there had been collusion between the captains of the Company's ships, the Factors on shore, and the Persian officials. In 1640 some zealous employés of the Company went so far as to recommend that force should be used to oblige the Persians to deal honestly in the matter.

At various times it was estimated that the English share, if it could be recovered in full, would amout to 5,000 or 6,000 Tūmāns, that is to considerably over £15,000 a year; and according to Mandelslo, one of the embassy from the Duke of Holstein to the Shāh, who passed through Bandar 'Abbās in 1638, the English were then only receiving about one-tenth of their just dues. In 1653, the privilege of free trade at Bandar 'Abbās having some years before been extended by the Shāh to the Dutch, the Company's servants urged that this exemption should only be held to affect the Persian and not the English moiety of the customs; but it does not appear in what manner this question was settled.

* The Persian Tūmān was at this time worth more than £3 English; in 1677 it was £3-6-8.

Decline of Portuguese power in the Gulf, 1628-53.

The Portuguese, though fallen from their high estate in the East, continued for a time to be a military danger to the English.

Captain Swanley's cruise, 1628-29.

Captain Swanley, who in 1628-29 went as Commodore of a fleet of five of the Company's ships to the Persian Gulf, to advance English trade and to land a Mughal Ambassador to Persia at Bandar 'Abbās, was commissioned to attack in the course of his voyage any Portuguese vessel or fleet which he might discover; but it is not known whether he found any opportunity of taking action on this part of his instructions.

Renewed activity of the Portuguese, 1630-31.

In 1630 the Viceroy of Goa, having received reinforcements from Europe, attempted to prevent an English fleet from approaching Sūrat; but the result of the actions which ensued, by sea and on land, was unfavourable to the Portuguese; and the Viceroy then transferred his attention to the Persian Gulf. A Portuguese envoy, with instructions from the King of Spain authorising him to resort to bribery, was at this time sent, or had already proceeded, to Shīrāz, where he succeeded in gaining the ear of the Persian Governor of Fārs; and, through the latter, a request for the rendition of Hormūz to the Portuguese was preferred to the Shāh and certain privileges for Portuguese trade at Kung were either secured for the first time or confirmed. At one moment it was feared that Portuguese influence in Persia was about to eclipse that of the English; but the agents of the East India Company were still able to obtain from the Shāh an order for 200 Persian troops to proceed to Bandar 'Abbās to defend the English Factory and shipping there against Portuguese attack; and ultimately, in 1631, the Portuguese were disappointed by the Persians and fell back on designs of seizing Hormūz by force. These, however, they were unable to put into execution, though to facilitate operations they established a post* at or near Rās-al-Khaimah on the Arabian Coast.

Hostility between the Persians and the Portuguese, 1632-38.

In 1632 and 1633 the Persians were anxious to take the offensive against the Portuguese at Masqat, and the Governor of Shīrāz extorted a promise of naval assistance from the English, who feared that, if they did not comply, the Khān might have recourse to the Dutch; the projected expedition, however, never took shape. In 1634 the Portuguese repaired the fortifications of Masqat. In 1638, when Mandelslo visited Bandar 'Abbās, the Portuguese language was still spoken, more or less, by all the native inhabitants; but Portuguese and Spaniards

* *Viz.*, at "Julfar."—See footnote on page 22 *ante*.

were prohibited from entering the town, and the former frequently revenged themselves by committing petty depredations in the vicinity.

Peace between England and Portugal in the East, from 1634.

Hostilities between the English and Portuguese in the East were at length brought to an end by a truce, concluded in May or June 1634, between the President at Sūrat and the Viceroy of Goa; explanations between the Crowns of England and Spain followed; and in 1635 instructions were issued to the Company's servants in Persia to remain neutral in the trouble between the Persians and the Portuguese. On the 20th of January 1636 the truce was replaced by a Convention signed at Goa, and amity was re-established.

Recovery by Portugal of her independence in Europe, 1640.

In 1640 Portugal was emancipated from the yoke of Spain and, under a prince of a house of Braganza, became again, after an interval of sixty years, an independent power; but this change had no very marked effect on the position of the nation in the East. The value of Masqat to the Portuguese military governor was estimated at this time at 50,000 ducats a year.

The Portuguese at Basrah, 1623-40.

On the loss of Hormūz the Portuguese had directed their commercial activity and* missionary enthusiasm largely to Basrah, where they established a commercial factory, a religious community, and a seminary of learning; and until 1640 at least, as we shall see later on, they maintained at that place a serious competition with English trade. In 1624 and 1625 they assisted the Turks to defend Basrah and its dependencies against Persian attacks, and in the latter year they kept five large vessels at Basrah for this purpose. The transfer of the Portuguese trade in the Gulf from Persia to Turkey was viewed with jealousy and dislike by the Shāh, and this appears to have been the principal cause of the Persian attempts upon Basrah.

Expulsion of the Portuguese from 'Omān, 1640-50.

The hold of the Portuguese upon 'Omān now began to relax: in 1640 the Imām having been informed by Arabs in the Portuguese Custom house that the fort was weakly manned, a native force attacked Masqat, but without success; and in November 1643 Sohār was lost, 37 Portuguese being taken prisoners and the military guard all killed. In 1648, as more fully related in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, the Arabs besieged Masqat and compelled the Captain-General to agree to terms by which the power and influence of the Portuguese in 'Omān were greatly circumscribed. Besides Sohār, the Portuguese had already lost, or lost about this time, "Caurusar," "Dobar" and Quryāt. At the end of 1649 Masqat was again assailed by an Arab force, and in January 1650 the Portuguese made a complete surrender of their supposed "impregnable fortress" and evacuated the country. In 1649, before this

* See the Appendix on Religions in the Persian Gulf.

final catastrophe, orders were sent out from Europe by the King of Portugal that every effort should be made to keep Masqat and that "Cassapo" (perhaps Khasab) should be strengthened; at Masqat Shaikhs and Moors were not to be allowed to live in the town. If possible, a port should be created at "Bandaly" near "Comoras" (Bander 'Abbās).

Position of the Portuguese in the Gulf after their expulsion from 'Omān. 1650-53

After the fall of Masqat, a Portuguese fleet was sent to the Gulf and apparently prospected for a new settlement on the coasts of Lār (*i.e.*, probably of the modern Bastak and Lingeh districts) and on those of Hasa. The island of Hanjam seems to have been tendered by the Persians, with rights of fortifications; but the Portuguese did not accept the offer, from an impression, apparently, that a site at "Cassapo" (perhaps Khasab) or at some other point upon the Arabian coast would be more advantageous. The Portuguese Factory and privileges at Kung, founded about 1625, were maintained; but, with the cessation of the power of the Portuguese to compel vessels to call there, the prosperity of the place seems gradually to have departed. The Portuguese had thus been dislodged from their last remaining territorial foothold in the Persian Gulf, and the Portuguese flag, as familiar in Gulf waters during nearly a century and a half as that of a local power, had become the ensign of a distant and foreign nation.

Causes of the decline of the Portuguese power.

The fall of the Portuguese was due to several causes, principally perhaps to violence and bad faith in dealing with their Oriental neighbours; but also, largely, to jealousies and dissensions among themselves. They founded no mercantile company, as did their rivals the English and the Dutch, their trade being instead inefficiently administered as a royal monopoly; and, in the end, even the military basis on which their power rested became insecure for want of discipline and of professional foresight. The low level of Portuguese naval discipline in 1624-25 was remarked by the Italian traveller Pietro della Valle, who, notwithstanding his marked sympathy for fellow-Catholics, could not forbear from contrasting what he saw on Portuguese vessels with the conditions that prevailed on board English ships. The verdict of the Portuguese historian himself is given in these words: "The ruin of our affairs "proceeds from the little regard the great ones have for the lesser sort; "and the covetousness of the small ones, which made them forget their "country and their honour..... The Portugueses can recover what is "lost, but know not how to preserve what they gain, which is the "most glorious part, it being the work of fortune to gain, and that of "prudence to preserve."*

* See *The Portugues Asia*, Vol. III, pages 382–3 (Stevens' translation of Manuel de Faria y Sousa).

Growth of the power of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf, 1628-53.

The disappearance of the Portuguese from the field did not, it should be observed, relieve the English in the Persian Gulf from commercial and political rivalry; for, as the power of the Portuguese declined, that of the Dutch increased rapidly and became dangerous.

Methods of the Dutch in Persia, 1628-37.

In Persia the Dutch, resorting to bribery and paying high prices for Persian commodities, strove assiduously to oust the English from the position that they had so painfully won; and in 1633 the Factors of the East India Company did not venture to raise the question of a fresh silk contract with the Shāh, though one was desired, for fear that they should be outbidden by the Dutch. There were also traitors in the English camp. In 1637, on the death of Gibson, the English Agent at Isfahān, it was discovered that he had actually been lending money out of the funds of the East India Company to the Dutch, and so enabling them to buy silk and generally to encroach upon English trade. The speculative methods of the Dutch had, however, some disadvantages; at this time they were in debt to Armenian merchants in Persia to the extent of £100,000, and, as their stocks were deficient and they failed to reduce their liabilities at the end of the season below £65,000, a temporary embargo was placed, at the instance of the Armenians, upon their exportation of silk.

Dutch factory, exemption from customs, and general progress at Bandar 'Abbās, 1638-41.

In 1658, the year in which Mandelslo visited Bandar 'Abbās, the Dutch as well as the English had a Factory there, the whole spice trade was in their hands, and they had obtained an exemption from import duty. In 1639-40 Dutch shipping and stock predominated at Bandar 'Abbās; but the English Factors in Persia, unwilling to give way to their rivals, postponed compliance with orders that they had received to close the Company's establishment at Isfahān. In 1641 the Hollanders, in their efforts to "engross" or monopolise the export trade of Persia, were selling European goods in the country below cost price.

Dutch attack on Qishm and extortion of privileges, 1645.

In 1645 the Dutch, whose object was now to make their influence predominant in Persia by any means whatever, not excluding even military force, sent a large fleet to the Gulf under Commodore Block.* At Bandar 'Abbās a refund of 4,900 Tūmāns was demanded of the

*See Bruce's Annals, Vol. I, page 414. Tavernier (page 94) gives a somewhat different and more elaborate explanation of the Qishm incident, but he was misinformed as to the date.

Persians on account of customs realised from the Dutch Agent,—a circumstance from which it would appear that the Dutch had not been uniformly successful in their efforts to avoid paying duty; and the prospects of a collision between the Dutch and the Persians became so serious that the property of the English East India Company at Bandar 'Abbās was removed for greater safety to Basrah, where it arrived in June 1645. In the autumn of 1645, no settlement with the Persians having been effected, the Dutch attacked Qishm; and, though they failed to take the place and lost a number of men from the heat, the Shāh at once sought an armistice and prepared to yield to their demands for trade upon more favourable terms. Block died at Isfahān, whither he had proceeded by special permission; but before his death he had a satisfactory interview with the Shāh, of which the result appeared in a license granted to the Dutch to export silk, free of duty, from any part of Persia.

Increasing predominance of the Dutch, 1646-53.

The Dutch next extended their mercantile war against the English to 'Irāq and sent a fleet of eight vessels to Basrah,—a step by which the trade of the English Factory recently established at that place was for the time being destroyed. In 1649 the influence of the Dutch in the Gulf was in the ascendant, and there appeared a prospect of their obtaining further privileges from the Persian Government, who now held them in awe, but not in respect. In 1650 the preponderance of the Dutch in the Gulf continued to increase and was intensified by the expulsion of the Portuguese from Masqat; the Dutch fleet which visited Bandar 'Abbās in this year consisted of ten vessels, and the stocks landed were large. About this time, according to Tavernier, the Hollanders disposed of about 1,500,000 lbs. of pepper in Persia * and paid with the same for the whole of their silk. In the following year cargoes of an estimated value of nearly £100,000 were brought ashore at Bandar 'Abbās from eleven Dutch ships, and English trade suffered severely. In 165253 the Dutch sent fifteen vessels and goods worth more than £120,000 to Bandar 'Abbās, thus swamping English commerce; but a demand which they made for equality of treatment with the English was still rejected by the Shāh, on the ground that they had not performed such services to Persia as the English had. A Dutch Commissary, however, had a favourable reception at Isfahān; yet with all the advantages on his side and in spite of heavy pecuniary sacrifices, he was unable to prevent the English from obtaining a considerable quantity of silk on advantageous terms.

* From Tavernier's language it might be thought that he referred to an annual arrangement, but the quantity of pepper seems too large for this.

War between England and Holland in Europe, 1652.

Meanwhile, in 1652, though news of the event had not yet reached the East, war had broken out between the English and the Dutch in Europe.

Competition of Courten's Association with the East India Company, 1635-50.

During some years of the period now under consideration, the English East India Company had to contend not only with foreign competition but also with that of "interlopers," or unchartered traders, belonging to their own nation. In December 1635, in consequence of the peace lately arranged with Spain and Portugal, an association of merchants, to trade to the Portuguese settlements in the East, was formed by Sir William Courten under a royal charter which the East India Company considered to have been unjustly granted in violation of their ancient and exclusive rights; their remonstrances being disregarded, however, they merely instructed their servants not to afford any assistance to the representatives of the rival association. Captain Weddell, formerly of the East India Company's service, was one of the principal organisers of the new corporation. In 1640 Courten's Association competed strenuously in the Persian trade, and they even made efforts to instil doubts into the mind of the Persian Government respecting the light in which the East India Company was regarded by the King of England. In 1645 one of the ships of Courten's Association visited Bandar 'Abbás, and the commander, in consideration of a promise that he would at his return take over the whole of the Shâh's silks at that port, was allowed by the Shâhbandar or chief customs officer to land his whole cargo free of duty. At last, in 1649, this unfortunate rivalry was terminated by an arrangement between Courten's Association, now known as "The Assada Merchants," and the East India Company.

Course of the East India Company's trade, 1628-53.

The Company's trade in Persia, 1629-1632.

It remains to review the course, during this period of severe competition, of the East India Company's trade in the Persian Gulf.

The death of Shâh 'Abbâs I was a serious blow to the Company's trade in Persia, for, on the occurrence of that event, the royal silk mag-

zines were plundered and local rebellions occurred, resulting, in 1631, in the dissemination of Persian silk far and wide over Turkey and Russia; the new Shāh, moreover, was addicted rather to dissipation than to business, and he did not at first maintain stocks of silk for disposal as had been the custom of his grandfather. Much difficulty, too, occurred in transporting the silk, which was collected at Isfahān, to the port of shipment at Bandar 'Abbās; and in 1631-32 no less than six English Factors succumbed to the hardships of the road, while accompanying caravans between those two places. After this a short-lived attempt was made to have the silk brought to Bandar 'Abbās by Persian agency; but the frauds committed by the native transporters were enormous, and it was found necessary to re-weigh and examine every bale at Bandar 'Abbās.

In 1633 a profitable trade was done. The conclusion was now reached that, inasmuch as private merchants in Persia had no credit and were unreliable, the only practicable method of carrying on the silk traffic was by means of a general contract with the Shāh,—an arrangement however not free from drawbacks, for there was a constant danger of the Dutch outbidding the English for the contract. In the same year also some frauds, in regard both to the quality and quantity of the silk supplied, were discovered; but redress was obtained by a representation to the Shāh, to whom the faulty silk was shown. 1633.

In 1634 it was reported that the last contract, which was for nearly £100,000 worth of silk, had been satisfactorily fulfilled by the Shāh's agent; but the Dutch were busily engaged in bribing the Persian officials, and it was feared that in future the Shāh would demur to receiving any portion of the price of his silks in kind and would insist on full payment in cash. 1634.

In 1635 the Company in London instructed their servants in India to procure pepper and fine spices, for the purpose at once of facilitating the trade in Persia and improving that in India. About the same time the commercial position was reconsidered by the Company's representatives in Persia, who were inclined to recommend that the royal contract system for silk should be discontinued and the article bought instead in the open market; but, before orders on their proposals could be given, a fresh contract was arranged by Gibson, the Agent at Isfahān, on the 16th July 1636: under this agreement the Shāh undertook to deliver 1,000 loads of silk to the English within three years at the rate of 42 Tūmāns or about £130 per load, and to accept payment for one-third of the whole amount in ready money and for the remainder in broadcloth, kerseys and tin. 1635.

1636. In 1636 President Fremlen from Sūrat visited Bandar 'Abbās and drew up a new set of "regulations"; these were apparently adopted, but their nature is not explained.

1638. In 1638 a letter from King Charles, requesting that commercial relations might be placed on a better footing, was presented to the Shāh along with portraits of the English royal family; and by these means a new contract for silk was secured, as also a Farmān for the recovery of debts still due to the Company under a former contract. In the same year, at the time of Mandelslo's visit to Bandar 'Abbās, the exports of the English from that port were silk and cotton cloth, raw silk and raw cotton, Persian carpets, rhubarb, saffron, rosewater, etc., while their imports were cloth, tin and steel from England, and indigo and silk and cotton stuffs from India; the stuffs last mentioned were, it would appear, preferred by the Persians, on account of their finer texture and brighter colours, to the manufactures of their own country.

1639. In 1639 Fremlen's "regulations" began to produce their effect, which was apparently satisfactory; and, partly it would appear by means of a threat of withdrawing from Isfahān, an order was obtained from the Shāh for 265 loads of silk and arrears of customs at Bandar 'Abbās; but it was feared that there would be difficulty in arranging a fresh silk contract. It appears to have been really the desire of the Company at this time to close the Isfahān Factory and concentrate their business at Bandar 'Abbās; but the competition of the Dutch and of Courten's Association rendered the abandonment of Isfahān impossible. Shīrāz, on account of its superior climate, was inhabited, so far as possible, by the Factors in Persia in preference to Bandar 'Abbās.

1641. In 1641 trade was depressed by uncertain markets; and outstandings not easily recoverable and presents which the Shāh required in return for every petty Farmān made serious inroads upon the Company's profits. In 1642 Persian merchants dealing with Aleppo began to undersell the Company in European goods, but the trade in Indian commodities continued profitable.

1643-44. The position of affairs about this time cannot however have been satisfactory, for in 1643 the Company were inclined to withdraw from the Persian trade altogether, first selling off their stock and recovering their debts in the country; but the design was opposed by their local representatives. In 1644 the intentions of the Company were still doubtful, but eventually they decided to remain.

1646-47. In 1646 a fall in the price of silk in Persia temporarily re-invigorated that branch of the business, which was in a drooping state; but in 1647

trade generally became more precarious than at any previous time, and the outlook was gloomy.

War between the Shāh and the Mughal Emperor interrupted communication by land between Persia and India in 1648-49, and the Company derived considerable profits from freight on goods passing between the two countries by sea. In 1649, notwithstanding a decrease of the demand for English cloth in Persia and a deficiency of spices for importation into that country, trade was unusually profitable; and the gains of the season were estimated at 4,000 Tūmāns, or more than £12,000. 1648-49.

In 1651, in consequence of Dutch competition, of the unsaleableness of English imports, and of want of funds, not much business was done by the English Factories in Persia; but two caravans of merchandise were despatched from Bandar 'Abbās to Isfahān. The English employés of the Company in Persia were of opinion that the predominance of the Dutch, which was now oppressive, could best be met by resorting to the Dutch method of bringing imposing fleets and large stocks to Bandar 'Abbās; and they recommended that this should be done by their masters, so soon as circumstances should make it possible. 1651-53.

English commercial relations with 'Irāq were first established during the period with which we are now dealing; the details of their institution are given in the chapter on the history of Turkish 'Irāq. After two preliminary visits by employés to Basrah, in 1635 and 1640, the East India Company established a provisional Factory there in or before 1643; and in 1645, as related above, Basrah became temporarily the chief station of the Company in the Gulf. Up to 1645 the English merchants at Basrah enjoyed immunity from Dutch commercial competition, but in that year it became suddenly very acute and for a year or two deprived the English of all their profits. The Company's trade in 'Irāq, 1625-40.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE FIRST WAR BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH TO THE INVASION OF PERSIA BY THE AFGHĀNS, 1653-1722.

Events in Europe, 1653-1722.

To render more intelligible the relations of the English, the Dutch, and others in the Persian Gulf during the period on which we now enter, it is necessary to recall some leading events of contemporaneous European history.

First war between the English and the Dutch, 1652-54.

During a series of years tension had been increasing between England and Holland in consequence of commercial rivalry between the two nations, and especially of aggressions committed by the Dutch in the East against the English East India Company. In 1651 a Navigation Act was passed in England, of which the object was to destroy the Dutch carrying trade; and in 1652 Cromwell proceeded to declare war against Holland. The conflict thus begun for mastery of the seas lasted two years; but no clear superiority was gained by either belligerent in the operations, which were conducted on the one side by Tromp and Ruyter and on the other by Blake and Monk; and the military result, when in 1654 peace was made by the burgher party of Amsterdam, was open to dispute. A joint Anglo-Dutch Commission, however, which met after the war, awarded damages to the amount of £85,000 to the English East India Company; and these were duly paid by the Dutch Company, who were obliged also to afford other reparation.

The effect of this struggle on affairs in the Persian Gulf was neither distinct nor permanent; but we are obliged, by the total absence of important historical landmarks in that region between the fall of Hormūz and the end of the 17th century, to adopt the first Anglo-Dutch war as a fixed point in our narrative.

Foundation of the French East India Company, 1664.

In 1664 an East India Company was formed in France; the authority was a charter granted by Louis XIV on the advice of his finance minister, Colbert.

Second war between the English and the Dutch, 1665-67.

In 1665 the Navigation Act was re-enacted in England and a second war with Holland began. An English success off Lowestoft in 1665 was followed by a doubtful victory for the Dutch in the Channel in 1666; eventually, however, the Hollanders were driven into their ports; and the peace of Breda, in 1667, brought hostilities to an end. The reaction of this contest on Persian Gulf affairs is even less easily discoverable than that of the war of 1652-54; but in India it occasioned a blockade of the English Company's ships at Sūrat by the Dutch.

War between the French and the Dutch, assisted in turn by the English, 1672-78.

Not long after these events the ambition of Louis XIV of France brought him into collision with both Holland and Spain; war against Holland was declared in 1672; and in 1676 the combined Dutch and Spanish fleets were destroyed in the Mediterranean by the French. The King of England (Charles II) at first made common cause with France against Holland, and in 1672 a somewhat indecisive engagement between English and Dutch vessels took place at Solebay; but public opinion in England was hostile to France, compelling a peace with Holland in 1674; and towards the end of the six years' struggle England was ranged, with

other European powers, upon the side of Holland. In 1678 the independence of the Dutch was secured by the peace of Nimeguen or Nimwegen.

War between England, Holland and France, 1688-97.

In the next European contest, which began in 1688, England and Holland combined to oppose the predominance of France in Europe; but, under this new alliance, Dutch interests were altogether subordinated to English policy. In 1690 an Anglo-Dutch fleet was defeated by the French off Beachy Head, but in 1692 a French armament was destroyed off La Hogue; this last event did not, however, prevent the capture in the following year of the "Turkish fleets" of England and Holland,—an occurrence to which we shall have to refer later in connection with trade in the Persian Gulf,—and the East India Company's ship "Berkley Castle" was sunk by the French in the Channel. At length in 1697, France being exhausted and the question of the Spanish succession having begun to absorb the attention of Louis XIV, hostilities were brought to an end by the peace of Ryswick.

War between the English and the French, 1702-13.

In 1702 England joined, on the side of the Grand Alliance against the French, in the great European war that had now arisen through the settlement of the Spanish Succession in accordance with the views of Louis XIV; this war, in which the victories of Marlborough at Blenheim, Ramillies and Malplaquet and the capture of Gibraltar by the British were incidents, continued until 1712 and was terminated by the peace of Utrecht in 1713. No direct consequences of this struggle are traceable, however, in the history of the Persian Gulf.

The Old and New East India Companies, 1653-1722.

A slight résumé of the history of the East India Company during this period will be useful, and is even required, to explain the course of English trade in the Persian Gulf.

The Merchant Adventurers, 1654-57.

Considerable anxiety was caused to the East India Company, in the years immediately following the Dutch war, by the proceedings of a body of persons known as the Merchant Adventurers; these were apparently holders of shares in a United Joint Stock, formed in common by the East India Company and the Assada Merchants on the occasion of the agreement between them in 1649. The claim of the Merchant Adventurers was that they as individuals, like the members of the "free" Turkey and Russia Companies, should be at liberty to trade separately, on private capital, within the territorial sphere of their privileges; but the suggested arrangement was of course opposed by the East India

Company, whose own operations were conducted wholly on joint-stock principles and who feared private competition. Both sides had recourse to the Government of the day, and the issue remained long in doubt. Cromwell in 1655 borrowed £50,000 from the East India Company, but simultaneously he permitted the Merchant Adventurers to equip and despatch a small separate fleet; and during 1656 the matter remained under discussion. At length, early in 1657, the Protector, on the advice of a Council of State, decided that private enterprise by individual holders in the United Joint Stock must be discontinued. The result was the accession of a majority of the Merchant Adventurers to the East India Company upon the usual joint-stock terms of membership.

Establishments and policy of the East India Company, 1658-98.

The character of the East India Company was at this time still in the main commercial; but the Company had now began to assume, partly driven by events and partly guided by experience, that political status and position which were in the end to overshadow their mercantile origin.

1661-87.

In 1661, in part payment of the dowry of the Infanta of Portugal on her marriage to King Charles II of England and in consideration of an undertaking by England to guarantee the safety of the Portuguese possessions in the East Indies, the island and harbour of Bombay were transferred in full sovereignty from the Portuguese to the English Crown; and in 1662 the Earl of Marlborough was sent from England with a fleet to take possession; but he was disappointed in the object of his mission by the evasions of the local Portuguese authorities. At the same time Sir George Oxinden was despatched to India as President and Chief Director of the affairs of the East India Company in Asia; and the question of how to combine or co-ordinate the rights of the King and the interests of the Company in the East began to be discussed. In 1665 or 1666 it was proposed by the Company's servants at Sūrat that application should be made for the King's permission to establish a Factory at Bombay, of which possession had now been resigned by the Portuguese; but the action eventually taken went far beyond this suggestion, for in 1668 Bombay Island was made over by the Crown to the Company on an annual rent of £10 a year in gold, and the Company were invested with authority to maintain troops and establish a civil administration there. In 1685, under the royal patent, Sir John Child was appointed by the Company to be Captain-General and Admiral of their forces in the East; and already, in 1684, it had been decided to remove the headquarters of the Company in India from Sūrat to Bombay, but this measure was not carried into effect until the spring of 1687.

In 1689 or 1690 the Court of the Company in London, in sending instructions to the Presidency of Bombay, foreshadowed the shifting of their policy in India to its ultimate basis of territorial sovereignty, and made use of these memorable words: "The "increase of our revenue is the subject of our care, as much as our "trade: 'tis that must maintain our force when twenty accidents may "interrupt our trade; 'tis that must make us a nation in India; "without that, we are but as a great number of Interlopers, united by "His Majesty's Royal Charter, fit only to trade where no body of power "thinks it their interest to prevent us." 1689-90.

As early at least as 1681, the exclusive rights of the East India Company had excited the jealousy of other would-be traders to the East, and the appearance of interlopers, or private merchants who disregarded and violated the Company's monopoly, had been remarked. An opinion soon after this became current that the Company's privileges were invalid, inasmuch as they rested on a royal grant which had not been confirmed by Parliament, and in 1693 the House of Commons passed a resolution affirming the right of all Englishmen to trade to the East Indies and elsewhere unless prohibited by Act of Parliament; the immediate result of this pronouncement was an increase in the interloping trade, which the company by legal and other means endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to combat. In 1698 a body of private merchants, by tendering a loan of £2,000,000 for public purposes, secured an Act of Parliament under which they were incorporated as the "The General Society trading to the East Indies" and by which the rights of the Old Company—after this generally described as "The London Company"—were abolished, the abolition to take effect from the 29th of September 1701. On the 3rd of September 1698 the General Society received their charter as a corporation, and it was understood that the individual members would trade separately under the charter to the amount of the capital possessed by each; * but two days later, by a second charter, a group comprising the great bulk of the subscribers to the General Society was incorporated under the name of "The English "Company trading to the East Indies," and a second organised Company was thus brought into the field as a rival to the London Company. The London Company, after taking up stock in the English Company to the amount of £315,000 as a precaution for the future, prepared to compete with them to the uttermost, and a bitter struggle began; the London Company

Formation of a New East India Company, known as the "English Company", in opposition to the Old East India or "London" Company, 1698.

* In this respect, had no change been made, the New Company would have differed from the Old, which was, as already mentioned in the text, a joint-stock company.

enjoyed the advantage of experience and an established position in the East; but a number of their dismissed servants had found employment under the English Company. As favourites of the legislature, and apparently of the Court, the English Company were enabled to assume a more public and national character than had ever been borne by their older rivals; they procured the deputation, chiefly in their own interests, of Sir William Norris as an Ambassador from the King of England to the Mughal Emperor; and their Presidents in the East were invested with consular rank and powers.

Struggle between the New and the Old Companies in the East.

On the arrival of the English Company's representatives in India a lamentable conflict began there, which might have resulted, had the power of the Portuguese or the Dutch been still considerable, or that of the Mughals greater, in the loss by the English of their position in India. It was claimed by the agents of the English Company that the London Company's servants had no longer the right to deal directly with the native powers or to issue passes to native vessels, and they even disputed the right of the older Company's vessels to fly the union flag; but to these pretensions the London Company's employés would not at first submit, and they declined to recognise that the English Company's officers, in their consular capacity, had any authority over themselves. The contest was altogether unintelligible to the Mughal authorities, who did not fail, however, to turn it to their own advantage, and inflicted heavy injuries upon both sides. One deplorable incident of the struggle was the instigation of the Mughals by Sir N. Waite, a servant of the English Company, to detain Sir John Gayer, the London Company's Governor of Bombay, whom they had "confined and barbarously used" at the beginning of 1701, and who did not apparently regain his freedom until 1705 or later.

Steps towards amalgamation of the New and Old Companies, 1699-1707.

Before long it began to be realised in England that continuance of the struggle would probably result in the bankruptcy of both companies, and early in 1699 overtures for a union were opened by the English Company, whose financial position, notwithstanding their official advantages, was apparently the weaker; but these advances were at first repelled by the London Company, who in 1700 obtained an Act prolonging their existence as a corporation beyond 1701. The King of England having signified his desire that amalgamation should be promoted, and the state of affairs on the Continent of Europe being unsettled, negotiations were commenced, and resulted on the 27th of April 1702 in an agreement between the companies, to give effect to which a charter of union was granted on the 22nd of July following. The consequence was

a provisional union upon equal terms: the interest of the English and London Companies in the joint concern created was fixed at £988,500 each;* the common trade for seven years was to be directed by a Court of twenty-four managers, half nominated by the one Company and half by the other; during seven years the Companies were to maintain separate establishments and accounts and to dispose of their existing separate stocks; and, at the expiration of that period, final and complete amalgamation was to take place. A valuation held at this time showed the dead stock of the London Company to be worth £330,000 and that of the English Company £70,000. The arrangements prescribed were duly carried out, though not without some further regrettable friction between the representatives of the two corporations in the East. The proceedings were accelerated by the appearance in 1707 of more private merchants, who began to protest against the monopoly granted to the Companies, and by a demand made on the Companies by Government for a loan of £1,200,000.

Union of the New and Old Companies, 1708.

Amalgamation was ultimately effected by an award of the Earl of Godolphin, dated the 29th of September 1708; and the Company formed by the fusion received the name of "The United Company of the Merchants of England trading to the East Indies." As it was decided that it should operate under the charter of the English (or New) Company, the United Company should perhaps be regarded technically as deriving its existence from that body rather than from the London (or Old) Company. By the beginning of 1708 the separate affairs and accounts of the Old Company in Persia had been wound up and closed.

Special charter obligations and English legislative enactment, 1693-1702.

It remains to notice certain charter obligations and English legislative enactments by which English trade in the East was influenced during this period. In 1693, when the East India Company received a new charter, they were required to export, in their fleet of the following season, not less than £150,000 worth of English produce and manufactures; and this condition, as we shall see later on, gave an impulse to their trade in cloth in Persia. Again, when the New or English Company was constituted in 1698, one of the conditions imposed on them was that one-tenth of the goods which they exported should be of English origin; and this provision was afterwards made applicable to the United Company which came into existence by the amalgamation of the Old and New East India Companies in 1708. The nature of English trade in the East was also affected by an Act, passed in 1699 or 1700, which

* The balance of £23,000 in the total capital of £3,000,000 belonged to the "separate traders," a residuum of the General Society.

imposed an additional duty of 15 per cent. on "wrought silk, Bengalls, "and stuffs mixed with silk or herba or the manufacture of Persia, China "or the East Indies, and all calicoes painted, dyed, printed or stained "there, that were not made up or used before Michaelmas 1701;" the effect of this measure was to increase the Company's investments in raw materials, and to decrease those in finished tissues, from the East.

Affairs in India, 1653-1722.

Disturbances caused by the Marhatas, 1664-1706.

The Mughal Aurangzib, who ruled from 1658 to 1707, was Emperor of India during the greater part of the period with which we have now to deal; but his authority was disputed in parts of the country; and his wars, in particular those with the Marhatas, caused great insecurity in the neighbourhood of the English settlements upon the western coast. Thus it happened that in 1664 the Marhatas, led by Sivāji in person, attacked Sūrat; but the town was saved from destruction by the East India Company's servants, who fortified and defended the English Factory, so earning the gratitude of the Mughals. In 1706 the Marhatas again invested Sūrat, and again failed to take it.

Friction between the English and the Mughals, due to interference with the Company's trade, 1664-90.

Friction from time to time arose, in both local and general matters, between the East India Company's servants and the officials of the Mughal Empire. At one time, between 1686 and 1690, a state of open war prevailed; it may be attributed in part to the non-observance or withdrawal by the Mughals of privileges regularly granted to the English, whose claims for compensation on account of injuries now aggregated more than 6¼ lakhs, and in part to a design on the part of the Company to place themselves beyond reach of ill-treatment for the future by establishing fortified stations with dependent districts. In 1687 the English, to enforce their claims, began to capture the ships of Mughal subjects at sea; the Mughals replied by seizing the Company's Factory and employés at Sūrat; and Sir John Child, the Governor of Bombay, again retaliated by fresh seizures of vessels under the Mughal flag. The war continued until early in 1690, when the Company's servants taken at Sūrat were at length released, and a Mughal force sent by sea from Sūrat, which had occupied a part of Bombay Island and shut the English up in the town, was withdrawn; but the Farmān of 27th February 1690, by which this adjustment

was made, was couched in the most insulting terms and required restitution and payment of compensation by the Company. Subsequently, however, a grant of liberty to trade in the Mughal dominions, described in the language of the day as a Hasb-al-Hukm, was obtained from the Emperor, by whom also some compensation was promised for the injuries suffered by the Company; and, though the English had failed in their project of establishing territorial bases, it was considered that they had succeeded in rehabilitating to some extent their national reputation.

Friction between the English and the Mughals, due to the proceedings of European and other pirates, 1691-1705.

No sooner, however, had this settlement taken place, than the relations of the Company—and indeed of the English nation—with the Mughals began to be disturbed by the depredations of European and Arab pirates, for which the Emperor proposed to hold all the English, Dutch and French in India jointly accountable; and, in the years following, the position of the English in India was further compromised by the wars with France, in 1688-97 * and 1702-12, and by the internecine struggle, from 1699 to 1702, between their own Old and New Companies. The first case of piracy seems to have occurred in 1691; it was attributed to an English ship, and an embargo was placed on all European shipping at Sūrat; one of the pirates, however, was subsequently captured and proved to be a Dane. In or about 1695 two fresh piracies were committed on Mughal vessels by a ship under English colours; this led to the confinement of the English at Sūrat and to an embargo being placed on the trade of the English, the French and the Dutch, with the design of compelling the European powers to combine for the suppression of piracy by their fellow-countrymen. Soon afterwards another piracy occurred, on this occasion in the Persian Gulf, with the result that the English Factors at Sūrat, except those of the highest rank, were put in irons by the native authorities and remained in custody for a considerable time. In 1696 European piracy was rife in Indian seas; even ships from America, fitted out at New York, were now engaged in it. In 1698 an agreement was reached by the principal European nations in India, whereby the police of "Southern" Indian waters devolved on the English, the Dutch were made responsible for the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf was assigned to the French, whose East India Company, founded in 1664, had maintained a Factory at Bandar 'Abbās at least since 1677; this arrangement, however, seems to have been still-born. In 1699 Sir John Gayer

* In 1692 one of the Company's ships was captured by the French within 50 leagues of Bombay.

was authorised to arrange convoys for Mughal vessels with pilgrims proceeding to the Red Sea, and the Old Company's ships were regularly commissioned to make prizes of pirates; but as yet nothing had been effected against the latter, and the English, from this circumstance, had become at Sûrat "as despicable as the Portuguese in India and "as odious as the Jews in Spain." The trade of the English, Dutch and French at Sûrat was now again stopped by the Mughal Government; and the Dutch, in despair, temporarily removed their shipping to Batavia. In 1700 Captain Gillam and 9 other pirates, who had been taken, were executed in England; but the conflict between the English Old and New East India Companies paralysed both for action against buccaneers. In 1702, on a request from the Old and New Companies at their union, a small naval expedition was sent by the English Government to deal with piracy in the East, but its achievements were inconsiderable; and in 1703 or 1704 a fresh piracy caused the Mughals to seize and confine once more the English Agents at Sûrat, whose native brokers were at the same time maltreated and compelled to sign bonds for six lakhs of rupees to be paid as compensation to the sufferers. The wars with the French in Europe now stood in the way of decided action against the pirates, among whom the Masqat Arabs, encouraged doubtless by the license of European adventurers, had been conspicuous ever since 1695. Abetment of piracy was among the charges bandied by the Old and New English East India Companies against each other; and, while on one occasion two of the Old Company's ships did actually mutiny and become pirates, it is probable that on the other hand some of the Interlopers who in the beginning supported the New Company were themselves engaged in nefarious practices.

It is clear that circumstances such as these cannot but have affected adversely the growth of English trade in the Persian Gulf; and in fact, in 1689, it was expressly reported from Bandar 'Abbâs that commerce had received a severe check through the appearance of an English corsair in Gulf waters. The crew of the vessel just mentioned plundered the Portuguese Factory at Kung, and the Company's ship "Caesar" was sent in pursuit of her, but without result.

Embassy of Sir W. Norris to the Mughal Court, 1699-1702.

The appointment of Sir William Norris, at the instance of the New Company, as Ambassador from the King of England to the Mughal Emperor has already been mentioned; his instructions appear to have been general and his powers discretionary, but the object of his mission was undoubtedly to place the New Company's trade in India on a sound basis, by obtaining suitable Farmans from the Emperor and, it may have

been hoped, by securing recognition of the consular character of the Presidents of the New Company. Sir William Norris arrived in India in 1699, but did not reach Sūrat—where his conduct was characterised by great severity towards the representatives of the Old Company—until the end of 1700; nor did he start on his journey to the Mughal camp until January 1701. His negotiations with the Emperor were unsuccessful. It appears that the requisite Farmāns were withheld chiefly because the English Ambassador refused to agree to a condition on which the Mughals insisted, namely, that the English should guarantee the safety of ships in the "Southern" Indian seas; and in this respect it is impossible to do otherwise than commend his wisdom, inasmuch as any such undertaking on his part might have involved the New Company in incalculable losses, besides which it would have been tantamount to official recognition of the system under which the Mughals were at this time accustomed to extort compensation for every piracy from the Old Company.

Events in Turkey, 1653-1722.

We now return to the countries adjoining the Persian Gulf.

Successive Sultāns.

The sovereigns of Turkey during the period under consideration were Muhammad IV (1648-87), Sulaimān II (1687-91), Ahmad II (1691-95), Mustafa II (1695-1703) and Ahmad III (1703-30); but Persian Gulf affairs occupy no place of importance in the history of their reigns.

Events in Persia, 1653-1722.

Shāh Sulaimān, 1666-94.

In Persia, on the demise of 'Abbās II in 1666, his eldest son Sulaimān succeeded to the throne and ruled thereafter until his own death in 1694; his court was splendid, but his character was depraved and his reign altogether uneventful. In 1657 there was war between the Shāh and the Mughal Emperor of India. In 1684 there were simultaneously present at his court an Embassy, headed by M. Luis Fabritius, from Charles XII of Sweden and accredited representatives of various degrees from the sovereigns of France, Germany, Russia, Poland, and the Pope. The Swedish Embassy, which was sent partly for commercial purposes and partly to set Persia against Turkey, remained at Isfahān till the end of 1685.

Shāh Husain, 1694-1722.

With Husain, the son and successor of Sulaimān, the Safavi dynasty of Persia virtually ended, and the country then entered on a new era of its history; the explanation of this revolution is to be found in the decrepitude of the Safavi government and in the growing strength and aggressiveness of the Afghāns of the Qandahār district. In 1709, under a leader named Mīr Wais, the Ghilzais possessed themselves of Qandahār, and the best troops at the disposal of the Persian monarch proved unequal to the task of its recovery. In 1720 the Afghāns under Mahmūd, a son of Mīr Wais, assumed the offensive and, having entered Persia, attacked Kirmān; but Lutf 'Alī Khān, a Persian commander who had been sent into the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās to recover some islands from the Arabs of Masqat, marching northwards, was able to reoccupy Kirmān and temporarily to expel the Afghāns from the country. The respite gained was, however, short. Towards the end of 1721 Mahmūd again left Qandahār to invade Persia; on his march he assaulted, but did not succeed in capturing, Kirmān and Yazd; after defeating the principal Persian army in the neighbourhood, he undertook a long and perilous siege of the Shāh in Isfahān; and in October 1722 his arduous and persevering efforts were rewarded by the abdication of Shāh Husain in his favour and the submission of the capital.* Persia thus passed, for a time, under Afghān rule.

Political relations of the East India Company with Persia, 1653-1722.

Indirect effects of the Dutch war in Persia, 1653-54.

During the Anglo-Dutch war a naval success gained by the Dutch in the Persian Gulf, which will be described later, at first lowered the prestige of the English in Persia; but subsequently it was rehabilitated by the news of a British victory off Portland.

Relations with Persia disturbed by the Merchant Adventurers, 1656-57.

On the conclusion of the Dutch war, the position of the East India Company in Persia was unsettled by the proceedings of the Merchant Adventurers, whose history we have traced above, for rumours disseminated by the commanders of their ships in the East, that the East India Company was about to be dissolved, led the Persian Government to claim

* According to Hamilton (*New Account, I, 110-2*) the English at Isfahān helped to defend the place and were made prisoners by the Afghāns, who also plundered the English and Dutch Factories; his version, however, contains serious inaccuracies and cannot be regarded as reliable.

that the Farmān of Shāh 'Abbās I in favour of the Company had lapsed and to suspend, in a measure, all concessions of later date. Trade, whether export or import, thus became for a time impossible; but the Factors continued to occupy the Company's premises at Bandar 'Abbās in order to maintain the right to the same and to the half share in the Bandar 'Abbās customs. By the absorption of the Adventurers in the Company in 1657 these difficulties were removed.

The East India Company's difficulties with the Persian Government and reduction of their establishment in Persia, 1657-64

The disappearance of the Merchant Adventurers and the continuance of the East India Company on its original footing deprived the Shāh's Government of all excuse for interfering further with English trade in Persia; but the attitude of the Persians continued to be unfavourable, especially in the matter of the Bandar 'Abbās customs; and, so unsatisfactory did the position become, that the Company were led to contemplate the adoption of forcible measures for obtaining redress. In 1659 it was proposed by the Presidency at Sūrat to establish, partly with this object, a station and garrison at Masqat; and negotiations with the local Arab authorities were undertaken, but without success. In 1660 the Court of the Company in England recommended a blockade of Bandar 'Abbās or of the Persian coast; but the Sūrat Council found themselves unable to act upon these instructions as at least eight ships were required, whereas only two were available of which the crews had become ineffective, while fixed bases, such as were essential for obtaining water and supplies, would have to be secured. In 1663 the Court at home advised that either two or three honest and able servants should be left at Bandar 'Abbās to trade and to recover the half share of the customs on a commission to themselves of 5 per cent., the remainder of the staff being withdrawn; or that the whole establishment should be removed, and a Factor sent instead from Sūrat once in the year to claim the moiety of the customs. Meanwhile, at Bandar 'Abbās, the demeanour of the Persians, incited by the Dutch, grew extremely insolent; under the orders of the Shāhbandar the native broker of the English Factory was so grievously beaten, and that in the presence of Mr. Craddock, that he was "carried away doubtful of life," some hundreds of Tūmāns being afterwards extorted from him; and in many ways the powerlessness of the English was made painfully apparent. The Presidency of Sūrat considered that it would be useless, as well as very expensive, to send a representative to complain at Isfahān; but they still held that a blockade was inadvisable, inasmuch as, Persia being a land power and having no maritime interests, the blockade might have to be maintained for two or three years in order to produce the desired effect. Moreover, the

blockade, unless it were undertaken with a great force would probably be disregarded by the Dutch; and there was also a possibility of umbrage being given to the Mughal Emperor, the trade of whose subjects with Persia by sea would be interrupted. Eventually, in 1664, the Sūrat Council resolved to leave two English employés at Bandar 'Abbās and not to attempt any negotiations at Isfahān: this decision they referred to their masters at home for approval.

Rolt's mission, its failure and continued annoyances, 1669-72.

In 1669 it was stated that the Company's trade in Persia had been, during several years, to a great extent relinquished; and that only an Agent had been maintained at Bandar 'Abbās to claim periodically the English moiety of the customs. In this year the Company's Court at home sent a Mr. William Rolt to Persia, as their own special nominee, to take charge of their affairs in that country but to act at the same time in subordination to the Council at Sūrat; and the latter body were desired to report the number and kind of armed vessels required to protect trade in the Gulf and to enforce payment of the English share of the Bandar 'Abbās customs. By Rolt's "continued wearysome and chargeable attendance on the Persian Court" the situation, up to the end of 1671, had not been at all improved: trade for various reasons continued precarious; the Persian Customs officer at Bander 'Abbās was very frequently changed; the enjoyment of even those privileges which had undeniably been granted to the English was uncertain; an arbitrary interference in the affairs of the Company was exercised by the Shāh's Vazir; and applications for redress at Isfahān were as expensive as their results were transient. Rolt himself, in the end, expressed an opinion that there was no prospect of the rights and privileges of the English being vindicated or maintained otherwise than by open force; and the Persians, on their part, began to talk of superseding Bandar 'Abbās by creating a new port at Rig or elsewhere. The Governor of Shīrāz had nevertheless the effrontery to demand the use of the Company's ship "Advance" to transport a Persian military expedition by sea, but his request was refused. Early in 1672 instructions were given for warning the Shāh, his chief minister the I'timād-ud-Daulch, and the Shāhbandar at Bandar 'Abbās of the serious consequences that might ensue from persistent molestation of the English; and the Sūrat Presidency apparently continued to discuss the possibility of retaliatory measures.

Fresh hopes and disappointments of the Company in

In 1674, hostility between the English and the Dutch in Europe having for the second time ceased, a more hopeful spirit began to pervade the management of English affairs in Persia; a letter from King Charles II was transmitted to Shāh Sulaimān; a collection of the Farmāns in

favour of the Company was made by the Agent in Persia and, after being translated into English, was forwarded to the Company at home; and efforts were made to obtain from the Shāh a fresh Farmān confirming those of earlier date. In 1675 it was decided that, pending further measures, the Company's merchant ships sent to the Gulf should be armed, "to give the appearance of force and commerce;" and, in 1676, effect was given to this resolution by the despatch of two armed vessels to the Gulf, freighted with broadcloth and tin, but also intended to protect trade and to recover what was due on account of customs at Bandar 'Abbās. To the Shāh it was apparently explained, on this occasion, that the English moiety of the customs at Bandar 'Abbās was claimed on account of past services at Hormūz and that separate payment must be made by him of half the charges of the vessels now sent to establish security at sea, and it seems to have been added that the refusal of either demand would be treated as a declaration of hostilities; but the outcome of these proceedings is not recorded. Meanwhile it had been represented by the Sūrat Presidency to their masters in England that, if war were declared, it should be in the name of the King and not of the Company; they pointed out that nothing beyond a naval blockade could be attempted; and they expressed a fear that a rupture between England and Persia might be utilised by the Portuguese or the Dutch to obtain a monopoly of trade at Bandar 'Abbās. With reference to a discussion which had now been carried on for several years without any conclusion being reached, the Presidency declared their own preference for peaceable negotiations over hostilities, in seeking an arrangement with Persia. In 1677 the Company's Court, probably on this advice, relinquished the idea of forcible action; but trade continued to languish; and in 1680 the question of abandoning the Bandar 'Abbās Factory was considered. In 1681 hopes of improvement were raised by the success of Mr. Pettit, the Agent of the Company in Persia, in obtaining some satisfaction in regard to the Bandar 'Abbās customs, but in 1682 they were shown to be illusive. The debts due to the Company in Persia now amounted to £1,000,000.

Persia, 1674-82.

It was at length decided in 1682 to adopt a more spirited policy, and a letter of remonstrance was written by the Company's Court in England to the Shāh, the effect of which, it was intended, should be seconded by a naval demonstration off the Persian coast; but execution of this last measure was apparently deferred by events in other quarters. In 1683 the Company fitted out the "Charles the Second," a powerful ship of 60 or 70 guns; and her commander, Sir Thomas Grantham, was authorised to procure, by two successive seizures of Persian shipping, payment in

Abortive expedition of Sir T. Grantham to Bandar Abbās, 1683-84.

the first place of the arrears of customs * and, thereafter, the establishment of trade on a reasonable footing. On arrival off Bandar 'Abbás however, apparently in 1684, Grantham found a strong Dutch fleet blockading the town, which was likewise defended by a strong Persian land force; and, being unable in these circumstances to carry out his instructions with advantage, he returned to Bombay.

1684-94. Meanwhile the tone of the Persian Government, who had recently suffered from the hostility of the Portugese, became more friendly; and, even before Grantham's arrival in the Gulf, advances had been made to the English by the I'timád-ud-Dauleh, the Persian prime minister. The nature of these overtures may be inferred from the reply, which was that, on condition of the English share of the customs being regularly paid and of Persian goods being shipped exclusively in English bottoms, the Company would undertake to send first-rate vessels and sufficient stocks and to maintain the trade with Persia in a flourishing condition. In these more favourable circumstances it was ordered by the Court, in 1684, that two members of the Bandar 'Abbás Factory should always reside at Isfahán to watch over the interests of the Company at that place, and that an effort should be made to secure a preference over their Dutch competitors in the exportation of Kirmán wool; and in 1686 further instructions were given to the local agents to request special encouragement from the Sháh for English shipping, and to suggest the grant of a contract to the Company for all the silk and Kirmán wool formerly taken by the Dutch. In the latter year also, an order for the protection of English trade and a confirmation of the privileges enjoyed by the English at Bandar 'Abbás were obtained, notwithstanding Dutch intrigues, by the Company's Armenian "linguist" or interpreter at Isfahán.

Negotiations for renewal of grants to the Company, 1694-97.

Nothing more of importance happened during the reign of Sháh Sulaimán. On the death of Sulaimán, in June 1694, it became necessary to obtain confirmation of the rights and privileges of the Company in Persia by his successor Sháh Husain; and, while steps were being taken towards this end, the Agent found himself obliged to make a payment to the Governor of Kirmán, who had ordered the export of wool from his province to be reduced to 700 maunds a year. A gratuity to the Shahbandar at Bandar 'Abbás also was found to be indispensable. By acceding to the requests of the Persian Government for assistance in capturing Masqat, where they promised that the English should receive the same

* The Company, it would seem, now calculated the aggregate of the sums of which they had been defrauded in connection with the customs, at 150,000 Tūmāns; but they naturally did not expect to recover the whole of this.

privileges as at Bandar 'Abbās, the course of negotiations for the renewal of grants might, in 1696, have been accelerated; but the Company prudently abstained from committing themselves to hostile action against the Arabs of 'Omān, whose pirates had up to this time respected British shipping.

Farmān of the 18th June 1697.

At length, after many delays, a satisfactory Farmān,* dated 18th June 1697, was signed by the Persian monarch; its general provisions were similar to those of the Farmān of Shāh 'Abbās I of 1617 and need not therefore be summarised here,† but in it was added a condition that the import and export duties payable by the Company in Persia should be the same as those levied by the Turks at Aleppo and Constantinople.

Raqams renewed or granted in 1697.

The Raqams ‡ or subsidiary grants by which the Farmān was accompanied were 20 § in number; of these 18, already existing, were now only confirmed, while the remaining two were granted for the first time. Under the old Raqams the Company enjoyed the following rights:—(1) to possess a house at Isfahān; (2) to recover goods taken from them on the road; (3) to be exempt from Rāhdāri or road dues throughout Persia; (4) to receive civil usage; (5) to export twelve horses annually; (6) to export (? in each year) 2,000 maunds of merchandise duty free; (7) to convey their goods in safety to their house at Isfahān; (8) to bring water to their house; (9) to have guards for their caravans; (10) to make, drink and export wine; (11) to employ assistants for making wine; (12) to buy what Kirmān wool they might require; (13) "to have the power of judging of the offences of their own people;" (14) to sell goods for ready money to the Governor of Bandar 'Abbās, who, however, was forbidden to compel such sales; (15) to re-occupy a house at Shīrāz, of which they had been dispossessed by the Persian Governor; (16) to refuse presents to Khāns and Governors; (17) to be protected against hindrance in landing their goods at Bandar 'Abbās; and (18) to deal free of duty in sugar and assafœtida. The two new Raqams provided (19) for the exemption of British trade in Persia, in future, from the dues known as Sad-Yak‖ and Havoy,¶ and (20) for an immediate adjustment of the arrears of customs due to the English at Bandar 'Abbās.

* Also described as an 'Ahdnāmeh or "engagement."

† A statement of the contents will be found in Bruce's *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, Vol. III, pages 241-3, from which also (page 243) the statement of Raqams given in the text is taken.

‡ Literally "writings."

§ According to Bruce the number was 21, of which 19 were old, but his enumeration shows only 18 of that class.

‖ Or "one per cent."

¶ So in Bruce. It is difficult to conjecture what Persian word is intended.

Visit of the Shāh to the English Factory at Isfahān and results, 1699-1700.

On the 23rd of July 1699 the Shāh, attended by the ladies of his Haram, paid a visit in state to the English Factory at Isfahān, then under the management of Mr. Bruce, where sumptuous preparations had been made for his reception. The visit was prompted by his own curiosity to examine a building of which the agreeable exterior had attracted its notice, but it did not take place until the Shāh had satisfied himself that a precedent existed, to prove its consistence with his dignity, in a similar visit by Shāh 'Abbās I to the English Factory after the taking of Hormūz. On the appointed day the Factory building and warehouses were vacated by the staff, who had also petitioned the Shāh "that directions might be given to the eunuchs to prevent persons from attempting, by means of the holes in the buildings, to look at the King and his attendants," and everything passed off happily. The expenses of the reception amounted to more than £12,000, but the results were advantageous. Not only did the Shāh testify to his gratification by presenting a robe of honour, a valuable sword and a horse to the Agent, but one year's arrears of customs were immediately paid at Bandar 'Abbās, and other solid advantages followed. The Dutch soon afterwards tried to induce the Shāh to visit their Factory likewise, but in this they were not successful. In 1700 a gift of "optical glasses of all descriptions" and a "collection of rich sword blades for his selection" were sent by the Company to the Shāh in acknowledgment of the favour shown by him to their representatives; and the Agent, now a Mr. Oliver, was instructed to present a petition for the privilege of exporting raw silk from Persia.

Prescott's unsuccessful mission, 1704-05.

In 1704 a Mr. Prescott was sent from England to convey a letter, accompanied by presents, from Queen Anne to the Shāh and to take charge of the Company's Factories in Persia. He died at 'Isīn near Bandar 'Abbās in November 1705, three months after his arrival in the country, commemorated only by a remark of the Agents in Persia, "that an honourable Agent would have been better than a poor Ambassador."

Discredit to the English from the prevalence of piracy, etc., 1705-07.

The credit of the English in Persia had now again fallen to a low level on account of the dishonourable treatment to which they were being subjected by the Mughals in India and of their own failure to repress piracy; and in 1707 the Shāh proposed to send a Persian merchant as an envoy to Bombay to solicit naval aid against the pirates. The English Agent in Persia, however, fearing that the state of affairs in India did not reflect credit on his country and that closer acquaintance with them on the part of the Persians might lead to a combination between the Persians and the Dutch, dissuaded him from his intention by promising that suitable measures should be taken against the pirates as

soon as the war in Europe was over. Before this, in February 1707, the ship "Diamond" was captured by pirates on a voyage from Bombay to Bandar 'Abbās.

Attack by Balūchis on the English and Dutch Factories at Bandar 'Abbās, 1721.

The invasion of Persia by the Afghāns in 1721-22 was accompanied by an incursion of Balūchis from Makrān into Kirmān and Lār, where they committed serious depredations. In November 1721 the Balūchi hordes attacked the town of Lār, and in particular a caravansarai occupied by twelve Dutchmen who were escorting treasure of the Dutch East India Company; but the Hollanders beat off the attack with great loss to their assailants and with none to themselves, and subsequently, having removed into the Lār fort, defended that also with success. On the 15th of December the Balūchi host appeared before Bandar 'Abbās; but the English and Dutch there had received timely notice of their approach and had placed the Factories in a good state of defence before their arrival. The first attack was made on the English Factory and was beaten off; and a second, attempted two days later on the Dutch Factory, which was much stronger, was equally unsuccessful; a Dutch warehouse however, within a pistol-shot of the Dutch Factory, fell into the hands of the Balūchis, who pillaged it of goods to the value of £20,000. The siege continued for 10 or 12 days, during which the Balūchis occupied the town; at their departure they reduced the place to ashes, and they did not finally quit the neighbourhood until about a month later. The garrison of the English Factory at Bandar 'Abbās, about 50 strong and consisting almost altogether of sailors, had three or four men killed and seven wounded, and one of the latter, a Factor, subsequently died; the loss of the Dutch was twelve men killed and eight or ten wounded.*

History of the English share of the Bandar 'Abbās customs, 1653-1722.

Several references have been made above to the English moiety of the Bandar 'Abbās customs, which continued to be a perennial cause of dispute between the East India Company and the Persian Government; but a more detailed and connected account of the question may be added here.

1662-73.

In 1662 Mr. Richard Craddock, on being sent to take charge of the Company's interests in Persia, was instructed to demand payment of 1,000 Tūmāns, but he was authorised at the same time to accept 400 Tūmāns or any larger sum. In the first year of his residence in Persia, probably in 1669, Mr. Rolt succeeded in recovering 850 Tūmāns; but in 1670 the Agent found himself obliged to recommend that a small naval

* These proceedings are fully described by Hamilton, who himself took part in them, in his *New Account of the East Indies*, Vol. I, pages 107-110. Malcolm makes the year 1724 and the assailants Afghāns, but the personal testimony of Hamilton must be preferred.

force should be sent to compel payment, as had recently been done with success by the Portuguese at Kung. In 1672, apparently, the amount recovered was 1,000 Tūmāns, which was much less than had been expected; and in 1673 only 650 Tūmāns were obtained, notwithstanding the outlay of a sum exceeding this by some hundreds of pounds in efforts to obtain a settlement.

1676-77. In 1676 it was recommended by the Sūrat Presidency that one of two arrangements should be made with the Persian Government: viz., either the Company should receive the fixed sum of 3,000 Tūmāns a year, the Company's ships in that case to pay the ordinary duties, or the customs on all goods belonging to or freighted by the English should be specifically assigned to the Company; but it was pointed out that the latter arrangement would be disadvantageous in time of war, when trade was stopped. The decision of the Company's Court in England in 1677 was that, if possible, 1,000 Tūmāns a year should be obtained in lieu of the moiety of customs, the other arrangements with the Persians in regard to Bandar 'Abbās to remain unchanged.*

1680-95. For the season 1680 a sum of 1,000 Tūmāns was obtained by Mr. Pettit, the Agent in Persia, and he was sanguine of recovering a similar amount for 1681. In 1689, on the plea of injuries sustained by their subjects from pirates at sea, the Persians withheld payment, and in 1690 they argued that the Bandar 'Abbās customs had been diminished by the diversion of trade, during the war between the English and the Mughals, from that port to Kung; the Agent, however, succeeded in obtaining two sums, one of 1,995 and one of 1,500 "chequins," but two years' payment still remained in arrear. Subsequently the Persians discharged what was due from them up to the 1st of March 1692; but in the following three years there were no further receipts.

1697. Early in 1697 their share of the customs for five years was claimed by the Company, but liability for one of these years was disputed by the Persian Government; a written agreement for liquidation of four years' outstandings was, however, obtained. By this time, apparently, a fixed annual payment of 1,000 Tūmāns had become established by usage, or had been agreed to by both sides, in place of the fluctuating moiety. By the end of 1697 payment for the current year had been made; but arrears were due.

1699. In January 1699 the Company's Agent obtained an order of payment for the year ending March 1699, and also for the regular discharge of

* At this time, according to Dr. Fryer, the Shāhbandar paid 22,000 Tūmāns a year to the Shāh for the farm of the Persian moiety of the customs.

the obligation from year to year; some arrears were at this time paid in silk to the amount of 1,340 maunds,—an expedient of which the Dutch complained bitterly, representing it to be an infringement of a monopoly that they then held. After the Shāh's visit to the English Factory at Isfahān in July 1699 a payment of 1,000 Tūmāns was made by the Shāhbandar on account of the Bandar 'Abbās customs, and 2,000 Tūmāns more were promised.

In 1700 arrears were due to the amount of 982 Tūmāns, and payment was obtained by means of a Raqam from the Shāh, assisted by a bribe of 50 Tūmāns to the Shāhbandar. At the union of the Old and New East India Companies in 1702 the right to the moiety of the Bandar 'Abbās customs passed to the Company formed by their amalgamation. In 1705, the year of Mr. Prescott's mission to Persia, arrears had accumulated to a large amount, and it was feared that either force or presents would be required in order to obtain satisfaction; in 1706, however, by one means or another, the Agent, Mr. Lock, was able to secure a Raqam for 1,000 Tūmāns for the current season and for 5,981 Tūmāns of arrears. Of the arrears 2,306 Tūmāns was due to the Old Company separately, and of the whole 2,219 Tūmāns was discharged by the Persians in silk. By 1708 the proportion of customs payable to the Old Company had been received and their separate account closed. 1700-08.

Proceedings of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

After news of the declaration of war between England and Holland reached India, the Dutch in the East proposed a combination between themselves and the Portuguese for the purpose of destroying English trade; but the Portuguese declined to entertain the suggestion, as also counter-proposals made to them by the English. The Dutch however, unaided, captured the Company's ships "Roebuck" and "Lanneret" off Jāshk; and soon afterwards they made a prize of the "Blessing" and drove the "Supply" on shore, where she became a total wreck. At the end of January 1654, in an action fought off Bandar 'Abbās, five Dutch vessels sank the English ship "Endeavour" and captured the "Falcon" and about 30 prisoners, in* circumstances by no means creditable to the The Anglo-Dutch war in the East, 1653-54.

* The "Endeavour" was the only English Ship that fought well on this occasion. The "Dove" and the "Welcome" kept out of the fight altogether, and many of the "Falcon's" men deserted her thinking that she was on fire. The historian says: "The Dutch were most of them drunk, and knew not what they did, the English I think were little better, if not worse." According to one account 80 prisoners were taken with the "Falcon," and the action was fought "at Sind" not at Bandar Abbas.

English name; indeed the crews on both sides appear to have been the worse of liquor. So completely was the Gulf in the hands of the Dutch after this, that the Company's Agent at Basrah was ordered to remove to a place of greater safety, and it was thought that it might be necessary to send silk purchased in Persia to Europe by way of Isfahān. News of peace, however, at length brought this critical state of affairs to an end.

Predominance of Dutch over English trade, 1664-84.

During the remaining portion of this period, as may have been gathered from facts already mentioned, the power and activity of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf continued to be a source of disquiet to the East India Company; and the proposal to form an English station at Masqat in 1659 was made partly with the object of counteracting their influence. In 1664 the Dutch seem to have had the advantage in trade at Bandar 'Abbās, and were now accustomed to send three or four large and well-stocked ships there every year, "which maker them esteemed, but wee a despised people." When Dr. John Fryer, F.R.S., visited Bandar 'Abbās in 1677, he found "the Hollanders Absolute in the Spice Trade," and so strong was their monopoly that he seems to have credited a report that on one occasion they deliberately burned four ship-loads of their own spices in order to oblige the Persian merchants to accept rates for the other two; the Dutch, before this, also dealt largely in sugar and copper; and their exports were estimated by the worthy doctor to amount to "Fifty thousand Thomands worth of Velvets, Silk, Raw and Wrought, with Rich Carpets besides many Tunn of Gold and Silver, Yearly." In 1682 the Dutch still sent two large ships annually to Bandar 'Abbās, and the contrast between these and the vessels supplying the English Factory was as yet to the entire disadvantage of the latter.

Hostilities between the Dutch and the Persians, 1684.

Disagreements between the Dutch and the Persians from time to time occurred, and, as we have already seen, a blockade of Bandar 'Abbās was undertaken by the Dutch in 1684. The Court of the East India Company censured their Agents in Persia for not having given them immediate notice of these hostilities and for having neglected "to let out the Company's ships on freight, during this war, which would have yielded considerable profit."

Dutch intrigues against the English, 1686.

In 1686 the Dutch were labouring to alienate the Persian Court from the English, but their machinations were defeated by the Company's interpreter, an Armenian, at Isfahān.

Residence of Dr. E. Kaempfer

In November 1685 the Westphalian traveller Dr. E. Kaempfer, who had come to Persia in 1684 as Secretary of a Swedish Embassy to the Persian Court, having accepted the post of Chief Surgeon to the Dutch

East India Company in the Persian Gulf, left Isfahān for Bandar 'Abbās. He remained at Bandar 'Abbās until the end of June 1688 and then sailed for Batavia, whence he proceeded on his better-known expedition to Japan. During his stay in the Persian Gulf Dr. Kaempfer, though he suffered much from ill-health, made a careful study of the natural history of the Bandar 'Abbās district; the results are contained in his *Amoenitatum Exoticarum Fasciculi* and include an elaborate monograph on the date-palm.

at Bandar 'Abbās, 1688-88.

About 1688, or from the time that Dutch interests began to be subordinated in Europe to those of England, the two countries being now in alliance and at war with France, the Hollanders began to lose credit in Persia. They were at this time endeavouring to compete with the English in the importation of Indian-made goods, but the English were able to prevent their obtaining a monopoly of Kirmān wool.

Increasing competition of the English with the Dutch, 1688-89.

In 1690 a Dutch Ambassador visited Isfahān, accompanied by a magnificent retinue and bringing valuable presents; he sought to obtain from the Shāh a monopoly for the Dutch of the Kirmān wool trade, but in this he could not succeed. On his return to Bandar 'Abbās in 1691, however, by gaining over the Shāhbandar and others, he was able to obstruct English trade in that neighbourhood to such an extent that the English Factors found it advisable to send a whole cargo of newly arrived goods direct to Isfahān.

Dutch Embassy to the Persian Court, 1690-91.

In 1695, difficulties between the Persians and the Arabs in the Gulf having become acute through repeated attacks by the latter upon Persian shipping, it was feared that the Dutch might come to the aid of the Shāh's Government and so secure preferential trading rights in Persia, but this fear was not realised; the Dutch, however, at the time enjoyed the privilege of importing 20,000 Tūmāns worth of merchandise free into Isfahān every year, as against a quantity 5,000 Tūmāns' worth only passed free to the English. In 1697 chiefly with a view to forestalling the Dutch, the Company's representatives in Persia offered the ship "Charles the Second" for the purpose of conveying to India an Ambassador whom the Shāh had accredited to the Mughal Court.

Continued rivalry of the English and the Dutch, to the increasing disadvantage of the latter, 1695-1705.

As mentioned already in another place, the Dutch, who had at some time obtained a monopoly for the export of silk from Persia by sea, protested strongly in 1699 against part payment by the Persians in that commodity of the English share of customs at Bandar 'Abbās. It does not appear whether this protest was ultimately successful, but the Dutch found means to attach the Shāhbandar to their interest and were suspected of having instigated him to assert, as he did assert, that he had paid

1,300 Tūmāns more on account of customs to the English Agent than was admitted by the latter. The visit of the Shāh in July 1699 to the English Factory at Isfahān was a serious blow to the Dutch, for it resulted in an immediate change of attitude on the part of the Shāhbandar, who now strictly prohibited the erection by them of a fort at Bandar 'Abbās; and, though they begged that the honour of a royal visit might be conferred on their own Factory also, they did not obtain it, their argument that the Stadtholder had become King of England being apparently overborne in the mind of the Shāh by the rejoinder of the English Agent, that the Dutch as a nation had no king at all and were therefore unworthy of attention.

In 1705, the trouble from pirates still continuing, it was again feared that the Dutch might take the matter up in order to gain favour with the Shāh; but once more this expectation was not fulfilled.

Proceedings of the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

Chiefly by means of their Factory at Kung, where since 1625, they had shared the customs with the Persian Government as the English did at Bandar 'Abbās, the Portuguese still clung to the remnants of their interest in the Persian Gulf; they were frequently at war with the Persians and constantly so with the Arabs; and their relations with the English, by whom they were somewhat distrusted, were not invariably cordial.

Difficulties of the Portuguese with the Persians, 1653-1722.

The recovery of the Portuguese share of the customs at Kung seems to have been attended by the same difficulties as those with which we have become familiar at Bandar 'Abbās. On one occasion the Portuguese, by resorting to a naval demonstration, obtained payment of some arrears; and the fact that their action was quoted in 1670 by an English Agent, as a precedent for similar measures which he recommended at Bandar 'Abbās, helps to fix approximately the date of the occurrence. In 1681 or 1682 the Portuguese, by a second naval demonstration on a small scale, intimidated the Shāhbandar into disgorging the sum of 9,000 Tūmāns which was then due to them. It is stated that after 1711 nothing more was paid to the Portuguese on account of their share of the Kung customs. About 1721 there was a small trade at Kung, carried on chiefly by Indians, both Hindus and Muhammadans; but the prosperity of the

place had suffered greatly from the proceedings of the Masqat Arabs. Kung then boasted of a church, and there were one or two priests there who subsisted on alms and perquisites.

Relations of the Portuguese with the English, 1653-1729.

The fear that a rupture between the English and the Persians might turn to the advantage of the Portuguese, as well as of the Dutch, was one of the considerations which restrained the East India Company from using naval force upon the Persian coast, as had been done both by the Portuguese themselves and by the Dutch. In 1676 great resentment was caused among the English by the refusal of the Portuguese to grant passes to native vessels under their control for proceeding to Bandar 'Abbās; and in the following year it was decided, in case the Portuguese should persist in their unfriendly conduct, to deny English passes for Kung to native Indian vessels requiring them; the issue of this dispute is not recorded. In 1689, as already mentioned, the Portuguese Factory at Kung was plundered by an English pirate vessel, which made a brief appearance in the Gulf and could not be captured by the Company's marine; and from 1695 onwards the visits of the Company's vessels to Kung were discontinued, apparently because they were found unprofitable.

As we shall see in the following paragraph, the Portuguese were at times inclined to suspect that the depredations of Arab pirates upon their shipping were deliberately encouraged by the English.

Relations of the Portuguese with the Arabs of 'Omān, 1653-1722.

Between the Portuguese and the Arabs of 'Omān relations, ever since the fall of Hormūz, had been continuously hostile, and a virtual state of war was the rule. About 1660 Mombāsah was temporarily wrested from the Portuguese by the Masqat Arabs; but the conflict did not become serious until the last decade of the 17th century.

1693—69.

In 1693 some Portuguese frigates were severely handled by Masqat vessels; and in 1694 or 1695 the Arabs made a maritime descent on Kung, where they inflicted damage estimated at 60,000 Tūmāns. About 1696 the Portuguese, at once less prudent and less powerful than their neighbours the English and the Dutch, consented to help the Persians against the Masqat pirates; and the immediate result was a division of the 'Omānī fleet into two squadrons, one of which swept along the African seaboard and burned the Portuguese settlement at Mombāsah, while the other destroyed the Portuguese Factory at Mangalore on the Indian coast.* The Portuguese, in 1697, attributed the aggressiveness of

*Hamilton, however (*vide* his *New Account*, Vol. I., page 75) makes the year of this descent 1695 and the cause a quarrel between the Arabs and "the Carnatick Rajah."

the Masqat Arabs to their having been supplied by the English at Bombay with ammunition, alleging further that the 'Omāni vessels were frequently commanded by Englishmen and flew the English flag; and in the same year Portuguese shipping seems to have suffered severely from the operations of European pirates, who, it was asserted by the Portuguese, held passes from the English East India Company, but the Company denied connection with them and repudiated responsibility for their actions. On the 13th of May 1698 two Portuguese frigates were attacked off Rās-al-Hadd by a flotilla of eight 'Omāni vessels, commanded by the Wāli of Matrah, and a fight ensued which lasted for three hours; the result was the defeat of the Arabs with a large number killed including their commander, while the Portuguese lost only five men killed and eleven wounded. About 1699 Mombāsah was captured by the 'Omānis,—who retained it until its temporary recovery by the Portuguese in 1728,—and a general massacre of Portuguese took place along the whole African coast.

1714-19. After this there was apparently a lull in the hostilities until the 19th of February 1714, when the Arabs attacked a Portuguese fleet off Sūrat; but the Portuguese on this occasion, with a loss to themselves of 28 killed and 34 wounded, drove their assailants out to sea; and the Arab flagship was even said to have foundered, on her way home, from injuries received in the action. Shortly afterwards the Arabs, burning to avenge this disgrace, appeared with a fleet off Kung and demanded the surrender of the Portuguese Factor there by the Shāhbandar, but again they were beaten off with loss. In February 1719, circumstances being propitious, a Portuguese squadron was sent to the Gulf, and on the 4th of August it brought an Arab fleet to action off Kung; the first day's engagement, which lasted from 9 A.M. to 7 P.M. was favourable to the Portuguese, and on the next day they undertook a pursuit of the enemy, not returning to Kung until the 8th of August. In these first encounters the Portuguese had 10 men killed and 35 wounded. Meanwhile the Arabs had retired across the Gulf to Rās-al-Khaimah, in the neighbourhood of which place the Portuguese, suspecting them to be countenanced by the English and the Dutch, again sought them out on the 29th of August, and, after more fighting, drove the last of them into port on the 2nd of September. The prisoners taken in these wars were made slaves on both sides; the captives of the 'Omānis are said to have been the better treated.

Proceedings of the French in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

The French, as has already been mentioned, established an East India Company in 1664; and in 1677, if not earlier, they possessed a Factory at Bandar 'Abbās. In the latter year Dr. Fryer visited Bandar 'Abbās, and afterwards he placed on record these observations regarding French trade there: "The French have as little to do at this Port as in other "Places; and were it not for the Credit of their Interpreter, who gets "good profit by Wine (he being privileged with a Wine-press for that "Nation at Siras, as well as the other Europe Nations), they could not "subsist; but Monsieur makes an outside, lives retiredly, and without "more Business than to visit and be visited (which Courtesy passes "interchangeably among the Christians as well as Natives) lounges his time away." In 1682 the French had a small trade in cloth with Basrah. In 1698, as we have seen, in consequence of a nominal agreement—from which nothing resulted—among the principal European nations in the East, the French undertook the policing of the Persian Gulf against pirates.

Course of the East India Company's trade in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

Determining factors in the Company's trade, 1653-1722.

The general state and the fluctuations of the East India Company's trade in the Persian Gulf during this period, both of which we are now about to examine, were determined in part by mercantile considerations, but in part also by the political factors that have already been described above,—namely, by the competition of the Merchant Adventurers, by the rivalry between the Old and New Companies, by the relations of England with Holland and France and of the Company themselves with the Mughal Empire and Persia, and by special charter obligations and English legislative enactments arising out of the commercial policy, at the time, of the English nation.

The trade with Persia, 1653-75.

In 1657, in consequence of war between the Persians and the Mughals and of breach of the Company's rights and privileges by the Persian Government, English trade in Persia was at a standstill. In 1661 it was ordered that a consignment of 30 or 40 Tūmāns' worth of red oxide should

be sent to India by the Company's Factory at Bandar 'Abbās. In 1674 large quantities of defective goods having been received in India, it was directed that the Kirmān wool and other articles exported from Persia should be more strictly inspected in future, by the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbās, before being despatched. In 1675 Kirmān wool was in great demand, and the Bandar 'Abbās Factory was instructed to procure as much as possible.

Unfavourable state of the Persian trade, 1669-72.

In 1669 the Persian trade, in consequence of persistent disregard by the Persians of English trading rights and privileges, was in a depressed condition; but it was still considered to be of great importance, and the Agent in Persia recommended that, with a view to promoting trade between Bombay, Sūrat and Persia, grants of land should be offered to Banyans as an inducement to settle on Bombay Island. In 1672 the Company's servants were ordered to demand consulage on all English goods landed at Bandar 'Abbās and to report the names of individuals who refused payment; this order apparently referred to private speculations by the Company's servants, in connection with which there had been habitual evasion of the Company's rights. In the same year it was explained by the Sūrat Council that among the commodities which they required from the Persian Gulf were galls, red oxide, liquorice, almonds, raisins and skins, but that they disapproved of a consignment of inferior Hamadān galls which had been sent them at some time previously.

Generally low and ultimately precarious state of the trade with Persia, 1676-82.

The armed ships of the Company which made the voyage to Persia in 1676 carried large quantities of broadcloth and tin, and their return cargoes were expected to consist mainly of silk and wool; it was directed that, if possible, a pretended seizure should be made at Bandar 'Abbās of the "Siedpore", a native Indian merchant vessel which had stolen away to Persia without a pass from the Company. Dr. Fryer accompanied the next year's armed fleet to Bandar 'Abbās in 1677 and reported in the following terms on the position of English trade: "The English "Company's Trade is but small here, only carrying off some few Drugs, "Carmania Wool, Goats, Dates and Horses; though they make it worth "their while to keep an Agent in good Port (*sic*), as well from the "Allowance from the Shawbander, as by Consulage of 2*l.* and ½ *per* "*Cent.* for all Foreign Goods that seek their Protection; on which score "they seem to drive a Trade, and send up every Shipping Three or Four "hundred Camels laden with Indian Wares; as many as the Dutch "bring down to ship off on their own Stock and Ships: but this Year a "great Bluster was made with English Cloth and Tin brought by our "Arrival; which, however, the understanding Traffickers smile at, know-

"ing it comes better Cheap by the Caphala's* in Exchange of other Goods "from Stambole, *i.e.*, Constantinople, Smirna, Scanderoon, and Aleppo; "and that Suffahaun is already over-full of London Cloath, or Sackcloath "Londre, as they call it." The Sūrat Presidency's view of the state of trade in this year was, however, more favourable than Dr. Fryer's, but they blamed their representatives for the past delays in shipping Kirmān wool; and in 1678, in consequence of the impoverishment of the people by scarcity and exactions of the Shāh's Government, the outlook again became unsatisfactory. About this time the English Agent at Bandar 'Abbās was said to benefit largely by extending his protection, for a consideration, to native Persian subjects. In 1680 the Persian trade continued depressed, and orders were given to sell off all the Company's broadcloth and tin at Bandar 'Abbās for what they would fetch and to buy Kirmān wool of better quality than had been obtained in the previous year; it was added that, if prospects did not improve, the Factory at Bandar 'Abbās might have to be abandoned. In 1681 business continued unremunerative and the Agent was desired to retrench expenditure by every means in his power. In 1682 the outstandings of the Company in Persia amounted to £1,000,000, and trade was still steadily declining.

The "round voyage," 1682.

In 1682 an effort was made to reorganise the Company's trade in the East by a system of "round voyages." The "Dragon" was accordingly sent from England to Soqotrah, where she was to be met by a fleet of three native vessels; these auxiliaries, after conveying a part of her cargo to Mokha and obtaining cargoes of coffee and olibanum, were to rejoin her in the Persian Gulf, where she in the meanwhile would visit Bandar 'Abbās and then Basrah, returning from the latter port to Bandar 'Abbās; after taking in Persian goods she was to sail for Sūrat. By this scheme, it was hoped, different areas of trade would be linked up, profitable exchanges initiated, and English navigation increased; but the project did not answer to the expectations of its framers and the experiment of 1682 was not, apparently, repeated. Among the reasons assigned by the Agent and Factors at Bandar 'Abbās for its failure were the miserable appearance of the "Dragon", a vessel of only 180 tons, which cut a poor figure beside the stately ships of Holland, and the fact—probably of greater real moment—that the Mokha and Basrah markets could be more conveniently served and tapped by the Sūrat and Bandar 'Abbās Factories through Armenian dealers, etc., than by ships on circuit; they recommended instead that good vessels, manned by Europeans, should be sent in order to give Persian merchants confidence in the Company's

* That is Qāfilahs or caravans.

shipping and to secure their custom as consigners on freight,—a branch of business from which the Dutch were said to derive enormous profits.

Gradual revival of the Persian trade 1683-90.

In 1683-84 the Company's Persian trade was disturbed by the competition of Interlopers and by a revolt of some of the Company's own military servants at Bombay under Captain Richard Keigwin, whom his enemies quaintly termed the "Oliver and Protector of the Island of Bombay"; the Company's goods in Persia also proved unsaleable, and the Agent and Factors reported that fresh stocks were needed. In 1684 there was a loss in England on nearly all the Persian commodities brought home, and no "black" Kirmán wool could be disposed of, but twice as much "red" was required. In 1685 a consignment of salt from Hormúz to Sumatra was arranged. In 1687, on account of the hostilities then being waged between the Company and the Mughal Emperor, only a limited trade with Persia could be done; but various kinds of gums were procured, and it was reported that English cloths, if they were of the proper colours and qualities, might be disposed of to the amount of 1,000 half-pieces annually; from the fact that Armenians brought cloth from Turkey and exchanged it for silk the inference was drawn that silk could be most advantageously obtained by barter for cloth. In 1688 operations in Persia continued to be impeded by the Mughal war, and in 1689 the difficulties of the situation were increased by the appearance of an English pirate vessel in the Persian Gulf itself; but in 1690 the trade to the Gulf suffered less from the war than might have been expected, arrangements were made to barter English cloth for silk and Kirmán wool and to obtain wormseeds, rhubarb and lapis lazuli, and surplus stocks were ordered to be reshipped to India.

Design of the East India Company to establish a cloth monopoly in Persia and divert the silk trade to the Gulf by the help of the Armenians, 1689-93.

The Company were at this time much impressed by the skill and success of the Armenians as merchants, both in India and Persia; and they attempted, by allowing the Armenians to send their goods to Europe in the Company's ships from Bombay in 1689 and Bandar 'Abbás in 1690, to induce them to throw in their lot, commercially, with the English; in Persia, however, the strong existing interest of the Armenians in the trade *viâ* Turkey was a serious obstacle to the scheme, though this was not at first realised. In 1691 the Company proposed to enter into competition in broad-cloth with the Turkey Company, who exported it to Persia by Aleppo, paying customs from which the East India Company at Bandar 'Abbás were exempt; and the Company's servants hoped to be able to push the sale of this article through their supposed natural allies the Armenians. In 1693, the year in which the East India Company were first required to export a large quantity of English home manufactures, the Turkey Company's consign

ment of cloth for the East was captured at sea by the French, whereupon the East India Company despatched £50,000 worth of English cloth by their year's fleet and decided to advance the price of that commodity in Persia by 50 per cent. It was now their object to divert the Persian silk trade from Aleppo to Isfahān, where the silk might be obtained in exchange for their cloth and then sent by caravan to Bandar 'Abbās for shipment.

Continued competition between the East India and Turkey Companies in the Persian cloth trade and opposition of the Armenians to the East India Company's projects, 1693-98.

In 1692 the Agent in Persia had been directed to proceed to Isfahān to confer with the leading Armenian merchants, and to make arrangements for the accommodation at that city of some young writers who were being sent from England as apprentices in the Persian trade, and who would be expected to study the language of the Armenians and their methods of business. In 1693 "insinuations" against the Armenians began to be received, perhaps to the effect that they were not sufficiently devoted to the Company's interests; but it was ordered that certain contracts which had been formed with them should nevertheless be fulfilled. In 1694 the Armenians began to make difficulties in exchanging the East India Company's English cloth for silk, alleging that the rival trade by way of Aleppo was still in full vigour; the English sub-Agent at Isfahān reported unfavourably on the character of some of the Armenian brokers; and the Agent, it would seem, was obliged to proceed to the capital to adjust matters. It now appeared that the Armenians were not really acting in the interests of the East India Company, for they equally supported the English trade with Persia through Aleppo; and in 1698 two additional East India Factors were sent to Tabrīz and Mashhad expressly to undersell the Turkey Company's cloth in those markets. The Persian market, owing to this competition, was soon glutted with English cloth; but the East India Company's sales at Isfahān and Bandar 'Abbās produced 30,000 "sequins". As much cloth as possible was disposed of in 1697 at Bandar 'Abbās, Shīrāz and Isfahān by underselling the Turkey Company's goods; and at the end of the year the Court of the Company decided to persevere in this competition. Meanwhile the Armenians, who seem to have preferred the Aleppo route, were successful in preventing the issue of a Raqam authorising the East India Company to export silk by way of Bandar 'Abbās; but the Company's servants, notwithstanding their opposition, were able to sell large quantities of cloth, brought by the ship "Charles the Second" to Bandar 'Abbās on 17 months' credit to Persian shop-keepers. Mr. Barwell, who went as Chief Agent to Persia in 1698, was instructed not only to continue pushing the sale of the Company's cloth but also to obtain, if possible, an entrance into the silk trade, which was evidently monopolised at this

time by the Armenians, and to request a Farmán for exporting silk from Bandar 'Abbás; but silk could now be obtained in Bengal at about half of the prices current in Persia, and the matter had thus lost some of its importance. In 1698 the Armenians, who had entered into an agreement to take all the Company's cloth for the year, refused to give security for payment, with the result that the contract was annulled and that the Company's servants had to make new arrangements.

Flourishing state of the East India Company's trade, notwithstanding failure of their silk and cloth scheme, 1700-06.

In 1700, in consequence of the Act imposing additional duties on finished tissues from the East and also of a demand for raw silk in England, the Company began to give more attention to the unwrought article; the Persian trade was good; and, though the only commodities saleable were looking-glasses and cloth, and fresh difficulties with the Armenians arose, a whole vessel was required to carry away from Bandar 'Abbás the silks, chintzes and Kirmán wool that had been accumulated. In 1701, as a war in Europe was apprehended by which Italian and Spanish commerce might suffer, the Company's servants in Persia were instructed to procure all the raw silk, Kirmán wool and drugs that they could, in order to profit by the expected rise in the European market. In 1705 it was reported from Persia that 4800 pieces of cloth could be sold annually in Persia if the trade were exclusive, and half that quantity so long as competition through Turkey and Russia continued; but it was found that the system of bartering cloth for silk would not answer, on account of the high export duties on silk, and that purchases could be made more advantageously with money: in other words the Company's scheme of diverting the entire silk trade to the Gulf, and of carrying it on without money by barter of cloth, had proved a failure. In 1706 trade in Persia was very good; the greater part of the Company's stock of cloth was sold at a profit of 16 per cent.; and larger purchases than usual of Persian produce were made.

The trade with Turkish 'Iráq, 1653-1722.

The proceedings of the East India Company in 'Iráq during this period are fully described in the separate history of that province. The provisional Factory established at Basrah about 1643 apparently ceased to exist in 1657; and, during the remainder of the period, trade with Basrah was maintained by ships specially sent to that port from Súrat in charge of servants of the Company. By the famous Capitulations of 1661, modified in 1675, the position and trade of British subjects in the Turkish Empire were placed on a sound footing.

The East India Company's Establishments in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

Staff.

The establishments of the East India Company in Persia fluctuated during this period according to the state and prospects of trade. Once in 1664, as we have seen, the staff in Persia was reduced to two Europeans, and, up to 1661 at least, there was no permanent European establishment in Turkish 'Irāq. In 1682, when an attempt was made to place the Persian trade on a better footing, Mr. John Gibbs was appointed to be Agent in Persia with a Council of four to assist him, of which the members were to succeed to the Agency, should it become vacant by death or removal, in order of seniority. In 1693, when the aspect of affairs had begun to improve, the staff in Persia was augmented so as to consist of a Chief Agent, four Factors and four Writers; and at this strength it appears to have stood afterwards, unless the two Factors specially sent to Tabrīz and Mashhad in 1696 were, as seems not improbable, additional employés. In 1676 there was a "Chyrurgeon" at Bandar 'Abbās, a Mr. Samuell Carleton, whose relations with the other Company's servants occasioned great trouble; and, from various references to "Europe wine" sent from India for "Padres," it might be supposed that the staff in Persia were not without a chaplain; but, on the other hand, burials seem to have been generally conducted by themselves, so that by "Padres" foreign priests or missionaries may have been meant.* There is nothing to show that the Company's employés in the Persian Gulf were ever accompanied by their wives or children.

Stations.

Bandar 'Abbās was at first the principal Factory in Persia, and the Factory building at that place was a gift from the Shāh, standing between the purchased premises occupied by the Dutch and the French. For a time, perhaps, the establishments at Shirāz and Isfahān were either closed or maintained on a reduced scale; but Mr. Craddock, when he was sent as Agent to Persia in 1662, was authorised to spend some months of each year at Shirāz or Isfahān, because "Death hath been so familiar in those parts, caused by ill aire, staying so long in it at Gombroon"; and in 1684 it was expressly ordered that two of the Council should remain constantly at Isfahān to watch the Company's interests there. In 1692 Isfahān was selected as the centre at which Writers in Persia were to be trained; and in 1693, when augmentation of the staff took place, the Chief Agent was given liberty to reside at Isfahān or at Bandar 'Abbās as he pleased, and

* One of these Padres, however, was named Barnaby and drew a bill of exchange upon the Company (1661).

it was laid down that the Factories at Isfahān and Bandar 'Abbās should both be permanent. In 1695 there was only a sub-Agent at Isfahān, but again, in 1697 or 1698, it was ordered that the Factory there should be treated as the Company's chief seat in Persia and the Factory at Bandar 'Abbās as subordinate to it. In 1699, as we have seen, the English Factory at Isfahān was deemed worthy of a visit by the Shāh of Persia and his ladies.

Life and conduct of servants.

Personal details of the Company's staff are interesting, but not of historical importance; they relate chiefly to the deaths of Factors (generally without a will), to their decent burial (sometimes with the help of the Dutch), and to the "villanies and baseness" of Hindu brokers, etc. The decease in June 1677 of Mr. Gerald Aungier, President at Sūrat, is worthy of mention, however; for it was considered that the maintenance of the English trade in Persia, in very difficult circumstances, during the preceding sixteen years had been due mainly to his talents, integrity and zeal, and the event itself was regarded as a public calamity. In some respects the Company do not appear to have been well served by their employés in Persia. In 1662 the Sūrat Council complained that they had received no regular accounts from Bandar 'Abbās for three years, and in 1676 a reprimand became necessary, as the books of that Factory had been withheld for four years, on the frivolous plea that paper was not obtainable.

Correspondence.

At the beginning of the period, and possibly later also, the Court of the Company in England seem to have carried on their correspondence with the East in duplicate, sending one set of copies overland by Aleppo and Basrah and the other by sea round the Cape. In 1686, when Interlopers or private merchants were securing earlier intelligence from India than the Company, arrangements were made for the despatch of information to the Court, at intervals of six weeks, by the Aleppo route.

'Omān affairs, 1653-1722.

Proposal to establish a station of the East India Company at Masqat, 1659.

As has already been mentioned, the Council at Sūrat contemplated in 1659 the formation of a settlement, protected by a garrison of 100 troops, at Masqat; but the consent of the native Arab powers could not be obtained, and the proposal was dropped. The object of the scheme was to establish a commanding influence in the Gulf by overawing Persia and counteracting the sea-power of the Dutch.

Piracy and aggressions on Persia by the 'Omānis, 1699-1707.

In 1677, when Dr. Fryer visited the Persian Gulf, the inhabitants of O'mān had already acquired the reputation of "a Fierce and Treacherous People, gaining as much by Fraud as Merchandize." By 1695 they had taken to piratical courses and acquired five large ships carrying 1,500 men; they had plundered Kung; they had captured an Armenian ship; and they had so threatened Bandar 'Abbās that a Persian customs officer on one occasion asked that the English ship "Nassau" might be detained for 20 days for the defence of the port, and the request was granted. These events led Captain Brangwin, who was at the moment the Company's Agent in Persia, to predict that the 'Omānis "would prove as great a plague in India as the Algerines were in Europe." War between Persia and Masqat being now expected, and there appearing a probability that the Dutch would offer to assist the Persians, the East India Company's servants in Persia were anxious that English aid also should be tendered; but Sir John Gayer, the Governor of Bombay, wisely decided that, as the Arabs had not yet offered any obstruction to English shipping or trade, such action would be inexpedient.

After this, however, a Masqat ship having been seized by Indian pirates, the 'Omānis made reprisals on English private or interloping vessels, but not on those of the Company; the first English vessel to be seized was one commanded by a Captain Morrice, who with his men was reduced to slavery and could not be ransomed; and in 1705 a rich ship under Captain Murvel, bound from Bengal to Persia, was taken through the pusillanimity of the crew, who made no resistance. In 1704-05 the Court of the Old Company announced their intention of equipping armed ships, as soon as the war with France should be over, to clear the seas and "to root out that nest of pirates, the Muscat Arabs"; but the French war continued, and in 1707 there were complaints of 'Omāni as well as of Marhata depredations in Indian waters. The aggressions of the 'Omānis upon the Portuguese, especially in 1693-99 and 1714-19, have already been noticed above.

Seizure of Persian islands by the 'Omānis of Masqat, about 1730.

Some years later the "Muscateers" seized certain islands off the Persian coast, among which was apparently Qishm. A Persian army under Lutf 'Ali Khān was sent into the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās to dislodge them; in consequence, however, of the Afghān invasions of Persia, which had now begun, this force returned northwards to Kirmān without having effected anything. Somewhat earlier, in 1718, a successful descent had been made on Bahrain by the Masqat Arabs; but the inhabitants to a large extent temporarily forsook the islands, and by this means the 'Omāni occupation was brought to an end

History of the Persian Gulf from the Invasion of Persia by the Afghans to the removal of the British Headquarters in the Gulf from Bandar 'Abbas, 1722-63.*

Events in Europe and India, 1722-63.

During the period now to be examined, the only events in Europe affecting the position of Great Britain in India and the Persian Gulf were the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years' War, in both of which Britain took part against France.

The Silesian Wars, 1742-48.

In the Silesian Wars, which began in 1742, Holland, the only other European power having important interests in the Persian Gulf, joined with Britain in supporting the cause of Maria Theresa. The British victory at Dettingen in 1743 and defeat at Fontenoy in 1745 were incidents of this war, with which also was connected the Jacobite invasion of Scotland and England in 1745-46. In India Britain lost Madras to the French in 1746, but recovered it under the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.

The Seven Years' War, 1756-63.

By the Seven Years' War, which continued from 1756 to 1763, the maritime and colonial superiority of Britain over France was definitely established. Passing over the incidents of the struggle in Europe, of which the battle of Minden in 1759 was the most important, and over events in America, we may observe that the course of operations in the East was favourable to Britain and resulted in the total overthrow of the French power there. The British Factory at Bandar 'Abbás in the Persian Gulf was, as we shall see further on, captured and destroyed

* The principal authorities relating to the period 1722-63 in the Persian Gulf are an anonymous official *Précis containing Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, printed in 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600—1800*, printed in 1906, both covering the whole period. For the general affairs of Persia Malcolm's *History of Persia*, 1815, and for that of Turkey Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, 1856, may be consulted, as before. Apart from the semi-official authorities first quoted, the most valuable sources of historical information about the Gulf countries at this time are Niebuhr's *Description de l'Arabie*, 1774, and his *Voyage en Arabie*, 1776, referring particularly to the year 1765-66 but dealing also with earlier events. Mention may also be made of Ives's *Journey from Persia to England*, 1773, relating chiefly to occurrences in or about 1758, and of *Five Letters from a Free Merchant in Bengal*, 1777.

by a French naval force in 1759; but in India the French settlement of Chandarnagar fell to the British arms in 1757 and that of Pondichéry in 1761. Holland, in the contest in Europe, remained neutral; but in India her influence also disappeared before that of Britain.

British relations with native powers in India.

In consequence of the decay of the Mughal Empire after Aurangzib's death in 1707, the British were drawn, apart from their wars with the French, into difficult and uncertain relations with native powers in various parts of India; and these cannot but have affected their policy in the Persian Gulf. The loss of Calcutta in 1756, to Sirāj-ud-Daulah, Nawāb of Bengal, the tragedy of the "Black Hole," and the campaign of 1757 ending in the victory of Plassey must have absorbed the attention of the East India Company at one time; and a little later, through the grant to them of the Twenty-four Parganas, their interests in Bengal began to possess a territorial character. Under the Nizām-ul-Mulk, an official of the defunct Mughal Empire, Haidarābād had meanwhile become politically the capital of the Dakkhan; and Clive, during his first governorship of Bengal in 1758-59, took measures to establish British influence there.

Persian and Turkish affairs, 1722-63.

Afghan invasion and occupation of Persia, 1722-29.

During the Afghān occupation of Persia, which lasted for seven years, the internal and external affairs of that country were plunged in confusion. Tahmāsb Mirza, a son of Shāh Husain who had escaped from Isfahān before its fall, proclaimed himself Shāh and continued the war against the invaders, at first with little success: the Afghāns, on their part, committed massacres and atrocities. On the north and east the Russians and the Turks began to encroach on Persian territory, regulating their proceedings by a treaty for the partition of north-western Persia into which they had entered in 1723, and in this manner the Russians possessed themselves of some of the districts adjacent to the Caspian Sea, while the Turks secured Kurdistān, Armenia and part of Āzarbāijān. In 1724 Shīrāz was taken and plundered by the Afghāns. In 1725 Mahmūd, the original commander of the Afghan host, became mad and died: he was succeeded by his cousin Ashraf, between whom and the Turks hostilities immediately began. The Afghāns in 1726 inflicted two successive defeats on the Turks within a few marches of Isfahān; the Ottomans

retired on Kirmānshāh; and a Treaty* followed, under the terms of which Ashraf, in consideration of his title to the throne of Persia being admitted by the Porte, acknowledged the Sultān of Turkey as his spiritual suzerain and made other more material concessions, which, perhaps, can hardly be regarded as binding on later Persian sovereigns. Meanwhile, however, a general combination among Persians had been formed to expel the Afghān intruders; Tahmāsb Mīrza had obtained the support of the rising Qājār tribe of Astarābād; and in 1727 a remarkable military leader joined his cause in the person of one† Nādir Quli, an Afshār Turk, who temporarily changed his name, in compliment to his new master, to that of Tahmāsb Quli Khān. As yet, however, the Afghāns had sustained no check; they succeeded in reducing the town of Yazd, which had hitherto defied their assaults; and in 1728, as will be related further on, they gave trouble at Bandar 'Abbās and plundered the British Factory there. At length, in 1729, Tahmāsb Quli Khān defeated the Afghāns at Dāmaghān, whence they fled to Tehrān and then retired on Isfahān, sustaining another reverse at the hands of the victorious Persians before they reached the capital. Continuing their retreat south-eastwards, the Afghāns were once more defeated near Persepolis and driven into Shīrāz by Tahmāsb Quli Khān; Ahmad Shāh, their leader, had in the meantime put Shāh Husain, the deposed Persian sovereign, to death; and Tahmāsb Mīrza had re-occupied Isfahān. At Shīrāz the Afghāns did not attempt to stand a siege, but dispersed in all directions in the endeavour to regain their native country,—an object in which but few of them were successful. Ashraf himself was slain by Balūchis in one of the deserts between Shīrāz and Sīstan. Of his followers some found their way by Lār to the coast and, crossing the Persian Gulf, landed in Hasa, where they were immediately put to death; others were exterminated in Makrān; and others again were to be seen, in after years, earning a scanty livelihood as labourers at Masqat.

Virtual interregnum, 1729—36.

After the cessation of the Afghān danger confidence did not long reign between Shāh Tahmāsb and his successful general Tahmāsb Quli Khān. The latter, having received four of the northern districts of Persia to govern, at once assumed the authority of an almost independent prince, expelled the Turks from some of the places which they held, and demanded from Mahmūd I, who had recently ascended the Turkish throne, the

* This Treaty disposed of all questions of frontiers, diplomatic representation, extraditions, pilgrimages, and trade: see Aitchison's *Treaties*, 4th edition, Vol. XII, Appendix 3.

† Nādir Quli belonged to no distinguished family and is said to have been at one time a robber.

rendition of Ázarbáíjān to Persia. These measures promised success; but they were frustrated by the pusillanimous behaviour of Shāh Tahmāsb, who, after being defeated in a battle by the Turks, concluded a treaty with Ahmad Pāsha, the Turkish governor of Baghdād, whereby he resigned his claims to all the countries beyond the Araxes in favour of the Sultān and ceded Kirmānshāh and its dependencies to the Pāsha himself. Tahmāsb Quli Khān immediately denounced this treaty as a betrayal of the national interests; and not long afterwards, on the 16th of August 1732, he dethroned the Shāh, substituting for him a puppet in the person of his infant son, whom some historians have styled Shāh 'Abbās III. In July 1733 Tahmāsb Quli Khān marched on Baghdād, which he invested; but he was defeated near Sāmarrah by Topāl 'Osmān, a gallant Turkish soldier, and obliged to abandon the siege. In less than three months' time, however, he renewed his invasion of 'Irāq, overthrew a Turkish army under Topal 'Osmān, who was slain in the battle, and again prepared to invest Baghdād; but at this juncture a revolt broke out in the province of Fārs and recalled him to Persia.

Reign of Nādir Shāh. 1736—47.

In the spring of 1736, considering his position to be now sufficiently established, Tahmāsb Quli Khān assumed the name of Nādir Shāh and accepted the crown of Persia, which was offered to him by the nobles and military chiefs of the realm; but, before doing so, he prevailed on the electors to agree to the extraordinary condition that the Shī'ah sect should be abolished and that the people of Persia should become Sunnis.* On ascending the throne Nādir Shāh made a peace with Mahmūd I, Sultān of Turkey, by which the frontier that had bounded the two empires in the time of Murād IV was restored; this done, he gave rein

* It was intended that the converted Persians should form a fifth Sunni sect, to be known as the Ja'fari, distinct from the already existing Sunni sects of Hanafi, Shāfi'i, Māliki and Hanbali; the name proposed was taken from that of Ja'far-as-Sādiq, whom Shī'ahs respected as the sixth Imām and to whom Sunnis could not object as he lived in the days before the Shī'ah schism. The recognition of the Ja'fari sect became the subject of a correspondence between Nādir Shāh and the Sultān of Turkey; but the latter, though he agreed to proposals for a release of prisoners on both sides, for free trade, and for mutual reception of Ambassadors, would have nothing to do with the religious scheme; and even in Persia the Ja'fari sect does not seem to have made much real headway. The principal objects of Nādir Shāh in his attempted innovation were probably (1) to conciliate his army, which consisted partly of Sunnis; (2) to facilitate the incorporation in the empire that he aspired to found of Sunni countries such as India, Afghānistān and Turkey; and (3) to obliterate the recollection of the displaced Safavi dynasty, under whom the Shī'ah faith had been the national religion of Persia and with whom it was closely identified. Nādir Shāh's proceedings in this respect had evidently a great interest for Niebuhr: see his *Voyage en Arabie*, Vol. II, pages 22—433. At the present day Shī'ahs in Turkey are frequently termed Ja'faris.

to his ambition in other directions. One of his first exploits was the subjugation of the Bakhtiyāri tribe, which he accomplished in one short campaign; and, as is more fully related elsewhere, his troops crossed the Persian Gulf in 1737, overran 'Omān in 1737-38, and were not finally expelled from that country until 1744. Meanwhile the Shāh had undertaken offensive operations against his old opponents the Afghāns, and in 1738 he took Qandahār, after a siege begun in 1737, and also Kābul. In 1739 he passed onwards to India, making it his pretext for an attack on the Mughals that they had countenanced the Afghāns. He defeated a Mughal army in battle near Karnāl and temporarily occupied Delhi, but he was too wise to attempt the annexation of a country so extensive and so far from his base, and after a short stay he returned to Persia. On his homeward march Nādir detached to Sind a body of troops by which that province was duly visited and the submission of its ruler obtained; and it is even possible that he accompanied this force in person. Meanwhile, as related in the separate history of Persian Makrān, Taqi Khān, Baiglarbaig of Fārs, had entered Makrān and apparently reduced a part of it to obedience to the Shāh. In 1740 Herat was added to the Persian dominions; and in the following year Mashhad became the capital of Persia. By this time hostilities were once more in progress between Persia and Turkey; but Nādir Shāh, after gaining a final victory over the Turks at Erivan in 1744, once more made peace with the Porte. Taqi Khān, the commander of the Makrān expedition and governor of Fārs, rebelled against the Shāh in 1744, but he was at once surrounded in Shīrāz; and eventually, in attempting to escape from the town, he fell into Nādir's hands and was mutilated. The mind of the tyrant had now become unhinged; he had blinded his own son Riza Quli Khān, whom he distrusted; his * severity and cruelty towards his subjects during the last five years of his reign knew no bounds; and eventually, in 1747, he was assassinated by four of his officers. Among the ambitions entertained by Nādir Shāh was, as will appear further on, the possession of a navy in the Persian Gulf, and he eventually succeeded in acquiring some 20 or 25 vessels which were ordinarily kept at Būshehr. A few of his ships are said to have been constructed at Būshehr and Rig, but a design which he had formed of building an entire fleet with timber conveyed by forced labour across Persia from the district of Mazandarān remained unexecuted.

* The traveller Niebuhr remarked on the number of persons still to be seen in 1766, including even Arabs of Bahrain, who had been deprived of an eye in the reign of Nadir Shah.

Anarchy, and rise of Karīm Khān, 1747-63.

Terrible disorders followed the death of Nādir Shāh, and in these not only his descendants, but also the Afghāns, the Qājārs, the Bakhtiyāris and a rising individual named Karīm Khān, played a part. Karīm Khān was a Kurd and belonged to a family, known as Zand, of an obscure shepherd tribe. The first to succeed Nādir Shāh was his nephew 'Alī, who assumed the name of 'Ādil Shāh and signalised his accession by putting to death 13 sons and grandsons of Nādir, sparing however Shāh Rukh, a son of Riza Qulī Khān. 'Ādil Shāh was soon overthrown and blinded by his brother Ibrāhīm, who was himself almost immediately assassinated, and after him 'Ādil Shāh too was slain. Shāh Rukh, whose mother was a daughter of the Safavī monarch Shāh Husain, next ascended the throne, but he was quickly seized and deprived of sight by a usurper named Saiyid Muhammad or Sulaimān, who in his turn was put to death in 1750; and Shāh Rukh was then restored, but only to be once more deposed and imprisoned.

About this time the power of an Afghān, Ahmad Shāh, Abdālī, who had possessed himself of Qandahār and who before long made himself master of Mashhad also, began to be felt in Persia; and simultaneously a movement took place in the south-west of that country, where 'Alī Mardān Khān, chief of the Bakhtiyāris, and Karīm Khan, Zand, combined to raise a Safavī to the throne in the person of Shāh Ismā'īl, son of a sister of the late Shāh Husain. Ahmād Shāh, Abdālī, captured Shīrāz in 1750; but, being opposed by the Qājārs of Mazandarān in the north, he did not attempt to make good his conquests in Persia, and, after placing the blind Shāh Rukh in possession of Khurāsān with Mashhad as his capital, he again retired to Afghanistān.

In 1752-53 the whole country was a prey to anarchy; its subjugation by Ahmad Shāh, Abdālī, was momentarily expected; and gangs of Afghāns and lawless Persians appeared in the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās. A split occurred between 'Alī Mardān Khān and Karīm Khān; the former was assassinated; and Karīm Khān obtained undivided control of the puppet Shāh, Ismā'īl, in whose name he governed Shīrāz with the title of Vakīl.

After this Āzād or Asad Khān, an Afghān who had seized Āzarbāijān, defeated Karīm Khān in the field; and in 1758 this adventurer obtained Isfahān, of which in 1755 he still held possession. Continuing his operations he obliged Karīm Khān in 1756 to abandon even Shīrāz and to take refuge in the mountains of Fārs; but not long afterwards the Vakīl engaged him successfully at the defile of Kumārij, between Shīrāz and the coast, and recovered Shīrāz. In 1758 Āzād Khān was living at

Baghdād, to which place he had retired, virtually as a prisoner of the Pāsha Governor.

In 1757 Karīm Khān was firmly established at Shīrāz, Behbehān had submitted to his authority, and he carried out a partly successful expedition against the Ka'ab of 'Arabistān; but in that year the Qājārs of Mazandarān, who had offered their aid against Āzād Khān, made war upon him under the orders of their head, Muhammad Husain Khān. The Zand chief, in 1757-58, was for a time besieged in his capital of Shīrāz; but the Qājār, weakened by defections from his force, was ultimately obliged to return to Mazandarān, where he was shortly after defeated and killed by members of his own tribe, assisted by the troops of Karīm Khān. The Vakīl then resumed possession of Isfahān. Karīm Khān, in his operations in the south, was joined by some Arabs from the Persian Gulf districts who accompanied him as far as Isfahān, but they did not behave so well as he could have desired. His relations with the Arab tribes in his jurisdiction were usually friendly, but he punished them with severity when they were guilty of excesses or refused to pay revenue. In 1758 Karīm Khān took Yazd, and in 1759 he granted a remission of taxes at Isfahān and appointed his brother Sādiq Khān governor of Shīrāz; but in 1760 it was reported that he was not yet master of Persia.

General Persian relations and policy of the East India Company, 1722-63.

Relations before the accession of Nādir Shāh, 1722-36.

With the Afghāns, unless with their marauding troops at Bandar 'Abbās in 1728, it does not appear that the British in Persia had any dealings during the Afghān occupation of Persia from 1722 to 1729; but, as Nādir Shāh gradually came to the front, a correspondence was opened between him and the East India Company. In 1733 Nādir promised that on the fall of Baghdād, against which he was then operating, the Company's privileges in Persia should be renewed; but after this a coolness arose, in consequence, it would seem, of dispositions made by the English for helping the Turks to defend Basrah against the Persians, and the Company's representatives at Isfahān and Kirmān were treated with such disfavour that the question of a withdrawal from those stations was seriously discussed. In 1735 the attitude of Nādir continued hostile, and on one occasion the Company's

representatives at Bandar 'Abbás went on board ship to escape evil consequences, reporting at the same time that Nádir would not be pacified unless the British made amends for their previous unfriendly action at Basrah by assisting him to take that place. On receiving this information the Presidency of Bombay endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to recall the "Queen Caroline," which had just sailed for Persia with their Agent; they despatched the galley "Prince of Wales" and the ships "Robert" and "Jenny" to the assistance of their staff at Bandar 'Abbás; they decided, with questionable good faith, to grant a passage to a Persian Ambassador returning from India and then, if it should appear advisable, to detain him as a hostage; and, finally, they authorised the sale, but only in an extremity, of one or two of their vessels to the Persian Government. A little later, towards the end of 1735, "a strange Raqam" was issued by Nádir, who was now expected to proclaim himself Sháh, to the effect that the British should be exempt from customs duty to the extent of 1,000 Tumáns a year or so much more as Muhammad Taqi Khán, the governor of Fárs, might think fit; but Nádir still continued to urge the Company's representatives to supply him with ships, and they were at last constrained to agree that, on condition of a deposit of 8,000 Tûmáns in cash being made, they would procure him two vessels of 20 guns each. Meanwhile, on account of insults and oppressions, the Factory at Isfahán was closed; but correspondence with Nádir and his local officials on the subject of a renewal of privileges continued, and the prospect of a peace between the Persians and the Turks gave ground for hope that the difficulties of the Agency at Bandar 'Abbás would shortly come to an end.

Relations during the reign of Nádir Sháh, 1736-47.

After his accession to the throne of Persia, which took place early in 1736, Nádir Sháh made peace with the Turks and began to show a very favourable disposition towards the English.

1736.

He remained firm, however, in his determination to create a Persian navy in the Gulf for general purposes; and the Company's representatives were obliged to make good their promise of supplying two ships on payment, an offer which they had not expected that the Sháh would accept. The vessels provided were the "Northumberland," which the Persians—not being good judges in marine matters—readily took over although she was in bad condition,* and the "Cowan," which was in reality a fine ship. By the end of 1736 the Sháh had apparently renewed

*This appears to have been due to the fraudulent behaviour of a Captain Mylne whose effects were ordered to be attached in case the Persians should raise any claim, but they did not.

some of the Company's privileges, but the remainder still trembled in the balance; and, rather than offend the Shāh, the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās reluctantly undertook the conveyance to India of a Persian Ambassador to the Mughal court, a service which had been demanded of the Dutch but which they, for want of a ship, had been unable to perform. Earlier in the year, from similar motives, the British had been obliged to entertain a son of Muhammad Taqi Khān at 'Isin near Bandar 'Abbās at great expense, and to give him valuable presents. A letter from the President at Bombay, congratulating Nādir Shāh on his accession, was duly delivered to that potentate and elicited assurances of favour and protection.

1737. On the 15th of February 1737, probably in connection with a Persian expedition against 'Omān which sailed on the 1st of April following, the Baiglarbaig of Fārs, Muhammad Taqi Khān, arrived in person at Bandar 'Abbās. Subject to confirmation by his master, he renewed by Raqam all the former privileges of the English in Persia except the right of receiving 1,000 Tūmāns a year from the customs of Bandar 'Abbās; he substituted for the last a right of taking one-third of the customs on goods imported in British ships, a British representative to be present at the customs house on such occasions; and he promised that British merchants should be civilly and justly treated. His entertainment cost the Agency 150 Tūmāns in presents and other expenses; and they also found it necessary to give him a bill on Kirmān for 200 Tūmāns in silver, in order that he might not prohibit the exportation of copper and Black Money * and goods other than wool from Kirmān, as he talked of doing. The Company's staff were not urged to give assistance, which they had in fact been instructed by their superiors in India to refuse, in the expedition against 'Omān; but so much pressure was brought to bear upon the Dutch that they eventually sent a ship.

1741. After this the East India Company had no dealings of consequence with Persian officials until 1740, when, as described further on, a serious mutiny occurred in the Persian naval service, and the British and the Dutch were called upon to help in its suppression: on this occasion the old claim that the English were bound by an agreement to assist the Persians in their maritime undertakings was once more advanced by the Persian Admiral. The Dutch gave the Persians some real assistance, though of an ineffectual kind; but the British confined their action to the loan of some saluting guns, a gunner, and a detachment

* Evidently "Siyah Pul", *i.e.*, coined copper.

of African soldiers for equipping a Persian ketch upon which, at the insistence of the Admiral, the British flag was hoisted. The operations of the Admiral against the mutineers ended in a fiasco, and the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbās, apprehending the issue of "some strange and severe orders" by the Shāh, requested that the guard of the Agency might be strengthened; but it does not appear that Nādir Shāh took any steps to express resentment.

In 1743 the British Factory at Isfahān was re-opened, but the up-country trade was crushed by * "inland duties," and the endeavours of the Company's employés to obtain a Raqam for exemption from these were not immediately successful. The Shāh's minister at first asked that the question might be dropped; but, when hopes of a gratuity were held out to him, he promised to use his best endeavours, adding however that his efforts might fail, and that in such a case a public application to the Shāh at a cost of about Rs. 30,000 would become necessary. It was apparently considered by the Agent that a sum of 700 or 800 Tūmāns would be well laid out in securing the desired exemption. 1743.

In 1744 the question of inland duties at Isfahān was settled by the Shāh, who decided that in future they should be paid by the British at the same rates as by his own subjects. The Shāh's officers took upon themselves, besides bringing this order into force, to demand arrears of inland duties, and the Company's representatives were compelled to pay up under this name about 2,800 Tūmāns, of which it does not appear that any portion was ever refunded.

Nādir Shāh, whose capital after 1741 was at Mashhad, visited Isfahān early in 1746; and during his stay there, according to the Chief and Council of Bandar 'Abbās, "he treated our Resident as civilly "as could be expected from the tyrannical disposition he was in the "time he was there, but we believe it was owing to the help of a "present, amounting to shahees 70,169-9, which could not be avoided "without running the risk of his resentment." Before leaving Isfahān on an expedition—apparently his last—to Sīstān, where a revolt had broken out, Nādir Shāh wrote to the Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās requesting that a European physician might be sent to him; and the Agent, learning that there was already a capable practitioner at or near Isfahān, instructed the Resident there to make the necessary arrange- 1746.

* The nature of these duties is not clear; if they were either Rāhdāri, Sad-yak or Havoy, " they ought not, under the former privileges confirmed by Nādir Shāh, to ha ve been demanded.

ments. The relations of the Company with Nādir ended, not unpleasantly, with this incident, and with the issue to their Linguist at the Shāh's camp of "a Rogam freeing the English of the Up Country Dutys, which was well worded".

Relations after the death of Nādir Shāh, 1747-63.

The death of Nādir Shāh exposed the Company's establishments in Persia to fresh dangers and difficulties, and in December 1747 an order was sent from Bombay to Bandar 'Abbās for the withdrawal of the up-country Factories at Isfahān and Kirmān; but it is not clear, in the case of either place, that the instructions were obeyed.

1748. Early in 1748 it was reported that the Company's Resident at Isfahān had applied to the new Shāh for a renewal of the Company's privileges and had received a satisfactory reply; and a journey by a Mr. Danvers Graves from Bandar 'Abbās to Kirmān to collect debts due to the Company, which had been in contemplation, was apparently performed as soon as the roads were clear.

1750. It might perhaps have been well if the up-country factories in Persia had been withdrawn, as directed by the Bombay Presidency in 1747, for in 1750, while Messrs. Graves and Dalrymple were at Isfahān enquiring into some irregularities that had occurred there, the Factory was attacked and plundered and the two gentlemen themselves were ill-treated, wounded, and stripped. They regained Bandar 'Abbās with difficulty in the month of October; but Mr. Dalrymple, broken down by the hardships which he had undergone, died before the end of the year, and the factory at Isfahān was never re-opened. The outrage was ascribed to rebels against the Shāh's authority, by which expression, however, the Afghāns of Ahmad Shāh, Abdāli, were probably meant.

1750-51. In 1750 the case of Muhammad Baig, one of the Ambassadors whom Nādir Shāh had sent to the Mughal court, attracted some attention in India. This individual, having been robbed by the governor of Sūra; under the Mughals, applied to the East India Company for their good offices and received some assistance, but not so much as he desired. He then endeavoured through Mulla 'Ali Shāh, the Persian Admiral at Bandar 'Abbās, to induce the Company to do more on his behalf; but the Bombay Government instead raised the question of detaining, on account of sums due to themselves by the Ambassador, a ship belonging to him which they had saved from the Mughals. How the matter ended is not clear; but it seems that in 1751 Muhammad Baig wrote a letter to Mulla 'Ali Shāh, belittling the military power of the British in India, and that the Persian Admiral in consequence adopted a very insolent tone towards the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbās.

In 1755 affairs in Persia were still in a chaotic condition. Mr. Wood, an employé of the Company, obtained from Karīm Khān, who now held Shīrāz, a Raqam authorising the establishment of a Factory at the port of Rig; and almost simultaneously Karīm Khān's principal opponent, Azād Khān of Āzarbaijān, wrote to the British Agent informing him in a friendly manner of his intention to advance upon Shīrāz. 1755.

A beginning had been made at Bandar 'Abbās in 1752 in collecting and translating all the Raqams, orders and grants of consequence relating to the Company's privileges in Persia; but the work was not apparently completed until 1756, when a box containing copies of the translations was apparently sent to the Presidency. The collection was made under orders from Bombay; and it is not a little difficult to understand the anxiety of the Company about the nature of their Farmāns at a time when no responsible government existed in Persia, and when no prospect of any being established was apparent. 1756.

Question of removing the British Agency from Bandar 'Abbās, 1750-63.

In consequence of the dissolution of the central government of Persia and the troubles, to be described hereafter, which sprang up in consequence at Bandar 'Abbās, the latter place had now ceased to be a safe or eligible site for the chief British settlement in the Gulf.

1750.

The question of removal was first mooted in 1750, on the taking of Shīrāz by the Afghāns of Ahmad Shāh, Abdāli. This event led the British Agent to propose that he should be authorised to transfer the Agency to Bahrain and to seize the Persian fleet at his departure from Bandar 'Abbās, but his scheme did not find favour at the Presidency, and it was ordered that the Agent and Council should not leave Bandar 'Abbās unless there were pressing danger, in which case they might retire "till "the Troubles in the Kingdom of Persia are subsided" to "any Island "up the Gulph near Bundar Bushire or Bunder Rique where they are "sure there is water and provisions and the inhabitants will permit "them to land and join with them for their mutual defence." In no circumstances was the Agent to seize the Persian ships at his departure. The matter was then dropped for a time.

1752.

At the beginning of 1752 Nasīr Khān of Lār, who owned no superior and whose influence was now paramount in the neighbouring country, paid a visit to Bandar 'Abbās; and his proceedings there, though he professed friendship for the Company, opened up such a vista of future extortion that the Agent advocated the removal of the Bandar 'Abbās establishment to some adjacent island such as Qishm or Hanjām. In an insular position, he argued, the property of the Company would be secure without payment of blackmail to any local chief; and he anticipated that

many native merchants would settle on an island under British protection, that the new station would become the main centre of trade between Masqat and Basrah, and that the petty chiefs of the mainland, instead of charging import duties of 16 or 17 per cent. on British trade, would compete against one another to attract it. In the opinion of the Agent a force of two ships and 300 men would be sufficient to cover the operation of transfer, and he thought there was every reason to expect that the customs receipts would be large enough to defray the expenses of any military garrison that might be required. The Bombay authorities were averse from this scheme, but they seem to have called for reports on the islands of Hanjam and Bahrain, and these were furnished in the autumn of the same year by Mr. Wood, the Agent at Bandar 'Abbás, who evidently disapproved of both places and was himself inclined to recommend the acquisition of a small existing fort on the south-eastern corner of Qishm Island under a grant from the Shah or from the Khán of Lár. A few days later Mr. Wood, with the instability of whose character we shall become better acquainted hereafter, wrote to Bombay deprecating the proposed transfer altogether on the ground that the Agency at Bandar 'Abbás was perfectly safe, and that removal might lead to a rupture with the Persians and give an advantage to the Dutch. He had lost sight, apparently, of the inconvenience of extortions by local governors.

1760. Mr. Wood's arguments, which agreed with their own inclinations, seem to have satisfied the President and his Council at Bombay that no steps need be taken; and the question of removal slumbered until 1760, when it was revived, probably by the success of the Dutch settlement founded on Khárag in 1753, by the capture and destruction of the British Agency at Bandar 'Abbás by the French in 1759, and by the growing insolence of the local chiefs near Bandar 'Abbás. A report on the feasibility of obtaining another site having been required by the Presidency authorities from the Agent, the commandant of the Hormúz fort was interviewed by the latter, accompanied by a Captain Baillie, in the autumn of 1760; but the Persian official, though he agreed to a British settlement being formed on the island, could not be induced even by a bribe to surrender the fort, and the prospects of obtaining it otherwise, whether by force or under a grant from the Khán of Lár, also appeared doubtful. The Agent moreover considered that, even apart from those obstacles, Hormúz was not an eligible place, for supplies were non-existent, water scarce, and the fort and buildings so ruinous that it would cost Rs. 80,000 to put them in repair.

1761. The President and Council at Bombay, upon receiving the Agent's report, pointed out that he had unduly restricted his enquiries, for what

they had required was his "opinion of any place of security in the Gulph he might judge proper;" and, as the constant changes and confusion at Bandar 'Abbās prevented their forming an opinion of their own on the subject, they invested him and his Council with discretion in the matter of removal, subject to the condition that, if it were undertaken, all the treasure, copper, wool, etc., then at Bandar 'Abbās should be returned to Bombay along with the artillery and garrison, except the sepoys, and that one "covenant servant" and the Linguist should remain behind to receive the wool investment. It was explained to the Agent that no scheme involving expenditure could be adopted without the sanction of the Company's Court at home, and that no hostile action could be taken against the Persians during the continuance of the war with France; but the Agent was to favour the President and Council with his "clear and explicit sentiments" in regard to the whole situation. It was added in the Presidency letter: "We still think a House with a servant at "Gombroon will be necessary in order to preserve a communication "with Carmania, and also to keep open an intercourse with the Caravans that may come from the Interior Provinces of Persia." About the beginning of April 1761, soon after these orders reached Bandar 'Abbās, the Agent, Mr. Alexander Douglas, proceeded to Basrah intending to view by the way all the islands in the Gulf which might seem suitable for a settlement, and on his return journey he visited Būshehr and had an interview with the local Shaikh; but he was slow in submitting his opinion, and at the end of the year the Presidency found it necessary to remind him that they "impatiently expect his sentiments about removing from Gombroon."

Mr. Douglas's opinion, when it was received at the beginning of 1762, was that trial should be made of Būshehr, to which place he advised that a covenant servant should be sent; the port was secure, being surrounded on three sides by the sea and on the fourth by a wall mounted with serviceable artillery; it was full of inland merchants, who seemed to enjoy complete liberty of trade; and the Shaikh, with whom alone it would be necessary to deal, bore an excellent character and was anxious for the presence of a British Factory. A polite letter from the Shaikh to the Governor of Bombay was enclosed, explaining that Būshehr was now the principal port for the interior of Persia, the communications with which were safe, and that there was a trade with both coasts of the Gulf; and the Shaikh promised, though the Presidency did not consider his assurance sufficiently explicit until it had been repeated, that the goods of the Company and those of their servants should be exempt from customs duty. In regard to the islands other than those near Bandar 1762.

'Abbas, the Agent reported that none had any safe anchorage in southerly winds, and that all but Qais and Shaikh Shu'aib were uninhabited. On the above information the President and Council decided that Mr. Douglas might be allowed to go himself or to send his Second, Mr. Lyster, to Būshehr with an experimental cargo; but they declined to commit themselves, without further experience, to any permanent arrangement. The Court of Directors, when the intentions of the Bombay Presidency came to their knowledge, agreed that in view of the arbitrary behaviour of the Khān of Lār it was now advisable to withdraw temporarily from Bandar' Abbās, and they prohibited the landing of any more goods at that port; but they directed that a Linguist should remain in a small hired house to keep the British flag flying. With reference to the project of starting a new settlement, the Court prohibited the taking of any steps without their express sanction, and they suggested that in the meantime the Gulf Agency should be transferred to Basrah.

Arrangements for withdrawal from Bandar 'Abbās, February-March, 1763.

These instructions were issued in April 1762, but they did not take effect until the following year, when the President and Council at Bombay informed the Agent of their purport and sent the ship "Prince of Wales," Captain Court, and the ketch "Drake," Captain Lindsey, to assist in their execution. These vessels arrived at Bandar 'Abbās, where the "Swallow," Captain Nesbit, was already lying, upon the 26th of February 1763; and the Nāib* or Deputy Governor of the town, suspecting some unusual design on the part of the British, immediately sent to his master the Khan of Lār, begging him to come in person with reinforcements.

Capture of the Nāib's house and the Persian fort and evacuation of the Agency.

As the Nāib, on becoming aware of what was actually intended, showed a disposition to hamper the proceedings and absolutely refused to afford any reparation for the extortions which had been practised on the Agency by himself and others in recent years, as there was a chance moreover that some compensation might thereby be secured for the Company, and, finally, as some sort of diversion was necessary in order to prevent the Persians from harassing the retirement from the Agency, which was situated at a distance from the sea and was surrounded by houses and walls, Mr. Douglas resolved—apparently on his own responsibility—to attack the Persian fort and the old Dutch Factory. In the latter building, which had been in possession of the Persians since about three years, the Nāib resided and was supposed to

* This may have been the father-in-law of Ja'far Khān, who had been placed in charge of the town on the 10th of January: *see* page 109 *post*.

keep his ill-gotten gains. Accordingly, on on the 4th March the "Prince of Wales" having been brought into 2¼ fathoms of water and the "Drake" and "Swallow" having taken up their stations about three-quarters of a mile off shore, a bombardment of the fort was begun; but the range was too great for the guns of the "Prince of Wales," and the ordnance of the "Drake" and "Swallow" proved too light for battering. The only piece that did any execution was a mortar under the direction of Lieutenant Thomas Durnford, "Fire Worker," of which the quoin gave way at the first, and the whole of the bed at the twentieth discharge; after these accidents it was still kept in action by means of rope lashings, but accurate practice was no longer possible.

In the meanwhile a weak military detachment, reinforced by parties from the ships and commanded apparently by Captain Palmer, attacked the Nāib's house, which was taken after an hour and a half's fighting. Unfortunately the Persians, during the progress of the attack, found means to remove most of the valuables through an embrasure at the west end of the building, and the Nāib's wife and family, whom it was intended to capture and hold as hostages, made their escape by the same way. Mr. Douglas was thus disappointed in his hope of being able to recoup the Company's losses.

On the morning of the 5th March the Persian garrison, unable to endure any longer the fire of the single British mortar, evacuated the fort and retired westwards to the village of Sūru. A party was then landed, who, finding it impossible to remove the enemy's guns, spiked all but two and burned the carriages. The killed in these operations were three Europeans of the "Prince of Wales's" crew, four of the military detachment, one of the train, and five sepoys. On the evening of the 7th, a body of 250 horsemen having appeared in the vicinity, the landing parties and staff of the Agency, together with all the moveable property that had been captured, were embarked on board ship.

Further Proceedings.

It was determined, after due consideration, not to attack the Persian Admiral Mulla 'Alī Shāh in his fort at Qishm, one reason being that the mortar could not be used any longer, and another that the Admiral had spent all his substance during the previous three years in subsidies to the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah. Mr. Douglas, however, ordered Captains Court and Lindsey to seize the ship "Rahmāni", then lying off Lāft, which was in the possession of the Admiral's Qāsimi ally; but after arrival there, on Captain Court "representing the risque and dangers to be very great", the attempt was countermanded.

Two hired Trankis carrying the stock of the Bander 'Abbās Agency having been despatched to Basrah under convoy of the "Drake", and arrangements having been made for the sale of two Trankis belonging to the Company, Mr. Douglas apparently returned to Bombay, despatching ahead of him by the "Prince of Wales" all the treasure of the Agency except a parcel of Mahmūdis, which, as they would not pass current in India, he sent to Basrah with the other goods. These spirited and on the whole well-conducted operations at its abandonment are perhaps the least unsatisfactory episode in the whole history of the Bander 'Abbās Agency, and they had a considerable effect in restoring the credit of the British name in the lower Gulf, where it had been impaired by insolence and injury too long tamely endured.

Affairs at Bandar 'Abbās and in its neighbourhood, 1722-63.

General character.

We may now turn to the local history of Bandar 'Abbās and its adjacent districts, of which the events, towards the close of the period, will be found to afford a full explanation of the withdrawal of the British Agency in 1763. The truth is that this part of Persia became, after the death of Nādir Shāh, a pandemonium of indecisive warfare among petty chiefs who had little real power, and who were devoid of all sense of dignity and administrative responsibility. The principal figures in this strife were Nāsir Khān,* the Persian chief of Lār, a district and town at some distance in the interior; Mulla 'Alī Shāh, an Arab born, but, as commandant of the Persian fleet and governor of Bandar 'Abbās under Nādir Shāh, usually regarded as a Persian official; and, during a part of the time, 'Abdul Shaikh, chief of Qishm and head apparently of the Bani Ma'in tribe, whose influence was generally predominant on that island.

Events before the accession of Nādir Shāh, 1722-36.

During the Afghān occupation of Persia (1722-29) affairs in the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās were very unsettled. The Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah upon the Arabian coast having established a port of his own at Bāsidu on Qishm Island in opposition to Bandar 'Abbās, Mr. Draper, the British Agent in Persia, proceeded against him in April 1727 with the "Britannia" frigate, "Bengal" galley and two Trankis, and obliged him to make good the loss which had resulted to

* The name is spelt both Nassir and Nasseer in the records and may therefore have been either Nāsir or Naṣīr.

the East India Company from the decrease of trade at Bandar 'Abbās. In 1728 the Afghāns appeared at Bandar 'Abbās, took the town, and fell foul of the Dutch. Upon this, it would appear, the Dutch seized Hormūz, but were persuaded to give it up again by the British Agent and his subordinates, who mediated. The local Persian authorities then attacked and expelled the Afghāns; but the latter succeeded in re-taking the town, and on this occasion plundered the British Factory. Finally, the Persians having ousted the Afghāns and having been induced by the Dutch to believe that the British had assisted the marauders, a fine of 300 Tūmāns was imposed on the British Factory by the Persian authorities and some of the Company's premises were seized.

Events during the reign of Nādir Shāh, 1736—47.

In the spring of 1736, Nādir Shāh having then very recently ascended the throne, the native merchants of Bandar 'Abbās were sorely oppressed by the local authorities and abandoned the place; but they were prevailed upon to return. The Persian expedition to 'Omān in 1737 and that to Makrān in 1739 were both made, in so far as movements by sea were involved, from Bandar 'Abbās as a base.

1740. A mutiny occurred, in August 1740, of the Arab crews by whom Nādir Shāh's vessels in the lower Persian Gulf were manned; it was accompanied by the murder of the Admiral, a Persian named Mīr 'Alī Khān; and it was followed by a distribution of the Persian fleet, consisting of three ships, a grab and a brigantine, between the Arab Shaikhs of Qishm and Rās-al-Khaimah. The Dutch were induced to send two 20-gun vessels, which they had in port, against the mutineers; but, after a favourable opportunity of recovering the grab had been missed, their vessels returned ignominiously to Bandar 'Abbās on the 13th of September. A new Darya Baigi or Persian Admiral, "who had never seen a ship or the sea in his life," then arrived to take charge of affairs. After fitting out a Persian ketch with the help of the British and hoisting the British flag on it, as related in the last section, he set out on the 23rd of September with this ketch, two Dutch ships, a small grab and about 20 Trankis to look for the enemy; but the only action fought was a small skirmish, by which the Admiral was so terrified that he returned hastily to Bandar 'Abbās on 12th of October pursued as far as Kung by the rebels. Whether the Persian ships were ever recovered from the Arabs does not appear; but the general condition of affairs on shore was now better than previously, and some attention at length seemed to be paid at Bandar 'Abbās to the welfare of the Shāh's subjects.

1744. In the spring of 1744 a very curious and involved affair occurred at Bandar 'Abbās. It began with the receipt by the British and the Dutch

simultaneously of Raqams from Nādir Shāh at Hamadān, requiring their co-operation in seizing Muhammad Taqi Khān, governor of Shīrāz, who had rebelled; but these Raqams were accompanied by letters from a Sardār at Shīrāz which called upon the European Factories to assist, if necessary, one Mīr 'Alī Sultān, who had been sent with troops, in arresting the governor and customs officer of Bandar 'Abbās. The Dutch immediately sent to Mir 'Alī Sultān inviting him to approach, and he entered the town on the night of the 27th March, when it was discovered that he had Raqams from the Shāh confirming the governor and customs officer in their appointments. The latter, on being summoned to receive his Raqam, attended, but the governor delayed, whereupon about 40 men were sent to attack his house, the Dutch at the same time opening fire upon it and upon his fort. The British, knowing that the Dutch did not intend to act upon the Shāh's Raqam of confirmation, invited the governor to surrender to them, which he did; and the British Agent then wrote to Shīrāz reporting that, as the Shāh's Raqam had not been shown him, he had seized the governor according to the Sardār's commands. It is not known how the episode ended.

Events after the death of Nādir Shah, 1747-63

Serious disturbances involving danger or inconvenience to the British Factory did not again begin at Bandar 'Abbās until 1750, or three years after the assassination of Nādir Shāh; but from that date onwards they continued almost without intermission for thirteen years.

1750.

Towards the end of 1750 there was great anxiety at Bandar 'Abbās, for the Bakhtiyāris had occupied Fasa, Jahrum and Dārāb and threatened the whole of the Garmsīr or low country towards the Gulf from no very great distance, while Ahmad Shāh, Abdālī, whose success in taking Shīrāz had attracted thousands to his banners, sent messengers to the Persian authorities near Bandar 'Abbās requiring large amounts of grain and money. It was ascertained that Ahmad Shāh meant to extort a huge sum from the European Factories at Bandar 'Abbās; but, as the "Drake" ketch and a large Dutch ship were then in the harbour, this demand was not openly propounded; and the British and Dutch arranged between themselves with Mulla 'Alī, who was to send them one ship, for a joint withdrawal in case of emergency to the islands. It was fortunate that the necessity to remove did not arise, for Mulla 'Alī Shāh subsequently allowed himself to be won over by Ahmad Khān, "a sharp, cunning fellow," who arrived at Bandar 'Abbās on the 13th of December with only ten men. By this emissary the Mulla was induced to adopt a more favourable opinion of the Afghāns and to promise one year's revenue to Ahmad Shāh.

In 1751 anarchy prevailed, Persian merchants began to emigrate from the country in large numbers, and trade came to a standstill. A Balūchi raid occurred in the Shamīl district. The Hūwalah * sent a fleet of a dozen Trankis to Bandar 'Abbās, ostensibly to congratulate Mulla 'Ali Shāh, the Persian Admiral and Governor, on the marriage of his daughter, but in reality to carry off his vessels; and that astute individual, making a virtue of a necessity, presented them with a ship and two gallivats, which left him with only one ship in his possession. 1751.

At the beginning of 1752 Nāsir Khān, chief of Lār, suddenly attacked Bandar 'Abbās, captured Mulla 'Ali Shāh with his family and his remaining ship, and plundered the wealthier inhabitants of the town, one of whom died under torture. The Khān paid a friendly visit to the British Factory, where he offered to appoint as governor of Bandar 'Abbās anyone whom the Agent might desire,—a suggestion which was evaded "as genteely as possible,"—and received 100 Tūmāns as a present from the Factory. This did not prevent his extorting other 80 Tūmāns from the Hindu merchants under British protection, but no protest was made on this score as more than six times the amount had been taken from the Dutch. Soon after the Khān's return to Lār, trouble arose between him and 'Abdul Shaikh of Qishm in consequence of the sale of a Persian ship by the latter to the Imām of 'Omān; the Khān at once sent to Mr. Wood, the British Agent, requiring him to recover the ship, which had not yet sailed; and that gentleman most reluctantly complied, despatching the "Drake" and the "Rahmāni" to Lāft, by which means the surrender of the disputed vessel was obtained without the firing of a single shot. At the end of the year the Khān again visited Bandar 'Abbās in person with 2,000 Afghān and Persian soldiers and contracted at the British Factory a debt of 99,035 Shāhis, "in broadcloth, tabbies and sattins" probably "to make Apparel for his Families and Dependants, "which they by no means could avoid supplying him with, as the hazard of "a refusal would have been far greater than that of trusting to his honesty "in regard to payment." In discharge of this debt the Agent received, as did also the Dutch Agent for purchases made at the Dutch Factory, a parcel of bad bills; and in the case of the British five unserviceable brass guns were thrown in, which were consigned to Bombay as 997 maunds of old copper. Before he left, the Khān re-appointed M la 'Ali Shāh to the governorship of Bandar 'Abbās, in subordination to himself. Some hopes 1752.

* Possibly those of Bahrain, but more probably those of the Persian coast, who were in the 18th century the main part of this so-called tribe. See Niebuhr's *Description de l'Arabie*, pages 271-272, in whose day most of the coast Arabs from Bandar Abbās to Kangūn were considered to be Hūwalah.

were still entertained by the British at this time of advantage from the Khān's protection, for, as was generally admitted, he was the only person capable of maintaining any sort of order in the districts around Bandar 'Abbās.

1753. In 1753 the Agent found himself obliged to retain the Company's ship "Guardian" at Bandar 'Abbās for a considerable period, the reason being that Nāsir Khān was at the time hard pressed by an Arab combination and in danger of being overthrown, in which case it might have been necessary to embark the Company's servants and goods. Nāsir Khān however, though a number of Persians joined with his Arab enemies, succeeded in maintaining his position as principal chief in the Garmsīr or "Hot Country," as his jurisdiction was called.

1754. During 1754 the situation of Nāsir Khān continued critical. He was repulsed in an attack on Kirmān and was several times defeated by the Hūwalah, with whom he was compelled to make peace, while Mulla 'Alī Shāh, having become distrustful of his intentions, seized Hormūz and stationed a ship there, but himself remained at Bandar 'Abbās with another ship.

1755. In 1755 a new factor appeared upon the scene in the person of a lieutenant, named 'Alī Khān, of the Vakīl Karīm Khān of Shīrāz; this officer twice defeated Nāsir Khān in the field, driving him into his capital of Lār, and appointed tax-collectors to visit Mīnāb and Bandar 'Abbās. Shehryāri, the chief of Mīnāb, sent these agents away unpaid; but at Bandar 'Abbās, where they remained or some time, they were perhaps more successful. Mulla 'Alī Shāh was required by them to supply "sundries" to the value of Rs. 4,000 for the Vakīl; and it was intimated to the English and Dutch Agents, but with what result does not appear, that they were expected to send him handsome presents. The advance on Shīrāz towards the end of the year of Āzād Khān, Afghān, who had an understanding with Nāsir Khān, compelled Karīm Khān to recall 'Alī Khān from Lār, but not till he had ravaged that district "in a terrible manner". Meanwhile Mulla 'Alī Shāh had laid siege to Lāft on the island of Qishm, the stronghold of 'Abdul Shaikh, with whom he was at war, and the latter, who was 80 years of age, happening to die while the siege was still in progress, the place surrendered. Thereupon Mulla 'Alī Shāh returned home in triumph with the head of his deceased enemy; and, on his arrival at Bandar 'Abbās, he levied a contribution of Rs. 3,000 on the "Multanny* and Panksally" merchants there for the purpose of rewarding the Arabs who had joined his

* Evidently "Multāni," *i.e.*, probably Sindis or Khōjahs.

cause. The result of his operations seems to have been the expulsion of the Bani Ma'in from Qishm.

In 1757 Nāsir Khān invaded Shamil, but he had to return in haste to Lār, an attack on which by Karīm Khān was apprehended. Mulla 'Ali Shāh still continued to withhold from Nāsir Khān a sum of 1,000 Tūmāns and two brass guns which he had often promised to give him; and in this year, much to the indignation of the Khān, he placed himself beyond the latter's reach by retiring to Hormūz and at the same time persuaded a number of the chief inhabitants of Bandar 'Abbas to retire likewise to islands. 1757.

At the beginning of 1758 Mulla 'Ali Shāh was still at Hormūz; Lārak at this time also belonged to him; and he was strong in a matrimonial alliance which existed between his family and that of the Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah. In March of this year Dr. Ives visited Bandar 'Abbās with a party of the Company's servants who were on their way to Europe by way of Turkish 'Irāq; and he mentions, in his account of his journey, that the Khān of Lār had about 5,000 armed men at his disposal and that he had lately defended his capital with success against Karīm Khān. A few days before Dr. Ives's arrival Nāsir Khān, on the complaints of the British and the Dutch, sent a force against a petty chief near 'Isīn who had interrupted the wool trade with Kirmān, and the robber was dislodged from his fort and about 70 of his men were slain; but, unfortunately, a detachment of the Khān's force allowed themselves to be surprised by a party of the enemy after their success, and lost several killed. Among these last was the Khān's chief officer, and the Surgeon of the British Agency was called in to attend the wounded. At Bandar 'Abbās, at the time of Dr. Ives's visit, no inhabitants remained except the dependants of the European Factories and a few Hindu and Persian merchants. In June the fort of Shamīl was taken by an enemy of the Khān of Lār and that of 'Isīn was seized by a party sent by Mulla 'Ali Shāh; and these two incidents, both disagreeable to the Khān, were celebrated with firing of guns and distribution of presents by Mulla 'Ali Shāh, who remained on Hormūz, and whose rashly defiant conduct occasioned general surprise. Towards the end of the year Muhammad Vali Khān, a commander in Kārim Khān's army, appeared in Lār and began to plunder the country; he defeated Nāsir Khan, killing his principal lieutenant, and obliged him to fortify himself in the town of Lār; and so general was the alarm caused by his presence that even Shehryāri, the chief of Mīnāb, thought it time to levy a contribution of Rs. 30,000 from his subjects 1758.

for the purpose of buying off an attack. While Muhammad Vali Khān's intentions remained undeclared, the ketch "Viper" was detained at Bandar 'Abbās, in addition to the ordinary guard vessel, for the protection of the British Factory; and her detention was subsequently approved by the Presidency authorities.

1759

About the middle of January 1759 Muhammad Vali Khān, who had now been appointed Sardār of Garmsīr in supersession of Nāsir Khān, advanced to Mināb, and in fifteen days he entirely ruined the place, his conduct being still that of a freebooter rather than of a Governor. The Dutch Factory was finally withdrawn from Bandar 'Abbās at this juncture. A couple of months later Muhammad Vali Khān approached Bandar 'Abbās, and the Linguist of the British Agency, who was sent to wait upon him, was "received very genteely and presented with a Coat of Honour". Muhammad Vali Khān then publicly announced his intention of reducing Lār and informed Mulla 'Ali Shāh that, after Lār was taken, he would remove him from the government of Bandar 'Abbās, but that wily character, who "seemed regardless of the continent in "time of troubles, but generally returned as soon as they were blown over, "behaving with the greatest arrogance," appeared less concerned at the threats of Karīm Khān's official than at the refusal of the British Agent to lend him Rs. 4,000. In April an unpleasant incident occurred, due to the town having been deserted by its respectable inhabitants. The door, timber, etc., of some of the Agency servants' houses having been carried off by robbers, complaint was made to the Persian Deputy-Governor or Nāib of Bandar 'Abbās, who denied that the culprits could be his subjects and offered to punish them if produced. Some Arabs were accordingly arrested by the Agency employés; but, while they were being conducted to the Nāib, they drew their swords, wounded several men, and escaped; and no redress could be obtained for this outrage, as it proved to have been committed by dependants of the Qāsimi Shaikh who at the time were nominally engaged in cruising, in alliance with Arabs of Chārak, against Mir Mahanna, the piratical chief of Rīg. In June Muhammad Vali Khān was in the neighbourhood of Lār, where Karim Khān had ordered him to remain.

Capture and destruction of the British Factory at Bandar Abbās by the French, October-November 1759.

In October of the following year the British Factory at Bandar 'Abbās was suddenly attacked, captured, and destroyed by a French fleet; the whole circumstances of the affair are minutely described in the interesting despatches below, which have been taken from the original records of the Bombay Presidency.*

* The liberty has been taken of amending the punctuation, etc., to a slight extent.

From the Agent and Council at Gombroon to the President and Governor in Council, Bombay.

Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,

This address your Honour, etc., will receive *viâ* Muscat, and is to give you the disagreeable news of the French having taken the Hon'ble Company's Factory; they came into the road on the 12th in the evening with four ships under Dutch Colours, one of which was a vessel of sixty-four guns, one of twenty-two guns, with the Mary belonging to Chellaby and the Mamoody belonging to Mahomet Soffy. On the 13th, early in the morning, they landed to the westward of the Factory with two mortars and four pieces of cannon, and began to batter; we, on our parts, did what the few number of Europeans we had would admit of.* As to the Topasses and seepoys, few of them would stand to the guns. About 11 o'clock, being high water, their ship of twenty-two guns hauled within about one quarter of a mile of the Factory and began to play on us; at the same time they ashore played on us with their mortars and guns from the westward.

At about half an hour past three in the afternoon a summons was sent from the French Camp, upon which the Agent called a Council of War consisting of himself, William Nash, Lieutenants Bembou (*sic*) and Evans and Ensign Johnson, wherein the strength of the House was considered, with the people we had to defend it, and our being sure of having no succour from Moolah Ally Shaw. The Military Gentlemen were of unanimous opinion that the house was not tenable, upon which it was unanimously agreed to make the best terms we could; and that night the same was agreed on as per copy of the capitulation herewith enclosed, but sorry we are to remark the same has not been observed in the manner we might have expected from Europeans. They have gone so far as to take away a few liquors we had for our use and many other things, unnecessary at present to trouble your Honour, etc., with; to be brief they comply with the articles just as they like.

The French are at present embarking the old copper and unloading the Mamoodis, whose cargoe consisting of Dates they have given to Moolah Ally Shaw, who supplies them with every thing in his power; at present, by what we can perceive, their stay here will be no longer than needs must, and will go to some Port in India.

The French had on shore, when they took possession of the Factory, according to the best accounts we could take, about four hundred and fifty Europeans and one hundred and fifty Coffrees; they had brought Bamboos with them and made scalling ladders, and were determined to have scaled the House on the 13th at night.

On the 12th we had intelligence of the French having been at Muscat and were bound further up the Gulph, upon which Lieutenant Bembou was ordered to carry the "Speedwell" to Loft, but before he could get under weigh the French appeared, and prevented his complying with orders; which being perceived, he was told to run the ship ashore, but being pursued very close by the twenty-two gun ship, and the Tide flowing and having two sails set, she floated; and the French sent people and took possession of her, so they have now five ships.

On the 13th, while the French ships were standing into the Road, Moolah Ally Shaw came to the Factory and gave the Agent all imaginable assurances of his affording us assistance, and that if the French attempted to land he would do what was in his power to prevent it; but, on his being sent to in the morning and

* According to Low, *Indian Navy*, I. 152, the garrison of the factory consisted of 16 seamen and some sepoys.

acquainted that they were approaching the shore in order to land, instead of performing his promise he remained quiet in his Fort; and, tho' about ten o'clock the Agent requested he would send a few men to our assistance, yet not a man could be got. The reason he assigned for not doing it was that one of his ships which was at anchor in the anchor (*sic*) was in their Power and that, if he afforded us assistance of men, they would certainly carry her away; tho', to be brief, he was really afraid of the French, and not long after their landing sent them such refreshments of greens and fruits as the season afforded, telling them he would supply them with whatever [was] in his Power and the Place afforded.

Out of the few number of Europeans we had, we beg leave to acquaint your Honour, etc., that Ensign Johnston and Serjeant Ranscommen were so much indisposed as to be able to do no duty the day we were attacked.

The French have sent the Europeans and Topasses on board their ships and have given liberty to the sepoys to go where they like.

According to the best Intelligence we can get, the French have positive orders to demolish the Factory, saying the English demolished their Settlement at Chandernagore, tho' for the present to keep things smoothed with Moolah Ally Shaw they tell him they will make him present thereof; at the same time they tell our gentlemen they have no such design, and that its only done to amuse him for the present, being in want of his assistance. Messrs. Bembon, Evans, Johnston and Mainwaring are repair, at their own particular request, to Bombay.

The Two French Ships were fitted out from the Islands, and, as they say, on purpose for this place, and had been just five weeks from thence when they arrived here.

So soon as the French are gone, we shall endeavour to get down this year's investment of wool and endeavour to procure money to send the Linguist for to pay for the same; and, should any Guard Ship have left Bombay with woolen goods for this place e'er this reaches your Honour, etc., we shall take those ashore for market and afterwards send the vessel to Bussorah; at present Woolens are in demand in the inland Parts, according to the information we have received.

At present we reside at the Dutch Factory.

We were unable till now to procure a Boat for Muscat, and, so soon as we can get one for Bussorah, we shall write to the Hon'ble Company. A boat was dispatched the 12th for Bussorah.

We have wrote to Norotam at Muscat to pay the Freight of this Boat, being Rupees Three hundred (300), which we request your Honour etc., will pay to his order.

We are with respect,
Hon'ble Sir & Sirs,
Your most obedient humble servants,
ALEXANDER DOUGLAS.
WILLIAM NASH.

GOMBROON
22nd October 1759.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION WITH THE FRENCH AT GOMBROON.

Articles of Capitulation for the English East India Company's Factory of Gombroon, between Alexander Douglas, Esq., Chief of the said Settlement, and Council, and Monsieur Des Essars, Captain of His most Christian Majesty's Ship Condé, and Commander-in-Chief of the present Expedition, and Monsieur Charuyau, Captain Commandant of the Land Forces.

Article 1st.

So soon as the present Capitulation is signed, a Detachment of French Troops are to take possession of the Factory; the Keys are to be delivered to the Commanding Officer; and no Person is to come in or go out without his permission, as he will take care to prevent Disorders and Thefts.

Article 2nd.

All Effects of what kind soever contained in the Factory are to belong to the Besiegers, and are to be delivered to the French Commissary with all Books and Papers in Possession of the Besieged; the Besiegers are to be shown the Warehouses that they may place the necessary centinels over them; the Artillery, Arms, Ammunition, Provisions, Money, Merchandize and Slaves, in general everything contained within the Factory, are comprehended in this article.

Article 3rd.

The Chief, the Garrison, Factors, Writers, and all Europeans in the service of the English East India Company, in general all the subjects of His Britannick Majesty in the Factory, are to be Prisoners of War under the following Clauses only.

Article 4th

Whereas Monsieur D'Estaing, Brigadier (of) Foot and formerly a Prisoner of His Britannick Majesty, now on Board the ship Condé on his way to Europe by the way of Bussorah, being desirous of rendering more secure the Intelligence received of an Exchange having been made in his behalf between Governour Pigot, Esq., of Madrass and Monsieur Lally, Lieutenant-General, it is now agreed between the Besiegers and Besieged that Alexander Douglas, Esq., Chief of the English East India Company's Factory at Gombroon, with William Nash, Ensign Johnston, Dymoke Lyster, Lieutenant George Bembou, Lieutenant Richard Evans, and Richard Malnwaring, are lawfully exchanged for Monsieur D'Estaing, and they are at full liberty to go where and to what Places they please, in consequence of which Monsieur D'Estaing is under no other Clause than what is specified in the Sixth Article.

Article 5th.

Tho' the present Exchange of Prisoners is an unnecessary precaution in behalf of Monsieur D'Estaing, yet all persons mentioned in the preceding Article are absolutely free; but shou'd Monsieur D'Estaing have been already exchanged, as he undoubtedly is, in that case (for) the seven Persons already mentioned, who now enjoy their Liberty, a like number and of equal station of His most Christian Majesty's subjects, are to be released, whenever a Castle is made (? taken).

Article 6th.

Monsieur D'Estaing, in order to fulfil with the greatest Exactitude the Promise he made Governour Pigot that he would not take arms against the English, on the Cormandel Coast only, for the space of eighteen months reckoning from the 1st of May 1759, desires it may be inserted in the present Capitulation that, notwithstanding he is now exchanged, yet he will keep the promise made Governour Pigot of not taking arms against the English, on the Coast of Cormandel only for the space of eighteen months, but he is at free Liberty in all other Places to take arms.

Article 7th.

If it is possible to agree about the repurchasing of Gombroon Factory, it will be looked on as part of the present Capitulation, the Besiegers reserving to themselves the Liberty nevertheless to do therewith as they may think fit, should no Agreement be concluded with the Besieged.

Article 8th.

In conclusion of the Exchange of Monsieur D'Estaing, and at his particular request to Monsieur Des Essars, Alexander Douglas, Esq., Chief of the English East India Company's Settlement of Gombroon and all others mentioned in the fourth Article have liberty, and may carry away all their own effects, of what kind or sort soever, excepting Ammunition, Provisions, Marine, Military or Warlike Stores, or any thing tending thereto, or to the Art of War.

Gombroon the fourteenth day of October, at six o'clock in the [illegible]ning and in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and fifty nine.

ALEXANDER DOUGLAS.

DES ESSARS. WILLIAM NASH.

CHABOTAU. RICHARD JOHNSTON.

Bombay Castle, 26th December 1759.

Came in a Dingey with a letter from the Agent and Council at Gombroon, dated the 8th ultimo, acquainting us that the French left that place the 2nd, and they believed were really gone to the Islands. That on the 30th October at night they went on board their ships after setting fire to the Factory, wherein they had dug mines and placed combustibles, by which means great part of it was destroyed; but, had it not been for the villainy of Moolah Ally Shaw, they believe much might have been saved, for when the French quitted it not a Door of the Compound was touched; but no sooner were they gone than he set fire thereto in order to get the Iron Work; and they also left behind upwards of 30,000 maunds of Copper and other Goods, but, notwithstanding their repeated applications to him for People to Guard them, he gave them up to a general pillage, and was so barefaced as to confess, in a visit he made the Agent, that he believed there was none but what had a share in the body. However, they hoped he would be convinced the English could resent an injury, which might easily be done. That they concluded he had gained on the whole about 60,000 Rupees, exclusive of the guns, etc., left him by the French, and his whole tribe of Arabs had profited in proportion; and that he had entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with the French, the obligation being signed by Monsieur D'Estaing and wrote in French, and his was wrote in Persian[s]. That they had mentioned the little regard shewn to the article of Capitulation and believe, if Monsieur D'Estaing had not been there, Des Essars would have deprived them of every commodity necessary, as he publickly avowed his aversion to all Englishmen and acted in such a manner as to dishonour the name of a Commander-in-Chief. That they had burnt the "Speedwell" and, [as] from what the Agent and Council could learn, they (were) bound to the Islands; and, Serjeant Rainscommon being unable to undertake so long a voyage, they had wrote to Monsieur D'Estaing for his being sent on shore, which he had granted and only desired one of his countrymen might be released in his stead, which they hoped we would comply with.*

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* Low (*Indian Navy*, I. 152—3) states that d'Estaing virtually commanded the expedition and was therefore guilty of breach of parole; he adds that the French "certainly derived more profit than honour from this feat of arms, for we are" told the account of how they laid regular siege to an almost defenceless factory was" received with surprise and derision by all military gentlemen in India."

A few months later misfortune overtook Mulla 'Ali Shah. His fleet then consisted of two ships, one large gallivat and one armed Tranki, and he had strengthened himself in the preceding November by giving a daughter in marriage to a chief of the Persian mainland who disposed of about 400 armed men; but his personal following amounted to 200 men only, and his resources had been drained by the subsidies which he paid to his other allies, the Qāsimi Arabs. The Mulla's subjects now rose against him at Hormūz, where they made him a prisoner and confined him in the fort; but, while they repulsed an attempt at rescue made by his people and some Arabs, they refused to hand their prisoner over to the Khān of Lār. At Bandar 'Abbās however they delivered up the fort, which they had seized, to a brother of Nāsir Khan, named Ja'far Khān, who happened to be near with a couple of hundred men. The Bani Ma'in tribe thought this a good opportunity to recover the island of Qishm and prepared, with assistance from Ja'far Khān, to besiege Lāft; but that place was protected by the "Roumania", one of Mulla 'Ali Shāh's vessels.* To remove this obstacle, the Khān of Lār proposed that the Company's ship "Godolphin" should be sent to take the "Roumania", but the Agent declined on the ground that the "Godolphin" drew too much water; he contemplated, however, lending the Khān the services of the smaller vessels "Drake" and "Swallow" when they should arrive, for the disturbances had brought the trade of the Agency to a standstill. One of Mulla 'Ali Shāh's vessels, the "Faiz Rabbāni", was given up by the people of Hormūz to some Arabs of Chārak, who took it to Ja'far Khān. On the 24th of June Mulla 'Ali Shāh, who had meanwhile regained his freedom, assisted by 1,000 Rās-al-Khaimal Arabs under the personal command of their Shaikh, landed near Bandar 'Abbās and seized the town; but his forces failed to capture the fort, and on the 28th, after plundering the town, they re-embarked and withdrew to the island of Qishm. Nāsir Khān then sent a retaliatory expedition against Lingeh, and in August his people attempted a raid upon Rās-al-Khaimah; but his troops, meeting with no success at either place, instead laid waste the island of Qishm. Grave apprehensions were now entertained of an attack on the British Agency either by Ja'far Khān or by his brother, the Khān of Lār, who was in the neighbourhood with a large force; and the Agent found himself obliged, by the undefended character of the Company's temporary premises, not only to lend the Khān the "Drake" ketch to convey the Bani Ma'in from one place to another, but also to submit to his repeated demands for a loan of 1,000 Tūmāns. In September Nāsir Khān was encamped at Khamīr, where he was engage in many schemes; and to prevent the seizure of Hormūz by the Chief of 1760.

* The name is so given, but it may be a mistake for "Rahmāni."

Minâb, who had been urging the release of Mulla 'Ali Shâh's family, he sent some Bani Ma'în and Châràk Arabs to garrison that place; but he was now most anxious to come to terms with Karim Khân of Shîràz in regard to the government of Garmsir and for this purpose suddenly departed to Lâr, after expressing a desire "to clap up a peace" with Mulla 'Ali Shâh—yet without doing so—and neglecting an opportunity afforded by the arrival of a Masqat vessel to his assistance of making an attack upon the Arabs of Râs-al-Khaimah. The loan to the Khân of Lâr was approved by the Bombay Presidency on the ground that it could not have been avoided; but they remarked that "there is no end of those impositions when once submitted to, and it is avoid them that we point out "the Agent's removal to Bussorah or elsewhere, or only going with the "goods for a time to other ports."

1761. In April 1761 matters were still unsettled between Karim Khân and Nâsir Khan; the latter, notwithstanding many promises, had not repaid any part of the loan of 1,000 Tûmâns, and his brother Ja'far Khân, on whose attitude the safety of the British depended and whom it was therefore necessary to placate, had run up a debt of Rs. 3,718 at the Agency. It was now the opinion of the Agent and Council in Persia that, "the people of that Kingdom and its Coasts being of so bad a "Disposition, Europeans would find it difficult to live amongst them as "formerly, unless they were determined to resent affronts," and they described them as a race "who only regarded the present and had neither "honour nor honesty, who kept troops at the expense of the industrious, "and who paid no regard to the fair trade." Matters, so far from improving, still grew worse. In May, an attack by Arabs on Bandar 'Abbâs being apprehended, Ja'far Khân began to construct defences of smaller perimeter than those existing; and he so arranged matters as to bring the Agency building into the new town wall, which he insisted that the British should assist in defending. It was feared by Mr. Dymoke Lister, who then held charge, that these dispositions might cover some design of seizing the Agency, and a month's supply of wood and water was laid in, while Ja'far Khân continued to urge a disagreeable request for the loan of a couple of guns. In the autumn Nâsir Khân obtained the government of Garmsir from Karîm Khân on condition of paying 2,000 Tûmâns a year as revenue, of maintaining 100 musketeers at Shîràz, and of holding all his troops at the disposal of the Vakil for operations in Garmsir. A temporary improvement in the situation at Bandar 'Abbâs followed, and the Khân even repaid in cash 50 of the 1,000 Tûmâns that were due from him and offered further payments in kind. On account partly of

his general misgovernment and partly of the complaints of the Bani Ma'in, Ja'far Khan was now recalled from Bandar 'Abbas, his place there being taken by one Hāji 'Ali who proved in all respects an excellent governor. The Bani Ma'in at Hormūz, who found it difficult to subsist on account of the scarcity of water and whom the perpetual attacks of the Qawāsim had now reduced to poverty, were permitted to remove, and some of them apparently went to Chārak. Encouraged probably by the partial removal of the Bani Ma'in, Mulla 'Ali Shah, whose family were confined in the Fort at Hormūz, now proceeded to the Arabian coast and returned with a force of Qawāsim; and two assaults were made upon Hormūz by him and his allies, but without success, for they were repulsed by the natives of Hormūz and by some of the Bani Ma'in who remained. In the course of these operations 2,400 bags of rice consigned from Masqat to the British Agency at Bandar 'Abbās were seized by the Qawāsim and converted by Mulla 'Ali Shāh to his own use without payment of compensation, whereby the Agent was obliged to apply to Nāsir Khān for a supply of rice, to be credited as repayment in part of the loan due from him. At the end of 1761 the restless Bani Ma'in were still on the move; those of them who had been to Chārak had now returned to Hormūz; but a number of the tribe had been induced by Hāji 'Ali to settle quietly at Bandar' Abbās with their families.

Prospects were again altered for the worse by the unexpected return of Ja'far Khān, on the 3rd of February 1762, to resume the government of Bandar 'Abbās in supersession of Hāji 'Ali: his reappointment was a disagreeable surprise to the Bani Ma'in, who had settled there on a distinct assurance from the Khān that Ja'far would never come back, and who now "found themselves trepanned." Ja'far Khān at once resumed his oppressions, especially of persons connected with the British Agency; and in a few months the town of Bandar 'Abbās, which under Hāji 'Ali had begun to recover its population and prosperity, was reduced to a few date-stick huts. Only a few well-to-do inhabitants remained, and there were no longer any customs to be collected. Nāsir Khān also made so many excuses for not repaying the loan which he had taken from the Company that the money began to be regarded as lost; and the Agent and Council were at length forced by various circumstances to believe "that former oppressions, as well as those then practised, were with his approbation and consent." The general position was described as intolerable. 1762.

On the 10th of January 1763 Ja'far Khān was recalled to Lār; but his father-in-law, an avaricious man, was appointed in his place and it

was fully expected that the Khān of Lār, after stripping Ja'far Khān of his infamously acquired riches, would allow him to return to Bandar 'Abbās in order that he might collect more. Peace was at length concluded between the Bani Ma'īn on the one side and Mulla 'Ali Shāh and the Qawāsim on the other, the terms being that the Bani Ma'īn should keep Hormūz and be placed in possession of the Lāft fort, while the Qāsimi Shaikh should retain the ship "Rahmāni," and that the revenues of Qishm Island should be equally divided for the future among the three parties to the peace. The settlement, however, promised little advantage to the general tranquillity, for it set free the Bani Ma'īn to commit depredations in other quarters. Thus in January 1763 they seized Kuhistak, a port belonging to the Mīnāb chief, and pretended to hold it at the disposal of the Khān of Lār, their real object being to induce the Khān to place them in possession of Bandar 'Abbās; but to this he would by no means consent, and it was reported that on the contrary he desired them to enter his service as sailors, bringing their own ships, when, on condition of their not carrying on any trade and merely cruising according to his directions, he would grant them regular pay. Such an arrangement would, it was foreseen by the British Agent at Bandar 'Abbās, probably lead to the Bani Ma'īn becoming common pirates; but at this juncture the British Agency was suddenly withdrawn, as described in an earlier section, and the interest of the Company and their servants in Bandar 'Abbās affairs came to an end.

Affairs on the Persian coast between Rig and Kangūn, 1722-63.

Until 1755 events on the Persian coast of the Gulf above Bandar 'Abbās possessed almost no interest for the representatives of the East India Company in Persia; and we have consequently little information regarding them before that year.

Position at Būshehr in 1755.

The government of Būshehr was seized, in the first half of the 18th century, by a family belonging to the Matārīsh tribe of 'Omān who were Sunnis. In the reign of Nādir Shāh, however, in hope of being appointed to command the fleet which that ruler created and stationed partly at Būshehr, the head of the family, whose name was Nāsir, became a Shī'ah along with the whole of his relations,—an act of apostacy by which he incurred the dislike of the other Arabs of Būshehr, and indeed that of

nearly all the maritime Arabs of the Persian Gulf.* About 1752 Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr in alliance with Mīr Nāsir, the chief of Rīg, reduced the island of Bahrain, possession of which during the remainder of the period under consideration he apparently retained by means of his fleet, consisting of one large vessel and a number of gallivats. In 1755 Shaikh Nāsir seems to have been imprisoned by Karīm Khān, who had required him to answer for the ships of the former Persian navy and to pay up 5,000 Tūmāns on account of the revenue of Bahrain during the previous three years.

Position at Rīg in 1755.

The history of the family who in 1755 held possession of Rīg was very similar to that of the Shaikhs of Bahrain. They were by extraction Za'āb Arabs from the coast of what is now Trucial 'Omān; but the father of Mīr Nāsir, who was chief in 1752 and who in or about that year granted the Dutch permission to settle on the island of Khārag, had become a Shī'ah, and Mīr Nāsir himself had married a Persian, so that the family were no longer regarded as genuine Arabs. Mīr Nāsir was murdered, between 1753 and 1755 at the instance of Mīr Mahanna, the younger of his two sons; and this youthful monster, who was present at the crime though he did not actually participate in it, soon afterwards in a fit of fury killed his own mother also for venturing to reproach him with his father's death. Mīr Mahanna's proceedings were however arrested by the return from Bahrain, where he happened to be at the time, of his elder brother Mīr Husain; and the latter took possession of the government of Rīg.

Mr. Wood sent to establish a British Factory at Rīg, 1755.

Such was the position of affairs when Mr. Francis Wood, formerly Agent at Bandar 'Abbās, arrived at Rig to establish a British Factory there. This project had been sanctioned by the Court of Directors in April 1754, and Mr. Wood's commission as Resident was issued at Bombay on the 18th of October in the same year, but he did not start from Bandar 'Abbās until March 1755. His instructions were to promote the sale of British woollen manufactures at Rig; to take all proper measures to hinder the merchants there from dealing in French or other foreign woollens; to discourage, so far as possible, the trade of the Aleppo Adventurers in the same; to lend no money or goods to the local authorities; not to deal with native merchants except for ready money; and, finally, to insist upon the privilege of collecting the customs on all goods imported or exported by the British being granted him, "as it will be for the Hon'ble Company's Credit and Honour, and a "means of alleviating their expenses." All controversy with the Dutch,

* So the authorities, but it is not apparent how *Nāsir* could have recommended himself to Nadir Shāh by becoming Shī'ah; see page 83.

who had now a great influence in the Gulf and whose settlement on Khārag faced Rīg, was to be avoided; but it is difficult to resist the conjecture that the Rīg enterprise was in reality directed chiefly against them.

Agreement with Mir Husain, Chief of Rig, June 1755.

Mr. Wood, though his instructions referred to Rīg only, stopped at Būshehr on his way and endeavoured to come to an agreement with Shaikh Nāsir for settling there instead; but the Shaikh would not agree to cede the customs on British goods except on condition of receiving a fixed payment of Rs. 1,500 a year. Eventually the Resident, in consequence of remonstrances and orders from Bandar 'Abbās, proceeded to Rīg where he arrived in June. He found no merchants present at the port, but the chief Mīr Husain, who had been summoned to Shīrāz by Karīm Khān and was on the point of leaving, postponed his departure for three days, readily granted the privileges which Mr. Wood had been directed to solicit, and assured him that "the credit of the English would very "soon draw all the merchants back again to Bunderick and restore the "place to its former flourishing condition."

Temporary withdrawal from Rig and return there under a Raqam from Karim Khān, July to September 1755.

The demeanour of the inhabitants of Rīg became so insolent after their chief's departure that the Resident withdrew to Basrah and then to Būshehr, where he proposed to remain until Mīr Husain's return to Rīg; but the receipt of a Raqam from Karīm Khān, authorising the establishment of a Factory at Rīg, caused him again to change his mind. He returned to Rīg in September and, being well received on this occasion by the people of the place, proceeded to settle down.

Proceedings of the Resident at Rig, April 1756.

On the 6th of April 1756 Mr. Wood crossed over in the "Neptune" galley to Khārag Island, where he remained until the 15th, carefully observing the methods and proceedings of the Dutch, whose guest he was. On the 20th of April Mīr Husain and his brother Mīr Mahanna arrived at Rīg from Shīrāz, where they had both been imprisoned by Karīm Khān, and only released "in consideration of their known * poverty;" they had performed the journey home on foot in company with Qāid Haidar Khān, the ruler of Hayāt Dāvud, and with a great number of Būshehr people. Mr. Wood, finding them "quite bare of "provisions, cloths and money, ... was obliged to make them "a present, consisting chiefly of rice and piece-goods, to the amount of "nearly three hundred and sixty (360) Rupees, which . . was not "only necessary but quite unavoidable."

* And possibly on account of the straits to which Āzād Khān, Afghān, had at this time reduced Karīm Khān.

Flight of the Resident from Rig and murder of Mir Husain by Mir Mahanna, June 1756.

On the 8th of June Mr. Wood received a letter from Baron Knip-hausen, the head of the Dutch settlement on Khārag, warning him that the chastisement of the Mīr had been resolved on by the Dutch and that there might therefore be trouble at Rig very shortly. Upon this the British Resident, who believed that a pro-Dutch party had been formed in Rīg under the leadership of Mir Mahanna with the express object of murdering himself and of displacing Mīr Husain, thought it prudent to retire once more to Basrah. His justification of his conduct was that the premises which he was building for the Company were not yet in a defensible state, and that the Factory guard were not sufficiently armed; but he left a corporal behind with orders that the British flag should continue to be flown during his absence. On his return to Rīg, on the 27th of June, he found that a revolution had occurred; Mīr Husain and several others had been killed by Mīr Mahanna, who was now in power, the unfinished Factory building had been almost levelled with the ground and the British flag had been lowered, but no actual injury had been inflicted on the employés of the Company. He reported these occurrences to the Agency at Bandar 'Abbās, added that in his opinion no prospect of success at Rig remained, and solicited orders; and in reply he received the scathing letter which follows from his official superior:—

From Alex. Douglas to Francis Wood, Resident at Bunderick.*

On the 21st came to hand your letter of the 20th ultimo, and it gives me great concern to find that the troubles at Bunderick prevented your taking on shore the Consignment of Woolen Goods and Tin, Ship "Betsey"; as, from your former advices to this Agency, had the place being in a state of tranquillity, an advantageous sale for our Hon'ble Masters might have been expected.

I observe your greatest motive for going to Bussorah was [on] the receipt of a letter from Mynheer Kniphausen, who no doubt (wishes) to engross the trade of Bunderick and Bushire to himself, wherefore our having a settlement at either of those places can't be agreeable to him; and as much you might expect he would fling all the obstacles in his power in your way to prevent it and give you frequent alarms, though I see no reason whatever that should induce him to attempt your life, which you seemed apprehensive of when you proceeded to Bussorah, nor do I perceive by your advices that any violence was committed on the people you left behind; therefore I think that, if your apprehensions had not been so great and that you had stay'd at Bunderick, communicating to Meer Hassain the advices which from time to time you might get of the designs his Brother or (the) Dutch had against him, in all probability he might have avoided the fatal stroke which happened to him, when our Hon'ble Master's House would have been secure; besides I much doubt whether the Arabs would have demolished the House had you been present, but, finding it was left in charge of only a corporal, they had the less restraint on them.

The want of arms for the military and Timber and stores for finishing the house ought to have been no inducement for your leaving Bunderick, as you had indentes

* In this transcript punctuation, etc., have been slightly amended.

hither for the arms, which were sent you by the first vessel that sailed hence after it receipt, and you could have applied to the Resident at Bussorah to have procured and sent you on the Hon'ble Company's account such materials as you stood in need of.

As the Hon'ble the President and Council direct that every proper expedient be tryed for making a settlement at Bunderick and conceive great hopes from the promises you formerly wrote were made you by several merchants at Bussorah, as also you having wrote hither that you doubted not but it would answer the Hon'ble the President and Council's expectations, (I) shall not give any directions for your quitting Bunderick until I receive their further orders on that head; nor would I have you take such a step unless you apprehend your and the people's lives in danger, or something very material happens that I can't at present foresee.

You ought to represent to Meer Manna the advantages it will be to Bunderick our Hon'ble Masters having a settlement there; on the other Hand that he may depend the Honourable the President and Council of Bombay will take satisfaction for any insult offered the Hon'ble Company or their Servants.

As Hussain Caun Cadjar is now in this Kingdom with a large army, and, having taken possession of Spahaun some time past and now besieging Shyraah, a revolution may soon be expected, and if his designs are to keep possession of the Country he will undoubtedly appoint proper persons to reduce these Shaiks to his obedience and give encouragement to all merchants whatever, and then it may not be in Meer Manna or the Dutch their powers to give any obstructions. A little time will show, (h)is real Intentions.

It's currently reported here that Meer Manna on your return to Bunderick from Bussorah made an offer of rebuilding the house at his own expense, which, if true, I am surprised to find no mention made thereof in your advices.

I am,

Sir,

Your Loving Friend,

Alexander Douglas.

Gombroon:
4th July 1756.

In July the Bombay Government, who were still in ignorance of these events, despatched an assistant to Mr. Wood in the person of a Mr. Hughes.

Contemplated expedition against Kangūn and Rig, October 1765.

Meanwhile trouble had arisen between the Company and the Shaikh of Kangūn, one of the principal ports after Būshehr between Bandar 'Abbās and Rig, the cause being aggressions committed on two vessels trading under the Company's protection. The authorities at Bombay ordered the Agent at Bandar 'Abbās to send the "Swallow" and "Drake," if they could be spared, to demand satisfaction; and Mr. Wood at Rig, being acquainted with the details of the affair, was to accompany the expedition. Orders were accordingly sent to Mr. Wood by the Agent

apparently in October, to meet the ships at Kangûn; and he was further authorised, after matters should have been settled at Kangûn, to take both vessels to Rig for the purpose either of re-establishing the Factory or of exacting reparation for the destruction of the Company's building.

These instructions found Mr. Wood in a depressed state of mind. His relations with Mir Mahanna, whom he described as a "a young indiscreet "man, wholly given up to the most destructive vices, and so extremely "revengefull that it's dangerous to give him even the slightest occasion of "offence", had been unfortunate from the first; the chief had begun to utilise the débris of the Factory for building a wall round the town, and the Resident could not prevail on him to desist "neither by means of "presents, nor by conforming to his intemperance in point of drinking, at "frequent, nay almost daily visits"; and the Mir further refused to allow the British to collect the customs on British goods, as his brother had promised that they should do, unless they paid him Rs. 2,000 a year. At length, on the night of the 6th of November between 10 and 11 P.M., a body of Arabs sent by Mir Mahanna appeared at the gate of the caravansarai where the Resident lodged and insisted that he and the other Europeans, including Mr. Hughes and a Mr. Purnell, should leave the place within half an hour, as the chief suspected them to be enemies and in league with the Dutch. They at first attempted to parley, but, on the Arabs preparing to use force, had to retire on board the "Dragon"; and at their departure the Topass * guard were disarmed and Mr. Wood's effects were plundered. The next day Mir Mahanna invited them ashore again, but they refused to go. By detaining the Chief's messenger Agha Mahmûd, and by sending two barrels of gunpowder as a present, Mr. Wood in the course of ten days succeeded in recovering most of the goods that had been left on shore; but some private losses of his own remained which he proposed to charge to the Company in his accounts. In the meanwhile the "Swallow" and "Drake" had arrived at Rîg, and on those vessels the staff of the Rîg Factory appear to have returned to Bandar 'Abbâs, where they arrived at the beginning of December 1756. Mr. Wood now strongly dissuaded the Agent from undertaking operations against either Kangûn or Rîg, representing that the force available was not nearly sufficient for the purpose, that the Arabs would be greatly exasperated, that no real satisfaction would be obtained, and that the trade of Rîg would be thrown completely into the hands of the Dutch; he still, however, professed to consider Rig an excellent market for British woollens and a

* Portuguese soldiers employed by the Company were called Topasses.

good place for obtaining grain and wine at moderate prices; but he insisted strongly on the necessity of providing a defensible house for the Resident, to cover the building of which he thought that a large a vessel with 200 able-bodied men and two Gallivats would be required. So ended the Company's experiment * at Rig; and the expedition to Kangûn was abandoned. Mr. Wood seems to have received compensation from the Company, on account of his private losses, to the extent of Rs. 6,000 or more.

War between the chiefs of Rig and Chârak, 1750.

In 1759 there was war between Mîr Mahanna and the Shaikh of Chârak, and the latter had apparently the support of the Qâsimi Shaikh of Râs-al-Khaimah.

Course of British trade in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

The trade in Persia.

The trade of the East India Company in Persia, notwithstanding the serious political obstacles which it had to encounter, the generally disturbed state of the country, and the depreciation of Persian silver, seems to have flourished during this period in a considerable degree; but between the years 1726 and 1730 it was at a very low ebb.

1736.

In December 1736 Kirmân wool † was despatched from Bandar 'Abbâs to Bombay to the amount of 392 bags; but it was unpacked as for want of large timbers, the Company's servants had been unable to set up a press. In addition to this consignment a further quantity of 6,000 maunds had been sent off from Kirmân, which, in consequence of the impressment of transport for laying out provisions on the route of Nâdir Shâh's troops marching to Qandahâr, did not reach Bandar 'Abbâs in time to be shipped with the rest. 14,000 maunds more, also, had been purchased. The Company's establishment at Kirmân was at this time in charge of a Pârsi named "Seawax", in regard to whom the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbâs were of opinion that, "tho' a very honest man", he "ought not to be trusted alone in Carmenia, as being a Gaber he is "liable to be fleeced by the Government, who would oblige him to make "presents or lend the Company's money on any pretext, by which his "Expenses might be greater than would be occasioned by the Continuance

* In March 1757 the Company still had the establishment of a Factory at Rig in view, but no action was taken on account of difficulties which probably arose from the war with France.

† This commodity from Kirmân was always described as wool, but it seems to have been in reality goats'-hair: see page 118 *post*. Refer also to Oliver's *Voyage*, II, 459.

"of a Company's servant, which will be necessary if they send any Woollen "goods up there." The chief imports at this time seem to have been broadcloth and perpets, and a merchant representing both the Shāh and the Governor of Fārs once arrived at Bandar 'Abbās and wished to buy large quantities of these. As, however, he proposed to pay for them by means of bills on the customs officer, the British Agency refused to supply him; but the Dutch did business with him on his own terms.

At the beginning of 1737 Mr. Savage, in charge of the Company's affairs at Kirmān, reported that some Georgians had arrived there from Isfahān with cloth from a * Factory which had recently been established at Astrakhan, and that, in view of this fact, not more than 1,000 or 1,200 Tūmāns' worth of the Company's woollen goods could be disposed of by him during the coming season. An obstacle to trade in Kirmān was the depreciation of the Persian silver coinage, consisting of 'Abbāsis and Mahmūdis, in consequence of which the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās decided to send not more than one-fifth of the year's woollen goods to Kirmān, and to take payment for the same only in 'Abbāsis at five Shāhīs, or in coined copper, or in old copper. The other four-fifths were disposed of through the broker at Bandar 'Abbās, for the sole alternative was to sell to the local governor, "who wou'd have obliged them to take silver money at fifty per cent." A little later it was reported that the broker found difficulty in getting rid of the broadcloth and perpets which he had taken; that communication with Kirmān had been interrupted by the impressment of the Agency muleteers to carry provisions to the camp of Nādir Shāh, who was then besieging the citadel of Qandahār; and that four or five foreign merchants had come to Kirmān to buy red wool for, it was supposed, the Aleppo market. 1737.

In 1740, notwithstanding the unsettled state of Persia, there was a strong demand for English woollens; it appeared to be due to a prohibition against the importation of woollens from Turkey. The price of Kirmān wool was however so high, in consequence of its being taken to manufacture coats and caps for Nādir Shāh's army, that Mr. Savage was unable to purchase any at a reasonable price. 1740.

By the beginning of 1744 the British Factory at Isfahān, for a time in abeyance had been re-opened, and by this means the trade from Russia into that part of Persia had been altogether stopped. Encouraged by this success the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās were inclined to send 1744.

* This must apparently have been a Factory of the (British) Russia Company, with whose operations on the Caspian and in Northern Persia (chiefly in 1742-49) the names of Elton and Hanway are associated.

Mr. Savage, when the winter should be over, from Kirmán to Mashhad, as by this means the Russia Company's goods might be driven out of Khurasán and their only remaining market in Persia closed and the proposal was approved by the Bombay Presidency; but difficulties connected with inland duties and the generally disturbed state of the country prevented its execution. Muhammad Taqi Khán was for a time in revolt at Shiráz, and it appeared that his proceedings might result in bad debts to the Company, notably in the case of the Kalántar of Shiráz, who owed them 400 Túmáns and who was now blinded and despoiled of his goods on suspicion of sympathising with the rebellious governor. In this year dates to the value of Rs. 2,142 are mentioned as having been sold by the Bandar 'Abbás Agency to an English merchant, and the reference is one of the earliest to that commodity.

1747. After the warehouses at Kirmán had been cleared by sales, 141 bales of broadcloth and 1,000 pieces of perpets were sent there in March 1747; this left no broadcloth at all in stock at Bandar 'Abbás, and the Agent and Council requested that a supply might be sent them immediately from Bombay. The Presidency having in this year ordered a large quantity of Kirmán wool exclusive of previous indents, the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbás stated that they would endeavour to obtain it through Mr. Graves, but that they were not sanguine of success because, "from the oppression of the Government, the people are obliged to sell "their goats in the market to raise money for their tax, & the villages "circumjacent had been plundered and their goats destroyed." From this remark it would seem that the so-called "wool" of Kirmán, at the time such an important article of export, was in reality goats'-hair: a supposition which seems to be corroborated by the fact that the favourite quality was neither black nor white, but "red."

1748. At the beginning of 1748 the Agency at Bandar 'Abbás was so short of cash that 2,000 maunds of copper were sent to Barkah * for sale, though no advices had been received thence.

1749. In 1749 the Court of the Company were pleased to order "a provision "of fifty thousand pounds weight of Carmenia Wool, as much of it red as "may be procurable, and as cheap as possible, without any limitation as to "price," and orders were given accordingly to the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbás. Copper was still a leading export from Persia, but there is nothing to show from what source it was obtained.

1751. In 1751 the prospects of trade were not encouraging, owing to the anarchy that then prevailed throughout Persia and to rumours of a renewal

* *Sic*, but perhaps the name is a mistake for Basrah.

of competition from Astrakhan. From Bandar 'Abbās it was reported that "the Government in all parts was grown so bad that most of the noted "merchants were afraid of risquing their lives and effects under it any "longer, for which reason many of them had invested their money in "jewels, etc., and were gone with their families to Mecca, where they "proposed to reside until the country was brought under some regular "authority." Wool in Kirmān was scarce and very dear; it could not be purchased even in the villages under 60 Shāhis a maund, corresponding to more than 110 Shāhis for the picked and cleaned article, whereas in 1736 it had apparently been brought to Bandar 'Abbās at 35 Shāhis a maund, clear of all charges.

In 1752 there was still a dearth of Kirmān wool on account of the scarcity of goats; but news was received that the Russia Company had only sent one vessel from Astrakhan to Rasht during the three years preceding, and that the agents, not venturing to land, had been obliged to sell their goods for ready money on board ship. 1752.

Wool continued scarce in Kirman in 1753, owing to the depredations committed upon live-stock by government troops and bands of robbers, but in July 900 maunds had been obtained and 1,000 maunds more were expected to be purchased; the price, however, was enhanced by the Dutch, who were endeavouring to capture the whole trade, to over Rs. 8 per maund for the article uncleaned. Communication with the interior from Bandar 'Abbās was insecure, and exactions by officials from merchants were heavy; but "broadcloth and perpets were goods so adapted to the Persian taste and so necessary for their dress in the winter season" that they continued to sell very well; and in twelve months 320 bales of cloth were sent to Kirmān and all the perpets in stock at Bandar 'Abbās were cleared out. On an indent from the Agency 500 pieces of perpets were then sent to Bandar 'Abbās, but 3,000 more were immediately required. Perpets were of the highest value in assisting the disposal of other cloths. The cloth goods stored at Bandar 'Abbās were found to suffer much from the heat, from mildew and from a kind of worm. An attempt was made to find a market for cochineal in Persia and Turkish 'Irāq, but it did not succeed. 1753.

The decision in 1754 to open a British Factory at Rīg was prompted chiefly by a desire to push the trade in British woollen manufactures, which was very profitable at this time, and to overcome competition by the French and by Aleppo Adventurers, of whom the latter sent their goods to Basrah overland. 1754.

At the end of 1755 the trade at Bandar 'Abbās was in a most flourishing condition: 1,200 maunds of Kirmān wool had been exported to 1755.

Bombay, 3,240 maunds remained awaiting shipment, 750 maunds were expected from up-country, and the funds remitted to Kirmān for investment during the year amounted to upwards of Rs. 74,000. There were also "large remains of old copper" at Bandar 'Abbās, and fresh consignments of woollen goods were earnestly desired there, before the hot weather should put an end to the trade for the season.

1756. In the spring of 1756 wool and copper to the value of 1,620,957 Shāhis were shipped to Bombay from Bandar 'Abbās, and the Agent and Council explained that silver rupees were required for purchases at Kirmān, as the merchants there would accept no other coin and bills of exchange were difficult to obtain. Between the 29th of September and the 7th of December the Agent had remitted Rs. 10,000 to Kirmān on account of the "investment" of the current year and Rs. 22,000 for that of the coming season; he had actually received 2,580 maunds of wool; and he hoped that the quantity would reach 10,000 maunds for the year then closing. "He mentioned his apprehensions that a refusal to take "the black sort of wool wou'd be attended with bad consequences, as the "Dutch made no exceptions to any colour and used every means in their "power to engross the whole investment."

1756-58. During the years 1756 to 1758 the Court of the Company in London seem to have given great attention to suiting the Persian market; they even had cloths designed and manufactured in imitation of Dutch and French fabrics which sold well in the Gulf; and they constantly asked for samples of their rivals' goods. They were not satisfied, however, with the Kirmān wool sent them; and in 1758, having lost considerably by their sales in that article, they insisted that no more of the black sort should be sent them and that an attempt should be made to buy red without either black or white; if wool could be procured at Kirmān at 70 Shāhis per maund, exclusive of charges, 20,000 lbs. of it might be purchased, but otherwise only 10,000 lbs. at a price not exceeding 80 Shāhis a maund. The Court also demurred to the building of warehouses at Kirmān and ordered that, if extra accommodation were needed, it should be hired. Dr. Ives, who visited Bandar 'Abbās in 1758, specifies the following as minor articles of export from Persia in which the Company did not deal but left the trade to private merchants,—common assafœtida and the superior sort called Hing, dragon's blood, opopanax, sagopenum,* ruinas, cummin-seeds, almonds, seedless raisins, black raisins, pistachios, prunes and dates. He adds: "I cannot conclude this account

* Meaning "Indian madder."

"of the situation of affairs at Gombroon, without paying a just compli-
"ment to the great prudence and sagacity of the English and Dutch
"factories established there, who amidst all the shocks and convulsions
"of a civil war among the Persians, have met with little or no interrup-
"tion in their trade from any of the contending parties; it being a
"maxim with them, to side openly with none of the competitors, and
"yet at the same time to keep well with all: for this end, civil letters,
"and sometimes presents, have been thought indispensably necessary."

The Kirmān wool investment of 1760 amounted to 3,000 maunds, of 1760.
which 2,820 maunds were red, 135 white, and 45 grey; the last quality the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās proposed to sell locally for what it would fetch. Disturbances in Khurāsān affected the trade of the Company, and much less business was done in this year than had been anticipated. Wool and copper were still the chief commodities in the export trade.

In 1761 the commercial horizon was overcast. Great oppression 1761.
was exercised in Kirmān by Karīm Khān's governor, and a contribution of 30,000 Tūmāns was demanded from the province which was found, when it came to be distributed, to be equal to seven times the ordinary annual revenue. The Linguist who represented the Company in Kirmān was included in the governor's exactions, and he was informed by his superiors that, if after despatching the annual wool investment he saw no prospect of remaining "in any degree of security," he might return to Bandar 'Abbās. The Linguist seems accordingly to have collected the wool investment of about 3,000 maunds, after which he obtained permission from the governor to leave Kirmān. There was little sale for woollen goods at Bandar 'Abbās in this year; and the Agent and Council reported that "the Kingdom seemed to go very fast unto Ruin, the "Great Men paying no regard to the Subject, but only the gratifying "their Soldiers and Dependents; and they much feared the Ruin of "Trade would be the consequence." The Bombay Presidency desired that, as old copper was now very low, none should be sent them, and that remittances should be made in gold or silver.

Stagnation, due to the same causes, continued in 1762. The total 1762.
value of the sales at Bandar 'Abbās from August 1761 to August 1762, during which time few traders from the interior visited the place, was only Rs. 36,020. This was due largely to the state of affairs in Kirmān, where Multāni merchants dealing largely in woollens had formerly resided and carried on a trade with Mashhad and Qandahār; but they had now been discouraged by the exactions practised on them, their goods from Bandar 'Abbās being habitually seized by the local authorities at arbitrary rates, and had ceased to trade.

The trade in Turkish 'Irāq.

The Company's trade, and commercial arrangements in Turkish 'Irāq are fully described in the chapter on the history of that country.

Establishments and general arrangements of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

Organization and nomenclature.

During the first half of the 18th century the words "Agent" and "Factor," "Agency" and "Factory" appear to have been somewhat indiscriminately used to describe the Company's servants and stations in the Persian Gulf and Persia; but by degrees the head of the Company's interests in the whole of that region came to be known as "the Agent" and Bandar 'Abbās, being his headquarters, as "the Agency." The Isfahān station, before its final closure, was frequently described as a "Residency;" such also was the status of Basrah; and, as both of these places were subordinate to Bandar 'Abbās, we should perhaps understand that an "Agent", after about 1750, corresponded with the "Agent to the Governor-General" rather than with the ordinary "Political Agent" of the present day. The Company's interests in Kirmān were represented sometimes by a European employé and sometimes by a Linguist or native interpreter, and the station there did not belong to any particular class. The term "Honourable Company," referring to the East India Company, was in use in the Gulf as early as 1737, or perhaps earlier; and the fact that the Company was more than a society of merchants must have been recognized in 1763, when the Shaikh of Būshehr urged that "an English Sarkar Factory" should be established at his port. That the distinction between "covenanted" or superior and other servants of the Company must have been introduced before 1750 is shown by the following order issued by the Bombay Presidency in that year: "And if the circumstances of their "affairs at Spahaun absolutely requires a Covenant Servant to continue "there some time longer, Mr. Dalrimple must be appointed to relieve "Mr. Graves till such time as he can be recalled, for we would have no "Covenant Servant reside there any longer than the necessity of these 'ill conducted affairs * may unavoidably require."

Personnel.

With regard to personnel we may remark on the large number of Scotsmen among the Company's employés in the Gulf,—a feature distinguishing this period from the last, which was mostly antecedent to the

* Apparently the reference is to Messrs. Pierson and Blandey's case—see page 126 post.

parliamentary union of England and Scotland. Thus among the civil servants of the Company we find such names as Dalrymple, Douglas, Geekie, Ross, Shaw and Stuart; among naval commanders such as Clough, Crichton, Douglas, Grant, Kerr, Lindsey, Milne and Nesbit; among medical officers those of Forbes and Rose; and among military officers that of Mackenzie. The predominance of Lowland over Highland names is remarkable.

Staff, etc., in Persia.

Among the Agents at Bandar 'Abbás during this period the most conspicuous were Francis Wood (1752), who was afterwards deputed to open the Factory at Rig, and Alexander Douglas, who held charge during the difficult period from 1753 to 1763 and arranged the withdrawal of the Agency from Bandar 'Abbás in the latter year.

The Company's staff suffered severely from the climate and the following casualties in Persia are recorded in some selected letters; there were probably many others:—

1735 and 1736. The Agent had to leave Bandar 'Abbás in both years on account of ill-health.

1739. Mr. Dacres died.

1740. Mr. Rose, Surgeon, died.

1743 (19th November). Ensign Mackenzie died intestate and his effects "were sold at outcry."

1745-46. Messrs. Jones and Science (*sic*) died.

1747. Mr. Ross and a European gunner died.

1750 (11th December). Mr. Dalrymple died.

1752. Messrs. Went and Perceval died, both intestate, also Ensign Burrage (11th November), and several Topasses and sepoys; the life of Mr Wood, the Agent, was twice despaired of, but he recovered. Between March and September this was a very sickly season.

1753 (9th June). Mr. Sedgwicke died.

1755. Messrs. Parsons and Secker died.

1756. Mr. Pompet died.

1758. Mr. Holmes died, and the Surgeon was invalided.

1759. (12th March). Captain Crichton died.

1760. This was another unhealthy season. Mr. Nash and most of the European soldiers died, and Ensign Nack (*sic*) was invalided. More assistants were asked for, and in the following year two Writers were sent.

1761 (7th November). Mr. W. Douglas, apparently one of the new Writers, died.

1763. Mr. A. Douglas, the Agent, after effecting the removal of the Agency from Bandar 'Abbās reported: "My constitution being "greatly impaired thro' my long residency in this unhealthy "place, which I have little prospect of recovering but in my "native climate, ... these considerations have induced me to "return to my standing at the Presidency, etc.," and he accordingly sailed for Bombay, presumably on his way to Europe.

The average strength of the staff at Bandar 'Abbās is not ascertainable,* but it was not large, and this list evidently represents a very heavy mortality †. Regard being had to the political and military dangers of the situation, to the difficulties and disappointments of trade, to the ‡ isolation of the life, to the hardships of travel and to the unhealthiness of the climate, the manner in which the Company's interests were maintained in the Gulf during this period may well be quoted in proof of British pertinacity.

* In 1740 the covenanted servants of the Company employed in Persia and their annual salaries were: Mr. N. Whitwell, Agent, £150; Mr. St.G. Pack, Accountant and Warehouse-keeper, £40; Mr. H. Savage, at Kirmān, £30; and Mr. J. Pierson, Secretary, £15. In 1751 it was as follows:—

Residence.	Persons' names and employments.	Time of their arrival in India.	At what salary.	Present salary per annum.	Ages.	Title.
			£	£		
Bandar 'Abbās	Mr. Henry Savage, Agent.	11th September 1732.	5	150	35	4th in Council, and 2nd Treasurer.
Ditto.	Cowan Henry Draper, Secretary.	1st October 1743.	5	15	23	Factor.
Ditto.	James Dalrymple, Assistant to Mr. Graves at Isfahān.	10th September 1744.	5	15	35	Do.
Isfahān	Danvers Graves, Resident.	9th June 1737.	5	40	29	Senr. Merchant.

† This mortality may have been due in part to habits of life which prevailed among the Company's servants. See Hamilton's *New Account* (I. 95): "The Europeans often hasten death sooner than he would come of his own Accord, by Intemperance and Debauchery of several Kinds; and they have a Burial-place near the town well stored with Tombs, but never a Christian Church in this Town," etc., etc.

‡ Between the 17th of September, 1752 and the 22nd of June 1753 no opportunity occurred of sending a letter from Bandar 'Abbās to Bombay; probably, however, this was an interval more than usually long.

Such amenities of life as were attainable were not neglected by the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbās. They lived at a common table, which was supplied at their employers' expense with Madeira and Persian wine; the latter cost about twenty-pence the bottle and was "the best," says Ives, "I ever tasted except claret." The Agency had a country house and a pleasant garden at 'Isīn, ten miles distant; and it was to this place that a son and brother of Muhammad Taqi Khān, Governor of Fārs, invited themselves as guests at the beginning of 1736.

Public events of importance were duly celebrated by the British community at Bandar 'Abbās. At the end of 1761 the Bombay Presidency ordered the Agent and Council "to proclaim his most gracious "Majesty George the third, and enclosed them copy of the Form use'd "on that occasion, and order'd them to take the oath of Allegiance to "him, and to administer both that and the oath of Fidelity to all the "Officers there, both Military and Marine."

Staff, etc., in Turkish 'Irāq.

Full information regarding the Company's establishments in Turkish 'Irāq is given in the historical chapter dealing with that country.

Military establishments.

The Company's civil establishments were never without their military guards, whether at Bandar 'Abbās, Basrah or Rīg. At the end of 1743 the military at Bandar 'Abbās applied to be relieved, as they had served there for more than two years; and the Presidency apparently sent in their place "a sergeant, drummer and twelve topasses, as a common watch," but declined to replace Ensign Mackenzie, who had died, on the ground that the situation did not warrant the continuance of an Ensign's command. In 1744 the Agent and Council demurred to a reduction of their guard "from the uncertainty of the times," and requested that an Ensign and two or three Europeans for Corporals might be sent; the rank and file were apparently Portuguese "Topasses," whose pay was Rs. 4 a month,* and Indian sepoys. In 1747, the situation being somewhat critical after the death of Nādir Shāh, the Presidency sent the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbas "two practical gunners with sundry "stores and permitted them, if absolutely necessary, to detain half a score "of men out of the "Drake," in order to defend their Factory against "any rabble that might insult them." In 1748 two of the Agency Topasses went out to the back of the town to fight, and one of them, Francis Pereira, killed his adversary, Laurence de Romade, with a stick and was sent as a prisoner to India. After 1750 the detachment at Bandar 'Abbās seems to have been generally an officer's command, and a guard-

* In 1751 the Topasses petitioned that their pay might be raised to Rs. 5 as at Bombay.

ship was sometimes kept there for the defence of the Agency, as for example the "Drake," which remained for this purpose for about twelve months from July 1750, in consequence of disorders at Isfahán and in other parts of the country. At the beginning of 1752 the Súbahdár of the sepoys at Bandar 'Abbás was "much out of order," and the Agent and Council recommended that he should be relieved, as also the married sepoys, who, as their pay was handed to their families at Bombay, were unable to live on their rations, and in whose place bachelors would be preferred. In this year Lieutenant Wardman and a Sergeant returned to Bombay with a detachment; a sergeant, two corporals and a gunsmith, all Europeans, arrived; and a midshipman was taken on shore from one of the Company's ships. On the 25th July 1753, the Ensign in command having died, the garrison at Bandar 'Abbás consisted of one Sergeant and one corporal, who must have been Europeans, 24 Topass soldiers and 23 Bombay sepoys; and there was also a European gunner who was inefficient, being addicted to drink. In 1761 the "usual detachment of military" were sent to Bandar 'Abbás in the "Drake," ketch; but the Agent was instructed not to land them except in an emergency, as experience had shown that residence on shore was injurious to their health; and he was invited to consider whether sepoys might not be substituted for such of them as were Europeans.

Conduct of servants.

Malversation on the part of the Company's servants in the Gulf seems to have been rare; but in 1747 grave irregularities came to the notice of the Bombay Presidency, the culprits being Messrs. Pierson and Blandey, the Company's representatives at Isfahán. Attention was first drawn to their proceedings by a bill of exchange which they drew on Basrah at the exorbitant premium of 50 per cent.; further investigation showed that they had taken up locally sums amounting to Rs. 14,300, for which they had given bonds, some at 10 and some at 15 per cent. interest per mensem; and they were found to have committed several other gross irregularities and to have been "studiously fallacious in their accounts." The case was complicated by conflicting orders sent to the Bandar 'Abbás Agency from London and Bombay, and it dragged on until 1750, in which year Messrs. Graves and Dalrymple were sent to Isfahán apparently to go into the matter on the spot, but were obliged to leave hurriedly, as we have seen, in consequence of an attack upon the Factory. Towards the end of the year Pierson confessed his guilt at Bandar 'Abbás before Mr. Graves and the Agent and Council, and his effects ("which, being only his wearing apparel and superfluous horse "ornaments, etc., will not amount to a quarter part of what they deem "him answerable to the Hon'ble Company") were secured and sent to India

Another bad case of misconduct, noticed in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, occurred at Basrah a few years later.

Communication with the Company's stations in the Persian Gulf was ordinarily maintained by ships from Bombay, but at times vessels with goods were sent direct from England to Bandar 'Abbās and proceeded thence to Bombay; such were the "Hector" in 1756, the "Prince Edward" in 1757, and the "Admiral Watson" of 400 tons, carrying 80 men and 24 guns, in 1758. The question of correspondence was one of some difficulty during the wars with the French. In 1748 original letters from India seem to have been sent "overland *viâ* Grand Cairo" and duplicates by way of the Persian Gulf. In 1755, peace then prevailing, both original and duplicate letters from Bandar 'Abbās to London were forwarded by Basrah and Aleppo, but "by different Conveyances"; one of the packets of this year, which was at first supposed to have miscarried, was accidentally found in the desert and brought to Aleppo by a Turkish subject, and it was concluded that the messenger had died or been killed upon the road. In 1756, war with France having begun, the establishments in the Gulf were ordered to stand well upon their guard, and thereafter various precautions in regard to convoys, etc., were taken; but a number of important letters despatched from Aleppo apparently failed to reach Basrah, and the Company's Court in London could not "avoid being in pain, for fear the dispatches sent as well "from His Majesty's Ministers as Ourselves immediately upon the "Declaration of War against France" might have fallen into the hands of the enemy. About the same time the Agency at Bandar 'Abbās were ordered by the Directors to be discreet in their correspondence, and to obey the orders of the Secret Committee, of whom three were a quorum, as if signed by the whole Court. In 1761 correspondence between Bombay and London was in duplicate, one set of copies being sent *viâ* Basrah, and material passages were, "as usual, disguis'd in the large Cypher." In 1762 there were again serious miscarriages of correspondence sent by Basrah which were attributed to the negligence of Mr. Shaw, the Resident there.

Communications and correspondence.

Extinction of Portuguese influence in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

During this period, or possibly before it began, the Portuguese finally disappeared from the Gulf. Direct advices from England to Bandar

'Abbās showed that in May 1740 the despatch of a Portuguese fleet from Europe to the Gulf was expected, but it never arrived. In March 1758, when Dr. Ives passed Kung, that place was in ruins and had apparently been deserted by the Portuguese.

Proceedings of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

Proceedings of the Dutch at Bandar 'Abbās and Būshehr before their occupation of Khārag Island, 1722-1752.

The Dutch, at the beginning of the period now under discussion, had factories at Bandar 'Abbās and Basrah. In Persia their attitude towards the native powers seems to have been generally more compliant than that of the English; but towards the Afghāns, as we have already seen, their conduct in 1728 was by no means subservient, and it was only in consequence of British mediation that they gave up Hormūz, which they had seized. As has been related in the history of affairs at Bandar 'Abbās, the Dutch assisted the Persian expedition against 'Omān with the loan of a ship, and in 1740 they made a show of helping the Persian authorities to suppress a mutiny of the Arab crews of the Persian navy. In 1744 they joined a Persian emissary from Shīrāz in an attempt to arrest the Persian Governor of Bandar 'Abbās; but their action was neutralised by that of the British. In 1747, at the invitation of a Sardār, the Dutch re-established a settlement at Būshehr which they had closed; the employé sent to reside there was a Mynheer Belvelt from the Basrah Residency, who took with him a supply of sugar, sugar-candy, camphire and some spices. In 1748 the Dutch began to talk of abandoning their Factory at Bandar 'Abbās, which no longer yielded much profit; and at the beginning of 1751 it was ascertained by the British Agent that they had thoughts of seizing Khārag and removing their Bandar 'Abbās Factory to that island. Early in 1752 Nāsir Khān of Lār visited Bandar 'Abbās, where he laid the Dutch and their dependents under contribution; and in April of that year a determined effort was made by the British to stifle a business in woollens at Basrah which the Dutch carried on from Aleppo, the British Resident at Basrah receiving "particular directions to undersell them and endeavour to render "this Branch of Trade disadvantageous by all fair means that he could "possibly invent." In 1752 the Dutch still continued to maintain a Resident at Bandar 'Abbās, and it was reported that they intended to raise the status of the Factory, which had been reduced, to its former level. These circumstnces led the British Agent1 to oppose suggestion that had been made for the removal of the British Factory; and the event justified his

expectations, if not his advice, for on the 10th of November 1752 a Mynheer Scondelwoert arrived from Batavia with a large European vessel, several assistants and a military guard, and re-established the Factory on its former footing. On the 23rd of April the grab "Nancy," belonging to Dutch merchants at Sūrat, was totally wrecked near Old Lāft between Qishm Island and the main; and most of her cargo was seized by 'Abdul Shaikh, the native ruler of Qishm.

Occupation of Khārag Island by the Dutch under Baron Kniphausen, 1753.

At this juncture, under the advice of Baron Kniphausen,* a Prussian gentleman who had served in the army of his own country and in that of France and who was now in the employment of the Dutch East India Company, the policy of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf suddenly took a new departure. The Baron, on his virtual expulsion† from Basrah, where he was Resident, paid a visit to Khārag; finding the place suitable for a commercial settlement he induced Mīr Nāsir, chief of Rig, to give him a letter offering the island to the Dutch East India Company; and, armed with this document, he proceeded on his way to Batavia, where he succeeded in persuading the Dutch authorities that the opportunity of occupying Khārag was one that ought to be embraced. These events probably took place in 1752. On the 21st of September 1753 a Dutch vessel, the "Fortune," anchored at Bandar 'Abbās to await Baron Kniphausen, who was now expected from Batavia; another Dutch ship had passed up the Gulf in the preceding month of June and had not returned. On the 6th of October the Baron himself arrived at Bandar 'Abbās in the "Getrouwt," a very large ship, and remained there taking in provisions until the 11th, when he sailed

* The chief authorities in regard to Baron Kniphausen's life and character, to his expulsion from Basrah and to the Dutch settlement on Khārag are the following: a letter from Mr. Wood, the British Resident at Rig, to the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās, dated 3rd May 1756 (No. LXXVI in Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay*); Ives's *Journey from Persia to England*, 1773, pages 207-25; Niebuhr's *Description de l'Arabie*, 1774, pages 278-9, and *Voyage en Arabie*, 1776, Vol. II, pages 149-66; *Five Letters from a Free Merchant in Bengal*, 1777, pages 146-52; and *The Island of Kharak or Charrack* in the Asiatic Journal for September 1838, pages 23-4. The anonymous writer of the last named article seems to have confounded Khārag Island with the port of Chārak in Shibkūh. Of Kniphausen it may safely be said that he was able, versatile and energetic; on the other points of his character no decided opinion can be expressed, but it seems probable that he was a liar and a loose liver. The Free Merchant's estimate of the Baron is vindictively depreciatory; that of Ives is friendly and favourable; the judicious Niebuhr reserves his opinion, but is apparently not free from suspicions; and the other authorities are silent on the personal question.

† The circumstances of his leaving Basrah are described in the History of Turkish Iraq, see page 1267, *post*.

again, ostensibly for Būshehr. The "Getrouwt" and the "Fortuna" were both full of men, ammunition and timber, and two small Dutch vessels which a few days later sailed past Bandar 'Abbās without calling were reported to be laden with warlike stores. The British Agent conjectured that the Dutch intended either to attack Basrah or to seize Bahrain; but they settled instead on Khārag,* where they began to fortify a position on the north-eastern corner of the island. They were shortly joined by the Dutch representative from Būshehr, who destroyed his house and garden at that port before leaving it, but his action seems to have been due to a difference with Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr. Baron Kniphausen, not long after his arrival at Khārag, quarrelled with Mir Nāsir over the question of whether or not rent was payable by the Dutch on account of their occupation of the island; and open hostilities followed and continued almost without intermission for some years.

The Dutch settlement on Khārag under Baron Kniphausen, 1756-58.

In 1756 Mr. Wood, the British Resident at Rīg on the mainland opposite, paid a visit to Khārag, where he remained from the 6th to the 15th of April, and he sent a lively account of what he had observed—also a plan of the Dutch fort, which he had "leisure and opportunity of taking with the greatest exactness"—to the British Agency at Bandar 'Abbās. The military guard consisted of 60 Dutch soldiers, who were under the strictest discipline, and of 100 African slaves armed with swords and targets; but the only vessels allotted to the station were a sloop of 10 carriage and 6 swivel guns and a gallivat mounting six 3-pounders and 4 swivels. The town was to be defended by a deep fosse without a wall, one end of which, upon the sea, would serve as a boat harbour. The goods in the warehouses comprised sugar, sugar-candy, pepper, rice, leather, spices of all kinds, tin, lead, iron, perpets of a double breadth, and broadcloth of all sorts; the two last were of kinds unsuitable to the Persian market, but some medleys had been indented for of which the patterns—Mr. Wood was very sorry to say—seemed to be exceedingly well chosen. Eight or ten boats were constantly employed in pearling round the island; but this part of their operations the Dutch conducted with great secrecy. The scale on which the Factory had been established seemed to Mr. Wood to show a complete disregard of expense; but, if the situation in Persia were to become settled, he thought that Khārag might become a populous and flourishing place.

* According to one authority of doubtful value the Dutch did not land on Khārag until January 1754, in which case it is not improbable that they had spent some time in prospecting at other places.

The Dutch intended to import 80 families of Chinese and thereafter to drive out the native Arab inhabitants.

Mr. Wood, as has been shown, was convinced that his own subsequent expulsion from Rīg was brought about by the intrigues of the Dutch on Khārag, who, he believed, were anxious to possess themselves of Rīg.

Dr. Ives and his companions visited Khārag on their way from India to Europe in 1758 and were entertained by the Dutch there from the 31st of March to the 19th of April. The staff of the Factory at this time consisted of Baron Kniphausen, the Chief, who had now reached middle age; Mr. Bosman, the Second, who was accompanied by his *wife; Mr. Robingson, an ensign in the Dutch artillery, but of English extraction; Mr. Nicoli, accountant; and Mr. Binkey, master attendant. The fort, which was of stone, was square and mounted 32 guns, and before the gate, facing the sea, was a ravelin containing 12 guns, six to eighteen pounders; the garrison of the fort consisted of 100 European soldiers. A wall had been begun which was to run from north-west to south-east behind the town, and a triangular bastion had been constructed at its north-western end. There was a small harbour, protected from southerly winds by a stone breakwater, and in it lay two or three armed gallivats of 6 to 8 carriage-guns apiece. The Baron showed much interest in the British travellers and endeavoured, but without success, to arrange for their making the journey to Aleppo by the desert route from Kuwait, with the Shaikh of which place he was in relations; he was "very inquisitive about the diving-bell and some other late discoveries "made in England, for enabling men to keep a long while under water: and he commissioned Dr. Ives to buy him in England a library of all sorts of books, besides scientific and other instruments,—a task which that gentleman duly discharged.

The Dutch settlement on Khārag under Mr. van der Hulst, 1759-61.

Baron Kniphausen remained at Khārag till 1758 or 1759, when he returned to Batavia and was succeeded by Mr. van der Hulst, formerly his principal assistant at Basrah. Under Mr. van der Hulst, who governed Khārag for two and a half years, the war between the Dutch and the chief of Rīg continued. On one occasion Mīr Mahanna sent over two armed vessels at night, which by the clever device of carrying noisy fowls on board and so causing themselves to be mistaken for boats

* This is the first mention with which the writer has met of a European lady in the Persian Gulf. Probably the Mr. "Bosman" mentioned here is the same as the Mr. Buschman who afterwards became Chief: see page 132, *post*.

with supplies from Būshehr, succeeded in approaching, boarding and capturing two Dutch gallivats that lay immediately under the guns of the Khārag fort. After this exploit, Mīr Mahanna in person made a descent on the island with about 100 men and even approached the fort; but, on a party of 25 Europeans with two field guns turning out to engage him, he took flight under cover of some rocks and escaped by sea. As a precaution against the recurrence of such attempts, the fortifications of Khārag were then added to, and a wall was built to enclose some habitations and warehouses that had hitherto stood in the open. Mr. van der Hulst did not enjoy the favour of the Dutch Governor of Batavia, to whom he was subordinate, and in or about 1761 he was recalled to headquarters; but at Bandar 'Abbās he quitted the ship on which he was travelling, placed himself under the protection of the British, and returned to Europe *viâ* Bombay.

The Dutch settlement on Khārag under Mr. Buschman, 1761-63.

Mr. van der Hulst was followed in office by Mr. Buschman, who had been one of the original members of the Dutch staff on Khārag, and of whose eccentric personality the traveller Niebuhr has left an interesting account. His two predecessors had been constantly on bad terms, and sometimes at open war, with their Arab neighbours, especially Mīr Mahanna; but Mr. Buschman was able, by better management, to establish more satisfactory relations. On Mīr Mahanna deputing a principal man with an armed escort to discuss matters with him—and perhaps to seize the Dutch settlement if an opportunity of doing so should present itself—Mr. Buschman made such a judiciously ostentatious display of all his military resources as led the envoy to pronounce the fort impregnable and to persuade his master to agree to the conditions desired by the Dutch.

History of the Dutch Factory at Bandar 'Abbās from 1753 till its removal in 1759.

The Dutch Factory at Bandar 'Abbās continued in existence for about five years after the foundation of the settlement on Khārag, and for a time the staff there maintained a close competition with the British in the Kirmān wool trade, sometimes offering to pay 10 Shāhis a maund more than the British Linguist would give. The British on their part neglected no means of competition but secured specimens of Dutch cloth goods which sold well, ascertained the prices, and caused imitations to be manufactured in England and the trade of the Dutch in woollens gradually ceased at Bandar 'Abbās, where after 1754 they imported no more goods of that kind. At length it became known that the Dutch intended to retire from Bandar 'Abbās, and about the end of 1758 a vessel arrived there, on which most of their goods and the treasure of their Factory were removed to

Khārag; on the 3rd of February 1759 the staff followed in a second ship; and the Factory building at Bandar A'bbās was apparently left in charge of a Linguist. The gentlemen of the British Agency, after the destruction of their premises by the French in the autumn of 1759, seem to have found a temporary refuge in the old Dutch Factory, and at the beginning of 1760 negotiations for leasing or purchasing it were opened with the Dutch Chief at Khārag; but they must either have failed or been dropped, for in 1763, as we have seen in another place, the Persians had been in occupation of the building for three years. Early in 1760 it was expected that the Dutch would endeavour to seize Hormūz, and the British Agent was ordered to take measures to forestall them; but they did not move.

Proceedings of the French in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

Early in the period with which we are now dealing, or possibly before it began, the French Factory at Bandar 'Abbās was withdrawn. Until 1739 the superior of the Carmelites at Basrah seems to have discharged the duties of French Consul in Turkish 'Irāq; and for a number of years after that, beginning about 1742, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Babylon, at Baghdād, was Consul for France there. In 1755 a French Residency, which at some previous time had existed at Basrah, was re-established.

French affairs in the Gulf during the peace with Britain, 1728-56.

Towards the end of 1735 a French vessel called at Bandar 'Abbās, sold part of her cargo, and then left for Basrah. Her stay having been somewhat prolonged, and customs at 4½ per cent. having been duly paid on the goods landed from her, the French before their departure received a letter from Nādir Shāh in which they were urged to re-establish their settlement at Bandar 'Abbās,—a turn of events which was viewed with some alarm by the British and probably by the Dutch, neither of whom paid customs at Bandar 'Abbās. In 1736 another French ship seems to have visited the port; for in the spring of 1737, on the arrival of the French vessel "Herene" (*sic*) at Bandar 'Abbās, her commander, M. Beaumont, sent ashore to complain of impositions to which a French subject, M. Boisroll, had been subjected in the previous year, and to inquire what treatment he might himself expect. The Governor of Fars

who happened to be present in the town, made many fair promises; but in the end he only agreed to refund what was due to M. Boisroll by means of a rebate on the customs payable by M. Beaumont,—a concession by which, as M. Beaumont sold very little of his cargo, the French were little advantaged. In 1752 a small French ship sailed from the Gulf for India in company with the Company's galley "Rose" and a Bombay frigate, the object being mutual defence against Angria, the Indian pirate, and other dangers. The establishment of a Factory at Rig was approved by the East India Company in 1754 partly for the purpose of competing with French woollens, which had apparently obtained some hold in the northern part of the Gulf; and steps were taken, probably somewhat later, "to imitate very exactly the French Fabrick"; but the imitation was not despatched from England until 1757, by which time hostilities between France and Britain had begun.

French affairs in the Gulf during the Seven Years' War, 1756-63.

In February 1756, the Seven Years' War being now imminent, the King of France ordered all British subjects to quit his dominions before the 1st of March and invited his own people to fit out privateers against English commerce, promising to pay 40 livres for every British gun and prisoner captured, and to buy the privateering vessels at prime cost if an early peace should be concluded; and the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London, though they seem to have anticipated the result of the approaching contest with confidence, enjoined extreme vigilance upon their servants at Bandar 'Abbās. In 1757, war having been declared by Britain on the 18th of May 1756, the Court of Directors instructed the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās to be guided in the main by such directions as they might receive from Bombay, but at the same time to comply most exactly with any orders received direct from the Company's Secret Committee in London.

On the 14th of January 1758 the French frigate of war "Bristol" appeared off Bandar 'Abbās, where for some days she continued to cruise between Qishm and Hormūz, eventually leaving for Basrah; in April she was lying at Basrah with another French vessel, and civilities were exchanged between the French and the British officers there; and in June efforts were made by the East India Company's ships "Revenge" and "Drake" to intercept the "Bristol", which was expected to leave Basrah at the beginning of that month on her way down the Gulf; but they were not, apparently, successful. The capture and destruction by a French naval expedition in the following year of the British Agency at Bandar 'Abbās have already been described in an earlier section.

Affairs of the Arabian Coast, 1722-63.

Events on the Arabian coast during this period are described at length in the separate histories of its divisions, and in this place a brief recapitulation will suffice.

Sultanate of 'Omān.

The most remarkable occurrence in the 'Omān Sultanate, or rather Imāmate, was the rise of the two factions known as the Hināwīyah and Ghāfirīyah, by which the power of that state was, until the formation of a strong central Government under the Āl Bū Sa'īd, greatly reduced for external action. In 1737 the armies of Nādir Shāh, the usurper of the Persian throne, invaded 'Omān, establishing an occupation which was at length overthrown by the Imām Ahmad, founder of the Āl Bū Sa'īdi dynasty, in 1744. The attitude of the British in this struggle was one of neutrality. In 1758 and 1760 the Imām of 'Omān was at war with the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah.

Trucial 'Omān.

The Qawāsim of the coast known at the present day as Trucial 'Omān played a considerable part about this time in the Persian affairs. In 1727 a small British naval expedition exacted compensation from the Qāsimi Shaikh for losses which he had occasioned to the East India Company's Factory at Bandar 'Abbās by establishing a rival port at Bāsīdu on the island of Qishm. In 1737, when the Persians invaded 'Omān, the Qawāsim at first submitted to Nādir Shāh's general; but by 1741 their attitude towards the invaders had become doubtful and they had incurred the distrust of the Persians. By 1747 an alliance had been formed between the Qawāsim and Mulla 'Alī Shāh, the Persian Governor of Bandar 'Abbās, which continued to subsist at least until 1763. Probably by means of this alliance, the Qawāsim succeeded before 1760 in obtaining a foothold on the island of Qishm; and, by a treaty concluded among the parties interested, they obtained in 1763 a third part of the revenues of the island.

Qatar and Bahrain.

Of Qatar nothing is heard during the period now under consideration. Bahrain, at the time apparently independent and governed by Hūwalah Arabs, was seized about 1753 by the Shaikh of Būshehr, assisted by the Mir of Rig, and thus became indirectly a dependency of Persia.

Kuwait

The port of Kuwait was as yet obscure and insignificant. It was governed by an 'Athbi family, with whom the head of the Dutch settlement that existed on Khārag Island between 1753 and 1766 maintained friendly relations.

Affairs of Turkish 'Irāq, 1722-63.

The campaigns in which Nādir Shāh, during his brief tenure of power, sought to annex Turkish 'Irāq to the Persian empire are the only noteworthy feature in the foreign relations of the latter country between 1722 and 1763. In 1733 Nādir Shāh in person endeavoured, without success, to reduce Baghdād; and about 1735 and again in 1743 his troops advanced against Basrah, but on both occasions they were repulsed or otherwise compelled to retire. A regular Factory of the British East Indian Company was first established at Basrah in or about 1723; and continuous relations, generally unsatisfactory, between the Company's servants and the local Turkish authorities had thus a beginning; but, during the period with which we are at present concerned, there were no transactions of political importance. The Dutch, who also had established a Factory at Basrah, were obliged to leave that place about 1752 in consequence of differences between their Resident and the Turkish Governor; nor did they again return to 'Irāq. A French Residency at Basrah, after being for some time in abeyance, was re-opened in 1755.

The general and internal history of Turkish 'Irāq is given in detail in the chapter devoted to that country.

Affairs of the Persian Coast 'Arabistān and Makrān, 1722-63.

Events on the Persian Coast, within the limits of the government of Fārs, have already been disposed of in the general sections above: it only remains to refer here to the more outlying provinces of 'Arabistān and Persian Makrān.

'Arabistān.

In 'Arabistān the period seems to have been devoid of important events; but one of the chiefs of that district came into temporary and unenviable prominence at the capture of Isfahān by the Afghāns in 1722.

Persian Makrān.

In 1739 an incursion was made into Persian Makrān by Muhammad Taqi Khān, Nādir Shāh's governor of Fārs; but it had no permanent results; and at his withdrawal the country became again, as it had been before, independent in all but name of the authority of the Shāh.

For further details the reader is referred to the separate histories of 'Arabistān and Persian Makrān.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE TEMPORARY LOCATION OF THE BRITISH HEAD-QUARTERS AT BASRAH TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA, 1763-97.*

In dealing, from a British stand-point, with the period from 1763 to 1797 in the Persian Gulf, it is important not to lose sight of certain events which were taking place at the time at a distance from the Gulf itself, in India and even in Europe. These we shall notice in passing, wherever it may be necessary to do so, in order to explain British activity or inaction in the field with which we are particularly concerned.

General affairs and British interests before the Persian invasion of Turkish 'Irāq, 1763-75.

Relative positions of the native powers in Gulf, 1763-65.

In the Persian Gulf, in 1763, the strongest administration was that of Karīm Khān, the Vakīl of Persia, who was now firmly established at Shīrāz and had extended his authority over the whole country with the exception of a few outlying districts. Among the tracts not yet fully subjugated by him, however, were some of those adjoining the Gulf, such as 'Arabistān. Turkish 'Irāq, the second in size and importance of the governments in the Gulf, was held at this time by 'Alī Pāsha, whose position at home was too insecure to allow of his exerting influence abroad, and who was fully engaged, during his short tenure of power, in coping with local rebellions. Kuwait already existed, but its 'Atbi inhabitants were not prominent in Gulf affairs; Zubārah in Qatar did not come into being until 1766, and for some years after its foundation it was not a place of any account; and the Bahrain Islands were as yet

* The authorities for this period are mentioned in foot notes in the chapters following, which contain separate histories of the different divisions of the Persian Gulf. The most important for the Gulf generally are the official *Précis of Information in regard to the First Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with Summary of Events, 1600-1800*, printed in 1905.

dependent on Persia through the Shaikh of Bahrain. The only considerable power in the Gulf besides Persia and Turkey was the Imamate of 'Omān, which, having shaken off the yoke of Persia only a few years previously, was still inspired with anti-Persian sentiments and a strong feeling of nationality. The naval resources of the Imām, however small the military forces of which he disposed on land, were probably not inferior to those of all the ports of Persia combined; but he was seriously incommoded, in operations abroad, by the necessity of defending his north-western frontier against the Qawāsim, with whom he was almost always at war.

Position of the British in India 1763-75.

The British power in the Persian Gulf was as yet represented, almost exclusively, by the East India Company; and the Company were at this time fairly free from embarrassments in other quarters. In India the progress of the Marāthas had received a temporary check through their defeat by the Afghāns at Pānipat in 1761. After the battle of Buxar in 1764 the dangers to be faced by the British in Bengal were no longer so great as they had been; and in 1765 the revenue administration of that province passed into their hands. The first Mysore war, however, ended unfavourably to the British in 1769; and even the expansion of their interests in India, under Clive and Warren Hastings, must have tended to withdraw the attention of the East India Company from affairs in Persia and Arabia.

Transference of the Persian Gulf Agency from Bandar 'Abbās to Basrah, 1763.

The Agency, or principal British establishment in the Gulf, was removed at the beginning of 1763 from Bandar 'Abbās, where it had ceased, from its isolated position and the constant prevalence of local disturbances, to possess a commercial or even a political value. It was located instead at Basrah in Turkish 'Irāq, absorbing a Residency, which had formerly been subordinate to it; and in 1764 it was expressly recognised by the Porte as a Consulate under the Capitulations. Mr. Price, the Agent specially deputed from India to inaugurate the new arrangements, was ordered to negotiate for a Residency at Būshehr also, and did so with success; but, in spite of the foot-hold thus retained in Persia, the policy of the Agency was dominated for some years from this date by sympathy with its new Turkish surroundings, and verged on hostility towards Persia. The transference of the British Agency from Persian to Turkish soil was thus an event of decided political significance.

Overtures by Karīm Khān to the British

Karīm Khān, on his part, was anxious enough to maintain friendly relations with the representatives of the East India Company, for he

saw clearly that without the aid of a naval power it would be difficult to bring the tribes of the Persian Coast into thorough subjection; and he therefore granted them, almost with alacrity, various commercial privileges in Persia and permission to open a Factory at Būshehr, which they desired. He took advantage of the opportunity afforded by this grant in 1763 to intimate that he would be glad to pay for the services of British ships in helping him to reduce Mīr Mahanna of Rīg, a predatory chief on the coast to the north of Būshehr, who would not submit to his authority; and in 1764 he made a distinct request for the co-operation of one or two British vessels against the same rebel, at the same time offering to subsidise one or two British cruisers for permanent police duty in the Gulf, and even volunteering to hand the town of Rīg over to the East India Company. The Government of Bombay do not seem to have regarded these proposals as in the least attractive; but they authorised the occasional loan of the services of a British vessel to the Vakīl, provided that it were so managed as to be advantageous to the Company and not to upset the general arrangements for trade.

for naval assistance, 1763-64.

In 1765 Karīm Khān, who was still engaged in consolidating the Persian kingdom by incorporating its more loosely attached dependencies, marched in person against the Ka'ab tribe of 'Arabistān, in subduing whom the Turks had promised him their assistance; and about the same time he asked that British ships might be sent to support, along with the Būshehr fleet, some operations that his general Amīr Kuhneh Khān was about to undertake against Mīr Mahanna by land. The Vakīl's application was addressed to Mr. Jervis, the British Resident at Būshehr, by whom it was forwarded to Basrah with a suggestion that the "Tartar," then at Basrah, might be lent under the authority already granted by the Bombay Government. Mr. Wrench, the Agent at Basrah, and his Council complied with Mr. Jervis's request; but, whether from jealousy of him or for other reasons, they did so most reluctantly; and, in their unwillingness to act as required upon this occasion, there may perhaps be traced the first germs of a prejudice against Karīm Khān that afterwards caused much mischief. Various attacks upon the island of Khārgu, to which Mīr Mahanna retired directly that danger began to threaten him at Rīg, and upon his fleet, were made by the "Tartar" and the Būshehr vessels during the month of June 1765; but the crews of the Persian vessels showed extreme caution, or even cowardice. The "Tartar" alone was unable to carry the matter through, and in July the expedition against Mīr Mahanna was abandoned. Meanwhile Karīm Khān had destroyed

Unsuccessful Anglo-Persian attack upon Mīr Mahanna of Rīg, 1765.

Dōraq, the capital of the Ka'ab country, as well as an important irrigation work belonging to the tribe; but the failure of the Turks to act in concert with him, as they had promised, enabled the rebels to escape further punishment at his hands by crossing to the western side of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Unsuccessful Anglo-Turkish war against the Ka'ab, 1765-66.

In July 1765, only a few days after the Anglo-Persian attack upon Mir Mahanna had been discontinued, a new and sudden turn was given to political affairs in the Persian Gulf by the seizure in rapid succession, by Ka'ab tribesmen, of three British vessels in the Shatt-al-'Arab: these were the "Sally" of two masts, an unnamed yacht belonging to the Basrah Residency, and the "Fort William" of three masts. There is nothing to show whether the motives of the Ka'ab in this case were merely piratical, or whether the tribe had come, in consequence of the Khārgu operations, to regard the British as the allies of their oppressor Karīm Khān. The Agent and Council at Basrah, though aware that the Vakil had lately claimed the Ka'ab as his subjects by overrunning their country, applied to the Turks for redress, so manifesting a distinctly anti-Persian bias; and it was immediately arranged at Basrah that joint operations against the Ka'ab should be undertaken by a Turkish army and a British fleet. The Government of Bombay, approving of the scheme, equipped the largest expedition that had sailed, at least for very many years, from India for the Persian Gulf; it comprised four vessels of European build and small detachments of European infantry and artillery. The Turks were not yet ready to move when this armament arrived at Basrah, and the British began operations on their own account from Khor Mūsa; but in May 1766, they experienced a sharp check, which seems to have wanted but little in order to become a serious reverse. At last, after considerable delay, and under an agreement to pay 1,000 Tūmāns a month for the assistance of the British fleet if continued beyond the end of June, the Turks took the field; and concerted action followed, by land and sea, during the months of July, August, and September. On one occasion an attempt was made to recapture the "Sally" and "Fort William" from the Ka'ab, but it ended in their destruction by fire at their moorings. At length, on the 23rd of September 1766, the British attempted to storm some Ka'ab redoubts without the help of the Turks, who now pretended to be waiting for the assistance from the Persian Government; but the result was a disastrous repulse in which Captain Brewer, the military officer commanding, was killed with a number of others, and some field-guns and chests of ammunition were lost.

Intervention of Karīm Khān between the British and the Turks on the one side and the Ka'ab on the other, 1766.

At this unfortunate juncture Karīm Khān interposed, asserting the Ka'ab to be Persian subjects, and insisting that both the British and the Turks should retire from Persian territory; but he promised that they should be compensated for the losses inflicted on them by the Ka'ab. The Turks, it should be mentioned, had been much harassed by the Ka'ab in recent years and had already taken partial action against them, with British support, in 1761-62, 1763 and 1765. In October 1766, in consequence of the intervention of Karīm Khān, the Turks refused to carry on the war any longer and retired, notwithstanding the earnest and repeated protests of the British Agent and Council at Basrah, within their own borders; and the joint campaign against the Ka'ab came to an end. Reinforcements as strong as the original expedition were despatched from Bombay at the beginning of 1767; but before their arrival at Basra[1] the question had entered on a new phase, and active operations could not with propriety be resumed.

Settlement arranged between the British and Karīm Khān 1767-68.

The change in the situation was due to the arrival of a Persian envoy at Basrah with proposals, on the part of Karīm Khān, for the British and the Turks. In consequence of the communication to the British, Mr. Skipp of the Basrah Factory proceeded to Shīrāz in April 1767 with perplexing, if not conflicting, instructions from the Government of Bombay and from his immediate superior, Mr. Moore, who had now taken the place of Mr. Wrench as Agent at Basrah. Mr. Skipp, though the visit of a European gentleman to Shīrāz had been invited by the Vakīl, was not at first well received; but in the end he was able to arrange, provisionally, a not unsatisfactory settlement. Mr. Moore, however, who had conceived a strong aversion both for Karīm Khān and for Mr. Skipp, referred the proposed settlement to Bombay instead of immediately ratifying it; and he even went so far as to suggest a military combination against Karīm Khān between the East India Company and Mīr Mahanna. The Bombay Government, on learning how matters stood, authorised a second journey by Mr. Skipp to Shīrāz for the purpose of accepting the offered settlement, or such terms as Karīm Khān might still be willing to grant; but, subject to a condition that no hostility should be shown to Karīm Khan, the Agent was invested with full discretion to make the best arrangements that he could. Finally, on the 14th of April 1768, Mr. Skipp obtained an agreement from the Vakīl, under which, in consideration of the British reducing or making a serious effort to reduce Mīr Mahanna, Karīm Khān was to obtain compensation for them on account of the outrages committed by the Ka'ab and to transfer to

them the island of Khārag, if it were taken in the operations. Mir Mahanna, it should be explained, had wrested Khārag from the Dutch at the beginning of 1766, and the island was now his place of residence instead of Rig. The agreement with Karīm Khān contained other clauses advantageous to the British besides those specified; but it did not remove certain difficulties in regard to trade of which the Company's servants complained.

Unauthorised British expedition against Hormūz and loss of the "Defiance," 1767.

While these matters were under discussion it occurred to the Agent and Council at Basrah that the services of the reinforced, but still idle, British armament in the Gulf might be turned to profitable account; and a part of it was accordingly sent against the Shaikh of Hormūz in connection with a piracy, accompanied by murder, which had been committed on the British ship "Islamabad" in 1765, and in the proceeds of which the Shaikh was said to have shared. This expedition, notwithstanding the pretext alleged for it, was little better than a filibustering raid; but it was stopped, before it reached its destination, by an accidental explosion on board the "Defiance," the principal vessel sent, by which she was destroyed and almost all her crew, including about 170 Europeans, were lost. The Agent and Council professed to have acted in this case in accordance with the wishes of Karīm Khān, but Mr. Skipp denied that these had ever been ascertained; and the Vakīl, when the circumstances came to his knowledge, expressed his displeasure at the attempted interference of the British with a Persian vassal.

Ineffectual British attack on Khārag, 1768.

This contretemps did not prevent the British from making an attack, under their agreement with Karīm Khān, upon the island of Khārag; but the operations, which lasted from the 20th to the 29th of May 1768, were indifferently conducted; and, after a serious accident to a watering party, they were ignominiously abandoned. In August following, Karīm Khān was prepared to make an effort in conjunction with the British against Mir Mahanna; but the Agent and Council at Basrah at this point, summarily broke off negotiations with him, and recalled Mr Skipp from Shīrāz. Meanwhile Mir Mahanna, who—though a noted pirate—had hitherto respected British vessels, withdrew the exception that he had been accustomed to make in their favour, and the "Speedwell," a trading vessel, was captured by some of his subjects.

Withdrawal of the British Residency

At the beginning of 1769 a revolution took place on Khārag, by which Mir Mahanna was deprived of his chiefship and driven into exile: and the Agent and Council at Basrah, who were anxious to prevent the

island from falling into the hands of Karīm Khān, made a half-hearted attempt to dictate to the new Mīr, and even authorised the commander of the Company's squadron to destroy his vessels, or those of the Ka'abs if a favourable opportunity should occur. Mr Morley, the Resident at Būshehr, foreseeing trouble with the Persian Government in consequence of these and other similar proceedings, then retired from Persia along with his whole establishment; and direct friendly intercourse between the British and the Vakīl was at an end. The withdrawal from Būshehr happened to be consonant with the views of the Court of Directors in London, who had allowed themselves to be influenced to a great extent by the opinions of Mr. Moore, and who consequently regarded Karīm Khān as altogether untrustworthy; but it was strongly disapproved by the Government of Bombay, and they ordered the Agent to commence negotiations for the re-establishment of the Būshehr Residency. Mr. Moore, however, found means to postpone compliance with their instructions until 1770, when a return to Būshehr was positively prohibited by the Court. The Directors were at this time indignant on account of certain restrictions which the Vakīl, in the supposed interests of Persia, had imposed on British trade in the country; and they accepted the opinion of Mr. Moore, which was contrary to that of the Government of Bombay, that the Company's trade in the Gulf could be most conveniently and most profitably carried on from one settlement at Basrah.

from Būshehr, 1769.

In the summer of 1770 some boats from Khārag captured the "Britannia" and another vessel under British colours and carried them to Rīg, where they were detained. The Agent and Council at Basrah, having failed to obtain immediate satisfaction, reported that they believed the seizures to have been ordered by Karīm Khān and suggested, by way of remedy, that a large expedition should be sent to the Gulf, carrying 500 European soldiers and 1,500 sepoys at least, to punish the Vakīl and extirpate piracy, root and branch. But the Court of Directors, however unwilling they might be to seek a reconciliation with Karīm Khān, were still more averse to war with him; and they therefore forbade hostile measures and suggested recourse to the protection of the Royal Navy and to a system of convoys in the Gulf. The authority of the Vakīl was now better established upon the Persian littoral than in the beginning; Tangistān and Dashti had been visited by his troops in 1765, Lār and with it Bandar 'Abbās had been reduced in 1766, and symptoms of disregard for his authority at Būshehr and

Piracy by Khārag boats on British vessels, and suggested expedition against Persia, 1770.

Kangūn had been repressed in 1767; but the Ka'ab were still practically independent.

Capture of the "Tyger" by Rig vessels and detention of Messrs. Beaumont and Green in Persia, 1773.

In April 1773, on account of an epidemic of plague which had broken out at Basrah, Mr. Moore and his staff left that place for Bombay; but on the way down the Shatt-al-'Arab the "Tyger", one of their vessels, was boarded and captured by Rig pirates, and Messrs. Beaumont and Green of the Basrah Factory, who were on board of her, were taken prisoners. This outrage cannot, from the accidental nature of the circumstances, have been designed by Karīm Khān; but he allowed himself to profit by it to the extent of incorporating the "Tyger" with one of the Persian fleets in the Gulf, and of detaining Messrs. Beaumont and Green at Shīrāz as hostages for the behaviour of the British, or to compel the East India Company to come to an understanding with him. Eventually in the spring of 1774, some time after the Agent had returned from Bombay to Basrah, the two English gentlemen were allowed to leave Shīrāz for Būshehr in charge of the Shaikh of the latter place; but there they remained until the September following, when Mr. Beaumont was allowed to visit Basrah as bearer of a proposal that, in return for his own and his companion's liberation and the restoration of the "Tyger", the East India Company should re-establish their settlement at Būshehr.

Agent and Council however, under instructions which they had received from Bombay not to treat with the Vakīl at all until both Messrs. Beaumont and Green should have been released, declined to entertain the suggestion; and Mr. Beaumont remained a prisoner.

Difficulties between the Persian Vakīl and the Imām of 'Omān, 1769-74.

While the relations of Karīm Khān with the British followed the course above described, difficulties of an acute kind had occurred between him and the Imām of 'Omān, the chief cause being a demand by Karīm Khān in 1769 for the renewal of the tribute which had been paid by 'Omān to Persia in the time of Nādir Shāh. To this demand the Imām Ahmad, himself the deliverer of 'Omān from Persian rule, would by no means accede; and the result was chronic hostility at sea between the two powers, from which the British, though their own relations with Karīm Khān were unfriendly, held strictly aloof. In 1770 the Imām threatened Būshehr with a fleet; and in 1773, helped by his usual enemies the Qāsimi Shaikh and the Shaikh of Hormūz, he did some damage upon the Persian coast. At the end of 1773 a Persian fleet, including the captured British vessel "Tyger," were got together at Kangūn for service against the Imām; but the Ka'ab, who had been summoned, neglected to appear, and other tribal contingents which had

joined refused to put to sea. The Shaikh of Būshehr, whom Karīm Khān early in 1774 had placed in charge of the negotiations on his part, consequently found himself unable to effect any settlement. Shortly before this, overtures for naval co-operation had been made on behalf of Karīm Khān both to the British and to the Turks; but the British had refused to entertain them, and the Turks, though they made fair promises, were careful to do nothing.

General affairs and British interests during the siege and occupation of Basrah by the Persians, 1775-1779.

Cause of war between Persia and Turkey.

At more than one time since the end of 1773 a war between Persia and Turkey had been considered imminent; and in March 1775 hostilities were begun by Karīm Khān, who sent his brother Sādiq Khān in command of a large force against Basrah. The motives of the Vakīl in declaring war cannot be stated with certainty. The reason which he himself alleged was the ill-treatment by the Turkish Government of Persian pilgrims to the Shī'ah shrines in 'Irāq; but he had also recent defeats by the Turks in Kurdistān to avenge, and he may have been influenced besides by a not unnatural desire to extend the frontiers of Persia. There are also indications of a belief on his part that possession of Basrah would enable him to reduce 'Omān, of which the trade was largely with that port, to submission, and to defeat a policy which the British Agent and Council at Basrah had lately adopted of boycotting the Persian Ports and endeavouring to attract all trade to Basrah.

Conduct of the East India Company's representatives and of the Imām of 'Omān with reference to the war between the Persians and the Turks.

Basrah was invested by the Persians on the 7th of April 1775 and held out gallantly under Sulaimān Āgha, the Turkish Mutasallim, until the 16th of April 1776, when it surrendered. The conduct of Mr. Moore and his associates in connection with the siege, for which event public opinion at Basrah seemed to hold them responsible, was as ill-considered and erratic as might have been expected from their former treatment of Karīm Khān. They at first gave out that their attitude would be strictly neutral, and this would no doubt have been a proper line of policy to follow; but no sooner did a Ka'ab fleet appear in the river to assist the Persian army than they sent cruisers to attack them; and for a few days they supported the defence so energetically that the Mutasallim was encouraged to defy the Persians with what afterwards appeared to have been unnecessary vehemence. On the approach of the

Būshehr fleet from below Basrah to join that of the Ka'ab, which had already gone above the town, the Agent and Council became alarmed; and on the 11th of April 1775 they quitted Basrah for Būshehr, leaving the Company's Factory and the goods in it unprotected. On their way to the Gulf they engaged the Būshehr fleet, which was on its way up the river, and drove them into the mouth of the Kārūn.

More useful assistance was received by the Turks from the Imām of 'Omān, whose strong fleet in August 1775 defeated a part of the Persian navy, opened the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and enabled the defenders of Basrah to reprovision the town.

Re-institution of friendly relations between the British and Karīm Khān, 1775.

Meanwhile, on the very day that the siege of Basrah began, Mr. Garden arrived at Būshehr on a mission from the Government of Bombay to Karīm Khān. For the sake of restoring good relations, if this could not be done in any other way, he was authorised to re-establish a British Factory at Būshehr, though this was contrary to the orders of the Court of Directors; and by an intelligent use of his powers he succeeded, not only in procuring the release of Mr. Beaumont and the return of the "Tyger," but also in arranging for the security of the Company's property at Basrah in case the town should be taken by the Persians. But he did not so much as refer to the still outstanding claim for damages on account of the Ka'ab piracies of 1765, perhaps from a consciousness that it was now too old to be revived with decency or any chance of success.

Position of the British at Basrah and Būshehr during the Persian occupation of Basrah, 1775-79.

On the capitulation of Basrah the representatives of the East India Company were at once replaced in possession of the Factory, which was found undamaged; but the form of government established by the Persians,—a purely military occupation in face of hostile surroundings,—was unfavourable to trade, and the violence of the Persian Governor under Sādiq Khān gave frequent cause for complaint. Karīm Khān, it is true, was always ready to correct abuses when brought to his notice; but the outlook at Basrah was so disheartening that the Court of Directors of the East India Company at one time contemplated an entire withdrawal from the place, and the Agency there was actually reduced to the status of a Residency.

At Būshehr, where the local administration was as favourably disposed as the Vakīl himself, everything proceeded smoothly until the end of Karīm Khān's reign.

Effects of the Persian occupation of Basrah in

A noteworthy consequence of the Persian occupation of Basrah was the migration of a number of merchants to Kuwait and the removal of others, who did not feel themselves secure even there, from Kuwait to

Zubārah in Qatar. The trade and general growth of both Arab seaports were strongly stimulated by these events; and the effect upon Zubārah, in particular, was so marked that the attention of the Persians was attracted to it; and in 1777 and the following years they tried, but without success, to obtain possession of the place.

other parts of the Gulf, and various matters, 1776-79.

At the end of the period, in 1778-80, the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah had already begun to indulge in those indiscriminate piracies by which, a few years later, they were to acquire great notoriety; but it does not appear what relation, if any, their lawlessness bore to the general political situation in the Gulf. Trouble between the Ka'ab and the subjects of the Shaikh of Būshehr in 1777-78, and hostilities at various times from 1775 to 1779 between the Imām of 'Omān and the Shaikh of the Qawāsim and the Shaikh of Hormūz, also figure as detached incidents.

General affairs and British interests after the retirement of the Persians from Basrah, 1779-97.

Decline of Persia after the death of Karim Khān.

With the death of Karīm Khān in 1779 Persia at once ceased to be the predominant state of the Persian Gulf; and before long it had become one of the feeblest and most disorganised. The heirs of Karīm Khān fought among themselves for the succession to the throne, and no less than seven rulers of his family followed one another in eighteen years. They had no influence abroad; and even the provinces and districts of Persia itself passed steadily out of their control, to be recombined under the first monarch of the Qajār dynasty, by whom they were succeeded in 1797.

Loss by Persia of Basrah in 1779, of Bahrain in 1783, and (virtually) of Bandar 'Abbās and dependencies in 1794.

Basrah was evacuated by Sādiq Khān immediately that he received news of his brother's death; for he wished to assert his claims to the throne in person, and the troops forming the Basrah garrison were required by him for the purpose. The place thereupon reverted peacefully, as Sādiq Khān seems to have intended that it should, to Turkish jurisdiction. An important duty was performed by the British Residency, between the departure of the Persians and the return of the Turks, in supporting an Arab administration which undertook temporarily the management and protection of the town.

The next dependency lost to Persia was Bahrain, which was first attacked by Arabs from the mainland in 1782. Reprisals on the adjacent Arab settlement of Zubārah were then attempted by the Shaikh of Būshehr, who was governor under Persia of Bahrain; but they failed; and the victorious 'Utūb at once crossed over into Bahrain, followed by a horde of other Arabs, obliged the Shaikh's garrison to surrender, and took possession themselves.

The lease of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies was transferred in 1794 from a Persian vassal to the Sultanate of 'Omān; and the districts and islands which it comprised thus came, for practical purposes, under the jurisdiction of a foreign power.

Internal state of Persia Turkish 'Irāq and 'Omān.

In Persia disorders and civil war broke out on the death of the Vakīl and were as rife in the Gulf districts as in other parts of the country. Būshehr was seized and partially plundered in 1779 by the Khān of Tangistān, who was quickly destroyed in his turn by a combination of the maritime chiefs between Rig and 'Asalu. In 1780 there was fighting between the chiefs of Hormūz and Chārak, and also between those of 'Asalu and Tāhiri. In 1791-92 the Mīr of Rīg and the Khān of Khisht espoused the cause of Lutf 'Alī Khān, the rightful ruler of Shīrāz, and the Shaikh of Būshehr that of his enemies, with the result that the districts between them became a scene of raids and counter-raids.

In Turkish 'Irāq there were one or two rebellions against the Pāsha of Baghdād, and in 1787 the town of Basrah was for some months usurped and governed by the Shaikh of the Muntafik; but the power of Sulaimān Pāsha, the governor, gradually became consolidated; and political conditions were on the whole more stable than in Persia. Some annoyance was caused by the Ka'ab, from the direction of Persia, in 1784 and 1791; but a more disquieting feature was the aggressiveness of the Wahhābis upon the western frontier. In 1784, after about a generation of growth and expansion in Najd, these fanatics first began to make themselves felt upon the borders of the Baghdād Pāshāliq; and between 1793 and 1795 their raids against Kuwait caused some alarm. By 1795 they had conquered a part of Hasa from its Bani Khālid rulers.

The Imamate of 'Omān was broken up in 1793 into three separate principalities; but the chief of these, becoming a Sultanate with its capital at Masqat, carried on the naval traditions of the Imamate with undiminished prestige. The ruler, Saiyid Sultān, was even able to add the Makrān ports of Gwādar and Chahbār to his dominions proper, and

to extort from Persia a lease of Bandar 'Abbās, Mīnāb, and the adjacent islands.

Difficulties of the East India Company in the East and at home, 1779-97.

During this period a series of inconclusive wars in India threw a heavy and almost continuous strain upon the resources of the East India Company, thus hampering their action in the Persian Gulf. Among these contests were the first and second Marātha wars, from 1775 to 1782, by which the British gained little advantage; the second Mysore war, from 1780 to 1784, which resulted in a mutual restitution of conquests; and the third Mysore war, from 1790 to 1792, after which Tipu Sultān was stripped of half his dominions, yet remained a dangerous enemy.

At home also the East India Company had to contend with various adverse occurrences, such as the movement which produced Fox's India Bill of 1783, and the trial of Warren Hastings on an impeachment by Fox, Burke and Sheridan, which opened in 1788 not to close before 1795.

Hostilities between the British and the French in the East, 1778-83 1793-97.

From 1778 to 1783, in consequence of the French having taken the side of the British North American colonies, then in revolt against the mother country, there was war between Britain and France in the East. Pondichéry, restored to France by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 on condition of remaining unfortified, was again captured by the British in 1778 and retained until 1783; and in 1781, during the progress of the second Mysore war, there was severe fighting with the French under Suffren in Indian waters.

In 1793, the French Revolution having taken place in the meanwhile, war was declared by Britain against France in Europe; and hostilities in India followed. Before the end of the year Pondichéry once more succumbed to a British force, and the other French settlements of Chandarnagar, Kārikāl and Mahé surrendered; but meanwhile French war-vessels and French privateers from the Mauritius had begun to ravage British commerce in the eastern seas; and in the winter of 1793-94 a British naval squadron was sent to deal with them in Javan waters. In 1795 Holland became a party to the war on the side of France, with the result that in 1795-96 a British expedition wrested Ceylon from the Dutch. In 1796-97 French agents made their appearance in Persia and the Persian Gulf; and in 1797 the British still continued to operate against the possessions of the Dutch in the East Indies.

British policy and relations with the Persian Gulf, 1779-97.

These difficulties in India with various native powers and with the French afford, together with the instability of the Persian Government, a sufficient explanation of the British policy in the Persian Gulf at the time, which was wanting in strength and decision. The British relations with

the states in the Gulf were on the whole not unsatisfactory, but the unfavourable circumstances of the time made it impossible that they should be close or continuous. Ja'far Khān, who ruled at Shirāz from 1785 to 1789, was well disposed to the East India Company and in one year granted two Farmāns for the protection of British trade in Persia; and his son, Lutf 'Ali Khān, followed in his footsteps. From 1791 to 1793 there was tension between the British Resident at Basrah and the Pasha of Baghdād, and in 1793 the Residency was removed to Kuwait, where it remained until 1795; but the difference was somewhat of the nature of a private quarrel, and after its settlement friendship was renewed and maintained. A serious symptom for the future was the commission of two daring crimes at sea by the Qāsimi tribe, who in 1797 captured the British vessel "Bassein" and attacked the British cruiser "Viper," but the significance of these events, which were the precursors of a reign of terror soon afterwards established by the Qāwasim, was not appreciated at the time.

Dutch interests and proceedings in the Persian Gulf, 1763-66.

Khārag, the only Dutch settlement, 1763.

The time had now arrived for Dutch influence and trade to disappear, like those of the Portuguese at an earlier date, from the waters and coasts of the Persian Gulf. After the withdrawal of the Dutch from Basrah about 1752, from Būshehr in 1753 or 1754, and from Bandar 'Abbās in 1758-59, their only remaining station in the Gulf had been the fortified settlement which they established on Khārag in 1753; and this Factory, though it was maintained on a liberal and even extravagant scale, especially in the matter of naval and military defences, does not seem to have been commercially of much advantage to the Dutch East India Company.

Loss of Khārag by the Dutch, 1766.

In 1765 the Dutch on Khārag became involved in hostilities with Mir Mahanna of Rig, which they had hitherto carefully avoided; and at the beginning of the following year their fort was captured, and they themselves expelled from the island, by that desperate character. Probably in view of the unprofitableness of the Khārag settlement, as well as of the dangers to which it was exposed, no attempt to re-establish it was made by the Government of the Dutch East Indies.

French interests and proceedings in the Persian Gulf, 1763-1797.

French political establishments, 1763-97.

During the period that elapsed between the end of the Seven Years' War and the French Revolution, France appears to have been, as before, without any official representative in Persia. At Basrah she had in 1765 a Resident or Consul who did not trade, whose salary was irregularly paid, and whom the Mutasallim in 1765 decided to treat on ceremonial occasions as inferior in rank to the British Resident. The Latin Bishop of Baghdād was generally a Frenchman; and before the French Revolution he ordinarily discharged, in addition to his episcopal duties, those of French Consul at the headquarters of the Pāsha's Government. After the Revolution, at least in 1796-97, the French representative at Baghdād was a layman, who was described as "le commissaire des relations commerciales", but whose position probably did not differ in any essential point from that of an ordinary Consul.

Dealings of the French with the 'Omān Sultanate, 1765-92.

Through their Consul at Baghdād, and through agents in Mauritius, the French Government at this time generally maintained a friendly intercourse with the ruler of 'Omān; but mutual amenities were in abeyance from 1781 to 1790 in consequence of the unauthorised seizure by a French privateer of a war-vessel belonging to the Imām. In 1785 a French mission from Mauritius sought permission to establish a French Factory at Masqat, but their efforts met with no better success than the similar endeavours of the British about the same time.

French activity in the Persian Gulf, 1763-92.

After the declaration of war by Britain against France in 1793 and the union of Holland with France in 1795, a period of unrest and intrigue in the countries adjoining the Persian Gulf began; but up to 1797 there was no decided action in this region by the British, who had enough to occupy them in India, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies.

Mission of MM. Bruguière and Olivier to Turkey and Persia, 1793-98.

The most important political mission sent to the Middle East by France at this time was one which consisted of Citizens Bruguière and Olivier, two eminent naturalists. It remained five years, from 1793 to 1798, in Turkey, Egypt and Persia; and its proceedings are fully related by M. Olivier in his book * of travels.

The delegates, who, except during their short visit to Persia, seem to have been engaged rather in the study of politics, trade, and natural

* Dr. G. A. Olivier's *Voyage dans l'Empire Othoman, l'Égypte et la Perse*, Paris, 1801-1807.

history than in practical negotiations, arrived at Constantinople in May 1793 and remained there until the following November. A French Envoy-Extraordinary, in the person of Citizen Descorches, was then present in the Turkish capital; but, as a nominee of the revolutionaries, he was not recognised by the Porte; and the French community at Constantinople were much divided among themselves by political questions. The greater part of 1794 was spent by MM. Bruguière and Olivier on the Turkish islands of the Levant; and from December 1794 till May 1795 they were in Egypt. At the end of August 1795 they left Constantinople, to which they had returned, for Persia; they were supplied by Citizen Verninac, the successor of M. Descorches, with the necessary funds and with letters for the Pāsha of Baghdād and the Prime Minister of Persia; and they were the bearers of a verbal communication from the Porte to the Government of Persia. The travellers remained at Aleppo from the middle of November 1795 to the end of February 1796, the delay being partly due to warnings which they received from their friends that, if they attempted to continue their journey otherwise than in company with a regular caravan, they might be destroyed by Bedouin hirelings of the British Consul at Aleppo; and the case of * M. Borel du Bourg seems to have been cited to them as an instance in point. MM. Bruguière and Olivier reached Baghdād at the beginning of April 1796, stayed there for about six weeks, and were brought into contact during their visit with Sulaimān Pāsha, whom they were fortunate enough to cure of an alarming complaint. At Baghdād they had opportunities of conferring with their fellow-countrymen Citizens Rousseau and Outrey, of whom the former was French "Commissioner for Commercial Relations" at Baghdād, while the latter was at once a merchant and court physician to the Pāsha; and here too they provided themselves with an interpreter in the shape of a young French clerk, named Caraman. They left Baghdād again on the 18th of May 1796 and reached Tehrān on the 2nd of July; but Āgha Muhammad Khān, the ruler of Persia, had gone to Khurāsān, and they decided to await his return in one of the villages near the capital, prosecuting in the meanwhile their botanical and zoological researches. Āgha Muhammad Khān arrived at Tehrān on the 20th of September, and two days later the French delegates had the first of a series of interviews with Hāji Ibrāhīm, his Prime Minister, to whom they presented their letter of introduction

* For the case of M. Borel du Bourg, see the chapter on the history of Kuwait.

from M. Verninac and one from the Pāsha of Baghdād. On the 14th of October, having transacted their business with the minister and collected a quantity of valuable materials relating to the recent history of Persia, they set out on their homeward journey; from the middle of December 1796 to the beginning of May 1797 they halted at Baghdād, waiting for the formation of a caravan; and in October 1797, after a tour to Cyprus and through part of Asia Minor, they regained Constantinople. Here they were detained for some time by the necessity of collecting their valuable specimens, which had been left in deposit at various places; and the death of the French Ambassador, M. Aubert du Bayet, placed a difficulty in the way of their obtaining a secure means of transport by sea to France, which Mr. Smith, in charge of the British Embassy, declined to remove by furnishing them with special safe-conducts. They did not sail from Constantinople until the 30th of May 1798, and, still loitering by the way, they only reached Ancona on the 19th of September. On the 3rd of October M. Bruguière died of fever at Ancona, and M. Olivier returned to France alone.

It is obvious from the leisurely way in which this mission proceeded, and from the large amount of attention which it devoted to matters only indirectly, or not at all, connected with politics, that it cannot have had any immediate or definite task to perform. Its object at first, in so far as that object was political, seems to have been to discover in the Ottoman Empire some field in which the activities of the French nation might be deployed with advantage; and, in this connection, the * occupation of Egypt by the French was strongly recommended by the members of the mission. The journey to Tehrān in 1796 was no part of the original scheme, and it was probably made under specific instructions, which, from various remarks by M. Olivier in his *Voyage*, we may conjecture to have been: first, to arrange an alliance between Persia and Turkey against Russia, and, second to revive French influence in Persia. As the French delegates obtained a promise that a Persian Ambassador should be sent to Constantinople, they may be considered to have partially attained the former of these objects; but in regard to the other, if it were what we assume it to have been, they were not so fortunate. At the time of their visit to Tehrān two treaties between France and Persia already existed, of which the later had been signed at Paris by a Persian

* In one passage in his *Voyage* (II, 133) M. Olivier seems to claim for the reports of his colleague and himself the credit of having brought about the subsequent expedition to Egypt under Bonaparte.

Ambassador, but no steps were taken to have these treaties renewed; nor was anything done towards establishing or re-establishing French settlements at Isfahān, at Shirāz, and in the Persian Gulf, or toward acquiring the island of Khārag for France,—measures which it seems clear that M. Olivier had at least revolved in his mind. M. Olivier* explains that his colleague and he deliberately abstained from raising these questions on account of the unfavourable impression that they had formed of Persia as a state; but the fact that the †presents for the Persian Court had not arrived when they were needed, and the further fact that MM. Bruguière and Olivier had not apparently any audience of Āgha Muhammad Khān himself, suggest that there may have been other reasons ‡ also for the negotiations ending where they did.

Precautions taken by the British against French designs, 1796.

The British Resident at Basrah had early information, probably from the British Consul at Aleppo, of the presence of MM. Bruguière and Olivier at the latter place in the beginning of 1796, and he reported to the Government of Bombay that the intention of these gentlemen appeared to be "to penetrate in the assumed character of naturalists and botanists by the way of Baghdad through Persia into India." Accordingly on the 1st of July 1796 Mr. Jonathan Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, wrote to Mr. Hankey Smith, the British Resident at Būshehr, ordering him to co-operate with the Company's representatives at Basrah in tracing the movements of MM. Bruguière and Olivier and, if possible, in arresting them and forwarding them to Bombay along with their papers. That

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* See his *Voyage*, Vol. III, pages 88—89.

† The presents consisted of jewels, which should have followed the mission from Constantinople, being sent as far as Baghdād in the charge of an Indian nobleman, and beyond it under arrangements to be made by the French Commissioner for Commercial relations there.

‡ See also a footnote in Kaye's *History of the War in Afghanistan* (II. 44—45) which presumably refers to the mission of MM. Bruguière and Olivier. The writer states, apparently on the authority of Sir J. Malcolm, that the objects of the mission were (1) to induce Āgha Muhammad Khan to seize Baghdād and Basrah, (2) to persuade him to help Tipu Sultān against the British, and (3) to obtain his consent to the re-settlement of the French at Bandar Abbas; and he attributes its failure chiefly to the non-diplomatic character of the agents to whom it was entrusted. M. Olivier was a very intelligent man and a deserving public servant, but it must be admitted that his arrival at Tehrān without valuable and sufficient presents betrayed the political novice.

other French agents were moving about in the Middle East at this time is shown by the instructions given to Lieutenant Skinner, in whose vessel the orders for Mr. Hankey Smith were sent; for he was directed to make close enquiry regarding the presence at Masqat of persons of French nationality or in the French service, and, if any such were found, he was to try to get them handed over to him by the local authority. The three individuals whose arrest was chiefly desired were M. Descorches, perhaps the former Envoy-Extraordinary of France at the Porte; Mr. Humphries, an English renegade, who was his fellow-traveller; and the Abbé de Beauchamp, probably a priest of that name who had lately been the representative of France at Baghdád. All of these were supposed to be on their way to Mauritius, where the Abbé had been designated for an official appointment; and Lieutenant Skinner was authorised to offer the Governor of Masqat a sum not exceeding Rs. 8,000 for the surrender of each of them, as well as Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 3,000 a head for the surrender of any other Frenchmen who might be there. Nothing seems to have resulted from Lieutenant Skinner's cruise, unless that in January 1797 Saiyid Sultán wrote to Bombay that a report which had reached the Governor of the Presidency, that three Frenchmen were living in 'Omán territory and supplying their Government with information prejudicial to the East India Company, was without foundation. In 1797 there were rumours of French and Dutch vessels being allowed by Saiyid Sultán to frequent Masqat under Arab colours, and the Governor of Bombay seems to have reprimanded the native agent of the East India Company there for negligence in reporting the fact, and also to have expostulated with the Saiyid himself on the subject. In what manner the Saiyid could be supposed to prevent Europeans from abusing his flag upon the high seas, which was the real cause of inconvenience to the British, is not clear. An American, Captain Crouch, whose ship the "Latchmi" made a voyage from Batavia to Masqat, and thence to Mauritius, seems to have come under suspicion of helping the French. In 1798, through two sons of Mr. Hankey Smith, the British Resident at Búshehr, who were captured by the French in the * "Lanal" and carried to Mauritius, the existence of French arrangements for obtaining information by means of Arab visitors to Masqat was brought to light. The movement of British vessels between India and the Persian Gulf was naturally one of the principal subjects of study of the French spies.

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* *Sic*: perhaps the "Laurel."

Activity of native Indian powers in the Persian Gulf, 1763-97.

Haidar 'Ali and Tipu Sultán of Mysore.

The rulers of the state of Mysore in India, namely Haidar 'Ali until 1782 and his son Tipu Sultán from that year onwards, did not neglect the field afforded by the Persian Gulf for the extension of their political influence; and that influence, in view of the fact that they were three times at war with Britain during the period, and that on the last of those occasions Tipu Sultan was shorn of half his dominions and had to pay an indemnity of £3,000,000 besides, cannot but have been hostile to British interests. At the beginning of 1774 an ambassador from Haidar 'Ali visited the court of Karim Khán at Shiráz with presents, and tried to obtain for his master, in consideration of naval aid to be afforded to Persia, a matrimonial alliance with the family of the Vakil and a trading settlement in the Gulf. It was stated that Karim Khán in his answer, while he rejected the proposed intermarriage, offered Bandar 'Abbás to the Mysore ruler; but the proceedings had no visible outcome; and it was thought that, had it been otherwise, the Mysoreans would have found the Shaikh of Hormúz a troublesome neighbour to their new station. In May 1776 the same or another ambassador from Haidar 'Ali was known to be present at Masqat. About the same* time, a person described as a "Mughal Envoy" was sent to Masqat by Tipu Sáhib, then Governor of Mangalore, and was well received by the Imám, who granted him a site for a house. This mission to Masqat was evidently intended to be permanent, and it was not withdrawn during the period with which we are now concerned; but by 1797 the Envoy had come to be spoken of as "Tipu Sultán's Wakíl," which was no doubt a more correct description of him. There was evidently some trade between the Mysore territories and Masqat, for five or six vessels under Mysore colours used, about 1797, to visit the 'Ománi capital every year.

The Mughal Emperor.

In this connection we may also notice a visit which was paid to the court of Ja'far Khán, the ruler of Southern Persia, about the end of 1786, by two Englishmen, Major John Morrison and Captain George Biggs. The Major was an elderly man, formerly on the East India Company's

* The date is uncertain, and the "Mughal Envoy" who thus settled at Masqat may have been identical with either (or even both) of the Mysorean ambassadors to Persia.

Bengal establishment, who represented himself as being in the service of the Mughal Emperor, Shāh 'Ālam, and as having come on his behalf to arrange a treaty of commerce with Persia, assisted by one Ghafūr Baig, whose arrival from Delhi he professed to be expecting. The younger officer seemed to be merely the travelling companion of the elder. These two gentlemen had left England in August 1785 and had journeyed by Constantinople, Baghdād and Isfahān to Shīrāz. There was evidently something suspicious about their conduct, and they were very closely watched by the British Resident at Būshehr, who ascertained that Major Morrison had made proposals of some kind to Ja'far Khān and had supplied him with a list of officers' names; but the Resident also learned that the Khān, whatever Major Morrison's scheme, "had made reflections on it by no means advantageous to the understanding of that gentleman, and had not returned any answer to it." Towards the end of January 1787, Major Morrison, who had at first talked of continuing his journey to Delhi by way of Sind or Gujarāt, left Būshehr for Basrah with Captain Biggs, evidently with the intention of returning to England.

British administrative and official arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1763-97.

Establishments of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf, 1763-97.

After the reduction of Basrah from an Agency to a Residency in 1778, as already described, the establishments of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf consisted of two Residencies, administratively independent of one another, at Basrah and Būshehr, and of a Native Agency at Masqat, where the institution of a Residency was desired by the British authorities but was not permitted by the Masqat Government. In 1783 a Native Agency at Baghdād was added.

Customs and consulage of the East India Company, 1763-7.

Goods imported by British merchants into Turkish 'Irāq or Persia paid duties to the East India Company, by whose local representatives they were collected, exclusive of those taken by the Government of the country. In Turkey the right of collecting such duties by way of "consulage" was conceded by the capitulations, and recognition of the Company's Agent at Basrah as a Consul was regularly obtained so early as 1764. In Persia the right was admitted in practice, or at least not contested, by the native authorities. In the Company's accounts the

receipts from duties were divided into "customs" and "consulage," of which the former ordinarily amounted to 3 per cent. *ad valorem* and went into the public treasury, while the latter was at the rate of 2 per cent. and was equally divided between the Governor of Bombay and the * Agent or Resident at the port of collection. About 1773-75, however, the total of the duties taken by the Company at Basrah seems to have been 6 and not 5 per cent.; and from 1784 onwards half of the consulage seems to have been carried to the credit of the Company themselves, instead of to that of their officers.

Formation of the Secret and Political Department of the Bombay Government, 1785.

On the 11th of January 1785 the Government of Bombay resolved to separate the secret and political part of their work from the rest; and a Secret and Political Department, distinct from the Public Department, was on that day established, with Mr. James Beck as its first Secretary. Of the signatures appended to the resolution constituting it, one was that of the Hon'ble Mr. R. H. Boddam, Resident and Governor, probably the same who† visited Masqat in 1769, and another that of Brigadier-General Nilson, doubtless the officer who commanded the land troops in the British attack on Khārag in 1768. All subordinates, including those in the Persian Gulf, were immediately informed of the new arrangement.

Services rendered by the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf.

The occasional employment of the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf, in support of the East India Company's marine, seems to have begun during this period. The action of the Shaikh of Būshehr in 1770, when he invited the Company to re-establish the Residency withdrawn from his port in the previous year, was attributed by the Agent and Council at Basrah to "his apprehensions on hearing of the arrival of one of His Majesty's ships in the Gulph"; and in 1771, on the Agent and Council clamouring for a strong expedition to be sent to the Gulf to chastise Karīm Khān and suppress piracy, the Court of Directors in London passed the following remarkable, because novel, order: "If all efforts "to put an end to the piratical views of the Persians and other powers in "the Gulph, and to procure reparation of injuries, without having recourse "to arms, shall prove ineffectual, you are to represent the same to the "Presidency, that they may lay it before the Commanding Officer of His "Majesty's Ships in the East Indies and endeavour to obtain such "protection and assistance in the circumstances as the case shall require".

* During the time that Bushehr was a Residency under the Basrah Agency, however, half of the local share went to the Resident at Būshehr and half to the Agent at Basrah.

† See chapter on the History of the 'Omān Sultanate.

In April 1773, a few days before the first temporary withdrawal of the Company's Factory from Basrah, that port was visited by the "Swallow", sloop-of-war, which, though she brought some bales of piece-goods on freight from Súrat, would appear from the name of the Commander (Sir John Clerke) to have been a Royal Navy vessel. But the only King's ship of whose visit to the Gulf at this time full* details have been preserved was the "Seahorse", Captain George Farmer, which arrived at Búshehr from Bombay and Masqat on the 12th of May 1775, after the commencement of the siege of Basrah by the Persians and the second temporary withdrawal of the British Factory from that place. Captain Farmer had received orders from his Commodore, Sir Edward Hughes, "to assist the East India Company in any place where he "should happen to be, where the Company had any settlement or factory "if it was requested by the Company's servants;" and, in consequence of these instructions he offered his services for convoying British vessels to Basrah and protecting them there, notwithstanding the siege; but the offer was declined by the British Agent, who had arrived at Búshehr. That there was feeling on the subject of co-operation between the officers of the Royal Navy and the Company's representatives seems to be indicated by Captain Farmer's precaution in taking the traveller, Mr. Parsons with him to Mr. Moore, as "an attesting witness" of his having obeyed his orders. On the 15th of July the "Seahorse" left Búshehr with several vessels which Captain Farmer had undertaken to protect against the Marāthas on the voyage to India; and on the 31st she arrived at Masqat, her crew of about 170 men having suffered severely on the way down the Gulf from bad water shipped at Búshehr and from extreme heat. The men frequently fell down on deck from sheer weakness, and the number on the sick list at one time rose to over 50. None died, however; and, some days after leaving Masqat, Mr. Parsons, who was a passenger on the "Seahorse", was able to remark: "It is a great pleasure to see with what alacrity our seamen "go aloft and perform their duty, as well as to observe the change of "their complexion, which, from being pale and languid, is become fresh "and lively: they are so much recovered in strength, as to be able to do "twice the duty required of them, whereas before we quitted Muscat, "we could scarcely find men sufficient to do the ordinary duty on board

* But a most important detail escaped the knowledge or notice of contemporaries. Horatio Nelson belonged to the "Seahorse" at this time and probably took part in this cruise. See foot note, page 1260, *post*.

"the ship, from the excessive heat; now every man on board can very "well bear, and indeed does wear a cloth coat or waistcoat."

The "Desert Mail."

From the time of the Seven Years' War with France the route between India and Europe by way of Basrah and Aleppo had been highly prized and much used by the East India Company, and even by the British Government, as a safe and speedy line of communication. This overland post, or "Desert Mail" as it was called, seems to have been managed by the Company's representative at Basrah and the British Consul at Aleppo jointly; and, in the troubled close of the eighteenth century, its efficient maintenance was regarded as one of the most important duties of the former of those officers. During the Persian occupation of Basrah in 1776-79, and again during the sojourn of the Basrah Residency at Kuwait from 1793 to 1795, the eastern terminus of the line was located at Kuwait instead of Basrah; and the working, for various reasons, was not so satisfactory as under the ordinary conditions. The friendly relations which were generally maintained by the British Agent at Basrah with the chiefs of Arab tribes, such as the Muntafik, and even with the Wahhábis of Central Arabia, whose rise had already begun to have a politically disturbing effect, sufficed as a rule to ensure the safety of the British despatches.

Marine passes and convoys, 1767-71.

The alarming prevalence of piracy in the Gulf in the years that followed Mir Mahanna's successful defiance of the British and the Persians in 1765 and the unfortunate expedition by the British and the Turks against the marauding Ka'ab tribe in 1766, stimulated after 1769 by the war between Karim Khán and the Imám of 'Omán, obliged the representatives of the East India Company to consider various expedients for the protection of sea-borne traffic in general.

In 1767 the Agent and Council at Basrah, whose heads had been turned by the location of a strong squadron in the Gulf under their orders, actually introduced, without reference to superior authority, a system of granting British colours and passes to all owners of native vessels who applied for them and agreed to pay Rs. 100 a year per vessel; it was evidently anticipated by the local officers that these passes would, without occasioning serious inconvenience to the Company, give sufficient protection against the depredations of the subjects of petty maritime chiefs and bring in a considerable revenue. The Resident at Búshehr, on being ordered to do his part in establishing this system, went further and proposed that the duties payable to the Company by British merchants should be realised also from such native

merchants as took British passes; but his suggestion was negatived by the Agent in Council, who considered that the native traders, as they already paid 8 or 9 per cent. on the value of their goods in customs to the Persian administration, could not reasonably be expected to pay anything more. The whole plan of the Agency, however, as soon as it came to the knowledge of the Court of Directors, was condemned by them in the following terms :—

In your letter under date of the 15th November you mention a resolution you have taken, and put into execution, of giving passes under the Company's seal to the vessels and boats trading in the Gulph, for which they pay one hundred rupees yearly, in order to protect them from being plundered by the several Arab Sheiks. This may be very well for them, but with respect to your employers it appears to be a destructive and unwarrantable measure; for, though Meer Mahuna now says he shall have regard to the passes, you may judge he will not long remain in that disposition, as the consequence would be fatal to him, his principal dependence being the plunder he is to get from those very people whom you wish to protect; besides he is only one of many others (*sic*) lower in the Gulph who follow the same trade, and will now be more induced to do it than ever, seeing the bad success we have had with our forces at Bussorah, which is the first time they have known such an instance. You must expect constant complaints that no regard has been paid to the passes, which you have no power to redress, unless the fleet was kept whole year(s) in the Gulf; besides this we must be in a general state of war with all Arabs, and, if no notice is taken of the insult, our credit is lost. Upon the whole it appears the most extraordinary transaction that could have occurred to you and (been) executed without any orders from your superiors.

It can hardly be doubted that in consequence of these strictures, passed on the 2nd of March 1768, the Agency scheme of granting colours and passes must have been withdrawn from operation; but there may have been some delay in communicating the orders of the Court, for in September 1769 the Agent and Council at Basrah themselves enquired of the Bombay Government "Whether our cruizers were to give "convoy and protection to the ships and vessels of any power whatever, "if at variance with the* Caun, unless such ships and vessels were fur- "nished with English passes and colours; and how far the furnishing "such ships and vessels with such passes was compatible with the "interests of the India Company?"

Protection of trade generally, in so far as it was undertaken by the Company at this time, at length came to depend on a system of convoys.

* Karim Khān, Vakil of Persia.

which was maintained for two or three years while the state of the Gulf was at its worst, about 1769-71, and of which the mercantile public were allowed to avail themselves. Already in the spring of 1769 the East India Company's local squadron was divided into two parts, of which one was wholly employed on convoy duty in the waters of the Gulf; and later the Government of Bombay issued instructions that the "Drake" should be specially stationed at Masqat in the months of April and December to protect Indian vessels from that port all the way to Basrah. In the autumn of 1769 the Agent and Council at Basrah decided not to make special arrangements for convoying the annual coffee fleet, then at Masqat, from that place to Basrah, lest offence should be given thereby to Karīm Khān, who was at war with the Imām; they thought that the Imām himself was in a position to provide proper protection, and that, if this were not the case, the fleet might at least wait until the next visit of the "Drake" to Masqat in the ordinary course. In the summer of 1771, after the piracy committed on the "Britannia," a large number of vessels were employed on convoy duty in the Gulf, including the "Resolution", "Expedition", "Bombay", "Dolphin" and "Fox"; and the "Expedition" and "Fox" were once specially sent to Masqat to fetch some upward-bound vessels thence.

Conduct of the East India Company's servants, and conditions of service.

It was during the second Governorship of Clive in Bengal, from 1765 to 1767, that private trade and the acceptance of presents by the East India Company's servants in India were first prohibited, and that a large addition was made to their pay out of the proceeds of the salt monopoly. These reforms were not immediately extended to the Company's establishments in the Persian Gulf, doubtless because the employés in that region had no executive or administrative duties to perform, and there was not therefore the same necessity for a change; and private trade continued to be carried on openly by the servants of the Company for a number of years after the close of the period. Serious allegations of corrupt dealing which had been made against Messrs. Shaw and Garden and Mr. Skipp of the Basrah Agency were investigated in 1761-63 and 1768-69; but in both cases it was found that no dishonest act had been committed, and that the charges were due to private malice. In 1767 the following curious order, originating evidently from past abuses, was issued by the Governor and Council at Bombay to the Agent and Council at Basrah:—

Great Irregularities having been found to arise from the Commanders of the vessels in Persia being allowed to keep a table at the Honourable Company's expense without

any limitation, we have determined that they shall be allowed to charge at the rate of two rupees per day for every person, whether Europeans, Turks or Persians, they may be under the necessity of entertaining at their tables, which you are to make good to them accordingly, and finally adjust all accounts relative to their vessels before their return to India.

Foreign trade of the Persian Gulf, 1763-97.

Unfavourable character of the period in regard to foreign trade.

The period now under consideration was distinguished, on the whole, by an absence of commercial prosperity in the Persian Gulf; but this was due largely to political and other causes of a non-permanent character. The rise of piracy, in which the Ka'ab, the followers of Mir Mahanna and other petty chiefs of the Persian Coast, and the Qawāsim now indulged; the extinction of the Dutch trading settlement on Khārag; a great dearth of specie both in Persia and in Turkish 'Irāq; the ravages of plague in Turkish 'Irāq, in 1773; the siege and capture of Basrah by the Persians and their manner of governing the town from 1776 to 1779; last but not least the almost continuous civil wars which raged in Persia after the death of Karīm Khān in 1779: these were all factors of importance in restricting commercial enterprise and intercourse. The growth of piracy had the effect, it is true, of increasing the freights obtained by ship-owners, but at the same time it tended to prevent the navigation of the Gulf by unarmed or weak vessels. The scarcity of specie was a more natural phenomenon, but not perhaps less detrimental to trade, than piracy; it was due in part to economic causes, such as the non-production locally of exportable goods sufficient to balance imported goods, and in part doubtless to hoarding, the ordinary result of political insecurity. Even in the time of Karīm Khān the deficiency of money in Persia was so serious that he prohibited its exportation; and the results of his policy, shown in a balance of trade temporarily less unfavourable to Persia, were considered by some to have justified its adoption. At a later date, about 1790, it was reported that* nine-tenths of the merchandise imported into Persia from India were paid for in specie; and it was estimated that, through the enormous

* But Captain J. Malcolm in 1800 estimated the portion paid for by Persia in specie or bullion at only eight lakhs of rupees, or four-tenths of the whole. He placed the annual export of specie and bullion from Basrah at ten lakhs of rupees out of total exports worth 30 lakhs.

drain on the monetary resources of Persia which this represented, the depredations of Nādir Shāh in India had been nearly redressed. Turkish gold was hardly obtainable; the exchange was unfavourable to Turkey; and remittances to foreign creditors were made by Turkish and Arabian merchants, to a great extent, in gold of Venetian, Dutch and even Hungarian mintage. The misfortunes which affected Basrah from 1773 to 1779 diminished its trade, and partially altered its commercial character, by keeping away those up-country merchants who had been accustomed to resort to it as a purchasing market and to bring cash with them from other parts of the Turkish Empire. Still more impoverishing, in their effect upon the Gulf region as a whole, were the wars which for many years discouraged industry and interrupted communications in Persia. The Shi'ah pilgrimages to Najaf and Karbala were generally regarded as tending to deplete Persia of wealth without bringing in any return; but it is obvious that, in this case, what was lost to Persia was merely transferred to Turkish 'Irāq and not withdrawn from the general trade of the Gulf.

Articles of export from the Persian Gulf.

The most precious export of the Persian Gulf consisted at this time, as it does still at the present day, in pearls; but the annual value of the proceeds of the fishery, which as yet was almost entirely concentrated in the Bahrain Islands, was estimated in 1790 at only * half a million of Bombay rupees. In regard to this branch of trade it was remarked: "The principal part of the † pearl is conveyed from Bahreen "direct to Surat, and from Bahreen to Mocha (*viâ* Muscat), Bushire, "Scindy, Surat and Calcutta, from which four last mentioned places it "is circulated through Candahar, Multan, India, Tartary and China. "The remainder supplies the markets in the Persian Gulf, and in "part finds its way, through the channels of the Levant, to those of "Europe."

The true exports of Persia were old copper, drugs, rosewater, dried fruits, raw silk, raw cotton, sulphur, and rock-salt. Those of Turkish 'Irāq were dates to the value of more than half a million of Bombay rupees a year, old and new copper, gall-nuts, tobacco, opium, gum, catgut and pen-reeds, besides many horses to Sūrat and Gujarāt in India. There was besides a large transit trade through Basrah, in

* Captain J. Malcolm, however, writing only ten years later, estimated the annual export of pearls at one million rupees.

† In old commercial phraseology, by what seems to us a curious affectation, the word "pearl" is generally treated as a collective singular.

numerous manufactured and other articles, from Europe and the Turkish provinces beyond Baghdād to the countries of the Gulf and to India.

Articles of import into the Persian Gulf.

The leading articles imported by way of the Gulf into both Persia and Turkish 'Irāq were Bengal piece-goods, Coromandel chintzes, Madras long-cloth, cotton yarn, and various cotton manufactures of Malabar, Broach, Cambay, Sūrat and Gujarāt; English woollen goods; silks; Arabian coffee; sugar and sugar candy; spices, condiments and perfumes; indigo; drugs; chinaware; and metals. Of the Indian goods, muslins and fine cotton cloths were from Bengal and Madras, and coarser cloth for the use of Arabs was from Sūrat. The sale of English woollen goods at Basrah had declined by 1789 to about one-fourth of what it had been twenty years earlier, and by 1796 it had almost entirely ceased, the principal * reasons for this being apparently its expensiveness and the rivalry of cheaper and equally good French stuffs. The silks of Bengal were preferred in Turkish 'Irāq to those of China, and even to those of Gilān. The trade in coffee was one of great volume and importance; half the produce of Yaman, it was estimated, found its way to the Gulf; and from the Gulf not only the whole of the surrounding countries, but even parts of Europe, were supplied with the berry. American sugar, when its price was not too high, was preferred to East Indian; but Batavian and Bengal sugars also commanded a certain sale. Indian indigo was at this time expelling the American article from the Persian Gulf market, and local production of the dye had begun at Shūshtar in 'Arabistān.

Distribution and organisation of foreign trade in the Gulf.

Light is thrown on the distribution of the foreign trade about this time by a report from the pen of Captain J. Malcolm, written in 1800, not long after the close of the period and before any marked change in the situation had taken place. The total trade of the Gulf, export and import, was placed by this authority at 160 lakhs of rupees a year, mostly with India. The annual imports from India into Persia were

* These are the reasons adduced by the French traveller, M. Olivier. He adds that the former sale of English woollens was only due to the British East India Company being under an obligation to the British Government to dispose of a fixed quantity of British manufactures (See page 51 *ante*), and that to satisfy this obligation they took and sold so much woollen cloth at a loss every year. When these woollens ceased, in consequence of altered arrangements, to be sold at a loss, they also ceased, according to this authority, to be saleable at all in opposition to French woollens. In regard to this explanation the present writer can only say that he has met with nothing to corroborate it in British official or unofficial sources of information. According to M. Olivier French woollens, satins, velvets, gold and silver cloth and Lyons lace had a good sale in the Gulf region, and most of them went as far as Qandahār.

estimated at 20 lakhs of rupees, with return exports of 12 lakhs in goods and 8 lakhs in specie and bullion. The Indian imports into Turkish 'Irāq amounted to 30 lakhs annually, paid for by merchandise to the value of 20 lakhs and by specie and bullion to the value of 10 lakhs. Bahrain and the rest of the Arabian coast of the Gulf took 10 lakhs' worth a year of Indian goods, and exported pearls to an equal extent. The value of the Arabian coffee brought to the Gulf every year was estimated at 20 lakhs of rupees.

The two principal ports of foreign trade were Masqat and Basrah, through one or other of which passed the great bulk of the goods that either entered or left the Gulf. It was calculated that more than half of the Indian imports at Būshehr and Basrah and the bulk of those into Bahrain were received through Masqat; and, similarly, the goods arriving by land from Europe, Asia Minor, etc., were distributed from Basrah as a centre. Būshehr was now practically the only port of Persia, as Basrah was of Turkish 'Irāq; Bahrain served Hasa and Central Arabia through Zubārah and Qatif; and Masqat was almost exclusively a port of transit. Būshehr and Kuwait were sometimes used as bases from which to smuggle goods into Turkish 'Irāq and even across Turkish 'Irāq to Europe.

The transport of goods between India and the Gulf was carried on partly by vessels which were the property of European merchants in the East, partly by vessels owned by Muhammadan merchants of Sūrat, and partly by vessels belonging to Arab merchants of Masqat. The distribution of goods from Masqat was at first conducted by means of Masqat shipping; but, after the Arab occupation of Bahrain in 1783, the 'Utūb threw themselves successfully into the carrying trade, securing a large proportion of that between Masqat and Basrah, and even began to make voyages on their own account to and from India. The 'Utūb also made themselves respected at sea by repelling some piratical attacks of the Ka'ab upon their vessels. The mercantile marine of Masqat continued as yet, however, to be the most important belonging to any state in the Gulf; it consisted of "dows, dingies and square-rigged vessels, belonging to Arabs"; and the people of Masqat were reckoned "active and enterprising, though not very skillful seamen."

Commercial communications.

It was considered, even in these days of sailing ships, that the passage from India to Basrah, or *vice versâ*, was one that might be safely attempted at any season of the year; but from June to September, on account of the prevalence of the south-west monsoon, a direct passage

could not be made from India to Masqat, and the voyage required perseverance, skill, and a well-found ship; and during June and July, owing to the persistence of northerly winds, the passage up the Gulf from Masqat was likely to be "boisterous and tedious".

In 1790 there was a practically fixed tariff for the carriage of goods by river boat in Turkish 'Irāq and 'Arabistān, the unit of calculation being a bale of 300 to 400 pounds' weight English. The rates per bale from Basrah were 12 Bombay rupees to Baghdād by the Tigris, 15 Bombay rupees to Hillah by the Euphrates, and 4 Bombay rupees to Shūshtar by the Kārūn, and they included the customs payable to local authorities by the way as well as freight proper. The cost of sending goods from Hillah to Baghdād by land, on mules or camels, was 4 Bombay rupees per bale.

Merchandise could at this time be conveniently forwarded from Kuwait or Basrah to Aleppo by caravan; and the charge per camel load of 700 English pounds, covering presents to Shaikhs by the way, was 130 Bombay rupees for piece-goods and 90 Bombay rupees for "gruff" or heavy merchandise. The rates for carriage to Baghdād were half those to Aleppo. The journey from Kuwait to Baghdād by caravan occupied about 30, and that from Kuwait to Aleppo about 80 days.

Recommendations for promoting British trade in the Persian Gulf, 1790.

Our knowledge of the circumstances of Persian Gulf trade at this time is derived largely from a report on trade furnished by Messrs. Manesty and Jones of the Basrah Residency in 1790, and a summary of their recommendations for increasing British trade may be interesting to the reader.

Some of these referred to specific articles of import and export. The compilers of the report did not apparently despair of the future of the British woollen trade, but they emphasized the necessity for comparative cheapness, for absolute suitability of colour, and for the receipt of the year's consignments on the spot by October at latest. They believed that hardware and glass might be imported at a profit, and that a market might be found for English carpets of moderate price. Among valuable exports they mentioned the drugs of Persia, which they thought had not received sufficient attention; but they did not consider that Kirmān wool, on account of its increased use for shawl-making and prohibitions against its export by Ja'far Khān, could now be obtained in a quantity greater than 3,000 Tabrīz Mans per annum. They mentioned the production of wine as an industry capable of great development; and they suggested an inquiry into the dyes employed by Persian carpet-makers, which were more durable than those then known to the manufacturers of Wilton and Axminster.

In regard to methods of trade, they proposed that in future the absolute rule against allowing credit to native customers, as also that against bartering goods for goods, should be relaxed, and that the Company's servants in the Gulf should instead be invested with a certain discretion in regard to both matters. By this means it would be possible to secure orders from reliable merchants, who could not afford to pay immediately in cash in the great scarcity of specie that prevailed. With respect to the consulage of 2 per cent. collected at Būshehr and Basrah, which was formerly divided between the local Resident and the Governor of Bombay, but of which half had since 1784 been credited to the Company's own receipts, they suggested an important modification. Consulage had hitherto been levied only on the goods of British merchants trading to the Gulf, and since 1780 the number of these had become greatly reduced, with the result that the consulage revenue had suffered diminution; and Messrs. Manesty and Jones advised that the Armenian and Muhammadan merchants residing in the Company's settlements in India, by whom the greater part of the trade under the British flag was carried on in vessels commanded and officered by Englishmen, should be made liable to consulage. They pointed out that the imports at Basrah and Būshehr from ships under British colours had been worth nearly 40 lakhs of rupees in 1787, and that therefore, especially if peace were to revive trade, the Company might derive substantial advantage from the extended consulage.

Recommendations as regards establishments.

The report of 1790 also suggested several changes in the Company's official establishments. The Resident at Būshehr, it was recommended, should in future be "Resident in Persia" with liberty to establish himself either at Būshehr or at Shirāz, the capital of the country; a Writer should be given him to carry on routine duties at Būshehr; and a surgeon skilled in drugs should be posted to the Residency as an adviser in the drug trade. A British Factory should be established at Masqat, if possible, as it was a trade centre of the highest importance and an excellent place at which to study the commerce of the whole Persian Gulf. A formerly existing Factory in Sind should be reinstituted, and a travelling servant should be attached to it, whose duty it would be to visit Multān and, if necessary, Qandahār: this recommendation had reference to a trade from Masqat to Afghānistān by way of the Indus valley which had recently been opened up with some success by Būshehr merchants, and the articles proposed for experiment were woollens and metals. A civil servant from Bombay, it was also advised, should be sent to Persia to study at first hand the exportable products and the requirements in imported goods of all the provinces of the country, and to report fully thereon.

It does not appear to what extent, if at all, the recommendations of Messrs. Manesty and Jones were accepted by the East India Company. Among the concluding remarks of the authors stood the following sentence:—

> The framers of the present report beg leave, previous to its conclusion, to give it as their decided opinion that the success of the British general commercial intercourse with Arabia and Persia, and of the particular plans for its increase which they have pointed out, must ever principally depend on the propriety of the conduct of the gentlemen under whose management they may be prosecuted; and to express a hope that, as the duties of their stations must necessarily often place them in situations replete with delicacy and difficulty, their Hon'ble Employers will fix their intentions, not their success, as the criterion by which to judge of their merits.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF DURING THE NAPOLEONIC ERA IN THE EAST, 1798-1810.

The Napoleonic era in the East, if we may so term the period at the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries during which the policy of Britain in Asia was regulated chiefly with reference to France, was of shorter duration than the corresponding period in Europe: it lasted only from Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1798 to the expulsion of the French from Mauritius at the end of 1810. During its continuance the Government of India, as well as His Majesty's Government, had to cope with very grave difficulties in the form of systematic depredations by French war vessels and privateers upon British sea-borne commerce, and with still greater anxieties arising from the supposed designs of the French and from their actual proceedings, especially in Persia. They had also to deal with a serious state of local affairs in the Gulf, due to the appearance and rapid growth of piracy by sea-faring Arab tribes, for which the arrival of the rapacious and fanatical Wahhábis of Najd upon the coast-line of the Gulf may have been in part responsible.

Depredations of the French upon British sea-borne commerce in the East, and British defensive arrangements, 1798-1810.

The Persian Gulf was only a small part of the field over which the Anglo-French struggle in Eastern waters was fought out, the base used by the French in their operations being the island of Mauritius, from which various important routes of communication by sea were easily assailable. One of the earliest seizures made by the French in the Persian Gulf was that of the "Pearl" in 1799, which is mentioned in the history of the 'Omán Sultanate; it was attended by an encounter between a British and a French war vessel in which both were destroyed by fire and the explosion of their magazines; but the French succeeded in carrying their prize to Masqat. In 1803 the East India Company's small cruiser "Fly" was captured off the island of Qais and brought to Búshehr by the French privateer "La Fortune," Captain Surcouf, of much greater strength, as described in the history of the Persian Coast; and the "Fly" was not the only vessel taken by this Frenchman in the course of his raid in the Gulf.

There was no want of vigilance on the part of the British Government or of the East India Company; but their efforts, so long as the French retained Mauritius, were by no means completely successful. In 1798 a squadron of the Royal Navy watched the straits of Báb-al-Mandab, while another was stationed on the Malabar coast. In 1799 a British naval force was sent to cruise in the Red Sea, and the island of Perim was occupied from 3rd May to 1st September by troops from Bombay, which were afterwards transferred to Aden and remained there until March 1800. Later in 1800, however, two armed French vessels began to stop and examine native shipping in the neighbourhood of Aden, and fears were entertained of their visiting the Persian Gulf, for which they were said to be bound, but they did not make their appearance in that quarter. The removal of the French army from Egypt in 1801 made little difference in the situation in Indian waters; and in 1807 alone the damage caused by the French to Calcutta shipping was computed at £300,000. At last, with the surrender of Mauritius on the 3rd December 1810 by General de Caen to a naval and military force despatched from India under General Abercromby, the vexatious activity of the French in the Eastern Seas came to an end.

Supposed designs and actual proceedings of the French in the East, and counteractive measures taken by the British and Indian Governments, 1798-1810.

More disturbing, however, than the real injuries suffered by British commerce at sea were the apprehensions aroused by Bonaparte's insatiable ambition, especially after his invasion of Egypt in 1798, when the opinion that he meditated* Asiatic conquests first began to gain ground. There were solid indications, in the shape of French political missions and other circumstances, which showed that the countries of the Middle East were included in his designs; and the audacity and phenomenal success of his career in Europe made caution necessary in assigning limits to what he might achieve, or at least attempt, in Asia.

Circumstances of the time in India and Afghānistān, 1798-1799.

In India, where Tipu Sultān of Mysore was still a dangerous enemy to the British Government and other native princes were disaffected, circumstances were at the beginning of the period propitious to anti-British intrigue. The disquiet in India was intensified by annual threats of invasion on the part of Zamān Shāh, the ruler of Afghānistān, whose incapacity to carry them out and the precariousness of whose own position at home were not as yet realised by the British authorities; and it was feared that, should he enter the country, he might be welcomed by some of the Muhammadan powers as a deliverer from the British and from the Marāthas. A letter from Bonaparte to the Sultān of 'Omān, written at Cairo in January 1799, was intercepted by the British at sea; it contained an enclosure for Tipu Sultān in which hopes of French assistance against the British were held out to him. Tipu Sultān on his part was active in seeking aid against the British wherever he thought that it might be found; and, shortly before his death, he despatched embassies to the courts of Kābul, Tehrān and Constantinople, which all arrived together at Masqat, then the seat of a political representative of the Mysore Government, in April 1799. The Kābul mission proceeded from Masqat to Sonmiani, and we have no information

* On the 27th September 1800 Captain Malcolm wrote from Isfahān: "Those rascals the French will persuade the Turks that they are their best friends before they have done; and if they succeed in establishing themselves in Egypt on any terms, we must look to every quarter, and to none with more care than the Persian Gulf."

as to its further movements. Those destined for Tehrán and Constantinople were carried in a vessel owned by the Sultán of 'Omán to Búshehr and Basrah, respectively, where they disembarked; but the envoys to the Porte were persuaded by the British Resident at Basrah to return to India on account of the death of their master, which had meanwhile occurred at the fall of Seringapatam in May 1799; and those accredited to the Persian monarch, though apparently received by him as a matter of form, were unable for the same reason to enter upon the business for which they had been sent.

Establishment of a British Residency at Baghdád, 1798.

In the summer of 1798, before any overt step had been taken by the French in the Middle East, a British Residency was established at Baghdád under Mr. (afterwards Sir) Harford Jones of the Bombay civil establishment. The object of this measure was, by acquiring an ascendancy over the Pásha of Baghdád, to check the extension of Bonaparte's influence eastwards. The British and Turkish Governments were now informally united against the French, and in 1799 a regular defensive alliance was concluded between them, having as an immediate object the expulsion of the French from Egypt. Meanwhile, under orders from the Porte, the French Consul and the subjects of the French Government at Basrah were arrested and sent as prisoners to Constantinople; but there is nothing to show that the British were in any way responsible for this unusual and unjustifiable proceeding on the part of their Turkish allies.

Mission of Mehdí 'Alí Khán to the Persian Gulf and Persia, 1798-1799.

Soon after the creation of the British Residency at Baghdád, a further step for the protection of British interests in the Middle East was taken in the deputation from India to the Persian Gulf of Mehdí 'Alí Khán, a Persian protégé of the Governor of Bombay. This Envoy, besides promoting British trade in the Gulf, was to arrange for the prevention, if possible, by means of a Persian military movement upon Herát, of any attempt at an invasion of India by the ruler of Afghánistán, and for the exclusion of French influence from 'Omán and Persia. In so far as they related to encouraging hostilities by Persia against Afghánistán, the instructions given to Mehdí 'Alí Khán were superfluous, both on account of the enmity already existing between the two rulers and of the real powerlessness of Zamán Sháh; but they were productive of useful results in 'Omán, where an agreement was obtained from the Sultán on the 12th October 1798 binding him to the British side in the Anglo-French contest, excluding the French from his territories during its continuance, and granting the British a right to settle at Bandar 'Abbás, which he held on lease from Persia. The Sháh of Persia, also

was induced to issue an edict for the arrest of any Frenchmen who might be found in his dominions.

First mission of (Captain) Malcolm to the Persian Gulf and Persia, and location of a British Political Agency at Masqat, 1799-1801.

The mission of Mehdi 'Ali Khān was immediately followed by another under Captain J. Malcolm of the Indian political service, of which the scope and objects were almost precisely similar: its despatch was due to the initiative of Lord Mornington, Governor-General of India. On the 17th January 1800, Captain Malcolm obtained a renewal of the agreement given by the Sultān of 'Omān in 1798, as also a further concession for the establishment of a political agency in charge of a European officer at Masqat, to which Dr. Bogle was immediately appointed; and, very shortly after, the political representative of the late Mysore Government disappeared from Masqat. In January 1801 Captain Malcolm concluded a political treaty with Persia of which the effect, so far as the French were concerned, was to deny them a footing in the country and to provide for joint operations against them by the British and the Persians in case they should succeed in establishing themselves there by force or fraud. A commercial treaty arranged by Captain Malcolm at the same time contained no articles of note; and, though he returned to the Persian Gulf by way of Turkish 'Irāq, his dealings with the Pāsha of Baghdād did not go beyond an exchange of formal courtesies.

Missions of Hāji Khalil Khān and Muhammad Nabi Khān to India, 1802 and 1805-1807.

In 1802 a Persian merchant named Hāji Khalil Khān proceeded to India on the part of the Shāh of Persia to obtain the ratification by the Governor-General, which was still required, of the treaties made with Captain Malcolm in the previous year. This Persian Envoy was accidentally and most unfortunately killed at Bombay in a brawl between his own servants and a native guard of honour supplied by the Bombay Government; and the negotiations, though the Envoy's death was very calmly received by the Persian Government, were interrupted.

In 1805, another Persian merchant, Muhammad Nabi Khān, was sent to India as the successor of his relative the deceased Envoy; but the Government of India, of which the head had changed, were no longer possessed by the sentiments which had inspired the mission of Captain Malcolm; and in 1807, His Majesty's Government to whom the matter had been referred having shown themselves equally apathetic, the second Persian Envoy returned home leaving the treaties still unratified.

Intrigues of the French in Persia; Missions of Colonel Romieu, M. Jaubert,

Meanwhile a correspondence, which ended in the establishment of regular diplomatic intercourse, had been opened between France and Persia. The first overtures, which proceeded from the French Government, seem to have been made through agents of doubtful respectability and to have been regarded in consequence with some degree of suspicion

and Mirza Muhammad Riza; Treaty of Finkinstein; and British rupture with the Porte, 1801-1807.

by the Persians. In 1804 a proposal by France for joint action by herself and Persia against Russia, with whom Persia was now at war, was still rejected by the Shāh, although properly authenticated. The reason for its rejection may have been a lingering hope of British assistance, which he would have preferred, on the part of the Shāh. In 1805 Colonel Romieu visited Tehrān on a regular mission from Napoleon; and he was followed in the next year by M. Jaubert, who induced the Persian monarch to send a high official, named Mirza Muhammad Riza, to Europe to treat with Napoleon. The result of Mirza Muhammad Riza's mission was the treaty of Finkinstein, whereby, in May 1807, France and Persia became allies on equal terms against their common enemy Russia; but in 1807-1808, the Persian Government twice took measures to persuade the British Resident at Būshehr that their close relations with France did not imply any unfriendliness towards Britain.

Early in 1807 a rupture occurred between Britain and the Porte in consequence of an intimacy which had sprung up between the Turkish and the French Governments, and in Europe Britain and Turkey were nominally at war until the beginning of 1809; but the Pasha of Baghdād, partly perhaps on account of the despatch of a strong British naval squadron to the Persian Gulf in 1807, decided to ignore the quarrel between his master and the British power, and in Turkish 'Irāq matters remained on a perfectly amicable footing.

Relations of France with the 'Omān Sultanate, 1803-1808.

In 'Omān also the French entertained political views, which were no doubt connected with their larger schemes in Persia; but their policy here was at first frustrated by the steady adherence of Saiyid Sultān to his Agreements of 1798 and 1800 with Britain. In 1803 M. de Cavaignac was specially deputed to Masqat by General de Caen, the French Governor of Mauritius, to establish a French Consulate and Political Agency; but Saiyid Sultān declined even to discuss the matter, and the French emissary returned disappointed to his head-quarters. In 1807-1808, however, Saiyid Sultān's son and successor Saiyid Sa'īd entered into treaty relations with France, and a French Consular Agency was instituted at Masqat under M. Dallons.

Second mission of (General)

The success of the French with the Shāh placed His Majesty's Government and the Government of India both on the alert, and the *

* Here we are concerned only with the Persian Gulf field; but it may be mentioned that in 1808 the Government of India sent missions also to the rulers of Lahore, Kābul and Sind. All of these had reference, at first, to the supposed French danger; and the treaties concluded by the two last contained anti-French articles. The mission to Sind was begun by Captain Seton, Resident at Masqat, who mismanaged it, and was carried through by Mr. N. B. Smith, Resident at Būshehr. The Lahore and Kābul missions were headed by Messrs. Metcalfe and Elphinstone respectively.

consequence was the simultaneous organisation of two separate British missions to the Persian Gulf and Persia, which came into virtual competition with one another. The preparations for the mission despatched from England under Sir H. Jones were the earlier begun; but the Indian mission under General Malcolm, starting from a point nearer to the scene of action, was the first in the field. General Malcolm, after touching at Masqat, reached Būshehr in May 1808; but he had not the patience to overcome gradually the adverse influence that a new French mission under General Gardanne had by this time established at Tehrān; and, being required to open his negotiations with the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz, he refused to do so and left again for India in July. The instructions given to General Malcolm by Lord Minto seem to have been of a somewhat indefinite character, but it was intended that he should study the political situation in Persia, arrange for the expulsion of the French from the country, should that be possible, and devise military measures for frustrating any attempt that might be made by them to form a settlement in the Persian Gulf. He was invested, for the period of his employment in the Gulf, with full control over all the office* and establishments of the Government of India in that region; and he was also accredited to the Pāsha of Baghdād.

Malcolm to the Persian Gulf, 1808; proposed British occupation of Khārag; and mission of Sir H. Jones to Persia, 1808-1809.

When the news of General Malcolm's failure reached India, Sir H. Jones, who had been waiting at Bombay, was authorised by the Governor-General to leave for Persia, which he did without delay. New orders to remain at Bombay, which were sent him instantly on General Malcolm's arrival at Calcutta, did not reach Bombay until after he had sailed. The Government of India then turned their attention to a scheme, which had already been considered, for the acquisition of an island in the Persian Gulf; but, whereas it had formerly been discussed with a view to commercial advantage and to an agreement with the Persian Government on the subject, it was now treated rather as a military question and dispositions were made for carrying it out with a high hand. Already in 1799 the Government of Bombay had suggested the establishment of a British station on Khārag or Hormūz, and in 1800-1801 Captain Malcolm had endeavoured, in adjusting the Commercial Treaty with Persia, to obtain a cession of the islands of Qishm, Hanjām and Khārag; but he had been defeated by the obstinacy of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, who regarded the proposal with intense suspicion. It was

* The egregious Mr. Manesty, British Resident at Basrah, protested against his subjection to General Malcolm in inflated terms.

now resolved that Khārag should be occupied by a force under General Malcolm without the consent of Persia, partly as a precaution against a forward movement by France or Russia, between whom since the pacification of Tilsit in July 1807 instead of war a close political understanding had existed, and partly as a guarantee for observance by the Persian Government of a more respectful attitude towards Britain than that displayed in their recent treatment of General Malcolm. In the spring of 1809 Captain Grant, an officer on General Malcolm's staff who was sent in advance of the intended Khārag expedition, explored Persian Makrān and travelled thence by land to Bandar 'Abbās; the object of his mission was to report on the military aspects of the country traversed with reference to the possibility of a European attack on India.

Meanwhile Sir H. Jones had arrived in Persia, where a change of circumstances very favourable to British interests had taken place, for it had become evident to the Shāh that no decided step would be taken by France to restrain her Russian ally—the power which he chiefly dreaded and with which he was now at war—from aggression on Persia. The influence of General Gardanne at Tehrān was rapidly on the wane, and Sir H. Jones had little difficulty in reaching the capital and carrying his negotiations to a successful conclusion. His chief embarrassments, or what he himself esteemed as such, were the projected descent by General Malcolm upon Khārag, of which the Persians had by some means become aware, and distinct orders to retire from Persia which he received from Lord Minto; but he took measures which would probably have ensured provisional submission by the Persians to the British occupation of Khārag, even if General Malcolm's expedition had not in the end been countermanded by the Government of India in consequence of news of the difficulties in which Napoleon had become involved in the Peninsula, and he simply disregarded as *ultra vires* the commands of the Governor-General to suspend the mission, now fairly entered on, with which he had been charged by His Majesty's Government. Complete success rewarded his determined behaviour; and on the 12th March 1809 a Preliminary Treaty was concluded with Persia, whereby the Shāh annulled all his previous arrangements, whatever they might be, with other European powers, and undertook to refuse a passage through Persia to a European army proceeding against the British dominions in India, while Britain on her part engaged to assist the Persian Government with troops, or in lieu thereof with a subsidy, individual British officers and military stores, against any European invader of Persian territory.

The obligation imposed on Britain in case of an invasion of Persia was to hold good even if the invading power were at peace with Britain, but in such circumstances Britain might first endeavour to bring about a settlement by friendly intervention between Persia and the aggressor. Provision was also made in the Treaty against the worn-out bogey of an Afghān invasion of India. Mr. Morier, the secretary of the mission, was at once sent to England to obtain ratification of the Treaty, which he carried with him: he was accompanied by a Persian Envoy, Mirza Abul Hasan, whose duty it was to inform himself, for his master's satisfaction, of the channel through which the subsidy mentioned in the Treaty would be paid, in case it became due. About the end of April 1809 the last of the French diplomatic agents quitted Tehrān; and by the end of 1810 the French Consular Agency established at Masqat had been withdrawn. Notwithstanding the alarm, almost amounting to panic, which the activity of the French at first excited in British India, it seems probable that Napoleon's proceedings, at least after the collapse of his Egyptian enterprise, were designed to keep Britain occupied and anxious in the East rather than to prepare the way for any serious campaign against her Indian possessions.

Third mission of (General) Malcolm to Persia, 1810.

Early in 1810 General Malcolm was again deputed to Persia by Lord Minto, partly as evidence of the Government of India's approval of the Treaty arranged by Sir H. Jones, partly to restore the credit of the Indian Government in Persia, which was supposed to have suffered by the repulse of their last mission, followed as it immediately was by the triumphant success of the rival Envoy, and partly, it would seem, in order that the Governor-General might have a representative on the spot ready to assume the duties of permanent Envoy at the Persian Court, in case, as he had recommended in correspondence with the Home Government, the appointment of the Envoy at Tehrān should be left to himself. General Malcolm was also directed to make a geographical study, so far as feasible, of Persia and the countries adjacent to it; and to enable him to carry out this duty, and also to add to the impressiveness of the mission, he was provided with a large and brilliant staff of officers. His Majesty's Government had decided, however, that the appointment of Envoy at Tehrān should for the future be filled from England; and General Malcolm accordingly, after a purely formal visit to the Shāh, returned to India. On this occasion again he passed through Baghdād on his homeward journey, but an internal revolution was at the time in progress at the headquarters of the Pāshāliq and prevented the transaction of any political business with the local Government.

Disturbed condition of the Persian Gulf, 1798-1805.

While Great Britain concentrated her attention on the real or imagined schemes of Napoleon in Turkey, Persia, Afghānistān and Arabia, a state of general disorganisation and insecurity was fast coming into existence in the Persian Gulf, the remedying of which was destined to cost her in the end far more, both in military effort and in money, than the short-lived scare of French aggression upon India. The causes of unrest were various; but the principal among them seem to have been the natural turbulence and rapacity of certain maritime Arab tribes, particularly the Qawāsim,* the alarming growth in Najd and ultimate appearance in the Persian Gulf of the Wahhābi power of Central Arabia, the ambition and naval resources of the Saiyid of 'Omān, and the weakness of the Arab principality of Bahrain. Had the Government of India, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, understood the real seriousness of the local situation, had they given more attention to the earliest symptoms of maritime disorder in the Persian Gulf and less to problems of high policy at the capitals of the Middle East, had they in short taken a close rather than a comprehensive survey of the position, it is possible that the immediate interests of the British Empire would have been better served by their action. The case, however, was probably one in which to be wise before the event required more than human foresight; and it is possible that, if the great political missions of the period to the Persian Court had never started, the position of Britain in Persia at the present day would have been much less considerable than it is.

Development of the Wahhābi power in Najd and its extension to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, 1798-1805.

The Wahhābi movement, as explained in the chapter on the history of Najd, had its beginnings in Central Arabia about the middle of the eighteenth century; and, though it was in its origin religious, it quickly assumed a political and secular shape. The result was the formation of a

* The term "Qawāsim," it should be observed, was at this time used in a wide sense to designate all the tribes of the coast of North-Western 'Omān (including the Qawāsim proper) who engaged in piracy: in other words, apparently, the inhabitants of all the ports of that coast except Dibai and Abu Dhabi.

fanatical and at the same time aggressive and even predatory state, which found in pious principles a warrant for the plunder and pillage of its neighbours, and against which those neighbours, for want of enthusiasm and a proper military organisation, were unable effectively to contend. Before the opening of the period now under consideration the Wahhābis had begun, in opposite directions, to make war on the Sharīf of Makkah and to harass the Shaikh of Kuwait, and had partially conquered the principality of Hasa, governed by the Banī Khālid, on the western side of the Persian Gulf. An expedition despatched against them in 1798 by the Pāsha of Baghdād, whose frontier towards the Arabian desert had already for some time been exposed to their ravages, reached the Hasa Oasis; but it was unable to expel the Wahhābī garrisons there, or to proceed any further on its way to the Wahhābī capital of Dara'īyah. The Turkish commander, in his retirement upon Turkish 'Irāq, was beset by a large Wahhābī force and concluded a six years' truce with the son of the Amīr: it was afterwards ratified by the Pāsha of Baghdād but it was not respected by the Wahhābis. In 1800 the capture of the port of Qatīf completed the conquest of Hasa by the Wahhābis and brought them down to the shores of the Persian Gulf; in the same year they occupied the oasis of Baraimi, from which they commenced to threaten both the Pirate Coast and the 'Omān Sultanate; and by 1803 they had established their supremacy over the whole Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, including Bahrain, between Kuwait and the 'Omān Sultanate, on neither of which last, however, they had as yet made any serious impression. In 1801 the outlying town of Karbala in Turkish 'Irāq was surprised and sacked in a few hours, with its sacred Shī'ah shrine of Husain, by a Wahhābī host, who at the same time perpetrated a frightful massacre of the unarmed inhabitants; and the incident was of some general importance, for it provoked deep indignation in Persia against the Pāsha of Baghdād for his want of vigilance. In 1802, by way of reprisals, a second expedition against the Wahhābis in their own territories was organised by the Pāsha of Baghdād; but, like the first, it ended abortively. Meanwhile, in 1801-02, the Wahhābis, whose energy at this time was equal to the most distant, diverse, and extraordinary enterprises, had possessed themselves of Makkah; in 1804 Madīnah also submitted to their yoke; and they then proceeded to subjugate other parts of the province of Yaman. Around, upon the circumference of the Wahhābī empire thus extended, perpetual terror reigned; and the rulers of Turkish Irāq, Kuwait and 'Omān no longer knew a moment's repose.

Difficulties between the states of 'Omān, Persia, Turkey and Bahrain, 1798-1805.

There were also dissensions and difficulties among the principal states of the Gulf, notwithstanding the fact that the territorial integrity, and even the independence, of most of them except Persia were threatened by the progress of the Wahhābis. In 1798 there was tension between the Saiyid of 'Omān and the Pāsha of Baghdād, arising out of a pecuniary claim by the former against the latter, and the Saiyid made preparations for blockading Basrah; but a settlement was in the end reached by mutual agreement without the assistance of the British Resident at Basrah, whose good offices were at first invoked by the Turks. In 1799 the Saiyid of 'Omān, encouraged by the Persian Governor of Fārs, made an attack upon the shipping of Bahrain, which Shaikhdom he was ambitious of subjecting to his own authority; but the ruler of Bahrain was induced by the Shaikh to Būshehr to place himself under the protection of Persia. Saiyid Sultān then proceeded to indemnify himself for the deception practised on him by the Persians by occupying Khārag Island, which belonged to Persia and was generally held by the Shaikh of Būshehr as a part of his government; and he contrived to retain possession of it until the next year. In 1800-01 the ruler of 'Omān successfully seized, and for a time administered, the Bahrain Islands; and in 1802, having been dislodged, he again managed to establish himself in possession; but he ultimately failed to make good his footing, and on his departure the Shaikhdom came under the domination of the Wahhābis. At the end of 1804, on the death of Saiyid Sultān of Masqat, the Persian port of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, which he held on lease from the Persian Government, were seized by the Banī Ma'in, an Arab tribe but Persian subjects; and another dispute, dangerous to the peace of the Gulf, thus came into being.

Outbreak of piracy in the lower Persian Gulf, 1798-1805.

It was in these circumstances of disturbance and confusion that Arab pirates, who may hitherto have been employing themselves quietly in harrying native shipping, were emboldened to turn their attention to British vessels and so became conspicuous. The seizure of the "Bassein" and the unprovoked attack on the "Viper" by the Qawāsim in 1797, already referred to, were premonitory symptoms of trouble; and it cannot but be supposed that the negligence with which both cases were treated by the British authorities encouraged the commission of further offences. The next instances of lawlessness were not precisely piratical; they consisted in the plunder, in 1803, of the British ships "Hector" and "Alert", which had gone ashore on the Persian Coast, by the Arab Shaikh of Nakhīlu and his subjects; and in these partial

redress was obtained, after the lapse of two years, through the Persian Government and the Shaikh of Būshehr. In 1804 the crew and passengers of the "Fly", which had been captured, as already mentioned, by a French privateer, were piratically attacked while on their way to India in a native vessel that they had purchased at Būshehr and were carried off by the Qawāsim, who did not readily restore them to liberty. In 1805 the "Shannon" and "Trimmer", two merchant vessels owned by Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, were taken by Qāsimi pirates; and in the same year a fleet of Qāsimi vessels attempted to seize the East India Company's large cruiser "Mornington", but were beaten off with loss.

First British expedition against the Qawāsim and treaty of peace, 1805-06.

The loss of the "Shannon" and the "Trimmer" was an affair too serious to be ignored; and the Government of Bombay now directed Captain Seton, the British Resident at Masqat, apparently at his own suggestion, to assist the Sultān of 'Omān, who also had grievances against the Qawāsim, in chastising that unruly tribe. At the beginning of June 1805 Captain Seton, in the "Mornington", joined Saiyid Badar off Qishm; but, before taking action against the Qawāsim, the allies recovered by force the Persian leased seaport of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, which had been lost to 'Omān, as already mentioned, on the death of Saiyid Sultān. This was a proceeding open to misconstruction by Persia, and one that made it evident, whatever reasons Captain Seton might allege in justification of his conduct, that his attention was not so firmly fixed as it ought to have been on the sole object of the joint expedition as sanctioned by Government. At length, in the beginning of July, an opportunity presented itself, and was promptly utilised by the allies, of blockading a considerable flotilla of Qāsimi vessels in the anchorage of Qishm; but the Sultān of 'Omān appeared indifferent to the advantages of a full and immediate settlement with the Qawāsim, and the British Resident perhaps gave too much weight to their evasive pleas and promises of amendment. The Government of Bombay, who probably overestimated the effect of the lesson on the tribe, were at first inclined to insist on a very drastic and comprehensive settlement; but, when it was shown to be impossible of attainment with-

out a continuation of hostilities, they allowed themselves to be placated by the restoration of the hulls of the "Shannon" and "Trimmer", from which everything of value had been removed; abandoned a just claim to compensation for incidental injuries; and accepted a bond for future good behaviour, volunteered by the Qawāsim, without sureties. The so-called treaty embodying these conditions was dated 6th February 1806. A serious feature of the case was a doubt as to the connection with it of the Wahhābi Amir, whose dictation appears to have been alleged by the Qawāsim as an excuse for their misdeeds, and to whom Mr. Manesty had already appealed in vain for restitution through a special messenger. An exaggerated idea of the power of the Amir was at this time current in the Persian Gulf, and the Qawāsim were evidently acute enough to profit by it in prevailing on the British authorities to be satisfied with an incomplete settlement.

The outcome of these perfunctory proceedings, in which the Resident was moreover hampered by directions intended to prevent a collision with the Wahhābis, the Persians or the Turks, and even by a conflict of opinion with the British Residents at Basrah and Būshehr, was of course only to postpone the inevitable reckoning with the tribes until the piratical spirit had found a fresh opportunity of asserting itself.

Temporary cessation of piracy followed by its revival on an increased scale, 1806-1809.

For about two years the Qawāsim remained quiescent; but their better conduct was probably due, in part at least, to the stationing of a large British squadron in the Gulf in 1807-08 in connection with the rupture in Europe between Britain and Turkey. The policy of the Government of Bombay, who under the benevolent Mr. Duncan even prohibited the officers of their marine from firing first when the ships under their command were approached by Arab vessels in a threatening manner, cannot but have encouraged the Qawāsim to resume their piratical courses; and a series of melancholy and disgraceful affairs was the result of their forbearance. In April 1808 the "Lively" was attacked off the Gujarat coast by four large Arab vessels, but defended herself with success; and an opportunity of punishing some of the offenders, who were afterwards discovered at Sūrat, was unaccountably neglected. During the same year a score of native Indian

craft fell victims to Arab pirates in Indian waters. In September 1808 the "Minerva", another trading vessel owned by Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, was captured by the Qawāsim. Most of her officers and crew were barbarously put to death, while the wife of Lieutenant Taylor, a political officer in the Gulf, was carried into captivity and had to be ransomed, and the second mate and the carpenter, who were taken to Rās-al-Khaimah, were never again seen. In October 1808 the "Sylph" cruiser, accompanying Sir H. Jones's mission to Persia, was overpowered and had most of her crew massacred by Arab pirates; but she was almost immediately retaken by H. M. S. "Néréide", which opportunely appeared upon the scene. About the same time four pirate vessels fell upon the Company's cruiser "Nautilus", proceeding up the Gulf; but the latter, her commander having wisely disregarded the standing orders of the Bombay Government against forestalling attack, proved more than a match for her assailants. The Qawāsim now possessed 63 large vessels and a huge fleet of small ones; they had, it was reckoned, about 19,000 men afloat; and their Shaikh insolently suggested that the Bombay Government should pay him blackmail, in return for which he would guarantee the safety of British commerce in the Gulf. In June 1809 the "Doria Dowlut", a British vessel under British command, was taken by the Qawāsim. Piracies were also freely committed by Rahmah-bin-Jābir, an 'Athi freebooter of Qatar, but he showed remarkable prudence in abstaining from offences against vessels under the British flag.

Second British expedition against the Qawāsim and its results, 1809-10.

The measure of Qāsimi iniquity was now full, and in September 1809 the Government of India despatched a combined naval and military expedition from Bombay under the joint command of Captain Wainwright, R.N., and Colonel L. Smith of the British military service. The chief object of the operations was to put an end to piracy by the destruction of all piratical craft and the conclusion of an arrangement with the piratical tribes whereby the safety of navigation in the Gulf might for the future be assured. The force employed consisted of two vessels of the Royal Navy, ten vessels of the East India Company's

marine, 1,000 European troops, comprising the 65th and part of the 47th Foot and some artillery, and an equal strength of native sepoys. The first point of attack was the Qāsimi capital of Rās-al-Khaimah, which was bombarded on the 12th November 1809 and captured the next day by house to house fighting with little loss, some thirty large war vessels being afterwards destroyed in the harbour. On the 14th, in consequence of an alarm that a force of Wahhābis, with whom the commanders of the British expedition had been cautioned against coming into conflict, was approaching, the troops were hurriedly re-embarked; and the enemy, whose spirit was still unbroken, defiantly re-occupied the town.

A visit was then paid to Lingeh on the Persian Coast, where some piratical Arab war vessels were destroyed, after which operations were undertaken against the fort of Lāft on the island of Qishm and resulted in its evacuation by the enemy. The fighting at Lāft was the most severe in the course of the campaign and involved a loss to the British of 11 killed and 55 wounded.

In January 1810 Colonel Smith at the instance of the Saiyid of 'Omān, the restoration of whose authority at certain places where it had been overthrown was one of the secondary objects of the expedition, made a successful attack, with the help of an 'Omāni contingent, upon the port of Shināṣ, which was desperately defended by a strong garrison in the Wahhābi interest. The Saiyid did not venture to re-occupy the position thus recovered; and, on the withdrawal of the British and himself on board ship at the conclusion of the operations, a Wahhābi general from Baraimi fell upon and routed some of his forces which remained on shore. How Colonel Smith justified his direct action in this instance against the Wahhābis, which was contrary to his general instructions, is not clear: possibly the prohibition applied only to that part of his duty which was connected with the Qawāsim and with piracy.

After the Shināṣ affair the British armament revisited both the Pirate Coast and the Persian littoral, and some vessels were found and destroyed at Rams; but the fleets of 'Ajmān and Shārjah eluded discovery, except four vessels belonging to the latter which were detected and burned at Mughu. The ports of Mughu, Nakhilu, Chārak, Kung and Band Mu'allim on the Persian side, which all belonged to the guilty or suspected class, were apparently found empty of large shipping.

Part of the expedition returned to India in February 1810, immediately on the conclusion of these proceedings; and the remainder left

the Gulf in April, after operations against Rahmah-bin-Jâbir of Qatar, suggested by the British Resident at Bûshehr, had been disallowed by the Government of India. No formal admission of defeat or written engagement for future good conduct was obtained from the piratical tribes; and the real work of pacification, as the event showed, yet remained to be done. The Wahhâbi Amir, to whom a communication was addressed, in reply professed neutrality towards the British and stated that he had forbidden his followers to attack their vessels.

British trade in the Persian Gulf, 1798-1810.

The subject of British trade in the Persian Gulf during this period is dealt with at length in the histories of the Persian Coast and Turkish 'Irâq, and it is therefore unnecessary to enlarge on it here. In Persia especially there was a general revival of commercial activity, due to the establishment of order by the Qâjârs after many years of virtual anarchy; and a not unsuccessful effort was made by the East India Company to resuscitate their trade in that country. The mission of Mehdi 'Ali Khân to Persia in 1798-99 had an important commercial aspect; so also had that of Captain J. Malcolm in 1799-1801; and exhaustive reports on the Persian Gulf trade were furnished by Messrs. Maister and Fawcett, two experts at Bombay, in 1799, and by Captain Malcolm during his stay in Persia in 1800. Horses, some of them for the King's and the Company's mounted troops in India, were at this time a not unimportant export from both Turkish 'Irâq and Persia. The trade carried on by native merchants in Turkish 'Irâq was oppressed by heavy import, export, and transit duties; and the Turkish currency became hopelessly depreciated, the value of the piastre falling from one-tenth of a pound sterling at Basrah in 1783 to one-twenty-fifth at Constantinople in 1811.

British political establishments in the Persian Gulf, 1798-1810.

Employment of Mehdi 'Ali Khân in Persia by the

There is little to notice in connection with British official matters in the Persian Gulf, during the period, besides the exceptional employment of Mehdi 'Ali Khân, a Persian gentleman, as Resident at Bûshehr

Government of Bombay, 1798-1803, and his subsequent treatment, 1803-04.

and Envoy to the Persian Court, and the manner in which his services were recognised. Mehdi 'Alī Khān was a personal protégé of Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, and the principal facts of his history are related elsewhere in connection with his mission. During his tenure of the Būshehr Residency he presumably drew the ordinary pay of the appointment, and he was allowed in addition a percentage on the increased profits which might accrue to the East India Company's trade through his exertions, also commission at the rate of ten per cent. on supplies furnished to the Company's cruisers; but he received no special remuneration on account of his mission to the Shāh, which appears to have been suggested by himself, his actual expenses in connection with the same being however refunded. In 1801, while still Resident at Būshehr, he was deputed by the Government of Bombay on a mission to Mokha in the Red Sea; and during his absence the following peculiar dispositions, made by himself and sanctioned by Government, took effect at Būshehr:—

He appointed Omdutettejaur Aka Mahomed Jafar, Zubdutettejaur Aka Mahomed Hossein, and Khoja Arutoon to take care of and protect the property of the Company with instructions to pay the utmost and most unremitted attention to the details of their service, Omdutettejaur being to exercise the duties of Noabut or of Deputyship, and Zubdutettejaur those of Wazarut or Stewardship, and Khoja Arutoon those of Tehveeldauree, *i.e.*, to hold the immediate charge and custody of all the articles, whether of money or goods. It was incumbent on them to exert themselves in the sales of the latter, as soon as the plague was dissipated, considering the prices the same as those of the previous year and not liable to the variation of a single Deenar. It would greatly redound to their credit if they should be able to procure the vend of a considerable quantity of the goods previous to his return; and in the event of the plague reaching Bushire they were to transport the Company's goods to wherever the property and families of Mullaketejaur Haji Khaleel and of Haji Ismail might be removed to and remain deposited. With respect to the delivery of the goods that should have been sold, it was necessary that the authority and order for all issues of this kind be given conjointly to the sepoys from all the three persons above named; and all receipts from the merchants of the prices of the goods, which were to be carefully recovered as they fell due, must be immediately lodged under the charge of Khoja Arutoon in the Treasury, over which the Company's sepoys must day and night remain constantly stationed as sentinels, and each of the three persons above named (was) to keep accounts of the receipt of all sums of money on account of the Sarkar. As long as Captain Malcolm remained in Persia, whatever requisition he might make or order he might issue (was) to be considered as (that) of Government itself, and every attention paid that not a hair's-breadth of deviation take place in the execution of any of his commands.

It was added, no doubt in accordance with the customs of the Residency, that,—

Every Sunday, from sunrise to sunset, the flag was to remain hoisted; and, whenever any ship appeared in the offing displaying the English colours, it was to be immediately answered by the hoisting of the Residency (flag); and on the three festival days, *viz.*, Christmas, New Year's Day, and His Majesty the King of Great Britain's Birthday, the usual ceremonies were to be observed and the accustomed gratuities be bestowed on the sepoys, etc.

In 1803, as mentioned elsewhere, Mehdi 'Ali Khân was compulsorily retired from the service, his phenomenal mendacity, though faithfully exercised in his employers' interest, having become, it would appear, a cause of scandal and even of diplomatic difficulties. On his retirement he received a pension of R800 a month; and, when he died in July 1804 leaving little or no property, it was continued at the reduced rate of R500 a month to his heirs. The financial responsibility of sending his corpse to Najaf for interment at an estimated expenditure of R20,000 was undertaken, in case a grant for the purpose should not be sanctioned by Government, by his friend Mr. Duncan, who apparently caused the body to be accompanied by a Mr. Henshaw. Mr. Duncan referred to his own conduct on this occasion as "a mark of attention, which I can never "regret to have shown to the last solicitations of an extraordinary man, "whose uncommon talents have during a period of about eighteen years "been in various instances ably applied to the promotion of the British "interests in that quarter of Asia extending from the Ganges River to "the Caspian and Red Seas, of which the Company at home have more than "once expressed their sense, accompanying their latest mention of the "subject in relation more particularly to the beneficial operation of his "great proceedings in that quarter and to the increased vend he had made "such progress in introducing, and was so likely to establish, for our "British woollens with the expression of a desire that some complimentary "token of their approbation might be bestowed on him by this Government"; and he added "As no good opportunity occurred of carrying this "part of their orders into effect, they may perhaps be pleased to consider "it the more allowable to be put to some expenses in procuring for him a "coveted grave."

Miscellaneous matters.

The state of the Residency building at Bûshehr in 1798 is sufficiently explained by the following request addressed by Mr. Hankey Smith to Government after the local disturbances which occurred in that year: "I

"beg leave to iterate my solicitations for reinforcement of sepoys as "absolutely necessary to defend this old ruin from the attempts its appear- "ance seems to invite with impunity to the beastly rabble which have of "late inhabited this place." Basrah continued to be, at the beginning of the period, the channel through which the most recent European news was received by the British in India; and thus we find the Resident remarking, in closing a letter to the Governor and Council of Bombay on the 10th October 1799: "I have also the honour to transmit you the" "Lloyd's Evening Post from the 12th to the 29th July and Journal de" "Francfort from the 22nd July to the 9th August, containing very inter-" "esting intelligence, to which I beg leave to make a respectful reference."

Subjection of the British establishments in the Persian Gulf to the Government by Bombay, 1806.

In 1806 the Residencies at Baghdād and Būshehr were made in all respects subordinate to the Government of Bombay, and the Residents were prohibited from corresponding direct with the Government of India, which previously, it would seem, they had been at liberty to do.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE END OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA IN THE EAST TO THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF, 1810-1856.

The next period in the history of the Persian Gulf was distinguished by immunity from the disturbing influences of European politics, and by the close and beneficial attention which Britain devoted to local questions, especially the repression of piracy. The Perso-Russian war of 1804 closed indecisively with the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813. Danger from France no longer existed; in India, apart from the Gurkha war of 1814-1815 and the Pindāri and Marātha troubles of 1817, peace and security generally prevailed; and it was not until towards the close of the period that Russia, having defeated both Persia and Turkey in the field, and having obtained by the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828 and that of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833 a commanding influence in those countries, began to be suspected by British politicians of designs* on India similar to those formerly attributed

* Illustrations of the Russophobia which came into existence at this time will be found in the works of various contemporary writers, *e.g.*, in Wellsted's *Travels in Arabia* (I, 400—04) and Mignan's *Winter Journey* (II, 144—171).

to France. A treaty founded on the treaty of 1809, but directed, though general in its terms, against Russia rather than against France, was concluded between Britain and Persia in 1814, the year after the treaty of Gulistān between Persia and Russia. This treaty, which bound Persia to assist in preventing a European attack upon India and Britain to give active support to Persia in repelling an invasion of her territory by a European power, underwent a serious modification in 1828, whereby Britain was released from the last-mentioned condition, with the consent of Persia, in consideration of a money payment. Finally in 1834, on a change of sovereign taking place in Persia, Britain and Russia agreed mutually to respect the independence and territorial integrity of that country but the understanding was the prelude to a sharp and even dangerous crisis between them in Persian affairs.

Maximum development, decline, and temporary extinction of the Wahhābi power, 1810-1819.

Position of the Wahhābis in 1810.

In 1810, immediately after the second British expedition against the Qawāsim, the general power of the Wahhābi state and its influence in Persian Gulf affairs, reached their highest point; but a decline of both, though as yet unforeseen, was near at hand. The Wahhābis at this time held undisturbed possession not only of all Central Arabia, but also of the greater part of Hijāz, including the sacred cities of Makkah and Madīnah; and portions, at least, of Yaman were under their control. In the direction of Syria they had, it would seem, made themselves masters of the oasis of Jauf-al-'Āmir; and their armies from time to time still threatened the Pāshāliq of Baghdād, and even its capital. Kuwait continued to defy their occasional efforts for its reduction; but Hasa, Qatar and Bahrain had fallen entirely under their sway and were formed in 1810 into a province of the Wahhābi empire, governed by a Wahhābi official who was stationed in Bahrain. The Wahhābis had recently strengthened their hold upon the 'Omān Promontory by occupying, from their advanced base at Buraimi, some forts in the Shamailiyah district; and their local prestige upon the Pirate Coast had been little if at all shaken by the British capture of Rās-al-Khaimah, though it took place almost

under their eyes, or even by the expulsion of their own garrison by a British and 'Omāni force from the port of Shināṣ, which they had lately seized. Their attitude towards the Saiyid of 'Omān was menacing in the extreme.

Advance of the Egyptians in Western Arabia and gradual relaxation of Wahhābi pressure in the Persian Gulf, 1811-1815.

In 1811 Muhammad 'Ali, Pāsha of Egypt, began his operations for the recovery of the Turkish Red Sea districts usurped by the Wahhābis; and the effect of his movements was felt at once even on the opposite side of Arabia, their hold upon which the Wahhābis found themselves obliged partially to relax. Before the end of the year Qatar and Bahrain, attacked by the Saiyid of 'Omān, were evacuated by their garrisons; but Mutlaq, their able and energetic commander at Baraimi, was nevertheless able to invade the 'Omān Sultanate and to capture the fort of Samāil in the heart of that country. In 1811 or 1812 a symptom of anxiety, or at least of a willingness to abandon his policy of haughty isolation, was shown by the Wahhābi Amir in despatching an envoy to the Persian Government of Fārs; but the mission had no visible results. In 1812, after one serious disaster, the Egyptians succeeded in expelling the Wahhābis from Madīnah; and in the following year they recovered Makkah, Jiddah and Tāif; but an expedition which they made against Turabah ended in failure. The Hajj or public pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah, closed by the Wahhābis since 1802, was now thrown open once more to the Muhammadan world. Notwithstanding the reverses sustained by the Wahhābis and some military assistance lent by Persia to the Sultān of 'Omān, the Wahhābi commander at Baraimi was again able, in 1812-1813, to invade the Sultanate with success, to overrun the districts of Masqat, Eastern Hajar and Ja'alān with fire and sword, and to attach permanently to the Wahhābi interest, by their conversion to Wahhābi principles, two of the leading tribes in the eastern part of the country. Towards the end of 1813, however, after a profitable inroad into the Bātinah district, Mutlaq was killed in operations against a tribe in the interior of 'Omān; and the weakened position of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia could then no longer be disguised. In 1814 the Wahhābi state suffered a still greater loss in the death of the Amīr Sa'ūd, a chief of diplomatic and administrative ability; and after this their affairs, partly for want of his intelligent guidance, and partly on account of the obstinate perseverance of the Egyptians in their attacks from the west, went steadily from bad to worse. In September 1814 the Wahhābis, under a local leader achieved a victory over the Egyptians in Zahrān; but this was their last triumph. In January 1815 the

troops of the Amīr were overthrown at the decisive battle of Bisal a place on the inland confines of the Hijāz district; the capture of Turabah followed; and even the remote settlements of Ranyah and Bishah were visited by an expedition.

First invasion of Qasim by the Egyptians, 1815.

The scene of action then shifted to the northwards, where Tūsūn Pāshah, son of Muhammad 'Ali, considering the opportunity favourable, advanced from Madinah with a small force of about 1,000 men to Rass in Qasim. The movement, which was undertaken in defiance of Muhammad 'Ali's orders, was a dangerous one; but the Wahhābi Amīr was overawed and agreed, in consideration of the Egyptians retiring from Qasim, to relinquish his claims to Makkah and Madīnah, to acknowledge the Sultān of Turkey as his suzerain in a general sense, and to accept a line passing through Hanakiyah as the boundary between his dominions and the country under the direct rule of the Egyptians. Tūsūn Pāsha's expedition into Central Arabia lasted from the middle of March to the end of June 1815, and his halt in Qasīm was of only four weeks' duration. The treaty arranged with the Wahhābis was not ratified by Muhammad 'Ali, possibly from pique at his son's disobedience and success, but perhaps because he did not think its terms sufficiently favourable.

Second invasion of Qasim and conquest of Nejd by the Egyptians, 1817-1818

In the next year, 1816, Muhammad 'Ali despatched Ibrāhīm Pāsha, another of his sons, from Egypt in command of a large force with express orders to crush the Wahhābis by advancing to their capital of Dara'iyah. The operations did not commence until 1817, when Ibrāhīm Pāsha reached Hanakiyah and began to act against the hostile tribes in that vicinity and in the direction of Jabal Shammar. The first regular engagement of the campaign took place at Jabal Mawiyah, where the Amīr 'Abdullah attacked an Egyptian force and suffered a serious defeat. Ibrāhīm Pāsha then pushed on to Rass, which he besieged for three or four months, but failed to take, notwithstanding heavy losses in killed and wounded and a vast expenditure of ammunition. He obtained possession, however, without difficulty, of Khabrah, 'Anaizah and Buraidah; and Qasim as a whole then submitted to him.

Shaqrah in Washam was taken in January 1818, after a short siege, it being the first place in Southern Najd to fall; and a massacre was committed by the Egyptian troops at Dhrumah, but not without some provocation in the shape of an irregular attack which was made upon them. On the 6th April 1818 the operations against Dara'iyah were begun; and they continued with varying success, the besieging Egyptian force being itself at times reduced to the utmost straits, until the 9th

September. The Amir 'Abdullah then surrendered and was sent a prisoner to Constantinople, where, contrary to the hopes with which he had been amused, he was executed. Dara'iyah, after being plundered, was razed to the ground; and fortifications of every sort were destroyed throughout the whole of the conquered districts.

Egyptian occupation of Najd and Hasa, 1818-1819.

The Egyptians, after the destruction of the Wahhábi capital, annexed Hasa, where, as well as in Najd, military posts were established by them at various points. They also undertook a number of expeditions against refractory tribes; but they did not establish anything approaching to effective control of the country; and, for the most part, they failed even to understand their political environment. The strain of a general occupation having become too great to be endured, the Egyptian troops in July 1819 evacuated Hasa, which was made over to the chiefs of the Bani Khálid, the original rulers of the district before the Wahhábis, to be held in dependence on the Porte; and in the following month Ibráhim Pásha himself, accompanied by the bulk of the Egyptian army of occupation, which never so far as is known amounted to more than several thousand men, withdrew from Najd to Hijáz. Some Egyptian garrisons, however, seem to have remained in Najd until 1824, after which none are mentioned; but the sovereignty of the Sultán of Turkey was not expressly repudiated after their departure, and a nominal tribute even continued to be paid him by the Wahhábi Amir.

Revival of piracy and various events in the Persian Gulf, 1811-19.

The effects of the punishment of the Qawásim by the British expedition of 1809-10 soon passed away; and the rapid revival of piracy thereafter, occurring at a time when the Wahhábis were in a depressed condition and when their local influence was weakened to such an extent that it had almost ceased to exist, seemed to prove that the innate greed and ferocity of the Arab tribes, not Wahhábi instigation or compulsion, were the true causes of maritime disorder in the Persian Gulf.

Action of the Sultan of

The only native power in the Gulf which served as a check upon either the Wahhábis or the Qawásim was that of the 'Omán Sultanate.

which remained almost continuously at war with both. In 1811 Saiyid Sa'id took an active part in compelling the Wahhābis to relinquish their hold on Qatar and Bahrain; and the Wahhābi governor stationed in Bahrain was at the same time actually made a prisoner by him, or by his allies the Āl Khalīfah of Bahrain. It is possible that the Āl Khalīfah, as afterwards asserted by the Sultān of 'Omān, were moved, whether by gratitude or by considerations of expediency, to admit their political dependence upon Masqat. From 1813 onwards the 'Omāni ruler was in correspondence with Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha of Egypt in regard to measures to be taken against the Wahhābis and the Qawāsim; and in that year and in the next, having failed to secure the active support of the British, he made efforts on his own account to reduce the Qāsimi capital of Rās-al-Khaimah; but the only result was a treaty, soon disregarded, by which the Qawāsim bound themselves to refrain from preying on the inhabitants of certain coasts claimed by the Sultān as under his protection.

'Omān against the Wahhābis in Qatar and Bahrain, 1811, and war between him and the Qawāsim, 1813-1814.

The attitude of the Government of India towards the Wahhābis and the Qawāsim during the critical years immediately following the expedition of 1809-10 was undecided; and, largely in consequence of their indecision, the fruits of that considerable effort were in the end altogether lost. The Wahhābi envoy who visited Persia in 1811 or 1812 did not fail to make overtures to the British Resident at Būshehr for the establishment of mutual amity and commercial relations between their respective states; but the Government of India seemingly hesitated to pronounce on the question until 1814, when they decided, without prejudice to the maintenance and even encouragement of friendly intercourse, to avoid entering into a treaty with the Wahhābi Amīr. The Sultan of 'Omān, before embarking on his expedition of 1814 against Rās-al-Khaimah, tried to persuade the British authorities in India to make common cause with him against the Qawāsim, and argued that the Agreements of 1798 and 1800 between himself and the British power constituted an offensive-defensive alliance under which it was impossible for them to ignore his request; but the validity of his contention was not admitted, and no naval or military assistance was afforded him. The British Resident in the Persian Gulf, however, under orders from Government, accompanied the 'Omāni fleet to Rās-al-Khaimah upon two occasions; but no opportunity apparently presented itself, as had been hoped, for intervention by him with advantage to British interests. Towards the end of 1814, in connection with demands made by the British Resident for reparation in a particular case, an emissary bearing letters from the Wahhābi Amīr and the Shaikh of

Attitude of the British Government towards the Wahhābis and the Qawāsim, 1811-1814.

the Qawāsim appeared at Būshehr; and a preliminary agreement for the discontinuance by the Qawāsim of their attacks upon vessels under the British flag, for the restitution by them of certain specific property, and for their adoption of a distinguishing flag was executed; but it remained a dead letter.

Piratical offences committed by the Qawāsim, 1811-1816.

In these circumstances, of unsuccessful action by the Sultān of 'Omān and practical inaction on the part of the British Government, piratical offences by the Qawāsim recommenced and rapidly multiplied. The years 1810 and 1811 passed quietly, but in 1812 signs were perceived of a revival of piracy.

1813.

In 1813 several large native vessels belonging to Basrah and Kangūn were attacked and robbed by Qawāsim; some others owned by British Indian subjects and flying the British flag met with similar treatment; and others again remained confined to port in India, not venturing to sail on account of the increasing danger at sea.

1814.

In 1814 the "Ahmad Shāh," a native vessel under British colours, was plundered while aground near Qais Island by the Shaikh of Chārak, and part of the booty was carried to Rās-al-Khaimah by Qawāsim who were probably concerned in the crime: this was the case which led to the correspondence, in the same year, between the British Resident at Būshehr and the Wahhābi and Qāsimi chiefs. About the same time a Persian vessel was captured between Masqat and Bandar 'Abbās. In August 1814 some native craft under the British flag were taken by Arab pirates at sea off Porbandar; and a boat which the Resident sent with a communication in this case to the Qāsimi Shaikh was actually, notwithstanding the preliminary agreement very recently concluded by the emissary of that chief at Būshehr, seized in the Rās-al-Khaimah harbour and confiscated.

1815-1816.

This last act was virtually a declaration of war, and we are consequently not surprised to observe that a great increase of maritime offences affecting British vessels occurred in 1815 and 1816. In the former year a ship belonging to the Sultān of 'Omān, and carrying property of the East India Company, was seized by the Qawāsim at Mughu with the assistance, or at least the knowledge, of the inhabitants of that place; half a dozen native Indian vessels were captured in Indian waters; the Sultān of 'Omān's flag-ship "Caroline" was all but taken, the Saiyid himself being wounded, in an encounter with a large Qāsimi fleet off Quryāt; and a British Indian vessel was overpowered near Masqat, of which the crew were all either killed or kidnapped. In January 1816 the East India Company's small armed vessel "Periah

Dowlut," with a wholly Indian complement, was captured by Rás-al-Khaimah corsairs near Dwarka, and the bulk of her people were either slain or wounded; and in the same month a considerable Qásimi squadron engaged the Company's cruiser "Aurora" while convoying a treasure vessel for the Sultan of 'Omán in the Persian Gulf, but suffered defeat and heavy loss. Attacks which were next made by Qásimi pirates upon the American ship "Persia," the "Macaulay," and the "Cintra" were unsuccessful; but a French schooner, on her way from Mauritius to Basrah under convoy of a French ship, was daringly plundered. Among the victims of Arab lawlessness, which now followed one another in rapid succession, was a ship of unknown name under British colours, which was never seen again and of whose crew none survived; also the Company's armed boat "Turrarow." Later in the year three native Súrat merchantmen were taken by Qawásim in the Red Sea, this affair involving a loss to the owners of about twelve lakhs of rupees, besides which almost the entire crews were massacred.

The above list of outrages is probably not exhaustive even in regard to British and Indian vessels, and it takes almost no account of the depredations upon ordinary Arab and Persian shipping, which the British authorities did not at this time regard as a matter affecting themselves. The spectacle of the offences committed by the Qawásim with profit and impunity did not fail to demoralise a number of the Arab Shaikhs upon the Persian Coast opposite, and the Bahrain Islands became a great market and distributing centre in the Gulf for the stolen property which the Qawásim acquired by their violence.

Attack by the Sultan of 'Omán upon Bahrain and proceedings of the British Resident in connection therewith, 1816.

An expedition by the Sultán of 'Omán against Bahrain provided, in the summer of 1816, an interlude in the harrowing drama of Qásimi outrages. In 1811 Saiyid Sa'íd had taken action in Bahrain as the friend of the 'Athi ruling family and their helper against the Wahhábis; but now, on their denying the political allegiance which he claimed from them as his due, he appeared once more on the scene as the ally of Persia and of their mortal enemy, the pirate Rahmah-bin-Jábir, while they on their part sought the aid of their former oppressors the Wahhábis and of the piratical Qawásim. The Sultán encouraged the idea that his action was countenanced, and would even be supported, by the British Government; but the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who visited Bahrain while the 'Ománi attack was impending, found means to convince the Shaikh of Bahrain, though not without the execution of an unauthorised agreement, that the attitude of the British towards him was one of benevolent

neutrality. Saiyid Sa'id, disregarding an offer of British mediation, soon afterwards made a descent on the island of Muharraq; but he was driven again to his ships with heavy loss. The feebleness of the Bahrain principality, however, continued to invite aggression by its stronger neighbours.

British demand on the Qawāsim for reparation, 1816.

The serious Red Sea case, constituting as it did a warning of the extent to which piracy might be expected to spread if it were allowed to flourish unchecked in the Persian Gulf, led to an unconditional demand for reparation being made on the Qāsimi Shaikh, at the end of November 1816, under orders from the Government of India. The demand was presented by the Resident in the Gulf, who took with him to Rās-al-Khaimah one vessel of the Royal Navy and three of the East India Company's marine, but it was rejected by the Shaikh with such obstinacy and even insolence that the Resident was provoked, though no coercive action was sanctioned by his instructions, to undertake an immediate naval attack upon Rās-al-Khaimah. This enterprise, however, which was carried out on the 1st December 1816, resolved itself into a futile long-range cannonade, and was abandoned without any advantage having been obtained. Two vessels were then sent with demands for satisfaction to the ports of Shārjah, Lingeh and Chārak, where it is probable that they met with no greater success than had attended the visit of the whole squadron to Rās-al-Khaimah. The marauding fleet of Rās-al-Khaimah alone consisted at this time of about 60 large vessels, and the piratical ports of Shārjah, Rams, Lingeh and Chārak boasted some 40 others of a smaller size: of all these a great proportion were constantly at sea, and they were frequently sighted by the British cruisers, which however were seldom able to come up with them on account of their superior sailing qualities.

Continued depredations by the Qawāsim, 1817-1819.

The demonstration against Rās-al-Khaimah was not, perhaps, altogether without effect: at any rate there was a diminution during the next two years in the number of attacks committed by the Qawāsim upon British vessels. Towards the end of 1817, however, a Qāsimi fleet raided Shaikh Shu'aib Island, and threatened 'Asalu, Kangūn, and Daiyir in such a manner as to cause a serious panic at Būshehr; and about the same time the Qawāsim captured two native ships off Diu, besides the "Mustapha," an Arab vessel under British colours and command, at a point only 70 miles from Bombay. At the end of 1818 the East India Company's cruiser "Antelope" in a spirited action fought with considerable risk to herself, saved the Sultān of 'Omān's ship "Rahmany" and a Baghlah from capture by a group of Qāsimi vessels

with which she found them engaged; and other encounters, too numerous to be mentioned, took place between the Qawāsim and His Majesty's and the East India Company's ships.

Third British expedition against the Qawāsim, settlement, and connected occurrences, 1819-20.

At length, various internal troubles in India having been successfully surmounted between 1814 and 1817, it was resolved by the British Government of that country to make an end of piracy in the Persian Gulf.

Preparations for the expedition, 1819.

In the spring of 1819 Captain Sadleir was sent in advance from Bombay to arrange for the co-operation with the British against the Qawāsim of the Sultān of 'Omān, and, if possible, of the Egyptian forces then occupying Najd and Hasa, to whose commander he was authorised to offer possession of Rās-al-Khaimah as an incentive to joint action. A satisfactory understanding with Saiyid Sa'id was reached; but from the first there was no chance of an agreement with the Egyptians, who, before the season fixed for British action arrived in the autumn of 1819, had withdrawn entirely from their acquisitions in Hasa and partially even from Najd. Dr. Jukes was sent on a special mission to the Persian Governor of Fārs to reassure him as to the objects of the British expedition, and suitable explanations were also offered to the Shāh of Persia through the British Envoy at Tehrān.

Operations for the expedition, 1819-20.

The British armament, which left India at the beginning of November 1819 and was under the command and political control of General Sir W. Grant Keir, consisted of three vessels of the Royal Navy, six of the East India Company's marine, and a land force of over 3,000 men, including a company of European artillery, the 47th and 65th Foot, and a battalion and some details of native Indian infantry; and it was joined before Rās-al-Khaimah by the Sultān of 'Omān with two ships and 600 men. An 'Omāni army also marched by land to the scene of

operations, but arrived too late to be of service. Lieutenant Bruce, the British Resident at Būshehr, was attached to General Grant Keir's staff as his political adviser. A landing was made on the 3rd December 1819 and on the 9th the town was occupied without resistance, after a short siege in which the artillery played the principal part. The enemy suffered heavily in the fighting; but the British losses were, by comparison, very slight. The hill fort of Dhāyah near Rams was taken on the 22nd December, when nearly 400 fighting men laid down their arms and became prisoners of war; and serious operations were then at an end. In January 1820 a fort having been constructed and a British garrison established at Rās-al-Khaimah, the other ports of the Pirate Coast were visited, and a clean sweep was made of their military defences and of their larger war vessels. A squadron also repaired to Bahrain and obtained the surrender and destruction of several piratical craft which had found refuge there; and similar measures were taken at Lingeh, Mughu, 'Asalu and Kangūn upon the Persian side.

Settlement with the Qawāsim and General Treaty of Peace, 1820.

These decisive proceedings quickly resulted in the submission of all the Arab chiefs of the Pirate Coast; and on the 8th January 1820 a General Treaty of Peace was framed, to which on various dates they severally became parties, and to which the Āthi Shaikhs of Bahrain also adhered. By this Treaty the Arab signatories bound themselves and their subjects to abstain for the future from "plunder and piracy" as distinguished from lawful and open warfare, by sea; and various arrangements were prescribed for ensuring a strict observance by them of their new obligations, among these being the adoption by the tribe of a common distinctive flag, and the institution of a system of ships' papers for purposes of identification. The Treaty also contained articles directed against the inhuman practice, hitherto common, of butchering prisoners of war, and against the slave trade. It was clearly recognised, however, at least by the commander of the British expedition, that security in the future would depend less upon the paper engagements subscribed by the Qawāsim and other tribes than upon the ability and alacrity of the British Government to punish violations of the same. The policy involved in this view having fortunately been accepted by the British authorities in India, who never again allowed a piratical proceeding in the Persian Gulf to pass without instant notice and punishment, the old régime of lawlessness and violence at once became obsolete; but for some years vigilance and occasional action continued to be required in order to prevents its return.

The Sultān of 'Omān did not neglect the opportunity afforded by his close association with the British in the expedition of 1819-20 to reassert * his claims to suzerainty over the Bahrain Islands; and the Āl Khalīfah joint Shaikhs of that principality, though the British authorities were careful to avoid even the appearance of supporting Saiyid Sa'īd's pretensions, were eventually intimidated by him into sending a representative to Masqat, through whom they promised an annual tribute of $30,000. The Persian Government of Fārs, on whose support the Saiyid had hitherto leaned in his enterprises against Bahrain, were much chagrined by this settlement, in which they had no part.

Submission of the Shaikhs of Bahrain to the Sultān of 'Omān, 1820.

Period of special precautions against piracy immediately following the expedition, 1820-23.

It had for some years been regarded as desirable that the British Government should possess a permanent base of action in the Persian Gulf. This project was first raised in connection with the question of trade and the supposed designs of European powers in Persia; but, with the rise of piracy, greater stress came to be laid upon its military advantages in relation to the smaller and more turbulent of the Gulf powers. In 1801 an ineffectual effort † was made, as we have seen, to obtain the cession of some islands by Persia, which would have made the realisation of the scheme possible; in 1808-09, the seizure of Khārag was contemplated, and all but carried into execution, by the Government of India; and the commanders of the expedition of 1809-10, against the Qawāsim were ordered ‡ to select a suitable island for a British settle-

Presence of a British military garrison in the Persian Gulf, 1820-22.

* *Vide* page 193 and page 195 *ante*.

† *Vide* page 175 *ante*.

‡ The orders on this point, in 1809, were worded as follows:—

"The Governor in Council would also be happy to be favoured with your opinion in respect to the most eligible island in the vicinity of the Jasaaree ports which it would be advisable for us to occupy as a maritime station or Residency in preference to Muscat, with the view of more effectually commanding the entrance of the Gulph and checking the future depredations of the pirates, accompanied by your sentiments in respect to the force that may be necessary to maintain [the] possession not only against the native powers in the Gulph but also with reference to such European force as (may) occasionally visit that quarter, and which it is not to be supposed will ever exceed two French frigates at the utmost, so long as we maintain our maritime superiority. The removal of the Residency from Muscat is the more desirable from the lamentable casualties that have occurred at that insalubrious station, at which perhaps every object we have in view would be attainable through the agency of the native broker, controlled by the presence of the Resident at a vicinal port."

ment, but no action appears to have been taken by them on this part of their instructions. The project of a British "central station" in the Persian Gulf, which might ultimately supersede for all purposes, the East India Company's settlements at Būshehr and even Basrah, was revived in connection with the expedition of 1819-20; and General Sir W. Grant Keir, at his departure from India, was instructed to report on the question with especial reference to the islands of Qishm and Hanjām. In the end, as Rās-al-Khaimah, where arrangements were at first made for installing the permanent British garrison, was found to be unsuitable, the General recommended the transfer of the troops to Qishm; but he deprecated the immediate removal, which had been suggested, of the British Political Residency in the Persian Gulf to the same place. Advantage was accordingly taken of a claim asserted by the Sultān of 'Omān to possession of Qishm in his own right—and not as a leaseholder under the Persian crown, which he was in the case of Bandar 'Abbās,—to obtain from him written permission to occupy that island; and in July 1820 the British detachment left at Rās-al-Khaimah was transferred to Qishm town. The new station, however, proved intolerably hot and unhealthy; and, after Dairistān and Sahgh on the south coast of the island had been tried and found unsuitable, the garrison, early in 1822, was established at Bāsidu.

The occupation of Qishm provoked, as seems to have been foreseen, extreme resentment on the part of the Persian Government, who absolutely denied the title of the Sultān of 'Omān to independent sovereignty over Qishm, and who even, by way of rejoinder, claimed the Sultān's dominions in Arabia as an appendage of Persia. Dr. Jukes, who was sent to Shirāz in the summer of 1821 to explain matters, seems to have succeeded in reconciling the Persian Governor of Fārs to the accomplished fact of the British occupation of Qishm; but no argument which the British representative at Tehrān could adduce had any effect on the mind of the Shāh or his ministers; and they continued to demand, as they had done from the first, the withdrawal of the British detachment. Eventually the authorities in India arrived at the conclusion that it would be better to evacuate the island than to be constantly at issue with Persia in regard to it; but a sudden rupture of relations between the Persian monarch and the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān, which occurred in the spring of 1822, made it inexpedient to appear to comply with the wishes of the Persian Government until the end of that year or the beginning of 1823. Then at length the Qishm detachment, which really served no useful purpose, was removed to India.

Two British expeditions against the Bani Bu' Ali inTribe of the 'Omān Sultanate, 1820-21.

A small but serious and unnecessary war which took place in 1820-21 served to illustrate one of the dangers attendant on the presence of a moveable British force in the Gulf under the orders of a political officer with large discretionary powers. The Bani Bū 'Ali of the Ja'alān district in 'Omān, who were at the time in rebellion against the Sultān, having murdered a messenger sent by Captain Thompson, the British political representative and military commander on Qishm, to interview them in regard to a case of piracy, that officer was induced to make common cause with Saiyid Sa'id, and joined him, with a force of about 400 Indian sepoys, in an attack upon the Bani Bū 'Ali capital, situated in the interior behind the port of Sūr. The result was a grave disaster in which the small British force was practically destroyed, along with its officers, and the Sultān's levies were either dispersed or cut up, and from which Captain Thompson himself and Saiyid Sa'id were fortunate in escaping with their lives.

The Government of Bombay, as soon as they became aware of the facts, removed Captain Thompson from his appointment; but at the same time, thinking it necessary to vindicate the military reputation of Britain in 'Omān, they despatched an expedition to Sūr under General L. Smith, who had had previous experience of Arab warfare at Rās-al-Khaimah in 1809-10. The military force, which consisted of about 1,300 Europeans, drawn from the Bombay Artillery, His Majesty's 65th Foot, and the Bombay European Regiment, and of over 1,500 native sepoys, arrived in 'Omān at the end of January 1821 and advanced in February on the head-quarters of the Bani Bū 'Ali, where, on the 2nd March, a bloody engagement was fought upon the very scene of the previous encounter. The British casualties in killed and wounded were nearly 200, but the loss of the enemy amounted to considerably more than that number in killed alone; and the result was the complete submission of the tribe, a number of whom were temporarily deported to India.

Rupture of British relations with the Pāsha of Baghdād, 1820-22.

While the British were thus engaged, in the lower Persian Gulf and Gulf of 'Omān, in making secure the pacificatory results of the expedition of 1819-20, a crisis occurred in Turkish 'Irāq which, but for the personal influence of Mr. Rich, the Resident at Baghdād, might have had serious consequences. The cause was the arrogant behaviour of the Pāsha of Baghdād, who persisted in disregarding the treaty rights and privileges of British subjects in the Pāshāliq, and who ultimately presumed so far as to levy double the legitimate duties upon British trade. In 1820, in consequence of his arbitrary proceedings, the British Factory

at Basrah was temporarily transferred to Muhammareh; and in the spring of 1821 the Residency at Baghdâd was for a short time besieged by Turkish troops with the apparent purpose of intimidating the Resident, or even of seizing his person. Mr. Rich was able, however, by firm and judicious action, to extricate himself from his dangerous situation at Baghdâd, and retired *viâ* Basrah to Persia, where he remained until his death from cholera in the autumn of the year. A demand for satisfaction and for the removal of grievances was enforced by Mr. Rich's successor, Captain Taylor, under instructions from the Indian Government, by a transfer of the whole British political establishment from Turkish 'Irâq to Kuwait, where it remained from the end of 1821 until April 1822. The settlement secured by these means was such as effectually to safeguard British interests in the Pâshâliq, and in 1823 a document in which it was formally recorded in detail was obtained by Captain Taylor from the Pâsha.

Complaints by the Persian Government against the British Resident at Bûshehr, unauthorised agreement executed by the latter, and his removal from office, 1820-22.

Simultaneously with these difficulties in Turkish 'Irâq, trouble arose between the Persian Government and the British Resident, Lieutenant Bruce, at Bûshehr: it was due to the success of the Sultân of 'Omân in extorting an admission of dependence from the Shaikhs of Bahrain, which the Persians wrongly attributed to the exercise of influence by Lieutenant Bruce during a visit paid by him to Bahrain in the course of the expedition against the Qawâsim. Lieutenant Bruce was able to clear himself, to the satisfaction of the British authorities, of the various charges upon which the Persian Government demanded his recall, and it was decided to maintain him in office without regard to their complaints; but in 1822, after his return to Persia from a visit to Bombay, he allowed himself to be drawn by the Shîrâz Government, possibly from a hope of conciliating them, into executing a foolish and unauthorised agreement which had to be repudiated by the Government of Bombay, and which necessitated his own removal from Bûshehr. This invalid agreement, more fully noticed in the histories of the Persian Coast and Bahrain, dealt in a manner contrary to the established British policy, and most unfavourable to British interests, with questions such as the political status of Bahrain, claims for compensation arising out of the British expedition of 1819-20, etc.; and it would have committed the Government of India to assisting the Persian authorities, on their demanding it in certain circumstances, with a naval force.

Naval measures adopted by the British

On the evacuation of Qishm by the British detachment for a time stationed there, recourse was had to purely naval precautions against a

revival of piracy. The essential feature of the new system was continuous cruising off the Pirate Coast by three or four vessels of the East India Company's marine, of which six in all were now allotted to the service of the Gulf. It was ordered that, in cases of piracy committed by denizens of the Persian coast, direct action should not be taken in future by British political or naval officers, but that application should be made to the Persian local authorities, or in case of need to the Persian Government, who since the punishment of the Qawāsim had professed themselves able and willing to deal effectually with such offences when committed by their own subjects. Masqat was at first the place of rendezvous of the Indian Government vessels employed in, or visiting, the Gulf; but it was found too distant from the principal field of British naval activity to be convenient, and a resolution was taken to substitute Mughu, where a depôt of stores would be located and a native political agent appointed. The Mughu arrangement possibly came into force for a short time; but in the autumn of 1823, on account of apprehended objections on the part of the Persian Government, Bāsidu on the island of Qishm was adopted instead as the British naval base in the Persian Gulf.

for the preservation of order at sea, 1822-23.

On the withdrawal of the British detachment and its commanding officer from Qishm, the political supervision of the whole Persian Gulf on the part of the Indian Government devolved on the British Resident at Būshehr; and special instructions were given to Lieutenant McLeod, the successor of Captain Bruce, as to the manner in which his duties as Resident, particularly under the General Treaty of Peace of 1820, should be performed. It fell to him to explain the requirements of the Treaty, which were not so well known or understood as might have been expected, to the signatories; to give effect, so far as possible, to certain of its provisions—such as that rendering obligatory the use of a distinctive flag—which had been neglected; and to make it evident that the withdrawal of the British military garrison hitherto maintained in the Gulf did not proceed from any loss of interest on the part of Government in the maintenance of security at sea. He was also directed to establish personal touch with the various Shaikhs of the Arab coast, to investigate closely the political conditions prevailing, and to make arrangements for obtaining regular information of passing events. These tasks were admirably discharged by Lieutenant McLeod, who in January 1823 made a voyage—almost of discovery—along the Arabian littoral, visiting the chief ports of the Pirate Coast, Qatar and Bahrain,

Special instructions to the Resident in the Persian Gulf and tour by him on the Arabian coast, 1823.

and who, in a full and able report, explained for the first time the working of local politics. Various questions of the interpretation of the settlement of 1820 were raised by Lieutenant McLeod as a result of his tour, and were at once decided by Government; and political business may be said to have fallen about this time, or shortly after, into the general course which it has since followed. A Native Agent of the Būshehr Residency seems to have been installed at Shārjah in 1823, being transferred thither on Lieutenant McLeod's recommendation from Qatīf, where he had previously been posted.

Period of the progressive establishment of good order at sea, 1824-36.

Later history of piracy, 1824-35.

Piratical offences were still, after this, occasionally committed; but, as a rule, such mishaps as occurred affected native vessels only, and so belonged to a class of which, before the expedition of 1819-20, it had not been customary to take account at all. Few of the later cases are of sufficient importance to merit separate notice; and a number of them, though not justifiable as acts of regular warfare, were the less blameworthy in that they were committed by crews which political disturbances, not greed of plunder, had induced to put to sea. There were, moreover, scarcely any of a serious character in which the culprits escaped punishment altogether.

In 1827 some tribesmen of Qatar and Bahrain perpetrated a piracy, accompanied by murder, upon a Būshehr vessel bound for Dīlam, which they stopped off Ganāveh; but the ringleader in the affair, having been captured in the following year upon the Persian coast, was handed over to the British Resident. After he had been transferred to the keeping of the Shaikh of Būshehr, however, he unfortunately escaped from custody during a political revolution. Another heinous offence was one committed in 1828 by a Rās-al-Khaimah Batīl upon a Sohār boat, in which the crew of the latter, fourteen in number, were drowned by being thrown overboard and the boat herself was sunk after being plundered: in this instance the Shaikh of the Qawāsim was obliged by the British political authorities to arrest and punish the criminals—one of whom he even caused to be put to death, to deliver up the piratical vessels for

destruction, and to restore as much of the stolen property as could be recovered. The only crime against a British vessel was the unceremonious boarding of the "Sunbury" in 1829 at Shārjah, to the Shaikh of which place her cargo had been sold; but it was expiated, though due in part to a misunderstanding, by the burning of a boat implicated and the flogging of a conspicuous offender under orders from the Shaikh. In 1831 the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, who was then at war with the inhabitants of Sohār, began to raid indiscriminately vessels from all places in the 'Omān Sultanate and captured more than a dozen which did not belong to Sohār; but in 1832 he was called to account by a British naval force which visited his port and obliged him to make full reparation to the sufferers by his wrongful seizures. In 1834 the British squadron in the Persian Gulf was reduced to two vessels; and, partly no doubt for this reason, but partly also in consequence of the passionate excitement aroused by a bitter struggle in 1833-34 between Shārjah, the greatest of the Pirate Coast Shaikhdoms, and Abu Dhabi, the next in strength, the hitherto blameless Bani Yās tribe of the last mentioned principality betook themselves to piracy. After committing a series of atrocious massacres and robberies at sea, the Bani Yās proclaimed their intention of trying conclusions with the slender naval force maintained by the East India Company in the Persian Gulf; but the British were equally eager, and with better reason, for the encounter; and on the 16th April 1835 the Company's sloop-of-war "Elphinstone" engaged and utterly defeated a piratical Yāsi fleet of six vessels, severely damaging two, and rescuing a large Persian ship which they had recently taken. The humiliation of the tribe was so extreme that they agreed, without further coercion, to a most stringent settlement under which they surrendered fifteen captured vessels and a considerable amount of cargo, paid up $10,000 as compensation in cash, and gave ample security for the payment of an additional sum of $1,600. They also released all the prisoners that they had taken, and delivered up two of their own number who had been ringleaders in the recent outrages, one of whom was afterwards convicted of piracy at Bombay and sentenced to transportation for life. Several piracies were committed in 1834-35 by the Bani Yās of Dibai, as well as by those of Abu Dhabi; but in these cases also satisfaction was rigorously exacted.

The stern punishment inflicted on the pirates in 1835 may be regarded as the death-blow to piracy in the Persian Gulf, for it never again showed itself there in any formidable shape.

History of the pirate Rahmah-bin Jabir, and his proceedings 1824-25.

No account of events in the Persian Gulf at this period would be complete which did not mention the 'Athbi freebooter Rahmah-bin-Jábir, an extraordinary and desperate character to whom more than one reference has already been made. He narrowly escaped punishment as a pirate, as we have seen before, during the British expedition of 1809-10, against the Qawásim. At that time, and for several years afterwards he was closely associated with the Wahhábis; but his ruling motive was enmity towards the Ál Khalífah Shaikhs of Bahrain; and, when in 1816 the Sultán of 'Omán prepared to attack Bahrain and the Wahhábis took the part of the Ál Khalífah, Rahmah broke with his former allies and connected himself with the 'Omani ruler. The Wahhábis in consequence, in the same year, expelled him from his principal fort of Dammám on the coast of Hasa and obliged him to retire to Búshehr, where he remained under Persian protection until 1818. He then returned to Hasa to help the Egyptians in their operations against the Wahhábis, and was rewarded by the latter, when victorious, by being replaced in possession of Dammám. In 1819 Rahmah was expected, both as a political ally of the Sultán of 'Omán and as an enemy of the Wahhabite Qawásim, to assist the British expedition which sailed in that year against Rás-al-Khaimah; but instead of doing so he proceeded, early in 1820, to join the Persian Governor of Fárs in an abortive scheme of forestalling the designs of the Sultán of 'Omán upon Bahrain by means of a Persian descent on those islands. An order for the destruction of Rahmah's vessels was then passed by the commander of the British expedition, but was recalled on the ground of his being a dependent of Persia; and in April 1820 he declined, on the plea of his connection with Persia, an offer of admittance as a party to the General Treaty of Peace between the British Government and the Arab chiefs of the Gulf. In 1822 the Ál Khalífah of Bahrain and Rahmah-bin-Jábir submitted their differences to the arbitration of the British political representatives in the Persian Gulf, and, after ineffectual attempts to reconcile them had been made by Lieutenant-Colonel Kennett and Lieutenant McLeod, a settlement was at last arranged by Colonel Stannus in February 1824. Rahmah then turned his attention to the port of Qatif, blockading it and attacking its shipping in order to compel the inhabitants to pay him tribute, or rather blackmail; and these proceedings he continued into the year 1825, disregarding the remonstrances and even the threats of the British political officers, by whom they were regarded as savouring more of piracy than of regular warfare. A new quarrel having broken out at

this juncture between Rahmah and the Āl Khalīfah, and the British Resident having declined to intervene except on a condition—to which Rahmah would not agree—that the people of Qatīf should be included in any peace arranged, hostilities were resumed and ended with the destruction of Rahmah and his vessel in a set combat with a ship commanded by one of the Āl Khalīfah. In his closing years Rahmah was rather a petty territorial ruler, with head-quarters at Dammām, than a pirate; and he had always carefully abstained from offences against the British Government and British subjects; but his death none the less conduced to the establishment of a more settled state of affairs in the Persian Gulf.

Revival of Wahhābi influence in the Persian Gulf, 1824-33.

On the withdrawal, in or about 1824, of the last of the Egyptian garrisons from Najd, the power of the Wahhābis and their influence in Persian Gulf affairs began to revive; but their name no longer inspired an almost superstitious terror as formerly, and their policy and aims now resembled very closely those of ordinary mundane states. In 1825 the Shaikh of Shārjah professed to be seriously alarmed by the progress of the Wahhābis and sought British support; but it was not until 1830, when, after a contest with the Banī Khālid lasting about six years, the Wahhābis recovered possession of Hasa, that they became once more an important factor in the Persian Gulf. At the end of 1830 a threatened combination between them and the Sultān of 'Omān so alarmed the Shaikhs of Bahrain that, after vainly soliciting help from the British Government, they made submission to the Wahhābi Amīr and undertook to pay him tribute in future; and there was much excitement upon the Pirate Coast, where the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain openly professed themselves partisans of the Wahhābis, but these latter did not make any immediate attempt to profit by the situation. Friendly advances, which reflected his moderate and civilised character, were made by the Wahhābi Amīr Turki-bin-'Abdullah to the Bombay Government in 1831; and, though no treaty was concluded in accordance with his suggestions, he did not fail to receive a courteous answer to his communication. In 1833 the Sultān of 'Omān, having failed to enlist the active co-operation of the British in resisting the encroachments of the Wahhābis upon his dominions, followed the example of the Bahrain Shaikhs by becoming tributary to the Wahhābi Amīr, with whom he also entered into a compact for mutual aid against rebellious subjects; and in 1834 the Wahhābi representative at Baraimi interfered in a struggle which was in progress between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi, the two

leading chiefs of the Pirate Coast. Simultaneously, however, there was a decrease of Wahhābi prestige in the direction of Baḥrain, the Shaikh of which principality in 1833 repudiated his allegiance to the Wahhābi Amīr and in 1834 wrested from him the island of Tārūt and blockaded the ports of the Hasa coast.

Difficulty between the Sulṭān of 'Omān and the Pāsha of Baghdād, 1825-26.

At the beginning of the period of Wahhābi revival, a difficulty occurred between the Sultān of 'Omān and the Pāsha of Baghdād: the cause was a subsidy, claimed by the Sultān as having been granted to his grandfather for helping the Turks to defend Basrah against the Persians in 1775-76, which was withheld by the Pāsha. A naval blockade of Basrah, contemplated in 1825, was actually enforced by Saiyid Sa'īd in 1826; and the Pāsha, who had at first denied the claim, and who had refused British mediation, found himself obliged to comply with the 'Omāni ruler's demands and to pay up considerable arrears of the subsidy which were due.

Application by the Pāsha of Baghdād to the British authorities for military assistance, 1827-28.

In 1827 the Pāsha of Baghdād, having been directed by the Porte (in consequence of the danger to the Turkish Empire from Russia) to organise an efficient army in Turkish 'Irāq, had recourse to the British authorities in India, from whom he requested help in the form of a loan of British officers and non-commissioned officers to act as instructors and as superintendents of technical departments, a supply of arms and military stores, and three war vessels of considerable size. The conditions which he proposed were such that the Government of India would not, if they complied, be involved in any expense. The application of the Pāsha was strongly supported by the Government of Bombay, but it was rejected by the Government of India, partly on the ground of unsatisfactory relations which they supposed to exist between the British Government and the Porte,—a decision greatly regretted by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, who thought that the opportunity, except in so far as the Pāsha's request related to naval matters, ought certainly not to have been neglected. The advantages which they considered had been foregone by the refusal of the Government of India were the establishment of British influence in Turkish 'Irāq and the acquisition of a coign of vantage from which the proceedings of Russia in the Middle East might have been carefully watched. The Pasha did not, as the Directors hoped that he might, renew his proposals.

Disturbance in the Persian Coast, insults

While the Wahhābis were endeavouring to re-establish their position upon the western coasts of the Persian Gulf, the Persian government, favoured by hostilities between the Sultān of 'Omān and the ruling Arab

family of Būshehr and by dissensions among the members of that family, were exerting themselves, not entirely without success, to obtain direct administrative control of the town of Būshehr and its dependencies.

to the British Residency at Būshehr, and proceedings of the Sultan of 'Omān, 1826-32.

In September 1826 the Shaikh of Būshehr was captured at sea by the Sultān of 'Omān, who kept him a prisoner at Masqat until May 1827; and during the Shaikh's detention a conflict took place among the members of his family for the Governorship of Būshehr. An accidental consequence of this broil was an insult to the British Resident, who had attempted to mediate among the Shaikh's relations. The Residency was withdrawn for a short time from the town of Būshehr to a place in the neighbourhood; but, on reparation being promised by the Persian Governor of Fārs, it was immediately re-established; and in 1827 a Persian official was deputed by the Shāh from Tehrān to inquire into and redress the grievances of the British political representative.

About the end of 1828 Timūr Mirza, a son of the Prince Governor of Fārs, was appointed Governor of Būshehr in supersession of the hereditary Shaikh and called upon the Sultān of 'Omān, who had recently married his sister, to help him in establishing his authority. In 1830 the Shaikh was restored to his former position by the Persian Government, and Saiyid Sa'id had then to be restrained by the British authorities from affording active assistance to Timūr Mirza, who was apparently disposed to resist the orders displacing him. In 1832, however, Riza Quli Mirza, a brother of Timūr Mirza, was sent by his father to assume direct control of Būshehr; and a naval demonstration subsequently made against the town by the Qāsimi Shaikh in the interests of the Shaikh of Būshehr was stultified by the action of the British Resident, who compelled the Qawāsim, by threats of force, to withdraw. Early in 1833 the Persian princeling was obliged to quit Būshehr by a rising against him, headed by one Jamāl Khān of Būshehr and the hereditary chiefs of Tangistān and Dashtistan; but later in the year, the insurrectionary combination having broken up, the royalists repossessed themselves of the town without serious difficulty. The influence of the British Resident was exerted, throughout this contest, to prevent the commission of excesses; and a practical appreciation of the value of British support was shown by both sides,—by the Shaikh of Būshehr, who in 1828 made overtures for British protection, and by the Persian Governor of Fārs, who in 1832 advanced an absurd argument, with reference to the Qāsimi demonstration against Būshehr, that it was the duty of the British Government "under treaty with Persia" to protect the Persian Coast against maritime attacks by whomsoever made.

Attack by the Sultān of 'Omān upon Bahrain and resulting disturbances at sea in the Persian Gulf, 1828-29.

In the autumn of 1828 the Sultān of 'Omān, unassisted on this occasion either by the Wahhābis or by the Persians, but accompanied by a contingent of Banī Yās from Abu Dhabi, made a serious attempt to reduce the Shaikhs of Bahrain, who had long since repudiated the position of dependence on Masqat accepted by them in 1820. The Āl Khalīfah, however, presented a firm front to Saiyid Sa'īd's attack and repulsed it with a loss to the invaders, among whom the Banī Yās were afterwards alleged to have acted treacherously towards their allies, of two vessels and about 500 men.

The extent to which the powers of the Persian Gulf now depended upon British protection against one another in maritime matters was illustrated by a complaint which the senior Shaikh of Bahrain, as a party to the General Treaty of Peace, immediately brought against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who was also a signatory, in respect of the Sultān of 'Omān's descent upon Bahrain. He was informed in reply that the incident must be regarded as one of legitimate warfare and therefore as not coming within the scope of the Treaty; and the result was the equipment by him of a fleet for the purpose of making reprisals upon the Sultān of 'Omān. As was common in such circumstances, whether from excitement or through mistake, actions practically indistinguishable from piracy followed, the principal being the plundering and sinking of a neutral Murbāt vessel by the 'Atbi squadron; and it became necessary for the Resident to enforce, by means of armed demonstration, the payment of partial compensation by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the sufferers in the case of the Murbāt vessel. In 1829, not without pressure applied to the Shaikhs of Bahrain by the British Resident, a reconciliation took place between them and the Sultān of 'Omān, of which a principal condition was the recognition by Saiyid Sa'īd of the independence of Bahrain.

Rebellion in Qatar against the authority of the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1835.

Another event by which the security of the Gulf was considerably endangered occurred in 1835, when the people of Huwailah in Qatar, then a dependency of Bahrain, rebelled and joined with some disaffected members of the Bahrain ruling family and a number of Wahhābi subjects in committing maritime irregularities. The immediate consequence was the secession of a body of Āl Bin 'Alī and Āl Bū 'Ainain tribesmen, under a daring and energetic leader named 'Īsa-bin-Tarif, to Abu Dhabi where they came for the time being, under the restrictions of the General Treaty of Peace.

The first Maritime Truce, 1835, and Restric-

The General Treaty of Peace of 1820, while it prohibited "plunder and piracy" at sea, was no bar to regular naval hostilities and it was

therefore inadequate—in a region where warfare between petty Arab states was frequent, and where, as many examples showed, fighting of any kind was apt to give rise to piratical practices affecting neutrals—to ensure the maintenance of security at sea in a full and proper degree. The disadvantages of a system of mutual rapine was quickly perceived by the more intelligent among the signatories of the Treaty as soon as under its provisions they began to enjoy, in however limited a degree, the blessings of peace; and a desire sprang up, on the part of some of them, for further restrictions upon the use of force. When maritime war prevailed in the summer months, it was apt to disturb, and even to prevent, those pearl diving operations which were the principal resource of all the sea-faring Arab tribes; and it was clear that, if hostilities could be confined to the pearlers' off-season, the change would be a notable boon to all, even to the combatants. Accordingly in 1835, immediately after the final outbreak of piracy among the Bani Yās, the question was taken up by Captain Hennell, the Resident at Būshehr; and he ultimately succeeded in arranging a Maritime Truce, to be observed by the leading Shaikhs of the Pirate Coast and their subjects, from the 21st May to the 21st November of that year. The Truce was received with acclamation by all of those whom it principally concerned. It proved to be the first of a series of Truces, the enforcement of which, together with that of the General Treaty against piracy, in the end brought about a state of perfect maritime security in the Persian Gulf; and from the year 1835 the tract hitherto described as the "Pirate Coast" may legitimately, and even more appropriately, be referred to as "Trucial 'Omān." tive Line, 1836.

In 1836 an additional limitation was imposed by the British authorities, without treaty, upon hostile operations at sea, which the Arab tribes were required to conduct for the future, at such times as no Truce existed, exclusively in certain defined waters adjoining their own coasts. Notwithstanding an opinion expressed by the Court of Directors of the East India Company so lately as 1834, that it could be inexpedient to assume that general protectorate over the Arab tribes "which would be implied in our prohibiting wars and becoming the arbitrators of all their disputes," the chiefs adhering to the Truce were given to understand that infringements of the same should be reported to the British political authorities, by whom they would be punished in the same manner as acts of piracy had hitherto been; but the success of the measure justified the departure, if such it were, from the established policy of the Company.

British enterprise in Turkish 'Irâq, 1834-36.

The development of Turkish 'Irâq seems to have become, about this time, an object of concern to the British Government. Their motives in the matter appear to have been partly economic, but partly also political. They were anxious to discover the best line for postal communication with India, and this they seem to have supposed might be afforded by the Persian Gulf and the great water-ways of Mesopotamia, rather than by the Red Sea and the Egyptian overland route; but it is probable that they were also influenced by considerations connected with the apprehended competition of Russia for political influence in the Middle East. A report on the administrative and economic position in Turkish 'Irâq was submitted to the British Government at the end of 1834 by the traveller Mr. J. B. Fraser, who had been commissioned by them to investigate it upon the spot. Early in 1835 an expedition under Colonel F. R. Chesney, R.A., left England for Turkish Arabia to make an experiment, for which the permission of the Porte had been obtained, and for which the British Parliament had granted £20,000 and the East India Company £5,000, in the direction of introducing steam navigation upon the Euphrates. Two river steamers were launched upon the upper Euphrates in the course of 1835-36; but one of them, the "Tigris," was unfortunately lost in a storm within a few weeks after her completion. The remaining vessel, the "Euphrates" navigated on the rivers Euphrates, Shatt-al-'Arab and Tigris, of which surveys were made, during the rest of the year; but in December the expedition was broken up, and the "Euphrates" was then transferred on a valuation from the British Government to the East India Company. The experiment, in so far as it related to the establishment of rapid and certain communication between England and India, cannot be described as a success; and in 1837 the Red Sea route, which was better suited for the conveyance of passengers and goods, was officially adopted.

British Trade in the Persian Gulf, 1810-36.

In regard to commerce, the period with which we are now concerned was chiefly remarkable in the Persian Gulf for the cessation of the trade hitherto carried on by the servants of the East India Company for the Company's benefit, as well as of that in which they had hitherto been permitted to engage on their own account. Restrictions upon private

trade by the Company's servants are first mentioned in connection with the Residency at Masqat, where such trade was forbidden as early as 1805, and where the prohibition was expressly renewed in 1809 on the appointment of a new Resident; but it was not, apparently until 1822 that an order for the discontinuance of private trade by "Political officers of all ranks and descriptions" was issued and became applicable to the Būshehr Residency, where it had up to this time been permitted. A reasonable time was allowed to the officer affected by the new order for closing their business transactions, and the official salaries of some of those affected by the change were increased by way of compensation. The trade monopoly of the East India Company in their corporate capacity was abolished, in its application to India and the countries immediately dependent thereon, in 1813; and, from a quotation in official correspondence, it would seem that the trade of the Persian Gulf had then already been thrown open to all by a Resolution of the Bombay Government dated 2nd July 1811. Some business continued, however, to be conducted in the name of the Company until 1819, when it was reported that sales of their goods were made periodically—instead of day by day, as formerly—at the Būshehr Residency. After 1819 there are no references to the East India Company's trade, and it seems probable that it came to an end with the private trade of their servants, after the closing of which the company must frequently have been represented by officers without mercantile knowledge or experience.

British establishments and official organisation in the Persian Gulf, 1810-36.

At the beginning of 1810 four separate and independent political Residencies were maintained by the Government of India at Baghdād, Basrah, Būshehr and Masqat, of which those in Turkish 'Irāq and Persia had been since 1806, and that at Masqat from an earlier date, entirely subordinate to the Government of Bombay. The Residency at Masqat, however, was vacant at this time, through the recent death of an incumbent. All business of a character in any sense local to the Gulf, such as the expedition against the Qawāsim in 1809-10, was as yet left to the handling of the Bombay Government.

Absorption of the Masqat Residency into that of Bûshehr, and of the Baghdâd Residency into that of Basrah.

The question of a reduction of the British political establishments in the Gulf came under consideration in 1809-10 in consequence of the cessation of danger from France; and it was resolved by the Government of India that their political representation in the Gulf region should ultimately, if it were found possible, be concentrated in one Residency; but the desired reduction was obviously too considerable, notwithstanding the supposed extirpation of piracy by the late expedition against the Qawâsim, to be effected all at once. In January 1810 General Malcolm, then starting on his third mission to Persia, recommended that the Residency at Masqat should be abolished, the representation of British interest in the 'Oman Sultanate and on the Arab coast generally being entrusted thereafter to the Resident at Bûshehr, who should be furnished with such assistance as would enable him to undertake the work thus imposed on him in addition to his former duties. The suggestion seems to have been accepted at once by the Government of India; and Mr. Hankey Smith, Resident at Bûshehr, who accompanied General Malcolm on the voyage from Bombay to the Gulf, was ordered to take Masqat under his charge and was provided with two Assistants, Messrs. Babington and Williams of the Civil Service, in addition to his existing Assistant (Lieutenant Bruce) at Bûshehr; but he was not employed, as had been proposed by General Malcolm, to negotiate with the Arab tribes on the conclusion of the anti-piratical expedition then in progress, the reason, however, probably being that the necessity for a regular settlement with the tribes was not as yet properly appreciated. On the 1st May 1810 Mr. H. Smith informed the Government of Bombay that "the pernicious effect of the climate of Maskat obliged him to resign all further charge of the duties of that station," at which—it may perhaps be inferred—he had been instructed to reside; but Government, in permitting him to relinquish it, directed his Assistants Messrs. Babington and Williams to remain at Bûshehr, and exhorted them to qualify themselves..." for future employment in the Gulph by acquiring a thorough and practical knowledge both of Persian and Arabic." Meanwhile search was to be made for a station more healthy than Masqat from which the affairs of 'Oman might be supervised. The horror in which Masqat was held at this time by the East India Company's servants is not difficult to understand if it is remembered that the climate had already proved fatal to all the four Residents who had held office there since the foundation of the Residency in 1800. On Mr. H. Smith's withdrawal to Bûshehr, where he remained as Resident for about a year longer, British concerns in 'Oman were probably left to the care of a Native Agent, as formerly.

Meanwhile the Residency at Baghdād, instituted in 1798, was done away with; and the Resident at Basrah became responsible for all political duties in Turkish 'Irāq; but this change, as the remaining Resident made Baghdād his head-quarters, was in effect an abolition rather of the Residency at Basrah, where from this time onwards a European Political Assistant was generally stationed.

Reduction of the status of the Bushehr Residency, 1811.

On the 29th March 1811 Mr. H. Smith, who belonged to the Civil Service, resigned the Būshehr Residency; and the question of appointing a successor to him had to be faced. The opinion of the Bombay Government in 1810, in view at first of General Malcolm's presence in Persia on his third mission to the Shāh and later of the appointment of Sir Gore Ouseley to represent the British Government at Tehrān, had been that the Būshehr appointment might be deprived of its political character and reduced to the status of a Commercial Residency, held by an officer on pay lower than that of Mr. Smith. Acting on these principles, they at once cut down the military guard at Būshehr on Mr. Smith's departure and suggested to Lieutenant Bruce, the Assistant who remained there in charge, the propriety of his corresponding with themselves in future instead of with the Government of India,—a hint with which that officer did not, apparently, consider it his duty * to comply. The Government of India, who intended that Lieutenant Bruce † should be appointed to the vacant post on a salary less than that enjoyed by Mr. Smith but greater than that allowable to a purely commercial Resident—for, they pointed out, a number of political functions must still be discharged by the officer at Būshehr—having inculcated the necessity of liberal treatment on the Government of Bombay, the latter, misunderstanding the intention, proposed a scheme for placing the Būshehr Residency "upon a basis of equal efficiency and respectability with the several Political Residencies in India." The Government of India found themselves compelled to protest against some expensive proposals by the Government of Bombay, involving the appointment of a Civil Servant to Būshehr, to which this misconception gave rise, and to combat an analogy which it had been sought to establish between Būshehr and Baghdād, and they continued to urge the

* From this it would appear that the orders of 1806 must have been rescinded, perhaps in consequence of the general powers with which General Malcolm, the Envoy of the Governor-General, was invested on his Second Mission in 1808.

† Lieutenant Bruce had been more than twelve years Assistant at Būshehr and had acted, during a great part of that time, as Resident.

selection of Lieutenant Bruce; but the Government of Bombay, while they consented to reduce the emoluments of the post as proposed by themselves, apparently insisted on conferring it on a Mr. Flower of the Civil Service, remarking: "The orders of the Honourable Court and "the claims of the * Civil Service are a bar to whatever expectations "Mr. Bruce may have formed of being advanced beyond the station of "an assistant at Bushire, and it is only out of consideration to the length "of his services in that capacity that we are restrained from abolishing the "situation of assistant at that Residency." Mr. Flower, however, did not in the end proceed to the Gulf; and the office of Resident at Búshehr appears to have been filled continuously by Lieutenant Bruce from the departure of Mr. Smith in 1811 until his own removal in 1827, during which period he had charge of the British political interests in every part of the Gulf except Turkish 'Iráq. With effect from the 4th July 1812 the Búshehr Residency came under the control of the Bombay Government, to whom the expenses of maintaining it were thereafter debited.

The scale of pay prevailing at this time in the political service in the Persian Gulf appears from the correspondence in this case between the Government of India and the Government of Bombay, and it may be quoted for comparison with the rates in force at the present time. The regular salary of the Resident at Búshehr in his commercial capacity was only Rs. 600 per mensem; but Mr. Smith, as Political and Commercial Resident, drew a salary of Rs. 1,500 a month exclusive of allowances amounting to Rs. 1,200 monthly "for contingencies† and table expenses," to which a supplementary salary of Rs. 500 a month, making Rs. 3,200 in all, was added on the suppression of the Masqat Residency. The expenditure originally proposed by the Bombay Government in 1811 was Rs. 2,950 a month; but it was subsequently reduced to Rs. 2,300, of which Rs. 1,600 represented the salary and personal allowances of the Resident. The emoluments solicited by Mr. Bruce were the salary of a Commercial Resident, or Rs. 600 per mensem, and allowances at the same rate as Mr. Smith's, or Rs. 1,200 per mensem, making Rs. 1,800 a month altogether. The salary of a Political Assistant in the Gulf seems to have been ordinarily Rs. 400 or Rs. 500 a month; and the Assistant at Búshehr was apparently authorised, while the public trade of the Company continued, to charge a commission of two per cent. on Persian produce procured through him.

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* Lieutenant Bruce was an officer of the East India Company's marine.

† These apparently included house rent, servants, etc.

Conversion the Basrah Residency into a Political Agency in Turkish Arabia, 1812.

In 1812 the title of "Resident at Basrah," being no longer in accordance with the facts, was changed to that of "Political Agent in Turkish Arabia," and the holder was authorised to reside either at Baghdád or at Basrah, as he might find advisable, and to station his Assistant at whichever place he did not select for his own head-quarters. The Political Agent, however, who under these orders made his abode at Baghdád, was almost always described as "Resident at Baghdád."

Temporary or nominal reorganisation in 1822.

In May 1822 orders were issued for carrying into effect the long-contemplated economy and reform by which all British concerns in the Persian Gulf and in Turkish 'Irāq were to be brought under the control of a single officer. Mr. Rich, Resident at Baghdád—or, more correctly, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia—having died, Captain Bruce, Resident at Būshehr, was directed to assume charge of the combined Residencies as soon as he should have wound up the commercial business in which, like other political officers of the day, he had been engaged on his own account, but which, under an order applying to the whole Political Department, was prohibited for the future. In consideration of the loss which he must suffer in being thus debarred from trade, his salary, apart from allowances, was raised (probably from Rs. 600) to Rs. 1,200 per mensem, and Captain Taylor, the acting Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, who became his Assistant for affairs in that country, received an increased salary of Rs. 600 a month for the same reason. The new "Political Agent in the Gulf of Persia," as he was styled, was authorised to make either the island of Qishm, where a British military detachment was at the time stationed, or Basrah his head-quarters; and, in case of his removing from Būshehr, as contemplated in his instructions, he was to leave a Native Agent at that port. On the 1st November 1822, however, possibly before the arrangements ordered had come into force, Captain Bruce was removed from his post on account of an unauthorised engagement into which he had recently entered with the Government of Shīrāz, and the amalgamation of the Residencies was countermanded by the Government of Bombay "in consideration of the removal of "our troops from Kishm, and the necessity that will exist for "Lieutenant McLeod's directing his whole attention to the conciliation of the Arab tribes." Political powers were exercised, it should be noted, by the military officer in command of the British military detachment which was maintained on Qishm from 1820 to 1822.

Re-establishment of the

The Political Agency in Turkish Arabia (or "at Basrah," as it was also called) was then re-established, and Captain Taylor was appointed

Political Agency in Turkish Arabia, and its subsequent history, 1822-32.

Agent on a salary of Rs. 800 a month, with a table allowance of Rs. 400 a month which in 1824 was increased to Rs. 1,000. In 1824 the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia was made subordinate in some respects to the Resident at Būshehr, with whose instructions in all matters affecting the maritime Arabs and the Persian Coast he was directed to comply, and whom he was ordered to furnish with copies of all his despatches; but in the affairs of Turkish 'Irāq he retained freedom of action, subject to a proviso that without the sanction of the Resident at Būshehr he should undertake nothing by which British interests in the Gulf generally might be compromised. After 1828 the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia sometimes resided at Baghdād, where political business could be more easily transacted than at Basrah; and from 1832 onwards Baghdād seems to have been his regular head-quarters. The actual expenses of the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia were Rs. 60,068 for the year from 1st February 1828 to 31st January 1829, when it was still located at Basrah; they included the staff and regimental allowances of a European military officer by whom the Residency guard was then commanded, and the allowances of a Civil Surgeon.

History of the Būshehr Residency, 1822-34.

The Būshehr Residency, on account of the conspicuous duties which the Resident had to perform in connection with the repression of piracy, enjoyed at this time much higher prestige and consideration than the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia, which was, as we have seen, in some respects subordinate to it; but the emoluments of the Resident at Būshehr did not differ greatly, on the average from those of the officer at Basrah or Baghdād. For Lieutenant McLeod, who died of fever in 1823 within a year of his appointment, a fixed travelling allowance at the rate of Rs. 500 a month to be drawn by him while absent from head-quarters was sanctioned: the object of this allowance was to encourage active touring by the Resident, especially to the ports of the chiefs who were signatories of the Treaty of 1820. Colonel Stannus, who succeeded Lieutenant McLeod, received a salary of Rs. 1,500 a month and a table allowance of Rs. 600 per mensem; and in November 1831, in consequence of orders from the Court of Directors of the East India Company that the Residency should be conferred upon a Civil Servant, it was given to Mr. Blane, whose personal allowances while holding the appointment aggregated Rs. 2,800 a month. Mr. Blane replaced Dr. McNeill of the Bombay medical establishment apparently the same officer who afterwards rose to the high post of British Minister at Tehrān. The cost of maintenance of the Būshehr Residency from 1st

May 1829 to 30th April 1830 was Rs. 78,524; and at Būshehr at this period, as in Turkish 'Irāq, the Residency guard was commanded by a British officer, and there was a Civil Surgeon. From 1823 to 1834, it should be observed, the office of British Envoy at Tehrān was filled by nominees of the Government of India, not of the British Government,—at first Sir J. Macdonald Kinneir and then Sir J. Campbell; and, perhaps in connection with this change, a scheme was propounded by the Court of Directors in 1834 for diminishing the political expenditure in the Persian Gulf by reducing the status of their officer at Būshehr from that of Resident to that of Assistant to the British Envoy at Tehrān; but the Assistant was to be invested with considerable discretion (besides power to refer, in an emergency, to the Government of Bombay) in matters concerning the Arab powers of the Gulf. The Bombay Government, however, protested strongly against this anomalous arrangement, which they considered must lead to the nomination of officers of insufficient experience to the difficult position of British representative at Būshehr,—a position that was likely to become even more difficult if, as had been proposed by the Governor-General of India, the duty of watching over the maritime peace should hereafter be transferred from the Indian to the Royal Navy; they foresaw no advantage from the Arab tribes being brought under the surveillance, even indirect, of the British Envoy at Tehrān; and they were unwilling to incur the divided responsibility which might be forced upon them by a reference from the officer at Būshehr upon the occurrence of a crisis in Gulf affairs. In deference to their objections, evidently, the project was abandoned.

The idea of establishing a British station on an island in the Gulf, despite the unfortunate experiences of the British detachment on Qishm, was not yet dead. In 1827, doubtless in consequence of the disturbances which had recently occurred at Būshehr, Major Wilson, the Resident, was ordered to visit and report on several places in the Gulf to which the Residency might in case of need be transferred. He recommended Khārag, and his recommendation was supported by the Governor of Bombay, Sir J. Malcolm, who had for nearly twenty years strongly advocated the British occupation of Khārag. A Civil Finance Committee, appointed in 1830 to enquire into the finances of British India, however, condemned the Khārag plan as likely to entail an increase, rather than to facilitate a reduction, of expenditure; and their view was justified by an estimate framed by the Acting Resident in 1831, which showed that, while a saving of half a lakh of rupees a year in civil

expenditure would be compatible with the occupation of Khárag, there would be an inevitable increase in the military budget of two lakhs of rupees annually, exclusive of an initial outlay of one lakh upon buildings and the cost of periodical repairs to the same. The Khárag scheme, therefore, was again quietly laid upon the shelf.

The possibility of an amalgamation of the Búshehr and Basrah or Baghdád appointments, contemplated in 1810 and for a short time realised, or all but realised, in 1822, had meanwhile been kept in view; and the Civil Finance Committee of 1830 pronounced in its favour, and were apparently supported in this, as in the rest of their recommendations, by the Government of India; but the Court of Directors of the East India Company, when the general question of administrative reorganisation in the Persian Gulf finally came before them in 1834, decided that, in view of the political situation in the Middle East, the abolition of the separate Agency in Turkish Arabia was for the time being impracticable.

Administrative changes in 1835.

In 1835, in which year the general charge of British interests in Persia was retransferred from the Indian to the Home Government and Mr. H. Ellis proceeded as British Ambassador to Tehrán, the British political representative in Turkish 'Iráq, who since 1806 had been (with an interval, perhaps, from 1808 to 1811) subordinate to the Government of Bombay, came instead under the direct orders of the Government of India. Such being already the position of the Resident at Bushehr, all the British establishment maintained in the Persian Gulf were from this date under the immediate control * of the Government of India. It was proposed in 1835 to abolish the post of Assistant to the Resident at Búshehr, but the change was at first postponed and then vetoed.

Marine and river surveys, 1810-36.

It was during the period with which we are now concerned that the first regular marine survey of the Persian Gulf was made. Charts of a kind for the guidance of vessels in the Gulf already existed in 1785, and these Lieutenant John McCluer, a self-taught surveyor of the East India Company's Marine, had devoted himself assiduously to correcting during a period of three years' service in the Gulf, the result of his voluntary labours being a chart of the whole north-eastern side of that sea and of the Shatt-al-'Arab up to Basrah, accompanied by a memoir, besides plans of the harbours of Masqat, Basrah, and other ports. The south-western or Arabian shores of the Gulf, however, remained for the most part practically unknown; and in 1810, giving the commanders of the British expedition against the Qawásim

* Correspondence, however, was apparently sent under flying seal through the Government of Bombay, *vide* page 1339, and complete control was not transferred to the Government of India until 1873, *vide* page 265.

detailed instructions for the visitation of piratical ports, the only map with which the Government of Bombay could supply them was a "topographical sketch" by one Saiyid Taqi, showing roughly the positions of eight or nine piratical places to the south-west of Ras-al-Khaimah. In 1811 a surveying officer was placed on board the East India Company's cruiser "Benares" in the Persian Gulf, but the nature of the duties on which the vessel was employed made systematic operations by him impossible. Towards the end of 1815 orders for a regular survey were issued by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, but danger from pirates made their execution impracticable. In 1817 a memoir on the ports and pearl banks of Bahrain, together with surveys, was prepared by Lieutenant Tanner of the Bombay Marine; but it was not until 1820, on the conclusion of the third expedition against the Qawāsim, that a proper survey of the southern and western waters of the Gulf, beginning at Rās Musandam, was undertaken by Captain P. Maughan in the "Discovery," assisted by Lieutenant J. M. Guy in the "Psyche." Lieutenant Guy succeeded to the direction of this survey in November 1821, and he had carried his operations as far as the promontory of Qatar when, in February 1823, his place was taken by Lieutenant G. B. Brucks. Lieutenant Brucks completed the survey of the Arabian coast, which occupied him until 1825; and early in 1826 he began work on the Persian coast and islands, to which the following two years were devoted. In 1828 operations were begun in the Gulf of 'Omān under his command, and were continued by Lieutenant S. B. Haines, who finished the Makrān coast to Karāchi in 1829: the 'Omān side had previously been completed down to Masqat. This first marine survey of the Persian Gulf, partly from the smallness of the vessels employed, was a most arduous and painful service; and a lamentably large proportion of the officers employed on it either died or broke down in health from the effects of climate and hardship.

A survey, for purposes of navigation, of the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq, made by Colonel Chesney's expedition in 1836, is noticed in another place.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY TO THE INSTITUTION OF REGULAR STEAM COMMUNICATION AND MAIL SERVICES, 1836-62.

The period which followed the extirpation of piracy in the Persian Gulf was one of transition, during which that sea and its shores emerged from the barbarous obscurity that had enshrouded them since the connection of

Britain with their affairs began into the comparative civilisation and notoriety which they enjoy to-day. The arts of peace and of war, the requirements of commerce, of diplomacy, of military strategy, had all a part in promoting this great change.

Conflict of Russian and British policy in Persia and Afghanistan to 1842.

Reference has already been made to the concern which the activity of Russia beyond the Caucasus and the Caspian had begun to arouse, at the close of the last period, in those responsible for the defence of British India or connected therewith as military or naval officers.

Objects of British and Russian policy in Persia and Afghanistan.

The design generally attributed to Russia was one of breaking down the Persian and Afghan kingdoms, which formed a barrier athwart all paths leading from her territories in the direction of British India. She was careful not to proceed too fast or too openly; but to doubt that she really entertained some such scheme would be to disregard many palpable indications and to impeach of inexcusable errors and folly all the statesmen by whom British policy in the East was directed. It is probable that neither Russian nor British politicians had at this time any adequate conception of the difficulties, physical and political, which interference in the vast, rugged, uncivilised zone separating the frontiers, as they then were, would involve; for of the region in question nothing was as yet known by practical experience, save from the standpoint of the isolated traveller. The scheme on both sides was to press forward and forestall the adversary in the acquisition of political influence; this was with a view on the part of Russia to aggressive, on that of Britain to defensive action.

Discussions on the subject of British policy in Persia, to 1836.

In 1834 Dr. J. McNeill, the physician of the British Legation at Tehran, proceeded to England and there initiated journalistic and literary discussions of Russian expansion in Asia which soon attracted general attention. He was assisted by Mr. Urquhart and Mr. Bailli Fraser, the traveller, the latter of whom remained for some time afterwards as a sort of "Oriental reporter" at Downing Street. Shortly before his return to Tehrán, where he was at this juncture appointed British Minister, Dr. McNeill published a pamphlet entitled "The Progress of Russia in the East," in which he argued that it was to the interest of Britain to preserve, at all costs, the integrity of Persia.

The chief cause to which the Russian question, existing in a latent form since 1828 or even since 1804, owed its appearance in the field of public debate was probably the accession to the throne of Persia in 1834 of Muhammad Shāh, whose conduct gave the impression of his being subservient, or likely to become so, to Russian policy. Fat-h 'Ali Khān, notwithstanding the Treaty of Turkmanchai, resisted successfully to his dying day the establishment of a permanent Russian Mission at Tehrān; but his grandson was more compliant. The new Shāh, after a Russian Minister had been definitely established at his Court, seemed to consult him no less freely and intimately than he did the British representative. It is possible that the Shāh's cousins, the sons of the Farmān-Farmā of Fārs, were countenanced by the British Government as potential rivals to Muhammad Shāh; and their reception in England in 1835 probably made an unfavourable impression on that ruler and contributed to his estrangement from Britain.

Immediate cause of a Russo-British crisis in Persia, 1834-36.

The relative strength of British and Russian influence at the Persian Court and the dissimilar manner in which the designs of the Shāh upon Herat were viewed by the British and Russian representatives at Tehrān are described in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast and Islands. Muscovite influence was decidedly in the ascendant, and Russia favoured the idea of a Persian attack on Herat. That town and its districts were a part of Afghanistan, but they formed a principality which was politically detached from the rest of the country, being still governed by a branch of the Sadozai family; and they seemed not unlikely to go down before a military effort of even such moderate strength as Persia might be expected to put forth. If Herat were annexed to Persia, it would come *ipso facto* under Russian influence and might be made the seat of a Russian political agent for the prosecution of further designs in Afghanistan. If, on the other hand, Persia failed at Herat, she would be weakened and would fall more completely into the hands of the foreign power predominant at her capital. In any case Britain could not but oppose all acts of Persian interference in Afghanistan and must so, of necessity, make herself disagreeable to the Shāh. British influence was as a matter of fact exerted to prevent the Herat enterprise, though without success; and British representations contributed to its abandonment in the end by the Shāh, not however until weight had been lent them by the occupation * of Khārag Island in

Persian expedition to Herat and British occupation of Khārag Island, 1837-38.

* Sir H. Rawlinson (*England and Russia in the East*, p. 59) seems to question the existence of any real connection between the British occupation of Khārag and the Persian withdrawal from Herat; but in this he seems to stand alone among eminent authorities. There can of course be no doubt that the determined character of the defence of Herat, inspired by Pottinger, was a more important factor than any other in the failure of the Persians.

the Persian Gulf by a force from India, and perhaps by rumours that a British invasion of Afghanistan was being prepared.

Burnes' Mission to Kābul and First Afghan War, 1837-42.

The development of events on the Afghan (side) had no very direct connection with Persian Gulf affairs, but it must be mentioned. In 1837 Lieutenant Burnes, afterwards Sir Alexander Burnes, was deputed to Kābul by Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, chiefly to negotiate an understanding with Dōst Muhammad Khān, the Bārakzai ruler of North-Eastern Afghanistan. This British Mission, from various causes, failed in its principal object; while a less formal Russian Mission to Kābul, conducted by one Witkewitch or Vicovitch, who was afterwards disowned by the Russian Government and committed suicide, achieved an apparent but only temporary success. Lord Auckland then determined to remove the reigning Amīr of Kābul from power in the interests of Shah Shujā', an ex-ruler of Afghanistan belonging to the old Sadozai dynasty, who had resided in India for many years as a political refugee and pensioner of the British authorities. A British invasion of Afghanistan and the First Afghan War (1838-42) ensued, resulting in the occupation of Kābul and other points in the country, and in the surrender and removal to India of Dōst Muhammad Khān. The occupation of Kābul, however, ended disastrously, and field operations were renewed in order to rehabilitate the prestige of the British arms in the East, an object which they in a considerable degree effected. The notion of imposing a Sadozai ruler on the Afghan people having been abandoned, Afghanistan was ultimately evacuated by the British troops and Dōst Muhammad Khān replaced in possession of Kābul and its dependencies, while Qandahār and its territories continued under the government of other members of the Bārakzai family,—to be annexed, however, some years later by the ruler of Kābul.

The First Afghan War, which was fought under precarious conditions across the whole breadth of the then independent states of the Punjab and Sind, has been condemned as a political blunder * of the first magnitude; and it is not impossible that, with reflection, some less dangerous and costly expedient for counteracting Russian intrigue in Afghanistan, on its first appearance, might have been found. But the principle on which the war was fought, the exclusion of Russian influence from the vicinity of India, must be admitted to have been sound; and it might also be argued that the military experience and political knowledge gained by Britain, to say

* The Duke of Wellington is said to have been a severe critic of the policy followed.

nothing of the plain warning held out to Russia, formed an adequate return for the bloody and expensive campaign of 1838-42.

Continued friction and ultimate settlement between Britain and Persia, 1838-41.

To return to Persia: the withdrawal of the Persian army from before Herat did not end the tension between Britain and Persia. The British Government had other specific grievances against the Government of the Shāh besides the Herat expedition; and, in the undefined state of relations between the two countries, fresh ones quickly came into existence, of which two arose from events at Būshehr. It was not until late in 1839, after the failure of a Persian Mission to Europe by which various Foreign Offices besides that in London had been approached, that the Shāh began to manifest a conciliatory disposition; and it was only in 1841, that a full and satisfactory settlement was arranged,—including the signature of a Treaty of Commerce, which had until then been obstinately refused,—or that the British Minister was able to return to Tehrān, which he had quitted. Kharag was evacuated early in 1842, a proposal for its purchase by Britain having previously been negatived by Her Majesty's Government on the ground of the pretext which might be afforded to Russia for corresponding action in the north.

Diminished opposition of Russia to Britain after 1838.

As the prospect of success in her designs grew smaller, the hostile attitude of Russia towards Britain in Persia and Afghanistan was relaxed. In 1838 Russia renewed the pledge, given originally in 1834, to abstain from aggression on Persia; and later a Russian Minister professed that the Tsar had counselled the Shāh to submit to Britain's demands for a settlement. Nevertheless the Russian Government feigned to believe that the Āghā Khān's rebellion against the Shāh in 1838-39 had been instigated from Bombay, and that the British traveller Layard was responsible for the revolt of a Bakhtiyāri chief in 1840-41. The British disaster at Kābul at the end of 1841 seemed to offer a good opportunity for the resumption by Russia of a forward policy in Persia and Afghanistan; but the magnitude of the British operations in Afghanistan had impressed her, as had also their apparent failure, which she took as a lesson to herself; and she had, besides, difficulties of her own in the Caucasus and with Khīva.

During the remainder of Muhammad Shāh's reign Britain and Russia actually co-operated with a view to the delimitation of the Perso-Turkish frontier; and at his death their representatives in Persia acted in harmony in order to prevent a dispute over the succession.

Endeavours to establish communication between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, and incidental opening up of Turkish 'Irāq, 1837-61.

Towards the close of the last period, as has been mentioned, an expedition under Colonel Chesney had been fitted out at the expense of Her Majesty's Government and the Honourable East India Company with a view to the institution of communication between Europe and India, if possible, by means of steamers on Euphrates. It was characteristic of the age that one ground on which the undertaking was recommended was that it might indirectly strengthen Turkey and Persia against Russia. Colonel Chesney's great experiment gave disappointing results, but the scheme of through communication was not immediately abandoned.

Unsuccessful effort of the East India Company to utilise the Euphrates as a steamer route, their armed flotilla, and the British stationnaire at Baghdād, 1837-42.

A steamer surviving from Colonel Chesney's expedition was made over at the beginning of 1837 to the East India Company, by whom in 1840 three additional steamers for river work, all iron-built and heavily armed, were placed on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq. The remarkable flotilla thus formed,—the existence of which does not seem to have disquieted the Porte,—was done away with in the summer of 1842, a thorough examination of the Euphrates from Basrah to Maskanah by two of the steamers during the previous year having shown that the river was for practical purposes unnavigable by vessels of their class. One steamer of the flotilla was retained on the Tigris, however, as a stationnaire or yacht for the British Political Agency at Baghdād. Before the removal of the bulk of the flotilla to India, the lower Kārūn as well as the Euphrates and Tigris had been explored by its vessels.

Question of British rights of commercial navigation on the Tigris, 1845-46.

The presence of Government steamers on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq suggested the idea of commercial navigation by private steamers, and British merchants at Baghdād began to study the question. They were not able to take practical steps in the matter at once, but their intentions gave greater importance to a question which arose in 1845 regarding the title of British vessels to navigate the internal waters of Mesopotamia under the British flag. In 1846 a Vizirial letter was obtained through the exertions of His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of which the meaning, according to the most favourable construction, was that British-owned vessels, without distinction of class, should continue to navigate the Tigris and Euphrates under their national colours, as they had done in the past.

In 1856-57, with countenance of His Britannic Majesty's Government and the support of the Hon'ble East India Company, a British Company was formed for the construction of a Euphrates Valley Railway connecting the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf, and even obtained from the Porte a concession for the undertaking. Subsequently the promoters, among whom were Mr. Andrew, the originator of the scheme, and Colonel Chesney, the leader of the Mesopotamian expedition of 1835-37, sought a financial guarantee for the enterprise from the British Government of the day; but they failed to secure one, and the concession lapsed.

Proposed Euphrates Valley Railway, 1856-57.

This was not, it may be observed, the first project for a Railway to connect the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf. Another had been propounded previously in or about 1840.

In 1861 the "City of London," the first steamer to ply on the waters of Turkish 'Irâq for commercial purposes, was placed on the Tigris by Messrs. Lynch & Co., a British firm at Baghdâd, but associated in this matter with other shareholders under the name of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, Limited. As the Vizirial letter of 1846 seemed an insufficient basis on which to risk a considerable amount of capital, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had endeavoured in 1859-61 to obtain a regular concession or Farmân for steam navigation in the name of the Company. A document was granted, but it was not of the sort desired and, while it contained nothing new, it added materially to the confusion and uncertainty in which the question of British rights of internal navigation was involved.

Introduction of commercial steam navigation on the Tigris, 1861.

The largeness and almost exclusiveness of the part played by Britain in the opening up of Turkish 'Irâq by navigation, and by explorations and surveys to be mentioned later, begot in the minds of the local British officers about this time a habit of regarding the province almost as a British protectorate.

Disturbance of the political equilibrium of the Persian Gulf by Central Arabian factors, 1839-53.

During the period now in question Central Arabia became, during a few years, a focus from which disturbing influences radiated to different parts of the Persian Gulf.

Egyptian aggressions, 1839-40.

The expansion of Egypt, a process initiated in 1831, began in 1839 to threaten seriously the districts bordering on the Persian Gulf, notwithstanding an assurance previously given by Muhammad 'Ali to the British representative at Cairo that his conquests would not take an easterly direction. In 1838 the Egyptian forces had overrun Najd, installing an Amir subservient to Egypt; and towards the end of that year, or early in the next, the maritime province of Hasa and its ports were occupied by them. An Egyptian political agency was established at Kuwait, probably as an outpost in the direction of Turkish 'Irāq; and the proceedings of the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief in Najd soon showed that it was his aim to reduce Bahrain, Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate to dependence upon Egypt.

The Government of India, aware that the encroachments of Muhammad 'Ali in Western Turkey were regarded unfavourably by Her Majesty's Government, at once took steps through the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to frustrate the Egyptian designs in the Gulf. The defence of the Bahrain Islands by a British naval force was authorised; the Shaikhs and tribes of Trucial 'Omān were encouraged to combine against the intruders, a British officer even visiting Baraimi to infuse courage into the Na'im of that place, whose attitude of all the tribes was the most decidedly hostile to the Egyptians; and an alliance was promoted, with a view to resisting Egyptian aggression, between the Saiyid of 'Omān and his relative the ruler of Sohār. Certain local chiefs, however, among whom the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi were conspicuous, showed a disposition to submit to the Egyptians, whom they imagined to be irresistible because they had defeated the Wahhābis; and the Shaikh of Bahrain even entered into a secret agreement with the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief and became a tributary of the Cairo Government.

In the spring of 1840 a British blockade of the Hasa coast was about to be enforced, when the Egyptians, alarmed by the prospect of coercion at the hands of Britain and other European powers in the Mediterranean, suddenly evacuated Hasa and Najd. The excitement which their restlessness had caused in Eastern Arabia then at once died away.

The accumulation of difficulties caused in 1839-40 by uncertain relations with Russia, a great war in Afghanistan, a diplomatic crisis in Persia, and Egyptian aggression in Syria and the Persian Gulf, must have been embarrassing to the British Government; and it cannot but be admitted that they confronted the situation with energy and success.

Wahhabi aggressions, 1844-1853.

After the Egyptians had retired, their policy of dictation towards neighbouring Arab principalities in the Persian Gulf was resumed by the

Wahhābis; but the proceedings of the latter were less dangerous, on account of their more limited and less organised resources and of their ignorance of the politics of Europe, and were consequently regarded by the British Government with equanimity though not with indifference. In 1843 the Na'īm of Baraimi were informed that Britain was not concerned to support them against the Wahhābis as she had done against the Egyptians. British influence was probably exerted, however, to prevent a civil war in Bahrain (1842-43) from throwing that Shaikhdom into the power of the Wahhābis; but in 1844 the Wahhābi Amīr was permitted to possess himself of Dammām on the mainland to the detriment of Bahrain. In 1845 and 1853 British naval demonstrations were made upon the Arabian coast and enabled the representatives of the Saiyid of 'Omān to obtain better terms from the agents of the Wahhābi Amīr, who were demanding increased tribute from Masqat and who seemed inclined to proceed to extremities.

Convention of the Shaikh of Bahrain with the British Government, 1861.

In 1861 it became necessary to restrain the Shaikh of Bahrain by forcible means from aggressive action against te Wahhābi coast; and advantage was taken of a semi-rupture which occurred between him and Britain to compel the signature by him of a Convention, bringing Bahrain within the circle of the petty Arab principalities which looked to Britain for protection against attack from without and for adjustment of maritime disputes among themselves, and which were bound to abstain from disturbing the peace at sea.

Frontier and other disputes between Turkey and Persia, and European intervention, 1836-52.

Early in the period now under review the relations of Turkey and Persia along their common border became exceedingly tense; and Britain and Russia, as soon as their mutual distrust arising out of Persian and Afghan affairs had been to some extent laid aside, took steps to avert a violent collision which seemed to be threatened between the two Oriental states.

Difficulties between Turkey and Persia, 1836-43.

Among the principal causes of difficulty were the undefined nature of the frontier, a temporary occupation of Muhammareh by the Turks in 1837, a temporary occupation of Sulaimānīyah by the Persians in 1840, reprisals by the Turks in the direction of Ardilān in 1842, a massacre by Turkish troops at Karbala in 1843 in which many Persians suffered, and continued ill-treatment of Persian subjects and oppression of Persian interests in Turkey.

Joint Commission and Second Treaty of Erzeroum, 1843-47.

A joint Turko-Persian Commission for the settlement of all difficulties, on which Britain and Russia as mediating powers were also to be represented, had already been arranged when the massacre at Karbala occurred. For a moment war after the massacre seemed imminent; but the deputation of a British officer to Karbala, representing the Russian as well as his own Government, enabled the crisis to be peacefully surmounted; and the joint Commission held sittings at Erzeroum during 1843-44, after which, on account of the intractibility of the Turkish Commissioner, the negotiations were conducted in Europe. In 1847 the Second Treaty of Erzeroum was signed. It settled all disputed points in principle, but it left most matters of detail for future adjustment, and it had to be amplified by assurances on the part of the British and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople before Turkey finally consented to ratify it.

Attempted delimitation of the Turko-Persian frontier, 1848-52.

An attempt was then made, by means of another joint Commission formed in 1848, in which British and Russian representatives were again included, to define the Turko-Persian frontier on the spot. Very little was effected, however, the unreasonableness of the Turkish delegate being again the principal obstacle to progress; and in 1852 the Commission broke up, not having done much more than collect information and survey a belt of territory within which the true frontier line was considered to lie.

The treatment of Persian subjects by the authorities in Turkish 'Iraq remained, notwithstanding the provisions of the Treaty of Erzeroum, almost as unsatisfactory as before.

Difficulties between Britain and Persia, Anglo-Persian War, and Treaty of Peace, 1853-57.

The endeavours of Britain, in conjunction with Russia, to obtain fair treatment of Persia by Turkey were quickly followed by a diplomatic and military rupture between Russia and Turkey, leading to one between Russia and England, to which yet a third between Britain and Persia succeeded.

The Crimean War, 1854-56.

The Crimean war, due primarily to excessive Russian demands upon Turkey, created much excitement in the Middle East. Strong efforts were made by Russia, before the entry of France and Britain into the fray, to induce Persia to act with her against Turkey; and at one time they promised to be successful. Turkey on her part, inspired by hopes of becoming master of Muhammareh, as Persia may have been by dreams of securing Karbala and Najaf, would not perhaps have regarded a Russo-Persian coalition against her with any greater dismay than a war with Russia only; but

a small demonstration by British armed vessels in the Persian Gulf and Shatt-al-'Arab at the beginning of 1854 availed to keep peace unbroken between the two Muhammadan powers. Among the European nations engaged in the Crimean struggle war continued until 1856.

The Herat question and other disputes between Britain and Persia, 1852-56.

Meanwhile, chiefly in consequence of a revived ambition on the part of Persia to annex Herat,—an ambition the realisation of which was still regarded by British statesmen as likely to be injurious to British Indian interests,—the relations of the British and Persian Governments were deteriorating. In 1852 Persia occupied Herat; but in 1853 she was induced by Britain, not without difficulty, to sign an Agreement relinquishing Herat and undertaking not to interfere with it in future.

In 1854-55 the conduct of the Persian Government towards the British Minister at Tehrán, perhaps in consequence of an idea that Britain was too much hampered by the Crimean war to resent it, was extremely insulting; and at the end of 1855 the British diplomatic representative was withdrawn from Persia. In 1856, presuming probably on the absence of the British Mission and on the supposed difficulties of Britain in Europe, the Persians again occupied Herat.

Anglo-Persian War and Treaty of Peace, 1856-57.

A short but decisive war followed, in which Persia was quickly beaten to her knees. The attitude of the Turks, who perhaps hoped that one result might be the transfer of Muhammareh to themselves, was neutral, but benevolent towards Britain; and it was noticed that the issue of the operations had a salutary effect in Turkish 'Iráq, where it inspired additional respect for the British name. The war was ended by a Treaty by which Persia recognised the independence of Afghanistan, and in particular of the Herat province, and bound herself to submit any future differences which she might have with the ruler of Herat to British mediation. All other questions pending between the British and Persian Governments were settled also, in principle or in detail, by the Treaty.

The Indian Mutiny, 1857-58.

At this point occurred the great Indian Mutiny of 1857-58; but, except in a very rapid withdrawal of the Persian Field Force to India after its work was done, no effect of the Mutiny was perceptible in the Persian Gulf.

French activity in the Persian Gulf region, 1836-61.

The only European power besides Britain and Russia which during this period displayed any interest in the countries of the Persian Gulf was France, and her activity was superficial and mostly confined to the years 1839-48.

The French Government declined in 1839 to support the Shāh in the difficulties in which he then found himself with the British Government; but they enabled the Shāh's envoy to obtain French in place of British military instructors for the Persian army. In the same year, or in the year following, a French diplomatic Mission proceeded to the Persian Court; and in 1840 representatives of French art and religion, as well as of French military science, were much in evidence in Persia. The French Mission, though its efforts were continued for some years, failed to secure a ratified Treaty of Commerce with Persia, which was its principal object: such a Treaty, it will be remembered, was only obtained by Britain in 1841 after great difficulties. Most of the French military instructors quitted Persia within ten years; but in 1855 a Franco-Persian Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was at last secured.

In the 'Omān Sultanate the efforts of France were more quickly successful, and there a Commercial Treaty was carried through in 1844.

Between 1841 and 1848 the French Consul-General at Baghdād asserted himself somewhat vigorously and showed an interest even in local affairs, especially in such as related to Persia; and there were other indications that France aimed at establishing large political and material interests in Turkish 'Irāq. Perhaps in consequence of the divergence of British and French policy in regard to Egypt and Turkey, the attitude of the French representatives in Persia and at Baghdād seems to have been one of distrust and hostility towards the British; but their influence, except in so far as it was sustained by the interests of Latin Catholicism, had no root in actuality, and it quickly withered away.

British naval arrangements in Persian Gulf, 1836-61.

The execution of British naval policy and naval duties in the Persian Gulf continued, throughout the period now being dealt with, to be confided to the Indian Navy.

First steamer in the Persian Gulf, 1838.

The first steamer seen in the Persian Gulf seems to have been the I. N. S. "Hugh Lindsay," which visited the coast of Trucial 'Omān on duty in 1838 and caused no small sensation by her novel appearance and evolutions.

Relative position of the Political Resident and the Commander of the Indian Naval Squadron, 1841.

A dispute probably having arisen in regard to the relative position of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Commander of the Indian Naval Squadron there, instructions on the subject were issued by the Government of Bombay at the beginning of 1841 to the Superintendent of the Indian Navy. The most important paragraph of the Government letter ran as follows: "In the first place the Honourable the "Governor in Council declares the authority of the Resident to be para- "mount in the Persian Gulf, and places the entire Indian Naval Squadron " which may at any time be stationed in that quarter at the disposal of the "Resident for any service which he may deem it advisable to assign to it, "either wholly or in part, and this officer is responsible for his acts to no "other authority than to that of the Government whose representative "he is."

On the other hand the Commodore on the Station was to remain "absolute master of the internal details, discipline, equipment and organisation of every vessel under his command."

It was added that there was nothing in the rules laid down derogatory to the honour or independence of the Indian Navy, because the Resident was the representative of Government, and that it was essential to the public interest that a good and perfect understanding should always exist between the two officers.

Orders regarding the undue detention and immobilisation of Indian Navy Vessels in the Persian Gulf, 1843.

The following extract from a letter addressed by the Government of Bombay to the Resident in the Persian Gulf at the end of 1843 casts much light on the difficult conditions under which naval duties were carried on there at the time:

I am directed to inform you that the Superintendent of the Indian Navy has recently brought to the notice of Government the evils which have resulted from the practice of detaining vessels of the Indian Navy in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea for the immoderate period of two or three years.

The Honourable the Governor in Council, having taken this subject into consideration, is satisfied that the practice is destructive of the best interests of the service, ruinous to discipline and efficiency, prejudicial to the health of the crews, and a fertile source of discontent.

In illustration of these evils, the case of the H. C. Sloop-of-War "Elphinstone," lately returned to Bombay, has been cited. This vessel reached Bombay in a most inefficient condition, her crew debilitated by her long detention in the Persian Gulf, aggravated by her having been injudiciously detained in a sickly port, instead of being constantly kept in motion, which in itself is one of the best preservatives of health and energy. On her arrival, from the above causes, she appeared more like convalescent ship than an effective sloop-of-war.

The Governor in Council entirely disapproves of the practice which seems now to prevail of keeping the vessels of war temporarily placed at your disposal stationary in port, instead of keeping them constantly in motion and thus securing the chief object for

which they are detached—the continued suppression of piracy, and the protection of British commerce.

Government is further of opinion that, keeping the vessels of war in the Gulf constantly moving in a circle, each vessel in its turn should be directed to proceed to Bombay for the purpose of refit and the promotion of discipline.

As a general rule, therefore, the Governor in Council has resolved that a vessel detached from the Gulf, shall not continue on service there for a longer period than twelve months, and that on the expiration of this period, whether relieved or not, she shall return to Bombay, unless under the pressure of some great and overriding emergency of such a nature as will justify the Resident in the Persian Gulf detaining her on his own responsibility, but with the understanding that the discretion is not to be lightly exercised, and shall under all circumstances be immediately reported to Government.

Maintenance and growth of maritime security, 1836-61.

Maritime security had been definitely established in the Persian Gulf at the close of the last period, but it had still to be watched over and perfected during the period now under consideration.

Periodical Maritime Truces, 1836-42.

The system of Maritime Truces, happily introduced in 1835, continued to develop. These Truces, under which every kind of violence at sea by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman and their subjects was prohibited and penalised, were at first arranged to cover the pearl fishing season only and were a matter of annual arrangement; later they were made for twelve months at a time and were practically continuous; and finally, in 1843, a Truce for ten years was concluded among the usual signatories.

In 1836 successful punitive and deterrent action was taken by an Indian Naval Squadron at Dôhah, Wakrah, and 'Odaid against Bani Yâs pirates and their harbourers; and in 1841 a few shots fired into Dôhah by another similar squadron brought about the surrender of a piratical vessel, which was immediately destroyed. In 1845 an expedition to Jinnah Island resulted in the capture of another vessel which had been employed for piracy. These were the principal occasions on which forcible action was required; and not only were such offences against good order at sea as now occurred confined within Arab circles, but the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast began to show a true appreciation of their responsibilities and to co-operate with the British Government in bringing offenders to justice.

The matter of wrecks was one in which progress was slower. The settlement of some claims that arose from the plundering of a vessel stranded at Hanjâm in 1838 occupied three years; and it was only completed in the end by means of seizures of Qishm vessels in Indian ports.

In 1853 the régime of Maritime Truces was made permanent by the conclusion among the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān of a Perpetual Treaty of Peace, of which the terms were the same as those of the periodical Truces. Perpetual Treaty of Peace, 1853.

At the end of 1854 the delivery up and destruction of a piratical craft was enforced at 'Anik on the coast of Hasa by energetic naval action. The owner seems to have been the last of the race of professional pirates in the Persian Gulf, and the disappearance of piracy as a calling is marked by the replacement of the word "piracy" in official correspondence about this time by the milder term "maritime irregularity." In 1855 an Arab vessel in difficulties near Khor-al-'Odaid was attacked and one of the crew killed; and an Indian vessel from Bombay met with bad treatment at Shārjah; in 1856 there was a technical breach, on a large scale, of the maritime rules at Abu Dhabi; and in 1860 a case of wreck, worse than that of 1855, occurred at Rās-al-Khaimah. In these cases substantial compensation for the injured parties was recovered, and in a majority of them severe punishment was inflicted, over and above, on the offending places or individuals. The only grave case of the period, one in which two Arabs lost their lives, resulted *inter alia* in the surrender of one of the chief criminals, who, being an 'Omāni subject, was executed at Masqat by order of the Sultān of 'Omān.

Maritime Surveys, 1836-62.

In so far as officers and ships permitted, the work of surveying the Gulfs of Persia and 'Omān was carried on by the Indian Navy concurrently with their duties of watch and ward.

A survey of the south-east coast of Arabia, begun by Captain Haines in 1833, was discontinued in 1837 owing to the exigencies of the service; and from 1839 to 1844, in consequence of the war in Afghanistan and want of money for general purposes, marine surveys by the Indian Navy were almost entirely in abeyance. In 1839, however, perhaps in connection with the occupation of Khārag, a report on the harbour of Kuwait was made by an officer of the Indian Navy. The survey of the south-east coast of Arabia was resumed in 1844 and completed in 1848. In 1857, it having been decided to revise the Persian Gulf survey of 1820-28, in which errors and omissions were known to exist, Captain C. Constable, assisted by Lieutenant A. W. Stiffe, was appointed to carry out the work. He completed it in 1860, the vessels employed being at first the "Euphrates" and later the "Marie," and the result of the labours of

the two officers was a general chart of the Persian Gulf in two sheets, of which the essential features were reliable, but which Captain Constable himself described in 1862 as not being on nearly a large enough scale. Meanwhile a survey of the harbour of Bahrain was made by Lieutenant Whish, I.N., in 1859.

Land and river surveys and explorations, 1836-61.

The land and river surveys initiated by the Chesney Expedition of 1835-37 were continued with great energy during more than twenty years by the officers of the Indian Navy employed with the British Mesopotamian flotilla or the stationnaire of the Baghdād Political Agency; they extended to 'Arabistan and, elsewhere, to the confines of Persia with 'Irāq. The following is a synopsis of the principal achievements of those officers:

Commander Lynch (1837-43)—the Tigris from Mūsal to Ctesiphon; the Euphrates below Maskanah; and connection of Nineveh, Baghdād, Ctesiphon and Babylon by triangulation.

Lieutenant Campbell (1841-42)—the Tigris below Baghdād; and connection of the upper Euphrates with the Mediterranean chronometrically;

Commander F. Jones (1843-54)—Zohāb; the old Nahrwān Canal; the old course of the Tigris above Baghdād; the country between the Tigris and the Persian hills from Baghdād to Mūsal (trigonometrical); and the country from Musaiyib to Najaf (lost in the India Office).

Commander Selby (1841-42 and 1855-61)—the Kārūn River with its branches and affluents; and the Euphrates district from Babylon to Samāwah (trigonometrical, lost in the India Office but reconstituted).

In 1862 the principal survey still required was one of the Shatt-al-'Arab from Basrah to the sea; charts of this river had been prepared by Commander F. Jones and Lieutenant Collingwood, but had been lost in the offices of Government.

Archæological research, 1836-61.

The systematic examination of ancient sites in the Persian Gulf region began during this period under British auspices. The most celebrated

among the early excavators were Layard, Rawlinson, and Loftus; the sites attacked were those of Assyria, Babylonia, and Susiana; and the years of most active investigation were those from 1845 to 1850.

British official organisation and arrangements, 1836-62.

Assumption of the Government of India by the Crown, 1858.

On the 1st November 1858, under an Act of the British Parliament for the Better Government of India passed in the same year, the administration of India passed from the Hon'ble East India Company to the Crown, and the Governor-General received the new title of Viceroy.

Temporary transfer of the British Legation at Tehrān to the India Office, 1859-60.

The right of nominating to the British Legation at Tehrān together with the control of its activities, which since 1855 had been vested in Her Majesty's Government instead of the Government of India, was transferred in 1859, as a compromise, from the Foreign to the India Office. The only incumbent during the continuance of the arrangements thus introduced was Sir H. Rawlinson, formerly Political Agent at Baghdād, who shortly resigned the post on its being replaced under the Foreign Office.

British representation at Masqat from 1840, and separation of Zanzibar from the 'Omān Sultānate, 1861.

In 1840, to meet the danger of Egyptian intrigues in 'Omān, a British Resident was appointed to Masqat, where there had been none for a generation. The emergency had passed, however, almost before his arrival at his post; and, as the Sultān of 'Omān now generally resided at Zanzibar, the British political officer with him was transferred to that island.

In 1861, by arbitrament of the Viceroy of India to whom the *de facto* rulers of 'Omān and Zanzibar had referred some questions in dispute between them, 'Omān and Zanzibar became separate Sultānates and a subsidy of $40,000 a year was made payable by the Sultān of Zanzibar and his successors to the Sultān of 'Omān and his successors, as compensation to the latter for the smaller pecuniary value of the share assigned to them in the family possessions. In consequence of this change a separate British political representative was again appointed to Masqat.

British representation in Turkish 'Irāq 1839-51.

In Turkish 'Irāq, where British interests continued to increase throughout the period, a British Vice-Consulate was established at Mūsal at the end of 1839, and the office of Agent at Basrah was made a European appointment in 1851.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE INSTITUTION OF REGULAR STEAM COMMUNICATION AND MAILS TO THE ASSUMPTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA OF THE DIRECT CONTROL OF POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS, 1862-73.

The feature differentiating the period on which we now enter from those that preceded it was a great and sudden improvement, due entirely to British initiative, in the means of communication within the Persian Gulf and between the Gulf and the outside world. No later change in the local conditions of life and work has been so radical, and it may therefore be said that the modern history of the Persian Gulf begins in 1862.

Internal and external communications, 1862-73.

Steamers and mails, 1862-68.

It seems incredible, but it is true, that before 1862 letters from Baghdād for India ordinarily passed by Syria, Egypt and the Red Sea; and, more extraordinary still, letters for India from Būshehr often followed the same route after being sent from Būshehr to Baghdād *viâ* Tehrān. This untoward state of affairs, which was due to the infrequency and irregularity of naval communication between the Gulf and Bombay after piracy had been suppressed, was remedied by a mail steamer service, subsidised by the Government of India and organised by the British India Steam Navigation Company in 1862. Bombay and Basrah were the terminal ports, and the stipulated number of voyages was at first eight a year, but in 1866 the runs became fortnightly. Baghdād was not long in benefiting by the improved conditions; for in 1863 a mail steamer service between Basrah and Baghdād, subsidised by the Government of India, was arranged through the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. The sailings were at first six-weekly, then fortnightly, and before long at the rate of three a month.

To deal with the correspondence for which carriage was thus provided, British Indian post offices were opened at various places, the first of the series at Masqat and Būshehr in 1864, and the last at Basrah and Baghdād in 1868.

Telegraphs, 1864-69.

Telegraphs were of slightly earlier inception, but did not become so quickly ready for use as passenger and mail services. After the completion of a telegraph line between Constantinople and Baghdād in 1861, under British auspices, there was a pause in the operations. Land lines and cables were carried from Karāchi to Gwādur and thence to Fāo, and from Būshehr by Tehrān to Khānaqīn in 1862-64; but it was not until 1865 that a gap between Basrah and Baghdād was closed, giving direct communication between India and Europe *viâ* Fāo, Baghdād and Constantinople. The whole of the technical and a large part of the political arrangements, in both Turkey and Persia, devolved upon British officers; and in 1869 British subsidies were granted to the chief of Persian Makrān for the protection of the land line passing through their districts.

Railway and navigation projects, 1871-73.

Schemes for railway communication followed hard upon the improvements just described.

Mr. Andrew had not ceased to push his project for a railway between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, which the occurrence of the Indian Mutiny and the construction of the Suez Canal had invested with greater importance than before. The salvation of Persia from Russia was still mentioned as an object recommending the scheme; and the Porte were believed to favour it, while regarding a change of alignment to the northward desirable. A strong Parliamentary Committee, formed by the British Government in 1871, investigated the scheme and reported in 1872 in its favour; but they gave a cautious opinion with reference to the desirability of aiding its execution by means of a financial guarantee on the part of the British Government; and in the end no effectual action was taken.

In 1871-73 a suggestion for the construction of a railway from Shūshtar by Isfahān, or from Dizfūl by Khurramābād, to Tehrān, under a guarantee from the Persian Government, was made by a British merchant at Būshehr; but the economic conditions of the day in Southern Persia militated against its favourable reception.

Connected with this last project was a proposal that steam navigation should be instituted on the Kārūn River with the assistance of the Persian Government.

Persian affairs and relations, 1862-73.

Internal state of Persia.

During the earlier part of the period Persia was visited by scarcity, and the political state of the country, from this cause, was somewhat unquiet; but, by the personal energy of the Shāh and his close attention to public affairs, more settled conditions were by degrees established.

British relations with Persia.

The result of the Anglo-Persian war continued to influence the relations of Britain and Persia, though at times the Shāh's Government seemed in danger of forgetting the salutary lesson that they had received. To speak generally, however, the period was one of improving relations; and solid progress was made in eliminating that fertile source of discord,—the undefined frontiers of Persia.

Herat, 1860.

The troublesome question of the Herat province, which had remained in virtual vassalage to Persia notwithstanding the Treaty of Peace of 1857, disappeared on the consolidation of Afghanistan into a single Amirate by Dōst Muhammad Khān, the last step in which process was the annexation of Herat to Kābul by force of arms in 1863.

Sistān, 1863-72.

One consequence of the unification of Afghanistan was friction between that country and Persia on the border of Sistān, part of which district, formerly belonging to Herat, was effectually occupied by Persia between 1864 and 1867. An equitable partition was effected in 1872 through British mediation.

Makrān, 1862-72.

But the question of Persian boundaries in which Britain was most directly concerned arose in Makrān, a region where sovereign rights were exceedingly ill-defined, and in regard to the geography and conditions of which neither Power at first possessed information. In 1861-62 Persia was understood to claim the whole of the coast region lying westward of Sind, and in 1863 she formulated distinct pretensions to the ports of Chahbār and Gwadar. In 1864 the attitude of the Shāh's Government was aggressive in Makrān; and in that year, and again in 1868-69, a Persian invasion of Kalāt, a state under British suzerainty, was apprehended. At length, after repeated and thorough investigations by British officers, negotiations were initiated at Tehrān which resulted, in 1870, in the formation of a mixed Boundary Commission including British, Persian, and Kalāt representatives. Finally, in 1871, the proposals of the British Commissioner were accepted by the Shāh, with one reservation in regard to Kōhak. The actual delimitation of the frontier agreed upon took place in 1872.

In 1872, the Persian Government made good their claim to Chahbār —which lay to the west of the boundary arranged between Persia and Kalāt but was claimed by the Sultan of 'Omān—by expelling the 'Omān representative in possession.

General matters.

The attitude of the British Government in regard to Persian affairs generally throughout the greater part of the period was one of indifference and neglect, and more than one request by the Shāh's Government for British aid in reorganising the Persian army was ignored, with the result that the direction of Persian military matters passed into other hands. In 1870-72, however, great efforts were made by private British and Indian philanthropists, with the help of the British official establishments on the spot, to mitigate the effects of a famine prevailing in Southern Persia; and in 1872, a Persian Prime Minister very favourably disposed to Britain having come into power at Tehrān, a gigantic industrial concession and monopoly, known as the "Reuter Concession," was granted to a British capitalist. This concession, unfortunately, besides being unworkable, made a very regrettable impression both in Persia and in Russia; and its inevitable revocation left behind a vexatious consequence in the shape of a large British claim for compensation, satisfaction of which was immediately obtainable.

Turkish affairs and relations, 1862-73.

While Persia continued to make moderate progress in the path of good order and administration, or at least maintained her position, Turkey, in spite of pretended reforms at home and a specious policy of territorial expansion abroad, seriously lost ground.

General state of Turkey

The Crimean war, of which the issue was seemingly favourable to Turkey, in reality injured her. At its close she found herself invested with a position in Europe which for many reasons she was incapable of filling; and her abuse of the resources of the European money market, now open to her, carried her rapidly along the road to ruin. She was led, by the conditions in which she found herself placed, to adopt an attitude and a policy that were founded on an over-estimate of her own importance and strength; and before long she fell into dire financial straits. By 1866 matters had reached such a pass that even in the remote province of Turkish 'Irāq recourse was had to the extreme measure

of sequestrating military pay and civil salaries. The unsatisfactory character of the local administration throughout the Empire, which in most respects remained unimproved, was aggravated by these new financial difficulties.

Government of Turkish 'Irāq

The political state of the province of Turkish 'Irāq was at first hardly better—it could not possibly have been worse—than it was during the preceding period. The chief cause of disorder was the same as before, *viz.*, the obstinacy of Turkish officials in attempting, with insufficient means of compulsion, to govern the Arab tribes with a high hand. In 1863-64 an ineffectual effort was made to reduce the Muntafik; in 1864-66 the Khazā'il were coerced with some success; in 1865 the Hamawand (Kurdish) and 'Anizah (Arab) tribes defied the authority of the Turkish Government with impunity.

In 1869-72 much better order was temporarily established by Midhat Pāsha, the first "Wāli" of Baghdād, and the whole system of local administration was recast in accordance with a system of reform then being extensively applied throughout the Ottoman Empire. The improvements realised, however, though for the moment there was great activity in the administration, and though the forms of business introduced were destined to become permanent, were mostly superficial. They hardly outlasted Mid-hat Pāshā's tenure of power.

From 1863 onwards the Turkish Government possessed steamers on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq, and after 1867 these seem to have been worked chiefly for commercial purposes in imitation of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, but under the management of Ottoman officials.

Notwithstanding strenuous opposition on the part of the Turkish authorities, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company succeeded about 1864, with the support of the British Government, in increasing their fleet by the addition of a second steamer. The attitude of the Turkish Governor of Baghdād towards British interests at this time was uncompromisingly hostile; it seemed to be prompted largely by a fear that the British representative might acquire undue influence with the mismanaged Arab tribes; and it extended to the operations of the British staff employed on the construction of the Turkish telegraph lines, as well as to British navigation on the Tigris.

Annexation of Qatar and Hasa by Turkey, 1871.

The principle of territorial expansion by which the Turkish Government, notwithstanding the precarious state of the Empire, were inspired was well illustrated by their restless proceedings with regard to Eastern Arabia. One of its chief exponents was Mid-hat Pāsha, the reforming

Wāli of Baghdād. In 1866, there were indications that the Porte intended to assert and enforce their authority over Kuwait; in 1869 they intimated that they regarded Bahrain as belonging to them; and early in 1871 it was understood that an attempt would presently be made to establish Turkish sovereignty over Central Arabia, Bahrain, Masqat, and the Arab tribes of Southern Arabia generally. An appeal made by a displaced Amīr of Southern Najd to the Turkish Government for restoration to power in dependence upon Turkey quickly provided them with an opportunity for open action; and in the summer of 1871 Hasa was occupied by Turkish troops sent by sea from Basrah; while Kuwait, from which armed assistance and marine transport had been borrowed for the operations in Hasa, was considered to have been incorporated in Turkey on the same occasion. Riyādh in Central Arabia had been the original objective of the Turkish expedition to Hasa, of which latter province the direct administration was undertaken by Turkish officials towards the end of 1871 to the disappointment of two contending Wahhābi Amīrs; but no advance was made from Hasa to Riyādh. A warning from the British Government, to which point was given by the stationing of a British political officer in Bahrain in 1871-72, sufficed to prevent actual Turkish aggressions, though not Turkish threats, against that principality; but the Turkish flag was hoisted at Dōhah in Qatar, a Turkish military detachment later occupying that place; and Mid-hat Pāsha, in his official gazette, included the chief towns of Trucial 'Omān in an enumeration of those belonging to the conquered province of "Najd," a province which his troops had not entered at all, though they had taken possession of one of its outlying dependencies (Hasa). About the same time that direct Turkish rule in Hasa began, a Turkish Consulate was established at Būshehr in Persia on the opposite side of the Gulf, possibly with an eye to Bahrain affairs.

The British Government did not admit the title of the Porte to any territory in Eastern Arabia except Hasa, which had been actually occupied; but the annexation of Hasa, even by such a power as Turkey, was a sufficient evil in itself and greatly increased the difficulty of maintaining maritime security in the waters of the Persian Gulf.

Relations of Turkey and Persia, 1861-72.

The most noteworthy incident in the relations of Turkey and Persia during the period under consideration was a visit which the Shāh paid to

Turkish 'Irāq in the winter of 1870-71, as a pilgrim to the shrines at Kādhimain, Karbala, Najaf, and Sāmarrah.

No progress was made in defining the Turko-Persian border, though Britain and Russia in 1869 urged the advisability of a settlement upon the Turkish and Persian Governments. Meanwhile, the zone of acute frontier differences had begun to extend further southwards; and a Convention prescribing the maintenance of the *status quo*, which was itself unknown, was resorted to by the two Powers chiefly concerned as a temporary expedient. In 1871, on the occasion of the Shāh's visit to Turkish 'Irāq, negotiations took place for the extradition to Turkey of the rebellious Hamawand tribe, which had migrated *en masse* to Persia about 1865; but they were fruitless.

Affairs and relations of the Western Coast of the Persian Gulf, 1861-73.

Until their expulsion from Hasa by the Turks in 1871 the Wahhābis were the predominant power on the western side of the Persian Gulf, and their proceedings sometimes caused trouble to the British Government, who were interested in the maintenance of general good order in the Gulf and along its shores.

British rupture with the Wahhābis, 1865-66.

In 1864 the Wahhābis began to harass the ruler of the 'Omān Sultānate with demands for increased tribute, and British mediation was tendered for the purposes of adjusting the difficulty, but the offer was not even acknowledged by the Wahhābi Amir. In the spring of 1865 the British Resident in the Persian Gulf visited the Wahhābi ruler at his own capital; but the position in which Colonel Pelly found himself at Riyādh precluded discussion of political business there. After the Resident's return to the Gulf the pressure of the Wahhābis on the 'Omān Sultānate was renewed; and a serious affair, attributed to their incitement, in which British Indian subjects were among the sufferers, occurred at Sūr. Another Wahhābi outrage having been committed on the coast of the 'Omān Sultānate, a British ultimatum was despatched to the Amīr at the beginning of 1866; and it was arranged that, in default of a satisfactory reply by a given date, British naval action should be undertaken upon the coast of Hasa, while the Sultān of 'Omān, provided with British guns and ammunition, should advance against the Wahhābi outpost of Baraimi. This last movement

was prevented by the assassination of the Sultān by one of his own sons and the operations of the single British vessel sent to Qatif and Dammām were inconclusive; but the local confederates of the Wahhābis at Sūr itself were severely punished. Later, it appeared that the Amīr was willing to accept British mediation in the dispute between himself and the Sultān of 'Omān and that the time allowed him for replying had been too short. In 1866, suitable assurances for the future having reached the British representative in the Gulf from the Amīr, peace was re-established.

Destruction of Dōhah and Wakrah by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and British action, 1867-68.

In the autumn of 1867 a sudden and treacherous descent was made by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi upon Dōhah and Wakrah in Qatar, places then dependent on the principality of Bahrain. The two towns were wholly destroyed, the inhabitants being at the same time driven forth and despoiled of all their property. There was some delay on the part of the British authorities in taking action, due to the Abyssinian war and to other causes, during which the injured tribes themselves attempted to retaliate upon Bahrain; but in the latter part of 1868 severe if tardy chastisement was inflicted upon the two principal delinquents, the Shaikh of Bahrain being deposed in favour of a brother, while his war vessels and fort of Abu Māhur were annihilated, and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi being compelled to pay a fine under threat of bombardment of his port.

Persian claims to Bahrain, 1862-69.

At intervals between 1862 and 1869 the Persian Government put forward claims to ownership of Bahrain, but they were academic and of no political importance.

Invasion of Bahrain from the mainland and British action, 1869.

In 1869 the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, aided by several desperate associates of mark and a host of Bedouin tribesmen, invaded the main island. The reigning Shaikh was defeated and killed in battle, and the principality remained in the hands of the usurping coalition for two or three months. Towards the end of the year a British naval squadron appeared upon the scene and quickly overcame their attempted resistance. Several of the ringleaders in the invasion, including the ex-Shaikh, were then captured and deported to India; and Bahrain was left in possession of a son of the deceased Shaikh.

Expulsion of the Wahhābis from Baraimi, 1869.

In 1869 the Wahhābis, who had abstained from interference in the events in Qatar and Bahrain just described, were expelled from Baraimi, an outpost on the border between Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultānate from which they exercised influence over both, by a new and energetic Sultān of 'Omān. Civil war in Najd and the subsequent annexa-

tion of Hasa by the Turks prevented any effort being made by the Wahhābis for its recovery.

Wahhābi appeals for British assistance, 1871-73.

During the two years following the annexation of Hasa by the Turks the Wahhābi Amīr more than once claimed British assistance on the ground that the Turkish descent on his seaboard had been a violation of that maritime peace which Britain was pledged to maintain; but in reply he was reminded that, not being himself a party to any Treaty with the British Government, he was not entitled to expect British intervention on his behalf.

Affairs of the 'Omān Sultanate, 1862-73.

The affairs of the Omān Sultānate, no doubt in consequence of the appointment of a British political officer to Masqat, received greatly increased attention from the British Government during this period. The interposition of Britain in the difficulties between the Sultān and the Wahhābi Amīr in 1864-66 has already been mentioned.

The Zanzibar Subsidy.

On the separation of the 'Omān and Zanzibar Sultānates in 1861 under an arbitral award by the Viceroy of India, a subsidy of $40,000 a year had become payable by the ruler of Zanzibar to the ruler of 'Omān in perpetuity; and the regular discharge of this obligation was a matter which from time to time called for attention on the part of the British Government. From 1868 to 1871, 'Omān being then held by a usurping ruler whom the British Government did not recognise, payment of the subsidy by the Sultān of Zanzibar was excused; and on the accession of an approved candidate to the throne of 'Omān in 1871 the subsidy was made a charge upon the British and Indian Treasuries in equal shares.

The Sultān of 'Omān's Bandar 'Abbās fief, 1866-68.

Another matter in which the ruler of 'Omān received support from the representatives of the British Government was that of a fief of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies in Persia, to hold which he considered himself entitled by custom. In 1866, the existing grant having terminated through the death of a Sultān of 'Omān, the districts were resumed by the Persian Government, and it was not until two years later that a fresh lease of them for eight years was obtained at Shirāz by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. The new lessee being expelled almost immediately by a rival, and his successor in the Sultānate not being favourably regarded by the British authorities, the lease then lapsed and was never renewed.

Foreign Powers other than Britain, in the Persian Gulf, 1862-73.

Except Russia, whose general influence in Persia and Turkey was great and incessant, but whose attention had not yet been turned specifically to the Persian Gulf, the only foreign power besides Britain having any political interest in the countries adjoining that sea was France.

Anglo-French Declaration regarding 'Omān and Zanzibar, 1862.

In 1862, France and Britain signed a joint Declaration binding themselves to respect the independence of the 'Omān and Zanzibar Sultānates. This instrument, which must have passed almost unnoticed at the time of its execution, for the Government of India remained in ignorance of its existence until 1871, was afterwards to be found an inconvenient restraint by both signatories.

Central Arabia.

There is some reason to think that the journey of the British traveller Mr. W. G. Palgrave across Central Arabia in 1862 was undertaken at the instance of the Emperor of the French, with political objects.

Turkish 'Irāq.

In 1864, a French company was understood to have applied for navigation facilities on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq, similar to those enjoyed by the (British) Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, and to be claiming equality of treatment with British merchants in matters purely commercial.

A French Vice-Consulate was reinstituted in 1870 at Basrah, where there had been no French representative for many years.

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1862-73.

Abolition of the Indian Navy and difficulties arising therefrom, 1862-68.

About the end of 1862 the vessels of the Indian Navy serving in the Persian Gulf were recalled to India; this was a measure preparatory to the abolition of the service to which they belonged. On the 30th April 1863 the Indian naval flag was hauled down at Bombay, and the Indian Navy ceased to exist. It was understood at the time of the change that the duties performed in the past by the ships of the Indian Navy would devolve in future on those of the Royal Navy; but some years elapsed before a practical method of working with the substituted force was devised, and in the interval British political interests suffered severely in the Persian Gulf, in the Red Sea, and elsewhere.

The chief disadvantages of the new system were that, owing to the extent of the East Indian naval station and the relatively small strength in ships of the East Indian Squadron, it frequently happened that no vessel was at hand when required; that, calls upon ships from different quarters being numerous, no vessel could remain long in one place; that the officers were, by traditions and training, less suitable for the performance of political duties than their predecessors of the Indian Navy; and finally that, as the officers and vessels belonged to a Royal instead of a local force, their services could not be so freely requisitioned by the political authorities. Her Majesty's Government seem at first to have intended that the Political Residents in the Persian Gulf and at Aden should be deprived altogether of the use of vessels for general purposes, a change which the institution and improvement of mail steamer services may have seemed to warrant, as well as of control over the employment of vessels of war; and, though the "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose," two ships of the Bombay Marine which partially supplied the place of the Indian Navy, were left provisionally in the Persian Gulf, their withdrawal as soon as the laying of the telegraph cables in the Gulf should have been finished, was contemplated.

1864. In 1864, the Resident in the Persian Gulf reported that he had reason for believing the slave trade to be still in full vigour, but that he no longer possessed the means of dealing with slaving craft.

1865. In 1865, he observed that, while Government had expressly constituted the holder of his office arbitrator in all difficulties arising among the chiefs of the Arab coast, whether at sea or on land, he was in reality powerless to perform his functions in the absence of suitable means of locomotion; that in the season of the pearl fishery, from April to October, when disputes were frequent, the ships of the Royal Navy were forbidden by the standing orders of the Admiralty from cruising in the Gulf; and that the Arabs would not be slow to take advantage of the Resident's inability to move about at will, with the result that the Gulf might in time become as insecure as ever it had been in the past.

1866 The operations against the Wahhábis at Qatíf and Dammám were undertaken in haste, with rather disappointing results, because H.M.S. "Highflyer," the only vessel available, could not remain long in the Gulf. The case also brought into prominence "the disadvantages under which "commanders of Her Majesty's ships cruising in the Persian Gulf labour "for want of officers acquainted with the local politics, the habits and "feelings of the maritime tribes, and the navigation of this difficult arm of "the sea." A remedy for the first difficulty was sought in the appointment of two Political Assistants in the Búshehr Residency; but it is obvious

that they cannot have supplied the deficiencies felt in regard to local information of a marine character.

The crisis at Masqat in 1866 illustrated the dangers inseparable from the want of a local naval force. Had the "Berenice," a ship it would seem of the Bombay Marine, not been at hand, it might have been impossible to provide in time for the safety of British subjects; nor was it not until the "Berenice" with the refugees aboard her had reached Khor-ash-Sham that H.M.SS. "Highflyer" and "Octavia" appeared at Masqat. It being contrary to the orders of the Admiralty to employ Royal Navy vessels as guardships for telegraph stations, the "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose" of the Bombay Marine were stationed at Gwādur and Khor-ash-Sham to afford protection required in consequence of the revolution in 'Omān.

A little later in the same year H.M.S. "Pantaloon" was compelled to leave the Gulf suddenly, as a demand for her services had arisen on the coast of East Africa; and the progress of peace negotiations with the Wahhābis and the investigation of numerous maritime irregularities that had occurred were both perforce interrupted.

These occurrences drew from the Resident, in correspondence with the Government of Bombay, the following observations:

> The way to provide for the maritime police of the Gulf is to have an armed vessel at the disposal of your representative in the Gulf—such vessel to be adapted for coasting work, to be efficiently armed and manned from England, *and to be under the orders of the Indian Government.* Her Majesty's troops come out to India for long terms, and serve under the Indian Government; work would be much facilitated if the same rule obtained in regard to Her Majesty's ships of war. If this cannot be, then the next best thing might, perhaps, be to have an Indian Naval Staff Corps serving aboard vessels built for the Indian Government, but built in England with all the modern fittings and improvements of the English Dockyard.

1867-68. The great disturbance of the peace which occurred on the coast of Qatar in October 1867 exhibited the deficiencies of the new naval system, or want of system, in a glaring light. Except the Bombay Marine gunboat "Hugh Rose," which could only steam for eight hours at a time and was manned entirely by natives of India, the first vessel to become available was the "Sind," also of the Bombay Marine, which arrived on the spot in an inefficient condition in May 1868; and in the following month there were symptoms of a renewal of trouble on a large scale. Only at the end of July or beginning of August 1868 did H.M.S. "Vigilant" reach the Persian Gulf and make possible those punitive and repressive operations which ought to have been undertaken many months earlier.

Introduction of Royal Navy arrangements, 1869-71.

At length in 1869 arrangements facilitating the co-operation of the Royal Navy with the Indian political authorities, were introduced. In consideration of the payment of a subsidy of £70,000 a year by the Government of India, and of certain stipulations in regard to expenditure on shore and the docking and repair of ships, the British Admiralty undertook to appropriate six vessels of the Royal Navy's East India Squadron to special service under that Government. Three of the six were to be steam gun vessels or gunboats and were to be detached for constant and exclusive service in the Persian Gulf, where they were to perform police duties and prevent the Arab chiefs from rendering navigation and commerce insecure by piratical expeditions and from engaging in the slave trade. The officer in command of the Persian Gulf flotilla was to consider himself at the disposal of the Political Resident and the other political officers for the support of British authority; and he was not to adopt aggressive measures without the sanction of the political representatives, who were better acquainted than he with the habits of the people and better qualified to judge of the course to be pursued in dealing with native chiefs and their subjects. A general rule under which hostilities could not be undertaken without reference to the Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron was relaxed with reference to the Persian Gulf.

1871-72.

These arrangements came into force in 1871-72, in which year* H.M.SS. "Bullfinch," "Magpie," "Vulture," "Lynx" and "Nimble" served in Persian Gulf.

Naval ambitions of Persia, 1868-69.

During the period that British naval prestige was at its lowest in the Gulf the Shah of Persia conceived the idea of taking upon himself a part of the duties left derelict, and proposed to acquire several small ships of war which would be commanded by British officers and manned by Indian and Arab crews. His idea seems at first not to have been discountenanced by H.B.M.'s Minister at Tehran, but it encountered opposition from the Government of India, and a partial re-creation of the Indian Navy was discussed, only to be negatived. It was apprehended that a Persian navy might be used for the prosecution of Persian designs upon Bahrain; but, as it was also feared that the Shah, if disappointed of British assistance, might have recourse to France, it was resolved to give him—if unavoidable—one ship. His Persian Majesty, however, did not persevere in his naval projects; and, with the institution of an efficient naval police by means of vessels of the British Royal Navy, the matter dropped temporarily into oblivion.

* A list of the British vessels employed in the Persian Gulf from 1863 to 1905 will be found in Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis on Naval Arrangements in the Persian Gulf*, 1862-1905, printed in 1906, pages 6-10.

British marine surveys in the Persian Gulf, 1861-73.

Total discontinuance of marine surveys, 1861-71.

The abolition of the Indian Navy caused the same lamentable disorganisation in the matter of marine surveys as in that of naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf.

It appears to have been deemed a natural corollary of the placing of India under the Crown in 1858, as well as of the subsequent abolition of the Indian Navy, that the hydrographical work of the Indian Government should be transferred to the British Admiralty,—the India Office and the Government of India being retained, however, as media of communication and control in matters of importance. Some action seems to have been taken with this view in 1861, but it is not clear that the Admiralty were ever informed of the decision that in future "the surveys of the Indian seas would be conducted by the Royal Navy at the expense of the Imperial Government," though in 1862 the Admiralty Hydrographer was supplied with a memorandum by Captain Constable and three other leading surveyors of the Indian Navy on the state of the Indian marine surveys and a list of such as required to be undertaken. It was shown that large scale plans of Masīrah Island and Straits (made in 1846), of Khor-al-Jarāmah, Bandar Khairān, and Bandar Jissah (made in 1848-49), of Būshehr harbour (made in 1857), and of the Daimāniyāt Islands (made in 1858) had not been published. There was no survey of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and the chart of its entrance from these a was old and inaccurate. Outer soundings of the Makrān coast were wanting. In the result, during the following ten years, no fresh surveys were undertaken, and many original drawings and memoirs, the fruit of expensive surveys, were lost.

Resumption of survey work, 1871.

In 1871 the Government of Bombay, having awakened to the necessity for new surveys, consulted Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Colonel Herbert, the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq; and a general discussion of the subject was initiated. Both officers drew attention to the desirability of surveys being made of Kuwait harbour and Khor 'Abdullah, with reference to the contingency, which then appeared not remote, of a railway port being required in that quarter; and the Resident in the Persian Gulf also dwelt on the need of a revision of the Persian Gulf charts in certain places. The upshot was that Mr. Girdlestone, formerly a midshipman in the Indian Navy, was deputed to the

Persian Gulf in 1871 to make a survey of Bahrain and Qatar waters, apparently under the auspices of the Government of Bombay; and in 1872-73 operations were in progress in those seas.

British policy and official matters in the Persian Gulf, 1862-73.

Colonel Pelly's Musandam Scheme, 1863.

The period was one of great economic and commercial expansion in the Persian Gulf, due chiefly to the introduction of steam communication, posts and telegraphs; and the growth of British interests of every sort was on a corresponding scale.

As the Political Residentship of Colonel Pelly in the Persian Gulf covered almost the whole of the period, it will not be amiss to illustrate here, by means of somewhat copious extracts from his official despatches, the views upon general questions of that able officer and incisive writer.

In 1863, he propounded a remarkable scheme for the consolidation of British influence in the Persian Gulf. It can best be described by reproducing the *ipsissima verba* in which he recommended it to the Government of Bombay—

Memorandum enclosed in letter no. 1-A., dated 12th January 1863.

The question of the development of the Persian Gulf, line of Steam and Telegraphic communication is under the consideration of Government, and I beg respectfully to submit the following remarks bearing on that question in its relations to the Political Residentship for the Persian Gulf. In order to avoid occupying the time of Government longer than may be absolutely necessary, I offer what I have to say in the form of *results* of thought. It will be easy for Government, map in hand, to trace the steps which led to these results.

1. The principal objects in establishing a Political Residency in the Persian Gulf were the suppression of piracy, the suppression of the slave trade, and the development of trade.

2. Piracy on a large scale is now checked, but the maritime Arab chiefs require to be constantly watched, and their disputes at sea to be promptly and justly arbitrated: otherwise they would at once resume their old habits.

3. The slave trade still obtains.

4. Trade, which was in the first instance contemplated on a comparatively limited scale, may now be expected on an ever-increasing and extended scale. This trade is, and

will be, composed of goods entering the Gulf in square-rigged vessels from Europe, from territories to the eastward of India, from India itself, etc.; of goods in Native crafts coming from Western India, Muscat, East Africa, and the Aden coast line of Arabia, of goods in caravans coming from Meshed, Herat, and other points in Southern Central Asia, down through Seyd, to Bunder Abbas, the natural outlet for all such trade; of goods coming in caravans by way of Tehran, Ispahan, and Shiraz, down to Bushire; of goods coming down the Tigris, whether by river-steamer or boat, to Basreh, and there being transhipped into sea-going steamers or craft for transit down the Gulf of a pearl and fishery trade in the Gulf itself, especially along its western and Arab shore; and of a trade in dates and miscellaneous goods coming from and to the ports of the western coast line between Khowait or Graine to the northward, and Ras-al-Khyma to the southward.

5. The Residency was first established at Bushire, probably for political reasons, and because it was not then safe to establish it on the opposite Arab shore, which was, moreover, reputed of deadly climate.

6. That Bushire was not geographically considered by any means the most convenient point for effecting the objects which its establishment had in view, is shown from a glance at the map. For it is plain that, as the series of buccaneers to be overawed were settled along the lower western coast line of the Gulf between Khuteef, Bahrain, and Cape Mussendoom, any point along that shore would have had advantages over Bushire provided the climate and political status had admitted of such an establishment.

7. That Bushire was not a well-selected point, viewed from a naval point of view, is implied in the fact that the squadron had to find a Head Quarter station elsewhere, apart from the Political Resident. Bassadore on the unhealthy island of Kishm, was selected and has since remained the Naval Head Quarters, although we have, I believe, no title to it other than the verbal permission of the Imam of Muscat, who, by a treaty subsequently entered into with Persia in 1856, has resigned his own pretensions to sovereignty over Kishm, and consented to farm it from the Shah for a term of years; and to hold this farm under certain treaty conditions, which may any day bring our occupation of Bassadore into question. Again, that Bushire roads are not convenient for shipping is equally obvious from the facts that the anchorage is confined, shallow, and exposed, as from the facts that communication with the shore by boat is slow, hazardous, sometimes impracticable for days together. The distance of the anchorage from the shore is nearly four miles.

8. That Bushire was not well selected for the prevention of the slave trade is shown from a glance at the map. The strategic point for throttling this trade, if by force it can be suppressed, being (*sic*) obviously the narrow strait between Capes Jask and Mussendoom, at the entrance of the Gulf. One steam vessel lying there, with her boats out as flanking parties, might visit every craft entering the Gulf more effectually than could a dozen such vessels cruising in the Gulf after craft, which, having once entered it, would hug shallow dangerous shores, with slave ports always at hand.

9. Viewed from a war point of view, a station at Cape Mussendoom would, in respect to the naval command of the Gulf, have possessed as many advantages over Bushire, as does, in respect to the command of the Mediterranean, Gibraltar possess over an anchorage like that of Algiers or Tunis

10. That the element of a telegraphic communication is now introduced, and that it would be convenient to have the main station or the one from which, in the contingency of breakage in the line on either side, communication could be most readily supplied by steam, at the same point with the Residency and Coal Depôt.

11. That a Coal Depôt is an element which must now be considered on an increased and an increasing scale, and that it would be advisable to have this depôt at the entrance

of the Gulf for the following reasons:—that the colliers would thereby be saved the risk, delay, and cost of working up the Gulf against its prevailing wind, a north-easter; that coal taken in at the mouth of the Gulf would be sufficient to every steamer (even when well laded) to run her up to her extreme possible terminus of Bussrah or Koorrah and back; that the entrance of the Gulf is the point first reached by a steamer coming in from a distant port, and liable therefore to be short of coal; that the entrance of the Gulf is conveniently situate half way between Western India and Bussrah; that the great difficulty ships coming to the Gulf trade experience, is not arrival at the entrance, but the sailing up and down it; and that, consequently, it may be expected that, as trade developes, it might become convenient for it to be carried by sailing craft to Cape Mussendoom, and thence to be distributed round the Gulf, and up the Tigris line by steamers, which, in like manner, would collect goods along the Gulf shores, and bring them to the central entrepôt at Mussendoom.

12. That even (*sic*) political consideration, Persian territory is not so convenient for our purposes of a Residency, a Telegraph Station, a Coal Depôt, and a free port of trade, as might be some other point in the Gulf. The Persians have some good qualities, but they are jealous and small-minded beyond any people I ever came across in the course of my twenty-two years travel. Almost any Government in the world affords privileges of wholesome lodging to foreign representatives, but what is the fact at Bushire? They would not allow the Resident to build a house, although such a house was essential to his health! When the question was referred to England, the Resident was reluctantly allowed to build a house of the dimensions of his tent! The Physician in charge of the Residency venturing to do the same, his house was pulled down by the order of the Persian Government, and in contempt of the Resident. I give these facts simply in illustration of our political relations with Persia, after forty years' diplomacy and great expenditure. The simple truth is, if I may be allowed to judge from my experience in the Legation at Tehran, and here in the Residency, there will never be real political confidence on the part of Persia towards England, so long as we attack her when she aggresses eastward, and so long as we decline a defensive treaty with her to the westward. So situate, our relations with Persia may be disturbed suddenly and overawed by Russia, or from her own jealous temperament, Persia might interrupt our eastern communication *via* the Gulf in her jurisdiction, before force or diplomacy could intervene to save them.

13. That at the present moment, and while all our relations with the Gulf are under consideration, it would perhaps, be worthy the time of Government to solve permanently, the following problem:—To find a point somewhere in the Persian Gulf which shall offer following advantages:—

1st.—*Centrality*, as a free port, where trade may concentrate, where re-shipment may take place, and where goods transhipped may be most conveniently distributed.

2nd.—Which shall possess centrality as a telegraphic station, and most readily afford means of maintaining on either hand communication by steamer in the event of accident to the cable.

3rd.—Which should be the most central and convenient point for a Coal Depôt.

4th.—Which should be the most dominating point for keeping the sea police along the Pirate Coast, and for settling or preventing quarrels among the maritime Arabs with the least possible delay, with the minimum cost of fuel, and without taking the Resident to any great distance from his Head Quarters.

5th.—Which should enable the Resident of the Gulf to manage, without embarrassment, the relations in the (*sic*) Muscat as well as those in the Gulf, for the territories of Muscat are so mixed up with those of Persia and the Arabs, and its political relations are so interwoven with the politics of the Gulf, that it would

be obviously, and apart even from reasons of finance, it would be (*sic*) very desirable that they should be under one and the same superintendence.

6th.—Which might become a colony, or rather the inoculation, with an atom of civilized life, in the body of barbarism along the Arab coast, tending to expel that diseased barbarism by the wholesome, healthful and slow, but natural, means of introduced civilization. I think you would find such means more permanent, and in the long run more successful, both towards suppressing piracy and slavery, than you will even find ships of war or menaces, etc., and visits of state from your Resident.

7th.—Which shall be as secure as practicable from political difficulties.

8th.—Which may afford us an indisputable title to the ground we occupy.

9th.—Which may be sufficiently healthy, possess good water, and means of supply.

10th.—Which may afford calm and sufficient anchorage.

11th.—Which, in the event of war, should show us with the key of the Gulf in our hands.

My opinion is, that some point near Cape Mussundom, under the Sultânate of our ally of Muscat, is the spot which all considerations indicate as that which should be our port, our political Residence, our Central Telegraph station, our main Gulf Coal Depôt, our anti-slavery station, and our fulcrum of general influence over the Gulf, over the Pirate Coast, over Western Mekran, and over the Muscat coast, climate being sufficiently favourable.

Lieutenant Stiffe, I.N., just arrived at Bushire, assures me that such a point is findable just west of Mussundoom; that a few weeks ago, when on telegraphic duty, he visited a headland called, I think, Ras Sheikh, which slopes up in tongue-like shape to the height of 1,000 feet, with good water and some cultivable ground at its base, with ample and land-locked anchorage, leading to a narrow neck of land some 400 yards wide, on the other side of which is a second inlet looking east of Mussendoom.

I consider such a position, if sufficiently healthy, would be the best possible for your Gulf and Muscat Residency, and the Political business of both might thence be more efficiently managed than either can be separately from Bushire and Muscat. At all events, in the present conjuncture of your Persian Gulf affairs, it would be well, I think, for Government to go to some little trouble and expense to test accurately the climates around Cape Mussundoom during the approaching hot season. And I am sure I am ready to aid personally in the experiment.

Finally, if the plan now pointed at be adopted, I should consider we did not lose much at Bushire, commercially, and when the Gulf and Tigris line shall be fully developed Bushire should not drain much trade beyond the arrondissement of Shiraz. Politically, it forms part of the charge of Her Majesty's Mission at Tehrân, and I do not think that Government in the least gains much by having the Residency in the town of Bushire, where there is little of real importance to transact, and where subordinates gossip and have likings and dislikings, and these come to injure the Government business in the long run.

The Residency at Bushire might be sold or disposed of, as Government please. All that would be lost would be some little personal conveniences to the Resident and his establishment, and the possibility of retreat to the neighbouring hills.

The immediate gains are, I think, obvious on reading the scheme, map in hand. What the future gains might be would become manifest should a crisis ever occur in our Red Sea line of communications.

Letter No. 2-A, dated 1st February 1863.

In a memorandum appended to my letter No. 1-A, of the 18th January 1863, I suggested the concentration of this Political Residency, Main Telegraph Station, and Coal Depôt at some spot near Cape Musandoom, where a free port and depôt might be developed at a point central between the Slave Channel at the entrance of the Gulf and the Pirate coast.

2. Some of the principal arguments recurring to me in favour of the scheme were summed up in the memorandum itself. And subsequent reflection tends to strengthen my conviction that it is possible for Government to create, supposing climate to be sufficiently bearable, near Cape Musandoom, a settlement which, from its geographical position, under a free rule, would, before many years elapse, become of considerable importance, and lend to our interest and to our status, whether commercial or political, in the Persian Gulf a character and a developement which they do not at present possess, and which, perhaps, they would not readily attain unless under some arrangement such as that proposed.

3. I believe that in a settlement of the nature suggested would be found the best means practicable for preventing slaves entering the Gulf; of preventing piracy and disturbance in the Gulf itself; of civilizing the maritime Arabs; of extending a healthful influence into Arabia on the one hand, and into Western Mekran on the other; of offering to many Indians and other merchants now scattered round the shores of the Gulf an unmolested refuge for the free prosecution of commerce; and finally, of giving to the ports of the Gulf, in general, an impetus and an example which it might be expected, would in the end induce or compel the Governments of these ports either to imitate our system or risk the loss of their trade.

4. If Government should approve the proposal, among matters of detail to come under consideration would be the following:—

1st.—A clear and valid written title should be obtained from the Sultán of Muscat for the land; and the conduct of this preliminary measure should, I think, be entrusted to cool and experienced hands: so conducted it would probably be easily arranged. But if any eccentrity were committed in this part of the business, much delay might ensue.

2nd.—The neighbourhood of Musandoom should be carefully examined, in view to selecting a spot suitable to the objects we have in view, in respect of water, extent of ground, non-command of position, calm and land-locked harbourage, etc.

3rd.—The ground should be laid out with forethought, to meet possible distant future requirements; the public stores and offices should be as compact as possible, and their site uncommanded whether by land or sea. Cuttings or seeds from trees found indigenous in the neighbourhood should, without loss of time, be planted along the proposed roads and in groups near the watering places and landing points. Emancipated slaves, at present agented by a 30 Rupees moonshee at Bassidore, might aid in the public works as free men.

4th.—The old scantling of our camp houses at Bushire, still available *I am told* at Bombay, might be sent up for use.

5th.—Moving buoys should be laid down in the anchorage for the general convenience of shipping; the moorings for Her Majesty's ships being a little apart from the others.

6th.—If practicable, a serviceable road* should be made from the settlement along the coast line to the so-called Pirate Towns and Forts. A good caravansarai should be erected at the settlement terminus of this line, for the convenience of all travellers, and I believe that the free, frequent, friendly, and beneficial interchange of visits which would then ensue, as between the maritime Arabs and the settlement, would do more to civilize the former and to open up Arabia to commerce and progress, than would do all the menaces that a Resident might fulminate from Bushire, and than all the annual visits of state that could be made before the year 1900; a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump; and strong healthy life expels disease by its very nature.

7th.—Notification should be made of the freedom of the port, and all people should be invited to settle there without any other condition than that of paying rent or purchase money for the ground they might secure, and of becoming subject to any municipal rules which the community might impose on itself.

8th.—No Turkish wall, no works with plunging fire would be required. Persons entering the settlement must come unarmed, and if any outrage occurred, punishment, severe but prompt, should be administered, and no further altercation or retaliation dreamed of.

9th.—The officer entrusted with the charge of the settlement should have full powers until all was settled. He could never have a fair chance of success if subordinates, whether afloat or ashore, were allowed to cavil or offer the *vis inertiæ*.

10th.—The Naval force should consist of two handy screw steamers. Vessels on the more recent plan as to engines, would be most efficient and cheapest in the long run. The title of Commodore or Senior Naval Officer (which in practice is only another name for Commodore, with the extra inconvenience of the officer by reason of his real want of rank being more than commodorely jealous of his dignity) should have no place in this little armament. The vessels should be attached to the chief of the settlement, and should be wholly at his disposal whether for anti-slave work, telegraph communication, suppression of piracy, conveyance of the chief to other points of Gulf, and for miscellaneous cruising and maintenance of peace along the pearl bank. As a general rule, one vessel should be on the move, the other in harbour ready to relieve or to meet accidents.

11th.—The functions of Government, and the actions of Government servants in the settlement should be limited to the removal of obstacles, to the maintenance of the peace, to the protection of commerce, in so far as to render its development really free and unmolested, and to the erection of remunerative public works, such as telegraph office, a post office, bridges, wells, etc. For the rest, the settlement should be allowed to grow of itself.

12th.—Muscat, whose interests and territories are thoroughly interlaced with those of its neighbours about Mussendoom, should form part of the Mussendoom charge; there might be a Native Agent in the town of Muscat; and the one now at Sharga might go there.

13th.—There should be a Vice-Consul under the Minister at Bushire, and who, though directly subordinate to the Foreign Office, might correspond upon Gulf affairs with the chief at Mussendoom.

5. The proposed settlement would flourish, I think, under any officer who would use common sense on its administration, and leave commerce and people in general to manage

* From the hasty glimpse I had of this coast in 1857, I fear that a road could not be made between the Elphinstone Inlet and Ras-al-Khyma. But the distance is short by sea; and, from Ras-al-Khyma northward, along the Pirate Coast itself, the coast is low and easily traversed.

ir own business. Perhaps, however, an officer who had been trained in a good school for general administration would be preferable to a mere diplomatist or a pure soldier, for the former is, perhaps, a little too prone to fancy work done when he has given the last polish to his despatch; and the latter, perhaps, occasionally forgets that Martial Law and the Habeas Corpus Act cannot co-exist in one and the same jurisdiction.

It does not appear that Colonel Pelly's suggestions, ingenious and well thought out though they were in many respects, were taken into serious consideration by superior authority. If they had been, the whole subsequent history of the Persian Gulf might have followed a different course.

Colonel Pelly's reports on politico-commercial questions, 1866-69.

Colonel Pelly was also the author of a series of striking reports on the trade of the Persian Gulf in its political aspects, two interesting extracts from which follow below:—

Letter No. 35, dated the 12th May 1866.

1. It is agreeable to me to submit that all is quiet in the Gulf as usual and trade seems thriving.

2. Nevertheless, at the hazard of being held disproportionately to intrude my local charge on the imperial care of Government, I would venture most respectfully to submit that these regions cannot with safety be any longer regarded as they were in years gone past. When your interests here were first represented, your frontier was behind Sinde and the Punjab; the influences of European Government had scarcely shown themselves in Central Asia; steam was unknown; and our trade was by native craft on our coasts, or between those and England by our own square-rigged vessels. Your interests here were considered from this point of view, nor did any radical change in this view have place, unless for the suppression of piracy, by the detachment of a squadron of the Indian Navy.

3. When I arrived in the Gulf in November 1862, the Government summarized its estimate of its interest in the following paragraph, thus evincing a desire to curtail and withdraw, rather than to extend, in this direction; and this apparently on economic grounds:—"It appears to His Excellency the Governor in Council that British interests "on the Persian shores of the Gulf will be amply represented by the appointment of "a Political Resident at Bushire with Consular powers, in lieu of a Resident and Assistant "Resident. The reduction of the Indian Naval Establishments in the Gulf will relieve "the Political Officer stationed at Bushire of most part of his duties as a disbursing "officer, and the post of Treasurer, to the Residency (Rs. 120 per mensem) can be abolished, the Accountant being entrusted with the reduced duties in addition to his own."

4. Yet events have shown that precisely from that period our interests in the Gulf line have taken an unexpected and unprecedented start. Trade, which in 1846 was represented in the gross by somewhat *under half a million sterling, is now upwards of five millions.* The Resident, whose duties were assumed to be limited to British interests on the Persian shore of the Gulf, has been shown to find his heaviest and most responsible duties on the Arab Coast. The abolition of the Assistant Residentship has entailed on the Resident those travels which

	£
To and from Bombay, Madras and Calcutta	3,000,000
To and from Batavia, Singapore and Mauritius	1,900,000
To and from Kurrachi and Red Sea, etc.	100,000
Grand total	5,000,000

22nd February to 22nd March 1863.
15th July to 10th September 1863.
2nd December 1863 to 11th January 1864.
3rd to 30th September 1864.
1st November to 22nd December 1864.
12th January to 25th March 1865.
26th March to 22nd April 1865.
14th October to 21st December 1865 and from 26th December 1865 to 21st April 1866.

might otherwise have devolved on the Assistant, to the end that periods as per margin have been passed by me in the open or on boardship. The reduction of the Indian Navy Establishment, which was regarded simply as relieving the Resident as a disbursing officer, has, in fact, given him no option other than to persuade by moral and individual power 1,500 miles of predatory coastal tribes, who had previously been coerced, or lawless at will. The Treasury Department, relieved of the Naval disbursements, has received those of the Telegraph and other miscellaneous items. The Consular powers with which it was proposed to endow the Resident were found to be inadmissible under our Treaty engagements with Persia; and in point of fact there is not, in so far as I am informed, any Legislative Act or Resolution of Government which would bear me out in the exercise of any magisterial authority, or in the practical execution of my engagements as Arbitrator of the Maritime Truce. Simultaneously with your telegraphic development, the postal and steam communication opened up, and steam, as usual, was followed by increased traffic of goods and passengers. The cotton crisis in Bombay gave a sudden excitement to the export of cotton in Persia, which suddenly increased a hundred-fold. It was further found out here that, if opium could pay a duty of Rs. 1,600 a chest in Bombay, Persia could lay it down of an equally good quality and free of duty; hence a trade through Batavia with China sprung up. The vast cultivation of cotton in our own provinces seems to have decreased; the growth of corn the littoral of the Gulf found it could supply us; hence a recent corn trade. Meantime, Russia has been pushing on from the northward telegraph lines, and other European speculations have been contemplated or executed; and all these material effects of civilization are accompanied by European Agents, whose manners and customs awaken thought, and with increased vitality inoculate Asiatic despotisms with increased irritation. The general result at the present moment is comparative restlessness, inquisitiveness, and what we should term radicalism, requiring on the part of all authorities concerned a watchfulness and state of preparation, which would have been premature so long as these regions remained in a condition of social and political stagnation. This is the drift of my argument.

5. On the other hand, I am sensible of the forcible argument which might be advanced in favour of the English Government abstaining from foreign relations and holding itself fortified within its own Indus Frontier. But I fear that with States, as with individuals, it requires almost superhuman wisdom and strength of will to stand permanently isolated and alone. An individual, indeed, may, perhaps, succeed, having the requisite staff within himself; but the life of a State involves a succession of Rulers, and if he who succeed lack those qualities upon which is based the policy of his predecessor, there is risk that the State will have to regain by force or convulsion the status to which it would otherwise have naturally grown.

Part of letter No. 104, dated the 19th June 1869.

* * * * *

11. Government are probably informed of the asserted intention on the part of the French to open a line from Suez to Bussorah so soon as the Lesseps canal shall admit. A French Agent who recently toured from Muscat to the Shut-eol-Arab reported, I under-

stand, very favourably on the productive powers and facilities for trade of the regions at the head of the Gulf.

12. There is in prospect, also, the opening of some line, whether of rail entire, or of rail combined with river and canal communication, between the head of the Gulf and the Mediterranean, and I have recently had an interesting conversation on this subject with the Turkish Director of Public Works in the Pashalik of Baghdad.

13. No one who has observed and studied the development of trade and progress and of political events since the time when I first served in Sindh in 1841, can be blind to the great potential importance of the line connecting Kurrachee with Europe *viâ* not the so-called Euphrates line without deviation, but *viâ* some line connecting the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean by the Tigris or Euphrates, or by canals, or by one or other, or by all of these combined, with connecting intervals of rail.

14. I forbear troubling Government with statistical statements, because I know how figures mislead, unless they are based on reliable accounts, and such are not at present available in these regions for the general trade.

15. But the constant increase in the number of steamers, the comparative small falling-off in native craft, the contentment of the merchants, the increased rate of such hire, the increasing number of solid houses at the ports, and the inconvenient rise in house-rent and general prices, while they do not constitute statistical statements, are yet facts which could not, perhaps, exist, unless the statistics of trade were favourable, whether tabulated or not.

16. On the other hand, it should never be forgotten that this line is, perhaps, singular in one respect, *viz.*, that while, on the one hand, civilisation and trade are increasing more than we could have expected, we have, on the other hand, constantly to watch on the Arab littoral tribes who have immemorially been accustomed to dwell in a condition wherein every man's hand was ever prone to be raised against his neighbour. To keep the maritime peace along the strongholds of these littoral Chieftainships is no child's play. It is not alone by the sudden and occasional appearance of a man-of-war that this can be thoroughly done. What is required is uniform vigilance and pressure. The position of the Resident as arbitrator of the maritime truce may be aptly compared with that of an officer holding a civilized frontier against lawless borderers. Those borderers would never be kept quiet or reduced to order and industry by intermittent sallies from a garrison, accompanied by tardy retaliation; what is wanted is the constant pressure of watchful outposts ready at any moment to put down raids, and uphold the peaceful and well inclined. The tribes so dealt with gradually come to perceive that the object of the civilized Power in patrolling is not vengeance, but the general good and the maintenance of peace and progress. The tribes thus come to learn also that raids and piracy are unsuccessful in practice. Our light gun-boats are such outposts and patrols for the Arab coast; and my respectful and earnest recommendation to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council is to keep the small sea force available for the Gulfs of 'Oman and Persia under one head, and to permit that head to patrol, detach, or concentrate it as he may deem the necessities of the moment to dictate. The telegraph runs through these regions, thus giving the Resident instant intelligence of whatever happens; although, as a rule, the littorals of Mekran and Muscat are entirely peaceful, and it is only along the Arab Coast of the Persian Gulf, between Cape Mussendoom and Kowait, that the maritime Arabs require habitual watching. But all that I could write on the principle involved in this agreement (*sic*) may be found better expressed in the writings of the General who first taught to meditate similar problems. I allude to those of the late Colonel John Jacob.

Restrictions on the action of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 1862-71.

The difficulty in which the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was placed from 1862 to 1871, through there being no naval force properly at his disposal, have been described. As will be apparent from the passages quoted above from his writings, they were severely felt by Colonel Pelly, the only Resident to suffer from them; and in his opinion they were increased by a ruling of the Government of India in 1865, following upon strong action which he had taken in Bahrain, that the Resident was not in future to seize vessels belonging to native chiefs on his own responsibility. With reference to this order he reported on 23rd April 1866:—

> Although loath to trouble Government with petty details, I would venture to append a few specimens of the complaints that reach their representative from the littoral of the Persian Gulf; and these should not be considered as *selected* specimens, for I have taken them one by one as they have to-day turned up, and the records show thousands of such cases.
>
> Formerly, the Resident would have despatched a vessel of the Gulf Squadron, with an Assistant or Agent on board, to enquire into the cases, and with instructions, failing satisfactory arbitrament, to blockade, fine, or otherwise punish. But under the more recent expression of views by the Indian Government, I do not feel at liberty to use any coercive measures, or to levy any fine, unless under the explicit instructions of Government.
>
> * * * *
>
> In the meantime, I most respectfully solicit the instructions of Government as to the means by which I should proceed, and as to the manner in which I should proceed with the particular cases now submitted.
>
> * * * *
>
> On the whole, I fear that in the long run Government will find it almost necessary to maintain peace at sea in the Gulf, and to protect the persons and property of their subjects residing in the sea-board trading marts; and to do this it seems almost essential that your representative should be in possession of:—1st.—The means of enforcing his arbitraments and maintaining peace; and 2nd.—Either discretionary power, or else clear instructions as to the manner in which he should use the means at his disposal.

Specimens of complaints from the littoral of the Persian Gulf.

Translated purport of a letter from Khumees bin Esau Seyhatee, to the Resident, Persian Gulf; received at Bushire 28th March 1866.

I beg to inform you that a boat belonging to me was broken up at sea between Bahrain and Kateef, and seven men who were on board of her were murdered. They blame Feysal for this act, as the sail of the boat was found in his possession. Feysal has denied the charge, and has accused Abdoollah Omanee of the deed. Abdoollah Omanee, who was with Feysal, hearing of this accusation, sought protection with the

Chiefs of Bahrain. The Chiefs of Bahrain now demand blood-money for the murdered men. This act was committed on the high seas, and obtainment of reparation for the same rests with you. I claim blood-money for the seven men and the value of the boat and gear, worth 55 dollars. It was my duty to inform you of this occurrence, as obtainment of reparation for the deed rests with you, and there is no excuse to be made in the matter. The boat is owned by me, Khumees bin Esau Seyhatee.

Translated purport of a letter from Khaled bin Sultan, Chief of Shargah, dated the 2nd Ramzan 1282 (20th January 1866). Received at Bushire 28th March 1866.

Informs that his bugla from Bussorah encountered a storm and had to put into Ejman, and in entering the creek she struck. Her cargo was taken out by the boats of the place, and only a portion restored. The owners of the stranded bugla then wished to float her, but were hindered from doing so until the waves broke her up, when again the owners tried to save portions of the wreck, but were again prevented. This is the order at sea now-a-days. If the Sirkar consent to our acting in like manner, let us know; but if the Sirkar intends doing justice to us, we require all that was taken from the bugla, as also all loss that has happened to the bugla since she struck.

Translated purport of a letter from Mahomed Ali, to Hajee Yacob, late Shargah Agent, without date. Received at Bushire 28th March 1866.

I beg to inform you that the Ahl-Boo Soomait, Saad bin Mahomed, attacked my people in three boats on the Pearl Banks and attacked them, breaking one man's tooth. We know that the Sirkar has command of the sea, not the Ahl-Boo Soomait. Please inform Resident of this, for we can act just as the Boo Soomait have done, but it is not the part of any but the Sirkar to afford us our rights.

Translation of a letter from Mahomed Busheer, acting as Shargah Agent, to the Resident, Persian Gulf, dated the 13th Shawul 1282 (1st March 1866). Received 28th March 1866.

Reports his failure to obtain from Ejman Sheik property taken from the Shargah bugla stranded at that port, or the wreck of the bugla itself. Property of Lingah people 5,780½ Krs: property of British subjects 2,100½ Krs.

Translated purport of a letter from the Chief of Mogoo, to Sheikh Mahomed Busheer, Lingah Agent, dated none. Received at Bushire 28th March 1866.

The Ahl-Boo Soomait attacked my people at sea with firearms, and took from them forcibly one diver. Mahomed bin Nair, who is bearer of this letter, will inform you of particulars.

Translated purport of a letter from Mahomed Busheer, acting for Shargah Agent, to Lingah Chief, dated the 13th Shawul 1282 (1st March 1866). Received 28th March 1866.

Demands compensation for one man's teeth and forcible removal of one diver from a Marroogee boat by the Ahl-Boo Soomait, also Resident will be informed of the circumstance; and if a ship of war be sent to demand redress, he should not feel grieved at Agent having reported the matter.

Translated purport of a letter from Bunyas residing at Kishm, dated the 3rd April. Received 18th April 1866.

They are 30 families residing at Kishm, but owing to bad treatment they wished to leave and return to their country, but the Sheikh of Kishm prevented them. Bog Resident will arrange to get permission for them to leave Kishm, as they are British subjects, and do not wish to remain any longer in Kishm.

Translated purport of a letter from Tursoo, Bunya, dated the 29th Zilkaada 1282 (16th April 1866). Received 16th April 1866.

Informs that their bugla with telegraph stores on board suffered from bad weather and put into Bahrain for repair, but the Sheik would not permit them to repair their bugla at Bahrein, and forced them to put to sea and proceed to Fao: but on their way thither were obliged to put the bugla on shore at Asban Coast, where she broke to pieces, and her wreak was taken away by Amaier tribe, 180 planks, and three boats from the Boo Felea tribe took portions of the wreck; rest has been brought to Koweit. This information has been corroborated by one Sheik Mahomed-ul-Mugheyzee of Koweit and Abdoollah bin Sleyman Kateef, both of whom are now in Bushire.

It does not appear, however, that the Government of India thought it necessary to modify their former instructions or to issue any new order.

Dependency of the British Legation at Tehrán, 1870-71.

In 1870-71 a Committee of the House of Commons, appointed to report on the subject of the British Diplomatic and Consular services, considered anew the question of the dependence of the Tehrán Legation, which still remained in all respects subject to the Foreign Office, though to a large extent maintained out of Indian revenues. They inclined to the view that the Mission should be placed under the Secretary of State for India, and recommended that, if such a change were considered impracticable, its members should generally be selected from the Indian services, and that the proportion of the cost of the Legation borne by the Government of India should be reduced. This resolution had, however, no result in practice.

Appointment of an Assistant Political Agent at Gwádur in 1863.

In 1863, in connection with telegraph construction and the boundary dispute pending between Kalát and Persia, a European Assistant Political Agent was stationed at Gwádur. The post was maintained during the rest of the period.

British political and official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1862-73.

The development of civilisation in the Persian Gulf had its counterpart on a smaller scale in Turkish 'Irāq, where, as already shown, British commercial navigation continued to make progress, and where, perhaps in consequence of the rapid growth of British interests, the attitude of the local Turkish authorities was, during the earlier part of the period, extremely unfriendly.

Station-naire of the British Political Agency at Baghdád, 1869-70.

In 1869, the assent of the Porte to the replacement of the stationnaire of the British Political Agency, a surviving relic of the British Mesopotamian flotilla though not one of its original vessels, was obtained; but the presence of the stationnaire was believed to be regarded with disfavour by the Turkish authorities; and in 1870 the Government of India was inclined, chiefly it would seem from considerations of expense, to acquiesce in its disappearance. On the advice of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, however, it was decided not to abandon the long-established British privilege of maintaining an armed Government steam-vessel at Baghdád.

The Oudh Bequest.

In 1849 a large pecuniary benefaction appropriated to the towns of Karbala and Najaf by a deceased King of Oudh under an Agreement with the Government of India, of which the founder had directed periodical distribution to be made through Mujtahids resident at those places, came into operation. The British Political Agency at Baghdád, as representing the Government of India in Turkish 'Iráq, became the channel of payment; and the magnitude of the "Oudh Bequest," as it was styled, which already amounted to Rs. 7,334, a month—some £750 at the rate of exchange then prevailing—and which would be increased later by the falling-in of certain life interests in the deceased King's estate, invested it with political importance. At first it was feared that the nature of the Bequest, which was to be enjoyed by Persian and Indian Shi'ahs, might be misunderstood by the Sunni Government of Turkey and so lead to friction; but this danger did not marialise. The British Political Agent in Turkish 'Iráq, however, chiefly with a view to the avoidance of political difficulties, was authorised by the Government of India to exercise "a judicious superintendence" over the expenditure of the money.

In the course of time serious embarrassments, to which the loss from view of the authentic Agreement sealed by the King of Oudh contributed not a little, arose in connection with the practical administration of the Bequest. Arrangements were made to secure to destitute Indians at Karbala, Najaf and Kádhimain, a share in the proceeds of the Bequest; and these arrangements became interlaced in a highly inconvenient manner with certain dispositions for non-official representation and protection of British Indian interests at Karbala and Kádhimain. The disbursement of the money having been left, apart from the safeguards introduced in the interest of Indians, entirely to Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf, the funds were to a large extent misappropriated or wasted. In 1866, the question of correcting this abuse was raised by the Nawáb Iqbál-ud-Daulah, a publicspirited Indian nobleman of the Oudh royal family settled at

Baghdād; and in 1867 the Political Agent, in consultation with the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, apparently recommended that the whole revenue of the Bequest should be made payable in future to Indian Mujtahids, and that their distribution of the money should be conducted through a Committee of respectable resident Indians, under the supervision of the British Political Agent. The Government of India, however, in view of the wording of the Agreement with the King of Oudh, as then known to them, negatived these proposals.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD NORTHBROOK, MAY 1872 TO APRIL 1876.

From this point onwards, conditions in the Gulf having assumed substantially their present shape, the most convenient division of time into periods will be one agreeing with the terms of office of the successive Viceroys and Governors-General of India.

Transfer of the direction of British political interests in the Persian Gulf from the Government of Bombay to the Government of India, 1872-73.

The British Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq was brought under the direct control of the Government of India in 1843*; but the British Political Residency in the Persian Gulf remained for nearly thirty years longer subordinate, as in the past, to the Government of Bombay. At length in 1872 the Government of India became desirous that the Government of Bombay should be deprived, in their favour, of the direction of "the relations of the British Government with the foreign powers and states to the West of India, *viz.*, Muscat, Zanzibar, those on the coast of Arabia, and those on the littoral of the Persian Gulf." In recommending the change to Her Majesty's Government, the Government of India observed on the 1st March 1872:

> In consequence of increased facilities of communication, the extension of commerce, the closer relations into which the affairs of Asiatic countries have been drawn with Europe, and from other causes, our political relations with these countries have of late years acquired an importance which they never before possessed, and have given rise to questions the most difficult and delicate of all that occupy our attention in the Foreign Department. Wars, revolutions, and dynastic changes have in some of these countries

* *Vide* page 1394 post, and in this connection see also pages 220 and 1339.

succeeded each other with great rapidity, and in all of them the march of events has been such as to demand a prompt decision on questions of the greatest international importance. We have, indeed, repeatedly found ourselves called on, in matters which had apparently been long settled, to consider questions involving the past, present, and future policy of Government, to decide rapidly, and to act promptly.

Nearly all of these questions have been of a purely imperial character, such as no authority but the highest in India could venture to decide. Some of the most momentous of them have arisen from the attitude assumed towards neighbouring Powers by the Governments of Turkey and Persia in matters closely affecting the most important interests of the British Empire. They have involved correspondence with Foreign Powers, judgments on the acts and policy of nations represented in the Councils of Europe, and action in important international affairs, which no local Government has either the knowledge of or the influence to enable them to control, and the settlement of which, even if they had, could not, consistently with what is due to powerful independent nations, be left in the hands of any authority subordinate to Her Majesty's Government of India.

In former years, when steam communication was in its infancy and telegraphs were unknown, it may have been thought desirable to leave a larger voice in these questions to the subordinate authorities, with whom communication with those countries could be most rapidly and regularly maintained. But such necessity has long passed away. There is no part of the countries referred to which cannot be communicated with as quickly through the telegraph, and nearly as quickly through the post, by the Government of India as by the Government of Bombay. The reasons for the exceptional course hitherto followed have therefore ceased, and the control of purely political relations with Foreign Independent Powers ought consequently to revert to the authority to which they properly belong, and by which alone they can be conducted with safety and advantage to the interests of the Empire. Indeed, the necessity for this change has been so strongly felt of late, that when matters of extraordinary importance or urgency have arisen—such, for instance, as the Turkish expedition to Nejd—we have not hesitated to communicate instructions direct to the Representative of the British Government on the spot, sending a copy to the Government of Bombay for their information. But even on such occasions—still more of course, on other occasions, when the entire correspondence, telegraphic or other, is conducted through the medium of the Local Government we find that a speedy and full comprehension, by the local British Agents, of the line of policy which the Government of India desires to pursue, and the receipt of timely information by ourselves of the state of affairs, are seriously impeded by the interposition of a local Government.

A number of particular cases were cited in the Government of India's despatch to illustrate the inconveniences which they held to be inseparable from the interposition of the Government of Bombay between themselves and the British political officers in the countries in question.

Later in the year, a personal change having meanwhile taken place in the Governorship of Bombay and no reply having as yet been received from Her Majesty's Government, the Government of Bombay of their own accord proposed that the control of the Political Residency in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agency in Zanzibar should be transferred from them to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, only such information as they might find of value or urgent importance being

communicated to them in future by the local political officers. The Government of India on the 23rd January 1873 accepted the proposal, subject to the sanction of Her Majesty's Government; directed that it should be carried into force at once; and issued the necessary instructions to all concerned. At the same time they ordered that copies of all communications passing between Būshehr and Zanzibar and themselves, or *vice versâ*, should be supplied to the Government of Bombay, to such extent as that Government might desire, for information and with a view to remarks and suggestions being made thereon by the Governor of Bombay.

The arrangements were duly sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government and, along with the political control of Persian Gulf and Zanzibar relations, the patronage of the political posts maintained by Britain in those regions passed definitely to the Government of India.

Affairs in Persia, 1872-76.

In Persia the power of the central Government, or rather of the monarch, continued to consolidate; and in 1873 the Shāh was able to venture on the striking innovation of absenting himself from his kingdom on a tour in Europe.

Russian policy was eminently hostile to British interests, chiefly in the direction of Central Asia, and schemes for promoting the penetration of counteractive British influence into Persia from the south were considered. In 1875-76 representations were made to the Persian Government in the interests of a British firm who were anxious to place steamers on the Kārūn River, and whose projects the Government of India were inclined to assist with a subsidy; but neither a special concession nor the opening of the river to general navigation, though the latter course was discussed by a Persian Commission, could at the time be obtained.

Affairs in Turkey, 1872-76.

In Turkey political conditions steadily deteriorated, owing to the prodigality of the Court and Government of Constantinople and to misgovernment in the Balkan districts.

The province of Hasa, annexed by the Porte during the last period, was found difficult and unprofitable to administer; and in 1874 the Turks

sought relief from the difficulties and expense in which they found themselves involved by appointing a local Shaikh to be Turkish Governor, and by withdrawing the bulk of the Turkish garrison. Within a few months, however, a relative of the Wahhábi Amir invaded Hasa and temporarily overturned the Turkish administration, besieging the Turkish nominee in a fort at the provincial capital. The situation was saved, from the Turkish point of view, by the prompt arrival of Násir Pásha, Shaikh of the Muntafik, from Basrah with a large force. On the Shaikh's return to Basrah in 1875, after a ruthless "pacification" of the revolted province, a Wilâyat of Basrah was formed by detaching some districts from the Wilâyat of Baghdad and adding Hasa to them; and Násir Pásha himself became, though by birth a tribal Arab, the first Governor of the new charge.

Ill-success did not deter the Turkish Government of the day from prosecuting their fatuous policy of territorial expansion. In 1874 they seized Jauf-al-'Amir on the confines of Najd by means of a small force sent from Palestine; but they were able to retain possession of that oasis for two years only. Turkish intrigues with 'Odaid on the border of Qatar, but situated in Trucial 'Omán, began; and during the period the Turkish flag was sometimes hoisted at the place, while occasional tribute also was believed to be paid by the inhabitants to Turkey. It was about this time that the Turks first began to show jealousy of imaginary British influence in Central Arabia.

Relations between Turkey and Persia, 1872-74.

The epoch now under review seems to have been one of an attempted rapprochement between Persia and Turkey.

The Sháh's pilgrimage on Turkish soil in 1871 was cast into the shade by a personal visit which he paid to the Sultán at Constantinople in 1873; and in 1875 certain long-contested points relating to the powers of Persian consular officers and the immunities of Persian subjects in Turkey, as also to those of Turkish consular officers and subjects in Persia, were settled by a Convention.

The question of the Turko-Persian frontier, however, still remained an obstacle to a perfect understanding. To dispose of it, a purely Turko-Persian Commission met at Constantinople in the winter of 1874-75; but the members could agree in nothing. A new Commission, including

British and Russian representatives, was then formed and sat at Constantinople during 1875-76; its duty, like that of its predecessor, was to trace a boundary on the map prepared by the Delimitation Commission of 1848-52; but its proceedings were delayed by excessive claims on the part of the Turkish delegate in the beginning, and the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-77 brought them to an end while still unfinished.

Affairs and relations of the West Coast of the Persian Gulf, 1872-76.

Along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf quietness as a rule prevailed, the Turks continuing in possession of Hasa, as already described, and Britain maintaining little correspondence and almost no relations with any local authority except the Shaikh of Bahrain. Bahrain had fallen under the influence of the British Government to such an extent that the Shaikh was accustomed to conform to their advice in external affairs and looked to them for protection against attack from without. In 1874 a Bedouin invasion of Bahrain from Qatar was threatened, but was averted by a British naval demonstration; and in the following year the Shaikh, under British advice, dis-severed his interests from those of the people of the mainland, where he had until then claimed to exercise authority.

Affairs of the 'Omān Sultanate, 1872-76.

In the Sultanate of 'Omān, as in Bahrain, the influence of the British Government tended to increase and the relations of their representatives with the native Government to become more intimate. British naval aid arrived too late to save the Sultān from submission to the demands of a rebel force of tribesmen which threatened Masqat at the beginning of 1874, but a month or two later a revolt in Bātinah was suppressed chiefly by British war vessels, which compelled the insurgents to withdraw from Masna'ah and Suwaiq.

Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1872-76.

Russian influence and opposition to British aims in Persia was, as usual, a dominant factor in the general situation; but there were still no symptoms of Russian activity in the Persian Gulf region.

Interest on the part of France was manifested only in an attempt to obtain from the Shah a large concession for irrigation works and industrial enterprise in 'Arabistān. This movement, which was associated with the name of Dr. Tholozan, physician to the Shah, was defeated by a British claim of prior right to compensation under the abrogated "Reuter Concession."

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1872-76

In 1874 it was arranged by the British naval authorities, with a view to the vessels of the Royal Navy detailed for service being kept in an efficient state by constant relief and change, that as a rule current duties should be carried on by two of the three special ships, the third being always absent on a trip to Indian waters. Each vessel was, if possible, to be allowed ten days or a fortnight in port at Karachi or Bombay every four months; on her return to the Gulf she was, as a rule, to call at Gwādur or Chahbār for the purpose of reporting her arrival and receiving orders as to her destination. The Political Resident was to be kept informed of the movements of ships; and it was added in the naval instructions: "The "requisitions made by the Political Resident and Agents of course must be "most carefully attended to, but should they materially interfere with the "system of relief, Commanding Officers should point out to these officers "what appears to them the best means for meeting both requirements, "informing them that these orders have been given with the view of "affording an efficient squadron, and requesting their co-operation in "attaining this object."

Later in the same year, in connection with the threatened descent by Arab tribes of the mainland upon Bahrain, the Resident in the Persian Gulf telegraphed to the Senior Naval Officer that the presence of a vessel of war was urgently required. Ten days passed before the vessel detailed for service left Karachi, and three weeks before she arrived on the spot; and meanwhile the crisis had to be met, as best possible, by stationing the Bombay Marine vessels "Hugh Rose" and "May Frere" off Bahrain. The Resident consequently requested that the cases might be defined in which relief routine should be considered to over-ride requisitions by the political authorities, and it was ruled by the Government of India that the Resident himself must decide in every instance whether the system of relief must give way to political exigencies; but he was required to report

by telegram to the Government of India every instance in which he exercised his power of interference with the relief programme, in order that the justifiability of his action might be reviewed. The Government of India attached great importance to the relief of the ships in rotation, and they considered that in the Bahrain case the Resident's estimate of the seriousness of the situation had been exaggerated. It appeared, moreover, that the delay complained of was due to the vessel at Karachi having had to wait for new boats from Bombay, she having recently lost three in a cyclone.

In 1874 the Wāli of Baghdād protested against a visit paid by a British war vessel to Qūrnah, on the ground that the Shatt-ul-'Arab above Basrah was an internal Turkish water.

Maritime security, 1872-76

There was only one serious infraction of maritime security during the period. It occurred in the Turkish port of Basrah, where the British mail steamer "Cashmere" was boarded by pirates while at anchor one night in June 1872. One of the native crew was killed; two Europeans were seriously injured; and property, chiefly specie, to the value of between £4,000 and £5,000 was carried off. The case was prosecuted by the British political authorities in Turkish 'Irāq with great energy, both in Turkish territory and in the adjoining Persian province of 'Arabistān, with the result that in the course of 1872-73 seven of the principal offenders were publicly executed at Basrah and about three-quarters of the pecuniary loss was made good, nearly half of the recoveries taking place in Persia.

Suppression of the slave trade, 1872-76.

Various agreements in restraint of the slave trade had been concluded by the British Government at different times with the powers and principalities surrounding the Gulfs of Persia and 'Omān; but few seizures of slaves had been effected by British vessels in those waters. It was only in 1873 that effective naval arrangements were made in East Africa and the Persian Gulf for the forcible suppression of the traffic; but by 1876 the importation of African slaves into the countries of [the Persian Gulf on a large scale, which had hitherto been the rule, had temporarily ceased.

Marine Surveys and investigations on land, 1872-76.

The survey of the waters of Bahrain and the Hasa coast, resolved on in 1871, was carried on during the years 1872-74 by means of the schooner "Constance." The operations began in the neighbourhood of Bahrain. On their being subsequently extended towards the mainland, some opposition on the part of the local Turkish authorities was experienced; but it was eventually withdrawn in consequence of representations made to the Wāli of Baghdād, and the survey completed without obstruction.

In 1875 the Resident in the Persian Gulf made a journey to Shirāz and submitted to the Government of India a valuable statistical and administrative description of the Persian province of Fārs.

Communications, 1872-76.

The Persian Government in 1875 established an internal postal service of their own, which at a later period partly supplemented and partly superseded British postal arrangements existing in Persia.

British interests and official matters in the Persian Gulf and Turkish 'Irāq, 1872-76.

No change of importance took place in British interests and political arrangements in the Persian Gulf or Turkish 'Irāq during the period.

Complaints of abuses in the administration of the Oudh Bequest in the latter country continued to be received; but the British authorities, on the information which they then possessed, still held that intervention by themselves would not be warranted under the terms of the Bequest.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD LYTTON, APRIL 1876 TO JUNE 1880.

The years following 1876 were characterised by an acute revival of the Afghan difficulty, in other words by a renewal of serious tension between Britain and Russia in Central Asia. This crisis followed a war between

Russia and Turkey by which the position of the latter power was greatly weakened, but which did not otherwise much affect the position in the Middle East. On the death in 1863 of Dōst Muhammad Khān of Kābul, the consolidator of Afghanistan, the provinces of Herāt and Qandahār again broke away from the central Afghan government; and five years elapsed before Sher 'Ali Khān, the son and successor of Dōst Muhammad Khān, succeeded with British support in re-incorporating them with his dominions. Meanwhile the frontiers of Russia in Central Asia were being rapidly pushed forward, and at length a political correspondence between Tashkend and Kābul came into existence.

The Second Afghan War, 1878-80.

On a breach occurring in 1878 between Britain and the Afghan Amīr, consequent on the refusal of the latter to receive a Mission from the Government of India headed by Colonel Sir Lewis Pelly, formerly Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Second Afghan War began. It lasted from 1878 to 1879. Sher 'Ali Khān, having fled to the northern part of his dominions, died at Mazār-i-Sharīf in February 1879; his son Ya'qūb Khān was installed in his place under the Treaty of Gandamak (May 1879); and a British Envoy was established at Kābul in the person of Sir Louis Cavagnari. This *quasi*-appropriation of Kābul by the British Government ended, like the more pronounced occupation of 1839-41, in a massacre of the British representative, his suite and escort. The Third Afghan War followed, with the result that Ya'qūb Khān became a political *détenu* in India, while Kābul and Qandahār were placed temporarily under British administration.

Third Afghan War, and contemplated dismemberment of Afghanistan, 1879-80.

And the end of the Second Afghan War the policy of the Government of India was still to maintain the unity of Afghanistan; but the Third Afghan War caused them to change their views and to recommend instead a disintegration of the troublesome Afghan state. The transfer of Herāt and Sīstān to Persia was contemplated, and negotiations with the Shāh for the cession of the former to Persia on certain stringent conditions even reached an advanced stage. In 1880, Herāt being still held by Ayūb Khān, a son of the late Amīr Sher 'Ali Khān, Qandahār was detached from Kābul by the British and conferred on a Sardār of the Bārakzai family; and the question of constructing a railway from Qandahār to Herāt and of affording financial aid to Persiawere mooted. Ultimately, however, before any irreversible step had been taken, British policy in Afghanistan reverted to lines more in accordance with the traditions of the past; and by the end of 1881 'Abdur Rahmān, who had been installed as Amīr under an agreement which subjected him to British political suzerainty, was master of Qandahār and Herāt as well as of the rest of Afghanistan.

Persian affairs and relations, 1876-80.

Internal state of Persia.

The Persian throne remained stable, and order was generally maintained throughout Persia, during this period. In 1878 the Shāh again visited Europe.

British policy in regard to communications in Persia.

The political interests of Britain in Persia being closely bound up with her political interests in Afghanistan, it became an object of British policy to acquire means of penetration into Persia from the southward, preferably through 'Arabistān and presumably with a view to counteracting Russia from a new direction. In the opinion of Sir O. (then Lieutenant-Colonel) St. John, who held political charge at Qandahār as Resident in Southern Afghanistan during 1880-81, the events of the Afghan War had so increased British influence and prestige in Persia that the Persian Government were at last convinced of Britain's being a safer ally than Russia; and the same authority held that the opening of "the Shūshtar route" and the construction of roads inland from Būshehr would, while they increased the material prosperity of the south of Persia, tend to produce stability in Anglo-Persian relations by enabling the British Government to exert pressure on the Court of Tehrān through the Persian Gulf. The possibilities latent in the situation seem to have been perfectly comprehended by Russia, who opposed the construction of British railways in the south of Persia with a tenacity equalled only by that of Britain in resisting Russian railway projects in the north.

1877-79.

Between 1877 and 1879 persevering efforts were made by the British Government through Her Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehrān to secure the opening of the Kārūn River to steam navigation; but the attitude of the Shāh on this point was one of obstinate resistance, dictated it would seem by a fear lest the growth of Muhammareh in value as a port should lead to its seizure by Britain,—a consummation to which close relations between the Shaikh of Muhammareh and the British representative at Basrah, together with mischievous articles in the European press, appeared in His Persian Majesty's eyes to lend probability. The question of roads was at first allowed to slumber; but schemes for a railway to connect 'Arabistān with Central Persia were recommended to notice by the British diplomatic representative in Persia with the same total absence of results as that for the opening of the Kārūn.

1879-80.

These unsuccessful negotiations, it may be observed, all took place before the exhibition by Britain of a benevolent attitude towards Persia in connection with the proposed partition of Afghanistan. Subsequently

when the question of Herāt was discussed, the Shāh would have been willing, in return for the advantages offered him, to concede the free navigation of the Kārūn and the construction of waggon roads from Būshehr to Tehrān and from Shūshtar to Isfahān.

Turkish affairs, 1876-80.

Grant and revocation of a constitution in Turkey, and Russo-Turkish war, 1876-80.

The disastrous crash towards which Turkey had for some years been trending along a path of financial extravagance, territorial ambition, internal misgovernment and unreal reforms, was reached in 1876. In May of that year the ruling Sultān was deposed by a group of politicians, among whom Mid-hat Pāsha, the first "Wālī" of Baghdād, was a prominent figure; and the reign of his immediate successor lasted only three months. At the end of 1876 the grant by the Sultān of a liberal constitution to the whole of the Ottoman Empire was suddenly announced, partly, it would seem, by way of evading the demands of a European Conference for concrete administrative reforms in European Turkey.

Russia, however, unimpressed by the guarantees which the new constitution afforded for the cessation of tyrannical government in the Balkans, declared war on Turkey in 1877; and in less than a year her armies were at the gates of Constantinople. In the course of 1878 an International Congress at Berlin detached the greater part of European Turkey more or less completely from the Ottoman Empire; while Britain agreed—on certain conditions which Turkey afterwards neglected to fulfil — to take part in defending the Asiatic dominions of the Sultān from future aggression, and received in return the island of Cyprus.

The Turkish constitution was revoked; and the country, despite a show of reform in finance, military matters and general administration, remained sunk in the abyss of misgovernment from which it had never really emerged. The inefficiency and corruption of the official class, which had now for about a generation been drawn from a lower social stratum than formerly, were extreme; and their growing dislike and even hatred of Europeans, seemed to increase with the degree in which they collectively imitated European political methods and individually adopted European ways of life.

Affairs in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-80.

The conditions which obtained throughout the Ottoman Empire generally were well exemplified at the time in the province of Turkish 'Irāq, where the normal course of events was as little disturbed as anywhere by political vicissitudes at the capital and an unsuccessful war. Some progress had been

made during the preceding twenty years in breaking the power of the Arab tribes; and administrative councils, partly elective, had been associated everywhere with the executive officials and were not without their use. Nevertheless the state of affairs was still such that Mesopotamia could not be described as enjoying the benefits of orderly government. At Karbala and Najaf rebellions occurred in the summer of 1877; the rising at the former place was not suppressed without recourse to military operations in the environs of the town. In the winter of 1877-78 there were grain riots at Baghdād itself, and the mob had their way. The large Shammar tribe were divided under rival chiefs; and only a small portion appeared inclined to follow the course marked out for them by the Turkish authorities and settle down to agriculture. In 1878-79 rival chiefs of the Banī Lām were at war with one another, endangering the navigation of the Tigris, and could not be reduced to order. The Āl Bū Muhammad, too, were internally at feud, and the followers of one of their Shaikhs, who was at variance with the Turkish Government, committed serious offences upon the same river. The last and most serious of the Āl Bū Muhammad outrages, occurring in 1880 just after the close of the period, was an attack upon the British mail steamer "Khalifah"; two natives on board were killed and the European officer in command was dangerously wounded.

The usual Turkish panacea of reorganisation was applied. It took the shape, this time, of the formation of a new Mūsal Wilāyat by a reduction of the area of the Baghdād Wilāyat in 1879, followed by the combination in 1880 of the remainder of the Baghdād Wilāyat and the whole of the Basrah Wilāyat into a single charge.

Steam navigation on the Tigris continued to prosper. Most of the vessels of the Turkish navigation flotilla were commanded at this time by European captains.

Affairs in Hasa, 1876-80.

In the summer of 1878 a serious rising against Turkish rule took place in Hasa; it was headed by members of the Wahhābī ruling family and continued with partial success until the end of the year, when it was at length suppressed by troops from Turkish 'Irāq.

At the same time, without regard to the precariousness of the Turkish position in Hasa, the Porte formally advanced pretensions to the ownership of 'Odaid in Trucial 'Omān.

Turko-Persian relations, 1876-80.

The period was one of virtual stagnation in Turko-Persian relations.

Affairs and relations of the western coast of the Persian Gulf, 1876-80.

Chiefly, perhaps, in consequence of the continued exclusion of the Wahhábis from the coast-line of the Persian Gulf by the Turks, and of the difficulties of the Turks themselves in Hasa, the period was one of political inactivity along the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf. The capture of Zubárah in Qatar by hostile tribes in 1878 deprived the Shaikh of Bahrain of his last foothold of influence on the mainland. This event, while it removed a cause of frequent complications, was accompanied by risks to the Bahrain principality which British naval vigilance had to be called in to parry; and its accomplishment left Bahrain more exposed for the future to the danger of sudden invasion from the mainland. The internal state of Bahrain about the same time became so disturbed that in the spring of 1879 a British political officer with a military guard was sent to reside on the main island for a time.

Affairs of the 'Omán Sultanate, 1876-80.

In 1877 rebels against the authority of the Sultán of 'Omán occupied Matrah and invested Masqat, but they were obliged by British naval action to retire without having secured any material advantages. They had committed some excesses, however, during their stay in Matrah; and the situation at one time appeared so dangerous that all the British Indian subjects at that place were embarked and removed from it by water.

European powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1876-80.

France maintained consular representatives, as she had done for some time past, at Baghdád and Basrah; and important archæological researches were initiated at Tallo in 1877 by a titulaire of her Basrah Vice-Consulate. Otherwise there were no evidences of French interest in the Persian Gulf region. The concession for irrigation and other purposes in 'Arabistán sought by Dr. Tholozan was granted by the Sháh in 1878 after his visit to Paris; but the French Government seemed to attach no importance to it, and presently it was cancelled by the giver in consequence of British

diplomatic representations, with the assent of the concessionaire himself. The French flag began to be employed by slave traders in the Gulf of 'Omān as a cover for their operations; this was a serious development, though almost unnoticed in the beginning, and was destined to cause much trouble at a later time.

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1876-1880.

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf remained on the same footing as in the previous years, but were occasionally defective. During the summer of 1879 there was no British war vessel in the Gulf.

Maritime security in the Persian Gulf, 1876-1880.

An outbreak of piracy occurred in the waters adjoining the coasts of Hasa and Qatar in 1878 and rapidly attained alarming proportions; many lives were taken, and many boats and much property were carried off. The pirates were mostly Bani Hājir of the mainland, and their lawlessness seemed to be connected in its origin with the Arab rebellion against the Turks in Hasa. The suppression of the pirates was a matter of difficulty because the coast of Hasa was now nominally under the Turkish flag, and because it was uncertain how far to the southward the territorial pretensions of the Porte extended or should be admitted. Efforts were made locally and at Constantinople to stimulate the Turkish authorities into taking effective action against the pirates; but their feeble endeavours to respond soon died away without result. In 1878 a number of piratical vessels were captured by a British man of war off Qatīf and handed over to the Turkish executive officials there; but in 1879, from considerations of international comity, it was ordered that action by British vessels on the coast of Hasa should be suspended. The disagreeable state of affairs which had arisen was thus prolonged, through no fault on the part of the British political or naval authorities, into the next period.

A serious case of river piracy occurred in the Shatt-al-'Arab in 1880, the Superintendent of the British telegraph station at Fao being among the sufferers; but it was strenuously followed up by the British authorities, and partial reparation and a penalty were extracted in Persian territory through the Shaikh of Muhammarah.

In 1879 the conclusion of an agreement for the mutual surrender of fraudulently absconding debtors was brought about, under British auspices among the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān. Its effect was greatly to reduce the number of the disputes from which such maritime irregularities as still happened on the pearl banks and in the lower Gulf ordinarily sprang.

Maritime and other surveys, 1876-1880.

In 1876 or 1877 the inlet of Khor-al-Hajar on the coast of the 'Omān Sultanate was surveyed by one of Her Majesty's ships; but no marine survey work of importance seems to have been carried out during the period.

Communications in the Persian Gulf region, 1876-1880.

Means of communication with and in the Persian Gulf remained almost unchanged. In 1878-79 a project for a British railway to connect the Persian Gulf with Europe *viâ* Kuwait, Baghdād, Mūsal and Diyārbakr was discussed. This "Tigris Valley Railway" was recommended by the Duke of Sutherland and supported by Mr. Andrew, well-known for his former strong advocacy of a Euphrates Valley Railway; but it came to nothing, like the project which had preceded it, for want of a financial guarantee from the British Government.

In 1878 opposition on the part of Turkey to the existence of British post offices in Turkish 'Irāq began to declare itself.

At the end of 1880 the British telegraph station on Hanjām Island was abolished, technical improvements in telegraphy having rendered an intermediate station between Jāshk and Būshehr no longer necessary for practical purposes.

British official matters in the Persian Gulf, 1876-1880.

Since the abolition of the Indian Navy in 1863, a Government steam vessel had generally been held at the disposal of the Resident in the Persian Gulf to carry him on his political tours, as a despatch vessel, and for

miscellaneous duties; but in October 1876 the last of the series of these ships, which had included the "Berenice" and the "Hugh Rose," was withdrawn, leaving the Resident dependent on the gunboats of the Royal Navy as his sole means of locomotion in the Gulf. A steam cutter was about the same time added to the establishment of the Bûshehr Residency, but it was given for quarantine work, and it was fit only for harbour duties. In May 1877, on a request from the Officiating Resident, the Indian Government steamer "Dalhousie" was sent to the Persian Gulf; but, being required for the transport of troops, she was withdrawn again in the following August. The want of a vessel seriously hampered the Resident in his political work, and in 1878 it was suggested by him that a steamer should be supplied in exchange for one of the three naval vessels detailed for service in the Persian Gulf.

The status of Bāsidu, commonly regarded as a British possession, was subjected to close scrutiny by the Government of India in 1878, but no final conclusion as to its nature was drawn by them from their enquiries.

In 1878 the British telegraph station at Jāshk was provided with a small military guard; and in the following year the British military headquarters in the Persian Gulf district was virtually transferred from Bāsidu to Jāshk, which thereafter was ordinarily garrisoned by about 90 Indian infantry.

In 1879 the European Assistant Political Agent at Gwādur was withdrawn and a Native Agent substituted; and in the same year the supervision of affairs in the 'Omāni dependency of Dhufār, on the southern coast of Arabia, was transferred from the British Resident at Aden to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1880.

In 1877, after the post had remained entirely vacant for five years, a European officer was appointed for the first time to the British Vice-Consulate at Mūsal; and in 1879 the consular status of the British representative at Basrah was raised from that of Vice-Consul to that of Consul.

A technical flaw in the management of the Oudh Bequest was removed in 1877 by the formal transfer to the British Political Agency at Baghdād, for the exclusive benefit of Indians, of about one-third of the proceeds of the Bequest which had been customarily so applied, but without written authority from the Mujtahid-Distributors, for nearly twenty years.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD RIPON, JUNE 1880 TO DECEMBER 1884.

The next four years were unmarked by any signal changes in the Persian Gulf region, events continuing to move leisurely along lines already traced out.

Affairs in Persia, 1880-84.

Navigation, railway, and road projects.

The question of communications in southern Persia became in 1881-82 the subject of exhaustive study by British experts, but no practical action resulted. The general conclusions reached were, apparently, that the opening of the Kārūn River to navigation was highly desirable; that the construction of a railway from the south coast to the interior was practicable, but that the route which such a railway ought to follow was, on existing information, doubtful; and that, if a railway were made from 'Arabistan northwards, an alignment by Dizfūl and Khurramābād would present certain technical advantages over others. In 1881 the Persian Government, alarmed by an incursion from Turkish territory into their own, and desirous of obtaining the support of the British Government, professed willingness to consider the desirability of opening the Kārūn and making a road from 'Arabistān to Tehrān; but in 1882-83, the danger which had rendered them conciliatory having disappeared, their attitude on the subject of Kārūn navigation again became impracticable.

Affairs in Turkey, 1880-84.

For the Ottoman Empire at large an important occurrence was the formation, in 1881, of a Department of Public Debt by which the finances of Turkey were brought, to a large extent, under international control.

State of Turkish 'Irāq.

In 1881 a serious revolt against Turkish authority took place on the part of the Muntafik, the largest and most important Arab tribe in Turkish 'Irāq; it seems eventually to have died out rather than to have been suppressed. In 1883 the left bank of the Tigris was disturbed, and the safety of navigation on that river was for a time endangered.

State of Hasa.

The Turkish administration of Hasa, as will become further apparent in treating the question of maritime security, was in a state of mere chaos,

In 1880 the 'Ajmān tribe attacked the Hasa Oasis, but were repulsed; and dissensions among the Turkish officials in Hasa came to a climax with the imprisonment of the civil Governor by the military Commandant,—an unusual proceeding which was subsequently condemned by higher authority.

Relations between Turkey and Persia, 1880-84.

Turko-Persian relations presented no salient features during the period under review.

Affairs and political relations on the western coast of the Persian Gulf, 1880-84.

Bahrain.

Bahrain was still the only principality on the Arabian side of the Gulf of which the affairs demanded serious attention on the part of the British Government. At the end of 1880, when Turkey had for some years been manifesting a disposition to meddle in Bahrain affairs and had in particular taken up, though tardily, the cause of the leaders in the Bahrain rebellion of 1869, preparations were made by a Bahrain refugee, who had become a pensioner of the Ottoman Government, to invade the islands. A Bedouin force collected under his leadership upon the coast of Qatar, but was unable to obtain boats in which to cross over to Bahrain, and before long British naval vessels arrived upon the scene and rendered the situation secure. Advantage was taken of the crisis by the Resident in the Persian Gulf to obtain from the Shaikh of Bahrain an Exclusive Agreement by which he bound himself to hold no political relations with any power but the British Government.

Qatar.

In 1882 the Shaikh of Dōhah, whom the Turks had appointed to govern Qatar in their name, but whose position as a Turkish official was not recognised by the British Government, Qatar being in their view independent of Turkish authority, expelled a number of British Indian traders from Dōhah. Direct compulsion having been applied to the Shaikh under the orders of the British Government, he allowed the traders to return, and paid, as demanded, a substantial indemnity in compensation of their losses. A Turkish protest followed, in reply to which the Porte were informed that their claims to Qatar were not admitted, and that the British Government would continue to hold direct communication with the chiefs of that coast.

Affairs and political relations of the Sultānate of 'Omān 1880-84.

In 1883 a determined attack was made upon Masqat by rebels from the interior, but was repulsed by the Sultān of 'Omān with some support from a British war vessel in the harbour. A large proportion of the British Indian subjects at Masqat and Matrah were obliged to take refuge afloat until it was clear that the assault had failed.

Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf and Turkish 'Irāq, 1880-84.

The only European power besides Britain as yet claiming influence in the Persian Gulf region was France; but Russia now made a first appearance in that political field.

France.

In 1881 there was a revival of Dr. Tholozan's scheme for irrigation and other enterprises in 'Arabistān; and, possibly in connection therewith, a subsidised line of French steamers began to run between Marseilles and Basrah, while French commercial agents, whose antecedents did not appear to be commercial, settled at Muhammarah and initiated a trade in arms and ammunition at that port besides engaging in speculations in grain. There was reason to think that these French undertakings enjoyed the countenance of Russia, who would gladly have seen British influence in 'Arabistān neutralised by any agency whatever. Again in 1883-84 a French engineer surveyed the Shīrāz-Fīrūzābād-Būshehr route in connection with a project for a railway from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf. Nothing came, however, of the 'Arabistān irrigation scheme; and in the course of the next few years the other evidences of French activity one by one disappeared. The French Vice-Consulate at Basrah was closed in 1883.

Russia.

The first and at the same time the only clear sign of Russia's attention having been drawn to the Persian Gulf was the institution of a Russian Consulate at Baghdād in 1881.

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1880-84.

Inefficiency of the Persian Gulf flotilla.

The system of naval arrangements introduced in 1871-72 continued in force; but there were occasional complaints that the vessels supplied for

service in the Persian Gulf were inefficient. Thus in July 1883, when a British vessel was wrecked in the south coast of Arabia and it was desired to send a ship of war to her assistance, neither of the two vessels then in the Persian Gulf could be despatched on this duty because both were incapable of steaming against the south-west monsoon.

Salutes and flags, 1879-1883.

In 1879 the naval regulations in regard to the firing of salutes by vessels in the Persian Gulf were changed; this was in consequence, partly, of a general international reduction of saluting which had taken place on the introduction of rifled artillery, and partly of a want of uniformity in practice which had prevailed in the Persian Gulf. About the same time the question of the flying of flags by political officers when cruising on board men-of-war was also brought under discussion. It seems to have been decided in the first instance, after consideration by the departments concerned, that naval salutes in honour of British political officers and of native rulers or authorities should be practically abolished, but that the flying of the Viceroy of India's flag by political officers holding responsible positions should be permitted to continue. The East India station standing orders of 1882 show, however, that the general restrictions on saluting were ultimately relaxed in favour of certain native chiefs in the Persian Gulf.

In 1883 the Shāh's scheme for the creation of a Persian navy was revived, after having been dormant for many years, and a beginning was made by ordering two small vessels from Germany.

Maritime security in the Persian Gulf, 1880-84.

Piracies off the coast of Hasa.

Disorder at sea in the neighbourhood of the Hasa coast, which had become a serious problem during the last period, was unabated; and it was clear that no co-operation in repressing it was to be looked for by the British on the part of the Turkish authorities. One of the latter, the Wāli of Baghdād, whose seat was distant hundreds of miles from the disturbed waters, finally took refuge in a denial of the fact that piracy existed. An effort was then made to secure the adherence of the Porte to arrangements under which action by British vessels in Turkish territorial waters would be regularised; but the negotiations were barren of result. Finally in 1881 the British Government, finding no alternative, absolved their naval commanders in the Persian Gulf from the obligation of respecting the three mile limit upon the Turkish coast in their operations for the suppression

of piracy; but a caution was given against raising avoidable disputes with the Porte, and against encroaching more than might be necessary upon the sovereign rights of Turkey. After the new order had been issued there was, for a time, a considerable diminution in the number of offences committed by pirates from Hasa territory.

The arms trade in the Persian Gulf, 1880-84.

Beginning of the arms trade.

This period witnessed the commencement of a trade in fire-arms and ammunition with the Persian Gulf which was later to attain vast dimensions and give rise to large political questions. The attention of the Government of India was first drawn to the traffic towards the end of the wars in Afghanistan, when steps were taken to impede its continuance through Indian ports. In 1881 the Shāh of Persia took alarm, and the entrance of arms and ammunition into Persia was prohibited; nevertheless importations were made at Muhammareh in that year by French merchants.

Communications of the Persian Gulf region, 1880-84.

Turkish jealousy of the British Post Office.

No improvement was made in the means of communication already existing in the Persian Gulf region; but the Turkish Government instituted an overland mail service between Turkish 'Irāq and Syria in imitation of and in competition with the British post on that line, and their opposition to the British postal services in Turkish 'Irāq became more pronounced. During the whole of the period the Porte continued to press for the abolition of the British post offices at Baghdād and Basrah, and in some cases their local officials resorted to unseemly obstruction of the working of the British post, but without success.

British official matters in Persia, 1880-84.

Virtual evacuation of Bāsidu, 1883.

In 1883 the British station of Bāsidu, continuously occupied for marine purposes since 1823, was practically evacuated for climatic reasons, a Native Coal Agent only being left in charge of the settlement.

Despatch vessel for the Persian Gulf Political Residency.

It was at length resolved in 1884, after an interval of eight years, to provide the Bûshehr Political Residency once more with a despatch vessel, apparently without reducing the number of the Royal Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf; but the necessity of building a ship occasioned delay.

British interests and official matters in Turkish 'Iraq, 1880-84.

The period was one of extreme discomfort to British interests in Turkish 'Irâq, anti-European feeling in Turkish official circles being now characterised by an intensity which it had never before possessed.

Unpunished murder of a European British subject at Baghdâd, 1881.

In 1881 an inoffensive British engineer in business at Baghdâd was murdered in the public street, and the local Turkish authorities threw every impediment in the way of the criminals being brought to justice. Strong and sustained pressure by the British Embassy at Constantinople ultimately failed to secure the conviction of the accused, who were acquitted again and again by the Turkish tribunals to which the case was successively transferred.

Turkish attempts to put an end to British commercial navigation of the Tigris, 1883.

In 1883, in connection with steps by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company for adding a new vessel to their fleet, the Wâli of Baghdâd suddenly denied the right of the Company to navigate the Tigris at all, as they had been doing for more than twenty years, and took high-handed measures to bring about a cessation of their business. Passengers and cargo were denied access to the British steamers by Turkish police, and the landing of passengers, cargo, and even mails was similarly prevented. More than a month passed before the British navigation of the Tigris was freed of this arbitrary embargo, the Company in the meantime sustaining heavy loss; and this result was not attained without energetic representations at Constantinople, enforced by the appearance of a British gunboat at Basrah. It was thought not impossible that the Russian Consul at Baghdâd might have encouraged the Wâli in his obstruction of the chief British commercial interest then existing in Turkish 'Irâq.

The Oudh Bequest.

Complaints of maladministration of the Oudh Bequest by unworthy Mujtahid-Distributors were received as in the past, and seemed to be well-founded, but no remedy was suggested or discussed.

British official matters of general importance, 1880-84.

Transfer of the superintendence of

It remains to mention a British official change of general importance which had for some time been gradually approaching, and which was not

Zanzibar from the Government of India to Her Majesty's Government, 1883.

without importance in the Persian Gulf, though not directly affecting it; this was the transfer of British interests and relations in Zanzibar from the care of the Government of India to that of Her Majesty's Government.

The origin of the Government of India's control over British affairs in Zanzibar is to be traced in the facts that Zanzibar was at first a dependency of the Sultanate of 'Omān, with which that Government were in relations, and that the last ruler of the undivided state of 'Omān-*cum*-Zanzibar had his headquarters in Zanzibar. A certain degree of connection between Zanzibar, Aden, and the Persian Gulf always existed; and in 1881 the Government of India expressly permitted its representatives in all three places to furnish each other with copies of such letters on matters of common interest as they might address to superior authority in India, provided that the letters were not of a peculiarly confidential nature.

But, though the trade of Zanzibar was largely in British Indian hands, the mercantile Indian community settled in large numbers in Zanzibar and on the East African coast was of older standing than the British Political Agency in Zanzibar; and the principal question of importance in Zanzibar, on which many other questions depended, was that of the slave trade, which was an Imperial and in no sense a specially Indian concern. Sir Bartle Frere, in 1873 or 1874, severely criticised what he described as "the "inherent vice of the present arrangement, which is, that the Government "of India is called on to control affairs and deal with questions which very "remotely concern any one east of Aden."

The Government of India had been for some years disposed to relinquish control of the British establishments in Zanzibar; and in 1882, when the cost of representation there and of the subsidy payable by the Sultān of Zanzibar to the Sultān of Masqat, which last in the course of negotiation concerning the repression of the slave trade had become a charge on the British authorities, was borne in equal moieties by the Home and Indian Treasuries, the Foreign Office in London proposed a scheme of transfer. It was, in outline, that the Imperial Government should assume the patronage, control and payment of the Zanzibar establishment, with its incidental costs and pension liabilities in consideration of the Indian Government's making itself responsible for the payment of the subsidy, so long as the subsidy should continue to be payable. The proposals of the Foreign Office did not commend themselves, in this shape, to the Government of India, who pointed out that more than half of the Zanzibar expenditure, at the rate then in force, would be thrown upon themselves by the proposed change; they foresaw, moreover, that the subsidy was not unlikely to be a perpetual charge, and that, if it should be discontinued, it might be necessary to

release the Sultán of 'Omán from obligations under which he lay to abstain from attempting to recover Zanzibar by force.

Ultimately, however, the transfer of Zanzibar to Her Majesty's Government took place, with effect from the 1st September 1883, on the basis proposed by the Foreign Office. Decision of the question of the perpetuity of the subsidy, and of its incidence in case it should be permanently continued, was postponed until the demise of the reigning Sultán of 'Omán.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD DUFFERIN, DECEMBER 1884 TO DECEMBER 1888.

The period next to be entered on was signalised by renewed tension in Anglo-Persian relations, arising from Russian progress in Central Asia.

Crisis in Anglo-Russian relations, 1885.

In February 1884 the Russians occupied Merv; and in March 1885, while the Amir of Afghanistan was in India, news was received of a serious violation of the Afghan frontier by a Russian force at Panjdeh near Herat,—an event which brought Russia and Britain within measurable distance of war. Among the results of the crisis were an addition to the Indian Army of 30,000 men, increasing the Indian military budget by £2,000,000 per annum; the formation of Imperial Service Troops in the Native States of India; and a prompt extension of the Indian railway system to and beyond Quetta in Baluchistan, whichhad been retained when Qandahar was evacuated in 1881.

Movements of Ayúb Khan.

In 1887 Ayúb Khán, a member of the Bárakzai family that ruled Afghanistan who had defeated a British column at Maiwand in 1881, and who had been detained under observation in Persia since 1884, escaped from surveillance and, after a last unsuccessful attempt to assert his pretensions in Afghanistan, threw himself on the mercy of the British Government at Mashad and was removed to India, where he remained as a British political pensioner.

Affairs and relations in Persia, 1884-88.

Russian political jealousy of Britain paralysed, almost until the close of the period, the development of communications in Southern Persia. There was no longer any talk of constructing roads; and the only result of a

seemingly ill-considered British scheme for a railway from Ahwāz to Tehran which was put forward in 1887, was the extortion by Russia from the Shāh in the same year of a promise that he would consult the Tsar before permitting any foreign company to construct a railway or water-way in Persia.

Opening of the lower Kārūn River to navigation, 1888.

In 1888 British diplomacy at last triumphed over Russian opposition and other obstacles to the extent of obtaining, after many years of patient effort, the opening of the lower Kārūn River to general navigation. Prospects were at the same time held out by the Persian Government of an arrangement for the construction of a road for wheeled traffic being made without delay to connect the head of navigation on the Kārūn with the Persian capital.

Formation of the Persian Governorship of the Gulf Ports, 1887.

Certain measures of administrative reorganisation taken by the Shah's Government in Southern Persia about this time were not devoid of practical significance. So early as 1882 a transference had begun to take place of ports and districts on the Persian coast from the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Fārs to the personal control of the Amīn-us-Sultān, a Court favourite. In 1887 the remainder of Fārs was conferred upon the same official; but simultaneously the most important towns of the littoral were removed from his charge, together with the districts and islands depending on them, and formed into a new administrative division styled "the Gulf Ports," which was placed under a Governor of its own, in the first instance a member of the Persian royal family. Probably in the next year, Jāshk and its districts were detached from the Governor-Generalship of Kirmān and included in the Gulf Ports division.

Activity and intrigues of Persia in the Persian Gulf, 1887-88.

These changes, probably inspired by the Amīn-us-Sultān, were accompanied by an outburst of Persian political activity in the Persian Gulf such as had never been witnessed there before. In 1887 the Arab port of Lingeh, hitherto under tribal government, was made subject to direct Persian administration, and the Persian flag was at the same time hoisted on the island of Sirri, which had close relations with Lingeh. Persian encroachments and intrigues in various directions followed. The withdrawal of the British military detachment at the Jāshk telegraph station was requested and obtained, but not until the immunities of the station and staff had been recorded in a formal Agreement between the British and Persian Governments. Official support of false allegations against the British political representatives at Būshehr and Lingeh and vexatious and insulting proceedings in the Būshehr custom house seemed to form part of a set policy for the reduction of British prestige, but were checked by sharp diplomatic remonstrances at Tehrān. In 1887-88 efforts were made to induce the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to place themselves under the suzerainty of Persia,

but without success, and Persian machinations seem to have been on foot even with reference to Qatar and Bahrain. The crop of anti-British manifestations quickly withered away, however, leaving few traces behind.

Affairs in Turkey, 1884-88.

There was no change in the general situation in Turkey during the period.

Turkish 'Irāq.

In Turkish 'Irāq tribal disorder had become less universal than formerly; nevertheless in 1886 the Hamawand were in revolt against the Turkish Government and infested the roads in their neighbourhood; and about the same time savage fighting took place between the Dilaim and the Shammar at no great distance from Baghdād.

Central Arabia.

A disposition to push their influence in Central Arabia was still shown by the Turkish Government. In 1886 a Turkish mission visited Ḥāil, the capital of the Amīr of Northern Najd, but failed to obtain his consent to the establishment there of an Ottoman mosque and school, and shortly afterwards, when the hegemony of Central Arabia began to pass into the hands of Ibn Rashīd, the relations between him and the Porte had become such that rumours were current of a design on the part of the Amīr to invade Trucial 'Omān in their interest.

Relations between Turkey and Persia, 1884-88.

The only dealings of importance between the Turkish and Persian Governments at this time related to the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Shalhah Island dispute, 1884.

The small island of Shalhah towards the Persian side of that river, formed about 1870, occupied by a Turkish subject in 1876, evacuated again in 1877 in consequence of pressure put upon Turkey, and taken possession thereafter by cultivators from Persia, came into direct dispute between the Wāli of Basrah and the Shaikh of Muhammareh in 1884. The Wāli on this occasion would have occupied the islet unawares; but the Shaikh was vigilant, and the arrival of a Turkish gunboat was forestalled by a *levée en masse* of the tribes on the Persian side.

Construction of a Turkish

It was clearly the object of the Turkish Government to assert their authority over the whole breadth of the Shatt-al-'Arab; and, having been

foiled in their design of seizing Shalhah, they proceeded at the end of 1885 to construct a fort on the Turkish bank of the river at Fāo, below Shalhah, commanding the entrance from the sea. Their action in this respect was contrary, if not to the letter, at least to the spirit, of the Second Treaty of Erzeroum as amplified by the explanation of the Ambassadors of the mediating powers, which seemed to imply that the opposing banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab would not be fortified by either Persia or Turkey; and the British Government also regarded the erection of the fort with disapproval for general reasons. In 1887 diplomatic remonstrances on the subject were addressed to the Porte through His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; they were founded partly on the British construction of the Treaty and partly on considerations affecting British interests. In 1888 the Turkish Government returned an unsatisfactory reply, and, had it not been for the annoyance then recently caused to Russia by the opening of the Kārūn to navigation, a British naval demonstration would probably have taken place in the neighbourhood of Fāo.

Fort at Fāo, 1885-88.

Affairs and relations of the western coast of the Persian Gulf, 1884-88.

Some unrest prevailed during the period upon the western shores of the Persian Gulf; it was due chiefly to misconduct on the part of the principal Shaikh of Qatar, but it was intensified by Turkish and Persian intrigues.

In 1886 the Shaikh connived at excesses by Bedouins at his port of Dōhah, his object being to bring about by indirect means the removal of the British Indian traders settled there; but a denial of complicity and an apology by him were accepted as sufficient amends by the British political authorities. In 1887 there was renewed disorder at Dōhah for which the Shaikh was responsible; this time the British subjects at Dōhah were temporarily removed to a place of greater safety, and valuables belonging to the Shaikh were sequestrated in Bahrain with the result that he paid compensation to the sufferers. These proceedings elicited a protest from the Ottoman Government, which His Britannic Majesty's Government refused to entertain on the ground that they did not recognise the existence of any Turkish rights in Qatar.

Ill-treatment of British Indian subjects in Qatar, 1886-1887.

In 1887-88 Turkey and Persia both manifested an undue interest in the affairs of Bahrain and Trucial 'Omān, the Shāh having revived his claim to

Turkish and Persian intrigues in Bahrain, etc.

Bahrain, possibly at Russian instigation; as a safeguard an Agreement was taken by the British authorities from all the Arab Shaikhs concerned, by which the signatories bound themselves not to enter into relations with other powers other than Britain and not to grant concessions to such powers. In 1888, when there appeared a danger of foreign intrigues assuming a practical shape, a British vessel of war was stationed off Bahrain with instructions to repulse, if necessary, any attempt at a landing on the islands by Turks, Persians, or Arabs from the mainland. A warning on the subject was also addressed to the Turkish Government; but in the case of Persia, which possessed no means of direct interference with the Shaikhdom, none was considered to be required.

Trucial 'Omān.

Early in the same year the Turkish Wālī of Basrah had visited Dōhah and established a military garrison and a coal dépôt there; and a little later, in the course of hostilities which had long been in progress between the Shaikh of Qatar and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, a son of the former was killed in battle. An anxious period followed, during which an invasion of Trucial 'Omān by the Shaikh of Qatar and the Amīr of Northern Najd under Turkish auspices was apprehended; but, though some commotion was caused among the Trucial Shaikhs, no actual movement of the sort took place. The attitude of the local Turkish authorities towards the Shaikh of Bahrain at this time was insulting, and they persisted in addressing him in terms which implied that he was officially subordinate to themselves; but their vagaries were ignored.

Affairs and relations the of 'Omān Sultanate, 1884-88.

Limited and conditional guarantee given by the British Government for the safety of Masqat and Matrah, 1886.

In 1886, in order to prevent rebel attacks on Masqat such as had occurred in the past with serious detriment to local British interests as well as to those of the Government of the country, the British Government caused to be announced a resolution which they had formed of assisting the Sultān of 'Omān to repel unprovoked attacks upon his capital and the neighbouring port of Matrah. This guarantee, the duration of which was expressly limited to the lifetime of the reigning Sultān, and which was qualified by a condition that the Sultān should govern in a manner approved by the British Government, emphasised and consolidated the special position which Britain had acquired in 'Omān.

Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1884-88.

Symptoms of Russian activity at this time became apparent in the Persian Gulf region. In the spring of 1887 Captain Vonblumor, a Russian officer of Cossacks in the service of the Shāh, visited Isfahān, Shīrāz, and Būshehr on a tour of inspection. In the winter of 1887-88 a Russian Cossack ex-officer appeared at Būshehr and caused some excitement in Persian circles by openly discussing the anti-British policy of his country, and an alleged arrangement between Russia and Persia to make common cause against Britain in the Persian Gulf; his presence at Būshehr synchronised with a short period during which, as has been shown, the activity of the Persian Government in the Gulf was unusually great and was characterised by hostility to Britain. Russia.

French undertakings were limited during the period to a continuation of the archæological investigations already begun at Tallo in Turkish 'Irāq, and to the excavation of Shūsh in 'Arabistān in 1885-86, where nothing had been done since the British operations in 1852. France.

American archæologists began work at Nifar in Turkish 'Irāq in 1888, and in the following year an American Consulate was established at Baghdād. America.

Evidence that the attention of European nations generally was now engaged by the Persian Gulf in a greater degree than formerly was afforded by the visits of American, Italian, and Austro-Hungarian public vessels between 1886 and 1888.

British naval arrangements, 1884-88.

In 1884 a discussion arose as to the possibility of a reduction in the number of the six vessels of the Royal Navy allotted by the Admiralty for particular services under the Indian Government in accordance with the arrangement of 1869. The question seems to have been complicated by the fact that the "Sphinx," a Royal Navy gunboat specially designed for duty in the Persian Gulf, as also the "Lawrence," a despatch vessel for the Persian Gulf Residency, were under construction at the time, and that the Royal Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf were frequently all employed for four months in the year in operations for the suppression of the slave trade, which was not a special service under the Government of India. An

additional element of uncertainty seems also to have been imported into the calculations by an at first imperfect understanding on the point whether the "Lawrence" was to be armed or not. The Government of India were in the beginning of opinion that five vessels of the Royal Navy, besides the new political despatch vessel, would be required for performing the necessary services; but other authorities inclined to the view that a smaller number would suffice.

Eventually in 1887, by which time it had been decided* that the Persian Gulf despatch vessel should be practically unarmed, though fitted for receiving an armament in case of war, when she might, under the Indian Marine Service Act of 1884, be attached to the Royal Navy, the Government of India arrived at the conclusion that the number of the Royal Navy Vessels at their disposal might be reduced to four, of which one should always be on duty in the Persian Gulf and one in reserve at Bombay, chiefly to meet demands in the Persian Gulf.

Reduction of the Indian special service flotilla and of the subsidy paid by the Government of India to the Admiralty, 1888.

This arrangement was accepted by the Admiralty in 1888, together with a reduction of the ordinary naval subsidy paid by the Government of India from £70,000 to £35,500 a year; but the Government of India were made responsible for the payment of certain minor charges in addition to the reduced subsidy, and the whole agreement was treated as provisional in view of the possibility that newer vessels carrying more expensive complements might before long be assigned to the East India Station. The practical result was the substitution in the Persian Gulf of a modern gunboat of the Royal Navy (the "Sphinx") and a political despatch vessel (the "Lawrence"), both steaming 12 knots, for three obsolete naval gunboats of the inefficiency and slowness of which there were constant complaints.

Persian Navy.

A Persian naval force came into existence in the Persian Gulf in 1885 with the arrival of the "Persepolis" and "Susa," which had been built to the order of the Persian Government in Germany. The latter, which was a very small craft, was appropriated to service on the Karûn River, and the possession of the "Persepolis" was of advantage to Persia only within her own territorial waters.

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*Her Majesty's Government ruled that, "should any fighting be necessary in ordinary "times in the Persian Gulf, it must be done by Her Majesty's ships of war stationed "there. It would be almost certain to produce complications if the civil officer were "placed in a position to make war, as it were, from his own yacht. On the other hand "it will be advantageous that vessels should be so constructed as to be capable of being "useful in time of war."

Maritime security, 1884-88.

Piracy continued to some extent along the coast of Hasa, and the year 1887 in particular was distinguished by numerous offences, but of no great gravity.

The arms trade, 1884-88.

In 1884, disregarding a previous warning, a native firm under British protection at Būshehr embarked in the illegal arms and ammunition traffic, which had begun to be remunerative; and in 1887 a Parsi-English firm doing no other business imitated their example and opened an agency at Būshehr.

British marine surveys, 1884-88.

No systematic marine surveys were undertaken in the Persian Gulf during the period under review. In 1886 or 1887 the inlet of Khor Bani Bū 'Ali was discovered by a British naval vessel; and at the end of 1888, in connection with the opening of the Karūn to navigation, the Bahmanshīr was partially examined by the Persian Gulf Residency steamer "Lawrence."

Communications, 1884-88.

The only feature of the period in respect of communications was the abolition, in 1886, of the old established British overland post between Baghdād and Damascus, which had ceased to be of practical importance. The Turkish Government mail service on the same route was suppressed in 1887, but re-instituted in 1889. The Turkish line of communication between Baghdād and Constantinople when the Syrian route was not in use seems to have lain by Mūsal and Diyārbakr.

British official matters in Persia, 1884-88.

The R. I. M. S. "Lawrence" provided as a despatch vessel for the Persian Gulf Residency arrived in 1887, removing a serious difficulty under which the Resident had laboured in the discharge of his political duties during more than ten years.

The total removal of an Indian military detachment from the British telegraph station at Jāshk in 1887 has already been mentioned.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1884-88.

Official obstruction of British activity in Turkish 'Irāq still continued, but it had diminished in intensity.

Turkish official obstruction, 1885-86.

In 1885 the Porte protested against a tour made by the British Resident on the Tigris above Baghdād in the Residency stationnaire "Comet"; but, when it was pointed out that he had merely gone to visit a part of his consular district, they made no rejoinder. Later in the same year, however, the Turkish Government raised objections to a tour which the Resident intended to make, for official purposes, to Karbala and Najaf; and it was not until 1886 that their objections were withdrawn and that the Resident regained freedom of movement within the bounds of the province.

Abolition of Mūsal Vice-Consulate, 1887.

In 1887 the British Vice-Consulate at Mūsal, where British subjects and interests were few or did not exist, was abolished.

Oudh Bequest.

After the death of the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, at the end of 1887, abuses on the part of the Mujtahid-Distributors under the Oudh Bequest at Karbala and Najaf increased with the cessation of his salutary influence.

British official matters in general, 1884-88.

Jubilee of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, 1887.

In 1887 the Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress Victoria was celebrated at different points in the Persian Gulf with gratifying indications, in many instances, of good will on the part of the local authorities and of the Arab or Persian population, as well as of loyal enthusiasm among European and Indian British subjects.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD LANSDOWNE, DECEMBER 1888 TO JANUARY 1894.

The dominant note in political affairs during the period about to be entered on was still opposition between Russia and Britain; but its principal manifestations were transferred from the region of Afghanistan, where a strong administration had been established by the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān, to that of Persia. The removal of the Afghan pretender Ayūb Khān from Persia *viâ* Baghdād to India in 1888 may be taken as marking the time of this change.

Affairs in Persia, 1888-94.

Politico-economic contest between Britain and Russia.

In Persia political interest turned chiefly on the duel between British and Russian influence, in which railway construction and other ostensibly economic matters, such as commercial concessions, were utilised as fighting ground. The advantage, except in regard to railways, seemed to rest with Britain, who had also been successful at the close of the last period in enforcing her wishes for the opening of the Karūn River to navigation.

The immediate rejoinder of Russia to the success of Britain on the Karūn was to wring from the Shāh, in March 1889, an agreement reserving railway construction in Persia for the next five years to a Russian company; this was countered by an engagement obtained by Her Majesty's Government, ante-dated for obvious reasons September 1888, by which preferential rights of railway construction in South Persia were conferred on Britain. A copy of this engagement having been communicated by the British to the Russian Legation at Tehrān in 1890, the Russian Minister in the following month induced the Shāh to give another agreement preventing railway construction in Persia altogether for the next ten years. Even this move, however, did not remain unanswered. Britain secured as a set-off a preference over other powers in regard to tramway construction in Southern Persia.

In matters purely commercial, British successes were rapid and considerable. In 1889 a British Bank—the Imperial Bank of Persia—was established with a monopoly of issuing bank notes, and with certain mining rights, under a concession of 60 years' duration. This Bank in the next

year acquired a concession for constructing and exploiting a road between Tehrān and Ahwāz which also was to hold good for a period of 60 years. A monopoly of lotteries and another for the sale of tobacco passed into the hands of British capitalists in 1891; but both of these were subsequently cancelled,—in the one case without, in the other case subject to, payment of compensation by the Persian Government.

Public order in Persia.

Order in Persia was generally well maintained; but in 1888-91 there was some unsettlement of conditions in Northern 'Arabistān, due originally to trouble in the adjoining Bakhtiyāri country.

In 1892-93 a state almost of war prevailed between the inhabitants of the Persian coast and those of the peninsula of Qatar on the Arabian side of the Gulf; but no cognisance was taken of it by the Persian Government, and after a time it ceased.

Affairs in Turkey, 1888-94.

The Turkish Empire, notwithstanding the absolute and centralised rule to which it was now subject, exhibited symptoms of increasing disorganisation. Albania and Yaman became, after 1892, seats of frequently renewed trouble.

Turkish 'Irāq.

In Turkish 'Irāq, in 1892, the Āl Bū Muhammad tribe on the lower Tigris rose once more in insurrection, and the navigation of the river became for a time uncertain and unsafe. There were signs, however, of increased attention to economic questions. In 1890 a barrage built by a foreign engineer in the service of the Turkish Government for the purpose of obliging the Euphrates to return partially to its Hillah channel, which it had entirely deserted for that of the Hindiyah, was completed; and the object in view was to some extent attained. Again in 1892 the formation of an Ottoman Company for the prosecution of steam navigation on the Tigris was announced and an Imperial Iradé on the subject appeared; but obstacles delayed, or even prevented the commencement of operations by the company.

Hasa and Qatar.

The difficulties of the Turkish administration in Hasa, which for a while had not been serious, were suddenly augmented at this time. About 1889 petty disturbances became rife, and in 1892 a savage attack was made by Bedouins on a valuable caravan proceeding from Hofūf to the coast under a Turkish military escort; in the latter affair many lives were lost and much property was plundered. In the autumn of 1892 the Wāli of Basrah arrived in Hasa to restore order; but his proceedings, though help was obtained

from the Shaikh of Kuwait, seem to have been ineffectual. In the spring of 1893 the Wâli moved to Qatar, the principal Shaikh of which district it had evidently been resolved to coerce into greater submissiveness towards the Turkish Government; but an attempt to capture that chief by surprise ended in a Turkish military disaster, the force employed being driven back with loss upon the town of Dôhah, while the Wâli sought safety on board a Turkish man-of-war in the harbour. British mediation between the Turks and the Shaikh was proffered and was readily accepted by the latter; but the Turkish authorities declined to avail themselves of it. In the end the Wâli returned to his headquarters at Basrah leaving the affairs of Hasa and Qatar in no better state than he found them; and ultimately, in Qatar, a settlement by no means favourable to Turkish prestige was patched up through an influential Ottoman subject from Basrah.

Relations of Turkey and Persia, 1888-94.

Turkish interference with the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab, 1891-93.

The years 1891-93, in spite of the embarrassments which weighed upon Turkey in Hasa, were marked by a renewal of Turkish aggressiveness towards Persia over the question of Muhammareh and the Shatt-al-'Arab, —in other words the question of their common boundary at its southern end. In 1891 there were signs that the pretensions of Turkey to Muhammareh were about to be revived, but it was only in 1893 that Turkish officers at Fâo suddenly began to collect customs duty on the cargo of vessels from abroad bound up the river to Muhammareh. The Turkish authorities at Basrah, so far from disavowing the action of their subordinates at Fâo, declared that they had received orders to treat Muhammareh as a Turkish port. At the request of the Shâh, and apparently after consultation with Russia, His Britannic Majesty's Government caused a strong protest to be made at Constantinople, and the result was instant cessation of interference by the Turks with freedom of navigation.

Turkish Fort at Fâo, 1890-94.

In the matter of the fort which they had begun at Fao some years before, the Porte showed themselves less pliable, while the Persian Government displayed inexplicable nonchalance. In 1889, after the failure of a British protest in the previous year, the Persian Ambassador addressed the Turkish Government on the subject; but his remonstrances were unheeded. In 1890, when three British vessels of war were assembled at Fâo, a British naval party, including officers, was fired upon from the fort when landing; but the British Officer Commanding was subse-

quently admitted to the fort, and punishment was asserted to have been inflicted on the author of the insult. In 1892-93, after an interval, work on the fort was resumed by the Turkish military authorities with the result that, in 1893, a very strongly worded request for its discontinuance was addressed to the Porte. In reply satisfactory assurances were received, but work on the fort did not actually cease until the middle of the next year.

Meanwhile in 1891 or 1892, the Turkish Government had appointed a Consular Agent at Lingeh on the Persian coast, but he was not officially recognised by the Persian authorities.

Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1888-94.

Franco-Russian joint activity.

A sudden revival of French activity in the Persian Gulf region distinguished the period, and there were indications of the adoption of a joint policy adverse to Britain in the Middle East by France and Russia, between whom close relations existed from 1891 onwards, though they were not described as an "alliance" till 1895. In the Persian Gulf the execution of the supposed common designs of the two Governments devolved at first on France alone, and there was no increase, for the time being, of direct Russian interference.

The use of the French flag by slave-traders had become not unfrequent in the Gulfs of Persia and 'Omān, and the immunity from search by British men-of-war which it conferred caused it to be eagerly sought after by native ship-owners. France was thus provided with a valuable instrument for the extension of her local influence. A French Vice-Consulate was also established at Būshehr.

America.

The rôle of America, the only remaining power as yet possessing fixed interests in the Persian Gulf region, continued to be pacific and non-political. The American excavations at Nifar in Turkish 'Irāq were still being prosecuted; and in 1891 the Arabian Mission, a Protestant body affiliated to the Reformed (Dutch) Church of America, opened a station at Basrah, to which was added in 1893 another in Bahrain.

Affairs and relations of the principalities on the western coast of the Persian Gulf, 1888-94.

The principalities on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf became exposed at this time to unwonted threats or solicitations on the part of foreign

powers, but the final result was that they were drawn into closer relations with the British Government than before.

Turkish aggressions, and Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and Bahrain with Britain.

In 1890 an attempt was made by the Turkish Government to establish a Turkish official at 'Odaid in Trucial 'Omān; but their designs in that direction were not fully realised. In 1891 two Frenchmen, one a well-known intriguer, frequented the Trucial Coast for a time and recommended the French flag to the notice of the Trucial Shaikhs, from whom they also seemed to be trying to obtain concessions. In the winter of 1892-93, or about the time that the Turkish pretensions to ownership of Muhammarah and control of the Shatt-al-'Arab were advanced, it was said that the Porte had finally decided on the annexation of Bahrain to the Turkish Empire. The "reversion" of Bahrain—and also of 'Omān—to dependence on Turkey was officially proclaimed at Qatif, where Turkish flags were forced upon the acceptance of Bahrain boat-owners; but British diplomatic representations availed to secure the withdrawal of the proclamation and the abatement of other annoyances. The British Government also, in a controversy regarding the status of Bahrainis in the Ottoman dominions, informed the Porte that Bahrain was under British protection and firmly maintained the right of Bahrainis to British protection in Turkey. But the principal outcome of the Turkish intrigues described was an Exclusive Agreement with the British Government signed by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and Bahrain, by which the establishment of any sort of relations between the Shaikhs and foreign powers was rendered impossible.

Affairs and relations of the 'Omān Sultanate, 1888-94.

French activity.

When French influence began, as already explained, torevive in the Persian Gulf, the 'Omān Sultanate was the chief field of its manifestation. In 1891 the French Embassy in London complained, under a misapprehension of the facts, that pressure had lately been employed by Britain to obtain a modification of the rule of succession to the throne of 'Omān. In 1893 a guarantee was given by the French Government, at the instance of the French Colonial party, that a French Vice-Consulate would be established at Masqat; and ministerial silence confirmed an impression that the principal duties of the new post would be to promote the use of the French flag and support Russian policy in the Persian Gulf. Also in 1893, one of the French adventurers whose presence in Trucial 'Omān had contributed to the conclusion by the Shaikhs of the Exclusive Agreement with Britain

endeavoured to obtain a footing on shore at the port of Sur. In the same year a Russian volunteer cruiser visited Masqat, and reports of secret Russian negotiations with the Sultan became current.

Agreement of the Sultán of 'Omán with Britain, 1891.

Meanwhile the adoption of measures to prevent the intrusion of disturbing foreign influences into 'Omán had been considered by the British Government; and it seems not improbable that, but for the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862, which placed such a step out of the question, the Sultanate of 'Omán might in 1890 have been declared a British protectorate. Instead, in 1891, an agreement with the British Government was signed by the Sultán under which he bound himself and his successors never to make any alienation of territory, whether temporary or permanent, in favour of any power but Britain.

British naval arrangements, 1888-94.

In 1892, notwithstanding the decision that her ordinary character should be non-combatant, the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence," the despatch vessel of the Búshehr Residency, seems to have carried a part if not the whole of the armament for which she had been fitted. The Indian Marine Act, passed in 1887, had been construed by the Government of India as a warrant for arming the "Lawrence" for particular service; but the question of the actual use of the "Lawrence" for combatant purposes seems not to have been raised until 1892. In that year the Resident in the Persian Gulf wrote:

> The fullest possible advantage of the "Lawrence's" presence in the Gulf is not taken so long as she is considered to be a non-combatant vessel. With only one man-of-war on the station, often for considerable periods outside the Gulf, it is evident that the police duties of the upper waters must be inadequately performed, especially during the hot weather when they are most likely to be required, and when Her Majesty's ships require a cooler climate. The piracies committed by the Beni Hajir are petty it is true; but they require watching lest they should develop into something more serious, and patrolling the neighbourhood of Bahrain would no doubt act as a check upon them. A patrolling ship, however, must have the power to act if necessary, and his under present conditions the "Lawrence" legally has not.

After discussion of the circumstances of the case, in obedience to the principle "that no sea-going armed vessel belonging to the State should be in commission unless she is under the control of the Admiralty," the disarmament of the "Lawrence" was ordered by Her Majesty's Government and duly carried into effect.

Maritime security, 1888-94.

During this period there was a considerable diminution in the number of piratical offences off the coast of Hasa, but in 1888-90 attacks upon vessels in the Shatt-al-'Arab became a serious evil.

The arms trade, 1888-94.

About 1890 there was an influx of arms and ammunition from Zanzibar into the Persian Gulf, due to restrictions imposed on the traffic in East Africa; and a direct trade in fire-arms between Europe and the dominions of the Sultān of 'Omān was initiated. This was the beginning of the growth of Masqat into the greatest market of arms of precision in the Middle East, which it afterwards became; and from the first a large proportion of the arms imported at Masqat were re-exported to other places in the Persian Gulf. The traffic was not yet regarded as of political importance; but the Government of India, for special reasons, induced the Sultān of 'Omān to prohibit importation at Gwādur in 1891; and in the same year the Shāh's edict of 1881 against the introduction of arms and ammunition into Persia was re-enacted.

British marine surveys, 1888-94.

In 1890 the approaches of the Shatt-al-'Arab and Bahmanshīr from the sea were surveyed by British vessels. With the assent of the Persian Government, the Bahmanshīr was examined and sketched in the same year and its impracticability for ocean steamers demonstrated. By permission of the Shāh and of the Sultān of 'Omān British tidal observatories were established at Būshehr and Masqat in 1892 and 1893.

British official matters and interests in Persia, 1888-94.

In Persia the attention of the British officials in the south was occupied chiefly by operations of British subjects which the opening of the lower

British enterprise on the Kārūn.

Kārūn to navigation had invited. The only British firm which seriously took advantage of the concession was the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Messrs. Lynch), whose steamers had plied for more than a quarter of a century on the Tigris; and a subsidy was presently granted at the joint cost of Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India to enable them to persevere with their enterprise in the face of difficulties which existed. These difficulties were great and varied. They included official obstruction on the part of the Persian Government, especially by imposing arbitrary embargoes on the exportation of grain and withholding the means of obtaining ordinary accommodation and business facilities; unfair competition by native merchants and local authorities; an obligation to maintain a service on the upper Kārūn, which proved unprofitable, in the name of the Shāh; and popular prejudice and fanaticism. The export trade of the country, however, rapidly increased; and, from the fact that Messrs. Lynch did not abandon their enterprise, it may be inferred that their gains in ordinary trade more than compensated for the steady loss which, in spite of the British subsidy, was understood to be the result of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's operations.

British consular appointment, etc.

In connection with the development of navigation and trade there were established at Muhammareh a British Vice-Consulate in 1890 and a British Indian Post Office in 1892.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1888-94.

Hostility of the Turkish administration to British interests.

The usual disfavour towards British enterprise in Turkish 'Irāq continued to be manifested by the local authorities; and in 1893-94, when the Porte were endeavouring to assert undivided authority over the whole waterway of the Shatt-al-'Arab, vexatious interference with British Indian sailing vessels and blackmailing of the crews on various pretexts became common, especially at Fāo. This matter had some connection with, but did not entirely depend on, the Turkish claim to Muhammareh; consequently the annoyances in question did not entirely cease with the abandonment of that claim.

Obstruction to the movements of the R. I. M. S. "Comet."

Attempts were made to interfere with the movements of the Baghdād Residency steamer "Comet" even on the lower Tigris; and in 1894, shortly after the close of the period, a voyage which she made to Sāmarrah on the upper Tigris formed the subject of an official protest by the Porte, who now formally denied her right to navigate the river above Baghdād.

Additions were made to the British establishments in Turkish 'Irāq, the consular post at Mūsal being revived in 1893 in the shape of a Consular Agency, while a Consular Agency was also created at Karbala in the same year in order to regularise and render more efficient the protection of the British Indian community there and at Najaf. British consular appointments.

The period was a stormy one in the history of the Oudh Bequest. Very great abuses in its administration by the Mujtahid-Distributors came to light; and strenuous efforts were made by more than one British Resident at Baghdād to rectify them, but in vain. Admonitions to the Mujtahids concerned, exaction from them of accounts, finally the institution of committees of supervision—the two last of which measures were held to require the concurrence of the Mujtahids themselves—were among the expedients unsuccessfully tried. The proceeds of the Bequest still continued to be dissipated without benefit to those whose misery should have been relieved by it. The state of matters having been represented to the Government of India, the terms of the Bequest were brought under careful examination. The only conclusion reached, however, was that intervention was impracticable, or at least undesirable, for the time being; but that it would probably be well that the appropriation of a separate share of the revenue of the Bequest to Indian beneficiaries, which had been customary, should cease. The Oudh Bequest.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD ELGIN, 1894-99.

The period next to be considered was one of incipient movements, gathering force, which were after its close to invest the Persian Gulf with a prominence that it had never before enjoyed in general politics. The chief factors were the understanding between Russia and France, which eventually became an alliance; strained relations between France and Britain; and foreign schemes for a railway to connect the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf. Towards the end of the period the power of the Government of India to observe and deal with developments in the Persian Gulf, where the security of British interests depended upon their vigilance and foresight, was somewhat impaired by difficulties in India, among which were the appearance of bubonic plague in a deadly form in 1896; sedition, due partly to the enforcement of sanitary measures against plague; and a tribal rising of unprecedented extent and seriousness on the North-Western Frontier in 1897.

It will be convenient to deal with the history of the period under the following main heads, rather more detailed than were required in earlier and less eventful periods:—affairs in Persia and Turkish 'Irāq and general British relations with those countries; activity in the Gulf region of foreign powers other than Britain; affairs in the Arab states and principalities of the Persian Gulf separately, and British relations with each; finally questions of an administrative and official order chiefly concerning Britain.

Affairs in Persia and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

Decadence of Persia under Muzaffar-ud-Din Shāh.

With the accession of a new Shāh to the throne in 1896 Persia entered on a path of decline not altogether unlike that which Turkey had already been following for more than a generation, one of the causes being financial extravagance. In Muzaffar-ud-Din Shāh those qualities of intelligence and character were lacking, the possession of which had enabled his father to maintain general good order throughout Persia, to accumulate treasure instead of incurring public debt, and to preserve a fair measure of independence *vis à vis* of foreign powers. Individual ambitions and ministerial factions, almost unknown under a Shāh who had been generally his own Prime Minister, now became a serious danger to the country.

Conflict of British and Russian interests especially in regard to communications, loans, and Customs.

In foreign relations the ruling note was still the familiar one of discord between Russian and British policy in Persia; and the conflict was in process of extending to new areas. The question of railways had been postponed by Russian action, as before explained; but a fresh success was gained by Britain in the matter of road construction, a concession for a road to connect Ahwāz with Isfahān *viâ* the Bakhtiyāri country being turned into account by the native concessionnaires in 1897 through a British company, not however without corresponding advantages being obtained by Russia in the north.

Entirely new was the question of financial loans. Some money for public purposes had been borrowed in the European market before the assassination of Nāṣir-ud-Din Shāh; but it was only in 1898 that the requirements of the new sovereign obliged his Ministers to seek a large supply of money wherever it could be found.

The question of loans brought up the question of guarantees for repayment; and in this manner the state of the Persian Customs came under examination, with the result that in 1898 Belgian experts were obtained for the purpose of reorganising them. A matter closely connected with loans

and guarantees was that of utilising as a financial pledge the customs of Southern Persia, which from the British point of view it was essential should not in any circumstances be alienated to Russia. Steps for guarding against this danger had been taken by the British Government as early as 1892, when first the possibility of a loan being made by Russia to Persia had been foreseen; and in 1898, when an advance was drawn by Persia against the intended British loan of that year, the custom house of Būshehr was actually placed for a short time under British control. During this period local contests were waged between British and Russian political influence in various provinces,—in Khurāsān and Sistān, and even in Central and Western Persia,—which are described more particularly in another place.

With these preliminary remarks we pass to local questions in the Persian provinces adjoining the Gulf.

Northern 'Arabistān.

In Northern 'Arabistān there was some failure of good order even before the end of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh's reign, and in the first years of his successor the state of matters there grew worse. In 1894 the Dizfūl-Khurramābād road was closed, and in 1895-96 the surroundings of Dizfūl itself were disturbed. From 1896 to 1898, with one brief interval, the districts of Northern 'Arabistān lay at the mercy of Arabs and Bakhtiyāris, and even in the towns of Dizfūl and Shūshtar the rule was that of armed and disorderly elements.

Southern 'Arabistān.

In Southern 'Arabistān the period was characterised by the final disappearance of the Ka'ab Shaikhdom of Fallāhiyeh, which was absorbed in the Muhaisin Shaikhdom of Muhammareh, the latter thus becoming co-extensive with the sub-province. The attitude of the Shaikh of Muhammareh had, for various reasons, been one of hostility to the British since the opening of the Kārūn to navigation in 1888; but in 1897, on the assassination of Shaikh Miz'al and the accession of Shaikh Khaz'al to power, there was a change. The new Shaikh not only showed himself very well disposed towards British interests and representatives, but presently, made anxious by the general course of events in Persia and still more so by an obvious intention on the part of the central Government to do away with his local autonomy, secretly endeavoured to place himself under British protection. In response to his overtures he was informed that the British Government could not undertake to maintain his independence either against Persia or in the case of a dissolution of Persia; but promises of friendly advice and support were given him.

Persian Coast and Islands.

The general weakening of authority throughout Persia extended to the Persian Coast and Islands. In 1897-98 nine different Governors of the

Gulf Ports succeeded one another in the brief space of fifteen months. In 1897 there was a riot, due to superstition, in which British survey apparatus was destroyed at Rishehr; and in the following year a murderous outrage was committed there, by followers of the chief of Tangistán, at the house of a British *protégé*. These incidents necessitated special arrangements for the protection of British life and property at Rishehr; and it does not appear that adequate satisfaction was obtained in either case. In 1898 a member of the ex-ruling family of Lingeh repossessed himself of that place in defiance of the Persian Government, which had been administering the port and district through their own officers; but he was ejected again early in 1899, after the close of the period.

Persian Makrán.

Of all the provinces in Persia with which we are concerned, however, Makrán was the most disturbed. There absolute anarchy prevailed; and at the end of 1897 a series of offences committed by bad characters against British subjects came to a climax with the murder of Mr. Graves, a British telegraph official, by a gang of Balúch robbers. A punitive expedition followed, conducted by a Persian commander with Persian forces, but under the supervision of British officers and with the backing of a small naval party and Indian military detachment, neither of which however took an active part in the operations. No serious fighting took place; but in the end the murderer of Mr. Graves was killed and two of his other assailants were captured, one of whom was punished.

Affairs in Turkey and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

In Turkey disorganisation proceeded apace. Persecutions and massacres of the Armenian subjects of the Sultán began, and in 1894-96 were at their height. Crete became refractory, and Cretan affairs led to a war between Turkey and Greece in which Turkey was easily victorious, but derived no real permanent advantages from her victory.

In Turkish 'Iráq quiet generally prevailed; and Turkish schemes of aggrandisement in Central Arabia and the Persian Gulf seemed, with certain exception to be noted later, to have been laid aside.

Relations of Turkey with Persia, 1894-99.

Turko-Persian relations were stagnant.

Activity of foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf region, 1894-99.

As political paralysis gradually overspread Persia and Turkey there was a notable increase in the activity of foreign powers besides Britain in the Persian Gulf region, especially France and Russia.

France.

In November 1894 a French Vice-Consulate was established at Masqat; and the function of the new French representative was clearly to undermine British influence in the Sultanate of 'Omān and to create French interests which it should be beyond the power of the native ruler to control. The chief means resorted to was the grant of the French flag to vessels owned by subjects of the Sultān; it was contended by the French authorities that the possession of the flag placed the vessels to which it was granted and all persons connected with them under French protection even as against the Sultān. In 1894 there were more than a score of 'Omāni vessels flying the French flag, and Sūr, the port to which they belonged, was becoming a focus of French influence. In 1897 the French Vice-Consul at Masqat successfully enforced against the Sultān the extreme rights which he claimed of protecting French flag holders.

In 1895 visits of French war vessels to the Gulf began, the first being that of the "Tronde," which called at Masqat.

Commercial enterprises were also utilised to push French influence, but with less considerable results. In 1896 the Messageries Maritimes Company instituted a subsidised steamer service between Bombay and the ports of the Persian Gulf; but, owing to vessels of unsuitable draft being employed, the venture was not a success. In 1898 the French Vice-Consul at Būshehr visited Muhammareh, and the re-institution of a French subsidised line calling at that port, which had been* withdrawn some fifteen years before, appeared to be contemplated; but nothing came of the supposed project.

In 1895 a monopoly of antiquarian research in Persia was obtained by France, and under it operations at Shūsh were renewed in 1897.

Russia

Russian proceedings in the Persian Gulf and its neighbourhood were still of a tentative character; but their scope was evidently wide. In 1898 an officer of special ability, Mr. Krongloff, was appointed to Baghdād, where a Russian Consulate, after being abolished in 1886 in favour of representation through France, had been re-established in 1889. In 1897 a Russian Consul-General was appointed to Isfahān, where Russia had no material interests.

* See page 283 *ante*.

A first indication of the strategical importance attached by Russia to the straits forming the entrance of the Persian Gulf was afforded by the journey of a Russian engineer officer, who came by Kirmân and Bandar 'Abbâs, to Hormûz in the spring of 1895; he remained for two days, made a survey of Hormûz, and at his departure gave it to be understood that the island would be made a Russian coaling station.

After 1896 the existence of bubonic plague in India provided Russia with a new pretext for intervention in Gulf affairs. In 1897, in pursuance, it cannot be doubted, of a plan which in other parts of Persia served admirably to obstruct British interests, two Russian medical agents, MM. Ost and Marc, the latter being the physician of the Russian Legation at Tehrân, were deputed to study plague at Bûshehr, where the disease did not then exist, and where it did not appear until two years later. In 1898 these doctors were followed by two others, MM. Rodzewitz and Kornajewski; and they in their turn were succeeded by M. Paschkowski, who made Bûshehr his headquarters in 1898 and 1899, and who displayed considerable professional activity during a slight outbreak of plague there in the latter year. It was a significant fact in connection with the designs of Russia at the mouth of the Gulf that all these medical men paid visits to Bandar 'Abbâs as well as Bûshehr; and MM. Rodzewitz and Kornajewski visited Basrah also. The fact that the sanitary precautions on the southern coast of Persia against the introduction of plague had been officially entrusted by the Persian Government to British agency, together with the short duration of the single small epidemic that occurred at Bûshehr, rendered the Russian medical missions inefficacious for the purposes which they were really intended to serve; and a threat made by the Russian Legation at Tehrân in 1899, that Cossacks would be sent to Bûshehr—as they had been to Sistân—to form a plague cordon, remained unexecuted.

The action taken at Baghdâd in 1898 was connected with a scheme for the establishment of a Russian port in the Persian Gulf, on which subject the new Russian Consul at Baghdâd had orders to report; and the fact that in 1898 Count Kapnist, a Russian of good family, applied to the Porte for a concession to construct a railway from Tripoli in Syria to Kuwait in the Persian Gulf seemed to show that Kuwait was the point then specially in view.

Germany.

During this period Germany for the first time made an appearance in Persian Gulf affairs. She had, though the fact was not yet known abroad, railway designs on the country between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. In 1894, in which year the German war vessel "Cormoran" visited Masqat, a German Consulate was established at Baghdâd by means of a German resident of private means; and in 1897 a German Vice-Consul was

appointed to Bûshehr, the total number of German subjects in the Gulf ports being at the time only six. A Bremen firm also commenced operations at Bûshehr; but the voyages of some specially chartered steamers which were sent out from Germany were unsuccessful. In 1898 formal confirmation was granted of a preferential right already conferred by the Porte on the (German) Anatolian Railway Company to construct a railway from Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf; but the fact did not immediately become public.

America.

American activity remained non-political in its character.

Affairs in the Sultanate of 'Omân and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

The period was marked in the Sultanate of 'Omân by the beginning of a crisis in the relations between the Sultân and the British Government, due partly to internal events, partly to the non-renewal in favour of the new ruler of the policy of armed support which Britain had maintained from 1886 to 1888, and partly to French intrigues.

Occupation of Masqat by rebels, and of alienation of the Sultân from Britain, 1895.

In February 1895 the Sultân's capital of Masqat was treacherously seized and occupied by armed rebels, who remained in possession of it for three weeks, while the British representative observed an attitude of virtual neutrality; but they were in the end ejected by a process of fighting, of negotiation, and finally of concession. This unfortunate occurrence greatly embittered the Sultân against the British Government, whom he considered as having deserted him in the hour of need, and whose claims for compensation to British subjects on account of injuries suffered in the rebellion he regarded as vexatious; and it greatly undermined his authority throughout his dominions. The continuance to him of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, which had not been withdrawn as it might have been on his failing to govern in a manner approved by the British Government, a small gift of artillery, and offers of British naval assistance for the recovery of the revolted district of Dhufâr in Southern Arabia seemed to have no effect in mollifying his resentment. Indeed the situation after the rebellion of 1895 was so unsatisfactory that proposals for the annexation of Masqat and Matrah, or the declaration of a British protectorate over the whole Sultanate, or an intimation to the leading Shaikhs of the country that they would not be allowed upon any pretext to attack Masqat or Matrah were discussed; and the third course, that of giving a modified assurance of support, which did not involve any principle inconsistent with the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862, was adopted by Her Majesty's Government. In 1896 the question of arranging for a modi-

fication of the declaration 1862 with a view to the establishment of a British protectorate was further discussed, but the time was held by Her Majesty's Government to be unpropitious for negotiations with France on the subject.

In 1895-97 loans were granted to the Sultān by the Government of India on the security of the "Zanzibar" subsidy; it was held that to require him to place his customs department under British management would be a violation of the Declaration of 1862.

Grant by the Sultan of a coaling station to France, 1898.

In 1898 visits were paid to Masqat by the French gunboats "Gabès" and "Scorpion" in succession; and in the course of the year, in disregard of his Agreement of 1891 with the British Government, the Sultān made a grant of a coaling station to France, but without assigning any particular place. The spot most likely to be occupied appeared to be Bandar Jissah, a harbour not far from Masqat; and naval dispositions were made there by the British Government to anticipate, if necessary, a French attempt at occupation. French influence was now powerful in the Sultanate, the port of Sūr being one of its principal seats; and the Sultān's attitude towards the interests of British subjects, and towards the British representative, was little short of insulting.

Affairs in Trucial 'Omān and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

In consequence of the Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikhs with Britain formed in 1892, of the well-established supremacy of British influence, and of the remoteness and general political unimportance of the tract, there was no unsettlement of conditions in Trucial 'Omān during this period.

Affairs in Qatar and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

In Qatar there were no developments worthy of note, if we exclude an attempt to invade the Bahrain Islands from Zubārah, which was frustrated by British naval action and will be noticed in connection with Bahrain affairs. Respect for the authority irregularly exercised by the Turks in Qatar was at an end among the inhabitants of the peninsula in consequence of the successful local rebellion of 1893. In 1894 a Turkish representative at Dōhah was murdered, and in 1898 there was a rising at that place in which several Turks were killed. The Shaikhs of Qatar in 1898

intimated their willingness to be included in the same political circle as the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān who had treaty relations with the British Government; but no steps for their admission to it were taken in response.

Affairs in Bahrain and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

Attempted invasion of Bahrain from the mainland frustrated by British action, 1895.

In Bahrain affairs the harbouring of aggressive designs by Turkey and the maintenance of a protective attitude towards the Shaikhdom by Britain continued to characterise the situation. The secession of a malcontent tribe from Bahrain to Zubārah in Qatar was followed by the establishment of a hostile settlement at that place with the active assistance of the principal Shaikh of Qatar and of the Turkish authorities in Hasa. In 1895 preparations on a large scale for the invasion of Bahrain were begun at Zubārah and were actively promoted by a Turkish official who had recently appeared there. A Turkish gunboat also arrived upon the coast for the purpose of covering the tribal operations. A British naval force was then concentrated in Bahrain waters, and, after ineffectual remonstrances had been addressed to the Porte, proceeded to forcible action. Over 40 vessels of the native fleet assembled for the invasion were disabled or destroyed, and 120 others were seized and carried over to Bahrain, where most of them were subsequently burned as the owners neglected to ransom them by paying a fine. This striking demonstration completely assured the safety of the islands, and a protest made by the Turkish Government only provided the British Government with an opportunity of emphatically re-stating their views in regard to Turkish pretensions in Qatar and Bahrain.

Turkish designs on Bahrain, 1897-98.

In 1897 a proposal to establish a sanitary post of the Constantinople Board of Health in Bahrain was rejected at the instance of Her Majesty's Government; and in 1898 a request by the Porte that a Turkish exequatur should be obtained for any British representative appointed in Bahrain was refused by the British Government.

Affairs in Kuwait and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

Several causes conduced to the sudden rise of Kuwait into political importance during this period.

Endeavours to enforce Turkish authority over Kuwait, 1896-97.

In 1896 an internal revolution occurred at Kuwait resulting in the accession of Mubārak, a new Shaikh, to power; the circumstances were such as to place bitter enmity between him and some members of his own family and to render his position at first extremely insecure. The attitude of the Turkish authorities, who regarded Kuwait as a Turkish possession, towards Mubārak was at first neutral or equivocal; they acquiesced in, and subsequently recognised, his usurpation of the chief power, but seemed inclined to attribute it to British machinations; and ultimately they endeavoured to profit by the Shaikh's weakness in order to substitute authoritative control over him for the indefinite influence which was all that they had previously wielded at Kuwait. In 1897 a sanitary official representing the Constantinople Board of Health was appointed to Kuwait; and the Shaikh at once made overtures to the British Government for political protection, but they were at first repulsed.

Decision of the British Government to enter into relations with the Shaikh of Kuwait, 1898.

The original suspicions of the Porte in regard to the existence of an understanding between the Shaikh and the British Government were indeed perfectly without foundation. It was only upon the Shaikh's addressing them that that Government began to debate the possibility and desirability of entering into relations with him. Up to this time Her Majesty's Government, in so far as they had considered the question at all, had been inclined to regard Kuwait as a dependency of the Turkish Empire, and an admission to this effect seems even to have been made by their Ambassador at Constantinople in 1893; but they now found it necessary to reconsider their impressions in this respect on account, firstly, of some of the Shaikhs' subjects being charged with participation in piracies on the Shatt-al-'Arab and, secondly, of supposed Russian designs on Kuwait in connection with a projected Mediterranean railway. Their decision was hastened by seeming preparations on the part of the Turks for military action against Kuwait, the grounds of which were unknown; and it was decided to obtain from Shaikh Mubārak an Agreement, similar to that signed by the Sultan of 'Oman in 1891, which would preclude any cession of territory by him to a foreign power without British consent.

British naval arrangements, 1894-99.

Revision of the naval arrangements between the Government

In 1895 the arrangement between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India in regard to the vessels of the Royal Navy placed by the Admiralty at the disposal of the latter Government was revised, the

number of vessels being retained at four, but the amount of the annual subsidy paid for their services being enhanced to £100,000. In addition to the subsidy, the cost of coal and repairs for H.M.S. "Sphinx" was in future to be borne by the Government of India and that vessel continuously employed in the Persian Gulf. The coal of the other ships, also, was to be paid for by the Government of India whenever they were employed on special services. The vessels allotted for work under the Government of India were H.M.S. "Marathon," 2,950 tons, "Brisk," 1,770 tons, "Pigeon," 775 tons, and "Sphinx," 1,130 tons, of which only the first was at all heavily armed.

of India and the British Admiralty, 1895.

In 1898 Commander Baker, H.M.S. "Sphinx," landed a force in Makrán during the Persian operations there without the approval of the British political representative; and later in the year the same officer attempted to pursue suspected slave traders on land on the coast of 'Omán by means of a boat party, whereby a protest was elicited from the Sultán. Commander Baker's proceedings were in the first instance approved by the Admiralty; but eventually Her Majesty's Government ruled that naval officers should take no active measures on land without the previous approval of the responsible political officers, and that—save in exceptional circumstances—all intercourse between naval officers and native chiefs or officials should be carried on through the medium or with the knowledge of the political officers.

Restrictions on the action of the naval authorities on land, 1898.

In 1896 the question of the salutes to be fired by ships of the Royal Navy in honour of native rulers was examined and the existing general rule re-affirmed that only vessels classed as saluting vessels, of which kind the "Marathon" and the "Brisk" were the sole examples among the ships at the disposal of the Government of India, might fire salutes; but it was added that two exceptions to the rule, especially authorised for the Persian Gulf, were still in force,—*viz.*, that smaller vessels might fire any salute on a particular requisition by a political officer, and that they might fire salutes not exceeding five guns without a requisition.

Salutes.

Maritime security, 1894-99.

Piracy at sea, even off the coast of Hasa, and maritime irregularities in the Gulf as a whole had now almost entirely ceased; but in 1895 some atrocious offences of a piratical character were committed in the Shatt-al-'Arab or near its mouth. In 1896 the Persian and Turkish authorities at Muhammarah and Basrah were stimulated through the British representa-

Piracies on the Shatt-al-'Arab and counteractive measures, 1896-97.

tives at these places to take action for assuring the safety of the river, and there was an immediate and satisfactory improvement in the state of affairs. In 1897 a relapse into insecurity occurred, to remedy which a system of water police was instituted on both banks by the local authorities under British pressure, a British gunboat being moreover stationed in the river during the winter of 1898-99 with excellent results.

The arms trade, 1894-99.

The arms and ammunition trade continued to expand; and the Persian Gulf finally became a market to which the tribesmen of Afghanistan and the North-Western Frontier of India resorted in order to supply themselves with the means of fighting each other and of resisting constituted authority. This fact was conclusively established for the first time in 1898.

Remarkable growth of the trade, from 1896.

About 1896 the growth of the traffic became alarming. In 1895-96 the estimated number of rifles imported at Masqat was only 4,350, in 1896-97 it was 20,000; and in 1897 no less than 30,000 rifles were believed to have been landed at Būshehr. All the weapons brought to the Gulf were now breech-loaders; and in Southern Persia, in particular, nearly the whole male adult population were armed with weapons of precision and made free use of them. It was ascertained that in 1896 the proportion of the arms and ammunition entering the Gulf and absorbed by Persia was about three-fifths of the whole, while about a quarter was taken by countries under Tur'kish domination and the remainder was disposed of in Arab states and principalities. The great majority of the imports were of British manufacture.

British repressive measures, 1897-98.

In 1897, as a preparation for dealing with the evil, the British Government armed themselves by formal agreement with power to search vessels navigating under the flags of Persia and the Sultanate of 'Omān for arms destined for Persia and to seize and confiscate such as might be found; and early in 1898, under this arrangement, a British steamer was stopped near Masqat and a large consignment of rifles and cartridges removed from her. The action of the British authorities was contested, by the British firm who suffered, in a court of law in the United Kingdom; but without success. About the same time the Shaikh of Bahrain sequestrated a large stock of rifles and ammunition belonging to the same firm in the island of Bahrain; and his action was upheld, though it had not been suggested, by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. In this case also the firm

failed to establish any claim to compensation; but after great delay the arms seized were voluntarily returned to them by the Shaikh in a damaged condition. Ultimately the firm became bankrupt.

In 1898, after the case just mentioned, the Shaikh of Bahrain was induced to prohibit the arms and ammunition trade in his dominions under pain of confiscation, and to authorise action by British men-of-war against Bahrain vessels suspected of carrying consignments.

Sanitary organisation in the Persian Gulf, 1894-99.

Results of the Venice Sanitary Conference, 1897.

The appearance of bubonic plague in India in 1896, which was the principal cause of the assembling of an international Sanitary Conference at Venice in 1897, having been held to necessitate the institution of quarantine in the Persian Gulf, various measures were taken there which the jealousies of rival powers invested with political significance. The Convention of Venice, ratified by Britain and Persia but not by Turkey, contemplated the establishment of a sanitary station at the entrance of the Gulf and of another at Basrah. Turkey had vainly urged the substitution of Kuwait for the station which it was intended to create at the mouth of the Gulf; and the Constantinople Board of Health, immediately after the Conference, proposed a scheme by which posts under their control would come into being in Bahrain and Qatar, as well as at Kuwait, Qatīf, and 'Oqair; but its execution was prevented except at Kuwait, and at Qatīf and 'Oqair which were admittedly Turkish possessions. A further effort was made by Turkey to secure, for political reasons, the transfer of the Baṣrah lazaret to Fāo; but it failed. In 1899 a Turkish suggestion for establishing in Bahrain a sanitary station to be controlled from Constantinople was again rejected.

Sanitary arrangements on the Persian coast entrusted to British agency.

The Persian Government, by an agreement with Britain, confided all quarantine arrangements at their ports to British agency; and British medical subordinates were immediately posted to Bandar 'Abbās, Lingeh, and Muhammareh. There was already a commissioned British medical officer at Būshehr, to whom was entrusted the management of the quarantine at that place and the direction of the sanitary operations elsewhere upon the coast of Persia. The activity of the British medical staff gave rise to slight popular disturbances at Būshehr in 1899.

Arrangements in the Sultanate of 'Omān and Bahrain.

The Sultān of 'Omān and the Shaikh of Bahrain at first rejected British assistance and made, or proposed to make, quarantine arrangements of their own.

British maritime surveys, 1894-99.

In 1894 telegraphic observations were undertaken at the Būshehr and Jāshk telegraph stations with a view to the determination of longitudes.

British interests and official matters in Persia, 1894-99.

Difficulties attending British enterprises in 'Arabistān.

British enterprise in 'Arabistan continued to be hampered by different obstacles, of which the greatest was now the disordered state of the country. In 1895 Messrs. Lynch's representatives at Nāsiri were seriously assaulted by Persian soldiers; in 1896 an employé of theirs at Shūshtar was the victim of a ferocious attack by a Persian subject; and in 1897 a mob, after pillaging a caravan belonging to Messrs. Lynch near Shūshtar, looted the offices of a Dutch firm under British protection there. No compensation could be obtained for any of these outrages. The profits of British navigation continued to be affected by corrupt or malicious interference with the exportation of grain and by the unfair competition of Persian associations, and in 1894 the subsidy from the British and Indian Governments enjoyed by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company was renewed to them, as they professed that in its absence they would be obliged to withdraw from the Kārūn.

The murder of a British telegraph official in Persian Makrān and the proceedings which resulted from it have been mentioned already under the head of Persian relations with Britain. In consequence of the disturbed state of the province the Indian military guard withdrawn in 1887 was reinstituted at Jāshk in 1898, and another was at the same time located at Chahbār.

British interests and official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1894-99.

Turkish interference with British navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

The attitude of the Turkish Government in regard to interference with British Indian sailing vessels at Fāo, which began during the last period, was extremely obstinate. British representations having been disregarded and British remonstrances defied by the Porte, arrangements for the appointment of a British Consular representative at Fāo were made by Her Majesty's Government; but the Porte intimated that no such official

would be recognised by them. A British war vessel was then sent to Fão whereupon the aggressions complained of ceased; and the Turkish Government tardily admitted the principle that British vessels from the open sea bound for Muhammarch or any other place in Persia must be allowed to pass Fão without Turkish interference. The understanding thus arrived at was violated by the local Turkish authorities in 1893; but threats of a renewal of the demand for British consular representation at Fão induced the Porte to order a discontinuance of the annoyances, which were made this time on sanitary pretexts.

Transfer of H. B. M.'s Consulate at Basrah from the Government of India to H. B. M. Government as regards personnel.

In 1895 the Government of India, finding difficulty in providing a permanent representative at Basrah, voluntarily transferred the patronage of the post to Her Majesty's Government; but its charges continued to be defrayed by the Indian Treasury.

The Oudh Bequest.

The question of the Oudh Bequest disappeared temporarily from view at this time, a system having been introduced at the beginning of the period with the sanction of the Government of India, under which Supervisors were appointed by the Resident at Baghdád as a check upon the proceedings of the Mujtahid-Distributors.

British official matters in general, 1894-99.

The Diamond Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen Empress Victoria was celebrated by the British officials and subjects at Búshehr, Shíráz Muhammarch, Masqat, and other places in the Persian Gulf on the 22nd June 1897.

VICEROYALTIES OF LORD CURZON, JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905 (DIVIDED BY THE TEMPORARY VICEROYALTY OF LORD AMPTHILL, APRIL TO DECEMBER 1904).

Critical nature of the period.

A critical period in the history of the Persian Gulf began in 1899 almost simultaneously with the first Viceroyalty and Governor-Generalship in India of Lord Curzon, whose control of affairs continued, with an interval of a few months in 1904, until late in the year 1905. The

activity and ambition of France and Russia in the Persian Gulf, which had been increasing for some years, received strong encouragement from the diplomatic embarrassments and military difficulties in which Britain seemed to be involved by war in South Africa from 1899 to 1902.

Views of Lord Curzon.

The crisis was in one respect well-timed from the stand-point of British interests, for Lord Curzon at the time of his appointment to the Indian Viceroyalty was already an expert in Persian affairs, had travelled in Persia, and had made a particular study of the question of the Persian Gulf, the importance of which he recognised. His personality, moreover, was forceful in a rare degree; he courted rather than feared responsibility; and his methods were rapid and energetic. In a book entitled "Persia and the Persian Question," published in 1892, Lord Curzon—then the Hon'ble George Curzon, M.P.—had expounded his views on the Persian Gulf and epitomised them as follows:—

I have now completed the entire periplus of the Persian Gulf, and have shown the Persian Government along its northern shores exercising a more vigorous and undisputed sovereignty than at any period since the reign of Shah Abbas; upon its southern coast the Turks endeavouring to extend a precarious influence over Arabia; and small Arab states, retaining either wholly or only in part their original independence; while between all parties intervenes the sworded figure of Great Britain, with firm and just hand holding the scales. It is no exaggeration to say that the lives and properties of hundreds of thousands of human beings are secured by this British Protectorate of the Persian Gulf, and that were it either withdrawn or destroyed both sea and shore would relapse into the anarchical chaos from which they have so laboriously been reclaimed. That the Persian Government has been enabled to reassert its authority upon the north littoral; that the pirates of the opposite coast have been taught that rapine is not a safe religion, and where they once swept the sea with laden slave-dhows now dive harmlessly for pearls; that the Arab tribes, instead of being subjected to the curse of pashas, retain the liberty they so dearly prize, is due to the British Government alone. The very soundings of the channels and curves of the shores, by which navigation has been rendered easy for the vessels of the world, were the work of the officers of the old Indian Navy, and have been transferred without acknowledgment to the charts of other countries navigating these seas. These considerations, to which I draw special attention from a belief that they are not generally recognised in England, are essential to an understanding of the attitude taken up by this country with regard to the future control of the Persian Gulf, and of her resistance to the possible intrusion of an enemy into the waters for whose security she has, both in treasure and in life-blood, spent so much.

Every claim that can be advanced by Russia for the exclusive control of the Caspian sea could be urged with tenfold greater force by Great Britain for a similar monopoly of the Persian Gulf. Hundreds of British lives and millions of British money have been spent in the pacification of these troublous waters. Where the Russians in the north have scared a few penniless buccaneers, the British in the south have effectively destroyed a pirate combination and fleet that recall the last century of the Roman Republic and the exploits of Pompey. A commerce has been fostered and multiplied that, if it is advantageous to Great Britain and India, is also the source of great wealth, and almost of livelihood, to Persia, to Arabia, and to Turkey. Thousands of British subjects peacefully ply their trade under the armed protection of the Union Jack. England, however, makes no

arrogant pretention as Russia has insisted upon in the case of the Northern lake. She does not demand that the Persian Gulf should be a *mare clausum* against foreign trade. She does not impose treaties upon humiliated foes, wresting from them the right to fly their own flag in their own waters. The merchant navies of the world are free to plough these waves, and to fill their holds with incoming or outgoing treasures. But at least she must and does claim, in return for the sacrifices to which she has submitted, and the capital which she has sunk, and for the sake of the peace which she is here to guard, that no hostile political influence shall introduce its discordant features upon the scene. A Russian port in the Persian Gulf, that dear dream of so many a patriot from the Neva or the Volga, would, even in times of peace, import an element of unrest into the life of the Gulf that would shake the delicate equilibrium so laboriously established, would wreck a commerce that is valued at many millions sterling, and would let loose again the passions of jarring nationalities only too ready to fly at each others' throats. Let Great Britain and Russia fight their battles or compose their differences elsewhere, but let them not turn into a scene of sanguinary conflict the peaceful field of a hard-won trade. I should regard the concession of a port upon the Persian Gulf to Russia by any power as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture of the *status quo*, and as an intentional provocation to war; and I should impeach the British minister, who was guilty of acquiescing in such a surrender, as a traitor to his country.

In the first year of his Viceroyalty, in a monumental despatch dated the 21st September 1899 which dealt exhaustively with the whole Persian problem, Lord Curzon, after describing the interests and position of Britain in the Persian Gulf in terms similar to those used in his book, submitted to Her Majesty's Government proposals in regard to the policy which should be jointly pursued by the Home and Indian Governments in Persia, especially in Southern Persia and in the Gulf. It was evident from his recommendations that closer and more responsible contact with the problem and increased experience had only confirmed him in the opinion that the maintenance of British political supremacy in the Persian Gulf was a matter of vital importance to the British Empire.

Division of the subject

In relating the events of the next seven years we shall deal in succession with the following matters: the internal affairs, both general and local, of Persia and Turkey; the nature and objects of foreign activity in the Gulf, principally Russian, French, and German; the significance of certain Muhammadan forces and movements; the affairs of the Arab principalities and other territorial divisions in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of 'Omān with special reference to British and foreign interests and relations; the response of Britain, in its more purely diplomatic and military aspects, to foreign activity; and, finally, British official arrangements, dispositions and undertakings in the Persian Gulf, many of which were influenced, stimulated, even suggested, at this time by the competition of foreign powers. Such an arrangement of the subject seems to be that best lending itself to orderly and logical exposition.

Persian Internal Affairs, 1899-1905

Increasing political disorganisation of Persia.

The decline of Persia under the unworthy successor of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, proceeded apace. From 1898 to 1903 an able though unscrupulous minister virtually ruled the country in the person of the Amīn-us-Sultān or Atabaig-i-A'zam; but his position was precarious from the first, in consequence of strong political combinations against him; and at length he was driven into exile by adverse influences at court, religious opposition, and popular discontent. The year of his downfall, 1903, was characterised by widespread disorder in Persia, accompanied in places by massacres of Bābis, a sect whose progress the distressed state of the country seemed to favour. Financial difficulties, attributable largely to the extravagance of the Shāh and his Court, had become the chief bane of Persian Politics. In 1900, in 1902, and again in 1905, the Shāh visited Europe; and the loans to which his ministers were obliged to resort reduced Persia to a state of serious indebtedness, mainly to Russia but partly also to Britain, beginning in the year 1900. Towards the end of the period doctrines of representative Government began to gain a footing in Persia and completed, however excellent in themselves, the disorganisation of the political life of the country.

Improvement of the Persian Customs Department.

While most branches of the administration decayed, if decay may be predicated of things already rotten, the department of Customs, placed under the management of Belgian officials in 1899, rapidly became more efficient and successful in its working. Such hopes of the regeneration of Persia as could reasonably be entertained seemed, indeed, to depend upon that department. The Persian customs of the Persian Gulf, previously farmed out and execrably mismanaged, began to come under Belgian control in 1900; but the process of transfer was not completed until two years later. The reform of the customs was not, however, free from drawbacks. Its execution by foreign agency, the only manner in which it was possible, made it unpopular with Persians; the centralising and levelling tendencies of the department as re-organised inspired local officials and hereditary governors, whose authority it curtailed or threatened, with fear and distrust of the Tehrān Government; and, last but not least, it furnished fresh subjects of controversy between rival foreign powers in Persia. The behaviour of the Belgian officials employed was often arrogant and highhanded; and the transfer to them of administrative functions not properly belonging to customs employés gave some ground for apprehending that the department might in the end become

too powerful and even, to state an extreme view, absorb into itself the whole executive government.

'Arabistān.

In the districts of Northern 'Arabistān disorders which had their beginning in the last period remained unabated, and were even intensified, until the arrival in 1905 of a strong Governor, the Sālār-i-Mukarram, by whom they were suppressed. The steamer "Shushan", run on the upper Kārūn by a British company on behalf of the Persian Government, was attacked by raiders in 1902, in 1903, and again in 1904; and it was only by the efforts of the Shaikh of Muhammareh, whom the central Persian Government persuaded to intervene, that navigation was kept open until the appearance of the Sālār-i-Mukarram upon the scene.

The Hawizeh district, occupying a doubtful position between Northern and Southern 'Arabistān, defied the authority of the Shāh until 1904, when its reduction was undertaken by the Shaikh of Muhammareh, to be completed in the following year by the Shaikh and the Sālār acting in concert.

Southern 'Arabistān, under the rule of Shaikh Khaz'al of Muhammareh, continued undisturbed; but difficulties were threatened from time to time between that powerful chief and his neighbours the Bakhtiyāri Khāns.

Persian Coast and Islands.

The Governments of Fārs and the Gulf Ports changed hands frequently during the period; and, in the prevalence of unsettled conditions, the Persian Coast and Islands reflected the state of Persia at large. Early in 1899, before the Persian administration had grown so weak as it afterwards became, the hereditary Arab Shaikh who had repossessed himself of Lingeh was again expelled to make way for a Persian official; but elsewhere Persian authority was to a great extent in abeyance and anarchy prevailed, especially in the districts of Tangistān, Shamīl, Mināb, and Biyābān, where local power was in dispute among rival chiefs.

Persian Makrān.

The state of Persian Makrān was even worse than that of the Persian Coast and Islands; and petty wars between unimportant rulers, internal revolutions in their principalities, racking taxation, scarcity, and depopulation were the order of the day.

Turkish Internal Affairs, 1899-1905.

Misgovernment and approaching revolution.

The political course of Turkey still tended downwards. By 1903 the state of Macedonia had become critical, and everywhere throughout the Ottoman Empire discontent due to maladministration prevailed. The evils of the day were at the time generally attributed to the administrative methods of the reigning Sultān, 'Abdul Hamīd, which were arbitrary and

secret; and towards the close of the period a political party had begun to take shape in Turkey whose object was the establishment of representative government. It was not apparent then that, as later events demonstrated, the causes of Turkish decline lay deeper than in the "absolutism" of the administration.

Turkish 'Irâq

In Turkish 'Irâq there was a recrudescence of the tribal disorders which had temporarily ceased, for no ascertainable reason, during the last period. In 1899-1900 the lower Tigris was disturbed by the depredations of the Banî Asad. In 1903 the Al Bû Muhammad tribe in the same neighbourhood came into conflict with the Government, and a massacre was committed among them by Turkish troops. From 1900 to 1905 Sa'dûn Pâsha, the Shaikh of the great Muntafik tribe on the lower Euphrates, was almost continuously in rebellion against the Porte, whom he successfully defied. Three military expeditions were launched against him in vain, with serious consequences on one occasion to a detachment of Turkish troops.

The economic condition of the province, however, continued to improve, —chiefly it is true in consequence of the slow, natural, inexplicable process by which commercial interests assert themselves amidst military and unsettled surroundings. Direct official efforts at amelioration were also not entirely wanting. In 1904 a great impulse was given to steam navigation on the Tigris through the acquisition by the Administration of the Sultân's Civil List of all the Turkish steamers on the rivers of Mesopotamia; a new department, styled the Hamidiyah Navigation Office, came into existence; and effective competition with the operations of the (British) Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company was created, by which general trade did not fail to benefit. Sir William Willcocks, a British irrigation engineer who had gained a high reputation in Egypt, about the same time turned his attention to the problem of irrigating Mesopotamia. A vast scheme elaborated by him was brought to the notice of the Turkish Government in 1905, but failed to obtain immediately their practical support. The need for action in irrigation matters had been emphasized by the failure of the original Hindiyah barrage, with results disastrous to a large tract of country, in 1903.

Hasa.

Hasa showed no signs of progress in security or civilisation, though it had now been under Turkish administration for thirty years. In 1902 a large caravan moving from the interior to a port on the coast was captured by Bedouins when one march short of its destination; a considerable military escort which accompanied it was virtually annihilated; and the value of the booty that fell into the hands of the raiders was estimated

at thousands of pounds. Reprisals were made on the Arabs, and the Turkish garrison of the province was increased, but without lasting results. In 1906, after the close of the period, alarming attacks upon caravans and military guards were renewed, and eventually Arab tribesmen assailed the provincial capital and inflicted much loss on the troops holding it. Trade by British Indian merchants in Hasa, which had flourished before the Turkish occupation, had by this time been practically extinguished by insecurity and official interference.

Najd and Kuwait.

Turkish affairs in Najd and Kuwait, being really external to the Ottoman Empire, are dealt with further on.

Russian activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

We now approach the subject of foreign activity in the Persian Gulf. It may be remarked at the outset that the operations of Russia,—who, though from of old she was the chief rival of Britain in the Middle East, had previously confined her opposition to remote parts of Persia,—were those which now most seriously menaced the established position of Britain in that sea.

Russian policy in Persia generally.

But first it is necessary to examine the situation, as between Britain and Russia, in Persia as a whole. When Persia fell into financial difficulties early in the reign of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shāh, negotiations were set on foot for a joint British and Russian loan to the Shāh's Government; but in 1900 they were stultified by a separate Russian loan of large amount which was obtained by Persia on conditions that freed her from her obligations to other foreign creditors, only to bring her into strict financial bondage to Russia. Further Russian loans followed and were the means of securing for Russia important advantages in various political questions between her and Britain in Persia. In 1903 the liabilities of Persia to Russia were estimated at four million pounds sterling; and, though in 1903 and 1904 Persia was persuaded to accept considerable advances of British money, a vast superiority in the matter of financial obligation remained on the side of Russia.

In 1899 Russia obtained an extension for ten years of the arrangement by which railway construction in Persia was blocked; and meanwhile her own railway system was being extended towards the Russo-Persian frontier, which it eventually reached at Julfah in 1904.

Russian influence was also in process of consolidation or extension in various parts of Persia. A quarantine cordon established in Khurāsān in

1897, on the pretext of plague being prevalent in India, provided Russia with an excuse for introducing Russian sanitary officials and even Russian troops into the province, and by this means her political influence at Mashad was greatly enhanced. In 1900 a Russian Vice-Consulate was established in Sistān, and its establishment was followed by strong efforts on the part of Russia to overthrow British prestige in that district, so important to the safety of India; but, though persisted in for some years, their end was failure. On the frontier between Khurāsān and Afghanistan, on that between Sistān and Afghanistan, and even on that between Persia and the state of Kalāt, Russia laboured between 1902 and 1905 to create difficulties for Britain by fomenting boundary disputes, but without success.

Even in Central and Western Persia Russian influence was being pushed, in opposition to British, from consular bases at Isfahān and Kirmānshāh.

In 1901 a bold attempt was made by Russia, by means of a Trade Declaration, to procure permanent advantages for her trade in Persia over that of all rivals. A new Persian Customs Tariff, which needless to say favoured Russian trade, was arranged by Russia and Persia in consultation without the knowledge of Britain; and, but for a satisfactory counter-Declaration between Britain and Persia which followed in 1903, the Tariff would have been liable to subsequent revision by agreement between Russia and Persia alone.

Russian designs in the Persian Gulf.

In the Persian Gulf region, to which we again turn, the principal objects of Russia were the creation of a naval base in the Gulf and the construction of a railway across Persia by which the military resources of the Russian Empire could be brought to bear for its support. The advantages to be derived by Russia from the establishment in such a manner of a strong position in the Gulf were obvious: besides enhancing her prestige and giving her access to another ocean it would greatly extend and consolidate her hold on Persia and increase her power of offensive action against the British Empire in the East. The design was bold and entirely new, going far beyond anything that Russia in the past had seemed actually to contemplate; but the moment appeared favourable for its execution. The position of Russia in Manchuria was supposed to be secure, and presently the commitments of Britain in South Africa furnished the partisans of a Russian forward policy in Persia with specious arguments in favour of immediate action.

Russian quest of a naval base in the Persian Gulf.

During the year 1899 warnings of impending danger reached the British Government from divers quarters. In March the "Servet", a

Turkish newspaper at Constantinople, announced that Russia was about to seize Qishm Island in order to forestall Britain. In August His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān reported the existence of reasons for believing that Russia had acquired, in regard to a port in the Persian Gulf, certain rights which it might not suit her to enforce immediately; and in October the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador at Constantinople confidentially that there was ground to suppose that the Russian Government were negotiating with the Persian Government for a port in the Persian Gulf to form the terminus of a trans-Persian Russian railway, or even that the two Governments had already reached an understanding on the subject. Almost simultaneously a striking article appeared in the St. Petersburg "Viedomosti," edited by Prince Ukhtomski; it advocated the acquisition of the port of Bandar Abbās, together with the islands of Qishm, Hanjām, Lārak and Hormūz, in order to provide a terminus for a Russian railway across Persia; and special reference to the excellent but little-known anchorage off Lāft on the island of Qishm proved that the scheme was based upon good local information. In this article a scheme for a trans-Persian railway to Chahbār Bay was also mentioned, but was treated as of secondary importance. The Persian Government strenuously denied the existence of negotiations between themselves and Russia on the subject of any port in the Persian Gulf; but later developments, as will be seen, made the truthfulness of their disclaimer appear very doubtful.

In 1900 the Russian cruiser "Gilyak" visited the Persian Gulf, and the circumstances of her visit seemed to point to an intention on the part of the Russian Government to establish a coaling station at Bandar 'Abbās. This vessel, which was *en route* to the China station, left Aden for the Persian Gulf on the 7th February 1900 after a voluminous telegraphic correspondence between her commander and the Russian Government. She arrived at Bandar 'Abbās on the 14th February and was joined there by the "Waddon", a British merchant vessel which had been specially chartered at Suez to carry coal for her to Bandar 'Abbās, and which left Aden two days after she did. The object of these peculiar arrangements, which might have been obviated by coaling at Bombay or Karachi, can only be conjectured. The 300 tons of coal brought by the "Waddon" was more than the "Gilyak" could receive into her bunkers, and, after the greater part of the surplus had been piled on her deck, a small residue of about 16 tons remained; this small quantity, insignificant in itself but sufficient for the foundation of a depôt, the commander of the "Gilyak" would, with the permission of the Persian Deputy-Governor of Bandar

'Abbás, have deposited on shore. But the British Government, apprised beforehand of the "Gilyak's" probable intentions, had arranged that wherever she went in the Gulf she should be proceeded by a British vessel of superior force, though in no ostentatious or offensive manner; and in conformity with these orders H. M. S. "Pomone" was lying at Bandar 'Abbás before the "Gilyak's" arrival and remained there until she left. Secret instructions for action had also been prepared by the Admiralty for the guidance, in the crisis which was feared, of the British Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf. The presence of the British ship of war at Bandar 'Abbás, however, possibly caused the situation to develop along lines which it might not otherwise have followed; for the Russian coal, instead of being landed, was eventually transferred to two native boats. This averted the principal danger. The secret instructions prepared for the guidance of the British naval commander were not issued; and on the 24th February, the "Gilyak" having left Bandar 'Abbás and arrived at Búshehr, the orders for shadowing her were cancelled. On the 23rd of February M. Muravieff assured the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that the Russian Government had not the slightest desire or intention of acquiring a coaling or other station in the Persian Gulf; but he added that the commander of the "Gilyak" had been warned not to entertain any such idea,—a remark which seemed to betray the previous existence of some project. In any case the belated assurance, given after an attempt to land the coal had been frustrated, cannot be regarded as of much value. The "Gilyak" did not call at Bandar 'Abbás on her return voyage, and after some time had elapsed the coal was taken in charge by the Persian Deputy-Governor who sealed it up in a small warehouse connected with the "Kulah-i-Firangi", his own official residence.

Russian naval demonstrations in the Persian Gulf.

The tour of the "Gilyak" in the Persian Gulf was the first of what cannot be regarded otherwise than as a series of Russian naval demonstrations made with a political object, for Russia had no material interests in the Gulf, and the Gulf lay off the track of her men-of-war proceeding to the Far East.

The "Gilyak", which was a sloop of war with a convenient draught of only 10 feet, but heavily armed, proceeded from Búshehr to Basrah, where she lay from the 5th to the 17th of March. She had been met at Muhammareh by the Russian Consul from Baghdád, who obtained a relaxation of the quarantine rules of the Basrah port in her favour and arranged a display in honour of her visit. On her return voyage she called at Kuwait, reached Búshehr again on the 19th March, and left that place on the 21st for the China station. At Basrah and at Kuwait she

was anticipated by a British vessel of war, and on her way down the Gulf she did not call at any place below Būshehr.

The next demonstration was made by the "Varyag", a new protected first-class cruiser of 6,460 tons built in America. On her way to the Gulf she called at Aden, where she caused annoyance by an unmannerly use of her search-lights in harbour. On the 10th December 1901 the "Varyag" arrived at Masqat; and on the following two days ceremonial visits were exchanged, under the auspices of the French Consul, between her officer and the Sultān. On her departure from Masqat, on the 12th of December, trace of her was temporarily lost; it had been given out that she was returning direct to Aden, but on leaving harbour she headed northwards and on the 16th December made her appearance at Būshehr. On the 21st December she left Būshehr southward bound, carrying the Russian Consul-General, and touched at Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās; she remained at the former place from the 26th to the 27th, and at the latter from the 28th to 31st December.

The Russian flag was shown in the Gulf for a third time by the "Askold", a protected first-class cruiser of 5,905 tons. As the natives of the Persian Gulf then imagined that the strength of a ship depended on the number of her funnels, and as the "Askold" had five, her appearance made a strong impression. This ship arrived at Masqat on the 3rd December 1902 and sailed for the Persian Gulf on the next day. M. Adamoff, the Russian Consul from Basrah, was present on board during a part of the cruise. On the 14th of December the "Askold" was at Kuwait, and on the 17th at Lingeh, which she left the same evening for Bandar 'Abbās.

A fourth trip was made in the Persian Gulf by the second-class protected cruiser "Boyarin" of 3,200 tons, in company with the French ship "Infernet" of 2,452 tons. This demonstration was intended, apparently, to prove the solidarity of Russian and French policy in the Gulf. Both ships arrived at Masqat from Jibūti, but independently, the "Infernet" on the 21st and the "Boyarin" on the 23rd February 1903. During their stay at Masqat the French and Russian naval officers had audiences of the Sultān. The two vessels left Masqat together on the 24th of February and arrived on the 28th at Būshehr, where M. Passek, the Russian Consul-General, after civilities had been interchanged with the local Persian authorities, embarked on the "Boyarin." From Būshehr the Gulf was crossed to Kuwait, where the "Boyarin" and "Infernet" remained from the 5th to the 8th March; and on the 14th, after a visit to Lingeh, they returned to Masqat, the Russian Consul-General being still

on board. The Sultān visited both ships in harbour on the 16th, after which they took their departure separately.

Russian railway reconnaissance in Southern Persia, 1900.

The visits of these ships to the ports of the Persian Gulf were generally characterised by much ceremony; profuse salutes and formal courtesies were resorted to to give *éclat* to the proceedings; and on more than one occasion the ship herself was thrown open to inspection by the riff-raff of the Arab or Persian populace. "A little more reserve," the British Consul at Basrah remarked, "would have produced a greater impression on the Oriental mind."

In 1900 a Russian railway reconnaissance was carried southwards from Central Persia to several points on the coast of the Gulf, a proceeding in itself sufficient to explain the nature of Russian designs in southern Persia and the manner in which the Russians hoped to support the naval base of which they were in search. The expedition by which the reconnaissance was carried out consisted of nearly a dozen Russians, not including some Russian or Russian-speaking servants. They reached Tehrān in March 1900 and left again for Isfahān about the 6th of April, accompanied by the Secretary of the Russian Legation in Persia and by some 60 Persian Cossacks. On arrival at Isfahān, on the 18th of April, the expedition was found to have diminished in numbers, some of the members having evidently been detached to examine branch routes. Of those who reached Isfahān all but one left again on the 24th of April in the direction of Shīrāz, while the remaining member, M. Tomiloff, started alone for Shūshtar *viâ* the Bakhtiyāri country upon the following day.

The scattered party eventually reached the coast at four different places. The first to emerge were M. Sakhanski, in charge of the whole expedition, who reached Būshehr before the end of May, and M. Tomiloff, who arrived at Muhammareh from Nāsiri on the 18th of that month. M. Sakhanski remained at Būshehr until the 3rd of June, when he returned to Europe by sea. M. Tomiloff made his way by sea from Muhammareh to Būshehr, whence he travelled by road to Shīrāz and back again, returning to Būshehr on the 12th of June; he was then conveyed by the Darya Baigi in the Persian steamer "Persepolis" to Muhammareh and returned northwards by Nāsiri. The third party to complete their work arrived at Bandar 'Abbās on the 7th of June, having travelled thither from Shīrāz *viâ* Fīrūzbād; on arrival it consisted of three Russians, one of whom was Dr. Sakhanski, a nephew of the leader of the expedition; another Russian who had started with them from Isfahān had shot himself accidentally in the course of the journey and had been sent back from Qumisheh to Tehran for medical treatment. The fourth party, composed originally of three Europeans, was the last to arrive at

the coast and suffered severely from the heat; they left Kirmān about the 12th of June and made *viâ* Bampūr, Qasrkand and Dashtyāri for Chahbār, where two of them, Captain Rittich and M. Palmgren, arrived on the 27th of June, preceded on the 26th by the corpse of their companion, M. Ilün, who had succumbed to the heat; M. Palmgren, a Swede by race and an elderly man, was much exhausted. The two unfortunate explorers were succoured by the British Telegraph officials at Chahbār and eventually reached Masqat in safety in a native boat.

The expedition which carried out this extensive reconnaissance was described by the Russian Consular officials in Persia as a "geographical mission," but the head of it, M. Sakhanski, was referred to in the Russian press as "Director of Persian Railways." Some doubt prevailed at the time as to the nature of the Russian Government's connection with the undertaking, but it was in part removed by later information which came into the possession of His Majesty's Government in 1903. The expedition was then proved to have been a Railway Commission, charged with ascertaining the best route for a Russian railway from Transcaucasia across Persia to the sea; and it was found that the leader of the Chahbār party had been Captain P. A. Rittich of the Russian General Staff, the author of a pamphlet on "Railways in Persia" which had made some stir in Russia in the early part of 1900, when the Russian press was full of Persian railway projects and was apprehensive lest the access of Russia to the sea should be barred by a junction between a German railway to Baghdād and the Indian railway system. It seemed that the Commission —or at least Captain Rittich—had condemned the Būshehr and Bandar 'Abbās routes as ending in the Persian Gulf, where the power of Britain was for naval reasons supreme, and at places which were incapable of conversion into ports, and that Captain Rittich had recommended the construction of a railway by way of Rasht, Qazvin, Tehrān, Qum, Kāshān, Yazd, Kirmān, Bam and Bampūr to Chahbār Bay at an estimated cost of £19,696,000 of which £1,575,000 was for the construction and armament of a port at Chahbār. The fact that the railway could not be supported by local, and must depend upon intercontinental, traffic had been clearly realised; and it had been proposed that special customs duties should be applied in Persia—presumably after the establishment of exclusive influence there by Russia—to prevent the railway from becoming subservient to British commercial interests.

The Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company and other Russian

Chiefly no doubt with a view to the creation of solid interests in the Persian Gulf, but partly perhaps with the object of providing colourable grounds for political interference there, resort was next had by Russia to subsidised commercial enterprises. The first hint that Russian commercial

commercial enterprises in the Persian Gulf, 1900-

operations were about to be undertaken with official support was given by a Russian doctor at Búshehr who stated, at the beginning of July 1900, that a Russian line of steamers would begin to run to the Gulf in the following autumn.

The actual execution of this scheme was preceded, however, by a tour of enquiry made by MM. Siromiatnikoff and Pellenberg, who arrived at Búshehr from Bombay on the 19th of June 1900, and from whom the information of the Russian doctor at Búshehr was probably derived. M. Siromiatnikoff was afterwards found to be a member of the editorial staff of the St. Petersburg newspaper "Novoe Vremya." M. Pellenberg travelled from Búshehr *viâ* Bandar Dilam, Fallâhiyeh, and the Fallâhiyeh canal to Muhammareh, which he reached on the 18th of July and subsequently proceeded to Ahwâz. M. Siromiatnikoff meanwhile visited Basrah and Baghdâd and, like M. Pellenberg, devoted himself to genuine commercial enquiries. In the course of his tour, however, M. Siromiatnikoff managed to visit Kuwait and proffered his services to Shaikh Mubârak for the purpose of obtaining a Russian decoration, but the proposal was courteously declined. Towards the end of August the travellers met again at Búshehr; they then passed a week at Bandar 'Abbâs; and from Bandar' Abbâs they made their way to Lingeh, where they embarked for Europe towards the end of September.

On his return to St. Petersburg M. Siromiatnikoff was ordered by the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovitch to draw up a report of his mission and did so; the report was submitted for consideration to M. de Witte, the Russian Minister of Finance. M. Siromiatnikoff stated that there was a good opening for Russian products in Southern Persia, chiefly for sugar, but also for cotton and woollen goods, grain, spirits, and other Russian merchandise; but in his opinion the trade could only be started by means of a Russian line of steam-ships, which it would be necessary to subsidise in view of the strong position of the existing British lines. Return cargoes of rice and dates would be obtainable. M. Siromiatnikoff advocated the opening of a Russian bank at one of the Persian Gulf ports, the establishment of coal depôts at Búshehr and Basrah, and the inauguration at those places of a Russian Consulate and Vice-Consulate respectively, protected by strong guards of Cossacks. He also urged that at least one Russian war-vessel should be constantly present in the Gulf. A special committee was appointed by the Minister of Finance to examine the report, including representatives of various administrative Departments and commercial bodies: it met at St. Petersburg on the 11th December 1900. The Committee adopted M. Siromiatnikoff's proposals almost without

modification. They recommended that a regular line of steamers should be established, subsidised at the rate of 3 roubles per sea mile, to run at intervals of two months from Odessa to Būshehr and Basrah; that the Russian Black Sea Navigation Company should be charged with the maintenance of the line; and that the Company should be bound to establish coal depôts at Būshehr and Basrah. The Russian duties on rice should be lowered in the case of rice imported from Persia by the Persian Gulf route. A Russian Commercial Bank and a Russian Consulate should be established at Būshehr and a Russian Vice-Consulate at Basrah. Finally the Minister of War should be requested to provide a military guard at both places for the protection of the Consular establishments, and the Minister of Marine to station a vessel of war in Persian waters for permanent service. The recommendations of the Committee appear to have met with immediate if provisional acceptance, for the "Exchange Gazette" of the 15th (28th) December 1900 announced that an experimental run from Odessa to the Persian Gulf would be made early in the following month by a steamer of the "Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company," and that favourable rates had been arranged for the conveyance by rail of goods, destined for this route, from the commercial and industrial centres of Russia to Odessa. Reductions in the railway tariff were subsequently notified in the "Messager Officiel" of the 12th (25th) January 1901.

The first steamer of the new Russian line to visit the Persian Gulf was the "Korniloff." She was an antiquated vessel built in 1869, of small carrying capacity, and unsuited by her draught for work in the Persian Gulf. On her first cruise in the Gulf she mounted six machine guns "for defence against pirates," and the crew were said to receive instruction in their use. After touching at Masqat, Jāshk, Bandar 'Abbās, and Lingeh the "Korniloff" arrived at Būshehr on the 21st of March 1901. At Masqat she saluted the Sultān's flag with three guns, and the salute was returned gun for gun with an intimation that, as she was a merchant vessel, the compliment could not be repaid on any future occasion. At Būshehr she was met by Prince Dabija, the Russian Consul-General from Isfahān, who had come there on the 4th of March to await her arrival and had been received by the Persian Governor, acting under instructions from Tehrān, with much distinction at his entry into the town. From Būshehr the "Korniloff" proceeded to Basrah, where she arrived on the 4th and remained till the 15th of April; she then began her return voyage down the Gulf. At the beginning of April the Dutch firm of Messrs. Hota & Son at Būshehr, which had enjoyed British protection

there for 15 years, transferred themselves to Russian protection and became the local agents of the new Russian line. The cargo of the "Korniloff" consisted on this occasion of about 1,000 tons of general cargo, and she brought ten passengers from Europe. At Bandar 'Abbás she discharged 600 bags of sugar, and at Búshehr 7,500 cases of kerosine oil, besides a quantity of sugar, cotton, silk, piece-goods and crockery, which two Russian agents remained on shore to sell. At Basrah were landed about 5,000 cases of oil, wood ready sawn for about 50,000 date boxes, also some piece-goods and sugar; the two last-named commodities did not meet with a ready sale. At Basrah the "Korniloff" might have obtained a return cargo of grain for Jiddah, but her excessive draught prevented her accepting it as it would have had to be lightered over the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab. On his return to Europe the commander, M. Klassing, was summoned to St. Petersburg to give an account of the voyage. The results were evidently regarded as inconclusive, for the drawing up of a contract between the Company and the Russian Government was deferred. A subsidy for the voyage was paid at the rate, it is believed, of 4 roubles per sea mile. In July 1901 the organ of the Russian sugar industry at Kieff drew attention to the new opening in the Persian Gulf, and announced that the Ministry of Finance would shortly publish a practical guide book to the Gulf compiled by a person who had been specially deputed to study the conditions of trade on the spot.

The "Korniloff" sailed from Odessa for the second time on the 11th of September 1901 and reached Masqat on the 4th of October. Here, disregarding the intimation made by the Sultan on the last occasion, she proceeded to fire a salute of 9 guns and demanded that it should be returned on the ground that she was a "Government vessel." The Sultan was inclined to refuse, but gave way upon a second salute of 21 guns being fired and the Russian flag sent ashore for a return of the compliment. This matter having been arranged to the satisfaction of the Russian commander, he weighed anchor and left Masqat precipitately without discharging any cargo. The "Korniloff" subsequently called at Bandar 'Abbás, Lingeh, Búshehr, Failiyeh (near Muhammareh), and Basrah; she left Lingeh homeward bound on the 23rd of November. At Búshehr the newly constituted Russian Consulate-General, which owed its creation in part at least to the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company's venture, was now in existence, having been opened in September 1901, and was able to assist the "Korniloff" in her operations. On this second voyage the "Korniloff" obtained a full cargo at Odessa and was obliged to decline further offers at Constantinople and Port Said; she carried six passengers

and her cargo consisted of about 650 tons of timber and planks, besides about 1,000 tons of kerosine in cases, sugar, flour, and manufactured goods. At Bandar 'Abbās she discharged about 5,000 cases of kerosine, at Lingeh a small quantity of cotton goods, at Būshehr 12,000 cases of kerosine and 100 cases of glassware, at Basrah 16,500 cases of oil and about £1,500 worth of wood, chiefly beams for building which were intended to compete with the Jāwi wood ordinarily imported at Basrah from Singapore. This time she secured a good return of cargo at Basrah, chiefly of dates in skins and bags, consigned to the Levant and Constantinople; at Būshehr she obtained 4,600 bags of tobacco for Bairūt, 60 cases of gum-tragacanth for London and Odessa, some bales of raw cotton for Odessa, and a small quantity of opium for Alexandria; to these were added at Lingeh 3,500 bags of tobacco for Jiddah and 20 bales of Persian carpets. Passages booked at Basrah by native passengers for Jiddah, Egypt and Constantinople brought in about £230 and over 30 Muhammadan pilgrims were embarked at Lingeh. It is probable that on this voyage the "Korniloff's" expenses were more than covered by her earnings, in which case the subsidy, understood to be now fixed at 50,000 roubles for the round trip, represented a clear gain to the owners. The cruise was thus not unprofitable, but an immense amount of time had been wasted in discharging and collecting cargo.

While the "Korniloff" was making her second voyage in the Gulf another Russian vessel, having apparently no connection with the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, was also engaged there. This was the "Sigrid" from Batoum, an English-built vessel of 1,300 tons and 16½ feet draught; she was understood to belong to a Company which owned 13 other similar vessels and received no subsidy, but was reimbursed by the Russian Government the amount of the dues paid by their ships in passing through the Suez Canal. The "Sigrid" discharged 18,000 cases of kerosine oil at Būshehr and 45,000 at Basrah. On her return voyage she obtained about 3,000 tons of grain and general cargo at Basrah at a low freight, and a small quantity at better terms at Būshehr; she completed her cargo with 620 tons of red oxide for London, which she loaded at Bū Mūsa Island. For at least part of her cruise the "Sigrid" appears to have been chartered by Hāji Allana, a merchant of Bombay. An agency for the Company owning the "Sigrid" was accepted by an Armenian merchant at Būshehr, but the Gulf was not again visited by any of their steamers.

The first cruises of the "Korniloff," being of special interest, have been described in some detail; but her subsequent voyages and those of the "Azoff" and "Truvor" which followed her, call for no remarks. The

new line secured without difficulty the date and passenger traffic between the ports of the Persian Gulf and those of the Levant and Black Sea, for on this run there was no competing company; but the trade thus obtained was limited in amount and was restricted to certain seasons of the year. In the general carrying trade between Europe and the Gulf the new line made little headway, and after the first some difficulty seemed to be experienced in obtaining full cargoes for the outward voyage. Wood, kerosine and sugar continued to be the chief exports brought out by the Russian steamers; for their other cargo there was little sale, their cottons being undersold by Indian manufactures and their chintzes outclassed by others. In January 1903 there was still no regular contract between the Company and the Russian Government, but under an informal agreement with M. de Witte the Company continued to send out four ships a year and to receive an annual subsidy of 200,000 roubles (£21,000). At this time negotiations were on foot for the establishment of a regular contract for 20 years, but the matter was held over for consideration by the Department of Merchant Shipping then in course of formation under the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich. At length, at the end of March 1903, it became known that the relations of the Company and the Russian Government had been placed on a clear footing by a contract. Under the agreement an annual subsidy of 200,000 roubles was granted by the Government for 12 years in consideration of the despatch of four steamers to the Gulf in each year by the Company. The Suez Canal dues paid by the Company were also to be reimbursed by the Russian Government. Control over the selection of the Company's principal representative in the Gulf was reserved by the Russian Government to themselves. This contract, recommended by the Council of the Empire, was sanctioned by the Tsar in April 1903, and shortly afterwards it was announced in the "Odessi Listok" of 25th April (8th May) that two new steamers would be specially built for the Persian Gulf service in Russian yards. A notice issued from the head office of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company at Odessa which reached Bûshehr in June 1903 explained the local organisation and working of the Company. The chief office in the Gulf had been established at Bûshehr under a M. Pavloff, and subordinate agencies had been, or would shortly be, created at Masqat, Jâshk, Bandar 'Abbâs, Lingeh, Muhammareh and Basrah. Cargo and passengers would be carried direct by the steamers of the Company's line to and between these ports, also to Aden, Jiloûti, Jiddah, Suez, Port Said, Jaffa, Baîrût, Smyrna, the Dardanelles and Constantinople, and would be accepted for transhipment to other places in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. In consequence of the reorganisation Messrs. Botz & Son lost their position as the Company's agents at Bûshehr, and

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further information showed that the new staff in the Gulf was likely to be entirely of Russian nationality. In 1903 some Batoum firms sent travellers to the Persian Gulf and steps were taken for the establishment of museums of Russian products and manufactures at Būshehr and Basrah. In November 1903 the Russian Government decided to station a war vessel permanently in the Persian Gulf, and the construction of a gunboat was subsequently provided for in the Russian naval programme of 1906. Towards the end of 1904 the Russian Government, in order to assist the operations of the Company, annulled their general prohibition of trade between Europe and Persia by the Batoum-Baku route in respect of certain kinds of British merchandise, notably Indian tea, if carried by the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company's steamers from Odessa to Batoum, and certain reductions of custom duty were granted in favour of the same articles.

Further aid was rendered to Russian trade in Southern Persia and the Gulf by the despatch of two Russian commercial missions to those parts in 1904 and 1905, the second under the auspices of the Russian Department of Mercantile Shipping. The first mission consisted of five members, and both were headed by Prince Anatouni, a Caucasian Armenian of good birth. Members of the first mission were seen at Shīrāz, Būshehr, Muhammareh, Shūshtar, and other places, the Prince himself visiting the two last in person in August 1904; the chief object then appeared to be the establishment of Russian Banks at Būshehr and Shīrāz. On the second occasion Prince Anatouni was still described as "Secretary of the Russian Bank," but he was also charged with the inspection of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company's staff, which now consisted of one senior and seven junior agents stationed at the Persian Gulf ports enumerated in the Company's prospectus of 1903. This duty cannot have been very thoroughly performed, for the Prince, who arrived at Būshehr on the 27th of September 1905 in the Company's steamer "Truvor," left in the beginning of October for Shīrāz, where he remained till the end of the month, and then departed for Isfahān and Tehrān.

Increased Russian consular representation in the Persian Gulf region.

Concurrently with the development of the Russian naval, military, and commercial schemes described above, there were additions to and improvements in the consular staff maintained by Russia in the countries adjoining the Persian Gulf. These will be noted in their proper places in dealing with the detailed political history of the Gulf.

Russian sanitary agents and policy in the Persian Gulf.

Little political advantage was derived by Russia from the "plague missions" which, as mentioned in the history of the last period, she occasionally sent to the shores of the Persian Gulf. The fact that the sanitary

measures at Persian ports had been committed by the Persian Government to British management, together with the short duration of a single small epidemic of plague that occurred at Būshehr, defeated the real purpose of these Russian deputations; and a threat made by the Russian Legation at Tehrān in 1899, that Cossacks would be sent to Būshehr as they had been to Sistān to form a plague cordon, remained merely a threat. When attempts were made in 1903 and 1904 to encroach upon the powers of the British sanitary executive, they appeared to proceed from the Persian Government and the doctor of the French Vice-Consulate at Būshehr, nor is there any proof that they were instigated by the representatives of Russia at Tehrān or elsewhere. Russia, however, still continued to regard the sanitary organisation of the Gulf as a field in which the predominant influence of England might advantageously be challenged; and in 1905 the Russian delegate on the Board of Health at Constantinople unsuccessfully urged the creation of a sanitary station, under the authority of the Board, near the Straits of Hormūz, a project of the Paris Conference of 1903 which Great Britain had accepted subject to conditions but was known to regard with disfavour.

French activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

While Russia was striving to create for herself a naval and commercial position in the Persian Gulf, the French Republic, though its schemes were of a less grandiose character, was somewhat similarly employed.

Concerted action of France and Russia.

A local understanding between the two powers had early been detected by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, who on the 7th June 1899 placed the Political Resident at Būshehr in possession, by telegram, of his views on this subject. Co-operation between Russia and France in the Persian Gulf was recommended in an article which appeared in the St. Petersburg "Novoe Vremya" of the 13th (26th) September 1901; and the amenities exchanged between French and Russian naval officers in the Gulf itself pointed, on more than one occasion afterwards, to the existence of a common policy. The joint tour of the Russian cruiser "Boyarin" and the French cruiser "Infernet" to Masqat, Būshehr, Kuwait and Lingeh in 1903 was obviously intended as a display of united action.

Projected French naval base in the Gulf of

At the same time it would be a mistake to suppose that France had no separate ambitions of her own in the Persian Gulf. The facts on the contrary indicated that she aimed at the establishment of a French protectorate

or quasi-protectorate in some part of eastern 'Omān, and that she was in search of a naval *point d'appui* in the same neighbourhood. Persevering endeavours were made, as in the past, to create by wholesale grants of the French flag, especially to natives of Sūr, a class of maritime Arabs dependent on French protection and subject to French authority; and an attempt by France to obtain the valuable harbour of Bandar Jissah near Masqat for occupation was very nearly successful. Both of these important questions are dealt with at length elsewhere; and here it is enough to remark that the flag question became so acute in 1903 as to bring France and Britain,—a fact which fortunately did not become public,—within measurable distance of a rupture. There is, indeed, no reason to doubt that France entertained designs, unconnected with the furtherance of Russian policy, upon the 'Omān coast between Masqat and Ras-al-Hadd, and possibly upon the hinterland as well, for the French Vice-Consul during a period of years maintained intimate relations at Sūr with the Banī Bū 'Alī and Jannabah tribes who occupy also a large part of the interior.

'Omān and indiscriminate conferment of the French flag on native vessels.

A free use of war vessels was made in the Gulf by France during the time of her greatest political activity there. In 1900-01 the French men-of-war "Drome," "Catinat," and "Achéron," in 1901-02 the "Catinat," "Jean Bart," "Infernet," and "Chasseloup Loubat," in 1902-03 the "Infernet," and "Friand," and in 1904 the "Infernet" were seen in the Gulf of 'Omān, some of them visiting the Persian Gulf also. Lieutenant Jules Viaud of the French Navy, better known as "Pierre Loti," Academician, sentimental politician, and author of "L'Inde sans les Anglais," was in the Persian Gulf in April 1900; he spent a day at Masqat, where he had an interview with the Sultān, and thence went to Būshehr.

French naval demonstrations in the Persian Gulf.

A malicious press campaign against British proceedings in the Persian Gulf, conducted in Arabic as well as in French and Russian journals, was a singular accompaniment of the contest between France and Britain.

Journalistic attacks of French origin on British proceedings in the Persian Gulf.

Early in 1899 there settled at Masqat a certain Antoine Goguyer, a Frenchman of energy and ability, to whose manœuvres some reference must be made. The antecedents of M. Goguyer, who spoke Arabic like a native, were shady; he was an inveterate *mécontent*, and in the past he had had trouble with the French Foreign Office. At one time he was obliged to leave Tunis on account of his misdeeds, and at another he was imprisoned by M. Lagarde, the French representative in Abyssinia, doubtless not without cause. M. Goguyer's affairs at Masqat, in so far as they relate to his dealings in arms, are dealt with elsewhere; in this place we are only concerned with the political side of his conduct.

M. Goguyer had not been long at Masqat when he opened an attack

upon Britain in the French newspapers, his favourite organ being the "Dépêche Coloniale," in which one article was even printed over his signature; virulent communications clearly traceable to the same source appeared also in Russian journals and in the Arabic press of Egypt. M. Goguyer's tirades showed bitter animus and an unscrupulous disregard of truth, but their style was pungent and some of them were undeniably witty; they were chiefly directed against British policy as personified in the British Political Agent at Masqat; but the Sultán of 'Omán also came in for a share of ridicule and abuse. Two British coal-prospecting expeditions made from Súr in 1901 and a speech delivered by Lord Curzon in Darbar at Shárjah in 1903 were savagely reviewed in French prints, and an Arabic article on British policy in Central Arabia which appeared in the "Ahrám" of Cairo in September 1904 showed that M. Goguyer had not neglected to acquire information during a then recent visit to Kuwait; an earlier article in the same Egyptian newspaper in 1902 had dwelt on the insolence of the English and "their slaves the Hindus" at Masqat. The object of the writer was obviously to create strong feeling in France and elsewhere, partly, it may be, as a means of forcing the hand of the French Foreign Office. In the circumstances it was not wonderful that in 1903, after M. Goguyer had been at work for three years, a report that Britain was about to annex Masqat caused disquietude in France and provoked an interpellation in the French Chamber.

The Sultán of 'Omán was not allowed to remain in ignorance of M. Goguyer's attacks; on the contrary he was regularly supplied with translations or copies of the same by unknown correspondents in Europe. In the beginning of 1901 the Sultán consulted the British representative at Masqat as to the possibility of action being taken against M. Goguyer, and the matter was referred to His Majesty's Government, who decided to ascertain in the first instance whether M. Goguyer possessed any official status at Masqat. The reply of the French Ambassador was somewhat ambiguous, for he merely stated that M. Goguyer "was believed to be the representative of a shipping agency, and that there was no reason for thinking that he had any official position, although he might have been employed by the French Vice-Consulate as a clerk." In 1902 M. Laronce, who in the previous year had succeeded M. Ottavi as French Vice-Consul at Masqat,—an estimable gentleman but one who stood in awe of M. Goguyer's scurrilous pen—was persuaded by the British Political Agent to ask his Government whether he might agree to M. Goguyer's deportation from Masqat by the Sultán. The reply of the French Foreign Office was unfavourable, but a warning to M. Goguyer that he should exercise more circumspection in his writings was authorised. Soon after he had repelled

this mild rebuke with open defiance of the Vice-Consul's authority M. Goguyer proposed to fly the Russian commercial flag over his premises in virtue of his connection with the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, but he was interdicted from doing so by M. Laronce.

Meanwhile a case had occurred between M. Goguyer and an Arab merchant, 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali of Bandar Jissah, from whom M. Goguyer claimed Rs. 20,000 on account of joint transactions in arms and ammunition; the claim was urged upon the Sultān by the French Vice-Consul; and in the end, supported by the presence of a second-class cruiser, the "Friand," which called at Masqat towards the end of October 1902, the French arguments prevailed and the money was paid. Subsequently it was discovered that M. Goguyer had received in this way Rs. 7,500 more than his due, and M. Laronce, under a decision of the French Court of Appeal in Bourbon, called on him to refund the amount. This M. Goguyer at first refused to do, nor did he submit until a month after the Vice-Consul had attached a large portion of his stock in trade.

In April 1904, M. Goguyer's newspaper attacks still continuing, the Sultān with the approval and assistance of M. Laronce wrote to M. Delcassé, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting that Masqat might be relieved of M. Goguyer's presence. M. Delcassé's reply, dated the 26th of May 1904, was that M. Goguyer was not a man of violence but an honest trader, that he had influential employers who had formally made themselves answerable for his conduct, and that in future he would be restrained from writing against the Sultān and from interesting himself in the internal affairs of 'Omān; for the present M. Delcassé was not prepared to go further. M. Goguyer thus remained at Masqat and his anti-British fulminations continued.

Another and by no means creditable feature in the French campaign against British influence in the Gulf remains to be described. It consisted in the systematic dissemination throughout the Muhammadan world of intelligence and opinions politically injurious to Great Britain by means of an Arabic newspaper purporting to be written by Muhammadans for Muhammadans. The title of this print, originally the "Fath-al-Basāir" or "Opening of Eyes," was changed in 1902 to the "Murshid-al-Albāb" or "Preceptor of Hearts."

About April 1900 the paper in question began to reach Masqat, where it was delivered gratuitously and post paid to several of the leading Arab residents; and the fact that some of the copies were addressed by name to leading Shaikhs in the interior of 'Omān betrayed a command of local information by those engaged in the enterprise. In May 1900 copies were

received by Muhammadan inhabitants of Aden, and the mail which reached Bombay on the 7th of July contained copies for Lingeh, Bûshehr and Bahrain. Eventually in 1903 it was ascertained that nine copies of the paper were then being regularly sent to the French possessions in the Comoros, Réunion and Madagascar, 21 to East Africa, 20 to Masqat, 1 to Dibai, 3 to Bahrain, 2 to Kuwait, 3 to Basrah, 7 to Tehrân, 6 to Bûshehr, 2 to Bandar 'Abbâs, 7 to Lingeh and 17 to British India, the last including four which were addressed to Aden. Among the addressees at Masqat were the Sultân, his eldest son, some of his principal officials, and the members of a rebellious family in Sharqiyah; the addressee at Dibai was the Shaikh of that place; two of the Bahrain copies were destined for the Shaikh of Bahrain and the notorious Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhâb, who was an acquaintance of M. Goguyer; the copies posted to Kuwait were for Shaikh Mubârak and Ibn Sa'ûd, the chiefs respectively of Kuwait and Central Arabia; at Basrah two of the intended recipients were connected with the Naqîb of that place; the addressees at Tehrân were principally high officials of the Persian Government; those at Bûshehr included the Governor and the Kârguzâr; at Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbâs the Persian Deputy Governors were among those to whom copies were sent. The postmark was almost invariably that of the French post office at Bairût in Syria, but one issue of the paper which reached Bombay on the 14th of July 1900 had been posted at Tangier.

The tone of the "Fath-al-Basâir" was calculated to inflame Muhammadan feelings everywhere against Britain, whose policy was represented in an odious light. Such phrases as "The greatest of all sedition-mongers are the English" and "The devils of this epoch are the English" were of frequent occurrence in its columns. The paper dwelt exultantly on British discomfitures in any part of the world, from whatever cause proceeding: the South African war, while it lasted, provided a favourite topic. Some brochures of similar appearance and tendency to the "Fath-al-Basâir," but differently entitled, also reached the Gulf from time to time.

In June 1900 the Sultân of 'Omân signified a wish that the "Fath-al-Basâir" should be prevented from circulating in his territories, and the Government of India immediately arranged for its elimination at Bombay from the Masqat mail. Eventually in 1901 special treatment of copies intended for Aden was authorised, and in 1903 arrangements were made both at Aden and Bombay for dealing with all copies contained in the mails transhipped at those places or destined for Indian ports. The adoption of closed covers in September 1900 by the managers of the journal, the occasional despatch of the paper by French or Italian mail steamers in 1901, and the change of title in 1902, were all difficulties in the way of effective

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interception, and at the beginning of 1904, a few copies still occasionally found their way to Masqat.

The origin of the "Fath-al-Basâir" was discovered in 1902, through the strange experiences of an Arab named Salim Qamri, the son of a Zanzibar merchant. Salim Qamri, who in 1902 was about 30 years of age, had been at one time employed as a clerk in the service of the Sultân of Zanzibar, and had subsequently visited Jibûti, Hodaidah and the Persian Gulf on his own account. Eventually in 1900 he settled at Lahaj near Aden under the protection of the Sultân of that place, and in 1901, he became a student in the school of the United Free Church of Scotland's Mission at Shaikh 'Othmân; here he was converted to Christianity and in 1902 was baptised. In March 1902 he received through the French Consul at Aden an advantageous offer of employment at Paris, which he accepted; it emanated from a M. Piat, formerly French Consul at Bûshehr. Salim Qamri reached Paris about the beginning of June and found that he was to be employed there as native editor of the "Fath-al-Basâir" under M. Piat, who was then working in the French Foreign Office. The minute account which he gave of the *modus operandi* and of the contents and distribution of the paper, tallying as it did in every respect with what was already known from other sources, was enough in itself to place his veracity beyond suspicion. After falling in for a short time with the wishes of his employers, who kept him under close surveillance, Salim Qamri struck work from conscientious motives; and on his persisting in his refusal to assist in the production of the paper, he was medically examined, pronounced insane, and consigned about the middle of July to the Sainte Anne Lunatic Asylum in Paris. Meanwhile, however, he had succeeded in communicating by post with the Revd. Dr. Young, head of the Scottish Mission at Aden, and with the Revd. Mr. Brechin, a Scottish clergyman in Paris; and in August he addressed an appeal for help to the British Embassy in Paris. Eventually Dr. Young, who came to Paris for the purpose, succeeded with official assistance in obtaining Salim Qamri's release from the asylum —where he had been confined on the ground of "erotic mania, prostration and depression"—and brought him back to Aden.

His formal deposition taken by a Magistrate at Aden on the 15th and 16th of December 1902, added something to what was known of the "Fath-al-Basâir" bureau and its operations. According to his statement a letter had been issued to the Somali Mulla in the name "all Muhammadans and their teachers" promising him aid in arms and ammunition, from Jibûti, in his struggle against the English; a second "from all Muslim teachers" had been sent to the Shaikh of Kuwait, urging him to break off

relations with England and submit to the Sultân of Turkey; and a third had been addressed to Najm-ud-Dîn, the "Addah Mullah" of Afghanistan, on the part of "all Muhammadans," which promised support in a war with England and counselled him to side with Russia.

Independent confirmation of Salim Qamri's story was also forthcoming, inasmuch as envelopes containing the "Fath-al-Basâir" which had been seized by the Indian Post Office were identified by Mr. J. Bolton, stationer, of 39, St. George's Place, Knightsbridge, whose trademark they bore, as having been specially made for the French Embassy in London, whence, according to Mr. Bolton's information, they had been forwarded to Paris. In 1902, it may be remarked, M. Piat was shown in the official directory of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs as "employed on special service." The opinion of Sir E. Monson, British Ambassador at Paris, on Salim Qamri's case is worth quoting: it ran as follows:—

> From enquiries which I have caused to be made at the Consulate-General as to the circumstances under which Mr. Atlee visited and succeeded in rescuing this unfortunate man, I have come to the conclusion that his story, romantic and unusual as it appears, is no invention or hallucination; and, with the knowledge that his Majesty's Government possess of the unscrupulous character of many of the men employed by France on official foreign service in the East, it is not difficult to believe that M. Piat's action, needlessly cruel as it undoubtedly was, has not been exaggerated in the description given by his victim * * * * * * I am at the same time quite ready to believe that some of the high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not be disposed to close their eyes to the commission of grave irregularities to the prejudice of British interests in the East.

It is not apparent that the proceedings of M. Goguyer or M. Piat in any way advanced French interests or undermined British influence in the Persian Gulf; and their campaigns had the tendency, common to all campaigns of such a nature, to become less and less effective the longer they were maintained. It has been thought well to describe them, however, to show in what spirit and with what weapons the contest with Britain was waged on the part of France. In 1905 the circulation of the "Murshid-al-Albâb" still continued, notwithstanding an improvement in the relations between Britain and France, which took place about 1904 and effaced the bitter memories of Fashoda which had inspired French policy at the beginning of the period.

French commercial enterprises in the Persian Gulf.

Some efforts by French representatives to establish French trade in the Persian Gulf may be mentioned, but they were of little importance. An article by M. Ottavi, the French Vice-Consul at Masqat, in the "Moniteur Officiel du Commerce" of the 29th of March 1900 advocated th establishment by French enterprise at Masqat of a "grand magasin de nouveautés

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on bazar," having a branch at Paris or Marseilles; the object of the proposal was to create direct trade between France and the Persian Gulf which, the writer argued, would compete on favourable terms with existing British trade through Bombay, inasmuch as the sea voyage would be shorter and the payment of customs and middlemen's profits at Bombay would be avoided; nothing, however, resulted from the suggestion. In March 1903 M. M. Dumas and Castlelin, the former a partner in a Marseilles firm, came provided with letters of recommendation by the French Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs, to Bahrain and made preparations for settling there; in consequence, however, of an outbreak of plague they hurriedly quitted the place in the month of May following. They had brought with them numerous samples of French manufactures, and M. Dumas during his sojourn made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a concession for pearl-fishing from the Shaikh. Again, at the beginning of August 1903 M. Jouannin, General Secretary of the "Comité de l'Asie Française," arrived at Masqat with an assistant and remained for about a month exhibiting French goods and making commercial inquiries. Early in September M. Jouannin visited Bahrain, where he stayed for three weeks, employing his time in the same manner as at Masqat; during his stay he mooted the foundation of a Bank in Bahrain, but his overtures were rejected by the Shaikh. After an unsuccessful endeavour to arrange for a journey to Central Arabia he left Bahrain and proceeded to Basrah and Baghdád. No political character was attributed to a visit which was paid to Bahrain in August and September 1905 by Mme. Nattan, the widow of a Paris jeweller, accompanied by a daughter and a nephew. The party were accompanied by a son of the notorious Anglophobe M. Goguyer, and they were subsequently joined by M. Goguyer himself, but it appeared that they had no serious object beyond the purchase of pearls.

The French archæological excavations at Tallo in Turkish 'Irāq ceased in 1900, but those at Shūsh in Arabistān continued throughout the period.

German activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

To the circle of European powers taking an active interest in the Persian Gulf was added, about this time, the German Empire. Germany stood in high favour at Constantinople, partly on account of her having abstained—which other powers did not—from remonstrances with Turkey on the subject of the Armenian massacres of 1895, partly on account of a visit

paid by the German Emperor, William II, to the Turkish dominions and capital in 1898; and during the period her influence was in the ascendant in the innermost and most influential Ottoman circles.

The "Baghdād" Railway.

A concession for the construction of an Ottoman Railway from Konia in Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf *viâ* Baghdād was definitely secured by Germans in 1899; and in 1900 a German technical commission, headed by the German Consul-General at Constantinople, travelled along the proposed alignment of the railway in Turkish 'Irāq and reported upon all questions connected therewith. The original idea of the concessionaires was to bring the line down to the coast in Kuwait Bay; but eventually the choice of a terminus in the Persian Gulf was postponed, as the selection of Kuwait was opposed by Britain, whose interest was then popularly supposed to lie in obstructing the whole project until she had been admitted to a large share in it, and who could not in any case have agreed to the formation of a railway port in the Gulf except under conditions ensuring its innocuousness to her own military position. A final Convention for the building of the Konia-Persian Gulf line by a new "Baghdād Railway Company," to be formed by the existing Anatolian Railway Company, was signed in 1903; but nothing was done under it in the Persian Gulf region up to the end of the period with which we are concerned.

Possibly in connection with the Baghdād Railway project, the German war vessel "Arcona," in returning from the Far East in 1899, was ordered to visit Basrah. She called at Masqat, Lingeh, and Būshehr, arriving at the last-named place at the end of March; but from there, having learned that her draught was too great to allow of her crossing the bar of the Shatt-Al-'Arab, she returned southwards leaving the cruise uncompleted.

Beginnings of German trade in the Gulf.

German trade in and with the Persian Gulf may be said to have had its real beginning about this time. In 1899 a party of Germans visited Bandar 'Abbās to study the commercial situation there. A German named Toeppen, who became a convert to Muhammadanism, sometimes suspected of being a political intriguer but really a mercantile adventurer, was in evidence at various places in the Gulf from 1899 to 1904. A representative of a Hamburg firm who had traded in mother-of-pearl shells at Lingeh for some years established himself in Bahrain in 1901; he had also business relations with Trucial 'Omān, and his dealings with the Trucial Shaikhs were considered to have some political significance. In 1906 the (German) Hamburg-America line began a service of steamers between Europe and the Persian Gulf, and the German merchant already mentioned was appointed their Agent in Bahrain.

In Turkish 'Irāq Germany had secured a practical monopoly for the

excavation of ancient sites; and work at Babylon, begun in 1898 by a German mission, continued throughout the period.

The actual interests of Germany in the Persian Gulf were thus, it will be seen, small as yet; but her prospective interests, dependent on the Baghdád Railway and on an expansion of trade, were very considerable.

Belgian activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

Projected Belgian syndicate.

A small Belgian enterprise in the Gulf deserves mention as showing the readiness of all nations to participate, if a profitable opening could be found, in business operations there. M. Simais, formerly Commercial Attaché of the Belgian Legation at Tehrán and in 1901 Director-General of the Persian Customs of the South, was undoubtedly interested in the proceedings; he had visions of a Belgian trading syndicate which would establish a bank in Persia and a line of steamers in the Gulf in competition with existing British institutions.

Cruise of the "Selika."

The prospecting operations of M. Simais' friends were carried out by a small Belgian steam yacht, the "Selika" of Antwerp, commanded by M. Adrien de Gerlache, who had once led a Belgian expedition of discovery in the antartic regions. The party consisted, besides M. de Gerlache, of a military officer, an artist, a doctor and two men of science, the last being, it was said, of French nationality. After leaving Masqat, where she arrived on the 7th of March, the "Selika" cruised along the coast of Ruús-al-Jibál and was not seen again until she appeared at Bahrain on the 11th April. According to statements by the party travelling on her she had called at Dibai, had been detained a fortnight by an accident to her machinery at the island of Arzanah, and had spent two days at Dóhah; but the length of time during which she had lingered in the neighbourhood of the pearls banks appeared suspicious, especially as the remainder of her cruise was short and as M. Simais stated that she came in connection with a pearl fishing concession granted by the Persian Government two years previously. On the 21st of April the "Selika" left Bahrain for Qatíf, and on the 23rd she reached Búshehr, whence she took her departure for Bombay. It was subsequently ascertained that the travellers in the "Selika" had purchased or otherwise obtained about 3,000 francs' worth of small pearls which they sold at a high profit on their return to Europe.

In November 1901 M. de Gerlache reappeared at Bahrain, but without the "Selika," and his pearl-dealing operations were this time unsuccessful.

M. Simais died, and the project of a syndicate were abandoned. The "Selika" was subsequently purchased* in Europe by the Persian Government for their Customs service and became the "Muzaffari."

American activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

The form of American activity in the Persian Gulf remained unchanged. Archæological work was prosecuted by Americans at Nifar in Turkish 'Iraq until 1900. In that year an American Consular Agent was appointed at Basrah. At one time the affairs of the (American) Arabian Mission in Bahrain gave some trouble to the British authorities, who were responsible for the safety of the missionaries, and the Government of India would gladly have seen the latter withdrawn; but ultimately the dangers due to the presence of the Mission, such as they were, passed away.

Muhammadan forces and movements, 1899-1905.

Certain Muhammadan forces and movements, chiefly religious and journalistic, claim attention as having had at this time points of contact with British policy in the Persian Gulf.

The Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf.

The most important of these were the proceedings of the Mujtahid fraternity of Karbala and Najaf, who then were, and for some years longer remained, a political factor of no mean power in politics. In 1905, when the state of Persia became troubled, certain of the Mujtahids threw in their lot with the critics of the Persian Government and by their pronouncements encouraged, to some extent, opposition to the Shah and his chief minister, the Atabaig-i-A'zam. The immense prestige which the Mujtahids enjoyed in Persia and the authority with which the masses invested their opinion, even in purely secular and political affairs, made this development a matter of serious anxiety to the Persian Government. Steps were first taken to conciliate them, but without success. At length in 1904 measures for repressing their activity were adopted by the Porte at the instance of Persia, and the desired effect was produced.

Through the Oudh Bequest, of which certain of their number were Distributors, the British Government were to some extent in relations with the Mujtahid body; and his Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrán thought

* *Vide* page 2604, *post*.

that the circumstance might be turned to account to moderate their interference in Persian politics, to render them less hostile to Christians and Europeans as such, and even to draw them into a sort of alliance with the British Government for defeating Russian designs in Persia. Steps were taken in 1903 in the direction suggested, but they were ineffectual, the Mujtahids showing no inclination to enter into cordial dealings with the British political representatives; and in the following year advantage seems to have been taken by the Persian Government of the British negotiations with some of the Mujtahids to prejudice the Porte against them as persons holding relations with a European power: hence the action, already mentioned, of the Turkish Government.

Arabic and Persian press.

Manifestations of hostility to British policy in the Persian Gulf were from time to time remarked in the press of more than one Muhammadan country, and some of them were genuine, being inspired by genuine religious or racial feeling; but such were difficult to distinguish from the emanations of the pseudo-Islamic bureau maintained in the French Foreign Office. This difficulty was felt especially in regard to an Arabic anti-British leaflet, posted at Cairo, which reached Bombay on the 12th of December 1903; copies were found addressed to Masqat, Dibai, Kuwait, Basrah, Muhammareh, Bûshehr and Lingeh; and its interception by the Indian Post Office was authorised. The tract purported to be the work of one 'Abdul Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah; it related to a tour by Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India in the Persian Gulf; and its object was to dissuade the inhabitants of the Gulf from attaching importance to the demonstration, and from putting faith in the British Government.

The "Liwa," "Muaiyid," and other newspapers published in Egypt set themselves in 1904-05 to disseminate mendacious accounts of British action in the Persian Gulf and North-Eastern Arabia, and the effects, as they had some influence, were unfortunate. These papers were believed to be largely responsible for a strongly Anglophobe attitude exhibited by most of the Turkish officials in the Basrah Wilayat in 1905; and, on the other hand, it was suspected that the Egyptian journals were themselves directly inspired from Constantinople.

Belonging to a somewhat different class was the "Habl-ul-Matîn," a Persian newspaper published at Calcutta, which frequently took advantage of the freedom of the press in British India to disparage the Government whose protection it enjoyed. In this print there appeared a false and anti-British account of a crisis in Bahrain in 1904 which made it necessary to arrange for a *démenti* by a respectable newspaper at Tehrân. The "Habl-ul-Matîn" offended upon other occasions also, but its attacks had not the importance attaching to those of the Cairo press.

Affairs and foreign relations of the 'Oman Sultanate, 1899-1905.

The general affairs and foreign relations of the different territorial divisions of the Persian Gulf region call next for notice.

Rupture between the Sultān and Britain, and settlement of the French naval base question.

The period opened with a serious rupture between the British Government and the Sultān of 'Omān, of which the general causes, though specific reasons were not wanting, were the generally hostile attitude of the Sultān to Britain and his increasing intimacy with France. The presentation of an ultimatum requiring him to settle certain claims of British subjects and give satisfaction on various other points had already been authorised when the discovery, mentioned in the history of the last period, was made—that in disregard of his Agreement of 1891 with the British Government the Sultān had granted a coaling station to the French; and the cancellation of this grant was added to the other demands embodied in the ultimatum. After a week of unsatisfactory discussions, following its presentation, the Sultān on the 16th February 1899 at last submitted, but not until actual dispositions had been made for an immediate bombardment of his palace and forts by a British man-of-war. A French coaling station was ultimately provided at Masqat itself by dividing, in accordance with a suggestion made by the British Government, the site used by British vessels for storage of coal there into two portions, either of which the French authorities were at liberty to choose. This was the end of the French scheme for a naval base in the Gulf of 'Omān.

Settlement of the French flag question.

The question of the French flag in the 'Omān Sultanate, though its importance had been greatly diminished by the frustration of the project for a French naval base, continued to give trouble for some years. Encouraged by British support the Sultān, from 1899 onwards, strenuously resisted the conferment of French flags on subjects of his and denied the validity of such grants when made without his concurrence. Contrary views were maintained by the French authorities with great pertinacity; and in 1903, in consequence of an attack on a vessel flying the French flag at Sūr and the punishment by the Sultān for a quarantine offence of some individuals connected with another vessel of similar status, matters took a grave turn. Two of Her Majesty's ships and a French man-of-war were presently collected in Masqat harbour, and, while the British Government sustained the action of the Sultān in regard to the quarantine breakers the French authorities sought to intimidate him into reversing it. A crisis not devoid of danger was at length terminated by an agreement between Britain and

France to refer the question of the French flag in 'Omân to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal; and that Court at length, in 1905, arrived at a finding by which such restrictions were imposed on the grant and continued use of French flags as robbed the tricolor of its value as an instrument of French political aggression in 'Omân.

Improved relations of the Sultân with Britain.

After the rupture of 1899 the relations of the Sultân with the British Government became satisfactory, and the smoothness of their course was not again disturbed. In 1902, the Sultân gave an undertaking that he would not permit certain coal fields in the hinterland of Sûr to be worked by any foreign Government or company until the British Government had been allowed an option of working them in conjunction with himself. In 1905, after two years' consideration, it was decided that negotiations should be undertaken for the conclusion of a new British Commercial Treaty with the Masqat Government to take the place of that of 1891.

In 1904, in the course of a general adjustment of political differences which took place between Britain and France, the question of a British protectorate over the Sultanate of 'Omân was again considered; but France was unwilling to relinquish any of her rights under the Declaration of 1862.

Russian agents, etc.

Russia seems to have recognised that she did not possess any vital interests in the Sultanate of 'Omân, and consequently to have left the furtherance of any policy there in which she may have been a partner entirely to her French ally. In 1901, however, two Russians arrived at Masqat on the 9th March and remained a week; one of them was a brother of Count Leontieff of Abyssinian fame and had made the voyage from Marseilles to Aden with his better known relation; his companion at Masqat was a M. Ermtere. The pair paid several visits to the French Vice-Consulate and had more than one interview with the Sultân, but their conversation was so mysterious that the Sultân, an intelligent man, was unable to understand the drift of it. Eventually, the day before their departure, they petitioned His Highness for written permission to deal in arms at Masqat, and were informed in reply that the trade was free to all, and that no written permission to engage in it was required.

A few months later a rumour, current once before in 1899, became rife, that the Russian Government intended to establish a consulate at Masqat, and the Government of India recommended that definite instructions should be given to the British Political Agent at Masqat as to his attitude in regard to this question. His Majesty's Government accordingly directed that the Sultân, in case of his applying for advice, should be counselled to discourage the project upon commercial grounds.

The Russian cruiser "Varyag" arrived at Masqat on the 10th of December 1901, and on the following day complimentary visits were exchanged between the officers and the Sultān, the French Consul acting as intermediary. The Sultān was much impressed by the appearance of the "Varyag" and subsequently remarked that it was the finest war-vessel that he had seen in the Gulf. At the farewell visit of the "Boyarin" to Masqat about the middle of March 1903, M. Passek, the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr, in conversation with the Sultān broached the topic of a Russian consular officer for Masqat; the Sultān however ignored his remarks and M. Passek did not attempt to return to the subject.

Affairs and foreign relations of Trucial 'Omān, 1899-1905.

During this period the right of the British Government to represent the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān in external affairs was clearly affirmed and admitted upon more than one occasion.

France and the representation of the Shaikhs of Trucial Omān by Britain in their foreign relations.

In 1903 a native vessel flying the French flag was wrecked at Dibai, and the French representative at Masqat at first took steps for a settlement of the case, in which compensation was claimed, between the Shaikh and himself direct. However, on the special relations of the Trucial Shaikhs with Britain being explained and the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 communicated to the French Government, the latter in 1904 agreed that the case of their *protégé* should be disposed of through the British political representative in the Gulf, and action was taken accordingly.

Persia and the same.

But it was chiefly through matters affecting Persia that the virtual suzerainty of Britain over Trucial 'Omān was brought into prominence. In 1899 the Persian Government, being apprehensive of an Arab descent on Lingeh from the ports of Trucial 'Omān, appealed to the British Government to prevent the movement they feared, and the requisite steps were taken by the British political authorities; but this did not prevent Persian intrigues with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in 1900-01, in which however the chief object on the Persian side was probably to assure the safety of Lingeh. In 1903 the title of Britain to present claims which the Trucial Shaikhs entertained against the Persian administration of the coast opposite to their own was affirmed by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, and appears to have been admitted by the Persian Government on their being made aware of the Exclusive Agreement.

Attempted annexation to Persia of Bū Mūsa and Tunb Islands.

The most significant instance of British political intervention with a foreign power in the interests of a Trucial Shaikh occurred however in 1904, when an attempt was made by Persia to annex the islands of Bū Mūsa and Tunb. The decline of trade at Lingeh after the establishment of a post of the reorganised Persian Customs there in 1902, leading as it did to suggestions by merchants that a new *entrepôt* of trade should be established on Bū Mūsa, caused the Persian Government to cast covetous eyes on that island and on the island of Tunb. Russian incitement also may have been at work, for Russia, after a visit paid by the Viceroy of India to the Persian Gulf in 1903, seemed to apprehend the creation by Britain of a naval station or stations at the entrance of the Gulf. In the spring of 1904 a Belgian officer of the Persian Customs visited Bū Mūsa and Tunb, removed flags which had been hoisted there by the Shaikh of Shārjah under the advice of the Government of India in the previous summer, substituted Persian flags, and installed Persian custom guards on both islands. Diplomatic remonstrances by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān resulted, however, in the removal of the Persian flags and the replacement of the Shārjah colours. One of the inducements employed by the British Legation in this case was a hint that the ownership of Sirri Island, which had been annexed by Persia in 1897 but was claimed by the Shaikh of Shārjah, would be called in question by Britain if Persia claimed Bū Mūsa and Tunb.

Affairs and foreign relations of Qatar, 1899-1905.

The political position of the Qatar promontory remained indeterminate throughout the period, the Turks still affecting to treat it as a part of the Ottoman dominions, whilst the British Government regarded it as an independent Arab territory and themselves, consequently, as entitled to maintain direct relations with its Shaikhs.

Relations of Turkey with Qatar.

At the end of 1902 the Porte attempted to assert their authority over Qatar by appointing Turkish administrative officials to Wakrah and Zubārah, as well as to 'Odaid, which place, though situated in Trucial 'Omān, they persisted in treating as a dependency of Qatar; the new Ottoman officials were in addition to a representative whom the Turkish Government already maintained at Dōhah. A Turkish Mudīr actually made his appearance at Wakrah in the spring of 1903; but later, on

representations being made by His Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, the Porte undertook to maintain the *status quo* in Qatar, cancelled the appointment, and withdrew from other projected encroachments.

Relations of Britain with Qatar.

Meanwhile, since 1900, Ahmad, one of the Shaikhs of Qatar, had been in correspondence with the British representative in Bahrain, his object being to obtain British protection in return for an undertaking on his part to maintain maritime security near the coast and co-operate generally with the British Government. It was considered, however, in 1903, that the promise given by the Porte to abstain from disturbing the *status quo* in Qatar involved a corresponding obligation on the part of Britain not to enter into a fresh agreement with any Qatar Shaikh; and the negotiations ended in nothing.

Affairs and foreign relations of Bahrain, 1899-1905.

The principal event in Bahrain affairs during the period was a rupture between the ruling Shaikh and the British Government, which various causes contributed to bring about.

Maladministration of the Bahrain customs.

In 1899 it was calculated that the trade of Bahrain had increased in less than ten years, under the fostering protection of Britain, by 40 per cent.; but the Shaikh owing to mismanagement of the Bahrain customs, which he invariably farmed out to merchants, had benefited little by the prosperity of the port. He was strongly and repeatedly advised to adopt a better system but obstinately evaded doing so, and his pecuniary difficulties, by which the administration of his principality suffered more than he did personally, remained unrelieved.

Disorder in Bahrain and rupture between the Shaikh and Britain.

This controversy somewhat disturbed the relations of the Shaikh with the British political representative in Bahrain; but the open breach, which occurred in 1904, had nothing to do with the customs question. For some years the Shaikh had been on bad terms with one of his nephews, named 'Ali; and the latter, of whom the Shaikh was really afraid, had taken to evil courses and began to trouble the public peace by his behaviour. At length, in September 1904, a serious aggression was committed by 'Ali on a German firm at Bahrain; and in November a riot and general attack upon the Persians in Manámah town occurred, for which his servants and dependents were responsible. The Shaikh was at once called to account for these outrages, and in the case of the German firm a satisfactory settlement was reached without serious difficulty or delay. But in the case of the Persians the course in which the Shaikh persisted showed that he had

no intention of doing them justice. Ultimately, on the 25th February 1905, the Shaikh was presented with an ultimatum, made effective by the presence of three British vessels of war, which required him to arrange for the infliction of certain punishments, the payment of certain compensation, and, among other matters, the surrender of 'Ali, for deportation by the British authorities. The Shaikh complied on the following day with most of the conditions; but 'Ali, whether with or without the Shaikh's connivance, had escaped to the mainland and was consequently not surrendered. The submission made by the Shaikh being regarded as sufficient, however, the incident was declared closed and official relations returned to a normal footing. A few months later 'Ali voluntarily came in and was removed to Bombay for a term of years.

Improved relations of the Shaikh with Britain and prosperity of Bahrain.

After this crisis the relations of the Shaikh with the British Government, though his internal administration remained in many respects unsatisfactory, were very much better than they had been; and trade expanded in an extraordinary manner, attaining in 1905-06 the unheard of value of £3,000,000 sterling.

An Assistant Political Agent, a European officer, was appointed to Bahrain in 1900, and in 1904 a Political Agent was substituted as the British representative.

Turkey and Bahrain.

Among foreign powers having relations with or interests in Bahrain, Turkey must — on account of her proximity, traditions, and claims to ownership — be given the first place. In 1900 Bedouins massacred on the mainland a member of the Bahrain ruling family and a number of persons who accompanied him. As the offenders were nominal Turkish subjects, the Shaikh of Bahrain's demands for satisfaction were rossed by the British Government on the attention of the Porte; but it soon became evident that the local Turkish authorities in Hasa could or would do nothing against the guilty Arab tribe to enforce a settlement; and eventually the case dropped. The Turkish Government, by way of reminding the British Government of their own pretensions to sovereignty over Bahrain, made frequent requests for information concerning the crisis between the Shaikh and Britain in 1904-05, and in the end it was intimated to them that discussion of the subject could not be continued by His Majesty's Government.

Persia and Bahrain.

The Persian Government, while they concurred in the steps taken by the British authorities in Bahrain to obtain redress for their subjects injured in 1904-05, and even expressed gratitude, soon afterwards renewed their claims to possession of Bahrain. Arguments on the subject continued until after the close of the period at Tehrān, where the pretensions

of Persia were firmly declared by His Britannic Majesty's Minister to be inadmissible, and where the principal argument used by the Persian Government was conclusively refuted.

German interests in Bahrain.

The only European power besides Britain possessed of fixed interests in Bahrain was Germany; and the only local representatives of her trade were a single German firm who began business there in 1901. The firm have been mentioned already in connection with the crisis of 1904-05, when satisfaction for the aggression committed on them was obtained by the British political authorities. Later, in 1905, when the German Vice-Consul at Būshehr sounded the Resident there on the subject of German representation in Bahrain, he said he understood that the foreign relations of Bahrain were in the hands of Britain and that direct communication between himself and the Shaikh was open to objection; in reply he was told that such were the facts, and that the good offices and, if necessary, the protection of the British Government would be extended to German subjects in Bahrain. Previously, in 1902, when the firm proposed to acquire premises in Bahrain, it had been held by the Government of India that the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 was no bar to their doing so; but it had been explained to the firm's manager, and also to the Shaikh of Bahrain, that no claim to extra-territorial rights or to the intervention of a non-British consular representative could be founded on the possession of immoveable property in Bahrain.

France and Bahrain.

Visits of French merchants to Bahrain have already been mentioned above, but no political interest in the principality was ever shown by France. In 1904, apparently in connection with a project on the part of some French subjects of engaging in the pearl fisheries of the Gulf, the French Government enquired of His Majesty's Government whether Bahrain might be considered as included in the French Vice-Consular district of Būshehr; but the question seems to have remained unanswered, owing to its not having been pressed by the French Government.

Russia and Bahrain.

Bahrain was not unvisited by Russian travellers, but it appeared to be regarded by the Russian Government with less solicitude than even Masqat. In October 1899 two Russian travellers were ascertained to be present in Bahrain and their stay was prolonged into the month of December. In May 1902 a Russian marine zoologist visited Bahrain, spent about a fortnight in collecting specimens there, and had an ordinary interview before his departure with the Shaikh to whom he had brought a letter of introduction from the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr. This traveller, whose name was M. Bogoyavlevski, appears to have been really a scientist without political interests: he also visited Kuwait. About a

year later the thanks of the Imperial Natural History Society of Moscow for the courtesy shown to their representative were conveyed to the Shaikh of Bahrain by the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr, who probably welcomed the opportunity afforded of entering into friendly correspondence with the Shaikh.

Affairs and foreign relations of Central Arabia, 1899-1905.

Events in Central Arabia, which since the Turkish occupation of Hasa in 1871 had very little affected the course of Persian Gulf affairs, at length began to make their influence felt again in the Gulf.

War between the Amirs of Southern and Northern Najd.

About 1891 a great internal revolution had taken place in Central Arabia by which the whole of Najd had been brought into subjection to Ibn Rashīd, the northern or Shammar Amīr, not excluding even the territories of Ibn Sa'ūd, the southern or Wahhābi Amīr, his former overlord. About 1900 the power of the Wahhābi began to revive, and a struggle followed into which the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Turkish Government were drawn, with perceptible and even conspicuous results on the coast of the Gulf itself. Early in 1901 the Shaikh of Kuwait joined Ibn Sa'ūd in an invasion of the debatable district of Qasīm, between Southern and Northern Najd, which the Wahhābi Amīr was endeavouring to wrest from his Shammar rival. The invasion in the end failed; but the Shammar Amīr, alarmed by its partial success, sought help of the Porte, whose vassal he professed himself to be. He also applied to the British Government for protection. The Government of Turkey were in no wise loath to interfere, and they began by trying to intimidate the Shaikh of Kuwait into abandonment of Ibn Sa'ūd's cause and into submission to themselves; but their efforts were foiled by British support of the Shaikh. It was arranged that the Turks should restrain Ibn Rashīd from fighting with Ibn Sa'ūd on condition that the British Government on their part should oblige the Shaikh of Kuwait to remain quiet.

Turkish invasion and short-lived pacific occupation of Qasīm.

Meanwhile the Wahhābi arms were making rapid progress in Najd, and by the end of March 1904 Ibn Sa'ūd had not only recovered his hereditary dominions proper but had also possessed himself of Qasīm. The Turks were then tempted into marching from Turkish 'Irāq to the assistance of Ibn Rashīd; but shortly after their arrival in Qasīm they were defeated by the Wahhābis and retired northwards. Early in 1905 a Turkish force larger than the first penetrated from Turkish 'Irāq into the neighbourhood of Qasīm; and in the meantime it had been amicably arranged between the

Porte and Ibn Sa'ûd, in negotiations at Basrah, that each of the two Amirs should in future govern his ancestral dominions as a vassal and official of the Sultân, while the intervening district of Qasîm should be occupied by Turkish troops with the free consent of all concerned and so brought under direct Turkish control. This scheme was actually carried into effect; small Turkish garrisons were established in Qasîm; and an imaginary partition of the country into Turkish administrative districts took place. But Ibn Sa'ûd, who was now much stronger than Ibn Rashîd, had no intention of allowing himself to be restrained by the Turks from further victories. After the end of the period with which we are concerned Ibn Rashîd fell in battle with the Wahhâbis, and the Turkish pacific occupation of Qasîm, which depended on an exact balance of power between Northern and Southern Najd, came to an ignominious end.

The Amir of Southern Najd and the Trucial Shaikhs.

In the summer of 1905, while the Wahhâbis, probably impressed to some extent by the Turkish annexation of Qasîm, were militarily inactive, the son of their Amir appeared in the deserts of Hasa and Qatar and wrote thence to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omân to apprise them of his intention of visiting their country in the following year. His letters seemed to reawaken a danger that had lain dormant for fully a generation, and there was some consternation among the Trucial Shaikhs; but remonstrances were addressed to him indirectly through the Shaikh of Kuwait, and no action followed his correspondence.

Britain and Central Arabia.

Chiefly through their effects at Kuwait, the stirring changes in Central Arabia drew the attention of the Government of India to Najd for the first time in many years, and there was some renewal of the occasional intercourse with that country which had taken place in earlier times. In 1901 it was proposed to send Muhammadan agents from India to Central Arabia to study the conditions prevailing there; but the time was held to be inopportune. In the following year Ibn Sa'ûd attempted to enter into correspondence with the British authorities, but his advances met with no encouragement. In 1904, for reasons of policy at Kuwait, the British Government requested the Porte not to send the Shammar Amir against the Wahhâbis; but their dissuasion was ignored. Ibn Sa'ûd again sought British protection, and the idea of sending a British officer to the Wahhâbi capital to discuss the situation with Ibn Sa'ûd himself was considered, but only to be rejected, for His Majesty's Government saw clearly how undesirable it was that they should be involved in any degree in Central Arabian politics.

No other European power showed the slightest interest in the affairs of Najd, if we except Russia, whose Consul-General at Bûshehr had an

interview with a son of the Wahhábi Amír at Kuwait during a visit to that port in 1903.

Affairs and foreign relations of Kuwait, 1899-1905.

Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikh with Britain.

As has already been explained, the principality of Kuwait was brought within the political purview of Britain by the prospect of its becoming the terminus of a railway from the Mediterranean. During the period under consideration the importance of Kuwait to the British Government was still the same; and eagerness to make themselves masters of the place, which may or may not have been due to its value for railway purposes, began to be evinced by the Turks. At the beginning of 1899 Shaikh Mubárak, the ruler of Kuwait, signed an Exclusive Agreement which debarred him in the same manner as the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omán were debarred from receiving representatives of foreign powers other than Britain, and also (like the Sultán of 'Omán) from alienating any part of his territory to foreign governments or subjects without the previous approval of Britain. He received in return a written assurance of the continued exercise, on certain conditions, of British good offices in his favour. Both documents were so drawn up as to bind, and apply to, the Shaikh's heirs and successors as well as himself.

Threatened Turkish aggressions on Kuwait.

The Agreement, which was in the first instance secret, had no sooner been concluded than the Turks endeavoured to assert their authority over Kuwait by various means. One expedient was the despatch of a harbour master from Basrah with a small military guard to take charge of the port of Kuwait, but the Shaikh did not suffer him to remain in the place. There was talk of forcible Turkish action against Kuwait, and a strong warning was addressed to the Porte through His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, which elicited an ample disclaimer, accompanied, however, by assertions that Kuwait belonged to Turkey. A few months later, in 1900, the Turkish Government were given to understand in unmistakeable terms that Britain could not consent to any alterations of the *status quo*, or cession of territory to foreigners, at Kuwait. In 1901, after the Shaikh's return from his unsuccessful expedition into Najd, the Turkish Wáli of Basrah visited Kuwait and endeavoured to cajole the dispirited ruler into accepting a Turkish garrison at Kuwait; but Mubárak had sufficient firmness of mind left to refuse. The attempt was renewed later in the year through the commander of a Turkish gunboat, but again it failed, a British

vessel being present in the harbour; and the Porte and the British Government then mutually agreed that the *status quo* at Kuwait should be respected. Before the end of the year, in disregard of this agreement, an attempt was made by the Turks, by means of an ultimatum, to compel the Shaikh to receive their troops. This time the Shaikh wavered, but in the end, supported by the presence of British vessels of war, returned a negative reply. The Porte then asserted that the ultimatum had not been authorised by themselves; but a few weeks later there were various indications that a combined attack upon Kuwait by the Turks and Ibn Rashid was imminent. Ibn Rashid had already, for some time, been threatening the place from a distance. A British naval force of five vessels was accordingly concentrated in Kuwait Bay, and arrangements were made to assist the Shaikh, both on sea and land, to repel the expected assault. This crisis, which happened at the beginning of the year 1902, passed harmlessly over.

Turkish encroachments on Kuwait territory.

Foiled in their design of seizing Kuwait town, the Turks resorted to piecemeal encroachments on Kuwait territory. Early in 1902 they established military posts at Safwānand Umm Qasr and on Būbiyān Island, their object being clearly to secure possession of Khor 'Abdullah and its branches; nor could their withdrawal from these places be obtained. In the summer of 1902 arrangements were made at a base in Turkish territory for a piratical descent on the town of Kuwait from the sea, but they were divulged, and the vessels of the expedition were scattered by a British gunboat at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab. In the winter of 1902-03 a demonstration was made against Kuwait by Ibn Rashid, after which external alarms ceased; but the Shaikh had still to endure various persecutions at the hands of the Turks which his ownership of large estates in Turkish 'Irāq enabled them to inflict on him.

Appointment of a British political officer to Kuwait.

In 1904, after a visit paid by the Viceroy of India to Kuwait at the end of 1903, it was decided to appoint a British political officer to Kuwait to watch Kuwait and Turkish and Central Arabian affairs, but, in consequence of a complaint by the Porte that the creation of this post amounted to a violation by Britain of the *status quo*, it was, after the lapse of some months, left temporarily vacant.

German interest in Kuwait.

It should be observed that Germany, on account of her railway schemes, took almost as close an interest as Turkey in Kuwait. The visit of a German railway commission to Kuwait early in 1900 was the occasion of one of the warnings addressed by Britain to Turkey in regard to interference with the Shaikh; and the German Ambassador at Constantinople was plainly informed, at the same time, that the Shaikh was not free to grant lands to the Baghdād Railway Company without the permission of the

British Government. Again in 1901 a German diplomatic protest was made in London, in support of one by Turkey, on the subject of British intervention in Kuwait. The shifting of the focus of interest in Kuwaito-Turkish relations in 1902 from Kuwait Bay to Khor 'Abdullah may plausibly be ascribed to changed advice given by Germany to Turkey in regard to the site of the Gulf terminus of the railway.

Russian interest in Kuwait.

At the opening of the period the Russian Government were believed to entertain designs of establishing a port at Kuwait, and early in 1899 several Armenians of Russian nationality were sent to Kuwait by the Russian Consul at Baghdād, who seemed to be the chosen instrument of Russian policy in this part of the world. A month later M. Krouglow visited Kuwait himself in the "Gilyak" and interviewed the Shaikh, but the door had already been closed to foreign political enterprise at Kuwait by the Shaikh's Exclusive Agreement with Britain; and the Persian side of the Gulf after this claimed most of Russia's attention. During the crisis between himself and the Turkish authorities in 1901, the Shaikh of Kuwait communicated with the Russian representative at Baghdād, to what effect is not known; and at the end of the year the Russian man-of-war "Varyag" visited Kuwait. Her help was offered to the Shaikh for the purpose of maintaining his independence, which was then still threatened, but it was not accepted. In 1902 the Russian Vice-Consul at Būshehr came to Kuwait in the Russian war vessel "Askold;" and in 1903, when the Russian cruiser "Boyarin" and the French cruiser "Infernet" visited the port in company, the Russian Consul-General was on board the former; but the interest of Russia in Kuwait had by that time become platonic.

Affairs and foreign relations of Turkish 'Irāq, 1899-1905.

Affairs in Turkish 'Irāq have been anticipated in dealing with the internal affairs of Turkey above, and the foreign relations of the province were confined to commercial and ordinary matters.

Increased attention of European powers to Turkish 'Irāq.

Consular representation underwent some expansion, the most important changes being made, among foreign nations, by Russia, who in 1899 established a Vice-Consulate at Basrah, charged with the protection of French as well as of Russian interests, and in 1901 raised the status of the Russian post at Baghdād to that of a Consulate-General. British representation was strengthened also, but for independent reasons, not by way of rejoin-

der. In 1903 a British Vice-Consul was substituted for the British Consular Agent at Karbala; and in 1905 an Assistant for Trade and Commerce was added to the staff of the Political Resident at Baghdad. In 1903 a new Residency built and owned by the British Government, came under occupation by the British establishments at Baghdad.

Affairs and foreign relations of 'Arabistān, 1899-1905.

Some of the events of the period in 'Arabistān have already been described in relating the internal history of Persia, and it only remains to notice those which were specially connected with external politics.

The Shaikh and the Imperial Persian Customs.

Interest centred chiefly in an effort made by the central Persian Government, possibly at Russian instigation, to reduce the power of the Shaikh of Muhammareh,—a design which was frustrated principally through support lent by the British Government to the Shaikh. In 1900 it became known that the Shāh's Government intended to place the customs of 'Arabistān, hitherto farmed to the Shaikh, under the direct administration of the reorganised Customs Department; and the Shaikh was greatly alarmed at the prospect, mostly because of the further inroads on his executive authority which it seemed to him to portend. In 1901 the transfer of the customs was actually ordered, but Shaikh Khaz'al was successful in obtaining a respite and sent an agent to Tehrān to negotiate there on his behalf in consultation with British Legation. At length an arrangement was effected whereby the Shaikh retained the nominal headship of the customs, while their technical administration was placed in Belgian hands, and various financial advantages and the continuance of certain traditional immunities enjoyed by the Shaikh and his subjects in regard to customs were conceded to him. In 1903 and 1904 the Persian Government showed a tendency to encroach on the position which they had granted to the Shaikh with reference to the Customs: but the Shaikh, with British diplomatic encouragement, successfully opposed their moves.

British support of the Shaikh against Russia and the central Persian Government.

The customs question was only one aspect of a larger one,—that of the Shaikh's political position *vis à vis* of the central Government; and it was in the wider field of conflict that he benefited most by British support. At the end of 1902, in view of the aggressive action of Tehrān, His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Persia was authorised to inform the Shaikh, who was much dismayed by threatened Russian interference in the case, that the

British Government would protect Muhammareh from naval attack by a foreign power, and would afford him their general good offices and support, so long as he continued loyal to the Shāh's Government and conformed to such advice as might be given him by Britain. The British Minister also entered into communication with the Persian Government on the subject of Southern 'Arabistān and intimated to them that Britain, while she fully recognised the sovereignty of Persia over Muhammareh and its dependencies, could not regard with indifference any political changes there which might prejudicially affect British interests or afford foreign powers an opportunity of interfering in local affairs. A satisfactory reply was received, at the beginning of 1903, from the Persian Government; and a little later the favourable arrangements arrived at in regard to the 'Arabistān customs was made public, the Shaikh's chief anxiety being at the same time set at rest by a formal grant to him and his subjects from the Shāh, in proprietary right, of the districts of Muhammareh, Fallāhīyeh and Hindiyān, of which he had feared that he and they might be arbitrarily deprived by the Government. Renewed apprehensions on the part of the Shaikh were relieved at the end of 1903 by fresh assurances from His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Persia, who had then lately visited Muhammareh.

Russian policy in Arabistān.

The attitude of Russia during the contest, thus happily concluded, had been consistently adverse to the Shaikh. In 1899, not long after the visit of the "Gilyak" to the Shatt-al-'Arab, the Russian Consul-General at Isfahān had come to Muhammareh and endeavoured to intimidate the Shaikh, whom he informed that Russia was about to acquire a port in the Persian Gulf and would enter into political competition with Britain in that part of the world. In 1902 the Russian representative at Tehrān had actively supported the displacement of the Shaikh by the Belgian customs administration, and during the progress of the negotiations at the capital the Shaikh's agent there had been bullied by the Russians to such an extent as to cause fears of his master's succumbing entirely to Russian influence,—a prospect which was the immediate reason of the important assurance given by Britain at the close of that year. A Russian Consular Agent was appointed in 'Arabistān in 1902 in the person of a Dutch merchant at Nāsiri (Ahwāz). In 1904 Russian travellers made a tour in Southern 'Arabistān, a Russian decoration was conferred on the Shaikh through the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr, and a Russian trade commissioner visited Muhammareh and the Kārūn; but Russian policy in 'Arabistān had by this time been decisively checked.

The Shaikh and Turkey.

The Shaikh's relations with Turkey, in which country he had great possessions on the western bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, were characterised by dignity and reserve; they were not entirely friendly.

British commercial interests in 'Arabistān.

The principal British interests in 'Arabistān were still, as in the past, those represented by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and Messrs. Lynch. There was a continuance of vexatious opposition to British steam navigation and of arbitrary grain embargoes. The British subsidy of the Company was renewed, on the expiration of the period for which it was granted, in 1899; but the Government of India decided to contribute to it for only one year longer, their decision being dictated by principles in regard to a division of financial burdens in the Middle East between themselves and Her Majesty's Government, not by any doubt of the importance of British interests on the Kārūn. In 1902 the Persian Government, to the detriment of British trade, closed custom houses which existed at Nāsiri and Shūshtar and insisted on the payment of all duties at Muhammareh; but in 1903 they were persuaded to reconsider and reverse this step.

At the end of 1899 the road connecting Ahwāz with Isfahān *viâ* the Bakhtiyāri country, work on which had been begun during the last period, was opened for traffic and materially facilitated trade. In 1904 efforts were made to arrange for the opening of the Khurramābād-Ahwāz road, a concession for which was held by a British corporation; but they were brought to a standstill by an attack in the Dirakwand Lur country upon two British officers engaged in studying on the spot the political conditions of the enterprise.

In 1905 arrangements were concluded between an important British Oil Company and the Bakhtiyāri Khāns for the exploitation, on the borders of Northern 'Arabistān, of a concession which the former had obtained for working mineral oil in Persia.

Question of Kārūn irrigation.

In 1903-04 the question of irrigating a portion of 'Arabistān from the Kārūn, of which nothing had been heard for some years, was resuscitated by a Dutch engineer. It was followed with close attention by the British authorities who foresaw that, if the scheme were carried out under foreign auspices, it might put an end to British navigation on the Kārūn without any compensating advantage to British interests; and eventually in 1905 it was investigated on the ground by a British irrigation engineer from India, who found it to be unpractical, and who was charged with the preparation of a more satisfactory project in case one should be required.

British official matters in 'Arabistān.

The visit of the British Minister in Persia to 'Arabistān in 1903 has already been mentioned; another, to Northern 'Arabistān only, had been paid by his predecessor in 1899. In 1904, to meet a need for improved British representation in the country, the British Vice-Consulate at Muhammareh was made a Consulate, and a British Vice-Consul for

Northern 'Arabistān, to whom an Indian military escort was allowed, was appointed to Nāsiri (Ahwāz).

Affairs and foreign relations of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1899-1905.

The history of the period in the Persian Coast and Islands has already been noticed, in more than one of its aspects, in what precedes. Only a few matters of external interest connected with it remain to be mentioned.

Russian movements on the Persian Coast.

Russian attention was for some time directed to the lower part of the Persian coast and its islands. In September 1900 M. Siromiatnikoff, whose commercial mission will engage attention later on, arrived at Bandar 'Abbās in a native boat from Lingeh along with some other Russians and asked to see the coal left behind by the "Gilyak," but the Persian Deputy-Governor feigned to be ignorant of its existence. The coal remained in the same place until 1904, notwithstanding a proposal for its removal by the Belgian Director of Customs, and it was locally regarded as being still Russian property.

On the 26th of December 1901 the Russian cruiser "Varyag," on return from her cruise in the Persian Gulf, called at Lingeh and exchanged salutes with the Persian battery; on the 27th the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr, who was on board, disembarked and inspected the town and its environs; and on the same evening the "Varyag" left again for Bandar 'Abbās. At Bandar 'Abbās salutes and official visits were exchanged and the public were freely admitted to the ship. On the last day of the year the "Varyag" left Bandar 'Abbās for Karachi, but the Russian Consul-General remained behind and occupied himself in visiting Qishm and in collecting information at the Bandar 'Abbās custom house until the arrival of the up-mail enabled him to return to Būshehr.

In February 1902 a Russian, M. Ritman, who appeared to be a military officer, arrived at Lingeh from Būshehr, having apparently made the journey between the two places by land; from Lingeh he proceeded to Bandar 'Abbās, visiting Bāsīdu, Lāft and Qishm town on the way, and on the 19th of March he left Bandar 'Abbās for Kirmān. In March 1903 the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr again visited Lingeh, this time in the Russian cruiser "Boyarin," and made enquiries about the representation of the British Government at Bāsīdu and the flying of the British flag there.

British cases and interests on the Persian Coast.

Claims for compensation on the part of British subjects and British protected persons had been accumulating for a number of years when, in 1900, an attempt was made to bring them to a settlement. Including some which had arisen in 'Arabistán and Persian Makrán as well as in the Persian Coast and Islands, more than a hundred claims were found to exist, and their aggregate value was between £25,000 and £30,000. Proceedings between the British and Persian authorities continued until 1905, but no progress was made towards a settlement, the reason being the adoption of dilatory tactics by the Persian Government.

Careful supervision was exercised by the British authorities over the affairs of the British coal station and settlement at Bāsidu, which was to some extent utilised as an asylum by refugees from Persian territory; and in 1904 the island of Hanjām was re-occupied, ostensibly for telegraphic but really for political reasons, with the result that in the following year the Persian authorities took steps, which the Arab inhabitants at first found alarming and seemed inclined to resist, for strengthening their position there. In 1905 a serious demonstration was made by a mob against the British Agency at Lingeh, but satisfactory reparation was obtained.

Foreign and British consular representation on the Persian Coast.

Foreign activity on the Persian Coast was manifested chiefly in the creation of new consular posts. In 1901 a Russian Consulate-General was instituted at Būshehr; and in 1904 a Russian Consular Agency, subsequently raised to the rank of a Consulate, was opened at Bandar 'Abbās. The French Vice-Consulate founded at Būshehr in 1889 was still maintained, as was also a German Vice-Consulate which had existed there since 1897. In 1905 there was a Consular Agency at Lingeh which represented both Russia and France; as a French institution it dated from 1899, when an attempt had been made at Lingeh to promote the use by native vessels of the French flag.

There was a corresponding expansion of British political representation, necessitated chiefly by the activity of foreign powers. In 1900 a British Vice-Consul (and Assistant to the Resident) was appointed at Bandar 'Abbās; and in 1904 the post there was made a Consulate and its consular district extended, certain tracts on the Arabian side of the Gulf being at the same time placed under the political supervision of the incumbent. In 1903 a British Consulate was established at Shirāz under a European officer. In 1904 consular status was conferred on certain members of the British Residency staff at Būshehr; a Commercial Assistant was at the same time added; and in 1905 the Resident was provided with a Second Assistant.

Affairs and foreign relations of Persian Makrān, 1899-1905.

Even Persian Makrān was affected by the political activity of the period. In 1900 a Russian, described in the Russian press as a professor of natural science in the College of the Cadet Corps at Moscow, an individual whose scientific curiosity invariably carried him to fields of political interest and who had already visited Barapūr and Persian Balūchistān in 1898, attempted to penetrate from Sīstān into British Balūchistān, but did not succeed. After 1900 Chahbār became a principal objective of Russian railway policy in Persia; and in 1904 the Russian representative at Lingeh was engaged in enquiries regarding the customs of Gwādur. Russian designs in Persian Makrān.

A British Vice-Consulate was established at Bam in 1905, but was not long maintained. Some progress was made in Persian Makrān during this period, at meetings between British and Persian officials, in the settlement of numerous claims of British subjects to compensation for injuries and crimes against them. The proceedings held in the years 1904 and 1905 were the most satisfactory. British affairs in Persian Makrān.

British response to the activity of foreign powers in the Persian Gulf region, 1899-1905.

From what has gone before it will be clear that in 1899-1900 the predominance of Britain in the Persian Gulf, between which and the security of British India an intimate connection existed, was seriously threatened by the policy of foreign powers, especially by that of Russia, France, and Germany. The naval designs of Russia in the Persian Gulf and her railway schemes in Persia, the French project of a naval base in the Gulf of 'Omān, and the powers acquired by Germany for constructing a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf were all circumstances of serious import, though the full significance of the last was not as yet generally realised. To guard against the possible consequences to herself of these developments Britain had recourse to precautions, some of a diplomatic or parliamentary, some of a naval or military order, which we now proceed to describe.

The first diplomatic measure taken by His Britannic Majesty's Government was the delivery to the Persian Government in April 1900 of a reminder concerning the priority of British railway rights in Southern Persia under the Shāh's assurance* of 1889; it was prompted by the Railway rights in Southern Persia.

* *Vide* page 2036, *post*.

assembling at Tehrān of the Russian survey mission which in 1900 overran the whole of Southern Persia, headed by an official who in the Russian press was described as "Director of Persian Railways." In carrying out the instructions of Her Majesty's Government the British representative at Tehrān forwarded to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs a copy of the autograph letter of the late Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh to which his reminder referred; a translation of that document will be found elsewhere in this Gazetteer. The authenticity of the promise was readily admitted by both the Sadr-i-A'zam and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was not possible, in consequence of the weak health at the time of the reigning Shāh, that the British representative at Tehrān should bring the question personally to His Persian Majesty's notice; but various steps were taken to ensure that he should be made aware of the existence of the document, and they were such that in the end no doubt remained that Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh had both seen it and admitted its binding force. The Russian Minister at Tehrān also, in conversation with the British Chargé d'Affaires, stated that he was aware of the Shāh's promise regarding railways in the south. If the Russians were at that time inclined to attempt a practical encroachment on the railway rights of Great Britain in Southern Persia, the production of Nāsir-ud-Dīn's written promise and its recognition by his son and successor may have operated as a deterrent, and may have been the cause of their ultimately taking no action.

Control of the Customs of Southern Persia.

The second British diplomatic measure related to the control of the customs of Southern Persia, upon which there was a danger that Russia might establish some lien. Discussion of the subject began in 1899 on the basis of a pledge given by Persia to Britain in 1897 that the Southern Customs would never be placed under foreign supervision or control. It was prolonged until 1904 when the Persian Government with apparent reluctance at length admitted that in pledging part of their customs revenue as security for Russian loans in 1900 and 1902 they had not consciously contravened the guarantee of 1897 in any particular. The British Government in taking note of this admission, which they did not regard as satisfactory, officially informed the Shāh's Ministers that the assurance of 1897 must still be considered as valid, and that in the event of any attempt on the part of Persia to ignore the rights of Britain thereunder, the necessary steps would be taken by the British Government to ensure that they were respected. The firm attitude which the British Government maintained throughout the long controversy on this question had undoubtedly a salutary effect; and it is not impossible that, if that attitude had been less inflexible, some alienation of the Southern Customs, including those of the Gulf, might actually have occurred in favour of

Russia or of Russian creditors of Persia. In the result the customs of "Fārs and of the Persian Gulf" were specifically excluded from those pledged as security for the Russian loans, and the question which remained was that of the precise meaning of the phrase "Fārs and the Persian Gulf,"—an expression which His Majesty's Government contended must, under the guarantee of 1897, be regarded as synonymous with "Southern Persia" and as including Muhammarah.

Anglo-Persian Trade Declaration.

A third British diplomatic measure, already referred to above, was the signing of a Trade Declaration between Britain and Persia early in 1903, whereby the new Persian tariff secretly arranged between Russia and Persia in 1901 was made inalterable without British consent. This step prevented the continuance of a procedure which might otherwise have been maintained to the increasing disadvantage of British trade.

Exposition in Parliament of the British policy in the Persian Gulf combined with a warning to European powers.

The fourth measure was of a parliamentary character. It consisted in an announcement made on the 5th May 1903 by Lord Lansdowne, speaking as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in reply to a question by Lord Lamington. The passage referring to the Persian Gulf was reported as follows in the "Times" of the 6th of May :—

I now pass to the closely-connected subject of the Persian Gulf. I feel sure that the noble lord's interest in the Baghdād railway scheme was because he felt it did closely affect our interest in the Persian Gulf. I do not yield to the noble lord in the interest which I take in the Persian Gulf, or in the feeling that this country stands with regard to the navigation of the Persian Gulf in a position different from that of any other Power. The noble lord told your lordships with absolute truth that it was owing to British enterprise, to the expenditure of British lives and money, that the Persian Gulf is at this moment open to the navigation of the world. It was our ships that cleared those waters of pirates; it was we who put down the slave trade; it was we who buoyed and beaconed those intricate waters. Well, at this moment, out of a total trade in the Gulf ports of £3,600,000—the figures are those for 1901; we have none later—£2,300,000 represents the commerce of this country; so that it is clear that, up to the present, at all events, we have succeeded in preserving a liberal share of that commerce. But there is no doubt that in the Gulf, as in other parts of Persia, we are feeling very keenly the competition of other Powers. That, I am afraid, is our fate not only in Persian waters; nor can we expect, because we have been in the development of commerce throughout the world the pioneers of that form of civilisation, that we shall always be able to maintain the position of superiority which we at first enjoyed. The noble lord asked me for a statement of our policy with regard to the Persian Gulf. I think I can give him one in a few simple words. It seems to me that our policy should be directed in the first place to protect and promote British trade in these waters. In the next place I do not think that he suggests, or that we should suggest, that these efforts should be directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other Powers. (Hear, Hear.) In the third place—I say it without hesitation—we should regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with

all the means at our disposal. (Cheers.) I say that in no minatory spirit, because, so far as I am aware, no proposals are on foot for the establishment of a foreign naval base in the Persian Gulf. I at least have heard of none; and I cannot help thinking that the noble lord would almost unnecessarily warm at the idea of such a foreign intrusion, with which, so far as I am aware, we are not at present threatened.

More than a year before, at an informal interview which he had on the 19th of March 1902 with the French Ambassador in London, Lord Lansdowne had remarked with reference to the Persian Gulf that Great Britain "entertained the strongest objection to, and would certainly oppose, any attempt on the part of other Powers to create strategical bases or fortified harbours in those waters;" and his statement of the 5th May 1903 was therefore the expression, not of sudden resolve, but of the deliberate and fixed policy of His Majesty's Government. The statement did not escape notice in the quarter to which, doubtless, it was principally addressed. On the 6th of May the Russian Ambassador remarked to Lord Lansdowne that he had read it with interest, and that he saw nothing in it to which exception could be taken. He added that Lord Lansdowne probably had Russia in his mind when he spoke, but that Russia had no idea of establishing a naval base in the Persian Gulf.

Selection of British naval bases in the Persian Gulf in view of possible contingencies, and connected matters.

The apparent intention of the Russian Government in 1899 to establish a naval station in the Persian Gulf together with the proceedings of the French in regard to Bandar Jissah in the same year, obliged the British Government to consider what counteractive measures would be required in case of a Russian, or of a combined Russain and French, scheme being carried into effect.

To enter in detail on the inquiries which were held, on the discussions which followed, or on the decisions which were finally reached would be inexpedient; suffice it to say that the attention of the British Government was directed to harbours, anchorages and land positions near the entrance of the Gulf, and especially to certain points on the islands opposite Bandar 'Abbās and on the Ruūs-al-Jibāl promontory, between which lie the Straits of Hormūz. In 1902 the situation was considered in its strategical bearings at a conference between representatives of the Admiralty, War Office, Foreign Office and India Office in London; and at a later date the military policy of His Majesty's Government was finally laid down by the Committee of Imperial Defence. We shall confine ourselves to describing some more or less overt naval precautions which were taken, chiefly through the agency of the Government of India, between the years 1900 and 1905.

In 1900 preliminary reports upon a number of the principal harbours and anchorages of the Gulf were submitted by Commander H. A. Phillipps, R.N., Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, and were duly considered by the Admiralty and India Office. In 1903 a survey was made of the whole Persian coast of the Gulf and of a part of the coast of Persian Makrân; it was conducted by commander H. B. T. Somerville, R.N., specially deputed from England for the duty, in conjunction with commander T. W. Kemp, R.N., Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf. The object of the survey was to ascertain the points offering the greatest advantages for the establishment of a defended port on the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf by a foreign power strong upon land; and special notice was given to the facilities that existed at each place for connecting the port, when established, by rail with the interior of Persia. At the end of 1903, during the tour of His Excellency Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, in the Persian Gulf, much time and attention were devoted by the Viceroy in person and by Rear Admiral G. L. Atkinson-Willes, the Naval Commander-in-Chief who accompanied him, to the study of the strategical problem upon the spot; remarks on the places visited were embodied by the Admiral in a report; and early in 1904 the views of the Government of India were placed before His Majesty's Government in a special despatch. These proceedings related particularly to the defensive measures which it might be necessary to take at the mouth of the Gulf; but in the course of the cruise Khor Mûsa and Khor 'Abdullah, which were important for reasons of a different order, were visited, and subsequently formed the subjects of separate despatches addressed by the Government of India to his Majesty's Government. Khor Mûsa had been roughly surveyed by H. M. S. "Sphinx" in May 1903, and Khor 'Abdullah was similarly surveyed by the same vessel in July of the next year—without landing of shore parties, but not without protests on the part of the Turkish Government. A more exact survey of Khor 'Abdullah, proposed by His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief in 1904 and sanctioned by His Majesty's Government in the same year, was placed on the programme of the Royal Indian Marine Surveying Ship "Investigator" for 1905-06.

A survey less important, but political rather than commercial in motive, was one of the waters between Bahrain, Hasa and Qatar which was made by the "Investigator" in 1901-02. In the course of the operations poles were erected on the mainland and a party landed to connect the triangulation with that of Bahrain,—proceedings which came to the knowledge of the Porte and which provoked remonstrances on their part.

The British station of Bāsīdu.

Interest in the British settlement of Bāsīdu on Qishm Island was revived by the situation which now existed. Enquiry in 1901 showed that the relics of former British military and naval occupation comprised the remains of two double-storeyed dwelling-houses, an Assistant Surgeon's house, the house and store-room of a contractor, a workshop, a small barrack, a small caravanserai, a cemetery, and three water-tanks; but all of these were in bad repair, and all the buildings, except one of the dwelling-houses, were unrepairable. The Coal Agent in charge of the British flag-staff and flag and his assistant were found to be occupying quarters of their own in the neighbourhood which were not the property of Government. It was decided that, as the Government buildings were not required, no attempt should be made to repair them. In order, however, to emphasize the British position at Bāsīdu it was ordered that the flag, which hitherto it had been customary to hoist only on Sundays, on holidays, and on the arrival of a ship, should be flown in future every day from sunrise to sunset.

In 1902 the extent of the British station at Bāsīdu was investigated, and it appeared that the limits had never been defined. The adjoining villages of Singau and Old Bāsīdu (the former uninhabited since 1883, the latter known also by the alternative name of Nakhlistān) had at one time, it was believed, formed part of the British station; but they had at a later period come to be regarded as situated outside—Singau since 1864, and Old Basidu since 1874 at least—and taxes had been collected at both by the Persian Zābit of Qishm. The Government of India, on consideration of the evidence, directed that Singau should be treated as included in, and Old Basidu—where revenue was still taken by the Persian authorities—as excluded from, the British station; they suggested however to the Secretary of State for India that it was possible, and might be advisable, to claim for the British station the same limits as had belonged to the earlier Portuguese settlement, which apparently included Nakhlistān and Qal'eh Hāji Karim.

In 1901 attention was directed to a channel which leads from the open sea to Bāsīdu along the southern and western coasts of Qishm and which, it was thought, might be found deeper and more convenient for steam vessels than the ordinary direct approach. A survey of this channel was accordingly ordered, but want of time prevented its execution in the season 1901-02, and, though it was examined by the Royal Indian Marine Ship "Lawrence," and traversed by Lord Curzon in 1903, it was not included in the survey programme of 1904-05. Eventually it was arranged that, unless more important work interfered, it should be carried out in the cold weather of 1905-06.

The possibility of immigration into Bāsīdu, especially from Lingeh where the régime of the Imperial Persian Customs was now pressing heavily upon trade, began in 1902 to demand consideration. A merchant of Qishm town, agent for a Hindu rice-exporting firm at Calcutta, applied for permission to land 10,000 bags of rice at Bāsīdu and build a godown near the landing place; and similar enquiries, made from time to time by inhabitants of Lingeh and others, some of which are mentioned in the history of the coast of Fārs, indicated that Bāsīdu, if the British Government were prepared to countenance the scheme, might possibly develop into a customs-free trade distributing centre of considerable importance. The opinion of a meeting of representatives of the Admiralty and India and Foreign Offices, held in London in July 1902 to consider questions connected with Bāsīdu and other places, was, however, adverse to the encouragement of immigration on account of the political complications which it might entail. Orders had already been issued by Colonel Kemball, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and had been confirmed by the Government of India, that British subjects should not be prevented from settling at Bāsīdu if they wished to do so, but that any buildings erected by them should be temporary only, and that the sites should be allotted by the Resident. In May 1905 the Government of India further directed that the immigration of non-British settlers should be discouraged so far as possible, and that the Resident should keep a watch upon the arrival of new settlers, British or foreign, who might erect huts or appear to be more than passing visitors. These instructions sufficed to prevent, if prevention was really required, an influx of merchants and others into Bāsīdu.

Bāsīdu was visited in April and May 1901 by a native official of the Persian Imperial Customs who stated that a Customs employé would shortly be posted at Old Bāsīdu for the prevention of the arms trade. No action followed his visits, but it was laid down by the Indian authorities that no Persian official should be allowed to reside in the British station without the express consent of the British Government.

M. Ritman's visit to Bāsīdu in 1902 and the enquiries of M. Passek in 1903 about the British position there have already been mentioned as evidences of Russian activity near the entrance of the Gulf.

Re-occupation of Hanjām as a British telegraph station.

In 1904 the British telegraph station on Hanjām Island, abandoned since 1880, was re-established; and an extension of telegraphic communication was arranged, partly by cable and partly by land line across Qishm Island, from Hanjām to Bandar 'Abbās. At one time it was proposed by the naval authorities to locate the new telegraph station at Bāsīdu, but Hanjām was ultimately preferred.

Britain and the Ruûs-al-Jibâl promontory.

The attention of the British authorities was necessarily engaged, from an early stage of the strategical discussion, by the great inlets of the Ruûs-al-Jibâl headland. The question of practical measures was in this instance complicated by an uncertainty, not finally dispelled until 1905, as to the political status of the territories concerned and the action taken was in consequence not free from inconsistency.

The principal indentation in Ruûs-al-Jibâl is Khor-ash-Sham or Elphinstone Inlet, which opens into the peninsula from the Persian Gulf and is divided from Malcolm Inlet, a corresponding arm of the Gulf of 'Omân, only by a slender isthmus known as Maqlab. From 1864 until 1868, under the Masqat telegraph conventions of 1864 and 1865, a land line of the Indo-European Telegraph Department had traversed the isthmus of Maqlab and a British telegraph station had existed upon a small island in Khor-ash-Sham. In 1902 it was regarded by the Government of India as uncertain whether the Ruûs-al-Jibâl tract pertained to the Sultanate of Masqat or was connected with Trucial 'Omân, and whether its rude inhabitants, the Shihûh and Dhahûriyîn, were legally as well as virtually autonomous. If Ruûs-al-Jibâl were a part of the Sultân of 'Omân's dominions, it must be treated as subject to the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 and action by Great Britain inconsistent with that declaration must be avoided; if, on the other hand, it belonged to one or more of the Trucial Shaikhs, or were completely independent, the British Government would be free to take such steps as they wished without risk of international complications.

The first recommendations of the Government of India, made in 1902, were compatible with all possible views as to the ownership of Ruûs-al-Jibâl. They were that Telegraph Islet in Khor-ash-Sham should be re-occupied, the British flag being hoisted and a Native Agent stationed there as at Bâsidu, and that the strip of littoral from Dibah to Khor Kalba on the eastern side of the 'Omân promontory should be recognised by the British Government as a dependency of Shârjah, and therefore as subject to the agreements existing between the Shaikh of Shârjah and the British Government. Both recommendations were accepted by His Majesty's Government.

In 1904, shortly after Lord Curzon's cruise in the Persian Gulf and examination of the various inlets of Ruûs-al-Jibâl, the Government of India, who at this time inclined to the view that the district did not belong to the Sultân of 'Omân, suggested that, under arrangements with the neighbouring tribes, flagstaffs should be planted on the Maqlab isthmus and on Ghanam Island as well as on Telegraph Islet, the British flag being hoisted on them when required. The proposal was in the first instance

approved by His Majesty's Government, and the flagstaffs, consisting of tubular iron poles 38 feet in height, were erected by H. M. S. "Sphinx" in the positions selected for them on the 21st and 22nd of November 1904.

Early in 1905, however, in connection with the French flag arbitration proceedings at the Hague, fresh facts came to light which made it impossible to regard the Ruûs-al-Jibâl promontory otherwise than as a part of the Sultanate of 'Omân. This in itself might not have necessitated the abandonment of the new flagstaffs, but a further difficulty had arisen at the end of 1904 in regard to the pattern of flag to be flown; and the Admiralty, influenced chiefly by the consideration that the protection of the flags would devolve on the Royal Navy; and that their presence, unaccompanied by the proclamation of a protectorate or by formal annexation, would not avail to prevent foreign powers from hoisting similar flags in adjoining positions, opposed the retention of the flagstaffs. Meanwhile the erection of the staffs, though carried out with all possible secrecy, had not escaped notice, and an article referring to that on Ghanam Island,—probably from the pen of M. Goguyer at Masqat,—appeared in the "Ahrâm," an Arabic newspaper at Cairo, on the 21st June 1905. The removal of the flagstaffs was decided on, but was deferred until the conclusion of the proceedings at the Hague; it was eventually carried out in part on the 18th October 1905 by the telegraph steamer "Patrick Stewart." The staff on Ghanam Island was found intact, but that on Maqlab had been thrown down and stripped of its fittings by the Arabs of the neighbourhood. The staff on Telegraph Islet was left *in situ* pending further consideration of the question.

British light-house schemes.

In 1904 it was proposed by the Government of India to establish a light-house, partly in the interests of navigation and partly in order to strengthen the political position of Britain in the Ruûs-al-Jibâl district, either upon the extremity of the Ruûs-al-Jibâl promontory or upon one of the three islands known as the Quoins (Salâmah wa Binât-ha). Preparations were even made for proceeding with the work; but in consequence, it would seem, of the altered views of the British Government as to the ownership of Ruûs-al-Jibâl, the scheme was not pursued, though it was still strongly advocated by shipping interests in the Gulf.

British naval demonstrations.

An effective rejoinder to Russian and French displays of naval force was made on various occasions, at the instance of the Government of India, by the despatch of British vessels of superior strength to the Gulf;

and the tour of Lord Curzon, as Viceroy of India, at the end of 1903, constituted a demonstration of power and splendour which no foreign nation could hope to rival in Persian Gulf waters.

In 1901 H. M. S. "Highflyer," the flagship of Rear-Admiral Bosanquet, commanding the East India Squadron, made a cruise in the Gulf, visiting Sûr, Masqat, Bûshehr, and Bandar 'Abbâs; she was the largest ship and carried the heaviest guns yet seen in the Gulf.

The cruise of the Russian "Varyag" in December 1901 was answered by a visit from H.M.S. "Amphitrite," Captain Windham, a first-class cruiser of 11,000 tons, which was diverted to the Persian Gulf on her way from England to China. The "Amphitrite," which arrived at Aden on the 1st of June 1902, anchored in Risût bay on the evening of the 4th June and made use of her electric lights after dark; on the 5th of June she coasted along the district of Dhufâr and halted for the night off one of the Kuria Muria islands; on the 6th she stopped off Râs Madrakah and landed a party for musketry practice. On the 8th of June the "Amphitrite" arrived at Masqat and saluted the Sultân's flag with 21 guns, and on the following day a visit was paid by her officers to the Sultân. On the 10th the Sultân made a return visit and was shown heavy gun practice at sea outside the harbour; the firing was good and he was greatly impressed. Some of the inhabitants of Masqat were allowed to come on board and were shown over the ship. The same afternoon, after landing the Sultân, the "Amphitrite" proceeded to Sûr carrying Major Cox, the Political Agent at Masqat, who remained on board during the rest of the tour. From Sûr the "Amphitrite" returned to Masqat, touched at Sîb and Barkah, and on the 13th of June reached Bandar 'Abbâs; the following day a salute of 21 guns was fired and visits were exchanged with the Persian Deputy-Governor of the place. On the night of the 14th the "Amphitrite" anchored off Hanjâm, and on the 17th she reached Bûshehr. A visit to Bahrain, which had been contemplated, was abandoned on account of the dangerousness of the approach for a ship of the "Amphitrite's" draught. At Bûshehr, on the 18th, the Persian flag was saluted and a visit paid to the Governor. The "Amphitrite" then crossed to Kuwait, where a cordial reception was given her in the Shaikh's absence by Shaikh Jâbir, his eldest son. On her way down the Gulf the "Amphitrite" anchored within sight of Dôhah in Qatar, visited the coast of Trucial 'Omân on the 22nd of June, and rounded Musandam on the evening of the 23rd. In the Gulf of 'Omân she anchored off Bidyah in the Shamailiyah district, and on the 25th she concluded her cruise, by disembarking Major Cox at Masqat. The sight of this fine ship made everywhere a profound impression.

The immediate reply to the cruise of the Russian "Askold" in December 1902 was the despatch to the Gulf, in the following month, of His Majesty's first-class battleship "Renown," which had brought His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught to India for the Coronation Darbar at Delhi and was for the moment unemployed. This was by far the largest and most powerful vessel which had ever been seen in the Persian Gulf. The "Renown" left Bombay on the 25th of January 1903 and visited Masqat, Būshehr, Lingeh, Bandar 'Abbās and Jāshk, but her great draught rendered a visit to Kuwait impossible. At Masqat the Sultān, and at Bandar 'Abbās the Persian Deputy-Governor, with a number of officials were entertained on board.

The incidents of Lord Curzon's historic cruise in the Gulf in 1903 are fully recorded elsewhere.

British Naval and Military Arrangements, 1899-1935.

British Naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf.

While the question of permanent dispositions for naval action in the Gulf, in case of certain contingencies, was attentively studied by the British and Indian Governments, the important matters of ordinary organisation and of material and personnel in time of peace were also brought under examination.

Under the arrangement concluded in 1895 for a period of ten years expiring on the 31st March 1906, and in consideration of the payment by the Government of India of an annual subsidy of £100,000, four vessels of the Royal Navy, of which two were cruisers and two were gunboats, had been placed at the disposal of India for special duty in local waters; but of these one only, the gunboat "Sphinx," was permanently affected to the Persian Gulf, for service in which she had been particularly constructed. In practice, however, it was found that one vessel was insufficient for the work of the Persian Gulf, and from 1897 to 1902 inclusive the number of His Majesty's ships present in the Gulf at all seasons of the year was ordinarily either two or three. In 1902, with a view especially to more effective patrolling of the Gulf of 'Omān as a check on the exportation of arms and ammunition from Masqat to the Persian side, the Government of India recommended that the Royal Indian Marine Ship "Lawrence" should be armed for employment, when required, as an auxiliary to H.M.S. "Sphinx" and other vessels of the Royal Navy, and should be placed for combatant purposes under the orders of the naval authorities; but

the scheme was considered by His Majesty's Government to involve legal and other difficulties and was not carried into execution.

In 1903 the Admiralty, in the interests of British naval efficiency in general, proposed a change which was accepted by the Secretary of State for India and by the Government of India on an understanding that there should be no increase in the naval subsidy payable by India. The change involved the formation of a flotilla of three gunboats for constant service in the Persian Gulf; the exemption of larger vessels from regular service in the Gulf, where their usefulness was restricted by their greater draught; and an annual cold weather cruise of the East Indies Squadron in Persian Gulf waters, during which the permanent gunboats should be withdrawn to India to refit and in order that leave might be given to their crews. One result was a reduction of the number of vessels supplied in return for the Indian subsidy from four, of which two were large and two small, to three, all small; but, in the view of the Government of India, the increase of suitable vessels in the Persian Gulf was of enough importance to justify the abolition of special service vessels elsewhere. In October 1904 the new arrangement was brought into effect with the gunboats "Sphinx," 1,130 tons, "Lapwing," 805 tons, and "Merlin," the last of these being a temporary substitute for H.M.S. "Redbreast," 805 tons; and the "Fox," 4,360 tons, and "Perseus," 2,135 tons, were removed from the Gulf. The number of European officers and men serving on board ships of war in the Persian Gulf was at the same time reduced from about 716 to about 124, the reduction being due largely, however, to the substitution of Asiatics for Europeans in respect of stoker ratings. The limits of the waters within which the subsidised ships might be employed was defined as an imaginary line running from Aden south of Soqotrah to Bombay, and it was arranged that during the five summer months each of them should proceed in turn to Colombo for change and musketry practice. The assent of the Government of India to these modifications, proposed by the Naval Commander-in-Chief was provisional only; and it was represented to the Secretary of State that the Gulf of Aden (but not Soqotrah) should be excluded from the beat of the Indian special service vessels, and that the reduction of the gunboats by one in summer should be countervailed by the addition of a special light draught vessel for work in the neighbourhood of Bahrain and in the shallow creeks and inlets at the head of the Gulf. In making the last suggestion the Government of India dwelt on the fact that three ships were ordinarily required in the Gulf,—one to check piracy at the head of the Gulf in the date season, another to police the pearl banks and the shallow waters round Bahrain, and a third to patrol the seas between Masqat and Bandar Abbás.

In April 1905 a new project was brought forward by the Admiralty. It was that the existing arrangements should be terminated, that the duties carried on in Indian waters by ships of His Majesty's Navy should be made to devolve on ships of the Royal Indian Marine, and that the "Sphinx," "Lapwing," and "Redbreast" should be handed over to the Government of India for incorporation with that Marine. The plan was not acceptable to the Government of India. They foresaw certain advantages from it in the shape of more immediate control by themselves over a portion of the Naval force in Indian waters, in the formation of a body of officers possessing special local qualifications, and in an enhancement of the status of the Royal Indian Marine; but they held that these would be outweighed by loss of prestige in the Persian Gulf, where the regular war vessels of other European nations were now frequently seen, by decreased naval efficiency, by a serious sacrifice of economy, by imperfect cooperation between the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Marine, by the difficulty of arranging reliefs and consequent prejudice to the health of crews, and by a cessation of direct interest in the Persian Gulf on the part of the British Admiralty. They therefore adhered to the opinion which they had expressed in 1902, that the true remedy for the difficulties of the situation was to arm particular ships of the Royal Indian Marine, when necessary, as auxiliaries to, but not as substitutes for, ships of the Royal Navy. The scheme of the Admiralty was not in the end adopted, and the arrangements introduced in 1904 consequently continued in force. The special light-draught vessel suggested by the Government of India was not, however, provided.

In June 1903 the British political representatives at Būshehr, Masqat, Bandar Abbās and Lingeh were made responsible for informing the Admiralty by telegram in future of the arrival, departure and destination of foreign men-of-war and transports which might touch at their ports.

Salutes.

The question of the official salutes to be fired by vessels of the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf was settled in 1900, the following scale receiving the sanction of His Majesty's Government:—

Occasion.	Time.	Number of guns.
Birthday of Her Majesty the Queen (everywhere in the Persian Gulf).	At noon on the 24th May in each year.	31
Proclamation day of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen-Empress of India (everywhere in the Persian Gulf).	At noon on the 1st January in each year.	31

Occasion.	Time.	Number of guns.
Birthday of His Imperial Majesty the Shāh of Persia (in Persian ports only).	.....	21
Official visit by His Highness the Sultān of Masqat.	At termination of visit.	21
Do. by His Excellency the Governor of Bushehr.	Do. . .	17
Do. by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Do. . .	13
Do. by the Political Agent at Masqat .	Do. . .	11
Do. by the Agents, Consuls-General and Commissioners and Consuls-General.	Do. . .	11
Do. by Consuls-General . . .	Do. . .	9
Do. by Consuls	Do. . .	7
Do. by the Shaikh of Kuwait . .	Do. . .	5
Do. by the Shaikh of Bahrain . .	Do. . .	5
Do. by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi .	Do. . .	5
Do. by the Shaikh of Dibai . .	Do. . .	3
Do. by the Shaikh of Shārjah . .	Do. . .	3
Do. by the Shaikh of 'Ajmān . .	Do. . .	3
Do. by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain	Do. . .	3
Do. by the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah .	Do. . .	3

The salutes of the Persian Governors of Muhammareh, Lingeh, and Bandar 'Abbās were fixed on this occasion at five guns each.

In 1902 it was decided that the British Assistant Resident at Bandar 'Abbās, though as a Vice-Consul he was not entitled to any salute, should be saluted for local reasons with seven guns. The salute of the British representative at Masqat, as a Consul, was only seven guns, but as a Political Agent of the Government of India he was accustomed to receive eleven; and in 1903 it was decided, notwithstanding certain difficulties with foreign consular representatives to which the practice had given rise, that his customary salute should not be reduced.

British military and marine establishments in the Persian Gulf.

A statement of the Indian Army and Royal Indian Marine establishments maintained in the Persian Gulf in 1905, with their cost, will be found in Annexure No. 1 to this Chapter. In 1904 the British consular guards in Persia were increased, about 130 Indian cavalry being distributed

among 12 British Consulates, the Indian infantry guards at various consular and telegraph stations in the Gulf were maintained.

British official undertakings of a general or commercial character in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

British Marine Surveys in the Persian Gulf.

Some marine surveys of which the objects were naval rather than commercial have already been mentioned; but others of a more ordinary character were undertaken also. The principal points in the Gulf at which it was sought to increase the conveniences for merchant shipping were Bûshehr, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab. The survey of the southern approach to Bâsidu, already alluded to under another head, was in part commercial in its object.

Bûshehr harbour.

A resurvey of Bûshehr harbour was recommended by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf in 1902, chiefly for the purpose of ascertaining whether large vessels could not be brought into the inner harbour (Khor Dairah) and the necessity of coaling at a distance of seven miles from land obviated. In September 1903 Persia consented to the proposed resurvey on condition that a Persian representative should be admitted to watch the proceedings, and that any marks which might be required on shore should be erected by employés of the Persian Government. In September 1904, before the operations had commenced, the Persian Government were seized with sudden apprehensions and enquired whether they were expected to contribute to the cost of the work. They received a reassuring reply; but in the following month they intimated that, whatever the result of the investigations might be, they would neither arrange to deepen the Bûshehr harbour themselves nor permit it to be deepened by the Government of India. The Royal Indian Marine surveying vessel "Investigator," Commander Heming, was selected for the duty; she left Bombay in October 1904 and finished her work at Bûshehr on the 22nd November. The soundings showed that the configuration of the harbour had changed very little since 1857, and that, while the deepening of the inner anchorage and the approach to it from seawards for ships of heavy draught would be of little use so long as the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab continued to regulate the size of vessels employed in the Persian Gulf, the dredging of a channel for vessels of moderate size from the inner anchorage to the wharves on Khor Sultâni would be an advantageous and probably not a difficult operation. The portion of the harbour between Khor Dairah and Khor Sultâni was surveyed in greater detail than the

rest; but, to avoid exciting the suspicions of the Persian delegate, no separate large scale plan of it was made.

Kuwait harbour.

Early in 1903 a resurvey of Kuwait harbour was advised by Commander Kemp, Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, and his proposals having received the support of the Government of India, were sanctioned by His Majesty's Government. In the summer of 1904, under a new mail contract, British steamers began to call at Kuwait; and in November of the same year the survey there was begun by the Royal Indian Marine Ship "Investigator," immediately after she had finished her work at Būshehr. The operations were interrupted, however, by an outbreak of beriberi on board, which attacked 34 out of a crew of 70 and necessitated the return of the vessel to Bombay on the 12th December. The "Investigator" was at Kuwait again at the end of February 1905, but the survey of the harbour could not be finished before the end of the season, nor was it finally completed till two years later. In the course of the survey steps were taken to ascertain whether the boat harbours of the town, which were dry at low water, could be improved; but it was found that no improvement could be made without extending the existing breakwaters for a distance of a quarter of a mile seawards, a process of which the results could not be expected to justify the expenditure involved. The operations led, however, to a fuller knowledge of the advantages of Bandar Shuwaikh, a well sheltered anchorage about 3 miles west of the town. In May 1905 the Government of India sanctioned the construction at their own expense of an improved beacon on Rās-al-Ardh, to serve as a guide to vessels entering Kuwait Bay, in replacement of a private beacon which had been erected there by the British India Steam Navigation Company. The British survey of Kuwait harbour was not allowed by the Turks to pass without objection, and their protests in this case were accompanied by reckless misstatements of fact and by imputations of political intrigue.

Bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

In July 1904 it was suggested by the Naval Commander-in-Chief that the positions of some buoys laid down by the British India Steam Navigation Company, to mark the entrance of the Shatt-al-'Arab should be altered, and that the charge of the buoys should be undertaken for the future by the Government of India. Accordingly, in April 1905, the buoy on the bar and two inner buoys were moved by the "Investigator" further to the eastward to indicate the actual deepest channel; but the Government of India, fearing international complications, declined to take over the buoys from the British India Steam Navigation Company, though the latter were willing, and even anxious, to transfer them to Government on certain conditions.

Khor-al-Qalai'ah, Bahrain.

H. M. S. "Redbreast," Commander H. B. T. Somerville, was employed during the winter of 1904-05 in examining the Khor-al-Qalai'ah islet of Bahrain Island, which it was hoped might afford harbour facilities superior to those of the exposed anchorage off Manāmah. The survey, however, showed that the entrance was difficult and the holding-ground poor, and no steps were taken for the utilisation of the inlet beyond the erection of a permanent beacon to mark the entrance. A fresh survey of Manāmah harbour and its approaches had already been made by the Royal Indian Marine Ship "Investigator" in 1901-02.

Compilation of the Persian Gulf Gazetteer.

The increased importance of the Persian Gulf after 1899 caused the need of a geographical and historical handbook of that region for the use of political officers to be felt. The compilation of the present Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Omān, and Central Arabia was accordingly ordered by Lord Curzon in 1903 and begun in the following year. In the winter of 1904-05 the writer, assisted by Mr. J. C. Gaskin, afterwards Commercial Assistant to the Resident at Baghdād, and by Lieutenant C. H. Gabriel, a candidate for the Political Department of the Government of India, to which he was subsequently appointed, toured in the Gulf and collected information for the Gazetteer. Among the places visited by the writer at this time were Masqat, Sohār, Shārjah, Bahrain, Kuwait, Basrah, Baghdād, Karbala, Hillah, Muhammareh, Būshehr, Bandar 'Abbās, and Jāshk; he had previously accompanied the cruise of Lord Curzon in the Persian Gulf at the end of 1903. Detailed surveys of different districts in the Gulf were made during the cold weather of 1904-05, in connection with the Gazetteer operations, by a party from India under Surveyor Sher Jang, K.B; they resulted in large scale maps of the Bahrain Islands, of the county about Kuwait and between Kuwait and the Turkish frontier, of the Būshehr peninsula, and of the tract in 'Omān forming the immediate hinterland of the towns of Masqat and Matrah.

Journeys and explorations by British officers, partly in connection with the Gazetteer.

Various other explorations were made, both independently of and in connection with the Gazetteer. In 1901 Captain P. Z. Cox, then Political Agent at Masqat, with Captain H. H. Dowding of the Military Intelligence Branch, Simla, ascended Wādi Tāyīn in the 'Omān Sultanate from the sea to its head, returning to Masqat *viâ* Wādi Samāil; and in 1902 Major P. Z. Cox, unaccompanied by any European, made a tour of 400 miles across the whole breadth of 'Omān from Abu Dhabi to Masqat and obtained much new information regarding the districts of Dhāhirah and 'Omān Proper. The course of the Jarrāhi River in 'Arabistān, till then very imperfectly known, was observed in 1904 by Major Burton, His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Muhammareh, who also investigated the geography of the

Fallāhīyeh district and the nature of the principal land approaches to Khor Mūsa. In the following year two British naturalists, Colonel Bailward and Mr. Woosnam, travelled in 'Arabistān. Valuable explorations were made in 'Arabistān by Lieutenant D. L. R. Lorimer, His Britannic Majesty's first Vice-Consul at Ahwāz in 1904 and the following years. In the cold season of 1905-06 a number of most productive journeys were undertaken by Major P. Z. Cox, as resident in the Persian Gulf, chiefly for the purpose of solving topographical problems connected with the Gazetteer. In 'Arabistān Major Cox visited Dīlam, Behbehān, the Hindiyān River, Ma'shūr, the Jarrāhi River, Buziyeh, Fallāhīyeh, the Bahmanshīr, and Qubbān, determining carefully the course of the Hindiyān and casting much light on the connection of the important inlet of Khor Mūsa with the Kārūn River and Bahmanshīr, which till his journey had been very imperfectly understood. In 'Omān he travelled by land from Rās-al-Khaimah to Sohār *viâ* Baraimi, Lieutenant C. A. Scott of the Royal Indian Marine accompanying him to determine accurately the position of the Baraimi Oasis, which was found to be misplaced in all existing maps. In 1905 Captain Knox, the Political Agent at Kuwait, made a tour to the southward from that place; and in the next year, soon after the close of the period, the same officer reached Hafar, a famous landmark, in the interior distant 160 miles from Kuwait, which, though mentioned by previous European travellers in Arabia, had not been reached by any of them. Between 1903 and 1905 the geography of many large and almost unknown tracts in Eastern Arabia was elucidated by political officers through native information, the largest shares in this very difficult work being taken by Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, and by Major Cox, the Political Resident in the Gulf.

Geological reconnaissance of the Persian Gulf.

A general geological reconnaissance of both sides of the Gulf, combined with a closer examination of localities where the existence of minerals was suspected, was carried out in the winter of 1904-05 by Mr. G. Pilgrim of the Indian Geological Survey, the results of whose expedition are summarised by himself in an Appendix to the Gazetteer. Some coal seams in the country behind Sūr in 'Omān had previously been scientifically examined in 1901 by Drs. von Krafft and Oldham of the Geological Survey of India.

Antiquarian research.

The attention of the Government of India was drawn in 1904 to the prehistoric tumuli of the Bahrain Islands, and arrangements were made for the excavation of some of the mounds. A cursory inspection was also made, through native agency, of ancient sites near Ganāveh on the Persian coast.

British steam communications and postal services in the Persian Gulf.

The acceleration of the Persian Gulf mail steamer service in 1904 was a notable achievement of the period; it resulted from the establishment by the British India Steam Navigation Company in return for an increased subsidy, of a fast mail line in addition to an existing slow cargo and mail line. The extra subsidy on account of the rapid service, borne entirely by the Government of India, was Rs. 3,00,000 per annum; and the average speed of the fast line was fixed at 13, and of the slow line at 8 knots an hour. Kuwait was for the first time definitely included among the Company's ports of call, and Dibai, though not entered in the schedule of the contract, was henceforth regularly visited by the Company's vessels.

A postal subsidy of Rs. 24,000 a year paid by the Government of India to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company for a weekly mail service in both directions between Basrah and Baghdād was renewed for ten years with effect from 1904.

British telegraphs in the Persian Gulf.

The period was also remarkable for the first considerable extensions of the telegraph system of the Persian Gulf made since 1869; they were dictated by considerations of policy and strategy as well as of commercial advantage.

Jāshk-Masqat cable.

The inadequacy of the communications between Masqat and the outside world was remedied, first of all, by the laying of a cable from Jāshk to Masqat which was opened for traffic in November 1901; in this enterprise, approved though it was in principle by His Majesty's Government, no financial assistance was rendered to the Government of India by the British Treasury.

Bandar 'Abbās connection.

A second and perhaps more important scheme was propounded by the Government of India in 1900 along with the first, but its realisation was delayed by the refusal of the Home Government to undertake a share of the cost and by doubts of a technical nature as to the best means of carrying it into effect; its object was the inclusion of the port of Bandar 'Abbās in the circuit of the Persian Gulf cables. This it was originally intended to arrange by looping one of the existing cables between Jāshk and Būshehr into the bay of Bandar 'Abbās; but in 1902 a proposal by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, that telegraphic communication should be extended to Bāsīdu, suggested the alternative of landing a cable on Hanjām, where a British telegraph station had existed from 1869 to 1880, and of constructing a branch thence to Bandar 'Abbās. This alternative project was finally accepted by His Majesty's Government on the advice of Lord Curzon after he had personally visited Hanjām in 1903; and in April 1904 one of the Būshehr cables was relanded on the island and the telegraph station there re-occupied without notice to the Persian Government,

under a former concession which had never been revoked. Subsequently in May 1905 the permission of the Shāh was obtained by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān for the construction of a line from Hanjām, partly aerial (across Qishm Island) and partly submarine, to Bandar 'Abbās. This line, which was to be worked by Persian operatives and on repayment of the cost of construction was to become the property of the Persian Government, was completed before the close of the year.

Central Persian telegraph line.

An addition to the means of telegraphic communication between Persia and India was undertaken in 1902 in the shape of a Central Persian telegraph line; but its bearing on the Persian Gulf was slight.

British telegraph subsidies in Persian Makrān.

In 1899 an important change was made in connection with the telegraph subsidies paid to local chiefs in Persian Makrān for the protection of the land line traversing their districts. It consisted generally in a redistribution of the money among a greater number of recipients than before, some of the small chiefs in the immediate vicinity of the coast from whom services were mostly required being now included, while the shares of larger chiefs in the interior were correspondingly reduced.

British Commercial Missions to the Persian Gulf region.

In view of the increased mercantile activity of foreign nations in Persia and the Persian Gulf region, special attention was devoted by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India to British and Indian trade in those parts, and two commercial missions were charged with the study of trade questions on the spot.

Mr. Maclean's mission.

The first involved the despatch from England by the Board of Trade's Advisory Committee on Commercial Intelligence, of Mr. H. W. Maclean, who had been not long before Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia at Tehrān and Honorary Attaché of His Britannic Majesty's Legation in Persia, and who by his experience of Persia and intimate acquaintance with its trade was admirably qualified for the part he had to perform. Mr. Maclean left England at the beginning of 1903 and called at Bombay on his way to Persia. The Government of India, who had been asked, and who had willingly agreed, to grant him all the facilities and aid in their power, suggested that he should study with special care the trade in tea, coffee, indigo, and Indian cotton manufactures, as well as the general effect of the new Persian customs tariff, and should work out the rates *ad valorem* on the products of various countries when, as in the case of cotton textiles, there was but one specific duty for grades and kinds differing much in price. In the course of the enquiries made under his original instructions Mr. Maclean visited the principal trade centres of Turkish Arabia and Persia including, it would seem, Bandar 'Abbās, Būshehr, Basrah, Baghdād, Kermānshāh, Hamadān, Tabriz, Mashhad, Tehrān and Isfahān; and, when

he was about to leave Tehrān for London in November 1903, his orders were changed and he was directed to return by way of Masqat, where a commercial mission of the "Comité de l'Asie Française" had in the meanwhile made a rather prolonged stay. Mr. Maclean submitted in all three valuable reports. The first, dated 5th December 1903, from Tehrān, consisted of a note on the new Persian customs tariff; the second, completed at Rasht on the 20th December 1903, dealt with the whole subject of British trade in Persia; the third, which related to 'Omān, Trucial 'Omān, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and which embodied the result of the enquiries made by Mr. Maclean after the extension of his tour, was submitted in London on the 12th April 1904.

Mr. Newcomen's mission.

The second British commercial mission was sent from India under the auspices of the Indian Government. It was supplementary to that of Mr. Maclean, and the particular field of its labours was South-Eastern Persia, which lay outside the scope of Mr. Maclean's investigations, but which was a region of special importance to Indian trade.

The despatch of this Indian mission was originally suggested by Major P. M. Sykes, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kirmān, who himself decided the routes to be followed, made all the arrangements in Persia, and postponed taking leave which was due to him in order that the mission might be rendered a success. The cost of the mission was undertaken by the Government of India and by the Chambers of Commerce of Upper India and Bengal. The Chambers of Commerce of Bombay and Karachi were consulted also in regard to the duties of the mission, but they declined active participation in the arrangements. As finally constituted the mission consisted of Mr. A. Gleadowe-Newcomen of Cawnpore, assisted by Messrs. Luffman and Ryan. Mr. Newcomen, who besides having seven years' practical experience of tea-planting was well versed in other branches of Oriental trade, was formally recognised by the Government of India on the 8th October 1904 as President of the mission and as representative of the Bengal and Upper India Chambers of Commerce and of the Indian Tea Cess Committee. The arrangement as to expenditure was that the salaries of the delegates for a period of six months and the cost of samples should be borne by the commercial bodies in whose interests they were sent, while the cost of the journey to and from Persia, the actual travelling expenses in Persia, and the price of outfit, including tents, furniture and horses, should be defrayed by the Government of India.

The mission sailed from Bombay on the 13th October 1904, and on the 21st reached Bandar 'Abbās, where they were detained in quarantine until the evening of the 25th. Notwithstanding that arrangements had been

made with the Persian Government for facilitating their journey in Persia, they experienced incivility and obstruction at the hands of M. Cattersel, the Belgian Director of Customs at Bandar 'Abbās. This was, however, the sole instance of discourteous treatment of which they had to complain in the course of their tour, and suitable notice was taken of M. Cattersel's conduct by the Persian Government, who shortly afterwards, on the complaint of the British Minister, removed him from Bandar 'Abbās to another appointment. At Bandar 'Abbās the mission were met by Khan Bahādur Asghar 'Ali, the British Consular Agent designate for Bam. They were accompanied on the march by Hospital Assistant Tafazzul Husain, placed on duty with them by the Government of India, and by a small escort of Indian cavalry who were proceeding on relief to Kirmān, as well as by a Persian military escort. From Bandar 'Abbās the mission journeyed to Saidābād, where they arrived on the 25th November; they were met near that place by Sartīp Mīrza Riza Khān, whom the Persian Government had sent from Tehrān to receive them. On the 27th November they were joined by Major Sykes, and on the 16th December the whole party arrived at Kirmān.

It had been intended that from Kirmān the mission should travel to Sīstān, returning to the coast at Gwādur *viâ* Magas and Kōhak; but, as it appeared that this route would be unprofitable, the programme was modified with the assent of the Government of India, and operations in Persian Balūchistān were restricted to a tour from Kirmān to Bam and Jiruft. Bam was reached on the 14th January 1905, and on the 20th February the mission returned to Kirmān. From Kirmān the mission marched to Yazd, arriving there on the 16th March; Shīrāz was reached on the 18th April; and from Shīrāz Mr. Newcomen and his companions travelled by the ordinary route to Būshehr, whence they sailed for India on the 19th May.

At Kirmān Messrs. Luffman and Ryan were laid up with fever, and at Yazd Mr. Newcomen had the misfortune to fracture one of his legs above the ankle. On the 31st March the advanced party of the mission escort was fired on at Mihrābād, between Yazd and Shīrāz, and one of the Persian cavalry guard received a severe flesh wound through the thigh. These were the principal difficulties which attended the work of Mr. Newcomen and his associates.

In their journey the mission confined themselves strictly to commercial enquiries, in which they were aided by the British consular officials. Their relations with the local Persian representatives were everywhere most friendly, and in more than one place they were received with considerable distinction. The representatives of Russia in Persia did their best, however,

to let it be thought that the mission was a political one, inspired by sinister motives; and a complaint was on one occasion received by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān that the members took photographs and made sketches, that they showed too much interest in the strength of Persian military garrisons, and that they were themselves military officers. The uneasiness of the Persian Government was easily removed, however, by assurances from the British Legation.

The tour was in every respect a success. A very large amount of valuable commercial information was collected by the indefatigable energy and industry of Mr. Newcomen. British goods, especially tea, were exhibited and advertised in some entirely new markets. A careful itinerary also, maintained during the whole arduous journey of 1,790 miles, threw much new light on the state of commercial communication in Southern Persia.

Miscellaneous British proceedings in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

British measures for the maintenance of Maritime Security in the Persian Gulf.

The peace of the seas was practically undisturbed during the period except on the coasts of Qatar and Hasa and in the Shatt-al-'Arab, in other words except in those parts of the Gulf where the shore was actually under Turkish jurisdiction or Turkish jurisdiction was claimed.

Off Qatar.

A number of piratical offences occurred off Qatar, where tranquillity had prevailed for several years, in 1899 and 1900; but pressure by the British authorities upon the principal Shaikh of Qatar, though he pleaded helplessness on account of the Turkish occupation of Dōhah, resulted in their cessation.

Off Hasa.

Along the Hasa coast, which also had been unusually quiet for some time, there was in 1899 a serious recrudescence of piracy; and from then until the end of the period the state of matters in that quarter grew progressively worse. The principal pirate was an exiled member of the Bahrain ruling family who was also connected by blood relationship with a marauding Arab tribe on the mainland, and whose bases of operation were, after the first, places in Turkish territory. Remonstrances by the British authorities proved entirely ineffectual, being either disregarded or rudely repulsed by the local Turkish officials to whom they were addressed. H.M.S. "Sphinx" visited Qatif in 1902, but without satisfactory results; and later in the year the Turks, after capturing the pirate leader already mentioned, negligently or intentionally allowed him to escape; and his

activity was renewed with lamentable results. In 1905, the British Political Agent in Bahrain twice visited Qatif and interviewed the Turkish representative there, but could obtain no satisfactory assurances.

On the Shatt-al-'Arab.

In the Shatt-al-'Arab, after an interval of two years' quiescence, piracy in 1900 again became a scourge in the river and about its mouth. Numerous cases, some of them very serious, occurred; the sufferers were chiefly British Indian, Bahraini, and Persian vessels. Efforts were made to induce the Turkish and Persian authorities to co-operate for the restoration of security, and direct action was on some occasions taken by British vessels. The Shaikh of Muhammareh made some response to the appeal of the British authorities; and in 1905, principally in consequence of action taken by him, there were signs of improvement. No compensation was obtained, however, for numerous injuries to British subjects navigating the river.

The arms trade; its repression undertaken by Britain in the Persian Gulf.

The trade in arms and ammunition showed an alarming increase, and its evil effects began to appear not only in the Persian Gulf, where the possession of rifles by their subjects was rapidly undermining the authority of the Persian and Turkish Governments in their own territories, but also on the North-West Frontier of British India, where arms and ammunition obtained from the Persian Gulf made their appearance in large quantities among the hill tribes, greatly increasing the difficulty of an already difficult border administration. From time to time changes were remarked in the course of the trade; and it may perhaps be reckoned an advantage that the methods of those engaged in it became by degrees more systematic, and consequently more easily followed and understood. The greatest place of importation was Masqat, where the trade, under treaties with European nations and America, was free; and it was considered impracticable to secure the assent of France, the power after Britain chiefly interested, to any revision of the Sultán of 'Omán's commercial engagements which would enable that ruler to exclude the trade from his dominions. A secondary base of the traffic had been formed at Kuwait, where a nominal—but only nominal—prohibition of it was enacted by the Shaikh under British advice in 1900: Kuwait was the market from which the warring powers in Central Arabia and the Arabs of Turkish 'Iráq principally obtained their supplies of rifles and cartridges. An interdict of the trade in Trucial 'Omán, arranged in 1902, narrowed the question to one of preventing the exit from Masqat of the arms and ammunition which could not after 1902 be lawfully landed at any other place in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of 'Omán except Qatar, which was unimportant and where there was no ruling chief in relations with the British Government. Dispositions were made, in consultation with the Sultán of 'Omán, for checking the export of arms

from Masqat; but the task seemed hopeless. On the Persian coast, however, preventive action was not altogether impossible; seizures of contraband arms were occasionally made by the Turkish Government; and the establishment of a British Vice-Consul at Bandar 'Abbās in 1900 had some effect in discouraging the operations of the Afghan arms dealers who had begun to make use of that port. About 1901 Persian Makrān showed signs of becoming the chief thoroughfare of the Afghan trade, and in the next year an arrangement was formed between the Persian Governor-General and the British Political Agent in Kalāt for preventing the introduction of rifles and ammunition into the Makrān districts, where the local market was already glutted and continued importation implied the existence of a transit trade to the countries beyond. The development of the trade across Persian Makrān appeared so serious, regard being had to the facilities which it afforded the Afghan tribes of the North-West Frontier of India for providing themselves to an unlimited extent with war material, that in 1905 a discussion arose as to whether exportation from Masqat should not be combated by British naval agency. The discussion did not bear fruit during the period with which we are concerned; but it resulted in the establishment, at a later time, of a British naval blockade of the arms trade in the Gulf of 'Omān.

The slave trade.

A great blow was dealt to the slave trade, which still lingered in a reduced shape, through successful anti-slaving operations by the Portuguese authorities in East Africa in 1902; and it had a powerful indirect effect in the Persian Gulf region, where the 'Omāni town of Sūr, the home of a large number of the slave-traders captured in East Africa, was plunged into mourning.

British sanitary organisation in the Persian Gulf.

Bubonic plague still continuing in India, responsibility for sanitary arrangements in the Persian Gulf continued to devolve on the British political authorities there, especially in Persia where full control of the necessary arrangements had been conferred on them by the Persian Government.

In Persia.

In 1899 a British medical expert was deputed from India to deal with a small outbreak of plague which occurred at Būshehr, but his proceedings or proposals caused a tumult among the ignorant and excitable populace, and no measures could be enforced. The epidemic, fortunately, soon died away. In 1903 the Persian Government, influenced by Russian advice, suddenly became desirous of transferring the sanitary control of their ports from the British medical staff hitherto employed to their own Customs Department; and in 1904, chiefly through the physician of the French Vice-Consulate at Būshehr, strong efforts were made to undermine the authority of the British Residency Surgeon at Būshehr in sanitary matters. Repeated

vigorous protests made by the British Legation at Tehrān resulted, however, in the Customs being prohibited from interfering with the work of the British sanitary agents at the various ports.

In the Sultanate of 'Omān.

The attitude of the Sultān of 'Omān in sanitary questions was at first, on account of other difficulties between him and the British Government, extremely unsatisfactory; but in autumn 1900, he at length handed over the sanitary administration of the port of Masqat to the British Agency Surgeon, at the same time placing under him qualified subordinates whom he had brought from India on his own account.

In Bahrain.

The Shaikh of Bahrain continued to resist the introduction of proper measures against plague in his dominions; and in 1900 the abuses of a sanitary system which he had set up were so much greater than its advantages that the Government of India found themselves obliged to insist upon its abolition. In 1905, had an epidemic of plague which appeared in Bahrain not suddenly ceased, the necessary steps would have been taken there by the Government of India through an agent of their own.

British dispensaries at Kuwait and in Bahrain.

In 1904 a dispensary was opened at Kuwait in connection with the British Political Agency established there; and in 1905 the maintenance of a Victoria Memorial Hospital in Bahrain, which had been founded by private subscription in 1901, was undertaken by the Government of India.

British official matters, 1899-1905.

Death of Her Majesty Queen Victoria and Coronation of His Majesty King Edward VII.

The news of the decease of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress Victoria on the 22nd January 1901 occasioned universal demonstrations of grief and sympathy at all stations in the Persian Gulf. At Būshehr most of the British subjects, European and Indian, paid special visits of condolence at the Residency, and expressions of sorrow were transmitted to the Resident by the Shaikh of Bahrain. At Masqat, where the Sultān put an end to the *I'd* rejoicings and caused the shops to be closed and 101 minute guns to be fired, the general feeling seemed akin to consternation. The Coronation of His Majesty the King-Emperor Edward VII was celebrated at all places in the jurisdiction of the Persian Gulf Residency on the 1st January 1903.

Division of expenditure and patronage between the Home Government and the Government of India.

In 1900 the financial relations between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India arising from political and consular representation in Persia were readjusted, and a rule was established that future increases in expenditure should be divided equally between the two Governments. In 1904 Sir Mortimer Durand of the Indian Civil Service relinquished charge of His Britannic Majesty's Legation in Persia, which he had held

for six years. From 1899 to 1901 the functions of Military Attaché and Oriental Secretary in the Legation were combined in a British officer of the Indian Army; but after 1901 the Military Attachéship was the only post at Tehrān filled by an officer from India.

Conclusion.

To resume. An attack on the political predominance of Britain in the Persian Gulf may be considered to have begun with the first visit of a Russian surveyor to Hormûz in 1895, but it did not become serious until 1899, when the French sought to secure a naval base in 'Omān. A great impetus was given to foreign activity by the South African war of 1899-1902, especially in its earlier stages, when a false appreciation of Britain's future place in the world became current. Those years accordingly witnessed preparations by Russia for establishing a naval station in the Persian Gulf and for constructing a railway across Persia to the sea, as well as the foundation of a Russian line of steamers and trading company for operations in the Gulf, and intensified efforts by France to push her influence in 'Omān. Unmistakable symptoms at the same time showed that, in the Gulf, Russia and France were actuated to some extent by a common policy. The more serious manifestations of foreign ambition were accompanied by Russian and French displays of naval force and were attended by an increase of Russian consular representation in the Gulf region.

As the British Empire gradually and without loss of stability emerged from the South African difficulty, some revulsion of feeling and change of policy on the part of foreign nations became perceptible. The more dangerous enterprises of Russia were suspended, and eventually little remained to differentiate the situation in the Gulf from that which had existed before the crisis, except the mercantile undertaking to which the Russian Government had committed themselves and their inflated consular establishments. By the end of 1903 political tension between European nations in the Persian Gulf had entirely ceased.

The assault on British predominance was energetically met and repelled at every point. Nothing was conceded even at the period when the state of international politics was most favourable to the adversaries of Britain, and British activity continued unabated even after the causes which provoked it had been withdrawn. Effective diplomatic barriers were raised against dangers from Russia which threatened in Persia. French intrigue

in 'Omān was checked by firm action at Masqat, and the question of the French flag in 'Omān was carried before the Hague Tribunal, by which it was ultimately decided in favour of Britain. In Bahrain the authority of the British Government was proved and emphasised by strong and successful measures for the protection of foreign subjects, and trade flourished in an unprecedented degree. Kuwait was savedfrom falling under Turkish domination, was defended against the menaces of the Amir of Northern Najd, and became for the time being a British protectorate except in name. In 'Arabistān intimate relations were formed with the Shaikh of Muhammareh which assured the predominance of British influence in his councils. On the coast of Persia throughout its length British interests were maintained with success, and an important position was secured at Hanjām; while in Persian Makrān, notwithstanding internal anarchy, British subjects and property were adequately protected. The strategical position was examined from the British and Indian points of view, and dispositions were made for meeting every emergency. The British naval arrangements in the Gulf were reorganised; new marine surveys were carried out; foreign demonstrations were answered by counter-demonstrations of superior force. The number of the British political representatives in the Gulf was increased, and steps were taken simultaneously to add to their dignity and prestige. At the same time the general efficiency of British action in the Gulf was enhanced by improvements in passenger, postal, and telegraphic communications; the interests of British and Indian trade were promoted by the despatch of commercial missions; and the political history and geography of the Gulf region were brought under close investigation.

It is not possible, by any analytical process, to separate the effects of these measures from other factors by which the cessation of the assault on the British position in the Gulf was brought about; and it is hardly easier to distinguish the policy of the Government of India from that of His Majesty's Government, with which it was blended and in which it was absorbed. Changes in the international situation in Europe and elsewhere were undoubtedly elements of first-rate importance; but had British policy in the Gulf been supine during the time of crisis, such changes, coming as they did too late, would not have prevented serious permanent injury to British interests. In the defensive political campaign of this arduous period it was ordinarily the part of the Government of India to suggest and to execute, of the British Government to control and to direct: the conduct of operations in the diplomatic field devolved upon His Britannic Majesty's Government, while the political contest in the Gulf itself was waged for the most part by officers of the Indian services and with Indian resources.

Lord Curzon, among whose first political acts as Viceroy was a deadly blow to French influence in 'Omán, and whose progress round the Gulf at the end of 1903 marked the real conclusion of the troubled epoch, was entitled at his departure from India in November 1905 to regard with satisfaction both the issue of the struggle and the part that had been played in it by his own Government. The results attained were satisfactory, for disaster had been averted; but they cannot, in prudence, be regarded as perpetual.

ANNEXURE NO. 1.—INDIAN ARMY AND ROYAL INDIAN MARINE ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1905.

Indian Army Establishments.

Stations.—Chahbár, Jáshk, Muscat, Bahrain, Búshehr, and Baghdad.

Strength.—Three Subadars, 3 Jemadars, 11 Havaldars, 15 Naiks, 4 Buglers, 210 Sepoys, 2 Hospital Assistants, and 10 followers; total 258 troops.

Distribution of Sepoys.—Chahbár, 45; Jáshk, 45; Muscat, 17; Bahrain, 24; Búshehr, 49; Baghdád, 30.

Cost.—Pay, Rs. 38,525; clothing, Rs. 2,266; rations, Rs. 30,735; batta, Rs. 6,258; repairs to arms, Rs. 5,210; medicines and diet, Rs. 600; postage, Rs. 125; water supply, Rs. 961; conservancy, Rs. 48; lighting and heating, Rs. 45; total Rs. 84,782 per annum.

Royal Indian Marine Establishments.

Royal Indian Marine Ship "Lawrence."—A steel paddle steamer, built in 1886, stationed at Búshehr, at the disposal of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. Gross tonnage, 902; I. H. P., 1,277; speed, 12 knots. Armament: four 4-inch B. L. guns, not mounted; four 6-pr. Nordenfelts and four ·45 inch five-barrel Nordenfelts, mounted. Complement: 4 Officers, 2 Engineers, 3 Warrant Officers, and 80 Petty Officers and men. Average cost for three years, Rs. 1,45,656 per annum.

Royal Indian Marine Ship "Comet."—A steel paddle steamer, built in 1884, stationed at Baghdád, at the disposal of the Political Resident,

Baghdad. Gross tonnage, 182; I. H. P., 190; speed, 9 knots. Armament: two ·45 inch five-barrel Nordenfelts, mounted. Complement: 1 Officer, 4 Warrant Officers, and 33 Petty Officers and men. Average cost for three years, Rs. 42,423 per annum.

Muscat Coal Depôt.—In two places, both occupied rent free. Establishment: 1 Fireman and Coal Tindal, 2 Peons, and 1 night watchman. Cost, Rs. 6,200 per annum.

Bāeida Coal Depôt.—No buildings. Establishment: 1 Coal Agent, 1 Peon, and 1 fire-engine man. Cost, Rs. 750 per annum.

Bāshehr Coal Depôt.—Fifteen godowns, rented at Rs. 1,100 per annum. Establishment: 1 Coal Tindal, 2 Weighmen, and 1 fire-engine man. Cost, including rent, Rs. 9,728 per annum.

Baghdād Coal Depôt.—(Since abolished, coal for the "Comet" being stored in a godown in the Residency grounds.)

CHAPTER II.

HISTORY OF THE 'OMĀN SULTANATE.*

The modern history of 'Omān, as that of the Persian Gulf in general, may be considered to begin at the close of the 16th century of the Christian era.

RULE OF THE NABĀHINAH, 1506-1624.

Internal history of 'Omān, 1600-24.

Rule of a nominal Imām and the Nabāhinah.

In the year 1600 'Omān was governed, as it had been generally since 751 A.D., by an elective Imām † or ruler possessing in name supreme religious, military and political authority; but the real power was at this time in the hands of the Nabāhinah or Banī Nabhān, a clan who had

* This account of the history of the 'Omān Sultanate is founded chiefly upon the materials of which an account follows.

The only authority relating to 'Omān and extending back to very early times is the *Kashf-al-Ghammah* of Sirhān-bin-Sa'īd of Izki; a part of it has been translated by Colonel E. C. Ross under the title *Annals of 'Omān*, 1874, and brings the history of events down to the year 1728. The most general historical work on 'Omān is the Reverend G. P. Badger's *Imāms and Seyyids of 'Omān*, 1870, which consists of a translation of the Arabic chronicle of Salīl-ibn-Razīq and others, covering the period 661 to 1856 A.D., and of an analysis and a continuation by the translator extending to 1870. The authorities for the period 1600-1800 are those cited for the Gulf generally in the footnote to the title of Chapter I of this Volume; and some information regarding 'Omān at the beginning of the 19th century is given by Vincenzo Maurizi (*alias* Shaikh Mansūr) in his *History of Seyd Said*, 1819, referring to the years 1807 and 1814.

Captain R. Mignan's *Winter Journey*, 1839, gives particulars of the Ras-al-Khaimah expedition of 1819 and of the Banī Bu 'Alī expedition, both British; and Lieutenant C. R. Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, deals fully with all marine and military matters in which Britain was concerned down to 1863.

The most valuable and trustworthy sources of information for the recent period initiated by the establishment, at the end of the 18th century, of political relations

their hereditary seat in the hilly Hajar country at the villages of Maqniyát and Yanqul, and whose influence first became predominant about the year 1566.

Opposed to the Nabáhinah there was, however, a strong coalition which embraced the Bani Hina tribe, the ruler of the Samáil Valley, and the chief of Rustáq. Bahlah, still an important town of the inner tableland of 'Omán, was in those days the political capital of the whole country, and it was more than once lost and recovered by the Nabáhinah and their adversaries.

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between Britain and 'Omán are, however, the records of the Government of Bombay and the Government of India, and a number of summaries and précis which have been compiled from the same. The *Précis of Information in regard to the first Connection of the Honble East India Company with Turkish Arabia* covers the period from 1646 to 1840 and contains scattered references to 'Omán affairs. *Bombay Selections No. XXIV* comprises a summary of events from the end of the 18th century down to 1853, and is supplemented, where it is deficient, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*. Mr. Saldanha's *Précis on Muskat Affairs, 1856-72*, continues the story, and is partially overlapped by Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler's *Summary of Affairs of the Government of India in the Foreign Department from 1861 to 1869*; by Mr. C. Girdlestone's *Note on Events in 'Omán subsequent to the Expulsion of Syud Salim*, written in 1869; and by Mr. C. E. Buckland's *Précis of Muscat Affairs from October 1869 to March 1872*. Mr. Buckland's *Précis* was carried on by himself to June 1873; by "F. C. D." to July 1874; by an anonymous summarist to July 1875; by Mr. P. J. C. Robertson, Assistant Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, from August 1875 to December 1884, inclusive; by Lieutenant W. Stratton, First Assistant Political Resident, to the end of 1888; and by Captain S. H. Godfrey, First Assistant Political Resident, to the end of 1892. Another *Précis of Muskat Affairs*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, completes the series down to 1905.

The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, beginning with one for 1871-72, supply a concise chronicle of events in 'Omán from year to year and contain three valuable monographs, *viz.*, *Outlines of the History of 'Omán from A. D. 1728 to 1853*, by Captain E. C. Ross, in the Report for 1882-83; and a *Biographical Sketch of the late Seyyid Sa'eed-bin-Sultan* and a *Sketch of the Career of Seyyid Sultan-bin-Ahmed*, by Colonel S. B. Miles, in the Reports for 1883-84 and 1887-88 respectively.

The work known as Aitchison's *Treaties* disposes fully and conclusively, in 'Omán as elsewhere, of the subject with which it is concerned.

Zanzibar affairs, which until 1856 were interwoven with (and even now are not entirely divorced from) those of Masqat may be studied in Captain P. D. Henderson's *Précis of Correspondence relating to Zanzibar Affairs from 1856 to 1872*, in Lieutenant M. L. Ramsay's *Précis of Zanzibar Affairs from 1873-1878*, and in Mr. R. N. Lyne's book, *Zanzibar in Contemporary Times*.

The latest portion of this history, that referring to events since 1899, was carefully revised by Major P. Z. Cox, Political Resident, Búshehr, and Major W. Grey, Political Agent, Masqat.

† The origin and nature of the Imamate of 'Omán are explained in the Appendix on Religions.

At the close of the period now under consideration the Nabāhinah were overthrown, and even expelled from their original location in Hajar, by the Ya'āribah, another indigenous family, who seem to have been connected with the chief of Rustāq.

Overthrow of the Nabāhinah by the Ya'āribah.

Affairs of the Portuguese in 'Omān, 1600-24.

On the coast, at this time somewhat neglected by the native powers, whose internecine struggles were carried on chiefly a the interior, the Portuguese had long held sway; but their authority vas on the decline. They still occupied Masqat, where they had first appeared in 1507; and that place was, next to Hormūz, their principal military station in the Gulf. There were probably Portuguese posts at Qaryāt and Sūr also, but this is uncertain.

Possessions of the Portuguese in 'Omān, 1600.

In 1616, probably at the invitation, and certainly with the assistance, of a native chief named 'Omair-bin-Himyar, the Portuguese attacked and captured the Bātinah seaport of Sohār, of which the increasing trade had caused a diminution in the receipts of their customs houses at Masqat and Hormūz; the town was burned to the ground, and the fort, taken by bombardment and assault, was permanently occupied by the Portuguese.* Whether this affair had any connection with the contest between the Nabāhinah and the Ya'āribah cannot be determined; but the decline of the Nabāhinah appears to have followed very closely on the capture of Sohār by the Portuguese. In 1623, as mentioned in the next paragraph, the Portuguese, after the loss of Hormūz—their chief settlement,—added Khor Fakkān to their possessions in 'Omān.

Capture of Sohār and Khor Fakkān by the Portuguese, 1616 and 1623.

Relations of Persia with 'Omān, 1566-1623.

Shortly after the fall of Hormūz the Persians seized Sohār and Khor Fakkān; but before the end of 1623 they were again ejected from both places by the Portuguese commander Ruy Freire de Andrade.

* In 1622, nearly a century before, the Portuguese had expelled the Persians from Sohār; they did not, on that occasion, take direct possession of the place but contented themselves with setting up a native ruler under Portuguese protection.

RULE OF THE YA'ĀRIBAH, 1625-1744.

Under the Ya'āribah rulers who followed the Nabāhinah, and whose capital was Rustāq, the Portuguese were finally expelled from the country; and 'Omān, suddenly developing into a naval power, entered, under the auspices of the new dynasty, upon a career of piracy, aggression, and foreign conquest.

Internal affairs of 'Omān from the rise of the Ya'āribah to the expulsion of the Portuguese, 1625-50.

Effective control established over all 'Omān by the Ya'ārabi Imām.

The first of the Ya'ārabi line was Nāsir-bin-Murshid, a relative of the Rustāq chief who had opposed the Nabāhinah; he proceeded, immediately after his election to the Imamate in 1625, to reconvert that office from the shadow that it had become into a reality. In the course of a reign of more than 20 years he brought the whole of the interior, including Sharqīyah, under his effective rule.

Affairs of the Portuguese in 'Omān, 1625-50.

Position of the Portuguese at Masqat, 1625-40.

After the fall of Hormūz in 1622, a number of the Portuguese who had resided on that island removed to Masqat, bringing with them Muhammad Shāh, a nephew and namesake of the native ruler of Hormūz whom the Persians had carried into captivity; this prince the Portuguese at Masqat continued, at first, to treat as if possessed of royal dignity. By the influx of the new settlers the size and importance of the Portuguese station at Masqat were for a time increased; and Pietro della Valle, when he visited the place in 1625, found there two churches and a motley population of Portuguese, Arabs, Indians and Jews. The principal fort then was the modern Mīrāni; and at the top of the pass leading to Kalbūh the Portuguese had a rampart, defended by artillery, to prevent incursions into the town from that side. In Bātinah, where the Portuguese still retained Sohār, they were held in such execration that their merchant vessels at times dared not touch to obtain water.

In 1634 the Portuguese repaired their forts at Masqat; and about 1640 the place was deemed an "impregnable fortress." The appointment of Commandant was believed to be worth 50,000 ducats a year.

Arab attack upon Masqat and loss of Sohār, Qaryāt and Sūr by the Portuguese, 1640-48.

It was at this time, however, that the Arabs of 'Omān, encouraged by the growth of their own power, began a series of assaults upon the Portuguese which ended in the expulsion of the latter from the country. In 1640 the Imām of 'Omān, being informed by Arabs employed in the Portuguese customs house at Masqat that the garrison had been seriously reduced by the despatch of troops with a naval expedition, attacked the place; but he was repulsed with considerable loss. On the 7th of November 1643, however, Sohār was captured by the Arabs, some of the Portuguese garrison being killed and others taken prisoners; and Khor Fakkān, if it had been retained after its capture by Ruy Freire in 1623, which is doubtful, must apparently have been lost about the same time. At length, on the 16th of August 1648, a large Arab force, under the command of Sa'īd-bin-Khalīfah, commenced a regular siege of Masqat; and on the 11th of September, the ammunition of the Portuguese beginning to fail, negotiations were opened; but the demands of the Arabs were so extravagant that the besieged prolonged their defence to the uttermost and did not finally capitulate until the 31st of October, by which time the hills above Makallah had fallen into the possession of the enemy, and plague, with a mortality of 50 a day, was raging in the town. Peace was then arranged on the following terms: that the Portuguese should raze to the ground certain forts which they possessed at Matrah, Quryāt and Sūr*; that the Imām should demolish a fort which he had built at Matrah, that place for the future to be considered neutral; that 'Omāni vessels should go abroad unchecked, but should take Portuguese passes for the return voyage; that subjects of the Imām should pay no duties, either personal or commercial, on entering or leaving Masqat; that trade should be in every respect free; and that the Arabs should destroy all fortifications erected during the siege, while the Portuguese should not build anything upon the site of their demolished works. These terms clearly involved the financial ruin of the Portuguese settlement; but there was no alternative to acceptance. The Captain-General of Masqat, Dom Julião de Noronha, and the Vedor of Finances were subsequently placed under arrest by order of the King of Portugal with a view to an enquiry into their conduct; but the final result of the proceedings against them is not recorded.

* Mr. Danvers (II. 296) gives the name as "Dobar," but from another authority it appears that Sūr must be meant.

Fall of Masqat, January 1650.*

The end, after this, was not long delayed. Towards the end of 1649, Masqat being again in a state of siege, but no proper watch kept, a body of Arabs entered the town by night, killed a number of unresisting people, and invested the Portuguese Factory and also one of the forts; the Portuguese commander, being hard pressed, had retired into the fort and was thus separated from the bulk of his arms, ammunition and supplies, which, contrary to regulations, were stored in the Factory. By a vessel which arrived at Diu on the 18th of January 1650, carrying some 700 Masqat refugees, news of these events reached India, and a fleet was at once despatched to Masqat by the Viceroy of Goa; but it arrived too late. The fort had surrendered on the 23rd of January, and the Factory three days later, to a very inconsiderable force of Arabs. Some natives who fought on the Portuguese side were said to have shown great courage; but the conduct of the Portuguese Captain-General was pusillanimous, if not treacherous; and a Portuguese fleet which happened to be present in the harbour, instead of attempting to recover the town, had weighed anchor for Diu. To escape the results of an enquiry into his behaviour on this occasion, the commander of the fleet, Braz Caldeira de Mattos, subsequently fled to Cochin; he was condemned, but could not in any case have been executed, being a Cavalheiro.

Relations of Persia and England with 'Omān, 1625-50.

In 1625, as mentioned in the chapter on the General History of the Persian Gulf, the Persians, under an alleged agreement, claimed the assistance of the English, their recent allies in the capture of Hormūz, for the purpose of reducing Masqat. It was considered by the representatives at Sūrat of the East India Company that it would be inexpedient plainly to deny the obligation, but they found means of evading compliance with the Persian demand.

Internal affairs of 'Omān from the expulsion of the Portuguese to the Persian invasion, 1650-1736.

Prosperity and naval power of Omān.

The Ya'arabi era was, for the most part, one of internal peace and prosperity, during which wealth increased and learning flourished; it was remarkable also for a sudden and extraordinary development of naval

* The version of the capture of Masqat given by Hamilton in his *New Account* (I. 59-62) appears improbable, though he had it from an individual who professed to be an eye-witness.

power, which led to irregular warfare and piracy by 'Omānis, beginning about 1677. In 1695 the fleet of the Masqat Arabs, as they were then called by strangers, comprised five considerable vessels carrying 1,500 men; and in 1715 it consisted of one ship of 74 guns, of two of 60 and of one of 50, besides 18 smaller vessels carrying 32 to 12 guns, and some Trankis or rowing vessels of 8 to 4 guns,—an imposing naval force with which the officers of the Imām terrorised the shores of the Indian and Arabian oceans from Cape Comorin to the Red Sea. The 'Omānis, under Sultān-bin-Saif II, seized and temporarily occupied Bahrain about 1718; and along the Arabian coast, about the same time, the authority of the Imām extended as far to the southward as the Kuria Muria Islands.

Rise of the Hināwi and Ghāfiri political factions, 1723-28.

The Ya'ārabi period was disturbed, towards its close, by a contest for the succession that paralysed the power of the Imām abroad and gave birth to the Hināwi and Ghāfiri factions at home,—a source of anarchy which none of the later rulers of 'Omān have been able to suppress, and very few to control. Rustāq, the capital under the Ya'āribah, was seized by the adherents of a youthful pretender to power; but the rightful Imām was able to maintain himself till his death in the central district of 'Omān, not however without the help of a remarkable partisan leader, Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, of the Miyāyihah or Bani Ghāfir tribe. About the time of the true Imām's decease, in 1723, Muhammad-bin-Nāsir took Rustāq and captured the person of the claimant, in whose name he at once proceeded to act against the boy's former supporters; but among these a leader, hardly inferior to Muhammad-bin-Nāsir himself, had now arisen in the person of Khalf-bin-Mubārak, known as "the Dwarf," a Shaikh of the Bani Hina. In 1724 a request on the part of Muhammad-bin-Nāsir to be relieved of the guardianship of the young Ya'ārabi ruler was met in a strange fashion by the elders of 'Omān, who elected Muhammad personally to the Imāmship; and he, having accepted the charge and made Jabrīn in central 'Omān his headquarters, ruled for four years with much vigour. He conducted successful campaigns in almost every part of the country; reduced marauding Bedouins to order for the first time; pursued the Āl Wahībah even into the Rub'-al-Khāli desert; and had many encounters in different districts with his ubiquitous adversary Khalf, who, in the later stages of the war, made Masqat town his base and held it carefully. Muhammad's last operations were against Sohār, which had defied his authority; Khalf marched to the relief of the besieged garrison; and the final catastrophe, in 1728, was one of dramatic completeness, for both leaders were killed in a complicated action that took

place under the walls of the fort. The origin, composition, and even the names of the modern Hināwi and Ghāfiri factions are traceable to the tribal combinations formed in this war by the genius of Khalf the Hināwi and Muhammad the Ghāfiri.

Relations of the Portuguese with 'Omān, 1650-1736.

The expulsion of the Portuguese from Masqat seemed to increase rather than to diminish the enmity of the 'Omānis towards that nation; and frequent conflicts, described in the chapter on the General History of the Gulf, occurred between them, both at sea and on shore. In 1658 a strong Portuguese fleet appeared off Masqat and might, it was considered by some authorities, have destroyed the 'Omān navy and retaken the town. Between 1693 and 1699 various naval encounters took place in which the Portuguese generally had the advantage; the 'Omānis retaliated with destructive raids upon the Portuguese settlements of Kung in the Persian Gulf, Mangalore in India, and Mombāsah in East Africa; and eventually they took possession of the last named place. In 1714-19 a fresh series of naval battles occurred in Indian and Persian Gulf waters, in which the Portuguese were completely victorious.

Relations of the English with 'Omān, 1650-1736.

The dealings of the English with 'Omān during this period were generally friendly; but towards its close a partial rupture occurred in consequence of the piratical misdeeds of the Arabs.

Scheme for an English settlement at Masqat, 1659.

In 1659 the establishment of an English station and a garrison of 100 men at Masqat was seriously contemplated by the East India Company's Presidency of Sūrat, as a means of strengthening their position in the Gulf against the Dutch and Persian Governments; but the consent of the Imām to the project could not be obtained, and it come to nothing.

Loss of the "Merchant's Delight" on Masīrah Island, 1684.

About 1684 a London ship, the "Merchant's Delight," was cast away on Masīrah Island; but the Bedouins of a neighbouring camp, on a promise of receiving half the cargo and influenced by superstitious motives, treated the crew with unexpected friendliness and even

hospitality, and despatched them in Trankis or "Barks without Decks" to Masqat, along with their full share of the cargo.*

Piracies by 'Omānis on English vessels, about 1700-10.

It will be seen, on reference to the chapter on the General History of the Gulf, that after the Masqat Arabs had embarked, about 1695, on a career of piracy, they continued for a time to respect all English vessels; and when eventually, about 1700, they began to depart from this principle, they still confined their attention to the ships of private traders, which were themselves frequently piratical, and did not meddle with those of the East India Company. The Bombay authorities, notwithstanding representations in 1695 by their agents in the Persian Gulf, who feared that the Dutch might gain the good graces of the Persians by assisting them against the pirates of Masqat, decided at first to hold aloof, as no English vessel up to that time had suffered; but later, in 1704-05, when the depredations of the "Muscateers" had become general, it was resolved by the Court of the Company to undertake the suppression of 'Omāni piracy as soon as the war between England and France should be ended. In 1707 Arab pirates were said to be still exercising their vocation along the Indian coast; but after this, though no decided measures were taken by the English or any other European nation, piracy seems to have ceased,—probably in consequence of dynastic disputes and the Hināwi-Ghāfiri conflict in 'Omān.

Relations of Persia with 'Omān, 1650-1736.

During this period the relations between Persia and 'Omān were hostile. During the piratical epoch covering the last decade of the 17th and the first of the 18th century the efforts of the Arab buccaneers were chiefly directed against Persian trade and shipping, which suffered severely. Towards 1720 the 'Omānis appear to have seized some of the Persian islands in the vicinity of Bandar 'Abbās, and for a time to have retained possession of the same. A Persian force which was sent to expel them in 1720 was recalled northwards by the Afghān invasion of Persia in that year; and there is no further information in regard to the proceedings of the Arabs on the islands.

* Hamilton's *New Account*, Vol. I, pages 56-58.

Persian invasion and occupation of 'Omān, 1737-1744.

Difficulties of the Imām Saif-bin-Sultān II.

The line of the Ya'āribah had now become degenerate, and its ruin was shortly brought about by a combination of causes. The Imām Saif-bin-Sultān II, finding himself hard pressed by a competitor for the Imāmate, took a body of Balūch mercenaries* into his service; but they were soon destroyed. He then sought the assistance of the Persian sovereign, Nādir Shāh, and at the same time admitted one of his own subjects, a merchant named Ahmad-bin-Sa'īd, Āl Bū Sa'īdī, to his confidence, thereby placing himself in the power of two persons whose interests, as the event showed, were inimical to his own.

Persian invasion and occupation, 1737-38.

Nādir Shāh did not neglect the request for aid made to him by the Imām of 'Omān; but from the first it was clearly perceived, at least by the English in Persia, that the object of the Shāh was not, as he pretended, to assist the Imām to suppress rebellions among his subjects, but to annex 'Omān to Persia. The Persian expedition sailed from Bandar 'Abbās on the 1st of April 1737; it was under the command of Latīfeh Khān and consisted of about 5,000 men with 1,500 horses. The Dutch, under pressure from the Persians, contributed a ship to the armament; but the English were careful not to involve themselves in the affair. Disembarkation on the Arabian coast apparently took place at Khor Fakkān, where a small fort was built of which the remains were still visible in 1779; and the chiefs of the adjacent Rās-al-Khaimah district seem before long to have tendered their submission to the Persian general. In the course of 1737-38 the Persians overran the whole of 'Omān; captured Masqat, a place of rising importance, but not as yet the capital of the country; and besieged Sohār, where Ahmad-bin-Sa'īd, the recently promoted favourite of the Imām, held out against them with great determination. The Imām, apparently, was not altogether incapacitated for action; for in 1741, when he still possessed 9 top-sail vessels, a supposed combination between him and the Arabs of Rās-al-Khaimah with the object of seizing an island near the Persian coast and thence plundering Bandar 'Abbās greatly alarmed the Persians; and, in the same year, the Persian Government were much perturbed because an English ship had taken a navigation pass from the Imām, and because the commander of a British vessel had proposed to sell it to that potentate.

Expulsion of the Persians, 1744.

A new claimant of the Imāmate having been killed in a partially successful attempt to raise the siege of Sohār, and the Imām himself

* This seems to have been the beginning of the system, now well established in 'Omān, of relying on foreign mercenaries, especially Balūchis.

having died of a broken heart at Hazam, Ahmad-bin-Sa'id was left for a time to contend alone against the Persians in Bātinah. Ultimately however the 'Omānis, united among themselves by the excesses which the invaders everywhere committed, expelled the Persian troops from the interior of the country and even obliged them to abandon the siege of Sohār. After this Ahmad-bin-Sa'id obtained the surrender of Masqat town by a bloodless stratagem; but he completed his patriotic task—it is said—in a different manner, by inviting the whole Persian force to Barkah, where he caused them to be treacherously massacred.

IMĀM AHMAD-BIN-SA'ĪD, 1744-83.

Election of the Imām Ahmad, 1744.

In recognition, doubtless, of his services to the country by the expulsion of the Persians, the successful governor of Sohār was invested with supreme authority in the state, thus becoming the founder of the Āl Bū Sa'īdi dynasty which still governs 'Omān. His election to the Imāmate, which probably took place at Rustāq, appears to have been regularly conducted; but it is doubtful whether the suffrages of the electors were unanimous. The opposition, afterwards, of some of the Ghāfiri tribes to his rule favours a conjecture that he was carried into power chiefly by the Hināwi faction, to which his own tribe, the Āl Bū Sa'īd, belonged.

Rebellions and other events in 'Omān, 1744-83.

The reign of Ahmad, though undisturbed by the aggression of foreign powers, was chequered, to the very end, by internal and domestic troubles. These arose chiefly from the efforts of the displaced Ya'arabi family to recover their position, from the hostility of a large Ghāfiri element to the new Imām, and from the rebellious conduct of two of Ahmad's sons; and, if the sons did not carry their disloyalty so far as to endanger the common interests of the family, the Ya'arabi chiefs and the Ghāfiris, on the other hand, several times reduced the Imām to serious straits.

Contest with the Ya'āribah.

Extant accounts of the contest with the Ya'āribah are inconsistent, but it seems to have broken out almost immediately after the promotion of Ahmad to the Imāmate. The leader on the side of the Ya'āribah was one Bal'arab-bin-Himyar, a member of the former ruling family; he had his headquarters at Bizaili in Dhāhirah, and his principal supporters were Ghāfiris of the Ya'āqib, Miyāyihah, Na'im and Banī Qitab tribes. In the beginning of the campaign Bal'arab held possession of the field; but in the end he was defeated and slain by the Imām. Āfi in Wādi Ma'āwal and Farq near Nizwa are mentioned by conflicting authorities as the scene of the final overthrow of the Ya'āribah.

Rebellion in Dhāhirah and Western Hajar.

The next serious crisis which the Imām Ahmad had to face was one brought about by the intrigues of Nāsir-bin-Muhammad, a Ghāfiri chieftain of the Dhāhirah District. This crafty individual, who had been restrained by jealous neighbours from building a fort at 'Ainain in Wādi-al-Kabir, succeeded in connecting himself by marriage with the Imām and thereafter placed the valuable stronghold of Ghabbi in the hands of the latter, by whose protection he was enabled to carry out his schemes of private aggrandisement at 'Ainain. As soon as his object was secured he threw off his allegiance, raised the country against the Imām, and himself seized Ghabbi. Hilāl, the eldest son of Ahmad, was sent by his father into Wādi Banī Ghāfir and punished the Miyāyihah, who had taken a leading part in the rebellion, by the destruction of all their towers; but a subsequent advance on Ghabbi by Ahmad in person, which was made from Sohār as a base, ended in disastrous failure and in an accommodation under which, apparently, Ghabbi was retained by the Imām's treacherous brother-in-law. This incident seems to prove that forts in the interior of 'Omān were gained and lost by the Āl Bū Sa'id no less lightly in the early days of their rule than at the present time.

First revolt of the Imām's sons Saif and Sultān, 1781.

In February 1781, towards the end of Ahmad's reign, his sons Saif and Sultān revolted against his authority and took Barkah by surprise: they even put to death the Wāli and garrison who held the place in the name of the Imām. Barkah was quickly recovered by bombardment and the young rebels were pardoned, after which the Imām marched against a Ya'ārabi chief whom he had made governor of Nakhl, and whom he now suspected of having countenanced the attempt on Barkah. The Imām's attack on Nakhl, notwithstanding extensive preparations on his part, was unsuccessful and resulted in an ignominious peace; and, while his forces were employed before Nakhl, a body of Na'im and Banī Qitab raiders from Dhāhirah swooped down upon Matrah, *viâ* Wādi Samāil, and plundered the town. This was the first of a long series of

similar episodes, of which the last occurred so lately as 1895. Afterwards Hazam, where some of the Ya'ārabi family had their abode, shut its gates against the Imām; and, his artillery having proved incapable of reducing the fort, that place also was lost to him.

Second revolt of Saif and Sultān, 1781-82.

A second and more successful rebellion on the part of Saif and Sultān took place at this juncture, in December 1781. The brothers seized the forts of Jalāli and Mirāni at Masqat, and were eventually permitted to retain them, on condition that Saif should accompany his father as a hostage. This arrangement, brought about by the mediation of the Qādhis of Rustāq, lasted for one year only, at the end of which time Ahmad, having repented of the compromise, made Saif a close prisoner and prepared to bombard the forts. A fresh accommodation then took place, in accordance with which Saif was set at liberty, Ahmad was placed in possession of Fort Mirāni, and Fort Jalāli was handed over unconditionally to Saif and Sultān. In the following year, however, Saif and Sultān kidnapped their brother Sa'id at Barkah and retired with him to Fort Jalāli at Masqat; no reason for their action is suggested by the native historian, but jealousy of Sa'id, whose succession may have been desired by the Imām, possibly supplied the motive. The Imām immediately marched from Rustāq and took up a position on Masqat Island, cannonaded Fort Jalāli from Fort Mirāni and also from the open sea to eastward, and finally caused an unsuccessful assault to be made by his troops on a breach that had been opened in the western face of the besieged work. Unappeased by the accidental escape of Sa'id from the fortress, the Imām continued his operations with vigour; but, intelligence having been received of the investment of Rustāq in his absence by Ibn-Rahmah,—a chief, it would appear, of the region now known as Trucial 'Omān,—he once more forgave his sons and raised the siege.

Ibn-Rahmah did not await the Imām's return to Rustāq, but immediately withdrew to his own country.

Internal political position at the Imām Ahmad's death, 1783

The Imām Ahmad died in the end of 1783, at Rustāq, and was buried there on the west side of the fort. Before his death, perhaps even early in his reign, he had contracted a matrimonial alliance with the Ya'ārabi family, by taking to wife a daughter of the late Imām Saif-bin-Sultān. Ahmad is described as having ruled the whole of 'Omān from Ja'alān to Baraimi; but it seems that at the time of his death neither the districts of Dhāhirah and Jau, nor the important strongholds of

Nakhl and Hazam, though closely adjoining his capital, were in his possession. Masqat, even, was partly held by his rebellious sons; and it may be doubted whether his control over the rest of the country was at all complete or effectual. In Africa the port of Mombāsah, which had belonged to his predecessors in the Imāmate, was lost during his reign to a family of the Mazāri' tribe.

Relations with North-Western 'Omān, 1744-83.

The political status, in the reign of the Imām Ahmad, of the promontory that divides the Gulf of 'Omān from that of Persia is somewhat obscure. The overlordship of the Imām appears to have been at first admitted, under compulsion, by the inhabitants of that region; but according to one account, an advance against Sohār by the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah was among the earliest of the dangers which Ahmad-bin-Sa'id had to encounter after his accession; and, though the Qāsimi chief was on this occasion obliged to retire after a drawn battle at Bithnah in Wādi Hām, the Imām also lost credit by the engagement. In 1758, a combination having been formed against the Imām by Mulla 'Ali Shāh of Hormūz and the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, a Masqat fleet proceeded to Dibah, but did not, apparently, engage the enemy. In 1760 some vessels were sent by the Imam to Bandar 'Abbās to assist the Khān of Lār and the Bani Ma'in in an attack on the Arabs of Rās-al-Khaimah; but no attack was in the end made, the Khān being prevented by difficulties with Karim Khān, Vakil, of Shirāz from embarking on the expedition. As will be seen later on, there was in 1775 an alliance between the Imām of 'Omān and the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, directed against the Persians; but by 1775 it had broken down and hostilities by land had been resumed between the two Arab powers, and in 1780 there was again warfare by sea. The attack by the northern chief Ibn-Rahmah—probably Shaikh Saqar of Rās-al-Khaimah, one of whose ancestors was named Rahmah—on Rustāq in 1783 has already been noticed above.

Relations with Persia, 1744-83.

That no fresh invasion of 'Omān by the Persians took place, after the accession of Ahmad to the Imāmate, was probably due less to the

military reputation and resources of the new Imām than to the death of Nādir Shāh in 1747, and to the difficulties with which Nādir's successor, the Vakīl Karīm Khān, had to contend.

1753-67. Hostilities continued, however, between some of the local authorities in Persia and the Imām; the former watched the proceedings of the latter with much jealousy and lost no opportunity of annoying him and opposing his policy. Thus in 1753, as related in the chapter on the General History of the Gulf, the Khān of Lār took possession, with the assistance of the East India Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās on whom he did not scruple to put pressure, of a ship that had been bought by the Imām of 'Omān from 'Abdul Shaikh, the ruler of Qishm, as an addition to his navy. In 1758, as already mentioned above, the Imām was threatened by a combination between Mulla 'Alī Shāh of Hormūz and the Arab Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; and in 1760 he became a party to an alliance, of which the Persian Khān of Lār and the Bani Ma'in Arab tribe of the Persian coast were also members, against the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah; but on neither occasion, it would seem, did any actual hostilities occur. In 1765 the coffee annually exported from Masqat to Basrah was loaded, for the sake of security against the Ka'ab, who were then marauding in the Shatt-al-'Arab, on one of the Imām's men-of-war; but this ship, not venturing to proceed beyond Khārag, halted there towards the end of the year to warehouse her cargo in the Dutch settlement, and was taken along with the island, on the 1st of January 1766, by Mīr Mahanna, the piratical chieftain of Rīg. In 1767 Mīr Mahanna held up a fleet of Sūr vessels carrying coffee to Basrah and, "under the pretext of Customs and a kind of compulsory commerce, squeezed from them 380;" and in autumn of that year over 1,000 bales of coffee had collected at Masqat which, from dread of the Mīr, could not be sent up the Gulf.

1769-79. In 1769 the Vakīl Karīm Khān, whose position at Shīrāz had for some years been well established, demanded the restitution of a Persian ship that had come into the possession of the Imām, also payment by him, with arrears, of the tribute at one time rendered to Nādir Shāh. Both demands were rejected by the 'Omān Government, who replied that the ship had been lawfully purchased from Shaikh 'Abdullah of Hormūz and would not be given up; and they further argued "that," "with respect to the annual tribute paid Nādir Shāh, he was too powerful" "a tyrant to contend with, and it was therefore paid him, not as a" "tribute of right, but as a tribute it would be very impolitic to refuse" "him; Nādir Shāh however and Carem Caun, they said, were powers" "widely different; the one they dreaded, the other they rather despised;"

"the one was the conqueror of all Persia, the other only Vackeel of two"
"or three of its provinces; if, therefore, Carem Caun thought proper"
"to persist in his demands, they would answer him by cannon and ball,"
"if he made use of that kind of argument with them." The Sūr coffee fleet for Basrah was accordingly detained at Masqat by the Imām, though not until two Sūr vessels "laden with coffee and other gruff" had been captured by Persians on the voyage to Basrah; and petty hostilities at sea followed, in which the advantage generally rested with the Imām and his allies. In 1770 the Imām's fleet, carrying a considerable land force, made a demonstration against Būshehr; and in 1773 his Wāli of Masqat,* in conjunction with the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and Hormūz, destroyed two Persian gallivats belonging to Bandar 'Abbās and a Persian magazine at Lingeh. At the end of 1773 Karīm Khān had collected a naval force at Kangūn under Mīr Mihr 'Alī of Rig; it consisted of the captured British vessel "Tyger," of an old ship from Būshehr specially fitted out for the occasion, and of all the Rig and three other gallivats; but the crews could not be induced to put to sea against the Imām, and the Ka'ab of 'Arabistān, who were directed to assist, evaded compliance with the order. Eventually, in the spring of 1774, after an unsuccessful effort by the Vakīl to obtain the co-operation of the British and of the Mutasallim of Basrah in an expedition against Masqat, Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr was placed in command of the united Persian fleets and empowered to negotiate a settlement with the Imām, who now professed to desire amicable relations with Persia and even released some Persian property on which he had seized; but, as Karīm Khān on the one side would not abandon his claim for tribute, and as Ahmad, on the other hand, remained obstinate in his refusal to pay, nothing could be arranged; and the Imām ultimately announced that his fleet would proceed to Basrah as usual, relying on its own power to defend itself against Karīm Khān and every other enemy. In August 1775, when Mr. Parsons visited Masqat, the Imām's navy was lying there and at Matrah in readiness to convoy a large fleet with provisions for Basrah, which was now besieged by the Persians; the fighting force consisted of no less than 34 vessels, of which four, built at Bombay, carried 44 guns each, five were frigates of 18 to 24 guns, and the rest ketches and galliots mounting from 14 to 8 guns apiece. The Persians were still permitted to resort to Masqat for trade, though for no other purpose; but there was such a congestion of goods at the port, due to the war, that half of the merchandise lay

* This was Khalfān-bin-Muhammad, who afterwards in 1787 received the traveller Francklin at Masqat.

piled up in the streets,—unsheltered from the elements, but safe from plunder under the protection of the Imām's excellent police. It was reported that the Imām intended, in case Basrah fell, to despatch a Saiyid, accompanied by the Mughal Envoy at Masqat, to the Vakīl to solicit peace and promise payment of an annual tribute; and Karīm Khan, when Basrah was at length taken in 1776, called for a report as to the possibility of operating from thence by land against 'Omān; but no decisive step was taken upon either side. The Shaikh of Hormūz, under orders from the Vakīl, was by this time waging maritime war against the Imām, and in the summer of 1776 he seized a vessel belonging to his own subjects which was laden with merchandise from Masqat for Būshehr and Bahrain; but in November 1778 he was kidnapped by treachery, or otherwise seized, and carried off to Masqat in an 'Omāni vessel. In the following year, however, he was again at liberty. The death of Karīm Khān in 1779 destroyed, for the time being, the influence of Persia in the Persian Gulf and increased the consequence of 'Omān and the other maritime Arab states, which it left in undisputed possession of that sea.

Relations with Turkey, 1744-83.

On the occasion of the siege of Basrah by the Persians in 1775-76, an expedition was, as we have seen, prepared by the Imām for the assistance of the Turks, who had lately refused to make common cause with his enemies; and it was instrumental in retarding for a time the surrender of the town. The operations of this fleet at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab are described in the history of Turkish 'Irāq. It is stated that encouragement to withhold tribute from Persia, held out to the 'Omānis by the Turks, was one of the considerations which decided Karīm Khān to send his troops against Basrah; but the natural disposition of the 'Omāni ruler, in these circumstances, to side with the Porte appears to have been further stimulated by the promise of a Turkish subsidy. The trade of Masqat, at this time, was to a very large extent with Turkish 'Irāq, the annual visit of the 'Omāni "coffee fleet" in particular being an important event at Basrah; and in 1791 the Turks were drawn into hostilities with the Ka'ab tribe in consequence of an attack by the latter on 'Omāni vessels in the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Relations with India, 1744-83.

Diplomatic relations between 'Omān and India arose, during the reign of the Imām Ahmad, from assistance rendered by an 'Omāni delegate with a ship of war in destroying a piratical community on the Malabar coast who had interrupted the rice trade between Mangalore and Masqat. This courtesy led to the despatch, through the grateful Governor of Mangalore,* of an Envoy nominally on the part of the Mughal Emperor of India; the Envoy visited Rustāq and concluded a treaty by which the Mughal Government bound themselves to support the Imām with men and money against his enemies. This mission, which had its beginning about 1774, or perhaps 1776, terminated in 1800; but, a site in Masqat town having been allotted to the Envoy, who eventually came to be known simply as "Tipu Sultan's Wakil," he built on it a house which, at the middle of the 19th century, was still in existence and was known as the "Nawāb's House." In 1776 it was expected that the Imām, if Basrah fell, would request the good offices of the Envoy in accommodating matters between him and Persia; but it does not appear that these expectations were realised.

Relations with European powers, 1744-83.

Relations with Britain, 1774-83.

The relations of the East India Company with 'Omān, though they had not as yet any European representative in the country, were of a friendly character; but their policy with reference to the frequent difficulties between the Imām, on the one side, and the Persian Government, petty Persian chiefs and Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, on the other, was generally neutral. In 1753, as we have seen, the Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās sided with the Khān of Lār in a dispute about a Persian ship which had been sold by a Persian subject to the Imām of 'Omān; but in 1758, on the other hand, it was complained that the captain of an English ketch had hired her out to the Imām for use in a naval expedition which he contemplated against Rās-al-Khaimah. In 1763 Mr. Price, on being appointed Provisional Agent in Persia, was ordered to touch at Masqat on his way to the Gulf to obtain intelligence; and he

* At the time Tipu Sāhib, afterwards of Mysore. This was the colour given to the transaction, but it is difficult to believe that the Mughal Government of the day had really much to do with it.

was authorised to present "Sundries" worth Rs. 200 "in the Hon'ble Company's name, as a mark of their favour" to a Hindu broker named Narotam, who was their local representative and had done good service in transmitting news to India. In 1769 the Company's servants at Basrah were inclined to assist the Imām by convoying the trading vessels of his subjects to Basrah; but they refrained, partly on account of peremptory orders given them to avoid hostilities with Karim Khān and partly because they believed that Ahmad was capable of making adequate arrangements without their help. In 1769 a Mr. Boddam* from the Presidency visited Masqat without advising the Agent and Council at Basrah of his proceedings; they considered his action in this respect to be improper and suggested an apology; but the Bombay Government held that the demand was "most absurd and ridiculous, as Mr. Boddam" "was in no shape under their orders or accountable to them for his pro-" "ceedings." Mr. Boddam's visit was mentioned by the Government of 'Omān many years afterwards as the occasion on which friendly relations between themselves and the British power were instituted. In 1771 the Basrah Agency suggested an alliance with the Imām for the purpose of suppressing the pirates of Rīg and Kharag, whose proceedings they attributed to the instigation of Karīm Khān; but the proposal, which was connected with one for a British naval and military expedition on a large scale, was disapproved; the Court of the Company in London, however, indicated that during the continuance of piracy Masqat might be used as a port of rendezvous, from which "the shipping bound up the Gulph" might be escorted to its destination by British cruisers.† In 1773 the members of the British Agency, on their withdrawal from Basrah to Bombay under Mr. Moore on account of plague at the former place, remained from the 4th to the 6th of May at Masqat; and here one of their number, a Mr. Abraham, was left behind with instructions to proceed to Būshehr and thence report on the progress of affairs at Basrah. On their return to Basrah, later in the year, the Basrah Agent and his Council again put in at Masqat, where they were detained from the middle of November until the 1st of December by the necessity of repairing damage sustained by the ketch "Euphrates" through losing her rudder and driving ashore at the entrance of the harbour. In 1773 the Company were represented at Masqat by a native broker named Narāin Dās, who apparently still held office at the time of Colonel Capper's visit in 1779.

* Probably Mr. R. H. Boddam, who in 1785 was Governor of Bombay.

† The order was perhaps intended to apply to British shipping only; but Parsons, writing in 1775, states that native vessels running to and from Basrah took advantage of the British convoys.

Relations with France.

The only other European Government maintaining relations with 'Omān at this period was the French monarchy, which, through its agents at Baghdād and in the Mauritius, for a time kept up a correspondence with the Imām and sent him occasional presents of military material. In 1781, however, this amicable intercourse was interrupted in consequence of the wrongful seizure by a French privateer of the "Sālih," a 50-gun ship belonging to the Imām; nor was it resumed until several years afterwards.

General.

When the traveller Niebuhr, early in 1765, passed through Masqat, there was still no resident European, either official or non-official, at that port.

Internal administration and revenue, 1744-83.

Ahmad, though indifferently supported by his subjects on various occasions, enjoyed their respect and esteem in a high degree and left behind him a not unmerited reputation for justice and liberality. The people of Sohār, in particular, showed a steady attachment to their former governor and lent him valuable aid in more than one crisis of his affairs. Full religious liberty was allowed by Ahmad, even to Hindus; and security of the person and property of foreigners at Masqat was ensured by an efficient police.

Ahmad affected greater state than previous Imāms. He surrounded himself with a court in which not only political personages but also literati and men of the law held an honoured place; and he was a patron of poets, or at least of such poets as eulogised his character in their works.

His revenue from the customs of Masqat was estimated in 1765 at Rs. 1,00,000. Import duty in those days was determined by the national or religious status of the merchant; it was 5 per cent. *ad valorem* for Europeans, 6½ per cent. for Muhammadans, and 9 per cent. for Hindus and Jews.

The Imām also collected 6 per cent. in kind on the date harvest, which was then, as it is still, the most valuable economic asset of the country; and he was at the same time a private trader, importing slaves and ivory in his own vessels from Zanzibar and Kilwa.

Military resources of the Imām Ahmad.

The naval force of the Imām consisted, in 1765, of four large and eight small vessels; the former in time of peace were employed by their

master in the East African trade, and the latter were supposed to keep the waters of 'Omān free of pirates,—a duty which they could not effectually perform. By 1775, as we have seen, the Masqat fleet had greatly increased, and held the sea against the Persians. The Imām maintained a body-guard of African slaves for the defence of Rustāq and a mounted contingent of free Arabs for service in the open country, besides whom, on exceptional occasions, he was accustomed to import Jadgāl and other mercenaries from Makrān. The troops of the Masqat garrison were armed, at the time of Niebuhr's visit, with matchlocks, swords and daggers; and the pay of each man was four rupees a month.

Trade of Masqat under the Imām Ahmad.

The trade of Masqat with Basrah furnished cargo, about 1765, for some 50 vessels (called Trankis) per annum; and it is interesting to observe that the mariners of Sūr were already well known on account of the important part which they played in the coffee trade, *viâ* Masqat, between Yaman and Turkish 'Irāq. The removal of the British Agency from Bandar 'Abbās in 1763 was very advantageous to Masqat, which by 1775 had become the principal entrepôt of trade between the Persian Gulf, India and the Red Sea. Exports at Masqat supposed to be brought from the interior of Arabia were gums, drugs, ostrich feathers, hides and skins, honey, bees-wax and live cattle and sheep; and imports from abroad, for local consumption, were Indian piece-goods, pepper, ginger, rice, tobacco, coffee and sugar, and English cloth, cutlery and toys. The transit trade embraced all articles of commerce in the Gulf.

IMĀM SA'ĪD-BIN-AHMAD, 1783.

Sa'īd's election and virtual deposition, 1783.

Hilāl, the eldest son of Ahmad, was disqualified by blindness for the office of Imām, and the choice of the electors fell upon his next brother Sa'īd,—the same who had played an undignified and passive part in the dissensions between the late Imām and his sons Saif and Sultān. Sa'īd-bin-Ahmad was the last genuine elected Imām of 'Omān, and also the last ruler of that country to reside at Rustāq. He early became

unpopular with his subjects; and, after two unsuccessful attempts had been made to supersede him in favour of his next eldest brother Qais, he virtually abdicated in favour of his more capable son Hamad. Sa'id, in retirement at Rustáq, appears to have sunk into a lethargic state not far removed from imbecility; but up to the time of his death, which did not occur until long afterwards in the reign of Sa'íd-bin-Sultán,* he continued to enjoy the title of Imám; and on one occasion he even reappeared, for a brief space, as ruler of the country.

SAIYID HAMAD-BIN-SA'ID, 1784-92.

Events in 'Omán, 1784-92.

Hamad, in achieving his usurpation, had recourse to intrigue and deceit; but he refrained from violence, and his conduct may be excused on the ground of his father's incompetence and of the impossibility of maintaining the ascendency of the family by any other means.

The attempts made to dethrone Sa'id in favour of his brother Qais had proved the possession of popularity by the latter; but more dangerous to Hamad was the rivalry of his uncles Saif and Sultán, whose ambition had disturbed the closing years of the Imám Ahmad. Saif was soon compelled to leave the country for East Africa, whither Hamad pursued him, and he ultimately died at Lámu; but Saiyid Sultán, though he fled to Gwádar in 1784 and received a grant† of that place from the Khán of Kalát, from time to time renewed the contest upon the soil of 'Omán. On one occasion, with the support of the local Ghafiri tribes, he invaded Wádi Samáil, all but captured Hisn Samáil, and succeeded in destroying a part of Saijah. Another time, in the absence of Hamad at Rustáq, he plundered Matrah and established himself for a while at Dársait; and, in an attempt to dislodge him from that place, the Wáli of Masqat was defeated and was pursued by Sultán to the Jabru gate of Matrah. Open warfare has never been an obstacle in the Ál Bú Sa'idi family to friendly interviews between relatives engaged upon opposite sides, and meetings from time to time took place between Hamad and Sultán, each of whom had a salutary respect for the courage and duplicity of the other.

Hamad died of small-pox at Masqat in 1792 and was interred in one of the Wádis behind the town.

* Sa'íd-bin-Ahmad was still alive in 1811, but by 1821 he was dead.

† See the history of Gwádar, page 601. The title of the present Sultáns of 'Omán to Gwádar depends on this grant.

Reign and policy of Hamad, 1784-92.

So far as can be gathered from the meagre accounts of his regency that are extant, Hamad was a youth of equal moderation and spirit, and was especially diligent in strengthening the military bases of his power. By conciliatory treatment he made the Ya'ārabi governor of Nakhl his fast friend for life; with the help of the Banī Kalbān he wrested the strong fortress of Bahlah from a Shaikh of the 'Abriyīn; he fortified Ruwi, and strengthened the defences of Masqat and Barkah; and he caused a large frigate, the "Rahmāni," to be built for him at Zanzibar.* In 1790 Masqat, of which the trade and shipping continued to increase, was the richest and most flourishing port in the whole Persian Gulf region.

Removal of the capital from Rustāq to Masqat, about 1784.

But the most important measure of Hamad's reign was probably the transference of the capital from Rustāq in the interior to Masqat upon the sea coast. This was a step fraught with lasting and momentous consequences. It removed the rulers of 'Omān from a situation in which they could only maintain themselves by military and political efficiency; it placed an assured and easily collected customs revenue within their reach, enabling them to maintain a semblance of authority by bribery alone; and it eventually exposed them to the influences of a foreign civilisation which estranged them from the tribes of the interior and diminished their popularity with their subjects. Had the capital remained at Rustāq, it is possible that 'Omān might have enjoyed in the following century the benefits of a more direct and vigorous government, and that the moral decay of the ruling family might have been less rapid.

Other significant innovations.

Other political changes of importance were in progress at this time. A tendency towards hereditary sovereignty, which had already shown itself in the time of the Ya'āribah, was confirmed under the first rulers of the Āl Bū Sa'īdi line; but, though the succession was henceforth confined to one family, no exact principle of devolution was established; and the new régime, which may be described as one of imperfect heredity, soon proved to be more fertile of discord than the system of popular election that preceded it. About this time, also, there came into vogue a practice of granting appanages to the near relations of the ruler; and, as these grants generally took the form of a Waliship or local government, which the holders frequently strove to convert into an independent Shaikhdom, they conduced to the dismemberment of the country and to the paralysis of the central government.

* This vessel was destroyed by fire in Masqat harbour three days before Hamad's death. It bore the same name as an older ship, belonging to the Imām Ahmad, which had been employed against the Malabar pirates and took part in the relief of Basrah.

Relations with European powers, 1784-92.

British relations, 1784-92.

Under the reign of Hamad, the 'Omān Government continued to refuse applications which were repeatedly made to them for permission to establish a British Factory at Masqat; and in 1785 the Company were still unrepresented there, except by a native broker whose name is given as "Coja Chunder-Caun."

French relations, 1784-92.

In 1785 the port was visited by three French vessels from the Mauritius; the first, which arrived on the 22nd of August, was a man-of-war carrying 44 guns and a crew of 350 men; the other two, which came into harbour on the 25th, were of smaller size, and one of them was a merchant ship. The French remained for some days; and it was reported that they had sought leave to open a Factory, but that it had been refused by the Governor, Shaikh Khalfān, under the orders of the Imām.

SAIYID SULTĀN-BIN-AHMAD, 1792-1804.

The evil results of the changes just described above did not become apparent under Sultān, the fifth son of the Imām Ahmad, whom natural force of character now placed at the head of affairs. His rule, on the contrary, was strong; and 'Omān, which his premature ambition had frequently disturbed, became at length the gainer by his energy and resolution. The reign of Sultān may be roughly divided into two periods separated by the year 1800. The first of these was distinguished by conquests of new territory; the second was occupied by a struggle, not entirely successful, to defend the frontiers of 'Omān against the encroachments of the Wahhābis of Central Arabia and their allies the Qawāsim of the 'Omān Promontory.*

Usurpation of Sultān and dismemberment of 'Omān, 1793.

On the death of his son Hamad, the nominal Imām made a short-lived effort to assert himself; but Saiyid Sultān was not inclined to

* The Qawāsim are strictly a small family, which has furnished, during more than a century, the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah. Even at the present day, however, the name Qawāsim is sometimes used to describe all Arabs subject to the authority of the Qāsimi family; while at the beginning of the 19th century the term seems to have included all tribesmen subject to Qāsimi influence, or, in other words, all the inhabitants (except the Bani Yās) of what is now Trucial 'Omān, and possibly those of Rūs-al-Jibāl as well.

submit to Sa'id's authority and soon made himself master of Barkah and of the Masqat forts. Sultān was at first supported by his brother Qais, the holder of Sohār and Matrah, in whose interests he even professed to be acting; but the seizure of the Matrah fort by Sultān at length opened the eyes of Qais to the hollowness of his friendship. Sultān then completed his conquests by expelling from the castle of Bait-al-Falaj the last garrison that held out against him in the Masqat district. Upon the position, thus consolidated, of Sultān the united forces of Sa'id and Qais could make no impression, especially as the Ghāfiris throughout the country were favourable to Sultān, whose mother was a relative of their Tamimah or principal chief. In virtue of a family compact framed at Barkah, probably at the beginning of 1793, Sultān was invested with the chief authority in 'Omān and his irregular acquisitions were recognised, while the titular Imām was confirmed in possession of Rustāq, and Sohār was preserved to Qais. After this settlement the brothers appear to have lived in amity; and, on Sohār being threatened about 1799 by the Na'im, who were accompanied on this occasion by the Bani Qitab and a contingent of Bani Yās from Dibai, Sultān and Sa'id proceeded to the assistance of Qais and inflicted a sanguinary defeat upon the invaders at "Dabbāgh," possibly Liwa. About the same time Sultān was able effectually to chastise the Durū' Bedouins, who had been disturbing the general peace of the country. The fort of Nakhl, however, seems to have remained, throughout the reign of Sultān, in possession of a virtually independent representative of the Yā'ārabi family.

Conquests and acquisitions of Sultān on the Persian coast, 1793-94.

One of the first acts of Saiyid Sultān on his accession to power was to occupy Gwādar, where his exile had been passed under the protection of the Khān of Kalāt. Here a Wāli deputed by Sultān established a fort; and from this place the Wāli subsequently proceeded by Sultān's orders against Chahbār, which he captured by surprise and added to his master's dominions. Saiyid Sultān in person then conducted a naval expedition against the Bani Ma'in ruling Qishm and Hormūz, whom he worsted and overthrew; and a natural but historically important result of this success was the transfer, in 1794, of the revenue*

* 1794 was the year in which Āgha Muhammad Khān, Qājār, finally overthrew Lutf 'Ali Khān, Zand. The lease of Bandar 'Abbas, etc., if it was formally granted, may have been given by either of these.

lease of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, which then included Mīnāb and the islands of Qishm, Hormūz and Hanjām, from the Shaikh of the Bani Ma'in to the ruler of 'Omān. The yearly rental was probably not more at first than $4,000, the amount at which it still stood in 1821; but a surety for payment seems to have been required by the Persian Government from the Saiyid, and to have been furnished by him in the person of a Persian merchant and banker named "Haji Khelat."

Friction with Persia and Turkey, and war with the Qawāsim, 1794-1800.

The sudden appearance in the Gulf of a power so aggressive as 'Omān was under its new ruler seems to have caused widespread anxiety. In 1797 a rupture took place between 'Omān and Persia, and the Shaikh of Būshehr was directed by the Persian authorities to prepare a land force to be embarked against Masqat; but he was not, apparently, able to give effect to his instructions.

In 1798 Saiyid Sultān, who seems to have maintained that he had a pecuniary claim against the Baghdād Government in consequence of the services rendered by his father during the siege of Basrah, made peace with his constant enemy the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah and seemed about to prosecute his demands upon the Pāsha of Baghdād by force. His attitude so disturbed the Turks that they at one time sought the good offices of the British Resident at Basrah; but in the end the matter was amicably adjusted, without British intervention, between the Mutasallim of Basrah and the commodore of the Masqat coffee fleet, then at Būshehr.*

After the settlement of this dispute, Sultān, ever energetic, seems to have reopened hostilities with the Qawāsim: he had been at war with them previously during the whole of 1797. A naval attack which he made on Dibah was repelled by the Sharqiyīn and Naqbiyīn tribes, but not without severe loss to themselves. At the beginning of 1800 Sultān was still at war with the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah.

Attempted subjugation of Bahrain, 1799-1802.

War with Bahrain and seizure of Khārag, 1799.

The reduction of the Bahrain islands was, from this time onwards, the chief object of Saiyid Sultān's endeavours; but the Wahhābi difficulty, which we shall presently describe, now hampered all move-

* At the suggestion of Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, Captain Malcolm was authorised in 1799 to advise the Saiyid to maintain friendly relations with the Turks, who were in close amity with the British Government, but it does not appear what action he took in this respect.

ments on his part, and the cheme was never fully realised. The pretext for war against Bahrain seems to have been the refusal of the 'Atbi Shaikhs of those islands to pay a due which Sultān claimed the right to levy on all ships entering the Persian Gulf from the Indian Ocean; but his chief object was probably to obtain control of the most valuable pearl market in the Gulf. In 1799, under an arrangement with the Persian governor of Fārs, he proceeded to cruise against the 'Utūb and captured three of their vessels; but the only result of these operations was to throw the 'Utūb into the arms of Persia, for they now tendered their allegiance to the Shāh and even paid one year's revenue as a guarantee of sincerity and good faith to Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, the representative of the Persian Government in the matter, who had proffered his services as mediator. Sultān indemnified himself by seizing the island of Khārag, for the lease of which to himself he began to treat with the Persian Government over the head of Shaikh Nāsir, the actual farmer; but his proposals were not entertained, and in August 1800 the Shaikh re-occupied Khārag with a force of 1,500 men from the mainland.

First occupation of Bahrain, 1800-01.

In 1800 Sultān's forces made a successful descent upon Bahrain, and his young son Sālim was placed in nominal charge of the islands with headquarters in the fort of 'Arād on Muharraq Island, an experienced Wāli being attached to him as his adviser. An expedition by Sultān's forces against the town of Kuwait, where some of the 'Utūb of Bahrain had taken refuge, was not successful, unless in outward appearance; and shortly afterwards, Sālim having been besieged in 'Arād and compelled to surrender, the 'Omāni occupation of Bahrain came to an abrupt end, having lasted only a few months.

Second occupation of Bahrain, 1802.

Soon afterwards Saiyid Sultān again landed troops in Bahrain, but the Wahhābis had now undertaken to assist the 'Utūb, and this time the Saiyid was compelled to invoke the aid of the Persian Governor-General of Fārs, which after some delay he obtained. The arrival of a Persian contingent from Būshehr enabled Sultān to defeat the 'Atbi Shaikhs in the summer of 1802; but, before he had completely driven them out of the islands, the growth of the Wahhābi danger near home obliged him to suspend his active operations and, in the end, to withdraw altogether from Bahrain.

First Wahhābi invasion of 'Omān, 1800-03.

The progress of the Wahhābi power in Eastern Arabia now claims our attention.

Early proceedings of the Wahhábis in 'Omán.

In 1800, after the occupation of the Hasa and Qatif Oases by the Wahhábis, a large Wahhábi detachment, mounted on horses and camels, made their way thence by land to Baraimi on the confines of the 'Omán Sultanate; here their leader Hariq, a Nubian slave, established a fortified settlement; and here the Na'im, Bani Qitab and other tribes of Dhahirah, who were unfriendly to the central government of 'Omán, quickly identified themselves with the Wahhábi cause. Saiyid Sultán, ever prompt in action, made peace with his enemy the Qásimi Shaikh of Rás-al-Khaimah and marched, *viâ* Wádi-al-Jizi, against Baraimi; but the result of the first encounter was so unfavourable that he made a truce with Hariq and retired on Sohár. This temporary respite from hostilities at home enabled Sultán, as we have seen, to prosecute his designs against Bahrain with some measure of success; but, in that direction also, the influence of the Wahhábis, which was thrown into the scale of the 'Utúb, retarded the progress of his arms; and a fresh breach with the Wahhábi Amír, which occurred in 1803, destroyed his last hope of success in Bahrain.

Hostilities precipitated, 1803.

The immediate cause of the final rupture seems to have been the favourable reception by Sultán of overtures from the Sharífs of Makkah, who were then endeavouring to defend the Hijáz district of Western Arabia against the assaults of the Wahhábis. Early in 1803 Sultán had himself gone on pilgrimage to the Holy Cities, leaving 'Omán to be governed in his absence by his young son Sálim, assisted by a council of regency; and, though he did not himself take any active part in the hostilities between the Sharífs and the Amír, he assisted the former with money and munitions of war, and possibly also with the loan of a small armed contingent. During the absence of Sultán his nephew Badar, the son of Saif, after failing in an attempt to obtain possession of Fort Jaláli at Masqat, fled to 'Ajmán and thence to Zubárah, eventually making his way to Dara'iyah, where he associated himself closely with the Wahhábi Amír.

Naval campaign of the Wahhábis against 'Omán, 1803.

The resentment of the Wahhábi ruler at Sultán's conduct in Hijáz affairs, intensified by the aversion which he already felt for him as an Ibádhi heretic, at length broke forth in a declaration of war. As suzerain of the Qawásim of Rás-al-Khaimah and of the 'Utúb of Bahrain and Kuwait, the Wahhábi Amír now called upon them, unwilling though they were to abandon the pearl fishery for the season, to cruise against the subjects of the 'Omán Government; and they reluctantly obeyed his summons. Alarmed by a new development that seemed to threaten the future safety of their own coasts, the Persian and Turkish authorities in the Gulf at first showed a disposition to make common cause

with Saiyid Sultān; but for want of courage, or possibly of the appropriate means, their good intentions remained inoperative; and the ruler of 'Omān was left to bear the brunt of the Wahhābi's displeasure alone. Sultān quickly destroyed the war fleet of the 'Utūb; but his enemies were too numerous for him, even at sea; and he found himself unable to undertake offensive operations and at the same time protect his own coasts from ravage. A descent by a hostile squadron on the island of Qishm, then a dependency of 'Omān, which they overran and pillaged, was among the incidents of this maritime warfare.

Peace made, but violated by the Wahhābis.

At last, a mission having been sent by Sultān to Dara'iyah, a truce was concluded for three years on condition that 'Omān should pay an annual tribute of $12,000, and that a Wahhābi political agent should be allowed to reside at Masqat. The truce, however, had hardly begun, when it was violated by the Wahhābis.

Land campaign of the Wahhābis against 'Omān.

The Wahhābi troops under Hariq entered the Bātinah district, committing unspeakable atrocities as they advanced towards Masqat; and a force despatched by Saiyid Sultān for the defence of Suwaiq, which was in danger, was ambushed by them in difficult ground and almost altogether annihilated. In this emergency a national council of war was convened by Saiyid Sultān at Barkah, and it was resolved to continue the struggle against the invaders to the uttermost. The first object of the patriotic assembly was to raise the siege of Sohār, where Hariq, after his successful action near Suwaiq, had invested Qais; and Khābūrah was appointed as a place of rendezvous for the tribes of 'Omān. When, however, a large force had collected at Khābūrah and was about to march on Sohār, Hariq, who in the meanwhile had probably received intelligence of the assassination of his master 'Abdul 'Aziz at Dara'iyah, withdrew from Sohār to Baraimi; and the 'Omāni leaders, satisfied apparently with the retirement of the enemy, allowed the great tribal muster to disperse.

Relations of Saiyid Sultān with Britain, 1792-1804.

A choice of policy, more momentous even than his decision to resist the Wahhābis, was imposed on Saiyid Sultān by the strife which prevailed from 1793 to 1802 between the British and the French in eastern seas; his final decision was not taken, however, until 1798.

British affairs in 'Omān from 1792 to 1798.

British interests in 'Omān were still represented by a native broker, who in 1793 asked to be supplied with a British pass and flag for a vessel that he owned. In 1796 Lieutenant Skinner was sent to Masqat with a ship, with instructions to enquire whether there were any

Frenchmen residing at Masqat; if there were, he was authorised to offer the governor of the port from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 3,000 for the surrender of each with his papers; but, in the case of M. de Corches or of the Abbé de Beauchamp, who was stated to have been sent as French Resident to Mauritius, or of Mr. Humphries, "an Englishman of notorious character," who was to have accompanied M. de Corches, the amount might be raised to Rs. 8,000. No Frenchmen were found at Masqat, however; and Saiyid Sultan, in a friendly letter to the Governor of Bombay, denied the presence of any. In 1797 a request by the Company's broker (Narotam Ram Chandar Raoji) to be allowed to import salt into Bengal was refused, but he was granted instead a salary of Rs. 100 a month. At the same time he was instructed to present a letter from the Governor of Bombay to Saiyid Sultān and, in conjunction with the Commander of one of the Company's ships, to obtain from him an assurance that the vessels of the French, and of the Dutch who were in alliance with them against Britain, would be prevented from visiting Masqat under Arab colours,—a device to which they had begun to resort and which made impossible their capture by the British at sea.

Mission of Mehdi 'Ali Khān and First Agreement with Britain, 1798.

In 1798 the occupation of Egypt by a French army and the suspected designs of Bonaparte in the East impelled the British authorities in India to seek a closer understanding with the ruler of 'Omān, as also with the other native powers in the Gulf. In September 1798 Mīrza Mehdi 'Ali Khān, a Persian gentleman of good family who had been selected for the appointment of British Resident at Būshehr, was depatched to the Gulf in the "Panther"; he was instructed to ascertain at Masqat the real disposition of Saiyid Sultān towards the French, to endeavour to dissuade him from assisting them, and to report on the trustworthiness of the Company's broker, which had come under suspicion, in political matters; he was further to obtain, if he could, a concession for the establishment of a British Factory at Masqat; and he might promise, in case the Saiyid undertook to exclude the French from 'Omān, that a surgeon would be sent him from India. In the space of ten days, at an expenditure of only Rs. 2,820, Mirza Mehdi successfully discharged the greater part of his commission; for he obtained the execution by Saiyid Sultān, on the 12th October 1798, of a Qaulnāmeh, or written agreement, securing the main objects of British policy. By this document the ruler of 'Omān bound himself always to take the part, in international matters, of the British Government; to deny a commercial or other foothold

in his dominions to the French and Dutch nations, so long as a state of war should prevail between their Governments and the British East India Company; to dismiss from his service and expel from 'Omān an employé of French nationality; to exclude French vessels, which then made Masqat a base for privateering operations against British commerce, from the inner anchorage used by British ships, or, in case of a fracas occurring in the port, to lend active assistance to the British; and, finally, to permit the British to establish, should they wish to do so, a large fortified Factory and a sepoy garrison at the port of Bandar 'Abbās, which the Saiyid then held on lease from Persia. Dissuaded, however, by the Company's broker, he refused to permit a British Factory at Masqat, on the ground that such a concession might involve him in a war with the French and the Dutch; and, though he at first agreed to receive an English gentleman as political agent at Masqat, he subsequently withdrew his consent under the influence of the broker, who represented that constant disputes would result. Saiyid Sultān requested that his vessels in Indian ports might be supplied with wood and water free of charge, a privilege enjoyed by British vessels visiting Masqat, and that each of his ships might be allowed to discharge 5,000 maunds of salt at Calcutta instead of 1,000 maunds only, which was the maximum prescribed for ordinary Arab vessels; both of these points were referred by the Mirza to the Bombay Government for a decision. Saiyid Sultān also wrote a letter to the Governor of Bombay, acknowledging the presents which he had received, and assuring him that a vessel which he had despatched to Mauritius had been sent there only to obtain restitution, if possible, of a ship seized by the French. The removal from his post of Narotam Ram Chandar Raoji, the broker, whom the envoy represented as favourably disposed to the French and the Dutch, was ordered by the authorities at Bombay; but in the meanwhile he died. His place was given to Vishn Dās, a nominee of Mehdi 'Ali Khān, who was entertained on a salary of Rs. 100 per mensem; but this appointment also was not entirely suitable, for it was afterwards found that Vishn Dās was in the service of Saiyid Sultān.

Suspected continuance of relations and correspondence between Saiyid Sultān and the French, 1799.

In the year following the conclusion of the Agreement, facts came to notice which brought the attitude of Saiyid Sultān towards the British Government once more under suspicion; in particular it was alleged that he still employed Frenchmen in his service and exhibited a partiality for their nation; that his governor of Zanzibar had shown incivility to Commodore Blankett of the Royal Navy, who happened to call there for

supplies with a squadron of His Majesty's ships; that he had himself facilitated the transmission of presents from Tipu Sultán to the Sháh of Persia; that he had suffered the French to bring a ship belonging to Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, which they had taken, into Masqat harbour; that he had allowed a ship to carry to Mauritius a quantity of grain and sulphur taken in the "Pearl," a native vessel under British colours which had been captured by the French, the rest of the cargo being openly sold in the Masqat bazaar; and that he had received, on the 10th of November 1799, a French agent specially deputed to him from Mauritius. The doubt which these reports excited was intensified when a British man-of-war intercepted at sea a letter from Bonaparte to the ruler of 'Omán, containing an enclosure for Tipu Sultán of Mysore. This interesting document was dated Cairo, the 25th of January 1799; it informed Saiyid Sultán of the French occupation of Egypt, credited him with friendly sentiments towards France, promised protection to merchant vessels which he might send to Suez, and requested him to transmit the enclosure to Tipu Sáhib. The enclosure held out to Tipu Sáhib hopes of aid by Bonaparte in throwing off the British yoke. Whether Saiyid Sultán, subsequently to his treaty with the British, had done anything to invite such a communication it is at this distance of time impossible to determine; but the Indian Government of the day must have had substantial grounds for dissatisfaction with his conduct, for they were led to consider the propriety of withdrawing certain indulgences that had been extended to him at Indian ports,—possibly those relating to wood, water and salt for which he had petitioned in 1798.

Captain Malcolm's Mission, and Second Agreement with Britain, 1800.

At the end of 1799 Captain John Malcolm, who was then despatched by the Government of India on his first political mission to the Persian Court, was instructed "to adjust, while at Maskat, any points relating to our interests at that place" which might be recommended to his attention by the Government of Bombay; but he was not to allow negotiations with Saiyid Sultán to delay him on his way to Persia. With him sailed in the Company's ship "Intrepid" Assistant-Surgeon A. H. Bogle, who had been selected, in case matters should be satisfactorily arranged, as physician to the Saiyid and British Political Agent at Masqat; for the Saiyid had asked that an English physician might be sent to attend him. Dr. Bogle's salary was fixed at Rs. 500 a month exclusive of field allowance, which also he was to draw. Captain Malcolm, learning at Masqat that the Saiyid had gone on a cruise, landed Dr. Bogle and proceeded on his way to the Gulf, where, on the 17th of January 1800, he had the good fortune to find Saiyid

Sultān on board his ship the "Gunjava," in the anchorage between the islands of Qishm and Hanjām. On the next day, "after a short but explicit conversation," Saiyid Sultān, on whose mind the submission of the whole western coast of India to the British power—and possibly the failure of Bonaparte in Syria—had produced a deep impression, set his seal to a new Agreement which Captain Malcolm, though without definite instructions on the subject, thought it advisable to propose; this document confirmed the former treaty in its entirety and provided for the admission of a British Political Agent at Masqat, as a means of averting misunderstandings. Captain Malcolm then continued on his voyage to Būshehr, while Saiyid Sultān sent to Masqat for Dr. Bogle, who joined him at Hanjām on the 12th of February; and when the "Gunjava" returned to Masqat, on the 29th of that month, Dr. Bogle had already established himself in the Saiyid's confidence and regard and had received from Captain Malcolm written instructions to assume the position of British Political Agent at Masqat. Saiyid Sultān requested, both through Captain Malcolm and Dr. Bogle, that eight or ten European artillerymen might be sent from Bombay to replace several French employés whom he was about to discharge from his service; it does not appear, however, whether this concession was granted. Shortly before the arrival of Captain Malcolm in the Gulf the Saiyid had sought the good offices of the Bombay Government for the purpose of obtaining a ship for himself at Bombay.

Further relations of Saiyid Sultān with Britain, 1800.

In 1800 Saif-bin-Muhammad, who was acting as regent of 'Omān during the absence of the Saiyid on an expedition against the Qawāsim, wrote to Mirza Mehdi 'Ali Khān complaining that a permit given to his master by the Government of Bombay for the importation of 10,000 maunds of salt at Calcutta had been disregarded by the authorities in Bengal. The Resident in reply reminded him of the recent suspicious dealings of his Government with the French at Masqat, and advised him "to look upon the friendship and esteem of the English Government as the soul by which Muscat breathes and has its being," and to "fly the continuation of the French fraternity as you would the plague." At the same time, irritated perhaps by Captain Malcolm's supersession of himself in Persia and by the appointment of Dr. Bogle at Masqat, he suggested to the Governor of Bombay that the Saiyid should be attacked on account of his "ambiguous connection," and that a lease of Masqat to the British, which might be had for the asking, should be obtained from the Shāh of Persia; but these suggestions appear to have been ignored. The seizure of Saiyid Sultān's salt at Calcutta was subsequently shown to have been due to his having neglected to obtain p

certificate covering the consignment from the Company's broker at Masqat.

British Political Agents, 1800-03.

Dr. Bogle, the first British Agent or Resident at Masqat, died in less than a year, a victim of the Masqat climate, and was succeeded in 1801 by Captain David Seton of the Bombay Army. Ill-health obliged Captain Seton in 1802 to take a year's leave to India, but in June 1803 he returned to his post.

Repulse of a French mission in accordance with the British treaties, 1803.

The fidelity of Saiyid Sultān to his engagements with the British power was after this subjected to a severe test; but he emerged with credit from the ordeal. General de Caen, who in the spring of 1803 had been appointed by Napoleon to be Captain-General of the French possessions in the East and had received a special commission to report on the position of the British in India, now established himself in Mauritius, and thence despatched, in September 1803, a M. de Cavaignac whom Napoleon had himself invested with the quality of French Consul and Political Agent at Masqat. On the 3rd of October 1803 M. de Cavaignac reached Masqat in the French frigate "Atalanta," a well-known ship of her day. Fortune at first seemed to smile upon his enterprise, for Captain Seton had left Masqat on a cruise in the Persian Gulf and the town was full of French sympathisers, chiefly merchants and others who had commercial relations with Mauritius. While awaiting the return of Saiyid Sultān, then engaged at a distance in negotiating with the Wahhābi commander, M. de Cavaignac was made aware of the existence of the British agreements of 1798 and 1800, hitherto apparently unknown to the French; this discovery may perhaps have prepared him for the ultimate failure of his mission. On the 12th of October Saiyid Sultān arrived in his capital and immediately informed the French mission that, while he was willing to discuss commercial matters, he could not, on account of his agreements with the British, accept a French representative at Masqat, or even entertain proposals on such a subject. So decided was his attitude that no interview at all took place between him and M. de Cavaignac, and the "Atalanta," after remaining one day more in port to test the finality of his reply, vanished under cover of night.

Reasons of Saiyid Sultān's adherence to the British interest.

That Saiyid Sultān consented to enter into an exclusive arrangement with the British and that, having done so, he scrupulously regarded its obligations are facts of which the explanation is to be sought in the importance to the inhabitants of 'Omān of the Indian trade, rather than in any personal preference on the part of the ruler for Englishmen over Frenchmen. It seems to have been directly intimated to Sultān more than once, that, were he to throw in his lot with the French,

the British Government would have no alternative but to place his dominions under a commercial blockade from the side of India. The deportation of the French army from Egypt in British ships and the victories of Lord Lake over the Marāthas in India, too, were significant events which cannot but have influenced his political views.

Difficulties between Saiyid Sultān and the Government of Bombay, 1803-04.

Notwithstanding his loyal observance in difficult circumstances of an important treaty, the conduct of Saiyid Sultān at this time was regarded by the Bombay Government as unsatisfactory, chiefly in regard to the prevalence of piracy. The fact seems to have been that Sultān wished to make it a rule that every ship proceeding up the Gulf should put into Masqat and receive a safe conduct or a convoy, to protect her against pirates, from his officials there; and when ships under the British flag disregarded this condition, as they frequently did, and afterwards suffered by the misdeeds of pirates under Sultān's real or nominal jurisdiction, he was somewhat slow to inflict punishment or enforce restitution.

In particular, Sultān appears to have been held responsible for the depredations of one Nāsir, a Suwaidi or member of the Sūdān tribe, who, after forsaking his home in the Shaikhdom of Rās-al-Khaimah, had settled on the island of Hormūz, in the jurisdiction of the ruler of 'Omān, and thence had committed several piracies. On one occasion, the Suwaidi seized a botella * belonging to Mīrza Mehdi 'Ali Khān, before mentioned, while carrying British official despatches; but Saiyid Sultān in this instance obliged him to restore the boat to the owner, and himself transmitted the despatches to their destination.

Again a vessel owned by Muhammad Nabi Khān, afterwards Persian Envoy to India, was captured by the Suwaidi while navigating under British colours; and a small vessel carrying gunpowder consigned from the Bombay Arsenal to the Turkish Governor of Basrah likewise fell into his hands. On the last occasion some even of the local officials, subject to Masqat, were supposed to have shared in the plunder. Sultān was perhaps reluctant to take action in these later cases, for nothing was done by him until the Bombay Government had sent the "Duncan" with Indian troops on board to the Gulf; and, though Captain Seton accompanied him on an expedition to Hormūz which ensued, the offenders with all their property were allowed to escape to Hasa, where they joined the Wahhābis.

It was further alleged that Saiyid Sultān had allowed property looted by the people of Nakhīlu from the British ships "Hector" and "Alert," which went ashore in the summer of 1803 upon the Persian coast, to be disposed of at Masqat; and another grievance against him

* Possibly a Batil is meant.

was the purchase from the captors, by Saiyid Sultān on his own account of the British ship "Armenia" which had been taken by the French. There was also a dispute about the non-expulsion from 'Omān of a party of Frenchmen who had come from Goa to Masqat, protected, as Sultān alleged, by a British pass; but this last case must have been a weak one, for the men in question, after being seized by a British ship at Masqat and carried off to Bombay, were eventually sent back to 'Omān for disposal.

For the settlement of these difficulties Saiyid Sultān, in the beginning of 1804, sent an agent of his own to Bombay to offer explanations; and, at the same time, he invoked the mediation of Mehdi 'Ali Khān, lately British Resident at Būshehr, who enjoyed special favour with Mr. Duncan, the Governor. By these means a reconciliation seems to have been in the end effected between the ruler of 'Omān and the Government of Bombay, by whom the death of Saiyid Sultān, when it occurred a few months later, was sincerely deplored.

Relations of Saiyid Sultān with France, 1792-1804.

The nature of the connection between Saiyid Sultān's Government and France has been partially illustrated in the foregoing section, but a few facts remain to be added.

Early relations of Saiyid Sultān with the French.

It is related that Saiyid Sultān, while in rebellion against his father and besieged by him in one of the Masqat forts, succeeded in capturing a French sloop of war which put into the harbour, and was assisted by some of his French prisoners in defending his position by artillery fire. The favourable impression made on his mind by this incident was probably confirmed by the action of the French authorities in 1790, though Saiyid Sultān was not himself upon the throne at that time, in sending a small vessel to Masqat to replace the "Sālih" unjustly seized by a French privateer in the reign of Ahmad,—an act for which reparation had been frequently demanded by the Government of 'Omān.

Employment of Frenchmen by Saiyid Sultān.

The friendly relations between France and 'Omān, restored by this means, were disturbed by the French Revolution; but Saiyid Sultān, after his accession, freely availed himself of the services of individual French subjects whom chance threw in his way. Among these the best known were Maurelle, a French military surgeon, and Justaigne, a Fleming by birth, who were both cast by shipwreck, but at different times, upon the coast of 'Omān. The article in the Saiyid's Agreement relating to the dismissal of Frenchmen from his service was that which

occasioned most friction with Britain; and as late as 1801 it became necessary to remonstrate with him on the continued presence of Justaigne at Masqat.

Communication with Mauritius, 1797-98.

In 1797-98, and even later, there seems to have been constant communication between Masqat and Mauritius. In 1797 the "Lakhshmi," commanded by Captain Crouch, who was possibly an American, visited Masqat from Batavia and then sailed for Mauritius; and in 1798 it was reported by Captain Spence of the "Pearl" that there was a Frenchman at Masqat who kept two small vessels running between that port and Mauritius.

Case of the "Pearl," 1799.

The case of the "Pearl," already referred to above, is somewhat obscure; but the following seem to be the facts. On the 23rd of September 1799 a French war vessel either passed Masqat at sea, or called there and was hospitably received; she then proceeded up the Gulf in search of British shipping. On the 29th of the same month a British cruiser with a crew of only 60 or 70 men arrived from Būshehr at Masqat, took in supplies, and went in pursuit of the Frenchman. Meanwhile the French warship had apparently captured the "Pearl,"—a native vessel under the British flag, with a partly British crew, and bound for India,—on board of which were some horses belonging to Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, and some property of Mirza Mehdi 'Ali Khān, the British Resident at Būshehr. The British and French war ships seem after this to have encountered, with the result that both took fire and blew up; but the "Pearl" was brought by the French to Masqat, where Mr. Manesty's horses were bought in by the Company's broker and the rest of the cargo was disposed of as already mentioned. Mr. Cramlington, one of the officers of the ill-fated "Pearl," died at Bombay in November 1799 before full information had been obtained from him on the subject.

Dealings of Saiyid Sultān with Tipu Sāhib of Mysore, 1792-1800.

The dealings of Saiyid Sultān with Tipu Sāhib may be regarded as a branch of his relations with the French, with whom the ruler of Mysore maintained a connection. The Mysore political agency founded at Masqat in the reign of the Imām Ahmad continued to exist under Saiyid Sultān, but it was now apparently described as a "Factory"; and in 1797 it was reported that five or six vessels under Mysore colours visited the port every year. Tipu Sāhib's representatives seem to have quitted Masqat somewhat hurriedly soon after the installation of Dr. Bogle there as British Political Agent, and suffered shipwreck, it was said, on the coast of Kach in returning to India; their master, it should be remembered, was by this time dead.

Last cruise and death of Saiyid Sultān, 1804.

In 1804, on the Wahhābis renewing their efforts for the complete conquest of 'Omān, where they had now succeeded in establishing a post so near to Masqat as Barkah, Saiyid Sultān turned for aid to the British and to the Turks. At the hands of the first he met only with discouragement; from the second he received many promises but no real assistance. Thrown on his own resources Saiyid Sultān proceeded, in September 1804, to sweep the Gulf with fourteen war-vessels in search of pirates. He eventually reached Basrah, where he had an unsatisfactory interview with the representative of Turkish authority; the subsidy claimed on account of services at the siege of Basrah and the preparations for meeting the Wahhābis were probably the chief subjects of discussion. On his return homewards, near Lingeh, Saiyid Sultān left his ship, the "Gunjava," for a smaller vessel, the "Badri," in which he proposed to touch at Bāsidu or possibly to make his way through Clarence Strait to Bandar 'Abbās; but the little "Badri," when beyond reach of help from the 'Omāni fleet, was attacked at a venture by three Qāsimi war-vessels of Rās-al-Khaimah; and Sultān, shot through the head with a musket ball in the brief encounter, was buried on shore at Lingeh. This sad event took place about the middle of November 1804.

Character, administration and revenues of Saiyid Sultān.

Saiyid Sultān was a man of bold and enterprising temper; and in freedom from sensuality, and possibly also in sincerity, he was the superior of his more famous son, Saiyid Sa'īd.

Little is known of his domestic policy, but the facts which have been preserved seem to indicate that peace and prosperity prevailed in 'Omān. In 1802 the annual revenue of the Masqat customs was estimated at Rs. 3,00,000,* while the port of Suwaiq yielded Rs. 40,000. Import duty was collected at the rate of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, and a drawback of 2½ per cent. was allowed on goods re-exported. The land revenue of the country had mostly been assigned to relations or to military retainers for their support, and little of it reached the Masqat treasury. There was a valuable export of salt from the territories held on lease from Persia, which, when the salt was admitted to British India, brought in as much as Rs. 1,00,000 a year to the Government of 'Omān.

* In all probability an excessive estimate. The amount about 30 years later was placed at $100,000, and at the present time, even, it is less than $300,000.

The private property of the ruler, accumulated for the benefit of his children, consisted largely in date-plantations.

Military and naval resources of Saiyid Sultān.

The standing army of Saiyid Sultān was composed of about 300 armed slaves and 1,700 Sindi, Balūchi, and Arab mercenaries; in addition to these, however, all Arab subjects were bound to render military service in an emergency, while some enjoyed grants of revenue on condition of responding to every call to arms, and so formed a kind of militia. It was calculated that Saiyid Sultān, with the assistance of his brothers Sa'īd and Qais, could put 20,000 men in the field in 'Omān; but his means of carrying on war abroad were more restricted; and in the expedition against Bahrain in 1802 his force only amounted to 7,000 men, of whom 2,500 were Persians.

The strength of his fleet is uncertain,* but it must have been relatively powerful; for, though he could not entirely protect his long coast line against the great maritime combination which the Wahhābis raised against him, he never apparently hesitated to seek out and bring to action his enemies at sea.

Trade of 'Omān under Saiyid Sultān.

The mercantile marine of 'Omān was at this time in a most flourishing state, and trade had increased enormously in the later days of the Imām Ahmad and since his death.

Mercantile Marine.

No less than fifteen ships of 400 to 700 tons, besides three brigs, belonged in the time of Saiyid Sultān to the port of Masqat alone, while Sūr was the headquarters of a fleet of a hundred sea-going vessels of various sizes. The largest craft made voyages to Bengal, returning by Malaya and Batavia, or touching at places on the Malabar coast; and commercial intercourse was maintained by vessels of inferior capacity with the Persian Gulf, the western coasts of India, East Africa and even Abyssinia.

Foreign trade.

Foreign trade was on a scale corresponding with this large commercial navy; and it was carefully protected by the local government, who

* His flagship the "Gunjava" was a vessel of 1,000 tons, carrying 32 guns of various calibres. In 1800 he had three others rigged and armed in the European manner, each of more than 20 guns.

showed every consideration for the interests of merchants, whether natives or strangers. The import duties were not heavy, amounting to 6 or 6½ per cent. only, *ad valorem*, on merchandise of all kinds; and the custom of buying and selling for cash, which prevailed at Masqat, commended itself to European traders and was in agreeable contrast with commercial usage at some other ports in the Gulf. In the last decade of the 18th century the proportion of the trade of the Persian Gulf that passed through Masqat was about five-eighths of the whole or one crore of rupees per annum; and almost every line of business there was represented. The principal exports to India, as also to Batavia and Mauritius, were specie, pearls, sulphur, rocksalt, copper, and arsenic; those to the ports of the Red Sea were Basrah dates, pearls, Indian cloth goods and spices; and those to places in the Persian Gulf were Yaman coffee and European and Indian stuffs. The imports by European vessels from India and elsewhere were chiefly piece-goods, Indian cloth goods, sugar, spices, rice, turmeric, indigo, iron, steel, tin, lead, red lead, small cannon, cannon balls, and some coarse firearms, the last three of these articles being mainly supplied by the French. The leading import from the Red Sea was one of coffee, representing, it was supposed, half the entire produce of Yaman, and fully providing the countries of the Middle East as well as, to some extent, Russia, Germany and other European States.

Politico-commercial aims of Saiyid Sultān.

It is not perhaps wonderful that, in these circumstances, Saiyid Sultān should have claimed an exclusive right to protect navigation in the Persian Gulf, and should have wished for this purpose to make a preliminary visit to Masqat obligatory on all vessels proceeding up the Gulf: the difficulties with the British Government and with the 'Athbi rulers of Bahrain to which these pretensions gave rise have been noticed above in connection with political affairs. It was also the Saiyid's ambition to make Masqat the sole distributing centre of goods from abroad destined for sale on the western side of the Gulf; but the 'Utūb, who were the most enterprising merchants in the Gulf and who had no love for Masqat, preferred after the first to begin and end their trading voyages at Basrah,—a circumstance which secured to that port a good share of the direct wholesale trade with India and other foreign countries. Eventually Saiyid Sultān found it to his advantage to enter into close commercial relations with the Basrah authorities; and thereafter, by mutual arrangement, goods from either port were admitted into the other on payment of a reduced import duty of 3 per cent. *ad valorem*.

SAIYID BADAR-BIN-SAIF, 1804-07.*

Disorders following the death of Saiyid Sultān, 1804-05.

With the death of Saiyid Sultān stable government ceased for a time to exist in 'Omān. The two elder sons of the deceased, Sālim and Sa'id, were minors under the guardianship of Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, Jāhiri, a relative of Saiyid Sultān on his mother's side; and their succession to the Sultanate was immediately disputed by Qais, the ruler of Sohār, the most active and capable of the surviving sons of the Imām Ahmad. Qais, whose claims were favoured by Sa'id-bin-Ahmad of Rustāq, the nominal Imām, and Muhammad-bin-Ahmad of Suwaiq, his brothers, at once advanced through the Bātinah district, taking possession on the way of Khābūrah and Sīb, and laid siege to the capital.

Rise of Badar-bin-Saif and Wahhābi intervention.

The position of the young Saiyids was already precarious, when the sudden reappearance on the scene of their cousin† Badar-bin-Saif gave a new aspect to their affairs, for the personal qualities and Wahhābi connection of the returned exile, who had been summoned to their aid from Zubārah in Qatar by Saiyidah Mōzah, a daughter of the Imām Ahmad and a lady of unusual force of character, immediately caused the balance to incline against Qais. The Wahhābis having threatened Sohār, and a large contingent of Ghāfiris under Hamaid-bin-Nāsir of 'Ainain having arrived from Dhāhirah in the neighbourhood of Masqat, Qais was obliged to relinquish Matrah, which he had seized, and at first agreed to accept some small scattered additions in Bātinah to his principality of Sohār; but a few weeks later he repented of the arrangement and re-occupied Matrah, once more obliging Badar to requisition Wahhābi aid. A large Wahhābi force now proceeded towards Masqat by land; and fifteen of their vessels, manned by 'Utūb and other maritime tribes subject to Wahhābi influence, anchored in Masqat harbour and caused much alarm in the town by displaying trophies of the sack of Karbala, and by other unusual proceedings. The policy of the Wahhābis, however, was to keep the contending factions of 'Omān in a state of equipoise; and their interference resulted, on this occasion, in the retention of Matrah by Qais and in the grant to him by Badar of a salary of $1,000 a month.

* This short period has generally been treated as a part of the reign of Sa'id-bin-Sultān; but, as will appear, the supreme power was entirely in the hands of Badar till his death in 1807.

† *Vide* page 424 *ante*.

The general outcome of all these evolutions, which seem to have occupied a few weeks only, was the virtual displacement of the young sons of Sultān from power and the substitution of Badar in their place.

Policy of the Government of India, 1805.

The British Government in India, who in the reign of Saiyid Sultān had become accustomed to regard the state of 'Omān as a convenient and ever-ready instrument for the repression of piracy, were much exercised by the uncertainty of the succession at his decease, and by the possibility of the country falling under a government less serviceable than that of Saiyid Sultān to the objects of British policy in the Gulf.

Re-institution of the British Political Residency, 1806.

They accordingly re-established the British Residency at Masqat, which had been withdrawn a few months previously, and despatched Captain Seton to take charge of it; his instructions were to support the interest of the sons of Sultān, if this could be done by influence without involving the British Government in hostilities with the opposite party, but otherwise to establish friendly relations with the *de facto* ruler, and in either case to obtain recognition of the engagements of 1798 and 1800 by the eventual successor of Saiyid Sultān. Captain Seton on his arrival, probably in April, found Saiyid Badar in power and well-disposed to the British Government; and from him he obtained, in May 1805, full and satisfactory confirmation of the treaties made with his predecessor. In the time of Saiyid Sultān, however, the Political Resident had not been allowed to fly the British flag at Masqat, while the house assigned him by the native government was described as a miserable hovel; and it does not appear that any change was as yet made in either of these respects. The Government of India, in re-instituting the Masqat Residency, declared their intention of maintaining it permanently; and it was described at this time by the Government of Bombay, though apparently placed under their orders, as existing "for general purposes, and not solely or principally for the service of Bombay."

Recovery by Badar of the dependencies of 'Omān in Persia, 1805.

Expedition against Bandar 'Abbās and co-operation of the British Resident, May-July 1805.

Captain Seton, whose orders related chiefly to the suppression of piracy, a scourge now rapidly becoming intolerable, took part in a naval expedition that sailed from Masqat in May 1805 for the recovery of Bandar 'Abbās from the Bani Ma'īn Shaikhs of Qishm, by whom it had been appropriated during the confusion following the death of

Saiyid Sultān, and for the relief of Mināb, which was besieged by them. Captain Seton considered the recovery by the Saiyid of the Persian dependencies of 'Omān to be an indispensable preliminary to any successful crusade against piracy in the Gulf; and he thought it likely that, if he were not himself present, Badar might be drawn into proceedings offensive to the Persian and Wahhābi Governments. The 'Utūb under Wahhābi influence who had lately visited Masqat joined the expedition at the outset, but deserted it at an early stage of the proceedings. The operations at Bandar 'Abbās in June, and those which followed at Qishm in July, are fully related elsewhere*; here it is enough to mention that the steps taken for the recovery of the leased Persian territories were altogether successful, though they subsequently evoked a strong protest from the Shāh's ministers, but that the blockade of the Qāsimi fleet resulted, in so far as 'Omān was concerned, merely in a truce of 70 days between the Saiyid and the Qawāsim.

Saiyid Badar, in recognition of the countenance and aid lent him by Captain Seton, and perhaps in the hope of uniting British and 'Omāni interests upon the Persian coast, was willing at this time to authorise the establishment of a British factory at Bandar 'Abbās on such terms as might be desired; but the offer was declined, as the concurrence of the Persian Government was felt to be necessary.

In the following year the Saiyid succeeded in kidnapping Mulla Husain, the head of the Bani Ma'in, whom he carried off to Masqat and detained until Qishm and Hormūz should be delivered up as a ransom for his release; but Shaikh Sultān, the Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, by throwing a force into the town of Qishm, rendered compliance with these terms impossible to the Bani Ma'in. During the absence of the fleet from Masqat in 1805 Shaikh Sultān had made two piratical descents on 'Omān territory, at Sūr and Gwādar.

Internal affairs of 'Omān.

Final defeat of Qais by Badar.

On his return home Badar made ready to assume the offensive against Qais; but before his preparations were completed Qais appeared at Matrah, invested Masqat by land, and attacked the various entrances to that town in succession, but without result. The Ghāfiris (especially the tribes subject to that dangerous intriguer, the Shaikh of 'Ainain), some of the Hināwis (including apparently the Hirth under the leadership of 'Isa-bin-Sālih, father of an afterwards celebrated rebel against the rulers of 'Omān), and the titular Imām (Sa'id-bin-Ahmad) allied on this occasion to the side of Badar, who also received assistance

* *Vide* page 181 *ante* and page 638 *post*.

from the distant Banī Yās of Dibai, and eventually even from the 'Utūb; while Qais was supported, as was not unnatural, by the Banī Ma'in of Qishm and by some at least of the Qawāsim. The young Sa'id-bin-Sultān, who was at Barkah, meanwhile succeeded in capturing Sib and Bidbid, and the garrison of Masqat, encouraged by Sa'id's successes and themselves strengthened by reinforcements, were about to attack Matrah, when Qais, finding the tables turned, entered into negotiations; so unfavourable was his situation that the settlement deprived him not only of Matrah but also of all the other acquisitions, except Khābūrah, which he had made since the death of Saiyid Sultān. A subsequent attempt by Badar to recapture Khābūrah was foiled by the treachery of Hamaid-bin-Nāsir of 'Ainain, who on two occasions had received a present of $40,000 for his services against Qais; but the forts of Bahlah and Nizwa in the interior were surrendered to Badar by Muhammad-bin-Ahmad, the brother and ally of Qais.

Assassination of Badar by Sa'īd-bin-Sultān, 1807.

The power of Qais had no sooner been broken than Sa'id-bin-Sultān, now about seventeen years of age, determined to throw off the yoke of Badar, who, by the assassination some time previously of Muhannah-bin-Muhammad, the Ya'ārabi ruler of Nakhl, had deprived Sa'id and his brother of their most loyal and disinterested adherent. In 1807, Sa'id, having decoyed Badar to Barkah, caused him to be murdered near that place in circumstances of exceptional treachery; but his act, instead of meeting with the reprobation which it deserved, was generally applauded and accepted as a proof of his capacity to rule. It led moreover to a reconciliation with Qais, who now placed himself in voluntary subordination to his successful nephew.

SAIYID SA'ĪD-BIN-SULTĀN, 1807-56.

It seems to have been anticipated by the British authorities that the rule of Sa'id, begun amidst unfavourable omens, would be of short duration: 'Omān, except the sea coast, was in the hands of the Wahhābis; an exodus of the inhabitants from Masqat town had set in, prompted by want of confidence in the new government; and Makrān, with the possible exception of Gwādar, had shaken off Arab control. The event, however, falsified the expectations even of the most competent local

observers; and the reign of Sa'id, though troublous and disturbed throughout, in the end continued for half a century and is thus, probably, the longest in the whole history of 'Omān. Until his death in 1821, Sālim, the elder brother of Sa'id, was associated with him in the government; but his influence on affairs, notwithstanding the excellent relations which to the end prevailed between him and Sa'id, was imperceptible,—a circumstance of which his peculiar and unstable character seems to afford a sufficient explanation.

The reign of Sa'id is naturally divisible into two parts. During the first, which ended in 1829, he was personally occupied with the affairs of 'Omān and of the Persian Gulf, and his policy there was bold and aggressive, somewhat resembling that of his late father. During the second part of his reign, Sa'id's attention was chiefly engaged by his growing interests in East Africa, and Zanzibar became his principal residence, while his position in 'Omān, its maintenance having been abandoned to incapable regents, deteriorated rather than improved.

Hostilities with the Wahhābis and their allies the Qawāsim, 1807-20.

The accession of Sa'id was unfavourably regarded by the Wahhābis, whose schemes received a sudden check through the removal of their convert and instrument, Badar; and the Wahhābi Amir, whose arms had not as yet suffered a permanent reverse in any quarter, seems to have resolved on a serious effort for the subjugation of 'Omān. In the meanwhile, however, that potentate affected to believe the assurances of Sa'id, who shamelessly denounced his former guardian, Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, as the murderer of Badar; professed his own readiness to maintain all existing arrangements with the Wahhābi power, including payment of tribute; and promised to permit the replacement of a Wahhābi garrison which had fled from Barkah on the assassination of Badar.

Repulse of Saiyid Sa'id from Khor Fakkān, 1808.

A direct collision was accordingly postponed; but in May 1808, with the assistance of his uncle Qais and of Muhammad-bin-Matar, headman of Fuairah, Sa'id proceeded against Khor Fakkān, where Sultān-bin-Saqar, Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, had built a small fort and established a base for the piratical operations that his tribe were now conducting under the patronage of the Wahhābis. The expeditionary force, which included contingents of the Āl Wahībah, Hirth and Hajriyīn tribes, captured the fort and put the garrison to the sword; but Sultān-

bin-Saqar suddenly appeared upon the scene with a superior force and drove them to their ships with heavy loss, Qais-bin-Ahmad being among the slain. Later in the same year, the Wahhábis removed Sultán-bin-Saqar from the Shaikhship of Rás-al-Khaimah and substituted Husain-bin-'Ali, Shaikh of Rams, as governor on their part over the Qawásim; and, on the same occasion apparently, they placed a garrison of their own troops at Khor Fakkán.

Hostilities between Sa'id and the Wahhábis, 1809.

In 1809 Saiyid Sa'id, taking advantage of the absence of the Wahhábi Amir at Makkah and relying on assistance promised by the Shaikh of Búshehr, by the 'Utúb, and by a discontented section of the Qawásim, proceeded to the Gulf with an armament with the intention, it was supposed, of attacking the new Wahhábi chief of the Qawásim; but his allies failed to co-operate with him as they should have done, and he was obliged to return to Masqat without having effected anything. The Wahhábis, who still maintained a political agent at Masqat and whose religious emissaries had established a sort of inquisition in the town, now summoned Sa'id to join with the Qawásim and 'Utúb in a naval expedition against Kuwait and Basrah: and only by the stationing of the British frigate "Cornwallis" off Rás Musandam, a measure which prevented the exit of piratical expeditions against his coasts from the Persian Gulf, was the Saiyid enabled to evade compliance with their imperious demands. But the general countenance and naval support of the British Government could not save him from paying by land the penalty of his persistent, though somewhat indirect, opposition to the policy of the Wahhábis. By seizing Muhammad-bin-Násir, the same whom he had unjustly accused of the murder of Badar, and by imprisoning him until he delivered up the forts of Samail and Bidbid, Sa'id had estranged a valuable supporter; and Muhammad-bin-Násir, after securing the friendship of the Bani Ruwáhah and of Hamaid-bin-Násir of 'Ainain, betook himself to the headquarters of the Wahhábi Amir. The Amír, whose intentions in regard to 'Omán have already been mentioned, was then easily induced to despatch an expedition under Mutlaq the Mutairi, accompanied by Muhammad-bin-Násir, against 'Omán.

Anglo-'Ománi expedition against Shinás, 1809.

It was at this juncture, in 1809, that the Government of India despatched their first expedition against the Qawásim, the proceedings of which beyond the limits of the Saiyid's dominions are related* elsewhere in their proper place. Colonel Lionel Smith, the British commander, after carrying out his instructions at Rás-al-Khaimah, Lingeh and Láft, returned to Masqat, where he held a consultation with Sa'id as to the propriety of further measures. The Wahhábi general Mutlaq, who had arrived too late to assist the Qawásim in the defence of Rás-al-Khaimah,

* *Vide* page 183 *ante* and page 643 *post*.

had now captured the port of Shināṣ in Bāṭinah and placed it in charge of one Muḥammad-bin-Aḥmad. Saiyid Sa'īd, on being questioned, recommended an expedition for the recovery of Shināṣ, as also of Khor Fakkān, where he had been so disastrously defeated in the preceding year; and his suggestions were accepted. The expedition, accompanied by Saiyid Sa'id with about 2,000 men in English and French-built ships, reached Shināṣ on the 31st of December 1809. On the 1st of January 1810 they landed and entrenched themselves on the beach and were joined by the Saiyid's mounted forces, who had fought their way from Sohār; on the 2nd of January a few shells from a 10-inch mortar were thrown into the fort held by the enemy, but without much result, and recourse was had to battering. On the morning of the 3rd of January, a breach having been effected, the troops advanced to the assault; a party of Saiyid Sai'd's men, through a mistake, obtained a start of the British troops and got to the breach first, but they were strongly opposed and could not enter. The British column then forced their way in and drove the defenders into two towers of the fort, which was square with a tower at each angle; but in these towers the remains of the garrison held out, fighting with extraordinary determination, until 5-30 P.M.; when, their defences having been rendered untenable by artillery fire, they accepted quarter. Eleven persons emerged from the smaller, and upwards of 100 from the larger of the two towers, nearly all of whom were more or less maimed or bruised. The British loss, owing to the enemy having acted entirely on the defensive, was small, there being only one European killed, two officers and seven Europeans wounded and two sepoys wounded; of the enemy over 400 were believed to have been killed in the whole of the operations. The 'Omānis lost 30 or 40 men, chiefly in cavalry encounters around the place. The Saiyid, on the plea that the fort had been rendered indefensible, declined to place troops in it, and the proposed expedition against Khor Fakkān was abandoned. Meanwhile Mutlaq had arrived from Barāimi, and, on the evening of the 5th of January, the day that the British troops and Saiyid Sa'id embarked on their ships, he fell upon the 'Omāni forces remaining in the neighbourhood of Shināṣ and dispersed them with considerable slaughter; Sālim, the brother of Sa'id, and 'Azzān-bin-Qais, the ruler of Sohār, who were with the army on shore, narrowly escaped with their lives.*

* From the conflicting accounts contained in the works of Maurizi, Buckingham, Brydges, Low and the native annalist, it is difficult to understand what really happened at Shināṣ. The present writer has followed, in the main, some valuable extracts from the Regimental Records of the 65th Foot, kindly placed at his disposal by Captain T. D. Parkinson, Adjutant, 1st York and Lancaster Regiment.

Wahhábi successes, 1811.

Mutlaq, following up this success, advanced to Sohár, which he invested but was not able to take; he then passed on towards Masqat, which with Matrah and Barkah he for a time blockaded. Besides Muhammad-bin-Násir, Jábiri, he had with him Hamaid-bin-Násir of 'Ainain; and an influential Ya'árabi of Nakhl, one Málik-bin-Saif, also attached himself to the Wahhábi cause. At the beginning of 1811, in attempting to relieve Hisn Samáil which had been besieged by Muhammad-bin-Násir, Sa'íd suffered a severe defeat in Wádi Ma'áwal, losing the greater part of his mercenary force of Balúchis and Jadgáls; and Hisn Samáil shortly afterwards capitulated to the enemy. Mutlaq in the meantime had returned to his headquarters at Baraimi.

Saiyid Sa'íd assisted by Persia, 1812.

Disappointed in the hope of succour from India, to the British rulers of which he had repeatedly made application in vain, Sa'íd towards the end of 1811 despatched a mission to Shiráz under his brother Sálim. The Persians, who hated the Wahhábis on account of the atrocities committed by them at Karbala in 1802, and who perhaps thought that they saw in the embarrassment of 'Omán an opportunity of re-establishing their suzerainty over that country, agreed to assist him; and at the beginning of 1812 Sálim returned, bringing with him a force of 1,500 mounted Persians and four light guns worked by Russian deserters, the whole under the command of Sa'adi Khán, Qájar. The combined 'Ománi and Persian force recovered Nakhl and Hisn Samáil; but it was almost annihilated at Saddi in 'Omán Proper, in an attempt to capture the fort of Izki; and Hisn Samáil fell once more into the hands of the enemy.

Fearful Wahhábi invasion, 1812 or 1813.

Turki and Faisal, sons of the Wahhábi Amír Sa'úd-bin-Muhammad, had now arrived at Baraimi and relieved Mutlaq of his command; but, as they were attempting to pass through Bátinah, a successful night attack was made upon their camp by the people of Khadhra; and Mutlaq, with levies from the Dhahirah tribes, hastened to rejoin them at Hazam. Having been beaten off with loss in an attack on Barkah, the Wahhábis ravaged the outskirts of Masqat, plundered the town of Matrah and the village of Arbaq, and then swept through Eastern Hajar in a tornado of bloodshed and destruction. Hail-al-Ghaf and Tiwi suffered severely from their passage; but the inhabitants of Súr were able partially to buy off their hostility. From Súr they marched inland to Falaij-al-Mashaikh in the Ja'alán District, where they encamped. From Ja'alán they made an excursion against the coast village of Hadd, which they burned. During their stay in Ja'alán the Bani Bú 'Ali and Bani Násib became their fanatical supporters and helped them against the Bani Bú Hasan. Eventually Mutlaq returned to Baraimi by way of Izki, at which place

he was hospitably entertained on his journey by his ally Muhammad-bin-Nāṣir.

Failure of Saiyid Sa'īd's first expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1813.

But the end of the first and most dreadful period of Wahhābi tyranny was at hand. Sultān-bin-Saqar of Rās-al-Khaimah, after his deposition by the Wahhābis from the Qāsimi Shaikhdom and imprisonment at Dara'īyah, had escaped and made his way to Jiddah. He was thus brought into communication with Muhammad 'Alī of Egypt; and the Pāsha utilised his services as an envoy to the Saiyid of 'Omān, whose co-operation against the Wahhābis he was anxious to secure. Sa'īd gladly fell in with the views of Muhammad 'Alī, wrote to Tūsūn Pasha promising his assistance, and apparently undertook to restore Sultān-bin-Saqar to his Shaikhdom by force of arms; indeed his unsuccessful expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah in 1813, which was accompanied by Lieutenant Bruce, the British Resident at Būshehr, and is more fully described in another place,* had the restoration of Sultān-bin-Saqar for one of its objects.

Death of the Wahhābi Mutlaq, 1813.

As a counterblast to the new combination against himself, the Wahhābi Amīr ordered a fresh invasion of 'Omān; and Mutlaq, having assembled an overwhelming force, descended once more into the Bāṭinah district. Sa'īd, perceiving the futility of resistance upon this occasion, waited upon Mutlaq at Suwaiq, made his submission, and propitiated the Wahhābi with a gift of $40,000. Mutlaq then proceeded to Najd; but, his successor Ibn-'Azdakah having been murdered on the way to Baraimi by the Banī Yās of Dhafrah, the Wahhābi Amīr directed him to return to 'Omān without delay. On regaining Baraimi, Mutlaq, who had perhaps been reproved for treating Sa'īd with undue leniency, immediately organised an expedition and marched against the Saiyid's supporters in Sharqīyah. Here in November 1813 the redoubtable Wahhābi met his death at the hands of a party of the Hajrīyīn, being separated at the time from the bulk of his army, whom he had sent out in different directions to ravage the country of that tribe. His arms and coat-of-mail were carried as trophies to Saiyid Sa'īd at Masqat. One Ibn Mazrū' shortly after arrived at Baraimi to take the place of Mutlaq; but with the death of Sa'ūd, the Wahhābi Amīr, in 1814, all danger from the Wahhābis ceased by land. No formal peace, however, was concluded; for Sa'īd persisted in his determination to reinstate Sultān-bin-Saqar as Shaikh of the Qawāsim, a condition to which the Wahhābi would by no means consent; and 'Abdullah, the successor of Sa'ūd, continued from time to time to make use of the Qawāsim to annoy the Saiyid and his subjects by sea.

Vide page 650 *post*.

Partial failure of Saiyid Sa'id's second expedition against Ras-al-Khaimah, and continued hostilities with the Qawāsim, 1814-18.

In 1814 Sa'id, after he had preferred an unavailing request for naval and military reinforcements to the Bombay Government, proceeded for the second time against Rās-al-Khaimah; and, though he did not actually succeed in reducing the place, he compelled the inhabitants to agree to terms of peace, among which was one of abstention from piracy and maritime warfare in the seas extending from Bahrain and Kangūn in the Persian Gulf to Rās-al-Hadd and Gwādar in the Gulf of 'Omān. But the views of the Saiyid had, it would seem, undergone some change; and it was now his object to establish his own authority at Rās-al-Khaimah and to place Sultān-bin-Saqar over the Qawāsim of Shārjah only. In 1815 Sa'id again represented his need of assistance to the Bombay Government, complaining at the same time of the insolence of the Wahhābi Wakīl at Masqat and of the aggressiveness of the people of Rās-al-Khaimah; but again his overtures were doomed to failure. Before long his worst apprehensions were justified by the appearance of a piratical fleet of the Qawāsim in the Gulf of 'Omān; Matrah was threatened by these marauders; and the Saiyid, being obliged to put to sea against them in person, was wounded and very nearly captured along with his 40-gun frigate, the "Caroline," in an action fought off Quryāt. In 1816 Sa'id blockaded Rās-al-Khaimah for four months without effect, and in the following year he was defeated by a Qāsimi force on land at Khor Fakkān. After the fall of Dara'iyāh in 1818, however, the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah, alarmed at the progress of the Egyptians in Najd, besought him to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with them,—a proposal which he at once rejected.

Reduction of Rās-al-Khaimah by a British expedition, 1819.

Towards the end of 1819 the second British expedition for the suppression of piracy in the Persian Gulf proceeded from Bombay, *viā* Masqat, against Rās-al-Khaimah. The incidents and results of that short campaign are fully described elsewhere*: here we are only concerned to observe that Saiyid Sa'id personally accompanied the armament, to which he contributed two frigates and 600 men, besides a large land force that arrived too late to be of use; and that, though he obtained no extension of territory under the settlement,—a contingency which had been contemplated by the Government of Bombay,—the pacification of the Qawāsim was of great advantage to him in every way and released him finally from the fear of a dangerous enemy. It had originaly been desired by the British Government that the Egyptians should co-operate with them against the Qawāsim; but this part of the scheme did not commend itself to Sa'id, who distrusted the Egyptians,

* *Vide* page 197 *ante* and page 653 *post*.

and its abandonment through force of circumstances must have been agreeable to him.

Attempts by Sa'id to subjugate Bahrain, 1812-28.

During the earlier part of his reign the policy of Saiyid Sa'id in regard to Bahrain was the same as that of his father Sultān, who had perseveringly endeavoured to annex it to his dominions. In all, three expeditions were despatched by Sa'id against Bahrain[1]; and, though the first of these, in 1811, might be justified as a counter-attack on the Wahhābis, who were then overrunning 'Omān, the later two, in 1816 and 1828, are not susceptible of any such explanation.

First expedition against Zubārah and Bahrain, 1811.

The expedition of 1811 was facilitated if not suggested by the reduction, in consequence of the successes of the Egyptians in the Red Sea districts, of Wahhābi garrisons which had been established two years previously in Bahrain and at Zubārah on the coast of Qatar; it resulted in the destruction of Zubārah, in the capture of a number of Wahhābi officials, including the Governor of Bahrain or his brother, and in the restoration of Bahrain to the 'Utūb.

Second expedition against Bahrain, 1816.

The second expedition, in the summer of 1816, was of a different character; it was directed against the 'Utūb, was undertaken in opposition to advice tendered by the British Resident at Būshehr, and was countenanced by the Persian authorities at Shīrāz. Arab boats from Būshehr, 'Asalu and Kangūn on the Persian coast took part in the descent, which was made on the island of Muharraq; but the invaders failed to make good their footing and were eventually expelled with great loss, Hamad, a younger brother of Saiyid Sa'id, being killed in the affair. Sa'id, in accordance with a financial bargain about Bahrain which he had struck with the Government of Shīrāz, next took his fleet over to Kangūn to ship some Persian reinforcements; but, finding that treachery towards himself was intended by the Persians, he thence returned home. In 1817 Rahmah-bin-Jābir, who had taken part with Sa'id in the expedition of the previous year, a famous pirate and a bitter enemy of the 'Utūb, visited Masqat and tried to induce the Saiyid to renew his attack, but without success.

At the beginning of 1820, when his prestige had been greatly exalted by co-operation with the British in the successful attack on Rās-al-Khaimah, Sa'id appeared inclined to renew his attempts on Bahrain either in conjunction with Persia, for whose support he had

been previously negotiating, or independently upon his own account. So apprehensive was the Persian Governor-General of Shīrāz that Sa'īd might now dispense with his assistance, that he wrote to the commander of the British expedition suggesting that four or five British ships should be lent to Persia for the purpose of conveying Persian troops to Bahrain.

Third expedition against Bahrain, 1828.

The Saiyid, however, abstained from further action against Bahrain until 1828. In that year, after some months devoted to preparations, during which he firmly assured the 'Utūb that he had no designs against them, he sailed for Qishm; called at Abu Dhabi, where he was joined by the Shaikh of that place with a contingent of Bani Yās; and eventually arrived off Bahrain in the month of November. A detached fort had been taken, and he had arranged for a general assault on the town of Manāmah, when the precipitate and possibly treacherous landing of his Bani Yās auxiliaries upset his plans and brought about a premature engagement with the enemy. The 'Omānis were driven into the sea with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, the Saiyid himself receiving a slight wound and being with difficulty rescued from a worse fate by the efforts of his faithful Nubian slaves; two of his vessels also, which ran ashore in the confusion, fell into the possession of the enemy. Discouraged by this reverse, by the fear of treachery, by an outbreak of cholera on board his ships, and by unfavourable news from his possessions in East Africa, Saiyid Sa'īd decided to relinquish the enterprise and returned to Masqat.

In the following year an avenging 'Atbi squadron of seven vessels under the personal command of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad set out to cruise against the shipping of the Saiyid's subjects, but met with little success. In December 1829, peace and an informal alliance were at length concluded between the Saiyid and his adversaries the 'Utūb, a principal condition being discontinuance of the tribute which was claimed by the former.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'īd with Persia before 1829.

The embassy sent by Sa'īd to Shīrāz in 1811, the despatch of Persian troops to help him against the Wahhābis in the following year, and the doubtful assistance lent him by the Shīrāz Government in his attempts to reduce Bahrain have already received notice; but, in order to complete a review of the Saiyid's early relations with Persia, mention

must be made of certain difficulties which arose in connection with his lease of Bandar 'Abbás, and of a disagreement which occurred between him and 'Abdur Rasúl, Shaikh of Búshehr.

First attempt by Persia to annul the lease of Bandar 'Abbás, 1823.

In 1823 a covert attempt was made by the Persian Government to dispossess Sa'id of Bandar 'Abbás and its dependencies; but the Saiyid, having arrived at Bandar 'Abbás with two ships of war, entered into negotiations with the agent of the Shíráz Government and succeeded, partly by bribery and partly by promising a slightly increased tribute for two years, in retaining his valuable fief. Before leaving, however, he either seized or made away with the Hákims of Bandar 'Abbás and Mínáb, who had encouraged the designs of the Persians.

Hostilities between Saiyid Sa'id and the Shaikh of Búshehr, 1826.

In 1826, during the absence on pilgrimage at Makkah of the Shaikh of Búshehr, who had calumniated the Saiyid to the authorities at Shíráz and had tried to supplant him in a matrimonial alliance with the family of the Farmán-Farmá then governing Fárs, Sa'id declared war against his rival and succeeded in capturing a vessel belonging to him, which he immediately incorporated with his own fleet: he refrained, however, probably out of respect for the British Residency, from molesting the port of Búshehr; and he caused the merchandise belonging to third parties which had been found on the "Nasrat Sháh" to be delivered to the owners. A little later, while cruising off Qishm for the purpose, he was fortunate enough to capture Shaikh 'Abdur Rasúl himself, then on his way home from Makkah, together with two more of his ships; nor did he release him or his vessels until he had extorted from him a bond for $80,000.

Matrimonial and other connections of Saiyid Sa'id with Persia, 1827-29.

In 1827, a Persian lady, daughter of the Prince-Governor of Shíráz, and sister of Timúr Mírza and Rizá Qulí Mírza, was duly betrothed to Sa'id, who soon afterwards went in person to meet his bride at Bandar 'Abbás. In 1829, in consequence of a request from Timúr Mírza, who had just taken Búshehr, Sa'id's frigate "Muzaffar" followed the "Harriet" belonging to Shaikh 'Abdur Rasúl, from Kangún into Búshehr harbour in order to seize her there, if desired; but before the arrival of the ships a settlement had taken place on shore.

Relations of Sa'id with Turkey before 1829.

Expedition of Saiyid Sa'id against Basrah, 1826.

The only dealings which Sa'id had with the Turks arose out of the ancient subsidy granted, or said to have been granted, by the Turkish Government to the Imám Ahmad for services rendered by him at Basrah in 1775-76. The claim of the Saiyid for arrears amounted, in 1826, to $104,000. As the Pasha of Baghdád, notwithstanding representations by

the British Resident on the Saiyid's behalf, refused to treat, Sa'id in the autumn of the year blockaded Basrah, and was successful in obtaining satisfaction of his demands. In 1827 the Shaikhs of the Ka'ab solicited his help against the Turks of Basrah; but the Saiyid, on the advice of the British Resident, declined to interfere.

Internal affairs of 'Omān from 1814 to 1829.

Sohār and Nakhl acquired by Saiyid Sa'id.

The more striking events in 'Omān during the first years of Sa'id's reign were all incidents of his struggle with the Wahhābis, an account of which has already been given above, and after the death of Mutlaq the country settled down into a state of comparative quietude. In 1814, in consequence of the death on pilgrimage of 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Sohār, Sa'id obtained possession, unopposed, of that principality; but the authority of Sa'id over Nakhl, where the Ya'arabi family still exercised much influence, was not established beyond dispute until after the second expedition against Bahrain in 1816. In 1821, the year in which his elder brother Sālim died of paralysis and left him sole ruler in name as well as in fact, Sa'id confirmed his uncle Tālib-bin-Ahmad in the governorship of Rustāq; but it cannot be ascertained which of the other forts in the country were at this time in his possession or under his direct control. At some time, apparently, between 1821 and 1828, a successful raid was made by Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, Wahhābi, from Buraimi on the Hajriyīn tribe; but it was not on a serious scale, and the only object of the leader was to take private and personal vengeance for the death of his father Mutlaq. A reconciliation had now taken place between Saiyid Sa'id and Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, Jābiri; but Hamaid-bin-Nāsir of 'Ainain was still among the opponents of the Government of 'Omān.

Pilgrimage of Saiyid Sa'id to Makkah, 1824.

In 1824 the situation generally was so favourable that Sa'id was able to undertake the pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah, which he performed with great éclat, but at heavy expense. Notwithstanding his Ibādh unorthodoxy he was treated with much distinction by the Sharif of Makkah; and he was loaded at his departure with presents from the Pāsha of Egypt.

Annexation of Dhufār to Omān, 1829.

In 1829, on the murder of Muhammad-bin-'Aqīl, Shaikh of Dhufār, Sa'id sent a force and took possession of the Dhufār district.

Preoccupation of Sa'id with East African affairs, 1829-56.

We have now reached a point at which Sa'id began to find his chief pleasure in the extension and improvement of his East African dominions

and to regard the maintenance of his position in 'Omān, though that country was still the chief source of his naval and military strength, as an arduous and unpleasant duty to be delegated so far as possible to agents. With his proceedings in East Africa we are not concerned, except as they bear on the course of events in 'Omān; but a few of the principal facts may be recounted in order to show how great was the pressure of African affairs upon his personal attention. Zanzibar, it would seem, had from the first acknowledged his authority; but Mombāsah, under a line of hereditary governors belonging to the 'Omāni tribe of the Mazāri' had, since the accession of the Imām Ahmad at least, enjoyed virtual independence. To this independence Sa'id was now resolved to put an end. His earlier attempts against Mombāsah had caused the Mazāri' and their subjects to seek protection from British naval officers; and a declared British protectorate over Mombāsah even existed from 1824 to 1826, but it was withdrawn in the latter year at the instance of the Government of India, who were unwilling to thwart the projects of their ally.

First visit of Sayyid Sa'id to East Africa, 1829-30.

The difficulty arising from the British protectorate having been removed and the aspect of affairs in 'Omān being auspicious, Sa'id in December 1829 proceeded on his first voyage to East Africa. He was repulsed with heavy loss from Mombāsah, and after paying a visit to Zanzibar returned to Masqat, which he reached in May 1830.

Second visit, 1832.

In the course of his second expedition to East Africa, which lasted from spring to September of 1832, Sa'id obtained possession of the Mombāsah fort by a discreditable stratagem, and began to prepare Zanzibar for his residence by laying the foundations of a palace and starting clove and rice plantations.

Third visit, 1833-36.

His third absence from 'Omān extended from November 1833 to April 1835. It was distinguished by an unsuccessful attack on Mombāsah, which had in the meanwhile reverted to the Mazāri'; by a hollow peace with the Mombāsah chiefs; and by a rising of African natives against his authority at Siwi.

Fourth visit, 1836-39.

On the fourth occasion Sa'id left Masqat in November 1836 and did not return until September 1839. During this interval he repossessed himself by treachery of the Mombāsah fort and captured a number of his Mazrū'i rivals, whom he afterwards put to death. On this expedition to Mombāsah he was accompanied by the adventurer 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who afterwards played a large part in the affairs of Bahrain and Qatar.

Fifth visit, 1840-51.

His fifth sojourn in East Africa, which he now regarded as his home, was the longest of all, being prolonged from the autumn of 1840 into

the spring of 1851; and, but for a terrible disaster at Sîwi in 1844, in which some auxiliaries from the Persian Gulf perished along with his own Arab force, it might be described as uneventful.

Sixth visit, 1852-54.

Sa'îd again left Masqat in November 1852 on his sixth voyage to Zanzibar, where he would probably have remained to pass his declining years in peace, had not circumstances made another visit to his hereditary capital necessary.

Death of Saiyid Sa'îd, 19th October 1856

He arrived at Masqat for the last time in May 1854 and was detained there by Persian affairs until 1856. In September of that year he sailed once more for Zanzibar, but died at sea on the 19th of October, before reaching his destination. In this manner more than two-thirds of his time, after 1829, was spent by Saiyid Sa'îd either on board ship or in his African possessions.

Having anticipated the movements and personal history of the ruler, we now proceed to relate the internal events, the aggressions of the Wahhâbis and the Egyptians, and the transactions with Persia and other powers in the Gulf which characterised the second part of the reign of Sa'îd.

Internal affairs of 'Omân, 1829-56.

First rebellion in 'Omân and loss by Saiyid Sa'îd of Sohâr, etc., 1850.

When Saiyid Sa'îd first sailed for East Africa in 1829, he withdrew the garrison that only a few months previously he had thrown into Dhufâr; but the step may be taken as a symptom not so much of weakness as of indifference, when more important interests were at stake, to the fate of a district so remote. Sa'îd endeavoured to secure the peace of his dominions during his absence by imprisoning at his departure his cousin Hilâl-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ahmad, Wâli of Suwaiq, a youth whose ambition he distrusted, and by subsidising the Shaikhs of the Qawâsim and Bani Yâs; and he appointed his nephew Muhammad-bin-Sâlim to act as regent on his behalf. Scarcely had he sailed, however, when Saiyidah Jôkhah, the high-spirited sister of Hilâl, seized Suwaiq and excited a rebellion in Bâtinah with the object of procuring her brother's release; and Hamûd-bin-'Azzân-bin-Qais, at the invitation of the former subjects of his father, took possession of Sohâr, to which he quickly added Khâbûrah, Liwa and Shinâs. The regent was supported by his uncle Saiyid Tâlib, Wâli of Rustâq, by his aunt Saiyidah Môzah, who had before played an important part in the troubles that followed the death of Sultân-bin-Ahmad, and by Muhammad-bin-Nâsir, Jâbiri; but, the rebellion continuing to spread, he found himself compelled to invoke British aid and to despatch a swift vessel to recall Sa'îd. The British

Resident in the Persian Gulf, instructed by Government, prepared to support the representative of the absent ruler by every available means; a British man-of-war was sent to defend the capital, which was in danger, other vessels were held in readiness, and the leaders of the rebellion were warned to desist from their attempts to overthrow the power of Sa'id. Sa'id, on his return in May 1830, made light of the insurrection and dismissed the British cruiser; but he was foiled in his attempts to reduce Sohār, and was ultimately obliged to release Hilāl and to agree to the retention by Hamūd of Sohār, Khābūrah and Majīs in consideration of an annual tribute of $8,000. Dissatisfied with this settlement, Sa'id, after engaging the help of the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Rās-al-Khaimah, renewed his attack on Sohār; but the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, annoyed that his aid had not been sought also, kept the Rās-al-Khaimah Shaikh in play in his own territory; and, on a successful sortie being made by the defenders, the 'Ajmān Shaikh turned his arms against his employer. Sa'id then retired to Masqat utterly disgraced, having lost 400 or 500 men. Early in 1832, after entrusting his affairs in 'Omān to his nephew Muhammad-bin-Sālim, to his own eldest son Hilāl (whom he made Wāli of Masqat) and to a relation named Sa'ūd-bin-'Alī (whom he appointed Wāli of Barkah), he returned to Africa to resume his interrupted operations against Mombāsah.

Second rebellion in 'Omān and loss by Saiyid Sa'id of his possessions in Shamailiyah, 1832.

Soon after Sa'id's departure, Sa'ūd-bin-'Ali made prisoners at Barkah of his nominal coadjutors Muhammad-bin-Sālim and Hilāl who were on their way to Rustāq; he also laid siege to Masna'ah, but could not take it. Hamūd-bin-'Azzān and Hilāl-bin-Muhammad, after taking part in the ineffectual siege of Masna'ah, proceeded to beleaguer Rustāq on their own account, while the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah took possession of Dibah, Khor Fakkān and Ghallah, places on the Shamailiyah coast. Saiyidah Mōzah and Muhammad-bin-Nāsir were as before the mainstay of Sa'id's party; and the former succeeded in ransoming her nephew and grand-nephew from Sa'ūd-bin-'Ali by a payment of $8,000. The British Government also lent effectual aid, the Assistant Political Resident in the Persian Gulf being at once deputed to Masqat with a respectable naval force, and a man-of-war being stationed there as a guardship till the immediate danger was past. Sa'id, on his arrival at Masqat in September 1832, was obliged to condone the rebellion; but he succeeded in inducing Sa'ūd-bin-'Alī to exchange his Wilāyat of Barkah for that of Rustāq. The British Government turned a deaf ear to the Saiyid's requests for aid in recovering his Shamailiyah possessions from the Qawāsim, and advised him to remain at home in future and protect his hereditary dominions.

Third rebellion in 'Omân and loss by Saiyid Sa'îd of Rustâq, 1834.

But Sa'îd could not bring himself to abandon his designs on Mombâsah, which was now once more in the hands of the Mazâri'; and in November 1833, after making terms with the Wahhâbis, whose presence at Baraimi was again seriously felt, he placed his third son Thuwaini in charge of 'Omân and left for East Africa. Again his departure was the signal for a revolt, in which the leading spirit was this time Hamûd-bin-'Azzân. Hamûd seized Rustâq, of which the Wali, Sa'îd-bin-'Ali, had recently been murdered; and, the trusty Muhammad-bin-Nasir having died, the forts of Ibra Samâil and Bidbâd, of which he had been in charge, appeared to be in danger also. The British Resident in the Persian Gulf accordingly visited Masqat and wrote to Hamûd to inform him that further aggressions on his part would cause him to be regarded as an enemy of the British Government; but Hamûd, nothing daunted, partially occupied Suwaiq towards the end of 1834. He was promptly dislodged, however, by a force which Thuwaini sent from Masqat.

Fruitless endeavours of Saiyid Sa'îd to recover Sohâr and Rustâq, 1835-36.

Sa'îd, having returned from Africa in April 1835, organised an expedition against Rustâq, but it failed; and a subsequent attempt upon Sohâr was abandoned by him from personal fear of an enormous tribal levy which had been collected for his operations from the Dhâhirah district. In 1836 Sa'îd entered into an arrangement with Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the Wahhâbi, for the expulsion of Hamûd from Sohâr and Rustâq; and Sohâr was again invested, the troops of the Wahhâbi and the tribal contingents besieging it by land, while the ships of the Saiyid blockaded it by sea. The defenders, however, having suggested that the Wahhâbis in event of success might retain Sohâr for themselves, Sa'îd became suspicious of his allies and broke off the siege, which perhaps he was well-advised in doing. These two last expeditions against Sohâr are said to have cost the Saiyid not less than $300,000 in subsidies and presents.

Treaty of peace between Saiyid Sa'îd and Saiyid Hamûd of Sohâr, 1839.

During Sa'îd's fourth absence from 'Omân, between November 1836 and September 1839, Hamûd, having attained his principal objects, remained quiescent; and, as the time of the Saiyid's return approached, he even sought the good offices of the British Government as mediator between himself and his relative. As Hamûd stood well with the British authorities and had joined a federation formed under their auspices to oppose the advance of the Egyptians, the Resident was permitted to exercise good offices on his behalf; and on the 23rd of December 1839, not without difficulty, a treaty was concluded between Sa'îd and Hamûd at Masqat, by which the territorial *status quo* was

confirmed and the parties bound themselves to live in peace without jealousy or discord, Sa'id even undertaking to afford the Sohār chief military support, should such be required, against his enemies.

Eccentric behaviour thereafter of Saiyid Hamūd, 1839-49.

Whether Hamūd faithfully observed this treaty or not is uncertain: facts can be adduced in favour of either view. In 1840 Hamūd accompanied Sa'id on a cruise to Qishm and Bandar 'Abbās; but again in 1841, after the departure of Sa'id for Africa, he paid a visit to Bombay of which the object has not been satisfactorily explained and was probably hostile to Sa'id. On his return to Sohār the conduct of Hamūd was peculiar; for he placed some * Mutawwa's or religious zealots—among them the afterwards famous Sa'id-bin-Khalfān Khalili,—in charge of his principal forts, to hold them against the Wahhābis, and himself adopted a religious profession and way of life. A proposal was next circulated, perhaps without his approval, that he should be raised to the Imamate of all 'Omān. Then, a disagreement having occurred between Saif, the son of Hamūd, and the Mutawwa' party, the former succeeded in possessing himself of Sohār; but, on his opening friendly relations with Sa'id's representative Thuwaini, his father Hamūd caused him to be assassinated. The order, connection, and explanation of these events are, and must remain, obscure.

Treacherous removal of Saiyid Hamūd by the representative of Saiyid Sa'id, 1849-50.

In 1849 Saiyid Thuwaini proceeded by sea to Shinās. One of his objects was to provide for the safety of Shinās, Ghāllah and Khor Fakkān—the two latter having been at some time recovered from the Qawāsim—which were again threatened by the northern tribes; but another object also soon declared itself in the treacherous seizure at Shinās of Hamūd, whom Thuwaini suspected of hostile proceedings inconsistent with the treaty of 1839, and in an attack on Sohār. Qais, the brother of Hamūd, defended Sohār with energy and called in the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, with whose help Shinās, Ghāllah and Khor Fakkān were quickly taken; meanwhile however, in April 1850, Hamūd had died in his prison at Masqat, not without suspicion of foul play. The Government of India, who strongly reprobated the faithless conduct of Saiyid Thuwaini, sent the Political Resident in a steam-frigate to mediate, but not authoritatively, between the parties in the field; but his intervention remained without effect: letters also were written by the British authorities to Saiyid Sa'id at Zanzibar to urge his immediate return.

Recovery of Sohār by Saiyid Sa'id, 1851.

Sa'id on reaching Masqat in May 1851 approved the proceedings of Thuwaini, who in all likelihood had only obeyed his father's instructions;

* The Appendix on Religions may be consulted with reference to the Mutawwa' party and their views.

and in September, with assistance from the Shaikh of Dibai, Sa'id himself commenced a short but successful campaign against Qais. Khābūrah was taken after a two days' bombardment; Sultān-bin-Saqar, the Qāsimi Shaikh, was detached from the cause of the enemy; Shināṣ fell; and Qais surrendered. The settlement which followed transferred Sohār to Saiyid Sa'id, but it left Rustāq and Hibi in the possession of Qais, to whom also a subsidy of $200 a month was granted: thus came to an end the separate Sohār principality, or what by the British authorities had been treated as such when, in the year 1840, they concluded with its chief an anti-slavery treaty. Sa'id was now master of the whole sea coast, and his reputation in 'Omān stood higher than ever before,—a result to which his judicious political arrangements had contributed no less than the success of his military operations.

During the last visit of Sa'id to Zanzibar, 'Omān seems, apart from the inevitable turmoil caused by a return of the Wahhābis upon the stage, to have remained fairly quiet.

Aggressions of the Wahhābis and Egyptians, 1829-56.

The dangers which threatened 'Omān from the side of Najd during the later part of Sa'id's reign are so little connected with the course of local affairs just related as to be capable of separate consideration; their appearance and disappearance were regulated chiefly by the crises through which the Wahhābi kingdom itself passed during this period.

Tribute from 'Omān to the Wahhābis fixed at $5,000 in 1833.

By 1830 the power of the Wahhābis, temporarily crushed at its centre in 1818, had revived to a considerable extent in Eastern Arabia; and in 1833 their pressure was felt once more on the frontiers of 'Omān. The British Government in India, who admitted no responsibility for the defence of the Saiyid's dominions by land, having approved his intention of entering into a friendly understanding with the Wahhābi Amir, a compact was formed between the Saiyid and the Wahhābis under which the limits of direct government of the contracting powers were defined and Sa'id undertook to pay $5,000 a year as Zakāt to the ruler of Najd. A further stipulation by which each party was bound to assist in suppressing rebellion in the dominions of the other was deemed imprudent by the British authorities, especially in view of the hostile relations existing between the Wahhābis and the Pāsha of Egypt; but Sa'id assured them that the observance of this article would be regulated, on his part, by a strict regard for the wishes of the British Government. The arrange-

ment just described appears to have been negotiated with the Wahhábi general Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq by Saiyid Sa'id immediately before his third expedition to East Africa, but there is nothing to show how long the tribute promised continued to be paid. The abortive combination formed by Sa'id and the Wahhábis in 1836 for the purpose of expelling Hamúd-bin-'Azzán from Sohár and Rustáq has already been noticed under the head of internal affairs.

'Omán threatened by Egypt, 1839-40.

In 1839 the Egyptians occupied the position in Central Arabia from which they had ousted the Wahhábis; but they continued the domineering policy of their predecessors towards 'Omán, and they even made use of the same local agents, namely Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq and Bin-Battál. Sa'id, in order to promote his designs on Bahrain, which he had never abandoned, was disposed at first to conform his policy to that of Muhammad 'Ali, Pásha of Egypt; but, on becoming aware of the anti-Egyptian sentiments of the British Government in what concerned Eastern Arabia, he associated himself with their views, underwent the reconciliation already mentioned with his kinsman Hamúd of Sohár, who was a consistent opponent of Egyptian influence, and disregarded a peremptory demand made on him for assistance by Khurshid Pásha, the Egyptian Commander in Najd. Such correspondence with the Egyptian authorities as he could not avoid he carried on henceforward with the cognisance and approval of the British Government. The danger to 'Omán from the Egyptians ceased only on the withdrawal of the latter from Najd in 1840.

Wahhábi aggression renewed, 1845.

At the beginning of 1845, during Sa'id's longest absence from 'Omán, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq appeared once more at Baraimi in his original and familiar character of Wahhábi agent, captured Majis, and demanded tribute of Sa'id's representative (Saiyid Thuwaini) and of Hamúd (the Sohár chief) at the rate of $20,000 and $5,000 per annum respectively. Hamúd was ready to appeal to arms, but Thuwaini preferred to temporise; and a truce was patched up on the understanding that $5,000 down should be paid on account of Sohár, while the rest of the demand was referred to Saiyid Sa'id at Zanzibar. This arrangement was in consonance with the advice of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, who on the first appearance of danger had counselled Thuwaini to comply with the Wahhábi demands, provided they were not excessive or humiliating, and in the opposite case to threaten a reference to the British Government. Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq soon violated the truce by permitting a raid on Barkah, and began to collect a huge levy of tribesmen, largely Bani Qitab, for an attack of Masqat: in this emergency the British Resident

in the Gulf addressed a stringent protest to the Amīr, enjoined Sa'ad to await his master's orders, and sent British war-vessels to cruise upon the Bātinah coast. These steps caused the Wahhābi to abate his demands; he agreed to accept, exclusive of an initial present of $2,000, an annual tribute of $5,000 a year which Thuwaini under his father's instructions was willing to pay; and the Wahhābi expedition was then broken up, and Majīs restored to the ruler of 'Omān. The prestige of the Wahhābis seems to have suffered by this settlement, for we now find a number of local chiefs and tribes—particularly the Yāl Sa'ad—arming against them; and their messengers in Bātinah were after this frequently detained and otherwise treated with contumely.

Tribute from 'Omān to the Wahhābis enhanced to $12,000 in 1853.

At the end of 1852 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, the son of the Wahhābi Amīr, arrived at Baraimi with a commission to extend and enforce the authority of his father's Government. Taking advantage of the recent expulsion of Qais-bin-'Azzān from Sohār, he required the cession of that district by Saiyid Sa'id, and demanded an increase of tribute so great as to make it apparent that what he really wished was a pretext for declaring war. The British Resident in the Gulf, who had meanwhile reached the coast of Trucial 'Omān upon a different errand, at once applied himself to counteracting the influence and prestige of the Wahhābis, and at the same time encouraged the regent Thuwaini to resistance by a promise to assist him, if need be, in the defence of his capital: his attitude emboldened Saiyid Thuwaini to proceed to Sohār, which he placed in a state of defence. The Wahhābis then abandoned their design of attacking Bātinah, and a compromise was arranged under which the frontiers of 'Omān remained intact, but the yearly tribute payable to the Wahhābis was increased from $5,000 to $12,000; simultaneously an offensive and defensive alliance was established between the signatories, the Wahhābis in particular undertaking to assist the regent Thuwaini in case of internal difficulties. In the next year, the tribes of Bātinah having withheld their contributions and payment of the stipulated tribute being consequently impossible, Thuwaini called upon 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal for the aid guaranteed by the recent treaty; it was afforded, though not without reluctance; and at the end of 1853 the refractory tribes had been coerced and amity still prevailed between the Government of 'Omān and the Wahhābi power. Ahmad the Sadairi, whom the Wahhābis now placed in charge of Baraimi, seems about this time to have undertaken a tour in 'Omān Proper, where he probably wrung fresh contributions from the inhabitants, irrespective of the tribute already paid for the whole country by the ruler of 'Omān.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with Persia after 1829.

The connections of Sa'id with Persia during the later part of his reign were at first not unsatisfactory; but towards the end his influence and position in that country were suddenly and irretrievably destroyed.

Renewed friction between Saiyid Sa'id and the Persians at Bûshehr, 1830-31, 1839, and 1846-48.

In 1830 and 1831, contentions again prevailing at Bûshehr between Shaikh 'Abdur Rasûl and Timûr Mirza, Saiyid Sa'id was much inclined to send ships to the assistance of the latter, who was his brother-in-law; but he finally allowed himself to be dissuaded by the Resident at Bûshehr and by the Governor of Bombay from embroiling himself in the internal affairs of Persia. In 1839, conceiving himself to be insulted by the murder—at the hands of a rival chief—of Jamâl Khân, a candidate for the Governorship of Bûshehr whom he had employed as his agent in arranging a fresh matrimonial alliance between himself and the royal family of Persia, Sa'id was disposed to adopt extreme measures against the port of Bûshehr; but eventually, under British advice, he contented himself with making a respectful reference to the Shâh, and received in reply an assurance that the murderer should be suitably punished. In 1840 Saiyid Sa'id visited Hormûz and Qishm on a tour of inspection.

Second attempt by Persia to resume the Bandar 'Abbas fief, 1846-48.

In 1845 and 1846 the relations of Saiyid Sa'id with Persia were again strained. The trouble originated in the ill-treatment of a Masqat merchant at Bûshehr and in the seizure at that place of some chests of indigo which were the property of Muhammad-bin-Sâlim, the nephew of Sa'id; and it was shortly aggravated by the advance, under instructions from the Governor-General of Fârs, of a Persian army against the Saiyid's fief of Bandar 'Abbâs, where an attempt was made to extort a large payment from Saif-bin-Nabhân, the 'Omâni Governor. Saiyid Sa'id, being superior to the Persians at sea, was inclined to retaliate by blockading or even attacking Bûshehr, and the Persian authorities were considerably alarmed by his attitude, especially Shaikh Nâsir of Bûshehr who feared the loss of Khârag Island; nevertheless they continued to temporise, and eventually Minâb, one of the chief places in the Saiyid's rented possessions, was invested by a Persian force under Fazal 'Ali Khân, Governor of Kirmân. Saif-bin-Nabhân would at this juncture have declared a blockade of the Persian coast in his master's name, but a stringent prohibition by the British Resident at Bûshehr deterred him, and he resorted instead to payments, or

promises of payment, which had the effect of causing Fazal 'Alī Khān to withdraw his troops. In 1847 Saiyid Sa'īd received a second Persian princess in marriage, a grand-daughter of Fath 'Alī Shāh; but the match had no political significance or value, and he continued to demand in vain reparation for the indignities which he had suffered. British intervention also failed for a time to procure redress; but in 1848, when the British authorities were on the point of withdrawing their objection to his employing naval force, the unfriendly sovereign of Persia died, British influence at Tehrān revived, and a settlement was reached. The offender Fazal 'Alī Khān was removed from his post.

Renewal of the Bandar 'Abbās lease to Saiyid Sa'īd on unfavourable terms and at an increased rental, 1856.

During the last absence of Saiyid Sa'īd at Zanzibar between 1852 and 1854, the Persians, probably encouraged by the difficulties to which the Wahhabis at Baraimi had reduced the 'Omān regency, renewed their efforts to terminate the 'Omāni occupation of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies; and they succeeded in expelling Saif-bin-Nabhān, whom Sa'īd on his return from East Africa found residing at Masqat and treated with coldness,—apparently from a belief that the catastrophe had been partly due to his mismanagement. The Saiyid shortly after despatched against Bandar 'Abbās a large expedition, composed chiefly of Arabs from Sharqiyah and 'Omān Proper, under the command of his son Thuwaini, and the lost districts were temporarily recovered; but they could not be held against the ever-increasing numbers of the Persians, and Saiyid Thuwaini was eventually driven to his ships, while many of his force fell in the hands of the enemy and were carried as prisoners to Shirāz. The Bani Yās of Trucial 'Omān would apparently have made common cause with the Saiyid on this occasion; but the British authorities, fearing that this might bring the Qawāsim into action on the opposite side, forbade them to cross the Gulf to his assistance. The lease of Bandar 'Abbās to Sa'īd was renewed * by a Persian edict in 1855, and by a formal treaty on the 17th November 1856. The districts of Shamil, Mināb and Biyābān, and the islands of Qishm and Hormūz, were specified as included in the lease; but the sovereign rights of Persia over all these places were now clearly asserted and admitted, and the annual rental—in 1821 only $4,000—was increased from $6,000 to $14,000 Tūmāns, including an honorarium of 2,000 Tūmāns. The new arrangement was made in favour of Sa'īd and his † sons only, and was

* See Aitchison's Treaties, 3rd edition, Appendices 45 and 28.

† Or descendants ("Aulād"). The Government of India, in discussing the question in 1868, inclined to the view that the term included "any Ruler directly descended from the loins of the then Imām."

declared terminable at the option of Persia after twenty years, or on the accession of a usurper to the throne of 'Omân; and it contained various stipulations, favourable to Persia, which are mentioned * in the history of the Persian Coast and islands. The general effect of the arrangement was to transfer the position of the Saiyid at Bandar 'Abbâs from a basis of right to one of sufferance, and it was necessarily very damaging to his prestige.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with other native powers in the Gulf after 1829.

Renewed designs of Saiyid Sa'id on Bahrain, 1829-43.

The demands of East Africa on his attention and resources and the absorption of what remained of these by difficulties with the Wahhâbis and the Persians left Sa'id with no power to prosecute an active policy in any other direction. Of relations with Turkey nothing is heard; nor did Sa'id manifest any interest in places upon the Arabian coast of the Gulf, except only Bahrain, to the affairs of which he showed himself not entirely indifferent.

In 1830 the Saiyid appeared to be negotiating with the Wahhâbi Amîr for the transfer of the islands of Bahrain to himself as a fief; but his endeavours were frustrated by a settlement which his own attitude enabled the Wahhâbis to extort from the 'Utûb. In 1835 Sa'id performed a friendly service to the ruling 'Athbi family of Bahrain by sending his son Hilâl to compose their domestic differences; but the desired object was not attained. In 1839 Saiyid Sa'id seems to have entered into negotiations with Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt for the conferment of the Bahrain islands on himself, to be held by him under the suzerainty of the Egyptians. The incompatibility of British and Egyptian policy constrained him in the same year to abandon this scheme, but he immediately proposed another by which he should seize and occupy the Bahrain islands in the interests of the British Government and in opposition to the Egyptians; the suggestion, however, did not commend itself to the British authorities. In 1843, civil war then raging in Bahrain, Saiyid Thuwaini in his father's absence was invited by certain interested parties to annex the islands, and in reply sent provisional

* *Vide* page 2045 *post*.

assistance to his well-wishers in the shape of military stores; and Saiyid Sa'id himself afterwards pressed for the approval by the Government of India of an effort at annexation. It was withheld, however, chiefly in view of the unlikelihood of success and of the probability of offence being caused to the Wahhābis and Persians, and the enterprise remained unattempted.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with Britain after 1809.

Early preference of Saiyid Sa'id for a French alliance.

Saiyid Sa'id, notwithstanding the presence of a British political representative at Masqat, showed a disposition, when he first came to power, to depart from the policy of his father Saiyid Sultān and to range himself on the side of the French in the struggle which was still proceeding. The pessimistic view taken by the British Resident, at the time, of Sa'id's prospects in 'Omān may have afforded some just cause for resentment on the Saiyid's part; but it is difficult to understand why the Indian Government, unless they were in ignorance of the facts, did not at once protest effectively against certain of his proceedings which were incompatible with the Agreements of 1798 and 1800. In June 1807 a treaty was concluded at Mauritius between the French Captain-General de Caen and an envoy from Sa'id, for which, in the following year, a revised treaty was substituted. A French Consular Agent, M. Dallens, was about the same time sent to reside at Masqat, where he remained at least until 1810, and French influence became for a short time predominant in the Saiyid's councils. These events took place notwithstanding a warning delivered at Masqat at the end of April 1808 by General John Malcolm, then on his second mission to Persia. In 1810, however, the capture by the British of Mauritius and Réunion—retarded, it is said, by the complaisance of Saiyid Sa'id in throwing supplies into those places by means of his own ships—destroyed for a time the power and prestige of the French in East African and Arabian waters; and during the next five years their flag and influence were excluded from the countries bordering the Indian Ocean,—a state of matters which compelled Sa'id to seek a good understanding with Britain.

Rās-al-Khaimah expeditions of 1809 and 1819.

Even before French influence had been finally dissipated, a rapprochement, due to the depredations of the Qāsimi pirates upon British and 'Omāni commerce alike, had begun between Sa'id and the Government of

India; and we have already seen how in 1809 the Indian Government associated the Saiyid with themselves in their first decided effort to extirpate the buccaneers of the Persian Gulf and, indirectly, to intimidate the Wahhábis. From the time of the first Rás-al-Khaimah expedition onwards, Britain was the only European Power interested in the Saiyid's Arabian and Persian affairs: the transactions of the ruler of 'Omán with other great nations related almost exclusively to his African possessions. The policy of the British Indian Government towards 'Omán from 1810 to 1818 was, as our relation of events has shown, friendly yet, in what concerned the Wahhábi power, reserved; and in 1826, a discussion of the point having been raised by Saiyid Sa'íd, it was expressly held by the Government of India that the treaties of 1798 and 1800, while they implied strict friendship, did not constitute an offensive and defensive alliance against all enemies between the states of Great Britain and 'Omán. The Saiyid was not assisted by Britain to repel the frightful incursions which the Wahhábis made on his territories between 1810 and 1813 in retaliation for the part he had taken in the expedition against Rás-al-Khaimah; nor was he encouraged in his attempts, from 1814 to 1816, to restore an anti-Wahhábi chief to authority over the Qawásim. In 1819, however, during a temporary eclipse of the Wahhábi power, the Government of India launched their second and very successful expedition against the piratical Qawásim; and no one reaped greater or most lasting benefit from the operations than the Saiyid, who was thus compensated for much of what he had previously suffered by reason of his connection with the British.

First Bani Bú 'Alí expedition, 1820.

Here we may notice a curious isolated episode * in the history of 'Omán, in which the British and Saiyid Sa'íd were jointly concerned. In 1820, the Bani Bú 'Alí tribe of the Ja'alán district having been charged with complicity in certain piratical proceedings, Captain Thompson,† the British Political Officer at Qishm, was authorised by Government to take suitable action against them, after satisfying himself of their guilt. After this a messenger—apparently the Shaikh of Rás-al-Hadd, who had been sent with a letter to the chiefs of the tribe—was murdered on the beach at Lashkharah; and Captain Thompson, on his own responsibility, decided

* For fuller accounts of the two Bani Bú 'Alí expeditions see *Bombay Selections, XXIV*, pages 189—191; Saldanha's *Précis* (1801-53), pages 127—128; Mignan's *Winter Journey*, II, pages 248—271; Low's *Indian Navy*, I, pages 270—274 and 280—285; and Badger's *Imáms and Seyyids*, pages 338—345. Mignan's account, as that of an eye-witness of the second operations, is the most interesting.

† An account of the very remarkable career of Captain (afterwards General) Perronet Thompson will be found in Low's *Indian Navy*, I, page 381 (footnote). In 1820 he was an officer in His Majesty's 17th Light Dragoons

to take action jointly with Saiyid Sa'id, to whom also the Bani Bū 'Ali were obnoxious as they were in open rebellion against his government. In pursuance of this design six companies of Indian sepoys were embarked by Captain Thompson at Qishm and landed at Sūr, where they were reinforced by a tribal levy under the Saiyid, consisting chiefly of Bani Jābir, Hishm, Hajriyin and Āl Wahibah. On the 8th of November the allies encamped at Falaij-al-Mashāikh, and surrender of the murderers of the British messenger, as well as of the fortifications and arms of the tribe, was demanded; but the negotiations failed, entirely, it would appear, in consequence of the determination of the British Political Officer to enforce the surrender of the arms. On the following day, the 9th of November, a force of 380 sepoys and 4 guns, with 2,000 Arab auxiliaries, advanced to attack the village of Balad Bani Bū 'Ali; but they were ignominiously routed by a charge of swordsmen, and fell back upon their entrenched camp with a loss of 7 British officers, 270 sepoys and all the guns. Saiyid Sa'id himself behaved with coolness and courage and was wounded in the hand in endeavouring to save a British artilleryman—an act of gallantry which the Government of India subsequently acknowledged by the presentation of a valuable sword. Most of the tribesmen by whom Sa'id was attended either fled, immediately that the day turned against them, or remained neutral; but the Hajriyin proved an honourable exception and were killed to the last man. On the night after the battle the British camp was attacked, but without success, by the Bani Bū Husan, in whose land it was situated; and, eventually, the remnants of the British force returned *viâ* the Wādi-al-'Aqq to Masqat, where they arrived on the 17th of November.

Second Bani Bū 'Ali expedition, 1821.

The Government of Bombay, considering that Captain Thompson had exceeded his instructions for the suppression of piracy and had allowed himself to be made an instrument of the Saiyid's internal policy, condemned the whole of his proceedings and ordered him to be removed from his post; but it was necessary that the military reputation of Britain should be rehabilitated in 'Omān. A strong expedition, consisting of 117 British officers, of 1,263 British rank and file from His Majesty's 65th Regiment, the Bombay European Regiment and the Bombay European Artillery, and of 1,686 native soldiers, was despatched from Bombay under the command of General Lionel Smith, the same who had directed the operations against Rās-al-Khaimah in 1809, and reached Sūr on the 27th of January 1821. On the night of the 11th of February the lines of the headquarters staff and the Bombay European Regiment, which were situated at some distance from the main camp, were surprised by a large party of Bani Bū 'Ali swordsmen, who succeeded in inflicting over

40 casualties before they were driven off. On the 2nd of March 1821 the British force arrived before Balad Bani Bū 'Ali, where the skeletons of their predecessors still strewed the ground. The warriors of the tribe, about a thousand strong, repeating their formerly successful tactics, rushed out of the village and fell sword in hand upon the right brigade, when stiff fighting and some confusion followed; but, once the rush had been stemmed, the Bani Bū 'Ali were practically defeated; the village was quickly surrendered; and the tribe this time consented to lay down their arms. Saiyid Sa'id was present, but only as a spectator of the engagement. The British casualties were 26 killed and 171 wounded, while the enemy left 235 dead upon the field besides carrying off, it was supposed, as many more. The prisoners, among whom were the principal chief Muhammad-bin-'Ali and his brother Khādim, numbered about 250, and of these nearly 100 were wounded. Some 80 of the prisoners were made over to Saiyid Sa'id, who allowed them to die of starvation at Masqat; but 150 others, including Shaikh Muhammad-bin-'Ali, were conveyed to Bombay and were well treated there. After an interval of two years, when the assent of the Saiyid to their return had with some difficulty been obtained, the Bombay prisoners were repatriated at the expense of the Government of India, and were provided with funds to enable them to make a fresh start in life. As a tribe, however, the Bani Bū 'Ali have never fully recovered the position which they once held in 'Omān.

British occupation of Qishm Island, 1820-1822.

The relations of the British Government with the Sultān of 'Omān arising from the British military occupation of the island of Qishm under his authority from 1820 to 1822 or 1823 are fully described in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast.

Maritime outrage by subjects of the 'Oman Sultanate, 1829.

Notwithstanding the example made of the Bani Bū 'Ali, outrages continued to be committed by pirates and wreckers under the jurisdiction of Masqat, and even by the Bani Bu 'Ali themselves.

In 1829 a small vessel belonging to a Mr. Shipton was attacked and plundered on a voyage from the Red Sea by dependents of Saiyid Sa'id, but the Sultān took immediate steps in the matter, with the result that in the first instance $6,000, and later 1,000 crowns, were recovered from the pirates and remitted to the Government of Bombay.

About the same time the British ship "Oscar", having gone ashore on the coast of the Ja'alān district on her way from Bombay to Būshehr, was boarded by Arabs, chiefly belonging to the Bani Bū 'Ali and Bani Bū Hasan tribes, who plundered her of her cargo worth eight lakhs of rupees, the greater part of which, but for their violence, might have been saved. Under the orders of the Bombay Government, whom the underwriters in India had approached with strong representations on the subject, the Resident in the Persian Gulf then proceeded in the schooner "Fly," accompanied by Commodore Collinson in the

"Ternate", to Masqat, where three other cruisers belonging to the East India Company were already assembled. On the 19th of October 1829, after a small part of the "Oscar's" cargo, consisting of Kashmir shawls had been recovered at Masqat on payment of salvage, the Resident, with the British squadron, and the Sultān, with two frigates, sailed in company for Sūr; but no traces of the missing property were discovered at that place. Commodore Collinson then visited Khor Jarāmah, where he had a long interview with Muhammad-bin-'Ali, the chief Shaikh of the Bani Bū 'Ali, and persuaded him to give up a few shawls and cash to the amount of $1,200, this being all that the Shaikh, according to his own solemn oath, had it in his power to restore. As the offending tribes could not be punished by means of a naval expedition, the Resident abandoned the idea of further recoveries, and instead "endeavoured to create such an impression on "the minds of the inhabitants of this dangerous coast as would be likely "to prove highly beneficial to any British ship that might have the "misfortune to suffer a similar accident to that which had befallen the "Oscar"; and so the proceedings terminated.

Assistance rendered to Saiyid Sa'īd by the British Government on several occasions.

After the difficulties with the Bani Bū 'Ali, encountered together in 1820-21, the British authorities in India never failed to show their solicitude for the interests of Saiyid Sa'id, at times restraining him from imprudent enterprises in Bahrain, Persia or Turkish 'Irāq, and at others directly supporting his authority against rebels, or enabling him to obtain a reduction of Wahhābi demands. The British naval demonstrations at Masqat in 1830 and 1833, the threats addressed by the Political Resident to Hamūd during his rebellion in 1834, the peace arranged between Saiyid Sa'id and the Sohār chief by British intervention in 1839, the help and encouragement afforded by the British representatives in the Wahhābi crises of 1845 and 1852, the diplomatic support lent to his case at Tehrān in 1848,—these are leading illustrations of the spirit which, after 1821, animated the policy of the British Government towards Sa'id. On the other hand the Government of India, in 1834, positively declined to undertake the responsibility of maintaining the integrity of the continental possessions of the Imām of Muscat against the Wahhābis, remarking that, "if we "were once to commit ourselves by a declaration of our intention to "support that Chief, this line of policy must be followed up at any "expense, and it is impossible to set limits to the waste of blood and "treasure which might ensue in consequence." The Saiyid on his part was not wanting in gratitude; and, at his final departure from Zanzibar

in 1854, he placed his son Khālid, whom he left in charge there, under the virtual guardianship of Colonel Hamerton, the British Resident. A great part of 'Omān was explored in 1835-36 by Lieutenants Wellsted and Whitelock of the Indian Navy, under the auspices of Saiyid Sa'īd.

Commercial and other treaties with Britain, and cession of the Kuria Muria Islands.

The friendly and reasonable disposition of Sa'īd was turned to account by the British Government in the conclusion with him of various treaties, of which the most important were a Treaty of Commerce in 1839 and two Treaties for the suppression of the Slave Trade in 1822 and 1845, also of a Customs Agreement in 1846, by which transhipment dues on cargo were fixed in general at 5 per cent., special provision being made for landing dues in the case of distressed or injured vessels, while stores, the property of the British Government, were exempted from duty altogether. In 1854 Sa'īd transferred the Kuria Muria Islands to the British crown by a deed of gift, and refused to accept any *quid pro quo*: the islands were valuable on account of the guano with which they were then covered, and which the French had made several efforts to obtain.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'īd with the British Court.

Ceremonial courtesies were from time to time exchanged between Sa'īd and His Britannic Majesty. The Saiyid, about 1836, presented King William with the "Liverpool", a fine ship of war but too large for the service of Masqat, receiving in return a handsome yacht, the "Prince Regent"; and in 1838 he sent a mission to England to congratulate Queen Victoria on her accession, on which occasion also an interchange of valuable gifts took place. A less agreeable court incident was the clandestine departure for England in 1845 of Sa'īd's eldest son, Hilāl, for whom he entertained an unaccountable aversion, and whom he had clearly manifested his intention of excluding from the succession. The young man succeeded in making some political interest in England, but his friends were unable to influence the Saiyid in his favour, and he eventually died a refugee at Aden in 1851.

British political representation at Masqat.

At the beginning of Sa'īd's reign British political interests were represented at Masqat by a European officer; but, after the death of three successive Residents from the effects of the climate, *viz.*, of Lieutenant Watts in 1808 and of Captain Seton and Mr. Bunce in 1809, the place was adjudged too unhealthy for permanent occupation and was placed instead under the supervision of the Resident at Būshehr. In April 1840, however, in connection with the Egyptian danger, a British Resident (Captain Hamerton) was re-appointed to Masqat; but the Residency was soon afterwards removed to Zanzibar, where it remained till after the death of Sa'īd.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with France after 1809.

Commercial Treaty with France, 1844.

The short-lived ascendancy of French political influence in 'Omān has been mentioned in an earlier paragraph; during the period of its depression, which followed between 1810 and 1815, the French representative appears to have been withdrawn, and thereafter none was posted to Masqat during the reign of Sa'id. In 1817 communication with 'Omān was re-opened by the French Governor of Réunion; and Masqat was visited in 1819 by the French vessel "Zélée," in 1822 by the "Moselle," and a little later by the "Cléopatre," all sent on friendly or political missions by the French Governor of Bourbon. Ultimately a commercial convention came into existence, favourable to the importation of 'Omāni produce into the French possessions, and a brisk trade sprang up between the two countries. In 1839, however, pending the negotiation of a regular commercial treaty with France, a condition which was not fulfilled until 1844, Sa'id declined to recognise a French Consul at Zanzibar. The Treaty of Commerce with the French, which was signed in 1844, was communicated by Sa'id to the British Government for their approval before its conclusion; and, unless in East Africa, it entailed no political consequences.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with America.

Commercial Treaty with America.

The first treaty concluded between the ruler of 'Omān and the chief government of a great power, as distinguished from the government of a dependency, was one of amity and commerce negotiated at Masqat in 1833 by Mr. Roberts, Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, who visited the place for that purpose in the sloop-of-war "Peacock." This treaty became the model of the subsequent British and French commercial treaties of 1839 and 1844. The recognition of his importance by the Americans was highly flattering to Saiyid Sa'id, and he immediately sought to improve the occasion by promising them special commercial advantages in East Africa, where their trade lay, on condition of their assisting him by armed force to bring that region under subjection. There is nothing to show that the American government were inclined to take advantage of the offer; but the fact of its having been made was considered sufficiently serious to warrant the despatch of H.M.S "Imogene" from Bombay to Zanzibar in 1834, to inquire into the matter.

Character, administration and resources of Saiyid Sa'id.

Character.

Saiyid Sa'id was described, when in middle life, as tall, stout and of a distinguished presence, with a face and manner in which penetration and benevolence were agreeably blended; but he was prematurely aged, a circumstance sufficiently accounted for by his manner of life. The history of his reign bears witness to his self-reliance and tenacity, and in more than one emergency he displayed high physical courage; but intelligence and tact were perhaps more salient traits of his character.

The government of Sa'id in time of peace was mild and equitable, and trade flourished in a high degree. Foreign merchants were attracted in large numbers to Masqat, of which the population increased very rapidly; but the commercial development of the Saiyid's East African possessions was even more remarkable. In 1834 his annual receipts from the customs of Masqat were estimated at $100,000 and those from the customs of Zanzibar at $150,000, a year; the latter had risen in the course of one or two years from a total of $40,000 only, and they continued to increase until the end of his reign. The public revenues were supplemented by the profits of private trade, in which Saiyid Sa'id at one time had twenty ships employed.

Navy.

His forces for war were chiefly naval, and he lavished money and bestowed much personal attention on his fleet, sometimes even commanding his flagship in person; but the efficiency of his overgrown armaments was not on a par with their imposing appearance. The largest vessel he ever owned was the "Liverpool" line-of-battle ship, a two-decker of 74 guns, which he afterwards presented to the British sovereign; and in 1847 he possessed about fifteen vessels of war, of which one, the "Shāh 'Ālam," carried 54 guns.

SAIYID THUWAINI-BIN-SA'ĪD.

1856-66.

Separation of Zanzibar from 'Omān, 1856-61.

Division of Saiyid Sa'id's dominions at his death, 1856.

Sa'id left at his death a large number of sons, none of whom, however, were lawful children by his wives. It had been his intention that his eldest surviving son Thuwaini, whose mother was a Georgian concubine and to whom after 1833 Sa'id had invariably entrusted the affairs of 'Oman in his own absence, should succeed him at Masqat;

and he had designated his son Khālid, the offspring of a Malabari woman, as heir to his African dominions. Khālid, however, predeceased his father; and his place in the dispositions made for the family was taken by another son Mājid, whom Sa'id, at his final departure from Africa in 1854, left in charge of Zanzibar. At the death of Sa'id, accordingly, Thuwaini and Mājid stood forth as the rulers of Omān and Zanzibar respectively; while Turki, a brother intermediate in age, held separate possession of Sohār, over which his father in his lifetime had appointed him Wāli.

Agreement between Thuwaini and Mājid, the heirs in possession respectively of 'Omān and Zanzibar, 1857.

In 1856 or 1857 Muhammad-bin-Sālim was deputed by Thuwaini of Masqat to visit Mājid at Zanzibar, and succeeded in obtaining a promise from the latter that he would pay a sum of $40,000 annually to Thuwaini; one-fourth of this sum was to be devoted to satisfying the demands of the Wahhābis, who now exacted from 'Omān a yearly tribute of $20,000. It is uncertain whether the agreement thus formed was accompanied by conditions, or by any clear understanding as to the relative position of the two brothers; and it is therefore possible that the parties interpreted it in different senses, the one regarding it as an admission of his rights of suzerainty by an inferior, the other as a compromise entered into with an equal.

Expedition by Thuwaini against Zanzibar prevented by British interposition, 1858.

Whatever may have been its nature, it did not long remain in force; the promised payments were withheld by Mājid; and at the end of 1858 it became known that Thuwaini was about to proceed in person against Zanzibar. A steam frigate, despatched by the Governor of Bombay, succeeded in overtaking the 'Omāni expedition, after it had sailed, in the neighbourhood of Rās-al-Hadd; and Thuwaini, in deference to the wishes of Lord Elphinstone, who deprecated hostilities and suggested recourse to British arbitration, caused his fleet of about 10 vessels with 2,500 fighting men on board to put about and return to Masqat. It was perhaps fortunate for himself that he did so, for his brother Turki was already on the point of making an attack on the 'Omāni capital. The proceedings of Turki were possibly countenanced by Mājid; and it seems probable that Thuwaini, on his part, did what he could to promote disaffection to Mājid in Zanzibar, where in the autumn of 1859 the Hirth of 'Omān and Barghash, a younger brother of Mājid, rose in rebellion, and where the French Consul was believed to encourage the designs of the disloyal and of Thuwaini's agents.

British Commission of Enquiry, 1860.

Thuwaini, though he accepted the arbitration of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in principle, was extremely unwilling to bind himself to abide by His Excellency's decision; however, a written

guarantee of submission to the award having at length been obtained from him, Brigadier-General W. M. Coghlan, Resident at Aden, was appointed in May 1860 to investigate the claims of the disputants with the assistance of the Reverend G. P. Badger, Chaplain of Aden, an accomplished Arabic scholar, and of Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, temporary British Agent at Masqat. The proceedings of the Commissioner, who began by securing from each of the parties a formal bond for his acceptance of the Viceroy's decision, were careful and exhaustive; and his final report, which was not submitted until the close of the year, was accepted by Lord Canning without modification except in one unimportant particular. To the multifarious questions of principle and fact with which the report dealt it is unnecessary to refer in detail here.

Award of Lord Canning, by which Zanzibar was separated from 'Omān and a subsidy made payable by the former to the latter, 1861.

The general result of Lord Canning's award, promulgated on the 2nd of April 1861, was to separate the African possessions of the late Saiyid Sa'id from his territories in Arabia; to assign the new and independent principality of Zanzibar, thus created, to Mājid; and to impose on Mājid and his successors an obligation to pay the sum of $40,000 a year to Thuwaini and his successors, not by way of tribute, but in adjustment of the unequal inheritance of the two branches of the family, and as compensation for the abandonment by rulers of 'Omān of their claims to sovereignty over Zanzibar. The arrears payable by Mājid to Thuwaini were at the same time fixed at $80,000; and it was resolved to negative a claim advanced by Turki that his position at Sohār should be recognised as independent. Both Thuwaini and Mājid, verbally and in writing, professed themselves satisfied with the Viceroy's decision; and before the end of the year the latter had discharged the first six-monthly instalment of the subsidy and had remitted bills in payment of the total arrears. Experience had shown that the two States of 'Omān and Zanzibar could not be successfully governed by the same ruler; and it cannot be doubted that their separation on such equitable terms was beneficial to both.

Title "Sultān" of 'Omān officially adopted by the British Government.

On the separation of the principalities the Government of Bombay decided that each of the two rulers should in future be styled Sultān, a term by which, from this point onwards, we shall generally describe them.*

* The significance of the title Imām is fully discussed by Badger in his *Imâms and Seyyids*, pages 378—381. As the term Sultān (though possibly of British origin) is now commonly applied to the rulers of 'Omān even by natives of the country, we have used it in the text (in preference to "Saiyid") to designate the successors of the Imāms. The present ruler, however, is described on his own coins both as Sultān and as Imām.

Re-establishment of the British Residency at Masqat, 1861.

The arbitration proceedings brought home to the Government of India the expediency of re-appointing a European political officer to Masqat, where British interests at the time of the breach between Thuwaini and Mājid had been represented only by an illiterate Jew. This circumstance alone had placed Thuwaini at a considerable disadvantage in relation to his brother, for Mājid was advised in all his difficulties by the British Resident at Zanzibar. Lieutenant W. M. Pengelley of the Indian Navy was selected as the first incumbent of the revived post.*

Internal affairs of 'Omān, 1861-64.

Rebellion of Saiyid Turki and his treacherous seizure by the Sultān, 1861.

Saiyid Turki of Sohār, disregarding the advice of the British authorities that he should consider himself subject to his brother Thuwaini, now openly defied the authority of the Sultān; and Saiyid Thuwaini, in the early summer of 1861, was about to proceed against him with an armed force, when the British Political Agent volunteered his mediation and it was accepted by both sides. On a safe-conduct from the Political Agent, which Thuwaini promised to respect, Turki came to Sīb to confer with his brother; but, on the arrival of Thuwaini, he suddenly changed his mind, feigned indisposition, refused a meeting, and made arrangements for returning to Sohār. Thereupon Lieutenant Pengelley, by an unfortunate error of judgment, withdrew his intervention; and Thuwaini, conceiving that the safe-conduct was thereby annulled, seized Saiyid Turki and carried him off to Masqat, where he placed him in close confinement.

Sohār acquired by the Sultān, 1861.

The people of Sohār, on hearing of this, revolted; and Thuwaini sailed against them with a naval force, the Political Agent following him in a British sloop-of-war. The town of Sohār was found deserted, and Thuwaini returned after installing his son Sālim there as Wāli.

Suwaiq and Khābūrah lost by the Sultān, 1861.

A little later, in the month of September, the Yāl Sa'ad of Bātinah and the Banī Jābir rose in rebellion at the instigation of Qais-bin-'Azzān

* Lieutenant Pengelley had served with the Turkish contingent in the Crimean war and had done good service in collecting transport animals in Turkish 'Irāq for the Persian war of 1856-57.

of Rustāq and murdered Saiyid Hilāl-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ahmad, Wāli of Suwaiq, who refused to join them: Qais also was killed in the affair, but his son 'Azzān shortly afterwards succeeded in making himself master both of Suwaiq and of Khābūra.*

British Political Agent changed, 1862.

The action of the British Political Agent at this juncture was again injudicious: he wrote to the rebels "commanding them in the name of the British Government to deliver up those towns to the legitimate ruler of the country"; he despatched H.M.S. "Elphinstone" to the Bātinah coast; and he urged the Resident in the Persian Gulf not only to permit the Bani Yās Shaikhs of Dibai and Abu Dhabi to send their vessels of war to the Sultān's assistance, but also himself to arrest some deputies who had gone to interview him on behalf of the rebels. The insurgents, however, treated these menaces with contempt; and in February 1862 the Government of India, disapproving of Lieutenant Pengelley's proceedings, sent Major Green to replace him.

Turki released and Suwaiq and Khābūrah recovered by the Sultān 1862.

Soon after the arrival of the new Agent the "Elphinstone" was sent away; Saiyid Turki was released from confinement and received an allowance; and the Sultān was dissuaded from accepting Persian offers of assistance and induced to make an effort, which proved entirely successful, to dislodge the rebels, by the means at his own disposal, from the territories which they had usurped.

Renewed Wahhābi aggressions and British intervention, 1864-66.

Rebellion of 'Azzān-bin-Qais at Rustāq with encouragement from the Wahhābis, 1864.

Toward the end of 1864, when hostilities broke out between the Sultān and 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Rustāq, the latter received support from Turki-bin-Ahmad the Sadairi, Wahhābi agent at Baraimi. Saiyid Thuwaini, in alarm, at once sought the mediation of the British Government and asked to be supplied with ammunition; and Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who was then on the point of undertaking his remarkable journey to Riyādh in Central Arabia, was ordered by Government to report upon the situation. No further developments took place until Colonel Pelly's return from the interior, when, in April 1865, he proceeded to Masqat and there ascertained that 'Azzān-bin-Qais had thrown off his allegiance to Thuwaini and placed himself under the Wahhābi Amir, and that the Amīr had begun to demand increased tribute

* According to one account Hilāl and Qais fell by each other's hands, Qais being the first to strike.

from 'Omān and to threaten an invasion of the country in case of non-compliance. Colonel Pelly on becoming aware of these facts sent a letter to the Wahhābi Amīr, with whom his visit to Riyādh had made him personally acquainted, offering his own services as a mediator, and he also invited 'Azzān-bin-Qais to a conference at Masqat; but the letter remained unanswered, and the invitation was politely declined.

Wahhābi demand for increased tribute, 1865.

In August 1865 the usual Wahhābi mission arrived at Masqat and demanded four times the customary annual tribute; the Sultān, by the advice of Colonel Disbrowe, the British Political Agent, paid the ordinary amount, and sent a message to the Amīr that, as regards the remainder, he awaited the result of Colonel Pelly's offer of mediation.

Wahhābi raid on Sūr, 1865.

In the same month the Jannabah of Sūr, who were discontented with the Sultān's rule, sought Wahhābi assistance from Baraimi; and the Wahhābi agent, nothing loth, sent his brother and a Wahhābi contingent who plundered Sūq Sūr, assisted by some of the disaffected tribes of Ja'alān, especially the Jannabah and Bani Bū 'Ali. A garrison occupying a fort on behalf of the Sultān of 'Omān held out for two days; but they were unable to prevent the entrance of the enemy into the quarter, and eventually they themselves surrendered. Nearly all the damage inflicted fell upon Hindu traders and shopkeepers of the place, who were British Indian subjects; the extent of their losses was estimated at $27,700, and one of their number was killed and another wounded. They were prevented from disposing in the ordinary way of the corpse of their companion; and, before being allowed to leave for Masqat, they were stripped of almost all their clothing.

Assistance given by the British Government to the Sultān against the Wahhābis, 1865-66.

The Sultān, after a feeble demonstration by sea in the direction of Sūr, purchased peace of the Wahhābis by one payment of $10,000 and another of Rs. 6,000; but the British authorities in India, conscious that policy and self-interest required them to abandon their usual attitude of neutrality, now incited him to resistance and prepared to aid him with munitions and ships of war in re-establishing his authority at places where it had been overthrown by the Wahhābis. On the advice of Colonel Pelly, Thuwaini was shortly afterwards supplied with two guns and a large quantity of powder and other ammunition for an assault upon Baraimi, which was clearly recognised to be the key of the Wahhābi position in 'Oman, and the Sultān began to collect his tribes for the expedition,—measures to which the Wahhābis replied by an attack on Saham, where some Banyans, British Indian subjects, were driven into the sea, one of them being drowned. The British Political Resident also addressed notifications to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, reminding those who were partisans of the Wahhābis that their ports were within

range of British naval guns, and informing the others, who sided with the Sultān, that they were at liberty to proceed to his assistance by land.

Direct action, by the British Government against the Wahhābis and the Jannabah of Sūr, 1865-66.

These were the local dispositions made to meet the situation; and among those of a further-reaching character, more fully noticed in the history of Najd, was an ultimatum sent through his seaport of Qatīf to the Wahhābi Amīr, in which a written apology and compensation for the outrage at Sūr were demanded. No reply to the ultimatum having been received within the limit of time prescribed, naval operations against the Wahhābis followed at Qatīf and Dammān; and on the 11th of February H.M.S. "Highflyer" appeared off Sūr to insist on atonement by the Jannabah for their part in the affair of August by payment of $27,700 compensation within 24 hours. On the tribe attempting to procrastinate, a fire was opened which demolished their forts; the whole of their boats were either confiscated or destroyed; and a large quantity of their ship-timber was burned. No personal injury was suffered by non-combatants, who were given ample opportunity to remove; but a small part of the town was accidentally burned, in consequence of a change in the direction of the wind.

Settlement between the British Government and the Wahhābis, 1866.

At length, on the 20th of February, two letters from the Wahhābi Amīr reached Colonel Pelly, who had taken up his post of observation at the British telegraph station then existing in Khor-ash-Sham: the first, which was dated 28th January, accepted Colonel Pelly's mediation between the Wahhābis and the State of 'Omān, subject apparently to a condition that the British Government should undertake to enforce the award; while the second, in reply to the British ultimatum, stated that an agent would be sent to discuss matters and that the Jannabah were guilty of the outrage at Sūr, but that the Amīr recognised his responsibility for recovering damages from them. The Government of India animadverted on the stringency of the demands which had been made by their representative at Qatīf and Sūr, and on the shortness of the time allowed for compliance with the British terms at both those places; but they were on the whole satisfied with the result of the operations. In April 1866 Wahhābi emissaries from 'Abdullah, who had recently succeeded his father Faisal as ruler of the Wahhābis, arrived at Būshehr and undertook, besides giving other more general assurances, that the Amīr should not in future attack Arab tribes in alliance with the British, especially those of 'Omān, so long as the customary Zakāt was punctually paid. The British Government on their part declined to guarantee the payment of Zakāt, but the good offices of the Būshehr Residency were promised in any dispute which might arise on the subject.

The subject of this mission in its wider aspects is discussed in the history of British relations with Najd.

Assassination of Thuwaini, 1866.

Almost at the same time that he received the letters of the Wahhábi Amír, the British Resident was informed of the death of the Sultán of 'Omán by violence at Sohár, whither he had gone to organise the advance on Baraimi and whither his brother Saiyid Turki, with whom he was now perfectly reconciled, had accompanied him. The murder, which had occurred on or about the 11th of February, was apparently committed by Sálim, an unnatural son of the deceased. Accompanied by a Wahhábi accomplice Sálim stole into an upper room of the Sohár Fort, where his father was enjoying a midday siesta, and shot him through the forehead with a double-barrelled pistol: thus tragically but unregretted, after a long regency and a short reign, died Thuwaini-bin-Sa'id. The chief characteristics of Thuwaini appear to have been weakness and duplicity; not one of the British officers with whom he was brought into contact ever, apparently, professed either liking or respect for him; and the manner of his death seems to indicate that he was detested even by the members of his own family.

Foreign relations of 'Omán, 1856-66.

Treaties with Britain.

Communication between Masqat and the outside world was improved during the reign of Thuwaini by the institution of a British service of mail steamers; and in 1864 and 1865 an Agreement and a Convention were concluded with the Sultán to facilitate the execution of British telegraph projects in the Persian Gulf. These matters are dealt with in the historical Appendices relating to postal and telegraphic communications in the Gulf; and the establishment of a British Assistant Political Agency at Gwádar in 1863 is mentioned in the historical note on that dependency.

Anglo-French Declaration of 1862.

The most important treaty of the period bearing upon the position of 'Omán was, however, one to which the Sultán himself was not a party. On the 10th March 1862 Great Britain and France subscribed, at Paris, to a Declaration or reciprocal agreement to respect the independence of

the Sultāns of Masqat and Zanzibar. This compact, pregnant with consequences as yet unforeseen, arose apparently out of Zanzibar affairs and was entered into by Her Majesty's Government without reference to the Government of India. The Indian Government did not, in fact, become aware of its existence until 1871.

The claims of Persia to Gwādar and Chahbār, raised in 1864, are noticed in the separate history * of those ports. Persian relations.

SAIYID SĀLIM-BIN-THUWAINI.

1866-68.

General insecurity consequent upon the accession of Sālim, 1866.

The British Resident, after receiving the news of Thuwaini's death and instructions to abstain for the present from acknowledging Saiyid Sālim, left Khor-ash-Sham for Masqat in the unarmed Residency steamer "Berenice." On his way down the coast he touched at Sohār: here he learned the details of the recent tragedy and succeeded in obtaining the release of Saiyid Turki, whom Sālim had placed in close custody and whose life was in imminent danger. On or about the 1st of March Colonel Pelly reached Masqat and found the British Indian community in a state of panic. Sālim, who with a party of fanatical priests was now in possession of the town, attempted to open communication with the Resident by sending a near relative with a letter in which it was asserted that Thuwaini had died of fever after a short illness; but Colonel Pelly ignored these overtures and devoted his attention to embarking the British Agent, all Christians, and the pearls and specie of the Indian merchants on board the "Berenice," while at the same time he advised the British Indian subjects for whom there was not room on the "Berenice" to seek safety in native boats. No war vessels having yet arrived, and information having been received of a plot by Sālim and his adherents to attack the "Berenice" by night and massacre all on board, Colonel Pelly decided on quitting Masqat; and after dark the vessel left for Khor-ash-Sham.

When H.M.S. "Octavia" and "Highflyer" arrived at Masqat a few days later, the bazaars were closed, trade was at a standstill, not a single native vessel was to be seen in the harbour, and all British subjects had departed. An invitation from Sālim to visit him on shore was declined by the naval officer commanding.

* *Vide* page 601 *post*.

Meanwhile the "Coromandel" was sent from Bombay with Colonel Disbrowe, Political Agent, to assist British subjects who might be in danger at various places in 'Omān; and police were despatched from Karāchi for the protection of British interests at Gwādar, where much alarm was felt.

Relations of Sālim with the British Government, 1866-68.

Mission sent by Sālim to Bombay, 1st April 1866.

In April two envoys of respectable position arrived at Bombay with a letter from Saiyid Sālim, in which he prayed that his position as the successor of Thuwaini might be recognised by the British Government and protested against the hostile attitude of the British Resident in the Gulf. The Government of Bombay in their reply, which was signed by a Secretary only and was addressed to the envoys instead of to Sālim, ignored the Saiyid's main request; but they refrained from charging him with parricide, and they mentioned their expectation that British subjects in 'Omān would be protected as in the past.

British subjects permitted to return from India to Masqat, May 1866.

Eventually in May, chiefly on the representations of Indian merchants accustomed to carry on their business in 'Omān, the Government of India authorised the appointment, as a temporary measure, of a Native Agent at Masqat instead of the usual British officer; and it was intimated to British Indian refugees in India that they were at liberty to return to Masqat and to resume their commercial dealings there.

Recognition of Sālim and reinstitution of the British Political Agency at Masqat, September 1866.

In the following September Colonel Pelly, under the orders of Government, visited Masqat and formally recognised Saiyid Sālim as Sultān of 'Omān; the new Native Agent, Muhammad Bāqir Khān, was installed in his post; and the British flag was again hoisted over the Agency quarters. The new Agent died in January 1867 and was succeeded, after a short interval, by a British officer in the person of Captain Atkinson.

Masqat Order in Council, 1867.

The Consular powers of the British representative at Masqat were defined by an Order in Council, passed at Windsor on the 4th of November 1867.

Rebellions of Saiyid Turki and Hamad-bin-Sālim, 1867-68.

Attempt by Turki to recover Sohār.

Such was the position of affairs when the position of Sālim began to be actively disputed by his uncle Saiyid Turki. Turki first sought the help of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, but they were cautioned by the

British authorities against abetting his proceedings, especially by sea. Turki then made Yanqul in Dhāhirah his headquarters, and, having obtained support in that quarter, took Sohār by surprise, but was unable to hold it.

Capture of Matrah and assault on Masqat by Turki, 1867.

After this he removed to the Ja'alān District and succeeded in attaching to his interests the Hirth, Bani Bū Hasan, Hajriyin, and Āl Wahībah tribes. Finally he set his face towards Masqat, negotiating with Sālim as he advanced for the cession of Sohār, and arrived at Bidbid in the last days of August. His approach caused much alarm in Masqat, to allay which the British Government gave it to be known that Turki, even if successful, would not be recognised by them, and that the forts of which he might obtain possession would be bombarded by British vessels of war. Turki, however, pressed on to Matrah, which he captured, and attacked Masqat, but was repulsed from that place.

Intervention of the British Resident and deportation of Turki to India, 1867.

At this juncture Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Gulf, arrived before Matrah with H. M.'s frigate "Octavia." Turki thereupon abandoned his territorial pretensions, asking instead for a liberal pension; and, by the mediation of the Resident, it was finally arranged that he should receive from Sālim, by deduction from the Zanzibar subsidy, an annual stipend of $7,200 and should for the future reside in India under the supervision of the British Government. Sālim was accordingly replaced in possession of Matrah; and Turki, on the 11th of September 1867, embarked for Bombay.

Rebellion of Hamad-bin-Sālim, 1867.

These troubles had scarcely subsided when the peace was again disturbed by a particularly futile contest between the Sultān and his near kinsman Hamad-bin-Sālim, of which unjustifiable aggressions on the part of Sālim are said to have been the cause. Hamad, fief-holder of Masna'ah, which had been conferred on him by his uncle the late Sa'id-bin-Sultān, was supported by the local tribes; and Sālim, in February 1868, found himself obliged to summon Turki-bin-Ahmad-as-Sadairi, the Wahhābi agent at Baraimi, to his aid; to call upon the Hināwis of Ja'alān for assistance; and to draw upon a sum of $40,000 which had been placed at his disposal by the Government of India, on the security of the Zanzibar subsidy withheld at this time by Mājid, to the extent of $10,000. A hollow reconciliation then took place; but the Hināwis of Ja'alān were not to be baulked of their expected rewards. On the way to Masqat they allowed themselves to be bought over by Hamad for a small sum, but shortly returned to their allegiance to Sālim; and, after draining the resources of Sālim dry, they quartered themselves upon Hamad at Masna'ah and reduced him to the utmost straits for money.

In the end they were themselves seized by an unaccountable panic, and fled in small bodies towards their native country, losing a number of men by the way at the hands of their Ghāfiri foes. The unscrupulous and cowardly behaviour of these tribesmen was considered to have brought disgrace on the whole Hināwi faction.

Relations of Sālim with Persia.

The arrangement in regard to Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies made between Persia and the Sultān of 'Omān in 1856, remained in force until 1866 and was then legally terminated by the accession of Sālim, who was a grandson, not a son, of Sa'id. The Persians, accordingly, transferred the lease to one Shaikh Sa'id, formerly governor of Bandar 'Abbās under the Āl Bū Sa'id and himself a member of that family; but it was granted to him as a dependent of Persia, not as representing the Sultān of 'Oman; and the rent payable annually was increased from 16,000 to 20,000 Tūmāns. This Arab lessee having withheld the revenue due from him, the Governor-General of Fārs at the beginning of 1868 took steps for his forcible removal, with a view to the substitution of a Persian nobleman in his place. At this point, in April 1868, Sālim threatened to blockade the Persian coast unless the lease were given to him; and the Persian Government, who had then no vessels in the Gulf, applied for British mediation, while Sālim, unable to carry out the threat of blockade without the approval of the Government of India, which was refused, committed his interests to the hands of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. Colonel Pelly accordingly visited Shirāz in July 1868, accompanied by Hāji Ahmad, the minister of the Sultān; and on the 4th of August, after an attempt by the Persians who had regained confidence, to reject the British intervention, an Agreement was signed. By this document the lease of Bandar 'Abbās was renewed for eight years, in favour of Sālim and his descendants only, at an enhanced yearly rental of 30,000 Tūmāns: most of the other conditions were much the same as in 1856. In the course of the discussions the Sultān claimed Hanjām and Lārak as dependencies of 'Omān, irrespectively of the Bandar 'Abbās lease; nor was his claim to these islands either abandoned or disproved.

Temporary suspension of the Zanzibar subsidy, 1866-68.

It may be mentioned here that the Sultān of Zanzibar, on becoming aware of the accession of Sālim and the circumstances thereof, attempted to evade continued payment of the annual subsidy decreed in 1861; he argued that the arrangement was personal to Saiyid Thuwaini, and that in any case he could not be expected to continue payment to a parricide. His first contention was disallowed by the Government of India, on the ground that it was clearly opposed to the terms of Lord Canning's award; and the other difficulty was met by the Government of India undertaking to receive and transmit the amount due by the Sultān of Zanzibar to the Sultān of 'Omān, the necessity for direct dealings between Mājid and Sālim being thus obviated. Eventually the outstanding obligations were discharged by Mājid in the spring of 1868.

It may be noted incidentally that, in 1867, the Government of Bombay found it necessary to warn the Sultān of Zanzibar against presenting munitions of war as gifts to subjects of his relation the Sultān of 'Omān,—an abuse which did not again become clamant till nearly thirty years afterwards.

Expulsion of Sālim by 'Azzān-bin-Qais, 1868.

Capture of Masqat by 'Azzān-bin-Qais.

A final upheaval against his authority now terminated the short and unhappy reign of Sālim. On the 23rd of September 1868 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Rustāq made himself master of Barkah, on the 29th he captured Matrah, and on the 1st of October he suddenly occupied the town of Masqat while Sālim, leaving his valuables to become the spoil of the enemy, hurriedly took refuge in one of the harbour forts.

Neutrality of the British Government.

Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Gulf, who was present in the harbour, suggested an armistice until the wishes of the Government of India could be ascertained; but 'Azzān declined to wait, and commenced operations against the fort in which Sālim still held out. No active part was taken in the contest by H.M.S. "Vigilant" beyond placing a rocket-party in one of the forts to prevent the removal by 'Azzān from its vicinity of an 18-pounder gun which the British Govern-

ment had once presented to Thuwaini and of which the companion, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Resident, had been seized and brought into use by the besieging party. On the 7th of October instructions were received by Colonel Pelly to abstain from using force on Sālim's behalf.

Flight of Sālim.

The 8th of October passed in fruitless negotiations between Sālim and 'Azzān; and on the 9th, after Sālim had sought an asylum on board the "Vigilant", 'Azzān hoisted his flag upon the forts and proclaimed his accession by an artillery salute. On the 12th of October, Sālim, in a ship of his own, left Masqat for Bandar 'Abbās.

Causes of Sālim's overthrow.

The downfall of Sālim has been attributed to various causes, but chiefly to his general unpopularity, to his treatment of Hamad-bin-Sālim of Masna'ah, and to his dependence on the Ghāfiri tribes of Ja'alān, of whom the powerful Banī Bū 'Alī and Jannabah were paralysed, at the time of 'Azzān's insurrection, by a feud between themselves.

SAIYID 'AZZĀN-BIN-QAIS.

1868-71.

Early associates and proceedings of 'Azzān, 1868-69.

Ultra-religious character of Azzān's early administration.

The immediate result of this revolution, achieved at the expense of Sālim, was to place in power a group rather than an individual; for 'Azzān was in the beginning largely dependent on his principal advisers and adherents. Among these the most prominent were Sa'id-bin-Khalfān, Khalīli, the ecclesiastic who had for a time held charge of Rustāq in the lifetime of Hamūd-bin-'Azzān, and Sālih-bin-'Ali, the leading chief of the Hirth. In the beginning the influence of the former, who was, or soon became, the father-in-law of 'Azzān and who generally acted as Wāli of Masqat town, predominated, and gave a fanatical colour to the administration; a white Mutawwa' banner was substituted for the time-honoured red flag of 'Omān; tobacco and strong drink were prohibited; music of all sorts was placed under the ban; and the easy-going inhabitants of Masqat were compelled to attend the mosques with regularity, and to trim their moustaches in a particular style. The new régime thus resembled Wahhābism in some of its external characteristics; but, as subsequent

events showed, no sympathy existed in political matters between its exponents and the Wahhābi power. Discontent was soon rampant in more than one quarter, for fines and confiscations were numerous, yet the pay of the troops was in arrear. Foreign trade declined, and the revenue afforded by the customs became insufficient for the needs of government.

Military successes of 'Azzān and rapid extension of his authority.

But the energy of 'Azzān was equal to all emergencies; and, while the Khalīli at the beginning of 1869 lorded it at Masqat and kept his master—as was currently reported—on very short commons financially, 'Azzān marched from Barkah with 3,000 men and two guns against the refractory tribes of Wādi Samāil and its tributaries. In February 1869, after reducing Ghailah, Milaiyinah and Nafa'ah, he completely humbled the Siyābiyīn, who were then his principal adversaries. Having effected a junction at Nafa'ah with his supporter Sālih-bin-'Ali, who brought with him from Samad a contingent of 1,500 Hirth, Hajriyīn, Habūs and others, 'Azzān succeeded, notwithstanding the difficult nature of their country, in chastising also the Nidābiyīn and Rahbiyīn, who were sympathisers of the Siyābiyīn. The enterprise had been regarded by onlookers as rash and even suicidal; and the complete success of 'Azzān evidenced an ability and force of character to which 'Omān had long been unaccustomed in her rulers. Sohār, Samāil, Masna'ah and Sūr had already submitted to his authority, without even an attempt at resistance.

'Azzān described as "Imām."

Early in his reign 'Azzān seems to have been proclaimed "Imām" by his priestly supporters; but it does not appear that the title, though often applied to him, ever received the needful ratification by the tribes of 'Omān as a whole.

Proceedings of 'Azzān's rivals, 1868-69.

Failure of Sālim-bin-Thuwaini in the interior of 'Omān, 1869.

Sālim, the deposed prince, having been cautioned by the British authorities not to disturb the maritime peace by a naval expedition against 'Omān, crossed privately from Bandar 'Abbās to Dibai and entered into negotiations with the Sadairi agent who represented the Wahhābis at Baraimi, with the object of arranging an attack by land upon 'Azzān. In April 1869, however, the violent death of the Wahhābi agent at Shārjah deprived Sālim of the aid upon which he chiefly relied; and, though in May he made a tour by way of Barkah, Izki and Nizwa to the Ja'alān district and returned northwards *viâ* Birkat-al-Mōz, he was unable to secure any active support.

Successes of 'Azzān in the same, 1869.

In the months of September and October following, after the capture of Baraimi as related below, 'Azzān paid a visit to 'Omān Proper and reduced the fortresses of Bahlah, Nizwa, Izki and Adam; and he even entered the Ja'alān district and awed the inhabitants, including the Banī Bū 'Alī, into submission. At Adam he repaired a fort built by his ancestor the Imām Ahmad.

Seizure of Gwādar by Nāsir-bin-Thuwaini, 1869.

The manœuvres of Saiyid Nasīr, another son of the deceased Thuwaini, were more successful. This individual, having escaped by a stratagem from surveillance at Masqat, crossed in April 1869 to Gwādar, of which place he succeeded in making himself master; and he might possibly have taken possession of Chahbār also, had he not been forestalled by Dīn Muhammad, the Balūch chief of Dashtyāri, who occupied it himself.

Veto placed by the British Government on naval operations.

A considerable influence on the course of events was exerted by the British Government, who peremptorily forbade the competitors to make expeditions against one another by sea. This prohibition made it impossible for 'Azzān to recover Gwādar, and at the same time it prevented Nasīr from making Gwādar a base, as he was anxious to do, for operations against 'Omān; it also had the effect of obviating a hand to hand struggle between 'Azzān and Sālim, whose respective headquarters were divided by the sea.

Relations of 'Azzān with the Wahhābis, 1869-70.

Baraimi taken by 'Azzān from the Wahhābis, 1869.

After the murder of the Wahhābi agent in 'Omān, the Na'īm tribe of Baraimi, who had suffered much from his tyranny, were inclined to shake off the Wahhābi yoke altogether and applied to 'Azzān for his assistance. 'Azzān immediately proceeded in their direction and, in passing through the Bātinah district, endeavoured to recruit reinforcements; but the tribesmen generally did not respond to his summons, and the Ghāfiris in particular were firm in their refusal to break with the Wahhābis. At Barkah 'Azzān had received a letter from the Wahhābi Amīr, who called upon him, on the ground of his having assumed the title of Imām, to remit the customary tribute of 'Omān to Riyādh; but, the Khalīli having been consulted, it was resolved to ignore this demand. A more threatening communication was now received from 'Abdul 'Azīz, a Wahhābi commander who had recently made a successful raid on Sohār and who, from his name, may have been identical with the Wahhābi leader of the attack made upon Sūr in 1865. Having been joined by Sālih-bin-'Alī with a contingent of 500 men

from the Ja'alān district, 'Azzān advanced on Baraimi with a total force of about 1,500 men; took the place, after slight resistance, on or about the 18th of June 1869; and, after installing a garrison under one of his own relations, returned to Masqat. Before leaving Barsimi 'Azzān entered into an alliance with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and undertook to pay him a subsidy on condition of his protecting the Baraimi frontier of 'Omān. A counter-alliance was formed by the remaining Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān among themselves; but the Shaikh of Shārjah quickly forsook it and attached himself to the interests of 'Azzān.

Inability of the Wahhābi ruler to retaliate, 1870.

The British Resident in the Persian Gulf, on hearing of the capture of Baraimi, hastened to remind the Wahhābi Amīr of the obligation under which he had placed himself in 1866 to abstain from molesting Arab States in alliance with the British Government; but his letter was apparently ignored, and 'Azzān presently received a laconic warning from 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal to prepare for an invasion of 'Omān by the Amīr in person at the head of 20,000 men. At the beginning of 1870 it seemed probable that the threat would be carried into effect; for the Wahhābi chief was then at 'Oqair on the coast of Hasa and had ordered a large fleet of boats to be made ready, which he probably intended to use as transports for a part of his force. Meanwhile, at the end of February, 'Azzān, accompanied by his own brother Ibrāhīm and by Sa'ūd, a rebellious brother of the Wahhābi Amīr, proceeded to Baraimi and conferred there with his ally the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. Various obstacles now interposed, which obliged the Wahhābi to defer his operations against 'Omān: among them were the unseasonable scarcity of water and forage in the country between Hasa and Baraimi, the combination between the Abu Dhabi Shaikh and the ruler of 'Omān, the prospect of being himself called to account by the British power in connection with the recent invasion of Bahrain from Hasa, and the fear of intrigue at Riyādh during his absence. Before long 'Abdullah was involved in civil war at home, and he found no further opportunity of prosecuting his designs on 'Omān.

Successful campaign of Turki against 'Azzān and death of 'Azzān 1870-71.

The enmity of the Wahhābi power had thus no direct consequences; but, by encouraging his rivals to renewed activity, it affected very detrimentally the position of 'Azzān.

Return of Saiyid Turki from India, March 1870.

Early in 1869, when the British authorities in India still regarded 'Azzān's usurpation with an unfavourable eye, restraint on Turki's movements had been withdrawn; and in March 1870, Turki, though without the express permission of Government, left India for the Persian Gulf as a private passenger on board a British steamer.

His failure in Trucial Omān.

In May he was at Dibai on the coast of Trucial 'Omān, as was also Sālim, the ex-ruler of 'Omān; but he was as yet without funds, and a request from him for a loan by the British Government was of course refused. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, moreover, who continued steadfast in his alliance with 'Azzān, had dissuaded the other chiefs of that region from helping Turki; and the Wahhābi Amīr, in whom was Turki's chief hope, had now returned to his capital in Central Arabia. In these circumstances, Turki, preceded by Sālim who went to Qishm, retired disappointed to Bandar 'Abbās. 'Azzān was at this time engaged in besieging the fort of Hazam, where the descendants of the ancient Ya'arabi line of rulers still held out against his authority.

His sojourn at Bandar 'Abbās.

In July Turki made a suspicious movement from Bandar 'Abbās in the "Muzaffar", a vessel under British colours, but, being overtaken by the Resident, he returned to port; his native craft, however, he sent to lie at Khor Fakkān on the Shamailiyah coast. In August funds sent for his use by the Sultān of Zanzibar began to reach him through a Hindu firm at Bombay: the first instalment amounted to $20,000.

His successful invasion of 'Omān, September 1870.

In September Turki landed at Khor Fakkān and proceeded viâ Fujairah and Wādi Hām to Baraimi. He was joined on the way by the Bani Qitab and at Baraimi by the Na'im tribe; the Na'im had possession of all the forts in Baraimi, except the principal one, which was held by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in the interest of 'Azzān. The Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Rās-al-Khaimah also attached themselves to Turki's cause. 'Azzān, who, with his brother Ibrāhīm, had meanwhile brought his nine months' siege of Hazam to a successful conclusion, and in the course of a tour in the Dhāhirah District had captured the strong post of 'Ainain, now marched to meet him. As 'Azzān, approached Dhank, he was deserted by a large proportion of his mercenary forces; but he possessed an advantage in the shape of two pieces of artillery, and his troops still numbered about 4,000 men. On the 5th October 1870 the armies encountered in Wadi Dhank, a short way above Dhank town, and the result was a complete and somewhat unexpected victory for Turki. After the battle, in which their side had suffered 300 or 400 casualties, 'Azzān and Ibrāhim retreated to Sohār, while Turki passed on through 'Omān Proper, Badīyah and Ja'alān to Sūr where he

encamped and collected a large force. On the 29th of October Major Way, the Political Agent at Masqat, visited Sūr and warned Turki against undertaking operations by sea, at the same time refusing to grant him an interview. Finally, about the end of the year, Saiyid Turki and his principal adherent, Saif-bin-Sulaimān of the Banī Riyām, marched from Sūr, the former proceeding to Ja'alān and the latter taking the coast route towards Masqat. By the middle of January 1871 Turki was at Mudhaibī, threatening Samad with a force of 3,000 men, and Saif-bin-Sulaimān had occupied Quryāt on the coast; while Sālih-bin-'Alī was holding Samad, and 'Azzān, with his brother Ibrāhīm, was busily engaged in preparing for the defence of Masqat and Matrah.

Defeat and death of 'Azzān, January 1915.

Saif-bin-Sulaimān attacked 'Azzān in Matrah, apparently on the 30th of January, and took the place all except two forts. Both Saif and 'Azzān were killed in this engagement; the latter, it is said, met his death in the Jabru suburb of the town.

Relations of 'Azzān with the British Government.

The usurpation of 'Azzān seems to have been, at the first, more distasteful to the British authorities than that even of his paricidal predecessor. The arrogant and fanatical character of his counsellors, the unfavourable influence of his administration on trade, and the fact that he was not of the line of Sa'īd, whom British officers had come to regard as the natural rulers of the country, were the principal objections against him; and the way towards a better understanding was for some time closed by personal friction between Colonel Disbrowe, the Political Agent, and the members of the new government.

Friction between 'Azzān and the British Political Agent over the prohibition of maritime warfare 1869.

On the seizure by Saiyid Nasir-bin-Thuwaini of Gwādar in April 1869, the Political Agent, in order to prevent recourse by the Masqat authorities to a naval expedition against that place, interdicted the sailing of any vessel of war from the harbour; and when, in the following month, 'Azzān, disregarding Colonel Disbrowe's protests, despatched munitions of war by sea to Barkah and other of his own ports in 'Omān, that officer to mark his displeasure hauled down his flag and took up his quarters for a few days on board the Indian Marine vessel "Clyde". Colonel Pelly, however, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, disallowed the Political Agent's interpretation, in the second case, of the rules relating to the maritime

peace; and it was explained to 'Azzān that, while debarred from descents by sea on foreign or disputed territory, he was not restricted in regard to naval movements within his own territorial waters: 'Azzān in return professed himself grateful and desirous to please the British Government in every respect.

Other difficulties.

Meanwhile, however, an attack on the private house of Mr. Shore, the British Agency Accountant, had been threatened, "should the sounds of a concertina proceed therefrom"; and in August and September some tobacco in which British subjects were interested was seized by the Masqat authorities and destroyed by them in accordance with their religious principles. A little later an attempt was made by the local administration to detain the "Prince of Wales", a ship under the British flag, which they claimed as belonging of right to the navy of 'Omān and as having been unwarrantably carried off by Salim at his departure from Masqat; but in this matter they yielded to the protests of Colonel Disbrowe.

The "Clyde" incident, October 1860.

On the 15th of October a much more serious incident occurred. The Political Agent, having received notice of an intended attack by Nasir-bin-Thuwaini of Gwādar upon Masqat, requested the officer in command of the "Clyde" to move her to a different berth under Fort Jalāli; but he had omitted to inform the local authorities, and the garrison of the fort, not understanding the reason of the manœuvre, opened a fire of matchlocks on the "Clyde" and maintained it for half-an-hour. The Political Resident in the Gulf was ordered to proceed to Masqat at once, and arrangements were made for collecting a British naval force there in case reparation should be refused. Colonel Pelly, however, was successful in obtaining a written apology from the Khalili, who was in charge of Masqat during the absence of 'Azzān, as well as an oral apology made publicly by a deputation of five notables on board the "Dalhousie"; and on the 3rd of November 'Azzān himself expressed, in unqualified terms, his regret at what had happened and his respect for the British Government. Colonel Pelly reported on this occasion that the British Indian subjects at Masqat did not complain of being themselves oppressed, and that their two chief grievances were the enforcement of the Muhammadan law of creditor and debtor and of a prohibition against the purchase of tobacco by Masqat subjects, which affected a branch of their trade.

British Political Agent changed, 1860.

At the end of the year, when matters had quieted down, Colonel Disbrowe was transferred to another post and was succeeded at Masqat by Major Way, the latter being placed in strict subordination to the Resident

and instructed not to correspond directly with the Government of Bombay unless in exceptional circumstances.*

Discussions regarding the official recognition of 'Azzān by the British Government, 1869-70.

In November 1869 the Government of India instructed Colonel Pelly to make careful local inquiries regarding the stability of 'Azzān's position in order that the question of his recognition as Sultān of 'Omān might be decided. It was felt that the non-admission of his claims reacted unfavourably on the British position in 'Omān; but the case of Sālim had shown what embarrassment might result from the premature recognition of an insecurely established ruler. The undesirability of a Wahhābi conquest of 'Omān, whence Wahhābi influence might radiate to India, was clearly perceived; but it was thought that the mere recognition of 'Azzān, while irritating to the Wahhābi Amīr, would do little to strengthen 'Azzān's position *vis à vis* of that potentate. Eventually the Government of India inclined to disregard the standing danger of a Wahhābi attack and to acknowledge the Sultanate of 'Azzān, provided that his power were shown to be well-established in his own dominions; but in February 1870 the imminence, as was supposed, of an actual Wahhābi invasion caused them to postpone their decision. A few days later, however, apprehension of the Wahhābis being still at its height, they directed Colonel Pelly (then at Calcutta) to proceed to the Persian Gulf with all convenient speed and there formally recognise 'Azzān, if in his opinion such a step should appear to be expedient; in case, however, of his deciding in favour of recognition, he was to reserve for future settlement all questions of detail, such as the maintenance of former treaties and conventions and the validity of 'Azzān's claim to particular territories abroad. The arrival at Masqat of non-British European vessels which did not hesitate to admit the sovereignty of 'Azzān soon illustrated the danger of backwardness on the part of the British authorities; and additional reasons in favour of recognition were supplied by the facts that the British Political Agency at Masqat had been continuously maintained and that an apology in the "Clyde" case had been accepted from 'Azzān as *de facto* ruler. Colonel Pelly, however, did not at once make use of his discretionary power to recognise 'Azzān, and before long the opportunity for doing so as an emergency measure had passed away.

* To avoid allusion to the personal aspect of these difficulties was impossible without conveying a false impression. It is clear from the Government records that the attitude of Colonel Disbrowe towards 'Azzān and his strained relations with Colonel Pelly, to whom he was only partially subordinate, were a principal cause of the troubles of 1869. In fairness to Colonel Disbrowe it should be added that, in the opinion of Government, he was not alone to blame for the differences between himself and Colonel Pelly.

The "Bullfinch" incident, March 1870.

In March 1870 a boat belonging to H.M.S. "Bullfinch" was fired on in Masqat harbour; but the occurrence was shown to be due partly to a mistake by the garrison and partly to the neglect of the boat to carry a light after dark, as required by the regulations of Masqat harbour; consequently the harmonious relations which now prevailed were not disturbed.

Discussions regarding the recognition of 'Azzān continued till interrupted by his death, 1870-71.

At length, in May 1870, the Government of India submitted the question of the recognition of 'Azzān to the Secretary of State, with especial reference to the terms and conditions on which it might be granted; in particular they desired to know whether, in case of recognition, all previous treaties with the ruler of 'Omān should be maintained; whether continuance of the Zanzibar subsidy should be guaranteed; whether the good offices of Britain with Persia should be promised in connection with the lease of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, which had lapsed by the displacement from power of Sa'id-bin-Sultān's descendants; and whether the responsibility of mediating for the restoration of Gwādar and Chahbār to 'Omān should be assumed. Before these difficult questions could be resolved, the situation in 'Omān had been entirely altered by the appearance of Turki on the scene; and at the time of his death the Sultanate of 'Azzān was still officially unrecognised by the British Government.

History of the Zanzibar subsidy during the reign of 'Azzān.

During the whole of his reign 'Azzān received nothing on account of the Zanzibar subsidy, nor was anything paid to his successor on account of the period during which 'Azzān had ruled. The non-recognition of 'Azzān's government was not the sole cause of this omission. Mājid, the Sultān of Zanzibar, found in the usurpation of 'Azzān a fresh excuse for not discharging his liabilities under the award of 1861; from May 1868 he discontinued his payments; and about the end of that year he sent a mission to England to remonstrate against the obligations to which he had been subjected. Her Majesty's Government, who were anxious at this time to obtain from Mājid certain facilities for the suppression of the slave trade, encouraged him through his envoy to hope for release from the payment of the subsidy. A long discussion followed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India, in which the latter maintained that there had been no change of circumstances which could be held to invalidate Lord Canning's award; that justice and good faith required the British Government either to enforce against the Sultān of Zanzibar the award which they had imposed on the Sultān of 'Omān, or to set the latter free to prosecute his claims on Zanzibar

by all means in his power; and, finally, that good policy obliged the British Government to insist on continued execution of the award, inasmuch as failure to do so would bring all their arbitral decisions between native powers in that part of the world into contempt and would greatly weaken the 'Omān Sultanate, which in the interests of Britain ought rather to be strengthened. The Government of India also combated a suggestion that, if it were found necessary to continue the subsidy, the burden of payment should be transferred from the Sultān of Zanzibar to themselves: such a charge, they contended, could not fairly be cast upon the Indian revenues, because it would procure for India no new advantages in 'Omān or elsewhere, and would be in effect a financial measure for the suppression of the African slave trade,—a matter in which India was not concerned. The question was not finally settled in the lifetime of 'Azzān; but in 1870 hopes were held out to Saiyid Mājid by Her Majesty's Government that the arrangements existing under the arbitration of 1861 would soon be declared at an end.

In connection with the Zanzibar subsidy question we may mention that in December 1869 there were rumours of a descent contemplated by 'Azzān upon Zanzibar; and that, upon another occasion during the reign of 'Azzān, the British authorities found it necessary to warn Mājid against harbouring designs on Masqat.

Character and administration of 'Azzān.

'Azzān may perhaps be justly regarded as the most meritorious and the most unfortunate among recent sovereigns of 'Omān. Such leadership and manly resolution as his had not been witnessed at Masqat since the days of Sultān-bin-Ahmad; nor had he been approached by either of his immediate predecessors in energy or in determination to rule. He had many disadvantages to contend against, not the least being the character of the associates by whom he was carried into power and the dissensions that prevailed among them; but, as his authority became consolidated, the influence of religious fanaticism in his councils declined, and he always showed much skill in maintaining an outward agreement between his rival advisers, the Khalīli and Sālih-bin-'Ali, Hārithi. The rule of 'Azzān was strong; but its centralising tendency was distasteful to his subjects, and it could only be maintained by great severity. The forts of Masqat in his time swarmed with political prisoners and the town with hostages; and the Ghāfiri faction as a whole disliked and were distrusted by him. In general his government was abhorred from the first by the townsmen, who were completely in his power; while the tribesmen became alienated from it gradually, as they discovered its absolutist ten-

dencies. But for the refusal of British recognition, the consequent loss of the Zanzibar subsidy, and the release by the Indian Government of his most dangerous rival Turki, it is possible that 'Azzān might nevertheless have surmounted all his difficulties and reduced 'Omān, for a time at least, to the semblance of a well-ordered monarchy.

SAIYID TURKI-BIN-SA'ĪD.

1871-88.

Events in 'Omān from Turki's accession to his temporary retirement, 1871-75.

Capitulation of 'Azzān's supporters, February 1871.

After the death of 'Azzān-bin-Qais and Saif-bin-Sulaimān at Matrah, operations were continued by the surviving leaders upon either side, and by the 3rd of February the town of Masqat was in the possession of Turki's adherents, a number of whom belonged to the Hishm tribe; but the Khalili still held out in the forts. Meanwhile Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, had arrived on the spot, and a day or two later Turki, whom Sālih-bin-'Ali had successfully held in check at Samad, appeared at Masqat to profit by the success of his supporters. An armistice having been arranged, the Khalili consented to surrender the forts to Turki upon certain terms, of which the principal were that members of the late government should not be molested by the new, and that their official acts should be ratified, and their public liabilities assumed, by their successors. A written agreement was accordingly drawn up and was attested by Colonel Pelly and by Major Way, the Political Agent at Masqat, as witnesses. It was fortunate that the British officers concerned took the precaution of explaining that they assumed no responsibility for the subsequent observance of the agreement by either party; for, less than a month after, the death of the Khalili took place in circumstances indicative of foul play and was followed within 48 hours by the death of his son also.

Position of Turki at the commencement of his reign, 1871.

As matters now stood, Turki was master of Masqat, Matrah and Sūr, and the commanders of a number of the forts in the interior of 'Omān had declared for him; but Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, the brother of the deceased 'Azzān, from his headquarters at Sohār ruled the whole Bātinah coast

between Shināṣ and Masna'ah, both of which were in his hands; the Rustāq valley was held by 'Azzān's cousin Faisal-bin-Hamūd; and some Wahhābis, profiting by divisions among the Na'im, had reoccupied the Baraimi fort. The most serious competitor for the sovereignty of 'Omān, however, appeared at first to be Sālim-bin-Thuwaini, the ex-Sultān, who was now living in exile at Qishm; and even greater disquiet was before long to be caused to Turki by 'Abdul 'Aziz, his own younger brother, who at first joined him as one of his dependents. The decisive battles of Dhank and Matrah had been won for Turki chiefly by Ghāfiri tribesmen, and it was upon the loyalty of the Ghāfiris that the new sovereign in the beginning of his reign chiefly relied.

Recovery by Turki from Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais of Shināṣ, Liwa, Masna'ah, Suwaiq and Khābūrah in Bātinah, but not of Sohār, 1871.

The recovery of the Sohār principality was the first task to which Turki addressed himself. On his first expedition, in May and June 1871, Shināṣ was taken; but Sohār town, though besieged, made a successful resistance. A second effort in August 1871, in which the Shaikh of Dibai participated, resulted in the capture of Liwa; and the walls of Sohār Town also were breached and the place was about to be stormed, when the followers of Turki, true to the 'Omāni predilection for a balance of power, insisted on a compromise by which Sallān and Khābūrah with all intermediate places on the Bātinah coast (including Sohār) should be retained by Ibrāhīm, while the remainder (including Masna'ah and Suwaiq) were transferred to Turki. In this position matters remained until November 1871, when Turki, who had now been strengthened by British recognition of his Sultanate, succeeded in taking Khābūrah.

Movements of 'Abdul 'Aziz, Sālih-bin-'Ali and Sālim, 1871-72.

Meanwhile in June 1871, 'Abdul 'Aziz, after declining the command of the Sohār expedition which was offered to him, had established himself at Gwādar in virtual independence of his brother; and rivalry and opposition, which only the impecuniosity and personal insignificance of the malcontents prevented from becoming a danger to Turki's rule, now sprang up on every side. At the end of the year Sālih-bin-'Ali was fostering disaffection among the Hināwi tribes of the Sharqiyah District and had opened a treasonable correspondence with Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais; 'Abdul 'Aziz, by means of emissaries sent from Gwādar, was carrying on intrigues throughout 'Omān; and Sālim at Qishm was meditating a coalition with Ibrāhīm, whose sister he had received in marriage. In February 1872, Sālim, after an interview *en route* with Ibrāhim, landed at Sūr; but on Turki following him to that place, which is a stronghold of the Ghāfiris, he decamped to the country of the Bani Bū Hasan in the interior.

Renewed struggle in Bāṭinah, 1872.

In the spring of 1872 Ibrāhīm succeeded in repossessing himself of Majīs and Shināṣ, and laid siege to Liwa; but the forces of the Sultān inflicted a severe defeat on him in the Dabbāgh quarter of the latter town and the places which had been lost were recovered.

Departure of 'Abdul Aziz and Sālim to India, loss of Khābūrah, recovery of Gwādar and loss of Chahbār, 1872.

About the same time Sālim, operating from a base in Ja'alān, attempted to seize Sūr; but this attempt also was foiled. At the beginning of May, in the absence at Bombay of Saiyid 'Abdul 'Azīz, a detachment of Wahhābi mercenaries was sent over to Gwādar and re-occupied the place in the name of Turki; but in the meanwhile Chahbār had passed irretrievably out of the possession of 'Abdul 'Azīz into that of Persia. The course of events in autumn was less favourable to the Sultān; for in September Sālim made a raid upon Quryāt, in which the Wāli of that place was wounded, and then again threatened Sūr, while Khābūrah fell once more into the hands of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais. At the end of the year the situation again improved, for Sālim, having failed to raise a party in 'Omān, left Sūr in a native sailing boat for Bombay.

Recovery by the Sultān of the whole of the Bātinah coast, 1873.

In July 1873 Turki, fortified by the renewal in his favour of the Zanzibar subsidy and assisted by the Na'im tribe, felt himself strong enough to undertake the reduction of Sohār; and on this occasion Ibrāhīm, who a short time before had received the fort of Hazam also as a gift from his relative Hamūd-bin-Faisal of Rustāq, surrendered after an investment of a few days only. The entire Bātinah coast was ceded to Turki, while Ibrāhīm in return merely received a bonus of $5,000 and a pension of $100 a month, the latter conditional upon his living at or near Hibi, the only place of strength that remained to him of his former possessions.

Renewed activity of the rebels, attacks on Gwādar, and deportation of 'Abdul 'Azīz to India, 1873.

Immediately after this success of the Sultān the rebel party again became very active. 'Abdul 'Azīz and Sālim having left Bombay in separate Baghlahs about the end of May, the former, towards the close of July, invested Gwādar and nearly succeeded in capturing it. In August an attempt was made by Sālih-bin-'Ali to advance on Masqat; but it was frustrated by the Ghāfiri Nidābiyīn and Rahbiyīn, who prevented his passage through Wādi-al-'Aqq; and a contingent of Āl Wahībah, whom Sālih had sent in advance, found themselves in a somewhat precarious position under the walls of Matrah. In September 'Abdul 'Aziz was captured at sea near Sūr by the Political Agent, Major Mockler, in H.M.S. "Rifleman", and was deported to Karāchi, where he was kept in honourable detention; a warrant under Regulation III of 1818 was however prepared, in case he should at any time attempt to escape or to abuse his comparative freedom. A little later the partial advantages gained by Turki were countervailed by the

retirement of Hamūd-bin-Faisal of Rustāq into private life and the succession to his place of Ibrāhim-bin-Qais, for from this time onwards the rebellious line of Qais had their chief seat in the inaccessible Rustāq valley, instead of upon the coast. On the 8th of December 1873 Gwādar was taken by Sālim, who appeared there unexpectedly with a handful of followers and escaladed the fort, possibly with the connivance of the Wali; but his tenure of the place, as will appear from the history of Gwādar, lasted only three days, after which he became once more a homeless wanderer.

Towards the end of 1873 Turki, who at the time was unmarried, espoused the daughter of his cousin Hamad-bin-Sālim.

First rebel attack on Masqat, January 1874.

At the beginning of 1874, Turki being at the time prostrated by sickness, Sālih-bin-'Ali, on a false report of his death, marched from the Sharqiyah district on Masqat with a force of 300 tribesmen, chiefly Hirth, Habūs, Hajriyīn and Āl Wahībah, among whom were also a few Bani Ruwāhah. As a candidate for the succession Sālih brought with him Hamūd, a son of the late ruler 'Azzān-bin-Qais, whose age was about 12 years. The 'Aqq pass having been denied them by its Ghāfiri custodians, Sālih's Hināwi force took the Qahza route and arrived at Ruwi, entirely unexpected, on the 17th of January. A small detachment of Wahhābi mercenaries sent out to attack them was defeated with loss, and the rebels then took possession of Matrah; they respected the fort of the Khōjahs, over which floated the British flag, but they plundered indiscriminately in the bazaars, and part of the damage so caused fell upon British Indian subjects. Arrangements were made by the British authorities to support Turki in resisting the further progress of the rebels; but the necessary means were not immediately at hand, and the Sultān preferred to treat with the enemy rather than to protract matters till ships could arrive. On the 20th of January terms were arranged by the Sultān at Masqat with Hamūd-bin-Sa'id, Jahafi, of the Āl Wahībah tribe, afterwards a celebrated freebooter and rebel. The principal conditions on which the insurgents promised to retire were that they should receive $6,000 in cash and 100 bags of rice; that sales of confiscated property made by the Government of 'Azzān-bin-Qais to the Hirth and Bani Ruwāhah should be confirmed; that the property of the Khalili should be restored to his family; and that the proceedings of the rebels themselves should be condoned; a stipulation also was added against any attack by the Sultān on Ibrāhim-bin-Qais, whom Sālih-bin-'Ali undertook to restrain. H.M.S. "Nimble" arrived at Masqat on the 22nd of January; but it was too late, for the terms had been ratified and the rebels were already evacuating Matrah. The undertaking given by the Sultān to recognise the confis-

cations of 'Azzān gave great offence to the Ghafiri tribes especially to those of Wādi Samā'il who had been largely despoiled; and where the Ghāfiris were strong, as at Nakhl, they flatly refused to respect it.

Masna'ah and Suwaiq occupied by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, but recovered for the Sultān by British action, 1874.

This episode was hardly over when Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, whose capital was now in Rustāq, began to move once more in Bātinah: on the 6th of March 1874 he took the town of Masna'ah and laid siege to the fort. Ibrāhīm was supported by Muhammad-bin-Salaiyim, Ghāribi, the most influential Mutawwa' of Bātinah; the Yāl Sa'ad, the largest tribe in that district, flocked to his standard in ever-increasing numbers; and fears began to be entertained for the safety of Barkah and even of Masqat. The fort of Masna'ah surrendered after one week's siege: but Major Miles, the British Political Agent, when the rebels persisted in occupying it in defiance of his request that they should await the pleasure of the British Government, caused them to be driven out by shell fire from H.M.S. "Philomel". On the 26th of March Colonel Ross, Resident in the Persian Gulf, arrived with Major Miles at Masna'ah and demanded the evacuation of the fort, which the rebels had in the meantime re-occupied; and, the demand having been complied with, the work was dismantled by the guns of H.M.S. "Rifleman" and "Philomel" to such an extent as to render it untenable. In the beginning of June the Yāl Sa'ad captured Suwaiq, from which place however British Indian subjects had previously been removed as a measure of precaution, and plundered the bazaar; but Major Miles, having proceeded to the spot in H.M.S. "Magpie", obliged the insurgents to withdraw. The rebellion in Bātinah then collapsed, leaving no trace behind except a considerable bill on account of the losses sustained by British Indian subjects at Masna'ah, one of whom had been killed in the disturbances there: the subsequent proceedings in connection with this claim are described in a later paragraph. Ibrāhīm after this succeeded in possessing himself of 'Awābi; but eventually, about the end of 1874 or beginning of 1875, he made nominal submission to the Sultān, and was allowed to retain Rustāq, besides obtaining from the Sultān a pension of $100 a month.

Abdul Aziz permitted to return from India, May 1874.

The difficulty of facing such crisis as had occurred without the help of a single influential or disinterested adviser had disposed Turki to a reconciliation with his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz, and about the beginning of May 1874 the exile was permitted to return from Karāchi to Masqat, in time to render good service in the recovery of compensation for their misdeeds from the Yāl Sa'ad.

Hināwi-Ghāfiri disturbances, 1874-75.

Nevertheless disorganisation, due to the ill-health, indecision and occasional faithlessness of Turki, continued to spread during 1874; and in 1875 even the capital was affected. In August of 1874 difficulties

between the Hināwi and Ghāfiri tribes in Wādi Samāil became so acute that the Sultān was obliged to proceed in person to the spot; but the settlement that he arranged was unacceptable to the Ghāfiris, and their submission to it was insincere and of short duration. Fighting between the two great factions was already in progress at Izki, Birkat-al-Mōz and Nizwa in 'Omān Proper, and later it broke out at Yanqul in Dhāhirah. Meanwhile the Sultān, who from day to day was falling more and more under the influence of the Hināwis, had greatly weakened his position at Masqat by the dismissal of a large part of his reliable Wahhābi mercenaries and by the substitution for them of ordinary Hināwi tribesmen,—a measure in itself sufficient to incapacitate him for impartial authoritative intervention between tribe and tribe. In February 1875 open war was declared between the Ghāfiris and Hināwis of Wādi Samāil; irreparable mischief was done by the Ghāfiris in felling large numbers of date trees belonging to the Hināwis; and the feud was not composed until June, when the Ya'āqib of Ibri intervened and persuaded the parties reciprocally to withdraw their claims.

Insubordination of Banī Bū Hasan guards and insolence of Al Wahībah tribesmen, 1875.

In May 1875 a dispute occurred at the capital between the Sultān and the Banī Bū Hasan, who were now strongly represented in the garrisons of the Masqat forts; and, while 'Abdul 'Aziz conciliated the offended tribe by granting, under his brother's authority, all their demands, the Sultān hid himself on a merchant ship in the harbour. After this incident Turki, who was physically indisposed and mentally depressed, would have abdicated his authority altogether, had he not been dissuaded by Colonel Miles and 'Abdul 'Aziz. At the beginning of July an estrangement took place between Turki and his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz in consequence of the indulgence shown by the former to Numaish, an unworthy favourite, and to Hamūd-bin-Sa'īd the Jahafi; and a number of the Al Wahībah took advantage of the circumstance to occupy Masqat and Matrah, and to demand various concessions, of which the most serious was the permanent retention of themselves in the Sultān's military service.

Retirement of Turki to Gwādar, August 1875.

Matters were brought to a crisis on the 10th of August by a rupture between Turki and 'Abdul 'Aziz. The latter had demanded the dismissal of the Balūch garrisons from the Masqat forts on the ground that they were fraudulently kept below strength by the responsible commandants; when this demand was refused, he resigned office; and Turki for a few days carried on the administration alone. A rising then occurred of Bedouins who were anxious to take the place of the Balūchis, and Turki was obliged to hand over the forts of Jalāli and Mīrāni to the malcontents. Disgusted with the course of affairs and feeling himself unable to maintain the contest, Turki now went on board his corvette the "Rahmāni,"

leaving 'Abdul 'Aziz to struggle as best he could with the prevailing anarchy. On the 21st of August 1875, having assured Colonel Miles that he would return if circumstances permitted, and having formally appointed 'Abdul 'Aziz to act for him, Turki left for Gwādar in H.M.S. "Rifleman".

Turki's internal administration, 1871-75.

Political and military causes of Turki's initial want of success.

The ill-success of Turki as a ruler was a severe disappointment to many, including the British authorities, by whom his accession had been regarded with complacency. The energy and military qualities by which he had attained the Sultanate soon became foreign to his character; and the support of the Ghāfiri tribes, to which he chiefly owed his position, almost as quickly ceased. The chief causes of his failure were probably ill-health and the success of Sālih-bin-'Alī's sudden attack on Masqat in 1874; the latter showed the Sultān's power to be without real foundation, and induced him to exchange the friendship of the Ghāfiris for that of the Hināwis, whom he had come to regard as the more dangerous. His independent military resources, consisting originally of a few hundred Wahhābis and Balūchis, were never considerable; and he consented, as we have seen, to reduce them to a still lower level at the dictation of the Hināwis, thus cancelling his own authority and virtually handing the capital over to Bedouin control.

Turki's early advisers.

Some of Saiyid Turki's worst mistakes might have been averted had he possessed a trustworthy minister and been willing to defer to his opinion; but the fact is clear, though not fully accounted for, that his position from the beginning was one of isolation. His first Wazir, a man of evil character named Thuwaini-bin-Muhammad, was dismissed by him in 1872 for complicity in the murder of Nāsir-bin-'Alī, Wāli of Masqat, and was assassinated a year later by a slave of his supposed victim. After the removal of Thuwaini, Turki fell into the hands of Maish or Numaish, an unscrupulous adviser of low origin, who after three years in the Sultān's service was believed to have amassed a fortune of $40,000. The return of 'Abdul 'Aziz, especially as it had been voluntarily sought by the Sultān, might have been expected to put an end to the unsatisfactory state of affairs; but 'Abdul 'Aziz, though animated by a sincere devotion to his brother's interests, was never after the first fully trusted by him, and had to contend on unequal terms, almost up to the time of Turki's departure for Gwādar, against the hostile influence of Maish.

Turki did not display during the first part of his reign any of that skill and patience in dealing with the tribes of 'Omān for which in his later years he obtained a considerable reputation; and large sums from the Zanzibar subsidy, and from other sources, were squandered by him in indiscriminate subsidies and ineffectual bribes.

Personal defects of the Sultān, due to inexperience.

Turki's relations with the British Government, 1871-75.

Turki, perhaps in consequence of his two years' residence in the Bombay Presidency, during which he may have had opportunities of recommending himself and his claims to notice, was from the beginning a *persona grata* with the British Government and their agents. His recognition as ruler of 'Omān was recommended without delay, sanctioned by the Secretary of State in June 1871, and communicated to Turki himself on the 8th of August following.

Recognition of Turki as Sultān, 1871.

The transference, at the beginning of 1873, of the Persian Gulf Residency and Masqat Agency from the charge of the Government of Bombay to the direct supervision of the Government of India had no unfavourable effect upon British relations with the new Sultān; and the unhesitating signature by Turki in April 1873 of a new treaty for the suppression of the slave trade, proposed at Masqat by Sir Bartle Frere as plenipotentiary of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, contrasted favourably with the behaviour of Barghash-bin-Sa'īd, Sultān of Zanzibar, who declined to treat on the subject, and gave Turki a higher place than before in the good graces of the British authorities.

British anti-Slave Trade Treaty, 1873.

The renewal of the annual subsidy of $40,000, formerly paid by the Sultān of Zanzibar under Lord Canning's award of 1861, had been held out, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, as an inducement to Turki to sign the new treaty, and payment of the same was now resumed by the Government of India with effect from the date of Turki's accession, the Sultān being at the same time informed that it would be maintained "so long as he continued faithfully to fulfil his treaty engagements and manifest his friendship towards the British Government". From this time onwards until 1883, the cost of the subsidy, which in commemoration of its origin may still be called the

Regrant and disposal of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, 1871-75.

"Zanzibar" subsidy,* was divided, like the other expenses of the Zanzibar Agency, in equal moieties between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India. Between the 26th of April and the 6th of November 1873 the amounts due under the new arrangement were paid to Turki; but his disposal of the money, though it possibly enabled him to recover Sohār, was generally injudicious, and, so far from procuring him any solid advantages, appeared to inflame rather than to satisfy the cupidity of the tribes and of their untrustworthy leaders.

British naval and political support at Gwādar, Masna'ah and Sīnaiq, 1873-74.

Besides the indispensable financial support thus afforded to Turki he received, on various occasions, valuable naval and political assistance from the Government of India. On the 1st of September 1873, when 'Abdul 'Azīz and Sālim were disturbing the country in the neighbourhood of Gwādar, they were warned that, if after rejecting certain terms which had been offered them by Turki they attempted either to cross to 'Omān or to make their way to the Persian Gulf, the British Government would endeavour to arrest them; and, as already related, 'Abdul 'Azīz was actually captured under these orders and interned in India. In 1874, on the occasion of Sālih-bin-'Alī's attack on Matrah, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was authorised, on condition of abstaining from operations ashore, to lend Turki active assistance by naval fire wherever it could be brought to bear. These instructions, as we have seen, or at least the means of their execution, did not arrive until the crisis that elicited them was over; but they remained in force for some time after as standing orders. The original expulsion of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais's adherents from Masna'ah, in March 1874, was undertaken on his own responsibility by Major Miles, the Political Agent at Masqat, before the orders of Government on the Bātinah rebellion had been received; but eventually the instructions relating to Masqat and Matrah were given a wider application, and the expulsion of the rebels for the second time from the Masna'ah fort was covered by a general permission

* The discussions between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India in 1868-70 (see page 490 *ante*), in which the former impugned, and the latter maintained, the indefeasible right of the Sultān of 'Omān to a subsidy under the Award of 1861, did not result in any definite conclusion. Therefore the subsidy of which payment to Turki began in 1873 may be regarded either as a new subsidy or as a continuation of that decreed by Lord Canning; but the latter view, which is in harmony with the arguments used by the Government of India in 1868-70, appears the juster, and the name "Zanzibar" will accordingly continue to be employed in this Gazetteer, though with inverted commas to mark the doubt. The fresh conditions annexed to the subsidy by the Government of India in 1873,—namely fulfilment of treaty engagements and friendship to the British Government—seem inconsistent with the previous admission by that Government of the unqualified right of the Sultān of 'Omān to the subsidy so long as he should be restrained from attacking Zanzibar.

from Government to give Turki active support so far as guns from the sea could reach. The withdrawal of the Yāl Sa'ad from Suwaiq in June 1874 was likewise the result of a British naval demonstration made under the same extended orders.

Subsequent modified policy, 1875.

At the beginning of 1875, the incompetence of Turki having become fully apparent, the Government of India adopted a more reserved policy in 'Omān and instructed their representatives to avoid interference in the dynastic and internal affairs of the country and to confine themselves to the exercise of good offices merely. More stringent conditions were at the same time attached to the employment of armed force by the local British authorities in support of the Sultān. In accordance with the new policy no persistent endeavour was made to restrain Turki from abdication; and, when he finally did retire, British action at Masqat was restricted to arrangements for the safety of British subjects in case of disturbances.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omān, 1871-75.

It only remains, in connection with British relations, to describe the manner in which losses sustained by British subjects in the political disturbances of the period were from time to time made good.

Sohar claims 1872.

At the beginning of 1872, some Hindu traders having been maltreated and subjected to extortion by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais at Sohār, which place was not then in the power of Turki, the British authorities themselves undertook to enforce reparation. Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Gulf, himself proceeded to Sohār in April 1872 on H. M. S. "Quantung," assessed the losses after inquiry at $2,255, and returned after recovering half of the amount in cash and obtaining a bond for the remainder.

Matrah claims, 1874.

Compensation for the losses suffered by British subjects in the capture of Matrah by Sālih-bin-'Alī in January 1874 was paid by the Sultān himself, as Government held that by making terms with the rebels he had condoned the insurrection and rendered himself responsible for its consequences.

Masna'ah claims, 1874.

In the Masna'ah case, in which the compensation was fixed at $15,000, the Sultān was warned against a premature reconciliation with the delinquents; and in July 1874 Colonel Ross, Political Resident, and Major Miles, Political Agent, proceeded again to Masna'ah in the "May Frere" with H.M.S. "Philomel", "Nimble" and "Magpie" and the Sultān's corvette "Rahmāni", the last carrying Saiyid 'Abdul 'Azīz, whom Turki had empowered to negotiate on his behalf. The fort at Masna'ah was found partially repaired and garrisoned for the third time by Ibrāhīm's men; but on the 19th of

July a few shots from the "Philomel" and the support of the men-of-war's boats enabled 'Abdul 'Aziz to land and occupy it without resistance. Negotiations between 'Abdul 'Azīz and the Yāl Sa'ad followed, and it was at length arranged that $5,000 (or one-third of the amount due) should be paid by the Sultān on condition of the Yāl Sa'ad returning to their allegiance to him, and that the remainder should be collected by the Yāl Sa'ad within 70 days. This settlement received the assent of the Government of India; but it was not fully or punctually carried out, for in the end $400 due from the Yāl Sa'ad was remitted, and notwithstanding the remission payment was only completed in January 1875.

Kuria Muria Islands case, 1875.

After the disposal of the Masna'ah affair another case, arising out of the wrongful confinement and subsequent release on ransom at Hallāniyah Island of subjects of the Rāo of Kach, claimed attention: the offenders in this instance were Bani Bū 'Ali of the Ja'afarah section, belonging to Lashkharah on the South-East Coast of 'Omān. Major Miles went to Lashkharah in H. M. S. "Philomel"; and, as the surrender of the actual offenders could not be obtained, a fine of $600 was imposed and was readily paid at Sūr by some Shaikhs of the Bani Bū 'Ali who represented themselves as having been authorised by the Ja'afarah to act on their behalf. A more considerable claim which had its origin at Sūr in June 1875 was not settled, as will be related further on, until 1877.

Regency of 'Abdul 'Aziz, August to December 1875.

Hināwi satisfaction and Ghāfri discontent.

The position of the regent after his brother's departure was in no way enviable, for the Masqat treasury was empty and the forts were held by a discontented tribal soldiery whose pay was in arrears; but 'Abdul 'Aziz showed energy and good sense in coping with the difficulties of the situation. The leading men of both factions received friendly invitations to visit Masqat, and a number of them, chiefly Hināwis, responded to the summons, while the turbulent Bedouins were treated with a judicious parsimony which had an excellent effect on the public finances. The general character of the new régime was, after the first, Hināwi and fanatical; for Sālih-bin-'Ali, arriving from Sharqiyah at the head of 400 men, became the principal adviser of 'Abdul 'Aziz, while the Mutawwa's, flocking into Masqat, usurped municipal authority and placed an interdict on dancing and prostitution. The prospect of exclusion from

influence and of subjection to their rivals now alarmed the Ghāfiri tribes, and the Bani Riyām, Bani Jābir, Jannabah and Bani Bū 'Ali prepared to repudiate the authority of the regent. Badar-bin-Saif, Wāli of Sohār, also made ready to resist, with the help of the Na'im tribe, any attempt to coerce him that might be made from headquarters. At the beginning of October, after a month's residence at Masqat, Sālih-bin-'Ali left for Sharqiyah, ostensibly in order to protect the interests of the government there. A visit of more than three weeks' duration was paid to 'Abdul 'Aziz in October by Zāid-bin-Khalifah, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who promised to support his interests.

Deportation of Sālim to India.

At this juncture the arrest was effected at sea, by British naval agency, of the ex-Sultān Sālim-bin-Thuwaini, who since his escapade at Gwādar in December 1873 had resided at Qishm on a pension of $150 a month from Turki. Having left his Persian retreat for 'Omān, Sālim was captured off the Suwādi islands by H.M.S. "Daphne" on the 10th or 11th of October; his excuse for disregarding the previous warnings of the British Government was that he had come to arrange for the continuance of the pension that had been paid him by Turki; but he had with him two Baghlahs and about 40 men, and it was believed that he had meant to land at Hail Āl 'Umair in Bātinah and thence to make a dash on Masqat. He was accordingly removed to India and kept at Haidarābād in Sind, under conditions similar to those under which 'Abdul 'Aziz had been detained at Karāchi; but he died of small-pox in the following year.

Relations of the regent with the British representative.

Colonel Miles, the British representative at Masqat, maintained, with the approval of Government, a somewhat distant attitude in his relations with the regency, and more than one request by 'Abdul 'Aziz for pecuniary assistance was refused, the Zanzibar subsidy being continued instead to Turki at Gwādar; confidential orders however were given that, if in a grave emergency at Masqat 'Abdul 'Aziz should prefer a written request for help in the name of his brother Turki, it should be complied with in the accustomed manner, as if emanating from Turki himself. It seems probable, from various indications, that only the fear of non-recognition by the British Government restrained 'Abdul 'Aziz from declaring himself ruler of 'Omān in his own right.

Sudden return of Turki from Gwādar and end of the regency, December 1875.

Towards the end of the year returning health and spirits decided Turki to resume the personal administration of 'Omān; but the manner of his reappearance was peculiar, for, instead of acquainting his deputy with his intentions, he landed clandestinely at Matrah from a native boat on the 13th of December, 'Abdul 'Aziz being then absent

at Hisn Samāil where he had gone for the purpose of replacing a Ghāfiri garrison by one of Balūchis. The fort guards at Matrah, who were partly Balūchis, acknowledged Turki without hesitation and put him in possession of the place; but the Bani Bū Hasan holders of the Masqat forts declined to admit him to the capital without orders from 'Abdul 'Aziz; and the latter, probably alarmed by Turki's extraordinary conduct, sent them orders to hold out until he should himself arrive to their assistance. On the 19th of December, Turki, having received Ghāfiri reinforcements from Nakhl and a few Wahhābis from the faithful Wāli of Sohār, occupied the heights above Masqat town; and on the 21st, after two days of harmless skirmishing with the defenders, he entered the place unopposed. The forts held out for a few days more and then surrendered. Turki had been joined soon after his arrival at Matrah by the notorious Hamūd-bin-Sa'īd, Jahafi, with 30 men.

British flag incident.

An incident of these operations was the improper use by Turki's adherents of the British flag, which they hoisted on a boat sent by Turki from Matrah with a letter to Colonel Miles. The boat was fired on, as it passed, by the Masqat forts; but, an ample apology having been made by both sides for the impropriety of which they had been guilty, the matter was allowed to drop.

Events in 'Omān from the return of Turki to the attack, by Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Aziz, on Masqat, 1876-83.

The second portion of the reign of Turki was not free from disturbances caused by Sālih-bin-'Ali, Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, and other lesser malcontents; but his authority did not again sustain any severe shock.

'Abdul 'Aziz driven into the interior, 1876.

'Abdul 'Aziz was soon abandoned by his adherents and found himself obliged to retire from Hisn Samāil to Samad. The Samāil fort continued for a short time to be held in his name by a garrison of the Bani Ruwāhah tribe; but, after some fighting beneath the walls in which a good many casualties occurred on both sides, it surrendered and was occupied by a garrison of the Sultān's Balūchis. Various negotiations then took place for an understanding between the two brothers; and in March 1876 Colonel Miles, the Political Agent, who had assumed the *rôle* of intermediary, had a meeting with 'Abdul 'Aziz at Quryāt. 'Abdul 'Aziz, however, would agree to no settlement which involved his removal

from 'Omân ; and Turki on the other hand refused to grant him terms except on condition of his residing out of the country.

Raid on Bâtinah by Hamûd the Jahafi, 1876.

The principal event of 1876, however, was a serious incursion into the Sultân's territories by Hamûd-bin-Sa'îd the Jahafi. This pestilent rascal, who had been imprisoned by Turki in April, was very imprudently released at the request of Sâlih-bin-'Ali in July ; and in September he descended from Sharqiyah on the Bâtinah accompanied by a gang of marauders, without the approval, it would seem, on this occasion of either Sâlih-bin-'Ali or Ibrâhim-bin-Qais. Passing through Rustâq he committed depredations at Jammah, all but captured the Sultan's second son Faisal and favourite Numaish at Tarif, and so reached Sîb ; but, on finding that the British Indian traders there had withdrawn leaving little booty behind, he plundered the bazaar of what it contained and proceeded to Saham, securing at the latter place some property of Hindus which the owners had not time to remove or to conceal. Hamûd next joined himself to the Ma'âwal of Wâdi Ma'âwal, whose relations with the Sultân had always been bad—chiefly on account of lands confiscated by 'Azzân-bin-Qais and bought in by the Ma'awal at a low price—and who at this time were in overt rebellion. The people of Nakhl and Samâil, however, having come to blows with the Ma'âwal and inflicted severe loss upon them, the intervention of the Sultân was sought ; and he seized the opportunity to obtain the expulsion of Hamûd from the Ma'âwal country.

Second rebel attack on Masqat, June 1877.

In 1877 a fresh attempt was made on Masqat by the discontented subjects of the Sultân. The moving spirit as usual was Sâlih-bin-'Ali, assisted by the Mutawwa' party, and an attempt was made to give the movement a creditable appearance by alleging "His Highness's irreligiousness and laxity of morals" as the chief cause of popular dissatisfaction. The approach of the rebels was announced by a letter from Sâlih-bin-'Ali which reached Mr. Robertson, the Acting Political Agent at Masqat, on the 9th of June. Mr. Robertson was entirely new to his position, and H.M.S. "Teazer" had left the port the day before ; but Colonel Miles was still at Masqat, and Mr. Robertson acted in consultation with him in the crisis which followed. On the 14th of June the rebels, notwithstanding a written remonstrance from the Political Agent, pushed on to Matrah and occupied that town unopposed ; not, however, before Mr. Robertson and Colonel Miles had removed the Hindu traders of the place with their valuables to boats in the harbour. The Khôjahs at this time desired to remain in their fort, where they considered themselves safe. Sâlih had failed to persuade 'Abdul 'Aziz to join him upon this occasion, but he was accompanied by Hamûd the Jahafi ;

the bulk of his force consisted of Āl Wahībah, but the Hirth, Habūs, Hajriyin, Bani Bū Hasan and Bani Ruwahah were also represented, of whom the Hajriyin had been among the most consistent supporters of Saiyid Turki's father. The Masākirah gave money aid to the rebels on this occasion, but sent no men to join them. On the 15th of June H. M. S. "Teazer" opportunely returned to Masqat: and on the 17th Ibrāhim-bin-Qais joined the rebel camp. The insurgents, who numbered at least 1,000 men while the defenders of Masqat did not exceed 200, appeared on the evening of the 17th to be advancing to the assault; and, after a warning had been sent them, H. M. S. "Teazer" at the request of the Sultān threw some shells into the valley behind the town. A few rounds were fired at night also to alarm the rebels and prevent their gathering for an attack. On the next day the "Teazer" ran round to Matrah and dislodged some rebel sharpshooters whose fire from adjacent houses was galling the garrison of the fort; and advantage was taken of the opportunity to oblige all British subjects in the Khōjah fort to leave it and go on board vessels: the "Teazer" then returned to Masqat, where she repeated the artillery demonstration of the previous day with the same satisfactory effect. On the 19th of June the rebels opened communication with the Sultān; but he refused to discuss matters unless they retired to Ruwi, which they accordingly did. On the 20th the "Teazer" carried Turki to Matrah, whence he proceeded to Bait-al-Falaj for an interview with Sālih-bin-'Ali; the latter demanded $20,000 as the price of his retirement, but the Sultān was firm in his refusal to pay anything. During their occupation of Matrah various atrocities had been committed by the rebels, including the murder of children and of unarmed negroes. On the 21st of June the Mutawwa' force broke up, Sālih returning to Samad and Ibrāhīm to Ustāq; but Hamūd the Jahafi lingered for some days in Wādi Bōshar, threatening to raze every house and to destroy every date tree between Barkah and Masqat unless he received a douceur of $2,500 from the Sultān; and in the end the government of Masqat, powerless to attack him, considered it the best policy to accede to his request. The Sultān, relieved of present anxiety, showed a prudent regard for the future by immediately repairing the defences of Masqat and Matrah, by increasing the garrisons at both places, and by re-introducing foreign mercenaries. A short time after these events 'Abdul 'Aziz left Samad for the country of the Bani Bū Hasan in the Ja'alān district, where he remained for several months without obtaining any active support.

In the summer of 1878 'Abdul 'Aziz made a movement against Maṣqat, eliciting a written protest from Colonel Miles; his advance was arrested by Ghāfiri opposition in Wādi Samāil, but not until it had given rise to a panic in the capital, where the recollection of Bedouin brutalities in the previous year was still fresh. Apart from this scare, 'Omān, for the next few years, remained exempt from serious disturbances.

Movements of 'Abdul Aziz, 1878.

In 1879 some trouble with the Rīnds occurred at Gwādar, and in the same year Dhufār was re-occupied by troops from 'Omān, after an interval of fifty years; but these events, which are related in the Annexures on Gwādar and Dhufār history, did not re-act on the home politics of 'Omān. There were local rebellions in Dhufār in 1880 and 1883.

Trouble at Gwādar and re-annexation of Dhufār, 1879.

Such disturbances as occurred in 'Omān itself were purely local or tribal. One centred upon the fort of 'Ainain in Dhāhirah, which early in 1879 was seized from the Miyāyihah by some Balūchis. The Balūchis retained it until 1881, when, being hard pressed by a large Ghāfiri combination, they made it over to the Bani 'Ali of Yanqul: the Sultān, it may be remarked, by authorising the Balūchis to hold the fort in his name, had given great offence to Shaikh Barghash, the Tamimah of all the Ghāfiris. Soon after taking possession of Bait-al-'Ainain the Bani 'Ali made a successful sortie against the Ghafiri besiegers, in which over 50 men were said to have been killed. In 1881 the Miyāyihah were at war with no less than eight other tribes.

Tribal contest for possession of Bait-al-'Ainain, 1879-81.

Another important dispute related to the fort of 'Awābi, which was held by the 'Abriyīn and claimed by the Bani Riyām. It was decided by the transfer of the fort in 1881, in consequence of an agreement, to the ownership of the Sultān, who retained in it the garrison of the 'Abriyīn.

Acquisition of 'Awābi by the Sultan.

But the most serious tribal affray was one which resulted, in July 1881, from an old feud between the Bani Bū 'Ali and the Bani Bū Hasan in Ja'alān; it took the form of an attack, after five days' notice given, by the Bani Bū 'Ali assisted by the Jannabah, Bani Rāsib and Hishm upon the Bani Bū Hasan, whom they totally defeated in their own quarter of Jawāhi-al-Khuwaisah and drove into the fort. This engagement was described as the most sanguinary ever fought between 'Omani tribes, and was said to have cost the lives of 60 of the Bani Bū 'Ali and 75 of the Bani Bū Hasan.

Battle between Bani Bū 'Ali and Bani Bū Hasan, 1881.

In 1882 there was a recrudescence in 'Omān of political trouble of a graver kind. On the 11th of March Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais once more seized Masna'ah; but, warned by previous experience, he carefully protected the British Indian traders from pillage, and the commercial life of the port continued undisturbed. The Sultān, however, was resolved

Masna'ah again taken by Ibrāhim-bin-Qais and recovered by the Sultān, 1882.

on recovering it by force of arms; and on the 9th and 10th of April he attacked the fort with an 18-pounder gun, H.M.S. "Arab" being present to watch events, but not to take part in the operations. Ibrāhim himself was absent at Rustāq, and on the second day of the bombardment the fort was taken by assault, not without a number of casualties on either side. Turki then resumed possession of Masna'ah; and the success thus gained redounded considerably to his credit.

Matrah and Masqat threatened by rebels, 1882.

In the month of June 1882, however, Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz and Hamūd the Jahafi succeeded in slipping through the 'Aqq pass; and on the 22nd they arrived at Wataiyah with the declared intention of attacking Matrah and Masqat. A protest by Major Grant, the Political Agent at Masqat, failed to divert them from their purpose; but, on the 24th of June, influenced probably by the arrival of H.M.S. "Arab" which anchored off Matrah, the rebels substituted negotiations for threats and in the end extorted favourable terms from the Sultān, one condition being the payment of a pension of $200 a month to 'Abdul 'Aziz. Saiyid Faisal, the Sultān's son, was then sent to punish the Nidābiyīn for allowing the passage of the rebels through Wādi-al-'Aqq, but he allowed himself to be deterred by the threats of Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Aziz.

Machinations of Sālih-bin-Ali, 1883.

Throughout the earlier part of 1883 Sālih-bin-'Ali was busy in preparing the way for a supreme effort to depose Saiyid Turki; but he had now lost the support of Ibrāhim of Rustāq, who in March of that year accepted a pension of $100 a month from the Sultān; and, though he still put 'Abdul 'Aziz prominently forward, it seems to have been his intention, if successful, to set the religious recluse Hamūd-bin-Faisal of Rustāq upon the throne. Sālih made skilful use of dissensions among the Ghafiris of Wādi Samāil and its tributary Wādis, especially of a dispute between the Nidābiyīn and Bani Jābir about date plantations at Sarūr, to weaken the chief defence of Masqat against invasions from Sharqiyah. He was so successful that the confidence of Turki in the Nidābiyīn was temporarily shaken, and the tribe repudiated their obligation to hold the 'Aqq pass against the Sultān's enemies.

Third rebel attack on Masqat, October 1883.

Of the final attempt on Masqat, which was not made until October, there were several premonitory symptoms. In June Hamūd the Jahafi attempted to make his way down to Masqat, but was stopped at Sarūr by the loyal Bani Jābir and Siyabiyīn tribes. At the middle of August Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Aziz were at Sarūr, where they had come unopposed, to settle the dispute between the Nidābiyīn and Bani Jābir; but, though they had a large force with them, they unaccountably returned

from Sarûr to Sharqîyah. At length, on the 19th of October, Colonel Miles, the Political Agent, received intimation from 'Abdul 'Azîz of an impending attack on Masqat; it was accompanied by a request that arrangements should be made for removing British subjects out of harm's way. The Sultân, who on this occasion appeared to great advantage and showed much energy, concentrated his forces to the number of about 500 men for the defence of Masqat, leaving Matrah somewhat slenderly garrisoned; this disposition, as events turned out, was the best that could have been made. Meanwhile British Indian subjects at Masqat were required by the Political Agent to ship their valuables and to be in readiness to embark themselves, and the Hindu traders at Matrah were brought round for greater safety to Masqat; but the Khôjahs of Matrah were left to their own discretion and elected, for the most part, to remain in their fort. On the 21st of October the advance guard of the rebel army arrived at Ruwi; and at 1-30 A.M. on the 22nd a determined and altogether unexpected assault, led by 'Abdul 'Azîz in person, was made at three separate points upon the wall of Masqat town. This direct attack on Masqat by way of the Wâdi-al-Kabîr was considered to be a remarkable departure from the time-honoured custom by which Matrah was occupied first and used as a base against Masqat. The night was dark, the assailants were dressed in black and provided with scaling-ladders, and the garrison, though on the alert, were not expecting an alarm; but the attack was repulsed, the Sultân himself proceeding to the ramparts; and the rebels retreated with a loss of about 30 men killed and 60 wounded. 'Abdul 'Azîz fell back on Sidâb and thence on Ruwi, rejoining Sâlih who had not risked his person in these operations, though a small nocturnal attack had been made by his men upon the walls of Matrah. On the 22nd the Sultân, doubtful of his ability to defend Masqat without assistance, obtained from the Political Agent a promise of support by H. M. S. "Philomel" which was then in harbour; and all British subjects in the town, except those attached to the Agency, were ordered to betake themselves to boats. During the day a welcome reinforcement of 70 Jannabah arrived from Sûr in the Sultân's steam-yacht "Dâr-as-Salâm"; and in the evening Colonel Miles with the "Philomel" paid a visit to Matrah, and, after causing a couple of 7-inch shells to be thrown over the rebels' position to prevent their advancing against the ill-defended walls, returned to Masqat. On the 23rd the Sultân asked that occasional shots might be fired by the "Philomel" to keep the enemy at a distance during the following night,

and his request was granted. On the 24th the enemy appeared in force in the upper part of Wādi-al-Kabīr and on the heights above Kalbūh, and annoyed towers guarding the water supply with musketry fire, but could not capture them. On the 25th some friendly Shaikhs of the Hirth and Masākirah arrived with a contingent of 300 men, and the fire of the "Philomel" was discontinued. On the day following a small fleet of boats entered the harbour, bringing reinforcements to the number of 700 men from various quarters, and, all danger being now at an end, the town gates were thrown open and the garrisons permitted to leave their posts. On the same day Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Aziz broke up their camp at Ruwi and returned to Sharqiyah, leaving a small party behind to bring the wounded home. The rebels had lost about 70 killed, including three or four Shaikhs; and the Sultān regarded the operations as the most decisive in 'Omān since the battle of Dhank, in which the power of 'Azzān-bin-Qais was broken. The tribes principally implicated in this rebellion were the Hajriyīn, Hirth and Habūs; but the Sultān subsequently stated that no tribe of Sharqiyah was entirely innocent of participation in the rising. The Bani Battāsh remained neutral, and the Bani Kalbān and Bani Shakail declared for the Sultān.

Punitive expedition to the Samāil and Ma'āwal valleys, November 1883.

The army of the Sultān having increased at the end of the siege to about 3,000 men, he despatched a force of about 1,700 men, under his son Faisal, to follow up the rebels and punish the disaffected Ghāfiri tribes who had given them passage. The movements of Faisal, who did not start until the 3rd of November, were too leisurely to occasion any anxiety to the retreating enemy; but he was successful in the second object of his mission and obtained the submission of the tribes in and about Wādi Samāil, besides compelling the Nidābiyīn and Rahbiyīn, after he had driven them up Wādi-al-'Aqq, to renounce their alliance with the Hināwis. On his return march Faisal visited the Ma'āwal tribe, who had paid no revenue for three years, in their own valley; and he carried off their principal Shaikh a prisoner to Masqat. The Sultān, on Faisal's arrival, disbanded his levies and dismissed them all with presents to their homes. The operations by Faisal were said to have brought in fines to the amount of $19,800, exclusive of a fine of $12,000 imposed on the Ma'āwal, of which at least half was ultimately recovered.

Internal Administration of Turki, 1875-1883.

Improved policy of the Sultān.

The domestic policy of Turki, after his resumption of power at the end of 1875, differed considerably from what it had been before, for he now no

longer favoured the Hināwi tribes but rather returned to dependence on the Ghāfiris; he paid more attention to the efficiency of his own military resources; and he utilised the services of his own relations and of other respectable men more freely in the administration.

His military resources.

The re-enlistment of foreign mercenaries, Hasāwis and Najdis, while it made the Sultān almost independent in his capital of tribal support, was not an unmixed benefit; for the soldiery were prone to factions among themselves, and the behaviour of those among them who were Wahhābis was apt to be truculent. In 1879 the chief of the Hasāwis at Masqat was murdered by the Najdis, and the fear of an armed struggle between the two corps was so great that H.M.S. "Beacon" was sent to strengthen the authority of the Sultān. In 1881 a Hindu merchant was shot dead at Matrah, and so strongly did the Hindu community believe this murder to be the work of the Sultān's Wahhābi guard that they petitioned the Political Agent to take steps for its disbandment. In 1882 a daring robbery of a Khōjah British subject was committed by a Wahhābi soldier at Matrah, and some difficulty was experienced by the Political Agent in obtaining reparation.

His naval resources.

The naval position of the Sultān was extremely weak after his return from Gwādar, during his sojourn at which place he had disposed of his only vessel, the corvette "Rahmāni," by selling her at Bombay. In 1876 Turki solicited the help of the British Government in obtaining a steam-vessel, the cost of the same to be deducted by instalments from the "Zanzibar" subsidy; but the request was not favourably entertained. In the end, however, Turki received the steam yacht "Dār-as-Salām" as a gift from his brother the Sultān of Zanzibar; and she seems to have been of considerable service in strengthening his control over the coast.

His public servants.

Turki's principal minister throughout this period of his reign was Sa'id-bin-Muhammad, the brother of his original ill-fated Wazir, Thuwaini-bin-Muhammad. Entire confidence did not, however, exist between the Sultān and Sa'id; moreover the latter was the enemy of Badar-bin-Saif, a consistent supporter of Turki who had governed Sohār as Wāli ever since its capture in 1873. In consequence largely of the intrigues of Sa'id, Badar was removed from Sohār in 1878 and banished to Zanzibar; but Turki in 1879 allowed him to return to 'Omān and appointed him governor of Matrah. Turki discovered a useful servant in a certain Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, whom, from 1879 onwards, he employed chiefly in Dhufār.

His relations.

With most of his near relatives, except his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz, Turki was on friendly terms; but in 1876, on suspicion of intrigue, he

deported his nephews 'Abdul 'Azīz, Muhammad, Hamūd and Hamdān, the sons of Thuwaini, to Qishm, where their brother Hārib already resided; Nāsir-bin-Thuwaini, however, with whose conduct he was satisfied, was allowed to remain at Masqat. In 1877 an allowance was granted by Turki to the exiles; but their brother Hārib did not apparently relish their presence at Qishm, for he himself soon afterwards removed to the British settlement of Bāsidu.

His family.

Turki's sons were now old enough to afford him some help in the government, and in 1880 he employed Faisal, the second eldest, as Wāli at Hisn Samāil and Nizwa, and Fahad, the third, as Wāli of Barkah. Muhammad, the Sultān's eldest son, was in nominal or real charge of Sohār from 1878 to the end of the period, but he early disgusted his father's subjects there by his arbitrary behaviour and incompetence.

Fiscal innovation, 1881.

An octroi duty of 5 per cent. on all produce entering the towns of Masqat and Matrah from landward was substituted by the Sultān in 1881 for one of 2 per cent. only. It caused much dissatisfaction among the neighbouring tribes and was perhaps one cause of their failure to support the Government in 1883.

Relations of Turki with the British Government 1875-83.

In the contest with 'Abdul 'Aziz which ensued on Turki's return from Gwādar at the end of 1875 the attitude of the local British officers was at first neutral, and the mediation between the brothers unsuccessfully attempted by the Political Agent was purely personal and unofficial; but, as soon as the position of Turki was seen to be secure, the policy of modified support was resumed in his favour.

History of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, 1875-83.

Payment of the "Zanzibar" subsidy continued without interruption, and was very frequently made in advance of the due date in order to relieve some pressing necessity of the Masqat Government. To meet the convenience of the Sultān, the instalments, which had at first been half-yearly, were made quarterly in 1876; and in 1879 they became monthly. From the 1st of September 1883, the date on which His Majesty's Government assumed the exclusive direction of Zanzibar affairs and from which the financial connection of the Government of India with that protectorate ceased, the subsidy became an entirely Indian charge. It was paid, after 1873, in rupees at the rate of Rs. 86,400 a year—the equivalent, presumably, at the time of conversion of $40,000; and the amount has not since been

reduced, although the value of the dollar has declined in comparison with that of the rupee.

British policy of modified support of the Sultan continued, 1875-83.

General and naval assistance continued to be rendered to the Sultān by the Government of India under much the same conditions as formerly, but, perhaps, with somewhat less readiness. In 1876 the Government of India declined to undertake the custody of Hamūd the Jahafi, whom the Sultān had arrested and wished to have confined in an Indian jail; and in 1877 they refused to lend the services of a ship of war for the recovery of Suwaiq, which Turki then considered as good as lost on account of the disloyalty of the governor. In 1880, at the request of the Sultān and to prevent the recipient from making a political use of the money, a sum of over $8,000, realised at the instance of the Indian Government on account of some rights of inheritance which 'Abdul 'Azīz possessed at Zanzibar, was paid over by instalments instead of in a lump sum. Implements of war and military stores were supplied to Turki from India at various times, some gratis and others on payment; and in 1883 the Resident was authorised to assist him, unofficially, in obtaining drill instructors for his Balūch and African retainers. On at least three occasions written requests to refrain from an intended assault on Masqat or Matrah, were addressed by the Political Agent at Masqat to advancing rebels; and Mr. Robertson and Colonel Miles made a cautious use of British war ships to repel the serious attacks upon the capital in 1877 and 1883, their action in each case being subsequently approved by Government. In 1881 it was intimated to the Political Agent that, on Turki's death, the Government of India would not interfere, in event of the succession being disputed, unless to prevent the reunion of 'Omān and Zanzibar.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omān. 1875-83.

One other phase of British relations remains to be dealt with, namely the protection, during the period under consideration, of British subjects in 'Omān and the vindication of their just rights: such matters, in consequence of the extreme weakness about this time of the Sultān's government, were far from easy of settlement.

Sūr claim, 1875-77.

An unimportant but difficult and protracted case arose from a burglary at Sūr, in June 1875, on the premises of a Hindu merchant; the offenders belonged to the Jannabah tribe, and the value of the goods stolen was $1,600. Neither 'Abdul 'Azīz during his regency nor the Sultān

after his return from Gwādar was able to obtain any satisfaction from the Sūris; but at length in July 1877 Mr. Robertson, the Political Agent, accompanied by the Sultān's Wazīr, proceeded to the spot in H.M.S. "Teazer" and, by threats of instant coercion, recovered the amount of the Banyan's claim together with a fine of $2,000. The fine, after the cost of sending the ship had been deducted, was handed over to the Sultān.

Saham claim, 1876.

The raid of Hamūd the Jahafi in Bātinah, in the autumn of 1876, was the cause of some loss to Hindu traders at Saham, whose property was plundered partly by Hamūd's men and partly by the Yāl Bū Qarain inhabitants of the town. The direct damage in this case was estimated at $3,544; but a claim was also brought for the amount of outstanding debts which the traders, in the expectation that they would not be able to return to Saham, feared that it might be impossible to recover. For the item of direct damage the Sultān was held responsible, inasmuch as the traders had been left defenceless through the unauthorised withdrawal of a guard at Saham by the Sultān's Wāli of Sohār, and he ultimately accepted the responsibility; but in regard to the recovery of the debts it was ordered by Government that the procedure customary in such cases should be followed. When the traders subsequently wished to return from Sohār to Saham and Dīl, both of which were unwalled towns, objections were at first raised by the Sultān; but, the British representatives having taken their stand upon an article in the Commercial Treaty of 1839 by virtue of which British subjects were at liberty to reside and trade in any part of the Sultān's dominions, the right of the traders to return was not, apparently, any further contested.

Matrah claim, 1877.

The most important case of recovery of compensation for British subjects was that which resulted from the occupation of Matrah by the rebels in the rising of 1877. The damages in this instance were at first assessed at $15,000; and Mr. Robertson proposed, and Colonel Ross supported, a scheme by which one-fourth of the compensation should be paid by the Sultān and the remaining three-fourths by the actual rebels, pressure being put on the latter by seizure of their exports at Sūr and Matrah. The mail by which these recommendations were forwarded to India unfortunately went astray, and the whole question was entirely lost sight of until 1879, when it seems to have been decided that the British claim should be reduced to $10,000 and that payment should be demanded of Salīh-bin-'Ali personally and of the Hajriyin, Hirth and Habūs tribes, the Sultān, it would seem, being now excused from payment of any share. A notification was accordingly issued by the Resident, in

February 1880, in which Sālih-bin-'Ali was called on to pay $1,500, the Hajriyīn $5,750, the Hirth $2,750 and the Habūs $1,000 to the Sultān,* whom the notification declared to be acting in the matter with the full consent and support of the British Government; and it was intimated that, if payment were not made within a month, the demand might possibly be increased. Various excuses, but no payments, were made by the tribes concerned; and, in September 1880, the Sultān's official Saif-bin-Badar in the "Dār-as-Salām," accompanied by Major Grant, Political Agent, in H.M.S. "Woodlark," proceeded to Sūr to lay an embargo on produce belonging to the Hajriyīn tribe which was said to have reached that port; but the information on which they acted was incorrect, and no attachable property could be found. Eventually, with the concurrence of the Government of India, after a portion of the demand had been recovered by seizures, it was arranged between the Sultān and those of his subjects concerned that a tax of $1 per Bahār should be levied on all dates exported from Sharqīyah, to whatever tribe belonging, and the proceeds devoted to paying off the indemnity. The right to realise this tax was apparently leased by the Sultān to his Hindu customs farmers; and, $1,400 out of the collections having subsequently been withheld by them on account of other claims against His Highness, Turki was constrained to make good the amount by short drawals of the "Zanzibar" subsidy. The final settlement of the whole claim does not appear to have been reported to Government; but it was no doubt discharged, in process of time, by means of the temporary tax.

Other cases, 1882.

In September 1882 a Hindu Faqīr, a British subject, was murdered by night in the Miyābīn quarter of Masqat town; but no clue could be obtained in the case. The murder of a Hindu merchant and the robbery of a Khōjah at Matrah within the following two months have been mentioned above in connection with the lawlessness of the Sultān's Wahhābi guards. In the former of these cases there was no proof against any individual, but in the second restitution and punishment of the culprit were obtained.

Illegal harbour dues at Khor-al-Hajar and Khor-al-Jarāmah, 1877-80.

A matter of an exceptional character, of which the British authorities were obliged to take cognisance, was an attempt by the inhabitants of Rās-al-Hadd to extort dues from vessels using the harbour of Khor-al-Jarāmah, concerning which and the somewhat similar Khor-al-Hajar a dispute as to proprietorship seems to have existed between the people of Rās-al-Hadd and those of Sūr. A British war vessel visited the spot in connection with this affair about 1877; and again, in 1879, H.M.S. "Ready" at the request of the Sultān conveyed one of his officials to Sūr and Rās-al-Hadd, when

* The total of these sums is $9,000 only. Possibly there is a clerical error in the records.

the disputed harbours were declared free to all lawful traders and the difference between the Arab disputants was at the same time composed. In 1880 fresh difficulties arose regarding the use of the two Khors, and the places concerned were visited by H.M.S. "Woodlark" and the Sultān's "Dār-as-Salām." All tolls on trading vessels entering the Khors were now finally abolished; but Nākhudas were required to pay for actual assistance received, and were advised to propitiate the local chiefs with occasional small presents.

Events in 'Omān from the attack on Masqat by Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Azīz to the death of Turki, 1883-88.

The last five years of Turki's reign were free from dangerous combinations against his power,—a state of affairs due chiefly to the repulse of the rebels from Masqat in 1883 and to an important assurance of support, given by the British Government in 1886, which will be noticed further on. The position of the Sultān was now relatively strong: in 1884 he did not hesitate to reject the overtures of Salih-bin-'Ali for a pardon; and at the end of 1884, when a new Shaikh of Rās-al-Hadd, appointed by him, was murdered by the former Shaikh, an expedition sent from Masqat in the "Dār-as-Salām" promptly deposed the rebel. Rumours of a fresh attack to be made on Masqat, which prevailed in August 1885, died away unfulfilled. In July 1886 the Sultān was able to make a short trip into the interior, which he had not visited for many years. Tribal disorder and disregard for the Sultān's authority continued, however, in the more distant, and even in some of the nearer districts; but only two instances are deserving of notice.

Rebellion of the Bani Battā-h, 1885-86.

The first was a rebellion of the Bani Battāsh, some of whom, in September 1885, made an attack on the Sultān's Wāli of Quryāt, killing one of his followers. Blood-money for this injury had already been partly paid, when Turki, in May 1886, without reference to his Wazir, caused Muhammad-bin-Shimās, the turbulent chief Shaikh of the tribe, to be seized and executed in his presence. In September the Bani Battāsh retaliated by attacking the Quryāt fort, but were repulsed; they succeeded, however, in looting some merchandise which was the property of a Hindu trader. In October 'Abdul 'Azīz, acting in concert with the Bani Battāsh, appeared at Hājir in Wādi Jannah or Hatāt with 200 men, mostly Habūs, but retired to Samad on a force being sent against him. A few days later a body of 1,200 men with one gun, under Badar-bin-Saif and

the Sultān's sons, marched inland from Quryāt, routed the Bani Battāsh at Misfāh, which they destroyed, and razed the fort of Mazāra', the tribal capital, to the ground. The Bani Battāsh then submitted and eventually paid a fine of $4,000.

Suwaiq taken by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais and recovered by British intervention, 1887.

The second conspicuous example of defiance of the Sultān's authority was the unexpected seizure of Suwaiq, in July 1887, by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, whose allowance had been stopped by Turki and who was encouraged to activity by the prevalence of disorder in 'Omān Proper. Colonel Ross, however, with Colonel Mockler, went immediately to Suwaiq in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" and induced Ibrāhīm to evacuate the place quietly, on condition of his pension being restored; and a Hināwi combination which Salīh-bin-'Ali was forming in the Sharqiyah District then immediately dissolved.

The Gwādar and Dhufār dependencies.

The affairs of Gwādar and Dhufār at this time are fully related in the Annexures to the present chapter; in the former the principal event was a settlement, in 1886, with the Rind tribe; in the latter a rebellion occurred in 1887, and there were suspicions of Turkish intrigue.

Death of Turki, June 1888.

Saiyid Turki, whose health had long been feeble, died on the 3rd of June 1888, a few days after receiving a visit at Masqat from his friend Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident. The Sultān, though feeble in character and sometimes treacherous in conduct, was of a mild and liberal disposition, and his death was felt to be a misfortune for 'Omān.

Administration of Turki, 1883-88.

Administrative matters at Sohar, Izki, Nizwa, Sūr, Farq and Birkat-al-Mōz.

The Sultān's authority at a distance from his capital was everywhere, even at the close of his reign, either nominal or precarious. In 1884 Turki was obliged to remove his son Muhammad from the government of Sohār, where his rule was extremely unpopular; and in the same year the fort of Izki was lost to the Bani Ruwāhah and again recovered—though not without expense—by the Sultān, while Nizwa also passed out of his control into that of the Bani Riyām and was not so quickly retaken. From the port of Sūr, notwithstanding its large trade, the Sultān derived only $2,000 a year as customs; and a scheme devised in 1884, to improve matters in this respect by enclosing the town with a wall, ended in nothing. In May 1885 an attempt by Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, Wāli of Izki, to seize Farq for the Sultān ended in a fiasco. In June 1887 the Sultān was deprived of Birkat-al-Mōz by a Shaikh of the Bani Riyām

and condoned his conduct; and the temporary loss of Suwaiq in the following month, already mentioned, was an indirect consequence of the injury to his prestige resulting from the Birkat-al-Mōz incident.

Increased respect enjoyed by Turki towards the end of his reign.

Turki's mind, in his last days, was somewhat unhinged by his sufferings, and about a month before his death he even dismissed his Wazir Sa'id-bin-Muhammad on suspicion of practising sorcery against his life; but otherwise, during the concluding years of his reign, Turki enjoyed a reputation for sound judgment in tribal affairs and for skill in the management of his Arab subjects. He conciliated the people and kept before his eyes the Arab ideal of a sovereign,—that of a Shaikh of Shaikhs, *primus inter pares*: in short he was a weak, but not an evil, ruler.

Special Relations of Turki with the British Government, 1883-88.

The financial support of the British Government was continued by means of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, a check being however imposed on the granting of advances of the same by the Political Agent on his own responsibility; and a marked extension was given to the policy of armed assistance to the Sultan in his difficulties.

Undertaking by the Government of India to uphold Saiyid Turki in repelling unprovoked aggression, and conferment on him of the G.C.S.I., 1886.

In 1885, when rumours of disaffection in the Sharqiyah district once more became rife, it was suggested by Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, that an explicit announcement should be made to all concerned that the British Government would not allow attacks upon the towns of Masqat and Matrah, where British subjects possessed valuable interests, to be permanently successful, but would, if necessary, expel the rebels who occupied them and replace Saiyid Turki in possession. Colonel Ross argued that use and wont had made it impossible to decline future requests from Turki for armed assistance, and that, such being the case, it would be well to declare clearly the policy of Government, inasmuch as the mere declaration would probably suffice to prevent attacks on the capital; the guarantee, however, should be personal to Turki and should not extend to his successors. The Government of India, reposing confidence in Colonel Ross's knowledge of the situation and in the soundness of his judgment, authorised an announcement to the Sultan, and to his rivals and enemies, that the British Government had for especial reasons resolved to uphold Saiyid Turki in

repelling unprovoked aggression during his lifetime, but that as their normal policy towards 'Omān was one of non-interference in dynastic struggles and internal administration, their active support would not necessarily be continued to his children. This decision was announced at a public Darbār held in the palace at Masqat on the 13th of July 1886; the principal object of the Darbār, as such, was however the presentation to Turki of the insignia of the G.C.S.I., which had been conferred on him. 'Abdul 'Aziz had been invited to attend, but had declined to come in unless the safe-conduct given him by the Sultān were guaranteed by the British Political Agent,—a condition which could not be granted. The Secretary of State, when informed of the assurance respecting British support, regarded it with some misgiving and directed a condition to be attached, namely that the support promised would be continued only so long as His Highness should conduct his administration in a manner not unsatisfactory to the Government of India. The results of the announcement however justified the anticipations of Colonel Ross, for no serious effort was again made by rebels to overthrow Turki's government; and its effect appeared also in the readiness with which Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais restored Suwaiq to the Sultān in 1887, as already described, when called upon to do so by the British authorities.

It may be added here that, under British advice, Turki in 1886 declined overtures from residents of Dibah, Khor Fakkān and Kalba for the annexation of the Shamailiyah tract to the 'Omān Sultanate.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omān, 1883-88.

The protection of British subjects in 'Omān and reparation for minor injuries sustained by them at the hands of unruly tribesmen continued to be subjects demanding constant attention. In 1883 the British S. S. "Knight of the Bath" was wrecked on the Kuria Muria islands; but the crew, having made their way to an Arab village near Rās Sauqirah, remained there in safety until relieved by a vessel which was despatched from Bombay on the facts being reported at Masqat. In spring 1884 the safety of the Indian traders at Saham was threatened by Bedouin incursions from Dhāhirah; and the Political Agent suggested, and obtained, an increase of the Sultān's garrison at that place. At the beginning of 1886 raids were made in the neighbourhood of Sohār and Shinās by the Bani Qitab, 'Awāmir and other predatory tribes, and H.M.S. "Osprey" was sent to Shinās; but the compensation for incidental damage to Hindu traders, chiefly through exaction of blackmail, was paid by the Sultān. In January 1886 the Khōjah merchants at Khābūrah, who were

British subjects, complained of extortion and personal ill-usage by Hamad-bin-Nāsir, the Wāli of the town; and the British Political Agent was successful in obtaining from the Sultān the removal of that official and the payment of $100 as an indemnity to the sufferers. The misconduct of the Bani Battāsh resulted, in September 1886, in some loss to a Hindu trader at Quryāt, but it was doubtless made good out of the fine soon after recovered from the tribe. In April 1887 two boats of H.M.S. "Kingfisher," while lying at anchor at Sūr, were fired on by night from the shore and obliged to put to sea for safety; but no damage was done, nor could any clue to the author of the outrage be obtained. At Sūr in July 1887 one Hindu trader was beaten and another kidnapped by the Aulād Kāsib, a small section, originally of the Jannabah, who had attached themselves to the Bani Bū 'Ali; but the necessity for action by the Sultān or by the British Government was obviated by prompt and friendly action on the part of the Shaikhs of the Bani Bū 'Ali.

Relations of Turki with Zanzibar throughout his reign, 1871-88.

The reign of Turki in 'Omān was almost exactly synchronous with that of his brother Barghash over Zanzibar. In 1871 or 1872 Turki wrote to Barghash, claiming payment of the Zanzibar subsidy under threats of a rupture, and professed anxiety to make an attempt on Zanzibar; but, from the time that payment of the subsidy was undertaken by the British Government, the brothers seem to have remained upon excellent terms: indeed in 1880 Saiyid Turki proposed to retire from the sovereignty of 'Omān in favour of Saiyid Barghash. Gifts were frequently exchanged, the more valuable being sent by Barghash, who in 1884 presented Turki with Rs. 32,000 to make good a deficit caused by the rebellion in 'Omān in the previous year and in 1886 gave him the S. S. "Sultani;" the "Dār-as-Salām" steam yacht, also, was a gift from Zanzibar. In March 1888 Barghash paid a visit to 'Omān and spent a week at the hot springs, of Bōshar, hoping in vain for relief from a fatal disease by which he was attacked; Turki treated him with great distinction and received in return a present of $50,000. Both brothers died within three months of this their last meeting.

Relations of Turki with Persia, 1871-88.

Non-renewal of the Bandar 'Abbās lease notwithstanding British intervention, 1871.

By the expulsion of Sālim from the Sultanate of 'Omān in 1868 the lease of Bander 'Abbās and its dependencies, then only two months old, was annulled; and the Persian Government proceeded to grant a new one in favour of Hāji Ahmad Khān, apparently the very minister of Saiyid Sālim who had taken part in the negotiations for the lease of 1868. During the reign of 'Azzān, and for some time subsequently, this individual, notwithstanding some vicissitudes which are described in another place, succeeded in maintaining his position as leaseholder under the Persians; but in 1872 he was superseded by one Ahmad Shāh of Mīnāb. Meanwhile, however, the question of the Bandar 'Abbās lease was not lost sight of by Turki, who several times applied for British aid in obtaining it. In 1871 the good offices of the British Resident at Tehrān were brought into play on his behalf; but the Shāh evidently distrusted the policy of 'Omāni Sultāns on Persian soil, and the lease was in the end refused. The Persian Government stated on this occasion that an agent of the Sultān, if one should be stationed at Bandar 'Abbās, would be treated with proper respect, but that he would not be officially recognised. In 1875 the Persian Government, who now treated Hāji Ahmad Khān as a Persian subject, pressed certain claims of his to property at Masqat on the attention of Turki through the medium of the British Government; but it was alleged by Turki in reply that Hāji Ahmad Khān had left Masqat in 1868, two years before the Sultān's own accession, and that he had subsequently removed all his personal property to Persia. In 1875 Turki was still desirous that the lease of Bandar 'Abbās should be renewed to him. In 1879 he made a telegraphic offer to the Shāh's government for the lease of Bandar 'Abbās, without result, and was anxious to appoint a representative at the place; but the Political Agent at Masqat, by referring to what had been said on the subject by the Persian authorities in 1871, was able to dissuade him from his purpose.

Relations of Turki with the Ottoman Porte, 1871-88.

In the earlier years of Turki's reign Ottoman military transports on the way to or from Basrah occasionally anchored in Masqat harbour. The

Turks were at this time, on account of the recent annexation of Hasa, regarded with much suspicion throughout Arabia; and the treatment by the Sultān of the Turks with whom he was brought in contact appears to have been so uncivil as to necessitate a hint by the British authorities that he should be more circumspect. In 1873 some trouble was caused by the purchase of four persons at Masqat, as slaves, by the chief officer of a passing Turkish vessel; and between 1875 and 1886, as explained in the separate history of Dhufār, the Turks seems to have encouraged the pretensions of the Moplah, Saiyid Fadhl, to ownership of that district of the 'Omān Sultanate.

General relations of the British Government with Turki throughout his reign, 1871-88.

The financial and naval policy of the British Government towards Saiyid Turki has been described, stage by stage, in some of the foregoing paragraphs; but a few other features of Anglo-'Omāni relations still remain to be mentioned.

Personal and ceremonial matters.

The Sultān, during his reign, received numerous marks of British favour, among which were his investment, already alluded to, with the G.C.S.I., in 1866, and the presentation to him in 1887 of two batteries of 12-pounder guns, with carriages and ammunition complete, for the defence of his Masqat forts. Turki on his part was the donor, at different times, of gifts to Her Majesty Queen Victoria and to the Viceroy of India; and in 1887 he caused the jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen to be celebrated at Masqat with much éclat and rejoicing.

Question of the Slave Trade.

The Treaty for the suppression of the Slave Trade, obtained by Sir Bartle Frere in 1873, was of great value; but the sincere efforts of the Sultān to enforce it, in co-operation with the British Government, tended to make him unpopular with certain classes of his subjects. His loyalty in slave trade matters may thus have been one cause of his extreme dependence on British support; and it certainly was a principal reason of the personal regard in which he was held by the British political officers with whom he had to do.

Questions of status and jurisdiction.

An important question of status was satisfactorily settled, in 1873, by Turki's unqualified recognition in writing of the amenability to British jurisdiction of the subjects of Native Indian States resident in 'Omān, and of the applicability in their case of treaty provisions relating to

British subjects proper. Various other matters connected with status and jurisdiction were settled during the reign of Turki.

Commercial discussions in the reign of Turki related largely to the sea customs, which were, and are, the financial mainstay of the 'Omān State. Commercial questions.

In 1867 a concession had been obtained from the Sultān of the day in favour of the British India Steam Navigation Company, by which only one-eighth of the legal transhipment duty of 5 per cent. should be charged, or, if the goods were landed for transhipment, a rebate of seven-eighths should be allowed on reshipment. In 1871 a movement was made by the Company to obtain the total abolition, in so far as they were concerned, of transhipment duty; and in 1872 the Sultān consented to forego all duty upon transhipments of Gulf cargo, if made without landing the goods, for Aden or Zanzibar. A test case, which occurred in 1874, showed that this exemption was not intended by the Sultān to apply to goods taken ashore pending transhipment.

In a letter, dated the 10th of February 1875, a wider application was given by the Sultān to the concession, *granted by his father in 1846, in respect of the dues on cargo landed from damaged vessels and subsequently reshipped.

Various questions of taxation, also, were agitated from time to time. In 1872, a system of manifests and reports for vessels entering and leaving the harbour of Masqat having been introduced by the Sultān in order to meet the wish of the British authorities for shipping statistics, a fixed fee of $2 per manifest and a graduated fee of Re. 1 per 50 tons of cargo began to be levied under his orders. The Resident was inclined to think that these proceedings were partly at variance with the terms of the Commercial Treaty of 1839, but he was instructed that no exception need be taken to the new charges unless the rates were increased, and that it would be enough to remind the Sultān of Article 9 of the Treaty. Questions of taxation.

In 1877 weighment dues, instituted by Sa'id early in his reign, and wharfage dues, instituted by Turki in 1873, were found to exist at Masqat. The amounts of both were moderate; but the Sultān, on the matter being mentioned to him, issued a notice making the payment of either charge optional in the case of British Indian subjects.

In 1880 some Banyans, relying on Article 10 of the Commercial Treaty, protested against a monopoly of dyeing silk for the Arab market which brought $2,000 or $3,000 a year into the Sultān's treasury; but the Government of India thought that there was no need to interfere with this long-established arrangement.

* *Vide* page 467 *ante*.

In 1881 the octroi tax in the towns of Masqat and Matrah was enhanced from about 2 per cent. to 5 per cent. and, instead of being included in the annual contract for the sea-customs, was farmed out as a separate tax and fetched $15,500 for the first year. This innovation, already mentioned above,* was not regarded as unfair to British subjects, but it was irritating to the rural Arabs and was expected to drive trade to Sūr.

In 1879 mention was made for the first time of a tax better known in after years; it was at first described as a tax on country produce imported from the interior into the towns of the coast. By 1886 the rate of this tax, originally lower, had been enhanced to 5 per cent., and the tax had virtually assumed the form of an impost on dates exported from the coast of 'Omān to places abroad and was represented as a substitute for one of the ordinary taxes on agricultural produce which the Sultān was unable to collect from growers in the far interior. The Government of India seem to have considered it doubtful whether the tax was really, as some of their officers contended, an export tax; and, further, whether the silence of the commercial treaty of 1839 on the subject of export duties gave sufficient ground for protest against the imposition of such. No effort was therefore made at this time to get the tax withdrawn; but the Sultān, in consideration of thus receiving a consolidated duty of 5 per cent., abolished some other petty dues which existed in the seaport towns. It was subsequently ruled by the Government of India that no objection could be taken to the levy of a tax, even if exceeding 5 per cent., upon tobacco exported by sea from Bātinah to Masqat, inasmuch as any understanding with the Sultān in regard to export taxes could have reference only to exports for abroad.

Compulsory weighment of Matrah dates at Masqat.

In 1885 a complaint, first heard in 1880, was renewed; it was that British Indian subjects exporting dates from Matrah were being compelled to send their goods to Masqat for weighment and assessment of duty. Representations by the Political Agent resulted in the discontinuance for the time being of this innovation, and no attempt was made to re-introduce it in the time of Turkī.

Limit of jurisdiction of the British Agency at Masqat and provision of a guard, 1880.

It may be mentioned here that in 1880 the Government of India fixed the boundary between the political jurisdictions of their Aden and Masqat representatives at Rās Sājar on the southern coast of Arabia: also that the Masqat Agency was for the first time provided with a military guard in the same year, the guard consisting of a havaldar's detachment of Indian infantry.

Tours by the British Political Agent.

The character of Saiyid Turkī's reign and his personality favoured the free movement of the British Political Agent in the interior of 'Omān,

* *Vide* page 512 *ante*.

and full advantage was taken of these circumstances by Colonel Miles, who seems to have possessed many personal friends among the leading men of the country. In 1875 Colonel Miles made an excursion from Sohár to Barsimi by Wádi-al-Jizi and back; in 1876 he visited Nakhl, crossed Jabal Akhdhar and returned to Masqat by Wádi Samáil; in 1884 he entered Wádi Táyin by the Qahza pass and made his way home by Quryát and a route adjacent to the coast; and in 1885-1886 he made an extensive tour through 'Omán Proper and Dhahirah and came back *viâ* Rustáq.

Relations of Turki during his reign with non-Asiatic powers other than Britain, 1871-88.

With European powers except Britain, and with the United States of America, 'Omán had but little contact in the time of Turki.

Commercial Declaration exchanged with the Netherlands, 1877.

In 1877, not without the assistance of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, a commercial Declaration was exchanged between the Government of the Netherlands and the Sultán of 'Omán; it provided that, in matters of export, import, and transit trade, most favoured nation treatment should be extended by each of the signatories to the other.

American and French Consular Agencies established at Masqat, 1880-81.

In 1880 a Consul at Masqat was appointed by the United States of America in the person of Mr. Maguire, a British merchant. In 1881 Mr. Maguire was recognised by the French Government as Consular Agent of France in 'Omán.

SAIYID FAISAL-BIN-TURKI,

from 1888.

Accession of Faisal, 1888.

Saiyid Turki left three sons; the eldest, Muhammad, was the son of a negress, while the second and third, Faisal and Fahad, were Abyssinians on the maternal side. All three had served as Wális under their father, and had gained some experience of public affairs; but Muhammad, who had been unsuccessful as Governor of Sohár, was disqualified by appearance and manner, as well as by want of capacity, for succession

to the Sultanate of 'Omān. Turki towards the end of his life had expressed a wish to separate Gwādar from the rest of his dominions and to leave it to Muhammad; but the idea was not countenanced by the British authorities, and no step was taken by Turki towards carrying it into effect. On the decease of Turki, the sovereignty was assumed by Faisal, who in 1881 had married his cousin 'Alaiyah, daughter of Thuwaini, and whose claims were supported by his brother Fahad; and Muhammad, conscious of his inferiority and unsupported by any party, made no effort to assert his claims. Most of the Shaikhs of 'Omān, including the treacherous Sālim-bin-'Alī, Hārithi, responded in loyal terms to the announcement by Faisal of his own succession; and, contrary to the general expectation, no disturbance of the general peace took place. The age of Saiyid Faisal at his accession was about 28.

Internal events in 'Omān from the accession of Faisal to the rebellion of 1895.

The proceedings of the British Government, chiefly the continuance to Faisal of the "Zanzibar" subsidy without interruption, the discouragement of 'Abdul 'Aziz and Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, and the ultimate recognition of Faisal as Sultān in 1890, are discussed in a later paragraph; here we shall relate only such events of the first part of his reign as belong to the internal history of the country.

Loss of 'Awābi and failure of an attempt by Faisal to recover it.

The first emergency with which the new ruler had to deal was the loss of 'Awābi: this fort, well placed for watching the valley of Rustāq, had in 1881, as the result of a dispute between the 'Abriyin and Bani Riyām tribes, passed quietly into the possession of Saiyid Turki. On the 2nd of September 1888 'Awābi was captured by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais after a stout resistance by the garrison; and on the 18th of the same month Faisal, accompanied by his brother Muhammad and by Tahnūn, son of Shaikh Zāid of Abu Dhabi, proceeded in the "Sultāni" to Barkah, where a tribal levy of about 3,000 men was collected. The Sultān's force reached Wushail in Wādi Fara' without opposition, and Faisal approached near enough to the Rustāq fort to shell it with field guns, of which he had brought three with him; but his troops, whom he was unable to pay, were anxious to avoid serious fighting, and the Yāl Sa'ad tribe suddenly rose in his rear and cut his communications with the coast. After less than a month's campaign the defection of

the Banī Ghāfir obliged Faisal to consent to the retention of 'Awābi by Ibrāhīm. He then slipped away by night to Masqat to avoid the necessity of paying the remnants of his army; and, though the Yāl Sa'ad soon afterwards sought and obtained his forgiveness, the general result of the expedition was damaging to his prestige.

The most important internal occurrences of the period were, however, disloyal Hināwi movements in the Sharqīyah District and dissensions between Hināwis and Ghāfiris in Wādi Samāil. The Sharqīyah troubles favoured the endeavours of 'Abdul 'Azīz to make good his claims to the throne; and, but for the attitude of Sālih-bin-'Ali, whom Faisal succeeded in alienating from 'Abdul 'Azīz and in attaching to his own cause for a time, they might have had dangerous consequences.

Rebellion of 'Abdul 'Azīz and Hamūd the Jahafi, 1889-90.

In April 1889 there were rumours of a Hināwi rising in aid of 'Abdul 'Azīz, who about the same time paid a visit to his friend the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; in May several attempts were made by Sālih-bin-'Ali to bring about a reconciliation between 'Abdul 'Azīz and Faisal, but without success; and about the middle of July a letter was received by the British Political Agent at Masqat from 'Abdul 'Aziz, in which the latter announced his intention of attacking Masqat. At the end of July 'Abdul 'Aziz actually advanced from Samad in the direction of Masqat; but he was repulsed from the Qahza pass by a tribal gathering of 600 men and fell back again on Samad. In January 1890 the free-booter Hamūd-bin-Sa'īd the Jahafi, descending from Sharqīyah by way of Rustāq where he was joined by Hamūd and Sa'ūd, the sons of 'Azzān-bin-Qais, arrived with 200 men at Ghubrah, a little to the west of Matrah, and there halted to await the arrival of 'Abdul 'Azīz. All the more direct passes between Samad and Masqat having been blocked by the influence of Sālih-bin-'Ali and of Rāshid-bin-'Ozaiz, the Sultān's indefatigable Wāli of Samāil, 'Abdul 'Azīz was unable at once to join his associate; but the nearness and well-remembered character of the Jahafi threw the town of Masqat into a panic, and on the night of the 13th January there was much firing from the walls at an imaginary enemy. Not until the beginning of February, when Saiyid Faisal had collected 2,000 adherents at Masqat and his Wāli of Sohār had arrived at Wādi-al-Qāsim in Bātinah with a contingent of 450 Na'īm Bedouins, did any advance take place against 'Abdul 'Azīz and Hamūd, who were now on the point of effecting a junction near Sīb. On Saiyid Faisal taking ship for Sīb, however, the enemy retired to the interior; and Saiyid Fahad, who commanded his brother's land forces, marched unopposed to Jammah, here he remained until it was clear that no further danger was to be appre-

hended. The Na'im contingent, disappointed of active service, looted the Yāl Sa'ad country as they passed through it on their homeward journey. Hamūd-bin-Sa'id, deserted by his followers and unable to regain Sharqīyah by crossing the intervening hostile country without an escort, made his submission to the Wāli of Barkah and was pardoned by Saiyid Faisal and sent home in safety. The movement against Saiyid Faisal which we have just described had apparently the sympathy, but not the active support, of Ibrāhim-bin-Qais, whose allowance had been discontinued by the new ruler.

Final departure of 'Abdul 'Aziz from 'Omān, 1890.

'Abdul 'Aziz remained at Rustāq until the end of March 1890, when he left for Abu Dhabi. In June he arrived at Būshehr and, after an interview with the Resident, sailed for Bombay, whence he did not again return to vex the politics of 'Omān. Until his death in 1907 he continued to reside in the Bombay Presidency, supported by the bounty of his relatives, the Sultāns of 'Omān and Zanzibār.

Dissensions between Hināwis and Ghāfiris, 1890-93.

The passage of Hamūd the Jahafi through the country at the beginning of 1890 was the indirect cause of much trouble between the Hināwis and Ghāfiris in Wādi Samāil; and eventually communication between coast and interior was interrupted, and the trade of Masqat and Matrah brought to a standstill. In January 1890 some 400 sheep were raided by Hamūd's following from the Ghāfiri Rahbiyin, and the Rahbiyin almost immediately retaliated by an attack, in Wādi Samāil, on a caravan belonging to the Hināwi Āl Wahībah and Habūs tribes; 40 camels were carried off and 6 members of the Hināwi caravan were killed in this affair. In the last week of November 1890 a caravan of 80 camels from Masqat, laden chiefly with goods belonging to the Hināwi Hirth, was completely plundered, on its way up Wādi Samāil, by the Ghāfiri Bani Jābir. The Khafir or protector of the caravan, himself a Maskari and therefore of the Ghāfiri faction, then took to the hills with a gang of about 20 men, closed all routes to Sharqīyah, and began committing murders up to the very gates of Masqat and Matrah; he was seconded in his efforts by a Hināwi gang which 'Abdullah, the son of Sālih-bin-'Ali brought with him on a visit to Masqat in January 1891. This condition of affairs, which continued until April, was exceedingly detrimental to the trade of Masqat and Matrah, for neither could merchandise be sent for sale to the up-country districts nor could debts outstanding there be realised; and it was feared at one time that a number of the British Indian traders in those towns would be obliged to suspend business. At length in the beginning of May 1891, at the invitation of Sālih-bin-'Ali, the Sultān, who had hitherto shown a reprehensible apathy in the matter, intervened

through Rāshid-bin-'Ozaiz, his Wāli of Samāil; and peace was arranged on condition that $1,800 should be paid as damages by the Ghāfiris of Samāil to the Hināwis of Sharqīyah, in settlement of all claims. On the Hināwi side the Habūs were not satisfied with the award of the Sultān, and in August 1892 they re-opened the feud by raiding 700 goats from the Rahbiyin; by way of reprisal a mixed force of Rahbiyin, Nidābiyin and Bani Jābir invaded their country, doing much material damage, and cut them off by a strict blockade from direct access to Masqat. In the result, trade by the main highway from the coast to the interior of 'Omān ceased altogether during the latter part of 1892; and in January 1893 the Sultān found himself obliged once more to intervene. In a meeting held at Sīb he gave judgment in favour of the Ghāfiris against the Habūs for $1,200; but, as he virtually undertook the discharge of this liability himself, the Habūs returned jubilant to their homes, and on their way raided some cattle from the tribes with whom they had just been reconciled.

In October 1892, before this settlement, Hamūd the Jahafi made a fresh attempt to raid in Bātinah, but he was taken ill and had to return to Sharqīyah.

In 1894 disturbances were renewed in Wādi Samāil, between the Āl Bōshar, supported by the other Hināwis, and the Ghāfiris of the valley; but the Sultān, by the instrumentality of Rāshid-bin-'Ozaiz, was again able to patch up a seeming settlement. H'ākwi-Ghafiri dissensions renewed, 1894.

The Samāil valley and the Masqat district were not however, during these years, the only scene of tribal disorders in which the government of 'Omān were directly or indirectly interested.

A serious faction fight having occurred at Khasab in Ruūs-al-Jibāl between the Kumāzirah and Bani Hadiyah, sections of the Shihūh, Saiyid Faisal in August 1888 despatched his brother Fahad and others to the spot in the "Sultāni;" and the offending Shaikhs of both parties, whom the emissaries brought back with them, were interned for a time in Fort Jalāli at Masqat. Tribal disturbances in various districts, 1888-93: Ruūs-al-Jibāl.

In Dhāhirah, at the end of 1889, somewhat serious fighting took place between the Bani Kalbān and Na'im on the one side and the Bani 'Ali on the other, in which the Bani 'Ali were worsted; and raids committed by the tribes of Dhāhirah on those of Bātinah led, in the winter of 1892-93, to a blockade of the routes from the coast into Dhāhirah by the Yāl Sa'ad, and to a combination against the Yāl Sa'ad by the Ya'āqib, Bani Kalbān and Bani Shaksil. The disputants in the last case rejected the mediation of the Sultān and continued to fight out their Dhāhirah, and Bātinah.

differences until the end of 1893, when, after a bloody encounter at Mabrah, they submitted their feud to the arbitration of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais. The comparatively civilised district of Bātinah was not itself free from internal trouble; and a serious attack on the Hawāsinah of Ghaizain, which was made by the Bani 'Umr in February 1891, was followed by severe reprisals.

'Oman Proper.

In 1893, the Bani Hina of 'Omān Proper became embroiled with the Bani 'Umr and Bani Kalbān, apparently in consequence of aggressions committed by the first-named on the Āl Khamaiyis near Hail Bani Hina, and were also attacked, for a different reason, by the Bani Shakail; in both contests the Bani Hina were worsted in the field, and the disputes were eventually settled by arbitration—the former, relating to the Āl Khamaiyis, by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, and the latter by Sālih-bin-'Ali. In August 1894 Hilāl-bin-Zāhir, a prominent Shaikh of the Bani Hina who had usurped the fort of Nizwa from an Āl Bū Sa'idi Wāli during the reign of Turki, was murdered by the eldest son of the Saiyid whom he had displaced; but his son, Badar-bin-Hilāl, retained possession of the place.

Coast of Eastern Hajar.

In 1893, Qurta', a celebrated Sharqiyah raider, by threatening Quryāt obliged the Sultān to take special measures for the protection of that town; but he afterwards retired and begged for forgiveness. In the same year an ancient feud broke out afresh between the Bani Muqim and the Salūt of Tiwi, and considerable loss of life occurred; Saiyid Fahad, who was sent by his brother to arrange the dispute, failed to do so; and it was finally composed by Sālih-bin-'Ali. At the end of 1888, and again in May 1889, fighting took place at Sūr between the Jannabah and Bani Bū 'Ali tribes, and the good offices of the Sultān were exercised, not without effect, upon both occasions; but in 1893, when desultory hostilities began in Ja'alān between the Bani Bū 'Ali and their old enemies the Bani Bū Hasan, last reconciled by Turki in 1887, it was Sālih-bin-'Ali and not Saiyid Faisal who eventually brought about a truce. The Bani Bū 'Ali were at this time much weakened by a deadly internal blood-feud, which had originated in 1887 from the murder of the Tamimah of the tribe, Muhammad-bin-Mājid, by a man of the Sinadah section. The original murder was revenged by the assassination of Yūsuf-bin-'Ali, a Shaikh of the Sinadah, and 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim was elected Tamimah in place of Muhammad; but the feud continued, and in 1891 Hamūd-bin-Mājid, the slayer of Yūsuf-bin-'Ali, was himself killed by a relative of his victim.

Remarkable storm, June 1890.

A terrible cyclonic storm may be mentioned here, which lasted from midnight of the 4th to midnight of the 5th June 1890. Its ravages

extended along the coast from Sūr to Suwaiq and inland as far as Wādi Samāil. At Masqat 11·24 inches of rain fell in 24 hours; and it was calculated that throughout 'Omān more than 700 persons were killed, and more than 100,000 valuable date palms uprooted, by the violence of the elements.

Administration and character of Faisal, 1888-94.

Management of the tribes.

It will have been observed from the foregoing that the Sultān, between 1888 and 1894, played on the whole a less conspicuous and successful part in reconciling tribal differences than his subject Sālih-bin-'Alī or the *quasi*-rebel Ibrāhim-bin-Qais: in fact his policy, from carelessness rather than from incapacity, was apathetic and estranged from him even the best disposed tribes.

Other branches of government.

Other aspects of his rule, hardly more satisfactory, also claim attention. The reign of Faisal commenced with the loss of 'Awābi and an unsuccessful expedition to recover it; and his efforts during the next few years to extend his direct authority, or to recover it where lost, were all equally unfortunate. In September 1891 the Sultān went by sea to Masna'ah, taking his brother Fahad and 150 men with him, and marched thence by land to Nakhl, Khōdh and Samāil; but if, as is believed, his object was to visit 'Omān Proper and promote his interests there, it was frustrated by the Bani Riyām, who refused to give him passage into that district. In November 1891 Faisal left by land for Bātinah with a field gun, but the vigilance of Ibrāhim-bin-Qais prevented the attempt on 'Awābi which it was probably his intention to make. In June 1893, leaving Fahad in charge of Masqat, the Sultān proceeded to Nakhl and detached a force to take possession of Mansūr, in Wādi Fara' or Rustāq, which was held by the Bani Harrās; a peaceful transfer of the place was apparently expected, but the negotiations failed; and Faisal, on hearing that a large body of the Bani Jābir, whom he himself had summoned, were approaching under Sulaimān-bin-Saif, a dismissed Wāli of Masna'ah, retreated in haste from Nakhl to Barkah upon the coast. In June 1894 riots took place at Matrah between Balūchis and the African servants of the Khōjah community, and order was not restored without difficulty. In September 1894 Badar-bin-Hilāl, after the death of his father as already described, offered Nizwa to Sayid Faisa on condition that he came to receive

possession of it in person; but the proposal, as there were reasons for suspecting treachery, was declined. In fact His Highness's position, as regards administrative control throughout the country generally, was stationary if not retrograde.

Personal characteristics of Faisal.

The ill-success of Saiyid Faisal at the beginning of his reign is attributable partly to faults of character and partly to mistakes of policy. He was not without energy; but his energy was fitful, and his conduct as a rule was characterised rather by sloth and procrastination. Economical in his personal expenditure, he was often extravagant in the prosecution of impracticable aims. His arrogant and suspicious temper prompted him to despise and reject all advice, and his position in the government was at first one of extreme isolation and of antagonism to all his surroundings.

Advisers and supporters.

When the Wazir Sa'id-bin-Muhammad, on the death of Turki, returned from abroad, Saiyid Faisal, instead of accepting his services, drove him into exile again, and, but for representations by the British authorities, would probably have confiscated his property. It was only in May 1889 that the Sultān consented, at the request of the British Political Resident, to nominate a Wazir who should be the medium of confidential communications with the British Agency: the individual then selected was one Muhammad-bin-'Azzān. Saiyid Faisal from the first showed considerable confidence in his brother Sayid Fahad, but the latter was a youth of ill-balanced mind and committed suicide in June 1894, in order to escape domestic troubles arising from his marriage two years previously with one of his cousins, a daughter of Saiyid Barghash, Sultān of Zanzibar. The valuable support of Sālih-bin-'Ali was retained by the Sultān only until 1894, when he alienated it by showing favour to Sa'id-bin-'Ali, a rival Shaikh of the Hirth; and the catastrophe was thereafter not long delayed.

Loss of power at sea.

Saiyid Faisal's most serious error, in non-personal matters, was his failure to maintain the steam-vessels upon which his control of the coast at a distance from Masqat, and especially of the port of Sūr, depended. The "Dār-as-Salām" he caused to be sold at Bombay; and the "Sultāni" he allowed to fall to pieces through neglect.

Political relations with Great Britain, 1888-94.

Saiyid Faisal's natural impatience of restraints and obligations reacted unfavourably on his relation with the British power; but the process

of estrangement was gradual, and no marked disagreement occurred until after the final departure in March 1891 of Colonel Ross, whose experience as Political Resident in the Gulf extended back over 18 years.

Recognition of Faisal by the British Government postponed, 1888.

Saiyid Faisal, on first assuming the administration, expressed a hope that the friendship of the British Government might be continued to him, solicited their protection and promised steadfastly to carry out their wishes. On the advice of Colonel Ross formal recognition of the new Sultān was postponed, but payment to him of the "Zanzibar" subsidy was not suspended. The Government of India, in recommending the continuance of the subsidy, took the opportunity to suggest that, as in former times, a part of it should be made chargeable to Her Majesty's Government; but no alteration of the existing arrangements was obtained. In 1888, during this period of undefined relations and in connection with his operations against 'Awābi, Faisal requested the support of H.M.S. "Turquoise" on the Bātinah coast, but it was not granted; and about the same time both 'Abdul 'Azīz and Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais wrote to inquire whether Saiyid Faisal would be supported by the British Government in the same manner as his father,—a query to which the Resident returned a very guarded reply.

Faisal recognised by the British Government, April 1890.

In the spring of 1889 the formal recognition of Faisal's Sultanate, recommended by the Resident and the Government of India, was authorised by the Secretary of State; but Colonel Ross, finding on arrival at Masqat that fresh dangers threatened the new ruler from the Sharqiyah region, refrained from making the announcement which had been the object of his visit, and reported the circumstances of his abstention to the Government of India. At length on the 6th of April 1890, in full Darbār and in the presence of His Highness's brothers and the principal inhabitants of Masqat, Colonel Ross informed Saiyid Faisal of his recognition as Sultan by the British Government, and a salute of 21 guns was fired from the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence;" Saiyid Faisal in his reply expressed his "earnest desire to be guided in all important "matters of policy by the advice of the British Government, and so to "conduct the government as to secure the continued friendship and appro-"bation of His Excellency the Viceroy and the British Government."

British Commercial Treaty, 1891.

The first item of business transacted with the Sultān after his formal recognition was the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, to take the place of the Treaty of Commerce of 1839. The arrangement of a fresh treaty, on the model of one recently concluded with Zanzibar, had been suggested by Colonel Ross in 1887, but proceedings were postponed by the death of Turki;

on the recognition, however, of Saiyid Faisal, a treaty following the lines approved by the Government of India was signed by him and by Colonel Ross, and was transmitted to the higher authorities. The document was not in perfect accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government, and a fresh treaty was accordingly drafted and signed at Masqat, as before, by the Sultān and the Resident; the date of signature of this revised document was the 19th of March 1891 and ratifications were exchanged in the following year. Colonel Ross, it was found, had inadvertently acted as a plenipotentiary without having been invested with the powers of one; but this technical flaw was not considered by Her Majesty's Government a sufficient reason for withholding the British ratification. There was not in the new treaty any material departure from the spirit of the old, which it was expressly declared to supersede; but it contained a new provision by which the Sultān was debarred from prohibiting the import or export of any particular article, and the levy of export taxes was made conditional upon the consent of the British Government. The treaty was to remain in force for 12 years absolutely, and it was to be terminable at any time thereafter on the expiration of 12 months' notice given by either party.

Suggested British protectorate over 'Omān, 1890.

In consequence perhaps of the activity of the French Colonial party, of which we shall have more to say hereafter, a discussion had in the meantime, in 1890, been initiated in London between the Foreign and India Offices as to the best means of precluding the interference of other European powers in 'Omān affairs. The consolidation of British influence by means of a protectorate treaty, similar to those recently concluded with the chiefs of the South Arabian coast, was at first suggested by the India Office; and the arbitration of 1861, the "Zanzibar" subsidy, the practical importance to successive Sultāns of recognition by the British Government, the occasional intervention of that Government in dynastic disputes and the deportation of claimants or pretenders to India, the armed assistance lent to Saiyid Turki in various crises, the negotiation of the Dutch treaty of 1877 through the British Resident, and the predominance of British national and commercial interests in 'Omān were adduced by the Government of India as proofs of the existence already of a virtual British protectorate over 'Omān, or, at least, of the justice of the claim that 'Omān should be regarded as falling within the British sphere of influence.

Agreement of the Sultān with Great Britain

As, however, the institution of a protectorate would have been contrary to the terms of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 and the consent of the French Government to the withdrawal of that Declaration was for

the time being impossible to obtain, it was resolved by Her Majesty's Government to proceed in a different manner. This decision resulted in the signature by the Sultán on the 20th March 1891, the day after the conclusion of the new commercial treaty, of an Agreement by which he bound himself, his heirs and his successors never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, the dominions of Masqat and 'Omán or any of their dependencies.* regarding cession of territory, 1891.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omán, etc., 1888-94.

It was an unfortunate feature of the Sultán's early administration that representations regarding injuries to British subjects often excited lively opposition upon his part; but the tendency did not immediately declare itself in full strength. In July 1888, when some Hindu traders at Barkah were assaulted by Bani Jábir tribesmen, His Highness caused justice to be done and imprisoned some of the principal offenders. In 1888 he maintained a claim to dispose for his own benefit of a vacant plot of land in the Khójah fort or quarter at Matrah; but in 1889, on the Khójahs representing that their ownership of everything within the walls had remained undisputed for more than a century, the Sultán abandoned his contention "out of respect and regard for the British Government." At the end of 1889 some Hindus were threatened and assaulted at Súr, but no reparation, at least in the first instance, could be obtained. Miscellaneous cases.

The first serious disagreement in a case of compensation resulted from incendiarism in the Khábúrah bazaar, by which British Indian subjects were losers to the amount, as afterwards assessed, of $12,739. The conflagration, which broke out on the night of the 24th February 1891, was shown to have been due to a dispute between the Hawámid and Sawálim sections of the Hawásinah, the former of whom claimed from the latter a share in the shop rents of the bazaar, and it was clear that the fire had been kindled by certain individuals of the Hawámid; nevertheless the Sultán pretended to believe that it was accidental, and he did not, until considerable pressure had been put on him, accede to the demand for compensation. He next endeavoured to collect one-third of the fine from the Sawálim section, who were innocent; but eventually, on the representations of the British Political Agent, he desisted from this injustice. The matter, in consequence of the Sultán's attitude, took more than two years to settle; and in 1892, while it was still pending, an attempt was Khábúrah fire, 1891.

* The text of this Agreement is given in Annexure No. 4 to the present chapter.

made by the discontented Hawāsinah to prevent the Indian traders of Khābūrah from obtaining crews for their boats.

The "Khiva case."

In 1893, however, when the S. S. "Khiva" with pilgrims for Jiddah was destroyed by fire off Murbāt in Dhufār, the Sultān sent the Zanzibar steamer "Avoca," then at Masqat, to the assistance of the destitute crew and passengers; and his creditable conduct on this occasion, as well as that of the local Shaikhs, was acknowledged by the Government of India and rewarded by suitable presents.

British Political Agency at Masqat rebuilt, 1890.

In 1889-90 the British Political Agency, an old and inconvenient building, was reconstructed on the same site at a total cost of Rs. 87,000 and re-occupied in July 1890. A sum of Rs. 2,000 was subsequently granted for the purchase of furniture.

The rebellion of 1895.

Causes.

The principal causes of the rebellion and attack on Masqat which we are about to describe were undoubtedly the estrangement of Sālih-bin-'Ali from the Sultān's cause, the dissatisfaction of some of the Hināwi tribes under Sālih's influence with the existing régime, the weakness—due to his own apathy—of Saiyid Faisal's military and political position, and the non-renewal in his favour by the British Government of the guarantee of support which they had given to his father Turki.

Complicity of the Sultān of Zanzibar.

But, although these factors were sufficient in themselves to account for the outbreak, there can be little doubt that an additional impulse and a special direction were imparted to the movement from Zanzibar. At the accession of Saiyid Faisal his uncle Khalifah-bin-Sa'id was Sultān of Zanzibar and gave evidence of a favourable disposition towards him by presenting him, at the beginning of 1889, with 203 rifles, some ammunition and 6,000 lbs. of gunpowder. The successor of Khalifah was 'Ali, also a son of Sa'id; and he too, during a reign of three years beginning in 1890, gave no symptom of harbouring designs on 'Omān. On the death of 'Ali in March 1893, however, the Zanzibar Sultanate passed to his nephew Hamad-bin-Thuwaini, whose earlier years had been spent in 'Omān and who retained a strong interest and many friends in the land of his birth. By January 1894 a stream of 'Omāni Arabs had begun to pour into Zanzibar, and frequent suggestions were made in Hamad's ear that he should possess himself of 'Omān. Among the visitors were 'Abdullah, a son of the notorious Sālih-bin-'Ali, and Shaikh Muhsin-bin-'Amr, both of the Hirth tribe; also Hamūd-bin-Sa'id the Jahafi, the well-known raider; these

arrived in Zanzibar in company in February 1894. It was stated by some that these chiefs, who on their way to Zanzibar had visited 'Abdul 'Aziz in his place of detention at Bombay, had come to offer the Sultanate of 'Omān to Hamad; and the British Consul-General at Zanzibar, Mr. Cracknall, was accordingly instructed to caution Saiyid Hamad against lending himself to any such intrigue. In May 'Abdullah-bin-Sālih, Muhsin-bin-'Amr and Hamūd the Jahafi returned to 'Omān, and the two former paid a visit to the Sultān at Masqat. It was ascertained that 'Abdullah and another Shaikh of the Hirth had between them received, at their departure, three field-pieces and 300 barrels of powder from the Sultān of Zanzibar; and that prince, on the probable consequences of such gifts being pointed out by the Government of India, was again warned, and promised that in future he would not give 'Omāni visitors anything beyond the customary sword or dagger and robe of honour, unless he was specially requested to do by Saiyid Faisal. In the following year, when the serious financial difficulties of Hamad came to light, the British authorities at Zanzibar reported that they were partly due to his extravagant liberality to Arabs from 'Omān.

Suspicious movements of Sālih-bin-Ali, 1894.

In October 1894, some months after the return of his son from Zanzibar, Sālih-bin-'Ali moved to Samad on pretext of settling disputes among the Habūs, Zikāwinah and Warūd of that place. He was next heard of as chastising, with a large force, the Bani Shahaim of Wādi Dima; and about the same time, in the month of November, one of his sons arrived in Wādi Tāyin with a considerable following. During these proceedings of Sālih, the Ghāfiri tribes in charge of the Sharqiyah passes had closed them against caravans proceeding towards Masqat, and the Sultān had seized and imprisoned two sons of one of their Shaikhs whom he found at Matrah; but he refused to see in the conduct of the tribes any sign of disloyalty towards himself on the part of Sālih, and, on the passes being reopened towards the end of November, he released the two hostages on a request from that chief. In December a sanguinary affray took place at Nizwa between the Bani Hina and the Bani Riyām inhabitants of the town, and Sālih in the following month sent his son 'Abdullah to mediate between Badar-bin-Hilāl and Sulaimān-bin-Saif, the heads respectively of the two factions; in the end a six months' truce was arranged.

Town of Masqat taken by treachery and surprise, 13th February 1895.

From Nizwa 'Abdullah-bin-Sālih went towards Masqat, ostensibly to confer with the Sultān regarding Nizwa affairs; and Saiyid Faisal, hoping perhaps that the interview might be the means of recovering Nizwa for himself, showed no disinclination to receive him. 'Abdullah arrived at the capital on the 11th of February with Muhsin-bin-'Amr,

who had been his companion on his visit to Zanzibar; and on the next day Hamūd the Jahafi, likewise a sharer in the excursion to Zanzibar, made his appearance: each of these three chiefs was attended by a small armed following. After according the Shaikhs an audience, the Sultān, on the evening of the 12th of February, sent them $1,200 in cash and the usual presents of dismissal; but the trio still lingered in the town; and, after dark, numbers of their followers began to straggle in from outside. This circumstance excited the suspicions of the Sultān's Hadhramauti and Wahhābi mercenaries, who hastened to inform their master; but the Sultān declined to believe that his guests could possibly contemplate so great a breach of Arab honour as an attack upon himself. About 4 A.M., however, on the morning of the 13th, the Bedouins within the walls seized the gates of the town by surprise and admitted from outside a large body of confederates who had hitherto remained at Ruwi. The house of Saif-bin-Badar, the Sultān's commander-in-chief, was surrounded; the new palace was invaded; and an attempt was made to force a way into the old palace, where the Sultān was, for the purpose of taking his life. After defending himself bravely in his apartment for a considerable time the Sultān, preceded by his wife and sister-in-law, reached the British Agency over the intervening house-roofs and thence betook himself to Fort Jalāli, while his brother Muhammad made good his escape to Fort Mirāni.

Steps taken for the protection of British subjects.

Measures were instantly taken by the British Political Agent for protecting, so far as possible, the lives and property of British subjects. Colonel Hayes Sadler addressed a letter to 'Abdullah, the rebel leader, warning him that he would be held personally responsible for any injury that might occur; notices of nationality were affixed to the doors of the Hindu traders in Masqat; and the Khōjahs of Matrah were given a British flag to hoist over their fort. The British Indian military guard were brought into the Agency for its defence.

Other proceedings on the 13th of February.

Meanwhile determined attempts were made by the Sultān's adherents, supported by heavy gun and rifle fire from Fort Jalāli, to recover the palace, the house of the late Saiyid Fahad, and the customs house; but all were repulsed. A message was next received by Colonel Hayes Sadler from the rebels, suggesting that further steps should be taken for the protection of British subjects at Matrah, where Shaikh Sālih was shortly expected; and the Agent in reply informed the leaders that the liability for damage at Matrah, as well as at Masqat, would rest with themselves. By evening the insurgents, whose number did not in the beginning exceed 300 men, were masters of the town and of its gates; but the Sultān still

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held the principal forts on the harbour, a tower in the south-eastern part of the town wall, and all the block-houses on the adjacent hills. The revolutionary leaders, who had their men under perfect control and restrained them from plundering, gave it to be generally understood that they had come, not to rob, but to set up a ruler who would be able to make his power respected throughout the country.

Proceedings on the 14th of February.

On the 14th of February the British India Steam Navigation Company's mail steamer entered the harbour, but passengers for Masqat were not allowed to land; and the vessel herself was immediately despatched to Chahbár with a telegram from the Political Agent, informing the Resident of the situation that had arisen and asking for naval assistance. The Sultán requested that the steamer might be sent to Súr to fetch a reinforcement of loyal tribesmen from that port, but his application was refused by Colonel Hayes Sadler, who considered it now the more necessary to observe a strict neutrality because the town was in the hands of the rebels and they had the lives and property of many British subjects entirely at their mercy. The insurrectionaries spent the day in wrecking the Sultán's palaces and in auctioning such of his effects as they did not destroy; some of the property thus sold was bought in by British Indian traders with the object of saving it for His Highness. On this day the Political Agent received a letter from 'Abdullah, in which an attempt was made to establish a community of interest between the rebel leaders and the British representative, and great deference was expressed for the opinion of the latter; but Colonel Hayes Sadler merely replied that what he required was the protection of British subjects and of their property.

Proceedings from the 15th to the 17th February.

Early on the 15th of February the white Mutawwa' flag was seen floating over the Sultán's palace. On the 16th the rebels were about to advance into the British Agency quarter in order to blockade Fort Jalali more effectively, but on the remonstrances of the Political Agent they desisted from their intentions. The first reinforcement for the Sultán arrived on the morning of the 17th in the shape of a contingent of Bani Jábir from Tiwi; and the rebels, almost simultaneously, received a large addition to their forces. On this day the rebel leader Muhsin-bin-'Amr waited on Colonel Hayes Sadler and sought to impress on him that the insurrection was a general Hináwi movement for the purpose of dethroning the reigning Sultán, but that the tribes of 'Omán desired nothing so much as the friendship and support of the British Government. In the afternoon the Political Agent visited the Sultán, and the Sultán enquired whether the Agent could mediate between him and the rebels

before any damage was done to property; Saiyid Faisal also asked who would be responsible for the material loss to neutrals, were he to descend from his fort and attempt to recover the town by force. To the first question Colonel Hayes Sadler replied that he would be glad to afford his good offices when the proper time for mediation should have come, but that the rebels had not as yet shown any desire for compromise; in regard to the damage that might be done by fighting in the town his answer was that the Government of a country were responsible for the general safety, and that, though he had in the beginning informed the rebels that they would be held responsible for the losses caused, the situation had now somewhat changed by their remaining for five days in possession of the town without any destruction of property having occurred. Late the same evening 'Abdullah announced the approach of his father, Shaikh Sâlih-bin-'Ali, with a large force; also the arrival of Sa'ûd-bin-'Azzân of Rustâq, who had, he said, assumed the leadership of the rising. Matrah had up to this time escaped occupation owing to the numerical weakness of the insurgents.

Arrival of the British Political Resident, 18th February.

On the 18th of February, in the morning, the Sultân's men made an unsuccessful attack on the Bâb-as-Saghîr, and severe street fighting took place in the Hindu traders' quarter. On the arrival, immediately thereafter, of H.M.S. "Sphinx" the belligerents were induced by the Political Agent to agree to a truce of a few hours, under cover of which all British subjects in the town were removed to the Makallah cove, except the Europeans, who were received on board the "Sphinx" or into the Agency building. In the afternoon Colonel Wilson, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, arrived in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" and assumed the political direction of affairs.

Proceedings from the 19th of February to the 1st of March.

On the 19th and 20th of February a desultory fire was kept up by the Sultân's men; on the 21st they gained ground up to the eastern gate of the customs house; on the 22nd a sepoy of the British Agency was wounded by a stray bullet. Complaints were now received of depredations on the property of Hindu traders by the Sultân's levies, who mostly belonged to the Banî Bû 'Alî, Hishm and Banî Râsib tribes, and the Shaikhs were warned by the British authorities that, unless they restrained their followers, the boats in which they had come from Sûr would be seized and destroyed. On the 23rd of February Hamûd-bin-'Azzân, brother of Sa'ûd, arrived at Ruwi, and looting of property by the rebels was reported for the first time. On the 24th a large Âl Wahîbah reinforcement was reported to have reached Sâlih-bin-'Alî at Ruwi, and there were indications of the rebellion developing into a general contest between the

Hināwis and the Ghāfiris throughout the country. On the 25th the Sultān's forces recaptured the water-gate as well as a tower half way between it and the Bāb-al-Kabīr; and the Bani Bū 'Ali levies advanced their barricades some 50 yards. On the 26th the Sultān sent an evasive reply to questions by the Resident regarding his intended course of action; the boat of Surgeon-Major Jayakar, the Agency Surgeon, was fired on, probably by mistake; and the Hindu temple in the middle of the town was taken by the Sultān's adherents. The remaining days of February were uneventful. On the 1st of March a peon of the British Agency was killed by a random shot. During these inconclusive operations H.M.S. "Bramble" had arrived at Masqat.

Reference by the rebels to the Government of India, 2nd March.

On the 2nd of March matters seemed to have reached a deadlock, for the rebels had become powerless for aggression, while the Sultān's men still shrank from making a decisive attack on them; and plunder of the property of British subjects had recommenced. An interesting interview took place on this day between the British Resident and the Political Agent on the one side and Muhsin-bin-'Amr and a second Shaikh of the Hirth upon the other; the causes and objects of the revolution as well as the actual situation were discussed. The rebel Shaikhs stated that they represented all the Hināwis of 'Omān; that a change of ruler was generally desired; that, though acting on their own behalf and not on his, they wished to offer the Sultanate of 'Omān to Hamad-bin-Thuwaini of Zanzibar, whom they knew to be a friend of the British Government while Faisal was not; and that, failing Hamad, they desired that a son of 'Azzān-bin-Qais should be placed upon the throne. With regard to complaints of looting they admitted their responsibility and that they had no longer full control over their men; but they said that Sālih-bin-'Ali, who was wealthy, would pay the necessary compensation. In reply the Shaikhs were informed that it was not even clear that all the Hināwis of 'Omān were on their side; that they did not in any case represent the Ghāfiris, who were much more numerous throughout 'Omān than the Hināwis; and that their action in disturbing the country, and in causing injury to British interests, would undoubtedly be regarded by the British Government in a very serious light. At the request of the Shaikhs, however, their views were reported to the Government of India by cable.

Inaction of the Sultān, 3rd March.

On the 3rd of March the Resident informed Government of the unsatisfactory attitude of the Sultān, who, though now possessed of an adequate force, remained inert; and he pointed out the impossibility of dislodging the rebels from the town by naval fire without great damage to property. In reply the Resident was instructed that no expectation of assistance in coercing the rebels should be held out to the Sultān.

Truce ending in a panic, 4th to 6th March.

In consequence of renewed complaints of looting a fresh truce of three days, from the 4th to the 6th of March inclusive, had now been demanded and obtained by the Resident; this was done in order that the goods, as well as the persons, of the British Indian traders might be placed in safety at Makallah before greater damage occurred. During the 4th and 5th of March goods continued to be removed, but under increasing friction with the rebels; and on the 6th a panic took place, and the British Indians all returned to the Makallah cove. The Sultān, though warned of the responsibility he might incur by his refusal, declined to extend the truce, even for the purpose of removing the remaining property of the Indians; and on the 7th of March hostilities were resumed.

Orders of the Government of India communicated to the rebels, 7th March.

On the 7th of March, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Major Hayes Sadler, having obtained a short cessation of hostilities, proceeded in a boat to the customs house and informed Sālih-bin-'Ali personally of the orders passed by the Government of India on the representations of the Hārithi Shaikhs: they were merely to the effect that a reunion of 'Omān with Zanzibar was out of the question, and that the property of British subjects must be respected, otherwise active measures for its protection would be taken. Shaikh Sālih admitted his responsibility for the damage done by the rebels and promised to pay full compensation; at the same time he requested that the property of British subjects which still remained in the town might be removed, but he was informed that this was impossible, especially as the lives of British subjects appeared to be no longer safe among the invading Bedouins. On the same day the Sultan applied to the Resident for active assistance in expelling the rebels from Masqat, but under the previous orders of the Government his request was refused.

On the 8th of March further looting took place.

Retirement of the rebels and reoccupation of the town by the Sultān, 9th and 10th March.

On the 9th of March terms of peace were at length arranged,—the Sultān, as subsequently transpired, paying over $12,000 in cash to the rebels besides promising to condone the rebellion and to continue the allowances of the Rustāq family,—and the insurgents evacuated their positions, pillaging, wantonly destroying, and setting fire to the town in several places, as they withdrew. On the 10th the Sultān's levies overran the town, and a general conflagration was with difficulty prevented by means of the British Agency fire-engines. The Indian traders, from fear of the so-called loyal tribesmen, whom there was neither money to pay off nor a sufficiency of boats to send away, did not return from Makallah for some days.

On the 13th of March the French cruiser "Troude" arrived from Obock, where she had received orders for Masqat while the rebellion

was still in progress. During the trouble at the capital, Quryāt also had been attacked by the raider Qurta, and two British subjects there had sustained losses to the amount of $1,000.

Tribes implicated and casualties.

The principal tribes implicated on the rebel side at Masqat were the Hirth; the Habūs, along with their dependents the Āl Bū Rashaid and some of the Zikāwinah and Warūd; the Bani Battāsh; the Awāmir of 'Omān Proper; the Bani Ruwāhah; the Rahbiyīn; and the Hināwis of middle and lower Wādi Samāil, especially those of Fanjah and Khōdh; to whom may be added the Bani Na'amān, Shurūj and Fawāris, also the inhabitants of the Rustāq valley and a number of the people of Khadhra and of other places in Bātinah. At the end of the insurrection the rebels at Masqat were about 2,000 strong, while the loyalists approached double that number. On the side of the Sultān about 40 were killed and 60 wounded: the losses of the rebels were estimated at 80 killed and 80 wounded.

Internal history of 'Omān from the rebellion to the rupture with Great Britain, 1895-98.

The credit of the malcontent tribes and of their Shaikhs was as much depressed by the partial failure of the rebellion as that of the Sultān by its partial success; and, except in the distant dependency of Dhufār, where the Sultān's authority was in abeyance from 1895 to 1897, the internal peace of 'Omān was not seriously disturbed during the next four years. For a time, however, the Sultān continued to be harassed by swarms of rapacious Shaikhs who crowded in from all parts, but chiefly from Sūr and Samāil, to claim rewards for real or imaginary services rendered during the crisis.

Riot at Izki, 1895.

In June 1895 there took place at Izki one of the periodical conflicts between the Nizār and Yaman inhabitants of that place, the former being aided as usual by the neighbouring Bani Riyām and the latter by the Bani Ruwāhah; but peace was easily restored by Saiyid Muhammad, elder brother of the Sultān, whom His Highness sent to mediate between the factions.

Acquisition of Nizwa by the Sultān, 1895.

In November 1895 Badar-bin-Hilāl was assassinated at Nizwa by the Bani Shakail; and Saiyid Faisal, who had governed that place as Wāli before its loss in his father's time, despatched his trusty servant Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, then on leave from Dhufār, to recover it in his name; this Sulaimān effected by the simple expedient of buying out the holders and installing a garrison of his own in their place.

Violent death of Sālih-bin-'Ali, 1896.

In May 1896 Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Alī, taking advantage of the discontent caused by the imposition of a part of the rebellion indemnity-tax on the Ghāfiris—a circumstance which will be explained further on—induced part of the Bani Jābir of Wādi Samāil to join with the Bani Ruwāhah in attacking Saijah, which was held by loyal Bani Jābir and by Bani Hadhram, and himself assumed command of the operations. This, however, was the last appearance on the scene of the veteran intriguer, whom a random shot now laid low, in the month of September, at an age of over 75; during thirty years of his life he had played a conspicuous part in the politics of 'Omān, generally in opposition to the Sultān of the day, and he had often been suspected of personal aspirations to the supreme power. It is a remarkable fact that Sālih's son 'Abdullah had predeceased him, surviving by an even shorter period his recent perfidy at Masqat; and the life of Hamūd the Jahafi, also, was now not far from its close.

Abortive expedition of the Sultān against the Bani Ruwāhah, 1896.

The Sultān took advantage of the consternation created by Shaikh Sālih's death to organise an expedition against the Bani Ruwāhah, from whom, by removing the tax on the Ghāfiris, he at the same time detached their allies of the Bani Jābir; but his movements were too slow; his huge host of several thousand mercenaries, when they arrived within striking distance of the enemy, refused to fight; and in the end the Sultān was obliged to return to Masqat, having achieved nothing but the expenditure of some $60,000, which he could ill afford.

Disturbances at Nakhl, 1896-1897.

In June 1896 a disturbance at Nakhl had been quelled by the Sultān in person at the head of a few hundred men, but exactly a year later trouble was renewed there; on this second occasion, however, the Wāli of Barkah was able to cope with it unaided.

Rustāq affairs, 1895-98.

In December 1895 Sa'ūd-bin-'Azzān of Rustāq had advanced against Sohār with an army of Yāl Sa'ad, Hawāsinah, Maqābil and Na'īm, but a reinforcement of 120 men, whom the Sultān forwarded by sea, enabled the Wāli to repulse him; and affairs on the Rustāq side remained quiet until the death of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais in May 1898. On the occurrence of this event Sa'ūd-bin'Azzān, who was supported by the Shaikhs of Rustāq, seized the principal fort by treachery and obliged Sa'īd, the son of the late Ibrāhīm, to take refuge in Hazam, where he shortly afterwards besieged him. Saiyid Faisal no sooner heard of these proceedings than he sent Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim to the assistance of Sa'īd, and the siege of Hazam was raised; but, on Sulaimān preparing to advance against Rustāq, the Bani Ruwāhah and various Sharqiyah tribes began to move to its assistance, while the Yāl Sa'ad, hitherto impassive spectators, showed signs of unrest.

The attempt on Rustāq was accordingly abandoned, when a counter-attack on the Sultān's possessions in Bātinah was at once threatened and, but for the opportune death at Rustāq of the notorious Hamūd-bin-Sa'id the Jahafi, one of the moving spirits, would probably have been carried out.

Affairs at Sūr, 1898.

The trouble at Sūr, of which place the inhabitants were now being encouraged by French agency to make light of the Sultān's authority, was attributable chiefly to the high-handed and tactless conduct of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim. This official, on his recall from Dhufār, spent about a week at Sūr in March 1898 and abruptly informed the Shaikhs that in future he would not respect the Khafir system, of which it is possible that they were making some improper use. When he sailed for Masqat he left his son, a boy of twelve years, in charge of the place, with instructions to build forts commanding the water-supply of the town and the caravan routes from the port to the interior. In May a deputation representing all sections of the Jannabah of Sūr waited on the Sultān at Masqat, but he turned a deaf ear to their grievances; later, however, in deference to the advice of 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim, Tamimah of the Bani Bū 'Ali, work upon the new fort was discontinued; but the Sultān still refused to remove the son of Sulaimān from the Walāship. At length, towards the end of September, a force consisting chiefly of Jannabah, but partly also of Bani Bū 'Ali and Bani Rāsib, beleaguered the old fort occupied by the Sultān's representative; and on the 4th of October an attack was made, which resulted in the surrender of the garrison, after a short defence, and in their deportation to Masqat. At the end of the year the Jannabah were persuaded to admit a new governor and a fresh garrison on the part of the Sultān; these, on their arrival, found the old fort dismantled, only the bare walls remaining.

The Sultān's administration, 1895-98.

Military reforms.

On the subsidence of the rebellion the Sultān took measures to strengthen the defences of Masqat and Matrah, which he had long neglected, and caused seven 12-pounder guns to be mounted on Fort Mirāni and five on Fort Jalāli. He also re-enlisted 40 African guards who had served his father, armed his palace retainers with rifles, and ordered gunpowder and rifle cartridges from England.

Ministers.

A change of ministers also took place as an indirect consequence of the rebellion. In 1896 some treasonable letters which Muhammad-bin-'Azzān, the Wazīr, had written to Sālih-bin-'Ali came into the hands of the Sultān through Zanzibar; and the minister, who on being confronted with them was unable to deny his guilt, was imprisoned until he had paid a fine of $20,000, after which he was banished to East Africa. He was succeeded in office by Muhammad-bin-Sa'id, who had formerly served Saiyid Turki in the same capacity.

Other public servants.

The most useful of Faisal's local governors at this time were Rāshid-bin-'Ozaiz, whom he continued to employ at Hisn Samāil, and Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, already more than once mentioned, a negroid of enterprising but rash temperament; Dhufār was the principal sphere of Sulaimān's activity, but he rendered services at Nizwa and Hazam also, which have been noticed above.

Limits of the Sultān's authority.

During the period now under consideration the direct authority of the Sultān prevailed only over Masqat and Matrah, over Bātinah to the east of Masna'ah, and over the principal coast towns to the west of Masna'ah; but his power was felt in a modified degree in Nakhl, Wādi Ma'āwal, Wādi Tau and Wādi Samail, and in some places such as Sūr upon the coast to the south-east of Masqat. By the recovery of Nizwa the Sultān's influence in 'Omān Proper, where he already held Izki, was considerably increased.

Indebtedness of the Sultān.

The Sultān, as we shall presently see, was greatly embarrassed at this time by want of money; and his debts were rapidly and steadily accumulating.

Revival of French influence in 'Omān, 1891-98.

Compact between France and Russia.

Some time before these events, France and Russia, as more fully explained in another place, had entered into a combination for the purpose of diminishing British influence in the Persian Gulf and of promoting a joint policy of their own in that region. In 'Omān the task of opposing Britain devolved on France; and a contest of international significance thus arose, shortly afterwards, upon a little known stage.

French protest relating to 'Omān, 1891.

In 1891 the French Ambassador in London, in consequence presumably of a misconception of the circumstances in which Saiyid Faisal had succeeded his father to the exclusion of his uncle 'Abdul 'Aziz and of his elder brother Muhammad, complained that the rule of succession to the

Sultanate of 'Omān had recently been altered under the advice of the Government of India; and the complaint, though it betrayed ignorance of the facts, was a symptom of renewed political interest in 'Omān, on the part of the French, after an interval of more than 80 years.

Debate in the French Chamber, 1893.

The new policy of the Republic in the Gulf was at length made clear by a budget debate which took place in the French Chamber of Deputies at the beginning of 1893. On M. Deloncle, a Deputy of the Colonial party, proposing a supplementary credit of 7,000 francs for the establishment of a Vice-Consulate at Masqat, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Develle, gave a promise that the post should be created; and, in doing so, he took no step to disavow the main arguments advanced by M. Deloncle, namely, that it was to the interest of France to support Russian policy in the Gulf, and that facilities ought to be provided for the registration of native shipping under the French flag.

Other indications of French and Russian interest.

Further indications of Franco-Russian interest in 'Omān were not long wanting. A plan of the harbour at Sūr,* published by the French Government in 1901, shows that their attention had been directed to that place at some earlier date; and in 1893 M. Chapui, a somewhat disreputable French subject who had attracted notice by his proceedings on the coast of Trucial 'Omān two years previously, arrived at Sūr in a steamer flying the French flag, and tried, but without success, to obtain a site for a coal shed there. In September 1893 the Russian volunteer cruiser "Nijni Novgorod" called at Masqat, where some of the officers had a private interview with the Sultān; and about this time rumours of Russian intrigue and of the presence of a Russian secret agent at Masqat became current, not only on the spot, but also at Zanzibar.

Appointment of a French Vice-Consul at Masqat, 1894.

At length on the 8th of November 1894, M. Ottavi, the long-expected Vice-Consul for France, arrived at Masqat and entered on his duties. His activity ran principally in two channels: he endeavoured to subvert the influence of the British representative with the Sultān and his entourage; and at the same time, by encouraging 'Omāni navigators to use the French flag without their sovereign's consent and even in defiance of his orders, he laboured to create a French interest independent of the Sultān's good graces. The general results of M. Ottavi's policy with the Sultān were apparent chiefly in the growing intractability of Saiyid Faisal to British influence, a fact of which ample illustration will be found in a later paragraph on British relations. Here we may recall the visit of the "Troude" to Masqat in 1895, a few days too late to assist the Sultān in dealing with the insurgents, and mention that in

* See British Admiralty Chart No. 2369-106, in which the plan figures as an inset.

1897 the services of the French war-vessel "Surprise" were offered for the suppression of a rebellion in Dhufār but were declined by the Sultān.

The scheme for advancing French influence by a wide distribution of the French flag, though now for the first time boldly pursued in 'Omān, was by no means a novelty in French political practice. So early as 1869 the French colonial authorities at Nossibé and Mayotte began to issue French papers to owners of native vessels who were not French subjects; and in 1863 the circumstance was brought to the notice of Her Majesty's Government as an obstacle to the suppression of the slave trade, for vessels to which the French flag was granted became, *ipso facto*, exempt from search by British cruisers. In 1869 it was reported that nearly every native vessel to the south of Zanzibar now sailed under French colours, and evidence of the manner in which the French flag was abused to give cover to the slave trade in African waters continued to accumulate. This aspect of the question specially engaged the attention of Sir Bartle Frere on his mission to Zanzibar in 1873, but it is foreign to our present subject.

The French flag system extended to 'Omān, 1891-97.

It was in 1891, about the time when French interest in 'Omān began to revive and the Franco-Russian understanding relating to the Persian Gulf was formed, that the question of the French flag first attracted serious attention at Masqat; it was found that already 13 Nākhudas of Sūr were in possession of French colours, and that the flag was now granted not only in Madagascar but also at Obock, and even at Aden by the French Consul at Aden. The Sultān, who foresaw that a French claim to protect vessels at sea might easily develop into a claim to protect the persons and property of 'Omāni subjects connected with those vessels on shore, at once took up the question; but, though he succeeded in obtaining the attendance of 200 Jannabah at Masqat to discuss it, he was unable to check the growth of the practice. The Sultān also appealed to the Government of India for advice and proposed to address a remonstrance to the head of the French Republic, but the Government of India requested him to refrain from direct protest until they had referred to the Secretary of State; at the same time, however, they informed him that the use of the French flag by his subjects could have no effect as against himself, and that he might safely take any steps he pleased to uphold his jurisdiction, in his own waters, over such of his subjects as might have taken the French flag. Communication between the British and French Governments in Europe resulted in the disavowal by the latter of the action of their Consul at Aden, and early in the next year the flags issued at Aden were withdrawn from the holders:

certain assurances also were given by the French Government on this occasion, which the British Government interpreted as meaning that the general system of granting French flags to aliens would be abandoned, but in this respect there was a misunderstanding. At this juncture France, by her ratification in 1892 of the General Act of the Brussels Slave Trade Conference of 1890, incurred a plain obligation to restrict the grant of her flag to such native mariners as were either French citizens or subjects of a State under French protection; but the restriction was overlooked or intentionally disregarded, and the issue of French flags and papers to Arabs under the jurisdiction of the Sultān of 'Omān continued. By 1894, the year in which a French Vice-Consul was appointed at Masqat, the number of French flag holders at Sūr had risen to 23, of whom 11 belonged to the Jaanabah and 12 to the Bani Bū 'Alī tribe; of the authorisations some had been obtained at Obock, some in Madagascar, and others in East Africa. The French flag and certificate,—the latter renewable annually and known as a "titre de navigation,"—were granted either on the security of immoveable property owned in a French colony, or on the personal security of an approved French flag holder; and, the latter being readily procurable, they were obtained without difficulty by 'Omāni boat owners or Nākhudas on their annual trading voyages to the Red Sea or East Africa; moreover, as the privileges were attached to the vessels, of which the owners and crews were continually changing, it became impossible for the Sultān to know how many and what persons might claim protection under a particular certificate. It soon became evident that M. Ottavi intended to push to its utmost limits the indefinite right of protection which the French registration of Omāni vessels provided him with a pretext for exercising. From 1892 onwards abundant evidence was forthcoming of the abuse of the French flag by the importers of slaves at Sūr and by the runners of slave cargoes to places in the Persian Gulf, especially in Turkish 'Irāq; and in 1896 two Sūri vessels under the French flag, the "Salāmah" and the "Sa'ad," were captured by a British vessel in the act of carrying slaves. This last very flagrant case led to fresh correspondence between the British and French Governments; and it was now ascertained that the French assurances of 1891 merely referred to admittedly irregular grants of the flag, as by the French Consul at Aden, and that there was no intention on the part of the French Government to discontinue the grants in what they considered to be legitimate cases. The "Salāmah" and "Sa'ad," in compliance with the claims of M. Ottavi, were handed over to him for disposal; and in 1897 the position of the French Vice-Consul was further strengthened by successful inter-

ference, in two instances, on the ground of the French registry of vessels. In the second of these cases the Sultān, who had imprisoned one of his subjects for refusing to exhibit a French navigation certificate the benefits of which he claimed, thought it necessary, on M. Ottavi protesting, to set the man at liberty. The full scope of the French pretensions and of the scheme based upon them was thus rapidly becoming manifest; but to the Sultān, when in May 1897 he addressed a protest on the subject to the French Vice-Consul at Masqat, the only reply vouchsafed was that the custom had existed for forty years, and that it had been acquiesced in, until the present, by the rulers of 'Omān. In 1897 it was reported that no less than 38 'Omāni vessels had obtained a French status through the Consulate of France at Zanzibar.

Relations with Great Britain and decline of British influence in 'Omān, 1895-98.

Causes of the alienation of the Sultān.

It is time now to revert to the subject of British relations with 'Omān, and in doing so we may premise that British policy in 'Omān, though never more friendly or helpful to the Sultān than in the years immediately following the rebellion of 1895, was increasingly unsuccessful; that there was a growing estrangement on the part of the Sultān; and that the accumulated strain of the period ended in, and was relieved by, a complete rupture. The causes of the alienation of the Sultān were, principally, the neutral behaviour of the British representatives in the crisis of 1895, the vexatious results in the shape of claims for compensation—chiefly British—that followed, and the growth of French influence at Masqat.

British policy of neutrality modified after the rebellion of 1895.

The neutrality of Colonel Wilson and Colonel Hayes Sadler was in part at least inevitable, for once the rebels had occupied the town of Masqat by surprise many British subjects and much British property were in their power; and in any case it would have been impossible to eject them by naval force without doing much material damage to the place. The attitude of the Resident and Agent was also strictly in accordance with the policy of the British Government, who had abstained from renewing to Saiyid Faisal the pledges of active assistance given to his father Turki. The general outcome of the rebellion being however unsatisfactory, as now appeared, discussions regarding a change of policy were initiated; and the Government of India proposed that either

(1) Masqat and Matrah should be annexed and the Sultān pensioned, or (2) that a British protectorate over 'Omān should be declared, or (3) that it should be intimated to the leading Shaikhs of 'Oman that, whatever differences they might have with their Sultān, the British Government would not, in view of the importance of British interests at those places, permit attacks upon Masqat and Matrah.

Safety of Masqat and Matrah guaranteed by the British Government, 1895.

The Government of India themselves favoured the proposal for a protectorate; but, realising that it might not be prudent to open negotiations with France for the withdrawal of the Declaration of 1862, they recommended the third course, which was in fact a slight modification of the policy observed during the preceding reign. The Secretary of State for India having signified his support, in case the assent of France to a British protectorate over 'Omān should be unobtainable, of this proposal, it was adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and the Resident in the Persian Gulf was authorised to communicate the decision to the Sultān for notification to the Shaikhs of 'Omān; at the same time the Sultān was to be made to understand that he was not absolved from taking proper and necessary measures for his own defence. The Sultān, who had more than once hinted that he considered the British Government to have failed in their duty to him, received the announcement with a coldness which had not been expected, and even affected to treat it as a mere matter of course. He also demurred, on the ground of expense, to holding a Darbār for the purpose of making the orders of Government generally known; and in lieu thereof a written notification, after its terms had been approved by the British Political Resident, was circulated by him to the leading men of the country at the end of 1895.

Other assistance, 1896.

In 1896 two 5½-inch mortars with ammunition were presented to the Sultān by the Government of India as an addition to his means of defence; and in the same year an offer of naval assistance was made to him, as will be seen in the history of Dhufar, for the purpose of recovering that province, which had revolted; but it was at first declined.

British protectorate again suggested by the Government of India, 1896.

The hostility of Saiyid Faisal to British interests was now so apparent that, in June 1896, the Viceroy of India, Lord Elgin, suggested by telegram that advantage might be taken of affairs in Madagascar to obtain the assent of the French Government to a British protectorate over 'Omān; the reply, however, was that the Foreign Office, while they appreciated the importance of trying to secure a protectorate, considered that the measure could not be successfully accomplished at the time. In 1897 the Sultān requested British aid for the recovery of Dhufar, but it was evident that he did so with reluctance, and he showed no real gratitude

for the favourable result : the ungracious behaviour of the Sultán in the matter of the Dhufár expedition was believed to be due to the influence of the French Vice-Consul over his mind. Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, it was still found possible, at the beginning of 1898, to conclude with the Sultán a useful agreement in restraint of the arms traffic, the nature of which is described in the Appendix on that subject.

British loans to the Sultán, 1895 and 1897.

The financial support of the British Government was never more necessary to Saiyid Faisal than in the years following the revolt of 1895, and it was not withheld. The "Zanzibar" subsidy continued to be paid as usual. In 1895, the Sultán having made written application for a loan of $30,000 and virtually intimated that, if it were not granted, he would have to look for assistance elsewhere, the Government of India sanctioned the advance to him of a sum of $60,000, to bear interest at 4½ per cent. and to be recovered by monthly deductions of $2,000 from the "Zanzibar" subsidy ; on his part the Sultán undertook in writing that the money should be applied to meeting his actual difficulties, and that he would not borrow from any other foreign power so long as the loan remained unrepaid. In 1896 and 1897 Saiyid Faisal made further requests for pecuniary aid, chiefly for the purpose of establishing his authority in the interior ; but, as he would not at first give a satisfactory statement of his financial position and prospects, there was some delay in meeting his wishes. Eventually the Sultán was brought to admit that his expenditure was in excess of his income by about $700 per mensem, and that his liabilities already amounted to $130,000, of which $100,000 (inclusive of $35,000 bearing interest at the rate of 24 per cent.) was due to Banyans and Arabs on account of loans contracted by him locally at the time of the rebellion ; he stated that he required Rs. 60,000 to pay off the portion of the debt subject to high interest and Rs. 40,000 to extinguish the remainder, which was due to Arabs. On the Sultán giving an assurance that the money would be devoted to paying off the more urgent items of his liability and that he would take steps to make his income and expenditure balance, a sum of Rs. 60,000 was in June 1897 advanced to him on the same terms as the first loan, repayment of this supplementary amount to commence upon discharge of the former one. It was also resolved that, in case the Sultán should give evidence of an intention to place his finances on a sound basis, he should be assisted with a third loan of Rs. 40,000 to enable him to pay off his Arab creditors ; and it was suggested by the Government of India that an officer should be lent him for the purpose of reforming his customs, from which he did not derive as much benefit

as he might, or even that further loans should be made to him on the security of the customs instead of the subsidy. With reference to these last proposals it was ruled by Her Majesty's Government that assumption by the Government of India of direct control over the Masqat customs would be inconsistent with the Declaration of 1862, but that the appointment by the Sultān of a British Superintendent of Customs would be admissible, and that a loan to the Sultān might with propriety be made on the security of the customs. About the same time however, at the beginning of 1898, it leaked out that nearly half of the last loan had been misapplied by the Sultān and that his debts now amounted to more than $190,500; he had also sent in no projects for reduction of current expenditure; and he had politely, but distinctly, refused to make any change in the management of his customs.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omān, 1895-98.

Indemnity for British sufferers by the rebellion of 1895.

Meanwhile it had been necessary to insist on the satisfaction by the Government of 'Omān of the claims of British subjects for losses sustained in the rebellion of 1895. These claims had been scrutinised by a committee appointed by the British Political Agent, and the compensation justly due had in the end been assessed at $77,895. The Government of India, though they approved of the action of their Political Agent in refusing to hand over to the Sultān a party of 25 Hirth arriving at Masqat from Zanzibar in a British steamer immediately after the rebellion, were willing to assist the Sultān in any reasonable manner, and agreed that the indemnity might be exacted from the offending tribes in the shape of a tax levied on their export trade; that the Sultān, while he was to understand that his own responsibility was in no way lessened thereby, might be authorised to notify that the demand was made at the instance of the British Government; and that the tax should be fixed at such a rate as to produce the amount required in three years at most. The claims of British subjects, and with them those of an American (the Rev. Mr. Zwemer) and of an Algerian, were to be satisfied first; and thereafter the special tax might be maintained until 'Omāni sufferers by the rebellion had also been compensated for their losses, after which it should be abolished. The Sultān concurred generally in these arrangements; but he clung obstinately to the view that British subjects should have no precedence over 'Omāni subjects, and for some time he persisted

in speaking of the sums realised as "common to the four governments." At first a special export duty of 10 per cent., in addition to the usual export duty of 5 per cent., was imposed on the produce of the guilty Hināwī tribes only; but, owing to the collusion of Ghāfiri tribes, to the abuse of an exemption in favour of the Hajriyīn, to the weakness of the Sultān's executive at Sūr, and to the partiality displayed by the Sultān himself in making collections at Masqat, the tax instead of bringing in $20,000 to $30,000 a year, as had been estimated, yielded between the 1st of August 1895 and the 14th of March 1896 the sum of $9,054 merely; and of this only $650 was derived from Sūr, the chief port of the offending tribes. In July 1896 the Sultān, to punish the Ghāfiris for conniving to screen the Hināwīs and also on account of the part which his own Ghāfiri levies had taken in the plunder of Masqat, imposed an extra 5 per cent. on exported Ghāfiri produce, so raising the export duty payable by the tribes of that faction to 10 per cent.; but, as we have seen, the circumstance was taken advantage of by Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Ali to detach some of the Ghāfiris of Wādi Samāīl from their allegiance, and the new order, which from the first had been discountenanced by the British Political Agent, was then almost instantly repealed. At the beginning of 1897 Saiyid Faisal asked to be allowed six years in all in which to discharge the indemnity, but promised to pay interest on what remained due after the end of the third year; and in the same year, 1897, he farmed out the punitive tax to Ratansi Parshotam, an Indian merchant, for $15,000 per annum. In March 1898 only $29,711 of the indemnity had been paid off, and in August the tax was re-farmed to the same individual for $18,000, though another Hindu had offered $25,000 for it.

Grievances of British Indian traders.

During the period now under consideration, grievances on the part of British Indian traders in 'Omān continued to accumulate. In 1889, and again in 1894 and in every subsequent date season up to and including that of 1898, the British Indian date exporters of Matrah were compelled to bring their consignments to Masqat to be weighed; this was an arbitrary arrangement from which Saiyid Turki had desisted on remonstrances being made, but in the case of the present ruler mere remonstrances were of no avail. As Fard dates, which went to America only, were exempt from this order, the system amounted to a differentiation in favour of American trade; and it was unfair to the Khōjahs of Matrah, by the ingenuity of whose rivals, the Hindus of Masqat, it was probably contrived. The commercial treaty of 1891, also, was indifferently observed by the Sultān's officials, and illegal charges were common. Export duty was frequently in excess of the 5 per cent. rate agreed to by the British Government.

and in the case of 'Omāni tobacco it amounted to 20 per cent. On one occasion, in 1898, an additional punitive export tax of 5 per cent. was suddenly imposed on the date produce of the Rustāq and Ma'āwal valleys, after the whole of it had been bought up by British Indian merchants; a remission however was in this case, but not without difficulty, obtained. It was also reported that at various places in 'Omān export and import duties were recovered in an unequal manner to the detriment of British subjects, the Arab merchant of a neighbouring port, and sometimes even of the same port, paying at a reduced rate or even nothing at all, while the British Indian trader was invariably charged the full 5 per cent. At Gwādar too, in 1897, it was necessary to request the Sultān to abate the exorbitant dues which he had begun to levy on fish-yards owned there by British subjects; and the point, though with reluctance, was conceded.

Rupture with Great Britain, 1899.

Unfriendly behaviour of the Sultān towards Britain, 1893-98.

Events had for some time been leading towards a disagreement between the Sultān of 'Omān and the British power. The deeper causes and their manifestations have already been discussed; but there were other symptoms also, significant though more superficial, of growing antipathy on the Sultān's part. Already, at the end of 1893, he had omitted to salute, as required by old custom, the British Political Agent, Colonel Hayes Sadler, at his departure for Būshehr to assume charge of the Residency,—an intentional mark of disrespect which had necessitated a reference to the Government of India. For a number of years it had been the practice for the Sultān's batteries to fire a salute on Proclamation Day in honour of the Queen-Empress of India; but on the 1st of January 1898, the Resident (Colonel Meade) and the Political Agent (Major Fagan) being then both at Masqat, the accustomed salute was fired without the hoisting of the British flag, and Saiyid Faisal explained the innovation by saying that the ceremony was now to be regarded as a greeting to all Christian nations and not as a compliment to the Queen-Empress alone. The Resident, however, by laying stress on the unfriendliness of discontinuing a long-established courtesy, succeeded in obtaining from the Sultān a written apology and promise of future observance of the fête; and on the 3rd of January, accordingly, the British flag was flown all day and the Queen-Empress's annual salute was fired in the usual manner. At the end of January 1898 a gunner of H.M.S. "Cossack" was assaulted at

Masqat by a slave of the Sultān and subjected, along with two officers of his ship, to ignominious treatment by certain of His Highness's officials. On the matter being represented to the Sultān the slave was flogged and the officials imprisoned; but the affair was none the less an indication of the state of feeling prevalent in palace circles at Masqat.

Increasing intimacy of the Sultān with France, 1898.

Soon after this matters began to move more rapidly. The French gunboat "Galès" arrived at Masqat in February 1898 and remained there until March; but the object and results of her visit could not at the time be ascertained by the British Political Agent. In October another French gunboat, the "Scorpion," spent a fortnight at Masqat: she brought a breech-loading field gun as a gift from the French Government to the Sultān. The stay was made the occasion of friendly demonstrations and secret conferences, in which M. Ottavi played a large part; valuable return presents were given by the Sultān; and the officers of the ship, with the French Vice-Consul, made an expedition to Bandar Jissah, a small but defensible harbour on the coast 5 miles south-east of Masqat, of which they took photographs and made rough plans. A direct result of the visit of the "Scorpion" was the dismissal by the Sultān of his Wazīr, Muhammad-bin-Sa'īd, whom he had appointed in January 1897, and the reinstatement of Muhammad-bin-'Azzān. The latter, besides being illiterate, was now in his dotage; but he was a more facile instrument in the hands of the French party than Muhammad-bin-Sa'īd, who in May 1898 had induced the Sultān to re-open discussion of the flag question with M. Ottavi, and who was believed to have opposed the rapprochement with the French in all its stages. French interests at Masqat were now actively promoted by an individual who held a peculiar dual position as confidential secretary to the Sultān and as dragoman of the French Vice-Consulate; this was 'Abdul 'Aziz, an Arab of the Bani Ruwāhah tribe, who had been known to M. Ottavi at Zanzibar and who with Hilāl-bin-'Amr, a name with which we shall become more familiar hereafter, had been expelled from that island in 1893 for political intrigues. 'Abdul 'Aziz, who first arrived at Masqat in 1893, and who doubtless harboured resentment against the British authorities for his expulsion from Zanzibar, had been a salaried employé of the Sultān at least since November 1895; and in his capacity as such he certainly had access to the Sultān's correspondence with the British Agent, for letters sent by the Sultān to the Agency were sometimes in his handwriting. It cannot be doubted that the knowledge he thus obtained was placed at the disposal of his other employer, the French Vice-Consul.

Grant by the Sultān to the French of a coaling station, 1898.

The immediate cause of the crisis which now occurred was an announcement in the Parisian "Journal des Débats" of the 20th November 1898 to the effect that a French man-of-war had established a coaling-station at

Bandar Jissah. It received corroboration from a report, apparently reliable that the French Vice-Consul at Masqat had received special promotion to Consul for valuable services, and it was resolved to sift the matter to the bottom; for the conduct of the Sultān, if he had granted any concession such as that suspected, was clearly a violation of his Agreement of 1891 with the British Government regarding the non-alienation of territory. In January 1899 the occupation of Bandar Jissah by the French was considered so probable that an officer and boat's crew of H.M.S. "Sphinx" were stationed there, and remained for some time, to hoist the British flag in case of the appearance of a French man-of-war; and a remonstrance founded on the agreement of 1891 was addressed to the Sultān by Major Fagan, the British Agent at Masqat. In reply to Major Fagan's protest the Sultān admitted the grant of a concession, which, however, he described in vague terms and professed himself unable to cancel. A Russian agent was stated to be present in Masqat at this time and to be in communication both with the Sultān and with the French Vice-Consul.

Demand for redress of the grievances of British subjects resolved on.

Various other questions, relating for the most part to the treaty rights of British subjects and to compensation claimable by them, were pending at this time, as we have seen, between Saiyid Faisal and the Government of India; and on the 24th of January 1899, Lord Curzon, who had very recently assumed the Viceroyalty of India, proposed to instruct Colonel Meade, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to deal with these unsettled cases, and to inform the Sultān that the subsidy paid him would be withheld until they were disposed of. In view of the Sultān's recent intrigues and evident hostility Lord Curzon also considered that a serious warning was required, and he consulted Her Majesty's Government as to the terms in which it should be administered. On the 25th of January the Secretary of State for India authorised the Viceroy to remind the Sultān of past favours conferred on him by the British Government, as well as of the conditions of friendship and observance of treaty engagements on which the continuance of the "Zanzibar" subsidy depended, and to admonish him that, in event of his conduct continuing to be unfriendly, the support of the British Government would be withdrawn and might even take another direction. Further, to compel a settlement of the outstanding questions, the Secretary of State was prepared to approve of any measures, not inconsistent with the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 and not requiring French concurrence, which Lord Curzon might consider likely to be efficacious.

Addition of a demand for cancellation of the grant to the French.

Under the sanction thus conveyed, a memorandum embodying the British demands was prepared by the Government of India for communication to the Sultān, and the Resident was ordered to proceed to

Masqat, where he arrived in the first week of February. Lord Curzon had meanwhile directed, upon his own responsibility, that a demand for the cancellation of the concession to the French should be added to the memorandum before presentation,—a step which the Sultān's avowal of a grant to the French, the incompatibility of such a grant with the British Agreement of 1891, and the undesirability of ignoring the principal ground of offence combined to render necessary. On the 7th of February Colonel Meade reported the inclusion of the additional demand in the memorandum, which already required that 'Abdul 'Aziz, Ruwāhi, should be permanently dismissed from the Sultān's employment; that interest at the rate of 5 per cent. should be paid on the balance, still due, of the indemnity of 1895; that nowhere should a tax be levied on British, which was not equally levied on 'Omāni subjects; and, finally, that all import duties, and also the tax on dates brought from the interior or exportation, should be reduced to 5 per cent. in accordance with treaty.

British ultimatum presented to the Sultān, 9th February 1899.

On the afternoon of the 9th February an Arabic translation of the memorandum, after being read to him, was handed to the Sultān by way of ultimatum. The Sultān was willing to give way at once in regard to the dismissal of 'Abdul 'Aziz, the payment of interest on the indemnity, and equality of taxation as between British and 'Omāni subjects; but he wished time for discussion of the other points. Discussion, however, was refused; and 48 hours were allowed for a reply.

Proceedings from the 10th to the 14th of February.

On the 10th of February the French Vice-Consul, to whom the Sultān had sent a copy of the British Agreement of 1891, informed Saiyid Faisal in writing that he could not recognise its existence as it was contrary to the Declaration of 1862, and that the grant of a coaling station to the French, which had been voluntarily made, could not be recalled. On the 11th the Sultān wrote to the British Resident, urging that the grant of a coaling station was not a cession of territory and was therefore not contrary to the agreement of 1891; at the same time he expressed a hope of being leniently treated and enclosed M. Ottavi's letter of the previous day. On the 12th Colonel Meade replied to the Sultān, returning the letter of the French Vice-Consul and denying the right of the latter to intervene in a matter connected with the Agreement of 1891, and reminded the Sultān that the period of grace had already expired. The next day, the 13th of February, the Sultān sent written notice to the Resident of the revocation of his gift of a coaling-place to the French, and requested British protection against the French in case it should prove that he had incurred the displeasure of the latter. On the

14th of February H.M.S. "Eclipse" from Bombay carrying Admiral Douglas, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, in India arrived at Masqat, where H.M.S. "Redbreast" had preceded her.

Compulsion of the Sultān by naval force authorised.

Before the actual presentation of the ultimatum Colonel Meade had suggested that, as the Sultān appeared to rely upon French support, the use of compulsion should be authorised even to the extent of employing naval force if necessary; and this request, subject to the condition that collision with the French should be avoided, had been recommended by the Viceroy to Her Majesty's Government on the ground that, at the stage which matters had reached, defiance by the Sultān of the British power could not be permitted. Her Majesty's Government, while they considered that the demand for cancellation of the French concession somewhat exceeded the limits of their previous instructions, agreed that, if it had already been presented, compulsion as proposed by Lord Curzon might be employed to enforce compliance with it as well as with the demands originally authorised.

Proceedings on the 15th of February.

The authority to use force, if required, did not reach Masqat until late on the 15th of February, on which day Colonel Meade, considering the measure to be necessary, had of his own motion required the Sultān to announce the cancellation of the French concession in public Darbār as well as by public notices; to inform the French Vice-Consul in writing of the fact, sending a transcript of the letter to the British Resident; to supply the British Agent with a copy of the grant to the French; and to signify his compliance with the other demands contained in the ultimatum. The proceedings at Masqat were reported, as they took place, to the Secretary of State, who authorised a guarantee of support being given to the Sultān in case he followed the advice of the British Government; but publicity in regard to the cancellation of the French concession was strongly deprecated. Colonel Meade was immediately instructed by the Government of India not to require a public announcement; the orders, however, did not reach him until after the demand had been made and complied with.

Submission of the Sultān to the British demands, 16th February.

On the 16th of February, no answer to the Resident's last letter having as yet been received from the Sultān, Admiral Douglas assumed charge of the negotiations and summoned Saiyid Faisal to meet him on board his ship at 2 P.M. Meanwhile the "Eclipse" was warped into position for opening fire on the palace and forts; all shipping was cleared out of the line of fire; and arrangements were made for warning the inhabitants of the town and the foreign consular representatives. A letter was now received from the Sultān, showing that he had publicly notified the cancellation of the French grant and had informed the French Vice-Consul of the same; it contained, as requested, a transcript of the letter

sent to M. Ottavi in which the Sultān justified cancellation on the ground of the Agreement of 1891 with Britain, also a copy of the original grant to the French. It was not, however, entirely satisfactory, and a personal interview was still insisted on. The grant to the French, now seen for the first time, conferred on them a coaling-place, but left the exact site undetermined; it had been granted on the 7th of March 1898, during the visit of the "Gabès" to Masqat. At length, after various delays, the Sultān came off to the Admiral's flagship and, after a long discussion, submitted unconditionally to all the British demands; when he returned on shore it was under his ordinary salute of 21 guns. M. Ottavi immediately protested in writing against the cancellation of the French grant, but without effect.

Public announcement by the Sultān of cancellation of his grant to the French.

On the 17th of February the Admiral paid a visit to the Sultān; and in the afternoon of the same day, at a general Darbār attended by all the leading men of Masqat, the Sultān announced the renewal of amicable relations between himself and the British Government and the cancellation of his agreement for a coaling-place with the French, which, he said, had been entered into in forgetfulness of the rights of Britain.

French policy in 'Omān after 1899.

Continued French intrigues in 'Omān.

The result of these proceedings was to deprive the French of the hope of obtaining a naval base in 'Omān under their own control; but they did not as yet despair of the success of their other designs, and for the next three years French intrigues continued to be rife in 'Omān. The Wazīr of the Sultān was still Muhammad-bin-'Azzān, who owed his appointment to French influence; 'Abdul 'Azīz, the dragoman of the French Consulate, though ostensibly dismissed from His Highness's employment, for a time continued to have free access to his presence; and in May 1901 Hilāl-bin-'Amr from Zanzibar suddenly arrived at Sūr and commenced an anti-British propaganda among the tribesmen of the Sharqiyah district. This Hilāl was a brother of Muhsin-bin-'Amr, the rebel of 1895, and a son-in-law of the notorious Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Ali; as chief adviser of Hamad-bin-Thuwaini of Zanzibar he had encouraged that prince to take a mischievous interest in the affairs of 'Omān; and in June 1896 he had been deported from Zanzibar to Aden, but he had subsequently been allowed to return to East Africa. The number of French agents in 'Omān was increased by the arrival at Masqat in 1899 of a Frenchman, M. Goguyer, who settled there as a dealer in arms and ammunition, became in 1901

the local representative of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, and was joined in 1902 by two of his sons and by another Frenchman; M. Goguyer had given trouble to his own Government previously in Tunis and Abyssinia, but he had the powerful influence of the French Colonial party behind him. A journalistic campaign which he now inaugurated against British influence is described separately elsewhere.* In 1901 the chauvinistic M. Ottavi, who carried his anti-British spleen so far as to be generally absent from Masqat, and so to avoid dressing his flagstaff on Proclamation Day, was succeeded in the French Vice-Consulate at Masqat by the more moderate M. Laronce.

Settlement of the French coaling station question, 1899-1900.

The results of British action at Masqat were mortifying to the French Government, the more so on account of the publicity with which they had been invested; but they placed the question of the French coaling station upon a clear basis and necessitated its being discussed thereafter by the British and French Governments as a matter between themselves. The French authorities, who evidently hoped to be able to retain Bandar Jissah by means of suitable guarantees as to the nature of the French occupation, at first demurred to the view maintained by the British Foreign Office, that the Declaration of 1862 precluded the acceptance by either France or Britain of a cession or lease of 'Omân territory; eventually however they accepted the British reading of the treaty. In March 1899 an assurance was given to France that no obstacle would be raised to her obtaining coal sheds in Masqat harbour on the same conditions as the existing British sheds in the Makallah cove were held; this implied that the national flag would not be flown, that defences would not be erected, and that the basis of occupation would be sufferance merely, conveying no territorial or sovereign rights. At the end of March Major Fagan, the British Political Agent, suggested that the British and French coal yards might both be accommodated in the Makallah cove; and the unwillingness of the French Government to adopt this simple and natural solution of the difficulty made it even plainer than before that what they really desired was a separate *pied-à-terre* in 'Omân, not coaling facilities at a port where steam vessels under the French flag hardly ever called. In July 1899 the French Government proposed Riyâm, and in January 1900 Kalbûh, bays outside the Masqat harbour, as the site of the coal yard to be allotted them; but the British Government declined to agree to either, and at length in May 1900 the British offer of a division of the Makallah site was accepted. The ground, after being somewhat enlarged, was divided into two portions with equal superficies and frontage, and the French, having been invited to choose, took the southern half.

* *Vide* page 339 *ante*.

Progress of the French flag question, 1899-1902.

In the ultimatum of February 1899 the Sultān had been advised by the British Government to order his subjects to use a distinctive flag and to explain to his people that the grant to them, after such order, of flags or protection by the representative of a foreign power would be invalid and would amount to an infringement of the independence of 'Omān. The Sultān, chiefly on sentimental grounds, was indisposed, and in the end refused, to make any alteration in the nondescript red flag of 'Omān; but he wrote on the 16th of February 1899 to the French flag-holders at Sūr, enjoining them to give up their flags; and on the following day he informed the French Vice-Consul at Masqat that he did not recognise the right of the French to exercise jurisdiction over 'Omāni subjects in 'Omān, that he regarded the action of the French in this respect as contrary to the Declaration of 1862, and that in future he would exercise jurisdiction over his subjects himself. Nothing of importance resulted from these steps; and the proceedings in the case during the next four years, though continuous and not devoid of incident, were inconclusive.

1899.

In October 1899 the French Government, acting upon incorrect information, complained that the British representative at Masqat had, besides calling in question the validity of the French flag, demanded of the Sultān that he should enforce the disuse of the French flag by his subjects and promised him the assistance of a British man-of-war. At the end of the year various expedients for neutralising the effects of the French flag system were under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

1900.

In May 1900 the Sultān signified his willingness to write a letter to the British Government, requesting them to undertake his case in a discussion with the Government of the Republic; but the offer was not accepted. In June 1900 the Sultān, who at this time had no suitable vessel of his own, paid a visit to Sūr in H.M.S. "Sphinx." Captain Cox, the British Political Agent at Masqat, was also on board; but neither he nor the British naval officers took any cognisance of the Sultān's doings on shore. The result of the Sultān's visit, in so far as it concerned the French flag case, was that on the 12th June the French flag-holders of Sūr spontaneously presented the Sultān with a written agreement in which, after solemnly professing allegiance, they renounced from that day the benefits of French protection and undertook to return the French flags and certificates in their possession at the earliest opportunity to the authorities from whom they had received them. This paper related to no less than 45 vessels, and the only 'Omāni vessel flying the French flag not included in it was one which did not belong to Sūr; three of the certificates produced had been issued

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locally by M. Ottavi. The greater number of the signatories eventually failed, it is true, to carry out the terms of the agreement; but the incident was not without importance, for it encouraged the Sultān to take a stronger line than hitherto and it shook, in some degree, the confidence of the French representative. By means of an edict dated the 15th of June, which was communicated to the foreign representatives at Masqat upon the same day but was not publicly promulgated until the 6th of August, the Sultān informed his people that he did not recognise foreign flags or papers in 'Omān, and that he would not condone the acceptance of such by 'Omānī subjects unless with his own express consent in writing. It was not clear whether the last clause of this edict referred to the future only, or was meant to have retrospective effect.

On the 26th of June the French Government, who were by this time apprised of the Sultān's excursion to Sūr and its results, intimated through their Ambassador in London that no more French papers of protection would be issued, and that existing papers would be carefully examined with a view to the cancellation of any which might have been unjustifiably granted. The French store ship "Drome" arrived at Masqat in August, nominally to carry out this duty and to enquire into the prevalence of the slave trade under the French flag; but the inquiries made there and at Sūr by her commander seem to have been cursory. An attempt was made instead to intimidate the Sultān into giving up the French navigation certificates which some of his subjects had surrendered to him, and to persuade him to re-employ 'Abdul 'Azīz in his dealings with the French Vice-Consulate: but on both points Saiyid Faisal was firm. At the end of the year the French flagship "Catinat" also visited Masqat and Sūr, and a second attempt to influence the Sultān was made, with equal want of success.

In April 1901 it was suggested by Captain Cox that, for the purpose of narrowing the limits of the foreign jurisdiction created by use of the French flag, the Sultān might be advised to issue an edict, in continuation of that of the 15th June 1900, to the effect that from a specified date none of his subjects would be permitted, without his written authority, to fly a foreign flag in the territories or territorial waters of 'Omān. His Majesty's Government, to whom this suggestion was referred, having expressed a doubt whether the distinction which it involved was sustainable, the Government of India hoped that at least an assurance to the Sultān might be authorised, consonant with the advice given him in 1891, to the effect that the assertion by the French Government of a claim to jurisdiction over and protection 1901.

of His Highness's subjects in Masqat (territory and territorial waters would be regarded as incompatible with the Sultān's independence, and that the British Government would support him in resisting any such claim. In consequence, however, of a communication received from the French Ambassador in August 1901, a decision on this point was deferred. The memorandum now presented by M. Cambon stated that the promise of the Sūri boat-owners to give up their French flags had been obtained by force, with the help of the British authorities, – a view which MM. Ottavi and Goguyer had sedulously inculcated; that strict investigations had been held by the French for the purpose of revising the list of French flag-holders; and that the accusations of slave-trading against vessels flying the French flag were unfounded. The paper also contained various minor allegations of undue British interference in the affairs of 'Oman.

1902 While materials for a complete reply to this memorandum were being collected at Masqat, a peremptory claim on behalf of the French Government to entire jurisdiction over French flag-holders was suddenly advanced in writing by M. Laronce, who had succeeded M. Ottavi as Vice-Consul of France at Masqat. This occurred on the 23rd of January 1902 during a visit of the French flagship. Captain Cox, at his own suggestion, was authorised to protest on the strength of the Declaration of 1862 against the assumption by France of jurisdiction over 'Omāni subjects; and his protest, made on the 11th of February, was successful beyond expectation. At the beginning of March M. Laronce informed him that France had no intention of bringing 'Omāni subjects under French jurisdiction, and that she claimed nothing more than rights of surveillance and police over vessels bearing the French flag. The Sultān also was assured on the 4th of March, by the French Vice-Consul and the Commander of the R. F. "Catinat," that the French flag-holders of Sūr, for which port the "Catinat" was bound, would be informed of the Sultān's sovereignty on land.

In March 1902 a fresh communication was received from the French Ambassador in London by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs; it stated that the freedom of the Sūri boats under French colours from complicity in the slave trade had, as the result of a careful watch placed upon them, been established, and that the scrutiny of claims to use the French flag had almost been completed by the French authorities. The pledge given in June 1900, that no more French papers would be issued, was repeated upon this occasion; but as subsequent events

showed, it was not regarded by the French as a bar to the renewal of papers in favour of existing holders. In April Lord Lansdowne handed to M. Cambon a memorandum, answering the French complaints of the previous year and recapitulating the chief points of the case, upon which, it was observed, the two Governments appeared to be in accord; and simultaneously a request was made that a list of the native vessels and owners considered to be entitled to the use of the French flag might be furnished by the French to the Sultān and also to the British Consul at Masqat.

Sudden crisis in the French flag case, 1903.

Matters were thus leisurely progressing towards a settlement, and the objections of the British Government and of the Sultān had already resulted in a considerable abatement of the pretensions of the French, when suddenly, in the spring of 1903, in consequence of two unforeseen accidents, the question of the French flag suddenly assumed a somewhat dangerous aspect. On the 26th of March the sailing vessel "Khadhra" of Sūr, flying French colours, attempted to leave that port in defiance of the orders of 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim, the chief of the Banī Bū 'Alī, and was fired upon* and forcibly detained by the Chief's men. Again, on the 9th of April, quarantine was broken at Masqat by five natives of Sūr arriving in a British mail steamer from Bombay, three of whom, in consequence of their connection with boats using the French flag, were regarded by the French Vice-Consulate as under its protection; the fugitives, who immediately made for Sūr in a sailing boat, were pursued by an official of the Sultān in a steam launch lent for the purpose by H.M.S. "Perseus," and were recaptured. In the first of these two cases—which occurred almost simultaneously with the circulation in France of a rumour that Britain was about to annex Masqat—the French Vice-Consul claimed an indemnity of $1,500 for the detention of the vessel, and, in the second, the instant release of the alleged French protégés. The Sultān, while declaring his readiness to be bound by a joint decision of the French and British Governments in either case, would not in the meantime accede to the demands of M. Laronce, but proceeded instead to deal with the offenders in the quarantine case as 'Omānī subjects, and sentenced them to three months' imprisonment each. The British Government on receipt of this news decided to support the Sultān, on the ground that he was justified, pending a settlement of the French flag question, in acting upon his own view of his rights; and H.M.S. "Naiad" was accordingly sent to join H.M.S. "Perseus" in Masqat harbour, where both ships were present before the arrival on the 11th of May of French war-ship "Infernet." The French Consul at Masqat, in con-

* See also page 580 post.

junction with the commander of the "Infernet," made strenuous efforts to obtain the release of the prisoners in whom he was interested; but the Sultān, assured of British support, remained inflexible.

Agreement between Britain and France to refer the question to the Hague Tribunal, 1903.

At this point, in consequence of a vehement demand by the French Ambassador in London for the release of the imprisoned Sūris who were claimed as French subjects, discussion became direct between the French and British Governments and local negotiations at Masqat were suspended. On both sides the national honour was now seriously engaged, and deadlock was at one time feared; but ultimately a proposal that the whole matter should be referred to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal was made by Lord Lansdowne after consulting the Cabinet, and, being accepted by the French, provided a convenient solution of the difficulty. Incidentally it was arranged between the two Powers that the prisoners in dispute should be liberated by the Sultān without being handed over to the French local representative, and that the "Infernet" should be removed. Accordingly the prisoners were released on the 29th of May, and the "Naiad" and "Perseus" left Masqat the next day, H.M.S. "Pomone" remaining until the departure of the "Infernet" on the 3rd of June. The immediate result of the liberation of the prisoners was necessarily prejudicial to the Sultān's prestige, and for some time afterwards he continued to be insulted by boats from Sūr, which, after hoisting the tricolor, ran across the bows of his new steamer the "Nūr-al-Bahr."

Preliminary proceedings, 1904-05.

In Europe the proceedings continued in a manner somewhat more rapid and decisive than hitherto. In March 1904, in the course of a general arrangement of political difficulties then taking place between Britain and France, a move was made by the French Government for the withdrawal of the 'Omān flag question from the Hague Tribunal and for its immediate settlement on a basis highly favourable to themselves; but the British Government did not consent, and the original arrangement was maintained. On the 13th of October 1904 a Compromise or Agreement for the reference of the dispute to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal was signed in London by Lord Lansdowne, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador: by this document the points in issue were defined and the procedure to be followed was fixed. Subsequently Jonkheer A. F. de Savornin Lohman, member of the Second Chamber of the States General of Holland and formerly Minister of the Interior in the Netherlands, was appointed arbitrator on behalf of France, and Mr. Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, on behalf of Great Britain, while

Dr. H. Lammasch, an Austrian senator and professor of international law in the University of Vienna, was nominated to the post of umpire by His Majesty the King of Italy. The court thus constituted finally assembled at the Hague on the 25th of July 1905, and further sittings were held on the 1st, 2nd and 8th of August, at the last of which the award was announced.

Proceedings at the Hague, 1905.

It is impossible in the space at our disposal to follow the course of the proceedings through the stages of Case, counter-Case and Argument: suffice it to say that the reserved attitude of France obliged Great Britain to assume the rôle of plaintiff, which she desired to avoid, and to define the French position, which the French case had been formulated with judicious vagueness in order to disguise. The British contentions were, in substance, (1) that, without the consent of the Sultān, 'Omāni subjects could not legitimately become the recipients of French flags and papers unless under some treaty between the Sultān and the French Government, and that no such treaty existed; (2) that under Article XXXII of the Brussels Act of 1890 France was debarred from granting flags and papers to Arabs unless they were either (*a*) French citizens or (*b*) French protégés in consequence of being subjects of States under French protection, and that the 'Omānis in question were neither of these; (3) that the withdrawal of 'Omāni subjects from the Sultān's jurisdiction by the conferment upon them, in opposition to the Sultān's wishes, of French flags and papers was a violation of the Sultān's independence and therefore contrary to the Declaration of 1862; (4) that the grant of the flags and papers, even if permissible, could not confer on the holders or on persons connected with them immunity in the territory or territorial waters of 'Omān from the Sultān's jurisdiction; (5) that in any case the right to possess such papers was personal and was not transmissible by inheritance; and (6) that papers and flags granted in respect of particular vessels could not be transferred by the holders to other vessels. The French on their part argued (1) that the conditions of citizenship in 'Omān were indefinite and unascertained; (2) that the status of the flag-holders in question was that of a migratory, sea-faring and polygamous community, whose connection with some of the French colonies was not weaker than their connection with 'Omān; and (3) that in its relations with European countries, 'Omān, as a Muhammadan power, was liable to be dealt with on the analogy of the Turkish Empire as subject to a "régime de capitulations:" they also protested against the far-reaching character of the British contentions and urged that existing usage should be respected. It is noteworthy that the French did

not, in the case of a single one of the 26 boat-proprietors mentioned in the revised list which accompanied their counter-Case, attempt to establish by evidence a close connection with any French Colony. Arguments were adduced on both sides which the Tribunal deemed to be irrelevant from the judicial point of view; such were the British allegation that the slave trade was carried on freely under cover of French flags, granted in the manner complained of, and the French assertion that the Declaration of 1862 had been violated by Great Britain herself on various occasions.

Decision of the Tribunal, 8th August 1905.

The Tribunal found that the situation was governed in the main by the Brussels Act of 1890, after its ratification in January 1892 by the French Government; and that the faculty of a European State to create protégés in 'Omān must be determined by the analogous case of Muhammadan principalities in the west which had agreements with Christian powers on that subject. By the award of the Tribunal it was accordingly decided, with reference to the legitimacy of the French pretentions:—

That before the 2nd of January 1892 France was entitled to authorise vessels belonging to subjects of His Highness the Sultān of Masqat to fly the French flag, only bound by her own legislation and administrative rules;

That owners of native vessels, who before 1892 had been authorised by France to fly the French flag should retain this authorisation as long as it was renewed by France to the grantee; and

That after the 2nd of January 1892 France was not entitled to authorise vessels belonging to subjects of His Highness the Sultān of Masqat to fly the French flag, except on condition that their owners or fitters-out had established or should establish that they had been considered and treated by France as her protégés before the year 1863:—

and with regard to the effect, transmissibility and transference of the French flag:—

That vessels of 'Omān authorised as aforesaid to fly the French flag were entitled in the territorial waters of 'Omān to the inviolability provided by the Franco-'Omāni Treaty of November 17th, 1844;

That the authorisation to fly the French flag could not be transmitted or transferred to any other person or any other vessel, even if belonging to the same owner; and

That subjects of the Sultān of 'Omān, who were owners or masters of vessels authorised to fly the French flag, or who were members of

the crews of such vessels or who belonged to the families of such owners or masters, did not enjoy in consequence of that fact any right of exterritoriality which could exempt them from the sovereignty, especially from the jurisdiction, of His Highness the Sultān of 'Omān.

The award, it will be seen, was substantially in favour of the British claims on all important points, and it left little for subsequent determination except the number of individual vessels entitled to fly the French flag in accordance with the conditions laid down. It may be added here that, though the Sultān had authorised the British Government to present the case against France on his behalf as well as on their own, the French objected to the association of his name with that of the British Government, and the point was accordingly waived; consequently the Sultān was not a party to the case beyond the preliminary stages.

Subsequent proceedings under the award. 1905-06.

Major W. Grey, the British Consul at Masqat, and M. Laronce, the French Vice-Consul,—the latter of whom had been in Europe during the proceedings at the Hague,—were next instructed by their respective Governments to co-operate for the purpose of bringing the award of the Tribunal into effect. It was easily settled between them that a proclamation by the Sultān to his subjects would be the best means of making the terms of the award known in 'Omān; but, in regard to a list of persons entitled to possess the French flag, which they had been ordered to draw up in consultation with one another, they were unable to arrive at any agreement. In the view of M. Laronce the continued use of the French flag was permissible under the award in the case of 22 owners and 46 vessels; whereas, according to the information of Major Grey, the correct figures were only 14 and 18, respectively. Ultimately, on the 13th of August 1906, His Majesty's Government decided, as an act of friendship, to accept the list of the French Vice-Consul without further question and to concede the transference of the French flag from any vessel lost, sold, destroyed or otherwise disposed of to another vessel of the same owner, provided only that the number of vessels authorised to fly the French flag should not be increased in the case of any owner. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government every 'Omāni subject under the French flag must on landing in 'Omān become liable to the jurisdiction of the Sultān, and crimes committed at sea under the French flag should not therefore be tried by the French Vice-Consul at Masqat; but no objection could be raised to the temporary landing of accused persons in such cases under the orders of the French Vice-Consul for the purpose of despatch before French courts elsewhere. His

Majesty's Government were also of opinion that 'Omāni subjects should be made aware that they would be severely punished for infringements of the award, and that they were at liberty to renounce at any time the right of using the French flag. The French Government would be approached with reference to these matters, and would also be asked to keep the Sultān and the British Consul informed of transferences of the flag from one vessel to another, and to supply both these authorities annually with a list of the surviving flag-holders and remaining vessels.

Relations of the Sultān with Great Britain after 1899.

Improved situation.

After February 1899 the demeanour of the Sultān towards the British representative at Masqat greatly improved, and in the following month Saiyid Faisal paid his first friendly visit to Major Fagan at the British Political Agency; but for a time he continued to show suspicion and seemed to hope that the late action of the Government of India would be repudiated by Her Majesty's Government,—an idea in which he was probably encouraged by M. Ottavi. In the summer of 1899 Captain Cox was appointed Political Agent at Masqat, where, during the next four years, his able and sympathetic guidance of the Sultān was to produce the happiest results. In May 1900 the Sultān, though he declined to dismiss Muhammad-bin-'Azzān from the Wazirate, agreed to substitute for him, in dealings with the British Agency, the ex-minister Muhammad-bin-Sa'īd, whose political sympathies were British.

Visit of Saiyid Taimūr to India, 1902-03.

The Sultān received a cordial invitation to attend the Coronation Darbār at Delhi on the 1st of January 1903 as a guest of the Government of India, or to send a deputation to represent him, in case he were unable to be present. Not venturing to absent himself from his kingdom for so long a period as would have been necessary, Saiyid Faisal sent his eldest son Taimūr in his stead, attended by Saiyid Yūsuf Zawāwi, one of His Highness's friends and advisers, and by Ahmad-bin-Nāsir, Governor of Matrah. Major Cox accompanied the deputation as Political Officer. Saiyid Taimūr was the bearer of valuable presents of Masqat gold work for His Majesty King Edward, which he delivered to the Viceroy; and at Masqat the Sultān honoured the day of the Darbār by firing a salute of 101 guns in honour of the King-Emperor and by paying, in person, an official visit of congratulation to the British

agency. After the conclusion of the ceremonies at Delhi, Saiyid Taimūr spent a fortnight at Bombay and visited Poona, where he had a friendly meeting with his exiled grand-uncle, 'Abdul 'Aziz. Before returning to Masqat he was taken on a tour to Agra, Aligarh and Calcutta, and he did not reach home until after the middle of February 1903.

Lord Curzon's visit to Masqat, 1903.

Fresh proofs of international amity were interchanged at the state visit which Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, paid to Masqat in November 1903 in the course of his tour in the Persian Gulf: this visit, together with the ceremonials and festivities by which it was marked and the political declarations of which it was the occasion, is fully described in another place.* The Sultān, who had for some time previously entertained an idea of abdicating in favour of his son Taimūr, now placed himself in the hands of the Government of India and promised to be guided by their advice in the matter; and, after a Darbar held on board H.M.S. "Argonaut," he was formally invested by the Viceroy with the insignia of the G.C.I.E. In the course of the visit it appeared, from an ebullition on the part of Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Turki in the presence of the Viceroy, that His Highness's elder brother aspired to succeed to the Sultanate in case of a vacancy.

'Omān and the general political settlement between Great Britain and France, 1904.

In February 1904 His Majesty's Government informed the Government of India that, in a general settlement of political questions which was then being negotiated with France, an effort would be made to secure French recognition of a British protectorate over 'Omān; but at the same time they enquired whether, if this were impossible, there were any smaller concession in 'Omān which they might endeavour to obtain. The reply of Lord Curzon was that, apart from the recognition of a British protectorate, or rather from the abrogation of the Declaration of 1862, no satisfactory solution of the 'Omān problem presented itself.

Discharge by the Sultān of all his pecuniary liabilities to the Government of India, 1900.

After the crisis of 1899 the policy of financial support of the Sultan was continued by the Government of India in the shape of the "Zanzibar" subsidy and of special loans. The subsidy, in consequence of the Sultan's unsatisfactory behaviour, had been suspended with effect from the beginning of December 1898, and the question of its renewal was not raised until about ten months afterwards, when it was at length broached by the Sultān. At the end of September 1899 the liabilities of Saiyid Faisal to the British Government amounted to Rs. 90,000, of which Rs. 34,000 represented the balance of the indemnity of 1895, Rs. 36,000 the balance of the loan of 1897, and Rs. 20,000 overdue instalments of repayment of that loan. Arrears of the subsidy aggregated Rs. 72,000, but the Government of India considered that the Sultān, in strict right, had for-

* *Vide* Appendix P.

feited his claim to these. The punitive tax for the discharge of the indemnity was still in force ; but its proceeds, under a system of direct collection, were diminishing. The matter of the subsidy remained under discussion until the following year, when the Government of India eventually decided to permit the liquidation of all their claims from the accumulated arrears of the subsidy. In October 1900 this adjustment was made, and a small balance remaining was paid over to the Sultān.

Further loans to the Sultān, 1902, 1903 and 1904.

The freedom of Saiyid Sir Faisal from indebtedness to the Government of India was not, however, of long duration. In 1902 he received a loan of Rs. 1,61,956 for the purchase of a steam vessel required for his administration, and it was settled that the amount should be repaid out of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, by short drawals, at the rate of Rs. 3,000 a month. In 1903, in connection with dangers threatening his government from Rustāq, the Sultān obtained a cash advance of Rs. 20,000, repayable by deductions of Rs. 1,000 a month from the subsidy; and in 1904 a further amount of Rs. 30,000 was lent him, upon similar terms of repayment, for the wedding expenses of his son Saiyid Taimūr: on the last of these occasions he gave an understanding not to borrow except from the British Government until his existing liabilities had been discharged. In August 1905 the debts of the Sultān to the Government of India still amounted to about Rs. 1,00,000, and his debts to private creditors in his own dominions reached a similar figure. In September 1905 the Sultān applied for a fresh loan of Rs. 20,000, in order to enable some members of his family to perform the Hajj ; but, while the request was under consideration, he obtained from private creditors the sum that he required and so committed, as he was afterwards reminded, a technical breach of his obligation not to borrow except from the British Government. The decision of the Hague Tribunal in the French flag case had by this time made it possible to take a firmer line with the Sultān in matters of finance. The Government of India were no longer inclined to grant him petty loans for miscellaneous purposes; but they were of opinion that a substantial loan might be permissible, in consideration of a suitable *quid pro quo*. Negotiations for a fresh advance to the Sultān were about to be commenced on two conditions—that the Sultān should borrow a trained Customs official from the Government of India for the management of his customs and that any loan granted should be part of a general scheme for the reform of his finances— when, in December 1905, on the advice of His Majesty's Government, action was suspended until the proceedings arising out of the award of the Hague Tribunal should have been

satisfactorily concluded. At the end of September 1906 the debt of the Sultān to the Government of India had been reduced to Rs. 45,791.

British control of the Sultān's customs sought but not obtained.

The control of the Sultān's customs through a British official for the purpose of rendering the management more efficient had been discussed, as we have seen before, so early as 1897. After 1899 it became definitely an article in the policy of the Indian Government. In 1904 a scheme was proposed under which the object might be attained with the assistance of the Imperial Bank of Persia, who would be asked to open a branch at Masqat; but before it had been communicated to the Sultān it was laid aside in favour of another, of which the essential features were that the Sultān should appoint a nominee of the Government of India to be head of his customs, that differences between the Sultān and this official should be settled by the arbitration of the Political Agent, and that on these conditions the Government of India should guarantee to the Sultān a minimum monthly customs revenue of $20,000. The Secretary of State for India, however, to whom these last suggestions were submitted in February 1905, while he approved of the first, questioned the admissibility of the second and third points; and, as has already been explained, the proceedings following the award in the French flag case soon after necessitated the postponement of the matter. The reluctance of the Sultān to agree to a change in the management of his customs appeared to be due to more than one cause; he feared that it might incapacitate him to draw in advance, as he was accustomed to do, on the farmer or superintendent of customs; he expected it to result in the abolition of various personal and tribal exemptions which he was anxious to maintain; and, after 1900 at least, he was deterred by French reports, echoed in the Arabic press, that the customs and with them the whole government of Masqat were about to come under British domination.

British Sanitary control of the port of Masqat established, 1900.

In April 1899 bubonic plague appeared at Masqat and Matrah, and the question of the sanitary supervision and control of those ports arose. The attitude of Saiyid Faisal in the matter was at first obstructive; but, as the influence of the French Vice-Consul over him declined and his confidence in his British advisers increased, he no longer sought to dispense with British assistance. With effect from the 1st of October 1900, the approval of the Government of India having been previously obtained, he placed the Surgeon of the British Agency at Masqat in charge of his whole sanitary administration and staff and at the same time appointed him private physician to himself and to his family. The observance of the Sultān's quarantine regulations was

made obligatory on British subjects and British protected persons by a notification issued by the British Consul at Masqat on the 6th of July 1903. The Appendix on Epidemics and Sanitary Organisation deals fully with these and allied matters.

Telegraph service inaugurated at Masqat, 1901.

In the Appendix on the Telegraphs of the Persian Gulf will be found an explanation of the circumstances in which, in November 1901, 'Omān was brought into telegraphic communication with the outside world by means of a cable laid from Jāshk to Masqat.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omān from 1899 to the present time.

After 1899, in consequence of the generally quiet state of the country, the protection of British subjects in 'Omān and the punishment of offences against them demanded, but for one case of exceptional gravity, comparatively little attention. Tribal raids of the ordinary type, however, continued.

Case at Quryāt, 1899.

The Sultān, being unable to recover compensation from the tribesmen, made good out of his own pocket the losses, amounting to nearly $1,200, of four British traders of Quryāt, whose goods were carried off in the plunder of the Quryāt bazaar in June 1899 by a gang from Sharqiyah under Hamad, a son of the late Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Ali.

"Baron Inverdale" case, 1904.

The most serious case of the period arose from the loss of a British ship upon the southern coast of Arabia, where the people are wild and uncivilised, and where the treatment of shipwrecked crews has always been a matter of grave uncertainty. On the 2nd of August 1903 a French merchant ship, the "Amiral Gueydon," having caught fire by an explosion, was beached at Rās Hāsik. The crew and passengers, 56 persons in all, were protected by the Sultān's representative in Dhufār and by the Shaikh of Murbāt until the end of the monsoon, and were then despatched in native boats to Masqat; but upon the way there, in the neighbourhood of Rās Madrakah, they were picked up at sea by the Russian steamer "Trouvor." Exactly a year later, on the 2nd of August 1904, the "Baron Inverdale" of Ardrossan, a steamer with a registered tonnage of 2,140, having 31 souls—mostly British—on board, struck Jibliyah, an island of the Kuria Muria group, with more tragic consequences. Eight Greek sailors preferred to remain on the wreck and were taken off it a fortnight later by the British steamer "Promo," but the rest of the company left the ship on the 6th of August in two life-boats, intending to make for the mainland. The smaller of the boats, which must have contained six persons, was never heard of again; the other, after passing up the Masīrah channel, seems to have been driven about the middle of August upon the north end of Masīrah Island, where the 17 occupant were cruelly massacred by Arabs for the sake of their property. On

rumours of the occurrence reaching Masqat, Saiyid Sir Faisal and Major Grey, the Political Agent at Masqat, went to Masīrah Island, where they remained from the 10th to the 18th of September, but could discover no evidences of the atrocity; and before this the R.I.M.S. "Dalhousie" from Aden had visited the wreck, and H.M.S. "Lapwing" had made the tour of Masīrah Island, without discovering any clue to the fate of the missing men. At the end of September the Sultān again left for Masīrah, this time alone, and in less than a fortnight returned to Masqat having discovered all the particulars of the crime and arrested 10 of the murderers, members of the Jannabah and Āl Bū 'Isa tribes, one of whom threw himself overboard on the voyage to Masqat. Twelve of the principal persons of Dawwah and Umm Rasās, who had assisted in concealing the affair, were also brought back by him in custody. The proofs of guilt—which included some relics of the ill-fated party—having been found sufficient, the captured murderers were sentenced to death by the Sultān; and, in accordance with the procedure of 'Omāni criminal justice, they were then conveyed back to the scene of the massacre. Here they were shot by the Sultān's 'Askaris and buried, without the rites of their religion, in the presence of Saiyid Taimūr, of Major Grey, and of a party of seamen from H.M.S. "Merlin." The small hamlet of Jidūfah at Rās Hallī, the nearest village to the scene of the massacre, was destroyed by fire, and a monument in masonry of the punishment of the murderers was erected upon a rock, while over the grave of the victims a slab was placed and the burial service read. Some of the ordinary prisoners, or rather hostages, were kept in confinement at Masqat until January 1900, and were then released as they were suffering in health; in the meantime it had become evident that the capture of the remaining offenders and the recovery of pecuniary compensation for the outrage could not be achieved, either by the continued detention of the hostages or by any other means.

Interpretation of the Commercial Treaty of 1891.

No serious difficulty occurred, during the period now under consideration, in connection with questions of British rights under treaty in 'Omān. In 1900 there was a slight difference of opinion between the Sultān and the Political Agent regarding the precise interpretation of the clause of the Commercial Treaty of 1891 that relates to transhipment. The Sultān was at first disposed to contend that exemption from duty could not be claimed on account of goods landed at Masqat unless they were declared in the manifest or bill-of-lading to be for transhipment or re-exportation; while the Government of India were constrained to admit that, in a strictly legal sense, goods consigned to agents at Masqat with

discretion as to disposal must be held to have reached their "port of destination" on arrival at Masqat. In the end, however, the Sultān was induced, in the interests of trade, to place a liberal construction upon the article; and he explained that he had been driven to take up his original position by the dishonesty of the merchants, who, in the absence of a bonded warehouse, had been allowed to keep goods duty-free upon their own premises pending re-exportation.

Preparations for revision of the same.

In 1903 the Government of India began to consider the question of a revision of the Commercial Treaty of 1891, which had now by lapse of time become terminable. Proceedings were delayed for two years by the French flag case; but at length, in November 1905, the Secretary of State authorised the Government of India to proceed with the negotiation of the new Treaty, the proposed terms of which he at the same time approved. The modifications desired were of minor importance.

Internal taxes in relation to British commercial interests.

In the date season of 1903 a complaint that the Sultān was proposing to enhance the Zakāt or agricultural tax on dates, which then stood at 1 per cent., led to some peculiar discoveries. It now appeared that, whereas the export duty of 5 per cent. on dates had been agreed to by the Government of India, whose consent was by treaty indispensable, as a substitute for Zakāt where the latter was not recoverable, the Sultān's practice was to levy both export duty and Zakāt in such places as he found it practicable. Thus, while Zakāt was unknown at Sūr, it was collected in the Sohār Wilāyat and at some date-growing ports in Bātinah in addition to export duty. The Government of India insisted that, if the rate of Zakāt were increased, the tax should be collected direct in the interior, and not at the coast by means of what was virtually an enhancement of export duty.

Restrictions on the liquor trade.

In 1904 the Sultān, with the consent of the British, French and American consular representatives, prohibited the retail sale of intoxicating liquors by his subjects; and a similar restriction was imposed on British subjects by a consular notification dated the 7th of June 1904.

British explorations and enterprises in 'Omān after 1899.

Journeys of British officers.

In consequence of the quieter state of the country and the more favourable disposition of the Sultān, inland tours of exploration in 'Omān once more became, after 1900, possible to the British Political Agent: none of importance had been undertaken since those made by Colonel Miles during the reign of Turki.

In 1901, with the permission of the Sultān and under the instructions of the Government of India, an expedition was organised for the examination of some coal measures which were reported to exist in the hinterland of Sūr. The first attempt, made by Captain Cox and Dr. von Krafft, a geologist of the Government of India, from Kalhāt as starting point, was baffled by the behaviour of the Mashārifah and other tribes, on whose credulity M. Ottavi, his assistant 'Abdul 'Azīz, the family of Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Alī, Hārithi, and Hilāl-bin-'Amr and Mohsin-bin-'Amr of the Hirth had worked with effect; for, although the party, not without long delay and after being ambuscaded and fired at *en route*, succeeded in reaching the spot, which lay at the head of Wādi Falaij 20 miles inland from Sūr, their examination of it in the circumstances was necessarily so hasty as to be of little value. The Sultān, who had done his utmost to facilitate the work and had even proceeded for the purpose to Sūr and sent his son Saiyid Taimūr to join the party, subsequently made arrangements for a second expedition, which in November 1901 was carried out by Captain Cox, accompanied on this occasion by Dr. Oldham as geologist and by Captain Dowding of the Essex Regiment as an Intelligence Officer. A thorough exploration of the neighbourhood showed that the coal, though of excellent quality, existed in small quantity only, and that there was no prospect of mining operations being undertaken with profit; as a precaution, however, an engagement* was obtained from the Sultān in 1902, that he would not grant a concession for working the field to any foreign government or company until an opportunity had been given to the British Government of undertaking the work in conjunction with the Sultān himself.

Captains Cox and Dowding, on their return journey, landed at Daghmar and thence returned to Masqat by a circular overland route *viâ* Wādi Tāyin and Wādi Samāil; they met with no obstruction or incivility except at the one small village of 'Aqdah, where the inhabitants at first barred the way, gun in hand with lighted match.

In the summer of 1902, Major Cox was able to carry out, unaccompanied by any European, a journey by land from Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān to Masqat. This was the longest tour ever made by a British officer in 'Omān; it was entirely successful; and a large amount of valuable information regarding the districts of Baraimi, Dhāhirah and 'Omān Proper was gleaned by Major Cox on the way.

Acquisition of land and erection of quarters.

During recent years various additions have been made by the Government of India to their material assets and staff at Masqat. In 1901,

* The text of this undertaking will be found in Annexure No. 5 to this chapter.

in addition to other smaller purchases, a large plot of land on the sea-front, extending from the British Political Agency to the Sultān's customs house, was acquired from Ratansi Parshotam, an Indian merchant, at a cost of Rs. 50,000; and a house was erected thereon for the Agency Surgeon, besides quarters for the telegraph establishment and the Agency clerks. While Dr. Jayakar was Agency Surgeon, for 23 years ending in 1900, he had resided in a house of his own at Matrah; and before 1901 there were no telegraph officials, and the political clerks had been accustomed to find accommodation as best they could in the native town.

Dispensary.

From 1900 onwards efforts were made at intervals by various Political Agents and Agency Surgeons to obtain, entirely for the benefit of Arab and other native patients, an improvement of the buildings and equipment of the dispensary attached to the British Agency; but, though the Government of India in 1902 added a compounder to the staff at their own expense, the Sultān and native community gave little assistance, and Government, in view of their apathy, took no further steps.

Harbour improvements.

Besides the above, some expenditure was incurred by the Government of India in efforts to improve the harbour at Masqat, and especially the facilities for landing or communicating with the shore in bad weather. In 1903 a sum of Rs. 3,000 was granted for the commencement of an experimental coal jetty in the Makallah cove, and a further amount of over Rs. 8,000 was subsequently allotted for the purpose of carrying on the work. A scheme for a breakwater on the east side of the harbour near its head and another for a pier opposite to the British Political Agency were also discussed; but in 1904 it was decided in the first place to try whether the case could not be met by deepening the Duwairah channel, so as to provide a new and sheltered entrance to the harbour, and money was allotted for the work.

Internal history of 'Omān after 1899.

The narrative of recent internal affairs in 'Omān has been postponed to the end because of the much greater importance, during the time in question, of the Anglo-French contest, which for a long time absorbed the Sultān's attention and sometimes, even in domestic questions, restricted his freedom of action very considerably.

Visitations of epidemic disease, 1899.

The period, we may observe, opened with a severe visitation of the country in 1899 by the three epidemic diseases of plague, small-pox and cholera, the melancholy results of which are described in the special Appendix on sanitary matters.

In politics the two chief centres of interest since 1899 have been Sûr and the Rustâq valley.

Affairs at Sûr.

Sûr, a town never submissive to the authority of the Sultâns of 'Omân, had been hitherto neglected by Saiyid Faisal, who did not once visit it during the first twelve years of his reign. In 1898, as has been mentioned before, the inhabitants expelled the Sultân's garrison by force but allowed it to be replaced on sufferance. By 1900 the people of Sûr, especially those of the Jannabah tribe, had almost ceased, under French encouragement, to regard the Sultân as their master.

1900.

In May 1900 Hilâl-bin-'Amr arrived at Sûr from East Africa, joined hands with M. Ottavi, and began to inveigh against the Sultân and the British; and the spirit of the Jannabah was now such that, when summoned by the Sultân to meet him at Masqat, they refused to go and insolently suggested that he should deal with them instead through the French Vice-Consul. It was this state of matters which obliged Saiyid Faisal in June 1900 to make a visit to Sûr, the first since his accession. His reception was more favourable than he had expected; for all the elders of the town immediately paid their respects to him, the chief Shaikh of the Bani Bû 'Ali came down from the interior with a thousand men to do him honour, and, as already related, the Sultân was successful before he left in obtaining from the French flag-holders of the port, including the Jannabah, a formal profession of allegiance to himself and a renunciation of French protection.

1901.

In June 1901 the Sultân sent 80 Wahhâbi 'Askaris to garrison his post at Sûr, and the French flag-holders, few of whom had observed their promise given in the previous year, understanding the act as a threat to themselves, asked M. Ottavi whether he would protect them in case of an attack by the Sultân's troops; his reply was unfavourable, and the incident marked another stage in the decline of French influence at Sûr. In the autumn of 1901 Saiyid Faisal paid a second visit to Sûr and was anxious, for fiscal and administrative purposes, to enclose the town by a wall on the landward side. Difficulties as to labour and material caused him to desist from this project; but, before he left Sûr, he had carried into execution an older and less ambitious scheme—that which had helped to provoke the local rebellion of 1898—by erecting blockhouses between Sûr and Bilâd-as-Sûr to command the caravan routes to the interior.

1902. In 1902, as related in another place* the town of Sūr was plunged into mourning by the capture *in flagrante delicto* of a large number of Sūri slave traders by the Portuguese in East Africa. The Sultān, at Lord Curzon's visit to Masqat in 1903, begged that British influence might be used to obtain a mitigation of the sentences passed on these men by the Portuguese courts,—in most cases imprisonment for 25 years; but he was given to understand that his request could not be granted.

1903. In the spring of 1903, the ordinary annual hostilities between the Ghāfiris and Hināwis of Sharqīyah being then in progress, 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim, the Tamīmah of the Banī Bū 'Alī, found reason to suspect that the people of Sūr, though Ghāfiris, were supplying his enemies with the sinews of war. He accordingly marched down to the coast and declared the harbour blockaded until his demands for satisfaction should have been satisfied; and this, as we may mention in passing, was the occasion of a vessel flying the French flag being fired on by his adherents,—an occurrence which in its turn led to an unsuccessful claim for compensation by the French Vice-Consul upon the Sultān and so indirectly contributed to bring about the settlement of the whole French flag question. After 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim had returned to the interior, relations between his supporters in the 'Aiqa quarter and his opponents in Muqraimatain became so strained that, when Major Cox arrived there in August, he found the two factions on the point of opening fire upon each other across the intervening creek. The Political Agent, having obtained a truce of 48 hours, returned at once to Masqat and informed the Sultān, who immediately proceeded to the spot in his vessel the "Nūr-al-Bahr." The Jannabah would not at once submit to his mediation, and, before the proceedings had commenced in earnest, the Sultān was called away by serious news from Rustāq; nevertheless his visit averted actual fighting for the moment, and the dispute was adjusted, not long after, by neutral Shaikhs of the neighbourhood.

Affairs in the Rustāq Valley. The situation in Rustāq, which was the cause of the Sultān's premature departure from Sūr, arose from a coalition between the Mutawwa' or puritanical party of the Sharqīyah District and the Sultān's rivals belonging to the 'Azzān branch of his own family. We left Sa'ūd-bin-'Azzān in possession of Rustāq in 1898, after the expulsion of Sa'īd-bin-Ibrāhīm; but he did not long enjoy his acquisition, for in March 1899 he was murdered by his brother Hamūd-bin-'Azzān, who then succeeded him.

Meanwhile the Sharqīyah rebels had never been entirely quiescent In May 1899 a Shaikh of the Banī Rāsib of Sharqīyah, at an interview

* *Vide* Appendix L.

with the British Political Agent at Masqat, had endeavoured to sound him as to the probable attitude of the British Government in case of a fresh rising against the Sultān. In April 1900 there were short-lived rumours of an attack on Masqat, to be attempted by the tribes of Sharqīyah as a protest against the indemnity export tax still levied upon Hināwi produce; and the Sultān considered it advisable to strengthen Quryāt and Sīb, while Sa'id-bin-Ibrāhim of Hazam moved to his assistance with 300 men. A little later 'Isa-bin-Sālih, Harithi, with his brother Hamad actually visited Wādi Samāil, but his intrigues there met with no success and the Sultān refused him permission to visit Masqat; 'Isa, it should be explained, was a dignified, ascetic and bigoted character, on whom in this respect the mantle of his father Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Ali had fallen, while his younger brothers 'Ali and Ahmad (or Hamad) were mere commonplace marauders. In 1901 the family of Shaikh Sālih, as mentioned in an earlier paragraph, had a share in obstructing the first expedition which went, under the auspices of the Sultān, to examine the coal deposits in the hinterland of Sūr; and in the same year the Sultān received from 'Isa-bin-Sālih a threatening letter relating to the manumission of slaves, in which the hand of Hilal-bin-'Amr was thought to be traceable.

After this the Sharqīyah malcontents did not again come into prominence until August 1903, when, during the visit of Saiyid Faisal to Sūr, news was received that 'Isa-bin-Sālih and his two brothers with a considerable following were on their way to Western Hajar to seize Hazam and Rustāq. Hazam was at this time still in the possession of Sa'id-bin-Ibrāhim, whose sister the Sultān had married in 1898, and Rustāq was held by the fratricide Hamūd-bin-'Azzān. With both of these Faisal was outwardly on good terms; but they were practically independent of him, and they were at feud with one another. The Sultān, on receiving intelligence of 'Isa's movements, returned to Masqat and despatched Saiyid Taimūr and Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim by water to Sīb to bar the passage of the rebels towards Rustāq; but the 'Aqq pass had been at once thrown open to them by its treacherous custodians, and, before the Sultān's troops could arrive at Fanjah, the rebels had crossed their front and were beyond reach of pursuit. The Sultān himself then proceeded to Masna'ah and put the loyalty of Sa'id to the test by inviting him to a conference; but the latter declined the invitation and instead made his way to Rustāq, where he joined 'Isa-bin-Sālih and Hamūd-bin-'Azzān. 1903.

The intention of 'Isa, who aimed at power and knew that he could not compete for the Sultanate in his own person, was apparently to revive

the obsolete dignity of the Imamate, to confer it upon Sa'id, and then to govern in his name; this was the policy which his father Sâlih and the Khalîli had pursued with some success at the beginning of the reign of 'Azzân-bin-Qais. Hamûd was easily persuaded to give up Rustâq in favour of Sa'id; but the garrison of the fort, who belonged to the Bani Ruwâhah tribe, persisted, until sufficient inducements were offered them, in their refusal to deliver it up.

Meanwhile Saiyid Faisal had sent Sulaimân-bin-Suwailim with 150 men to strengthen 'Awâbi, his outpost in the direction of Rustâq, and had placed Saiyid Taimûr in garrison at Masna'ah, under the walls of which place there grew up a large camp of professed friendly Shaikhs and their followers, maintained in idleness by the Sultân's bounty. Saiyid Taimûr at one time proposed to make a dash on Hazam; but the Yâl Sa'ad, who dreaded falling under the exclusive power of the Sultân, frustrated his scheme by sending a warning to the garrison.

H.M.S. "Sphinx," sometimes carrying Major Cox, from time to time visited different places on the coast, and courteous letters promising protection to British subjects were received by the Political Agent from 'Îsa and Sa'id; consequently there was no panic among the Indian traders of Bâtinah, and, though some of them sent their valuables to Masqat for safe custody, they themselves remained in the towns and villages where they were established in trade. Only one serious raid by the adherents of 'Isa-bin-Sâlih occurred; it was committed on the outskirts of Barkah by 'Îsa's younger brothers, and the chief sufferers were the family of the Sultân's stable manager there, one of whose sons was killed. Some of the Sultân's horses, carried off on this occasion, were returned by 'Îsa when he learned to whom they belonged.

The claims of Sa'id-bin-Ibrâhîm to the Imamate aroused no popular enthusiasm; and in October the Sultân found himself in a position to disband the greater part of his expensive levy, while Sa'id humbly solicited the renewal of an allowance which he had been accustomed to receive from Saiyid Faisal. 'Îsa-bin-Sâlih and his men, whose own country in Sharqiyah was at this time suffering from drought and who, while at Rustâq, lived upon the inhabitants, lingered there until February 1904; but their presence did not, after October 1903, occasion any disquietude. In 1905 'Îsa made overtures for a reconciliation with the Sultân, and they were favourably received; but, as the Shaikh declined to visit Masqat without an escort which the Sultân considered excessive, no personal interview could be arranged.

In various other quarters besides Sūr and Rustāq events took place which were of some general importance to the government of 'Omān.

Expeditions by the Sultān's Wāli of Sohār, 1901-05.

Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, as Wāli of Sohār, engaged in 1901 in an attempt to wrest the fort of Bait-al-'Ainain in Dhāhirah from the Miyāyihah; but the expedition, though helped by the Bani Kalbān, suffered heavy loss and ultimately returned under orders from the Sultān. In 1904 'Arāqi in Dhāhirah was secured for the Sultān. In 1905, with the aid of his former allies the Bani Kalbān, Sulaimān made successful reprisals on the Maqābil, who had been giving trouble in the neighbourhood and in July had even attacked the Sohār fort, killing the 'Aqīd. Apparently on this occasion, one of their forts in Wādi-al-Hilti was taken by Saiyid Sir Faisal's representative.

In 1900 a standing menace to the peace of the country was removed by the submission of Shaikh Khalfān-bin-Thinaiyān, who, after heading a rebellion at Nakhl in 1897, had evaded arrest by the Wāli of Barkah, then sent against him; this individual, having become friendless and homeless, now took sanctuary in the Sultān's palace at Masqat and received a free pardon.

Recovery by the Sultān of 'Awābi, 1900.

At 'Awābi a dispute about Zakāt arose in 1900 between Sa'id-bin-Ibrāhim and the 'Abriyīn; the former, to enforce his claims, cut off the irrigation of the date groves of the 'Abriyīn, whereupon the tribesmen besieged and captured the fort. The Sultān then intervened, and, rejecting an offer of the 'Abriyīn to hold the place in his name, established in it instead a detachment of his own Wahhābis. In April 1902 two of the Wahhābi garrison were murdered by villagers; but the Sultān, having gone in person to the spot, succeeded in capturing one of the murderers and subsequently caused him to be executed at Masqat.

Disturbances in Wādi Ma'āwal, 1901.

Wādi Ma'āwal became in 1901 the scene of serious disturbances between the Bani Ruwāhah and the Bani Riyām, and, as often as the Sultān composed the feud, it broke out afresh. The last deputation sent by the Sultān took with them, as Khafir, an aged and respected Qādhi of Barkah; but the party were ambushed at the entrance of Wādi Ma'āwal, and the Qādhi himself was killed by the first volley. This melancholy incident, which must have been undesigned, apparently brought about a natural cessation of hostilities.

Destruction of tribal towers by the Sultān at Sīb, 1902.

At Sīb, at the beginning of 1902, much annoyance was caused to the other inhabitants by some of the 'Awāmir, Aulād Hadid and others, who, being at feud among themselves, kept up a constant long-range rifle-fire

upon each other from the towers in their several quarters; but in April the Sultān, during a visit to the place, ordered the towers to be demolished, which was done, almost without resistance, according to his directions.

Danger to the Sultān's rule at Nizwa, 1902, and Izki, 1905-06.

In October 1902 a serious fracas occurred between the Sultān's garrison at Nizwa and a party of Jannabah in the town; a guard sent by the Wāli to arrest the Jannabah, whom the Wāli suspected of a design against his life, met with resistance and used their rifles, killing four of the Jannabah; but the Sultān was able to pacify the tribe, and his position at Nizwa, which is not in the Jannabah country, was in no way weakened. Izki in 1905-06 was in some danger from the Bani Riyām, who revolted and laid siege to the place; but it was relieved in good time by the despatch of a force, composed partly of Bani Ruwāhah, under Wāli Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim. This success, however, led indirectly to the death of the Wāli, who in February 1907 was murdered by the Siyābiyīn in Wādi-al-'Aqq, in retaliation for the confiscation by him of a caravan that the Siyābiyīn had attempted to send to the Bani Riyām.

Tribal fighting in Ja'alān, 1904.

Ja'alān continued to be as usual the scene of bitter feuds, and in 1904 a severe conflict, in which 20 or 30 men were killed, took place towards the western end of the district between a party of Bani Bū 'Ali and another of Āl Wahibah. Among the slain was a son of 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim, the Tamīmah of the Bani Bū 'Ali, and in revenge for his death a Shaikh of the Āl Wahibah was murdered near Masqat a few months later.

Saiyid Faisal's administration, 1899-1907.

It now only remains to notice the character, in its domestic and personal aspects, of the Sultān's government after the crisis of 1899. In every respect except finance there was considerable improvement, and the Sultān's general political position became better than it ever had been in the past.

Customs brought under direct management, 1899.

To take the unsatisfactory department of finance first, we may observe that the administration of the Sultān's customs, which are the chief source of his revenue, remained inefficient, though it was to some extent reformed. The Sultān, as already mentioned, repeatedly declined the proffer by the Government of India of a trained official to reform the methods of the department; but their advice was not altogether without effect upon his mind. At the end of 1899 the Sultān abolished

the vicious system of farming the customs, and, by the instrumentality of two Indian Muhammadans with experience of customs work, whom he had obtained on his own account from Bombay, introduced in its place a system of direct management. The customs receipts rose in the first year to $206,701, of which nearly $190,000 was net revenue, as against a maximum farm in preceding years of $170,000, and in 1902-03 they reached the high figure of $285,597; but the increase in the returns was partly countervailed by a continued decline in the value of the dollar. In 1901-02 the ports of Suwaiq, Masna'ah, Barkah and Sūr were taken under direct management, and in 1903 the same system was extended to Gwādar; owing to the French flag difficulty at Sūr, however, there was not at first any improvement in the receipts at that place. Under the new régime the customs premises at Masqat, especially the wharf, office, and warehouses for goods, were very greatly improved. Lord Curzon, on his visit to Masqat in 1903, strongly advised the Sultān to employ a financial expert or a competent committee to audit his customs accounts; but this salutary counsel was disregarded, at least until the Sultān's system had produced its natural results. In 1905 the Sultān quarrelled with Muhammad Ibrāhim, his Indian superintendent of customs, whose accounts he distrusted but could not in the absence of independent clerks disprove, and dismissed him, replacing him by another Indian. Damodar Dharamsi, a Hindu merchant of Masqat, was at the same time appointed supervisor of the customs accounts on a salary of Rs. 100 a month,—an arrangement which, it was feared by the British Political Agent, would afford no better guarantee than before against fraud, and might prove to be the precursor of a return to the farming system. It was at least clear that, so long as the Sultān continued to prefer loose and irregular methods, and to borrow through his customs superintendent from merchants who were expecting consignments of dutiable goods, no real improvement could be expected. An analysis of the customs and other revenue of the 'Omān Sultanate will be found in the general article relating to it in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer.

Sultān's financial position.

In his financial difficulties the Sultān sometimes had recourse to confiscations, and in 1899 he obtained by this means an estate worth $25,000, left by a Balūchi who had been murdered at Sīb. The Sultān's liabilities of all sorts, as shown already in connection with British policy, amounted in 1905 to about Rs. 200,000; and, though the proportion (about half) then due to the British Government had by the end of 1906 been mostly discharged, it was thought that not much progress had been made in paying off the remainder. Indeed in 1906 the Sultān was

reported to be borrowing small sums from all and sundry; and, though in April he had refused a loan of $20,000, which was offered him free of political conditions by the British Government, he was stated in September to have incurred liabilities in other quarters to the amount of $120,000.

Currency.

The question of currency is one which, since 1894, has given a certain amount of trouble at Masqat. On the closing of the Indian mints there set in a serious drain of Indian rupees and copper pice towards India. The value of the dollar, which is the principal coin of the country and the only monetary standard in the interior, also began to decline by rapid and irregular stages, and by March 1894 had fallen to 108 pice, whereas until 1893 it stood at 136 to 140. The scarcity of pice, which was a cause of great hardship to the poorer classes, was remedied at first by a supply of copper coin which the Sultān caused to be struck for him in England, and later by the foundation of a mint for copper coin at Masqat itself. The fluctuation of the silver exchange was a more serious evil; and the deputation of merchants under British protection, who waited on Lord Curzon during his visit to Masqat in November 1903, requested that steps for dealing with it might be considered by the Government of India. In 1904 a scheme for the universal and exclusive adoption of the Indian currency in 'Omān was prepared by the Government of India; but, on account of the more important question of customs management, which is still pending, it has not yet been mentioned to the Sultān or discussed with him.

Military and naval resources of the Sultān.

The military resources of Saiyid Sir Faisal are described in the geographical volume of this Gazetteer: they are probably sufficient for the defence of his actual possessions against any ordinary attack which might be made upon them. The "Nūr-al-Bahr," a steam-vessel of 300 tons, purchased in 1902 with the assistance of the Government of India and brought into use in June 1903, replaced the Sultān in the position which he lost at the beginning of his reign through dispensing with his father's steam-vessels the "Dār-as-Salam" and "Sultāni"; and it enabled him, in particular, to re-assert his authority at Sūr and to increase it at all places on the Bātinah coast. When Saiyid Taimūr visited India in 1903, two guns for his father were presented to him by the Viceroy to be mounted upon this vessel.

General administrative position of the Sultān.

The extent and effectiveness of the Sultān's administration in 'Omān in recent times are discussed in the geographical portion of this Gazetteer; and from the facts there given, and from the events related in the paragraph on internal history above, it will be apparent that the influence of the Sultān in 'Omān has latterly become both stronger and

further-reaching than at any previous period in the reign of Saiyid Faisal himself or, perhaps, it might be added in the reign of his father Saiyid Turki. After 1900 the Sultān showed more energy than before in touring and in the general work of government; and, as in the case of his father and grand-father, his judgment gained in balance and his character in weight and sobriety with the lapse of years. Like Saiyid Turki, however, Saiyid Faisal was subject to fits of despondency; and in 1903 before the Viceroy's visit, and once again later, he was so harrassed by the cares of state as to talk seriously of abdication. The assassination of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim in 1907 was a severe blow to the Sultān, and the first news of that event was received by him with consternation.

Dynastic matters.

From the dynastic point of view the situation in 'Omān was not unsatisfactory. In 1903 Muhammad, the elder brother of Saiyid Sir Faisal, in whose favour he was passed over in 1888, showed that he entertained hopes of the succession in case the Sultān should predecease him or resign; but he had no following, and his ambitious ideas were discouraged by the British representatives from the first moment of their appearance. Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, the uncle of the present Sultān, died at Bombay in April 1907, and his heirs were so little formidable to Saiyid Sir Faisal and his family that their return to Masqat was permitted without hesitation. Since 1903 it had been clear that the Rustāq branch of the Āl Bū Sa'idi family equally did not possess any strong member likely to become a dangerous competitor for the throne of 'Omān; and interest therefore centred chiefly in Saiyid Taimūr, the eldest surviving son of the Sultān, who had always been treated as heir-apparent. Saiyidah 'Alaiyah, the mother of Taimūr, was a daughter of the former Sultān Thuwaini-bin-Sa'id, and the pedigree of the youth was thus unexceptionable upon the maternal side. Saiyid Taimūr may be considered to have entered on public life in 1901 at the age of 16, when on returning from a tour in the interior he was received by his father with a salute of 13 guns and on the following day paid a visit alone to the British Political Agent. In December 1904 he was married to a daughter of 'Ali-bin-Sālim-bin-Thuwaini,* a second cousin once removed of his own; a complimentary

*'Ali-bin-Sālim first arrived in 1898 from Zanzibar, whence he had been expelled for political intrigues, and lived at Masqat for some years upon the bounty of the Sultān; eventually, in the beginning of 1904, the Government of Zanzibar, in consequence of a request made by Saiyid Faisal to Lord Curzon during the visit of the latter to Masqat in 1903, agreed to permit his return to East Africa. 'Ali-bin-Sālim, however, shortly sought leave to go back to Masqat, and it was granted him in September 1904.

visit was paid him on this occasion by Major Grey, who presented him with a silver tea and coffee service and the congratulations of the Government of India.

In 1905 the character of Saiyid Taimûr was as yet impressionable and unformed, and in that year some anxiety was caused by his discovering ultrareligious tendencies, adopting Mutawwa' habits, and engaging in a friendly correspondence with some of the fanatics in the Sharqiyah district, such as 'Isa-bin-Sâlih, who might, it was feared, estrange him from his father. The matter, however, received attention from Saiyid Sir Faisal, from Major Cox, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and from Major Grey, Political Agent at Masqat; and, after a wish on the part of Saiyid Taimûr to go on pilgrimage to Makkah had been disappointed, he showed no further symptoms of bigotry. The only son of the Sultân besides Taimûr who had up to 1907 been employed in any public capacity was Nâdir, who was the child of a different mother.

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ANNEXURE NO. 1.—HISTORY OF DHUFĀR.*

Dhufār, though a dependency of 'Omān, is so remote and self-contained a district that its affairs can scarcely be said to form part of the general history of the Sultanate. It will, therefore, be convenient to treat of them separately.

Early History.

Of events in Dhufār before the beginning of the 19th century little is known with certainty.† The ruins of Bilād and Rubāt attest the existence in Dhufār, at some past epoch, of a community more civilised than the present inhabitants; and the elaborately carved tombstone of Mālik Ibrāhīm-bin-Mudhaffar at Rubāt bears the date 710 A. H., and is therefore more than 500 years old. It was stated in 1883 by Saiyid Turki, Sultān of 'Omān, in a correspondence with the Sharif of Makkah, that the district was once held by the Portuguese and that after their day it passed into the possession of the Ya'arabi Imāms of 'Omān; but these statements rest, perhaps, on no better foundation than Arab tradition.

Reign of Muhammad-bin-'Aqīl, about 1804 to 1829.

At the beginning of the 19th century Dhufār was ruled by Saiyid Muhammad-bin-'Aqīl, 'Ajaibi,‡ a buccaneer and slave trader, who at one time owned three square-rigged vessels and was the terror of shipping in the Red Sea. In later life he possessed himself of Dhufār and governed the district in an enlightened manner for about 25 years, making Salālah his capital. He was finally assassinated at Murbāt in 1829 by Sālim-bin-Thori, the chief of all the Qarās, whose family had a blood-feud against him. His tomb is shewn near Murbāt.

*The principal sources of information in regard to the traditions and early history of Dhufār are Cruttenden's *Journal of an Excursion from Morebat to Dyreez*, Haines's *Memoir of the South East Coast of Arabia*, and Carter's *Descriptive Account of the Ruins of El Balad*: the last mentioned work contains also an account of the chief antiquities of the district. Mrs. Bent's *Southern Arabia* deals with ancient remains and contains some conjectures in regard to ancient history. For events since 1875 the official papers specified in the footnote on the historical bibliography of the 'Omān Sultanate are the principal and almost the only authority.

† Traditions of an ancient local dynasty called Minquwi, of their supersession, and of the arrival of the Al Kathīrāre preserved in Carter's *Descriptive Sketch*. See also Mrs. Bent's *Southern Arabia*, pages 227-276, which contains several passages referring to the early history of Dhufār.

‡ The fullest account of the 'Aqīl family will be found in Haines's *Memoir*.

First annexation of Dhufār to 'Omān by Sa'id-bin-Sultān and subsequent connection of the district with Masqat, 1829-1875.

Occupation by 'Omāni troops and their withdrawal, 1829.

Immediately on the death of Muhammad-bin-'Aqil, a force was despatched from Masqat by Sa'id-bin-Sultān, the ruler of 'Omān, to occupy Dhufār in his name; and Sa'id at the same time offered the local Walīship to 'Abdur Rahmān, a brother of the deceased Muhammad-bin-'Aqil, then residing as a merchant at Bombay. The proposal was, however,* declined by 'Abdur Rahmān; and the troops of occupation, being required for service in East Africa, were removed from Dhufār after a very short stay.

The American, 'Abdullah Lorleyd, about 1836.

Subsequently to the withdrawal of Sa'id's troops in 1829, a prominent figure in Dhufār was for some years an American, known as 'Abdullah Lorleyd, who had been captured as a boy of ten years old in one of Muhammad-bin-'Aqil's piracies in the Red Sea, in which the other Americans of the ship's crew were murdered, and had grown up among the people of Dhufār. When Midshipman Cruttenden of the "Palinurus" visited Dhufār in 1836, Lorleyd, who had become a Muhammadan, was living at Salālah with his Arab family. The country, in the absence of any settled authority, was given up to warfare, chiefly between the Kathīris of the plain and the Qarās of the hills; and the white man, by his mental superiority, and by the daring and success with which he led expeditions against the Qarās, eventually succeeded in establishing a personal ascendency which he retained as long as he lived. The villages of the plain, however, were entirely independent one of another after Muhammad-bin-'Aqil's death: in 1836 Dahāriz was the most important of these.

Official deputations from Dhufār to 'Omān.

During the whole of the period now in question no revenue or tribute seems to have been remitted from Dhufār to Masqat, and there was no interference by the Sultāns of 'Omān in the internal affairs of the country. Saiyid Turki however, in 1876, alleged that never after 1829 did the Shaikhs of Dhufār fail to pay homage on the accession of a new Sultān at Masqat. According to the Sultān's statement a deputation consisting of 'Ali-bin-Sālim, Kathīri and 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah, Shanfari, had paid their respects to Saiyid Thuwaini and to Saiyid Sālim on the assumption by each of power; and a similar deputation had sought an interview with 'Azzān-bin-Qais after his usurpation, but had met with a rebuff; while Turki himself, in the first year of his reign, was waited upon by 'Ali-bin-Sālim. These emissaries, from 1856 onwards, were understood to have visited Masqat on behalf of Hamad-bin-'Umar, Marhūni, who was the most influential among the chieftains of Dhufār at the time.

British marine surveys off the coast of Dhufār.

Dhufār was visited by surveying vessels of the Indian Navy on various occasions between 1833 and 1846; towards the end of this period the country was disturbed, and parties from the ships were more than once fired on by the Qarās.

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* According to another account, however, 'Abdur Rahmān wished to obtain the district, but Saiyid Sa'id would not accede to his proposals.

Usurpation of Saiyid Fadhl-bin-Alawi, Moplah, 1875-1879.

Early history of Fadhl.

In 1875, probably about the month of August, an adventurer of an unusual type and one of a kind peculiarly interesting to the Government of India succeeded in establishing his personal authority over Dhufâr, and the connection of the district with 'Omân was temporarily severed. The usurper was Saiyid Fadhl or Fazl, a Moplah priest, who, for participation in the Moplah rising of 1852, had been expelled from India and forbidden to return under pain of arrest; in his outlawry he had resided at Makkah and other places in the Ottoman dominions; and he had acquired a high reputation for sanctity. In 1853, at the instance of the British Government, he was prohibited by the Porte from leaving Turkish territory; and there he seems to have remained until 1875, when he left his adopted home in the Hijâz province and proceeded, probably at the invitation of local Shaikhs who had seen him at Makkah, by sea to Dhufâr.

Arrival of Fadhl in Dhufâr, 1875.

Arrived in the district he began to enter into political arrangements with the tribes and quickly became master of the situation; one of his sons administered justice in his name. At an early stage of these proceedings he appears to have sought the recognition of the Turkish Government and to have asked for military assistance, but both were apparently withheld. The usurper was not ignorant of the connection of the district with 'Omân; but, when the presence of the Sultân's flag was mentioned as an obstacle to his claims, he contemptuously advised the objectors to "make a pillow of it".

Protests by the British Government to the Porte, 1876-77.

Saiyid Turki, who was Sultân of 'Omân at the time, first became aware of the Moplah's usurpation by a letter which that individual addressed to him,—a letter in which the writer described himself as Governor of Dhufâr under the Ottoman Porte and recommended Shaikh 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah, as a Turkish subject, to the favourable notice of the Sultân. Saiyid Turki, who regarded Dhufâr as part of his own dominions, immediately informed the Government of India; and they, though not convinced of the validity of the 'Omâni Sultân's title to the district, represented to Her Majesty's Government the inconveniences to be apprehended from the settlement of a professed enemy of the British Government in such a locality, and from the extension of Turkish influence to any point upon the South Arabian coast. The British Ambassador at Constantinople was accordingly instructed, neither assuming that Saiyid Fadhl had acted with the knowledge of the Porte nor asserting in any way the claim of the Sultân of 'Omân to suzerainty over Dhufâr, to remonstrate with the Turkish Government against the proceedings of Fadhl and to urge them to repudiate his acts. No definite answer having been obtained to this communication, made originally in 1876, it was repeated in 1877, but still apparently without result.

Expulsion of Fadhl by the Dhufâris, 1879.

In the end, however, the usurpation of Fadhl was brought to an end by local causes. The Moplah, who had made Salâlah his capital, at first enjoyed the support of the settled population and carried on desultory hostilities, not without success, against the predatory Qara tribe;

and he even extended his influence westwards over a part of the Mahra country. Gradually, however, his rule, which was arbitrary and oppressive, fell into discredit; for, while he exacted forced labour and contributions for himself and his family and levied import and export duty on all goods at 5 per cent., he was not long successful in composing the dissensions among tribes, nor was his administration of justice as between individuals applauded. At length, in January 1879, a general revolution took place among the people, and he was obliged to fly the country.

Second annexation of Dhufār to 'Omān by Turki-bin-Sa'id, 1879.

Factions in Dhufār.

On the expulsion of Saiyid Fadhl from Dhufār, Shaikh 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah, who had taken a leading part in the affair, paid a visit to Masqat and induced the Sultān, then Saiyid Turki, to extend his authority once more over this derelict corner of Arabia. The inhabitants of Dhufār were now divided into three parties, of which one headed by 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah desired the Sultān of 'Omān for their master, while another led by 'Awadh-bin-'Azzān aimed at the restoration of Saiyid Fadhl, and a third, probably the largest, was in favour of independence.

Successful expedition from Masqat, 1879.

An expedition by sea, despatched by Saiyid Turki under Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, reached Hāsik at the eastern end of Dhufār in the end of March or beginning of April 1879 and thence proceeded, partly by water and partly by land, along the coast to Sadah and so to Murbāt, where the whole force, consisting of about 100 men, arrived on the 7th of April. The people of Murbāt at once tendered their submission to the Sultān's representative; and, notwithstanding the hostility of a majority of the Āl Kathīr, Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim was able on the 11th of May to report himself firmly established at the capital. One of his first acts, intended no doubt to conciliate the people, was to reduce the rate of customs duty from the 5 per cent. taken by Saiyid Fadhl to 4 per cent.

Intrigues affecting Dhufār at Shihr and Makalla in Arabia and at Haidarābād in the Dakkhan, 1879.

At this time the question of Dhufār was complicated by a dispute between the Chiefs of Makalla and Shihr, under the jurisdiction of the Aden Residency, in which the Sultān of 'Omān, by showing sympathy with the Makalla Chief and sending an agent to reside for a short time at his court, incurred the hostility of the ruler of Shihr. It followed that, while the Chief of Makalla cordially supported the designs of the Sultān in Dhufār, the Chief of Shihr threw his weight into the opposite scale and expressed so clearly his intention of interfering in Dhufār affairs that in June 1879 a warning, which proved effectual, was addressed him by the British Resident at Aden. At the same time steps were taken to prevent the success of appeals for help which had been made, both by the Chief of Shihr and by a minister of the Sultān of 'Omān, to Arabs in the employment of the Nizām of Haidarābād in India.

Dhufār transferred by the Government

An indirect consequence of the discussions which thus arose was a decision by the Government of India, at the end of 1879, that the district of Dhufār should be regarded in future as falling within the jurisdiction

of the Masqat Political Agency and not of the Aden Residency; this was a reversal of the earlier practice, in which questions relating to Dhufār had always been referred to the Resident at Aden. The boundary between the two jurisdictions on the south coast of Arabia was now fixed at Rās Sājar.*

Separation of India from the political jurisdiction of Aden to that of Masqat, 1879.

Events in Dhufār from the 'Omāni occupation of 1879 to the evacuation of 1895.

The new régime in Dhufār soon attracted considerable unpopularity, partly perhaps because it had been established at the request of a minority of the natives, and partly, it cannot be doubted, on account of the taciturn and imperious temper of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim the Wāli, whose proceedings here, as afterwards in 'Omān, were generally characterised by energy rather than by discretion.

First rebellion against the Sultān, 1880.

Before the end of the year a split occurred between Sulaimān and the principal supporter of the Sultān's interest in the district, the Shaikh 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah; the Wāli suspected the Shaikh of working in the interests of a faction and sent him away on a suitable pretext to Masqat, where the Shaikh, in revenge, complained to the Sultān of misgovernment and extravagance on the part of the Wāli. The result of his visit to Masqat was disappointing to 'Awadh, for the Sultān showed him but little liberality and sent him home by the arduous route across the desert; and towards the end of 1880 'Awadh showed his displeasure by going into rebellion, surprising the Salālah fort and seizing the substitute of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, then absent at Masqat. At the same time the rebellious Shaikh opened a correspondence with the Chief of Shihr and with some Arabs at Haidarābād in the Indian Dakkhan. The Sultān's whole force in Dhufār was at this time only about 30 men; but 30 more were already on their way there, when the news of the rebellion reached Masqat, partly to relieve and partly to reinforce the existing garrison. On the 21st of December 1880 the Sultān's steamer "Dār-as-Salām", with two boats in tow, left Masqat for Dhufār; she carried an expeditionary force of 180 men accompanied by Saiyid Khamis-bin-Sulaimān, Āl Bū Sa'idi, and Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim. The instructions of Saiyid Turki to the leaders were that, if they found the inhabitants generally averse to his rule, they should evacuate Dhufār altogether, but, if only 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah and his party were hostile, strong action should be taken against them; further, if retention of the district were decided on and Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim appeared not unacceptable to the people he should resume his position as Wāli, but otherwise Khamis-bin-Sulaimān should remain in his place.

Counter-revolution in favour of the Sultān, 1880.

Meanwhile a counter-revolution had taken place in Dhufār. In the absence of Shaikh 'Awadh from the fort it was captured, after some

* As shown in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer, the boundary might now appropriately be placed a few miles further to the westward.

fighting and a few casualties, by a combination of his enemies under the leadership of a former supporter of Saiyid Fadhl; and, upon this success, the substitute Wāli was replaced in authority by general consent of the people. On the arrival of the "Dār-as-Salām" at Murbāt, 'Awadh fled to the hills; negotiations with the leaders of the expedition followed; and eventually the Shaikh received a promise of his life and undertook in return to surrender himself at Masqat within a certain fixed time. The "Dār-as-Salām" then returned to Masqat, where she arrived on the 4th of January 1881; she brought back the guns which had been sent with the expedition; but the troops, except an artillery detachment, remained to garrison the district. Perfect tranquillity for a time reigned in Dhufār, and the usual taxes were collected without difficulty or opposition.

Second rebellion against the Sultān, 1883.

At length, in January 1883, news reached Masqat of a fresh insurrection in Dhufār; and the Wāli, Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, reported himself besieged in the fort. The despatch of reinforcements was delayed by the accidental absence of the Sultān, Saiyid Turki, at Gwādar; but, on his return, a force of 70 men was got together for service in Dhufār and was shipped from Masqat, along with a 10-pounder gun, about the middle of February. Before the arrival of this armament, however, the siege of Salālah had been raised; and the reinforcements, instead of remaining in Dhufār, returned to 'Omān. Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, having left his son 'Ali in charge of the Wilāyat, came to Masqat in the April following, and was for several months employed by the Sultān in negotiations in the interior of 'Omān.

State of Dhufār at Colonel Miles's visit, 1882.

In November 1883 Colonel Miles, the British Political Agent at Masqat, paid a visit to Dhufār in H.M.S. "Philomel": the object of his tour was to acquire information about the southern coast of Arabia as far as Rās Sājar, a task which he very efficiently performed. Colonel Miles, from his local observations, was inclined to attribute the failure of the Sultān's administration in Dhufār, where the Ma'ashani branch of the Qarās was then actually in revolt, to the character of the Wāli, Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, who, though a staunch adherent of the Sultān and a good soldier, was of negro descent and had not the tact to govern amidst discordant elements, nor the capacity to develop the resources of the district. The tax demanded of the Bedouins in Dhufār was at this time one dollar yearly on every five camels, the same on every ten cattle, and one goat out of each twenty.

Third rebellion against the Sultān and withdrawal of the 'Omānis, 1885.

On the 11th of May 1885 another rebellion suddenly broke out in Dhufār in the absence of the Wāli; and 'Ali, the son and substitute of Sulaimān, found himself besieged in the fort with a detachment of 40 Wahhābi soldiers. At the middle of July, by the mediation of the Ahl 'Umr Qarās of Murbāt, 'Ali-bin-Sulaimān was enabled to evacuate the fort and to retire unmolested to Murbāt, whence he sailed in September for Masqat taking most, if not all, of his men with him. Thus ended for a time the 'Omāni occupation of the greater part, at least, of Dhufār; but it is possible that Murbāt continued to be held in the Sultān's name; and the rebels wrote to Saiyid Turki to inform him that, while they could not tolerate the administration of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, they were not averse to the Sultān's government *per se*. Dhufār between 1879 and 1885 brought in no surplus revenue, and continued to be, in a military sense as well as financially, a drain upon the resources of 'Oman.

Efforts of Saiyid Fadhl to recover Dhufār, 1879-1887.

Intrigues of Fadhl at Constantinople, 1879-1884.

On his expulsion from Dhufār in 1879 the Moplah Saiyid Fadhl had retired in the first instance to Makalla; but, his intrigues there meeting with no success, he made his way during the next few months by way of Berbera and Jiddah to Constantinople. There he quickly gained the ear of the Sultān of Turkey; and, before the end of the year, that monarch, notwithstanding the advice of his ministers, was almost persuaded to lend the Saiyid active assistance for the recovery of Dhufār. In 1880 Saiyid Fadhl wrote to the Sultān of 'Omān that he had gone to Constantinople in connection with a scheme of reforms for Dhufār, that he was now about to return, and that he was astonished at the presumption of Turki in violating Turkish territory; and about the same time the Sharif of Makkah advised the Porte to recognise and support Fadhl, because, he said, the 'Omāni annexation of Dhufār would produce a bad effect in Arabia. In August of the same year the honorary title of "Wazir" was conferred on Saiyid Fadhl by the Sultān of Turkey. In March 1883 Fadhl again wrote to Saiyid Turki from Constantinople, claiming that friendship existed between himself and the British Government and stating that he would never renounce his claims to Dhufār; and this missive was followed in July by one from the Sharif of Makkah, in which the Sultān of 'Omān was advised to renounce his claims to Dhufār in favour of Fadhl. To the suggestion contained in the latter of these Saiyid Turki, advised by Colonel Miles, the Political Agent, returned a courteous refusal, stating that Dhufār had belonged to the Portuguese, to the Ya'arubi dynasty of 'Omān and to his own ancestors, but that Saiyid Fadhl had no hereditary claim. In 1884 the Government of Bombay received, through the Turkish Consul-General there, a letter from Saiyid Fadhl, in which he complained of the action of the Sultān of 'Omān in Dhufār; and the question of Dhufār formed the subject of several articles in the Arabic newspaper "I'tidāl", published at Constantinople.

Attempted descent on Dhufār in the interest of Fadhl frustrated by the British authorities at Aden, 1886.

It was in 1886, however, during the temporary or at least partial evacuation of Dhufār by the Government of 'Omān, that Saiyid Fadhl made his chief effort to recover the district; but it was frustrated by British intervention. On the 20th of January in that year the returning pilgrim ship "Metapedia", under British colours, was boarded at Aden, and Muhammad, a son of Fadhl, with 16 personal attendants and 100 disbanded Arab soldiers of the Sharif of Makkah, was found to be on board; on the vessel being searched a large quantity of arms and ammunition, including revolvers and Martini-Henry rifles and carbines, was discovered and confiscated under the Arms Act. Muhammad, whose object was undoubtedly a descent on Dhufār, then landed to await, as he said, the orders of the Porte; but he did not apparently receive any.

Subsequent proceedings of Fadhl, 1886-87.

A little later it was reported that an agent of Muhammad had succeeded in conveying to Salālah in Dhufār the Turkish flag and a document purporting to be a Turkish commission, as also some Turkish coin and a quantity of military stores, all of which he had deposited in the house of one of the Al Kathīr. No overt act, however, followed these

preparations; and the controversy closed for the time with a written remonstrance on the subject of Dhufar, which was addressed by the Turkish Wāli of Basrah to Sayid Turki in March 1886 and was ignored by the latter. In 1887 Saiyid Fadhl did not fail to complain of the Aden incident, both to the British Resident at that place and to the Viceroy of India; but no notice was taken of either communication.

Events in Dhufār from 1886 to 1895.

Authority of the Sultān re-established in Dhufār, 1887.

During the year 1886 the authority of the Sultān of 'Omān was practically in abeyance in Dhufār; but a detachment of his troops, too weak to take the offensive, was soon sent to Murbāt, or perhaps had never been withdrawn from that place. In December the Sultān appointed Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Sulaimān to be Wāli of Dhufār, with Saiyid 'Abdul Jalil as assistant, and gave him an armed escort of 50 Arabs and 20 Balūchis. The new governor seems to have succeeded in re-establishing the Sultān's authority; but he remained, apparently, for less than a year.

Fourth rebellion against the Sultān, 1887.

At the end of 1887 Saiyid Turki had resolved to send Sulaimān-bin Suwailim back to Dhufār; and we find the Dhufāris besieging the 'Aqīd, who at the moment represented the Sultān's authority, and professing a determination to resist the return of Sulaimān by force. The crisis appears to have been regarded as requiring a serious effort; and, on the 13th of January 1888, Saiyid Turki despatched his sons Faisal and Fahad with various notables of 'Omān, 200 fighting men and one gun, on his steamship the "Sultāni" to Dhufār. The expedition was successful: Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim was installed as Wāli, and five disaffected Shaikhs of Dhufār, who had corresponded with Saiyid Fadhl and with the Chief of Shihr, were arrested and placed in irons on board ship. Upon the return voyage the "Sultāni" ran out of coal, and, much anxiety having been caused at Masqat by her non-arrival, H.M.S. "Turquoise" at the end of February went in search of her, found her with provisions exhausted near Rās Madrakah, and brought her safely to port.

Peace in Dhufār under Faisal, 1888-95.

Soon after these events Saiyid Turki died and was succeeded by his son Faisal, the first seven years of whose reign passed quietly in Dhufār. In 1891, a reinforcement of 100 Wahhābi mercenaries was sent from Masqat to reinforce the garrison.

Explorations of Mr. and Mrs. Bent in Dhufār, 1894-95.

In December 1894 and January 1895 Dhufār was visited, and the Samhān hills were explored, by Mr. and Mrs. T. Bent; and a survey of the country was made by Khān Bahādur Imām Sharif, who accompanied the party.

Proceedings of Saiyid Fadhl from 1887 to 1895.

Meanwhile Saiyid Fadhl had not renounced his hopes of recovering Dhufār. His residence was at Constantinople; his four sons known as

Sahl Pasha, Hasan Pasha, Muhammad Bey and Ahmad Bey, were holders of stipends from the Turkish Government; and Saiyid Fadhl himself still received subscriptions from India, but his income from that source was diminishing.

Overtures by Fadhl and his family to the British Government in regard to Dhufar, 1894-95.

In 1894 Saiyid Fadhl applied to the British Ambassador at Constantinople for permission to return to Dhufar with his sons, and offered, in return for British protection, to maintain free trade between Dhufar and all British possessions and to assist in suppressing the traffic in slaves; but his proposals were not entertained. In the spring of 1895 Sahl Pasha, the son of Fadhl, was living at the Qubbah palace near Cairo as a guest of the Khedive of Egypt, and while there he opened negotiations with the British Consulate-General in Egypt for the countenance of Great Britain in recovering possession of Dhufar; but his advances were discouraged, and in the following summer he returned to Constantinople. As, however, there was fear of unauthorised action by Fadhl or his family, arrangements were made by the British authorities for a careful watch to be kept at Cairo, Jiddah and Aden; and the Sultan of 'Oman was advised to strengthen his position in Dhufar in regard both to *personnel* and to *matériel*.

Dhufar lost to 'Oman but recovered with British assistance 1895-97.

Fifth and most serious rebellion against the Sultan, 1895.

The most serious and prolonged rebellion in Dhufar against the sovereignty of 'Oman began with the sudden capture, on the 3rd of November 1895, of the Sultan's fort; in this affair 'Ali, the son, and Mussid, the nephew, of the absent Wali Sulaiman-bin-Suwailim were killed along with 11 of the ordinary garrison; and the remainder of the Sultan's forces retreated, as usual in time of difficulty, to Murbat. The immediate occasion of the revolt was the imprisonment of one of the Al Kathir who had defrauded the Sultan's customs; but the general causes lay deeper, and were, as more than once before, the harshness and misgovernment of Sulaiman-bin-Suwailim, under whom, it was said, forced labour, irregular exactions and interference with the women of the country had become serious grievances. The initiative in the rising was taken by the Al Kathir of the hills; but they were soon joined by the entire population, except the Shanafir Kathiris of Hafah under 'Awadh-bin-'Aman and the Garra of Taqah and Murbat, who were both as a rule supporters of the Sultan, but upon this occasion assumed a neutral attitude.

Ineffectual attempt at suppression by the Sultan.

The news reached Masqat towards the end of November, and Saiyid Faisal immediately despatched a force of 100 Wahhabis and 150 of the Bani Kalban tribe; but the expedition, though a good base of operations was provided by Murbat, was unable to retake the district; and an attempt to land near Salalah, the capital, was actually repulsed.

British intervention, 1896.

As reports of the presence of agents of Saiyid Fadhl in Dhufar were rife and the rebels had made use of flags which were described as

Turkish, Colonel Hayes Sadler, the British Political Agent at Masqat, under instructions from the Government of India, proceeded to the spot at the beginning of March 1896 in H.M.S. "Brisk" to investigate. The Sultān of 'Omān had also authorised Colonel Hayes Sadler to negotiate with the tribesmen on his behalf. The Political Agent found the Sultān's flag flying over Hāfah village, in which the garrison were virtually prisoners, while a Turkish flag floated over Salālah; but no proof was obtained of the presence of emissaries from Shaikh Fadhl, though the rebels had undoubtedly applied for help both to him and to the Chief of Shihr, and the Turkish flag appeared to be one of those of which the introduction into the district had been reported ten years earlier. Colonel Hayes Sadler had an interview with the leaders of the rebellion, of whom the principal were Sālim-bin-Hamad, Marhūni, and 'Ali-bin-Kathairi; but their attitude was defiant, and they refused the reasonable terms offered them by the Sultān, *viz.*, forgiveness for the past, the removal of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, the appointment of a more conciliatory governor, the restriction of taxation within the limits sanctioned by custom, and prompt redress of grievances.

British offer of assistance rejected by the Sultān, April 1896.

On Colonel Hayes Sadler's return to Masqat the question of assisting the Sultān to recover Dhufār was discussed, and a proposal was sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government that the action of the Sultān's forces on land should be supported, if necessary, by British naval fire. The offer was communicated to the Sultān at the beginning of April, accompanied by a condition that he should abide by British advice regarding future arrangements in Dhufār, and it was at first not unfavourably received; but within a very few days His Highness's attitude changed under the French influences to which he was at this time subject; and, professing himself unable to agree to a condition so vague as that of submission to future British advice, he intimated that he could now neither conciliate the Āl Kathir nor replace Sulaimān by another Wāli. He added that he expected, in the absence of foreign complications, to be able to reduce Dhufār unassisted.

French protest against British intervention in Dhufār, May 1896.

In May 1896 a protest was lodged by the French Ambassador in London against the recent action of the British Government in sending the "Brisk" to Dhufār to support the Sultān's interests,—a proceeding to which objection was taken as being unilateral and therefore inconsistent with the Declaration of 1862. In reply an assurance was given by Her Majesty's Government that the incident complained of implied no intention on the part of Britain to establish a protectorate over 'Omān, or to depart from her engagement with France to respect the Sultān's independence.

British aid solicited by the Sultān, January 1897.

In January 1897 the Sultān, being at length convinced of his own inability to recover Dhufār, solicited the assistance of a British man-of-war and accepted the conditions upon which the British Government were now willing to grant it: these were pardon, after full submission, for the rebels; the appointment of a Wāli acceptable to the local Shaikhs; and the discontinuance of extra taxation. At the beginning of March 1897 the French war-vessel "Surprise" arrived at Masqat, and her services against the rebels in Dhufār were offered to the Sultān, but were declined.

The Sultān's authority restored by an Anglo-'Omānī expedition to Dhufār, March, 1897.

On the 12th of March, Colonel Wilson, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, left for Dhufār in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence"; the "Lawrence" had been preceded by native vessels carrying the Sultān's main force of about 300 men and she was accompanied by H.M.S. "Cossack", on board of which were Captain Beville, the Political Agent at Masqat, Hamad-bin-Nāsir, the Wāli of Matrah, and Saiyid Muhammad, the Sultān's elder brother, with about 70 followers. Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim was absent from Masqat when the expedition sailed and was thus unintentionally, but not inopportunely, left behind. The "Lawrence" and "Cossack" anchored off Salālah on the 16th of March, and the Turkish flag was found hoisted in two places. On the 17th, the Political Agent met the rebel Shaikhs on shore; he offered forgiveness for the past and a guarantee against enhanced taxation; but the Shaikhs demanded that either there should be no 'Omāni Wāli of Dhufār at all, or that he should be of their own choosing and should not be supported by troops. On their proposals being rejected the Shaikhs at first declared themselves under Turkish protection, but finally they requested that they might be taken under British protection, or receive a British guarantee for the redress of future grievances. On the evening of the 17th, the Sultān's land forces being now in possession of the village of Hāfah, Colonel Wilson in writing required the submission of the rebels within two days upon the two conditions already explained to them by Captain Beville; on the 18th and 19th the Shaikhs still appeared obstinate; but at dawn on the 20th the Turkish flags had been struck and were soon sent on board the "Lawrence", and resistance was at an end. On the 21st the Resident landed in order to confirm the conditions of peace, granted nominally by Saiyid Muhammad, the Sultān's brother, and the same day the "Lawrence" left for the Persian Gulf; but the "Cossack" with the Political Agent remained for two days longer. The Shaikhs of Dhufār had meanwhile withdrawn their objections to the return of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, who appeared moreover to be the only one of the Sultān's officers capable of dealing with the local situation; consequently when it became known that he had, during the absence of the expedition, sailed from 'Omān for Dhufār, no effort was made to intercept or recall him.

Renewed overtures of Fadhl to the British Government, 1896-97.

Saiyid Fadhl was not, apparently, the instigator of these disturbances; but he immediately tried to turn them to his own advantage. He wrote in May 1896 to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and, after referring to the recent revolt in Dhufār against the tyrannical 'Omāni governor and to the hoisting of a "red flag with a crescent", proposed that he should send an envoy of his own to the spot with instructions to fly "the national flag of Dhufār, green with a pentagonal centre"; that he should cause a regent agreeable to the people to be elected; and that he should proclaim a complete accord between himself and the British Government and the intention of the latter to protect the rights and independence of the Dhufār principality. In reply he was informed that he must not proceed to Dhufār, and that no envoy of his could be recognized or assisted by the British authorities. Saiyid Fadhl continued for a time to press his scheme of sending a representative to Dhufār; but the objections of the British Government were not withdrawn.

Events in or connected with Dhufār from 1897 to 1907.

Fresh risings in Dhufār and recall by the Sultān of the unpopular Wāli, 1897.

Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim having reached Dhufār and taken over charge of the district on the 15th of April 1897, the familiar tale of discontent and insurrection was shortly resumed. In April and May about 45 men of the 'Omāni garrison in Dhufār deserted in two parties and returned to Masqat; and about the same time the inhabitants of Hāfah, instigated as was supposed by the Wāli, attacked the people of Salālah and killed one of them. The Sultān, when news of the last affair reached him, wrote *viâ* Bombay and Aden to recall Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim from Dhufār, and sent Saiyid Saif-bin-Ya'arab to succeed him as Wāli; Sulaimān, however, did not see fit to comply at once with the Sultān's mandate; and, when at length he quitted Dhufār in February 1898, he brought Saif-bin-Ya'arab away with him and left one of his own slaves, a worthless and illiterate Nubian, in charge of the district. His departure was probably delayed at the end by an affair which occurred in November 1897, in which another of his nephews, together with an Arab who accompanied him, was killed by Qarās. It was on his way back to Masqat at the beginning of 1898 that Sulaimān called at Sūr and, by his inconsiderate dealings with the inhabitants, prepared the way for the revolt which took place there later in the year.

Alleged breach by the Sultān of the amnesty guaranteed to the rebels, 1898.

Soon after this an incident arose at Masqat in connection with the British guarantee of the terms granted by the Sultān's brother to the Dhufār rebels in 1897. In May 1898 Shaikh Sālim-bin-Hamad, Marhūni, the leader of the rebellion, was brought to Masqat under arrest and placed in close confinement; and a month later his cousin, 'Umr-bin-'Abdullah, was similarly treated. Major Fagan, then Political Agent at Masqat, being informed that the imprisonment of Sālim-bin-Hamad had been procured by Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim on account of the murder of his son in 1895, an offence clearly covered by the amnesty of 1897, demanded the immediate release of the Shaikh; but the Sultān refused, alleging that after the rebellion Sālim had again incited the tribes to resist the authority of the Wāli. Major Fagan then pressed for a public inquiry, which also the Sultān declined to allow. As the Government of India were not satisfied of the accuracy of the Political Agent's information the matter was not officially pressed; but in December 1898, in response to a friendly suggestion by Major Fagan, the Sultān released both prisoners, in honour of his own approaching marriage with the sister of Sa'īd-bin-Ibrāhim of Rustāq.

Unsuccessful Bedouin rebellion against the Sultān, 1899.

At the beginning of 1899, Sulaimān being still employed elsewhere, a fresh crisis arose in Dhufār. On two occasions supplies destined for a fort in the interior were intercepted on the way by Bedouins. The acting Wāli, in making a third attempt to victual the place, prepared an ambuscade for the robbers; his stratagem was successful and nine of the Bedouins were killed. The nomads of the country then rose *en masse*, and reinforcements from Masqat were urgently requested by the Deputy Governor; but in the end the settled inhabitants of the district took part with the officials against the Bedouins, and the insurrection subsided of itself.

Saiyid Fadhl appears to have died about 1900 at Constantinople, where for some years he had subsisted chiefly on the liberality of the Porte; and with his death foreign intrigue in Dhufār apparently came to an end.

Death of Fadhl and cessation of foreign intrigue, 1900.

The beaching of the French ship "Amiral Gueydon" at Rās Hāsik in 1903 and the protection of the crew and passengers by the Sultān's representative in Dhufār and by the Shaikh of Murbāt have already been mentioned in the general history of the 'Omān Sultanate. According to a report received at Masqat, the coast of Dhufār was visited in April 1905 by about a dozen vessels of war, supposed to be Russian, which remained there at anchor for two days; some of the crew went ashore, but they committed no mischief. These ships may have been the second portion of the Russian "Third Pacific Squadron," which, under Admiral Niebkoatoff, is known to have left Jibuti on the 7th of April 1905 *en route* for the seat of the war with Japan in the Far East.

Passing visit of Russian war-vessels to Dhufār, 1905.

From 1900 onwards Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim was Wāli of Sohār in 'Omān, where he principally resided, and Dhufār was governed by a subordinate on his behalf. During these years the district appears to have enjoyed peace and prosperity; and when, in December 1906, Major Grey, Political Agent at Masqat, visited Dhufār in H.M.S. "Redbreast" and had a meeting there with the Sultān Saiyid Faisal and his son Saiyid Taimūr, he found the country in a flourishing condition.

Peace in Dhufār, 1900-06.

ANNEXURE NO. 2.—HISTORY OF GWĀDAR AND CHAHBĀR.*

Origin of the connection between Gwādar and 'Omān, 1784-92.

During the 17th century the Bulaidais were the dominant tribe in Makrān, of which Gwādar and its territories then formed an integral part. In the 18th century the Bulaidais were supplanted by the Gichkis, and a Brāhūi family also rose into prominence, whose head at the time was one Mohbat Khān. In 1736, Mohbat Khān submitted to Nādir Shāh of Persia and was appointed by the conqueror to be his principal officer in all Balūchistān, including Makrān. In 1739, Taqi Khān, the general of Nādir Shāh, withdrew from Balūchistān and the Gichkis profited by the opportunity to secure themselves a position at Gwādar, of which place they remained until some years later in sole possession.

* The principal authorities for the history of Gwādar are the records and précis mentioned in the bibliography of the 'Omān Sultanate (see footnote, page 397). To these may be added an anonymous précis entitled *Correspondence on the Progress of Persia in Mekran and Western Baluchistan*, 1869, also the *Official History of the Mekrān Telegraph Line*, 1895.

Nāsir Khān I of Kalāt, 1750-93.

After a time, however, the Gichkis quarrelled among themselves over questions of religion; and the assistance of Nasīr Khān I of Kalāt, the younger brother and successor of the Brāhūi chief Mohbat Khān, was invoked by one of the contending factions. Nasīr Khān—who reigned from 1750 to 1793 and was a vassal of Afghānistān, not, as Mohbat Khān had been, of Persia—then commenced a series of incursions into the Gichki territories; and eventually, about 1778, he obtained for himself a moiety of the revenues of those districts, the administration, however, remaining in the hands of the Gichkis.

Grant of Gwādar by Nasīr Khān I to Saiyid Sultān.

In 1784, as has been related in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, Saiyid Sultān-bin-Ahmad, then an unsuccessful pretender to the sovereignty of 'Omān, sought refuge in Makrān. According to local traditions Saiyid Sultān came first to Zīk, a fortified village of the Mīrwāris in Kōlwa, and thence, having been joined by Dād Karīm, Mīrwāri, proceeded to Kharān, where his cause was espoused by Mīr Jahāngīr, a Naushairwāni chief. The confederates then resorted to Nasīr Khān at Kalāt, who at first apparently undertook to assist Saiyid Sultān in making himself master of 'Omān, but eventually, it would seem, receded from his promise and instead conferred the port of Gwādar—at the time an insignificant fishing village—upon the 'Omāni exile.

Character and validity of the grant.

The exact nature of the grant by Nasīr Khān is shrouded in an obscurity which it is now probably too late to dispel, and it has in recent times become a subject of controversy. In support of the claims of Kalāt to the ownership of Gwādar at the present day it is alleged that the grant was not permanent, and that it was only for the maintenance of Saiyid Sultān so long as he should continue to be a refugee in Makrān; while on behalf of the 'Omāni Sultān it is contended that the object of the arrangement was to secure naval protection for the coasts of Makrān, by enlisting the co-operation of a prince whose ultimate succession to the sovereignty of 'Omān was regarded by Nasīr Khān as certain. An argument on which the advocates of the Brāhui claim rely is that in 1784 half the revenue of Gwādar still, apparently, belonged to the Gichkis, and could not therefore be lawfully alienated by Nasīr Khān: to prove the survival of the Gichki rights in 1784 reference is made to deeds executed by the Gichkis in 1778 and 1793, which convey a share in the revenues of Gwādar and Chahbār to a certain deserving individual, and a statement made by the writer Hāji 'Abdun Nabi in 1839 is quoted, to the effect that only the Brāhui half share of the revenue of Gwādar was conferred by Nasīr Khān upon Saiyid Sultān. It is added—to include here evidences of a still later date—that the Gichkis continued to receive their share of the revenue of Gwādar, amounting to $3,000,* up to the time of Bībi Maryam, a Bulaidai lady who was married to a Gichki; this person was described in 1868 by the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar as living on the charity of the Sultāns of Masqat, but it is asserted by the Gichkis that what she received was really hers by right, and that it represented the Gichki share of the revenue, which the Sultāns of 'Omān had gradually curtailed. From this short summary of the arguments it will be seen that the Masqat case rests practically upon the prescription of a century and upon nothing else.

* The total amount is said to have been $7,000 a year, of which the 'Omāni Sultān received $1,000 on account of the expenses of collection, besides his own share amounting to $3,000.

while the evidences in favour of the Kalāt view are reducible to *ex parte* documents and assertions, the value of which, on account of the time that has elapsed, cannot now be tested.* The title of the Sultāns of 'Omān to Gwādar, inasmuch as it has been impugned and cannot be supported otherwise than by evidence of long possession, may be described as of doubtful validity; but it is obvious that the flaw is technical rather than material.

Annexation of Gwādar to 'Omān, 1792.

Until the year 1792, when he at length attained to the supreme power in 'Omān, Sayid Sultān would appear to have made Gwādar a base for expeditions against the Arabian coast opposite; and he had no sooner established his power at Masqat than he took measures to secure Gwādar as a dependency of 'Omān by despatching a certain Saif-bin-'Ali with troops to govern the place and build a fort there.

Events at Chahbār, 1792-1809.

Annexation of Chahbār to 'Omān, 1792.

After he had carried out his instructions at Gwādar, Saif-bin-'Ali proceeded to Chahbār with a fleet of boats which he brought into the harbour under pretext of fishing, took the town by surprise one night, and added it to his master's possessions. The possessor at the time was one Shafi' Muhammad, Bulaidi, who paid a quarter of his revenue to Mīr Subhān, the chief of Dashtyāri Bāhu, and had for some time paid another quarter to the Saiyid of 'Omān. The place was said to have been betrayed by one Allah Rakhiya, a Khojah.

Chahbār seems to have been lost to 'Omān on the death of Saiyid Sultān in 1804, but to have been recovered again after a short interval. Its revenue in 1809 was Rs. 5,000 a year, which went entirely to the Saiyid of 'Omān.

Events at Gwādar from 1792 to 1861.

Early attacks on Gwādar.

Of the history of Gwādar during the next 70 years extremely little is known; but it seems that, after the 'Omāni occupation, Gwādar rapidly distanced in prosperity the ports of Pasni and Jiwani, to which it had formerly been reckoned inferior. Endeavours were made by the Brāhūis from time to time to recover Gwādar, but the weak rulers who followed Nasir Khan were incapable of carrying the matter to a successful issue and were as a rule fully engaged in protecting other outlying

* For a statement of the arguments on the Kalāt side the Imperial Gazetteer of Baluchistān and the Provincial Gazetteer of Makrān may be consulted. The case for 'Omāni ownership has never been fully set forth, and the present Sultān, secure in the strength of his *de facto* title, professes ignorance of the grounds on which it is based; some remarks by the Reverend G. P. Badger from the 'Omāni point of view will be found, however, in his official report No. 9, dated 3rd June 1861.

parts of their state, especially upon its western border. Between 1804 and 1807, it is said, Mir Dōstain, the Bulaidai chief of Sarbāz, took possession of Gwādar during the confusion that followed the death of Saiyid Sultān; but, if the statement is correct, he was ejected after a short tenure of the place by troops despatched from Masqat. In 1805 a piratical raid was made on Gwādar by the Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; and about 1839, according to Makrāni tradition, Shaikh Qāsim, Gichki, threatened Gwādar and succeeded in obtaining payment of the Gichki moiety of the revenue on account of two years.

Sardār Khan's invasion of South-Eastern Persia *viâ* Gwādar and Chahbār, 1843-44.

A curious incident, a little later, was an expedition made into South-Eastern Persia *viâ* Gwādar and Chahbār by Sardār Khān, the brother of His Highness the Agha Khān. At the end of 1843 Sardār Khān left Karāchi with a body of 200 horsemen whom he had collected, and, marching by land, reached Gwādar at the end of a few weeks. After a short halt at Gwādar he moved on to Chahbār, which, on account of the Khōjah settlement there, he found a convenient base of operations; and, by means of negotiations conducted from Chahbār, he eventually made himself master of Pampūr. Here however he was besieged by a Persian army, and, having been obliged to surrender, was removed as a prisoner to Tehrān.

Attempt of the Nāib of Kaij on Gwādar, 1847.

In 1847 Faqīr Muhammad, the Nāib of Kaij, invested Gwādar with a force of 1,000 men; his object was to extort from Saiyid Thuwaini, at that time regent of 'Omān, a customary annual present which had been withheld for two years in succession. After the attacks of Faqir Muhammad had been several times repulsed, the inhabitants of the town, finding themselves straitened for ammunition and supplies, obtained a truce; they then kept the Nāib amused with idle promises, and possibly with small payments, until the arrival of 100 men in the brig "Nāsiri" from Masqat obliged him to relinquish the siege.

Efforts of the Brāhuis to recover Gwādar, 1857, etc.

In 1857 an expedition was organised by Nasir Khān II, partly with the object of recovering of Gwādar, and was despatched to Kaij under the command of Shāhghāsi Wāli Muhammad; but the contemplated attack upon Gwādar was apparently bought off by the Arab governor, who presented a number of slaves and a sword to the ruler of Kalāt and possibly paid a sum of money as well. Another expedition against Gwādar was subsequently planned by Khuda Dād Khān; but, in consequence of trouble with the Naushairwāni tribe of Kharān, it had to be abandoned.

The claim of Kalāt to Gwādar, 1861-63.

The affairs of Gwādar and Chahbār during the following eight years, from 1861 to 1869, were closely connected with the construction of the Persian Gulf telegraph, an undertaking which gave rise to some difficult questions of jurisdiction and boundaries.

The preparations for erecting a land line of telegraph from Karāchi to Gwādar seem to have inspired the Khān of Kalāt with the idea of reviving, assisted by the British Government, his dormant claim to the

latter place; and in 1861 he proposed that Gwādar should be purchased by the British authorities from the Sultān of 'Omān and handed over to himself,—an arrangement which, he argued, would benefit both the state of Kalāt and the Government of India. The suggestion, after full consideration, was rejected by the Government of India on the ground of ancient possession by the Sultān; and in April 1863 the Commissioner in Sind was informed by the Government of Bombay that the Khān's claim to Gwādar was as little sustainable as his claim to Karāchi and as little deserving of countenance.

The claims of Persia to Gwādar and Chahbār, 1863-69.

The fluctuations of Persian authority in Makrān during the 19th century are described in the separate history of that province: in the present place we have only to consider those pretensions on the part of Persia to Gwādar and Chahbār which were excited by the British negotiations for telegraph rights.

Obstruction of British telegraph work near Gwādar by local Persian officials, 1862-63.

At the end of 1862, as the land line from Karāchi was approaching Gwādar, it became apparent that the local Persian authorities would not much longer remain quiescent. At the commencement of 1863 Ibrāhīm Khān, the Persian Sartīp of Bampūr, began to interest himself in the operations and wrote to Thuwaini, the Sultān of 'Omān, and to the Arab Wāli of Gwādar desiring them to prevent the further progress of the line until the sanction of the Persian Government should have been obtained. To give weight to his admonitions Ibrāhīm Khān next, apparently, assembled a large body of Rinds and advanced in the direction of Gwādar, causing much excitement and the interruption of communications with the interior. On the 12th of March 1863 a serious raid was committed near Gwādar, and a number of men from the "Hugh Rose" gunboat were landed for the protection of the telegraph officials. In May 1863 fresh letters from Ibrāhīm Khān were received by Mr. Walton, in charge of the telegraph construction party, and by the Wāli of Gwādar; the threats which they contained appeared, however, to be conditional upon the work being carried beyond Gwādar. Permission was given by the Sultān of 'Omān for the landing of British troops in order to protect the telegraph, but it was not immediately utilised.

Claim of Persia to all Makrān and Baluchistān including Gwādar and Chahbār, 1864.

Meanwhile the Persian Government, having been addressed through the British Legation at Tehrān, repudiated the proceedings of Ibrāhīm Khān; but the language of the Shāh's ministers indicated the existence of vague and extensive Persian claims in the direction of Makrān; and shortly afterwards it became known that Persia considered Gwādar and Chahbār specifically her own. In 1864 Colonel Goldsmid was sent to the spot to collect evidence bearing on the territorial disputes which had arisen, and his report was adverse to the alleged rights of Persia at Gwādar and Chahbār; but meanwhile the pretensions of the Persian Government had continued to increase. At the end of 1864 they were found to include "sovereign rights over all

Makrān and Balūchistān"—the basis of claim being apparently the conquests of Nādir Shāh; and in 1867 they constituted a serious obstacle in the negotiations for the extension of the land line of telegraph to the westward of Gwādar. In a Persian official memorandum it was now stated that "the Persian Government considered Kaij and Makrān integral parts of the province of Kirmān and therefore undoubtedly Persian territory," and that the ports of Gwādar and Chahbār "were also placed by them in exactly the same category as other ports belonging exclusively to Persia."

Persian claim to Gwādar waived and abandoned, 1868-71.

Eventually however, in concluding the Telegraph Convention of 2nd April 1868, these claims were waived, without prejudice, by the Persian Government; and they also, though not without reluctance, abandoned a contention which they had raised that the coast from Gwādar westwards should be described in the Convention as "the Persian Coast". The boundary laid down by General Goldsmid in 1871 between Persian and Kalāt territory afterwards placed Gwādar beyond the reach of Persia; but it did not affect Chahbār, which, though claimed by Persia, was still actually in possession of the Sultān of 'Omān.

British political representation at Gwādar, 1863-1873.

Establishment of an Assistant Political Agency, April 1863.

The situation of Gwādar, near the point of contact between several spheres of political influence, is peculiar, and the place may be regarded in various different aspects: it is at once a dependency of the Sultanate of 'Oman, a locality of which the interests are closely bound up with the affairs of Southern Balūchistān and particularly of the Kaij district, a convenient point from which to survey the affairs of Persian Makrān, and a station upon the Makrān section of the Indo-European Telegraph Department's land telegraph, of which the headquarters are at Karāchi. The multiplicity of the interests which thus exist at Gwādar has not been without its effect on the nature of British representation there, and has from time to time necessitated administrative changes which will presently be described; but the institution of a British Agency was due, in the first instance, to the difficulties with Persia which arose out of the construction of the land telegraph to Gwādar in 1862-63.

The British representative was, in the beginning, a European Assistant Political Agent, the cost of whose appointment was debited to the Indo-European Telegraph Department; and the first incumbent of the post was Lieutenant E. C. Ross, Adjutant of the 1st Balūch Regiment,—afterwards Sir E. C. Ross, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,—who had been nominated by Mr. Mansfield, Commissioner in Sind, to be Assistant Political Agent at Kalāt, but who was ordered, in consequence of the threatened trouble with Persia over the telegraph, to proceed to Gwādar instead. He arrived there in April 1863. About the same time, under the authority from the Sultān of 'Omān for landing British troops at Gwādar to protect the telegraph, 100 Karachi

armed police under a Native Officer were sent to Gwādar; and, on their withdrawal in September 1863, a small military detachment from India was substituted as a guard.

Proposed political reorganisation, 1869.

In 1869 it was suggested that the political officer at Gwādar, whom it had hitherto been the custom to gazette as Assistant to the Political Agent at Masqat and to the Political Agent at Kalāt, should be made Political Agent on the Makrān Coast, thus becoming independent of the Agents at Masqat and Kalāt, and that he should be given a place in the cadre of the Political Department instead of being attached as it were to the Indo-European Telegraph Department's establishment. In practice his relations, other than those with Masqat, were with the Commissioner in Sind, for communication between Gwādar and Kalāt could hardly be said to exist. The proposed change was vetoed, however, the chief reasons assigned being that no inconvenience had resulted from the subordination of the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar to more than one authority; that the larger political questions in Makrān,—those connected with Persia,—were of an imperial character and could not be entrusted to the handling of a local officer; and finally that the investment with a higher position of the Assistant Political Agent, whose primary duties related to the telegraph and to the collection of information, might be to give his appointment a more political character and to promote interference in the internal affairs of the country.

Proposed transfer of the Agency, 1872.

In 1872 the removal of the Assistant Political Agent, with the telegraph station, to some spot healthier than Gwādar on the Makrān coast was mooted; but eventually it was decided rather to try and improve the sanitation, and with it the health, of the place.

Events at Gwādar from 1861 to 1872.

Tranquillity at Gwādar, 1861-68.

While the Khān of Kalāt and the Persian Government were pressing their claims to the possession of Gwādar, that is from 1861 until 1868, the history of the place itself continued for the most part to be uneventful. In 1863 a terrible fire occurred, and deaths from starvation among the houseless population were only prevented by the prompt action of the British officials in obtaining supplies. In 1864 and 1865 two Telegraph Conventions, the latter referring specifically to the Sultān's possessions in Makrān, were concluded between the ruler of 'Omān and the British Government. In 1866, on the murder of the Sultān Thuwaini and the succession of his son Saiyid Sālim, there was a panic at Gwādar; but British Indian police were temporarily drafted in from Karāchi to afford protection to British subjects and interests.

In the course of the four years following 1868, however, the course of affairs at Gwādar did not run quite so smoothly.

Usurpation of Gwādar by Saiyid

'Azzān-bin-Qais, on his accession to the Sultanate of Masqat in 1868, sent a certain Saiyid Saif to govern Gwādar as his representative; but the new Wāli quickly disgusted the inhabitants by his Mutawwa'

Nasir, 1869-71.

tendencies; and, when in April 1869 Nasir, a son of the Sultān Thuwaini, escaped from detention at Masqat and arrived at Gwādar, the people received him with open arms and expelled Saiyid Saif in his favour. 'Azzān wished to send a force to re-instate the displaced Wāli, but the preservation of the maritime peace in the Gulf of 'Omān, as well as in the Gulf of Persia, was at this time a part of the policy of the British Government; and an interdict was placed by Colonel Disbrowe, the Political Agent at Masqat, upon the sailing of the intended expedition. A little later the idea of attacking Masqat was mooted by Nasir-bin-Thuwaini, which obliged Major Ross, the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar, to address to him a similar prohibition. 'Azzān-bin-Qais, however, continued to press for permission to attack Gwādar, which he regarded as part of his hereditary dominions, in a regular manner; and eventually, as his relations with the British authorities improved, the latter became disposed to concede the point. The desired authorisation, however, was withheld until 'Azzān should have been officially recognised by the British Government—a condition which in consequence of his premature death was never fulfilled. Nevertheless, in February 1869, an annual payment of Rs. 1,500 to the ruler of Masqat was sanctioned by the Government of India on account of telegraph facilities afforded at Gwādar and Chahbār, two-thirds of the sum being, it was understood, on account of the former port.

At the end of January 1870, Saiyid 'Abdul 'Azīz, son of the late Sultān Sa'id and younger brother of Saiyid Turki who was 'Azzān's principal rival, appeared off Gwādar in a native coasting vessel and was decoyed ashore and seized by Nasir-bin-Thuwaini; but the latter, preferring to deport rather than to imprison him, at the suggestion of Major Ross sent his captive to Būshehr in a British mail steamer. In October 1870, in consequence of a report that 'Abdul 'Azīz was about to attack the place, alarm prevailed at Gwādar; and the Indian traders there were allowed to take refuge in the British telegraph station. This arrangement was objected to by Dāhu-bin-Muhammad, the African Wazir of the Arab Wāli of Gwādar, who one day appeared in the office and presented a pistol at the head of Mr. Possmann, then in charge; but Mr. Possmann struck the weapon out of his hand with a ruler, and his followers were cleared off the premises by the telegraph staff. Two days later Major Ross, who had been absent, returned from Karāchi with the "Dagmar" and the I.M.S. "Kwangtung"; and on the following day, under threat of a bombardment of the fort, Dāhu gave himself up and was removed to India, where he was detained as a political prisoner for two years.

Usurpation of Gwādar by Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, 1871-72.

When Saiyid Turki-bin-Sa'id succeeded 'Azzān-bin-Qais at Masqat, his brother Saiyid 'Abdul 'Azīz, already mentioned, after declining the command of an expedition against Sohār and the prospective governorship of that place, crossed over in June 1871 to Gwādar, and established himself there in place of Nasir-bin-Thuwaini, who had meanwhile taken ship for Zanzibar. At his arrival the functions of government were apparently being carried on in the name of Sayid Turki, but most inefficiently, by a Balūchi who had once been a peon on the staff of the British Political Agency. The action of 'Abdul 'Azīz was not apparently authorised by Saiyid Turki, but neither did he at once

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disarew it; and we may therefore surmise that the departure of 'Abdul 'Aziz from 'Omān, where his presence was a cause of danger, was at first not altogether unwelcome to his elder brother. In August 1871, however, Saiyid Turki applied for the aid of the Indian Government in ejecting 'Abdul 'Aziz from Gwādar and Chahbār; the request was not granted, but Saiyid Turki was informed that he was at liberty to take naval and military action for the recovery of both places,—a permission of which he did not at once avail himself. 'Abdul 'Aziz, immediately that he found his authority sufficiently established at Gwādar, commenced a series of efforts, which will be described later on, for the capture of Chahbār. These were crowned, in January 1872, with temporary success; but in March 'Abdul 'Aziz was expelled from his new possession by a Persian army and retired to Bombay, leaving Gwādar as well as Chahbār to its fate. In the beginning of May 1872, 'Abdul 'Aziz being then at Bombay, Saiyid Turki threw a garrison of 200 Wahhābi mercenaries into Gwādar and secured the place for himself; the inhabitants both of Gwādar and of Chahbār had favoured his claims to the Sultanate from the time of his first appearance in the field as a candidate.

Events at Chahbār to the capture of that place by Persia, 1861-72.

Chahbār did not emerge from its usual obscurity until after the accession of 'Azzān-bin-Qais, but from that event until its final loss to 'Omān in 1872 it continued to be much in evidence. In 1864 the revenue of Chahbār was Rs. 6,000 a year, of which Rs. 1,000 was retained by the Arab Wāli, Rāshid-bin-Hamad, for administrative expenses; but the protection of the place devolved upon two local chiefs, Dīn Muhammad, Jadgāl, of Dashtyāri and Mīr 'Abdullah of Gāh, who received respectively Rs. 900 and Rs. 200 a year for the discharge of this duty. The Wāli had only 10 Arab attendants of his own.

Temporary occupation of Chahbār by the Chief of Dashtyāri, 1869.

In 1868 or 1869, after the expulsion of Saiyid Sālim from Masqat, Chahbār was quietly occupied by Dīn Muhammad, the more powerful upon the spot of its salaried protectors; and like Gwādar it was not recovered for 'Omān in the time of 'Azzān-bin-Qais. Notwithstanding this, an annual subsidy of Rs. 500 a year on account of telegraphic conveniences enjoyed by the British Government at Chahbār was paid after February 1869, as already mentioned, to the government for the time being of 'Omān.

Struggle between Saiyids Turki and 'Abdul 'Aziz and the local chiefs for possession of Chahbār, 1871.

In August 1871, after the conquest by Saiyid Turki of 'Omān and the seizure by 'Abdel 'Aziz of Gwādar, a curious triangular struggle for the possession of Chahbār began. 'Abdul 'Aziz first wrote from Gwādar to Khōjah Ismā'il, a Sindi by race but an 'Omāni subject, and at the time nominally governor of Chahbār on behalf of Saiyid Turki, desiring him to retain the whole of the customs; to discontinue an allowance formerly enjoyed by Dīn Muhammad, whose usurpation of the chief power in 1868 or 1869 must have been temporary only; and

to exclude that chief from the Chahbār fort. Dīn Muhammad on becoming aware of these orders established himself in the fort, and, professing to hold it in Saiyid Turki's interest, requested Turki's permission to resist the demands of 'Abdul 'Azīz by force if necessary; and a little later Muhammad 'Alī, chief of Bāhu, whose help had been solicited by 'Abdul 'Azīz, also wrote offering his services to Saiyid Turki. These proposals, which by the advice of the British political officers were declined, induced Saiyid Turki to seek the aid of the British Government in expelling 'Abdul 'Azīz from Gwādar and Chahbār: the meagre results of his application have already been mentioned above.

Abortive attempts of 'Abdul 'Azīz upon Chahbār, 1871.

In the meantime 'Abdul 'Azīz did not desist from his efforts to capture Chahbār. In September 1871 he started by land for that place with a following of 150 of the Rind tribe and others; but the chief of Bāhu, whose attitude has already been described, induced him on this occasion to return to Gwādar. In October, having received promises of assistance from Husain Khān, chief of Gaih, 'Abdul 'Azīz again took the route for Chahbār, this time with a few companions only; but once more he was obliged to fall back on Gwādar without having accomplished anything. About the same time Saiyid Turki sent the former Wālī of the place, Rāshid-bin-Hamad, to Chahbār on a special mission; but the envoy failed in his object, of which the precise nature is not known, and returned to Masqat in the following month.

Seizure of Chahbār by 'Abdul 'Azīz, January 1872.

At length, on the 15th of January 1872, Saiyid 'Abdul 'Azīz left his headquarters on pretext of a shooting excursion in the interior; after placing a few miles between himself and Gwādar he embarked in a Dangi; and shortly after he arrived at Chahbār, where the fort, held only by two or three men under Aghi, a son of Dīn Muhammad, fell into his hands without resistance. The fact that the boat on which 'Abdul 'Azīz sailed for Chahbār belonged to Sohār and brought letters from the chief of that place lent colour to a supposition that the coup had been instigated, or at least suggested, by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais.

Expulsion of Abdul 'Azīz from Chahbār by the Persians, February 1872.

'Abdul 'Azīz was not destined, however, long to enjoy the fruits of this venture. With Dīn Muhammad he concluded an arrangement by which he was to remain in undisturbed possession of Chahbār while the matter was referred to Saiyid Turki; but Sartīp Ibrāhīm Khān, the Persian Governor of Bampūr, was less accommodating. Early in February 'Abdul 'Azīz received a letter from the Sartīp stating that Chahbār belonged to Persia, and desiring him personally, in case he desired Persian recognition, to wait on the Sartīp at Qasrkand for the purpose of entering into the necessary arrangements. It is worthy of remark that the Vakil-ul-Mulk, Persian Governor-General of Kirmān, was also at Qasrkand at this time. 'Abdul 'Azīz consulted Captain Miles, the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar, who had meanwhile been authorised by the Government of Bombay to inform Ibrāhīm Khān that Chahbār had always been regarded by the Government of India as belonging to Masqat, and that its status was not affected by the determination of the Perso-Kalāt boundary; and, at the suggestion of Captain Miles, 'Abdul 'Azīz solicited the orders of Saiyid Turki. Before a reply could be received from Masqat, however, the Persians had arrived in the neighbourhood, and a request for advice was telegraphed by 'Abdul 'Azīz to Colonel

Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf; but the time for negotiation was already past. About midnight on the 21st of February Ibrāhīm Khān's leading troops under the command of Husain Khān of Gaih, who was acting with the Persians, reached Chahbār; and on the next day, after a defence of three hours and the loss of several men, 'Abdul 'Azīz evacuated the fort, which he had held with four guns and a garrison of 30 Arabs and Balūchis, and took refuge on board of a vessel in the harbour.

Directly the fighting was over the Persians commenced to plunder the town, from which the British Indian residents had fortunately sent away their families and much of their property in anticipation of the attack. To the remonstrances which Major Miles, in accordance with the instructions of the Government of Bombay, addressed to him from Gwādar, Ibrāhīm Khān replied denying the claim of 'Omān to possession of Chahbār and asserting the title of Persia, which had, he said, been confirmed by the recent* award of the Perso-Kalāt Boundary Commission; he also complained of the conduct of 'Abdul 'Aziz in confining some Persian subjects on board of his vessel. After a few days' halt the Sartīp made over charge of the town to Husain Khān of Gaih and departed for Qasrkand in the interior. The proceedings of Husain Khān were much complained of by the British traders of Chahbār, who were reduced to great straits for food and at the same time were prevented from removing their goods lest they should quit the place. Most British subjects had now taken refuge in the neighbourhood of the British telegraph station, and, to ensure their safety, it was resolved to send a vessel of war to the spot; but none was at the moment available. 'Abdul 'Aziz remained for some days on his vessel in the harbour; he intercepted specie arriving from abroad, sent boats to fetch armed assistance from Sūr and Khābūrah in 'Omān, and, on one occasion at least, opened fire on the fort; but his action only irritated the enemy without advantage. Meanwhile representations were made by the British Minister at Tehrān to the Persian Government, who were still in total ignorance of the occurrences at Chahbār; and Captain Miles, the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar, was directed to proceed to Chahbār in the despatch vessel "Hugh Rose" and to remain there until the arrival of a gunboat. The Persian Prime Minister twice telegraphed to Husain Khān, whose attitude towards the British Government was openly disrespectful, almost derisive, to afford full protection to British subjects; but the Khān at first paid little attention to these commands. Eventually the Persian Government sent orders by courier to the Governor-General of Kirmān to despatch a special Commissioner to Chahbār to settle the grievances of British subjects; and, after this, matters seem to have returned gradually to their normal course. In March Ibrāhīm Khān, who was reported to be on his way to Tiz to inspect a new fort built there by his orders, was said to have offered immunity from taxation for one year as an inducement to Hindu traders who had left Chahbār to return. Compensation for the losses sustained by British subjects, which in consequence of the precautions

Ill-treatment of British subjects by the Persians on the occupation of Chahbār.

* This was of course nonsense. The settlement of the frontier between Persia and Kalāt could not affect the title of Masqat to any place, whether on the Persian or the Kalāt side of that frontier.

taken were not large, was subsequently obtained through the Persian Government.

Acquiescence of the British Government in the Persian occupation of Chahbār.

The mediation of the Viceroy of India in the dispute regarding Chahbār between 'Omān and Persia was offered, but was not accepted; and in the end no action was taken by the British Government to obtain the rendition of Chahbār to the Sultān,—a matter in which, according to the view of the authorities of that day, Great Britain was not interested. It only remains to add that in 1874 the Sultān of 'Omān, who apparently thought that Chahbār had been assigned to Persia in the adjustment of the Perso-Kalat boundary, appealed to the Secretary of State for India and to the Viceroy for rectification of the supposed error. In reply he was informed that the proceedings of the Boundary Commission had no reference to Chahbār, but that the British Government were nevertheless unable to interfere; and at the same time he was dissuaded from provoking a collision with Persia.

Events at Gwādar from 1873 to 1888.

After the loss of Chahbār the interests of the 'Omān Government in Makrān were limited to the town of Gwādar and a few square miles of territory adjoining.

Attack on Gwādar by 'Abdul 'Aziz, July-August 1873.

The year 1873 was marked by two attempts on the part of relations of Saiyid Turki to deprive him of possession of Gwādar; the rebels were Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz and Saiyid Sālim, the ex-Sultān of 'Omān, both of whom left Bombay for Makrān in native sailing vessels about the end of May. The movements of Sālim were delayed by his arrest on a warrant at Karāchi, upon a charge of cheating; but 'Abdul 'Aziz towards the end of June landed at Pasni, and on the 18th of July he appeared at Gwādar, where he established himself near the British Telegraph Station with the object of cutting the town off from its water supply. His following consisted of about 600 men, half of them Rinds and other subjects of Kalāt; and Khuda Nabi Bakhsh, a local chief of some influence, was among those who had attached themselves to his cause. The Sultān of 'Omān, when this trouble first arose, was engaged in an attempt to reduce Sohār; but he sent a small detachment of 20 men to Gwādar to reinforce the original garrison of 40 men. A much larger draft, sent later, unaccountably returned to Masqat; but the defence of Gwādar was greatly strengthened by the adhesion to the Sultān's cause of some local Kalmatis, the fear of a blood-feud with whom had a restraining effect upon the followers of 'Abdul 'Aziz. Matters remained in suspense until the 22nd of July, when a determined attempt was made by 'Abdul 'Aziz to carry the fort, and for a time it seemed as if the Sultān's Wāli must capitulate to superior numbers; but the event did not justify these apprehensions. Matters however appeared so serious that the entire community of British subjects and persons under British protection now left the town, first affixing to their premises notices of nationality provided by Captain Mockler, the British Assistant Political Agent, and

assembled for safety in a sheltered situation near the Telegraph Office; and on the other side Khuda Nabi Bakhsh, alarmed at the prospect of injury to British interests, severed his connection with 'Abdul 'Aziz. At length, on the 7th of August, the besiegers withdrew baffled. The total cost of the operations to the Sultán of 'Omán was about Rs. 8,000; and the losses sustained by his Arab and Balúchi subjects were considerable.

Losses of British subjects.

The attack on Gwádar was not commenced by 'Abdul 'Aziz until, in reply to a request by him that British subjects might be removed beyond reach of danger, he had been informed that he would be held personally responsible for all injuries that might befall British persons or property through his acts of aggression. As at Chahbár in 1872, the protection of a British gunboat was not immediately available, and H.M.S. "Rifleman" did not reach the scene until two or three days after 'Abdul 'Aziz had commenced his operations; nevertheless, out of 130 British shops protected by official notices, only 5 were tampered with by 'Abdul 'Aziz's partisans; and, though the traders entitled to British protection estimated their losses at Rs. 48,658, Captain Mockler placed them at a very much lower figure. It was ruled by the Government of India that to recover compensation from Saiyid Turki would be unfair, and from Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz impossible; consequently no official estimate of the damage done was ever drawn up.

Terms offered by Saiyid Turki to 'Abdul 'Aziz and Sálim, and ultimatum of the British Government.

But the Government of India, while they recognised the impracticability of obtaining reparation from 'Abdul 'Aziz, were now resolved to put an end to his disorderly proceedings, as well as to those of Saiyid Sálim, who, a few days after the incidents above described, announced his intention of making a fresh attack on Gwádar. 'Abdul 'Aziz was now in Báhu and Sálim in Kaij, and their presence was disturbing to the country at large and even threatened to cause trouble with Persia. Accordingly, at the end of August, the Commissioner in Sind was informed that, in case of the Saiyids approaching Gwádar to molest it, they might be called on to withdraw and to disperse their men, and that, if they refused, they might be arrested. A few days later the Commissioner was further authorised to inform the Saiyids that an allowance of $300 a month would be paid to each of them by Saiyid Turki, on condition of their residing in British territory and abstaining for the future from interference in the affairs of 'Omán,—an offer for the consideration of which ten days were allowed them,—and to warn them that, if they forcibly threatened Gwádar or attempted to make their way to 'Omán or to the Persian Gulf, they would be liable to arrest.

Capture and deportation of 'Abdul 'Aziz, September 1873.

The terms offered were not accepted by either of the Saiyids; but in September 1873, as we have seen in the history of the 'Omán Sultanate, 'Abdul 'Aziz was captured at sea and removed to India. Sálim however remained at large in Makrán, chiefly in the district of Dashtyári, and definitely declined a renewed offer of the same terms as before.

Seizure of Gwádar by Sálim and failure of an attempt to arrest him, December 1873.

The course adopted seems to have driven Sálim to desperation. In the early morning of the 8th of December 1873, having made a forced march from the interior of 100 miles in two days, he arrived in Gwádar with only 15 followers and captured the fort by escalade: the Wáli, one Sa'íd-bin-Khamis, was absent at the time; and the acting Wáli was a weak man, incapable of action, but not, it was believed, disloyal to the Sultán. On the 11th of December H.M.S. "Columbine" and the

Manora" tug, carrying 60 armed police under a European officer, arrived from Karāchi, whence they had been despatched under the orders of Government; and Captain Moekler arranged for a cordon to be drawn across the isthmus and called upon Saiyid Sālim to surrender. The summons, however, was ignored; and, shortly after nightfall, Sālim, with the loss of a horse which was shot under him, succeeded in breaking through the line and in gaining the open country. As it was impossible to pursue him into Persian territory negotiations were re-opened, but Sālim still declined the terms proposed; and in the end he escaped from Makrān and made his way back to his original retreat on Qishm Island.

Fresh machinations against Saiyid Turki in Makrān, 1874.

In April 1874 Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, a brother of Sālim-bin-Thuwaini, left Masqat surreptitiously with one Dāhu, the same African who had given trouble at Gwādar in 1870, and landed, probably with disloyal intentions, at Puzim in Makrān; but, in the month of September following, the pair were brought back in custody to Masqat by Din Muhammad, chief of the Dashtyāri district, whom the Sultān had suborned. The erring Saiyid was confined in the palace and not otherwise punished; but Dāhu disappeared and was believed to have been executed.

Capture and deportation of Sālim, October 1875.

From August to December 1875, Saiyid Turki himself resided at Gwādar, having virtually resigned the sovereignty of 'Omān for the time being into the hands of his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz, to whom he had been partially reconciled. In October, during his sojourn at Gwādar, Saiyid Sālim, his principal rival, was arrested at sea by a British man-of-war under the orders of 1873 and deported to India.

Fondness of Saiyid Turki for Gwādar and his later residences and proceedings there.

Gwādar was again visited by the Sultān in August and September 1881 for change of air, and in January 1885; shortly after his visit in 1883 he caused the garrison to be reinforced by a draft of 80 Wahhābis; and between 1884 and 1886 a post was constructed under his orders at Pishukān, on the western boundary of the Gwādar enclave. In 1888, shortly before his death, Saiyid Turki, for whom Gwādar had always had a special attraction, wished to separate it from the rest of his dominions and confer it on his eldest son, Muhammad; but this intention remained unfulfilled.

Difficulties with the Rind tribe, 1875-86.

About 1875 strained relations arose between the Sultān's officials at Gwādar and the Balūchi tribe of Rinds, whose headquarters are in Mand, close to the Persian frontier, at a distance of about 80 miles from the coast. The Rind country is open and not destitute of cultivation, the fighting strength of the tribe is only about 1,500 men, and the majority of its members ordinarily follow peaceful pursuits; but the headmen, on the other hand, possess little influence over individuals, and the tribe for this reason are prone to misbehave and difficult to control.

Causes of the Rind trouble.

The trouble at Gwādar between the Rinds and the representatives of Saiyid Turki was intensified—if it was not created—by the treaty for the abolition of the slave trade signed by the Sultān in 1873, in which he bound himself to make free all persons entering his territories from without; and the liberation of slaves who took refuge at Gwādar, strict observance of the treaty being insisted on by the British Assistant Political Agent there, soon became a serious grievance in the eyes of the Rinds and other slave-owning tribes of the vicinity.

Early misbehaviour of the tribe, 1875-76.

In 1875 some Rinds made a small raid upon a caravan travelling from Gwādar to Bāhu, and the whole tribe were as a punishment excluded from the town for six months by order of the Arab Wāli; but the effects of this blockade seem to have fallen chiefly upon the trade of Gwādar itself, and the Sultān found it necessary to appease the merchants and the customs farmer by paying them compensation out of his own pocket. In 1876 a party of Rinds, incensed by the manumission of some of their slaves at Gwādar, vowed vengeance against the British Political Agent; twice cut the telegraph wire in the neighbourhood; abducted a telegraph employé, who was however released after two or three days' detention; and committed other offences chiefly against the British telegraph establishment.

Serious Rind episode at Gwādar, 1879.

After this outbreak, minor outrages continued to occur from time to time, and in June 1879 feeling was much embittered by an unfortunate fracas in Gwādar town which resulted in the death of three Rinds, members of a party whom the Wāli had ordered to appear before him and who had attempted to resist his mandate by force. Seven prisoners taken by the Wāli on the same occasion were released on an agreement that no reprisals should be made, and that the tribe should abstain from depredations in future; but the incident was not forgotten by the Rinds, who more than once afterwards threatened to institute a retaliatory blood-feud, not only against the Arab Government but also against the British telegraph establishment. The situation was fully reported on at the time by Captain Durand, First Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, who arrived at Gwādar while the matter of the seven Rind prisoners was still pending before the Wāli; he gave it as his opinion that the temerity of the Rinds was increasing, and that punitive measures of some sort were required for the restoration of order. To allay apprehension during what was locally regarded as a crisis, H.M.S. "Ready" was sent for a time to Gwādar to protect British subjects and their property.

The trade of Gwādar with India and Balūchistān was none the less increasing at this time; it was mainly in the hands of British subjects, who now numbered 50 or 60 households.

Recrudescence of the Rind trouble, 1883.

In 1880 there was a lull in the offences committed by Rinds and no more serious cases occurred until 1883. In January of that year, however, while Saiyid Turki was personally present at Gwādar on a visit to the place, an attack was made by a gang of 16 Rinds on a telegraph party at Sarchib, 57 miles west of Gwādar; it resulted in the kidnapping of a telegraph Jamadar and the carrying off of a considerable amount of property, some of which belonged to the British Government. The Rind country had suffered from scarcity during three years, and the primary

object of the attack was undoubtedly plunder; but the excuse alleged by the Rinds themselves was the Gwādar affair of 1879, and it is not improbable that a desire to embarrass the Sultān may have been among the motives of the crime. The Jamadar was released after a few days, but stores of considerable value remained unrecovered, and the Rinds were said to have renewed their threats of a feud against the British and 'Omāni Governments. Major Mockler, who had an intimate knowledge of Gwādar, acquired during his service there as Assistant Political Agent, was deputed from Basrah to examine into the situation; and after local inquiry he arrived at the conclusion that, while there was no danger of a feud, the time had come for the coercion of the Rinds by the troops of the Khān of Kalāt, assisted, if necessary, by the British Government. As a measure of precaution, however, an escort consisting of a Jamadar and six camel-riders was provided for the protection of the Inspector of the telegraph-line between Gwādar and Chahbār; and the sale of gunpowder and similar articles to Rinds was prohibited at Gwādar by order of the Wāli.

Attempted settlement of the Rind difficulty, 1884.

A tour by the Agent to the Governor-General in Balūchistān in some of the outlying portions of his charge had been for some time in contemplation; and in July 1883 Sir Robert Sandeman was authorised to visit with a military escort, during the ensuing cold weather, the tracts of Panjgur, Kaij, and Southern Balūchistān. A part of his mission, as defined by his instructions from the Government of India, was to enquire into, and so far as possible settle, the questions pending with the Rinds at Gwādar; and it was arranged that Major Mockler, on account of his local experience, should be associated with him in the task. The Rinds were at this time being solicited to profess allegiance to Persia, but there was little danger of trouble from this cause, and a more substantial obstacle in the way of a settlement was the nominal character of the control as yet exercised by the Khān of Kalat over this part of his dominions. Sir R. Sandeman reached Kaij on the 5th of February 1884, and was met there by Major Mockler; but the Rinds, in spite of a summons which had been addressed to them, did not at first appear. After five days' delay at Kaij a move was made to Tump, a Rind village 40 miles west of Turbat, and this had the effect of bringing in some of the Rind headmen and their followers. At Tump Sir R. Sandeman appointed a Jirgah for the disposal of 26 cases pending between Gwādar and Kalāt subjects and the Rinds; but the proceedings of the Jirgah, held on the 12th, 13th and 14th February, were partial and unsatisfactory, and some differences of opinion arose between Sir R. Sandeman and Major Mockler. On the 14th of February, however, an agreement was executed by the Rind chiefs in attendance, by which they undertook to be responsible for the conduct of their tribesmen and to surrender evil-doers.

On the 20th of February Sir R. Sandeman reached Gwādar; but nothing could be effected there as the Wāli had no power to settle cases on behalf of the Sultān, and the necessary authority was not obtainable without delay. On the 23rd of February Sir Robert left for Karāchi, where, in consultation with Mr. Ffinch, Director of Telegraphs, he summarily decided the telegraph claims which lay against the Rinds. Subsequently the Wāli of Gwādar, who seems to have had insufficient

notice of what was required on his part, produced a list of 90 supplementary claims by 'Omâni subjects against the Rinds; and Sir R. Sandeman and Colonel Ross, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, agreed that these should be disposed of at a meeting between Colonel Miles, the Political Agent at Masqat, and Mr. Ffinch. The arrangement, however, broke down on a preliminary point.

Settlement with the Rinds, 1885-86.

The whole matter then came before the Government of India, with a strong recommendation on the part of Sir R. Sandeman that the Rinds should be treated with leniency and in accordance with tribal custom, and his report was very carefully reviewed. The proposed settlement, however, was not approved by the Government of India; and instead a special tribunal was constituted, with powers to consider all claims against and by the Rinds, including claims already disposed of by Sir R. Sandeman when a retrial of such might appear to the court itself to be advisable. It was ordered that claims of more than twelve years' standing should be treated as time-barred; but, with a view to a complete settlement, the Sultân of 'Omân was persuaded to agree to the submission of the celebrated Rind claim on account of the three tribesmen killed at Gwâdar in 1879 to the judgment of the tribunal. For the trial of the bulk of the cases the court consisted of Colonel Reynolds of the Balûchistân Agency and Colonel Miles, Political Agent at Masqat, but in the disposal of telegraph claims the place of Colonel Miles was taken by Mr. Ffinch, Director of Telegraphs; the tribunal was assisted in its deliberations by native assessors, representing the interests, respectively, of Masqat, Kalât and the Rinds. The cases and counter-cases settled amounted to 123 in all. Thirteen of these were telegraph cases; and it was proved that the wire had been cut four times, and that telegraph employés had several times been robbed. In the case of the Jamadar kidnapped and property looted in 1883, a fine of Rs. 620 was imposed on account of the damage not made good. The remaining 110 general cases included 5 of considerable raids, several of highway robbery, and a number relating to petty cattle-thefts, besides the Rind claim of 1879. Except in regard to the last-mentioned case, which was referred for decision to the Government of India, the judges found themselves in complete accord. No decrees were passed in favour of the Rinds; but judgment was given against the tribe, on behalf of Arab and British subjects, for sums amounting to Rs. 5,216 and Rs. 1,744, respectively. The proceedings began on the 6th of March and were concluded on the 16th of April 1885.

The findings of the special court in which both judges agreed were, but for one trifling modification, accepted by the Government of India as they stood; and, concurring with Colonel Miles and disagreeing with Colonel Reynolds, they rejected the Rind claim of 1879, which was for an amount exceeding Rs. 6,000. The question of the execution of the award was one of some difficulty, for the Rinds had been led to expect that no serious demands would be made against them on account of past offences, and there were also doubts as to the feasibility of coercing the tribe without resort to expensive operations; so ultimately, in view of these facts, of the improvement in the behaviour of the tribe since 1883, and of their submission to Sir R. Sandeman in 1884, the Government of India decided themselves to undertake the obligations of the Rinds on

condition of the tribe's executing a bond for good behaviour and an undertaking to repay within five years the amounts liquidated on their behalf; repayment however was to be demanded only in event of fresh misbehaviour by the tribe. The required agreement having been obtained by Colonel Reynolds on the 20th of February 1886, the liabilities of the tribe to their creditors were discharged by the Government of India out of public funds, and no demand was made upon the Rinds for repayment.

British political representation at Gwādar from 1873 to the present time.

Changes of organisation, 1863-77.

From 1863 until 1877 the European Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar remained under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind, being regarded at the same time as an assistant to the Political Agents at Masqat and Kalāt; but after 1873, in consequence of the transfer of the Persian Gulf in that year from the Government of Bombay to the Government of India, matters reported by him were referred to the Supreme Government by the Commissioner in Sind, instead of to the Western Presidency. In 1873 the Sultān's Wāli of Gwādar endeavoured to persuade the Assistant Political Agent to intervene in a difficulty with some of the Rinds of Mand; but, this request having been brought to the notice of the Government of India, they enjoined their representative to interfere as little as possible in local quarrels.

In 1877 the British officer at Gwādar was withdrawn from the authority of the Commissioner in Sind, and was made Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf for the country between Gwādar and Jāshk, remaining Assistant to the Political Agent at Masqat in respect of Gwādar proper, and becoming Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General in Balūchistān in regard to Kalāt affairs. This change was due to difficulties in regard to political jurisdiction on the coast between Gwādar and Jāshk, which had been assigned to the Persian Gulf Residency, but which was actually supervised from Gwādar. The pay of the appointment was now fixed at Rs. 1,000 a month and its cost was divided equally between the Political and Telegraph Departments.

In 1879, the advisability of maintaining a British officer at Gwādar having been called in question, and the post being vacant at the time, Sir R. Sandeman, then in charge of Balūchistān, advocated the reduction of the post to a native agency controlled by the Political Agent at Kalāt; and in that year partly on account of the phenomenal unhealthiness of the Gwādar station, where a kind of wasting fever generally prevailed, the European Assistant Political Agency was abolished and a Native Agency substituted. The reconstituted Agency, however, instead of being placed under the Political Agent at Kalāt, was made subordinate to the Deputy Director (now the Director) of Persian Gulf Telegraphs, on whom political charge of the whole Makrān coast was at the same time conferred, his position with respect to the British political authorities in the

Persian Gulf, 'Omān and Balūchistān being assimilated to that held by the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar between 1877 and 1879. This arrangement, inasmuch as the Director is the head of British telegraph interests in Makrān and possesses special facilities for visiting the coast in a telegraph vessel, was found convenient; and, with an interval of a few months in 1884 during which charge of Gwādar was assumed by the Agent to the Governor-General in Balūchistān, it remained undisturbed from 1880 onwards.

Indian Military guard, 1877-80.

In 1877, possibly in connection with the turbulence of the Rinds near Gwādar, it was arranged to increase the strength of the Assistant Political Agent's military guard to about 24 sepoys; but the change did not apparently take effect until the end of 1878. In January 1880 the guard was again reduced to 12, and in December 1880 to 8 men, in consequence of the extreme unhealthiness of the station; and soon afterwards it was abolished altogether.

Telegraph station at Gwādar closed, 1893, and re-opened, 1894.

In September 1893 the telegraph station at Gwādar was closed, and a telephone communicating with Chahbār and Ormārah was provided instead for the use of the Native Political Agent; but the arrangement was not found satisfactory, and in the following year the telegraph station was re-opened as a combined post and telegraph office.

Proposals since 1895 for the transfer of Gwādar from the Sultān of 'Omān to the Government of India or the Khān of Kalāt.

The failure of the Khān of Kalāt in 1861 to recover Gwādar by the good offices of the Government of India has been already mentioned in its proper place; but it remains to notice some later proposals which were made from time to time with the object of abolishing the apparent anomaly of 'Omāni sovereignty in Makrān.

In 1885 the question was mooted by Sir R. Sandeman, then Agent to the Governor-General in Balūchistān, who suggested that the port should be acquired from the Sultān on a quit-rent and handed over for management either to the Khān of Kalāt or to the British authorities in Balūchistān; but the Government of India negatived the scheme, as they considered that the British occupation of Gwādar would entail serious responsibilities, and that, even if the Khān of Kalāt were disposed to purchase the place, which he was not, it would be impolitic to press the transfer upon the Sultān of 'Omān.

The subject was revived in 1891, when the Government of India, on the ground that the Sultān had lately signed an agreement restricting his own power to dispose of territory and that Gwādar was no longer regarded as of high value to Balūchistān, again declined to take steps to obtain a cession of the place.

Between 1900 and 1902 indications were not wanting of an interest in Gwādar on the part of Russia and France, and the Government of India proposed to His Majesty's Government that an attempt to secure a cession of the port on reasonable terms should be made through the

Khān of Kalāt, the necessary funds being supplied by the Government of India and the Khān alone appearing in the transaction; the expenditure, it was urged, would be justifiable as an insurance against an attempt by a foreign power to obtain a footing on the Makrān coast. The Home Government, who, in view of the attitude of France in 'Omān affairs, did not consider that the question could judiciously be taken up in the manner indicated, suggested that an effort should be made instead to obtain a lease of the Gwādar customs for the Khān of Kalāt for a fixed term of years; but this alternative did not commend itself to the Government of India, and the matter accordingly dropped.

In September 1903 the Khān of Kalāt requested the assistance of the British Government in obtaining the rendition of Gwādar; and in January 1904 the Jām of Las Bailah also advanced a claim, not seriously sustainable, to possession of the port, which he alleged that a bride from Kalāt had brought into his family as a part of her dowry. The Government of India, however, decided in 1904 not to take action on either of these applications; and at this point the question rested.

Renewed trouble with the Rind tribe, 1891-1894.

Friction with the Rinds in 1891 and 1892.

Since the beginning of the reign of Saiyid Faisal over 'Omān, peace and security have ordinarily prevailed at Gwādar; but until 1894, notwithstanding the settlement of 1886, friction with the Rinds still occasionally arose from questions connected with the liberation of slaves. In 1891 the demeanour of the tribe was discontented and menacing; and the Native Agent who represented the British Government, and who appeared for that reason to be in some danger, was ordered to live in the fort; but nothing happened to justify the apprehensions which had been excited. Again in May 1892 the Rinds demanded the surrender of 70 slaves whom they alleged to have absconded to Gwādar, threatening in case of refusal to create a disturbance, and the situation was sufficiently serious to necessitate a re-inforcement of the garrison and the despatch of an official of high rank from 'Omān; but it subsided for the time on a warning being conveyed to the Rinds through the Political Agent in Southern Balūchistān. During the cold weather of 1892-93 fugitive slaves continued to collect at Gwādar, where their number in May 1893 amounted to several hundreds; and so strained was the situation thus created that it was found advisable to induce the refugees to remove to British India, and some of them were even provided with the means of reaching that destination.

Final settlement with the Rinds, 1894.

The trouble continued at Gwādar, in the form of threats and even of petty outrages by the indignant Rind slave owners, until the beginning of 1894, when, on the 15th of January, a satisfactory settlement with the tribe was at length negotiated by Captain Ramsay. By the new agreement, which was in writing, the Rinds bound themselves to make no further disturbances at Gwādar on account of fugitive slaves, while the Government of India undertook that released slaves should not be allowed to remain at Gwadar for more than 15 days after

their liberation; furthermore, upon the Rinds promising to make restitution for the raids that they had recently committed, the forfeiture of Rs. 7,010 to which the tribe had now become liable under the settlement of 1886 was waived. After 1894 the Rind question was not prominent at Gwādar.

Affairs at Gwādar after 1868.

Natural calamities, tribal raids, etc.

Other noteworthy events at Gwādar during the period under consideration were few. In 1892 there was a serious outbreak of small-pox in the months of March, April and May; its ravages were intensified by the refusal of the people to permit the isolation of cases, even Khōjah and Hindu merchants declining to allow their patients to be removed to hospital. In the same year a few cattle, the property of British Government employés, were stolen with the connivance of the headman of Nigwar; and a long and troublesome case followed, which was ultimately settled by the Sultān agreeing to advance the compensation himself and recover it afterwards from the delinquents. In April 1893 a terrible fire broke out in the town of Gwādar, which rendered 1,000 people homeless and caused damage to the extent of about Rs. 80,000. In 1905 Mir Ahmad Khan, one of the joint rulers of Bāhu, looted 300 camels from Pālairi within the border of the Sultān of 'Omān; his intention was to punish a tribe who had left his dominions and settled at Pālairi with the Sultān's permission, but among the camels carried off were a number belonging to employés of the British telegraph. Partial restitution was eventually obtained in this case.

Taxation.

In the Sultān's administration of Gwādar the department of finance is the most important, but it was for a time the one of which the working was the least satisfactory. In 1897 the taxes imposed on the fish-yards owned by British subjects were found to be excessive and out of all proportion to the profits of the industry; nevertheless Saiyid Faisal was at first disinclined to reduce them, and an abatement was not obtained without considerable difficulty.

Customs.

In the summer of 1903 direct management of the Gwādar customs was introduced by the Sultān, and the application of a uniform *ad valorem* import duty of 5 per cent. was announced; but the results were less favourable than they had been at Masqat, and much discontent was caused by the abolition of some complicated customs and privileges of long standing, to which the merchants of the port were attached. In 1903-04 the gross customs receipts under the new system were only $22,000, as against $40,000 obtained by farming the right of collection in the previous year. In February 1904 Saiyid Faisal paid a personal visit to Gwādar, in the course of which various misunderstandings between the merchants and his officials were removed; and in the same year he changed his Superintendent of Customs. Accordingly in 1904-05 the gross receipts rose to $27,000, and by 1907 the complaints of the merchants had ceased, and the uniform import duty of 5 per cent. was being regularly collected.

General administration.

The administrative difficulties of the Sultān at Gwādar were largely due to the difficulty of obtaining trustworthy and capable officials in his dominions. In 1902 the Saiyid Faisal removed Saif-bin-Sa'id from the Wādlishīp of Gwādar as his conduct there was not satisfactory, but that of his successor was worse and compelled the Sultān temporarily to reappoint the former governor. In 1903, however, the Sultān was fortunate enough to find, in one Saif-bin-Ya'arab, a more successful and deserving representative.

ANNEXURE NO. 3.—HISTORY OF RUÛS-AL-JIBĀL.

The internal history of the remarkable mountainous headland of Ruûs-al-Jibāl, tenanted entirely by the semi-barbarous tribes of Shihûh and Dhahûriyin, is almost unknown. Its external history may be divided into three periods: an early period, during which the external relations of the district were chiefly with the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārjah; a middle period, from 1864 to 1868, during which a British telegraph station existed in Khor-ash-Sham or Elphinstone Inlet and direct dealings between the British authorities and the tribesmen of the neighbourhood appear to have been the rule; and, finally, a recent period, during which the right of the Sultān of 'Omān to authority over the district has gradually become clear.

Early period, 1836-1864.

War of the Shaikh of Shārjah against the Shihûh, 1839.

In 1836 an admission is said to have been made to the British authorities in the Gulf by Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, that the Shihûh of Ruûs-al-Jibāl were dependents of the Qāsimi Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar; but the tribe themselves did not apparently admit their subordination to that chief and continued to maintain a friendly intercourse with Masqat. A quarrel subsequently arose between the Shihûh and the Shaikh of Shārjah through the dismantlement of a Shihhi fort in the neighbourhood of Dibah by a Qāsimi official to whom it had been treacherously surrendered; and the Shaikh of Shārjah, finding himself unable to retaliate effectively by land upon the Shihûh, who were now raiding his territories, resolved in 1839 on a naval blockade of their whole coast, especially of Khasab and Kumzār; but the progress of the Egyptians in Najd, by which the Shaikh's position was more vitally affected, caused him to abandon his intention and to conclude, instead, a hasty peace with the Shihûh.

Second war of the Shaikh of Shārjah against the Shihûh, 1855-57.

In 1855, in consequence of the murder of Mashāri-bin-Ibrāhim, Qāsimi governor of Dibah and grandson of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, by Shihûh over whom he had attempted to tyrannise, the Shaikh of Shārjah called his subjects of Shārjah, Khān, Abu Hail, Fasht and Hairah to arms, and ordered the majority of them to rendezvous at Rās-al-Khaimah and march thence by land against Dibah; while he himself

accompanied by 100 boats and the whole fighting strength of the Za'āb tribe, proceeded to the same destination by sea. The Qāsimi land forces under the Shaikh's sons were unable to force the mountain defiles, and in the end they also were conveyed by boat to Dibah. The war, at first local, shortly became general; for the Shihūh of Kumzār and other places now put to sea to pursue the boats of the Qawāsim, or to carry assistance to their kinsmen at Dibah; and the Qawāsim, on their part, began to attack the Shihūh, wherever found. In one instance a Kumzāri Batil, which happened to put into Khor Fakkān, was seized by the people of that place, who killed eight of the crew and made the rest prisoners. At length in January 1857, when this state of matters had lasted apparently about a year, the British Political Resident, Captain Felix Jones, called upon Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar to desist from sending troops and warlike stores by sea; and the Shaikh, with a bad grace and not without an attempt in 1858 to obtain cancellation of the orders by a direct reference to the Government of Bombay, ultimately submitted. It was part of the Shaikh of Shārjah's case that the Shihūh were his rebellious subjects, whom he must be allowed full liberty to coerce; but the Resident at this time believed that the allegiance of the Shihūh was due, and had, unless in exceptional circumstances, hitherto been rendered, to the ruler of Masqat,* and that the object of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar was simply to subdue the tribe wrongfully and by force of arms to his own authority.

Tour of the British Resident along the coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, 1859.

In 1859 the British Political Resident visited Bakhah, Khasab, Kumzār and other principal points on the coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl in a steam frigate, of which the appearance created a great sensation among the unsophisticated barbarians of the country, and obtained the release of some Qāsimi prisoners who had been captured from boats at sea by the Shihūh. As to the political status of the country, the impression which he derived from intercourse with the people was that they had a predilection for the Government of the Saiyid of Masqat and were animated by an implacable hatred of the Qawāsim. It was evidently in the course of this tour that Captain Jones, as described in the general history of Trucial 'Omān, obtained at Khasab the surrender of a pirate whom, as a subject of Masqat, he at once handed over for execution to Saiyid Sa'id.

Minor events in Ruūs-al-Jibāl, 1859-1863.

Two offences against security at sea, committed in 1859 or 1860 by inhabitants of Bakhah, were, as related in the history of Trucial 'Omān, settled directly by the British authorities with the local Shaikh; but in 1863 Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, on receiving a complaint from the Shaikh of Khasab that his village of Ghassah had been burnt to the ground by a boat expedition from Kumzār, referred the parties to the Political Agent at Masqat, at the same time reporting to the Government of Bombay that both Khasab and Kumzār belonged to the Sultanate proper of 'Omān.

* It is not clear whether this opinion refers to the whole of the Shihūh or only to those, probably of Ba'ah, between whom and the Qawāsim the disagreement originally arose.

Middle period, 1864-1868.

At this juncture affairs in a part of Ruûs-al-Jibâl were brought, for a time, under the immediate notice of the British political authorities, through the establishment by the Indo-European Telegraph Department of a short land line across the isthmus of Maqlab, between the Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets, and of a telegraph station on an island in the latter.

History of the British telegraph occupation, February 1864 to December 1868.

The telegraph cable, brought from Gwâdar, was landed on the 9th of February 1864 on the Maqlab isthmus, where Colonel Disbrowe, Political Agent at Masqat, had spent a fortnight of the preceding month in establishing relations with the people of the country. Much trouble was experienced in dealing with the uncivilised Dhahûriyin, especially of the two neighbouring villages of Habalain and Maqâqah; quarrels arose among the indigenes themselves, and between them and the workmen of the construction party; honest labour at a fair price was not to be obtained; telegraph stores were pilfered; and finally an intimidating, or more truly a begging letter was received from "all the Bedouins," of which the key-note was "Give us something, or your abode is not safe." No material assistance was lent by the Sultân of 'Omân, though he asserted the country to be under his jurisdiction; but the practical difficulties of the situation were eventually overcome by the personal influence of the British officers. Although no actual danger was apprehended, Colonel Disbrowe considered that the presence of a vessel of war for two or three months would have a good effect; and the gunboat "Hugh Rose" was accordingly sent from Bombay to protect, for a time, the newly established telegraph station and its occupants. The cable-laying ships and main part of the telegraph party proceeded on their way to Bûshehr about the middle of March.

For nearly four years, notwithstanding the drawbacks of the place, the telegraph station in Elphinstone Inlet was maintained; but at length, in December 1868, the office was transferred to Jâshk on the Persian coast. The heat in Elphinstone Inlet was excessive; and the insolence of the natives, notwithstanding the periodical gifts which their chiefs received, had been frequently such as to make the presence of a gunboat necessary.

Discussions as to the ownership of the Ruûs-al-Jibâl district, 1864.

In 1864, in connection with the operations, and with regard particularly to control of the natives and protection of the telegraph station, the question of the ownership of Ruûs-al-Jibâl was raised, and was found to present considerable difficulties. In January 1864 Colonel Disbrowe, who had hitherto assumed that the district belonged to the 'Omân Sultânate, was informed by Sulaimân, Shaikh of the village, that the people of Habalain owned allegiance to the Qâsimi Shaikh of Shârjah; and the Political Agent, though the statement was not satisfactorily corroborated and was on the contrary denied by a Wâli whom the Sultân then maintained at Khasab, considered the point to

be of such importance that he returned to Masqat with Colonel Stewart, R.E., the Director of the telegraph operations, and asked Saiyid Thuwaini to state in writing, for purposes of official record, whether Maqlab itself and the villages of Habalain and Maqâqah, between which the telegraph line crossed the isthmus, were part of His Highness's territory, and whether he agreed to certain local dispositions proposed by the telegraph officials. In reply, in a communication dated 21st February 1864, the Sultân with reference to "Maqlab, Khasab and their neighbourhood" stated categorically "These are all my country and my dependents, no one has any concern with them;" and he assented to the suggestions regarding details of construction. From local enquiries, made later, it seemed certain that Kumzâr and Khasab on the western coast, together with the villages between them, actually acknowledged the sovereignty of the Sultân of 'Omân; but some doubt remained as to the status of the inhabitants of Film, Shâbûs, and Shisah on the eastern side of the promontory, who were said to be virtually independent while at home and to become subjects of the Shaikh of the Shârjah in the date season, when they were accustomed to migrate to Dibah. On the other hand no claim to any part of Ruûs-al-Jibâl was openly advanced by the Shaikh of Shârjah, and it was stated that, in reply to a reference from the Shaikh of Maqâqah, Sultân-bin-Saqar had merely ordered that the telegraph operations should not be opposed in any way.

The undispelled doubts in regard to jurisdiction at Maqlab continued for some time to exercise the Government of Bombay; but they clearly inclined to the view that the tract belonged to Masqat. The question whether the telegraph station should be regarded as lying in the official district of the Consul at Masqat or in that of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, between whom at this time there was some friction, was decided by the Bombay Government on the 21st of April in favour of the former officer, on the ground that "it is generally admitted that Mussendom is in the territory of the Imaum of Muscat:" and later, on the 5th of July 1864, the same Government ruled that "the Telegraph Islands in the Elphinstone Inlet are part of the Muscat territory," and that consequently the Political Agent at Masqat should deal with offences committed in Ruûs-al-Jibâl by British subjects under his consular instructions, obtaining from the Sultân of 'Omân the requisite authority to dispose of such as might be committed by others. On the 26th of October 1864 however, on a representation by Colonel Pelly, Resident in the Persian Gulf, that it was inexpedient to raise a question of local boundaries and that the contingency of claims to ownership by the Trucial Shaikhs might be provided for by the execution of an agreement on their part to protect the British telegraph at all places in or near their territory, the Government of Bombay readily assented, adding that no investigation of claims had been either intended or authorised; and, as the Government of India held similar views, an agreement was obtained in the form suggested, as is related in the history of Trucial 'Omân. The ownership of Ruûs-al-Jibâl thus remained indeterminate.

In 1865 a journey was made by land from Dibah to Râs-al-Khaimah by Colonel Disbrowe, Political Agent at Masqat, and Captain Powell

of the late Indian Navy; but the only record of it that exists is a sketch map, and the purpose for which it was made is not known.

Recent period, 1869-1907.

Agreement by the Sultān of 'Omān with the Qāsimi Shaikh, 1871.

As mentioned in the history* of the Shamailiyah tract, a written agreement was executed by Saiyid Turki, Sultān of 'Omān, in 1871, by which he acknowledged the title of the Qāsimi Shaikh to the whole of the Ruûs-al-Jibāl district with the exception of Khasab, but the beneficiary never founded any claim to possession upon this document, and in 1879 it was repudiated as invalid by Turki himself for reasons which, if they were in accordance with the facts, cannot but be deemed sufficient.

Question of the maritime peace on the coast of Ruûs-al-Jibāl, 1881.

In 1881, in connection with hostilities which arose in 1879 between the people of Fujairah and their suzerain the Shaikh of Shārjah, it was decided by the Government of India that peace at sea should be maintained along the coast of Shamailiyah, and—so far as convenient—along the coast of Ruûs-al-Jibāl, in the same manner as upon the shores of Trucial 'Omān.

Minor events, 1885-90.

In 1885 or 1886 the Shaikh of Bakhah brought himself to notice by an armed demonstration at sea in the direction of Sha'am; and in 1893 one of the Shaikhs of the Shihûh of Khasab was called to account, through the Sultān of 'Omān, for a similar irregularity in regard to the same place. Further details of both of these cases will be found in the general history of Trucial 'Omān. In 1887, one of the men of the Masqat Wāli of Khasab having been killed in a fight between the Bani Hadiyah and Bani Shatair divisions of the Shihûh at that place, Saiyids Faisal and Fahad, sons of the Sultān of 'Omān, went by sea to Khasab, and, after recovering a fine of $500 from each, reconciled the factions with one another. In 1888 the Sultān of 'Omān was obliged to send a ship to stop fighting which had again broken out at Khasab between the Bani Hadiyah and the Bani Shatair; and on this occasion three men of the former and four Shaikhs of the latter division were brought back as prisoners to Masqat and interned in Fort Jalāli. Between 1886 and 1890 some unrest prevailed among the Shihûh of Ruûs-al-Jibāl adjoining Rās-al-Khaimah, and various raids, murders and other injuries were committed by them in the environs of the town; but they did not themselves come off scatheless in all their attempts. These disturbances are noticed in the history of Trucial 'Omān.

The great Kumzār pearl case, 1899-1902.

A case which arose in 1899 concerning the royalty on a very valuable pearl, found by a wader of Kumzār in Ruûs-al-Jibāl, is described at length in the Appendix on the Pearl Fisheries; the result indicated that the title of the Sultān of 'Omān to sovereignty over Ruûs-al-Jibāl was not now questioned by the Trucial Shaikhs, at least not by the Shaikh of Shārjah.

* *Vide* page 780 *post*.

Recent investigations of the political status of Ruûs-al-Jibâl, 1900-05.

In 1900, as explained in the chapter on the General History of the Persian Gulf, the evident intention of other European powers to establish for themselves a naval position in the Gulfs of Persia and 'Omân made it unecessary to consider, from the British point of view, the naval situation in those waters; and the promontory of Ruûs-al-Jibâl figured largely in the ensuing deliberations of the British and Indian Governments. The practical results of the discussion find their appropriate place elsewhere; but in this place the facts finally elicited in regard to the ownership of the district may be placed on record.

In 1902 a voyage along the coast of Ruûs-al-Jibâl was made by Major P. Z. Cox, then Political Agent at Masqat, chiefly for the purpose of ascertaining local opinion on the subject of jurisdiction. Major Cox reported that the Shaikh of Limah admitted, in the abstract, his subordination to Saiyid Faisal-bin-Turki of Masqat and regarded the Sultân's wishes as a law to him. The Dhahûriyîn of Malcolm Inlet seemed to recognise that the ruler of Masqat possessed at least a patriarchal authority over them; and they added that, if any dispute should arise amongst themselves, they would appeal to the Sultân to settle it. The people of Kumzâr unhesitatingly and unequivocally acknowledged the sovereignty of the Sultân, not only over themselves but over the whole Shihhi tribe, with the exception of a few who were said to be subject to Râs-al-Khaimah.* The Shihûh of the villages between Elphinstone Inlet and the Râs-al-Khaimah border expressed friendly and loyal sentiments towards Saiyid Faisal, and their Shaikh was in the habit of paying complimentary visits to the Sultân at Masqat. On the other hand, facts were observed by Major Cox which seemed to point to the enjoyment by the inhabitants generally of practical independence; and Major Cox was of opinion that, on the evidence obtained by him, it was open to the British Government to regard Ruûs-al-Jibâl either as a district of the 'Omân Sultanate or as an autonomous tract.

The 20th of November 1903 was spent by Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, while on tour in the Persian Gulf, with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Atkinson-Willes, in an examination of the inlets and coast of Ruûs-al-Jibâl; but no opportunity occurred in the course of this short visit for a satisfactory investigation of the political position of any of the villages.

In March 1905 the present writer, partly with a view to supplementing Major Cox's enquiries by ascertaining what opinion as to the ownership of Ruûs-al-Jibâl prevailed in a neighbouring district, paid a visit to Shârjah, where a meeting, attended by the Shaikh of Shârjah himself, by an intelligent Shihhi, and by various other well-informed men, was held at the house of the Residency Agent for the purpose of investigating this and other points of geographical and political interest. By the assembly it was stated, with absolute unanimity, that all places upon the sea between Sha'am and Dibah, in other words the whole coast of Ruûs-al-Jibâl, belonged to Masqat; and no difference of status in the interior was suggested.

*Probably the Shihûh of Sha'am, Ghalîlah and Khor Khuwair, who live outside the Ruûs-al-Jibâl district, and whose position as dependents of Râs-al-Khaimah has never been doubtful.

From the facts related in the foregoing summary of events it will be apparent that sovereignty has been claimed and exercised in the past by the Sultâns of 'Omân over parts of Ruûs-al-Jibâl, especially Khasab; that the inhabitants, though in most places they exist in a state of virtual independence, are generally disposed to admit a connection with Masqat; and that the Shaikh of Shârjah, whose grandfather was supposed in 1864 to entertain a rival claim to the district, does not now dispute the title of the Sultân of 'Omân.

ANNEXURE NO. 4.—AGREEMENT REGARDING CESSION OF TERRITORY BY THE SULTAN OF 'OMÂN, 20TH MARCH 1891.

Praise be to God alone!

The object of writing this lawful and honourable Bond is that it is hereby covenanted and agreed between His Highness Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultân of Muskat and Oman, on the one part, and Colonel Edward Charles Ross, Companion of the Star of India, Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of the British Government, on the other part, that the said Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultân of Muskat and Oman, does pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors, never to cede, to sell, to mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, the dominions of Muskat and Oman or any of their dependencies.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable Bond Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultan of Muskat and Oman, and Colonel Edward Charles Ross, Companion of the Star of India, Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the former for himself, his heirs and successors, and the latter on behalf of the British Government, do each, in the presence of witnesses affix their signatures on this ninth day of Shaaban one thousand three hundred and eight (A.H.) corresponding to the twentieth day of March (A.D.) 1891.

E. C. ROSS,
Colonel, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Signature of His Highness Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultan of Muskat and Oman.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twenty-third day of May 1891.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

ANNEXURE NO. 5.—TRANSLATION OF AN UNDERTAKING GIVEN BY THE SULTĀN OF 'OMĀN ON THE 31ST OF MAY 1902, TO THE BRITISH POLITICAL AGENT AT MASQAT, REGARDING THE SUR COALFIELDS.

After the usual compliments.—Regarding the communication you made to me on the subject of the Geologist's report and the views of Government on the subject of the coal deposits, Your Honour is at liberty to inform Government on my behalf that for the present I have no intention of entering upon the work myself; and that in the future, if any Government or company ask my permission to embark upon the mining enterprise in question, I will not accord such permission without first communicating with Government, in order that they may themselves take up the work with me if they feel so inclined. This is what had to be written, may you be preserved.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF TRUCIAL 'OMĀN.*

The history of the region at the present day known as Trucial 'Omān before the middle of the 18th century is almost entirely lost.

PERIOD PRECEDING THE RISE OF PIRACY, 1600-1778.

Relations of the Portuguese with the coast of 'Omān between Khor Quwai and Rās-al-Khaimah, 1600-1750.

In February 1625, after his defeat off Bandar 'Abbās by the English and the Dutch, the Portuguese commander Ruy Freire de Andrade retired with some of his vessels to an anchorage—probably Khor Quwai—on the opposite Arabian coast, and there established a temporary base;

* The chief general authorities for the history of Trucial 'Omān are *Bombay Selections, XXIV*, 1856; Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*, printed in 1906, supplementing the last in various important respects; Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Trucial Chiefs, 1854-1905*, also published in 1906; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. Buckingham in his *Travels in Assyria, Media and Persia*, 1829, gives a valuable and independent account of the piracies of the Qawāsim; and Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, contains full information relative to all British naval or combined land and sea operations affecting Trucial 'Omān. Some additional facts relating to the Qāsimi pirates will be found in Mosley's *Journey through Persia*, 1812, and in Mignan's *Winter Journey*, 1839.

For early times (1600-1800) the authorities are, generally, those cited in the footnote to the title of Chapter First of this volume.

For revision of the recent history of the tract, and for much supplementary information regarding the same, the writer is indebted to Major P. Z. Cox, Resident in the Persian Gulf, who was assisted in his enquiries by Khān Bahādur 'Abdul Latīf, Residency Agent at Shārjah. Interesting extracts from the Regimental Records of the 65th Foot were kindly supplied by Captain T. D. Parkinson, Adjutant, 1st York and Lancaster Regiment; and the writer is also indebted to Major H. G. Purdon and to Captain J. B. Wall (P) Adjutant, of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.

and about the same time the Portuguese authorities seem to have had in view the establishment of a station at Khasab. Eventually Kung became the chief if not the only Portuguese settlement in the Persian Gulf proper, though, from a mandate of the King of Portugal dated 1649, for the strengthening of the "fortress of Cassapo," it might perhaps be inferred that a post was also maintained at Khasab. About 1631, in pursuance of measures for recovering Hormūz from the Persians by force, the Portuguese built a fort "in Julfar," *i.e.*, near Rās-al-Khaimah; and this may have been the post, just mentioned, which is conjectured to have existed at Khasab.

Proceedings of the Rās-al-Khaimah Arabs on the Persian coast, 1600-1750.

It does not appear that the Arabs of the 'Omān coast were much in evidence in the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās, or anywhere upon the Persian side of the Gulf, before the Afghān invasion of Persia which began in 1720. In the confusion following the overthrow of the Safavi dynasty Shaikh Rāshid, probably the ruler of Rās-al-Khaimah, seized Bāsidu on the island of Qishm and there established a settlement of which the trade seriously affected the customs receipts at Bandar 'Abbās, then shared by the Persians and the English. This led to an English naval expedition in April 1727 against Shaikh Rāshid, conducted by Mr. W. H. Draper, the East India Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās; the ships employed were the "Britannia" frigate, the "Bengal" galley, and two Trankis; and the outcome was the recovery from the Shaikh of "the share of customs due to the East India Company." In 1737, when a Persian force landed at Khor Fakkān and began to overrun the territories of the Imām of 'Omān, the Arabs of Rās-al-Khaimah appear to have made submission to the Persian commander; but in 1741, the Persian occupation of the Imamate still continuing, the Arabs came under suspicion of intending plunder of Bandar 'Abbās, in concert with the Imām, after seizing an island in the vicinity.

The Qawāsim at home and abroad, 1750-1800.

Very little is known of the internal condition even towards the end of the 18th century of the region now styled Trucial 'Omān; but it seems clear that neither the Portuguese nor the Persians then retained any hold upon the country, and that the influence of the Qāsimi Shaikh, whose capital at this time was Rās-al-Khaimah town, greatly predominated over that of his neighbours. The subjects of the Qāsimi, to whatever tribes they might belong, were generally spoken of as Qawāsim; and it seems possible that, abroad, the name was applied to almost all Arabs hailing from the western coast of the 'Omān promontory. It was the decline of Persian influence in the Gulf after the death of Nādir Shāh that in the end brought the Qawāsim upon the general scene.

From their first appearance abroad their energy was directed to exploiting the nearer parts of the Persian coast and to promoting or opposing the policy of their neighbour, the Imām of 'Omān, as their interests at the moment might happen to dictate.

Establishment of the Qawāsim on the Persian coast and islands, 1750—1766.

On the decease of Nādir Shāh in 1747, Mulla 'Ali Shāh, who under the late sovereign had been Governor of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies and Darya Baigi or Admiral of the Persian Gulf, finding himself pressed with demands for tribute from more than one quarter and threatened by Nāsir Khān, the hereditary ruler of Lār, secured the aid of the Qawāsim, with whose Shaikh—apparently Rāshid-bin-Matar—he seems to have allied himself by giving him a daughter in marriage. In 1758 Mulla 'Ali Shāh with vessels from Hormūz, came to the assistance of the Qāsimi Shaikh against the Imām of Masqat; but no actual collision occurred between the opposing forces. In 1759, as related in the chapter on the General History of the Gulf, the crews of some Arab vessels, subjects of the Qāsimi Shaikh, who were supposed to be cruising against Mir Mahanna, the piratical chieftain of Rīg at the northern end of the Gulf, created a disturbance at Bandar 'Abbās and inflicted serious injuries on the servants of the British Agency there, for which no reparation was afforded by the Persian Deputy-Governor of the place. In June 1760 the Qawāsim, who appear in the meantime to have obtained a footing at Qishm and Lāft on the island of Qishm and also at Lingeh and Shanās on the coast of the mainland to the westwards, assisted Mulla 'Ali Shāh to seize the town of Bandar 'Abbās; but, being unable to dislodge a garrison which held the fort for the Khān of Lār, they again withdrew; on this occasion their strength was estimated at 1,000 men, and they were commanded by Shaikh Rāshid in person. The Khān of Lār replied with demonstrations against Lingeh and Rās-al-Khaimah, but he found both places too strong and too well prepared to be seriously attacked; he succeeded, however, in devastating the island of Qishm. In 1761 Mulla 'Ali Shāh brought over the Arabs of Rās-al-Khaimah to help him in an attack on Hormūz, where his family were kept prisoners in the fort by the inhabitants of the place and by the Bani Ma'in Arabs; two assaults were made, but both failed. In the course of these disturbances vessel from Masqat, carrying 2,400 bags of rice and a "Leaguer of Arrack" for the British Factory at Bandar 'Abbās, was seized by the Qawāsim, and the rice was appropriated by Mulla 'Ali Shāh, who seems, however, to have made restitution. Early in 1763 a tripartite peace was arranged between the Bani Ma'in on the one side and the Qawāsim and Mulla 'Ali Shāh on the other; among the conditions were the definite assignment to the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah of

a ship named the "Rahmāni," of which he had taken possession, and an equal division of the revenues of Qishm Island among the parties.

Expulsion of the Qawāsim from Persia about 1765.

Karīm Khān, Zand, in establishing his power over the south of Persia, appointed Shaikh 'Abdullah of the local tribe or family of the Bani Ma'in to be ruler over Bandar 'Abbās, Hormūz and Qishm; and this Shaikh succeeded, about 1765, in expelling the Qawāsim and other intruders from his dominions, and was able during his lifetime to keep them at a distance.

Relations with the Imām of 'Omān, 1750-80.

Before their expulsion from Persia the Qawāsim had generally been at war with the Imām Ahmad of 'Omān, who apparently claimed, yet was unable to enforce, a species of suzerainty over them. Afterwards when the policy of Karīm Khān appeared to threaten the independence of the Arabian littoral generally, they formed a temporary alliance with the Imām; and in 1773 two Persian gallivats belonging to Bandar 'Abbās were destroyed by the 'Omāni fleet, assisted by that of the Hormūz Shaikh, the Masqat vessels retiring thereafter to Rās-al Khaimah. In 1775, however, the Qāsimi Shaikh and the Imām were again at war between themselves; and the Shaikh, relying on his personal resources alone, did not scruple to seize Būshehr vessels on the plea that the cargoes belonged to subjects of the Imām. In 1780 their relations were still hostile.

Accession of Shaikh Saqar bin-Rāshid at Rās-al-Khaimah, about 1777.

In or about 1777 Shaikh Rāshid resigned the headship of the Qawāsim in favour of his son Saqar, and the latter sought escape from the extreme isolation of his position by marrying a daughter of Shaikh 'Abdullah of Qishm, and so adjusting his differences with the Ma'ini family.

PERIOD OF THE RISE AND SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY, 1778-1820.

General history, 1778-1803.

Commencement of piracy by the Qawāsim, 1778-80.

In the years 1779 and 1780 the whole Gulf was in a state of turmoil owing to the non-existence of any controlling power; and the contest between the Qāsimi Shaikh and the Imām, resumed after a short interval during which the Qawāsim had addicted themselves to mercantile pursuits, contributed largely to the prevailing confusion. The Qāsimi fleet, manned by ruffians who depended on piracy for their livelihood,

scoured the seas plundering all indiscriminately; and their successful example soon found imitators in every Arab port. Towards the end of 1778 the Qawāsim captured a vessel belonging to the East India Company on its way from Bombay to Basrah, and sold the crew and passengers as slaves; and in 1779 they seem to have been in possession of a ship named the "Expedition," belonging to the Shaikh of Būshehr, which they declined to restore.

Qāsimi intervention in Bahrain, 1782.

In 1782 the Shaikh of the Qawāsim, after mediating unsuccessfully between the 'Utūb and the Persian claimants of Bahrain, took part with a contingent of his subjects in the unsuccessful assault by the Persians on the 'Atbi stronghold of Zubārah; his attitude on this occasion appears to have been determined by a recent outrage on the part of the 'Utūb, who had captured a boat belonging to his Shaikhdom and put 18 of the crew to death.

Raid, possibly Qāsimi, on Rustāq in 'Omān, 1783.

About 1783 Ibn-Rahmah, a Shaikh of the Pirate Coast—as the modern Trucial 'Omān may most appropriately be styled at this time—made a serious attack on Rustāq, then the capital of the Imām of 'Omān; but the identity of the chief cannot now be fixed* nor the significance of his raid ascertained.

Some years of peace followed, during which nothing was heard of the Qawāsim; but in 1797 a state of war again prevailed between Masqat and Rās-al-Khaimah and hostilities had been declared between the Imām of 'Omān and the Government of Persia,—circumstances which may have conduced to the commission in this year of two remarkable and unprovoked outrages by the Qawāsim.†

Capture of the "Bassein," May 1797.

On the 18th of May 1797, off Rams, a fleet of Qāsimi boats attacked and captured the snow "Bassein", though under British colours and carrying public despatches, and took her to Rās-al-Khaimah, where she was detained for two days and then released by order of the Shaikh. No reparation seems to have been exacted for this insult to the British flag.

Attack on the "Viper," October 1797.

Impunity bore its natural fruit. In the month of October following a fleet of Qawāsim, commanded by Sālih, a nephew of the Qāsimi Shaikh, were lying in the harbour of Būshehr, their purpose being to intercept

* It may have been Shaikh Saqar of Rās-al-Khaimah, whose great-great-grandfather's name was Rahmah.

† Mr. F. Warden, Member of Council at Bombay, gives another explanation of these incidents (*see Bombay Records, XXIV*, pp. 57 and 302); but his two suggestions, (1) that the British had previously failed to observe neutrality in the Gulf and (2) that the conduct of the Qawāsim arose from a contest between the Imām Sa'īd of 'Omān and his brother Sultān, appear to be equally unfounded.

some Sūri vessels returning from Basrah, and were granted, on the request of the representative of the Indian Government, at Būshehr, a supply of powder and cannon shot from the H.E.I. Company's brig "Viper" of 14 guns; having received it, they treacherously and without warning attacked the "Viper" at anchor, while her crew were at breakfast on deck. The "Viper," with great promptitude, slipped her cable and made sail to escape being boarded; and, in the engagement which followed, she not only beat off her assailants but succeeded in chasing them out to sea; her gallant commander, Lieutenant Carruthers, was killed, and among a crew of 65, all told, there were no less than 32 casualties. Once more the authors of the outrage were suffered to escape without punishment. The British authorities were apparently satisfied by an assurance received from the Qāsimi Shaikh, that he had the highest regard for the British nation but exercised no control over Shaikh Sālih, who "had proceeded to the Persian shore and there established himself among the Bani Khalid Arabs, marrying a woman of that tribe, which was one of a villainous nature and character;" and no exception appears to have been taken even to a statement by the Shaikh that the "Viper" had been the first to fire.

Relations with Masqat, 1798-99.

In 1798 Saiyid Sultān of 'Omān made peace with the Qawāsim in order to facilitate the enforcement of certain claims which he had against the Turkish authorities at Basrah; but with the settlement of the Turko-'Omāni dispute there was a return to the normal state of warfare between the two Arab powers, and Saiyid Sultān made a naval attack, which was beaten off, on the Qāsimi seaport of Dibah.

In 1799 an attempt on Sohār was made by the Na'im and Bani Qitab tribes, assisted by Bani Yās from Dibai; but the invaders were defeated at Liwa, with great loss, by the Saiyids Sultān and Qais of 'Omān.

Establishment of the Wahhābis in 'Omān, 1800-03.

In 1800, as related in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, an advanced force of the Wahhābis, who had lately annexed the oases of Hasa and Qatif, arrived in Baraimi. The leader of the expedition immediately took measures for a permanent occupation of the place, which he must have seen to be admirably adapted for controlling all western 'Omān, and succeeded in attracting some of the neighbouring Bedouin tribes to his standard; and the ruler of Masqat and the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah—though they sunk for the moment their hereditary differences, consulted together, and even tried conclusions with the newcomers in the field—were unable to rid themselves of their presence. The wilder tribes of 'Omān continued to flock to the standard of the Wahhābi invaders, and, by the middle of 1802, the whole eastern coast of Arabia from the

neighbourhood of Basrah to Dibah in the Gulf of 'Omān was reported to acknowledge their authority. In 1803 the Qawāsim, under pressure from their Wahhābi masters, took the sea against their late ally, Saiyid Sultān; and they probably had their share in a raid on the island of Qishm, then a dependency of Masqat, which was ravaged in the same year at the instigation of the Wahhābis.

Increase of Piracy, 1804-05.

Alleged irresponsibility of the Wahhābis.

The establishment of the Wahhābis at Baraimi was followed by an increase of piracy and lawlessness at sea, which in India was ascribed chiefly to their influence; but a dispassionate study of the facts, after the lapse of more than a hundred years, by no means confirms the extreme contemporary view that the Qawāsim, in the incidents which now took place, were mere unwilling instruments in the hands of the Wahhābis. The natural character of the Qawāsim, as proclaimed by their conduct in 1778-79 and 1797, and the policy of the Bombay Government, which will shortly appear from the sequel, were such that it appears almost superfluous to search for any further explanation of events in the working of Wahhābi influences; and it must be remembered that *force majeure* on the part of the Wahhābis afforded a convenient and unverifiable excuse for acts which nothing could justify.

The "Fly" case, 1804.

In 1804 a number of English gentlemen and Indian British subjects, who had been captured by a French privateer * and released at Būshehr, were making the passage from that place to Bombay in a native vessel, when, between Tunb Island and Rās Musandam, they were captured by Qāsimi pirates after a resistance in which several of their number were wounded. Some of the party had belonged to the H.E.I. Company's cruiser "Fly", which, on being pursued by the French vessel, had been run ashore on Qais Island, the treasure and despatches that she carried being at the same time thrown overboard in shallow water; and on their way down the Gulf the travellers had made shift to recover the "Fly's" despatches, but had been obliged to leave the treasure behind. Finding that they were held prisoners at Rās-al-Khaimah without hope of release, they volunteered, on condition of receiving their liberty, to enable the Qawāsim to recover the sunken treasure of the "Fly", which they did;

* This ship was "La Fortune" of 38 guns, Captain Surcouff, afterwards taken by H.M.S. "Concorde".

but the Arabs then proceeded to a general massacre of the inhabitants of Qais and afterwards departed, leaving the released prisoners to their fate upon the deserted island. In the end, out of a once numerous company, only two—Mr. Jowl or Yowl, an officer of the mercantile marine, and a seaman named Pennel—survived to reach Bombay and deliver the carefully preserved despatches of the "Fly"; the rest mostly perished between Qais and Būshehr, some by shipwreck and others from the hardships of the way.

The death of Saiyid Sultān of Masqat at the hands of the Qawāsim in 1804 is related in another place.

Capture of the "Shannon" and "Trimmer," 1805.

In 1805 two English trading brigs, the "Shannon", Captain Babcock, and the "Trimmer", Captain Cummings, both belonging to Mr. Manesty, the H.E.I. Company's Resident at Basrah, were attacked by pirates in the neighbourhood of Farūr Island and taken after a slight resistance. The Indian members of the crews were put to death; and Captain Babcock, having been seen to fire a musket in the fray, was condemned to lose his arm, which was accordingly struck off with a single blow of a sword. The European prisoners were then conveyed to the Arabian coast, from which in course of time they succeeded in making their escape. Subsequent enquiry showed that the "Shannon" had fallen to the Qawāsim of Lingeh, while the "Trimmer" had passed into the possession of those of Rās-al-Khaimah; and both were at once converted by the captors into vessels of war and were regularly employed in piracy. Mr. Manesty, conceiving that the Wahhābi Amīr had power to order the release of his property, sent an agent to wait upon him at his capital of Dara'iyah; but nothing resulted from this mission.

Attack on the "Mornington," 1805.

In the same year a fleet of 40 Qāsimi vessels surrounded the H.E.I. Company's cruiser "Mornington", of 22 guns, and tried to capture her; but the attack failed, and the assailants had reason to regret the encounter.

First British expedition against the Qawāsim, 1805.

Policy of the Bombay Government.

Up to the point that we have now reached, the Government of Bombay had manifested towards the pirates a degree of forbearance which, in the light both of earlier and of later events, it is difficult to understand. It appears to have been a standing order of that Government that none of their vessels in the Gulf should fire until they had

been fired upon,—a rule which placed their small and isolated cruisers at a dangerous disadvantage in dealing with an enemy whose favourite method of attack was by boarding; and offenders against this regulation were liable to heavy punishment. On one occasion Lieutenant Gowan of the "Fury," 6 guns, having beaten off a number of boats which closed in upon him with hostile intent during a calm, received on arrival at Bombay a severe reprimand from the Governor in person for "daring to molest the innocent and unoffending Arabs of those seas."*

Coercive measures adopted, March 1805.

In March 1805, however, at the suggestion apparently of Captain David Seton, who had been sent to Masqat as Resident for the second time in consequence of the death of Saiyid Sultān, Government determined to assist the ruler of Masqat in chastising the Qawāsim;† but the decision was hedged about by so many conditions and qualifications as to render it almost impossible of execution. Captain Seton was to refrain from action altogether unless satisfied that the Wahhābi Amir would not take offence at the coercive measures to be employed; in his proceedings towards the pirates, even, he was "to act with the greatest moderation" and "to aim at pacification by means of negotiation"; and he was to avoid all possible complications with the Governments of Turkey and Persia. A further difficulty was created by his being required to conduct his proceedings in consonance with the ideas of Mr. Manesty, Resident at Basrah, and also with those of Lieutenant Bruce, Resident at Būshehr. In the event Captain Seton, who sailed from Masqat in the "Mornington" on the 28th of May 1805, unfortunately allowed himself, before taking steps against the Qawāsim, to be drawn into thinly-veiled co-operation with Saiyid Badar against the Ma'ini possessors of Bandar 'Abbās,—a proceeding against which the Persian authorities afterwards protested as an act of hostility against themselves; but before their protest had time to take effect Captain Seton found an opportunity for a partial reckoning with the Qawāsim.

Blockade of the Qāsimi fleet at Qishm, July 1805.

On the 15th of June the Anglo-'Omāni squadron, on a report that a Qāsimi fleet had arrived there, moved over to Qishm town; but the rumour proved to be incorrect, and, as the Qawāsim were in too great

* These are the allegations of the journalist Buckingham, but they have been adopted by Low, the historian of the Indian Navy. Some allowance must be made for the strongly anti-official tendencies of Buckingham, who was subsequently deported from India because of his attacks upon the Government of the day.

† There was chronic hostility, as we have seen, between the Qawāsim and Masqat; and at this time it was specially incumbent on the ruler of Masqat to take steps for avenging the death of his immediate predecessor, Saiyid Sultān, who had been slain by the Qawāsim.

force on shore to be attacked by landing parties, the ships returned to their former station. At daybreak on the 5th of July, however, a flotilla of 30 Qāsimi boats carrying about 1,000 men entered the Qishm roadstead; and here Captain Seton and Saiyid Badar immediately blockaded them.

Preliminary negotiations.

In the negotiations that followed the part of intermediary was assumed by Mulla Husain, Shaikh of Qishm. Captain Seton in the first place required that the losses suffered by British shipping should be made good by the Qawāsim; but, as they assured him that they could not pay more than Rs. 10,000, and such a sum only by instalments, the question of an indemnity was dropped. Eventually it was arranged that, if the "Trimmer" were returned to Captain Seton at Masqat in 25 days, along with a letter for the Governor of Bombay expressing the penitence of the Qawāsim, their inability to pay an indemnity, and their resolve to abstain from piracy in future, a truce should be observed until the Governor's pleasure was known; and that, if the Governor considered the settlement satisfactory, the "Trimmer" should be retained by Government and peace declared. Mulla Husain was anxious that Captain Seton should have a personal interview on shore with Sultān-bin-Saqar, Shaikh of the Qawāsim, who was present; but Captain Seton avoided compliance with this wish as he learned that further conditions, to enable the Qawāsim to visit India, would be pressed upon his acceptance.

Saiyid Badar was anxious to return to Masqat, and it is possible that his impatience may have prejudiced the negotiations; on his part he was satisfied with a truce of 70 days, after which he intended, according to his own statement, to requite the Qawāsim for the death of Saiyid Sultān and to expel them entirely from Qishm and the other parts of his Persian fief. While the Masqat fleet was before Bandar 'Abbās the Qawāsim appear to have attempted a diversion by means of maritime raids on Sūr and Gwādar.

Further negotiations, October 1805.

Eventually, in October 1805, an agent from Mulla Husain of Qishm arrived at Masqat to negotiate on behalf of the Qawāsim, and Captain Seton applied for the instructions of the Bombay Government; these, when received, were to the effect that any peace to which the Government became a party should be of a universal character, extending to the whole Gulf, and that full indemnification for past losses must in any case be required.

First British treaty with the Qawāsim, 1806.

The enforcement of these extensive demands, so disproportionate to the impression which had as yet been made on the minds of the Gulf

Arabs, having proved impossible without recourse to hostilities on a large scale, a modest treaty was signed by Captain Seton at Bandar 'Abbās on the 6th of February 1806 and was confirmed by the Governor-General of India on the 29th of April following. By this document peace was established, the Qawāsim binding themselves under a penalty of $30,000 to observe the same; the "Trimmer", which had been brought to Masqat, was restored, all claims to the cargo, guns, etc., of that vessel and of the "Shannon" being however waived by the British Government; the Qawāsim undertook to assist British vessels visiting, or driven upon, their shores, and promised to give three months' notice before infringing the peace, should they find themselves compelled to do so at the behest of the Wahhābi Amīr; finally, in case of the treaty being ratified, as it was shortly after, the tribe were to be at liberty, as before, to frequent the ports of India. The Wahhābi Amir was not consulted in the negotiations. Before the execution of the treaty the "Shannon" had already been returned in a dismantled state.

Temporary cessation of piracy, 1806-1808.

Large British fleet in the Gulf, 1807.

For fully two years from the signature of this peace the Qawāsim remained quiescent, abstaining at least from offences against British trade and vessels. It is not improbable that their good intentions, recorded in the treaty of 1806, were confirmed by the presence in the Gulf during 1807 of a fleet of no less than eight of the H.E.I. Company's cruisers. These ships were originally sent in company with H.M.S. "Fox" to threaten Basrah, in consequence of hostilities in Europe between Britain and Turkey; but, instead of being withdrawn on the conclusion of this service, they were left on duty in the Gulf for about a year.

Tribal wars of the Qawāsim, etc., 1806-1808.

In other directions, however, the turbulence of the Qawāsim was not altogether suspended. In 1806 some of the Qawāsim espoused the side of Saiyid Qais of Sohār in his contest with Saiyid Badar of Masqat for the mastery of 'Omān, but they did not do so with sufficient force to prevent his being worsted by Badar. A spirited movement by which the Qāsimi Shaikh, Sultān-bin-Saqar, recovered Khor Fakkān from the 'Omāni Saiyids Sa'id and Qais in May 1808 is described in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate.

His exploit at Khor Fakkān must have been one of the last public acts of Sultān-bin-Saqar at this time, for within the next few months he was deprived, under orders from the Wahhābi Amīr, of his general headship over the Qawāsim. He retained at first independent authority in his own port of Rās-al-Khaimah; but in the following year (1809) even this was taken from him; Husain-bin-'Ali, Shaikh of Rams, was nominated governor and tax-collector on behalf of the Wahhābis over most of what is now Trucial 'Omān, including Rās-al-Khaimah; and other Wahhābi officers were appointed to the smaller sub-divisions of the country. The Wahhābis also possessed themselves of the forts of Fujairah, Bithnah, and Khor Fakkān in Shamailiyah.

Deposition the Qāsimi Shaikh by the Wahhābi Amīr, 1808.

Revival of piracy, 1808-1809.

Apparently before the removal of Shaikh Sultān from the Qāsimi Shaikhship the predatory instincts of his tribe had broken forth once more upon the high seas and the treaty of 1806 had been violated. This breach of their engagements was the more notorious that it was committed off the coast of India.

In April 1808, off the coast of Gujarat, the schooner "Lively," Lieutenant Macdonald, was hemmed in by 4 Arab vessels, each larger and carrying more men than herself, and an attempt was made by the enemy to board her; but it was repulsed by the determined fire of the "Lively," which did great execution. Three of the pirate craft which took part in this affair were subsequently discovered at Sūrat and were taken to Bombay; but, though wounded men were found concealed on board and the identification in other respects appeared to be complete, the Government, "in consideration of their long detention, set them free again to exercise their calling on some hapless coaster." This they, or others resembling them, seem to have done with effect; for, in the course of 1808, no less than 20 country vessels fell a prey to Arab buccaneers off the Indian coast.

Attack on the "Lively," 1808.

About September 1808 the "Minerva," Captain Hopwood, another trading ship belonging to Mr. Manesty of Basrah, was captured by boarders from a number of Qāsimi boats, which had maintained a running fight with her during several successive days. The majority of the occupants were, it was said, put to a cruel death by methods indicative of religious fanaticism; but the lives of the second mate and

Capture of the "Minerva," 1808.

carpenter and of an Armenian lady, wife of Lieutenant Taylor, Assistant Resident at Bûshehr, were spared, and they were carried prisoners to Râs-al-Khaimah. Mrs. Taylor was successfully ransomed a few months later by Lieutenant Bruce, the Resident at Bûshehr, but her two less fortunate companions never, apparently, regained their liberty.

Capture and re-capture of the cruiser "Sylph," 1808.

On the 21st of October 1808, a few weeks after the mishap to the "Minerva," the H.E.I. Company's cruiser "Sylph" of only 78 tons, mounting 8 guns, was approached by a fleet of large Arab vessels; she had been accidentally separated from the squadron which carried Sir Harford Jones and the members of his Mission to Persia; and Muhammad Husain Khân, one of the Persian secretaries attached to the Mission, was actually on board of her at the time. Precluded by regulation from using her guns until it was too late, the tiny vessel fell an easy prey to the crowd of boarders which the Arab ships hurled on her deck from their towering bows; and a wholesale massacre of her crew, who perished fighting desperately, was the sequel. Among the few survivors of the action were the commander, Lieutenant Graham, who fell, covered with wounds, down the fore hatchway, and the Persian secretary, who hid himself in a cabin-locker. The lives of the remnant were saved by the sudden appearance on the scene of H.M.S. "Néréide," Commodore Corbett, a frigate of 36 guns, at the sight of which the Qawâsim took to flight in their own vessels abandoning the "Sylph," and were pursued for some distance by the "Néréide," but without success. *

Attack on the cruiser "Nautilus," 1808.

Only three days after the "Sylph" incident the H.E.I. Company's brig "Nautilus" of 14 guns, Lieutenant Bennett, was threatened, while passing the island of Hânjâm, by a squadron of two large and two small pirate vessels. In consequence of the order which prohibited British ships from taking the initiative in these affairs, Lieutenant Bennett considered himself obliged to hold his fire until the hostile squadron had advanced so near that the war dances and brandished spears of the Arab crews could be distinctly seen and their songs and shouts heard; he then hoisted the British colours and fired two shots across their bows. As they still continued to approach, the "Nautilus" immediately discharged a broadside at the two larger vessels; and a gunnery combat ensued which was maintained for nearly

* The statement of Sir H. J. Brydges in his *Brief History of the Wahauby* (page 38), that the "Néréide" sank three of the pirate vessels is not accepted by Low, the historian of the Indian Navy. See also a quotation from the log-book of the "Néréide" at page 46 of Morier's *Journey through Persia*.

an hour. At length the Arab squadron took to flight, pursued by the "Nautilus," who plied them with her shot as long as they were within range.

Second British expedition against the Qawāsim, 1809-10.

Temerity and strength of the Qawāsim.

The insolence of the Qawāsim and their power for mischief had now reached such a point that they could no longer be ignored; and the spirit of the tribe was clearly shown in a demand, made by the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah about this time, that the Government of Bombay should pay tribute for the privilege, which he would accord to their ships, of navigating the Persian Gulf in safety. The Qāsimi sailing craft were estimated to amount to 63 large and 813 smaller vessels, and the crews to aggregate nearly 19,000 men.

The Wahhāb Government and the Qawāsim.

The outbreak of piracy in 1808 was attributed, like the same phenomenon in 1805, to Wahhābi influence; but the indications of this, though more substantial than on the former occasion, could still hardly be called conclusive. Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams had, it is true, visited the capital of the Wahhābis before becoming their representative in the Qāsimi country; and there were rumours of an engagement on his part that one-fifth of the proceeds of piracies should be paid to the Wahhābi Amīr in accordance with Wahhābi practice in such matters. The piracies on the Indian coast were considered by Captain Seton to be due to Wahhābi instigation; and, whether his belief were well-founded or no, it was undeniable that the recent outrages coincided very closely in time with the supersession of the hereditary Shaikh of the Qawāsim by a Wahhābi officer. In 1809 the deposed Qāsimi Shaikh, Sultān-bin-Saqar, was decoyed by the Wahhābis to their capital, Dara'iyah, and there detained; but he eventually escaped, by way of Yaman and the port of Mokha, to Masqat, where he was kindly received by Saiyid Sa'id, the ruler. Meanwhile a demand had been addressed to the Qawāsim by the Wahhābi Amīr, that they should join the 'Utūb in a naval expedition against Kuwait and Basrah; and with this requisition they seem to have complied, or at least to have professed their willingness to comply.

Events immediately preceding the British expedition of 1809.

On the coast of Persia, in 1809, the Qawāsim sustained a check, being driven out of Lingeh and Chārak by a Persian force from Lār and compelled to retire to Bāsādu on Qishm Island; it is probable, however, that this reverse was of very short duration, for a British armament a

few months later destroyed Lingeh on the ground of its being a Qāsimi town. The Qawāsim about the same time sent 22 boats to the relief of Rahmah-bin-Jābir, a pirate of Khor Hassān in Qatar, when he was attacked by a Persian expedition from Būshehr; and so effectual was their co-operation that the Būshehr flotilla was repulsed and six of the vessels belonging to it were captured. Perhaps the last victim of Qāsimi rapacity during this period was the "Deria Dowlut," Captain Flemming, which seems to have been taken in June 1809; while in October of the same year a boat from H.M.S. "Caroline," commanded by Lieutenant Wood, boarded and captured one of a fleet of 27 piratical vessels. A naval demonstration was made by Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat against the Qāsimi ports, but it was wholly ineffectual.

Motives of the British expedition.

In these circumstances a naval and military expedition was sanctioned by the Governor-General of India, of which the principal object was to destroy completely the sea power of the piratical tribes at that day denominated "Qawāsim," and to release British subjects and others who might be held by them in bondage; but there was also an intention of replacing Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat in possession of certain places in the Gulf of 'Omān, of which he had been deprived by the Qāsimis. The 'Omān Sultanate was at this time threatened with invasion by the Wahhābi general Mutlaq, whose headquarters were at Baraimi; and a desire to relieve the ruler of Masqat from this danger has also been mentioned as among the motives of the expedition.* A conciliatory convention was, if possible, to be arranged with the piratical powers after the destruction of their vessels. Incidentally topographical information regarding the country, and especially the ports, of the Qawāsim was to be procured; and an "eligible island" was to be sought for in the vicinity of the Qāsimi coast, which it might be possible to occupy as a maritime station or a Residency.

Instructions to the commanders.

The instructions issued to the naval and military commanders in charge of the expedition placed all these objects before them for attainment, except that relating to the relief of Masqat from Wahhābi pressure; this last, if it entered into the scheme at all, was apparently viewed as an indirect consequence, with which executive officers were not concerned. Special stress was laid upon the complete destruction of all piratical craft. From the political point of view extreme caution was enjoined. Land operations of every sort were to be avoided, so far as possible, and especially any conflict with forces in the service of the Wahhābi Amīr; no hostility towards the Wahhābis was to be expressed; and the supposed connection of the Wahhābis with the Qawāsim was to

* See *Bombay Selections, XXIV*, pages 131 and 205.

be ignored, the latter being treated for all purposes as an independent power.* The susceptibilities of the Persian and Turkish Governments were to be respected to the utmost, and the local representatives of the former were to be assured, if necessary, that the operations against the pirates covered no territorial designs. At Lâft, though that place was no longer under the control of the Saiyid of Masqat, the Qâsimi shipping was not to be destroyed without his express assent.

Strength and organization of the expedition.

The naval force detailed for the expedition was placed under the command of Commodore J. Wainwright of H.M.S. "Chiffonne," 36 guns, and consisted, besides the flagship, of H.M.S. "Caroline," 36 guns; and of the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Mornington," 22 guns; "Ternate," 16 guns; "Aurora," 14 guns; "Mercury," 14 guns; "Nautilus," 14 guns; "Prince of Wales," 14 guns; "Vestal," 10 guns; "Ariel," 10 guns; "Fury," 8 guns; and "Stromboli," bomb-ketch.

The land force, conveyed in 4 large transports and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel Smith of His Majesty's 65th Regiment, amounted to about 1,411 fighting men, of whom 883 were Europeans and 528 natives of India; the European portion was composed of His Majesty's 65th Regiment, the flank companies of His Majesty's 47th Regiment, and a detachment of the Bombay Artillery.†

The armament, as a whole, was under the joint command of Captain Wainwright and Colonel Smith.

By the death of Captain Seton, Resident at Masqat, a month before it sailed, the expedition was deprived of its political adviser.‡ Mr. Bunce, who was sent to take Captain Seton's place but probably possessed no local knowledge, was ordered by the Bombay Government to remain at Masqat; he also expired before the end of the year.

The voyage.

The expedition started from Bombay on the 14th of September 1809. Before the ships had been 24 hours out of port the bottom fell out of the "Stromboli" bomb-ketch, and she foundered, carrying with her

* In some earlier instructions sent to Captain Seton a sort of explanation to the Wahhabi Amir of the action about to be taken against the Qawâsim appears to have been contemplated: see *Bombay Selections*, *XXIV*, page 42. The writer has not been able to ascertain whether these earlier instructions were cancelled or executed.

† According to Regimental Records there were 638 sepoys and the whole force only numbered about 1,200 men.

‡ Captain David Seton, of the Bombay Military Service, was Resident at Masqat, with two short intervals, from 1800 to 1809. He died of fever at Barkah on the 2nd of August 1809 and was buried at that place. He was not a careful reader of his instructions, and the repudiation by Government of the treaty which he arranged with the Amirs of Sind in 1808 (*vide* Kaye's *Afghan War*) will be remembered; but he seems to have been an earnest and energetic officer, and his death was much regretted.

an artillery officer, most of her crew, and the main supply of heavy ammunition for the force. Masqat was reached on the 24th of October, and here the expedition was joined by Captain Pasley and other members of Sir John Malcolm's third Mission, then on their way to Persia; these gentlemen "most handsomely volunteered their services," which were accepted. Saiyid Sa'id, who was in a despondent mood, seemed to regard the smallness of the armament with some dismay in view of the task assigned it; and he did not, apparently, at this stage offer to co-operate. Pilots and small boats for landing were, however, obtained; and on the 2nd November the expedition left Masqat. An offer made by the Shaikh of Kuwait to join the British expedition with his whole naval force and supply pilots for all the piratical strongholds was declined by Captain Wainwright, who afterwards regretted his action in this respect, for the pilots obtained at Masqat were altogether useless.

Arrival at Rās-al-Khaimah, 11th November 1809.

The expedition arrived off Rās-al-Khaimah on the afternoon of the 11th November; but the shallowness of the soundings made it necessary for the ships to anchor at distances of 2 to 4 miles off the town, according to their size. The captured "Minerva," a full-rigged ship on which the Qawāsim had mounted 20 guns, was starting from Rās-al-Khaimah on a cruise when the British squadron arrived; but, on sighting the armament, she put about and ran aground under a circular tower about a mile to the south of the town. In this position she was attacked by the smaller British vessels and taken; but a heavy fire from the shore prevented her removal, and she was burned instead where she lay. In the attempt to cut out the "Minerva," the cruiser "Prince of Wales" went aground and suffered some damage by a fusillade from the land.

Bombardment, 12th November.

On the 12th the town was bombarded during three hours by such of the vessels as from their size could approach near enough; but the defenders maintained an unshaken fire from small batteries and entrenchments thrown up along the beach, and little or no impression was made.*

Landing and capture of the town, 13th November.

In the early morning of the 13th a demonstration was made against the mouth of the harbour at the north end of the town, under cover of which the whole of the British infantry and some detachments of marines and native troops were landed at the opposite end, in water reaching to their waists. The landing was disputed by a crowd of swordsmen, but their rush was broken by a fire of case from gunboats, and they were then driven back by a charge. By sunrise the wall across the peninsula on the landward side of the town had been secured, along with its towers and

* According to Regimental Records (65th Foot) the bombardment was not a heavy one and was only made to cover a reconnaissance for the purpose of locating the enemy's shipping.

some adjacent buildings. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon the centre of the town had been gained, the British flag had been hoisted on the Shaikh's house, and only the northern quarters at the point of the peninsula remained in possession of the enemy. By 4 P.M. 50 vessels belonging to the place, including 30 large war boats, had been set on fire by the seamen of the fleet, and the town had become the scene of a general conflagration. Some booty was obtained by individuals,* but no general plunder was authorised.

Evacuation, 14th November.

At daylight on the 14th, in consequence of a report that a large body of Arabs was approaching from the interior, Colonel Smith, actuated doubtless by the instructions to avoid a conflict with the Wahhábis, hurriedly re-embarked his force. No admission of defeat had been obtained from the enemy, who immediately re-occupied the shore with every gesture of defiance. There is reason to believe that the Wahhábi general Mutlaq did actually move to the assistance of Ras-al-Khaimah as soon as he heard that it was attacked; and, especially in view of what occurred a few weeks later at Shinás, it is impossible to condemn the cautious behaviour of the British commander.

Casualties.

It does not appear that the fighting at Rás-al-Khaimah can have been of a severe character; but some particular buildings were held with obstinacy. The fatal casualties on the British side were two men killed on board the "Prince of Wales" and Captain Dansey of the 65th Regiment, slain by a spear, which struck him in the neck while he was clearing a house in the town; the wounded numbered 21. But for the screen formed by the smoke of burning houses, the British losses would, it is said, have been much heavier. In regard to the enemy it was reported that "from 70 to 80 of these vagabonds were killed." The landing and embarkation of the troops, in view of the difficulties by which these operations were attended, were considered to have been very successfully performed.

Destruction of Lingeh, 17th November.

The armament then crossed the Gulf to Lingeh, which was deserted by the inhabitants at its arrival; on the 17th the town was occupied without resistance by a small detachment of native troops and given to the flames; and 20 sailing craft, of which 9 were large war vessels, were destroyed.

Operations at Láft, 26th to 28th November.

At midday on the 26th of November the cruisers "Mornington," "Ternate," "Nautilus" and "Fury" with the transport "Mary," having obtained pilots at Qishm town, entered Clarence Strait and anchored off the port of Láft. They carried a force of about 500 land troops,

* A private of one of the British regiments soon after placed £300 in an officer's hands to be remitted to his friends.

most of whom were Europeans. The Qawāsim, or their Qishmi allies occupying the place, were summoned to surrender; but without result. About 2 P.M. on the 27th, the garrison being still defiant, 300 men* were landed to storm the fort; but the work proved to be of unexpected strength, and the result was a decided reverse for the assailants. A 5½-inch howitzer, which had been brought up to force the only entrance, was abandoned in the open under a heavy fire; and the attacking force were obliged to take cover behind hillocks and sand ridges, in positions from which they could not even retire until darkness fell. Meanwhile, however, a heavy fire was maintained by the "Fury" and some gunboats; and by sunset the fort had been seriously shattered. The casualties of the day amounted to 11 killed and 55 wounded, among the killed being an Irish subaltern of the 47th Regiment, Lieutenant S. Weld, who made a gallant attempt to form a party for the recovery of the howitzer. At nightfall an ultimatum was sent to Mulla Husain, who commanded the defence, requiring the evacuation of the fort by 2 A.M.; and daybreak revealed a Union Jack waving on the battlements in the hands of Lieutenant Hall of the Bombay Marine, a survivor of the "Stromboli," who had entered the place single-handed by night, a few of the garrison who still lingered there taking flight at his approach. Eleven vessels, captured apparently during the unsuccessful attack on the fort, were burned; and the town, with miscellaneous property to the value of Rs. 2,00,000, was delivered over intact to an agent of the ruler of Masqat.

Pause in the operations, December 1809.

On the 7th of December the whole force rendezvoused at the base, which was the roadstead of Barkah near Masqat; and the flank companies of the 47th Regiment and 200 sepoys were sent back to Bombay. In the general destruction of Qāsimi shipping small boats not convertible to piratical uses had been spared to avoid exciting unnecessary bitterness.

Shināṣ affair, January 1810.

Saiyid Sa'id, whose confidence had revived with the recovery of Lāft, was now anxious that the programme of the Bombay Government should be executed in its entirety by the expulsion of the Qawāsim from the ports of Shināṣ and Khor Fakkān on his western seaboard, and it was decided to comply with his wishes. The successful operations which resulted from this decision are described, together with their for the Saiyid disastrous sequel, in the history of the Sultanate of 'Omān.

Final operations on both coasts, January 1810.

Leaving Shināṣ, the expedition returned to the Persian Gulf and on the 15th of January 1810 reached Rams, where 10 large vessels were given up to be burned. At Jazīrat-at-Hamra, the next place visited, the people

* *Viz.*, a light company of the 47th, half a company of the 65th, a detachment of the 2nd Native Infantry, and some seamen and marines.

at first made a show of resistance; but, learning that the town of Rams had been spared, they eventually surrendered 8 large vessels for destruction. At Shārjah no large vessels in good condition were found. The war fleet of 'Ajmān evidently was spared or escaped, for in 1811 we find it cruising in the Gulf in company of the pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir. On the 21st of January the armament, having crossed the Gulf, anchored at Mughu on the Persian coast, and four Shārjah boats found in the anchorage were destroyed. Nakhilu, Chārak, Kung and Band Mu'allim were visited, but no large craft were found; a strict warning was addressed, however, to the Shaikhs of the two first-named ports.

Question Qatar pirates.

Before the return of the whole expedition to India, a discussion took place as to the expediency of operations against Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the piratical chief of Qatar, who, with the assistance of the Qawāsim, had defeated an attack made on him by the Persian authorities of Būshehr. His punishment was strongly advocated by Mr. Hankey Smith, the British Resident at Būshehr; but the project was in the end negatived, partly on the ground of Rahmah's neutral and even friendly attitude towards the British power, and partly on that of a close connection which he had recently formed with the Wahhābis. The bulk of the expeditionary force returned to Bombay in February 1810; but a portion was detained in the Gulf until the question of Rahmah's punishment had been settled, and did not reach India till April.

General outcome of the expedition.

As Sultān-bin-Saqar, the legitimate Shaikh of the Qawāsim, was still at this time an exile without authority over his tribe, while the Qawāsim themselves as yet remained in strict if not voluntary subjection to the Wahhābi agents set over them, no attempt was made to arrange the conciliatory convention which it had been one of the objects of the Bombay Government to bring about. Regard being had to the somewhat inconclusive end of the military operations at Rās-al-Khaimah, it is probable that no satisfactory arrangements could have been attained at this time without further coercion. An impression nevertheless prevailed among British officials that the danger from the Qawāsim was practically at an end; and discussion was limited to proposals for preventing its recrudescence. Mr. Manesty, the Resident at Basrah, advised that an embargo should be laid by Government on the exportation of timber from India to Masqat and the ports of the Persian Gulf; and his suggestion, which was supported by General Malcolm, British Envoy to Persia, was adopted, but proved futile.* To

* The sale of timber to Arabs on the coast of Malabar was prohibited for a time, until experience showed that they had no difficulty in obtaining it thence by indirect means, especially from Travancore.

the Wahhābi Amir a letter would seem to have been addressed, requesting that potentate to prohibit piracy by his dependents; and he in his reply, which was dignified but somewhat sarcastic in tone, appears to have stated that he had no cause of quarrel with Christians and that he had interdicted his followers from molesting British vessels.* The "distinguished zeal, prudence, promptitude and ability" with which the operations generally had been conducted by Captain Wainright and Colonel Smith† were highly commended by the Governor-General of India in Council.

Renewed trouble with the Qawāsim, 1811-1819.

Recrudescence of piracy, 1812.

During the remainder of 1810 and throughout the year 1811, the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Benares" and "Prince of Wales" being for part of that time employed in the Gulf, there was a complete cessation of piracy; but in 1812 the Qawāsim showed signs of returning to their nefarious practices. In 1813 several large craft belonging to Kangūn and Basrah fell into their hands, while some Indian trading vessels under the British flag were plundered by them, and others lay in enforced idleness at Porbandar not venturing to put to sea. The possibility of a renewed outbreak such as occurred is partially explained by the unsurveyed state of the Persian Gulf, in consequence of which a much larger proportion than was supposed of piratical craft had escaped destruction in 1809-10.

Anglo-'Omāni proceedings at Rās-al-Khaimah, 1813.

In 1813, as mentioned ‡ in the history of the 'Oman Sultanate, an expedition was undertaken by Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat against Ras-al-Khaimah, the ostensible object of the same being the restoration of Sultān-bin-Saqar, the legitimate Shaikh of the Qawāsim, who promised to exert his influence for the repression of piracy, to his position of authority over the tribe. At the suggestion of the Saiyid and under orders from the Government of Bombay, Lieutenant Bruce, the British Resident at Būshehr, accompanied the 'Omāni expedition for the purpose of witnessing the agreement which Sa'id proposed to form

* See Morier's *Journey through Persia*, pages 374-375.

† Colonel Lionel Smith, G.C.B., G.C.H., served with the 65th Regiment from 1806 till about 1825; he was promoted Major-General in 1819; he became Colonel of the 1st Foot in 1834 and Colonel of the 40th Foot in 1837; and in the latter year he reached the rank of Lieutenant-General. In 1838 he was created a Baronet. He was appointed Governor-General of Jamaica, and afterwards of Mauritius, where he died in 1842.

‡ *Vide* page 445 *ante*.

with Sultān-bin-Saqar; of arranging with the Qāsimi Shaikh, after his restoration, a renewal of the treaty of 1806; and of concluding new treaties upon similar lines with other Arab powers in the Gulf. The failure from the military point of view of the Saiyid's expedition, notwithstanding help rendered by the Bani Yās tribe of Abu Dhabi, caused the British scheme founded on it to fall to the ground.

Repetition of the same, 1814.

In 1814 a fresh expedition by Saiyid Sa'īd against Rās-al-Khaimah in which the Bani Yās once more assisted, was crowned with partial success, the Qawāsim binding themselves by the terms of peace to abstain from aggression upon the inhabitants of either coast of the Gulf of 'Omān and of the Persian Gulf below Bahrain and Kangūn, all of whom were to be regarded as subjects of Masqat, and to return any booty which might have been taken by their fleets then actually at sea; but the engagement was not observed. During the presence of the Saiyid before Rās-al-Khaimah, or very shortly after his departure, a Persian vessel carrying goods from Masqat to Bandar 'Abbās, a port under his jurisdiction, was attacked by 7 Qāsimi boats and taken after a stout resistance in which many were killed on both sides; and it is not clear that restitution was made even in this case, although it was covered by the terms of the treaty, on which the ink was not yet dry.

Saiyid Sa'īd, before sailing against Rās-al-Khaimah in 1814, had attempted to enlist the active co-operation of the Bombay Government by claiming the benefits of an offensive and defensive alliance; but this interpretation of existing Anglo-'Omāni treaties was at once repudiated by the British authorities. Lieutenant Bruce, however, who had been instructed to proceed to Rās-al-Khaimah in any case and to demand satisfaction for recent injuries by the Qawāsim, besides obtaining, if possible, a fresh treaty with the tribe, was authorised to accompany the expedition; but it would seem that either the course of events or the line of policy followed by his associate was such as did not permit of his intervening in the negotiations.

In the accommodation which was arranged the Saiyid appears to have concentrated his attention on obtaining advantages for himself, and even to have obliged Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar to relinquish in his favour all claims to Rās-al-Khaimah; but it was agreed that the Shaikh should be placed in possession of Shārjah, at which place and at Lingeh he for some time afterwards continued to reside.

Relations of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar with Persia, 1814.

In August 1814 Sultān-bin-Saqar, who was then at Lingeh and was supposed to be well disposed towards the British Government, sent an agent of his own to the Court of Shirāz, on a mission of which the nature did not transpire; the only visible result was that, three months

later, the Shaikh received a dress of honour from the Shāh of Persia and was requested to co-operate with the Persians in the reduction of Bahrain.

Preliminary agreement between the Resident at Būshehr and a Qāsimi plenipotentiary, October 1814.

The Resident at Būshehr had for some time been in correspondence with Hasan-bin-Rahmah, *de facto* Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, in regard to depredations committed by the Qawāsim on the coast of India; and in the meanwhile the ship "Ahmad Shah," apparently containing remounts for the East India Company, had been taken by the Shaikh of Chārak near the island of Qais, whence a part of the booty had been carried off to Rās-al-Khaimah in a Qāsimi boat. Hasan-bin-Rahmah did not immediately reply to the Resident's first letter, but proceeded to Dara'iyah to confer, perhaps on the subject thereof, with 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ūd, the Wahhābi Amir. On his way back to Rās-al-Khaimah Hasan-bin-Rahmah despatched from Hasa a certain Hasan-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ghaith with letters from the Shaikh himself and from the Wahhābi Amir for Lieutenant Bruce; this emissary arrived at Būshehr on the 2nd of October 1814. In their epistles the Amir and the Shaikh both denied the commission of offences by the Qawāsim against the British flag, but promised the restitution of any property the taking of which could be proved; both requested that the distinction between British subjects and others might be made more plain; and a request was added by the Shaikh that Hasan-bin-Muhammad might be treated as a plenipotentiary empowered on his part to renew the treaty of 1806, and that the past might be regarded with a lenient eye. To increase the attractiveness of these proposals a hope was held out that an Agent would shortly be deputed by Hasan-bin-Rahmah to Bombay for the purpose of negotiating a regular treaty; and, by way of mollifying the resentment of the British Government, it was verbally explained by the envoy that the incessant naval warfare in which the Qawāsim engaged was necessary for the maintenance of their position in the Gulf, and that without it they could not live in safety from their enemies. Lieutenant Bruce and the emissary accordingly signed a preliminary agreement by which it was provided that, in consideration of the Qawāsim's respecting British vessels in future, flying a special flag to distinguish them from other maritime Arabs, restoring the Company's property taken from the "Ahmad Shah," and fulfilling certain other conditions, the misdeeds of the past should be overlooked and the tribe should be at liberty to visit the ports of British India. On the Resident's part this agreement was entered into subject to the approbation of the Government of Bombay, to whom it was immediately referred.

Immediate break-down of the arrangement.

The hollowness of the arrangement was, however, very shortly demonstrated by the seizure, in Rās-al-Khaimah harbour, of a boat in which Lieutenant Bruce, under the orders of Government, had sent friendly letters to the chief and to his envoy, Hasan-bin-Muhammad, regarding the capture off Porbandar in the preceding month of August of some boats under British colours. According to one authority * the wretched envoy himself had, on his return from Būshehr to Rās-al-Khaimah, been subjected to the most degrading treatment because of his concessions to the infidel.

Numerous fresh outrages by the Qawāsim, 1815.

The Qawāsim, feeling perhaps how deeply they had committed themselves, now indulged in a carnival of maritime lawlessness, to which even their own previous record presented no parallel. In the Mughu anchorage, with the connivance of the people of Mughu, they captured a Baghlah belonging to Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat which was laden with remounts for His Majesty's 17th Light Dragoons and with sulphur for the British Government. Six native vessels were taken by them off the coast of Sind; and not long afterwards an action was fought off Quryāt between one of their fleets, consisting of a ship with 25 Baghlahs and Batils, and a squadron commanded by Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat in person. In this encounter the Saiyid was wounded, while his flagship the "Caroline" was boarded, and, but for an opportune discharge of grape from the poop among the enemy's boarders crowding the forecastle, would probably have been taken. In 1815 a British Indian vessel was captured by the Qawāsim near Masqat, the majority of the crew being put to death and the remainder held to ransom.

Capture of the "Deriah Dowlut," January 1816.

On the 6th of January 1816 the H.E.I. Company's armed pattamar "Deriah Dowlut," officered and manned entirely by natives of India, was attacked by Qawāsim off Dwarka, and eventually taken by boarding. Out of 38 souls on board, 17 were killed or murdered, 8 were carried prisoners to Rās-al-Khaimah, and the remainder, being wounded, were landed on the Indian coast. The entire armament of the "Deriah Dowlut" consisted of two 12-pounder and three 2-pounder iron guns; whereas each of the pirate vessels, three in number, carried six 9-pounders and was manned by 100 to 200 Arabs, fully armed.

Attack on the "Aurora," January 1816.

In the same month a Qāsimi squadron composed of 15 vessels, the smallest pulling 20 oars, waylaid the H.E.I. Company's cruiser "Aurora" of 14 guns, Captain Jeakes, while convoying down the Persian Gulf a large

* *Vide* Buckingham, pages 424-425.

Baghlah that carried treasure for the ruler of Masqat. Though much incommoded by the Baghlah, which she had in tow, the "Aurora" stood on through the middle of the hostile fleet; and in the action which ensued she plied them so hotly with grape and canister that several were sunk, and the remainder at nightfall drew off baffled, and disappeared in the direction of the Arabian coast.

Other piracies, 1816.

Not long after this, the Qawāsim pursued and fired at the American ship "Persia"; attacked the "Macaulay" and the "Cintra"; and even plundered a French schooner on the voyage from Mauritius to Basrah, though convoyed by a ship of the same nationality. A few weeks later several other seizures were achieved by the Qawāsim, among them that of a ship under the British flag, of which the name was never ascertained; this vessel was taken by five pirate boats and her crew and passengers were put to the sword. The H.E.I. Company's armed boat "Turrarow" also fell into the hands of the Qawāsim; and on every side their captures and atrocities continued. Matters had now reached such a pitch that Lieutenant Bruce, the Political Resident, could not even obtain a boat to carry a letter of remonstrance to Rās-al-Khaimah; most of the ports on the Persian side to the south of Nāband had begun to emulate the Pirate Coast to the best of their ability; the Shaikh of Chārak had attached himself to the piratical Qāsimi organisation; and 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, Shaikh of Bahrain, was reported to have announced his intention of adopting piracy as the shortest road to fortune.

Capture of Sūrat merchantmen in the Red Sea, 1816.

Matters were at length brought to a head by the capture in the Red Sea, in 1816, of three Indian merchant vessels from Sūrat, which were making the passage to Mokha under the British flag; of the crews only a few survivors remained to tell the tale, and the pecuniary loss was estimated at Rs. 12,00,000. The pirates were commanded on this occasion by Amīr Ibrāhīm, a kinsman of Hasan-bin-Rahmah, the *de facto* Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah. In this new and remote quarter the offences by the Qawāsim had their beginning in 1815; and it was probably about this time that, as tradition relates, they made cruel raids at various points along the southern coast of Arabia including the Kuria Muria Islands and Hāsik on the mainland, both of which they left virtually depopulated.

Reparation refused.

The circumstances of the outrage upon the Sūrat vessels took some time to investigate; but in September 1816, as soon as the facts had been made clear, His Majesty's sloop "Challenger," 18 guns, and the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Mercury" and "Vestal," 14 and 10 guns respectively, sailed from Bombay for the Gulf. The "Ariel,"

already present there, was meanwhile sent to Rās-al-Khaimah to demand an explanation, and returned to Būshehr with a flat denial, on the part of the Qawāsim, of their complicity in the Red Sea affair; to this denial were subjoined the further curious justifications, that the Qawāsim had promised to respect the lives and property of Christians only, not those of idolatrous Hindus, and that in any case they could not recognise as native subjects of Britain any inhabitants of the western coast of India except those of Bombay and Mangalore. The Resident, Lieutenant Bruce, and his Assistant, Lieutenant Taylor, arrived off Rās-al-Khaimah on the 28th of November with the "Challenger," "Mercury," "Vestal" and "Ariel," and early the next morning a letter addressed to the Shaikh was conveyed ashore by Lieutenant Taylor, but he was not allowed an interview with the chief. A little later, however, Hasan-bin-Rahmah consented to see Captain Bridges of the "Challenger," whom Mr. J. S. Buckingham, afterwards well-known as a traveller and journalist, accompanied in the capacity of interpreter; and by these gentlemen it was ascertained from the chief personally that he had both received the letter of the Resident and fully understood its contents. In that communication discussion of the principal point, whether the Qawāsim were the authors of the crime in the Red Sea or not, was refused; the immediate restoration of the plundered vessels and property or, alternatively, the payment of their value in cash was demanded; the surrender of Amir Ibrāhīm for punishment was claimed; and it was added that two sons of Shaikhs must be delivered up to the Government of Bombay as hostages for the future behaviour of the tribe. In event of failure to comply with all or any of these terms the squadron, under the instructions received by the Resident, was simply to withdraw after denouncing the displeasure of Government against Qawāsim. The answer of the Shaikh, delivered at noon on the 27th, was insolent and evasive; but he was given a further period of 24 hours for consideration, and meanwhile a wind from the north-west arose, which compelled the squadron to weigh anchor and run over for shelter to the coast of Qishm. On the 30th the ships again appeared before Rās-al-Khaimah and a fresh period of grace was allowed the Shaikh, terminating at noon on the following day. Hasan-bin-Rahmah continued obstinate and adhered firmly to his own counter-proposal, which was that he should be allowed to send envoys to Bombay to settle the matter there.

Futile attack on Ras-al-Khaimah, 1st December 1816.

On the receipt of this reply the squadron stood in as close to the town as they could without going aground and opened fire upon four Arab vessels which were anchored close in-shore; but the range, which was fully a mile, was too great for all but a few of their guns; and,

though some 350 rounds were fired, no visible execution was done.* The squadron then dispersed, the "Mercury" and "Ariel" being detailed to visit Shārjah, Lingeh and Chārak on a mission similar to that performed at Rās-al-Khaimah, while the "Challenger" convoyed the "Vestal" out of the Gulf, turning back at Masqat to afford protection to upward-bound vessels.

Naval resources of the Qawā-im.

The piratical force of the Qawāsim at this period was estimated at 60 large boats belonging to Rās-al-Khaimah, carrying from 80 to 300 men each, besides 40 others of a smaller size distributed over the ports of Shārjah, Rams, Lāft, Lingeh and Chārak. At the time of the British squadron's visit to Rās-al-Khaimah it was understood that the Qawāsim had about 20 vessels actually at sea, of which 15 were then prowling in the Gulf of 'Omān and 5 in the upper part of the Persian Gulf.

Raids by the Qawāsim on the Persian Coast, 1817-18.

The Government of Bombay, though decisive action against the Qawāsim was now contemplated, were not in a position to take immediate steps; and, while they delayed, the temerity of the pirates continued to increase. In October 1817 a Qāsimi fleet made a raid on Shaikh Shu'aib, burned and plundered the villages at the western end of the island, drove off all the cattle, and slaughtered a number of the inhabitants. A little later they entered the roadstead of 'Asalu, captured there 5 large native Baghlahs worth with their cargoes Rs. 3,00,000, and put the crews to death. After a stay of 12 days at 'Asalu the pirate fleet made a demonstration against Kangūn and even attacked Daiyir, but they were repulsed by the inhabitants of the latter place. These outrages, of which the proximity to Būshehr steadily increased, caused a panic in that town; and the people were with difficulty restrained by the Governor from taking flight to the interior.

Depredations on the coast of India.

Simultaneously two native ships, with cargoes of cotton, were taken by the Qawāsim off Din; and thereafter the "Mustapha," an Arab vessel but officered by Englishmen and flying English colours, was captured only 70 miles north of Bombay.

Escape of a Qāsimi fleet at Gwatar, December 1818.

In December 1818 the H.E.I. Company's brigs "Thetis" and "Psyche," assisted by H.M.S. "Eden," succeeded in cornering 14 piratical Qāsimi vessels in Gwatar Bay; but, time having been allowed them until the morning, in opposition to the advice of the Company's officers, they made their escape during the night.

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* In these proceedings the local officers appear to have exceeded their instruction. *Vide* Buckingham, pages 497-498.

Defeat of a Qāsimi squadron by the "Antelope," December 1818.

On the 21st of December 1818, near the island of Qishm, the Company's cruiser "Antelope" came upon the "Rahmany," a full-rigged ship belonging to the Sultān of 'Omān, beset, along with a native Baghlah, by a Qāsimi fleet consisting of 4 great Baghlahs, 2 Batils of the largest size and another vessel, with which they had maintained a running fight for two days, almost exhausting their ammunition. The "Antelope," Lieutenant Tanner, immediately attacked the pirate fleet and drove them towards the coast of Qishm; they then turned at bay and made desperate attempts to board their determined assailant, but were repulsed by the accurate fire of the British guns, after having on one occasion succeeded in approaching within 100 yards. On the pirates taking to flight the "Antelope" gave chase and pursued them for 5¼ hours, but could not overtake them on account of the lightness of the wind. This was a remarkable action, inasmuch as the combined force of the Qawāsim amounted to 29 guns and about 1,070 men, whereas the "Antelope" carried only twelve 18-pounder carronades and two 12-pounder brass guns with a crew, all told, of 71 Europeans and 37 natives. The Qawāsim subsequently confessed to the loss of 117 men in the affair with the "Antelope."

Various engagements, pursuits, etc., by British cruisers, October 1818 to February 1819.

On Christmas morning, 1818, H.M.S. "Eden" and the Company's brig-of-war "Psyche" rescued a captured boat from two pirate Trankis, which managed to escape; during the whole of the same day the Company's cruiser "Thetis" followed without success a Qāsimi fleet of 7, and on the next day another of 4 sail; and on the 10th and 11th of January 1819 H.M.S. "Eden" sunk 2 piratical Baghlahs off Qishm and Hanjām, but failed to capture 6 Trankis by which the Baghlahs were accompanied. About the same time H.M.S. "Conway" found 17 Qāsimi war vessels at Bahrain, returning with a large number of men from Qatif, where they had arrived too late to help the Wahhābi Amir in opposing the Egyptian forces which were then overrunning Arabia; but the commander, Captain Barnard, out of respect for the neutrality of the port of Manāmah abstained from attacking the Qawāsim at anchor; and, once at sea, the Qawāsim were able to evade his pursuit. Between October 1818 and January 1819 the Company's cruisers "Thetis" and "Psyche" encountered the Qawāsim sailing in flotillas of 2 to 10 vessels no less than 17 times, and continued to drive them from place to place; but, on account of the superior sailing qualities of the Arab boats, the British vessels seldom or never succeeded in bringing them to action. In February 1819, on the occasion of a British naval demonstration at

Bahrain, the Shaikh of those islands was induced to arrange with Hasan-bin-Rahmah for the exchange of some Qāsimi prisoners in the hands of the British Government against Indian women then held in captivity at Rās-al-Khaimah: of the latter 17 were released.

Preparations by the Qawāsim to occupy Bāsidu.

The Qawāsim now entertained the design of forming a settlement at Bāsidu on the island of Qishm, to which they might retire if successfully assailed by the ever advancing Egyptians, and whence, at the same time, they might continue to prey with convenience upon the upward and downward commerce of the Gulf. The gallant action fought by the "Antelope" is believed to have been largely instrumental in frustrating the execution of this scheme.

Overtures of the Qawāsim rejected by the Government of Bombay.

Conscious of impending retribution, the *de facto* Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah at this point made overtures for a reconciliation with the Government of Bombay and adverted to the negotiations of 1814 between himself, the Wahhābi Amīr and the British power; but it was too late. His advances were sternly rejected.

The third British expedition against the Qawāsim, 1819-20.

Deliberations preceding the expedition.

The third campaign of the Indian Government against the pirates of the Persian Gulf was undertaken, after full consideration, with a firm resolve that it should be final and conclusive; and it probably would not have been so long delayed as it was, had it not been for difficulties in India, particularly those occasioned by the Gurkha war of 1814-15 and by the Pindāri troubles and Marātha war of 1817-18. Operations appear to have been contemplated as early as 1816; but it was not until September 1818 that the Government of Bombay submitted, under orders from the Government of India, detailed suggestions for the pacification of the Gulf. It was believed that a stubborn resistance would be offered by the Qawāsim, to overcome which a strong land force, estimated by the Government of Bombay at 3,000, and by the Government of India at 4,000 or 5,000 men, would be required; and, as on account of the position of affairs in the Dakkhan not a single battalion could be spared in time for service abroad during the approaching winter, the Government of India directed that the expedition should be postponed until the following year. The Wahhābi power in Central Arabia had recently been overthrown by Ibrahīm Pasha, son of Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha, Viceroy of Egypt; and it was hoped that the eastward progress of the Egyptians, whose active co-operation against Ras-al-Khaimah it was at the same time resolved to invite, would in the meantime make the task of the

British easier by striking terror into the Qawāsim. Pending a settlement the Government of Bombay maintained the system, which had already been for some time in force, of protecting trade by giving convoy up and down the Gulf to trading vessels,—a duty in which they were materially assisted by His Majesty's ships. Some of the East India Company's vessels were placed for this purpose at the disposal of the officers of the Royal Navy commanding in the Gulf, while others were stationed off the Persian Coast to prevent piratical attacks upon that side.

In the following year, 1819, discussion of the measures to be taken in the Gulf was resumed, and various schemes were proposed for ensuring the maintenance of peace after the conclusion of the expedition. The Government of Bombay, who did not regard the possible introduction of the Egyptians into Gulf affairs with much satisfaction, inclined apparently to a scheme under which the Saiyid of 'Omān should be placed in charge for the future of the Pirate Coast and Bahrain Islands, and should in return authorise the formation of a British settlement upon the island of Qishm, and even defray the cost of maintaining it. The Government of Bombay considered that the Saiyid had a hereditary claim to suzerainty over the Pirate Coast, and that the Shaikh of Bahrain had forfeited all claim to consideration by harbouring and protecting pirates; and they understood that the Shāh of Persia had expressed his readiness to agree to the occupation of Bahrain by the Saiyid on condition of an annual payment of 30,000 Tūmāns to himself out of a total estimated revenue of 200,000 * Tūmāns; but they entertained some doubt of the expediency of destroying the independence of the Shaikhs of Bahrain, and they evidently anticipated serious opposition on the part of the Persian Government to the location of a British post on Qishm. The course which was in the end adopted, after argument,† will appear from the

* The estimate must have been excessive for the Tūmān was then worth about a pound sterling, while the present revenue of Bahrain is only about £20,000 per annum.

† An independent line was adopted by Mr. F. Warden, who had made a special study of Persian Gulf subjects, who in his capacity of Chief Secretary had not been consulted by the Governor of Bombay in regard to the expedition, and who therefore, as a provincial member of the Bombay Board, delivered himself on the 12th August 1819 of a monumental minute on policy. Mr. Warden's main contention was that the Wahhābis, not the Qawāsim, were principally to blame for the piracies committed by the latter; and he observed: "The result of my researches has established this "important fact, that piracy is not indigenous to the soil or the shores of the Persian "Gulph, but of recent growth; on the contrary every tribe is rather disposed to engage "in commercial pursuits." He argued that the molestation of British vessels was to be

sequel: it involved the acceptance of naval and military aid from the Saiyid of 'Omān and the ultimate occupation of Qishm under his authority, but without his financial assistance.

attributed to undue interference by the British Government in native affairs in the Gulf; he endeavoured to explain away the "Bassein" and "Viper" cases of 1797; and he represented the Qawāsim and the 'Utūb as obliged by the Wahhābis to engage in piracy against their will. Of the Qawāsim he wrote: "The Joasmees then, not "being free agents but compelled by the Chiefs placed over them by the Wahabee to "engage in maritime depredations, do not appear to be so atrociously guilty, so deeply "stained with the crimes of piracy, as I thought when I was less acquainted with their "history. * * * * The prevalence of piracy, then, in the Gulph of Persia "may be attributed wholly and exclusively to the instigation of the Wahabee tribe. "Under that impression I feel disposed in some degree to advocate the cause even of the "Joasmee tribe, and to palliate their enormities." Mr. Warden regarded the Saiyid of 'Omān, on whose weakness and restlessness he dwelt at length, as a most unsuitable chief to be invested with any sort of general supremacy in the Gulf; and it cannot be doubted that he stood on firm ground when he insisted that the Saiyid had no valid claim to the overlordship of the Pirate Coast, that the Persian Government would object to his being placed in possession of Bahrain, and that his claim to sovereign rights over Qishm, as against Persia, was probably ill-founded. Mr. Warden was in favour of reducing the strength of the proposed expedition and of limiting its scope to the restoration of the authority of Shaikh Sultān, the lawful non-Wahhābi head of the Qawāsim, for which purpose he would have invoked the co-operation not only of the Saiyid of 'Omān, but also of the Shihūh, the Bani Yās, the 'Utūb of Bahrain and Kuwait, the Persians, and the Turks. He agreed, however, with the general opinion that a British station should be established on the island of Qishm, but to this end he would have negotiated with the Government of Persia rather than with that of 'Omān, and he was even in favour of a transfer of the Persian Gulf Residency from Būshehr to Qishm. He urged the desirability of a convention with the tribes for the suppression of piracy, the importance of a right to visit all ports and destroy armed vessels, and the necessity of a prohibition of the export of ship-building timber from India.

Some of Mr. Warden's suggestions had results which are traceable in the subsequent proceedings; but his general line of argument did not meet with the approval of Government. In a minute, dated 6th September 1819, Sir E. Nepean, the Governor of Bombay, observed: "The Board is already in possession of my opinion on the rest "of the points contained in Mr. Warden's minute; and all that may be necessary for me "at present to add is that the impressions formed by all the most intelligent officers, "naval and military, who have for some years past visited the Gulph are directly in "opposition to those entertained by Mr. Warden; and so far from thinking they (the "tribes) are disposed to quit their present predatory habits and to have recourse to "commercial pursuits, they consider their present habits so deeply rooted that nothing "but the strong hand of power will keep them down. What said the Chief of Rasel-"Khyma on Mr. Bruce's remonstrances in consequence of his breach of engagement on "the capture of some vessels belonging to our native subjects? 'If we (meaning the "Joasmees) were to accede to the proposition of respecting vessels navigated by natives "of India, we must starve.'"

Mission of Captain Sadleir, April 1819 to January 1820.

For the purpose of concluding preliminary arrangements,* Captain G. Forster Sadleir of His Majesty's 47th Regiment had already been despatched from Bombay, on the 14th of April 1819, with letters for Saiyid Sa'id and Ibrahim Pasha. The instructions of this officer were that he should call at Masqat, and, after making known to the Saiyid the nature

* As it has been stated information about Captain Sadleir is not now procurable, the present writer takes the opportunity of placing on record some facts which he has been able to collect regarding the forgotten career and personality of a remarkable officer.

George Forster Sadleir was born at Cork on the 19th January 1789. His father, James Sadleir, who belonged to a Tipperary family, purchased an estate named Shannon Vale and was at one time High Sheriff of the city of Cork. His mother was a Miss Forster, and his second name was derived from her family. He had two brothers, of whom the younger, Richard, served in the Royal Navy.

Sadleir joined the Army as Ensign on the 4th April 1805; he was promoted Lieutenant in the same year, Captain in 1813, and Major in 1830; and he retired from the service, by sale of his commission, on the 17th February 1837. He saw military service at Monte Video and Buenos Ayres in 1807; from April 1812 to June 1815 he was engaged, with twelve sergeants from his Regiment, in training the Shah's troops in Persia, in acknowledgment of which he was subsequently awarded a Farmán and sword of honour from Fateh 'Ali Shah; he took part in the Malwa campaign, Central India, and was employed in a political capacity under Sir J. Malcolm, 1817-18; in 1819-20, he carried out the mission in Arabia, described in our text, for the charge of which he was recommended by the Government of India to the Government of Bombay; in 1820-21 he was sent as Envoy to Sind and concluded the "Treaty of Hyderabad on the Indus," and in 1824-26 he discharged the duties of Major of Brigade with the Bengal Division of the British army in Burma.

He returned to Europe in 1833 or 1834, probably not for the first time since his departure for the East, for on the 20th March 1826 he had been enrolled as a Freeman of Cork. After his retirement he married, probably in 1847 or 1848, a Miss Ridings of Cork, her brother also marrying his sister; and about 1855 he emigrated to New Zealand. He died in Auckland before 1868.

A personal touch is supplied by an officer of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment who writes: "Sadlier was a great linguist, but a man of violent temper, and he was the "cause of Colonel Elrington being tried by Court Martial, as he reported the Regiment "to be in a mutinous state on the line of march in Scotland, when he was in command. "It was in the year 1834, and the Batta allowance was given in kind (bread) in Scotland "instead of money, and the men could not understand this and stuck the loaves on their "bayonets."

Whether his name was spelt "Sadleir" or "Sadlier" must be considered doubtful: possibly it was written in both ways. An extract copied from the Freeman's Roll of Cork gives "Sadlier"; but "Sadleir" is the form found in the records of the War Office and that favoured by most of his surviving relatives and friends. It is believed that no male representative of the family bearing the name of Sadleir[or Sadlier is now alive.

of his mission to Ibrahim Pasha and ascertaining the nature and extent of the assistance which the ruler of 'Omán himself would be able and willing to afford, should proceed with the utmost despatch to the camp of the Egyptian commander, whom he was authorised to assure that, as soon after the termination of the monsoon as it might be convenient to undertake operations from India, an adequate British force, naval and military, would be sent to the Persian Gulf for the purpose of co-operating with the Egyptians in the reduction of Rás-al-Khaimah, and that the town would thereafter be delivered over to be garrisoned by Egyptian troops, provided the Pasha should have allotted a competent force to the service of covering the siege. In the formal letters addressed to Ibrahim Pasha that general was congratulated on his recent brilliant successes, and the scheme of joint Anglo-Egyptian operations was unfolded for his consideration. Captain Sadleir was further directed to study the situation of the Egyptians in Central Arabia and to fathom, if he could do so without showing too great an interest in the subject, their ulterior designs in the direction of the Persian Gulf; but, whatever those designs might be, he was to refrain from giving the Egyptians, on behalf of the British Government, any guarantee beyond that authorised in regard to Rás-al-Khaimah. As much information as possible regarding the geography and resources of Central Arabia itself was to be collected by Captain Sadleir in his journeyings; and, having accomplished his mission, he was to return to the Presidency headquarters.

Before Captain Sadleir's arrival on the spot, the political situation had so changed as to render the main part of his task impossible of fulfilment, but in his efforts to perform it he showed himself possessed of extraordinary energy and perseverance. Incidentally he achieved the unique distinction of being the first European to traverse the Arabian continent from sea to sea, and that at the hottest season of the year.

Captain Sadleir's negotiations with the Sultán of 'Omán, May 1819.

Captain Sadleir remained at Masqat from the 7th to the 18th of May 1819 and was successful in obtaining from Saiyid Sa'íd a careful estimate of the political position and military force of the Qawásim, a promise by the Saiyid to co-operate in person with the British expedition at the head of a large force, a precise statement of the part which he was prepared to take in the operations, and a detailed undertaking to assist in the matter of supply and marine transport. In one respect only Saiyid Sa'íd was not amenable to persuasion: he would not consent to any sort of association between his own troops and those of the Egyptians; and he manifestly regarded the proposed co-operation

of the latter at Rās-al-Khaimah as in the highest degree dangerous to his interests. Saiyid Sa'id also expressed an opinion that Ibrāhim Pāsha would be unable to reply to the British proposals without a reference to his father, the Viceroy of Egypt, and that Captain Sadleir's mission could not be accomplished before the time fixed for the expedition, unless the latter were postponed; in both of these respects his anticipations were remarkably confirmed by the event.

Captain Sadleir's quest of Ibrāhim Pāsha and journey across Arabia, June to September 1819.

On his journey from Masqat to Būshehr, Captain Sadleir was much delayed by contrary winds; nor did he reach Qatif, where his attempts to open communication with Ibrāhim Pāsha began, until the 21st of June. He found the credit of the Egyptians already gone and their short-lived occupation of Eastern Arabia practically at an end; but he still considered it his duty to convey his despatches to their destination. From Hofūf, which he reached on the 11th of July, he accompanied the disorganised and retreating Egyptian forces by Dara'iyah and Shaqrah to Rass in Qasīm, where he arrived on the 26th of August, only to learn that the Pāsha had left 48 hours previously for Madīnah. From Rass it was impossible for Captain Sadleir, in the actual state of the country, to return to the Persian Gulf; and he therefore pushed on with the Egyptians to Madīnah, in the environs of which he arrived on the 6th of September, his horse falling down exhausted just as he reached the last halting place.

Unsatisfactory issue of Captain Sadleir's negotiations with Ibrāhim Pasha, September to November

On the 8th of September Captain Sadleir obtained an interview with Ibrāhim Pāsha, and on the following day he delivered the letters of the Governor-General of India and the Governor of Bombay, together with a sword, a gift from the former to the Pāsha; but the Egyptian commander insisted on referring the proposals of the Indian Government, though no longer capable of being put into effect, to Muhammad 'Ali at Cairo. The Pāsha then proceeded on pilgrimage to Makkah, Captain Sadleir meanwhile awaiting the result of the reference at Yanbo', where he suffered severely from fever. When a sufficient time had elapsed for the receipt of a reply from Egypt, Captain Sadleir followed Ibrāhim Pāsha to Jiddah; but the tone of the Pāsha, formerly friendly, had now become uncivil. Eventually, in consequence of a studied insult to the Governor-General of India contrived by the Pāsha in connection with his return present, Captain Sadleir broke off communication on the 14th of November. On the 23rd of January 1820, the H.E.I. Company's cruiser "Prince of Wales" happening to visit Jiddah, Captain Sadleir was taken on board and so, apparently, returned to Bombay after an absence of nearly a year, during which he had supported with indomitable spirit the most unusual hardships. Of the despatches sent by

Captain Sadleir to the Government of India after his departure from Hofûf not one reached its destination; and in the expedition against Rás-al-Khaimah, which meanwhile took place, the expectation of Egyptian assistance was after the first discarded.

Assurances to Persia.

To prevent a misunderstanding by the Persian Government of the objects of the British expedition, such as might easily arise through the chastisement of the Shaikhs of Lingeh, Mughu, Chárak and Chiru, who were believed to be implicated in recent piracies and whom it was intended to punish, Dr. Jukes was despatched in advance with reassuring letters from the Governor of Bombay for the Persian Governor-General of Fárs and the Persian Governor of Búshehr; and, on the 15th of December 1819, a letter explaining the intentions of the Indian Government was addressed to Mr. H. Willock, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrán, for the satisfaction of the Persian Court.

Objects of the expedition.

In the instructions ultimately issued to Major-General Sir William Grant Keir, K.M.G., in whom were vested both the supreme political authority and the direction of the military operations, much was left to the discretion of the commander; but it was clearly indicated that the main purpose of the expedition was the exemplary punishment of the Qawásim of Rás-al-Khaimah and the annihilation of their power, by the capture of the town and the destruction of all their piratical craft as well as of every object of naval or military use which might be found there; and similar measures were to be applied to Rams and other guilty ports subordinate to Rás-al-Khaimah, and to places on the Persian coast of which the piratical character might be established. The principal restrictions imposed by the orders of Government were that the British troops should not, unless in very exceptional circumstances, be employed at any distance from the places at which there were piratical vessels to be destroyed; and that, on the Persian side, the utmost practicable consideration should be shown for the undisputed rights of His Persian Majesty. As regards the temporary administration of Rás-al-Khaimah, which the Government as yet intended to transfer to the Egyptians, it was at first ordered that Shaikh Sultán-bin-Saqar, who had recently deserted the Saiyid of Masqat in an attempt to capture the place, should not on any account be placed in charge of the same; but this prohibition was early rescinded, Sir W. Grant Keir being invested instead with discretionary power to make the town over after capture to Sultán-bin-Saqar, or to any other chief whom the people might elect, provided only that he was unconnected with the Wahhábis and unlikely to become a patron of piracy.

Composition of the naval and military forces.

The ships of war placed at the disposal of Sir W. Grant Keir were the following, some of which were assembled at Bombay while others were already in the Gulf: H.M.S. "Liverpool," 50 guns, Captain

Collier; H.M.S. "Eden," 26 guns; H.M.S. "Curlew," 18 guns; and the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Teignmouth," "Benares," "Aurora," "Nautilus," "Ariel" and "Vestal," of 16, 16, 14, 14, 10, and 10 guns respectively. The transports for the conveyance of land troops and naval stores numbered 18; and the military portion of the force consisted of one company of European artillery,* His Majesty's 47th and 65th Regiments, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Native Infantry, the flank companies of the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Native Infantry and of the Marine Battalion, and half a company of Pioneers; in all 3,069 fighting men, of whom 1,645 were Europeans and 1,424 were sepoys.† The divisional staff consisted of Major E. G. Stannus, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain D. Wilson, Assistant Quartermaster-General; and Captain G. F. Sadleir of the 47th Regiment, Interpreter: the place of the last, as he was still absent on his mission, was taken by ‡ Captain T. Perronet Thompson of H. M.'s 17th Light Dragoons.

The voyage, 3rd to 24th November.

Sir W. Grant Keir having embarked in the "Liverpool," the division of transports carrying the European troops sailed from Bombay on the 3rd of November 1819 and was followed by the remainder at an interval of a few days; the whole were under the convoy of men-of-war. The Qawāsim remained active to the last. At the end of October their vessels were reported to be cruising in large numbers off the coasts of Makrān, Sind and Kathiawar; and the "Curlew," while actually on her way to Bombay to join the fleet, had been attacked by 15 large Qāsimi boats which she defeated in a five hours' battle, sinking three and capturing seven. While the fleet made straight for the appointed rendezvous off Qishm, the commander of the expedition proceeded in the "Liverpool" to confer with Saiyid Sa'īd at Masqat, arriving there on the 13th of November; on the 21st he rejoined the main body of the expedition at sea; and on the 24th, a gale then blowing, all but the rearmost ships were collected at an anchorage under the lee of Lārak Island.

Reconnaissance and blockade of Rās-al-Khaimah, 25th

On the 25th of November the "Liverpool," accompanied by the "Benares," arrived off Rās-al-Khaimah and blockaded the harbour, while the transports on the 26th moved round to Qishm town to take

* The guns were "a battering train of six 18-pounders, with some 10-inch mortars and 5½-inch howitzers, and field pieces in proportion." (Regimental Records.)

† "The 65th Regiment embarked 750 rank and file on this expedition, and the light company was armed and equipped, by the authority and sanction of Government, as riflemen." (Regimental Records of the 65th Foot.)

‡ See footnote page 463 *ante*.

November to 2nd December.

in water. The 26th and 27th were devoted by Sir W. Grant Keir and his chief engineer to an examination of the defences of the town; and, as the result showed that the place might be taken with the force already available at Qishm, the "Benares" was sent to summon the fleet thence. The ships arrived on the 2nd of December, followed in the afternoon by the four last transports, whose arrival—lest a change of weather should take place—it had been decided not to await; and on the same day Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat made his appearance with two frigates and 600 men.

Disembarkation, and siege and capture of the town, 3rd to 9th December.

Upon this occasion the landing was effected about 2 miles south of the town, and a cordon was immediately formed across the peninsula; the 3rd of December passed in these preliminary operations and in disembarking tents, stores and provisions. It was found that the old wall across the isthmus had been taken down since 1809, leaving a bank in its place, and that a fort * had been constructed in the middle of the isthmus with the materials; a new wall had also been built, nearer to the town than the old. Rifle pits had been dug by the enemy in advance of his position. On the 4th a ridge about 900 yards from the nearest part of the fortifications was seized by the † "skirmishers and pickets" of the force, the enemy being driven back upon the fort and town; in this engagement Major Molesworth of the 47th, "a gallant and zealous officer," was struck on the head and killed by a shot from one of the enemies' guns, the fire of which he had mounted the ridge to observe. During the following night a battery for four guns was completed at a distance of 300 yards from the southernmost tower of Rās-al-Khaimah, with a mortar battery on the right of it about 100 yards from the edge of the inner harbour or backwater. On the 6th the town was bombarded, and its defences shaken, by the guns of the fleet and of the land batteries; the response of the defenders was feeble, apparently for want of ammunition, for they frequently fired large stones from their guns and darted out, between the discharges of the British artillery, to collect round-shot which had lodged outside the walls. On the night of the 6th, under cover of unusual darkness, the Arabs made a stealthy sortie; and the British mortar battery on the right was actually in their possession for a short time, during which they succeeded in removing a howitzer to a distance of about 100 yards;

* The fort, which was 350 paces from the new town wall, was a quadrangular stone building of much more solid construction than any ever before seen in the Persian Gulf. (Regimental Records of the 65th Foot.)

† *Viz.*, all the light companies of the force (51 in number) under Captain Buckhouse of the 47th, followed by pickets under Major Molesworth of the same regiment.

but they were quickly driven out again at the point of the bayonet, leaving six dead. During the 7th more guns and mortars were brought into position, including two 24-pounders from the "Liverpool," and during the 8th the enemy's works were subjected to almost continuous battering. A bombardment of the town was maintained throughout the night; and before daylight on the 9th the guns re-opened against the fort, the breaches in which were reported practicable at 8 A.M. The storming party, composed of 100 bluejackets and marines, the whole of the 47th Regiment, and the grenadier and flank companies of the other regiments, then advanced to the attack under the command of Colonel Elrington of the 47th; but their advance was unopposed, and the town, which had been evacuated in the night, was occupied as fast as the troops could run through it. Boats were then brought into the creek, and a party were sent over to Mahārah on the mainland and took possession of a round tower there. The operations had involved much fatigue and privation, which were borne with cheerfulness by the troops. The weather, during part of the time, was inclement and unfavourable.

Military results.

On the British side the total loss in the operations was 1 officer and 4 men killed and 3 officers and 49 men wounded. The casualties of the enemy were admitted by the Shaikh himself to amount to 400 killed and wounded, and some reports placed them at so high a figure as 1,000. Very little ordinary property except cattle remained in the town, the length of the siege having afforded the inhabitants' ample opportunity to remove their effects across the harbour to the mainland; but 60 or 70 guns, most of them small and unserviceable, and about 80 vessels of 40 to 250 tons were captured. The only persons found in the place were a score of men and a few old women; of the former some were captives of the Qawāsim.

Co-operation of Saiyid Sa'īd.

Useful assistance, especially in the matter of disembarkation and embarkation and in the conveyance of guns, matériel, etc., was lent by the crews of the Masqati frigates. The 'Omāni land army did not arrive until two days after the capture of the town; and, at the instance of the British General, they were immediately sent home, lest their presence should lead to complications, and because of the scarcity of supplies. The Saiyid himself remained on the spot until the 7th of January, when he took his leave.

Operations against and capture of Dhāyah, 18th to 22nd December.

On the fall of Rās-al-Khaimah the "Curlew," "Aurora" and "Nautilus" were sent to blockade Rams, a coast village a few miles to the northward, at which there were some piratical vessels and of which the Shaikh, Husain-bin-'Ali, was devoted to the Wahhābi interest

and had at one time acted as agent on behalf of the Wahhábis in the whole Qásimi country. Rams was found abandoned, the inhabitants having retired to Dhâyah, a place about 2 miles inland, where there was a village with a strong fort belonging to Husain-bin-'Ali upon a pyramidal hill; and, as the fort was considered by the Arabs to be impregnable, preparations for its capture, in view of the moral effect which its fall might be expected to produce, were immediately undertaken. On the 18th of December a force, consisting of His Majesty's 65th Regiment, of the flank companies of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Native Infantry Regiment, and of 30 artillerymen with two brass 12-pounders, two 8-inch mortars and four field guns, proceeded against Dhâyah under the immediate command of Major Warren of the 65th, General Grant Keir, however, accompanying the troops in person. On the 19th the enemy were driven back upon Dhâyah, disputing every foot of ground as they retired through the date plantations; an evasive answer was returned by the Shaikh, who had been summoned to surrender; and a couple of mortars commenced playing on the fort. The defences of Dhâyah were found to be unexpectedly strong. On the 20th more ground was gained, and the attacking force was increased by the flank companies of H.M.'s 47th Regiment, under Captain Backhouse, and of the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Native Infantry. On the morning of the 21st Dhâyah was completely surrounded, Ensign J. Matheson* of the 65th, "a most gallant, intelligent and zealous officer," being killed; and in the evening two 24-pounders from the "Liverpool," which had been brought up in face of great physical difficulties † by a naval contingent from the ships, were got into position against the fort on the north-east side, and a couple of 12-pounders against the Shaikh's house on the westward. On the 22nd an opportunity was allowed the garrison of sending their women and children to a place of safety; but it was neglected. At 8-30 A.M. the guns opened, and at 10-30 a breach had been made practicable and a column were about to advance to the assault, but were halted on the appearance of a white flag. The besieged now surrendered on condition that their lives should be spared, they giving up their arms and other property; at 1-30 P.M. the British flag was hoisted on the fort and Shaikh's house; and the prisoners, amounting to 598 fighting

* Also spelt (in the same Regimental Records) Mathison and Matthison.

† The guns had to be brought three miles up a narrow, intricate and shallow creek, and dragged first through a muddy swamp and then over rocky and intersected ground. The efforts of the sailors under Captain Walpole, R.N., and Lieutenant Campbell, R.N., were described by General Keir as "astonishing" and, in his experience, unsurpassed.

men, were marched to Rams to be embarked on the transports. For the safety, and even for the comfort, of the women and children, who exceeded 400 in number, every consideration was shown; and before the departure of the squadron so many of the male adult prisoners as were certified by Lieutenant Bruce, the Political Resident, to be usually peaceful cultivators were set at liberty and permitted to rejoin their families, with whom they found an asylum at the adjacent village of Shimil in Sīr. The prisoners not released, amounting—exclusive of the Shaikh himself—to 177, most of whom were either professional men-at-arms or natives of places that remained to be visited by the expedition, were then removed by sea to Rās-al-Khaimah. Eleven guns were captured, and the fort and Shaikh's house were blown up. The total British loss in the operations at Dhāyah was 1 officer and 3 men killed and 16 men wounded, one of whom died; among the Indian troops there were apparently no casualties.

Further operations, January and February 1820.

At their return to Rās-al-Khaimah, on the 26th of December 1819, the force from Dhāyah found that the demolition of the defences there ordered to be destroyed had been completed by the troops left behind, while the construction of a work for the accommodation of a British garrison had also made considerable progress. On the 17th of January 1820, a garrison of 800 sepoys with some artillery being left at Rās-al-Khaimah, the expedition proceeded against the remaining piratical harbours upon the coast. Jazīrat-al-Hamra was found deserted; but at Umm-al-Qaiwain, reached on the 18th of January, and at 'Ajmān, Fashṭ, Shārjah, Abu Hail and Dibai, the fortifications and larger vessels were destroyed. The fate of the shipping of Rās-al-Khaimah itself is not clear; Sir W. Grant Keir was evidently averse to its total destruction, and, for a time at least, spared a portion under plea of employing it in the service of the fleet.* On the receipt of a report that ten piratical vessels had taken refuge in Bahrain, which was now clearly shown to be a constant resort of the pirates and the principal market in which they disposed of their plunder, a naval force was detached to obtain their surrender; and, having been handed over, they were duly destroyed. In February some of the war-vessels and transports, carrying the bulk of the force, crossed over to the island of Qais, where they watered; and thence,

* That the Bombay Government, some time later, had reason to doubt whether the orders for the total destruction of piratical craft had been carried out as ordered appears from paragraph 6 of their letter No. 37 of the 16th February 1820. In the Regimental Records of the 65th Foot it is stated that 218 vessels in all were taken or destroyed by the expedition.

the expedition being declared at an end, they returned to Bombay. Some boats were taken and destroyed at the Persian ports of Lingeh, Mughu, 'Asalu and Kangûn. Prize money with interest, aggregating Rs. 2,66,625, was distributed seven years later under the orders of the East India Company: it was chiefly on account of vessels taken or destroyed.

General Treaty of Peace, 1820.

Negotiations with the Qawâsim.

Having followed the course of military events to the end, we may now revert to the political negotiations which commenced upon the fall of Rās-al-Khaimah. During the siege terms had been offered to such of the garrison as might surrender, but none of them had taken advantage of the offer; on the town passing into the possession of the British, however, Qadhib-bin-Ahmad, Shaikh of Jazirat-al-Hamra, came in upon an assurance of safety and was allowed to remain at large. Encouraged by his example Hasan-bin-Rahmah also gave himself up on a promise of "Amân"; this was a condition by no means implying freedom from personal restraint, but, as his confinement along with his suite appeared to excite general distrust, he was again set at liberty, and confidence was re-established. Numbers of Arabs then flocked in for the purpose of buying back the dates and rice which they had abandoned in the town; Sultân-bin-Saqar, Shaikh of Shârjah, soon after appeared to tender his unconditional submission; and he was followed by Muhammad-bin-Hazzâ', the nine-year old chief of Dibai, sent in by his father's widow, who was in charge of the government of that principality. On the 15th of January 1820 Shaikh Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams and his followers were released, partly in order to facilitate the negotiations, and partly because there was sickness among the prisoners and it seemed not unlikely that a number of them might die in custody.

Preliminary agreements.

As the first step towards a general settlement, each principal Shaikh of the Pirate Coast was required to sign a preliminary agreement; and not until he had done so, and had fully discharged its obligations, was he allowed to become a party to the General Treaty of Peace, which was the principal result achieved by the expedition. The objects of the preliminary agreements were, generally, the surrender of the vessels, towers

and guns of piratical places, under a promise that pearling and fishing craft should be restored, and the release of Indian prisoners; but no two of the agreements were precisely similar, and that signed at a late stage in the proceedings by an envoy of the Shaikhs of Bahrain bore reference chiefly to commercial dealings between Bahrain subjects and the pirates of 'Omān. By Hasan-bin-Rahmah, now described as Shaikh of Khatt and Falaiyah only, it was agreed that Rās-al-Khaimah, with Mahārah on the further side of the harbour, should remain in possession of the British Government. In the case of the Shaikh of Shārjah who had shown from the first a lively anxiety to submit, and of the Shaikh of Dibai, who was but little to blame and for whom the ruler of Masqat had interceded, an undertaking was given that the British troops should not enter or lay waste their towns. 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain as well as Shārjah were disposed of in the preliminary agreement made with Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar. The dates of execution of these documents, giving a rough clue to the progress of the negotiations, were as follow: by the Shaikh of Shārjah, 6th January 1820; by the Shaikh of Khatt and Falaiyah (Hasan-bin-Rahmah), 8th January; by the Shaikh of Dibai, 9th January; by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, 11th January; and by the Shaikhs of Bahrain (through an envoy), 5th February.

General Treaty concluded, 8th January 1820.

The General Treaty of Peace, subscribed in turn by each of the above chiefs after the obligations imposed on him by his preliminary agreement had been fulfilled, and also by some additional Shaikhs, was signed as below: by Hasan-bin-Rahmah of Khatt and Falaiyah, formerly of Rās-al-Khaimah, and by Qadhīb-bin-Ahmad of Jazīrat-al-Hamra, at Rās-al-Khaimah on the 8th of January 1820; by Shaikh Shakhbūt of Abu Thabi, at Rās-al-Khaimah on the 11th of January; by Husain-bin-'Ali of Dhāyah, at Rās-al-Khaimah on the 15th of January, the day of his release; by Zāid-bin-Saif, on behalf of his nephew the Shaikh of Dibai, at Shārjah on the 28th of January; by Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, at that place on the 4th of February; by Saiyid 'Abdul Jalīl, envoy on behalf of the Shaikhs of Bahrain, at Shārjah on the 5th of February, and by the Shaikhs themselves, Sulaimān-bin-Ahmad and 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, in Bahrain on the 23rd of February; and, finally, by Rāshid-bin-Hamaid of 'Ajmān and 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid of Umm-al-Qaiwain, at Falaiyah on the 15th of March. From their separate signature of this treaty it would appear that the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain were now considered to be independent rulers,—a status not conceded to them in the preliminary agreements. This position they have retained to the present day; but it may be observed, in the same

connection, that the Shaikhs of Dhāyah (or Rams) and Jazīrat-al-Hamra, who no longer enjoy any such distinction, were apparently treated in 1820 as on an equality with those who still do.

Terms of the Treaty.

By the first article of the General Treaty of Peace the signatories bound themselves to abstain for ever from all plunder and piracy by sea and land. In the second article plunder and piracy were distinguished from lawful warfare; and plunder and piracy, to whatever nation the persons attacked might belong, were interdicted under pain of death and forfeiture of property. The third article prescribed a flag for use by all Arabs included in the treaty, namely, that known in the British Navy as "White-pierced-Red"; of this pattern the red centre was understood to perpetuate the blood-red flag of the Qawāsim, the emblem even at the present day of most maritime Arabs, while the white border was symbolical of peace. The object of the fourth article was apparently to make it clear that the British Government entertained no political or territorial ambitions in the Persian Gulf and would not interfere in ordinary local disputes. The fifth article, some difficulty in enforcing which was foreseen by Sir W. Grant Keir himself, contemplated the introduction of two sets of papers, *viz.*, a "Register" for the identification of every vessel by means of measurements, etc., given under the signature of the chief, and a "Port Clearance," also signed by the chief, to certify the particulars of the actual voyage on which the vessel might be engaged, both of which were to be produced on the demand of a British or "other" vessel: the object of these provisions was to introduce law and order at sea and to prevent irresponsible equipages from ranging the Gulf with impunity. Principally to facilitate execution of the provisions relating to ships' papers the sixth article empowered the "pacificated" Arabs to maintain an agent at the British Residency in the Gulf and the British Government to accredit an envoy to the Arabs, the representative in either case to be paid or maintained by the party whose interests he represented. The seventh article, introduced chiefly in order to make it clear that failure of one or more signatories to conform to the treaty should not be held to absolve the others from observance of the same, imposed upon the pacificated Arabs the duty of co-operating with the British Government to punish plunder and piracy. The eighth article condemned the barbarous Qāsimi custom of putting prisoners to death in cold blood and proclaimed a war of extermination against those who should in future practise it. The ninth article, which was inserted at the instance of

General Grant Keir's Interpreter, Captain Thompson, afterwards a distinguished Abolitionist,* prohibited the slave trade among the pacificated Arabs; this article, which, strange to say, was accepted without demur, was described as politically advantageous, inasmuch as the resistance to the British forces had been carried on largely by means of slaves. The tenth article made the pacificated Arabs free of British ports and conferred on them, in somewhat vague terms, a guarantee of British protection against aggression by all and sundry. The eleventh and last article provided for the adherence from time to time of fresh signatories to the treaty.

Dissatisfaction of the Government of Bombay with the terms arranged.

The Government of Bombay, though they highly commended his conduct of the military operations and appreciated the humane motives that inspired his policy, were disappointed at the leniency of General Grant Keir's settlement, and desired, if it were not too late, to introduce some conditions of greater stringency. In their opinion the more guilty of the Shaikhs should have been removed from their positions of authority, other local chiefs being substituted for them or their possessions transferred to the Saiyid of Masqat, while those who had actually fallen into the hands of the force should have been detained in custody: the release of Husain-bin-'Ali was particularly regretted. The† treaty ought to have interdicted the fitting out of armed vessels at ports hitherto piratical; to have limited the size of the vessels employed in commerce; to have stipulated for powers of search and confiscation by the British authorities in order to enforce these conditions; to have provided for a restriction of the export of ship-timber from India; and to have forbidden the construction of fortifications in certain circumstances, at the same time empowering the British Government to enter on and destroy any that might be built in disregard of the prohibition. In the view of the Bombay Government the treaty, as it stood, afforded no guarantee against the renewal of piracy, except one of an illusory character depending on the institution of ships' papers, and was so drafted that breach of its conditions would not render the culprits liable to any punishment that might not equally have been inflicted in the absence of a treaty.

To these strictures Sir W. Grant Keir made a spirited but temperate reply. He explained that if, instead of accepting the voluntary submission of the hostile chiefs, he had attempted to enforce extreme measures against them, it would have been necessary for him, in contravention of his instructions, to have pursued them into the interior;

* See footnote in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, page 463.

† In the objections referred to in this sentence we seem to discover the influence of Mr. Warden. (See footnote, page 659.)

and that, if others had been substituted in their place, the British Government, committed to the support of their own nominees, would have become entangled in local affairs. The minor stipulations which it was desired to insert in the treaty might, he conceived, be enforced at any time when a necessity for them should arise, for they would be in harmony with the general spirit and objects of the treaty, which were perfectly well understood by the Arabs. In his opinion, any condition which obliged the boats of particular ports to put to sea unarmed would make it incumbent on the British Government to protect them from the attacks of their enemies; and the export of ship-timber from India appeared to him to be a question of the internal regulations of that country, to which it was unnecessary to refer in a treaty with the Qawāsim. But the principal argument of Sir W. Grant Keir was that, though a treaty might be entered into with the Qawāsim to restore confidence, "any measure calculated to secure their reform must have its foundation in power," and that reliance must be placed, not on the binding power of any agreement, but rather on the moral effect of the defeat which the tribe had sustained, and on prompt and effective action by the naval and military force which it was the intention of the Honourable Company to maintain for the future in the Gulf. By the treaty death and forfeiture were declared to be the penalty of piratical crimes, and, such being the case, it could not be said that the treaty failed to render punishable the violation of its own terms.

In the end, though in certain respects the views of the Bombay Government remained unaltered, the settlement as arranged upon the spot was allowed to stand; and subsequent events proved the policy of Sir William Grant Keir to have been no less judicious than it was liberal.

PERIOD FROM THE GENERAL TREATY OF PEACE TO THE FIRST MARITIME TRUCE, 1820-35.

Arrangements for the repression of piracy after the expedition, 1820-23.

Views of the Bombay Government.

In despatching a force against Rās-al-Khaimah the Government of Bombay had not, as already shown, lost sight of the fact that, whatever immediate success might attend the expedition, further measures of a more

permanent character would be required to confirm the results obtained. The project to which they inclined was the establishment of a British naval and military station in a central situation in the Gulf, which would enable them to exercise a more immediate and commanding influence over its waters than could be wielded from either Būshehr or Basrah. They anticipated that the island of Qishm, which with Hanjām they believed to appertain to the ruler of Masqat, would be found to afford every advantage for the execution of this scheme; that a port might be created thereon which, by means of customs dues, could be rendered self-supporting, at least in part; and even that the Political Residency at Būshehr, where a commercial factory had ceased to be required, might without detriment to British interests in Persia be transferred to the new settlement. The project was referred to Sir W. Grant Keir for an expression of his opinion; and in the meanwhile an effort was made, through the British Envoy at Tehrān, to obtain the concurrence of the Persian Government, which it was felt would probably be withheld. One battalion of native infantry was the military force which the Government intended to locate permanently in the Gulf; but they were prepared if necessary to exceed this limit, and at one time they even proposed the retention of one company or more of European troops. An argument advanced in favour of the occupation of an island was that a detachment in such a position would be less exposed to attack than on the mainland, and that the proportion of the garrison immobilised for the defence of the station would in consequence be smaller.

Recommendations of Sir W. Grant Keir.

At the beginning of April 1820, after a personal visit to Qishm Island, Sir W. Grant Keir submitted his views. He deprecated the immediate removal of the Residency from Būshehr, as possibly involving the commercial ruin of that place; and he suggested that, after the establishment of the new station, some time should be allowed for trade to settle in its natural channels before any great modification of the existing political arrangements was undertaken. The General regarded the position of the garrison at Rās-al-Khaimah as perfectly secure; but a very serious difficulty existed in regard to the water supply and scurvy and fever were prevalent, and he consequently advised that the troops should be transferred to Qishm, which he concurred with the Government of Bombay in thinking the most suitable place in the neighbourhood for a cantonment.

Evacuation of Rās-al-Khaimah, 18th July 1820.

These views having found acceptance, Captain Thompson, who, "having exerted himself most successfully in acquiring the confidence of the inhabitants," had been placed in political and military charge of

Rās-al-Khaimah with the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Native Infantry and 20 artillerymen under his orders, was instructed, after procuring the consent of the Saiyid of Masqat, to remove his force to the island of Qishm, destroying the defences of Rās-al-Khaimah before evacuating it, and handing the town over at his departure to Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, or to any other suitable chief. Saiyid Sa'id having readily signified, in writing, his consent to the occupation of Qishm, Captain Thompson proceeded to negotiate with Sultān-bin-Saqar, promising him possession of Rās-al-Khaimah on condition that he should agree to the detailed stipulations of which the omission from the General Treaty of Peace had been regretted by the Bombay Government; but to this condition the Shaikh would by no means agree, and he further insisted that the defences of the place should not be destroyed before its rendition. Captain Thompson, as the Shaikh remained obstinate and he himself was not vested with discretion in the matter, first destroyed nearly every building in Rās-al-Khaimah, these being all in a greater or less degree fortifications, and then evacuated the place on the 18th of July. Two days later the troops disembarked at Qishm town.

Temporary occupation of Qishm, followed by a system of purely maritime control.

The occupation of Qishm having given rise to difficulties with Persia, and the climate of the island having proved extremely unhealthy, a scheme of maritime control was, about the end of 1821, adopted by the Government of Bombay on the advice of Mr. Meriton, Superintendent of Marine; this, it was hoped, would render superfluous the retention of a military force in the Gulf. It was decided to maintain in all a squadron of six cruisers, of which three, based on the island of Qais, should cruise continually off the Arab ports from Rams to Dibai. On the island of Qais, which was selected because the prevailing winds favoured rapid communication between it and the Pirate Coast, a small dépôt of stores, with gunboats, should be established under the care of a Master Attendant and the protection of a small sepoy guard. Of the remaining three cruisers, two were to be employed in carrying despatches, in affording convoy, and in other miscellaneous duties between Masqat and Basrah; and the third was to be used in maintaining communication with Bombay. A year later, on the evacuation of Qishm being carried into effect, these arrangements were slightly modified, four instead of three vessels being appropriated to active cruising duties, while one only was reserved for general employment between Masqat and Basrah. Masqat was made, at the end of 1822, the point of rendezvous of the H.E.I. Company's vessels in these seas; but in 1823 Mughu on the Persian Coast was substituted, and arrangements were made for establishing a store dépôt at that place, as also a Native Agent on the part of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. Ultimately in September 1823 the

Resident was instructed, in case, as appeared to be probable, the Persian authorities should object to a British establishment at Mughu, to make the necessary dispositions at Basidū instead.

Relations of the British Government with the Pirate Coast, 1820-35.

Instructions to the Resident, November 1822.

The immediate supervision of the Pirate Coast having devolved, at the withdrawal of the Qishm detachment, on the Residency at Būshehr, Lieutenant J. McLeod,* an able and judicious officer, now appointed to that post *vice* Captain Bruce removed, was directed to visit the signatories of the General Treaty of Peace for the purpose of conciliating them, and of confirming them in the disposition which they had hitherto shown to adhere to their obligations; he was also to take advantage of the opportunity to explain that the evacuation of Qishm betokened no change of policy on the part of the British Government, and that a marine force would still be maintained in the Gulf and would continue to visit the Pirate Ports; and he was to arrange for the introduction of ships' papers and the use of a particular flag,—two provisions of the treaty which had hitherto been generally neglected. In case of a recurrence of piracy he was empowered to proceed to the destruction of boats; but he was not to resort to operations by land. On the Persian side the Resident was to maintain a close watch upon piratical ports; but, in case of action becoming necessary, he was merely to refer to the Persian Government, who had now undertaken full responsibility for the control of their own coast. Lieutenant McLeod, besides establishing a system of news reports, was to study in detail the whole political system of the Persian Gulf. The true understanding of local affairs upon the Arabian side may be said to date from the time when these orders were carried into execution.

Lieutenant McLeod's tour on the Pirate Coast, January 1823.

In January 1823 the Resident, in the "Ternate" accompanied by the "Aurora" and "Antelope," all under the command of Captain Faithfull, made a voyage along the Pirate Coast and visited Qatar and Bahrain. Besides interviewing all the principal Shaikhs and fulfilling the other instructions which he had received from Government, especially that relating to the institution of ships' papers, the Resident discussed with the chiefs a number of points that had arisen

* Lieutenant McLeod died of fever at Būshehr in the following September.

in regard to the interpretation of the General Treaty of Peace, of which document even the simplest requirements did not appear to be universally understood; and the free and friendly intercourse thus established inaugurated a new epoch in the history of British dealings with the Pirate Coast. Incidentally, Lieutenant McLeod sought to dissuade Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah from hostilities against the ruler of Masqat, for in his opinion a state of war between these two, of whom the former possessed the greater military strength and had less to lose, while the latter was the more wealthy, was fraught with grave danger to the safety of seas; and he concerted measures with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to compel Suwaidān-bin-Za'al, a dangerous maritime wanderer with a large following, to adopt a more settled mode of life. As a marine survey of this part of the Gulf, recommended by General Sir W. Grant Keir before his departure, was now in progress, the Resident took the opportunity afforded by his cruise to visit the scene of operations. Between Shārjah and Dōhah in Qatar the squadron took a still unsurveyed passage.

Questions relating to the interpretation of the Treaty, 1823.

One measure now recommended by the Political Resident was the establishment of a Native Agency at Shārjah, if necessary by the transfer of a Native Agent who was then maintained at Qatif; and the proposal appears to have been carried into effect soon afterwards.

Connected with the Treaty of 1820 were a number of doubtful points, certain of which, raised for the most part by the perverse ingenuity of Sultān-bin-Saqar, the Resident now referred to Government for an authoritative decision. Before the removal of the troops from Qishm, Colonel Kennett being then the political officer at that place, two other questions had been agitated,—whether the British authorities had the right to enquire into the building of new vessels at the piratical ports and to destroy them on the stocks in event of the explanation given being unsatisfactory, and whether it was permissible to detain the vessels of signatory states if not possessed of the papers or flying the flag required by the treaty of 1820; in both cases the decision appears to have been in the negative. The principal points now discussed were the competence of the British authorities to forbid the building or rebuilding of fortifications by chiefs, the scope of the article (No. 9) relating to the slave trade, and the extent to which under another article (No. 10) the British Government was pledged to protect the pacificated Arabs against the attacks of non-signatory powers. It was ruled with reference to these, in March 1823, that the terms of the treaty did not warrant any prohibition of the building

of forts; that the article in which slaves were mentioned referred not to the buying and selling of persons already enslaved but to raids on the coast of Africa for the purpose of making slaves, which alone could be correctly described as "plunder and piracy"; and that the promise of protection against non-signatories only covered the Indian ports to which, by the same article, access was guaranteed to signatories.

Here it may be mentioned that Sultān-bin-Saqar, having apparently received permission from Lieutenant-General Smith so long before as 1821, proceeded in 1823 to erect a tower 30 feet high on the sea-face of Rās-al-Khaimah, whereupon Captain Faithfull of the Bombay Marine, supposing this to be a breach of treaty, at once proceeded to the spot with five cruisers and obtained the demolition of the work. Captain Faithfull's action was rendered possible by his omission to consult the Resident, who was probably by this time aware of the ruling of Government in regard to new fortifications,—an omission which he was enjoined to avoid for the future in all political questions, unless of extreme urgency. Destruction of a tower at Shārjah, 1823.

The establishment of order at sea was necessarily a gradual process; but piracy had ceased to be a profession, and such cases as occurred, even when they could not be attributed to quarrels among the Arab chieftains or their subjects, did not often affect the vessels of foreigners. Minor piracies, 1823-88.

At the end of 1823 one Hassūn of Shārjah fitted out a boat for piratical purposes and was said to have cruised for some time, but without success, off the coast near Jāshk; on his return to port his proceedings became the subject of inquiry, but evidence sufficient to ensure his conviction was not obtained. 1823.

At the beginning of 1824 two other Shārjah boats put to sea with nefarious intentions, as was reported to the Senior Marine Officer by the Shaikh, though not until after their departure; and a little later it was stated that they had captured a Mahra Baghlah near Soqotrah, putting all on board of her to death, and had proceeded on their way to Zanzibar. This case also was apparently not free from doubt, for the British Government, on the return of the boats to their home waters, rested content with the breaking up of one, which was found abandoned at Chārak, while the other, discovered at Matrah, was left unmolested. 1824.

In 1825 a somewhat grave case occurred through an unprovoked attack by some vessels of Shārjah upon a Bahrain boat near the island of Hanjām, in which the Bahrainis had three or four men killed and were robbed of a considerable amount of specie; and in the month of August the Senior Marine Officer was directed to proceed to Shārjah 1825.

with a squadron and demand full compensation: should it not be granted he was to remove the Residency Native Agent and to capture all the vessels belonging to the port. As a result of his proceedings ample redress was vouchsafed to the injured parties, the Shaikh of Bahrain expressed himself satisfied, and a proper appreciation of the treaty of 1820 was inculcated upon the people of the whole Gulf.

1826-27. In 1826 a series of piracies were committed by 'Obaid-bin-Sa'adûn and Saif-bin-Dhaikhân (or Tikhân), adherents of the freebooter Suwaidan-bin-Za'al who had fled from Abu Dhabi territory and settled at Dôhah in Qatar, in the nominal jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Their offences included the taking of an Abu Dhabi Baghlah, several persons in which were killed and wounded; the capture of an Umm-al-Qaiwain boat, not long retained, with a loss to the defenders of one man killed and one wounded; and the plunder of a vessel belonging to Bahrain. On the ground that the base of these piratical operations was Dôhah in the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Bahrain, while the sufferers in one case belonged to Umm-al-Qaiwain, a dependency of Shârjah, Sultân-bin-Saqar now attempted to evade payment of the compensation arranged in the Hanjâm case of 1825; but his plea was not admitted by the British authorities. It does not appear that in the cases of 1826, though the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi appealed to the British authorities and nearly declared war against the Shaikh of Bahrain, any action was taken by the Resident; but in 1827 the Shaikh of Shârjah was induced to imprison one 'Adwi of 'Ajmân who had committed piratical acts against boats belonging to Dibai.

1828. In 1828 some Banî Yâs pirates, who in July of that year had captured two Bahrain Baqârahs and a Kuwait Batîl not far from Dôhah, succeeded in escaping to the interior; but the boats taken were recovered and restored to the owners. In September 1828 a vessel manned chiefly by subjects of Abu Dhabi, after a cruise upon the Persian Coast and the seizure of their captain at one place where they touched, returned to the Arabian side, plundering on their homeward way four boats belonging to 'Asalu which they found in the neighbourhood of Yâs Island; but the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, on both parties appearing before him, caused the sufferers to be fully compensated.

Serious piracy on a Sohâr boat, 1828. In 1828 the atrocities of earlier days were recalled to mind by an attack made upon a boat from Sohâr by a Batîl under the command of one Muslim-bin-Râshid of Râs-al-Khaimah; in this affair the whole cargo of the Sohâr boat was plundered, the crew numbering 14 persons were tied to a grapnel and thrown overboard, and the vessel itself was

scuttled and sunk. Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, alarmed at the view of the case taken by the British authorities, despatched a Baghlah in pursuit of the pirate Batil, which was eventually forced on shore near Lingeh; the majority of the buccaneers were captured and taken to Ras-al-Khaimah, where they were imprisoned for several months; and the Batil and the stolen property recovered were delivered up to the Saiyid of 'Omān. Muslim-bin-Rāshid seems to have been subsequently strangled by order of Sultān-bin-Saqar, whom, if rumour may be trusted, he accused of being himself the instigator of the crime.

Case of the "Sunbury," 1829.

In 1829 the British merchant ship "Sunbury" was somewhat unceremoniously handled at Shārjah in consequence of a belief, not unfounded, that she carried supplies for the hostile port of Abu Dhabi. The cargo for Abu Dhabi having been resold by the agent of the owner to the Shaikh of Shārjah without the knowledge of the captain of the ship, several boatfuls of men boarded the "Sunbury" in a very insolent manner to take delivery; an attempt was made to haul down the British flag; and the mate, in resisting it, was struck with some violence by one of the Arabs. The incident was quickly terminated on the arrival of the "Amherst" sloop-of-war. Shaikh Sultān, after protesting his ignorance of the affair, caused the first boat that had boarded the "Sunbury" to be burnt, while the chief aggressor in the matter of the colours was tied up and flogged by his orders.

Further petty piracies, 1831-34.

In 1831, a number of places on the Persian Coast having been deserted by their inhabitants in consequence of the plague then raging, some Qawāsim on their way home from Basrah seized the opportunity to plunder Dilam and Rig, which were among the number; and further down the coast they took possession of a boat returning from Kangūn to Būshehr.

1832.

These excesses appear to have been ignored; but when the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, being openly at war with the people of Sohār as a natural consequence of his coalition with Saiyid Sa'id against them in 1831, extended his depredations to the shipping and commerce of the 'Omān Sultanate to which Sohār had now ceased to belong, steps were immediately taken to call him to account: this, however, was not done until his captures at sea amounted to more than a dozen vessels with their cargoes. Sultān-bin-Saqar having found it convenient to deny that he any longer possessed authority over 'Ajmān or Umm-al-Qaiwain, an ultimatum was conveyed direct to Shaikh Rāshid of 'Ajmān by two British vessels of war; and his efforts at evasion being cut short by a refusal to allow him more than 24 hours' grace, the Shaikh, after

the value of one 'Ajmān Batīl seized in reprisal by the people of Masqat had been deducted, made good the balance of the claim by handing over boats, money, jewels and other property to the required amount. These events took place in 1832.

1832-33. In May 1832 a boat belonging to a British subject was taken by pirates off the Persian Coast; and subsequently three of the principal offenders, who belonged to the village of Khān in the Shārjah principality, absconded from that place and took refuge with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. The settlement of this case was delayed by other more pressing demands on the services of the British cruisers in the Persian Gulf; but in 1833 the chief of Abu Dhabi, on whom the first demand was served, paid up a fine of $1,500 rather than surrender the criminals. Shaikh Sultān, from whom $2,000 fell to be recovered, was at first recalcitrant; but a few shots fired into a Shārjah Batīl lying near 'Ajmān quickly brought him to his senses.

1833. In 1833 the crew of a Qāsimi boat touching at the island of Khārgu carried away a portion of a tent belonging to the British Residency, which had been transferred to Khārgu during the prevalence of plague at Būshehr; and, as the marauders were well aware of the British ownership of the article stolen, the case was treated as one of intentional insult, and a war vessel was sent in pursuit. The thieves were found at Muhammareh and brought back with the stolen property to Būshehr, but were afterwards released at the intercession of the Shaikh of Būshehr.

1834. In 1834 some members of the Sūdān tribe who had recently removed from 'Ajmān to Abu Dhabi attacked a Batīl of the Matārish from Matrah and plundered her of property worth $1,000; no loss of life, however, occurred. In this case redress was withheld by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, until British vessels, prepared to enforce it, appeared off his port. In this year the squadron in the Gulf consisted of two cruisers only, the "Amherst" and the "Elphinstone."

Final outbreak of piracy among the Bani Yās, 1835. The year 1835 was made remarkable by an expiring flicker of the old piratical spirit, which this time flamed up, not among the subjects of the Qāsimi Shaikh, but in the formerly well-behaved and law-abiding tribe of the Bani Yās. The outbreak may be attributed partly to a change of rulers at Abu Dhabi and to dissensions among the Bani Yās; partly to the passions kindled by recent savage wars between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah; and partly to the weakness of the British naval establishment in the Gulf. The Bani Yās pirates placed themselves in the fair-way of the Gulf and began to

prey upon passing commerce without respecting any flag, even the British; their robberies were accompanied by atrocities, such as the massacre of entire crews, that vied with the worst offences in former days of the Qawāsim; and so infatuated were they by their easy success against native trading vessels that one of their squadrons put to sea with the avowed object of encountering the Company's cruisers. On receiving news of this last challenge Commodore Elwon, commanding the Persian Gulf squadron of the Indian Navy, immediately directed Captain Sawyer to proceed with his vessel, the "Elphinstone" sloop-of-war, in search of the pirates and to bring them to action. The "Elphinstone" carrying eighteen 32-pounders, was much more powerful in relation to Arab war-vessels than her predecessors of 15 years before,—a fact which the pirates perhaps did not appreciate; but her crew was comparatively small, numbering only about 150 men, of whom however 80 were Europeans. On the 16th of April the "Elphinstone" came up with the pirate fleet, which appeared to consist of 3 Baghlahs, 1 Batil and 3 Baqārahs, the largest Baghlah having one of the others in tow: this last vessel proved eventually to be the "Nāsir" of Kangūn, captured by the pirates off Kung four or five days previously. After gaining a position to windward and double and treble shotting his guns with round and grape, Captain Sawyer, unfettered by the necessity of waiting till he was attacked, steered between the large Baghlah and her prize; and, as the "Elphinstone" passed through with her guns almost touching the enemy's sides, both broadsides were discharged with terrific effect, making the splinters fly in every direction. The Arabs confined themselves to an attempt at board, which had it been successful would have sealed the doom of the "Elphinstone," for the large Baghlah alone contained at least 200 men; but it was frustrated by a destructive fire of small arms. Seeing that the fortune of the day was against them, the pirates at once made off, abandoning the "Nāsir," from which a prize crew of about 90 men leaped into the water and were picked up by the large Baghlah. That vessel, accompanied by the Batil, was pursued by the "Elphinstone" until nightfall, when she rounded Farūr Island and disappeared; and meanwhile the remainder of the pirate fleet, after stripping the "Nāsir" as far as they could, sailed away in another direction. Returning on the next day to the scene of the encounter, the British cruiser took possession of the "Nāsir" and rescued nine of her original crew drifting on a raft, to which, fearing the return of the pirates, they had committed themselves. Enquiry showed that 33 dead bodies of pirates had been thrown overboard from the "Nāsir" alone while

some 25 wounded had been carried off by their friends; and the losses on the large pirate Baghlah must have been even more considerable.

The settlement with the Bani Yâs which followed this well-merited chastisement was satisfactory in the extreme. One brig, 7 Baghlahs, 2 Batils and 5 Baqârahs, which had been captured by the Bani Yâs, were surrendered; the greater part of the cargo taken from the "Durya Dowlut," a Baghlah under British colours, was recovered; compensation for other property to the amount of over $10,000 in cash and kind was obtained, a bond and security in the shape of 3 large Bani Yâs vessels being taken for due payment of the balance of $1,600; all prisoners in the hands of the pirates were released; and two of the principal buccaneers, Muhammad-bin-Saqar and Muhammad-bin-Mâjid, were handed over to be tried for their crimes. In addition a Bani Yâs Batil, which happened to arrive from India at Masqat, was detained by the authorities of that port. At Bombay Muhammad-bin-Saqar was convicted of piracy on the high seas in the case of the "Durya Dowlut" and sentenced to transportation for life; but Muhammad-bin-Mâjid, on the failure of the case against him, was brought back to the Gulf to be handed over to Shaikh Sultân-bin-Saqar, and unfortunately escaped by swimming ashore from an anchorage four miles off Shârjah.

Piracies by Dibai boats, 1834-35.

General depredations on the trade of the Gulf were commenced by the Âl Bû Falâsah of Dibai soon after their secession, elsewhere described, from Abu Dhabi; they attacked and plundered 1 Masqat, 1 Bahrain and 2 Nâband vessels, murdering in the first case 5 men; and they looted a village on the coast of Bâtinah near Masqat. A British demonstration against the town of Dibai, however, procured full satisfaction in the cases in which it had not been voluntarily afforded or otherwise obtained.

Piracies by Shârjah boats, 1835.

In 1835 the Shârjah chief, on pretence of assisting the Saiyid of 'Omân against the rebellious town of Sohâr, proceeded with a fleet to Khor Fakkân and Dibah, but his depredations soon extended beyond the shipping of Sohâr to that of his nominal ally, and even to neutral vessels; for such as were reported, however, he was compelled to afford satisfaction.

Relations of the Pirate Coast Shaikhs with the Saiyid of Masqat, 1820-35.

Before proceeding to review the internal history of the Pirate Coast from the General Treaty of Peace in 1820 to the first Maritime Truce in

1835, we may take account of some external influences which were not without their effect upon domestic politics. The foreign factor of greatest importance on the Pirate Coast, after the British power, was at this time undoubtedly the Saiyid of Masqat. The principal supporters of His Highness on the Pirate Coast were ordinarily the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai; but in 1825 an exceptional combination occurred, Abu Dhabi and Dibai allying themselves with Shārjah, while 'Ajmān sought to preserve his independence of Shārjah by attaching himself to Masqat.

The Baraimi-Dairah case, 1824-27.

In 1824 a dispute arose between Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat and Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah over the oasis of Baraimi, which, in a former treaty between them, had been declared neutral territory; the details of the quarrel are now obscure, but it seems that the Shaikh of Shārjah had wrongfully built or taken possession of some towers in Baraimi. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi had in the meantime encouraged a colony of Sudān refugees from Shārjah to build a fort at Dairah between Dibai and Shārjah; this settlement was a source of much annoyance to the Shārjah Shaikh, and, in conjunction with the Baraimi difficulty, produced a general state of tension which the British Resident considered it his duty to relieve.

At a visit to Shārjah in December 1824 the Resident effected a reconciliation of the parties on an understanding that the Baraimi towers and the Dairah fort should both be demolished, and that the Sudān immigrants should be removed to some other part of the Abu Dhabi principality. In February 1825, no steps having been taken by Sultān-bin-Saqar to carry out his part of the arrangement, a strong remonstrance was addressed him by the Resident; the Shaikh in reply pleaded intrigues on the part of his adversaries and suggested that a commission of three persons, one appointed by himself, one by the Saiyid of Masqat and one by the Resident, should be sent to Baraimi to superintend the execution of the agreement. In May 1825 the Resident took advantage of a visit which he paid to Masqat to despatch Gulab Ananda, the Native Agent representing Britain at that port, along with some troops of the Saiyid to witness the destruction of the Baraimi towers under an authorisation specially obtained from the Shārjah Shaikh. Scarcely however had the delegate started when Sultān-bin-Saqar made a sudden attack on Dairah, afterwards repulsing a force sent by Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt to its relief; and this treacherous action on his part necessarily put an end to the efforts of the Resident to adjust the quarrel. The Masqat Agent, it may be noted, on his return from

Baraimi, reported about the delay in the proceedings in a sense wholly unfavourable to the good faith of Sultān-bin-Saqar.

The result of the rupture between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi was to prevent the subjects of either Shaikh from taking part in the pearl fishery for the year,—an exclusion which was severely felt by both sides and led to a reconciliation in October 1825 under the auspices of Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, then present on the coast with a squadron of his vessels. In this settlement the Baraimi difficulty was entirely ignored; but the demolition of the Dairah fort and the withdrawal of the Sūdān colony by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi were decreed. A curious clause, probably representing the Saiyid's brokerage on the bargain, was added, but apparently remained unfulfilled; it provided for the neutralisation of the town of Dibai by the handing over of its defences to the ruler of Masqat. The arrangement remained a dead-letter until 1827, when the dismantlement of Dairah was enforced by Saiyid Sa'id with a naval force; but His Highness before his departure compensated Shaikh Tahnūn with a gift of military stores and encouraged him to seize Dubai. The ruler of Masqat undoubtedly considered a rapprochement between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi to be hostile to his own interests.

Designs of the Shārjah Shaikh, 1829-30.

In 1829, before starting on his first expedition to East Africa, Saiyid Sa'id endeavoured to arrange for the security of his possessions at home by granting subsidies to some of the Pirate Coast chiefs, and among them Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar was promised an allowance of Rs. 2,000 a year. Notwithstanding this payment the faithless ruler of Shārjah was hardly restrained, at first by the remonstrances of the chief men of his tribe and later by the menaces of the British Government, from throwing in his lot with the rebels who in 1830 attempted to upset the Saiyid's government.

Intrigues relating to the operations Sohār, 1831.

After Sa'id's return from Africa he endeavoured to obtain the aid of Sultān-bin-Saqar in his operations for the recovery of Sohār in 1831, but the Shaikh hung back, demanding as the price of his support the transfer to himself of either Dibah or Khor Fakkān, and eventually a raid by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi on Qāsimi territory prevented his taking part on either side in the fighting at Sohār. The movement of the Abu Dhabi Shaikh was intended to embarrass Saiyid Sa'id, who had declined his assistance at Sohār, probably because of the bad behaviour of the Banī Yās contingent in an expedition against Bahrain in 1828. The only one of the Pirate Coast chiefs who rallied to the side of Saiyid Sa'id before Sohār was consequently Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, Shaikh of 'Ajmān, a dependent of Shārjah: on the defeat of the Masqat

troops this unreliable ally changed sides and helped to complete the Saiyid's discomfiture.

Annexation by the Shārjah Shaikh of the Shamailiyah district.

In 1832, on the occurrence of another rising against Saiyid Sa'id's authority during his second absence in East Africa, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar availed himself of the opportunity to seize, by surprise or treachery, Dibah and the Shamailiyah ports of Khor Fakkān and Ghallah, which were thus lost to the 'Omān Sultanate. But for the timely arrival of two Masqat frigates, with reinforcements and stores, it is probable that the town of Shinās also would have fallen into his hands.

Connection of the Wahhābi power with Pirate Coast affairs, 1820-35.

Temporary discredit of the Wahhābis, 1821-23.

The prestige of the Wahhābi Amir was for a time destroyed by the successful operations of the Egyptian and British forces against him and his dependents; but, with the withdrawal of the Egyptians from Najd and of the British from Qishm, his influence in 'Omān began to revive. Though in 1821 Sultān-bin-Saqar had already abjured Wahhābi tenets, and though his authority was even then preponderant over that of Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams, the official representative of the Wahhābi interest on the Pirate Coast, it was nevertheless the case that in 1823 a large proportion of the people were still Wahhābi in sympathy; but of the secular power of the Wahhābi Amir there was no longer a trace to be found in the country.

Revival of Wahhābi influence, 1824.

In 1824 the Wahhābi state began to raise its head once more in Central Arabia; and Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar and his chief dependent, Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Hamaid of 'Ajmān, lost no time in creating interest for themselves with its ruler. The negotiations were conducted quite openly on the part of the Shaikh of Shārjah, who pretended that they were necessary for his safety.

Correspondence between the Shaikh of Shārjah and the British authorities relative to the Wahhābi danger, 1823.

In November 1825, in an interview with the British Resident, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar professed great fear of the growing power of the Wahhābis and enquired whether he might rely on British aid in endeavouring to defend his independence against them; he also asked what course he should follow if the Wahhābis were to make war on the Saiyid of Masqat and demand the assistance of Shārjah. No reply was apparently given to the question about British support, the Bombay Government thinking it more prudent not to publish their intention of avoiding a collision with Wahhābis over merely territorial matters; but the Shaikh

was informed that no plea of compulsion by the Wahhābis would be admitted by the British Government in extenuation of piratical proceedings, and he was strongly advised to abstain from joining any combination against His Highness of Masqat.

Refusal of the British Government to support the Shaikh of Shārjah against the Wahhābis, 1830.

In 1830 the successes of the Wahhābis in Hasa and the prospect of their immediate appearance in 'Omān caused a considerable stir upon the Pirate Coast. The Shaikh of Shārjah, who had everything to lose by their return, endeavoured, while openly professing delight at their approach, to obtain in secret a promise of support against them from the British Government; but it was explained to him that Britain had no end in view except the maintenance of maritime security and could not interfere in the internal affairs of Arabian states. A large number of the common people, however, as well as the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain, who hoped that by some change they might be freed from their dependence on Shārjah, sincerely rejoiced at the appearance of the Wahhābis; and Rāshid-bin-Hamaid of 'Ajmān even applied for the post of Wahhābi vicegerent in the country, but received the chilling reply that the Amīr regarded, and would continue to regard, the Saiyid of Masqat and the Shaikh of Shārjah as the two heads of the tribes of 'Omān. Rāshid was however made the medium, in 1831, of a communication from the Wahhābi Amīr to the Governor of Bombay, in which the former signified a wish to be on terms of amity with the British Government.

Ineffectual Wahhābi intervention, 1834.

In 1833, in consequence of an internal revolution, the principality of Abu Dhabi fell temporarily under Wahhābi influence; and in 1834 the Wahhābi representative at Baraimi interposed, on the side of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, in the chronic feud—then at its height—between that ruler and the Shaikh of Shārjah. His action, however, though it prevented Sultān-bin-Saqar from obtaining Bedouins to beleaguer Abu Dhabi town on the landward side, did not seriously impress him or cause him to desist from hostilities.

Relations of the Qawāsim with the Persian Coast, 1820-35.

The Qawāsim had still a close connection with the coast of Persia, where Lingeh was governed by a family of their tribe; and they seem to have favoured, not unnaturally, the side of the local Arab Shaikhs in the periodical difficulties between the latter and the central Persian Government.

In 1832 Shaikh Nāsir, a hereditary Governor of Būshehr who had been expelled by the Persian authorities, blockaded his former charge and summoned the Qawāsim to his aid, promising them the plunder of the town if it should be taken. In response to this invitation Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, at the end of November, arrived in person at Būshehr with a fleet carrying from 1,000 to 1,500 men; and serious mischief might have resulted had not Mr. Blane, the British Resident, seeing that Shaikh Nāsir's blockade had already failed and that there was no hope of his permanent restoration by violence, ordered the Qawāsim to withdraw. This they did reluctantly and only in consequence of threats by the Resident to employ force. Demonstration at Būshehr, 1832.

Internal affairs of the Pirate Coast, 1820-35.

Even before the evacuation of Rās-al-Khaimah by the British forces Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar had stepped into the place of principal authority among the Qawāsim. Hasan-bin-Rahmah of Rās-al-Khaimah had then already become subservient to him; and the aged Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams, who clung to his Wahhābi ideas and was apparently supported by Qadhīb-bin-Ahmad of Jazīrat-al-Hamra, could make no head against his influence. Position in 1821.

At the time when, in January 1823, Lieutenant McLeod's visit to the Pirate Coast first laid bare to view the internal politics of the country, the influence and power of the Shaikh of Sārjah greatly exceeded those of any other chief, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, his chief competitor, not excepted. Sultān-bin-Saqar had now deported the old Shaikh of Rams to Shārjah, replacing him by Muhammad-bin-'Abdur Rahmān, the son of a former Shaikh; his own brother Muhammad he had placed over Rās-al-Khaimah town, which now occupied a site on the mainland opposite to the peninsula; the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, owned him for his liege-lord; and on the coast northwards of Shārjah the only chief who considered himself independent was Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān. This last obstacle in the way of his complete supremacy Sultān-bin-Saqar was extremely anxious to remove, and, as evidence of his rights over 'Ajmān, he referred the Resident to the preliminary agreement made between himself and General Sir W. Grant Keir in 1820, which expressly covered 'Ajmān; but the force of the argument as proving the perma- Position in 1823.

nent subordination of 'Ajmān was not admitted, and the Shaikh was further informed that the British Government took no interest in his claims to suzerainty over other chiefs.

Lieutenant McLeod, dissenting from the current view that the ruling Shaikh of Sharjah was little better than a monster in human shape, described him at this time as a turbulent and ambitious man, but superior in ability, as well as in most other respects, to his neighbours. The establishment of Shaikh Sultān's power over the whole Pirate Coast might, he reported, possibly be advantageous to Government; but it should be understood that, as no Shaikh was absolute even in his own tribe, so the hegemony of Shārjah over the other principalities would be nominal at the best; and the Resident foresaw trouble from the rancorous hatred of its ruler for Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat.

The principality of Dibai, still governed by Zāid-bin-Saif, the uncle of the Shaikh, was at this time dependent on that of Abu Dhabi, of which the ruler was Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt; and both of these states, which were military and pastoral rather than maritime in their condition, generally inclined to alliance with Masqat.

The Qawāsim, whose extreme poverty and fewness of resources were now for the first time set in a clear light, still built their boats entirely of Indian teak; their warlike stores were obtained from Bahrain, from the Persian ports of the lower Gulf, and from Masqat; and their arms, mostly taken from prizes, were commonly of Persian manufacture. None of the chiefs possessed more than three or four boats except Sultān-bin-Saqar who had at least 30 fine vessels, each capable of containing 50 to 100 men; and it was strongly suspected that most of these were over three years old and had been hidden away by the Shaikh, instead of being surrendered, at the time of the British expedition.

Continued ascendancy of the Shaikh of Shārjah, 1823-32.

Qadhīb-bin-Ahmad of Jazīrat-al-Hamra was now dead; in 1824 his successor was removed by Sultān-bin-Saqar to make way for a more pliant representative in the person of one Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah; and about the same time the Shaikh of 'Ajmān also bowed to the inevitable and acknowledged the overlordship of Shārjah. In 1825 Shaikh Sultān, having acquired influence at Dibai by his own marriage with the sister of the young Shaikh, was scheming to obtain actual possession of that place, the nearness of which to his capital would be a serious danger in case of its falling under inimical influences. In 1832 however, Sultān-bin-Saqar, made aware by experience of the disadvantages of being held responsible for the behaviour of minor chiefs, formally resigned his pretensions to suzerainty over 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain; and in

1833 he sustained a serious reverse at Abu Dhabi which cannot but have lowered his prestige.

Meanwhile, in 1828, the town of Rās-al-Khaimah had begun to rise once more on its original site, the ruins of the old town serving as quarries of material for the new; the wall across the isthmus on the landward side of the town had already been restored; and a square tower had been built on a mound which marked the place of a former principal fortification.

Hostilities between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi, 1825-31.

It is unnecessary here to do more than refer to the acts of war between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi which took place in 1825 in connection with the Baraimi-Dairah quarrel, and which have already been mentioned above.

In February 1829 Sultān-bin-Saqar, irritated by a constant coalition against himself between the Saiyid of Masqat and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, took advantage of the failure of the joint expedition of those two powers against Bahrain to declare war against Abu Dhabi; and very soon, by means of a blockade, he succeeded in reducing to severe straits the principal and only town belonging to his rival. The prospect of exclusion from the approaching pearl fishery was however equally disagreeable to both sides; and in June 1829, by the mediation of Muhammad-bin-Qadhib, Shaikh of Lingeh, peace was arranged on condition that neither party should interfere any more with the subjects or dependents of the other.

In 1831 trouble was renewed in consequence of the curious imbroglio, already described, which resulted in 1831 from the operations of Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat against Sohār. The Shaikh of 'Ajmān, on his return from Sohār, found that his town had been plundered and the flocks of his subjects raided by Bani Yās and Manāsir despatched by Shaikh Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt; and war against Abu Dhabi was immediately declared on his part and on that of the Shaikh of Shārjah. A peace was shortly patched up by the Shaikh of Lingeh, no doubt with the object of postponing matters until the end of the pearl season; but in September it was broken by subjects of Shārjah, who attacked two pearl boats of the Bani Yās near Bahrain, an act to which the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi immediately replied by seizing 14 vessels of the Qawāsim that happened to call at his port for provisions. A partial adjustment of claims now took place, but in December 1831 the situation was again strained; no further serious operations however took place.

Determined but ineffectual efforts of Shārjah

In 1833, encouraged by a split among the Bani Yās and the secession of the Āl Bū Falāsah section and others from Abu Dhabi to Dibai, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar resolved on a supreme attempt to

to crush Abu Dhabi, 1833-34.

overthrow, once for all, the power of his hated rival the Bani Yās Shaikh.

All Shārjah subjects having been hurriedly recalled from the pearl banks in the height of the diving season, much to their discontent, a naval expedition against Abu Dhabi was prepared without delay; it consisted of 22 boats carrying 520 Qawāsim, under the command of Shaikhs Sultān-bin-Saqar and Hasan-bin-Rahmah, and of 80 boats manned by 700 of the Āl Bū Falāsah and other refugees at Dibai. On the afternoon of the 10th September 1833 the Qawāsim and their allies landed at a point about four miles from Abu Dhabi, which town they expected to find almost deserted and to capture without difficulty on the morrow; but the Shaikhs of the Bani Yās had received sufficient notice of the intended attack to collect a large number of their own tribe and of Manāsir Bedouins; and, when the sun rose, the invaders discovered that they were surrounded by a vastly superior force. Seized by panic they fled to their vessels; but most of these, left high and dry by the tide, were not available for escape. Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar himself was nearly drowned by the sinking of a small boat, in which he had put to sea along with four of his slaves. The losses of the Qawāsim on this occasion amounted to 30 men killed, including a brother of the Shaikh of Lingeh; and six of their vessels, one a Patil, were taken. Of the Bani Yās allies 15 were killed, and 235 were taken prisoners and compelled to return to their homes at Abu Dhabi, while of the 80 boats contributed by the Bani Yās dissidents no less than 60 were captured.

The Shaikh of Shārjah did not, however, abandon his enterprise, but by means of alliances with the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Lingeh got together a fresh fleet, which sailed from Dibai on the 9th of November 1833. Having arrived before Abu Dhabi, Sultān-bin-Saqar during three days endeavoured to take the place by direct naval attack; but his attempts were defeated by a large mixed garrison of townsmen and Bedouins, whose fire from six or seven large vessels moored by iron chains to the shore was very effective and even damaged the Baghlah of Shaikh Sultān himself. A blockade was accordingly substituted on the part of the Qawāsim, by which the defenders of the town soon found themselves reduced to serious straits; and the departure of Saiyid Sa'id from Masqat to his African possessions destroyed, about the same time, their last hope of assistance from without. To add to the troubles of the besieged, thirty of their boats were captured by the Qawāsim at some distance from Abu Dhabi; ten of their men were

killed in an engagement with the people of Dibai; and a caravan of 50 camels bringing dates from Baraimi to Abu Dhabi was intercepted by the enemy.

The garrison, however, did not lose heart, but under cover of night sent three large vessels carrying 500 men to sea; these were pursued by a detachment of 20 sail from the blockading fleet, but were not overtaken. The first exploit of the escaped vessels was the capture of an 'Ajmān Baqārah near Bustānch; out of the crew of eight men, seven were put to death. They then attacked a Masqat Baghlah, killed five of her crew, and plundered her of a quantity of dates, Rs. 3,000 in cash and all her guns,—a piratical proceeding for which they afterwards voluntarily accounted to the Masqat authorities without the intervention of the British Resident. After this, a pursuing Qāsimi squadron coming in sight, they made sail for home and regained Abu Dhabi in safety.

Meanwhile Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt of Abu Dhabi had succeeded in inflicting deterrent punishment on the Ghafalah and other Bedouin tribes who had assisted the people of Dibai in cutting off his supplies by land, and the discomforts endured by the crews of the blockading fleet were hardly less than those which the inhabitants of the beleaguered town suffered; for the provisions and water of the fleet had to be obtained from Lingeh and Rās-al-Khaimah, and each individual on board was required to make the arrangements for his own supply. Finally, in 1854, a peace was arranged through the Shaikh of Lingeh, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi restoring all the vessels which he had captured since the beginning of the war and the Shaikh of Shārjah withdrawing his blockade.

The peace was not of long duration. A foray in Qāsimi territory by Manāsir Bedouins, dependent on Abu Dhabi, led to retaliation by the seizure upon the pearl banks of ten Bani Yās boats, together with their crews of 80 men and pearls to the value of Rs. 4,000. This rupture having obliged the Shaikhs to withdraw their subjects from the banks, a penalty severely felt by both, Shaikh Khalifah of Abu Dhabi was persuaded to send his father Shaikh Shakhbūt as an envoy to Shārjah with proposals of peace, and a stable treaty was at length arranged. In regard to the Bani Yās domiciled at Dibai it was settled that they should henceforward be regarded as subjects of Shārjah.

The exhausting war which we have just described, perhaps the most persistently waged of any that ever occurred between Shaikhs of the Pirate Coast, had undoubtedly an excellent effect in preparing the way for the conclusion of the first Maritime Truce in 1835.

PERIOD FROM THE FIRST MARITIME TRUCE TO THE PERPETUAL TREATY OF PEACE, 1835-53.

The Maritime Truce and Restrictive Line, 1835-36.

Failure of the Treaty of 1820 to establish absolute security.

The insufficiency of the General Treaty of Peace for the purpose of maintaining security at sea was now fully apparent; for it did not prohibit regular maritime warfare, and experience had shown that in the Persian Gulf such warfare must usually be expected to degenerate into indiscriminate piracy.

The need of further restrictions seems to have been felt even by the chiefs themselves. The Shaikh of Shārjah, in 1827, and the Shaikh of Bahrain, in 1828, argued earnestly that under Article No. 4 of the Treaty the British Government were bound to prevent hostilities at sea, whatever their nature, among the pacificated Arabs; but the reception by the British authorities of this suggestion was necessarily, from the wording of the Treaty, unfavourable. The attempt to enforce the provision relating to ships' papers, it may here be remarked, had long been abandoned as impracticable; and in other respects, as we have seen, the Treaty had been found ambiguous, if not unworkable.

The British Government were as yet unwilling to assume responsibility for the prevention of all warfare at sea, especially as they foresaw that interference might disturb the balance of power between maritime principalities and others of which the power was chiefly military; and in 1834 the Court of Directors expressly ruled that it was inexpedient, even at the invitation of the petty Arab States, to assume any sort of protectorship or arbitral authority over them. Nevertheless the British authorities, while they continued to regard themselves as in strictness merely the head of a naval confederacy for the suppression of piracy, exerted all their influence on the side of peace, and for a time even made it a rule to treat as piracy all aggressions committed on the pearl banks during the annual fishery; they insisted also that the requirements of the Treaty of Peace should be observed even by such Arab principalities as were not parties to it, such as those of Qatif and Kuwait.

The first Maritime Truce, 1835.

These being the circumstances and the views of the principal parties, Captain S. Hennell, the Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf, seized the opportunity of the settlement with the Banī Yās to assemble some of the principal Shaikhs or their agents at Bāsīdu, where, after an unavailing attempt had been made to adjust their claims and counter-claims, it was

proposed by Captain Hennell that they should agree to a Maritime Truce to cover the season of the approaching pearl fishery.

This suggestion having met with general acceptance, a more formal meeting was held at the Bûshehr Residency on the 21st August 1835, and here a document was sealed by or on behalf of the Shaikhs of Shârjah, Dibai, 'Ajmân and Abu Dhabi, whereby they bound themselves to observe an inviolable truce from the 21st of May to the 21st of November of the same year, during which period all claims should remain in abeyance; to afford redress for any infraction of the truce by their respective subjects; and, in case of any aggression being committed upon their subjects, not to retaliate, but to report the matter to the British political or naval authorities. The Resident on his part was careful to explain to the parties, before execution of the agreement, that any breach of the truce, when once established, would be treated as a case of piracy, and that no regard would be paid to the existence of a state of war on land.

The Shaikh of Bahrain, who was amenable to British influence and between whom and the Saiyid of 'Omân there was at the time a prospect of war, was not invited to subscribe to the Truce; but everywhere its conclusion was hailed with delight by those interested in the pearl trade,—in some cases almost the entire population. The importance of Captain Hennell's achievement may be judged by the fact that, before this, some of the pearl merchants of Shârjah had actually offered to pay $ 20 a year to the British Government for each pearl boat of which the safety at sea should be guaranteed.

From 1835 onwards "Trucial 'Omân" becomes the most appropriate name for the country hitherto known as the Pirate Coast, and its chiefs may henceforth be correctly described as "the Trucial Shaikhs."

The Restrictive Line, 1836.

Another suggestion made by Captain Hennell in 1835 and well received by the Shaikhs was that, for the protection of neutral commerce, a portion of the Gulf on the Persian side should be placed out of bounds for tribal warfare, even at the times when no truce existed. On the recommendation of Captain Hennell the Bombay Government agreed that the cruising of Arabian war-boats nearer to the Persian coast than the islands of Bû Musa and Sirri should at all times be interdicted; but Major Morison, who succeeded Captain Hennell, was able to arrange with the Shaikhs for the substitution of Sir Bû Na'air in place of the islands previously mentioned, by which means the area liable to disturbance was still further reduced.

In consequence of some irregular proceedings on the part of the Shaikh of Bahrain the restrictive line was afterwards authoritatively

prolonged by way of Hālūl Island, of a point 10 miles off Ras Rakan, and of the island of Qaaiyin, to Ras-az-Zor upon the coast near Kuwait. No formal agreement in regard to the line was ever executed; nor was any required.

British relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1835-53.

Series of short maritime truces, 1835-42.

During the eighteen years which followed the conclusion of the first Maritime Truce, the relations of the Trucial Shaikhs towards the British Government and towards one another at sea continued to be regulated by the General Treaty of 1820, supplemented by a series of maritime truces similar in their terms to that of 1835. The second and third truces, concluded on the 18th of April 1836 and the 15th of April 1837 respectively, were apparently for not more than eight months each; but the period of the fourth, signed in 1838, was fixed, at the instance of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, at one year. Annual truces were arranged thereafter in 1839, 1840, 1841 and 1842; but on the expiration of the Truce of 1840 a slight interval occurred, by which the Shaikh of Shārjah profited to make a naval attack on the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain.

The Ten Years' Maritime Truce, 1843-53.

The establishment of permanent peace at sea having been proposed by Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar in 1837, the attention of the Bombay Government was directed to the question; and, in 1841, they expressed a wish that a truce for more than a year might, if possible, be arranged. Although the Shaikhs as a whole were not adverse to a lengthened truce, considerable doubt was felt by Captain Hennell, the Resident, as to the expediency of any change; he feared that a prolonged or permanent maritime truce would impose an intolerable strain on the propensities of the Arabs to wrong-doing and retaliation, and might so lead to a breakdown of the whole trucial system; and he foresaw that it would operate to the disadvantage of the Qawāsim, who were predominant at sea but suffered severely from the depredations of the Banī Yās on land. It was also apprehended that the difficulty and responsibility of settling by peaceful means quarrels that would ordinarily be decided by the sword, a duty which would necessarily devolve on the British Government as guarantor of the truce, might prove excessive. In the end the matter was left by Government to the experience and discretion of Captain Hennell, who justified the confidence reposed in him by negotiating a truce, upon the usual conditions, for an extended period of

10 years from the 1st of June 1843. In the eyes of even the Qāsimi Shaikh the prospect of an undisturbed pearl fishery year by year outdid in attractiveness the possibility of taking naval revenge at intervals upon his military rival the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

Working of the periodical maritime truces.

The idea underlying the Maritime Truces was, on the part of the British authorities, the prevention of piracy, as distinct from its punishment under the Treaty of 1820; and the truces were regarded as a natural corollary to the suppression of crime at sea, inasmuch as they provided a guarantee for the free exercise of other maritime callings by tribes formerly piratical. The result of the truces, within the limits which bounded them, was beneficial in the highest degree. The danger, at times apprehended, of hostilities at sea between a signatory and a non-signatory power never took actual shape; and from engaging as allies in the naval wars of non-signatory powers, as one or more of them might have done upon opposite sides,—this being a case not provided for in their engagements,—the Trucial Shaikhs were firmly, and successfully dissuaded by the local British authorities.

A point more than once debated in the early years of the trucial system was the proper treatment thereunder of attacks by land parties upon the crews of fishing boats drawn up in creeks or backwaters, often at a distance from their own port. It was held by the Resident, in whose view the Shaikhs eventually acquiesced, that such attacks were a form of land warfare and as such were not prohibited by the terms of the Maritime Truce.

Trivial cases of aggression, chiefly at the pearl banks, by boat upon boat were still not infrequent; they were almost invariably due to the absconding of indebted divers or other pearl operatives from the jurisdiction of one Shaikh to that of another, and they generally took the form of an attempt to capture the debtor, or to recover the amount of his debt, from the boat or the tribe to which he had attached himself. The settlement of such cases was felt to be a delicate matter, for enforcement of extradition by the British authorities might involve a high degree of interference on their part in local affairs and might destroy an important safeguard against oppression of their subjects by the Shaikhs. Endeavours were accordingly made to induce the Shaikhs to come to an understanding on the subject, independently of any guarantee by the British Government for its observance; but they failed, partly because of the reluctance of the Arab to surrender in any circumstances the fugitive who has taken refuge with him, and partly in consequence of an idea entertained by each chief that his own government was the most attractive to strangers and would be the chief loser by a check upon migration. For the

solution of this difficulty, finally attained in 1879, the time was not yet ripe.

Cases of piracy and breaches of the Maritime Truce, 1835-53.

The principal infractions of the Treaty of Peace of 1820 and of the Maritime Truce at the time in force may now be placed on record; but in doing so it is unnecessary to distinguish between the two classes, for all aggressions at sea were now equally included in the piratical category. The much less serious character, on the whole, of the offences committed during this period is a clear testimony to the progress made, under the Treaty of Peace alone, in the years preceding.

1837. In 1837 an ordinary piracy was committed on a boat belonging to Bandar 'Abbās by inhabitants of Hairah village; but the Shaikh of Shārjah, whose subjects the pirates were, of his own accord compelled them to make restitution.

1838. In 1838 two Qāsimi subjects, Sultān-bin-Sohār and Muhammad-bin-Sohār, brothers, attacked and plundered a Khārag boat at the northern end of the Persian Gulf, killing several persons; and they also looted, in the vicinity of Rās-al-Hadd, a vessel belonging to the Bātinah coast. Sultān, having been captured at Lingeh, was delivered over by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Shaikh of the Ka'ab, whose interest in the case will be explained further on; but Muhammad and a Nākhuda who had been associated with him in his misdeeds, on their surrender by Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar after severe treatment at Shārjah, were released by the British authorities with a light additional punishment. Also in 1838, a Baqārah belonging to Khābūrah in the 'Omān Sultanate was stealthily pursued by a Baqārah of Dibai to an anchorage at Barkah and there, at night but not unawares, attacked. Of nine men on board the Khābūrah vessel, six were wounded and two subsequently died; but blood-money and other compensation were exacted in full from the aggressors by the British authorities through the Shaikh of Dibai.

1840 In 1840 some petty controversies took place on the pearl banks, and elsewhere at sea, between subjects of Abu Dhabi and Dibai and between subjects of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi; but they were unaccompanied by bloodshed or extreme violence and were adjusted by the Resident under the terms of the Maritime Truce. More serious was the plunder by Bin-'Askar, a member of the rebellious Qubaisāt section of the Bani Yās, in his flight with a number of companions from Abu Dhabi to Dibai, of two Baqārahs owned by Bani Yās and containing pearls of high value; nor did the Shaikh of Dibai at once comply with the demand of the British authorities, that Bin-'Askar should be handed over to his own Shaikh.

The ruler of Dibai also became liable about this time for compensation on account of an Abu Dhabi boat, which some of his subjects, mov-

ing by water and not by land, had discovered in a creek and there broken up in reprisal for a land raid by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

In 1841, as the Dibai Shaikh persisted in his refusal to satisfy the claims outstanding against him, some of which arose from the petty disputes on the pearl banks already mentioned, a British squadron including the steam frigate "Sesostris," Commodore Brucks, was sent against his town. After two shells from the 8-inch guns of the "Sesostris" had been fired over the place, he consented to pay $400 as compensation, and to surrender the Baqārahs brought by Bin-'Askar from Abu Dhabi, with their fittings. In the same year a boat belonging to a respectable member of the 'Amāir of Hasa was plundered by pirates while stranded between Zakhnūnīyah Island and Bahrain, one of the crew being killed and others wounded; and, as the criminals were shown to be Manāsīr and Bani Yās of the Hawāmil section, a demand was made on the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi for redress. He at once took personal action by sea and other vigorous action by land against the offending communities, with the result that, notwithstanding the remoteness of their habitat, one of their boats was destroyed and five of their bad characters were captured together with their families and 50 camels. 1841.

In 1844, a Qāsimi subject having seized a person of the Ka'ab tribe from a Dibai boat on the pearl banks, as related further on, some men of Dibai ventured to retaliate by plundering a Baqārah of Shārjah; but the Shaikh of Dibai, Maktūm-bin-Butai, who had profited by experience and was now a thorough-going supporter of British policy, repudiated the act, restored the property taken, and, after punishing the perpetrators, obliged them to lodge security for their future good behaviour with the British Residency Agent at Shārjah. The Ka'ab case abovementioned and some others which had occurred at the pearl fishery made it necessary for the Resident, Colonel Hennell, to enforce respect for the Ten Years' Maritime Truce, then recently concluded, by demanding reparation and security for the future from the aggressors, who were subjects of Shārjah; and, with the ready concurrence of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, these were immediately afforded. Meanwhile a fresh claim against Shārjah had arisen through the conduct of an infuriated pearl diver of that port, who, after firing with his matchlock on an 'Ajmān boat, boarded it and did some execution among the crew with a spear and an iron mace; but the further requisition on the Shaikh of Shārjah which this incident necessitated was satisfied with the same alacrity as the former. In both cases the demands of the Resident were conveyed to Shārjah by a ship of war. 1844.

At the beginning of 1845 an affair occurred which illustrated in a remarkable manner the growth of a more orderly spirit, in matters mari- 1845.

time, among the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān. Two vessels with rice, bound from Lingeh to Shārjah, attempted to make the 'Ajmān creek in a storm; one was wrecked at the entrance, but the other succeeded, with the loss of a part of her cargo, in reaching the inner harbour. Here she would certainly have been plundered but for the exertions of the Shaikh, 'Abdul 'Aziz, and his brother, who, hastening to the beach and drawing their swords, swore to cut down the first man who should tamper with the vessel or her cargo. For his spirited conduct on this occasion the Shaikh received through the Resident the special thanks and commendations of Government.

1849-50. In 1849 and 1850 a number of claims relating to the seizure and counter-seizure of slaves from boats at sea arose between the people of Abu Dhabi and Dibai; but, with the assistance of the Resident, they were all satisfactorily adjusted. In the autumn of 1850, however, a case of a gravity now unusual occurred in the capture of a Hamriyah boat and the murder of two of her crew by subjects of Abu Dhabi. The "Tigris," Lieutenant Manners, and the "Euphrates," Lieutenant Tronson, were at once despatched to Abu Dhabi town and intimidated the Shaikh by approaching within effective range of the shore,—an operation hitherto unattempted at Abu Dhabi; and, perhaps in consequence of this manœuvre, they had no difficulty in obtaining satisfaction of the claim that they brought, which was for $600 as blood-money and the restoration of the boat and property taken.

1852. In the spring of 1852 a piracy was committed in Zanzibar waters, upon a Zanzibar craft, by a Baghlah of which the owner resided at Rās-al-Khaimah; but the slowness of communication in those days between Būshehr and East Africa greatly protracted the case, and at the time of the conclusion of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace in 1853 it was still unsettled. The Qāsimi Shaikh at first sought to evade responsibility on the plea that the entire crew of the pirate boat were natives of Qashiyāt in Bātinah, and therefore subjects of Masqat; but in the end he seems to have agreed to pay whatever compensation might be assessed. Likewise in the spring of 1852, a boat, belonging to Banī Yās seceders established at Dōhah in Qatar but carrying passengers for Dibai, was seized off Abu Dhabi town, and then and there appropriated with all that she contained. This affair being regarded not as a legitimate act of sovereignty over rebellious subjects but as an infraction of the Maritime Truce, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was immediately called to account; and, though he had in the beginning professed to act under an authorisation by the Wahhābi Amir to coerce the dissident

Bani Yās by confiscating their boats, he found no difficulty in accommodating himself to the Resident's demands, made known to him through Commodore Robinson.

The Native Agent established at Shārjah in 1823 was now, apparently, the medium of all ordinary communications between the Resident and the Trucial Shaikhs. The Shārjah Agency.

The incumbent during a considerable part of the formative period now under consideration, when the personal character of the functionary must have been a matter of great importance, was one Mulla Husain. The relations of Mulla Husain with Shaikh Sālih, a brother of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, who acted as Deputy-Governor of the town of Shārjah until 1838 when he was superseded, were extremely cordial; and the removal of Sālih was accordingly regarded by the British authorities with some dissatisfaction.

In 1852 the relations between the Shārjah Shaikh and the Residency Agent, then Hāji Ya'qūb, to whom insults followed by reparation were twice offered, became exceedingly strained: this state of matters was partly due to revelations made by the Agent in connection with the slave trade, and it was aggravated by an order of the Court of Directors, that compensation payable to persons under Shārjah jurisdiction should not in future be handed to the Shaikh for disbursement. The order in question, which was issued in contrariety to the advice of the Resident, seems to furnish a clue to a charge of misappropriating money which, among others, the Shaikh levelled at the Agent.

The article in the General Treaty of Peace referring to the slave trade, on which Government in 1823 had placed a somewhat restricted interpretation, was expanded during the period now in question by three separate treaties concluded with the Trucial Shaikhs. Treaties for the suppression of the slave-trade, 1838, 1839 and 1847.

The first of these, signed in 1838, conferred on British Government cruisers the right to detain and search, anywhere at sea, vessels belonging to the ports of the signatories which might be suspected of carrying off or embarking slaves; also the further right of seizing and confiscating such vessels in event of the suspicion being found correct. It does not appear that the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain subscribed this agreement.

The second treaty, that of 1839, conceded similar rights of detention and search over a part of the Indian Ocean in regard to vessels suspected of being engaged in the slave trade, and authorised the confiscation of the same with their cargoes should they be found carrying slaves. This treaty contained an express declaration that Somālis were "Hurr" or free and therefore not liable to enslavement, and it made the

sale of Somális punishable. It is not clear that this treaty was formally accepted by the Shaikh of Ajmán.

The third and last treaty, dated 1847 and signed by all the Trucial Shaikhs, prohibited the exportation of slaves "from the coasts of Africa and elsewhere" on board vessels belonging to the signatories or their subjects or dependents; and it conferred on British warships the power to detain and search suspected vessels anywhere at sea, and to seize and confiscate the same on proof of the prohibition having been violated by their means.

From the wording of these engagements it would appear that they bore no special reference to the slave trade in the Persian Gulf, but were rather adjuncts to larger schemes for the suppression of the traffic on the coast of Africa.

Connection of the Egyptians and the Wahhábis with Trucial 'Omán, 1835-53.

The external relations of the Trucial Shaikhs during the period that we have now reached, other than those which they had with the British Government, were almost exclusively with the Wahhábis or, at first, with the Egyptians, by whose power that of the Wahhábis was for a time superseded in Central Arabia.

Successful Egyptian Intrigues in Trucial 'Omán, 1839.

In 1839—in disregard of a pledge not to extend his conquests in the direction of the Persian Gulf, given in 1838 by Muhammad 'Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, to Colonel Campbell, the representative of the British Government at Cairo—the Egyptians occupied Hasa, appeared to contemplate the reduction of Bahrain, and despatched an agent to prepare their way among the tribesmen of Trucial 'Omán. These steps provoked countermoves on the part of the British Government, who felt their influence in the Gulf to be imperilled by the progress of the Egyptians; and in February 1839 the Political Resident at Búshehr was expressly instructed to exert his influence for the purpose of checking their further encroachments. With the same object a visit was paid to the coast of Trucial 'Omán by Sir F. Maitland, the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in the East, in H.M.S. "Wellesley"; and the Trucial Shaikhs, in the presence of Captain T. Edmunds, Assistant Political Resident, who accompanied the cruise, solemnly undertook to hold no friendly relations with the emissary of the Egyptians, but on the contrary to oppose him. Notwithstanding this promise the Egyptian agent,

who was no other than the former Wahhábí representative Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, was allowed by Shaikh Sultán-bin-Saqar to remain at Shárjah, where, on his arrival in March 1839, a fortified house and tower had been placed at his disposal by the Shaikh; and from this point of vantage Sa'ad at once began to intrigue, calling on the Na'im tribe through Shaikh Sultán-bin-Saqar to surrender Buraimi for occupation by a garrison of Wahhábis, whom he had brought with him, and opening a direct correspondence with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, whose co-operation with themselves, in view of his previous steady opposition to Central Arabian influences, had been confidently anticipated by the British authorities. On the Na'im, who had but recently obtained or recovered possession of Buraimi, the threats of the Egyptian agent produced no effect, and the Na'im were encouraged in their defiant attitude by Saiyid Hamúd-bin-'Azzán of Sohár, who immediately sent his own brother Qais with 200 men to their assistance; but by Shaikh Khalífah-bin-Shakhbút of Abu Dhabi the advances of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq were cordially received.

Counteractive measures by the British authorities, July 1839.

The situation *vis à vis* of the Egyptians was now so unsatisfactory that Captain Hennell, the Political Resident, resolved on a personal visit to Bahrain and Trucial 'Omán; he arrived off the coast of the latter on the 1st of July 1839 in the H.E.I. Company's Steamer "Hugh Lindsay," of which the novel and surprising evolutions were not without their influence on the disaffected Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.* Captain Hennell's enquiries showed that the Shaikhs of Dibai and Umm-al-Qaiwain were unfavourably disposed towards the Egyptians, but that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was using every endeavour to supplant the Shaikh of Shárjah in Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq's favour, which Sultán-bin-Saqar on his part was doing his utmost to retain. From each of these four chiefs the Resident obtained a general written agreement to support the policy of the British Government and to resist that of the Egyptians; and in the case of Sultán-bin-Saqar a further clause was added, by which the Shaikh bound himself not to enter into any correspondence or treaty with Muhammad 'Alí of Egypt, his dependents, or any other foreign power without the consent of the British Government, and to regard the friends and enemies of the British as his own. The Shaikh of Shárjah was also furnished, at his own request, with letters from the Resident to himself and to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq representing the

* The "Hugh Lindsay," Lieutenant Campbell, drew only eleven feet of water, and the power of the vessel to advance up a narrow channel against the wind greatly impressed the Arabs.

advisability of the return of the latter to Najd; and, to satisfy the Shaikh's demands for British support, the Resident promised that, in case compliance with the policy enjoined should involve him in hostilities, he should be supplied with such munitions of war as might be necessary and proper: this undertaking Captain Hennell offered to confirm in writing on the expulsion of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq. Meanwhile an appeal for help against Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq had reached Captain Hennell from the Shaikhs of Baraimi, to which that officer replied by encouraging them to maintain their independence, by holding out hopes that an Agent would be sent to reside with them, and by promising to supply them with ammunition, if attacked because of having conformed to his advice. The Resident's letter addressed to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq contained a reference to these negotiations, and indicated that the Na'im of Baraimi had been taken under British protection pending a settlement between the British and Egyptian Governments.

Policy of the Indian Government.

The whole of Captain Hennell's proceedings were confirmed, and his zeal and energy were highly applauded, by the Governor-General of India; but the project of extending British protection to Baraimi, indicated in the Resident's letter to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, was negatived, along with certain other of his proposals for more active measures against the Egyptians and their supporters in Eastern Arabia. The Government of India considered that the larger question of Egyptian encroachments was one for the British Cabinet; and it is probable, moreover, that the anxieties of the first war in Afghānistān had by this time begun to cramp their policy in other directions; but the Resident was authorised to pursue, and, even to extend, the policy of distributing ammunition, etc., for use against the Egyptians.

Further action of the British authorities, 1839-40.

The local results of Captain Hennell's visit were not entirely satisfactory; for, though the Egyptian agent now took his departure for 'Oqair, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, in violation of the spirit of his freshly-formed obligations and in the interest—as was supposed—of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, proceeded in person against the Na'im of Baraimi; but the Na'im, though disappointed in this emergency of the help of the Shaikh of Shārjah, stood firm and even repulsed the attacks of Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt with such vigour as to make him desirous of peace for the sake of his Bedouin supporters. At this juncture the Resident intervened and required the Shaikh to make such reparation as should be satisfactory to the Na'im within three months, on pain of being considered an enemy to the British Government and of rendering himself liable for the payment of a lump sum of $1,000 as compensation to the Na'im; and eventually Shaikh Khalifah was able to produce a letter

from the Na'im Shaikhs certifying that their claims had been satisfied and amity restored.

British support extended to the Shaikhs of Baraimi January 1840.

In January 1840 Captain Hennell revisited the coast of Trucial 'Omān and held a meeting at 'Ajmān with the Shaikhs of Baraimi, whose position he was anxious to strengthen; the principal figure among the Shaikhs was Hamūd-bin-Sarūr of the Shawāmis division of the Na'im, the holders of the Baraimi forts. The Resident was able to effect a defensive alliance against all enemies between the Na'im and the Dhawāhir inhabiting the Oasis, whose mutual hostility had hitherto been a source of weakness; but his efforts to reconcile the Na'im with their neighbours the Bani Qitab were not equally successful. A judicious distribution of rice, money and ammunition, which next took place, was designed to illustrate the advantages of the British connection and was so regulated as to make it clear that the favours of Government would be reserved for its sincere supporters.

Captain Hamerton's journey to Baraimi, January and February 1840.

On the conclusion of these proceedings Captain A. Hamerton, an officer of the Khārag Field Force who was soon after selected to be Political Agent at Masqat, travelled from Shārjah to Baraimi under the protection of Hamūd-bin-Sarūr, regaining the coast at Sohār in Bātinah. He found the defences of Baraimi to consist of a main fort on the south side of the place, built of sun-dried bricks and about 60 paces square, and of a smaller one, about 300 paces to the northwards: both of these were constructions of Mutlaq the Wahhābi. The Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai did their utmost, by means of intrigues, to prevent Captain Hamerton's journey.

Withdrawal of the Egyptians from Najd, May 1840.

On his return to Hasa, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq seems to have incurred the distrust of his employers and to have been sent by them under surveillance to Riyādh; but not long afterwards the Egyptian occupation came to an end, and in May 1840 the Egyptian troops were in full retreat from Najd.

Suspected designs of the Khālid and 'Abdullah on 'Omān.

The Egyptians at their withdrawal had installed Khālid as ruler of Najd, and reports soon became current that the new Amīr cherished designs upon 'Omān. Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq probably still maintained a correspondence with the Trucial Shaikhs; and in 1841 a letter addressed to him by the Shaikh of Shārjah fell into the hands of the Na'im of Baraimi, who found that it related to a project for their own destruction. In November 1841, the Amīr Khālid being then at Hofūf in Hasa and his movements indicating an intention to proceed against 'Omān, the remonstrances of the British Government were conveyed to him through Lieutenant Jopp, who landed at 'Oqair and, after visiting the Amīr at his headquarters, returned to the coast at Qatīf. The Amīr in

his reply denied that he entertained any designs on 'Omān; but his continuance in power after this event was so brief as to leave it uncertain whether his assurances had been sincere.

'Abdullah, the successor of Khālid, during his brief tenure of power, opened a correspondence with the Trucial Shaikhs, in which he announced his intention of sending Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq as his agent to Baraimi; but his letters, except that which he had addressed to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, were obtained by Colonel Robertson, the British Political Resident, who remonstrated against his proceedings on the ground that they might lead to a revival of piracy. 'Abdullah, in reply professed his abhorrence of piracy; but he did not fail to claim the people of Trucial 'Omān as his subjects.

Discontinuance of British support to the Shaikhs of Baraimi, 1843.

In July 1843, immediately on his return to power, Faisal, the restored Amir of Najd, informed the Shaikhs of 'Omān by letter that it was his intention at the end of the hot weather to send a force under Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq to take possession of the province. Alarmed by these threats the Na'im of Baraimi, who had ere now by lawless acts estranged their former ally Saiyid Hamūd of Sohār, applied for aid to the British Government; but in reply they were informed that the object of the assistance given them in 1840 was to prevent the establishment of the Egyptians in the country, and that, this danger having been removed, it was now the intention of the British Government to withdraw from interference in the internal affairs of Arabia. At the same time friendly communications of a general nature were passing between the Būshehr Residency and Riyādh.

Re-occupation of Baraimi by the Wahābis, 1845.

Early in 1845 Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, accompanied by a small force, arrived once more in the neighbourhood of Baraimi. His hesitating approach betrayed some uncertainty as to the event; but on this occasion the Na'im and Dhawāhir submitted without resistance, the Baraimi forts were at once placed in his hands, and the Trucial Shaikhs hastened to do him honour. Once firmly established in his old headquarters he devoted his attention, with results which are described in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, chiefly to squeezing the richer principalities of Sohār and Masqat, but did not therefore neglect less valuable prey which lay within easy reach. On the contrary he at once engaged in intrigues to obtain possession of the town of Dhank in Dhāhirah, and in October he made preparations to seize the small oasis of Dhaid in the interior of Trucial 'Omān, besides which he proposed to build a fort on the coast in Zora, an insulated tract between 'Ajmān and Hamrīyah. These proceedings and his general arrogance and rapacity

soon brought into coalition against him on the east the Na'īm tribe, the chief of Sohār, and the Mutawwa' class of 'Omān, and on the west all the Trucial Shaikhs except the chief of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who, probably with a view to some personal advantage, favoured the design of the Wahhābis on Dhaid. His enemies did not as yet venture on active opposition in arms to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq; they chose at first the safer course of accusing him to his master of malversation in respect of the revenues that he collected,—a charge which, from his behaviour in a settlement with the Saiyids of Sohār and Masqat, seems to have been well-founded. At this time the Wahhābi agent's direct communications with Central Arabia appear to have been broken by the tribes, now hostile, that lay upon the route. Sa'ad's departure from Baraimi for the court of the Amīr, at which he had resolved to appear in person for the purpose of justifying his conduct, was countermanded at the last moment, on the unexpected arrival from Najd of an order confirming him in his appointment but requiring of him an immediate remittance in money. With the assistance of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, who provided a vessel, he at once despatched a quantity of treasure by sea to Hasa.

Temporary expulsion of the Wahhābis from Baraimi by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, 1848-49.

The position of the Wahhābis at Baraimi remained unaltered until the 4th of May 1848, when Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn of Abu Dhabi, taking advantage of the momentary absence of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq and assisted by the Dhawāhir tribe, suddenly captured a Wahhābi post in the Dhawāhir country. Shaikh Sa'id was at once joined by the Na'īm and by a contingent from Sohār under the command of Saif-bin-Hamūd of that place; the result was the capitulation, after a short struggle, of both the Wahhābi strongholds in Baraimi; and these were immediately occupied by the Abu Dhabi Shaikh, while Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq sought refuge at Shārjah. The son of the Sohār chief, in consequence of a misunderstanding, soon withdrew his support; and the Shaikhs of Shārjah, Dibai and 'Ajmān,* irritated at the pre-eminence so easily acquired by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, combined with the Wahhābis; but Shaikh Sa'id continued to maintain his position at Baraimi with boldness and success. At length, in February 1849, peace was arranged between the contending parties by an emissary of the Sharīf of Makkah; the conditions were apparently unfavourable to Shaikh Sa'id, for they involved the restoration of the Baraimi forts to the Wahhābi agent and a general return to the *status quo ante bellum*.

In November 1849 the Shaikhs of Dibai and Shārjah strongly urged the Wahhābi Amīr to settle the emigrant Qubaisāt section

* According to one account the Shaikh of 'Ajmān (like the Shaikh of Umm-al-Quiwain) refused to take part against Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn.

of the Banī Yās under his own protection at Khor-al-'Odaid ; but this intrigue failed in consequence of prompt and successful measures by which the Abu Dhabi Shaikh obliged the seceders to return to their homes and their allegiance.

Various unsuccessful attempts by the Trucial Shaikhs to expel the Wahhābis, 1850-51.

In March 1850 Shaikh Sa'īd-bin-Tahnūn, who had since the peace of 1849 been carrying on negotiations with Saiyid Thuwaini, regent of Masqat, for a fresh attack on the Wahhābis, sent a contingent of 400 Banī Yās and Manāsīr to assist his ally in the defence of Shinās against the Qawāsim, and himself began an attack on the Wahhābi position at Baraimi by destroying the irrigation channels of that settlement. An interruption of his operations was threatened by the collection at Dhaid of a large force from Shārjah, Dibai, 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain ; but this army having proceeded, after much discussion among the leaders, to Bātinah to take part in the struggle there between the Saiyids Thuwaini and Qais, Shaikh Sa'īd was left free to prosecute his desultory, and in the end ineffectual, operations against Baraimi. In the following November a combined but apparently fruitless attack was made by the Qawāsim, Banī Yās and Na'īm upon the Najdi garrison of Baraimi. This attack was the precursor of a regular combination in 1851 between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi against the Wahhābis ; but the alliance was due, on the part of Shaikh Sultān, merely to jealousy of the favour now shown by the Wahhābis to the Shaikh of Dibai, and it was barren of results.

Sojourn of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, Wahhābi, at Baraimi, 1853

In the spring of 1853 the Trucial Shaikhs, with the exception of Sa'īd-bin-Buti of Dibai who deputed a relation to represent him, waited in person upon 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, then recently arrived in Baraimi as the representative of his father the Wahhābi Amīr ; and so assiduous were they in their attentions to him, and in their rivalry for his good graces, that the presence of all upon the coast was not secured without some difficulty by Captain Kemball, when he arrived there in May 1853 for the purpose of concluding a Perpetual Treaty of Peace. The principal object of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal during his stay at Baraimi was, as explained in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, to wring the utmost possible concessions from the unfortunate ruler of Masqat,—a policy in which, needless to say, he was warmly encouraged by Shaikh Sultān of Shārjah. Shaikh Sa'īd of Abu Dhabi, on the other hand, exerted himself to prevent an invasion of Bātinah by the Wahhābi and Qāsimi forces, such as was proposed and at one time all but undertaken ; and the terms of peace, the most favourable that 'Abdullah could be persuaded to grant, were arranged at Sohār by the instrumentality of this chief and of a certain

Ahmad-as-Sadairi, who had now apparently succeeded to the position of Wahhābi agent at Baraimi formerly held by Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq.

Other external relations of the Trucial Shaikhs, 1835-53.

Relations with the Saiyid of Masqat.

The Shaikh of Shārjah continued to display, as in earlier times, a relentless animosity against the rulers of 'Omān; and in 1842 he even broke off negotiations for a peace, otherwise advantageous to himself, with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, merely because it would have entailed amicable relations with the Saiyids of Masqat and Sohār. In 1849 he was contemplating an attempt to recover Khor Fakkān from Saiyid Thuwaini, regent of Masqat, into whose hands it had fallen, as also had Ghallah; but he was for the moment dissuaded by the Wahhābi agent at Baraimi and the Shaikh of Dibai. In 1850, supported—as has already been mentioned—by his neighbours of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain, Shaikh Sultān marched to the aid of Qais-bin-'Azzān of Sohār against Saiyid Thuwaini; and Shinās, Ghallah and Khor Fakkān were quickly taken and distributed between the allies, in whose possession they remained for about a year. In 1851, on the appearance before Sohār of Saiyid Sa'id in person, Shaikh Sultān was bought over to abandon Qais to his fate. The army of the Saiyid, assisted by a contingent from Dibai, then recovered Sohār and Shinās with little difficulty; but Ghallah and Khor Fakkān appear to have remained in the hands of the Shārjah Shaikh, who thus profited by the war to the extent of regaining his lost possessions in Shamailiyah.

Relations with the Arabs of the Persian Coast.

Some of the Trucial Shaikhs continued to follow with interest the fortunes and disputes of their Arab kinsmen settled on the Persian littoral; but they were generally restrained by the influence of the British Political Resident from active interference upon that side. In 1835 the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was withheld from sending help to the Āl 'Ali of Chārak, his ancestral dependents; and in 1837 the Shaikh of Shārjah was similarly prevented from supporting the people of Tavuneh against those of Chārak.

Relations with the Shaikh of the Ka'ab in Persian 'Arabistān.

There was occasional friction between the Ka'ab Shaikh of Persian 'Arabistān and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān. The seizure of a Ka'ab subject by Qāsimi pirates in 1838, together with the steps taken in connection with it by the British authorities, has been mentioned in a previous paragraph; but this affair, though the victim was among the wealthiest and most valued of Shaikh Thāmir's supporters, gave rise to

no serious difficulties, for the Ka'ab chief, mollified by the surrender of the chief criminal, accepted the assurances of the British Resident that the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Lingeh and their subjects as a whole were innocent. The Qawāsim, apparently expecting severe reprisals, had in the meanwhile formed their Basrah-bound vessels, 22 in all, into a fleet sailing together for mutual protection.

In December 1841 a case much more difficult of settlement arose through the seizure at Muhammareh of a Batil belonging to Abu Dhabi; this act was committed under the orders of Shaikh Fāris, the Ka'ab chief of the day, who justified it by reference to an untenable claim of his own, more than 30 years old, against the Bani Yās tribe. After a protracted controversy, of which the particulars are described in the history of 'Arabistān, the Batil was returned to the owners through the British authorities in May 1845.

Relations with Bahrain.

The intervention of the Trucial Shaikhs in Bahrain affairs was now discountenanced by the British Government in the same manner as their interference in Persia. In 1843 permission to assist the ex-chief of Bahrain, 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, was positively refused to the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Dibai by whom it had been sought, and the more prudent Shaikh of Abu Dhabi himself voluntarily declined to listen to overtures from the other contending faction in Bahrain. In July 1851, however, the questions pending between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhābi Amir were amicably adjusted by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, in whose conduct upon this occasion there was nothing reprehensible.

Internal affairs of Trucial 'Omān, 1835-53.

Leading motives.

The internal history of Trucial 'Omān at this time, relating chiefly to petty wars among the principalities, is confusing and monotonous; but it is not altogether without meaning or explanation. The central fact is a contest for the general paramountcy between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi: a contest in which, after the first, the power of Shārjah appeared relatively to decline, and one by which the Shaikh of Dibai, who held the balance of power, profited so largely and so unscrupulously that the principals from time to time forgot their feud in an endeavour to exterminate him by united action.

Besides hostilities traceable to the antagonism between Shārjah an Abu Dhabi there was, however, much desultory fighting due to

predatory raids and the reprisals which they provoked; and some incidents of considerable importance arose out of aggressions by the Shaikh of Shārjah on his smaller neighbours. About 1840 it was clearly the ambition of the Shaikh of Shārjah to reduce Umm-al-Qaiwain, 'Ajmān, and even Dibai to dependence upon himself.

Relations between Shārjah, Abu Dhabi and Dibai, 1838.

In May 1838 Shaikh Khalifah of Abu Dhabi, in whose mind the secession of the Āl Bū Falāsah to Dibai still rankled deeply, made a sudden raid upon that place in the absence of the inhabitants at the pearl banks, captured a tower upon the sea face, and, after placing a garrison of his own in it, withdrew. On receiving news of the incident the Āl Bū Falāsah at once returned from the pearl fishery and, assisted by Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, dislodged the intruding Banī Yās after three days' operations; they also destroyed the tower. Bickerings followed, but in the end a settlement was effected, and the boats of Dibai and Abu Dhabi were enabled to return to the pearl banks before the close of the season.

1839. In 1839 a blood-feud arose between the people of Dibai and those of Umm-al-Qaiwain; it led to hostilities between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain and is therefore treated of in a later paragraph.

1840. A year later the hand of Maktūm-bin-Buti, Shaikh of Dibai, was shown in the domestic affairs of the Qāsimi principality by Shaikh Saqar-bin-Sultān's proclaiming his independence, in the town of Shārjah, of his father, the Qāsimi Shaikh; and on the failure of this *coup d'état*, during the continuance of which the influence of Shaikh Maktūm had dominated Shārjah, the rebellious son was provided at Dibai with a refuge from his father's vengeance. Seemingly stung to fury by these proceedings, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar underwent a reconciliation with his arch-enemy, Shaikh Khalifah of Abu Dhabi, and it was agreed between them that, on the capture of Dibai, the town should be completely destroyed and the inhabitants obliged to remove to Abu Dhabi or Shārjah; the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain also, having been placated by Shaikh Sultān, was persuaded to join in the arrangement. When matters had reached this point the Shaikh of Shārjah, with a falseness almost incredible even in one so celebrated for that quality, suddenly accepted the submission of the Shaikh of Dibai, which was accompanied by a gift of $ 1,000, and withdrew, leaving his indignant allies to conclude the affair as they best could.

1841. In 1841 Dibai was much weakened by the exodus of 500 discontented Āl Bū Mahair, who settled at Shārjah; and at the same time the prevalence of a virulent fever in the town of Dibai caused a number of the inhabitants to desert it and settle temporarily, with the written

permission of Shaikh Sultān, at the place called Dairah which in 1824-1827 had been the cause of a serious dispute between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi. Finding Dibai almost undefended in consequence of these events and of the departure of the men of the Āl Bū Falāsah to the pearl fishery, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, after securing the neutrality of the Bani Qitab and other Bedouin tribes, made a dash with 150 men upon the town, which he took and plundered, ravaging the date groves, destroying all provisions found, and burning a Batil, the property of Shaikh Maktūm, on board of which two men also were killed. The Shaikh of Dibai at once applied to the Shaikh of Shārjah, who came to his aid with 200 men; but, while the allied force did not venture to attack the invaders, now in occupation of Jumairah, the enterprising Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt sent out a raiding party which looted the village of Khān in their rear, carrying off fifteen slaves, and returned to headquarters in safety. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi then retired to his own territory, whence he afterwards attempted a surprise on the towns of Dibai, Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah; but this time, finding the enemy everywhere prepared to receive him, he was obliged to retreat with the loss of a few men and of his own riding camel.

1842. In April of the following year it was suggested to Shaikh Khalifah that he, with the other Trucial Shaikhs, should enter into an engagement to abstain from mutual aggressions by land as well as by sea during the approaching pearl season; but the Shaikh, who was still smarting under the ill success of his latest raid, declined to consider the suggestion, and even proceeded to detach Shaikh Maktūm from Shaikh Sultān as a preliminary to a fresh attack on the latter. He remained quiescent, however, during the summer months; and in October 1842, unusual cordiality then prevailing between himself and Shaikh Maktūm, the latter undertook to arrange a peace with Shārjah; but the Shārjah Shaikh refused to abandon his enmity with the Saiyid of Masqat, which was an indispensable condition, and the negotiations accordingly failed.

1843. In March 1843 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi paid a visit to the Shaikh of Dibai, and, much to the chagrin of the Shaikh of Shārjah, their friendship appeared to be confirmed.

A raid by 150 camel-riders of the Bani Yās was next conducted by Sultān, a brother of the Abu Dhabi Shaikh, against the allies of the Qawāsim; and, all in the space of seven days, the Bani Qitab had three men killed and 70 camels taken, a caravan bound from Baraimi to Shārjah

was plundered, and three of the Na'im were slain, the raiders themselves returning home with the loss of only two men killed and two wounded.

In July a hollow peace put an end, temporarily, to the war; but in August, at the instigation it was believed of the Shaikh of Dibai, Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Shakhbût with a considerable force of horse and camelry ravaged the territories of the Bani Qitab, Ghafalah and Na'im and carried off a number of their camels, which had been collected for safety at Dhaid while the owners themselves were absent on a foray in the Bâtinah district. Promises to restore the booty taken were given by the Bani Yâs, but they were not fulfilled.

In November 1843, in consequence of an attack by Ghafalah on a Dibai caravan, Shaikh Maktûm carried fire and sword into the country of that tribe and of the Na'im, who were allies of Shaikh Sultân-bin-Saqar, and the result was an approach to a rupture between the two Shaikhs; but the Qâsimi Shaikh from prudential motives so hung back that even the Ghafalah, incensed at his desertion, turned their arms against him and threatened to transfer their allegiance to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. An inhabitant of Shârjah having been killed by the hand of a brother of Shaikh Maktûm, a crisis again occurred, and again passed over harmlessly. Finally, a direct collision took place in the interior between the Ghafalah and the Shaikh of Dibai and several men were killed on either side; the Shaikh was victorious, but lost the sight of one eye.

In July 1844 the Shaikh of Shârjah set about trying to recover his lost influence with the tribes of the interior; but in Bedouin state-craft he showed himself no match for Khalifah-bin-Shakhbût, who, in the course of a summer tour, succeeded in attaching to his cause even the tribes that he had most recently plundered. At Baraimi the Abu Dhabi Shaikh held a gathering of his friends and allies, which was attended by Saiyid Hamûd-bin-'Azzân, the ruler of Sohâr, and Saiyid Qahtân-bin-Saif, Deputy-Governor of Shinâs; but Shaikh Maktûm of Dibai, who was invited to present himself for a settlement of his differences with the Ghafalah, thought it more prudent to excuse himself and sent his brother Sa'id in his room. 1844.

In 1846 the whole of the Trucial Coast was involved in war by the ambition of Shaikh Sultân-bin-Saqar, whose object still appeared to be the annexation of Umm-al-Qaiwain and 'Ajmân and the crippling of Dibai. The threatened chiefs combined in self-defence against the Shaikh of Shârjah, who in his turn persuaded Sa'îd-bin-Tahnûn, a new Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, unversed as yet in Qâsimi duplicity, to enter with him into a counter-alliance. We are not here concerned with the conduct of the Umm-al-Qaiwain or of the 'Ajmân Shaikh, though the steadfastness 1846.

of the former had a strong influence on events, but shall confine our attention to the dispute between Shārjah and Dibai and its results.

The immediate cause of quarrel was a resolve by Sultan-bin-Saqar to set limits to the growth of Dibai by building a number of towers at Abu Hail, a place situated on the coast of his own territory but distant only five miles from Dibai, which proceeding Shaikh Maktūm felt it necessary at all costs to prevent. Hostilities had scarcely begun, when they were interrupted by the arrival off Shārjah of a British and Indian naval squadron under the command of Commodore Sir H. Blackwood, R.N., who urged the combatants to suspend matters until a reference should have been made to the Resident. To this suggestion they agreed, but on the departure of the ships Shaikh Sultān immediately broke his promise and recommenced building at Abu Hail; and Captain Kemball, who arrived in March 1846 to promote a reconciliation on behalf of the Resident, found war fairly begun and his own best efforts of no avail.

A day or two after the Assistant Resident's departure the situation was greatly altered by the death of Saqar, son of the Shārjah Shaikh, who was killed in an attack on Umm-al-Qaiwain; and, at the request of Shaikh Sultān himself, a truce for more than 6 months, to the 12th of November following, was mediated by Commodore Hawkins. On the part of the principal mover in the matter the observance of this truce was merely nominal, for Shaikh Sultān at once resumed his building operations and excluded Dibai subjects from Shārjah, besides instigating the Abu Dhabi chief to insult the Shaikh of Dibai and to harass the Bedouin allies of Umm-al-Qaiwain; and on one occasion over 20 men of the latter, belonging to the Ghafalah tribe, were reported to have been butchered in consequence of his incitements.

On the expiration of the land truce the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Shārjah again met, and it was decided first to reduce Dibai; but Shaikh Sultān, seized by a sudden fear lest Shaikh Sa'id should retain the place, if captured, in his own hands, changed his mind and insisted that Umm-al-Qaiwain should be the first objective of the combined force.

1847. Hereupon the allies opened separate negotiations with Shaikh Maktūm, their intended victim, who threw himself into the arms of the Shārjah Shaikh and in February or March 1847 concluded a peace with him, while with Abu Dhabi he remained at war. The reason of Shaikh Maktūm's choice appears to have been that Shaikh Sultān now promised to destroy the towers at Abu Hail,—an undertaking which he did not fulfil or even intend to fulfil,—while Abu Dhabi, on the other hand, pressed upon him a disagreeable condition implying forgiveness of the obnoxious Bani Qitab.

Matters remained stationary until the 12th of January 1848, when, intercourse between 'Ajmān and Shārjah having been but lately resumed, a treacherous attempt was made by the governor of Shārjah, Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Sultān, a worthy son of his father, to possess himself of the 'Ajmān fort. The scheme miscarried and was at once disavowed by the elder Qāsimi Shaikh; but the disgust which it excited was such as to throw the four other Trucial Shaikhs into combination against Sultān-bin-Saqar and his sons. No active retaliation however was attempted. 1848.

The relations of the Shaikhs with one another during the next two years in Baraimi and Bātinah, have been partially described above, and at home no movements of importance took place among them. It may be added here that, during the occupation of Baraimi by Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, his relations with the Shārjah and Dibai Shaikhs were much strained. In July 1848 he required the former, as his ally, to break with the latter—a requisition with which Shaikh Sultān merely pretended to comply; and in December the Shaikhs of Shārjah, Dibai, and possibly 'Ajmān combined to recover Baraimi for the Wahhābis, but the force which they assembled never, apparently, reached its destination. 1848-50.

In 1851, notwithstanding the efforts of Shaikh Maktūm to prevent it, peace was concluded between Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn and Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar; but in 1852 Shaikh Sultān, who had interfered in the domestic affairs of the Dibai principality, found himself confronted by a defensive alliance between the Shaikhs of Dibai, Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain. 1851-52.

Relations between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain, 1839.

The aggressions of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar on the small neighbouring Shaikhdom of Umm-al-Qaiwain, the independence of which, notwithstanding his repudiation of suzerainty in 1832, he would willingly have destroyed, demand a short separate notice. In 1839, two inhabitants of Dibai having been slain in the desert by men of Umm-al-Qaiwain and others who mistook them for members of the Manāsir tribe, the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, hastened to tender compensation through the Shaikh of Shārjah, for the share of his subjects in the deed; but his offer was not accepted, nor was the friendly intervention of the British Resident productive of any result. A raid was then made by the Shaikh of Dibai, with the consent of the Shaikh of Shārjah, upon the territory of Umm-al-Qaiwain; but it ended in the capture of six of the Dibai party by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who placed them in confinement and refused to let them go. Shaikh Saqar-bin-Sultān, son of the Qāsimi chief, now openly sided with Shaikh Maktūm of Dibai; and Umm-al-Qaiwain was approached by a joint force, which, after drawing the defenders into

the open by a simulated flight, inflicted on them a loss of 20 killed and many wounded. The affair ended with the release of the six prisoners and the payment of blood-money in the original case by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain.

1840. On the expiration of the current Maritime Truce in the following year, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, who was by no means satisfied with the blow which his son and ally had dealt to the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, made a well-organised effort to reduce that port. While he himself with 700 Bedouins invested the place by land, a fleet of 3 Baghlahs and 60 Baqārahs, commanded by Saqar-bin-Sultān and the Shaikh of Dibai and carrying 1,500 men, proceeded to blockade it by sea; but a tower, situated at the entrance, prevented the boats from entering the backwater or creek, without possession of which the blockade could not be made effective. An entrenchment covering this tower was taken by a landing party of the Qawāsim, but they were beaten back from the tower itself with a loss of 8 men killed and 40 wounded; and meanwhile the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, with a view to relieving Umm-al-Qaiwain, had made an attempt to surprise the town of Dibai. In these circumstances the mediation of the British Resident was gladly accepted by the parties, and a formal treaty of alliance and friendship was concluded on the following conditions: that Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar should withdraw his demand for the destruction of a particular tower protecting the water supply of Umm-al-Qaiwain; that 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid should compensate the Qāsimi Shaikh for his loss in skirmishes previous to the siege; and that no fresh fortifications should be erected by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain.

1841. In 1841, encouraged by dissensions between the Qāsimi Shaikh and his son Saqar, Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid sounded the British Resident as to the permissibility of resuming work on certain fortifications, left incomplete at the time of the siege, upon the sea face of Umm-al-Qaiwain; but the project was severely discouraged by the Resident as involving a breach of the treaty mediated by himself. The Shaikh, however, disregarding the Resident's wishes, shortly proceeded to complete the unfinished towers and even to build an additional one for the defence of the backwater.

1842. Upon this Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar immediately applied to the Resident for enforcement of the treaty; and in November 1842 the Assistant Resident was deputed to the coast of Trucial Omān to enquire into the case. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was unable to justify, except as a precaution against treachery which he apprehended from

Shaikh Sultān, his own open and undeniable violation of the treaty; not only did he refuse to dismantle the new works, but he even expressed an intention of building others; and, in effect, he said that he would only desist under compulsion. The Shaikh of Shārjah, with his usual acuteness, refused to discuss any compromise and appealed to the honour of the British officials. Eventually the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was obliged to suspend his building operations, and the case was referred for the orders of Government.

In May 1843 the Assistant Resident, armed with authority from Government, again proceeded to the spot, and Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, until he found that coercion would be used if necessary, was just as obstinate as before; but the conclusion of the Ten Years' Maritime Truce, which took place at this time, deprived the question of its practical importance, and it was decided that, after the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain had fulfilled his obligations by destroying the works constructed in violation of the treaty, the treaty itself should be annulled and the Shaikhs and the British Government absolved from their mutual responsibilities. The British Agent was directed to remain at Umm-al-Qaiwain to witness the demolition of the towers, and their destruction was commenced; but, after one tower had been levelled with the ground, the Shaikh of Shārjah, at the intercession of the Shaikh of Dibai and not uninfluenced by a threat on the part of the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain to ruin the pearling season by beginning a war on land, agreed that the remainder should be spared—a concession which the British authorities very readily confirmed. 1843.

In 1844 Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar was driven by adverse winds to take refuge in the harbour of Umm-al-Qaiwain, and Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, overlooking the past, invited him ashore and treated him as a distinguished guest during a night and day. This, however, seems to have been a mere incident of Arab hospitality, for it led to no improvement of the bad relations between the two chiefs. 1844.

In the general war which broke out along the Trucial Coast in 1846, chiefly in consequence of the ambition of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain played an important part. In marked contrast with Shaikh 'Abdul Azīz of 'Ajmān, the other member of the triple combination, who finding it to his advantage to do so soon changed sides, Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid supported with unswerving loyalty his ally of Dibai; and by these two the war was carried to a not unsuccessful conclusion. Early in the operations an encounter took place in the 1846-47.

neighbourhood of Umm-al-Qaiwain between a force under the personal command of the Shaikh and a raiding party of Bani Qitab and others accompanied by Shaikh Saqar-bin-Sultān of Shārjah; in this affair, the son of the Qāsimi Shaikh having been slain after a fierce struggle, the partisans of Shārjah were put to flight. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was included in the peace of 1847; but, though he subsequently co-operated with the Qawāsim in an expedition to Bātinah he ever remained on his guard against the vengeance of the Shaikh Shārjah for the death of his son.

Aggression by the Shaikh of Shārjah on the Shihūh of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, 1839.

It will be interesting, before leaving the subject of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar and his attempted aggrandisements, to notice some operations which he undertook in 1839 against the neighbouring Shihhi tribe. The Saiyid of Masqat is said to have admitted in 1838 the dependence of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl district on the Qāsimi Shaikh; but the Shihūh, inhabiting the same, apparently held other views. One of their forts having fallen by treachery into the hands of Shaikh Sultān's representative at Dibah and having been demolished by him, the Shihūh embarked on a series of raids and forays, to which the Qāsimi Chief replied by unsuccessful land expeditions against their chief towns of Khasab and Kumzār. Shaikh Sultān had, in consequence of these reverses, resolved on a naval blockade of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl coast, when the success of the Egyptians in Najd drew his attention to a different quarter, and even caused him to take the initiative in seeking peace with the Shihūh.

Conflict between 'Ajmān and Hamrīyah, 1848.

It remains to mention an isolated conflict; between the people of 'Ajmān and those of Hamrīyah; it did not, apparently, disturb the relations of 'Ajmān with the Shaikhdom of Shārjah, to which Hamrīyah belonged. In September 1848, on the death of Saif-bin-'Abdullah, Shaikh of Hamrīyah, the inhabitants of that village elected one 'Abdullah as Shaikh in his place. This proceeding seems to have been resented by 'Abdul 'Azīz, Shaikh of 'Ajmān, for he immediately set out to attack Hamrīyah at the head of 400 men; but the 'Ajmāni host, were routed at the first encounter by an inferior number of the people of Hamrīyah, who pursued them back to the very gates of their own town. In this engagement Shaikh 'Abdul 'Azīz was killed and his brother Hamaid-bin-Rāshid wounded, while the newly elected chief of Hamrīyah also lost his life; and, besides the leaders, there were 26 men killed and 20 wounded on the side of 'Ajmān and 5 killed and 22 wounded on the side of Hamrīyah. 'Abdur Rahmān, a son of Saif-bin-'Abdullah, then became Shaikh of Hamrīyah; and Hamaid-bin R-āshid succeeded his deceased brother as Shaikh of 'Ajmān.

Perpetual Treaty of Peace, 4th May 1853.

When the period of the Ten Years' Maritime Truce began to near its end, Captain A. B. Kemball, then Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, consulted the Shaikhs who were parties to the same regarding the conclusion in its place of a permanent peace at sea. The replies received were not unfavourable, and the project was strongly supported by the Government of Bombay; accordingly, at the beginning of May 1853, Captain Kemball, under the sanction of the Government of India, proceeded in the "Clive" to the Trucial Coast, where the negotiations were quickly and successfully completed. Experience had now convinced the Shaikhs of the benefit to all from unbroken peace at sea, and not even that *pro formâ* opposition was encountered which had been anticipated on the part of the more powerful Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi, the Shaikh of Shārjah being satisfied by an assurance that the signature of the new treaty would not debar him, in an extreme case, from defending his maritime possessions in the Gulf of 'Omān by naval means against the ruler of Masqat. The terms of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, as it was styled, were similar to those of the Ten Years' Truce, but included, as an additional stipulation, that the "perfect maritime truce" now established "for evermore" should be watched over and enforced by the British Government. The treaty, which took effect from the 4th of May, was signed by the Shaikhs on various dates between the 4th and the 9th of that month.

The continuance of a system of presents, which the Resident was accustomed to bestow at his periodical visits in recognition of good conduct on the part of the individual Shaikhs, was expressly sanctioned by the Government of India.

PERIOD FROM THE PERPETUAL TREATY OF PEACE TO THE EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT, 1853-92.

British Relations with Trucial 'Omān 1853-92.

Maritime irregularities.

The term "maritime irregularity", which after 1853 generally figures in official correspondence in place of the word "piracy", is significant of the great and peaceful revolution which, by the firmness and moderation of the British political officers, had been gradually brought about in the Persian Gulf.

1854. On his first visit to the Trucial Coast after the conclusion of the Perpetual Peace, the Resident, Captain Kemball, found the Shaikhs confirmed in their "attachment and devotion to the British Government" and in their resolution faithfully to observe their engagements. On this occasion only two slight cases of breach of the peace at sea came under his consideration, and they were easily settled.

1855-1856. In January 1855 a Shū'ai belonging to one 'Abdul Karīm of Bahrain, having been driven by a storm to take shelter near Khor-al-'Odaid, was attacked and plundered there by two Baghlahs of Abu Dhabi; in the fray 'Abdul Karīm himself was wounded and one of his men was killed. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, Zāid-bin-Khalifah, who had just succeeded to the Shaikhdom, at first demurred to settling the case on the ground that it had occurred under his predecessor; but, this plea having been disallowed, he complied with the demands made on him through Commodore Ethersey by paying full compensation for the robbery and $600 as Diyah or blood-money on account of the murdered man, and by causing the two offending Baghlahs to be burnt.

A disturbance which took place at Hamriyah in 1855 gave rise to several slight aggressions at sea, two of them upon stranger vessels belonging to the Batinah coast; but redress in these cases was easily obtained.

In November 1855, while the "Kallian", a Bombay native vessel belonging to a Hindu British subject, was unloading her cargo at Shārjah, a storm arose and drove her on shore. On the wind abating a rabble from the town came down to the beach and plundered and partially destroyed her, besides tearing down a British flag which the Nākhuda had hoisted for her protection; and a second British flag having been hoisted, the Arabs began to abuse the British Government and violently assaulted one of the crew. A man-of-war was accordingly despatched to Shārjah with a demand for compensation, for the repair of the vessel, and for the punishment of the guilty parties; and, after a vain attempt by the Shaikh to present the case as one of wreck and to throw the blame upon Bedouins not amenable to his authority, these terms were substantially fulfilled.

An ordinary case of the seizure of runaway divers upon the pearl banks was so energetically handled in this year by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who imprisoned the chief offender and returned the kidnapped divers to the Residency Agent at Shārjah, that Government authorised a special increase in the value of his next annual present.

1856. A peculiar case arose in July 1856 from the participation of a force, sent by sea from Shārjah, in an attempt to reinstate at Abu Dhabi

Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, the ex-ruler of that place. The attack of the legitimists having failed, it was decided to treat the case as one of maritime aggression and to hold the Qāsimi Shaikh partially responsible for the damage done in Abu Dhabi town, though this was to some extent the work of Bedouin allies whom the *de facto* Shaikh had found himself compelled to summon to his assistance. The fine on the Shaikh of Shārjah was fixed at $25,000, payable by instalments, of which it was intended to remit a portion should the attitude of the Shaikh be satisfactory; but his shifty conduct placed clemency out of the question, and this large sum was in the end exacted to the last dollar, the final payment not being received till May 1860.

In 1857, as is more fully related in another place,* the Shaikh of Shārjah was prevented, on grounds of expediency and not under the Treaty of Perpetual Peace, which did not apply to the case, from taking action by sea against the Shihūh, with whom he was at war. 1857.

In 1859 an atrocity occurred, which revived for a moment, the memories of former days. Three natives of Hasa, subjects of the Wahhābi Amīr and passengers on a vessel of Dibai bound for Lingeh, were thrown overboard by the Nākhuda and crew, who desired to take possession of their valuables. Two were drowned; but the third member of the party, 'Abdullah-bin-Husain, managed to keep himself afloat until he was picked up by a vessel from Sūr. Eventually he laid information before the Resident, Captain Felix Jones, I. N., who despatched Commodore Balfour with a squadron to require (1) the surrender for destruction of the boat in which the crime had been committed, (2) the payment of $1,800 as compensation for property taken, (3) the payment of $1,800 as blood-money on account of two murders and an attempted murder, and (4) the public execution of 'Obaid, the Nākhuda of the guilty vessel, or, in lieu thereof, the payment of a fine of $1,000. Prompt compliance with these terms was enforced by Commodore Balfour, an officer of very decided character on the Shaikh of Dibai, the fine being accepted instead of the surrender of the chief murderer; but later in the year Captain Felix Jones, discovering that Muhammad-bin-Bazrān, another of the murderers, had returned to his home at Khasab, went there with Commodore Balfour and demanded his surrender under a penalty of $1,000. Muhammad-bin-Bazrān was accordingly delivered up unconditionally by the elders of the town—the first instance, it was * stated, of such a surrender being made to the British authorities—and, having been handed over to 1859.

* The statement was not absolutely correct. It will be remembered that in 1835 two pirates were surrendered by the Bani Yās.

Vide page 625 ante.

his sovereign, the Sultān of 'Omān, was blown from a gun at Masqat on the 21st of May 1860. In 1859 the surrender of seven Shārjah boats which had been guilty of piratical acts, apparently upon the Persian coast, was obtained by Commodore Jenkins, I.N., at 48 hours' notice; but the particulars of this case are not ascertainable.

1860 In 1860 the Shaikh of Hamrīyah, after having in the previous year been obliged to pay up a small sum on account of a robbery committed at sea on board a vessel belonging to his port, was so ill-advised as to move by water to the assistance of his suzerain, the Shaikh of Shārjah, who was engaged in coercing some rebellious subjects at Khān and Abu Hail: this thoughtless act cost him $250.

Two cases which occurred at Bakhah in 1859 or 1860 may, though they belong properly to the Ruūs-al-Jibāl district, be mentioned here as constituting breaches of maritime order on the coast immediately adjoining Trucial 'Omān; in the first a fugitive from Sha'am, at the instigation of the Shaikh of Bakhah, stole a Baqārah and some fishing nets from Sha'am and brought them to Bakhah, and in the second a shipwrecked crew, cast ashore at Bakhah, were robbed by the Shaikh of their few remaining effects. In each case the Shaikh, though he was not a signatory of any truce or peace and would at the present day be regarded as a dependent of the Sultān of Masqat, was called upon to pay a fine of $100. Payment of the first fine was refused by him to Lieutenant Dyer of the brigantine "Tigris;" but the arrival of Commodore Balfour on the 15th of February 1860 with the steam frigate "Semiramis" and the "Elphinstone" produced a satisfactory settlement, to which was annexed a warning to the Shaikh to be "careful how he ever again refused any demand made on him by the Captain of one of Her Majesty's Indian Navy vessels."

1860. In January 1860 the "Fath-al-Khair" of Lingeh, in endeavouring to enter the harbour of Rās-al-Khaimah during a storm, ran aground and was at once surrounded, with felonious intent, by 15 or 20 armed boats commanded by Shaikh Ibrāhīm, a son of the Qāsimi Shaikh and Deputy-Governor of the town. The unfortunate vessel, after being pillaged and wilfully damaged, was allowed to go, and made the best of her way to the Persian coast, where the owner found an effective advocate in Commander Balfour; for that officer, after due enquiry through a subordinate and a short correspondence with Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, who merely ordered his son to afford redress, himself proceeded to Rās-al-Khaimah. Shaikh Ibrāhīm had recourse to subterfuges, but they were cut short by the entry of eleven armed boats into the harbour, which took six vessels

belonging to the port in tow. In the result the compensation, amounting to $810, was disgorged within 48 hours, and subsequently an additional punitive fine of $500 was levied under the orders of the Bombay Government.

In 1866 the Political Resident, Colonel Lewis Pelly, submitted for the information of Government a number of specimen cases illustrative of the petty irregularities which still frequently occurred in the Gulf. It appears that Colonel Pelly felt himself precluded under recent orders from resorting to coercive measures, or even to the imposition of fines, without the previous sanction of Government; and that the abolition of the Indian Navy, whose ships, always at the disposal of the Resident, had been replaced by those of the Royal Navy with more extensive duties to perform, had increased the difficulties of the Resident's position. The reply to this important reference, in which the Resident clearly implied that more freedom of action should be allowed him and a greater material force placed at his disposal, is unfortunately not traceable. 1866-68.

From this time onwards the maintenance of the peace in Gulf waters seems to have become almost a matter of routine, and recourse to exceptional measures was seldom required. In September 1868, however, in connection with a great raid by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and 'Abu Dhabi upon the coast of Qatar, described in the history of Bahrain, Colonel Pelly found it necessary under the orders of Government to proceed to Abu Dhabi with the "Vigilant", "Sind" and "Hugh Rose", and a satisfactory settlement was obtained, but not without actual preparations for a bombardment. The terms enforced included the surrender of a Mashuwah and two Arab mares and the payment, partly by instalments, of compensation to the amount of $25,000; but of this large sum, it would appear, only Rs. 3,740 was ever actually realised. The Shaikh was obliged by Colonel Pelly to give up his only three guns, which were however returned to him, as their removal might have exposed the town of Abu Dhabi to Bedouin attacks.

Considerable alarm was caused in Trucial 'Omān by the Turkish expedition which annexed Hasa in 1871, for the avowed object of the Turks was the subjugation of "Najd," and it appeared that by "Najd" they understood all countries which had at any time paid tribute to the Wahhābi Amīrs; the statement even appeared in an official journal at Baghdād that Shārjah, Dibai and Abu Dhabi were places in "Najd." The British Government, however, were ultimately successful, as related in the histories of Hasa and Bahrain, in inducing the Turks to confine their proceedings to Hasa and Qatar; and meanwhile, in June 1871, they instructed the Resident in the Persian Gulf to prevent the Trucial 1871.

Shaikhs from taking part, on either side, in the struggle between the Turks and the Wahhābis.

1876-81. In 1876, in connection with an attempt by the people of Shamailiyah to cast off the yoke of the Qawāsim, the question of the despatch by sea by the Shaikh of Shārjah of reinforcements, military stores, etc., for his garrison at Dibah was formally raised. The Shaikh contended, not unreasonably, that such a proceeding on his part was not prohibited by any of his engagements; but the Resident, Colonel E. C. Ross, recommended that all such acts should be forbidden by Government on grounds of general policy, experience having shown that armed Arabs, when once afloat, invariably gave way to the temptation to indulge in indiscriminate plunder. In 1880 the Resident withheld permission from the Shaikh of Shārjah to attempt the recovery of Fujairah by sea, advising him instead to proceed by "negotiations and wise arrangements"; and in the following year the Government of India ordered that the whole of the Qāsimi coast on the Gulf of 'Omān from Dibah to Khor Kalba, as also the coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, so far as might be convenient, from Dibah to Musandam, "should be deemed subject to the operation of the maritime truce," which was not applicable to the coasts of the 'Omān Sultanate.*

1879. In 1878 Shaikh Hashar of Dibai, a man of quick and impetuous temper even for an Arab, refused to satisfy three claims established against his subjects, the plaintiffs in two cases being Persians and in the third an Indian; and Colonel Miles found it necessary to visit Dibai in H.M.S. "Teazer". Compensation and a fine were exacted and an offending boat was burned, after which the Shaikh apologised for his conduct and friendly relations were resumed.

1882. In June 1882 it was discovered that boats belonging to 'Ajmān had been implicated in an attack, some time previously, on the "Fath-al-Karīm", a vessel under Turkish colours in the Red Sea, and that part of the booty had been landed at 'Ajmān. H. M. S. "Arab" was accordingly

* Such was the form of the order, but it appears somewhat inappropriate. The General Treaty of Peace of 1820 and the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853 do not apply to particular waters or coasts, but to the subjects of the signatories wherever they may be. It would have been sufficient, and more strictly correct, to have recognised Shamailiyah as belonging to Shārjah, as was actually done later in 1903. Nor can the inhabitants of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, who are Masqat subjects, be properly regarded as subject to the treaties quoted above, to which their Sultān is not a party.

sent to 'Ajmān, where a quantity of the goods was recovered and nine of the boats implicated were publicly burnt as an example.

1884. In June 1884, a dispute about diving stations having taken place on the pearl banks between a boat of 'Ajmān and another of Shārjah, Saif-al-Adham, a mischievous 'Omāni who had been living on Sirri Island for several years since his expulsion from 'Omān, sided with the Shārjah boat and fired upon the other. In consequence of this offence H.M.S. "Philomel" was sent with the Residency Agent to Sirri, where Saif's own boat was publicly destroyed.

1885-1886. In 1885 or 1886 the Shaikh of Bakhah moved by sea with an armed force, apparently to assist the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and Shārjah in some operations against Sha'am; he escaped with an admonition from the Resident.

Slave trade, and further Engagement (1856) relating to the same. At the beginning of the period the slave trade continued almost unabated, especially at Shārjah, Umm-al-Qaiwain and 'Ajmān. The Shaikhs professed themselves extremely willing, but quite unable, to suppress the traffic; it was ascertained however that the Shaikh of Shārjah, who was the most obsequious of all in his protestations, habitually levied a tax of $4 upon each newly imported slave. In 1856 a further Engagement was obtained from the Trucial Shaikhs, in which they undertook, among other things, to seize and deliver up to the British authorities any slaves whose importation into their territories should be proved.

Telegraph Agreement, 1864. The Ruūs-al-Jibāl tract having been crossed at the isthmus of Maqlab by the Indo-European Telegraph Department's line and a station having been established on an island in Khor-ash-Sham, it was considered advisable, as the jurisdiction over the district was asserted by some of the inhabitants to belong to Shārjah, to obtain a written guarantee for the protection of the line "in and near" their territories from all the Trucial Shaikhs. An Agreement in this sense, in the form of an additional article of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853, was accordingly concluded in 1864.

Absconding Debtors Agreement, 24th June 1879. We have already adverted, in connection with the Ten Years' Maritime Truce, to a principal cause of such minor disturbances as still occurred at sea—the migration, namely, of debtors engaged in the pearl fishery or pearl trade from one jurisdiction to another with a view to evading their liabilities. The evil was a far-reaching one, and in 1868 Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident, took steps for enforcing the duty of extradition upon harbouring chiefs; but they were not, apparently, efficacious. At length, on the 24th of June 1879, an agreement for the mutual surrender of fraudulently absconding debtors was accepted

and sealed by the Trucial Shaikhs in the presence of Hāji 'Abdur Rahmān, the Residency Agent at Shārjah, and of Hāji 'Abdul Qāsim, Residency Munshi, who had been specially deputed from Būshehr to explain to the Shaikhs the views and wishes of the Resident: it provided that in future every runaway of the class in question should be at once surrendered; that, if on the contrary he were harboured, the harbouring chief should be liable to a fine of $ 50, or in case of the absconder being allowed to proceed to the pearl banks to a fine of $100, besides incurring liability for the just debts of the runaway; that the facts, if disputed, should be settled by a Majlis or council of arbitration; and, finally, that no fine should be enforced without the approval of the British Resident. The Government of India were at first apprehensive lest the new system, by unduly increasing the power of the Shaikhs over their subjects, should lead to oppression; but Colonel Ross was able to assure them that, under the patriarchal form of government which prevailed, cases of genuine oppression were rare, and that the system was not likely to be abused. Experience has now fully demonstrated both the justness of this view and the beneficial tendency of the Agreement. *

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with the Wahhābis, etc., 1853-92.

Wahhābi intrigues.

The power of the Wahhābi agent in Trucial 'Omān, though his presence was not at once removed, had fallen to a low point; and, having no longer any material force at his command, he was reduced to maintaining his position by petty intrigues and by playing off one Shaikh against another.

1854.

In 1854 Ahmad the Sadairi, who at this time was still the representative of the Wahhābi Government in Baraimi, was reported to be making a laudable use of his influence to restrain the Trucial Shaikhs from wanton aggressions on one another; and he had even, on the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi declining to hold himself responsible for the conduct of the Manasir, organised a successful expedition against that predatory tribe.

1855.

In 1855 on the contrary, in a difficulty which occurred between a colony of Shihūh at Hamriyah and the Shaikh of Shārjah, the suzerain of that place, reason was found for suspecting that the Wahhābi agent had encouraged the rebellion with a view to the eventual creation of a *pied à terre* for himself upon the Trucial seaboard. In this project

* The text of the Agreement will be found in Annexure No. 7 to this Chapter.

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he was opposed by the Na'im of Baraimi, one of whose chiefs, Fadhil-bin-Muhammad, had an interview with Captain Kemball at the coast in 1855, and suggested that British influence should be brought to bear for the expulsion of the Wahhábis; but the Resident explained that the policy of Government was now one of non-intervention in internal affairs, and himself merely continued to avoid, as his predecessors had done since 1840, direct communication with or recognition of the Wahhábi representative.

1864-1866.

From 1864 to 1866 the attention of Turki-bin-Ahmad the Sadairi, Wahhábi agent at Baraimi, was chiefly engaged by the affairs of the 'Omán Sultanate, on which he was trying to enforce payment of an increased tribute; but from this struggle, which is described in another place, the Trucial Shaikhs, including Shaikh Sultán-bin-Saqar who was now in his dotage and died in 1866, seem to have held themselves aloof. About this time Shaikh Khálid-bin-Sultán of Sharjah, who had thrown in his lot with the Wahhábis, ventured with their assistance to erect a fort on the coveted Zora site between 'Ajmán and Hamriyah; but, as this innovation threatened to disturb the peace of the entire coast, the fort was bombarded and destroyed by H.M.S. "Highflyer" in January 1866, on the occurrence of a breach between the British Government and the Wahhábis. The question of Zora remained in abeyance thereafter until 1895.

1867.

In 1867, on the re-incorporation of Rás-al-Khaimah with the Sharjah Shaikhdom, the intervention of the Wahhábis was sought, but without success, by Ibrahim, the displaced Shaikh of Rás-al-Khaimah.

Final expulsion of the Wahhábis from Baraimi, 1869.

In April 1869 the Wahhábi representative at Baraimi, having proceeded to Sharjah, entangled himself in the domestic quarrels of the ruling family with the result that, in a general affray which took place, he was shot dead. A number of his followers were killed on the same occasion, and the others withdrew. Two months later the opportunity thus presented was taken advantage of by Saiyid 'Azzán-bin-Qais of Masqat, as related in the history of the 'Omán Sultanate, to drive the Wahhábis once and for all out of Baraimi.

Baraimi affairs, from the departure of Wahhábis, are treated of in the Annexure on the history of the Abu Dhabi principality, with which the Oasis, though independent, is very closely connected.

Threatened invasion, 1888.

In 1888 there were rumours, emanating from Qatar, of a contemplated invasion of Trucial 'Omán by Ibn-Rashíd of Najd; but, as no invasion was attempted, it seems probable that they may have been invented and disseminated by Jásim, the Al Thání Shaikh of Dohah, for his own purposes.

The Shaikh of Dibai was at first inclined to favour the cause of the expected invaders and to ally himself with the Āl Thāni Shaikh, who was the professed exponent of their views; but later in the year, after a visit to Masqat, he veered round and formed with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi a Hināwi combination to resist any advance from Central Arabia. The Shaikh of Shārjah, whom Shaikh Jāsim attempted to draw into the affair and whom he pretended to consult with regard to the landing at Shārjah of stores for the Central Arabian forces, was advised by the British authorities to excuse himself from co-operation as best he could, and apparently did so; but a little later he figured as member of a Ghāfiri combination of all the other Trucial Shaikhs against the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai. The Na'im of Baraimi from the first professed an intention of acting on the side of the Shammar Amir.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with the Sultanate of 'Omān, etc., 1853—1892.

In the peaceful era which had now dawned there was no more actual warfare between the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and the ruler of Masqat; and, so far as any connection was maintained between them, it depended chiefly on the internal affairs of the Sultanate, which are related elsewhere in the proper place.

1854. In 1854, hostilities having broken out at Bandar 'Abbās, in connection with the lease of that place, between the ruler of Masqat and the Persian Government, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, actually put to sea with a fleet to render assistance to Saiyid Sa'id; but he was obliged to return to port by the British authorities on the ground that his action might widen the area of disturbance and produce a state of general insecurity at sea.

1857. The encroachments of Saiyid Turki of Sohār in 1857 on the possessions of his brother Saiyid Thuwaini in Bātinah were attributed partly to the instigation of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, to whom a stern warning against intrigue in that direction was accordingly conveyed by the Resident under the orders of Government.

1861. In 1861 a converse case occurred, through attempts by emissaries of Saiyid Thuwaini to arrange a combination with the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain against the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārjah; but the chiefs addressed refused to entertain the suggestion, baited

though it was with liberal promises, and no occasion for interference by the British authorities arose.

Saiyid Turki of 'Omān, in the course of his endeavours in 1867 to recover his appanage of Sohār, had recourse once more to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān; but those whose aid he sought, having been warned by the officers of the British Government against any disturbance of the peace, especially at sea, made no response to his overtures. 1867.

After his capture of Baraimi from the Wahhābis in 1869, 'Azzān-bin-Qais formed an alliance with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, to whom he also promised a subsidy for the defence of the frontier of the Sultanate upon that side. The alliance was directed against the other Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, all of whom Saiyid 'Azzān then regarded as favouring the Wahhābi cause; but not long afterwards the Shaikh of Shārjah also associated himself with the allies, and the danger from the Wahhābis came to an end. 1869.

In May 1870 Saiyid Turki of 'Omān paid a visit to Dibai with a view to enlisting the support of the Trucial Shaikhs in his struggle with the usurper 'Azzān-bin-Qais; but the influence of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who adhered loyally to his understanding with 'Azzān, was sufficient to prevent for the time any overt movement in favour of the princely wanderer. In the following October, however, in the battle of Dhank which virtually gave to him the Sultanate of 'Omān, Saiyid Turki received invaluable aid, in the shape of contingents, from the Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Rās-al-Khaimah and from the Na'im and Bāni Qitab tribes. 1870.

In the following year the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi visited Saiyid Turki, notwithstanding the previous opposition between their views, and was received with every honour; but in January 1886 he was suspected of a design to raid the Bātinah District in concert with the rebels of Sharqiyah, and in May 1887 Saiyid Turki was guilty of an unfriendly act in lending support to the Dhawāhir of Baraimi, who were at war with the Bani Yās. In 1891 Shaikh Zāid made another journey to Masqat, apparently in connection with Baraimi affairs. 1871-1891.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with Qatar, 1853-92.

War between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

For about 9 years, from 1881 to 1890, almost continual warfare prevailed by land between Zāid-bin-Khalifah, Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, and

and the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Qatar, 1881-1890.

Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Qatar. For this state of matters a claim which the Āl Thāni Shaikh maintained to possession of Khor-al-'Odaid in Abu Dhabi territory was partly responsible; but the scene of action was at all times so remote from the more populous part of Trucial 'Oman, that we have preferred to treat of the operations in connection with Qatar affairs rather than in the history of Trucial 'Omān. The scare of an invasion from Central Arabia in 1888, already mentioned, was perhaps only a stratagem by which Shaikh Jāsim sought to bring about an alliance of the other Trucial Shaikhs against his enemy Zāid.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with the Turkish Government, 1853-92.

'Odaid affairs, described at length in the separate history of the Abu Dhabi principality, gave opportunities for interference in Trucial 'Omān of which the Turks did not neglect to avail themselves. In 1874 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi complained that the local Turkish officials in Qatar had written to him on the subject of 'Odaid, denying his authority there; in 1875 the Turkish flag was apparently sometimes flown at 'Odaid; and there is no doubt that a small tribute to Turkey was paid by the 'Odaid colonists between 1873 and 1876. In 1878 the Porte claimed 'Odaid as a Turkish possession and protested against operations for the repression of piracy which had been undertaken there by the British authorities a few months before. Finally, in 1889, the Wali of Basrah addressed the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, urging him to submit his differences with the Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar to Turkish arbitration; but the suggestion was declined under British advice.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with Persia, 1853-92.

In 1855, Khalifah-bin-Sa'id, the Qāsimi Shaikh of Lingeh, being then a minor and his affairs having fallen into some disorder, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, who was his kinsman, assumed virtual charge of Lingeh and continued for some months to reside there.

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Internal history of Trucial 'Omān, 1853-1892.

Political combinations without permanence, and an endless succession of petty wars by land, compose almost the whole internal history of Trucial 'Omān during this period. Of these meaningless occurrences down to the year 1870 only two need be signalised. Earlier events.

At the end of 1857 an attack was made by the Shaikh of Abu Hail, a dependent of the Shaikh of Shārjah, on an encampment of the Mazāri' tribe at Khawānij and resulted in the death of four Mazāri', one of whom was a Shaikh; the Abu Hail force, 150 strong, regained their homes the same night with a quantity of booty including 2 horses and 30 camels. As the Shaikh of Shārjah declined to make restitution to the Mazāri', the Shaikh of Dibai, under whose protection the Mazāri' were, obtained the help of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi against him; and in March it was announced that Shārjah had been defeated. A reconciliation of the parties was then effected by the Residency Agent at Shārjah. 1857.

A campaign by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi against the Shaikh of Shārjah in April 1868 was rendered memorable by an unusual incident, for Zāid-bin-Khalifah, advancing in front of his troops, challenged his enemy, Khālid-bin-Sultān, to meet him in single combat. The proposal having been accepted, the challenger inflicted on his antagonist a wound which quickly proved mortal. 1868.

In 1869 the town of Rās-al-Khaimah and its dependencies became a separate Shaikhdom under Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah, a nephew of the ruling Shaikh of Shārjah, and so continued until his death in 1900. Separation of Rās-al-Khaimah from Shārjah, 1869.

From 1871 onwards, in consequence of the institution of Administration Reports, information regarding the dissensions of the Trucial Shaikhs is abundant; and, notwithstanding the extreme unimportance of most of the events, it seems advisable, on account of their recentness and of results which in some cases still continue, to present them to the reader in a condensed form. Later events.

In 1871 or 1872 the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, between whom and the Shaikh of Shārjah there was a dispute in regard to Bū Mūsa, put to sea with the intention of raiding the horses of his enemy from that island; but he was anticipated by boats from Shārjah which arrived there first. The Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai were at this time at daggers drawn, in consequence of the protection afforded by each chief to runaway debtors from the jurisdiction of the other. 1871-72.

1872-73. During 1872 or 1873 war was begun, or continued, between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān eventually coming to the assistance of the former and the headman of Hamriyah, a disloyal subject of Shārjah, to that of the latter.

1873-74. In 1873 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi joined the combination against the Shaikh of Shārjah, who was generally unpopular on account of his faithlessness, and made a raid by night upon Shārjah town. Eventually the Shaikh of Shārjah was defeated with a loss of 50 men.

1874. In 1874 the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah joined the Shaikh of Shārjah, while the Shaikh of Dibai enrolled himself in the opposite faction and the headman of Hamriyah apparently withdrew from the affair. The friendly offices of the British Residency Agent were exercised without avail to promote a reconciliation.

1875. An expedition by land from Dibai, 200 strong, now attacked the environs of Rās-al-Khaimah, killing 7 men, and returned home. Soon afterwards, in February 1895, the headman of Hamriyah effected a reconciliation between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain; but the war between Shārjah and Dibai continued; and in May an attack on Dibai town was made by the people of 'Ajmān and Shārjah, reinforced by Bedouins of the Na'im tribe. About July a raid was made on Hamriyah by 200 camel-riders from Abu Dhabi, who next, with the assistance of a Dibai force, ravaged the gardens of Fasht and Shārjah. At length in September peace was made between Shārjah and Dibai.

1876. In 1876 the country appears to have been quiescent after the exceptional disturbances of the previous year.

1877-78. In July 1877 the 'Awāmir Bedouins fell upon the town of Dibai, killing two men and wounding 10; but they were repulsed with a loss to themselves of 40 killed and eight captured: in October, assisted by the Darū', they again plundered a Dibai settlement. Between August 1877 and February 1878 numerous raids were made by Bani Qitab Bedouins, chiefly in Abu Dhabi territory; but subjects of Shārjah and Dibai were not exempt from molestation, and the Ghafalah apparently countenanced the doings of the Bani Qitab. In February 1878 both townsmen and nomads became weary of the strife and a general peace was arranged. The town of Dibai had now become the principal port on the coast and was larger than Abu Dhabi, which appeared to be declining.

1879. At the close of 1879 the Na'im of the Baraimi neighbourhood were divided amongst themselves, and the Shaikhs of Shārjah and 'Ajmān each espoused the cause of a different faction; the result was tension upon

the coast also, where the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qaiwain associated themselves with 'Ajmān and a counter alliance was formed between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi. No actual hostilities, however, took place among these chiefs; and in December the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, who had gone to Baraimi, returned to his home after witnessing the success of his protégés amongst the Na'im.

During the years 1880 and 1881 general tranquillity prevailed. 1880-81.

In 1882 a quarrel, arising out of family relationships, came to a head between the Shaikhs of Umm-al-Qaiwain and Rās-al-Khaimah and ended in open warfare; the principal cause was a marriage contracted by Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah of Umm-al-Qaiwain with a sister of Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah of Rās-al-Khaimah, subject to a stipulation that the lady should continue to reside at Rās-al-Khaimah and that her husband should spend a part of each year with her there. A divorce was declared by the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, who went to Rās-al-Khaimah for the purpose as agent of the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain; but it did not end the dispute; and wrangling continued on the subject of property. Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah, who was of a more turbulent disposition than his adversary, then allowed seven boats from his port to proceed to Rams for the purpose of provoking a quarrel, which they did most effectually by assaulting the crew of a Rās-al-Khaimah fishing boat; these proceedings, however, verged upon a breach of the maritime peace, and the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was accordingly reprimanded by the British Political Resident and compelled to pay a fine. Fighting on land ensued, in which the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was assisted by the Shaikh of 'Ajmān and the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah by his own brother, the Shaikh of Shārjah, and by a part of the Na'im tribe. At length, in January 1883, a reconciliation between the parties was arranged by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, on the condition that all injuries should be mutually condoned. The Shaikh of Dibai was at this time on good terms with the Shaikhs of both Shārjah and Abu Dhabi. 1882.

The years 1883 and 1884 were uneventful. The chief of Abu Dhabi was now regarded as the most powerful among the Trucial Shaikhs, the hegemony having been lost by Shārjah chiefly through the incompetence of its ruler, Saqar-bin-Khālid, who succeeded to the Shaikhship in 1883. Presents were exchanged between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultān of 'Omān, and between the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain and the Sultān of Zanzibar; but they had apparently no political significance, at least of a local character. 1883-84.

1885. As usual in Trucial 'Oman, after a short interval of peace there was a sudden renewal of disturbances. In May 1885 the son of Ahmad bin-'Abdullah, Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, quarrelled with his father and took refuge with Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, Shaikh of 'Ajmān, who refused to give him up; and the Shaikh of Shārjah, Saqar-bin-Khālid, joined the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain for the purpose of attacking 'Ajmān. Shortly after this the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain sent to sea two Baqārahs carrying 50 men, as also some munitions of war which were landed partly at Hairah and partly at Shārjah,—an act for which it was necessary to call him to account. In November, Mr. Robertson on behalf of the Resident, visited Umm-al-Qaiwain in H.M.S. "Reindeer", but Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah evaded a meeting; subsequently, however, his conduct seems to have been condoned on his undertaking not to repeat the offence. Meanwhile raids were committed by the inhabitants of Umm-al-Qaiwain and Hamriyah upon one another; they were suspended, but only for a brief space, after a reconciliation effected in August by the Residency Agent at Shārjah. At the end of November the Shaikh of Dibai united with the Shaikh of 'Ajmān and began to foray the Shaikh of Shārjah's territories.

1886. On the 20th of January 1886 the Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Hamriyah attacked the town of Shārjah with a force of about 1,000 men and a field-piece, and a battle followed in which the people of Shārjah lost 40 men killed and 25 wounded, while the attacking force had only five fatal casualties. At the request of Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid of Shārjah the British Residency Agent, who had in the meanwhile informed the Shaikh of Dibai that he would be held responsible for any loss suffered by British subjects in Shārjah, intervened between the parties and succeeded in arranging a peace upon condition that the Shaikh of Shārjah should renounce his alliance with the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain. After the retirement of Shārjah from the conflict the campaign was continued by Dibai, 'Ajmān and Hamriyah against Umm-al-Qaiwain and Rās-al-Khaimah; but the operations were now confined to petty raids, some of which were committed on dependencies of Rās-al-Khaimah, at the instigation of Dibai, by the people of Bakhah and Kumzār and by the Shihūh tribe generally. In April an attempt at mediation on the part of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was foiled by the obstinacy of the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain. In May a raid was made on Umm-al-Qaiwain by the people of Hamriyah, and shortly afterwards, in the absence of the men of Hamriyah at the pearl banks, a force from Umm-al-Qaiwain entered and destroyed that place, killing

several persons and carrying off with them 25 slaves besides other booty: the headman of Hamriyah, however, defended himself in his fort and escaped capture. To avenge this injury to his ally, the Shaikh of Dibai mustered a force of 35 horsemen and 400 camel-riders and marched against Umm-al-Qaiwain, but the excesses of the headman of Hamriyah so displeased him that he soon returned home. In September a dispute about divers arose between Shārjah and 'Ajmān, which, had the Residency Agent not mediated, would probably have led to a renewal of hostilities between those two.

In 1887 several robberies were committed by Bedouin Manāsīr on boats anchored in creeks to the north of Abu Dhabi town, subjects of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah being among the sufferers. As the robbers had swum off from the land these cases could not be treated as infractions of the maritime peace; and, as it did not appear that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi could fairly be held responsible for the misdeeds of a lawless and wandering tribe, the British authorities did not do more than appeal to his honour and sense of justice. In September a band of Manāsīr marauders made a successful raid so far to the north as Shārjah, from which place they carried off eight women and children and several camels and horses. 1887.

In 1888 a feud prevailed between the people of Rās-al-Khaimah and the Shihūh tribe; several townsmen were murdered in outlying date plantations; and 200 palms were destroyed by Bedouins at the village of Khatt in Jiri. 1888-89.

A coalition, as already mentioned above in connection with Wahhābi affairs, took place in 1888 between the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai, whom the supposed Wahhābi danger had found bitterly at variance, and about the same time the Shaikh of Dibai effected a reconciliation between the Shaikh of Shārjah on the one hand and the Shaikh of 'Ajmān and the headman of Hamriyah on the other; his object appears to have been to set the people of 'Ajmān and Hamriyah at liberty to assist Dibai in case that principality should be called upon to withstand a Wahhābi attack. The coalition, however, between the Hināwī Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai soon provoked a counter-alliance between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah; and the Shaikhs of Umm-al-Qaiwain and 'Ajmān, after endeavouring for a time to hold aloof, threw in their lot with the northern combination, which thus became a federation of all the Ghāfiris.

In February 1890 active trouble broke out between the principalities of Shārjah and Dibai, in consequence of redress being refused for the 1890.

mutilation of some Dibai camels within Shārjah limits; friction had really begun in the summer of 1889, when some raids were committed on Shārjah by Manāsir Bedouins nominally subject to the influence of Dibai and Abu Dhabi. A temporary understanding was patched up by the British Residency Agent; but in March 1890 a fresh rupture took place, and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi moved a force in the direction of Dibai to support his ally. A considerable amount of petty mischief was done on both sides, after which negotiations for a general peace took place, apparently at the instance of the Shaikhs of Rās-la-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qaiwain; but they were inconclusive. A raid was made on Rās-al-Khaimah by hostile Shihūh and was repelled with a loss to the raiders of 11 men killed. The punishment of a raiding gang of 'Awāmir and Na'im by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi led to threats against Abu Dhabi by the Na'im, but they were not fulfilled.

1891. The year 1891 passed quietly, in consequence partly of the balance of power established by the Hināwi and Ghāfiri combinations of 1889, which still endured, and partly of the good offices of the British Residency Agent in averting collisions between Shārjah and Dibai. Certain differences occurred between the Shaikhs of Umm-al-Qaiwain and Rās-al-Khaimah, but they were adjusted by the Shaikh of Shārjah. The most important event of the year was probably the migration *en bloc* of about 400 men of the Marar tribe from Dibai, where they considered themselves ill-treated by the Shaikh, to Shārjah; the move was effected at the end of the pearl season by simply returning from the banks to Shārjah instead of Dibai. This affair gave rise to a number of pecuniary claims and counterclaims of which the settlement, notwithstanding the constant mediation of the British Residency Agent, was attended by fighting on land and dragged on for nearly three years.

Exclusive Agreement of the Trucial Shaikhs with Great Britain, March 1892.

In order to understand the genesis of an important Agreement by which the position of the Trucial Shaikhs with reference to the British Government was in 1892 further defined, it is necessary to go back a few years and refer to certain events by which the undisputed predominance of British influence in Trucial 'Omān seemed to be threatened. These

events indicated the entrance into Persian Gulf affairs of new forces which were shortly to bring about a general challenge of the British position in the whole region of the Gulf.

Persian intrigues with the Trucial Shaikhs, 1887-88.

An absurd but apparently serious attempt was made by Persian officials in 1887-88 to establish a footing in Trucial 'Omān, the principal agent employed being Sartīp Hāji Ahmad Khān, a former Deputy-Governor of Būshehr. In August 1887 this individual left for the coast of Trucial Omān on the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company's steamer "Calder",—a proceeding so extraordinary on his part, with reference to the season of the year and to other circumstances, that the British Resident at Būshehr, Colonel E. C. Ross, caused him to be followed by the Residency steamer "Lawrence" to Abu Dhabi, where he landed in full uniform. After spending some days with the Shaikh at Abu Dhabi the Sartīp paid a visit to Dibai; and then, returning to Abu Dhabi, he took his departure for Lingeh in a native sailing vessel. The Trucial Shaikhs, who had pledged themselves to reticence towards the British authorities, at first preserved an impenetrable silence regarding the designs of Ahmad Khān; but at length, the Shaikh of Dibai having been persuaded to unbosom himself to the Sultān of 'Omān, it transpired that the Sartīp had proposed the establishment of close relations between the Shaikhs and the Persian Government with a view to the exclusion of British influence from Trucial 'Omān. In January 1888 Ahmad Khān, apparently believing the way to be now sufficiently prepared, returned from Būshehr to the Trucial Coast in a native vessel. He brought with him a number of Persian flags, presumably for distribution, and, being a man of method, would have commenced operations in the neighbourhood of Rās Musandam; but the inhabitants of that tract refused to let him land. Later, accompanied by the Shaikh of Qishm and a number of armed men, he had an interview with the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain; but soon after this, the impracticability of his scheme having quickly become apparent, he again withdrew to Persia. The Persian Government, on a complaint being made at Tehrān by the British Legation, repudiated the Sartīp's action and even volunteered to reprimand him; and, though, they subsequently presented him with a sword of honour, their official disavowal, being communicated through the Commander of H.M.S. "Osprey" to the Trucial Shaikhs, assuaged the not inconsiderable excitement to which the proceedings of Ahmad Khān had given rise along the coast.

Preliminary exclusive assurances, 1887.

In December 1887, between the first and the second visit of the Sartīp to the Trucial Coast, a precaution had been taken by Colonel Ross which no doubt contributed materially to the final discomfiture of

the Persian emissary; it consisted in obtaining from the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi, Rās-al-Khaimah, 'Ajmān, Umm-al-Qaiwain, Shārjah and Dibai a written assurance on the part of each that he would on no account correspond or enter into an agreement with any Government whatever except the British, and that he would not, without the assent of the British Government, allow an agent of any other Government to reside in his dominions. These undertakings were forwarded by the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

Turkish intrigues.

During a number of years, as elsewhere related, the Turkish Government showed considerable interest in the dispute between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Qubaisāt rebels against his authority who had settled at Khor-al-'Odaid in the vicinity of Qatar; and, subsequently, the protracted war between the Abu Dhabi Shaikh and the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Qatar provided the Turks with an excuse for a correspondence with the former, in which they pretended to exercise authority over him.

Proceedings of suspected French agents, 1891.

But the principal reason for attaching the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to the British Government by new and more stringent obligations was the appearance of two Frenchmen upon the Trucial Coast, whose object was suspected to be political intrigue; for a forward movement on the part of the French Government had, by the simple expedient of distributing French flags, lately been begun in 'Omān. Of the two suspicious individuals one was named Tramier or Thomy, while the other was a M. Chapuy, "half adventurer, half merchant and wholly intriguer", who two years later came to notice again through his proceedings at Sūr in the 'Omān Sultanate. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who was three times visited by the associates and received presents from them, fell to some extent under their influence; he was easily convinced of the advantages of the French flag, which now enabled more than a dozen vessels belonging to Sūr to engage in the slave trade without fear of molestation by British cruisers; and he even offered to write a letter to the French Government, promising a good reception in his country to citizens of the French Republic.

The Exclusive Agreement, March 1892.

In view of the mischievous activity of MM. Chapuy and Tramier, who were at length reported to have obtained the grant of a site at Umm-al-Qaiwain, Major A. Talbot, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, suggested the conclusion of a formal Agreement on the lines of the written assurances of December 1887; and, his proposals having been approved by the Government of India, an Exclusive Agreement was signed on various dates in March 1892 by the Trucial Shaikhs—at this time six in number through the existence of a separate Shaikhdom of Ras-al-Khaimah—and by the Shaikh of Bahrain. Under this Agreement

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the Shaikhs bound themselves, their heirs, and their successors (1) on no account to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British Government; (2) without the assent of the British Government not to consent to the residence within their territories of the agent of any other Government; and (3) on no account to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of their territory save to the British Government. These engagements were ratified by the Viceroy of India on the 12th of May following, and were subsequently approved by Her Majesty's Government.*

The difficulties which had arisen did not disappear immediately on the conclusion of the Exclusive Agreement; for the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai at first pretended to think that the return to them of ratified copies meant that the Agreement had not been confirmed, and the Shaikh of Dibai, annoyed at British interference with the slave trade, was reported to have proposed "taking the French flag and so escaping from the malice of the English". By degrees, however, the results of the supposed French agents' visits were effaced.

PERIOD SINCE THE EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT.

British relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907.

General features of the period.

The closeness of the relations existing between Great Britain and Trucial 'Omān increased greatly after the conclusion of the Exclusive Agreement in 1892. British influence began to permeate the country; and, as will be apparent from facts related further on, the preferential rights of Great Britain in Trucial 'Omān became a factor of importance in questions arising between the Shaikhs and external powers.

Observance of the Treaties of 1820 and 1853.

The Agreements of the Shaikhs for the maintenance of peace at sea were observed with great exactitude. Even trivial breaches of these became almost unknown, and no difficulties of any sort arose, except from a minor question of the use of the Trucial flag.

1892.

In March 1892 some Dibai subjects crossed over to the island of Sir Abū Na'air, a possession of the Shaikh of Shārjah, and disarmed and ejected from one of the fishing grounds some natives of Sirri Island, who were then, on account of the connection of Sirri with Lingeh, regarded as Qāsimi dependents; in accordance with the orders of the British

*Annexure No. 8 to this chapter gives the text of the Exclusive Agreement.

Resident, however, the aggressors were required to withdraw and to return the arms seized; and the Shaikh of Dibai undertook that in future his subjects should not resort to Sir Bû Na'air without express permission from the Shaikh of Shârjah. In September of the same year the Shaikh of Dibai despatched an armed boat to the assistance of the Shaikh of 'Ajmân, who was then threatened with a land attack by the Shaikhs of Shârjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain; but on account of this lawless proceeding he was condemned to pay a fine, and it was realised in the following November at a visit of the Resident to the coast.

No maritime irregularity deserving of mention was committed after this by the inhabitants of Trucial 'Omân; but in 1893 a Shihhi Shaikh of Khasab in Ruûs-al-Jibâl, having put to sea with an armed party, attempted to enforce a claim upon the property of his deceased father-in-law at Sha'am. In consequence of this misdemeanour the Sultân of 'Omân, acting on British advice, summoned the Shaikh to Masqat, where after much delay he appeared and was mulcted in the sum of Rs. 50.

Injuries to persons under British protection.

Cases in which it was necessary to demand redress on behalf of persons enjoying British protection were, similarly, few and insignificant. In 1904, a Hindu having died at Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Saqar, who was in charge of the town in the absence of his father Shaikh Zâid, extorted $100 in return for permission to dispose of the body according to Hindu rites; but the money was afterwards refunded on a requisition by the Resident. In November of the same year a Hindu was robbed on Dalmah island, in the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, of a considerable sum in money and pearls; and again the unsatisfactory attitude of the Shaikh necessitated a remonstrance by the British political authority.

Question of the necessity of renewal of agreements, 1900.

In 1900 Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz, on his accession not without violence to the Shaikhship of 'Ajmân, wrote to the British Resident at Bûshehr that he had signed the agreements of his predecessors with the British Government and that he would abide by them; and the Resident in reply expressed approval of the Shaikh's resolution. The incident was of a novel character and suggested that agreements by predecessors were not regarded as binding by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omân, unless confirmed by themselves; but an enquiry held by Colonel Kemball showed that such was not the case, and the Government of India then laid it down that the various engagements executed by individual Trucial Shaikhs are necessarily binding on their successors. At the same time the Government of India emphasized the desirability of taking means to secure that each chief should be clearly acquainted with the provisions of the agreements by which he is bound.

Arms Agreement, 1912.

An Agreement for the suppression of the arms trade in their territories was signed by all the Trucial Shaikhs in 1902. As among the expedients by which the British Government were at this time endeavouring to combat the growth of the traffic in the Gulf, this Agreement is mentioned in the special Appendix on the Arms Trade, where also the text of the same is given as an Annexure.

Relations of the British Government with Trucial Oman explained to the French Government, 1903.

The wreck at Dibai in the autumn of 1903 of the "Fath-al-Khair", a native vessel owned at Suwaiq in the Sultanate of 'Omān, but flying the French flag and therefore regarded by the French Vice-Consul at Masqat as under his protection, led to an exchange of views between the British and the French Governments in regard to the political status of Trucial 'Omān. In consequence of allegations that the boat in question had been plundered, the French Vice-Consul addressed a demand for compensation direct to the Shaikh of Dibai; and the despatch of the French cruiser "Infernet" to Dibai to enforce compliance with the same was momentarily expected. At this juncture the Government of India authorised the British Resident in the Persian Gulf to inform the French Vice-Consul of the existence of the Exclusive Agreement and to offer to relieve him of the case; and at their suggestion a similar communication was made in Europe to the French Government. In April 1904 the French Government, after explaining that they had hitherto been unaware of the existence of the special relations between the British Government and the Trucial Shaikhs, agreed that the settlement of the case should be entrusted to British authorities, which was accordingly done. Eventually some compensation was awarded by a Shara' court at Dibai to the owner of the "Fath-al-Khair", which was proved to have foundered in consequence of a collision.

Supply to the Trucial Shaikhs of copies of their Agreements and of Trucial flags of correct pattern, 1907.

In 1906, with the object of ensuring that the Trucial Shaikhs should be properly acquainted with their treaty obligations, each was supplied with a collection, clearly printed in Arabic and in English and handsomely bound, of the principal agreements in force between himself and the British Government. To this collection was prefixed, as an introduction, an address delivered by His Excellency Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to the Trucial Shaikhs at a Darbār held at Shārjah on the 21st of November 1903.* Arrangements were also made to provide the chiefs from time to time with flags of the pattern prescribed in the Treaty of 1820, in adherence to which they had shown themselves remiss, some through indolence and apathy, others from prejudice. Avoidance of the use of the Trucial flag was most marked at Abu Dhabi and Dibai; and in 1906 the Hināwi Shaikhs of those

Vide the Appendix on Lord Curzon's Cruise page 2638.

places after mutual consultation informed the Resident, in reply to a communication on the subject, that they could not compel their subjects to place themselves under an emblem so closely identified with Qāsimi traditions and Ghāfiri principles. For various reasons it was considered expedient not to press the matter at the time.

General relations.

Apart altogether from the question of specific engagements and their results, the period now under consideration was on the whole an auspicious one in the history of British relations with Trucial 'Omān.

For three years, ending in 1892, no Resident visited Trucial 'Omān in person; but, in the years following, numerous tours along the coast were made by Colonel M. J. Meade, Colonel C. A. Kemball and Major P. Z. Cox, the successive Residents, and the foundations of a more regular and direct intercourse were laid. In these circumstances it became possible for British officers to pay occasional visits to the interior; and Major Cox, who, under the auspices of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, had travelled by way of Baraimi from Abu Dhabi to Masqat in 1902, was able in 1905 to explore the unknown country between Rās-al-Khaimah and Baraimi and to return to the coast at Sohār.

In 1902, the idea of a formal British protectorate over Trucial 'Omān having been mooted, a close examination was made of the existing system, which was in the end declared to be perfectly satisfactory. It was reported by Colonel Kemball, in this connection, that new chiefs on their succession now generally sought to be recognised by the British Government, and that his advice, though not authoritatively given, was generally obeyed and even welcomed in internal affairs.

In the same year the general attitude of the Shaikhs towards the British power was shown by their observance of the 26th of June as a public holiday in honour of the Coronation of King Edward; and the visit of Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to the Trucial Coast, where, as elsewhere described, he held a Darbar at sea off Sharjah on the 21st of November 1903, was a further proof of the confidence and harmony that had come to prevail. At the same time it should be understood that the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān were still unprogressive, ignorant, and prone to childish suspicions. The failure of the Hināwi Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai to enforce on their subjects the use of the Trucial flag has already been mentioned; and other symptoms of a like nature appeared, in 1906, in the unwillingness of the Shaikhs to supply the Resident with genealogical tables of their families, in the reluctance of the Shaikh of Dibai to agree to the establishment of a British Indian post office at his capital, and in objec-

tions made by the Shaikh of Sharjah against the hoisting of a British flag over the British Agency at Sharjah.

Commercial relations.

A remarkable development of commerce, within the narrow limits imposed by poverty of natural resources and sparseness of population, characterised the period between 1892 and 1907 in Trucial 'Omān; it was accelerated after 1902 by the decline of the Persian port of Lingeh. Before 1902 not more than four or five steamers had called at Dibai annually; but in the year mentioned no less than 21 steam vessels, mostly belonging to the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company, entered the port; and early in 1904 the British India Steam Navigation Company included Dibai in their regular time-table.

In 1902 the question of urging the Trucial Shaikhs to limit the rate of customs duty leviable by themselves to 5 per cent. *ad valorem* was discussed; but, as the rates actually in force were found to be everywhere lower than 5 per cent., it was decided to postpone action. A little later, however, a lessee of the export duty on mother-of-pearl shells at Dibai was found to be collecting the tax at a rate higher than 5 per cent., and a reference was made to the Shaikh, who at once promised to reduce it.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with Persia, 1892-1907.

Difficulties arising from the Perso-Arab crisis at Lingeh, 1899-1900.

In 1899 a question arose between the Government of Persia and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān through the expulsion by the Persians of the hereditary Arab Shaikh of Lingeh, and later the meddlesome activity of the recently instituted Imperial Persian Customs occasioned trouble; in both cases the task of controlling the Arabs and of representing Arab interests devolved on the British power.

In October 1899 the Persian Government, alarmed by a report that the expelled Shaikh of Lingeh and his supporters had found an asylum in Trucial 'Omān, appealed to the British Government to prevent their collecting a force for the recovery of Lingeh; and suitable warnings were accordingly addressed to the Trucial Shaikhs by the British authorities. Again in January 1900 the Persian Government complained that Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, the ex-Shaikh of Lingeh, was harboured by the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; they asked that the British Government should prevent a descent by him upon Lingeh, which was apprehended; and they added a mighty threat that they would

take action themselves against the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah,—a proceeding which, as was reported by the Resident, might easily result in the loss of their only vessel, the "Persepolis". A second warning was consequently sent to the Rās-al-Khaimah chief by H.M.S. "Melpomene"; but it was ascertained at her visit to the port that, though Shaikh Muhammad was living there, no design of attacking Lingeh really existed. (The claims of Qawāsim and others on account of property destroyed or appropriated by the Persians in the Lingeh affair are dealt with in the history of the Persian Coast and Islands.)

Intrigue of the Governor of the Persian Gulf Ports with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, 1900-01.

Early in 1900 it was discovered that a friendly correspondence was in progress between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Darya-Baigi, the Persian Governor of the Gulf Ports; the matter was brought to the notice of the Residency Agent in Trucial 'Omān by the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai, in whose minds the intrigue evidently excited apprehension. The object of the Darya Baigi was probably to detach Shaikh Zāid from the rest of the Trucial Shaikhs for the purpose of preventing an Arab attack upon Lingeh, a contingency of which the Persian officials still lived in dread; and the Abu Dhabi Shaikh, on his part, had probably no deeper motive than to obtain favourable consideration of claims by some of his subjects to property in Persia and good treatment for his vessels upon the Persian Coast. Local rumour, however, connected the affair with the efforts of Russia to obtain a foothold in the Gulf, and in any case it was impossible to ignore so flagrant a violation by a Trucial Shaikh of his Exclusive Agreement with the British Government. When the negotiations were detected the Shaikh had already sent two horses as a present to Lingeh, had differentiated himself from his neighbours by the adoption of a green flag in place of that prescribed by the Treaty of 1820, and had received a sword of honour from the Shāh of Persia along with a commendatory epistle, bearing the royal seal, which was publicly read in an assembly at Abu Dhabi. A remonstrance however sufficed; the direct dealings of the Shaikh with Persian officials instantly ceased; and the use of the new flag was also, but not so immediately, discontinued.

Principle affirmed of the representation of the Trucial Shaikhs abroad by the British Government, 1901-03.

In February 1901 a Dibai boat, which, in returning from Sohār, had been obliged by stress of weather to take shelter at Hanjām, was seized for technical reasons by the Persian Imperial Customs. The boat and its general cargo were soon released in virtue of representations made by the British Political Resident; but restoration of seven rifles and 900 cartridges found on board, the personal property of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, was only obtained in 1903 through the British Minister

at Tehrān. By this case, which the Government of India regarded as a test of the right of Great Britain to act on behalf of the Trucial Shaikhs in external affairs, the British Legation in Persia were made aware for the first time of the existence of the Exclusive Agreement of 1892; and the right in question, subsequently admitted, as we have seen, by France, may be considered to have been definitively assumed upon this occasion.

Attempted annexation of the islands of Bū Mūsa and Tunb by Persia, 1904.

The next question to arise between Trucial 'Omān and Persia was one of importance, for it involved, to some extent, the naval position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. The establishment of control over Lingeh by the Persian Imperial Customs had, in 1902, driven much of the trade of that place away to the opposite side of the Gulf, especially to Dibai; and thereafter, with a view to the creation on Bū Mūsa of a trade emporium untrammelled by Persian official interference, some merchants of Lingeh began to suggest that the island should be made a port of call by the British steamship companies. Bū Mūsa had formerly been ruled by the hereditary Arab governors of Lingeh in their capacity of Qāsimi Shaikhs, not of Persian officials, and, after the abolition of the Arab governorship of Lingeh, the title of the Shaikh of Shārjah to possession of the island was indubitable. Nevertheless it was feared that actual and prospective loss of trade, if not further-reaching political considerations, might tempt the Persian Government to some act of annexation; and the attention of the Government of India was drawn in this connection not only to the island of Bū Mūsa, but also to that of Tunb, of which the status was precisely similar. In the result the Shaikh of Shārjah was advised to hoist his flag on both islands, and in the summer of 1903 he did so. The sequel proved the precaution to have been necessary. At the end of March or the beginning of April 1904 the Persian Customs steamer "Muzaffari," carrying M. Dambrain, the European Director of Persian Customs at Būshehr, visited Tunb and Bū Mūsa; the Shārjah flags were lowered; the Shārjah flagstaffs were dismantled; and two Persians were placed on each of the islands as Customs guards. It subsequently appeared that these high-handed proceedings, though carried out by a Customs officer, had been initiated by the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, most probably under Russian advice; in the case of Bū Mūsa, the Minister, who evidently perceived the international bearings of the enterprise, had shown marked hesitation in giving the order to occupy. Serious representations were at once made in the proper quarter by the British Minister at Tehrān, and in the end

the Customs guards were withdrawn and the Persian flags, which had been hoisted, were removed by order of the Persian Government; this was done on the 14th of June 1904, and a few days later the Trucial flag was replaced on both islands to the general satisfaction of the inhabitants of the Trucial Coast. The Persian Government, in consenting to remove the evidences of their usurpation, had stipulated that the ownership of the islands should be discussed at leisure between themselves and the British Government; but as mentioned in the history of the Persian Coast they failed to convince the British Government of the existence of Persian rights; indeed they did not seriously attempt to do so. Here it only remains to add that the Persians subsequently complained of the erection by the Shaikh of Shārjah of new buildings on Tunb, but that the complaint—in itself inadmissible as maintenance of the *status quo* formed no part of the mutual understanding—was proved by local investigation, and by the visits of British officers to Tunb in 1904 and 1905, to be groundless.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with the Wahhābi power, 1892-1907.

Correspondence between Trucial 'Omān and Central Arabia had not at any time entirely ceased; and in 1902 it was reported that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi had sent a present of camels to Ibn-Sa'ūd, the Wahhābi ruler, and had received four horses in return.

Designs of Ibn-Sa'ūd on Trucial 'Omān, 1905.

In September 1905, Wahhābi supremacy having meanwhile been re-established in Najd, where for some years it had been in abeyance, 'Abdul 'Aziz, the son of Ibn-Sa'ūd, addressed letters to all the Trucial Shaikhs informing them of his arrival in Qatar and of a reconciliation which he had effected among the Bedouin tribes of the Āl Morrah, Bani Hājir and 'Ajmān; he added that he hoped to visit Trucial 'Omān in the spring of 1906.

Behaviour of the Trucial Shaikhs.

These communications were received with dismay by the Hināwi Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai, who foresaw a great diminution to their own prestige as a result of the intrusion of the Wahhābis, and with corresponding relation by the other or Ghāfiri Shaikhs, who were longing for deliverance from the twenty years' hegemony of Abu Dhabi. A correspondence was at once opened between the Abu Dhabi Shaikh and his fellow Hināwi and ally, the Sultān of 'Omān, against whose authority the advent of the Wahhābis would dispose his Ghāfiri subjects to rise;

indeed the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi considered the matter of sufficient importance to warrant a visit by himself to Masqat in November 1905.

A caution against engaging in intrigues with the Wahhabis was at once addressed to all the Trucial Shaikhs by Major P. Z. Cox, the British Political Resident, who happened to be passing through the country on a journey to Baraimi; and later it was repeated under the authority of the Government of India. The matter was then brought unofficially to the notice of Shaikh Mubárak of Kuwait through Captain Knox, the British Political Agent at that place, a hint being at the same time thrown out that the British Government would view with disapprobation any interference by the Wahhábis in Trucial 'Omán. Shaikh Mubárak, who at first explained the proceedings of Ibn-Sa'úd as a mere device to extort blackmail, and who professed to have remonstrated with him on the subject, afterwards stated that Ibn-Sa'úd had written disclaiming all unfriendly intentions towards the British Government and regretting any harm that might have been caused by careless remarks on his own part. Since then nothing more has been heard of Wahhábi designs in Trucial 'Omán. Attitude of the British Government.

Relations of Trucial 'Omán with the Sultanate of 'Omán, 1892-1907.

A constant friendly intercourse was maintained between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultán of 'Omán, culminating, as we have seen, in 1905 in mutual consultations regarding the Wahhábi danger.

In September 1892 the Shaikh of Dibai made a journey to Masqat; and towards the end of 1895 his successor and a son of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi visited that place, but the object of their excursion could not be ascertained. 1892-95.

In July 1904 Khalifah and Sultán, two sons of Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi, were received with much honour at Masqat; were dismissed, after a prolonged visit, with costly presents; and were conveyed as far as Sohár on their return journey by the Sultán's yacht "Núr-al-Bahr". 1904.

It was ascertained in 1906 that, during the last ten years, the Sultán of 'Omán had been paying a cash subsidy of $5,000 per annum to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi on condition of his restraining the Bedouin tribes of Baraimi and Dhâhirah from incursions into the Bátinah district; and reason was found for believing that, as far eastwards as 'Ibri in Dhâhirah and perhaps also in parts of Ruûs-al-Jibal, though all 1906.

of these belonged to the Sultanate, the influence wielded by Shaikh Zāid-bin-Khalifah far outweighed that of Saiyid Faisal-bin-Turki.

Other foreign relations of Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907.

The Turkish Government informed of the relations between Britain and Trucial 'Omān, 1893.

The Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853 had been communicated to the Porte in 1891; and in 1893 the Turkish Government were informed by Her Majesty's Government of the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 between the Trucial Shaikhs and Great Britain.

Turkish case, 1895.

In 1895 a Turkish subject, while proceeding down the creek at 'Ajmān to embark on a vessel outside, was shot dead from the bank by a watchman who had challenged him and his companions without obtaining a reply. The matter was adjusted by the Resident with the Turkish authorities through the British Assistant Political Agent at Basrah and the Turkish Vice-Consul at Būshehr, the relations of the deceased in the end waiving their claims, which an 'Ajmān Shara' court had held to lie against the watchman personally and not against the Shaikh of the principality.

Ibrāhim Effendi, Turkish subject, 1900-1907.

In later years, in consequence of the pacification of the country and the development of trade, the attention of foreigners, sometimes of undesirable character, was attracted more frequently than before to Trucial 'Omān. One of these, calling himself Dr. Ibrāhim Effendi, settled as a vaccinator at Sharjah during a smallpox epidemic in 1900, fled to Baraimi in 1904 on the appearance of plague in the Gulf, and on his return to the coast made his head-quarters at Abu Dhabi. This individual, who was originally a Jew and afterwards became in succession a Christian, a Shi'ah Muhammadan and a Wahhābi, was for some time assisted in his business by 'Abdur Rahmān, a proselyte from Hinduism to Islām. In 1904 Ibrāhim Effendi visited Bombay and there volunteered, on terms which were not accepted, to expose the intrigues of a foreign power in Trucial 'Omān. About the same time he also memorialised the Sultān of Turkey to grant him an allowance for what he described as his charitable work in Trucial 'Omān.

Turkish claim to 'Odaid, 1902-03.

In 1902-03, as explained in the history of Qatar, a move was made by the Porte to establish a Turkish Mulirate at 'Odaid in the Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom; but it was checkmated by the action of the British Government.

German subjects.

In 1904, Herr Toeppen, a German adventurer and pervert to Muhammadanism, informed the British Government that one of the Trucial Shaikhs was trying to obtain German protection; he also offered his services in the matter, as those of a person well acquainted with the country, but they were declined. The lease of the export duty on mother-of-pearl shells at Dibai, already mentioned as having given rise in 1902 or 1903 to a commercial question, was found to have been granted to an employé of the German firm of Wönckhaus; and the Shaikh was accordingly advised not to grant such concessions in future without first consulting the Resident.

Internal affairs of Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907.

Friction between Shārjah and Dibai, 1892.

We come at length to the internal history of the country during fifteen years,—a period during which, be the cause what it may, actual fighting by land has been much less common than formerly, while political combinations have shown more than ordinary stability.

To the troubles which befell in 1891 between the Shaikhs of Dibai and Shārjah there succeeded a truce which, having been shaken in September 1892 by the despatch of an armed boat from Dibai to the assistance of 'Ajmān against Shārjah, was again solemnly renewed at Dibai in the same month in the presence of Sultān-bin-Muhammad, a leading Shaikh of the Na'im.

Settlement of the Marar case, 1893-94.

The migration of the Marar from Dibai to Shārjah, where they permanently settled, continued however to be a source of quarrel between the two principalities so long as the claims arising from the affair remained unadjusted. In November 1893 war was again declared between Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah on the one part and Dibai on the other, and the Shaikh of 'Ajmān was subsequently drawn into the fray on the side of his Qāsimi allies. In March 1894 a partial reconciliation between the disputants was effected by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, but the Marar question remained unsettled; in the end it necessitated a special visit by the Resident to the Trucial Coast, in the course of which, at a meeting held under the superintendence of Mr. J. C. Gaskin, Assistant Resident, the dispute was finally laid to rest. The Shaikh of Shārjah on this occasion tried to avoid meeting the Resident, and the usual complimentary gifts were in his case consequently withheld.

Bedouin raids, 1895-97.

In January 1895 Manāsīr and Āl Morrah nomads from a distance commenced raiding the whole of the inland districts between Abu Dhabi and Rās-al-Khaimah and were reported to have captured some 400 camels and 100 horses. The Bani Qitab, who were perhaps the principal sufferers, then appealed to the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai; and, on these chiefs calling out their Bedouins, the scourge was temporarily abated. In the following season marauding Manāsir from Qatar again made their appearance in Trucial 'Omān; but, finding the inhabitants prepared to resist them, they changed their tactics and paid visits of courtesy to the Shaikhs of Dibai, Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain, whom they thus obliged to entertain them. From Hamrīyah, however, the people there not being sufficiently upon their guard, they carried off a number of animals and a few slaves. Before the end of the winter of 1896-97 a check was inflicted on the Manāsir by the Bani Qitab, for that tribe, warned by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, with whom they had then recently been reconciled, and assisted by the people of Shārjah, defeated the marauders with loss in a sharp engagement.

Great fires, 1896-97.

The towns of Trucial 'Omān, consisting to a large extent of huts of dry date fronds and other inflammable materials, are at all time very liable to damage by fire; but the year 1896 was rendered memorable by an extraordinary series of conflagrations. In the town of Shārjah 400 houses were reported to have been destroyed, and the loss in property was estimated at Rs. 30,000; at Dibai half of the town proper was said to have been wasted by the flames, together with the whole of the Dairah quarter; while at Abu Dhabi 170 houses were burned, and such property as the owners succeeded in rescuing from the blaze was pillaged by Bani Yās Bedouins. In 1897 there were several fires at Dibai, and a slave-woman caught in the act of incendiarism was put to death.

The Zora case, 1895-1906.

The next political incident of importance arose from designs conceived by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in regard to Zora, a sandy tract upon the sea extending from 'Ajmān to Hamrīyah, but cut off from those places and from the mainland between them by a creek never fordable at more than two places; the advantages of the insular position of Zora had been fully realised by Shaikh Zāid-bin-Khalifah, who aspired to the headship of all the Bedouin tribes of Trucial 'Omān and saw in Zora a safe asylum for the flocks and herds of his allies and an excellent base for operations by himself, in case of hostilities with tribes lying at a distance from Abu Dhabi. In 1895 the Shaikh obtained from the British Residency, to which the full significance of his action was not as yet apparent, permission to send stores by sea for the use of Bedouins

whom he had collected at Zora in support of the Banī Qitab, then at war with their neighbours; but, the other Trucial Shaikhs having thrown difficulties in the way, he found himself unable to turn the authority thus granted to account. In 1897 a section of the Sūdān tribe under Sultān-bin-Nāsir requested the leave of the Resident to colonise Zora; and in 1900, on the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi offering to protect the settlement and promising to assist the inhabitants with non-military stores sent by sea, the desired permission was given: Shaikh Zāid, it may be observed, was himself a Suwaidi on his mother's side, and a daughter of the Suwaidi Shaikh Sultān-bin-Nāsir was among his wives. The Zora scheme was however alarming to the Ghāfiri Shaikhs; the Shaikh of 'Ajmān at once took steps to protect himself by building a fort near one of the fords connecting Zora with the mainland; and the Shaikh of Shārjah, in September 1900, appealed to the Resident to prevent the establishment of a non-Qāsimi stronghold in the midst of Qāsimi country. The permission given to colonise was accordingly revoked, to the intense annoyance of Shaikh Zāid, who saw himself thus deprived of one of the chief means on which he had counted for the extension of his influence over all Trucial 'Omān, Ruūs-al-Jibāl, Shamailiyah and Baraimi. It may be added that in March 1905 Major Cox, the Political Resident, made a personal inspection of Zora and came to the conclusion that the proposed settlement should not be authorised, unless with the unanimous assent of all the Trucial Shaikhs, which it was unlikely would ever be given.

Disappearance of Rās-al-Khaimah as a separate Shaikhdom, 1900.

In 1900, on the death of Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah of Rās-al-Khaimah, that place and its dependencies were re-incorporated with the principality of Shārjah from which they had been separated since 1869. The number of the Trucial Shaikhs was thus reduced from six to five, the latter being their original number.

The Shamailiyah case, 1902-05.

The troubles which arose in 1902 between the Shaikh of Shārjah and his vassal the headman of Fujairah in Shamailiyah are fully narrated in an Appendix to this chapter, and at present we are concerned only with their effects upon the relations of the Trucial Shaikhs with one another. The cause of the rebellious headman, who had appealed to the Sultān of Masqat and to the Shaikh of Dibai, was espoused in Trucial 'Omān by the Shaikhs of Dibai and 'Ajmān, with whom the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, on account of neglected claims by his subjects against Shārjah, afterwards associated himself; but the influence of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who, with a view to propitiating the Shaikh of Shārjah in the Zora case, had recently formed a close alliance with him, was

thrown at first into the opposite scale. No actual hostilities, however, took place among the Trucial Shaikhs in connection with the Shamailiyah dispute. In 1903, on the return of the Shārjah Shaikh from an expedition to Shamailiyah, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, without prejudice to an offensive and defensive alliance that existed between himself and Dibai, entered into a similar arrangement with Shārjah; and thereafter there was close friendship between them, while the alliance between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi was also maintained. In 1905 Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid appeared to have relinquished all idea of coercing the refractory Fujairah headman.

Dispute in Wadi Hatta, 1905.

A curious difficulty, destined to produce unforeseen and somewhat far-reaching consequences, now occurred in connection with two villages in the upper part of Wādi Hatta in Western Hajar, a valley through which runs a route from Dibai in Trucial 'Omān to the town of Shinās in Bātinah. These villages, Hajarain and Masfūt, both inhabited by Biduwāt, seem to have belonged originally—as the lower part of Wādi Hatta does still—to the Sultanate of 'Omān; but about 1870, in the reign of Saiyid 'Azzān-bin-Qais, an irreconcilable quarrel taking place between the two, the people of Masfūt placed themselves under the protection of the Bani Ka'ab and the Na'im of Baraimi; and at a later period, in the reign of Saiyid Turki, the Sultān of 'Omān in view of his own inability to defend Hajarain against the Na'im of Baraimi, acquiesced in its virtual transfer to the Shaikh of Dibai. Such was the position, when, in 1905, the Bani Qitab, actuated by enmity towards the Na'im of Baraimi, occupied the hills at the head of Wādi Hatta, built a fort (called Hanz) to command the road at a spot known as Jabail, and proceeded to annoy passing caravans. In these acts they were countenanced by the people of Masfūt, who in so doing apparently took the opposite side from their Na'im protectors, and by Rāshid-bin-Ahmad, a new and vigorous Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who was said to have supplied funds for the building of the fort; but the Na'im of Baraimi and the Shaikh of Dibai entertained strong objections to the fort and called in the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, whose opinion coincided with their own. In September 1905 the five Trucial Shaikhs held a meeting at Dibai, the venerable Zāid-bin-Khalifah in effect presiding; and it was apparently decided that the Jabail fort should be destroyed, and that the Bani Qitab should restore Masfūt, which village had fallen completely under their influence, to the Shaikhs of Baraimi. Shaikh Zāid on this occasion urged Shaikh Rāshid to abstain from encouraging the Bani Qitab, and he even obtained from him a promise to comply with this

advice; but the young chief of Umm-al-Qaiwain had in reality not the slightest intention of deferring to the venerable doyen of the Trucial Coast, and only a few weeks later he conducted the two leading Shaikhs of the Bedouin Bani Qitab to 'Ajmān and Shārjah, where, obviously with the aim of stultifying the policy of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, he reconciled them to the ruling chiefs.

Further difficulties arising from Bani Qitab affairs, 1905-06.

Meanwhile, in July or August 1905, a quarrel had arisen in the Dhāhirah district of the 'Omān Sultanate between a Balūch colony at Afláj Bani Qitab and their overlords, the sedentary Bani Qitab of the same place; and attempts were shortly made by the latter to capture the Balūch fort in the hamlet of Māzim. The Balūch thereupon appealed to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi for help, and he accordingly tried to prevent the nomad Bani Qitab from joining their kinsmen in the assault upon Māzim, but without success; the garrison of Māzim, however, continued to hold out. The quarrel was at its height in December 1905 while Major Cox, the British Resident, was journeying from Rās-al-Khaimah to Baraimi, and there was at that time some talk of a combination between the Shaikhs of Umm-al-Qaiwain, Shārjah and 'Ajmān for the purpose of supporting the Bani Qitab against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; but in reality the Ghāfiri Shaikhs were not prepared to go far, and a remonstrance which Major Cox addressed to Shaikh Zāid, referring to the threatened danger of a Wahhābi incursion, was not without sedative effect. But the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was still anxious to convince the Bani Qitab of the impossibility of opposing his wishes and the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain of the folly of attempting to compete with his influence in Bedouin affairs; so in February 1906, after notifying a demand for blood-money on account of Balūch slain, he collected his forces and prepared to move against the Bani Qitab. In this extremity the tribe appealed first to the Shaikh of Dibai, who intimated that he regarded the claim for blood-money as just; then to the Shaikh of Shārjah, who declined to have anything to do with the matter; and finally to the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who, doubtless under great pressure from the Bani Qitab, in the end undertook their case, so violating his recent promise not to afford them encouragement. Finally counsels of moderation prevailed, and a general meeting of chiefs was held at Khawānīj near Dibai, which resulted in a settlement. A written agreement, dated about the end of April 1906, was also drawn up, in which the respective spheres of tribal influence of the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain were defined; in this document the Bani Qitab, the Ghafalah and the Bani Ka'ab were assigned to

Shaikh Rāshid, while Shaikh Zāid—in some cases to the prejudice of third parties who were not apparently consulted—obtained the following as dependents: Sultān-bin-Muhammad, Shaikh of the Na'im of Buraimi; Muhammad-bin-Sulaimān, Shaikh of Dariz in Dhāhirah; Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, headman of Fujairah in Shamailiyah; and the Shihūh tribe of Ruūs-al-Jibāl. Jurisdiction over subjects of the Sultān of 'Omān may have been claimed by Shaikh Zāid merely on behalf of that ruler, whose representative and plenipotentiary, in consequence of the strict alliance existing between them, he may have conceived himself to be; but his invasion of the rights of the Shaikh of Shārjah by asserting influence over Fujairah is more difficult to justify; and, were it not for the well-known apathy of Saqar-bin-Khālid, the continuance after this of amicable relations between Abu Dhabi and Shārjah would be inexplicable.

Treacherous seizure of the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and his rescue by the British Resident, 1907.

The settlement was a triumph for the Shaikh of Umm-al Qaiwain as confirming his right to a voice in Bedouin politics; but it was impossible that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi should for long acquiesce in a partition of privileges hitherto exclusively his own with his youthful competitor. Accordingly, about the end of November 1906, having arranged with the Shaikhs of Dibai and Shārjah for their support, he began to collect and arm his adherents among the Manāsir and the Bani Hājir tribes and to prepare for a fresh rupture with the Bani Qitab and for an attack on Falai or Falaj Āl 'Ali,—a small but valuable oasis belonging to the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, from whose capital it is distant about 16 miles inland. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, on his part, proceeded to set the defences of Falai in order and applied to the British Resident for assistance in procuring two breech-loading guns to be mounted on the fort,—a request which was of course declined. Major Cox then addressed a forcible remonstrance to both Shaikhs, and a seeming reconciliation took place; but, at the beginning of January 1907, Shaikh Rāshid, who had ventured to pay a friendly visit to Shaikh Zāid at his camp in the interior, was, after being hospitably entertained for several days, suddenly seized, thrown into chains, and called on to surrender Falai upon pain of forfeiting his life. On receiving news of this affair the Resident immediately despatched a letter from Būshehr by H.M.S. "Proserpine" demanding of Shaikh Zāid that his prisoner should be released; and on the next day, the 17th of February, Major Cox himself followed in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence". On arrival at Shārjah it was ascertained that the Shaikhs of Shārjah, Dibai and 'Ajmān had joined the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi at a place 20 miles inland from Shārjah, where they held Shaikh Rāshid in confinement and were preparing for an

attack on Falai; also that the attendants captured with the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain had been sent by boat to Abu Dhabi,—an act which might reasonably be construed as a breach of the maritime peace. With much difficulty and after a week's negotiations, the Shaikh of Shārjah being employed as an intermediary, Major Cox succeeded in arranging for the unconditional release of Shaikh Rāshid, whose appearance when he reached the "Lawrence" bore witness to a good deal of physical and mental suffering. After this, in accordance with a friendly understanding that the Resident should, on Umm-al-Qaiwain being set at liberty, mediate between him and the other chiefs, two days were devoted by Major Cox to tedious discussions on shore; in these the Shaikh of Shārjah appeared for himself and for 'Ajmān, and the Shaikh of Dibai for himself and for Abu Dhabi. The result was a written settlement of all differences by which, it was hoped, general peace might be secured for some time to come. On the conclusion of the negotiations Shaikh Rāshid was landed at Umm-al-Qaiwain, where he was received by his subjects with many rejoicings. He seemed grateful for his rescue, and he afterwards presented a thank-offering to the Resident in the shape of a well-bred camel and a young horse, both of which were accepted on behalf of Government.

ANNEXURE No. 1.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE SHARJAH PRINCIPALITY.

In the following short summary we propose to deal with the affairs of the ruling family of Shārjah and with events of merely domestic significance. The external history of the Shaikhdom is included in that of Trucial 'Omān, which is contained in the foregoing chapter.

Shaikh Saqar-bin- Rāshid, 1777-1803.

In 1777 Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Matar of Rās-al-Khaimah, the chief of the Qawāsim, resigned the headship of the tribe, after holding it for about 30 years, in favour of his son Saqar. Shaikh Saqar married, as one of his wives, a daughter of Shaikh 'Abdullah, Ma'īni, of Qishm.

Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, 1803-66.

Place of residence and character of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar.

In or about 1803 Shaikh Saqar was succeeded by his son Sultān, who was destined to rule the Qawāsim for a period extending over two generations and to witness, it might almost be said, the whole process of change from barbarism to civilisation in the Persian Gulf. The internal events of his Shaikhship are less known as well as less important than the external already related; and it is even uncertain whether, after the restoration to him of Rās-al-Khaimah in 1820, he resided chiefly at that place or at Shārjah. Till the end of his life he was indifferently described as "Shaikh of Shārjah" and "Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah;" and the direct administration of both towns appears to have been ordinarily carried on by a near relation acting under his orders, and not by himself personally. According to a general consensus of opinion the leading characteristic of Shaikh Sultān was his duplicity, which even by other Arabs was regarded as phenomenal. In his later life his peculiarity in this respect had become so notorious that he was thoroughly distrusted by all, and his "machinations seldom produced, comparatively speaking, any evil consequences."

Governors Rās al-Khaimah and Shārjah, 1803-04.

During the earlier years of his rule Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar generally employed his brothers, and of a later period his sons, as his representatives in direct charge of the towns of Rās-al-Khaimah and Shārjah. Ras-al-Khaimah was governed in 1823 by Muhammad-bin-Saqar, a brother of Shaikh Sultān; and he may have remained in office there until his death, which occurred at some time prior to 1845. Before 1838 the affairs of Shārjah town were guided by Sālih-bin-Saqar, another of Shaikh Sultān's brothers, who, though his mother had been a slave, was one of the most intelligent and enlightened Arabs of his day upon the Trucial coast; his deposition in 1838 in favour of Saqar, the son of Shaikh Sultān by a Qāsimi wife, was consequently much regretted by the British political authorities.

Rebellion of Saqar-bin-Sultān against his father, 1840.

In 1840, at the instigation of Shaikh Maktūm of Dibai, a restless and intriguing chief, Saqar-bin-Sultān made an effort, which was for a short time successful, to cast off the authority of his father and to rule the town of Shārjah as an independent principality; he obtained support chiefly by promising to reduce the tax on pearl divers, which was then levied by Shaikh Sultān at the rate of $7 per head annually. An appeal to arms was at first threatened; but eventually Shaikh Sultān agreed, with much reluctance, to accept an annual tribute from his son and to abstain from direct interference in the affairs of the port. In December 1840 however, Shaikh Sālih, the ex-governor of Shārjah, and some other principal residents of the town, disgusted at the influence which the Shaikh of Dibai had acquired over their new Shaikh, banded themselves together to put an end to the usurpation; this they effectually did by surprising Shaikh Saqar asleep and handing him over a prisoner to his justly offended father. Shaikh Sultān then arranged to remove Saqar to

Ras-al-Khaimah; but the latter, on the way to his appointed place of exile, broke his arrest and took refuge with the Shaikh of Dibai. Military movements followed which are described in the history of Trucial 'Omān, and Shaikh Sultān, after basely betraying his allies, concluded an arrangement with the Shaikh of Dibai, and even replaced Saqar in the government of Shārjah without so much as requiring of him a guarantee not to molest Shaikh Sālih and the other loyalists in the town of Shārjah.

Administration of Shārjah town, 1840-55.

Shaikh Saqar continued in charge of Shārjah until his death in battle with the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain in 1846. He appears to have been succeeded by 'Abdullah, another son of Shaikh Sultān, whose mother belonged to an Āl 'Ali family of Tāvuneh on the Persian Coast. 'Abdullah's government was signalised chiefly by his treacherous attempt, noticed elsewhere, to seize the fort of 'Ajmān in 1848; but he continued in office until 1855, when he was killed in fighting at Hamriyah.

Rebellion of the headman of Hamriyah, 1854-55.

In 1854 occurred the first of a series of rebellions by the inhabitants of Hamriyah, a township on the coast, against the authority of the Shaikh of Shārjah, their lawful ruler. The cause of the trouble on this occasion was a blood-feud that arose between the Hūwalah of Shārjah town and a body of the Shwaihiyin, recent immigrants into that place, who numbered about 500 fighting men. On the interested advice of Ahmad-as-Sadairi, the Wahhābi representative in Trucial 'Omān, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar somewhat hastily transferred the Shwaihiyin to Hamriyah; and here they immediately began to concert measures with 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Saif, the headman of the village, for asserting the independence of the place against Shārjah. When Captain Kemball, the British Political Resident, visited the Trucial Coast on his annual tour in September 1854, he was approached by Shaikh Sultān with a request for permission to coerce the people of Hamriyah by maritime operations; but Captain Kemball, though unwilling to encourage the rebels, persuaded the Shaikh—chiefly on the ground that, as Hamriyah was situated between 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain, the Shaikhs of those places might be drawn into the fray—to promise that he would postpone proceedings by sea and not undertake them, even in the last resort, without a further reference to the Residency.

Affairs at Lingeh, where his young relation Khalifah-bin-Sa'id—a minor—was chief, obliged Shaikh Sultān after this interview to spend several months on the Persian coast. During his absence he rashly entrusted the handling of the Hamriyah affair to Ahmad-as-Sadairi, the Wahhābi representative. This faithless individual, after doing his utmost under pretence of mediation to aggravate the quarrel, attempted to introduce a Wahhābi garrison of his own into the fort of Hamriyah; and, on the failure of this scheme, he induced Shaikh Sultān, who had meanwhile returned home, to undertake operations by sea and land against the refractory township. Captain Kemball, arriving off Hamriyah in the "Clive" on the 31st of May 1855, found that the place had already been invested for 25 days, during which period no letter on the subject from Shaikh Sultān had reached him, though it was stated that one had been despatched. The besieging force consisted of the Qāsimi Shaikh's own levies, of the Wahhābi agent's retinue of 150 men, and of a contingent from 'Ajmān upwards of 3,000 strong; and their artillery amounted to five guns, of which two had been brought from Lingeh,

two from Shārjah by sea, and one from 'Ajmān. The strength of the besieged was about 800 fighting men only; but they enjoyed he countenance, if not the actual support, of the Shaikhs of Dibai and Umm-al-Qaiwain, to whom the embarrassments of their powerful neighbour of Shārjah were generally a source of relief. The fighting had been of an unusually obstinate character and the result highly favourable to the besieged; for, while the assailants had lost over 60 men killed, including 'Abdullah, the son of the Qāsimi Shaikh, and double that number wounded, the casualties of the garrison were believed not to exceed 10 men killed. In these circumstances Shaikh Sultān eagerly sought the good offices of the Resident, by means of which he hoped that he might be enabled to retire without utter disgrace from an impossible enterprise; and Captain Kemball, while absolutely declining to guarantee any settlement that might be arranged, undertook the office of mediator. The headman of Hamriyah and the Shwaihiyin refugees, emboldened by their successful defence and instigated by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, would not at first listen to any proposals; but eventually, on the Resident threatening a strict enforcement of the maritime peace, whereby apparently their supplies would have been altogether cut off, it was settled that $500 should be paid by the rebels to the Shaikh of Shārjah in token of submission, and that, on the conclusion of the pearl season, the Shwaihiyin should quit Hamriyah and settle wherever else they pleased. The Residency Agent, Hāji Ya'qūb, was sent on shore to witness the formal submission of the rebels to the Shaikh; and the H. E. I. Company's schooner "Constance" remained at the place for a few days longer until the besiegers had broken up their camp and retired. From the predominance in Shārjah town at the present day of the Shwaihiyin tribe it would seem that Shaikh Sultān must eventually have succeeded in persuading the malcontents to return there.

Governors of Rās-al-Khaimah and Shārjah, 1855 to 1866.

In 1860, and probably for some time before, Rās-al-Khaimah was ruled by Ibrāhīm-bin-Sultān, the son of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar by a wife of the Marāzīq or Marzūqi tribe; and in 1855 Mashāri, a son of Ibrāhim, had been appointed sub-governor of Dibah, and had been murdered there by tribesmen of the Shihūh. When Shaikh Sultān died, in 1866, Ibrāhim still held charge of Rās-al-Khaimah.

On the death of 'Abdullah-bin-Sultān in the operations at Hamriyah in 1855, the administration of Shārjah town seems to have been assumed by Muhammad-bin-Saqar, a grandson of Shaikh Sultān; but intrigues for the removal of this young man were shortly commenced by Khālid-bin-Sultān, one of his uncles. The aged Qāsimi Shaikh, who had at last fallen into his dotage and lost both memory and hearing, seems now to have counted for little in the disputes among his unruly progeny. About 1859, Shaikh Khālid having formed a strong party in Shārjah, the town was for a time divided between him and Shaikh Muhammad, each presiding over his own adherents; but such a state of matters could not long endure, and, at the end of 1860 or beginning of 1861, Shaikh Khālid, having decoyed Shaikh Muhammad to a distance from Shārjah in the course of a morning ride, suddenly shot him with his own hand and threw his body into a well. Shortly afterwards, on Captain Felix Jones paying a visit to the coast, Shaikh Khālid sought an interview with him; but it was refused on the ground that the

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Resident could not hold converse with "one so recently and so fearfully polluted."

Co-operation of the headman of Hamriyah with the Shaikh of Shārjah, 1860.

Early in 1860 the Shaikh of Shārjah, by which term must be understood at this time either Shaikh Muhammad or Shaikh Khālid, called upon the headman of Hamriyah to assist him in a land attack in which he was engaged upon the villages, then disaffected, of Khān and Abu Hail. 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Saif was rash enough to respond by proceeding to the scene of hostilities by sea with armed men and munitions of war and was fined $250 by order of the Political Resident. This sum he duly disbursed on a demand for payment being preferred by Commander Cruttenden.

Shaikh Khālid-bin-Sultān, 1866-1868.

Rās-al-Khaimah separated from, and again reunited with Shārjah, 1866 to 1867.

On the death of his father Shaikh Sultān in 1866 at the ripe age of over 80 years, Shaikh Khālid, the murderer of his own nephew Muhammad, succeeded to the Shaikhdom of Shārjah, while Ibrāhim-bin-Sultān proclaimed his independence at Rās al-Khaimah. In May 1867, however, Shaikh Khālid made a successful attack on Rās-al-Khaimah, expelling Ibrāhim and re-incorporating the town and its dependencies with the principality governed from Shārjah. In 1868, as explained in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Shaikh Khālid died of a wound received in single combat with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi: he expired on the 14th of April.

Shaikh Sālim-bin-Sultān, 1868-1883.

Separation once more of Rās-al-Khaimah from Shārjah, 1869.

The place of the deceased Shaikh Khālid, whose mother was a Qāsimi, was taken by Shaikh Sālim, the son by a slave woman of Shaikh Sultān; and the administration of Rās-al-Khaimah was at the same time conferred on, or assumed by, Shaikh Sālim's nephew Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah, who in 1869 proclaimed himself independent of Shārjah and so remained until the end of his days.

Pretended resignation of Shaikh Sālim, 1869.

In April 1869 the agent of the Wahhābis at Baraimi came to Shārjah, and, under cover of arbitrating in some disputes upon the coast, proceeded to plot the imprisonment of Shaikh Sālim, the establishment of his brother Shaikh Ibrāhim at Rās-al-Khaimah, and the transfer of Shaikh Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah from Rās-al-Khaimah to Shārjah. An affray however arose in the town; and the death of the Wahhābi agent who was struck by a bullet, put an end to these designs. Shaikh Sālim, apparently with a view to disarming the resentment of the Wahhābi Amir, then went through the form of resigning the chiefship in favour of his brother Ibrāhim; but the two remained in close relations, and there

was probably no real transfer of authority. A few months later, the Wahhābis remaining inactive, Shaikh Sālim openly resumed his position as principal Shaikh.

Attack by Shaikhs Sālim and Ibrāhim on Rās-al-Khaimah and intervention of the British Political Resident, May 1869.

Meanwhile, early in May 1869, Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, while on his way to Masqat in the "Dalhousie," received intelligence at Lingeh that a serious breach of the maritime peace was threatened by the Qawāsim in the neighbourhood of Rās-al-Khaimah. Taking the gunboat "Hugh Rose" in tow, he crossed the Gulf to Rās-al-Khaimah, and, arriving there on the 12th of May, found that Shaikhs Sālim and Ibrāhim of Shārjah had in fact proceeded by sea to expel Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah from Rās-al-Khaimah, near which town they had landed 1,500 men from boats and now occupied a position protected on the landward side by a creek in which their fleet, amounting to 32 vessels, was hauled up. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain had sent some 900 men by sea to the assistance of Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah; and fighting had already occurred both at Jazirat-al-Hamra and in front of Rās-al-Khaimah town. On the evening of his arrival Colonel Pelly received on board his vessel the Shaikh of Rāsal-Khaimah, who assured him that the sole object of the attack was to place Shaikh Ibrāhim in possession of the town; and on the 13th of May, after an interview with the leaders on the opposite side, Colonel Pelly ordered Shaikhs Sālim and Ibrāhim to withdraw their fleet and forces by sunset. The Resident remained on the spot until dark, by which time all the vessels of the attacking force had defiled out of the creek; he then continued on his way to Masqat, where his presence was urgently required. Colonel Pelly's "prompt and judicious measures" on this occasion were subsequently approved by the Government of India.

Combination of the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah and Shaikh Sālim against Shaikh Ibrāhim, 1871-73.

In 1871 dissensions apparently prevailed between Shaikhs Sālim and Ibrāhim at Shārjah, and the latter had possibly obtained a partial ascendancy in the town, for, taking advantage of his temporary absence at Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Sālim called in his nephew Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah of Rās-al-Khaimah and the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, and with their assistance made himself undisputed master of Shārjah. Soon after this affair Hamaid consolidated his position at Rās-al-Khaimah by re-annexing Shaam, Rams and the Shimil village in Sīr, which had at some time separated themselves from his principality. In 1873 it was reported that Shaikh Sālim found difficulty in meeting certain financial liabilities which he had assumed on behalf of his "predecessor", a term which in this case was probably intended to apply to Shaikh Ibrāhim.

Secession of Hamriyah from Shārjah, 1875.

In 1873, as mentioned in the history of Trucial 'Omān, the headman of Hamriyah, at this time Saif-bin-'Abdur Rahman, joined a general combination of chiefs against his overlord the Shaikh of Shārjah, from which he again in 1874 withdrew; and in 1875 he was engaged, apparently as a neutral, in mediating a peace among the remaining belligerents. Soon afterwards, in 1875 or 1876, he seems to have seceded from Shārjah and proclaimed his independence, with the result that a number of difficult claims and counter-claims, some of old standing, arose between the two places.

Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid, 1883 to the present time.

Usurpation of the Shaikhdom by Saqar bin-Khālid, March 1883.

At the end of March 1883, Shaikh Sālim having gone for a change of air to Bū Mūsa Island, where his horses were at grass, and his brother Ahmad having proceeded on a journey to Rās-al-Khaimah, their nephew Saqar-bin-Khālid, a youth of 20 years or less who had been left in charge of Shārjah, seized the opportunity to proclaim himself ruler. He was shortly recognised as such by the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah, Umm-al-Qaiwain, 'Ajmān and Dibai; and he also obtained the support of Muhammad-bin-'Ali, a chief of the Bedouin Na'im, and of Mutawwa' Khasuwāni, the leader of a band of Bani Qitab freebooters. This revolution was facilitated by the unpopularity of Shaikh Sālim, attributable to his partiality for men of religion and to his indifference to the interests of his subjects; but in general character Sālim was not, perhaps, inferior to his successor, who soon proved to be weak and unobservant of his promises. Shaikh Sālim retained possession of Bū Mūsa; but in May he paid a visit to Yūsuf, one of the Qāsimi Shaikhs in Lingeh, and in July he moved to Dibai, where a settlement, guaranteed by the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and Dibai, was arranged between himself and his usurping nephew. Under the terms of this agreement Sālim was to acknowledge the Shaikhship of Saqar and was in return to receive an annual pension of $600 and to retain his personal property at Shārjah and Dhaid, while his debts at Shārjah were to be discharged by Saqar.

Intervention of the British political representative, 1884.

In 1884 there were complaints on both sides that this agreement was not being observed, and the guarantors apparently held that the blame rested with Sālim, who was reported to be again living on Bū Mūsa. In the meantime Shaikh Saqar allied himself by marriage to the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah. Up to this point the Resident had avoided all connection with the dispute, refusing to give advice or instructions to Saqar on his accession and declining to take special security against breach of the maritime peace from Shaikh Sālim; but in June 1884, on Shaikh Sālim appearing at 'Ajmān, the Residency Agent at Shārjah was able to arrange a friendly meeting between him and Shaikh Saqar at 'Ajmān. On this occasion a written document was executed by Shaikh Saqar in favour of Sālim, in which it was promised that the latter should receive a pension of $400 a year, half in kind and half in cash, also the revenue of the island of Sir Bū Na'air, which sometimes amounted to $200 annually, and, finally, a sum of $250 on account of the past year.

Futile effort by Shaikh Saqar to recover Hamriyah, 1884.

In April 1884 a fatuous attempt was made by the new Shaikh of Shārjah to recover Hamriyah, which, apparently ever since its secession in 1875, had continued to enjoy virtual independence. The expedient adopted was to invite Saif-bin-'Abdur Rahmān, headman of Hamriyah, to Shārjah, and on his arrival there to despatch his brother Muhammad-bin-'Abdur Rahmān to take charge of the place in the interest of the Shaikh of Shārjah. The coup was effected as arranged; but Saif, on his return to Hamriyah, at once expelled his brother Muhammad without the slightest difficulty.

Expedition by the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and Shārjah, 1885.

In December 1885, Sha'am having revolted against the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, that chief, assisted by his cousin the Shaikh of Shārjah, proceeded against the place and quickly reduced it to submission, inflicting a fine of $1,600, of which a portion was paid at once.

Proceedings of the ex-Shaikh Sālim, 1886-89.

The expelled Shaikh, Sālim, continued to watch for an opportunity of obtaining better terms than he had yet received from his successful rival. In June 1886, on a combination being formed by the Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Hamriyah against the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, Sālim once more landed at 'Ajmān; but no opportunity having occurred of prosecuting his designs against Shārjah, he shortly returned to Bū Mūsa. In 1888 Sālim paid a visit to Dibai, between the Shaikh of which place and the Shaikh of Shārjah enmity at the time prevailed; a reconciliation, however, having taken place between the two, he was persuaded by the Shaikh of Dibai to promise, in return for the restoration of his pension, which had been suspended, to abstain from intrigues against his nephew. In April 1889, nevertheless, he organised an attack upon Shārjah; but he was unable to carry it out. Again, a little later, he became reconciled to Shaikh Saqar, who this time received him into favour and appointed him his Wazir.

Re-incorporation of Rās-al-Khaimah with the Shārjah Shaikhdom, 1900.

On the 2nd of August 1900 Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah, Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, was removed by a paralytic stroke, and Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid in the following month re-annexed the town and district to his principality of Shārjah without encountering any opposition. Shaikh Saqar at first placed his cousin Hamad-bin-Mājid in charge of Rās-al-Khaimah; but a few months later, having found his conduct unsatisfactory, he substituted his own son Khālid as governor.

Hamriyah affairs, 1903-04.

The township of Hamriyah, of which the headman on the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit to the coast, in November 1903, vainly sought to obtain recognition as an independent Trucial Shaikh, continued in theory attached to the Shārjah principality and in practice virtually independent; the reason of the prolonged estrangement was chiefly, so far as could be ascertained, the neglect or incapacity of the Shaikh of Shārjah to protect the interests of his vassal when assailed by others. On the 3rd of September 1904 a change of headmen occurred at Hamriyah by the death of Saif-bin-'Abdur Rahmān and the succession of his son 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Saif. The latter soon resigned his position in favour of an elder relation named Saif-bin-Saif, of whose ambition he stood in dread; but, on the latter proceeding to despoil him of his personal property, 'Abdur Rahmān attacked the house of Saif by night, taking him prisoner and killing his son, and himself resumed the headship of Hamriyah. Shaikh Rāshid of Umm-al-Qaiwain then intervened and settled the matter by removing Saif-bin-Saif to his own capital.

Political position and personal character of the Shaikh of Shārjah, 1907.

Under Saqar-bin-Khālid the importance of Shārjah among the Shaikhdoms of Trucial 'Omān declined, and the prestige of the Qāsimi name sunk to an unprecedentedly low level. In private life the Shaikh was weak, miserly, and uxorious: in public business he was apathetic and seemed incapable of exertion. He alienated his subjects and former Bedouin adherents by indifference to their grievances and requests; and he forfeited the respect of the other Trucial Shaikhs by his general insignificance, both as a man and as a ruler. In

his personal relations with British officers Shaikh Saqar always showed himself friendly and well-disposed; but, from indolence, he was sometimes remiss in enforcing the just claims of British subjects; and, on the occurrence of internal difficulties in his state, he manifested too great a disposition to rely on the help of the British Residency, instead of grappling with them himself. In 1904 the general dissatisfaction of his subjects with his rule found expression in a plot to depose Shaikh Saqar in favour of his uncle, the ex-Shaikh Sālim; but timely information enabled Shaikh Saqar to frustrate the intrigue and Muhammad-bin-Khādim, one of the chief conspirators, was obliged, on escaping from custody, to seek refuge at Umm-al-Qaiwain. The direct administration of the town of Shārjah was held, until his death about 1906 by Shaikh Saqar's son Rāshid,—a young man who in character resembled his father; and Rās-al-Khaimah was in 1907 still governed by Khālid, the only son then surviving of the Shaikh.

ANNEXURE No. 2.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE ABU DHABI PRINCIPALITY.

As in the case of Shārjah it appears advisable to devote a short separate notice to the internal affairs of the Abu Dhabi principality, of which the external history has been given in the preceding chapter.

Early history, 1761-1818.

Foundation of Abu Dhabi town, 1761.

The foundation of the town of Abu Dhabi is ascribed to the year 1761. The surrounding country was then already occupied by the Bani Yās,—a land-faring Bedouin tribe who, until the accidental discovery of water at the site of Abu Dhabi town, where a small village of 20 houses now sprang up, had not apparently a single permanent settlement upon the coast.

Rulers down to and including Shaikh Muhammad, deposed in 1818.

For information regarding the chiefs of the tribe at the time of the establishment of the Abu Dhabi principality the reader is referred to the genealogical table of the Bani Yās Shaikhs. Probably the last Shaikh to reside chiefly in the interior was Dhiyāb-bin-'Īsa who in 1793 was murdered by his second cousin, Hazzā'-bin-Zāid. The death of Dhiyāb was amply avenged by his son Shakhbūt, for the young Shaikh succeeded in putting to death no fewer than ten persons who had been present at his father's assassination: and in 1795 Hazzā', the actual murderer, found himself obliged, from fear of a similar fate, to fly

the country along with all his supporters. Shaikh Shakhbūt remained at the head of the tribe until 1816; he was then deposed by his son Muhammad, who ruled for two years.

Shaikh Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt, 1818-33.

Accession of Shaikh Tahnūn, 1818.

In 1818 Muhammad was expelled from Abu Dhabi by his brother Tahnūn,—an enterprise favoured by Shakhbūt, the father of both, by a majority of the Bani Yās tribe, and by the ruler of Masqat who afforded material assistance.* Muhammad sought refuge at Dōhah in Qatar under the protection of the Shaikh of Bahrain, while Tahnūn became Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, but for a time associated his father with himself in the administration and employed him on important missions, particularly on that of negotiating a peace with the commander of the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah in 1819-20. The accession of Tahnūn to power under the auspices of Masqat was the beginning of a permanent breach between the Qawāsim and the Bani Yās, who, if tradition may be believed, had hitherto lived as close friends and allies.

Movements of Suwaidān bin-Za'al, 1822-23.

In 1821 or 1822, some time after the accession of Shaikh Tahnūn, an individual named Suwaidān bin-Za'al, who appears to have been head of the Maharibah section of the Bani Yās, absconded from Abu Dhabi in order to avoid payment of his debts, and adopted a roving and predatory life. Action was at once taken against him by Shaikh Tahnūn, who succeeded in capturing some of his boats; but these proceedings were viewed by the British authorities of the day with disapproval, as endangering the tranquillity of the seas; and the Shaikh was even required, on pain of a British war vessel being sent against his port, to desist from them and to give up the vessels which he had seized. At the end of the year Suwaidān paid a visit to Masqat, where he received a present from Saiyid Sa'id, and in January 1823 he was reported to have settled down quietly on the island of Yās. A different view of Suwaidān's character now apparently presented itself to the local British officers, for we find the Resident advising him to make his submission to Shaikh Tahnūn and even encouraging the latter, on certain conditions, to reduce him by force. Eventually Suwaidān was reconciled to his chief and returned to Abu Dhabi in 1828.

Attack on Abu Dhabi town by the

Late in the year 1823 the ex-Shaikh Muhammad, whose headquarters were now at Dōhah in Qatar, appeared before Abu Dhabi at the head

* Such is the account given by Lieutenant Hennell about 1831, see *Bombay Selections, XXIV*, page 464; but Lieutenant McLeod, writing in 1823, states that Tahnūn was set up by the ruler of Masqat about 1821 in place of his father, his brother Muhammad at the same time taking flight. Signature of the General Treaty of peace on behalf of Abu Dhabi was in any case performed (on the 11th of January 1820) by Shaikh Shakhbūt, who in 1833 was still alive; but it is certain that in January 1823 Tahnūn already held the sole power.

of a number of Manāsīr Bedouins and attacked and plundered the town; but he was driven out with a loss of 35 men by his brother Tahnūn, who hastened to the spot with a large force from the interior. Retreating northwards he took refuge in Shārjah, whither Tahnūn followed by land and demanded his surrender; but, before matters came to a crisis between the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Shārjah, Muhammad relieved the latter of his presence by returning to Qatar.

ex-Shaikh Muhammad, 1823.

Shaikh Tahnūn had long distrusted his brothers Khalīfah and Sultān and had kept them at a distance from Abu Dhabi; but he was at length persuaded by his father, Shakhbūt, to allow them to return. Soon afterwards they were found to have entered with some of the principal residents of Abu Dhabi into a plot for the removal of Tahnūn,—an act of treason with which the Shaikh prepared to deal by throwing some of their confederates into prison. This precaution, however, was not sufficient. On the contrary it precipitated the action of the conspirators; and in April 1833 Shaikh Tahnūn fell a victim to the pistol of his brother Khalīfah and the dagger of his brother Sultān.

Assassination of Shaikh Tahnūn, April 1833.

Shaikh Khalīfah-bin-Shakhbūt, 1833-45.

Khalīfah and Sultān at first ruled in partnership; but gradually the predominance of Khalīfah declared itself, and Sultān descended to a subordinate place. A tender of allegiance and Zakat on the part of the usurpers was readily accepted by the Wahhabi Amir, who at once took them under his protection and forbade the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārjah to meddle in their affairs.

Accession of Shaikh Khalīfah, 1833.

In the course of the following summer a conspiracy was formed by some malcontents at Abu Dhabi to murder Shaikh Khalīfah and replace him by one of his first cousins; but the cousin whom it was intended to benefit himself divulged the plot to the Shaikh, who, retiring into his fort, seized three of the ringleaders and put them to death. He was also about to execute two influential merchants; but popular indignation and the opposition of his brother Sultān diverted him from his purpose and obliged him to be satisfied instead with the expulsion of one of the merchants named Bin-'Iyān, whom, after beating and despoiling of his property, he sent in a Baqārah to Lingeh.

Plot against Shaikh Khalīfah, 1833.

This violence on the part of Shaikh Khalīfah was highly prejudicial to his own interests, for it led to the secession from Abu Dhabi to Dibai, during the pearl fishery, of a large number of Bani Yās of the Al Bū Falāsah section. Dibai, of which the date of foundation cannot be fixed but may have been later than that of Abu Dhabi, seems to have been readily surrendered by the individual who then governed it on behalf of Shaikh Khalīfah to the seceders; and they, in the following autumn, were joined there by the bulk of their relatives, returning from the pearl banks. The secession was permanent, almost the entire body of the Āl Bū Falāsah being to the present day domiciled at Dibai; and

Secession of the Āl Bū Falāsah to Dibai, 1833.

that place, which had hitherto been a dependency of Abu Dhabi, became after 1833 a dangerous rival, and at times enemy, of the parent state.

The attack on and subsequent blockade of Abu Dhabi town by the Shaikh of Shārjah in the autumn of 1833 were due to these dissensions, which appeared to Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar to provide an excellent opportunity of crushing the Bani Yās chief on pretext of obtaining justice for the merchant Bin-'Iyān; but the result was far from answering to the expectations of the wily intriguer.

First secession of the Qubaisāt to 'Odaid, 1835-37.

In 1835, when heavy damages on account of piratical outrages by the Bani Yās were being recovered by the British Government from the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, the subjects of Shaikh Khalifah began to disperse in all directions with a view to avoiding payment of their individual contributions; and it even became necessary for the British authorities to request other Shaikhs to abstain from affording asylum to fugitives from Abu Dhabi.

It was impossible, however, to prevent by these means the emigration of the Qubaisāt section of the Bani Yās, who now, under the leadership of Khādim-bin-Na'amān and leaving their debts at Abu Dhabi unsettled, removed in a body to Khor-al-'Odaid,—an inlet of the uninhabited coast near the base of the Qatar promontory, distant nearly 200 miles from Abu Dhabi. The British Resident made an effort to reconcile the Qubaisāt with their chief and to induce them to return to their allegiance, but it was unsuccessful; and soon afterwards it was reported that the settlers at 'Odaid were affording encouragement to pirates, especially to the notorious Jāsim-bin-Jābir, Raqraqi, whose depredations occasioned a British naval demonstration along the Qatar coast in 1836, as related in the history of that promontory. The usual headquarters of the pirates were at Mirfah, an anchorage on the coast of Taff in Dhafrah, where they were accustomed to bring their spoil ashore and load it on camels for despatch to different destinations; but Jāsim had in the first instance issued from 'Odaid, and the headman of that place continued to countenance him so long as he dared.

At length in May 1837, permission to take such measures as were necessary having been accorded by the Resident, Shaikh Khalifah contrived to fall without warning upon the 'Odaid settlement, which he completely destroyed: 50 of the inhabitants were killed; the fortifications and houses were dismantled; and the wells were filled up with the ruins of the buildings and the bodies of the slain. A number of the Qubaisāt then took refuge at Dibai, and probably at other places also; but, when they saw that some of their number who had gone back to Abu Dhabi were treated with indulgence and had their boats restored to them, they accepted a general amnesty offered by Shaikh Khalifah and returned to their homes and their allegiance, among them being Khādim-bin-Na'amān, the chief of the seceders.

Assassination of Shaikh Khalifah, 1845.

In July 1845, in circumstances which are not fully explained, Shaikh Tahnūn with his brother Sultān was treacherously murdered by one 'Isa-bin-Khālid, who had long been lying in wait for his life. The deed was committed at a season when the town was almost deserted by its inhabitants, these having gone either to the pearl banks or to the date

grove of Lūwah ; and it formed the conclusion of a feast of which the victims had just partaken, at the invitation of the murderers, under the shade of a Batil drawn up upon the beach.

Administration of Shaikh Khalifah.

Notwithstanding the fratricidal crime by which he first attained to power, but which we may consider to have been expiated by the manner of his own death, the rule of Shaikh Khalifah had been in every respect creditable to his character. By his gallantry, firmness and prudence he raised the Abu Dhabi principality to a position much higher than it had ever before occupied ; and at the same time he maintained, at least after 1835, a good understanding with the British authorities, and restrained his subjects to the best of his ability from breaches of the maritime peace.

Interregnum, 1845.

On the death of Shaikh Khalifah the headship of the Bani Yās was assumed by the principal assassin, 'Isa-bin-Khalid, apparently with the consent of such of the tribe as were then at hand ; but two months later the usurper was cut off by Dhiyāb-bin-'Isa, who from his name may be supposed to have been a first cousin of Shaikh Khalifah. Dhiyāb was slain in his turn by Khalid-bin-'Isa, a son of his victim ; but this individual, instead of attempting to secure the Shaikhdom for himself, prudently returned, after avenging his father's death, to Sharjah whence he had set out. A brother of Khalid contrived to obtain possession of the fort of Abu Dhabi ; but he was speedily ejected by Muhammad-bin-Hamaid and Rāshid-bin-Fādhil, two influential leaders of the Bani Yās, who now declared for Sa'id, a son of the former Shaikh Tahnūn and consequently nephew of the late Shaikh Khalifah.

Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, 1845-55.

Accession of Shaikh Sa'id, 1845.

The chief authority was retained in their own hands by Muhammad and Rāshid until the arrival of Shaikh Sa'id, who, being generally regarded as the most eligible chief, and being supported moreover by the moral influence of the British Political Resident, established himself in power without any difficulty.

Second (attempted) secession of the Qubaisāt to 'Odaid, 1849.

In 1849, dissatisfied at the favour shown by Shaikh Sa'id to the Mahāribah section of the Bani Yās with whom they were at feud, encouraged also by the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Dibai to hope that the Wahhābi Amir would shortly assist them to establish themselves at 'Odaid, the Qubaisāt of Abu Dhabi once more abandoned their homes and settled temporarily at Dōhah in Qatar. Effectual measures to compel their return were at once taken, in November or December 1849, by

the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. After imprisoning some of the Qubaisāt who still remained at Abu Dhabi, he sent for the leaders of the Dōhah colony and on their arrival gave them a flattering reception. During the following night, however, the boats in which they had come were stripped of masts, sails and all other gear; and the entrapped envoys, thus deprived of the means of escape, found themselves obliged to agree to the terms imposed by the Shaikh, which included, besides return from Dōhah, the satisfaction of all debts due by the Qubaisāt to private creditors and the payment of a fine to himself.

Expulsion of Shaikh Sa'īd and accession of Shaikh Zāid, 1855.

In 1855 Shaikh Sa'īd became embroiled with the entire body of his subjects. The occasion was the murder by a tribal elder of his own brother, apparently not without justification, for the Bani Yās as a whole sided with the elder and resisted the intention of Shaikh Sa'īd to put him to death. On a promise given by the Shaikh to remit both that and every other penalty the murderer was brought into his presence, whereupon Sa'īd, reverting to his original determination, drew his dagger and with his own hand struck the man dead. The populace at once rose in arms; and Shaikh Sa'īd, after defending himself for some time in his citadel, escaped to the Persian island of Qais, taking with him most of his property both in goods and cattle. To the British Residency the Shaikh represented his expulsion as due to efforts which he had made to punish a piracy, committed by Bani Yās of the Hawāmil and Mahārībah sections, upon a Shū'ai belonging to one 'Abdul Karīm.

Shaikh Zāid-bin-Khalifah, from 1855.

On the flight of Shaikh Sa'īd-bin-Tahnūn, his first cousin, Shaikh Zāid-bin-Khalifah, was elected to succeed him. According to an arrangement apparently customary among the Bani Yās, a brother named Dhiyāb was associated with Zāid in the government; but as usual nothing was heard, after the first, of the assistant chief.

Attack on Abu Dhabi town by the ex-Shaikh Sa'īd, 1856.

In July 1856 a piratical and altogether unexpected descent upon the town of Abu Dhabi was made by the exiled Shaikh, Sa'īd-bin-Tahnūn, who in this affair took Shārjah for his base of operations; his fleet consisted of three vessels, all small, of which one was his own, one belonged to the island of Qais, and the other was obtained at Abu Hail in the Shārjah principality. On the 19th of July, the principal Shaikh (Zāid) being then absent in Dhafrah, Sa'īd-bin-Tahnūn landed at Abu Dhabi and obtained possession of the town, which was plundered by his adherents; Shaikh Dhiyāb and the few inhabitants then present at Abu Dhabi shut themselves up in the fort, and there held out until the arrival of Shaikh Zāid from the interior with a party of Bedouins. On the appearance of the relieving force the invaders were immediately discomfited; Sa'īd bin-Tahnūn himself was among the slain. As mentioned in the history of Trucial 'Omān, the damage done at Abu Dhabi on this occasion was partially made good out of a large fine of $25,000, imposed on the Shaikh of Shārjah because of the complicity of some of his subjects in the raid.

In nothing does the essentially Bedouin character of the subjects of the Abu Dhabi Shaikh appear more distinctly than in the readiness with which, on slight provocation, they abandon their homes and settle elsewhere. We have already noticed the permanent hiving-off of the Āl Bū Falāsah in 1833 and the temporary secession of the Qubaisāt in 1835-37 and 1849, and mention must now be made of a sustained effort on the part of the Qubaisāt to free themselves, by removal to a distance, from the control of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. Third secession of the Qubaisāt to 'Odaid, 1869-80.

In 1869, for reasons not ascertained and therefore probably of slight importance, a body of the Qubaisāt under the leadership of Buti-bin-Khādim once more forsook Abu Dhabi and established themselves in the remote creek of 'Odaid. 1869.

In 1871, in consequence of complaints by Shaikh Zāid that the prosperity of Abu Dhabi was diminished by the competition of the 'Odaid settlement and that the latter had become a city of refuge for fraudulently absconding debtors, Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Gulf, made careful enquiries both personally and through his Assistant, Major Smith, regarding the ownership of 'Odaid; the result was to show that 'Odaid itself, to which at this time no Shaikh of Qatar so much as laid claim, was undoubtedly situated within the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. The 'Odaid colonists, however, claimed to form a state entirely independent of Abu Dhabi; they asserted that their territory extended half way from 'Odaid to Wakrah on the side of Qatar, and in the other direction as far as the island of Yās, and that it included Dalmah and other adjacent islands formerly considered to belong to Abu Dhabi; moreover, while they expressed a wish to continue under the Trucial flag, they hinted not obscurely that, if their pretensions were not admitted, they would place themselves under the protection of the Turks, who had now arrived in Qatar. Colonel Pelly asked that he might be given instructions for dealing with the matter, inasmuch as the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, relying on the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853, had claimed his intervention as an arbitrator. 1871.

The orders of the Government of India, communicated in May 1872, were to the effect that no action by the Resident was called for under the Maritime Truce, no attack having been made by sea upon the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, and that Colonel Pelly should not interfere unless he apprehended a breach of the peace at sea between the parties; but that he should report at once any overt action indicating an intention on the part of the Turks to establish their supremacy at 'Odaid. 1872.

The position remained unchanged until 1873, when Colonel Ross, who had meanwhile succeeded Colonel Pelly in charge of the Gulf Residency, reported an application by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi for leave to take naval action against the 'Odaid rebels: it was explained that an expedition by land was impracticable on account of physical obstacles. Colonel Ross was inclined to think that refusal of sanction might throw the Shaikh himself into the arms of the Porte; but the Government of India in reply directed him to avoid, if possible, giving any answer to Zā'id's request, and, in the opposite case, to inform him that the Government of India could not countenance, and would even prevent, the proposed naval expedition. 1873.

1874-75. In 1874 the Shaikh, having repeated his request in regard to an expedition by sea, was informed of the prohibition of the Government of India; and in 1875 he stated that he had received letters from the Turks, ordering him to abstain from interference with 'Odaid. At this time it was reported that the 'Odaid settlement possessed both a Trucial and a Turkish flag, and that either was flown as the circumstances of the moment happened to dictate.

1876-77. In 1876-77, various piracies having been committed by Bedouins belonging to the neighbourhood of 'Odaid, a strict enquiry was made into the behaviour and circumstances of the colonists. It was stated that some Turks had previously visited 'Odaid, and that a small annual tribute of $40 or 50 was now paid by the inhabitants to the Turkish Government. In regard to the piracies, it was shown that the offenders were Āl Morrah, who had made use of creeks and anchorages and even of vessels belonging to 'Odaid,—proceedings which the headman of 'Odaid was not in a position to prevent. In consequence of this last discovery the case took a new departure; and, in May 1877, the Government of India directed the Resident to use his best endeavours to promote a reunion between the settlers at 'Odaid and the main body of the Banī Yās tribe, at the same time authorising him, in case of non-success, to assist the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in coercing the seceders. These instructions were duly approved by the Secretary of State for India, and steps towards their execution were at once taken by Captain Prideaux, the Acting Political Resident in the Gulf; but he was not able to bring about any agreement. Matters were further complicated by a piracy by 'Odaid boats upon a Wakrah boat, which occurred in April and obliged Captain Prideaux to insist on the liberation of some prisoners who were confined at 'Odaid. In December 1877 Colonel Ross, who had meanwhile returned to his post, reported that his efforts at reconciliation had failed in consequence of the reliance which the headman of 'Odaid now placed on the help of the Turks and did not hesitate to express, even in writing. He further applied for the services of a war vessel for the purpose of executing his instructions, and the "Teazer" was placed at his disposal. On the arrival of this ship at 'Odaid it was found that the settlers had fled, first dismantling their houses and filling up the wells. These transactions led to a discussion with the Turkish Government which is described in another place.

1880. The 'Odaid fugitives found an asylum at Dōhah in Qatar, where apparently they resided during 1879; but in January 1880 they accepted an offer of Shaikh Zāid to let them return to Abu Dhabi; and, a short time after, the Shaikh's son Khalīfah went in person to bring them home. They were obliged to escape secretly from Dōhah, where Jāsim, the Āl Thānī Shaikh, would now have compelled them to remain; but they reached Abu Dhabi in safety, resumed their allegiance to their chief, and received back their date palms and other property.

Later questions affecting 'Odaid are connected with the history of Qatar rather than with that of Abu Dhabi.

Affairs in the Buraimi Oasis.

We may now consider shortly the recent history of the Buraimi Oasis, which, after the expulsion of the Wahhābis in 1869, ceased to

play an important part in the general history of Trucial 'Omān and became almost an annexe of the principality of Abu Dhabi. Oasis, 1875-1907.

At the beginning of 1875 a state of war existed between the Bani Yās and the Na'im; and many distant, and in some cases murderous, raids were executed, especially by the former, who were assisted by their allies the Manāsīr and Bani Hājir Bedouins. In January 200 mounted Manāsīr and Bani Hājir made an attack on the Na'aimi town of Dhank in Dhāhirah; and about the same time a similar force of Manāsīr and Mazāri' made an unsuccessful expedition against Baraimi. The Bani Qitab, finding themselves in danger from the Bedouin allies of Abu Dhabi, applied for protection to the Shaikh of Dibai, who went out with a force of camelry and stood guard over them until satisfactory assurances had been received from Shaikh Zāid. 1875.

In May 1887 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi went to war with some of the Dhawāhir of Baraimi who opposed the extension of his influence to that place. The Sultān of 'Omān, Saiyid Turki, sent assistance in money and ammunition to the recalcitrant Dhawāhir; but the consignment arrived too late. Within a month of his departure Shaikh Zāid returned home victorious, bringing two Shaikhs of the Dhawāhir back with him as prisoners. In April 1889 the Shaikh of 'Ajmān went to Baraimi and composed some disputes which had arisen there among the Na'im. 1887-89.

In April 1891 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi marched to Baraimi, where he was joined by the Shaikh of Dibai with 30 horsemen and 300 camelmen and apparently engaged in hostilities with the Dhawāhir, for his principal operation was the storm and capture of the village of 'Ain. Peace was now established between Shaikh Zāid and the Al Bū Kharaibān Na'im of Baraimi; and the Shaikh even took to wife a daughter of the Na'aimi holder of the Baraimi forts. The Bani Qitab and the Bani Ka'ab, formerly reckoned dependents of the Qawāsim, now attached themselves to the interest of Abu Dhabi; and in June 1891 the Shaikh, being then on a visit to Masqat, persuaded the Sultān to restore some allowances which he had been accustomed to pay through his Wāli of Sohār to the Na'im and Bani Qitab tribes but had suspended. 1891.

When by these and by other similar means he had established a considerable degree of influence over Baraimi, Shaikh Zāid proceeded to adopt more open and unmistakable measures for the virtual annexation of the Oasis. About 1897, or possibly earlier, he appropriated or reclaimed the estate of Jāhali on the south-western border of the cultivated area; and since then divers pieces of land and sundry water channels in Baraimi or its environs have been purchased by Shaikh Zāid and his sons, especially by his eldest son, Khalifah, who has recently founded a new settlement, Mas'ūdi, on the north-western edge of the Oasis. 1897-1907.

In 1904, a year in which Shaikh Zāid spent several months at his estate of Jāhali, hostilities nearly arose from the purchase by Shaikh Khalifah of a share in an old disused Falaj, belonging to Ghāfiris, at Baraimi; for, on some of the co-owners objecting to the intrusion of the Hināwi Bani Yās, Shaikh Zāid at first prepared to enforce his

son's right by arms. At a meeting held at Samaih near Khor-al-Ghanādhah, however, he was induced, by the advice of the Shaikhs of Dibai and 'Ajmān and of his friend Muhammad, the chief Na'aimi Shaikh of Baraimi, to abandon forcible measures. About the same time he proved the strength of his influence in the Baraimi neighbourhood generally by obliging the Bani Qitab to pay blood money for two citizens of 'Ibri town in Dhāhirah, whom they had slain.

General matters, 1857-1907.

After the attack on Abu Dhabi town in 1856 the internal history of the principality was, apart from the affairs of 'Odaid and Baraimi described above, wholly uneventful. The wars of the Bani Yās with the Al Thani Shaikhs of Dohah will be more appropriately related, though the interior of the Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom did not entirely escape their effects, in the history of the Qatar promontory. Shaikh Zaid performed the Hajj in 1880-81, and in 1904 he received a fine mare with trappings from the Sharif of Makkah.

ANNEXURE No. 3.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE DIBAI PRINCIPALITY.

Of the early history of Dibai town little is known. It existed already in 1799; and in 1825, as appears from the general history of Trucial 'Omān,* its possession was an object of ambition to the ruler of Masqat. Notwithstanding the separate signature on behalf of its chief Hazzā'-bin-Za'al, then a minor, of the General Treaty of Peace in 1820, Dibai appears to have existed until 1833 as a dependency of the Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom; but in that year, as related elsewhere,† on the arrival of a body of 800 seceders from Abu Dhabi belonging to the Āl Bū Falāsah section of the Bani Yās tribe, it attained indisputably to the status of a separate principality.

Shaikh Maktūm-bin-Buti, 1833-52.

Accession of Shaikh Maktūm to sole power, 1836.

The leaders of the exodus of the Āl Bū Falāsah from Abu Dhabi were 'Obaid-bin-Sa'id and Maktūm-bin-Buti, who seem, according to a practice common among the Bani Yās, to have been recognised as joint chiefs; but on the death on the 9th of June 1836 of 'Obaid, who was regarded as the senior of the two, the undivided power devolved upon Maktūm, at that time a haughty and inexperienced youth.

Administration and character.

The new principality was exposed for a time to considerable danger, both from the jealousy of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, the former suzerain of Dibai, and from the ambition of the Qāsimi Shaikh of Sharjah, between whom a combination was more than once formed for its suppression; but the personal courage and the ability of Shaikh

* *Vide* page 686 *ante*.
† *Vide* page 765 *ante*.

Maktūm were equal to every emergency, enabling him to play off with success the one enemy against the other; and it is probable that the peril from outside was not without advantage in strengthening his authority at home. The internal history of Dibai under Shaikh Maktūm was in any case singularly uneventful, but in 1843 he lost an eye in battle with the Ghafalah Bedouins. As has often happened in the case of an Arab ruler refractory at the beginning of his reign in his relations with the British Government, Shaikh Maktūm showed in later life a sincere appreciation of the objects and advantages of British policy in the Gulf; and he ultimately acquired, in a high degree, the confidence and respect of the local British authorities.

Death of Shaikh Maktūm, 1852.

Shaikh Maktūm fell a victim to small-pox in the spring of 1852. He died at sea on a voyage to Qishm from Masqat, where he had gone to visit his ally Saiyid Sa'id, probably in connection with recent events in Bātinah.

Shaikh Sa'īd-bin-Buti, 1852-59.

Rebellion against Shaikh Sa'id, 1852.

Shaikh Maktūm was succeeded by his brother, Shaikh Sa'id, but the position of the latter, though his accession was peaceful, was challenged by Hashar and Suhail, sons of Maktūm; and, on his imprudently leaving Dibai to visit Saiyid Sa'id at Masqat in October 1852, the fort of Dibai passed by treachery into their hands. The governor appointed by Shaikh Sa'id at his departure,—one Sa'id-bin-Rāshid, his own maternal uncle,—was at first imprisoned, but soon again released by the usurping chiefs; and, before the return of the Shaikh, this individual succeeded in justifying the confidence reposed in him by measures which resulted in the flight of Hashar and Suhail from Dibai. The cause of the exiles was espoused by the Shaikh of Shārjah, with whom they sought an asylum, and by whom a certain Sa'id-bin-Ma'anah was induced to leave Dibai with others of the Al Bū Mahair tribe and to settle at Shārjah; but the evil went no further. Shaikh Sa'id was able on the 17th of December 1852 to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain by which the intrigues of the Qāsimi chief were effectually nullified.

Administration, character, and death of Shaikh Sa'id.

No further internal incident distinguished the Shaikhship of Shaikh Sa'id, and, like his predecessor in his later years, he was careful to cultivate a good understanding with the British Government: thus he was the only one of the leading Shaikhs of the coast who was not in attendance at Baraimi on the son of the Wahhābi Amir when the Resident arrived in 1853 to arrange the Perpetual Treaty of Peace. Shaikh Sa'id died in December 1859 of small-pox, a disease to which his family seem to have been unusually susceptible, for another brother and a nephew now also succumbed to the same malady, which, as will be recollected, had carried off his brother Maktūm.

Shaikh Hashar-bin-Maktūm, 1859-86.

Shaikh Sa'id was followed in the Shaikhship by his nephew and former rival, Hashar-bin-Maktūm, who on his accession wrote to the British Political Resident professing friendship and a desire to fulfil his obligations towards the British Government; nor did the attitude of the new chief, in a case of serious outrage at sea committed by the Āl Bū Falāsah immediately before his elevation to the chiefship, belie his fair words. Shaikh Hashar died on the 22nd of November 1886, and the succession was claimed by his brother Rāshid and by his son Maktūm, whose supporters were approximately equal in number and influence.

Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Maktūm, 1886-94.

The dispute as to the succession having been peacefully settled by the elders of the tribe in favour of Rāshid, the latter was recognised as Shaikh by the British Political Resident. In 1892, as mentioned in the general history of Trucial 'Omān, the conduct of this chief was not entirely satisfactory; his treatment of British subjects gave rise to complaints; and it became necessary to visit him with a penalty for having violated the Perpetual Treaty of Peace. In September of that year he paid a visit to Masqat, returning by Baraimi and forming on the way a matrimonial alliance with the Āl Bū Shāmis division of the Na'im tribe. In December 1892 he became seriously ill; his indisposition, at first attributed to poison, was subsequently described as a paralytic seizure. He eventually died on the 7th of April 1894.

Shaikh Maktūm-bin-Hashar, 1894-1906.

The place of Shaikh Rāshid was taken, on his death, by his nephew and original competitor, Maktūm-bin-Hashar. The sons of the deceased Rāshid at once formed a conspiracy against their cousin; but Shaikh Maktūm seized them and imprisoned them for five months, after which they were released and took up their residence at Shārjah on small compassionate allowances granted by the Qāsimi Shaikh.

The subsequent policy of Shaikh Maktūm was liberal and enlightened and resulted in the rapid growth of the port of Dibai, which after 1902, assisted by the decadence of Lingeh, became a regular place of call for steamers and the chief commercial emporium of the Trucial Coast.

The relations of the Shaikh with the British political authorities were always excellent, chiefly on account of the reasonableness of his disposition; and his sudden death on the 16th of February 1906, apparently from heart disease, was much regretted.

Shaikh Buti-bin-Suhail, from 1906.

On the death of Shaikh Maktūm, leaving no son who had reached man's estate, the government of Dibai was assumed without opposition by his cousin Buti-bin-Suhail, an elderly man. The new Shaikh was reported to be somewhat uncouth and less civilised than his predecessor.

ANNEXURE No. 4.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE UMM-AL-QAIWAIN PRINCIPALITY.

The principality of Umm-al-Qaiwain, though it has played a not inconsiderable part among the petty states of Trucial 'Omān, is almost devoid of anything that can be described as internal history. This circumstance may be due in part to the longevity of the ruling family, belonging to the Al 'Ali tribe, of whom three—a father and two sons—between them governed Umm-al-Qaiwain for nearly a century.

'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, from before 1820 till after 1853.

The first of these, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, must have succeeded before 1820, in which year he personally subscribed the General Treaty of Peace; and in 1853 he still lived to accept, on behalf of his Shaikhdom, the Perpetual Treaty of Peace which was then executed. The year of his death is not known.

Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah, from before 1873 till 1904.

In 1873 Umm-al-Qaiwain was governed by his son, Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah, who had in the meantime succeeded an elder brother named 'Ali. Ahmad married a sister of Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz, ruler of 'Ajmān, of whom his eldest son, Rashid, was born about 1876. Another wife was a sister of Shaikh Hamaid, Qāsimi, of Rās-al-Khaimah; but her he divorced in 1882. Shaikh Ahmad died on the 13th of June 1904 at an advanced age, apparently of paralysis; his health had been failing for some time previously, and infirmity prevented him from attending in person the Viceregal Darbār held off Shārjah in November 1903.

Rāshid-bin-Ahmad, from 1904 to the present time.

Shaikh Rāshid, who succeeded his father without opposition, and who in September 1904 wrote to the British Political Resident announcing his peaceful accession and accepting without reserve the existing treaties, appeared to possess ability and force of character; and, though somewhat headstrong, he was reported to be a satisfactory man with whom

to deal. Soon after his accession he married a daughter of his maternal uncle, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān.

ANNEXURE No. 5.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE 'AJMĀN PRINCIPALITY.

The internal history of 'Ajmān presents few points of interest or importance.

Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, from before 1820 to 1838.

The Shaikh of the principality in 1820 was Rāshid-bin-Hamaid; he died in 1838 and was at first succeeded by his son Hamaid-bin-Rāshid.

Hamaid-bin-Rāshid, first period, 1838-41.

In May 1841 Hamaid-bin-Rāshid, who had married a daughter of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, was displaced by his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Rāshid. This chief, having gained an entrance into the fort by stealth along with some of his slaves and being supported by the good will of the people, was able to maintain his position for a time, and the matter was apparently treated as a family quarrel by the Shaikh of Shārjah, who did not attempt to interfere; but, on learning that Hamaid proposed to erect another fort for himself in the vicinity, Abdul 'Aziz again retired in his favour.

Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Rāshid, 1841-48.

The self-effacement of 'Abdul 'Aziz was not of long duration, and he soon appeared once more in the character of principal Shaikh. His good conduct in 1845 in a matter affecting the maritime peace has been noticed elsewhere; but in tribal politics he was an inconstant and unreliable factor; and in 1846 he deserted the Shaikhs of Dibai and Umm-al-Qaiwain, his allies, in their struggle for independence against Shārjah and Abu Dhabi. In September 1848, as noted in the general history of Trucial 'Omān, 'Abdul 'Aziz was killed in battle with the people of Hamriyah.

Hamaid-bin-Rāshid, second period, 1848 till before 1873.

'Abdul 'Aziz was succeeded by his brother Hamaid, whom he had originally displaced, and who also was wounded in the Hamriyah fight. The death of Hamaid occurred at some time before 1873.

Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, from before 1873 to 1891.

Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, the son of the last Shaikh, ruled 'Ajmān in 1873 and continued to do so till April 1891, when he died and made way for his son Hamaid-bin-Rāshid.

Hamaid-bin-Rāshid, 1891-1900.

Hamaid-bin-Rāshid ruled from 1891 till the 8th of July 1900. On that day he was murdered by his uncle, 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Hamaid, who then assumed the Shaikhship. No sympathy was felt for the victim, who had alienated the members of his own family by his failure to make them regular allowances out of the state revenue: indeed his removal was received with general approbation.

'Abdul 'Aziz immediately assured the British subjects resident at 'Ajmān of his protection; nor was his *coup d'état* either accompanied or followed by any general disturbances. The new Shaikh subsequently wrote to the Resident to seek recognition by the British Government; but tacit recognition had already been afforded, and it was not considered advisable to grant any of a more formal character. 'Abdul 'Aziz was a close personal friend of the ruling Shaikh of Shārjah. Abdal 'Aziz-bin-Hamald, from 1900.

ANNEXURE No. 6.—HISTORY OF THE SHAMAILIYAH TRACT.

The Shamailiyah tract on the shores of the Gulf of 'Omān, which for historical purposes may be taken as extending from Dibah to Khor Kalba and as including both of those places,* has undergone within the last century so many external and internal political vicissitudes that its history cannot be conveniently related in connection with the affairs of any principality. A short separate notice of events in Shamailiyah is accordingly given below.

Indeterminate political position of Shamailiyah, 1798-1850.

About the end of the 18th century the northern part of Shamailiyah was evidently held, or at least claimed, by the Qawāsim; for Saiyid Sultān of Masqat, on a rupture occurring between himself and the Qāsimi Shaikh in or about 1798, made a naval attack on Dibah. The place appears to have been defended chiefly by the Sharqiyin and Naqbiyin tribes, who successfully frustrated the Saiyid's attempt but themselves suffered considerably in the operations. The Qawāsim at Dibah, 1798.

Several years later, as is more fully related in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Rās-al-Khaimah obtained possession of Khor Fakkān, the most central and one of the most important places on the Shamailiyah coast; and a base for piratical expeditions was at once established there by the Qawāsim. In 1808 Saiyid Sa'id, the young ruler of Masqat, assisted by his uncle, Qais-bin-Ahmad of Sohār, and by a local chief, Muhammad-bin-Matar of Fujairah, captured the new Qāsimi stronghold at Khor Fakkān; but, before he had time to make good his success, he was suddenly defeated and expelled by a force under Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar. The Qawāsim at Khor Fakkān, 1808.

* The generalisation is faulty only in the inclusion of Dibah, which is situated just outside the district properly known as Shamailiyah.

Occupation by the Wahhābis of Fujairah, Bithnah and Khor Fakkān, 1809-10.

In the following year, about the time that they brought the Pirate Coast and its hinterland* under their direct control, the Wahhābis appear to have occupied the forts of Fujairah, Bithnah and Khor Fakkān in Shamailiyah with troops or adherents of their own; and simultaneously they seized the adjacent town of Shināṣ in Bāṭinah, which belonged to Masqaṭ. At the beginning of 1810 Shināṣ was recaptured from the Wahhābis by a joint British and 'Omāni expedition; but the operation was so little profitable to Saiyid Sa'id, for whose benefit it was undertaken, that the reduction of Khor Fakkān, though previously resolved on, was not attempted. The Wahhābis, therefore, presumably remained in full possession of Shamailiyah.

Recovery by the Saiyid of Masqaṭ of Dibah and Khor Fakkān (date uncertain).

At some time after these events, possibly as an indirect result of the British expedition to Rās-al-Khaimah and the humiliation of the Qawāsim in 1819-20, the ruler of Masqaṭ must have regained possession of the whole of Shamailiyah*; for in 1831 we find the Qāsimi Shaikh, Sultān-bin-Saqar, bargaining with Sa'id of Masqaṭ for the cession to himself, as the price of his co-operation with the Saiyid in an attempt upon Sohār, of either Dibah or Khor Fakkān.

Seizure of all Shamailiyah by the Qāsimi Shaikh, 1832.

In the following year, 1832, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar profited by the absence of Saiyid Sa'id in East Africa and a consequent rising against his authority in 'Omān to seize Dibah, Khor Fakkān and Ghallah and so to bring the whole of Shamailiyah into subjection to himself: his success upon this occasion has sometimes been wrongly described as the final annexation of Shamailiyah to the Sharjah principality. In 1835 Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar proceeded with a Qāsimi fleet to Dibah and Khor Fakkān, and complaints of piratical outrages upon Masqaṭi and other vessels which soon began to reach the British authorities necessitated action by the latter, as is related in another place.

Recovery of central and southern Shamailiyah by the ruler of Masqaṭ (date uncertain).

Again, after an interval, Khor Fakkān and Ghallah, with—it may safely be assumed—the coast between these two places, returned into the possession of the Saiyid of Masqaṭ; but nothing is ascertainable in regard to the time or manner of this revolution. The Shaikh of Sharjah had not, however, abandoned his claim to the whole district; and in 1849 he was only restrained by the advice of friends from an expedition for its recovery.

Final annexation of Shamailiyah to the Sharjah Shaikhdom, 1850.

The end of these alternations between 'Omāni and Qāsimi ownership came in 1850, when, on an invitation from Qais-bin-'Azzān of Sohār, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar hastened to his assistance, with the result that Shināṣ in Bāṭinah as well as Ghallah and Khor Fakkān in Shamailiyah fell into the hands of the allies and were divided between them, the Qāsimi Shaikh doubtless retaining the two Shamailiyah ports. In 1851, on the arrival of Saiyid Sa'id in person, Shaikh Sultān withdrew his support from Saiyid Qais, whom Saiyid Sa'id then easily expelled not only from Shināṣ but also from Sohār. The whole of Shamailiyah, however, remained in possession of the Shaikh of Sharjah, whose neutrality, it seems not unnatural to suppose, may have been secured by an undertaking on the part of Saiyid Sa'id to maintain the *status quo* in this respect.

* It should be noted, however, that the troops of the Saiyid had intermediately been in possession of Khor Fakkān and had been again ejected in 1817.