GAZETTEER

OF THE

PERSIAN GULF,

'OMĀN,

AND

CENTRAL ARABIA.

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BY

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PART I



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1915

Shamailiyah under Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, 1850-1866.

The only event of importance which occurred in Shamailiyah between the final annexation of that district to Shārjah and the death of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar was a rising, in 1855, of the Shihūh in the neighbourhood of Dibah. Mashāri, son of Shaikh Ibrāhīm of Rās-al-Khaimah and grandson of Shaikh Sultān himself, having been appointed ruler over Dibah, immediately put forth his hand to oppress the neighbouring Shihūh, probably those of Bai'ah, and was waylaid and murdered in consequence by members of that tribe on a journey from Dibah to Rās-al-Khaimah. This extreme step, which was not taken by the Shihūh until their appeals to Shaikhs Sultān and Ibrāhīm against Mashāri had been rejected, led to a general war between the Qawāsim and the Shihūh tribe which is described in the history of Ruūs-al-Jibāl.

Rising of the Shihūh near Dibah, 1855.

Shamailiyah under Shaikh Khālid-bin-Sultān, 1866-1868.

On the death of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar and the accession of his son Khālid in 1866, the headman of the village of Fujairah in Shamailiyah, one 'Abdullah-bin-Khamis, ceased to pay tribute to Shārjah. There is reason to think that the whole of Shamailiyah at this time rose in insurrection and that it was not recovered until after the death of Khālid, but this is a matter of conjecture rather than of certainty.

Revolt in Shamailiyah, 1866.

Shamailiyah under Shaikh Sālim-bin-Sultān, 1868-1883.

Some time after this, Sālim, the brother and successor of Khālid sent a force to Dibah for the purpose of re-conquering all Shamailiyah, or so much of the district as was not at the time submissive to his authority; but the Sharqiyin, who had acquired a taste for independence, combined under the leadership of the headman of Fujairah to oppose the attempt and formed an alliance with the Shihūh under Sālih-bin-Muhammad, Shaikh of Bai'ah, who were regarded as subjects of Masqat. In the result the Qāsimi force was besieged in Dibah by the Sharqiyin and Shihūh; and Shaikh Sālim, being unable to send reinforcements by land from Shārjah, as the passes through the hills were held by the Shihūh, deputed one of his brothers to make a friendly settlement. The mission was a success: the Sharqiyin submitted and promised to pay tribute.

Rebellion in Shamailiyah (date uncertain).

Rebellion renewed in Shamailiyah, 1876.

Not long afterwards, in consequence of the Shaikh of Shārjah's representative at Dibah having imprisoned twelve Sharqiyin of Gharaifah, another combination was formed between the Sharqiyin and the Shihūh, who closed the nearer passes; and the Qawāsim were again besieged in Dibah. Shaikh Sālim on this occasion sent 50 men with provisions and munitions of war by sea to Dibah; and some prisoners who had been taken were despatched by boat to Shārjah. On the arrival of H.M.S. "Arab" at Dibah the fighting there ceased; but in the meanwhile a force of 800 Qawāsim had arrived from the direction of Shināṣ and taken a fort at Gharaifah, killing 36 and capturing 30 of the rebels. It was suspected that these troubles in Shamailiyah had been fomented in the interests of Masqat.

Abortive insurrection at Fujairah, 1879.

In the spring of 1879 the people of Fujairah rose against and expelled one Sarūr, who had been set in authority over them by the Shaikh of Shārjah, and replaced him by a certain Marzūq. At the same time they sent a deputation to Shārjah to inform the Shaikh of their proceedings; but Shaikh Sālim, instead of being appeased by this step, confined the members of the deputation, sent a land force against the fort of Fujairah, which was recaptured and garrisoned with Balūch, and even transported some prisoners to the island of Bū Mūsa. An allegation by the Fujairah malcontents that the Shaikh had attacked them by sea with the help of their outside enemies was clearly shown to be false.

Claim of the Sultān of 'Omān to Fujairah, 1879.

Upon this Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, the headman of Fujairah and apparently the most active of the insurgents, made his escape to Masqat, where he arrived in April, and invited the Sultan of 'Omān to take Fujairah for the future under his own protection. Discussions between the Sultān and the British authorities followed, in which Saiyid Turki at first claimed sovereignty over Fujairah; but eventually he admitted the liability of the place to pay tribute to Shārjah and only argued against oppressive interference there by the Qāsimi Shaikh in local matters. In his correspondence the curious fact was elicited that Saiyid Turki had in 1871 given a sealed document to the Shaikh of Shārjah containing an admission that the whole of the coast from Khor Kalba to Shārjah, with the single exception of Khasab, belonged to the Qawāsim; but this agreement he now repudiated on the ground that it was executed before his accession to the Sultanate and that it was conditional upon the rendering of certain services by the Qāsimi Shaikh which the latter had never performed.

Successful insurrection at Fujairah, 1879-80.

The Qawāsim did not long remain in undisturbed possession of Fujairah. At the end of 1879 or beginning of 1880 Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, having returned from Masqat by sea but in a peaceable manner, headed a fresh rising at Fujairah in which the Qāsimi garrison were driven out of the fort with a loss of eight men killed.

British intervention, 1880-81.

The question of disturbance of the maritime peace which arose in connection with Shamailiyah affairs in 1876 and again in 1880 is noticed,* being a matter of general importance, in the history of Trucial 'Omān. Here we are only concerned to observe that in 1881 the Shaikh of Shārjah, having been discouraged in his original wish to undertake the recovery of Fujairah by sea, fell back upon a second set of demands, *viz.*, that he

* *Vide* page 724 *ante*.

should be allowed by the British Government to operate by land, that he should be supported before Fujairah by a British man-of-war, and that the Sultān of 'Omān should be restrained from countenancing Hamad-bin-'Abdullah; but the Political Resident, Colonel Ross, whom the Shaikh visited at Būshehr, in the end apparently persuaded him to agree to the arbitration of the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; and this the people of Fujairah also were ready to accept. The dispute seems to have been ultimately settled in this manner, on a basis of submission by the chief of Fujairah to the chief of Shārjah as his suzerain, together with continued payment of customary tribute; and a written agreement was executed by Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, apparently in 1881, in which he admitted his dependence on the Shaikh of Shārjah. It was the opinion of Colonel Ross that the complete independence of Fujairah, which in the past had always been subject either to Shārjah or to Masqat, was an object that, in the general interest, ought not to be promoted.

Shamailīyah under Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid, after 1883.

At his accession to the Shārjah Shaikhdom in 1883 Saqar-bin-Khālid found the Shamailīyah district divided into two fiefs, one of which, adjoining Dibah, had been conferred by Shaikh Sālim on his brother Ahmad, and the other, embracing Khor Fakkān, on his brother Mājid: this arrangement Shaikh Saqar made no direct effort to change.

Practical independence of Fujairah, 1884.

But Shaikh Saqar, while he did not himself attempt to displace his kinsmen from their possessions, seems to have instigated that turbulent character, Hamad-bin-'Abdullah of Fujairah, to seize not only Gharaifah on the coast, but also the important hill fort of Bithnah in Wādi Hām, which commands the only direct route between Shamailīyah and the coast of Trucial 'Omān. The Fujairah headman waited for no second invitation, but attacked and took both places, besides plundering Zubārah, the inhabitants of which village had gone to the assistance of those of Bithnah. Instead, however, of holding these acquisitions at Shaikh Saqar's disposal, Hamad-bin-'Abdullah made overtures for protection to the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; and the Shaikh of Shārjah, unwilling to offend that personage, who was his own near relation, remained quiescent.

Shamailīyah still coveted by the Sultān of 'Omān, 1886.

In June 1886 the Wāli of Sohār reported to his master, Saiyid Turki of Masqat, that the people of Khor Fakkān, Dibah and the neighbourhood were anxious to be taken under the protection of the 'Omān Sultanate; and the Sultān requested the advice of Colonel Miles, formerly Political Agent at Masqat, who was now Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf. Colonel Miles replied that interference in Shamailīyah was inadvisable as it might lead to a conflict with the Qāsimi Shaikh, with whom the Sultān was then at peace, and that it would probably in the end prove injurious to the interests of the Sultān himself. This answer, which was approved by the Government of India, was sufficient to convince Saiyid Turki of the desirability of abstention, and instructions in accordance with it were given by him to the Wāli of Sohār.

Petty disturbances in Shamailiyah, 1895-96.

In 1895, at the instigation as was supposed of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, an attack was made by some of the Shihūh on the village of Hair in Shamailiyah, where they killed a number of the inhabitants and destroyed the fort. In the following year the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah would have rebuilt Hair; but the Shihūh interposed, and their obstruction was for the time successful. In 1896-97 a Qāsimi was murdered at Fujairah, and the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah undertook an expedition against the place, which resulted in the payment of blood-money.

Fresh revolt at Fujairah, 1900-01.

At length in 1900 the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah died, and that place and its dependencies were re-absorbed in the Shaikhdom of Shārjah, governed by Saqar-bin-Khālid. Shamailiyah was still held in two fiefs, a northern and a southern, by Rāshid-bin-Ahmad and Hamad-bin-Mājid, the sons of the original grantees, of whom the latter derived a revenue worth about $2,000 per annum from Fujairah, including 150 skins of dates, 12 cwt. of wheat and $10 in cash.

About the beginning of 1901 the Shaikh of Shārjah sent Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, the headman of Fujairah, to treat, as his representative, with the Shihūh in regard to a murder which had occurred at Dibah; but Hamad apparently profited by the occasion to form a private understanding with the Shihūh, and shortly afterwards he showed signs of disaffection. Negotiations followed, in which the Shaikh of Dibai took part; but they were inconclusive; and Ahmad-bin-Mājid at Ghallah, distrusted by the headman of Fujairah and cut off from the assistance of his relation the Shaikh of Shārjah by the hill fort of Bithnah, was placed in a dangerous predicament.

The combinations among the chiefs of Trucial 'Oman to which this crisis gave rise are described in the general history of that region.

The reason, or at least the pretext, of the headman of Fujairah for his revolt was, as subsequently explained by himself, that Shaikh Saqar-bin-Sultān had in the first instance failed to obtain redress for the robbery of certain natives of Lingeh, residing at Fujairah, by 'Awāmir and Bani Qitab Bedouins; and that, when Hamad in these circumstances had sought the good offices of the Shaikh of Dibai, the Shaikh of Shārjah, taking offence at his action, had employed the Mazāri' and Jalājilah Bedouins to harass Fujairah and had obliged the Jalājilah to divert their trade from Fujairah to the port of Ghallah.

Intervention of the British political authorities, 1902.

In April 1902, Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid having assembled a body of 250 Bedouins for an attack on Fujairah, and a disposition having appeared on the part of the Shaikhs of Dibai and 'Ajmān to assist Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, the attention of the British Resident, Colonel Kemball, was directed to the dispute with a view to its settlement. A visit was paid to Fujairah by Major Cox, then Political Agent at Masqat, before whom Hamad contended that the agreement executed by him in 1881 did not apply to his own village of Fujairah and seemed loth to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Shaikh of Shrājah in any shape or form; the Shaikh of Dibai was warned to desist from interference; and the Sultān of 'Omān, Saiyid Faisal-bin-Turki, was restrained from affording support which the headman of Fujairah had gone in person to Masqat in order to procure.

Such was the position of affairs when Colonel Kemball directed the Residency Agent at Shārjah to take steps to assemble a board of conciliation. The Shaikh of Shārjah, though he declared his inability to restrain Bedouins from attacking Fujairah, was at this time willing to accept a general decision by the Resident between himself and Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, and he granted a safe-conduct to enable his adversary to appear at Shārjah. The headman of Fujairah, on the other hand, would agree to no such compromise; he declined to attend the meeting at Shārjah and was obviously resolved not to submit to any settlement; and it was suspected that he was encouraged in his purpose of resistance by the Shihūh of Bai'ah and even by the Wāli of Sohār in the 'Omān Sultanate. In October 1902 Saiyid Turki of Masqat, at the instance of the British political authorities, sent orders to the Shihūh of Bai'ah to refrain from countenancing Hamad-bin-'Abdullah; but in the meantime Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid had repented of his own conciliatory attitude, and in November he caused two inhabitants of Fujairah to be murdered by the way as they were returning from 'Ajmān to their homes.

In December Mr. Gaskin, Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, was sent to the spot in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" to effect an accommodation, if possible; Shaikh Saqar joined him on board at Shārjah on the 27th of December, and on the 28th the vessel reached the coast opposite Fujairah. Two days were spent in negotiations: but the demeanour on shore of Hamad-bin-'Abdullah's armed followers was almost threatening, and the attempt at mediation had to be abandoned.

In these circumstances the Government of India decided that there was no need to interfere between the disputants, provided that it was clearly understood by both that the peace at sea must not be disturbed; and they were consequently left to pursue their own measures one against the other.

Further events, 1903.

In April 1903 the Shaikh of Shārjah sent an expedition against Fujairah which reached Bithnah; and it was reported that Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, though again assisted by the Shaikh of Bai'ah, had been obliged to sue for peace, to admit his vassalage, and to enter into a provisional agreement; but the settlement was nominal only and made no real change in the situation. In his address to the Trucial Shaikhs at the Darbār held at sea off Shārjah in November 1903, Lord Curzon referred to the Fujairah case and counselled an amicable agreement; but his exhortation fell on unheeding ears.

Recognition of Shamailiyah by the British Government as belonging to the Shārjah Shaikhdom, 1903.

Early in 1903, in connection with measures for securing the naval position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, it was decided by His Majesty's Government, in accordance with recommendations by the Government of India, that the Shamailiyah district from Dibah to Khor Kalba should be regarded as belonging to the Shāikhdom of Shārjah, not as an independent principality nor as connected with the Sultanate of 'Omān.

Shamailiyah officially

In the course of some topographical and political inquiries which were held by the present writer on tour at Sohār in March 1905, a

regarded at Sohâr as belonging to Shârjah, 1905.

striking corroboration of the correctness of this view was obtained. By a crowded assembly which included the Sultan of 'Omân's Acting Wâli of Sohâr it was stated, without one dissentient voice, that the coast from Khor Kalba to Dibah, inclusive, belonged to the Shaikh of Shârjah.

Position in Shamailiyah, 1905-07.

By 1905 the Shaikh of Shârjah had apparently abandoned all hope of reducing the headman of Fujairah to obedience; and in that year it was ascertained that Hamad-bin-'Abdullah held adverse possession of the following places in addition to his own village of Fujairah:—Rithmah, Gharaifah, Marbah, Qarniyah, Qidfah, Saqamqam and Sufad. In April 1906, as mentioned* in the general history of Trucial 'Omân, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, in a written agreement between himself and the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, claimed the headman of Fujairah as among his own political dependents, and no protest was apparently entered by the Shaikh of Shârjah.

ANNEXURE No. 7.—MUTUAL AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE SHAIKHS OF TRUCIAL 'OMÂN ON THE 24TH OF JUNE 1879.

Preliminary.

Since it is to the interest of all the Trucial Chiefs to combine mutually for the prevention of their subjects absconding for fraud from one territory and taking asylum in another, especially as regards divers and sailors, on this account we, whose seals and signatures are attached to this document, hereby agree and bind ourselves in the presence of Haji Abul Cassim, Residency Moonshee, specially deputed for giving effect to this object, and Haji Abdur Rahman, Government Agent, to give aid in every way possible in preventing such runaways from obtaining aid or asylum in our countries.

Therefore, in accordance with this agreement, we consent—

1st. In the event of a runaway seeking refuge in our territories, whether by sea or land, to consider it our duty to at once restore him to the Chief from whose jurisdiction he may have absconded.

2nd. In the event of its being proved that a runaway is protected by any Chief, and not delivered up, or his liability accepted when demanded by the Government Agent, such Chief shall be liable to a fine of 50 dollars in addition to all just claims proven against such runaway.

3rd. Further, if the Chief harbouring such runaway refuse to deliver him up or accept his liability when demanded by the Government Agent, and permit him to proceed to the pearl banks in pursuance of his vocation, such Chief shall be liable to a fine of 100 dollars in addition to all just proven claims against the runaway.

* *Vide* page 754 *ante*.

4th. When facts are disputed a council of arbitration (mejlis) will be convened, at which the Government Agent will preside, the disputing parties and all the Trucial Chiefs sending delegates, or if they wish attending themselves. The decision of the council to be binding only when confirmed by Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

5th. These fines are only to be enforced when Her Britannic Majesty's Resident in the Persian Gulf has satisfied himself that the Chief complained against is really in fault and fairly liable.

We therefore have written and put our signatures and seals to this document consenting and binding ourselves to carry out this agreement without opposition.

Correct.

(Sd.) SALIM BEN SULTAN BEN SUGGUR AL JOASMI,
with his own hand.

Seal.

Correct.

(Sd.) RASHID BEN HOMEYD BEN RASHID AL NAEEAMEE.

Seal.

Correct.

(Sd.) HUSHUR BEN MUKTOOM.

Seal.

Correct.

(Sd.) AHMED BEN ABDULLAH BEN RASHID.

Seal.

Correct.

(Sd.) The mendicant of God, ZAYED BEN KHULIFA.

Seal.

Correct.

[Sd.] HOMEYD BEN ABDULLAH BEN SULTAN AL JOASMI,
with his own hand.

Seal.

ANNEXURE No. 8.—EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT OF THE SHAIKHS OF TRUCIAL 'OMĀN WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, MARCH 1892.

I, Zaeed bin Khalifah, Chief of Abu Dhabi, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors, to the following conditions, *viz.*:—

1st. That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British Government.

2nd. That without the assent of the British Government I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3rd. That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory, save to the British Government.

Dated Abu Dhabi, 6th March 1892, corresponding to 5th Shaaban 1309 Hijri.

Signature of Zaeed bin Khalifah, Chief of Abu Dhabi.

A. C. TALBOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

(The documents signed by the other Trucial Shaikhs, *viz.*, the Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān, Shārjah, Rās-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qaiwain, the first three dated the 7th and the last two the 8th of March 1892, are identical in form.)

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF QATAR.*

Qatar the head-quarters of the Āl Khalīfah section of the 'Utūb, 1766-1782.

Settlement of the 'Utūb at Zubārah, 1766.

The modern history of Qatar opens with the settlement at Zubārah, upon the western shore of the promontory, of immigrants from Kuwait—the whole Āl Khalīfah division, namely, of the 'Utūb. It is stated that, at the arrival of the 'Utūb in Qatar in 1766, Huwailah, inhabited by Āl Musallam of the Banī Khālid stock, was the largest place on the coast; but Fuwairat and Dōhah also existed, the former being occupied by Ma'ādhīd and other Āl Bin-'Alī, and the latter by Sūdān refugees from the Pirate Coast. The Āl Khalīfah were followed to Zubārah at a short interval by their kinsmen the Jalāhimah, another division of the tribe, whom they at first hospitably received; but dissensions shortly broke out, resulting in the secession of the Jalāhimah to the neighbouring village of Ruwais, where they addicted themselves to piracy and were afterwards all but exterminated by the Āl Khalīfah and by others whom the Āl Khalīfah called in to their assistance. After this event the remnant of the Jalāhimah appear to have transferred themselves from Ruwais to the adjacent port of Khor Hassān.

Injury to Persian interests from the growth of Zubārah.

The growth of Zubārah was greatly stimulated by the Persian occupation of Basrah between 1776 and 1779, during which a number of Basrah merchants together with fugitives from Kuwait resided temporarily at Zubārah and the pearl trade and the general trade of Eastern Arabia with

* Apart from the records of the Government of India there are few sources of information regarding the history of Qatar, and such works as do exist are compilations from those records. The principal authorities for earlier times are *Bombay Selections, XXIV*, 1856; and a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906: those for a more recent period are a *Précis of Nejd Affairs, 1804-1904*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1904; a *Précis of Bahrein Affairs, 1854-1904*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Katar Affairs, 1873-1904*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. Palgrave's *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865, throws some light on the condition of Qatar in 1863; and Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, gives some details of British naval operations not to be found elsewhere. The single Agreement relating to Qatar will be found in Aitchison' *Treaties*.

India to a considerable extent centred there; and in 1779 the Imām of 'Oman sent a ship to Zubārah upon some friendly errand. In these circumstances the reduction of Zubārah became an object of importance to the Persian Government; and under their instructions several attempts, commencing in 1777, were made upon the place by the Shaikh of Būshehr, but without success. In 1780, possibly in the same connection, but more probably in consequence of piracies committed by the Ka'ab of 'Arabistān, that tribe were at war with the 'Utūb, both of Zubārah and of Kuwait. At length in 1782, emboldened perhaps by the increasing difficulties of the Zand rulers of Shirāz, the 'Utūb of Zubārah ventured to retaliate by an incursion into the island of Bahrain, where much damage was done by them to the town of Manāmah, and whence they carried off a Būshehr vessel that had come to fetch the annual tribute paid by the islands to Persia. The military danger from the existence of Zubārah to the Persian position in Bahrain was thus made fully apparent.

Unsuccessful Persian attack on Zubārah, 1783.

'Ali Murād Khān, the ruler of Shirāz, immediately ordered Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr to organise, with the help of the petty rulers of Rīg, Ganāveh, Dashtistān and other places on the coast, a strong expedition against Zubārah; and a force of 2,000 men was accordingly embarked for this service under the command of Muhammad, a nephew of Shaikh Nāsir. The Persian fleet at first blockaded Zubārah, and negotiations ensued in which the rôle of mediator was assumed by Rāshid-bin-Matar, the retired Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; but the utmost that the 'Utūb would concede was the return of the plunder which they had taken in Bahrain. This offer having been declined, the Persian troops were disembarked and proceeded to attack the Zubārah fort; but, being met on shore by a force much larger than they had expected, they were routed and driven to their ships with heavy loss. Shaikh Muhammad, who commanded, as well as a nephew of Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Matar and some notables of Hormūz, who had accompanied the expedition, were among the slain in this disaster. Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr and Shaikh Rāshid met after this at 'Asalu on the Persian coast, where they endeavoured, but without success, to equip a second expedition.

Conquest of Bahrain by the 'Utūb and transfer of their headquarters from Qatar to Bahrain, 1783.

A month or two later, the Persian garrison of Bahrain having succumbed to the 'Utūb of Zubārah, to whose assistance their brethren of Kuwait had in the meantime arrived, the islands passed under the sway of the 'Utūb and became, instead of Zubārah, the principal seat of their Shaikhs. Ahmad-bin-Khalīfah was the first of the 'Athi chiefs that ruled over Bahrain.

Affairs during the ascendency of Rahmah-bin-Jābir in Qatar, 1783-1816.

Settlement of Rahmah at Khor Hassān, 1783 or later.

The Jalāhimah, under the sons of a Shaikh named Jābir, had taken their part with the other 'Utūb in the conquest of Bahrain; but after the victory, conceiving themselves to have been slighted or insufficiently rewarded, they appear to have sojourned for a time on Khārag Island and at Būshehr. Subsequently they returned to Qatar, where they settled at Khor Hassān; and at that place a contest for the chief power in the section took place between 'Abdullah, an elder son, and Rahmah, a younger son, of Shaikh Jābir. The dispute was eventually decided in favour of Rahmah; and 'Abdullah at some time before 1810 fled to Masqat, where he died, to seek the assistance of Saiyid Sa'id against his brother. The power of Rahmah in Qatar was, however, at no time universal, and it did not at first extend even to Zubārah, which was in the immediate vicinity of his own headquarters. In 1805 an 'Athi Shaikh of Zubārah, evidently not Rahmah, joined with the 'Athi Shaikh of Kuwait in seeking British aid against the Wahhābis.

Zubārah was at this time a larger and more important place than Qatif; and in 1790 foreign merchants enjoyed complete protection there, and there were no customs duties. The share of the Arabs of Qatar in the pearl fisheries was at this time small.

Naval depredations by Rahmah, 1783-1809.

The name of Rahmah-bin-Jābir soon became notorious as that of a daring and successful freebooter, by whose depredations the Persians and the 'Utūb other than the Jalāhimah were the chief sufferers. In 1809, shortly before the despatch of the first British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, reprisals against Khor Hassān were attempted by a Persian fleet from Būshehr; but Rahmah, reinforced by his sympathisers the Qawāsim, defeated the expedition and even captured some of the enemy's vessels. Towards the end of 1809 he was reported to have taken 20 Batīls owned by the 'Utūb while at sea on their way from Kuwait to Masqat; and in this affair a son of 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, Shaikh of Kuwait, was killed in charge of the convoy. In revenge for the death of the latter a naval attack on Khor Hassān was threatened by the 'Utūb of Kuwait, but was not, apparently, made. The exploits of Rahmah, though in some cases piratical, were performed as a rule under pretext of lawful warfare; and towards the subjects and officials of the British Government, even at a period when

no respect was shown for them by the Qawâsim, his conduct was scrupulously correct. On one occasion he was stated to have shown "remarkable . . . forbearance towards the *Augusta* Cruizer, when in the power of his fleet."

Political position and treatment of Rahmah by the British authorities, 1809.

By 1809 Rahmah had entered into close relations with the Wahhâbi power and controlled, in conjunction with their emissaries, even the town of Zubârah; the latter circumstance would seem to mark a recent growth of his power, for in 1800-02 some of the 'Atbi chiefs expelled from Bahrain by Saiyid Sultân of Masqat had been able, in spite of their enmity with Rahmah, to take refuge at Zubârah and engage there in negotiations for assistance by the Wahhâbis in recovering Bahrain. In consequence partly of the intimacy of Rahmah with the Wahhâbis, a collision with whom the British Government were anxious to avoid, and partly of his irreproachable attitude towards British interests, it was decided, in connection with the Râs-al-Khaimah expedition of 1809, to abstain if possible from direct action against him. At one time indeed it was intended to require, from whichever of the two Jalâhimah brothers might be found in possession of Khor Hassân, a written undertaking to desist at least from giving "employment or active support" to the Qawâsim, who were said to have resorted there from Râs-al-Khaimah, and in event of refusal "Khor Hassân and its maritime and piratical equipments" were to be destroyed; but in the end even these conditions were apparently waived in deference to the opinion of the naval and military commanders of the British expedition and of General Malcolm, then British Envoy to Persia. Mr. N. H. Smith, Political Resident at Bûshehr, who had not perhaps been informed of the decision, would have sent a force to Khor Hassân for the purpose of destroying Rahmah's vessels; but the movement was disallowed and action prevented by the Government of Bombay with the concurrence of the Government of India.

Predominance of the Wahhâbis in Qatar, 1809-11.

In 1809, as already indicated, the Wahhâbis with the support of Rahmah brought Qatar strictly under their own rule; Bahrain soon succumbed to the powerful Wahhâbi influences which were then directed on it from Zubârah and Qatîf; and in 1810 a Wahhâbi governorship of Qatîf, Qatar and Bahrain, with headquarters in Bahrain, was instituted and conferred upon one 'Abdullah-bin-'Ufaisân. Under the ægis of the Wahhâbi power, Rahmah assisted by boats from the Pirate Coast proceeded, soon after the conclusion of the British operations at Râs-al-Khaimah, to atrocities of increasing gravity; he captured 18 loaded vessels belonging to the 'Utûb of Zubârah and Bahrain; he took a ship and several smaller vessels belonging to Masqat, Kangûn, Bûshehr and other ports of

which, with a very few exceptions, he put the crews to death: in short, he created a reign of terror in the Gulf. In May 1811 Rahmah made a piratical cruise of some importance, on which he was accompanied by a fleet from the town of 'Ajmān; but the star of his Wahhābi patrons was now temporarily declining, and events soon occurred which obliged him to become more circumspect.

Expulsion of the Wahhābis from Qatar, 1811.

In 1811, the power of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia having been greatly weakened by events upon the western frontier of their empire, Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat attacked them in Qatar by means of a naval expedition, expelled their garrisons from Zubārah and Khor Hassān, and destroyed the former of these two places by fire. The result appears to have been the evacuation by the Wahhābis not of Qatar only but also of Bahrain, where their governor of Hasa, Qatar and Qatif was taken prisoner, and the restoration of the sovereignty of the Āl Khalifah. Rahmah, who represented the Wahhābi power at sea in this part of the Gulf, fought a desperate action with the fleet of the 'Utūb and sustained a decided reverse; and about this time, or soon after, he seems to have transferred his headquarters from Qatar to Dammām on the coast of Hasa.

In 1813 Rahmah, whose respect for the British name was as inalterable as his hatred for the 'Utūb of Bahrain, unwittingly committed a piracy on a Baghlah from Basrah freighted with horses belonging to the East India Company; but, on discovering the mistake, he made arrangements for forwarding the animals to Bombay, where they all eventually arrived in safety.

Removal of Rahmah-bin-Jābir from Qatar and his proceedings until the second British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1816-20.

Migration of Rahmah from Dammām to Bushehr, 1816.

In 1816, or possibly earlier, Rahmah somewhat suddenly disassociated himself from the Wahhābi cause and joined the ruler of Masqat. This change of sides appears to have been due not to inconstancy on his part, but rather to the implacability of his resentment against the 'Utūb of Bahrain, between whom and Saiyid Sa'id, formerly allies, enmity had now arisen; and Saiyid Sa'id appears to have intended, had he been successful in his attack on Bahrain in 1816, to set Rahmah-bin-Jābir in the place of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs. The Wahhābis and the Qawāsim, as friends of the Āl Khalifah, now became the enemies and the victims of Rahmah; while the Wahhābi Amir, annoyed at Rahmah's desertion

of his case, persecuted him by every available means. In July 1816 a fort which Rahmah had constructed at Dammām on the coast of Hasa was blown up by the Wahhabis; not without difficulty he rescued his family and effects at Khor Hassān, the removal of which to Dara'iyah had been directed by the Amir; and at length, in October 1816, he arrived at Būshehr as a fugitive and an exile, accompanied by about 500 families and bringing with him, besides smaller boats, two very large Baghlahs, a great Batil and several Baqarāhs. To the present day the western and northern coasts of Qatar are dotted with the remains of forts attributed to Rahmah.

Rahmah's relations with Masqat and war with the Qawāsimi, 1817.

The proceedings of this restless individual during the next two years form properly no part of the history of Qatar; but still less do they enter into that of any other district. At Būshehr Rahmah was well received by Shaikh Muhammad, the Governor, who assigned a quarter for his residence and that of his dependents; nor did he delay to visit the British Resident, to whom he professed friendship for the British Government and readiness to be employed in fighting the Qawāsim, whose day of reckoning was now at hand.

Saiyid Sa'id was anxious that Rahmah should become a subject of Masqat and settle in some part of 'Omān; but the pirate, who regarded his patron as disgraced by the failure of the expedition against Bahrain in 1816, declined the proposal. In 1817, however, Rahmah visited Masqat with the object of inducing Sa'id to renew his attempts on Bahrain; but he found the Saiyid occupied with various internal difficulties.

In 1817 Rahmah made a highly successful cruise against the Qawāsim and captured twelve of their boats while engaged in carrying supplies from Bahrain to Rās-al-Khaimah; four of these he brought back with him to Būshehr, and eight he sank or destroyed, for want of crews to man them, after removing part of the cargoes.

Migration of Rahmah from Būshehr to Dammām, 1819.

In 1818 Rahmah removed again from Būshehr to Dammām; and thenceforward he may be regarded as connected with the province of Hasa rather than with Qatar.

British dealings with Rahmah in connexion with the Rās-al-Khaimah expedition of 1819-20.

It was expected in 1819 that Rahmah, either on his own account or under the auspices of Masqat, would join the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, and it was resolved to accept his services should they be offered; but Rahmah, who never lost sight of his main object—the humiliation of the 'Utūb of Bahrain—and with whom the punishment of the Qawāsim was a merely secondary matter, did not come forward. Instead, in February 1820, when the Prince Governor of Fārs was endeavouring to organise an expedition against Bahrain in

order to anticipate the designs of Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat in that quarter, Rahmah crossed the Gulf to Būshehr and placed himself with three vessels at the disposal of the Persians. On the 10th of February he sailed from Būshehr for Tāhiri to join the Prince Governor; but on the way his largest Baghlah was wrecked upon a shoal near Bardistān, Rahmah and his companions barely escaping with their lives,—an accident which seems to have put an end to the enterprise in so far as he was concerned. During these proceedings an order for the destruction of Rahmah's vessels had been issued by General Sir W. Grant Keir, the commander of the British expedition; but, as Rahmah was found to be at the time in the employment of the Shīrāz Government, it was decided to postpone action. On the 13th of April 1820 Rahmah was again at Būshehr, where he was invited by the Resident to become a party to the General Treaty of Peace. He declined, pleading that he was now a servant of the Governor-General of Shīrāz; and this excuse, on its being corroborated by the Shaikh of Būshehr, who also undertook to be answerable for Rahmah's future conduct, was accepted as sufficient by the British authorities.

British Relations, 1821-23.

Punishment of piracy, 1821.

In 1821 in consequence of piracies committed by the inhabitants, the town of Bida' (now Dōhah) was destroyed by the East India Company's cruiser "Vestal," and three or four hundred of the people migrated temporarily to the islands between Qatar and the Pirate Coast.

Visit of the Resident to Qatar, 1823.

In January 1823, in the course of his voyage of discovery along the Arabian coast which is more fully described * in the history of Trucial 'Oman, Lieutenant McLeod, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, paid a visit to Dōhah (then Bida') on the eastern side of Qatar; he found the place, which was admittedly a dependency of Bahrain and therefore subject to the provisions of the General Treaty of Peace of 1820, under the administration of a Shaikh of the Āl Bū Ainain. Dōhah was at this time the only port in Qatar which possessed any trading vessels; but the requirements of the Treaty in regard to flags and the registry of vessels were not observed by the inhabitants, who appeared to be ignorant of its terms. Lieutenant McLeod, however, obtained a list of the shipping; and, on his arrival in Bahrain a few days later, he made representations to the Shaikh which, it was thought, would secure a proper observance of the

* *Vide* page 677 *ante*.

Treaty in Qatar.* A British marine survey of the Qatar coast and of the waters to the east of it was at this time in progress, and the operations were assisted by the Shaikhs of the littoral to the best of their ability.

General history of Qatar from the Resident's visit in 1823 to the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840.

Between the Resident's visit in 1823 and the close of the Egyptian occupation of Hasa in 1840 the affairs of Qatar attracted little attention. Such matters as came to notice rested either to the sovereignty of the Bahrain Shaikh over the promontory or to attacks committed by the inhabitants, or by piratical refugees, upon boats belonging to other parts of the Gulf.

Relations of Qatar with Bahrain.

Although the authority of the Shaikh of Bahrain in Qatar was not at this period questioned, and although the Shaikh was generally able to expel those who resisted it, his writ cannot be said to have run freely.

1828. An inhabitant of Bahrain having been stabbed by Muhammad-bin-Khamis, the headman of the Āl Bū 'Ainain of Dōhah, the Shaikh of Bahrain caused the offender to be placed in confinement; his tribe revolted; and in May 1828 Shaikh 'Abdullah, after destroying the fort of the Āl Bū Ainain at Dōhah, removed them to the villages of Ruwais and Fuwairat, where they came more directly under his control.

1833. In 1833, and perhaps for some time previously, Shaikh Abdullah of Bahrain, with his sons Mubārak and Nāsir, resided on the coast of Qatar for the purpose of watching the proceedings of the Wahhābis, a rupture with whom he was meditating.

1836. In 1835, as related in the history of Bahrain, the people of Huwailah rebelled against the authority of the ruler of Bahrain, opened a correspondence with the Wahhābis, and were abetted in their revolt by Ahmad and by another undutiful son of Shaikh Abdullah. By the mediation of Saiyid Hilāl, a son of Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, a settlement was arranged between the Shaikh and his rebellious subjects: the conditions were that

* The registration of ships, as observed in the history of Trucial 'Omān, ultimately proved to be impracticable and was abandoned; but, in view of the indefinite status, replete with political difficulties into which the Qatar promontory has now lapsed, it is much to be regretted that our officers did not continue to insist, as they did in Trucial 'Omān, on the use of the Trucial flag. In this there could have been no real difficulty so long as Qatar remained under the Shaikhs of Bahrain; and the maintenance of the flag might have stereotyped the dependence of Qatar on Bahrain, and with it the principle of British control over Qatar.

each party should retain the advantages acquired during the war, but that Huwailah should be evacuated and demolished, and that the inhabitants should remove to Bahrain and settle there under a guarantee by the Saiyid of Maeqat for their personal safety. The agreement was almost immediately violated by Shaikh 'Abdullah's nephews and other partisans, who incited some members of the Āl Bū Kawārah tribe to make a raid on Huwailah; and this affair, in which a boat was sunk and a dependent of 'Isa-bin-Tarif, a leading man among the people of Huwailah, was killed, and for which Shaikh 'Abdullah refused to make reparation, led to the secession of 'Isa-bin-Tarif, accompanied by a number of the Āl Bin Ali and Āl Bū Aimain, to Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Oman. The British Resident in the Gulf, however, forbade the seceders to use Abu Dhabi as a base for operations against Bahrain, except on the condition that the Shaikh of that place consented to make common cause with them and to declare war against the Shaikh of Bahrain,—a condition which was not fulfilled; and the subsequent proceedings of the emigrants, described in the history of the Bahrain Shaikhdom, did not affect the promontory of Qatar.

In 1836 and 1837, as mentioned in the history of Bahrain, Shaikh Abdullah seems to have entertained an idea of retiring from the midst of the family conflicts by which he was surrounded in Bahrain to a safer and more peaceful abode at Khor Hassan in Qatar, and he even made preparations for the move; but he does not appear to have carried his purpose into effect until some time afterwards. 1836-37.

In 1839, in consequence of relations lately formed by the Shaikh of Bahrain with the Egyptian Military Commander in Hasa, the inhabitants of Qatar became exposed to fresh exactions; and their discontent reached such a pitch that the Āl Bū Kawārah, whose principal settlement was Fuwairat, applied for leave to remove from the country and to settle elsewhere under the protection of the British Government. At the end of 1839 or beginning of 1840, on some of the Na'im of Qatar refusing to pay Zakāt which had been demanded of them by the Egyptians through the Shaikh of Bahrain, Muhammad Effendi, the Egyptian Governor of Hasa, despatched a party of regular troops, assisted by Bedouins of the Makhadhdhabah division of the Bani Hājir, to lay waste their country; but the assassination of the Governor in the neighbourhood of Hofūf obliged the expedition to return prematurely without effecting anything. 1839-40.

Maritime irregularities committed by residents of Qatar.

During the first part of the period now in question, some insecurity was created at sea by Bani Yās refugees from Abu Dhabi who had settled temporarily in Qatar. The first of these to arrive was Muhammad-bin-Shakhbūt, who had himself been deposed in 1818 from the Abu Dhabi

Shaikhship; and he was followed by Suwaidān-bin-Za'al, a discontented member of the Mahāribah section of the Bani Yās, who quitted Abu Dhabi in 1822 but did not apparently settle in Qatar until some time later. In January 1823 Suwaidān, who was then supposed to be living at Yās Island, was said to have at command about 1,000 armed supporters and to possess a fine Batil and 50 smaller boats. Among his followers were Saif-bin-Dhaikhān (or Tīkhān) and 'Obaid-bin-Sa'adūn, whose names were before long to be associated with piratical outrages.

1823-24. Towards the end of 1823 Muhamad-bin-Shakhbūt, then domiciled at Dōhah in Qatar, made an unsuccessful attempt to recover his position at Abu Dhabi, in the history of which Shaikhdom his expedition is described; and, on his return to Qatar, he appears to have shifted his headquarters from Dōhah to Huwailah. Early in 1824, a piracy by Muhammad-bin-Shakhbūt on a vessel of Dibai—a place then in alliance with Abu Dhabi—having been reported, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf somewhat hastily required Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain, as ruler of Qatar, to take action against Muhammad, and even offered him the assistance of a British squadron; but the supposed piracy was in the end shown not to have occurred.

1826-28. In 1826 a number of piratical offences, noticed in the history of Trucial Omān, were committed from Dōhah in Qatar by 'Obaid-bin-Sa'adūn and Saif-bin-Dhaikhān (or Tīkhān), the followers of Suwaidān-bin-Za'al; they carried their plunder at first to Dōhah, but soon afterwards they decamped from that place. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was, with some difficulty, restrained by British influence from declaring war on account of these incidents against the Shaikh of Bahrain, and it does not appear that any corrective action was taken by the British political authorities; but in 1828, on the return of Suwaidān and his followers to Abu Dhabi, the depredations of the gang came to an end.

Meanwhile, however, in May 1827, a heinous piracy had been committed by one 'Obaid (or 'Abdullah)-bin-Mahanna, a tribesman of the Manāsir, who had recently settled at Dōhah in Qatar. With some companions, among whom was a certain Husain-bin-Jāsim of Bahrain, he attacked a Būshehr Batil off Ganāveh, on her way to Dilam; a number of the occupants were put to death, and the remainder, after being completely stripped, were landed on the coast near Bardakhān. A small portion of the property plundered was recovered in Bahrain; but to the demand of the British Resident for the surrender of 'Obaid and Husain the Shaikh replied that they had fled beyond his jurisdiction, which appeared to be the case. Enquiries, however, continued; and in April

1828 the Resident had an interview with Shaikh 'Abdullah, at which he impressed on him the necessity of doing his utmost to arrest the offenders. At length in September 1828 'Obaid-bin-Mahanna, issuing from some unknown haunt with a number of Manāsir associates, resumed his piratical practices in the neighbourhood of Būshehr; but, having landed at Ziyārat on the Persian coast and aroused suspicion there by his enquiries as to the destination of a small Baghlah which was there at anchor, he was taken prisoner by the inhabitants after a desperate resistance. From Ziyārat 'Obaid was brought to the British Resident at Būshehr, who, after his identity had been satisfactorily established, handed him over to Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl to answer for his depredations on Būshehr boats and murders of Būshehr subjects; but 'Obaid cheated the gallows by escaping from custody during the storm of Būshehr by Timūr Mirza in November 1828. On their return from Ziyārat to the Arabian coast, the crew of 'Obaid's boat, as mentioned in the history of Trucial 'Omān, plundered four vessels belonging to 'Asalu.

In 1831, apparently so near to Būshehr as Halileh, a piracy of an ordinary character was committed on a Kangūn fishing boat by an individual named Hasūm, whose home was at Fuwairat in Qatar; the criminal was not traced, however, until the following year. It was afterwards ascertained that, on leaving Halileh, Hasūm had crossed the Gulf to 'Oqair, where he attempted to surprise a boat belonging to Bahrain; but the crew were on their guard and took him prisoner along with eight of his companions. After having been detained for some days at 'Oqair the prisoners had managed to escape to Huwailah in Qatar, and here the boat taken by them at Halileh was subsequently recovered. 1831-32.

After the punishment of the Bani Yās for piracy in 1835, a number of the tribe emigrated* westwards to Khor-al-'Odaid, partly to escape paying their share of the fines imposed by the British Government, and partly in order that they might be able to continue their piratical mode of life. They were countenanced by the inhabitants of the eastern coast of Qatar, who not only made no effort to restrain their depredations, but even supplied them with water and other necessaries; and it was consequently resolved to send a naval force to demonstrate the accessibility of those waters to British vessels and to remind the people of Qatar of their responsibilities. The cruise, which was made by two sloops of war and a schooner, was a complete success: it resulted in an undertaking, imposed on the headmen of Dōhah, Wakrah and 'Odaid, to seize the boats of the pirates or otherwise to pay a fine; in the capture of some of the dependants of Jāsim-bin-Jābir, Raqrakī, the chief 1836.

* See also page 766 *ante*.

among the pirates; and in the burning upon the beach, in presence of the Resident, of one of the piratical Baghlahs. In September 1836 the headman of Dōhah, who was suspected of maintaining close relations with the Raqraqi, was personally warned by the Resident not again to harbour him.

Relations with Britain.

Qatar, as a dependency of Bahrain at the time, came under the operation of the Maritime Truce of 1835; and in 1836 the Restrictive Line was prolonged from Sir Bū Na'air Island, by way of Hālūl, so as to pass ten miles north of the extremity of the Qatar promontory.

General history of Qatar from the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840 to the attack by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi on Qatar in 1867.

Piracies off the coast of Qatar and British bombardment of Dōhah, 1841.

The misdeeds of Jāsim-bin-Jābir, however, continued; and in February 1841, in consequence of a Rās-al-Khaimah vessel having been seized and plundered by him, a squadron consisting of the steam frigate "Sesostris," the "Coote," 18-gun sloop of war, and the "Tigris," 10-gun brig, was sent under Commodore Brucks, I.N., to require from the headman of Dōhah the surrender of the pirate's vessel and the payment of a fine of $500, besides compensation for property plundered. After a short bombardment of the place by the 8-inch guns of the "Sesostris" the vessel of Jāsim, who was actually present in Dōhah at the arrival of the squadron but lost no time in making his escape to the interior, was handed over and publicly burnt; and some other property which he had left behind was confiscated. The ships then proceeded on a similar errand to Dibai.

In the early summer of 1841 a Lingeh boat, carrying dates and matting from Qatif to Bahrain, grounded on the western coast of Qatar, and, while in this helpless state, was relieved of cargo to the value of 240 Muhammad Shāhi rupees by five Baqārahs which put off from the coast. A complaint made by the sufferers to Nāsir, a son of the Shaikh of Bahrain, was disregarded; and eventually, at the request of the Shaikh of Lingeh, the case was taken up by the British Resident at Būshehr, and it was decided that the Shaikh of Bahrain should be held responsible. The Qataris, however, pleaded that the property claimed had been voluntarily paid them as salvage by the master of

the distressed vessel; and, as in the end they substantiated this story by an oath of divorce taken in the presence of a Qādhi, the compensation money, which had been recovered from them, was returned.

Affairs in Qatar during the civil war in Bahrain, 1840-43.

Soon after this the promontory of Qatar began to figure, as a scene of operations, in the struggle between Abdullah-bin-Ahmad and Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, the rival Shaikhs of Bahrain, of which the general course is described in the history of that principality. On the first occurrence of a breach between the chiefs in 1840, Shaikh Muhammad, the junior of the two, retired to Qatar and established an influence which was for a time superior to his grand-uncle's in that part of the Bahrain Shaikhdom. In 1842, however, when Khālid, the ex-Amir of the Wahhābis, visited Shaikh 'Abdullah from Dammām, he was received at Khor Hassān in Qatar where the old chief was then residing, Shaikh Muhammad having in the meanwhile returned to Bahrain; and a little later on actual hostilities breaking out between the relatives, the first act of Shaikh Abdullah was to recross the straits and land in Bahrain, whence in the month of June he succeeded in expelling Shaikh Muhammad. The people of Khor Hassān in Qatar must apparently have sided with Shaikh Muhammad, for the victor immediately gave up that village to partial plunder; and it was perhaps for the purpose of combating the influence of Shaikh Muhammad, which seems to have been generally strong upon the mainland, that Shaikh Abdullah soon after made arrangements to re-occupy the deserted site of Zubārah. Shaikh Muhammad, however, who had landed in Qatar on his expulsion from Bahrain in 1842, anticipated his grand-uncle by seizing the fort of Murair near Zubārah; and not long afterwards he obtained possession of Fuwairat, and assumed the offensive by launching from that place an expedition, ultimately successful, against the Bahrain islands. In April 1843, immediately after the capture of Muharraq, a Qatari contingent by whom Shaikh Muhammad was assisted were suddenly recalled to Qatar by an attack of the Manāsīr upon their homes; but their departure caused no inconvenience to Shaikh Muhammad, whose position in Bahrain was by that time firmly established.

Affairs in Qatar during the continuance of the struggle between the Shaikh and the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, 1843-49.

In the autumn of 1843 'Isa-bin-Tarif, the Āl Bin-Ali ally of Shaikh Muhammad, transferred his abode from Qais Island to Dōhah in Qatar; the change was welcome to the British authorities both because it brought that warlike character to the side of the Restrictive Line on which, in certain circumstances, he could be permitted to indulge his tastes, and because at the same time it took Dōhah out of the hands of a headman of the Sūdān tribe who was more addicted to piracy than to regular war.

In 1844 the ex-Shaikh Abdullah, sailing from Nâband on the coast of Persia, sought to surprise 'Isa-bin-Tarif at Dôhah; but the attempt failed, and he sought another field of operations. In 1847 the contest for the Bahrain Shaikhship was practically ended by a decisive battle on land, fought near Fuwairat in Qatar; in this engagement 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who had meanwhile changed sides and become the mainstay of 'Abdullah's party, lost his life, and the hopes of the ex-Shaikh perished with him.

Visit of the Wahhâbis Amîr to Qatar, 1851.

Early in 1851 Faisal-bin-Turki, the Amîr of the Wahhâbis, in the course of a tour through his dominions, arrived within two stages of Dôhah in Qatar; and the people of that place, as well as of Wakrah and Fuwairat, immediately evinced an inclination to throw off their allegiance to the Shaikh of Bahrain and to become subjects of the Wahhâbi empire. A timely peace, however, arranged in July 1851, removed the risk to which the Âl Khalîfah were exposed of losing their possessions in Qatar as they had already lost Dammâm in Hasa.

Political position of Qatar, 1866-67.

In 1866 it was reported by Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Gulf, and in 1867 the view was accepted by the Government of India, that the Shaikh of Bahrain probably owed fealty to the Wahhâbi Government on account of his possessions in Qatar, but that, in regard to the Bahrain islands, he was altogether independent of the Wahhâbis; and the tribute of $4,000 a year which the Bahrain Shaikh now rendered to the Wahhâbi Amîr was regarded as a payment made to secure his subjects in Qatar from aggression by other tribes of the mainland. At one time between 1852 and 1866 the Amîr appears to have had a representative of his own at Dôhah; but it is probable that this agent was only the local Shaikh.

Attack on Qatar by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and its consequences, 1867-68.

Cause and circumstances of the attack, 1867.

A remarkably treacherous and destructive attack was made in October 1867 on Dôhah and Wakrah, the principal places upon the eastern coast of Qatar, by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi acting together; the motive, on the part of the Shaikh of Bahrain, was a desire to punish the inhabitants for some restiveness against his authority which they had lately exhibited. The proceedings of the allies are fully described in the history of Bahrain, to which they properly belong, and

need not therefore be mentioned in this place; suffice it to say that the towns of Dōhah and Wakrah were, at the end of 1867, temporarily blotted out of existence, the houses being dismantled and the inhabitants deported, and that the damage inflicted was estimated to amount to over $2,00,000. In June 1868, after an unsuccessful appeal for redress to the Wahhābi Amīr, the Qatar tribes which had suffered embarked on a retaliatory expedition against Bahrain; but they did not obtain any decided success.

British intervention and proceedings at Wakrah, 1868.

The intervention of the British political authorities in the Gulf, though considerably delayed by circumstances over which they had no control, in the end produced a strong effect, as is related in the history of Bahrain. The results were most conspicuous in Bahrain, where one Shaikh was deposed and another installed; but they extended also to Qatar, which Colonel Pelly, leaving Bahrain early in September 1868, immediately visited with H.M.S. "Vigilant," the gunboat "Hugh Rose" and the steamer "Sind." At Wakrah the principal Shaikhs of Qatar had an interview with the Resident on board ship and were informed that they had incurred the severe displeasure of Government by their expedition against Bahrain; their plea that the expedition was merely retaliatory was accepted, however, in partial extenuation of the irregularity committed; and, as related elsewhere,* a considerable amount of redress was ultimately obtained for them from the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi.

Agreement by the Al Thāni Shaikh of Qatar, 12th September 1868.

An Agreement, dated the 12th of September 1868, was then obtained from Muhammad-bin-Thāni of the Āl Thāni, the most influential man in the whole promontory, whereby he undertook to return to Dōhah, which he had forsaken, and to reside peaceably there; never to put to sea with hostile intent, but instead to refer all his disputes with his neighbours for settlement by the British Resident; not to assist the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, but on the contrary to hand him over to the Resident, should he fall into his power; and, lastly, to maintain with the new Shaikh of Bahrain the same relations as had existed between himself and the former Shaikhs of those islands, submitting for decision by the Resident any differences of opinion that might arise in regard to matters such as tribute. The tribute mentioned may have been the sum which was payable by the Shaikh of Bahrain on account of Qatar to the Wahhābi Amīr.

* *Vide* page 891 *post.*

Nothing is known of the manner in which the Āl Thāni had attained by 1868, to predominant influence in Qatar; they were Ma'ādhid and therefore of the Āl Bin-'Ali, the tribe of 'Isa-bin-Tarif.*

Agreement in respect of tribute to Bahrain.

A further agreement was furnished by Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Thāni and the chief Shaikhs of the Qatar Bedouins according to which the tribute, if any, payable by them to Bahrain should be determined before the British Resident, and paid in future through the Residency; and Colonel Pelly then addressed a letter to "all the Chiefs of Qatar," informing them of the settlement reached, and warning them of the consequences of any future breach of the maritime peace.

Redress obtained for robbery of British subjects.

Before leaving Wakrah the Resident adverted to a robbery, which had taken place there, of property belonging to certain British Indian subjects resident in Bahrain; and he demanded of the assembled Shaikhs the payment of 18,000 Qrāns as compensation. The amount was immediately produced, one-third in cash and two-thirds in the shape of a bill on a wealthy pearl merchant of Lingeh, the bill being secured by a sealed bag of pearls which was handed over to Colonel Pelly to be delivered to the merchant on receipt of payment. The sum actually realised in this case amounted to 18,699 Qrāns; and out of this 16,200 Qrāns were paid away to two complainants who were able to give proof of their losses.

History of Qatar from the attack by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi to the occupation of Dōhah by the Turks, 1867-71.

During the four years following the great raid made on Qatar by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi no event of importance occurred in the promontory, and the political situation there remained unchanged.

General history of Qatar from the Turkish occupation of Dōhah to a rebellion against Turkish authority, 1871-93.

Occupation of Dōhah by the Turks, 1871-72.

In July 1871, a little more than a month after the occupation of Qatif by the Turks, a deputation, headed by the Shaikh of Kuwait, was sent by the commander of the Turkish troops to Dōhah in Qatar and succeeded in persuading Jāsim, the son of Muhammad-bin-Thāni, Shaikh of Dōhah and the most influential man in Qatar, to accept the Turkish flag; the senior Shaikh, now old and infirm, did not approve of the step, and continued for a time to fly the Arab flag over his own house. On news of this event reaching Būshehr, Colonel Pelly, the Resident in

* *Vide* pages 796 and 799 *ante*.

the Persian Gulf, despatched his assistant, Major Grant, in H.M.S. "Magpie" to Dōhah, where the state of matters was found to be as described; the Shaikh assigned as a reason for his submission to the Turks that he lived on the mainland and that the Turks were a land power, also that the British Government had failed to do his subjects justice in a certain case of piracy. Meanwhile Colonel Pelly, with a view to ascertaining whether the Turkish proceedings at Dōhah had been authorised by the Turkish Government, telegraphed to Colonel Herbert, the British Resident at Baghdād, and was informed in reply that the Wāli of Baghdād professed not to know whether Turkish flags had been sent to Qatar or not, but claimed that Qatar was not covered by a previous Turkish assurance that there should be no interference with Bahrain. In August, the Turks having meanwhile taken possession of the Hasa Oasis, Qatar became a base for hordes of Bedouins who began to harass the Ottoman troops from the southward, and two or three months later Sa'ūd the Wahhābi himself retired to Qatar with a large Bedouin following who insisted that the settled inhabitants, on pain of having their property raided, should furnish them with supplies; during this crisis a warning was sent by the Political Resident to British Indian subjects in Qatar, probably to the effect that, if they remained, it must be at their own risk. In January 1872 a Turkish Commodore, accompanied by 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, Shaikh of Kuwait, visited Dōhah with the "Assur" and another Turkish steamer, from which, much to the disgust of the Shaikh and the inhabitants, a detachment of 100 Turkish troops and a field gun were landed; this garrison having established themselves in a fort of the Āl Musallam, the Turkish occupation of Dōhah was complete. The measures described seem to have been taken under the orders of Midhat Pāsha,—who himself visited Hasa at the end of 1871, in response to a request from the Shaikh of Dōhah for protection against Sa'ūd's Bedouins.

Removal of Turkish regular troops, 1873.

In 1873 the regular troops originally stationed by the Turks at Dōhah appear to have been withdrawn, a detachment of 30 Dhābitīyahs or gendarmes being substituted.

Internal affairs, 1874.

Except in the internal affairs of Qatar, especially the administration of the chief town and its immediate environs, little or no change was produced by the presence of a Turkish post at Dōhah; tribal relations generally continued on the same footing as formerly, and the Āl Thāni Shaikhs of Dōhah were still the principal factor in politics.

1874

In 1874 fighting occurred near Zubārah between the Na'īm and the Bani Hājir, in which the latter were worsted; and in the same year

Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah held the Bani Hājir to account for a piracy committed near Khor Shaqiq, on a boat belonging to 'Abdul Karīm of Bahrain, in which more than $2,000 in cash, belonging to Shaikh Jāsim himself, was taken, besides goods belonging to British Indian subjects. The Turkish gunboat "Iskanderia" made a cruise along the coast to enquire into the misbehaviour of the Bani Hājir, and the result was apparently to show that Shaikh Jāsim himself was partly to blame for the disorder that prevailed.

1875. Lieutenant Fraser, Assistant Resident, who visited Dōhah in 1875 in connection with a British claim, found that the Āl Thāni Shaikhs, who had at first welcomed the Turkish occupation as a means of shaking off British control in maritime matters, were now heartily tired of it; but, for fear of being deported to Constantinople, they concealed their dissatisfaction. The Turkish representative, Jāsim Āgha, who was also Qādhi, notwithstanding the smallness of the force of only 50 gendarmes at his disposal, insisted on being consulted by the Shaikhs in every matter and recovered considerable sums of money from the inhabitants of Dōhah.

1876. In the autumn of 1876, in the discharge at Dōhah of an errand relating to piracy, Captain Guthrie, commanding the B.M.S. "May Frere," obtained information that the town now paid from 9,000 to 10,000 Qrāns per annum as revenue to the Turkish Government, but that this amount was insufficient to cover the expenses of the small Turkish detachment, whose duties were of a police and not of a military nature. The worst of the Qatar piracies in this year was one committed in the Dōhah harbour, close to the house of Shaikh Jāsim himself, by a party of seven Bani Hājir who attacked an Abu Dhabi vessel at night while the crew were asleep, killing two men and carrying off a slave and a quantity of other property; the total compensation due was assessed at $2,679, but it was not apparently obtained, though a reference on the subject was made by the British Government to the Porte. In this year Shaikh Jāsim was appointed by the Turks to be Qāim-Maqām or Deputy-Governor of Qatar, and thereafter his father Muhammad-bin-Thāni, who seems to have been better disposed to the British than to the Turks, and who died two years later in 1878, had no more voice in public affairs.

1879-81. In May 1879 the Mutasarrif of Hasa came to Dōhah in the "Iskanderia" and had interviews with various prominent individuals, including Shaikh Jāsim, whom he formally appointed to be governor over Dōhah town. In November there took place an exodus to Fuwairat of some of the Āl Bū Kuwārah inhabitants of Dōhah; it was traced to

jealousy of Shaikh Jāsim's new position and was said to have been instigated by the Shaikh of Bahrain; and a British and a Turkish gunboat both visited the coast to enquire into the incident. In 1880 the Bani Hājir pirate Zāid-bin-Muhammad relieved a boat of some pearls belonging to Shaikh Jāsim and captured a vessel belonging to Wakrah; and raids were committed near Dōhah by Manāsir and 'Awāmir. In 1881 the Āl Bū Kuwārah were joined at Fuwairat by some of the Na'īm; and the 'Ajmān tribe carried off 450 camels from Qatar. In December 1881 Ahmad, a brother of the Shaikh of Bahrain, landed on the west coast of Qatar with about 200 followers for purposes of sport, and Shaikh Jāsim sent a deputation from Dōhah to welcome him and invite him to an entertainment in the interior; but Ahmād insisted that Jāsim should come in person to greet him where he was, and his wishes were obeyed, after which he accompanied the Dōhah Shaikh to a camp. The strength of the Turkish detachment at Dōhah at this time, whether regular troops or gendarmes, was about 130 men.

In April 1884 a raid was made by Bani Hājir Bedouins upon the coast of Qatar, and a son of the Shaikh of Wakrah was killed. In the following month Shaikh Jāsim began preparations for an expedition by sea against the Bani Hājir in Dhahrān, representing to the British officials that he had obtained the sanction of the Turks and desired the leave of the British Government also; but his request was refused, and he abandoned his bellicose intentions. In July the 'Ajmān, who by threats of attacking Dōhah had made it impossible for the inhabitants to proceed as usual to the pearl fisheries, encountered a force of their enemies the Manāsir at the wells of Banaiyān in the Jāfūrah desert and were defeated with much loss,—a result that gave great satisfaction to Shaikh Jāsim. In this engagement the Āl Morrah and Bani Hājir tribes were divided, some of each fighting upon either side. 1884.

In April 1885 a boat belonging to Wakrah was wrecked off Fuwairat and plundered by the people of that village. In October about 100 persons belonging to Wakrah emigrated with 10 boats to Ghāriyah in consequence of a quarrel with Shaikh Jāsim, who in December made an attack on Ghāriyah, killing four of the inhabitants. The Turkish gunboat "Mirrīkh" toured upon the coast for some time during the year. 1885.

Rivalry between Shaikh Jāsim and Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, 1886-87.

In the following year a competitor with Shaikh Jāsim for influence in Qatar appeared in the person of Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, a Turkish subject but son of the Wazīr of Bahrain, who assumed the headship of the Ghāriyah settlement and who, from his intrigues with the Turks, seemed to aim at supplanting Jāsim in the Qāim-Maqāmship of Qatar. A suggestion by the officer in charge of the Turkish gunboat, that the people of Ghāriyah should be allowed to live in peace under

Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhab, so irritated Jasim that he again attacked the place, but this time without success. Muhammad, after urging the establishment of a regular Turkish customs house at Dohah, went away to Hasa; but he returned in May with 50 Dhabitiyahs, of whom 20, it was said, would be posted at Ghariyah. By these proceedings Jasim was greatly incensed and at first threatened to withdraw from Dohah and commence hostilities against Muhammad; but in July a reconciliation was arranged. In the winter of 1886-87, Muhammad, who all the time kept up an active correspondence with the Turkish authorities in Hasa and 'Iraq, visited Bahrain; he was met there by the inhabitants of Ghariyah, whom, apparently with the approval of the Turks, he then settled at Darin on Tarut Island, Ghariyah being thus almost depopulated.

Disturbances, 1887.

The next year was of one considerable unrest in Qatar. Shaikh Jasim, who greatly feared the establishment of a customs house in Qatar and was generally upon bad terms with the Turks, considered that the best means of frustrating Ottoman designs would be to destroy the importance of Dohah, a task which he now set himself to accomplish; retiring to Dha'ain, he announced that he had severed his connection with Dohah and was no longer responsible for the affairs of Qatar, which would in future be "first referred to God and then to the Turkish Government." Disturbances in Dohah and its neighbourhood, probably instigated by Shaikh Jasim, followed; and in June or July the bazaar was plundered by Bani Hajir Bedouins, the principal sufferers on this occasion being some Persian traders who had incurred Jasim's displeasure. In August the mischief extended to British subjects, and piracy at sea began, with the result that the British Political Resident was obliged to take action in the manner described in a later paragraph. By the middle of October all was quiet again.

Visit of the Wali of Basrah to Dohah and replacement of the Turkish military garrison, 1888.

The year 1888 opened with a visit to Dohah by Nafiz Pasha, Wali of Basrah, who had an interview with Shaikh Jasim and promised him a title and decoration; a coal depôt was established; and, a little later, a military garrison of one infantry battalion or 250 men was stationed at Dohah and a steam launch placed there. These arrangements may have been due to the remonstrances of the British Government regarding piracies in Turkish waters or to the disorders at Dohah in the previous year, but they were suspected by the British authorities to be preparations for a Turkish advance in the direction of 'Oman,—the more so that the predominance acquired in Najd by the Amir of Hail over the Wahhabi ruler of Riyadh was supposed to favour a forward policy in Arabia on the part of the Turks.

Attempt by the Turks to establish close control over Qatar, 1889-91.

In July 1889, in connection with a scheme, possibly his own, of establishing direct Turkish administration in Qatar, 'Akif Bey, the Mutasarrif of Hasa, paid a visit to Dōhah. His first interview with Shaikh Jāsim took place at the house of Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb and cannot have been free from danger; for, while the Mutasarrif was accompanied by his personal attendants only, the Shaikh appeared with a retinue of about 600 armed footmen and 60 or 70 horsemen and camel-riders, many of whom carried loaded Martini rifles. A second and more private meeting afterwards took place, at which the Mutasarrif suggested the institution of a regular administration and a customs house; but the project was strongly opposed by Jāsim, who tendered his resignation of the Qāim-Maqāmship in writing.

In the following year the proposals of 'Akif Bey for the better government of Hasa became known in some detail. He had recommended that Jāsim, on account of his frequent absences, should be provided with an Assistant in the Qāim-Maqāmship; that Government buildings should be erected at Dōhah; that cavalry as well as infantry should be stationed there; that taxes should be levied on pearl dealers and other merchants; and that a harbour-master should be appointed at Dōhah to collect dues from native vessels. Posts should be established at Zubārah and 'Odaid; two steamers should be run between Dōhah, 'Oqair and Qatīf; and at 'Oqair a mosque should be built. In the autumn of 1890 Mudirs intended for Zubārah and 'Odaid arrived in Bahrain from Basrah, but they did not proceed to their posts; the hitch was apparently due to the departure of 'Akif Bey from Hasa, upon sick leave, at the beginning of 1891.

Meanwhile, in 1890, Shaikh Jāsim caused it to be proclaimed that the administration of Qatar had been transferred from himself to the Turkish officials; but his resignation was not accepted by the Wāli of Basrah, who early in 1891 exhorted him instead to discharge his customary duties with zeal.

Piracies and miscellaneous occurrences, 1889-1892.

In 1889 a piracy, attended by loss of life, was committed by Banī Hājir on a Bahrain vessel off the coast of Qatar; Shaikh Jāsim recovered the stolen property, but failed to arrest the offenders. In 1890 the Āl Morrah, at the instance of Mutasarrif of Hasa, were prohibited from entering Dōhah. At the beginning of 1891 a fight occurred between the 'Ajmān on the one side and the Āl Morrah, Banī Hājir and Manāsir on the other; and, during the pearling season, some Banī Hājir seized a vessel at Wakrah and carried off six boats of the Qubaisāt Banī Yās from an island in the neighbourhood,—an outrage for which Shaikh Jāsim professed himself unable to afford any redress. In 1892 there was a

serious crop of maritime outrages. A boat was seized near Wakrah, taken away, and abandoned near Zubārah; another boat, belonging to Shaikh Jāsim, was boarded near Dha'ain and carried off, with the pearls she contained, after two of the crew had been killed and one wounded; again a Persian boat from Jazeh in Shibkūh was attacked near Wakrah, 10 of the crew being killed and 13 wounded, and a quantity of pearls taken; and finally a Shārjah pearl boat was seized and removed to Khor Shaqiq, but was recovered by Jāsim,—Jāsim, however, at the intercession of elders, released some prisoners whom he had taken. In 1872, from August to November, 'Abdur-Rahmān, the expelled Wahhābi Amir of Najd, resided at Dōhah under the protection of Jāsim.

British relations with Qatar during the same period, 1872-1893

Case of piracy and complaints of exactions, 1874.

A piracy has already been mentioned above, which was committed by Bani Hājir in the summer of 1874, near Khor Shaqiq, on a Bahrain vessel owned by a certain 'Abdul Karīm, and in which some British Indian traders were sufferers jointly with Shaikh Jāsim himself. Shaikh Jāsim promptly took measures for recouping his own losses; but a year passed without any redress being afforded to the British subjects affected; in 1875, however, compensation was obtained by Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, who despatched his Second Assistant, Captain Fraser, to settle the matter with Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Thāni.

Meanwhile a petition was received from the British Indian traders at Dōhah, who complained of exactions by the Shaikh and expressed a wish to leave the place; but, as it appeared that the dues complained of were ordinary taxes taken for the purpose of providing protection against Bedouins, the petitioners were informed by the Resident, under the orders of the Government of India, that it was for themselves to decide whether they should leave Dōhah or not, and that, if they remained, they must conform to the local laws and system of taxation.

Incivility of the Turks to a British vessel, 1867.

Captain Guthrie, commanding the B.M.S. "May Frere," experienced some discourtesy at a visit to Dōhah in 1876 from the officers in charge of the Turkish post, who, as he was returning from the shore to his ship, shouted after him that Dōhah was Turkish territory and that he must leave the port before sunset. As a number of Arabs had witnessed the scene Captain Guthrie was careful to remain at Dōhah for another 24 hours.

Ill-treatment of Indian traders, 1876-1879.

In 1876 Shaikh Jásim, who had then recently been appointed by the Turkish Government to be Qáim-Maqám of Qatar, took advantage of his new powers to vent his spite against Chela and Rama, two of the British Indian subjects for whom compensation had been obtained by Captain Fraser in the previous year; this he did by causing them to be summoned to the distant provincial capital of Hofúf on the frivolous ground that their depositions were required.

In 1879 a fresh case occurred, in which a Hindu was beaten and otherwise ill-treated by the Turkish officer at Dóhah for having exported dates,—an act not known to be prohibited. Notwithstanding a recommendation by the Government of India to Her Majesty's Government that compensation should be claimed on behalf of the Hindus Chela and Rama, no satisfaction had as yet been obtained in the case of 1876; and Colonel Ross was inclined to recommend that, in view of the unfortunate effect of such incidents as these upon British prestige in the Gulf, steps should be taken to withdraw all British subjects from Dóhah. The Government of India, however, thought it better to press for the removal from Dóhah of the offending Turkish officer, by name Muhammad Ágha; and this, in the end, was obtained.

Warning addressed to the Shaikhs of Qatar and discussions with Turkey, 1879-1881.

In 1879 a warning by the Political Resident against connecting themselves with the Bani Hájir pirates, who at this time were giving much trouble along the Arabian coast, was conveyed to the Shaikhs of Qatar by Captain Woodroffe, accompanied by the Residency Agent in Bahrain. This was done in connection with a case in which the Bani Hájir buccaneer Záid-bin Muhammad, having seized two vessels belonging to the Mahándah of Khor Shaqíq, used them to plunder a fishing vessel anchored off Ras Laffán to the amount of 2,000 Qráns, one of the crew also being killed.

It should be noted that in March 1881 Shaikh Jásim represented to the British Resident that his authority did not extend to the whole Qatar coast and that he was only responsible for Dóhah and Wakrah under the Agreement of 1868; he requested therefore that the people of other ports, such as Fuwairat and Ruwais, should be compelled to remove and settle in his territory, after which he would answer for their behaviour.

A discussion with the Porte, relative to piracies off the Arabian coast generally, took place between 1879 and 1881 and is fully related in the history of Hasa.

Question of dealings and

In 1881, in consequence first of threats of an invasion of Bahrain by Násir-bin-Mubarak with the assistance of Shaikh Jásim of Dóhah, and

political relations with the Shaikh of Dōhah, 1881-82.

later of projects on the part of Jāsim himself to proceed by sea against the 'Ajmān tribe near Qatīf and the Qubaisāt section of the Banī Yas, a question arose as to the degree of interference which might still with propriety be exercised by the British Government in such matters in Qatar; in each of the cases mentioned, it should be added, Shaikh Jāsim had been advised by the British authorities in the Gulf to refrain from action and had complied with their advice. The Government of India, recognising that the agreement made in 1868 with Shaikh Jāsim's father, by which Shaikh Muhammad undertook not to make war by sea, could hardly, on account of its personal character and the subsequent assumption by the Turks of authority at Dōhah, be regarded as binding on Shaikh Jāsim, referred the point to Her Majesty's Government, whose orders, issued early in 1882, were to the effect that the Shaikh, though he had accepted the position of an Ottoman dependent on land, should be encouraged to maintain close and direct relations with the officers of the Government of India and to defer to them, as he appeared inclined to do, in all matters affecting the peace of the seas. As regards the course to be followed in event of the Shaikh of Dōhah or any other Shaikh similarly situated putting to sea with hostile intentions, either without reference to or in disregard of the warnings of the British Resident, Her Majesty's Government were unable to give the Government of India any precise instructions; they held that it was for the Government of India to decide, upon general considerations of expediency, whether coercion should be employed in any individual case. It had been intimated to the Porte in July 1881, at the conclusion of the discussions mentioned in the last paragraph, that, as they declined to agree to a joint police of the seas, Her Majesty's Government were obliged to undertake that duty single-handed "without reference to the claims of the Sultān to territorial jurisdiction in those waters." The commanders of British cruisers in the Gulf were accordingly empowered to act as might be necessary to prevent or punish disturbances of the peace at sea, avoiding, however, the raising of needless questions with Turkish authorities, where such might exist, and unnecessary encroachment upon the jurisdiction of the Sultān, wherever the same might be effectually established on the coast to the north of 'Odaid.

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Promise by Shaikh Jāsim to adhere to the Agreement of 1868.

About the same time Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident, proposed that Shaikh Jāsim, whose character and conduct were as unsatisfactory as ever, should be compelled to acknowledge in writing the continued validity of the Agreement signed by his father in 1868; but the Government of India, being of opinion that proceedings to this end

might bring about a difficulty with the Turks, ordered that a verbal assurance only should be obtained. This was done; and the renewal of his treaty obligations to abstain from war at sea and to refer his disputs with his neighbours to the British Resident appeared for a time to have a restraining effect upon the unruly Shaikh.

Expulsion of British Indian traders from Dōhah and action of the British Government, 1881-83.

In October 1881 Shaikh Jāsim began to harass the British Indian traders at Dōhah, whose operations in pearls interfered with his own, and whose position he was therefore determined to render untenable; but a visit of H.M.S. "Woodlark" to the port resulted in a temporary settlement of the difficulty. Eventually, however, in 1882, Jāsim forcibly closed the shops of the Indians and expelled them from the place, giving false reasons for his action. In May 1882 a Residency Agent was sent to him with a letter to warn him that he would be held responsible for loss caused to British subjects; but he was obdurate. In November 1882 a confidential Agent of the Residency visited Dōhah in H.M.S. "Woodlark" to require compensation for the traders; and again the demand was disregarded. At length, in December 1882, authority having been first obtained from Her Majesty's Government, Colonel Ross, the Resident, proceeded in person to Dōhah with H.M.S. "Woodlark" and H.M.S. "Arab" and insisted, on pain of instant hostilities, that the Shaikh should apologise to the British Government, pay compensation to the Indian traders, and grant the latter permission to return to Dōhah. With these conditions Jāsim found himself obliged to comply; and the indemnity recovered, amounting to Rs. 8,000, was paid over to the Indians, who had meanwhile taken refuge in Bahrain.

Protest by the Porte against the British proceedings, 1883.

No sooner did the Porte become aware of the direct recovery of damages from their so-called Qaim-Maqām by means of a British naval demonstration at Dōhah than they protested to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and the question was referred to Her Majesty's Government; Shaikh Jāsim, it appeared, had represented the affair in strong colours to the Turkish authorities, and had threatened to resign the Qaim-Maqāmship unless the Rs. 8,000 recovered from him were refunded. The British Ambassador was at first directed to avoid, if possible, discussion of the subject; but, if it were not possible, he was to state distinctly that the British Government could not admit that Turkey possessed any sovereign rights on the Qatar coast. Eventually, the matter still being pressed, Lord Granville on the 7th of May 1885 informed the Turkish Ambassador in London, in writing, "that the claims of the Porte to rights of sovereignty over the Qatar coast had never been admitted by Her Majesty's Government." Exception

having been taken to this reply, the Turkish Ambassador was further told in unequivocal terms, on the 22nd of September 1883, that the British Government were unable to accept the views of the Porte, and that they were not prepared to waive the rights which they had exercised at intervals, during a long period of years, of dealing directly with the Arab chiefs of the Qatar coast, when necessary, in order to preserve the peace of the seas or to obtain redress for outrages on British subjects or persons entitled to British protection.

Further ill-treatment of Indian traders by Shaikh Jásim and piracies, 1883-86.

After the settlement in 1882 five of the Indian traders who had been expelled returned to Dóhah; but their position there was still disagreeable on account of the hostility of the Shaikh. In 1886, after taking precautions to disavow his responsibility for anything that might happen to the British traders in his absence, Shaikh Jásim temporarily quitted Dóhah for 'Odaíd; and immediately the Indians were attacked by Bani Hájir Bedouins and two of their number were wounded, but not seriously. The Assistant Resident, Khan Bahádur 'Abdur Rahmán Hakím, who was sent to the spot to investigate, found reason to believe that the affair had been deliberately arranged by Shaikh Jásim with his son, whom he left in charge at Dóhah, and that the object was to intimidate the Hindus into withdrawing from Dóhah and so to put an end to their rivalry in trade. Later, however, the Resident reported that Jásim had emphatically denied his complicity in the matter and had apologised for the occurrence; and under orders from the Government of India the denial and apology were accepted.

In the autumn of 1886, several petty cases of piracy having been committed by Bani Hájir off the coast of Qatar, the Residency confidential Agent was sent in H.M.S. "Sphinx" to interview the headmen of the coast, and was successful in obtaining from them assurances of co-operation with the British Government, some of which were given in writing.

Wanton attack on British Indian traders at Dóhah and action of the British authorities, 1887.

In 1887, on the withdrawal of Shaikh Jásim from Dóhah on account of differences between himself and the Turks, there was an outbreak of lawlessness in the town, most probably instigated by the Shaikh himself from his place of retirement. At the beginning of the troubles the Indian traders were protected by the Shaikh's relatives in Dóhah; but early in August two Indian British subjects were wantonly attacked and wounded by Arabs. Piracies also began along the coast, half a dozen being reported within a short time. The Shaikh of Bahrain, some of whose subjects were among the victims of these outrages, now requested permission to take forcible action on his own account; but the British

Resident instead directed that specie and pearls to the value of Rs. 20,000, belonging to Shaikh Jāsim in Bahrain whither the Resident had himself proceeded, should be impounded; and this was immediately done. Meanwhile all the British subjects at Dōhah had been removed by the Assistant Resident, who was sent there for the purpose and to remind Shaikh Jāsim of his responsibilities; H.M.S. "Osprey" had arrived in Bahrain; and the Turkish military commandant in Hasa had gone with a guard to Dōhah, and was engaged in consultation there with Jāsim and the other Shaikhs. The result of Colonel Ross's pacific expedient was eminently satisfactory, for Shaikh Jāsim presently sent an Agent to Bahrain to negotiate; and the case was settled by payment of Rs. 6,390 as compensation to the injured British Indian and Bahrain subjects out of the property attached.

Protest by the Porte, 1888.

Shaikh Jāsim, while through force of circumstances he was obliged to submit to the British demands, neglected no means of upsetting what had been arranged and appealed to the Wālis of Basrah and Baghdād, representing that he had been despoiled of "all" his property in Bahrain on account of his connection with the Turkish Government. The immediate result of his complaints was a threatening letter, probably unauthorised by higher authority, in which the Mutasarrif of Hasa demanded from the Shaikh of Bahrain the restoration of Jāsim's property; and later the inevitable protest was addressed by the Porte to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. With reference to the protest the British Ambassador was referred by Her Majesty's Government to the views which they had expressed in 1883, and to which, he was informed, they still adhered.

Assistance of the British authorities requested by Persia, but not utilised, 1887-88.

In connection with the losses sustained by Persian subjects at Dōhah, the Shāh enquired whether the British authorities could assist his Government in obtaining the reparation to which the former were entitled, estimated at 80,000 Tūmāns; and a hope appears to have been held out of compliance with the request as soon as the claims of British subjects should have been adjusted. Early in 1888, however, the Persian Government seem to have had recourse instead to the good offices of the Porte, but whether they obtained any satisfaction by this means is uncertain. As mentioned in the history of Bahrain, it appears that a Persian Minister about the same time actually gave countenance to the idea of a raid to be made by Shaikh Jāsim upon Bahrain in the interests of Persia.

Visit of the Resident to Dōhah, 1888.

In October 1888 Colonel Ross visited Dōhah and had an interview with Shaikh Jāsim, who came to meethim with a following of about

700 mounted Bedouins. The Shaikh complained of the injustice of the treatment which he had received.

Further correspondence between the British and Turkish Governments regarding the position of the Porte in Qatar, 1889.

The energetic proceedings of Nāfiz Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, in Qatif and Qatar occasioned, in 1888, some disquiet to Her Majesty's Government; but, as the steps taken were ostensibly due to British strictures on the prevalence of piracy, and as a discussion of boundaries was not desired, it was apparently resolved not to object to them. At the time it was believed that the Shammar Amir of Hāil contemplated operations against 'Omān, and that it might be the intention of the Turks to assist him with troops from Hasa and Qatar. In 1889, however, with the plain object of asserting Turkish sovereignty over Qatar, the Turkish Foreign Office informed the British Ambassador at Constantinople that the garrison in Qatar would be reinforced from the Baghdād Army Corps; but Her Majesty's Government deemed it sufficient to remind the Porte, with reference to the state of war which then prevailed between the Shaikh of Dōhah and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and by which the Turks might have been tempted to seek an extension of influence in the direction of Abu Dhabi, that Her Majesty's Government could not view with indifference any attempt on the part of the Turkish authorities at interference or aggression in 'Omān.

Relations of Qatar with Bahrain, and affairs at Zubārah, 1872-92.

Qatar was the theatre, during this period, of various movements, dangerous, or at least interesting, to the Bahrain principality; but these are noted in the history of Bahrain, and here we shall confine ourselves to some remarks on the claim of the Shaikh of Bahrain to Qatar and on affairs at Zubārah.

Claim of the Shaikh of Bahrain to Zubārah, 1873.

The sovereignty of the Shaikh of Bahrain over Qatar, unquestioned before, was brought into discussion by the Turkish conquest of Hasa; and in 1871 Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident, was desired by the Government of Bombay to report on the subject, but obtained leave to defer doing so on the ground that there was a probability of the Turks withdrawing from Hasa. The question then slumbered until the summer of 1873, when a Turkish officer was reported to have gone to Zubārah in Qatar for the purpose of persuading the inhabitants to acknowledge Turkish authority; by this occurrence the Shaikh of Bahrain was moved to formulate a claim to Zubārah on the ground that the Na'im of

Zubārah were his subjects and had acknowledged the fact in the presence of Colonel Pelly, the late Resident. Colonel Ross, after receiving a report on the subject from his Assistant in Bahrain, Major Grant, informed Government that the sovereignty of Qatar was indeterminate, though the whole of the coast had lately fallen under Turkish influence; and, the rights claimed by the Shaikh of Bahrain being uncertain and beyond the power of the possessor to enforce, he at the same time asked Major Grant to dissuade the Shaikh, as had been done in the past, from entangling himself in the affairs of the mainland. Colonel Pelly, the ex-Resident, to whom the papers were referred for opinion, considered that the question of territorial sovereignty should still, so far as possible, be avoided; and he thought that the Shaikh of Bahrain, while he was acknowledged to possess certain rights of pasturage, etc., on the Qatar coast, should not therefore be held to be empowered to put to sea for the purpose of coercing any port in Qatar. Meanwhile, in September 1873, the Shaikh of Bahrain had again asserted his claim to Zubārah and the obedience of the Na'im tribe and asked whether he must relinquish it; and at length, towards the end of the year, the Government of India expressed their general concurrence in the view that the Shaikh of Bahrain had no clear or important rights in Qatar and that he should be restrained, so far as possible, from raising complications on the mainland.

Zubārah attacked, and reinforced by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1874.

In September 1874, after attempts on their part to cross over from Qatar into Bahrain had been foiled by movements of vessels of the Bombay Marine, the Banī Hājir turned their attention to the Na'im village of Zubārah; and, but for the appearance of the "Hugh Rose" gunboat there, they would probably, notwithstanding a brave resistance by the small summer garrison, have taken the place and obtained possession of boats with which they might have invaded Bahrain. The delay gave the Na'im time to return in strength from Bahrain and the pearl banks to Zubārah, where they shortly inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Banī Hājir. Before the end of the year Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, a Bahrain refugee, appeared upon the coast of Qatar, and the prospect of Zubārah falling into his hands caused great alarm to the Shaikh of Bahrain, who asked permission of Colonel Ross, the Resident, to reinforce Zubārah, on the ground, first, that Zubārah was a dependency and invaluable outwork of Bahrain, and again that, if he failed to help his allies the Na'im in their extremity, he would forfeit their support for the future. Colonel Ross was moved by these arguments to agree to the reinforcement of Zubārah as a purely defensive measure; but his action was not altogether approved by the Government of India, who considered that, in view of

the decision reached in the previous year, the Shaikh should have been dissuaded from sending men to Zubārah and should have been encouraged to depend altogether upon the British Government for the defence of his islands. It subsequently transpired that an absurdly inaccurate account of the whole affair had been telegraphed to the Porte by their Wāli at Baghdād, representing the Na'im of Zubārah as a tribe in rebellion against the rightful authority of the Turkish Government whom the Bani Hājir had been employed to coerce, but who had escaped punishment through improper interference by the Shaikh of Bahrain. The dangers which threatened Bahrain from the side of Qatar were shown by the Resident to be chiefly due to the uncertainty whether the coast, on the side towards Bahrain, was or was not under the authority of the Porte.

Claim of the Shaikh of Bahrain to sovereignty in Qatar disallowed by the Government of India, 1875.

The Shaikh of Bahrain, though he had intimated his readiness to be guided by the advice of the British Government, once more in April 1875 put forth a claim to sovereignty over the whole of Qatar, which he asserted to be subject and tributary to Bahrain. On the fact being reported to them, the Government of India observed with regret the continued disposition of the Shaikh to entangle himself in the affairs of the continent and ordered that he should be made to understand that, if he persisted in a course opposed to their advice and thereby became involved in complications upon the mainland, the consequences would be upon himself, and they would hold themselves free to take such measures with respect to him as they might think necessary. The purport of this letter was communicated to Shaikh Īsa by Lieutenant Fraser, the Assistant Resident, in person; and the Shaikh, while denying that his rights in Qatar had become invalid or extinct, stated that he bowed to the orders of Government.

Evacuation of Zubārah by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1875.

The Shaikh afterwards made a request through his brother that he might be allowed to postpone the withdrawal of his men from Zubārah until the end of the pearl season; but it was not granted. In the neighbourhood of Zubārah, except for a few raids and counter-raids by the Bani Hājir and Na'im upon each other's cattle, matters remained fairly quiet; but in the pearl season some of the Beni Hājir put to sea to commit piracy,—a proceeding which led, as mentioned in the history of Bahrain, to excessive action by the Shaikh in very distant waters.

Matters at Zubārah, 1876-77.

In 1876 the Bani Hājir tribe was temporarily split into two factions, one of which connected itself with Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the Bahrain outlaw, and the other with the Na'im of Zubārah. The precaution was taken of again warning the Shaikh of Bahrain to refrain from

interference on the mainland; but it was not apparently necessary, for no visible results followed from the new combination. In 1877 there were complaints, as described in the history of Bahrain, that Shaikh 'Isa still maintained undesirably close relations with Zubārah; but enquiry showed that he was not, in fact, doing more than was required to keep the Na'īm upon his side and to prevent their joining the Banī Hājir.

Destruction of Zubārah. 1878.

In September 1878, as related in the history of Hasa, a heinous piracy, accompanied by the murder of four persons, was committed by the inhabitants of Zubārah upon a passing boat; and Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, was directed by the Government of India to demand of the Turkish authorites that the place should be punished, and to offer British naval assistance for the purpose. These instructions he executed by starting on the 22nd of October in person for Basrah, where he had a not unsatisfactory meeting with the Wālī, 'Abdullah Pasha. In the meantime, or immediately afterwards, Zubārah, of which the inhabitants had made themselves obnoxious to all their neighbours by raids and piracies, was attacked by a large force under Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak. Colonel Ross, on becoming aware of this new complication, at once proceeded from Būshehr to Bahrain, where he arrived on the 17th of November in H.M.S. "Teazer," H.M.S. "Arab" being already anchored there. Shaikh 'Isa came on board and earnestly besought that some action should be taken in favour of the Na'īm; but the Resident's reply was a refusal, at which he appeared greatly dissatisfied. On the 18th of November Colonel Ross landed at Zubārah from the "Teazer" and visited the camp of Shaikh Jāsim, pitched about half a mile from the square fort of Murair, in which the Na'īm, to the number of about 500 souls, were besieged; the village of Zubārah proper was already completely in ruins, and it was said that some boats had been burnt. The force with Shaikh Jāsim appeared to number about 2,000 armed men; and, in consequence of the disparity in numbers between the attackers and the attacked, there had been no actual fighting. On his return to Bahrain Colonel Ross found a telegram from his acquaintance, the Wālī of Basrah, to the Qāim-Maqām of Qatīf, in which the latter was directed to send the gunboat "Iskanderia" immediately to Zubārah in order to prevent any attempt by the besieging force to invade Bahrain; and this order he at once forwarded to its destination. The Nā'im besieged in Murair surrendered, on unfavourable terms, not long after Colonel Ross's departure, and Zubārah as a populated place ceased to exist; the inhabitants,

between whom and Shaikh Jāsim a peace seems to have been arranged by the commander of the "Iskanderia," were in the first instance mostly removed to Dōhah. It was considered at this time, both by the British Resident and by the Shaikh of Bahrain, that the best solution of the Zobārah difficulty, in so far as the security of Bahrain was concerned, would be the permanent occupation of the place by the Turks.

Rumours of a Turkish occupation of Zobārah, 1888-91.

In 1888 it was reported that the Turks intended to rebuild Zubārah; and, as it was feared that the agent selected would be the Bahrain outlaw Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the British Resident was instructed by the Government of India to inform that individual and Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, who was his father-in-law, that a settlement at Zubārah would not be permitted. No actual attempt to re-occupy the place was observed. In 1890 and 1891 there were rumours of the appointment of a Turkish Mudīr to Zubārah, and the post was at first offered to Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārin, who declined it; but the project, after a Mudīr designate had arrived in Bahrain, was apparently abandoned.

Relations of Qatar with Abu Dhabi and affairs at 'Odaid, 1872-93.

The history of a colony of Bani Yās seceders at Khor-al-'Odaid, maintained from 1869 to 1878, will be found included in that of the Abu Dhabi principality,* within the territorial limits of which 'Odaid is situated; but the bearing of certain events there upon the history of Qatar, which the inlet closely adjoins, should be noted.

Relations of the Turks with 'Odaid, 1871-76.

In 1871, soon after the arrival of the Turks in Hasa, it appeared that the Turkish flag had been offered to the Bani Yās colonists at 'Odaid; but the latter, who professed themselves independent of all authority, were said not to have accepted it, though there was also a contradictory rumour that it was hoisted on Fridays. In 1873 four Turks visited 'Odaid and arranged that a sum of $40 or 50 should be paid annually by the settlers through Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, after which they went away, having been deterred by the inferior character of the water supply from establishing a post. In 1874 Shaikh Zāid of Abu Dhabi stated that local Turkish officials had written to him asserting 'Odaid to be under their protection, and calling on him to abstain from interference there; he was unable, however, to produce their letters when called upon to do so. In

* *Vide* page 763 *ante*.

1875 it was ascertained that the headman of 'Odaid had both a Trucial and a Turkish flag and that he used one or the other as occasion required. On the 18th of October 1876, when Captain Guthrie visited 'Odaid in the "May Frere," he found the Trucial flag flying but learned that tribute was still paid to Turkey.

Correspondence with the Porte regarding piracies committed from 'Odaid, 1877.

In 1876 and 1877 a number of piracies were committed by the Āl Morrah, a Bedouin tribe nominally dependent on Turkey, from boat harbours under 'Odaid; these proceedings the headman of 'Odaid was unable to prevent, and representations to the Turkish Government became necessary. Her Majesty's Government, while avoiding specific mention of 'Odaid, reference to which might have raised an inconvenient territorial question, drew the attention of the Porte to the increase of piracy along the Qatar coast which had resulted from the extension of Turkish sovereignty in that direction, and intimated their own resolve not to allow the peace of the Persian Gulf to be disturbed by marauders, whether proceeding from places like Dōhah actually in Turkish possession, or belonging to tribes that admitted Turkish supremacy and sailing from the ports of independent chiefs too weak to prevent the abuse of their territory. The Turkish Government in reply denied all knowledge of piratical outrages on the Qatar coast and asked for particulars.

Complaint by the Porte of British action at 'Odaid, 1878.

In 1878 the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs complained of action by the British authorities at 'Odaid a few months previously, which, as related in the history of Abu Dhabi, had resulted in the abandonment of the place by the Bani Yās colonists; and in the Turkish communication 'Odaid was stated to be a dependency of the Turkish district of Qatar. It does not appear from the records of the Government of India what reply was made to this complaint; but, from the correspondence which shortly after took place in regard to piracies off the coast of Hasa and Qatar, it seems clear that the British Government were resolved not to admit Turkish pretensions to jurisdiction at 'Odaid or at any place further to the eastward.

Protracted war between the Shaikhs of Dōhah and Abu Dhabi.

From 1876 onwards, as a result of the presence of Bani Yās rebels at 'Odaid, hostile relations prevailed between the Shaikh of Dōhah and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; and in 1880, by the return of the Qubaisāt to Abu Dhabi, the enmity between the Shaikhs was much embittered. During the sojourn of the Qubaisāt at 'Odaid that place had fallen largely under the influence of Shaikh Jāsim, to whom, by their removal, it was again lost; and his indignation was expressed in pecuniary claims which he now brought against their headman, Buti-bin-Khādim.

1881. In 1881 Jāsim intimated to the Resident an intention on his part of occupying 'Odaid and seizing the person of Buti-bin-Khādim; but Colonel Ross was able to prevent him from attempting either enterprise. In December 1881 a raid was committed by Bani Hājir and other Bedouins from Qatar in the neighbourhood of Abu Dhabi and a number of camels were carried off and sold at Dōhah, whereupon the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi immediately prepared to retaliate and Shaikh Jāsim made dispositions for defence; but eventually, by the intervention of Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, the matter was settled without fighting.

1885. In 1885, after an interval of peace, Shaikh Jāsim re-opened his feud with Abu Dhabi, alleging that a debt due from Buti-bin-Khādim, for which Shaikh Zāid had become surety, had not been discharged; that the Manāsir, who were protected by Shaikh Zāid, had plundered some natives of Qatar on Dalmah Island and had raided Qatar territory; and that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was interfering with 'Odaid, which belonged of right to Shaikh Jāsim and which he intended to occupy. The complaint in regard to the Manāsir probably referred to the carrying off from Na'aijah near Dōhah, by the Āl Bū Sha'ar section of that tribe, of some cattle and three female slaves belonging to Jāsim's dependents,—an act for which reprisals were at once made at Jāsim's instance by the Bani Hājir and the Āl Murrah. These tribes made a foray on the Bani Yās country, carrying off six camels which found a market at Dōhah, and recriminations between the two Shaikhs followed; but matters were once more temporarily adjusted by the agency of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the Bahrain refugee. Meanwhile the Political Resident, in reply to a communication from Shaikh Jāsim, had desired him to relinquish his intention of occupying 'Odaid and to send particulars of his claims against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi with a view to a settlement; but with the latter invitation Shaikh Jāsim did not see fit to comply.

1886. In the summer of 1886 Shaikh Jāsim informed Shaikh Zāid that he had been directed by the Turkish authorities to rebuild 'Odaid, and he enclosed, as evidence of his statement, a letter from the commander of the Turkish vessel "Zuhaf." This correspondence was forwarded by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to the Political Resident, but in the meantime, apparently, Shaikh Jāsim made a movement from Dōhah in the direction of 'Odaid. The Resident, however, again warned him to desist from his proceedings and held a vessel of war in readiness to proceed to the spot, while a protest made to the Turkish authorities resulted in the disavowal and censure by the Wāli of Basrah, in writing, of the action of the commander of the "Zuhāf"; and accordingly no attempt to occupy 'Odaid was made by Shaikh Jāsim.

In 1887 a piratical Baqārah from Wakrah attacked a boat of the Qubaisāt Bani Yās on the pearl banks, and one of the crew of the latter was so severely wounded that he died. 1887.

In 1888 the protracted war between the Shaikhs of Dōhah and Abu Dhabi suddenly reached a crisis. In February of that year, the Wali of Basrah being then actually present in Dōhah, a raid was committed at Na'aijah in the immediate vicinity by Manāsīr camel riders, chiefly of the Āl Bū Sha'ar section, who carried away 40 male and female slaves; and some of the Manāsīr, advancing yet nearer, abducted two or three slaves from the very outskirts of Dōhah. Pursuit was attempted, but was unsuccessful. In March Jāsim made a retaliatory raid into the district of Liwah in Dhafrah and carried off some 400 camels, which he divided amongst his followers; he also recovered, on this occasion, two of the slaves raided from Dōhah; and he caused 20 Liwah villagers to be soundly thrashed. In May the tables were again turned by a raiding party of 250 Bedouins whom Shaikh Zāid despatched against Dōhah under his son Khalifah; on their arrival before the place, Shaikh Jāsim himself being then at Dha'āin, the townspeople turned out against them in scattered detachments, were drawn by a simulated flight into an ambush, and lost 34 men killed, among whom was 'Ali, a son of Jāsim. Death of a son of Jāsim in the war, 1888.

Between rage and grief Shaikh Jāsim was all but distraught; he incited the Turks to invade Trucial 'Omān, he applied for help to Ibn-Rashid, he opened a correspondence with the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān other than Shaikh Zāid, and he subsidised freely a number of the Bedouin tribes. On Ibn-Rashid making a favourable response to his overtures disturbances on a serious scale, and even an attack by Jāsim and his allies upon Abu Dhabi, began to be apprehended by the British political authorities. Prospect of Turkish and Central Arabian interference in the war, 1888.

The Turks, however, possibly on account of a warning against interference which the Government of India asked might be conveyed to the Porte, did not move; Ibn-Rashid also remained inactive; and Shaikh Jāsim's reprisals eventually took the shape of incursions into Liwah, in January and February 1889, in which date plantations were cut down and men, women, and children barbarously murdered. Shaikh Jāsim also prohibited the subjects of the Shaikh of Dibai, who had now thrown in his lot with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, from landing in Qatar for trade or for any other purpose. In April the Bani Yās in their turn retaliated by an expedition to the distant region of Barr-al-Qārah, from which they carried away a large number of camels belonging to the Bedouin tribes that supported the Shaikh of Dōhah. In June a counter- 1888.

raid was made by Jâsim's people in the direction of Abu Dhabi, from which they returned with camels taken from the Darû' and Âl Bû Shâmis Na'im. In August a number of the Âl Morrah transferred themselves to the side of Shaikh Zâid and promised to act with him against raiders from Qatar. In his eagerness to strike, Shaikh Jâsim ventured upon one occasion to despatch armed men and ammunition by boat to Sîla', a place on the coast considerably to the eastward of Khor-al-'Odaid and therefore under Abu Dhabi; but for this act he was severely reprimanded by the Resident under the orders of the Government of India, an intimation being added that repetition of the offence would entail serious consequences.

Turkish support of the Shaikh of Dôhah in the war, 1889.

During the continuance of the war the Turkish garrison at Dôhah received orders to assist Shaikh Jâsim in defending the town, if attacked; but they were prohibited from operating at a greater distance than 4 hours' march from Dôhah. At the end of 1889 the Wâli of Basrah tried to arrange a reconciliation and wrote a letter to Shaikh Zâid of Abu Dhabi, in which he exhorted him to submit to Turkish arbitration with a view to the avoidance of strife and bloodshed, and for the sake of the Muhammadan religion, common to the disputants, and of the "latent" sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey over both, which other powers were seeking to deny. To this communication the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, advised by the British Political Resident, replied that it was his own wish and intention, so long as the Shaikh of Dôhah abstained from aggressive movements, to confine himself to the government and protection of his own territories.

1890-91.

In 1890 raids and counter-raids continued, the advantage on the whole resting with the Shaikh of Dôhah; and in 1891 a raiding party from Qatar actually reached a point beyond Abu Dhabi town and succeeded in evading pursuit.

Rumoured design of the Turks to occupy 'Odaid, 1890-91.

In 1890-91, as already mentioned, there were rumours of an intention on the part of the Turks to post a Mudir at 'Odaid; but, though a Mudir designate actually arrived in Bahrain from Basrah at the end of 1890, they came to nothing.

Rising in Qatar against Turkish authority, 1893.

Relations between the Turks and the Shaikh of Dôhah, their nominal representative in Qatar, had for some time been growing more and more

strained, for Shaikh Jāsim had successfully obstructed the Turkish scheme of establishing a custom house at Dōhah, and the Turks believed him to be responsible for much of the tribal disorder and insecurity which prevailed in the country and along the coast. Matters were now brought to a crisis by a visit which the Wāli of Basrah paid to Qatar in the course of a tour to Hasa, doubtless with the object of setting matters right.

Negotiations between the Wāli and Shaikh Jāsim, February-March 1893.

His Excellency arrived by land from Hofūf towards the end of February 1893, accompanied by 300 cavalry, who had marched from Basrah *viâ* Kuwait, and by a regiment of infantry. He summoned Shaikh Jāsim to his presence at Dōhah; but Jāsim, who feared arrest notwithstanding a promise of safety, refused to visit him; and the Wāli, suspecting treachery or unwilling to compromise his own dignity, declined a suggestion by Jāsim that they should meet with small escorts in the desert. The negotiations continued for nearly a month, Ahmad, a brother of Jāsim, being employed on a safe-conduct as intermediary: but Jāsim refused to come in from Wajbah, 12 miles west of Dōhah, where he had taken up his position, and the Wāli at length resolved on forcible action.

Defeat of a Turkish force, 26th March 1893.

On the night of the 25th March, having first placed Ahmad and twelve of the principal men of Dōhah in confinement, the Wāli moved out with the Turkish troops and tried to surprise Shaikh Jāsim at Wajbah; but in this he failed, and the Arabs, collecting, attacked and defeated the components of the Turkish column, which were somewhat scattered. Most of the fighting appears to have taken place at Misaimīr about 7 miles south of Dōhah from which it would seem that the Turks had attempted a circuitous approach on Wajbah, or that they found a convenient line of retreat by Misaimīr. The troops, losing considerably as they went, eventually made their way back to the Dōhah fort; their retirement was covered towards the end by the guns of the Turkish vessel "Mirrikh," which afterwards opened on the town; and the Wāli took up his quarters on board the "Mirrikh." The total loss of the Turks on this day was estimated at 100 men, and of the Arabs at 400 souls—men, women, and children. By seizing the wells in the neighbourhood of Dōhah the Arabs compelled the Wāli to liberate Ahmad and the other leading men whom he held as hostages, and the Wāli had also to make terms for the return by land to Hofūf of the cavalry that he had brought with him from Hasa. After these events Dōhah was deserted by its inhabitants, who scattered to other places; Shaikh Jāsim continued to live quietly at Wajbah; and the "Mirrikh," with the Wāli on board, remained at anchor in the Dōhah harbour.

Attempted British intervention, May 1893.

A few days before the collision, Shaikh Jāsim, who evidently felt that his position was growing difficult, had written to the British Political Resident imploring his protection; and he had also applied to the Shaikh of Bahrain for leave to settle, under his jurisdiction, in the northern part of Qatar. On the Misaimīr affair coming to be known in London and at Constantinople, Lord Rosebery, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, requested that the British Political Resident or another officer should be sent to the spot to mediate between the Turks and Shaikh Jāsim; and Colonel Talbot, at the end of April, accordingly proceeded from Būshehr to Dōhah. The Wāli, however, declined to discuss matters with him unless by order of the Porte, and in the meantime news of his dismissal arrived; so Colonel Talbot, leaving the Wāli behind, moved to Wakrah, where he had an interview with Jāsim. Ahmad, having been appointed by his brother as plenipotentiary, agreed to accept any decision by the British Resident and asked to be provided with a place of refuge on the Qatar coast, where he might renew the Agreement of 1868 or undertake the same obligations as the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān. Here, however, the British proceedings ended.

Final settlement, June 1893.

In June 1893 a settlement between the Turkish Government and the Shaikh was effected by the Naqīb of Basrah, who arranged that, on condition of the arms captured from the Turks being surrendered, Shaikh Jāsim should be allowed to resign the Qāim Maqāmship in favour of his brother Ahmad, and should receive a free pardon.

General and internal history of Qatar since the rising against the Turks, 1893-1907.

Turkish Assistant Qāim-Maqām posted at Dōhah, 1893.

Notwithstanding this settlement and his own apparent unwillingness to serve them, Shaikh Jāsim continued to be treated by the Turks as Qāim-Maqām of Qatar; but a regular Turkish official was also posted to Dōhah as Assistant Qāim-Maqām. The refusal of the Turks to accept Jāsim's resignation was probably due to the consideration that he was less dangerous as an official than he might be as an irresponsible free-lance. The Turkish garrison at Dōhah was maintained, after 1893, at a considerable strength.

1894.

In 1894 the Assistant Qāim-Maqām of Dōhah and his wife were murdered by two Turkish soldiers, who at first escaped to Wakrah, but were in the end arrested and brought back.

In July 1896 the Bani Hājir carried off some 3,000 sheep and a number of camels belonging to the Na'im of Qatar; Ibn-Rashid, however, intervened, and in November he demanded that reparation should be made by Shaikh Jāsim to the Na'im, which was immediately done. 1896.

In 1897 Shaikh Jāsim, acting on behalf of the people of Qatar, appears to have informed the Mutasarrif that they could not afford to contribute to a war fund opened by the Turks in connection with their war against Greece. 1897.

In 1898, during a temporary absence of the Turkish gun vessel usually kept at Dōhah, a small rising took place in which several Turks and Arabs were killed. The reason of it appeared to be that the Arabs considered a successful raid made by the Shaikh of Kuwait in April 1898 upon the Bani Hājir, who were under the protection of Shaikh Jāsim, to have been instigated by the Turkish authorities. After this affair the garrison of Dōhah was again strengthened. Disturbances at Dōhah, 1898.

In 1902 both Jāsim and his brother Ahmad declined an invitation to visit Hasa. 1902.

In September 1905 a Muhammadan Turkish subject was murdered at Dōhah by Shaikh Ahmad, the brother of Jāsim, in mistake for a Jew, the partner of the deceased, against whom Ahmad had a grievance; and difficulties with the Turkish authorities at Basrah were at first apprehended on account of this incident. Ahmad, however, on becoming aware of his mistake, at once apologised to the Turks and tendered Rs. 800 as blood-money to the relatives of the murdered man; but the latter refused to accept compensation. 1905.

In 1906 it was reported that the Turkish garrison at Dōhah was nominally 200 men, but that it generally stood, on account of desertions, at about half that strength. 1906.

In November 1905, through a visit by Captain Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, much light was cast upon the administrative position in Qatar. It appeared that Shaikh Jāsim, though for five or six years he had been living in retirement at Lūsail and had nominally abdicated both the Qāim-Maqāmship and the chiefship, was still in reality ruler of Dōhah and all its dependencies, and that nothing of importance was done in Qatar without his being consulted. At the same time his brother Ahmad, who discharged the active duties of the Qāim-Maqāmship and who was accordingly the medium in all dealings with the Turks, had succeeded in acquiring a certain position of his own, and some jealousy prevailed between him and Jāsim. Semi-independent charge of Wakrah was held by Shaikh Jāsim's third son, 'Abdur Rahmān. In Administrative position in Qatar, 1905.

spite of his great age, probably well over 80 years, Shaikh Jāsim was found in excellent health and full possession of his faculties; he appeared to be keenly interested in all matters of business.

Assassination of Shaikh Ahmad and sequel, December 1905.

In December 1905, shortly after Captain Prideaux's visit, Shaikh Ahmad was murdered by one of his own servants, a Bani Hājir, on account of a private grudge; it was generally suspected that Khalifah, the eldest son of Shaikh Jāsim, had also been privy to the crime. The old Shaikh proved himself quite capable of dealing with the emergency, for he obliged the elders of the Bani Hājir to resort in a submissive manner to his camp, where they gave an undertaking to hunt down and execute the murderer. At the close of one of his discussions with them an untoward incident occurred in the shape of a sudden and murderous attack on Sālim-bin-Shāfi', chief Shaikh of the Makhadhdhabah division of the Bani Hājir, by a slave of the deceased; but, connection with the deed having been emphatically repudiated by the Āl Thāni, the progress of the negotiations was not disturbed. A few weeks later the murderer of Shaikh Ahmad was shot dead in Dhahrān by Bashīr, a nephew of Sālim-bin-Shāfi', and the feud arising from the death of Ahmad was declared closed. One result of the murder of Ahmad was to leave 'Abdullah, the fourth son of Jāsim, in charge of Dōhah, whereby he was considered to have obtained an advantage over his eldest brother Khalifah in respect of the ultimate succession to Shaikh Jāsim. It was noticeable that the Turks abstained very carefully from meddling in the nomination of the new Shaikh of Dōhah, and that they left the matter entirely to Shaikh Jāsim; but, notwithstanding their respect for his independence in tribal matters, his foreign relations continued to be controlled by the Turkish military commandant of the Dōhah fort. In November 1906 an attempt was made on the life of Shaikh 'Abdullah by a negro slave, who was not shot down until he had killed two persons.

Tribal matters, 1905-06.

In April 1905 Shaikh Ahmad of Dōhah headed a raid by Āl Morrah and Bani Hājir of the Makhadhdhabah division on 'Ajmān, Bani Khālid of the 'Amāir section and Bani Hājir of the Āl Muhammad division, who were then encamped in the Jāfūrah desert; some spoil in the shape of flocks was obtained, but the raiders lost five men killed. In May 1906 Shaikh 'Abdullah of Dōhah undertook a small punitive expedition against the predatory Bani Hājir and Manāsir tribes; and in July he again forayed the Bedouins, proceeding himself as far as Dōhat-as-Salwa and sending a party, by whom twelve Bedouins were killed, through Barr-al-Qārah almost as far

as 'Oqair. In August 1906 the Shaikh of the Āl Morrah, who had suffered heavy punishment at the hands of the 'Ajmān and become a fugitive, visited Shaikh 'Abdullah; in September the 'Ajmān composed a long-standing feud with the people of Dōhah by surrendering 100 camels and entering into engagements; and in November the head of the Makhadhdhabah Banī Hājir came to an arrangement with Shaikh Jāsim, which made it possible for the Makhadhdhabah to camp again with safety in Qatar.

British relations with Qatar during the same period, 1893-1907.

The relations of the British authorities with Qatar continued after 1893 on the same unsatisfactory footing as before, being still partly with the Turks and partly with the Shaikhs of the Āl Thānī family.

Question of the status of Qatar, 1893.

On the 15th of April 1893, in the course of discussions relating to late events at Dōhah, a note was handed to Lord Rosebery by the Turkish Ambassador in London in which reference was made to Qatar as "a Turkish sub-governorship" and "a dependency of Najd." Attention having been drawn to these expressions by the Government of India, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook, as the communications had been of an informal nature, to remind the Turkish representative privately that Her Majesty's Government dissented from the view implied in the note.

Question of British war vessels at Dōhah and British liberty of action in Qatar, 1893.

In 1893 the Turkish authorities at Dōhah protested against the presence of H.M.S. "Brisk" in the harbour, forbade the Commander to hold torpedo practice in the bay, and prevented the officers of the ship from visiting the shore. Instructions for future guidance were solicited by the naval authorities; and it was laid down by the Government of India, with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, that, while Turkish rule should not be recognised at Dōhah and British naval officers might act there, as upon the coast of Hasa, in such manner as might be necessary to prevent or punish infractions of the maritime peace, it was desirable that no opportunity should be given to Turkish officials of asserting by overt action such nominal authority as the Porte might possess in the locality, and that, therefore, Her Majesty's ships should refrain from visiting the harbour of Dōhah except when special occasion for doing so should arise.

About the same time it was observed by Her Majesty's Government, in correspondence with the Government of India, that, as the actual authority of the Turks appeared to be confined to the town of Dōhah, there was no sufficient reason for allowing the pretensions of Turkey to interfere with British liberty of action in Qatar or prevent the Government of India from making such treaties with the chiefs of Qatar as might be considered advisable.

Insult to the British flag at Dōhah, 1894.

In the spring of 1894 a vessel owned by a British Indian subject was boarded, on entering the port of Dōhah, by a party of Turkish soldiers who at first hauled down and took possession of her British flag; on being satisfied, however, that the vessel was British and had a British certificate, they restored the flag. The Political Resident from Būshehr then visited Dōhah in H.M.S. "Sphinx," but the local Turkish officials, on the ground that the Resident's direct request was irregular, refused to offer any explanation of the incident and referred him to the superior Turkish authorities. The Government of India instructed the Resident to take no further action in the matter inasmuch as the mistake had been rectified as soon as discovered, while to press for explanations would only be to elicit an assertion of the Porte's jurisdiction at Dōhah, all occasion for which it was desired to avoid; but the Wāli of Basrah, having been informed of the occurrence by the British representative there, denied the lowering of the flag and gave assurances of the friendship of Turkey for Britain.

Attempted invasion of Bahrain from Zubārah, 1895.

The history of an attempt to invade the Bahrain Islands, made by Shaikh Jāsim in 1895 with the countenance of the Turks, is given at length in the history of the Bahrain principality. As there related, the attempt was frustrated by the forcible action of British war vessels at Zubārah, and provided Her Majesty's Government with an opportunity of informing the Porte that they could not admit the part of the coast on which Zubārah was situated to lie within the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire.

Question of a Turkish sanitary post in Qatar, 1897.

In 1897 the Constantinople Board of Health proposed to establish a sanitary post in Qatar; but the project was defeated by the opposition of the British delegate, who explained that Her Majesty's Government did not recognise the existence of Turkish jurisdiction over Hasa.

Question of the renewal of treaty relations between Great Britain and the Al Thāni

The admission of Shaikh Jāsim in 1882 that the Agreement of 1868 was still valid and his willingness in 1893 to renew that Agreement or to contract engagements similar to those accepted by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān have already been mentioned. In 1898, at a private interview with Lieutenant Robinson of H.M.S. "Sphinx," Shaikh Ahmad, who then represented

his brother at Dōhah, declared his readiness to enter into the same relations with the British Government as were maintained by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman; and in November 1899, at a meeting with Colonel Meade, the Political Resident, at Wakrah, Shaikh Ahmad expressed a desire to form a closer connection with the British power and asked for permission to occupy 'Odaid; but no action was taken on his requests as he failed to confirm them in writing. Shaikhs. 1898-99.

After the posting of Mr. Gaskin to Bahrain as Assistant Political Agent at the beginning of 1900, Shaikh Ahmad made indirect overtures to him for an understanding with the British Government; his proposals resembled the suggestions that he had made to Colonel Meade in 1899, and he continued to repeat them at intervals. At length, in the spring of 1902, a definite message was received by Mr. Gaskin from Shaikh Ahmad, who offered, on condition of British protection being extended to himself and his followers, to take up his residence at any point on the coast which might be appointed,* to hold himself responsible for the security of the adjoining waters, and to co-operate with the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain in such matters as might concern them on the mainland. The principal motives of the Shaikh's offer were undoubtedly fear of the Turks and a desire to strengthen his own position in the eyes of the people of Qatar; but, as the arrangement proposed might have satisfactory results, the offer was reported by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government. An investigation of Shaikh Ahmad's position was authorised, but it was directed that no obligations should be undertaken without further reference to the Secretary of State or without full consideration of the political and military aspects of the case. After enquiry it was reported that Ahmad was already virtual chief of Qatar; that his brother Jāsim, though still treated by the Turks as Qāim-Maqām of Qatar,—a title which he repudiated,—had retired in his favour; and that Ahmad was more likely to succeed his brother at his death than any of Jāsim's sons. Subsequent experience, as we have seen, showed this report to be partially erroneous, inasmuch as Jāsim's retirement from the chief power was, up to 1905, only ostensible; and the violent death of Ahmad in 1905 falsified the expectations current in 1902 regarding the succession to the chiefship. 1900-02.

* This is what was reported at the time; but it was afterwards stated that the instructions of Shaikh Ahmad's agent, one 'Abdur Rahmān, Wazzān, were to apply for leave to colonise 'Odaid. In reply to a query by Mr. Gaskin, however, the agent said that he thought Shaikh Ahmad would be equally well satisfied with a settlement at Zubārah or at some other place.

1903. It was thought that on the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit to Bahrain, in November 1903, Shaikh Ahmad might present himself in person to urge his wish for British protection; and, in view of this contingency, the answer to be given him was discussed between the Indian and British Governments. It was decided by His Majesty's Government that the *status quo* in Qatar, which the Porte on its side had recognised by the withdrawal of Mudirs appointed to Wakrah and Zubārah,—a matter which will presently be mentioned,—ought not to be disturbed by the conclusion of any fresh Agreement between the Shaikhs of Qatar and the British Government; but that the Shaikh might be assured of the friendship of the British Government being continued, so long as he should abstain from entering into engagements with another power. Ahmad, however, did not appear in Bahrain; and the necessity of making any communication to him was thus obviated. It was generally admitted at this time that an Agreement with the Shaikhs of Qatar would be advantageous, inasmuch as it would invest the British Government with a special position in regard to the maintenance of maritime peace off the coasts of the promontory, and would increase the weight of British opinion in any international question that might arise concerning the use of the adjacent pearl banks; but it was held expedient to defer a final decision until the British position in the Persian Gulf should have been examined by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and until tension at the moment prevailing between Great Britain and Turkey in Arabia should have subsided. In September 1903 Shaikh Ahmad was eager to be informed by Mr. Gaskin, who came to Lūsail, whether a petition by him for British protection was likely to be favourably received; but in 1905, when Captain Prideaux visited Qatar, he seemed to have grown indifferent on the subject, though he still complained of the Turkish incubus at Dōhah.

Attempt by the Porte to establish posts and officials at Zubārah, Wakrah and 'Odaid, 1902-04.

While the proposals of Shaikh Ahmad for closer relations with the British Government, made in 1902, were under consideration, a step was taken by the Turkish Government which temporarily diverted attention from that subject and added to the complications with which it was already beset. On the 27th of November 1902 it was suddenly announced in the "Iqdām," a semi-official Turkish organ, that Turkish Mudirliks were to be created at 'Odaid, Wakrah, Zubārah and Jazīrat-al-'Amāir * on the Arabian coast. Confirmation of the news was soon forthcoming in Bahrain, the Mudīr designate of Zubārah

* The islands of Muallaniya and Jinnah are both known as Jazirat-al-'Amāir: either or both may have been intended.

arriving in Hasa in February of 1903, and the official intended for Wakrah in the month after. It was further ascertained that the Turkish scheme involved the erection of guard-houses to connect Zubārah with 'Oqair. Towards the end of March 1903 a Turkish gunboat left Basrah for Qatar to assist in the execution of the general design. Exactly three days later, on the 23rd of March, assurances were received by the British Ambassador at Constantinople from the Grand Vazīr that no intention of posting officials to the places in question existed; but the proceedings of the Turks continued to be suspicious and were closely watched. H.M.S. "Sphinx" was sent to visit Zubārah and 'Odaid, and called at Wakrah, where the Turkish flag was found flying. Meanwhile Yūsuf Bey, the Mudīr designate of Wakrah, had reached Bahrain on his way, as was suspected, to Wakrah. Under the authority of His Majesty's Government obstacles were placed in the way of his sailing for Qatar, but he succeeded in evading them; he left Bahrain on the 27th of April; and a few days later, after one unsuccessful attempt, was reported to have established himself at Wakrah. In the interim, on the 27th of April, an assurance had been obtained at Constantinople that the *status quo* in Qatar should not be in any way disturbed. After a short time Yūsuf Bey was called to Dōhah to act for the Assistant Qāim-Maqām of Qatar, and a peremptory demand for his recall from Wakrah having been addressed to the Porte by His Majesty's Government, it does not appear that he subsequently returned to the place. Soon, however, it was discovered that 'Abdur Rahmān, son of Shaikh Jāsim, had been officially appointed to Wakrah in place of Yūsuf Bey with the title of Mudīr and a salary of $52 a month. This elicited a fresh protest from the British Government, who refused to recognise the right of the Turks to appoint any administrative official whatsoever in Qatar, even from among the local Shaikhs; and at last, in October 1904, 'Abdur Rahmān was, by order of the Porte, deprived of the status of Mudīr. It seems, however, that he was allowed to retain his salary,* which the Turks represented to be a subsidy of old standing, as also the status which he enjoyed at Wakrah as local agent of the Turkish Government.

Piracies on the coast of Qatar, 1893-1906.

From 1893 to 1898 piracies were of rare occurrence upon the coast of Qatar. The only serious case, apparently, was one that occurred in 1895, in which a British Indian sailing vessel was plundered, one of the crew being killed and others wounded; and in 1896 'Ali, an Āl Bin-'Ali

* In 1906, however, it was stated that 'Abdur Rahmān had never actually drawn this salary.

refugee from Bahrain settled at Ghārīyah, attacked a Bahrain boat and carried off Rs. 1,000 in pearls and money.

1899. The year 1899, however, was signalised by a renewal of insecurity. In February 1899 a Persian vessel, the "Mubāraki," was plundered by Arabs at Abu Dhulūf, losing two-thirds of her cargo. On the 16th of August a Bahrain jolly-boat was attacked and carried off by Bani Hājir Bedouins near Dhakhīrah, but recovery of the boat and part of the cargo was subsequently effected through the Shaikh of Dōhah. A few days after the piracy at Dhakhīrah, two Dangis belonging to Hindu British subjects were captured, again by Bani Hājir pirates, near the Fasht-ad-Dibal; one was pillaged and abandoned, the other was taken bodily to Rās-adh-Dhabaiyah, where she was beached and became a total wreck. The damage in these three cases amounted to over Rs. 16,000, of which amount only about one-fourth was made good by restitution. The remainder was still unrecovered when Colonel Meade, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, visited Wakrah on the 25th of November 1899 and had an interview on shore with Ahmad, the brother of Shaikh Jāsim, principally with reference to the outrages.

1900. On the 18th of August 1900 some Bedouins of Qatar, disguised as pearl-fishers, boarded a Bahrain vessel at the Qarainah bank, a few miles north of Rās Rakan, and plundered her; in this case the property lost scarcely exceeded Rs. 300 in value, but the principal loser was a shell-purchaser in the employment of a British mercantile firm. This fresh case revived the question of reparation for the earlier piracies.

1902. The proceedings, however, remained infructuous; and in February 1902 they were abandoned, chiefly on account of the time that had elapsed since the occurrences, and of the security which had since prevailed along the Qatar coast. The ability of the Shaikh of Dōhah to prevent piratical outrages was not entirely clear, and he asserted that the depredations were invariably committed by the Bani Hājir Bedouins, whom the presence of the Turks prevented him from chastising, and that some of the so-called piracies were committed by marauders who waded out from the coast and did not make use of boats belonging to villages. It was, however, decided by the Government of India that in future the Shaikh should continue to be held responsible for the behaviour of the Bedouins of Qatar, his property in Bahrain being if necessary placed under attachment until redress had been afforded, and that the inhabitants of coast villages should be treated as answerable for the use of their vessels by pirates.

1906-07.

After 1900 there were no further complaints of piracy on the Qatar coast until the 8th of January 1906, when the crew of a Persian boat belonging to Rig arrived in Bahrain and stated that in the previous month, after being driven by stress of weather to Abu Dhulûf in Qatar and compelled by the elements to jettison part of their cargo, they had been plundered and otherwise ill-treated by the inhabitants of the village. Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, proceeded in H.M.S. "Sphinx" to the scene of the accident, where he remained from the 28th to the 30th of January; but 'Isa-bin-Hamad, the headman of the place, though assured of good treatment, refused to come on board and professed himself a subject of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Captain Prideaux accordingly wrote to the headman requiring his presence before him in Bahrain and returned to his headquarters, but bad weather prevented the removal of two boats belonging to Abu Dhulûf which it had been intended to take away as security for the headman's appearance. 'Isa-bin-Hamad eventually arrived in Bahrain on the 1st of March and stated that nothing had been taken from the Persians except salvage which they voluntarily paid; but, in the meanwhile, his contumacy had been reported to the Government of India and orders requested. In June 1906 a protest was lodged by the Turkish Ambassador in London, to the effect that Captain Prideaux's action would have a disturbing effect on the tribes and might give rise to difficulties. The Persian complainants, though duly summoned, did not return to Bahrain to answer the objections of the headman; and the case, as one of piracy, was then necessarily dropped, the headman being merely cautioned as to his future behaviour.

Orders of Government in regard to piracies, February 1907.

Some points, however, had been raised by the incident in regard to which the Government of India considered it necessary to issue instructions for the future guidance of their officers. These instructions, after being approved by His Majesty's Government, were issued in February 1907: their substance was that, as action against piratical communities on the coast of Qatar, especially when the sufferers were persons not entitled to British protection, required careful consideration, all cases of piracy and maritime disturbance should be reported, as they occurred, to the Government of India. This form of procedure the Government of India considered to be preferable both to the grant of discretionary powers to local officers and to the laying down by themselves of any general rule, and they did not anticipate that the slight delay which it might involve would have an disadvantageous results in regard to the final settlement of cases. They added that it appeared unnecessary to make a rule, as had been

suggested by the Political Agent in Bahrain, that petty chiefs should be required to come off or send a boat, without having been specially asked to do so, to every British Government vessel arriving in their vicinity.

Maritime disturbance, 1900.

Of a non-piratical nature, but otherwise worthy of mention, was a collision which occurred off the coast of Qatar in 1900 between the Āl Bin-'Ali and the 'Amāmarah: these tribes, as related in the history of Bahrain, had a blood-feud with one another of several years standing. On the 16th of June 1900, five boats of 'Amāmarah and two of Dawāsir from Bahrain were driven by an adverse wind into the neighbourhood of Wakrah, where a fleet of Āl Bin-'Ali and other boats was engaged in pearling; and the Āl Bin-'Ali, who were in greater strength than the 'Amāmarah, finding their blood-enemies unexpectedly at hand, hoisted their flags, as in honour bound, and made sail as if to attack. The 'Amāmarah replied by a fusillade from their boats, and a serious encounter might have ensued but for the intervention of a nephew of Shaikh Jāsim, who persuaded the 'Amāmarah to surrender their arms to the Āl Bin-'Ali and enabled them to depart in safety. As it appeared, from investigations held by the Assistant Political Officer in Bahrain, that the Āl Bin-'Ali were the aggressors,* they were in the first place fined Rs. 1,000 for breach of the maritime peace. Being required to deliver up the 'Amāmarah rifles, 20 in number, which had passed into their possession, they substituted some inferior weapons; and for this further offence an additional fine of Rs. 500 was imposed on them. The fines were paid with a promptitude which showed the effectiveness of the means of compulsion held in reserve by the British Government, — the sequestration, namely, of property owned by the Āl Bin-'Ali in Bahrain.

Visits of British officers to Qatar, 1899-1903.

In 1899, as already mentioned, the Resident, Colonel Meade, paid a visit to Wakrah; and in September 1903 Mr. Gaskin, the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, touched at Lūsail and at Wakrah and interviewed Shaikhs Jāsim and Ahmad separately.

1905.

In November 1905 Captain Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, crossed over to Qatar in a native boat and went to see Shaikh Jāsim in his camp at Bū Hasa, about 10 miles inland from Lūsail: here he remained for three days, transacting business with the Shaikh, and had an interview with Nāsir-bin-Mubarak, the Bahrain refugee and claimant. On his return to the coast Captain Prideaux spent a day with Shaikh

* It may be mentioned, however, that the Āl Bin'Ali have never ceased to deny the justice of this decision; they allege that they got up sail to avoid the 'Amāmarah, not to attack them; and they claim credit for not having fired back when fired upon.

Ahmad at Dōhah. By this visit a great addition was made to what had before been known, geographically and politically, concerning Qatar.

1906. In May 1906, Major Cox, the Political Resident in the Gulf, accompanied by Captain Prideaux, made a tour by sea in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" to Lūsail, Dōhah, Wakrah and Khor-al-'Odaid. At Lūsail a friendly interview with Shaikh Jāsim and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, his son-in-law, took place; at Dōhah a call was made on the Turkish Commandant and business was discussed; at Wakrah, where no member of the Āl Thāni family happened to be present, the party visited the headman of the Āl Bū 'Ainain tribe and inspected the fort and wells; at 'Odaid the inlet was traversed for several miles in a steam-cutter, but not a single human being was described upon its shores. The visit to Dōhah was afterwards reported by the Turkish military authorities in Hasa to Constantinople, with a recommendation that efforts should be made to put down piracy in order to deprive the English of all excuse for interference on the Qatar coast.

Relations of Qatar with Najd, 1893-1907.

Relations with Ibn-Rashid, 1893-1896. We have seen that before the crisis of 1893, and especially in 1888, friendly relations prevailed between Shaikh Jāsim and the Amir of Jabal Shammar: nor were they discontinued, apparently, until the overthrow of Ibn-Rashid's power in Najd. In 1894 Shaikh Jāsim sought an interview with Ibn-Rashid, which was refused for fear of the Turks; and in 1896, as already mentioned, the Shaikh at the request of Ibn-Rashid caused restitution of animals raided to be made by one tribe of Qatar to another.

Relations with Ibn-Sa'ūd, 1905. When Hāil declined and Riyādh obtained the ascendancy in Central Arabia, Shaikh Jāsim, in his later years a convinced Wahhābi and during most of his life a bitter enemy of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, had no difficulty in adapting himself to the change and began to send money and other gifts annually to Ibn-Sa'ūd; but his views in this respect were not shared by his brother Shaikh Ahmad. A visit paid by 'Abdul 'Azīz, son of the Wahhābi Amir, in the summer of 1905 to districts adjoining Qatar brought out the divergence of opinion in the Āl Thani family very clearly: for, while Shaikh Jāsim sent the Amīr a letter of welcome, with $ 8,000 in cash and a present of rifles and rice, and himself visited him at the wells of 'Araiq, Shaikh Ahmad warned him that any attempt on his part to cross the border of Qatar would be opposed by the united forces of Dōhah and Abu Dhabi.

CHAPTER V.

HISTORY OF BAHRAIN.*

Early History, 1602-1783.

Expulsion of the Portuguese by the Persians, about 1602.

In tracing the course of events in Bahrain it is unnecessary to go back beyond 1602, about which year the Portuguese were expelled from the islands by the † Persians; the ruined fort on the northern coast of the main island, known at the present day as Qal'at-al-'Ajāj, is a relic of the Portuguese occupation.

Persian occupation of uncertain duration.

After this the Persians appear to have retained possession for a considerable time; and in 1622 they must have had a military dépôt in Bahrain, for they brought thence a quantity of the gunpowder which they expended in the siege of Hormūz.

Seizure of Bahrain by the Imām of 'Omān, 1718.

In or about 1718 a descent was made on Bahrain by the Arabs of Masqat, then governed by Sultān-bin-Saif II, an Imām of the Ya'arabi

* The only authorities in regard to the recent history of Bahrain are the records of the Government of India and compilations based thereon, among which may be mentioned *Bombay Selections, XXIV*, 1856; a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906; a *Précis of Bahrain Affairs, 1854-1904*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Katar Affairs*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. For Agreements, etc., relating to Bahrain the reader is referred to Aitchison's *Treaties*, and for details of British naval action and similar matters to Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877. Palgrave's *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865, gives a view of the state of affairs in Bahrain in 1862-1863. The authorities for early events (1602-1800) are the same as those cited for the corresponding period in the footnote to the title of Chapter First.

† In this and in most other places where "Persians" are mentioned in connection with Bahrein affairs, the term must be understood to mean "subjects of the Persian Government." Persian subjects employed by their Government in matters at Bahrain have generally been Arabs of the Būshehr and Kangūn neighbourhoods.

dynasty; it is not clear whether the Bahrain islands were then derelict or whether a Persian garrison held them; but in either case the invaders seem to have had little difficulty in establishing their power. The 'Omāni occupation seems to have lasted for a short time only, and it is said to have been brought to an end by the voluntary removal from their homes of the indigenous population, who emigrated to other places in order to escape foreign oppression.

Predominance and proceedings of the Hūwalah, about 1751-53.

At the middle of the 18th century the Hūwalah Arabs, at the present day still strongly represented in the islands, were the chief resident tribe and controlled the politics of the archipelago; but in 1753 they were so much divided among themselves by feuds that the conquest of the islands appeared likely to prove an easy task for any foreign invader.

Annexation to Persia, about 1753.

Apparently in that very year, invited by the local situation, Shaikh Nāsir, the ruler of Būshehr under the Persian Government, made a descent upon Bahrain and, with the assistance of Mīr Nāsir, chief of Rīg, established his own authority there. In this manner the islands again became a dependency, at least in name, of Persia.

Revenue on account of Bahrain claimed by the Vakīl of Shīrāz, 1755-67.

In 1755, partly because of his failure to pay 5,000 Tūmāns on account of the revenues of Bahrain during the three years that it had been in his possession, Shaikh Nāsir was imprisoned by the Vakīl Karīm Khān at Shīrāz; and in 1767 the Vakīl seems to have insisted that he should pay 4,000 Tūmāns a year on account of Būshehr and Bahrain together.

Events Bahrain, 1753-83.

There is no information regarding the internal affairs of Bahrain during the Persian occupation established in 1753. In 1771 pirates of Kharag, having captured two ships under British colours—with several others—in the Gulf below Būshehr, carried their prizes to Bahrain and kept them there until they found an opportunity of removing them to Rīg. In 1779 a certain Shaikh Nāsir of Bahrain, who brought with him a vessel of his own, took part in the recovery of Būshehr, on behalf of Shaikh Nāsir of that town, from one Bāqir Khān into whose hands it had fallen. These affairs, which hardly concern Bahrain, are related in full in their proper places.

English and other foreign views in regard to Bahrain, 1602-1783.

Bahrain was one of the first places in the Persian Gulf to attract the attention of the representatives of the English East India Company.

Thomas Aldworth, appointed chief of the Sūrat Factory on its foundation at the beginning of 1613, was soon engaged in a search for new markets outside India, and reported upon Bahrain, during his first year of office, in the following terms: "I find there is a seaport town called "Bareyn, whereunto a ship of 2 or 3 hundred tons may come, and I "understand this country spends much cloth, for the Venetians bring it "overland and so carry with them again all sorts of Persian Silks, which "trade is, as it were, offered us, and surely I think in short time will be "able to vent as much cloth as Suratt."

1623. The Company soon after this selected Jāshk, and subsequently Bandar 'Abbās, as their port in the Persian Gulf; but occasional references to Bahrain continue to occur in their records, as for example in 1625, when some information regarding the pearl fishery with its headquarters in Bahrain was extracted from Portuguese deserters.

1700-01. In 1700-01, when, after a brief re-approchement, the relations of the Old East India Company with the Persian Government had again become unsatisfactory, it was suggested by Mr. Owen, the Company's Agent in Persia, "that, if in future it should become necessary for the Company to "employ force for the preservation of their privileges and trade in Persia, "it would be expedient to take possession of the Island of Barrein near "Bassorah, a station which would not only afford a proportion of Persian "produce, but enable the Company's cruisers to overawe the trade."

In 1751, when an attack on Bandar 'Abbās was feared, the Company's representatives there asked that they might be authorised to remove elsewhere and pointed out that the present was "a fine opportunity ..... of seizing the Persian Fleet and settling at Bahreen;" but the Bombay Presidency in reply to these proposals, while they sanctioned a temporary transfer of the Factory to some other place, strictly forbade any interference with Persian vessels.

1752. In 1752, the project of a removal from Bandar 'Abbās being still under consideration, enquiries were made in regard to various possible new locations: and Mr. F. Wood, the Company's Agent, reported in those terms on Bahrain; "I can get no better intelligence relating to "the Island of Bahreen, than its being a place held in superstitious "veneration by the Hoolah Arabs, and that it is very fertile, abound-"ing with Springs and fresh water, but both the Air and Water are "extremely unwholesome according to the Account of several Persons "who have been formerly Inhabitants of that Place." Eventually, in 1763, Būshehr was chosen in preference to Bahrain as the base of the Company's operations in the Persian Gulf, just as Jāshk had been selected a century and a half before.

When the Dutch under Baron Kniphausen formed a settlement on Khārag at the end of 1753, it was strongly suspected that they meant to seize Bahrain, and the suspicion for some time continued to be entertained; but, if they harboured the design thus attributed to them, they took no steps to carry it into effect. Dutch view, 1753-66.

Conquest of Bahrain from the Persians by the Arabs, 1783.

The recent history of Bahrain may be said to date from 1783, in which year the Persians, then in possession, were expelled from the islands. The Arab horde which drove them out was led by the Shaikhs of the 'Utūb; but it included contingents from numerous tribes of the Arabian mainland.

The conflict in Bahrain may have been provoked by Persian aggression upon Zubārah, a flourishing settlement on the adjacent coast of Qatar which had been founded a few years previously by 'Atbi settlers from the port of Kuwait. This place Shaikh Nāsir, Governor of Būshehr and Bahrain under the Persians, was commissioned by Karīm Khān, Zand, to reduce; and as early as 1777, apparently, some attempt was made by him to carry out his instructions. Invasion of Bahrain by the 'Utūb, 1782.

After the death of Karīm Khān, the power of Persia as a Government being for the time paralysed, the Arabs of Zubārah retaliated, probably in 1782, by a descent on the Island of Bahrain; they defeated Shaikh Nāsir in the field, drove him to his fort, plundered and destroyed the town of Manāmah, and took possession of a Būshehr vessel with which they retired to Zubārah.

As related in the history of Qatar, a counter-attack was next made upon the 'Utūb of Zubārah by the Shaikh of Būshehr with the aid of supporters from Rās-al-Khaimah and Hormūz; but it was ignominiously repulsed. A message from Shaikh Nāsir informing his son, who had been left in charge of Bahrain, of the defeat of the Persians and urging him to hold out resolutely in Bahrain, was meanwhile intercepted at sea by a fleet of six large vessels and a number of boats despatched by the 'Utūb of Kuwait to the relief of their kinsmen at Zubārah; and this expedition, having changed their destination, ran to Manāmah, seized and set fire to the town, and shut the Persian garrison up in the citadel. The northern 'Utūb were joined in Bahrain, as quickly as the available means of transport would admit, by the 'Utub of Zubārah and Ruwais Capture of Bahrain by the 'Utub and other Arabs, 1782.

and by contingents from various tribes of Qatar, among them Āl Musallam from Huwailah, Āl Bin'-Ali from Fuwairat, Sūdān from Dōhah, Āl Bū 'Ainain from Wakrah, Kibīsah from Khor Hassān, Sulutah from Dōhah, Manāna'ah from Abu Dhalūf, Sādah from Ruwais, Āl Bū Kuwārah from Sumaismah, and Na'im Bedouins from the interior of the promontory. The Bahrain Islands were quickly occupied by the invaders; and the Persian garrison of the Manāmah fort, after a siege of about two months' duration, capitulated on the 28th of July 1783 and were allowed to return to Būshehr.

Events from the foundation of the Bahrain Shaikhdom to the first attack on Bahrain by the Saiyid of 'Omān 1783-1800.

Secession of the Jalāhimah, 1783.

Bahrain was thus transformed from a Persian dependency into an Arab principality governed by Shaikhs of the Āl Khalifah section of the 'Utūb. The Jalāhimah section of the tribe, who had once before separated themselves from the rest of the 'Utūb in Qatar and who now considered themselves unfairly treated by the majority in Bahrain, shortly took their departure for the mainland, leaving the Āl Khalīfah in undisputed possession of the new conquest. The disappointed Jalāhimah were at this time under the leadership of four brothers, sons of a deceased Shaikh named Jābir; and one of these, named Rahmah, was destined to achieve great notoriety and to become the scourge of the Āl Khalīfah of Bahrain.

Abortive measures of the Persians for the recovery of Bahrain, 1783-1785.

The Persian Government, or rather the Arab Shaikhs representing them in the Gulf, could not at once reconcile themselves to the loss of Bahrain. During the latter part of the year 1783 preparations were on foot for an expedition on a large scale by the Shaikhs of Būshehr and Hormūz, assisted by Persian troops and by the Shaikh of the Qawāsim, against Zubārah and Kuwait; but no armament actually sailed. Again, in February 1785, the fleets of Būshehr and Rig rendezvoused at Kangūn, where a small land force had already arrived from Shīrāz, to await the Shaikhs of Hormūz and Rās-al-Khaimah; but the death of 'Ali Murād Khān of Shīrāz dispelled the danger which thus threatened the Āl Khalīfah of Bahrain. During the next few years, while the Shīrāz Government laboured under domestic difficulties, the Shaikhs of Bahrain remained unmolested; and in 1798 they were still able to lend effectual aid to the Shaikh of Būshehr in affairs upon the Persian coast.

The conquest of Bahrain by the 'Utub gave a great impulse to the trade of the islands, for the Arab immigrants soon acquired a mercantile fleet and became the principal carriers of goods between Masqat, at this time the chief local emporium, and Basrah and the places on the western coast of the Gulf. There were no import duties in Bahrain under the first 'Atbi Shaikhs, and the interests of merchants were carefully protected. The pearl trade of the Persian Gulf was at this period almost entirely controlled by the people of Bahrain; and their annual imports from India, valued at 10 lakhs of rupees, were paid for by means of pearls, chiefly through the market of Masqat.

Growth of trade, 1783-90.

First attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān on Bahrain, 1799-1802.

Throughout a whole generation following this short era of peace, the independence of Bahrain was more than once in serious jeopardy; but the cause, at this later time, was less the assertion by Persia of claims to sovereignty than the ambition of Saiyid Sultān and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat to annex, without any shadow of right, the comparatively rich and valuable islands of Bahrain.

In 1799 Saiyid Sultān of Masqat, not without encouragement from the Persian governor of Shirāz, declared war against the 'Utūb of Bahrain; this he did ostensibly on the ground of their refusing to recognise a tax or due which he claimed the right to levy on all vessels passing Masqat, but really with the object of conquering Bahrain. The marine of the Āl Khalifah seems to have consisted at this time of three large vessels only, all of which were captured at sea, while returning from India, by the navy of Masqat; but Saiyid Sultān did not as yet venture to land in Bahrain. The 'Utūb, alarmed by his proceedings, opened a correspondence with Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, who received their advances with alacrity and, on their offering to become tributary to Persia, proceeded privately to Bahrain and received from them an instalment of revenue on account of the past year. The 'Utūb seem to have stated to the Persians on this occasion that Bahrain had once belonged to the Turkish Government, out of whose possession it had passed about seventy years previously.*

Outbreak of war with Masqat, 1799.

In 1800 the ruler of Masqat invaded Bahrain, capturing 25 of the leading families, whom he deported to Masqat, and establishing an 'Omāni garrison in a fort at 'Arād on Muharraq Island. Some of the

Invasion and occupation of Bahrain by Saiyid Sultān, 1800-1801.

* This was of course incorrect. The Turks temporarily established themselves in Bahrain in 1559, but they were again expelled by the Portuguese in the same year.

chiefs of the defeated 'Utûb took refuge on this occasion at Zubârah, and others at Kuwait, to which last place Saiyid Sultân apparently pursued them. At his departure the Saiyid left his youthful son Sâlim, with whom he associated a reliable adviser, in charge of his interests in Bahrain; but the position of the 'Omânis there was precarious, and in 1801, not long after the sailing of the Saiyid's fleet, they were invested in 'Arâd by the 'Utûb and compelled to surrender and to evacuate Bahrain.

Renewed invasion of Bahrain by Saiyid Sultân, 1802.

In the following year, having obtained some assistance from Bûshehr by permission of the Persian ruler of Shîrâz, Saiyid Sultân again landed in Bahrain and successfully engaged the 'Utûb; but the latter had now secured the support of the Wahhâbis, whose outposts by this time threatened the land frontiers of the 'Omân Sultanate; and in these circumstances the ruler of Masqat seems to have found it expedient to abandon his enterprise and return home.

Events from the first to the second attack by the Saiyid of 'Omân on Bahrain, 1802-1816.

Extension of Wahhâbi influence over Bahrain, 1803-1809.

After these events the 'Utûb of Bahrain succumbed for a time, but reluctantly, to the influence of the Wahhâbis. In 1803, at the bidding of the Wahhâbi Amir, they sent their subjects to cruise against the people of Masqat at a season when they should have been more profitably engaged in pearl-diving, and suffered a heavy defeat at sea; and in 1805, during a dynastic dispute in the 'Omân Sultanate, a fleet largely 'Athi proceeded to Masqat, apparently to watch events there in the Wahhâbi interest. In 1805, however, the Shaikhs of Bahrain were inclined to join Saiyid Badar of Masqat in an attack on the Qawâsim, of which the real object was to destroy the local influence of the Wahhâbis; and their disposition towards the Saiyid had become so favourable that they now paid him at Masqat the dues which they had formerly withheld. In the same year they proposed that the Bombay Government should, by promising the occasional assistance of one or two vessels of war in Bahrain, place them in a position to defy the Wahhâbis,—a request to which the British authorities, though it was recommended for acceptance by Captain Seton, the Political Resident at Masqat, and supported by the 'Athi Shaikhs of Kuwait and Zubârah, were unable to agree; and in 1809 they ventured to disregard a summons by the Wahhâbi

Amir to join with the Qawāsim in a naval attack upon Fayrah and upon their own 'Atbi brethren at Kuwait.

Bahrain under strict Wahhābi control, 1710-11.

In 1810 the Wahhābi Government, who had lately strengthened their position in the Persian Gulf by entering into arrangements with Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the head of the dissident Jalāhimah section and the most influential personage at the time in Qatar, appointed an agent or Wakīl to superintend on their behalf the administration of Bahrain, Hasa and Qatar; this individual was named 'Abdullah-bin-'Ufaisān, and his usual residence appears to have been in Bahrain. The authority of the 'Atbi Shaikhs in local matters was maintained; but they were obliged to pay tribute through the Wakīl, and Wahhābi teachers were stationed in the principality to convert the people to the reformed doctrines.

Bahrain freed from the Wahhabis by the ruler of Masqat, 1811.

In 1811, however, embarrassments having arisen upon his western frontier in consequence of the gradual advance of the Egyptians upon that side, the Wahhābi Amīr reduced his garrisons in Bahrain and Zubārah; and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat immediately profited by the opportunity to attack both places. Zubārah was burnt, and in Bahrain the Wahhābi Wakīl was taken prisoner and the 'Utūb were restored to power, but in subordination—so Saiyid Sa'id afterwards declared—to Masqat. In the same year a desperate action was fought at sea between the 'Utūb of Bahrain and Rahmah-bin-Jābir, of which the result was favourable to the Shaikhs of Bahrain.

Short-lived alliance between the 'Utūb of Bahrain and the Saiyid of 'Omān, 1811-1813.

In 1813 the 'Utūb of Bahrain, whose interests at this time coincided with those of the Saiyid of Masqat, volunteered to join the latter at Dibai with a fleet of 15 or 20 sail and a force of 2,000 men for an expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah; but they did not fulfil their undertaking. The unexpected failure of Saiyid Sa'id's attack in that year upon the Qāsimi stronghold may have been due, in part, to their defection.

Second attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān on Bahrain, 1816.

Origin of the rupture.

Towards the year 1816 some revulsions of feeling affected the powers interested in Bahrain, and new combinations were formed. The 'Utūb of the islands now sought the protection of the Wahhābis and entered into a friendship with the Qawāsim, while Rahmah-bin-Jābir ranged himself under the standard of Masqat.

Proceedings of the British Resident.

On the 19th of July 1816, news having been received of the sailing of an expedition from Masqat against Rās-al-Khaimah and Bahrain, Lieutenant Bruce, Political Resident at Būshehr, arrived in Bahrain, where he had an interview with 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, the Shaikh of the principality. The Shaikh, to whom the Saiyid had held out a threat that British ships of war would participate in the attack on Bahrain and that the ports of British India would be closed to the 'Utūb so long as they were at enmity with himself, complained to Lieutenant Bruce that the treaty between Masqat and Bahrain had been wantonly broken by Saiyid Sa'id, who had treacherously seized 15 Bahraini vessels and their cargoes off Masqat. On being assured of the neutrality and even friendship of Britain— of which the Resident apparently undertook to convince him by the conclusion of an informal agreement not authorised by Government— 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad declared himself able to hold his own, at least with Wahhābi assistance, against any force which might be brought against him; and the event fully justified his opinion.

Saiyid Sa'id, who was now approaching Bahrain, on his part professed, in a correspondence with the Resident, that he was compelled to act against the 'Utūb by their repudiation of his suzerainty, which they had admitted in 1811, by their alliance with the Wahhābis, and by their indulgence in piratical practices. He turned a deaf ear to the dissuasion of the British representative, and he even neglected to answer a letter in which British mediation was offered.

Repulse of the Masqat expedition July or August 1816.

The Masqat armament, to which three Būshehr vessels were added by order of the Persian Government of Shirāz and which was strengthened by Arab contingents from the Persian ports of Kangūn and 'Asalu, arrived on the scene a few days after Lieutenant Bruce's departure from Bahrain. A landing was immediately effected by the 'Omānis on the Island of Muharraq; but, in an engagement which followed, the invaders were signally defeated with the loss of two near relations of Saiyid Sa'id, one of whom was his younger brother Hamad.

Unsuccessful negotiations between Saiyid Sa'id and the Persian Government of Shirāz for a fresh attempt on Bahrain.

The Saiyid with his fleet then crossed the Gulf to Kangūn to take on board 1,000 musketeers and 400 irregular horse whom the Persian Governor-General of Fārs had undertaken to provide on an understanding that, should the troops be embarked and the expedition then fail or be abandoned, the ruler of Masqat would defray the expenses incurred and in future remit an annual Pishkash to Shirāz, and that otherwise, in case of the islands being taken, the Saiyid should pay 10,000 Tūmāns a year over after to the Governor-General of Fārs. After some

time, however, Saiyid Sa'id discovered that the Persians really intended to seize him by treachery and carry him a prisoner to Shīrāz, so he abandoned the idea of accepting their assistance and returned home. Soon afterwards a Persian emissary arrived in Bahrain, by name Sikandar Khān, who accepted presents from the Shaikhs of Bahrain for the Prince of Shīrāz and conferred on them in return Persian robes of honour. Some political understanding, also, was probably arranged at the same time; but it cannot have been one of any consequence.

In 1817 Rahmah-bin-Jābir visited Masqat and would fain have persuaded the Saiyid to equip another expedition against Bahrain; but he found Sa'id's attention engrossed by domestic difficulties.

Close connection between the 'Utūb and the Qawāsim, 1817-1819.

Sale of plundered property in Bahrain.

The attitude of the Shaikh of Bahrain, whose plausible assurances in 1816, backed as they were by an invitation to open a direct trade between India and Bahrain, had convinced the Resident of his attachment to commerce and his aversion for piracy, now became extremely unsatisfactory; and he was shown to be assisting, with grain and every other kind of store, the piratical Qawāsim, "who hourly frequented the ports of the island," and with whom he had now formed an alliance. In 1817 Lieutenant Bruce was constrained to report that Bahrain, which had become the principal mart for property plundered by pirates and the main dépôt from which the Qawāsim drew their supplies of rice and dates, could itself hardly be regarded otherwise than as a piratical settlement, especially as numbers of the inhabitants were accustomed to proceed to Rās-al-Khaimah and there to enlist as temporary members of buccaneering crews. At this time craft engaged in piracy generally landed their booty direct in Bahrain, whence a portion of it was carried over to Būshehr and other places on the Persian coast by vessels belonging to Kuwait. Nevertheless, on the appearance of the Egyptians in Hasa about the end of 1818, Shaikh 'Abdullah appears to have offered to provide them with sea transport for a force that they proposed to send against Rās-al-Khaimah and the other piratical ports.

Inoperative agreement by the Shaikh to prevent the

In February 1819, a report having been received that several Indian women had been brought from Rās-al-Khaimah and sold in the Bahrain bazaar as slaves, H.M.S. "Eden," Captain Loch, with H.M.S. "Conway" and the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Benares," "Mercury"

Sale of plundered British property in Bahrain, 1819.

and "Antelope," were despatched to Bahrain for an enquiry into the matter. The report was not substantiated, but Captain Loch succeeded in obtaining, by an exchange of prisoners through the Shaikh of Bahrain, the liberation of 17 Indian women who were held in captivity by the Qawāsim at Rās-al-Khaimah; and, before his departure from Bahrain, he persuaded the Shaikh to execute an agreement for preventing the sale of captured British property in his dominions,—an agreement which, unfortunately, the Shaikh afterwards treated as if it did not exist.

Banī Yās mistaken for Qawāsim in Bahrain, 1819.

During his stay in Bahrain Captain Loch received information from the British Residency Agent, a native, that a squadron of Qāsimi vessels was lying in the "southern anchorage"—perhaps Khor-al-Qalai'ah; and immediately, without paying sufficient attention to the assertions of the Shaikh and his ministers that the crews were not Qawāsim but Banī Yās, or to the advice of the East India Company's officers, he sent a boat expedition under cover of the "Antelope" to take possession. The vessels, which were boarded and captured after a stout resistance, were wrecked in being brought out of the anchorage; the Shaikh of Bahrain professed great indignation at violation of the neutrality of his port; and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, to whom or to whose subjects the vessels were afterwards proved to belong, made a claim for reparation on the Bombay Government which, it is believed, was admitted and satisfied in respect both of property and of lives lost.

Bahrain affairs in connection with the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1819-1820.

British policy of neutrality in regard to Bahrain.

When in 1819 an expedition was despatched from Bombay against the piratical stronghold of Rās-al-Khaimah, the policy of the British Government in regard to Bahrain was defined as one of complete abstention from interference between rival claimants to possession; and it was resolved to inform the 'Athbi Shaikh that, so long as he restrained his subjects from piracy, he would reap the advantages of a friendly neutrality on the part of Britain, whereas, should a piratical spirit manifest itself in Bahrain, the same measures of coercion would be applied to the 'Utūb as to the Qawāsim. The conclusion with the Shaikh of "an engagement similar to that negotiated by Mr. Bruce in the year 1816," which would assure the 'Utūb of the benevolence of British intentions, was also contemplated by Government. From the general line of action thus marked out there seems to have been no deviation.

The idea of transferring Bahrain to Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, which had at first been entertained, was thus definitely set aside; but the Saiyid himself did not neglect to make use of his temporary close connection with the British at Rās-al-Khaimah for the purpose of advancing his interests in Bahrain. The crippling of their allies, the Qawāsim, was a severe blow to the 'Utūb of Bahrain, who moreover suspected that the ruler of Masqat was encouraged and supported in his designs by the British Government; and so impressed were the Persians with the probability of the Saiyid's success on this occasion that at the beginning of 1820 the Government of Fārs, who had recently rather hung back in the matter, began to beg him to convey their troops to Bahrain; and the Prince Governor of Shīrāz, when these applications failed, actually addressed himself to the commander of the British expedition and requested the loan of four or five transports, —a demand which, needless to say, was refused. An active share was taken in the Persian preparations by the 'Athī freebooter Rahmah-bin-Jābir, formerly of Khor Hassān in Qatar, who was now domiciled at Dammām in Hasa. Designs of Masqat and Persia on Bahrain, 1820.

When, early in January 1820, Saiyid Sa'id parted from Sir W. Grant Keir at Rās-al-Khaimah, it was believed that he would immediately attack Bahrain without depending on any except his own resources, and this he may have intended to do; but the Āl Khalīfah, now thoroughly alarmed, anticipated action on his part by making full submission through an agent whom they sent to Masqat. The terms arranged were that the 'Utūb of Bahrain should pay an annual tribute of $30,000 to His Highness, while he should release certain 'Athī Shaikhs whom he had detained and restore some Bahraini vessels and other property which he had taken at sea on their way from India. Both parties appear to have stipulated for a guarantee of this arrangement by the British Government, but none was apparently obtained; later, however, an instalment of $12,000 seems to have been actually remitted by the 'Utūb to Masqat on account of the promised tribute; and as to the fact of the tribute having been promised, at least, there can be no doubt whatever. Submission of the 'Utūb of Bahrain to the Saiyid of Masqat, 1820.

Some ten Qāsimi craft which were liable to destruction by the British armament at Rās-al-Khaimah having taken refuge in Bahrain, Captain Loch was despatched from Rās-al-Khaimah with H.M.S. "Eden" and H.M.S. "Curlew" to demand their surrender. This on the 17th of January 1820 he obtained, as also an agreement by the Shaikh not to admit any more boats of the same character into his port until Direct British dealings with Bahrain, January 1820.

authorised to do so by the British authorities. The agreement, it is obvious, was merely temporary, and it must have been meant to facilitate the destruction of piratical craft which was then proceeding upon the whole Pirate Coast.

Preliminary Treaty of Peace, 5th February 1820.

On the 5th of February 1820 a Preliminary Treaty of Peace, binding Salmān-bin-Ahmad and 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, Shaikhs of Bahrain, to prevent the sale of plundered goods, likewise the supply of necessaries to pirates, at places in their dominions and to deliver up all Indian prisoners, was executed at Shārjah by Saiyid 'Abdul Jalīl, a Wakīl representing the Shaikhs.

General Treaty Peace, 23rd of February 1820.

Finally, as guaranteed to them in this Preliminary Treaty, the Shaikhs were admitted to the benefits of the General Treaty of Peace. It was signed by their agent at Shārjah on the same day as the Preliminary Treaty, and by the Shaikhs themselves in Bahrain on the 23rd of February 1820.

Events from the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah to the third and last attack on Bahrain by the Saiyid of 'Omān, 1820-1828.

Treaty and other relations with Britain.

The engagements with the British Government into which the 'Atbī Shaikhs had entered were, upon the whole, satisfactorily observed; and it was not found necessary for cruisers to watch the ports of Bahrain, during the next few years, as those of the Pirate Coast were watched. Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, on his part, went so far as to claim that the General Treaty of Peace established relations of protection and dependence between the British Government and himself; but this impression Lieutenant McLeod, the Political Resident, was careful to remove, while on a visit to Bahrain in 1823. A British marine survey of the waters surrounding and lying to the east of Bahrain was in progress at this time, and was assisted by all the superior and inferior chiefs concerned to the best of their ability.

At the end of 1822 a boat belonging to Būshehr was seized by a Bahrain Batīl on account of a claim which the owner of the latter entertained against the Shaikh of Būshehr; and, the case at first appearing to be one of piracy, the Batīl and her crew were captured in the Shatt-al-'Arab by H.M.S. "Sophie" and conveyed to Bombay. In this case the Shaikh of Bahrain made no attempt to shield his

subjects, whom he admitted to have been guilty of an impropriety; but the charge of piracy was not established in the court of the Recorder of Bombay; and, the accused Bahrainis and their vessels having been released, a suitable explanation was made to the Shaikh.

In August 1825 a case occurred of petty aggression by a Bahrain Baghlah at Mokha upon a vessel belonging to that port; but a little later, on the arrival of the offending Baghlah at Masqat, the matter was easily settled by the intervention of the British authorities.

During this period not a single serious infringement of the maritime peace by Bahrain subjects was reported.

Cholera epidemic, 1821.

In the summer of 1821 the Bahrain islands were ravaged by Cholera. Four thousand persons, it was said, perished.

Agreement in regard to Bahrain between Captain Bruce, Political Resident, and the Government of Shīrāz, 1822.

An extraordinary and unauthorised agreement, relating to the affairs of Persia in the Persian Gulf generally and therefore more fully discussed in the history of the Persian Coast, was signed at Shīrāz on the 30th of August 1822 by Captain W. Bruce, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of Britain, and by Mīrza Zaki Khān, Minister to the Prince Governor of Shīrāz, on the part of Persia.

With regard to Bahrain the Agreement laid down that the islands had always been subordinate to the Government of Fārs, against whose authority the 'Athi Shaikhs had lately become rebellious; that the flag assigned to the 'Utūb of Bahrain under the General Treaty of Peace with Britain in 1820 should accordingly, if already granted, be withdrawn; that no assistance should in future be rendered by Britain to the 'Utūb of Bahrain; and that, on the contrary, the British Government should, if requested, assist the Persians against Bahrain with "one or two" vessels of war. In other words the title of Persia to possession of Bahrain was explicitly admitted. Captain Bruce, in accepting these conditions, appears to have been actuated by a belief that a demonstration against Bahrain, which the Prince Governor of Shīrāz was believed to contemplate, would probably be successful; and he held that, in any case, "the Island of Bahrain reverting again under the authority of Persia "will tend more to the tranquillity of the Arabian side of the Gulf than "almost any other act, and will at once do away with the petty acts of "aggression and retaliation existing between the different branches of "the Beni Attabee Arabs."

The views of the Resident were not shared by the Government of Bombay, who at once, in clear and emphatic terms, disavowed to the Government of Fārs the action of their representative at Būshehr, and, as a further mark of their disapprobation, removed Captain Bruce from his

appointment and recalled him to India. With reference chiefly to the clause of the Agreement that affected Bahrain, the Bombay Government remarked: "It acknowledges the King of Persia's title of Bahrain "of which there is not the least proof and which the British Government "cannot assert without injuring the pretensions of the Imaum and the "Attabees. It promises our aid against every power possessed of an "island in the Gulf, and expressly against the Attabees, to whom we are "bound by a treaty of friendship, and with whose conduct we have every "reason to be satisfied." According to a report by Major G. Willock, the British representative at Tabriz, the Shāh also, "whilst refusing his "accordance to the stipulations, expressed his displeasure that the Prince "of Shiraz should have entered into any engagements with the British "Government without his knowledge and injunctions."

Visit of Lieutenant Mcleod, Political Resident, to Bahrain and the general position there, January 1823.

In the course of an important tour along the Arab coast, undertaken by special order of Government, Lieutenant McLeod, the successor of Captain Bruce, landed on the 27th of January 1823 at Manāmah, where he was hospitably entertained by the Shaikhs of Bahrain. The chief object of his visit was to reassure the Shaikhs in regard to Captain Bruce's unfortunate Agreement, by informing them that it was of no effect, and that no change of policy was contemplated by Government; but the case was also discussed of the Bahrain Batīl which had been seized by H.M.S. "Sophie" and carried to Bombay on account of a technical piracy committed on a Būshehr vessel in the Shatt-at-'Arab. Shaikh 'Abdullah, the younger of the joint chiefs, who with a majority of the 'Utūb of the principality resided on Muharraq Island, was found to be in virtual charge of the state; his elder brother Salmān, who was now a very old man and was represented in most matters by his son Khalifah, had retired to spend the remainder of his days in Rifā'-ash-Sharqī on the main island, where the Resident had an interview with him also. Lieutenant McLeod reported that the authority of the Shaikhs of Bahrain in their own dominions did not appear to be so absolute as might have been expected, and that it was "borne with much reluctance by the inhabitants of the islands." Sons and servants already appeared to encroach upon the functions properly belonging to the Shaikhs alone.

1825.

The death of Shaikh Salmān occurred two years later, in 1825, when his son Khalīfah succeeded to a half share of the net revenue of the principality; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, though the concurrence of his nephew in all acts of government was theoretically required, contrived to retain the entire executive power in his own hands.

Feud between Rahmah-

The feud between Rahmah-bin-Jābir, chief of the dissident Jalāhimah 'Utūb, and the Shaikhs of Bahrain was, until its termination

by the death of the former, a source of constant unrest. Indeed Captain Bruce appears to have been betrayed into his maladroit concessions to the Prince Governor of Shīrāz partly by irritation at the petty warfare to which the enmity between the Āl Khalīfah and the Jalāhimah gave rise.

bin-Jābir and the Shaikhs of Bahrain, 1822-1829.

At the beginning of 1822 both sides appealed to the British authorities to mediate,—a request which was at once granted on condition that the British Government should not be understood to guarantee the observance by either party of such terms as might be arranged. An interview took place between 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad and Rahmah-bin-Jābir at Bāsidu in the presence of Colonel Kennett, the Acting Political Agent at that place; but the differences of the chiefs proved at this time to the irreconcileable. From the fruitless meeting at Bāsidu Shaikh 'Abdullah returned to Bahrain, while Rahmah proceeded to Masqat to lay his grievances before his friend and ally, Saiyid Sa'id; the only result of this movement, however, was that a few months later the ruler of Masqat informed the British Resident that he considered Rahmah to be an altogether unreliable character and declined to accept a responsibility for the actions of that chief which the Government of India wished to fix upon him.

In 1823 earnest but still unsuccessful efforts were made by Lieutenant McLeod to bring the principal disputants into accord.

At length, on the 24th of February 1824, an agreement was signed in Bahrain before Colonel E. G. Stannus, Political Resident, by Shaikh 'Abdullah and Rahmah-bin-Jābir, by which they undertook to be at peace with one another for the future upon certain conditions, principally the withdrawal by Rahmah of his protection from the Āl Bū Samait tribe and the indemnification by him of Bahrain subjects for certain losses which he had inflicted on them. This peace, which seems to have been observed by both parties for nearly two years, ultimately broke down; in 1825 an attempt was made by the Resident, but without success, to effect an accommodation between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Āl Bū Samait; and in the war which was then renewed, the blind and aged Rahmah, as related in the history of Hasa, perished in an extraordinary and dramatic manner by his own act.

Renewed designs of the Saiyid of Masqat upon Bahrain.

In 1820, as we have seen, the Shaikhs of Bahrain submitted to the ruler of Masqat and undertook to pay him an annual tribute, of which one instalment was actually discharged; but by 1822, if not earlier, they had ceased to observe their engagements. In August 1822, when a naval attack on Bahrain by Saiyid Sa'id appeared imminent

letters were addressed by the Governor of Bombay to him and to his opponent, Shaikh 'Abdullah, deprecating war and suggesting to both sides that the tribute claimed should be rendered by the 'Utûb if it were of ancient origin and had been regularly paid, and that otherwise the demand for it should be withdrawn by the 'Omâni sovereign. In the spring of 1823, when rumours of a combined attack to be made on Bahrain by the Persian Government, the ruler of Masqat, and the Qâsimi Shaikh were current, the Government of Bombay addressed Major Willock, the British representative at Tehrân, requesting him to dissuade the Persians from disturbing the tranquillity of the Gulf; and in 1825, when, on the death of Shaikh Salmân of Bahrain, Saiyid Sa'îd proceeded to champion the claim of his sons to supreme power as against their uncle Shaikh 'Abdullah, a strong personal remonstrance was addressed to His Highness of Masqat by the Governor of Bombay.

Third and last attack by the Saiyid of 'Omân upon Bahrain, 1828.

Preparations at Masqat and in Bahrain, June—October 1828.

About June 1828 a report became current that Saiyid Sa'îd of Masqat was collecting ships and men for a fresh attack upon Bahrain; but it was immediately contradicted by the Saiyid himself, who even sent an envoy with presents and a reassuring letter to the 'Athbi Shaikhs. The duplicity of his conduct in this having become apparent, the 'Utûb presently sought the intervention of the British Government; but the Resident declined to interfere, unless by detaching the Bani Yâs, whose junction with the Saiyid might, it was feared, induce the Qawâsim to make common cause with the 'Utûb. In August Saiyid Sa'îd sent a written declaration of war to Shaikh 'Abdullah, bidding him expect his arrival after the expiration of one month; and early in September the Masqat armament, composed of a large number of European-built and native vessels, sailed for Qishm, where it arrived on the 17th of the month. After a few days' halt at Qishm the fleet crossed the Gulf to Abu Dhabi and was joined by Shaikh Tahnûn, whom the British Resident had not been able to restrain from interference, and by a contingent of the Bani Yâs. On the 27th of October the Saiyid's fleet was scattered at sea by a storm; but it re-assembled, and on the last day of the month his ships cast anchor off Sîtrah Island, near the entrance of Khor-al-Qalaí'ah.

Meanwhile every disposition had been made by Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad for repelling the expected invasion. The larger craft belonging

to Bahrain had been massed in Khor Fasht, where they would be ready to meet any attack on Manāmah from the open sea; the vessels of medium and smaller size had been collected in the neighbourhood of Muharraq town, probably because that was a central position from which they could be quickly moved either to Manāmah harbour or to Khor-al-Qalai'ah; the entrance of Khor-al-Qalai'ah had been blocked by means of sunken boats filled with stones; all fortifications had been placed in a state of repair; and a large number of Arabs had been recruited from every direction for the defence of the islands. Meanwhile, too, efforts had been made by the 'Utūb to bribe the Abu Dhabi Shaikh to remain neutral, and from the event it may be inferred that they had not been altogether unsuccessful.

The shore opposite to the anchorage of the Masqat fleet was at first watched by a force under Khalifah-bin-Salmān, the junior Shaikh of Bahrain; but after three days, during which the 'Omānis were engaged in removing the artificial obstructions at the mouth of Khor-al-Qalai'ah, the defenders fell back upon Hūrah, an eastern suburb of Manāmah town.

Apparently on the 5th of November, the entrance of Khor-al-Qalai'ah having been cleared, two small vessels and eleven Baghlahs entered, and a summons to surrender was addressed to the 'Utūb, who received it with disdain. On the night of the 5th November a part of the Masqat force was landed, on Sitrah, and took possession of a fort; and the next day a bombardment of Manāmah town and of the fort on Hālat Abu Māhur was attempted, without success, by some vessels of the fleet. Nothing further happened until the 9th of November, when Saiyid Sa'id learned to his dismay that Shaikh Tahnūn and the Bani Yās had begun to disembark without orders between Rās-al-Jufair and Rās Umm-al-Hasam. He immediately hastened ashore, accompanied by a Nubian bodyguard and such other men as he could collect; but, before he reached the spot, the force on shore was hotly assailed by the 'Atbi troops covering Manāmah town, and was thrown into disorder by an unexpected charge of cavalry, from behind the date groves of Māhūz, upon its flank and rear. It was noted as a significant fact that the Bani Yās were the first to fly in this engagement; and it was subsequently alleged that they had turned their arms against their allies, had plundered them, and had even done their best to prevent fugitives from escaping in boats. Saiyid Sa'id himself, who was brought off the field by his Nubians, had to swim some distance to safety and while in the water received a spear wound in the sole of his foot. The scene of this rout would appear to have been the south side of Khor-al-Qalai'ah, somewhere between the eastern entrance of that inlet and the

town of Manámah. Meanwhile the fleet, seized by panic at the sight of what was passing on shore, instead of landing their assistance weighed anchor and ran out of Khor-al-Qalai'ah. In executing this manœuvre a brig and a Baghlah grounded, and the latter was carried off by the 'Utúb; but the 'Ománis, under cover of night, succeeded in burning the other where she lay stranded, not however before she had been stripped by the enemy. The loss of the invading force was estimated at 500 men.

Depressed by this defeat, by the fear of further treachery, by his wound, by an outbreak of cholera on board his ships, and by evil tidings from his East African possessions, Saiyid Sa'íd, after several undignified attempts to conclude a peace with the 'Utúb, finally sailed for home with his whole force on the 21st of November. The excuse to which he had recourse, that his enterprise was disapproved by Heaven, did not save him from heavy loss of prestige everywhere in the Persian Gulf; and his altered position there may have been one of the reasons for which, after 1828, he bestowed his attention chiefly on the distant and perhaps less arduous field of Africa.

Sequel of these events, 1828-1829.

Reference by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the British Political Resident, December 1828.

Immediately after the departure of the hostile fleet Shaikh 'Abdullah wrote to Colonel D. Wilson, the Political Resident at Búshehr, to complain of the conduct of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in joining in the attack upon Bahrain: he appealed to the fourth Article of the General Treaty of Peace, by which both himself and Shaikh Tahnún were bound, and in which it was stated that "the pacificated tribes should not fight with each other." In reply the Resident explained the meaning of the clause to be that the signatories should not fight with each other *in a piratical manner*, but only in the way of open and declared war.

Naval war between the 'Utúb of Bahrain and the Saiyid of 'Oman, 1829.

Having learned that to engage in regular hostilities was not contrary to the Treaty of 1820, the Shaikhs of Bahrain resolved to carry war into the enemy's waters and equipped for the purpose a fleet of seven large vessels, to meet which two frigates were sent to sea by Saiyid Sa'íd. The 'Abi fleet sailed on the 21st of March 1829 under the personal command of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad.

The war-ships from Masqat shortly fell in with a Bahrain vessel from India, the "Saiyár," which they first tried to intimidate by long range fire and then to board; but, finding the 'Athi crew prepared to receive them with combustibles, they sheered off again and continued the action

with their guns. The "Saiyár" made her escape during the night and eventually reached Bahrain with little damage, except to her cargo.

Case of a Murbát vessel taken by the 'Utúb.

Meanwhile the 'Athi squadron, after attacking on their way down the Gulf a large Baghlah belonging to the Shaikh of 'Asalu, by which they were beaten off after an encounter lasting several hours, found an easier prey in a vessel from Murbát, which they seized at sea in the neighbourhood of Masqat. On the way home with their prize they found themselves intercepted by the two Masqat frigates near Kúh Mubárak, upon which they took the Murbát vessel into shoal water, and, placing her between themselves and the enemy, proceeded to transfer her cargo to their own holds; darkness then coming on, they scuttled and sunk her, and by altering their course contrived to escape with their booty to Bahrain.

Murbát, situated far off on the south coast of Arabia, was not at this time a dependency of Masqat, and the treatment by the 'Utúb of the vessel belonging to that port which they captured was consequently piracy. The Resident immediately sent an ultimatum, in which restoration of the plundered cargo was demanded, to Bahrain by two vessels of war; and so effectual was this measure that property worth Rs. 8,000 was delivered up, besides which some of the goods consigned to persons in Bahrain were handed over to the owners. A balance remained for which it was proposed that the Shaikh of Bahrain should be compelled to pay compensation in cash; but the consideration that "it would be necessary to blockade the port with four ships of war, and perhaps to destroy the shipping by means of shells and congreve rockets, for which latter purpose a small vessel would be required" was considered serious and led to a decision that no further action should be taken.

Conclusion of peace between the 'Athi Shaikhs and the Saiyid of 'Omán, 2nd December 1822.

In the meantime, in response to hints thrown out by Saiyid Sa'id, who professed to be fitting out another expedition against Bahrain, the Government of Bombay had in April 1829 instructed Colonel Wilson, the Resident at Búshehr, to offer his services as a mediator. The Saiyid, who was in reality anxious to proceed to Zanzibar, and who cannot but have been aware of the favourable disposition of the British authorities towards himself, accepted the proposal with great readiness; but the victorious 'Utúb found means to bring the proceedings to a standstill by insisting that the British Government should undertake full responsibility for enforcing the observance of any treaty that might be arranged. To this condition, though the Saiyid was anxious that it should be conceded, the British Resident steadfastly refused to accede; and, after some months of unavailing effort, he declared his intervention at an end. Partly, it would seem, to punish the Shaikhs of Bahrain for their

obstinacy, a British cruiser ordinarily stationed on the pearl banks for the maintenance of order there was withdrawn during the season 1829.

By the apparent indifference of the British authorities Shaikh 'Abdullah was brought to a more reasonable frame of mind; and at length, on the 2nd of December 1829, by the intermediacy of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Nāsir of Būshehr, a peace was concluded between the belligerents. The principal conditions were that tribute should not in future be paid by Bahrain to Masqat, and that neither ruler should henceforward interfere in the affairs of the other; but a verbal agreement was added by which the parties bound themselves to aid one another in case of an attack upon either by a third party. Shaikh Tahnūn of Abu Dhabi was admitted to the benefits of this peace; but the rebellious Āl Bū Sumait of Bahrain were, on the demand of the 'Atbi Shaikh, specifically excluded.

General history from the peace with the Saiyid of 'Omān to the arrival of the Egyptians in Hasa, 1830-1838.

Submission of the Shaikhs of Bahrain to the Wahhābi Amīr, 1830-1831.

A little later commanding influence was re-established in Hasa, where the power of the Central Arabian dynasty had for a time been in abeyance, by the Wahhābi Amir Turki-bin-Sa'ūd; and effects of this change upon the position of the Shaikhs of Bahrain were instantly perceptible.

At the end of 1830 the Wahhābis presented the Shaikhs with a demand for payment of Zakāt and of compensation to the amount of $40,000 on account of horses left under the charge of Shaikh 'Abdullah by the Wahhābis many years before, and for cession of the fort of Dammām upon the coast of Hasa; at Dammām they proposed to locate Bashir, a son of Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the former deadly enemy of the 'Utūb of Bahrain. The Shaikhs of Bahrain endeavoured to obtain the intervention of the British authorities in their favour; but, failing in this and having reason to fear a combination between the Wahhābis and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, they sent a near relation to treat on their behalf at Riyādh. In the end it was settled that the supremacy of the Amir should be acknowledged, and that Zakāt should be paid; but the transfer of Dammām appears to have been waived by the Wahhābis in consideration of the 'Utūb having made their submission. The Amir in return undertook to protect Bahrain against external aggression but their intentions were distrusted by the Shaikhs, chiefly on account of their

unfriendly conduct in locating Bashīr-bin-Rahmah on Tārūt Island opposite to the town of Qatīf, where he was joined by a majority of the Āl Bū Samait, the constant allies of his father and the inveterate foes of the 'Atbi rulers of Bahrain.

Supremacy of the Wahhābi Amīr repudiated by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1833—1835.

In 1833 Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain was encouraged by the departure to Masqat of Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, who soon found his position on Tārūt untenable in consequence of the enmity of the people of Qatīf, to throw off his allegiance to the Wahhābis. As the Shaikh had been careful, before venturing on a complete rupture of relations, to assure himself of the neutrality of the Saiyid of 'Omān, and as he was supported by the Arab tribes of the mainland, especially the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid who immediately began at his instigation to harrass the Wahhābis in Hasa, the ruler of the Riyādh was unable to make any effective rejoinder. In 1834 Shaikh 'Abdullah assumed the offensive and blockaded the Wahhābi ports of Qatīf and 'Oqair. The assassination of the Wahhābi Amīr a little later, by his nephew Mashāri, was generally attributed to the machinations of the Bahrain Shaikh, who celebrated the event with firing of guns and other demonstrations of joy, and who immediately profited by it to obtain possession, not without some expenditure in bribes, of the Island of Tārūt opposite to the town of Qatīf. In 1835, on the failure of an attempt by the new Amīr, Faisal-bin-Turki, to recover Tārūt, Shaikh 'Abdullah resumed the blockade of Qatīf and 'Oqair, which he had suspended, and began to plunder the shipping of both places.

Domestic affairs of the Āl Khalīfah family, 1833-1835

In 1833, at the time of his breach with the Wahhābis, Shaikh 'Abdullah with his sons Mubārak and Nāsir had for some time been residing in Qatar to watch the proceedings of the enemy; but he seems thereafter to have returned to Bahrain. By the death of his nephew and colleague Shaikh Khalīfah-bin-Salmān, which occurred on the 31st of May 1834, Shaikh 'Abdullah soon afterwards became sole ruler of Bahrain; but so headstrong and impatient of his authority did his near relations, including his sons, now become, and so corrupt was his partiality, so undue his leniency and so excessive his general misgovernment when left to himself, that the internal affairs of the Shaikhdom soon began to wear a most serious aspect.

Rebellion in Qatar, 1835.

In 1835 the people of Huwailah in Qatar revolted against him and entered into a correspondence with the Wahhābis; one of his sons rebelled in concert with the Huwailah insurgents and began, with the assistance of some hundreds of Wahhābis, to commit depredations upon the sea-borne commerce of Bahrain; and another son named Ahmad, after

committing some irregularities at sea for which he readily afforded satisfaction on its being demanded by the British political authorities, made his way from Qatar to Masqat with the avowed intention of obtaining support against his father from Saiyid Sa'id. The latter, however, instead of complying with the wishes of Ahmad, sent his own son Saiyid Hilāl to compose the differences among the Āl Khalīfah chiefs; and an agreement, more fully noticed in the history of Qatar,* was arranged by his efforts; but it was almost immediately violated by the partisans of Shaikh 'Abdullah, who induced the Āl Bū Kuwārah to attack the inhabitants of Huwailah,—an act for which the Shaikh refused to make any reparation. This last affair led to the secession of 'Isa-bin-Tarif, the principal man of Huwailah, who at first took refuge with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān, and whose later proceedings will claim notice further on.

Rapprochement between the Wahhābis and the Utūb, 1836.

About the middle of the year 1836 Shaikh 'Abdullah, alarmed by symptoms of an intention on the part of the Government of Shīrāz to revive, possibly with support from the Saiyid of 'Omān, the Persian claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, took steps for a reconciliation with the Wahhābi Amir. Faisal-bin-Turki, to whose subjects in Hasa much inconvenience had been caused by the Bahraini blockade of the Hasa coast, and whom the Egyptians had now begun to press hard upon his western frontier, received the overtures favourably, and a settlement was speedily arranged. The Shaikh undertook to pay a nominal tribute of $2,000 a year to the Amir; the Amir in return promised to supply troops for the defence of Bahrain against attacks from without, and to refrain from calling on the Shaikh for marine transport in case of his deciding on an expedition against Masqat by sea; and intercourse between Bahrain and the ports of Qatif and 'Oqair was re-opened.

Internal affairs of Bahrain, 1836-38.

Meanwhile, however, the lot of the Shaikh's subjects in Bahrain was growing, from day to day, less endurable; and the islands were being rapidly depopulated by emigration. The towns were in a state of ruin and decay, and house rents had fallen to one-eighth of what they had been only a few years before. Six sons of the Shaikh pretended to exercise separate and independent power, and their attention was chiefly devoted to extracting money from merchants and other men of means. The ordinary subject in Bahrain had no acknowledged rights; his domestic animals, even, were frequently seized on pretext of corvée and were not returned. The result was a general exodus of the inhabitants to every quarter of the Persian Gulf.

* *Vide* page 794 *ante*.

The part played by Shaikh 'Abdullah, who was generally—but, as his subsequent doings proved, erroneously—supposed to have become effete by reason of old age, was ignominious in the extreme; he redressed no injuries, but merely advised the people to keep out of the way of his sons and their followers. In 1836 he declared that he was about to remove to Khor Hassān in Qatar; and the prospect of his taking such a step,—one for which they were unprepared and from which they augured trouble,—elicited transient professions of obedience and regret from the junior members of his family. That the Shaikh intended to make Qatar a base for operations against his unruly progeny in Bahrain appeared probable from a warning not to look to him for protection or redress in future, which, in the presence of the British Agent, he addressed to a Būshehri merchant for the general information of the foreign mercantile community. In 1837 he took further steps towards the execution of his threat by sending two of his wives, with their families and the furniture and even the doors of their houses, to Khor Hassān; by this proceeding his sons and other relations were considerably intimidated and induced to reform their conduct for a time.

British relations with Bahrain, 1830-1839.

Insult to the British Residency Agent in Bahrain, 1834.

One consequence of these differences in the Āl Khalīfah family was an insult offered to the native Agent of the British Government in Bahrain, which almost brought about a rupture of relations between Britain and the Bahrain Government. The sons of the Shaikh, being aware that a sum of money on account of mercantile transactions was due by the Agent to their father, claimed that it should be paid to themselves instead; and on this pretext, by dint of abuse and ill-treatment, they succeeded in extorting some large amounts from the British representative. The Agent, from whom the Shaikh appears to have withheld his protection, then hid himself to escape from further exactions; but, having been obliged to appear for the official purpose of visiting a British ship in the harbour, he was again set upon and molested.

Reparation having been refused, a British naval force was despatched to Bahrain to obtain it, by coercion if necessary. Under this compulsion the Shaikh yielded to the demands which were now made upon him: *viz.*, that one of his sons, or in default thereof the Shaikh himself, should come off to the vessel of the Senior Naval Officer, bringing with him a robe of honour for the Agent; and that the persons who had taken an active part in the ill-usage of the latter should be flogged in presence of

the British crew, either on board the ship itself or in one of the Shaikh's boats alongside.

Non-inclusion of the Shaikh of Bahrain in the Maritime Truce, 1835.

When the first Maritime Truce was arranged in 1835 among the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, as related in the history of that region, the Shaikh of Bahrain, though his position resembled theirs in that he was a party to the General Treaty of Peace of 1820, was not invited to become a signatory. The reason for the omission was two-fold: in the first place it was believed that Shaikh 'Abdullah, whose conduct in regard to the maintenance of peace at sea had hitherto been unexceptionable, would not allow himself to be drawn into a course contrary to the policy of the British Government, who could easily punish him; and, again, it was feared that the Shaikh, if admitted to membership of the Maritime Truce, might, in the not improbable contingency of war between himself and the ruler of Masqat, claim the intervention of the British Government to prevent an attack on Bahrain.

Extension of the Restrictive Line to Bahrain, 1836.

A Restrictive Line, between which and the Persian coast no naval hostilities were in future to be permitted, was established in 1836 for Trucial 'Omān under the authority of the British Government, with the approval of the Shaikhs but without the execution of any formal engagement on their part. In the same year, in consequence of the disturbed relations which then prevailed between the ruler of Bahrain and the people of Huwailah in Qatar, the line was prolonged—with the assent of Shaikh 'Abdullah, conveyed in a letter dated 26th March 1836—from the Island of Hālūl so as to pass 10 miles north of Ras-Rakan, the northernmost extremity of Qatar, and thence through the island of Qmaiyin to Rās-az-Zor, where it met the Arabian coast.

Piracies by 'Amāir and Bani Hājir, 1837.

In 1837 the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid and some Bani Hājir who were settled at Dammām—the latter being thus, in name at least, subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain—took advantage of the anarchy at the time prevailing in Hasa, as in all other parts of the Wahhābi dominions, to inaugurate a piratical campaign against the shipping of Qatīf. Some Bahrain boats also having suffered by their depredations, Shaikh 'Abdullah sought and obtained the permission of the British Government to chastise them, and was quickly successful in capturing two of their boats; in those operations five of the pirates were killed.

Maritime war between Bahrain and Abu Dhabi averted, 1838.

Since his departure from Huwailah in Qatar in 1835, 'Isa-bin-Tarif and his followers, who belonged chiefly to the Āl Bin-'Ali and Āl Bū 'Ainain tribes, had resided at Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān and had been restrained by the influence of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf from committing raids on the territories under the Bahrain chief.

In 1838 Shaikh 'Abdullah, who insisted that the emigrants should return and settle in Bahrain—a condition to which they would by no

means agree—obtained permission to coerce them by naval means after a fixed date, the Āl Bin-'Ali and the Āl Bū 'Ainain being on their part set free to fight with him after the same; but the Shaikh, at heart reluctant to embark on a war which would almost necessarily involve him in hostilities with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, hoped to induce the British Government to put pressure on the seceders to return; and, before the arrival of the decisive day, he offered, through the British Resident at Būshehr, to let them come back to Qatar. A British war vessel was then placed at his disposal to convey him or his accredited agent to Abu Dhabi for the purpose of negotiating on this basis; but at the last Shaikh 'Abdullah refused to make any arrangement with the rebels unless it were guaranteed by the British Government, a condition to which the British authorities could not agree. War was accordingly declared. Both parties had already been informed that their operations must be conducted within the Restrictive Line.

In the troubles which ensued the people of Bahrain appear to have been the heavier losers, and in 1839 the merchants of the principality invoked the good offices of the British Resident for bringing the contest to an end by a reconciliation; but the Assistant Resident, who was deputed for the purpose to the Arabian coast, found that the parties would not agree to any settlement without a guarantee by the British Government, which he was not authorised to afford.

Meanwhile, however, a friendly correspondence had been opened between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, the latter of whom was dissatisfied with the conduct of 'Isa-bin-Tarif and had already required him either to leave the country or to settle down as a law-abiding citizen; and an offensive and defensive alliance was shortly afterwards concluded between the Shaikhs with especial reference to the presence of Egyptian forces in Hasa, by which the independence of Bahrain was threatened. The result was that 'Isa-bin-Tarif decided to seek, after the pearl fishery of 1839, an asylum elsewhere than at Abu Dhabi, and consented, in the meanwhile, to a suspension of hostilities.

Bahrain affairs during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-1840.

Towards the end of 1838 Faisal-bin-Turki, the Wahhābi Amīr, was captured in Kharj by Khurshīd Pāsha, the commander of the Egyptian

Arrival of the

Egyptians in Hasa and demands of the Amīr Khālid on Bahrain. 1838.

forces then overrunning Central Arabia; and, after his deportation to Egypt, a puppet named Khālid was set up by the Egyptians in his place. Hasa was immediately occupied, the Wahhābi governor of that province, 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisan, taking refuge in Bahrain; and designs upon the Bahrain principality itself were shortly disclosed by successive demands on the Shaikh, preferred in the name of the Amīr Khālid, for payment of tribute at the former rate, for rendition of Tārūt Island and the fort of Dammām, and for the surrender of 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisan. Meanwhile emissaries of the Egyptians were engaged, in the Bahrain Islands as also in more distant places, in collecting supplies for the use of their troops.

Attitude of the Government of India.

The Indian Government, who were not indifferent to these events, directed their Resident in the Gulf to use all his influence to check the encroachments of the Egyptians; but in the absence of instructions from London they hesitated to adopt a decided line, and they felt themselves unable to hold out any definite pledge of assistance to the Shaikh of Bahrain, who now sought one. Captain Hennell, the Political Resident, in reply to a question by the Shaikh of Bahrain, consequently informed him, apparently in March 1839, that he could give no opinion as to the expediency of the Shaikh's sending a member of his family to wait upon Khurshīd Pasha in Hasa, and that the Shaikh himself must be judge of the matter.

Application for help by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Government of Persia.

Shaikh 'Abdullah, who was much alarmed by the proceedings of the Egyptians and perhaps even more so by a rumour, apparently well-founded, that the Saiyid of 'Omān was intriguing with the Egyptians to obtain and hold Bahrain as a fief under the Viceroy of Egypt, professed, in reply to the demands made on him in the name Khālid, to be a subject of the Persian Government.

Arrival of a Persian envoy in Bahrain.

For the purpose of substantiating this statement, probably at the nominee's own suggestion, the Prince Governor of Shirāz shortly sent an envoy in the person of a certain Hāji Qāsim to reside in Bahrain. This individual had formerly been the supercargo of a trading vessel, but now he was the bearer of a letter and a robe of honour for the chief of Bahrain and was escorted by a guard of 10 Persian infantry. His mission was a failure from every point of view, especially from that of his principals, who had somehow been led to suppose that the Shaikh of Bahrain was ready to pay an annual tribute in return for their countenance and protection.

First distinct orders of the

The intentions of Khurshīd Pāsha in regard to Bahrain having become clear, the Government of India found themselves obliged to anticipate,

to some extent, the instructions of Her Majesty's Government regarding the policy to be pursued in the Persian Gulf.

Government of India in regard to the designs of the Egyptians on Bahrain, 1st April 1839.

Advantage was taken of the presence of a British naval squadron in those waters to authorise Sir F. Maitland, by whom it was commanded, "strongly to use his influence" to deter the Egyptian General from further encroachments, and in particular from invading Bahrain; and the British Admiral was empowered, in event of the Egyptians persisting in their schemes and of the Shaikh of Bahrain soliciting British aid, to afford the Bahrain Government every encouragement to resist and all the support that he could render without engaging in actual hostilities; these measures in the opinion of the Government of India were likely to suffice, for the moment, to maintain the *status quo*. The Governor-General of India was not disposed, at the time, to enter into any new engagement with the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the Admiral was instructed, in case such an engagement should be suggested, so far to encourage the proposals of the Shaikh as to transmit them for the consideration of the Government of India.

In a letter, dated the 1st of April 1839, the Resident, Captain Hennell, was ordered to remonstrate with the Egyptian commander in regard to his proceedings against Bahrain; to inform him that his action was contrary to an understanding between the British and Egyptian Governments and might lead to an interruption of amicable relations; and to report on the material strength of the various parties, especially of the Shaikh of Bahrain, in the region affected.

In the meantime Khurshid Pâsha had written to the British Resident to sound him regarding the policy of the British Government in event of the conquests of the Egyptians being carried further; and Captain Hennell had replied, requesting that no active operations should be undertaken against Bahrain without notice sufficient to admit of a warning being conveyed to the British subjects resident in the islands,—an answer which the Government of India approved as well-timed and judicious and as tending to postpone a crisis until the arrival of Sir F. Maitland off Bahrain.

Subsequent stronger orders of the Government of India, 18th April 1839.

In a letter dated the 18th of April 1839, the Indian Government, advanced beyond the position that they had at first assumed, and empowered the Admiral, in event of the Shaikh of Bahrain having claimed British interposition and offered to place his territories under British protection, to assure him of the temporary protection of Her Majesty's squadron in the Gulf, and to intimate to Khurshid Pâsha that he had done so, and that it was incumbent on the Egyptians

to abstain from further military proceedings until both officers should receive orders from their respective Governments; should these measures fail of their object, Sir F. Maitland might inform Khurshíd Pāsha that he would be held responsible, if he crossed over to the islands of Bahrain, for commencing hostilities against the British Government, whose officers were authorised to defend the principality against invasion until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government should be known; and, after making this declaration, the Admiral might exercise his discretion as to the best means of defending Bahrain.

Visit of a British naval squadron to Bahrain.

About the same time Sir F. Maitland visited Bahrain in H.M.S. "Wellesley," accompanied by Captain Edmunds, Assistant Political Resident; and Shaikh 'Abdullah gave the latter a promise that he would take no steps to place himself under the authority or protection of a foreign power without first consulting the British Resident. It does not appear that any correspondence passed between the British Admiral and Khurshíd Pāsha: possibly the former had not yet received the latest instructions of the Government of India.

Report on the situation by the British Political Resident, 7th May 1839.

A full report on the resources of the Egyptians in Najd and Hasa, and on the power and attitude of all the Shaikhs and rulers of the Arabian littoral whose interests were threatened by their aggressions, was submitted on the 7th of May 1839 by Captain Hennell, the British Resident, in obedience to the orders of the Government of India.

In regard to the Shaikh of Bahrain it was stated that his means of resistance were such as to afford a prospect of success, if they were fairly brought into play. His insular position and the great superiority of his naval force, which included numerous war boats of the best class, were very much in his favour; and the fighting men devoted to his cause, of whom 6,000 could be collected on the islands of Bahrain and Muharraq alone, while 3,000 more could be brought over in an emergency from the 'Athi possessions on the mainland, were brave and determined, and accustomed to service at sea as well as on land. On the other hand Shaikh 'Abdullah was hampered by the enmity of 'Isa-bin-Tarif and the seceding Āl Bin'-Ali and Āl Bū 'Ainain tribes; and the Shi'ah Bahārinah, the aboriginal but unwarlike inhabitants of Bahrain, groaning under the tyranny of the 'Utūb, would doubtless sympathise with any invading power. If Khurshíd Pāsha could once gain a footing on Bahrain Island and thereafter keep open his communications with Hasa, it was likely that the 'Utūb would succumb to his disciplined troops and artillery; but, so long as the Shaikh maintained his naval superiority, an attack on the islands must necessarily be so difficult and dangerous that there was little

probability of its being attempted by the Egyptians. The naval advantage of the 'Utūb over the Egyptians could only be destroyed by the arrival on the scene of ships from Egypt or from Masqat; and in regard to the latter it was not to be expected that the representatives of the Saiyid of 'Omān, after they had been made acquainted with the policy of the British Government, would agree to co-operate with the Egyptians.

Sudden submission of the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Egyptians and protest by the British Resident, July 1839.

On the 28th of July 1839 the Resident arrived off Bahrain in the H. E. I. Company's steamer "Hugh Lindsay" to interview Shaikh 'Abdullah, who had suddenly and unexpectedly acknowledged the supremacy of the Egyptians and covenanted to pay them $2,000 a year as tribute, on condition that his local authority should be preserved intact and that no representative of Khurshid Pāsha should be sent to reside in Bahrain.

In conversation with Captain Hennell the Shaikh endeavoured to explain away his disregard of his promise to Captain Edmunds by asserting that the agreement with the Egyptians, though but recently ratified had actually been concluded before the arrival of the "Wellesley"; but he justified his action mainly on the ground of the Resident's refusal more than three months before to give him advice or a specific assurance of support, and of the virtual immunity from disturbance which he had purchased by a trifling and merely pecuniary sacrifice.

A written protest against the new arrangements, couched in nearly the same terms as another which he addressed to Khurshid Pāsha, was delivered to the Shaikh by Captain Hennell, who further commented on the possibility of the Bahrain Government becoming involved, in consequence of the relations that they had formed with the Egyptians, in hostilities with Great Britain. The Shaikh, in reply, protested that he would never, even at the demand of the Egyptians, place himself in opposition to the British Government; and he offered, on condition that a distinct pledge of protection should be given him in writing, to repudiate his agreement with the Pāsha and to avow himself a dependent of the British Government; on being pressed, however, to commit this proposal to writing, he declined; and he added that his repudiation of the agreement, if carried into effect, must in any case be explained by him to the Egyptians as due to compulsion by the British authorities. In conclusion he assured Captain Hennell of the unpopularity of the Egyptians, and of the extremely precarious nature of their position in Eastern and Central Arabia.

The general impression brought away by the Resident from this interview was that Shaikh 'Abdullah, now advanced in years and incapable of exertion, had submitted to the Egyptians in order to avoid a

conflict disturbing to his personal comfort; that the sustained political and military successes of Khurshid Pāsha had so shaken his naturally acute mind as to make him doubtful of the ability of the British to cope with the Egyptians on land; but that he would gladly be freed of the Egyptian yoke if this could be achieved by British influence without any effort on his own part.

Captain Hennell, in reporting his proceedings to Government, cast doubt upon the feasibility, hitherto unquestioned, of defending Bahrain against attack from the mainland by means of ships of war; he had now been informed that there were places where a fleet of boats might cross in safety, and where larger vessels would be prevented by shoals from approaching; and Shaikh 'Abdullah asserted that he had himself successfully adopted these tactics in former days, when at war with the Persians who were possessed of large vessels.

Retirement of the Egyptians, 1840.

Matters in Bahrain apparently continued as they were until the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840, whereupon their relations with the Shaikh of Bahrain were brought to an end and the affairs of the principality resumed their ordinary course. The action of the authorities in India and of the British officers on the spot was, it may be remarked, approved by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company when it reached their knowledge; and they concurred in an opinion expressed by Captain Hennell, that it would not be expedient to assume a regular protectorate over Bahrain.

Civil war in Bahrain and expulsion of 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad from the Shaikhship, 1840-1843.

Alienation of the sympathy of the British Government from Shaikh 'Abdullah, 1840.

By his conduct towards Khurshid Pāsha the Shaikh of Bahrain was considered to have shown preference for an Egyptian alliance and to have forfeited the friendship of the British Government; the possibility of his being displaced by a more favourably disposed Shaikh was discussed with equanimity by the Secret Committee of the Directors of the East India Company; and the Government of India decided not to hold back the Saiyid of 'Omān, should he again resolve on attempting the conquest of Bahrain. Nevertheless, out of regard for the general maritime peace, 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who with his dependents had migrated from Abu Dhabi to the Island of Qais in 1839 or 1840, was refused permission which he sought to put to sea against the Shaikh of

Bahrain; and this refusal was repeated by the British Resident on a visit to Qais in May 1841. The technical ground of objection was the violation which such hostilities would involve of the Restrictive Line established in 1836. It is possible that the estrangement between the British authorities and Shaikh 'Abdullah reacted unfavourably upon the position of the latter in his own Shaikhdom; and it may have even conduced to the troubles that now began.

Breach between Shaikh 'Abdullah and his grandnephew Shaikh Muhammad, 1840 1842.

In 1840, on the retirement of the Egyptians from Hasa, the inhabitants of that province, or some of them, sent one Mushrif to Bahrain to propose to Muhammad-bin-Khalifah-bin-Salmān, grand-nephew of the principal Shaikh of Bahrain, that he should himself assume the Government of Hasa and protect the people from Khālid, the usurping Amīr of the Wahhābis. Objections entertained by Shaikh 'Abdullah to this proposal led to a violent difference of opinion between Shaikh Muhammad and himself, which was temporarily smoothed over by a hollow reconciliation; but a little later, after offering his services to the British Government and soliciting their assistance against his grand-uncle, Shaikh Muhammad left Bahrain for Qatar, where he ingratiated himself with the inhabitants and set on foot a vexatious opposition to his aged relation. The sons of Shaikh 'Abdullah, also, had now provided themselves with retinues of 100 to 300 desperadoes each, and openly defied their father's authority; anarchy and confusion had overspread the whole Shaikhdom; and the trade of Bahrain quickly declined to little more than a half of what it had been only a few years before. In 1842, when Khālid, the ex-Amīr of the Wahhābis, paid a visit to Qatar and Bahrain, Shaikh 'Abdullah and Shaikh Muhammad had apparently exchanged places, for the former was then at Khor Hassān on the mainland and the latter in Bahrain.

Expulsion of Shaikh Muhammad by Shaikh 'Abdullah, 1842.

Such was the position of affairs when an open conflict was suddenly precipitated by an attempt on the part of Shaikh Muhammad to prevent the marriage of a young girl, belonging to Muharraq town, with Ahmad, a son of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The old chief came over from Qatar to arrange a settlement; but, having failed in his endeavours, he took up the cause of his son. Both factions then began to enlist fighting men, chiefly Bedouins who poured over from the mainland in the hope of plunder. Muharraq was the headquarters of Shaikh 'Abdullah, Manāmah that of Shaikh Muhammad, and the possession of a superior marine force enabled Shaikh 'Abdullah to blockade effectually the harbour of his antagonist. Indecisive skirmishes followed, in which Di'aij, a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, was killed upon the one side, and

Muhammad-bin-Mubārak, a grandson of Shaikh 'Abdullah, upon the other. At length, in June 1842, the elder chief completely defeated the younger by attacking him simultaneously on land and sea; Manāmah fell into the hands of Shaikh 'Abdullah; and Shaikh Muhammad, escaping with a few followers to Qatar, proceeded to Hasa and thence to Riyādh to seek aid of the Wahhābis. The town of Manāmah was sacked by the Bedouin auxiliaries of the victor, after which the old Shaikh crossed over to Qatar and gave up Khor Hassān also to partial plunder.

Shaikh 'Abdullah then began to rebuild Zubārah in Qatar, which had lain during a number of years entirely deserted.

Strained relations of Shaikh 'Abdullah with the Wahhābis.

The relations with the Wahhābis of Shaikh 'Abdullah, whose success was more apparent than real, were at this time extremely unfriendly. On the one hand Shāfi', a chief of the Bani Hājir and a relation and staunch adherent of Shaikh 'Abdullah, was detained as a prisoner by the Wahhābi Amir; and on the other three-fourths of the population of Saihāt, of which place the headman had been arrested by 'Umr-bin-Ufaisan, the Wahhābi Governor of Hasa, had migrated to Bahrain, and a blockade of the Hasa coast was maintained by the navy of Bahrain. These circumstances inclined the Wahhābis to make common cause with Shaikh Muhammad; but for the moment they were unable to afford him material assistance.

Permission given to 'Isa-bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah to join Shaikh Muhammad, and intimation of the same to Shaikh 'Abdullah.

At this juncture 'Īsa-bin-Tarif, the Āl Bin-'Ali fugitive, and Bashir-bin-Rahmah visited the British Resident at Bāshehr together and requested permission to ally themselves with Shaikh Muhammad and to embark on regular hostilities against Shaikh 'Abdullah. The required sanction, in view of the old Shaikh's unsatisfactory behaviour in 1839 and again in 1842 at the sack of Manāmah, was duly given, on condition that the Restrictive Line should be respected. 'Isa-bin-Tarif, it may be observed, was strongly suspected of having fomented the recent dissensions in Bahrain; while Bashir-bin-Rahmah, who could contribute 300 or 400 fighting men to the expedition, alleged that he was prevented by Shaikh 'Abdullah from enjoying the produce of his paternal estates near Dammām.

In November 1842 Captain Kemball, the Assistant Resident, was sent to Bahrain to warn Shaikh 'Abdullah of the permission for action granted by the British authorities to the hostile coalition. This communication was received by the Shaikh with consternation, almost with incredulity; he represented that, in the absence of most of his fleet and subjects, he would be unable to cope with his assailants; he hinted that

he would be obliged, therefore, to enter into relations with the Wahhābis; and he finally offered to allow Bashīr-bin-Rahmah to remove his produce from Dammām, provided that he did not, under this pretext, bring any large vessels into the vicinity. Captain Kemball reported these remarks to the Resident, but no further communication was made at the time to Shaikh 'Abdullah, who afterwards affected to have thought that the allies would be ordered by the Resident to suspend their operations and to have been prejudiced in his defence by this belief.

Negotiations of Shaikh 'Abdullah with the Wahhābis.

Meanwhile Shāikh 'Abdullah had opened a correspondence with the Wahhābis and had apparently offered, on condition of the release of Shāfi' of the Bani Hājir, to restore 'Oqair, of which he had somehow become possessed. A little later, whether on these or on other terms, the Wahhābi ruler set Shāfi' at liberty and suggested to the Shaikhs of Bahrain that they should compose their differences; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, who seems to have distrusted the sincerity of the Amīr's mediation, replied discourteously, advising him to observe a strict neutrality. In these circumstances the Wahhābis, not unnaturally, reverted to their support of Shaikh Muhammad.

Active operations and expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah from Bahrain, January-April 1843.

At the beginning of 1843 Shaikh Muhammad made his appearance in Qatar, of which promontory the inhabitants generally were favourable to his cause. He succeeded in occupying a small fort at Murair* before it had been garrisoned by the opposite party, and the troops sent by Shaikh 'Abdullah to hold Murair returned without making any effort for its recovery. From the point of vantage thus secured Shaikh Muhammad at once opened communication with his associates on Qais Island.

In February 1843, alarmed by the arrival of several boats from Qais, Shaikh 'Abdullah wrote to the British authorities requesting them to restrain 'Isa and Bashīr; but for various reasons, and partly in consequence of a misapprehension, no reply was vouchsafed to his application.

At length Shaikh Muhammad, from Fuwairat in Qatar where he was now established, despatched a considerable force in five Baghlahs to the eastern coast of Bahrain Island; and a landing was effected at a point opposite Rifā'-ash-Sharqi. Troops sent in haste by Shaikh 'Abdullah under the command of his son Nāsir, however, succeeded in reaching Rifā' before them; and an indecisive combat took place, in which several men were killed and wounded. An attempt to surround the invaders by land and to cut off their retreat by sea seems to have been unsuccessful.

* In the records this place is called "Mezzer," but no place with such a name is known, and the reference must apparently be to Qal'at Murair which then stood 14 miles south-east of Zubārah.

In March or April of 1843 the town of Manāmah passed into the possession of a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, not without the connivance of the inhabitants, who remembered with bitterness the conduct of Shaikh 'Abdullah's Bedouins in the previous year; and shortly afterwards 'Isa bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah arrived in Bahrain with a large force.

In April the allies attacked Muharraq town, the seat of Shaikh 'Abdullah, and obliged him to take refuge in "a small fort, situated at no great distance from the town"—possibly that of Hālat Abu Māhur—where, finding himself completely invested, he capitulated; and the fort of 'Arād, held by his sons, then also surrendered at discretion. The sons of 'Abdullah taken prisoners at 'Arād remained, with the consent of the victor, in Bahrain; but the Shaikh himself, to whom his captors allowed only one Batil and one Ghunchah for the conveyance of his family, dependents and property, took his departure for Dammām. That place, the sole remnant of his possessions, was now governed by Shaikh 'Abdullah's son Mubārak.

Incidents of the civil war in Bahrain affecting the British Government.

Outrage committed at the house of the British Residency Agent, 1842.

In 1842, on the defeat of Shaikh Muhammad by Shaikh 'Abdullah, the town of Manāmah, as we have seen, fell a prey to the Bedouins of the successful party; and among the goods pillaged were some belonging to British subjects. But a more serious incident arose from the behaviour of the native Agent of the British Residency in Bahrain, a man of "timid and imbecile character." To this individual Shaikh 'Abdullah, in the beginning of the troubles, suggested that he should either remove to Muharraq or go on board a British vessel, then in the harbour, until the crisis was over; but the Agent preferred to stay at Manāmah, and, on the town being attacked, he extended the protection of his house—if not that of the British Government—to the persons and property of a number of people having no claim to it, probably in return for a pecuniary consideration. Among those who took refuge with the Agent were a son and other dependents of a blood-enemy of Shaikh 'Abdullah, one Hamūd of the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid tribe, and the Shaikh shortly appeared in person to demand, under

pain of destruction of the house, its inmates, and all that it contained, the instant surrender of these obnoxious refugees; whereupon the Agent, losing courage, caused them to be thrown from the roof, and they were cut to pieces almost before they had reached the ground. The unwarrantable and impolitic behaviour of the Agent on this occasion was punished with immediate dismissal, and the countenance of the British Government was finally withdrawn from the Shaikh, on whom, however, it was not considered necessary, in the circumstances, to make any express demand for reparation.

Piracy in Manâmah harbour, March 1843.

In March 1843, after the landing of Shaikh Muhammad's partisans on Bahrain Island, an order was promulgated by Shaikh 'Abdullah, then at Muharraq, that no vessel should anchor near Manâmah town. This regulation having been broken by a Ghunchah which was entitled to use the British flag, and which carried a packet and stores addressed to the British Commodore at Bâsidu, two boats manned by Bedouin mercenaries were sent with an order to the Nâkhuda to move over to Muharraq; but these unreliable and dangerous messengers, on reaching the vessel, boarded her, plundered the cargo, including the British packet and stores, and hauled down and tore to pieces the British flag. On behalf of the Shaikh, who denied having ordered or in any way countenanced this outrage, it was urged that the Ghunchah had not shown her colours on entering the harbour; that her use of them was suspected to be a mere ruse; and that the fleet of 'Isa-bin-Tarîf and Bashîr-bin-Rahmah was at the time momentarily expected. A British war vessel was immediately despatched to Bahrain to make full enquiries; but, before any result had been reached, the expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah by his rival rendered further action useless.

About the same time as the last affair, but possibly before it, a Châlak boat under the Persian flag, into which goods from Bombay consigned to Hindu merchants in Bahrain had just been transhipped, was plundered in the harbour of Manâmah by Banî Hâjir and Sulutah Arabs subject to the authority of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The hostilities in Bahrain prevented immediate attention being given to this case, and on the first accession of Shaikh Muhammad to power it was considered inexpedient to press the claim upon him too strongly; but in February of the following year (1844), on the matter being brought to his notice, he submitted without demur to the British demand for compensation.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-KHALIFAH.

1843-1868.

Continuance of the civil war after the expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad from Bahrain, 1843-1849.

Interference of the Wahhabi Amir, 1843.

In June 1843, the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah having begun to make raids upon the commerce of the Bahrain Islands from his lair at Dammām, a flotilla was sent by Shaikh Muhammad, 'Isa-bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah which effectually confined his boats to the limits of the Dammām anchorage. The new Wahhābi Amir, Faisal-bin-Turki, whose position at home was still insecure, at first amused himself by playing off each of the Bahrain claimants against the other, and obtained promises of advantage from both; but, in the end, antipathy to the ex-Shaikh determined his attitude. Muhammad, a son of Shaikh 'Abdullah, having sallied out of Dammām to procure boats upon the adjoining coast, was arrested by the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif; and a similar fate befell another son 'Ali, on his arriving from Lingeh to join his father with a small contingent of the Āl Bū Samait tribe.

Intervention of the Shaikh of Kuwait, August 1843.

A disinterested attempt to save the ex-Shaikh by mediation from the worst consequences of his defeat and expulsion was now made by Jābir, Shaikh of Kuwait, who had hitherto refrained from interference. In August 1843, with the approval of the British Resident, Shaikh Jābir proceeded to Bahrain with a fleet of eight large vessels, and was successful in persuading Shaikh Muhammad to invite Shaikh 'Abdullah to a friendly conference; but the former, aware that his restoration to power was not to be expected, declined to appear; nor did he at this time return to live with Shaikh Jābir at Kuwait, as the latter had intended that he should do in case no settlement were arranged.

Appeal by the ex-Shaikh to the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai; His first visit to Bushehr.

An effort was next made by the sons of the ex-chief, Shaikh 'Abdullah, to interest the rulers of Shārjah and Dibai in their father's cause; and they obtained a promise that, on condition of there being no objection on the part of either the British Government or the Wahhābi Amir, support would be given him at the close of the pearling season. 'Isa-bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah, with a view to neutralising this combination, at once opened communication with the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain; and the latter, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid,

visited them at Qais Island, where he received a valuable present. In these circumstances, and more especially as it was understood that the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai did not desire to be embroiled in the affair, the reply of the British Resident at Būshehr to the ex-chief, who waited on him there, was that, while the British Government were prepared to arbitrate between the parties without themselves guaranteeing a settlement, they could neither intervene to restore Shaikh 'Abdullah to power nor permit the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to be dragged into a dangerous war without advantage to themselves or to the original combatants.

Persian intrigues, 1843.

It is probable that, at his visit to Būshehr, Shaikh 'Abdullah hoped to derive some benefit from a correspondence which had already been maintained for several months between himself and Shaikh Salmān, an individual who held no official position in Persia but was a nephew of the Shaikh of Būshehr. The interchange of views appears to have been commenced by Shaikh Salmān, who did not scruple, while Shaikh 'Abdullah was still blockaded in Dammām, to promise him the military assistance of Persia. In October 1843, doubtless with a hope of alarming the British authorities, Shaikh 'Abdullah professed himself ready, if disappointed by the British Government, to throw himself into the arms of Persia; but in reply, he was merely informed that the adherence of Persia to his cause would not be recognised by Britain unless it were open and declared.

Migration of Shaikh 'Abdullah from Dammām to Nāband and of 'Isa-bin-Tarif from Qais to Dōhah, 1843.

After a short sojourn at Būshehr Shaikh 'Abdullal returned to Dammām, whence he had come, but soon afterwards he transferred his residence to Nāband on the Persian coast, and almost simultaneously 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who chafed at the hindrances imposed on his operations by the Restrictive Line, removed his belongings from Qais Island and settled at Dōhah, then called Bida', in Qatar.

Attitude of the Government of Masqat towards the struggle between the Shaikh and the ex-Shaikh, 1843.

About the same time, or probably earlier, 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who was at heart no less an enemy of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah than of his unsuccessful rival, suggested to Saiyid Thuwaini, regent of Masqat, that he should profit by the dissensions of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs to conquer Bahrain, and volunteered to assist him in the enterprise. Saiyid Thuwaini referred the proposal to his father Saiyid Sa'id, the sovereign of 'Omān, then absent in East Africa; and the result was an application to the British authorities, by whose advice 'Isa-bin-Tarif's proposal was rejected. The principal reasons which influenced the British Government to dissuade Saiyid Sa'id from an invasion of Bahrain were the personal absence of His Highness from the scene; the incapacity of his representative, Saiyid Thuwaini; the probability of offence being

given to the Wahhábis, which might lead to an invasion by them of ʿOmán territory; the excuse which would be afforded to Persia for espousing the cause of the ex-Shaikh; and the veto which had already been placed by the British Government on action by the Shaikhs of Shárjah and Dibai.

Second visit of the ex-Shaikh to Búshehr, December 1843 to March 1844.

In December 1843 the ex-Shaikh ʿAbdullah, accompanied by six armed vessels, again visited Búshehr with the object of influencing the British political representative in his favour; but he declined to agree to an interview on board a vessel in the harbour, chiefly, it was suspected, because he meant to make use of a visit to the Residency as a screen for a secret meeting with his sympathiser Shaikh Salmán. He proceeded however to press, in writing, a request for British assistance, mainly on the grounds that he had rejected overtures by the Wahhábi Amír which tended to the establishment of Wahhábi influence over Bahrain, and that he was entitled, as a signatory of the General Treaty of Peace, to the naval protection of Great Britain. These arguments, however, were refuted; and the claims of the ex-Shaikh to British aid were disallowed.

A few days after his arrival at Búshehr Shaikh ʿAbdullah landed and was received with much distinction by the local authorities, probably under orders from Shíráz; three volleys of musketry were fired in his honour by the Persian regular troops; and he was provided with quarters in a bastion of the fortifications, his followers being at the same time accommodated in tents. His vessels, of which only two now remained, were brought into a backwater and drawn up on shore. It was soon rumoured that Shaikh ʿAbdullah had applied to the Persian Government for the loan of 100 mounted men and 500 infantry, and that he had offered, if successful in recovering Bahrain, to repay the expenses of this force, to remit in future a large annual tribute to the Sháh, and to leave one of his sons in Persia as a hostage for fulfilment of the contract. For three months Shaikh ʿAbdullah lingered at Búshehr, awaiting, but in vain, the acceptance of his proposals by the Persian Government.

In January 1844 the Shaikh, in a correspondence with the British Resident, resorted to the argument that he had been lulled into a false security, while still in possession of Bahrain, by the neglect of the British authorities to reply to certain of his communications,—a contention which was not admitted; and immediately before his departure, probably in March 1844, he had a personal interview with the Resident, at which he again pleaded hard, but unsuccessfully, for the countenance of the British Government. It was clear that the hopes which he had at first placed in the Persian Government had been disappointed.

Meanwhile the position of Shaikh 'Abdullah's sons at Dammām, the last remaining foothold of the family in Arabia, had become precarious. In December 1843 the Wahhābi Amir offered his services to the contending Shaikhs for the purpose of arranging a reconciliation between them; but his overtures were rejected by the ex-chief. Faisal-bin-Turki then declared war against Shaikh 'Abdullah and began to collect troops, partly for an investment of Dammām by land to supplement blockade by sea, and partly for the punishment of some of the Bedouin tribes in the neighbourhood who had hitherto kept the Dammām garrison, commanded by Mubārak, Nāsir, and another son of Shaikh 'Abdullah, supplied with provisions. Two boats with commissariat and military stores for the defenders of Dammām, despatched by Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait, were captured by the fleet of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah at Dōhat Balbūl, whence it had been intended to send the cargoes by camel to Dammām; but the incident, which might otherwise have led to a conflict between Shaikh Jābir and the *de facto* Shaikh of Bahrain, was adjusted by the friendly intervention of the British authorities. In March 1844 the garrison of Dammām, being reduced to great straits for supplies, proposed a capitulation; but their terms were not accepted by the Wahhābi Amir. Shaikh 'Abdullah, on becoming aware of the critical position of affairs, crossed from Būshehr to the Arabian side of the Gulf and attempted to throw supplies into Dammām, but failed, the boat which he sent being captured by the blockading squadron. A little later the Dammām garrison surrendered to the Wahhābis on condition that their lives should be spared and that they should be allowed to carry away their personal property, and the fort of Dammām was occupied in the name of Faisal-bin-Turki, who thereafter showed little interest in the quarrels of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs. The result must have been disappointing to Bashir-bin-Rahmah, to whom Shaikh Muhammad had promised, as a reward for his services against Shaikh 'Abdullah, the restoration of his paternal possessions.

Reduction of Dammām by the Wahhābis, March 1844.

During the absence of the ex-Shaikh at Būshehr, a Batīl, described as belonging to Bahrain but owned apparently by Bashir-bin-Rahmah or one of his family, was unwarrantably seized on the Persian coast, and therefore on the prohibited side of the Restrictive Line, by Shaikh 'Abdullah's dependents at Nāband. A remonstrance having been addressed by the Resident to the ex-Shaikh, the latter wrote to the chief local authority at Nāband asking him to restore the Batīl to the owners; but, while this message was in course of transmission by a British vessel, a change of authorities took place at Nāband, and the release of the Batīl was refused by the new governor. A lengthy correspondence ensued and redress

Maritime irregularity.

was eventually obtained in July 1844, not however until Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, now settled like 'Īsa-bin-Tarif at Dōhah in Qatar, had seized two Nāband Batils by way of retaliation. Bashīr, it should be added, immediately gave up these prizes when ordered to do so by the Resident on the ground that the case was already in process of settlement by the British authorities.

Visit of the ex-Shaikh to Kuwait and his third visit to Būshehr, 1844.

Shaikh 'Abdullah, on the failure of his attempt to convey supplies to Dammām, was hotly pursued by four Batils detached from the blockading squadron, but he succeeded in making his escape to Kuwait, where for a short time he resided. On the fall of Dammām most of Shaikh 'Abdullah's sons came to Bahrain and were allowed to settle in Muharraq; but Mubārak took refuge with his father's friend Shāfi' among the Banī Hājir; and Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, in violation —so his adversaries alleged—of terms arranged in the presence of the Wahhābi Amīr, refused to allow the ex-Shaikh to return to Bahrain unless as a private individual and on condition that his conduct in the future should be guaranteed by the British Government,—a requirement which the propounder well knew to be impossible. After a short stay at Kuwait, Shaikh 'Abdullah returned southwards and obtained, on the way, an interview with the British Resident at Būshehr; the meeting was held, by request of the ex-chief, at a place on the seashore about three miles from the town. The object of the visitor was clearly to extort help from the British Government by a threat of combining with the Wahhābis and availing himself of their assistance to recover Bahrain; but, as no interest was shown by the Resident in his intentions or affairs, Shaikh 'Abdullah continued on his way and once more took up his residence at Nāband.

Proceedings of the ex-Shaikh during a residence at Nāband, 1844-45.

Soon after his arrival at Nāband, the ex-Shaikh, whose movements greatly alarmed the divers on the pearl banks, proceeded to the Qatar coast with the intention of attacking 'Īsa-bin-Tarīf at Dōhah; but he found that vigilant enemy well prepared, and so sailed on into the home waters of Bahrain. Shaikh Muhammad, learning that his grand-uncle was in the neighbourhood, sent a deputation of merchants to invite him to return to his home; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, after evading compliance by insisting on conditions which he knew could not be accepted, proceeded to Qatif and thence despatched one of his sons on a friendly mission to the Wahhābi Amīr. After this, seizing two small vessels by the way near the Fasht-ad-Dibal, he returned to Nāband. A letter was at once sent by the British Resident to the chief authority at Nāband, requesting him to restrain Shaikh 'Abdullah from such disorderly pro-

ceedings in future; but, though the person addressed, Shaikh Ahmad-bin-Saif by name, received the representation in a proper spirit and apparently apologised to the Shaikh of Bahrain for the mischief already done, he was unable to control the actions of Shaikh 'Abdullah, who shortly after set out on another cruise and captured two more Bahrain vessels. Annoyed by these proceedings, to which the Restrictive Line prevented his making any rejoinder, the Shaikh of Bahrain appealed to the British authorities and sent his brother 'Ali to wait upon the Resident; and the result was an injunction, issued by the central Persian Government at the instance of the British Envoy, directing the Governor-General of Fārs to compel Shaikh 'Abdullah to give up the boats he had taken and to prevent him from disturbing the peace of the Gulf. The ex-Shaikh, finding himself unsupported by Persia, gave the Resident a verbal promise to abstain, so long as he should continue to reside in Persia, from aggressions upon Bahrain; but, as he refused to confirm this undertaking in writing, a British war vessel was despatched to Nāband, and he was told to consider himself as having been formally placed under restraint.

Proceedings of the ex-Shaikh at Qatīf, 1845.

Nāband having ceased, under these restrictions, to be a suitable place of residence for him, Shaikh 'Abdullah, in October 1845, informed the Resident of his intention to remove to Qatīf. Soon afterwards an unsuccessful attempt was made by him, in conjunction with the Wahhābis, to capture Bahrain, of which the details are given in a later paragraph on the relations of the Shaikh of Bahrain with the Wahhābi power. On the failure of this *coup* Shaikh 'Abdullah once more took refuge at Kuwait.

Proceedings of the ex-Shaikh during a residence at Kuwait, 1845-46.

On becoming aware of these events, the British representative at Būshehr wrote to Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait expressing a hope that he would not allow Shaikh 'Abdullah, while living under his protection, to indulge in depredations upon the trade of Bahrain; and the hint was apparently taken, for the ex-Shaikh, during his stay at Kuwait, remained altogether quiescent. In June 1846 Shaikh 'Abdullah received an invitation from the Governor-General of Fārs to return to Būshehr, where it was promised that he should be liberally entertained "until . . . . the season for action had arrived"; but in August the ex-chief, who was now well aware both of the duplicity of the Persians and of their inability to assist him, declined their flattering but insincere offer.

Proceedings of the ex-Shaikh during a residence in Hasa, 1846-47.

In September 1846, probably on account of the restraints to which he was subjected at Kuwait, Shaikh 'Abdullah removed to Hasa, where he settled at first in the neighbourhood of Dammām; and at the beginning of 1847 he was living, without any followers, on Tārūt Island. During the greater part of his stay in Hasa, as explained further on, war prevailed

between the Wahhábis and the Shaikh of Bahrain; but no active part in the hostilities was taken by the ex-chief. It was not until August 1847, when a peace was concluded between the principal belligerents by which the Wahhábi Amír bound himself not to abet Shaikh 'Abdullah in his machinations, that the exile suddenly woke to life, launched a vessel at Dammám with the supposed intention of proceeding to Qais to intrigue with some discontented 'Utúb there, and was joined by 'Isa-bin-Tarif of the Ál-Bin-'Ali, whose dislike of Shaikh Muhammad had now overcome his former hatred of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The demand made by the allies upon Shaikh Muhammad was for the restoration of his grand-uncle's vessels and other possessions. The immediate commencement of hostilities at sea was prevented by the arrival in the "Elphinstone" of Commodore Lowe, who required that the regular sanction of the Resident should first be obtained by the parties; but, when this omission had been supplied, the war, which quickly took a turn unfavourable to the ex-chief, began without further delay.

Death in battle of 'Isa-bin-Tarif and final ruin of the ex-Shaikh's fortunes, 1847.

The Restrictive Line was violated, at an early stage of the proceedings, by Shaikh 'Abdullah, who crossed to the Persian coast to obtain reinforcements; and Shaikh Muhammad, on his part, asked that the British Government would either restrain the 'Athi malcontents settled on Qais or grant him leave to take suitable measures against them. This request of the Shaikh was referred by the Resident to Government; but, before orders could be received from India, the campaign had been brought to an end by a battle fought on land, in which the troops of Bahrain, commanded by Shaikh Muhammad in person, defeated the allies near Fuwairat in Qatar; 'Isa-bin-Tarif himself was among the slain. This disaster was the death-blow of Shaikh 'Abdullah's hopes. The orders of the Government of India, at length received, were that an invasion of Bahrain by the allies should be prevented, if necessary, by a British naval force; but the decision was not communicated to Shaikh Muhammad, as it might have led him to neglect precautions for his own defence.

Correspondence of the Persian Consul-General at Baghdád with both parties.

About this time, probably in 1848, 'Abdul Jabbár Khán, the Persian Consul-General at Baghdád, opened a correspondence with both parties. To the ex-Shaikh he wrote assuring him of the active support of the Persian Government, "and begging him to make every preparation for "carrying into effect the plans he might have in contemplation,—however "momentous, however gigantic,—Persian assistance, full and powerful, "would most surely be accorded to him." His letter to Shaikh Muhammad was equally friendly and was apparently intended to blind

and mislead that overweening ruler. Steps taken by the British Resident at Baghdád resulted, however, in the discontinuance of the correspondence, on which the offending Persian functionary pretended that he had entered in ignorance of its impropriety.

The struggle between the chiefs was at length brought to an end by the death of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, apparently in 1849. This event took place at Masqat, in the course of a voyage undertaken by the ex-Shaikh with the object of persuading his former enemy, Saiyid Sa'íd, then at Zanzibar, to assist him in recovering his ancestral dominions. Death of the ex-Shaikh, 1849.

Relations of Bahrain with the Wahhábis from the accession of Shaikh Muhammad to the death of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, 1843-1849.

The interference of the Wahhábi Amír in the dynastic quarrels of the Ál Khalífah, resulting in the transference of Dammám from their possession to his, has already been described; but it remains to notice some other transactions between the Wahhábis and the Shaikh of Bahrain which had no very direct connection with the dissensions among the Ál Khalífah.

In the operations against Dammám the Amír Faisal and Shaikh Muhammad acted in concert; and, on the fall of that place, it seems to have been arranged that the Shaikh, in return for the aid lent him, should acknowledge the supremacy of the Wahhábis and pay an annual tribute, with arrears. Rupture between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhábis, 1845-1847.

Before the end of 1844 a demand for settlement of the arrears had been twice presented by the Amír and as often evaded by the Shaikh; and in 1845 it became known that 'Abdullah-bín-Sa'íd, the Wahhábi Governor of Qatíf, was plotting an attack upon Bahrain. The Wahhábi official, his plans not being yet matured, pretended unusual friendliness for Shaikh Muhammad; but the latter, who without difficulty penetrated this artifice, assumed the offensive, placed the ports of Hasa under blockade, and engaged in his service a noted pirate named Hamaid-bin-Majdal. At this juncture Shaikh 'Abdullah, the ex-chief of Bahrain, landed secretly near Ras Tanúrah, and sent messengers to his son Mubárak and to the Wahhábi Governor; his proposal was that he himself, with his vessels, should decoy the blockading force away from Qatíf, and that, during its absence, Mubárak should cross over from the mainland and 1845.

take possession of Bahrain. The scheme, in itself not unpromising, was frustrated by some of the 'Amāir, into whose hands part of Shaikh 'Abdullah's correspondence fell and by whom it was carried to 'Ali, a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, in Bahrain. In the result, the ex-Shaikh found himself confronted, before he had reached Qatif, by the Bahrain fleet in battle array; and he had some difficulty in escaping capture by them.

1846. Hostilities between Bahrain and the Wahhābis, and the blockade by the former of the Hasa coast, continued throughout 1846 without advantage on either side. In September 1846 the ex-chief of Bahrain reappeared and settled in Hasa, first near Dammām and then on Tārūt Island, with the result that the blockade, which had been temporarily relaxed, again became more strict, and that two engagements took place on the mainland, in one of which the Wahhābi governor was victorious, in the other the Shaikh of Bahrain; the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, however, did not himself take part in any of these proceedings. In October 1846 the Wahhābi official was desirous of calling some of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to his aid and sought permission to do so from the British Resident at Būshehr, and in November the Shaikh of Bahrain applied to the same authority for leave to form an alliance with the Shaikh of Dibai; but both requests were, as usual, refused.

End of the war and final settlement, 1847. Early in 1847 the situation was changed by the action of Hamaid-bin-Majdal and his 'Amāir, who seceded from the party of Shaikh Muhammad and attached themselves to the Wahhābis; and in August of the same year a settlement was arranged, under which the Amīr Faisal undertook not to encourage the ex-chief of Bahrain further, even though the latter should continue to reside in Hasa, while Shaikh Muhammad bound himself to pay tribute to the Wahhābis at the rate of $4,000 a year.

Relations of Bahrain with Persia during the same period, 1843-49.

Beyond the intrigues of Persian agents and officials in favour of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, especially in 1843-44 and 1846, which have been recounted above, there is nothing to be noticed in the relations of Persia with Bahrain at this time.

Relations of Bahrain with Turkey during the same period, 1843-49.

The case of Turkey, however, is different; for a claim by the Porte to sovereignty over Bahrain, afterwards urged from time to time, was advanced apparently for the first time in 1847. The views of the Porte found expression, on this occasion, in a letter addressed by the Mutasallim of Basrah to the Shaikh of Bahrain, in which the latter was invited to declare his allegiance to the Sultān and to submit detailed lists of the shipping of his principality in order that the vessels might be registered under the Turkish flag. A Turkish brig-of-war which at this time was cruising in the Gulf did not, however, visit Bahrain,—probably in order to avoid attracting unnecessary attention,—and the overtures of the Turks were evaded by Shaikh Muhammad; but the incident, as will be shown presently, afforded matter for reflection to the British Government.

Relations of Bahrain with the British Government during the same period, 1843-49.

Matters arising out of the dynastic struggle and out of Wahhābi affairs.

Certain transactions of the British authorities in regard to Bahrain have been noticed incidentally. Such were their repeated insistence on the observance of the Restrictive Line by both factions, their withholding of the Saiyid of 'Omān and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and Kuwait from participation in the war, and their discouragement of Persian intrigue and intervention; and such also, was the veto which they placed in 1846 on the design of the Wahhābis and the Shaikh of Bahrain to borrow aid against one another from the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān.

Treaty for the suppression of the Slave Trade, 8th May 1847.

On the 8th of May 1847, a treaty for the suppression of the Slave Trade, similar to that executed by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān in the same year, was signed by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain.

Proposal for a British Protectorate over Bahrain considered and rejected, 1847-49.

The insidious advances of Turkey in 1847 led to a discussion of the politico-commercial position of Bahrain. The Shaikh complained that heavier harbour fees and other dues were levied on his vessels at Bombay than on those of Persia and Masqat; and he professed himself inclined, on account of this unfavourable treatment, to accept—as the Shaikh of

Kuwait had already done—the Turkish flag. Enquiry having shown that the extra charges at Bombay were levied on Bahrain vessels because they did not possess registers, a refund was authorised; and the Shaikh of Bahrain was informed that in future his subjects might avoid payment of the heavier rates at Bombay by providing themselves with certificates signed by the Resident. The question raised did not, however, end here; for, in the opinion of the Bombay Government, it was obviously desirable to exclude interference by foreign powers in the affairs of the Persian Gulf, inasmuch as, without retaining the supreme authority in their own hands, the British Government could not hope to secure the performance of the objects which they had attained in that quarter at a large expense; and the Board of Directors concurred in their recommendation that "any attempts upon Bahrain ought to be resisted by the British naval force" in the Gulf, and that the British Political Resident should be so informed. In the meantime the Resident, Major Hennell, had been authorised, while avoiding discussion with the Turks, to ascertain whether the Shaikh of Bahrain was inclined to enter into a closer connection with the British power; and some months later, apparently in 1848, Shaikh Muhammad expressed a wish that his principality should be taken under British protection. Major Hennell, whose opinion had at first been adverse to the project, now recommended the Shaikh's offer for acceptance; but in September 1849, after a protracted discussion which resulted in an agreement between the Indian Government and Her Majesty's Government that a change of policy would be inexpedient, the Resident was directed to decline the proposal of the Shaikh, but to assure him at the same time of continuance of the good will and friendship of the British Government.

Piracies committed by one of the Qubaisāt, 1848.

While this important question was pending, the conduct of Shaikh Muhammad towards the British Government was not free from reproach, especially in regard to a pirate named Khalifah, a member of the restless Qubaisāt section of the Bani Yās tribe of Abu Dhabi. This individual, after plundering a number of vessels including one belonging to Bahrain, had somehow fallen into the hands of the Shaikh; and the question of his punishment was already under consideration by the British Resident, when the Shaikh, in violation of a promise given to the Residency Agent, again set him at liberty. A sharp remonstrance by Colonel Hennell produced a humble apology and a promise to re-arrest the pirate should occasion offer; but it does not appear that an opportunity of doing so was ever found.

Internal affairs of Bahrain, 1843-1849.

Arrival of the Dawāsir in Bahrain, 1845.

The Dawāsir who now inhabit Budaiya' and Zallāq on the main island appear to have arrived in Bahrain about 1845. On their way thither from their original home in Central Arabia, they are said to have sojourned for a few years on Zakhnūnīyah Island.

Existence of a colony of 'Athi malcontents on Qais Island, 1847-49.

Of the conditions prevailing in the Bahrain islands during the first years of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalīfah's rule we have little information; but such indications as exist point to internal misgovernment. The existence, as early as 1847, of a colony of Bahrain refugees on Qais island has already been mentioned in connection with the struggle between the Shaikh and his grand-uncle; and this settlement, though the inhabitants did not actually assist the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, must have been regarded by Shaikh Muhammad as in some way prejudicial to his interests, for we find him at the end of 1848 endeavouring, but without success, to persuade the Shaikh of Chārak to expel the 'Utūb from Qais. In January 1849, disgusted by the arbitrary government of the Shaikh, four of the principal merchants among his subjects left Bahrain and after some stay at Lingeh went to reside on Qais,—a proceeding by which Shaikh Muhammad was so much disquieted that he sent his brother 'Ali to Būshehr to seek the advice of the Resident. In reply to questions, the Shaikh was told that the British vessels in the Gulf would endeavour while in the neighbourhood to prevent the seceders from attacking Bahrain, but that it behoved the Shaikh himself to be vigilant; and the adoption by himself of a more conciliatory policy was suggested. This counsel seems to have borne fruit. Three of the merchants afterwards returned to Bahrain in a British vessel; and an amicable, if temporary, adjustment of their differences with the Shaikh was secured in June 1849.

General history of Bahrain and policy of the British Government during the remainder of Shaikh Muhammad's rule, 1850-68.

The affairs of Bahrain, in consequence of the irresponsible character of the ruler, of the close interest in the principality taken by Great Britain, and of claims to suzerainty advanced by the Wahhābis, the Turks and the Persians, became, after the death of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, extremely intricate. In the words of Lieutenant Disbrowe, "we have the launching

"of Butels and the expectation of attacks; seeking the Resident's advice "and speaking disparagingly of him for giving advice; the oppression of "subjects, and the flight of the oppressed; the deputing of envoys, armed "with full powers, to effect agreements and the return of the envoys to be "censured for the agreements they had effected." We shall treat the following period of nearly twenty years chronologically, without any attempt to separate the closely intertwined threads of the narrative.

Piracy by Bani Hājir and insolence of Shaikh Muhammad, 1850.

About the end of June 1850 a small Ghunchah from Khārag Island, bound for Qatīf, was captured off Rās Tanūrah by a party of 28 Bani Hājir who were returning to the mainland in a Bahrain Baqārah; and the Khāragis, after being plundered of all that they possessed, were landed, stripped, on the Hasa coast. On the grounds that he had connected himself by marriage with the guilty tribe, that he allowed them to frequent Bahrain in considerable numbers, and that he was secretly instigating their lawless proceedings, the Shaikh of Bahrain was compelled by the British Resident, although the Bani Hājir were not his subjects and the crime had been committed in the jurisdiction of the Wahhābis, to answer for the offence and to disburse 100 Tūmāns as compensation to the sufferers.

At nearly the same time, in the course of a correspondence relating to the death of a Bahrain subject, Shaikh Muhammad sent messages of an offensive character to the British Resident through Hāji Qāsim, the Residency Agent in Bahrain; his insulting remarks referred in part to Colonel Hennell personally, and in part to the British Government. A ship of war was immediately despatched to Bahrain to require an explanation, whereupon Shaikh Muhammad, repenting of his hasty conduct, deputed his brother 'Ali to Būshehr to offer an apology. In so far as he was himself concerned, Colonel Hennell accepted this *amende* as sufficient; but he insisted that, at the next visit of Commodore Porter to Bahrain, the Shaikh should visit that officer personally on board ship and express regret for his remarks derogatory to the British Government,—a demand to which 'Ali, on the part of the Shaikh, readily acceded and which was duly fulfilled.

Danger from the Wahhābis and sons of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah averted by British action, 1850-52.

In 1850 a breach between Shaikh Muhammad and the Wahhābis seemed to be imminent; and the prospect was the more serious that the British Resident had failed in an endeavour to persuade the sons of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah to settle peaceably on Qais Island, in consideration of allowances to be granted by the Shaikh of Bahrain.

1850.

Ill-feeling was first excited by the Amir Faisal's treatment of an envoy named Muhammad-bin-'Abdur Rahīm, whom he had himself sent to Bahrain and whom, on return from this mission, he despoiled of the presents with which Shaikh Muhammad had loaded him and even impri-

soned,—a course of behaviour so irritating to the Shaikh of Bahrain that he threatened to blockade Qatif unless reparation were made. A little later, in April 1850, a son of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the well known Wahhábi agent at Baraimi, visited Bahrain; and the cold reception which he naturally met with there did not tend to improve the relations between Shaikh Muhammad and the Amir.

Early in 1851 the Amir Faisal in person made his appearance in Qatar, at a place only two marches distant from Dōhah, whereupon the people of Dōhah, Wakrah and Fuwairat repudiated their allegiance to Bahrain and went over to the Wahhábis. The Shaikh of Bahrain, against his own better judgment, then tendered a small annual tribute to the Amir,—a circumstance from it may perhaps be inferred that he had failed to observe the agreement of 1847; but his adversary rejected the offer with scorn, proposed exorbitant terms instead, and invited the sons of the late Shaikh 'Abdullah to join him from their asylum on the Persian coast. Shaikh Muhammad then blockaded the Wahhábi port of Qatif; but the sons of 'Abdullah, arriving with a fleet which they had equipped on the Persian side, broke through the line of his vessels and entered Qatif harbour. Matters now assumed an aspect very threatening for Shaikh Muhammad; and he was, in fact, on the point of succumbing to the hostile combination when a British squadron, arriving off Bahrain, took the islands under their protection. Thereafter, at the end of July 1851, a peace was concluded between the disputants by the efforts of Shaikh Tahnūn of Abu Dhabi; Dōhah in Qatar was restored to 'Ali, brother of the Shaikh of Bahrain, from whom it had been taken; and the Wahhábi Amir returned quietly to Hofúf. 1851.

In this year a claim by the Porte to sovereignty over Bahrain was summarily rejected by the British Government.

In 1852, enraged by the recent settlement of the sons of 'Abdullah at Dammām under Wahhábi protection, Shaikh Muhammad proposed to withhold the instalment of tribute then due to the Amir and indulged in imprudent speeches; but by the advice of Captain Kemball, the British Resident, and of his own brother 'Ali, a man of greater self-control than himself, he was persuaded to make the required payment to an agent whom Faisal had deputed to receive it. 1852.

Soon after this Shaikh Muhammad gave way to irrational fears,—fears not only of rivals belonging to his own family but also of the Saiyid of 'Omān and even of Shaikh Tahnūn, the recent mediator between himself and the Wahhábis; and hardly had Captain Kemball, whom he had recently insulted, undertaken a correspondence on his behalf with the Difficulty of dealings with Shaikh Muhammad, 1852.

sons of 'Abdullah, when the negotiations were frustrated by the instability and unreasonableness of Shaikh Muhammad. Yūsuf-bin-Ibrāhim, the principal among the four Bahrain merchants who had migrated to Qais in 1849, still refused to return to his home without a guarantee of British protection, which could not be granted; and he eventually died at Lingeh in the following year (1853).

Supplementary engagement relating to the Slave Trade, 10th May 1856. Reparation obtained for the ill-treatment by Shaikh Muhammad of British subjects in Bahrain, 1858.

On the 10th of May 1856 an engagement relating to the Slave Trade, supplementary to the Treaty of 1847, was accepted by the Shaikh of Bahrain; in its terms it was identical with those obtained from the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān in the same year.

In 1858 Shaikh Muhammad, now described as "a man who combined "in himself the worst qualities of a tyrant, the most unbridled lust "and greed of wealth, and an uncontrollable temper, ignorance and impa- "tience against restraint," proceeded to lay an embargo on a Baghlah under the British flag, to prohibit vessels owned by Indian merchants in Bahrain from visiting Qatif, and to levy duties on exports in addition to those on imports, which alone had been taken before; and it was complained that his tone to Hāji Qāsim, the Residency Agent in Bahrain, had become very insolent.

Accordingly, in September 1858, Captain Felix Jones, the Resident at Būshehr, sent his Assistant, Lieutenant Disbrowe, in the "Clive" sloop-of-war to convey a letter and a remonstrance to the chief. The release of the impounded British Baghlah having been at once obtained, the Shaikh's brother 'Ali became, as usual, the medium of communication, and explained that the prohibition against vessels under British colours visiting Qatif was intended to prevent complications that might otherwise occur through the enmity of the Wahhābi governor against the Shaikh of Bahrain; Lieutenant Disbrowe replied that "the British flag "was fully able to uphold its dignity in every corner of the globe without "assistance from other powers." In regard to customs duties, it was explained that the British Government desired that they should not be of an arbitrary or oppressive character, a proposition to which Shaikh 'Ali made no objection; and a promise was given that the Residency Agent should in future be treated with the respect due to his position. The Shaikh, after an unsuccessful attempt to induce Lieutenant Disbrowe to pay him the first visit on shore, then came off to the "Clive" and expressed his regret at what had occurred; and his call was then returned by Lieutenant Disbrowe and Commodore Jenkins under a salute to the British flag.

Renewed danger from the Wahhábis and the sons of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah again averted by British action, 1859.

Notwithstanding the peace arranged in 1851, tension continued between the Wahhábi Amir and the Shaikh of Bahrain, and a vigilant watch was maintained by the local British authorities. In May 1853, with reference to one of the alarms of an invasion of Bahrain that from time to time occurred, the Government of India authorised the Government of Bombay to offer every obstacle to an attack upon those islands by the Wahhábi Amír—who was now nominally subject to the Ottoman Porte—on the ground that Her Majesty's Government would not permit the occupation of Bahrain by the Turkish Government, or by any one acting for them or in their interest. In 1859 matters again came to a head, and, notwithstanding the presence at the time of a British corvette in Hasa waters, preparations for a descent on Bahrain were made at Qatif and Dammám by the Wahhábi governor of the littoral and by Muhammad, a son of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah; the object of the movement was to place Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah in possession of Bahrain, and the excuse was that the Shaikh of Bahrain had instigated certain tribes of Qatar to attack the subjects of the Wahhábi Amír. Some Turkish and Persian vessels were seized by the confederates in a piratical manner and their crews impressed for service on the intended expedition. The British Resident immediately despatched Commodore Balfour to Dammám with the Persian Gulf squadron; and so threatening was the attitude assumed on arrival by that officer, whose conduct afterward received "the marked commendation of Government," that the allies at once discontinued their proceedings and the Wahhábi governor even sued for pardon.

An inconclusive correspondence then followed between the Wahhábi ruler, who was much annoyed at the intervention of the British authorities, and the British Resident, Captain Felix Jones, who believed that the fixed object of the Wahhábis was "universal dominion along the coast." The Amir asserted authority over Bahrain and declared himself a vassal of the Sultán of Turkey. The Resident, in reply, informed him of the determination of the British Government to preserve the independence of Bahrain, and remarked on the inconsistency of piratical seizures of Turkish shipping with professions of dependence on the Porte.

To Government Captain Jones made a recommendation that punitive action should be taken against the ports of Hasa; and a discussion was initiated as to the advisability of requiring Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah to leave Dammám.

Persian and Turkish protection simultaneously invited by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1859.

Towards the end of the year 1859, probably in connection with this crisis, Shaikh Muhammad made simultaneous applications for protection to the Persian Governor of Fārs and to the Turkish Wāli of Baghdād. The response of the Turks was delayed by the absence of the Wāli from his headquarters; but a Persian agent in the person of one Mirza Mehdi Khān, a well-known Anglophobe, almost immediately arrived in Bahrain, the Persian flag was hoisted, and Persian sovereignty was proclaimed. Scarcely, however, had these ceremonies been performed, when Muhammad Baig, the emissary of Mustafa Nūri Pāsha appeared; the Persian flag was again lowered; and the Turkish flag was raised in its place. To complete the absurdity of the situation the Persian agent refused to leave Bahrain or to surrender his imaginary authority in the Shaikhdom.

Discussion of the policy to be adopted by Britain in regard to these events, 1860-61.

Sir H. Rawlinson, the British Minister at Tehrān, who differed from Captain Jones, the Resident, in regarding these matters as of slight account, contented himself with obtaining from the Shāh's ministers an assurance that no military occupation of Bahrain should be undertaken by Persia until the question of title had been settled by diplomatic discussion; and he advised Captain Jones that, while hostilities against Bahrain from any quarter were to be repelled by force of British arms, the voluntary tender by the Shaikh of allegiance to any other power might, so long as it was not followed by a military occupation, be ignored as of no practical importance. On consideration of the correspondence the Government of Bombay instructed the Resident at Būshehr not to interfere with the occupation of Bahrain, whether by Persia or by Turkey, otherwise than by protest and by an intimation that the matter had been reported to Her Majesty's Government; but at the same time the agents of both powers were to be distinctly warned that aggression by Bahrain, or in the name of Bahrain, upon neighbouring tribes would not be allowed by the British authorities, and would even be prevented by force if necessary. In referring the general question to the Secretary of State, the Government of Bombay observed that the tranquillity of the Persian Gulf, which had been so long preserved by the policy of the British Government, seemed to demand that Bahrain should be regarded as subject neither to the Sublime Porte nor to Persia; and they recommended that the independence of the principality should be recognised, and that those engagements which in the interests of commerce, humanity and public security had been concluded between it and the British Government should be maintained. This view was approved by Her Majesty's Government in February 1861.

In the meantime the Persian and Turkish agents had apparently vanished from Bahrain.

Convention with Britain signed by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 21st May 1861.

In May 1861 it became known to the Resident that Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, without reference to himself, had commenced a blockade of the Hasa coast and was harassing the pearl fishers of Qatif and Dammâm, at the latter of which places Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, son of the late ex-chief of Bahrain, was still located.

Captain Jones immediately proceeded to Bahrain, where he arrived on the 18th of May, with the full Gulf squadron; but he could not prevail upon the Shaikh to discontinue the blockade of the Wahhabi coast. The explanation of the Shaikh's obstinacy was, or at least was believed to be, a promise by Persia to procure him the assistance of a French vessel. Having exhausted all his arguments in vain, the Resident placed the matter in the hands of Commodore Drought, who was immediately successful, without the firing of a single shot, in capturing two of the finest war vessels of Bahrain, the "Tawîlah" and the "Hamrah."

The Shaikh then made submission, and, after some negotiations conducted through his brother 'Ali, consented to sign a Convention proposed by Captain Jones. By this agreement, executed on the 21st of May 1861, Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah acknowledged the validity of the treaties and conventions concluded with the British Government by his predecessors in office; he promised to abstain, on condition of being supported by the British Government against external aggression, from "the prosecution of war, piracy and slavery by sea"; he engaged to submit cases of aggression on himself or his subjects by sea to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf as arbitrator and to look to him for redress, as also to make reparation for such maritime offences as might in justice be charged against himself or his subjects; and he undertook to recognise the jurisdiction of the British Agent and Political Resident over British subjects of every kind in Bahrain, and to permit the latter to reside and trade in his dominions, subject only to an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent. in kind or in cash upon their goods, which should not be more than once levied. Matters having been thus arranged, the Resident restored the war vessel "Tawîlah," but retained the "Hamrah." One result of the Convention was to assimilate the position of the Shaikh of Bahrain, who was not a party to the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, to that of the Trucial Shaikhs.

The Government of Bombay approved the proceedings of Captain Jones and referred the Convention, which they considered to be advantageous notwithstanding that it had been obtained by the Resident without

previous express sanction, to the Government of India, by whom it was accepted on the 9th of October 1861. The Resident was at the same time instructed not to return the "Hamrah" until the Shaikh, by his conduct, should show himself worthy of such consideration.

Expulsion of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām, November 1861.

Meanwhile a suggestion made by the Resident in connection with the attempted invasion of Bahrain in 1859,—that Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, who had repeatedly been warned not to disturb the peace and of whose proceedings the Shaikh of Bahrain had frequently complained, should be removed from Dammām—had been adopted by higher authority. It was intended by Government that the exile, on condition of residing at Kuwait or somewhere in Persia, should receive an allowance from the Shaikh of Bahrain. The Resident was warned, in case of force being required, to confine his operations to the sea and not to let himself be drawn into land operations.

Accordingly, in June 1861, the Resident wrote to the Wahhābi Amir, requiring him to eject Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām; and in November 1861, no reply to the letter having been received, he proceeded with the squadron to Dammām, from which, after a bloodless bombardment of an hour's duration, the son of the ex-chief with all his followers incontinently fled. No opposition to the proceedings of the squadron was offered by the Wahhābi garrisons at Qatif or Dammām; and the result was reported to be welcome to the traders of Hasa, and even to the Wahhābi authorities, whose failure to expel the refugee was due merely to ordinary Arab notions on the subject of hospitality.

A protest against the action taken at Dammām was made soon after by the Turkish Wāli of Baghdād and was answered by the British Political Agent at that place; but, as it related to the political position of Hasa, not Bahrain, it need not be noticed here.

Misbehaviour of the Shaikh of Bahrain in regard to British subjects, 1863-65.

Neither the treaty obligations which he had incurred nor the valuable assistance rendered to him in the expulsion of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām availed for long to keep the Shaikh of Bahrain in good relations with the British Government. In 1863, after the appointment of Colonel Pelly to the Persian Gulf Residency, the "Hamrah" was returned to Shaikh Muhammad at the suggestion of the new Resident, as the earnest of a policy of conciliation which he intended to pursue; but this concession failed to elicit any acknowledgment from the Shaikh beyond "a remark disrespectful to the Viceroy"; and ill-usage of British subjects commenced with such vigour that on one occasion the whole Indian community took refuge at Būshehr, whence the more wealthy among them refused to return.

Various claims arose against the Shaikh, of which one was in 1864 investigated by the Resident and settled by an agreement in writing, executed by the Shaikh and his brother, to pay a sum of 17,000 Qrāns. In the spring of 1865, on again visiting Bahrain, Colonel Pelly found that the compensation promised had not been paid, and that on the contrary a further sum of 3,000 Qrāns had been extorted by the ruler from the Hindu complainants. The Resident on this occasion confined himself to a written remonstrance; but in December of the same year, having failed to convince the Shaikh after a week's argument of the necessity of fulfilling his engagements, Colonel Pelly caused the Bahrain war Baghlah "Dīnār," of 500 tons and pierced for 10 guns, to be seized. Hardly had the Resident recommended to Government the sale of this vessel for the benefit of the British Indian claimants that the Bahrain authorities came to their senses and satisfied the demand against them; but in the meantime the Baghlah had been severely damaged by a hurricane, while in tow of the "Berenice," and foundered on reaching port, apparently at Būshehr.

The Government of India directed that the "Dīnār" should, if practicable, be restored to the Shaikh, and an attempt was made to fulfil their instructions; but the vessel sank and was lost on her way back to Bahrain. A general order was issued by Government, in connection with this case, that the Resident should not in future undertake the confiscation of vessels belonging to chiefs on his own responsibility.

Reassertion by the Persian Government of their claim to Bahrain, 1866-67.

The Persian Government, who in 1862 had protested against the seizure of the Bahrain war vessel "Hamrah," now complained of the proceedings in regard to the "Dīnār" on the ground that Bahrain, under the Agreement concluded by Captain Bruce in 1822,* was a dependency of Persia.

The Government of India, to whom the allusion was unintelligible referred to the Government of Bombay and were informed of the nature of Captain Bruce's Agreement and of its having been at the time instantly repudiated. Upon this the Government of India acquainted Mr. Alison, the British Minister in Persia, with the circumstances of the case and with their own opinion that, whatever might have been the pretensions of Persia (or the grounds of the same) to the sovereignty of Bahrain in former days, the Shāh could not now be regarded as possessing, in point of fact, any rights in the principality.

This communication to the British Legation at Tehrān was approved by Her Majesty's Government in 1867, and the matter apparently dropped

* *Vide* page 849 *ante*.

Claims of the Wahhábi Amír to Bahrain, 1866-67.

At the time of Colonel Pelly's visit to Bahrain in December 1865, a rupture of Anglo-Wahhábi relations being then imminent, reason was found to suspect the existence of an understanding between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhábis; and the seizure of the "Dinár" was dictated, in part, by the expediency of clipping the wings of the Shaikh in case he should suddenly resolve to throw in his lot with the Amír. The Shaikh, it is true, in making his submission, professed a wish to be delivered from the power of the Wahhábis; but his request was considered by the Resident to be insincere. Colonel Pelly was accordingly instructed to report on the political position of Bahrain with reference to the Wahhábi power.

The result of his enquiries was to show that the Shaikh held himself to be independent of the Wahhábis in so far as the islands of Bahrain were concerned, and that the annual tribute of $4,000 which he indubitably paid was on account of his possessions in Qatar, the object of payment being to secure the latter against attack by Arab tribes under Wahhábi influence. In submitting this information Colonel Pelly reminded Government of the* decision of the Court of Directors in 1847, that any attempt upon Bahrain should be prevented by a British naval force, if necessary; of the orders† of the Government of India in 1853, that every obstacle should be offered to the Wahhábi Amír, then regarded as a Turkish agent, should he seek to attack Bahrain; and of the‡ acceptance by the Secretary of State in 1861 of the view that the independence of Bahrain should be recognised and that the engagements between the Shaikh and the British Government should be maintained.

In March 1867, the Government of India enunciated an opinion that the Shaikh was independent of all other powers in respect of his insular possessions, and that he did not owe fealty to the Wahhábis unless in regard to Qatar.

Plunder of the Qatar coast by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and retaliation by the inhabitants of Qatar upon Bahrain, 1867-68.

In 1867 disturbances of a very unusual and serious character broke out between the Shaikh of Bahrain and his dependents in Qatar. A Bedouin of the promontory having been seized and deported to Bahrain by Shaikh Ahmad-bin-Muhammad, the representative of the Bahrain ruler at Wakrah, the headmen of Wakrah and Dóhah combined to demand his release, and, on their request being refused, took measures to expel Shaikh Ahmad from Wakrah; but their action was forestalled by that individual, removing himself, with his family and goods, to Khor Hassán. A seeming reconciliation then took place, the Shaikh of Bahrain releasing

* *Vide* page 882 *ante*.
† *Vide* page 887 *ante*.
‡ *Vide* page 888 *ante*.

the imprisoned Bedouin and the headmen of Qatar apologising to the Shaikh for their behaviour; but on the part of the ruler of Bahrain the proceedings were merely a blind to cover preparations for revenge. Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, one of the Āl Thāni Shaikhs of Dōhah whose influence afterwards became paramount in Qatar, having been invited to Bahrain for the purpose of making a permanent arrangement in regard to the administration of the promontory, was on his arrival treacherously cast into prison; and no sooner had this capture been effected than Shaikh Muhammad despatched a fleet of 24 boats, carrying 500 men, under the command of his brother 'Ali, and a land force of 200 men under Shaikh Ahmad, his agent, to punish the people of Dōhah and Wakrah. At the same time he sought assistance from the Shaikhs of Dibai and Abu Dhabi; and the latter, disregarding the advice of the British Agent at Shārjah, sent about 2,000 armed men in 70 boats to the Qatar coast; but the Shaikh of Dibai, with greater prudence declined to join. The Abu Dhabi fleet was the first to arrive on Qatar, and succeeded in pacifying the suspicions of the inhabitants until the arrival of the Bahrain armament, by which about 40 vessels belonging to Qatar had been captured on the way over. The towns of Dōhah and Wakrah were then sacked by the allied forces, even the rafters and doors of the houses being removed; and the inhabitants, who had been ordered to go forth and settle elsewhere, were plundered, when they tried to obey, of such possessions as remained to them. A number of the people were deported, and most of those who were left then voluntarily dispersed and sought asylum at various places on the coasts of Arabia and Persia. These events took place in October 1867. The damage inflicted on the people of Qatar was estimated at over $200,000.

The victims of this treacherous outrage immediately appealed for redress to the Wahhābi Amir, who maintained a claim to authority over Qatar, and it was soon reported that he had received their representations sympathetically and had assured them that, "as his intentions and those of the British Government coincided," no further harm should befall them from the direction of the sea. A demand by the Amir for the return of the spoil taken and for the repatriation of the exiles was flouted, however, by the Shaikh of Bahrain, and led only to the deportation afresh of certain Qatari families who had meanwhile been allowed to return to their homes. Instructions were then issued by the Wahhābi Amir to his representative in Hasa to prepare for an attack on Bahrain; but, beyond the plunder of some Bahrain subjects by a tribe of the Hasa coast, no visible results followed.

In June 1868 the injured Qataris took the law into their own hands and attempted a retaliatory attack on Bahrain; but the movement began and ended, it would seem, with a somewhat severe naval engagement.

Action of the British authorities with reference to the attack on Qatar, 1868.

The secrecy and rapidity with which the campaign of the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi against Qatar was arranged and carried out had deprived the British Government of an opportunity for prevention or intervention; but, the affair having quickly come to be regarded throughout the Gulf as a test of British preparedness to maintain peace at sea, it was resolved to inflict an exemplary punishment upon the offending chiefs and not to accept the excuse, which would probably be tendered by Shaikh Muhammad, that he was entitled to punish by any and every means his refractory subjects in Qatar.

Preparations and negotiations.

Much delay was caused, however, by the demands of the Abyssinian expedition upon the marine resources of the Government of India; and, for the time being, the only vessel actually in the Gulf was the "Hugh Rose" gunboat, manned entirely by natives of India and unable to steam for more than eight consecutive hours. In May the steamer "Sind" was placed at the Resident's disposal for a blockade of Abu Dhabi, with the Shaikh of which place it was intended first to deal; but, by an extraordinary oversight on which the Government of India afterwards animadverted severely, she arrived in the Gulf without any shot for her guns. Meanwhile the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi whom the Shaikh of Bahrain had privately agreed to reimburse for any indemnity that might be extracted from him by the British Government, had recourse to a policy of shifts and evasions; but on the 8th of June 1868 these were cut short by a letter from the Resident, in which he was called upon to pay 125,000 Qrāns as damages, to restore to Qatar the persons and property that he had removed, and to express regret for the past and an intention of behaving better in future. The news, received in June 1868, of retaliatory action by the people of Qatar accelerated the progress of events; and on the 23rd of July H. M. S. "Vigilant," which had arrived on other duty at Bombay, was despatched to the Persian Gulf. The commander, Captain R. A. Brown, was instructed to enforce upon the Shaikh of Bahrain, by all means at his disposal but in consultation with Colonel Pelly, the immediate payment of $100,000, the surrender of the armed Baghlahs employed by the Shaikh in his expedition, and the provision by the Shaikh of such

security for good conduct as the Resident might deem suitable; and demands of a similar character, to be finally disposed of on the spot, were authorised in the case of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

Settlement with Shaikh Al-bin-Khalifah, 6th September 1868.

No action was taken, however, until the beginning of September,* when Colonel Pelly with H.M.S. "Vigilant" and the gunboats "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose" proceeded to Bahrain, and Shaikh Muhammad, well aware that a reckoning was at hand, fled to Qatar. On the 8th of September 1868 an Agreement was executed by Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah, a brother of the absconding ruler who had been to some extent associated with him in the administration, whereby he undertook to make over the war Baghlahs and Ratils of the ruling family of Bahrain to the British Naval Commander and to pay $25,000 in cash to the British Resident on the next day; to pay a further sum of $75,000 in three annual instalments; and to appoint, for the better preservation of the peace at sea, an agent to represent him at Būshehr in his dealings with the British Residency. The Agreement also declared, on the authority of the principal inhabitants of Bahrain as well as of Shaikh 'Ali himself, that Shaikh Muhammad had by his piratical proceedings and flight forfeited the chiefship, and that Shaikh 'Ali had thus become sole ruler of Bahrain; and the latter pledged himself, in the event of his brother returning to Bahrain, to arrest him and hand him over to the Resident. The condition as to the surrender of the war fleet was duly performed; the vessels composing it were burnt; and the fort of Muharraq, or rather of Abu Māhur, was also destroyed along with its armament. When about one-fifth of the fine, however, had been collected, it was distributed rateably among the sufferers, and the remaining four-fifths were remitted.

The subsequent proceedings of the Resident upon the coast of Qatar and at Abu Dhabi form part of the history of those districts and need not be related here; but it may be mentioned that Colonel Pelly succeeded in effecting an arrangement, in regard to tribute and other matters, between the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah and the new Shaikh of Bahrain. The tribute in question may have been the whole or a part of the sum that was paid by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Wahhābis on account of Qatar.

Persian protest against the British

Protests against the action of the British political representative were shortly received from various Persian authorities; one, in which Bahrain

* These delays are not fully explained. That which occurred between the beginning of February and the middle of July was attributed by the Government of India to the inaction of the Bombay Government.

proceedings in Bahrain and reply of Her Majesty's Government, 1868-69.

was claimed to be "the property of Persia," was addressed by the Shāh's ministers to Mr. Alison, the British Minister at Tehrān; another, of similar purport, was sent to Colonel Pelly by the Kārguzār at Shīrāz; and a third, with which were enclosed two letters from the deposed Shaikh of Bahrain, was lodged at the Foreign Office on the 13th of April 1869 by the Persian Minister in London. A principal ground of complaint was that no previous notice had been given to Persia of the British intention to proceed against Bahrain.

In a reply, sent on the 29th of April 1869 after consultation between the Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India, and the Earl of Clarendon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Persian Minister was reminded that the Shaikhs of Bahrain had, at different periods in the past, entered into direct engagements with the British Government, he was further assured that the sole objects of the British Government in holding the Shaikhs to those engagements were the prevention of piracy and of the slave trade and the maintenance of the police of the Gulf—duties of which Great Britain would gladly, if it were possible, divest herself in favour of Persia. In conclusion a promise was given that, should punitive measures against the Shaikh of Bahrain again become necessary, Her Majesty's Government would, if practicable, cause the Persian Government to be informed beforehand, and that in cases in which this might be impossible, in consequence of the delay which a reference to the Court of Tehrān would involve, a full communication on the subject would be made to the Persian Government. The object of this reply was to avoid causing irritation at Tehrān; but it is not clear that any decided departure from the established British policy was intended by Her Majesty's Government.

'ALI-BIN-KHALĪFAH.

1868-69.

The rule of Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalīfah, inaugurated by his Agreement of the 6th September 1868 with the British Government, was short and tragic; it lasted less than one year.

Intrigues of the ex-Shaikh Muhammad, 1869.

In January 1869, at the earnest request of Shaikh 'Ali, who believed

that he could restrain his brother most effectually if he resided in Bahrain, the ex-Shaikh Muhammad was permitted by the British authorities to return home; but he at once engaged in a course of intrigues which necessitated his deportation to Kuwait. From Kuwait the ex-Shaikh removed to Qatif, where he settled down and entered into communications of sinister meaning with his relation Nāsir-bin-Mubārak—a grandson of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah—whose mother was a woman of the Bani Hājir Bedouin tribe.

Invasion of Bahrain and death of Shaikh 'Ali, 1869.

In August or September 1869, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak crossed over from the mainland in nine boats, accompanied by about 500 men of the Bani Hājir, and, landing in Bahrain, marched to Rifa'-ash-Sharqi, which was held in the name of Shaikh 'Ali by Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the chief who in 1861 had been expelled by the British from Dammām. A battle then took place, in which, owing mainly to treachery on the part of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Shaikh 'Ali was defeated by the invaders, and was killed on the field along with one of his sons. The usurping chiefs, over whom Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah appears to have acquired an immediate ascendancy, then occupied the towns of Manāmah and Muharraq; but they were unable to restrain their rabble of Bedouins, and the former place was plundered. The amount of the damage done at Manāmah, in which British Indian subjects suffered equally with others, was never clearly ascertained; but claims were afterwards registered to the amount of 21,53,797 Qrāns.

INTERREGNUM,

1869.

Immediate action by the local British authority.

When the news of this revolution reached Būshehr, the Resident, Colonel Pelly, at once despatched his Assistant, Captain Way, in

the "Dalhousie" to enquire into matters and to bring away any British Indian traders who might wish to leave; but the passion for gain among the last mentioned class was so strong that they one and all declined to be removed, preferring to remain at their own risk and do business in plundered property, which was being openly sold in Bahrain and Qatif at one-fifth of its real value.

Further action under the orders of the Government of India.

Instructions to the Resident.

Suggestions for dealing with the crisis were made by the Resident at the beginning of October, and at the middle of November he was authorised to blockade Bahrain and otherwise use force until the chief disturbers of the peace, namely Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Nāsir-bin-Mubārak and Muhammad-bin-Khalīfah, should have been surrendered; to recognise, if circumstances after execution of the first measure were favourable and the people generally seemed to approve of the appointment, 'Isa, son of the deceased 'Alī, as Shaikh of Bahrain; and to address the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān by letter, informing them of what had occurred and of the intention of Government to inflict adequate punishment. The questions of compensating persons plundered other than those who had bought in stolen property at nominal rates, and of blockading the Wahhābi ports until the loot deposited there should have been restored, the offending Bedouins chastised and the Governor of Qatīf removed, were reserved for later consideration; and the Resident was directed to exercise great caution in any communication which he might make to the Wahhābi Amir.

Proceedings in Bahrain, 19th November to 2nd December 1869.

On receipt of these orders Colonel Pelly proceeded to Bahrain with H.M.S. "Daphne," Captain Douglas, H.M.S. "Nymph," and the gunboats "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose." Operations commenced on the 19th of November and were over by the 2nd of December. The Hālat Abu Māhur fort was attacked with boats on the night of the 19th November, and the garrison capitulated and surrendered Muhammad-bin-Khalīfah, who was removed on board the "Daphne." Nāsir-bin-Ahmad, another Shaikh, was captured at sea. Nāsir-bin-Mubārak was shelled out of his fort—probably that of Manāmah, which was destroyed in the operations—and dislodged from another place in which he took refuge; but he succeeded in escaping to

Hasa with his followers. Muhammad-bin- Abdullah, the head of the whole combination was outmanœuvred and gave himself up. Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali came over from Qatar, where he was residing, and was installed as ruler without interference on the part of the British Resident, amid every sign of popular rejoicing. Captain Douglas received some contusions by the explosion of a mine, but he was not seriously injured.

Treatment of the prisoners and compensation of sufferers.

The three captured Shaikhs and two other ringleaders were deported to India, where they were at first confined in the fort of Asirgarh, and subsequently in the fort of Chunár. Násir-bin-Ahmad died at Chunár in 1873, and Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah in 1877; and the remaining three prisoners were then removed to Aden, where in 1880 two of them were released.

An arrangement was made with Shaikh 'Isa, at his accession, that the property of the ringleaders should be forfeited and the proceeds applied to the relief of the innocent sufferers by the invasion. The payment of this indemnity continued by instalments until 1876, when it was completed.

Connection of the Wahhábis with the invasion.

It was at first suspected that the Wahhábi Government were partially responsible for these ruinous disturbances in Bahrain, and a statement obtained currency that the Bani Hájir had at first refused to act without the authorisation of the Amír, which Násir-bin-Mubárak accordingly obtained by a visit to Riyádh; but the Government of India, as we have seen, declined to hold the Wahhábi Amír responsible without fuller proof of his complicity and information as to the degree of his control over Hasa. The event proved the wisdom of this decision, for the Amír subsequently wrote to the Resident disclaiming connection with the outrage; and, his guilt not being clear, it was ultimately found sufficient to remind him that the invasion had been made from his territory, where also Násir-bin-Mubárak had afterwards taken refuge and much of the plunder of Bahrain had been deposited, and to request, without the addition of any threat, that he would prevent in future such outrages as that which had occurred.

Position of the Government of Persia in regard to the invasion and to Bahrain generally.

Interception of a Persian message off Bahrain.

After the arrival of the British expedition off Bahrain, a native vessel from Daiyir on the Persian coast, flying the Arab flag, attempted to run the blockade. On being boarded she was found to carry an emissary from Mirza Mehdi Khān, the Persian envoy to Bahrain in 1859, with a dress of honour and letters in which Persian countenance and support were promised to Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the chief filibusterer; the letters stated that Mirza Mehdi Khān had been deputed to "the Persian ports and islands," but they were unaccompanied by any proper Farmān of the Shāh's government. The vessel was detained for having endeavoured to break the blockade; and the letters were delivered by the British authorities to the prisoner Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah and were by him handed over to Colonel Pelly.

Protest by the Persian Government.

In accordance with the orders of Her Majesty's Government issued a few months previously, a telegraphic communication had been made through the Resident, before the sailing of the expedition, to the British Minister at Tehrān for the information of the Persian Court. It stated that, under orders from India, Colonel Pelly was about to call the chief in possession of Bahrain to account for his breach of the maritime peace, and for his unprovoked attack on Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah who had been placed in power by the British Government. Later news of the Resident's proceedings was received with equanimity by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who merely observed that the Government of Persia were interested equally with the Government of Great Britain in the maintenance of the peace by sea, and that they had heretofore had no reason to object to the punishment of the delinquents; but he commented unfavourably on the action of the British authorities in preventing a Persian agent from landing and holding communication with the Shaikhs, and this complaint was repeated in an exaggerated form by the Persian Minister in London.

Shaikh 'Isa-bin-Khalifah, shortly after his installation, received a letter from Haidar Khān, Zābit of the Dashti district upon the Persian coast, in which he was advised to place himself under the protection of the Shāh; but the incident was of no importance.

Opinion of the Government of

In two despatches to the Secretary of State, dated the 22nd of February and the 20th of May 1870, the Government of India repelled certain charges which had been brought by the Persian Government

against their officers; and, in view of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards the question of Persia and Bahrain, they dwelt at length on the evils that were likely to arise from a renunciation by the British Government of their beneficent supervision of the peace of the Persian Gulf, as also on the inconveniences of any policy by which it might be attempted to associate the Persian Government with the British in that task. They pointed out that Persia, having no navy whatever, was incapable of assisting Great Britain to maintain the peace at sea and even more so of taking Great Britain's place, should that place be relinquished; had the case been otherwise, even, and had Persia possessed some power at sea, her intervention would merely have embroiled her with the Sultanate of 'Omān, with the Arab principalities, with the Wahhabi power and with Turkey, to all of which she was antagonistic; indeed the assertion by Persia of claims to Bahrain had already caused the revival of similar obsolete pretensions on the part of Turkey and other powers. By their treaty engagements with Arab Shaikhs the British Government were themselves pledged to maintain the peace and to obtain reparation for maritime aggressions; and, in the opinion of the Government of India, the British protectorate in the Gulf should be regarded as a matter of obligation rather than of right. In the later of their two despatches the Government of India observed: "If "we are no longer prepared to continue the performance of the tasks we "have undertaken, we must withdraw altogether; but the consequences of "such a step would be so disastrous, not only to our national honour, but "to the peace of the Gulf, to the prosperity of the tribes inhabiting the "littoral, and to the lives and property of our subjects, who, during the "peace of the last fifty years, have settled on the shores and embarked "enormous capital in the pearl fisheries and the trade with the mainland, "that we cannot contemplate this course as one of which Her Majesty's "Government could for a moment entertain." This conclusion does not appear to have been contested by the British Government.

Protest by the Porte against the action of the British Government in Bahrain.

A protest was also entered by the Turkish Minister in London against the recent proceedings of the British authorities in Bahrain, which were represented as acts of British sovereignty over "a portion of Turkish

territory." In reply to this remonstrance, however, the Ottoman Minister was informed that the British Government could not recognise the Turkish claim to the sovereignty of Bahrain.

SHAIKH 'ISA-BIN-'ALI,

from 1869.

The reign of Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali, begun in the somewhat striking manner described above, was disturbed during a number of years by the ambitious projects of the Porte and the formation of an Ottoman province upon the adjoining mainland. Against the danger of annexation by the Turks, however, Bahrain was steadily protected by the British Government; and in 1895, with the frustration by a British naval force of an invasion of the islands which had been attempted by Arabs with the countenance of the Turks, fear of aggression finally passed away.

Affairs Arising out of the Turkish Annexation of Hasa, 1871-72.

Turkish expedition to Hasa prevented from approaching Bahrain, 1871.

The Turkish annexation of Hasa in 1871 was accompanied by unmistakeable symptoms of a desire on the part of the Turks to lay claim to all the districts, including Bahrain, over which the Wahhabis had at any time exercised even transient sway. In 1870 Mid-hat Pasha, Wali of Baghdad, the prime mover in the affair, formulated a definite claim to "Bahrain and its dependencies" as appertaining to the "Qáim-Maqámliq of Najd," and therefore to the Ottoman Empire; and in 1871 the British Resident at Baghdad received information to the effect that, if the contemplated expedition to Najd were successful, the Turks would next turn their attention to Bahrain, Trucial 'Omán and the 'Omán Sultanate. Timely British protests, however, made at Constantinople in April and May 1871, drew from the Porte a repudiation of their supposed designs on these countries; and the leaders of the Turkish expedition received instructions from their Government which debarred them from even approaching Bahrain. At the end of May 1871, Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident, was instructed to visit Bahrain with the "Magpie," "Bullfinch" and "Hugh Rose"; to inform the Shaikh

who had asked for advice and protection, of the assurances obtained from the Porte; and to promise that, so long as the Shaikh continued to observe the Convention of 1861, the reciprocal obligations of Britain towards him would be fulfilled.

Murder of a Turkish messenger in Bahrain, 1871.

At an early stage of the Turkish proceedings in Hasa, the Bahrain outlaw Nāsir-bin-Mubārak had attached himself to the Ottoman expedition and had been employed as a medium of communication with the Arabs of the adjoining districts. In August or September 1871 an Arab of the Bani Hājir tribe was employed by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak to convey a letter from the Turkish commandant in Hasa to Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar; and this individual, having imprudently embarked in a Kuwait vessel which touched at 'Aqāriyah on the coast of Bahrain and having, it was stated, been recognised there as one of the slayers of Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah in the invasion of 1869, was put to death by some subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Among other letters found on his body and delivered to the Shaikh of Bahrain, by whom it was opened, was one from the son of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak to Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah that ran: "The "Turkish Government are mindful of Qatar, Bahrain and other places, in "view of putting down their enemies, so that their friends may rejoice. "Please God, you will soon receive news that may gladden you." The letter of the Turkish commandant was returned, unopened, to the master of the Kuwait vessel, by whom it was conveyed to its destination. Some fear was felt at first lest this incident should be utilised by the Turks as a pretext for aggression on Bahrain, and precautions were taken by the British Government and by the local British authorities to oblige the Turks to resort to diplomatic, and abstain from forcible methods. Among them was a reminder conveyed through the British Resident at Baghdād to Mid-hat Pāsha, then on his way to inspect the new province of Hasa, of the assurances given by the Turkish Government that there should be no interference with Bahrain. A demand for reparation was eventually made on the Shaikh by a Turkish Commodore, who arrived off Bahrain on the 22nd of November 1871 with a corvette and gunboat; it was answered by 'Isa-bin-'Ali in a conciliatory letter to Mid-hat Pasha, written apparently under the advice of Colonel Pelly, who had come to Bahrain. In his communication the Shaikh expressed regret that he had not been informed of the establishment of direct Turkish rule in Hasa, that a man belonging to a tribe at feud with the people of Bahrain and connected with Nāsir-bin-Mubārak should have been selected as a messenger and allowed to land in Bahrain, that this

emissary should have been permitted to proceed on his journey without any credentials to prove his connection with the Turks, and, finally, that a person employed by the Turkish Government to carry a despatch should have been found at the same time in possession of a letter to a Shaikh of Qatar in which it was stated that the Porte desired to annex Bahrain. Colonel Pelly presently withdrew to Búshehr, leaving Major Grant, the First Assistant Resident, to watch events locally and meet any Turkish attempt at aggression. In a reply to the letter of the Shaikh, Mid-hat Pasha did his best to dispose of the objections raised, and concluded with a demand for "10,000 legal Dirhams of pure silver" to be paid to Shaikh Jásim of Dóhah, "Qáim-Maqám of Qatar," as blood-money on account of the murdered tribesman; he tried at the same time to convey the impression that he was empowered to take forcible action in case of a refusal. At the end of January 1872 the Shaikh of Bahrain, advised by Colonel Pelly, replied to this demand by a suggestion that the matter should be arranged between the British and Turkish Governments, by whose joint decision he would abide; but the Porte preferred that it should be settled direct between the parties by agents,—a course to which the British Government were willing to agree on condition that there should be no resort to compulsion or a show of force. No further steps, however, were taken by the Turks.

Demand by the Turks for the surrender of two boats, 1871.

In December 1871, before the case of the messenger had been finally dropped, the Turkish Qáim-Maqám of Qatif wrote to the Shaikh of Bahrain demanding, on behalf of a resident of Qatar, the surrender of two boats which had been presented by Sa'úd, the Wahhábi Amir, to certain inhabitants of Bahrain before the arrival of the Turks in Hasa. After some correspondence, in which the Qáim-Maqám adopted an arrogant and domineering tone, Shaikh 'Isa, under advice from Colonel Pelly, offered to hand the boats over in the presence of British officers to any person whom the Wáli of Baghdád might depute to receive them; this proposal was prompted by a doubt as to the justice of the means by which Sa'úd had originally obtained possession of the boats.

Turkish aggression checked, 1871-72.

It may be added here that, before his return to 'Iráq, Mid-hat Pásha questioned a respectable pearl-dealer of Qatif as to the feasibility of arranging that a petition for the annexation of Bahrain to Turkey should be signed by 50 or 60 substantial merchants and others in the islands; and the general tendency of his proceedings made it clear what his intentions, or at least his wishes, in regard to the Shaikhdom were. The decided attitude of the British Government and the constant presence of British ships in Bahrain prevented, however, any actual

interference on his part with the principality; and this result was felt, throughout the whole Gulf, to be a salutary and well-timed check to Turkish pretensions and encroachments. At the beginning of 1872 an assurance was obtained from the Porte that they did not contemplate any change of policy and that they had no idea of extending Turkish sovereignty to the "independent tribes" of the Persian Gulf; but, during most of this year also, the British Assistant Political Resident continued to reside in Bahrain.

General history of Bahrain from the Turkish annexation of Hasa to an attempted invasion from the mainland, 1871-95.

Miscellaneous affairs in Bahrain, 1871.

In August 1871 'Abdul 'Aziz, a son of the late Wahhábi Amír Sa'úd, visited Bahrain and was received by the Shaikh with much ceremony. In October 1871 a misunderstanding arose between Shaikh 'Ísa and two of his brothers in consequence of a claim by the latter to one-half, instead of one-third, of the revenues of the principality; and, rather than compromise his position at a time when his difficulties with the Turks were at their height, the Shaikh appears to have conceded the demand.

Threatened invasion of Bahrain and the question of Zubárah in Qatar, 1874.

No event worthy of notice occurred after this until 1874, when, in the course of the summer, fears began to be entertained of a descent by the tribes of Qatar upon Bahrain. The danger was a real one inasmuch as Manámah and Muharraq were both open towns, while the Shaikh maintained no armed force, except a small guard, and was inclined to neglect all precautions and look to the British Government for protection. For the hostile movement Násir-bin-Mubárak, who lived in Hasa and was dependent on the bounty of the Turks, appears to have been partly responsible; and it should be observed that a request of his to the British Resident to intercede with the Shaikh of Bahrain in regard to some ancestral property had at the time been recently rejected. In August some 300 or 400 of the Bani Hájir, headed by blood-relations of Násir-bin-Mubárak, collected upon the Qatar Coast and made serious efforts to obtain boats for a piratical descent upon Bahrain; but their proceedings were regarded with disfavour by Shaikh Jásim of Dóhah and were frustrated for the time by the presence of the Bombay Marine vessels "May Frere" and "Hugh Rose." Eventually the would-be raiders procured a few boats from Dóhah and plundered a

Bahrain trading vessel, but they were prevented by the British ships from approaching the islands. Meanwhile H. M. S. "Nimble" and H. M. S. "Magpie" arrived off Bahrain, and it was decided that one ship of the Royal Navy should be retained there until the danger was over. The Government of India also suggested to Her Majesty's Government that the Porte should be requested to control such of the restless tribesmen as were subject to its authority. Debarred from action at sea, the Bani Hājir turned against Zubārah on the Qatar coast, a village and fort of the Na'im, who were close allies of the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the small summer garrison of Zubārah held out gallantly until relieved by their fellow tribesmen, who suddenly returned in strength from Bahrain and the pearl banks and inflicted a severe defeat upon the assailants. It was reported that Barrak-bin-'Arair, the tribal Mutasarrif who ruled Hasa under the Turks at this time, had encouraged the disturbances; but Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, was instructed to avoid addressing any local Turkish authority on the subject, and rather to concentrate his attention on the protection of British interests and the observance of British treaty obligations in Bahrain. Probably in consequence of representations made at Constantinople, the Turkish gunboat "Iskanderieh" soon after paid a visit to the coast of Qatar to enquire into the tribal movements. Not long afterwards, the redoubted Nāsir-bin-Mubārak left Hasa and appeared on the coast of Qatar, whence he wrote to Colonel Ross begging that he might not be prevented by the British Government from obtaining his just rights in Bahrain; but he was informed in reply that any attempt at aggression on his part would meet with active opposition from the British Government. At this stage of matters the Shaikh of Bahrain sought leave from the Resident to reinforce his Na'im allies at Zubārah, whom he considered to be in great danger, and the desired permission was granted on condition of his restricting himself to purely defensive arrangements. By the Government of India, who in 1873 * had adopted the view that the Shaikh of Bahrain had no possessions on the mainland of Qatar and that his rights there were of a very uncertain character, the action of the Resident was

* In 1871 the Government of Bombay requested Colonel Pelly to report on the question of sovereignty over Qatar, but Colonel Pelly asked permission to defer doing so as there was a probability of the Turks withdrawing from Hasa. In 1873 Colonel Ross reported † that the whole coast of Qatar had fallen under Turkish influence, and he was instructed by the Government of India to restrain the Shaikh of Bahrain from interference on the mainland on account of the doubtful character of his alleged rights and influence.

† Vide page 215 ante.

not entirely approved and they requested that the Shaikh should be withheld in future from entanglements on the mainland and advised to rely exclusively on the naval protection of Britain.

Subsequent relations of the Shaikh of Bahrain with Zubārah, 1875-77.

At the beginning of 1875 fighting continued around Zubārah between the Na'īm of that place and the Bani Hājir; but the Shaikh of Bahrain under British advice held himself aloof, so far as he could, from the quarrel. A claim which he made to the sovereignty of all Qatar and a protest by him against the restraints imposed on him by the British Government are noticed in the history of Qatar. In August 1875, having been informed that a crew of Bani Hājir had put to sea to commit piracies, he allowed five armed vessels under his brother Ahmad to leave Bahrain and search for the pirates at a great distance beyond his own territorial waters; and by this act, which was regarded as virtually one of aggression, he again incurred the disapprobation of the Government of India. In the autumn of 1877 it was stated that the Shaikh still maintained very close relations with the Na'īm of Zubārah, whom he subsidised, permitted to visit Bahrain, and enlisted, to the number of 100, in his bodyguard; that he allowed those in his service to return to Zubārah whenever that place was threatened; and that he had again thrown reinforcements and supplies into Zubārah itself. Not all of these allegations were substantiated, however, and Colonel Ross, in reporting these matters, pointed out that, if the Shaikh were to offend the Na'īm by withdrawing his favour from them, they would probably combine with the Bani Hājir. The Government of India accordingly decided that the question need not be pursued further.

During 1875 and 1876 peace and prosperity prevailed in Bahrain, and only occasional visits were paid to the islands by British war vessels and by the Assistant Resident in the Residency steamer. One or two political murders, however, occurred.

Lawless proceedings at sea of Bahrain vessels, 1878.

The connection of Bahrain with Zubārah, of which place the headman and his son were on one occasion hospitably entertained by Shaikh 'Īsa-bin-'Alī only a few days after an atrocious piracy committed by their people on a passing boat, reacted unfavourably on the conduct of Bahrain subjects at sea; and more than one incident giving rise to complaint took place. On the 2nd of September 1878 two Bahrain vessels carrying 50 armed men, which had been sent on a cruise round the islands, crossed over to the Dhahrān coast and, after a fray with some Bedouins there, carried away a boat. Again, on the 4th of September, a fleet of three Bahrain craft, despatched by the Shaikh to patrol towards the Fasht-ad-Dibal proceeded instead to Ras Rakan and fired on two vessels which

refused to halt when ordered, wounding one of the crews. The sufferers in the latter case proved to be subjects of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, and Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali was accordingly obliged by the Resident to apologise to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and to afford compensation to the wounded man, besides punishing the chief offenders in both cases. The boats in question appear to have been employed in guarding the seas between Bahrain and the promontory of Qatar, where dangers that might at any moment extend to Bahrain had begun to gather round Zubārah.

Fall of Zubārah, 1878.

In November 1878, as more fully related in the history of Qatar, the Na'aimi settlement of Zubārah was completely destroyed by a hostile combination of Bedouins under the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the Bahrain refugee; and fears, which subsequently proved to be unfounded, were entertained of an immediate attack upon Bahrain. During this crisis a vigilant watch over the safety of Bahrain was maintained by British vessels, and armed boats belonging to the Shaikh were stationed at various points under the orders of the British naval authorities; some of these boats, as shown in the last paragraph, occasionally exceeded their instructions. The Shaikh of Bahrain, who considered himself in honour bound to assist the Na'im of Zubārah, chafed angrily against the policy of inaction imposed on him by the British Government; and it cannot be questioned that the disappearance of Zubārah from the shore of Qatar exposed Bahrain to a greater risk of invasion, without warning, from the mainland. The homeless Na'im of Zubārah, to the number of about 300, soon afterwards took refuge in Bahrain.

Prevalence of piracy and general insecurity in Bahrain, 1878-79.

Meanwhile, as related in the history of Hasa, piracy, chiefly by Bani Hājir, became rampant in the seas adjoining Bahrain; and on land, simultaneously, an outbreak of robberies accompanied by murders took place. The most dangerous gang of criminals in Bahrain was one headed by a certain 'Ali-bin-Jābir, who was eventually arrested; but, while the hands of four of his associates were cut off as a punishment, 'Ali himself was suffered to escape—not, it was thought, without the connivance of the Shaikh himself—and joined the Bani Hājir. On the 11th of February, 1879, under the guidance of 'Ali-bin-Jābir, a gang of 30 Bani Hājir from Dhahran made a raid at 'Aqāriyah on the west side of the main island and killed a Bahrain subject.

Action by the British authorities on sea and land, 1878-79.

The steps taken by the British Government for the suppression of piracy are described in their proper place in the history of Hasa; here it may be mentioned that H. M. S. "Spartan" and H. M. S. "Vulture" were stationed for a time in Bahrain waters, and that four vessels taken by pirates from Bahrain owners were recovered by the second of these

ships. For the restoration of security on land Captain Durand, Assistant Political Resident, was ordered to reside temporarily in Bahrain with an escort of Indian infantry, and he remained there until April, by which time the situation had greatly improved; during his sojourn in the islands he found time to study his surroundings and to write an interesting descriptive report. From the 11th to the 18th of March 1879 Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, was present in Bahrain, and interviews with the Shaikh took place at which a number of subjects were discussed. Shaikh 'Īsa expressed a hope that the extradition of 'Ali-bin-Jābir might be obtained from the Turks, by whom that ruffian had now been arrested and sent to Hofūf; he desired that the island of Zakhnūnīyah, which had become a resort of pirates, should either be kept uninhabited or be handed over to himself for occupation, and that the British Government should exact full reparation for the losses that had been inflicted on his subjects by pirates from the Turkish coast; and he referred to an intention on his own part of chastising the Dawāsir of Bahrain, whom he suspected of treason and of collusion with the Banī Hājir. In regard to Zakhnūnīyah he was merely informed by the Resident that his wishes would be made known to the Turks, to whom the island belonged, and, with reference to the punishment of the Dawāsir, he was advised to act in such a manner as not to cause disturbances in Bahrain; but a demand for the surrender of 'Ali-bin-Jābir was made in accordance with his request on the Wāli of Basrah, and eventually, after some delay, was successful. On his arrival in Bahrain 'Ali-bin-Jābir was duly executed. In October 1879 matters had so far quieted down that Shaikh 'Īsa was able to proceed on a pilgrimage to Makkah, from which he did not return until the following January.

In December 1879 the Shaikh of Dōhah was annoyed by a migration of the Āl Bū Kuwārah tribe from that place to Fuwairat; and, as the Shaikh of Bahrain was accused of instigating it, it became necessary to remind Shaikh Ahmad-bin-'Ali, then temporarily governing the principality in his brother's absence, of the British prohibition of interference by the ruler of Bahrain in affairs on the mainland.

Preparations by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak for an attack on Bahrain, 1880.

In the summer of 1880 a rumour became current that Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the outlaw, who was now the head of the Āl 'Abdullah branch of the ruling family of Bahrain, would attempt an invasion of the islands. Nāsir, it should be observed, had now married a daughter of Jāsim, Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar, who would gladly have been free of the burden of supporting him and might have profited by his establishing

himself in Bahrain; and the Turkish officials in Hasa also were believed to take a strong interest in the doings of Nāsir, to whom an allowance of $ 60 a month was paid by the Turkish Government, and whose success might have afforded them an opportunity, better than any that had yet occurred, for advancing a claim to sovereignty over Bahrain. No actual movement took place until about the beginning of December 1880, when some 600 Bedouins of the Banī Hājir, Āl Morrah and Manāsīr tribes under Nāsir-bin-Mubārak appeared at Ruwais and Abu Dhulūf and would have crossed over to Bahrain in boats belonging to those villages, had the inhabitants not refused their consent. Meanwhile preparations had been made to despatch a British vessel of war to the spot, and H.M.S. "Beacon" soon after visited the Qatar coast and H.M.S. "Woodlark" Bahrain.

Action by the British authorities, 1881.

After these events letters were written by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak himself and by Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah to the British Resident, begging that Nāsir might be allowed to return to his home and property in Bahrain; but Colonel Ross replied that the title of Nāsir to property in Bahrain was not admitted and that an allowance would be granted him by the Bahrain Government only on condition of his settling in some approved locality beyond the limits of Qatar. Colonel Ross was afterwards instructed by Government to warn the Shaikh of Dōhah that, if he made himself in any way accessory to an attack on Bahrain, he would be held directly responsible,—a liability of which Jāsim now showed considerable anxiety to be free; and the Resident at Baghdād was directed to intimate formally to the Turkish authorities that, unless they could undertake to prevent and punish an attack on Bahrain from that part of the coast over which they claimed jurisdiction, the Government of India would be compelled, in event of measures for the protection of Bahrain or the redress of injuries becoming necessary, to take the matter into their own hands.

General tranquillity and miscellaneous affairs, 1881—88.

After these events the situation gradually quieted down. Some distrust between the Shaikh of Dōhah and the Shaikh of Bahrain, which had arisen on account of the supposed intention of the latter to establish the Na'īm of Zubārah at Fuwairat, was removed in December 1881 by an amicable meeting in Qatar* between Shaikh Jāsim and Ahmad-bin-'Alī, the brother of Shaikh 'Īsa; and Ahmad-bin-'Alī even married a daughter of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, but the match was not supposed to have any political significance. During the same year the

* See the history of Qatar. Ahmad apparently succeeded in inducing Jāsim to treat him with the deference due from an inferior to a superior.

numerous sons of the ex-Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah became discontented with their allowances and left Bahrain for Qatar; but, by the good offices of the British Resident, a reconciliation was effected and they were persuaded to return.

In 1882 Ahmad-bin-'Alī, brother of the Shaikh, made the pilgrimage to Makkah for the second time, and Bahrain was several times visited by the British Political Resident. 1882.

Internal quiet prevailed during 1883; but some offences at sea were committed, probably by inhabitants of Hasa, for Shaikh 'Isa, on a visit which he paid to Būshehr in H. M. S. "Woodlark," asked permission to take action against pirates on the mainland. The Resident in reply pointed out the reasons which made it impossible to grant his request. There was some discontent among the Sādah of Hadd, who at one time threatened to emigrate to Tārūt Island; but in the end they did not remove. Mubārak, a brother of the Shaikh of Kuwait, visited Bahrain in this year and was honourably received. 1883.

In 1884 a general increase of wealth and prosperity in Bahrain, due to several years of unbroken peace, became very apparent; and, while the Na'im tribe remained well affected to the Bahrain Government, presents were exchanged between Shaikhs 'Isa and Jāsim. A request from Nāsir-bin-Mubārak for the restoration of his confiscated date groves in Bahrain was rejected by the Political Resident. A visit to Basrah was paid in September by Ahmad, the Shaikh's brother. 1884.

Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, Wahhābi, visited Bahrain in 1886 and after receiving presents returned to the mainland; and a little later a similar visit was paid by 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ūd of the same family. Presents for the Shaikh of Bahrain arrived from the Persian Governor of Lār, but they were returned to the sender. The Na'im of Qatar continued friendly, but their friendship was dearly purchased by the sacrifice of a large portion of the public revenues of Bahrain, for which it did not appear that any adequate *quid pro quo* was obtained from the tribe. 1886.

On the occasion of the jubilee of Her Majesty Queen Victoria in 1887, partly at the intercession of the Porte, the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, was released from British surveillance at Aden on condition of residing at Makkah or Madīnah. It may be added here that in 1889 he applied for leave to return to Bahrain, which was not granted, or for an increase of his allowance, which was refused, partly because he was in receipt of pecuniary assistance from the Turkish Government. In 1890 he died at Makkah. 1887.

1888. In 1888, probably in consequence of difficulties with the Banī Yās of Trucial 'Omān in which he was involved and to secure the safety of funds which he was accustomed to place in Bahrain, Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah sought the friendship of the Shaikh of Bahrain, to whom he deputed his son 'Abdullah, and vague terms of amity were arranged.

Death of Ahmad-bin-'Alī, 1888. Ahmad-bin-'Alī, the brother of Shaikh 'Īsa, died of small-pox in October 1888. The position of the Shaikh was considered to have been greatly weakened by this event, for he had been accustomed to depend in everything on the advice and loyal support of Ahmad, and he was himself at this time slow and undecided in matters of business, whereas Ahmad, though sensual and devoted to field sports, possessed some ability and strength of character and was considerably feared because of his harshness. 'Abdul Wahhāb, kinsman and Wazīr of the Shaikh, retired about the same time on account of old age and was replaced at first by his son 'Abdur Rahmān, a Turkish subject, whose home was at Dārīn on Tārūt Island. After the death of Ahmad many of the mainland tribes of Qatar and Hasa, instigated by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, began to frequent Bahrain and to play upon the fears of Shaikh 'Īsa, from whom they obtained presents on condition of not assisting Nāsir; and numbers of these unwelcome visitors even obtained free passages to Bahrain from the Shaikh of Saihāt or from 'Abdul Wahhāb, the late Wazīr, at Dārīn, upon whom they would quarter themselves until arrangements were made by their host. The revenues of the deceased Ahmad, amounting to half those of the entire Bahrain principality, were resumed by Shaikh 'Īsa, who instead granted allowances to Ahmad's numerous progeny,—an arrangement from which trouble afterwards sprang.

1889. In 1889 a considerable immigration of Na'īm and Sulutah from Qatar into the Bahrain islands took place.

1891. After the battle of Buraidah in 1891, in which he was defeated by Ibn-Rashīd, 'Abdur Rahmān, the head of the Wahhabi interest in Najd, took refuge temporarily in Bahrain.

1892. There was considerable fear in 1892 of an invasion of Bahrain by Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak from Qatar, where they were said to be collecting forces; and the panic in Bahrain at one time reached such a height that the resident British Indian subjects embarked their valuables on board boats in Manāmah harbour. Letters of warning were addressed by the British authorities to the leaders of the movement; a promise was obtained from the Turkish Wālī of Basrah that he would direct his subordinates in Hasa to prevent

the intended raid; and in the end Nāsir-bin-Mubārak returned quietly from Qatar to Hasa. Nāsir at this time was endeavouring to procure a location for the Bani Hājir tribe in which they might settle down permanently; and a visit which he now paid to Kuwait appeared to have had some connection with the same object.

In 1894 Shaikh 'Isa was attacked by small-pox, but by June he had recovered from the disease. In October there were fresh rumours of a descent on Bahrain to be attempted by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak; and the Political Resident caused a warning to be conveyed to Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, without whose co-operation it was believed that Nāsir would not be able to effect anything. 1894.

Relations of Turkey with Bahrain during the same period, 1871-1895.

The anxiety of the Turks to assert authority over Bahrain has incidentally been made clear in reviewing the general history of the Shaikhdom, but we have still to refer to indications of Turkish policy that have not yet been mentioned. As Bahrain is in fact the ocean port of Hasa and affords a convenient retreat for fugitives from the Turkish coast, its continued independence must have been galling to the Ottoman authorities. They cannot but have regarded their own precarious administration of the mainland with dissatisfaction; and they may have thought that possession of the thriving and easily governed principality of Bahrain would remove their principal difficulties. If Bahrain could have been secured by indirect means it would soon have been in possession of the Porte.

Complaints by the Porte of British action in Bahrain, 1872-73.

In July 1872 the Porte, through their Ambassador in London, complained of acts of British sovereignty lately exercised in Bahrain, and in particular of the landing of a party of 20 British soldiers in the islands; but inquiry showed the charges to be without foundation, unless they referred to the measuring of base lines on shore in connection with a marine survey; and the Turkish Government were informed accordingly. In 1873 the preposterous statement was made by Turkish authorities that a Bahrain boat had been sunk by British officials in Bahrain for having supplied water to the Turkish steamer

"Assur"; the incident, on investigation, proved to be wholly imaginary.

Sojourn of the Wahhábí 'Abdur Rahmán in Bahrain before his invasion of Hasa, 1874.

The Turks having alleged, as a serious grievance, that the invasion of Hasa by the Wahhábí 'Abdur Rahmán-bin-Sa'úd, described in the history of Hasa, had been undertaken from Bahrain, the circumstances of his descent were strictly investigated by the British authorities. It was found that the conduct of 'Abdur Rahmán during his stay of about two months in Bahrain had been outwardly correct; that the Shaikh of Bahrain, beyond entertaining him as a visitor and presenting him at his departure with a sum of about Rs. 200, had given him no assistance whatever; and that no military force had been raised by him in Bahrain, though about 50 armed Najdís had followed him from Bahrain to the coast of Hasa in a boat which they themselves hired. The Wáli of Baghdád appears to have requested leave of the Porte to proceed to Bahrain and punish the Shaikh for his complicity in the enterprise of 'Abdur Rahmán, but it was not given; and meanwhile, as a precaution, a British naval force was sent to protect the islands.

Alleged British fortifications and projected Turkish lighthouse at Manámah, 1875.

The Porte in 1875 complained to the British Ambassador at Constantinople of the erection of British fortifications at Manámah in Bahrain, where, they seemed to suppose, asylum would be given to fugitives from Turkish authority in Najd; and again the ungrateful task of inquiring into supposed misdeeds by their officers devolved upon the British Government. In the end it was shown that the Shaikh of Bahrain had, in May or June 1875, repaired his fort at Manámah, but that no British official or British subject had been in any way concerned with the work. Immediately afterwards it became known, through the British Legation at Tehrán, that the Turks themselves contemplated building a lighthouse at Manámah; and the British Government in their turn entered a protest, with the result that the project was abandoned.

Claims of Qatar subjects pressed on the Shaikh of Bahrain by the Wáli of Basrah, 1875.

In the same year the claims of two Qatar pearl merchants were pressed upon the Shaikh of Bahrain by Násir Páshá, the Muntafik Wáli of Basrah, in a manner which seemed to indicate that the object of the Wáli was not so much to obtain satisfaction for the Qataris, who might have had recourse to the ordinary Sálifat-al-Ghaus, as to raise a political question. The Shaikh of Bahrain was accordingly advised by the Resident, under orders from the Government of India, to deal with the claims in a fair and courteous spirit; and at the same time remonstrances were addressed to the Porte through the British Ambassador at Constantinople.

In June 1879 there were rumours that the Turks intended to establish in Bahrain a coal dépôt which would gradually be converted into a political agency; but, if any such movement had been intended, it was frustrated by an Agreement concluded between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the British Government in the following year. In November 1880 a Turkish squadron paid a visit to Bahrain, and the commander was heard to assert that Bahrain was Turkish territory.

Proposed Turkish coal dépôt in Bahrain, and visit of Turkish vessels, 1879-80.

A petition against British interference in Bahrain was submitted in April 1879 by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak and his adherents to the Grand Vazir of Turkey; in this document the writers described Bahrain as an Ottoman possession, protested against their own expulsion by the British, and requested that Muhammad-bin-Khalifah and one of his companions should be released, and that they themselves should be allowed to return to Bahrain and resume possession of their property. The matter was taken up by the Vazir as something quite new, as a striking illustration of the high-handed proceedings of Great Britain, and as proof that an attempt had been made, in defiance of pledges, to assert British sovereignty over Bahrain; and Her Majesty's Government, after again disclaiming the exercise of sovereignty over Bahrain which they regarded, they said, as independent, promised to investigate the acts of violence of which the petitioners complained. The result of the enquiries which they made from the Government of India, however, was to show that the petition related merely to the punishment of the principal actors in the disturbances of 1869.

Cause of the rebels of 1869 taken up by the Turkish Government, 1879-80.

In 1879 and 1880 cases occurred in which the Turkish authorities in Hasa requested the Shaikh to extradite criminals and debtors who had absconded to Bahrain; and in one instance a certain 'Abdullah, who was accused of murder, was actually surrendered. The more difficult question of debtors absconding from Bahrain to Hasa was referred by the Political Resident to the Government of India, who ordered that the Shaikh should be discouraged from entering into direct correspondence with the Turks, and that a list of Bahrain claims should be obtained with a view to the disposition of the Turkish authorities being ascertained through the British Resident. In the opinion of the Government of India requests by the Turkish authorities for extradition could not affect the position of the Shaikh of Bahrain detrimentally, but were rather an admission of his independence.

Extradition of criminals and debtors between Hasa and Bahrain, 1879-80.

In August 1887, at the request of the British Political Resident, an embargo was laid by the Shaikh of Bahrain on pearls and specie to the value of $20,000, the property of Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah in Qatar, which happened at the time to be deposited in Bahrain; this step was taken for the purpose of compelling Jāsim to pay compensation for an outrage against British subjects which is described in the history

Turkish protest against the seizure of property of the Shaikh of Dōhah in Bahrain, 1887-88.

of Qatar, and the result, in so far as Bahrain was concerned, was a protest addressed by the Porte to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, leading to renewed consideration by the British Government of the political position of Bahrain. The instructions finally given to the British Ambassador at Constantinople were to the effect that Her Majesty's Government were unable to admit any claim by the Porte to jurisdiction over the Shaikh of Bahrain, whom, as had been intimated before, they regarded as an independent ruler, and with whom they were themselves in treaty relations.

Warning to the Porte against attempting to land troops in Bahrain, 1888.

A few months later, in connection with a design upon Bahrain which will be noticed further on under the head of Persian relations, the Grand Vazir of Turkey was requested by the British Embassey to issue strict orders to the Turkish officials in the Gulf to abstain from every kind of interference in Bahrain, and was informed that a British man-of-war which had been stationed there had orders to prevent any landing of Arabs, Persians, or Turks. On this occasion the Grand Vazir replied that there was no intention whatever of sending Turkish troops to the islands, and he even seemed indisposed to urge the claim of the Porte to sovereignty; but it was believed that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs would have regarded the matter in a different light, and in any case subsequent events showed that the Turkish claim had not been abandoned.

Insulting correspondence of the Turkish authorities with the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1888.

In 1888 much annoyance was caused by the style of address employed by the Turkish authorities in Hasa in their correspondence with the Shaikh of Bahrain, to whom they always wrote as to a subordinate official. The direction upon the envelope frequently ran "To the Shaikh of the Island of Awāl." The explanation of this absurdity was that a Wāli of Basrah, having discovered that the name "Bahrain" had in olden times been applied to a part of the mainland also, ordered that the former use of the term "Bahrain" should be revived, and that the island should be distinguished by its ancient appellation of "Awāl": he evidently thought that the case for Turkish sovereignty would in some way be helped by the change.

Demands of the Turkish authorities for the surrender of revenue defaulters, 1890-91.

In August 1890 a very insolent letter was addressed to the Shaikh of Bahrain by the Qāim-Maqām of Qatif and one Saiyid Mustafa; in it they demanded the surrender of Shaikh 'Abdur Rahīm of Saihāt who had absconded, they said, to evade payment of revenue due to the Turkish Government. Shaikh 'Isa having informed the Qāim-Maqām's agent that Shaikh 'Abdur Rahīm was not in Bahrain, an attempt was made by the party from Qatif to seize two of 'Abdur Rahīm's dependents; but it was frustrated by the servants of the Shaikh of Bahrain. As Shaikh 'Isa,

notwithstanding the aggressive behaviour of the visitors, had succeeded in maintaining his dignity, Colonel Ross did not consider further action to be required in this case; but he promised the Shaikh that, if his authority should be invaded, he would come effectually to his assistance. In June 1891 the Mutasarrif of Hasa, in a polite letter to the Shaikh of Bahrain, requested the surrender of 28 persons, said to be revenue defaulters, and the matter was referred by Shaikh 'Isa to the British Political Resident; but it does not appear how the question was ultimately settled.

Turkish sovereignty over Bahrain proclaimed at Qatif and Turkish flags forced on Bahrain boat owners, 1893.

In December 1892, the Wāli of Basrah being then on tour in Hasa, information reached the British Assistant Political Agent at Basrah that the Porte had instructed the Wāli to treat Bahrain as a Turkish dependency, and the Resident in the Persian Gulf informed the Senior Naval Officer that he should take action, if necessary, to prevent the landing of Turkish troops in Bahrain. This step was approved not only by the Government of India but also by Her Majesty's Government, who caused the Porte to be informed of their decision. That some design on the independence of Bahrain had actually been entertained seems probable, for in the first week of January 1893 it was proclaimed at Qatif, under the orders of the Qāim-Maqām, that Bahrain and 'Omān had reverted to Ottoman jurisdiction, and Turkish flags were forced upon the owners of one or two Bahrain boats at Qatif. On the 20th of August 1893 a formal notification by the Qāim-Maqām, in which it was stated that the British Government had no connection with Bahrain and that Bahrain was a part of the Turkish Empire and would in future be treated as such, was pasted up in the bazaars and coffee-houses of Qatif. Representations to the Porte followed; and at length, in December 1893, the Turkish Government professed to have issued orders for the withdrawal of the obnoxious notification, as well as instructions to their officers not to enter into disputes with the representatives of the British Government in regard to Bahrain.

Transhipment of Turkish troops in Bahrain waters prohibited by the British Government, 1893.

In March 1893 the despatch of a draft of 30 Turkish soldiers to Hasa *viâ* Bahrain was prevented by Lieutenant Beville, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, who warned the local representative of the British India Steam Navigation Company against accepting them as passengers. His action was upheld by the Government of India; and the Porte were subsequently informed, through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, that the transhipment of Ottoman troops in Bahrain waters could not be permitted.

Political status of Bahrain subjects in the Turkish dominions, 1890-94.

A question deserving separate notice, which arose during this period, was the political status of natives or subjects of Bahrain when residing or travelling in the Ottoman Empire. The point was first discussed in 1890 on a report from Lieutenant Stratton, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, who stated that the Turkish authorities were endeavouring to exact military service from *soi-disant* natives of Bahrain settled at Basrah and at Abul Khasib on the Shatt-al-'Arab, on the ground that they were Turkish subjects and amenable to Turkish law. As it was not clear that the complainants in this case really belonged to Bahrain, and as no request for British intervention had been made by the Shaikh of Bahrain, the Government of India decided not to take action in the matter.

In 1892 the question came under consideration again, in consequence of certain taxes, recoverable from Ottoman subjects only, having been levied at Basrah upon natives of Bahrain; and a demand for a refund was preferred by the British Assistant Political Agent, who contended that Bahrain and its inhabitants were under British protection. On this occasion the Turkish Government addressed the British Embassy at Constantinople and denied the title of natives of Bahrain to British protection; but the reply, given under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, was to the effect that, as Bahrain was now under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen of England, no interference by the Ottoman authorities with natives of Bahrain could be admitted. A year later, in April 1893, the Turkish Government again protested against the assumption by the British Assistant Political Agent at Basrah of a title to protect natives of Bahrain; and once more Her Majesty's Government maintained the right of their diplomatic and consular representatives in the Ottoman Empire to extend their good offices to the class of persons in question.

Meanwhile, in January 1893, a deputation of Bahrain subjects resident at Basrah had waited upon the British representative there to request British protection, and had been informed in reply that protection would be given on the condition that those claiming it should produce a letter from Shaikh 'Isa-'bin-'Ali certifying their Bahrain nationality. Arrangements were accordingly made, in 1894, for the regular issue of certificates of nationality by the Shaikh of Bahrain to boatmen and others among his subjects proceeding on voyages to Basrah

In 1895 a test case arose through the robbery of a Bahrain subject on board a sailing vessel on the Shatt-al-'Arab at a place about 10 miles below Basrah; the crew and passengers were obliged by river pirates to

give up all their valuables; and the sum lost by the individual principally in question was considerable. A claim for redress was immediately lodged on his behalf with the Wāli of Basrah by Captain Whyte, the British Assistant Political Agent; but the Wāli refused to entertain it on the ground that the right of the British representative to protect natives of Bahrain was not recognised by the Porte. The British Embassy at Constantinople, on being informed of the incident by Captain Whyte, urged upon the Turkish Government the necessity of admitting the intervention of the British representative in the pending case and other similar cases; but, though the controversy was continued in 1896, the Turkish Government could not be induced to abandon the position that they had taken up, and no redress was obtained in the case of piracy.

Relations of Persia with Bahrain during the same period, 1871-95.

The Government of Persia, notwithstanding the consolidation of British influence in Bahrain and the advantage gained by the Turks in the extension of Turkish sovereignty to the adjoining coasts of Hasa, still jealously maintained their own obsolete claims to Bahrain. In May 1871, while the Turkish occupation of Hasa was in progress, the Shāh sought, through the British Minister at Tehrān, information as to the probable effect of the movement on Bahrain; and he was informed of the assurances given by the Porte that no encroachment upon the Shaikhdom would be attempted.

Revival of the Persian claim to Bahrain, 1886.

In September 1886 the Shāh of Persia, seized by a sudden and somewhat unaccountable desire to re-assert his sovereignty over Bahrain, verbally desired Mr. Nicolson, the British Minister at Tehrān, to convey a message on this subject to the British Government; it was to the effect that His Majesty considered the communication made to him in April 1869 as tantamount to an admission of his rights in Bahrain, and that he was anxious to establish his authority over the islands either by sending a Governor to Bahrain or by recognising the Shaikh as his representative, but that he wished the maritime police to remain in the hands of the British naval authorities. An answer was prepared by Her Majesty's Government stating that they did not concur in His Majesty's interpretation of the communication of April 1869; that, on the contrary, they

considered Bahrain to be independent; and that they must continue to maintain their direct treaty relations with the Shaikh: as, however, the Shāh did not return to the subject, this reply was not delivered by Mr. Nicolson. The whole of this incident was attributed, at the time, to Russian suggestion.

Persian intrigues in regard to Bahrain and British action, 1887-88.

In 1887, in connection with the losses sustained by some Persian subjects in disturbances at Dōhah in Qatar, the Shah of Persia enquired of the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān whether any assistance could be given by the British authorities in obtaining reparation, and a hope was apparently held out to His Majesty that, after the British claims for compensation at the same place had been satisfied, the good offices desired would be afforded. In the following year, however, partly in connection with the same affair and partly, it would seem, in connection with some general scheme for extending Persian influence in the Gulf, an independent and rather underhand line of action was adopted by the Persian Government, whose proceedings, on this occasion also, were thought to have been inspired by Russia. The principal agents employed were the Malik-ut-Tujjār, Governor of the Gulf Ports, and Hāji Ahmad Khān, a Persian General; and Bahrain, as well as Qatar and Trucial 'Omān, was included in the sphere of their operations. The active proceedings of these emissaries were practically confined to Qatar and Trucial 'Omān, in the histories of which regions they are described; but it afterwards became known, partly through the disclosures of the Malik-ut-Tujjār, whom the Persian Government presently removed from his post, and partly from copies of Persian official telegrams which were obtained at Tehrān, that the Amīn-us-Sultān had sanctioned a scheme proposed by Hāji Ahmad Khān for the seizure of Bahrain by Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, who had seemingly undertaken to put the Persians in possession of the Shaikhdom. In these intrigues there were symptoms of concerted action between Persian and Turkish officials; but it was not believed that there could be any serious co-operation between the two Governments, whose interests on the Arab coast must necessarily be antagonistic.

In February 1888, while the principality was thought to be in danger from these intrigues, the Political Resident, Colonel Ross, caused two British vessels of war to be stationed off Bahrain with instructions to prevent, by force if necessary, any hostile attempt to land by Turks, Arabs or Persians. The Government of India, who approved of his action, requested the British Minister at Tehrān to inform the Persian Government of it; but, as the Amīn-us-Sultān on being questioned disavowed all

designs on Bahrain, Mr. Nicolson thought it better to avoid the reference to forcible action.

British relations with Bahrain during the same period, 1871-95.

Some large and important features in the relations of the British Government with Bahrain during this period have come under notice in the preceding paragraphs; but others, of a more direct and in some cases confidential character, still remain to be mentioned.

Marine Survey, 1871-73.

Between 1871 and 1873 a survey of the reefs and anchorages of Bahrain was carried out by the Bombay Marine schooner "Constance."

Ill-treatment of the agent of the British India Steam Navigation Company, 1873.

In 1873 one 'Abdullah-bin-Rajab, a Bahrain subject but the representative of the British India Steam Navigation Company in Bahrain and therefore constructively under British protection, was suddenly arrested by order of the Shaikh and thrown into prison without any accusation against him being formulated. The British Assistant Resident in Bahrain, on hearing of these proceedings, requested the release of the man and enquired what the complaints against him were; and the Shaikh, though he protested in somewhat violent terms against Major Grant's interference, caused the prisoner to be set at liberty. The charges, it appeared, were one of assault upon some Bahrain subjects and another of cutting wood in plantations belonging to the Shaikh, of which the first was shown to be true, but the second could not be substantiated. On remonstrance being made by the Resident, Shaikh 'Isa eventually expressed regret for the hastiness of his proceedings and made a personal apology to Major Grant for the tone of his letter to him.

British consent of a political murder by the Shaikh, 1877.

On the 28th of April 1877 Fahad-bin-Ahmad, a first cousin of the father of Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali, was killed in Bahrain by Ahmad-bin-'Ali, the Shaikh's brother; the explanation given was that Fahad had rendered himself obnoxious and dangerous to the Government, and had threatened Ahmad-bin-'Ali when the latter was sent to deprive him of his arms. On the ground that the British Government, in consequence of the position which they had assumed in Bahrain, were bound to prevent grave outrage or oppression by the ruler, or at any rate not to remain unconcerned spectators of such acts of violence but rather use their influence to repress them, Colonel Prideaux, the British Resident, was authorised to convey to Shaikh 'Isa and to his brother the emphatic disapproval by Government of the act which they had committed and a warning against such conduct in future. The instructions were duly executed.

First Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikh with the British Government, 22nd December 1880.

We have mentioned above the Turkish scheme of 1879 for establishing a coal dépôt in Bahrain and the subsequent visit of Turkish ships to Bahrain in November 1880; and here we may add that there were about the same time indications of an awakening interest in the Persian Gulf on the part of several foreign powers, and that French, American and even Japanese vessels had visited its waters. In these circumstances Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, believing that Bahrain as one of the principal commercial centres would soon become an object of foreign attention, and finding on a visit to the islands that the Shaikh was disposed to conclude a special arrangement with the British Government, took the opportunity to obtain his signature to an Agreement which he immediately submitted for the approval of the Government of India. This Agreement, which was executed on the 22nd of December 1880, bound the Shaikh to abstain from entering into negotiations or making treaties with other Governments except by the sanction of the British Government, and to refuse permission to any Government other than the British to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling dépôts in Bahrain territory, unless with the consent of the British Government. It was stipulated, however, that the engagement should not apply to or affect customary friendly correspondence with the local authorities of neighbouring states on matters of minor importance; and that the validity of the Agreement should depend on its approval and acceptance by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council. In justification of his unauthorised action Colonel Ross explained that the existence of a formal Agreement, besides being desirable from the British point of view, would be convenient to the Shaikh, who could point to it in refusing to accede to the overtures that he might receive from foreign powers. The Government of India, while they informed the Resident that it was as a rule inexpedient for political officers to enter, however guardedly, into negotiations of such a kind without special instructions, recommended the Agreement to Her Majesty's Government for acceptance; and, with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, it was ultimately ratified in 1881.

Final Exclusive Agreement by the Shaikh with the British Government, 13th March 1892.

In 1892, in circumstances which are explained in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Colonel Talbot, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, recommended that fresh Agreements, embodying a provision against cession of territory to foreign Governments, should be concluded with the Trucial Shaikhs; and, on his proposals being adopted by the Government of India, occasion was found for obtaining the signature by the Shaikh of Bahrain, on the 13th March 1892, of a similar document. In

this new instrument the Shaikh undertook on no account to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British Government; not to consent, without the concurrence of the British Government, to the residence within his territory of the agent of any other Government; and on no account to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of his territory save to the British Government.*

Attempted invasion of Bahrain from Qatar and subsequent proceedings, 1895-96.

Formation of a hostile Al Bin-'Ali settlement at Zubārah in Qatar, 1895.

In 1895 the danger, long foreseen, of an invasion of Bahrain from the mainland by Arab tribes under Turkish influence assumed a material shape, and was met by forcible intervention on the part of Great Britain.

In March 1895 the Āl Bin-'Ali, a discontented tribe of Bahrain, emigrated to Qatar under the leadership of a Shaikh named Sultān-bin-Salāmah and entered into relations with Shaikh Jāsim, with whose support they shortly formed a settlement at Zubārah. As the existence of the settlement constituted a grave danger to Bahrain, Shaikh Jāsim was at once informed that it could not be permitted to continue: but he paid no attention to the warning. Meanwhile the Turkish Mutasarrif of Hasa honoured Zubārah with a visit, the work of building continued to be pushed on, and it was reported that preparations were being made by the Mutasarrif and Jāsim for hoisting the Turkish flag. The attention of the Porte was consequently drawn to the matter through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and they were informed that, if the proceedings at Zubārah were allowed to continue, the Government of India would be obliged to take measures for the protection of the Shaikh of Bahrain. A sufficient interval having been allowed for these representations to take effect, H.M.S. "Sphinx" under Commander Pelly, a nephew of the former distinguished Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was sent to Zubārah with an order requiring the immediate return of Sultān-bin-Salāmah and his tribe to Bahrain; but the demand was met by a refusal on the part of the Shaikh, supported by a Turkish Mudir recently posted to Zubārah, who claimed the place as a Turkish possession and the Āl Bin-'Ali as Turkish subjects. The "Sphinx" accordingly returned to Bahrain, first seizing seven boats of

* The text of this Agreement will be found in Annexure No. 1 to this chapter.

the Āl Bin-'Ali; and on the 15th of July nine more of their boats were captured and removed by the same ship. The Āl Bin-'Ali then became desirous of a reconciliation with the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the Turkish Mudir threw obstacles in the way, even to the extent of detaining some boats sent from Bahrain to fetch an Āl Bin-'Ali family who wished to return; and he was reported to have announced that Bahrain was wholly, and Qatar partially, included in the Ottoman dominions. The situation now became in various respects threatening: Shaikh Jāsim was found to have collected a large number of boats, as if a descent on Bahrain were in view; the Mutasarrif of Hasa had assembled a force at Qatif, on the improbable plea that an expedition against Najd was designed; and the Turkish gunboat "Zuhāf" was cruising upon the coast of Qatar.

British preparations to defend Bahrain.

In these circumstances the Government of India proposed that any movement by the people of Qatar against Bahrain should be resisted by force, subject to a condition that if the hostile fleet came under Turkish colours explanations should first be demanded, and that, if the explanations were unsatisfactory, a warning should be given that the ships would be fired on if they advanced within three miles of the Bahrain coast. H.M.S. "Pigeon" was sent to join the "Sphinx" in Bahrain, and arrangements were at first made, but were subsequently cancelled, for despatching a battalion or wing of Indian infantry from Bombay. Eventually a third ship, the "Plassey," was added to the squadron of defence.

British representations to the Turkish Government.

Meanwhile, in consequence of the language and proceedings of the Turkish Mudir at Zubārah, two separate communications had been made to the Porte: on the 12th of August a protest against the action of their officials was addressed to the Turkish Government through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, an intimation being added that Her Majesty's Government did not recognise Ottoman jurisdiction on the coast of Qatar, that Ottoman claims to Bahrain, which was under British protection, were inadmissible, and that measures would be taken to protect the islands from aggression; and on the 22nd of August the Turkish Ambassador in London was reminded that Her Majesty's Government had several times before informed the Porte that they did not recognise Turkish jurisdiction on the coast of Qatar and had likewise notified to them that Bahrain was under British protection.

Destruction and capture of the hostile fleet, 6th September 1895.

Upon the spot, a crisis was rapidly approaching. On the 19th of August the Mutasarrif of Hasa wrote a bombastic letter to the Political Resident, accusing him of breaking the peace of the coast of "Najd" by seizing boats; warning him that the people of Qatar felt

impelled to attack Bahrain; stating that he himself had restrained the Qataris hitherto, but could do so no longer; asking for the return of the boats seized by Commander Pelly; and advising the removal of British subjects from Bahrain within 17 days, reckoned from the 19th of August. To this communication the Political Resident, Colonel Ross, proposed to reply that the responsibility for whatever might happen would rest on the Turkish officials, and forcible recovery of the Bahrain boats detained at Zubārah was suggested by the Government of India and authorised by Her Majesty's Government; but meanwhile, on the 5th of September, Commander Pelly received a report that the "Pigeon," which he had sent to watch the hostile fleet at Zubārah, had been boarded by the Turkish Mudir, who insisted on her immediate departure. The Mudir added threats of hostile action in case of non-compliance and intimated that Shaikh Jāsim would attack Bahrain and that the Turks would assist his operations. On the next day, the 6th of September, Commander Pelly himself proceeded to Zubārah, where, finding the Qatar boats armed and prepared for sea, he decided that Bahrain could only be saved from invasion by destruction of the enemy's vessels; the period mentioned by the Mutasarrif of Hasa, moreover, had now expired. Accordingly, after one hour's notice given in writing had elapsed, the "Sphinx" and "Pigeon" opened fire and quickly disabled 44 vessels. By the morning of the 7th of September the Turkish Mudir and his flag had disappeared, and Jāsim had hoisted a flag of truce and asked pardon, alleging that the boats had been collected not spontaneously but under the orders of the Mutasarrif of Hasa. The preliminary terms offered by Commander Pelly and accepted by Jāsim were that the Āl Bin-'Ali should evacuate Zubārah and return to Bahrain, that the Bahrain boats detained at Zubārah should be restored, and that the Shaikh's muster of Bedouins should be dispersed. The active operations concluded with the removal to Bahrain of about 120 vessels, distinct from those which had been disabled or destroyed.

Settlement with Shaikh Jāsim and the guilty tribes, September 1895 to April 1896

With the exception of Sultān-bin-Salāmah and a few of his adherents, the Āl Bin-'Ali now returned to Bahrain; but the question of punishing Shaikh Jāsim and his allies still remained; and eventually the Shaikh was informed, in February 1896, that a fine of Rs. 30,000 must be paid, otherwise the vessels captured at Zubārah would be destroyed. Jāsim however refused to pay, on the ground that he had nothing to do with the matter; and accordingly, after three boats belonging to Bahrain had been released free of charge and 17 others belonging to the Āl Bū Kuwārah tribe had been ransomed by permission of the Resident

for Rs. 6,856, the remainder, which the owners had neglected to redeem, were burnt as they lay off Bahrain in April 1896. The fines realised, as there was no compensation to be paid in the case, were credited to Indian Imperial revenues. The services of Commander Story, the Senior Naval Officer, and of the officers under his command were brought by the Government of India to the favourable notice of the naval authorities, and the conduct of the proceedings at Zubárah was deservedly commended. The most arduous part of the operations, however, was really the close watch maintained upon the place in very hot weather during the weeks preceding the active operations.

Friendly relations with Qatar were restored in 1896, when the reopening of trade with places there was formally notified in the Bahrain bazaars.

Turkish protest, 1894.

A protest was raised by the Porte against the action of the British ships at Zubárah, on the ground that it amounted to an attack upon a tribe in Turkish territory and under the protection of the Turkish flag, and therefore to an act incompatible with the friendly relations existing between Turkey and Britain. The British Government in reply merely referred to their own communications of the previous year, adding that the measures taken were necessary for the protection of Bahrain, and that Her Majesty's Government could not admit the coast on which Zubárah was situated to be part of the Ottoman Empire.

General history of Bahrain and British policy in the Shaikhdom from the attempted invasion of 1895 to the rupture of 1904.

After and probably to some extent in consequence of the failure of this attempt upon Bahrain, the affairs of the principality took a new departure and there was a change in the main subjects of interest and importance. The pretensions of Turkey ceased to be a cause of disquiet; trade increased and flourished in a remarkable degree; and the attention of the British Government, whose influence in Bahrain was now more powerful than before, was turned chiefly to schemes of internal improvement and reform, and to precautions against political competition on the part of European powers. Any distinction between British policy and the general course of events in Bahrain is henceforward impracticable; and we shall consequently, in what follows, deal with both together.

Regulation of the succession to the Shaikhship and domestic affairs of the ruling family, 1897-1904.

Shaikh 'Isa, for reasons which he did not at the time explain and has not since divulged, thought it necessary, towards the end of 1897, to make arrangements for the devolution of the Shaikhship after his own demise; and, by a will written in October 1897 and attested by the seals and signatures of a number of his principal subjects, he appointed his eldest surviving son Hamad to be his successor. In November 1897 a visit was paid by Hamad to Colonel Meade, the British Political Resident, at Būshehr; and in February 1898, on the occasion of a visit by Colonel Meade to Bahrain, Shaikh 'Isa approached him with a request that Hamad's position as heir-apparent might be recognised by the British Government. It may be mentioned that in 1890 Shaikh 'Isa had expressed a wish that an elder son of his, Salmān, should be officially recognised as his successor; but up to the death of Salmān, which occurred in November 1893 in the neighbourhood of Riyādh as he was returning from a pilgrimage to Makkah, no steps were taken by the Shaikh in the matter. The recognition of Hamad, as it might have the effect of averting a dynastic struggle on the death of Shaikh 'Isa, was recommended by the Government of India, and was sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government at the end of 1898; but the announcement of the decision was postponed by the Resident, to whom discretion in the matter had been given, chiefly because efforts were being made at the time to induce the Shaikh to reform his customs arrangements and he had shown no disposition to conform to advice. Eventually, notwithstanding the continued obstinacy of the Shaikh in the matter of the customs, the communication was made to him on the 12th of February 1901. It was reported to have been received by Shaikh 'Isa with tears of emotion and to have given satisfaction to the ruling family and to the people of Bahrain.

In 1899 differences between Shaikh 'Isa and his nephew 'Ali-bin-Ahmad came to light, and supplied a probable explanation of the anxiety shown by the Shaikh in the previous year in regard to the succession of his son Hamad. The relationship of the parties was somewhat complicated, inasmuch as 'Ali's mother, after being divorced by Ahmad, had married Shaikh 'Isa and borne Hamad: thus 'Ali and Hamad were half-brothers, as well as cousins and rivals. Ahmad, the father of 'Ali and the younger brother of Shaikh 'Isa, had in his lifetime, as we have seen, enjoyed half the revenues of Bahrain; he had, by arrangement with 'Isa, assisted in the administration; and his house was an imposing edifice in Manāmah town, known as the Bait-ash-Shuyūkh, which through his occupation of it had become associated in the general mind

with the governorship of the port of Manâmah. 'Alí-bin-Ahmad, who at his father's death in 1888 was placed by Shaikh 'Ísa on an allowance, continued to occupy the Bait-ash-Shuyûkh and to fly the flag of Bahrain on a staff over it; and, as he grew up, he seemed inclined to assert a position of semi-independence,—a line of conduct which was favoured by the apathy of Shaikh 'Ísa in regard to details of administration at Manâmah. In February 1898 'Alí-bin-Ahmad complained to Colonel Meade that his uncle was keeping him out of the estates and income which he ought to have inherited; and in November of the same year he made an urgent appeal to the Resident for assistance. Shaikh 'Ísa, on enquiry being made from him, brought charges against 'Alí of interfering in the administration of Bahrain and of forming a party hostile to the Shaikh's government. At length, at the instance of Colonel Meade, 'Alí having first made proper submission to Shaikh 'Ísa, a family council was convened; and a monthly allowance of Rs. 600, in addition to a lump sum annually of Rs. 800, was assigned to the youth, who was at the same time confirmed in possession of landed property of considerable value; but the agreement was not reduced to writing. 'Alí remained discontented, and in June 1901 he made a journey to Masqat, where he complained to the Sultân of his treatment by his uncle and the British authorities, and would have interviewed M. Ottavi, the French Consul, had the latter not been absent at Sûr. It was then proposed by the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain and recommended by Major Cox, the Political Resident, that the resolution of the British Government to support the authority of Shaikh 'Ísa, conditionally upon his observing his obligations towards them, should be announced at a public Darbâr in Bahrain; but the Government of India, who had a change in the representation of British interests in Bahrain in view, decided to postpone their decision until that change should have been carried out.

In 1902 Râshid, the third son of Shaikh 'Ísa, died of consumption. In 1904 the Shaikh's second surviving son performed the Hajj and visited Cairo, where he was treated as a guest by the British Consul-General.

Efforts by the British authorities to secure an improvement in the administration of the Bahrain customs, 1899-1902.

A regular customs administration was first instituted in Bahrain about 1860 and remained under the direct control of the ruler until 1888, when a pernicious innovation was introduced, the collection of duty being thereafter farmed out to local contractors, generally a syndicate of Hindu merchants. About the time of the change of method the trade of Bahrain began, under the security afforded by British protection, to expand with great rapidity; and in 1899 it was calculated that the increase in less than a decade had been more than 40 per cent. But

the finances of the Shaikh of Bahrain failed to benefit in a corresponding degree; the enhanced profits went chiefly to the customs contractors; and the Shaikh resorted to irregular taxation to supplement his insufficient revenues. In 1899 the Government of India thought that a reform of the Bahrain customs was desirable in order to render them more productive, and they were prepared to lend the Shaikh an officer for the purpose of carrying out the necessary improvements; but their suggestions were obstinately resisted by the Shaikh. The ruler of Bahrain was attached to the contract system, chiefly because it enabled him to obtain ready money by selling the customs for years in advance, and because it was not incompatible with discrimination of persons in collecting the duties; but the true explanation of the pertinacity with which he rejected, and continued to reject, the suggested reforms was that he regarded acceptance of British advice, and the services of a British official as compromising to his dignity and independence. On the 7th of October 1899, in violation of a promise not to extend the current customs contract without reference to the British Resident, Shaikh 'Isa, being in need of money and anxious to postpone the question of reform, granted a fresh lease for two years from the 10th of March 1902, the date to which the customs were already farmed. At the same time he enhanced the general rate of duty from 4 to 5 per cent. without giving previous notice to the British authorities of his intention to do so; and to this step, though discourteous, no technical objection could be taken.

At the beginning of 1900 a European officer, as explained in a later paragraph, was posted to Bahrain; but the Shaikh could not be prevailed on to cancel the new customs contract which he had granted. He rejected the offer of a loan which would have enabled him to pay off his debts to the contractors, and he declined the good offices of the British Government when they were tendered for the purpose of persuading the contractors, who were British subjects, to forego their legal rights. 1900.

Towards the end of 1901, the appointment of a British Director of Bahrain Customs having been recommended by Sir N. O'Conor, Ambassador at Constantinople, as a measure which would appear to the Turks a material proof of British authority in Bahrain, a customs official and a sum of money sufficient to enable him to discharge his liabilities to the farmers was again pressed upon the Shaikh's acceptance; but the Shaikh, though his financial position was deteriorating, declined the offer; and, while he outwardly professed an intention of taking the customs once more under direct management, he 1901.

was really engaged in preparations for farming them out for a fresh period upon more favourable terms. At length, at the end of 1901, it became known that Shaikh 'Isa had extended the customs lease in favour of the actual holders to the end of February 1906.

1903. The question of the Bahrain customs was after this allowed to rest until Lord Curzon's visit to the Persian Gulf in November 1903, when it formed the chief subject of discussion between His Excellency the Viceroy and the Shaikh. Shaikh 'Isa was unable to show that the change proposed in the customs arrangements was in any way detrimental to his interests, or to answer Lord Curzon's arguments that it would extricate him from his pecuniary difficulties, increase the revenues of his state, and secure a sound position for his successor Hamad, whom the Government of India had agreed to recognise: he took refuge, instead, in assertions that the matter was one which only concerned himself; he asked that the question might be postponed until his death; and in the end, he said that he must consult his son and brother. His Excellency then gave the Shaikh a final warning that the matter could not and would not be dropped; and so the discussion terminated.

1904. An enquiry by the Resident, Colonel Kemball, which followed Lord Curzon's visit, revealed a state of matters worse even than had been suspected. It was shown that the Shaikh had already leased his customs on the basis of a 5 per cent. duty up to April 1906, and on the basis of a 4 per cent. duty up to January 1908. The amounts of the contracts were as follows:—

	Rs.
1903	1,16,200
1904	1,17,500
1905	1,23,300
1906	96,200
1907	96,200

or Rs. 5,49,300 in all; and against this amount the Shaikh had already drawn three sums aggregating Rs. 2,12,000 from the farmers. Moreover it was calculated that the customs should yield, under direct management, about Rs. 3,50,000 per annum, or three times as much as was actually being obtained by the Shaikh.

To coerce Shaikh 'Isa into acceptance of the much needed reform would have been easy, but it was thought better that he should spontaneously consent. The proceedings were therefore again dropped while steps were taken, with the object of acquiring greater influence

over the Shaikh, to improve the character of British political representation in Bahrain. The policy of the customs farmers, it may be remarked, was weak and conciliatory towards all traders; and there was no question of injury to foreign trade in Bahrain from their proceedings, but only of great financial loss to the Bahrain Government.

British political representation in Bahrain.

In 1899 it was felt that the time had come to replace the Native Agent representing the British Government in Bahrain by a European officer. In earlier days, before the reduction of the Būshehr Residency staff in 1879, an Assistant Resident had occasionally been sent to reside in Bahrain; and since then a great development of British interests, and especially of trade, had taken place. The Agent in 1899, a local merchant named Āgha Muhammad Rahim, was moreover uncongenial to the Shaikh, over whom he possessed no influence; he was not free from suspicion of having abused his position in order to forward his own commercial interests; and the protection of British Indian traders from petty exactions was not so complete, nor the settlement of their cases so rapid, as could be desired.

1900.

Accordingly, in January 1900, the employment of a European officer in Bahrain was sanctioned as a temporary measure, and at the end of the year, with the approval of the Secretary of State, it was made permanent. Mr. J. C. Gaskin, an uncovenanted Political Assistant of the Būshehr Residency, was the first incumbent: he arrived at Manāmah and assumed charge of his office on the 10th of February 1900.

1901-02.

During the years 1901 and 1902 an official residence for the Assistant Political Agent was built on the shore to the east of Manāmah town at a total cost of Rs. 31,470; when completed it was the most commodious and imposing edifice on the main island.

1902.

In 1902 the question of investing the Political Assistant in Bahrain with powers under the Merchant Shipping Act, and with those of a Notary Public, was discussed. In the end it was decided, as the matter was not urgent and various technical difficulties existed, not to pursue the matter.

In 1904, after the failure of various attempts to induce the Shaikh of Bahrain to agree to a reform of his customs administration, a further enhancement of the status of the British representative in the islands was proposed by the Government of India and approved by His Majesty's Government: it consisted in the substitution of an officer on the graded list of the Indian Political Department for the subordinate officer whose appointment had been sanctioned in 1900. The change was carried into effect on the 18th of October 1904, Mr. Gaskin being on

that date relieved by Captain F. B. Prideaux, who was afterwards invested with the local rank of Political Agent and given a guard of about 90 regular Indian infantry.

Protection of British subjects.

During the period now in question wrongs committed upon British subjects and offences against the dignity of the British Government were few, and two only need be particularised.

1897.

In 1897 Saiyid Khalaf, a bankrupt trader of Bahrain and not a British subject, escaped from the custody of Sharidah, one of the Shaikh's officials, and took refuge in the house of a certain Muhammad Khalil who was then acting as British Residency Agent; whereupon Sharidah entered the house and removed him, with the assistance of another man, notwithstanding the protests of the Acting Agent. Colonel Meade, the Political Resident, while admitting that Saiyid Khalaf had no claim to British protection, considered the violation of the British Agency to be a serious impropriety and requested that Sharidah and his companion might be fined Rs. 500 each and obliged to furnish written apologies for their behaviour. With this demand the Shaikh of Bahrain immediately complied, and the fines were credited to the Government of India in the Būshehr treasury.

1899.

In 1899 an incident occurred which exhibited the weakness of Shaikh 'Isa as a ruler and even brought loyalty towards the British Government into doubt. A warehouse belonging to the Shaikh, in which had been deposited a quantity of arms, the property of the Anglo-Parsi firm of Frazer, Times & Co. but at the time under sequestration at the instance of the British Political authorities, was feloniously entered by night; and two Hindus, British subjects, who occupied a part of the buildings and who imprudently disturbed the operations by appearing on the scene along with other Hindus, were wounded with daggers by the trespassers. The ringleaders in this case proved to be Sharidah, the same high-handed official of the Shaikh who has already been mentioned, his son Fahad, and one Amir Sālih-bin-Rāshid, an old and favourite servant of the Shaikh. The Shaikh showed great reluctance to deal properly with the case; and it was not until strong pressure had been brought to bear that the offenders were banished from Bahrain and a sum of Rs. 1,000 was paid up by way of indemnity. Of the amount thus recovered Rs. 400 were given to Farsi and Rs. 50 to Dhar Singh, the wounded Hindus, the remainder being retained by Government. Sharidah and his son returned to Bahrain after a few months without the consent of the Government of India and were again expelled; but, after their exile had

lasted about a year, the ban was removed on condition that the Shaikh should be responsible for their future good conduct.

Matter relating to British trade.

In June 1900 Mr. Van Lennep, the manager of the Shirâz branch of the (British) Imperial Bank of Persia, visited Bahrain and recommended the establishment of an agency of the Bank there. Accordingly a small experimental office was opened at Manâmah, in charge of an Arab British subject; but the Shaikh was influenced by Indian traders in his entourage, to whom he owed money, to discountenance and oppose the undertaking, and after about two months it was abandoned. In 1903 it was found that transhipment dues in Bahrain were levied at the high rate of 2½ per cent *ad valorem* on all kinds of goods, but no action was possible at the time as there was no agreement with the Shaikh on the subject and a farm of the customs had been granted by him on the basis of this rate; the inexpediency, in his own interests, of a heavy duty on transhipment was however explained to Shaikh 'Isa under orders from the Government of India. Great natural difficulties in connection with the landing of cargo at Manâmah were partially removed in 1904 by the construction by the Shaikh of a landing stage at a cost of about Rs. 30,000; and the wharfage dues for the use of this pier were arranged on a moderate scale in accordance with the views of the Government of India.

A detailed survey of Manâmah harbour and its approaches was made by the R.I.M.S. "Investigator" in the winter of 1901-02; and in 1904 an asphalt deposit near Jabal-ad-Dukhân, which had been discovered in 1902 and yielded excellent specimens of bituminous rock, was examined by a scientific expert, but proved to be of small extent and commercially unworthy of attention.

Miscellaneous matters.

A visit extending over the 26th and 27th of November 1903, was paid to Bahrain, by Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, in the course of his cruise in the Persian Gulf, which is fully described in another place.

In 1901 the senior partner of the Indian firm of Ganga Ram, Tikam Das & Co. in Bahrain proposed that a charitable hospital should be established in Bahrain to commemorate Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and offered to open the subscription list with a donation of Rs. 5,000. About Rs. 15,000 more having been subscribed, and the amount of Rs. 20,000 thus obtained being considered sufficient to provide a hospital building and quarters for the staff, the Government of India undertook to maintain and equip the institution, which was eventually opened in 1905.

In 1903 Bahrain was visited by plague and in 1904 by cholera; particulars of both epidemics are given in the Appendix dealing with Sanitary Organisation.

Internal history of the Shaikhdom during the same period, 1895-1904.

Feud between the Āl Bin-'Ali and 'Amāmarah.

In November 1895 a blood-feud arose between the Āl Bin-'Ali—the tribe whose secession to Zubārah in the preceding March had been the cause of trouble—and the 'Amāmarah of Bahrain; it was occasioned by the act of some 'Amāmarah, who shot dead Sultān-bin-Salāmah, the head of that section of the Āl Bin-'Ali who had not consented to return to their homes, while he was alone in a boat off Ras Tanūrah on the Hasa coast. In December a petition was received by the British Resident from the family of the deceased Sultān, alleging that Shaikh 'Isa had instigated the murder and had deprived them of their property in Bahrain, and Colonel Wilson accordingly wrote to the Shaikh urging him to do justice according to Arab law; but no steps were taken by Shaikh 'Isa, whose obvious reluctance to punish the 'Amāmarah tended to confirm the suspicions against him. In 1896 'Ali, a son of Sultan, collected a Bedouin following on the mainland and tried to incite some of the Āl Bin-'Ali who had returned to Bahrain to make reprisals on the 'Amāmarah; in this he was not successful, but some Āl Bin-'Ali who sympathised with him again left Bahrain and joined him at Ghariyah in Qatar, no attempt being made by the Shaikh to prevent their movements; and a piracy was committed from Ghariyah upon a Bahrain boat. Subsequently, in 1900, a fracas occurred at sea between some boats of the Āl Bin-'Ali and the 'Amāmarah, as is related in the history of Qatar.

Relations with Turkey during the same period, 1895-1904.

After the decided check to Turkish policy through the failure of the attempted invasion of Bahrain from Zubārah in 1895, very little interference in Bahrain affairs was exercised by the Ottoman authorities

on the mainland. In 1897, however, the Constantinople Board of Health proposed to establish a sanitary post in Bahrain; but the project was abandoned on the objections of the British delegate, who represented that Bahrain was an independent principality under British protection. In 1898 the Porte, professing to have heard that a British Vice-Consul had been appointed in Bahrain, requested Her Majesty's Government to apply to them for his exequatur; but it was decided to reply that the British Government could not admit the right of the Turkish Government to insist that British consular officers in Bahrain should be provided with an Ottoman exequatur. Towards the end of 1900 Salmān-bin-Di'aij, a cousin of the Shaikh of Bahrain, was murdered, along with a number of Bahrain subjects, in Dhahrān, where he had gone for sport, by Bedouins of the Āl Murrah tribe; this incident and the reclamations to which it gave rise are described in the history of Hasa.

Relations with Persia during the same period, 1895-1904.

Question of the political status of natives of Bahrain in Persia, 1899.

In 1899 the question of the right of natives of Bahrain to British protection in Persia was raised by the French Minister at Tehrān in connection with a claim brought by a French protégé of Persian nationality against the widow of a Bahrain subject, who was herself the daughter of an emancipated slave. The case was referred to the British Legation in consequence of certain charges of misconduct made by a French consular official against the British Residency Agent at Lingeh; and the British Minister, on a suggestion by the Resident in the Persian Gulf approved by the Government of India, apparently stated in reply that the Shaikh of Bahrain had been precluded by treaty since 1880 from holding direct relations with any foreign power other than the British, and that his subjects abroad were under British protection.

Visit of a Persian customs official to Bahrain, 1901.

On the 31st of August 1901 a Belgian Director of the Imperial Persian Customs visited Bahrain in a Persian Government steamer and interviewed the Shaikh, to whom he represented that he had been sent by the Shāh to arrange for the posting of two Persian customs officials in Bahrain, and that the duty of these officials would be to examine the seals placed on the cargo hatches of vessels at the Persian port last visited and to seal the hatches again at the departure of the steamers from Bahrain. The Belgian called also on the British Political Assistant

in Bahrain, whom he informed that vessels not complying with the proposed formalities in Bahrain would be repelled afterwards from Persian ports. On a protest made by the British Minister at Tehrán, the Grand Vazir of Persia expressed his astonishment and regret at the incident and declared, as did also the Minister of Customs, that the proceedings of the Director were altogether unauthorised.

American interests in Bahrain, 1895-1904.

During the decade now in question a station belonging to the Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reformed Church, which had come into existence in Bahrain as early as 1893, began to attract attention. In February 1899 Mr. Zwemer, author of "Arabia, the Cradle of Islam" and head of the mission, sought the aid of Colonel Meade, the British Political Resident, in purchasing a building site but the Government of India did not consider that British assistance could with propriety be given him, and Mr. Zwemer renounced for the time the idea of obtaining land by purchase. Subsequently complaints were made by the Shaikh and other inhabitants of Bahrain of attacks by Mr. Zwemer and his Scripture readers upon the Muhammadan religion, and the Government of India were anxious that steps should be taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring about the recall of the missionaries, whom they considered to be exposed to some risk of personal violence. A communication was accordingly made by the Foreign Office to the United States' Embassy in London, resulting in an injunction addressed by the Board of American Missions to Mr. Zwemer in which he was urged to exercise the utmost caution compatible with the performance of his duties; and, after the proceedings of the missionaries had lost their novelty, no further complaints regarding them were received from Bahrain. In April 1901 Mr. Zwemer asked the British Resident whether there was any agreement between the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain which would debar the latter from selling property, or allowing property to be sold, to the Arabian Mission in Bahrain for the establishment of a hospital, and Colonel Kemball replied that he was not aware of any such obstacle. The Government of India were inclined to consider that the Resident's reply was inconsistent with the Exclusive Agreement of 1892; but it was eventually ruled by His Majesty's Government that in the case in question, where no suspicion of a transfer of sovereignty or

administrative rights existed, it was unnecessary and undesirable to invoke publicly the terms of the Agreement of 1892. The first hospital and dispensary in Bahrain, with 21 beds, was opened by the Mission in 1902 under the name of the "Mason Memorial Hospital." From the 1st of November 1901 the services of the physician attached to the Arabian Mission were retained by the Government of India for the benefit of their political representative in Bahrain; and in 1903, notwithstanding the decision to establish the "Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital," it was resolved to continue this arrangement on account of the good work done by the Mission.

German interests in Bahrain, 1895-1904.

Establishment of the firm Messrs. R. Wönckhaus & Co., 1901.

The appearance in Bahrain in 1901 of a German firm, doing business in mother-of-pearl shells, gave rise to various political questions; it was a branch of the Hamburg house of Traun, Stürken & Co. and was established by a Mr. Wönckhaus, after whom, as he was a partner in the Persian Gulf branch of the business, it was styled Robert Wönckhaus & Co. This Mr. Wönckhaus, who originally came to the Gulf in 1897 and who until 1901 resided chiefly at Lingeh, was believed to have relations with the German Government; and, on a visit to the coast of Trucial 'Oman, he succeeded in obtaining by an artifice copies of the Treaties of the Trucial Shaikhs with Great Britain. Except an agency of the British house of Gray, Paul & Co. of Bushehr, who since about 1890 had been represented at Manámah by an English-speaking native, this was the first European firm to secure footing in Bahrain.

Importation of alcoholic liquors into Bahrain prohibited, 1900.

As the Shaikh of Bahrain had reason to suppose that the new firm, then about to be established, would endeavour to deal in cheap spirits, he published, in 1900, an edict prohibiting the introduction of alcoholic liquor into Bahrain under penalty of confiscation; and the interdict, on the understanding that it should not be interpreted as preventing the importation of liquor by Europeans for their own consumption, was held by the Government of India to be unobjectionable.

Questions of status and protection.

The question of the purchase of house property by Mr. Wönckhaus soon arose; and in 1902 it was ruled by the Government of India that, as the question was one of private ownership merely, no opposition need be made to the acquisition of premises by Mr. Wönckhaus, but that it

should be explained to him, and also to the Shaikh of Bahrain, that no claim to extra-territoriality and no direct dealings between the Shaikh and the consular or other representatives of a foreign power could result from the title obtained. It had already been decided by the Government of India in 1900, with reference to Mr. Wönckhaus, that, in the event of mercantile or other cases arising between the subject of a European power and a subject of Bahrain, the good offices of the British representative should, as a matter of courtesy, be extended to the European subject; and that the British representative should, in case of necessity, claim the right to protect such a subject as he would a British subject.

French interests in Bahrain, 1895-1904.

In 1904, in connection with a scheme on the part of French subjects to engage in the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf, the French Ambassador in London enquired whether there would be any objection to the inclusion of Bahrain in the jurisdiction of the French Vice-Consulate at Būshehr. The Government of India, on being consulted, recommended that the reply should be delayed until certain political questions connected with the pearl fisheries which, as related in the Appendix on the pearl fisheries, were then pending had been settled; and the question, probably in consequence of the departure of the French prospectors from Bahrain, was not, apparently, repeated by the French Government.

Rupture between the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1904-05.

Misbehaviour of 'Ali-bin-Ahmad, May-September, 1904.

The differences between Shaikh 'Īsa and his nephew 'Ali-bin-Ahmad have already been mentioned. In the beginning of 1904 a fresh estrangement seems to have occurred between them, for in May of that year the Shaikh complained to Mr. Gaskin that 'Ali had collected a number of bad characters in his service and had entered on a course of extortion and violence towards the general public and of disrespect, if not of disloyalty, towards the Shaikh himself. Another family council to

arrange matters was suggested; but it was considered desirable to postpone the proceedings until an improvement, then contemplated, in the status of the British political representative in Bahrain had been effected. Meanwhile, as subsequent events showed, the authority of the Shaikh in Manāmah, which he seldom or never visited, had fallen so low that there was little or no check on the disorderly doings of 'Ali's retainers, many of whom were professional negro bullies.

Outrage on Messrs. Wönckhaus & Co., 29th September 1904.

On the 29th of September an attempt was made by some of 'Ali's men, under the Sukhrah system, to impress a cooly in the employment of the German merchant Mr. Wönckhaus; the premises of the firm were entered; and an assault was committed on a European assistant, a Mr. Bahnson, as well as on native members of the establishment. 'Ali himself was present and did nothing to prevent what occurred.

Attack upon Persians, 14th November 1904.

On the evening of the 14th of November a second act of lawlessness on a more serious scale was committed. An accidental quarrel having arisen between a negro retainer of 'Ali and a Persian servant of Hāji 'Abdun Nabi, the chief Persian merchant at Manāmah, the opportunity was seized by 'Ali's bodyguard to commence an attack on all the Persians at hand. A cry was raised of "Kill the Mughals"; and Jāsim, one of the leading Sunni Mullas of Bahrain, having sent the worshippers at his mosque to join in the affair, it developed into a regular anti-Shi'ah riot and ended by the Persians taking refuge in their houses. Only sticks were used, but the father and brother of 'Abdun Nabi were dangerously wounded, and seven other Persians were injured, but less seriously. Captain Prideaux, the new Political Agent in Bahrain, who had been trying without success to arrange a compromise in the case of Mr. Bahnson now interviewed the Shaikh in regard to the riot; but the Shaikh, on the ground that the Persians were Muhammadans, declined to admit his interference and expressed an intention of having the case tried by the local Shara' courts, from which, composed as they were of Sunnis, no justice for the Persians was to be expected. Eventually it was arranged between Captain Prideaux and the Shaikh that the orders of the Resident, who was then on tour in a remote part of the Gulf, should be awaited. For several days the Persians kept their shops closed and 'Ali's men continued to behave arrogantly in the streets, for the Shaikh was afraid of his nephew and totally unable to control him; but confidence was partially restored by the arrival of H.M.S. "Redbreast" at Bahrain on the 27th of November.

Meanwhile the German complainant had placed his case in the hands of the German Consul at Būshehr, who wrote direct to Shaikh 'Isa,

demanding redress, and in reply was referred by him to the British authorities. The Persian sufferers also had telegraphed to the Shāh and had been informed in answer that the British Government would take action on their behalf.

Visit of the Political Resident to Bahrain. 30th November to 10th December 1904.

Major Cox, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, arrived at Manāmah on the 30th of November, and the case of the German merchant was taken up first. On the 14th of December it was settled by the payment of Rs. 1,000 as compensation, and by a sound flogging publicly inflicted on four of the ringleaders in the assault, who were sentenced in addition to banishment from Bahrain. The next four days were spent in discussing the case of the Persians, but without result. The Shaikh at first endeavoured to argue that the Persians were the aggressors; but, the evidence being conclusively against this view, he eventually fell back on his original position, that the Persians were amenable to his jurisdiction alone, and that their case must therefore be tried by the Bahrain courts. The status of the Persians as foreigners resident upon an island under British protection, together with the certainty of injustice being perpetrated should the case be made over to a Sunni tribunal, forbade any concession on this point; and a deadlock ensued. Major Cox quitted Bahrain on the 10th of December to report the situation to Government, leaving the "Redbreast" to maintain order at Manāmah. In virtue of an undertaking by the Shaikh that 'Ali and his followers, within a week of the Resident's departure, should leave Bahrain for a period of three weeks, the turbulent young man sailed for Qatar on the 17th of December: his last act in Bahrain was to seize, for his own use, three Baghlahs which were at the time actually employed in discharging the cargo of the British steamer "Kangra."

Ultimatum presented to the Shaikh of Bahrain, 25th February 1905.

On the 23rd of February 1905 Major Cox returned to Bahrain as bearer of the demands authorised by His Majesty's Government upon Shaikh 'Isa. He had been empowered to enforce compliance with the same by the naval force, if necessary; the British cruiser "Fox" and the gunboats "Sphinx" and "Redbreast" were now assembled in the harbour; and preparations had been made for landing a force of 150 seamen and marines to protect the lives and property of foreigners in case action by the ships should be required. On the morning of the 25th of February an ultimatum was presented to the Shaikh and 24 hours were granted for fulfilment of the terms. The demands of the British Government were that six of the ringleaders in the attack on the Persians, whose identity had been established, should be expelled from Bahrain, and along with them the four delinquents who had been banished in the former

case and had returned; that Rs. 2,000 should be paid as compensation to the Persians through the British Political Agent; that a special guard of the Shaikh's own men should be stationed for the protection of the Manámah bazaar; that 'Ali should leave Bahrain and not be permitted to return for five years; and, finally, that the system of Sukhrah or forced labour, in so far as the employés of foreigners were concerned, should be prohibited by public notification. The Shaikh was warned, in the memorandum delivered to him, that further rejection of advice in important matters would not be tolerated by the British Government, and that their support might be withdrawn, and might even take another direction, if his attitude continued unfriendly. Lastly it was explained to him in the same document that the fulfilment of the terms concerning 'Ali and the other offenders involved * their surrender at the British Agency, whence they would be removed in a British man-of-war for conveyance to places of detention abroad. In the course of the day Shaikh 'Isa intimated that 'Ali was likely to abscond and asked assistance for the purpose of capturing him at his house. The required aid was immediately given, but 'Ali was not found; he had already fled. Shaikh 'Isa vehemently denied having connived at 'Ali's escape; he promised to have the islands scoured in pursuit of him during the ensuing night; and he agreed in the meantime to send his own son Hamad on board the "Sphinx" as a hostage.

Submission of the Shaikh to the British demand. 26th February 1905.

The next morning at 8-30 A.M., half-an-hour before the expiry of the period of grace, Shaikh 'Isa arrived at the British Agency accompanied by his sons Hamad and 'Abdullah. He brought with him the compensation money and the notification in regard to Sukhrah, and he announced that the bazaar guard were ready for inspection; but 'Ali and the ten men whose surrender was required were not produced, and it was stated that they could not be found. The Shaikh, however, who still continued to assert his own good faith, assisted in the attachment of his nephew's house and moveable property, including two boats which were burnt; and on the 28th of February, when Shaikh 'Isa finally intimated that 'Ali and the others whose surrender was required had absconded to the main land and were beyond his reach, Major Cox decided, on the Shaikh undertaking to offer large rewards for their arrest, that further proceedings were unnecessary. It had been suggested by the

* Major Cox considered that the appearance of the offenders in person was indispensable, in order that their descriptions and marks of identification might be recorded for future use; and further, that unless they were removed from Bahrain under British supervision, there would be no guarantee for the order of expulsion being carried out.

Government of India that the custom houses of Bahrain should, in certain circumstances, be taken charge of but the proposal had not commended itself to His Majesty's Government; and, such being the case, further pressure could only have been brought to bear by means of a bombardment, which, in view of the Shaikh's partial compliance with the ultimatum, it appeared to Major Cox would hardly be justifiable. Hamad was next released; and the Shaikh, in token of renewed amity, presented the British Agency with a plot of land which it had been intended to purchase from him. Before leaving Bahrain, which he did on the 4th of March in order to communicate the position to Government, the Resident interviewed and sternly warned the Mullas Jásim and Ahmad, the two chief Sunni ecclesiastics in Bahrain; these men, who were brothers, had undoubtedly had a hand in the disturbances and were deserving of being classed with Sharídah, the offender of 1899, and with Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahháb of Dárin, Turkish subject, as among the Shaikh's more mischievous advisers.*

Surrender of 'Ali-bin-Ahmad, 18th July 1905.

The result of the proceedings was regarded by the Government of India as on the whole satisfactory; but, as 'Ali remained at large, some apprehension continued to prevail at Manámah. It ceased however, on the 18th of July 1905, with the voluntary surrender of 'Ali, who, accustomed to a life of ease at Bahrain, quickly tired of a wandering existence among the Bedouins of Qatar. During his absence from Bahrain he had more than once enquired on what terms he would be allowed to come in, and he had been told in reply that the original orders concerning him still held good, and that, as regarded details, he must trust to the clemency of the British Government. 'Ali was accompanied by four of the other men, his servants, whose surrender had been demanded; and it was arranged that he should reside for five years as a political *détenu* at Bombay, on an allowance of Rs.600 a month, while the rest should be imprisoned for six months in the Central Jail at Haidarábád, Sind. A warning was conveyed to Hamad, the heir-apparent, whose attitude throughout the crisis had been as little satisfactory as his father's, that the ultimate recognition of his claims by the Government of India would depend upon his future conduct.

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* Mulla Jásim in 1892 had caused some trouble in Bahrain by persuading the Shaikh to exact death duties at the rate of one-third of each estate, but the innovation caused great dissatisfaction and was soon abandoned. Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhab appears to be the individual of that name who in 1866-67 caused some disturbance in Qatar and who temporarily succeeded his father as Wazir of Bahrain in 1888.

External affairs and foreign interests, etc., in Bahrain, 1905-07.

Position of Great Britain in Bahrain.

The position and influence of Great Britain in Bahrain were undoubtedly consolidated by the crisis of 1904-05; and the relations of the Shaikh with the British Political Agent, though the former still regarded offers of advice as attempts to undermine his authority in internal matters, improved slowly but steadily during the following year. Foreign trade continued to expand with extraordinary rapidity; in 1905-06 it was greater by 57½ per cent. than in the most favourable year previously recorded, and in 1906-07 there was a further increase of 5¼ per cent., and a total value of Rs. 4,73,18,202 was attained.

The course of affairs was not, however, equally satisfactory in all departments. No progress was made in the matter of customs reform, on which so much stress had been laid by the British Government; and the existence of a large contraband trade to Persia, partially accounting perhaps both for the increase of trade and for the unwillingness of the Shaikh to allow any interference with his customs arrangements, came to be suspected.

It was felt also that some features of the internal administration of Bahrain were not altogether creditable to the protecting British power. The slave trade still flourished, and slaves were freely imported from Qatar and Hasa, and occasionally from Sūr in the 'Omān Sultanate. Oppression of subjects too was rife, carried on not only by the Shaikh and by members of the Āl Khalifah family, but also by petty magisterial and revenue authorities, and especially by the Qādhis, who were addicted to gross abuse of their functions; the chief sufferers from the arbitrariness of the administration were the aboriginal cultivating population, who lived in a condition of virtual serfage and were liable to forced labour and to other hardships.

The question of a remedy for these evils and of a stricter definition of the subordinate relations of the Shaikh with the British Government was raised after the crisis of 1904-05 and was duly considered by His Majesty's government, who resolved, however, to pursue a cautious policy. It was decided that, for the time being, the activity of the British political authorities should be confined to the direction and control of the Shaikh's external relations, and that amelioration of the internal government should be sought by indirect and pacific means.

through increase of influence with the Shaikh and by gaining his confidence and trust. In 1905 the Political Agent was authorised to manumit slaves, in suitable and deserving cases, without reference to the Resident at Būshehr; and in that year and in 1906 efforts were made to obtain confirmation, through the Shaikh of Bahrain, of an informal undertaking given in 1895 by some of the chief men of Bahrain to the commander of H.M.S. "Pigeon" that they would not in future buy, sell, or give away slaves; but the endeavour was not successful.

British surveys, etc.

In the season 1904-05 a marine survey of Khor-al-Qalai'ah was carried out by H.M.S. "Redbreast," Commander Somerville; and in 1905 a plane-table land survey of the islands of the Bahrain archipelago was made on the scale of one inch to a mile. Excavation of some of the sepulchral mounds for which Bahrain is famous was commenced during the winter of 1906-07 by Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent, in the neighbourhood of 'Ali.

Turkish relations.

The Turkish Government showed an undue interest in the crisis between the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain in 1904-05; and, though reminded that the Bahrain Islands and the inhabitants were under British protection, they continued to press for explanations until His Majesty's Government cut the matter short by declining to continue the discussion. With an interval, possibly from the autumn of 1905 to the spring of 1907, during which they were sent by land, the Turkish official mails between 'Iraq and Hasa continued to be exchanged *viâ* Bahrain, as they had been for a long time previously; and in 1907 it was ascertained that a Turkish employé was maintained in Bahrain for the purpose of making the arrangements. Shaikh 'Isa's relative and principal adviser, the Turkish subject Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārin, maintained a pernicious influence over him; and in 1906 rumours were current, which were apparently not altogether devoid of foundation, that the Shaikh desired to place himself under the protection of Turkey.

Persian relations.

The Persian Government, though they gratefully concurred in the steps taken by the British Government in 1905 to obtain redress for their subjects who had suffered at Manāmah, re-asserted in the same year their ancient claim to sovereignty over Bahrain; and they obstinately refused to consider natives of Bahrain, while residing in Persia, in any other light than that of Persian subjects. In February 1906, after a prolonged argument and not without instructions from His Majesty's Government, the British Legation at Tehrān declared that they maintained the British right to exercise good offices on behalf of Bahrainis in

Persia and refused to entertain any further representations from the Persian Government on the subject of the Persian claim to Bahrain, which was now stated to be "entirely inadmissible"; but in September 1906 the question was once more revived by the Grand Vazir of Persia in a letter in which he referred to Captain Bruce's unauthorised Agreement of 1822. In reply to the Vazir's arguments it was pointed out that the Agreement in question, so far from having been ratified by the British Government, had been expressly repudiated; that Captain Bruce had been removed from his post; and that the Shah of Persia, on his part, had withheld his approbation from the Agreement, and had censured the Prince of Shīrāz for entering into such an engagement without proper authority.

German, French and other interests.

In 1906 the German Hamburg-Amerika line inaugurated a service in the Persian Gulf, where their first steamer, the "Candia," called at Manāmah on the 26th of August. Mr. Wönckhaus, whose own business was not in a thriving condition, was appointed agent in Bahrain, and made an effort to obtain the privilege of flying the flag of the line over his house; but the Shaikh was inflexible in refusing to grant any such concession.

In the summer of 1905 Bahrain was visited by a French family interested in the pearl trade, who were joined there by M. Goguyer, the notorious Anglophobe arms dealer of Masqat. A memorial against his own treatment by the British Government, which was sent by Shaikh 'Isa a little later to the Secretary of State for India and to the Viceroy of India, was probably inspired by M. Goguyer.

General affairs.

In 1905 Bahrain was visited by plague for the second time in three years, as noted in the Appendix on Epidemics, the victim of greatest importance being this time the notorious Sharīdah. In 1906 the Shaikh was inclined to impose a special tax upon Jews, of whom about 50 had settled in the islands during the previous ten years; but he allowed himself to be dissuaded from doing so by the British Political Agent.

ANNEXURE No. 1.—EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT OF THE SHAIKH OF BAHRAIN WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, 13TH MARCH 1892.

I, Esau-bin-Ali, Chief of Bahrain, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do

hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors, to the following conditions, *viz.*—

1st.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2nd.—That, without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3rd.—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British Government.

Dated Bahrain, 15th March 1892, corresponding with 14th Shaaban 1309.

ESAU-BIN-ALI,
Chief of Bahrein.

A. C. TALBOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Resident, Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

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CHAPTER VI.

HISTORY OF HASA.*

First Wahhābi occupation of Hasa, 1795-1818.

Conquest of Hasa by the Wahhābis, about 1795.

When the Wahhābis first appeared from the interior upon the shore of the Persian Gulf, the Shaikhs of the Bani Khālid tribe were the rulers of Hasa; and theirs was the first organised administration at the coast to go down before the onslaught of the ferocious sectaries. The rule of the Bani Khālid was mild and favourable to commerce. In 1790, import duties at Qatif amounted only to one per cent. *ad valorem*; foreign merchants were well treated; and there was a considerable trade with Najd. The residence of the Bani Khālid chiefs was in the Hasa Oasis.

Consolidation of the Wahhābi position in Hasa, 1795-1810.

By the year 1795 the Wahhābi Amīr had broken the power of the Bani Khālid and had taken partial possession of Hasa, which he immediately converted into a base for the further extension of his influence towards Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and 'Omān. His proceedings in relation to those districts are described in their separate histories and here we are only concerned with events in the oases of Hasa and Qatif and in the deserts adjoining them.

In 1799 the first actual crossing of swords between the Ottoman Porte and the Wahhābi power occurred, the place being near Thāj in the Hasa region; this campaign, however, belongs rather to the history of Najd, in which it is related.

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* Almost the only authorities, apart from the records of the Government of India, which deal with events or with conditions prevailing in Hasa are Sadleir's *Diary of a Journey across Arabia* (in 1819), published in 1866, and Palgrave's *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865; and both of these are rather descriptive than historical. The most useful compilations based on official sources are the following: *Bombay Records, XXIV*, 1856; a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906; a *Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Bahrein Affairs, 1854-1904*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Katar Affairs, 1873-1904*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, supplies a number of interesting details regarding British naval action on the coast of Hasa.

In 1800 the Wahhābis took the town of Qatīf by storm, with great slaughter of the inhabitants. In 1801 opposition to Wahhābi rule probably still persisted, or had been revived, in Hasa; for in that year it was reported that communication between Qatif and Najd was suspended, and that the Central Arabian trade from India, which ordinarily followed the Hasa line, was being carried on instead through Basrah and Kuwait; but by 1802 the position of the Wahhābis in Hasa was sufficiently consolidated to admit of their helping the 'Utūb of Bahrain to cast off the yoke of the ruler of Masqat. In 1810 the Bahrain islands with the adjacent mainland districts of Qatif and Qatar were formed into a Wahhābi governorship over which was placed a certain Abdullah-bin-Ufaisān, the seat of administration of the group being in Bahrain. In 1811 the progress of the Egyptians obliged the Wahhābi Amir to withdraw military garrisons which he had established at Hofūf and Qatif; but in 1814 his influence, though it had ceased in Bahrain, was still paramount in Hasa.

Settlement of Rahmah-bin-Jābir in Hasa.

Fort built by Rahmah at Dammam.

The famous pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, an 'Atbi of the Jalāhimah section who had already a settlement at Khor Hassān in Qatar, about this time built himself a fort at Dammām on the coast of Hasa, at the extreme southern end of the Qatif Oasis.

Expulsion of Rahmah by the Wahhābis, 1816.

Here he remained as a staunch supporter of the Wahhābi interest until 1816, when, having deserted the Wahhābi cause and joined with the Saiyid of 'Omān in an attack upon Bahrain, then more or less under Wahhābi protection, he found himself obliged to cross the Gulf and seek an asylum in Persia. In July 1816, before his final departure from the Arabian side, Rahmah's fort at Dammām was blown up by the Wahhābis.

First Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1818-19.

Arrival of the Egyptians in Hasa, 1818.

After capturing the Wahhābi capital of Dara'iyah in September 1818, Ibrāhim Pāsha, the commander of the Egyptian forces, removed the inhabitants of the town to Hasa and himself proceeded thither: his intention seems to have been to make that relatively fertile province

the headquarters of his Arabian administration. Of the movements of the Egyptians in Hasa very few details are known; but it appears that Ibrāhim Pāsha was assisted by Rahmah-bin-Jābir, who came over for the purpose from Būshehr, in reducing by artillery fire the Wahhābi port of Qatīf. Rahmah profited by his good understanding with the Egyptians to settle again at Dammām, where he at once began to rebuild the fort destroyed by the Wahhābis two years before. At the end of 1818 a large force of Arabs from the Pirate Coast arrived at Qatīf in 17 war-vessels to assist the Wahhābis against the Egyptians; but they were too late, and returned peacefully *viâ* Bahrain.

Events during the first Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1818-19.

Journey of Captain Sadleir through Hasa and evacuation of the province by the Egyptians, 1819.

At noon on the 18th of June 1819, in carrying out a mission to Ibrāhim Pāsha of which the objects and incidents are described* in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Captain G. Forster Sadleir of His Majesty's 47th Regiment arrived off the coast of Hasa; but an ignorant Būshehri pilot ran the Hon'ble Company's cruiser "Vestal," on which he was a passenger, upon a sandbank, and there she remained fast during the night. The Egyptian authorities on shore were slow to render assistance; but on the afternoon of the 19th of June a complimentary deputation from Rahmah-bin-Jābir appeared on board, and on the next day the "Vestal" was brought safely into Qatīf harbour with the morning tide by two intelligent pilots whom Rahmah sent. Captain Sadleir had intended to make 'Oqair the point of his departure for the interior, but he allowed himself to be dissuaded by Rahmah and the Egyptian sub-governor of Qatīf, and on Monday the 21st he landed at Saihāt, towards the southern end of the Qatīf Oasis. This change of plan, for which he cannot be blamed, probably cost him some valuable days, and so may have contributed to the failure of his mission.

At the time of Captain Sadleir's arrival, the Egyptians, having found it necessary to concentrate their forces in Arabia, were about to evacuate Hasa. Khalīl Āgha, the Egyptian sub-governor of Qatīf, had already received orders to return with two subordinates to Hofūf, making over his charge to Mushrif, a nephew of Shaikh Muhammad, the head of the Banī Khālid; the roads between Qatīf and Hofūf were unsafe; and attacks on Egyptian convoys between Hofūf and the

* *Vide* page 661 *ante*.

military headquarters of Ibrāhim Pasha in Najd had begun to occur. As Khalid Agha, whose authority had been maintained only by a force of 60 Arab hirelings and was now almost gone, appeared indisposed or unable to make any arrangements, Captain Sadleir decided to accept an offer of the Bani Khalid chiefs to forward him on his journey, and accordingly left Saihat on the 28th of June 1819 under the protection of Mushrif; but the conduct of the latter in the desert was "that of a barbarian who had got his prey in his power, and determined not to lose the opportunity lest another so favourable should not offer;" and the behaviour of the senior Shaikh, Muhammad, who was incompetent and very deaf, and of his brother Majid was hardly better. Captain Sadleir did not reach Hofūf until the 11th of July; he had been dragged in the interval on a preposterous round to the wells of Badrāni, 'Aziz-al-Ma, Mulaihah, Abwāb, Umm Rulai'ah, Hafairah, 'Ain Dār and Dumaiyagh, and to the village of 'Ayūn; and in the course of his wanderings he had suffered extreme discomfort and anxiety, and had been obliged to submit to very unreasonable extortions on the part of the Bedouins.

At Hofūf the British envoy was well received by Muhammad Agha, the Egyptian Kāshif or Governor of Hasa, who had lately received orders to transfer the province to the Shaikhs of the Bani Khalid and to rejoin Ibrāhim Pasha in Sadair with the Egyptian garrison of Hasa. Of the latter only about 250 men now remained, and the Egyptian officers whom Captain Sadleir met, worn out with long service in a rude and inhospitable country, were delighted at being thus recalled to headquarters. Muhammad Agha at first professed a strong interest in the object of Captain Sadlier's journey and offered to take him with him as a companion on his own withdrawal, for which the date fixed was the 22nd of July; but on the 21st, after sending some transport to Captain Sadleir, he slipped away privately without further notice. Captain Sadleir followed, later on the same day, with the main body of the Egyptian troops; and on the 24th, before leaving the Hasa district for Najd, he passed a second time by the wells of Umm Rulai'ah. While at Hofūf Captain Sadleir learned that the intruding Egyptians, during their occupation of the country, had enforced their authority by very arbitrary means, and that their departure was awaited by the inhabitants with the utmost impatience.

Ibrāhim Pasha seems to have hoped that by retaining a garrison at 'Anaizah in Central Arabia, he would be able to keep up communication with Hasa and to extract a regular tribute from the Bani

Khalid Shaikhs, whose authority over that province, overthrown by the Wahhabis, was re-established at the removal of the Egyptian officials.

Existence of a British Agent at Qatif, 1823.

At the time of Captain Sadleir's visit no Christians or Hindus were to be found at Qatif, nor, in the unsettled state of affairs then prevailing, could any person be induced to act as a broker; for any man who gave signs of possessing money would have been immediately laid under contribution by the Egyptians. In 1823, however, at the time of the Political Resident's voyage along the Arabian coast, there was a native Agent of the Bûshehr Residency at Qatif, whom Lieutenant McLeod proposed to transfer to Shârjah on the Pirate Coast.

Proceedings of Rahmah-bin-Jâbir, 1818-26.

Peace arranged between Rahmah and the 'Utûb of Bahrain, 1824.

After his re-establishment at Dammâm in 1818 during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, Rahmah-bin-Jâbir began to harass the 'Utûb of Bahrain with increased success; and so disturbing to the general peace was this maritime struggle that between 1822 and 1824, as related in the history of Bahrain, the British political authorities constantly tried to arrange matters between the parties. At length in February 1824, as described in the history of Bahrain, a peace was concluded, of which one condition was that Rahmah should not interfere to prevent the punishment by the Shaikhs of Bahrain of the refractory Âl Bû Samait tribe, who had recently settled under his protection at Dammâm.

Other events, 1824.

Rahmah then paid a visit to Masqat; and, on his return to Dammâm, he proceeded to blockade Qatif, of which place the inhabitants had recently ceased to pay him tribute, or rather blackmail, for the protection of their commerce at sea. Rahmah was at this time approaching seventy years of age, and ill-fortune had made havoc of his material resources; but he was animated by a spirit as haughty and indomitable as ever. On the Shaikh of Bûshehr proceeding, under the orders of the Shîraz Government who were piqued at the reconciliation between Rahmah and the 'Utûb of Bahrain, to detain the family of one of his sons, Rahmah about June 1824 sought permission of the British authorities to declare war against the Shaikh; but the incident was eventually settled by the release of the prisoners at the instance of the Resident and their return to Dammâm. Meanwhile, whether by the submission of the people of Qatif or by profitable captures made in

the course of his operations against them, Rahmah's financial difficulties had been to a great extent relieved.

Rahmah's blockade of Qatif, 1825.

Early in 1825 Rahmah paid another visit to Masqat; and he also obtained from the British Political Resident an authorisation, of which he did not apparently avail himself, to take part, on the side of Shaikh Tahnūn, in a war then in progress between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Shārjah in Trucial 'Omān. Towards the end of 1825, trouble having again arisen over the blackmail payable by the people of Qatif, Rahmah, in total disregard of remonstrances by the British political authorities, began to harry the defenceless merchant vessels of that port. Two British cruisers were accordingly stationed off Dammām, and it was at first intimated to Rahmah that, unless he discontinued these depredations, active proceedings would be taken against him; but ultimately it was decided to refrain from coercion unless he should extend his depredations beyond the shipping of Qatif, and a further remonstrance was addressed to him. The obstinacy of Rahmah was attributed to his confidence in the reviving power of the Wahhābis, to whom, he believed, the renewal of piratical disturbances at sea would not be unwelcome.

New breach between Rahmah and the Shaikhs of Bahrain.

Meanwhile a fresh rupture had occurred between Rahmah and the 'Utūb of Bahrain; but the hostilities had not free course until after the removal, in consequence of the decision not to interfere between Rahmah and the people of Qatif, of the British cruisers from Dammām. Neither Rahmah nor the 'Athi Shaikh being fully prepared for a regular war, both of them requested the British Resident to impose a truce, and their suggestions were apparently entertained; but, the Resident having insisted that the people of Qatif should be included in the truce—a condition to which Rahmah would not agree, matters were in the end allowed to take their course.

Last engagement and death of Rahmah, 1826.

About the end of 1826, finding himself hard pressed by his enemies who had now invested Dammām, Rahmah crossed the Gulf to Būshehr and sought to interest the Resident in his case; but, failing in this, he recruited some 25 or 30 Balūchis for service and returned with them to Dammām, where a Bahrain fleet was then lying. On arrival at Dammām he fired a salute by way of insult,—an act which so incensed the 'Utūb that Ahmad-bin-Salmān, a nephew of their principal Shaikh, volunteered to attack him with his own Baghlah, and, the offer being accepted, immediately laid his vessel alongside that of Rahmah. A very determined struggle then ensued, in which the Bahrain warship once drew off to take more men on board from the rest of the

'Atbi fleet; and it continued till Rahmah, who was now totally blind, aware that his vessel must in the end be boarded and captured by superior numbers and that no quarter was to be expected, gave orders to grapple with the enemy. Taking his youngest son—a boy eight years of age—with him, he caused himself to be guided to the powder magazine, blew up the vessel with his own hand, and so perished along with all his companions. The explosion set fire to the attacking vessel, which also blew up, but not until after those on board had been rescued by their friends.*

In his appearance, vividly depicted by Buckingham in 1816, Rahmah seems to have been nothing short of repulsive. His clothing was squalid in the extreme. His face, "naturally ferocious and ugly," was disfigured by scars and by the loss of an eye, his "figure presented a "meagre trunk, with four lank members, all of them cut and hacked, "and pierced with wounds of sabres, spears, and bullets, in every part, "to the number perhaps of more than twenty different wounds." The bone between the shoulder and the elbow of his right arm was completely wanting, in consequence of a wound, but he could still grasp a dagger in his right hand and make shift to use it with the help of his left. His spirit was truculent and revengeful; but he bore calamity with a fortitude not less remarkable than the callousness that he showed in inflicting suffering. Among his own followers, many of whom were slaves, he was said to maintain discipline by free recourse to the death penalty; and none ventured to disobey his orders. He showed his prudence in avoiding, throughout his life, direct collision with the British Government; and, from the friendliness of his personal relations with some of the British officers at the Bûshehr Residency, it may be inferred that he possessed redeeming qualities. Nevertheless his death was felt as a relief throughout the Gulf.†

Reconquest of Hasa by the Wahhābis, 1824-31.

Indecisive hostilities between the

The Bani Khalid Shaikhs, replaced in authority over Hasa by the Egyptians, succeeded in maintaining their position for some years; but,

* This is the generally received account of the affair; but if, as appears to be stated, there were no survivors of Rahmah's crew, it is difficult to understand how the circumstances of the explosion ever became known.

† The only description of Rahmah by one who had seen him will be found in Buckingham's *Travels in Assyria, etc.*, pages 356 to 358. That censorious and somewhat pharisaical writer evidently failed to appreciate the old sea-wolf.

Wahhābis and the Bani Khālid, 1824-30.

as the Wahhābi Amir, who now professed allegiance and paid tribute to the Egyptians, was soon at war with the Bani Khālid, it is improbable that money from Hasa can for long have continued to reach the Egyptian exchequer. The Bani Khālid made Hofūf their capital, and held possession besides of the seaport of Qatif. Hostilities between the Wahhābis and the Bani Khālid began about 1824, but until 1830 the results were inconclusive.

Final defeat of the Bani Khalid, by the Wahhābis, 1830.

At the beginning of 1830 the Bani Khālid Shaikhs took the initiative by marching with a large body of their tribe upon Najd, and Faisal-bin-Turki, the son of the Wahhābi Amir, moved out from Riyādh to meet them. At this juncture the Bani Khālid had the misfortune to lose their best military leader in the person of Shaikh Majid, who was taken ill and died; and the command of the forces devolved, with the consent of Majid's brother, the aged Shaikh Muhammad, who was conscious of his own incapacity, upon Barghash, a nephew of Muhammad. The new leader, after some delay, advanced against the Wahhābis who fell back before him; but hardly had he done so when Turki-bin-'Abdullah, the Wahhābi Amir, who had left Riyādh in person on the night of the 23rd March 1830 at the head of 1,200 men, succeeded in passing round one of his flanks and seized Wabrah,* the base of his operations and the source of his water supply, which he had left unguarded in the rear. The Bani Khālid thus found themselves cut off from water and placed between two bodies of the enemy, who, after allowing a day to pass, attacked them next morning upon both sides, completely routing them and capturing the whole of their women, children, tents, horses, camels and cattle. The Shaikhs Muhammad and Barghash escaped in safety to Hofūf, where for a short time they prolonged their resistance; but, on the majority of the Beni Khālid making submission and the march of the Wahhābis being continued to Hofūf, the capital of Hasa fell, and Qatif, too, shortly surrendered.

Enlightened policy of the Wahhābi Amir in Hasa, 1831.

The power of the conqueror, whose policy—unlike that of his ancestors and predecessors—was distinguished by tolerance and conciliation, was rapidly established in Hasa, where he placed some garrisons and contented himself with levying the usual Zakāt; and in 1831 Turki returned to the interior. The change of masters was beneficial to the country, inasmuch as the anarchy and civil war which had prevailed under

* The name is given as "Dabrah" in the records, but no such place is known. Wabrah, a well-known watering station and the crossing place of many routes in Summān, must be meant. The Arabic characters for "W" and "D" may sometimes be mistaken for one another.

the Bani Khālid Shaikhs were quickly brought to an end. A few demonstrations against the Wahhābis were attempted by Muhammad, the surviving Bani Khālid Shaikh; but they were feeble and ineffective.

Events during the second occupation of Hasa by the Wahhābis 1830-38.

From Hasa, as a base, the Wahhābi ruler at once sought to extend his influence over the Bahrain Islands; but his success in this direction was by no means so complete or so permanent as in Hasa; and the friction with the 'Utūb of Bahrain which his ambition excited was prejudicial to the tranquillity and economic well-being of the mainland.

Establishment of Bashīr-bin-Rahmah on Tarūt Island, 1831-32.

When, in 1830, the Amir called upon the Shaikhs of Bahrain to acknowledge their allegiance to himself, it was his intention to establish Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, a son of the deceased pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, at Dammām, as a check upon the 'Utūb; and the project was supported by Saiyid Sa'īd of 'Omān, who had harboured Bashīr since the death of his father in 1826, and who looked for his assistance in case of a fresh expedition from Masqat against Bahrain. In their settlement with the 'Utūb of Bahrain however, in 1831, the proposal relating to Dammām was dropped by the Wahhābis; but almost immediately after, at the intercession it would appear of Saiyid Sa'īd, they gave Bashīr permission to settle on Tarūt Island, opposite to the town of Qatīf, and to build himself a fort there at Dārin. Bashīr was shortly joined by a majority of the Āl Bū Samait tribe, who had, like his own family, an irreconcilable feud with the Shaikhs of Bahrain; but, having incurred the enmity of the people of Qatīf, he found himself unable, even with the help of the Āl Bū Samait, to maintain his position at Dārin; and in 1832, after destroying the fort that he had just built, he removed again to Masqat with his immediate followers.

Difficulties of the Wahhābis in Hasa, 1831-35.

In 1831, encouraged by difficulties which had arisen in Najd between Turki-bin-'Abdullah and one of his own relations who claimed the Amirate of the Wahhābis, some Bani Khālid of the 'Amair section made a simultaneous attack on Hofūf and Qatīf, but without success.

A feud had meanwhile sprung up between the 'Amāir of Jinnah, supported by some of the Sūdān tribe, and the inhabitants of Qatīf. The original cause was the refusal of the Qatīf people to continue payment of certain blackmail claimed by the 'Amair; but feeling had been

greatly inflamed by losses, including a chief, suffered by the 'Amāir in attempts to enforce their demands; and the mediation of the Wahhābi Amir failed to appease the strife. It resulted from this feud that in 1832 the 'Amāir boarded a Bahrain vessel near Qatif and put to death 12 out of 30 natives of that town whom they found on board, and that in 1833, with the connivance of the 'Utūb of Bahrain, they established themselves at Dammām, blockaded Qatif, and began to prey upon its commerce.

Emboldened by these disorders the Shaikhs of Bahrain in 1833 renounced their allegiance to the Wahhābi Amir, and the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif, apparently considering the situation of his master to be desperate, sought their protection; but, by the energy of Turki-bin-'Abdullah, the dangers which threatened his authority in Hasa were temporarily surmounted, and Zakāt was collected, possibly for the first time, from the inhabitants of the Hasa coast.

Seizure of Tārūt Island by the 'Utūb, 1834.

In 1834 the Bahrain Shaikh blockaded the Wahhābi ports of Qatif and 'Oqair, and, on the assassination of Turki-bin-'Abdullah, annexed the island of Tārūt to Bahrain, besides instigating the Bani Khālid to attack the Wahhābis in Hofūf, and Qatif; but the movement on Hofūf was frustrated by 'Umr-bin-Ufaisān, the Wahhābi Governor, with great loss to his assailants, and the insurgent Bani Khālid were driven to seek refuge under the guns of the Bahrain garrison on Tārūt.

Authority over Hasa asserted by the Egyptians, 1835.

About the middle of 1835 there arrived at Masqat from Makkah, a respectable merchant formerly of Bahrain, named 'Abdullah-bin-Mashāri, who brought with him letters from Ahmad Pāsha, the Egyptian Governor of Hijāz, addressed to the Saiyid of 'Omān, the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhābi Amir; the purport of the credentials was that the bearer had been granted a farm of the revenues of Qatif for $20,000 to $24,000 per annum by the Egyptian Government, and that he should be allowed to assume and exercise his authority as lessee without opposition. It is probable that the object of the Egyptians in making this appointment was to prepare the way for a reconquest of Najd from the west by creating embarrassments on the Wahhābi Amir's eastern border. 'Abdullah-bin-Mashāri was courteously received by Saiyid Sa'id, who provided him with a Batil to carry him from Masqat to Qatif; but Faisal-bin-Turki, who had in the meantime removed his father's murderer, the usurper of the Wahhābi Amirate, sent a body of troops to defend his rights at Qatif, and the would-be tax-gatherer disappeared from that place very soon after his arrival. The sons of Bin-Mashāri were subsequently found to have procured letters of recommendation from the Government of Bombay.

The Wahhābi force sent to expel Bin-Mashāri from Qatif afterwards attempted to recapture Tārūt from the Shaikh of Bahrain, but their efforts were unavailing; and the 'Utūb at once retaliated by resuming the blockade of Qatif and 'Oqair, which they had withdrawn.

Failure of the Wahhābis to recover Tārūt and appropriation of Dammām by the 'Utūb, 1835.

At the middle of 1836, Bahrain being now threatened by the Persians and Najd by the Egyptians, the 'Utūb and the Wahhābis found mutual advantage in a settlement of their differences. The first overtures proceeded from the Shaikh of Bahrain, but they were readily accepted by the Amīr; the 'Utūb placed themselves under the protection of the Wahhābis, and the 'Athi blockade of the Hasa coast was discontinued. In 1837, the power of the Wahhābi Amīr in Hasa being paralysed by a struggle which had begun in Najd between himself and an Egyptian nominee named Khālid, the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid, along with some Bani Hājir who had settled at Dammām under the protection of the Utūb of Bahrain, began to commit piracies on Qatif and Bahrain boats; but the Shaikh of Bahrain, having obtained the permission of the British Resident at Būshehr, immediately took measures against them and put an end to their depredations.

Rapprochement between the 'Utūb and the Wahhābis, 1836-38.

The second Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-40.

At the close of 1838 the active operations of the Egyptian army in Najd came to an end on the surrender of the Wahhābi Amīr, Faisal-bin-Turki, at Dilam in Kharj, whence he was sent a prisoner to Egypt. Before this event a conspiracy among the 'Amāir Bani Khālid at Hofūf in favour of the Egyptians had been detected and severely punished by the Wahhābi commander in Hasa, 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, who put three of their principal men to death. On the fall of Dilam the Hasa and Qatif Oases immediately submitted to the Egyptians, while the representative of the Wahhābi Government sought an asylum in Bahrain; and the Egyptians, throwing off their disguise as supporters of the pretender Khālid, announced that their conquests were made in the name of Muhammad 'Ali, Viceroy of Egypt. It is not clear whether Khurshid Pāsha, the Egyptian general, whose headquarters during his occupation of Najd were first at Sulaimiyah in Kharj and later at Tharmidah in Washam, ever visited Hasa in person; but a regular Egyptian administration was established there without delay, a garrison of 500 irregulars being placed at Hofūf, and smaller posts at Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair upon the coast.

Expulsion of the Wahhābis by the Egyptians, 1838-39.

Proceedings of the Egyptians in Hasa, 1839.

For a time it appeared probable that the Egyptian commander would attempt to extend his conquests so as to include both Bahrain and 'Omān, and the proceedings on the part of the British Government to which this anticipation gave rise are described at length in the histories of Trucial 'Omān and Bahrain; but in the end no actual movement was made by him in either of these directions, and the submission tendered by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Egyptians early in 1839 was consequently gratuitous and unnecessary. In 1839, during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, an expedition, consisting partly of Egyptian troops and partly of Banī Hājir of the Makhalidhabah division, was despatched from Hofūf against the Na'im of Qatar who had refused to pay tribute; but the assassination of Muhammad Effendi, the Egyptian Governor of Hasa, by some Arabs in the vicinity of Hofūf necessitated its recall.

Evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians, 1840.

The position of Khurshid Pasha in Najd was one of great and increasing difficulty. The hostility of the country people made it difficult for him to provision his posts or to keep open his communications; four armed vessels with military stores, which he expected on the coast of Hasa from the Red Sea, did not arrive, and their place was ill-supplied by a Kuwait boat which in November 1839 brought a single cargo of ammunition; it gradually became clear that the reduction of Bahrain, which was probably the main object of his excursion to the shores of the Persian Gulf, would not be permitted by the British Government; and finally his master, Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt, had begun to regard his successes with jealousy and dislike. In the circumstances a general retirement became necessary; and in Hasa, the first district to be evacuated, it seems to have been carried into effect in April or May 1840. The last act of the Egyptians in Hasa was the execution of Barghash, a Shaikh of the Āl Humaid section of the Banī Khālid, who they were reported to have put to death in revenge for the shooting of their Governor, Muhammad Effendi. At the time of the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, the blockade of the ports of Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair, which they held upon the coast, had begun to be seriously contemplated by the British Government.

Internal affairs of Hasa from the second occupation by the Egyptians to the present occupation by the Turks, 1840 71.

A distribution of events in Hasa, during the generation following the evacuation of that province by the Egyptians in 1840, under the heads

of internal affairs, relations with Bahrain, and British relations is necessarily somewhat artificial; but such a classification must, for the sake of clearness, be adopted.

Hasa under the Amir Khālid, 1840-42.

At their own withdrawal the Egyptians left their creature Khālid in possession of the Amirate of Najd, supported by about 800 of their troops. The new ruler, apparently unconscious of the real weakness of his position, at first indulged in dreams of foreign conquest; and about October 1841 he moved down to Hasa with the intention, as was supposed, of sending an expedition against 'Omān; but difficulties nearer to the seat of his power soon recalled him to Najd. In December 1841, or early in 1842, he was expelled from Riyādh by 'Abdullah-bin-Thināiyān, a more powerful rival, and retired to Qatif with his foreign troops, whose presence was obnoxious to his subjects and was one of the principal causes of his downfall. The inhabitants of Hasa had already opened a correspondence with the new Amir, 'Abdullah; and the people of Qatif soon forced Khālid to dismiss his Egyptian soldiers and take refuge with Mubārak, a son of the Shaikh of Bahrain, in the seaside fort of Dammām further down the coast. He was received by Mubārak as a welcome guest; and, in April 1842, he paid a visit to the Shaikh of Bahrain at Khor Hassān in Qatar, was treated there with much respect, and was encouraged to hope for assistance in recovering Qatif. Operations undertaken in his interest against the Hasa Oasis and the port of 'Oqair were temporarily successful, but Mubārak-bin-'Abdullah was soon in full retreat to the coast before the victorious army of 'Abdullah, and Khālid then left Dammām for Kuwait.

Hasa under the Amir 'Abdullah, 1842-43.

No internal events of importance characterised the short reign of Khālid's successor, 'Abdullah, over the province of Hasa. At the end of 1842 the inhabitants who had so readily professed allegiance to him began, in consequence of his exactions in Qatif, to be discontented with his rule; but there was not as yet any open movement among the settled population against his authority. A number of the Bedouin tribes in the neighbourhood at first refused to submit to him, but these he appears to have coerced with success. In 1843 his sovereignty ceased.

Hasa under the Amir Faisal, 1848-65.

In 1851 Faisal, the successor of the Amir 'Abdullah, visited Qatar, and it may be presumed that he made a tour in Hasa at the same time. The object of his visit to the region appears to have been the chastisement of some of the Bedouin tribes; and at the present day he is remembered as the only ruler of Najd who ever pursued the wild Āl Morrah into their sandy retreats with any success.

Relations of Hasa with Bahrain during the same period, 1840-71.

The affairs of Hasa at this time however, are of little interest apart from the relations of the province with Bahrain, and these last are so fully described in the history of Bahrain that it will be unnecessary to do more than briefly refer to them here.

Invitation to the Bahrain Shaikhs to annex Hasa, 1840.

In 1840, on the retirement of the Egyptians from the country, Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah of Bahrain was invited by a section of the inhabitants through one Mushrif, possibly a Shaikh of the Bani Khalid,* to assume authority over Hasa and exclude the Egyptian puppet Khalid. This invitation, which was declined through the influence of 'Abdullah, the senior Shaikh, was one cause of the dissensions, ending in civil war, which shortly broke out between the joint chiefs of Bahrain.

Friction between the Wahhabis and Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain, 1842-44.

In the first phase of the struggle between the rival Shaikhs of Bahrain, the elder, 'Abdullah, was successful; and the younger, Muhammad, in 1842 retired to Hasa and thence journeyed to Riyadh, where the new Amir 'Abdullah showed a disposition to take his part. The result was an estrangement between the Wahhabi Amir and the reigning Shaikh of Bahrain; the Shaikh blockaded the coast of Hasa and gave asylum in Bahrain to most of the inhabitants of Saihat, who emigrated from that place on account of a grievance against the Wahhabi Governor of Qatif; and the Amir, on his part, arrested a chief of the Bani Hajir, named Shafi', who was closely related to the Shaikh. Dammam on the Hasa coast was still a dependency of Bahrain, but it was claimed, as a paternal inheritance, by Bashir-bin-Rahmah. From the course of the negotiations for the release of Shafi' it appears that the port of 'Oqair was also, at this time, held by the Bahrain Shaikh; but it cannot have remained long in his possession.

Recovery of Dammam by the Wahhabis, 1844.

On his expulsion from Bahrain, in April 1843, Shaikh 'Abdullah established himself with his sons at Dammam, his only remaining possession; and there he was shortly blockaded from the sea by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, assisted by Bashir-bin-Rahmah and 'Isa-bin-'Ali; while on the landward side the place was invested, at the end of 1843, by

* There is nothing, however, to show whether this was the Mushrif by whom Captain Sadleir was uncivilly treated in 1819.

a Wahhābi force. In March 1844 Dammām surrendered to the Wahhābis, Shaikh 'Abdullah himself being at the moment of capitulation somewhere outside the cordon by which the place was surrounded. The Wahhābis then occupied Dammām in the name of their own Amīr, Faisal-bin-Turki, much to the disappointment of Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, to whom possession of it had been promised by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain. These events are more fully related in the history of Bahrain.

Coalition between the Wahhābis and the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain, 1845-47.

In 1844 or 1845 the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah began to negotiate with the Wahhābis for their support, which they readily granted, probably because they found that Shaikh Muhammad, since his accession, was no longer amenable to their influence. In 1845, on war being declared between the Wahhābis and Bahrain, the Shaikh of Bahrain placed the Hasa coast under blockade and took into his service a pirate named Hamaid-bin-Majdal, of whom we shall presently have more to say under the head of British relations; while the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, on his part, landed secretly in Hasa near Ras Tanūrah. In correspondence with his son Mubārak, who since the fall of Dammām had been living among the Bani Hājir Bedouins on the mainland, and with 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'īd, the Wahhābi Governor of Qatīf, the ex-Shaikh attempted to arrange for an invasion of the Bahrain Islands; but his plans were frustrated, when on the point of execution, through their becoming known to the Shaikh of Bahrain. The blockade of the Hasa coast by the Shaikh of Bahrain's vessels continued throughout 1846; in September of that year the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah settled temporarily near Dammām, under Wahhābi protection, removing shortly after to Tarūt Island; and some fighting occurred on the mainland between the principal belligerents, in which the ex-Shaikh did not take part. At the beginning of 1847 the pirate Hamaid-bin-Majdal and his dependents of the 'Amīr tribe deserted the Shaikh of Bahrain and joined the Wahhābis, and terms of peace were shortly afterwards arranged between the Wahhābi Amīr and the Shaikh of Bahrain, by which the former bound himself no longer to support the pretensions of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah. The latter, finding himself betrayed, soon after took ship at Dammām, and he did not again make Hasa a base for his operations.

Sons of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah re-established by the Wahhābis at Dammām, 1852.

In 1850 the relations between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhābi Amīr again became strained, and in 1851 the Shaikh once more had recourse to a maritime blockade of Hasa; but the sons of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, crossing with a fleet from the Persian coast, forced their way into the harbour of Qatīf and placed their naval resources at the disposal of the Amīr Faisal. Aggressive action against Bahrain by the

Wahhábis and their allies was prevented by the arrival of a British squadron off the islands; but the sons of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah received a reward for their services from the Wahhábis in the shape of permission to re-occupy Dammám.

Attempted invasion of Bahrain from Qatif and Dammám, 1859.

In 1859, as more fully related in the history of Bahrain, preparations were made at Qatif by the Wahhábi Governor of that place and at Dammám by Muhammad, a son of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, for an invasion of Bahrain; but their plans were upset by the arrival on the scene of a British naval force under Commander Palfour, whose menacing attitude completely cowed the Wahhábi official.

Expulsion of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammám by British action, 1861.

The presence of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah at Dammám, in close relations with the Wahhábi power, had now for some years been a standing danger to the Shaikhdom of Bahrain; and, after a discussion suggested by the events of 1859, the Government of India decided that he should be expelled. To a previous suggestion by the Resident, Captain Felix Jones, that Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah should be removed, the Wahhábi Amír had sent an indignant reply; and in 1861, on a requisition to the same effect being addressed him under the orders of Government, he remained silent. Accordingly in November 1861, as described in the history of Bahrain, Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah and his dependents were compelled, under the fire of a British warship, to evacuate Dammám.

Invasion of Bahrain from Hasa, 1869.

The connection of the Hasa province, which served as a base to the marauders, with the successful invasion of Bahrain in 1869 by the ex-Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalífah and others, aided by the Bani Hájir tribe of the mainland, is fully noticed in the history of the Bahrain Principality.

British relations with Hasa during the same period, 1840-71.

Piracy by a Dammám boat, 1840-41.

Early in 1840 a piracy was committed between Khor Músa and the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab upon a boat belonging to Kuwait. The perpetrators remained undiscovered until August 1841, when a follower of Múbarak-bin-'Abdullah, then governing Dammám on behalf of his father, was shown to have been of their number. A demand was accordingly made upon the Shaikh of Bahrain for payment of 274 Muhammad Sháhi rupees or, alternatively, for the surrender of the pirate and his boat; and compliance with the former condition was obtained.

Mission of Lieutenant

The mission of Lieutenant Jopp, who in November 1841 visited the Wahhábi Amír in Hasa, had reference to the designs which that chief

was supposed to entertain in the direction of 'Omān, and will be more appropriately described in another place.

Jopp to Hasa, 1841.

More than once between 1845 and 1854 the attention of the British authorities was attracted to the coast of Hasa by the misdeeds of Hamaid-bin-Majdal, a member of the 'Amāir section of the Banī Khālid tribe, who, as related elsewhere, combined with the Shaikh of Bahrain against the Wahhābis in 1845 and in 1847 transferred his support to the other side. Early in 1845, Hamaid, who had broken with a part of his tribe, had forsaken his usual residence on Abu 'Ali Island, and was already in the service of the Shaikh of Bahrain, seized a Baqārah belonging to Khārag as she was entering the port of Qatif with a cargo of wheat from Rig and carried her to Abu 'Ali Island; the crew, after being despoiled of all their property, were allowed to make their way home in their empty vessel. The damages were estimated at 1,500 Muhammad Shāhi rupees; and it was reported that Hamaid-bin-Majdal, on being warned that the goods he was plundering belonged to a person under British protection, merely laughed and asked "Who are the English?"

Piracy by Hamaid-bin-Majdal and his punishment, 1845-1850.

Such open contempt of the maritime peace and its guardians could not be tolerated; and in May 1845 the Resident deputed his Assistant, Captain Kemball, to superintend the punishment of the pirate, who had now established himself on the island of Jinnah. This service, which was undertaken by Commodore Hawkins, I.N., with his flagship "Coote" and the schooner "Constance," supported by two armed Baqārahs, was attended by serious difficulties of navigation; and Hamaid, who seems to have believed his island inaccessible, replied insolently to the first summons to submit; but, when morning broke, he found himself surrounded by the boats of the squadron and hastened to apologise. He was obliged to surrender his Baghlah, which was retained till the following October and was then redeemed by him on payment of 2,059 Muhammad Shāhi rupees in cash and 141 in kind, the total demand against him being thus liquidated. The operations at Jinnah were extremely trying to those engaged in them on account of the terrific heat of the sun, the season being June; and the skilful management and successful issue of the expedition were highly commended by the Court of Directors.

In the summer of 1846 the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif had the presumption to address the British Resident, demanding that he should expel Hamaid-bin-Majdal from his abode and compel him to return a Ghunchah and five other vessels belonging to Qatif which he had seized; in case of failure the Governor threatened to give the Banī Hājir and other Bedouin tribes of the mainland permission to commit piracies. A

British naval demonstration at Qatif, 1846.

friendly but effectual admonition was immediately conveyed to the arrogant official by two British cruisers.

Fresh piracy by Hamaid-bin-Majdal and repetition of his punishment, 1854.

In 1854 Hamaid-bin-Majdal, who was now apparently settled at 'Anik near Qatif town, committed another piracy by seizing a large Baghlah which he refused to give up, though the Resident, Captain Kemball, went in person to demand its surrender; he seemed to consider himself completely protected by the Turkish flag, which he had hoisted over his dwelling. On the matter being referred to Bombay, orders were received to destroy a Baghlah belonging to the pirate, by force if necessary, but to avoid operations on land.

In November 1854 a squadron of vessels of the Indian Navy arrived off 'Anik; it consisted of the flagship "Clive," Commodore Robinson; the "Falkland," Commander Hewett; the "Tigris," Lieutenant Foulerton; and the "Constance," Lieutenant Crane. 'Anik itself was unapproachable from the sea; but a Baghlah, round which the Arabs had constructed a sand-bag battery, was observed on shore in an assailable position, and was attacked with a flotilla of 13 boats, one of which was a rocket-boat, while the other 12 carried two 12-pounder and six 3-pounder guns besides a force of 200 seamen and marines. During the attack the tide went out; the heavier of the British boats were left high and dry; and a large force of Arabs swarmed down to capture them, but were repulsed by a hot fire of artillery and musketry. When the tide again rose, Hamaid-bin-Majdal thought it prudent to send off a flag of truce, and the Baghlah was surrendered, and next morning was burnt by the boats of the squadron, which returned to shore for the purpose. On the British side only a few men were wounded in this affair, but the Arabs lost heavily and were much demoralised by the shells and rockets.

The British naval demonstration at Qatif and Dammām in 1839 and the expulsion of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām by a British force in 1861 have already been noticed above in connection with Bahrain relations. The British proceedings at Dammām in 1861 elicited a strong protest from the Turkish Wāli of Baghdād in the following year, on the ground that Dammām was in the territory of "Faisal Bey, the Qāim Maqām of Najd," and formed "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultan"; to which the British Resident replied, denying the claim of Turkey, and asserting the right of Britain to deal directly with the Wahhābi Amīr.

British operations at Qatif and

In 1866, in consequence of a rupture between the British Government and the Wahhābi Amīr, operations were undertaken by H.M.S. "Highflyer," Captain Pasley, at Qatif and Dammām, the only points except

'Oqair in the Wahhábí dominions which were accessible to a naval force: the circumstances and the general scheme of action are given in the history of Najd. On the 13th of January 1866 an ultimatum, in which 17 days were allowed for compliance, was transmitted to the Amir at Riyádh through his representative at Qatíf. On the 30th of January, after an interview in Elphinstone Inlet with Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident, Captain Pasley with the "Highflyer" again arrived at Qatíf and ascertained that there was as yet no reply to the ultimatum. Accordingly, on the 2nd of February, boats under Lieutenant Fellowes entered Qatíf harbour and destroyed the small fortification of Burj Abul Lif, as also a native vessel which was not worth removing. On the next day boats were sent under Lieutenant Long to demolish, if possible, the fort at Dammám. A party were landed, who had to wade a considerable distance, and attacked the place; but, finding the garrison much stronger than had been represented and being unable to effect an entrance, they retired with a loss of three men killed and two officers and three men wounded. On the 4th of February the attack on Dammám was renewed by Lieutenant Long at high water, and the fort was plied with shot, shell and rockets; but the wall could not be breached, and the place remained in the hands of the enemy. The British ship then returned from Hasa to the lower end of the Gulf, and more successful operations were carried out at Sûr. The failure of the proceedings on the Hasa coast may perhaps be attributed to the want on the "Highflyer," of a European officer possessing local knowledge and experience; for the only political representative with Captain Pasley was the Residency (Native) Agent from Shárjah, whom Colonel Pelly, in his own unavoidable absence, had deputed to accompany the expedition.

Dammám, 1866.

During this period a small trading colony consisting of Hindu subjects of the British Government came into existence at Qatíf; they were engaged chiefly in the importation of general merchandise and in the exportation of boiled dates to India. The first British Indian house established at Qatíf was that of Kalunga, a wealthy merchant of Kach, who commenced business in Hasa about 1864. Two other Hindu firms followed about 1866.

British commercial interests.

Annexation of Hasa by Turkey, 1871.

So far back as 1866 designs of territorial expansion in Eastern Arabia had been betrayed by the attitude of Turkish officials in 'Iráq

Meaning of the Turkish

forward movement.

towards the Shaikh of Kuwait; and in 1871 the forward policy of the Ottoman Government, or of its local representatives, suddenly took shape. The causes which led to this movement are not discoverable in the Persian Gulf itself: they were probably of a general nature, connected with a desire on the part of the Turkish Government to assert their authority over the Arabian continent as a whole.

In the Persian Gulf, where much jealousy of the position acquired by Great Britain had for some time been shown by Turkish officials, the object of the Porte appears to have been nothing less than the extension of their influence over the coast and islands of the Arabian sea-board from Kuwait to Masqat: but, as will be shown, the realisation of their scheme was confined within narrower limits by natural obstacles and by British opposition.

The principal promoter of the movement was Mid-hat Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of 'Irāq at the time; and an opportunity for action was provided by dissensions in the Wahhābi ruling family of Najd. Soon after the death of the Amir Faisal-bin-Turki in 1865, a conflict had broken out between his sons 'Abdullah and Sa'ūd; and the Turks profited by the situation to recognise 'Abdullah, the elder, as Qāim-Muqām of Najd on their behalf, and so to obtain from him an admission of their suzerainty over Central Arabia.

Discussions between the Porte and the British Government.

Some hint of the intentions of the Turkish Government appears to have reached the Government of India at the beginning of 1871, and in February, Colonel Herbert, the British Political Resident at Baghdād, was ordered to enquire into the matter. At first no confirmation of the rumour was forthcoming; but eventually, at the end of March, the Resident reported that a Turkish expedition would shortly be sent by sea from 'Irāq to Qatīf for the purpose of supporting the cause of the Amir 'Abdullah in Central Arabia. The Government of India immediately drew the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the undesirability of the warlike operations contemplated by the Porte, which would involve a breach of the maritime peace and might be destructive of British trade, besides leading to political complications. Colonel Herbert having been further informed at Baghdād that it was intended to establish Ottoman supremacy over "Bahrain, Masqat and the independent tribes of Southern Arabia," a further communication was made by the Indian to the Home Government; and, at the end of April or beginning of May, an assurance was obtained from the Porte at Constantinople that they did not harbour the ambitious designs attributed to them. It was added by the Turks on this occasion that their sole object was to restore tranquillity

in Najd, and that there was no question of disturbing the peace at sea, but only of transporting a force by water to a point on the coast from which it could march into Najd. In May it was ascertained that Mid-hat Pasha, who in 1870 had described Bahrain and its dependencies as "countries of the Ottoman dominions, appertaining to the Qāim-Maqāmliq of Najd," was aware of the pledges given by the Port; and he stated that the commander of the expedition had received explicit instructions that "he should on no account turn his eyes on Bahrain." Meanwhile the Shāh of Persia had enquired of the British representative at Tehrān about the intentions of the Turkish Government in respect of Bahrain, and had been informed of the assurances given at Constantinople. Considerable irritation at the interest shown by Great Britain in the Turkish movements in Arabia was expressed by the Grand Vazir at Constantinople; and it became necessary to disabuse him of an impression, which he appeared to entertain, that resistance by Arabs to lawful authority of the Sultān of Turkey was encouraged by the British Government.

British policy in the Persian Gulf in connection with the Turkish expedition.

The prospect of a disturbance of the peace of the Gulf, so unusual in its nature, placed the Government of India in a difficult position; and the narrowness of the legal or treaty basis on which the established practice of interdicting all armed movements by sea rested now became for the first time fully apparent. The question was one not of hostilities between signatories of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, but of a possible war between signatories and non-signatories, for which that treaty made no provision. The Resident in the Gulf, Colonel Pelly, was soon approached by Arab chiefs with indirect queries whether the British Government would prevent the maritime tribes from proceeding to the assistance of the Wahhabi Sa'ūd, against the Turks; and Sa'ūd made an explicit request in writing that either the Shaikh of Kuwait should be prevented by the British Government from assisting the Turks or he himself should be considered at liberty to take action by sea. On the one hand it was felt by the British authorities that to restrain the Arabs would be to give indirect assistance to the Turkish expedition, on the other that to let them loose might be to upset the political equilibrium of the whole Gulf and at the same time to provide the Porte with an excuse for conquering and annexing their countries. Ultimately, on the 30th of May 1871, the Resident was instructed to visit Bahrain and to assure the Shaikh that, so long as he continued to observe his Convention of 1861 with Britain, the obligations of the British Govern-

ment towards him would be* fulfilled; and on the 5th of June Colonel Pelly was further instructed to interdict the Trucial Shaikhs from maritime operations, whether on the side of or against the Turks, and to use his influence with all other chiefs for the purpose of maintaining the peace at sea. No reply was sent at the time to the Wahhábi Sa'íd. When the crisis arose there was not a single British war vessel in the Gulf; but eventually the "Bullfinch" reached Bahrain on the 3rd of June, the "Magpie" passed Jáshk on the 5th of June, and the "Lynx" arrived at Hanjám on the 16th of July.

The Turkish Government were subsequently informed of the instructions given to the British Resident, and the Grand Vazir expressed his thanks; he added, however, that, if any of the Trucial Shaikhs should voluntarily offer their services to the Porte, the same would be accepted, as the Turkish Government had no cognisance of the arrangements in regard to the maritime peace in the Gulf. To meet this evasion the Turkish Minister was immediately supplied with copies of the engagements between the British Government and the Trucial Shaikhs.

Occupation by the Turks of the Qatíf Oasis.

Precise details regarding the Turkish operations are, for the most part, wanting. The naval portion of the expedition, seen by Colonel Herbert at Basrah at the beginning of May, consisted of the steam corvette "Bronssa," 23 guns; the steamer "Ninone" originally unarmed, in which four guns had been placed; the "Khojah Bey," an old wooden guardship long deemed unseaworthy, 18 guns; and three Basrah-built brigantines, little better than the "Khojah Bey," carrying 12, 6 and 4 guns. Two other steamers were added later; but the bulk of the transport must have been provided by the Shaikh of Kuwait, who was subsequently found to have joined the expedition in person with 300 vessels belonging to his port. Saiyid Muhammad Sa'íd, a son of the Naqíb of Basrah, Mansúr, a Shaikh of the Muntafik, and other influential Arbas from 'Iráq accompanied the troops, apparently as "parlementaires" or political intermediaries. The Turkish force, which consisted of about 4,000 regular troops and 1,500 Arab auxiliaries with nine guns, disembarked at Ras Tanúrah on the 26th of May 1871 and marched by land to Qatíf town, meeting with slight opposition by the way. The Wahhábi Governor of Qatíf having refused to surrender, the town was attacked by land and sea on the 3rd of June and was taken after a three hours bombardment. A column was then sent out which occupied 'Anik after a show of resistance,

* A general assurance of support must have been intended. In the Convention, however, protection by Britain except against "Chiefs and tribes of this Gulf" does not appear to be promised.

capturing there three guns and a quantity of ammunition; it proceeded next to Dammām, which fell on the 5th of June. 'Abdul 'Azīz, a son of the Wahhābi Sa'ūd, escaped from Dammām before it was taken; he left behind him a prisoner, Muhammad-bin-Faisal, whom the Turks released; and nine iron and two brass guns and a quantity of military stores also came into their hands. At the end of June the Kuwait fleet had returned home and the Turkish force was still in the Qatif Oasis; but an advance was contemplated.

Turkish proclamation at Qatif.

On his first reaching Qatif town a manifesto was published by Nāfiz Pāsha, the Turkish Commander, in which it was announced that the expedition had come to restore the authority of 'Abdullah, the Qāim-Maqām of Nājd; that Sa'ūd, the rival of 'Abdullah, and his supporters would be pardoned if they came in and made submission; and that, in the meanwhile, the tribes which remained peaceably in Qatif and Hasa would enjoy Turkish favour and protection.

Advance by the Turks into the Hasa Oasis.

Early in July the Turkish force left Qatif for Hofūf: the march across the intervening desert occupied, though unopposed, 15 days. Thereafter, the Hasa Oasis having been occupied without any fighting, the Arab contingent of Muntafik and others, as also the political intermediaries, were dismissed to their homes; the cause of this appears to have been, in part at least, commissariat difficulties; and the Muntafik, who returned by land *viâ* Kuwait, lost many horses on the way from scarcity of fodder and of water. From the time of disembarkation the Turkish expedition had been a prey to starvation, enteric fever and cholera; the march to Hofūf had further weakened its strength; and it was now brought to a complete standstill in Hasa by hot winds and a violent outbreak of malaria. In August, when the total Turkish force in Hasa was estimated at 3,400 men,—*viz.*, 2,500 at Hofūf, 500 at Qatif, 150 at 'Oqair and 250 on the march,—one third of the whole were reported sick and ineffective; and the Turkish Commander, who had become uneasy in regard to his communications with the coast, enlisted 900 natives of the country as soldiers on pay of $6 a month. A shock was given to Muhammadan sentiment throughout the province by the arrival at Qatif of a ship-load of wine sellers and Baghdād prostitutes; but the trading classes seemed on the whole to prefer the disadvantages of Turkish administration to the greater severities and exactions of the Wahhābis.

Proceedings of the Wahhābis.

At the time when the Turkish force first landed in Hasa, the Wahhābi brothers 'Abdullah and Sa'ūd were fighting with each other in the interior, at a distance of some 200 miles from the coast. The advantage appeared to rest with Sa'ūd, the opponent of the Turks, who had obtained posses-

sion of the capital, Riyâdh. In August 'Abdullah arrived at the Turkish headquarters, having been prevented by the insecurity of the roads from coming in earlier; but in October, seeing that the intention of the Porte was not to re-establish but to supplant his authority, he fled, preceded by his brother Muhammad and accompanied by his son Turki, from Hofûf to Najd. In October no movement took place upon either side. In November Sa'ûd attacked the Turks in Hasa; but he was beaten off and retired with his Bedouins to the deserts in the direction of Qatar, where he remained for a considerable time. Correspondence with a view to a reconciliation and joint action against the Turks then began between Sa'ûd and his brother 'Abdullah, but it had no result.

Visit of Mid-hat Pâsha to Hasa, November-December, 1871.

On the 9th or 10th of November 1871, Mid-hat Pâsha, the Wâli of Baghdâd, anxious to see the fruits of his action with his own eyes, left the Shatt-al-'Arab for Kuwait, where he spent one day, and thence proceeded with three steamers, carrying a considerable number of troops, to Qatîf. He reached that port on the 13th or 14th of the month, and on the 21st embarked again with an escort of 500 men for 'Oqair, from which he made his way to Hofûf. The objects of the Pâsha's visit to Hasa, as stated by the Turkish Commodore in conversation with Colonel Pelly, were to enquire into certain complaints of corruption, to settle the administration of Hasa, and to arrange for the further advance of the Turkish troops to Riyâdh; but the garrison of Hasa was found in so miserable a plight, able only to act on the defensive, that the last of these ideas was necessarily abandoned. Mid-hat Pâsha contented himself, accordingly, with proclaiming the deposition of the Wahhâbi rulers of the Âl Sa'ûd family and the appointment in their place of Nâfiz Pâsha as Mutasarrif of Najd; but he had not relinquished his unexecuted schemes. On his way back to Baghdâd, where he arrived on the 28th of December, the Wâli purchased the "Snipe," a steamer formerly British, to maintain communication between Fasrah and Qatîf. Mid-hat Pâsha had brought a large number of invalid soldiers back with him to Baghdâd, and on the 1st of January 1872 he despatched a fresh draft of 300 men from there to Hasa.

Bearings of the Turkish expedition on Qtar and Bahrain affairs.

The assurances given by the Turkish Government that no aggression would be committed upon Bahrain, or upon independent Arab tribes, were not very rigidly construed by the agents of their policy. About June 1871 Mid-hat Pâsha denied, in a communication to Colonel Herbert, the possibility of the existence of independent tribes in Najd; and the comprehensiveness of the name "Najd" in his estimation was indicated by a list, published in the Baghdâd official journal, which included among

the "houses and gardens" of Najdthe towns of Sharjh Dibai and Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān. As related in the history of Qatar, the Turkish flag was hoisted at Dōhah on the coast of that promontory in July 1871 and a Turkish garrison established there in January 1872; and it seems not improbable that, but for the attitude of the British Government and the constant presence of their war vessels, some similar measures would have been attempted in Bahrain, where, as described in another place, more than one endeavour was made by the Turks to intimidate the Shaikh. From an early stage of the proceedings the Bahrain exile Nāsir-bin-Mubārak was found to be present with the Ottoman forces; and a disposition to intrigue with the Turks was at one time shown by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān, but after a visit which he paid to the Sultān of O'mān in 1872 his attitude was found to have changed. Early in 1872 the Turkish Government gave fresh assurances that their action would be confined to vindicating their authority in districts to which their title was undisputed, and they referred to the recent recall of Mid-hat Pāsha from Baghdād as a proof that they did not mean unduly to extend the field of operations.

Military occupation of Hasa by the Turks, 1872-74.

Negotiations with the Wahhābis.

In the spring of 1872 negotiations with Sa'ūd were opened by Raūf Pāsha, the new Wāli of Turkish 'Irāq; and Sa'ūd's brother 'Abdur Rahmān with a certain Fahad-bin-Sanaitān, arrived in Hasa to treat with the Turks. 'Abdur Rahmān was induced to visit Baghdād, where he was detained under surveillance until August 1874; and not long afterwards Fahad-bin-Sanaitān was accused of intrigue by Muhammad Pāsha, who had meanwhile succeeded Nāfiz Pāsha as Mutasarrif, and was sent in irons from Hasa to Baghdād. Muhammad Pāsha was followed in the Mutasarrifate by Faiz Pāsha; and in 1873, while the garrison were relieved and efforts were made to establish regular steam communication between Basrah and Qatif, the scheme of advancing to Riyādh seemed to have been abandoned.

Internal affairs.

Meanwhile the inhabitants of Hasa began to tire of Ottoman rule and to complain loudly of oppression by the Turkish officials and soldiery; and it was reported that the Government had no well-wishers left among the local Arabs. The Turkish troops continued to be decimated by disease

British relations.

In 1873-1874 a marine survey of the Hasa coast was carried out by the British schooner "Constance" under special arrangements with the Porte and with the Turkish authorities in 'Irāq.

Government of Hasa by the Turks through a Shaikh of the Bani Khālid, 1874.

Installation of Barrak-bin-'Arair, March 1874.

In March 1874 the Turks, finding the Hasa province a serious drain upon their military and financial resources, made a short-lived experiment in economical administration: it consisted in a sweeping reduction of the garrison and in the substitution of *Barrāk-bin-'Arair, head of the once dominant Bani Khālid tribe, as Mutasarrif in place of a Turkish official. The new Governor was installed by Nāsir Pāsha, Shaikh of the Muntafik, who arrived at Rās Tanūrah with the steamers "Athaur," "Ālūs," "Lebanon" and "Sinope"; he brought with him Ahmad Pāsha, who had been appointed to command the remaining troops, and a supply of grain for the Turkish posts. A large assembly was held in Hasa, in which the appointment of Barrāk was announced; and Nāsir Pāsha then returned to Basrah with the bulk of the troops and a number of prisoners, the latter being persons who had sent in memorials against the exaltation of Barrāk. The tribal Mutasarrif was provided with a corps of Dhāhtiyahs or military police, by means of which, and of the tribes well affected to himself, it was hoped that he would be able to maintain his authority.

Rebellion, and overthrow of Barrāk.

These arrangements lasted for some months; and at first, but for frequent complaints of the exactions of the Mutasarrif and for various symptoms of the unpopularity of Turkish rule, affairs seemed to progress smoothly enough. Early in the autumn of 1874, however, the Wahhābi 'Abdur Rahmān, having been permitted to leave Baghdād, proceeded to Bahrain and thence opened a secret correspondence with some of the tribes on the mainland.† A few weeks later he landed at 'Oqair; thousands flocked to his standard; and Shaikh Barrāk shortly found himself invested in the fort of Hofūf. The Turks, with unusual promptitude, despatched a force of 2,400 infantry and 4 guns under Nāsir Pāsha, who was responsible for the arrangement made with

* The name also occurs as "Bazib," "Barab," etc., but Barrak appears to be the correct form.

† A protest made by the Turkish Government in regard to 'Abdur Rahman's proceedings in Bahrain is noticed in the history of that principality.

Barrāk, by sea to the scene of the revolt; and "the work of retribution was quick, decisive and terrible." 'Abdur Rahmān fled; his force dispersed in all directions; and the Hasa Oasis was given up during several days to the excesses of the Turkish soldiery. Order being restored, Nāsir Pāsha in February 1875 returned to 'Irāq, leaving his son, Mazaiyid Pāsha, in charge of the province *vice* Barrāk deposed; and about the same time Hasa and the other districts depending on Basrah were separated from Baghdād and formed into a separate Basrah Wilāyat under Nāsir Pāsha,—an arrangement which continued until 1880.

Subsequent events in Hasa, 1875-77.

Miscellaneous affairs, 1875-78.

During the next three years few reports, except such as related to the occasional relief of Turkish troops, were received of affairs in Hasa. In 1876 Mazaiyid Pāsha was succeeded as Governor by one Sa'id Bey. In 1877 abortive negotiations took place between the Turks and 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, Wahhābi, with a view to the appointment of the latter as Turkish Mutasarrif of Hasa.

Serious outbreak of piracy upon the Hasa Coast, 1878-80.

In 1878, in consequence of an alarming outbreak of piracy with which the Turks showed themselves unable to deal, Hasa became for a time the chief centre of interest in the Persian Gulf; the Bahrain Islands and the promontory of Qatar were affected by the rapidly spreading disorder; and large questions of British policy and of the position and responsibilities of the Turkish Government in Eastern Arabia arose and were discussed. The piratical trouble appears to have been closely connected, in its origin, with a rebellion in Qatīf.

Piracies from August to November 1878.

In order to enable the seriousness of the situation to be appreciated, it is necessary first to give a brief account of the depredations committed by the pirates; and in doing so it will be advisable to include some crimes belonging properly to the Qatar district which cannot be conveniently treated of elsewhere.

A gang of Bani Hājir, having crossed the Gulf, seized and plundered some Persian vessels near Shaikh Shu'aib Island, wounding two men; then, attacking a boat of unknown nationality, they murdered the Nākhuda,

carried off Rs. 10,000 in cash, and returned to Qatar. Another gang, consisting partly of Bani Hājir and partly of Āl Morrah, seized a Shū'ai belonging to 'Amāir of Qatif; put to sea in the same and captured a Qatif Baqārah, which they carried to Dammām; took and plundered a Qatif Māshuwah; proceeded in the Qatif Baqārah to the Qatar coast, where a Baqārah of Dōhah fell a prey to them off Rās Laffān; and finally carried their plunder to Dōhat-as-Salwa and there released the prize in which their cruises had been made. A party of Bani Hājir Bedouins under Zāid-bin-Muhammad, one of the Bani Hājir of Dhahrān, having embarked at Dōhah as passengers in a Rās-al-Khaimah vessel, compelled the master to put ashore at a place on the coast of Qatar; re-inforced there by 17 other Bedouins they sailed for the Persian coast; between the islands of Qais and Hindarābi they captured a Māshuwah, owned upon the Persian side, wounding the Nākhuda and his son; they then returned to Rās Laffān on the coast of Qatar, where they transferred four of their victims to the Rās-al-Khaimah boat and let it go, but two of the Māshuwah's crew they retained as prisoners. A Bahrain Māshuwah, on her way from Qatif to Bahrain, was attacked and plundered by Bani Hājir near Dammām, and two slaves on board of her were carried off. Another Bahrain Māshuwah met with similar treatment in the same neighbourhood at the hands, it was supposed, of the same gang. On the 4th of September a Qatar Māshuwah bound for 'Oqair was attacked, while passing Zubārah, by the people of that place in two Būgarahs; three passengers were killed on the spot, six were wounded of whom one died, a girl was kidnapped, and property worth $700 was taken; the attack was led by Muhammad-bin-Rāshid, son of the headman of Zubārah, whose father, looking on from the top of his fort, found nothing to censure in his proceedings except that the lives of any of the victims should have been spared. At Dārin on Tārūt Island a boat belonging to a Baghlah owned by Ibrāhim-bin-Yūsuf, a naturalised British subject, was seized by a gang of 25 Bani Hājir under the aforesaid Zāid-bin-Muhammad, who carried it off to Dammām; the crew were then released except a boy and a slave; these the pirates kept. A Būm, anchored in the inner harbour at Qatif town, was seized by Bedouins, probably 'Amair, and was carried off along with her cargo of dates, the Nākhuda and two sailors being at the same time kidnapped; she was afterwards seen prowling in a piratical fashion off the Bahrain islands. A Dangi, while lying in the inner harbour of Qatif, was surrounded by four boats of the Amāir and plundered of $200, a large sail and her small boat. A boat from a Ghunchah belonging to Rās-al-Khaimah was attacked on shore by six or seven 'Amair under the very walls of the Qatif fort, and

property worth more than $360 was plundered; the robbers fired after their victims, as they attempted to escape by swimming, and wounded the Nākhuda; the boat was taken to 'Anik. A Māshuwah, carrying passengers for Bahrain, was seized at the town of Qatif by a gang of 'Amāir and carried off. On the 27th of September a Bahrain Baqārah, arriving near Qatif town, was attacked by a Būm and a Māshuwah, containing respectively 13 and 16 Bani Hājir, and was robbed of her sails, small boat and gear; the personal effects of the crew were taken and a slave kidnapped by the pirates, who landed with their spoil at Dammām.

All the above cases, which are probably not given in their strict chronological order, appear to have occurred during the months of September and October 1878.

Piracies from December 1878 to July 1879.

At the end of December 1878 Mansūr-bir-Manākhir, a Shaikh of the 'Ajmān, and Zāid-bin-Muhammad, already mentioned, having seized by force a boat belonging to Bahrain, put to sea and plundered two vessels near Qatif town, from one of which they carried off property worth Rs. 20,000; ten vessels carrying Turkish troops from Qatif to 'Oqair were in sight at the time, but disregarded the appeals of the victims for assistance. Early in 1879 a new gang of Bani Hājir, encouraged by the successes of Zāid-bin-Muhammad, started under another leader and took two Bahrain vessels laden with dates; after despatching their booty to the interior they sailed again in quest of fresh plunder. On the 11th of February a daring raid was committed in Bahrain by a band of 30 Bani Hājir from Dhahrān, who landed at 'Aqūriyah and killed a Bahrain subject. A whole series of piracies ensued, committed by Zāid-bin-Muhammad of Dhahrān and his Bani Hājir followers with the assistance of some of the 'Ajmān; it culminated, in July 1879, in an attack upon a Bahrain pearl vessel, in which one of the crew was killed and three were wounded, while the vessel herself with property worth 2,000 Qrāns and two slaves, was carried off but ultimately recovered.

In June 1879 the pecuniary loss caused by these offences was estimated to have reached 67,000 Qrāns, in the recovery of 8,834 Qrāns out of which the British Government, through its subjects, was interested. In one case two native vessels bound for Kārachi, the "Harsingar" and the "Futtehkar," had been fired into and plundered by pirates at a distance of only two miles from Qatif town.

In June and July of 1880 fresh piracies by Zāid-bin-Muhammad and his associates were reported.

Local action by Turkish and British Governments.

The Turkish administration would gladly have ignored these atrocities, though committed invariably by their nominal subjects and to a large extent in Turkish territorial waters; but the British Government, by

whom peace in Hasa waters had formerly been maintained, could not acquiesce in a policy of inaction.

1878. In October 1878, in connection with the serious crime then recently committed off Zuhārah, Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, was instructed to ask the Turkish Wāli of Basrah that the offending township should be punished, and to make an offer of British naval assistance. About the same time H.M.S. "Vulture," Commander Pringle, succeeded in capturing fifteen piratical vessels of the 'Amāir off Qatif and three vessels and four boats belonging to the Bani Hājir, two of which were prizes from Bahrain, in the waters to the south of Qatif. All these craft were handed over to the Turkish Governor of Qatif on a receipt; and the important services rendered by the ship were subsequently acknowledged both by the Government of India and by the Foreign Office in London. In a friendly interview with Colonel Ross at Basrah in the month of October, 'Abdullah Pasha, the Turkish Wāli, declined the help of British ships, but promised to punish Zuhārah if the guilt of the place were established to his own satisfaction; in the meanwhile, however, Zuhārah ceased to exist, having been destroyed by tribal enemies as described in the history of Qatar.

1879. In January 1879, the disorders still continuing, a Turkish force marched by land against the small coast settlement of Qal'āt-al-Husain in Dhahrān; but it did not succeed in capturing any of the pirates or in recovering any of the stolen property; and meanwhile two Turkish vessels of war, the "Broussa" and the "Iskanderia," which had been sent to the coast of Hasa by the Turkish Ministry of Marine, had both broken down. In February, chiefly for the protection of Bahrain, H.M.S. "Spartan" was stationed off the coast of Qatif, and the Assistant Political Resident, Captain Durand, was posted temporarily in Bahrain; and by April two Bahrain vessels carried off by pirates had been recovered by H.M.S. "Vulture," and matters had to some extent quieted down. In July, in consequence of the renewed piracies of Zāid-bin-Muhammad, representations were made to the Porte and to the Turkish Governor of Basrah, but without satisfactory, or indeed any, result. In November Zāhit Pāsha, the successor of 'Abdullah Pāsha at Basrah, was urged to take action for the suppression of piracy in Hasa; but he showed no disposition to comply. In December the Shaikhs of Qatar were warned by letters from the British Resident in the Gulf, delivered through the Senior Naval Officer, to avoid becoming implicated in the crimes of Bani Hājir.

1880. In April 1880 Zāhit Pasha was addressed regarding the pirate Zāid-bin-Muhammad and replied that he had not yet been able to effect his capture

Finally in March 1881, worn out by the importunity of the British authorities, by whom further complaints had been raised in consequence of fresh misdeeds by Zāid in the months of June and July preceding, the Wāli of Baghdād informed the British representative there that "no piracy or plunder of vessels had been committed by Zāid-bin-Muhammad" and "that perfect tranquillity and security prevailed on the Qatar coast by land and sea." 1881.

In short, though Hasa had become in name a Turkish province, maritime security along the coast—so far as it existed at all—was maintained by the action, now legally unjustifiable, of the British Government.

Discussion as to Turkish jurisdiction and responsibility on the coast of Hasa, and orders as to British action in future upon the same, 1878-81.

A very difficult problem had thus arisen through the substitution of nominal Turkish jurisdiction for virtual British jurisdiction upon the coast of Hasa, and through the uncertainty which prevailed as to the extent of littoral over which Turkish rights were claimed, or should be admitted to exist. On the one hand it was desired to avoid giving offence to Turkey: on the other it was abundantly clear that any concession to the Porte would result in a proportional increase of piracy.

View of the Government of India.

The Government of India, who began to consider the question in 1878 and whose opinions were expressed in May 1879, deprecated the recognition of Turkish authority anywhere to the southward of 'Oqair, except at the town of Dōhah in Qatār only, where a Turkish garrison was maintained. They considered that the Shaikhdoms of Trucial 'Omān should be expressly placed beyond the sphere of Turkish influence not only in regard to the coast but also in regard to the interior; and that stipulations should be made in respect of Bahrain implying British protection of that principality and enabling the Shaikh, though otherwise debarred from interference on the mainland, to pursue aggressors upon his islands into Turkish jurisdiction. To mark and secure, from an international point of view, the political position of the Arab Shaikhs in question, it was suggested that arrangements should be made for the payment by them in future of a small tribute to the British power in return for its protection. With reference to the prevention of piracy it was proposed

that pirates should continue to be pursued by British vessels into Turkish waters, and even upon the Turkish coast within the range of naval fire, but that otherwise operations upon the mainland should devolve upon the Turkish authorities; that pirates captured by British ships under these conditions should be dealt with by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf; and that the Turkish administration should be held responsible for obtaining redress in the case of all piracies committed from Turkish jurisdiction.

Opinion of Her Majesty's Government.

The India Office were at first disposed to concur in the recommendations of the Government of India; but the Foreign Office considered that the acceptance of the scheme by the Porte, involving, as it did, the abandonment of considerable territorial pretensions on the part of Turkey and the admission of foreign interference in waters admittedly Turkish, was not to be expected. The establishment of a declared protectorate over the Arab principalities concerned was likely, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, to give rise to inconveniences even more serious than those which it was sought to avoid. The Foreign Office inclined to the view that British naval interference in Turkish waters should only be exercised in special circumstances, when the consent of the local Turkish authorities had been obtained.

Action by British vessels on the Hasa coast suspended May 1879.

Meanwhile the question of the employment of British ships of war against pirates in Turkish waters or on the Turkish coast, authorised by the Government of India in March 1879, had been referred by the Naval Commander-in-Chief in India to the Admiralty, and by the Admiralty to the Foreign Office. In May 1879 a suspension of the operations in question was directed; and later, as the Law Officers of the Crown held them to be internationally unjustifiable even in the peculiar circumstances of the Hasa coast, they were prohibited.

Negotiations with Turkey.

As time went on, however, and insecurity in the Gulf showed no signs of abating, it became necessary to insist on attention being paid to representations, from time to time addressed by the British Government to the Porte, which had hitherto been met by evasion and delay. Sir H. Layard, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was accordingly instructed to suggest an arrangement by which the Turkish Government should permit action, when indispensable for the suppression of piracy, by British vessels within the three-mile limit to the north of 'Odaid; and it was intended that certain stipulations for Turkish co-operation when available, for the transfer of prizes to the Turkish authorities, and generally for the maintenance of the dignity of Turkey in her own waters should form part of the understanding. Negotiations on this basis continued at

Constantinople during a part of the year 1880, but were altogether fruitless.

Final orders in regard to British naval action.

All efforts to arrange the matter by conciliatory action having thus failed, it was ultimately decided by Her Majesty's Government, in 1881, that British Naval Officers on the East India Station should not be hampered by the three-mile limit in pursuing piratical craft in Turkish waters; and subsequently it was explained by the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India that the intention of this order was somewhat wider than it appeared to be; for it meant, in fact, that "the "commanders of British cruisers in the Gulf should have liberty to act as "might be necessary to prevent or punish disturbance of the peace of the "seas, avoiding, however, the raising of needless questions with the "Turkish authorities, where they exist, or unnecessary encroachment upon "the jurisdiction of the Sultán, wherever it may really be effectively "established along the coast north of 'Odaid." No decision as to the proper limits of Turkish jurisdiction on the coast of Eastern Arabia resulted from the correspondence and negotiations described above; indeed care was taken to avoid raising the question with Turkey, whose claims were understood to be excessive, comprising Bahrain and all 'Omán; and, apart from a resolution not in any circumstances to recognise Turkish sovereignty over Bahrain or over countries to the east of Khor-al-'Odaid, Her Majesty's Government themselves abstained from forming any conclusion

Turkish Governors of Hasa, 1878-1907.

The narrative of internal affairs in Hasa, from the year 1878, may now be resumed. We shall first mention the names of the governors by whom the province was successively ruled, and then notice the events of the period, on which their personalities do not appear to have exercised much influence.

Mutasarrifs of Hasa, 1876-77.

Sa'íd Bey, appointed in 1876, remained in power until the next year, when he was recalled, not before he had earned for himself a good reputation as an administrator.

1877-79.

Sa'íd Pásha, his successor, was a native of Baghdád, of non-Turkish birth, and a man of some intelligence and activity; during this, his first term of office, he gained the esteem and good-will of the people of Hasa and maintained an efficient administration. His removal, in 1879,

resulted from the disgrace and dismissal of his patron, 'Abdullah Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, by whom he had been nominated.

1879-80. In December 1879, Sa'id Bey was re-appointed to the Mutasarrifate and sustained his previous good reputation until his final departure in

1880-81. 1880. In 1880 Hasa, with the other districts depending on Basrah, was again incorporated in the Wilāyat of Baghdād.

Sa'id Bey was relieved by 'Abdul Ghani Pāsha, sent from Constantinople, who was described as a religious fanatic of weak intellect. A revolt of the 'Ajmān tribe in 1880 led to the suspension and confinement of this governor by the military officer commanding the troops; and, though a commission which was sent to enquire into the case reported in his favour, 'Abdul Ghani Pāsha was removed in the following year.

1881-85. Sa'id Pāsha was then appointed Mutasarrif for the second time, and discharged the duties of his office with ability and in a conciliatory spirit from 1881 until 1885. In 1884 the Basrah districts, including Hasa, were finally separated from Baghdad and constituted into a separate Wilāyat.

1885-86. Nazīh Pāsha relieved Sa'id Pāsha in November 1885, but his term of office was short, terminating early in 1886.

1886-87. His successor, Muhammad Sālih Pāsha, remained in power from March 1886 till some time in 1887.

1887-90. From 1887 to January 1890 Hasa was governed by Rifa'at Bey, during whose term of office a visit was paid to Qatif and Qatar by Nāfiz Pasha, Wāli of Basrah. His removal was attributed, by one account, to friction between himself and the military authorities in Hasa; but it may have been due merely to a change of Wāli at Basrah, where Nāfiz Pāsha about the same time made way for Hidāyat Pāsha. Rifa'at Bey appears to have been an energetic administrator.

1890-91. The post of Mutasarrif was held from 1890 to 1891 by 'Akif Bey, a military officer with a large programme of political reform and aggrandisement, the greater part of which he was unable to execute. He left, on account of ill-health, early in 1891, and was said to have died on the way home.

1891-94. In May 1891 Sa'id Pāsha assumed the governorship of Hasa for the third time; he remained until April 1894, when he resigned. During his Mutasarrifate the Wāli of Basrah made a tour in Hasa, which lasted from October 1892 till May 1893 and is described further on; and some effort was apparently made to improve the administration, the Qāim-Maqām of Qatif being removed in July 1893 and replaced, in January 1894, by one Raūf Effendi.

The next Governor was Ibrāhim Pāsha, formerly in charge of Hodaidah, who held office until 1896. 1894-96.

Sa'id Pāsha was then appointed to Hasa for the fourth time; he was recalled for the last time in 1900. In conversation with the British Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, on his final return to 'Irāq in January 1901, Sa'id Pāsha attributed his removal to the machinations of the military commandant in Hasa, whom he described as "an ignorant Turk." It seemed that his later policy in Hasa had been to supersede the regular Turkish garrison, in part, by a locally raised force; and that the commandant, annoyed by his aspersions on the troops, had succeeded in convincing the superior authorities that the pro-native policy pursued by Sa'id Pāsha had been responsible for the introduction of modern rifles into the country in quantities which endangered the safety of the Turkish army of occupation. Sa'id Pāsha died in retirement at Baghdād in 1905. 1896-1900.

The military Commandant who had traduced Sa'id Pāsha succeeded him as Mutasarrif; but his rival's depreciatory estimate of his character was evidently not erroneous, for he only retained his position until September 1901, when he was dismissed on account of the universal discontent excited by his high-handed proceedings.

Another military officer, named Taufiq Bey, then acted as Mutasarrif. 1900-01.

A civil Mutasarrif was again appointed in 1902, in the person of Saiyid Tālib Pāsha, son of the Naqīb of Basrah, who arrived in June of that year. He showed considerable energy in dealing with tribal disorders; but his illegal exactions were boundless, and culminated, early in 1903, in his plundering the house of Hāji Mansūr Pāsha, one of the Bahārinah of Qatif, manager of the Dāirat-as-Saniyah properties in Hasa and probably the richest merchant in the whole province, whom he charged with disloyalty to the Turkish Government, and whose brother, Ahmad-bin-Juma, he imprisoned. The spoil of Hāji Mansūr's house filled three sailing vessels, of which the departure was reported by the British representative in Bahrain, while their arrival at the Naqīb's residence at Sabiliyāt on the Shatt-al-'Arab came in due course to the notice of the British Consul at Basrah. Tālib Pāsha was temporarily recalled in October 1903, when Fāiq Pāsha, the military Commandant, was nominated to act as Mutasarrif during his absence; but he was not finally removed from his appointment until February 1905. His treatment of Hāji Mansūr appears to have been the cause of his dismissal. * 1902-05

* Tālib Pasha appears to have been the author of a long [minute, pan-Islamic in tendency, on Turkish policy in Arabia, of which a copy was obtained by the British Embassy at Constantinople.

1905-07. The next Governor was Najîb Pâsha, under whom troublesome bickering continued between Hâji Mansûr and the customs farmers of the province: the cause of the latter, who had been under the protection of Tâlib Pâsha, was now supported by the military authorities generally and by a number of the civil officials. Najîb Pâsha was still in power at the beginning of 1907.

Fiscal and general administration of Hasa, 1877-1907. From the first the government of Hasa by the Turks has been carried on at a financial loss; and many of the political difficulties with which local Governments have had to contend may be traced to the efforts of successive Mutasarrifs, doubtless under orders from Constantinople, to develop the local revenue and make it balance the expenditure.

1882. At the beginning of 1882, probably under 'Abdul Ghani Pâsha, harbour dues began to be collected at Dârin from vessels entering or leaving the port of Qatif; and vigorous efforts were made to collect arrears of agricultural revenue, fixed at Rs. 1,70,000, from the villages of the Qatif Oasis. The latter demand, in some cases at least, referred to plantations once owned by the Wahhâbi Amirs which had escheated to the Turkish Government and had greatly deteriorated through inattention. In one case troops with a gun were marched out to coerce a refractory village, but it was found deserted.

1887-88. In 1887, under Rifa'at Bey, a spasmodic attempt was made to create an ocean port at Dârin, for the purpose of capturing the Hasa and Central Arabian trade of Bahrain; but the experiment was a failure and was discontinued in the following year.

1891. In 1891 great discontent was reported to prevail at Qatif on account of "new laws" regarding land tenures, succession, and probate duty. The cause of these troubles may have been the institution in Hasa of a branch of the Department of Land Records; for the Tâpu, established in 'Irâq in 1889, would naturally be extended to Hasa soon afterwards.

1894-95. Throughout 1894 a struggle was maintained at Qatif between the merchants and the Turkish collectors of revenue; it related to the enhancement of a tax upon dates for export; and it was accompanied by a demand for arrears on account of two previous seasons. Notwithstanding deputations to Basrah and emigration to Bahrain, the authorities appear in the end to have carried their point. These events occurred under Ibrâhîm Pâsha, who also attempted to recover increased tribute from the 'Ajmân, Âl Morrah, and other nomads; but the main result, as will be seen further on, was the dragging of the Mutasarrif into a quarrel between two Bedouin tribes.

1900. About the end of 1900 the Governor of Hasa was directed to levy an extraordinary contribution of 12,000 Liraḥs on the province for the benefit of the Imperial Turkish Treasury. This demand accentuated general dissatisfaction that already existed among the wealthier inhabitants of Hasa, by whom it had to be met.

1901. In 1901 it was stated in Baḥrain by the retiring Mutasarrif of Hasa that the annual revenue of the province was 60,000 Liraḥs, of which 54,000 was swallowed up by army expenditure, leaving a deficit after civil charges had been met.

1903. An enumeration of the date palms in the Qatif Oasis, made in 1903, was said to have resulted in an immense increase in the registered number of taxable trees.

1905-06. The customs of the province for the year 1905-06 were leased for an amount greater by 37½ per cent. than in the preceding year; and in 1906-07 the amount of the farm was higher, by 12½ per cent., than in 1905-06. In the autumn of 1905 and spring of 1906 a census of the population was attempted in the Qatif and Hasa Oases, apparently with a view to the imposition of a poll tax; but serious riots resulted at Hofûf and Mubarraz, and the proceedings were stopped.

Political administration and tribal disturbances, 1878-1907.

The political condition of Hasa, outside the two principal cases, was during this period one of chronic insecurity: in this respect no progress appears to have taken place during the last thirty years, but rather the reverse.

Rebellion, 1878. In the summer of 1878 a rising against Turkish authority, headed by Muḥammad and 'Abdur Raḥmân, sons of the late Wahhâbi ruler Sa'ûd, took place in the Qatif Oasis; Dammâm passed temporarily into the hands of the Wahhâbis; and the town of Qatif was closely invested for a time by hordes of Bedouins. These were dispersed in the first instance by the accidental appearance of H.M.S. "Vulture," and afterwards large Turkish reinforcements arrived from 'Irâq. In December the sons of Sa'ûd, unable to make head against the Turks, took refuge in Baḥrain; but they were not allowed to remain there. Many of the people of Qatif had also sought an asylum in Baḥrain during the investment of their own by the Bedouins.

1879. In 1879, in consequence of raids committed by some of the Bani Khâlid about Qatif, Sa'id Pasha with the gunboat "Iskanderia" visited and destroyed one of their forts, apparently that of Qasr Âl Subaih upon the coast to the northwards, after which the guilty section submitted and gave hostages for their future good behaviour. The Mutasarrif was unable, however, to make any impression on the marauding Bani Hâjir; and a respectable merchant of Hasa was at this time waylaid and murdered by Zaid-bin-Muhammad, the well-known pirate belonging to that tribe.

1880-81. In 1880 the 'Ajmân tribe attacked the Hasa Oasis, expecting to take the Turkish garrison at a disadvantage; but the Commandant, who had been apprised of their intentions, gave them a warm reception, killing 60 of the 'Ajmân and capturing two of their Shaikhs The civil Mutasarrif, 'Abdul Ghanî Pâsha, seems to have been locally considered accountable for this incident; and, as already mentioned, the military authorities in Hasa even proceeded so far as to place him under arrest on some charge arising from the affair. On his return to the province in 1881, Sa'îd Pasha tried to induce the chiefs of the 'Ajmân to return to Hasa, whence they had fled; but for some time they refused to be cajoled.

1882-92. During several years after this, the province enjoyed peace; but about 1890 disturbances again became rife; and at length, in 1890 or 1891, a large date caravan was plundered by Bedouins of the Âl Morrah, Bani Hâjir, and other tribes. This necessitated a temporary withdrawal of the tribal subsidies paid by the Turkish Government; and several camelmen were executed in connection with the raid. 'Âkif Bey, the Mutasarrif at the time, seems to have advocated the formation of a camel corps to deal with the Bedouins and to escort caravans between Hofûf and 'Oqair; and he also proposed the establishment of a number of posts, some of which were sanctioned.

1892-93. Possibly in consequence of these arrangements, travellers by the Hofûf-'Oqair road passed unmolested during the rest of 1891 and part of 1892; but on the 14th of May 1892 a very serious outrage was committed by 300 Bedouins of the Manâsîr, Bani Hâjir and Âl Morrah tribes, who attacked a caravan proceeding under an escort of 25 Turkish soldiers from Hofûf to 'Oqair, killed 15 and wounded 10 persons, carried off cash and goods to the value of Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 20,000 respectively, and plundered 40 pilgrims who were marching with the caravan. Numerous robberies, attributed to the Bani Hâjir and Âl Morrah, began to occur in the vicinity of Hofûf; and the townspeople no longer dared

to make journeys, unless in armed parties of 20 or more and protected by the presence of tribal Rafiqs. About the middle of October 1892 the Wāli of Basrah arrived at Qatīf, evidently to enquire into the state of affairs in Hasa, and proceeded *viâ* 'Oqair to Hofūf. At Hofūf his first act was to take security from the chief people of the town and neighbourhood that they would have no dealings with the marauding tribes, whereupon the latter retired into the desert. In February 1893, when the Wāli made an excursion to Qatar, Arabs were engaged to protect caravans travelling by the Hofūf-'Oqair road; and the regular troops were employed in raiding the Bedouins, not altogether without success. About the same time the help of the Shaikh of Kuwait appears to have been invited, for in March Shaikh Mubārak of that place arrived in Hasa by land with a number of mounted men. In May 1893 the Wāli, after witnessing with his own eyes a serious Turkish disaster in Qatar, returned to Basrah by way of Qatif; he had failed to restore security; and the Hofūf-'Oqair road was still considered unsafe. In June 1893 a grand attack by the Manāsīr, Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah upon the Bani Khalid was expected, and caravans for 'Oqair were again provided with military guards; but the raid did not take place.

In February 1894 a caravan on the way from Hofūf to Qatif was attacked and plundered by Bedouins of the Dawāsir tribe; but the robbers, on finding that it was under the protection of a Dōsiri Rafiq, made restitution. In 1895, the Mutasarrif having required the Bedouin tribes of Hasa to render an increased tribute, the 'Ajmān pleaded their inability to pay until property raided from them by the Mutair should have been recovered, whereupon the Governor, with the assistance of the 'Ajmān and other tribes, attacked the Mutair and captured some of their animals. 1894-95.

In April a post-runner was waylaid and robbed between Qatif and Hofūf by some Āl Morrah, and pursuit of the raiders was undertaken by mounted troops from Hofūf. Meanwhile, however, the Āl Morrah gang were attacked by Dawāsir, and the troops, coming up, saw and fell upon these last, with the result that two Turkish soldiers were killed and two wounded and that the Dawāsir took three of the cavalry horses. 1896.

In 1901 the road from Hofūf to 'Oqair again became very unsafe; and on the 30th of April 1902 a large caravan, while moving down to the coast under an escort of 120 regular cavalry, 30 regular infantry and 80 mounted Dhābitīyahs, was attacked and captured at Qōfdīyah, about 15 miles from 'Oqair, by Āl Morrah and Bani Hājir; among the Āl Morrah the Āl Bahaih section were prominent in this affair. The 1901-02.

escort were for the most part, either killed or taken prisoners and kept by the Bedouins as hostages for the safety of fellow-tribesmen then in jail at Hofûf. The booty of the robbers consisted of goods worth about Rs. 1,00,000 in addition to some 600 camels and 300 donkeys. In June 1902 Tâlib Pasha arrived as Mutasarrif of Hasa, and in July the Turkish garrison of the province was increased by 500 infantry, 200 cavalry and 4 light guns. On the 19th of September a column, sent out from Hofûf, succeeded in surprising a large camp of Âl Morrah at Zarnûqah, about 40 miles south of the Hasa Oasis; many Arabs were killed, including a brother of one of the Shaikhs of the Âl Bahaih, and much Bedouin property fell into the hands of the Turks. The new Mutasarrif further interdicted the people of Hasa from trading with the Âl Morrah; and in October, after a skirmish with an Âl Morrah escort, a caravan of 80 camels, laden with rice and dates for the tribe, was captured by the Turks; on this occasion there were several casualties on the Turkish side. Probably with a view to strengthening their hold upon the Arab tribes, as also to asserting their sovereignty over the coast to the northward, the Turks, in 1902, established Dhabîtîyah posts upon the islands of Musallamiyah and Jinnah.

At the beginning of 1905 the internal position must still have been unsatisfactory, for, in January of that year, another battalion was added to the Hasa garrison.

1906-07. In January 1906 a serious fracas occurred at Ruqaiqah, a great Bedouin camping ground one mile to the south of Hofûf, between the 'Ajmân and Âl Morrah tribes; but the Turks intervened and stopped the fighting. A day or two later Muhammad-bin-Sharaim, the chief Shaikh of the Âl Morrah, was murdered, and the tribe seem to have considered the Turks in some way responsible for the event; the result was that, on the 3rd of March following, a large caravan on the Hofûf-'Oqair road was ambuscaded by Âl Morrah, Banî Hâjir and Manâsir at Barsiman, a place only five miles from Qofdîyah, where a similar disaster had taken place in 1902. On the present occasion the Turkish escort of 45 men and a number of camelmen and travellers were killed, and property to the value of Rs. 3,00,000 was carried off. No retributory measures were undertaken by the Turks: and in April, August and September other caravans were surprised and looted by Bedouins on various roads leading to or from the Hasa Oasis. In August a collision occurred between the inhabitants of Mubarraz and an encampment of the 'Ajmân, in which several lives were lost; and in October a more serious conflict took place between the townspeople of Hofûf, aided by the Turks, and

Bedouins of more than one tribe: in this last affair the troops suffered about 20 casualties and temporarily lost a gun.* At the end of December military reliefs from Basrah began to reach Hasa, and advantage was taken of the temporary increase of the garrison to overawe, and to some extent pacify, the Hasa Oasis and surrounding districts; the withdrawal of the relieved troops, who appeared somewhat shaken by the experiences which they had undergone on their service in Hasa, then commenced. In February 1907 Sa'adûn Pâsha, the chief man of Mubarraz, and his son left in haste for Basrah to assure the Turkish authorities there of their innocence in regard to the disturbed state of Hasa.

Piracies upon the Hasa coast, 1881-1907.

Piracies from 1881 to 1888 and Turkish inaction.

Meanwhile the scourge of piracy continued upon the coast of the Hasa province, though generally in a milder form than during the epidemic of maritime lawlessness in 1878-80.

1881. In May 1881 the celebrated Bani Hâjir pirate, Zâid-bin-Muhammad, tried unsuccessfully to seize some boats belonging to the 'Amâir; petty piracies near Qatif and between Qatif and Bahrain followed; and finally the Bani Hâjir attacked an 'Amâir boat and killed two men. Notwithstanding the fact that these outrages were committed in the immediate neighbourhood of Qatif, no steps were taken by the Turks to secure or chastise the Bani Hâjir.

1883. In June 1883 Bani Hâjir pirates seized a Bahrain vessel near the coast of Qâtif and plundered it, after mortally wounding the Nâkhuda. A month later four slaves who had been carried off in the affair were restored to the owners through the Turkish authorities in Qatif.

1884. In August 1884 Bani Hâjir committed a piracy on a Qatar boat anchored off Qatîf, and some members of the tribe were arrested by the Turkish authorities.

1886. In 1886 a number of piracies occurred in the harbour of Qatif, in which boats belonging to Bahrain suffered. Their continuance unpunished was a cause of much disgust to the Shaikh of Bahrain, and a general

* According to a letter received at Basrah from the Tâbur Aghasi at Hofuf, the losses of the Turks were very much more severe: viz., two officers and 76 men killed, 59 men wounded, and 85 mules, 141 rifles and one gun lost: and the village of Shaqîq was plundered and burned by the Arabs. The gun, according to the same authority was bought back for $700

feeling of insecurity was diffused along the coast. A Turkish government steamer was anchored at Qatif when these outrages occurred, yet no attempt was made by the Turkish authorities to prevent them or to punish the malefactors.

1887. In 1887 there was a large crop of offences. On the 1st of August a Bahrain boat was taken by Bani Hājir and robbed to the amount of Rs. 645; in July a Kuwait fishing boat was plundered off Rās Tanūrah of property worth $400, four of the crew being wounded; in September a boat belonging to a brother of the Shaikh of Bahrain was looted by 30 Bedouins, in Qatif harbour, of every article of value; on the 14th of September a Kuwait boat off Dārin suffered loss, at the hands of a large band of Bedouins, to the extent of Rs. 2,318; on the 16th of October a Bahrain boat was pillaged off 'Anik by a gang of Bani Hājir; on the 22nd of October a Tārūt boat was similarly treated, also by Bani Hājir; and on the 27th of October two vessels, one belonging to Kuwait and the other to Bahrain, were attacked by Bani Hājir near 'Oqair, two sailors and five passengers were wounded, and everything moveable on board of either was carried off.

1888. In April and May 1888 two or three more cases of piracy occurred in Qatif waters notwithstanding that Nāfiz Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, had visited Qatif in the preceding February and taken security from Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārin for the prevention of piracy in the neighbourhood.

Discussions regarding Piracy between the British Government and the Porte, 1883-89.

In 1883, in connection with the piracy committed in that year, a reference was made to the Porte by Her Majesty's Government; but, in consequence of redress having been afforded, though incomplete, and of the undesirability of raising the question of Turkish jurisdiction on the eastern coast of Arabia, the proceedings were ultimately allowed to drop. In 1887 and 1888 several remonstrances were addressed to the Turkish Government on the subject of maritime disorders in the neighbourhood of Qatif; but the only result was the despatch of an additional Turkish gunboat to the Hasa coast. This was a futile proceeding, for the Bani Hājir, whom it was chiefly necessary to coerce, were not a maritime tribe and only carried on their piratical practices by means of borrowed or stolen boats, while the waters which they frequented were generally too shallow for effective action by an armed steam vessel. An increase of the Turkish naval force in the Persian Gulf, besides being useless, was undesirable; and an effort was therefore made to impress on the Porte the greater need for action on land, with the result, apparently, that in 1889 a military post for the prevention of piracy was temporarily estab-

lished on Rās Tanūrah. The trouble taken by Her Majesty's Government was not altogether thrown away, for there was now a brief cessation of piracy, and, when outrages recommenced, some attempt was made by the Turks to deal with the pirates on land.

Fresh outbreak of piracy and ineffectual action by the Turks, 1891-1892.

In the pearl fishing seasons of 1891 and 1892 piratical offences abounded once more on the coast of Hasa. On the 18th of June 1891 a gang of 14 men, believed to be Bani Hājir, boarded a Shū'ai lying at Saihāt, killed one of the crew, and threw the others into the sea; Turkish troops were apparently sent in pursuit of the raiders. The same gang then attacked another boat, which, after killing one of the crew, they completely stripped; and a Turkish gunboat went to search for them, but they could not be found. In July a Qatif Shū'ai was boarded by 18 Bani Hājir near 'Oqair, one of the crew was wounded, all property on board and the gear of the vessel herself were taken, and two slaves and a cousin of the Nākhuda were carried away; in this case a Turkish military detachment turned out, but effected nothing. On the 20th of August, 16 Bani Hājir took possession of a Shū'ai from Tāhiri, a place on the Persian coast, with cargo for Bahrain and plundered her of goods to the value of Rs. 2,495, which they landed at Dōhat-as-Salwa; the Turks in this case took no action. In the next year, on the 1st of May 1892, a Bahrain boat putting into Dārin on the way to Qatif was pillaged by three Bedouins. On the 21st of May two Qatif Shū'ais were seized by Bani Hājir; but one was recovered, after pursuit of the pirates, by Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, a notable of Qatif. On the 6th of June a gang of 25 Bani Hājir seized a Baghlah at Qatif and plundered a Qatif vessel of her cargo and gear besides Rs. 1,300 in cash; an armed boat was sent after the pirates by the Turks, but failed to come up with them. Finally, in September, a party of Bani Hājir Bedouins attacked a boat from Hasīnah on the Persian coast while beached at Qatif, killed the Nākhuda, wounded two of the crew and carried off $700; in this instance Turkish troops went in pursuit and captured 10 of the robbers, but none of the booty was recovered. In 1892 a boat containing 20 Turkish soldiers was detailed by the authorities at Qatif to convoy boats passing between that place and Bahrain; but even after this some petty piracies occurred and went unpunished.

British proceedings in regard to the piracies of 1891-1892.

With a view to the restoration of order it was proposed in 1891 by Colonel Talbot, Resident in the Persian Gulf, and recommended by Colonel Mockler, Resident at Baghdād, that the consent of the Ottoman Government should be obtained to the action of British cruisers in Qatif waters, either in combination with or independently of Turkish vessels;

but Her Majesty's Government decided that the scheme of separate action by British cruisers adopted in 1881 should continue to be followed, and that Turkish co-operation should not be invited. In some of the cases of piracy partial redress had been afforded by the Turks; and it was decided by Her Majesty's Government to refrain, in these circumstances, from further demands for reparation.

Further piracies.

In September 1893 a Kuwait vessel, beached at Qatif, was attacked by 15 robbers; one of the crew was wounded and one of the marauders killed. Pursuit was made by Turkish customs guards, but was ineffectual.

In 1895 a single Arab,* while travelling as a passenger in a boat from Qatif to Bahrain with Tek Chand Dwarka Das of the Indian firm of Ganga Ram Tikam Das & Co. in Bahrain, made a brutal and treacherous attack upon his Hindu fellow passenger. The Baniyah, by throwing himself overboard, escaped with the loss of a hand and other severe wounds; and the Arab then caused himself to be landed upon the coast with all the valuables—chiefly pearls—which the boat contained, estimated at Rs. 40,000. From the records it does not appear that satisfaction was ever demanded or obtained for this heinous outrage upon a British subject.

1898.

In 1898 Turkish gunboats were present more continuously than usual on the Hasa coast; but the Bani Hājir, nevertheless, committed some piracies in Bahrain waters.

Serious recrudescence of piracy, 1899-1900.

In 1899 a fresh outbreak of piracy began along the shores of Hasa; it was directed, as usual, chiefly against Bahrain shipping, the richest and the most defenceless in those seas.

The first case brought home to Turkish subjects was the plunder, on the 11th August 1899, of a Bahrain jolly-boat upon the Shiqqatah pearl bank to the north-west of Bahrain; the robbers were 'Amāir of Hālat Dārīn on Tārūt Island, and the loss caused was estimated at Rs. 1,500.

The next year, on the 17th of August 1900, another Bahrain boat was boarded off Rās Tanūrah, again by natives of Dārin; property to the value of Rs. 3,924 was carried off, and a passenger who threw himself into the sea to escape the pirates was drowned. On the 2nd of September 1900 a Bahrain vessel was taken at sea, only a few miles north of Manāmah town, by Bani Hājir buccaneers, the damage done on this occasion amounting to Rs. 732; and on the same day a predatory attack was made, likewise by Bani Hajir, upon some Arabs on the island

* This Arab was apparently Ahmad-bin-Sahoan, who afterwards became a notorious pirate. See two pages further on.

of Umm Na'asān. On the 6th of September a Bahrain boat was attacked near 'Oqair by Bani Hājir of the Āl Muhammad section; two men were wounded and much property was carried away, of which the bulk belonged to merchants of Hasa.

Behaviour of the Turks in regard to the piracies of 1899-1900.

In the last of these instances Sa'īd Pāsha, the Mutasarrif of Hasa, bestirred himself to the extent of sending out troops by whom tribal camels were seized and Shaikhs arrested, and the Hasa merchants received compensation, but none was obtained by such of the sufferers as happened to be subjects of Bahrain; and in the Shiqqatah and Rās Tanūrah cases partial redress only was afforded to the Bahrain complainants. The matter was accordingly brought, through the British Consul at Basrah, to the notice of the Wāli; but the latter treated the subject nonchalantly and ultimately refused to discuss it on the ground that Bahrain was a Turkish, not a British, dependency.

In August 1901 fresh demands for indemification and for the suppression of piracy were made on the Wāli of Basrah, but without apparent result. So far as could be learned, the only Turkish measure for maintaining security at sea off Hasa continued to be, as in the past, the rare despatch from Qatīf to Bahrain of an armed boat, which, after remaining for a few days at Manamah, was accustomed to return direct to the Turkish coast.

Visit of H.M.S. "Sphinx" to Qatif, 1902.

Accordingly, with a view to ascertaining the steps, if any, taken by the local Turkish authorities, a visit by H. M. S. "Sphinx" to Qatīf was authorised, and in February 1902 was carried out; but the results were unsatisfactory, and no information of the kind desired was obtained. On the other hand the Commander of the British vessel and the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, who accompanied him, were treated with marked discourtesy; they were detained first at the customs house and then at the port office, they had great difficulty even in obtaining an interview with the Qāim-Māqnam, and they were prevented from entering the town.

Piracies of Ahmad-bin-Salmān, 1902-1907.

In 1902 a fresh series of maritime outrages began, and a new pirate leader made his appearance, who soon proved himself a worthy successor of Zāid-bin-Muhammad; this was Ahmad-bin-Salmān, the son of a member of the ruling family of Bahrain by a daughter of a Shaikh of the Āl Muhammad section of the Bani Hājir. Ahmad had been for long an outlaw from the Bahrain islands and had lived for a time in Qatar, but he was now virtually domiciled in Turkish territory.

1902.

Early in July 1902 this individual, with some Bani Hājir companions, stole a boat from Saihāt near Qatīf and put to sea for nefarious pur-

poses; but, having been driven on shore shortly afterwards by adverse winds, the boat was recovered by an armed party from Saihāt. On the 4th of August Ahmad succeeded in carrying off another boat from Sanābis on the island of Tārūt; and, after crossing on the same day to the island of Umm Na'asān in the Bahrain principality, he seized a Bahrain boat of 28 tons burden, which he took over to Dhahrān along with its crew and cargo. On the 12th of August, he utilised his new prize to capture another Bahrain vessel off Dha'āin in Qatar and returned to his base of operations, which was now at Dōhat Dhalūm, with plunder worth Rs. 5,400, chiefly in pearls. Up to this time Ahmad had retained some connection with Qatar, where his family in September 1902 were still living at Sumaismah, and he had disposed there of part of the proceeds of his Umm Na'asān raid; but the fruits of his second piracy were bestowed in Turkish territory, and his family soon followed him thither. In October 1902, on representations made by the British authorities to the Wāli of Basrah, Ahmad seems to have been captured by the Mutasarrif of Hasa. That official, in response to a request made direct and not through British intermediacy, returned a slave taken in the second piracy to the owner at Bahrain, and intimated that the rest of the stolen property was being recovered.

1903. In July of 1903 news was received that Ahmad, who had meanwhile been released or allowed to escape, was encamped with four 'Amāir companions at 'Anik, and subsequently at Saihāt, waiting for an opportunity to recommence his depredations. The fact was brought to the notice of the Ottoman authorities, who professed in reply that an effort had been made to arrest him and that he had escaped along the coast in the direction of Kuwait; but the worthlessness of their assertions was soon demonstrated by Ahmad's reappearance in Hasa, where on the 15th of August he made an unsuccessful attempt to seize a boat at Dammām. He was then tried in his absence by the Hasa courts and was said to have been condemned "par contumace" to fifteen years' imprisonment.

1904. Nothing more was heard of Ahmad until the summer of 1904, when, early in August, he commandeered a boat on the Qatif coast near Safwa; and a few days later, with 14 companions, he boarded a Qatar vessel anchored on the Fasht-ad-Dibal and carried off plunder to the value of Rs. 3,642. This was the only piracy in connection with which his name was specifically mentioned in 1904; but the Turkish coast continued unsafe, and, on the night of the 4th of December 1904, a Persian Būm lying at Qatif was entered by robbers who killed three of the crew and carried off property worth $2,000. In this case

the authorities at first arrested three inhabitants of Tarût Island and two others, on suspicion; but in the end the Persians got no satisfaction. A few weeks later the Persians returned in a sailing boat with a considerable force and attacked the first local boat they saw, which happened to belong to Dārin, killing three Turkish subjects.

On the 25th of June 1905, his family being then settled at 'Anik near Qatif, Ahmad-bin-Salmān re-appeared and captured a boat, and on the next day he took another boat; in these proceedings two men were killed and two wounded, and property valued at Rs. 3,600 was carried away. A month later 10 Bedouins in a Shū'si, calling themselves followers of Ahmad, held up a vessel between Qatif and Bahrain, from which, after killing a boy and wounding two men, they removed property worth about Rs. 1,000. In October three Bedouins, who were proceeding as passengers in a boat from Dōhah in Qatar to Bahrain, suddenly fell upon and murdered another passenger, robbed all the other persons on board, and compelled the boatmen to change their course and sail to the Dhahrān shore in Hasa. 1905.

Early in July 1906 Ahmad-bin-Salmān woke to life once more and seized two small Bahrain boats on the coast of Dhahrān while the crews were collecting firewood; one he disabled, and in the other he embarked with his companions, some 10 men of the Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah tribes. The pirates, most of whom, being landsmen, suffered severely from sea-sickness, spent a week ashore near Rās-al-Buraiqat during a spell of bad weather, after which they moved to Dōhat 'Ain-as-Saih. On the 14th of July they fell in with a Budaiya' Būm, carrying passengers for Qatif; this vessel carried only two firearms, but the owners made good use of them and not only wounded Ahmad himself but killed his most enterprising lieutenant, one of the Āl Morrah. This misadventure put an end to the proceedings of the gang for the season. 1906.

British action in regard to the piracies of Ahmad-bin-Salmān. 1905-07.

In June and July 1905 Captain F. B. Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, made two sailing trips of about four days' duration each in search of Ahmad-bin-Salmān, on which he was accompanied by about 50 of the armed retainers of the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the whereabouts of the pirate could not be discovered. A fugitive slave of Ahmad, an eye-witness of the second piracy committed by his master during the season, was however found by Captain Prideaux and was sent to Qatif to give evidence before the Turkish authorities; the Qaim-Maqām there apparently threw the witness into prison, but he also arrested four of the followers of Ahmad,—a step to which the gang replied by a third piracy, committed in July. In September Captain Prideaux visited Qatif and had

a friendly interview with a new Qáim-Maqám who had recently arrived; the meeting resulted in the release of the slave witness, who was subsequently manumitted.

In the summer of 1906, in consequence of the re-appearance of Ahmad-bin-Salmán, a British gunboat remained at Bahrain or on the banks during the greater part of the pearl-fishing season. In August the pirate paid a visit to Dóhah, and, though it appeared to have been of a furtive character, an explanation was required of Shaikh Jásim; but no further action was taken.

1907. In June 1907, in consequence of a report that Ahmad was about to recommence his depredations, H.M.S. "Lapwing" visited Qatif in order that her commander might discuss the subject amicably with the Qáim-Maqám; but the meeting was declined, and the British officer and his party were treated with gross discourtesy, regarding which representations were made to the Porte by His Majesty's Government.

British relations with Hasa, 1871-1907.

Political and general relations. The relations of the British Government with Hasa during the period now under examination, for the most part either arose out of piracies, and have therefore been already described, or had reference to Bahrain and will be noticed in a later paragraph. Here it may be mentioned that in 1884 the "Mubárak," a vessel belonging to a British Indian trader in Bahrain, was impressed by the Turkish authorities at Qatif to carry troops to 'Oqair; but, the matter having been represented at Constantinople, compensation was promised and assessed at Rs. 50.

Commercial relations. We have adverted above* to the establishment at Qatif, before the Turkish annexation, of an Indian trading community; and we may now trace the subsequent history of the settlement.

1871-1896. With the effective occupation of Hasa by the Turks and the institution of custom houses the period most favourable to foreign trade probably came to an end; but the affairs of the British Indian colony remained in a flourishing condition for some years longer. It has been estimated that, when the prosperity of the Hindu merchants was still at its height, trade worth not less than 15 lakhs of rupees per annum used to pass through their hands; and in the busy season when temporary visitors were added to their number, as many as 60 trading Hindus, all however unaccompanied by their families, might be found simultaneously

Vide page 965 *ante*.

at Qatif. About 1880 Ganga Ram Tikam Das & Company, one of the leading Hindu firms in Bahrain, made an effort to improve their position by establishing a strong agency in charge of Hindus at Qatif; and their example was followed by another Indian house.

Ultimately, however, in consequence of the exactions of the customs contractors and of obstacles thrown in their way by the port officials at the instigation of local merchants, the trade of the Hindus began to decline. Merchandise exported to India was liable to a duty of 1 per cent. only; but the duty was collected at the time of shipment at a rate of 8 per cent., the amount leviable on goods exported to Persia, and in practice the rebate of 7 per cent., legally recoverable on proof of arrival of the consignments in India, was seldom or never obtained from the contractors. The excess duty thus recovered from the Indian traders in three seasons was estimated, at the end of 1894, at Rs. 19,500; but the refund obtained in consequence of representations by the British Government amounted to Rs. 5,012 only. The other principal difficulties from which the Hindus suffered were intentional delays in weighment of their goods by the customs authorities, detention of their vessels for unreasonable periods in quarantine, executive orders which made it impossible for them to obtain animals for transport, and failure of the Turkish authorities to assist them in the recovery of debts. Political disorders and lawlessness eventually increased the difficulties of the situation; and, after the serious outrage committed in 1895 on one of the agents of Messrs. Ganga Ram Tikam Das & Co., the Hindus gradually withdrew from Qatif altogether. Their business, by 1897, had fallen to a half or even one-third of its former amount; and what remained was conducted on disadvantageous terms through local Muhammadan agents. 1890-97.

With characteristic pertinacity, however, the British Indian traders of Bahrain clung to the idea of re-establishing their position at Qatif; and in 1901 they offered to contribute Rs. 1,200 a year for 5 years towards the pay of a British consular representative at Qatif, should one be appointed. In November 1903, on the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit to Bahrain, they renewed their request for consular protection in Hasa; and they subsequently offered to guarantee a contribution of Rs. 2,000 a year. The necessity for some action was clear, inasmuch as the sum wrongly recovered as customs duty at Qatif from British Indian merchants amounted, in the year 1903 alone, to not less than Rs. 25,000. Representations were accordingly made to the Turkish Government on the subject of these exactions, and a promise was obtained from the Wali of Basrah that they should be discontinued, and that items already levied 1901-03.

in excess should be refunded. In consequence of these assurances a scheme which had been prepared for British consular representation, viz., to obtain recognition of the Political Agent in Bahrain as Vice-Consul for Hasa and to post a native agent under his orders to Qatif, was again laid aside.

External relations of Hasa other than those with Great Britain, 1871-1907.

The close connection of Hasa with Bahrain, due to the commercial dependence of the province upon that Shaikhdom, necessarily continued under Turkish rule. Bahrain was the principality most seriously affected by the piratical developments, already described, upon the Turkish coast; and Hasa was naturally the base from which, as explained in the history of Bahrain, the Turks sought to assert their influence over those islands.

Massacre of Bahrain Shaikhs and their followers in Hasa, and British representations, 1900-04.

One tragic incident, however, unconnected with either of these questions, falls to be noticed here. At the end of 1900 Salmān-bin-Di'aij, a first cousin of 'Īsa-bin-'Ali, the ruling Shaikh of Bahrain, proceeded on a hawking expedition, with his sons Di'aij and Bishr and a nephew named 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Rāshid, to the coast of the Dhahrān district in Hasa. The Shaikhs were accompanied by 20 servants and by four Bedouin Rafiqs; of the Rafiqs one belonged to the Āl Morrah, one to the 'Ajmān, and two to the Bani Hājir tribe. In the early morning of the 3rd of December 1900 the party were suddenly attacked in their camp at the Bin-'Aqdān well, five miles inland from Dōhat 'Ain-as-Saih, by a band of about 50 Āl Morrah Bedouins of the Āl Bahaih section, headed by Rāshid-bin-Maqārih, a chief of the Āl Bahaih, one of whose sons had been killed in the previous year, in pursuance of a blood feud, by 'Amāmarah subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Of the Bahrain party only Bishr, the son of Shaikh Salmān, and two of the tribal representatives escaped,—alive though not unwounded; and a Dōsiri of Bahrain, who belonged to a separate hunting party but happened to be in Shaikh Salmān's tent when the surprise took place, shared the fate of his entertainers. On the side of the assailants the leader Rāshid with one of his sons was killed, and one or more tribesmen were wounded. Thirty camels and twenty rifles were part of the spoil carried off by the Āl Bahaih, whose object was probably plunder rather than reprisals—not warranted in the circumstances by any Arab custom—against the Shaikh of Bahrain.

The corpses of Shaikh Salmān and his party were buried by Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Qatīf who went to the spot for the purpose.

Through the British Consul at Basrah this massacre was brought to the notice of the Wāli of the Basrah without delay, and the Turkish authorities at first held out hopes of early redress. At this early stage of the matter they probably underestimated the difficulty of coercing the Āl Bahaih and feared retaliatory measures by the Shaikh of Bahrain against the tribe; indeed their apprehensions of action by the Shaikh were unmistakably betrayed in letters which they addressed to him. Soon, however, having become aware of the elusive habits of the offending section and also, no doubt, of the intention of the British Government to restrain the Shaikh of Bahrain from immediate reprisals, their anxiety to placate the latter grew perceptibly cool.

Serious representations to the Porte were delayed for a time by doubts on the part of His Majesty's Government as to the expediency of admitting that Turkish territory extended so far south as the scene of the occurrence; but they were eventually made, in August 1901, on the ground that the Āl Bahaih had retired into country under Turkish control. Before the occurrence of a Turkish disaster, which has already been mentioned above, at Qōfdīyah near 'Oqair in April 1902, the Turkish Government had so far yielded to the British representations regarding the Dhahrān massacre as to send stringent orders to their local officers for the arrest and punishment of the murderers. The fact that the Āl Bahaih had taken a leading part in the Qōfdīyah affair subsequently supplied the Turks with a separate incentive to action; and for a short time the negotiations in the Shaikh of Bahrain's case assumed a more promising aspect, especially after the success of the Ottoman troops against the Āl Morrah in September 1902.

Meanwhile the Shaikh of Bahrain had been asked by the Government of India to state the reparation to which he considered himself entitled, and had replied that the murder of three of his own relations could only be expiated by the surrender to him, without conditions, of an equal number of the Āl Bahaih; that blood-money to the amount of Rs. 23,520 was due to him on account of the 20 retainers and the Dōsiri visitor; and that the value of the property plundered was Rs. 11,620. The Turks demurred to the claim, both on account of its nature and its amount; and it is probable that their successes against the tribe were not, in fact, more than sufficient to wipe out their own claims arising from the Qōfdīyah outrage. In the interim the Āl Bahaih, through the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Qatar, had made advances to the Shaikh of Bahrain for

an amicable settlement, and the Shaikh had been authorised by the British Government to respond ; but the Āl Bahaih eventually hung back, and the intended negotiations did not take place.

In 1903, no steps having as yet been taken by the Turkish authorities to compensate the Shaikh of Bahrain for the massacre, discussion of the case was resumed between the British Government and the Porte. An assertion by the Porte that the murderers had all been killed in subsequent encounters with the Turkish troops having been disproved, and the unwillingness or inability of the Turks to take further action having become clear, His Majesty's Government decided that the Shaikh of Bahrain might be authorised to proceed in his own way against the Āl Bahaih, provided that nothing was done in territory recognised as Turkish. This decision was communicated to the Porte in October 1904, but it was withheld from the Shaikh in consequence of his misconduct in certain matters which form part of the history of Bahrain.

In February 1905 a fresh outrage on Bahrain subjects was committed by the Āl Bahaih tribe at Dōhat Huwaiqil in Barr-al-Qārah. The victims on this occasion were the crews of two Māshuwahs from Hadd on Muharraq Island, who had landed to collect firewood ; they were attacked by a gang of 35 Bedouins, two of their number were dangerously wounded by the bullets of the Āl Bahaih, and a slave belonging to the party was carried off. In 1907 it appeared that the Āl Bahaih, whom the Shaikh had prohibited from visiting Bahrain, considered themselves, on this account, as at feud with the whole Arab population of the islands.

Relations with Qatar and Trucial 'Omān.

The Turkish Mutasarrifs of Hasa were, after the occupation of the province, the principal instruments of the Turkish policy of expansion on the side of Qatar and Trucial 'Omān ; but their proceedings in this respect, belonging rather to the history of Qatar, are described in another place.

Relations with Kuwait.

The use of Kuwait to some extent as a base of operations and the assistance given by the Shaikh of Kuwait in the Turkish conquest of Hasa in 1871 have been noticed above, as has also the co-operation of a Kuwait contingent under Shaikh Mubārak to restore order in Hasa in 1893. Towards the end of 1899 an Irādé, authorising the construction of a line of telegraph from Basrah to Qatif which would necessarily have passed through Kuwait, was issued by the Sultān of Turkey ; but no steps were taken to give the scheme effect.

Relations with Najd.

The negotiations and other dealings of the Turks in Hasa with the Wahhābi rulers of Central Arabia have been described above in so far as

they related to the occupation of Hasa by the Turks and to the further designs of the Porte upon Najd. In 1892 asylum and a pension were provided by the Turks for 'Abdur Rahmān, the fugitive head of the Āl Sa'ūd of Najd, who had been expelled from Central Arabia by Ibn-Rashid.

Occasional communication was held also with Ibn-Rashīd, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar. Thus in March 1894 the 'Ajmān tribe, having been attacked by Ibn-Rashīd, apparently in the coastal tract of Salā' towards Kuwait, appealed to the Turks for redress on the ground of their being tributary to the Porte, and the Mutasarrif of Hasa wrote on their behalf to the Amīr; but to his letter Ibn-Rashid merely replied that the 'Ajmān were robbers, and that action had been taken against them in the interests of law and order. In 1895 Ibn-Rashīd complained that intercourse between Kuwait and Najd was being interrupted by the raids of the 'Ajmān, Āl Morrah and other tribes nominally subject to Turkey, and requested the Mutasarrif of Hasa either to reduce them to order or to permit him to do so; but the only response to this request seems to have been an attack by the Turks assisted by the 'Ajmān upon the Mutair, a tribe generally regarded as under the protection of the Amīr, of which an account has already been given above.

In July and August 1905 'Abdul 'Aziz, son of the Wahhābi Amīr, whose power had again superseded that of Ibn-Rashīd in Central Arabia, paid a visit to the part of the Jāfūrah desert adjoining Dōhat-as-Salwa. His presence, though he was nominally at this time a Turkish official, appeared to be embarrassing to the authorities in Hasa; but he hospitably received a Turkish Tābūr Āghāsi who was deputed to call on him in his camp at Da'ailij in Jāfūrah.

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF KUWAIT.*

Early History.

Foundation of Kuwait by the 'Utûb, 1716.

The foundation of the town of Kuwait, though a modern event, is the subject of various and conflicting traditions. The first settlers, however, almost certainly belonged to the 'Utûb, a tribe consisting of three principal divisions, the Jalâhimah, Âl Khalîfah and Âl Subâh, and said to be derived from the 'Anizah of northern Central Arabia. † Kuwait seems to have come into existence about the commencement of the 18th century, according to one account in 1716; and from the name it may reasonably be conjectured that the place was in the beginning an ordinary Arab settlement protected by a small fort. According to a tradition preserved by the Âl Subâh family who now govern Kuwait, the reason why the ancestors of their section came to Kuwait was that they had been expelled by the Turks from Umm Qasr upon Khor Zubair, an earlier seat from which they had been accustomed to prey as brigands upon the caravans of Basrah and as pirates upon the shipping of the Shatt-al-'Arab. When the settlement at Kuwait was formed, the Jalâhimah section were headed by one Jâbir, the Âl Khalîfah by Khalîfah-bin-Muhammad, and the Al Subâh—according to one tradition—by a Shaikh named

* For facts in regard to the history of Kuwait, we are not so entirely dependent as in the case of Qatar, Bahrain and Hasa on official records and compilations, and the following published works may be cited: Ives' *Voyage*, 1773; Section in Zach's *Monatliche Correspondenz*, July to December 1805; Heydges' *Brief History of the Wahauby*, 1834; Stocqueler's *Fifteen Months' Pilgrimage*, 1832; Pelly and Colvill's *Recent Tour round the Northern Portion of the Persian Gulf*, in the Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, Volume XVII, 1865; Pelly's *Report on a Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh*, 1866; and Pelly's *Report on the Tribes, etc., around the shores of the Persian Gulf*, 1874. The official publications containing most information are: *Bombay Selections, XXIV*, 1856; a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906; a *Précis of Kuwait Affairs*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Najd Affairs, 1804-1904*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency.

† There is also a division known as the Âl Fâdhil, but they have played no part in history.

Sulaimān-bin-Ahmad ; and the Āl Subāh enjoyed some sort of political predominance over the other divisions of the tribe. According to another authority the chief Shaikh of the Al Subāh at the time of the foundation of Kuwait was one Rahīm.

Rapid growth of the settlement, 1716-66.

In the first fifty years after its foundation, the town of Kuwait grew rapidly in wealth and importance ; and the 'Utūb, partly by means of matrimonial alliances with other tribes in the neighbourhood, succeeded in making their position good against the Banī Khālid, who till shortly before had dominated the whole north-eastern coast of Arabia. The chief of Kuwait from about 1756 to about 1762 was Shaikh Subāh, who was succeeded by his son, Shaikh 'Abdullah.

Relations of the Dutch at Khārag with the Shaikh of Kuwait, 1758.

In 1758, when Dr. Ives and his party passed through Khārag on their way from India to Europe, friendly relations prevailed between Baron Kniphausen, the head of the Dutch settlement on Khārag, and the Shaikh of Kuwait, "a man greatly obliged to him, and in some measure under his influence" ; and it occurred to the Baron that arrangements might be made through the Shaikh for the British travellers to accompany a caravan proceeding from Kuwait by the desert to Aleppo—a route which, though more arduous, was shorter in time than that by Basrah and Baghdād. A boat was accordingly sent, on the 31st of March, to fetch the Shaikh from Kuwait to Khārag ; but he did not make his appearance until the 14th of April ; and his demands, when he came, were so extortionate and so firmly maintained as to make the Baron secretly doubtful of the expediency of the plan which he had himself proposed. The British party, on becoming aware of this, relieved him from his embarrassment by suggesting that, for various reasons, they should continue their journey by the Basrah-Baghdād route.

Emigration of the Āl Khalīfah and Jalāhimah from Kuwait to Zubārah in Qatar, 1766.

In 1766, in circumstances of which no explanation except one probably fanciful is extant, the Āl Khalīfah division of the 'Utūb separated themselves from the rest of the tribe and removed to Zubārah in Qatar, where they became an independent colony. They were followed, after a short interval, by the Jalāhimah ; and the Āl Subāh remained in exclusive possession of Kuwait.

Effect on Kuwait of the capture of Basrah by the Persians, 1776-79.

Friendly relations between the 'Utūb of Kuwait and those of Zubārah must, if ever interrupted, have shortly been resumed, for in 1776 one of the Shaikhs and a number of the chief inhabitants of Kuwait took refuge at Zubārah in consequence of the capture of Basrah by the Persians. The fall of Basrah did not, however, injure Kuwait ; on the contrary, a considerable part of the trade of Basrah was diverted, during the Persian occupation of that place, to Kuwait.

Opening of British relations with Kuwait, 1775-78.

The recorded history of British relations with Kuwait opens in 1775, when, on the investment of Basrah by the Persians, the British desert mail from the Gulf to Aleppo began to be despatched from Kuwait instead of Zubair. This arrangement was continued during the Persian occupation of Basrah until 1779, but it did not work very satisfactorily as the messengers were not under any proper control, and one packet was lost *en route* about the end of 1778.

Kuwait a dependency of Basrah, 1775.

In 1775 Kuwait was regarded as a dependency of Basrah; and, at the breaking up of the Anglo-Turkish squadron at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab on the departure of the British Agency to Büshehr, it was considered a safe place at which to drop the Turkish and Arab personnel.

Arrest of a French officer at Kuwait by a member of the H. E. I. Company's Basrah Factory, 1778.

An unusual incident occurred at Kuwait at the end of 1778, or possibly in January 1779. On the 3rd of August 1778 M. Borel du Bourg, a young French officer, left Marseilles with despatches in cypher for the French authorities in Pondichery and Mauritius. He was travelling from Aleppo to the Persian Gulf, when, in the desert at about 15 days' journey from Basrah, a party of Bedouin Arabs threatened him, and he had the misfortune to shoot one of their number. Severely wounded by a sword cut on the head, he saved his life by throwing himself on the protection of the oldest of the robbers and promising to pay a sum equal to £100 English on condition of being conveyed in safety to Kuwait. On arrival at Kuwait he succeeded in borrowing the promised amount from an Armenian of the place, after which he wrote to M. Rousseau, the French Consul at Basrah, desiring to be supplied with the means of continuing his journey to Pondichery. The French Resident having refused or hesitated to honour the draft of his fellow-countryman, it was carried by the Arab messenger to the British Factory at Basrah, of which the staff in this manner became aware of M. du Bourg's presence in Kuwait.

A difficult question was thus raised, for a report had reached Basrah of war having been* declared between Britain and France, in which case it would be incumbent on British officials abroad to seize wandering French emissaries; but, on the other hand, the consequences to the British Resident were likely to be serious if he took action against M. du Bourg on information which subsequently proved to be incorrect. Mr. W. Digges Latouche in charge of the British Factory,

* The report was not incorrect. From 1778 to 1783 there was war between France and Britain, in consequence of the former power having openly sided with the United States of America in their War of Independance.

"perhaps as benevolent, humane and generous a being as ever existed," decided in the end that the Frenchman must be arrested, and sent his Second in Council, Mr. Abraham, in a cruiser, to put the resolution in effect. The vessel anchored out of sight of the town; and after dark Mr. Abraham, accompanied by the captain Mr. Sheriff, a man of remarkably powerful physique, proceeded on shore in a boat. The chief obstacle to the execution of their orders was the opposition of the Shaikh of Kuwait, who, though a well-wisher of the British Government, was strongly averse to the seizure of a person at the time enjoying his hospitality; after a protracted argument, however, his objections were withdrawn, principally, it would seem, in consequence of an assertion that M. du Bourg was a fraudulently absconding debtor. The British representatives then proceeded to M. du Bourg's house, and, on the door being opened by the French officer, who was in momentary expectation of a reply from the French Resident at Basrah and appeared dressed in nothing but his shirt, Captain Sheriff seized him in his arms and held him fast, while Mr. Abraham searched his apartments. The despatches were found; but M. du Bourg succeeded in destroying the key of the cypher, which was concealed in the lining of his coat, and their meaning was never ascertained.

It is pleasant to know that on arrival at Basrah M. du Bourg, whose misfortunes seem to have excited the greatest commiseration in his captors, and who was so incensed against M. Rousseau that he refused to hold any communication with the French Consulate, became the object of "every respect and attention" in the British Factory; that his wound, which for want of treatment had grown dangerous, was cured; and that he was eventually despatched on his homeward journey *viâ* Aleppo "with every assistance he could receive from the gentlemen of ou, Factory."

Participation of the 'Utúb of Kuwait in the 'Atbi conquest of Bahrain, 1783.

As related in the history of Bahrain, the 'Utúb of Kuwait took a leading part in the expulsion of the Persians from those islands and in the reduction of Bahrain to an Arab principality under their 'Atbi kinsmen of Zubárah. Three years previously, in 1780, they and their fellow-tribesmen of Zubárah had been at war with the Ka'ab tribe of 'Arabistán; but the circumstances are not known.

Trade of Kuwait, 1775-90.

Kuwait, of which the prosperity was at this time considered to stand necessarily in an inverse ratio to that of Basrah, benefited greatly through the occupation of the latter town by the Persians, in consequence of which the whole Indian trade with Baghdád, Aleppo, Smyrna and Constantinople was between 1775 and 1779 diverted to it. Even

after this, until 1781, merchandise for Aleppo was sometimes forwarded by direct caravan from Kuwait, thus escaping the duties levied by the Pasha of Baghdád on goods forwarded through Basrah. By 1790 Kuwait had begun to share in the commercial prosperity which the seizure of Bahrain had brought to the whole 'Utúb tribe by drawing them into the carrying trade; and goods were imported from Masqat, Zubárah, Bahrain and Qatif. Merchants were efficiently protected at Kuwait, and the duty on imported goods was levied at the low rate of 1 per cent. *ad valorem*.

Temporary location of the Basrah (British) Factory at Kuwait, 1793-95.

Staff and establishment of the Factory.

On account of difficulties with Turkish officials, described elsewhere in the history of Turkish 'Iráq, the staff of the British Factory at Basrah withdrew from that place on the 30th of April 1793* and established themselves temporarily at Kuwait, where they remained until the 26th of August 1795. From the selection of Kuwait as a place of retreat from the Turks, it is clear that, whatever may have been the case in 1775, it was not in any real sense a Turkish dependency in 1793. The head of the factory was Mr. S. Manesty, a gentleman who played a conspicuous and somewhat eccentric part in the relations of Britain with Turkish 'Iraq about this period; and among those who accompanied him in his migration were the Joint Factor, Mr. Harford Jones, afterwards Sir Harford Jones Brydges, British Envoy to Persia; also a Mr. Reinaud, who at a later time attained celebrity as the first European visitor to Dara'iyah in Najd. For the protection of the British Factory at Kuwait a small cruiser was kept anchored in the bay, and a guard of sepoys under a native officer was stationed on shore. The staff of the Factory suffered much discomfort at Kuwait from the intense heat, which caused them sleepless nights, and from "the supply of water,.....infamously bad in quality, being at once salt, sweet and bitter"; and failure of health after a time obliged Mr. Harford Jones to proceed on leave to Europe.

* In Sir Harford Jones Brydges' *Wahauby* the date is given as 1792, but this is probably a misprint.

Wahhābi aggressions on Kuwait, 1793-95.

During the sojourn of the factory at Kuwait the Wahhābis were at war with the place, which they were anxious to reduce to submission; and they frequently showed themselves in the neighbourhood, causing incessant alarms. The town was at this time poorly defended by a mud wall, which, in the rainy season, frequently crumbled down in large breaches to the great alarm of the inhabitants; but the courage of the people was sustained by their confidence in Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, described as a venerable old man of commanding appearance, whom they regarded more as a father than as a governor. In general a Wahhābi attack did not amount to more than a temporary seizure of the wells by a party of ten or twenty Bedouins, whom the matchlockmen of the town ordinarily succeeded in dislodging after a bloodless skirmish at very long ranges; but belated wanderers near the town were treated by the Wahhabis with great inhumanity, the women being carried off and the men instantly put to death. It is recorded, on the authority of Dr. Seetzen, that Mr. Reinaud on one occasion actually saw two Wahhābis murder an unfortunate Kuwaiti upon the seashore and wash their hands in his blood. During the stay of the East India Company's servants at Kuwait only one serious attack in force, which was easily repulsed, was made by the Wahhābis. The real attitude of the British Factory towards these conflicts is uncertain: in theory it was one of neutrality.*

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* The statements made by Sir H. J. Brydges in his *Wahauby* (pages 12 to 16) and by Mr. Reinaud in his conversations with Dr. Seetzen (see Von Zach's *Monatliche Correspondenz*, July to December 1805, pages 234 to 235) are irreconcilable. Sir Harford represents the grand attack as having been made by about 500 Wahhābis, who were driven off by a single shot from an old gun that had been brought ashore by the Shaikh from one of his vessels; and he is careful to explain that the Factory had no share in the proceedings, and that good relations were, on the contrary, studiously maintained with Ibn Sa'ūd. Mr. Reinaud, on the other hand, places the strength of the enemy at 2,000 camels, each carrying two men, the front rider armed with a gun and the other with a lance to protect his companion while reloading; he alleges that, under Mr. Manesty's orders, two guns were landed from the British cruiser, that the sepoy guard of the Factory took part in repelling the attack, and that the Wahhābis lost heavily in their flight along the beach by the fire of the cruiser herself; and he adds that the resentment of the Wahhābis at this interference expressed in depredations upon the Company's desert mail, was the cause of his own mission to Dara'iyah. Sir Harford may be the more reliable authority; but, on the other hand, it seems unlikely that Mr. Reinaud's circumstantial story should be altogether a fiction.

History of Kuwait from the removal of the British Factory till the arrival of the Egyptians in Hasa, 1795-1838.

Internal history.

During more than 40 years after the return of the British Factory to Basrah, the name of Kuwait was seldom mentioned in the political correspondence of the Persian Gulf.

In 1820 Kuwait was represented as containing an armed population of 5,000 to 7,000 men, of whom only a few hundred were 'Utūb by race, and as dependent for its water supply upon the island of Failakah. In 1829 the authority of the Shaikh of Kuwait was partially acknowledged by the Bedouin tribes upon the coast as far to the southward as Rās Khafji; the annual imports of Kuwait were estimated at $5,00,000, the exports at nearly $1,00,000; and the place, which was flourishing in consequence of the peaceful policy of its ruler, was credited with the possession of a mercantile marine of 15 Baghlahs from 450 to 100 tons, 20 Batils and Baghlahs from 120 to 50 tons, and 150 other boats from 150 to 15 tons. In 1831 the town extended one mile along the shore with a depth of quarter of a mile, and the streets were wider than those of Masqat or Būshehr; but the only defence was a wall less than a foot thick on the side towards the desert, outside of which was a trench; and two honeycombed pieces of ordnance protected each of the three gates. The Shaikh in 1831 levied a duty of 2 per cent. upon all imports, but maintained no armed force.

The solidarity of the 'Utūb of Kuwait with those of Bahrain and Qatar appears to have been maintained during this period; and the Shaikhdom continued to resist, on the whole with success and latterly under the protection of the Turks, the efforts of the Wahhābi Amirs to incorporate it with their dominions. Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh governed Kuwait until 1812, when he died, much regretted by all on account of the mildness of his rule, which favoured commercial development, and under which the population of the town had increased very greatly. Shaikh 'Abdullah was succeeded by his son Jābir-bin-'Abdullah.

In 1831 the fleet of Kuwait assisted that of the Ka'ab Arabs to blockade Basrah in the interest of Dāwud Pāsha, who was about to be displaced from the governorship of Turkish 'Irāq; and about the same time Kuwait began to flourish with increased vigour in consequence of misfortunes by which Basrah had been overtaken.

Relations of Kuwait with Bahrain.

In 1800 or 1801, in consequence of asylum having been afforded to some of the 'Atbi leaders whom he had recently expelled from Bahrain, al yid Sa'id of Masqat appears to have visited Kuwait with a fleet by way of naval demonstration, if not of attack; and it is possible that on this occasion he succeeded in obtaining from the Shaikh the homage which he now apparently claimed as his due from all the 'Utūb. In 1809, on the eve of the first British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, the pirate-politician Rahmah-bin-Jābir of Khor Hassān in Qatar, who extended to the 'Utūb of Kuwait his desperate hatred for those of Bahrain, captured 20 Kuwait Batils which were making a voyage to Masqat. 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, Shaikh of Kuwait, one of whose sons was in charge of the convoy and lost his life in the affair, then vowed to punish Rahmah by means of a naval expedition against Khor Hassān; but it does not appear that he ever carried his threat into execution. In 1817 vessels from Kuwait frequented the ports of Bahrain and were the chief means by which plunder brought to Bahrain by Qāsimi pirates was conveyed across the Gulf for disposal in Persia.

Relations of Kuwait with the Wahhābis.

In consequence of the descents by the Saiyid of 'Omān upon the Bahrain Islands in 1800 and 1802, a temporary *rapprochement* seems to have taken place between the 'Utūb of Kuwait, as well as those of Bahrain, and the Wahhābis; and in 1803, at the bidding of the Wahhābi Amīr and not without reluctance on their own part, the people of Kuwait abandoned the pearl fishery for the year and proceeded to cruise, along with their kinsmen of Bahrain and the Qawāsim of Trucial 'Omān, against the flag of Masqat; but in this enforced and distasteful employment they seem to have met only with reverses.

In 1805, alarmed by the evident intention of the British authorities in India to take action against the piratical Qawāsim, the 'Atbi Shaikhs of Kuwait and Zubārah, after describing themselves as subject to the Wahhābi Amīr, represented the probability of their being compelled by him to engage in depredations on British trade, and suggested that the British Government should guarantee to them, in case of their severing their connection with the Wahhābis, a safe retreat in Bahrain; but their proposals were not entertained.

At some time before this, apparently about 1801, some impetus was given to the development of Kuwait by troubles between the Wahhābis and their subjects in the region of Hasa; by these disturbances the ordinary route of Indian merchandise to Central Arabia was closed for a time, and the place of Qatif and 'Oqair as ports of entry for the interior was taken by Kuwait and Basrah. In 1809 the Wahhābi ruler, on

account of the refusal of tribute by the Shaikh and the repulse of a Wahhábi expedition from Kuwait in 1808, was found to be urging the Qásimi Shaikh and the Saiyid of 'Omán to undertake a naval expedition against Kuwait and Basrah,—a summons which neither saw fit to obey. In 1813-14 the port of Kuwait was reported to be independent of Wahhábi influence.

Relations of Kuwait with Turkey.

In 1829 it was stated that the Shaikh of Kuwait acknowledged the authority of the Turks, to whom he paid an annual tribute of 40 bags of rice and 400 Frásilahs of dates, and from whom he received every year a dress of honour. About 1836 Shaikh Jábir, being called upon to do so by the Turkish authorities, assisted them to reduce the rebellious town of Zubair to submission; but his part in the operations was confined to a blockade of the approaches to Zubair by water. On the fall of the town one of the Zubair family of Zubair, named Ya'qúb, took refuge at Kuwait, where he was subsequently alleged to have sold to the Shaikh the estate of Sáfiyeh in the Ma'ámir district on the Shatt-al-'Arab,—a circumstance which was to give rise to many troubles in the future.

In 1809 the Shaikh of Kuwait offered to join the British expedition against Rás-al-Khaimah with his own fleet, which was larger than that of the Qawásim, but his proposal was not entertained by the British commanders.

Relations of Kuwait with 'Arabistán.

In 1837 Shaikh Thámir, Chief of the Ka'ab tribe, in 'Arabistán, seems to have temporarily taken refuge at Kuwait, in consequence of the occupation of his town of Muhammareh by the Turks.

British relations with Kuwait.

In 1821-22, on account of difficulties with the Turkish authorities in 'Iráq, the British Residency at Basrah was for a short time removed from that place to an "island," possibly Failakah, in the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Kuwait.* Captain Taylor, then in temporary charge of the Residency, struck his flag at Basrah on the 15th of December 1821 and remained in Kuwait territory until the 19th of April 1822, when he returned to Basrah with his whole establishment.

After this Kuwait appears to have escaped notice by the British authorities for a considerable period; and in 1831, when the traveller Stocqueler visited the port, he was assured that no European had been seen there for many years,—an assertion which the curiosity manifested by hundreds of people in his appearance and dress seemed to corroborate.

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* An inference that Kuwait was not as yet fully subject to the influence of Turkey (see preceding paragraph) might perhaps be drawn from this circumstance. The reference to an "island" may have been made in error.

Kuwait affairs during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-40.

Posting of an Egyptian agent to Kuwait, 1838-39.

In 1838, on reaching the coast of the Persian Gulf in Hasa, the Egyptians sent an agent to reside at Kuwait, nominally to purchase supplies; and some boat-loads of barley, obtained from the Shatt-al-'Arab, were in fact forwarded by this individual to Qatif. It was believed, however, that his real functions were those of a political emissary and news writer, in connection with the design of Khurshid Pasha to wrest 'Iraq from the Turks; and he was treated with much distinction by the Shaikh of Kuwait, who gave him the seat of honour in all assemblies. The only consignment of military stores that reached the Egyptians by sea during their occupation of Hasa was one brought to Qatif, in November 1839, by a Kuwait Ghunchah from Hodaidah in the Red Sea. The fleet of Kuwait, at this epoch, was said to be large and well-appointed.

Discourtesy of the Shaikh of Kuwait to the British political authorities, October-November 1839.

Shaikh Jabir of Kuwait had always been regarded as a good friend of the British Government, and in his written correspondence he had never failed in courtesy; but in 1839, estranged possibly by the neglect of the official representatives of the British Government to conclude treaties or cultivate personal relations with him, and overawed, like the Shaikh of Bahrain, by the successes of Muhammad 'Ali's troops in Arabia, he was guilty of marked discourtesy to a British officer. On the 30th of October 1839, Lieutenant Edmunds, the Assistant Resident at Bushehr, deputed by the Resident to interview Shaikh Jabir with reference to the establishment of a British line of post across the desert from Kuwait to the Mediterranean, arrived at Kuwait in a British war vessel, which on anchoring fired the usual salute in honour of the Shaikh. The salute was not acknowledged, and, when a letter from the Resident was sent to the Shaikh on shore, only a verbal message was returned promising an answer the next day. The deputation of relatives and followers, moreover, ordinarily sent on board by Arab Shaikhs to welcome a British official visitor, did not make their appearance; and Lieutenant Edmunds remained on board his ship, without any further communication taking place between himself and the Shaikh, until the third day. He then requested a meeting with Shaikh Jabir, which was granted; but on his arrival the old man, whom he found surrounded by a concourse of people, only half rose from his seat, did not lay aside the pipe which he was smoking, and denied that it was a custom at Kuwait to return the

salutes of British vessels; he produced however a reply, ready written, to the Resident's letter. Lieutenant Edmunds and Captain Hennell, the Political Resident, both considered the unusual conduct of the Shaikh on this occasion to be due not to ill-will but principally to a desire to mislead the Egyptian agent at Kuwait as to the nature of his relations with the British power; and, this view having been adopted by the Government of India, it was decided that no formal remonstrance need be addressed to the Shaikh.

Question of establishing a British settlement in the vicinity of Kuwait, 1839.

In returning to Būshehr Lieutenant Edmunds visited Failakah Island, on the suitability of which for the site of a British naval and military station to replace Khārag he reported unfavourably; but he was much impressed with the potentialities of Kuwait itself, and thought that the place might be found well adapted for certain purposes by the British Government. Perhaps in the same connection Lieutenant Felix Jones of the Indian Navy also reported on the harbour of Kuwait in this year.

History of Kuwait from the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians to the annexation of that province by the Turks, 1840-71.

During the 30 years that followed the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from Eastern Arabia, the political relations of Kuwait were mainly with the Turkish province of 'Irāq; but friendly intercourse was maintained with the representative of Britain in the Gulf, and there were signs of increasing intimacy between the rulers of Kuwait and Central Arabia. On the other hand the close connection, founded on kinship, between the 'Utūb of Kuwait and Bahrain, which had been suspended since about 1820, appeared, after a short revival in 1843-46, to die a natural death.

Internal history.

During the greater part of this period Kuwait was ruled by Shaikh Jābir, who died in or about 1859 and was succeeded by his son Shaikh Subāh. The Government of Shaikh Subāh,—who in 1863 was described as a fine, stout, hale old man, more than 80 years of age, rough in appearance and manner but kind of heart,—was patriarchal; and he sat daily at the gate to superintend the affairs of his subjects. In the town of Kuwait there was little interference by officials with the life of the people, and punishments were seldom inflicted; political authority was exercised by the Shaikh, but judicial power belonged to the Qādhi alone; there

were no customs or other taxes, the revenue for public purposes consisting of about $20,000 a year which was voluntarily contributed by merchants and others; and religious toleration, extending even to Jews, was the rule. Beyond the limits of the town the influence of the Shaikh reached some 8 or 10 miles. Bedouins were not allowed to enter Kuwait armed. Shaikh Subāh, at his death in or about 1866, was succeeded by his eldest son 'Abdullah.

Relations of Kuwait with Bahrain.

The intervention of Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait in Bahrain affairs, occasioned by the struggle there between Shaikhs 'Abdullah and Muhammad of the ruling Āl Khalīfah family, is described at length in the history of the Bahrain principality. Here it will be enough to recall the facts that in August 1843 the Shaikh of Kuwait of his own motion, but not without the approval of the British authorities, visited Bahrain and tried, in vain, to reconcile the rivals; that in 1843 or 1844, at the imminent risk of a collision with Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, which in fact was only averted by the intervention of the British authorities, he attempted, unsuccessfully, to provision the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah's fortress of Dammām, then invested by the Wahhābi forces on land and blockaded by the fleet of Shaikh Muhammad at sea; that in 1844, after the fall of Dammām, he harboured for a short time the fugitive Shaikh 'Abdullah at his town of Kuwait; and, finally, that he allowed the ex-Shaikh to remain at Kuwait from 1845 to 1846, during which period, as particularly requested by the British Resident at Būshehr, he was careful to restrain his guest from the commission of maritime irregularities. In 1869 Muhammad, an ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, was deported to Kuwait, but he did not remain there long.

Relations of Kuwait with Najd.

At the epoch now under consideration, the attitude of the Kuwait Shaikh towards the Wahhābi power, hitherto that of a declared opponent or at best of a nominal and unwilling feudatory, became decidedly less antagonistic. In 1841 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān, a relative and competitor of Khālid, the *de facto* Wahhābi Amir, took refuge at Kuwait, where he stayed for a short time only; but before the end of the same year, on 'Abdullah, who had meanwhile returned to Central Arabia, obtaining the upper hand, Khālid in his turn sought and found an asylum at Kuwait. In 1863 friendly relations existed between the Shaikh of Kuwait and Faisal-bin-Turki, who then ruled Najd, but no tribute was paid by the former to the latter. In 1866, as we shall see further on, the Wahhābi Amir 'Abdullah, who maintained an agent at Kuwait for political purposes as his father too had done even so early as 1851, was prepared to assist the Shaikh in a quarrel which occurred between the

latter and the Turks; and it may have been at this time that, as described in the history of Najd, he passed near to Kuwait in returning from a raid upon the tribes of Turkish 'Irāq.

Relations of Kuwait with 'Arabistān.

In 1841 the Ka'ab Shaikh Thāmir appears to have sought an asylum at Kuwait for the second time, having been expelled from his hereditary possessions in 'Arabistān by the Persian Governor of that province; but he soon migrated to Basrah.

British relations with Kuwait.

Official intercourse between the British Resident in the Gulf and the Shaikh of Kuwait appears to have been infrequent; but personal relations continued on an excellent footing. On his visit to Kuwait in 1863 Colonel Pelly, the Resident, accompanied by Dr. Colvill, arrived at Jahrah by land from Basrah on the 3rd of March; the next day he was conducted by Mubārak—a son of the ruler—to Kuwait, where he spent a couple of days with Shaikh Subāh; on the 7th of March, under arrangements made by the Shaikh, Colonel Pelly left Kuwait by sea for Turkish territory; and he passed two days, on the way there, in the Khors adjoining Bubiyān Island. Colonel Pelly's remarkable journey to Riyādh in the spring of 1865 was begun at Kuwait, where he spent several weeks, including one at Jahrah, in making his arrangements and awaiting the permission of the Wahhābi Amīr. The possible future of Kuwait as a commercial port and as a meeting-place of sea-borne and other trade, together with its suitability in certain circumstances for the site of a British telegraph station or coal dépôt, were clearly realised by Colonel Pelly, who even remarked, with extraordinary prescience, that Khor 'Abdullah might hereafter become the chief line of approach by steamer to the commercial capital of Turkish 'Irāq, and that its head might one day be connected by a railway with the Mediterranean. By April 1866 the steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company had begun to call frequently at Kuwait; but their visits were suspended soon after for political reasons which will presently be explained.

Relations of Kuwait with Turkey, 1840-63.

The relations of other powers with Kuwait were less close however than those, arising from contiguity, which were maintained by Turkey. In 1847 the example of the Shaikh of Kuwait was quoted by the Shaikh of Bahrain in justification of the latter's own avowed intention of placing himself, in certain conditions, "under the guardianship of the Porte." In 1863 Shaikh Subāh assured the Resident that the rulers of Kuwait had always been tributary to the Turkish Government; but it was ascertained by Colonel Pelly, from another source, that the use of a distinctive flag had at one time been practised by the Shaikh of Kuwait for some

years together, and that it had only been discontinued because trade carried on under it did not meet at Bombay with treatment so favourable as that under a recognised flag: the reason of discontinuance was thus the same as that which in 1847 inclined the Bahrain Shaikh also to seek the protection of Turkey. In 1863 there was no mention of tribute paid by Kuwait to Turkey, but complimentary presents of dates were sent to Kuwait by the Turks in token of their own suzerainty, and as payment for the supposed protection by the Shaikh of the mouth of Shatt-al-'Arab.

Dispute regarding the Sūfiyeh estate in Turkish territory.

In 1866 trouble arose out of the possession by Shaikh Subāh of Sūfiyeh, the estate on the Shatt-al-'Arab alleged to have been purchased by Shaikh Jābir from a member of the Zuhair family of Zubair some 30 years earlier.* This property was now sequestrated by a Turkish Qāim-Maqām in consequence of a claim, raised by the Zuhair, that the vendor had been owner of a share only and not of the whole of Sūfiyeh. At the same time Shaikh Subāh was required to expel from other lands, owned by him at Fāo, some cultivators who had immigrated from Persian territory. The Turkish officials from the first showed a strong prejudice in favour of the Zuhair claimants; and 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, who went to Basrah as his father's agent in the case, narrowly escaped being thrown into jail there because he refused to make payment, on his own responsibility, of the value of seven years' produce which the plaintiffs were held by the Turkish authorities to be entitled to receive. Eventually, however, the dispute was settled by the Wāli of Baghdād in favour of the Shaikh of Kuwait. The proceedings of the Turks in this case were regarded by the inhabitants of Kuwait as intended to bring them into collision with those of Zubair; but they were prepared for a conflict; and the British Agent at Basrah, in reporting the matter, remarked that "rather than submit to a Turkish Government at Kuwait the people to a man would abandon the place." The final order of the Wāli, upholding the Kuwait Shaikh's title to Sūfiyeh, was perhaps due to a report that Shaikh Subāh, with the object of attacking Zubair if the decision should go against him, had obtained a promise of countenance and armed support from the Wahhābi Amīr.

Designs of the Turks on Kuwait and suspension of the British steamer service, 1866.

In 1866 Nāmiq Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of 'Irāq, evinced intentions of converting the nominal suzerainty of the Porte over Kuwait into a real control; the arrival of two Turkish corvettes from Constantinople was looked for; and it was apprehended by Colonel Kemball, the British Resident at Baghdād, that "the prescriptive freedom of Kuwait"

* *Vide* page 1008 *ante*.

might shortly become a thing of the past. The visits of British merchant steamers to Kuwait were regarded with extreme jealousy by the Turkish authorities in 'Iráq, and the latter appeared to be collecting statistics to prove that the prosperity of Kuwait was injurious to Basrah. The Shaikh of Kuwait, alarmed at the prospects raised, begged that his town might not be made a port of call by British steamers; and a suspension of the service was accordingly recommended by Colonel Kemball.

SHAIKH 'ABDULLAH-BIN-SUBÁH.
1866-92.

From the death of his father, probably in 1866, until his own demise in 1892, Kuwait was ruled by 'Abdullah-bin-Subáh.

Relations of Kuwait with the Porte, 1866-92.

Participation of Kuwait in the Turkish expedition to Hasa, 1871.

During the whole period of his rule Shaikh 'Abdullah appears to have maintained very close relations with the Turks, and to have been an obedient and even enthusiastic instrument of Turkish policy. In 1870 or 1871 he became the medium of overtures from 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, the displaced Wahhábi Amir, for the assistance of the Turks. In 1870 he supplied sea transport, to the amount of about 300 native vessels, for the Turkish forces sent to conquer Hasa; he accompanied the expedition in person; and it was chiefly through his agency that the Shaikh of Dóhah in Qatar was persuaded to accept the Turkish flag.

Visit of Mid-hat Pásha to Kuwait, 1871.

When Mid-hat Pásha, Wáli of Baghdád, went on a tour of inspection to the new Hasa province at the end of the year, he halted on the way for one day at Kuwait, where he was said to have "installed" the Shaikh. The investiture of the latter was probably with the rank of Qáim-Maqám on the part of the Turkish Government, which he subsequently held; for, from language held by the Porte in 1901, it appeared that the Turkish Government considered Kuwait to have been annexed at the same time as Hasa.

Relations of Kuwait with the Wahhábis, 1866-92.

At some time between 1872 and 1874 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, a claimant of the Wahhábi Amirate whose attitude towards the Turks was

somewhat uncertain, was apparently permitted by the Shaikh to reside in the neighbourhood of Kuwait. In 1872, as related in the history of Najd, the town of Kuwait was threatened by the Wahhábi Amír Sa'úd; but the Shaikh, after drawing away his leading supporters, attacked him and put him to flight. About 1884 the Shaikh of Kuwait appeared to favour the cause of the Shammar Amír, who had then begun to commit aggression on the Wahhábis.

Relations of Kuwait with Great Britain, 1866-92.

British indifference to Kuwait affairs.

In the time of Shaikh 'Abdullah direct relations with Kuwait do not appear to have been cultivated by the British political authorities in the Persian Gulf; and the place was evidently regarded as under the exclusive influence, if not the sovereignty, of the Porte. In 1876 the Acting Political Resident, Colonel Prideaux, mentioned Kuwait along with Qatif and 'Oqair, as a Turkish port on the Arabian side of the Gulf. In 1888, in consequence of fears of an advance by the Turks against 'Omán, the British Ambassador at Constantinople was informed by Her Majesty's Government that they admitted the existence of Turkish jurisdiction on the Arabian coast as far south as Qatif and were anxious that it should be effectively exercised within those limits, but that beyond Qatif they considered the local chiefs to be independent; no communication, however, in this sense was made to the Porte at the time. The orders under which, as described in the history of Hasa, British naval officers were authorised, in 1881, to take measures even in Turkish territorial waters for the suppression of piracy were doubtless intended to apply to the littoral of Kuwait as well as to that of Hasa and Qatar.

Relations of Kuwait with Arab states and tribes, 1866-92.

Visit of Mubárak to Bahrain, 1889.

In 1869 the ex-Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain was deported to Kuwait; but he did not remain there long. In 1883 Mubárak, a younger half-brother of the Shaikh of Kuwait, paid a friendly visit to Bahrain, where he was warmly welcomed and hospitably treated and received many presents at his departure. Before this Mubárak had been occasionally employed by the Turks upon diplomatic errands, and the fact

caused his proceedings in Bahrain to be watched with attention; but it did not appear that his journey in this instance had any political motive.

Friction with the Bani Hājir, 1892.

In March 1892 an attack was made on the marauding Bani Hājir, probably in Hasa, by a relative of the Shaikh of Kuwait, who killed four of them and carried off a number of their camels and sheep; and somewhat later the Bani Hājir retaliated by surprising a Kuwait boat at night and killing two of the crew.

SHAIKH MUHAMMAD-BIN-SUBĀH.

1892-96.

Internal history of Kuwait, and relations with the Turks, 1892-96.

Shaikh 'Abdullah was succeeded by his full brother Muhammad, whose Shaikhship was short and, except for the manner of its ending, uneventful.

Despatch of a force to the aid of the Turks in Hasa, 1893.

Shaikh Muhammad was before long invited by the Turks to co-operate in restoring order in Hasa, where in 1892 serious troubles had broken out; and in March 1893 Mubārak-bin-Subāh arrived in Hasa for this purpose with a large force of Bedouins, having marched all the way by land from Kuwait.

Assassination of Shaikh Muhammad, 1896.

In May 1896 Shaikh Muhammad, along with his full brother Jarrāh, was assassinated in the interests of his half-brother Mubārak; Muhammad, it was said, fell by the hand of Mubārak himself, while Jarrāh was killed by another of the family, assisted by a man of the 'Ajmān tribe. It is not clear whether this event was due to public or domestic differences, or whether it was prompted solely by greed and ambition on the part of Mubārak. According to one account Shaikh Muhammad was generally unpopular as a ruler; and this much at least is certain, that the Kuwait public showed no signs of disapproval.

British relations with Kuwait, 1892-96.

Political status of Kuwait.

During the short period of Muhammad's rule British relations with Kuwait were still in abeyance, and there was no sign as yet of any

change in the views of the British Government regarding the political position of Kuwait. In April 1893 Sir C. Ford, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, stated officially to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government admitted the existence of Turkish sovereignty along the coast from Basrah to Qatif. In 1895, however, a piracy was committed in the Shatt-al-'Arab on the "Haripasa," a British-protected vessel; and, partly from the proceedings to which this case gave rise, but not before the death of Shaikh Muhammad, there arose a doubt in the mind of the British authorities as to the nature of the connection between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Turkish Government.

SHAIKH MUBĀRAK-BIN-SUBĀH,

from 1896.

General history of Kuwait from the accession of Shaikh Mubārak to the Exclusive Agreement with Britain, 1896-99.

During the first three years of his reign the position of Shaikh Mubārak, in danger as he was of revenge from members of his own family and without external support, seemed very precarious.

Proceedings of the sons of Muhammad and Jarrāh, 1896-98.

The sons of the murdered Shaikh Muhammad and his brother Jarrāh removed, after remaining a short time at Kuwait, to Turkish 'Irāq, where their cause was warmly taken up by their maternal relation * Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah (generally known as Yūsuf Bin-Ibrāhīm) of Dorah on the lower Shatt-al-'Arab, a wealthy merchant and landholder of the Basrah Wilāyat. Efforts were made by Yūsuf to interest the Wāli of Basrah and even Ibn-Rashīd, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, in the case of the young men, and no means of harassing Shaikh Mubārak was neglected. On the 30th of June 1897 a boat expedition, organised by Yūsuf on the coast of the Hindiyān district in Persia, appeared off

* The relationship was rather complicated. 'Ali-bin-Jābir, who was the youngest brother of Shaikh Subāh of Kuwait, married the youngest daughter of 'Ali-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ibrāhim, and had by her three daughters, of whom the eldest married Shaikh Muhammad and became the mother of his sons Subāh, Sa'ūd, Khālid and 'Adhbi, while the second married Jarrāh and bore a son Hamūd and a daughter who married her own first cousin Subāh-bin-Muhammad. An elder daughter of 'Ali-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ibrāhim married 'Abdullah, a first cousin of her own father, and became the mother of Yūsuf.

Kuwait; but it retired, as the place was found in a state of defence, without firing a shot. Possibly at the instigation of Yūsuf, the inhabitants of the Turkish frontier town of Zubair petitioned the Porte for the removal of Mubārak from Kuwait; and one of the sons of the late Shaikh Muhammad made overtures to the British political authorities, offering to accept British protection if his birthright was restored to him through their influence. In August 1897 Yūsuf was in Bahrain, having perhaps been obliged by the Turks to leave 'Iraq in consequence of his escapade at Kuwait, and solicited the good offices of the British Government; but he was told that no support could be given him against the Shaikh of Kuwait. Meanwhile Shaikh Mubārak had proposed that the question between his nephews and himself should be referred to the arbitration of the Shaikh of Bahrain; but, partly through the unwillingness of the Shaikh of Bahrain to act as arbitrator, this suggestion, to which the Government of India were ready to agree, came to nothing. During 1897 and 1898 it was frequently reported that an attack on Kuwait by the Shaikh's nephews was impending; but Mubārak, with great steadiness, professed his ability to repulse any attempt that might be made.

Attitude of the Turkish authorities towards Shaikh Mubārak.

The attitude of the Turks towards Shaikh Mubārak was for a considerable time one of neutrality. His usurpation of the Shaikhship had been represented to the Porte by Hamdi Pāsha, then Wāli of Basrah for the first time, as a favourable opportunity for establishing close Turkish control over Kuwait; and, though Mubārak on his accession had professed loyalty to the Sultān and even hoisted the Turkish flag, as was observed by the officer commanding H.M.S. "Sphinx" at a visit to Kuwait in July 1896, his fate, as regarded Turkish recognition, remained for long in suspense. On one side were ranged the influence of the Shaikh's nephews and of their relations and the political considerations urged by the Wāli of Basrah; on the other were the bribes lavished by Shaikh Mubārak on Rajab Pāsha, Mushir of the Baghdād Army Corps, on the Shaikh-ul-Islām and Shaikh 'Abul Huda at Constantinople, and on others; and these last in the end prevailed. Meanwhile, however, the Wāli's policy of administrative absorption was not altogether rejected; and in February 1897, in anticipation of a resolution passed in that year by the Board of Health at Constantinople, a Turkish quarantine official arrived at Kuwait and took up his residence there, *à titre provisoire*, without any protest, so far as is known, on the part of the Shaikh. At length, in December 1897, Muhsin Pasha, who had replaced Hamdi Pasha as Wāli of Basrah, was informed by telegram of

the appointment of Shaikh Mubārak by Imperial Irādé to the Qāim-Maqāmship of Kuwait; the Shaikh's name began to appear in the official almanac of the Wilāyat, and his correspondence with Basrah to be carried on, under that style; and an annual allowance of 150 Kārahs of dates was assigned to him, which was subsequently, it would seem, commuted into a cash salary of about £300 a year.

Hostility of the Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar, 1897-98.

Besides the constant danger from his own relations, Shaikh Mubārak had before long to face a wide but ineffectual combination contrived by Yūsuf Bin-Ibrāhim of Dorah during his visit to Bahrain in the summer of 1897. In September of that year it was reported that Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar, was making preparations for an attack on Kuwait by land and sea in conjunction with the Shaikh's nephews, and was endeavouring to draw Ibn-Rashīd into the scheme and to detach the 'Ajmān tribe from Shaikh Mubārak. In the beginning of November this attack, though discountenanced by the Turks, seemed to be on the point of execution; but eventually it did not take place. On the other hand the Shaikh of Kuwait inflicted some loss on the Bani Hājir tribe, who were among the adherents of the Shaikh of Dōhah; and early in 1898 a small rising against the Turks took place at Dōhah, which was attributed to a belief that the attack by the Kuwait Shaikh on the Bani Hājir had been instigated by the Turkish authorities.

In November 1898 the Naqīb of Basrah was sent by the Turks to arrange a settlement between the two Shaikhs; but his mission was a failure.

British doubts as to the nature of the connection between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Turkish Government, 1896-97.

By these and other events the attention of the British Government was gradually attracted to Kuwait; and an opinion began to gain ground among British officials that the connection of the Turkish Government with Kuwait was less close than, in recent times, had generally been supposed. An absurd rumour which obtained currency in Palace circles at Constantinople in 1896, that the murder of his brothers by Mubārak had been instigated by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, led to enquiries being made by the British Embassy in the Turkish capital; and these showed that there were persons, even there, who asserted Kuwait to be entirely independent of the Porte. At the end of 1896, the case of the "Haripass" piracy being then under consideration, it was suggested that the Shaikh of Kuwait, for reasons described in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, should be held accountable; but this proposal did not commend itself to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. Sir P. Currie thought that the Shaikh of Kuwait,

while he acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte, was in reality an independent potentate and only nominally subject to the Sultan; but the Government of India, considering that for practical reasons such a view was to be voided, were inclined, early in 1897, to advise that the responsibility for the actions of the Shaikh should be fixed upon the Turkish Government. At length, in consequence of information supplied at Constantinople in March 1897 by Captain Whyte, who had shortly before been Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, Sir P. Currie enquired the view of Her Majesty's Government regarding Turkish authority at Kuwait. He was informed in reply that Her Majesty's Government had never admitted Kuwait to be under the protection of the Turkish Government, but that the existence of Turkish influence would probably be difficult or impossible to deny.

Overtures of the Shaikh for British protection, February-August 1897.

No remonstrances on the crime by which he had attained the chiefship were ever addressed to Shaikh Mubárak by the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; but the Shaikh in July 1896, when his port was visited by H.M.S. "Sphinx," showed evident signs of alarm, declined to visit the ship, and made evasive replies to questions about his use of the Turkish flag. The impression formed by Commander Baker on this visit was that Kuwait, in theory an independent principality, had fallen greatly under Turkish influence, especially since the accession of Mubárak. Matters remained unchanged until February 1897, the month in which the Turks sent a sanitary official to Kuwait, when Shaikh Mubarak suddenly requested an interview with Colonel Wilson, the Political Resident, or with an agent deputed by him. In view of the rumours that had prevailed at Constantinople a few months previously concerning British interference at Kuwait the matter was referred to Her Majesty's Government, who replied that the interview might be granted, subject to the discretion of the Political Resident; and shortly afterwards it became known that the object of Shaikh Mubárak was to ask for British protection. Meanwhile the "Haripasa" piracy case had been proceeding; and at the beginning of May, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, the Resident in the Gulf was directed to warn the Shaikh of Kuwait, when he should meet him, that his responsibility would be enforced if his subjects were not restrained in the future from committing attacks upon British Baghlahs: this order was the first sign of a changed view of the political position of the Shaikh of Kuwait on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Towards the middle of July, or about three weeks after the attack attempted

by Yûsuf of Dorah on Kuwait, no interview having as yet taken place between the Resident and Shaikh Mubârak, it became known that a delegate from the Shaikh had arrived in Bahrain and was on his way to visit the Resident, Colonel Meade, at Bûshehr; but, on hearing that Yûsuf of Dorah was also expected in Bahrain, this individual returned to Kuwait without accomplishing his mission. Meanwhile another case of piracy occurred in the vicinity of Kuwait.

Mr. Gaskin's visit to Kuwait, September 1897.

In August Mubârak represented that he had no one sufficiently intelligent to send as a representative to Bûshehr and asked that a delegate from the Residency to whom he could explain his views might be sent to visit him. In accordance with his wish Mr. J. C. Gaskin, Extra Assistant to the Resident, was deputed to Kuwait in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence," and arrived there on the 5th of September 1897. Shaikh Mubârak, whose negotiations for recognition by the Porte were still pending, declined to go on board the "Lawrence" lest by doing so he should give offence to the Turkish authorities; and two interviews, at both of which Captain Hewett of the "Lawrence" was present, took place on shore. As regards piracy at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, the Shaikh denied that subjects of Kuwait had ever engaged in piracy, but he admitted that some of the inhabitants of his estates on the banks o the river, over whom he had no control, might be guilty; he had, he said, offered to police the river mouth, but the Turks had declined to allow him to do so, and Kuwait boats were now unable to visit the Shatt-al-'Arab unless in twos and threes for mutual protection; to the best of his ability, however, he would co-operate with the British Government for the suppression of piracy. With reference to his own overtures, which it was the principal object of Mr. Gaskin's visit to investigate, Shaikh Mubârak stated that he and his people, in order to prevent the annexation of Kuwait by the Turks, who had shown themselves grasping and unreliable, desired to be taken under British protection in the same manner as the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omân; and he promised that, if this were done, he would assist the British Government with all the force at his command in maintaining law and order in his part of the Gulf.

Overtures of the Shaikh declined by the British Government, October 1897.

The request of the Shaikh was at once reported to Her Majesty's Government, who replied that they were not disposed to bring Kuwait under protection or to interfere more than was necessary for the maintenance of the general peace in the Persian Gulf. A few days later, on the 20th of October, in consequence of a report that a Turkish gunboat was about to leave Basrah for Kuwait, the question was again raised

by the Government of India, who mentioned that Kuwait appeared to be a centre of piracy * and an emporium of the slave trade, and enquired whether, in these circumstances, a modification of policy might not be desirable; but the Secretary of State for India adhered to his original instructions, adding that there was nothing in the political situation of Kuwait to hamper naval officers in bringing home to the Shaikh his responsibility for piratical acts.

Overtures of the Shaikh renewed, November 1897.

In November 1897, when an attack on Kuwait by Shaikh Jásim of Qatar and Yúsuf of Dorah was believed to be imminent, H.M.S. "Pigeon" was sent to Kuwait to watch events, the commander being instructed not to interfere unless British interests were directly menaced; and Shaikh Mubárak seized the opportunity to repeat his request for British protection.

Danger to Kuwait from Russia and Turkey, 1898.

At length, in 1898, circumstances arose which compelled the British Government to consider measures for the exclusion of foreign influence from Kuwait. There was reason to think that the Russian Government wished to establish a coaling station at that place; and attempts were being made to obtain from the Porte a concession in favour of Count Kapnist, a Russian subject, for the construction of a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, a scheme which, in the absence of any arrangement between the British Government and the Shaikh, might end in the creation of Russian territorial rights at Kuwait. At the same time, notwithstanding the recent recognition of Shaikh Mubárak as Qáim-Maqám, tension of which the causes were not evident appeared to exist between the Shaikh and the Turkish authorities; the appointment of a Turkish Commission to investigate complaints against the Shaikh was reported; and rumours began to circulate of the possible despatch of a Turkish force from Basrah by sea to Kuwait.

The Exclusive Agreement with Britain, 23rd January 1899.

Orders of Her Majesty's Government.

In January 1899, with a view to forestalling Russian action, it was decided by Her Majesty's Government that an engagement on the model of the Agreement of 20th March 1891 by the Sultán of 'Omán should be obtained from the Shaikh of Kuwait, binding him and his successors

* The correctness of this allegation seems to be doubtful; there may have been some confusion between Kuwait and the Shaikh's estates in Turkish 'Iraq. At no time before or since have there been complaints of piracy by inhabitants of Kuwait

not to alienate any portion of his territory to foreigners without the consent of the British Government; and it was hoped that, in this manner, the necessity of taking overt steps towards the establishment of a British protectorate would be avoided. The consideration to be offered the Shaikh was a single payment of £5,000 or less, or an annual subsidy not exceeding £200.

Signature and terms of the Agreement, 23rd January 1899.

Under these orders Colonel Meade, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, proceeded in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" to Kuwait, where he arrived on the 21st of January 1899; the Turkish corvette "Zuhāf" was then in the harbour, but she left on the following day. On the 23rd of January the desired Agreement was signed by Shaikh Mubārak, who in it pledged himself, his heirs and his successors not to receive the agent or representative of any foreign power or government at Kuwait, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for occupation, or for any other purpose, any portion of his territory to the government or subjects of any other power without the previous consent of the British Government. This last obligation was to extend to any portion of the Shaikh's territory which might at the time be in the possession of the subjects of any other government. Hamūd and Jābir, the brothers of Mubārak, were present at the signature of the Agreement, but they refused to attest it as they disapproved of its terms; the Shaikh, however, assured Colonel Meade that the concurrence of his brothers was not necessary to make the Agreement binding on his successors.

Letter supplementary to the Agreement, 23rd January 1899.

A letter was then given to the Shaikh by Colonel Meade, in which, on behalf of the British Government, he assured the Shaikh, his heirs and his successors of the good offices of the British Government, so long as they on their part should continue to observe the obligations of the Agreement. In this document the secret character of the Agreement was emphasized, and payment was promised of a sum of Rs. 15,000 which had been fixed as the consideration for its execution.*

Explanation of unauthorised conditions.

It was subsequently explained by Colonel Meade that the condition against the reception of foreign representatives was inserted by him because Shaikh Mubārak stated that advances had been made to him by the French, and that the reference to territory already in the possession of foreign subjects was intended, primarily, to guard against the transfer of house property owned by Turkish subjects at Kuwait to Russians or others.

* The text of both Agreement and letter will be found in Annexure No. 1 to this chapter.

Ratification of the Agreement, 16th February 1899.

Her Majesty's Government, on the proceedings being reported to them, approved the action of the Resident and authorised ratification of the Agreement, notwithstanding that it went beyond what they had intended; and it was accordingly ratified on the 16th of February. A hope was also held out to Shaikh Mubárak, under the orders of the Secretary of State, that the British authorities would do what they could to protect his interests and those of his brothers in the matter of their estates at Fáo, a share in which was claimed by the nephews in Turkish territory. Of the sum of £1,000 paid to Shaikh Mubárak half was contributed by the Home Government and half was charged to Indian revenues.

General history of Kuwait from the Exclusive Agreement to the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, 1899-1904.

Attempts by Turkey to assert authority at Kuwait and resistance of the Shaikh. January-September 1899.

The next few months witnessed strenuous efforts by the Turkish authorities at Basrah, possibly due to their having become aware of the Shaikh's Agreement with Britain, to assert themselves at Kuwait; Shaikh Mubárak on his part showed a new intractability in his dealings with the Turks; and a rather strained situation arose. On the occasion of Colonel Meade's visit to Kuwait objections were made by the Turkish sanitary *préposé* there, an ordinary Arab, to the landing of the Resident's party from the "Lawrence," as being a breach of the Turkish sanitary regulations. They were disregarded, and a protest by the Turkish Government followed, but had no result. In February 1899 a movement against Kuwait by sea was apprehended on the part of the Turks, and the question of protective measure was considered by Her Majesty's Government, who decided that in case of need a serious warning should be addressed to the Porte, and that until this had been done no forcible action should be taken by British ships. In March the state of affairs seemed so critical that the Government of India caused H.M.S. "Lapwing" to be stationed for a time in the neighbourhood of Kuwait, and the employment of a secret newswriter at Kuwait was sanctioned. In the same month, the Russian gun-vessel "Gilyak" called at Kuwait, and the Russian Consul from Baghdád, who was on board, had an ordinary interview with the Shaikh. In May Shaikh Mubárak, who now appeared anxious to precipitate matters with the Turks, established regular customs at Kuwait and began to realise an enhanced duty of 5 per cent. on all imports, including those from

Basrah and other Turkish ports which had hitherto passed altogether free. On the 2nd of September a Turkish harbour-master, with five soldiers, arrived to take charge of the port of Kuwait; but the Shaikh declined to receive him, and he was obliged to return to Basrah the next day; instructions, however, reached Basrah from Constantinople that the matter should not be dropped. Next it was reported that the Turks intended to establish a customs house at Kuwait and to connect Fão with Qatif by a telegraph through Kuwait, and that the Turkish military authorities were demanding forcible action against Kuwait.

Warning by the British Government to the Porte, September 1899.

In consequence of these indications of a forward Turkish policy, a warning was in September 1899 conveyed to the Porte by the British Ambassador at Constantinople under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government: it was to the effect that the British Government, while they entertained no designs on Kuwait, had friendly relations with the Shaikh; and that, if any attempt were made to establish Turkish authority or customs control at Kuwait without previous agreement with Her Majesty's Government, a very inconvenient and disagreeable question would be raised. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply gave assurances that the reception of a harbour-master by the Shaikh would not be pressed any further; that there was no intention of establishing an Ottoman custom house at Kuwait; and that no military expedition against Kuwait was contemplated, for, though operations had been proposed by the Wâli, the Sultân had withheld his sanction. Later it was represented to the British Ambassador that his language had greatly disturbed the Sultân, who regarded it as indicative of a desire on the part of the British Government to interfere with Turkish liberty of action in Turkish territory; but Sir N. O'Conor, while avoiding the direct issue—that of the dependence of Kuwait on Turkey—reiterated the warning already given; and the matter was dropped for a time. The Wâli of Basrah also was cautioned, through the local British Consul, not to take hostile action against Kuwait.

Dalliance of the Shaikh with Persia, October 1899.

In the following month, October 1899, it was ascertained that Shaikh Mubârak had undoubtedly applied through the Shaikh of Muhammareh to be taken under the protection of Persia; but this move, which the Shaikh took no pains to conceal, was perhaps contrived by him merely to test the degree of interest taken by the British Government in Kuwait. His advances were rejected by the Shâh.

Change of Wâli at Basrah, 1899.

Meanwhile Mubârak had taken precautions, by means of intrigues at Basrah, to counteract the more dangerous results of his uncompromis-

ing policy towards Turkey; and, acting in concert with the Naqîb of Basrah, he succeeded in procuring the removal of Hamdi Pâsha, the Wâli of the day, an honest but unpopular official, and the appointment in his place in autumn 1899 of Muhsin Pâsha, a military officer, who was prepared to represent Kuwait affairs to the Porte in a new light. One of the chief dangers which Shaikh Mubârak had at this time to avoid was arrest while making an official visit to Basrah in person,—a mark of submission on which the Turkish Government strongly insisted. Muhsin Pâsha played his part well; and not only were no further encroachments on the Shaikh's independence attempted by the Turks for more than a year and a half, but, as we shall presently see, Mubârak safely paid the required visit to Turkish territory, received a Turkish official decoration from the Sultân, and was enabled to harass with impunity the Turkish vassal Ibn-Rashîd of Najd, and even to invade and temporarily occupy a part of his principality.

Visit of a German Railway Commission to Kuwait, January 1900.

Before these occurrences, however, a German Commission visited Kuwait in search of a suitable terminus for the projected Baghdâd Railway; it was headed by Herr Stemrich, the German Consul-General at Constantinople; and, but for the Agreement of 1899, concluded chiefly in view of a similar Russian project, and a warning conveyed to the Shaikh by the Commander of H.M.S. "Melpomene" that he should make no arrangement with the Commission without the approval of the Government of India, the incident might have had results prejudicial to the position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. From Mubârak's account of his interview with the Commission, which took place at Kuwait on the 19th of January 1900, corroborated as it was by a subsequent report of the Commission itself, it seems that the Shaikh expressed himself unfavourably as regards the establishment of a railway terminus within his jurisdiction, and that he made it clear to the members of the Commission that the real control of the country rested with himself and not with the Sultân of Turkey. The Commission apparently tried to open negotiations with him for the sale of Kâdhamah at the head of Kuwait bay and for the lease of the lands surrounding Kawaikib and Ghadhai,—a scheme involving the acquisition in all of a plot of about 20 square miles; but their intentions were frustrated by Mubârak's strict observance of his obligations to the British Government, in which he was probably fortified by a doubt of the good faith of the Commission, and by a suspicion that their proposals might be a skilfully disguised movement on the part of the Turks. At

Basrah the head of the Commission had given out that it was the intention of the promoters of the railway to deal with Turkey direct and to ignore the Shaikh of Kuwait.

British declaration to Turkey and Germany in regard to in Kuwait, April 1900.

These proceedings of the Baghdād Railway Commission made it necessary that the views of Britania in regard to Kuwait should be stated clearly to the Porte and the German Government. Accordingly, on the 15th April 1900, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in the course of an interview with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, insisted on the fact that, although the British Government did not wish to interfere with the Sultān's authority in the Persian Gulf, still they were desirous of maintaining the *status quo*, and could not view with indifference any action which would alter it or give to another power rights or privileges over territory belonging to the Shaikh of Kuwait. On the same day Sir N. O'Conor saw the German Ambassador, and, in order that no doubt should remain in his mind, placed before him in explicit terms the British position with reference to Kuwait, making it clear that the Shaikh was not at liberty to cede or in any way to alienate to the Baghdād Railway Company either Kūdhamah or any part of his territory, without the consent of Her Majesty's Government.

Outbreak of hostilities in Central Arabia, 1900.

We may now resume the main thread of our narrative. In the summer of 1900 there began a series of movements which led, first, to a remarkable incursion by Mubārak into the very heart of Central Arabia, and eventually to the restoration of the Wahhābi dynasty in Southern Najd. Since 1897, 'Abdur Rahmān Ibn-Sa'ūd, the rival in Najd of 'Abdur 'Aziz Ibn-Rashīd, had been residing at Kuwait as a pensioner of the Shaikh,—a circumstance in itself sufficient to predispose Ibn-Rashīd to enmity against Mubārak. The natural resentment of the Shammar Amir against the harbourer of his enemy had doubtless been inflamed by Mubārak's fugitive nephews and Yūsuf of Dorah, who early sought Ibn-Rashīd's assistance and by 1900 appeared to have become his permanent clients. How exactly hostilities in the interior commenced is uncertain; this much is known, that Ibn-Sa'ūd departed from Kuwait in August 1900 and in the following month, having achieved some substantial successes, appealed to his protector Mubārak for reinforcements. About the same time or a little later, from his haunt on the Euphrates, Sa'dūn Pāsha, a Muntafik outlaw of Turkish 'Irāq, raided some of the nearer tribes dependent on Ibn-Rashīd; and indications were not wanting of his having acted, in this matter, in collusion with the Shaikh of Kuwait. Shaikh Mubārak himself was absent from his capital while the French Government vessel "Drome" was at Kuwait

from the 14th to the 16th of October; and at the end of the month, when Colonel Kemball, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, called at Kuwait with orders to impress on the Shaikh the advisability of abstaining from action that might afford a pretext for Turkish interference, Mubārak was still invisible. In the light of what followed it is not unreasonable to conclude that at the time he was actively employed in the desert in forwarding the interests of his protégé Ibn-Sa'ūd.

Intervention of the Wāli of Basrah, November 1900.

At the end of October 1900 Ibn-Rashīd appeared at Samāwah on the Euphrates with a large following; he demanded of the Turkish Government redress for the injuries inflicted on his subjects by Sa'dūn, satisfaction from the Shaikh of Kuwait, and justice for the nephews of the latter; and he threatened to attack Kuwait if his requests were not conceded. Meanwhile Shaikh Mubārak had effected a junction with Sa'dūn, and an armed collision between the allies and Ibn-Rashīd appeared to be imminent, when the Turks suddenly intervened with marked success. Through the influence of Saiyid Ahmad and Saiyid Tālib, sons of the Naqīb of Basrah, Ibn Rashīd was persuaded to return home and Shaikh Mubārak to meet the Wāli of Basrah at Rāfidhīyah, a country house of the Naqīb near Zubair; while Sa'dūn, by other means, was induced to vanish temporarily from the scene. On the 17th of November Mubārak came in with the Wāli, his friend Muhsin Pāsha, to Basrah, where he passed the following day, received the order of the Mejidieh of the second class, and promised to abstain from relations with "foreign powers;" and by the 24th of the month he had returned in safety to Kuwait. The Turkish demand for an official visit by the Shaikh had thus been satisfied and a decided triumph achieved by Muhsin Pāsha, who, besides averting a serious crisis, had successfully asserted the authority of the Porte over two of the principal chiefs in Arabia.

Invasion of Central Arabia by the Shaikh of Kuwait, December 1900—March 1901.

But the arrangement thus concluded was a hollow one, for the Shaikh's submission was feigned, and he was in reality on the point of adopting an audacious and independent policy. Ibn-Rashīd was now harrying the Bedouin adherents of Kuwait in the Dahānah and Summān deserts; and, on the 18th of December 1900, Mubārak, after announcing that he could not abstain from hostilities while Yūsuf of Dorah was harboured by Ibn-Rashīd, placed himself at the head of his forces and marched on Hafar, where the enemy was supposed to be encamped. The Kuwait force was composed mainly of 'Awāzim, Rashāidah, Mutair, 'Ajmān, Banī Hājir and Banī Khālid Bedouins; but it included also a number, estimated at 1,000, of

Kuwait townsmen and refugees from Najd. At the beginning of February 1901 the Shaikh was compelled, by the defection of some of his Mutair allies, to fall back into the neighbourhood of Kuwait; but the check was of short duration. He had before this been informed by letter of the desire of the British Government that he should abstain from compromising displays of activity; and, as he had disregarded the advice, it was thought inexpedient to repeat it. The account of his subsequent Central Arabian expedition will be found in the history of Najd. At the outset it was a brilliant success: Qasīm was occupied; the son of Ibn-Sa'ūd was appointed titular governor of Riyādh; some members of the family of Ibn-Rashīd entered into negotiations with the triumphant invader; and Mubārak strengthened his position among his Bedouin adherents by espousing a daughter of Sultān-ad-Dawīsh, a leading chief of the Mutair. A severe engagement, however, which took place on the 17th of March at Sarīf, about 20 miles north-east of Buraidah in Qasīm, though it was attended by heavy loss on both sides, so altered the aspect of affairs that Shaikh Mubārak was obliged to beat a hasty retreat from Najd. Much anxiety prevailed in Kuwait and rumours that the Shaikh himself was among the slain had obtained currency there, when, on the 31st of March, he regained his capital safe and unwounded, followed at an interval of four days by Ibn-Sa'ūd and Sa'dūn. The dispersed Kuwaitan army straggled home in small detachments during the following month; but there were at least 50 * who never returned, among them the Shaikh's brother Hamūd with his son Subāh and the Shaikh's nephew Khalīfah, all of whom fell in the battle of the 17th March.

Visit of the Wāli of Basrah to Kuwait and request of the Shaikh for British protection, May 1901.

The seriousness of the situation created by this adventure was quickly brought home to the Shaikh. It seemed to be the intention of the Turkish Government to make the Mushīr of Baghdād their agent in investigating the affair from their side,—a measure which would have deprived Shaikh Mubārak of the benefit of his understanding with Muhsin Pāsha and might even have brought that official himself into trouble; but, for the time being, the negotiations remained in the hands of the Wāli. Muhsin Pāsha was the guest of the Shaikh at Kuwait from the 19th to the 23rd of May 1901, and he took advantage of Mubārak's dejection and alarm to press on him the acceptance of a Turkish military garrison at Kuwait. The Shaikh, however, while he treated his visitor with respect and courtesy and even accompanied him

* Possibly the loss was greater than 50. Local tradition already had it in 1907 that no less than 700 townsmen of Kuwait fell, of whom 150 were put to death as prisoners, in cold blood, after the battle!

as far as Fáo on his return voyage to Basrah, retained firmness enough to concede nothing; but he felt a greater need of support after the insidious attempt just made to beguile him into surrendering his independence; and on the 28th of May, through the commander of H. M. S. "Sphinx," he approached the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf with a request that the British Government would assume a permanent protectorate over Kuwait as soon as possible. Meanwhile, it is certain, he had also held communication with the Russian Consul-General at Baghdad. The declaration of a British protectorate over Kuwait, involving as it must large international questions and responsibility in future for controlling the actions of the Shaikh, did not recommend itself to His Majesty's Government; and at the end of June the proposal was rejected. Overtures for British protection received from Ibn-Rashid about the same time were similarly repelled.

Incident at Kuwait and arrangement between Britain and Turkey to maintain the *status quo* there, August—September 1901.

While the Shaikh of Kuwait's request was still under discussion the attitude of the Turks grew menacing. A considerable military force, of which the destination was at the time believed to be Kuwait, was assembling on the Euphrates; and the Sultán of Turkey, under the influence of the German and Russian Embassies at Constantinople, was urging the Wali of Basrah by telegram to arrange for the establishment at Kuwait, by pacific means, of a custom house and telegraph office, as tangible proofs of Ottoman authority. To meet these dangers the commander of the British gunboat "Perseus," then at Kuwait, was authorised under instructions from His Majesty's Government to prevent, by force if necessary, the landing of Turkish troops; and Colonel Kemball, the Political Resident, who visited Kuwait for the purpose, gave Shaikh Mubárak a qualified assurance of support, conditional on his continuing to observe the Agreement of 1899. On the 24th of August 1901 the Turkish sloop-of-war "Zuháf," heavily laden with stores, entered Kuwait harbour, where the "Perseus" was already lying; and the Turkish commander was immediately warned by the commander of the "Perseus" of the order against the landing of Turkish troops. On the 25th of August the Turkish officer had an interview with the Shaikh, at which he tried in vain to obtain from him an admission of Ottoman sovereignty; he then left for Fáo, threatening the Shaikh with future punishment. Protests against the action of the "Perseus" were soon received in London from the German and Turkish Ambassadors; in that presented by Turkey the British Agreement of 1899 was declared to be invalid, as having been made with a Turkish official. The British reply

was, in both cases, that His Majesty's Government had no desire to disturb the *status quo* at Kuwait; and, on the 9th of September, the controversy between the British Government and the Porte regarding Kuwait was closed, to all appearance, by a mutual engagement to respect the *status quo*.

Panic at Kuwait on the approach of Ibn-Rashíd, September—October 1901.

While the discussions just described were proceeding in Europe Ibn-Rashíd was not inactive. At the end of September 1901 his partisans raided a camp of the Rashāïdah not far from Jahrah; and, though eventually driven off, they succeeded in carrying away a considerable booty and killed several men of a Kuwait force which was sent against them. The Bedouin inhabitants of the whole country-side then flocked into the neighbourhood of Kuwait town for protection, and a huge camp was formed, containing thousands of Bedouins with their flocks and herds, which extended along the coast as far as Rās-al-Ardh; but, a second raid by Ibn-Rashíd's men in the neighbourhood of Jabal 'Amūdah and Rās Misha'āb having proved less successful than the first, the invaders retired towards Central Arabia, and the enormous gathering of refugees at Kuwait melted away as suddenly as it had formed. Ibn-Rashíd lingered for some time longer at Hafar, and his protracted stay there, taken in conjunction with the proceedings of the Turks, caused Shaikh Mubārak much uneasiness. During this disturbed period several British gunboats were held in readiness at or near Kuwait; the naval authorities were empowered by the Government of India to use force to repel an attack by Ibn-Rashíd; and a scheme for the defence of the town was arranged by the Senior Naval Officer. The experience gained and the observations made on this occasion showed that Kuwait was not defensible against a land attack by naval means alone. Shaikh Mubārak, in return for the good offices exercised on his behalf, was required to promise compliance with such British advice as might be given him, and he did so.

Crisis at Kuwait due to attempts by Turkey to upset the *status quo*, November-December 1901.

At the middle of November 1901, Ibn-Rashíd having in the meantime moved down from Hafar to Safwān, a place on the frontier between Turkish 'Irāq and Kuwait, the Naqīb of Basrah visited Kuwait with a telegram from the Sultān of Turkey. In this telegram the Wāli of Basrah was directed to send the Naqīb to interview Shaikh Mubārak and warn him that his course of action was rash and impious, and that he should seek safety by returning to his religious duty and propitiating the Sultān. According to one account, Shaikh Mubārak in reply made commonplace professions of loyalty to the Porte and complained of the doings of Ibn-Rashíd and Yūsuf of Dorah; but the Naqīb seems to have reported to his own Government that the Shaikh repudiated the suzerainty of the Sultān and that he had referred the

Turkish authorities to the British Government. In consequence of a representation by the British Ambassador at Constantinople these proceedings of the Naqib were disavowed by the Porte. A more determined effort to upset the *status quo*, the maintenance of which had so lately received the assent of the Ottoman Government, was made a fortnight later, when on the 1st of December the "Zuhāf," carrying the Naqib and a brother of the Wāli of Basrah, once more steamed into Kuwait harbour, the British cruiser "Pomone" and gunboat "Redbreast" being then anchored in the bay. A Turkish ultimatum was presented to the Shaikh, requiring him either to receive at Kuwait a Turkish military detachment—which, it was promised, should be under his own orders—or to leave Kuwait and retire to Constantinople or its neighbourhood; and great stress appears to have been laid on the alternative demand. On the 3rd of December three days' grace was obtained by the Shaikh in order that he might consider his reply; but on the 4th of December, the "Redbreast" having left with correspondence for Būshehr, this concession was withdrawn, and Mubārak was informed that he must give his answer immediately. The "Sphinx" having arrived from Būshehr without a written guarantee of protection from the Resident, such as he had hoped might be given, Mubārak evidently wavered; but, under pressure from the senior naval officer present at Kuwait, he at length informed the Sultān's messengers that he was prevented from giving a reply by threats of force on the part of the British naval authorities—a statement which Captain Simons personally confirmed in the presence of the Turkish emissaries. The Naqib and the Wāli's brother, finding their purpose frustrated, then withdrew on board the "Zuhāf," which took her departure early the next morning; while Captain Simons, as a precaution, spent the night at the Shaikh's house. Not until the 6th of December, when the crisis was already past, did the orders of His Majesty's Government reach Kuwait: they were to the effect that, as the Naqib's action amounted to a breach of the understanding between Turkey and Britain, His Majesty's Government would support the Shaikh and would not tolerate an attack by Turkish troops or ships on Kuwait, that the Shaikh should not leave Kuwait, and that he should continue to observe his engagements with the British Government. This message was received with much satisfaction by the Shaikh, who communicated it to all his principal men. About the time of the Naqib's mission, or possibly after its return, Muhsin Pasha was superseded in the Walíship of Basrah.

Attack on Kuwait threatened by the Turks and Ibn-Rashid and preparations made by a British naval force to defend Jahrah and Kuwait, December 1901—January 1902.

The proceedings of the Turkish agents at Kuwait were immediately repudiated at Constantinople by both Porte and Palace. Nevertheless, towards the end of December 1901, the continued presence of Ibn-Rashid with a part of his forces in the vicinity of Basrah, his constant communications with the Wāli and the Mushir, his orders for great quantities of supplies, and instructions which were sent from Constantinople to provide him with a large sum of money from the Basrah treasury, then empty, caused lively apprehensions to be entertained of a land attack on Kuwait by the combined forces of the Turks and the Amir; and simultaneously a prohibition of the export of goods from Basrah to Kuwait came into force, confirming these fears. Dispositions were instantly made by the British naval force at Kuwait to co-operate in the defence of the town; two Nordenfeldts and two Maxims were temporarily placed in the Shaikh's fort at Jahrah near the foot of Kuwait bay; and on the 1st of January 1902 the "Fox" and "Perseus" were ordered from Bombay to join the "Pomone," "Sphinx" and "Redbreast," which were already at Kuwait, with extra guns. Ibn-Rashid, deterred by these significant measures or perhaps held back by the Turks, did not approach any nearer, and he was soon reported to have withdrawn as far as the wells of Lainah in his own country, whereupon the general alarm subsided and the naval guns which had been landed were re-embarked. The crisis at Kuwait was witnessed by the Russian protected cruiser "Varyag," which arrived on the 21st December 1901 and left again on the 24th, after offers made to the Shaikh "to assist him in maintaining his independence."

Occupation of Safwān, Umm Qasr and Būbiyān Island by the Turks, 1902.

The Turks, however, had not abandoned their determination to coerce, by one means or another, the ruler of Kuwait; and the cessation of their activity in one direction was followed by an advance in another, which indicated a change in their tactics and initiated a new phase of the Kuwait question. A report having been received that Turkish military posts had lately been established at Umm Qasr and Safwān, the despatch of a British gunboat to Khor 'Abdullah and Khor-as-Sabiyah to verify the facts was authorised. This duty was carried out by H.M.S. "Sphinx," which left Kuwait on the 14th February 1902 and returned within a week after ascertaining that a Turkish post of 40 men existed at Umm Qasr and a larger garrison at Safwān; in the course of his cruise Commander Kemp collected important data regarding Khor 'Abdullah, the extreme value of which in relation to railway projects had not previously been realised; and on his return journey he discovered a Turkish outpost of 20 men upon the eastern side of Būbiyān

Island, where it had been established only a fortnight before. In March the Turkish garrison of Basrah was largely increased, and it was feared that the occupation of Huqaijah and possibly of Sabiyah, two places on the mainland opposite to the west side of Bûbiyân, was contemplated; by way of forestalling such a movement Shaikh Mubârak was advised to occupy Huqaijah effectively, which he did by placing 40 men there. About the same time it transpired at Constantinople that the Turks no longer regarded Kâdhamah in Kuwait bay as the probable terminus of the Baghdâd railway; and it was reported that their attention had now been directed, in this connection, to Khor 'Abdullah and its branches. His Majesty's Government considered that, on the information available as to previous ownership, it would neither be safe to contend that the establishment of Turkish posts at Umm Qasr and on Bûbiyân was a breach of the *status quo* nor justifiable to demand their abolition; but the Porte were informed that their occupation of those places could not be regarded as prejudicing the rights of the Shaikh of Kuwait. Incidentally, in the course of these discussions, His Majesty's Government informed the Government of India that they acknowledged Kuwait to be a part of the Ottoman dominions, subject however to the qualifications on which they had always insisted, *viz.*, that the Sultân's authority was of an unsubstantial character, and that the Shaikh enjoyed a large measure of practical independence; but this view was not, it should be observed, communicated to the Porte, as had at one time been intended. Shaikh Mubârak was so alarmed by the new Turkish policy of gradual encroachment that in March he offered the Wâli of Basrah a large bribe, which was not accepted, in order that it might be stopped.

In April 1902 the Shaikh complained of the attempted occupation of Musallamiyah Island, at the southern end of his territories or sphere of influence, by a Turkish detachment from Qatîf; but, as it appeared that the island might legitimately be regarded as falling within the Turkish Sanjâq of Hasa, he received no encouragement from the British Government to contest the rightfulness of the Turkish claim.

Other means employed by the Turks to harass the Shaikh of Kuwait, 1902.

The Turkish Government meanwhile resorted to other means besides territorial encroachment of harassing the Shaikh of Kuwait and making him repent his estrangement from them. A serious claim in respect of the family estates situated on the Shatt-al-'Arab was brought against him by his fugitive nephews in the Turkish courts; and the sequestration of some of the lands, *pendente lite*, caused him pecuniary inconvenience. Frequent raids upon the flocks and herds of Kuwait subjects

on the border near Safwān took place; they were generally organised by Yūsuf of Dorah at Zubair, and the Turkish garrison at Safwān made no effort to prevent them; but in some instances they were answered by reprisals from the Kuwait side. An attack was made also on Sabiyah, upon Khor-as-Sabīyah, by Yūsuf of Dorah's men, and some camels were carried off. On the 28th of May 1902 the Shaikh's agent at Basrah was arrested, and his house searched, on the charge of his being a subscriber to an Arabic newspaper called "Khilāfat," at that time published in London and treated throughout the Ottoman dominions as a seditious print; and having been found guilty of the charge, he was sentenced to ten years' incarceration in a fortress. The result of this case was a severe blow to the prestige of the Shaikh of Kuwait; nor was the event without political significance, for among the papers seized at the agent's house were some that cast light upon the Shaikh's relations with the British Government. The title-deeds of the Shaikh's properties in Turkish 'Irāq, which fell into the hands of the Ottoman officials by the same chance, were subsequently recovered through the good offices of British diplomacy,—a matter of no little importance to the Shaikh inasmuch as the land dispute between him and his nephews was still unsettled.

Relations of Kuwait with Najd and restricted guarantee of support by the British Government, August to October 1902.

Raids on Kuwait territory by Bedouin supporters of Ibn-Rashīd still continued to occur; and in August 1902 a fight between some of them and the subjects of the Shaikh of Kuwait took place at a spot, apparently the wells of Subaihiyah, only 30 miles from Kuwait itself. At this time events in Najd had turned, temporarily, in favour of Ibn-Rashīd; and, as there was a fear that Shaikh Mubārak might proceed to the assistance of his ally Ibn-Sa'ūd, he was expressly warned by the British Resident, Colonel Kemball, under orders from His Majesty's Government, not to encourage any action by which he was likely to become involved in difficulties with Najd or with the Turkish Government. Meanwhile the Shaikh, in view of the aggressiveness of enemy, had formally applied to the Resident for two or three guns, to be mounted on his fort at Jahrah for defence against Ibn-Rashīd in case he should approach from that side; but the request was refused as it was feared that he might use the guns, if supplied, for offensive operations; and instead he was informed, after the middle of October 1902, that, if he remained at Kuwait and observed his engagements to Britain, the British Government would charge themselves with the defence of such of his districts as adjoined the bay of Kuwait. The Shaikh expressed himself much disappointed, but he promised to abide by the advice given him.

Attempted capture of Kuwait by the Shaikh's enemies, September 1902.

The most dangerous and direct assault to which Mubārak had yet been exposed,—one of which the Turkish Government may or may not have been cognisant,—was arranged in the early autumn of 1902 by Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah of Dorah and came within a measurable distance of success: its object was to seize the town of Kuwait by a *coup de main* and, probably, to assassinate Shaikh Mubārak. A large body of Sharifāt Arabs from the Persian side, under the command of 'Adhbi-bin-Muhammad and Hamūd-bin-Jarrāh, Shaikh Mubārak's nephews, and well armed with rifles, embarked in boats at Dorah on the Shatt-al-'Arab; after leaving the river they loitered on the open sea, probably waiting for night. News of the expedition was received at Fāo on the 3rd of September by Commander Armstrong of H.M.S. "Lapwing," and he immediately hastened to Kuwait to give the alarm, but he found the town already under arms in consequence of information which had reached the Shaikh through his own people. The next day search was made without success for the enemy and their boats; but on the morning of the 5th they were discovered by the British gunboat in Khor 'Abdullah; and two of their Būms, which contained altogether 100 to 150 Arab riflemen and hoisted no flag, were pursued by the armed boats of the "Lapwing." Headed off from the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, the fugitives eventually ran their boats ashore in deep mud to the east of the river, and, concealing themselves in the long grass, opened a hot fire at close range on their pursuers. One British bluejacket was killed and two were wounded; but the Būms with their contents, including scaling-ladders, were captured and taken away. One of the Būms was subsequently proved to be the personal property of Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah, and both were ultimately destroyed at sea outside of the three-mile limit. The later history of this case will be found elsewhere; but the chief result, in so far as Kuwait was concerned, was the flight or expulsion of Yūsuf from Turkish 'Irāq to Najd, where he attached himself to Ibn-Rashīd. Before leaving the country, however, he took part in a final attack from Zubair upon tribesmen residing near Jahrah under Shaikh Mubārak's protection.

Demonstration by Ibn-Rashīd against Kuwait, 1902-03.

With the episode just described serious attempts from without to overthrow the power of Shaikh Mubārak came to an end; and the attention of the Turks was diverted from Kuwait to Central Arabia, where a contest between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashīd was now being waged. One other set of small movements in the neighbourhood of Kuwait remains, however, to be mentioned. In December 1902 Ibn-Rashīd again entered Kuwait territory and advanced within 19 hours

of the town, but was driven back by Shaikh Mubārak's men upon Hafar; and the Shaikh himself then moved to Jahrah, where he began to collect a force for purposes of defence, or possibly for offensive action. Fears having been expressed by the Turkish authorities that the concentration at Jahrah portended an attack upon Zubair, the Secretary of State requested that the Shaikh might be warned, as before, to avoid measures likely to involve him in difficulties in Central Arabia or with the Turkish Government; but these instructions had been anticipated by Colonel Kemball, the British Resident, who on the 18th of January 1903 had a long and friendly interview with the Shaikh at Kuwait and impressed on him the advisability of abstaining from action against Ibn-Rashīd, especially as the power of that chief was now, according to Mubārak's own admission, on the wane. After this, at the beginning of March 1903, the Wahhābi Amir, accompanied by his brother Muhammad, visited Kuwait to confer with Mubārak, whose son Jābir was still at Jahrah, holding that place with an armed force. This was the end of the alarms caused at Kuwait by Ibn-Rashīd.

Visits of Russian and French war vessels to Kuwait, 1902-03.

In these improved circumstances the visit of the Russian cruiser "Askold" to Kuwait on the 14th of December 1902 and the joint visit of the French cruiser "Infernet" and the Russian cruiser "Boyarin," which lasted from the 4th to the 8th of March 1903, caused no anxiety in regard to the local situation. On the latter occasion, however, an interview at which Central Arabian affairs were discussed took place between the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr and 'Abdul 'Aziz, son of Ibn-Sa'ūd, who happened to be present in Kuwait.

Visit of Lord Curzon to Kuwait, November 1903.

A visit paid to Kuwait by His Excellency Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, on the 28th and 29th of November 1903, which is described fully in another place, marked the consolidation of British influence in the principality and placed in a clear light the Shaikh's cordial relations with the British Government and his dependence upon the British power; indeed the Shaikh, on receiving a presentation sword from the hands of the Viceroy, spontaneously described himself as a "military officer of the British Empire." The ovation which Lord Curzon received on landing seemed to bear witness to the popularity of British connection; and the impression produced on the minds of the people and their chief by the sight of the East India Squadron must be reckoned among the important political results of His Excellency's tour in the Persian Gulf. Shaikh Mubārak was shown over the flagship "Hyacinth" and was much interested by what he saw, this being the first time that he had set foot on the deck of a man-of-war. At a

private interview on the R.I.M.S. "Hardinge" His Excellency impressed on Shaikh Mubārak the inadvisability of his embroiling himself in the strife of Central Arabia, as, though the British Government had promised to protect him against an attack on Kuwait, they would be unable to interfere if he involved himself in difficulties in the interior; and to this the Shaikh replied that he fully understood His Excellency's advice and that he would be guided by it. On the 30th of November the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence," carrying Lord Curzon, entered Khor 'Abdullah and proceeded up the creek as far as the junction of Khor Umm Qasr and Khor Zubair, where a short halt was made.

Appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, 1904.

Proposal to establish a British post office and dispensary at Kuwait, 1901-04.

Soon after His Excellency the Viceroy's visit, the British Government decided to take advantage of what seemed a convenient opportunity of securing, by a single measure, the improvement of postal communication with Kuwait, the extension to the town of the benefits of medical skill, and an increase in the efficiency of British political representation with the Shaikh. In July 1901 the British India Steam Navigation Company had established an agency at Kuwait and made the place a port of call for their steamers, and in November of the same year Shaikh Mubārak himself had suggested the establishment of a British post office; but, as a post office could not be established except as an adjunct to a British Political establishment and the time was not propitious for a change in the status of the British representative, who was as yet merely a native newswriter, the project remained for a time in abeyance. In accordance with a renewed request for a post office made by the Shaikh at the time of Lord Curzon's visit, however, it was resolved in 1904 to establish one in charge of a native medical subordinate, who could also carry on medical work among the people. The only condition insisted on by the British Government was one to which the Shaikh readily assented, that he should undertake not to allow the establishment of a post office by any other country; and an Agreement to this effect was obtained from him, of which the text is given in another place.* In July 1904, however, after the necessary preliminaries had been arranged, it was found advisable to suspend action lest certain negotiations should be prejudiced, which, as related further on, were then proceeding at Constantinople for the evacuation of Būbiyān Island by the Turks.

* See Annexure 4 to Appendix K.

Establishment of a British Political Agency at Kuwait, August 1904.

The post office scheme was in fact destined to remain inoperative; and it was in the end superseded by a measure of greater importance that had been under consideration by the British Government in the summer of 1903,—the appointment to Kuwait, namely, of a British officer whose principal duty, it was originally intended, should be to curb the aggressive tendencies of Shaikh Mubárak. In the spring of 1904, in consequence of interference which the Turks had begun to exercise in Central Arabia to the disadvantage of Shaikh Mubárak's ally Ibn-Sa'úd, the project of stationing a British political officer at Kuwait was revived, but with a different purpose and a considerably enlarged scope. On the 24th of June 1904 the despatch of a European Political Agent to Kuwait was authorised by His Majesty's Government; and on the 6th of August Captain S. G. Knox arrived at Kuwait from Búshehr duly accredited to the Shaikh, by whom he was well received, and the existing news-agency was abolished. An Assistant-Surgeon soon afterwards joined the Agency in his professional capacity; but, though he was accompanied by a postal subordinate, the establishment of a regular post office was still deferred.

Instructions of the Political Agent on appointment.

The instructions given to Captain S. G. Knox on his appointment reflect the policy of the Government of India and were as follows. The Agent's first object should be to cultivate and maintain close and friendly relations with Shaikh Mubárak and the other principal personages in Kuwait. The interests of British trade and traders at Kuwait and in the adjacent tracts of Arabia should be safeguarded. A vigilant watch should be kept over the proceedings of the Turks on the boundaries of Kuwait territories, and the Political Agent should endeavour to ascertain the true limits of Mubárak's effective occupation upon Khor-as-Sabiyah. Matters showing an intention on the part of the Turks, or of any other power, to interfere with or disturb the existing *status quo*, or anything which would lead to a belief that other powers had designs on or in connection with possible harbours within or without Kuwait territory, should be at once reported; and special but unobtrusive attention should be paid in this respect to Khor 'Abdullah and the waters adjacent to Búbiyán Island and Umm Qasr. The Political Agent should also endeavour to secure early and accurate information regarding the struggle between the Ibn-Rashíd and Ibn-Sa'úd families for the supremacy in Najd. Finally, he should investigate the alleged importation of arms at Kuwait, especially of rifles for Ibn-Sa'úd; but, pending further instructions, he should neither authorise nor forbid the Shaikh to continue the existing trade in arms.

In November 1904 the Turkish Government complained of the appointment of the British Political Agent at Kuwait as an infringement of the *status quo*. Important questions relating to the Aden frontier were then pending between the British and Turkish Governments, which made the occasion an unfavourable one for raising the whole question of Kuwait; and it was accordingly decided by His Majesty's Government that the newly appointed Agent should be withdrawn as soon as it was possible to do so without inconvenience, the withdrawal however to be temporary only, and to be so carried out as not to bear the appearance of a concession to Turkey. During his sojourn at Kuwait Captain Knox had successfully carried out, in complete harmony with Shaikh Mubārak, such of his instructions as depended for their fulfilment on himself; and his tenure of office had not been marked by a single untoward incident.

Captain Knox remained at Kuwait until the 16th of May 1905, when he was obliged by illness to take leave to England, his temporary withdrawal being thus brought about in such a manner that its cause was disguised from the Shaikh and that the unfortunate results which might otherwise have followed were averted. The current duties of the Agency were carried on, until Captain Knox's return on the 25th of October 1905, by the Assistant Surgeon, Dāwud-ar-Rahmān.

General history of Kuwait since the establishment of the Political Agency, 1904-1907.

We may now trace the history of one or two questions which continued to occupy attention after the arrival of Captain Knox at Kuwait; but some of the facts which it will be necessary to mention belong to a period earlier than 1904.

Case of the Shaikh of Kuwait's estates in Turkish 'Irāq, 1901-1904.

Reference has already been made to a dispute between Shaikh Mubārak and his fugitive nephews regarding certain family estates situated in Turkish territory on the Shatt-al-'Arab; and we have seen that a hope was held out to the Shaikh, soon after the conclusion of the Exclusive Agreement in 1899, that British influence would be used to prevent injury to his interests in that direction. The estates in question, of which the proprietary shares were in dispute, were situated at Gardilan and on 'Ajairāwiyah Island near Basrah, at Zain opposite the mouth of the Kārūn River, at Sūfiyah in the Dawāsir tract, and at Fāo. The Shaikh

was able to protract matters for a couple of years by declining to submit to the jurisdiction of the Turkish courts; but in December 1901, the Turks having resolved to break down his opposition to their authority at Kuwait, he was called upon to defend his case in a Basrah tribunal; and, on his failing to do so, judgment was given against him in default, and he was ordered to make over the estate at Zain to his nephews.

Shaikh Mubārak at once appealed to the Sultān of Turkey with the result that, early in 1902, an Imperial Irādé was issued for the appointment of a Commission to settle the whole dispute between him and his nephews. After much difficulty and delay a settlement was arranged by Hāji Mansūr, representing Shaikh Mubārak, and 'Abdul Wahhāb-al-Qirtās, representing the opposite side, in communication with Mr. Crow, H. B. M.'s Consul at Basrah, who, under instructions from Constantinople, had been admitted to a share in the proceedings; and this settlement, after being approved by the Commission and accepted by the parties, was embodied in a deed executed at Basrah on the 11th of July 1904 and attested, not only by the Wāli of Basrah and his Council, but also—at the request of Shaikh Mubārak—by the British Consul. The general effect of the settlement was to confer on Shaikh Mubārak undivided ownership and possession of the whole property at Fāo, while an absolute and exclusive title to the Gardilān, 'Ajairāwiyah, Zain and Sūfiyah estates and a money payment of £T7,296½ was obtained by the opposite party. The share of the nephews in ancestral moveable property at Kuwait was mentioned in the deed but was not affected by it, the rights and shares of both parties therein being maintained unaltered; but the title of Shaikh Mubārak to certain moveable property at Kuwait was expressly validated.

Early in 1904 the Shaikh applied for a loan of Rs. 1,00,000 from the Government of India to enable him to carry out the terms arranged; and this was readily granted, without interest, on condition that he should not borrow from any other lender without the consent of His Majesty's Government until the debt had been repaid in full, and that repayment should be completed by the end of 1905. The Shaikh, who has always shown himself a good man of business, discharged the obligation nearly a year before expiry of the period fixed.

A peculiar incident, which gave some trouble at the time but had no political consequences, occurred at the Shaikh's Fāo estate on the 10th of October 1904, when the Shaikh's land agent brought off to H.M.S. "Merlin" the dead bodies of an Arab man and woman together with three Turkish gendarmes in custody, by whom, he alleged,

they had been murdered. The commander of the "Merlin" refused to receive the agent's prisoners on board, and the matter thus lost its importance.

Discussions regarding the Turkish occupation of Bûbiyân Island, 1904.

In 1904, after Lord Curzon's inspection of Khor 'Abdullah, representations were made by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government as to the extreme undesirability of allowing both sides of that inlet—perhaps the most convenient terminus for a railway from Baghdâd to the Persian Gulf—to fall permanently into the hands of a power not very amenable to British influence. The question of Bûbiyân Island, which the Shaikh of Kuwait asserted to belong to his principality, and the occupation of which by the Turks was regarded by His Majesty's Government as a breach of the engagement to respect the *status quo* at Kuwait, was raised diplomatically at Constantinople; but no favourable opportunity of pressing for evacuation of the island could be found, and the Turkish post on Bûbiyân was not withdrawn.

Relations of Kuwait with Turkey and Central Arabia during the same period, 1904-1907.

Mediation of the Shaikh of Kuwait between the Turkish authorities and Ibn-Sa'ûd, February 1905.

In the history of Najd it is related how a Turkish force was despatched in May 1904 from 'Irâq to the aid of Ibn-Rashîd, only to be overwhelmed in Qasîm in the course of the following summer, by Ibn-Sa'ûd and his allies; also how in the winter of 1904-1905 the Turks prepared a second expedition, and thereby so alarmed Ibn-Sa'ûd that he agreed to a settlement which included the pacific occupation of Qasîm by an Ottoman force. Here it is enough to observe that the arrangement in question was brought about largely through the instrumentality of Shaikh Mubârak of Kuwait, who assumed, somewhat unexpectedly, the role of intermediary. Two meetings for discussion were held on the frontier between Kuwait and 'Irâq—the first at Safwân on the 8th, and the second at the Qash'âniyah wells on the 13th of February—between Ibn-Sa'ûd and Mukhlis Pâsha, the newly appointed Wâli of Basrah, and at both of these Shaikh Mubârak was present with a large escort; but he declined, content with having brought the principals together, to become *in propriâ personâ* a party to their arrangements.

The use by Shaikh Mubârak in his correspondence in this business of the title "Ruler of Kuwait and Chief of its Tribes," instead of that of

"Qāim-Maqām," gave some offence to the Turks; but it did not affect the course of the negotiations. A suggestion made by the Wāli at these meetings, that Turkish civil officials and troops should be sent to Kuwait, was met by Shaikh Mubārak, according to his own subsequent statement, with a *non possumus* reply and with a declaration of his loyal adherence to the connection which he had formed with the British Government.

Subsequent relations of Shaikh Mubārak with the Porte, 1905-1907.

Probably in consequence of the services which he rendered upon this occasion, the relations of Shaikh Mubārak with the Turkish authorities at Basrah were, from 1905 onwards, much more friendly. In August 1905 the Shaikh subscribed £T450 towards the erection of new Turkish barracks at Basrah; and, on the donation being cordially acknowledged, he professed devotion to the Sultān of Turkey and promised a further subscription of £T200. In 1905 a continuous stream of Turkish military deserters and officials escaping from Najd began to pour into Kuwait, where they arrived in a miserable plight: they were invariably fed and sent on to Basrah by Shaikh Mubārak. The number of these refugees up to March 1906 was about 500; in August Fariq Sadiq Pāsha himself came in with an escort of about 150 men; and at the end of December some 800 more men, almost the last remnants of the Turkish army of occupation in Qasim, reached the neighbourhood of Kuwait. This last body were not allowed by the Shaikh to enter the town, probably from fear that an occupation might be attempted. For the purpose of collecting and forwarding this rabble, the Shaikh of Kuwait's imprisoned agent, 'Abdul 'Azīz, the conditions of whose imprisonment had already been mitigated at the instance of His Majesty's Government, was allowed by the Turks to proceed to Kuwait; and there he was afterwards allowed to reside in a sort of open arrest, as the property which he owned in Turkish 'Irāq afforded a sufficient security against his attempting to escape. From the autumn of 1905 until the spring of 1907 the Turkish official mail between 'Irāq and Hasa was sent by land through Kuwait territory, instead of by British steamer *vid* Bahrain, as had hitherto been the rule; but Shaikh Mubārak declined to have anything to do with the arrangements or to accept responsibility for the safety of the mails, which in the end returned to the original route by sea. In August 1906 it was announced that Shaikh Mubārak had contributed £T500 to the Hijāz Railway fund, but this was not his first subscription, for he had already, in January 1904, received the medal conferred by the Sultān on distinguished subscribers.

Subsequent relations of Shaikh

After 1905 amicable relations continued to prevail between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Wahhābi Amīr; the former, as related in the history

Mubārak with Central Arabia, 1905-1907.

of Najd, began in 1906 to exert himself, at the request of Ibn-Rashid, to arrange a reconciliation in Najd; and after the death of Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah near Hāil in January 1906 the Shaikh of Kuwait even showed some sympathy for the Shammar Amir. In March 1906 Shaikh Mubārak appeared (or pretended) to entertain a utopian scheme for a friendly partition of Central Arabia under which Jabal Shammar would fall to Ibn-Rashid and most of Southern Najd to Ibn-Sa'ūd, while he himself would take possession of Qasīm and of the Wahhābi districts of Sadair and Washm. In July 1906 his efforts in the cause of peace were finally successful. The Kuwait Hajj to Makkah, for some time interrupted by the wars in Najd, was resumed; and in 1906 the number of persons who travelled in it was about 2,000 souls.

Relations of Kuwait with Great Britain, 1904-1907.

Notwithstanding the cessation of hostility between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Turks, the relations of the former with the British Government and with the officers representing them at Kuwait continued to be excellent. The only exception was a temporary and partial estrangement at the beginning of 1906 due to remonstrances, made by Captain Knox under the orders of Government in regard to the arms trade at Kuwait, which are noticed in the Appendix dealing with that subject.

Question of a distinctive flag for Kuwait.

A question which in 1907 had been pending for a considerable time, but remained unsettled, was that of the adoption by the Shaikh of Kuwait of a flag distinguishable from the Turkish. A change was first proposed in 1901, when a differentiation of the Kuwait flag from that of Turkey appeared desirable for more than one reason, but principally on account of the inconsistency of preventing the disembarkation of Turkish troops at a place where the Turkish flag was flown. The Government of India considered that the Shaikh ought to fly the red Arab flag; and the Shaikh, though he urged that the crescent had been used by his grandfather, his father and himself as a Muhammadan, not as a Turkish emblem, was willing to abandon it. In consequence, however, of the arrangement made by the British Government with the Porte in September 1901, for the maintenance of the *status quo* at Kuwait, the matter was dropped for a time.

In 1904, in connection with a discussion—which will be mentioned further on—as to the protection of Kuwaitis in Persia, the question of the flag was revived; and the Shaikh, having been approached under the

instructions of His Majesty's Government, in July 1905 expressed his willingness to adopt a flag of crescent design distinguished from the Turkish flag by the addition of the word "Kuwait," as also certificates of nationality for vessels belonging to his port. In March 1906, however, Shaikh Mubárak demurred, in the absence of an explicit guarantee that Kuwait vessels would not be harassed at Turkish ports, to the use of Roman letters on the flag; but he agreed that the name "Kuwait" might appear on it in Arabic characters. The adoption of the proposed flag, as thus finally modified, was then approved by His Majesty's Government; but again, in September 1906, the Shaikh represented that even the slight innovation to which he had consented might lead to unfavourable treatment of Kuwait vessels in Turkey, and requested an assurance on the subject by the British Government. The matter was then once more referred by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government.

Land explorations and marine surveys, 1904-07.

Advantage was taken of the favourable disposition of Shaikh Mubárak, after the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, to obtain fuller information about the surroundings of Kuwait both on land and at sea. In December 1904 a party of officers employed on this Gazetteer marched by land, in company with Captain Knox, from Kuwait to the Turkish border; and the opportunity was utilised to carry a plane-table survey, on a large scale, from Jahrah and the northern shores of Kuwait Bay up to the Turkish frontier posts of Safwán and Umm Qasr. In April 1905, Captain Knox made a tour into the country to the south of Kuwait, and in January 1906 he attained the distant but important point of Hafar, never before visited by a European, on the border between Kuwait territory and Central Arabia, Bedouin escorts being provided on both occasions by Shaikh Mubárak. In the winter of 1906-1907 the Political Agent made two more interesting journeys to the south of Kuwait, on the first of which it was found possible for Mrs. Knox to accompany him.

A marine survey of Kuwait Bay by the R.I.M.S. "Investigator" was begun in November 1904, and continued season by season until November 1907, when the work was completed.

Relations with Persia, 1904-1907.

Harassment of Kuwait

In September 1904 considerable feeling was aroused at Kuwait by the unjustifiable seizure of two Bûms belonging to the port by the

subjects by the Persian Imperial Customs, 1904-05.

Persian Customs steamer "Mozaffari," and a general disposition was remarked about this time, on the part of the recently re-organised Persian Customs, to interfere in a vexatious manner with Kuwait subjects and their boats upon the Persian side of the Gulf. The suspicion that Kuwait boats were engaged in running arms to Persia may have been, in some cases, not devoid of foundation; but gratuitous interference with Kuwait vessels generally was now pushed to such a point that the Government of India were constrained to draw the attention of the Secretary of State and the British Minister at Tehran to the matter.

Status and protection of Kuwait subjects in Persia, 1904-06.

In March 1905 the general question of the status and protection of Kuwaitis in Persia was discussed by the British Minister at Tehran with the Persian Government in connection with the difficulties just described. Sir A. Hardinge explained that Kuwait was *de facto* independent of Turkey, which had not established or maintained an effective control over the country; and he endeavoured, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, to secure for Kuwaitis in Persia the same position in respect of the good offices of Great Britain as was conceded in the case of Afghans, *viz.*, "that the friendly recommendations and wishes of the British Government on their behalf should be accepted." It appeared, however, that the Persian Government, while not averse in principle to the intervention of British diplomatic and consular representatives on behalf of Kuwaitis in Persia, were unwilling to concede the point in practice lest by doing so they should give umbrage to Turkey, whose representatives had already protested against the intervention of the British Resident at Būshehr in Kuwaiti cases. Instructions were in the end given by the Persian Government to the Director-General of Customs at Būshehr not to treat Kuwaitis with such harshness as to bring Kuwait cases into prominence, but at the same time he was enjoined not to admit the intervention of the British Political Resident on their behalf. Up to 1907 no real settlement had been reached.

Friendship of Shaikh Mubārak and the Shaikh of Muhammareh.

A strong personal friendship of some length of standing existed between Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait and Shaikh Khaz'al, the Muhaisin Shaikh of Muhammareh; but its basis, unless it consisted in a certain similarity in their political position, was not apparent. Frequent visits were paid by Shaikh Mubārak to Muhammareh and Failiyeh.

Relations with European powers other than Britain, 1904-07.

After 1904 an overt interest in Kuwait affairs was not displayed by any European power other than Great Britain. In September 1904,

soon after Captain Knox's arrival at Kuwait, the Shaikh received a communication from Basrah suggesting that he should profit by the visit of certain Russian officials, then at Basrah, to obtain a reconciliation with the Turks; and it was added that the Russian and French Governments, if the Shaikh consented to receive a Russian and a French Consul at Kuwait, would guarantee the arrangements made. The exact source of this message, to which Shaikh Mubárak sent a formal and meaningless reply, was not discovered. In September 1905 Mr. Bahnson, representing the German firm of Wönckhaus and Company in Bahrain, arrived in Kuwait to enquire into prospects of trade, but the Shaikh did not allow him to remain long.

Internal affairs of the Kuwait principality, 1904-07.

Previously to the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, no cognisance at all was taken by the British political authorities of the internal affairs of the Kuwait Shaikhdom; and after that event only so much attention was given them as the interest of the British Government in the general prosperity and stability of the Shaikh's Government warranted. It appeared that no one could be more competent than Shaikh Mubárak of Kuwait to manage his own affairs.

Dynastic matters.

Two of the sons of Shaikh Mubárak died in 1906, one of them being Fahad, his youngest, who two years before had been sent for medical treatment to India. The establishment of a British dispensary in Kuwait was partially due to the solicitude of the Shaikh for the life of this child.

Finances.

Notwithstanding a great increase in the trade of the port the Shaikh enhanced all taxation at Kuwait, and some discontent was occasioned thereby. Custom duties, in particular, were augmented; but care continued to be shown for the convenience of merchants, for the reception of whose goods a stone warehouse, spacious and secure, was provided, and the Customs Department in general, under the management of one of the Shaikh's slaves, appeared to be well administered. Export and import duties by land were likewise increased; and in 1907 there were complaints of new and burdensome dues levied on the pilgrims of the Kuwait Hajj at their return. The most serious grievance of the tax-payer was, however, a sudden demand, made in January 1907, on the owners of houses in Kuwait town built on land which had been provided free by the Shaikh. A large part of the

town was included in this category, and here it was required of the occupants that they should either pay three-fourths of the value of the buildings, when the property would remain their own, or accept one-fourth the value from the Shaikh and surrender their houses. Heavy taxation was a new feature in the administration of Kuwait, and the reasons for resorting to it in a time of exceptional peace and prosperity were not altogether clear. In 1906-07 Shaikh Mubárak purchased a new steam-yacht at a cost of over a lakh of rupees; and this, with expenses of maintenance, may have accounted in part for the pecuniary difficulties which he now began to allege.

Tribal affairs.

The tribal affairs of the Kuwait principality were ordinarily so well managed that nothing was heard of them, and opposition to the wishes of Shaikh Mubárak was rare on the part of the tribes subject to his influence. Towards the end of February 1907, however, a raid was committed by some of the 'Ajmán on Arabs living in the desert immediately around Kuwait town and depending on the Shaikh's protection; but Mubárak at once took steps to revenge the outrage, and the 'Ajmán would have been attacked in force had they not submitted, promised restitution, and surrendered Muhammad-bin-Hithlain, one of their principal Shaikhs, who was then imprisoned at Kuwait. A levy of the inhabitants for military service against the 'Ajmán and also, on another occasion, for the collection of Zakát from various Bedouin tribes, caused considerable dissatisfaction against the Shaikh in the town of Kuwait.

ANNEUXRE NO. 1.—AGREEMENT BY THE SHAIKH OF KUWAIT REGARDING THE NON-RECEPTION OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES AND THE NON-CESSION OF TERRITORY TO FOREIGN POWERS OR SUBJECTS, 23RD JANUARY 1899.

The object of writing this lawful and honourable bond is that it is hereby covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, on behalf of the British Government on the one part, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, Sheikh of Koweit, on the other part, that the said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah of his own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Koweit, or

at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of any other Government.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, the former on behalf of the British Government and the latter on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors do each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their signatures on this, the tenth day of Ramazan 1316, corresponding with the twenty-third day of January 1899.

(Sd.) M. J. MEADE,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

MUBARAK-AL-SUBAH.

(L.S.)

Witnesses.

(Sd.) E. WICKHAM HORE,
Captain, I.M.S.

(Sd.) J. CALCOTT GASKIN.

MUHAMMAD RAHIM BIN ABDUL NEBI SAFFER.

(L.S.)

Letter accompanying the execution of the above Agreement.

Dated the 23rd January 1899.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel M. J. Meade, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Subah, Sheikh of Koweit.

After compliments.—In view of the signing to-day of the agreement, so happily concluded between you, Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Subah, on behalf of yourself, your heirs and successors, on the one part, and myself, on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, I now assure you, as Sheikh of Koweit, of the good offices of the British Government towards you, your heirs and successors as long as you, your heirs and successors scrupulously and faithfully observe the conditions of the said bond.

The three copies of the bond will be sent to India to be ratified by His Excellency Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Her Imperial Majesty's Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, and, on their return, one copy, duly ratified, will be conveyed to you, when I will take measures to send you, as agreed, a sum of Rs. 15,000 from the Bushire Treasury. A most important condition of the execution of this agreement is that it is to be kept absolutely secret, and not divulged or made public in any way without the previous consent of the British Government.

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF NAJD OR CENTRAL ARABIA.*

The Wahhābi movement.

The present era of Central Arabian history began with the rise of Wahhabism, by which the course of events in Najd has since been largely determined. Consequently, in dealing with the era, it is necessary first of all to enquire into the origin of Wahhabism.

The founder of Wahhabism.

Concerning the founder of the Wahhābi sect, though he lived only a century and a half ago, and though general attention was early drawn to his proceedings by their political results, few authentic details have been preserved and the extant information is conflicting. It is agreed that he came of the Bani Tamim, a solid agricultural tribe of Najd, and 1691 is given as the year of his birth; but the honour of having been his birthplace is contested by the southern town of Hautah and the village of 'Ayainah in Wādi Hanifah. Even his name is doubtful; by some it is said that he was called 'Abdul Wahhāb, by others that this was his patronymic, and that he himself was Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb-bin-Sulaimān. He studied abroad at Basrah, at Damascus, and perhaps elsewhere; but finally he returned to his native country, where, about the year 1742, he began to expound and inculcate the doctrines which he had evolved during his years of study. According to the account which represents 'Ayainah as his native place, it was there that he began his public mission and there that he met, after a time, with opposition

* The following are the principal authorities for the history of Najd: Connoes *Histoire des Wahabis*, 1810; Sadleir's *Diary of a Journey across Arabia in 1819*, published 1866; Mengin's *Histoire de l'Egypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed Aly*, 1823 (not obtained by the present writer); Burckhardt's *Materials for a History of the Wahabys*, 1831; Brydges' *Brief History of the Wahauby*, 1834; *Bombay Selections XXIV, The Persian Gulf*, 1856; Palgrave's *Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, 1862-63*, published in 1865; Colonel L. Pelly's *Report on a Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh*, 1866; Colonel E. Ross's *Memoir on Nejd*, in the Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1879-80; Mr. C. M. Doughty's *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 1888; Baron E. Nolde's *Reise nach Innerarabien*, 1895; and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Nejd Affairs, 1904-1904*, printed in 1904. The writings of Mr. C. Huber also contain some historical information regarding Najd.

which obliged him to transfer the scene of his activities to the neighbouring town of Dara'iyah; but all authorities concur in stating that his later and more influential years were passed at Dara'iyah. He is said to have been married twenty times and to have had eighteen children. The 14th of June 1787 is mentioned as the day of his death.

Wahhabism in its religious or original aspect.

Wahhabism was at first a purely religious movement; afterwards, through force of circumstances, it acquired a secular and political character. In the beginning it was a reformation of Muhammadan doctrine and practice, inspired by the ideal of a return to the pristine purity of Islam, and took the form chiefly of a protest against superstition and luxury in the Muhammadan world. That the Wahhabi belief, if tried by the standard of the Qurān and the best accredited traditions of Islām, will be found strictly orthodox seems to be generally admitted; and the difference between the true Wahhabi and the ordinary Muhammadan appears to be due to the declension of the latter from the spirit of his own religion rather than to any eccentricity on the part of the former.

Wahhabism in its political or secondary aspect.

The adhesion of numbers of converts to the reformed faith in Central Arabia, together with the failure of that faith to find acceptance elsewhere, soon invested the movement in Najd with a political, a national, and even a military importance. Community of belief first paved the way for submission to a common administrative authority; by this authority individuals were compelled to obey the law and warring townships and districts were welded together into a solid and well-ordered principality; and, once internal unity had been established, a militant enthusiasm for the propagation of their religious principles abroad, not unmingled perhaps with a patriotic desire to cast off the hegemony of the Red Sea districts of Hijaz and Yaman, awoke in the hearts of the people. For the sharp conflicts between the Wahhabis and their neighbours which soon began, and which continued so long as the Wahhabis retained their religious fervour, neither party can be held solely responsible. The Wahhabis on their part displayed great intolerance, especially towards the Turks, whose morals they regarded as lax and non-Muhammadan; while their opponents, conscious of the logical soundness of Wahhabi doctrine and exasperated by the pharisaism of Wahhabi virtue, had recourse to calumnies and misrepresentations. The result was that each side virtually placed the other outside the pale of Islām, and that the Wahhabis, who were the more warlike, declared the lives and property of their antagonists to have been forfeited by religious infidelity and applied themselves to execute the sentence. On the one hand it must be admitted that the opposition to

the Whahābis proceeded largely from persons, such as the Sharīfs of Makkah, whose pecuniary interests the discouragement of honours paid to the memories and tombs of the illustrious dead threatened to affect; and, on the other, that the common herd of Wahhābis, while they did not understand the higher principles at issue but rather dwelt with narrow-minded complacency on such details as the prohibition of gold and silk attire, of rosaries, and of tobacco, revelled in the pillage and plunder which the punishment of the unbelievers rendered lawful and even obligatory. With Christians and Jews the early Wahhābis did not come much in contact; but their feelings towards such appear to have been much less bitter than towards those whom they regarded as false Muhammadans.

These preliminary observations will be illustrated by the history which follows of the Wahhābi power in Najd.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-SA'ŪD, before 1765.

The first secular chief to adopt Wahhābi principles, and to bring his policy and administration into harmony with them, was Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, Shaikh of Dara'iyah, in whose town and under whose protection the reformer Muhammad or 'Abdul Wahhāb lived during the later and most active part of his career. Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd belonged to a family, known as the Āl Maqran, of the Misālikh section of the Wald 'Ali division of the 'Anizah tribe; and from the name of his father was derived the alternative family name of Āl Sa'ūd, which has been transmitted to his descendants, and in virtue of which the Wahhābi Amīr is to the present day called "Ibn-Sa'ūd," in contradistinction to "Ibn-Rashīd," the Amīr for the time being of Jabal Shammar. At the time of his adopting Wahhābi beliefs Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd was at feud with Daham-bin-Daus, Shaikh of the neighbouring town of Riyādh; and the strength which Wahhabism gave to his cause enabled him to break the power of this rival, whom he at first reduced to the position of a tributary. He also carried his arms into the eastern province of Hasa; but against the Bani Khālid Shaikhs, who for about a century had been predominant in that region, he failed to obtain any success.*

* According to another account however, Muhammad, though he achieved the unification of a great part of Central Arabia, including possibly Jabal Shammar, made it his maxim "not to undermine the cliff," or, in other words, not to provoke neighbouring powers of dangerous strength. If so, his policy of caution and restraint must very soon have been abandoned by his successor for one of aggression.

'ABDUL 'AZĪZ-BIN-MUHAMMAD.

1765-1803.

Muhammad was succeeded on his death by his son 'Abdul 'Aziz, who had frequently commanded the Wahhābī forces in the field, and who had taken in marriage a daughter of the reformer Muhammad or 'Abdul Wahhāb.

Affairs in Najd, 1765-1803.

On his accession to power 'Abdul 'Aziz delegated the duty of directing military operations to his son Sa'ūd, who conducted them on the whole with striking success.

Reduction of Riyadh, 1772.

Riyādh, already made tributary, was finally reduced in 1773, the Shaikh Daham-bin-Daus taking refuge in Hasa, and was incorporated with the Wahhābī dominions.

Assassination of the 'Amīr Abdul 'Aziz, 1803.

The histories of the time contain no further notice of events in Najd until they mention the assassination of 'Abdul 'Aziz, which took place at Dara'iyah on a date variously given as the 4th of October and the 12th of November 1803. The scene of this deed was a public mosque at the time of evening prayer, and the perpetrator was a Persian Saiyid,* whose relations the Wahhābīs had murdered. The assassin was immediately put to death. 'Abdul 'Aziz had attained, it is said, the age of 82 years.

Operations of the Wahhābīs in Western Arabia, 1765-1803.

A strong outward movement of the Wahhābīs, zealous to propagate their doctrines, had now begun; and in no direction was their pressure more severely felt than in the Turkish districts of the Red Sea basin.

War with the Sharīf of Makkah, 1792—1802.

In 1792 or 1793 hostilities broke out between the Wahhābī Amīr and Ghālib, Sharīf of Makkah, whose religious and political views were naturally irreconcilable with theirs; and the war continued for several years in the form of desultory raids and counter-raids by the tribes

* Comnecz (*Histoire des Wahabis*) is more explicit. He says that the assassin, who used a dagger, was a Kurdish dervish and had taken service with 'Abdul 'Aziz on purpose to kill him, three of his own sons having been slain by Wahhābīs at the sack of Karbala in 1801.

dependent upon either. At one time Ghālib had the advantage, and during a whole year he held possession of the desert village of Sha'arah in Najd; but again he narrowly escaped being surrounded by the Wahhābis and escaped, with a few followers only, to Bīshah. In 1799 Sa'ūd, the son of the Wahhābi Amīr, came to Makkah on pilgrimage with a large number of armed followers, and in the next year he repeated the visit: in the light of later events both of these journeys should perhaps be regarded as military reconnaissances. In 1801 the tribes in the vicinity of Tāif fell under the influence of the Wahhābis and were placed by the Amīr in charge of a Bedouin Shaikh 'Othmān-al-Madhāifah, who was a brother-in-law of the Sharīf Ghālib but had been for several years at enmity with him.

Capture of Tāif and Qunfidah by the Wahhābis, 1802–03.

In 1802 Tāif itself, the "Garden of Makkah," situated only a couple of days' journey to the east of the Holy City, was taken by 'Othmān; the inhabitants, including even children, were mercilessly put to the sword; and, before the end of the year, the harbour of Qunfidah also, on the Red Sea coast, was lost by the Sharīf to the Wahhābis.

Capture of Makkah by the Wahhābis, 1803.

In April or May 1803, after a defence of two or three months' duration, Makkah succumbed to a loose investment by the Wahhābi forces which had reduced the inhabitants to great straits for food and drinkable water, and Sa'ūd took possession of the city. During their stay in Makkah, which was not long, the Wahhābis behaved with considerable moderation; but tombs forming objects of pilgrimage were razed to the ground; a Wahhābi reformation of manners and morals was instituted; and, before the departure of the army, a Wahhābi governor was installed in the person of 'Abdul Ma'īn, a brother of the Sharif Ghālib. Ghālib himself, when he found the surrender of Makkah to be inevitable, had slipped away to Jiddah on the sea, and thither the Wahhābis followed him, but they were unable to storm the fortifications and after eleven days gave up the attempt. The bulk of the Harb tribe, however, who had hitherto opposed them, now made submission, and Yanbū' on the coast submitted; but Madīnah, though beleaguered, still held out, and dysentery had begun in the invaders' camp.

Peace and restoration of the Sharif of Makkah, 1803.

In July 1803, the bulk of the Wahhābi forces having then returned to Najd, Ghālib came back from Jiddah, obtained the surrender of two small Wahhābi garrisons that had been left behind in Makkah, and resumed the government of the town; but a little later he submitted to the Wahhābi ruler and was granted favourable terms.

He was confirmed in possession of his revenues and political influence, and he was exempted, along with the whole population of Makkah, from paying tribute to the Amir. On his part he agreed to take no customs duty at Jiddah from true Wahhābis.

Operations of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1765-1803.

Seriously occupied as the attention of the Wahhābis must have been in the littoral districts of the Red Sea, their energy and resources were at this time such as to permit of a simultaneous and hardly inferior display of activity along the whole Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, where their cause made considerable progress.

Wahhābi attacks on Kuwait, 1793-95.

During the period from 1793 to 1795, while the British Factory from Basrah was temporarily established at Kuwait, frequent demonstrations and one more or less serious attack were made upon the town by the Wahhābis, but here they gained no success: some details of these hostilities are given in the history of the Kuwait principality. In regard to the nature of the relations subsisting between the British representatives at Kuwait and the Wahhābi Amir there is some doubt; for on the one hand it is stated that presents were regularly sent to the Amir, who in return * protected the British desert mail to Europe, and on the other it is alleged that the Factory once helped the people of Kuwait to repel a Wahhābi attack, after which 'Abdul 'Aziz showed unmistakable signs of resentment. In 1798-99, and again in 1802, Turkish expeditions against the Wahhābis marched, as will be shown further on, through Kuwait territory.

Wahhābi conquest of Hasa, 1795.

The province of Hasa, reduced for the first time in 1792, was finally conquered by the Wahhābis in 1795, when it was placed under Wahhābi governors and religious instructors. Hasa thus came to form a base in Eastern Arabia for the wider extension of Wahhābi influence; and a few years after, as we shall see in a later paragraph, it became the first battle-ground of the Wahhābi and the Turk.

Wahhābi intervention in Bahrain, 1802-03.

Established in Hasa, the Wahhābis soon began to exert an influence on Bahrain affairs; and it was largely through their aid that as related in the history of Bahrain, the 'Athbi rulers of the principality were able

* According to Corancez (page 50) the Amir undertook to protect the British mail only so long as he should be at peace with the Pāsha of Baghdād, but one part a man to death for tampering with it.

to prevent Saiyid Sultān of Masqat from obtaining a permanent footing in the islands. In 1803 Salmān-bin-Ahmad, Shaikh of Bahrain, appears to have visited the Wahhābi Amīr with a sum which he offered as tribute, but the payment was excused.

Wahhābi occupation of Baraimi and relations with 'Omān 1800-03.

It was also from Hasa that a Wahhābi force commanded by Hariq, a Nubian slave, proceeded to the Baraimi Oasis, which they seized and occupied with a view to future action against Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate: the particulars of their operations on this side are given in the histories of the regions mentioned. By the middle of 1802 Wahhābi influence extended along the whole coast from the neighbourhood of Kuwait to Dibah; and in 1803, in consequence of help lent by Saiyid Sultān of Masqat to their enemy the Sharif of Makkah, the Wahhābis declared war against 'Omān and, by compelling the 'Utūb of Kuwait and Bahrain and the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah to take the sea against him, reduced the Saiyid to serious straits; but peace was made on condition that tribute of $12,000 a year should be paid by the ruler of Masqat to the Wahhābi Amīr and that a Wahhābi political representative should be received by him at his capital. This peace was almost immediately violated by the Wahhābis, whose object seemed to be the complete subjection of 'Omān by an invasion; but news of the assassination of the Amīr 'Abdul 'Aziz, received at the end of the year, obliged them to suspend their proceedings for a time. Meanwhile Saiyid Badar, who ultimately succeeded Saiyid Sultān at Masqat, had left 'Omān and joined himself to the Wahhābis.

Aggressions of the Wahhābis on Turkish 'Irāq, 1765-1803.

Wahhābi raids on the borders of 'Irāq, 1784-98.

So early as 1784 the proceedings of the Wahhābis had begun to cause alarm to the Turkish rulers of 'Irāq, and during the next ten years the danger from them steadily increased; their attacks, being made suddenly at unexpected points, were often successful; and "the "ease with which the Wahhābis assembled a force, and the rapidity "with which that force marched, when assembled, astonished and "confounded the slowly moving Ottoman." The open country and the villages and smaller towns on the western borders of 'Irāq became a prey to Wahhābi depredations, especially towards the lower end of the province near Basrah; and in some cases, in default of that protection

which the Pāshāliq of Baghdād was unable to afford, the inhabitants paid blackmail to the Wahhābis. The power of the Banī Khālid tribe, who might otherwise have served as a partial bulwark against these assaults, was broken by the Wahhābis in their conquest of Hasa between the years 1792 and 1795; and from that time onward the necessity of steps by the Porte, if they cared at all for the security of their own dominions, was evident. The intrigues of the Sharif of Makkah and the complaints of Persian and other pilgrims, who now underwent considerable extortion on the journey across Arabia, also operated to incite the Turks to action.

First Turkish expedition against the Wahhābis, 1798-99.

For two or three years the Porte were unable to induce their representative at Baghdād, albeit he was none other than the once able and energetic Sulaimān Pāsha, to undertake an expedition against the Wahhābis; but at length in 1798, when even the town Hillah had begun to suffer from Wahhābi annoyance, he allowed his objections, which were probably of a personal and pecuniary nature, to be overcome. The Pāsha raised and equipped a force of about 5,000 Turkish troops, with an imposing but not very effective train of artillery, to which was added later a contingent of twice the strength drawn from the Shammar, Dhafīr and Muntafik tribes; and the regular part of this force, which in September 1798 was encamped on the right bank of the Tigris at Baghdād, appears to have reached Basrah by the beginning of December. The whole expedition was under the command of 'Alī Pāsha, the Kehiyah or steward of Sulaimān Pāsha, a Georgian slave, but married to his master's daughter; this individual has been described by one who knew him* as "ignorant, bigoted, irascible, obstinate, ill-mannered and brutal;" and his lack of military knowledge and his absurd and haughty treatment of the chiefs of the tribal contingent, on whom he had largely to rely, caused the failure of the expedition to be predicted by many before it had even started. The objective of the force was the Wahhābi capital of Dara'iyah, and it was determined to proceed thither by the circuitous but otherwise eligible route of Hasa, that Oasis being reduced on the way.

From Basrah 'Alī Pāsha marched by land to the Hasa Oasis, where he secured all the Wahhābi posts except the Kūt of Hofūf and Qasr Sāhūd at Mubarraz; but, these having held out for more than two months against his languid attacks and unskilful bombardments, he desisted from the siege and, on the advice of his Arab associates,

* Sh H. J. Brydges; but Mr. Manesty considered him "a brave and enterprising young man."

among whom Muhammad Baig, the most important, was suspected of correspondence with the Wahhābis, marched again for Basrah. His way was barred at Thāj in Wādi-al-Miyāh by Sa'ūd, son of the Wahhābi Amir, and the armies remained halted opposite to each other for three days, during which neither ventured to attack the other in force. A truce for six years between the Wahhābis and the Pāshāliq was then arranged, in May 1799; and, to obtain ratification of the same, a Wahhābi envoy returned with the Kehiyah to Baghdād. Meanwhile Sa'ūd visited Hasa; rewarded the garrisons of Kūt-al-Hofūf and Qasr Sāhūd; and punished those who had submitted to the Turks in the usual Wahhābi manner, by wholesale confiscation of their property. Matters between the Pāsha and the Amir were eventually adjusted at Baghdād, but not without some extraordinary displays of arrogance on the part of the Wahhābi delegate.*

The chief result of this ill-managed expedition was to inspire the Wahhābis with contempt for the Turkish troops, and in these circumstances it is no matter for surprise that the truce was, after the first, but indifferently observed by the Wahhabis; nor were they entirely without excuse, for presently a Persian pilgrim caravan, escorted by a Wahhābi guard, was attacked and plundered between Hillah and Najaf by local Arabs whom it was the duty of the Turks to restrain. Roving bands of plunderers now appeared again in the vicinity of Basrah; and at length, in 1801 a crowning humiliation at the hands of the Wahhābis overtook Sulaimān Pāsha, which shortened his days, "spread a gloom over the Muhammadan world, and elated to a high degree the character and confidence of the sectaries."

Sack of Karbala by the Wahhābis, 20th April 1801.

On the morning of the 18th of Zul Hijjeh, corresponding apparently to Wednesday the 20th of April 1801, a Wahhābi host suddenly appeared before Karbala, which at the time was partially deserted in consequence of a pilgrimage to Najaf,— a circumstance that doubtless had not escaped the observation of the enemy. The strength of the invaders on this occasion has been estimated by more than one authority at not less than 6,000 camels, mostly carrying two men. After halting and pitching a small camp in the gardens on the west side of the town, and after detaching two bodies which took up positions to the north and south, the Wahhābis proceeded to attack a gate opposite the Khaimahgāh

* A ludicrous scene which occurred at the Wahhābi envoy's first reception by the Pāsha is well described by Sir H. J. Brydges, who was an eye-witness: see his *Wakaudy*, pages 23-27.

from a caravansarai by which it was adjoined; and before long their guns* effected a breach in the town wall. The Naqīb, Saiyid Murtaza, and the civil governor, Mulla 'Umr, then fled by another gate, and a general *sauve qui peut* of the inhabitants ensued, while the Wahhābis made straight for the shrine of the Imām Husain, the adoration offered at which was particularly obnoxious to their principles. In the course of the day the Wahhābis wrecked and plundered the tomb to the best of their ability, destroying about half of the gilded copper dome; and they also thoroughly scoured the streets, except in the quarter of the tomb of 'Abbās, pillaging the houses and slaying every male inhabitant whom they met. In the late afternoon they withdrew again from the town and disappeared into the desert, taking with them, it is said, about 200 camel loads of the sacred treasure and of other spoil, besides many prisoners. The whole tragedy was the work of only eight hours.

The number of the inhabitants of Karbala massacred on this fearful day was at first supposed to be about 3,000, but subsequent enquiry showed that it was even greater and exceeded 5,000, of whom some 500 fell within the precincts of the Imām Husain's tomb. The Wahhābis, it has been stated, lost not a single man. Much distress existed during the whole year following among the survivors of the massacre, but some relief was administered by Mr. Harford Jones (afterwards Sir H. J. Brydges), Resident at Baghdād, on account of the Hon'ble East India Company; and a fund subscribed by Persians for the ransom of prisoners was also managed entirely by the British Resident, through whose efforts over 200 captives were released and sent, at their own desire, to Persia.

After their retirement from Karbala the Wahhābis attacked Najaf, but were repulsed, and raided settlements upon the Shatt-al-'Arab near Basrah, from which, however, they were driven out by the people of Zubair.

Second expedition of the Turks against the Wahhābis, probably in 1802.

The position of Sulaimān Pasha after this affair was critical; for, though the Porte had not themselves the means of removing him from his government, it was not impossible that the Shāh of Persia, whose subjects were the principal sufferers, might take effectual action against him and demand compensation for all losses sustained, including the damage done to the great Shi'ah shrine. To guard against a disaster at Najaf similar to that which had befallen Karbala, the treasures of the

* So one account clearly implies, but the Wahhābis did not take artillery with them.

shrine of 'Alī were removed temporarily, it is said, to the tomb of Imām Mūsa at Kādhimain near Baghdād; and, to placate the indignant sovereigns of Turkey and Persia, Sulaimān Pasha once more set on foot an expedition, largely tribal in its composition, against Dara'iyah. This force was commanded by Thuwaini, chief Shaikh of the Muntafik, and included contingents from the Dhafīr, Shammar and Ka'ab tribes, as well as from the Muntafik; but, like the expedition under 'Alī Pāsha, it ended in disaster. During a halt at the wells of Subaihīyah, 30 miles south of Kuwait, the commander Thuwaini was murdered by a slave; Sa'ūd, the Wahhābī, approached; and the whole force dispersed in confusion. The non-Bedouin portion, unable to find their way in the desert and dying of thirst, mostly surrendered to the Wahhābis, and those who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the more fanatical tribes of Southern Najd, such as the Qahtān and the 'Ataibah, were put to death in cold blood. Broken down by these accumulated misfortunes, Sulaimān Pasha expired on the 7th of August 1802.

The general supineness of the Turks in face of the serious provocations which they received from the Wahhābis is only intelligible in connection with their situation in Europe, which from 1768 to 1808 was continuously grave, at first by reason of foreign wars and later from internal causes. *

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* In 1768 the Sultān Mustafa III unadvisedly declared war by land and sea against Catharine of Russia; the Russians occupied the Crimea; and further losses to Turkey were only averted by an armistice, during which the partition of Poland took place. In 1773 war broke out afresh and continued till the peace of Kutchak Kainardji in 1774, by which the Crimea was made independent of Turkey, while Azoff, Kertch and Kinburn became Russian possessions. In 1783 Catharine definitely annexed the Crimea to Russia; and in 1788 Austria and Russia made a joint attack on Turkey with the object of spoliation. In 1791 the Russian armies crossed the Danube; and in 1792 the treaty of Jassy transferred Tiflis and the country between the Crimea and the Dniester from Turkey to Russia. After the accession of Paul, Russia and Turkey stood for a short time on the same side, as members of the second coalition against Napoleon who had invaded the Turkish Province of Egypt in 1798; but mutinous Janissaries, insubordinate provincial governors, and disaffected Christian subjects soon brought the Turkish Empire to the verge of dissolution. In 1804 Servia revolted, at first against the tyranny of the Janissaries, but ultimately against Turkish rule; in 1805 Turkey, now allied with France, was again attacked, but languidly, by Russia, and later a British naval force operated against Constantinople; in 1807 the Janissaries deposed the Sultān Salim III. Under Mahmūd II, who reigned from 1808 to 1839, this ebb of the Turkish fortunes was partially stemmed. (See footnote on page 1100).

SA'ŪD-BIN-'ABDUL 'AZĪZ.

1803-14.

Sa-ūd, whose succession to the Amirship on the death of his father seems to have been unopposed, perhaps because he had been nominated by 'Abdul 'Azíz in his lifetime, was a good specimen of the Wahhábi chief, and the administration in his day was typical of Wahhábi methods; a glance at his personality and system of government will therefore not be out of place. *

Personality of Sa'ūd.

Sa'ūd was handsome, even among his own family; he wore a beard of more than usual length, and so heavy was the growth of hair on his upper lip that it earned for him the sobriquet of Abu Shuwārib or "the Mustachioed"; his voice was sonorous, sweet, and persuasive. His knowledge of Muhammadan law was intimate; in power to apply it to actual cases he was not surpassed by any of the professional students of his own country; and his justice was as much applauded as his severity was feared. The strength of Sa'ūd's domestic affections, his sincerity of mind, his fidelity to his friends and the reliability of his word were unquestioned; but he was intolerant, especially of deceit, and somewhat choleric in disposition. In dress he was simple, in manner unassuming; as a ruler he was accessible in public audience; he avoided all ceremonial and instead maintained the dignity of his position by a princely hospitality. In personal and family expenditure Sa'ūd was frugal; by some he was accused of avarice, especially after the plunder of Karbala and the towns of Hijāz had whetted—as was supposed—his desire for wealth; and the rigour of his fines and confiscations has been attributed to interested motives as well as to zeal for the law. His only extravagance was in horseflesh, and he owned the finest mares in Arabia; three or four hundred he kept at Dara'iyah and others in Hasa, where lucerne was abundant. He was also well provided with the best riding camels. Sa'ūd is said to have fought by his father's side in battle at the early age of twelve years, and in his youth he bore a not undistinguished part in the exploits of the Wahhábi armies, many of which he commanded; but after his accession he avoided exposing himself in the field, and doubts of his

* The principal authority here is of course Burckhardt, in the existence of whose masterly and convincing *Materials for a History of the Wahabys* students interested in the subject are indeed fortunate.

personal courage came to be entertained. For several years after his father's assassination he wore a secret coat of mail; during his visits to Makkah he caused himself to be surrounded by extraordinary precautions; at Dara'iyah he seldom left his house except on Fridays; and throughout his reign a private interview with him was difficult to obtain. He showed some distrust of his brothers, and he allowed no power to his sons except the eldest, 'Abdullah; but he made much use of his sons in his military enterprises.

General administration of the Wahhābi Amir.

The position of Sa'ūd was never that of an absolute or arbitrary monarch; it was rather that of a great Arab Shaikh, ruling by influence, whose subordinate allies and subjects possessed a large degree of local freedom, and even rights, that he could not with safety invade. The authority of the Amīr was superior to all others but, only because he was recognised as the visible embodiment of the Wahhābi principle; and the people, for this reason, submitted voluntarily to his guidance. The Amir was careful to maintain, so far as possible, the hereditary power of families devoted to the Wahhābi cause, but of those which were not loyal he destroyed the influence by removing their chiefs to Daraʻiyah and substituting strangers in their place at home. In most cases new appointments to positions of authority were made by local election, the result of which the Amir merely confirmed. The Wahhābi dominions were divided into districts of which the principal, in the time of Sa'ūd, were 'Āridh-*cum*-Hasa, Qasīm, Jabal Shammar, the Haramain (*i.e.*, Makkah and Madinah), Hijāz (in the Bedouin acceptation of the hilly country to the south of Tāif), and Yaman: Bahrain, Qatar and 'Omān hardly, perhaps, formed regular districts. The executive government in each division, except in 'Āridh-*cum*-Hasa which contained the capital and was kept by Sa'ūd in his own hands, was carried on by officials, generally no doubt—as in the case of the Sharif Ghālib of Makkah—influential hereditary chiefs; and the principal duties of these executive governors were, besides political vigilance in their charges, to attend to the collection of the revenue and to furnish such military contingents as the central government might require. In matters of law and justice, however, the authorities were not the executive governors but Qādhis, carefully selected and sent down to the divisions from Dara'iyah; and from these, as from the governors, an appeal seems to have lain in all cases to the Amir. In time of peace the Amir relied largely on the advice of the family of the founder of Wahhabism, known as the "Aulād-ash-Shaikh", who seem to have formed in fact a sort of standing but informal council of state.

Civilising tendency at home of the Wahhábi government.

The tendency of the Wahhábi government in Najd, in comparison at least with the system or no-system which had preceded it, was essentially civilising. Among the principal objects kept in view were the establishment of law and order, the suppression of local wars and private feuds, and the substitution for the latter of state-inflicted punishments and state-awarded compensation; and considerable severity was used in the prosecution of these aims with the result that Arab license, though far from being abolished, was tempered and held in check. Local responsibility for the prevention of crime, especially robbery, was very strictly enforced; and punishment was even inflicted on bystanders who failed to interfere in personal affrays. By discouraging facility of divorce the Wahhábi Amir sought to raise the level of morality among his subjects. A great part of the new system was repulsive to the Bedouins, who had been accustomed to live by plunder; and the innovation of disregarding, in the case of criminals, the ancient principles of tribal protection or sanctuary must at first have been regarded with consternation.* The security established by the Wahhábi ruler was, however, appreciated by the non-nomadic population, though these too had their grievances; and, on the whole, public opinion appears to have supported the Amir in most of his reforms. Punishments were severe, but generally took the form of fines beneficial to the treasury; the death penalty however, though rare, was not unknown, and was inflicted in cases of homicide committed with a dangerous weapon. For men of position the gravest penalty was shaving of the beard, and enormous fines were sometimes paid in order to escape this last extremity of degradation.

Religious aspects of the administration.

The administration was characterised by less of religious austerity than might have been expected from the principles of those by whom it was conducted. After the first few years it was not attempted, even in Najd, to prevent the smoking of tobacco in private; and after 1810, an effort that had been made to avoid communication with heretics having been abandoned as impracticable, commercial intercourse with 'Iráq and Syria was gradually resumed. The punctual and regular observance of the fixed prayers was however enforced, when necessary, by beating with sticks. The commercial policy of Sa'úd was liberal; and, though usury was forbidden, he did not interfere with speculators who bought cheap and held up their stocks, even in times of scarcity, for a rise in prices.

* For the rules of tribal protection, see Pelly's *Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh*, Appendix XIII.

Financial system of the Wahhábis.

The financial arrangements of the Wahhábi government were simple and effective. The state domains were the principal source of revenue; they consisted chiefly of the confiscated lands of rebels and other offenders, leased in many instances to the original owners on a rent of one-half or one-third of the produce; and they were very extensive, embracing in Qasim, for instance, almost all the cultivated ground of the district. Another principal item of revenue was Zakát or tribute, literally "alms," taken from many classes and professions in accordance with the precepts of the Qurán; under this head unirrigated cultivation was assessed at one-tenth and irrigated at one-twentieth of the actual produce, and merchants were taxed at the rate of 2½ per cent. upon their capital, the amount of which they were required to declare on oath. One-fifth of the booty taken from "heretics" was appropriated to public purposes, the remainder being divided among the troops by whom it was captured; and in the early days of the Wahhábi power, when wars were being waged simultaneously in Hijáz and Yaman, in 'Iráq, and on the Persian Gulf littoral, this must have been a productive source of income. Ordinary miscellaneous fines also brought something into the treasury, and from the Bedouins were taken in kind, *viz.*, in horses, camels, and sheep.

The whole of this revenue, with the exception of the Bedouin Zakát, which was paid to the Wahhábi Amír direct and retained by him for his personal expenditure, was collected with elaborate precautions against fraud and extortion and deposited in the Bait-al-Mál or treasury which existed in each administrative district; and of the amounts received at each place one-fourth was forwarded to the great public treasury at Dara'iyah, while the rest was expended locally for the public benefit. The aggregate value of the contributions received at the head treasury from local treasuries did not ordinarily exceed $1,000,000 per annum; but in one particular year, under the rule of Sa'úd, it was said to have reached $2,000,000. From the central treasury compensation was paid to Wahhábis who had suffered at the hands of the enemy and assistance was given to those who had lost cattle by accident or disease; but in Sa'úd's time the outgoings were small in proportion to the income, and there must have been a great accumulation of treasure at Dara'iyah. From the Bedouin Zakát, collected in spring at prescribed watering places and delivered over to the Amír for private disbursement, were met the cost of his magnificent hospitality and that of the maintenance of his bodyguard: the dependents and guests whom he fed were estimated at 400 to 500 persons daily, and the expenditure on the bodyguard

was probably not less than £10,000 a year. It was a favourable point in the Wahhábi fiscal system that irregular extortions and forced gifts were not permitted; and Sa'úd, at the worst, was only suspected of occasionally taking steps to bring about the forfeiture by legal means of a mare which he particularly coveted. The Wahhábi ruler had no currency of his own and dollars were the principal medium of exchange in Najd, but Turkish coin was rejected and treated as abominable.

Military system of the Wahhábis.

Warfare was conducted by the Wahhábis on Bedouin principles. Apart from the Amir's mercenary bodyguard or Manjiyah of about 300 men, and from the retinues of his sons, there was no standing force; but every man between the ages of 18 and 60 was a soldier and was liable to render military service against those who had not accepted the reformed faith, whenever he might be called upon to do so. At times only a proportion, at times the whole, of the military strength of a particular district was called out; and very heavy fines were levied on those who, after being summoned, neglected to appear. This compulsory service in the field was probably the most unpopular feature of Wahhábi rule, at least with the settled population; and it fell so severely upon the owners of mares that many sold their animals, and the number of horses available in Najd became by degrees considerably reduced. The matchlock men of the towns and villages were a *corps d'élite* and took a leading part in the sack of Karbala. Substitutes might be hired by those called out for service except when the levy was universal. The Wahhábi soldier proceeding to the front was required to provide, in addition to his arms and a horse or camel, his rations for the campaign; these were fixed at 100 lbs. of flour, 50 or 60 lbs. of dates, 20 lbs. of butter, a sack of wheat of barley for his animal, and a skin for water. The Wahhábi military system was a good one for raids and incursions, but it supplied no men for the permanent occupation of foreign conquests; and, in fact, no regular Wahhábi garrison was ever maintained abroad for any length of time except at Madinah. The Wahhábis certainly excelled in those destructive raids on which they relied for breaking the spirit of their adversaries, and these they carried out with extraordinary secrecy and despatch, the leader generally assembling his men at an unlikely rallying place and moving off at first in a false direction. In a great invasion of the Syrian Hauran, in 1810, the Wahhábi forces marched for 35 days before reaching their objective and looted a large number of villages before the Pasha of Damascus, who had only two days' notice of their approach, could make any defensive preparations. The courage of the Wahhábi in war was stimulated by a belief that his soul, if he died fighting, went straight to Paradise; and he was chiefly terrible

to his foes on account of his consistent refusal to grant quarter to any who opposed him in arms. In the hostilities in Hijaz during the latter part of Sa'ûd's rule not a single instance, it is said, occurred of a Turkish soldier's life being spared by a Wahhâbi. On the other hand "Amân" or quarter, either partial and extending in that case to little but life, or complete and extending to both life and property, was invariably granted to such as made submission; and, when granted, it was most honourably observed. The honour of women was in all circumstances strictly respected.

We have dwelt at some length upon these particulars because they make the course of Wahhâbi history more intelligible; and it is probable that, even at the present day, some such system as that which prevailed in the time of Sa'ûd constitutes the Wahhâbi ideal of good government.

Internal history of Najd, 1803-1814.

The great activity of the Wahhâbis under Sa'ûd beyond their own borders tended to obscure such events as occurred in Najd, and hostility and the absence of communication between the people of Najd and their neighbours made the veil over Central Arabian affairs almost impenetrable. An internal rebellion, of which the exact time and circumstances are not known, is said to have taken place in the district of Hariq, but it was apparently suppressed. In 1808 there was scarcity in the interior, where drought had then prevailed for two or three years. By 1809, at latest, the northern oasis of Jauf-al-'Âmir had been added to the Wahhâbi dominions for in that year the Pâsha of Damascus made an effort, which ended in nothing, to organise an expedition against the place. Sa'ûd died of fever at Dara'iyah in the spring of 1814; the exact date is given as the 10th or 17th of April, and his age at his death is stated to have been 68 years.*

Proceedings of the Wahhâbis in Western Arabia, 1803-1814.

The conquest of the Turkish districts of the Red Sea littoral was completed by the Wahhâbis under Sa'ûd-bin-'Abdul 'Aziz. Madînah succumbed to a blockade in the spring of 1804 and was treated with some

Madînah taken by the Wahhâbis, 1804.

* Burckhardt says 45 or 50 years, but this seems almost inconsistent with his statement that a child of one of Sa'ûd's younger sons was presented to the Amîr at Makkah on one of his visits there.

severity on account of the favourable disposition of the inhabitants towards the Turks; thus, while private property was respected, the town was not exempted, like Makkah, from payment of tribute to the Amir. The Turkish representative was expelled from the place; a Shaikh of the Harb tribe was installed as governor; the treasures of the tomb of Muhammad—or such as had not been divided among themselves by the people of Madinah before the surrender—were appropriated by the Wahhábis; and an attempt was made to destroy the dome of the building itself.* The desecration of the tomb of the prophet was a shortsighted and impolitic act; it filled the whole Muhammadan world with horror, and it finally alienated all Sunnis from the Wahhábi cause in no less a degree than the desecration of the Karbala shrine had already alienated all Shi'ahs.

In the same year Abu Nuqtah, the principal Shaikh of 'Asír, overran the coast of Yaman from Qunfidah to Bait-al-Faqih, in the name of the Wahhábis, plundering the ports of Lahiyah and Hodaidah; and during the next three or four years he frequently repeated his incursions into the same tract. No attempt, however, was made to capture San'ah,—chiefly, it was believed, because the Wahhábi Amir was anxious to defer the taking of that place until he could himself be present and secure a main share in the plunder.

General position on the Western Coast of Arabia, 1804-08.

Under Wahhábi rule tranquillity prevailed in the conquered districts of the Red Sea coast, and, as communication with Najd was free and intercourse with Egypt unimpeded, provisions were abundant and prices low; but general trade, in consequence of the check to pilgrimages and to the resulting influx of foreign merchants, was stagnant. The local influence of Ghálib, Sharif of Makkah, which was an obstacle to the free exercise of authority by the Wahhábis, had begun to decline; but everywhere it was considerable, and at Jiddah as yet almost unimpaired; and the adroitness of the Sharif was such that the Amir could find no pretext for taking measures against him. By persuading Sa'úd to forbid public prayers being made in the mosques on Fridays for the Sultán of Turkey Ghálib succeeded in bringing about a yet more irreconcileable difference than already existed between the Porte and the Wahhábis.

Treatment of the Hajj by the Wahhábis, 1802-10.

The Wahhabis had always regarded with disfavour the great organised annual pilgrimages to Makkah and Madinah which were made under Turkish official arrangements from Damascus and Cairo and also by

* According to Colonel Ross the spoliation of the tomb and the attempted destruction of the dome did not take place until the year 1810, when the Amir visited Madinah in person.

large concourses of people, from Yaman and Persia. They were themselves exact in performance of the pilgrimage to Makkah, which was frequently made by Sa'ūd himself, and they had apparently no conscientious scruples even against pilgrimages to Madīnah; but the irreverent and licentious conduct of many of the pilgrims was repugnant to their feelings, and they had doubtless strong objections to the intervention of the "heretical" Turkish Government. In 1802 the Hajj from Damascus had difficulty in carrying out the pilgrimage to Makkah, and in 1803* it was obliged to turn back before even reaching Madīnah; the Egyptian and Persian Hajjs also came to an end in 1802 or 1803; and in the latter year the Cairo Mahmal, sent by sea from Egypt, was not suffered to proceed beyond Jiddah where it was landed. In 1810, however, an organised Hajj from Morocco and Northern Africa was permitted by Sa'ūd to visit Makkah in consideration of the religious character and propriety of the Maghrabiyīn. The performance of the pilgrimage by individuals who professed acceptance of Wahhābi tenets and comported themselves with decency was never, apparently, either prevented or hindered by the Wahhābi authorities in Hijāz.

Preparations by the Viceroy of Egypt for the recovery of the Holy Cities, 1804-10.

In 1804 Muhammad 'Alī† was appointed Pāsha of Egypt, chiefly in order that he might recover Hijāz for the Sultān of Turkey. In the same year 400 or 500 troops under Sharīf Pāsha had been sent to Jiddah, of which place their commandant was appointed governor by the Porte; but Sharīf Pāsha died at Jiddah, and the position remained

* From Comaneez' *Histoire des Wahabis*, 1806 (not 1803), would seem to be the year in which the caravan was repulsed.

† Muhammad 'Alī Pāsha was an Albanian soldier of fortune and a self-made man.

Ibrāhīm Pāsha, who is generally regarded as Muhammad 'Alī's eldest son, but according to some historians was only a step-son, entered soon after the conclusion of his campaign in Najd on a military career in Europe; and in 1848 he was regent of Egypt for only two months, predeceasing his father for whom he acted. 'Abbās II, the present Khedive of Egypt, is Ibrāhīm's great-grandson in the male line.

Tūsūn, who was Muhammad 'Alī's third (or second) son, died of plague at Rosetta in 1816, less than a year after his return from Najd. 'Abbās I, who ruled Egypt from 1848 to 1854, was his son; but in the character of that miserable voluptuary and bigoted Muslim we fail to trace a single lineament of the soldierly Tūsūn.

From the appointment of Muhammad 'Alī until 1841 Egypt was practically independent of the Porte and was actually stronger, both on land and sea, than the rest of the empire to which it nominally belonged. It is therefore necessary to emphasize the fact that the Central Arabian campaigns and occupations of 1815-18 and 1835-41 were Egyptian, not Turkish. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the so-called Egyptian forces included a large proportion of Albanians, Libyan Bedouins, etc., and doubtless, a number of genuine Turks.

unaltered. Suez fell into Muhammad 'Ali's hands in 1805 and Qusair in 1808, and, had he declared those ports closed to trade with Hijāz, it is possible that the inhabitants of that province would have been obliged, through failure of the food supplies for which they are dependent on Egypt, themselves to undertake the expulsion of the Wahhābis; but, either from respect for the Holy Cities and their inhabitants, or from unwillingness to injure the export trade of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali shrunk from this obvious expedient and deferred the recovery of Hijāz until he was in a position to attempt it by force of arms. The Pāsha's preparations were not commenced in earnest until the end of 1809; nor was he entirely at leisure from internal preoccupations until he had disposed of the Mamlūk rebellion, which continued into 1811. Once began, however, his measures were thorough and systematic; and, before commencing the campaign he was careful to provide a sufficient fleet of transports at Suez and to establish and garrison a chain of posts reaching down the eastern shore of the Red Sea as far as Wajj. As soon as the Sharif Ghālib of Makkah became aware of Muhammad 'Ali's intentions he opened a correspondence with the Pāsha.

Occupation of Yanbō' by the Egyptians and their repulse from Madīnah, 1811-12.

Command of the expedition was entrusted to Tūsūn Bey, son of Muhammad 'Ali, a youth who was only eighteen years of age but had distinguished himself by his courage in the Mamlūk wars. The infantry, consisting of 1,500 to 2,000 Albanians, arrived by sea near Yanbō' in October 1811; and that place, which was held by a nominally Wahhābi garrison of 100 men on the part of the Sharif Ghālib, surrendered after a feeble resistance of two days to the Egyptian commanders. A fortnight later Tūsūn Bey himself arrived by land with the cavalry, who numbered about 800 and consisted partly of Turkish horsemen and partly of mounted Bedouins: he had experienced no opposition by the way. In January 1812, the Sharif Ghālib as yet declining on various pretexts to assist either side, the Egyptians advanced from Yanbō' through the hills towards Madīnah; but in a gorge near the village of Jadaid they were taken unawares by a huge force of Wahhābis, just arrived from Najd, of whose presence they were altogether ignorant and by whom the mountains on either side were occupied in great strength. The result was a complete disaster for the invading force, who lost four guns, about 1,200 men, 200 horses, the whole of their baggage, and nearly all their camel transport; but pursuit by the Wahhābis was checked by the courage of Tūsūn Bey himself and of his Āgha,* Thomas Keith, *alias* Ibrāhīm,

* Thomas Keith was a native of Edinburgh; he was originally an armourer in the 72nd Highlanders; but, having been taken prisoner in Egypt, he became a Muhammadan and rose, after extraordinary adventures, to be the chief of Tūsūn's Mamlūks.

who between them succeeded in rallying a few of the Egyptian cavalry. The Sharīf Ghālib, on learning what had befallen the Egyptians, proceeded in person to join the Wahhābis; but the latter, soon after the action at Jadaid, returned to the interior, leaving the Harb tribe to watch Yanbō'.

Madīnah taken by the Egyptians, 1812.

In October 1812, having received large reinforcements from Egypt, having conciliated part of the Harb tribe, and having been approached by the Sharīf Ghālib, who again offered, as he had done before, to hand over Makkah and Jiddah to the Egyptians as soon as they should have taken Madīnah, Tūsūn Bey advanced once more against Madīnah. This time there was no resistance by the way; but the inner or walled town of Madīnah, from which the Wahhābis had expelled the inhabitants in order that they might occupy it themselves, held out for fourteen or fifteen days. At length, a breach having been opened in the wall by means of a mine as the Egyptian artillery was too light for the purpose, the troops entered headed by Thomas Keith, killed about 1,000 of the astonished Wahhābis, and plundered the town. About 1,500 of the Wahhābis gained the citadel, in which they stood a siege of three weeks; but at the end of that time their provisions gave out and they surrendered on favourable terms, which the Egyptians immediately violated by killing as many of them as they could,—an act of perfidy that caused a strong revulsion of feeling among the Bedouins in favour of the Wahhābis. The skulls of the dead Wahhābis were collected by the Egyptians and built into a tower upon the Yanbō' road, of which a portion still remained in 1815 and was seen by the traveller Burckhardt.

Makkah, Jiddah and Tāif occupied by the Egyptians, 1813

On the fall of Madīnah a force of 1,500 men under Mustafa Bey, a brother-in-law of Muhammad 'Ali, marched from Yanbō' in the direction of Makkah; the Sharīf Ghālib favoured their advance; and the local Wahhābi leader, Ghālib's brother-in-law 'Othmān-al-Madhāifah, was too weak to oppose it. In January 1813 the Egyptians entered Makkah, Jiddah being at the same time occupied by a detachment; and a fortnight later Tāif also, in the hills some 60 or 70 miles to the eastward of Makkah, was taken by Mustafa Bey, assisted by the Sharīf Ghālib, after a slight skirmish with 'Othmān. From Tāif, Mustafa Bey pushed on towards Turabah, to the east of Tāif; but he was defeated in the hills and returned, having lost 400 or 500 men. Tūsūn Bey, now created Pāsha of Jiddah, arrived at Makkah as a pilgrim in the course of the winter; and later, in September 1813, 'Othmān-al-Madhāifah was taken prisoner near Tāif and was sent to Constantinople, where he was beheaded.

Arrival of Muhammad 'Ali in Hijāz and deportation of the Sharif Ghālib, 1813.

On the 28th of August 1813 Muhammad 'Ali, who had received strict orders from Constantinople to proceed in person to Hijāz and feared that he might lose the Pashāliq of Egypt if he did not obey, arrived at Jiddah; he brought with him a reinforcement of 2,000 infantry; and in the meantime 2,000 cavalry and 8,000 transport camels had been despatched by the land route from Egypt. The Pāsha at once turned his attention to the problem of provisioning his forces, which had become one of great urgency, for the Turkish garrisons of Makkah and Tāif depended on the port of Jiddah for their supplies and transport was so scarce that it was hardly possible to forward them as fast as they were required. Sea transport, too, was inadequate; and to supplement this deficiency Muhammad 'Ali took up the whole of the shipping of Jiddah and Yanbō' and arranged to hire 20 vessels for one year from Saiyid Sa'īd of Masqat. The Pāsha quickly conceived a distrust of Ghālib, partly on account of the failure of the latter to provide camels when called upon to do so, and partly because it was obvious that the Arabs regarded the Sharif as their protector equally against the Wahhābis and the Egyptians. Muhammad 'Ali's suspicions led before long to the arrest of Ghālib by artifice, followed by his deportation to Turkey, where he died of plague at Salonika in 1816; but the local effect of this stroke of policy was unfortunate and caused the flight of many influential Arabs to the Wahhābi camp. Among these was Rājah, a relation of Ghālib, whom the Wahhābi Amir appointed his representative in Hijāz in place of 'Othman.

Unsuccessful expedition of Tūsūn Pāsha against Turabah, 1813.

Such being the position of affairs, Muhammad 'Ali, at the end of October or beginning of November 1813, determined on an expedition against Turabah, where Rājah had now fixed his headquarters and where many others of the adherents of Ghālib had assembled. The Pāsha had succeeded in collecting a small quantity of supplies at Tāif, and he therefore ordered his son Tūsūn Pāsha to advance from that place with 2,000 men and provisions for 30 days. The force was delayed on the way by troublesome hill operations against the 'Ataibah, and their provisions were almost exhausted before they came in sight of Turabah, where lived the Buqūm tribe, presided over by an old woman named Ghāliyah, whom the Turks regarded as a sorceress. After one unsuccessful attack on Turabah a retirement was commenced, and the Egyptians, closely pressed by the enemy during a four days' retreat to Tāif, lost 700 men by the way; on this occasion, as in the disaster at Jadaid, the force was only saved from utter destruction through the exertions of Tūsūn Pāsha, the commander, seconded by his faithful Scottish Āgha. As Taif was the only point from which operations

could at this time be carried on, it became a matter of the first necessity to re-provision that post; but in doing so great difficulty was experienced, for of the 8,000 camels sent from Egypt only 500 survived their arrival in Hijāz by as much as three months, and from the whole surrounding country not more than 500 local camels could be got together at one time. The route between Jiddah and Tāif, moreover, was very unsafe, being exposed to Wahhābi raids and surprises; and about one-third of the load of each convoy was consumed by the escorts and drivers on the march. During the winter of 1813-14 the Egyptian troops remained perfectly inactive.

Reopening of the Hajj, 1812-13.

An organised pilgrim caravan from Egypt apparently reached Makkah at the end of 1812; but it was not until November 1813 that a Syrian Hajj, the first to pass since 1802, was conducted in safety to the sacred city by Sulaimān Pāsha. On his way the Pāsha had been obliged to yield to the insolent demand of the Bedouins that he should pay up their allowances for the ten years during which the Hajj had been intermitted. Many pilgrims from Asia Minor and Turkey in Europe also made their way to Hijāz *viâ* Suez and Jiddah; and the townspeople of Makkah were cheered by prospects of returning prosperity.

Proceedings of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1803-14.

The details of Wahhābi action in Eastern Arabia during the reign of Sa'ūd will be found in the separate histories of the Arab principalities upon the coast of the Persian Gulf, chiefly in those of Bahrain, Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate; and here it will be enough to take a general view of the Wahhābi proceedings in that quarter.

Action of the Wahhābis at Kuwait.

In 1808 the 'Utūb of Kuwait, whose attitude towards the Wahhābi Amir had generally been one of defiance, withheld or refused to pay tribute; and a strong Wahhābi force was despatched against the town, but was repulsed with loss. This check to an enemy from whom he had much to fear was very welcome to the Pāsha of Baghdād, who did not fail to show his pleasure by sending a robe of honour and other gifts to the Shaikh of Kuwait. In the following year the Wahhābi Amīr, desirous of wiping out the defeat, ordered the 'Utūb of Bahrain, the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah and the Saiyid of Masqat to undertake an

expedition by sea against Kuwait and Basrah; but the Qawāsim alone expressed their willingness to obey, and even they in the end took no action.

Action of the Wahhābis in Bahrain, Qatar and Hasa.

Sa'ūd endeavoured, at the beginning of his reign, to consolidate the power obtained in his father's time over Bahrain and Qatar; and, so long as he remained free from embarrassments in other quarters, his efforts were not unsuccessful. In 1805, a dynastic quarrel being then in progress in 'Omān, he was able to despatch an 'Atbi fleet from Bahrain to watch the course of events at Masqat in the Wahhābi interest. In 1809 he won over to his side the dangerous pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, with whose assistance his power was quickly established in Qatar; and in 1810 he was able to appoint a Wahhābi governor over Qatar, Bahrain and Hasa with headquarters in Bahrain. In 1811, in consequence of the dangers threatening from the direction of Egypt and Hijāz, he was obliged to relax his hold on the newly acquired eastern districts; Zubārah in Qatar was successfully attacked by the ruler of Masqat; and the Wahhābi garrisons were either expelled or withdrawn from that place and from Bahrain, and were withdrawn from Qatīf and Hofūf in Hasa. By 1814 the influence of the Wahhābis in Bahrain affairs had ceased; but in Hasa, where there was no strong local power to contest the field, it remained paramount.

Action of the Wahhābis in Trucial 'Omān.

The establishment of a Wahhābi post in the Buraimi Oasis in 1800 did not long remain without effect on the affairs of the district known at the present day as Trucial 'Omān, and in 1804-05 there was a marked increase of lawlessness on the part of the piratical Qawāsim; but whether this was due to the direct incitement of the Wahhābis, or was an indirect result of their interference in local politics, must be considered a doubtful point. At the end of 1808 Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, the chief of the Qawāsim, was deposed by the Wahhābis from his general authority over the tribe; and in 1809 Husain-bin-'Ali, Shaikh of Rams, who had recently visited Dara'iyah, was appointed governor, on behalf of the Wahhābis, over the whole Pirate Coast. In 1808-09 a serious renewal of piracy took place and symptoms of fanaticism were perceptible, but conclusive proofs of Wahhābi instigation were still wanting; it was stated, however, that Husain-bin-'Ali had undertaken the usual obligation of a Wahhābi governor to forward to Dara'iyah one-fifth of the spoils taken in war from "heretics" by those over whom he was placed. In 1809 the Wahhābis consolidated their hold upon the 'Omān promontory by occupying with Wahhābi garrisons the forts of Fujairah, Hithnah and Khor Fakkān in Shamailiyah, and in the same year they succeeded in decoying Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar

to Dara'iyah, where he was detained under surveillance; but the Shaikh before long escaped from their custody and made his way through Yaman to the port of Mokha, whence he returned by sea to Masqat. At the end of the year, when the piratical port of Rās-al-Khaimah was attacked by a British armament, it was stated that Mutlaq, the Wahhābi leader at Baraimi, had moved to the assistance of the Qawāsim; but, if he did, he arrived too late. In 1812 piracy again revived upon the coast subject to the Qawāsim; but the connection of the Wahhābis with the outbreak, if they had any, was not clear.

Action of the Wahhābis in the 'Omān Sultanate.

We have already adverted to the interference of the Wahhābis in a dynastic quarrel at Masqat in the year 1805. The result of the struggle there was favourable to the Wahhābi protégé Saiyid Badar, who obtained the chief power and ruled Masqat from 1805 to 1807; but in the latter year he was assassinated by his cousin Saiyid Sa'id, Wahhābi influence at Masqat received a severe check, and a garrison which the Wahhābis had placed at Barkah fled from their post. The new sovereign, Saiyid Sa'id, professed a favourable disposition towards Ibn-Sa'ūd, who continued to be represented at Masqat by a political agent and some religious emissaries; but the Wahhābis were perfectly well aware of the Saiyid's secret hostility to their influence; and in 1809, after Sa'id had evaded compliance with an order to proceed in the Wahhābi interest against Kuwait, the Wahhābi general Mutlaq-al-Mutairi was sent to Baraimi with orders to organise and conduct a campaign against him. It was at this point that the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah took place, designed partly for the chastisement of the Qāsimi pirates and partly for the relief of the ruler of Masqat from the Wahhābi danger; it ended early, in 1810, with the recovery of the Saiyid's town of Shināṣ from the grasp of the Wahhābis, by whom it had been seized; but the effect of the operations was temporary and in the end probably unfavourable to the interests of Masqat. In 1811 Mutlaq, nothing daunted, proceeded with his task of subjugating 'Omān; after an unsuccessful blockade of Barkah and Matrah, he made himself master of Hisn Samāil in the heart of the Saiyid's dominions; and, having placed a garrison in that fort, he withdrew again to Baraimi. In 1812 the Saiyid's subjects, aided by a Persian contingent, retook Hisn Samāil; but this success was followed by a severe engagement in the neighbourhood of Izki, in which the 'Omānis and their allies were completely worsted. In the same year, or perhaps in 1813, the Wahhābis took a fearful revenge on Saiyid Sa'id; their forces, accompanied by Turki and Faisal, two sons of the Wahhābi Amir, devastated the districts of Masqat and Eastern Hajar; and they

encamped for a time in Ja'alān, which they made a base for their destructive raids, and where they succeeded in permanently converting the Banī Bū 'Alī and the Banī Rāsib, two important local tribes, to Wahhābism. They then returned, apparently without loss, to their principal post in the Barāimi Oasis.

Later in 1813, Saiyid Sa'īd having opened a correspondence with Tūsūn Pāsha and undertaken to restore the displaced Shaikh of the Qawāsim, the Wahhābī general Mutlaq invaded Bātinah in irresistible force and extorted from the ruler of Masqat a payment of $40,000. Mutlaq then proceeded to Najd; but, his successor Ibn-'Azdakah having been murdered, he quickly returned to 'Omān—only however to meet his death, in November 1813, at the hands of the Hajriyīn. His place at Barāimi was taken by one Ibn-Mazrū'.

First contact between British and Wahhābi policy.

The events described above, in Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate, brought the Wahhābis for the first time into contact with the British power, and that in a not altogether friendly manner; for the Wahhābis were suspected of instigating the piracies of the Qawāsim, and they certainly aimed at destroying the independence of the Saiyid of Masqat, which the British Government desired to maintain.

British settlement with the Qawāsim, 1806.

At the same time every precaution was taken by the British authorities to avoid the appearance of a conflict with Ibn-Sa'ūd. In 1805, when British action was first taken, in concert with Saiyid Badar, against the Qāsimi buccaneers, Captain Seton, the agent employed, was strictly enjoined by the Bombay Government to refrain from proceedings which might be displeasing to the Wahhābī Amīr; and, in the treaty which he arranged with the Qawāsim in 1806, the supposed connection of the Wahhābis with that tribe was studiously ignored.

British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah and Shināṣ, 1809.

In 1809, on the occasion of the expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, the same indirect policy was observed, and the commander of the British force was instructed to avoid a direct collision with the representatives of Ibn-Sa'ūd; but the peculiar circumstances of the imbroglio at Shināṣ led to an involuntary contravention of these orders, and some Wahhābi blood was apparently shed by the British arms in the capture

of that stronghold.* Rahmah-bin-Jābir, however, the pirate of Qatar, escaped punishment by the expedition, partly at least on account of his connection with the Wahhābis. At the conclusion of the campaign a letter was apparently addressed by the British authorities to Ibn-Sa'ūd, requiring him to restrain those under his influence from committing piracy; and an answer was received from the Amīr, in which, while he affected not to be impressed by the British operations on the coast, he stated that he had no quarrel with Christians and would prevent aggressions upon the British flag.

Overtures of the Wahhabi Amīr to the British Government, 1811-12.

The increasing difficulties of the Wahhābis in Western Arabia led, however, before the death of Sa'ūd, to another and more friendly exchange of communications with the British Government. In 1811 or 1812, possibly as a countermove to the journey of Saiyid Sālim from Masqat to Shīraz for the purpose of obtaining help from Persia, the Wahhābi Amīr sent an envoy named Ibrāhīm-bin-'Abdul Karīm to the Governor of Fārs, by whom he was well received; and this envoy, after discharging his duty at Shīrāz, waited on the British Resident, Lieutenant Bruce, at Būshehr, where he expressed, on behalf of his master Ibn-Sa'ūd, a desire that amicable relations should be established between the British and the Wahhābi Governments and that the ports of either should be thrown open to the commerce of the other. These overtures were submitted in due course to the Government of India, who decided, apparently in 1814, that it would be inexpedient to enter into a treaty or to form intimate relations with the Wahhābi Amīr; but they considered that friendly intercourse should be maintained with him, and that every effort made to confirm him in his favourable disposition.

Attacks by the Wahhābis on Turkish 'Irāq, 1803-14.

Under the Amīr Sa'ūd raids upon the borders of Turkish 'Irāq continued; but the people of that province were now thoroughly upon their guard, and no considerable successes were any longer achieved by the Wahhābis. The Wahhābis made, however, almost annual incursions, and they sometimes even crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia.

Harmless Wahhābi demonstration, 1803.

At the end of 1803, apparently by way of revenging the assassination of the late Amīr 'Abdul 'Aziz, which the Pāsha of Baghdād was

*From Burckhardt (II. 208) it would seem that a cousin of the Amīr Sa'ūd was among those killed.

suspected of having instigated, a force of Wahhabis plundered the environs of Najaf; but when the Pasha, who had now taken into his counsels a chief named Faris of the northern Shammar, advanced against them, they retired without fighting.

Unsuccessful Wahhabi attack on Zubair and Basrah, 1804.

In 1804 Wahhabi troops overran the neighbourhood of Zubair and Basrah, but, though they captured a Shaikh of the Muntafik tribe and by his means brought pressure to bear on his brother, who was governor of Zubair, they were unable to make any impression upon either place. A tower, however, covering the water supply of Zubair, was destroyed by an accidental explosion in which the whole garrison perished, after having successfully resisted the attempts of the Wahhabis during several days.

Turkish expedition from Hillah against the Wahhabis, 1804-05.

In November 1804 'Ali Pasha, the Wali of Baghdad, determined to try conclusions with the Wahhabis and moved out to Hillah with an expeditionary force; he was accompanied by 'Abdullah Pasha, by whom the last attempt had been made in 1803 to conduct the Syrian Hajj from Damascus to Madinah, and also by his own Arab adviser Faris. The troops remained inactive at Hillah until early in 1805, when a column of 400 picked men was detached, apparently to seek a combat with the enemy in the desert; but their operations seem to have begun and ended with a visit to 'Ain Said in the modern Qadha of Samawah, of which place the inhabitants had hitherto professed Wahhabism but now readily submitted to the power of the Turks. A few days after their departure Sa'ud arrived on the spot and reproached those who had made submission to the infidel, but the people were apparently disinclined to change sides again and even resented his threats, and a number of the inhabitants of the district migrated towards Baghdad in order to be out of the way of his vengeance.

Unsuccessful Wahhabi attacks on Najaf, Samawah and Zubair, 1806.

In April 1806, after making a raid on the Dhafir and 'Anizah Bedouins, 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ud, doubtless in reprisal for the action of the Pasha of Baghdad in the previous year, attacked Najaf and Samawah, but without success; and in the following month he sustained a further reverse at Zubair. At Najaf the Wahhabis, whose presence in the neighbourhood was not suspected, succeeded in gaining the walls by night; but the inhabitants of the town rushed to arms and drove them out again with heavy loss. Samawah was found prepared; and 'Abdullah, after some attempts on the place which were characterised chiefly by indecision, was fain to retire with a still greater number of casualties than he had sustained at Najaf. He next appeared before Zubair and Basrah, and, though the surrounding country was at this time flooded

up to the very walls, some consternation at first prevailed in Basrah. The Wahhābis, however, were encumbered with wounded and otherwise in distress; and their foraging parties were quickly driven out of the surrounding villages by Muntafik and Ka'ab tribesmen, who inflicted on them further losses.

Apprehension of a Wahhābi attack, 1807.

In 1807 a fresh attack of the Wahhābis on 'Irāq was apprehended, and the Pāsha of Baghdād moved out to Hillah to ward off any attempt that might be made on Karbala or Najaf. In June of 1807, with the reluctant consent of the Pāsha of Baghdād, the British Resident at Basrah began to construct for himself a fortified residence at Gardilān on the eastern side of the Shatt-al-'Arab opposite to Basrah.*

The Wahhābis driven from Shifāthah and Hindīyah, 1808.

In 1808 a force of Wahhābis appeared in the vicinity of Karbala, and a large army under their banner was reported to be marching on Baghdād itself, where great anxiety for a time prevailed. The bazaars were closed, and even Turkish merchants were ordered to arm themselves and reinforce the garrison; but the expected host did not arrive, and it was afterwards stated that their departure had been prevented by internal disturbances in Najd. The raiders near Karbala, however, established themselves in the Shifāthah Oasis to the west of that town, blockaded Karbala, invested Hindīyah (corresponding to the modern Tawairij), and showed themselves at 'Ain Said near Samāwah; but Sulaimān Pāsha, hastening from Baghdād with a force, drove them from all these places, and, after executing the principal man of Shifāthah on account of his refusal to abjure Wahhābism, returned in triumph to Baghdād, where he arrived on the 15th of August.

Wahhābi raid, 1810.

About 1810 a plundering expedition was carried out by 'Abdullah, son of Sa'ūd, who penetrated to within a short distance of Baghdād.

Wahhābi influence near Karbala, 1812.

In 1812 Wahhābi influence was still sufficiently powerful on the borders of 'Irāq to make it possible for Sa'ud's tax-gatherers to assemble the surrounding Bedouins and collect Zakāt from them at Hindīyah near Karbala.

Proceedings of the Wahhābis in the direction of Syria, 1803-14.

Commencement of Wahhābi raids on Syria, about 1806.

Flying raids were executed by the Wahhābis during this period on the confines of Syria; they began, apparently, with an incursion by Hark,† a black slave of Sa'ūd, between the years 1806 and 1808.

* This seems to depend on the statement of Corancez (page 111), who gives, however, a precise date.

† Hark may possibly be identical with the Harīq who in 1800 founded the Wahhābi post at Barāimī in 'Omān.

Great raid in Hauràn, 1810, and establishment of Wahhâbi influence, 1810-12.

In 1810 the Wahhâbis struck terror into the heart of Syria by a sudden foray into the Hauràn district, where, in the space of three days, they sacked no less than 35 villages; and the provincial capital of Damascus would probably have fallen, had they cared to attack it. The northern Anizah in 1810 still refused to pay Sa'ûd tribute, but he refrained from a breach with their chiefs, and by 1812 his influence over the tribe seems to have become established, for in that year the Jalâs or Qalâs section yielded him Zakât at a watering place only twelve hours distant from Aleppo.

'ABDULLAH-BIN-SA'ÛD.

1814-18.

Succession of 'Abdullah.

The successor of Sa'ûd was 'Abdullah, his eldest son by his first wife, whom, according to one account, he had caused to be recognized as his heir so early as 1805. The last words of Sa'ûd are said to have been an injunction, addressed to 'Abdullah, never to engage the Egyptians in the open plain,—a counsel which the Wahhâbis would have done well to observe. The succession of 'Abdullah was disputed by an uncle, brother of Sa'ûd, who also was named 'Abdullah; but, though this individual had a strong following among the 'Ulama of Dara'iyah, he was not able for long to maintain the contest.

Character and capacity of 'Abdullah.*

As a child 'Abdullah was precocious and at five years of age could gallop his mare; later he became popular among the Bedouins on account of his liberality and the frankness of his manners. His wife was taken from a family in the district of Hasa. Before his accession he was regarded as a paragon of all the virtues; but his career as a ruler, while it justified his early reputation for courage and skill in war, brought to light a serious lack of statesmanship. Inability to maintain combined action among the tribes subject to his authority was perhaps the chief cause of his failure; and it was observed that, after the death of Sa'ûd, the Wahhâbis of the south had to carry on their struggle against the Egyptians almost without help from those of the north.

* A portrait of 'Abdullah will be found in Brydges' *Brief History of the Wakauby* (frontispiece).

Proceedings of the Egyptians in Hijāz and Yaman, 1814-15.

Expedition to Qunfidah, March-May 1814.

For more than a year after Muhammad 'Alī's arrival in Hijāz his affairs, chiefly on account of the fewness of his troops and the scarcity of transport and supplies, made little progress. As a first step towards the conquest of Yaman an expedition was sent against Qunfidah, which was taken in March 1814 before the death of the Amīr Sa'ūd; but in May the Egyptians were again driven out of the place with the loss of the whole of their artillery, 400 horses, and a considerable number of camels. Meanwhile, in the spring of 1814, Muhammad 'Alī established himself at Tāif; and, in the course of the summer, Hasan Pāsha, a distinguished leader who arrived in June with 1,500 of the best infantry in Egypt, was sent to occupy Kulākh, a place some 30 miles to the east of Tāif on the way to Turabah.

Condition of the troops.

The condition of the army of occupation, of which the strength did not exceed 5,000—a number sufficient to protect the Holy Cities from attack, but not to overthrow the Wahhābis—was at this time far from satisfactory. The troops were dispirited by the length of their sojourn in an unhealthy country, where the cost of living exceeded their scanty and irregular pay, and they were demoralised by the successes of the enemy and by his invariable refusal of quarter. According to the traveller Burckhardt, who himself saw them at this time, "discontent, and a kind of panic, were universal among the soldiers."

Relations with the Bedouins.

Muhammad 'Alī, aware that to fail in Hijāz meant his removal from the Pashāliq of Egypt and the ruin of his career, clung to his task with great tenacity and adopted a new and more conciliatory policy both with the settled population and with the Bedouins of Hijāz; but he and his officers continued profoundly ignorant of the circumstances and mutual relations of the various Arabs with whom they had to deal. In August 1814 some of the adjoining tribes began to be attracted to the Pāsha's side by his liberality and friendly demeanour; and in the next month the Sharīf Rājah himself came in, and was placed by Muhammad 'Alī in command of a Bedouin contingent that had now been raised.

Transport and supplies.

Difficulties of commissariat, however, continued unabated. Up to this time about 30,000 camels belonging to the army had died in Hijāz, and even in Egypt camels had become scarce, while such as remained there

were required for forwarding supplies to the coast by the Qanah-Qusair and Cairo-Suez lines. The Harb, from whom local camels were obtained, refused to let their animals go beyond Tāif; and even at Tāif there was often not more than ten days' supplies for the garrison. Scarcity prevailed at Kulākh also, and at advanced posts which had been thrown out in the direction of Zahrān.

Defeat of the Egyptians in Zahrān, September 1814.

The fortune of the field also continued adverse to the Egyptians. In September their best troops, under one of their best commanders, were surprised and defeated in Zahrān by Bakhrūj, a chief of the southern Wahhābis; they lost in this action about 80 cavalry and 800 infantry, and were obliged to fall back upon Tāif; but they brought in with them about 60 heads of Wahhābis. Meanwhile the Wahhābis and the tribes favourable to the Egyptians continued to raid each other mutually, the advantage generally resting with the former.

Egyptian reinforcements and additions to transport.

Soon after this disaster, however, the aspect of affairs began to improve for the Egyptians. Eight hundred Bedouin horsemen, drawn from the tribes of the Libyan desert, arrived in Hijāz where half were posted to Madīnah and half to Taif; and they at once proceeded to make forays on the Wahhābis in the Bedouin manner. In November the Hajj arrived; the caravan from Syria brought with it 4,000 camels for the troops, of which 1,000 were stopped at Madīnah; while from Egypt there came along with the Mahmal, accompanied on this occasion by soldiers and officials only, 2,500 additional camels and a reinforcement of 1,000 Turkish horsemen. Twelve thousand camels belonging to the Syrian Hajj were temporarily requisitioned to carry stores from Jiddah to Makkah.

Great defeat of the Wahhābis at Bisal, 12th January 1815.

At length a forward movement began. On the 15th of December 1814 the bulk of the infantry, then at Makkah, left for Kulākh; and on Saturday, the 7th of January, after a short delay caused by a Wahhābi excursion towards Qunfidah, Muhammad 'Ali followed with about 1,200 cavalry and other troops. He had not gone far when he received news of the occupation by a Wahhābi army of Bisal, a place between Tāif and Kulākh, where on Thursday, the 12th of January, assisted by a Bedouin levy under the Sharif Rajah and by a part of the 'Ataibah, he brought them to action. The result of the first day's fighting was indecisive; but on the second day the Egyptians, having succeeded by means of a pretended flight in drawing the Wahhābis from the hillsides on which they were stationed into the open plain, achieved a success of which the completeness left nothing to be desired.

The defeated force, of whom not less than 5,000 men are said to have fallen, partly in narrow valleys among which they became entangled in their flight, consisted chiefly of southern Wahhâbis from Yaman; but a northern contingent under Faisal, a brother of the Wahhâbi Amir, were present, and the survivors among these carried back news of the disaster to Najd.

Successful expedition of the Egyptians in the south.

The battle of Bisal was the turning point in the contest between the Egyptians and the Wahhâbis, and the scene of operations was soon after this transferred to the north; but the conquest of the south was first completed by the capture of Turabah and by a march of the victorious troops to Kanyah and Bishah, whence they returned to the coast near Qunfidah. This southern expedition, though successful from the military point of view, occasioned a great expenditure of life and resources; of 4,000 troops who started on it only 1,500 returned, completely exhausted; and of 10,000 camels, half of which had been captured from the enemy at Bisal, only 300 lived to reach Makkah. A letter demanding his submission was addressed to Ibn-Sa'ûd by Muhammad 'Ali.

First invasion of Qasim by the Egyptians and resulting treaty, 1815.

Tûsun Pâsha sent to Madînah, 1814.

We now return to the north, where the fate of the Wahhâbi power was eventually decided. In June 1814 the Harb tribe, in consequence of the murder of one of their Shaikhs by the Egyptian governor of Madînah, had closed the communications between that place and the coast, and in August Tûsûn Pâsha was despatched by his father to arrange matters. This he succeeded in doing, after some difficulty at Jadaid and not without great concessions made to the Arabs; and in October 1814 he reached Madînah with about 500 cavalry and 300 infantry, the former of whom he immediately sent to Hanakiyah to watch the Wahhâbis of Najd and to make raids into their territory. In the course of the autumn of 1814, and especially on the occasion of the Hajj, Tûsûn Pâsha received, as we have already seen, considerable reinforcements; and in the early spring of 1815, when the news of the Wahhâbi disaster at Bisal began to produce its effect in Najd, he was ready to take advantage of proposals that were now made to him by many of the leaders in Central Arabia, particularly by the chief men of Qasim. In January 1815 the Wahhâbi

Amir was in Qasim, prepared to oppose the movements of Tūsūn; but on learning of the disaster at Bīsal he returned to Dara'iyah, dreading, it would appear, an advance against his capital by the Egyptian forces in the south.

Advance of Tūsūn Pāsha into Qasim, March-May, 1815.

About the end of March 1815, Tūsūn Pāsha left for Qasim, whither he had already despatched about 400 cavalry; he took with him 200 or 300 cavalry, 400 infantry and about 400 transport camels; and a few hundred Bedouins of the Harb and Mutair also followed his standard. On the way he halted for a month at Hanakiyah, and while there he received orders from Muhammad 'Ali to return to Madinah; but Tūsūn, who was now his father's equal in rank, declined to obey the command. Muhammad 'Ali, it should be observed, was now at Madinah, where he had arrived unexpectedly on the 14th of April, after his son's departure; but his time there was fully occupied in dealing with local troubles. Early in May Tūsūn Pāsha arrived in Qasīm, and he was joined at Ras by his political friends among the Qusmān and by the cavalry whom he had despatched in advance; but Hijailān, the principal man in Qasim, who was warmly attached to the cause of Ibn Sa'ūd, would have no dealings with him and instead collected a hostile force at Buraidah.

Precarious position of the Egyptians in Qasim, May-June 1815.

On the arrival of the Amīr 'Abdullah at Shināna, with a considerable force, both Bedouin and non-Bedouin, Tūsūn Pāsha found himself in a serious position; for the Wahhābis were able to prevent his drawing supplies from any but a few of the nearer villages, and in the meantime a detachment of 250 horsemen, sent as a reinforcement from Madinah, had been surrounded and cut up by Wahhābis on the road. This ill-fated party was commanded by Ibrahim Agha or Thomas Keith, whom Tūsūn Pāsha had left in charge of Madinah as governor, and who sustained his reputation for courage to the last by killing four of the enemy with his own hand before he fell. Meanwhile Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha, who showed no interest in his son's operations but rather appeared jealous of his achievements, hurriedly left Yanbō' on the 20th of May and returned to Egypt: in extenuation of his conduct it is alleged that his health had suffered by his residence in Arabia, and that he feared an attack by the Turkish fleet upon his port of Alexandria.

Treaty and return of Tūsūn Pāsha to Madinah, June 1815.

The weakness of the Egyptians was not, it would seem, fully apparent to the Wahhābis, or the Amir, believing that the resources of Egypt must in the end prevail over his own more slender means, thought it prudent to retire from the contest; whatever the reason, 'Abdullah readily responded to the suggestions for a settlement which now proceeded from Tūsūn. A treaty was arranged by which the Amir abandoned his claim

to the Holy Cities, reserving a right to visit them freely on pilgrimage, and by which he recognised the Sultān of Turkey as his overlord; the Pāsha on his part promised to withdraw from Qasīm; and Hanakiyah was made the boundary between the spheres of Egyptian and Wahhābi political influence.* Tūsūn regained Madīnah about the end of June 1815; his halt in Qasīm had lasted exactly four weeks.

Non-ratification of the treaty.

In August two Wahhābi envoys arrived in Cairo to obtain ratification of the treaty, but they were eventually dismissed with an ambiguous answer in which Muhammad 'Ali seemed to offer peace upon condition that the Wahhābis should cede to him the province of Hasa upon the Persian Gulf littoral. Tūsūn Pāsha himself returned to Cairo on the 7th of November 1815 and met with a cold reception from his father.

Second invasion of Qasīm by the Egyptians, 1817-1818.

Preparations for the expedition, 1816.

Matters remained in *status quo* for some months after this, chiefly in consequence of a conviction on the part of Muhammad 'Ali that a descent upon Egypt was meditated by Great Britain; but, as this fear passed away, he began preparations for continuing the war in Arabia. Disturbances had broken out in southern Hijāz, and the Egyptian garrisons had been obliged to retire from Bishah, Ranyah and Turabah. In August 1816 Ibrāhīm Pāsha, the eldest son (or possibly a step-son) of Muhammad 'Ali, left Cairo, having been provided with a force of 2,000 infantry and 1,500 Libyan Bedouin horsemen and ordered, it was believed, to advance from Madīnah through Qasīm to Dara'iyah.

Operations of the Egyptians from Hanakiyah.

A considerable time elapsed, however, before Ibrāhīm Pāsha could give effect to his instructions; and it was not, apparently, until some time in 1817 that he reached Hanakiyah, from which place, as a centre, he commenced a series of raids upon the surrounding tribes. The Harb and the 'Ataibah were among the Bedouins who suffered from these, and their fate induced many to declare for the Egyptians. The next enterprise of the Pāsha was an expedition into the Jabal Shammar region, in which the friendly Arabs were driven into action against the enemy by a body

* According to another account 'Abdullah also agreed to give hostages; to hand over Dara'iyah to any governor whom the Sultān might appoint; to restore the treasure plundered from Muhammad's tomb; and even to repair in person to Constantinople if required to do so.

of Egyptian cavalry behind them and suffered heavy loss, the Egyptians themselves escaping with less than 20 casualties.

Egyptian victory at Jabal Mawiyah, 1817.

At the request of the friendly Arabs, whom the Bedouins of the Wahhábis had now begun to annoy, a force with two guns was sent by the Egyptian commander to Jabal Mawiyah, on the road from Hanakiyah to Rass, and was there attacked by the enemy under the Amir 'Abdullah; the result of this engagement was very unfavourable to the Wahhábis, whose bleaching skeletons still strewed the plain when it was traversed by Captain Sadleir in September 1819; and the Amir himself fled through Rass to 'Anizah in Qasim. Ibráhim Pásha, who was in the rear and did not arrive until the fighting was over, followed the barbarous example of the Wahhábis upon this occasion by putting all his prisoners to death. Having collected his entire force at Mawiyah, to the *number of 1,200 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, he advanced against Rass and was openly joined by the Shaikh of the Mutair tribe, who had a feud against the Wahhábi Amir; on the way, apparently, he made an excursion against the 'Anizah tribe.

Unsuccessful siege of Rass by the Egyptians, 1817.

Arrived before Rass, Ibráhim prepared to carry that place at once; but the walls resisted the fire of his artillery for three days; and, when a breach had been opened, his troops were repulsed with heavy loss in attempting to storm it. The siege was then continued without success for three and a half months, and was ultimately abandoned. The Egyptians lost some 900 men killed and 1,000 wounded in these operations, and they expended 400 camel loads of small arms ammunition and 30,000 artillery rounds, but the casualties among the besieged only amounted to 50 killed and 70 wounded. A sort of agreement was apparently formed with the inhabitants of Rass, under which the fate of their town should be decided by that of 'Anaizah, the capital of Qasim.

Capture of Khabrah and 'Anaizah by the Egyptians, 1817.

The Pásha consoled himself for his failure at Rass by taking Khabrah, which only stood one day's siege. He next advanced against 'Anaizah, while the Amir 'Abdullah retreated upon Buraidah; 'Anaizah fell after a six days' bombardment; and the Amir then retired southwards to Shaqrah, where he remained during the next two months. Ibráhim Pásha occupied Buraidah on its evacuation by 'Abdullah, and the whole of Qasim submitted to the Egyptians.†

Shaqrah taken, 22nd January 1818.

On the 13th of January 1818, Ibráhim Pásha arrived near Shaqrah, the principal place in Washam, and reconnoitred the environs with 800

* Captain Sadleir makes the strength of the Egyptians at this time very much less.

† Sadleir gives a somewhat different version of this part of the campaign.

cavalry; and on the next day, after an arduous march across loose sand, he established himself on the southern and eastern sides of the town, which he at once proceeded to attack with a force raised by reinforcements to a strength of 4,500 regulars. On the 16th of January the suburbs were occupied after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, the Egyptians losing about 150 men and the Wahhābis leaving 68 men dead upon the ground. A number of prisoners taken by the Egyptians were at once decapitated. Ibrāhīm Pāsha then had recourse to siege operations, and Shaqrah surrendered on the 22nd of January, when the garrison were permitted to lay down their arms and disperse. During the second stage of the operations the Egyptians had 130 casualties, while among the Wahhābis 170 men were killed and 240 persons wounded.

Massacre at Dhrumah.

After a short halt at Shaqrah, due to heavy rains, the Egyptian commander, leaving the sick and wounded behind, resumed his march on Dara'iyah. On the way he passed Dhrumah, where, some unorganised opposition having been offered to the troops, he caused a large number of the inhabitants to be massacred. The Wahhābi governor, who had shut himself up in the fort, was given a safe conduct to Dara'iyah on condition of leaving behind all his property, which comprised a number of valuable horses, and of not again bearing arms against the Egyptians.

Arrival and preliminary operations at Dara'iyah, March 1818.

On the 22nd of March 1818, after being again delayed by bad weather, Ibrāhīm not without difficulty crossed the hills between Dhrumah and Wādi Hanīfah. His force now amounted to 5,500 men, horse and foot, and his artillery consisted of twelve pieces, of which two were mortars and two howitzers.* A camp was formed at 'Ayainah and a reconnaissance was carried up to the walls of Dara'iyah. On the 6th of April Ibrāhīm took up a position before the Wahhābi capital, to defend which the inhabitants, sallying out, threw up advanced entrenchments. On the 14th the Egyptians opened fire from two batteries upon an advanced work and captured it with a loss to the Wahhābis of two guns and some prisoners: the latter the Egyptians at once put to death. An eminence on which two guns were mounted, and which was held with much obstinacy by the Wahhābis, was taken a little later; and this mishap compelled the defenders of Dara'iyah to abandon their advanced positions, in which Faisal, the Amīr's brother, had hitherto commanded.

Dangerous situation of the Egyptian force, May-June 1818.

At this juncture the arrival of reinforcements and stores from Egypt on the one side, and of provisions from 'Irāq on the other, encouraged the Egyptian general, to whom the evil results of delay were becoming

* According to Captain Sadleir there were 1,93[illegible] cavalry and 5,600 infantry; but the sources of his information are not known.

apparent, to assault a work defending the Ghasíbah* quarter; but his troops, after a breach had been opened by artillery fire, refused to advance to the storm. The failure of this operation greatly compromised the prestige of the besiegers, and the Wahhábís entered on a series of daily attacks upon the Egyptian camp, causing them heavy losses. By the end of May the Egyptians were in serious straits. The Wahhábís kept them perpetually in play; the number of ineffectives in their camp was steadily increasing; they could not properly invest Dara'iyah; and supplies from Hasa were constantly entering the town without their being able to prevent it. On the 21st of June, after a sharp action in which the Egyptians lost 160 men including many officers of rank, a gust of wind suddenly carried fire into the Egyptian magazines; a terrific explosion took place; and the besieging army were left in the presence of an overwhelming enemy, hundreds of miles from support, with no ammunition but what remained in the soldiers' pouches and in the batteries. The next day the Wahhábís, aware of the disaster that had overtaken the Egyptians, attacked them in force with 1,500 men; but † Ibráhím Pásha, whose courage was unshaken, was able to infuse his own spirit into the troops, and the assault was at length repulsed, with great loss to the Arabs, by a heavy fire of grape from the artillery. The Wahhábís then lost heart and resumed the defensive.

Improved position and increased efforts of the Egyptians.

After an interval of more than three weeks, stores began to arrive from 'Anaizah and other advanced bases, and the Egyptians again obtained the superiority. On the 16th of August, however, during the absence of Ibráhím Pásha on a punitive expedition against some outlying villages, the Wahhábís attacked the Egyptian camp and were not beaten off without great difficulty. At length, stimulated to greater exertions by the news that Muhammad 'Alí had despatched Khalíl Pásha with a large force to assist or supersede him, Ibráhím began to press his attacks. Faisal, the Amír's brother, who played an important part in the defence, was struck down by a musket shot. A work containing three guns and artillery ammunition was taken by the Egyptians, who thus arrived in the immediate neighbourhood of the Ghasíbah quarter and were able to lay siege to a fort commanded by Sa'ad, a son of the Amír; and after two days this fort capitulated, being without provisions, and Sa'ad became a prisoner, but was well treated. The quarters of Ghasíbah and Sáhil ‡

* Ghasíbah is still the name of one of the quarters on the left or northern bank of Wádi Hanífah.

† Ibráhím was at this time only 26 years of age. There is a certain analogy between the position of the Egyptians before Dara'iyah and that of the British force upon the Ridge during the earlier stages of the siege of Delhi (1857).

‡ The quarter of Dara'iyah now adjoining Ghasíbah on the left bank of Wádi Hanífah is called Sarailah.

were bombarded and surrendered. The ex-governor of Dhrumah, who had given his parole not to fight against the Egyptians, was taken in arms and executed. The defenders of the Tarfiyah quarter laid down their arms; and only* Taraif, in which the Amir 'Abdullah himself was shut up, continued to resist.

Surrender of the Amir 'Abdullah, 9th September 1818.

At length on the 9th of September 1818, at the earnest request of his advisers, the Amir hoisted a white flag, and negociations began. An interview took place on the same day between 'Abdullah and Ibrahim, in which the Arab, though unable to disguise his emotion, bore himself with dignity and fortitude; while the Turk, on his part, showed every respect and consideration for his fallen foe and even released his son Sa'ad.† Ibrahim Pâsha offered peace on condition that 'Abdullah should at once proceed to Egypt and allowed him 24 hours for consideration of the offer; it was greatly feared that 'Abdullah, during this interval, might commit suicide or even escape to the desert; but at last, on the understanding that Ibrâhîm should intercede for his life, that the town of Dara'iyah should be spared, and that no punishment should be inflicted on those who had fought against the Egyptians, the Amir agreed to what was required of him and began to prepare for his journey.

The remainder of 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ûd's story is quickly told. Accompanied by his treasurer, his secretary and his most trusty slaves, he travelled down to the coast under a guard of 400 men; and in November he reached Cairo and had a reassuring interview with Muhammad 'Ali, to whom he exhibited a few of the treasures taken from Muhammad's tomb, brought with him by way of restitution; but his treatment at Constantinople belied the favourable expectations that he had been led to form. After being paraded as a public spectacle through the streets of the capital, he suffered death by decapitation in the square of St. Sophia, along with some of his companions in misfortune.

INTERREGNUM.
1818-19.

First occupation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1818.

Deportation of 'Abdallah's brother.

The power of Wahhâbi Najd as an organised state was for the time completely broken, and the Egyptians assumed the direct administration

* Taraif, on the southern or right bank of Wadi Hanifah, again exists at the present day under the same name.

† Captain Sadleir's account again differs from that of Mengin.

of the country. Four brothers of the deposed Amīr 'Abdullah were deported to Egypt and kept under surveillance at Cairo, one of these being Khālid; but the escape of another brother, probably Mashāri, caused much anxiety to the invaders.

Destruction of Dara'iyah, etc.

Dara'iyah was first pillaged, Ibrāhīm Pāsha reserving for himself the houses of the Āl Sa'ūd, in which it is believed but little of value was found, while the common soldiers seized what they could lay their hands upon, and torture was applied to persons who were suspected of concealing their property. The complete destruction of the town and its date gardens had been ordered from Constantinople and was eventually carried out, but not until many of the inhabitants had been deluded into paying large sums for personal exemption from the sentence; when all that could be got in this manner had been extracted, the houses were demolished, every fragment of building timber was burned, and the palms were cut down to the last tree. The homeless inhabitants were mostly removed by the Egyptian commander to Hasa or themselves took refuge at Manfūhah, where they camped in the date groves.

The fortifications of every town and village in Najd were then razed to the ground; and the thoroughness with which this operation was carried out is attested, in the case of Manfūhah, Riyādh, Tharmidah, Shaqrah and 'Anaizah, by the British traveller Captain Sadleir, who passed over the ground in 1819. Houses and date plantations were generally spared, except at particular places such as Dara'iyah and 'Anaizah.

Occupation of Kharj and Hasa.

An Egyptian post having been established at Sulaimiyah in Kharj, Ibrāhim Pāsha passed onwards to the province of Hasa, which at this time he seems to have intended should be the headquarters of his conquests. Arrived in Hasa, he was joined by Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the famous 'Atbi pirate of Qatar, who, after assisting the Pāsha to take the town of Qatīf by bombardment, was permitted in return to establish himself at Dammām on the Hasa coast. Ibrāhim at first entertained designs of further aggression in the direction of 'Omān, but these the natural difficulties of his position soon compelled him to abandon.

Punishment of Bedouin tribes.

Punitive expeditions were undertaken in all directions against the Bedouin tribes that had helped the Wahhābis; and vengeance fell in particular upon some of the Sabai', who were found at the wells of Rumāh in 'Urmah.

General relations of Turks and Arabs.

Everywhere, during the occupation, the Egyptian army appear to have lived on the worst possible terms with the people of the country, whose resources they consumed; and their own condition was evidently one bordering on misery. After a two years' sojourn in Najd some of the

principal Egyptian officials there were still as ignorant of the geography of the country as if they had never left Cairo.

Partial withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, 1819.

Gradually it became apparent that a complete occupation of Najd could not be maintained by the Egyptian forces, whose communications between post and post were maintained with difficulty on account of the hostility and increasing audacity of the Bedouin tribes, especially the 'Ajmān and the Sa'adah.*

Evacuation of Hasa, July 1819.

About June 1819 it was resolved to make over to tribal representatives the whole of the country to the east and south of Qasīm, and the process of evacuation was witnessed by Captain Sadleir of His Majesty's 47th Regiment, who accompanied the rearguard of the retiring forces, and whose mission to Ibrāhīm Pāsha on behalf of the Government of India is described in the history of Trucial 'Omān. The Kāshif of Hasa, to whose column, consisting of about 250 troops with 600 transport camels, Captain Sadleir attached himself, had prepared for his departure by extorting about 1,000,000 piastres from the inhabitants of Hasa; and, when he left, he installed the Shaikhs of the Banī Khalid as the representatives of the Turkish Government in Hasa. These Shaikhs were the hereditary foes of the Wahhābis, by whom their power had been previously overthrown, and it seems to have been hoped that they would continue to remit the annual tribute of Hasa to 'Anaizah in Qasīm, where it was intended to maintain an Egyptian garrison.

March from Hasa to Manfūhah, July-August 1819.

The usual line followed by the Turks between Hasa and Qasīm lay by Sulaimīyah in Kharj, and the Kāshif gave out that he intended to move by this route; but on the second day's march, fearing lest he should be attacked by the Sa'adah, who had recently been giving trouble near Sulaimīyah, he altered his course and made for the wells of Rumāh in 'Urmah, where, according to his arrangements, the Sulaimīyah detachment, consisting of 50 to 100 cavalry, ought to have joined him. They did not appear however,† being then shut up in their post by Bedouins; and the Kāshif was obliged to proceed to Manfūhah, where he arrived on the 3rd of August *viâ* Banbān, and to despatch half of his own escort to extricate them.

* The Sa'adah, though separately mentioned by the historian in this connection, were probably the sub-section so named of the 'Ajman.

† The reason of this is instructive. Ibrāhīm Pāsha, in ordering the withdrawal of the Sulaimīyah detachment, directed the officer in command first to destroy four obnoxious Shaikhs of Dilam, who had hitherto been treated as friends of the Egyptians; being unable to effect this by force, the official invited the Shaikhs to an entertainment, at which he caused them to be murdered; he was then himself immediately besieged.

March from Manfūhah to Rass, August 1819.

On the 13th of August the Sulaimiyah garrison reached Manfūhah in safety, and the march to Qasim was begun; the whole surrounding country was now up in arms; and the Kāshif was unable to give effect to a design that he had formed of butchering the principal Wahhābis of Manfuhah before he left. The ruins of * Dara'iyah, untenanted by any living creature, were passed on the same day; and the force camped for the night at 'Ayainah. On the next day the Haisiyah pass in Jabal Tuwaiq was surmounted, which still bore the tracks of Ibrāhim Pāsha's † guns; that officer had apparently marched from the neighbourhood of Dara'iyah not far in advance of the Kāshif. The retiring troops passed Barrah, which was found deserted, on the 15th of August; on the 16th they arrived Tharmidah, and on the 17th at Shaqrah. At Shaqrah the Turks were in time to pursue and overtake a body of the 'Ataibah, who had just raided the flocks and herds of the town; 20 of the enemy they despatched on the plain, and five they brought in as prisoners and beheaded. The camel transport, supplied by the Bani Khālid, should have been relieved at this place by animals belonging to the Mutair; but some hitch occurred, and eventually the Egyptians confiscated all the camels and dismissed the Bani Khalid without pay or compensation. During the whole march the Turks had not permitted the Arabs to take their camels to any distance from the camp for grazing, fearing lest they should desert. Mudhnib was reached on the 23rd of August, 'Anaizah on the 24th, and Rass on the 26th. Ibrāhim Pāsha had taken his departure from Rass for Madinah on the 24th; but an extraordinary mixed camp of Turks, Albanians, Libyan Bedouins and Bedouins of Najd still remained, to which Captain Sadleir added his quota of Persians, Indians, Portuguese and Armenians.

March from Rass to Hanakiyah, August-September 1819.

The Egyptian authority at Rass having refused to facilitate his return to India by way of Basrah, Captain Sadleir was obliged to continue on his way towards the Red Sea in the company of the retiring troops. On the 31st of August he arrived in the Wādi-al-Miyāh; on the 2nd of September he passed the former battlefield of Jabal Mawīyah; and on the 4th of September he reached the Egyptian post of Hanakiyah, after an exhausting continuous march of 29¼ hours without water.‡

Departure of Ibrāhim Pāsha for Egypt, November 1819.

The subsequent proceedings of Captain Sadleir in Hijāz are related in the history of Trucial 'Omān; and here it only remains to add that

* Captain Sadleir has left an interesting description of Dara'iyah as he saw it.

† In his operations the Pāsha's guns were generally dragged by camels.

‡ The features of this long and arduous retirement, in its mingled panic and brutality, are admirably brought out by Captain Sadleir in the graphic pages of his *Journal*.

Ibrāhīm Pāsha lingered at the coast until the 17th of November, when he finally sailed from Jiddah for Qusair.

MASHĀRI-BIN-SA'ŪD.

1819-23.

Soon after the withdrawal of the bulk of the Egyptian forces from Najd, Mashāri, a brother of the late Amīr, perhaps the same who had escaped from custody before the evacuation, gathered a party and assumed authority in Najd, apparently in defiance of the Egyptians. The Egyptian occupation, however, was still to some extent maintained. In 1822 a reinforcement of 700 cavalry was sent to 'Anaizah in Qasīm; orders were issued by Muhammad 'Alī that a fort should be built at Dara'iyah for the reception of an Egyptian garrison; and a little later 100 Egyptian cavalry stationed at Riyādh, which had now apparently supplanted Dara'iyah as the capital of Southern Najd, were surprised and cut up by Bedouins in the neighbourhood. The manner in which Mashāri's rule ended is uncertain; possibly, as one authority seems to indicate, he was overthrown by the Banī Khālid governors of Hasa, or, as stated by another, he fell into the hands of the Egyptians and was put to death.

TURKI-BIN-'ABDULLAH.

1824-34.

General and internal history, 1824-34.

Expulsion of the Egyptians, 1824.

Mashāri was succeeded by a relative named Turkī, belonging to an elder branch of the Āl Sa'ūd family; the father of Turkī was one Abdullah, a son of Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, the first Wahhābi Amīr. Turkī seems to have come into power by expelling an Egyptian detachment from Riyādh, and to have obtained immediate recognition among his fellow-countrymen as head of the Wahhābi cause. After his first success, which occurred at the end of 1823 or beginning of 1824, Turkī appears to have undertaken offensive operations further to the westward; and, from

the fact that after this time no Egyptian posts are mentioned as existing in Qasim, it may perhaps be inferred that the Egyptians were altogether ejected from Najd. Amicable relations must however soon have been established, for Turki throughout his reign paid a small annual tribute to the ruler of Egypt; but in other respects his position was that of an independent sovereign.

Internal policy of Turki.

The internal administration of Turki, when his power became established, was in accordance with the best Wahhábi traditions; but, at the same time, it was more liberal and enlightened than that of his predecessors. Like the first Amirs he restrained tribal disorder and punished robbery with a strong hand, but unlike them he encouraged the passage through his dominions of Sunni and Shi'ah pilgrims to the Holy Cities and even guaranteed their safety. Under Turki the religious prejudices of the Wahhábi sect, except that against the smoking of tobacco in public, were not obtruded upon those who did not share them.

Rebellion of Mashári and assassination of Turki. 1834.

In 1831 a nephew of Turki named Mashári, having obtained the support of the Qahtán and other tribes, rebelled against his uncle; but, though his opposition to some extent unsettled the country, he was unable to effect anything against the Amir by fair and open means. In 1834, however, he succeeded in compassing the death of Turki by assassination.

Proceedings of the Amir Turki in Eastern Arabia, 1824-34.

Under Turki the Wahhábis regained for a time their former position of influence in Eastern Arabia, and by 1833 the whole coast of the Gulfs of 'Omán and Persia as far north as Qatif owned their sovereignty, or at least their suzerainty, and payed tribute.

Wahhábi reconquest of Hasa, 1824-1834.

One of the first objects that Turki set himself to accomplish after his accession was the recovery of the province of Hasa, which had been retained by the Bani Khálid Shaikhs since their installation by the Egyptians in 1819. From 1824 to 1830 the contest remained undecided, but in the latter year, as related in the history of Hasa, the Bani Khálid finally succumbed to the forces of the Amír; in the conclusive battle, fought at Wabrah, the Wahhábis were led by Turki and his son Faisal in person. In 1831, encouraged by the rebellion of Mashári, the Bani Khálidventured to attack Hofúf and Qatif; but they were repulsed.

Wahhābi relations with Bahrain, 1824-1834.

Strong in possession of Hasa, the Amīr in 1830 demanded tribute of the Shaikh of Bahrain; and in 1831 the Shaikh, fearing a combination between the Saiyid of Masqat and the Wahhābis, of which there were symptoms, admitted the obligation to pay. The settlement, however, was far from being of a cordial or permanent character on either side; the Wahhābis on their part endeavoured to establish Bashīr, a son of the pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, at Dammām as a check upon the 'Utūb of Bahrain; and the Shaikh of those islands, as soon as he dared, which was not until 1833 after the departure of Bashīr, repudiated his agreement and incited the Banī Khālid to annoy the Wahhābis in Hasa. There is some reason to think that the assassination of the Amīr Turkī by Mashārī in 1834 was instigated by the Bahrain Shaikh, to whom it was at least highly agreeable, and by whom, before that event, war had been declared and the ports of Qatīf and 'Oqair blockaded from the sea.

Wahhābi influence in Trucial 'Omān, 1824-1834.

No sooner was Turkī firmly seated on the throne of Najd than the more restless among the chiefs of what is now Trucial 'Omān began to cultivate his good graces, especially the Shaikhs of Shārjah and 'Ajmān. In 1825 the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārjah secretly professed great fear of the Wahhābis and solicited a promise of British assistance in case a refusal by him to comply with the desires of the Amīr should bring him into trouble; no assurance, however, was given; but the Shaikh was strongly advised by the British authorities to refrain from joining in any movement against the Saiyid of Masqat.

The appearance of the Wahhābis on the coast of Hasa in 1830 gave rise to a fresh commotion in Trucial 'Omān, and their probable advent was anticipated with delight by the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain, who hoped with their help to throw off the suzerainty of the Qāsimi Shaikh, while by the latter it was naturally regarded with apprehension. The Shaikh of Shārjah once more sought British support, of which no hope was held out to him; and the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, perhaps remembering the days when Husain-bin-'Alī of Rams had lorded it over the country in the name of the Wahhābi Amīr, begged Turkī for a commission as Wahhābi agent. This last request was prudently refused by the Amīr, on the ground that he could recognise no chiefs in 'Omān except the Shaikh of Shārjah and the Saiyid of Masqat only; but later he made the Shaikh of 'Ajmān the medium of a friendly communication from himself to the British Government.

Wahhabi relations with

Relations between the Wahhābi Amīr and the Saiyid of Masqat were, owing to the great distance intervening between their frontiers, but

the 'Omān Sultanate, 1824-1834.

slowly resumed. The initiative seems to have been taken by the Saiyid, who in 1831 despatched an embassy with presents to Riyādh to request the assistance of the Amīr in reducing Bahrain,—a proceeding that Turki turned to his own advantage in order to extort submission and tribute from the Shaikh of Bahrain. In 1833 the direct pressure of the Wahhābis was felt once more in the 'Omān Sultanate, and in that year the ruler of Masqat was obliged to come to an understanding with the Wahhābi general, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the principal terms of the settlement being that the Saiyid should pay $5,000 a year as Zakāt or tribute to the Amīr, and that either party should assist the other in suppressing rebellions among his subjects. The latter clause of the agreement was deemed imprudent by the British authorities; but the Saiyid assured them that he would be guided, in his observance of it, entirely by their wishes.

Relations of the Amīr Turki with the British Government, 1824-1834.

The relations of Turki, during his reign, with the British authorities in India were restricted to one simple incident. About the middle of 1831 a message for the Governor of Bombay was received from the Amīr through the Shaikh of 'Ajmān; it expressed his desire "to have the treaty renewed which was made between you, the British, and Imām Sa'ūd."* On receipt of this communication, search was made in the archives of the Bombay Government for a treaty with the Wahhābis; but none could be found; and eventually an answer in general but friendly terms was transmitted to the Amīr through the British Resident in the Persian Gulf.†

FAISAL-BIN-TURKI (FIRST REIGN).
1834-1838.

General history and relations with the Egyptians, 1834-1838.

Accession of Faisal, 1834.

At the time of Turki's assassination, his son Faisal was engaged in defending the province of Hasa against the aggressions of the Shaikh of Bahrain; but he immediately left for Riyādh, where he besieged Mashāri,

* See also pages 1122 and 1125 *post*.

† It is characteristic of the ignorance of Central Arabian affairs which prevailed at this time that in the Bombay Government's letter Sa'ūd, who had died only 17 years before and who belonged to the same generation as Turki himself, was described as "your great ancestor."

the murderer and usurper, in the fort. Before long, aided by treachery on the part of some of the garrison, Faisal succeeded in entering the fort by night; and Mashārī with 20 of his associates was put to the sword. One of the assistants of Faisal in this enterprise, and the actual slayer, it was said, of Mashārī, was 'Abdullah-bin-'Alī, Ibn-Rashīd, whom the Amīr soon after appointed Mahfūdh or warden on his behalf of Jabal Shammar, and who thus became the founder of the present ruling family of Northern Najd. Faisal at once obtained general recognition as Amīr of the Wahhābīs; his age at the time was about 40 years.

Re-establishment by the Egyptians of their control in Najd, 1835-38.

Muhammad 'Alī of Egypt was not satisfied with the nominal suzerainty to which the progress of events had reduced his authority in Najd, and shortly after the accession of Faisal he took measures to re-assert his power. The first step was the appointment of a Bahrain merchant as customs farmer of the Wahhābī port of Qatīf in Hasa, by order of Ahmad Pāsha, governor of Hijāz; but this device, perhaps merely experimental, was frustrated by the firm action of Faisal, whose troops, as related in the history of Hasa, obliged the Egyptian nominee to take a hasty departure from Qatīf. In 1836, a large Egyptian force having in the meanwhile been concentrated at Madīnah, Muhammad 'Alī insisted that Faisal should join with his officers in a campaign against 'Asīr; but the Amīr excused himself on the plea of sickness and deputed a brother instead to present some horses and his excuses. It was believed, moreover, that Faisal had secretly sent help to the opponents of the Egyptians in the south. Muhammad 'Alī accordingly determined to replace Faisal by a more subservient Amīr, and for this purpose he released Khālid, a brother of the late Amīr 'Abdullah, from surveillance at Cairo, and sent Ismā'īl Bey with an Egyptian force to assist the pretender in making good his claims, which had, it would appear, some supporters among the people of Najd. Alarmed by these preparations Faisal sent messengers and submissive letters to the Pāsha of Egypt; but it was too late. In 1837, supported by an Egyptian force of 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry and 500 infantry with 12 guns and 4 mortars, Khālid occupied Qasīm and defeated Faisal in the neighbourhood of Riyādh; and the Amīr, when he fell back upon his capital, found that the fort had been occupied in his absence by some of his rival's adherents. The military command in Najd was then assumed by Khurshīd Pāsha, who had arrived with reinforcements for the Egyptians.

Surrender and deportation of Faisal, 1838.

The Amīr Faisal, having retreated to the district of Kharj, established himself in Dilam, where he was shortly beleaguered by three separate forces, one under Khurshīd Pāsha, another under the pretender Khālid,

and a third under a hostile Arab Shaikh. Seeing that resistance would be vain, he shortly surrendered; and he was deported to Egypt in December 1838.

Position of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1834-38.

Relations of the Wahhābis with Bahrain, 1834-38.

In the confusion following the murder of the Amīr Turki in 1834, the Shaikh of Bahrain found opportunity to annex the island of Tārūt, which belonged to the Wahhābis. In 1835 an attempt to recover the island was made by the force which Faisal despatched to eject the Egyptian customs farmer from Qatīf; but the endeavour failed, and the Shaikh of Bahrain resumed the maritime blockade of Qatīf, which he had meanwhile suspended. In 1836 efforts were made by the Wahhābi agent in Bahrain, under instructions from his master, to induce the Saiyid of Masqat and some of the tribes of the Arabian coast to attack Bahrain by sea in the interest of the Wahhābis; but the ruler of 'Omān replied that he could not join in such an enterprise without the knowledge and consent of the British Government, and this project, too, came to nothing. Very soon afterwards a reconciliation took place between the Wahhābi Amīr and the Shaikh of Bahrain, who were now both in danger, the former from the designs of the Egyptians and the latter from those of the Persian Government; and the result was a treaty by which the Shaikh pledged himself to pay a tribute of $2,000 a year to the Amīr, while Faisal on his part undertook to protect Bahrain from external aggression, and not to demand help from the Shaikh of Bahrain in case he should himself proceed against the Saiyid of 'Omān. In 1838, after putting to death three chiefs of the 'Amāir Bani Khālid, supporters of the Egyptians who were now rapidly advancing towards Hasa, the Wahhābi Governor of that province, 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, took refuge with the Shaikh of Bahrain.

Relations of the Wahhābis with the 'Omān Sultanate, 1834-38.

An attempt by the Wahhābis in 1836 to draw the Saiyid of Masqat into operations against Bahrain upon their own side has already been noticed above. In the same year, the town of Sohār in Bātinah having fallen into the hands of Hamūd, a rebel belonging to his own family, the Saiyid obtained help from Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the Wahhābi representative in 'Omān, who, it was arranged, should operate against the place by land

Subsequent movements of the Wahhābi leaders, and their relations with the Turks, 1872-74.

Defeat of the Amīr near Kuwait, 1879.

Early in 1872 the Amīr Sa'ūd appeared in the neighbourhood of Kuwait with a force greatly distressed for provisions and threatened to plunder the town unless his necessities were relieved; but the Shaikh, after judiciously enticing his principal supporters away from his camp, attacked him, and he fled accompanied by only 15 followers.

Mission of Hāji Ahmad Khān and treacherous seizure by the Turks of the Amīr's brother and agent, 1872-73.

The Turks had now for some time been in negotiation with Sa'ūd, and they had offered to recognise his authority on condition that he should admit his subordination to the Porte, relinquish his authority upon the coast, pay the same tribute as his father Faisal, indemnify the Turks for the cost of their operations in Hasa, and send two of his sons to reside as hostages at Baghdād. After his reverse at Kuwait, finding himself reduced to the utmost straits, the Amīr wrote to Hāji Ahmad Khān of Būshehr, lately Deputy-Governor of Bandar 'Abbās and once Wazīr of the Sultān of 'Omān, empowering him to treat on his behalf; and, after a visit to Raūf Pasha, Wāli of Baghdād, the Hāji arrived in Hasa in September 1872. The Amīr Sa'ūd, who distrusted the intentions both of his brother 'Abdullah and of the Turks, refused to leave the district of Kharj, where he then was, and a personal meeting became impossible; but there appeared in Hasa, to represent him, his brother 'Abdur Rahmān and a certain Fahad-bin-Suwaitān, whom he had appointed to be his agent in Hasa. 'Abdur Rahmān was conducted by Hāji Ahmad Khān to Baghdād and was there detained as a hostage; nor did Fahad experience better treatment, for in February 1873 he was arrested on a charge of intrigue, thrown into irons, and sent after 'Abdur Rahmān to Baghdād.

Expulsion of 'Abdullah from Southern Najd, 1873.

The position of Sa'ūd at length showed signs of improvement: the seizure by the Turks of a leading 'Ajmān Shaikh brought many recruits to his standard; he defeated 'Abdullah in Kharj and shut him up in Riyādh; and finally he took the capital, while 'Abdullah fled to the neighbourhood of Kuwait, or, according to another account, found an asylum among the western Bedouins of the Jabal Shammar principality.* 'Abdullah was closely connected with the house of Rashīd, having married first Nūrah,† a celebrated daughter of the Shammar Amīr 'Abdullah, and, after her

* Possibly this statement refers to his earlier flight to Jabal Shammar about 1870.

† Her brother, the Shammar Amīr Muhammad, was accustomed to use Nūrah's name as a sort of oath or asseveration.

death, a sister of Hamūd-bin-'Obaid; yet the Amīr Muhammad would not allow him to approach Hāil, nor do more than supply him with such horses, camels and sheep as he required for his subsistence.

Negotiations of Abdullah with the Turks.

'Abdullah was at this time advised by his full brother Muhammad to submit to Sa'ūd, but he declined to entertain the idea; he responded, however, to advances made to him by Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik, on the part of the Turks. He could not be persuaded to visit Baghdād or even Kuwait; but he sent the confidential secretary Mahbūb, now restored to favour, whom he had at one time placed over the Bamimi Oasis but who had been driven out thence, to convey his proposals: these were to the effect that Qatif and Hasa should be restored to him, in which case he would pay revenue, but that he should not be required to place himself in the power of the Turks.

Unsuccessful rebellion, headed by the Amir's brother 'Abdur Rahmān against the Turkish representative in Hasa, 1874.

In March 1874, on the advice of Nāsir Pāsha, the Muntafik chief, the Turks withdrew from their military occupation of Hasa, leaving Barrāk-bin-'Amir, a Shaikh of the Bani Khālid, to represent them as governor with the support of a body of gendarmerie. In August of the same year 'Abdur Rahmān, the brother of Sa'ūd, and soon after him Fahad-bin-Suwaitan were released from their captivity at Baghdād; 'Abdur Rahmān shortly arrived in Bahrain and opened a correspondence with the tribes of the mainland; a few weeks later he landed at 'Oqair and was joined by thousands of the 'Ājmān, Al Morrah and other tribes; a number of the Turkish gendarmerie were slain, and Barrāk was besieged in the fort of Hofūf. Dissensions, however, broke out among the 'Ajmān supporters of 'Abdur Rahmān; and, on the approach of Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik, who was responsible for the arrangements with Barrāk, with a Turkish military force, the Wahhābi army dispersed and 'Abdur Rahmān proceeded to join his brother the Amīr at Riyādh. The Turks, after his departure, punished the insurgents of the Hasa Oasis with merciless severity.

Death of Sa'ūd, 25th January 1875.

On the 25th of January 1875 the Amir Sa'ūd died of small-pox.

Relations of the Amir Sa'ūd with the British Government, 1871-75.

General policy of the British Government.

Sa'ūd, during his short and troubled reign, corresponded freely with the British Resident at Būshehr; but he did not receive that assistance which it was his object, in so doing, to obtain. The policy of the British

Government with reference to the Turkish occupation of Hasa is fully described in the history of that province; it was, briefly, to reassure the rulers of Arab principalities adjoining Hasa, to prevent them from embroiling themselves with the Turks, and to restrict as much as possible the scope of the Turkish operations.

Correspondence with Sa'ūd, 1871-73.

At the beginning of the war Sa'ūd requested the British authorities either to restrain the Shaikh of Kuwait from aiding the Turks with vessels or to permit him, the Amīr, to take action against the Shaikh at sea; but to this communication no answer was returned. In September 1871 Sa'ūd urged that the proceedings of the Turks against himself belonged to that class of maritime aggressions which the British Government had been accustomed to prevent, and he suggested that Great Britain should arbitrate between him and the Turks. In June 1872 and in March and May 1873 Sa'ūd again invoked the help of the British authorities upon various grounds, especially the old friendship between the Amīr of Najd and the British Government and the traditional policy of that Government itself in preventing maritime descents upon the coasts of the Gulf,—relying upon which, so Sa'ūd stated, he had neglected to defend his province of Hasa. Later the Amīr dropped his argumentative tone and merely asked for British friendship and good wishes. The Resident was instructed, should Sa'ūd revert to the question and demand assistance as a right, to explain to him that, as he was not a party to any maritime treaty with Britain and had received no assurances of protection, he could not claim the benefit of British intervention.

Release of the Amīr's brother and agent, 1874.

On the arrest of his agent in Hasa, Fahad-bin-Suwaitān, Sa'ūd complained to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf of the treachery of the Turks and was courteously informed in reply that the British Government could not interfere in the matter; but the case was referred by the Resident at Baghdād to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and it was possibly through the instrumentality of the latter that 'Abdur Rahmān and Fahad were subsequently released.

'ABDULLAH-BIN-FAISAL (SECOND REIGN), 1875-87.

General history of Najd, 1875-81.

Dissensions among the Al Sa'ūd.

The death of Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal left the sovereignty of the shrunken Wahhābi dominions in dispute among his relations. 'Abdur Rahmān-

January to July, 1875.

bin-Faisal was inclined to make terms with his half-brother 'Abdullah, but the Wahhābi priesthood, on account of the latter's connection with the Turks, would have none of him; and a force seems actually to have been despatched against him from Riyādh. About April 1875 Muhammad, the eldest son of the late Amīr Sa'ūd, joined the party of 'Abdur Rahmān in the capital, while 'Abdullah, it would appear, was excluded from the town and obliged to camp outside the walls. In July the British Political Resident at Būshehr and the Residency Agent in Bahrain received letters from 'Abdur Rahmān, in which he announced that he was now ruler of Najd and held the capital, and that 'Abdullah had become a fugitive in the desert; but no reply was sent to his communication.

Reconciliation among the Āl Sa'ūd, August 1875.

About August, however, 'Abdullah defeated 'Abdur Rahmān and re-entered Riyādh, where he set himself, at least in appearance, to conciliate all the members of his family. 'Abdur Rahmān became 'Abdullah's Wazīr and confidential adviser; and Muhammad and 'Abdul 'Aziz, the two eldest sons of the late Amīr Sa'ūd, who were as yet young and without influence, made peace with their uncle. This reconciliation among the Āl Sa'ūd caused the Mutasarrif of Hasa to withdraw from a correspondence with 'Abdullah on which he had been induced to embark while 'Abdur Rahmān was in the ascendant. The 'Ajmān were the only tribe that did not immediately submit to 'Abdullah's authority.

Rebellion in Hasa against the Turks, 1878.

From the end of 1875 to the end of 1878 tranquillity apparently prevailed in Central Arabia; but in the summer of 1878 there was a rising in Hasa against the Turkish administration, headed by Muhammad and 'Abdur Rahmān, the sons of the late Wahhābi Amīr Sa'ūd. This rebellion failed, as related in the history of Hasa, after some initial successes in the Qatīf Oasis; and in December 1878 the defeated Wahhābi leaders arrived in Bahrain with about 60 followers and were received there by the Shaikh, who was prevailed upon, however, by the British authorities to refrain from showing them favours.

Dissensions and reconciliation among the Āl Sa'ūd, 1879-80.

In 1879 the Amīr 'Abdullah was again at variance with his nephews, the sons of Sa'ūd, whom in the month of April he expelled from Kharj. Muhammad, the eldest of these youths, recovered Kharj in the following September or October; but his success was short-lived, for his uncle, who had just returned from a successful raid against the Mutair, made a sudden expedition to Kharj and took him prisoner. The Amīr did not apparently detain Muhammad for long; and in 1880 it was reported that, while 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal with his brothers Muhammad and 'Abdur Rahmān lived at Riyādh and held possession of the 'Āridh, Sadair and Washam districts, the children of Sa'ūd ruled, with his consent, over

Kharj, Hautah, Hariq and Aflāj and disposed of the 'Ajmān, Dawāsir and Āl Morrah tribes. In this year another attack by the Wahhābis upon the Turks was apprehended, and alarming rumours were circulated, perhaps by friends of the Muntafik tribe, who were then in rebellion in 'Irāq; but nothing occurred to justify the general expectation of trouble.

Journey of 'Abdullah-bin-'Abdullah to Constantinople, 1879-80.

In 1879 a new claimant of the Wahhābi Amirship appeared in the person of 'Abdullah, a son of the former Amir 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān. This individual, who had resided at Basrah since 1876, now undertook a journey to Constantinople with the object of obtaining for himself a grant of Najd and Hasa from the Porte in consideration of tribute and fealty, or at least of recovering his share of the property of the Āl Sa'ūd in Hasa, which the Turkish authorities had confiscated. On his way down the Gulf in October 1879, 'Abdullah-bin-'Abdullah called upon Colonel Ross, the British Resident at Būshehr, and sought to impress on him the advantages which would result to the Turks from his appointment; and he suggested at the same time that he should be supported in his proposals by the British Ambassador at Constantinople. From Jiddah, where he had an interview with Mr. Zohrab, the British Consul, 'Abdullah-bin-'Abdullah again wrote to Colonel Ross, pointing out how his scheme might benefit British and Turkish interests and hinting at the advisability of a British money loan to himself. 'Abdullah then visited Cairo, where he saw Mr. Malet, the British Consul, and in July he waited on the British Vice-Consul at Damascus. The British Government, however, decided to have nothing to do with 'Abdullah's application to the Porte; and, after his arrival at Constantinople in August 1880, nothing further was heard of him or of his proceedings.

Position in 1881.

In 1881 the Amir 'Abdullah was still in possession of Riyādh, where from time to time he was visited in a friendly manner by his nephew Muhammad; and some 'Ajmān chiefs, who were discontented with Turkish rule and refused to reside in Hasa, maintained personal relations with him.

Early hostilities between the Amir of Jabal Shammar and the Wahhābis, 1877-84.

Meanwhile trouble, of which the ultimate consequences to the Wahhābi state were not at once foreseen, arose between the ruling

family of the Āl Rashīd in the north and the rulers of Riyādh. The first unpleasantness appears to have been occasioned by an expedition which the Amīr of Jabal Shammar undertook in 1877 against the 'Ataibah, a tribe devoted to the Wahhābi chief; and soon afterwards the northern Amīr began openly to encroach upon the dominions of his nominal suzerain and seized the Wahhābi districts of Qasīm and Sadair, occupying, it would appear, the towns of Buraidah and Majma'; 'Anaizah in Qasim, however, apparently held out against him. In February 1880 an understanding was understood to have been reached between Ibn-Rashīd and Ibn-Sa'ūd; but, if so, it did not long endure. In 1882 an effort was made by the Wahhābi Amīr to recover Qasim and Sadair by military operations; but his troops were outnumbered by those of the Shammar Amir and he fell back upon Riyādh. He next discovered that Ibn-Rashīd had been intriguing with his nephews, the sons of Sa'ud, with a view to their joining the Shammar interest or remaining neutral; whereupon, to give greater cohesion to the Wahhābi cause, 'Abdullah, in March 1883, resigned the command of his forces in favour of Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, retaining for himself only the spiritual title of Imām and his authority as such. Each side made raids upon the dependents of the other, and in 1885 Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd obtained a transient success in Qasīm against the Shammar Amīr, whom he obliged temporarily to evacuate Buraidah; but, discovering from intercepted letters that his uncle intended him to be defeated and murdered, he relinquished the conduct of the operations and retired to his home in Kharj. After this Ibn-Rashīd, who possessed four moveable guns and a large number of Martini rifles, whose military organisation was more efficient than that of the Wahhābis, and who was reported to enjoy the benefit of a friendship with the Shaikh of Kuwait, had generally the advantage in the field.

Continued dissensions of the Āl Sa'ūd and deposition of the Amīr 'Abdullah, 1884-87.

The differences between the Wahhābi Amīr and his nephews were apparently irreconcileable, but the meagreness of the information which we possess regarding them precludes conjecture as to their real cause. We know that the sons of Sa'ūd maintained some connection with Bahrain, for Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd arrived there in February 1886 and

remained a month, and his brother 'Abdullah visited the islands in August of the same year, chiefly, it was suspected, for the sake of obtaining presents. Meanwhile the authority of the Amir 'Abdullah in Najd was, somewhat unaccountably, on the wane; but he remained in possession of the capital until the autumn of 1887, when he was suddenly seized and imprisoned by his nephews. Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd then wrote to the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān announcing his own accession to the Amirate of Najd; but his triumph, as we shall see, was not of long duration.

Relations of the Turks with Central Arabia during this period, 1875-87.

From what has gone before it will have been gathered that the relations of the Turks with the Wahhābis during the second reign of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal were of the slenderest sort, and that they were not characterised by any remarkable feature except the Hasa revolt of 1878; but Turkish influence, while it remained in abeyance in Southern Najd, was being gradually extended to Jabal Shammar. As explained in the separate history of that principality, there was friction between the Shammar Amir and the Turks on the Syrian frontier in 1872, and possibly in 1880; but in 1886 the Amir accorded a friendly reception to a Turkish mission, of which the object was to obtain leave for the erection of an Ottoman mosque and school at Hāil, and dismissed them with presents, though without granting their request. It was during the period now under consideration that the Turks first showed jealousy of the influence which they erroneously supposed the British Government to possess in Central Arabia.

British relations with Central Arabia during the same period, 1875-87.

In reality the British authorities had, as we have seen, no relations at all with Najd; and even their information regarding the course of events there was extremely defective. The omission of the British Government to reply to a letter from 'Abdur Rahmān in 1875, their

advice to the Shaikh of Bahrain against entangling himself in Wahhábi affairs in 1878, and their indifference to the proposals of 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyán in 1880 have already been mentioned above.

INTERREGNUM, 1887-1902.

Conquest of Southern Najd by the Amír of Jabal Shammar, 1887-92.

Administration of Southern Najd usurped by Ibn-Rashíd, 1887-88.

On learning of the displacement of the Amír 'Abdullah by his nephew Muhammad-bin-Sa'úd, the Amír of Jabal Shammar—at this time Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Ibn-Rashíd—marched against Riyádh, which capitulated and opened its gates to him after a short defence. At his departure Ibn-Rashíd carried the deposed Amír away with him to Háil, leaving an agent of his own at Riyádh to carry on the administration of the Wahhábi districts with the assistance of Muhammad-bin-Faisal, a brother of the ex-Amír; and he at once informed the Turks of his success, which he pretended to have achieved in their name. In August 1888, possibly at the suggestion of the ex-Amír 'Abdullah, the agent of Ibn-Rashíd at Riyádh hunted down and killed, in Kharj, Muhammad, Sa'ad and 'Abdullah, the only surviving sons—except 'Abdul 'Azíz who shared his uncle's captivity at Háil—of the former Wahhábi Amír Sa'úd-bin-Faisal. This massacre, perpetrated with impunity by the Shammar agent with a retinue of only 18 men, was an illustration of the paralysing prestige which the northern Amír had now acquired in Southern Najd; for Muhammad, "the modern Bayard of Arabia," was much beloved, and months passed before his adherents relinquished the hope that he might be still alive and in hiding.

Partial success of the Al Sa'úd against Ibn-Rashíd, 1890.

The deported ex-Amír 'Abdullah, being no longer considered dangerous, was permitted in the autumn of 1889 to return from Háil to Riyádh, and there he died almost immediately on his arrival; but in the following year 'Abdur Rahmán, his brother and former adviser, took Riyádh and captured Bin-Sabbán, the Shammar agent by whom the sons of Sa'íd had been put to death. It was believed that 'Abdur Rahmán had acted on the advice of sympathisers in Qasím to frustrate a plan formed by

Ibn-Rashid for the destruction of all the remaining descendants of the Wahhābi Amīr Faisal. A Shammar governor who had been installed in Kharj then capitulated, according to one account, without fighting; and the chiefs of 'Anaizah and Buraidah, and the people of Qasīm generally, declared for 'Abdur Rahmān. These proceedings brought the Shammar Amīr in anger from the north, accompanied by the Shammar, the Harb, and other tribes; but his siege and bombardment of Riyādh were ineffectual, sallies were made against his force, his Bedouin supporters began to melt away, and eventually a peace was arranged by which the districts of Kharj, Sadair and Washam were secured to him, but Riyādh and the rest of Southern Najd reverted to the Āl Sa'ūd. At the end of the year the people of Qasīm and Southern Najd as a whole, with the Bedouin tribes of the Mutair and 'Ataibah, had leagued themselves together to overthrow the power of Ibn-Rashid; and bloody feuds had been suspended, and hereditary foes united, by the universal hatred of Shammar tyranny. The confederation against Ibn-Rashīd was commanded by Zāmil, Amīr of 'Anaizah, from whose house the declaration of war was despatched.

Battle of Buraidah and complete victory of Ibn-Rashīd, 1891.

By February 1891 the opposing forces were in contact in Qasīm, the flanks of the allies resting on the towns of 'Anaizah and Buraidah; and the number of men in the field is said to have been greater than in any other war within living memory in Central Arabia. Hasan-bin-Mahanna, chief of Buraidah, on whose assistance the Shammar Amīr relied, deserted to the side of the confederates as soon as hostilities began. For a month fighting continued without decisive results, and, though vast numbers of camels were employed by day and night in bringing up water and other supplies, the provisions of Ibn-Rashīd's force began to fail. Towards the end of March Ibn-Rashīd made several desperate attempts to storm the position of the allies; but all of them, notwithstanding that his men were better armed than the enemy, were repulsed with loss. At length he braced himself for a final effort: his troops advanced to the attack driving some thousands of camels in front of them as a screen; and this time, though the loss in camels was very heavy, the Qusmān were driven from their ground. A hundred men are said to have fallen in the battle of Buraidah or *Mulaidah; the veteran Zāmil and his second son 'Ali were among the slain; two of their relatives were killed in the battle and several others

* In Nejd this battle appears to be generally known by the name of Mulaidah, a place which is said to be near Shaikhyah. The account given in the text is taken chiefly from Baron Nolde's *Reise nach Innerarabien*.

were deported to Hāil; Hasan-bin-Mahanna, Amīr of Buraidah, was captured in the desert and imprisoned at Hāil; the towns of 'Anaizah and Burnidah surrendered; Rass, Shaqrah and even Riyādh sent deputations to the victor to treat for peace; 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn-Sa'ūd, sought a refuge in Bahrain; and the Shammar Amīr placed a governor of his own in charge of Qasīm.

Unsuccessful renewal of the struggle by 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn Sa'ūd.

A little later Ibn-Rashīd's governor of Kharj, after plundering a pilgrim caravan, was killed in an attack upon the 'Ajmān tribe, and 'Abdur Rahmān profited by the opportunity to re-occupy Kharj and Riyādh; but he was soon surprised and totally defeated by the Shammar Amīr, who caused the fortifications of Riyādh to be levelled with the ground by the forced labour of the inhabitants, destroyed half of the date plantations, and laid the castle-palace of the Wahhābi Amīrs in ruins. The war was now over. All Central Arabia owned the sway of Ibn-Rashīd, and the Āl Sa'ūd had become a band of homeless wanderers.

Subsequent movements of 'Abdur Rahmān, 1891-92.

'Abdur Rahmān at first joined the Bedouins of Hasa, among whom he sojourned in constant fear of capture by the adherents of the Shammar Amīr; from August to November 1892 he lived in Qatar under the protection of the Shaikh of Dōhah, being joined there by his family from Bahrain; and finally, in November 1892, at the invitation of the Turkish Wāli of Basrah, he settled down in Hasa on a pension of £T33 a month, granted him by the Porte.

Relations of the Shammar Amīr with the Turks during his tenure of Southern Najd, 1891-1900.

Profession by Ibn-Rashīd of allegiance to the Porte, 1888.

In 1888, after his first decided victory over the Āl Sa'ūd, Ibn-Rashīd communicated with the Turks, professed himself a dependent of the Porte, and declared that he held his conquests at their disposal. This announcement was received with much satisfaction by the Turkish Government.

Expected expedition against Trucial 'Omān and policy of the Porte in Najd, 1888-89.

In the same year there were persistent rumours that an expedition against Trucial 'Omān was about to be undertaken, in the Turkish interest, by Ibn-Rashīd and the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar; the details of this question, in its local aspect, are given in the history of Trucial 'Omān. It may now be doubted whether such a project was ever actually entertained, unless perhaps by the Āl Thāni Shaikh; but

the danger at the time appeared so real that representations were made by the British Government to the Porte, in reply to which the Turkish Government stated that, apart from an occasional exchange of presents, no communication existed between the Sultān and the Shammar Amir. In 1889 it was ascertained by the British Ambassador at Constantinople that there was in fact a conflict of policy between the two, for, while Ibn-Rashīd desired to extend his authority over Hasa and yet to be, except in name, independent of the Turks, the Porte aspired to establish direct control over Central Arabia as well as Hasa.

Correspondence of both parties in Najd with the Turks, 1890.

In 1890, when a temporary settlement had been arranged in Najd between the Āl Sa'ūd and the Āl Rashīd, both sides sought the favour of the Turks; the Shammar Amīr accused his adversaries of entertaining designs on Hasa; and the Wahhābi chief, to whom the Turkish authorities at this time appeared inclined to listen, complained of the aggressions of Ibn-Rashīd and professed his own desire to submit to the Porte. As already mentioned, the head of the Āl Sa'ūd, after being worsted by Ibn-Rashīd, was granted asylum and a pension in Hasa in 1892.

Friction between Ibn-Rashīd and the Turks, 1895.

In 1895, as related in the history of Hasa, some friction arose, out of tribal affairs upon the borders of that province, between the Shammar Amir and the local Turkish authorities; but it had no serious results. In the same year a request for an interview, received from the Āl Thāni Shaikh in Qatar, was declined by Ibn-Rashīd for fear of giving offence to the Turks.

Renewal by the Āl Sa'ūd of the struggle for possession of Southern Najd, 1900-1902.

Residence 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn-Sa'ūd at Kuwait, 1897-1900.

In 1900 or three years after the death of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the formidable Amir of Jabal Shammar by whom Southern Najd had been conquered, 'Abdur Rahmān, the fugitive chief of the Āl Sa'ūd, began to move again; it is possible that he was encouraged by signs of disorganisation which the Shammar state, under 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-Mat'ab, nephew and successor of Muhammad, was now manifesting. About 1897 'Abdur Rahmān, having left his refuge in Hasa, settled at Kuwait and became a recipient of the bounty of Shaikh Mubārak as well as of that of the Turkish Government; and the Shaikh, irritated by support which Ibn-Rashīd had extended to certain rebellious nephews of his own, was before long induced to take an even more active interest in the case of his Wahhābi guest.

Commencement of hostilities, 1900.

In August 1900 'Abdur Rahmān, having received encouragement from well-wishers in Najd, suddenly left Kuwait for the interior, where he gained some successes over the Bedouins of Ibn-Rashīd's party; and in September of the same year he invited Shaikh Mubārak to join him with reinforcements. What action was taken in the first instance by the Shaikh of Kuwait is not clear; but during the greater part of October he was absent from his capital, and in November a collision on the borders of Turkish 'Irāq appeared imminent, between Ibn-Rashīd on the one side and Shaikh Mubārak and Sa'dūn Pāsha, a Muntafik outlaw, on the other. It was averted, however, by the Turkish authorities at Basrah, as is related at length in the history of Kuwait.

Expedition of the Shaikh of Kuwait to Qasīm and battle of Sarīf, 1901.

The Shaikh of Kuwait, notwithstanding the intervention of the Turks, had by no means renounced his intention of lending effectual aid to Ibn-Sa'ūd, and on the 18th of December 1900 he placed himself at the head of a large mixed force of Bedouins and settled Arabs and started for Qasīm. His preliminary operations are described in the history of the Kuwait principality. After the Summān and Dahānah deserts had been cleared of the enemy, declarations of loyalty to Ibn-Sa'ūd began to be received from many places in Southern Najd and Qasīm; and 'Abdul 'Aziz, the eldest surviving son of 'Abdur Rahmān, was nominated by anticipation, for Riyādh was as yet in possession of the enemy, to the governorship of the Wahhābi capital. On the arrival of Sa'dūn Pāsha which had apparently been awaited in the desert or on the confines of Qasīm, the allies resumed their advance; but the Shammar Amīr was now in the neighbourhood, and, when they reached Tarfiyah in Qasīm, he took up a position at Sarīf a few miles in their rear. On the 17th of March 1901 a decisive battle, known as the battle of Sarīf, was fought in the bed of Wādi-ar-Rummah at an equal distance from the two camps; it ended in the complete discomfiture of Shaikh Mubārak and Ibn-Sa'ūd. On the side of Ibn-Rashīd, Sālim and Mahanna, sons of the Amīr's cousin Hamūd, were slain; but the losses of the allies were considerably the heavier and included at least three near relations of the Shaikh of Kuwait and six members of the ruling Abul Khail family of Buraidah. According to a Shammar version of the affair, the defeated army made no stand at all and suffered heavily in its flight, many of the fugitives were dragged out of hiding places in cultivated fields or in stacks of straw, and of these some were put to death in cold blood by townsmen and slaves under the orders of Ibn-Rashīd. Within a fortnight Shaikh Mubārak, Ibn-Sa'ūd and Sa'dūn Pāsha had regained Kuwait in safety, while their dispersed troops continued to straggle home

Consequence of the expedition, 1901-1902.

The failure of this expedition proved a serious matter or some of those who had engaged in it, especially for the Shaikh of Kuwait and for those among the inhabitants of Qasim who had taken his part. On some of the latter Ibn-Rashid took summary vengeance; but the partial success of the hostile combination had greatly alarmed him; and about the end of May, through an agent at Basrah, he made overtures, which met with no encouragement, to obtain the protection of the British Government.

The only outsiders interested in the situation that had arisen were the Turkish Government, who were anxious to acquire influence over the Shaikh of Kuwait; and they immediately deputed the Mushīr of their 6th Army Corps from Baghdād to Basrah, where he arrived about the beginning of May and remained for several months. The task of this high officer was to arrange a reconciliation among the principal disputants, and this he proceeded to attempt by opening a correspondence with each; but it is not clear that he met with a favourable response from any one of them except Ibn-Rashīd. In August the Turks, who now seemed to be drifting into a pronounced partisanship of Ibn-Rashid, began to concentrate troops upon the Euphrates; and in September 1901, on raids being made by Ibn-Rashīd into Kuwait territory, a panic arose in the town and its neighbourhood, and preparations were made by the British naval authorities for assisting the Shaikh in case an emergency should arise. In November and December 1901, Ibn-Rashid being then at Safwān, a place upon the Kuwait border not far from Basrah, strenuous efforts were made by the Turkish authorities at Basrah to induce the Shaikh to submit to the Porte and even to admit a Turkish garrison to his capital; but they were foiled by the decided attitude of the senior British naval officer at Kuwait. A crisis followed which is described in the history of Kuwait; but it passed over harmlessly in consequence, it is probable, of British naval preparations for the defence of Kuwait; and the Shammar Amīr moved off, slowly and reluctantly, to the wells of Lainah on the eastern border of his own dominions.

Recovery of Riyādh by the Wahhābis, January 1902.

At this juncture the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd suddenly began to make progress in the south. About the 15th of January 1902 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān made a sudden dash from the side of Hasa, where he had for some time been engaged in collecting adherents, and recovered Riyādh for his father. He entered the town by night, accompanied at first by eight picked men; later he was joined within the walls by the rest of his party, who only numbered 80 all told; and with this force he surprised and slew the Shammar governor and took possession of Riyādh, to the general satisfaction of the inhabitants. Ibn-Rashīd's garrisons were then expelled

from the neighbouring districts of Kharj and Hariq; and it was represented to the Porte by Ibn-Sa'ûd that the country thus recovered would be ruled by him as a loyal subject of the Sultân.

'ABDUR RAHMÂN-BIN-FAISAL,
since 1902.

With the recovery of Riyâdh the interregnum in Southern Najd may be considered to end, and the reign of 'Abdur Rahmân as a Wahhâbi Amir to begin.

War between Ibn-Sa'ûd and Ibn-Rashîd, 1902-04.

Difficulties of Ibn-Rashîd, 1902.

Ibn-Rashîd was now fully aware of the precariousness of his situation. The port of Kuwait being in unfriendly hands, he could no longer obtain in sufficient quantities the arms and ammunition which were essential to the maintenance of his power in Najd; and he was conscious that many even of his hereditary subjects had been alienated by cruelty, rapacity, and general maladministration. Accordingly, at the middle of March 1902, he sent an envoy to the Turkish Wâli of Basrah praying for Turkish aid to subdue the "revolt," with which, as he confessed, he could no longer cope; and in a letter which he sent about the same time to the Grand Wazir at Constantinople, he attributed to the British Government a design of entering into close relations with Central Arabia through the agency of Ibn-Sa'ûd and the Shaikh of Kuwait.

Progress of the Wahhâbi arms, 1902.

In Najd the tide of war continued to roll steadily northwards. On the 8th of April, near Majma', 'Abdul 'Azîz-bin-'Abdur Rahmân inflicted a signal defeat on a body of the Qahtân tribe, who were supporters of Ibn-Rashîd; and by this time the 'Ataibah, Duwâsir, Sahai', 'Ajmân, Âl Murrah and Mutair tribes in the south and east had declared for Ibn-Sa'ûd, so that there remained to Ibn-Rashîd only the Qahtân, Harb and Dhafir, besides the Shammar to which he himself belonged. Many leading Wahhâbis, who had gone into voluntary exile during the Shammar domination of Southern Najd, began to return from Basrah and other

places abroad; the people, even in Qasīm and the districts adjoining it, were as a rule favourable to the cause of the Wahhābi dynasty; and a general impression prevailed that the supremacy of Hāil must ere long yield to that of Riyādh. On the 11th of May 1902 the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān left Kuwait for Riyādh, where he was soon established in the seat of his ancestors, having inflicted some loss on the hostile Shammar and Dhafir Bedouins by the way. On the 27th of May his son 'Abdul 'Azīz succeeded in capturing some of the relations of Ibn-Rashīd; and the reconquest of Southern Najd seemed all but complete.

Serious defeat of Ibn-Rashīd in Kharj, 1902.

Ibn-Rashīd, however, had resolved on a strong effort for the recovery of the southern districts, deprivation of which seemed to threaten him with the loss of Qasīm also at no distant period. At the end of July 1902 some of his supporters made an incursion into Kuwait territory and reached the wells of Subaihīyah, but were there repulsed. A little later the Shammar Amīr himself began to move southwards. Occupying Buraidah in Qasīm and Washaiqir in Washam as he passed, he detached some of his mounted troops to attack Riyādh and pressed on in person in search of 'Abdul 'Azīz, who was then in Kharj; he took Sulaimīyah; and he pitched his camp at Dilam, the capital of Kharj. At Dilam he remained inactive for a few days, during which the bulk of the inhabitants of the Hautah and Hariq districts, as also the Dawāsir tribe, flocked to the standard of 'Abdul 'Azīz at Muhammadi, a place with cultivation some two or three miles to the northward. On the 1st of November 1902, after three days of inconclusive skirmishing, a general engagement took place in which, after five hours' heavy fighting, Ibn-Rashīd was totally defeated, and fled, leaving his camp, many horses and camels, and one of his standards in possession of the enemy. 'Abdul 'Azīz followed up his success by advancing so far in the direction of Qasīm as Shaqrah; while Ibn-Rashīd, after making good his escape, took up his position for a time at Zilfi in the extreme north of Sadair. At the end of December 1902 a raid, headed, it is said, by Ibn-Rashīd in person was made on Kuwait subjects in the neighbourhood of Jahrah and did some damage; but the raiders were ultimately beaten off. Ibn-Rashīd then retired into Qasīm, and a short interval occurred in the active operations, during which 'Abdul 'Azīz paid a visit to Kuwait.

Interview of the son of the Wahhābi Amīr with a Russian official at Kuwait, 1903.

Ibn-Sa'ūd at this point received some encouragement from a European power. At an early stage in the Central Arabian conflict it had become known at Basrah that the agents of the Russian Government were taking an interest in the struggle, and now, on the occasion of 'Abdul 'Azīz's visit to Kuwait, an interview took place between him and

the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr; this official had arrived on board the Russian cruiser "Boyarin," which was visiting the port in company with the French cruiser "Infernet". It was reported from Kuwait that the Russian Consul-General on this occasion offered to help 'Abdul 'Azīz with money and arms, and the statement received some corroboration from an independent source. The interview in question took place at the beginning of March 1903.

Sadair recovered by the Wahhābis, 1903.

Ibn-Rashīd, meanwhile, occupied himself in chastising some of the outlying nomad tribes who were favourable to the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd, and he endeavoured to enlist upon his own side the services of the Muntafik outlaw Sa'dūn Pāsha. On the night of the 3rd of April 1903 he made an attempt to retake Riyādh, where the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān was now firmly established; but he was repulsed with loss. A few days later the Wahhābi 'Abdul 'Azīz, who after his visit to Kuwait had been recruiting followers at Nta', made a counter-attack upon Ibn-Rashīd's Bedouins, inflicting considerable injury. The year 1903 ended with the capture of Zilfi, and the consequent recovery of the district of Sadair, by this active scion of the Āl Sa'ūd.

Ibn-Rashīd's petition for assistance granted by the Porte, 1904.

Ibn-Rashīd now redoubled his efforts to obtain the active assistance of the Turks; and on the 7th of January 1904 he wired to the Grand Wazīr at Constantinople, soliciting the orders of the Porte and representing that Ibn-Sa'ūd was seeking to form relations with the British Government, and that he would probably be furnished by them with guns and ammunition. His petition must have been granted, for in April he was supplied with some specie, rifles and ammunition from Baghdād; and orders were issued for the concentration of a Turkish force at Samāwah on the Euphrates.

Recovery of Washam and Qasīm by the Wahhābis, 1904.

In the interim the successes of 'Abdul 'Azīz had grown even more rapid and decisive. On the 7th of February 1904, at Faidhah in Wādi-as-Sirr, he attacked and defeated a force under Husain Jarrād, Ibn-Rashīd's governor of Qasīm, killing the governor himself, whose standard and seal he despatched to Kuwait in token of victory. A number of other Shammar notables lost their lives in this encounter; and Southern Najd, by the submission of the district of Washam, was at last recovered in its entirety. 'Abdul 'Azīz, Ibn-Sa'ūd, next fell upon Qasīm, a district inclined to independence but generally, through force of circumstances, in semi-vassalage either to Hāil or to Riyādh. The town of 'Anaizah was entered on the 22nd of March, not without assistance from sympathising citizens; and Mājid, a son of Ibn-Rashīd's cousin Hamūd, who was encamped outside the place to defend it, was defeated on the same

while the Saiyid attacked it by sea; but sudden distrust of his ally's intentions caused the Saiyid to dissolve the combination thus formed before any attempt had been made on Sohār.

INTERREGNUM.
1838-40.

Second occupation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1838-40.

Direct administration assumed by the Egyptians.

After the deportation of the Amīr Faisal, the Egyptian commander, whose forces, regular and irregular, now amounted to about 3,000 men, established his headquarters at Sulaimiyah in the district of Kharj and despatched 300 irregulars to Hasa, where he caused the ports of Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair to be garrisoned. The position of Khālid, who from the first had been merely a puppet in the hands of the Egyptians, was now anomalous and uncertain; for, though the Egyptians in their dealings with neighbouring states pretended only to enforce the rights of the Wahhābi Amīr and at one time held a ceremony for the installation of Khālid and invested him with a robe of honour, Khurshid Pāsha appears, nevertheless, to have kept the entire management of affairs in his own hands and to have proclaimed the absolute sovereignty of his master, Muhammad 'Ali, over the whole of Najd.

Policy of the Egyptians and its conflict with British interests.

The designs of the Egyptian Government had this time a much wider scope than in 1818-19; and their object seems to have been now nothing less than the reduction of the whole of Eastern as well as Central Arabia, and the appropriation of the Turkish province of 'Irāq. An assurance which Muhammad 'Ali had given in 1838 to the British political representative at Cairo, that he did not mean to extend his authority in the direction of the Persian Gulf, was presently violated by the proceedings of his officers; and these consequently aroused British opposition, and were in the end, as we shall see below, completely frustrated. The growth of Muhammad 'Ali's power in Europe was regarded by the British Government

with *disfavour; and in the Persian Gulf it was felt that a serious decrease of British influence must result if the Egyptians should obtain a permanent foothold in Eastern Arabia. In February 1839 the British Political Resident at Büshehr was expressly instructed to use his influence to check the encroachments of the Egyptians.

Egyptian intrgiues in Eastern Arabia and relations with the British Government, 1838-40.

We may now pass on to consider some aggressions on the states of the Persian Gulf, which the Egyptians, from the base that they had acquired in Hasa, now attempted to commit.

* It is necessary here to revert to the European situation, and to continue the footnote at page 1061.

The accession of Mahmud II to the throne of Turkey, though his reforms made possible the survival of the Ottoman empire to the present day, did not at once check the course of disaster. In 1812 Russia took Bessarabia, the province between the Dniester and the Danube; and in 1820, while the Porte was engaged in crushing the rebellious Pasha of Janina, Greece rose in insurrection. The Sultan then turned for aid to his vassal Muhammad 'Ali, who had consolidated his power in Egypt during the troublous period following the expulsion of the French, and who now possessed a better fleet than his master, besides an army trained and organised in the European style. Ibrahim Pasha, whom his father placed in command of the Egyptian forces, soon reduced Crete and Greece, as he had done Qasim and Najd. Crete was taken in 1824; Samos fell, and the Morea was invaded; Missolonghi was captured in 1826, and the Akropolis of Athens in 1827. But at this point Ibrahim's victorious career was interrupted by the battle of Navarino, in which his whole navy was destroyed by the combined fleets of Britain, France and Russia; and in the following year, after a war between Russia and Turkey ended by the Treaty of Adrianople, Greece obtained her freedom.

In 1831 Muhammad 'Ali, whose heart was set on the aggrandisement of Egypt, threw an army into Syria under Ibrahim. War between Egypt and Turkey followed, and in 1832 Ibrahim inflicted a crushing defeat on the Turks at Konia in Asia Minor: the cession of Syria to Egypt and closer relations between Turkey and Russia, initiated by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, were the result. In 1839, in spite of improvements effected by Moltke and other Prussian officers, the Turkish Army was again shattered by Ibrahim at Nisib, and the Turkish admiral with his whole fleet deserted to Muhammad 'Ali; but this was more than Europe, except France who favoured Muhammad 'Ali, could tolerate. Acre was accordingly captured by the British, Austrian and Turkish fleets, and Ibrahim was obliged to withdraw from Syria. As the result of this intervention, in which Britain played the leading part, Syria was restored to Turkey, the Egyptian army was cut down to 18,000 men, and the Egyptian fleet was condemned to rot in the harbour of Alexandria; but Muhammad 'Ali, on making formal submission to the Sultan, was recognised as hereditary Governor of Egypt.

From the foregoing it will be evident that the Egyptian advance into Central Arabia in 1837, was part of a large forward policy, and that the withdrawal in 1840 was due to a collapse of the same.

Relations of the Egyptians with Bahrain, 1838-40.

Early in 1839 Khurshid Pāsha disclosed his intentions in regard to Bahrain by demanding of the Shaikh of the islands the tribute formerly paid to the Amīr Faisal, the rendition of Tārūt Island and Dammām, and the surrender of 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, the refugee Wahhābi governor of Hasa. The Shaikh would at first have thrown himself upon the protection of Britain; but the Government of India, not fully informed of the attitude of the Home Government towards Muhammad 'Ali, could not at once give the assurances that he desired; and the Shaikh then sought to stave off the Pāsha's demands by describing himself as a vassal of Persia. In April 1839 the Indian Government, on their own responsibility, authorised Admiral Sir F. Maitland, who was cruising in the Persian Gulf with a British squadron, to discourage the Egyptian commander from aggression upon Bahrain and even to afford the Shaikh as much support as could be given him without provoking a direct collision with the Egyptians; the object of these instructions was to gain time, while maintaining the *status quo*. Two or three weeks later stronger orders were issued, empowering the Admiral in certain circumstances, after a warning delivered to the Egyptian commander, to undertake the defence of Bahrain against Khurshid Pāsha; and at the Admiral's visit to Bahrain, which possibly took place before receipt of the revised instructions, the Shaikh formally promised not to place himself in subordination to any foreign power without first consulting the British Resident. In the meantime Khurshid Pāsha had written to the Resident with the obvious intention of discovering how the British authorities intended to act in the event of his attacking Bahrain, but the only answer that he received was a request that he would not move without notice to the Resident sufficient to allow of provision being made for the safety of British subjects in Bahrain; and subsequently the Resident was instructed by Government to remonstrate with the Pāsha on the subject of his designs against Bahrain, which order, no doubt, was duly executed. Notwithstanding the measures thus taken to strengthen him, the Shaikh, apparently in July 1839, entered into a secret agreement with the Egyptians by which he bound himself to pay them $2,000 a year as tribute, on condition that there should be no interference in the administration of Bahrain and that no Egyptian representative should be stationed in the principality; his chief motives for his action, which was highly displeasing to the British authorities, appear to have been the desire to escape from an anxious position and a doubt as to the ability of the British Government to protect him on land against Egyptians. A protest against

the agreement was addressed by the Resident both to the Shaikh of Bahrain and to the Egyptian commander, but the case had no further developments; and in the following year, on the departure of the Egyptians from Hasa, the agreement ceased to be of any practical importance. These matters are treated of at greater length in the history of Bahrain.

Relations of the Egyptians with Trucial 'Omān, 1838-40.

In Trucial 'Omān, likewise, the British authorities were obliged to take precautions against encroachment by the Egyptians. Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, whom the Amīr Faisal before the end of his reign had removed from Baraimi, joined Khurshid Pāsha in Najd at an early stage in the occupation, and was commissioned by him to proceed to Trucial 'Omān and obtain the submission of the principal Shaikhs to the titular Amir Khalid. Sa'ad arrived at Shārjah in March 1839 and was received with distinction by the Qāsimi Shaikh, who provided him with a residence. With him came a detachment of Wahhābi soldiers, whom he wished to place in Baraimi; but the Na'im, who held the Baraimi fort at this time and enjoyed the support of Saiyid Hamūd of Sohār, would not agree to admit them; and Sa'ad, though he induced the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to support his demand, was not in a position to coerce the fort-holders. Meanwhile a British political officer had visited the coast with Admiral Sir F. Maitland, and the Shaikhs of the Trucial ports had promised not to help, but on the contrary to resist, the Egyptian agent in his intrigues; nevertheless, after the departure of the fleet, the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Abu Dhabi began to compete with each other for the agent's favour. In Trucial 'Omān, as in Bahrain, an impression seems to have prevailed that the Egyptians were invincible on *terra firma*. In July 1839 the British Resident visited the coast and obtained from each ruling chief a written engagement to support British and oppose Egyptian policy; he took steps, through the Shaikh of Shārjah, to bring about the expulsion of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq from the country; and he encouraged the Na'im of Baraimi to stand firm, at the same time causing the Egyptian agent to be informed that the Na'im had been taken under British protection. Completely foiled in his purpose by these measures, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq embarked at Shārjah for 'Oqair, where, after carrying off 400 sheep with other property from the island of Qais, he arrived in due course; but he had apparently forfeited the confidence of his Egyptian employers, for soon after his return, he was placed under surveillance and removed to Riyāḍh. In connection with these events the chief man of Qatif received warning that an expedition by sea from Hasa against any part of the 'Omān coast would be opposed by the British naval force in the Gulf; and in January 1840 the Resident paid a second visit to the coast of Trucial 'Omān, where at 'Ajmān he arranged a defensive alliance against all enemies

between the Na'îm and Dhawâir of the Baraimi Oasis. A British officer also visited Baraimi. Most of these proceedings are more fully described in the history of Trucial 'Omân.

Relations of the Egyptians with the Sultanate of 'Omân.

The Egyptians continued the bullying policy of their predecessors the Wahhâbis, towards the Saiyid of Masqat; and they even used some of the same agents for the purpose, especially Sa'ad-Bine-Mutlaq and a certain Bin-Battâl. The Saiyid was at first inclined to attach himself to the Egyptians, through whom he hoped to obtain possession of Bahrain: but later he adopted the views of the Government of India and conducted his correspondence with the Egyptians according to the advice of the British political authorities. The reconciliation between the Saiyid and his kinsman Hamûd, effected by British intervention in 1839, had reference to the Egyptian danger; and the ruler of 'Omân, in the treaty which resulted bound himself to assist Hamûd, who was a stanch opponent of Muhammad 'Ali, against all his enemies.

Relations of the Egyptians with Kuwait.

Kuwait was among the more distant places to which the Egyptians, on their arrival on the shores of the Persian Gulf, despatched emissaries; and the duties of the individual whom they posted to Kuwait were probably political and not unconnected with a scheme for the conquest of 'Irâq, though his ostensible employment was merely that of a purveyor to the Egyptian forces. The Shaikh of Kuwait gave this Egyptian officer the highest seat in all assemblies; and his presence seems to have been the cause of an otherwise inexplicable discourtesy offered by the Shaikh in 1839 to the British Assistant Resident,—an incident of which the details will be found in the history of Kuwait.

Evacuation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1840.

The uncompromising opposition of the British Government to the more ambitious and distant designs of the Egyptians was seconded by the difficulties in which the latter soon found themselves involved with the inhabitants of the countries actually in their occupation; and early in 1840 a retrograde movement of their forces commenced. The Egyptian governor of Hasa was shot and killed by Arabs in the vicinity of Hofûf, and it was found necessary to recall a small force which he had despatched against the Nâim of Qatar. The attitude of the 'Ajmân tribe, whose principal Shaikh had been imprisoned by the Egyptians but contrived to escape from their custody, was bitterly hostile. Communications became unsafe, and even at Tharmidah, to which place the Pâsha had now removed his headquarters, supplies could not be brought in

except under heavy escorts. To add to the serious local difficulties of the Pāsha he was now in disgrace with Muhammad 'Ali, whose jealousy had been excited by his exploits, and very little assistance had reached him by sea, only one vessel with stores arriving at Qatif in November 1839, in place of four vessels of war which he had expected at an earlier date. In May 1840, when a blockade of the Egyptian ports of Qatif, Saihat and 'Oqair by British war-vessels was imminent, news was received of the actual withdrawal of the greater part of the Egyptian forces from Najd. Their departure had been heralded by a tour which Khālid, accompanied by a body of Egyptian cavalry, had undertaken in the districts of the interior in order to receive the allegiance of the local Shaikhs, whom he was in future to govern unaided. In Hasa the order to retire was celebrated, as it had been once before in 1819, by an abnormal display of rapacity on the part of the retiring officials; and Barghash, a Shaikh of the Bani Khālid, was at the same time put to death in retaliation for the murder of Muhammad Effendi. It was intended that Najd should for the future be controlled, through Khālid, from Madinah; and, to enable the Egyptian nominee to maintain his position, a force of 800 Egyptian troops, of whom about two-thirds were infantry, were left at his disposal.

KHĀLID-BIN-SA'ŪD.

1840-42.

General and internal history, 1840-42.

Weakness of Khālid's position.

The reign of Khālid, who as the creature of the Egyptians was generally disliked, and who appears to have possessed no capacity for government, was short and troubled. His prestige was impaired from the first by rumours that the ex-Amir, Faisal-bin-'Abdullah, had escaped or had been liberated in Egypt, and by the check which his Egyptian patrons were known to have sustained in Syria at the hands of European powers. Claims also were advanced by the Porte to suzerainty over Najd; and Khālid, acting perhaps under the advice of Khurshid Pāsha, made the professions of loyalty that were required of him and sent presents

to the Sultān of Turkey,—acts of submission which the Egyptians probably intended should be disavowed at the first convenient opportunity,—and was appointed in return Turkish Wāli of Central Arabia. The Egyptian troops by whom Khālid's power was supported received no pay and became discontented; moreover they were regarded with intense jealousy by the Arabs of the country, who considered that a Wahhābi Amīr should rely on the swords of his fellow-countrymen alone.

Visit of the Amīr to Hasa, 1841.

In October 1841, notwithstanding these difficulties, the Amīr Khālid descended to Hasa and appeared to be contemplating an expedition against 'Omān; his proceedings drew remonstrances from the British authorities and occasioned the despatch of a British officer to Hofūf, as will be related further on.

Rebellion of 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān. September 1841-April 1842.

The Amīr's ideas of foreign conquest, however, if he entertained such, were speedily dispelled by an insurrection at home, headed by his distant relative 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān, whose cause was supported by Turki-al-Hīzāni, one of the leading Shaikhs of the Kharj district in Najd. This rival, finding himself suspected by Khālid, at first fled to Kuwait; but in September 1841 he returned to Central Arabia, took possession apparently of Dhrumah, Hāir and Manfūhah in 'Āridh, and provided himself with the sinews of war by confiscating the estates of two wealthy inhabitants of those places, who were opposed to him and whom he executed. The Sahūl and other tribes attached themselves to his cause; and he was able to secure the neutrality, if not the support, of the important tribes of the 'Ajmān, Āl Morrah and Sabai'; but the 'Anizah, Mutair and Bani Hājir still followed the Amīr Khālid. In December 1841 'Abdullah found himself in a position to threaten Riyādh, but was repulsed in a skirmish; he had, however, an influential body of supporters in the town itself, who, on the very day of his defeat, admitted him by the southern gate after dusk and proclaimed him Amīr of Najd. The leaders of Khālid's army fell into his hands, and he put three of them to death; but he spared the life of a resolute individual named 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, probably the same who had governed Hasa under the ex-Amīr Faisal. The Amīr Khālid escaped to Hasa and undertook, as he had done once before, to dismiss the Egyptian troops whose presence was offensive to his leading supporters; but again he failed to observe his promise, and the people of Hofūf then tendered their allegiance to 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān. Khālid found himself obliged to flee to Qatīf, where he was rejoined by his troops; but here too the popular feeling was strongly adverse to him; his partisans deserted him; and, after dismissing his mercenaries, he took refuge at Dammām with Mubārak, a son of the Shaikh of Bahrain.

From Dammām Khālid visited Khor Hassān in Qatar, where the Shaikh of Bahrain in April 1842 gave him an honorific reception; but attempts made in his interest upon Hofūf and 'Oqair ended in failure. He finally retired to Kuwait, with the intention of renewing the struggle from the side of Qasim, where he possessed some interest.

Relations of the Amir Khālid with Arab states, 1840-42.

Relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1840-42.

The dealings of the Amir Khālid with other states in Arabia were slight, and were practically confined to Trucial 'Omān. Some of the chiefs of that region undoubtedly opened a correspondence with him, particularly the Shaikh of Shārjah, a letter from whom, relating to designs on Baraimi, was intercepted by the Na'im of that oasis in 1841. In October of the same year Khālid appeared to be organising an expedition against Baraimi; but, if this was the case, he was prevented from undertaking it by the rebellion, already in progress, which ended in his expulsion from his dominions.

Relations of the Amir Khālid with Great Britain, 1840-42.

Correspondence.

Early in his reign Khālid addressed a letter to the British Residency Agent in Bahrain, expressing a strong desire that "the amicable and cordial relations which formerly subsisted between his late father, Sa'ūd, and the British Government" should be renewed, and indicating that he would have taken earlier steps to this end had he not been prevented by Muhammad 'Ali.

Lieutenant Jopp's mission, November 1841.

In regard to Trucial 'Omān, however, as we have already mentioned, Khālid's attitude was ambiguous; and the British Political Resident, taking advantage of the instructions of Government to keep a watch upon the Amir's movements and warn him, if need be, that an attempt on his part to invade 'Omān would be resisted by the British Government, deputed an officer, Lieutenant Jopp, to interview the Amir at Hofūf and explain the position to him. The Government of India, who did not intend that the proceedings of the Amir should be scrutinised with the same strictness as those of the Egyptians, were inclined, when they became aware of this mission, to

doubt its expediency; but a satisfactory assurance was elicited from the Amīr, that he entertained no designs upon 'Omān; and incidentally some new and interesting geographical information was recorded by Lieutenant Jopp on his journey from 'Oqair to Hofūf and from Hofūf to Qatīf in November 1841.*

'ABDULLAH-BIN-THANAIYĀN.

1842-43.

Internal affairs, 1842-43.

The rule of the successful rebel, 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān, was brief and troubled. In Hasa the severity of his taxation soon estranged the inhabitants, who had in the beginning generally supported his cause; and a number of the Bedouin tribes on that side continued to be hostile to his authority. The ex-Amir Khālid at first threatened an attack from Qasim; and in March 1843 the ex-Amir Faisal, who had in fact regained his freedom, appeared in that district and at once became an even more formidable danger. In June 1843 Faisal marched southwards unopposed and besieged 'Abdullah in the citadel of Riyādh, to which he had retired with a few followers, and 'Abdullah was quickly obliged to surrender at discretion. Faisal had at first offered to associate the ex-Amīr Khālid with himself in his operations; but that helpless individual, who had now withdrawn to Madinah, refused to join him and so vanished from the page of history. Valuable assistance was given to Faisal in his operations by 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, his loyal Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar.

Relations with Bahrain, 1842-43.

In 1842, a breach having occurred between the joint Shaikhs of Bahrain, the younger, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, was expelled from the

*Bombay Selections XXIV, pages 111-115. Lieutenant Jopp was apparently the first European to travel between 'Oqair and Hofūf by any, and between Hofūf and Qatīf by the ordinary route.

islands by the elder and made his way to Riyādh, where he succeeded in enlisting the sympathy of the Wahhābi Amīr. 'Abdullah, the elder Shaikh, then blockaded the Wahhābi coast, temporarily seized 'Oqair, and gave asylum to discontented emigrants from Saihāt in the Qatif Oasis. In April 1843 'Abdullah was in his turn driven out of Bahrain by Muhammad and established himself at Dammām on the coast of Hasa. The Wahhābi Amīr was not in a position to interfere actively in these affairs.

Designs on Trucial 'Omān, 1842-43.

However weak an Amīr of the Wahhābis might be, it was considered necessary to his honour at this period that he should assert his claims to sovereignty over distant 'Omān; and this obligation 'Abdullah fulfilled by informing the Shaikhs of the Trucial coast that he intended to depute Sa'ad-bin-Muthaq to represent him at Baraimi. The Shaikhs of Baraimi, who were also addressed, openly alleged a connection with the British Government, which, they may have hoped, would deter the Amīr from meddling with their oasis; but they were divided among themselves, and the secret correspondence of some among them with the Wahhābis had, it was believed, a different tenor.

Relations with the British Government, 1842-43.

The letters of 'Abdullah to the Trucial Shaikhs, except one addressed to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi who refused to exhibit it, were procured by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf and became the occasion of a remonstrance by that officer against the Amīr's proceedings: the ground taken by the Resident was that Wahhābi influence had in the past conduced to piracy in Trucial 'Omān and necessitated punitive action by the British Government. 'Abdullah, in reply, professed a desire to co-operate with the British Government in the suppression of piracy and stated that he had enjoined the inhabitants of 'Omān to refrain from maritime offences; but it was observed that in his letter he claimed the people of 'Omān as his subjects.

FAISAL-BIN-TURKI (SECOND REIGN).

1843-65.

General and internal history, 1843-65.

Character and life of Faisal.

The manner of Faisal's second accession has already been related, and the remainder of his reign was, at home, practically devoid of incident.

Faisal was distinguished by his dignity and self-possession and was respected for the justice of his decisions, but he was greatly feared, especially by the Bedouins, on account of his merciless severity. Like Sa'ūd, the most distinguished of his predecessors, he was regarded by his subjects with mingled feelings, in which dislike and admiration blended. In his later years Faisal became blind and infirm; but, until a few months before his death, his faculties were unimpaired, and he continued personally to carry on the government. In June 1865 the Amir was attacked by paralysis, and on the 2nd of December following he died at Riyādh; the immediate cause of his death is said to have been cholera.

Administration of Najd, 1843-65.

In his dominions Faisal seems to have maintained perfect order, and from the very first year of his reign he showed great energy in protecting the yearly pilgrimages to the Holy Cities against marauding Bedouins. In the jail at Riyādh there were always many political prisoners of rank and influence. Grave offences were generally expiated by capital punishment and lighter ones by exile to Qatif, a sentence which was regarded by the people of the Central Arabian plateau as tantamount to a lingering death by fever. In 1848, or within the next few years, the Amir recovered most of the Qasim district which had seceded to Jabal Shammar; but he could not take the town of 'Anaizah. In 1853 and 1862 he made fresh efforts to reduce 'Anaizah; but they were unsuccessful.

Government of Hasa, 1843-65.

In Hasa, where Wahhabism was uncongenial to the character of the people, the Amir's rule was maintained chiefly by fear; and in that province, where disaffection consequently abounded, the temper of the Wahhabi officials was most suspicious and their methods were most inquisitorial. In 1851 Faisal visited the Hasa Oasis and the deserts to the

south of it in person, chastising the Bedouin tribes who harassed the trade and pilgrim routes; and his name is remembered at the present day as that of the only Amir who ever pursued the Āl Morrah tribe in their own country with any measure of success. It is stated, however, that the condition of the Wahhābi troops, when they finally brought the Āl Morrah to bay in the Jāfūrah desert, was such that the Amir had to be satisfied with a merely nominal settlement.

Resources.

The total annual revenue of the Wahhābi dominions, including Hasa, was computed item by item in 1865 at over $800,000 of which about six-sevenths were derived from the settled population.

Relations of the Wahhābi Government with adjacent states in Arabia, etc., 1843-65.

With peace and order prevailing at home and a revenue sufficient for the needs of Government, it was natural that the energies of the Wahhābi Amir should take an outward direction, and that the proceedings of the Wahhābis abroad should become more aggressive than they had been for a considerable time past.

Relations with Turkey and Egypt, 1843-65.

Some uncertainty overshadows the relations subsisting, during the earlier part of Faisal's reign, between his government and the governments of Turkey and Egypt. In 1851 the Amir was understood to pay tribute to the Porte; but accredited envoys of the Pāsha of Egypt were present in his camp, and the Wahhābi agent at Kuwait professedly supported Egyptian interests. In 1855, in correspondence with the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Amir asserted himself to be "a dependent of the exalted Turkish Government" and stated that his differences with Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt had been due to the conflict in policy between that Pāsha and the Porte. About 1860, in the course of discussions relating to Bahrain, the Amir Faisal again wrote, somewhat ambiguously, that "in accordance with treaties between the Wahhābi Amir and the Sultān 'Abdul Majid, there are matters which everyone is precluded from meddling with, unless on special grounds." These periodical declarations show that the Amir was not averse, when it suited his interest, to admit dependence on the Porte; and the Turks, on their part, clearly asserted their suzerainty over the Wahhābis. An illustration of the Turkish claims was afforded by a protest, lodged by the Pāsha of Baghdad in 1862, against the bombardment of Dammām in Hasa by

British war-vessels in the previous year; for the place in question was described as lying within the territory of "Faisal Bey, the Qāim-Maqām of Najd" and as forming "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultān." At the close of Faisal's reign, the tribute rendered by him to the Porte was merely nominal and seems to have been paid through the Sharif of Makkah.

Relations with Jabal Shammar, 1843-65.

So long as 'Abdullah, the first Mahfūdh, continued to rule Jabal Shammar, the loyalty of that province to the Wahhābi Amir remained unquestioned; and Faisal, on his return from Egypt, seems to have been assisted by his old dependent to recover his position in Najd. Talāl, the son of 'Abdullah, married a daughter of Faisal and continued, until his death in 1867, to pay a yearly visit to Riyadh, where he was accustomed to deliver his tribute of horses in person. About 1848, however, Qasim, which had hitherto been directly dependent upon the Wahhābi Amir, appears to have obtained the protection of the Shammar chief as a sort of an intermediate overlord.

Relations with Kuwait, 1843-65.

About 1851, as we have seen, the Amīr Faisal maintained an agent at Kuwait; and it was ascertained that in 1863 his relations with that place were friendly, although no tribute was paid him by the Shaikh.

Relations with Bahrain, 1843-65.

When Faisal came to the throne of Najd, a contest between 'Abdullah and Muhammad, the two rival Shaikhs of Bahrain, was in progress. The Amir availed himself of their mutual opposition to assert his own authority; and, but for the opposition of the British Government, who had determined to confine Wahhābi influence to the mainland, it is not improbable that he would have succeeded in reducing the Bahrain Shaikh to a position of strict dependence on himself.

1843-44.

The Amir at first sided with the younger claimant, Muhammad-bin-Khalīfah, who had lately been driven out by 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad; and, when the latter was in his turn displaced, it was principally by a Wahhābi force that, early in 1844, he was deprived of the fort of Dammām, his last remaining possession, of which the Wahhābi Amir considered himself to be the rightful owner.

1845-47.

For some time after this the Wahhābis, having achieved their principal object in the recovery of Dammām, remained quiescent; but in 1845, on Muhammad-bin-Khalīfah becoming intractable and refusing to pay an annual tribute with arrears to which he had agreed on the fall of Dammām, 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'id, the Wahhābi governor of Qatīf, began to arrange an attack on Bahrain, and Muhammad, anticipating his designs, placed the Wahhābi coast under blockade. An invasion of Bahrain from Hasa by a stratagem was then planned by the ex-Shaikh

'Abdullah and the Wahhábi governor of Qatif; but it miscarried, when on the point of execution, through the scheme of action becoming known in Bahrain. In 1846 two collisions between Wahhábi and Bahrain forces occurred on the mainland and each side was able to boast of one victory. At length, in August 1847, the Shaikh of Bahrain having been weakened by the desertion of some of the Banu Khálid from his side, terms were arranged whereby the Wahhábi Amír undertook to withdraw his active support from the ex-Shaikh, and the Shaikh in return engaged to pay $4,000 a year to the Wahhábis as Zakát.

1850-51. In 1850 relations between Shaikh Muhammad and the Amir Faisal again became strained, in consequence of the punishment by the Wahhábi ruler of one of his own envoys to whom the Shaikh had given a flattering welcome, and of a cold reception which Muhammad had subsequently accorded to a son of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the Wahhábi agent in 'Omán. In 1851 the Amir arrived in person in the neighbourhood of Qatar, seduced the inhabitants of the principal places in that promontory from their allegiance to Bahrain, and demanded an extravagant increase in the Bahrain tribute, of which payment had probably been withheld altogether. Muhammad thereupon blockaded the Hasa coast; but the preparations of the Wahhábis, who were now joined by the sons of the late ex-Shaikh, had assumed formidable proportions; and it is probable that the Shaikh was only saved from destruction by the appearance of a British squadron which the Resident sent for the protection of the islands. In July 1851 peace was again arranged by the efforts of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; but secretly tension continued; and the Wahhábi Amír established the sons of the late ex-Shaikh of Bahrain at Dammám.

1855-56 After these events, particularly in 1855-56, some correspondence in regard to Bahrain took place between the Wahhábi Amír and the Búshehr Political Residency; the Amír claimed the right to chastise at pleasure his dependent, the Shaikh of Bahrain; and the warning returned by the British representative under the authority of the Government of India, that no interference with Bahrain would be permitted, caused him intense irritation and dissatisfaction.

1859. In 1859 the Amir, who alleged, and perhaps not without truth, that the Shaikh of Bahrain was inciting the tribes of Hasa to hostile action against his subjects, having disregarded the warnings of the Resident and the presence of a British corvette off his coast, caused preparations to be made by his governor of Qatif, assisted by a son of the late ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, for a serious invasion of the islands. A British squadron was then despatched to threaten Dammám; and, in the result,

the enterprise collapsed, and the Wahhábi official even apologised to the British commander for his proceedings. This successful act of intervention greatly increased the bitterness of Faisal against the British Government and their representatives.

In 1861 the Shaikh of Bahrain assumed the offensive against the Wahhábi Amír without first consulting the British Resident. He blockaded the Wahhábi ports and sent six war vessels to cruise against Dammám; and only by most stringent measures, amounting to compulsion, could he be induced by his British advisers to discontinue his unwarrantable action. It was now clear, however, that tranquillity in Bahrain waters could only be restored by the removal of the sons of the late ex-Shaikh from Dammám; and this was accordingly effected, by British naval action, in November 1861. The dislodgment of these disturbers of the peace from their stronghold was reported to have been not altogether unpleasing to the local Wahhábi officials in Qatif, who could not themselves have done what was required without committing a breach of Arab hospitality. 1861.

Incidentally we may remark that, but for the vigilance with which the independence of Bahrain was watched over by the British Government during this period, the principality might have become attached to Hasa and afterwards have passed with that province into the possession of the Turks.

Relations with Trucial 'Omán, 1843-65.

In Trucial 'Omán, during the whole of this period, the Wahhábis were extremely active. In July 1843 letters and messengers from the Amír reached the principal Shaikhs of that region, informing them that at the end of the hot weather the Wahhábi agent Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq would arrive with troops to subdue the country; and all the chiefs, except those of Dibai and the Baraimi Oasis, appear to have professed in reply their satisfaction at the prospect.

1845.

Early in 1845 Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq appeared in Baraimi with a small force. He was, apparently, by no means confident of success; but the surrounding tribes at first displayed considerable enthusiasm for the Wahhábi cause, and he was encouraged to form designs of occupying Dhank and Dhaid, and even Zora upon the coast. His arrogance and extortions, however, quickly alienated and disgusted most of his supporters; and his direct communications with Najd were then cut, his messengers beaten and insulted, and complaints against him made to the Wahhábi Amír. At one time it appeared probable that Sa'ad would be visited with his master's displeasure; but, by one means or another, he succeeded in justifying his conduct and in retaining his post. A remittance of

treasure which he made by sea to Hasa no doubt contributed to restore him to favour.

1848. In May 1848 the Buraimi forts were captured by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, assisted by the ruler of the Sohar principality and by the Na'im and Dhawahir tribes; and Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, who had been absent when the attack began, took refuge with the Shaikh of Sharjah. Tribal jealousy then came into play, and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman as a whole turned against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; but the latter defied the combination against him and continued to hold Buraimi until February 1849, when he voluntarily restored it to the Wahhabis at the intercession of an envoy sent by the Sharif of Makkah.

1850-51. In March 1850 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, after communication with the regent of the 'Oman Sultanate, again attacked the Wahhabis in Buraimi, but this time he failed to make any impression; and an assault on the place, made in the following November by a combination of the Bani Yas, Qawasim and Na'im, was equally unsuccessful. In 1851 the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah formed an alliance against the Wahhabis; but nothing came of it.

1852-53. At the end of 1852 'Abdullah, the son of the Wahhabi Amir, arrived in Buraimi; but his proceedings there, as will be seen in the next section, had reference chiefly to the 'Oman Sultanate. The chiefs of Trucial 'Oman, however, except the Shaikh of Dibai, who avoided waiting on him in person, and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who did his best to dissuade him from aggression to the eastwards, visited Buraimi and fawned upon him in a servile manner.

1854-55. A certain Ahmad-as-Sadairi was appointed about this time to the Wahhabi agency in Buraimi, in succession to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq. In 1854 this individual appeared to be exerting himself to restrain the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman from mutual aggressions and to curb the license of the Bedouins; but in 1855 his activities took a mischievous turn, and it was found that he was scheming to obtain possession of the seaboard village of Hamriyah. In 1865 the Wahhabis were represented at Buraimi by Turki-bin-Ahmad, probably a son of Ahmad-as-Sadairi, but his attention was directed chiefly to the affairs of the 'Oman Sultanate.

In 1855, in a correspondence with the British Resident at Bushehr, the Amir Faisal described his mission in Trucial 'Oman as that of a benefactor by whom the savage tribes of the interior were restrained from preying upon and slaughtering the helpless populations of the coast.

Relations with the 'Omān Sultanate. 1843-65.

The Wahhābī post in Baraimī was used as a base for extremely aggressive action against the Sultanate of 'Omān in 1845, in 1853, and again in 1865.

1845.

On his arrival in Trucial 'Omān in 1845, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq demanded tribute, at the rate of $5,000 and $20,000 a year respectively, from the rulers of Sohār and Masqat, and, to enforce compliance, he ravaged the Bātinah district and took Majīs, butchering the garrison; $5,000 was then paid him on account of Sohār and it was agreed that the question of the Masqat payment should be referred to Saiyid Sa'id, who was absent in East Africa. The Wahhābi soon violated the truce that had been arranged; but the action of the British authorities in support of the regent of Masqat, Saiyid Thuwaini, obliged him in the end to be content with a total annual tribute of $5,000. A douceur of $2,000 was paid by Saiyid Thuwaini to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq in consideration of the settlement, and Majīs was restored to the former owner.

1853.

In 1853, during his sojourn in Baraimī, 'Abdullah, the heir-apparent to the Wahhābi Amirship, insisted that the Saiyid of Masqat should cede to him the town and district of Sohār and pay a greatly enhanced tribute for the remainder of his dominions: from the exorbitance of these demands it was believed that the Wahhābis merely sought a pretext for declaring war. Encouraged by British support, Saiyid Thuwaini prepared to defend Sohār; the Wahhābis abandoned their intention of invading Bātinah; and the ultimate result was an agreement under which the Saiyid was to retain Sohār and pay an increased tribute of $12,000 a year for the whole 'Omān Sultanate. It was further arranged that the Wahhābi agent and the ruler of Masqat should mutually assist one another against all enemies, and in pursuance of this undertaking Saiyid Thuwaini, in the following year, was actually helped by the Wahhābis to coerce some refractory tribes in Bātinah. The Wahhābi agent, after these transactions, paid a visit on his own account, probably in the capacity of tax-collector, to the district of 'Omān Proper in the interior.

1864-65.

In 1864 the Wahhābis brought indirect pressure to bear on the Sultān of 'Omān—now Saiyid Thuwaini, who had succeeded his father Saiyid Sa'id—by supporting a rebel, Saiyid 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Rustāq, against his authority; but the Sultān immediately sought the aid of the British Government, and the Political Resident in the Gulf, Colonel Pelly, was directed to report on the situation. In March 1865 Colonel Pelly paid a personal visit, which will be described later on, to the Wahhābi Amīr in his capital of Riyādh; and there he ascertained that

the intimidation of the Sultān had been ordered by the Amīr himself, who regarded Saiyid Thuwaini with the utmost contempt and wished to enhance his annual tribute from $12,000 to $40,000. In April 1863, on his return to the Persian Gulf, Colonel Pelly proceeded to Masqat, where he learned that Saiyid 'Azzān had now definitively placed himself under the protection of the Wahhābis, and that the latter were demanding an increased tribute and were threatening an invasion of 'Omān. In these circumstances Colonel Pelly, whose name the Sultān had already in 1864 without proper authority proposed to the Amīr as that of a mediator, wrote to his late host Faisal tendering his good offices for a settlement; but no notice was taken by the Wahhābi of this communication. In August 1865 Masqat was visited by the usual Wahhābi deputation, who demanded on this occasion four times the customary annual tribute; but, under British advice, the Sultān paid only the established amount, and stated that, with reference to the balance, he awaited the result of Colonel Pelly's offer of mediation. In the same month the Wahhābi agent at Barāimi, in response to an invitation by the disaffected Jannabah inhabitants of Sūr, sent a Wahhābi contingent to that place; a fort occupied by a garrison on behalf of the Sultān was taken after two days' resistance, Sūq Sūr was plundered, and one British Indian subject was killed and another wounded. Saiyid Thuwaini then weakly submitted and paid two sums, aggregating $16,000, to the Wahhābis as the price of peace; but the British Government, as we shall see later, did not allow matters to remain in this position.

Relations between the Wahhābi Amīr and the British Government, 1843-65.

British policy of non-intervention on the Arabian coast, 1843.

We have still to analyse the policy of the British Government in face of these systematic aggressions by the Wahhābis along an extensive line of coast: it may be described as one of *laissez faire* in Trucial 'Omān, of modified resistance in the 'Omān Sultanate, and of uncompromising opposition in Bahrain. During the occupation of Najd by the Egyptians, in 1838-40, the British political representatives in the Persian Gulf had been authorised to resist their encroachments at every point; and when the Wahhābi Amīr, having succeeded the Egyptians in Hasa, showed himself inclined to pursue the same aggressive policy, they proposed to counteract it by similar means. The Government of India, however, considering the danger from the ambitious of a Faisal to be much less

dangerous than those of a Muhammad 'Ali, decided to await developments and to maintain a policy of reserve and—so far as possible—of non-intervention; and they accordingly disapproved of a suggestion made by the Government of Bombay in 1844, that a fixed principle of action should be laid down and that an effort should even be made to bring the Wahhábi Amír within the circle of chiefs who were bound to the British Government by engagements relating to the maritime peace. In accordance with their views the Shaikhs of Baraimi, whom the attitude of Government with reference to the Egyptians had encouraged to hope for British support against the Wahhábis, were informed that the British Government would not interfere on their behalf, having withdrawn from all connection with the internal affairs of Arabia; and, to a letter received from the Wahhábi Amír, in which he expressed a desire "for the renewal of the amicable relations which existed between his father Turki and the British Government", a favourable reply was sent, assuring him that the British Government had no object in view except the preservation of the peace at sea, regarding which he had in his own communication declared himself to be solicitous. It was thought that, if a friendly intercourse between the British authorities and the Amír could be established and maintained, the effect upon the Arab tribes along the coast would be highly beneficial.

British policy of non-intervention modified, from 1845, except in Trucial 'Omán.

Soon, however, it became apparent that the Amír entertained ambitions which were not compatible with the integrity of the Bahrain Shaikhdom or the 'Omán Sultanate; and the Government of India, by a fear that changes too rapid and too extensive might otherwise result, were led to modify their policy of abstention.

British support of the Saiyid of Maqat, 1845.

In 1845, in connection with Wahhábi menaces against Maqat, the Political Resident, while he was cautioned to avoid threats which could not be carried out except by despatching troops from India, was authorised to express the views of Government and to make a naval demonstration. He accordingly wrote both to the Wahhábi Amír and to the Wahhábi agent in Baraimi, at the same time assembling a strong squadron upon the Bátinah coast; and the result, as we have seen above, was satisfactory, inasmuch as a becoming reply was received from the Wahhábis, Majis was evacuated by their troops, and the demand for tribute was reduced to moderate dimensions.

British protection of Bahrain, 1851.

In 1851, when the Bahrain islands were threatened with invasion by the Amír who was himself present on the mainland adjoining, the danger was averted by the despatch to the scene, apparently by the Resident on his own responsibility, of the whole British naval force in the

Gulf; and it was noticed that after this incident Faisal's attitude to the British Government became, for a time at least, more conciliatory. It had been necessary before this, in 1846, to address a stern warning to the Wahhābi Governor of Qatīf, who had permitted himself to use threats of encouraging piracy.

British support of the Saiyid of Masqat, 1853.

Again in 1853, when 'Omān was menaced with invasion by the son of the Wahhābi Amīr, the Resident, by summoning the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān from Baraimi to the coast, where he was waiting to conclude with them the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, by remonstrating with 'Abdullah on his detention of the Shaikhs at Baraimi, by sending a vessel of war to cruise along the coast, and by promising to assist the Sultān of 'Omān, if need be, in the defence of his capital, averted the cession of Sohār to the Wahhābis and enabled the Sultān to obtain peace on terms, far less disadvantageous as to tribute, than might otherwise have been extorted from him.

British protection of Bahrain, etc. 1859-61.

In 1859 Bahrain was again saved by British naval interposition from a Wahhābi descent which might have had serious and permanent consequences. This action and a demand that the sons of the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain should be removed from Dammām elicited bitter reproaches and a denunciation of British policy from the Wahhābi ruler.

Reparation for the Sūr outrage, 1865.

For the outrage committed at Sūr in 1865 the British Government undertook to obtain from the offenders the reparation due, which the Sultān of 'Omān was himself too weak to claim with any hope of success.

British policy of non-intervention maintained in Trucial 'Omān.

It was only in Trucial 'Omān that the representatives of the British Government continued to repeat—particularly in 1855, when the Na'im suggested that help should be given them to expel the Wahhābis from Baraimi—that they could not interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia; and even there they assisted the cause of tribal independence by ignoring, in all their political dealings, the very existence of the Wahhābi agent.

Attitude of the Wahhābi Amīr towards piracy.

It is due to the Amīr Faisal to mention that he never, so far as was ascertained, attempted to reply to the opposition of the British authorities by instigating piracy at sea; on the contrary, in 1855, he referred appreciatively to the "understanding between us and the British Government, of a hundred years' duration, for the security of traders and travellers passing on the seas."

Colonel Pelly's journey to Riyādh, February-March 1865.

Mention has already been made of the remarkable journey to Riyādh undertaken by Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident at Būshehr, in 1865; his principal object was to remove the animosity against Britain which anti-slavery proceedings at sea and frustration of Wahhābi policy upon the Arabian coast were believed to have excited in the Amīr, and

which, by 1863, had brought about a total cessation of intercourse. Colonel Pelly was also anxious to prove that Central Arabia was not inaccessible to a British officer travelling on duty, and he hoped to cast much light upon the geography and natural history of the country.

The starting point of the journey was Kuwait, where Colonel Pelly arrived in January 1865 and remained for some weeks, awaiting the permission of the Amīr to proceed; this came at last, but in a laconic form, and no guide was sent. Colonel Pelly was accompanied by Dr. W. H. Colvill, the Residency Surgeon, whom he placed in medical charge of his camp and charged with geological and botanical research, and by Lieutenant E. Dawes, I. N., of the Residency steamer, "Berenice," whose duty it was to take observations for latitude and longitude; and the interpreter was G. Lucas, a native Christian of Mūsal, who passed himself off as a Muhammadan under the name of 'Abdullah. The Resident's entire caravan consisted of about 30 camels; and his party including two Indian sowars, servants, and camelmen, numbered about 33 persons. Only one small tent was taken. The travellers took their departure from Kuwait on the 17th of February, the Residency steamer proceeding to await their return at 'Oqair, and marched by Wafrah, Wabrah and Rumhiyah to Sidūs in 'Āridh; here they turned and took their way down Wādi Hanifah to Riyadh, where they arrived upon the 5th of March, in uniform.

On the 6th Colonel Pelly, accompanied by his whole staff, paid a visit of ceremony to the Amīr Faisal in the fort in the middle of the town; and the next morning a private interview took place, at which the Resident was attended by his interpreter only. The Amīr was now old and altogether blind, but he appeared to be held by his subjects in the greatest awe; his immediate dependents, it was observed, generally mentioned him by the religious title of Imām. On both occasions the Resident's conversation with the Amīr was general; and, though political topics were introduced, Colonel Pelly was careful to avoid discussion of particular questions such as that of the Masqat tribute, in regard to which he did not feel himself to be sufficiently well informed; but, incidentally, the Amīr claimed sovereignty over all Eastern Arabia from Kuwait to Rās-al-Hadd and beyond. Faisal's manner was dignified, but friendly and at times even cordial; he appeared on the whole to be pleased by the Resident's visit; and it was arranged that Colonel Pelly, on his way from Riyadh to the coast, should visit Saih in Kharj for the purpose of seeing the Amīr's stud of horses. At this point, however,* hostile influences began to work

* A useless guide, Shaikh 'Ali of the Sabai,' whom Colonel Pelly had employed, gave a mendacious account at Riyadh of the proceedings of the party by the way.

in the Amir's unscrupulous and fanatical entourage; the manner of his confidential secretary Mahbūb, a "frivolous and vindictive mongrel," suddenly became insolent; Lieutenant Dawes' sketches were burnt, as a precaution; and on the 8th an attempt was made to detain the British party at Riyādh by withholding their camels. No arrangement for a final interview with the Amir could be made, and, in the afternoon Colonel Pelly thought it necessary to proceed without an appointment to the fort, where, however, he had a farewell meeting with the Amir, no less friendly than the interviews that had preceded it. The Amir, on this occasion, requested that he might be informed of cases of piracy or wrecking upon the Hasa coast, with a view to the severe punishment of the offenders; he asked that his maritime interests upon the coast of Persia might be protected by the Resident; he assured Colonel Pelly of his own sincere friendship; and, finally, he expressed a wish that correspondence should be maintained between them. About 9 P.M. on the 8th of March Colonel Pelly's caravan cleared the town of Riyādh, and the next day the march to the coast was begun in earnest; on the 17th of March the travellers passed Hofūf, and on the 18th they embarked on the Residency steamer at 'Oqair.

From this adventurous journey, as we shall shortly see, little or no political benefit resulted, probably in consequence of the helpless state into which the Amir sank only three months later; but the observations of Lieutenant Dawes supplied invaluable data, to which no addition has since been made, for a correct map of the most important district of Southern Najd. Lieutenant Dawes had a sunstroke on the way to Riyādh and suffered much from fever during the return journey.

Relations of the Wahhābi Amir with France, 1843-65.

Mr. Palgrave's mission, 1862.

Colonel Pelly was preceded at Riyādh by the traveller Mr. W. G. Palgrave, who passed through the Wahhābi capital in 1862 on his way across Arabia. Mr. Palgrave's mission, though he was a British subject, was not undertaken on behalf of the British Government; and it has been conjectured that he represented Napoleon III, who took a strong interest in Syria and Egypt, and who may at this time have turned his attention to Najd in connection with the Suez Canal, already projected.

Correspondence with the French.

In his talks with Colonel Pelly at Riyādh the Amir Faisal admitted having twice received general offers of assistance from the French; and on the latter of these occasions, which synchronised somewhat closely with

Mr. Palgrave's visit, the Amīr was—by his own account—invited to send his reply to the French Consul at Damascus, whom he accordingly thanked and informed that he did not at the time stand in need of help.

'ABDULLAH-BIN-FAISAL (FIRST REIGN), 1865-71.

Internal position at 'Abdullah's accession, 1865.

Faisal was succeeded at his death by his eldest son 'Abdullah, who had acquired considerable reputation as a military leader, and had been employed in 1852-53 as his father's representative at Baraimi to arrange with the Saiyid of Masqat for an increase of tribute. 'Abdullah was present in Riyādh during Colonel Pelly's visit in March 1865; but he mortified his curiosity and avoided an interview, fearing lest the Resident, through personal acquaintance with his defects, should obtain some advantage over him in his future career. One immediate result of 'Abdullah's succession was the downfall of the confidential secretary Mahbūb. The position of the new Amīr was weakened from the first by the rivalry and personal enmity of his next brother Sa'ūd, who at the time of Colonel Pelly's journey to Riyādh, was regarded as of a milder character than 'Abdullah, but eventually, by his frankness, liberality and daring, supplanted 'Abdullah in the affection of the Bedouins. 'Abdullah and his brother Muhammad were the sons of Āl Sa'ūd mothers and were consequently bigoted Wahhābis, whereas his half-brothers Sa'ūd and 'Abdur Rahmān were of Bedouin descent on the female side and had more generous dispositions. Sa'ūd, whose home was in Khurj, at once rebelled against 'Abdullah with the support of the Dawāsir; but at first he was defeated.

Rupture between the British Government and the Wahhābi Amīr, 1865-66.

An unpleasant legacy remaining from Faisal to his son was the settlement of the Sūr case, in which British Indian subjects and others

Resolution of the Government of India

to assist the Sultān of 'Omān.

had suffered at the hands of tribesmen instigated by the Wahhābi agent at Baraimi. Before the death of Faisal it had been resolved by the Government of India to encourage the Sultān of 'Omān to more active resistance of the Wahhābis; it was ordered that material assistance in the shape of munitions of war, and, if absolutely necessary, of money also, should be afforded him; and naval action in his favour was authorised on condition that operations on land were not to be undertaken.

Letter from the Amīr and intention of the Government of India not to demand compensation for British sufferers at Sūr from the Wahhābis.

Apparently in November 1865, Colonel Pelly being then on his way to Bombay after leave in Europe, a letter, which purported to come from the Amir Faisal and to be an answer to representations made regarding the behaviour of the Wahhābis at Sūr, reached the British authorities at Būshehr. In this communication it was stated that the Amīr had ordered the release of British subjects taken prisoners at Sūr and the restoration of their property; and, while the question of compensation was ignored, reference was made to an agreement between the British and the Wahhābi Governments "originally effected in the time of the late Sa'ūd, and again ratified in the time of the present ruler." On consideration of the letter, and after various enquiries, the Government of India decided that the Amīr should be invited to send a copy of the alleged treaty; that the Amīr should be given to understand that the Sultān of 'Omān was a friend and ally of the British Government who, while they hoped for a happy settlement of the Sultān's differences with the Amīr, could not regard encroachment on the Sultān's territory without grave concern; and that the Amīr should not be pressed to pay compensation for the recent injuries to British subjects at Sūr.

Ultimatum sent by the Resident to the Wahhābi Amīr, January 1866.

Meanwhile, however, decisive action, leading to an open breach with the Wahhābis, was taken by the local British authorities in pursuance of the instructions which they had received to help the Sultān of 'Omān. The chiefs of Trucial 'Omān were informed that they were at liberty to aid the Sultān against the Wahhābis; arrangements were made for the despatch of a Masqat fleet under Saiyid Turki, the Sultān's brother, to blockade the Wahhābi ports of Qatīf and 'Oqair; and, the attitude of the Shaikh of Bahrain appearing suspicious, one of his war-vessels, the "Dīnār", was seized by the British authorities, partly to prevent his helping the Wahhābis but partly also to compel satisfaction of claims which there were against him. On the 22nd December 1865 H.M.S. "Highflyer", Captain Pasley, left Bombay carrying two 18-pounder guns with ammunition for the Sultān of 'Omān, which she disembarked at Sohār, and early in January 1866 a consultation

was held at that place between Colonel Pelly and the naval commander. At this juncture an attack was made by a Wahhābi force on Saham in Bāṭinah, and the British Indian traders residing there were driven into the sea, one of them being drowned. The result of Colonel Pelly and Captain Pasley's deliberations was a demand made by letter on the Wahhābi Amir for a written apology in regard to the Sūr affair, for a written assurance that in future such outrages would be prevented, and for payment of compensation, to the extent of $27,000, on account of property lost or destroyed; and it was added that, if in seventeen days from the delivery of the letter to the Wahhābi Governor of Qatīf the required satisfaction had not been afforded, the Wahhābi forts on the seaboard would be destroyed, and the craft in their harbours confiscated. Colonel Pelly was prevented, by the necessity of sustaining with his presence the courage of the Sultān of 'Omān, who was to make an attack on the Wahhābi post at Baraimi, from himself accompanying Captain Pasley; but he sent instead the Residency Agent at Shārjah, who was landed in Bahrain on the 13th of January 1866 as bearer of the letter for the Wahhābi Amir. The "Highflyer" left Bahrain on the same day for Abu Dhabi and thence cruised along the Trucial Coast, destroying on the way a Qāsimi tower which had been erected, in the Wahhābi interest, on the insulated tract of Zora. On the 23rd of January Colonel Pelly and Captain Pasley met again in Elphinstone Inlet, where a British telegraph station then existed and a rendezvous had been arranged.

British naval operations on the Hasa coast and repulse from Dammām, February 1866.

The "Highflyer" left again on the 28th of January for Qatīf, where she arrived on the 30th, and where Captain Pasley learned from the Residency Agent that no reply had as yet arrived from the Amir, and that the Wahhābi Governor of Qatīf was asking for a respite of twelve days to allow of his communicating with Riyādh. Captain Pasley waited until the 2nd of February and then, the period of grace having expired, proceeded to carry out the threats conveyed in the ultimatum by sending armed boats to Qatīf under Lieutenant Fellowes; these demolished the island fort of Abul Lif and destroyed a single Wahhābi vessel which was found in the harbour and was not worth removing. On the 3rd of February a party under Lieutenant Long was despatched against the Dammām fort, which, according to the information of the Residency Agent, was held by a garrison of only twelve men; but the boats, on account of the shallowness of the water, could not approach within 200 yards of the beach. The party waded ashore and the outworks of the fort were taken, but the garrison was much larger than had been represented, and the assault was eventually repulsed with a loss of three men killed and two officers and

three men wounded. On the 4th of February, at high water, Lieutenant Long renewed the attempt on Dammām and plied the fort with shot, shell and rockets; but the range was excessive and no breach could be effected. On the 9th of February the "Highflyer" rejoined Colonel Pelly at Masqat, and operations were carried out on the 11th and 12th, with eminent success, against the Jannabah tribe of Sūr. The orders of the Government of India not to demand compensation from the Wahhābi Amīr were at length received by Colonel Pelly, and the "Highflyer" left the Gulf for Bombay.

Reply of the Wahhābi Amīr to the British ultimatum, etc., February 1866.

Colonel Pelly next proceeded to Elphinstone Inlet and was there awaiting news of the capture of Baraimi by the Sultān of 'Omān, when, on the 20th or 21st of February, he suddenly received intelligence of the violent death of Saiyid Thuwaini with attendant circumstances by which the 'Omāni operations against Baraimi were at once brought to a standstill. Almost simultaneously two letters from the Wahhābi Amīr reached the Resident. In one of these, dated the 28th of January, 'Abdullah accepted the proposal made to his father some months earlier that Colonel Pelly should mediate in the dispute between the Amīr and the Sultān of 'Omān; and in the other, which was a reply to the British ultimatum, 'Abdullah stated that he desired a consultation and would send an agent. He added that the Jannabah were guilty of the outrage at Sūr, but that it was incumbent on himself, the Amīr, to recover compensation from them.

Peace arranged by a Wahhābi envoy to Būshehr, 21st April 1866.

Soon afterwards a Wahhābi envoy named Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah-bin-Manāh arrived at Būshehr with definite proposals of peace; and Colonel Pelly, on his return to that place on the 21st of April, gave him an interview. A written declaration was taken from the envoy, in which, on behalf of the Amīr 'Abdullah, he expressed a desire for peace, assured the Resident that British subjects would be protected in the Wahhābi dominions, and promised that, beyond collecting the tribute established by ancient custom, the Wahhābis would not in future interfere with Arab principalities in alliance with the British Government, in particular the Sultanate of 'Omān. These terms having been duly submitted to the Government of India, the Resident under their orders informed 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, in a letter which he handed to the envoy, that the British Government did not wish to intervene or to become the guarantor of any agreement which might be formed between the Amīr and the Sultān, but that they had authorised the Resident to use his good offices in arranging the details of a settlement. It transpired, in the discussions held at Būshehr, that the "treaty" with the British Government mentioned by the Wahhābi ruler at an early stage of the

proceedings did not in fact exist, and that the Amir referred only to the friendly letters from the British Government which had from time to time been received and were regarded by the Wahhābi Government in the light of agreements. It also appeared that the Amir 'Abdullah had many enemies, and that his position in his own country was precarious. The Government of India regarded the outcome of the operations of February 1866 as on the whole satisfactory; but they considered that the procedure followed, both at Dammām and at Sūr, had been unnecessarily hasty.

Relations of the Wahhābi Amir with the Turks, 1866.

Wahhābi mission to Baghdād April 1866

About the same time that 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal sent an envoy to Būshehr, he despatched an agent named 'Abdul 'Aziz-as-Suwailim to the Turkish Wāli of Baghdād, apparently to complain of the British attack upon the Wahhābi seaboard and to solicit the intervention of the Porte to prevent its repetition. Namiq Pasha was at first inclined to request, through the British Resident at Baghdād or directly by telegram from himself to the Viceroy of India, that further action might be deferred until the question could be discussed between the British and the Turkish Governments; but later on some difficulty, not wholly explained, arose between the Wāli and the envoy; and the latter, on the 3rd of May, left Baghdād in disgrace.

Wahhābi raid on the Turkish border, April 1866.

One reason for the breakdown of these negotiations may have been a raid, which was led by the Amir 'Abdullah in person, apparently during the month of April, upon Arab tribes on the borders of Turkish 'Irāq. The Amīr, it seems, had made an expedition by way of Jabal Shammar against the Dhafir and part of the 'Anizah tribe; and, in pursuing the Dhafir towards the Euphrates, he came in conflict also with the Muntafik. Some severe fighting ensued, of which the final result was not clearly ascertained, and the Amir, after halting with his force for a time in the neighbourhood of Kuwait, returned to Riyādh. The Turks were at first informed that their subjects had been defeated in the encounter, and, while this opinion prevailed, the Wāli of Baghdād directed his subordinate at Basrah to write to the Amīr "deprecating hostilities between tribes subject to the same authority and recommending the mutual restoration of plunder as the basis of accommodation"; but later the same official accepted for himself 10 Arab horses and 10 camels which the chief of the Muntafik professed to have captured from the Wahhābis.

Relations of the Wahhābis with Kuwait, 1865-71.

The use of Kuwait territory by the Wahhābi Amir as a line of retirement after his raid on the frontier of Turkish 'Irāq in 1866 has already been noticed; and in the same year Abdullah-bin-Faisal apparently offered to join the Shaikh of Kuwait in an attack on Zubair in case the Turkish Wāli of 'Irāq should decide against the Shaikh in a dispute about property, then pending, between the Shaikh and some residents of Turkish territory.

Relations of the Wahhābis with Bahrain and Qatar, 1865-71.

Tribute paid by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Wahhābis, 1866.

An enquiry, held by Colonel Pelly under the orders of Government after the crisis of 1865-66, showed that the Shaikh of Bahrain was now entirely independent of the Wahhābi Amir in so far as his insular possessions were concerned, but that he paid an annual tribute of $4,000 to secure his dependencies in the Qatar promontory from attack by tribes under Wahhābi influence. At some time between 1852 and 1866 the Wahhābi Amir had a representative of his own at Dōhah in Qatar; but it is probable that this representative was merely the local headman of the place.

Invasion of Bahrain from Wahhābi territory, 1869.

The invasion of the Bahrain Islands in 1869, in which the ruling Shaikh, 'Ali-bin-Khalifah, lost his life, was carried out from the Wahhābi coast; but there was no clear evidence of complicity on the part of the Wahhābis, and, the Amir having written to disavow all connection with the affair, the Government of India merely ordered that he should be requested, without threats, to prevent similar occurrences in future.

Relations of the Wahhābis with 'Omān and Trucial 'Omān, 1865-71.

Destruction by a British force of a tower at Zora.

The destruction by a British war-vessel of a tower erected in Zora by the Shaikh of Sharjah, who at this time was hand in glove with the Wahhābis, has been mentioned above in connection with the operations of

1866; and by this measure the peace of the Trucial Coast, which the tower had endangered, was re-established. January 1866.

On the 7th of April 1869 the Sadairi representative of the Wahhábi Amír in Baraimi, having proceeded to Shárjah and involved himself there in the internal intrigues and dissensions of the ruling Qásimi family, was shot dead in a broil which arose in the town, and a number of his followers perished with him. Death by violence of the Wahhábi agent in Baraimi, 7th April 1869.

This event was shortly followed by the disappearance of the Wahhábis from Baraimi, which they had occupied, almost continuously, for nearly 70 years. Probably before the death of the Wahhábi agent at Shárjah a peremptory demand for payment of tribute had been addressed to Saiyid 'Azzán-bin-Qais, who had recently usurped the Sultanate of 'Omán, and a raid had been made by the Wahhábis on Sohár; consequently, when the Na'ím of Baraimi, after the mishap to the agent, invited Saiyid 'Azzán to join them in expelling the Wahhábis from the Oasis, he complied—being a man of bold and decided character—without hesitation. On or about the 18th of June the Wahhábi garrison of Baraimi surrendered, after a trifling resistance, to 'Azzán's force of about 1,500 men; and the Saiyid, after installing a garrison and forming an alliance with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, returned in triumph to Masqat. Capture of Baraimi from the Wahhábis by the Sultán of 'Omán, 18th June 1869.

'Abdullah-bin-Faisal was not inclined to submit tamely to the loss of Baraimi and, with it, of his whole position in Trucial 'Omán and 'Omán; but various circumstances incapacitated him for effective action for its recovery. Early in 1870 'Abdullah came down to Hasa, where he proceeded to collect a force; it was believed that large numbers of boats were being collected by his order along the coasts of Hasa and Qatar for an expedition to Trucial 'Omán and thence against Baraimi; and subsequently the Amír himself was reported to have reached 'Oqair. He was reminded, however, of his promise, given in 1866, not to commit aggressions upon Arab states having friendly relations with the British Government, and the overthrow by a British naval force of some usurping chiefs who had seized Bahrain served as a timely illustration of the dangers of a conflict with Britain, besides which he was aware that the invasion of Bahrain, committed as it had been from the coast of Hasa, might be laid to his charge by the British Government. A combination formed by the Shaikh of 'Abu Dhabi, the Amír's rebellious brother Sa'úd, and Saiyid 'Azzán of Masqat greatly increased the difficulty of his task in 'Omán; and the dryness of the season had made water scarce upon the routes by land from Hasa to Baraimi. In April 1866, dispirited by these obstacles, 'Abdullah seems to have Abortive preparations by the Wahhábi Amír for the recovery of Baraimi, 1869-70.

returned to his capital, where the intrigues of his own relations had become a source of danger. The loss of Baraimi illustrated the truth, exemplified on a larger scale by the Egyptian occupations of Najd in 1818-19, and 1838-40, and by the Turkish occupation of Qasim in 1905-07, that political paramountcy depends even in Arabia on the possession of sufficient material force at the place to be dominated, and that in the absence of such force it cannot long continue.

Rebellion of Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal, 1870-71.

Successes of Sa'ud.

After visiting the Sultanate of 'Omān, Sa'ūd, the younger half-brother of the Amir 'Abdullah, broke into open rebellion and began to seek for allies in every direction. The Shaikh of Bahrain was successfully dissuaded by the British Political Resident from lending countenance to Sa'ūd; but in the Hasa province a majority of the Bedouins quickly joined his flag. The cases of Hasa and Qatif declared for Sa'ūd; the Amir was worsted in a severe encounter at the wells of Jūdah in Taff; and Sa'ūd captured 'Abdullah's full brother Muhammad, whom he confined in the fort at Dammām.

Flight of 'Abdullah.

At this point the first reign of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal may be considered to end; for he fled to Jabal Shammar, of which state the Amir was nearly related to him by marriage, and through the Shaikh of Kuwait he made overtures for the support of the Turks, promising to render them tribute. The payment of tribute by the Amir to the Porte had, it would appear, become irregular or been altogether discontinued since the time of the Amir Faisal.

SA'ŪD-BIN-FAISAL,
1871-75.

Conquest of Hasa by the Turks, 1871.

The invitation of 'Abdullah was accepted with alacrity by the Turks, who immediately recognised him as their Qaim-Maqām of Najd; and

with the assistance of the Shaikh of Kuwait, as related elsewhere, a Turkish force was despatched to occupy Hasa and advance into Central Arabia.

The Turkish operations in Hasa, 1871.

The details of the campaign and of the subsequent proceedings of the Turks are given at length in the history of Hasa. Their disembarkation took place at Rās Tanūrah on the 26th of May 1871, and Qatif town fell upon the 3rd, and Dammām upon the 5th of June; at the latter place 'Abdul 'Aziz, a son of the Amir Sa'ūd, escaped capture by the Turks but left behind him in his flight the prisoner Muhammad-bin-Faisal, whom the Turks set at liberty; and it was proclaimed at Qatif by Nāfiz Pāsha, the commander of the Turkish forces, that the object of the expedition was to restore the authority of the "Qāim-Maqām" 'Abdullah in Najd, and that Sa'ūd and his adherents would be pardoned if they submitted. In July the Hasa Oasis was occupied by the Turkish troops without opposition, but the impossibility of their advancing across the deserts to Riyādh was now apparent, and Hofūf became the permanent headquarters of the army of occupation.

Movements of the Wahhābi leaders, 1871.

After invoking the help of the Turks 'Abdullah must have returned to Najd, for, when the Turkish troops were overrunning Hasa, the Amīr Sa'ūd was reported to be besieging 'Abdullah in a fort in the Kharj district. 'Abdullah, to whose cause the Qahtān tribe still adhered, was at length obliged to fly from Kharj; and, when he again encountered Sa'ūd to the west of Riyādh, it was with unfavourable results. The Amīr then obtained possession of the capital, and 'Abdullah, excusing himself by the insecurity of the routes in the interior for not having made an earlier appearance, joined Nāfiz Pāsha in Hasa; but he soon discovered that the object of the Turks was something quite different from his own restoration to power. In October, after being placed under surveillance and pressed to resign, 'Abdullah fled from the Ottoman camp with his son Turki, and retired to Najd, whither his brother Muhammad had preceded him. The Amīr Sa'ūd, who probably hoped to supersede 'Abdullah as the Turkish nominee, carefully abstained from hostilities against the troops in Hasa.

Much discontent had been excited at Riyādh by the high-handed proceedings of Sa'ūd's Bedouins, and the Amīr's uncle 'Abdullah-bin-Turki availed himself of the general indignation to seize and hold the capital. Muhammad then wrote to the Turkish commander at Hofūf, received in return some money and supplies, and was honoured by being appointed Mudīr of Riyādh under the Qāim-Maqām 'Abdullah. The Amīr Sa'ūd, incensed by these proceedings, then broke with the Turks and attacked them in Hasa with a force drawn from the 'Ajmān, Āl Morrah and

Dawāsir tribes, but unsuccessfully. After his failure he established himself in the neighbourhood of Qatar, where he compelled the coast population to contribute to the support of himself and his following, and from time to time he made raids upon the Turkish lines of communication.

Complete annexation of Hasa by the Turks, 1871-72.

After the flight of 'Abdullah and the attack on Hasa by Sa'ūd, Mid-hat Pāsha, Wāli of Baghdād, who visited Hofūf on tour at the end of November 1871, announced that Wahhābi rule in Najd was at an end and that direct administration of the country had been assumed by the Turks; and Nāfiz Pāsha was installed as the first Mutasarrif. These steps were professedly taken in consequence of a petition submitted by the people of Hasa, but it appears that the meaning of their representations was misunderstood or, more probably, misrepresented. At this early period, however, it is possible that Turkish rule may have been preferred by the inhabitants, on account of its laxity in some respects, to the domination of the Wahhābis, which had never been popular in Hasa.

Political results of the annexation of Hasa to Turkey.

The subsequent history of Najd was greatly influenced by the Turkish annexation of Hasa, which brought the shortest of all the routes from the sea to the Wahhābi country under Ottoman control; indeed all practicable lines of access to Central Arabia, except that from Kuwait, ran after this through Turkish territory, and a powerful hold upon Najd was thus obtained by the Porte. It should be observed, however, that the Turkish occupation of Hasa, which can only be supported from the sea, has made the position of Turkey in the Persian Gulf more vulnerable than before *vis-à-vis* of maritime powers.

Behaviour of the Wahhābi leaders, 1872.

'Abdullah after this wrote from Riyādh reproaching the Turks with their duplicity, and more than once a nominal reconciliation between him and his brother Sa'ūd was arranged; but the combination was always broken up, as soon as formed, by the treacherous behaviour of 'Abdullah in attacking the tribes most devoted to Sa'ūd, such as the Shammar and the 'Ajmān. The Amīr Sa'ūd, on his part, wasted the strength which he should have reserved for fighting the Turks in quarrels with various petty tribes in his neighbourhood.

day with considerable slaughter, while another son of Hamūd, named 'Obaïd, was among those who perished in the battle. This decisive action seems to have brought the whole of Qasīm, including the town of Buraïdah, under the influence of the Wahhābis with very little delay.

It was probably the events just related that finally determined the Ottoman Government to intervene actively in Central Arabia, where the influence of their protégé Ibn-Rashīd appeared to be at an end and his complete subjugation by Ibn-Sa'ūd already appeared as a not remote contingency.

Turkish military expedition to Qasīm, 1904.

The Turkish expedition, when it marched from Samāwah on the Euphrates in the last days of May 1904, consisted of about 2,000 infantry and six light guns, each carried in a litter between two mules, and it was escorted by a large contingent of Shammar and 'Anizah Bedouins; but its proportions were considerably reduced by disease and desertion before it reached the scene of action. It was too late to save Buraïdah; but an attack on Hāïl, which was threatened by the Wahhābis, was probably averted by the timely arrival of the expedition; and war was carried into the enemy's country by an advance southwards into Qasīm.

Battle of Bukairiyah, 15th July 1904.

The opening engagement took place at Bukairiyah, on the afternoon of the 15th of July, and appears to have been a confused affair. The first attack on Ibn-Rashīd and his Turkish allies was made by an 'Āridh contingent under the command of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān; but it failed, and the assailants were routed and driven off the field with considerable loss by Ibn-Rashīd's mounted troops. Meanwhile, however, the men of Qasīm, unaware of the fate of their associates who were separated from them by some low hills, were advancing on the Turkish camp; and in the evening they captured it. The Turkish commander, about a dozen of his officers, and a large number of his men were killed in the fight; all the Turkish guns and a large number of Turkish prisoners fell into the hands of the Qusmān; and Mājid, the eldest son of Ibn-Rashīd's cousin Hamūd, was killed in a cavalry *mêlée* at the close of the day,—the fourth of his family to fall in a vain endeavour to retrieve the sinking fortunes of Jabal Shammar. After this success the Qusmān withdrew to 'Anaizah. The remains of the Turkish force then resumed possession of their guns, except one which had been removed by the enemy and was

subsequently sent to Riyâdh; but of those recovered, three had been rendered useless.

Subsequent operations and retreat of the Turks to Kahâfah, July to October 1904.

In order to secure a better position or, possibly, to maintain an appearance of acting on the offensive, the Turks and their allies about the beginning of August moved some miles to the south-westward and occupied Shinânah, one of the separate villages forming the township of Rass. Here they remained immobile for about six weeks, drawing their supplies from the village of Nabhâniyah a considerable distance to the westward, while the enemy held the country to the east of them and even, it would appear, the remainder of Rass. Finally, about the 27th of September, the Turks and Ibn-Rashîd issued from Shinânah and attempted to bombard a fortified enclosure in the vicinity known as Qasr Ibn-'Aqaiyil, a few miles to the west of Rass, which was occupied by Ibn-Sa'ûd's friend, the chief of Buraidah. The enemy, observing this movement made a sally from Rass, upon which the Turkish troops broke and fled, and Ibn-Rashîd disappeared. Another gun and much booty were taken by the Wahhâbis and Qusmân; but on this occasion there was little loss of life. After this the remnants of the Turkish force, not numbering more than 700 men, took up a position at Kahâfah about midway between Buraidah and Hâil, for Ibn-Rashîd had, it is said, refused to allow them, though sent to his assistance, to approach any nearer to his capital. The Turkish expedition had thus ended in complete failure; but the Ottoman authorities, if they knew the facts, were far from admitting them; and banners, supposed to have been captured from Ibn-Sa'ûd, were carried in triumph through the streets of Karbala more than a month after the first Turkish defeat.

Negotiations and amicable settlement between Ibn-Sa'ûd and the Porte, 1904-1905.

Ibn-Sa'ûd seems to have been somewhat alarmed at the completeness of his own success against the Ottoman troops; and, about the end of October 1904, an apologetic letter was received from him by *Fakhri Pâsha, the acting Wâli of Basrah, an able and enlightened official trained to the military profession. In this letter the Wahhâbi Amîr sought to exculpate himself in respect of the attacks on the Turkish forces in Qasîm, asked that his submission might be accepted, and begged that payment of the allowance which he had been accustomed to receive from the Turkish Government might be continued. His proposals were referred to Constantinople and apparently met with acceptance; but preparations which had been commenced at Najaf for the despatch of a second Turkish force to Central Arabia were not discontinued. By

*According to another version it was Fakhri Pasha and not Ibn-Sa'ûd who made the first advances.

this time, however, it was generally understood that the objects of the expedition were pacific and not punitive,—a circumstance which may be held to indicate that Ibn-Sa'ûd's promises of good behaviour, although he had not yet appeared in person to confirm them, were regarded by the Porte as satisfactory and sufficiently reliable. Nor was the necessary confirmation long wanting. Hardly had the Turkish field force started from Najaf, when the Amîr 'Abdur Rahmân in person, accompanied by Shaikh Mubârak of Kuwait, arrived from the Kuwait side at the little village of Safwân on the Turkish frontier and was there met by Mukhlis Pâsha, who had recently assumed charge of the Basrah Wilâyat. The first meeting, held at Safwân on the 8th of February, was followed by official telegraphic discussions between Basrah and Constantinople. At the second meeting, which took place on the 13th of February at the wells of Qash'ânîyah, Ibn-Sa'ûd appears to have been informed that the Sultân had appointed him Qâim-Maqâm or governor of Southern Najd under the Porte, and that Ibn-Rashîd would not be allowed to interfere with the affairs of his districts; while Ibn-Sa'ûd, on his part, seems to have agreed to the location of Turkish civil officials and military garrisons in Qasîm.

Pacific occupation of Qasim by the Turks, 1905.

Military entry of the Turks into Qasim, April 1905.

Meanwhile, at the end of January 1905, the Turkish military expedition organised at Najaf towards the end of 1904 had marched for Qasim; it consisted of about 3,000 men with six guns and it was commanded by Ahmad Faizi Pâsha, Mushîr of the 6th or Baghdâd Army Corps, "a corrupt old rascal," more than 70 years of age, but by no means deficient in physical energy. The agreement concluded with Ibn-Sa'ûd shortly after its departure rendered the task of the expeditionary force an easy one. A junction was effected with a column of 750 men and a battery of field artillery sent from Madînah, but neither the rendezvous nor the subsequent route of the combined force can be identified with certainty from such reports as are available. No opposition was experienced; for the people of Najd were weary of war, and for the moment they welcomed the prospect of peace even under a Turkish ægis. Buraidah in Qasîm was occupied on the 15th of April 1905 and 'Anaizah three days later; a military post of 100 men or less was apparently established at either place; the Ottoman flag was hoisted,

the Hamidīyah march was played, and public prayers were recited in the name of the Sultān of Turkey. It was observed that Ibn-Rashīd was not present, even as a spectator, at these ceremonies; and the conclusion was drawn that the inhabitants of Qasīm, in submitting to the Porte, had stipulated that the Shammar Amīr should be allowed no *locus standi* in their affairs,—a point on which Ibn-Sa'ūd had from the first laid great stress in his negotiations with the Turks.

Civil organisation of the country by the Turks.

The country of Najd was next parcelled out into administrative divisions on the usual Turkish system. Burnidah was constituted a Qadha under Salīh-bin-Hasan as Qāim-Maqām, and 'Anaizah became a Mudirlik with 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-'Abdullah as Mudīr; but the relations of these two officials to one another were not, apparently, defined. Whether the new districts were administratively dependent on Basrah or on Madīnah remained unknown to the Arabs; but by the Turkish officials they were believed to have been attached to the Basrah Wilāyat, and Southern Najd was understood to have become a Qadha under the Wāli of Basrah, with Ibn-Sa'ūd for Qāim-Maqām and headquarters at Riyādh. These dispositions, which were the more easy to carry out that they were purely nominal, had no sooner been completed than the veteran Ahmad Faizi Pāsha, having received orders to suppress a rebellion in Yaman, threw himself on the back of a camel and hurried off by way of Madīnah to the port of Yanbū' on the Red Sea.

General history of Central Arabia during the Turkish occupation of Qasīm, 1905-06.

Visit of 'Abdul 'Aziz, Ibn-Sa'ūd to Qatar, etc., July to August 1905.

The proceedings of the Turks in Qasīm may have momentarily impressed the Wahhābi Amīr, for he discontinued his operations against Ibn-Rashīd and turned his attention instead to the coast of the Persian Gulf. In July and August 1905 the Amīr's son 'Abdul 'Aziz proceeded on a tour to the Jāfūrah desert and the borders of Qatar, and his unexpected visit was a source of embarrassment to the Turkish authorities in Hasa, who seemed uncertain how to behave but in the end sent a Tābūr Āghāsi to wait upon him at the wells of Da'ailij in Jāfūrah. wo caravans having been stopped at this time by robbers on the Hasa-'Oqair route, 'Abdul Aziz took advantage of the circumstances to put to death or mutilate a few Bedouins and so to pose as a friend of law and order; and he claimed to have reconciled the 'Ajmān, Fani Hājir and

Āl Morrah tribes, which were previously at feud. He made several halts at watering places in the neighbourhood of Salwa Bay; and he had a meeting at the 'Amaiq camping ground in Qatar with Jāsim, the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah, from whom his father was believed to have obtained valuable assistance in 1904. Eventually 'Abdul 'Azīz, finding the heat excessive, returned home eid the wells of Zarnūqah in Kharmah; but, before his departure, he wrote letters to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, announcing his intention of visiting 'Omān in the following spring. These missives, as related in the history of Trucial 'Omān, created some excitement among the chiefs to whom they were addressed, and the British political authorities were obliged to take cognisance of the matter.

Renewal of hostilities between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashid and death of the latter, 1905-06.

The hostilities of the Wahhābi and Shammar Amīrs, suspended for a short time out of a transient respect for Turkish authority, were renewed towards the end of the year. Between the two rivals, as subsequently explained by a Turkish Pāsha who had dealt with both, there was a decided contrast in character, for, while Ibn-Rashīd was the "desert warrior" pure and simple, Ibn-Sa'ūd was more of the "desert diplomatist"; but the deficiencies of the Wahhābi chief were more than made good by the soldierly qualities of his son 'Abdul 'Azīz. Towards the end of 1905 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān, assisted by his brother Muhammad, began to raid the Harb tribe and the Bani 'Abdillah branch of the Mutair to the westwards; he had now made Qasīm his base, and the headquarters of Ibn-Rashīd were at Kahāfah on the north-western frontier of the same district. At the end of March 1906 the Wahhābis were encamped at 'Ain Ibn-Fahaid in Qasīm, and Ibn-Rashīd was at Thamāmi, a watering place in the Bātin, about 70 miles to the north-east of their position. Ibn-Rashīd had by this time sought the mediation of Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait, whom he begged to regard him as a son, and that wily politician had already begun to weave a scheme for restoring peace in Najd by the creation of a buffer state to lie between the territory of the two Amīrs, to be under the Shaikh's own control, and to consist of the Qasīm, Washam and Sadair districts. Meanwhile, however, on the night of the 11th April 1906, the Wahhābis succeeded in surprising Ibn-Rashīd, while he was encamped in fancied security at a place known as Ruwaidhah, 20 or 30 miles to the east of Buraidah. A duststorm was raging at the time, and Ibn-Rashīd might perhaps have escaped; but he boldly declared his presence and fell, reciting his Rajaz war-song, under the concentrated fire of his assailants' rifles. A number of the Amīr's followers perished with him; and his head, having been cut

off, was fixed on a pole and paraded round the country in triumph; but this last enormity was condemned by all respectable Arab opinion, and some regret for Ibn-Rashíd's death was shown even by the Shaikh of Kuwait, to whom his signet ring was immediately sent, in proof of his success, by Ibn-Sa'úd.

Elation of Ibn-Sa'úd, April to June, 1906.

The Wahhábi Amír despatched letters or emissaries to announce his victory to the Sultán of Turkey, to the Turkish Wális of Baghdád and Basrah, and to the Arab chiefs of Hasa, Qatar and Bahrain. The deputation sent to Basrah was reported to have been well received by the Governor, and most of the Shaikhs who had been addressed returned their congratulations, accompanied by handsome presents. Ibn-Sa'úd also proclaimed himself ruler of "Sharq", by which he probably meant all Eastern Arabia. A temporary coldness shortly afterwards sprang up between the Wahhábi Amír and the Shaikh of Kuwait out of disputes relating to the tribute and allegiance of some Bedouin tribes,—perhaps the commonest cause of dissension among potentates in Central Arabia,—and it was reported that Ibn-Sa'úd, in the first arrogance of his success, had spoken disparagingly of Shaikh Mubárak; but the support of the Shaikh was essential to the Amír's safety, and the estrangement between them was not of long duration.

Deportation of the Qáim-Maqám of Buraidah and other aggressions committed by the Wahhábis, April to June, 1906.

'Abdul 'Aziz, after the destruction of Ibn-Rashíd, proceeded to take full advantage of his success. In April or May, disregarding both the official rank of his victim in the Turkish service and the presence of Turkish troops in Qasím, he seized Sálih-bin-Hasan, Qáim-Maqám of Buraidah, by a stratagem and deported him to Riyádh along with his brothers Muhanna and 'Abdul 'Aziz; the reason appeared to be that Sálih had taken his own position as an Ottoman Qáim-Maqám too seriously and was working in the interests of the Porte; but the measure, on account of Sálih's personal popularity in Qasím, was generally felt to be one of doubtful policy from the standpoint of Wahhábi interests. 'Abdul 'Aziz then carried his raids far to the northward, and, apparently in May, began to harry the Bedouins in the neighbourhood of Háil and to demand arrears of the tribute formerly paid by the Shammar Amír to Riyádh; but the gates of the town were closed against him, and scarcity of forage and supplies soon obliged him to retire. Some members of the Ál Sa'úd family who had been prisoners at Háil were now released, among them a youth named 'Abdul-'Aziz-bin-Muhammad, a grandson of the Wahhábi Amír Sa'úd-bin-Faisal, who early in July arrived at Kuwait and received medical treatment in the British dispensary there. Several political *detenus* belonging to the ruling families of 'Anaizah and Buraidah were also set at liberty about the same time.

Meanwhile Mat'ab, the son and successor of the deceased Wahhābi Amīr, maintained a correspondence with the Shaikh of Kuwait, whom he begged to proceed with the negotiations begun on his father's behalf; and the influence of Shaikh Mubārak apparently continued to be exerted in favour of a settlement. In July peace was arranged in Qasīm, and hostilities ceased; but a Wahhābi messenger, sent by Ibn-Sa'ūd to apprise the Shaikh of Kuwait of the circumstance, was murdered on his way in the desert by a Shammar tribesman, either in revenge for the death of the Amīr 'Abdul 'Aziz or because the murderer was not aware that peace had been made. It is not clear that the Wahhābi Amīr himself ever, during the whole of these proceedings, quitted his capital of Riyādh.

Peace declared between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashīd, July 1906.

We may now enquire in what light the recent proceedings of Ibn-Sa'ūd, exhibiting as they did complete disregard and even contempt for Ottoman authority in Central Arabia, were regarded by the Turkish Government. A deputation sent by the Wahhābi Amīr met, as we have already seen, with a not unfavourable reception at Basrah; but the sympathies of the Porte naturally lay with the family of Rashīd, who had for some time professed allegiance to the Sultān of Turkey, and by whose downfall, consequently, Turkish prestige in Najd could not but be lowered. The Wāli of Basrah attributed the disastrous end of Ibn-Rashīd to the intervention of the Shaikh of Kuwait, in the guise of a peacemaker, between the parties; but the Porte were inclined to suspect that there had been undue interference by the military in the work of the civil officials,—in other words that the commanders of the Turkish army of occupation had been attempting to exercise too much authority over the indigenous chiefs.

Attitude and action of the Turks with reference to the successes of Ibn-Sa'ūd, July to September 1906.

Before the end of April a telegram was received at Basrah from the Sultān's Secretary, directing that Mat'ab, the new Amīr, should be informed of the regret of the Sultān at the death of 'Abdul 'Aziz, of the intention of the Porte to punish the late Amīr's murderers, of Mat'ab's own confirmation as his father's successor, and of the continuance in his favour of his father's salary and allowances. The subsidy of Ibn-Rashīd from the Turks at this time was reported to amount to £T200 a month and 200 Taghārs of rice per annum, while that received by Ibn-Sa'ūd was £T90 a month; the former was disbursed from Baghdād through Karbala, and the latter from Basrah through Kuwait.

At the beginning of July, Sāmi Pāsha, who had been appointed military commandant and civil Mutasarrif of Najd about a year previously but had contrived until now to defer his actual departure, left Madīnah

with an escort of 500 infantry and one gun; and a month later he reached Qasim and made his headquarters at Shaihiyah, about 30 miles to the south-west of Buraidah. He then summoned 'Abdul 'Aziz, the son of Ibn-Sa'ûd, to his presence; but the Wahhâbi declined to enter his camp; and ultimately a meeting was arranged in the open country between Shaihiyah and Buraidah, at which the chief subjects of discussion were, apparently, the construction of forts at 'Anaizah and Buraidah for the reception of permanent Turkish garrisons and the release by Ibn-Sa'ûd of the Qâim-Maqâm Sâlih-bin-Hasan. With regard to the former demand 'Abdul 'Aziz, supported by the people of Qasim, seems to have insisted successfully on the observance by the Turks of a promise, previously given, that not more than 100 men should be placed in either of the towns; and the question of Sâlih was apparently dropped in consequence of an assertion—which afterwards proved to be false—that he had escaped from custody at Riyadh and been murdered by Âl Murrah Bedouins in the desert.

Fariq Sadîq (or Sudqi) Pâsha, who had commanded the Turkish forces in Najd before Sâmi Pâsha's arrival, now took his departure for Kuwait, where he arrived safely on the 21st August *viâ* Zilfi, the Sâfah wells in Summân, and Subaihiyah. He brought with him an escort of 142 men and had no casualties by the way.

About the end of September the new Mutasarrif sent a party of troops to purchase supplies at 'Anaizah; but the elders of the town refused to assist them on the plea of scarcity; and the Turks, as they were returning by night to their camp, were attacked and lost several of their number.

Meanwhile Tâlib Pâsha, an aide-de-camp of the Sultan of Turkey and probably identical with the ex-Mutasarrif of Hasa of the same name, was travelling from Baghdâd to Hâil as bearer of a Turkish decoration for the young Amîr Mat'ab, and at the end of September it was reported that he had reached his destination. The allowance of the Shammar Amîr from the Karbala treasury was at this time irregularly received, apparently because Mat'ab declined to pay certain bribes that were demanded by the Turkish officials.

Virtual withdrawal of the Turks from Najd, November 1906.

Hardships endured by

It was now evident to the Turkish Government that their occupation of Qasim, which was no longer approved by the people, had

become both unprofitable and dangerous. It was difficult to ensure supplies for the troops, who, according to the statements of deserters, could never obtain any tobacco and were sometimes reduced, for want of food, to eating the pith of date palms. The forces were clothed in rags. The Arabs, it was stated, frequently committed aggressions against the soldiers, while the latter, if they attempted to retaliate, were handed over by their officers to deputations of murmuring Shaikhs, by whom they were put to death. For these reasons the whole army of occupation, themselves largely Arabs, looked on the country as accursed and spoke of it as Bint-Iblís or "Satan's Daughter"; sickness and desertion were rife; and many sold their arms and ammunition to the people of the country, merely in order to provide themselves with the necessaries of life.

the army of occupation.

In the circumstances described the Turkish Government seem to have *decided, in the autumn of 1906, to reduce the garrison of Qasím from the strength of 2,500 or 2,000 men, to which it had been raised by the arrival of Sámi Páshaʾs escort from Madínah, to one of 200, and ultimately to one of 100 men only; and in November the withdrawal commenced. The first to move were the units belonging to western Army Corps, which left Qasím about the 3rd of †November; and some three weeks later the troops belonging to the Baghdád command started on their march to the coast. These last, numbering about 800 men with two field and four light guns, were supplied with 2,000 camels belonging to private owners at Buraidah, ʿAnaizah and Zilfí for transport; they marched in 25 days from Buraidah to Kuwait, which town the Shaikh did not permit them to enter; and they eventually reached Basrah in safety. The evacuation, in consequence of difficulties made by the Qusmán about the strength of the posts to be left, was perhaps more complete than had been intended by the Porte; and it is clear that not more than 50 men actually remained in Qasím, while one report placed the number as low as 26.

Almost complete withdrawal of the Turkish forces, November 1906.

If the total number of Turkish troops despatched to Qasím from ʿIraq in 1904 and 1905 be estimated at the lowest possible figure, *viz.*, 4,500, and the number of those who either were left in Qasím or returned to ʿIráq as soldiers be taken as probably 1,000 altogether,

Military and political results of the occupation and withdrawal.

* According to another account the evacuation was carried out by Sámi Páshá, who retired on Madínah, upon his own responsibility, the reason being that he could get no help, or even instructions, from Constantinople.

† According to the authority quoted in the last footnote Sámi Páshá did not fall back on Madínah until February 1907. The last of the troops withdrawing on that side had sometimes to subsist on locusts.

it will be apparent that the wastage by desertion and death in Najd must have been abnormally heavy. Desertions to Kuwait began in 1903, and it was estimated that, by March 1906, 500 Turkish deserters from Najd had already passed through the town. Of those who died in Qasim by far the greater number, it was stated, succumbed to disease.

The evacuation of Qasim was very injurious to Turkish prestige in Arabia. Disturbances which occurred in Hasa were attributed to the confidence with which the withdrawal had inspired the Arabs, and there was much anxiety in the spring of 1907 lest the troops employed in the construction of the Hijaz Railway should be attacked by Ibn-Sa'ûd. It was, however, by no means certain that the Turkish withdrawal from Najd would be permanent, especially as the completion of the Hijaz Railway, then rapidly approaching Madinah, could hardly fail to influence and strengthen the policy of Turkey in Central Arabia.

General history of Central Arabia after the Turkish evacuation of Qasim, 1906-07.

Relations of Ibn-Sa'ud, Ibn-Rashîd and the Shaikh of Kuwait, 1906-07.

After the departure of the Turkish forces an uneasy peace, broken by frequent but apparently incorrect rumours of renewed hostilities between Ibn-Sa'ûd and Ibn-Rashid, prevailed in Najd. In January 1907, as related in the history of Northern Najd, Mat'ab, the young Shammar Amîr, was murdered by his relation Sultân-bin-Hamûd, who then usurped his position. The attitude of the new Ibn-Rashîd, doubtless because he felt his position to be precarious, was conciliatory towards Ibn-Sa'ûd; and the Shaikh of Kuwait, who, like the townsmen of Qasîm and even the Turks themselves, did not wish a complete and permanent supremacy to be established in Najd by the ruler of either Riyâdh or Hâil, seemed inclined to transfer his support from the Wahhâbi to the Shammâr Amîr, whose cause had become undeniably weak. Shaikh Mubârak had previously alleged the government of Ibn-Sa'ûd to be wanting in system and organisation, and he now criticised the character of Ibn-Sa'ûd himself as being both "too quick to anger and too easily appeased;" it is possible, however, that this remark was intended to apply not to the actual ruler, 'Abdur Rahmân-bin-Faisal, but to his son 'Abdul-'Aziz, who was now frequently spoken of as "Ibn-Sa'ûd", perhaps on account of his greater activity and conspicuousness.

In Southern Najd the town of Majma' in Sadair continued to defy, in some sort, the authority of the Wahhābi Amīr, agreeing to pay to him the tribute which it had formerly rendered to the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, but refusing to consent to any enhancement of the same, or to enter into close relations with him. It was at length ascertained beyond doubt that Sālih-bin-Hasan, the deported Amīr of Buraidah, was alive in confinement at Riyādh; and his brothers Sulaimān and 'Abdur Rahmān were reported to have joined Ibn-Rashīd.

Miscellaneous political matters, 1907.

Relations of the British Government with Central Arabia, 1900-07.

In consequence of its physical inaccessibility and economic unimportance, Central Arabia has generally lain—as will be apparent from what has preceded—almost beyond the purview of the British and Indian Governments; but, after the revival of the Wahhābi power in Najd in 1900, the situation was modified in this respect by the alliance between the Shaikh of Kuwait and Ibn-Sa'ūd and the espousal of the cause of Ibn-Rashīd by the Turks.

At the beginning of 1901 the Government of India contemplated the despatch of Muhammadan agents to obtain reliable information regarding the political and religious conditions prevailing in Central Arabia, the obscurity of which was a cause of hesitation in policy; but execution of the scheme was deferred on account of the disturbed condition of the interior at the time.

Deputation of Muhammadan agents to Najd contemplated by the Government of India, 1901.

When Ibn-Sa'ūd, in May 1902, started from Kuwait to reoccupy his ancestral capital, he addressed a letter to the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, in which he begged that he might be regarded "as one having relations with the British Government" and that "the eyes of the benevolent British Government might be fixed on him," and intimated that at Kuwait he had declined overtures from a Russian official because he preferred that his relations should be with Great Britain. The action of the Resident in not replying to this letter was approved by the Government of India, and he was instructed that no encouragement should be given to Ibn-Sa'ūd, because the policy of the British Government was to abstain from connection with the affairs of Najd, especially while they remained in an unsettled state.

First overtures of Ibn-Sa'ūd to the British Government, 1902.

In 1904, when the Porte were about to despatch a military force to the aid of Ibn-Rashīd in Najd, the British Government found that they

Action of the British Government with

reference to the Turkish expedition to Najd and request for their protection by Ibn-Sa'ūd, 1904.

could not remain indifferent, for they were deeply interested in the maintenance of the *status quo* at Kuwait, and they feared that it might be imperilled if the help given to Ibn-Rashid should oblige Shaikh Mubārak to take the field once more on behalf of his friend Ibn-Sa'ūd. Accordingly, in February 1904, the British Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to claim fulfilment of a pledge given by the Turkish Government in October 1901, that they would restrain the Amir of Jabal Shammar provided the British Government restrained the Shaikh of Kuwait; and again, on news being received that Turkish troops had been ordered to proceed from Madīnah to Qasīm, a remonstrance on the subject was addressed to the Porte; but the British Ambassador felt that the aggressiveness of the Wahhābis weakened his arguments, and he doubted whether the reconstitution of the Wahhābi empire in Najd would be in every respect an advantage. The Government of India, however, pointed out that the power of the Wahhābis was now territorial, not fanatical; that British prestige would suffer at Kuwait, if the Shaikh were restrained from assisting his ally; and that the absorption of Najd by the Turks might be a greater evil than a Wahhābi domination and might lead to encroachments on Kuwait from an unexpected direction in which the boundaries of the principality were undefined. Further remonstrances at Constantinople were authorised; but they were ineffectual, and the Turkish expedition marched. The only practical outcome of the discussion between the British and Indian Governments was the appointment, a month or two later, of a British Political Agent at Kuwait.

Ibn-Sa'ūd, alarmed at the prospect of Turkish intervention, had in the meantime written to the Resident in the Persian Gulf requesting British protection; but no answer was returned to his letter.

Contemplated deputation of a British officer to Riyādh, 1904.

At the beginning of 1904 the Government of India had been led to consider the advisability of despatching a British officer to Riyādh* for the purpose of studying the situation and possibly of entering into closer relations with Ibn-Sa'ūd, and enquiry showed that such a mission could easily be arranged through the Shaikh of Kuwait. His Majesty's Government, however, in the state of affairs then prevailing, regarded the proposal with some apprehension and directed that, without their previous sanction, no steps should be taken to enter into relations with Najd or to send agents there; and eventually the Government of India informed the Home Government that, while recognising that it might shortly become incumbent on them to take a closer interest in the affairs

* In 1903 it was intimated to the present writer, then on leave in Europe, that he would probably be selected in event of an officer being required to travel in Central Arabia,—a contingency at that time already under consideration.

of Central Arabia, they did not propose to move immediately in the matter. To this conclusion His Majesty's Government readily assented, but they admitted the desirability of obtaining further information about Najd, and they did not discountenance the idea of the subject being re-opened at some future and more favourable opportunity. Again, at the end of the year, His Majesty's Government expressed a desire that it should be clearly understood that their interest and influence were to be confined strictly to the coast line of Eastern Arabia, and that nothing should be said or done to connect them, even indirectly, with warfare in progress in the interior. Their prudent self-restraint the Turkish Government would have done well to imitate.

Attitude of the British Government towards the designs of Ibn-Sa'ūd in the Persian Gulf, 1905-06.

Hardly had the Turks put into execution their designs upon Qasīm, when the proceedings of the Wahhābi Amīr himself in the direction of the Persian Gulf began to occasion anxiety to the British Government. The facts relating to his son 'Abdul 'Azīz's visit to Jafūrah and Qatar in 1905 and to his correspondence with the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān are given in an earlier paragraph of the present chapter and in the history of Trucial 'Omān; and as related in the latter place, Ibn-Sa'ūd through the Shaikh of Kuwait subsequently disclaimed all serious designs in the direction of 'Omān, and expressed regret for any accidental remark on his part which might have occasioned disquiet. Before the receipt of these satisfactory assurances, however, the Government of India had advised His Majesty's Government that, in their opinion, it was desirable to ascertain from Ibn-Sa'ūd—through the Shaikh of Kuwait, the Sultān of Masqat, or some other intermediary—whether he was prepared to abide by the engagement, given by his predecessor 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal in 1866,* not to molest British subjects in his own dominions and not to commit aggression on Arab states in alliance with the British Government; and they considered that, in event of the Amīr's reply proving unsatisfactory, he should be informed that the British Government would regard any attempt to interfere in 'Omān as an unfriendly act and would take suitable measures to frustrate it. Ultimately it was decided by His Majesty's Government that the steps proposed by the Government of India need not be taken unless the Wahhābi chief appeared at the coast for the purpose of carrying out the designs with which he was credited, and that, in the case supposed, the necessary warning should be conveyed to him directly.

Renewed overtures of Ibn-Sa'ūd to the British

Throughout the year 1906 persistent efforts to open negotiations for support by the British Government were made by the Wahhābi Amīr, or more probably by his son 'Abdul 'Azīz, through various intermediaries.

* *Vide* page 1124 *ante*.

Government, 1906.

The subject was first broached to Captain Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, by Musá'ad-bin-Suwailim, an emissary of Ibn-Sa'úd who arrived from Qatar and suggested that, in case the Amír should succeed in driving the Turks out of Hasa, a treaty should be arranged between him and the British Government whereby the latter should undertake to protect the Amír against subsequent attacks by the Turks from the sea, while they in return should be allowed to maintain a political officer in the oasis of Hasa or of Qatif. Captain Prideaux gave no encouragement to these suggestions; and the emissary at once left for Búshehr, where he avoided visiting the British Residency and instead despatched a long telegram from Jásim, the Ál Thání Shaikh in Qatar, to the Sultán of Turkey, recommending Ibn-Sa'úd to the favour of His Ottoman Majesty. The next advance was made by Ibn-Sa'úd through Shaikh Jásim, who, at an interview in Qatar between himself and Major Cox, the British Resident, made proposals similar to those brought forward by Musá'ad in Bahrain, and suggested that the Amír should have a meeting with a British officer at some place upon the Arabian coast. In August 1906 Shaikh Mubárak of Kuwait endeavoured to convince the Political Agent there, Captain Knox, of the desirability of Ibn-Sa'úd being taken under British protection, especially in the interests of British trade. In October an urgent request for a personal interview was received from Shaikh Jásim by Captain Prideaux in Bahrain; and that officer, being unable to go to Qatar himself, sent his interpreter, Mr. In'ám-ul-Haqq. The explanation of the Shaikh's letter was that he had received a further communication from 'Abdul 'Azíz, who feared that his case had not been pressed with sufficient warmth by the Shaikh of Kuwait, and who now sought an interview with Captain Prideaux at a rendezvous in the desert, either in person or through a brother; and it appeared that 'Abdul 'Azíz, being determined to recover Hasa, the most valuable portion financially of the former Wahhábi dominions, was anxious to be assured of British protection by sea in event of his being successful; also that he would in return bind himself by agreements to the British Government, probably resembling those of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omán, and would agree to the residence of a British political officer at his court. These proposals were at once reported by Captain Prideaux to higher authority. In November the subject was revived by the Shaikh of Kuwait. It will be observed that the advances of Ibn-Sa'úd in 1906 were made before the withdrawal of the Turks from Qasim, and that they were most urgent after the arrival there of Sámi Páshá with his escort from Madinah.

In February 1907 the question of the answer to be returned by the Political Resident to the spokesmen of Ibn-Sa'ūd was formally referred by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government, and the latter, in the month of May following, directed that Major Cox should, if possible, avoid the subject; otherwise he should inform the Amir's agents that, as Ibn-Sa'ūd's proposals involved considerations which it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to entertain, no reply should be expected.

Orders of His Majesty's Government in regard to the overtures of Ibn-Sa'ūd, 1907.

ANNEXURE No. 1.—SEPARATE HISTORY OF THE JABAL SHAMMAR PRINCIPALITY OR NORTHERN NAJD.

The external history of Northern Najd is given in full in the preceding chapter; but it appears advisable to add here a supplementary notice, referring chiefly to the internal affairs of the principality.

Early history of Jabal Shammar.

Of events in Jabal Shammar before the rise of the present ruling family, the Āl Rashīd, very little is known. The Wahhābis probably overran the country towards the end of the 18th century, at an early stage of their victorious career in Central Arabia; for, by 1809 at latest, their power was so firmly established in the northern oasis of Jauf-al-'Āmir, that the Turkish Pāsha of Damascus could not even collect a force for the purpose of dislodging them.

Relations with the Wahhābis, 1809.

In 1817 Ibrāhīm Pāsha, while on his way to overthrow the Wahhābis at their capital, made an expedition from Hanakiyah against the tribes of Jabal Shammar. It was not, apparently, successful; and it resulted in heavy loss to the Arab tribes who fought upon the Egyptian side.

Relations with the Egyptians, 1817.

The predominant family in Jabal Shammar in those days were the Bait 'Ali, who belonged to the Ja'far subdivision of the 'Abdah division of the Shammar tribe and had their seat at Hāil. About the year 1818, when the power of the Wahhābis was temporarily broken by the Egyptians, a young Shaikh of the Ja'far subdivision, whose family formed part of the Khalīl section, challenged the predominance of the Bait 'Ali; this was 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali-bin-Rashīd, the founder of the present dynasty of the Āl Rashīd. 'Abdullah succeeded in gaining to his side a majority of the citizens of Hāil; but the people of the neighbouring town of Qafar, at that time not inferior to Hāil in population and resources, unanimously supported his adversaries.

Rise of the Āl Rashīd.

'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, after a contest, was obliged to fly the country, and took the road by Jauf-al-'Amir to Syria. Beyond Jauf his party

Adventures of Abdullah-

bin-'Ali, 1819-34.

were attacked by hostile 'Anizah, and he himself was severely wounded and left for dead; but a passing merchant took him up and carried him to Damascus, where he recovered. After this 'Abdullah sought service with the Wahhábis, and he apparently took a prominent part in their successful campaign, in 1830, against the Bani Khálid in Hasa. In 1834 he was still in Hasa, assisting Faisal, the son of the Wahhábí Amir Turki, to repel the aggressions of the Shaikh of Bahrain upon that province; and, when the assassination of the Wahhábí ruler took place at Riyádh in the same year, he was one of those who helped Faisal to recover Riyádh and make good his claims to the Amirate. The usurper Mashári himself fell, it is said, by the hand of 'Abdullah.

'ABDULLAH-BIN-'ALI,

1835-47.

Abdullah bin-'Ali appointed Mahfúdh of Jabal Shammar by the Wahhábi Amír, 1835.

The Wahhábí Amír Faisal was no sooner established on the throne of his ancestors than he rewarded his late associate, 'Abdullah bin-'Ali, by conferring on him the governorship of Jabal Shammar together with the title of *Mahfúdh; and he commissioned him to subjugate the southern branches of the great 'Anizah tribe, supplying him at the same time with men and material resources. The first task of 'Abdullah, however, was to overcome the Bait 'Ali; but he soon drove them from Háil to Qafár, and from Qafár they were expelled by 'Abdullah's brother 'Obaid.

Conquest by Abdullah of Qasim, Háyat and Jauf-al-'Amir.

Finally the Bait 'Ali took refuge in Qasim, of which district the inhabitants were their partisans, and 'Abdullah thereupon sought the further assistance of the Wahhábí Amír, which he obtained on the condition that any new territory conquered should be added, not to his own governorship, but to the districts directly under Riyádh. With the assistance thus lent he devastated Qasim, taking its villages one by one, and almost exterminated his opponents of the Bait 'Ali; and finally, in accordance with the terms of his contract, he handed over the newly acquired district to the Wahhábí Amír.† His commission against the 'Anizah 'Abdullah partially executed by depriving them of Háyat, in the west, with its much prized springs of water; and by the instrumentality of his brother 'Obaid, whom he sent to compose dissensions in the distant northern oasis of Jauf-al-'Amir, he succeeded in establishing a sort of suzerainty over that place also.

Internal policy of 'Abdullah.

The domestic policy of 'Abdullah is represented as having been unpopular with the majority of his subjects. He established Wahhábism

* Or perhaps "Muhafidh" which would appear to be more natural, though not so given in the principal authority. "Mahfúdh", which has been translated "Warden," can only have that meaning if it is a contraction of some longer title.

† Perhaps the foregoing, so far as it relates to aid lent by the Wahhábí Amír, should be dismissed as unhistorical; it depends chiefly on traditions collected by Palgrave 25 years later, and it is inconsistent with the account given by Wallin, an earlier and more careful enquirer. 'Abdullah's services in Hasa and his share in the removal of Mashári are, however, confirmed by Wallin.

as the state religion and encouraged Wahhábi propagandists. He showed favour to the Bedouin tribes, and utilised them to break the strength of the towns and villages,—a process which, of necessity, was soon reversed under his sons. Towards the end of his reign he began to build a new quarter in Háil town exclusively for the residence of himself and his relations with their dependents.

Relations of 'Abdullah with the Wahhábis.

To the end of his days 'Abdullah appears to have remained a loyal and contented feudatory of the Wahhábi Amír Faisal, whom in 1848, after his return from Egypt, he assisted to recover his power in Najd; and no tribute seems to have been required of him by the Amír except an annual gift of horses.

Relations of 'Abdullah with Egypt.

'Abdullah was probably unfriendly to the Egyptians; and the loss of an Egyptian detachment in the Nafúd Desert, where they perished of thirst,—probably one of the Egyptian garrisons withdrawn from Najd about 1840—was, if local tradition may be trusted, deliberately arranged by the Mahfúdh through his brother 'Obaid. It is believed that George Augustus Wallin, the able Swede who visited Háil in 1845, and again in 1848 a year after 'Abdullah's death, was sent there by Muhammad 'Ali, Pásha of Egypt, to investigate the rising power of Jabal Shammar or, possibly, with some more definite political aim.

TALÁL-BIN-'ABDULLAH,

1847-67.

Expansion of Jabal Shammar under Talál. 1847-55.

'Abdullah left three sons, Talál, Mat'ab and Muhammad, of whom the eldest, Talál, was about 20 years of age. Talál's succession was unopposed; he profited throughout his reign by the loyal support of his uncle 'Obaid and of his brother Mat'ab; and under him the boundaries of Jabal Shammar continued to extend. One of his first expeditions was against Khaibar and was conducted by the formidable 'Obaid, with whom Mat'ab was associated in the command to temper his severity; Khaibar fell and was placed under a governor sent from Háil. About 1848 the people of Qasím after secret negotiations, transferred their direct allegiance from Riyádh to Háil, where Qasími refugees from Wahhábi tyranny had become accustomed to find a refuge; and the Wahhábi Amír for a time acquiesced, though unwillingly, in the new arrangement. Operations against Taimah, directed by Talál in person, were successful and enabled him to round off his western frontier. Finally, in 1855, he completed the work begun at Jauf-al-'Amir in his father's reign by proceeding thither in person, subduing the oasis, and placing it under a Shammar governor and three sub-governors of his own nomination.

Domestic policy of Talál.

The internal policy of Talál was progressive and pacificatory. He relied on the settled population and addressed himself to the task of curbing the Bedouins, whom his father had unduly encouraged. Life and property, both on the roads and in the villages, were secure in his day. His chief pleasure was in the construction of palaces, markets, shops, streets and fortifications; he introduced foreign merchants—many of them Shi'ahs, for Talál was not a strict Wahhábi—from Basrah and Mashhad 'Ali, and even from Madinah and Yaman; and he tried, it is

maid, but without success, to induce Jews and Christians from the north to settle at Hāil.

Relations of Talāl with the Wahhābis, Turkey, Egypt, and Persia.

Notwithstanding the umbrage given by his protection of the refractory Qusmān and the scandal which his irreligious habits of wearing silk and smoking tobacco occasioned to rigorous Wahhābis, Talāl, who had married a daughter of his father's friend the Wahhābi Amir Faisal, remained to the last on friendly terms with his suzerain at Riyādh; and he continued throughout his life to pay a yearly visit to Riyādh for the purpose of delivering his tribute of horses in person. At the same time, however, he professed allegiance to Turkey, caused the Sultan's name and titles to be proclaimed at Friday prayers in Hāil, and pretended that all his conquests were made in the Ottoman interest and in this attitude, which was partly forced upon him by increasing contact with the Turks on north and west, an interesting premonition of the subsequent fate of his family may be discovered. While he declined to enter into the schemes of 'Abbās I of Egypt, who sought, by means of an alliance with the Bedouins of the north and an understanding with the Wahhābi government in the south, to render himself independent of the Porte and master of the Arabian peninsula, Talāl maintained friendly relations with that Pāsha and even with his successor Sa'id; but he early discovered the inability of the latter to afford him the slightest protection against either Turkish or Wahhābi aggression. With Persia Talāl cultivated somewhat intimate relations, chiefly in the hope that one of his favourite projects might be realised,—the diversion, namely, of the Persian Hajj, with its incidental trade and foreign intercourse, from a route through Buraidah in Qasim, which it then followed, to a route through Hāil.

Death of Talāl, 1867.

On his return from one of his annual visits to Riyādh, Talāl fell into ill-health, and, dreading the loss of his reason or having actually lost it, he committed suicide by shooting himself. This happened in 1867.

MAT'AB-BIN-'ABDULLAH,

1867-71.

Death of Obaid, 1869.

Talāl was survived by his uncle 'Obaid and by his brothers Mat'ab and Muhammad, and he left also several sons of his own, of whom the eldest was Bandar, born about 1850. The succession fell to Mat'ab, whose short reign of about four years was remarkable chiefly for its tragic end, and for the death in 1869, at a very advanced age, of the veteran 'Obaid. 'Obaid was a true Wahhābi; but, notwithstanding this fact and a harsh, overbearing temper, he was extremely popular. His reputation for capacity and personal prowess also stood very high, and, according to one authority, he was the virtual ruler of the country after the death of his brother 'Abdullah. 'Obaid left six sons, well endowed with property in the shape of lands at Hāil, date-palms at Jauf-al-A'mir and a title to half the produce of Hāyat; but the eldest suffered from the family weakness of insanity, and the others except Hamūd, of whom more hereafter, exhibited various abnormalities and defects

Mat'ab was a mild and intelligent man; but his amiable character did not protect him from the ambition of his nephews Bandar and Badar, sons of Talāl, who assassinated him, probably in 1871. It was probably during the reign of Mat'ab that the Wahhābi Amir 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, having been expelled from power by his brother Sa'ūd, for the first time found a temporary asylum in Jabal Shammar.

Assassination of Mat'ab, 1871.

BANDAR-BIN-TALĀL,

1871-72.

Bandar, after he had thus usurped the Amirship, took the young widow of his murdered uncle to wife; and she bore him a son, 'Asar. To his subjects it seemed that the vengeance of Heaven followed him; for cholera ravaged the country in his day, and power and life were his only for a short twelve months. Muhammad, the only surviving brother of the deceased Mat'ab, took refuge at Riyādh, and for a short while he lived there under the protection of Ibn-Sa'ūd; but ultimately, by Wahhābi mediation, he was enabled to return to Hāil and to resume his place there as manager of the Baghdād-Makkah pilgrim route under the orders of his nephew the Amir. The inevitable collision between the two relations was not long delayed. In a quarrel outside the gates of Hāil, which seems to have been unpremeditated on the part of Muhammad, and in the presence of Badar and Hamūd, who had accompanied Bandar to the interview, the uncle stabbed the nephew dead. Badar fled; Hamūd joined Muhammad, with whom there is reason to think he had from the first sympathised; and the people of Hāil remained passive.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-'ABDULLAH,

1872-97.

General history of Jabal Shammar under Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, 1872-97.

In this manner the power passed to Muhammad, the third and last remaining son of 'Abdullah, the first Mahfūdh; for fate had willed that until the elder generation of the family was exhausted the sway should not fall permanently to any younger member. The first act of Muhammad was one of sanguinary precaution. Except 'Asar, the infant son of Bandar, and Nāif, a son of Talāl, whose lives were unaccountably spared, all the male descendants of Talāl, including Badar who had been captured, were put to death along with their slave foster-brethren; and others also from whom danger was apprehended by the new sovereign, among them, it is said, four sons of his own sister by one Jabbār, perished at his accession.

Accession of Muhammad and murder of the sons Talāl, etc., 1872.

Reception of the Wahhábi ex-Amir, 1873.

In 1873 the Wahhábi Amir 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, having been expelled by his brother Sa'úd, again found an asylum in Shammar territory; but Muhammad, though he supplied his wants, would not allow him to approach Háil. 'Abdullah married Núrah, a favourite sister of Muhammad, and after her death a daughter of 'Olaid, thus connecting himself by a double affinity with the Al Rashíd.

Conquest of Southern Najd by the Shammar Amir, 1877-91.

The history of the great contest for the supremacy in Najd which now occurred, resulting in the victory of Muhammad, is given at length in the preceding chapter; and here the facts need only be recapitulated in such a manner as to avoid a breach in the continuity of our narrative.

First encroachment on the Wahhábi dominions, 1877-84.

In 1877 Ibn-Rashíd forayed the 'Ataibah, a tribe regarded as subject to Riyádh. A little later he detached the district of Sadair and a part of Qasim from the Wahhábi dominions; and his possession of these conquests was apparently confirmed by a short-lived peace arranged in 1882. In 1882 the Wahhábis failed in an attempt to retake Sadair; and the recovery of Buraidah by the Wahhábi commander Muhammad-bin-Sa'úd in 1885 was only temporary. From 1884 onwards the Shammar Amir possessed a decided advantage in the field.

Complete overthrow of the Wahhábi power and subjugation of Qasim, 1891.

In 1887 Muhammad profited by family broils at Riyádh to seize the Wahhábi capital, which he placed under a Shammar governor, and to carry off to Hail, where he detained him for two years, the Wahhábi Amir 'Abdullah. In 1888 Muhammad-bin-Sa'úd, the most active of the Wahhábi family, was killed in Kharj along with two of his brothers. In 1890 Riyádh was taken by 'Abdur Rahman, a younger brother of the late Wahhábi Amir, and Ibn-Rashíd attempted to recover the place by bombardment, but did not succeed. Towards the end of the same year a strong confederation against Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah was formed by the Wahhábis, the people of Qasim, and a number of Bedouin tribes; but in March or April 1891, after successfully resisting him for a time, the league was overthrown by the Shammar Amir at the memorable battle of Buraidah or Mulaidah. 'Anaizah, which had hitherto successfully resisted the attempts of Ibn-Rashíd to reduce it by siege and bombardment, then fell into the hands of the victor, and Riyádh was to a large extent destroyed; while the power of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah became absolute throughout Central Arabia and so continued until the end of his life.

Relations of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah with the Turks, 1872-97.

Attempt of the Turks to

In 1872, immediately after Muhammad's accession, his northern town of Jauf-al-'Amir was surprised by a small Turkish force from Ma'an,

composed of Syrian and Moorish irregulars, and submitted without resistance. The Amir hastened to the spot and entered into negotiations with the leader of the Turks, and it was finally arranged that Jauf should continue to be included in the Shammar territories, but that Ibn-Rashid should pay 1,500 Majidis a year as tribute on account of it to the Sultān and that a Turkish Qāim-Maqām and garrison should remain. In 1874 the Moors of the garrison mutinied, not having received their pay, and handed over the place to Ibn-Rashid, who resumed possession in his own name and enrolled most of the Turkish deserters in his bodyguard. Jauf possessed a special interest for Muhammad, who had been wounded in the foot at its capture during the reign of his brother Talāl.

establish themselves at Jauf-al-Amir, 1872-74.

In 1880 the Amir Muhammad invaded the Hauran country, penetrating as far as Basrah, only 70 miles from Damascus; the result was a reconciliation with the northern tribes, whom it had been his object to coerce; and the conclusion of peace was celebrated by a great feast.

Raid by the Amir on the Syrian border, 1880.

Towards the end of his reign the relations of the Amir Muhammad with his Turkish neighbours appear to have become more friendly and more direct; this may have been the result of attentions paid by the Turks, who no doubt were anxious to profit by the rapid expansion of Ibn-Rashid's power in Central Arabia. In 1886, the way having been prepared by despatch of presents in the preceding year, an Ottoman mission visited Hāil to arrange for the establishment of a Turkish Government mosque and school at Hāil and were dismissed with gifts, but without a favourable answer. In 1888, when his successes in Southern Najd began to be considerable, the Shammar Amir was careful to inform the Porte of his victories and to pretend that he was acting in the Turkish interest. In the same year reports were circulated that Ibn-Rashid was about to invade Trucial 'Omān with the countenance of the Turkish Government; but they turned out to be premature if not baseless, and the existence of any such design was denied by the Porte.

Closer relations with the Turks and occasional friction on the Hasa border, 1885-97.

As noticed in the history of Hasa, some friction, arising out of tribal questions and raids, occurred in 1894 and 1895 between the Shammar Amīr and the Turkish authorities in Hasa.

Government, personality and death of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah.

In almost every year of his reign the Amir Muhammad rode against some offending Bedouin tribe; and the 'Anizah, 'Ataibah and Mutair, in turn, felt the weight of his hand. In April 1885, in retaliation for injuries committed upon some of his subjects, Ibn-Rashid actually raided and plundered a camp of the 'Ajmān so far distant from his capital and so near to the Persian Gulf as 'Awainah in Wādi-al-Miyāh; but on this occasion the 'Ajmān were successful, by a pursuit of his party, in recovering some of their horses that had been carried off. Allusion has just been made above to the Amir's difficulties in 1894 and 1895 with Arab tribes on the borders of Hasa.

Repression of the Bedouins by the Amir Muhammad.

Character and appearance of the Amir Muhammad.

The career of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah seems in itself to prove that he was a man of more than average energy and ability; but he owed much to the constancy and force of character of his cousin Hamûd-bin-'Obaid, and the personality of the latter seems to have made a deeper impression on most European visitors to Hâil than that of the Amir himself. It was during the reign of Muhammad that Northern Najd was visited by Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt, by the Frenchman Mr. C. Huber, and by Mr. C. M. Doughty, of whom the last was without doubt at once the greatest, the most exact, and the most sympathetic of all Central Arabian explorers.

Muhammad was barely of the middle height, but in build he was strong and thick-set. His beard was of the shape known as Spanish.

His personal history and death in 1897.

The Amir Muhammad was many times married. Some of his matrimonial alliances were dictated by political considerations, as for instance that which he contracted with the ruling family of Buraidah by marrying a sister of Husan-bin-Mahanna, but his principal object was undoubtedly to found a family. In this, however, he was disappointed, and he died childless in 1897,—a fate which popular superstition did not fail to connect with his cruel butchery of the sons of Talâl.

'ABDUL 'AZÎZ-BIN-MAT'AB,
1897-1906.

Position of 'Abdul 'Aziz at the beginning of his reign.

The favourite of the late Amir among his younger relations had been 'Abdul 'Aziz, the only son of his murdered brother Mat'ab; and 'Abdul 'Aziz it was who now succeeded to the Amirship. Nothing is known regarding the behaviour of Hamûd and his sons on this occasion; and 'Asar, the son of Bandar, was perhaps already dead. The situation of 'Abdul 'Aziz was difficult on account of the extent of the dominions which, relying on the small resources of Jabal Shammar only, he must hold and govern. At the outset he appears to have further weakened his position by oppressing his more distant subjects, of whose loyalty he was doubtful, by ignoring his father's influential cousin Hamûd-bin-'Obaid, and by making an enemy of Mubârak, Shaikh of Kuwait. The quarrel with Kuwait, which arose out of disputes about the allegiance of Bedouin tribes and was greatly embittered by encouragement subsequently given at Hâil to some rebellious nephews of the Kuwait Shaikh, was especially detrimental to the interests of 'Abdul 'Aziz; for the remarkable personality and far-reaching influence of Shaikh Mubârak were of great service to the cause of Ibn-Sa'ûd, and the port of Kuwait was closed to Ibn-Rashid, who thus became dependent on his suspicious neighbours the Turks for his entire supply of arms and warlike stores. The results were the loss, within a few years, of all Southern Najd and Qasim, and the reduction of Ibn-Rashid himself to a state of complete dependence upon the Porte.

Gradual subversion of the power of the Shammar Amīr by the Wahhābis, 1899-1906.

Invasion of Qasim by the Shaikh of Kuwait and reconquest of Southern Najd by the Wahhābis, 1900-03.

In 1899, not apparently without incitement on the part of the Turks, Ibn-Rashīd assumed a threatening attitude towards the Shaikh of Kuwait; and in the next year open warfare began between the Shammar Amīr and 'Abdur Rahmān, the head of the Wahhābi ruling family, who had for some time been harboured, and was now openly assisted, by the Shaikh of Kuwait. The course of the campaign has been fully related in the chapter on the history of Najd, and here it will suffice merely to mention the principal events. In August 1900 the Wahhābi chief left Kuwait for the interior and achieved some preliminary successes; and two or three months later a collision between Ibn-Rashīd and the Shaikh of Kuwait on the borders of 'Irāq was with difficulty averted by the Turks, whose assistance the former had invoked. Early in 1901 the Shaikh of Kuwait advanced into Qasīm, accompanied by 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn-Sa'ūd, and the position of Ibn-Rashīd appeared somewhat critical; but on the 17th of March, at the battle of Sarīf, the Shammar Amīr succeeded in inflicting a serious defeat on the invaders, by which their force was entirely broken up; on the side of the Shammar, however, Sālim and Mahanna, sons of Hamūd-bin-'Obaid, were killed. In autumn of the same year Ibn-Rashīd took the offensive against Kuwait, making his headquarters at Hafar; and in September a panic was caused at Kuwait by the raids of his partisans in the surrounding district. From November 1901 to January 1902 acute anxiety prevailed in consequence of a movement by Ibn-Rashīd to Safwān not far from Basrah, where he remained in close correspondence with the Turkish officials, and an attack upon Kuwait was believed to be imminent. Dispositions were made, however, by the British naval authorities to assist the Shaikh in repelling any act of aggression; and in the end the Shammar Amīr returned quietly to his country *viâ* the wells of the Lainah. About the time that Ibn-Rashīd withdrew from Safwān, the son of Ibn-Sa'ūd recovered Riyādh and the districts of Kharj and Hariq for his father; and the Shammar Amīr then sought aid from the Wāli of Basrah and from the Grand Wazīr at Constantinople, enforcing his appeal by insinuations that the British Government were assisting his adversary. Qasīm generally had now become favourable to the Wahhābi cause; and in November 1902, having attempted an invasion of Southern Najd, Ibn-Rashīd sustained a serious reverse in Kharj by which, apparently, the whole of that province except Sadair, Washam and Wādi-as-Sirr was lost to him. At the beginning of 1903 the Shammar Amīr still held Zilfi in Sadair; but by the end of the year that town, too, had been regained by the Wahhābis; and in February 1904, on the defeat of a Shammar force in Wādi-as-Sirr, Southern Najd in its entirety reverted to Ibn-Sa'ūd.

Recovery of Qasīm by the Wahhābis, 1904.

The Wahhābis immediately followed up their successes by advancing into Qasīm; and on the 22nd of March 1904 a decisive battle was fought under the walls of 'Anaizah in which Mājid-bin-Hamūd, the

commander of the northern forces, was defeated with loss, and his brother 'Obaid killed. By this unsuccessful action the whole of Qasim was lost to Ibn-Rashid.

Defeat of the Turks and Ibn-Rashid in Qasim, 1904.

The Turks then sent troops from 'Iraq to assist Ibn-Rashid to recover his position in Qasim; but the allied forces were defeated in two disastrous engagements, the first at Bukairiyah on the 15th of July, and the second at Qasr Ibn-'Aqaiyil on the 27th of September. The remains of the Turkish expedition retired upon Kahafah.

Turkish occupation of Qasim and domestic rebellion against Ibn-Rashid, 1905-06.

In April 1905, in consequence of arrangements made by the Porte with Ibn-Sa'ud, a Turkish force, drawn partly from 'Iraq and partly from Hijaz, occupied Qasim without opposition; and the farce was enacted of placing Qasim under nominal Turkish administration. In June 1905, Sultan, son of Hamud-bin-'Obaid, went into rebellion against his relative, the Shammar Amir, and apparently obtained independent possession of Jauf-al-'Amir in the extreme north, not without the countenance of the inhabitants and of the surrounding tribes; he also complained to the Sultan of Turkey against Ibn-Rashid, but without result.

Death of the Amir 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab, 11th April 1906.

After a short respite the Wahhabis, emboldened by the obvious powerlessness of the Turkish garrisons in Qasim, prepared to resume their attacks on Ibn-Rashid; and the Shammar Amir hung on the borders of Qasim, probably with the double object of preventing a northward movement against Hail and of inflicting damage upon the enemy, if an opportunity should occur. In December 1905 Ibn-Rashid was at Kahafah; in March 1906 he was at Thamami in Batin; and on the 11th of April 1906 he was surprised and killed by the Wahhabis at Ruwaidhah, probably not more than 30 miles from the nearest Turkish post. Shortly before his death 'Abdul 'Aziz had invoked the good offices of the Shaikh of Kuwait, whom he had asked to look upon him as a son, and to arrange a peace on his behalf with Ibn-Sa'ud.

Personality of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab.

Partly in consequence of the enmity between him and the Shaikh of Kuwait, by which authentic information regarding Jabal Shammar affairs was prevented from reaching the British political authorities in the Persian Gulf, considerable doubt prevailed, and still prevails, as to the real character of 'Abdul 'Aziz. The impression at first formed of the Amir by our officials was that he was of a harsh and impetuous disposition, without prudence or judgment, and that his administration, especially in his outlying dependencies, was excessively severe and provocative of disloyalty; but the result of later enquiries was to modify this opinion, and to show that he was in the end the victim rather of ill-fortune than of his own folly. His courage and skill as a military leader, despite his want of success in the field, have never apparently been called in question.

Relations of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab with British Government, 1897-1906.

In May 1901, after the invasion of Qasim by the Shaikh of Kuwait and Ibn-Sa'ūd, 'Abdul 'Aziz, disappointed at the dilatory and ineffectual action of the Turks on his behalf and strongly impressed with the advantages which the Shaikh of Kuwait had derived from British protection, made overtures on his own account to the British Government. The occasion was a message sent him by the British political authorities, suggesting that he should settle his differences with Shaikh Mubārak, to which the Amir replied by a letter written in a somewhat haughty strain; but simultaneously he caused his agent at Basrah to inform Mr. Wratislaw, the British Consul there, that the written communication was a mere blind, and that he really desired to cultivate good relations with the British Government. He suggested that the British Government should undertake to supply him, at his own cost, with arms and ammunition, and that they should depose his enemy, the actual Shaikh of Kuwait, in favour of a nephew: the Amir on his part, would undertake not to interfere in Kuwait affairs, and would guarantee the safe construction by British enterprise of railways across Arabia. Overtures from the Shammar Amir to the British Government, 1901.

The Government of India, while they considered that the Amir's requests were such as could not be granted, were anxious not to alienate his sympathy. They therefore proposed that a British officer should be sent from the side of 'Aqabah to interview the Amir and to ascertain more particularly his views and the nature of his personality, and they thought it might even be advisable that the British Government should undertake to restrain the Shaikh of Kuwait in future from hostilities against the Amir and to use their good offices to prevent Turkish aggressions on Najd; but His Majesty's Government, fearing that a mission might give rise to complications with Turkey and that anything in the nature of a protectorate might involve obligations which could not be discharged without resort to material force, withheld their approval. Accordingly no action was taken; and a few months later, as we have seen, the Shammar Amir fell more completely than before into the hands of the Turks and even joined with them in threatening an attack on Kuwait, after which no further communications passed between the Amir 'Abdul 'Aziz and the British Government. Orders of His Majesty's Government on the same and result.

MAT'AB-BIN-'ABDUL 'AZIZ.

1906-07.

'Abdul 'Aziz was succeeded by his eldest son Mat'ab, a youth about 18 years of age, whose straightforwardness and generosity, aided by Position of Mat'ab at his

succession, April 1905.

the remission of a year's taxes and the restoration of various personal allowances that had been reduced or abolished by his father, produced an immediate and favourable impression upon his subjects. The principality of Jabal Shammar was now, however, so impoverished that the young Amir could no longer find the annual tribute of 80 horses which his predecessors had been accustomed to pay to the Sultán of Turkey.

Relations with Ibn-Sa'úd and the Shaikh of Kuwait.

After the death of 'Abdul 'Aziz the Wahhábis continued to press their advantage against his successor, and in June 1906 the son of Ibn-Sa'úd appeared at the very gates of Háil demanding tribute, but he could not take the capital, and he was soon obliged by scarcity of supplies to withdraw from its vicinity. The Shaikh of Kuwait, who had apparently consented to negotiate with the Wahhábi ruler on behalf of the late 'Abdul 'Aziz, agreed at the urgent request of the new Shammar Amír, of his elderly relation Hamúd and of others of the family, to continue his efforts; and at length in July 1906, after discussions between the principals or their agents in Qasim, a regular peace was arranged, apparently on the basis that each Amir should keep what he then held.

Relations with the Porte.

The Turks showed much sympathy with the Amír Mat'ab when he came to power, but their own position in Qasim was so weak that they could afford him no real assistance; and the Sultán accordingly confined himself to condoling with the young chief on his father's death, to recognising him as his father's successor, and to promising the punishment of his father's murderers and the continuance to himself of his father's subsidy. In September 1906 Tálib Pásha, an aide-de-camp of the Sultán, arrived at Háil with a Turkish decoration for the Amír; but in November 1906 the Turkish garrison, except a score or two of men, was withdrawn from Qasim, and Turkish influence in Najd virtually ceased to exist.

Murder of Mat'ab-bin-Abdul 'Aziz, January 1907.

In the first week of January 1907 a fresh crime was added to the blood-stained annals of the Al Rashid. Sultán-bin-Hamúd, who had withdrawn to Jauf in 1905 and had subsequently returned to Háil, induced the Amir Mat'ab to join him on a hunting expedition in the country, in the course of which he treacherously shot him dead with his own hand; and simultaneously Sultán's brothers, Sa'úd and Faisal and his cousin, Dhári killed Mash'al and Muhammad, the brothers of the Amír, and Talál, the son of the Amir's cousin Náif. On their return to camp the murderers gave out that Talál had killed the sons of 'Abdul 'Aziz and that they had taken immediate vengeance on him, but their story obtained no credence. An infant son of Talál-bin-Náif was also put to death. By these crimes not a single male descendant of 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, the first Mahfúdh of Jabal Shammar, was left alive except an infant son of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab, whom his mother had apparently taken with her on a pilgrimage to Madinah. The females of 'Abdullah's branch were next expelled, or themselves voluntarily emigrated, to Madinah, whither Hamúd-bin-'Obaid, the senior member of the Al Rashíd family also betook himself, arriving there on the 7th of April. Hamúd had lived in retirement at Háil during the lifetime of 'Abdul 'Aziz, of whose policy he did not approve, and who did not seek his advice; but one of his daughters had married 'Abdul 'Aziz and was the mother of the Amir Mat'ab and his brothers; and it seemed that the old man's heart was broken by the murder of his grandsons by his sons.

SULTAN-BIN-HAMŪD, SINCE 1907.

The attitude of Sultān after his accession was subservient towards Ibn-Sa'ūd, with whom he appeared anxious to establish good relations; but the Turkish Government apparently did not recognise Sultān, for the allowances paid by the Porte to his two predecessors were not continued in his favour. Sultān twice made overtures through the Shaikh of Kuwait to the British Government; but they were not acknowledged (1907). Position of Sultān after his accession.

ANNEXURE NO. 2.—SEPARATE HISTORY OF THE QASĪM DISTRICT.

Early History of Qasim.

The detailed narrative of affairs in Central Arabia given in the preceding chapter and Annexure leaves little besides internal affairs to be noticed in the present separate history of Qasim.

Qasim appears to have been among the first acquisitions of the rising Wahhābi power at the end of the 18th century; but no details have been preserved of the manner in which it was occupied or incorporated with the Wahhabi dominions.

Qasim entered by the Egyptians, 1815, and the Egyptian occupation of Qasim, 1817-24.

The invasion of Qasīm by Tūsūn Pāsha in 1815, resulting in a peace between the Egyptians and the Wahhābis, and the occupation of the district by the Egyptians between 1817 and 1824 are fully dealt with elsewhere. From the encouragement given to Tūsūn Pāsha by some of the leading men in Qasīm it would seem that in 1815 a considerable proportion of the inhabitants were discontented with Wahhābi rule; but Hijailān, the most influential of the local chiefs, was devoted to the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd and would hold no communication with the Egyptians. The principal operations of Ibrāhim Pāsha's campaign in Qasīm were an unsuccessful siege of Rass, the capture of Khabrah and 'Anaizah, and the occupation of Buraidah without resistance. The bulk of the Egyptian troops seem to have been withdrawn from Qasīm about 1819, the year in which Captain Sadleir passed through 'Anaizah and Rass

on a political mission from the Government of India to Ibrāhim Pasha; but some apparently remained until 1824, when the Wahhābi Amīr Faisal-bin-Turki, at his accession, drove the last of the Egyptian garrisons from Najd.

Wahhābi reconquest of Qasim through the Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar, about 1835.

Nothing is known of the position of Qasim during the years that immediately followed the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops; but it is probable that the district enjoyed practical independence. When 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, the first of the Al-Rashid to rule Jabal Shammar, was placed over that province in 1835 by the Wahhābi Amīr Faisal, his principal opponents, the Bait 'Ali, whose influence had hitherto predominated in the northern principality, were supported by the people of Qasim; and the final result of the struggle was the subjugation of Qasim by 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, who handed it over to his master, the Wahhābi Amīr. It was perhaps during this period that an ill-conducted expedition started from 'Anaizah to attack the Amīr of Hāil and received short shrift at the hand of his brother 'Obaid.

Egyptian occupation of Qasim, 1837-1842.

The second occupation of Qasim by the Egyptians is described, like the first, in another place; it began apparently in 1837, when the Egyptians sent troops into Najd to assist Khalid-bin-Sa'ūd, whom they had put forward as a claimant of the Wahhābi Amīrship in opposition to Faisal-bin-Turki. It was from Qasim that Khālid, after he in his turn, had been ousted from power by 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān, made an ineffectual effort to recover Southern Najd in 1842; and it was in Qasim that the ex-Amīr Faisal, returning from his captivity in Egypt, commenced his victorious march on Riyadh in 1843. The exact date of the withdrawal of the last Egyptian military post from Qasim cannot be fixed; but it must have been later than the spring of 1842, when a few Egyptian soldiers attached to the Amīr Khālid still remained in Hasa.

Period from 1842 to 1862.

During the first few years after the withdrawal of the Egyptians the people of Qasim appear to have co-operated with the Wahhābi authorities for the restoration of order in Najd, and to have furnished military

contingents and paid annual tribute with regularity to the Wahhābi Government.

Rebellion of Qasim against the Wahhābis 1848, and its subjugation.

In 1848, however, true to the instinct which invariably bade them counteract a rising power, the Qusmān, after secret negotiations, transferred their direct allegiance from Riyādh to Hāil. The Wahhābi Amir for a time acquiesced in the change and accepted the explanations of his vassal at Hāil; but before long he began to put in force against the people of Qasim the levelling and incorporating policy which they themselves had assisted him to apply to Southern Najd. Buraidah, smaller and less important than 'Anaizah, was the first place singled out for reduction; and, its commerce having been cut off, the town quickly became desirous of peace. Thereupon the Wahhābi Amir invited some members of the leading family, the Bani 'Alaiyān, to Riyādh to discuss terms; but on their arrival he caused them to be massacred and instantly despatched his son 'Abdullah with an army to Qasim. Paralysed by the suddenness of these occurrences Buraidah submitted; and Mahanna, a rigid Wahhābi and a native of Riyādh, was installed there as governor.

Successful revolt of 'Anaizah against the Wahhābis, 1853.

The exact date of these events and of the annexation of 'Anaizah, which in 1852 was governed by Jalui, a brother of the Wahhābi Amir, cannot be determined; but it was in 1853 that the people of 'Anaizah, finding the Wahhābi yoke intolerable, rose under Yahya, whose son 'Abdullah was Shaikh at the time, and quietly and without bloodshed removed Jalui to Buraidah. The Wahhābi Amir Faisal at once marched from Riyādh against 'Anaizah and was joined before the walls by his Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar; but their united forces could make no impression on the stubborn town, which was partially self-supporting on account of the fields and date-plantations enclosed within the outer walls. According to one account the Wahhābis were at last induced to raise the siege by the Sharif of Makkah, who, from the point of view of his own interests, regarded the independence of 'Anaizah as a valuable check upon the Wahhābis, and whose mediation the Shaikh of 'Anaizah had sought.

Wahhābi administration in Qasim, 1853-62.

For some years after the failure of this expedition, the Wahhābis occupied themselves with crushing the Harb and 'Ataibah Bedouins, who were partisans of 'Anaizah, and with extending the dependencies of Buraidah, their headquarters in Qasim, in such a way as to isolate and harass 'Anaizah. Mahanna, the Wahhābi governor of Buraidah, was an oppressive and extortionate ruffian who did his best to break the spirit of the Qusmān under his rule by sending them on frequent military expeditions in the interest of the Wahhābis; in 1856 he fleeced a Persian pilgrim caravan so effectually that for two years the Persian Hajj across Arabia ceased altogether; and it was probably some characteristic act of his which occasioned the flight from Buraidah of a certain 'Abdullah-al-'Aziz, a member of the former ruling family. The fugitive was kindly received by the people of 'Anaizah, but soon afterwards he was murdered by Wahhābis in the desert.

Unsuccessful attempt of the Wahhābis to reduce 'Anaizah, 1862.

Open hostilities which were now declared by Ibn-Sa'ūd against 'Anaizah may have been a consequence of this incident, for the people of 'Anaizah considered themselves at feud with the Wahhābi Amir on account of the murder of their guest; but it has also been stated that the war was provoked by the refusal of the Shaikh of 'Anaizah to

appear in person before the Wahhābi Amīr and answer for tribute which was claimed of him. 'Anaizah was at this time ruled by Zāmil, who had seen fighting in his youth as leader of the 'Anaizah contingent in a Wahhābi expedition against 'Omān, and whose name was honourably distinguished in the later history of Qasīm; he had succeeded his cousin 'Abdullah, who was Shaikh in 1853, but his father also had once held the Shaikhship. The Wahhābis began their operations against 'Anaizah with a loose blockade organised by Mahanna from the neighbouring town of Buraidah, to which the people of 'Anaizah retorted vigorously by laying waste the lands and gardens of Buraidah. All Qasīm secretly sympathised with the 'Anaizans, and even Buraidah itself, between which town and 'Anaizah enmity usually prevailed, was on the verge of rising against the Wahhābis. Ibn-Rashīd and the Sharīf of Makkah would willingly have intervened, but they dreaded a personal rupture with Ibn-Sa'ūd; and 'Anaizah was left to stand alone.*

By degrees a large force was collected before 'Anaizah under a near relation of the Wahhābi Amīr who brought with him Bedouin contingents from distant Hasa and still more distant 'Omān; Talāl, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, with his uncle 'Obaid joined the Wahhābi camp; and Mahanna, governor of Buraidah, and the Wahhābis of Qasīm were already present. A regular siege of 'Anaizah was then undertaken, but the Wahhābi artillery produced no effect on the walls and the operations soon flagged, for the Qasīm levy at heart desired their failure and the Bedouins brought from a distance felt no interest in their success. On one occasion a part of the besieging force was routed by a sally of the besieged, a Wahhābi standard was taken, and Zāmil, no less humane than courageous, was already exerting himself to prevent a massacre of the fugitives, when of a sudden a rain-storm broke and the matches of the 'Anaizah musketeers were extinguished: in a moment the mounted Wahhābis had ridden them down and the half-won victory of the defenders of 'Anaizah was converted into the most serious defeat that they suffered during the whole siege. After this only two petty skirmishes took place, and finally the Wahhābis retired leaving 'Anaizah as they found it, a free town.

Period from 1862 to 1891.

Qasīm indigenous and at rest from war, 1862-80.

During the next 30 years Qasīm appears to have enjoyed immunity from disturbances, except those of a petty character resulting from raids by Bedouins upon Bedouins, and from punitive expeditions by the settled population against nomad breakers of the peace. In 1878 a notable defeat was inflicted on the Qahtān near the wells of Dakhnah by the Mutair, with whom they were at feud, assisted by the townsmen of 'Anaizah. By 1880 Buraidah had become a practically independent town

* At this juncture Palgrave, whose supposed mission from the Emperor of the French to the Wahhābi Amīr is noticed in the history of Najd, passed through Qasīm on his way from Hail to Riyadh.

and no longer paid any deference to the Wahhābi ruler; but it showed considerable respect for the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, whose power was now increasing from day to day. This was the time of the wanderings in Qasim of the enterprising French cartographer Mr. C. Huber and of his greater contemporary, the private English traveller Mr. C. M. Doughty, whose name stands with that of Niebuhr above those of all other workers in the Arabian field.

Qasīm conquered by Ibn-Rashīd, 1880-91.

A little after this Ibn-Rashīd possessed himself of Buraidah and its dependencies; but he was at first no more successful than the Wahhābis had been in his efforts to subjugate 'Anaizah. In 1885 Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, a Wahhābi commander, defeated the Shammar Amīr in Qasīm and temporarily recovered Buraidah; this was, for the time the last decided success gained by the Wahhābis in Qasim. In 1890 a combination to resist the progress of Ibn-Rashīd was formed, embracing the whole of Qasim and Southern Najd besides the Bedouin tribes of the 'Ataibah and Mutair; but it was disastrously defeated, at the battle of Buraidah or Mulaidah, which was fought in March or April 1891. The veteran Zāmil of 'Anaizah, who seems to have been the leading spirit among the confederates, was himself among the slain; with him fell his second son 'Alī and his relatives Khalīd-bin-'Abdullah and 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-Ibrāhim; and a number of the ruling Salaimi family of Buraidah were carried into captivity at Hāil.

Qasim a district of Jabal Shammar, 1891-1904.

The Shammar Amīr at once placed Qasim under a governor of his own, and for ten years the political position of the district remained unchanged. In 1901 the invasion of Qasīm by the Shaikh of Kuwait, acting in the Wahhābi interest, encouraged the Qusmān to hope for release from Shammar tyranny; but their expectations were disappointed by the defeat of the invaders at the battle of Sarif, and many of them suffered severely for having ventured to show premature sympathy with the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd. Among those killed in the battle were Sālih-bin-'Alī, Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Muhammad-bin-Hasan, Sālih-bin-'Abdullah, 'Alī-bin-'Abdullah, and Muhammad-bin-Ibrāhīm, all belonging to the ruling Abul Khail family of Buraidah; and several other members of that family were either deported by Ibn-Rashīd to Hāil or obliged to seek safety in exile. At length, in March 1904, the whole of Qasīm was lost to Ibn-Rashīd in consequence of an encounter, near 'Anaizah, between his troops and those of the Wahhābis.

Turkish invasion of Qasim, 1904, and Turkish occupation of the district, 1905-06.

The subsequent course of events in Qasim is so fully described in the preceding chapter on the history of Najd that nothing can be added here.

In 1904 the Turks, in alliance with Ibn-Rashíd, invaded Qasīm; but they suffered two serious defeats at the hands of the Qusmān and Ibn-Sa'ūd and were obliged to retire to the village of Kahāfah in Jabal Shammar. In April 1905, under arrangements made with Ibn-Sa'ūd, they achieved a pacific occupation of Qasīm which continued until November 1906; but it was never effective, and they were unable to prevent the Wahhābis from attacking and killing their ally Ibn-Rashíd on the borders of the district, or to obtain any satisfaction from Ibn-Sa'ūd for the kidnapping by his son of Sālih-bin-Hasan, Amīr of Buraidah, whom they had appointed to be Qāim-Maqām. In 1907 the Turkish troops remaining in Qasīm numbered less than 50 men. After the death of Ibn-Rashíd a number of political prisoners belonging to the ruling families of 'Anaizah and Buraidah, taken after the battles of Buraidah (1891) and Sarīf (1901), were released; and others who had been living abroad began to return home from exile.

CHAPTER IX.

HISTORY OF TURKISH 'IRĀQ.

In 1600, the year from which we begin our survey of the modern history of Turkish 'Iraq, Muhammad III was Sultān of Turkey; and war prevailed, as related in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, between him and Shah 'Abbās I, the Safavī monarch of Persia. In 1600 a considerable part of north-western Persia, conquered by the Turks some years previously, was still subject to the Porte and formed a Pashāliq of Tabriz, which was reckoned the third in the Ottoman Empire as being next in dignity after those of Cairo and Baghdād; but in 1603, that is shortly before the death of Muhammad III, Tabriz was recovered by the Persians, and the Turks were partially expelled from Persia.

AHMAD I, 1603—17.*

Muhammad III died on the 22nd of December 1603 and was succeeded in the Sultanate by Ahmad I, the elder of his two surviving sons.

* The special authorities for the history of Turkish 'Iraq from 1600 to 1773 are an anonymous official *Précis of Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600—1800*, printed in 1905; besides which the *Voyage en Arabie*, 1776 of Niebuhr, who travelled in the country in 1765-1766, contains a large amount of relevant information. Facts relating to particular periods will also be found in the following works: *Travels of Pedro Teixeira*, 1902, relating to 1604; *Travels of Sig. Pietro della Valle*, 1665, relating to 1625; *Collections of Travels through Turkey into Persia and the East Indies*, 1684, by J. B. Tavernier, whose journey in Turkish 'Iraq was made in 1652; and a *New Account of the East Indies*, 1739, by Captain A. Hamilton, whose acquaintance with the country seems to have extended from 1688 to 1723. Professor E. S. Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, 1856, may be consulted for general Turkish affairs during the period, and Sir J. Malcolm's *History of Persia*, 1815, in regard to Turko-Persian relations.

Relations with Persia, 1603—17.

The war with Persia continued, under the new sovereign, to the increasing disadvantage of Turkey. In 1604 'Ali Vardi Khán, a Persian general, advanced into the neighbourhood of Baghdád; but after a series of skirmishes, in which he captured about 300 prisoners, he suddenly and somewhat unaccountably withdrew. In 1605 a Persian force began an investment of Baghdád, but it was recalled by the Sháh, who had now resolved to crush the Ottomans in the field and who, by dint of immense preparations, was afterwards completely successful in so doing. The war, however, was carried on, without any very notable incident, during the whole reign of Ahmad I. About 1614 a fleet of 100 "frigates" and galleys was said to be maintained by the Persians at Rishehr, in order to prevent communication between the Turkish port of Basrah and the Portuguese port of Hormúz, both of which the Persians regarded as hostile.

Internal history, 1603—17.

The Portuguese traveller Pedro Teixeira, who visited 'Iráq in 1604, has left an interesting description of the province as it was in that year; and his account is specially instructive in regard to the indirect results, in the country, of the disastrous war which the Turks were then waging in Persia.

Baghdád in 1604.

Baghdád, at this time the second government in the Turkish Empire and inferior in importance to Egypt only, was governed in 1604 by Yúsuf Pásha, a Circassian eunuch, who had very recently been appointed to the Pashálíq. The power of this official was absolute in most matters, whether in peace or war; but, in dealing with merchants and foreigners, he had to reckon with an official protector of those classes who resided at Baghdád on the part of the Sultán of Turkey. As Baghdád had recently been threatened by the Persians, the extent of the military resources of the local government was one of the most important questions at the time of Teixeira's visit; and the traveller observed that the Pásha had at command, in addition to a personal guard of 1,500 to 2,000 men, a force of 4,000 or 5,000 troops in Baghdád itself, of whom about 1,500

were Janissaries, and nearly 10,000 more in the vicinity. The wall enclosing the city on the side towards Persia was at this time of burnt brick; connected with it were many subsidiary works, including four strong bastions on which heavy bronze guns in good condition were mounted; and outside was a deep ditch. There was a mint at Baghdād in which gold, silver and copper coins were struck; and a school of archery and another of musketry were maintained by the government. Trade was carried on with India by way of the Tigris and Basrah, and with Aleppo across the desert; in ordinary times of peace there was also a direct trade with Persia.

The Karbala-Najaf frontier in 1604.

Karbala and Najaf were ordinarily subject to Ottoman authority, Turkish garrisons were usually quartered in both those towns, and the nearest of the influential desert Shaikhs, Nāsir-bin-Mahanna, was accustomed to profess allegiance to the Porte; but in 1604, on account of the defeats lately sustained by the Turkish forces in Persia and of the withdrawal of the customary Turkish garrison, Karbala was in a state of revolt; and during Teixeira's stay there the horses, clothing and arms of some 30 or 40 Turkish soldiers, recently killed by Arabs of the place, were sold in the open market. Both at Karbala and at Najaf the Shia'h prejudice against Jews and Christians was at this time very strong.

Basrah in 1604.

The town of Basrah comprised in the same year about 10,000 houses, many large but of poor construction, and others merely reed huts. The fortifications were in ruins, but outside them ran a deep and wide ditch, filled with water from the creek. The town and its dependencies were governed by a Pāsha; the military garrison at headquarters amounted to 3,000 Turks, Kurds and Arabs; and a customs house existed, of which the receipts, after defraying all administrative expenses, yielded a large surplus. There was an arsenal containing some good artillery; but the armed vessels maintained by the Turks "for use in the river and thereabouts, to keep in order the rebellious Arabs, from whom they exact heavy tribute" were described as "few, of small scantling, and ill-built." The Shaikh of Arabistān, to whom Hawīzeh and Dōraq—the modern Fallāhīyeh—belonged, claimed Basrah, and in 1604 he was at war with the Turks; and the Ottoman authorities, to restrain amphibious Arab marauders, had built forts at numerous places on the bank of the river. Among these posts was one on the 'Arabistān side of the river opposite to Sarāji, three miles below Basrah, where was the anchorage for large vessels visiting the port. Dates were in those days, as now, the principal export of Basrah, and went to Baghdād, to various Persian ports and to Hormūz; trade generally was with Baghdād, Persia, Qatif, Hasa, Bahrain and Hormōz, all Indian goods being

received from the last named market, which was still in the possession of the Portuguese; and some food-stuffs were imported from Dūraq in 'Arabistān and from Rīg and Rīshehr upon the Persian Coast.

English relations, 1603—17.

The East India Company had not, during this period, any establishments in Turkish 'Irāq; but the despatch of Connock to Persia on their behalf in 1616, as related in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, led to the opening up of an English line of communication between Persia and Europe *viâ* Baghdād and Aleppo. In June 1617, Connock, who was then at Isfahān, requested the English Consul at Aleppo to arrange for a couple of trustworthy Arab messengers to convey his correspondence between Baghdād and that place; the chief danger to be guarded against was, apparently, interception of the despatches by Portuguese emissaries at Baghdād. In August of the same year Connock transmitted by this route the news of his success in obtaining a Farmān for English trade from Shāh 'Abbās.

MUSTAFA I (FIRST REIGN) and 'OTHMĀN II, 1617—22.

On the death of the Sultān Ahmad I, on the 22nd of November 1617, his younger brother Mustafa was raised to the throne; but, proving imbecile, he was deposed after a brief reign of three months. On the 26th of February 1618 the place of Mustafa was taken by 'Othmān II, a son of Ahmad I, whose age at the time was only 14 years; and 'Othmān ruled until 1622, when he was murdered by Janissaries.

In the reign of 'Othmān II a peace was made with Persia, having for basis the surrender of all the Turkish conquests in Persia; and during the period no event of importance occurred in 'Irāq. In 1619 the Court of the East India Company in London continued to receive news of Persian affairs through Aleppo.

MUSTAFA I (SECOND REIGN) and MURĀD IV, 1622—40.

On the death of 'Othmān II, Mustafa once more became Sultān of Turkey; but insanity again necessitated his removal after the lapse

of about a year, and he was succeeded by Murād IV, a younger brother of 'Othmān II, whose age, at his accession on the 10th September 1623, was only 11 years. Murād occupied the throne until his death on the 9th of February 1640.

Relations with Persia, 1622–40.

Occupation of Baghdād by the Persians, 1623.

The peace between Turkey and Persia was of short duration, for the Persians were not slow in turning to account the military superiority which at this period they indisputably possessed over the Turks, and they soon began to threaten Baghdād. Baghdād was in the possession of a local "tyrant," who had seized the government and was endeavouring to make himself independent of the Porte; but in 1623 his son, named Darwīsh Muhammad, betrayed the city into the hands of Shāh 'Abbās, who at once occupied it and put the usurping ruler publicly to death. Kirkūk, Mūsal and 'Ānah were then taken and garrisoned by the Persians; but the invaders did not long retain possession of 'Ānah, whence their Qizilbāsh garrison was expelled soon after the return of Shāh 'Abbās to Persia by Mutlaq, surnamed Abu Rish, the greatest of all the Arab Shaikhs of the desert. Hillah, Karbala and Najaf appear to have come under the authority of the Shāh soon after the fall of Baghdād; and there were fears, though ill-founded, on the part of the Turks for the safety even of Aleppo. Imām Quli Khān, governor of Shīrāz, whom the Shāh had ordered to join him in the operations against Baghdād, did not arrive until after the taking of the place; he had been delayed *en route* by difficulties with the Shaikh of Hawīzeh, who as a vassal of Persia should have accompanied his march.

Attacks by the Persians on Basrah or its dependencies, 1624-25.

After the fall of Hormūz in 1622 the Portuguese at first withdrew altogether from business in Persia and began to dispose of their goods chiefly at Basrah,—a system of trading which was highly disadvantageous to Persia, and one which the Shāh, on account of his naval weakness, could not hope to prevent except by capturing Basrah. He consequently required the Pāsha of Basrah, then Afrāsiyāb, a native of the country, to acknowledge the suzerainty of Persia by causing Persian coin to be struck, by substituting the name of the Shāh for that of the Sultān in public prayers, and by obliging the people of Basrah to wear their turbans in the Persian style; and he promised that, on these conditions being fulfilled, the Pāsha and his heirs should be recognised as

the hereditary rulers of Basrah, should be exempted from payment of tribute, and should enjoy perfect independence in all local concerns.

1624. This proposal the Pāsha of Basrah, relying on the naval aid of the Portuguese, whose interests in the matter were identical with his own, unhesitatingly rejected; and thereupon Shāh 'Abbās directed the Khān of Shīrāz to proceed against him. A Persian army, descending into 'Arabistān by way of Shūshtar, attacked and very nearly captured Qubbān, which was then regarded as a dependency of Basrah; but Qubbān was saved by the efforts of the Portuguese, whose vessels, either from the Karūn river or from Khor Qanāgeh, bombarded the Persian camp; and the invaders retired. This attack on Qubbān took place in 1624. The Persian troops employed in it, as in most of the operations around Baghdād, were described as Qizilbāsh.

1625. About the beginning of 1625 the Persians under Imām Quli Khān made a fresh incursion into Basrah territory; but first they expelled from Hawīzeh the Shaikh of that place, who had neglected to comply with the Shāh's summons to Baghdād, and who now took refuge at Basrah with about 500 followers. In the meanwhile Afrāsiyāb had been succeeded in the Pashāliq of Basrah by his son 'Alī; and, as both Baghdād and Hillah, commanding the Tigris and the Euphrates respectively, were now held by the Persians, it was impossible for the Turks to send help to the new Pāsha. In March 1625, when the Italian traveller Pietro della Valle was at Basrah, panic prevailed, and the chief reliance of the Pāsha was on five Portuguese vessels, for the services of which the Portuguese received a liberal subsidy and which they kept anchored in the river to protect the town. On the 13th of March proclamation was made in the town that every house must send one armed man to the Pāsha's camp to be employed against the Persians, who were now said to be close at hand. On the 14th news was received that the Persian forces were in the neighbourhood of Qūrnah, their object being evidently to cross unopposed to the Arabian bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab; and the Pāsha set out with his whole land force and three of the Portuguese ships to encounter them. On the 16th of March the two armies were reported to be in contact; and on the same day Gonsalvo de Silveira, the Portuguese naval commander, sent his remaining two ships and a smaller vessel to intercept, if possible, seven pieces of artillery which the Persians, it was thought, were about to bring by sea to Dōraq for use against Basrah. On the 19th an eminent citizen of Basrah, Shaikh 'Abdus Salām, mustered a large body of armed men, with which he proposed to march to the assistance of the Pāsha; it included no less

than 200 Sabians, carrying arquebuses and other weapons like the rest, but unwarlike in their appearance. On the 23rd authentic intelligence reached Basrah that the Persians had hastily abandoned their camp and marched away towards their own country, leaving their supplies and even their cooked provisions behind, and the cause of the movement was conjectured to be an order of recall, for no loss had as yet been inflicted on them by the troops of the Pāsha of Basrah. On the 31st of March the two Portuguese ships despatched on the 16th returned to Basrah, having failed in their principal object. Three Persian Tarādahs, however, had been captured, all the Muhammadans on board of which, including children, the Portuguese according to their barbarous custom put to death, except one rich man whom they kept alive in hope of a large ransom. On the 7th of April, the Persians being now at a safe distance, the Pāsha re-entered Basrah in triumph with all his troops.

Affairs from 1625 to 1638.

After these events matters remained *in statu quo* for a number of years. The Turks, it would appear, occasionally endeavoured, but without avail, to dislodge the Persians from Baghdād; two of their assaults were repulsed with success towards the end of the period by Safi Quli Khān, an Armenian by race, who then governed Baghdād in the name of the Shāh. In 1625 the influence of the Persians extended so far down the Euphrates as 'Arjah, a place on the left bank occupying approximately the position of the modern Nāsiriyah; and the chief of 'Arjah, one Hasan Āgha, a refugee Kurd who had established a strong influence over the surrounding Arabs, was believed to be at heart devoted to the Persian interest, though openly he still professed obedience to the Porte.

Recovery of Baghdād by the Turks, 1638.

In 1638 the Turkish Sultān, Murād IV, who in 1635 had wrested Erivan from the Persians, marched in person with a large force to recover Baghdād; his host set forth from Scutari on the 8th of May; and on the 15th of November, after 110 days of actual marching interspersed with halts, it arrived before Baghdād. The city was found garrisoned by about 30,000 men, of whom 1,200 were trained musketeers. By the 22nd December 1638 the defences of Baghdād along a front of 800 yards had been so completely levelled with the ground that, in the words of an Ottoman Writer, "a blind man might have galloped over them with loose bridle without his horse stumbling." The attempts made by the Turks to storm the breach on that and the following day were repulsed, but on the 24th of December it was carried with the loss of Tayyār Muhammad Pāsha, the Sultān's Grand Vazīr, who was shot dead in leading the attack. Quarter was at first granted to the garrison; but later, whether treacherously

or on account of some breach of conditions by the Persians, it was revoked, and over 20,000 of the defeated army were massacred. A few days later a general slaughter of the civil inhabitants of Baghdād took place under the orders of Murād, infuriated at the explosion of a powder magazine which had caused great loss among his troops. The Sultān remained in 'Irāq until February 1639, possibly visiting Najaf, where one of the * town gates is still called after him "Bāb Murād"; at his departure from Baghdād he is said to have passed through the Bāb-al-Tilism, which was then bricked up and has never since been opened. A strong Turkish garrison, commanded by a capable officer, was left at Baghdād; and from that time to the present the city has remained continuously under Turkish rule, but it has never again been visited by the Turkish sovereign.†

Peace with Persia, 1639.

In 1639 a permanent peace was arranged between Turkey and Persia, the common frontier of the two empires being at the same ‡ time fixed in general terms by a Treaty drawn up after "much stormy discussion" between the Ottoman Prime Minister and a Persian Commissioner. The terms of this settlement, which was reaffirmed in 1746 and again in 1823, will call for notice hereafter.

Internal history, 1622—40.

The Pashāliq of Basrah, 1622-40.

Probably about the beginning of the 17th century, the Pashāliq of Basrah came into the possession of Afrāsiyāb Pāsha, already mentioned, a man of good position in the neighbourhood, who, according to one account, obtained the government by paying 40,000 piastres to Aiyūd, the official nominee of the Porte. The Turks, having regard to the strength of Afrāsiyāb's local influence, to the excellence of his administration, to his profes-

* Local tradition asserts that Murād, to show his respect for 'Alī, entered Najaf on foot, and that in passing through the gate in question his turban was thrown from his head by the jostling of the crowd. This story appears highly improbable, but it does not follow that Murād did not visit Najaf.

† The above account of the recovery of Baghdād is mainly from Professor Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, Volume 1, pages 408-11. Tavernier in his *Persian Travels*, Book II, Chapter VII, gives a different version of the affair, which, though obtained upon the spot and almost contemporaneous, seems improbable. Both accounts agree that over 20,000 of the garrison were massacred after having received quarter.

‡ The substance of the treaty of 1639 is given in Rawlinson's *Memorandum on the Turko-Persian Frontier*, 1844.

sion of loyalty to the Porte and, most of all perhaps, to the difficulty of expelling him by force, acquiesced; and Basrah and its dependencies must, from this time until about 1669, be regarded as beyond their direct control. Afrāsiyāb treated foreigners in his dominions with consideration, and trade flourished under his rule; he died apparently about the end of 1624 or the beginning of 1625; and he was succeeded by his son 'Alī Pāsha, who "had intruded into the Government by force before his Father expired."

One of the first tasks that devolved on 'Alī Pāsha was the defence of Basrah against the Persians when they threatened it in March 1625; and the news of his confirmation in the Pashāliq, accompanied by a robe of honour and a scimitar from the Sultān of Turkey, reached Basrah on the 13th of May 1625 during the sojourn there of the traveller Pietro della Valle. At some later period 'Alī Pāsha caused Qūrnah, formerly an open town, to be fortified.

Affairs on the Karbala-Najaf frontier, 1622—40.

In 1625 there was much unrest upon the western frontier of 'Irāq, due to the behaviour of Mutlaq, surnamed Abu Rīsh, and of Nāsir-bin-Mahanna, two principal Shaikhs of the desert who were at war with one another; the former was the more powerful, being paramount chief of some very large tribe* in the north; but the latter was the nearer to 'Irāq, and caravans ordinarily travelled from Basrah to Karbala and some distance beyond it under his protection, for which they paid a high price. At the taking of Baghdād by the Persians in 1623 Nāsir had declared for the Shāh, while Abu Rīsh continued to support the Turks; but Nāsir soon broke with the Persians, and in June 1625 he attempted, after impressing into his service the members of a large caravan on its way from Basrah to Aleppo, to drive the Persians out of Karbala. The garrison, however, repelled his attack with loss. In the same month the traveller Pietro della Valle, while encamped at Qasr-al-Akhaidhir near Shifāthah, was subjected to extortion by Shaikh Abu Tālib, the son of Shaikh Nāsir, to whom his father, now old and retired from worldly affairs, had committed all executive functions in the tribe. A few marches further on Pietro della Valle entered the territories of Abu Rīsh, to whom also he was obliged to pay toll.

* The actual tribe to which either of these Shaikhs belonged cannot be determined. It may have been, in either case, the 'Aniah, the Banī Khālid or the Northern Shammar. Probably both Shaikhs did not belong to the same tribe. From his geographical position it seems not unlikely that Mutlaq was head of the 'Aniah.

English relations, 1622-40.

Beginning of English trade at Basrah, 1635.

English commercial relations with 'Irāq were first established during the period with which we are now dealing. Their institution seems to have been due to an idea that the East India Company's trade, which in Persia was then hampered by numerous obstacles, might find freer course under the Turkish flag. The first step, taken in 1635, consisted in the despatch by the Company to Basrah of a pinnace with a small "investment."

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1622—40.

The first Latin Bishop of Babylon, that is of Baghdād, was appointed in 1638 and was M. Bernard du Val, a French Carmelite.

IBRĀHĪM,

1640—48.

Murād, at his death on the 9th of February 1640, was succeeded by his brother Ibrāhīm, who ruled until August 1648 and was then murdered by Janissaries.

English relations, 1640—48.

Of the interna affairs of 'Irāq under the Sultanate of Ibrāhīm little is* known; but some facts relating to the affairs of the English East India Company have been preserved.

1640—43. In 1640, under pressure of competition elsewhere by the Dutch and by Courten's Association, Messrs. Thurston and Pearce, two employés of the Company, were sent with an experimental cargo to Basrah. They

* The names and dates of the Pāshas of Baghdād during this period will be found in Niebuhr's *Voyage en Arabie*, Volume II, page 252.

arrived there on the 31st of May and obtained a license from the Pāsha to land their goods; but the market had been recently glutted by the arrival of a Portuguese trading fleet from Masqat, and they only realised Rs. 30,000 by their sales. Political disturbances in 'Irāq in 1641 seem to have delayed further action; but by 1643 an English Factory had come into existence at Basrah on a provisional footing, and the returns were so satisfactory that it was decided to make it permanent. Dutch competition had not as yet penetrated to Basrah; and there it was found possible to exchange English luxuries, which were appreciated by the wealthier natives, for goods saleable in England.

In June 1645 the property of the East India Company at Bandar 'Abbās was temporarily transferred to Basrah during a crisis between the Persians and the Dutch, but the Dutch had now found their way into the Basrah market. In 1645-46 the representatives of the Company at Basrah were Thomas Cogan and William Weale. The trade of the English in 'Iraq was temporarily ruined in 1645 by the arrival of a Dutch fleet at Basrah; and in 1647-48 the Company's business between India and Basrah continued unprofitable owing to the keen rivalry of the Dutch. 1645—48.

MUHAMMAD IV.

1648—87.

Ibrāhīm was followed in the Sultanate of Turkey by Muhammad IV, who reigned from 1648 to 1687.

Internal affairs, 1648—87.

Almost all that we know of the internal state of 'Irāq during the reign of Muhammad IV we owe to the traveller Tavernier, who visited Baghdad and journeyed down the Tigris to Basrah in the year 1642. Baghdad in 1652.

Tavernier found Baghdad under the government of a Pāsha; and its importance was at this time still largely military. The city wall was of brick, and on the bastions were mounted about 60 guns, none of which, however, could throw a shot of more than five or six pounds weight; the moat was wide and five or six fathoms deep; and the citadel, mounting 150 guns, mostly without carriages, occupied the

same site as at the present day, near to the Mu'adhdham gate. The garrison as Baghdad amounted to about 5,000 men, including 300 Janissaries, some cavalry, and about 60 artillerists,—the last under the command of Signor Michael, a European who had taken part in the siege of 1638 on the side of the Turks. The trade of the city, though considerable, was less than it had been under the Persians; this was attributed to the slaughter by the Turks, at the capture of the place, of many of the richest merchants; and from Tavernier's remarks it may be inferred that Baghdād was in 1652 to a great extent depopulated. The majority of the inhabitants were Shi'ahs, but they were obliged to behave with civility towards Sunnis and the followers of other religions. On the Tigris below Baghdād taxes on buffaloes and other animals were collected by the Turkish officials as at the present time.

Basrah in 1652.

The ruler of Basrah in 1652 was Husain Pāsha, a son of 'Alī Pāsha and grandson of Afrāsiyāb Pāsha; this ruler, like his two predecessors, considered himself virtually independent of the Porte. Since his accession to power he had strengthened Qūrnah, of which his son was governor, with a second wall; his fort there was well provided with artillery, and at Qūrnah all vessels proceeding down the river were examined and supplied with passes showing the amount of customs duty to which they were liable and which they must pay at Basrah. At Basrah the police arrangements were admirable, and the port was frequented by many foreigners including the Dutch, who came annually bringing spices, the English, who dealt in pepper and to a less extent in cloves, and Indians who imported calico, indigo and miscellaneous goods; there were also many traders from other parts of the Turkish Empire. The principal source of the Pāsha's wealth was a tax upon date palms; but he also derived considerable profit from coining his own money; and customs duty was collected at Basrah at a rate nominally of five per cent., but in practice of four only. There were no longer any Portugese friars at Basrah; but Carmelites, at this time Italians, still remained.

Events at Basrah after 1652.

The policy of Husain Pasha was liberal, especially towards Christians, and brought him wealth; he extended the town wall of Basrah to the bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab and built a fortified residence in the suburb now known as Manāwi; and at last he so far presumed upon the prosperity of his affairs as to commit aggressions on the Baghdād Pashālīq and to annex some of its villages. He was successful in repelling a force which the Turks then despatched against him from Baghdād; but a young

relation, whom he sent to Constantinople to negotiate on his behalf, played him false and returned with troops and an authority from the Sultān to assume the Government of Basrah himself. A contest ensued of which the result was unfavourable to Husain Pāsha and obliged him to retire to Persia, and Basrah and its dependencies came under the power of his rival. This revolution, which seems to have had the effect of restoring direct Turkish control over Basrah and the surrounding districts, took place in or about the year 1669.*

English relations, 1648—87.

East India Company's trade with Basrah, 1648—87. Seizure by the Pāsha of the Company's possessions at Basrah, 1657.

English relations with 'Irāq, during the period now under consideration, depended solely on the commercial connection of the East India Company with Basrah.

The experimental Factory established at Basrah about 1648, though it is not mentioned by Tavernier who visited the place in 1652, apparently continued to exist until 1657, in which year the Pāsha of Basrah, in consequence of a rumour propagated by the Merchant Adventurers that the East India Company was about to be dissolved, seized upon the premises and goods of the Company. A Mr. Bell had visited Basrah in that year with one of the Company's vessels, but he had only succeeded in obtaining freight to the amount of Rs. 900 for his return voyage.

Voyage of Messrs. Cranmer and Sainthill to Basrah, 1661.

In April 1661 Messrs. George Cranmer and Robert Sainthill were sent from Sūrat to Basrah in the "Amerita" frigate with a cargo of Sūrat and other cloth, pepper, cassia lignum, rice, etc. They were instructed to remind the Pāsha of a promise given by him in the previous year that he would provide "a better house than that taken from the Hon'ble Company," and, if their representations on this point failed, they were to hire suitable premises on their own account. Freight goods were to be landed at once; but goods for sale were to be kept on board ship, with a view to avoiding payment of customs, until any doubts that might appear as to their profitable disposal had been removed. Mr. Sainthill was to return on the "Amerita," which was not to be detained beyond the 20th of September; but Mr. Cranmer was to remain until the amounts due for goods sold had been collected in full.

*A somewhat different and fuller account of Husain Pāsha's affairs is given by Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, in *his Précis of the relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistān, 1912, page 7.*

Voyage of Messrs. Lambton and Bromfield to Basrah, 1662.

In 1662 the Presidency of Sūrat ordered the ship "Seaflower" to be despatched to Basrah, with a cargo in charge of Messrs. Ralph Lambton and Henry Bromfield.

Voyage of Mr. Adames to Basrah, 1676.

In April 1676 the Sūrat Presidency appointed Mr. James Adames to the second place on their establishment in Persia and sent him to the Gulf in the "Revenge," with orders first to deliver some freight goods shipped for Basrah and then to return to Bandar 'Abbās and assume his appointment.

The Capitulations, 1661—75.

The celebrated Capitulations* with Turkey, a set of articles defining generally the rights of English subjects in the Turkish Empire and restricting the customs duty exigible from the English to 3 per cent., were concluded by Heneage, Earl of Winchelsea, Ambassador Extraordinary from the King of England to the Porte, in 1661; and in 1675 they were amended and amplified through Sir John Finch, another English Ambassador.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1648—87.

In 1679 Louis XIV of France by a decree appointed the Superior of the Carmelites at Basrah to be, *ex-officio*, French Consul at that place, irrespective of his personal nationality.

SULAIMĀN II, AHMAD II, MUSTAFA II and AHMAD III, 1687—1730.

The reigns of the next four Sultāns of Turkey, *viz.*, Sulaimān II (1687—91), Ahmad II (1691—95), Mustafa II (1695—1703) and Ahmad III (1703-30), were not distinguished by any very remarkable events in the region of the Persian Gulf. The general course of Turco-Persian relations after the Afghān occupation of Persia in 1722 is described in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, from which it will be seen that the Turks obtained possession of a large part of north-western Persia and were at first inclined to enter on a partition of the country with the Russians and a representative of the late Safavi Persian dynasty, but that they afterwards came to an understanding with the Afghāns, and that they finally began to retire from Persia before Nādir Shāh.

* The text of the Capitulations, as finally confirmed (with alterations) by the Treaty of Peace concluded at the Dardanelles in 1809, will be found in Aitchison's *Treaties*.

Internal affairs, 1687—1730.

The slightness of the English official relations with Basrah during the period and the general absence of accounts by private travellers leave us in almost complete ignorance of the state of 'Irāq between 1687 and 1730.*

Persian occupation of Basrah, ending 1691.

During a series of years, ending in 1691, Basrah appears to have been occupied by the Persians; this occupation must apparently have begun during the period last described (1648—87), and it may have been a consequence of the retirement to Persia of Husain Pāsha, the rightful governor, on his expulsion from Basrah, as already related, by a younger relation. No facts concerning the Persian administration of Basrah are on record, but it is stated to have been favourable to trade. In 1691 the Persians withdrew from Basrah in consequence, it would seem, of a severe epidemic of plague; and thereafter the town remained in a politically derelict condition and partly deserted by the inhabitants until 1695, when the Ottoman Government resumed possession.

Administration of Baghdād and amalgamation of the Baghdād and Basrah governments, 1702—23.

In 1702, when a certain Hasan Pāsha was appointed for the second time governor of Baghdād, the province of 'Irāq and its dependencies was in a miserable state of disorganisation. The Janissaries were masters of the city of Baghdād, and the Arabs held the surrounding country; security of trade did not exist; and most of the local merchants had migrated to Isfahān. The neighbouring district of Kurdistān was ruled by an independent Pāsha of the first class; the governor of Mārdīn was appointed direct from Constantinople; and even Basrah was a Pashāliq altogether separate from that of Baghdād. Hasan Pāsha, who must have been a man of strong character and who derived additional prestige from his ability to intervene with advantage to Turkey in the distracted affairs of Persia, succeeded in the course of his rule of 21 years in remedying these evils. In the Baghdād Pashāliq he broke the power of the Janissaries and the Arabs, re-establishing security of life and property; he obtained the addition of Mārdīn to his own territories; and, by persistently creating difficulties for the Pāshas sent from Constantinople to take charge of Basrah, he in the end secured that government for his own son Ahmad. On his death, in 1723, he was succeeded by Ahmad, who so recommended himself to the Porte by his conduct in Persian

* Hamilton (*vide* his *New Account*, Volume I, pages 75 to 88) appears to be the only contemporaneous authority having local knowledge. A list of the Pāshas of Baghdād is given, however, by Nisbahr in his *Voyage en Arabie*, Volume II, pages 362-3.

affairs that he was permitted to retain Baghdād, Basrah and Mārdin as a single charge.

Maladministration at Basrah about 1721.

It seems probable, from the maladministration which prevailed at the time of Captain Hamilton's acquaintance with Basrah, *viz.*, about 1721, that the place had then only recently come under the strong rule of Hasan Pāsha through his son Ahmad. Large Janissary forces were maintained at Qūrnah and at Basrah, the garrison of the former being much stronger than that of the latter place; and 8 or 10 armed galleys were maintained at Qūrnah, as against only 5 at Basrah. The officers of the galleys, under a "Captain Pāsha" or Commodore of their own, were at this time independent of the ordinary civil authorities; and in 1721, in a rebellion of the civil population against the governor of Basrah, by whose exactions they were being ruined, the Mufti of Basrah and the Turkish naval officers ranged themselves on the side of the rebels and formed a camp on the Shatt-al-'Arab, apparently at or near Manāwi; and eventually the civil governor, though no fighting took place, was obliged to come to terms with them and to put to death one of his own minions, a notorious blackmailer and extortioner. Official robbery was now the rule; the native merchants looked back with regret to the days of the Persian occupation; and even Europeans were not exempt from annoyance, for in 1721, Captain Hamilton himself was compelled by the Pāsha to part with a quantity of pepper, which he had brought for sale, at a price below that which had been offered him by merchants. Troubles between the Turks and the Arabs, due to the rigorous collection of taxes by the former, appear to have been not infrequent. Captain Hamilton gives minute details of a case in which a party of Janissaries, sent to exact revenue, were destroyed to the last man by the Arabs whom they had gone to coerce; he describes the affair as having occurred at Qubbān; but, from his account, 'Abbadān Island seems more likely to have been the scene of the tragedy.*

Muhammad Pāsha appointed to Basrah, 1727.

At the end of 1727 one Muhammad Pāsha was appointed, presumably by Ahmad Pāsha of Baghdād, to the Government of Basrah.

English relations, 1687—1730.

During the first part of the half century with which we are now concerned, the English trade with Basrah must have been carried on from

* Even this supposition is not free from difficulties, created perhaps by some change in the course of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Súrat or Bandar 'Abbás, for the East India Company's records, though they contain numerous references to "Bassorah ships," do not mention any Basrah Factory. Captain Hamilton's dealings in pepper and the ill-treatment which he received at Basrah in 1721 have already been noticed above.

Establishment of a permanent Factory at Basrah, about 1723.

About 1723, or perhaps earlier, a permanent Factory was evidently established at Basrah. In April 1724, the President and Council at Bombay held a consultation on the state of the Company's affairs at Basrah, and it was remarked that "there is nothing yet done for "the advantage of our hon'ble employers, more than a promise obtained "from the Bashaw that we shall pay but three per cent. duties* on the "broadcloth, none of which being disposed of at the time Mr. Houssay "despatched those advices; the prospect he gives us of selling it seems "rather an amusement than any real application to serve his employers, "while he continues so much involved in private trade." As the said Mr. Houssay had carried with him to Basrah the greater part of the effects of a deceased Factor at Bandar 'Abbás and had given no account of the same, and as it was rumoured that he intended to depart thence direct to Europe without either being granted leave or returning to head-quarters as required by the Company's rules, it was decided to recall him to Bandar 'Abbás; but, in order that Basrah might not be left unoccupied, the Agent in Persia was directed to proceed thither himself, or, if he could not go, to send a Mr. E. Edlyne in his stead. At the same meeting a notification was drawn up, to be published at Basrah, "requiring all the subjects of Great Britain trading under the Honourable Company's protection to be conformable to the rules of the factory, and "positively forbidding them to treat with the Government in any matters "relating to their trade but through the factory."

Difficulties with the local government at Basrah 1727-28.

In 1727-28, Mr. French being then the Company's representative at Basrah, several difficulties with the local government arose; but they were all, in the end, satisfactorily adjusted. In 1727 the Pásha suddenly demanded a poll tax of five Qurúsh per head on account of the Persian servants employed by Europeans at Basrah. The Dutch evaded the requisition by discharging their servants; but Mr. French positively

* This, as we have seen, was the maximum fixed by the Capitulations, but it is probable that at this time the Pásha of Basrah did not readily acquiesce in any limitations imposed on him by the Government at Constantinople; moreover, as will appear further on, neither the Pásha himself nor the Company's representative at Basrah had a copy of the Capitulations. In 1702, when Sir N. Waite of the English or New East India Company sent agents to Basrah to make enquiries, they reported that customs would be payable at the rate of eight per cent.

refused to comply, "pleading and insisting that, by the phirmaund "granted to the English,* they were exempted from such impositions, offer- "ing to deliver up the same again if it was not intended to be conformed "to, which at last had the desired effect." Soon after this, having been badgered for a present by the Pāsha's Kehiyah or deputy, Mr. French, on the arrival of the Company's ship "Britannia," purposely did not hoist the English flag as usual. The Pāsha then gave him fresh assurances of friendship and protection, and, when this had been done, a reconciliation took place, after which relations continued on a better footing for a time. In 1728 the Company's representative at Basrah received from Constantinople, apparently through the British Embassy there, an order of the Sultān of Turkey directing the Pāsha of Basrah to comply "with the terms stipulated with that Government on Mr. Houssay's first arrival," from which it would appear that the opening of the Factory at Basrah about 1723 had been preceded by some agreement with the local authorities; but this order was not immediately serviceable to its full extent, for it referred to the Capitulations, of which neither the Pāsha nor Mr. French had a copy; and Mr. French was obliged again to refer to the Ambassador. In August 1728 another difficulty arose from the arrest by the Turks of Mr. French's Linguist, whom they put in irons for having presumed to administer the estate of a deceased Armenian without an order from the Qādhi. Mr. French, with the rest of the English at Basrah, immediately retired on board the "Britannia," and the affair ended much to his advantage; for the Pāsha, or perhaps the Captain Pāsha, † in the end "gave him assurances of all the favour and "protection he could desire, and a phirmaund, that in case any of our "servants for the future commit any crimes we shall have the liberty of "punishing them ourselves, and when any disputes shall arise about debts "or contracts with the country people the Cauzy shall examine the affair "in the presence of our Resident, and in case he (the Resident) shall think "the sentence not equitable it shall not bind till the Bashaw, upon a fair "hearing, confirms it." At the time when these difficulties were in course of settlement the Company had various claims against the Pāsha on account of exactions, but it does not appear that they were ever successfully enforced. The attitude of the Pāsha, however, was after this much more favourable to the Factory.

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*The reference must be to some written guarantee of the local government. See last footnote

† This term is explained further on, see page 1214.

The Company's goods at Basrah seem to have consisted at this time chiefly of broadcloth, "perfects,"* "long ells" and other kinds of cloth; but iron also was imported, apparently for the markets of Hawizeh and Shūshtar. From October to December was the best time to obtain freights for India, for the boats from Baghdād and the caravans from Aleppo ordinarily reached Basrah in those months. The Company's trade and consulage at Basrah, 1727-28.

The amount recovered at Basrah between the 31st of July 1727 and the 1st of January 1728 as "consulage" due to the Company amounted to 26,904 Mahmūdis and 19 Qurūsh. This "consulage" was a duty recoverable by English Ambassadors and Consuls on goods carried in English ships, and was recognised by the 35th Article of the Capitulations; and, from its being collected at Basrah by the Company's representative, it appears that he must have been invested with consular status.† The rate of consula at this time is not stated.

MAHMUD I.
1730–54.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Persia, 1730-54.

As explained in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, war prevailed, at the accession of the Sultān Mahmūd I in 1730, between Turkey and Persia; and it continued, with varying fortune and an interval of peace after 1736, until 1744. The principal events of this contest were, in 'Irāq, the operations of Nādir Shāh against Baghdād in 1733 and two attempts by the Persians to capture Basrah, of which the second was made in 1743.

In 1733‡ Nādir Shāh, who had recently become regent of Persia on the deposition of Shāh Tahmāsb, invaded Turkish 'Irāq and laid siege to Baghdād, of which Ahmad Pāsha, the able and energetic son of Hasan Nādir Shāh's operations against Baghdād, 1733.

* *Quaere*, "perpets."

† It was apparently in the power of the English Ambassador at this time to appoint a Consul anywhere in the Turkish Empire—see Article 14 of the Capitulations in their original form, as given in the *Précis containing Information in regard to the first Connection of the Honourable East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874, Appendix A—but, from the circumstances in which a "Consulary Birat" for Basrah was obtained in 1764, (*vide* page 1223 post) it would seem that until that year the consular character of the Company's representative there had not been formally admitted by the Porte.

‡ According to Nishānji, Nādir's siege of Baghdād lasted eight months, and in that case it must have begun in December 1732.

Pāsha, was still governor; but his principal opponent was an ex-Vazīr of the Turkish Empire, named Tōpal 'Othmān or 'Othmān the Lame, who had been specially sent from Constantinople to command the Sultān's forces against the Persians. This 'Othmān has been described as a man "justly celebrated by Christian as well as Mahomedan writers, ... and who "was not only skilful, sage, and valiant, but who gave proofs of a noble "spirit of generosity and gratitude, such as does honour to human "nature." Nādir Shāh, leaving a considerable force in the trenches before Baghdād, advanced with his main body against Tōpal 'Othmān, who was encamped near Sāmarrah on the Tigris; and in that vicinity, on or about the 18th of July 1733, was fought one of the bloodiest engagements that ever took place between Turks and Persians. It resulted after a furious combat lasting eight hours, in the complete overthrow and rout of Nādir Shāh's army, which was not rallied until it reached Hamadān; and Ahmad Pāsha, on receiving news of the Turkish victory, sallied out against the Persian division investing Baghdād and drove them off with great slaughter, few of them, it was said, regaining Persia in safety, except a party commanded by Mahmūd Khān, Balūch. Within three months Nādir Shāh, whom this disaster had not dispirited, invaded Turkish territory with a fresh army; a battle followed, in which the Persians were victorious; and Tōpal 'Othmān himself who was infirm and generally rode in a litter, was among the slain. His head was brought to Nādir Shāh, who caused it to be sent with all honour to the Turkish camp.

Persian attacks on Basrah, 1735 and 1740.

Great offence was given to Nādir Shāh by the action of the British at Basrah in helping, or preparing to help, the Turks in the defence of that place against a Persian force, apparently in 1735. What actually occurred is not known; but the circumstances provoked a demand by Nādir Shāh that the British should expiate their fault by rendering him assistance against Basrah, and in connection therewith it is remarked in a Bombay Presidency Diary, under the date 22nd October 1735, that "the unlucky "affair at Basrah (of which the private traders only reaped the "advantage) first gave rise to these troubles." The authorities at Bombay, however, doubtful as to the manner in which a loan of vessels by themselves to the Persians might be regarded in Europe and fearing that it might excite the Turks to take extreme measures against the British at Basrah, strictly enjoined the Agent at Bandar 'Abbās not to place any of their ships temporarily at the disposal of the Persians; but they authorised him, in case their interests in Persia could not be secured by any other means, to resort to the safer expedient of sale, and two ships were eventually

transferred in this manner. In 1736 a peace between the Persians and the Turks removed for a time the prospect of further collisions.

In 1741 signs of renewed activity in the direction of Basrah were given by the Persians, who were said to be building boat-bridges at Hawīzeh; and on the 28th of August 1743 they laid siege to the town with a force estimated at 12,000 men. Mr. Dorrill, the British Resident, found himself in a difficult position: he had done what he could to avoid complications by preventing British vessels from remaining at the port, and he had even sent away a small brigantine of his own; but the crew of the latter, who were Arabs, had compelled the master to bring her back to Basrah. Mr. Dorrill, having firmly refused to lead his vessel to the local authorities, was arrested by their orders and kept as a prisoner for two days in a tent upon the town wall, when he submitted, fearing worse evils; but in the meanwhile he had caused the brigantine to be damaged and practically scuttled, and the Turks, on becoming aware of this, released him and dropped the matter. By Nādir Shāh's orders the siege was discontinued on the 27th of November, and the Persian troops marched away with their artillery on the 5th of December. The Persians, during the siege, destroyed the buildings over the tombs of Zubair and Talhah at Old Basrah, as having been erected in honour of rebels against 'Alī; but the shrines were rebuilt by the inhabitants soon after their departure. 1743.

No further hostilities between the Persians and the Turks took place in 'Irāq during the reign of Mahmūd I; and in 1746 the boundary of the two Empires was re-established by a Treaty, in accordance with the old arrangement between the Turkish Sultān Murād IV and his Persian contemporary in 1639, on a line which towards its southern extremity divided Khūzistān (or 'Arabistān) from 'Irāq-i-'Arabi; but this line itself was not defined. The Treaty also disposed of all other important questions pending between Turkey and Persia. 1746.

Internal affairs of Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

During the reign of Mahmūd I, Baghdād and Basrah with their dependencies continued to form one Pashāliq, and the Pāsha, who resided at Baghdād, was generally represented at Basrah by a Mutasallim or governor of his own appointment. At times, if not always, there was also a Captain Pāsha* at Basrah.

* See page 1214 *post*.

Government of Ahmad Pāsha, till 1748.

Ahmad Pāsha, as we have seen, still ruled Baghdād when it was attacked by the Persians in 1733. He was temporarily removed by the Sultān, accepting his dismissal with a good grace, about 1734; but his successors were unable to maintain order, and about 1736 he was reinstated. In 1741 the Porte proposed to take Basrah from Ahmad Pāsha and give it to a certain Husain Pāsha; but they were unable, apparently, to give effect to their intentions. The Persian attack on Basrah in 1743 was said to have been promoted by Ahmad Pāsha for the purpose of enhancing his own importance, or of preventing his own removal from office for a second time; it became the means of procuring him money, guns, and other supplies from the Porte; and after its failure he remained in undisturbed enjoyment of power until his death, which occurred from natural causes in 1747 or 1748, in the course of a campaign against the Kurds. Ahmad Pāsha was a skilful horseman, and his principal recreation was hunting lions, which he more than once killed single-handed, armed only with a spear.

In 1741 Ahmad Pāsha severely chastised the Bedouins, who had rebelled, and it was anticipated that they would give no more trouble for some years; but in 1746 the Arabs near Basrah created disturbances, and a force was sent against them from Baghdād under the Pāsha's Kehiyah or deputy. The Kehiyah was anxious to visit Basrah itself, but he was prevented by the Pāsha and had to content himself with sending for some of the principal inhabitants, from whom he extorted large presents. In the spring of 1747 a new Mutasallim was sent by Ahmad Pāsha to Basrah with orders for a reassessment of the date groves, "in order to oppress the Arabs in their tax, whereupon"—so wrote Mr. Grendon, the British Resident at Basrah—"thinking themselves "already too highly imposed upon, the tribe called Montefiqks are rebelled, "and to secure themselves and to (cause) the Turks all the detriment "in their power, they have opened the banks of the river which has laid "the desert quite under water, to the very walls at Basrah; this accident "has put the inhabitants into the greatest consternation, being now "apprehensive lest the disagreeable stench arising from it should cause "a pestilential fever." In June the inundation became so serious that three bastions of the Basrah town wall collapsed, and the whole of the inhabitants were placed on corvée for three days to repair the tottering ramparts. Shaikh Sa'dūn, the chief of the Muntafik was twice captured by the forces of Ahmad Pāsha, and on the second occasion was put to death by Sulaimān, the Pāsha's Kehiyah; and this measure, followed by the treacherous execution of 15 or 20 leading men among the Muntafik

who came one day to visit Sulaimān, reduced the tribe to a state of impotence from which it did not recover for many years. The Banī Lām also, upon the Tigris, were severely crippled by a sudden raid which Ahmad made upon them.

Government of Sulaimān Pāsha, from 1749.

Ahmad Pāsha left no male heir; but his Kehiyah Sulaimān Pāsha, to whom, though originally a Georgian slave, he had given his eldest daughter 'Ādilah Khātūn, a haughty and ambitious lady, in marriage, was considered to represent the family after his death and to be the natural successor to the Pashāliq. The Porte, however, had other views, and while they made Basrah a separate Pashāliq and ultimately gave it as a solatium to Sulaimān Pāsha, they attempted to establish their own immediate authority at Baghdād by sending three or four Pāshas in succession from Constantinople; but all of these were unsuccessful in coping with the unruly Arab tribes of the country. The first of the intruding Pāshas of Baghdād was "Cour Vazier," who, as he was bombarded in his Sarāi and expelled by the Janissaries before the 13th of March 1748, may have been merely some local official; and his place was taken by Hāji Ahmad Pāsha, who had been originally destined for Basrah and who had already appointed the Captain Pāsha there to act for him until his arrival. Early in 1749 Sulaimān Pāsha, who had meanwhile been nominated Pāsha of Basrah, advanced up the Euphrates by Samāwah and Dīwāniyah to the neighbourhood of Hillah. He was accompanied at the outset by his personal guard only; but 'Ali Āgha, the governor of Dīwāniyah, secretly espoused his cause and at once left for Baghdād to seduce the troops of the governing Pāsha—now apparently Tiryāki Hāji Muhammad, an ex-Wazīr—from their allegiance. This he did with such success that, when the two Pāshas encountered near Hillah, the Baghdād Pāsha, though his force consisted of 14,000 men as against 800 with Sulaimān, was obliged to fly; and before the end of the year Sulaimān Pāsha was recognised by the Porte as ruler of all the provinces that had been held by Ahmad Pāsha.

On the 22nd of February 1750 Sulaimān Pāsha's Mutasallim arrived at Basrah and received charge of the place from a Captain Pāsha who had been acting as governor; the latter was evidently expected to resist displacement, but instead he retired quietly to Manāwi. A visit from Sulaimān Pāsha in person was anticipated at this time, "when it is very certain numbers of worthless heads will be chopped off," but it appears that he did not come; and the Captain Pāsha may even have escaped the fate that was predicted for him on account of his having insulted the family of Sulaimān during the latter's absence on his campaign against

Baghdád. In 1752 the effects of Sulaimán Pásha's administration began to be perceptible in the greater security which prevailed around Basrah, and the British Resident was able to report: "For some time past this "country has been in perfect tranquillity; the Arabs kept under due "restraint; grain of all kinds been very cheap; the merchants of the "city unmolested, and the place in general in a more quiet state than for "many years before."

British political and general relations with Turkish 'Iráq, 1730–54.

British political relations with Turkish 'Iráq still consisted solely in the dealings of the East India Company's servants with the local government.

Difficulties at Basrah, 1735.

Reference has already been made to the difficulties in which the British were involved at Basrah, about 1735, in consequence of hostilities there between the Persians and the Turks, and to the concessions which it was found necessary to make in the matter to Nádir Sháh; but the British Resident at Basrah was not withdrawn, as had at one time been intended, for the purpose of convincing the Persians that the British had no leaning towards the Turks; and the Agent at Bandar 'Abbás, who had been invested at the end of 1735 with discretion to prevent ships under the Company's protection from visiting Basrah, found no occasion to exercise his powers.

Resident's journey to Baghdád, 1736-26.

In March 1726 Mr. French, the British Resident, had lately returned to Basrah from Baghdád; the object of his journey to the capital, which seems to have been undertaken on his own responsibility, was to obtain redress from the Pásha for misbehaviour on the part of the Mutasallim of Basrah; and in this he was entirely successful.

Journeys of the Assistant to the Resident to Baghdád, 1737-38.

In 1738 Mr. Dorrill, the Assistant to the Resident at Basrah, was sent by Mr. Whitwell, the Resident, to wait on Ahmad Pásha at Baghdád with a present and solicit his aid in recovering debts due, especially from Bedouins, to the estate of Mr. French, who had died in the preceding year. Mr. Dorrill had visited Baghdád in 1737 also. After 20,000 "Telotas" * had been recovered in barley, dates and wheat, the Pásha recalled the Ágha whom he had sent to Basrah to manage the business; and, as it was seen that nothing further could be expected without more payments, Mr. Dorrill was ordered to return to Basrah. The cost of Mr. Dorrill's mission was charged to Mr. French's estate, of which 30,000 Telotas remained unrecovered.

* The value of this coin is not stated.

The siege of Basrah by the Persians in 1743 led, as we had already seen, to a serious affront to Mr. Dorrill, the Resident; and the general behaviour of the Mutasallim and the other officials towards him, as also their demands for loans, had become so outrageous that in 1744 he proposed, if Ahmad Pāsha neglected his complaints, to retire on board ship and, if his grievances still remained unredressed, to leave Basrah. The authorities at Bombay, however, advised him to remain, provided he could do so by "submitting only to a small expense," and matters seem to have been temporarily adjusted. In 1745 there was fresh trouble between the Resident and the Mutasallim, arising partly out of Mr. French's estate against which claims amounting to 166,005 Mahmūdis had been brought by native creditors, and Mr. Dorrill had prepared to retire to Būshehr; but the Turks seized goods belonging to some of the Company's Bombay servants and shipped them for Baghdād, obliging him instead to repair in haste to the capital, where the creditors resided. On this occasion the Resident was well received by Ahmad Pāsha, who removed the Mutasallim of Basrah, replacing him by Yahya Āgha, a former satisfactory governor, and caused the property of some members of the Mutasallim's council to be sequestrated.

Ill-treatment of the British Resident and various cases 1743—45.

In 1747, in consequence of the inundation deliberately caused in that year by Arab rebels against the Pasha's authority and of the pestilence by which he apprehended that it would be followed, Mr. Grendon, the Resident at Basrah, sought permission to withdraw for a time to Baghdād, Khārag, Rig or Būshehr; but his request was refused by the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās.

Suggested withdrawal of the Resident from Basrah, 1747.

In June 1748 Mr. Grendon, who appears not to have liked Basrah, suddenly made over charge of the Residency to Mr. Pompet, Writer, and left for Bombay on private affairs, without first obtaining permission from his superiors. The Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās animadverted severely on his conduct, and they considered it to be the more reprehensible because Husain Pāsha, a new Mutasallim, who was one of the debtors to Mr. French's estate, had arrived at the time of his departure within a few days' march of Basrah.

Basrah Residency left in charge of a Writer, 1748.

In April 1749, Sulaimān Pasha having marched from Basrah to attack the Pāsha of Baghdād, his Kehiyah, whom he had left behind, demanded a loan from the Resident in addition to one already given. The Resident, however, struck his flag and threatened to leave Basrah, whereupon the Kehiyah desisted and sent an influential deputation to beg him to stay.

Threatened withdrawal of the Resident from Basrah, 1749.

In 1751 the Mutasallim of Basrah was again guilty of "violent measures and extraordinary behaviour" towards the Resident, who

Renewed trouble with

the local officials at Basrah 1751.

complained to Sulaimān Pāsha; and the latter administered "so very effectual" a reprimand to his subordinate that the business of the British Factory was thereafter carried on without the least hindrance or molestation.

Collection of documents bearing on British grants and privileges 1752-54.

In 1752 the Resident at Basrah was ordered to furnish translations, which had been called for by the Presidency of Bombay, of all the grants, etc., under which the British enjoyed privileges in 'Irāq. The required documents could not all be obtained at Basrah, and the Resident accordingly referred to the Ambassador at Constantinople; but up to February 1754 the necessary papers had not been received at Basrah.

Instructions to the Resident at Basrah, 1753.

In 1753 Mr. Shaw was appointed Resident at Basrah and received some general instructions from the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās in which they remarked: "We are likewise to acquaint you that the "Hon'ble Company will admit of no excuse for lending money to the "Government, or selling their goods to them, without first receiving the "amount; as by this means they are sure to sustain no loss from bad "debts."

Civility of Sulaimān Pāsha to the Resident at Basrah, 1754.

In July 1754 Sulaimān Pāsha of Baghdād, possibly influenced by the trouble he was experiencing from the Dutch at Khārag, made friendly advances to Mr. Shaw, the British Resident at Basrah, and sent him "a "fine Turkish sabre, with a very noble horse, richly caparisoned with "gilt furniture, with very extraordinary letters of compliments from the "Bashaw, his Kia (or First Minister), and Cuzenedar, or Master of the "Household, and Shahbunder, etc., expressing the particular satisfaction "they received from the regular decent conduct of our nation at all times "in the Bashaw's Government, and therein expressed their readiness, not "only to confirm all former grants and favours, but even to add to them, "if need were, as they found at all times made so proper a use thereof as "to render us daily deserving of additional instances of their particular "affection and esteem." The Resident, on receiving these presents and compliments at a large assembly in the Sarāi, "failed not to muster all the little rhetoric he was master of;" and subsequently he asked to be allowed to charge the cost of the return presents to the Company "as it is the custom at all other places on such public occasions."

Trade, consulage and other dues of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

Trade proper, 1730—54.

The official records contain few notices of the East India Company's trade at Basrah during this period. In 1733 the markets of Turkish

'Irāq were greatly disturbed by the Persian invasion of that year; but about 1737—39 the trade of Bandar 'Abbās, being seriously hampered by the Persian campaigns in 'Omān which were being conducted from that port, was largely diverted to Basrah, and the proportion of the Company's consulage collected at the two places was reversed. Copper in particular, imported into the Gulf in ships from Bengal, now went chiefly to Basrah. In 1741 the British woollen trade at Basrah benefited by a prohibition which the local authorities had imposed on the passage of caravans between Aleppo and that market. In 1752 and 1753 there was a great demand for perpets in Turkish 'Irāq.

Consulage and other dues.

The question of the consulage and other dues collected by the Company's representative at Basrah is frequently noticed in the correspondence of the day. In the sense of the Capitulations all the collections of the Company at Basrah were "consulage"; but the Company seem to have restricted that name to a portion which they allowed their officers to keep for themselves and to have styled the rest "customs."

1731. In 1731 Mr. French, the British Resident, obtained a Farmān from the Pāsha restricting the Customs duty leviable on British goods at Basrah to *3 per cent.; and, as Mr. French had made the disbursements necessary to secure this concession from his own private means, while the concession was expected to be highly advantageous to trade in general, he was authorised to charge the outlay to the Company, together with an honorarium of 3,000 Qurūsh for himself. An additional duty, in the shape apparently of one per cent. imposed on the Company's own goods and an extra one per cent. on the goods of private traders, was at the same time laid on all British trade at Basrah; and it was ordered that this arrangement should remain in force until the whole amount, with the interest accruing thereon, should have been recovered.

1733. In 1733 no consulage at all was obtained at Basrah, in consequence of a cessation of trade due to the nearness of the Persian armies.

1735. In 1735, whether before or after the charge created in 1731 had been cleared off, an additional duty was again imposed by the Company at Basrah in recoupment of the expenses incurred by them in connection with the first Persian attempt upon the town. A separate account for the fund thus formed was opened under the heading "Basrah Troubles."

1736. Mr. French, the British Resident at Basrah, was awarded 100 Tūmāns by the Bombay Presidency in partial repayment of the expenses of his journey to Baghdād in 1736; and he was "directed to charge it to

* This was the rate fixed by the Capitulations of 1861 but see footnote on page 1195, *ante*.

"the head of Basrah Customs, since the traders in general will find the "benefit of this proceeding."

1740. In 1740 the debit balance under the "Basrah Troubles" heading of 1735 had been reduced to 212,167 Shāhis, and it was anticipated that it would be totally extinguished in the course of the season that had begun.

Establishments of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

The following interesting list is extant of the Company's staff at Basrah as it stood in 1751:—

Person's names and employments.	Time of their arrival in India.	At what salary.	Present salary per annum.	Ages.	Titles.
		£	£		
Brabazon Ellis, intended for Resident.	22nd February 1749.	5	30	28	Junr. Merchant.
Nathaniel Pompet, but ordered to move to the * Residency.	9th December 1746.	5	15	26	Writer.
John Holmes, Assistant to the Resident.	10th June 1750.	5	150	36	Fifth in Council.
Danvers Graves.	18th May 1719.	5	40	62	Senr. Merchant.
Francis Wood, Secretary.	17th August 1743.	5	15	22	Factor.

At an earlier period however, in 1741, it consisted of only two persons, *viz.*, Mr. Thomas Dorrill, Provisional Resident, and Mr. Danvers Graves, Assistant to the Resident, whose annual salaries were £30 and £5 respectively.

The Company's allowance to the Resident for diet, house-rent and other charges, paid apparently in addition to salary, was in 1740 only Rs. 50 a month, which did not even cover the single item of house-rent, and the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās recommended that it should be increased; but it was not until 1747 that the Resident was authorised to charge his house-rent and the salary of his Linguist to the Company.

* Probably an error for "Presidency."

At this time Basrah was, as a rule, a far healthier station than Bandar 'Abbās. In the year 1737, however, which was a very unhealthy one, sickness carried off "all the English gentlemen* except one Mr. Sterling," "Purser of the *Poultney*, who prudently sealed up the warehouses;" and among the victims was Mr. French, the Resident, who died on the 7th of November. No other deaths during this period among the Company's servants at Basrah are recorded.

The Dutch in Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

The Dutch, during the greater part of the period which we are now examining, had a Residency at Basrah; and from it, at the end of 1747, a gentleman was sent to re-establish a Dutch settlement that had formerly existed at Būshehr. In or about 1752, however, calamity overtook the Dutch Residency at Basrah, of which the head was then the well-known Baron Kniphausen.† The Baron was arrested one day by the Turkish authorities on a charge of having had relations with a Muhammadan prostitute, and he was not released until he had paid, it was said, a bribe of Rs. 50,000; and large sums were extorted at the same time from other persons belonging to or connected with the Dutch Factory. On his release the Baron sailed for Batavia, where he arrived simultaneously with a letter containing complaints against him, sent by the Turkish governor of Basrah through the Dutch Factory at Bandar 'Abbās; and, whether at or after his departure is uncertain, the Dutch Factory at Basrah was withdrawn. Having cleared his character to the satisfaction of the Dutch authorities in the East Indies, Baron Kniphausen, as we have seen elsewhere, returned to the Persian Gulf at the end of 1753 and proceeded to settle with a naval and military force on the island of Khārag; and meanwhile the Dutch Ambassador at the Porte had procured a Farmān for the re-hoisting of the Dutch flag at Basrah. On arrival at Khārag the Baron sent to Sulaimān Pāsha a letter from the Dutch General in Batavia demanding repayment of the sums extorted from the Dutch Company's servants and the reception of Kniphausen himself at Basrah, and threatening that, in event of non-compliance, force would be used; but the reply of the Pāsha seems to have been that he would refund nothing, and that he would only admit a Dutch Resident if he were somebody other than

* Number not stated.

† The chief authorities on this gentleman's character and proceedings are specified in a footnote on page 129 *ante*.

Baron Kniphausen and were not imposed by force. It was apparently the case that the principal inhabitants of Basrah had very strong objections to Baron Kniphausen, and that they threatened to emigrate if he were allowed to return. In July 1754, however, the Baron proceeded to blockade the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and a little later he detained two valuable ships belonging to Turkish subjects which happened to call at Khārag; these proceedings quickly brought the Pasha to terms; and by the beginning of 1755 the money extorted had been reimbursed, and the Dutch had obtained leave to remove some goods which they had left at Basrah, and to collect debts which were due to them there. Subsequently the Dutch were invited—or at least gave out that they had been invited—by the Turks to return to Basrah; but they took no steps to avail themselves of the permission.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

The system of French consular representation in Turkish 'Irāq appears to have been remodelled about 1740, when a French Consul at Baghdād was appointed for the first time in the person of M. Baillet, a French Carmelite, who soon afterwards became Latin Bishop of Baghdād. About the same time a layman assumed charge of the French Consulate at Basrah, which had been held by eleven ecclesiastics between 1679 and 1739; but this first lay incumbent, a M. de Martainville, died in 1741, not long after his appointment. In 1748 the French Consul at Basrah, now described as the Resident, having received no pay from Pondichéry for two years, embarked with the whole of the French Residency establishment and property on board a Portuguese trading vessel and departed. His difficulties may possibly have been occasioned by the war then in progress between Britain and France.

'OTHMĀN III.

1754—57.

The short reign of the Turkish Sultān 'Othmān III is not marked by any important event in Turkish 'Irāq.

French and British Relations.

Re-establishment of the French Residency at Basrah, 1755.

In the summer of 1755 the French Residency at Basrah was re-opened by a M. Perdria, whose transactions the British Resident, Mr. Shaw, was directed to watch very carefully and report to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, for it was "imagined" that the Frenchman had been sent to Basrah "at this critical juncture" chiefly to forward intelligence to Europe. This order was sent from Bombay through the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās, the Agent being described on this and on various later occasions as "Agent for all affairs of the British Nation," a style of address due perhaps to the approach of war, but one that continued in use for a number of years after.

Journey of the British and French Residents to Baghdād, 1756.

About the beginning of 1756 Mr. Shaw, having been insulted and threatened by a boatman on the Basrah river, applied for redress to the Mutasallim; but that officer, instead of complying, incited the populace against him, and a riot occurred by which his life was endangered. As the Pāsha at Baghdād accepted the Mutasallim's version of the affair, by which the whole blame was thrown upon the British Resident, Mr. Shaw undertook a journey to Baghdād, leaving his Assistant, Mr. Garden, in charge at Basrah; he was accompanied by M. Perdria, with whom he seems to have been on good terms. At Baghdād, by means of a personal interview with Sulaimān Pāsha, Mr. Shaw was able to secure the removal of the Mutasallim and the punishment of the less important offenders; and the Pāsha also granted a Farmān "in which he "directed that all possible honour and regard should be paid to the interest "and credit of the British nation, and declared that the least breach of "that order would be attended with immediate loss of life and estate." The question of anchorage duties at Basrah, where it had been the custom to exact a present of 900 Qurūsh from every small and one of 1,500 from every large ship visiting the port, was raised by the two Residents during their visit at Baghdād, and Farmāns were obtained by them from the Pāsha abolishing these duties. M. Perdria was imprudent enough to give the Pāsha a present of 6,000 Qurūsh on this occasion, and Mr. Shaw feared that he would be expected to pay a like amount; but he proposed to decline giving more than 4,000 Qurūsh and to recover that amount by temporarily charging British ships at Basrah the same anchorage dues on behalf of the Company as they had been accustomed to pay to the Turks. The Government of Bombay were somewhat concerned at the

expense to which the Resident had thus committed himself without proper authority; but they agreed that, provided the terms of the new Farmán were respected by the Turks and no anchorage dues collected by them, the money spent might be recovered in the manner suggested; and recoveries continued to be made until 1760, when, the whole amount having been made good, they ceased. It was hoped that by the removal of the anchorage dues ships which had hitherto been accustomed to turn back from Búshehr, Bandar 'Abbás or even Maeqát would be induced to visit Basrah.

Misbehaviour of Bengal servants of the Company at Basrah, 1754—57.

Trouble appears to have been caused from time to time by gentlemen of the Company's Bengal establishment who carried on a trade at Basrah, and who sometimes tried to ignore the Resident; one of the principal offenders was a Mr. Baldrick who had business there in 1754. Early in 1757 the Bombay Presidency, "being sensible of the ill-effects of the "Bengal gentlemen endeavouring to evade any dependency on the "Hon'ble Company's Resident," empowered that officer to prevent any application being made to the Turkish authorities, except through himself,

MUSTAFA III.

1757—73.

The history of Turkish 'Iráq during the reign of Mustafa III was little affected by events in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, except in so far as war with Russia prevented the Sultán of Turkey from enforcing his authority over the Páshá of Baghdád. The peaceful relations at last established between Turkey and Persia were not disturbed. Mustafa died in the last days of 1773.

Páshás of Baghdád from 1757 to 1773.

During this period the whole of Turkish 'Iráq continued to be governed by a Páshá of Baghdád; and that office was filled by a series of men possessing local influence, with whose services the Porte, however much they might wish to do so, found it impossible to dispense.

Sulaimán Páshá, till 1762.

Sulaimán Páshá, who had seized the government of Baghdád in 1749 and was afterwards confirmed therein by the Porte, retained his position

until his death on the 14th of May 1762. More than one attempt was made, probably from Constantinople, to destroy him by foul means, but all were unsuccessful; and, so far from his paying any substantial tribute to the Sultān, he was in most years able and ready to prove that he had spent, on behalf of the Turkish Government, more than he had received. In the administration of his province he showed great energy, and he made himself the terror of the thievish Arab tribes, whom he reduced to tolerable order, and who surnamed him "Abu Lail" on account of his nocturnal raids upon them. At Baghdād he was known as "Sulaimān the Lion." In his time the journey between Baghdād and Basrah, whether by the Euphrates or by the Tigris, is said to have become safe even for travellers unaccompanied by a tribal protector; and the security that prevailed in his dominions, while disturbances were rife in Persia, had the effect of drawing a large proportion of the Indian trade, which had formerly sought Bandar 'Abbās and Isfahān, to Basrah and Baghdād. He was however influenced, to an undue extent, by his wife 'Adīlah Khātūn, who gave audiences, interfered in public business, and even instituted an order of merit of her own, of which the badge was a silk ribbon worn round the head; and it was at her instigation that, in 1758, he invited Sālim, the Kurdish chief on a campaign against whom her father Ahmad had expired, to Baghdād and treacherously put him to death by strangling. In 1758, at the time of Dr. Ives' visit to Baghdād, Sulaimān Pāsha was a childless man over sixty years of age, but addicted to unnatural vices.

'Alī Pāsha, 1762—64.

On the death of Sulaimān Pāsha without children, 'Alī Āgha, Mutasallim of Basrah, who had formerly been Governor of Diwānīyah and who in that capacity had given Sulaimān Pāsha invaluable aid in seizing the Pashāliq, contrived, by means of the recommendations of the local Baghdād officials supplemented by bribes at Constantinople to obtain the vacant post for himself. His appointment took place in July 1762, and the governments of Baghdād and Basrah remained, contrary to the general expectation, a combined charge. The first danger with which 'Alī Pāsha had to cope was a rising of the Janissaries at Baghdād, which obliged him temporarily to abandon the city; but very soon, with the help of the country Arabs and of the most influential citizens, who were all upon his side, he was able to suppress the revolt and even to punish the ringleaders with death. After this he reduced Kurdistan to obedience and undertook various expeditions, which are noticed further on, against Arab tribes of the province; but, of these last, one against the Khaza'il ended disastrously. His fall, however, which occurred in

1764, is believed to have been due chiefly to the intrigues of 'Ādilah Khātūn, in whose father's household he had been brought up, but whom he had rigorously excluded from power and whom he was suspected of a design to remove from Baghdād. 'Ali Pāsha, who was of humble parentage, happened to be a Persian by race; and this fact invested with some plausibility the assertions of his enemies that he was a Shi'ah in disguise, prepared to hand over the country to the Shāh of Persia,—a notion which to many minds was confirmed by his successes against the Sunni Janissaries and Kurds and his failure against the Shi'ah Khazi'il. 'Ādilah Khātūn at last succeeded in persuading some of the principal officials, who had hitherto been among 'Ali's sincere supporters, to believe that he intended to put them to death, and to consult their own safety by raising an insurrection against him; and this they did so suddenly and so successfully that he was obliged to hide himself, as best he could, in the city of Baghdād. A few days later he was arrested in female attire while attempting to escape to the country, brought back to the Sarāi, and executed.

'Umr Pāsha, after 1764.

'Ali was succeeded as Pāsha of Baghdād by 'Umr, the second husband of a younger sister of 'Ādilah Khātūn, whose first husband that masterful woman had induced Sulaimān Pāsha, on false evidence, to put to death. 'Umr Pāsha was regarded as a man of mediocre ability, and his elevation to the Pashāliq cannot have been agreeable to 'Ādilah Khātūn; but his name was proposed by a council of the chief officials at Baghdād and was accepted by the Porte.

Mutasallims of Basrah, from 1757 to 1773.

Basrah, with the districts dependent on it, was administered, as it had been since about 1720, by Mutasallims or Deputy-Governors whom the Pāshas of Baghdād appointed and removed at will.

'Ali Āgha, 1761.

'Ali Āgha, afterwards Pāsha of Baghdād, appears to have been Deputy-Governor of Basrah in 1761, in which year he commanded an expedition against the Ka'ab tribe.

Mahmūd, 1764.

In the summer of 1764 the Mutasallim of Basrah was one Mahmūd, who had the reputation of being a good soldier, and who, it was thought, might have become a candidate for the Pashāliq, had he been present at Baghdād at the time of 'Ali Pāsha's death.

Sulaimān Agha, 1765—68.

Mahmūd appears to have been succeeded by Sulaimān Āgha, a Georgian, who was destined to play a long and important part in the

history of Turkish 'Irāq and to rise eventually to the governorship of the Pashāliq. Sulaimān, during his first term of office at Basrah, ruled with moderation and distinguished himself by his freedom from rapacity; but he incurred the jealousy of Ismā'īl, the Kehiyah of the Baghdād Pāsha; and, notwithstanding a protest by the British Agent at Basrah, he was removed, early in 1768, for his negligence in not sending enough money to Baghdād, and for failing to meet some large bills drawn by his master the Pāsha against the public revenues of Basrah.

'Abdur Rahmān Baig, who, by paying a considerable bribe at Baghdād and promising to make Basrah a financially more productive province, had secured his own nomination to the Mutasallimate, did not retain his position long. In October 1768 the post was again vacant, the holder having died suddenly, not without suspicion of poison. 'Abdur Rahmān Baig, 1768.

Thereupon Sulaimān Āgha was immediately reinstated in the Deputy-Governorship; but his conduct towards the British and Christians in general was unsatisfactory during this, his second period of rule; and in 1769 he was actually removed by the Pāsha on the representations of the East India Company's Agent. Sulaimān Āgha, 1768-69.

The attitude of Yūsuf Āgha, the new Mutasallim, towards the foreign community was friendly; but in August 1771, to their great regret, he was displaced in favour of Sulaimān Āgha, whom the Pāsha had now re-appointed. This Yūsuf Āgha may have been identical with one Hāji Yūsuf who had charge of the town of Basrah in October 1763. Yūsuf Āgha, 1769-71.

Sulaimān Āgha seems after this,—with a short interval, ending in 1773, during which he was again replaced by Yūsuf Āgha,—to have retained the Mutasallimate until the capture of Basrah by the Persians in 1776, after the close of the period with which we are now concerned. His creditable conduct in the defence of the town will be noticed in its proper place. Sulaimān Agha, 1771—75.

Administrative head-quarters in Turkish 'Irāq in 1758 and 1765.

Interesting and minute accounts of Baghdād and Basrah, then as now the two main seats of government in Turkish 'Irāq, have been left by the travellers Ives and Niebuhr, who visited them in 1758 and 1765-66 respectively.

The form of government at Baghdād was the same, in miniature, as that at Constantinople. Most official appointments within the limits of his

charge were in the personal gift of the Pāsha; but he was obliged to submit all matters of great importance to his Council or Diwān, of which not only the Āgha or commander of the Janissaries, the chief Qādhi, and the Naqib of the shrine of 'Abdul Qādir, but also every ex-official of high rank resident at Basrah and various ecclesiastical authorities were members. The chief Qādhiship, it may be mentioned, was held every year by a new incumbent, appointed from Constantinople. The executive functionary next in rank and power to the Pāsha himself was his Kehiyah or Minister, who had charge under him of all matters, whether civil or military; and other officials, some of whom possessed a public character while some belonged rather to the household of the Pāsha, were numerous. The troops under the direct orders of the Pāsha of Baghdād, including his personal guards, amounted to 6,000 or 7,000 men; and in addition to these there were at headquarters a strong force of artillery and various corps of Janissaries, the latter variously estimated at 10,000 to 40,000 men; but over the artillery in question and over the Janissaries, who were imperial troops and received their orders from Constantinople, the Pāsha had no control. A number of the Janissaries were civilians in different ranks of life, who enlisted merely for the sake of the protection and privileges to which they became entitled as members of the corps; and sometimes even the Pāsha of Baghdād found it expedient to enrol himself as a Janissary. To meet a demand for extra troops to serve against the Kurds or the Arab tribes, it was not uncommon at Baghdād to grant contracts to individuals, who themselves acted as officers of the untrained rabble which they collected.

The defences of the main town of Baghdād consisted at this time of a wall with a parapet, loopholed throughout its length, and of nine bastions, each mounting six to eight brass guns of miscellaneous calibres. Outside the wall there was a good ditch, and beyond the ditch an indifferent glacis; and the height from the bottom of the ditch to the top of the wall was about 40 feet. The number of guns at Baghdād was about 150 of all sizes, mounted and unmounted.

Basrah.

At Basrah, on the phenomenal filthiness of which both travellers comment, the principal official was the Mutasallim, who had his residence in an open square of the native town, on the south bank of the 'Ashār creek, far from the Shatt-al-'Arab. In the days preceding the abolition of the Basrah Pashāliq, before 1720, not only the Deputy-Governor but also a "Kapitān (Captain) Pāsha" or naval commandant was appointed by the Porte, and the Kapitān Pāsha was a personage of high dignity and independent powers; but, on the incorporation of Basrah in the

Baghdād Pāshāliq, he became a nominee of the Baghdād Pāsha and his authority was greatly curtailed. The abode of the Kapitān Pāsha in 1765 appears to have been almost precisely at the spot occupied by the Turkish Commodore at Basrah at the present day. At Basrah, as at Baghdād, there was a considerable body of officials, including a Qādhi sent annually from Constantinople; and the Mutasallim of Basrah, like the Pāsha of Baghdād, was required in serious questions to consult his Council, on which the Kapitān Pāsha, the Qādhi, the notables of the country and others had seats. The notables, among whom was the Naqīb of Basrah, were collectively known as the* Ajal-al-Balad; their privileges included exemption from the land-tax, and rights of private jurisdiction upon their own estates. The Janissaries at Basrah, being removed from under the eye of their own principal officers, who were stationed at Qūrnah, were even more troublesome than at Baghdād; and on the death of Sulaimān Pāsha in 1762 the Mutasallim, with all his troops, was unable to prevent them from plundering in broad daylight the houses of Armenians, Jews and Hindus, and even those of such Muhammadans as had not enrolled themselves in a Janissary Corps. In the disorders which occurred, the Janissaries frequently came to blows among themselves, and as many as eight to twelve of them were often killed in a single day, besides an equal number of ordinary peaceful citizens. It might be supposed that a Mutasallim, surrounded by so many independent forces, must have been practically powerless; but such was not the case; and it was observed that an able man, skilled in playing off one faction against another, was able not merely to maintain his authority at Basrah, but even to amass considerable wealth by extortion.

Two other important official centres besides Baghdād and Basrah were Diwāniyah, generally known as Haskah, and Hillah, through both of which Dr. Ives and his party passed on their way up the Euphrates, finding in charge of the former 'Ali Āgha, afterwards Pāsha of Baghdād, who struck them as a "generous, genteel, worthy man." The jurisdiction of the governor of Diwāniyah at that time extended to Qūrnah on the one side and Hillāh on the other. Diwāniyah and Hillah.

Internal tribal affairs, 1757—73.

Notwithstanding the severe punishment which Ahmad Pāsha and Sulaimān Pāsha had from time to time meted out to the Arab clans,

*So Niebuhr; but in the English official records of the day they seem to be generally mentioned as the "Ions," by which, presumably, the term A'yān اعيان is intended.

Dr. Ives and his party, in travelling up the Euphrates in 1758, found the tribesmen in places by no means respectful or submissive to Turkish authority.

Bani Lām rebellion, 1763.

In October 1763 'Ali Pāsha, who had then ruled Turkish 'Irāq for more than a year, went in person to chastise the Bani Lām Arabs, who had been giving trouble, and apparently defeated them in the neighbourhood of Hawizeh.

Khazā'il rebellion, 1763—65.

He had less good fortune in his dealings with the Khazā'il, having their tribal capital at Lāmlūm, who had closed the Euphrates to all boats that did not pay them blackmail, and he even sustained a severe defeat at their hands; but 'Umr Pāsha soon after his accession invaded their country, burned Lāmlūm, expelled the reigning Shaikh Hamūd, and cut off the heads of six or seven of the principal men, which he sent to Constantinople. Hamūd, however, soon reappeared, ejecting a new Shaikh whom the Turks had installed, and 'Umr Pāsha, who had no desire to undertake a second campaign, thought it as well to recognise him; but the Khazā'il, though Turks passing through their country were still exposed to obloquy as Sunnis, did not venture after this to stop boats on the river.

Muntafik rebellion, 1769.

In 1769, the great Muntafik tribe, whose domains at this time embraced the western bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab from Basrah to Qūrnah and both banks of the Euphrates from Qūrnah to the neighbourhood of the modern Nāsiriyah, and who had now recovered from the punishment inflicted on them in the time of Ahmad Pāsha, rose against the Turks under the leadership of 'Abdullah, a brother of the deceased Sa'dūn. Communication between Basrah and Baghdād, both by the Euphrates and by the Tigris, was completely closed by this rising; at one time the rebels succeeded in capturing several villages near Basrah; and for some days they even confined the inhabitants of Basrah within the walls of the town. The cause of the trouble was the refusal of Shaikh 'Abdullah to make any payment to the Turks on account of his land-revenue, which was already in arrear by about nine years. In November the Pāsha of Baghdād reached the confines of the Muntafik country at Umm Labās, about midway between Samāwah and Qūrnah; and about the same time, the aid of the Ka'ab tribe having been invited, fourteen Ka'ab Gallivats arrived at Basrah, of which nine proceeded up the Shatt-al-'Arab in company with some Turkish vessels under the Kapitān Pāsha, the whole fleet carrying about 1,500 armed men, to operate against a tribe in alliance with the Muntafik whose settlements lay on the east bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab between Basrah and Qūrnah. In August 1769,

before this expedition against the Muntafik began, the Pāsha of Baghdād announced the deposition of 'Abdullah from the Shaikhship of the tribe in favour of one Fadhal; but how matters actually ended is not clear.

Renewed troubles, 1773.

Towards the end of 1773, communication between Basrah and Baghdād was again interrupted, trouble between the Turkish Government and the Arab tribes being, as before, the cause.

Difficulties of the Turks with the Ka'ab, 1757—73.

More serious troubles than these, however, were in store for the Turks—and also for the British, who rashly became their allies in the quarrel—with the Ka'ab tribe of Qubbān and Dōraq, whose power, under their Shaikh Salmān or Sulaimān, was day by day increasing. The Ka'ab were regarded at Basrah as being properly * Turkish subjects, and it was asserted that they had been wont in the past to pay revenue to the Turks for that portion, at least, of their territory which adjoined Qubbān; but the chief of the tribe had now begun to play off Persia against Turkey, at the same time withholding tribute from both countries, and also to encroach on the government of Basrah by occupying villages and tracts upon the Shatt-al-'Arab, even upon its western side. Throughout his proceedings the Ka'ab Shaikh was careful to stand well with the Arab notables of the Basrah neighbourhood, some of whom he detached from the Turkish interest by bribery; and, after the invasion of his country by Karīm Khān, Vakīl of Persia, in 1757, he set about creating a fleet of which the first vessel was launched in 1758.

First Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, 1761-62.

In 1761, the Ka'ab Shaikh "having of late been guilty of many enormities," the Pāsha of Baghdād ordered 'Ali Āgha, Mutasallim of Basrah, to proceed against him. The Āgha obeyed, marching by land with his own troops, after they had been reinforced by others sent from Baghdād and by an Arab tribal contingent, to Qubbān; and in June of that year, at the earnest request of the Turkish Deputy-Governor, Mr. Douglas, the British Agent at Bandar 'Abbās, then inspecting Basrah, sent the Company's vessel "Swallow" to co-operate with 14 Turkish Trankis in blockading Khor Mūsa, or one of its branches, in which some of the enemy's armed boats were lying. Shaikh Salmān took refuge

* This was the opinion of the Turks and also of the British Agent at Basrah in 1767, who may have been influenced by his Turkish surroundings; but according to Niebuhr the original territory of the Ka'ab all lay in Persia, and only those of their lands were in Turkey which they had subsequently seized from the Turks.

from the Turkish expedition in his fortat Dōraq or Fallāhiyeh, which was found to be extremely difficult of access; but ultimately he was reduced to serious straits and purchased peace by sending presents to the Pāsha at Baghdād. The Turkish forces were then withdrawn from 'Arabistān, the "Swallow" at the same time returning to Basrah. In 1762, the Ka'ab blockaded Basrah by closing the Shatt-al-'Arab to all vessels, whether bound upwards or downwards.

Second Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, 1763.

In October 1763, a number of the Ka'ab Shaikh's people entered the Dawāsir district, upon the western side of the lower Shatt-al-'Arab, and drove away the inhabitants. As the East India Company had an interest in some dates in Dawāsir, Mr. Price, who had recently opened the new British Agency at Basrah and still held charge of it, was inclined to send a vessel to prevent their removal by the raiders; but the Mutasallim advised him against taking any such decided action and wrote a letter for him to send, instead, to Shaikh Salmān. Meanwhile 'Ali Pāsha of Baghdād, who as Mutasallim of Basrah had commanded the last expedition against the Ka'ab, himself arrived in the vicinity of Basrah; and the Ka'ab, hearing of his approach, withdrew from Dawāsir, whereupon the "Swallow," Captain Nesbitt, accompanied by boats carrying 100 troops detailed by the Deputy-Governor of Basrah, dropped down the river to secure the dates in dispute. 'Ali Pāsha, however, was anxious to destroy the power of the Ka'ab and wrote as follows to Mr. Price:

> My desire is, as the well-being of my Government depends upon it, that, while I march with my army by land, you will send your ships to block up the mouth of the river, and you have full power to take, burn, and destroy whatever you may meet with belonging to the Chaab. In short, make yourselves masters of the Gallivats, as they will no doubt endeavour to escape to sea; and this my letter shall be a sufficient warrant for anything that may happen. The demolishing the Chaab will be a glory to your nation, and not to me, and you may be persuaded that this your ready assistance will be well known, and I doubt not recompensed, by the Sultan. It remains now with you, as soon as my letter arrives, to despatch away the ships, as besides the glory that will accrue, 'tis ever meritorious to demolish those who molest the least of our friends. The success, therefore, of this affair depends on your diligence, friendship, and sincerity.

In consequence of this request, the Company's ships "Tartar" and "Swallow" were sent to the Pāsha's assistance and had more than one encounter with the Ka'ab fleet, which now numbered several Gallivats; but again peace was made, and the expedition withdrawn, without any permanent settlement having been achieved.

Third Anglo-Turkish ex-

In 1765, when Karīm Khān, the ruler of Persia, marched for the second time against the Ka'ab with the object of subjugating them, he

had obtained a promise of co-operation from the Turks. The fighting fleet of Shaikh Salmān, Ka'ab, now consisted of as many as 10 or 12 Gallivats, besides which he owned about 70 smaller vessels; and no sooner did Karīm Khān enter his territory than he began to retire to the westwards, moving from one point to another by water, and eventually crossing the Shatt-al-'Arab into Turkish territory. The Turks, who really intended to assist the Persians according to their agreement, brought down an infantry regiment, known as the Barātaliis, from Baghdād; they collected a fleet of 11 Taknahs and a Gallivat,—the former a small kind of armed vessel, flat, and coated with bitumen,—under the Kapitān Pāsha at Basrah; they chartered a private British vessel, the snow "Fanny," Captain Parkinson, to join the expedition under a regular agreement as to risk, pay, and division of prizes; and they obtained the services of a couple of young Englishmen to command two of their own Taknahs. They had been dilatory, however, in completing these arrangements; and early in May, just as their force was about to start, a letter arrived from Karīm Khān in which he expressed his dissatisfaction with their conduct and informed them of his own retirement from the Ka'ab country. Upon this the Turkish expedition was countermanded; but eventually it received orders to proceed independently of the Persians. The Turkish land forces, amounting to about 5,000 men, then began their march down the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, the fleet in the river conforming to their movements; the Mutasallim, it was observed, invariably remained well in the rear with his best troops, while the inferior troops cleared the way. At length the head of the Turkish force arrived opposite the northern end of 'Abbādān Island, off which the Ka'ab fleet was anchored, and halted there for the night under the protection of the "Fanny," while the Mutasallim and Kapitān Pāsha encamped a couple of leagues nearer to Basrah. During the hours of darkness the Ka'ab fleet surprised the vessels under the command of the Kapitān Pāsha and captured three of his Taknahs without resistance; and on the next day they sailed quietly up the river in full view of the Turks, plundered several villages near Basrah, and took a number of small boats. Soon afterwards, however, Shaikh Salmān offered to make a single payment to the Turks; and a peace having been arranged on this basis, the Turkish forces returned to Basrah after an absence in the field of less than three weeks.

Expedition against the Ka'ab, 1765.

The participation of British subjects in this ineffectual expedition had been sanctioned, if not actually arranged, by Mr. Peter Elwin Wrench, the East India Company's Agent at Basrah, who, as remarked

Renewed trouble with the Ka'ab, August—October 1765.

by the traveller Niebuhr, may have been a better merchant than he was a politician; and the Ka'ab Shaikh contended that, in making peace with the Turks, he had not abandoned his right of retaliation on the British, whose unfriendly action he had every reason to resent. An alarming attack by the Ka'ab upon British shipping, which is described at length in the history of 'Arabistān, followed in July 1765; and on the 24th of August eight Ka'ab Gallivats appeared at Basrah, whereupon the Muntafik tribe under Shaikh 'Abdullah, on pretence of repelling the invaders, migrated into the date plantations on the right bank of the river below Basrah and there joined the enemy in making away with the fruit. The Mutasallim, whose chief fear was that an open combination might suddenly replace the secret understanding between the Ka'ab and the Muntafik, remained inactive at Manāwi, where he had concentrated all his troops for the defence of the town; and the disagreeable situation continued until the 10th of October, when the Ka'ab took their departure. By this time little of the date crop remained to be collected by the proprietors.

Fourth Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, 1766-68.

The unheard-of aggressions committed by the Ka'ab in 1765 upon vessels under the British flag obliged the East India Company to despatch a considerable mixed force in the following year for the punishment of the tribe. A campaign followed, of which the course is fully detailed in the history of 'Arabistān, and of which it is enough to say here that the Turks took part, as the nominal principals, on the same side as the British; that the heaviest action fought resulted in a deplorable defeat of the British; and that the operations were finally brought to an end by the intervention of Karīm Khān, Vakīl of Persia. In March and April 1767, as described in the historical chapter relating to the Persian Coast, a genuine effort was made by an emissary from Karīm Khān to the Ka'ab to obtain satisfaction for the British and the Turks, but it failed; and a naval blockade of the Ka'ab country, which the British had established on their retirement, was rigorously maintained until 1768. In that year, in consequence of their failure to take the island of Khārag under an arrangement which they had formed with Karīm Khān, and of the premature abandonment of further negotiations at Shīrāz, the British forfeited the support of the Vakīl in the Ka'ab case. The naval blockade of the Ka'ab was then, apparently, abandoned; and the Ka'ab, finding themselves once more at large, began to build forts upon both sides of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Assistance lent by the

At the end of 1769, as noticed in an earlier section, the Ka'ab, who had now begun to tire of their Persian connection, actually proceeded

to the assistance of the Turkish Mutasallim of Basrah against the Muntafik with a fleet of 14 Gallivats. Ka'ab to the Turks, 1769.

In 1771, the Turks were still at peace with the Ka'ab, and the latter appeared to have dropped their animosity against the British; but neither the Turks, who had unsettled claims against them amounting to more than Rs. 20,000, nor the British, who had received no compensation for the outrages of 1765, appeared likely to obtain any satisfaction from the tribe. Before the end of 1773 a fresh rupture occurred between the Ka'ab and the Turks, and the former stopped the trade of Basrah by stationing three of their Gallivats so as to close the navigation of the river. Renewed friction between the Ka'ab and the Turks, 1771-73.

British political and general relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1757—73.

In 1758, Mr. Garden, who was still Mr. Shaw's Assistant, visited Baghdād on important affairs, temporarily superseding Khōjah Raphael, an Armenian merchant from Persia, who was the Resident's ordinary agent or "attorney" at that place. Mr. Garden entertained there the English traveller Dr. Ives and his companions, on whom, as "an accom- "plished young gentleman" he made a favourable impression. Visit of Mr. Garden to Baghdād, 1758.

In the summer of 1759—partly to neutralise the effects of a visit which the French Resident had recently paid to Baghdād, partly to gratify Sulaimān Pāsha, who had sent him money and pressing invitations, and partly perhaps to attend to the interests of his own private trade—Mr. Shaw, the British Resident at Basrah, made a journey to Baghdād, where he remained as the Pāsha's guest from the end of June until the middle of August. He was treated during the whole of his stay with the utmost distinction, or, as he himself expressed it, "had such "public honours and favours conferred on me as has rejoiced the "friends, and confounded the enemies of our nation." The principal result of the Resident's visit, from the official point of view, was the grant to him by the Pāsha of a Farmān in which the Mutasallim of Basrah was commanded to observe most carefully every article of the Capitulations; and, lest his labour in obtaining such a document should appear to his employers superfluous, Mr. Shaw was careful to explain that the effect of the new orders would be not only to confirm the abolition of the anchorage dues or "Ships' presents," regarding which an understanding Journey of the British Resident to Baghdād and grant of a Farmān by the Pāsha, 1759.

had been reached in 1756, but also to abolish for the first time a number of other irregular charges on shipping and on the transit of goods to the interior. The exemption of the Company from inland transit dues, hitherto not enjoyed in practice, would enable them to supply the native merchants of Baghdād with goods on the same terms as those of Basrah, provided that the purchasers on their part undertook the risks of carriage; and the consequence would be a reduction of 13 per cent. in the price of woollens at Baghdād. Mr. Shaw, on his return to Basrah at the middle of September, met with a very hearty reception from the officials, merchants and citizens of the town,—a circumstance which he attributed to the favour shown him by the Pāsha at Baghdād, and to the redress of several Basrah grievances which he had by his representations been able to obtain.

Attempt by the Pāsha to levy customs at 5 per cent. on British trade, 1760.

Sulaimān Pāsha's regard for the Capitulations and for Mr. Shaw must rapidly have grown cool after the return of that gentleman to Basrah; for in the following year, professing to act under orders from Constantinople, he required payment of import duty by European merchants on their goods at the rate of 5 per cent. instead of the 3 per cent. admissible under treaty. The Mutasallim of Basrah, who was well affected towards the British, informed the Resident privately of this demand and of interference which had already been practised under it with the goods of Europeans at Baghdād; his advice was that the Resident should protest against the innovation, at the same time detaining the "Swallow" at Basrah as if for the purpose of shipping off the Company's goods; and he promised that remonstrances on his own part should not be wanting. The withdrawal of the obnoxious order was at length obtained, though not without the solemn production of the Capitulations by the British, nor until a present had been demanded from Mr. Shaw's private representative at Baghdād and refused; and only then did it become known that the eccentric behaviour of the Pāsha had been due to the advice of a new Kehiyah, who was an enemy of all Christians, and to whom had been assigned the difficult task of replenishing an empty exchequer.

The assistance against the Ka'ab given by the British to the Turks in 1761 has already been noticed above.

Elevation of the Basrah Residency to the status of an Agency, 1763.

In accordance with orders passed by the Court of Directors in the previous year, the Government of Bombay in January 1763 prepared to transfer the Company's principal station in the Gulf from Bandar 'Abbās to Basrah; and, as an important inquiry was to be held at Basrah into the conduct of the late Resident there, for which Mr. Douglas, the Agent

at Bandar 'Abbās, was held to be disqualified by his previous connection with the case, Mr. William Andrew Price was temporarily deputed from Bombay to carry out the delicate duty, and at the same time to establish the Agency. Before his arrival in the Gulf towards the end of March 1763, Mr. Douglas, as related in another place, had already withdrawn the Company's establishment at Bandar 'Abbās, sending most of the commercial stock to Basrah; consequently Mr. Price, apart from a halt which he made at Būshehr for the purpose of establishing a Residency there, as also directed by the Bombay Government, was able without delay to proceed on his mission to Basrah. He arrived there on the 13th of May, to find that a new Mutasallim, who bore "the character of an haughty, imperious man, and a mortal enemy to Christians," had arrived from Baghdād only three days previously to take charge of the Government; and he at first had some difficulty in arranging for his suitable reception on shore; but eventually, on the 18th of May, the Kapitān Pāsha, the Mufti and the Shah Bandar having been sent to meet him, he landed, and the new Agency was established.

It is unnecessary to refer again, in this place, to the intervention of Mr. Price in 1763, as described in an earlier paragraph, in the difficulties between the Basrah Government and the Ka'ab tribe.

The "Consulary Birat," 1764.

In August 1764, a "Consulary Birat," or * order of the Porte recognising the East India Company's Agent at Basrah as British Consul there, was obtained by Mr. Grenville, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and was forwarded "together with the Grand Signior's commandment attending it, as likewise the Consulary patent or commission" from the British Ambassador himself, to Mr. Wrench, who at this time occupied the position of Agent at Basrah. Mr. Grenville, with whom the idea of applying for the Barāat probably originated, and who certainly over-estimated its practical value, encountered considerable opposition on the part of the Turkish Government before he carried his point, and he was proportionately elated by his success, in announcing which to the Agent he wrote:

> It is the surest and most efficacious means that we know of, in this part of the world, for protecting the Company's commerce, their property, and just rights; it secures to them for ever, and more firmly than anything else can, a permanent and

* The "Consulary Birat" of 1764, or rather a translation of the same supplied a number of years afterwards by the Resident at Basrah, will be found in Aitchison's *Treaties*, Volume XIII, pages 7—9, 4th edition. A reference to that translation will show that the contents were substantially the same as those of the Barāat obtained for the Baghdād Residency in 1802 which is summarised at page 1301 *post*.

quiet residence at Basrah for their future Agents there: it silences for ever that new angled but dangerous doctrine of the Porte, the annual change of them. It is what has ever been practised by the Levant Company in almost all the considerable scales of the Levant for the sake of their commercial affairs; and by these means it is that their Consuls seldom or never meet with molestation in their respective establishments. The expediency and advantage of such a Birat is manifest and clear; the attainment of it was the doubtful point, and the more than doubtful, not only because of the extreme indisposition and aversion in the Porte to it, but because of its being in itself a new establishment, never practised byus before at Bussora, and an innovation in the eye of the Porte. In spite, however, I have succeeded; again I congratulate you upon it; and may the Company long enjoy the fruits of my success.

The Barāat ran in the name of Mr. Garden, who had been acting as Agent at Basrah while the negotiations at Constantinople were in progress; but the Ambassador assured Mr Wrench that this was immaterial, and that after a little time had elapsed it would be easy for him to obtain the substitution, in a way that was customary elsewhere, of his own name for Mr. Garden's.

1765. In 1765, some difficulty was experienced in inducing the local authorities in Turkish 'Irāq to respect and obey the recent commands of the Porte and the Sultan; but it was understood that their resistance was due to a bribe that some native merchants, who were opposed to the grant of Consular powers to the British Agent, had administered to the Pāsha of Baghdād; and Mr. Wrench and his council seem to have entertained no doubt that Mr. Garden, who was then at Baghdād, would be able to arrange matters with the Pāsha, especially if he were authorised to make him a present larger than the bribe. The Agent and Council understood that if the Consular powers of the Agency were recognised in practice, they would be able to land goods for native clients at the Company's premises and, on making themselves responsible to the Turkish Government for the duty payable by their customers, to hand them over direct to the importers, who would thus be spared the trouble and expense inseparable from the passage of goods through a Turkish custom house. The result of this procedure they expected to be that native merchants in general, and particularly the Armenians, whose import trade from India was the most considerable of all, would in future arrange to have all their goods consigned to them in British bottoms, by which means the receipts in consulage at Basrah would be increased and the Company re-imbursed for the heavy outlay that must have been incurred on their account at Constantinople. Whether, however, this interpretation of the scope of Consular powers proved to be correct, or whether the financial results were such as the Agent anticipated, does not, apart from one indication in the year 1769, on which we

shall have occasion to remark hereafter under another head, appear from the sequel.

Temporary establishment of a Residency at Baghdād, 1765-66.

The arrangement under which the East India Company's Resident or Agent in Turkish 'Irāq was located at the port of Basrah, while the Turkish Governor of the whole province had his residence at Baghdād, presented obvious inconveniences, to neutralise which various measures were taken at different times. In 1737, 1738 and 1758 an assistant to the Resident, and in 1736, 1745, 1756 and 1759 the Resident himself, visited Baghdād; Mr. Shaw, while he was in charge of Basrah, was ordinarily represented at the capital by Khōjah Raphael, an Armenian merchant from Persia; and, at the point which we have now reached, the Agent and Council seem to have become convinced of the necessity of maintaining a European representative at the Court of the Pāsha.

1765. The immediate cause of their first deputing a gentleman to Baghdād was a difficulty which they experienced, from not having as yet formally congratulated Sulaimān Pāsha on his accession or made him the customary present, in recovering a large debt that was due to their employers from a certain Hāji Yūsuf at Basrah; and they thought that the opportunity was also a good one for securing recognition by the Pāsha of the consular powers conferred on the British Agent, which, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, he seemed inclined to ignore; but it was not originally intended that Mr. Robert Garden, on whom their choice fell—partly because he had already visited Baghdād in 1758, partly because he knew Turkish, and partly because he was next in standing to the Agent himself,—should remain permanently, and the expenses of his trip were estimated at only Rs. 1,200. Mr. Garden, however, who left Basrah for Baghdād on the 28th March 1765, seems to have stayed there for some time; and, on his being recalled to India, Mr. Lyster was sent to take his place.

1766. In 1766, the establishment of a Residency at Baghdād having meanwhile been sanctioned by the Government of Bombay on the recommendation of the Agent and Council at Basrah, Mr. James Morley was sent from India to take charge of the new appointment and arrived on the 2nd of May at Baghdād, where he relieved Mr. Lyster.

It should be noticed, however, that the succession of the gentlemen mentioned to one another cannot have been continuous, for in January and February of 1766, when Niebuhr was at Baghdād, there was no British representative at that place. The presence of a European servant at Baghdād in 1765 and 1766 was no doubt useful in connection with the joint action of the British and the Turks in those years against the Ka'ab

tribe; but the Court of Directors, on coming to know of what had been done, disapproved of the action of the Bombay Government; and on the 23rd of November 1766 Mr. Morley was recalled from Baghdād.

Financial relations of the Turkish Government with the East India Company, arising out of the fourth Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, 1766-71.

The course of the expedition against the Ka'ab tribe undertaken by the Turks in 1766 in alliance with the East India Company is fully described in the history of the 'Arabistān province, which was the scene of the active operations; but the financial arrangements between the allies may be noticed, more appropriately, in the present place. The help of the Company was in the beginning gratuitous; but so tardy were the preparations of the Turks for the joint campaign that the representatives of the Company, towards the end of May, found it necessary to insist that, if the British naval and military forces were detained beyond the end of June, their expenses should be defrayed by the Turkish authorities and, this condition having been accepted by the Pāsha of Baghdād, a subsidy of 1,000 Tūmāns a month during the continuance of the expedition was arranged. This allowance was evidently payable in advance, for the Pāsha's Kehiyah, Muhammad or Mahmūd, on arriving from Baghdād towards the end of June to take command of the Turkish troops, immediately gave the British Agent an order for 600 Tūmāns, on account, which was duly honoured at the Basrah custom house. The Turkish instalments, however, soon ceased to be paid with regularity. In August, 320 Tūmāns in cash and an assignment of dates due to the Turkish Government, for which a purchaser at 1,080 Tūmāns was found, were obtained from the Kehiyah, but only by strong pressure; and on the 2nd of February 1768 the balance due to the Company was 11,718 Tūmāns, less the value of a quantity of dates made over to them by the Turks, of which they had been able to dispose at the rate of three Tūmāns per large Kārch. Already the Mutasallim of Basrah had begun to hint that enough had been paid to the British for the services of their fleet, and the Agent in reply to threaten that he would send it away, leaving Basrah unprotected,—an argument which seems to have prevailed over the objections of the Mutasallim, inasmuch as, by October 1768, the liabilities of the Turkish Government had been reduced to 2,950 Tūmāns. Difficulties, as we shall see hereafter, arose in 1769; and no further reduction had been effected up to the end of August 1771. It appears that a portion of the sum recovered was derived from the Turkish customs of Basrah, of which half was at one time assigned to the British for the purpose by Sulaimān Āgha during his Deputy-Governorship.

Difficulties with Sulaimān Agha

The conduct of Sulaimān Āgha, however, was not always satisfactory; and in June 1769 Mr. Moore, the British Agent at Basrah

was driven to complain to the Pāsha of Baghdād by letter of the injustice, oppression and rapacity of his representative, and in particular of his tyrannical treatment of the Armenians and other Christian merchants.* At the same time he mentioned, as illustrations of the Mutasallim's attitude towards the British, that within a week he had allowed two of his attendants to strike with clubs the horse of a gentleman who was at the time in the company of the Agent, and had caused the porter of the British Factory to be imprisoned and beaten, for no reason that could be ascertained unless that he was a Christian and a servant of the Factory. Before the Pāsha's answer, which merely stated that the Mutasallim had been reprimanded and ordered to make reparation for his conduct, reached Basrah, Sulaimān Āgha himself had expressed a wish for a reconciliation and had promised to comply with the following conditions laid down by Mr. Moore, the two last of which throw an interesting side-light on the question of consulage and customs and on that of repayment of the debt due by the Turkish Government to the Company :—

and his removal from the Mutasallimate of Basra', 1769.

First.—That the Mutasallim should send a deputation to the British Agent to apologise for the insults to which he had subjected him, especially in the imprisonment of the Factory porter, and to promise amendment of his conduct in future.

Second.—That the Mutasallim should give the British Agent an order for 20,000 Qurūsh on account of the duty on the goods landed by native merchants from certain specified British ships, and that he should agree to the Turkish customs on the goods landed by the British from the same ships being retained by the East India Company in part payment of the debt due to them by the Turkish Government.

Third.—That the customs on the cargoes of the other ships expected during the season should be divided in the following manner, *viz.*, "the "3 per cent. on all English property to be all paid to the Honourable "Company," and "the 7 per cent. on all country property whatever, "whether sold by the English or country merchants, to be equally "divided between the Mussaleem and the Honourable Company, or 3½ per "cent. each."

From these conditions it would appear that a number of the native merchants were still in the habit of landing the goods which they impor-

* In fairness to Sulaimān it should be recalled that Mr. Moore, as proved by his whole conduct at Basrah, was a peculiar and flighty character; and that Sulaimān, as we have seen already and shall see again hereafter, lived on excellent terms with other British officials. In the text we have only Mr. Moore's version of the case.

tol at the Turkish custom house, and not at the Company's premises as had been hoped by the Agent and Council in 1765.

The behaviour of Sulaimān Āgha, notwithstanding his acceptance of Mr. Moore's terms, must have continued unsatisfactory; for on the 31st of October 1769, on news being received that Sulaimān Pāsha had marched from Baghdād against the Muntafik tribe, Mr. Moore and Mr. Green embarked on the "Expedition" cruiser and proceeded up the Euphrates, accompanied by the bomb-vessel "Fancy," to Umm Labāa on the south side of the river half way from Qūrnah to Samāwah, where they found the Pāsha encamped. They arrived there on the 6th of November, to discover that the Mutasallim had anticipated them by some days and obtained the Pāsha's ear; but on the 12th, after the Mutasallim's departure for Basrah, the Agent had a private interview with the Pāsha, which resulted a few days later in the despatch of the Kehiyah, who was also the Pāsha's brother, to remove Sulaimān Āgha from his Government and to install in his place Yūsuf Āgha, who was generally reported to be an honest and humane man.

Refusal of the British to assist the Turks against the Muntafik, 1769.

In August 1769, the Pāsha of Baghdād earnestly begged the British Agent at Basrah to lend him the assistance of the Company's vessels for suppressing the revolt of the Muntafik under Shaikh 'Abdullah, already mentioned; but Mr. Moore, to whom the disastrous consequences of the Company's intervention in the war between the Turks and the Ka'ab were well known, whose relations with the rebellious Shaikh 'Abdullāh had always been friendly, and who at the time—as we have already seen—had unredressed grievances against the Mutasallim of Basrah, evaded the request on the ground that large European ships would be unable to act in the Euphrates. In the opinion of the Agent there was even at one time a possibility of the town of Basrah being captured by the Muntafik, and this he regarded as a strong additional reason for observing neutrality.

Withdrawal of the Agency staff from Basrah, 23rd April 1773.

In the spring of 1773 an outbreak of plague occurred at Basrah, resulting in heavy mortality and general panic. At the beginning of April, the Agent (Mr. Moore) and some of his establishment retired to "Belvoir," where also the Company's vessels "Drake" and "Tyger" were sent to lie, while the other members of the staff shut themselves up in the Factory building in the town of Basrah; and communication with the outer world was after that rigorously avoided. On the 7th of April the "Swallow," sloop-of-war, arrived at Basrah with 65 bales of piece-goods from Sūrat; and as Sir John Clerke, the commander, would not allow any boats from the shore to approach his vessel lest they should

bring contagion, the cargo was transhipped to the Company's cruiser "Drake" with a view to its being landed after the epidemic had ceased. The disease, however, so far from abating at the approach of the hot weather, as had been expected, continued day by day to increase; and the position of the Company's employés, whose servants had deserted them and whose provisions had begun to fail and could not, it was supposed, be replenished with safety, soon became extremely inconvenient.

At length, on the 23rd of April, having first sealed up the warehouses, recommended the Factory to the care of the local government, and appointed Khōjah Petrus and another Armenian merchant to represent the Company in their absence, they left Basrah for Bombay in the "Tyger" of eight, and the "Drake" of fourteen guns. In a resolution which they drew up immediately before starting, and which they left to be forwarded to the Court of Directors in London, they justified their conduct chiefly on the ground that there were not at Basrah any outstanding debts of consequence due to the Company, that the plague had caused a total suspension of business, and that it would be unsafe to hold communication with the natives for at least six months to come; and, in taking their departure, they were careful not to let it be suspected at Basrah that they meant to go so far as Bombay.

Capture of the "Tyger" in the Shatt-al-'Arab, 26th April 1773.

Three days ater, while the two vessels were still descending the Shatt-al-'Arab, the "Tyger", then three or four miles ahead of the "Drake", was unexpectedly boarded by four piratical Gallivats from Rīg which her commander, Lieutenant Scott, had taken for Maeqat vessels. Lieutenant Scott, finding that his lascars had all jumped over board and that he had only 11 Europeans left with whom to oppose the enemy, also threw himself into the water and was eventually picked up, along with two Europeans and two lascars, by the "Drake". Messrs. Beaumont and Green, Senior Merchants, who remained on board the vessel, were captured with her; but what became of the rest of the crew does not appear.

The "Drake" made every effort to overtake the "Tyger" and the pirate ships, which, assisted by a fifth Gallivat, quickly towed the unfortunate vessel away; but the pursuit, as the "Drake" on account of her draught of water was unable to cross the bar before the next morning's tide, was unsuccessful; and the Agent, considering it useless to proceed to Rīg with the "Drake" in her overloaded condition to demand the restoration of the "Tyger" and the release of the prisoners, resolved to prosecute his voyage "with the utmost expedition, lest from the lateness of the season the 'Drake' should lose her passage to

Bombay." The subsequent experiences of Messrs. Beaumont and Green and the employment of the "Tyger" by the Persians are described in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast. The passengers who reached Bombay in the "Drake" were apparently Messrs. Moore, Lewis and Latouche; it is not clear whether Mr. Reilly, the Agency Surgeon, ever left Basrah, and he was certainly there again at the middle of October 1773, more than two months before the return of the Agent and other members of the staff.

No reference has been made in this section to a case which formed the subject of much correspondence between the Agency and the Turkish Government from 1765 to 1768, as it arose out of the conduct of two of the Company's servants (Messrs. Shaw and Garden) and is discussed, for that reason, in a later paragraph.

Trade of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757–73.

The trade of the East India Company at Basrah was considerable during this period; but their representatives seem to have obtained but little business at Baghdād, even during the existence of a Residency at that place.

Woollen goods.

The chief article of import, here as in Persia, was woollen cloth of various sorts; and Mr. Shaw, on his visit to Baghdād in 1779, besides arranging—as he believed—for the future transit of the Company's goods to that place free of inland duties, actually disposed on the spot of 100 bales of coarse cloth at 7·4 Mahmūdis per gaz and of 30 bales of fine cloth at 17 Mahmūdis per gaz. He found that there was still a considerable importation of cloth from Aleppo to Baghdād; but this trade he hoped, by means of improved arrangements, entirely to "overset". In February 1768 there were "heavy remains" at Basrah; but 100 bales of broad cloth worth Rs. 30,569, consisting partly of coarse cloth and partly of coloured, had been consigned from Bombay and were expected to facilitate the disposal of the unsold stock. In 1771, there was a great accumulation of woollens, intended for sale in the Persian Gulf, both at Basrah and Bombay; and the Court of Directors, as a special measure, sanctioned their exchange for Gilān raw silk, and less than ½ of the price of the silk to be paid in woollens, after which the purchase of silk was to be discontinued. From 1765 to 1773, however, the average annual number of bales of Indian piece-goods imported at Basrah was 3,000 to 3,500. These were mostly the property of merchants settled in

Bengal, in Madras, and at Sūrat; and they were chiefly carried in ships belonging to British subjects or to Muhammadan merchants of Sūrat. The returns were largely in specie. During the same ten years the East India Company imported broad cloth and long ells at Basrah in considerable, and embossed cloth in small quantities.

Yaman coffee, brought annually by 'Omān vessels, was an important article of trade at Basrah during this period; but three times this traffic suffered serious interruption, *viz.*, in 1765 by the Ka'ab disturbances in the Shatt-al'Arab, in 1767 by the rapacity of Mīr Mahanna at Khārag, and in 1769 by the war between the Vakīl of Persia and the Imām of 'Omān. In 1761 an attempt was made to introduce Cornish tin at Basrah, but it does not appear to have been immediately successful; in 1764, however, there was a trade in tin there. Some iron, steel, lead, and carpets were imported also, but not in large quantities. Other imports.

The export trade in dates had now grown to some importance, as shown by several indications. In October of 1763 the "Swallow" was sent to Dawāsir on the Lower Shatt-al-'Arab to prevent interference with some dates in which Mr. Shaw, the ex-Resident at Basrah, who was indebted to the Company, had an interest; in October 1767 Mr. Lyster of the Basrah Agency was reported to be at Maharzi, probably the part of 'Abbādān Island so named, "engaged ... in gathering in what dates he possibly can", but his operations were impeded by the behaviour of the Ka'ab tribe; and in 1768 the Agent and Council allowed part payment of the Turkish Government's debt to the East India Company to be made in dates. Dates.

In 1759, when silver rupees became scarce at Basrah, orders were requested by the Resident and by the Agent at Bandar 'Abbās as to the kind of gold in which remittances should be made, instead, from Basrah to India; and early in the following year, not having as yet received definite instructions and rupees being no longer procurable, the Resident sent "Venetians and Nadiris" to Bandar 'Abbās, whence they were forwarded to Bombay. Specie.

The following extract from a Bombay Castle "Consultation", dated 24th April 1769, is interesting, as it illustrates the practice of the Company in relation to freights, and also casts some light on matters of discipline falling properly under the next section: Freights.

The petition from the Armenian and other merchants at Basrah, complaining of their not being furnished with an annual freight ship from Surat and other hardships in respect to their trade from thence, being now taken into consideration, the President declares that part which relates to him is an absolute falsity, as he never gave orders

to, or ever wrote a syllable to, Mr. Price on the subject, as the merchants allege that gentleman informed their constituents; and in regard to what they allege against Mr. Price, he must be called upon to reply to it; when proper measures will be taken to prevent all complaints of this kind in future by making some necessary regulations in respect to freight ships in general. We cannot, however, close this subject without remarking our surprise at the Agent and Council having referred the above petition immediately to our Honourable Masters, as translations of this nature ought to be submitted to us as their immediate superiors and through us to the Honourable Company. Acting otherwise is directly contrary to their and our orders and the general rules prescribed for advices to Europe.

Establishments of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757—73.

Organisation and appointments.

The interests of the Company in Turkish 'Irāq were represented, as we have seen, until 1765, by a Resident at Basrah, subordinate to the Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās; but in the year mentioned the Agency was transferred from Bandar 'Abbās to Basrah, which thus became the principal British station in the Gulf, and it remained there until after the close of the period. In 1760, before this change occurred, Mr. Garden, on account of his special qualifications, seems to have been appointed Joint-Resident with Mr. Shaw, whose Assistant he had been; but in the next year, as will appear further on, both were removed, and the sole Residency was restored. In 1764 a qualified book-keeper in the person of Mr. G. Skipp, Writer, was added to the staff of the Agency and received an allowance of Rs. 20 per month for taking charge of the accounts. In 1764 the entertaining of a "Latty" Master, apparently a private customs officer, with a staff of assistants, was sanctioned for the prevention of frauds; but the Bombay Government did not approve of a suggestion by Mr. Price, that a "Latty" or private customs house should be erected and native merchants compelled to use it, as they feared that the building itself would be expensive to construct and that future Mutasallims of Basrah might raise objections to the system. In the following year the Agent and Council asked for another Assistant to enable them to cope with the ordinary work. In 1765-66, as already explained, a temporary Residency under Basrah existed at Baghdād.

The Basrah Factory, and life of Europeans in the country.

The Agency building at Basrah, generally styled the Factory, was situated in 1765 near the southern bank of the 'Ashār creek at a distance from the Shatt-al-'Arab, a little way below the residence of the

Mutasallim, which was about the middle of the native town; but there was also a country-house or branch of the Factory at "Belvoir" on the Shatt-al-'Arab, 4 miles from Basrah, a place possibly identical with the modern Kût-al-Farangi.

It seems that the Company's employés at Basrah, when they were on good terms with one another, lived in a sort of mess; for in 1764, on the occasion of Mr. Price's deputation to report on personal matters there, it was specially enjoined on him by the Bombay Government "that at Basrah everybody live in one house (if it can be done), eat at "one table, and in every respect keep up a perfect harmony."

Europeans residing in the country were obliged, out of consideration for their dignity, to maintain some state; and Mr. Garden in 1758 would not allow English visitors at Baghdâd to appear on foot in the streets and restricted them to riding magnificently caparisoned horses. European residents generally adopted Turkish costume, of which two complete suits, in good style, cost nearly £100.

Complaints of ill-health are not many during this period; but in October 1770 Mr. Garden was obliged by illness to return to India, only a few months after he had arrived to take up the appointment of Second at Basrah; in the summer o 1771 an "almost general sickness" prevailed among the staff; and in 1773, as we have seen above, there was a severe outbreak of plague, to which, however, none of the staff fell victims.

Case of Messrs. Shaw and Garden, 1761—68.

We must now briefly notice a case, arising out of the conduct of two of the Company's servants in the Gulf, which caused a great official turmoil in its earlier stages, and which, in its later developments, was productive of much trouble with the Turkish Government.

1759—61.

Mr. Shaw, who held the office of Resident at Basrah from 1753 to 1761, was a liberal and hospitable gentleman, his name was well known and apparently respected throughout the country, and he maintained friendly relations with a number of Turkish officials in various places; but his conduct, though he had at one time been designated for the Residency in Sind, as a mark of the Company's approbation, in case he preferred it to Basrah, had grown by degrees less and less satisfactory to his employers. The necessity for his journey to Baghdâd in 1759 appears to have been called in question; complaints were made in 1760, by the Court of Directors, as to the inefficient manner in which the overland mail service to Europe was being managed by him; and, early in 1761, the Bombay Government found it necessary to call on the Agent at Bandar 'Abbâs to insist that the expenses of the Basrah Residency should be kept within moderate bounds, particularly "the article of presents, which

"we observed was become very large." At length in February 1761, much inconvenience having been caused in India by Mr. Shaw's detention of the "Drake" and "Swallow" at Basrah contrary to express orders, the Bombay Government appointed a Committee to report on his conduct and decided, in accordance with its recommendations, to remove him and to send a Mr. Stuart to Basrah in his place; but, as a letter had also been received from the Court of Directors ordering the removal of Mr. Shaw in case he were unable to justify his conduct in the matter of the overland mails, they thought it well that Mr. Douglas, their Agent at Bandar 'Abbás, should visit Basrah and investigate that point for the satisfaction of the Court.

1761. Messrs. Douglas and Stuart arrived at Basrah on the 14th May 1761, and the case suddenly took another turn. It was now discovered that Messrs. Shaw and Garden, the Joint Residents, were responsible to the Company for a shortage of 12,317 Tūmāns (or about Rs. 61,585) in the cash of the Factory, which they were unable to make good; and Mr. Garden was accordingly suspended from his employment by Mr. Douglas, Mr. Shaw being, it would seem, already under suspension. Mr. Douglas remained at Basrah until the 17th October 1761, when he returned to Bandar 'Abbás, leaving Mr. Stuart in charge of the Residency. Mr. Shaw then complained to the Bombay Government of having been unfairly treated by Mr. Douglas, who had hopelessly compromised his credit with the Turkish officials, encouraged his native debtors to dispute their liabilities, and finally departed just when a few days' delay might have enabled him to adjust the whole account; and he begged that means might be devised for enabling him to wind up his affairs at Basrah and also to vindicate his character.

1762. On the 21st of July 1762 Mr. Stuart, the new Resident, died suddenly at Basrah; and Mr. Douglas, as a temporary measure, sent Mr. Lyster from Bandar 'Abbás to take charge of the Residency.

1763. The Bombay Government, whom Mr. Douglas's report seems to have left in doubt whether Mr. Shaw had embezzled the Company's funds or had merely been guilty—as admitted by himself—of a breach of standing orders in supplying woollen goods on credit to a native merchant named Hāji Yūsuf, decided, on learning of the vacancy, to send an impartial person to the spot to clear up and settle the case; and they selected for this duty Mr. W. A. Price, whom, at the beginning of 1763, they invested with the rank of "Provisional Agent of Persia". Orders had already been issued to Mr. Douglas for the transfer of the Persian Gulf Agency from Bandar 'Abbás to Basrah, and it was intended

that he should ultimately retain charge of it, if he pleased; but during Mr. Price's visit his powers as Agent were to be in abeyance, an opportunity, however, being afforded him at Basrah of disproving the charges brought against him by Mr. Shaw. Mr. Douglas, who was senior in standing to Mr. Price, preferred not to go to Basrah on these terms; and, after withdrawing the Bandar 'Abbās establishment and sending most of the stock to Basrah, he returned to India without meeting his successor. The result of Mr. Price's inquiry was to show that Messrs. Shaw and Garden, though they had disobeyed orders, had not been guilty of any dishonesty, and that Hājī Yūsuf was really indebted to Mr. Shaw to the extent of 11,674 Tūmāns; and for this amount Mr. Price succeeded in obtaining an "obligation" from the Hājī.

Hereupon the Bombay Government, in January 1764, held that Messrs. Shaw and Garden were still answerable to the Company for a balance of 11,807 Tūmāns, which had been struck on the 24th of March 1762; ordered Mr. Shaw to Bombay, where, with a seat in Council "conformable to his standing" he was to await the decision of the Court of Directors; and cancelled the suspension of Mr. Garden, but refused to appoint him to the post of Second at Basrah, for which he had apparently been recommended by Mr. Price. Mr. Shaw, however, did not see fit to comply with these lenient orders, and instead betook himself to Aleppo, where he remained for some time without even informing the Directors in London of his presence there; and the Court, in November 1764, on becoming aware of this further circumstance, ordered him to be dismissed from the Company's service, while at the same time they insisted on Mr. Garden's being immediately recalled from Basrah to India. Mr. Price, after discharging his commission, had left again for Bombay in January 1764. 1764.

This was the end of the case as among the servants of the Company but it still remained to recover from Hājī Yūsuf the value of the goods, belonging to the Company, which he had obtained from Mr. Shaw. Up to March 1765 little or no progress had been made in the matter, the Pāsha of Baghdād apparently insisting on the production of proofs attested by a Qādhī, and the Agent and Council at Basrah, with the approval of the British Ambassador at Constantinople, refusing to comply; and in that month Mr. Garden, who had meanwhile returned to Turkish 'Irāq, was sent to Baghdād to interview the Pāsha in regard to this and other matters. The Kehiyah soon after asked to be allowed to inspect securities to the value of 9,000 Tūmāns which had been 1765.

deposited by Hāji Yūsuf at Basrah, and in reply he was informed that they would be handed to the Mutasallim, if desired, but that the Agent and Council could not themselves undertake the responsibility of forwarding them to Baghdād. Eventually Mr. Garden obtained an order for the sale of Hāji Yūsuf's property; but the Mutasallim represented that on account of the demands of Janissaries and other creditors upon the estate, it would be impossible to find purchasers for the houses, lands, etc., of which it consisted in the ordinary way, and that it would be better if they were put up for sale as the property of the East India Company. The Agent agreed to this suggestion on condition that the Hujjats or title deeds should first be delivered over to him; and the Mutasallim then had recourse to fresh evasions, alleging that the title deeds were "old, and few or none remaining", and suggesting that the Agent should find the purchasers first, when certificates in the Sultān's name would be furnished, superior in validity to any Hujjats.

1766. In June 1766 the Kehiyah, on arriving from Baghdād to take command of the Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, promised that within 20 or 30 days of the final defeat of the enemy he would settle the entire debt by "separating the lands among the sons and obliging them to pay off the whole in proportion"; and though the condition on which the promise depended was not fulfilled, repayment had begun in earnest by April 1767.

1767-68. For some time afterwards instalments seem to have been regularly received, and after the beginning of 1768 the case ceased to be mentioned, presumably because the claim had been settled.

Mr. French's estate, 1768. From instructions given by the Bombay Government to the Agent at Basrah in 1768, it would seem that proceedings still continued in regard to the estate of Mr. French, the former Resident, who had died at Basrah so long before as 1737, and that persons having claims were now advised to make application to the East India Company in London.

Case of Mr. Skipp, 1768-69. In October 1768, on his return from a mission to Shirāz, described in the history of the Persian Coast, Mr. Skipp, who had originally been sent to Basrah as book-keeper in 1764, was suspended by the Agent and Council there for breach of trust and breach of orders in his capacity of "Warehouse-keeper and Accomptant". It was apparently alleged that he had been guilty of dishonesty in the disposal of some "shalloons" at a low price jointly with Mr. Wrench, a former Agent, and also in the sale of some cloth but the Government of

Bombay, who were well aware of the animosity of Mr. Moore, the Agent, against Mr. Skipp on account of the divergence of their Persian policies, found Mr. Skipp guilty of an error of judgment only, removed his suspension, and restored him to his standing, at the same time, however, requiring him "to make good the difference on the price of the shaloons and the amount of Mr. Lyster's debt to the warehouse." The Bombay Government, while they thought Mr. Skipp's suspension not unwarranted in the circumstances, "highly condemned" the Agent and Council for having ordered it without allowing Mr. Skipp any opportunity of explaining his conduct.

Overland communication between Basrah and Europe, 1757—73.

Mails. We have already alluded, in connection with Mr. Shaw's case, to the interest shown by the Court of Directors of the East India Company in the efficient maintenance of overland communication between Europe and India by way of Basrah. Here we may add that on the same occasion they described the care of this "important channel" as an essential part of the Resident's duty and ordered the Bombay Government, in the following terms, to insist on his exact performance of the same: "whoever in future is appointed to Basrah (you) will keep "a watchful eye over his conduct; and if he ever fails in a punctual "correspondence with us or yourselves, or is ever found to delay advices "to or from India, call him immediately to Bombay; for early advices "may prove of the greatest consequence to our affairs, in time of war "especially."

Travellers. The Basrah overland route was frequented, to a limited extent, by European travellers, generally servants of the East India Company, between Europe and the East; but to those using it without proper arrangements it sometimes proved dangerous. A Captain Ivers was plundered in September 1757 on his way from Basrah to Aleppo; and at the beginning of 1758 Mr. Barton, a retired East India merchant, who after living for some time the life of a country gentleman at home, had determined to revisit India, was robbed and very nearly killed between Aleppo and Baghdād. Dr. Ives and his companions, who were in Turkish 'Irāq from April to June 1758, and the scientific traveller Niebuhr, who spent in the country the period from

August 1765 to March 1766, both arrived at Basrah from the Persian Gulf and returned to Europe by way of Baghdād, Diyārbakr and Aleppo. Sir Eyre Coote also passed through Basrah on a homeward journey *viâ* the desert in 1771.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757—73.

The French war frigate "Bristol" at Basrah 1758.

At the beginning of the Seven Years' War a French vessel of 300 tons with twenty 3-pounder guns was lying in the river at Basrah; and there she remained, protected by the neutrality of the port, until 1758, when a French frigate of war, the "Bristol", Captain Rivage, was sent to bring her away. The "Bristol" carried 30 guns and a crew of 140 men, of whom 85 were Europeans, and the rest lascars. When Dr. Ives and his friends were at Basrah in April 1758, they found the two French ships still there; and on the neutral soil of Turkey, notwithstanding that war prevailed between their nations, numerous courtesies were exchanged between the British and the French communities, over which Mr. Shaw and M. Perdria at this time respectively presided. At a supper party given by the French Resident at his country house, the company, which included the whole staff of the British factory, the British visitors, and all the officers of the "Bristol," amounted to 26, —the greatest number of Europeans, it was believed, that had ever been assembled at Basrah.

Contest for precedence between the British and French Residents at Basrah, 1759—65.

About the beginning of 1759, the Seven Years' War being still in progress, the French Resident at Basrah made a journey to Baghdād and obtained from Sulaimān Pāsha a Farmān in which it was enjoined that he should in future "be first received on the ceremonial visits and be respected as first of the European Residents." The Frenchman, on returning to Basrah, proceeded on the strength of this Farmān to treat the British Resident as inferior to himself in rank, and informed the great men and merchants of Basrah, especially the Christians, that they must on all public days visit the French before the British Resident. The persons to whom this order was addressed refused, however, to comply with it, and informed Mr. Shaw, the British Resident, that they preferred the British to the French. Mr. Shaw thereupon made a representation to the Pāsha of Baghdād, of which the result was that the Pāsha sent a command to the Mutasallim at Basrah "directing him and all his officers to regard the English as first in his esteem";

that he wrote to the French Resident at Basrah, condemning the order in regard to first visits which that officer had taken upon himself to issue; and that he "also addressed a letter to Mr. Shaw, expressing his concern at the Frenchman's impudence." Mr. Shaw's visit to Baghdād later in the year perhaps bore some reference to this affair: at least he reported that the ill-behaviour of the French Resident at Baghdād had been "in some respect the original cause" of the Pāsha's invitation to himself. The dispute lingered on, after the conclusion of the war, until 1765, when Sulaimān Āgha, on his appointment to the Mutasallimate of Basrah, finally decided it in favour of the British Resident by "giving him the preference to the French Resident "in regard to the first visit to the Serai, and gave orders to his guards "that, if he attempted to come there till after the English had had "their audience, to stop him; so that point of contest is at last "determin'd in our favour."

The French position in 1565–66.

In 1765-66, the year in which Niebuhr visited Turkish 'Irāq, the French were represented at Basrah by a Resident who did not engage in trade, and who made the most of an official salary by no means regularly paid; and the offices of French Consul at Baghdād and Latin Bishop of Babylon were still combined in the person of Mgr. Baillet, who eventually died of plague at Baghdād in 1773. The French Factory at Basrah was located in 1765 in the native town, on the south side of the 'Ashār creek, somewhat higher up than the residence of the Mutasallim.

Other European nations in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757–73.

Portuguese.

The Portuguese seem by this time to have disappeared entirely from Turkish 'Irāq.

Dutch.

The Dutch, after their removal from Basrah in or about 1752, never again established themselves in the country; but from 1754 to 1765 they maintained a settlement on the neighbouring island of Khārag, from which all the spices and drugs in the Basrah market were imported by native merchants.

Italians.

There were now several Italian merchants at Basrah who carried on a considerable trade with Venice and Leghorn by way of Aleppo. One of the richest of these, in 1765, was a M. Leoni, who was very efficiently represented at Baghdād by a young Venetian agent.

ABDUL HAMÍD I.

1773—89.*

The reign of the Turkish Sultán Abdul Hamíd,† who succeeded Mustafa III at the end of 1773 and ruled until his death in the spring of 1789, was occupied by an incessant struggle with the Russians, in which two leading incidents were the treaty of Kainardji, imposed on Turkey in 1774, and the complete annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 1783. The difficulties with which the Porte had to contend in Europe occupied their attention to the exclusion of all other affairs, and incapacitated them equally from restraining and from assisting the Pásha of Baghdád, from obliging him to respect their own authority, and from enabling him to repel invasion when his territories were entered by the armies of Karím Khán, Vakíl of Persia.

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*For the period covered by the reigns of 'Abdul Hamíd I and Sálim III (1773—89 and 1789—1807) in Turkish 'Iráq the official authorities are the anonymous *Précis containing Information in regard to the First Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, printed in 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600—1800*, printed in 1908: both of these cover the entire period. Other valuable sources of information are *Travels in Asia and Africa*, 1808, by Mr. A. Parsons, who was present at Basrah in 1774-75 at the beginning of the siege by the Persians; *Observations on the Passage to India*, 1784, by Colonel J. Capper, who visited Basrah in 1778-79 towards the end of the Persian occupation; *Observations made on a Tour from Bengal to Persia*, 1790, by Ensign W. Francklin, and a *Journal of the Passage from India*, by Dr. T. Howel, both of whom were at Basrah at the beginning of 1787, shortly after the collapse of Shaikh Thuwaini's usurpation; a *Brief History of the Wahauby*, 1824, by Sir H. J. Brydges, who was a member of the Basrah Residency from 1787 to 1795 and himself Resident at Baghdád from 1798 to 1806; and, lastly, the *Voyage dans l'Empire Othoman, l'Égypte et la Perse*, 1801—07, of M. Olivier, who passed through Baghdád twice in 1796-97.

Professor E. S. Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, 1856, contains the general history of Turkey during the period.

†The Agent in Council at Basrah wrote on the 23rd of April 1774 to the Government of Bombay ". . . . there is no hopes of a peace betwixt the Turks and "Russians being shortly concluded from a new Sultan Hulsem having lately succeeded "to the Turkish throne on the death of his brother Mustapha." The present writer is not aware how the discrepancy in names here is to be explained.

Epidemic of plague in Turkish 'Irāq, 1773.

The epidemic of plague that occasioned the withdrawal of the British Agency from Turkish Irāq in April 1773, as before described, began in March at Baghdād, that place having received infection by a caravan from Erzeroum; but it extended almost immediately to Basrah. At Baghdād, where it had been unknown during more than 60 years, the fell disease continued until the middle of May, and at Basrah it did not cease until September. Mgr. Baillet, the Latin Bishop of Babylon, was among the more notable victims at Baghdād; while the Pāsha and his suite sought and found immunity by isolating themselves in a country palace, surrounded by gardens, at distance of about three miles from the city. The mortality from plague was heavy throughout the country, and there was stagnation of trade and general depression; but the total number of deaths, which there was no means of estimating, has probably been* exaggerated by contemporary writers.

Affairs in Turkish 'Irāq, from the epidemic of plague to the siege of Basrah, 1773—75.

Return of the British Agency to Basrah, January 1774.

Mr. Moore, the British Agent at Basrah, and a part of his staff, who arrived in Bombay harbour from Basrah on the 14th of May 1773, remained in quarantine on Butcher's Island until the 17th of June following, when they were allowed to land in Bombay. Under the orders of Government they left again for Basrah on the 28th October 1773, taking with them two new ketches of 14 guns each, the "Tigris" and "Euphrates," which had been built at Bombay expressly to the order of the Pāsha of Baghdād. The party remained at Masqat from

* Turkish officials in 1774 succeeded in persuading Mr. Parsons that at Baghdad, out of about 500,000 inhabitants, more than 300,000 had died of plague in a little over four months and had been properly interred by the survivors, every burial being registered by the authorities. At Basrah, Mr. Parsons was led to believe that more than 200,000 people had perished out of 300,000. Another estimate, officially reported by the British Agency, showed a mortality of 200,000 in Basrah and its environs, and one of 2,000,000 in the entire province: the latter number probably exceeds the whole population of the country at the present day. Recent experience in India has shown that in large places, even when plague is most severe, the process of depopulation is not so rapid as this.

the 17th of November to the 1st of December, chiefly to admit of repairs to the "Euphrates," which had lost her rudder and sustained other injuries by going ashore at the entrance of Masqat harbour. On the 5th of January 1774 they reached Basrah and re-occupied the British Factory, which was found, apparently, in good order. The Pāsha of Baghdād seems to have been much pleased at the return of the Agency, and with the vessels supplied to him, and to have presented the Agent with a horse and trappings as a mark of his satisfaction.

Internal administration, 1773—76.

The ruler of the Baghdād province at this time was one* Hamad Pāsha, of whom little is known beyond these facts: that in 1774 he had already held the government for a number of years; that latterly he had neglected public business for a life of ease and seclusion; and that in September 1774 he was guilty of an act of base ingratitude in allowing his adoptive father, whose influence had procured him the Pashaliq, to be assassinated along with his sons on a suspicion that he disapproved of the Pāsha's administration and meant to subvert it.

The machinery of government continued, at the time of Mr. Parsons' visit to Turkish 'Irāq in 1774, to be much the same as it had been found a few years earlier by Ives and Niebuhr. There was still an Āgha of Janissaries at Baghdād representing the Turkish central government, but he had become—perhaps in consequence of the pre-occupation of the Porte with European affairs—a political cypher. A Kapitān Pāsha existed at Basrah, under whose control were the Turkish coasts of the Gulf and the waterways of 'Irāq below Baghdād and Hillah, and whose duty it was to collect tonnage dues on all non-British vessels arriving at or clearing from Basrah, as also on trading craft plying upon the rivers, and a monthly tax on fishing boats.

The Arab tribes were at this time at least as powerful as ever. From a point on the Euphrates 30 miles below Hillah to Basrah, and even further down the Shatt-al-'Arab, they were practically independent; they paid some tribute to the Pāsha of Baghdād for his protection, but they did not tolerate the presence of his officials; and they collected tolls upon river-borne traffic, at points such as 'Arjah and Samāwah, for the benefit of their own chiefs. The river-side capital of one of these chiefs, probably that of a Shaikh of the Muntafik, was visited by Mr. Parsons in 1774 between Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh and Qūrnah; it consisted entirely of tents, covered an enormous area, and sheltered a huge population; and the live stock of all kinds belonging to the camp were almost innumer-

*So Parsons; but was he not really 'Umr Pāsha, who succeeded in 1764? See footnote on page 1246 *post*.

able. Among the animals possessed by the tribe or their chief were horses of the best breeds, greyhounds, hawks, and even such a curiosity as a score of tame ostriches with red cloth collars and brass bells about their necks.

Among the principal items of public revenue in 'Iráq at this time were the sea-customs, which were levied at Basrah at the rate of 3 per cent. *ad valorem* on goods imported by Europeans, and at 8 per cent. on those of Turkish subjects and other Asiatics; and equivalent duties were collected on goods re-exported from Basrah to Aleppo or imported at Baghdád from Basrah, the valuation in the latter case being made according to the rates of the Baghdád market. Another important fiscal resource was a *tax on date palms in the neighbourhood of Basrah.

Course of trade, 1773—75.

Baghdád was at *this* period an important centre of trade, so much so that Mr. Parsons after visiting it wrote: "This is the grand mart "for the produce of India and Persia, Constantinople, Aleppo and "Damascus; in short it is the grand oriental depository."

Basrah was of consequence chiefly as the sea-port of Baghdád; but at times merchants of Aleppo carried on a direct trade with it across the desert by caravan. These Aleppo traders brought European goods to Basrah for sale, chiefly from Venice, also specie in the shape of Venetian Sequins; while from the Persian Gulf side, exclusive of European goods, the imports at Basrah were chiefly Indian piece-goods, Mokha coffee, and drugs from various parts of Arabia and Persia. The coffee, gums and Arabian drugs for the most part reached Basrah in 'Ománi vessels; but occasionally a British ship brought a cargo of coffee from Mokha; and goods from Persia invariably arrived in Persian bottoms. Of the piece-goods reaching Baghdád, large quantities were sent to Smyrna and Constantinople; but the drugs mostly found their way to Alexandretta, whence they were shipped to Venice, Leghorn, Marseilles, London and Amsterdam. Horses were exported from Basrah to India, where they fetched high prices. Besides Turkish and European merchants, there were many rich Armenian and Jewish traders at Basrah who lived by the continental transit trade, purchasing either on commission or, in advance of orders, at their own risk.

The question of direct caravans between Basrah and Aleppo deserves further mention, as it was occasionally a subject of correspondence

*In 1774 this tax on palms at Basrah was said to yield about 100,000 local Tumáns or £187,500 sterling a year, but this must have been an exaggerated estimate, the amount mentioned being approximately that of the revenue of the Basrah Wilāyat from *all* sources at the present day.

between the British Agent at Basrah and the Pāsha at Baghdād, the latter of whom did not readily agree to a lucrative traffic being carried on across his territories otherwise than through the capital, where it could be closely supervised. In the spring of 1773, however, in consequence of the outbreak of plague at Baghdād, the Pasha authorised the despatch of a caravan direct from Basrah to Aleppo; but Mr. Moore, the British Agent, was unable in the haste of his departure to take advantage of the concession, and after his return he could not at once obtain its renewal. In April 1774 the necessary leave was at last given; and about the same time a caravan from Aleppo came in at Basrah.

British Factory at Basrah, and customs and consulage of the East Indian Company 1703—1775.

The British Factory at Basrah still occupied the same site in the native town as in 1766; and vessels of 80 tons, lying in the creek, could load and unload cargo at its very gate. On the opposite side of the creek was a good garden belonging to the Factory; and the Company's Agent had, besides, a country house at Magil, the modern Kūt-al-Farangi, which, though it stood about half a mile inland from the water's edge, commanded an excellent view both up and down the Shatt-al-'Arab.

All goods brought in British ships, including the whole of the imports from India, paid "a duty and consulage" to the East India Company, amounting to 6 per cent., which was distinct from the customs levied by the Turkish administration; and the annual proceeds of the impost or imposts in question were, chiefly because of the Indian trade, not inconsiderable. In February 1774, the British Agent informed the Pāsha that he feared much merchandise was being fraudulently passed through the Baghdād custom house in his name at the European, or lower, rate of duty; and he requested that in future no goods should be treated there as British unless certified by himself to be such.

Siege and reduction of Basrah by the Persians, 1775—1776.

The occupation of Basrah by the Persians, which was the principal event in the history of Turkish 'Irāq during the reign of the Sultān 'Abdul Hamid, was neither unexpected nor sudden. On the contrary, an assault upon the town had been threatened for more than a year before any was actually made; and the event seems to have been in the end precipitated by successes which the Turks themselves gained, in Kurdistān, over the Persians. The further period of a year which

elapsed between the investment of Basrah and its surrender was ample to admit of succour being sent from Baghdād, or even from Constantinople; but it is probable that neither the Pāsha,* "a weak and needy ruler," nor the Sultān was in a position to render effectual aid.

Events leading up to the siege of Basrah, 1773—1775.

In the autumn of 1773, when the British Agent and his staff were on their return journey from Bombay, it was whispered for the first time that Karīm Khān had designs on Basrah. The Persian Governor of Kirmānshāh, 'Alī Qulī Khān, was known to have made preparations for invading Kurdistān, then a district of the Baghdād Pashāliq; and it was feared that a fleet and land force which were being assembled on the Persian coast under the orders of the Vakīl, ostensibly for service against Masqat, were really intended to operate against Basrah the apprehension excited at Basrah at this time was so lively that Khōjah Petrus, in whose charge the goods of the East India Company had been left, thought of shipping them to Baghdād for greater security; and the Agent himself purposed, if on his arrival at Basrah he saw that an attack was imminent, to embark as much of the Company's goods as possible on the vessels "Revenge" and "Drake", which he brought with him.

February to March 1774.

The actual position at Basrah was found less critical than had been feared; but in February 1774, some six weeks after the re-establishment of the British Agency, Karīm Khān was said to have requested, apparently through the Mutasallim of Basrah, the co-operation of the Turkish and British fleets against the Imām of 'Omān, with whom he was at war, and to have threatened in case of non-compliance to attack Basrah. This intelligence was fully confirmed by letters received from Messrs. Beaumont and Green, two of the East India Company's servants who were then confined by Karīm Khān at Shīrāz. Mr. Moore at once apprised the Pāsha of Baghdād that, so far as British vessels were concerned, the Vakīl's demand was inadmissible, adding: "In my "humble opinion, therefore, it behoves Your Excellency to order down "Your troops immediately for the defence of this place and give orders to "the different tribes of Arabs to march down to the banks of this river "to prevent the Persians from landing on this side of it—the sooner this "is done the better, as Bussora according to my notions is in no state of "defence whatever"; and at the same time he was careful to inform the Pāsha that the British ships then at Basrah could not be spared, partly

* Whom Brydges and Olivier both call 'Umr Pāsha, but who cannot well have been the 'Umr that succeeded 'Alī Pāsha in 1764 unless he was also called Hamad. See note on page 1242 *ante*.

because of the danger of a revival of plague and partly because of the risk of a sudden onslaught by the Persians, to furnish trading vessels bound from Masqat to Basrah, as had been requested by the Turkish authorities, with a convoy to protect them against Persian attack. On the 20th February 1774, acting upon his own view of the situation, the Agent caused the "Revenge" and "Drake" to be provisioned for three months and prepared for receiving the stock of woollens then in the Factory; but the Mutasallim, Sulaimān Āgha, deprecated the removal of the goods, which would, he said, alarm the town, cause many of the inhabitants to take flight, bring trade to a stand-still, and play into the hands of Karīm Khān, whose object it was by destroying the commerce of Basrah to compel the British to re-open their settlement at Būshehr. Eventually, on the Mutasallim's assuring the Agent that he had made arrangements for obtaining prompt information of the movements of the Persian army and that there was a prospect of detaching from the Persian cause the Ka'ab tribe, without the aid of whose fleet nothing could be effected by the enemy, and on his further giving a guarantee on behalf of the Pāsha and the Sultān, in which the Daftardār and Shaikh Darwīsh—the latter probably the Basrah Naqīb of the day—associated themselves with him, that the East India Company should be indemnified for any loss which they might sustain through their goods remaining for the present on shore, Mr. Moore agreed to delay action for a few days longer. He also undertook that the Ka'ab of 'Arabistān, against whom the East India Company had claims, should not be attacked by the British squadron if they brought their vessels to Basrah to help in the defence of the town; but, to a suggestion that the British should themselves intervene on the side of the Turks, Mr. Moore replied with decision that his nation were only merchants at Basrah, and that they would observe strict neutrality, retiring on board ship with so much of the Company's property as they could remove on the approach of the Persian army, but not finally quitting the place so long as it remained in possession of the Turks. The Agent, probably in March, informed the Pāsha of Baghdād of what had passed between himself and the Mutasallim and again urged that Basrah should be placed in a state of defence; but before the end of April, authentic information was received from Shīrāz that no preparations had as yet been made by the Persians for a campaign against Basrah,—a truth which had already been reported by the Ka'ab Shaikh to the Mutasallim,—and it began to be believed that Karīm Khān had, for the time at least, laid aside his original aggressive intentions. The Mutasallim, in the meanwhile, had done his best to pacify the Vakīl by promising to assist him with the

"Tigris" and "Euphrates" ketches against his enemy the Imām of 'Omān; but neither had the vessels yet been sent, nor was there any intention on his part of sending them.

The Ka'ab, in response to the Mutasallim's overtures, readily promised in case of a war to desert the Persians and to remove with their own ships from Dōraq; but hardly had this assurance been given when, as related in the chapter on the history of 'Arabistān, its worthlessness was exposed by an attempt on the part of the Ka'ab to capture the "Faiz Islām," a Turkish ship, at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab: an attempt which was frustrated only by the despatch of the British cruiser "Revenge" from Basrah to the relief of the threatened vessel. The Mutasallim was so grateful for the assistance lent him on this occasion that, on the safe arrival of the "Faiz Islām" at Basrah on the 15th of April, he repaired in person to the Factory garden to tender his thanks to the British Agent. Two days later all the subjects of the Ka'ab Shaikh at Basrah suddenly withdrew from the place; and it was feared, from the circumstance of the Ka'ab fleet being at the same time assembled at the mouth of the Kārūn, that an attack upon Basrah or upon the British vessels lying there, instigated by the Persian Government, might be impending. No hostile act, however, was as yet committed by the Ka'ab. April 1774.

During the summer and autumn of 1774, there was a lull in the rumours of danger from Persia; but at the beginning of 1775 a series of nocturnal raids by the Ka'ab on Basrah, described in the history of 'Arabistān, excited fresh alarm by illustrating the defenceless condition of the town. The wrath of Karīm Khān had recently been excited by defeats inflicted on his troops in Kurdistān by those of the Pāsha of Baghdād, and it was generally supposed that he would retaliate by moving against either Baghdād or Basrah,—in all probability against the latter, which was the more exposed to attack. January 1775.

On the 13th of January 1775, the Mutasallim, the Daftardār, and Shaikh Darwīsh visited the British Factory to consult the British Agent regarding the situation and to sound him as to the attitude which he would himself assume in case of an invasion. Mr. Moore, in reply, simply commented on the weakness of the fortifications, artillery and garrison of Basrah; recommended that a reinforcement of 3,000 to 4,000 men should be obtained from Baghdād, that the Muntafik tribe should be called out to prevent the Persians from crossing to the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and that a system of military intelligence should be organised in Persia; and explained, as on a former occasion, that

the position of the British must necessarily be one of neutrality, and that the British cruisers had been kept at Basrah only for the sake of embarking the Company's goods in case of need.

Two days later, on the 15th of January 1775, news reached the British Agency at Basrah, *viâ* Bûshehr, that a Persian army of 50,000 men had actually left Shîrâz under the command of Sâdiq (popularly known as Sadu) Khân, a brother of the Vakîl, to attack Basrah. The ostensible ground on which Karîm Khân thus at length opened the campaign was the ill-treatment of Persian pilgrims in Turkish 'Irâq when visiting the sacred shrines of Shi'abdom; and it appears that more than one demand for satisfaction * or amendment had, in fact, been addressed by him to the Turks, and neglected by them, before the final rupture. There is reason, however, as subsequent indications will show, for holding that the conduct of the East India Company's representatives at Basrah in diverting foreign trade from Persia to Turkish 'Irâq had at least contributed to bring matters to an extremity.

The annoyance caused at Basrah by prowling Ka'ab meanwhile continued, and even increased; and on the night between the 25th and the 26th of January 1775 a gang of 300 men of that tribe entered the town by scaling the walls, broke open a number of shops in the principal bazaar, and retired unpunished with a large booty of fine India cloth.

March 1775. Nothing further happened until the 6th of March, when the unsettled state of the country was exemplified in an attack committed by a body of armed men on three British officers from the Company's cruisers, who had gone to shoot on the left bank of the river about four miles below Basrah; the officers were dangerously wounded, stripped, and left for dead; their boat's-crew were cruelly beaten and stripped; and the boat itself was taken away. After dark the victims of this outrage were able to follow the bank of the river to a point opposite their ships, which they hailed, and were taken on board; but the condition of one of the officers, whose lung had been penetrated by a spear, appeared to be desperate.

On the morning of the 16th of March, news reached Basrah of the appearance of the advance guard and main body of the Persian army, amounting to some 30,000 horse and foot, at the mouth of the Suwaib tributary of the Shatt-al-'Arab, upon the left bank of the main river about 35 miles above Basrah; the rear, with which were the artillery

* According to Olivier (*Voyage*, Volume II, page 209) Karîm Khân demanded the head of the Pâsha of Baghdâd and the abolition of a tax on Persian pilgrims.

and the Commander-in-Chief, was expected to arrive in two days. The Persians at first found themselves confronted by a large Arab force which was encamped on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, having been posted there some days previously to hold the crossing; it consisted apparently of the fighting men of one tribe, possibly the Muntafik, under the command of one of their own Shaikhs whose name was 'Abdullah.

The same afternoon an envoy from Sādiq Khān arrived at Basrah with separate letters for the Mutasallim, the British Agent, and the heads of the Arab, Armenian and Jewish communities, desiring that each should send a representative to treat with the Persian commander for the ransom of the town. He was dismissed, however, without receiving an answer from any of those to whom the communication was addressed.

A long-expected danger had thus finally overtaken the Turks, who, notwithstanding that they had received about eighteen months' notice of its approach, had made no dispositions, unless during the few days immediately preceding, for meeting it.

Defences of Basrah, March 1775.

The defences of Basrah were carefully examined by the traveller Mr. Parsons, who happened to be at Basrah at this juncture; and the interest which the subject possesses, in view of later occurrences, seems to warrant a reproduction of his account *in extenso*. It runs as follows:—

This city is walled and surrounded with a deep and broad ditch. It has four gates and a sally port. The walls are of mud, from twenty to twenty-five feet think, with parapet walls, breast high, which have small embrazures for musquetry or arrows (the Arabs being good archers). The walls not only encircle the city on the side of the land, but likewise on those of the creek, the entrance of which is at a considerable distance, where the walls terminate on both sides; each extremity being defended by a fortification and a gate, which are three miles distant from the town. In the intermediate space are many thousands of dates and other trees, mixed with rice grounds. The walls are about twelve miles in circuit, and although not half the inclosed space is built, yet it is a large city, and before the plague, in 1773, was very populous. The two principal gates are large, and are situated on the land side, one is called the Baghdad, and the other the Zobeir gate; neither of them is defended by a ditch, which is wanting for a considerable distance on each side. The foundation of the walls, which is built of burnt brick, reaches so high as to be above the water when the ditch is full. The water is let into the ditch, at the flood tide, from the creek, and is retained by flood gates.

There are eight bastions, on each of which are mounted eight brass guns, twelve pounders, which besides upwards of fifty brass cannon, six and nine pounders, on ship carriages, are mounted round the walls. These were in such a state as to be unfit for use, until news arrived of the siege intended by the Persians, when the muselem was very vigilant in seeing them repaired: shot they had in plenty, as well as

gunpowder, which is made in the town, there being large quantities of salt-petre in the neighbourhood, so that they never import gunpowder, but supply other places with it. The fortifications on each side the creek's mouth are exclusive of the eight bastions.

* * * * *

At the entrance of the creek, on the right, is a castle with eight guns pointing down, and on the opposite side it has eight more, pointing up and across the river. On the left is a battery of four guns, which commands the entry of the creek, situated in such a manner as to act in conjunction with the castle in defending the entrance of the creek. About one hundred yards lower is a double battery of twelve guns in two tiers, called the captain pâsha's battery; adjoining to which is his house, and those of his officers and men. Near this is a gate, which lets them out of the city when occasion offers. There is another such gate near the castle, on the right hand entrance of the creek, which admits into the city, the castle terminating the city walls on that side; yet both those gates are very small, and may rather be called postern gates.

British vessels at Basrah, March 1775.

In November 1774, when Mr. Parsons arrived at Basrah, the following armed vessels belonging to the East India Company were lying in the river and apparently remained there, except the first-mentioned, until the commencement of the siege: the "Revenge" of 26 or 28 guns, of which 20 were 12 pounders, the largest fighting ship in the Company's whole fleet; the "Eagle," snow, of 16 guns; and the "Success," ketch, of 14 guns. The detention of the "Eagle" and "Success" at Basrah by the Agent, without their authority, was considered unnecessary and was much regretted by the Governor and Council at Bombay, who disapproved—as explained in the history of the Persian Coast—of Mr. Moore's provocative policy towards Karîm Khân, and who at this time, in consequence of a rupture with the Marâthas, themselves stood in urgent need of all the ships that they could collect; and in February 1775 they despatched peremptory orders by the "Drake", snow, which was proceeding to the Gulf, that both the vessels named should be released and sent back to them within ten days of receipt of their letter.

To the British ships enumerated above should be added, as being under the orders of the British Agent at Basrah in this crisis, the Pâsha's new 14 gun ketches, "Euphrates" and "Tigris," both of which still flew the British colours, were commanded by midshipmen in the Company's service, and had on board a few European sailors. Mr. Moore's retention of these ketches under his own control did not, as will appear later on, conduce to a steady observance of that policy of neutrality which he had twice professed.

Operations until the departure of the British

No sooner had the Persians appeared in force at the mouth of the Suwaib than Shaikh 'Abdullah basely deserted his post, leaving the enemy to cross the river unopposed. This a part of the Persian forces at once

proceeded to do, mostly upon inflated goat-skins; but Sādiq Khān was as yet without the means of throwing his artillery and heavy stores over to the right bank. Sulaimān Āgha, Mutasallim of Basrah, had only about 1,500 regular troops at his disposal, and, as their loyalty was not much to be relied upon, he decided to remain at Basrah and await the attack of the Persians behind walls; but he set an admirable example to all by his courage and vigilance, and he showed great personal energy in pushing forward the preparations for defence.

19th March.

On the 19th of March, Mr. Moore sent one of the Pāsha's new ketches up the river to obtain information of the movements of the enemy; she was commanded for the occasion by a lieutenant from one of the cruisers and manned by European sailors; and Mr. Abraham, one of the Factory staff, went in her.

21st March.

At 3 A.M. on the morning of the 21st of March, the fleet of the treacherous Ka'ab Shaikh, who had formerly promised the Turks that he would not help the Persians but who had now changed his mind in view of a possible sack of Basrah, slipped up the river from below the town to join Sādiq Khān's force. The British cruisers, which had apparently received orders from the Agent to prevent such a junction, unfortunately did not perceive the Ka'ab Gallivats, 14 in number, until it was too late to intercept them; but they immediately gave chase. The "Success" and the "Eagle" having ultimately captured a Gallivat apiece, the prize of the former was burned in the river, while that of the latter was brought back to Basrah. The rest of the Ka'ab fleet reached the Persian camp, though in a more or less damaged condition; and land batteries which the Persians had thrown up on the banks of the river made it impossible for the British squadron to attack them, after arrival there, with any chance of success.

22nd March.

On the morning of the 22nd of March, the British Agent, perhaps apprehending the consequences that his unsuccessful interference was well calculated to produce, went on board the "Eagle," to which the treasure and valuables of the Factory had already been transferred. The same afternoon the "Success" and one of the Pāsha's ketches returned from pursuing the enemy; and in the evening the Pāsha's other ketch — the one that had been sent up the river to reconnoitre upon the 19th — arrived, having met with some remarkable adventures.

On her way up stream, in passing the Persian camp, she had been hailed and enquiry made why she did not salute the Persian Commander-in-Chief, to which it was answered that she was going further up the river and would fire the salute on her return. On the 21st, the encounter

between the British squadron and the Ka'ab fleet having meanwhile taken place, the ketch had to pass the Persian batteries once more on her downward voyage; and, on the Persian authorities requiring her commander to land and pay them a visit, he sent a private soldier named Ryley, whom he dressed in his own clothes, on shore to personate him, while two Persian hostages were at the same time taken on board the ketch. Through some accident the Persians then opened fire upon the ketch, as did also the Ka'ab Gallivats, which were lying near the western bank of the river; the ketch returned the fire; and, after two men had been wounded on board, she proceeded on her way to Basrah. Ryley was thus left behind, but the imposture of which he was the instrument was not discovered; and on the 27th, having been well treated during his stay among the Persians, and having obtained valuable information with respect to their movements, he reached Basrah in safety, and the Persian hostages were discharged with presents.

23rd March. On the 23rd of March two emissaries from Sādiq Khān arrived at Basrah and interviewed first the Mutasallim and then the British Agent; they came to demand a sum of Rs. 20,00,000 as the ransom of Basrah; threatening that, if it were not paid, the town would presently be taken by storm; but they were dismissed, as on the former occasion, without any answer.

On the same day, at the suggestion of Mr. A. Parsons, the traveller already more than once quoted, who had been a sea captain and more recently Consul and Factor-Marine at Alexandretta under the Turkey Company, and who happened to be now at Basrah in a private capacity, the construction of a boom across the Shatt-al-'Arab immediately above the 'Ashār creek was commenced: it was composed of boats moored in a line across the river and connected by chains and cables. The object of this work was to prevent other Persian fleets, which were expected, from joining that of the Ka'ab above Basrah.

By the incessant labour of the British marine officers and the Kapitān Pāsha's men, the boom was finished on the evening of the 25th, "to the satisfaction of everyone interested in the preservation of Basrah"; and hopes even began to be entertained "that the Persian army, without "further supply of cannon, ammunition and provisions, must soon "decamp." Two Gallivats of the Kapitān Pāsha's fleet, each carrying 8 guns and 80 to 100 men, had meanwhile been placed under British commanders, and the British flag hoisted on board of them.

26th March. On the 26th of March the Ka'ab Gallivat taken by the "Eagle" was destroyed under the orders of the British Agent. In the course of

the operation an officer belonging to the "Success" was so severely burned in setting fire to a train of powder that it was feared he could not recover.

On the 27th it became known at Basrah, on the arrival of Ryley, that the bulk of the Persian army were now on the right bank of the river, but that the commander still remained upon the eastern side; also that the invaders, though they had few heavy guns, were well supplied with ammunition and provisions. 27th March.

On the 2nd of April it was stated that Shaikh 'Abdullah, the same who fell back before the Persians on their first appearance, had arrived at Zubair with all his men and promised to assist the governor in defending the place; and on the same day Shaikh Thâmir of the Muntafik tribe, who had been expected to embarrass the Persians during their march to Basrah by cutting the banks of the river and laying the country under water, arrived in Basrah without having done this, accompanied by 300 men. 2nd April.

On the 3rd of April about 200 Janissaries from Baghdâd made their appearance; they had left their boats at 'Azair, had marched to Qûrnah, where they re-embarked, had crossed to the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and had then finished their journey by land without coming in contact with the enemy. They brought with them letters from the Pâsha, containing promises of further help which there appeared little likelihood of his being able to fulfil. 3rd April.

Early in the morning of the 6th of April the advance guard of the Persian army came in sight of Basrah and began to pitch their tents about three miles from the Baghdâd gate of the town. By evening their camp extended to Kût-al-Farangi, a mile further off; and it appeared to contain many thousands of men, both mounted and unmounted. 6th April.

On the following day the rest of Sâdiq Khân's forces came up and located themselves in such a manner that the British Agent's country house at Kût-al-Farangi became, as it were, the centre of the vast Persian encampment. About noon hostilities commenced in a curious manner by four mounted Persians approaching so close to the town wall that ten or twelve men of the garrison, by slipping down from the corner of a bastion were able to surprise them, kill them all, and capture three of their horses. The whole male population of Basrah were now under arms; they appeared to be in high spirits; and all night long they remained upon the walls in readiness to repel an assault, should one be attempted. 7th April.

On the morning of the 8th of April a reconnaissance of the town

walls was made by a body of about 300 Persian horse, but they were careful to remain beyond range of the Turkish guns.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the "Eagle" and "Success" with the Pāsha's two ketches, slipped their cables and set off down stream under full press of canvas to attack a Būshehr fleet of 16 vessels which had been observed working up the river in the morning, and which had now arrived within about a league of the town; but the Persians turned back on seeing them and escaped, the possession of oars in addition to sails giving them an advantage in speed over their pursuers. The Būshehr fleet included the East India Company's brig "Tyger" which had been taken by the Ka'ab in the Shatt-al-'Arab two years previously, and it consisted for the rest of five Gallivats of 10 guns each and ten Gallivats of 6 to 8 guns. The movement of the British squadron against it took place at the suggestion of Lieutenants Robinson and Thistleton, who were in command, and who received the permission of the Agent to act as they thought best for preventing a junction between it and the Ka'ab fleet.

At 4 o'clock Mr. Moore, accompanied by all the members of the British Factory and by Mr. Parsons, rode round the walls, going as far as the mouth of the 'Ashār creek. On their way they met the Mutasallim upon his rounds, who promised to hold the town by land if the Agent would keep it by water; and they observed that the Turks and Arabs all appeared cheerful and confident, but that no townsman was any longer allowed to absent himself from his place at the wall, either by day or night.

9th April. About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 9th of April, the sky being perfectly dark, without either moon or stars, the Persians tried to scale the walls at several places between the Baghdād and Zubair gates; and a hand-to-hand struggle with the defenders ensued, which lasted for more than two hours. In the midst of the din and confusion of this conflict the British hastily quitted the Factory and made their way to the mouth of the 'Ashār creek, which they reached in safety notwithstanding the thick darkness; Mr. Parsons and another gentleman, who were the last to leave, took an hour on the way and narrowly escaped being killed by stones and tiles which Arab women, imagining them to be Persians, flung down at them from the tops of houses. The entrance of the creek was found to be well defended by bodies of two to three hundred armed Arabs, under the Kapitān Pāsha, drawn up on either side of it; and the party from the Factory embarked safely on the "Eagle."

Daylight showed that the attack had been repulsed, and Mr. Parsons afterwards saw 21 Persian heads exposed at the Baghdád and Zubair gates; but he was obliged to listen to curses invoked on the British name, and to hear Mr. Moore abused as the cause of the Persian invasion. In the afternoon Mr. Parsons and four gentlemen belonging to the Factory were tempted by curiosity to make a circuit of about ten miles along the walls: they found 500 men quartered at each of the two principal gates and some 200 on each bastion; even the rich Jewish and Armenian merchants had now been obliged to take up their residence near the ramparts; and, to the general surprise, the Carmelite Fathers had voluntarily elected to do the same, apparently by way of showing a good example. The credit of repelling the Persian assault during the previous night appeared to rest chiefly with Shaikh Thámir and his Muntafik warriors.

Meanwhile, however, on hearing that the Persians had attacked Basrah, the Amb Shaikh 'Abdullah had fled incontinently from Zubair. The whole of the livestock and supplies that he left behind, which according to one estimate might have provisioned the town of Basrah for a couple of months, fell into the hands of the Persians, to whom they must have been a fortunate windfall.

10th April.

April the 10th passed quietly until the evening; but about 9 P.M. the Pásha's Gallivats, which were moored on the further side of the river near to the boom, discovered men on shore and fired at them; and shortly afterwards the two boats in the boom closest to that bank were found to be on fire, as was also an adjoining village. The village, upon which the "Success" fired repeatedly, continued to burn for about six hours.

Withdrawal of the British Agency from Basrah to Búshehr, 11th to 15th April 1775.

The Agent and his Council, the latter consisting of Messrs. Green and Latouche, had written to Búshehr on the 23rd of March, urging Mr. Beaumont, who was detained there by the Persians, to despatch to them without delay any of the Company's cruisers which might happen to arrive from Bombay. Their letter reached Mr. Beaumont at Búshehr on the 30th of the same month, but there was not then any British vessel at the port. Later, the Persian fleet from Búshehr having made its appearance in the river below Basrah with the evident intention of joining the Ka'ab fleet above, and there being no longer much prospect of a vessel being able to arrive from the Gulf to his assistance, Mr. Moore thought it prudent to retire from Basrah. He made no attempt to save the Company's goods by shipping them, but left everything behind except the Agency treasure, which had already been embarked, at the mercy of

the belligerents,—an omission which may have been due to want of time but which was more probably dictated by the attitude of the Turks, the agreement with whom he was about to violate by leaving while the town still held out.

The descent of the river began at noon on the 11th of April; and the officers of the fleet, which consisted of the "Eagle," the "Success," the Pāsha's two ketches, and the two Turkish Gallivats, were apparently allowed to suppose that only an attack on the Būshehr fleet was meditated, after which the ships would return to Basrah. About three in the afternoon 12 Gallivats and 13 armed Trankis, the latter carrying stores for the Persian army, were sighted at anchor about three miles below the first island; at 4 P.M., the Persians having weighed, their principal Gallivat fired a shot at the "Eagle," on which the Agent and the members of his Council were passengers; and immediately thereafter a cannonade, seemingly directed at the two British ships, was opened by the other Gallivats. At half past four the "Eagle," on arriving within suitable range, replied with a broadside; the "Success" followed her example; and soon afterwards the Persians began to retire down a narrow reach of the river, assisted by a strong ebb tide, firing as they went, and pursued by the "Eagle" and "Success," which kept them in play with such guns as could be brought to bear upon the alternate tacks. The Pāsha's ketches and Gallivats could not keep up with the British vessels, and the ketches twice went aground. About half past five the "Success," which had already been struck three times, sustained some additional damage by having a yard-arm shot away, two gun-ports broken in, and two shot lodged in her starboard side. A little later the Persians took to flight, the faster ships among them helping the slower to escape by towing them, and at 6 P.M. they anchored in shoal water close to the Persian bank of the river. The "Eagle" and "Success" then took up positions abreast of them, as near as their draught of water would allow, and an artillery fire began at no great range, supplemented on the side of the British by musketry; this continued until dark, when both combatants desisted simultaneously as if by mutual consent. Not one of the Pāsha's vessels got near enough to fire a single shot during this engagement at close quarters, nor did any of them anchor until it was over. It is a remarkable fact that, in the whole day's proceedings, no one was killed or even wounded on board the "Eagle" or the "Success," and it is believed that the Persians likewise escaped

without casualties, but the rigging of the "Success" suffered considerable damage.*

When day broke on the 12th of April it was found that the Persians had placed their fleet beyond reach of the British by retiring into a shallow place, apparently within the embouchure of the Kārūn river; and at 6 A.M. the "Eagle" weighed anchor and,—to the surprise, it would seem, of the crew of the "Success," who did not yet know that the Agent had decided to renounce his share in the defence of Basrah,—led the way down the Shatt-al-'Arab. At three in the afternoon three Persian Gallivats were sighted advancing up the river; but these, as the Anglo-Turkish vessels drew near, wisely took refuge in a creek. Two hours later three other Persian craft were met, approaching from the same direction, one of which fired a couple of shots at the British ships and then immediately put about and went down-stream with her consorts, clearly with the object of keeping at a safe distance so long as daylight lasted. 12th April.

The Anglo-Turkish squadron anchored for the night, but was under way again on the morning of the 13th at 4 A.M. By noon the bar at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab had been crossed; and an hour later the ships lay to, while the Turks and Arabs on board the Pāsha's ketches, to the number of about 230, were being transferred to the Turkish Gallivats and the ketches manned instead by crews from the "Eagle" and "Success." The Gallivats then sailed for Kuwait, which was at this time a dependency of Basrah, and the British ships and the ketches shaped a course for Būshehr, where they arrived on the afternoon of the 15th of April. 13th April.

* It is difficult, on account of the strong personal interest of those by whom the affair has been described, to know exactly what happened between the British and the Persian squadrons on the 11th April 1775. Brief accounts by Mr. Moore, the British Agent, and by Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, the Commander on the Persian side, are extant (see pages 292 and 296—297 of Mr. Saldanha's *Summary of Events, 1600—1800*); but in the text the journal of Mr. Parsons has been followed, as being probably a more impartial authority than either. Mr. Parsons acted during the day as Lieutenant on board the "Success," supplying the place of the officer who had been injured by an explosion on the 26th of March and who was still dangerously ill; and he had at least an excellent opportunity of observing the incidents of the fight. Mr. Moore's account differs from that of Mr. Parsons chiefly in conveying the impression that the engagement was entirely at long ranges and that the British ships did not suffer any damage. According to Shaikh Nāsir's version, it was the British who began the battle; the vessels from Būshehr town, by his orders, took no part in the firing; and the only shots discharged on the Persian side were a few from Gallivats under the command of Mir 'Ali of Khārag. The Shaikh further asserts that the British remained at anchor where they were for a whole day after the encounter. The difficulty about Mr. Parsons's account is the smallness of the damage done in an artillery contest at close quarters.

British proceedings at Būshehr in regard to the siege of Basrah, 7th to 23rd April 1775.

Meanwhile, as is fully explained in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast, Mr. R. Garden, formerly of the Basrah Agency and at this time a member of the Bombay Council, who was proceeding to Basrah on private business with the intention of continuing his journey to Europe, had been commissioned by the Government of Bombay to open negotiations with Karīm Khān for the release of Mr. Beaumont, then detained in Persia as a prisoner in connection with the grievances of the Vakīl against the East India Company. It was also intended by the Bombay Government that general good relations with the Persian ruler should be instituted, if possible, by a reversal of the hostile policy pursued towards him by Mr. Moore, under whose orders a virtual boycott of the ports of Persia by the Company's ships, and even by private British vessels, had been brought about.

Mr. Garden arrived at Būshehr on the 7th of April in the Company's cruiser "Drake," under convoy of which came also three merchant vessels, bound for Basrah, with valuable cargoes. He was made aware by Mr. Beaumont of the request for naval assistance preferred by the Agent at Basrah a few days previously, and he had at once to decide whether he would comply with it or not. On full consideration he resolved, for several reasons, to adhere to the instructions that he had received at Bombay, rather than to reinforce Mr. Moore, whose anti-Persian tendencies were well known: he expected that Karīm Khān would in the end prevail over the Turks, and he feared that, when once the Vakīl had established his supremacy in the Gulf, it might be difficult or impossible for the British to come to any understanding with him at all; he considered that there would be extreme risk in attempting to force his way to Basrah with the vessels at his disposal, three of which were so miserably equipped as to be incapable of defence; and he believed, moreover, that the awkward situation in which the Basrah Agency found themselves, and which in his opinion had been brought about by their own indiscreet behaviour, might be remedied at any time by their embarking with the Company's goods on the "Eagle" and "Success," which they had with them. Mr. Garden also foresaw that to enter immediately into negotiations with the Vakīl might be the best way of safeguarding the Company's property at Basrah, jeopardised by the Agent's having made himself a party to the war on the side of the Turks; and he had good hope of success, for, while he had reason to believe that Mr. Moore's action in suspending commercial intercourse with Persia was largely responsible for the Vakīl's treatment of Mr. Beaumont and even for his attack on Basrah, he was empowered by the Bombay Government to

promise that, in event of a settlement, a British Residency should be re-established at Būshehr and British trade with the country re-opened. Mr. Garden's first letter to the Vakil at Shīrāz was despatched on the 11th of April; and on the 15th, on the arrival of Mr Moore and his companions at Būshehr, he wrote again to Karīm Khān, begging him to arrange that British property at Basrah should be respected,—a request which he repeated direct to Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, then serving with the Persian army before Basrah. On the 23rd of April a favourable answer was received by Mr. Garden from Karīm Khān, which removed anxiety for the future, and which at the same time laid "the blame of the late disturbances between the English and the Persians entirely on Mr. Moore."

Progress of the siege, April to August 1915.

The Persians at first met with little success in their attempts to reduce Basrah; and it was reported in a letter written from that place on the 20th of April "that the Montefficks and Benechalid Arabs had assembled "for its protection, that the desert was overflowed, and the town was in "very little danger from the Persian army." On the 6th of June a 50-pounder gun which had belonged to the Portuguese was successfully shipped at Būshehr, amid general rejoicings, for employment against Basrah; and during the rest of that month there was a constant coming and going of small craft between the two places. But the Persian artillery, notwithstanding that it was directed by two European artillerists, still failed to produce any serious effect on the Turkish defences; the astrologers advised delay whenever an assault was proposed; and the siege by degrees degenerated into a blockade. In August 1775, after dispersing a squadron of Persian Gallivats under the command of Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, a powerful fleet sent by the Imām of 'Omān to the aid of the Turks took up its position at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab and secured for a time the control of that river. Advantage was taken of the opportunity to bring an abundance of provisions into the town, which was thus put in a position to make a longer defence. It would seem, from the fact that in 1798 and again in 1826 a Turkish subsidy was claimed by the ruler of 'Omān on account of the services performed by his ancestor's navy at the siege of Basrah, that some sort of pecuniary inducement must have been held out by the Turks to the 'Omānis before obtaining their assistance. The Persians, on their part obtained valuable aid from the Khazā'il tribe of the Euphrates, who, though Arabs, were by religion Shi'ahs like themselves.

Departure of the British

In reply to a question by Mr. Garden, Mr. Moore had stated, on first arriving at Būshehr, that he intended to return to Basrah, should

Agent from Būshehr for Bombay, 15th July 1775.

the town escape capture by the Persians, and in the contrary case to make the best of his way to the Presidency; but the operations were protracted, and in the end he did not wait for their conclusion. On May the 12th* H.M.S. "Seahorse" of 20 guns, Captain Farmer, entered the roadstead at Būshehr, convoying a large Bengal ship destined for Basrah; and in this manner the number of vessels in port flying the British flag was increased to nine,—the "Success", it should be observed, had left for India on the 1st of May with despatches,—and some Persians professed uneasiness lest the British should attack the town by way of creating a diversion in favour of their friends the Turks. On the 24th of May, Captain Farmer, who had received orders from his Commodore, Sir Edward Hughes, to assist the representatives of the East India Company wherever he might meet with them, tendered his services for convoying to Basrah all or any of the ships at Būshehr intended for that place; but his offer was courteously declined by Mr. Moore. At length, on the evening of July 15th, all the British vessels then remaining at Būshehr except the "Drake" sailed for Bombay in company with H. M. S. "Seahorse", the commander of which had promised to afford them his protection against the Marāthas. With the fleet, in the "Eagle," went Mr. Moore, whose patience was worn out by confinement on board ship, for he would not land at Būshehr, and Mr. Parsons in the "Seahorse"; but Messrs. Latouche and Abraham were left behind at Būshehr in order that they might return to Basrah and take charge of the Company's effects there at the earliest available opportunity. In leaving for India Mr. Moore wrote to the Mutasallim of Basrah, stating that he was taking the two Turkish ketches with him to India for the same reason that he had brought them away from Basrah, *viz.*, to prevent their falling into the hands of the Persians; and at the same time he advised the Mutasallim, on account of the difficulty of returning the vessels to Basrah, to authorise him to sell them at Bombay on his behalf. In this farewell communication to Sulaimān Āgha the Agent remarked: "The honour that Your Excellency has "acquired in the gallant defence of Basrah will be remembered to the "latest times. I would that it had been in our power to have assisted "you more than we did; but it was not, of which I doubt not but

* The great Nelson appears to have been a midshipman on the "Seahorse" at this time: he was in her from 1773 to 1776, and, in the "ordinary course of cruising in peace times, he visited every part of the station from Bengal to Bussorah" (Captain Mahon's *Life of Nelson*, page 14). Of his service in the East Nelson himself said: Nothing less than such a distant voyage could in the least satisfy my desire of maritime knowledge: but he returned to England as an invalid.

"you will be perfectly convinced on maturely weighing the several "circumstances both before and since our departure from Basrah."

The irresolute conduct of Mr. Moore himself was certainly less worthy of praise than that of the Mutasallim. That, after he had rashly abandoned his original policy of non-intervention and actively associated himself with the defence of Basrah, he ought to have remained there to assist the Turks was not doubted at any rate by Mr. Parsons who concludes the relevant portion of his narrative with the words:* "The poor Bussorians are deserted by those whose duty and interest "it was to assist them to the utmost of their power: had they been "so assisted not the whole power of Persia would be able to take the "city"; and Mr. Garden was evidently of opinion that Mr. Moore had been guilty of a distinct breach of faith towards the Mutasallim, and that it would be dangerous for him to return to Basrah even in the event of an accommodation taking place between the Persians and the Turks.

Surrender of Basrah by the Turks, 15th April 1776.

Basrah held out, largely on account of the determination which Sulaimān Āgha was able by his personality to infuse into the defence, for more than a year from the date of its first being invested,—a circumstance from which we may perhaps infer, in view of the large number of the inhabitants, that the blockade by the Persians cannot have been very stringent.

At last, on the evening of the 15th April 1776, by which time the defenders had been reduced to dire straits and no hope remained of relief from Baghdād,† the leading Arab notables of Basrah and its neighbourhood visited Sādiq Khān in his camp to arrange for the surrender of the town; and on the morning of the next day the transfer of Basrah to the Persians was duly accomplished. The terms of capitulation were merely "that the inhabitants of Basrah should not be molested with respect to their persons or families," and the Mutasallim and notables were treated as prisoners by the victor, who sent them to Shirāz. Sādiq Khān, immediately upon the town being handed over to him, caused it to be occupied by about 6,000 Persian troops under

* These words might be read as referring merely to the Pāsha of Baghdād and the Turkish Government, were it not so clear that in Mr. Parsons' opinion the British ought to have continued at Basrah (see page 180 of his book).

† According to Olivier (*Voyage*, II. 402), the Pāshas of Mōsul, Vān, Diyārbakr, Aleppo and Damascus had meanwhile marched on Baghdād under orders from Constantinople and put the Pāsha to death as a sacrifice to propitiate the Persians. But Karīm Khān, though he professed to be satisfied, did not abandon the siege of Basrah.

the command of his son 'Ali Naqi Khán and of one 'Ali Muhammad Khán, with whose name we shall presently become familiar; and on the 21st of April he made his own public entry with additional troops, for whom accommodation was provided by requiring a number of citizens to vacate their houses. The townspeople were not otherwise troubled or despoiled in any way, and two Persians convicted of plundering were even beaten so severely that one of them died. There was, however, almost as great distress among the poorer inhabitants as during the siege, for they had before this sold most of their possessions, and now they could not find any employment.

It was stated that Karim Khán, on receiving news of the reduction of Basrah, "ordered Sadoc Caun to seal up all the effects in the place "belonging to deceased and absent persons, and forward him lists "thereof; to summons the Chaub Shaikh Barrakat thither, and "advise him of the result; and to examine and to send him a clear "account of the country leading from Basrah towards Muscat; from which instructions it would appear that the Vakil not only intended to turn his new acquisition to the fullest fiscal advantage, but even to make it a stepping-stone to further conquests. In June 1775, however, the naval contingents forming the Persian fleet were dismissed to their home ports; and Shaikh Násir reached Búshehr, the most distant of them all, on the last day of that month.

Affairs during the Persian occupation of Basrah, 1776–79.

Return of the British Agency staff to Basrah, May 1776.

Before the capitulation Mr. Galley, a servant of the East India Company, was already present at Basrah to watch over the interests of his employers; he was afterwards "very politely received" by Sádiq Khán and assisted by Shaikh Násir; and, on the evening of the 20th April, he was placed in possession of the British factory, where he found everything in good condition. The representative of the French East India Company, some Italians under French protection, and the Carmelite Fathers had remained in Basrah during the whole of the siege. On the 3rd of May a letter from Mr. Galley reached Búshehr; and the gentlemen of the Agency staff there, presumably Messrs. Latouche and Abraham, prepared with the least possible delay to take advantage of the favourable position of affairs by returning to Basrah. After providing themselves with suitable presents for Sádiq Khán and

Shaikh Nāsir, they went on board a native vessel in such haste that they delegated to the Resident at Būshehr the duty of reporting their movements to the Government of Bombay; but, after their embarkation, a contrary wind detained them in the harbour until the morning of the 5th of May. The records and papers of the Basrah Agency were left provisionally at Būshehr, where it was thought they would be safer, for the time being, than at Basrah. On reaching their destination the two gentlemen were able to report that "they found "the Hon'ble Company's factory in excellent order, that Sadoo Caun "expressed himself willing to shew the English every indulgence, "that his people had shown particular respect to the Agent in Council, "and that the first appearance of things was so flattering that, if "they had not been acquainted with the Persian character, they would "have formed a most pleasing opinion of their future prospects under "the Persian rule at Basrah." This happy state of matters may perhaps be attributed, in part at least, to the favourable disposition of Mirza Muhammad Husain, the chief adviser of Sādiq Khān, who used his influence with his master for the protection of such individuals as were recommended to him by the Agency; and so desirous was Sādiq Khān at first of standing well with the British that on one occasion he assured Mr. Latouche, upon whom the duties of Agent had devolved, that, though the British Factory was the only edifice in Basrah fit for his own occupation, "he would not reside in it, if the walls were made of gold."

Administration of Basrah by the Persians and their relations with the British Agency, 1776—79.

Moderation, however, soon ceased to distinguish the new government of Basrah, and by the beginning of June a heavy sum had already been assessed upon the town by Sādiq Khān as a contribution. The duty of collecting the money was delegated by the Persian officials to the leading citizens,—an arrangement which caused the demand to fall oppressively upon many who were ill able to pay, for the principal object of the collectors was naturally to save their own pockets. The Persians after this had recourse to compulsion in carrying out various other measures; and the British Agency began to be regarded by the people of Basrah as the only vindicator of their liberties and the sole remaining check upon the rapacity of their new rulers.

September 1776.

Antagonism between the Agency and the local Persian authorities was the natural outcome of these conditions; and in September 1776, in consequence of the forcible arrest by Sādiq Khān's agents of some native merchants who had taken refuge in the Factory,—a proceeding which was regarded by the British as a grave violation of their im-

munities,—the tension became acute. The Persians were well aware that the presence of the British Factory was advantageous to them because it lent importance to Basrah, encouraged the inhabitants to remain there instead of emigrating, and gave ground for expecting a profitable foreign commerce in the future; and the Persian governor, on learning that the Agent in Council had resolved to withdraw with his establishment from Basrah to Būshehr,—a resolution which, by the way, he had little expectation of being allowed by the Persians to carry into effect,—made haste to assure him that there should be no further encroachment on his privileges, and so prevailed on him to stay. The Company's employés, however, found that they were now practically prisoners at Basrah; and that there was not much hope of their being able to do business successfully there so long as the Persians continued in possession is shown by a remark of the Agent that "to endeavour to convince "them that force is incompatible with commerce, especially in regard "to us, might have succeeded formerly, but would now be as difficult "as to endeavour to convince them of the absurdity of their religion."

January 1777.

On the 31st January 1777 matters came to a crisis with an outrage on Khōjah Ya'qūb, the principal Jewish banker at Basrah, who was also broker to the British Factory; he was seized by the Persians at his own house, along with the women and other members of his family, and was compelled by repeated beatings, at some of which 'Alī Muhammad Khān, the acting substitute or successor of Sādiq Khān, was present in person, to sign a bond for 6,000 Tūmāns. The Agency Linguist, who was sent to demand an explanation of these proceedings, was refused an audience; and the Agent and his staff, after a letter of complaint addressed to Karīm Khān had been despatched by way of Būshehr, shut themselves up in the Factory and discontinued their intercourse with the local officials. The closing of the British Factory caused such a commotion in the town that the Persians were obliged to double the guards upon the gates in order to prevent a general exodus of the people; the amount which they succeeded in extorting from Khōjah Ya'qūb fell far short, notwithstanding all their severities, of what they had expected; they began to be apprehensive of the displeasure of Karīm Khān; and in the end after the Agent had ignored a number of hints that he should wait on 'Alī Muhammad Khān and seek a reconciliation with him, two of the latter's principal officers appeared at the Factory to suggest that Mr. Latouche should visit the Khān, when everything might be amicably arranged.

The Agent, however, declined to accede to this proposal; and on the 17th of March he was gratified by receiving a very friendly letter from Karīm Khān, accompanied by a Farmān in which 'Alī Muhammad Khān was peremptorily ordered to refrain from the conduct of which the British at Basrah complained, and to treat them with the utmost consideration. The letter itself, as translated at the time, was in these terms:— March 1777.

I have received your petition; and everything that you wrote concerning the situation of Bussora I have understood. I have always had, and still have, the greatest regard for the English nation; and I know they have the same regard towards me. I have always experienced their friendship towards me. I have now wrote a Phirmaund to Ally Mahomet Caun, Governor of Bussora, and have ordered him to behave in such a manner towards you and your people that you may be entirely contented and carry on your business to your satisfaction, both you and the people that are under you. I have ordered that no person whatever shall molest them in any shape,—that everyone shall behave towards them so that they may be free to carry on their business to their satisfaction. I have also wrote a Phirmaund regarding the Jews and Armenians at Bussora, ordering that they shall be well treated; that, except the head-money, not a Pinse * shall be taken from them; and that, if any of the Jews or Armenians want to go to any part of the Gulph for the sake of trade, they shall have liberty to do so with the knowledge of Coja Yacoob or Coja Aratoon. These orders which I have given Ally Mahomet Caun must be obeyed by him; and I desire that you will always depend that my friendship towards you is very great.

In June 1777 a fresh Farmān issued by Karīm Khān at the request of Mr. Latouche was received at Basrah, by which 'Alī Muhammad Khān was required to collect the export and import duties on British goods there at precisely the same rates as had prevailed during the Mutasallimate of Sulaimān Āgha, and to allow the Jewish and Armenian merchants of Basrah to leave home for trade, when permission was requested on their behalf by the British Resident. June 1777.

In November 1777 the Factory was broken into by thieves with the connivance of 'Alī Muhammad Khān; but the goods taken from it were afterwards restored from fear of the Vakīl's anger. November 1777.

The foregoing are the facts derivable from official sources; but additional light is thrown by the journal of Colonel J. Capper, who visited Basrah at the end of 1778, on the relations of the Persians, during their occupation of Basrah, both with the inhabitants of the town itself and with the Arabs of the surrounding country.

* That is "Fulūs", plural of Fals, farthing.

The Persian garrison of Basrah seems to have consisted in the beginning of about 7,500 men; and the inhabitants were too few and too feeble, in consequence of the vicissitudes of plague, war, and scarcity through which the town had lately passed, to be dangerous to their conquerors. The Persian Governor or Deputy-Governor, 'Ali Muhammad Khán, who was a monster of vice and cruelty, at first affected moderation; but he soon gave rein to his natural instincts, and thenceforward neither the honour nor the lives of the most inoffensive citizens were safe from him. His outrages were not confined to individuals. One night, "in a fit of drunkenness," he made a sudden raid from Basrah upon Zubair, burned the place, and massacred a number of the inhabitants; then proceeding to the village of Kuwaibdah, which lay at a few miles distance from Zubair upon the caravan route to Aleppo, he treated it similarly, and returned to Basrah. After this, however, Thámir, the Muntafik Shaikh, succeeded in drawing a Persian force from Basrah into ground enclosed by a water course on the north, the Shatt-al-'Arab on the east and a creek on the south, at a place about 11 miles from the town; and here they were overwhelmed and destroyed to the last man by a large gathering of Muntafik who were lying in wait for them near by, 'Ali Muhammad Khán himself being among the slain. From these incidents it may be deduced that the Persians held effective possession of little or nothing outside the walls of the town of Basrah.

Colonel Capper (who reached Basrah from Aleppo on the 18th of December 1778, saw Sádiq Khán enter the town with about 4,000 horse on the 24th, and left for Bombay on the 30th) found the place plunged in gloom; on the day of his arrival it did not appear to contain more than 6,000 inhabitants, Persian troops included; and "the principal "streets were like a burying ground, with scarcely a space of 3 feet "between (*sic*) each grave."

The traveller observed that the British Agent, as he passed through the streets, was received with great respect by the few remaining Arab inhabitants; and this he discovered to be due to the kindliness and generosity of Mr. Latouche, who after the reduction of the town had redeemed many Arabs from slavery and sent them to their friends in the country.

Proposed abolition of the British Agency at Basrah and its reduction.

When the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London became aware of the straits to which their servants at Basrah had been reduced during the winter of 1776-77, they ordered the Government of Bombay to arrange for the abolition of the Agency. They recom-

mended, as a means of doing this without risk to the servants or property of the Company, that leave should first be obtained from Karím Khán for removing the Agency to Búshehr, and that thereafter the establishment at Búshehr should be reduced to a single European employé, the stock in whose charge was never to exceed Rs. 10,000 in value. Should the Turks recover Basrah, however, they would permit a Resident to be sent there, but not without previous sanction from themselves. to a Residency, 1777-78.

The Bombay Government must have hesitated to comply with these orders, which were dated 4th July 1777, but did not reach India till the 30th April 1778, for no steps were taken to execute them before August of the latter year. By that time a prospect of war with France had arisen; and the Government of Bombay, as they thought that in case of hostilities it would be necessary to have a representative of some kind at Basrah for forwarding despatches between Europe and India, decided to retain a Resident there. Another consideration by which they were influenced was that, if only one employé remained in the Gulf, there would be no one at hand, in case of an accident befalling him, to take charge of the Company's interests and effects. Accordingly they offered the appointment of Resident to Mr. Latouche, at the same time directing his assistants, Messrs. Abraham and Galley, as well as the Surgeon, Mr. Robinson, to return to India immediately in the "Eagle"; and the mercantile stock at Basrah was at the same time ordered to be removed to Búshehr, and thence to India.

Mr. Latouche, in his reply, thanked the Bombay Government for the honour that they had done him in appointing him Resident; but he was as slow to obey the orders of his superiors in regard to the reduction of his staff as those superiors had themselves been in giving effect, in a modified degree, to the intentions of the Court of Directors. On the 25th of April 1779, by which time the Persian occupation of Basrah had ceased, Mr. Abraham and the Surgeon were still with the Resident at Basrah.

British trade at Basrah during the Persian occupation, 1776—79.

When Basrah passed into the hands of the Persians, the private trade carried on there by Europeans declined almost to vanishing point; nor did it, with the lapse of time, show many signs of recovery. Almost the only kinds of merchandise that continued to be imported were coffee and other "gruff" or heavy goods from Masqat and Búshehr and a few piece-goods from Súrat. This state of matters occasioned serious inconvenience to the Resident, who received, as a supplement to his pay, consulage at the rate of 1 per cent. on imports by Europeans: in 1777 his income from this source amounted to little more than Rs. 200, and

in 1778 it was expected even to fall short of that sum. Mr. Latourche, in view of the exceptional circumstances, requested the Government of Bombay at the end of 1778 to be so good as to remit the customs, at the rate of 3 per cent., which were levied by the Company at Basrah on goods privately imported by him. To strengthen his case, he reminded them that he had to pay an import duty at the rate * of 8 per cent. to the Persians on all goods brought to Basrah, as well as an export duty of 6 per cent. to the Company in the case of merchandise from Súrat; and he added that, as native merchants were able by some means to land their goods at Basrah on payment of less than 3 per cent. as customs, they could afford to undersell him in the local market. The result of this application is not recorded. Towards the end of the Persian occupation some not unsatisfactory business is said to have been done at Basrah in imported cloth, but the continued absence of many of the merchants and scarcity of specie due to the proceedings of the Persians prevented large operations.

Accident to the Desert Mail, 1778.

During the Persian occupation of Basrah the British overland mail to Aleppo was for a time despatched from Kuwait instead of from Zubair as formerly. The new arrangement was not altogether satisfactory, as it was not possible to exercise so strict a control over the messengers as when they were Turkish subjects and began or ended their journeys at a Turkish town; and the difficulties of the Resident were increased by unrest which prevailed in the desert at the end of 1778. On one occasion, about December 1778 or January 1779, the messengers were attacked by Bedouins on their way and reported at Baghdád that they had been robbed of the mails, of their camels, and even of their clothes; but a duplicate set of the correspondence, which followed 19 days later, reached Aleppo in safety; and it was stated at Basrah that the lost packet of originals had meanwhile come into the hands of other Arabs, who had conveyed it to its destination.

Murder of Mr. Hare.

It was probably at this same period, while the prestige of the Turkish Government with the Arabs was low, that Mr. Hare, an English gentleman from Bengal, was robbed and murdered near Lámlúm upon the Euphrates.

The French Consulate at Basrah.

The French Consul at Basrah about this time was a M. Rousseau remembered chiefly on account of his negligence in not assisting a young French officer, M. Borel du Bourg, who in travelling to the East with

* Why he should have had to pay 8 per cent. is not clear, for Karim Khán had a year and a half previously, ordered the Governor not to take Customs from the British at a higher rate than that in force under the Turks, viz., 2 per cent. See page 1265 *ante*.

despatches in 1778-79 was first attacked and wounded by Arabs in the desert and then captured by the British at Kuwait.

Recovery of Basrah by the Turks, 1779.

Rumours and negotiations, 1776—1778.

The occupation of Basrah was for the Persians a burdensome and unprofitable enterprise; and early in 1779 it came to an end. The Turkish Government had never regarded the loss of the place as final, and from time to time the invaders were made anxious by reports of warlike preparations on the part of the Turks. In September 1776, though trade between Baghdád and Shiráz remained open, it was stated that 'Abdullah, Pásha of Baghdád, had received a large supply of money from the Porte and was about to attack the Persians; and about May 1777 an immediate movement by the Turks for the recovery of Basrah was anticipated with pleasure by the inhabitants of the unfortunate town, while a Turkish invasion of Persia by more than one route was also predicted; but neither of these expectations was realised. In January 1778 it was asserted at Basrah, and in the following month the news was confirmed, that negotiations for a peace between Persia and Turkey were in progress at Shiráz; but up to the time of Karím Khán's death, on the 2nd of March 1779, the discussions had not in any way affected the situation at Basrah.

Spontaneous evacuation of Basrah by Sádiq Khán, 19th March 1779.

Private interest in the end brought about the change which considerations of public interest had failed to effect. On or about the 16th of March 1779 Sádiq Khán sent for Sheikh Darwísh and Mulla Ahmad, the secretary of the former Turkish Mutasallim of Basrah, and informed them that, in consequence of the death of the Vakíl, he was about to leave for Shiráz with the whole Persian garrison; that he proposed, pending the return of Sulaimán Agha, whom he would cause to be release from captivity in Persia, to entrust the government of the town to themselves; but that, if they refused, he would make it over to the Ka'ab Shaikh. The persons in question, after consulting Messrs. Latouche and Abraham and obtaining from them a loan of 600 Tumáns for administrative expenses, agreed to accept the charge; and on the 19th of March Sádiq Khán left the town with the last of his troops and crossed to the left bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab. On the following day the ships of the Persian fleet at Basrah, which was composed of squadrons from Rig, Ganáveh and Búshehr, left for their home ports; and, notwithstanding fears of an

attack being made on them by the Ka'ab while they were passing down the river, they reached the Persian Gulf in safety. On the 24th of March four Ka'ab Gallivats appeared off Basrah, and a demand was made for various articles said to have been left behind by the Persians; but some of the Muntafik tribe, whose help had been solicited by the temporary Government of Basrah, were already in the town; and on the following day one of their Shaikhs, Thāmir, arrived in person. The visitors accordingly "contented themselves with receiving one of the chains "which belonged to the Chaub, and with three or four guns which "they found at Goordilan, a fort on the other side of the river, and "opposite to the town, and which Sadoo Caun had been employ-"ed in repairing ever since his last arrival from Shyraz, in order to secure "his retreat, as the Vackeel's life was at that time very uncertain."

Position of the British Residency at the evacuation.

Sādiq Khān at his departure invested each member of the British Factory with a robe of honour, presenting the Resident in addition with "an horse and furniture"; he delivered over to the Residency between 400 and 500 Kārahs of dates in part payment of a debt of 1,700 Tūmāns for cloth, incurred by 'Ali Muhammad Khān during his government of Basrah; and he caused to be sent back to the Resident the sister-in-law of the Factory Linguist, whom an influential officer in his army had carried off by force from her parents' house and was preparing to abduct with him to Persia. The East India Company's representatives found themselves obliged in return to make a present of 300 Tūmāns to Sādiq Khān; but this, apart from a gift to Shaikh Thāmir and a loan, already mentioned, to the temporary administration, seems to have been the only unusual expense to which they were subjected by the change of government; and the situation, as a whole, was regarded by them with much complacency. They had been of service, during his imprisonment in Persia, to Sulaimān Āgha, whose restoration to the Mutasallimate was now expected; they stood well with the Arabs of Basrah and its neighbourhood, a number of whom had been redeemed from slavery by their instrumentality, and with the Muntafik Shaikh; they had cultivated friendly relations, during the Persian occupation, with the people of Rig, Ganāveh and Būshehr; and even the Ka'ab Shaikh, at this juncture, renewed his assurances of friendship "and delivered up a boat which "the Resident of Būshehr had despatched . . . . with news of the "Vackeel's death, as also five bales of coffee which he was sending in "her to Mr. Latouche."

Return of Sulaimān Āgha from Persia.

Sulaimān Āgha the former Turkish Mutasallim, presently returned from Shirāz having been released, according to one authority, at the instance

of the British Resident at Basrah. He was accompanied by the notables who had shared in his deportation and exile, among them Khōjah Ya'qūb, the important banker once before mentioned; and he brought back with him a servant named Ahmad, who had originally been a stable-boy, but who was destined to rise, by his master's favour and his own merit, to the highest post after that of Pāsha in the government of Baghdād.

Events from the recovery of Basrah by the Turks to the appointment of Sulaimān to the Pāshāliq of Baghdād, 1779.

Appointment of Sulaimān to the Government of Basrah, 1779.

On his return from Persia Sulaimān Āgha, who had deserved well of the Turkish Government by his stubborn defence of Basrah, received the rank of Pāsha and was reinvested with his former charge, possibly in direct subordination to the Porte and not as before in dependence on the Pāsha of Baghdād. He re-appointed Khōjah Ya'qūb, who had supplied him with funds during his captivity, to his former position as banker and financial adviser to the government of Basrah; and at the same time he promoted his servant Ahmad, who had served as negotiator between him and the Jew in their money transactions, and had ingratiated himself equally with both, to be a member of his household staff.

Appointment of Sulaimān to the Pāshāliq of Baghdād, 1779.

If, in consequence of Sulaimān's elevation to the dignity of Pāsha, the government of Basrah and Baghdād were for a time divided, it was not long before they were again combined, and that under his own administration. On the 27th October 1779* Husain, Pāsha of Baghdād, was deposed by Janissaries and obliged to quit the capital; and Sulaimān Pāsha became a candidate for the vacant Pāshāliq, which, largely in consequence of British support, he before long obtained, along with permission to reside at Basrah or at Baghdād as he found more convenient. Ahmad benefited by his master's promotion through being advanced to the responsible position of Muhrdār or custodian of the Pāsha's seal; but Sulaimān for some years deliberately abstained from appointing a Kehiyah or Minister,—an omission which drew many remonstrances from the Porte, as it was necessary that the Pāsha's nomination should

* According to Heydges, however, the Pāsha whom Sulaimān succeeded was named Ahmad, and he was put to death (*Brief History of the Wahauby*, page 187). The Ahmad in question may have been identical with the so-called Hamad who was Pāsha in 1774 (see footnote on page 1242). Olivier gives Sulaimān's predecessor in the Pashāliq the name of Hasan and indicates that he was removed for incompetence—*Voyage* II, 403.

be approved by them, and their approval was not given except in consideration of valuable presents. The happiest results were anticipated by all from Sulaimān Pāsha's appointment to the province; and, though it was foreseen that the state of disorganisation prevailing in the northern districts would oblige him to visit Baghdād, and that he might be induced by the central position of that city with reference to his territories as a whole to take up his residence there, it was hoped that his former connection with Basrah and the dependence in some respects of Baghdād upon it, which had been clearly demonstrated during the Persian occupation, would ensure for that port a larger share of administrative attention than it had received under his predecessors. The favourable outlook, as it presented itself to Messrs. Latouche and Abraham in January 1780, was described by them in these words: "On the whole, "from the known prudence and spirit of Soliman Pacha, as well as from "the great opinion which is entertained of him by the people in general, "not only of Baghdād and Bussorah, but of the several adjacent provinces, "we flatter ourselves with seeing these countries in a very few years in a "more flourishing condition than before the late troubles. The communi-"cation with Baghdād, which has for a long time past been stopped by the "Ghesaal" (*i.e.*, Khazā'il) "Arabs, already begins to open, and not only "they, but the rest of the Arabs, profess the greatest respect for and obe-"dience to, Soliman Pacha."

Internal affairs under Sulaimān Pāsha's earlier rule, 1779—89.

Suppression of a rebellion, 1780.

About the beginning of August 1780, a rebellion against the authority of the new Pāsha was brought to an end by the decisive defeat of the insurgents in an engagement lasting several hours. Ibn Muhammad Qatīl, who commanded the rebel army, was killed in the battle; and Muhammad Baig, who pretended to the Pashāliq, either fled the country or shared the same fate. It was hoped—though, as the sequel will show, in vain—that this success would render Sulaimān Pāsha's position unassailable for the future, and that its moral effect upon the Khazā'il, who were again interrupting communication between Basrah and Baghdād, would be such as to obviate the necessity for an expedition against them in their marshy retreats.

Turkish campaign against the Ka'ab, 1784.

In 1784 the Turks were again at war with their old adversaries the Ka'ab of 'Arabistan; and the Muntafik tribe, governed at this time by Thuwaini, one of the most celebrated of their Shaikhs, took an important

share in the hostilities upon the side of the Turks. A curious incident of the campaign was witnessed by Messrs. Latouche and Harford Jones of the Basrah Residency, the former of whom, as he was returning to Europe by Baghdād and Aleppo, arranged to have a parting interview on the way with Thuwaini, whose camp was then on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab at some distance above Basrah. Immediately after the visit, which ended at sunset, was over, Thuwaini struck his camp; and his force, consisting of 1,000 to 1,200 mounted men, at once began to cross the great river by swimming. In the course of the night and the following morning the Muntafik travelled a distance of over 65 miles by land, besides swimming two large creeks; and at 9 A.M. the next day they surprised the enemy in their camp and completely routed them. The Ka'ab had been aware of Thuwaini's appointment with Mr. Latouche, and they had not thought it possible that he could be upon them within so short a time after it.

Rebellion of Hāji Sulaimān Baig, 1786-87.

In 1786, the year after that in which Sulaimān Pāsha at last consented to appoint a Kehiyah in the person of his protégé Ahmad, then 36 years of age, a fresh rebellion broke out in the province; it was headed by Hāji Sulaimān Baig, the Shaikh of a powerful Arab* tribe in the vicinity of Baghdād. Hāji Sulaimān, who had resided for some years at the Pāsha's court, having been detected in a political intrigue, was ordered to quit the capital and obeyed; but he immediately took up arms against the Government, and he was supported in his resistance to the Pāsha by a strong party. Several engagements took place between the Pāsha's troops, which were commanded by the Kehiyah, and those of the rebel leader; and about the beginning of February 1787 the fortune of war appeared to favour the latter, who was said to have won a victory and to have taken prisoner the Pāsha of Kurdistan, one of Sulaimān Pāsha's generals. At one time it was even rumoured that the Porte had appointed Hāji Sulaimān Baig to the Pashāliq of Baghdād in supersession of Sulaimān Pāsha; but the statement, though well vouched for, proved to be erroneous; and the rebellion was at length suppressed or otherwise came to an end.

Various troubles, 1787.

In the early spring of 1787 the general outlook was far from reassuring, for not only was the rising just described at its height, but scarcity of provisions and high prices prevailed in the Basrah districts in consequence of the failure of the rivers to rise to their usual height during the previous season; and communication with Baghdād by the Euphrates

* Described as the "Tye" Arabs.

had once more been cut by the Khazā'il tribe, obliging merchants to adopt the Tigris route, which was longer in time and more expensive.

Occupation of Basrah by Shaikh Thuwaini, 6th May to 25th October 1787.

An extraordinary episode in the history of Basrah was the seizure of the town and its occupation during some months in 1787 by Thuwaini, the chief of the Muntafik tribe: this Shaikh, whose exploit against the Ka'ab in 1784 we have already noticed, is described by a contemporary traveller as being "a middle-aged man, of great courage and enterprise; "which, joined to a vigorous understanding, and a just and moderate "exercise of the sovereign power, have rendered him dear to his tribe, and "respected by all men." Thuwaini took advantage of the opportunity afforded by a visit from the Mutasallim of Basrah, who came to Zubair to congratulate him on a victory over his enemies, to seize that well-meaning official and his suite; and, having accomplished this without bloodshed, he sent a large body of tribesmen to occupy Basrah, which they did without difficulty, as there were not more than 200 troops in the place and only a very few Turks. On the 6th of May he entered the town in person with a following of about 5,000 Arabs and assumed the government of Basrah, taking possession at the same time of the Turkish fleet. No violence was committed, and private property was everywhere scrupulously respected; but the existing civil officials were removed from their posts and replaced by others, Arabs were put in command of the vessels of the fleet, and the Mutasallim and his principal subordinates were either deported—or voluntarily retired—by sea to India. Shaikh Thuwaini then wrote letters to Constantinople in which he asserted his own hereditary title to the Government of Basrah, claimed merit for his moderation and for the orderliness of his proceedings, and promised allegiance to the Sultān of Turkey on condition of being invested with a combined Pashāliq of Basrah and Baghdād. After extorting a loan of 6,000 Tumāns from the Jewish, Armenian and other merchants of Basrah, Thuwaini marched to a spot on the Euphrates somewhere between Qūrnah and the modern Nāsiriyah, and there cantoned his troops in readiness to meet the attack which he knew would shortly be made upon him by the Government of Baghdād. Sulaimān Pāsha had now with him an elder brother of Shaikh Thuwaini named Ahmad, who, having pretensions of his own to the Shaikhship of the Muntafik, had readily abandoned Thuwaini when he went into rebellion, and had met in consequence with a cordial reception at Baghdād. The Pāsha was careful to seek and obtain, before he moved, an alliance with the Ka'ab tribe, whom the Shaikh had already approached, but with whom he had concluded no arrangement; and in the beginning of October, the Porte having merely signified their pleasure that the head of the upstart should be sent to Constantinople, Sulaimān marched from

Baghdād. On the 23rd of the month the armies came in contact; and on the 25th, after a long and doubtful conflict upon the bank of the Euphrates, the tribal army was scattered and Thuwaini fled the field, attended only by a few followers. The victor then appointed Mustafa Āgha to the Mutasallimate of Basrah, recognised Ahmad as principal Shaikh of the Muntafik tribe, and not only obliged the merchants of Basrah to propitiate him with gifts, but also ordered them to pay double duties on their goods during the current year, irrespective of what Thuwaini had already taken from them in customs and as a loan. After a time Thuwaini made overtures to the Pāsha for a pardon; but these, at least in the first instance, were disregarded. Two English travellers, Ensign William Francklin, who was at Basrah from the 28th of December 1787 to the 12th of February 1788, and Dr. Thomas Howel, whose sojourn there lasted from the 23rd of February to the 1st of March 1788, have left an account of Shaikh Thuwaini's revolution; and Dr. Howel personally examined the site of the battle of the 25th October, which "bore the marks of having been the scene of great slaughter; for "it was abundantly strewed with the bones of men and horses."

Course of trade, especially British, 1779—89.

Trade revived at Basrah, to some extent, between 1780 and 1787; but in the next year it again became languid in consequence of the rebellion of Thuwaini and the difficulties of the Turkish Government in Europe. After 1786 there was little or no profit on the sale of Indian piece-goods in Turkish 'Irāq. In 1789 the number of bales of Indian piece-goods imported at Basrah was only 800, and the whole treasure freight of the merchant vessels returning to India did not exceed Rs. 50,000. The broadcloth and long ells imported by the East India Company had now a slow and unprofitable sale, and they could only be disposed of at a very long credit. This was due to several causes—to their high price; to the competition of similar goods of French origin; to an unfavourable exchange, involving loss on all remittances of money or valuables to India; and to a great and increasing dearth of specie, Turkish gold suitable for exportation abroad having practically ceased to be available. Some cheap kinds of locally manufactured cloth had taken the place of varieties formerly imported; and part of the Indian muslins consigned to Europe now travelled to their destination by some sea route, instead of by Basrah and Baghdād as formerly. An important commercial advantage enjoyed by the British in Turkish 'Irāq was that, in case of a native merchant becoming bankrupt, the claims of his British creditors were, under Farmān, satisfied in full before anything was distributed among native creditors.

Imports and exports.

Imports by sea were enumerated in 1790, with reference to the years immediately preceding, as "British woollens, Bengal piece-goods of "near fifty different kinds, chintz of different kinds from the Coromandel "coast, Madras long cloth, Port Nuovo blue goods, Malabar cloth, Surat "piece-goods of all kinds, cotton yarn; Guzerat piece-goods, chintz, and "Cuttanies; Cambay chauders, Broach and Scindy cotton shauls, bamboos, "chinaware, sugar, sugar candy, pepper, ginger, cardamoms, cloves, "nutmegs, cinnamon, cassia flowers, musk, lump Lack, camphire, turmeric, "indigo, iron, lead, steel, tin, Tothenaque, red lead, coffee, tobacco, a variety "of drugs, and many less important mercantile articles; all which, except "the proportions thereof necessary for the consumption of Bussora and its "immediate vicinity are transported to Aleppo and Bagdidad by Carravans "to Baghdad direct by the river Tygris, and by the river Euphrates *viâ* "Hilla, and to Shuster by boats." Imports from Aleppo and Baghdad were "copper, arsenic, galls, catgut, Persian saffron and raw silk, gold "and silver lace, Angora Shauls, Aleppo flowered piece-goods, Baghdad and "Aleppo cuttanies, Shamees, velvet, silks, sattins, English shalloons, "French broad-cloth, broad-cloth caps, Lamette, Ara, Contarino, Venetian "false coral and beads of different kinds, large and small looking-glasses, "stained glass, brass wire, coral, cochineal, tobacco, opium, a variety of "drugs, and many less important mercantile articles, all which, except "particular articles only intended for the Bussora market and the proper-"tions of the other articles necessary for the consumption of Bussora and "its immediate vicinity, are transported, by means of the before-mentioned "vessels which annually import at Basrah, from thence to the different ports "of the Persian Gulf, to Muscat and to India." Besides the re-exports just detailed there was a true local export of great importance, consisting of the dates grown in the Basrah district. The annual harvest of these was estimated to be worth, on the average, a million of Bombay rupees; and the major portion of it was sent abroad to various ports of the Persian Gulf, India and the Red Sea. There was a considerable trade from Basrah to Shûshtar, with which there was easy communication by the Kârûn River.

Duties on goods.

Import and export duties were fairly heavy in Turkish 'Irâq. Merchandise was divided for purposes of assessment into two classes, *viz.*, into "fine" and "gruff" goods: to the former class belonged all kinds of cloth, and to the latter such "heavy" articles as metals, coffee, tobacco, pepper and sugar. In the case of European merchant the amount of import duty was limited by treaty to 3 per cent. *ad valorem*, but in practice it was more, for their goods landed at Basrah, after paying

3 per cent. at that port, paid the same again on reaching Baghdād, and even a third time on reaching Aleppo; and export duties at 3 per cent. were levied also. Native merchants on the other hand paid 7½ per cent on "fine" goods received at Basrah from the sea or from Baghdād and 8½ per cent. on "gruff" similarly received; the rates on the goods exported from Basrah to Aleppo were similar; and 5½ per cent. was charged on all native exportations by sea. To escape these dues, sometimes aggregating 17 per cent. on the same goods, native dealers frequently resorted to smuggling. They made use for this purpose of the town of Zubair, first bringing their goods there by stealth from landing places on the Shatt-al-'Arab, and afterwards introducing them secretly into Basrah or despatching them undetected, by a caravan from Basrah, across the desert to Aleppo. Kuwait also afforded opportunities, which were not neglected, for contraband trade.

Transport of goods.

The cost of caravan and water carriage at this time is noticed,* being a question of general importance, in the chapter on the history of the Persian Gulf as a whole.

The above details are mostly derived from a report on trade furnished by Messrs. Manesty and Jones, the East India Company's representatives at Basrah, in 1790.

British political relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1779—89.

Relations of the British with Sulaimān Pāsha, 1779-89.

The dealings of the representatives of the East India Company with Sulaimān Pāsha—then Sulaimān Āgha—during his Mutasallimate of Basrah are the subject of some remarks in an earlier paragraph of this chapter, and we have already observed that his release from detention in Persia seems to have been due in part to British influence; but some facts regarding his subsequent connection with British officials remain to be stated.

1779.

When Sulaimān in 1779 became an aspirant to the vacant Pāshāliq of Baghdād, it was resolved, inasmuch as he personally owed large sums to individual members of the Basrah Residency staff, while the Government of Baghdād itself was similarly indebted to the East India Company, that the Factory should support his candidature, the success of which would enable both sets of obligations to be discharged. Funds were accordingly remitted by Mr. Latouche, acting on the Pāsha's behalf, to the British Ambassador at Constantinople for distribution

* *Vide* page 167 *ante*.

among the most influential personages there, including the Sultān's mother, the Vazir, and numerous high officials; and the desired result was attained. An item in the account afterwards furnished to the Pāsha, however, shewing that about £2,000 had been paid "to a person "whose name it was not proper to mention," attracted his attention; and to the end of his life he was accustomed to insinuate, whenever anything had put him in ill-humour with the British, that this sum had been appropriated by their Ambassador.

1782-84. During the years 1782 and 1783 Sulaimān Pāsha was supplied, on payment of the cost price and the expenses of carriage only, with 1,500 stand of arms and a quantity of gunpowder and cannon shot from Bombay; and about the same time, in compliance with a request from him which the Turkish Government at Constantinople subsequently supported, six armed Gallivats were built at Bombay and delivered to him at Basrah. One object of Mr. Latouche in travelling to Europe by way of Baghdād at the end of 1784, as already mentioned in another connection, was "to take leave of Sulaimān Pāsha, whom he had been "very instrumental in placing in that Pachalik, and with whom he "had large accounts to settle."

1787. In 1787, when it was generally stated that the leader of the local rebellion which occurred in that year had been chosen by the Porte to supplant Sulaimān Pāsha in the Pāshāliq, the Pāsha, who himself believed the report, "sent for Coja Marcar, the Hon'ble Company's "Agent at Baghdād, and in his presence ordered a letter to be written "to His Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, in which he in the "warmest terms entreated his friendly support and good offices at the "Porte to set aside the appointment which he supposed had been given to "Hadjee Soliman Beg, and acknowledged his many serious obligations "to the English." In the same year Mr. Manesty, the British Agent at Basrah, stated it as his opinion that Sulaimān Pāsha, although his conduct had not been entirely such as might have been expected after the favours that he had received at the hands of the British, was "really partial" to them, and that by considerate treatment he had given the merchants more encouragement than any of his predecessors.

Relations of the British with influential natives of the country, 1779—89. The British Resident at Basrah and the members of his staff seem to have maintained, apart from their dealings with the Turkish officials, a friendly intercourse with the Arab chiefs and other notables of the country. The motive of Mr. Latouche's visit to Thuwaini in 1784 was to deliver a present to the Muntafik chief, apparently in recognition of his good conduct with reference to the British Desert Mail, the working

of which he had it in his power to facilitate or to obstruct; and a service which Mr. Manesty was able to render in 1785 to one Muhammad Baig was afterwards frequently acknowledged by the recipient's brother, the same Ḥāji Sulaiman Baig who rebelled in 1786, and whose appointment to the Pāshāliq was considered probable in the following year. In 1787 the Resident, in a report on the general situation, was able to refer with satisfaction to "the very extensive influence which the "English now fortunately enjoy, and the very strict friendship which, "without an exception, they are now in with every person of consequence "in the country."

British establishments in Turkish 'Irāq, 1779—89.

It will be remembered that in consequence of the violent behaviour of the Persian governor of Basrah, or rather of the stringent orders by the Court of Directors which it occasioned, a reduction in the staff of the Basrah Agency had been ordered by the Government of Bombay in 1778, but that up to the beginning of 1779 it had not been carried into effect.

Staff of the Basrah Residency, 1779.

On the reversion of Basrah to Turkish jurisdiction Mr. Latouche, the Resident, represented to the Government of Bombay that the Court of Directors would now probably desire the Factory to be continued on more than a minimum scale, and he accordingly requested leave to keep Mr. Abraham with him as his Assistant and to retain the Surgeon formerly attached to the Agency. Permission was duly granted in both cases.

Fever at Basrah, 1780.

In the summer of 1780 "an epidemical fever" raged at Basrah and caused many deaths. Among the victims was Mr. Abraham, the Assistant Resident, who was sent to Būshehr in the "Eagle" for change of air, was taken ashore there at his own request on the 16th of June, and died the following day; but Mr. Petrie, another passenger who was dangerously ill of the same disease, escaped with his life. Captain Sheriff, who commanded the "Eagle," and most of his crew had also suffered; but during their stay at Būshehr, which lasted from the 16th to the 22nd of June, they all practically recovered.

Institution of a Native Agency at Baghdād, 1783.

In November 1783 the Government of Bombay sanctioned a proposal made by the Resident at Basrah, that a permanent Native Agent should be appointed at Basrah on a salary of Rs. 1,100 a month to

transact business with the Pásha on behalf of the East India Company, to forward packets to Basrah, and to obtain information. The first Native Agent selected was Khójah Marcar, who had been performing the duties of the new appointment gratuitously since July 1781; and he was authorised by Government, no doubt as a reward and as a token of their approbation, to draw his salary in arrear for the whole of that period.

New orders in regard to consulage, 1784

In 1784, under new orders, half of the 2 per cent. consulage at Basrah, hitherto equally divided between the Resident at Basrah and the Governor of Bombay, began to be credited to the East India Company themselves.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1779—89.

From 1782 to 1794 the duties of Bishop of Babylon, and probably of French Consul at Baghdād as well, were discharged by the Abbé de Beauchamp, as deputy of his uncle M. Mirodot du Bourg. This Abbé was a *savant*, and in his capacity as such he afterwards accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt.

SALIM III.

1789—1807.

The successor of 'Abdul Hamīd I in the Sultanate of Turkey was his nephew Salim III, a son of Mustafa III, who ascended the throne on the 7th April 1789 and was deposed on the 29th May 1807. The Ottoman Empire consisted in his day of 26 Ayālats or Governments; and among these was Baghdād, which included Basrah, but not Mūsal. The period was an important and even critical one in western Turkey where the Sultan endeavoured to restore the authority of the central Government long fallen into abeyance, and perished in the attempt, resisted by the 'Ulama and the Janissaries; but the most remote of the Asiatic Ottoman provinces, that with which we are concerned, lay almost beyond the range of the international convulsions of the Napoleonic era, and perhaps entirely so beyond that of the reforms.

or attempted reforms, in Turkey by which the reign of Salīm III was distinguished. In fact, it may be said that, but for the financial effects of Austrian, Russian and French wars, to which it was required to contribute, and but for incursions by the Wahhābis of Central Arabia, against which the Porte were unable to afford it protection, the Baghdād Pāshāliq remained unaffected by movements external to itself.

But, though the native rulers and populations of Turkish 'Irāq lived in comparative indifference to the progress of events in Europe, it was otherwise with the representatives of the western powers there; and, in order to explain the policies and relative positions of these agents at various times, the following facts may be recalled. From the accession of the new Sultān in 1789 until the treaty of Jassey in 1792, Turkey was at war with Russia and at first with Austria also, while Britain and Prussia were exerting their influence on her behalf, and France, which was in a state of revolution, took no part in the strife. From 1798 to 1801 there was war between Turkey and France, due to the invasion of Egypt by Bonaparte; and Turkey, after the beginning of 1799, was in receipt of active assistance from Britain and Russia. Finally, in 1806, the relations of Turkey and France having in the meanwhile become friendly and even intimate, a rupture between Turkey and Russia took place, and was followed by a breach between Turkey and Britain, in consequence of which the British Ambassador withdrew from Constantinople at the beginning of 1807, and a demonstration against the city was made by a British fleet under Admiral Duckworth. The most stirring days at Baghdād were doubtless those of 1798-99, when it was seriously expected that Bonaparte, either by the Euphrates or by some other route, would advance from Egypt against India.

The subject of the Wahhābi invasions of Turkish territory is dealt with further on in the present chapter and, more fully, in the chapter on the History of Najd; and it is not necessary here to describe the improvements in administration, both civil and military, to which Salīm III devoted much attention and which were one reason of his unpopularity and dethronement; for their influence on affairs in Turkish 'Irāq was of the slightest, if not altogether unfelt.

Internal affairs under Sulaimān Pāsha's later rule, 1789-1802.

Mention has already been made of Ahmad, originally a domestic servant of Sulaimān Pāsha, whom in 1785 he appointed to be his Kehiyah

Assassination of Ahmad Pasha.

Kehiyah, 1796.

or Minister, for whom he obtained at the same time the rank of a Pāsha of two horse-tails, and by whom for several years after that date the business of the Government, both foreign and domestic, was to a very large extent transacted. About 1790* Sulaimān Pāsha seems to have suggested to Ahmad Pāsha that he should become his son-in-law, and later to have promised that, if this took place, he would resign the Pāshāliq himself and recommend Ahmad to the Porte as his successor. Ahmad Pāsha, however, was averse to the proposed match, because it would involve, on account of the high rank of his master's †daughter, the dismissal of his existing domestic establishment, including a Georgian lady to whom he was greatly attached; and he continued to evade the proposed honour. At length Sulaimān Pāsha's daughter, having come to know of the unwillingness of Ahmad, so unflattering to herself, to change his condition, induced 'Ali, a Georgian slave who was her father's Khaznahdār or treasurer, to undertake the removal of Ahmad, promising to marry him instead, if he were successful. 'Ali found means to enlist the support of a number of Sulaimān Pāsha's Georgian body-guard, by whom Ahmad Pāsha was already disliked; and one morning, as the Kehiyah entered the hall of public audience, where Sulaimān was already seated, he was struck down by 'Ali, who stabbed him in the breast with a dagger, and was then instantly despatched by some of 'Ali's confederates in the body-guard. Sulaimān Pāsha, though he had covered his face with a shawl instead of making a serious effort to save his favourite, appeared at first to be genuinely affected by his death and retired to an inner apartment; but Muhammad Baig, one of his Arab advisers, and 'Abdullah, a Jewish banker at his court, whom he immediately summoned, persuaded him to acquiesce in the accomplished fact. He accordingly issued a proclamation announcing that Ahmad Pāsha had been put to death by his own orders for intended treachery, and he actually caused the nuptials of his daughter with the chief conspirator Ali to be celebrated the same evening. This event occurred in April 1796, immediately after the recovery of the Pāsha from an illness which had made him almost incapable of managing his affairs.

Resources of the Baghdād Pāshāliq in 1796—1797.

The resources of the Baghdād Pāshāliq, both military and fiscal, were estimated by the French traveller M. Olivier, whose visit took place in 1796—97, to be considerable. The Pāsha's bodyguard then

*The account in the text is taken from Brydges (*Wahaby*, pages 178—186). Olivier gives a different version of the circumstances leading to the assassination, which took place when he was himself at Baghdād (*Voyage*, Volume II, pages 411—414) and was practically witnessed by the French physician Ontrey.

†She was the only daughter born in wedlock of Sulaimān Pāsha.

consisted of 4,000 mounted and 2,000 unmounted men; but of purely Turkish cavalry there were not more than 1,200 in the province. The number of effective Janissaries was not ascertainable. The garrison of Baghdād city comprised about 8,000, and it was believed that more than 15,000 could be assembled there and elsewhere, if required; but the Janissaries could not be employed by the Pāsha except for the defence of the stations at which they were posted, only the Porte having the power to order them on other service. Much reliance was placed on the military contingents provided by Kurdistān, then governed by three chiefs who were nominated by the Pāsha of Baghdād and graded as Pāshas of one horse-tail, and whose forces amounted in the aggregate to some 12,000 or 15,000 mounted men. From the Arabs of the province it was possible to raise a force of 10,000 to 12,000 mounted men, but this was an unreliable and expensive levy. Unorganised bodies of musketeers could also be collected, in an emergency, in numbers dependent on the prospect of booty and success. The military force of the Pāshāliq was estimated at 40,000 to 50,000 men, all told; and it was understood that this number could be maintained in the field without drawing on revenues external to the province.

The fiscal receipts of the local Government amounted in an ordinary year, according to M. Olivier, to about 4,000,000 francs, derived from taxes on land, assessments on Arabs and Kurds, contributions of non-Muhammadans, customs, etc. The income from customs had been of especial importance since the diversion in part of the Indian trade from Persia to Turkish 'Irāq—which took place in the time of Karīm Khān. The proportion of the local revenue remitted to the Porte did not exceed one-eighth, the remainder being absorbed in local expenditure; and in years of war with the Kurds or the Arabs the remittances to Constantinople were liable to serious diminution.

According to Mr. Jones, who went to Baghdād as British Resident in 1798, the revenue of the Pāshāliq for some years previous to 1797 was not less than * £1,000,000 per annum, out of which the Pāsha sent less than £100,000 to the Porte and laid by, on his own account, £100,000 to £150,000.

Plague at Baghdād, 1802.

Early in April 1802, bubonic plague again made its appearance at Baghdād, and by the 9th of May it had carried off, it was estimated, about 2,000 souls; but from the absence of later references to the disease it may be assumed that the epidemic was not of long duration.

* The annual revenue of the modern Wilāyats of Baghdād and Basrah together is about £400,000.

The Pāsha forsook Baghdād as soon as the presence of plague in the city was reported, and no steps were taken, or even prescribed, by him for withstanding its progress; but he issued "unjust and inhuman orders" that none of the inhabitants should presume to follow his example of seeking safety in flight.

Political state of the Pāshāliq, May 1802.

Sulaimān Pasha, distinguished in earlier days by energy and courage, had now sunk into his official * dotage. The general state of the Pāshāliq in May 1802 was one of inefficiency, confusion, and alarm. The city of Baghdād and the town of Basrah were both insufficiently defended against attack; and the garrison of the former, apart from some 500 ragamuffins described as Barātalis, Tufangchis, etc., consisted of 6,000 to 7,000 Janissaries, "undisciplined and unruly, who probably, when "distressed by the inconveniences of a siege, would turn like a wounded "elephant on their own party." The greater part of Kurdistān was still comprised in the Pāshāliq, but the leading Kurdish families were distracted by feuds and broils, and the district itself, apart from the military contingents which it furnished, was not a source of strength to the Baghdād Government. Of the Arab tribes of the country the Shammar Tōgah upon the Tigris near to Baghdād were disaffected towards the authorities, by whom they had often been cruelly treated; and the more distant Banī Lām were in partial revolt through the attack of a Shaikh, recently deposed by the Turks, upon the successor whom they had set up in his place. The whole district from Kōt-al-Amārah to Jassān and thence to Hawīzeh was, owing to these causes, a prey to disorder. Besides these troubles at home there was also the constant danger, or at least the constant fear, of invasion from Central Arabia on the one side and from Persia on the other.

Death of Sulaimān Pāsha, 7th August 1802.

At the end of July 1802, though the condition of Sulaimān Pāsha, who had then been ill for some †time, was studiously concealed from the public, it was generally known to be critical; and plots and preparations for seizing the succession began. The ordinary medical attendant of the Pāsha was M. Outrey, a French surgeon, long resident at Baghdād; but on the 6th of August Sulaimān was visited, at the request of his relations and a number of influential persons, by Dr. Short, the Surgeon of the British Residency, who at once perceived that he had not

* In 1796, when seen by M. Olivier, he had fallen into a state of drowsiness and melancholy, accompanied by a disinclination equally for work and for pleasure but from this attack he apparently recovered.

† Early in May 1802 the Resident at Baghdād reported that the Pasha was now paralysed from his waist downwards.

many hours to live. The end came on the 7th of August before the hour of mid-day prayer.

Sulaimān Pāsha's Government, once firm, had been qualified not long before his death by the British Resident at Baghdād as "imbecile in the extreme" while he himself was spoken of as having outlived his honour and his reputation; but he deserves to be remembered as he was in the days of his vigour, when his appearance and character answered to the following description by Sir H. J. Brydges, to whom he was well known:—

> Sulaiman was, perhaps, as fine a specimen of a Turkish Pasha as ever existed. Born a Georgian, he was possessed of great manly beauty—his stature and form were such as to give the greatest effect to the magnificence of the Turkish dress—his countenance had a strong expression of reflection and humanity—he was as expert in all military and field exercises and sports as those who made them their employment and profession—sincere and warm in the exercise and belief of his own religion, he was as tolerant as a Turk could be towards those whom an article of his own faith bound him to consider as infidels—exact and economical in his expences, he was accused of avarice, but when he considered his country to be in danger, he freely and readily parted with that which he had amassed slowly and by degrees. I can vouch (for it passed through mine and the Jew Abdallah's hands) to his having sent, first and last, to the assistance of Essoof Pacha, the Grand Vizier, during his campaign in Egypt against the French, half a million of pounds sterling in money. His court was splendid, and the establishment of his household was on the scale of that of a great sovereign. In the early part of his life he had received many favours and great assistance from the English, and to the very last moment he acknowledged these, and any favour asked for by an English gentleman travelling through his Pachalik was sure to be gracefully and cheerfully granted.

Sulaiman had, also, according to the same authority, a strong sense of humour.

Trade from 1789 to 1802.

The trade of the Pāshāliq during the period 1789—1802 continued to be of much the same character as between 1779 and 1789. In 1800 the average annual value of Indian imports at Basrah was estimated at 80 lakhs of rupees.

External relations of Turkish 'Irāq, 1789—1802.

Invasions by and expeditions against the Wahhābis, 1789—1802.

Disquiet upon the western frontier, occasioned by the irreconcileable differences between the Turks and the Wahhābis, was the most salient feature of the external history of Turkish 'Irāq under the later rule of Sulaimān Pāsha. The Wahhābis were in general the active and aggressive party, and a detailed account of the struggle will be found in the chapter

on the history of Najd: in this place it will be enough to refer to some of its principal incidents.

First Turkish expedition, 1798.

Before 1798 various attacks had been made by the Wahhábis upon Turkish territory; and in that year, even the town of Hillah having begun to suffer from their depredations, a Turkish expedition marched from Basrah, of which the objective was Dara'iyah, the Wahhábi capital and the purpose nothing less than the reduction of Najd. This force, which was under the command of 'Ali Sulaimán Páshá's second Kehiyah, the murderer and successor of Ahmad Páshá, turned back from Hasa after a short and inglorious campaign; and the result of the expedition was merely a truce for six years, arranged at Hâj during the Turkish retirement on Basrah and subsequently ratified at Baghdád.

Sack of Karbala by the Wahhábis and second Turkish expedition, 1801—1802.

This truce, even, was not long observed; and on the 20th April 1801, a terrible disaster befell the Turks in the sudden seizure and complete sack by the Wahhábis of the town of Karbala, a place regarded as sacred by Shi'ahs and therefore by almost the whole Persian nation. Sulaimán Páshá endeavoured to reply to the outrage by an expedition against Dara'iyah, conducted this time not by a Turkish official but by Thuwaini, the chief Shaikh of the Muntafik tribe; but the result of this second attempt was even less favourable than that of the first, for not far beyond Kuwait the commander was assassinated, whether through political treachery or in consequence of some private grudge, and the leaderless force was dispersed and partly destroyed by the Wahhábis. These were the events that unnerved old Sulaimán Páshá, who in middle age had defended Basrah bravely for a full year against the whole force of Persia, and who now, on learning of the calamity at Karbala, was said to have exclaimed: "It is not fit I should live longer."

Attitude of the Arab tribes to the Wahhábis and apathy of the Turkish authorities, 1802.

The attitude of a number of the Arab tribes of 'Iráq was, in May 1802, extremely doubtful with reference to the Wahhábis. It was considered not improbable that the Khaza'il and the Shammar Tóqah, who had both suffered much at the hands of the Turks, might join the Wahhábis, if the latter should attempt an invasion in force; the loyalty of even the Muntafik tribe had become open to question; and the Pasha himself had enunciated it as a principle, that "enfin il ne faut pas "compter sur les tribues arabes, qui ont toutes les yeux sur les "Vehabes." The very extremeness of the danger begot a kind of apathy, which caused the town of Hillah, though unmistakeably threatened by the Wahhábis, to be left unwalled and undefended; and Mr. Harford Jones, the British Resident at Baghdád, was constrained to remark in addressing the Governor-General of India: "I fear Your Excellency

"will think I err if I tell you the Government here is so besotted as not "to perceive the importance of the port (? post) of Hillah, but on my "honor, my Lord, this is the case."

Relations with Persia, 1780—1802.

The only neighbours of consequence to the Pāshāliq besides the Wahhābis were at this time the Persians; and, after the establishment of Qājar rule in Persia, the Pāsha of Baghdād found it advisable to treat that country with consideration and respect. The founder of the Qājār dynasty, Āghā Muhammad Khān, was generally credited with designs upon Baghdād; and after his death in 1797 grave apprehensions were from time to time aroused by the conduct of his successor, Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, especially in 1801-02 when it was feared that he might require satisfaction of the Turks for their failure to protect the holy Shiah town of Karbala and its inhabitants against the fury of the Wahhābis.

Collision with the Ka'ab, 1791.

In the year 1791 a fresh rupture, which the Turks themselves had done nothing to provoke, occurred between their administration at Basrah and the semi-independent Ka'ab tribe in the Persian province of 'Arabistān. Earlier in the year the Ka'ab had ventured to attack the annual 'Omāni coffee fleet while on its way to Basrah, but had been repulsed with severe loss, most of their Gallivats being destroyed. To revenge this defeat, the Ka'ab constructed batteries upon both banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab and endeavoured, on the return of the 'Omāni vessels down the river between October and December, to prevent their passage; but the strangers were escorted by the Turkish fleet under the command of the Kapitān Pāsha, and, after an engagement between the ships and the batteries, they reached the Persian Gulf in safety. The Ka'ab then abandoned their batteries and withdrew to Dōraq, while the Turkish fleet returned to Basrah; but the Turks were extremely irritated against the Ka'ab on account of their insolence in having occupied positions on Turkish soil on the western bank of the river and in having demanded compensation from them, as they did, for the losses which they had sustained by their gratuitous attack upon the 'Omāni merchantmen. The matter, however, ended here.

Difficulty with the Saiyid of 'Omān, 1798.

A slight disagreement, mentioned also in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, occurred in 1798 between Saiyid Sultān, the ruler of Masqat, and the Turkish authorities in 'Irāq. By way of enforcing a claim to a sum of money which the Saiyid asserted to be due to him on account of the aid* rendered by his father to the Turks during the siege of Basrah in 1775-76,—a claim repudiated by the Pāsha, who as the defender of Basrah in that year must have been personally cognisant of the facts,

* *Vide* page 1359 *ante*.

—the 'Omāni ruler in July 1798 prepared to operate by sea against Basrah and, as a preliminary to doing so, opened negotiations with his enemy the Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah for a peace, and even for an alliance. Sulaimān Pāsha, who was by this time aware of the French invasion of Egypt and who was now about to launch his first expedition against the Wahhābis, feeling that any addition to his perplexities would be inconvenient, sent on the 20th August 1798 for Mr. Reinaud, an agent whom the British Resident at Basrah had deputed to Baghdād on business, and requested through him the good offices of the Resident in dissuading the Saiyid of 'Omān and the Qāsimi Shaikh from violent action. To this proposal Mr. Manesty, the Resident, very readily assented, but he found on enquiry that the Mutasallim of Basrah was already in correspondence with both of the other parties. Direct negotiations followed between the Mutasallim and Mulla Ibrāhim 'Ali, the commander of the annual Masqat coffee fleet, then lying at Būshehr; and in the end the dispute was adjusted, for the time being, and the 'Omāni ships paid their accustomed friendly visit to Basrah.

British political relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1789-1802.

It remains to notice the relations of Britain, as represented by the East India Company and their agents, with Turkish 'Irāq during the later years of Sulaimān Pāsha's administration.

Difficulty between the British Resident at Basrah and the Turkish authorities, arising from a case between Jews and a Christian, 1791-92.

In March or April 1791 Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, intervened in proceedings before the Mutasallim against a Christian inhabitant of Basrah named Risha, not apparently a British subject or even a European, who was taxed with the murder of a Jew. The ground of the Resident's interference seems to have been that *ex parte* evidence only had been taken in the case, and that the prisoner had not been allowed a fair trial; and, though he was unable to withhold the Mutasallim from finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to death, he succeeded in preventing the infliction of the extreme penalty. Meanwhile threats of resorting to personal violence against the British Resident and of cutting down the East India Company's flagstaff had been used by members of the Jewish community at Basrah, among whom the case had caused great excitement; but they were compelled to apologise to Mr. Manesty, in the presence of the Mutasallim and other Turkish officials, for what they had said; and Mr. Manesty at first accepted their apology. Subsequently, however, on learning from a private source that the head of the local Jewish colony had written of

him in disparaging terms to the Kehiyah Pāsha at Baghdād, Mr. Manesty demanded that the whole case should be reopened, that "the principal Jew" should be expelled from Basrah, and that ten other Jews who had taken part in the agitation should be fined or otherwise punished; but the Mutasallim of Basrah, on the ground that the Jews had already expiated their offence by an apology, refused to take action; and the Resident then referred the question to the Pāsha at Baghdād. The matter dragged on till about two years later, when the Pāsha, wishing to end it, summoned "the principal Jew" to Baghdād and caused the others to be admonished, or offered to have them admonished. How the prisoner Risha was finally disposed of is not stated.

Removal of the British Residency from Basrah to Kuwait, 1793-1795.

The settlement thus attempted by the Pāsha was rejected, however, by Mr. Manesty; and on the 30th of April 1793, accompanied by Mr. Harford Jones, who had been "Joint Factor" with him at Basrah since November 1788, he withdrew by way of protest from Basrah to Kuwait, taking the Residency with him. The Pāsha then wrote to the Governor of Bombay, complaining of Mr. Manesty's conduct and requesting that he might be recalled to India and another Resident sent in his place. The question raised by these events was referred by the Government of Bombay to the Governor-General of India, and by the Governor-General to the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London.

The incidents of the sojourn of the Basrah Residency at Kuwait from 1793 to 1795 are described in the history of that principality. The Resident, while he was at Kuwait, received more than one invitation from the Pāsha to return to Basrah; but he declined them all because a condition which he considered most essential,—the punishment, namely of ten of the Jews,—was not accepted; and finally he seems to have made an appeal to "His Majesty's Ministers," perhaps through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, for support.

Orders of the Court of Directors, April 1795.

The Court of Directors passed no orders in the case until April 1795. They then censured the conduct of Messrs. Manesty and Jones, whom they considered to have shown great want of judgment in reviving the dispute about the Jews after it had been practically settled; directed that those two gentlemen should be removed from their appointments in the Basrah Residency; and ordered that the officials sent to relieve them should, on arrival at Kuwait, intimate to the Pāsha that the East India Company would not press for the punishment of the ten Jews, and that, if an honourable reception were guaranteed, the Factory would be retransferred to Basrah. On the 15th of September 1795, on receipt of these instructions, the Government of Bombay appointed Messrs. N. Crow

and P. LeMesurier to the places of Messrs. Manesty and Jones, of whom the latter had recently left Kuwait for England on account of ill-health.

Return of the Factory to Basrah, 4th September 1795.

The Pasha was not aware, however, of the disposition of the higher British authorities to view the case in the same light as he did himself; and, not long before the arrival in India of the despatch by which his triumph would have been secured, he agreed to Mr. Manesty's terms. On the * 9th of August 1795 Ismá'íl Effendi, a Turkish officer of high rank, arrived at Kuwait to clinch matters by the delivery of a letter and to escort the Resident back with honour to Basrah. Mr. Manesty embarked at Kuwait on the 26th of August, and on the 4th of September he landed at Basrah, where he was well received and where, according to the agreement with the Pásha, the ten Jews were handed over to him "for personal chastisement or imprisonment"; but there is nothing to show what use he made of the power thus placed in his hands.

The subsequent arrival of Mr. Crow at Basrah with instructions for taking over charge of the Residency from Mr. Manesty gave rise to official difficulties which will be dealt with in a later paragraph.

Cordial relations between the British Resident and the Turkish authorities, 1797-98.

After the departure of Mr. Crow and the restoration of Mr. Manesty to the Residentship, in which he had been temporarily superseded, harmonious relations were established and maintained between the British Factory and the officials and influential men of the country. Of these relations the following egotistic account was given by Mr. Manesty in May 1798:—

> I am really happy in communicating to Government information that the affairs of the Residency are at present in a most prosperous state, and that I have not the smallest doubt of their long continuing so. The conduct of the Turkish Government in all its departments towards the factory and myself is friendly, handsome, and satisfactory in (*sic*) the highest degree. My influence with it is as extensive as I can myself desire. My influence and friendship with all the neighbouring Governors and Shaiks, and with the distant Shaiks in the desert, enable me to command their services on all occasions, and the general inhabitants of the country are devoted to my wishes. In short, Hon'ble Sir, I have now attained the desirable object of those politic and prudential measures which have invariably characterised my public conduct as British Resident at Bussorah. The honor, the credit, the respectability, and the influence are completely and firmly established, and the nation and the Hon'ble Company now in unequivocal enjoyment of all the advantages derivable from this valuable subordinate advantages which I flatter myself I shall be enabled to preserve to them by the future countenance and support of Government.

* The decision of the Court was reached in April, and it is quite possible that Mr. Manesty may have had private advices of its tenor from some friend in June or July, and may have then renewed his efforts to bring the Pásha round. He could offer to let the Jews off lightly if they were made over to him for punishment, as they eventually were.

The departure of Bonaparte for the East, and designs upon India which he was supposed to entertain, brought the adequacy of British representation at Baghdād under review in 1798. A British Residency in charge of a European officer had been set up at Baghdād in 1765, but it was abolished again in 1766, and for fifteen years thereafter Britain remained unrepresented at the headquarters of the Pāshāliq. In 1781, as a middle course, a Native Agency was established. At length, in June 1798, Mr. Harford Jones, who had been at home on leave since 1795, was summoned to the India House in London, and various plans for counteracting the schemes attributed to Bonaparte were discussed with him, including one by which he would have been associated with Commodore Blankett in a mission to the Arab chiefs of the Red Sea coast; but the issue of the deliberations was that, at his own suggestion, he was appointed to Baghdād "by his Majesty, and the Secret Com-"mittee of the East India Company, to reside with Sulaiman Pacha, in "quality of political Agent, but more particularly for the purpose of "prevailing on that almost independent chief to assist the Porte with "money, in disappointing the views on the East, whatever they might "be, with which Bonaparte, and the expedition fitted out from Toulon, had sailed."* The appointment was made in London on the 5th July 1798, and the new "Resident at the Court of the Pacha of Baghdad" arrived at his destination on the 24th of August following and assumed charge of his duties, superseding Mr. Reinaud whom Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, had deputed to Baghdād a short time before as a temporary arrangement. Establishment of a British Residency at Baghdād, 1798.

Joint action by the British and Turkish authorities in the East was regularised by a treaty of defensive alliance with the Sublime Porte, concluded by His Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary at Constantinople on the 5th January 1799, of which the immediate object was the co-operation of British with Turkish troops against the French army in Egypt.

The existence of a new establishment of equal rank at the head quarters of the Pāshāliq of Baghdād must have detracted considerably from the importance of the older Residency at Basrah; and eventually, Position of the Resident at Basrah, 1798-99.

Vide Sir H. J. Brydge's *Wahabis*, page 16. In a note on page 177 it is further explained that: "The intent of this appointment was, in the event of the French "influence prevailing at Constantinople, to endeavour to keep the Pasha staunch to "us; or if the Porte and ourselves drew together, to make him afford every assistance "in his power to his Sovereign." (Since the above was written some correspondence relating to the establishment of the Residency has been found by the present writer at Baghdād: it is printed as Annexure No. II to this chapter.)

friction * arose between Messrs. Manesty and Jones, of whom the former was the senior in rank, while the latter had now obtained the more conspicuous position. In December 1798 Mr. Manesty took advantage of the passage of the Kehiyah, 'Ali Pāsha, through Basrah on his expedition against the Wahhābis to establish friendly personal relations with him; but in February 1799, having enquired of the Government of Bombay whether he might proceed to Baghdād for an interview with Sulaimān Pāsha, he was told that he might do so only if the object which he had in view could not be equally well attained through Mr. Jones; and in consequence of this answer he gave up his intended visit.

British assistance in military matters to the Pāsha of Baghdād, 1798-99.

On several occasions in 1798 and 1799 the Government of Bombay supplied the Pāsha of Baghdād with mortars, muskets, shells, gunpowder and other munitions of war at cost prices; and, in response to a request for an experienced gunner and an "able bombardier of the "Muhammadam persuasion who had been trained in the military service "of the Honourable Company in India," a † conductor and two European gunners were sent to Basrah in August 1799.

Interception at Basrah of an embassy from Tipu Sultān to the Porte, October 1799.

In October 1799 Mr. Manesty became aware of the presence in Basrah of an embassy which Tipu Sultān of Mysore had despatched to the Sultān of Turkey, with presents and letters, to beseech his assistance against the British in India. It consisted of Saiyid 'Ali Muhammad, Kazdri, and Saiyid Madār-ud-Din, with a secretary named Hasan 'Ali and some attendants. Mr. Manesty caused the Ambassadors to be informed through Āgha Muhammad Nabi, a Persian Merchant and afterwards Persian Envoy to India, of the fall of Seringapatam and the death of their master, of which events he had himself just received intelligence; but they did not consider themselves absolved from the duty of discharging their mission in the interests of Tipu's heirs. The Resident also had recourse to the Mutasallim, 'Abdullah Āgha, by whom he thought the Ambassadors might be restrained from proceeding further; but that official presently received instructions from the Pāsha of Baghdād,

* The quarrel gave rise to a truly remarkable exchange of invectives, during which each of the disputants plied Government with "true copies" of the abusive letter that he heaped upon his adversary.

† The conductor, whose name was Raymond, subsequently deserted to the French, alleging himself to be of French extraction. He was afterwards appointed by the French Government to their Consulate at Basrah; and his surrender by the Turks could not be obtained until 1826, when he was given up as a deserter and taken to Bombay, but there pardoned on account of the long time that had elapsed since his desertion.

which he dared not disobey, for forwarding them on their way. Mr. Manesty then sent Āgha Muhammad Nabi with the Factory Linguist and a Factory Janissary to the Ambassadors; and this deputation enlarged with such effect on their position and obligations as servants of a conquered state, on the hardships to which they would probably be exposed at Constantinople, where the Sultān on account of his alliance with Britain would not be able to befriend them, and on his own positive determination not to let them pass, but on the contrary to compel them to return to Bombay in the "Antelope" then setting sail, that in the end—some hint of rewards having also been thrown out—they acknowledged themselves British subjects and promised to comply with the Resident's wishes. The presents and letters which they had brought for the Sultān, however, were taken from them by the Mutasallim, notwithstanding a protest by Mr. Manesty; but this was probably an unavoidable concession by 'Abdullah Āgha to the opinion of his Council, who were strongly in favour of the Ambassadors being encouraged to proceed to Constantinople.

Visit of Captain Malcolm to Turkish 'Iraq. 1801.

Captain J. Malcolm, in returning to India from his first mission to the Persian Court, paid a short visit to Turkish 'Irāq, to the Pāsha of which province also he was formally accredited. On the 15th March 1801, travelling from Hamadān, he reached the ill-defined boundary between Persia and Turkey; and soon afterwards he arrived on the banks of the Tigris, where, in consequence of the alarm of the Pāsha of Baghdād at the large number of Persians accompanying the mission, he discharged all his Persian attendants with princely gratuities. Sulaimān Pāsha refused to let Captain Malcolm pay for the local supplies furnished to the mission, showing himself in this respect more hospitable than the authorities in Persia, where payment had been accepted; but he was not free from strange suspicions, and on one occasion he sent specially to request that swords might not be drawn by the British Envoy's escort while in Turkish territory. The Pāsha was anxious for an alliance with the British, and he even expressed his regret that he had not been brought as a third party into the arrangement lately concluded between Britain and Persia by Captain Malcolm. Official dealings with him were confined, however, to one grand ceremonial visit, at which a letter from the Governor-General of India was delivered, accompanied by rich gifts. On the 31st March Captain Malcolm left Baghdād for Basrah in a river boat supplied by the Pāsha; but on the 8th April he transhipped to a vessel belonging to Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, which met him near Qūrnah, as did also a state barge belonging to the Pāsha. On the 14th of April, having resided for part of the time with Mr. Manesty

at his country house at Kût-al-Farangi, and having exchanged visits and presents with the local Turkish authorities, he embarked for Bombay on board the "Jonathan Duncan," which had been waiting for him at Basrah.

Disagreement between the British Resident at Baghdâd and the Pâsha of Baghdâd, 1801.

During the summer of 1801 the relations of Mr. Jones, the Resident at Baghdâd, with Sulaimân Pâsha were disturbed by an unpleasant incident. On the 9th of June the Pâsha informed Mr. Jones that there was a dangerous feeling against him in Baghdâd in consequence of a Turkish female having been seen—so it was alleged—to come out of his house; and he offered to assist Mr. Jones in making his escape from the city, adding that, if he decided to remain where he was, the local Government could not be responsible for his safety. Mr. Jones in reply refused to leave Baghdâd, basing his refusal on his entire innocence of the misdemeanour with which he was charged, whereupon the Pâsha, whose motives for raising and pressing the case are not apparent, announced that he could no longer recognise Mr. Jones as representing the British Government, forbade the staff of the Pashâliq to hold communication with him, and told him that he was no longer under Turkish official protection. Mr. Jones accordingly reported his circumstances to the Government of India and the Court of Directors in London; and, on his informing the Pâsha of this step and explaining to him the consequences which might be expected to follow, Sulaimân showed signs of trepidation; but, as he still refused to tender a written apology and a certificate to the effect that the accusation made against Mr. Jones was groundless, both of which Mr. Jones thought it necessary to obtain, the latter in his turn declined to exercise his functions as British Resident and retired to a place on the banks of the Euphrates to await the orders of his superiors. On the 20th October, however, the Pâsha at last declared himself, in writing, to be satisfied that the imputations against Mr. Jones were unfounded, and promised that he should be treated in future with the highest consideration and respect. The matter ended on the 20th of November with the return of the Resident to Baghdâd, where he was received by the Pâsha with the accustomed honours and at once resumed the duties of his office.

Vaccination introduced into Turkish 'Irâq, 1802.

Vaccination was introduced into Turkish 'Irâq by the Surgeon of the British Residency soon after the receipt, on the 30th March 1802, of some vaccine matter from Vienna. Work was begun at Baghdâd during the commencement of a plague epidemic there in April, and at Basrah in May.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1789-1802

Tenure of the Basrah Residency by Mr. Crow, January to September 1796.

The replacement of Mr. Manesty in the Basrah Residency by Mr. Crow, which, as already explained, had been arranged by the Government of Bombay in September 1795, led to a somewhat unseemly squabble. News of the reconciliation between Mr. Manesty and the Pāsha of Baghdād did not reach Bombay until after Mr. Crow had sailed; and Mr. Crow, on arriving at Basrah with his Assistant Mr. LeMessurier on the 1st January 1796, took over charge of the Residency under the instructions which he brought with him. Meanwhile, however, the Court of Directors had been informed of the satisfactory ending of Mr. Manesty's difficulty with the Turkish administration; and on the very day of his relief by Mr. Crow, a letter addressed to him by name was despatched from London, saying that the Court had seen fit to revoke their former orders for his removal. This letter arrived at Basrah on the 3rd April 1796; but, though Mr. Manesty was still there for the purpose of settling up his private affairs, Messrs. Crow and Le Messurier, professing to consider the effect of the letter doubtful, took no action on it beyond protesting vigorously, both to the Court of Directors and to the Government of Bombay, against the possible re-instatement of Mr. Manesty. In writingto the former body they gave it as their opinion "that the influence and dignity of the Residency have suffered a severe "shock, and that jealousy and distance seem to form the Turkish aspect, "as near as we have been able to contemplate it;" and they advised their superiors in India that "such a restoration" as that of Mr. Manesty "would be attended with the most destructive consequences to the "surviving portion of national credit we retain here and to the interests "of the East India Company in this establishment, and that the Pacha would regard such an instability of our public measures with contempt and indignation." The Court of Directors, however, were so far from being moved by the representations of Mr. Crow, that in their reply they reprimanded him for not having made over charge to Mr. Manesty before, and ordered him to do so on receipt of their letter without further evasion or delay. These instructions reached Basrah on the 25th of September and were executed the same day. On the 14th of October Messrs. Crow and Le Messurier took their departure for Bombay; and on the 8th of November Mr. Manesty poured forth his feelings in the

matter with characteristic exuberance, writing as follows to the Court of Directors :—

> If in the hour of your severity, supported by conscious rectitude and actuated by a laudable resolution to assert my honor, I ventured with independent spirit to address you in manly, free and animated language, I now, rejoicing in your favor, solicit your favorable acceptance of those calm and harmonized assurances of uniform devotion to the service and interests of my Hon'ble employers, which a mind restored to happiness, and reinvigorated by the enjoyment of returning honor and credit, feels it a pleasant duty to offer. The Hon'ble Company know me well, and they shall find me, if my abilities equal my integrity, and my constitution enables me to prosecute my views and wishes, a servant worthy of their applause, attention and support.

The British Desert Mail, 1798-1802.

British official correspondence continued to be forwarded regularly across the desert between the Basrah Residency and the Aleppo Consulate; and, during the wars with France, which began during the period, this overland route, owing to its directness and its security from the interference of European nations, possessed a higher value than at any time before or after. While the Residency was located at Kuwait there was tampering, * at times, with the mails by Wahhábis or under Wahhábi instigation; but the service was never seriously interrupted. In 1798 the Resident felt some anxiety in regard to the effect which the Turkish expedition against the Wahhábis, then about to be undertaken, might produce; but his influence seems to have proved, as he himself anticipated that it might, a sufficient protection to the carriers whom he employed. The news of the battle of the Nile reached India by way of Basrah; and in 1801 the Resident at Basrah, Mr. Manesty, received the thanks of the Government of India for having maintained rapid communication between them and the British forces in Egypt.

Establishment of the Baghdád Residency, 1798.

The establishment in 1798 of a Residency at Baghdád, independent of that at Basrah, has been mentioned already, with the considerations that led to it, as among the important facts of the British connection with Turkish 'Iráq at this time.

Provision of a Surgeon and military guard for the Resident, 1800.

In 1800 Mr. Jones, the Resident at Baghdád, fell ill; and as Mr. Manesty, the Resident at Basrah, declined to let the Basrah Surgeon go to his assistance, Mr. Jones was obliged to come all the way to Basrah for treatment. On Mr. Jones representing to

* There is some discrepancy, in regard to the immunity of the mails from interference, between the account given by Sir H. J. Brydges (Mr. Jones) in his *Wahauly* (pages 15—16) and that of Mr. Reinaud as reported in von Zach's *Monatliche Correspondenz* for July to December 1805 (pages 234—235). See also the footnote on page 1005 of this volume in the history of Kuwait.

Government the risk and inconvenience to which he had been exposed, a separate "Civil Surgeon" was appointed to the Baghdād Residency in September 1800 in the person of Dr. James Short of the Bombay establishment. The desire of Sulaimān Pasha to have a British medical man at hand had been brought forward by the Resident as an argument in favour of creating the new appointment; but the Pāsha, after Dr. Short's first arrival, employed him very little, and the doctor, offended by his neglect, would have refused to attend him on his death-bed in 1802, if he had not been officially required by the Resident to do so.

In August 1800, on the application of Mr. Jones, the Baghdād Residency was furnished with a native military guard from India, consisting of a Subadar, a Havildar, a Naik, and 26 sepoys. About a month later two drummers were added.

Annual cost of the Basrah Residency, 1801.

The cost of maintaining the Basrah Residency was scrutinised in 1801, when it was found that the items of salaries, allowances and rent, which in 1788 had amounted to Rs. 13,800 per annum, had increased by 1798 to Rs. 15,342. Ordinary fluctuating contingencies stood, about 1798, at Rs. 9,276 on an average of years; but by 1801 a fixed annual contingent grant of only Rs. 5,520 had been substituted by Government. The cost of carriage of the overland mail was treated as a charge by itself, and so also was the expenditure in presents to Arab Chiefs, which was at the rate of about Rs. 16,000 a year.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1789-1802.

In 1796-1797, after the French Revolution, France was represented at Baghdād by a "Commissioner for Commercial Relations," in other words no doubt a Consul; and this office was held by Citizen Rousseau, possibly the same individual who had been French Consul at Basrah nearly twenty years earlier. Baghdād was visited in 1796-97 by a French political mission, conducted by MM. Bruguière and Olivier, whose proceedings are fully described in the chapter on the general history of the Persian Gulf.

On the 8th of October 1798, less than two months after the establishment of the British Residency at Baghdād, orders were received by the Pāsha from Constantinople "to imprison the French Consul, the persons "in his service, and the French subjects residing at Basrah, and to send

"the French Consul and the several persons in his employment, together "with all the papers belonging to the Consul, to Constantinople;" and the measures thus indicated were duly carried into effect.

In October 1799 the French Factory at Basrah was in the hands of the Turks, who used it to accommodate the embassy, already mentioned, from Tipu Sultān of Mysore to the Sultān of Turkey.

Interregnum at Baghdād, August 1802.

Ambition of the Agha of Janissaries.

At the time of Sulaimān Pāsha's decease, the Āgha of Janissaries at Baghdād was a man of ability, enjoying the confidence of the Porte, but popular also at Baghdād, where he had distinguished himself by his excellent administration of the police. He was also ambitious. On the fact of Sulaimān Pāsha's serious illness first becoming known, he sought an interview with Mr. Jones, the British Resident, at which, after confessing that he had the succession to the Pāshāliq in view, he begged that a letter might be written on his behalf to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. Mr. Jones however declined, at the same time pointing out to the Āgha that what was expected of him, in accordance with the traditions of his office, was that he should take charge of the Pāsha's treasure at his death in the interests of the Porte and should carry on the administration of the Pāshāliq until a successor had been appointed from Constantinople; and he advised him to be satisfied, in the first instance, with performing these duties, and not in any case to put forward a personal claim to the Pāshāliq without having secured the treasure, which, if it came into the hands of his competitors, might be used against him with deadly effect.

Conflict between Agha of Janissaries and 'Ali Pāsha, the Kehiyah, and defeat of the former.

On the morning of the day that Sulaimān Pāsha died, the Āgha, whose plans must have been laid beforehand, embarked boldly on an attempt to seize the Government by force. At an early hour he sent Janissaries to capture Muhammad Baig,* "the great Arab, who was the agent "at the Pasha's court for the Shaiks of all the tribes tributary to the "Pachalik, and who resided in a large house in the suburbs on the wes- "tern side of the Tigris;" but the Baig had remained at the palace over-

* This was no doubt the Muhammad Baig who advised Sulaimān Pāsha to condone the murder of Ahmad Pāsha, and who afterwards accompanied 'Ali Pāsha's expedition against the Wahhābis in 1798-1799. It is possible that he was also the Muhammad Baig whose brother Hāji Sulaimān Baig had rebelled in 1786; see page 1273 ante.

night, and this attempt on the Āgha's part to secure a valuable hostage consequently failed. A little after 10 o'clock the Āgha, on horseback, passed the British Residency at the head of a rabble of 1,000 to 1,500 men "all with naked sabres and using the most furious gesticulations;" he was then on his way to occupy the citadel as a preliminary to attacking the palace, in which was 'Ali Pāsha, the Kehiyah, with his supporters; but he assured Mr. Jones that he, the British Resident, had nothing to fear from any of the contending factions. At twelve noon, Sulaimān Pāsha being then probably dead, fire was opened from the citadel, first with an unmounted gun of enormous calibre throwing a stone ball, and then with mortars; but the practice was so poor that the palace hardly suffered at all from the bombardment. From the moment that the first shot was fired, all business in the city was suspended and the people shut themselves up in their houses.

During the next eight or nine days the Āgha persevered in his enterprise; but after that, in consequence of the bribes which 'Ali Pāsha's party, having possession of the treasure in the palace, were able to lavish, his supporters began to desert him. He then attempted to bring forward a Georgian slave of the late Pāsha as a rival to 'Ali Pāsha; but this manœuvre failed, and he had to retire from the citadel to his own house, in which he was immediately besieged. Ultimately, having been taken prisoner, he was cut to pieces in the presence of 'Ali Pāsha; and fourteen of his principal Janissary supporters were strangled in succession on one night, a cannon being fired as the fatal cord was adjusted upon the neck of each. Within a fortnight or three weeks from the death of Sulaimān Pāsha, order had been completely restored by 'Ali Pāsha; and, though an immense amount of firing had taken place during that time, the actual number of casualties was extremely small.

Difficulties of the British Resident during the struggle.

The chief anxiety of the British Resident during the disturbances arose from the presence in the river, only a few miles below Baghdād, of boats laden with muskets, bayonets and shells which had been ordered by Sulaimān Pāsha from Bombay; but, by causing the vessels to be anchored at a distance from the bank, by hoisting British colours on board, and by informing both the Kehiyah Pāsha and the Āgha that the consignments were still British property and must not be touched, Mr. Jones was able to prevent these additional arms and ammunition from falling into the hands of the combatants.*

* The whole crisis is well described by Sir H. J. Brydges (Mr. Jones) in a note to his *Wahauby*, pages 204-210.

Application of 'Ali Pāsha for the Pāshāliq and his appointment, 1802.

'Ali Pāsha, the Kehiyah, when he had gained the upper hand, caused a petition for his own appointment to the Pāshāliq to be signed by the principal inhabitants of Baghdād and sent to Constantinople. The petition was supported by a remittance of rather less than £60,000, "and this was all that the Porte got of Sulaiman Pacha's treasure, "except some pieces of jewellery, shawls, furs, house-furniture, and rich "India goods;" for much had already been spent in fighting the Wahhābis, in contributing to the Turkish operations in Egypt, and in placating the indignant sovereigns of both Turkey and Persia after the disgraceful Karbala affair. Asad Baig, the thirteen-year-old son of the late Sulaimān Pāsha, did not figure in the transactions which followed his father's death; and, perhaps for this reason, a portion of his father's wealth was allowed to become his by inheritance. The douceur transmitted by 'Ali Pāsha, though small, was accepted by the Porte as sufficient; and formal intimation of his appointment to the Pāshāliq, accompanied by a mantle of investiture, arrived at Baghdād on the 6th of January 1803.

Condition of affairs, 1803.

'Ali Pāsha, notwithstanding the resolution of character that he had shown in destroying his early rival Ahmad Pāsha and in asserting his claim to the succession on the death of Sulaimān Pāsha, did not prove a successful ruler.* In 1806 the whole country was in a turmoil. War had broken out between various Arab tribes in alliance and the Jarbah branch of the Shammar, and the Pāsha had ordered a military levy in Turkish Kurdistān for the purpose of attacking the confederacy and relieving the Jarbah, who were hard pressed. This led to a second misfortune. On their way from Baghdād to Kurdistān, whither both had been sent to collect troops, 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, the principal Kurdish chief under Turkish influence, decoyed Muhammad Pāsha, the second in importance, to his tent, where he murdered him; and subsequently he entered on a course of contumacy and rebellion against the Baghdād Government. At this inauspicious moment 'Ali Pāsha found it necessary to imprison his own Kehiyah, who was acting disloyally, and 'Abdullah Āgha, a relation of the Kehiyah, who had once been Mutasallim of Basrah.

* His failure as a military commander against the Wahhābis in 1798 will be remembered.

The further course of these internal troubles need not be traced. 'Ali Pāsha continued unpopular among his subjects, and finally, to the great relief of the public mind, he was assassinated by a party of Georgians on the 18th of August 1807: this event occurred shortly after the deposition of the Sultan Salim III, and so a little after the end of the period with which we are now dealing.

Assassination of 'Ali Pāsha, 1807: his character.

Mr. H. Jones reported of 'Ali Pāsha in 1802, shortly before his accession to power, that "he was neither a man of business nor a "man of pleasure,—he had not parts for the one, and his fanaticising "prevented his being the other." The same authority represented him as detesting Jews and Christians, and his behaviour in public as being, at this time, "puerile and disgusting." The Pāsha's personal courage was was also esteemed doubtful; but he was reputed steady in friendship, and he never willingly broke his word.

British relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1802-07.

One or two transactions affecting British interests in Turkish 'Irāq belong to the short reign of 'Ali Pāsha.

'Ali Pāsha showed, at first, a favourable disposition towards the East India Company; and, on receiving the news of his confirmation in the Pāshāliq, he addressed a long letter to the Court of Directors in London expressive of his friendship for the British nation and of his respect for Mr. Jones, the Resident at Baghdād; but this friendly attitude on his part was not, as we shall see, very long maintained towards the gentleman specially mentioned.

Friendly attitude of 'Ali Pāsha at his accession, 1802-03.

Inconvenience had sometimes been felt at Baghdād in consequence of the British Residency at that place not having been formally recognised by the Government of Turkey as a Consulate under the Capitulations,* and His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople took advantage of the appointment of the new Pāsha in 1802 to remedy the defect by obtaining a Barāat or patent of recognition. By this document,† which was dated the 2nd of November 1802, Mr. Harford

Recognition of the British representative at Baghdād by the Sultān of Turkey, November 1802.

* Lord Elgin evidently attributed the persecution of Mr. Jones by the Baghdād authorities in 1801 to this cause; but it is possible that, like Mr. Grenville in 1764, he overestimated the value at Baghdād of recognition at Constantinople. As will be shown further on, the new safeguard did not prevent the virtual expulsion of Mr. Jones from Baghdād by the Pāsha in 1806.

† The text of the Barāat is given in Aitchison's *Treaties*, Vol. XIII, pages 10-11, fourth edition.

Jones was recognised as British Consul, according to the Capitulations, at Baghdād; his right to protect British merchants and travellers and to regulate the departure of British vessels was admitted; the public servants under his orders, his Assistants, and his "slaves" were declared exempt from various taxes and forms of contribution to the Turkish revenues, while he was made free in his personal capacity of liability to pay customs and excise; the immunity of the Consul himself from arrest, and of his house from closure, search and billeting of troops, was clearly established; complaints against him were ordered to be referred to the Sultān of Turkey and not to be disposed of by any other authority; the Consul was to be at liberty to travel about in the country without molestation; native vessels, on payment made, must carry his stores for him "according to the prevailing regulations," presumably those governing forced labour; in dangerous parts of the country he should be allowed to wear "a white turban, sabre, bow, or other warlike instruments;" and the officials of the Turkish Empire were ordered to assist and protect him everywhere and to deal with him, in all circumstances, according to the Capitulations. The British Residency at Baghdād, in its origin a temporary mission to the Pāsha, was thus placed upon the same regular footing that the Residency at Basrah occupied under the "Consulary Firat" of 1764.

Difficulty between the Resident at Basrah and the Turkish authorities, arising from the case of Captain White, 1808.

A second serious collision, not unlike that of 1793, now occurred between Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, and the authorities of the Pāshāliq. On the 4th of April 1803 a native mob at Basrah broke into the house of Captain White, the commander of Mr. Manesty's private trading vessel "Recovery," and carried off a woman, an Oriental Christian of Cairo, who was living there under his protection, and in regard to whom it was popularly asserted that she either was already a Muhammadan or had admitted in the presence of Muhammadans a desire to become one. The house, too, was plundered. Mr. Manesty at once applied for redress to the Mutasallim of Basrah, whom he suspected of being the instigator of the riot, but in vain; so on the next day he struck the British flag, caused the gate of the Factory to be bricked up, and prohibited intercourse between the town and British ships then lying in the river. At the same time he wrote to the Pāsha of Baghdād demanding the restoration of the woman to Captain White, the indemnification of Captain White for his other losses, and the punishment of the ringleaders in the attack with transportation, imprisonment and other penalties; and he threatened, unless full satisfaction were afforded, to withdraw to Calcutta and there to lay a complaint before the Governor-General of India. The Pāsha, on receiving Mr. Manesty's communication, informed

Mr. Jones, the British Resident at Baghdād, that he would enquire carefully into the case; and, after some time, he not only removed the Mutasallim for incapacity and summoned him to Baghdād to answer to the charge of having caused the *émeute*, but also directed that official's substitute to try, and on conviction to punish, all the persons who might be charged by Mr. Manesty with active participation in the outrage, and to make good to Captain White the material losses that he had sustained. He declined, however, to discuss the restoration of the woman, professing to consider that it would be contrary to the principles of his religion; and, when Mr. Manesty in reply refused to treat with him upon any other basis, he broke off the correspondence altogether. Eventually in July 1803, Mr. Manesty still standing firm, the Pāsha caused the woman to be given up, and the Resident forwarded her after Captain White to Calcutta. All demands having thus been satisfied, the British flag was again hoisted and the Factory reopened upon the 23rd of the month. 'Ali Pāsha had no doubt been a witness of Mr. Manesty's successful bout with his old master, Sulaimān Pāsha, in 1793-95, and preferred to avoid a contest to the bitter end with a gentleman so tenacious in matters of personal importance.

'Ali Pasha's Embassy to the Governor-General of India.

About the end of 1803 'Ali Pāsha sent an Ambassador to the Governor-General of India in the person of one Sulaimān Āgha. This individual arrived in Bombay on the 16th February 1804, and was provided by the Government of Bombay with passages to Calcutta for himself and his suite on the ship "Upton Castle" which sailed on the 3rd of April. The object of the Embassy is not recorded, nor the result; and it is therefore not improbable that the duties of the Ambassador were of a purely ornamental character, such as the offering of congratulations.

The principle governing the customs tariff of the Ottoman Empire with reference to Great Britain continued to be that of the Capitulations, *viz.*, that the duty levied should not exceed 3 per cent. of the market value of the merchandise; but it had been found convenient to assume fixed values for all classes of goods and to draw up a scale of authorised duties by weight and quantity, calculated from the fixed values on the 3 per cent. principle. Such a table had been framed in 1794; but by 1800, in consequence of a rise in the price of all commodities, the authorised duties had fallen below the 3 per cent. *ad valorem* level; and in that year, with the consent of Great Britain, the table was revised in a manner favourable to the Porte. Subsequently it was found that the duties paid by British merchants under the revised table were higher in some cases than those paid by the merchants of other Christian nations; and on the 13th

December 1809 a new table, free from this objection, was adopted for use under an agreement between Britain and Turkey.

Quarrel between Mr. Jones and Ali Pāsha, 1804-05, and enforced retirement of the former from Baghdād, January 1806.

In 1804 a dispute arose at Baghdād between Mr. Jones and 'Ali Pāsha, the cause being the uncivil treatment by the Pāsha of the Linguist of the British Residency. Mr. Jones demanded reparation, which the Pāsha refused, and official relations between them ceased. In November 1805 the Pāsha wrote to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and also to the Sultān of Turkey, asking that arrangements might be made for the removal of Mr. Jones from Baghdād; and, as the Porte strongly supported this request,—not because they were convinced of its justice, but because they were afraid to offend a far-off and semi-independent Governor,—and as they declined to be responsible for Mr. Jones's personal safety if he should remain any longer, Mr. Charles Arbuthnot, knowing well that His Majesty's Ministers at home would not press the case on account of the alliance then existing between Britain and Turkey, advised Mr. Jones to quit Baghdād. The latter accordingly made over charge of his duties to Dr. Hine, the Civil Surgeon, and left Baghdād early in January 1806; in February he was at Mūsal; and on the 21st of May he reached Constantinople.

Visit of Mr. Jones to Constantinople, May to October 1806.

Mr. Jones was fortunate enough to win the good opinion of the British Ambassador there, who invited him to remain for a time and to lend his services, in the event of an expected Persian Embassy to France passing through the Turkish capital, in obtaining information with regard to its objects. On the 13th October 1806 the Sultān of Turkey made it clear, by investing him with the Order of the Crescent of the Second Class, that he entertained no personal objections against Mr. Jones; and six days later that gentleman left Constantinople for England, charged with important despatches from the Ambassador. In August 1807 Mr. Jones, either in recognition of his political work during eight years at Baghdād, which had been commended by the Ambassador, or in preparation for a Mission on which he was shortly afterwards sent to the Court of Persia, received a baronetcy*.

Political position in Iraq after the rupture in Europe between Britain and Turkey, 1807.

If proof were needed of the practical independence of the Pāsha of Baghdād at this time in his dealing with foreign powers, it would be sufficient to cite the conduct of 'Ali Pāsha in 1807, when war broke out in Europe between Great Britain and Turkey. The Pāsha at first informed the British Residents at Baghdād and Basrah that they must withdraw from their charges; but on second thoughts he pressed them to remain, promising them full protection in their public and private

* He at first called himself Sir Harford Jones; but later, perhaps after his retirement, assumed the surname of Brydges.

characters, as in time of peace. This was a very different sort of treatment from that to which the French in Turkish 'Irāq had been subjected in 1798, on the occurrence of war between the Directory and the Porte. Both Residents availed themselves of the Pāsha's permission to remain at their posts, and their conduct in doing so was approved by the Governor-General of India.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1802-07.

Embarrassments of Mr. Manesty and his unauthorised journey to Bombay, 1805-1806.

The difficulty, a hundred years ago, of maintaining discipline and a proper regard for higher authority among public servants at distant stations like Basrah is exemplified in the extraordinary proceedings of Mr. Manesty in the year 1805. In 1804, as explained in another chapter, Mr. Manesty had, without reference to Government, assumed, the rôle of a Special Ambassador to the Court of Persia; and on his return from Persia he had been held accountable by the Governor-General of India for the whole of the expenses incurred. In 1805 finding himself unable to meet his liabilities and being in fear of personal violence from his creditors at Basrah, he negotiated bills on the Government of Bombay to the amount of Rs. 95,000, "which he earnestly hoped Government would honour on presentation," and at once left for India to explain and justify his conduct, making over charge of the Residency at his departure to Lieutenant E. H. Bellasis of the Bombay Engineers. Arriving at Bombay, unannounced, on the 10th April 1805, he at once proceeded to represent his case, with a request that his emoluments as Resident at Basrah might be increased. The office which he held was, in his opinion, "one of the most arduous, unpleasant, and uncomfortable "ones held by any servant whatever of the Honourable Company, and "that it was unprofitable had, to his misfortune, been indisputably "proved." He continued :—

> If, therefore, I cannot resume it on eligible terms, terms which I am ready respectfully to state and explain to Government, and on which only any gentleman can with prudence accept the situation, I shall most willingly resign it whenever you please, wisely preferring tranquillity, personal safety, and the most limited income in a British settlement to an extensive establishment, local rank, state, and authority subjecting me to unceasing care, laborious duty, serious dangers, and ultimate ruin in Arabia. If my past services remain unrewarded, if my just and reasonable claims are rejected, and if I cannot be Resident at Busorah under equitable, handsome, and profitable arrangements, I will, in India, endeavour usefully and honourably to exert those talents which have some pretension to consideration, and which ought long ago to have given me affluence in my native country.

Government, however, declined to raise Mr. Manesty's salary; and it was only with difficulty, and on condition that he lodged with them securities sufficient to cover the debit that would be created in his account with the Company, that they were persuaded to undertake the payment of such of his bills on them as he could not himself meet.

Arrangements in h's absence, 1805-1806.

Mr. J. Law, who in April 1805 was on the point of proceeding to Basrah in the capacity of Assistant to Mr. Manesty, was authorised instead to take charge of the Residency there, on his arrival, from Lieutenant Bellasis. This he did on the 3rd of July 1805, but he died soon after; and Lieutenant Eatwell of the Bombay Marine carried on the duties of the appointment until the 13th of June 1806, when Mr. Manesty returned from India, and resumed his place.

The tolerance shown for Mr. Manesty's vagaries almost passes comprehension at the present day, when strict sobriety of conduct prevails, and is enforced, in the Indian services.

Orders regarding the correspondence with India of the Residents at Baghdad and Basrah, 1806.

In January 1806, it was decided by the Government of India, on a reference from the Government of Bombay, that the Residents at Basrah and Baghdád should be regarded as under the immediate orders of the latter Government, and that they should not correspond direct with any other authority in India. The object of this order was, probably, to ensure proper respect and obedience on the part of Residents towards their immediate superiors. There is some reason to think, however, that this order was treated as repealed after the Second Mission of General Malcolm to Persia in 1808, when, as Envoy of the Governor-General, he was invested with general authority over the British establishments in the Persian Gulf and Turkish 'Iráq.

Customs and consulage at Basrah, 1806.

The year 1806, was distinguished by a great and sudden increase in the amount of the customs and consulage obtained by the East India Company at Basrah; but whether this increase was due to greater stringency in assessment and collection, or to better trade, or to both of these causes, is not clear. The whole collections from 1st May 1791 to 1st May 1806, had only aggregated Rs. 27,512; whereas in July 1806 alone a sum of Rs. 41,663 accrued, and it was expected that an additional Rs. 20,000 would come in before the 30th April in the following year. Mr. Manesty, in reporting this, added: "As long as I "may continue in office here, the annual amount must generally "exceed, and possibly in a material degree, the large sum of Rs. 50,000," but the fact that the period of small collections also was included in his Residentship seems to preclude the supposition that the improvement was due to his vigilance or energy.

MUSTAFA IV, 1807-08,

AND

MAHMŪD II, 1808-39.*

On the deposition of Salīm III, the eldest son of the late Sultān 'Abdul Hamīd I was raised by the Janissaries to the throne of Turkey under the title of Mustafa IV. He ruled from the 29th May 1807 to the 28th July 1808, when he was displaced by partisans of the deposed Salīm. During the last few moments of Mustafa's authority Salim perished by the bowstring, leaving the successful reactionaries no choice but to substitute for Mustafa his own brother Mahmūd, who was the sole other surviving male of the house of Othmān.

At home fresh attempts were made by the new Sultān, who ruled as Mahmūd II, to shake off the power of the Janissaries; but at first his efforts were unavailing. Abroad, during 1807 and 1808, Turkey continued to be on an unfriendly footing with Britain; but, after the Treaty of Tilsit on the 7th June 1807, when the French and the Russians combined and began to devise joint schemes for the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, the relations between Britain and the Porte tended to improve; and on the 5th January 1809, notwithstanding strenuous endeavours by France to prevent it, their differences were healed, by the Treaty of the Dardanelles. War was then resumed between Turkey and Russia,—a war in which, as in the Perso-Russian war of 1826-28, Muhammadan feeling and enthusiasm at first played a considerable part,—and hostilities continued until the Treaty of Bucharest, which was signed on the 28th May 1812.

Meanwhile, between 1804 and 1811, the Turkish province of Egypt had been brought under thorough control by Muhammad 'Alī Pasha, the Governor, who annihilated the turbulent Mamlūks; and the Wahhābis of Central Arabia, who had seized the sacred cities of Makkah and Madīnah, and whose proceedings ever since the sack of Karbala in 1801 had been a cause of incessant alarm upon the Syrian and Mesopotamian frontiers, were crushed by the same strong hand, their country being finally

* Some additional details of the general history of Turkey during this period are given in two footnotes to Chapter Eighth, see pages 1061 and 1100. The principal sources of information in regard to local affairs in Turkish 'Irāq are the *Précis containing Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874 and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Turkish Arabian Affairs, 1801-1905*, printed in 1905. Other authorities on particular points are cited in footnotes, and Rich's *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*, 1836, is of some general value.

occupied by the Egyptian troops in 1818, as is fully related in the chapter on the history of Najd.

The year 1826 brought relief from the difficulty with the Janissaries, who on being required to undergo a modern military training, mutinied and were at last completely destroyed; but it was also marked by the disadvantageous treaty of Akkerman, concluded with Russia. In 1828 another war with Russia began, which lasted until the Treaty of Adrianople on the 28th August 1829.

In the interim, from 1820 to 1827, Greece had been carrying on a struggle for independence of Turkey, and ultimately, at the battle of Navarino, the united fleets of Britain, France and Russia had taken action on her behalf and destroyed the navy of Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt, to whom the operations against the insurgent Greeks had been confided by the Porte.

Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha had by this time himself become a danger to the Sultān; and in 1831 he began to encroach upon his master's dominions. Syria was occupied and Asia Minor invaded by his troops. Britain, France and Russia then intervened, and a temporary settlement was effected in May 1833. It was followed a couple of months later by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which created a virtual offensive-defensive alliance between Turkey and Russia and made Russian influence supreme at the Porte. In 1834 an over-centralised system of Government was established for the whole Ottoman Empire, which eventually caused paralysis of the provincial administration and produced evils hardly less serious than those of provincial independence, but of a different kind. In 1839 the trouble between Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha and the Porte was renewed, and the attitude of the former was so aggressive as to provoke the intervention of certain powers including Britain, upon the side of Turkey. Mahmūd, however, died on the 1st July 1839 before matters had reached their final stage, and even without knowing that a part of his army and the whole of his fleet had gone over to the Egyptians.

Internal history of Turkish 'Irāq, 1807-39.

Assassination of 'Ali Pasha of Baghdad and succession of Sulaimān, 1807.

On the 18th August 1807, not long after the accession of Sultān Mustafa IV, 'Ali Pāsha, Governor of Baghdād and its dependencies, was assassinated by a confederacy of Georgian slaves. His death "diffused a general satisfaction throughout the Pachalic," and it was as little

regretted by the representatives of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq as it was by the native subjects of the Porte. Sulaimān, whom the Turkish Government appointed to succeed him, was a nephew of the Pāsha, similarly named, who governed Baghdād from 1779 to 1802. As Kehiyah of the late Pāsha he had commanded in a war against the Persians about the year 1806, in which he was taken prisoner; and in the same capacity he had assumed provisional charge of the administration upon 'Alī's death.

Rebellion and expulsion from the country of Salim Āgha Mutasallim of Basrah, 1810.

In 1810* Salim Āgha, Mutasallim of Basrah, rebelled against Sulaimān Pāsha whose place he hoped to obtain; but the Muntafik tribe, of whose support the Mutasallim had been assured, unexpectedly turned against him. On the 14th of July the Muntafik occupied the town of Basrah without violence, permitting Salim Agha to retire with his family and all his property to Būshehr. He was followed in the Mutasallimate by one Ahmad Baig, regularly appointed by the Pāsha of Baghdād, whose entry into Basrah the Muntafik did not oppose.

Removal of Sulaimān Pāsha by the Porte, 1810.

In the same year, for reasons not ascertained, the Porte decided on the removal of Sulaimān Pāsha from the Government of Baghdād, and a special official was sent from Constantinople to carry out the fiat. The Pāsha was supported by the troops of the local garrison; but the Kurds of the districts under 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, a chief whose difficulties with Sulaimān Pāsha had before this led him to coquet with Persia, arrayed themselves on the side of the Ottoman Commissioner. The issue of the struggle remained doubtful for some days, but on the 5th October a decisive engagement took place in the immediate vicinity of Baghdād. The fighting began early in the afternoon, when a body of Kurds charged the Pāsha's army, but were driven off by artillery fire. The Pāsha's guns, however, the carriages being ricketty, were soon all dismounted by their own recoil; and the Kurdish host, which was vastly superior in numbers, then resumed the offensive and pressed the Baghdād army hard so long as daylight lasted. A number of Kurds who had taken service with the Pāsha, and on whom he placed much reliance, deserted him at a critical moment; and on the morning of the 6th, finding himself all but forsaken by his followers, Sulaimān fled with a few faithful Georgians by the Basrah road. Reaching the Diyālah river in safety, he crossed it and broke down the bridge behind him; but a strong party of the Shammar Tōqah Arabs, in whose country he was,

* Probably an enfranchised Georgian slave of that name who had married an illegitimate daughter of the former Sulaimān Pāsha. He was a man of some intelligence and of affable manners, but not successful as a ruler.

overpowered his small escort and killed him. His head was cut off, stuck on a pole, and carried to the Turkish Commissioner, who at once caused it to be "carefully packed up, sealed, and sent as a trophy to Constantinople."

Sulaimān Pāsha showed undeniable courage in the closing scenes of his life; and his death was much regretted by Mr. Rich, the British Resident at Baghdād, who described him as "a man of warm affection and actual good principles," adding: "His faults were such as proceed from extreme youth, and would have been corrected by age and experience." His age at his death was only twenty-four years.

Appointment of 'Abdullah Pāsha to Baghdād, 1810.

The choice of the people of Baghdād, in nominating Sulaimān Pāsha's successor, fell upon Asad Baig, the eighteen-year old son of the Sulaimān Pāsha who had ruled the province from 1779 to 1802. The youth at first agreed to accept the charge, if conferred upon him; but, on learning the miserable fate of his predecessor, he burst into tears and refused upon any consideration to enter public life. Apparently in the month of December 1810, one 'Abdullah was appointed by the Porte to the Baghdād Pashāliq. This may have been the same 'Abdullah, formerly Mutasallim * of Basrah, who was living in temporary exile at Būshehr in 1808 at the time of Sir Harford Jones's mission to the Persian Court; and in that case the new Pāsha was a man † of unusual intelligence and character, and particularly well disposed towards the British. One of his first acts was to substitute Ibrāhīm Agha for Ahmad Baig in the Mutasallimate of Basrah.

Campaign of Abdullah Pāsha in Kurdistan, 1812.

The most important task imposed on 'Abdullah Pāsha by the Turkish Government was the reduction of 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, Kurd, who for his own ends had helped the Commissioner of the Porte to remove Sulaimān Pāsha from power, but who, having formed a close connection with Persia, was no longer inclined to admit his dependence on the Porte. In June 1812 'Abdullah Pāsha entered Kurdistān; and on the 18th of that month he achieved "a most signal and unexpected victory" over 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, giving hope of "the entire "subjection of the Courdistan to the Pāsha of Bagdad, by which that "Pachalic would acquire a strength and respectability it had not "possessed for the last ten years, and would in reality become the most

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* See page 1300 *ante*.

†See Mr. Saldanha's *Précis of Turkish Arabian Affairs, 1801-1905*, page 32; also Brydges' *Mission*.

"powerful territory under the Porte." The affair seems to have ended, however, in some sort of compromise * with Persia.

Death of 'Abdullah Pāsha, killed by the Muntafik, 1813.

The rule of 'Abdūllah Pāsha, however remarkable his good qualities† may have been, was not destined to last long. At the beginning of 1813 he took the field against the Shaikh of the Muntafik, who was threatening Basrah with a large force; but in the first week of February, on his arriving within striking distance, the greater part of his force suddenly threw down their arms and went over to the enemy. 'Abdullah Pāsha then placed himself in the hands of the Muntafik under assurances of personal safety, but a few days later they treacherously put him to death. The power of the Muntafik, whose most distinguished Shaikh at this time was Hamīd-bin-Thāmir, increased greatly after their victory over the Pāsha of Baghdād; and the country on the Euphrates almost as far as Samāwah came under their sway.

Government of Sa'id Pāsha, 1813-1816.

The successor of 'Abdullah Pāsha was Sa'id, a youth twenty-one years of age, who on the circumstances of 'Abdullah's death becoming

* See Chapter Eleventh, page 1870.

† The following portrait of 'Abdullah Agha (as he then was) was drawn by Mr. H. Jones, Resident at Baghdad, in 1802:—

"Abdullah Agha is native of Baghdad, born of one of the most respectable families "in the city, and was appointed from the office of Hasnadar to the Pashaw to that of "Mussulum of Bussora, which he filled for many years with superior credit to himself "and the greatest advantage to the Pashaw, his master. He is about forty-two years "of age, coarse in his person but most engaging and interesting in his manner and "conversation, knowing and practising that great and invaluable secret of accommoda-"ing himself to his company without the smallest loss of his own dignity. He is a "man of letters, a politician, a financier, and a merchant. He has procured himself, "what people in these countries seldom think of, a tolerable distinct and correct "notion of the state of Europe. He has been at uncommon pains to obtain some "ideas of geography; and he is the only Turk that I ever conversed with that had "a knowledge of the local situation and relation of the provinces of his own Empire. "He is liberal in his religious opinions and would, if policy would warrant it, be still "more so. He is liberal to his people without being profuse, and has the happy "talent of combining great expense with the most exact economy. He is always "happy to receive information in whatever shape, or by whomsoever it may be "offered to him, and is seldom or ever contented with knowing a thing superficially "or by halves. In his government at Bussora he was prompt, decisive and vigilant "and contrived to procure himself a great character for good faith, humanity, "and justice. He has been accused of being avaricious, but he certainly never gratified "that passion by extortion and oppression, . . He has been reproached with timidity, "—he never showed it in any act of his government, . . . He is (very much to the "credit of the Resident at Bussora) most firmly attached to the English and their "interests, justly and on conviction of the truth of it, considering the latter as in-"separably connected in these countries with those of the Porte."

known, was proclaimed interim Governor by the Qāḍhi of Baghdād. The selection must have been agreeable to the Saikh of the Muntafik, for he testified his approval by accompanying Sa'īd on his public entry into the capital. That event took place on the 16th March 1813, but the news of Sa'īd's confirmation as permanent Governor did not reach Baghdād from Constantinople until the 30th June following. The short administration of Sa'īd Pāsha was disturbed by frequent troubles both at Baghdād and at Basrah. The most serious of these was a rising at Basrah, in the course of which a body of Arabs entered the town by surprise, plundered the Sarāi and beat the Mutasallim; in the end, however, they were expelled by the Mutasallim and tranquillity was restored. On the 4th November 1816 orders from Constantinople for the deposition of Sa'īd Pāsha and his replacement by Dāwud Effendi arrived at Baghdād.

*Accession of Dāwud Pāsha, 1816-17.

As Sa'īd Pāsha refused to submit to the commands of the Porte, Dāwud was obliged to make good his right to the Pāshāliq by force of arms; and his success was not immediate or easy. On the 7th January 1817 he was attacked by the *de facto* Governor, and a large force which he had brought with him was scattered; but, not long afterwards, the desertion of Sa'īd Pāsha by a number of his troops and an insurrection at Baghdād in which the Mamlūks took part gave him the advantage over his rival. On the 21st February he entered Baghdād in triumph, and the city submitted to his authority; on the 22nd he was proclaimed Pāsha; and on the 24th the ex-Pāsha Sa'īd, who had endeavoured to hold out in the citadel, was put to death by beheading.

Outrages committed at Basrah by Arabs of Najd, 1820.

The new Governor, who was described as "Pasha of Bagdad, Bussorah and Courdistan" was at first hardly more successful than his predecessor in maintaining the general peace; and by the middle of 1819 parts of the country had fallen under the terrorism of armed gangs, communications—especially to the northward—had been interrupted, and trade at Baghdād had come to a standstill. In 1820 a series of grave outrages was com-

*For an account of Dāwud Pāsha's career, see Stocqueler's *Fifteen Months' Pilgrimage*, Volume I, pages 44-51.

†Lieut. A. T. Wilson seems to allude to these Basrah disturbances in his *Précis of the Relations, etc.*, page 14; but he refers them, though he mentions Hāji Yūsef and not Hāji Jābir, to a year later than 1827. According to Lieut. Wilson, Basrah was actually captured by people of Zubair and Najd; Axis Āgha, the Mutasallim, was extricated from danger and brought to Muhammareh by Ka'ab; and the Ka'ab afterwards helped the Turks to recover Basrah.

mitted at Basrah by Arabs of Najd,* in consequence, partly of a blood-feud which had arisen between them and the Mutasallim's body-guard, and partly of the instigation of some Najdi merchants in the town who considered themselves aggrieved by an order of the Baghdād Pāsha in regard to certain landed property and who wished to intimidate him. On the 16th July a party of Najdis entered Basrah and attempted, but in vain, to capture the Government Sarāi; they then plundered the place, murdered a number of the inhabitants and withdrew, killing in their retirement the commander of a small body of Balūchis who were advancing to assist the garrison of the Sarāi.

Kurdish and Persian relations, 1821.

In the summer of 1821 Dāwud Pāsha deputed his Kehiyah to Qizil-robāt to watch the Kurds and Persians, but the Kurds gained a victory over him. The Pāsha, on hearing of it, threw all the leading Persians at Baghdād into prison in order to extort money from them; and Georgians were marched from Baghdād to Karbala and Najaf to show "that, if they cannot fight, they can plunder." About the same time cholera carried off some thousands of persons at Basrah.

The Muntafik.

In the case of the Muntafik, whose opposition had been the ruin of his predecessor 'Abdullah Pāsha, Dāwud Pāsha's general policy of dividing a troublesome tribe against itself was employed to good purpose. He raised up a rival to Hamīd-bin-Thāmir, the principal Shaikh, in the person of that chief's own nephew 'Ajl; and the result was an internecine war which paralysed the Muntafik as a tribe and incapacitated them for mischief during a number of years.

Deposition of Dāwud Pāsha, 1831, and character of his administration.

In 1831 the Porte superseded Dāwud Pāsha, who had put to death at Baghdad an emissary of the Constantinople Government, and appointed in his place one Hāji 'Ali Riza Pāsha, otherwise known as Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha, or simply as 'Ali Pāsha. 'Ajl, the Shaikh whom Dāwud Pāsha had set over the Muntafik, made a feeble effort on his patron's behalf and called in the Ka'ab Arabs and those of Kuwait, whose fleets blockaded Basrah and caused some alarm; but this demonstration had no effect on the course of events at Baghdād. Dāwud Pāsha, had he been able, would have maintained himself in the Pāshāliq by force of arms, and he actually stood a siege of a few days in Baghdād; but eventually he sought shelter in the house of one Muhammad Āgha, by whom he was delivered up a prisoner to the enemy. His life was spared, but he was sent to Constantinople.

* They are described as "Najedah" Arabs, but no such tribe is known, and the reference to residence "Nugedah" merchants make it probable that natives of Najd are meant.

In the beginning of his rule Dáwud Pásha gave no evidence of administrative ability. His only object then appeared to be the rapid accumulation of wealth, and it was thought that he was indifferent to all else, that he left too much to be decided by his advisers, and that he did not exercise any supervision or control over violent or corrupt subordinates; such at least was the unfavourable opinion formed by *Mr. Rich, a British Political Agent, towards whom at the outset of his administration he behaved in a very unreasonable manner. There were, however, fewer serious disturbances in his time than in that of either his predecessor or his successor; and after he had ceased to rule his administration was mentioned with respect. He maintained a regularly paid and fairly efficient force of about 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 infantry and some artillery, which sufficed at least for the purpose of maintaining order.

Accession and character of Hájí 'Alí Rizá Páshá, 1831.

The new Pásha is said to have been the first of Turkish blood who governed at Baghdád, and his appointment was evidently intended to mark the beginning of a new system of administration. His mission was in the first place to destroy the power of the Georgian families in which the Baghdád Páshálíq had become vested, and to bring the Arab tribes under direct control instead of dealing with them through their chiefs; but it was generally understood that he was also charged with the introduction of reforms which would benefit all peace-loving subjects of the Sultán. The experiment, whatever its nature, was made on a large scale, for Músal, Diyárbakr and even Aleppo were now added to the territories normally attached to Baghdád; and the new Pásha, who was already a Vazír of the Turkish Empire, received in addition the high title of Khalífah, recalling the days of the Baghdád Khalífate.

The time of Hájí 'Alí Rizá Páshá's arrival was in one sense opportune, for the state of the country could hardly have been worse. Some districts were ruined by the treatment which they had suffered under the late administration, or by natural calamities such as †plague and floods;

* In 1821, after his own final departure from Baghdád, Mr. Rich wrote: "All is in "confusion there, and a Persian war seems inevitable. The Turkish troops are plunder- "ing and insulting everyone, and the bazars are quite deserted. The Pásha seizes "everyone he can get hold of to extort money; and all who can possibly escape are "running away in every direction. He has taken five thousands rupees from the "Nuwaab."

See Rich's *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*, Volume II, pages 225-226.

† The plague epidemic at Baghdád in 1831 is described by Wellsted (*Travels to the City of the Caliphs*, Volume I, pages 280-289). Loftus (*Travels and Researches*, pages 7-8) says that it destroyed 12,000 out of a population of 70,000; and that the river broke down the walls of the town in 1831 and swept away 7,000 houses in one night.

and Basrah in particular had lost almost all its inhabitants during the years 1831—32, while the neighbouring towns of Muhammareh and Kuwait had increased considerably at its expense. The first proceedings of the new Governor were distinguished by moderation and good sense. He spared the lives of a number of the Georgians whom he had been expected to destroy; he appointed as his chief adviser one Muhammad Effendi, Ibn-Nāib, who bore an excellent character and of whom he knew nothing except by reputation; he daily inspected parts of Baghdād city on foot, accompanied by a few attendants only; and his whole demeanour, as well as that of his officers, was distinguished by mildness and freedom from ostentation.

The new policy towards the tribes, however, early proved a failure; and in the course of a few years, as we shall see, the ordinary administration fell into a state which was by no means satisfactory; while the character of the Pāsha, as it finally declared itself, was summed up by the traveller Mr. J. B. Fraser in 1834 in the following sentences:—

All, the present Pacha, formerly Governor of Alleppo, and successor of Daood Pāsha at Bogdad, is about 50 years of age, of weak mind and feeble judgment, and so irresolute of purpose that neither his promises nor his commands can safely be deemed binding for an hour together. He is selfish and indolent in the extreme, of gross appetites and low propensities, exceedingly avaricious, and quite regardless of the nature of the means by which money may be acquired. He is not naturally inclined either to cruelty or injustice, but so intolerant of trouble or the fatigue of business that he will sanction or overlook almost any crime committed by his servants rather than submit to have his ease disturbed by investigation, and thus justice is virtually denied to the injured party. In point of moral courage and decision he is equally deficient, so that he is quite unequal to act in the critical situations he is frequently placed in, and which require a firmness and rigour of mind of which he is utterly devoid. The principal redeeming points in his character appear to be a good natured and easy affability, and a degree of literary taste and acquirements which would have fitted him rather for the quiet seclusion of private life than for the bustling scene on which he has been thrown.

Unhappily the Pāsha's deficiencies are by no means compensated by the talents or integrity of his servants. There is not in fact a single person about him qualified to aid his master or benefit the public. * * * * The few of his former officers who might have laid claim to better report were carried off by the plague or by assassination; those of his predecessors, who might yet be useful, remain unemployed from motives of policy and caution; and the whole of his existing establishment, both public and private, is contemptible and mean in the extreme.

Some of the greatest difficulties with which Hāji 'Ali Rizā Pāsha had to deal proceeded from the larger Arab tribes in the districts adjoining

the capital, who were always anxious to obtain new and better lands for cultivation.

Trouble with the Jarbah Shammar near Baghdād, 1832-1834.

In 1831 the Jarbah or Northern Shammar, who by a course of persistent annoyance, had already extorted a grant of the best estates upon the Dujail Canal and in Jazirah, began to clamour for fresh concessions; and the Pāsha, in refusing their demands, thought it politic to divide them by substituting a young chief for Safūk, the principal Shaikh, and by assigning to him and his section alone the lands hitherto held by the whole body of tribesmen. Safūk and the greater part of the Jarbah then retired to the northward and made common cause with other rebels against the authority of the Pāsha in the district of Mūsal.

In 1833 Safūk and his followers reappeared in the neighbourhood of Baghdād, where they plundered the country without opposition from either the new chief of the Jarbah or the Pāsha of Baghdād; and finally they blockaded the city itself. A two months' blockade, however, exhausted their patience; and Safūk returned to the north, threatening to come back in the following year.

Alarmed at the prospect of annual invasions thus opened up, Hāji 'Ali Riza Pāsha called in the assistance of the great 'Anizah tribe of the North Arabian desert, promising to give them the lands of which the Jarbah might be deprived by their co-operation; and the 'Anizah readily agreed and collected a large tribal army in the vicinity of Bagdād. At this juncture it became known that Safūk had given up the idea of returning to the Baghdād neighbourhood, and the Pāsha would then have receded from his bargain with the 'Anizah, but they insisted that he should hand over to them the promised lands, and suggested besides that all the country to the west of the Euphrates should be granted to them on lease. The Pāsha, who was unwilling to meet their wishes in either respect, next appealed to the friendly section of the Jarbah to help him in driving the 'Anizah out; and in October 1834 a joint attempt to do this was made and failed signally, the Jarbah suffering heavy loss. The 'Anizah then blocked Baghdād from the west, while parties of their marauders scoured the whole surrounding country and plundered travellers and caravans.

Difficulty with the 'Aqail at Baghdād, 1834.

Meanwhile a rupture had occurred with the 'Aqail, an Arab tribe or locally regarded as such, who about 1832 had established themselves in the part of Baghdād situated on the right bank of the Tigris: in that year, by threatening to plunder an important caravan that had arrived under their protection within a short distance of the city, they had obtained permission until then denied them, to settle within the walls.

The 'Aqail, it should be explained, were natives of Najd or Central Arabia; their sole profession was to act as carriers and to guide and protect caravans travelling between Baghdād and Aleppo or Damascus; and the number of them collected at Baghdād sometimes amounted to several thousands. Having obtained a footing in the south-western part of the city, they became its absolute masters, excluded the authority of the Pāsha, and harboured evil characters to such an extent that all the respectable inhabitants migrated elsewere.

In 1834 the Pāsha decided that the presence of the 'Aqail within the walls could not be any longer tolerated; and, a robbery commited on some of his own officers near Baghdād having been traced to members of their community, he required the 'Aqaili Shaikh, on pain of being attacked and expelled by force, to quit the place at once with all his dependents. The Shaikh endeavoured to obtain a guarantee that no attack would be made on him and his people after they had passed the city gates by the Pāsha's troops or by his Arab allies; but the Pāsha, who had already summoned the Shaikh of the Zubaid tribe and Sulaimān Ghānim, a noted enemy of the 'Aqail, to his assistance, refused to give one, whereupon the Shaikh proceeded to the Sarāi to remonstrate. While he was there a false rumour became current that he had been put to death, and the 'Aqail then seized their arms, cut the bridge of boats, and commenced simultaneous attacks upon the part of the city on the left or opposite Bank of the Tigris, where the Sarāi was, and upon a detachment of the Pāsha's troops under the Kehiyah, who were encamped outside the walls upon the same side of the river as themselves. The Pāsha hastily dismissed the Shaikh with a present and orders to quiet the 'Aqail, but he also sent help to the Kehiyah, who had lost a gun in the first rush of the Arabs but had subsequently recovered it, and whose men had followed the retreating 'Aqail into their own quarter. Fighting ensued on the inner side of the Hillah gate, and the result of the day was still doubtful, when suddenly it was decided in favour of the Pāsha by the safe arrival of ammunition and reinforcements sent in a boat from the left to the right bank, and by the advance of a body of Albanians across the bridge of boats, the two parts of which they had succeeded in reuniting. The 'Aqail defended themselves in their own houses until the next day, when they were apparently allowed to march out of Baghdād with the honours of war. Part of them went to the rebellious 'Anizah, with whom, it was suspected, they had previously formed secret relations, and part to the Jarbah Shammar; but neither tribe would give them any help in recovering their Baghdād location, which was what they chiefly desired.

The quarters of the town on the south-western bank of the Tigris were pillaged by the Pāsha's excited soldiery, the loss falling chiefly on the non-'Aqaili inhabitants, a number of whom were even killed by the troops. It remained for the Pāsha to settle as best he could with the Shaikh of the Zubaid and with Sulaimān Ghānim, whom he had invited to join him, and whose services he now no longer required.

How the 'Anizah and 'Aqail complications actually ended we do not know; but at the end of 1834 there were signs, such as dissensions among the 'Anizah, which portended an early break-up of the blockade of Baghdād.

Condition of the Baghdād Pāshāliq in 1834.

The administration of the Baghdād Pāshāliq as it was in the year 1834 has been depicted in highly unfavourable colours by Mr. J. B. Fraser. The industrious classes, especially the agriculturists, were so harried by official exactions and by Arab raids that they had reduced their operations within the narrowest possible limits, and their position compared unfavourably with what it had been under Sulaimān Pāsha, from 1779 to 1802, or even under Dāwud Pāsha. Of the revenue collected in the towns of Baghdād and Basrah, it was estimated that more than a half was lost to Government by the dishonesty of the collectors. Large tracts of country were held by officials as Tamlik, that is in lieu of salary, and the profits of such estates had ordinarily been underestimated for the purpose by at least two-thirds. The unsettled state of the country was as unfavourable to trade as it was to agriculture. The customs duties were not framed, but were collected and accounted for by Government officials with every circumstance of dishonesty. The dues payable for the privilege of engaging in various trades were leased to contractors who were guilty of scandalous abuses. In the mint fraud was prevalent to such an extent that ten piastre pieces, which were supposed to contain a third part of silver, contained in fact only a ninth. The desert routes had become practically impassable for small caravans on account of banditti, and the only tolerably safe line of communication with places abroad was the Shatt-al 'Arab below Basrah, upon which the river-bank chiefs exacted heavy dues from passing boats. The blame for this unfortunate condition of affairs was laid, however, by Mr. Fraser rather on the established system of government than on the ruling Pāsha, whom he described as being "to a certain extent liberal and enlightened in his views," and in regard to whom he remarked: "His country is exhausted, his people impoverished and his power and "course of improvement will probably terminate with himself, deepen-"ing the gloom of confusion that must follow, like a bright light

"suddenly extinguished." The actual revenue of the Baghdád Páshálíq proper, *i.e.*, of the district dependent on the towns of Baghdád and Basrah, was estimated at £17,030 per annum by Mr. Fraser, who thought that under an efficient administration it might yield not less than £1,389,537 a year. The actual value of the European imports brought to Baghdád from Aleppo and Damascus, by such caravans as were able to make their way through, he placed at a quarter of a million pounds sterling annually.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Persia, 1807-39.

Wars with Persia, 1806 and 1821-23.

Two wars with Persia which occurred upon the Kurdish frontier are described, from the Persian point of view, in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast. According to another authority, not followed in that place, the treatment of Persian pilgrims in Turkish territory was the cause of the war of 1821-1823, and it came to an end, in consequence of a cholera epidemic, without any decided success having been gained by the Persians. The Turko-Persian frontier was adjusted after this second war by the First Treaty of Erzeroum (28th July 1823); it re-established the boundary agreed on in 1639 and at the same time decided a number of contentious questions relating to pilgrims and trade.

Capture and evacuation of Muhammarah by the Turks, 1837.

In 1837, incited by the loss which the rising free port of Muhammareh was inflicting on Basrah and tempted, doubtless, by the opposition which existed between the Muhaisin Shaikh of Muhammareh and his overlord the Ka'ab Shaikh of Fallahiyah, the Governor of Baghdád, then 'Ali Riza Pásha launched an expedition against Muhammareh. It is * said that the town was taken by assault; that the merchandise stored in its warehouses was plundered; and that the walls were levelled and the guns of the place removed. It is added that 'Ali Riza Pāsha made a demonstration against Fallahiyah which resulted in the flight of the Ka'ab Shaikh to Kuwait; that he placed two joint Shaikhs in charge of the Ka'ab as vassals of Turkey; and that the former Shaikh of the Ka'ab himself, having returned and ejected these substitutes, signed "a convention with

* The chief authority for these statements is Sir H. Rawlinson in his Memorandum on the Ka'ab tribe and Mohammerah, 1844; but from internal evidence it would appear that he relied, perhaps to an unwarranted extent, upon Turkish sources of information. There is, of course, no doubt that Muhammareh was in some sort taken by the Turks in 1837.

"the Pasha of Baghdad, securing himself in occupation of the Shikh-"ship and pledging the allegiance of his tribe to Bussorah."

The Shaikh of the Muhaisin', however, instead of submitting to the Turks, had made his way to Bushehr, where he strongly urged upon the Persian Government of Shīrāz the necessity of recovering Muhammarah for Persia. Disappointed of official Persian assistance, he returned to Muhammarah after its evacuation by the Turks; resumed possession of the town; and defied the authority both of the Ka'ab Shaikhs, by whose convention with the Turks he refused to be bound, and of the Wāli of Baghdād.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with other countries in the Persian Gulf, 1807-39.

Blockade of Basrah by the Sultān of 'Oman, 1826.

As related in the history of the Omān Sultanate, the Sultān of 'Omān proceeded in 1826 to enforce a claim for arrears of a Turkish subsidy by means of a naval blockade of Basrah. The subsidy was the one, said to have been granted in return for help rendered by the Imām Ahmad during the Persian siege of Basrah in 1775-76, which had been a cause of dispute in the years 1798 and 1804; and the arrears claimed amounted to $10,000. The blockade lasted from August to November 1826, and the result was apparently compliance by the Pāsha with the Sultān's demands. The blockade had been contemplated in 1825; but the threats of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt availed, in that year, to prevent its being carried into effect.

British relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1807-39.

General good relations, notwithstanding the Anglo-Turkish War of 1807-09.

At the opening of the period, and for two years after, Britain was at war with Turkey in Europe; but in Turkish 'Irāq, on account of the favourable disposition of the Pāsha who had much to lose commercially by a breach with the British Indian Government, matters remained continuously upon a footing of peace and amity. Friendly letters were exchanged, upon special occasions, by the Governments of Bombay and Baghdād; and we learn incidentally that the consular Barsat of

1764 had been renewed by the Porte in the name of Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah. From this last fact we may perhaps conclude that the desirability of obtaining recognition of the consular status of each new Resident at Baghdād or Basrah was steadily kept in view. Before 1808 the Bombay Government were not, it would appear, aware of the terms of the Barāat of 1764, though they knew of its existence. In 1808 Captain Pasley, whom General Malcolm at his withdrawal to India left in charge of the Government of India's Mission to Persia, retired to Basrah when it appeared that his personal safety was endangered at Bāshehr.

Opening of a British official letter by Sulaimān Pāsha, 1808.

In March 1808 an official letter from Mr. Manesty, Resident at Basrah, to Dr. Hine, Acting Resident at Baghdād, transmitted by the former through the usual medium of the Mutasallim of Basrah, was opened and read by the Pāsha at Baghdād,—an act which elicited a protest in strong terms from Mr. Manesty. The Government of Bombay ordered the case to be referred to General Malcolm,* who in proceeding on his Second Mission to the Persian Court had been placed by the Government of India in charge of all their officers and establishments in the Gulf region; but, as the Pāsha had meanwhile promised Mr. Manesty that his packets should not be tampered with in future, at the same time expressing his surprise at the warmth of Mr. Manesty's language, no further action was taken in the matter.

Difficulties between Sulaimān Pāsha and the Resident at Baghdād and adjustment of the same, 1809-10.

In 1809 Mr. Rich, the British Resident at Baghdād, remarked a disposition on the part of the Pāsha to treat him with slight respect and even with positive rudeness. He accordingly reported the facts to the Government of Bombay; and in the meanwhile, as relations grew still more strained, he withdrew to some distance from Baghdād. After receiving a firm but conciliatory letter from Mr. Duncan, Governor of Bombay, on the subject of his treatment of the Resident, Sulaimān Pāsha informed Mr. Rich that he was desirous of being reconciled with him; and his professions, which had hitherto been found empty, were this time proved by the event to be sincere. In a letter to Mr. Rich, dated 25th January 1810, the Pāsha renounced "all species of authority or command in any shape over the Resident;" engaged not to interfere with Residency "states and ceremonies", such as the beating of drums, and especially the celebration of the King's birthday and undertook never to prohibit the interchange of visits, according to old custom, between his

* General Malcolm was accredited to the Pāsha of Baghdād, but found no opportunity, on this occasion, of visiting him.

own principal officers and the British Resident. Messages between the Pāsha and the Resident were to be conveyed by confidential agents of respectability; and if any doubt should hereafter arise in regard to the meaning of any of the conditions agreed on, especially that relating to ceremonials, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the Resident. The articles of agreement thus summarised sufficiently indicate the nature of the previous dispute. The formal letter embodying them was sent to Mr. Rich in his place of retirement by the hand of the second officer of the Pāsha's suite, who brought a guard of 200 Georgians and escorted the Resident back to Baghdād with every honour. On the 27th January 1810 Mr. Rich paid a "public ceremonial visit" to the Pāsha, at which he received a present of a horse with ornamental saddlery and was invested, along with Dr. Hine and others of the Residency staff, with a pelisse of honour. The settlement was regarded by the Resident as thoroughly satisfactory, and it was loyally observed by the Pāsha during the short remainder of his term of office.

Murder of Captain Grant and Lieutenant Fotheringham, 1810.

In the spring of 1810 Captain Grant and Lieutenant Fotheringham, who had been detached by General Malcolm, on his third and last Mission from the Governor-General of India to the Shāh of Persia, to explore the country between Baghdād and Isfahān, were robbed and murdered by Kalb 'Alī Khān, a Faili Lur chief, who was then in rebellion against the Shāh of Persia and had taken refuge in the country of the Bani Lām Arab tribe of Turkis 'Irāq. The Khān having heard that the two travellers had with them a large sum of money in gold,—a report almost certainly untrue,—caused them to be waylaid and attacked on the right bank of a hill stream called the Changūlak.* Captain Grant was killed on the spot; but Lieutenant Fotheringham and some Armenian servants were kept alive for several days, after which they also were put to death lest they should become instrumental in bringing about retribution. On account of the impotence of the Turkish and Persian authorities in the borderland where the crime was committed, it was impossible, evidently, to secure the punishment of the offenders.

Return of General Malcolm's Third Mission to Persia through Turkish 'Irāq, 1810.

General Malcolm, on the conclusion of his Third Mission to Persia, returned from Tabrīz to the Persian Gulf by way of Kirmānshāh, Baghdād and Basrah. On the 20th September 1810 he reached Baghdād, where he and his party were hospitably received and enter-

* See Capt. D. L. R. Lorimer's *Report on Pusht-i-Kuh*, 1909, pages 8-9.

tained by Mr. Rich,* the British Resident, and Mrs. Rich. During the halt of the mission at Baghdād an employé of the Residency was attacked in the neighbourhood by a gang of Arab maranders and robbed of 500 Qurūsh belonging to Government; but General Malcolm, with his suite and escort, went in pursuit of the thieves and captured four or five of them, with their horses, firearms, and a part of the stolen property, after a hard gallop of about ten miles. General Malcolm remained at Baghdād for a few days to afford the protection of his escort to the British Residency during the conflict, then proceeding, which ended in the displacement and death of Sulaimān Pāsha. On the 5th October, while the final act in the struggle was taking place, the Mission camp was made secure with every military precaution; and the same evening it afforded refuge to the Diwān Effendi, an adherent of the defeated Governor. Sulaimān Pāsha had urged Mr. Rich to obtain for him the support of the troops of General Malcolm's escort; but the request was one which it was not, of course, in the power of the Resident to entertain.

On the 25th October General Malcolm and his party reached Basrah. There he was entertained by Mr. Manesty, formerly Resident, but lately suspended from his functions; and on the 29th he embarked on the East India Company's cruiser "Ternate" for Būshehr and India.

Amicable relations with 'Abdullah Pāsha, 1810-13.

The relations of the British with 'Abdullah Pāsha during his brief tenure of power at Baghdād seem to have been particularly cordial. The Pāsha himself, immediately on his appointment to the Pāshāliq, expressed a desire for the establishment of a close mutual friendship, and Mr. Governor Duncan of Bombay replied in fitting terms.

Decrees by 'Abdullah Pāsha for the surrender of British deserters and against the enslavement of British Indian subjects, 1813.

In May or June 1812 Mr. Rich, Resident at Baghdād, was successful in obtaining from the Pāsha two valuable decrees in the form of orders addressed to the Mutasallim of Basrah. The first required the Mutasallim to surrender to the agent at Basrah of the British Resident, Baghdād, all sailors and workmen who might desert from British vessels in the port and place, or attempt to place, themselves under the protection of

* Mr. Claudius James Rich was a member of the Bombay Civil Service, of very scholarly tastes and extraordinary linguistic attainments. His wife was a daughter of Sir Jas. Mackintosh of Bombay. Mr. Rich's marriage and his appointment to Baghdād both took place in 1808, when his age was less than 24 years. He was a pioneer of archæology and an indefatigable traveller. He twice visited and studied the ruins of Babylon. He had travelled much in the Levant before his arrival in India; in 1813-14 he re-visited Constantinople and returned to Baghdād by land; and in 1820 he made a great journey into Kurdistān and Persia and visited the Nineveh site at Mūsal.

the Mutasallim himself or of the Kapitán Pásha. The second referred to kidnapped Indians, subjects of the British Government, whether male or female, who might be brought to Basrah for disposal as slaves by local or Masqat vessels, and ordered that they should be transferred to the Resident's agent. The abuses at which these two edicts were aimed no doubt prevailed at the time to some considerable extent.

Early relations with Dáwud Pásha, 1817-19.

Dáwud Pásha, on being appointed to the Pashálíq of Baghdád, at once informed Mr. Rich, the British Political Agent, of the fact and invited his congratulations; but Mr. Rich, as the success of the Pásha in enforcing his authority appeared problematical, at first abstained from answering his letter. When Dáwud Pásha at length prevailed over his rival, however, the Political Agent wrote him a suitable letter, referring in it to a "private and sincere friendship" which had always subsisted between them; and an exchange of complimentary letters then took place between the Pásha and Sir Evan Nepean, Governor of Bombay. By the middle of 1819 a cloud had come over the former good understanding between Dáwud Pásha and Mr. Rich; and the latter had to complain of an attack, committed amidst the disorders which now began to prevail, upon a mounted messenger of the Political Agency, through which a number of despatches from the East India Company's Agent at Constantinople were lost.

Attitude of the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah with reference to the outrages committed there by Najdis in 1820.

In 1820, when, as we have already seen, various outrages were committed by Arabs of Najd at Basrah at the instigation of some resident Najdi merchants, Captain Taylor, the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, was ordered by the Government of Bombay to observe complete neutrality as between the Turkish authorities and the disturbers of the peace, and not to comply with a demand made by the Mutasallim for the surrender of some property belonging to Najdi merchants which was on board of British ships in the river. Captain Taylor was at the same time cautioned not to afford his official protection to any persons other than those strictly entitled to it as British subjects or as connected with the Factory; but he was directed to use his good offices with either party, should this be necessary in order "to prevent those who had a claim to British protection from suffering injustice"; and he was authorised, in case injury or insult to the Factory should become imminent in consequence of the disturbances, to withdraw from Basrah to Búshehr, or to the island of Qishm on which a British military station had lately been established. These orders, issued by the Government of Bombay, were confirmed by the Government of India.

Disregard by Dāwud Pāsha of European treaty rights and his rupture with Mr. Rich, 1820.

The differences between Dāwud Pāsha and Mr. Rich, the Political Agent at Baghdād, had meanwhile become acute. The attempt to clear even a single bale of British goods from the custom house or an application for the recovery of the smallest debt owing to a British subject now invariably led to a violent quarrel; and matters culminated in an intimation by the Pāsha's ministers, of which the Pāsha himself was believed to approve, "that no European rights were recognised at Baghdad," and that in future the duties on European goods entering the Pāshāliq would be recovered at double the rates hitherto in force. In November 1820 Mr. Rich found himself obliged to direct his Assistant at Basrah, Captain Taylor, in case the goods of Mr. Scooboda,* a European merchant trading at Baghdād under British protection, were seized in the Turkish custom house, to strike the Factory flag; to suspend all communication with the Basrah Government, at the same time; informing them of the reason; and to prohibit commercial and other intercourse between vessels under British colours and the natives of the country. The goods of Mr. Scooboda having been seized, as anticipated, Captain Taylor withdrew with his staff from Basrah to Muhammarah, "a small town in a secure situation," of which this is perhaps the earliest mention. It may be mentioned that Mr. Rich had been absent from Baghdād on a tour in Kurdistān, Persia and the Mūsal districts from 16th April 1820 to 12th March 1821, a circumstance which cannot have conduced to the adjustment of difficulties with the Baghdād Government. Especially as he had just before (in March-April 1820) made a journey to Qasr-i-Shīrīn. In fact Dāwud Pāsha complained, and perhaps believed, that Mr. Rich had intrigued with the Kurds and Persians.

Demonstration against the Baghdād Political Agency by the Pāsha's troops, March 1821.

Not only were the remonstrances which the Resident now made against the action of the Pāsha ineffectual, but they even provoked fresh insults; and double duties began to be levied upon all British goods passing through the Pāshāliq. Finally Mr. Rich announced his intention of withdrawing from Turkish 'Irāq and proceeding to India, while the Pāsha on his part declared that he would not allow him to leave Baghdād. On the 25th March 1821 private information reached the Political Agency that the Pāsha was about to send a body of troops to arrest Mr. Rich; and the building, with the assistance of some† gentlemen who happened to

*Perhaps "Svoboda." There is still a family named Svoboda at Baghdād, but they are now under Austrian protection.

†These were Captain J. Elliot, afterwards of H. M., 21st Dragoons, Mr. Taylor of the Madras Cavalry, and Mr. Heste, Assistant Surgeon of H. M., 17th Infantry, besides whom Mr. Rich had an Assistant, by name Dr. Bell.

be passing through Baghdád at the time and were staying with Mr. Rich, was immediately put in a state of defence. The garrison of the Political Agency including the military guard and a number of local dependents of Turkish nationality who were personally devoted to Mr. Rich and refused to desert him, mustered nearly 100 muskets; and the management of the defence was undertaken by Captain J. Elliot, one of Mr. Rich's temporary guests. On the sides towards the main town the house was protected by the narrowness of the streets leading towards it, but it was open to artillery fire from the opposite side of the river. Among other precautions the Agency yacht was brought close under the walls of the building in order to prevent her being seized by the Turks. The British Political Agent was as popular with the inhabitants of the city as the Pásha was at this time generally disliked; and there was good reason to think that, if a shot should be fired, risings would at once be commenced by sympathisers with the British in various parts of the city, which would seriously embarrass the Turks. It was also said that the Commandant of the Turkish Imperial Artillery at Baghdád refused to act against the British, unless the Pásha could produce an order from Constantinople as a warrant for his proceedings.

The British dispositions for defence had hardly been completed when the Pásha's troops were seen to be in motion: some occupied the river bank below the Agency, probably with a view to cutting off the Agent's retreat by water; others were posted in different quarters of the town to overawe the inhabitants; and a body of regular infantry took up a position in the immediate neighbourhood of the Agency. The bazaars of the city were at once closed, and all business was suspended. The Commandant of the Pásha's infantry, an old friend of Mr. Rich, by whom his life had been saved on a former occasion, then visited the Agency accompanied by another Turkish officer; by the hand of the latter, who offered to become the bearer of any message that Mr. Rich might wish to send to the Pásha, that gentleman despatched a hasty note in Turkish, complaining of the threatening movements of the troops; and, during the absence of the other officer, the Infantry Commandant remained with Mr. Rich and found opportunity to assure him of his determination to prevent, if he possibly could, any action by his own corps against the Agency. Other officials from the Pásha then appeared and endeavoured to extort a promise from the Agent that he would not leave Baghdád until his difference with the local government had been settled; but Mr. Rich declined to say more, while so much as one Turkish soldier remained in the neighbourhood, than that he would not quit Baghdád during the

next night. The troops nearest to the Agency were at length withdrawn; but the little garrison, apprehensive of a surprise, remained under arms all night; and the Pāsha apparently thought it necessary to observe similar precautions at his own palace, and to keep detachment on duty in those quarters of the city where he distrusted the temper of the population.

On the 29th of March the Agent and his staff were still closely confined to the Agency. No objection had been made however, to the departure of his British visitors; and they apparently left Baghdād as soon as it was clear that direct violence was no longer likely to be employed by the Turks.

Withdrawal of the Agent, at Baghdād to Basrah, and thence to Būshehr, May to October 1821.

How much longer or under what conditions the Political Agent was detained at Baghdād does not appear; but the Pāsha, having been led to suppose that Mr. Rich was* required in India to fill the Governorship of Sūrat,—an idea of which it did not appear necessary to disabuse him,—at length consented before the summer heats had fully set in, to let him go. The Pāsha then even handed Mr. Rich a letter, in which he extolled his character and talents, for delivery to the Governor of Bombay; and on the 19th of May the Agent arrived in safety at Basrah with the whole of his establishment, having "left Baghdād with the greatest *éclat* and followed by the regrets and good wishes of almost the whole of the inhabitants," and having brought away with him all those who from their connection with the Agency stood in the least danger of the Pāsha's resentment. Mr. Rich was determined, however, to remain within reach of Baghdād until satisfaction should have been obtained from Dāwud Pāsha.

About a month later Mr. Rich, still accompanied by some native members of the British Agency who had incurred the displeasure of Pāsha by their devotion to British interests, removed from Basrah to Būshehr; but the Assistant Political Agent, Captain Taylor, who must in the meantime have returned from Muhammarah to his usual post, seems to have remained behind at Basrah. On the 5th of October 1821 Mr. Rich was attacked by cholera at Shīrāz whither he had gone in July in search of a cooler climate, Mrs. Rich having first been sent to India, and died after a few hours illness.

Proceedings of the Bombay Government in regard to the detention of the Political

On the first information received from Mr. Rich regarding his critical situation at Baghdād, Mr. Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, wrote in strong terms to the Pāsha, informing him that Mr. Rich had

* He had in fact been offered a post at the Presidency and had accepted it. See his *Narrative of a Residence in Kourdistan*, Volume II, page 158.

Agent at Baghdád, temporary removal of the Agency to Kuwait, and final settlement, May 1821 to September 1823.

now been positively ordered to leave Baghdád and desiring that the restraints imposed on him should at once be removed. The letter also stated that negotiations for the re-establishment of amicable relations could not be entered on until Mr. Rich should have reported his arrival at a place beyond the bounds of the Páshálíq. On the same date, the 12th May, 1821, Mr. Elphinstone addressed the British Ambassador at Constantinople, suggesting that immediate steps should be taken to procure the release of Mr. Rich, as well as public reparation for the insult which had been offered through him to the national honour. The question, in so far as it related to the freedom of the Resident, had already been settled on the spot by the time that these communications were despatched; but it remained to obtain satisfaction for the indignity inflicted and a guarantee for the discontinuance by the Páshá of his late outrageous conduct in several respects. The Government of Bombay, with the sanction of the Government of India, accordingly called on Dáwud Pasha to apologise to Mr. Rich both verbally through an officer and in writing, and to themselves in writing only; to reduce the duties on British trade to the rates sanctioned by treaty; to refund all sums which had been realised as duty in excess of the proper amounts; to make good the value of some merchandise, injured or destroyed during the dispute, which belonged to Messrs. Scooboda and Sturmy, two merchants trading at Baghdád under British protection; to engage to treat the representative of the British Government with becoming respect in future; and to protect and countenance all British travellers in the Páshálíq, extorting from them no illegal payments and redressing all their just complaints. It was added that, in event of the Páshá's reply being unfavourable, the Government of Bombay would be compelled to prohibit commercial intercourse between British ports and those of Turkish 'Iráq and to enforce the prohibition by naval measures. Mr. Rich was instructed to remove the Basrah Factory, pending compliance by the Páshá's Government with these demands, to some convenient place in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Rich was dead before the orders, dated 2nd October 1821, reached their destination; but his substitute, Captain Taylor, carried them into effect by withdrawing, on the 15th December 1821, to the "island" of Kuwait, which term should possibly be understood to mean the island of Failakah. At Constantinople the case had been strongly taken up by the British Ambassador, Lord Strangford, who wrote in April 1821: "I have not had an opportunity of fully inquir-"ing into the grounds of the Pasha's representations; but from the "information which I have already collected, it is quite evident to me,

"that Mr. Rich's sole offence consists in the *manly* and *justifiable* "opposition which he has continually made to the exactions and imposi- "tions which the Pāsha has exercised towards British commerce at "Baghdād."

The Pāsha, on receiving the letter of the Governor of Bombay, at once agreed to all the demands contained in it with the exception of that relating to an apology; and Captain Taylor, considering it advisable to waive this last difficult condition, left Kuwait with his staff for Basrah on the 19th April 1822. On the 1st May he made a public entry into the town of Basrah, having been received with every honour and mark of attention by the Mutasallim, and was presented by that official, under orders from the Pāsha of Baghdād, with a horse richly caparisoned. His action was subsequently approved by the Government of India.

The settlement of the case was protracted however until 1823, in which year, on the 29th of March, a formal acceptance of the terms laid down by the Government of Bombay was at length transmitted by the Pāsha; but a more detailed agreement was now considered necessary by the British authorities in India; and at some time between April and August 1823 it was duly obtained by Captain Taylor in a written form. The twelve conditions to which the Pāsha therein gave his "full and unreserved assent" were as follow:—

1st.—A compliance with all stipulations contained in the Imperial Treaties and Royal Firmans, ancient or recent.

2nd.—The restitution of whatever was taken from Mr. Stormy above the proper rate of customs, and of such property of Mr. Sconboda as was damaged or lost.

3rd.—Whatever may be deemed to constitute the complete safety in every respect of the life, property and honor of all Agents or Vakeels of the Government and of their protected dependents and subjects, together with an attentive regard for their views and wishes, a due estimation and honoring of them, and an admission of their rights to grant asylum and all other claims according to their ancient rights and customs, and that they may entertain as many servants as they are necessity for.

4th.—Should hereafter an Agent, not an Englishman, be established at Baghdād, he shall unquestionably meet with every proper honor and consideration, as it is due to his station.

5th.—Bills of exchange shall not be taken from their shroffs by force, nor money from their dependents or *protégés* by compulsion, nor shall temporary or arbitrary taxes of any kind ever be levied on their landed or other property contrary to their due right and custom.

6th.—No tax, except one previously well defined and arranged, shall be levied on boats, the property of British subjects and *protégés*, such for instance as pass between Bussorah and Baghdād; nor shall their boats be seized for the public service, nor shall the property of merchants, being British subjects or *protégés*, arriving at Baghdād,

otherwise than is usual on the arrival of the same at Bussorah, enter the Custom House contrary to stipulation and covenant.

7th.—Should British subjects and *protégés* lose any property in the town, or in public roads, and by theft or plunder, every exertion shall promptly be made to recover the same.

8th.—Should any dependent of Government suffer from any of our subjects offence or injury, the injured individual shall receive immediate satisfaction and reparation.

9th.—In commercial dealings, goods having been bought shall not be returned, except on legal and just plea, and commercial disputes shall be adjusted by an assembly of merchants according to mercantile usage.

10th.—Should British or Indian seamen desert, they shall not be forced to become converts to Islam, and in case of their willing conversion they shall be subsequently delivered up to their duty in order to prevent any detriment to the interest of the ship.

11th.—A spot shall be assigned on lease to the Resident for a house and godas, wherever he may point out.

12th.—The proven claims of British *protégés* to be enforced on whomsoever of our subjects it may be, without the smallest loss or injury to the claimants.

Customs recovered in excess from Mr. Sturmy were at the same time refunded; and compensation was made, in kind or otherwise, for goods lost by Mr. Scoboda. By this settlement, officially reported by Captain Taylor on the 5th September 1823, perfect amity was at last restored.

Refusal of various requests made by Dāwud Pāsha, 1824-28.

Dāwud Pāsha took advantage of the good understanding thus re-established to press various requests for assistance upon the British authorities in India. So early as February 1824 he applied for the services of a British medical officer and asked to be furnished with arms and accoutrements sufficient to equip a body of 1,000 infantry; but the Government of Bombay feared that the embarrassments inseparable from the residence of a British physician at the Pāsha's court would more than counterbalance any political advantages to be derived from it, and they did not see their way to meet his wishes either in that respect or in the matter of military supplies. Again, towards the end of 1827, in congratulating Sir J. Malcolm upon his appointment to the Governorship of Bombay, the Pāsha made a large request for assistance in military personnel and *matériel*, basing his application upon orders that he had lately received from Constantinople to organise an army of regular troops. He asked for a subaltern, two non-commissioned officers and a conductor of stores of the European Horse Artillery, of whom the last should be competent to superintend the manufacture of gunpowder; for a subaltern and two non-commissioned officers of European Infantry; for a gunsmith able to direct the making and stocking of muskets; for a planter and manufacturer of indigo; for three vessels of three masts, the largest to

be of 600 tons and carry 48 guns in two tiers; and for 3,000 muskets and sets of infantry equipment and 400 barrels of gunpowder. At the same time he declared his readiness to defray the whole of the expense involved and to pay liberal allowances to the British officers and non-commissioned officers while employed in the Turkish service. The Pāsha's application, which may have been prompted by the well known connection of Sir J. Malcolm with a former loan of British officers to the Persian army, as well as by the proximity of Russian forces to the northern frontier of the Pashāliq, was strongly supported by the Government of Bombay, Mr. F. Warden, a Member of Council, alone dissenting on the ground of the disputatious and unprofitable course in the past of the British relations with Turkish 'Irāq. In May 1828, however, the Government of India decided that a courteous negative should be returned to the Pāsha's request, one reason for this decision being a mistaken impression on their part that war between Britain and Turkey was not improbable in the near future, while another was a notion that the Pāsha might employ his new resources to rebel against his master the Sultān; but they authorised the purchase by an agent whom the Pāsha had deputed to Bombay of whatever military stores the Baghdād Government might require.

The action of the Government of India in this case was much regretted by the Court of Directors, who considered that a chance had been lost of establishing a valuable intelligence agency at an important point; and they directed that, if such an opportunity were to recur, it should be immediately embraced. By way of enforcing their views they remarked: "There is nothing comparatively so cheap as information. It gives to "the Government which possesses it over that which has it not the advan- "tage of a knowledge of futurity. We wish you to bear this constantly "in mind, not merely as regards the Pachalic of Baghdād, but as (regards) "all the countries to the west of Sutlege." The Pāsha's idea of creating a naval force was, however, to be discouraged, as contributing neither to the internal pacification of Turkish 'Irāq nor to its defence against invasion by land. The ambitions of Russia had already at this time become an important consideration in connection with British policy in Asia; and the Court of Directors of the East India Company seem to have been concerned lest Europeans of other than British nationality should acquire a footing in the Pāshāliq as military instructors.

Attitude of the British authorities in the dispute between the

In 1825, when, as we have already seen, an expedition against Basrah was contemplated by the Sultān of 'Omān, the British Resident at Būshehr communicated with the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq

Sultán of 'Omán and the Páshá of Baghdád, 1825.

suggesting British mediation. The Government of Bombay, however, instructed these officers to limit their intervention to the use of influence with the parties separately, and, as the Pásha declined to listen to Captain Taylor's advice, the Sultán was informed that he was at liberty to take any action he pleased. The sequel has already been described above.

Detention of a British official on a voyage down the Tigris, 1830.

In 1830 Dr. Baikie, an Assistant Surgeon of the Madras establishment, was detained, on a voyage down the Tigris in a Political Agency boat flying the British flag, by an Arab Shaikh, who irregularly obliged him to pay a heavy duty on his baggage. He subsequently memorialised the Bombay Government, and his claim was referred to the Political Agent in Turkish 'Iráq, but the result is not stated.

Admonition addressed by Hájí 'Alí Rizá Páshá to the Turkish officials at Basrah with reference to the respect to be shown for British rights, 1831.

Shortly after his appointment to the Páshálíq of Baghdád, Hájí 'Alí Rizá Pásha addressed a formal order to the Qádhi, Mufti, Mutasallim and A'yán of Basrah by which they were enjoined to show the utmost respect for the rights and privileges of the British representative at Basrah, "his agent, interpreters, *protégés* and dependents, and the "subjects of the Government arriving from Hindoostan, and their ships "and merchants, and all others soever." This document, which was dated 2nd October 1831, was publicly read in the Mutasallim's Council at Basrah and was officially registered in the offices of the Qádhi and the Daftardár.

Disapproval by the Government of India of a proposal by the Political Agent in Turkish 'Iráq, involving prolonged absences on his part from Baghdád, 1833.

In July 1833 Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Iráq, proposed that he should be authorised, in view of the predominance of Russian influence and the prevalence of Russian intrigue in Turkey, to travel as much as he thought fit in the northern districts of the Páshálíq, and even to reside occasionally at a point nearer than Baghdád to the supposed scene of Muscovite activity. The Government of India, however, concurring with the Government of Bombay, held that Baghdád itself was, as the seat of the Local Government, the very point at which vigilance against Russian designs was most required, and that the continuous presence of the Political Agent there was also necessary on account of the generally unsettled state of the Páshálíq; and they therefore directed him, in December 1833, to remain at Baghdád unless he should receive orders of a different tenor from His Majesty's Government.

Report by Mr. J. B. Fraser on the state of the Páshálíq, 1834.

The attention of the British Government seems to have been now directed in a particular manner to the field of Turkish 'Iráq; and in November 1834 the traveller Mr. J. B. Fraser, already mentioned, who had been commissioned to visit that country and Persia, reported in great detail upon the administrative condition of the Baghdád Páshálíq. A copy of his report was forwarded by the Political Agent, Colonel Taylor.

to the Government of Bombay; but no copy of it was transmitted by them, perhaps through an oversight, to the Government of India. Mr. Fraser's object was to indicate in what manner and to what extent, the resources of the province might be developed under better methods of government; and it should be remembered, in considering his recommendations, that the British Government at this time contemplated, as will presently be shown, the establishment of a steamer service on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq. In concluding his report Mr. Fraser remarked:—

> It were superfluous to expatiate on the field which such a change of system would open to industry and skill and capital in Mesopotamia, a region assuredly the most favourable in all respects, in climate, in soil, and in comparative proximity to all the seats of civilization and improvement in the old world, for the employment of these to advantage. Even the rapid advance of Egypt in apparent prosperity affords no fair scale to calculate the extent of improvement that might be expected here, for Mohmed Allee Pacha, though to a certain extent liberal and enlightened in his views, looks ultimately to self. * * * If, therefore, the permanent improvement and tranquillity of this province be an object of importance to Great Britain, let what will be the form of government established, let the nature and extent of its future connection with the Court of Constantinople be what it may, she must and will find herself forced to maintain in the Government a permanent influence; in fact, she must herself have the managing and directing of all measures of policy and improvement, let whoever or whatsoever be the organ for carrying them into effect.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with European countries other than Britain, 1807—39.

During this period Turkish 'Irāq was practically unaffected by the influence of any European power except Great Britain.

Precedence claimed by the French Consul at Baghdād, 1819.

In January 1819 Mr. Vigouroux, a French Consul at Baghdād, who had never before visited the Pāsha, requested an audience, at the same time claiming precedence over the British Resident on the ground that under treaty the French representative was entitled to be ranked before the British in all parts of the Ottoman Empire. These pretensions were of course rejected by the Pāsha of Baghdād, at the time Dāwud Pāsha, who remarked that, "Mr. Rich being a Resident "Minister and Monsieur Vigouroux only a Consul, there could not, under "any circumstances, be a competition between them."

Attitude of Russia after 1833.

In consequence of the *rapprochement* between Russia and Turkey brought about by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, Russian movements in the Baghdād Pashāliq began from that date to be apprehended by the British; but, intrigues, if they existed, never took a tangible shape. Some suspicion of the motives of the British Government in establishing steam navigation upon the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq appears, however, to have been instilled into the mind of the Porte by Russian diplomacy.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1807–39.

Amalgamation of the Baghdād and Basrah Residencies, 1809-10.

After the fear of French intrigue in the Middle East had died down, and before Russia's successful wars with Persia and Turkey in 1826-29 had enhanced Russian prestige in that region, the importance to Britain of her political position in Turkish 'Irāq was for a time sensibly diminished. Probably for this reason, at the recommendation of the Government of India, the Court of Directors of the East India Company decided in 1809 to abolish one of their Residencies in Turkish 'Irāq and to entrust the superintendence of their interests in the whole province, as before 1798, to a single Resident at Basrah, who might when necessary depute a European Assistant, to be allowed him, to visit the Pāsha at Baghdād. These steps were accordingly taken in 1810, when the Residency at Baghdād was amalgamated with that at Basrah; but no steps were as yet taken to carry out the further change, which was also contemplated, of making the Company's representative at Basrah subordinate to the Resident at Būshehr. The amalgamation took place under *Mr. Rich, whom the Government of Bombay had appointed Resident at Baghdād in 1808.

Disciplinary measure in the case of Mr. Manesty, Resident at Basrah, 1810.

On the occasion of this reform, the Court of Directors reviewed the conduct of Mr. Manesty, the actual Resident at Basrah, during his whole service there; and, in view of the frequent indiscretions and acts of insubordination of which he had been guilty, they decided that he should be removed from his post, the amalgamation of the Residencies consequently taking place under *Mr. Rich, the Resident at Baghdād.

* Mr. Rich arrived at Baghdād on the 4th May 1808, relieving Dr. Hine whom Mr. Jones had left in charge of the Residency in 1806. Mr. Rich's European Assistants after 1810 were Dr. Colquhoun between 1810 and 1818 and Captain Taylor between 1818 and 1821. Both remained at Basrah.

At the same time they prohibited the employment of Mr. Manesty on any foreign or diplomatic mission whatever, without further orders from themselves. It will be remembered that Mr. Manesty had twice, in 1791-95 and again in 1803, come into serious collision with the Pāsha, Governor of Baghdād, that in 1804 he had unwarrantably assumed the character of an Envoy to the Court of Persia, and that in 1805 he had drawn large bills upon the Government of Bombay in the absence both of authority and of funds, and had left his station to visit Bombay without the permission of Government. In these circumstances the action of the Court can hardly be regarded as too severe, nor can we do otherwise than share their surprise at the leniency with which the Bombay Government had treated * him. Mr. Manesty made over charge of the Basrah office to Dr. Colquhoun, the Residency Surgeon, on the 12th June 1810; but at the same time he announced his intention of remaining at Basrah on account of his private affairs until the 1st September, when he would proceed to England *viâ* Constantinople without resigning the service. He was informed in reply that he must conform with the regulations which required him to resign the service in the East before proceeding home, but that the Government of Bombay would recommend him for re-employment, should he so desire. Mr. Manesty, on receiving this intimation, formally and finally resigned the service, having "determined to accept the offer of an annuity which had "been made to him by the Committee of Management of the Bombay "Civil Fund," but permission for proceeding beyond Constantinople was withheld until he should have furnished Government with certain papers connected with his accounts, which had already been called for, and had satisfied all public demands against him. The conclusion of his case is not recorded.

Conversion of the Residency at Basrah into a Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq, 1812.

On the 23rd September 1812, in accordance with a recommendation made by the Government of India, the Court of Directors of the East India Company ordered a change by which the nominal organisation in Turkish 'Irāq was brought into harmony with the actual. In fact the "Resident at Basrah" was made "Political Agent in Turkish Arabia," and was expressly empowered to reside at Basrah or Baghdād as circumstances might require, and to depute his Assistant from either place for duty at the other. As Mr. Rich, however, the holder of the appointment until 1821, continued to reside at Baghdād, he did not cease to be

* Mr. Manesty had, no doubt, some redeeming qualities. He was patriotic and hospitable, and he lived at Basrah in the style of an English country gentleman. His wife was an Armenian lady, and they had a promising family.

generally known as the "Resident at Baghdād," and was styled so even in official correspondence.

Introduction of a system of passports for British subjects visiting Turkish 'Irāq, 1821.

In accordance with a suggestion made by Mr. Rich, the British Resident, the Government of India in 1821 prohibited British subjects from India from visiting the interior of the Baghdād Pāshāliq unless provided with a passport from the Political Secretary of one of the Indian Presidencies. The object of this restriction was to prevent an influx into the country of needy adventurers and others who might give trouble to the authorities and bring discredit on the British name. Notifications were issued by the Governments of Bengal, Bombay and Madras, that of the Bombay Government being dated 24th April 1821, promulgating the new order. The only penalty annexed to disregard of the regulation was liability to be prevented from proceeding up-country after arrival in Turkish 'Irāq.

Nominal or temporary abolition of the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq and inclusion of that province in the jurisdiction of the Political Agent in the Gulf of Persia, 1822.

At the time of the abolition of the Baghdād Residency in 1810 it had been intended, as we have seen, to bring the Company's affairs in Turkish 'Irāq under the management of their chief representative in the Persian Gulf; and in 1821 the change would probably have been carried into effect, had it not been for the serious disagreement which occurred in that year between Mr. Rich and Dāwud Pāsha. At length, on the 9th May 1822, on the restoration of amicable relations with the Pāsha some time after Mr. Rich's death, Captain W. Bruce of the East India Company's marine service, then Resident at Būshehr, was appointed "Political Agent in the Gulf of Persia," with jurisdiction extending to Turkish 'Irāq and headquarters at either Basrah or Qishm; and Captain Taylor, the British representative at Basrah, became his Assistant. It is doubtful, however, whether the new arrangement ever actually came into force, for its execution was to be delayed until Captain Bruce, under recent orders applying to all political officers, had wound up his transactions as a private merchant; and this he can hardly have done before the 1st November 1822, when, as explained in the history of the Persian Coast, he was removed from office.

Reinstitution of the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq and reduction of Basrah to a Native Agency, 1822.

In appointing Captain Bruce's successor at Būshehr the Governor of Bombay thought it advisable, inasmuch as the British detachment on Qishm Island was about to be withdrawn and the attention of the Resident at Būshehr would in all likelihood be fully occupied by the affairs of the maritime and piratical tribes of the Arabian Coast, to reinstitute the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq and make it independent of the Residency in the Persian Gulf. The first holder of the revived appointment was Captain R. Taylor of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry,

formerly Assistant to the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, whose name has more than once appeared in our narrative. Basrah proper was reduced to a Native Agency, but the Political Agent continued for some years to reside there.

Partial subordination of the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq to the Residency at Būshehr, 1824.

In 1824 another administrative change was made, whereby the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq became subordinate, but only partially so, to the authority of the British Resident at Būshehr. He was ordered, in all matters relating to the maritime Arabs or to the Persian Coast, to deal with the Resident at Būshehr and to comply with such instructions as he might receive from that officer; and he was also to supply the Resident with copies of his despatches; but in matters affecting the Baghdād Pāshāliq alone his responsibility and powers remained unaltered. Without the sanction of the Resident at Būshehr, however, no measures in regard to Turkish 'Irāq which might re-act upon other parts of the Persian Gulf were to be taken by the Political Agent; and the suspension of British trade with the Pāshāliq was specially cited as an example in point.

Changes of headquarters of the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, 1828-32.

During some years the headquarters of the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq continued to vary with circumstances, being sometimes at Baghdād, the administrative and political capital, and sometimes at the commercial port of Basrah. In 1828 the orders of 1812, issued at the time of the first institution of the Political Agency, were repeated by the Government of Bombay under instructions from the Court of Directors, authorising the Political Agent to reside at Baghdād or at Basrah as he found convenient; and it was suggested by the Court that, in case of the absence of the Political Agent at Baghdād, his duties at Basrah might be performed by a European Assistant. There appear, however, to have been objections on the part of the Indian authorities to the Agents' leaving Basrah; for in 1830, when he visited Baghdād at the express request of the Pāsha, he had first to obtain permission for his journey from the Government of Bombay. In the same year the Pāsha asked that Major Taylor, the Political Agent, might be permanently stationed at Baghdād instead of Basrah, but the Governor of Bombay replied that, in the interests of trade, he could not assent to His Highness's proposal. At the same time, however, an assurance was given to the Pāsha that Major Taylor would be allowed frequent opportunities of visiting the capital. On the 12th May 1831, plague having broken out at Baghdād, the Political Agent, who had then been at Baghdād for about a year and had witnessed at that place the displacement of Dāwud Pāsha by Hāji 'Ali Riza Pāsha, left again for Basrah; his brother-in-law,

who accompanied him died of the disease by the way. In January 1832 plague appeared at Basrah, and Major Taylor, at the request of the new Pasha, then returned to Baghdād. Soon afterwards the Court of Directors of the East India Company expressed a wish that the Political Agent, for the sake of obtaining accurate information and the better to establish his interest with Haji 'Alī Riza Pāsha, should "fix his residence chiefly at Baghdād," while his routine duties at Basrah should be discharged by a European Assistant, or, if there were none, by a Native Agent. In consequence of these orders the Political Agent thereafter resided mostly at Baghdād; and a suggestion that he made in 1833, under which, if accepted, he might have absented himself from the Pāsha's Court for considerable periods to watch the proceedings of the Russians on the northern frontier of the Pāshalīq, was, as we have already seen, negatived by the Government of Bombay.

Reserve enjoined on the Political Agent in his relations with the Pāsha of Baghdād, 1831-32.

The Court of Directors of the East India Company laid down, in 1831 and 1832, some principles for the guidance of the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq. It is not clear whether their action in this respect was occasioned by an observed tendency on the part of the Agent to overact his part, or whether it was suggested by some general review of the relations subsisting between the British and the Ottoman power. The Political Agent was expressly cautioned against regarding the Pāsha as an independent sovereign or himself as a plenipotentiary at a foreign court, and he was exhorted to bear in mind the dependence of the Pāsha upon the Porte and his own subordination to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. With the latter he was to correspond freely in all matters which might influence the general relations of Britain with Turkey; he was to supply the Government of Bombay with copies of his correspondence with the Ambassador; and he was to await the instructions of that Government in all matters in which they had not themselves invested him with discretion. In the absence of special directions he was to confine his attention to business that might properly be undertaken by a Consul, in particular the protection of British subjects and interests and the collection of political information, and he was to avoid entangling himself in the affairs, external or internal, of the Pāshalīq. In Persian business he was to be guided by the advice of the British Envoy at Tehrān.

Proposed absorption of the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq into that in

Meanwhile the abolition of the separate Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq, contemplated in 1810 and actually ordered in 1822, had been kept in view as a desirable object by the British authorities in India. In 1827 Mr. Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, considered that the

Agency might with advantage be suppressed, and his Council concurred in the opinion; but he left the decision to his successor, Sir J. Malcolm, who in 1828, while agreeing as to the advisability of a diminution of the political expenditure in the Gulf region, thought the time inopportune, in view of the critical relations of Russia with both Turkey and Persia, for any reduction of establishment in Turkish 'Irāq. In a report dated 26th April 1830 a Committee appointed in India to enquire into the state of the Government finances, recommended the retention of one Agency only, located at Būshehr, and the Government of India apparently adopted the suggestion; but the Court of Directors, before whom this and other questions of reorganisation came in 1834, decided* that no change should be made for the present in Turkish 'Irāq. This decision was due partly to the internal condition of the Pāshāliq, and partly to "the peculiar complication of circumstances in which the relations of "the various Powers connected with that part of the world are at this "moment involved."

The Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq replaced under the direct authority of the Government of India, 1835.

In 1835 the orders of 1806, making the British political representative in Turkish 'Irāq entirely subordinate to the Government of Bombay, were cancelled; and it was ordered that he, as well as the Resident at Būshehr, should in future correspond with the Government of India and be under their direct orders.† The despatches of the Political Agent were to be sent, however, under flying seal through the Government of Bombay, by whom copies would be retained.

The Political Assistantship at Basrah, 1807—39.

During the earlier part of this period, from 1810 to 1822, a European Assistant Political Agent existed at Basrah; but occasionally, during his absence, his place was filled by the native broker of the Factory, for whom an allowance of Rs. 200 a month was sanctioned in 1819. Soon after the death of Mr. Rich in 1821 the European Assistantship was abolished; and the broker received, in addition to his allowance, the title of "Native Agent" as an indication of his political status. The first Native Agent was Khōjah Johannes, who died in 1821; he was succeeded by his son Khōjah Parseigh Johannes, who held the office for 30 years. In 1832, when the Political Agent finally removed from

* They were influenced, probably, by a minute of the Governor of Bombay (Lord Clare) who observed that undoubtedly, if merely the protection of British commerce was required in Turkish Arabia, a Native Agent at Basrah would answer as well as a European Political Agent; but that he was of opinion that interests purely Indian were more deeply concerned, and that looking to the connection between European and Indian politics it appeared very doubtful to him whether it would be advisable, at all events for the present, to abolish the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia.

† See also pages 220 and 265.

Basrah to Baghdâd, the station at the former place was left in full charge of the Native Agent there.

*Introduction of steam navigation on the Euphrates and Tigris by a British expedition under Colonel F. R. Chesney, 1834-37.

The question of accelerating communication with India had now for several years been under consideration at home, and between 1826 and 1832 valuable surveys of part of the Syrian coast and of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris were made by Lieutenant Ormsby of the Indian Navy, assisted during part of the time by Mr. W. Elliot. Especial attention was directed to the Lower Tigris, which Major Taylor, the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irâq, considered to be important.

Captain F. R. Chesney, R.A., had also commenced a study of the problem of overland communication in 1829, during a visit to Egypt, when some enquiries as to the relative advantages of the Egyptian and Syrian routes between Europe and India were addressed to him by the Examiner of the India House. In 1831-32 Captain Chesney travelled extensively in the region between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf, making his outward journey down the Euphrates and by sea to Bûshehr, and returning to Europe by the Kârûn river and a route through Persia and Asia Minor. In 1833 Captain Chesney, who had now worked out a scheme for establishing communication with India by way of Turkish 'Irâq, had the honour of an interview with His Majesty King William IV; and the King, who was much interested in his project, encouraged him to persevere and suggested the creation of a steam flotilla to form part of the Indian Navy and be stationed in Mesopotamian waters for the purpose of strengthening Turkey and Persia against the advance of Russia. Important evidence was given by Captain Chesney in 1834 before a "Steam Committee" of the House of Commons; and that body, in their report, recommended the grant of £20,000 for an experiment in communication by the Euphrates route. The sum in question having been duly allotted, and £5,000 having been added to it by the East India Company, an expedition was organised by Captain Chesney, who, under a royal commission dated 25th

*The principal authorities on the Euphrates and Tigris expedition are General F. R. Chesney's *Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris*, 1850; his *Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition*, 1868; Mr. W. F. Ainsworth's *Personal Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition*; and the *Travels of Dorior and Madame Iselfor*, 1878. Condensed accounts of the expedition are given in Lieutenant C. R. Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, Volume II, pages 31—43, and Mr. H. V. Hilprecht's *Explorations in Bible Lands during the 19th Century*, 1903. The earlier proceedings of Lieutenant Ormsby are noticed in Lieutenant J. R. Wellsted's *Travels to the City of the Caliphs*, 1840.

November 1834 was appointed, with the rank of Colonel, to the direction and command of the same.

Navigation Farmān of 1834.

On the 29th of December following, a Farmān, authorising two British steamers "to navigate the Euphrates by turns" "for the purpose of facilitating commerce," as long as their doing so should be advantageous to both Turkey and Britain, was issued by the Turkish Government. Colonel Chesney was required by the terms of his commission to cultivate good relations with all the representatives and subjects of the Porte with whom he might be brought in contact; and the local Turkish authorities, on their part, were instructed to afford every kind of assistance in their power to the members of the British expedition. It was expected that 'Alī Riza Pāsha, the ruler of Baghdād, would co-operate willingly with the enterprise, for he had himself in 1833 recommended to the Porte the introduction of steam navigation on the Euphrates. He did in fact issue stringent orders in February 1835 to his subordinates on the Euphrates, directing them to protect, defend, assist, and serve the members of the expedition.

Preliminary operations, 1835-36.

Colonel Chesney left England in February 1835, accompanied by the greater part of his staff except Lieutenant H. B. Lynch of the Indian Navy, his principal assistant, who had preceded the expedition in order to make necessary local arrangements. Syria was at this time in the possession of Muhammad 'Alī Pasha of Egypt, and his son Ibrāhīm Pasha was at first inclined to deny the expedition access to the interior; but, this difficulty and others of a physical nature having been overcome, the "Euphrates" and "Tigris," two river steamers specially constructed at Liverpool, were conveyed* in pieces across the desert to "Port William," a point on the bank of the Upper Euphrates about 2¼ miles below Birejīk.

On the 26th September 1835 the "Euphrates," of 50 horse-power, was launched sidelong into the river from which she took her name, the height of the banks at the slip being no less than 25 feet; and in the course of the following spring the "Tigris," of 20, horse power, was successfully finished and floated. In April 1836 the two steamers commenced their passage down stream in company, the officers of the party being

*The transporting of the larger parts of the steamers from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates was a work of great labour. The boiler of the "Tigris" was hauled, on its journey, by 104 oxen under the charge of 52 native drivers.

distributed between the two vessels as below :—

"Euphrates."	"Tigris."
Captain Eastcourt, 43rd Regiment of Light Infantry, in command.	Lieutenant H. B. Lynch, I. N., in command.
Lieutenant R. F. Chesreland, R.N.	Mr. H. Eden, R.N.
Lieutenant H. F. Murphy, R.E.	Lieutenant R. Cockburn, R.A.
Mr. E. P. Charlewood, R.N.	Dr. Staunton, R.A.
Mr. J. Fitzjames, R.N.	Dr. A. Staunton.
Mr. W. Ainsworth.	Messrs. W. Ellior and J. Safer, interpreters.
Mr. T. Hurst, Engineer.	Mr. A. Clegg, Engineer.
Dr. and Mrs. Helfer, two Austrian travellers, passengers.	Lieutenant R. B. Lynch, 21st Bengal Native Infantry, brother of Lieutenant H. B. Lynch, passenger.

The European seamen and soldier artificers, as also the native employés, were equally divided between the two vessels.

Shortly after starting Colonel Chesney received orders from Sir J. Hobhouse, President of the Board of Control, recalling the expedition; but these he resolved to disregard.

Loss of the "Tigris," May 1836.

All went well until the 21st May 1836, by which time over 500 miles of river had been successfully surveyed. On the afternoon of that fatal day, at a place not far from 'Ánah, the "Tigris" was swamped by a violent squall from the west-south-west and went down amidst darkness, caused by flying sand, almost as deep as that of night. Lieutenants Cockburn and R. B. Lynch, 13 other Europeans, and 5 natives perished in the catastrophe; and Colonel Chesney, who was on board, and the rest of the officers and crew only escaped by throwing themselves overboard. The "Euphrates", which succeeded in making fast to the bank and in keeping her berth there during the storm by means of two hawsers relieved by her engines working at full speed, suffered no injury. The whole of the cash carried by the expedition and a large part of the instruments and stores were lost with the "Tigris" and the position of the wreck could not immediately be located. From time to time afterwards efforts were made to raise the sunken vessel, but ten years later it still remained *in situ*.

Proceedings of the expedition, 1836.

After the loss of the "Tigris" the surviving officers and men belonging to her were sent home to England, while the remainder of the expedition continued the survey of the Euphrates in the other vessel, and finished it to Qúrnah on the 18th June 1836. On the following day Basrah was reached; and thence the "Euphrates" proceeded under her own steam to Búshehr to refit. There the places of her European

complement, who were now entitled to and claimed their discharge, were filled by volunteers from vessels of the East India Company. On the 25th July the "Euphrates" left Būshehr in tow of the "Elphinstone" for the Shatt-al-'Arab; and she steamed up that river to Kūt-al Farangi, at this time the site of the Basrah Political Agency, where Lieutenant Murphy, a member of the expedition, had recently died after a severe illness. With Colonel Chesney on board she then ascended the Tigris to Baghdād, arriving there on the 30th August 1836, and left again for Muhammareh on the 5th September. From Muhammareh she proceeded up the Shatt-al-'Arab and Euphrates as far as Lāmlūm, carrying an Indian overland mail for Europe. After this, a serious break-down having occurred in her machinery, she returned with the current to Muhammareh where the necessary repairs were executed with the help of the Indian Government vessel "Hugh Lindsay."

Close of the expedition, 1837.

Notice was now received by Colonel Chesney that funds for continuing the expedition would cease to be available at the end of January 1837, and he accordingly made over the command to Major Estcourt and proceeded to Bombay, arriving there on the 1st December. During his absence in India Major Estcourt carried the "Euphrates" up the Kārūn River as far as Ahwāz, where further progress was barred by the rapids, and then revisited Baghdād and ascended the Tigris to a point 20 miles above it, but an accident to the vessel's rudder compelled him to return. It had now been arranged that the "Euphrates" should be transferred by His Majesty's Government to the East India Company, on payment by the latter of her value as assessed by a committee after a survey, and she was accordingly placed in charge of a British merchant at Baghdād. Most of her officers and men, the expedition under the orders of the British Government being now at an end, were dispersed and returned to their duties at home or in India. Colonel Chesney himself left Bombay, charged with important despatches for the Board of Control on the 25th April 1837; and on the 8th August he reached London, having travelled home from Basrah by way of Zubair and the desert. In March 1838 the "Euphrates," under Commander Hawkins, ascended the river of the same name as far as Hīt, but had great difficulty in passing the marshes in its lower course.

Continuation of the river survey in Turkish 'Irāq by Commander H.B. Lynch, 1837-39.

Although the experiment in overland communication by the Euphrates route was now discontinued, the idea of ultimately transmitting the Indo-European mails by way of Mesopotamia was still entertained. Lieutenant H. B. Lynch, whom the Secret Committee of the East India Company's Court in April 1837 appointed to the com-

mand of the "Euphrates" and of such other vessels as might subsequently be placed on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq, was directed to "enter "into friendly communications with the tribes frequenting the rivers "of Mesopotamia and endeavour to establish with them such relations as "may be serviceable to the interests of Great Britain, and may add to the "facilities for a speedy and regular transmission of mails between the "Persian Gulf and the coast of Syria," and he was also to complete the surveys of the "Euphrates" and the "Tigris," making in addition such astronomical, geographical and statistical observations as the more direct objects of his employment should permit. His political functions he was to fulfil in concert with, and under the guidance of, Colonel Taylor, the Resident. The above were his principal duties, but he was instructed besides to wind up the affairs of the late expedition in regard to depôts of stores and the wreck of the "Tigris," scrupulously observing any arrangements in respect of these which might have been already formed with the Arab tribes or the local authorities. In the two years following his appointment Lieutenant Lynch ascended the "Tigris" with his vessel to Kūt 'Abdullah above Baghdād, and also took her through the Saqlāwiyah canal, then joining the "Tigris" and the "Euphrates" near Baghdād. He further completed a map of the course of the "Tigris" from Mūsal down to Ctesiphon (Tāq Kisra) below Baghdād, and connected Niniveh, Baghdād, Babylon and Ctesiphon by triangulation.

The British Desert Mail and Dromedary Post. 1807—39.

The old British Desert Mail between Aleppo and Basrah, which had been found so valuable for official communication between Europe and India during the Napoleonic period, was abolished in 1833.

In 1836, however, in connection with the Chesney Expedition, a new Dromedary Post between Bairūt on the Syrian coast, and Hit on the Euphrates, passing *viâ* Damascus, was organised under the superintendence of the British Consul-General in Syria. This line was continued to Basrah in the form of a Horse Post by the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq under the orders from Government of Bombay; and in 1837 it was directed, though the Red Sea "Overland" route to Europe had just been officially adopted, that duplicates of all important despatches passing between England and India or *vice versâ* should be sent by the Bairūt-Basrah line. Bairut, it may be mentioned, was already like Alexandria in regular steam communication with Europe. The cost of maintaining the Bairut-Basrah Post from February 1838 to April 1843 amounted to nearly Rs. 90,000.

Trade in Turkish Irāq, 1807-39.

The private trade of the East India Company's servants in Turkish 'Irāq as well as that of the Company themselves having ceased during this period, and there being at this time no very large or important trade carried on by ordinary British subjects, commercial topics no longer occupy a prominent place in official correspondence.

Duties levied on the goods of native merchants, 1809.

At the end of 1809 a table was compiled by Mr. Manesty, British Resident at Basrah, showing the duties levied by the Turkish authorities on the goods of "native merchants," by which terms probably Ottoman subjects and not Asiatic British subjects were meant, for the rates, as will be observed, were far in excess of those authorised by the Capitulations in the case of "the English merchants and all under their banner." The import duties collected at Basrah ranged from 3½ to 8½ per cent. and at Baghdād from 3 to 8½ per cent. *ad valorem*, and the export duties at Basrah were uniformly 14 per cent. In the case of goods taxed at Basrah, an additional charge per packet was made if they were afterwards forwarded to Baghdād. The most moderate duties were those on "Guzerat, Leree, Teffereek and Germasoot goods," the tariff on which had been lowered to discourage smuggling; but the best pieces of these were often appropriated by the Customs Masters at valuations of their own. Among the articles paying the heaviest duties were sandal-wood, black-wood, iron, tin, lead, sugar, sugarcandy, coffee, spices, sticklac and other "gruff" articles, also cotton yarn of a kind known as "Shagyree"; and the next most severely taxed were Bengal goods of all descriptions, Sūrat, Gujarat and Sind piece-goods of various kinds, and Cambay goods. Additional duties appear to have been levied on the arrival of merchandise at Aleppo, and again at Constantinople.

'ABDUL MAJID, 1839—61.*

Mahmūd II, whose chief characteristics as a ruler were fortitude in adversity and perseverance, was succeeded by his son 'Abdul Majīd, a

* The principal authorities for local affairs during this period are the *Précis containing Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Turkish*

had of sixteen, but of good natural ability and carefully educated for the throne. The Sultán 'Abdul Majíd grew up † "a kind-hearted, well-inten-"tioned man, but constitutionally weak and feeble. His appearance agreed "with his character. He was small in stature, and pale, and sat with "downcast eyes."

The first task which confronted the young ruler was that of reducing to obedience his rebellious governor of Egypt, Muhammad 'Alí Pasha; but a combination of European powers, comprising Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia, took this duty out of his hands and discharged it more effectually than he could have done. France secretly sympathised with Muhammad 'Alí, favoured by whom she hoped ultimately to establish her own predominance in the Mediterranean. She desired to maintain him in possession of Syria; and she resented as a "mortal affront" to herself the decision of the other concerted powers, reached in July 1840, to present Muhammad Alí with an ultimatum requiring his submission to the Porte.

The British, Russian and Austrian fleets appeared in August off the Syrian coast; Bairút was bombarded; Acre surrendered; and the Egyptian army of occupation was dislodged from Syria by a rising of the inhabitants of the country. A naval demonstration against Alexandria followed and Muhammad 'Alí submitted, after which, by a Farmán dated 13th February 1841, the Sultán, acting on the advice of the powers, conferred the Pashálik of Egypt on him and his descendants as a hereditary possession, to be held by them on conditions consistent with the dignity and suzerainty of the Turkey. On the 13th July of the same year a Convention was signed at London by representatives of the five powers, whereby it was settled that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should be closed, so long as the Porte was at peace, to foreign men of war.

Arabian Affairs, 1901—1905, printed in 1905. To these may be added *Bombay Selection No. XLIII, Turkish Arabia, etc., 1857*, and several works by travellers (some of which will be quoted in footnotes) casting light upon particular points, such as Layard's *Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana and Babylonia*, 1887, *Nineveh and its Remains*, and *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon*, 1853; Loftus's *Travels and Researches in Chaldæa and Susiana*, 1857; and Mitford's *Land March from India to Ceylon*, 1884. With reference to the question of the Turko-Persian frontier the most valuable source is *Extracts from Correspondence relative to the Turko-Persian Boundary Negotiations*, in three parts, printed for the Foreign Office in 1912; but the Hon'ble R. Curzon's *Armenia*, 1854, supplies some additional facts. Low's *History of the Indian Navy* is of service in connection with the Mesopotamian surveys, navigation of the Tigris, etc.

† Layard's *Early Adventures*, Vol. II, page 482.

Before these events, on the 15th November 1839, certain administrative regulations, known as the Tanzímát, had been promulgated in Turkey in the Sultán's name. They were of great significance in the internal history of the Turkish Empire, for, although in the dominant Muhammadan elements of the Turkish Empire they excited either ridicule or dismay, they placed the rights of the "subject nationalities," in other words of the different Christian races under the Sultán's rule, upon a recognised basis. The import of the Tanzímát was, however, general; they not only proclaimed the equality of Ottoman subjects without regard to creed or race, but they decreed the abolition of arbitrary executive power everywhere and the establishment of principle and method in the civil administration. The Government of the Empire had, it will be remembered, been centralised in a high degree at Constantinople since 1834.

The rupture with Russia which caused the Crimean War was the only serious breach with a foreign power that occurred during the reign of 'Abdul Majíd. By acting jointly with other powers in the Egyptian question in 1841 Russia forfeited the predominance in Turkish politics which she had enjoyed under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi; and it was probably dissatisfaction with the situation at Constantinople, thus altered, which caused the Emperor Nicholas to revert to earlier schemes of his for a dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. In 1844, while on a visit in England, the Tsar proposed a partition of Turkey; but the only result of his overtures, which were declined by the British Government, was to inspire British statesmen with distrust of Russian intentions. At St. Petersburg, in January 1853, the Tsar renewed his proposals; and it was on this occasion that he made use, in conversation with the British Ambassador, of the term "Sick Man" which has since been so frequently applied to the Sultán and to Turkey. At this juncture Napoleon III demanded of the Porte, in the interests of the Latin Church, redress of certain encroachments said to have been made by the Orthodox Church on rights and privileges at the Holy Places in Palestine. The Emperor Nicholas, in opposition to this demand, required that the *status quo* at the Holy Places should be maintained unaltered, and insisted in addition that all Orthodox Christians in Turkey should be recognised as under Russian protection. The question of the Holy Places was capable of adjustment; but, in regard to the second demand of the Tsar, compromise was found impossible. A Russian ultimatum, presented on the 5th May 1853, having been rejected by Turkey with the approval of Britain and France Russian troops entered the Danubian Principalities. In October 1853 Turkey declared war against Russia; and on the 27th March 1854, after

further complications, Britain and France followed suit. The war in the Crimea resulted, which ended with the Treaty of Paris, signed on the 30th March 1856 by representatives of Britain, France, Turkey, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Sardinia. The Treaty contained an article, directed against interference by the European signatories in the internal affairs of Turkey or between the Sultān and his subjects, which clearly signified the failure of the Russian claim to extend protection to all Orthodox Christians in Turkey. The Convention of London of 1841 was renewed with certain slight additions. By other important articles of the Treaty Turkey was made a member of the European concert and admitted to the benefits of European international law, and the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire were guaranteed. The Black Sea was neutralised and thrown open to the merchant flag of all nations, while at the same time the possession of war vessels in its waters and even of arsenals on its shores by any power, even Russia or Turkey, was interdicted.

The effect of the Tanzīmāt was not, unfortunately, so immediate or so great as had been anticipated in the first flush of European satisfaction at the supposed regeneration of Turkey. Instances were not wanting, from time to time, of outrages against Christians in the Turkish Empire. In 1858 a fanatical outbreak occurred at Jiddah; and in 1860 there were massacres of Christians in Syria, leading in the first instance to a temporary French occupation of that province, and ultimately to the grant of that exceptional form of government which the Lebanon still enjoys.

Internal History of Turkish ʿIrāq, 1839—61.

In Turkish ʿIrāq the period was chiefly remarkable for the persevering efforts of the local Turkish authorities to enforce greater and more general respect for the Government on the part of the indigenous population, not excluding the Arab tribes, and to improve the provincial finances —or perhaps only to line their own pockets more handsomely—by a stricter collection of the revenue. This coercive policy was in part successful, for more than one sanctuary of violence and crime was brought under control; but it provoked incessant disorder everywhere, and it seems on the whole, accompanied as it was by a total neglect of economic and commercial considerations, to have tended rather to the ruin than to the betterment of the country.

Rebellion at Karbala, suppression of the same, and general massacre,* 1842–1843.

The town of Karbala was in 1842, and had then been for some twenty years, a self-governing semi-alien republic, exempt, but for the payment of an uncertain tribute, from the authority of the representatives of the Porte. Three-fourths of the inhabitants were Persians or of Persian extraction. The recent history of the place was not to its credit as a Turkish town. Two or three Governors appointed by the Pāshas of Baghdād had been murdered at their post. In 1831, or earlier, an attempt was made by Dāwud Pāsha to enforce his authority over Karbala; but it ended, after an eleven months' siege of the town, in a mere promise by the inhabitants to pay annual revenue. 'Ali Rīza Pāsha, the immediate successor of Dāwud Pāsha, was denied entrance into Karbala, even as a pilgrim; and, after obtaining a money payment and the acceptance as titular governor of his nominee Saiyid Wahhāb, a Karbalāi of good family, he seems to have acquiesced in its virtual independence.

In the interior of the town an extraordinary state of affairs prevailed. The government was really in the hands of some two or three thousand †Yārāmāz or "good-for-nothings" as they were called, recruited from among the criminals and broken men of all Turkish 'Irāq and Persia, who subsisted upon the other inhabitants and upon pilgrims. The Yārāmāz, who always went armed, followed different self-constituted chiefs: much the most powerful of these in 1843 was Saiyid Ibrāhim, Za'frāni, a Perso-Arab; and next to him were Mīrza Sālih and Muhammad 'Ali Khān, whose partisans were mostly Persians. Among the Yārāmāz themselves quarrels and bloodshed were rife; the respectable public lived in terror of them; and no resident or pilgrim was safe from violence until he had placed himself under the protection of one of their factions, — a protection which, needless to say, was not extended to him gratuitously. Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, described the situation as follows:—

> The power of government was in the hands of a constantly renewed band of malefactors, ruined outlaws and dishonest runaways from every corner and tribe of the Pachalic; even the Turkish soldiers and lower employés flying from the fear of merited punishment, debtors from their creditors, public delinquents from the just severity of the law, were all welcomed, protected, employed in arms, and denied to all the reclamations of the Turks.

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* This massacre is remembered at Karbala by Persians as the "Ghārati" or "Plundering," by Arabs as the "Daggah" or "Strike." The Muhammadan year was 1258, and the phrase "Ghadīr Dam" (—pool of blood), of which the letters yield that numerical value, is also used to denote it.

† Yārāmāz is a Turkish word meaning "it is worthless." Though a verbal form it is used also as an adjective meaning "evil" (man), "naughty" (child), etc.

The Mujtahids or most eminent theological doctors of the Shi'ahs, a class whose authority was at that day very great wherever they were found, were obliged at Karbala, though it was one of the two principal seats of Shi'ah learning, to play a part subordinate to the Yáramáz in local politics. Of their number the two most distinguished were *Saiyid Kázim, Rashti, and Saiyid Ibráhim, Qazvini, between whom there was bitter opposition and jealousy. Each of them enjoyed the support of a body of Yáramáz, the Rashti relying on Saiyid Ibráhim, Za'frani, and the Qazvini on Mirza Sálih. The titular Governor, Saiyid Wahháb, trimmed as best he could between his more distant master the Pásha and his nearer masters the Yáramáz, inclining to an alliance with Saiyid Ibráhim, among the latter, against the Persian factions of Mirza Sálih and Muhammad 'Ali Khán.

Such was the constitution of the Karbalaie Alsatia when, in the summer of 1842, a new provincial ruler was appointed to Baghdád in the person of Najib Pásha. The new Pásha was of sterner stuff than his immediate predecessor; and, about two months after he had assumed the Government, the failure of the people of Karbala to furnish him with supplies and their refusal to allow him to enter the town, even in the character of a pilgrim, if accompanied by more than four or five attendants, provoked him to insist on the reception by them of a Turkish military garrison within their walls. This was about the end of October 1842. Najib Pásha was at the time encamped at Musaiyib with Sa'dullah Pásha, the Army Commandant, who was engaged with his troops upon drainage works intended to make more accessible the watery fastnesses of the rebellious Ma'dán tribes,—a fact which shows that Ottoman authority was in abeyance in the neighbouring districts as well as in the town of Karbala itself. Negotiations followed, and the Pásha was visited in his camp by a deputation consisting of the Mujtahid Saiyid Kázim, the titular Governor Saiyid Wahháb, the Zill-us-Sultán (a son of the late Sháh of Persia, then living as a refugee at Karbala), and others. At their request the Pásha sent a Baghdádi named Háji 'Abdur Rahmán to Karbala to mediate between him and the rebels; and the chiefs of the latter as well as the principal inhabitants, at first undertook in writing to admit 500 soldiers into the town; but the agreement was torn up almost as soon as signed. Meanwhile the chiefs of the Yáramáz, who were the most strenuous advocates of resistance, as the Mujtahid Saiyid Kázim and the Zill-us-Sultán were of submission, made active preparations for

* This Saiyid Kázim was the founder of the Shaikhi sect, which still exists. Muhammad 'Ali, the founder of Bábi-ism studied under him at Karbala. His grandson, Saiyid Qásim, Rashti, lives at Karbala and owns much property there.

defending the town. Guns were mounted on the walls, and armed Arabs were brought in from the surrounding country.

Seeing that the rebels were not inclined to submit and that they were only utilising the delay to strengthen their position, Najīb Pāsha obtained reinforcements from Baghdād and ordered the Army Commandant to advance to Karbala with one regiment of cavalry, twenty guns, and three regiments of infantry. Sa'dullah Pāsha, with these troops and some friendly Arabs, arrived before the place on the 19th December 1842. He pitched his camp on the south-east side of the town outside the date plantations by which it is surrounded, and was fired on from these, but did not reply. The Mujtahid Saiyid Kāzim and the Zill-us-Sultān then visited the Commandant in his camp and proposed that the families of the Yārāmāz chiefs Saiyid Ibrāhīm and Mīrza Sālih should be delivered up to him as hostages; that the Commandant should then withdraw to Musaiyib with the bulk of his force, leaving 500 men behind outside Karbala; that this small force, on the arrival of the main body at Musaiyib, should be admitted into Karbala, while the Yārāmāz with their dependents were allowed to quit the town unmolested; and that, when the evacuation by the Yārāmāz was complete, the troops at Musaiyib should be at liberty to return to Karbala. Sa'dullah Pāsha seems to have accepted these conditions and to have sent to Najīb Pāsha at Musaiyib informing him of what had been done, whereupon the people of Karbala ventured forth from the town and the imported Arabs proceeded to amuse themselves outside the walls in their usual fashion, with Hōsah dances and firing of guns. On the next day it would seem, being the 21st or 22nd of December, the Zill-us-Sultān went to the Turkish camp with the family of Saiyid Ibrāhīm, Za'frānī, and with Mīrza Sālih in person. The party were well received by the Turkish Commandant; but presently Sulaimān Mīrza, another Persian refugee prince, arrived from Musaiyib with the news that Najīb Pāsha refused to sanction the retirement of any part of the Turkish force from before Karbala. Next morning the Commandant found that Mīrza Sālih had escaped to the town, that others of the required hostages were wanting, and that some of those delivered up to him were not the persons that they had been represented to be. He accordingly sent Ibrāhīm Āgha, an artillery officer, to Karbala to find out what was going on there. Crowds of townsmen and Arabs poured out of the date gardens as this emissary passed, asking him for news, and followed him to the town gate. While he was still at the gate an alarm was raised by watchers on the town wall, and it was said that the Turkish troops were advancing. In reality the Commandant was only improving the dispositions of his camp; but the rebels rushed out in large number

and attacked him. Ibrāhīm Āgha was hustled into the town, where he found safety with the Mujtahid Sayyid Kāzim. The engagement, unpremeditated on both sides, resulted in favour of the Arabs and townspeople. They captured the Turkish guns, but without the limbers, and carried some of them off in triumph, throwing the rest into a ditch from which the troops recovered them in the course of the following night. The fighting lasted till sunset, and there were a number of casualties on both sides. Sa'dullah Pāsha in consequence of this affair behaved with great rudeness to the Zill-us-Sultān, who was still in his camp, and sent him and the hostages to Najīb Pāsha at Musaiyib, whence they were transferred to Baghdād.

After this the attack and the defence of Karbala were regularly organised; there was daily skirmishing in the date gardens, and both sides brought their artillery into action. The fire of the Turkish guns was high and did little damage to the town, being as yet intended, perhaps, only to intimidate and annoy. Negotiations were at no time suspended. On the 1st January 1843, the Persian Consul from Baghdād arrived at Musaiyib with the Mujtahid Sayyid Ibrāhīm, the rival of the Mujtahid Sayyid Kāzim; and Najīb Pāsha was persuaded by them to promise not only that the town should be spared, if it were surrendered, but that the Yārāmāz even, should be allowed to leave it in safety by the gates on the side furthest from the Turkish camp. The rebels, however, emboldened by a false rumour that a Persian army was marching to their relief, made answer to these proposals that, at the most, they would let 200 men enter the town and a few more occupy one of the gates. This reply made Najīb Pāsha furious; and, after a sojourn of four or five days only in the Pāsha's camp, the Persian Consul and the Qazvīnī Mujtahid returned to Baghdād. An unfortunate omission on the part of the former functionary was that he took no effectual measures to convince his nationals in the town of the firmness of Najīb Pāsha's determination to make himself master of Karbala; but so great was the confidence of the defenders in themselves at this time, and so strong their disbelief in the seriousness of the Turks' intentions, that a message from the Persian Consul, if he had succeeded in sending one, would probably have been disregarded.

The Army Commandant had now begun to advance towards the town, —a movement which entailed on his men severe fighting in the date plantations as well as heavy labour in clearing an avenue of approach by cutting down palm trees. Possession of the tomb of Ibn Hamzah was wrested from the Yārāmāz, not without difficulty, and a battery of four

guns planted there at about 350 yards from the town wall. Inside the town anti-Sunni feeling ran high; the Mullas proclaimed the war to be one of religion; and gross abuse of the Sultán and his army was incessantly launched from the battlements at the besieging force. To meet a scarcity of shot and ball a brass railing was aken from the shrine of 'Abbás and melted down; and even holy men took their share, after the Turkish attack began in earnest, in repairing damage to the walls.

In the end the critical position in which his own force found itself obliged the Turkish Commandant to resolve, after holding a council of war, upon sharp and decisive action. Half rations and exposure to cold and damp had dispirited his troops, and desertion was rife. On the 11th January, the Turkish* guns began to play upon a portion of the town wall about 60 yards from the Najaf Gate, and by the next day a practicable breach had been effected. An Arab named 'Alwán was then despatched to the town, under a flag of truce, to summon it to surrender. Terms of capitulation had been all but arranged with him when the Yárámáz chief Mírza Sálih, drawing his sword and dashing his turban on the ground, cried out that it was too late to recede. The general opinion veered round to the Mírza's side; the messenger returned to the Turkish camp; and artillery fire was re-opened and continued until sunset, by which time the width of the breach was about 50 yards.

Even yet the Karbala rebels did not realise their danger, and, when on the morning of the 13th January before daylight the Turks reconnoitred the breach, the guard on it were found partly absent and partly asleep round a fire at the foot of the wall. Before the storming party reached the spot, however, a certain number of defenders had collected there and day had dawned. The breach was carried with the loss of about 50 men, and the Najaf Gate was then thrown open from within to admit the Turkish main body. The troops when mustered inside were divided into three columns, one of which was ordered to advance through the middle of the town, while the other two were to follow the inner side of the town wall in opposite directions until they met, seizing the various gates as they passed them. One of these two columns, on arriving at the Khaimahgáh Gate, found a crowd of Arabs, Yárámáz, and ordinary citizens of every sort collected there, unable to escape because the gate was shut. Some of the Arabs in the crowd fired; the soldiers replied, with fatal effect; and a stampede followed in which numbers of men, women, and children were knocked down and trodden to death. The crowd then retreated,

* The damage done to the date plantations by artillery fire was still conspicuous in 1849. See Loftus's *Travels*, page 65.

followed by the troops, to the Hor Gate. As they reached it, the other wall column came up from the opposite direction; shooting between the Arabs and the soldiers began again; and, the Hor Gate being open to the extent of nine feet only, a frantic crush ensued in which women and children suffered terribly. At length the crowd broke up. Most of the people fled for refuge to the shrines or to the houses of distinguished citizens; but some threw themselves over the town walls. In the meantime the column advancing through the middle of the town had arrived, in following up some Arabs, at the shrine of 'Abbás. The gate of the shrine was closed, and, as the troops halted before it, a fire was opened on them from a neighbouring house killing several; they forced the gate and were again fired at by Arabs and Yárámiz inside, and from the minarets. Exasperated beyond endurance the soldiers then fell without discrimination of sex or age, of combatant or non-combatant, upon a dense crowd of refugees which filled the courtyard. They pursued their victims even to the innermost part of the sanctuary, where a few were murdered clinging to the silver railings of the tomb of 'Abbás, and two—it was said—upon the actual tomb itself, so that its draperies were soaked with their blood. From this moment onwards discipline was at an end; the officers, unable to control their men, repaired to the Commandant; and the soldiers scattered themselves through the town, entering and robbing private houses and their occupants, often in the most inhuman manner, and slaying such few persons as were still abroad in the streets. The wife of a refugee Persian prince was wounded severely, and another member of the Persian royal family slightly; but the victims mostly belonged to the poorer classes. At length the Commandant, mounting his horse, proceeded to the shrine of Husain. Here he was just in time to prevent a repetition of the horrors that had taken place at the shrine of 'Abbás; and he emphasised his order to desist from slaughter by killing two or three soldiers with his own hand. An effort was also made to collect, for restoration to the owners, some of the booty that the soldiers had taken; but it was ineffectual. It was not until nearly sunset that disorder ceased and that the troops, "worn out with fatigue and satiated with plunder, became obedient to their officers and returned to camp." The subsequent conduct of the Turkish military authorities "was very unbecoming, allowing the troops to turn the Court of the * Mosque into a barrack yard; horses and mules were picketed in various parts, the soldiers playing native music and singing loose songs to the horror of the Sheeahs."

* *i.e.*, of the shrine of 'Abbas.

The general result of the operations was that the town of Karbala was brought thoroughly under Turkish control. The Yāmāz chiefs Mirza Sālih and Muhammad 'Ali Khān were captured, and the Yāmāz leader Saiyid Ibrāhīm, Za'frāni, gave himself up, as did also the titular Governor Saiyid Wahhāb: all of these were pardoned.* A few days after the capture of the place Najib Pāsha was able to enter Karbala, where, in true Turkish fashion, he took from the inhabitants a sealed declaration to the effect that the loss of life had been trifling. From Karbala he moved on to Najaf, another religious, recalcitrant, and largely Persian town; but there, naturally, no resistance was offered to him and his authority was established without any sort of difficulty.

Responsibility of the Turkish authorities and international enquiry, 1843.

Very exaggerated reports of the Karbala affair were current at first. It seems even to have been stated that 30,000 persons, most of them Persians, had perished, and that the whole town had been sacked and destroyed. In parts of Persia the population were excited to frenzy by these and similar rumours; and a rupture of Turko-Persian frontier negotiations then going on at Erzeroum, or even a war between Turkey and Persia, appeared not impossible. In these circumstances the British Ambassador at Constantinople deputed Lieutenant-Colonel F. Farrant, attached to the British Mission in Persia, whose services had been placed at his disposal by the British Minister at Tehrān and whom it had previously been intended to employ at Erzeroum, to investigate the facts upon the spot. Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, had taken the extraordinary step of writing to congratulate the Pāsha on the success of his operations against Karbala and had omitted to inform the Ambassador of his having done so. Apparently for this reason Sir Stratford Canning considered the appointment of a Special Commissioner necessary; and he directed Colonel Farrant "to remain at Baghdād "during the progress of the negotiations at Erzeroum and to retain in his "own hands the management of affairs relating to the frontier disputes "between the Governments of Persia and Turkey." The Russian Envoy at Constantinople, M. de Bouteneff, officially requested that Colonel Farrant should act on his behalf also; and that officer consequently represented, in his proceedings, the Russian as well as the British Government. The Porte consented, somewhat reluctantly, to send an Ottoman Commissioner to hold an enquiry on the spot; and their choice, which in the opinion of the British Ambassador could hardly have been more judicious, fell on †Nāmiq Pāsha.

* Some of them were pardoned at the intercession of Colonel Farrant, the British Special Commissioner, mentioned in the next paragraph.

† Probably the Nāmiq Pāsha mentioned by Layard in his *Early Adventures*, vol. II, pages 385—386.

Colonel Farrant's report, from which most of the detailed information given above is taken, was signed at Baghdād on the 15th May 1843. He believed that not more than 5,000 persons had been killed, of whom about 3,000 met their death inside the town, and that many of these last were Arabs. He seems to have had doubts whether even the reduced figures which he mentioned might not themselves be exaggerated, for he remarked that it was difficult to find a Persian in Karbala who could say that a relation or friend of his, or even a person whom he knew by sight, had been killed—yet the proportion of Persians among the slain was undoubtedly considerable. Thousands of Persians had fortunately escaped from danger by leaving the town before, perhaps even during, the operations against it; but the poor were unable to remove, and eventually carriage became unprocurable even by the rich. No British subjects lost their lives in the affair; but three Lucknowis from Oudh, then an independent Indian Kingdom, were killed at the shrine of 'Abbās. Some twenty or thirty natives of the Panjab and Kashmir, at that time not British possessions, were missing, and their fate remained unascertained. The deaths of Russian subjects, said to be numerous, could not be verified except in one single case.

Dr. Ross, the British Agency Surgeon at Baghdād, visited Karbala soon after the massacre, but unofficially, to attend to the injuries of some Persians with whom he was privately acquainted.

The Turkish Commissioner, Nāmiq Pāsha, estimated the casualties on the rebel and popular side at only 150 Persians and rather more than 200 others. The total losses of the Turks were about 400 killed and 200 wounded, from which it is evident that they must have met with strong resistance. Colonel Farrant was surprised to find the town and its shrines very little damaged, and he discredited the assertion that wholesale violation of women had taken place. The losses of property belonging to the shrines were insignificant, and the large claims raised by private individuals could not be verified.

In Colonel Farrant's opinion, it would seem, Najīb Pāsha could hardly be held accountable for the disaster. From the first he had made no secret of his determination to reduce the place; on the 18th November 1842 he had informed the Persian Consul and the British and French Consuls-General at Baghdād in writing of his intentions; he had prevented some Persian pilgrims from proceeding to the threatened town; he had negotiated constantly with the rebels so long as there was any prospect of a peaceful settlement; he had continued the negotiations even

after a successful sortie by the garrison; and, finally, he was not personally present at the spot. The conduct of Su'dullah Pāsha, the Turkish Army Commandant, was more open to criticism. Before the assault he proclaimed that 100 piastres should be given for every Yārāmāz head,—a thoughtless order which led to the cruel decapitation by soldiers of a number of innocent persons; and he did not, apparently, stir from a position that he had taken up on the wall near the Najaf Gate until about two hours after the slaughter had begun. But the catastrophe was really due to the obstinacy and dissensions of the Yārāmāz chiefs and of the general population, which prevented the surrender of the town, and to the inability to control their men after they had entered the town of the Turkish officers, one of whom, Tāhir Bey, the leader of the storming party, seems actually to have told those under his command that once inside the breach they might do as they pleased. It is also possible that, if the Persian Consul from Baghdād had shown more energy, by going to Karbala himself and persuading Persian subjects to leave, there might have been less loss of life. The absence of any public communication from him and his return from Musaiyib to Baghdād seem to have imbued many Persians of Karbala with a false sense of security.

The final opinion of the British Ambassador at Constantinople on the Karbala affair, expressed by him in September 1843 after receiving Colonel Farrant's report, was as follows: "Although the inhuman "outrages perpetrated by the Turkish troops at the time of the assault are "confirmed as to the leading points, (yet) the number of the slaughtered, "the extent of the mischief, particularly as to the lives and properties of "Persians, the conduct of Negib Pasha, and the degree of provocation "are now presented in a light which varies considerably from our first "impressions. The proceedings of the Pasha in particular appear to "have been far less culpable than the reports of the Persian Agent and "the French Consul had induced us to believe." His Russian colleague concurred in Sir Stratford Canning's view; and the terms of settlement subsequently arranged by the two Ambassadors at Constantinople, acting under instructions in the interests of the Persian Government, were these:

1. That the Porte should address a letter to the Prime Minister of Persia and communicate a copy of it to the representatives of the mediating powers;

2. That a suitable sum of money should be applied by His Highness the Sultan to the relief of the sufferers at Kerbela;

3. That the Porte should expressly declare its disapproval of the late expedition against Kerbela, its regret at the occurrence as unauthorised and unreasonable, and, more especially, its sorrow for the effusion of blood which ensued;

4. That Nejib Pāsha should be ordered to repair the shrines at Kerbela, to administer his province with equity, to protect the Persian subjects there, and particularly the pilgrims from Persia, and, finally, to undertake nothing that can bring upon him the displeasure of the Sultan;

5. That Nejib Pāsha should be threatened with dismissal in case of any future misconduct; and

6. That all these points should be announced to the two Ambassadors in writing by means of an Instruction addressed by Rifaat Pāsha to the Dragoman of the Porte and deposited in copy with the Ambassadors.

The removal of Najib Pāsha from office, which had been demanded by Persia, was not required.

We have dwelt at somewhat disproportionate length upon the Karbala affair because it illustrates so well tendencies and feelings which exist even now, though much attenuated, in Turkish 'Irāq.

Reduction to obedience of the Shaikh quarter of Baghdād City, 1847.

We may note, before turning to tribal and miscellaneous questions, that in 1847 Najib Pāsha extended the principle of the universal currency of the Sultān's writ to the quarter, then turbulent, in Baghdād city which takes its name from the tomb of Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir, Gilāni, and even to the shrine itself. It had been proverbial, before this, that every seditious riot in Baghdād had its origin in the Shaikh quarter, if not in the very precincts of the shrine. The transactions on which the Pāsha founded his action seem to have been connected in some way with taxation, and they included a demonstration at the Pāsha's country house by a crowd of 1,500 persons who presented him with an offensive memorial and threatened to resist his measures. On the return from Kurdistān of a military expedition, the despatch of which had evidently depleted the Baghdād garrison, guards were mounted on the shrine, and two of the principal officials connected with it were arrested—one of them in the sanctuary itself—and deported to Basrah.

Relations with the Banī Lām and difficulties with the Shammar, Khazā'il, and 'Anizah, 1843-44.

At the end of 1843 Persian intrigues among the Banī Lām, of which there had been complaints, were suspended; and a Turkish official with a small military escort was engaged in recovering taxes from the tribe. One expedition was in the field against the Northern Shammar, another had been despatched against the Khazā'il in their lagoons on the Euphrates. In 1844 an island fortress of the Khazā'il was taken and a Turkish garrison installed in it; but the 'Anizah to the west of the Euphrates, who had been showing themselves refractory, were considered to be beyond the reach of a Turkish expedition.

'Obaid, 'Anizah, 'Afaj, and Muntafik

In carrying out his policy of internal administration, the main principle of which was to suppress every kind of influence that competed with the authority of the Ottoman Government, Najib Pāsha seems,

after the reduction of Karbala, to have devoted his attention chiefly to the Pashâliq of Sulaimâniyah in the north, where the Kurdish family of the Bâbânzâdahs still held sway; but with his proceedings in that quarter we are not concerned. Affairs in Kurdistân appear to have engaged his personal attention in 1845, in which year, on his return with a military force from Kurdistân to Baghdâd by the banks of the Tigris, the 'Obaid tribe, apprehending an attack upon themselves, came down in large numbers into the neighbourhood of Kadhimain, took up a position there, and interrupted the communications of Baghdâd with Mûsal and Aleppo. At the same time Arab tribes from the Euphrates side, including the 'Anizah, began to close in upon Baghdâd from the west and south. How the danger passed, which it seems to have done harmlessly, is not apparent; but in May of the following year the 'Anizah were again in insurrection and busy intercepting caravans, while the Northern Shammar blocked the upper Tigris and the route to Mûsal. The 'Afaj near Diwâniyah were in revolt, and the chief of the Muntafik continued to postpone compliance with an invitation to visit Baghdâd which had been sent him. The forts of the 'Afaj were reduced, but the situation continued disturbed. disturbances, 1845-46

The dissatisfaction among the Arabs was due to efforts on the part of Najîb Pâsha to more than double the revenues of the province,—a process which necessitated very rigorous collection of the poll tax. Incidental consequences were that the tribes generally, among whom the Zubaid, Dilaim, Khaza'il and Muntafik had lately shown a tendency to exchange the nomadic for a settled life, now seemed inclined to abandon such cultivation as they possessed for brigandage, and that agricultural labour had become difficult to procure.

Cholera prevailed at Baghdâd in 1846 and 1847. In the second of these years the disease was less virulent, but the Pâsha and the French Consul-General left the town, and the British Political Agent went into camp at Qarârah. Business was partly suspended. Cholera epidemic, 1846-47.

The following melancholy account of Najîb Pâsha's administration was penned at the end of 1848 by Major Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdâd, who had in the beginning formed a favourable estimate of His Excellency's policy and character: Najîb Pasha's administration in 1848.

> Undoubtedly however of all the offences of which Najîb Pasha is justly chargeable, the gravest, inasmuch as they compromise the character of the Sultan's Government, alienate the affections of His Majesty's subjects and threaten to convert into a desert one of the finest provinces of the Empire, are the intolerable rigor of his financial administration, and the reckless greediness and venality with which His Excellency's

officers throughout the Pashalic pursue the one sole object of raising money. I have in vain endeavoured to obtain materials for drawing up a return of what may be considered unjust and oppressive taxes. Such a task indeed is quite impracticable, for the rates and amounts are daily fluctuating according as the Collectors discover a more lucrative machinery of taxation, and any return moreover, however authentic and elaborate, would convey but a very imperfect idea of the real pressure upon the labouring classes and the consumers, as the realisation of every item of revenue is in the hands of contractors, who are permitted to put in practice all conceivable means of extortion, even to the infliction of personal torture, provided they fulfil their pecuniary obligations to the Government. The trade in corn since the last harvest has been a monopoly in the hands of the Government and the price to the consumer accordingly has been more than double that which was warranted by the abundant resources of the country. On animal food and fruit and vegetables, the duties under a variety of denominations amount to an average of about 50 per cent. *ad valorem*, and dates, which to the Arab population constitute the real necessary of life, are hardly less extravagantly taxed. All the internal trades to which the wants of the community give extension or importance, are reserved as monopolies, and farmed out to the highest bidder, among these monopolies I may instance the manufacture of soap, of spirits and of leather, the dyeing and painting of cloths, the cleaning of cotton, the storing and weighing of rice and grain, porterage, brokerage, etc. The transit duties also are enormous on hides, wool, sheep skins, gall nuts, etc., the charges amount sometimes to 30 per cent. *ad valorem* before the goods reach the gates of Baghdad, and a further duty of 12 per cent. is levied on entrance into the town. New taxes too are being constantly added. Stamps are required for all public papers, whether bonds, acquaintances, agreements or even petitions. The passport fees press heavily on the poorer classes and the exorbitant charges on conveyance of property, on the realisation of money, on the mere passing of contracts, deter the rich from making any use of their capital. According to the data which I have collected from various quarters and which furnish at any rate the means of approximately estimating the result of Nejib Pasha's financial operations during the last year, I find that His Excellency, who was granted a farm of the Baghdad Pashalic at the assumed gross annual valuation of 60,000 purses (300,000£), has raised by ostensible means alone, above 120,000 purses (600,000 £); and at the most moderate calculation for his extraordinary profits, those I mean which have accrued from his grain monopoly, from his Kazielis on the Arabs, from confiscations, fines, presents, and above all from direct bribes, I should be disposed to assess the entire proceeds of his Government at not less than one million sterling, and when Your Excellency considers that during the interval in question no single fresh source of legitimate revenue has been opened, that there has been no territorial acquisition; no barren lands reclaimed from the desert; no increased trade, or improved cultivation; no discovery of metallic treasure; no invention in manufactures or extension of produce; but that on the contrary every branch of agriculture, commerce, enterprise and industry has very essentially declined, you will understand that this immense sum, so entirely disproportioned to the present capabilities of the province, could not have been raised without entailing a terrible amount of individual suffering, and without calling forth a general execration of the ruling power which sanctions, if it does not encourage, such grinding tyranny.

A few months later the British Political Agent had to report that the great Banī Lām tribe had risen in rebellion in consequence of the Pāsha's having farmed the collection of the taxes for which they were liable to the Shaikh of the Muntafik, their hereditary foe; that they had ravaged the districts of Mandalī, Jasān and Badrah and approached within 30 miles of Bagdād; and that the Pāsha seemed disposed to cancel the arrangement he had made with the Muntafik Chief,—a step by which the latter would probably be alienated, in his turn, with dangerous results. The *Northern Shammar, too, among whose chiefs Najīb Pāsha had cultivated dissension, succeeded for once in combining and in forming a coalition that seemed capable of sweeping the whole country down to the gates of Baghdād. Nightly robberies and other atrocities disgraced the streets of the city itself; these were believed to be the work of gangs of armed Arabs sent in from outside to distract the attention of the Government. Major Rawlinson observed that some allowance must always be made for natural turbulence of the Kurds and Arabs, but that in the present case the disorders were undoubtedly due to the character of the fiscal administration.

Banī Lām and Shammar revolts, 1849.

At length, in the summer of 1849, a very serious crisis arose upon the Shatt-al-Hindīyah in consequence of the extortionate demands made upon the cultivating Arabs there by the Pāsha. The lands irrigated by the Hindīyah and other canals from the right bank of the Euphrates were legally assessed at an amount equivalent to £17,800 sterling; but Shaikh Wādī, the Chief of the Zubaid, an outsider to whom the Pāsha had given them in farm, raised from them in one year no less a sum than £105,000. The tribes of the district, which were in general law-abiding, then rose, expelled the farmer and his myrmidons, and plundered the public granaries and store-houses in which their contributions in kind had been deposited after collection. Najīb Pāsha called upon 'Abdī Pāsha, the Army Commandant, to put down the insurrection and reinstate Shaikh Wādī by force of arms; but that officer, convinced that the tribesmen had a just grievance, declined to do more than despatch a column, with specific instructions for the restoration of order only. A furious altercation between the Pāsha and the Commandant followed, and eventually it was arranged to send a joint civil and military Commission to the spot to investigate the causes of the outbreak. The Commissioners did not agree; each supported the view of his own superior; and the feud between the civil and military heads of the administration became a public scandal.

Dangerous rebellion of the Hindīyah Arabs and friction between the Turkish civil and military authorities, May-June 1849.

*Safūk, the chief of the Northern Shammar, after assassinating his principal rival in the tribe, Nijris, was himself treacherously made away with in 1847 by an emissary of the Wālī of Baghdād. See Layard's *Nineveh and its Remains*, pages 61-78, for an account of Safūk and his affairs in 1846.

Simultaneous trouble with the Northern Shammar, Banī Lām and Shammar Tōqah, June 1849.

At this juncture the Northern Shammar tribe again broke out and pillaged the whole district lying between Sāmarra, Tikrīt and Kirkūk. Fresh complications arose with the Banī Lām, also, after the failure of an attempt to induce their chief, Shaikh Madhkūr, to trust himself in the hands of the Turks. The Turkish officer sent to invite him was one by whose instrumentality Najīb Pāsha had recently procured the murder of Safūk, the great chief of the Northern Shammar, while on safe conduct; and the wily grey beard of the Banī Lām evidently did not regard the fact as a propitious omen. The attitude of the Banī Lām shortly became a serious menace to all shipping on the Tigris: so much so that some Baghdād merchants trading with Basrah sent orders that a fleet of boats which was bringing merchandise for them up the river should wait at 'Azair. The Shammar Tōqah too, a tribe settled on the left bank of the Tigris a short way below Baghdād, embarked on hostilities against the Government.

End of the Hindīyah rebellion, June 1849.

It was now ascertained that the Shaikh of the distant but very powerful Muntafik tribe was implicated in the Hindīyah revolt, and that the rebels had been aided by armed contingents of the Dilaim, Dhafīr, 'Afaj, and Khaza'il tribes, which were in sympathy with them. The Army Commandant presently became alarmed at the extent of the financial responsibilities which the Porte, according to Najīb Pāsha, would consider him to have assumed. His fears led 'Abdī Pāsha to proceed in person to the Hindīyah districts, where he issued a manifesto of a nature to appease the tribes and held meetings with the chiefs of the Hindīyah Arabs, of the 'Afaj, and of the Khaza'il. All of the Shaikhs professed their loyalty to the Sultān, and eventually the Commandant obtained from the Hindīyah chiefs a written agreement in which they bound themselves to pay the full legal assessment of their districts and £10,000 in addition. 'Abdī Pāsha's settlement was however repudiated by Najīb Pāsha, who had meanwhile been busily engaged in falsifying his accounts so as to prove that his public expenditure equalled his receipts; an attempt at reconciling the two officials made by Dervish Pāsha, an Ottoman Commissioner for the delimitation of the Turko-Persian frontier, ended in failure and in the accession of the mediator to the party of the Army Commandant; and not long afterwards, probably in consequence of the representations of Major Rawlinson as well as of his own flagrant misconduct, Najīb Pāsha was removed from Baghdād.

Danger at Karbala, June 1849.

The Turkish military garrison at Karbala had got somewhat out of hand during the continuance of the Hindīyah rebellion; outrages were committed by them upon the people of the town; and citizens and soldiers

began to eye one another with mutual suspicion, both fearing violence. To complaints made by Persians of insults offered to their religion at Karbala Najib Pāsha actually replied that he had no control over the army and that the Persians must look to their own defence. This mischievous speech, made by the Pāsha during the height of his controversy with the Commandant, was undoubtedly intended by him to embarrass his opponent; and he followed it up by recalling the civil governor of Karbala to Baghdād,—an extreme measure which he justified by saying that he could not be responsible for the administration of places where he had no longer the means, in the shape of an obedient army, of enforcing his orders. The British Political Agent at Baghdād, concerned because of the disastrous effect which another Karbala incident might have on Turko-Persian relations, caused the recklessness and impropriety of his conduct to be pointed out to Najib Pāsha; but the Pāsha, determined as it appeared to ruin either the Commandant or himself, could not be brought to reconsider his orders. 'Abdī Pāsha, however, sent a trustworthy officer of his own to Karbala to supply the place of governor, and the public peace there was not disturbed.

Continued misbehaviour of the 'Afaj, Banī Lām, and Shammar Tōqah, July 1849.

The unrest in Hindiyah subsided after 'Abdī Pāsha's settlement; but the indirect effects of the rebellion continued to show themselves for a time in other parts of the country. The 'Afaj soon afterwards attacked a fort held in the name of Shaikh Wādi of the Zubaid and put the whole garrison to the sword; Shaikh Madhkūr of the Banī Lām closed the Tigris stopping all communication between Baghdād and Basrah; and the 'Obaid to the north, and the Shammar Tōqah to the south of Baghdād harried the districts within their reach.

Character of Najib Pāsha, 1842-49.

The character of Najib Pāsha, which has already appeared to some extent from his actions as recorded above, was thus summed up in 1848 by the British Political Agent at Baghdād:

> He possesses, or at any rate has possessed, a very remarkable natural energy, and his inflexible spirit, although too often degenerating into obstinacy, has on more occasions than one dissipated dangers that would have been fatal, if encountered with a less degree of firmness and serenity. That thorough knowledge also must be conceded to him, of the craft of Eastern Government, which can be alone acquired by fifty years' experience of public life. Herein however are, I think, comprised his full catalogue of virtues, and unfortunately there is a terrible amount of evil in the frailties, prejudices and passions which make up the residuum of his personal character. Proud, superstitious and corrupt, he is alone accessible to the influence of flattery, of saintly hypocrisy, or of bribes. His bigotry increases with his years and his rapacity with his wealth. Hating equally Christians and Shīahs, whom he classes together as infidels and strangers, his conduct to the two communities at Baghdād is merely in so far distinguished as the relative weight of the Persian and European Government

may be supposed to admit a greater or less latitude for the indulgence of his nature. The Christians, to whom in public he invariably attaches the opprobrious epithet of "Giour," have chiefly to complain of an indifference to their wrongs, of a disposition to enforce against them civil disabilities which in other parts of the Empire have either fallen into disuse or have been formally annulled, of systematised endeavours to confirm, if not to aggravate, their social depression.

It is interesting to compare* this opinion, the fruit of experience, with that which Major Rawlinson had enunciated five years earlier:

> In his internal administration Najib Pāsha evinces the same energy and firmness which have ever been his distinguishing characteristic. The suppression of robbery and disorder, the establishment of the authority of the Porte over the tribes subordinate to the Pashalic, the severe, but not extortionate, exaction of the dues of Government, and the introduction of system and arrangement into the various branches of administration appear to be the chief objects of his care, and it is only reasonable to suppose that, if these objects are carried out with the same vigour and constancy that have marked their first adoption, the increased prosperity of the province must be a necessary consequence.

Government of 'Abdi Pasha and difficulties with the Northern Shammar, 1849-50.

Najib Pāsha, though he left debts at Baghdād unpaid, did not fail to carry a large sum of money away with him on quitting the province.

He was followed in office by two incompetent successors, the earlier of them being 'Abdi Pāsha, the former Army Commandant, to whom a liberal salary was allotted by the Porte in order to place him above the necessity of committing extortion. 'Abdi Pāsha, as a civil governor, disappointed such expectations as might have been founded on his successful handling of the Hindiyah rebellion; he resigned himself absolutely to the guidance of Mulla 'Ali, a favourite eunuch and buffoon; and the state of the country went from bad to worse. The post of Kifl, not far from Hillah, was captured by Arabs and the whole Turkish garrison of about 60 men put to the sword. Baghdād itself was virtually besieged by the tribes, and travellers could hardly venture to leave it in any direction on account of the Bedouins, whose camps beset it to the very walls. 'Abdi Pāsha's main idea was to reduce to obedience the so-called Mu'dān tribes of the western marshes, including the 'Afaj whose yearly assessment of £900 he was anxious to double. For this purpose he endeavoured, with a force of 2,000 men, not counting irregulars, to close the head of the Shatt-al-Hindiyah, down which nearly one-half of the water of the Euphrates was now pouring; but the current washed away his dam nearly as fast as it was constructed. He succeeded in completing it, however,

* It is an almost invariable rule at Baghdād that each new Pāsha or Wāli makes a favourable impression on the British representative at first arrival, and that this impression is gradually replaced, as the Turkish official's character reveals itself, by a depreciatory and even hostile estimate on the part of the Resident.

and was able to arrest and imprison Wādi Bey, Najib Pāsha's favourite Shaikh and revenue farmer; but his officers were treated with contempt by Fahad, the Shaikh of the Muntafik, who had lately succeeded to the headship of that tribe on the death of his brother Bandar. The Pāsha next established himself at Diwānīyah with 3,000 men and began to re-organise the tribal arrangements and to recover arrears of taxes; but presently the Hindīyah dam gave way again, and with it disappeared such remnants of prestige as he still possessed. These events occurred during the winter of 1849-50.

Early in 1850, the regular forces of the province having mostly been sent against a rebel Kurdish chief, the Shammar north of Baghdād were called in by 'Abdi Pāsha to supply their place. This tribe were not infrequently made use of by the Turkish authorities to chastise smaller Arab tribes, a task which they were accustomed to perform with hearty good-will, but without much discrimination between the friends and the foes of the Government. On the present occasion the Shammar seem to have raided the banks of the Tigris so energetically that the country down to Kūt-el-Amārah was turned into a desert, road and river became equally unsafe, and trade was interrupted. Safūk, *Shaikh of the Shammar, prominent in the events of 1833, had been treacherously murdered by an agent of Najib Pāsha, as already mentioned, and the chief of the tribe in 1850 was his son Farhān.†

Muntafik troubles, 1850.

In 1850, Shaikh Fahad having somehow disappeared, the headship of the Muntafik tribe was disputed between Fāris-bin-'Ajīl and his cousin Mansūr-bin-Rashīd, with dire results to trade and the country at large. The Turks officially recognised Mansūr as chief; but hardly had they done so when his rival attacked him, driving him out and obliging him to seek refuge in the Ka'ab country. The Turkish authorities then accepted Fāris.

Government of Nāmiq Pāsha, 1852.

In 1852, the Baghdād Pāshāliq, after nine years of continuous misgovernment, was reduced almost to a wilderness. A new ruler had arrived in the person of Nāmiq Pāsha‡; but his headstrong violence and his

* Safūk was in friendly relations with the British Political Agency; and in 1841 he recovered at the request of Dr. Ross, the Agency Surgeon, some articles of which the traveller Mr. (afterwards Sir A. H.) Layard had been robbed on a journey.

† On Farhān, by 1855, the Turks had conferred a monthly subsidy; but it was not large enough, as that Shaikh himself once remarked, to meet his expenditure on coffee for guests, and he always treated it as of no account.

‡ This may have been the Nāmiq Pāsha who was deputed from Constantinople in 1843 to report on the Karbala massacre. There is reason to think that that once promising official became in his later days a thorough-going reactionary.

obstinacy in striving with insufficient means to establish absolute power were as fatal to the peace of the country as the incompetence of his immediate predecessors. To quote the words of Major Rawlinson the British Political Agent, in 1852:

> Nāmiq Pāsha inaugurated his government by acts of severity which were totally unsalled for, he then goaded the tribal chiefs one by one into a hostile confederation against the Government; and he has since, by exhibiting sometimes military weakness, by countenancing at other times measures of perfidy and scenes of cruelty, which it would be shocking to relate, and by maintaining throughout a violence of language and haughtiness of demeanour which to the Bedouins of the desert are of all things the most insupportable, so completely excited and exasperated the Arab population of the province that it would require perhaps a force of 50,000 men to put down opposition and restore general tranquillity.
>
> If Nāmiq Pāsha had exhibited but ordinary prudence, when on a recent occasion as reported in my last despatch dissension broke out in the ranks of the insurgents, there would have been a fair change of an honourable termination of his difficulties. Several indeed of the most influential of the Arab chiefs withdrew from the field and sent into Baghdād for terms, and if these parties had been conciliated, the submission of the others would in all probability have followed. To one and all, however, the same imperious answer was returned, that it was beneath the dignity of the Sultān's representative to treat with rebels; they were required to surrender unconditionally to appear in person at Baghdād and to sue for pardon; their cases would be then considered. This of course was considered by the chiefs as equivalent to condemning them to imprisonment or transportation, and, accordingly, as their power was in reality undiminished, they laid aside their differences and met once more to resist the common enemy. Since then matters have been daily growing worse. The outlying detachments of the Turkish troops have been cut up or driven in, the larger bodies of troops are beleaguered in their camps. Caravans have been plundered almost within sight of the walls of Baghdād, and as large bodies of horse, ten or twelve thousand strong, are now moving up from various quarters, there is an imminent prospect of the city being invested in so far at least as such an operation can be carried out by mere parties of irregular cavalry.

Rebellion of the Euphrates tribes, July 1852.

A little later Wādi Bey, the great Shaikh of the Zubaid to whom Najīb Pāsha had granted the farm of the Hindiyah district and whom 'Abdi Pāsha had cast into prison, finding Nāmiq Pāsha inexorable in certain demands which he had made upon him, declared war on the Pāsha and established himself at Musaiyib on the Euphrates, an important strategic point commanding the routes from Baghdād to Karbala, Najaf, Hillah, and Diwāniyah. His horsemen and those of the Dilaim and 'Anizah, who also had differences with the Government, were soon "scouring the country up to the gates of Baghdād, driving off camels, "plundering caravans, clearing out and burning the villages in the

"suburbs, and committing every species of havoc and disorder." Simultaneously a mixed force of Khazā'il, Ma'dān and 'Anizah Arabs were besieguering the Turkish garrison of Diwāniyah and cutting off its supplies. As in the time of Najīb Pāsha, the Turkish troops had begun to murmur at the privations and fatigue imposed on them by an apparently insensate policy; and Shākir Pāsha, the Army Commandant, had been suspended by Nāmiq Pāsha for too freely expressing his opinion of the inadequacy of the military resources of the province to the coercion of all the Arab tribes at one and the same time. In these circumstances, hampered also by a revolt at Najaf which we shall presently describe, Nāmiq Pāsha condescended to negotiate, though not in the first instance with the arch-rebel Wadi Bey; but the final settlement between him and the Euphrates tribes is not recorded.

First revolt at Najaf, August 1852.

There were at this epoch, as at the present day, two Arab factions in Najaf known as the Shumurd and the Zugurd. In general they occupied the town jointly, but a few years before 1852 the Shumurd altogether expelled the Zugurd; and in 1852, under a local Arab chief of some notoriety who had been badly treated by Nāmiq Pāsha, the Shumurd seem to have set the Government of Baghdād itself at defiance. If the Pāsha had deigned to make use of the Zugurd against the Shumurd, Najaf would probably have been recovered without difficulty; but he despised the assistance of such allies and instead caused Turkish troops from Hillah, Diwāniyah and Daghārah to be concentrated before Najaf under an officer named Salīm Pāsha. The task confronting this commander is thus described in a British despatch of the day:

> They (*i.e.*, the Shumurd) look with contempt upon the Turkish troops and are well aware that, while Wādi Bey and the Aniseh hold the open country, no military impression can be made on their position. It appears indeed that the plan of defence adopted systematically by this tribe is one which would try the metal of the best soldiers in the world. They place no reliance on the walls of the town, but intrench themselves within the strongest and most populous quarter, throwing up barricades across all the streets, connecting the houses by mines and galleries, loopholing the walls, and occupying every commanding point with their matchlock men, who are admirably armed and are the most expert marksmen in this part of Asia. Salim Pāsha's difficulties, if he thus attempted to expel the Shumerts by force, would be of the same nature as those which met Cavaignac in the Faubourg St. Antoine, while his chance of success would be infinitely less, inasmuch as the narrow streets and high-walled courts of an Oriental city afford greater shelter to the defenders, and the Turkish soldier, brave even to daring in the open field, quails before a hidden enemy.

In these circumstances Salīm Pāsha proceeded to negotiate with the Shumurd through the Shī'ah Mujtahids of the town; and those inter-

mediaries, to whose minds the recollection of the Karbala massacre in 1843 must have been present, exerted their influence with the chief of the insurgents so effectually that he agreed to evacuate the town and remove to Hillah, provided that his personal safety was guaranteed and that he and his followers were allowed to carry their arms and property with them. This arrangement was apparently carried out, but not without an unfortunate incident of which Nāmiq Pāsha gave the following account to Major Rawlinson at Baghdād: "that . . . . the Turkish officer who had "conducted the previous negotiations had judged it necessary to "arrest other parties in Nejjef who had not withdrawn; that the follow- "ers of these parties attempted a rescue; that the townspeople then rose; "that street fighting was maintained for 24 hours with considerable "loss on either side; that there was of course a good deal of pillage and "destruction of property; but that ultimately the Arab combatants were "driven out of the place, and that the authorities were now employed "in restoring order and returning to their proper owners the effects "which had been plundered." Major Rawlinson was disposed to think, however, that the whole matter was pre-arranged, that the chiefs were first enticed away, and that the townspeople, when off their guard and relying on the capitulation, were surprised by the Turkish troops. He believed, nevertheless, that no great damage had occurred.

Second revolt at Najaf, 1854.

At the beginning of 1854, Rashid Pāsha having in the meantime succeeded Nāmiq Pāsha as Governor-General of Baghdād, there was a second outbreak at Najaf against the authority of the Turkish Government. The cause seems to have been the withdrawal of a garrison that had been stationed in Najaf, which emboldened the Shumurd and Zugurd, acting on this occasion in concert, to assemble about 2,000 men and forcibly repossess themselves of the town. After an interval, during which he sent troops from Baghdād to Hillah and ordered the Commandant of Diwānīyah to be ready to co-operate, Rashid Pāsha himself proceeded to Hillah; and at the end of March a Turkish force recaptured Najaf, having expelled the rebels with little loss to themselves and small incidental injury to the general public. The Arabs, however, were said to have suffered severely.

State of the Baghdād Pāshāliq, 1854.

An interesting account of the internal condition of the Baghdād Pāshāliq was given by Commander Felix Jones, I.N., writing in 1854. With regard to the management of the Arab tribes, he said:

To sum up generally on this head, owing to the nomade habits, I must add, they are one and all but little under the control of the Turkish Government. It is true that a sort of tacit understanding exists between them and the authorities, that, so long as the revenue at which the tribe is assessed is paid, they are to suffer no molestation. This

assessment takes place annually, but much difficulty is experienced before the sum is fully paid up, the object of the Arab being to show he is really too poor, and that of the Government to obtain, if well paid in one year, an increase of tribute in the next. Thus both parties fall out, (and) are for the most part always at odds, if not at open war. Too weak to coerce them efficiently, the Government employs the usual weapons of the feeble, those of exciting party against party. Factions are thus raised in the tribes, the much-coveted Sheikhships are sold, as it were, to the highest bidders, and a constant rivalry exists, fomented by the Government as an element to neutralize the combinations and rebellions so frequent in all ages among these singularly constituted people. It is this system, however, which has impoverished both the country and people.

Commander Jone's remarks on the Government of the town of Baghdâd, etc., which follow, are obviously accurate as well as extremely interesting, and to a large extent they still hold good of the province at the present day.

On the Government of the province, and the *imperium in imperio* system pursued to weaken those who, when united, were able to set up in antagonism to authority, I have already touched. Generally speaking, the form of administration in Baghdâd and in the minor towns is based on that of Constantinople, varied only to suit local usages and requirements, when these do not operate badly upon the general law, which, of course is that of the Koran, and the interpretations which learned legislators have awarded to its less intelligible doctrines. The old despotic rule has been closed for some years; and now a council, at which the Pacha usually presides, hears and determines upon all cases. It is a mixed one of Mahomedans and Christians; but the latter in Turkey are not as yet sufficiently independent to do justice to their position when the Mahomedan portion may be biased by their creed, or by corruption, to pronounce an unjust award. To speak candidly, these nefarious practices in perversion of law and right are less complained of in Baghdâd than in most parts of the Turkish empire, and under the more enlightened and honest administration of the present Pacha, Mahomed Reshid, they are less flagrant. He discountenances them, indeed, in his desire to benefit the State and to raise his fellow Turk in the scale of humanity; a Herculean task certainly, but the attempt is still worthy of commendation. Trained by education in Europe, the present Governor-General of Iraq has the tact, and perhaps the energy, to work a change in this neglected province. Unfortunately he has no seconds. All his subordinates are as ignorant as Turks usually are, and his efforts are, moreover, often paralysed by the dogged obstinacy of their characters. The terrible pressure upon the resources of Turkey by the present war is another drawback to him, for he is called upon to furnish funds to aid in maintaining the struggle, and with an exhausted exchequer, he must resort to an extra tax upon his people. Complaints are therefore as rife as public improvement is at a stand-still. Too poor to maintain an efficient staff in the various departments, the fiscal arrangements of the province, as well as the police of the towns, are on the most slender and inadequate scale. Frequent and daring robberies, as well as loss of revenue, result from the want of force to levy the one, and the absence of efficient means to check the commission of the other. There is, in fact, no system; and so long as Governorships, public lands, custom dues, and the wholesale vending of many staple articles of commerce and food, are held as monopolies by the highest bidders in the State auction, improvement cannot be expected. Every one, of course, works these with the greatest gain and least loss to himself, regardless of the effect upon individuals, and the hideous consequences to the State. The regular army, too, in the province is far too small for its extent in the most peace-

able times; indeed, should a serious *émeute* arise in Baghdád itself, the whole force would barely suffice to put it down; and when the lawless character of the tribes around is considered, it is a wonder, indeed, that such a patchwork and threadbare form of government can hold together at all. The secret lies, however, in the opposite elements of the governed body, and the character of the general mind being too slow to work extended mischief; a love of repose and a singular apathy in the people to past, present or future events, adds to the security, while it acts in an inverse ratio when we think of the energy necessary to effect improvement. On the whole, it may be said that the population is a quiet one. There is little appearance of fanaticism in it. The Jew and the Christian are tolerated, and enjoy immunities which they do not elsewhere possess. The only tax upon them is the Kharaj, or capitation tax, levied annually on males only above the age of fifteen, in the proportion of about ten, five, and two and a half shillings per head. This exempts them from all other demands; and while the poor Mahomedan is often dragged from his wife and children, and made to serve as a soldier, these classes pursue their occupation in quiet in the midst of their families, and yet are not contented. But was the oriental ever so? No! and moreover, the Christians and Jews of Turkey, while they are insidiously robbing all classes of their neighbours, are ever ready to whine about oppressions, and, unfortunately they receive attention from those who are ignorant of their characters and real position in Turkey. I venture to assert, indeed, there is more real ill-will felt towards Jews in Europe than at the present time in Turkey, and the concealed hatred of Roman Catholic and Protestant manifests itself more in those civilised states than it now does in the dominions of the Sultan. We have nothing to compare among Mahomedans with the Spanish denial of sepulture to their fellow Christians. Here every sect of Christian has its churches and cemeteries; and the intercourse between individuals of totally different creeds in the common concerns of life is less restricted and infinitely more courteous than among those professing Christianity under different denominations in Europe. Massacre in this country, solely on account of antagonistic belief, is a rare thing and, when it does occur, it arises more from its being the first political weapon at hand on the part of the rebellious townspeople against the Government than from any inherent desire to shed Christian blood, and in some cases it has been brought about by the Christians themselves being urged to set at defiance the restrictions they had lived under in peace, if not in absolute freedom. * * *

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The law of Tanzimat, or Tanzimat, suspending the infliction of capital punishment in the provinces governed by Pachas, has been productive of both good and evil. It was certainly wise and humane to place restrictions on the despotic will of local Governors, particularly in the provinces near Constantinople, but we may question if it was politic to set aside the punishment which held in check the lawless tribes of marauders that wander over a great part of the Turkish empire, at a distance from the capital. In 'Iráq and its towns, the promulgation of this edict was looked upon by the evil as an amnesty for crime, and by the well-disposed with alarm. Revolt, robbery, and murder increased; whereas the amputation of a hand or a foot, the timely impalement or public decapitation of a blood-stained villain (I must speak the truth while deploring the necessity) operated for a long time in those provinces on the public mind, though doubtless there were occasions when the absolute power of the Pacha might be exercised in ridding himself of people less obnoxious to the public than to himself. The law, indeed, has been too sweeping to be attended with entire good; for we observe offenders, after being convicted of parricide and other baneful misorders, cape the death they have fully merited, and when immediate example was

required, by long confinement in prison awaiting a decision from Constantinople. For the more distant provinces this law should be modified, so that retributive justice should immediately follow the commission of crime. I will not deny but that long incarceration may be worse than death to the offender, but such a mode of punishment is lost in these countries, where example and precept are understood only through the channel of the eye. Here we might as well imprison a mule to deter others from kicking. The public mind is not yet enlightened enough to understand the motives of the penal refinements of our European codes.

Taxation of the Muntafik, 1851-55.

The rapid enhancement of fiscal demands at this period, together with the frequent changes in the Shaikhship of tribes which they involved, are well illustrated by the case of the Muntafik. Previous to Najīb Pāsha's arrival in 1842 the Shaikh of this tribe had been liable for an annual payment of 100,000* Shāmis only. By 1851, when Fāris was Shaikh, the assessment had risen to 200,000 Shāmis. In the autumn of 1851 Shaikh Mansūr undertook to pay 240,000 Shāmis a year; but in the spring of 1852 he was outbidden by Shaikh Sālih, who offered 300,000. In October 1853, the Samāwah district assessed at 100,000 Shāmis per annum having in the meanwhile been removed from the Muntafik Chief's jurisdiction, Shaikh Mansūr undertook to pay 310,000 Shāmis a year for the remainder; and in 1855 Shaikh Bandar assumed an annual liability, notwithstanding further reductions of territory, of at least 310,000 Shāmis.

Insurrection of the Āl Bū Muhammad, 1855.

In 1855 the Āl Bū Muhammed tribe, occupying the banks of the Tigris below 'Amārah, revolted for financial reasons and began to plunder villages and to attack boats plying on the river. It was found impossible to coerce them, because no sooner did Turkish troops appear on the scene than the amphibious tribesmen vanished into their lagoons; so, after the navigation of the Tigris had been completely suspended for six months, the Turkish Government agreed to accept as their revenue that which the tribe themselves were willing to pay.

Turkish administrative arrangements, 1839—61.

A few facts interesting to students of Turkish administration emerge from the records of the time. Some of them, implying changes, must no

* The Shāmi at this time was worth about one shilling and six pence English.

doubt be attributed to the reforming and centralising zeal of the Constantinople bureaucracy under 'Abdul Majíd, the first Sultán under whom the influence of the capital on provincial administration is clearly traceable at Baghdád. Others may have been connected with Turkish designs on Muhammareh.

Military recruiting at Baghdád, 1844.

So early as 1844 an attempt was made to raise a local regiment at Baghdád by voluntary enlistment. About 200 recruits were obtained; but fears of conscription or some other evil to follow created a panic in the city, from which 3,000 or 4,000 people actually took flight. The experiment was probably a failure.

Institution of Daftardárs, 1845.

In 1845 the first regular Daftardár or Accountant-General, an official ever since well known at Baghdád, appears to have been posted to Turkish 'Iráq. He seems to have worked at first under the direct orders of the central Government; and his authority superseded, in certain revenue matters, that of the executive ruler of the Páshálíq. That this centralising innovation cannot long have remained in full vigour seems clear from the arbitrary and ruinous fiscal policy pursued by Najíb Pásha and his successors after 1845, unless indeed it was dictated by the new official, which does not seem probable.

Octroi duties, 1847.

Orders from Constantinople were received at Baghdád in 1847 for the abolition of Ihtisáb or octroi duty in the towns. This may have been a fashionable reform, or proposed reform in Western Turkey at the time; but in Turkish 'Iráq octroi was destined to survive for many a year to come. The Daftardár of Baghdád made a journey to Basrah, however, to discover whether any compensating tax could be realised at that port in lieu of octroi.

Commission of Rághib Pásha, 1847.

Administrative Commissions of Enquiry now come into vogue. In March 1847 one Rághib Pásha was sent from Constantinople with a Farmán and sword of honour for Najíb Pásha, which he presented at Baghdád with much *éclat*; but he had also instructions to inspect Basrah and the Shatt-al-'Arab districts generally, and to report how the town could best be improved, the local revenues enhanced, and the naval strength of Turkey upon the river increased. The British Political Agent at Baghdád considered the proceedings of this Commissioner likely to appear suspicious not only to the Persians, with whom the frontier line was in dispute, but also to the Muntafik tribe for other reasons. The institution of a separate Páshálíq of Basrah three years later may have been a result of Rághib Pásha's deputation.

Existence of a Kahiyah at

In 1849 the ancient office of Kahiyah still existed at Baghdád. The Kahiyah was originally a very confidential officer of the Pásha's house-

hold, sometimes described as his chamberlain, and a member of his personal rather than of his official staff; but it seems probable that by 1849 he had become a public officer corresponding to the Assistant Wāli (Adjoint du Vali or Mu'āwin) of the present day. Baghdād, 1849.

As late as 1845 the Turkish Governor of Basrah still bore the old-fashioned title of Mutasallim, and his position was that of a modern "Qāim-Maqām" under the Pāsha, now "Wāli", of Baghdād. In 1850 the Basrah districts were suddenly divided from those of Baghdād and made a separate charge under an almost independent Pāsha. The new Basrah Pāshāliq embraced all the Turkish districts upon the Shatt-al-'Arab; those upon the Euphrates up to and including Samāwah; and those upon the Tigris up to and including 'Amārah upon its eastern bank, and, on its western bank, up to the point where the Hai or Shatt-al-Gharaf leaves it. Basrah thus comprised the whole territory of the Muntafik tribe, whose influence then greatly predominated in the internal politics of lower Turkish 'Irāq, and whose connections with Baghdād were slender. The Pāsha of Basrah was empowered to correspond direct with the Porte, but in military and financial matters he was made subordinate to the Government of Baghdād. Separation of Basrah from Baghdād and its erection into a Pāshāliq, 1850.

The first holder of the new Pāshāliq was Ma'shūq Pāsha, who arrived at Baghdād on the 3rd April 1850 and left again the very next day for the seat of his government, accompanied by a staff of naval officers and artificers whom he had brought with him from Constantinople.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Persia, 1839—61.

During the period with which we are now concerned the relations of Turkey and Persia were more than once strained almost to breaking point; but war was averted by the intervention of Britain and Russia in one case, and by isolated British action in another. The frontier province of Turkish 'Irāq, as it was the place of origin of some of the gravest questions between the two Oriental States, was also the scene of the hostile, mediatory, and preventive measures to which those questions gave rise.

The first treaty of Erzeroum, that of 1823, contained numerous excellent clauses for the improvement of Turko-Persian relations; but in practice it Frontier questions

and proceedings resulting in the Second Treaty of Erzeroum, 1839—47.

failed to establish a peaceful border. In 1842 friction between the two limitrophe powers became so intense that war seemed imminent. Mutual difficulties arose largely from the conduct of marauding chiefs and restless tribes upon the frontier to the north of Baghdád; but there were also larger questions at issue. The destruction of the disputed town of Muhammareh by the Turks in 1837 was a principal grievance of the Persian Government, and they demanded as compensation for the same the payment of about a million pounds sterling. Various pretenders to the throne of Persia were harboured at Baghdád, of whom two received pensions from the Turkish Government and others, who had visited England, from the British. In 1840 a Persian force occupied Sulaimániyah generally a dependency of Baghdád; and in July of that year the Sháh of Persia himself, having collected 12,000 men, a number of field guns and many camel-swivels, appeared to be meditating an attack on Baghdád, but was persuaded * to retrace his steps from Kangovár. A military expedition by the Persian Governor of 'Arabistán in 1841 to Fallahiyeh and Muhammareh was regarded by the Turks in much the same light as their own action at Muhammareh in 1837 had been by the Persians. The climax was reached when, in 1842, a force organised by the Turkish authorities at Sulaimániyah, which they had recovered, made a surprise attack on the summer quarters of the Persian Váli of Ardilán. The Persians, on this last occasion, were the real aggressors; but the fact did not transpire until later, nor did it prevent the Persian Government from invoking, with success, the good offices of the British † and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople. Troops began to be massed on both sides of the frontier; but eventually, on the advice of the mediating Ambassadors and under the superintendence of British and Russian agents who proceeded to the spot, but not without some reluctance on the part of the Turks, warlike preparations were discontinued.

It was eventually agreed that a Joint Commission of Turkish and Persian Plenipotentiaries, to be assisted by delegates representing Britain and Russia, the mediating powers, should meet at Erzeroum to investigate—and, if possible, settle — the territorial and other questions in

* According to Layard his return was due to Russian influence, the Russians fearing that Britain might, in case of a conflict, espouse the Turkish side (Layard's Early *Adventures*, Volume I, page 248). See also Mitford's *Land March*, Volume I, page 360.

† Despatches relating to the situation, so far as it had then developed, were carried by Sir A. H. (then Mr.) Layard for Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent at Baghdád, to the British Embassy at Constantinople in May-July 1842. See Layard's *Early Adventures*, Volume II, pages 306 *et seq.*

dispute. The British Commissioner was Colonel Williams,* R. A., afterwards Sir W. Fenwick Williams "of Kars," and with him was associated in the beginning the Hon'ble R. Curzon, afterwards Lord Zouche, from the British Embassy at Constantinople.

The first conference of the Commissioners at Erzeroum was held on the 15th May 1843. The difficulties inherent in the task of the commission were greatly aggravated by the recent Turkish massacre of Persians and other Shi'ahs at Karbala, and by various questions regarding the position of Persians in Turkey which had arisen; but examination of evidence and discussions continued at Erzeroum until March 1844, when they were interrupted by the insolence of the Turkish plenipotentiary, Enveri Bey,† in replying to his Persian Colleague,‡ Mirza Taqi Khan, on the question of whether Shi'ahs should be allowed to possess separate mosques of their own in Turkey. The principal negotiations were then transferred to Europe, the members of the commission awaiting the result at Erzeroum. Not uneventfully, however, for in 1846 the house of the Persian plenipotentiary was besieged and pillaged by a Sunni mob, the Turkish authorities not stirring to his assistance, though Colonel Williams risked his life in the affray. Two dependents of the Persian representative were murdered also; and eventually he received £8,000 as compensation from the Turkish Government.

At length, on the 31st May 1847, the Second Treaty of Erzeroum was signed at that place by the Turkish and Persian plenipotentiaries, Enveri Effendi and Mirza Taqi Khan, in the presence of Colonel Williams

* Colonel Williams was the original nominee, but he fell ill; and Mr. Curzon, who was at the time Sir Stratford Canning's Private Secretary at Constantinople, was appointed in his place. Colonel Williams presently recovered, however, and he and Mr. Curzon then proceeded to Erzeroum as Joint Commissioners. In October 1843, Mr. Curzon had an attack of brain fever at Erzeroum and was obliged, after his recovery, to go home. Sir Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, had originally advocated the appointment as British Commissioner of Mr. (afterwards Sir A. H.) Layard, a private traveller possessed of local knowledge; but his recommendations were not accepted by Lord Aberdeen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Lord Palmerston, Lord Aberdeen's successor, offered Mr. Layard a Joint Commissionership at a later stage of the proceedings, but Mr. Layard had by that time found other employment.

† The original Turkish Commissioner was Neri Effendi, who had been Ambassador at London and Vienna, but he died before the proceedings at Erzeroum began. It was only after some delay that Enveri Effendi, who had been his Secretary, arrived in his place.

‡ The first nominee of Persia was Mirza Ja'far, who had been Persian Ambassador at the Porte, but illness prevented his proceeding further than Tabriz in the direction of Erzeroum.

and Colonel Daimbo, the British and Russian Commissioners. The ratifications were exchanged at Constantinople on the 21st March 1848.

The principal provisions of the Treaty affecting the Persian Gulf region were as follows.

Second Treaty of Erzeroum, 1847.

As regarded pecuniary matters, Turkey and Persia were to abandon all their claims and counter-claims; but the question of certain pasturage dues and of losses sustained since 1845 was excepted from this provision, with a view to its being investigated and equitably settled by a Joint Commission. The general stipulation, it will be seen, barred the recovery by Persia of compensation for the damage done by the Turks at Muhammareh in 1837 and at Karbala in 1843.

With reference to the territorial question, the Turkish Government formally undertook that Persia should hold possession, in full sovereignty, of the town and port of Muhammareh, of the island of Khidhar (*i.e.*, 'Abbádán), of the anchorage, and also of the islands on the eastern bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, occupied by tribes recognised as dependent on Persia. Persian vessels should enjoy the right of navigating the Shatt-al 'Arab, with perfect freedom, from its mouth to the point where Turkish and Persian territory met upon the eastern bank. The frontier from Muhammareh in the south as far as Zohâe in the north was not mentioned in the Treaty at all and was thus left, under a final article, to be regulated by earlier treaties. A Joint Commission, including engineers, was to be appointed immediately for the actual delimitation of the frontier in accordance with the terms of the Treaty.

In respect of frontier administration, it was laid down that each border tribe should be compelled to inhabit one side of the frontier only; that raids and crimes committed across the frontier should be punished by the authorities of the territory from which they were committed; and that each power should station troops at suitable points for restraining the marauding tribes.

Further provisions were that Persian pilgrims were to be free to carry out their pilgrimages in Turkey without molestation; that Persian merchants and other Persian subjects in Turkey were to be protected and treated with consideration; and that Consuls appointed by the Persian Government to any places in Turkey where they might be required (except Makkah and Madînah) were to be recognised by the Turkish Government and enjoy the same *ex-officio* privileges as the Consuls of other powers. These last arrangements were reciprocal, Persia being equally bound by the Treaty to protect Turkish subjects and recognise Turkish Consuls in her dominions.

The Treaty was ratified subject to certain explanations of its meaning furnished by the Ambassadors of the mediating powers at Constantinople, Lord Cowley and M. de Titow, at the request of the Porte, which were accepted both by the Turkish Government and by a Persian plenipotentiary. These explanations were embodied in a joint note of the mediating representatives to the Porte and were not without significance. The most important were to the effect: that by the "anchorage of Muhammareh" was meant the place opposite to that town and within the Haffār Canal (*i.e.*, the Kārun River); that in leaving to Persia, in the region in question, the town, port, and anchorage at Muhammareh, as also the island of Khidhar (*i.e.*, 'Abbādān), the Porte did not give up, in the said region, any other lands or ports which might exist there; that Persia could not, under any pretext, lay claim to the countries situated on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, nor to land belonging to Turkey on the left bank, even in the event of Persian tribes being settled, wholly or partially, on the bank or lands mentioned; and that all claims for indemnification by State against State were at an end, the claims of private individuals only being cognisable by the Joint Commission which was to deal with recent losses and pasturage dues. By means of the Ambassadors' explanatory note a more detailed assurance regarding the reciprocal treatment of Turkish Consuls and subjects in Persia was conveyed to the Porte as having been accepted by Persia; and the Porte were at the same time informed of the Shāh's having agreed that, so long as Turkey did not build fortifications on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab opposite to Persian territory, Persia on her part would refrain from constructing any on the portion of the left bank assigned to her by the Treaty.

We may now examine the state of affairs which existed locally, on certain parts of the frontier, during the period which intervened between the accession of the Sultān 'Abdul Majīd and the conclusion of the Second Treaty of Erzeroum.

Affairs on the Basrah-Muhammareh frontier, 1839-46. 1841.

We have seen that the Turks, on withdrawing their troops from Muhammareh after the expedition of 1837, left Thāmir, the Shaikh of the Ka'ab, in possession of his domains, but as a dependent of Turkey.

As is more fully related in the history of 'Arabistān, however, the Ka'ab Shaikh Thāmir was obliged in 1841, by a Persian demand for arrears of revenue coupled with the movement of Persian troops against him, to withdraw from Fallāhiyeh to Muhammareh, whence he proceeded to invoke Turkish support. The Persian Governor of 'Arabistān then notified the Turkish Governor of Basrah of his intention to follow the absconding Shaikh to Muhammareh and invited the co-operation of the

Turkish fleet in preventing his escape by water. The Turks hesitated whether to assist or to disown their new vassal; and Shaikh Thāmir took refuge, for a second time, at Kuwait. The Persian Governor then occupied Muhammareh and threatened to advance to Di'aiji; but the attitude of the local Arabs prevented the execution of any further designs on his part. A tardy protest and demonstration were made by the Turks against the action of the Persians, but they were ignored, and the Persian Governor confirmed a double appointment which he had made to the vacant Shaikhship of the Ka'ab.

1842. In 1842, on the flight of the new joint Shaikhs and the retirement of the Persian Governor northward to deal with difficulties which had arisen in another part of his charge, the Turkish Governor of Basrah was instructed by the Pāsha of Baghdād to reinstate Shaikh Thāmir and to call upon the Persians to leave Muhammareh; but Shaikh Thāmir's influence over his own tribe was now clearly lost, even his patrons the Turks had begun to slight him, and no material action was taken on his behalf. To the demand for the evacuation of Muhammareh the Persians seem to have replied by claiming the whole left bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab up to Qūrnah, where the Shatt-al-'Arab was at that time formed by the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates.

1843. In the following year Shaikh Jābir, the chief of the Muhaisin and the real ruler of Muhammareh, having heard rumours that the Erzeroum Commission, which had lately assembled, were likely in the end to assign the Muhammareh district to Turkey, seems to have approached the Turkish authorities with proposals as to the terms on which he might be allowed to hold it under them. His action seems to have been prompted, also, by difficulties in which he found himself involved with the Persian revenue authorities; but it had no definite result.

1844. Meanwhile Thāmir, the ex-Shaikh of the Ka'ab, had migrated from Kuwait, his first asylum, to Basrah, and there had settled down as a wealthy private owner of houses, lands, and gardens. In 1884, at the suggestion of the Pāsha of Baghdād and helped on his way by the British authorities, most of whom at this time favoured the claim of Turkey to Muhammareh, he appeared before the Commission at Erzeroum and gave evidence before it, on the Turkish side, regarding the international position of the Ka'ab tribe. On his return journey, however, in April 1844, the ex-Shaikh, at the instance of the British Political Agent at Baghdād, was detained there lest, in the still unsettled state of the frontier question, his reappearance at Basrah should be the signal for trouble

in the neighbourhood of Muhammareh. Eventually, after three months' detention at Baghdād, he was allowed to proceed homewards on giving suitable assurances.

At this juncture, probably as a precaution against a sudden *coup de main* by the ex-Shaikh Thāmir and the Turks, but ostensibly for the purpose of recovering revenue from Shaikh Jābir, who was still in possession of the district, the Persian Governor of 'Arabistān threw a Persian infantry regiment, with one gun, into Muhammareh as a garrison. One result was the flight of the Muhaisin Shaikh across the Shatt-al-'Arab into Turkish territory, where the ex-Shaikh of the Ka'ab was already settled; another was a protest by the Porte against the military re-occupation by the Persians, *pendente lite*, of the disputed district. The Persians, however, set about enlarging and improving the fortifications of Muhammareh; while large numbers of the Ka'ab tribe, probably disliking the vicinity of a garrison, migrated from the Persian to the Turkish bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab and could not be induced to return. Towards the end of 1845 an attempt was made by the Persian authorities to bring Shaikh Jābir back to Muhammareh by the offer of favourable terms, but he feared treachery and would not adventure himself in their power. Meanwhile Musallim-bin-Barkat, another member of the Ka'ab ruling family and an aspirant to the Shaikhship, had taken refuge on the Turkish side of the river from the *de facto* Shaikh and was plotting against him there. The Turkish authorities, however, observed a correct attitude towards the refugees and abstained from seeking to benefit by their intrigues. That they did so seems to have been chiefly due to the influence of the British Political Agent at Baghdād, whose position as the representative of one of the powers mediating at Erzeroum no doubt gave weight to his advice. 1845.

The continuance of a Persian garrison at Muhammareh, though it was a small one, seems to have caused uneasiness at Basrah, to allay which and to maintain the Turkish claim to Muhammareh a Turkish guardship was, in 1846, stationed at the mouth of the Kārūn. The Persian Government objected strongly to the presence of this vessel, and the Porte, on representations being made, consented to remove it; but it continued to hover in the neighbourhood. To a protest made at Baghdād, probably by the British Political Agent, the Pāsha merely replied that the ship did not affect, in any way, the trade of Muhammareh. This does not appear to have been altogether the case, for at least one complaint was received at Baghdād, in 1847, of a boat bound for Muhammareh having been forced by the guardship to go to Basrah first and pay duty there 1846-47.

on all her cargo. Eventually, at the instance of the British Political Agent at Baghdád, acting on a request from the British Minister at Tehrán, the Pásha consented to withdraw the vessel to Basrah and issued peremptory orders on the subject.

In the end, Muhammarah having been awarded to Persia by the Second Treaty of Erzeroum, Shaikh Jábir made his peace with the Persian Government, returned to Muhammarah, and obtained official recognition as ruler of that place; but the ex-Shaikh Thámir never regained his position as chief of the Ka'ab.

Affairs on the Baghdád-Kirmánsháh frontier, 1839-47.

Of the state of matters on the frontier more to the northward, at this time, only fitful glimpses are obtainable. In May 1843 the Pásha of Baghdád informed Colonel Farrant, then temporarily representing the British Government as a Special Commissioner for frontier affairs at Baghdád, that, in spite of precautions taken to prevent such occurrences, a section of the great Jáf tribe dependent on Sulaimánlyah had made a foray into Persia and plundered tribes there. The Pásha wrote to the Governor of Sulaimánlyah to take immediate punitive and remedial action, and Colonel Farrant also sent letters through the Persian Consul at Baghdád to the same local Governor and to the Persian Váli of Sinnah, desiring them to keep their Kurds in order; but the result is not recorded. In December of the same year the British Political Agent at Baghdád, having resumed the supervision of frontier relations after the departure of the Special Commissioner, reported that a portion of the Jáf who had emigrated to Persia had voluntarily returned to Turkey, so removing a grave inconvenience; for the Turkish Government had demanded their extradition, which the Persian Government were not prepared to concede. Petty acts of depredation continued to be committed by the Kurdish tribes on the frontier, but they did not necessarily involve serious consequences, as the local authorities on both sides of the border were able, if they pleased, to afford mutual redress without any sacrifice of dignity, or injury to the interests of their respective Governments.

In March 1847, however, the Second Treaty of Erzeroum being as yet unsigned, the situation had grown much worse. The British Political Agent at Baghdád reported that the tribes on the Persian side, "despairing of any accommodation, have now fairly thrown aside all "respect for authority and are doing themselves justice in their own "barbarous way, as opportunity offers. Outrages and wholesale plunder, "accompanied by loss of life, are matters of every-day occurrence, and "order I think can hardly be restored without extensive military

"combinations." Major Rawlinson succeeded, through the British Legation at Tehrān, in obtaining the despatch by the Governor of Kirmānshāh of a special Persian officer to the frontier; but the Pāsha of Baghdād, when approached on the subject, declined to send anyone to co-operate with the Persian Commissioner, alleging that previous experience forbade him to put any faith in the Persians, and that he could only take such a step if the British Political Agent would guarantee a satisfactory result. He wrote to Major Rawlinson on the subject and asked that translations of his letter might be forwarded to Constantinople and Tehrān, but the letter was worded so offensively to the Persian Government that transmission was refused.

Treatment of Persian subjects in Turkish 'Irāq, 1820-47.

The lot of Persian subjects in Turkish territory appears, during this interval of suspense, to have been no enviable one. In 1846 it was complained by the Persians that irregular internal duties were levied on their trade; that the fees for interment in sacred soil at Karbala and Najaf had been enhanced; that a harmful monopoly for the washing of the dead had been granted at the Holy Cities; that a double toll was exacted from Persians crossing the Kūfah ferry near Najaf; that duties were now levied on burials even in the Khaimahgāh at Karbala, where they had hitherto been free; that a tax was imposed on Persian pilgrims to Makkah; that Persians, like Europeans, were required to be in possession of passports; and that Persian pilgrims were not properly protected, nor even compensated for their losses when the actual offenders against them were caught. Some of these complaints were not substantiated, and others were frivolous; but the fact remains that Persian subjects were regarded and treated with consistent hostility by the local Turkish officials. The fault lay, in part at least, with the Persian Government itself; and in March 1843, the British Political Agent at Baghdād wrote: "Although upwards of three months have now "elapsed since the death of the Persian Consul no measures have been "taken to replace him, and not only have my efforts to protect Persian "interests at Baghdād during the interval been unacknowledged and un-"supported at Tehran, but in some instances they have been actually "thwarted for no motive that I can conceive but that of jealousy; at the "same time every case in which I advocate Persian claims injures my "position with Nejib Pasha, hampers one in asserting British rights, and "risks collision with the Consul-General of France, so that I have been "constrained of late to remain almost passive."

Attempted delimitation of the

In 1848 a Commission was formed for the delimitation of the frontier in accordance with the Second Treaty of Erzeroum: it consisted of

Turko-Persian frontier under the Second Treaty of Erzeroum, 1848-52.

Derviah Pasha, representing Turkey, and Mirza Ja'far Khān, representing Persia, as principals, with Colonel Williams and Colonel Teherikoff, British and Russian Commissioners, as auxiliaries. The British surveyor was Captain Glascott, R.N., the Russian, M. Agranowitch. Mr. W. K. Loftus * was appointed geologist to the British Commission, but was employed largely on detached archæological duties.

1849. The Commission assembled at Baghdād in 1849, but the commencement of proceedings was delayed by the late arrival of the Turkish Commissioner, who after indulging in unilateral and high-handed action on the northern frontier, loitered at Mūsal until the season was too far advanced for field work. The summer of 1849 was passed at Baghdad, and in the autumn the British, Russian, and Turkish parties made a tour to Hillah, Najaf and Karbala, entering the courtyard of the shrine at Najaf to the great indignation of the Shi'ah population, but not venturing within the actual tomb of 'Ali.

1850. Operations only began in January 1850 at Muhammareh, where, during the early summer, the four camps composing the Commission suffered intense discomfort from heat, mosquitoes, and a curious endemic sickness. To escape these inconveniences the British party undertook a tour in the Persian hills, but there they lost one of their number, Mr. A. Wood, by death. The Turkish Commissioner, whose attitude had from the first been unpromising, now gave clear proof of the unconciliatoriness of his spirit by claiming for Turkey a large tract of country to the east and north of Muhammareh, including Qubbān, between which and the Turkish possessions to the west of the Shatt-al-'Arab the town, port and anchorage of Muhammareh together with the island of 'Abbādān should, he contended, form a small enclave. He also undertook separate surveys and statistical enquiries among the Persian tribes surrounding Muhammareh, intrigued with their chiefs, and issued inflammatory proclamations. The Persian Commissioner, not to be outdone by his colleague in the boldness of his pretensions, asserted that the rights of Persia on the left bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab extended so far up that river as the confluence with it of the Suwaib—a point many miles above Basrah. The argument on which the claims of the two plenipotentiaries were founded may be epitomised in the words : ancient suzerainty over the occupying tribes. A boundary intermediate between those claimed by the Turkish and Persian representatives was eventually suggested by the British and Russian Commissioners. It was approved by the mediating Govern-

* Mr. Loftus was afterwards appointed to the Geological Survey of India and died in 1858 while returning home from that country.

ments; but the Porte rejected it, and the Persian Government's acceptance of it was conditional.

The Turkish Commissioner had gone so far as to propose, in February 1850, that the collection of taxes by the Persian authorities at Muhammareh should cease, and that the Persian employés and troops there should be withdrawn, the place not having yet been formally * ceded to Persia; and later he pressed for the removal of Shaikh Jábir, whom the Persians had recognised as Governor, and made other irritating demands. In reply, moreover, to the admittedly "vain and impolitic substitution of the Royal Persian flag for the local colours which had marked the Shah's government of that town † for upwards of sixty years," Turkish war vessels appeared on the scene and maintained for a time what was virtually a naval blockade of the Kárún River.

Towards the end of 1851, however, on its being rumoured that Persian troops were on their way to re-inforce Muhammareh, the Turkish Commissioner agreed in writing, being then at Zohab with the rest of the Commission, that pending a final settlement no innovation should be made by either claimant in the Muhammareh district—in other words, that the *status quo*, which favoured the Persians, should be maintained. A special point was the possession of the island of Muhalleh (*i.e.*, Hájí Salbúq), on which the Persian authorities had installed an agent; and it was agreed, as the Turkish representative denied the island to be a part of 'Abbádán, that the Persian functionary should be provisionally withdrawn. 1851.

It was not the pleasure, however, of the Turkish Commissioner or of his Government that the temporary arrangement reached should continue. This was clear from the conduct of Ma'shúq Pásha, the ruler of the new Basrah Páshálíq, who now took two refugees from Muhammareh territory under his protection and patronage. They were Sulaimán-al-Ghadhbán and Músa-al-Jandil, of whom the former was provided with a place of abode on the Turkish side of the Shatt-al-'Arab opposite to Hájí Salbúq Island in disregard of the protests of Shaikh Jábir, while the latter was settled in a confiscated house at Basrah, formerly the property of Hájí Jábir, and made havoc as a pirate of native shipping on the lower Shatt-al-'Arab 1852.

* It had been relinquished to Persia by the Treaty of Erzeroum, under which the Commission were working, but Dervish Pásha probably hoped to find means of stultifying the Treaty.

† *Sc.* Muhammareh.

An attempt to delimit the frontier in the district of Zohâb between Baghdâd and Kirmânshâh, where a preliminary survey had already been made by Major Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdâd, and Commander Felix Jones of the Indian Navy in 1844, led to an acute difference between Dervish Pâsha and his colleagues; and at Mandali, on the 19th January 1852, acting professedly under instructions from his Government, he demanded the restoration of what he affected to consider the *status quo* at Muhammareh and in Zohâb,—including in the case of Muhammareh the hauling down of the Persian flag there, the dismissal of Hâji Jâbir, etc.,—and announced that in default of compliance he would no longer act with the rest of the Commission. On his persisting in this determination the other Commissioners decided to march southwards along the border and make a survey of the frontier region from Mandali to Hawizeh,—a resolve which they did not fail to carry out in spite of the strenuous opposition of Dervish Pâsha, who himself retired to Baghdâd.

An attempt was then made at Constantinople to obtain the substitution of arbitration by Britain and Russia for their mediation, but it failed owing to the non-acceptance of the proposal by the Porte; and the task of the mediating Commissioners was confined, after the withdrawal of the Turkish representative, to survey operations and the collection of useful information. By the end of April 1852, about which time Lieutenant Jackson, I.N., was attached to the British Commission, the whole frontier had been mapped from the northern extremity of Zohâb to the Persian Gulf; and in May the Turkish Commissioner rejoined his colleagues, but only to hamper their work by secret intrigues with Persian tribes during the completion of the survey northwards to Mount Ararat.

Further proceedings, 1853-57.

Early in 1853 Colonel Williams proceeded to England on leave; and the outbreak of the Crimean War shortly afterwards put an end, for the time being, to co-operation between Britain and Russia in the Turko-Persian frontier question. In November 1857 the seat of the British Commission was transferred from Constantinople to St. Petersburg, where work on the maps of the frontier continued for some time longer.

It had been the intention of Colonel Williams to draw up a comprehensive report embodying the views of himself and his Russian colleague in regard to the position of the frontier at every point; but, by an unfortunate accident, his materials were lost while in transit to Woolwich. The report would have explained the *status quo* of tribal occupation as existing in 1849-52, which is not now discoverable.

Treatment of Persian subjects in Turkish Irāq after the Second Treaty of Erzeroum, 1848-52.

The stipulations for the good treatment of Persian subjects in Turkish 'Irāq which were contained in the Second Treaty of Erzeroum seem to have remained, to all intents and purposes, a dead letter. Under Najib Pāsha's rule Persians were exposed to cruel harassment at the hands of the Turkish officials: witness the following extract from a despatch of the British Political Agent at Baghdād to the British Ambassador at Constantinople in 1848:—

> The Persians, to whom His Excellency commonly applies the equally dishonourable title of "Rafizi," are the objects of an undisguised and undiscriminating persecution. To enumerate the multitudinous grievances under which the latter parties suffer would be too great a trespass upon Your Excellency's time and patience. Those grievances have been catalogued for the most part in my previous despatches, and they extend over every portion of the body politic and every question of individual right, whether affecting religion, conscience, nationality, property, commerce or personal security. The last refinement of severity to which my attention has been drawn (and which has been superadded to the prohibition of all charitable bequests or benefactory outlay upon the holy shrines and to a compulsory substitution of Sunni for Shiah law in the towns of Karbala and Nejef, not only in regard to civil contracts, conveyance of property, testamentary dispositions, etc., but in such personal matters as marriage and divorce) is a formal interdict that His Excellency has lately placed upon those traditional mourning ceremonies which, within certain bounds, the Persians have always hitherto been permitted to exhibit at the present season in memory of their martyred Imams. This interdict is regarded as almost equivalent to proscription of the Shiah faith, and has called for the most violent resentment generally amongst the Persian population.

When a new appointment was made by the Persian Government to the office of Persian Consul at Baghdād, apparently in 1849, it was stated that the *exequatur* of the new officer denied his right to exercise the extra-territorial jurisdiction over nationals vested in the Consuls of European powers under Capitulations, and that the Turks insisted upon all suits in which Persians were concerned being tried by the Sunni courts of the province. In 1852 the Persian Government forbade their subjects to cross the frontier into the Baghdād Pāshāliq; but this prohibition seems to have been due to the disturbed state of Turkish 'Irāq at the time, rather than to difficulties of a diplomatic order.

Crisis on the Basrah-Muhammarah frontier and British naval demonstration, 1854.

At the beginning of the Crimean war there appeared a probability that Persia might make common cause with Russia against Turkey and her allies, and in 1854 the Persian Governor of Dizfūl collected troops near the Basrah frontier with the purpose of attacking Basrah in case a rupture should take place. The Pasha of Baghdād, on his part, called the Arab tribes to arms and embarked on intrigues with Shaikh Jābir, the Persian

Governor of Muhammarah. The despatch by the Government of India of the British steam frigates "Auckland" and "Akbar" in succession to Basrah at the beginning of 1854, as part of a general demonstration in the Persian Gulf, had a tranquillising effect, however; and Persia ultimately decided to remain neutral. The "Akbar," in the course of her visit to Turkish waters, proceeded with the Turkish Governor of Basrah on board as far up the river as Qūrnah, where she was apparently met by the "Comet" from above, carrying Sir H. Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdād. This manœuvre seems to have convinced certain rebellious Arab tribes in Turkish territory of the folly of calculating any longer on the embarrassments to which they had expected that hostilities with Persia would expose the local Turkish authorities.

Turkish 'Irāq and the Anglo-Persian war, 1856-57.

The Ottoman Government of Turkish 'Irāq took a close interest in the Anglo-Persian war of 1856-57, especially in the operations at Muhammarah, and their attitude is described in the chapter on the history of 'Arabistān. At Basrah, where "fortifications existed only in detached pieces, and were ridiculous as Military works," the fall of Muhammarah to the British expedition made a *profound impression. The transport purchased for the British Field Force, both camels and mules, was obtained largely in Turkish 'Irāq.

General British interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1839-61.

The period under consideration is characterised by a great expansion of British interests in Turkish 'Irāq together with an increased difficulty in protecting them. This difficulty arose, it may be conjectured, partly from the inevitable multiplication of points of contact and friction; partly from the bureaucratic influence of Constantinople in Baghdād affairs; and partly from the overweening and chauvinistically Turkish spirit of the Pāshas now posted to Baghdād by the central authorities.

* "The recent events at Muhammerah procured for the British visitors in the "bazaar considerable respect as well as attention; the conquerors of works before which "their own arms in their last attempt failed (Muhammerah having always been a "bone of contention in their quarrels with the Shāh), could not be treated with Moslem "insolence; and consequently salaams and obeisances were as plentifully bestowed "now as the epithets 'kafir,' 'infidel,' 'unclean dog,' 'son of a burnt father,' would have "been, but a short time previously, in the same place and by the very same people." (Hunt's *Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign*, page 206.)

From now onwards it is necessary to distinguish between the commercial interests of private British subjects and the political interests of the British Government, especially as the two were not always in accord.

Already in 1840 two British commercial firms existed at Baghdād and carried on a trade with Basrah in native boats, some of which were owned by the firms and sailed under the British flag. These boats, at favourable seasons of the year, carried country produce to Basrah for exportation and returned with cargoes of imported British goods; at other times they were employed in bringing salt, firewood, and other commodities yielded by the neighbouring riverain districts to Baghdād city.

In 1841 the port of Basrah was still comparatively inactive. Almost the only articles of export were Arab horses for Bombay and some wool and cotton for England which went *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope. An occasional British merchantman with Manchester goods and other British manufactures for the Arab tribes and Baghdād visited Basrah; but such ships had difficulty in finding any return cargo. Signs of better days to come were now, however, apparent.

British firms at Baghdād and projects of steam navigation, 1840-45.

About 1840, or not long after, the idea of placing steamers on the Tigris for trade seems to have been suggested to British merchants at Baghdād by the formation, which will be noticed further on, of an armed flotilla of British Government vessels. The merchants consequently regarded with extreme disfavour steps which were taken in 1843 by the Pāshā of Baghdād, assisted by the British Political Agent, Colonel Taylor, to obtain an iron river steamer from Bombay and to secure the services of Commander Lynch, I.N., in connection therewith; and some of them even went so far as to complain of Colonel Taylor's attitude in matters of trade, and to insinuate that he had an interest in a local commercial undertaking. The Pāsha's application was rejected by the Government of India, who also censured Colonel Taylor for having transmitted and recommended it; but the Pāsha was in a position to thwart the rival schemes of the British merchants, and he did not fail to do so.

Question of British commercial navigation of

By 1845 the British houses of business at Baghdād numbered at least three, *viz.*, Messrs. Mills & Co., Messrs. A. Hector* & Co., and Messrs.

* Mr. Alexander Hector was an enterprising man of business and maintained extensive relations, on his own account, with the Arab Shaikhs. In 1836 the Government of Bombay had proposed to appoint him "Agent for Dromedaries and Superintendent of the Mails through Syria between Muhammarah and Damascus" on a salary of Rs. 300 a month; but the Secret Committee of the East India Company vetoed the scheme on which this appointment depended. Layard seems to have had negotiations with Mr. Hector's firm in connection with his excavations at Nineveh; see his *Early Adventures*, volume II, page 368.

the Tigris and its settlement, 1845-1846.

Lynch & Co. The whole question of British rights of commercial navigation on the Tigris was at length formally raised in 1845. The discussions which took place were occasioned chiefly by the case of the "Karbalai," a British schooner; but they quickly assumed a general form, and the terms of the final settlement were general also. The "Karbalai" was built at Bombay by a merchant of that place, and her construction was so ingenious as to admit of her making the whole voyage from Bombay to Basrah by sea and thence by river to Baghdad without discharging any of her cargo.

The points which arose with reference to British vessels were four in number, *viz.*:—

1st, whether they might navigate the river from Basrah to Baghdad at all;

2nd, whether, if they might, they might also hoist the British flag on that part of their voyage;

3rd, whether they were liable to pay the dues claimed by the riverain Arab Chiefs through whose territories they passed; and

4th, whether a Turkish tax, known as Tálibiyah, levied on native boats at Baghdad, was recoverable from them.

With regard to Tálibiyah, it may be explained that this tax had been instituted at Baghdad about 1821; it was levied, according to tonnage and length of voyage, for every trip made by the vessels subject to it, being thus of the nature of a duty upon cargo; and it had not hitherto been realised from British boat owners. It was originally an arbitrary local impost, and its proceeds were supposed to be devoted to the maintenance of the bridge of boats at Baghdad; but, being found productive, it had been transferred to the schedule of Imperial taxes; in view of its irregular origin, however, no attempt was even then made to recover it from British subjects. Levied virtually upon cargo, it did not appear to be a demand of which British boat owners could fairly complain, as long as its application was restricted to boats engaged in district trade at Baghdad; but its extension to vessels employed in foreign trade through Basrah was considered to be unwarrantable, as involving an unauthorised addition to export duties. This tax, therefore, stood on a different footing from the dues claimed by the river-side Arab Shaikhs, which had formed the subject of a correspondence between the British Ambassador at Constantinople and His Britannic Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1843. The Shaikhs' dues, amounting on the Tigris to about 1,500 piastres for each voyage to Basrah, had been

held by the last-mentioned authority "to be in a certain degree legitimised "by long usage, by their application to the vessel rather than to the cargo, "and by their forming a perquisite of the Arab Chiefs, for which, in event "of their suppression, the Turkish Government would be bound to afford "indemnification."

Major Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, held that the possibility of a British sea-going vessel reaching Baghdād proved that place to be a "port"; and he argued very strongly in favour of the right of British vessels to fly their own flag above Basrah, not only on the ground that for 40 years Turkish boats possessed by British owners or owners under British protection had been permitted to navigate the river under British colours, but also because he feared that to concede the point of flying the flag might be to concede the right of British commercial navigation on the rivers of Mesopotamia altogether. The attitude of the Pāsha of Baghdād was uncompromising: he questioned the right of the "Karbalai" to enter the Tigris at all, and said he would refer it to Constantinople; he insisted, apparently under instructions from the capital, that in any case she should not hoist the British flag above Basrah; and he professed, with truth, his inability to prevent the Arabs from attacking her if the usual dues of the riverain Shaikhs should be refused.

The above threatened impediments to British navigation of the rivers of Mesopotamia were discussed by Sir Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, with the Porte; and in April 1846 a Vizirial Letter to the Pāsha at Baghdād was obtained through his exertions, of which the concluding paragraph in the French text (or translation) ran as follows:— Vizirial Letter of 1846.

"En conséquence, je vous écris et vous envoie cette dépêche afin que Votre Excellence mette ses soins à ce que l'on prenne des barques de commerce Anglaises qui, comme il a été dit plus haut, seraient désormais occupées à faire le commerce intérieur sur les deux fleuves susdits, des droits conformes à ceux que l'on prend des barques des sujets Ottomans: et à ce que l'on ne prenne sur les chargements des bâtiments Anglais qui viennent de dehors, et qui vont dans un pays étranger, que les droits de douane établis, et qu'un droit d'ancrage consistant en cinq piastres. Votre Excellence aura soin de ne rien faire prendre de plus."

The sense in which the British Ambassador understood the settlement thus reached in the light of the discussions preceding it, was explained by him in the following terms:—

British-owned vessels will continue to navigate the waters of Mesopotamia under their national colours equally whether they are engaged in the foreign or in the internal trade, and they will pay upon the merchandise which they convey the amount of duties respectively applied in each case by the Convention of Baltlia-Liman.

In the event of their being employed above the usual ports of entry in the internal traffic of the country, they will be liable to the anchorage duty which is always paid

here and which is sanctioned by the capitulations, but instead of paying 12 piastres as levied upon each vessel in the harbour of Constantinople, they will only pay 5 piastres.

There is no question of any difference between steam boats and sailing vessels.

With respect to vessels built in the country and owned by subjects of Great Britain, which cannot by our own regulations legally carry the national flag without registration under British authority, they will not pay higher duties than those required of the most favoured class of natives engaged in the internal trade, but they must be content to navigate like other vessels of the country. Though it is not impossible that such vessels as have hitherto abusively enjoyed the privilege of carrying their national colours may be tacitly allowed through favour to continue the same practice, it would not, I conceive, be proper for any British authority to support a claim which, be the state of Turkish law what it will, is manifestly at variance with the enactments of our own legislature.

State of trade, 1850.

In 1850 the trade of Basrah was still inconsiderable, the only vessels visiting the port being some which belonged to British merchants at Baghdád and an occasional cruiser of the East India Company. The only cause that could be assigned for this state of matters was Turkish misgovernment.

Protest by British merchants against the prevalence of disorder in the Baghdád Pashalig, 1852.

In 1852 the British merchants at Baghdád complained in writing to the British Political Agent there of the losses and risks to which they were exposed by the insecurity prevailing on the Tigris, communication by which between Baghdád and Basrah was at the time almost suspended in consequence of tribal disturbances, and requested him "kindly to take "such steps as he might consider likely to have a tendency to bring this "state of things to a termination;" and later they raised "the question "of their right to require the intervention of the Hon'ble East India "Company's armed steamer upon the Tigris for the protection of their "mercantile interests, now suffering much from the disorganisation of "the country and the inability of the Turkish Government to afford "redress."

Major Rawlinson was most unwilling to employ the Government steamer upon a duty that might bring her into collision with the tribes, to good relations with whom—for reasons which we shall examine later—he attached the greatest importance; and he thought that the difficulties experienced by the British merchants were largely of their own creation because "they are continually protesting against the river dues, "on which the Arab Chiefs depend for their support, they pursue their "Arab debtors with relentless severity (and) they exact compensation for "losses through the instrumentality of Turkish officials, which is of all "things the most distasteful to the independent Arabs."

The "Nitocris" was in any case unfit, at the moment, to perform the services desired of her. Major Rawlinson accordingly suggested to Colonel Rose, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, and also direct to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that a remonstrance with the Porte on the subject of Nāmiq Pāsha's sustained misgovernment might be authorised. Whether this proposal was adopted does not appear; but by 1854, if not earlier, Nāmiq Pāsha had ceased to govern at Baghdād.

Protection of British Indian subjects at Najaf, 1852.

The beginnings of an Indian colony already existed in Mesopotamia, though Indians were not, of course, so prominent in the province as they have since become. So early as 1821 there * was a "Nuwaub" at Baghdād, from whom Dāwud Pāsha extorted Rs. 5,000 and in 1850 a "Nawab of Oude" † resided there.

On the occasion of the first revolt at Najaf, in August 1852, the safety of the British Indian subjects there was a matter which caused not a little anxiety to the British Political Agent at Baghdād. As the town was crowded with Persian refugees and Indian pensioners, the Turkish authorities pretended to look with some suspicion on the outbreak, but Major Rawlinson was satisfied that it was in reality quite independent of foreign influence or money. Under the Oudh Bequest, which will be described further on, a sum of £5,000 a year was now disbursed by the Government of India at Najaf; and this payment had attracted many immigrants from India. A confidential agent was accordingly sent to Najaf from the Baghdād Political Agency to watch over the interests of the Indians there and to advise them, in case of serious danger, to retire to Karbala. On the day before the unfortunate incident with which the revolt closed, this agent left for Baghdād as the bearer of re-assuring letters for Major Rawlinson from the Chief Mujtahid of Najaf; but it does not appear that, in the fracas that occurred after his departure, any harm befell the British Indian residents of Najaf, who had at least been placed sufficiently on their guard.

Commencement of British commercial steam navigation on the Tigris, 1859-61.

In 1859 Messrs. Lynch & Co. of Baghdād, relying apparently on the Vizirial Letter of 1846, proposed to place a trading steamer on the Tigris and run it between Baghdād and Basrah. Sir H. Bulwer, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, doubted whether the Company would be warranted in venturing their capital on the strength of a mere Vizirial Letter, which might be cancelled at any moment by another similar document; but he expressed his expectation of being able to obtain from

* See Rich's *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*, volume II, page 226.
† See Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, page 576.

the Porte a Farmān or concession for establishing a line of steamers, if an application in due form were made. Messrs. Lynch accordingly applied for a Farmān "granting them the requisite sanction to navigate the rivers of the country with British registered steam vessels."

Vizirial Letter of 1861.

The outcome, however, was only another Vizirial Letter, addressed to the Pāsha of Baghdād and dated 15th January 1861. In this letter, perhaps by design, different matters were hopelessly jumbled together; and considered as a response to Messrs. Lynch's application, it was altogether inapposite. In fact it merely cited Farmāns of 1834 and 1841 relating to British *Government* steamers in Turkish 'Irāq, together with the Vizirial Letter of 1846, and directed that the instructions contained in these should be observed in practice. It did not even mention Messrs. Lynch. Under it, nevertheless, the firm seem to have succeeded in putting their first steamer, the "City of London," on the Tigris.

British official establishments, enterprises and policy, 1839-61.

The two middle decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a great increase of British official activity in Turkish 'Irāq. This increase has been partially illustrated already in the foregoing sections on Persian relations and British interests. Its principal causes were, on the international side, the Turko-Persian boundary dispute, Turkish misgovernment, apprehensions of a dissolution of the Turkish Empire, and British distrust of Russia. On the purely British side the chief factors were the growth of local British trade, a consequence perhaps of public attention at home having been attracted to the country by the Chesney Expedition, and a growing influx of Indians into the Holy Cities; but much was due also to the enthusiasm and energy of the British officers employed in the country, particularly Major Rawlinson and Commander Felix Jones, who were themselves impressed with the great potentialities of the Mesopotamian province, and who neglected no opportunity of enforcing their ideas on Government.

Proposal of the Government of Bombay to abolish the British Political Agency in Turkish

The great developments which were imminent in the country do not appear to have been anticipated by the Government of Bombay, which in 1843 informed the Government of India of their opinion that the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq, constituted in 1812, had for a long time past been maintained on a scale much more expensive than was necessary, and that all the objects which either His Majesty's Government or the

Hon'ble East India Company could desire in that quarter might be attained either by an Assistant to the Resident in the Persian Gulf being stationed at Basrah, or by the appointment of a Consul to Her Majesty on something of the same footing as Her Majesty's Consul at Masqat, by which arrangement a saving would be effected of about two-thirds of the expenditure actually being incurred. 'Irāq, 1843.

Unsatisfactory conduct of the incumbent (Colonel Taylor).

This reversion on the part of the Government of Bombay to the principle found impossible of application in 1809-10 and 1822 seems to have been prompted partly by their dissatisfaction with the Political Agent of the day, Colonel Robert Taylor. This gentleman's obnoxious recommendations that the Pāsha of Baghdād should be helped to create a Turkish commercial flotilla on the Mesopotamian rivers, accompanied, it may be observed, by another that the Pāsha should be allowed to purchase 20,000 cannon shot of different sizes at Bombay, have already been mentioned; and it is true* that in connection with the Karbala tragedy of 1843 Colonel Taylor had shown himself remiss and supine, if not actually a partisan of the local Turkish authorities.

Maintenance of the Political Agency, and appointment thereto by the Government of India of Major Rawlinson with special instructions and powers, 1843.

The Government of India, however, while admitting that the arrangements suggested by the Government of Bombay might not be unworthy of adoption at some future time, considered that at the moment, it being of paramount importance to preserve the peace between Turkey and Persia which many events had tended to exasperate against each other, an urgent necessity existed for the despatch of an officer possessed of the confidence of Government to represent British interests at Baghdād. Major Rawlinson, C.B.,† a young officer who had attracted the favourable notice of the Governor-General and who was at the time at Calcutta, was accordingly selected, at his own request, to be Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq in succession to Colonel Taylor. He was given a passage from

* Colonel Taylor is perhaps unfortunate in the connections in which his name has been preserved in official documents. We learn from Layard that "he was a man of much learning and an excellent scholar, acquainted with various Eastern languages amongst which was that of the Sabaeans, whose books he had studied under one of their priests" also that he possessed "a valuable library rich in manuscripts and rare works relating to Oriental geography and history" (Layard's *Early Adventures*, Volume II, pages 171 and 213). His hospitality also was great (Mitford's *Land Marchs*, Volume I, page 325).

† Major (afterwards Sir H. C.) Rawlinson (Bart.), was born in 1810 and died in 1895. He belonged to the Indian Army, and was one of the 1834 batch of British military instructors lent to Persia. In the Afghan War he was Political Agent in charge of Qandahār during its occupation by the British. In 1859, after leaving Baghdād and retiring from the service, he was British Minister at Tehran. His fame as a scholar especially in connection with the decipherment of cuneiform writing, is hardly inferior to his reputation as a political officer.

Bombay to Basrah in Her Majesty's brig of war "Clio" and arrived at Baghdād on the 16th December 1843.

The orders which he carried with him were such as to enhance, instead of reducing, the dignity of the office to which he was appointed: he was directed to make the preservation of peace between Turkey and Persia his principal care; he was enjoined to keep himself in constant communication with the British Ambassador at Constantinople and the British Minister at Tehrān, and to endeavour to give effect to their views; and he was "vested ..... with discretionary authority to issue directions "and to address requisitions to all the Political and Naval Officers in the "Persian Gulf as occasion may require." This last clause of his instructions gave rise, in 1848–49, to official difficulties, which are noticed in the history of 'Arabistān. From correspondence in those years it may be gathered that the dealings of the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq were now exclusively with the Government of India, and that the Government of Bombay had no authority over him.

Colonel Farrant, British Special Commissioner at Baghdād, 1843.

On arrival at his destination Major Rawlinson found that Colonel Farrant, whom the British Ambassador at Constantinople had deputed to Turkish 'Irāq to enquire into the Karbala affair, was still at Baghdād and that he had been ordered by the same authority to remain there during the progress of the negotiations at Erzeroum, and to retain in his own hands the management of affairs relating to the frontier disputes between the Governments of Turkey and Persia. Major Rawlinson carefully avoided bringing his powers into collision with those of the special Commissioner; and he did not intervene in frontier matters, except by way of co-operation at Colonel Farrant's own request, until the departure of that officer from Baghdād.

Frontier tour of Major Rawlinson, 1844.

In 1844, after entering on his special frontier duties, Major Rawlinson made a tour, in connection with border disputes, to Zohāb, Kirmānshāh and Sulaimāniyah. He was accompanied by Commander Felix Jones, I.N., who made a survey of the districts traversed.

Political and consular status of the British representative at Baghdād, 1829–61.

The political or Indian status of the British representative at Baghdād was now technically that of Agent, to which it had been reduced from that of Resident in 1812; and Major Rawlinson and his successors for many years seem never to have described themselves in their correspondence with the Government of India otherwise than as "Political Agent."

It appears probable that from 1802, when a consular *exequatur* was obtained from the Porte in the name of Mr. Harford Jones, until 1841, when Colonel Taylor was appointed His Britannic Majesty's Consul at

Baghdād and recognition of him as such was applied for at Constantinople, the British representative in Turkish 'Irāq was destitute of consular status; but no practical difficulty had arisen from this irregularity, if it existed. In March 1844, Major Rawlinson was appointed His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Baghdād in succession to Colonel Taylor, and the effect of the appointment was explained to him by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in these words: "I think it right to observe to "you that Consular rank was given to the East India Company's Agent at "Baghdād, not with a view of making the Agent especially a servant of "the Crown, but solely in order that he might be able, if circumstances "called for Consular interference, to act as Consul, and it was expressly "stated in the instructions to Colonel Taylor of the 10th August 1841, "which you will find amongst the Consular archives at Baghdād, that Her "Majesty's Commission was not intended to interfere with or alter his "position as the East India Company's Resident at Baghdād further than "to place under his superintendence the British Vice-Consul at Mosul."

This passage shows that the dual nature of the Baghdād charge was recognised by His Majesty's Government, and the use by the Secretary of State of the term "Resident" to describe, in his non-consular capacity the officer occupying it, is worthy of note.

On the 22nd November 1851 Colonel Rawlinson, who had been absent* on leave for two years, Lieutenant Kemball acting in his place, was appointed His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdād; and the consular status of the British Political Agency or Residency remained thereafter that of a Consulate-General.

The consolidated salary of the British Political Agent about this time (1836-44) was Rs. 2,500 a month, while that of the Residency Surgeon varied from Rs. 515 to Rs. 715 per mensem.

British military guard at Baghdād, 1839-61.

From its institution in 1800 until the year 1843 the strength and composition of the British military guard at Baghdād varied but little, the number of sepoys fluctuating between 25 and 32, while a fifer was occasionally substituted for drummers. In 1843, when Major Rawlinson become Political Agent, the guard consisted of one Native Officer, five non-commissioned officers, 24 sepoys, and two drummers. As there were difficulties connected with the relief of the detachment, Major Rawlinson at first proposed to dispense with an Indian military guard altogether and to substitute for it a mounted escort of 15 or 20 sabres recruited on the spot; it is possible that he was influenced by the further consideration

* He passed through Mūsal, meeting Layard there, in October 1849 on his way to England *viâ* Constantinople (Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, page 100).

that a mounted guard would be more useful to him on tour.* But subsequently, being unable, as he wrote, to find people of the country in whom he could place implicit confidence, and it being necessary also to provide for the safety of the Treasury, he modified his original proposals, and asked leave to retain a non-commissioned officer and nine sepoys of the Indian military detachment for employment as a treasury guard, and to engage a local mounted escort consisting of a Dafadar, 8 horsemen, a farrier and 3 grooms. This was granted, and in 1850 another horseman was substituted for the farrier; but otherwise no change was made in the sepoy guard or in the mounted escort until 1861-62, when, on grounds of economy, the strength of the escort was reduced from 13 men (including 3 grooms) to 10 men (including 3 grooms).

British representation at Basrah, 1851.

On the death of Khôjah † Paraeigh Johannes, the British Native Agent at Basrah, in June 1851, a joint recommendation by Major Rawlinson and Lieutenant Kemball was accepted by Government under which Mr. J. Taylor, a son of the former Political Agent Colonel R. Taylor, was appointed to be British representative at Basrah in subordination to the British Political Agent at Baghdád. This step was no doubt connected with the erection of Basrah by the Turkish Government into a separate Pâshâlîq, a change which had been made just a year earlier. Mr. Taylor's position, by whatever name his appointment may have been described, did not apparently enable him to exert much influence over the new Pâsha of Basrah; and Colonel Williams, the British Frontier Commissioner, found himself constrained to write as follows in November 1851, with reference to the proceedings of Ma'shûq Pâsha, already noticed elsewhere: "I have "had my doubts of the working of the new Pashalick of Bussorah, even "under ordinary circumstances, but here we have a man like the present "governor acting without the high control and supervision of the consulate "of Baghdád, embroiling his country, thwarting the benevolent views of her "allies, and, I fear, enriching himself by a system of wide corruption and "bribery, and I beg to submit to Your Excellency ‡ the question of the "propriety of his removal ere he can arouse the Persian Court to acts of "reprisal and (*sic*) their evil consequences to the trade of Bussorah as well "as that of Mohammarah.

* Mr. Rich's escort on a journey to Babylon in 1811 consisted of his "own troop of Hussars, with a galloper gun, a havildar and twelve sepoys"; and in 1820, when he visited Kurdistan, he took with him "the guard of twenty-five sepoys and their Subadar, allowed the Resident as a body-guard by the Government of Bombay." What would be the feelings of the Turks at the present day if the British Resident were to undertake a military progress through the country with the *Residency* guard?

† Layard calls him Mr. "Barnac" and describes him as an Armenian gentleman (Layard's *Early Adventures*, Volume II, pages 177 and 179).

‡ The British Ambassador at Constantinople.

"I beg to embrace this opportunity to bring this prompt notice of "Mr. Taylor's to Your Excellency's notice, and to suggest that, if the "separate Pashalick of Bussorah be rendered a permanent measure, "Mr. Taylor may receive such a commission as will enable him to com- "municate directly with Your Excellency."

British representation at Najaf, 1854.

In April 1854 a reference occurs, in official correspondence, to "the individual who officiates as British Agent at Nejef." This may have been an unofficial native correspondent only, though it was open to Major Rawlinson as Consul-General to appoint a Vice-Consul, for no mention is made of recognition by the Turks of any British representative at Najaf. His appointment was probably due, in any case, to the influx of Indian settlers into the Holy Cities, to which reference has been already made, and to the dangers to which the Indian immigrants were exposed in the course of the local revolts of 1852 and 1854.

Formation and work of a British armed flotilla in Mesopotamian waters, 1839-40.

In 1839 the East India Company despatched from England in frame work, *vid* the Cape of Good Hope, three additional iron steamers, the "Assyria," "Nimrod" and "Nitocris," which, with the "Euphrates" already maintained by the Company in Mesopotamia, were to form a flotilla of four armed vessels for service on the Euphrates and Tigris. The component parts, which were shipped on the "Urania" in June, arrived at Basrah on the 22nd December 1839; and by the end of April 1840 the steamers had been successfully put together. Each new steamer was divided into three compartments internally, and carried six swivels guns, besides two large guns fore and aft. The fuel used by them was tamarisk wood supplied by Arabs, on contract, at fixed stations.

Lieutenant* H. B. Lynch was appointed to command the flotilla, in which capacity he was to act under the advice of the Political Agent; and it was laid down that the Superintendent of the Indian Navy, to which the vessels were attached, should not "originate any orders as to the particular duties" on which they were to be employed.

It is not stated that the East India Company had other objects in view besides the promotion of trade by opening up and civilising the country; but it must be supposed† that the carriage of mails between India and Europe at first formed part of their plan.

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* An account of Lieutenant H. B. Lynch's career will be found in Law's *History of the Indian Navy*, Vol. II, pages 33-34, and page 289. He lost one brother in the accident to the "Tigris" on the Chesney Expedition and another by an illness contracted while commanding one of the vessels of the Mesopotamian flotilla.

† The traveller Mitford, however, remarks: "I imagine this flotilla is here more with a political object than for any service it may render either in forwarding mails or merchandise; for the latter it is useless, and, for despatches to India, it is much too dilatory: should the Suez line ever be interfered with there is a land route across the desert to Beyrout: and another by courier, through Turkey in Asia to Constantinople,

One of the steamers was fired at by Arabs, and struck, on her first voyage to Baghdād; she replied with discharges of grape-shot among the Arabs' herds of buffaloes, killing many.

The chief performance of the flotilla was an ascent of the Euphrates by the "Nitocris" and "Nimrod" in 1841 under the command of Lieutenant C. D. Campbell, I.N., assisted by Lieutenant Felix Jones, I.N., Commander Lynch being then on leave. After carefully examining the Euphrates from 'Ānah to Hilla in a boat, besides surveying the Tigris from Baghdād to Qūrnah and exploring the Shatt-al-Gharāf and Jahaglah, Lieutenant Campbell left Basrah on the 1st April 1841, passed 'Ānah on the 7th May, and reached Maskanah on the 31st May. Lieutenants Campbell and Jones visited the Mediterranean from Maskanah and connected that sea chronometrically with the upper Euphrates. Commander Lynch having rejoined at Maskanah in August, the descent began, on which a survey down the Euphrates was made and the "Nimrod" was sunk by a snag, but was raised again. 'Anah was reached on the 29th April 1842. The result of this remarkable voyage was, unfortunately, to demonstrate the practical unnavigability of the Euphrates by the steamers of the flotilla.

Navigation Farmān or Vizirial Letter of 1841.

It is not stated that the existence or movements of the flotilla aroused any distrust or opposition on the part of the Turkish authorities; and in 1841 a navigation Farmān or Vizirial Letter, supplementary to that of 1834, was obtained at Constantinople. The object was stated to be the protection* of "the Commandant† of the two steamers" in the execution of his duties. The document referred to the Chesney Expedition; it cited the Farman of 1834; and it concluded with this direction, addressed doubtless to the Pāsha of Baghdād, or perhaps to Turkish officials in general: "Vous aurez soin que les susdits bateaux fassent comme par le passé le service de la rivière, à condition qu'il n'y ait point un inconvenient quelconque et l'entreprise soit favorable aux deux parties."

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by which the letters would travel with greater despatch." (*Land March*, Volume I. pages 306-310.)

* In 1841, as we have seen, two of the steamers of the flotilla were detained for the season at Maskanah in the bounds of the Aleppo Pāshāliq; and special arrangements had to be made to prevent the local Arabs from annoying them.

† The substantive Commander of the flotilla was at this time Lieutenant Lynch, and if his name was mentioned in the Farmān, the circumstance may account for the confusion that subsequently arose, or was wilfully created, between the title of the British Government to navigate the rivers and that of Messrs. Lynch & Co. It should be mentioned, however, that Commander Lynch was absent on sick leave from July 1840 to August 1841. Unfortunately no copy of the Farmān is forthcoming among the archives of the Government of India or the Government of Bombay.

The "Euphrates," "Nimrod," and "Assyria" were withdrawn in the summer of 1842, under the orders of the Government of India, for service on the Indus. The total cost of maintenance of the flotilla from 1837, when the "Euphrates" was transferred to the East India Company, up to 1842, when the flotilla was broken up, was approximately Rs. 3,50,000. It is possible that the advantages expected from the flotilla, whatever they were, had not been obtained, or that they were found to be incommensurate with the expense. Disappointment in regard to the navigability of the Euphrates probably contributed to the result, all hope of a good mail route to Europe by that line having been extinguished.

Reduction of the flotilla and retention of the "Nitocris" only, 1841-1843.

In 1843 the "Nitocris" alone remained in the waters of Mesopotamia, and Lieutenant Felix Jones succeeded Lieutenant Lynch in command of her. The annual cost of the "Nitocris" was about Rs. 55,000.

In 1844 the utility of the "Nitocris" in Turkish 'Irāq seems to have been called in question by the Government of India, and a proposal was made to remove her as the other vessels of the flotilla had been removed. It was opposed by Major Rawlinson in two perspicuous despatches, from which the passages that follow are taken:

Question of the retention of any British armed steamer, 1844-45.

It is impossible, it appears to me, to reduce this question to a mere pecuniary calculation, for, although the outlay upon the one side be direct and tangible, yet the return which that outlay brings is, for the most part, incidental and a matter of opinions rather than of proof. The only immediate advantages that we desire from the presence of a steamer on the rivers of Mesopotamia refer to the protection of our merchants and to the security and extension which are thereby given to our commerce. Within the last few years three independent British houses of agency have been established at Baghdad, and other parties encouraged by the prosperous condition of the trade are about to enter on the same field of enterprise. The insecurity of the river and the rapacity of the Arabs who live on the banks presented in former times serious obstacles to the introduction of our manufactures into the Pashaliq of Baghdad, but those evils have now almost disappeared and it is matter of notoriety that we owe the change to our exhibition of strength upon the Tigris and Euphrates and to the friendly relations which we have established with the Montefik, the Beni Lam, the Zobeid and the other great Arab tribes upon the banks rather than to any increased efficiency on the part of the Turkish Government or to any real improvement in the character of the Arabs.

Whilst a single steamer continues to ply upon the river, the Arabs are reminded of our strength, and they respect not only British boats, but those also of our Turkish allies, but were that steamer to be withdrawn, they would assuredly revert to their old habits of plunder, and the river trade would be entirely at their mercy.

But the chief benefits which attend the presence of a steamer upon the Tigris are as I have mentioned incidental and their importance or otherwise depends upon a general view of Eastern policy which I am neither competent nor would it be becoming in me to discuss. It strengthens the hands of the British Agent in the most effectual, and at the same time in the least ostentatious, manner possible; it enables him to vindicate

the rights of those under his protection; it assists his mediation between the Turkish and Persian authorities; it places him in the most favourable position for maintaining the dignity of the British Government and it acquires for him local influence to an extent which, without such a means of support, would be altogether unattainable. The French Government has been unceasing in its endeavours for many years to supersede British influence in Asiatic Turkey, and that it has not more successfully availed itself of the vantage ground which it enjoys, as the declared protector of the Catholics of the East, is owing, I think as much to our continued exhibition of strength in this quarter and in the Persian Gulf, as to the late success of our arms in Syria, and to the presence of our fleet in the Mediterranean. The right of navigating the rivers of Mesopotamia with armed steamers, it may also be observed, was obtained with some difficulty by special firman from the Sultan; and so long as the right continues in active exercise, no attempt is likely to be made at its abrogation; but should the privilege be once voluntarily abandoned, should we resign the navigation of the rivers into the hands of another power, it would be necessary, in the event of a possible desire for the resumption of our right, to make a second application to the Porte; and I cannot doubt that in the spirit of isolation which has for some time governed the Ottoman Council, and which leads the Turkish Government to exhibit day by day more determined resistance to measures of European intervention, such an application would be received with much distrust, and would occasion serious embarrassment at Constantinople.

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By the establishment of wood stations along the course of the river, the Commander* is brought into regular and most friendly communication with the Arab tribes who reside upon the banks. He is visited by several of the Chiefs on every occasion of his ascent or descent of the river, and by a judicious distribution of trifling presents he is enabled to maintain a connection which, if it answered no other purpose than that of pre-occupying the ground, would still not be without its value. The rapidity also with which by the monthly visit of the steamer to Bussorah intelligence reaches Baghdad of the state of affairs in the Chaab country has frequently been found of the greatest use in supplying timely and correct information to Her Majesty's Ministers at Constantinople and Tehrân and to the Commissioner employed at Erzroom, whilst the occasional transport of Turkish officers of rank between Baghdâd and Bussorah lays the Local Government under obligations to us, which materially assist my official intercourse with the Pasha. I attribute it, indeed, in a great measure to the presence of a steamer at Baghdâd, that, where as in all the other provinces of the Turkish Empire occasions of dispute between the Local Government and the resident British functionary are of most frequent and embarrassing occurrence, I have not been called upon in a single instance since my appointment to this Agency to claim the interference of the Ambassador at Constantinople in the support of our interests, or the vindication of our national right.

The true point of view, at the same time, in which, I think, the maintenance of an armed steamer on the Tigris should be regarded, is as a part, however fractional and remote, of our great system of universal maritime ascendency. Our flag is at present supreme (by sufferance be it allowed yet it is still supreme) on the waters of Mesopotamia. If it be once lowered, another flag will replace it, and we shall then be excluded from the navigation of the Tigris and the Euphrates, as we have been shut out of the Danube, and as we are threatened with exclusion from the Nile.

* *Sc.* of the "Nitocris."

Attempt to reach Mūsal with the "Nitocris," 1846.

In April 1846 an attempt was made by Commander Felix Jones under instructions from Major Rawlinson, who attached great importance to its success, to take the "Nitocris" up the Tigris upon the spring floods as far as Mūsal. The river had already been ascended to some distance above Baghdād in 1845. The experiment was a failure, however, owing to the inability of the steamer to make head against the current at the spot where the river passes through a gap in the Hamrīn hills not far above Dūr. Major Rawlinson had intended that advantage should be taken of the voyage to establish friendly relations with the 'Obaid, 'Azzah Ṭāi and Shammar tribes, and he authorised* special disbursements in this connection; but his chief object was to retain the right of navigation "in active exercise, wherever there may be sufficient water for the steam vessel that bears our flag."

Absence of the "Nitocris" at Bombay, 1849-52.

The "Nitocris" was found particularly useful in 1849, when in consequence of tribal disturbances, all native navigation was stopped, while British-owned boats continued to pass freely up and down the Tigris. In 1850, however, she was reported unserviceable, and her replacement was urged by the Acting Resident, Lieutenant Kemball. In 1852 she was so crippled by defective boilers that she could not, even had the Resident approved of such a use being made of her, "be prudently sent on any service where she might be required to come into action with the Arabs."

Substitution of the "Comet" for the "Nitocris," 1852.

At length in 1852, after a delay caused by the Burmese War, the "Comet,"† a by no means new but otherwise suitable steamer, was refitted and sent to Basrah to take the place of the "Nitocris." She performed the same duties as her predecessor; chiefly the carrying of the British mails, the maintenance of friendly relations with the tribes, and the surveillance and protection of British trade and shipping, also survey and observation work.

British steamer depôts at Basrah (Kūt-al-Farangi or "Magil") and Baghdād, 1839-58.

In 1839 a site was required for putting together the British Government steamers sent in parts from Europe, and as a dépôt for the coal and other stores of the British flotilla that was to be, and Kūt-al-Farangi or "Magil," on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab 4 miles above Basrah, was provisionally occupied. This was an estate bought by Mr. Manesty, when he was British Resident at Basrah, from the native proprietors; on

* From 1844 onwards the Commander of the "Nitocris" had a grant of Rs. 100 a month from Government for the purpose of making small presents to the Arab Shaikhs with whom he was thrown in contact.

† It does not appear that she derived her name from Bell's first steamer on the Clyde. The Indian Navy at this time possessed a whole galaxy of astronomical bodies, including a "Planet," a "Satellite" and a "Meteor," as well as a "Comet." The "Comet" seem to have been built in 1838, and she took part in the operations in Sind in 1843.

it he had built a house and resided; and from him it was purchased by Colonel Taylor, who subsequently became British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irâq.

1840. In 1840 Commander Lynch, the officer in charge of the flotilla, suggested that Magîl should be acquired by Government from Colonel Taylor, who was still Political Agent at Baghdâd, as a marine dépôt. A board of military officers from Khârag Island, then under British occupation, visited the place in the same year and reported the ground and buildings to be suitable for the purpose for which they were required. There was also a question of renting a house and garden at Baghdâd, similarly the property of Colonel Taylor, which had been occupied as a dépôt for the flotilla.

1842. Correspondence on the subject was prolonged until 1842, when Colonel Taylor finally offered to sell the Basrah and Baghdâd dépôts for Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 10,000 respectively, which he represented to be the amounts that they had cost him, or to lease both to Government for a monthly sum of Rs. 250. Meanwhile, however, the flotilla was broken up; only the "Nitocris" remained; and it seemed to be expected that a dépôt could be dispensed with.

1844. But the necessities of the situation obliged Major Rawlinson and Commander Felix Jones to raise the question again in 1844, when, Colonel Taylor having left the country, the Magîl property was being managed by Messrs. Lynch & Co. on his behalf. It appears that the Magîl dépôt had, in fact, never been evacuated; and the Superintendent of the Indian Navy considered that one was required, and that Magîl was the most suitable place. At length, in May 1844, the Government of Bombay authorised the payment, as recommended by Major Rawlinson, of a monthly rent of Rs. 100. Messrs. Lynch had demanded double that amount on Colonel Taylor's behalf. Colonel Taylor then brought a back claim for rent of Magîl from 1st November 1839 to 1st May 1844 at Rs. 200 a month, and for rent of the Baghdâd dépôt from 1st May 1840 to 1st August 1843 at Rs. 100 a month, or in all for Rs. 14,700.

1847. In 1847 this claim was compounded on the payment by Government of Rs. 100 (instead of Rs. 300) a month for the two dépôts for the period during which they had been occupied, making altogether Rs. 5,400. Thereafter the lease of Magîl was renewed from time to time.

1851-52. In 1851-52 the Government of India were prepared to purchase the Magîl property for £1,000; but the transaction could not be carried out, because Messrs. Lynch, the managers, had only certain specified powers under their power of attorney, and Colonel Taylor was at the time too ill to be consulted.

In the end Messrs. Lynch & Co. themselves became the owners of Magil, and in 1858 they received Rs. 2,000 from the Government of India as compensation for damage done to the quays in the Persian War, when horses, mules and stores for the British forces were embarked there. 1858.

These were days of great activity in the exploration and survey of Turkish 'Irāq; the principal workers were the officers of the Indian Navy employed with the flotilla and, later on, with the "Nitocris" and "Comet." British explorations and surveys, 1839-61.

In 1841 a regular survey of the Euphrates valley was begun, the upper portion of which was eventually connected by chronometric observations with the basin of the Mediterranean. Commander Lynch and Lieutenants Felix Jones, Campbell, Selby, and Grounds, with the steamers "Nitocris" and "Nimrod," took part in the work. Commander H. B. Lynch.

Commander Felix Jones, after succeeding to the command of the "Nitocris" in 1843, engaged with remarkable energy, and for the most part single-handed, in the pursuit of topographical and general information. The result of his labours from 1843 to 1855, in which latter year he was appointed Political Resident at Būshehr, forms an enduring monument of intelligence, enterprise and industry; and the extent to which later * European workers in Mesopotamia are indebted to him is not, perhaps, generally realised. Commander Felix Jones.

In August and September 1844 he accompanied Major Rawlinson, the Political Agent, on his journey to Zohāb, Kirmānshah and Sulaimānīyah and made a valuable survey of the country traversed for the information of the Frontier Commission at Erzeroum. In April 1846, in the "Nitocris," he ascended the Tigris to a point above Dūr and recorded useful observations, but failed, as mentioned before, to reach Mūsal. In April 1848 he made a survey and wrote an elaborate account of the remains of the ancient Nahrwān Canal. Between April and September 1850 he examined and surveyed the country on the west side of the Tigris between Baghdād and the head of the Dujail. In 1852, under the orders of the Government of India, who now granted him a special allowance of Rs. 150 a month as "Surveyor" together with an allowance for an "Assistant," he made a trigonometrical survey of the country between the Tigris and the Persian hills, from Baghdād as far north as Mūsal, embracing the districts of Kifri (Salāhīyah), Kirkūk, Āltūn Kōprū, Arbil and Mūsal. In 1853 was

* Sir W. Willcocks, whose schemes for irrigation of Mesopotamia have now (1912) been taken in hand, drew his earliest inspirations on the subject from Jones' monograph on the old Nahrwān Canal. Jones' principal memorandum on Mesopotamia are printed in Bombay Selections, No. XLIII, 1857.

completed by his Assistant, Midshipman Collingwood, a large scale plan* of Baghdád city; it was accompanied by a memoir on the province, full of statistical information, from the pen of Commander Jones himself. In 1854 he sent to England, along with a memoir, three sheets of a "Babylonian" survey which he had completed, and which extended from Musaiyib on the Euphrates to the north-west corner of the Bahr-an-Najaf; but the maps were lost in the India House. After this, returning prematurely from leave, he acted as Political Agent at Baghdád from March to October 1855.

Commander W. B. Selby.

In 1855 Commander Selby succeeded Commander F. Jones in charge of the Mesopotamian surveys; and the districts of Babylon, Karbala, Kúfah and Najaf, already covered by Commander Jones, were trigonometrically resurveyed by him with the assistance of Lieutenants Collingwood and Beasher, besides which a considerable tract of country to the eastward was taken in.

This survey was finished in 1861; but the clean sheets were again lost, together with an elaborate paper by Commander Selby. The field books and original sheets having been procured from Baghdád, however, an admirable map was produced from them by Lieutenant Collingwood; it now requires some correction in consequence of natural changes, but it seems unlikely to be superseded. Other minor surveys were carried out by Lieutenant Collingwood.

The general outcome of the Chesney Expedition, and of 22 years' labour on the part of the Indian Navy officers mentioned who continued its work, was that Turkish 'Iráq had been converted from a *terra incognita* into a country perfectly well understood in its main features, while certain important districts in it had been carefully delineated in great detail.

British archæological enterprises, 1839-61.

Of less value politically, but nevertheless of great importance in the domain of archæological research, were the excavations undertaken and the discoveries made by British travellers and officials during this period at the ancient sites of Assyria and Babylonia. The subject† lies beyond

* This plan of Baghdád is still the best in existence. It was borrowed by the Wáli of Baghdád from the British Resident in 1912 for practical purposes and was used in 1913 by the representatives of a British firm of electrical engineers charged with the installation under a concession, of electric tramways and lighting at Baghdád. Collingwood had to work by stealth on account of the suspiciousness of the Turkish authorities, noting bearings and paces with a pencil upon his white shirt. While the plan was being made Commander Jones absented himself from Baghdád on other work.

† The following authorities may be consulted: Layard's *Early Adventures*, 1887, *Nineveh, and its Remains*, 1848, and *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon*, 1853; Loftus' *Travels and Researches*, 1857, besides his articles in the

the scope of our history, and here it will be sufficient merely to mention the two expeditions of Mr. (afterwards Sir A. H.) Layard to Assyria and Babylon in 1845-47 and 1849-50, which proved so rich in results; to the work of Mr. W. K. Loftus at Nifar, Warkah and Muqaiyar in 1849-50; and to the operations of Major (afterwards Sir H. C.) Rawlinson at various places during his tenure of the Baghdād Political Agency from 1843 to 1855. These excavators gave an immense extension to the work so well initiated by the precocious but unfortunate Rich during his term of office as Resident at Baghdād from 1808 to 1821.

The British Dromedary Mail, 1839-61.

After the introduction of regular British steam navigation on the Tigris the British Horse Post between Baghdād and Basrah was abolished. It existed, however, until September 1841, and seems to have been both efficient and safe. Letters were frequently conveyed between Basrah and Baghdād in five days, or about the same time as is now taken by the British mail steamers; and the British mail was so much respected by the Arabs as to confer a certain degree of protection on persons who travelled with it. A British Dromedary Mail *viâ* Damascus continued to exist; and in 1844, the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq was authorised to levy informal "postage" on articles sent by it by private individuals. At the same time, to meet a deficit in the revenue from "postage," the Government of India made a grant of Rs. 200 a month for the maintenance of the service.

Policy of the local British officers in Turkish 'Irāq, 1839-61.

If some of the British officers at this time employed in Mesopotamia secretly looked forward to a day when that province should have become a British possession, the fact need cause no astonishment. Turko-Persian frontier relations were supervised by the British representative at Baghdād; British local interests were daily increasing; and nearly everything that was done for the improvement of the country, whether in steam navigation, land and river surveys, postal communication or trade, was due to British foresight and hard work.

The Turkish provincial administration, on the other hand, as oppressive and corrupt as it was inefficient, seemed likely ere long to achieve its own ruin; and its hostility to all foreigners, vented in obstruction and annoyance, must have disposed such foreign representatives as had to deal with it to desire its downfall. Of his later relations with Najīb Pāsha Major Rawlinson wrote in 1848 to the British Ambassador at Constantinople:

Journal of the Royal Geographical Society; and a number of articles by Rawlinson in the Journals of the Royal Asiatic Society, Royal Geographical Society, and Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. An excellent general resumé will be found in H. V. Hilprecht's *Explorations in Bible Lands during the Nineteenth Century*, 1903.

Your Excellency must be aware, from my last six months' series of despatches, of the general spirit by which the Pásha is actuated. His hostility must be ascribed in its origin to his innate hatred of all Europeans, while it was no doubt called into more open activity by finding that British privileges interfered with his pecuniary gains and that my assertion of those privileges impeded the exercise of what he would fain have considered an irresponsible power. Tardily wakening to a sense of the impolicy of having incurred so formidable a danger as might arise out of the exertion of your Excellency's influence against him at the Porte, he is far from exhibiting at present the same disposition to invade our rights and to forget that which may be due to our honour and our interests which he displayed during his former happy state of confidence in the complete immunity of his contract,—but at the same time there is nothing like cordiality, or even conciliation, in his demeanour. He has been frightened into a truce, which is only broken by an occasional sortie, but he is by no means inclined to lay aside his arms, and I can only preserve the position of comparative security in which I have been placed through your Excellency's valuable support, by constant alertness and by showing that I am prepared to repel attack in whatever quarter it may be offered.

Colonel Rawlinson's* own views with reference to the future of Mesopotamia may be inferred from the following extract from a letter addressed by him to the Government of India in 1852:

The British Government has undoubtedly at present, owing to the efficient establishment which she has kept up for the last sixty years in Turkish Arabia, a paramount local influence, and there are two European eventualities, not perhaps imminent, but certainly to be looked for in due course of time, which may render that influence of great importance to India. One of these eventualities is the resumption of those schemes of ambition and aggrandisement which would probably inaugurate the reign of a new Russian Emperor: the other is the dismemberment of Turkey, which in the present sinking condition of the Empire would be the almost certain consequence of a European war.

I have thus considered it my duty, since my nomination to the Political Agency of Turkish Arabia, to adopt a general conciliatory conduct, and to strengthen and extend our local influence, as far as that end may be attainable without giving umbrage to the Turkish authorities.

It seems no far-fetched supposition that the enthusiasm and activity of the officers associated with the Political Agent in navigation and survey work may have had their source in great aspirations inconsistent with Turkish sovereignty over Mesopotamia and that some inkling of the forward policy which they entertained may have reached the Turks and the Arabs. The conviction that Britain entertains designs on Mesopotamia and the jealousy with which the Turkish authorities regard direct dealings between the British representative and Shaikhs of the Arab tribes, two notable features of the situation in Turkish 'Iráq at the present day, would in that case date from this period of rapid political and commercial movement.

*Writing on the 13th June 1853 to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Rawlinson submitted a lengthy memorandum in regard to the possible contingency of the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, and advocated strongly the occupation by troops from India of the whole strip of territory from the Lower Zab and Aanah to the sea.

Special British Indian interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1839-61.

Proposed British Euphrates Valley Railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, 1856-57.

The scheme of establishing rapid communication between Europe and India by means of British steamers on the Euphrates having been abandoned, its place was taken by a project for a railway to be constructed under British auspices from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. This* project was first propounded in March 1856 by Mr. W. P. Andrew, formerly an official in the Indian Post Office, who had made a special study of railway questions in India and the Middle East; and his proposals were supported by the Court of Directors of the Hon'ble East India Company. A company was formed, with Mr. Andrew as Chairman, for the execution of his scheme; a concession was, by the diplomatic good offices of Her Majesty's Government, obtained on their behalf from the Porte; General F. R. Chesney, the leader of the Euphrates and Tigris expedition of 1834-36, was appointed the Company's Commissioner at Constantinople; Sir John Macneill, an eminent railway expert of the day, became their Engineer-in-Chief; His Majesty's Ship, "Stromboli" was placed at the disposal of General Chesney and Sir J. Macneill; the harbours of Aleppo and Suwaidiyah were examined; and a survey was made of the route from Suwaidiyah to Aleppo, besides a reconnaissance of that from Aleppo to Muskanah on the Euphrates. The scheme was favourably regarded by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and by Lord Clarendon, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

On the 22nd June 1857 "a deputation in favour of the British Government granting pecuniary support to the Euphrates Valley Railway" had an interview with Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister; it was headed by Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. Andrew; and it included many distinguished members of both Houses of Parliament as well as specialists such as General Chesney and his former assistant Mr. W. Ainsworth, General Sir Fenwick Williams, the defender of Qārs, Sir Justin Sheil, formerly His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran,

* Mr. Andrew's project was preceded by another and more ambitious one which owed its existence to Sir Macdonald Stephenson and came into being, originally, about 1840. It contemplated, in its earlier form, continuous railway communication between the West and India *viâ* Constantinople, Asia Minor, Aleppo, the Euphrates Valley, Basrah, Bandar 'Abbās and Karachi; in its later form the line was intended to run, beyond Kharput, by Tabriz, Tehrān, Mashhad, Herāt and Qandahār into Sind. No guarantee was sought on behalf of this scheme, which continued in existence until 1879 at least; but it does not seem to have advanced much beyond the academic stage.

Mr. T. K. Lynch, and others. Lord Palmerston assured the deputation that the Government were fully alive to the importance of the Euphrates route, and that they had supported, and would continue to support, the project of a Euphrates Valley Railway, without consulting his colleagues, however, he was unable to say anything on the subject of a financial guarantee by the British Government; and he therefore requested that the proposals of the Company might be submitted to him in writing, promising that they should receive full consideration, and that the Government would assist the scheme in so far as they were able.

Evidently Her Majesty's Government arrived at the conclusion that a financial guarantee could not properly by given; and without a reliable guarantee, the undertaking no doubt appeared unattractive to capitalists. The concession granted by the Porte was in the end allowed to lapse without having been utilised by the Company.

Grant by His Highness Mír Náṣir Khán of Sind for the clearance of the Husainiyah Canal, 1836-42.

From the period with which we are now concerned Indian interests begin to bulk more and more largely in the work of the British Political Agency at Baghdád.

The clearing from silt of the Husainiyah Canal, the 20 mile long channel by which Karbala derives its water supply from the Euphrates, is a periodically recurring difficulty which continues even at the present day to exercise the Turkish local authorities. In 1836 His Highness Mír Náṣir Khán of Sind resolved to undertake the work of clearance as a pious duty and requested the good offices of the Governor of Bombay, to whom he remitted Rs. 20,000 as a first instalment towards the cost. As his agents for carrying out the operation he deputed to Karbala two individuals named Saiyid Mehdi Shah and Hájí Sálih; and it was his desire that the funds which they required should be advanced to them, from time to time, by the British representative at Baghdád. The arrangements which he desired were authorised; and in 1838 the Mír, having been informed by his agents that the work would cost a lakh of rupees, remitted a supplementary amount of Rs. 50,000 to the British Political Agent at Baghdád, through the Agent, the Governor-General in Sind, and the Government of Bombay. In 1839 Mír Náṣir Khán asked for a credit of an additional Rs. 50,000 at Baghdád, which was granted. In 1842 Colonel Taylor, after repeated references to him by the British authorities in India, reported that he had advanced Rs. 1,09,999 in all to His Highness's agents, *viz.*, in October 1837, April and November 1840, and June 1842; and the accounts were closed. A balance which remained due by the Mír, in consequence of his procrastination in making good the credit of Rs. 50,000 that had been allowed him, was in the end duly recovered.

The Oudh Bequest, 1849-61.

The Oudh Bequest, 1849-61.

We come now to the subject of the "Oudh Bequest", a valuable trust of an unusual nature, the administration of which, since it came into operation in 1849, has been a cause of grave and incessant difficulty to the British representative at Baghdád.

In 1825, during a period of financial stringency occasioned by a war in Burma, Lord Amherst, then Governor-General of India, accepted a loan, generally known as the third Oudh Loan, from Ghází-ud-Dín Haidar, King of Oudh. The terms of the loan were defined in an Agreement made at Lucknow through Mr. Mordaunt Ricketts, the British Resident in Oudh. The amount of the loan was ten million rupees, and its character was perpetual. The principal was never to be repaid; and the interest, fixed at 5 per cent. per annum, was to be applied by the Government of India in perpetuity to particular specified purposes.

Agreement concluded between the King of Oudh and the Governor-General of India, 17th August 1825.

The Agreement mentioned was concluded at Lucknow, in counterpart, on the 17th August 1825. One part, written in Persian and bearing the King of Oudh's seal, was delivered to Mr. Ricketts. The other part, written in Persian and signed by Mr. Ricketts as the representative of the Governor-General, was handed to the King under a stipulation, expressed in both parts, that it should be returned on being replaced by a document in accordance with it bearing the seal and signature of the Governor-General. The Agreement was ratified by Lord Amherst on the 30th September 1825. Unfortunately, though the contents of the two original parts and of the document signed and sealed by the Governor-General, which last contained an English translation in a column parallel to the Persian text, were very similar, the wording of all three was different.

The Agreement, among other things, made monthly allowances of Rs. 10,000, Rs. 2,500, Rs. 1,100 and Rs. 1,000, respectively, payable to Nawáb Mubárak Mahall, Sultán Maryam Begam, Mumtáz Mahall and Sarfaráz Mahall for life, the first two being wives of the King; and each of the said ladies was empowered to bequeath by will one-third of her allowance, after her death, to whatsoever person or object she desired; but the remaining two-thirds of each allowance, together with any portion not bequeathed by will of the one-third, were to be appropriated to benefactions at Karbala and Najaf. Other allowances, amounting in the aggregate to Rs. 929 a month, were assigned to servants and dependents of Sarfaráz Mahall, with a proviso that, if any of the assignees died without heirs, their allowances should be added to the sums devoted to the Karbala and

Najaf benefactions. It is the fund thus provided for disbursement at the Holy Cities which has since come to be known as the Oudh Bequest.

Discrepancies in the different parts of the Agreement.

The clause of the Agreement relating to the Oudh Bequest was, in the part sealed by the King of Oudh, fully, explicitly, and unambiguously worded. There the passage ran:

..... miqdār-i-bāqiyi-mashrūr-ast dar hīsah bardah nisf ba-Najaf-i-Ashraf va nisf ba-Karbalā-i-Mu'allā sāzad-i-Mujtahidān i-mujāvir-i-Ān-Āstan-i-malāik-pāsbān mī-rasānidah bāshand ki mushār-ilaihim az taraf-i-In-Jānib hīn'ābar-i-kasb-i-sawāb ba-arbāb-i-istihqāq taqsīm mī-kardah bāshand.

This may be translated: ..... they (*i.e.*, the Honourable East India Company), having divided the aforesaid remaining sum into two parts, shall continue to transmit half to Najaf the Noble and half to Karbala the Sublime, to the Mujtahids resident at the angel-guarded Threshold, so that the said Mujtahids may continue to distribute it to deserving persons on our behalf, for the acquirement of religious merit.

In the part of the Agreement signed by Mr. Ricketts the corresponding clause was worded thus:

..... va hamah mushāharah haqlmāsā nisf ba-Najaf-i-Ashraf va nisf ba-Karbalā-i-Mu'lla nizā-i-Mujtahidān-i-mujāvir-i-Ān-Āstān ahad-en mushbadan az taraf-i-Bādshāh-i-zī-jāh-i-mu'azzam-ilaihi rasānidah khāhad shod ki masālāt-i-ān'āid-i-ān-i-farkhundah-fāl-i-Jānib-i-Bādshāh gardad.

This version may be rendered in English thus:

..... and the whole remaining monthly allowance shall be transmitted, half to Najaf the Noble and half to Karbala Sublime, to the Mujtahids residing at the Threshold, eternally, on behalf of the glorious King aforesaid, in order that the religious benefits thereof may accrue to the auspicious condition of His Majesty the King.

In the bilingual document by means of which the Governor-General ratified the Agreement, the Persian text was exactly as in the part of the Agreement signed by Mr. Ricketts except that the omission of a stroke over a Persian letter made the wording ungrammatical and left room for a doubt whether the proper payees were the "Mujtahidān-i-mujāvir-i-Ān-Āstan", that is "the Mujtahids residing at the Threshold" or the "Mujtahidān (va) Mujaviran-i-Āstān", that is "the Mujtahids (and) Mujavirs of the Threshold".

The term "Mujtahid", it may be explained, includes only Shī'ah doctors of theology of the highest class; while the word "Mujavir" would mean persons officially connected with the holy shrines, perhaps even persons who had settled at or near them for religious reasons.

The second of the alternative readings was adopted in the somewhat slipshod English version of the Agreement as ratified, which proceeded :

> .. ..the remaining two-thirds.....is to be divided into two equal parts ; one half to be given to the Nujuf Usbruf, and the other half for Kerbulla to the* High Priest and Mujawurs (or persons who have it's charge), on the part of the said King, that His Majesty might thereby derive it's benefits.

True meaning of the Agreement.

It cannot be doubted that the part of the Agreement sealed by the King of Oudh was that in which his intentions were most † correctly, as well as most elaborately, expressed; that part, it will be noticed, stated that the funds transmitted to the payees were to be distributed by them to "deserving persons",—a point on which the other documents were silent. It is equally clear that there was no intention on the King's part of including Mujávirs among the original payees, and that Mujávirs would never have been mentioned at all in connection with the Oudh Bequest, had it not been for a clerical error by a Persian scribe which gave rise to an incorrect English version of the Agreement.

Coming into operation of the Oudh Bequest 1849.

Sultán Maryam Begam and Nawáb Mubárak Mahall both died in the year 1849, King Gházi-ud-Din Haidar having predeceased them in 1827, and the clauses of the Agreement of 1825 constituting the Oudh Bequest became operative. The question of how practical effect should be given to them was considered by Lieutenant Kemball, the Acting Political Agent at Baghdád, in the absence on leave of the Political Agent, Colonel Rawlinson.

Orders of Government in regard to the administration of the 1849-52.

The magnitude of the Bequest and the political difficulties in which it threatened to involve the British Political Agency at Baghdád seem to have daunted, somewhat, the officiating British representative. Rupees 1,668 a month from the allowance of Sultán Maryam Begam and Rs. 6,666 a month from that of Nawáb Mubárak Mahall had fallen in with effect from the 6th April and the 30th June 1849, and large sums were rapidly accumulating. Lieutenant Kemball accordingly addressed the Government of India and Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,

*The arbitrary substitution of the singular for the plural will be observed. Moreover "High Priest" or even "Priest" is a misleading translation of the word "Mujtahid," the duties of Mujtahids being professorial, judicial and notarial, but not sacrificial.

†The King of Oudh's part of the Agreement seems to have been lost sight of for a long time; but in 1911, having been rediscovered by Khán Bahádur Maula Bakhsh, Attaché in the Foreign Office, Simla, it was referred by the Government of India to the Government of the United Provinces for examination and opinion. That Government held that it was superior in authority to the other Agreement papers, and the Government of India apparently concurred.

making reference to the Karbala massacre of 1843 and to the inveterate antipathy always existing between the Sunni and Shí'ah sects of Islám, to the latter of whom the Oudh Bequest belonged, while the Government of Turkish 'Iráq was in the hands of the former. He feared that the Bequest funds were already sufficiently large, "apart from the loan which with "probable facility might be raised upon the forthcoming monthly pay- "ments, to corrupt, if need be, the Turkish garrisons on the spot; or at all "events to secure the aid and co-operation of a formidable body of Sheah "fanatics, who would scarcely require the spur of pecuniary gain to devote "their lives to a cause by them esteemed so holy",—namely the freeing of Karbala and Najaf from Turkish domination. He added "I have endea- "voured to show that the supply of such considerable funds by monthly "payments to the Mujtahids of Karbala and Nejjef may possibly, in their "uncontrolled expenditure, contain the elements of future disorder in this "Pashalic; and that their unconditional disbursement by me may hereafter "furnish grounds of umbrage to the Turkish Government". He also drew attention to the difficulties which might be experienced in keeping the Agency Treasury supplied with funds for making the required payments. In effect he only asked to "be invested with discretionary power to make "or suspend the payments in question without reference to the dates on which they fall due"; but it was clear from the tone of his letter that he disapproved of the execution of the Bequest being undertaken by the British Government, or at least by their representative at Baghdád.

Sir Stratford Canning, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, replied that the circumstances hardly seemed to warrant a violation of the terms of the King of Oudh's bequest, and that "the "most desirable arrangement would obviously be to pay the annuities as "willed, but to make the receivers effectually accountable for their proper "application". He considered the question to be one of such delicacy, however, as to necessitate a reference to Her Majesty's Government. In his instructions to Lieutenant Kemball he remarked: "You have at all "events to guard against any misunderstanding which might arise in some "period of trouble in consequence of the payments being made by means "of (the) British Agency, and I conceive that in spite of other consi- "deration(s) everything of a clandestine or mysterious character should on "that account be carefully avoided in the course of the transaction".

1850. It was meanwhile decided, however, by the Government of India that the money should not be paid at Baghdád, and that instead the chief priests of Karbala and Najaf should, through private agents of their own, draw on the Bombay Treasury for the amount. A guarded concurrence in

these orders was expressed by Lord Palmerston, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and the system so instituted remained in force until 1852.

In that year the question was re-opened by Colonel Rawlinson, on his return from leave. He pointed out that the circuitous method of payment at Bombay had, in fact, a clandestine and mysterious appearance, and was more likely to cause trouble with the Turkish authorities than direct and open payment through Baghdád. He also thought that there was a real danger of the money being misapplied by the Mujtahids for want of proper control and remarked: 1852.

> I may further mention that the evils which I have depicted as attendant on the present system of payment are not altogether hypothetical. I have reason to believe that there has been already an irregular, if not a treasonable, application of the funds; that considerable funds in fact have been diverted from charitable purposes to objects of personal ambition; and I have also learnt that the attention of the present Governor of the Pashalic has been drawn to the sudden influx of wealth into Kerbela and Nejjef, and that he has expressed uneasiness at what he calls "the secret subsidising of the holy shrines by the British Indian authorities."

The remedy, in Colonel Rawlinson's opinion, was—

> to place the disbursement unreservedly in the hands of the Political Agent accredited to the Court of Baghdat, who is at the same time Consul-General on the part of Her Britannic Majesty; to authorise him to see, according to the principle observed at Lucknow in all cases of guaranteed pensions, that the money in question is expended agreeably to the intention of the Royal donor, that is in eleemosynary grants and religious attendance, and not in political excitement or military corruption; and to give the Political Agent a discretionary power in emergent cases to suspend payment altogether.

These suggestions were not at all in accordance with the views of Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India; and under his orders Colonel Rawlinson was instructed "that neither the Government of India "nor the Political Agent have any right to exercise any control over the "stipends which have been left by will to the priests". A despatch was, however, addressed to the Court of Directors of the East India Company suggesting that the opinion of the British Ambassador at the Porte should be taken; and the result was that Colonel Rose (afterwards Lord Strathnairn), then British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, supported the proposals of Colonel Rawlinson, remarking that it was necessary to the maintenance of good relations with the Turkish Government that the means of revolt and intrigue should be taken out of the hands of its sectarian opponents, the Shi'ah fanatics.

Accordingly, in October 1852, the Government of India cancelled their original orders; the Oudh Bequest was made payable from the Baghdad Treasury; and the Political Agent was authorised to exercise "a judicious supervision over the expenditure of the money".

It seems probable that during the whole of this period discussions regarding the Oudh Bequest were conducted upon the basis of the misleading English translation of the Agreement of 1825. Various passages in the correspondence of Colonel Rawlinson and Lieutenant Kemball indicate this.

Results of the Oudh Bequest at Najaf, 1852.

In 1852, in a despatch about the Najaf revolt addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Rawlinson remarked: "Your Lordship will remember that the Indian Government .. ... pays a "sum of £5,000 annually, in virtue of its agreement with the late King of "Oudh, for the maintenance of the Shrine of Nejjef, and the charities "connected therewith; and you will understand that this payment has "drawn a vast concourse of devotees from India to reside in the town. "Their presence furnishes me with an additional motive for wishing to "prevent a recurrence of that scene of carnage which took place at the "sack of Kerbela ten years ago..... "

Local management of the Bequest 1852-54.

The manner in which Major Rawlinson, the Political Agent at Baghdad, "consequent upon the instructions of Government to exercise a "general supervision over the disbursements of the Lucknow benefactions "to Karbala and Najaf, with a view to preventing the misappropriation "of the funds to political or personal ends," proceeded in the local administration of the Oudh Bequest was described by himself in a letter to the British Resident at Lucknow, in May 1854, as follows:

I ordered last year into communication with the Chief Priests of *those places, Mirza Ali Naki and Sheikh Murtaza, and concerted with them a scheme of distribution which would, I conceived, reconcile the greatest practicable account of public benefit with a due regard to the terms of the original bequest, in this scheme, while providing completely for the individual claims of the Mujtahids and all the various religious establishments connected with the shrines, I secured at the same time a liberal allowance for purely charitable purposes, and even for objects of general interest and utility, such as repairing the mosques and colleges, and keeping open the canal from the Euphrates upon which Karbala is dependent for its supply of water. It is only fair to the Chief Priests to state that they responded most cordially to every suggestion which I offered and sought to secularise the distribution rather than to tie it up for exclusively religious purposes.

Having obtained from Mirza 'Ali Naqi an exact account of the application of the Karbala funds under this system during the year 1852-1853, Major Rawlinson forwarded it to the British Resident at Lucknow with these remarks.

* Karbala and Najaf.

My object, moreover, in forwarding these documents is not only to satisfy His Majesty the King of Oudh that the benefactions which came originally from the Lucknow Treasury have been duly administered, but to obtain also his Majesty's approval of the general scheme of distribution; for there is a certain fanatical party at Karbala, headed by some of the junior Mujtahids, which repudiates all appropriation of the funds in question to charitable or secular purposes.

Colonel Sleeman, the Resident at Lucknow, replied expressing his entire concurrence in the arrangements made which seemed to him "most benevolent and judicious" and his willingness to submit the accounts to the King of Oudh, but pointing out that His Majesty's approval of the proceedings through it could readily be obtained, was not in any sense requisite.

Relations of other European powers with Turkish 'Iraq, 1839-61.

Besides Britain the only European power which at this time maintained a representative in Turkish 'Irāq seems to have been France.

Representation of French interests at Baghdād.

There are frequent references in correspondence in the years following 1841 to a French Consul-General at Baghdād, whose attitude to the British representative, perhaps in consequence of the divergence of British and French policy in regard to Syria and the failure of a recent French mission to Persia, seems to have been unfriendly.

This official, though his country had no local interests except such as were connected with the Catholic religious orders, seems to have concerned himself a good deal in internal affairs. We have seen that Najib Pasha, before proceeding to the reduction of Karbala in 1842, thought it necessary to inform the French as well as the British representative at Baghdād of his intentions; and during the Karbala operations the French Consul-General was visited by some Persians who "requested his advice to know if they should proceed to Kerbella to help the Sheeahs, as it was a religious war".

In 1843, as has been mentioned under the head of relations with Persia, the British Political Agent at Baghdād found that attempts on his part to interpose between the Turkish authorities and Persian subjects were regarded with jealousy by his French colleague; and in 1845, in the debate regarding the necessity of retaining a British armed vessel in Mesopotamia, Major Rawlinson, as we have already seen, made reference to the ambitions of France in Asiatic Turkey.

'ABDUL 'AZĪZ, 1861-1876, AND MURĀD V, 1876.*

'Abdul Majīd died on the 25th June 1861 and was followed in the Sultanate by his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz, who ruled the Ottoman Empire for fifteen years. Under his rule the over-centralisation of the administration, dating from 1834, became intolerable, especially in the absence almost everywhere of means of communication; and in 1864 there was a partial return to the system of provincial devolution of authority. A† scheme of civil organisation prepared by 'Ali Pasha was, after having been applied experimentally to the Danubian provinces through Mid-hat Pasha afterwards Wāli of Baghdād, brought into force in 1867 throughout the Empire generally.

During the reign of 'Abdul 'Aziz the course of events in Turkish 'Irāq was little influenced, to outward appearance, by political events in Western Turkey: these last, therefore, need not be more than slightly noticed here. Trouble constantly prevailed in the Balkans, culminating in the "Bulgarian atrocities" of 1875-1876; and Muhammadan fanaticism was displayed in homicidal form at Salonica, where two foreign consuls were killed. But incompetent administration and wasteful finance were the most patent causes of a deterioration that now occurred in the general position of Turkey. Public extravagance had been rendered possible by the admission of the Ottoman Empire after the Crimean War to the circle of the European powers, which facilitated the raising by Turkey of foreign loans; and it was bankruptcy, precipitated it is true by military expenditure in the Balkans, that reduced her to the miserable position in which at the fall of 'Abdul 'Aziz she was found. The Sultān, whose personal profligacy in money matters

* The sources of information regarding the history of Turkish 'Irāq during the reigns of 'Abdul 'Aziz and Murād V are almost exclusively official: they have been condensed by Mr. J. A. Saldanha in his *Précis of Turkish Arabia Affairs, 1801-1905*, printed in 1905. Notable exceptions exist in Mr. J. C. McCoan's *Our New Protectorate*, 1879, relating chiefly to general administration, and the writings of Lady Anne Blunt, whose *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, 1879, though referring to 1877-1878, and *Pilgrimage to Nejd*, 1881, though referring to 1878-1879, contain information relating to the period. Mr. G. Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, 1878, should also be mentioned. Sir F. J. Goldsmid's *Telegraph, Travel*, 1874, contains some facts in regard to the construction of the Baghdād-Persian Gulf line of telegraph.

† An admirable account of the Turkish executive system as remodelled in 1867 will be found in McCoan's *Our New Protectorate*, vol. I, pages 232—39, followed by remarks on the judicial system.

was among the causes of the catastrophe, was deposed in May 1876, by a political coalition including the Grand Vazīr, the Minister of War, and Mid-hat Pāsha, ex-Wāli of Baghdād, under a Fatwa obtained from the Shaikh-ul-Islām. He died soon afterwards, not without indications of foul play, and was succeeded by a nephew bearing the title of Murād V. The new Sultān proved a nonentity and was removed for incompetence in August 1876, having reigned only three months.

As the situation of Turkey grew worse, from internal causes, Russian influence at Constantinople increased. In 1870, at the instance of Russia, the Bulgarian Exarchate was created by the Porte: this removed the Bulgarian Church from the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople and stimulated the growth of a Bulgarian national spirit. In 1871, after the overthrow of France by Germany, Russia succeeded in obtaining a partial abrogation of the Treaty of Paris, thus further enhancing her prestige on the Bosphorus. The modification of the Treaty restored to Russia and Turkey their freedom in regard to the maintenance of armaments in the Black Sea,—a change beneficial to the former country; but the Straits remained closed to all but Turkish men of war.

A law important to all foreign nations possessing subjects in Turkey was promulgated in June 1867, whereby foreigners were allowed for the future to own immoveable property throughout the Ottoman Empire, except in the sacred province of Hijāz, on condition of submitting to Turkish jurisdiction in respect of the same.

Relations of Turkey with Persia, 1861-76.

Visit of H. M Nāsir-ud-Din Shāh of Persia, to Turkish 'Irāq, 1870-71.

The most striking incident in the history of Turko-Persian relations during the reign of the Sultān 'Abdul 'Azīz, was a pilgrimage made by Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, the ruler of Persia, to the Shī'ah shrines of Turkish 'Irāq. The question of the visit was mooted in May 1870, or earlier; the visit itself took place in the following winter; and it must have caused acute anxiety to the Turkish Government in view of the mutual hatred of Sunnis and Shī'ahs, of the traditional enmity between Arabs and Persians, and of the incessant friction and strained relations between the Turkish and Persian Governments arising out of frontier relations, which appeared at this time to be again approaching a crisis. That it was not accomplished without the greatest inconvenience to Turkish

officials of all grades is plain from the following passage in a private letter written by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Persia from Kirmánsháh to Mr. Alison, British Minister at Tehrán, on the 27th October 1870.

Vous ne pouvez vous faire une idée des embarras sans nombre que nous avons malheureux voyage et des peines infinies que nous devons endurer.

J'ai été malade de fatigue et de privations, actuellement je me porte bien; mais n'allez pas croire que je vais à mon aise.

Le Roi vient d'arriver à Kirmanshah où il s'arrêtera dit-on une dizaine de jours. Si ça va de ce pas nous arriverons à Baghdad, Dieu soit guard (*sic.*)

The proceedings in connection with the Sháh's arrival and stay at Baghdád are well described in two despatches from Colonel Herbert, British Political Agent there, to his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople which we reproduce at full length below :

(24th October 1870.)

I have the honour to report that, on the 20th instant, news having reached Baghdad of the near approach of S. Ex.* Musheer-ood-dowlah, Persian Ambassador at Constantinople, and Kamil Pasha, Imperial Commissioner for the reception of His Majesty the Shah of Persia, His Excellency Midhat Pasha, accompanied by the chief officers of his Government proceeded to the shrine and village of Ma'arûf, about 3 miles to the north of the city, in order to meet them.

Troops were sent out as a guard of honour, and every honour done to their arrival.

The party entered Baghdad on the afternoon of the 22nd instant, and the visitors took up their residence at the serai, where the principal apartments were placed at their disposal.

I had the honour of paying them a ceremonial visit yesterday, the 23rd, when Musheer-ood-dowlah informed me it was his intention to proceed the same evening, or this morning, towards Kirmanshah, there to join the Shah.

Kamil Pasha remains here to accompany the Governor General to the frontier.

* * * *

(7th December 1870.)

In continuation of my despatch No. 19, dated 24th October last, I have the honour to report :—

On the 5th ultimo, intelligence having been previously received by telegram from Musheer-ood-dowlah, who had reached the Shah's camp, that His Majesty would on that day leave Kirmanshah for the frontier, His Excellency Midhat Pasha, accompanied by Kamil Pasha Imperial Commissioner, Ranof Pasha, Commander of the forces, and several officers of importance, and escorted by 800 infantry and a regiment of cavalry, left Baghdad for the purpose of meeting His Majesty at Khanikeen.

* This was Mirza Husain Khan, who in 1871 became Prime Minister of Persia and in 1872 induced the Shah to grant the Reuter Concession. See page 2034.

The Shah reached Baghdad early in the afternoon of the 22nd ultimo, and at once proceeded to take up his residence in a new* kiosk, which had been built in a large garden outside the city walls and furnished in a sumptuous manner for his reception.

His Majesty arrived in state, escorted by the above mentioned officers and his own attendant Ministers and others, and from a distance of, I suppose, upwards of two miles from the city passed with his cortége along a road specially marked out and cleared for his use, which was thronged by the inhabitants of the city and lined by the troops of the garrison, and by what was a new† feature in this country, the boys of the different schools, all neatly dressed, some in a regular uniform.

He was preceded by two detachments of Persian Infantry, each about 200 strong, and then by his Cavveen Regiment, 1,100 strong, headed by a large and excellent band of music.

The most perfect order prevailed during His Majesty's passage, every precaution having been taken by the Governor General of the province to preserve the peace.

A cloud of dust almost completely hid the Shah and his cortege from the view of spectators at a distance, and immediately on his passing, the crowd of nearly all the inhabitants of the city broke up and returned quietly and orderly to their homes.

I annex a list of the persons who have accompanied His Majesty, and which formed the enclosure of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran to Earl Granville of which the former has favoured me with a copy.

On the Shah's passing the camp of the Ottoman troops, who have been for sometime past living under canvas about a mile from the town, a salute of 21 guns was fired from the field artillery, and, on his alighting at Garden House, 101 guns were fired from the citadel.

It has been remarked, and with a feeling of disappointment among a people who regard courtesy as an essential sign of dignity, that the Shah returned the salute of none, great or small.

Even on receiving the Governor General and high officers of Khanikeen, he failed to return their salute by the smallest notice.

This is said to be the custom of the Persian Court.

He appears to be entirely occupied with himself, and is described by those who accompanied him from the frontier as travelling covered with gems and barbaric ornaments, and as looking over himself and stroking his ornaments complacently, and scarcely taking any notice of those around him, and then only addressing them abrupt questions.

On the forenoon after his arrival he proceeded to visit the Shorah ‡Shrine, common to all sects of Muslims, of Ma'azim.

Late in the afternoon he returned, and proceeded to the Turkish camp, where the troops had been under arms for some hours, awaiting his arrival.

The lateness of the hour of his coming obliged a curtailment of the review intended for his honour, but after a few movements and the march past, His Majesty caused

*The building still (1912) exists and is used as a hospital. It is on the left bank of the Tigris immediately above the town.

† It is an invariable feature of public occasions at Baghdad at the present day (1912) and appears to be a minor symptom of the militarism which threatens to destroy Turkey.

‡The place probably meant, the tomb of Abu Hanifah, is Sunni not Shi'ah. See Volume II of this Gazetteer, page 1243, article "Mu'adhdham."

numerous decorations of the Lion and the Sun to be distributed; to Midhat Pasha he gave the 1st class; to Raouf Pasha and Kamil Pasha the 2nd; and to many others inferior grades.

The distribution, however, does not appear to have been carefully considered, or to have given satisfaction, decorations having been given to officers of rank and standing such as are not unfrequently conferred on menial servants of the Court at Tehran.

On the morning of the 24th His Majesty, accompanied, as usual, by Midhat Pasha and many others, proceeded in the Ottoman Steamer *Mooval* to visit the great ruin of the ancient Persian Palace at Ctesiphon.

On this occasion, at a very late hour, indeed, in less than an hour before the *Mooval* left, I was personally requested by Shakir Beg, the Mutasarif, on behalf of Midhat Pasha, to permit Her Majesty's steam vessel *Comet* to accompany them in case of difficulties arising from the want of water in the river.

She accordingly followed as soon as steam could be got up, but the voyage of the *Mooval* being made without accident, her services were not called for.

The *Mooval* returned about 10 p.m.

The night was dark, but the principal houses on the river, which had been illuminated each night since His Majesty's arrival, were again lighted up; the bridge across the river was also illuminated, and as the boat, which was herself brilliantly lighted, moved slowly up the perfectly tranquil river, large blue lights, which had been previously arranged along the banks were burnt as she passed, casting a beautiful and clear light around and producing a strikingly picturesque effect.

On the two previous evenings a display of fireworks had been exhibited on the further side of the river from that on which His Majesty's camp was pitched.

On the 25th, at noon, the Shah received the Consular Corps of this city, including the establishment of this Consulate General,* the French Consulate, and the Italian Vice-Consulate.

* And Political Agency.

Mr. Ongley, *Attaché* to His Majesty's Mission at Tehran, who came down with the camp, accompanied our party.

We were all received in the tent of Yehya Khan, Moutamed-ool-Mulk, the Lord Chamberlain of the Court, where we were met by His Excellency Midhat Pasha, and at the appointed hour were introduced to the presence of the Shah by His Excellency, accompanied by Mushier-ood-Dowlah and Ali Reza Beg.

Midhat Pasha led us into the large room in the centre of the kiosk, where we found His Majesty sitting on a settee, wearing a suit of dark cloth clothes with frogs of diamonds across the chest, but without shoes or boots and wearing white stockings.

He took no notice, according to the custom of his Court, of our salutes, but on our being presented to him, he addressed to each a few commonplace remarks, after which we retired.

On our leaving, the whole party, including the Governor General of the province, were begged to form a group under the shade of the tent walls which were set up to screen His Majesty's residence from vulgar gaze, and these were photographed at the request of the Shah, who appears to have a fancy to retain the photographic likenesses of all admitted to his presence.

On the afternoon of the next day His Majesty visited the shrine, respected alike by all sects of Muslims, of Sheikh Abdool Kader, after which he attended another review of the Turkish troops.

On Sunday, the 27th, His Majesty proceeded by steamer to Kazimeen, to which place his camp had been removed, and on the following morning continued his route towards Kerbela.

Midhut Pasha accompanied His Majesty, and will continue in attendance on his person while he remains within Ottoman dominions.

The greatest credit is due to His Excellency and to the officers who have energetically carried out his orders for the perfect preservation of order that has existed during the Shah's visit to this city, and for the magnificence of the reception accorded to His Majesty, which has far exceeded what could have been expected in this locality; and it is said that His Majesty has expressed very great satisfaction with all the arrangements made.

His Majesty is expected at Baghdad in about a fortnight on his way back to his own dominions.

List of those who compose the Shah's Camp.

The King's mother, all his wives, six of his daughters and their attendants.
His Royal Highness the Hossam-es-Sultaneh and servants (in charge of the camp).
His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs and servants.
His Excellency the Moayer-ul-Memalek, with his son and wife, and his own Harem.
His Excellency the Zaheer-ud-Dowlah, chief master of ceremonies and servants.
His Excellency Yahia Khan, his wife and servants.
Pasha Khan Amzer-ool-Mouk, with servants.
Agha Ali, Ameen-oo-Hooseo, with servants.
Ali Reza Khan, Keeper of the Royal seals.
Hajee Hosseln Khan, Amzer-i-Toman, with 150 of his horsemen.
Kambar Ali Khan, with 100 horsemen.
The Cawvon Regiment, 1,100 strong.
From the Noosret Regiment, 250 soldiers.
From the Demavend Regiments, 250 soldiers.
12 Guns.
All the Peishkhidmets and the private and personal attendants of the Shah.
The Body-Guard.
Mahomed Mehdi Khan, Chief of the Body-Guard, and his wife.
The Ameen-i-Khelvet.
Sixty Artillerymen and one gun.
The whole are estimated at 20,000, 6,000 of whom are the King's own suite.

Having visited the shrines at Kādhimain, Karbala and Najaf, the Shāh returned to Baghdād on the evening of the 20th December. Colonel Herbert, on the 17th January 1871, related his further movements as follows

After a stay of three days, during which he again visited Ctesiphon, for a day's sport with his hawks and guns, His Majesty left on the morning of the 24th December for* Samarrah where are the tombs of the Imams Ali-un-Naki, otherwise known as Ali-ul-hadi, and Hussan Askeri, and thence proceeded direct to Khanikeen on the frontier, leaving Ottoman territory on the 9th instant.

Owing to the presence in His Majesty's camp of His Excellency Midhut Pasha and his constant care and exertion, no serious disturbances have taken place, but the march

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* After this visit the Shāh caused the principal dome at Sāmarrah to be regilded.

of the camp has been marked by mutual recriminations by Persians and Arabs of plunder and robbery.

I believe there is no doubt that some thefts were committed by Arabs, but that the followers of His Majesty plundered the people of the country and committed serious barbarities, and the impression left by them on the minds of all classes of persons is very unfavourable.

His Excellency Midhat Pasha returned from the frontier, whither he had attended the Shah on the 15th instant, and I had yesterday the honour of paying him a visit.

He gave me a long account of the trouble caused by the misconduct of the persons in the Persian camp, of their plundering the country people, to whom he had found it necessary to give indemnity, of the disgraceful manner in which the servants, grooms, and others of the Court openly sold in the camp portions of the supplies collected by His Excellency under instructions from the Porte for the use of His Majesty and suite, their horses and numerous animals, and the want of co-operation on the part of His Excellency Mushur-ood-dowlah and Mirza Saeed Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in attendance on His Majesty, who seemed to look upon these matters as every day and natural events.

The Shāh arrived at Kirmānshāh in his own dominions, without accident, on the 24th January 1871.

Turkish demand for the extradition of Hamawand refugees in Persia, 1871.

In the course of the Shāh's visit to Turkish Irāq the Wāli of Baghdād brought to his notice an important frontier question, that of outlaws from Turkish territory belonging to the Hamawand tribe, and forming nearly the whole of it, who had migrated to Persia, apparently about 1865. They appeared to enjoy the countenance of Malik Niyāz Khān, the Persian Governor of Zohāb; and they incessantly raided, from their safe retreat, the Turkish districts of Kirkūk and Sulaimāniyah. Mid-hat Pāsha added a request that the outlaws might be arrested as criminals and handed over to the Turkish authorities.

The Shāh at first appeared to concur and issued strict orders on the subject to Malik Niyāz Khān, who presently reported the arrest of no less than 280 men,—by which perhaps he only meant that most of the Hamawand tribe were then in his jurisdiction. When matters came to a point, the Shāh's staff of Persian Ministers and officials, among whom the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, Persian Ambassador at Constantinople, seemed to take the lead, demurred to handing over the prisoners to Turkey on the plea that to do so would be degrading to Persia. A Turko-Persian Joint Commission on the subject was formed at Khānaqīn, including amongst others Mid-hat Pāsha and Kāmil Pāsha on the Turkish side and the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh on the part of Persia; and eventually it was agreed, or was said by the Turks to have been agreed, that the Hamawand chief and twenty of his principal followers should be extradited on the understanding that their lives would be spared and that they would be deported

to Rumelia. The Persians, however, neglected to give effect to the agreement, if agreement it was, and even seemed prepared to repudiate it; and at Baghdád there were allegations that the Sháh, on the offenders being sent to him by the Governor of Zoháb, had received them with favour and presented a jewelled sword to their chief.

Colonel Herbert, the British Political Agent at Baghdád, suggested to Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrán that British influence might be used with the Persian Government to bring about the extradition of the Hamawand, as the Turkish demand seemed reasonable and compliance with it would avert threatened complications on the frontier; but, the Sháh being clearly determined not to concede the point, Mr. Alison deemed it inexpedient to intervene, more especially as pourparlers were on foot between Turkey and Persia for a direct settlement of all their frontier differences without recourse to the good offices of the British and Russian Governments.

Question of the Turko-Persian frontier, 1861—1876.

This Hamawand dispute leads back to the question of the Turko-Persian boundary, the surveys connected with which had been finished in 1852. The maps prepared on the basis of the British and Russian surveys were ready in 1865; but on examination they were found to contain inaccuracies, obliging the Ambassadors of Britain and Russia at Constantinople to withhold their signatures. The maps were accordingly revised, and were not finally passed till 1869.

In August 1869 a* Convention was entered into by Turkey and Persia, under which both powers undertook, pending a definitive settlement, to maintain the *status quo* and not to erect any new buildings in disputed territory. As the *status quo*, however, was differently understood by the parties, and as the materials bearing on it collected by Sir F. Williams were lost, the Convention was productive of no good results. On the contrary many annoying frontier questions cropped up, of which the Hamawand affair may serve as an example; the trouble extended to the Pusht-i-Kúh† section of the border, of which little had previously been heard; and from 1869 to 1873, notwithstanding a mutual agreement to remove refugees from across the frontier to a dis-

* The Protocol is given in Aitchison's *Treaties*, vol. XII, pages lxii and lxiii.

†The principal dispute in the Pusht-i-Kúh section related to the ownership of certain lands, known as the Saif Malkhatái, to the east and north-east of Badrah; and with special reference to some of these, known to the Turks as Saiyid Hasan and to the Persians as Bakasi and Ghuraibeh, the Turko-Persian Convention of 1869 was formally renewed in 1873. See Captain D. L. R. Lorimer's *Report on Pusht-i-Kúh*, 1909, page 32, and Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's *Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistán*, 1912, page 54.

tance from the border line and to refer the frontier question to a joint Commission at Constantinople, it seemed to grow progressively more dangerous.

Copies of the identic British-Russian map were communicated to the Porte in October 1869 and to the Persian Government in February 1870; and, in accordance with an agreement reached by Britain and Russia in 1865, an expectation was at the same time expressed on the part of the mediating powers that the line of boundary between the respective dominions of the Soltān and the Shāh would be found within limits traced on the map, and that the Ottoman and Persian Governments would themselves mark out that line, but that, in the event of any difficulty arising between them in regard to any particular locality, the points in dispute should be referred to the Governments of Britain and Russia.

It was not until December 1874 that a Turkish and a Persian Commissioner met at Constantinople to trace the frontier on the map, and in January 1875 their proceedings came to a deadlock. A new Commission was then formed, comprising representatives of the mediating powers; the British Commissioner was Sir Arnold Kemball, formerly British Political Agent at Baghdād, the Russian was Colonel Zelenoi. As Ottoman Commissioner the Porte chose Dervish Pāsha, whose attitude on the Delimitation Commission of 1848—52 will not have been forgotten. The new Commission assembled at Constantinople in June 1875, when the Turkish and Persian representatives were each invited to trace, on the identic map, the line of frontier claimed by his Government.*

Dervish Pasha expressed his inability to do this, since the line he intended to trace lay altogether to the east of the so-called frontier zone, and was based upon the solitary surveys he had made while separated from his colleagues on the former Commission.

As a result of this attitude, the Ambassadors made energetic representations to the Porte, and stated that any line passing outside the frontier zone on the identic map would not even be taken into consideration by the mediating Delegates.

The Porte hereupon formally recognised the zone as embodying the limits within which the frontier line should be traced; but this admission, it was added, would *ipso facto* lapse if the Commission then sitting did not arrive at a definite settlement of the frontier question.

About this time the Persian Government intimated that they would agree to the arbitration of Great Britain and Russia, and accept any line within the zone laid down by the mediating Delegates.

Memorandum on the Turko-Persian Boundary Question, 1833-1908, by Mr. Alwyn Parker, 8th December 1908.

The last sitting of his Commission was held in January 1876. The Turkish memorandum and the tracing of the frontier as claimed by the Porte were duly presented; but, owing to a misapprehension on the part of the Persian Commissioner, the Persian memorandum and tracing were not ready. Much delay ensued in consequence, and in July 1876 the outbreak of the Servian war put a stop to all further proceedings. The Persian documents were only communicated on the eve of this war.

Convention regarding the powers of Persian Consular officers and immunities of Persian subjects in Turkey, 1875.

The vexed question of the powers of Persian Consular officers and the immunities of Persian subjects in Turkey, which had given much trouble in the past, was finally regulated by a* Convention between Persian and Turkey, dated 20th December 1875. There had been a wide divergence between the Turkish and Persian Governments' views on these subjects, the former virtually claiming to treat Persians in Turkey as Ottoman subjects while the latter insisted on rights similar to those possessed by the great European powers under capitulation only. The Convention recognised the title of Persian Consuls and consular Dragomans in Turkey to the same privileges as those enjoyed by the Consuls and Dragomans of other powers; and the exclusive authority of the Persian Consuls over Persian subjects in questions confined to Persian subjects whether civil or criminal, and in matters of succession were affirmed; but Persian subjects were declared amenable to the jurisdiction of the Turkish courts in cases of breach by them of the law of the country and in mixed civil and commercial cases, certain powers of assistance and protection in the proceedings being reserved however to the Persian consular representatives. Among other matters, the immunity of Persian subjects from "taxes" to which only Ottoman subjects were liable was established. The Convention also laid down that all the provisions relating to Persian subjects in Turkey should apply equally to Turkish subjects in Persia, and that both should receive treatment due to subjects of the most favoured nation.

Internal history of Turkish 'Irāq, 1861—1876.

The early years of the reign of 'Abdul 'Aziz were characterised in Turkish 'Irāq by difficulties between the Turkish administration

*The text of this Convention will be found in Aitchison's *Treaties*, vol. XII, pages lxiv—lxvi.

and the Arab tribes, hardly less grave than those which had prevailed in the province from 1845 to 1855. The exciting cause was similar; it was a determined effort made by the Local Government, with insufficient resources and in disregard of the experience of Najib Pāsha and Nāmiq Pāsha, to bring the tribesmen under strict control, and extend Turkish executive authority to new and by the Turks almost untrodden districts. These difficulties interfered seriously with the construction of a line of telegraph from Baghdād to the Persian Gulf which had been undertaken by the Porte under British advice, and with British official aid; and the British Political Agent at Baghdād was consequently obliged to intervene, to a much greater extent than had been usual in internal affairs of the country.

Muntafik troubles, Nov. 1863—Aug. 1864.

It will be remembered that in 1855 Shaikh Bandar had been recognised as head of the Muntafik tribe on undertaking to pay a large annual sum for the farm of a group of districts from which some, formerly pertaining to the Muntafik Shaikhship, had been removed. In 1863, Shaikh Bandar having constantly made default in his payments,* Nāmiq Pāsha sent orders to Basrah under which Munib Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of that place, arrested Bandar when that chief came in a Turkish steamer to pay him a visit. The Shaikh was soon set at liberty, however; and Nāmiq Pāsha, suspecting that his release was due to bribery, caused Munib Pasha himself to be brought under arrest to Baghdād, where it was proved that he had in fact been guilty of corruption. Shaikh Bandar was subsequently induced, in hope of a renewal of the farm of the Muntafik districts in his favour, to come to Baghdād and pay up 150,000 Shāmis on account of the arrears due by him; but while still at Baghdād he died, on the 13th November 1863, owing about £25,000 to the Turkish Treasury.

Nāmiq Pāsha thought the opportunity favourable for extending direct Turkish rule to new portions of the Muntafik territory. He resolved, without seeking the approval of the Government at Constantinople, to detach the lands on the Shatt-al-'Arab below Qūrnah and those on the right bank of the Tigris above Qūrnah, including the Hai or Shatt-al-Gharaf tracts from the Muntafik Shaikhdom, and to annex the former to the Turkish Qāim-Maqāmliq of Basrah, and the latter to that of Azīzyah. At the same time the Muntafik Shaikh was to be deprived of the powers of life and death, mutilation, and corporal punishment generally, which he had exercised from time immemorial; he was to be debarred from exacting blood money in tribal disputes and other unap-

*It is uncertain whether this is the same Nāmiq Pāsha who was Pāsha of Baghdād in 1862—64: probably it was not.

thorised dues; and the local system of taxation was to be assimilated to that of the Ottoman Empire at large. All suits, criminal and civil, were to be decided in future by a Majlis or court composed of landowners, merchants, and other notables upon the spot, whose appointment as judges must be confirmed by the Pāsha of Baghdād. As the instrument for carrying out this policy, which they foresaw would be unpopular, Nāmiq Pāsha appointed Mansūr, one of the Muntafik Shaikhs, to be the first Turkish Qāim-Maqām of the Muntafik country, with headquarters at Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh. He associated with him, as Muhāsibahji or Accountant, one Sulaimān Bey, a Turkish officer who had been Mudīr of Khānaqīn, and to whom he gave instructions to show prudence and leniency, at the outset, in his dealings with men of local influence.

Shaikh Mansūr, who was secretly determined to thwart the Pāsha's intended subversion of Muntafik autonomy, no sooner reached home from Baghdād than he suppressed the notifications curtailing his executive authority, virtually imprisoned his colleague Sulaimān Bey by surrounding him with guards on the pretext that his life was in danger, and sent emissaries out in every direction to misrepresent the intentions of the Government and to invite the headmen of clans to join with him in making a stand for Arab rights, so that at least their semi-independence as mere tributaries might be preserved. The small tribes dependent on Shaikh Mansūr complied to the extent of stopping the navigation of the Euphrates and, apparently, of attacking Turkish steamers besides plundering grain destined by the Government for exportation to Jiddah; but they showed at this time no very decided preference for the rule of their own Shaikhs over that of the Turks, and their attitude seemed to be on the whole one of expectancy. The large Banī Lām, Al Bū Muhammad, and Khaza'il tribes did not respond at all to overtures which were made to them. Shaikh Mansūr in the meantime also wrote to Nāmiq Pāsha, professing his own loyalty but declaring that the chiefs under his authority were opposed to the new kind of government, that his brother* Nāsir was stirring up the tribes against him, and that he and Sulaimān Bey were in personal danger and powerless to vindicate their authority unless aided by troops from Baghdād.

Nāmiq Pāsha, on receiving this missive, recalled Shaikh Mansūr and Sulaimān Beg to Baghdād, pretending sympathy with the former in his difficult position; but at the same time, in January 1864, he sent troops from Baghdād to Diwāniyah and Kūt and despatched a steamer to 1864.

*Can this have been the Nāsir, Muntafik Shaikh, who afterwards became Wāli of Basrah? See page 1447.

'Amārah to fetch Shaikh Fahad-al-'Ali, a rival of Shaikh Mansūr, who was encamped on the bank of the Tigris near that place. Colonel Kemball, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, at this time favoured the Pāsha's plan in regard to the Muntafik country, for he expected that it would facilitate, if realised, the construction of the telegraph line.

But the opposition of the Muntafik to Nāmiq Pāsha's schemes was stronger and more genuine than had at first appeared. Shaikh Fahad declined the post of Turkish Qāim-Maqām at Sūq-ash-Suhyūkh on its being offered to him; and the smaller Muntafik Shaikhs avowed a resolve to defend their *quasi*-independence, if need be, by force of arms. In the circumstances the Pāsha, who had meanwhile summoned additional troops to Baghdād from Mūsal and Kirkūk and made other military dispositions for coercing the Muntafik, appeared to renounce the idea of changing the arrangements for the government of their territory and signified his willingness to appoint Shaikh Nāsir, the brother of Shaikh Mansūr, to be head of the tribe and farmer of the revenue of the districts for a period of one year on the same terms as the late Shaikh Bandar. Colonel Kemball was at this stage of the case brought into the proceedings in a manner which he has described as follows:—

> Shortly after my return from Bussorah I received a communication, signed by that* Chief and other elders of the Muntafik, deprecating the plan formed by the Pāsha and soliciting my intervention to dissuade him from its further prosecution, which communication I immediately submitted to the perusal of His Excellency with the draft of my proposed reply. This reply was, of course, superseded by His Excellency's change of intention, but I subjoin it in copy for† Your Excellency's information, as indicating the course that, with His Excellency's approval, I had determined to adopt on the occasion; when, however, Shaikh Nassir's Agent was quitting Baghdad, charged with the summons to his Chief, he waited upon me to state that no hope existed of its being complied with, unless I would pledge my word as a guarantee for the Shaikh's personal security. I declined, of course, to take upon myself such a responsibility, unless so solicited in writing by Namik Pāsha, to whom I accordingly referred him; but his fears, it seems, not permitting him to broach this condition to His Excellency, I thought it my duty to advise Namik Pāsha of what had passed between us. His Excellency replied that the solemn pledges he had already given, together with the prospect of investiture, would suffice, in his opinion, to re-assure Sheikh Nāsir and for the present he would not avail himself of my intervention.

After this, on the 11th February 1864, Shaikh Nāsir entered Baghdād, having first insisted on and obtained an unusual guarantee for his immunity from arrest. But nothing was settled between him and the Local Government. The Pāsha demanded that the Shaikh should pay

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* *viz.*, Shaikh Nāsir.

† H. B. M.'s Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.

up, before his formal investiture, the sum of £15,000 offered by him as earnest money at an earlier time when he was competing with his brother for appointment to the Shaikhship; the Shaikh, in reply, persisted that he could not raise so large an amount without first returning home; and the result was deadlock. Colonel Kemball protested against the delay thus occasioned, but in vain. He says:

> To my appeal on this head His Excellency has remarked that the interests of the telegraph must give way to those of the Government, and although he still looks for a speedy decision of the question, did it even issue in the postponement of the work till next autumn, he would not consent to a sacrifice of authority which must eventuate in confirming the *quasi*-independence of the Muntafik Chiefs by assuring them of the means on all future occasions of evading their just obligations.

The Pāsha then summoned Shaikh Fahad again to Baghdād, as also another Shaikh named Mashāri, in the hope that by playing them off against Shaikh Mansūr and against each other he might be able, if not to institute a Qāim-Maqāmlīq of Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh, at least to bring under direct Turkish government districts below and above Qūrnah which he had in the beginning decided to separate from the Muntafik Shaikhdom. Colonel Kemball, though he still regarded the reduction of the Muntafik country to the status of ordinary Turkish territory as desirable, at this point began to have doubts of the ability of the Local Government, in a military sense, to effect the change within any reasonable time. He left Baghdād for Hillah, however, prepared to push on the extension of the telegraph southwards as soon as an opportunity should occur.

On the 13th of March 1864, at the request of Nāmiq Pāsha, who had received a telegram from Constantinople demanding an explanation of the long continuance of the Muntafik difficulty, the British Political Agent returned to Baghdād. The Pāsha informed him that Shaikh Nāsir and Shaikh Fahad both declined to undertake the farm of the Muntafik districts, while Shaikh Mashāri was too weak and uninfluential to assert himself, if nominated; he acknowledged that the Muntafik were now unanimous in their determination to resist his projects, and that the season of the spring floods was too near at hand to allow of military operations—which would, moreover, alarm the Porte—being undertaken; and finally he requested Colonel Kemball's opinion. That officer recommended that the general question of the form of Government of the Muntafik country should be referred to Constantinople; that in the meanwhile Shaikh Fahad should be installed as chief, to avoid any appearance of surrender to the implied menaces of Shaikh Mansūr and

Shaikh Nāṣir; and that, if Shaikh Fahad demanded the removal of the two brothers from his jurisdiction, they should be compelled or induced to reside at Baghdād on a guarantee, confirmed if necessary by the Porte, for the safety of their persons and the security of their property, including large estates which they owned on the Shatt-al-'Arab. This advice appears to have commended itself, at least in part, to Nāmiq Pāsha. On the 19th of March he despatched a steamer with a Buyuruldi (or patent) and flag of investiture for Shaikh Fahad-al-'Alī. A letter accompanying the Buyuruldi merely stated that the Shaikhship of the Muntafik had been conferred on Fahad upon the same conditions as those on which Shaikh Bandar had formerly held it. No more precise mention was made in the letter of the limits of the new Shaikh's jurisdiction, of the amount of his financial obligations, or to the period for which the arrangement was to remain in force,—a vagueness which Colonel Kemball thought likely to be productive of distrust in the recipient's mind. Returning from Baghdād to Hillah the British Political Agent, with the previous approval of Nāmiq Pāsha, addressed letters, probably of warning or remonstrance, to Shaikh Manṣūr and Shaikh Nāṣir.

At the beginning of April, partly because of the detention of Shaikh Nāṣir at Baghdād against his will—an evident breach of faith against which Colonel Kemball did not fail to protest, as the Shaikh had come in on a safe conduct—and partly perhaps in consequence of the appointment of Shaikh Fahad, Sulaimān, a son of Shaikh Manṣūr, suddenly appeared on the Baghdād-Hillah road with a body of armed tribesmen, and telegraphic and all other communication between the two places was temporarily interrupted. Nāmiq Pāsha, who expected that Shaikh Fahad would be able to restore order immediately, declined an offer by Colonel Kemball to place himself in communication with Shaikh Manṣūr or even, if necessary, proceed in person to his camp; but Shaikh Fahad continued to haggle over the terms of his appointment, and matters remained in suspense. No general amnesty such as might have served to conciliate the adherents of Shaikh Manṣūr was published; but the Pāsha was eventually persuaded to send letters of assurance, through Shaikh Fahad, to the principal men whose attitude was doubtful.

Early in May 1864, Shaikh Fahad, who had not yet accepted full responsibility for the Muntafik, was encamped on the right bank of the Tigris at 'Ali-ash-Sharqi. Assisted by a detachment of 300 Turkish infantry with one gun, 200 'Aqaili matchlock men and 100 Bashi Bazouks from 'Amārah, he had repelled a half-hearted attack made on

him by the partisans of Shaikh Mansūr; but he was, or seemed, unable to advance. Meanwhile, infuriated by the insolence of Shaikh Mansūr and his family, Nāmiq Pāsha had determined on military operations "in spite of the difficulties arising out of the marshy character of the country, the lateness of the season, and his own state of unpreparedness." A force of 1,000 regular infantry and 2 guns under Hāfiz Pāsha, Army Commandant, left Baghdād on the 2nd May for Kūt, where it was to receive a reinforcement of 500 regular infantry and whence it was to advance, if practicable, to Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh. The help of the Bani Lām and Bani Rabi'ah tribes was invited; and Shibli Pāsha, commanding at Diwāniyah, was ordered to co-operate with a regiment of cavalry, 400 irregular horse, and 4 guns. It appeared to be the intention of Nāmiq Pāsha to force the hand of the Porte by making the restoration of Shaikh Mansūr impossible.

By the middle of June 1864 the authority of Shaikh Fahad was sufficiently established to admit of the return of the Turkish troops to their garrisons, except a detachment of 300 men and 1 gun which, at the Shaikh's request, was left at Rās-al-Jazirah, a place on the Shatt-al-Gharāf not far from Kūt. Fahad himself was then in the neighbourhood of Shatrah, engaged, on his way to Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh, in receiving the submission of the smaller tribal authorities and in sub-lotting the revenues of the districts. He had been guilty of gross treachery in putting to death Sulaiman-al-Khalaif, Shaikh of the Ajwad, one of the principal divisions of the Muntafik, and in seizing two other Shaikhs, all of whom had approached him on safe-conduct. Nāmiq Pāsha "disavowed the act, which he declared to be *disapprovable*, though he "added that, as these Shaikhs had been foremost in resisting the substi- "tution of Turkish for Arab rule in the Montific Territory, he could not "regret that they should have been the first to experience the effects of "the despotism they had themselves mainly contributed to set up." Before the end of the month, however, it was reported that Shaikh Mansūr had again collected a force, with which he was threatening Samāwah, and that the Bani Mālik, a large division of the Muntafik, had at his instigation renewed their claim to certain lands south of Basrah from which they had been ejected by Munib Pāsha during his governorship of Basrah. Conspicuous among Shaikh Mansūr's supporters was 'Osmān Bey, the son of a former Governor of Mūsal, who had fled to the Arabs, being a Treasury defaulter, on his removal from the Mudirship of Samāwah. To counteract these demonstrations Shibli Pāsha was

ordered to proceed to Samáwah with the whole garrison of Diwániyah, while a detachment of rifles commanded by Muhammad Pásha was embarked on steamer at Baghdád for service at Basrah.

In July 1864 a serious disaster befell the force advancing to the relief of Samáwah. The unmounted portion, consisting of 350 riflemen with 3 guns, were proceeding to their destination by water when they were unexpectedly attacked by the Bani Hachaim, Ál Bú Hussáin, and Dhawálim, of whom the first two had been supposed to be mutually unfriendly. The next day Shibli Pásha arrived by land at the same place, accompanied by his cavalry and by mounted contingents of the Jabúr and Zubaid tribes; but the enemy, having a great superiority in numbers, obliged him to retire. He then applied to Baghdád for reinforcements. Of the infantry more than half had been killed, besides the officer in command; and a week after the occurrence only 90 of their number, of whom 30 were wounded, had succeeded in straggling back to Diwániyah. All three guns were lost, but two of them were brought back, later, by the inhabitants of a small Saiyid colony near the scene of the fight.

Námiq Pásha lost no time in despatching additional troops, under Háfiz Pásha, to punish the rebels and, if still possible, save Samáwah. The chief of the Bani Hachaim was known to be in correspondence with Shaikh Mansúr and with Shaikh Mutlaq, the head of the Khazá'il, under whose influence the Ál Bú Hussáin were; and there was therefore some reason to fear that the attack on the Turkish troops might have been the outcome of a widespread Arab conspiracy. On the 21st of July Háfiz Pásha's force, consisting of 2,000 regular troops, 350 irregular cavalry, and large Arab contingents, marched from Diwániyah. Shaikh Fahad was still in the Hai district, but was preparing to advance to Durrají with the Turkish garrison of 300 men and one gun that had been stationed originally at Ras-al-Jazirah, and later at Shatrah. An incursion attempted by Sulaimán, the son of Shaikh Mansúr, was successfully repelled, the invaders being driven back across the Euphrates; and the Bani Zaraij, incited by the Turks, began a series of attacks on the Ál Bu Hussain and Dhawálim, who were their tribal foes. On the Government troops arriving to the support of the Bani Zaraij, a fight was reported to have taken place in which 60 or 70 of the enemy were killed and the missing gun was recovered. A final engagement occurred on the banks of a canal known as the Abu Chilib, in which the Arabs were said to have lost 600 in killed and wounded, including women and children,

while the troops at the same time captured some cattle, a huge number of sheep, and other booty. According to information from non-Turkish sources, however, the people thus severely punished were not the enemy at all, but quiet pastoral tribes who had brought peace offerings to the Turkish commander and had been assured by him that they would not be molested. The smallness of the Turkish losses, which were quite insignificant, as also the presence of the Arabs' women and children, gave a colour of truth to this version of the affair and made it necessary to discount the importance of the "victory" claimed by the Turks. In any case, however, Hāfiz Pāsha reached Samāwah with his force at the beginning of August, and was joined there by Shaikh Fahad. Meanwhile 'Osmān Bey gave himself up to the Turkish authorities at Diwāniyah, in consequence of a price having been set upon his head; Shaikh Mansūr was reported to be retiring to Najd by way of Kuwait; and attempts on the part of the Bani Mālik to give trouble near Basrah were frustrated by the arrival of the troops under Muhammad Pāsha.

These operations on the north-western border of the Muntafik country may in one sense be described as successful; but their result, after all, was practically to restore the position which existed when Nāmiq Pāsha first began to meddle with the tribe. No garrison seems to have been left at Samāwah, and almost the only real change was the substitution of Shaikh Fahad for Shaikh Mansūr. Moreover, the attitude of Shaikh Fahad himself was equivocal. Up to the 7th of September he had paid only £5,000 into the treasury on account of the revenue of the financial year of which the closing date was the 11th; he declined to come to Baghdād to be formally invested with the Shaikhship; he refused even to accept office unless under a guarantee that the Turks would forego for three years all encroachment on the established privileges and jurisdiction of the Muntafik Shaikh; though now all-powerful in the Muntafik country, he professed to be unable to protect boats on the Euphrates and obviously did not exert his authority to restore order; he showed great reluctance to meet Hāfiz Pāsha at Samāwah; and he absolutely declined to take part with the Turks in an expedition against the Khazā'il which was now impending.

In March 1865 Shaikh Mansūr was still at large in the desert to the south of Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh; but Shaikh Fahad was at last persuaded to visit Baghdād, where he undertook to pay off the balance due to the Treasury by his predecessor Shaikh Bandar and was then confirmed in the Shaikhship of the tribe for three years with effect from September 1863. 1865.

1866. In May 1866 it was reported that Shaikh Mansūr, who was living among the Dhafīr, would not come to Baghdād, the reason being that he distrusted promises of pardon and good treatment that were held out to him by the Turks, while Nāmiq Pāsha on his part would "tolerate no guarantee beyond his own words." Shaikh Nāsir, who had escaped outlawry by timely submission, was then absent on a pilgrimage to Makkah but was expected to return in time to compete for the farm of the Muntafik districts on the expiry of its tenure by Shaikh Fahad in September 1866. October came, but no new appointment was made to the Shaikhship, and it was expected that Shaikh Fahad would be re-invested with it for another three years, though probably on less advantageous financial terms than before.

Centumacy and reduction of the Khazā'il, 1864—66. No sooner were the Muntafik disturbances at an end in 1864 than trouble arose with the Khaza'il of the Shamiyah district, whose Shaikh was Mutlaq, and whose territory extended from Shināfiyah to Najaf on the one side and to Abu Jawārir on the other. It was not alleged against Shaikh Mutlaq that he had ever made default as farmer of the revenue assessed on the lands of his tribe, which in fact he was accustomed to pay with punctuality, adding to it presents for the Turkish officials, or that he had shown active sympathy with the Muntafik in their late revolt; but he was virtually independent, he would not appear and do homage in person to the Pāsha of Baghdād, and he was suspected of having harboured the guilty Āl Bū Hasan and Dhawālim after their attack on Shibli Pāsha's column.

Before resorting to military operations Nāmiq Pāsha once more consulted the British Political Agent and received from him a sound opinion, the whole of which is perfectly applicable to the situation in Turkish 'Irāq at the present day.

I said that however patriotic His Excellency's desire to reform the larger tribes of Turkish Arabia under complete control, I was of opinion that the force at his disposal was unequal to the purpose, not, perhaps, to beat the Arabs wherever they should encounter the main body of the troops, but to maintain the positions which might be successively occupied; and that in consequence, and for a period probably very protracted, not only would the highways of communication be rendered impassable, but the settled districts would be exposed to incursions, leading, of course to the usual results, a desolated country, stoppage of trade, and loss of revenue, which, sooner or later, must oblige the Government to compromise its aims and to restore matters to their normal condition. I readily admitted that the dominancy of the Arabs over the most fertile portions of this province was a great evil; but it was an evil which could not be overcome by isolated and convulsive efforts at coercion, and was assuredly the lesser evil compared with the state of anarchy ensuing upon failure. On my instancing the more recent case of the Muntafiq tribe, His Excellency did not deny that the attempt to establish Turkish rule at Sukeyh Shiookh had had this issue.

Swayed by his own partiality for the use of force, urged on also by flatterers whose real object was to involve him in difficulties that should lead to his recall, Nāmiq Pāsha after some days hesitation launched an expedition against the Khazā'il. On the 4th September 1864 a force of 3,000 regular troops and 1,000 irregulars marched from Diwāniyah; but Shaikh Mutlaq and his followers retired to the desert beyond the Euphrates without showing fight. It was apprehended, however, that their withdrawal would prove "the forerunner of serious and extended disturbances."

In the course of the following six months Shaikh Mutlaq wrote more than once to the British Political Agent, asking him to intercede on his behalf with Nāmiq Pāsha; but Colonel Kemball did not, apparently, do so. In the spring of 1865 the Pāsha informed the Khazā'il Shaikh that, if he would make submission in person and without conditions, he would be allowed to reside at Baghdād without molestation. In August of the same year Shīdi Pāsha took action, as an interlude in the Khazā'il campaign, against the Bahāhithah, one of the 'Afaj clans, and against the Āl Budair of the Daghārah tract. The mud forts of these tribes on land were destroyed by the troops; but the tribesmen with their families, after a short conflict, withdrew to the then existing 'Afaj and Daghārah lagoons, where their assailants could not follow them. 'Abdul Muhsin, a Shaikh of the 'Anizah with whom Shaikh Mutlaq had taken refuge, obliged the latter, at the instance of Nāmiq Pāsha, to quit his camp; but the desert chief at the same time professed inability to restrain Shaikh Sumair, possibly not one of the Khazā'il, but a Shammar chief, who with the help of Daghaiyin, a relative of 'Abdul Muhsin himself, had lately carried off 100 Baghdād camels from a grazing ground close to the city. 1865.

At length in May 1866 Shaikh Mutlaq, weary of the vagrant life of the Bedouins with whom he had thrown in his lot, and of their greed and venality, accepted the pardon offered him and came to Baghdād to pay homage to Nāmiq Pāsha. It was arranged to settle him, with his immediate dependents, upon lands lying to the east of the Tigris; and in his former district, or rather kingdom, of Shāmiyah a new system of direct dealing between the Government and the lesser tribal Shaikhs, which had been introduced, was maintained. 1866.

In 1865 general insecurity prevailed in Shehrizūr, as the division of Kirkūk was then styled, owing to the depredations of the Hamawand, a tribe living in the neighbourhood, and renowned for their lawlessness even

Depredations and impunity of the Hamawand. 1865.

at the present day. In March it was reported at Baghdád that a considerable success over them had been achieved by a Turkish expedition from Kirkúk and Sulaimániyah; but before long their increased vigour in infesting the roads, burning villages, levying blackmail, and ultimately in threatening Sulaimániyah during the absence of the garrison, showed that the loss which they had suffered, chiefly in the capture of some of their women, had only served to exasperate them. Military reinforcements were sent from Baghdád to Kirkúk; but at the same time Námiq Pásha, seeing that coercion was impracticable, ordered Taqi-ud-Dín Pásha, Governor of Kirkúk, to revert to a system of subsidies which had previously existed and had been abandoned.

Movements of the 'Anizah and Shammar and lawlessness of the 'Anizah, Aug.—Dec., 1865.

The immigration of the 'Anizah and Shammar Bedouins into the northern districts dependent on Baghdád, which takes place every year on a large scale, was attended in 1865 by more than the usual amount of friction and excitement. Anxiety first began to be felt in August, when it was reported that 'Anizah to the number of 4,000 horsemen and camel riders had crossed to the east of the Euphrates, and that the Shammar, who are their hereditary enemies, were retiring before them across the Tigris. Far-reaching disorders were feared by the Pashá of Baghdád, for, as the British Political Agent remarked in a despatch: "The presence of Bedouins in the cultivated districts, "whether as invaders or refugees, is almost equally to be dreaded, and "however gladly His Excellency would restrict the conflicts between these "large nomad tribes to the waste lands west of Mosul, he is unhappily "powerless alike to prevent the encroachment of the one, or the retreat "of the other." By the middle of October, however, the two great hostile tribes were settled in their usual autumn seats, the Shammar occupying the right bank of the Tigris down to within 10 or 12 miles of Baghdád, the 'Anizah both sides of the Euphrates down to Mussaiyib and in the neighbourhood of Karbala and Najaf; and their chiefs, subsidised by the Turkish authorities, were restraining them, as in ordinary years, from highway robbery and from the invasion of cultivated districts. Shaikh Farhán, who ruled the Shammar, was anxious in this year to carry his tribe some distance to the southward of Baghdád; but permission was denied him by Námiq Pásha, and he acquiesced in the prohibition. It was remarked by Colonel Kemball: "Owing to the converging course of the two rivers at this point, his "position there would expose his retreat to be cut off, did he defy the "Government and drive it to coalesce with the Anazeh against him.

"This resource is, of course, the chief instrument of control which the "provincial authorities possess over the rival Bedouin tribes, but, owing "to the full appreciation by the latter of their common interests, apart "from the mere acquisition of plunder, and to the difficulty of leading "such allies to discriminate the property of friends and foes, one of "dangerous and doubtful efficacy, and only to be employed in extre-"mity."

Meanwhile a robbery of more than usual importance was committed by 'Anizah belonging to the Fida'ân and Sabâ'ah sub-divisions of the tribe. A caravan from Aleppo having arrived at 'Ânah on the Euphrates, a portion of it, comprising 75 camels with their loads, crossed the river there and made straight across country for Baghdâd. The loads consisted of British manufactures to the value of £6,000 and were the property of leading merchants, Turkish subjects, at Baghdâd. The conductor of this portion of the caravan was connected by marriage with an 'Anizah family; and it was surmised that either he had presumed too much upon the fact in adopting an unprotected route, or that he was in league with the robbers into whose hands the animals and goods fell: all were taken by foraging parties of the 'Anizah whom they encountered. Demands for restitution were addressed by the Turkish authorities to the chiefs of the guilty sub-divisions; but on the 17th October the British Political Agent was obliged to report: "To the remonstrances of Nâmik "Pasha the one Shaikh has returned no reply; the other, pleading the con-"tumacy of his followers, has boldly referred His Excellency to the sword "as the only means of vindicating the authority of the Government: "and His Excellency's threats of reprisals and of stopping the Musableh "(permission to traffic with the towns) are, as usual, invalidated by the "dread of provoking general disturbance and by the impossibility of dis-"tinguishing the real offenders. For the rest a sudden fall in the price of "longcloths, etc., is a sure indication that the plunderers have already "bartered their booty to pedlars and petty traders." Of the camels 40 had been immediately returned to the owners, who may themselves have been tribal Arabs like the 'Anizah, and it was not expected that the recovery of the other 35 would present any difficulty; but the merchandize stood on a different footing.

An accident made the recovery of partial compensation possible. Dissensions having occurred among the offending sections, which resulted in the secession of several families, the great 'Anizah Shaikh fell upon and plundered their camps, not, however, on behoof of the Turkish

Government, for he and his followers claimed all their booty for themselves; but, out of 2,000 camels captured, 142 were secured by some Turkish irregulars who had been sent to co-operate with the Shaikh, and of these 82—very inferior animals—actually reached Baghdád. In the end compensation to the extent of about one-fourth of the value of the goods lost was obtained, whereupon Colonel Kemball remarked: "This "issue, though, indeed, reflecting credit upon the management of Nāmiq "Pāsha as productive of a result more substantial than that which usually "attends the ostensible efforts of the Turkish executive to save appear-"ances, is an additional instance only of their powerlessness in such cases. "Nor does that result represent an unmixed gain, for the Sabaa and "Fidaan offenders, angered at the co-operation of Shaikh Abdool Muhsen "against them, have resorted, or pretended to resort, to retaliation, and, "while seeking to surprise his outlying adherents, have intercepted a "caravan with money to the amount of 35,000 G. S. P., passing from "Nejjeff to Kerbela, which they have carried off."

In December the 'Aniza and Shammar began to return, according to custom, to their more western and northern pastures in the Arabian desert.

Cholera and plague, 1866-67.

In the autumn of 1866, as frequently occurs, there was a slight epidemic of cholera at Baghdád, lasting about two months; but the number of deaths from the disease registered *per diem* at no time exceeded fifteen. In the summer of 1867 plague appeared, but not in a severe form, in some of the Euphrates districts of the province, and it lingered there for some time.

Burglaries at Baghdád, 1866.

Towards the end of 1866, as from time to time happens, serious burglaries, accompanied in some cases by murder, became common in Baghdád City; and grave suspicion fell, as has been the case in very recent times also, upon the soldiers of the military garrison. The British Political Agent, in reporting three quite recent cases in which life had been taken, remarked:

In no case, however, can I recall the conviction of the burglars; the official opinion being that the institution of the Tanzimat when not supplemented by the machinery of police as organised in Europe forms an effectual bar to the detection of malefactors. In one of the three instances above mentioned the office of a British Indian merchant was forced and his watchman* killed; but as on a former occasion when the same office was robbed of £1,500 the perpetrators were discovered and lodged in jail, yet effected their escape under circumstances which implied the connivance of the Zabtiah, I may on the present occasion anticipate no better result when the burglars succeeded in putting out of the way the only witness of their act. Lest murder should follow, people, conscious of the inefficiency of the police, though aware of the presence of thieves in their houses, abstain from giving the alarm.

* This man was laid down and his throat deliberately cut.

Administration of Nāmiq Pāsha, 1863—1868.

Nāmiq Pāsha, under whose government all the events related above occurred, though his policy towards the Arab tribes was aggressive and on the whole unsuccessful, seems not to have been insensible to the claims of public works. As happens in the case of most Turkish rulers at Baghdād, however, the pacific and useful part of his administrative programme was early laid aside to make way for *actions d'éclat*, and was never executed. When first he arrived at Baghdād it was one of his chief ambitions to place "the* dyke of the Jezair" on a permanently satisfactory footing without "recourse to the former vicious system of contract through the instrumentality of the Arab Shaikhs, with its attendant evils of forced labor and arbitrary exactions." He seems to have set apart £40,000 or £50,000 for the proposed work, in case it should be sanctioned by the Porte; and having been unable to obtain a competent engineer from Egypt, he moved the Turkish Government "to engage the services an experienced† Dutch officer for this purpose, who should be conversant with the execution of similar works." Nothing is heard of the project afterwards, however, during the rule of Nāmiq Pāsha.

Nāmiq Pāsha seems to have been succeeded by Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha, probably the former Governor of Kirkūk, who was in power at Baghdād in 1868.

Appointment of Mid-hat Pāsha to Baghdād, 1869.

Mid-hat Pāsha, the most energetic and best known ruler of Baghdād in modern times, the first also to bear the hierarchic title of Wālī or Governor-General‡ instead of the more indefinite one of Pāsha, assumed charge of the province of Turkish 'Irāq in April 1869. His advent is noteworthy as inaugurating in Mesopotamia the § present system of Turkish civil administration; and his subsequent doings are interesting on account of the personality of the man himself, whose force of character, whatever may be thought of his judgment and intelligence, enabled him a few years later to play a leading part in affairs at Constantinople and to determine in a great measure, as the event has

*It is not clear what dyke is meant, but it must have been a large and important work. Some say that it was the dam at the head of the Saqlāwiyat canal, and this is probably correct: see page 1542 *post*. Mid-hat Pāsha, as we shall see, was in the beginning—and only in the beginning—attracted by the same scheme.

†A slight acquaintance with Turkey enables one to infer that somebody had told him Holland was a country of dykes.

‡ So the Turks translate the word Wali, though the importance of a Wilāyat often hardly exceeds that of a Collectorship or Deputy Commissionership in India.

§ With regard to the civil re-organisation of the Turkish Empire in 1867, see page 1416 *ante*, text and footnote.

proved, the later destinies of Turkey. The despatch of Colonel C. Herbert, Acting British Political Agent and Consul-General at Baghdád, in which Mid-hat Pásha's earliest actions at Baghdád are described, is given below *in extenso*: it was dated 26th May 1869 and was addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have the honour to report the arrival, on the 30th ultimo, of His Excellency Mid-hat Pasha, Governor-General of Turkish Arabia, accompanied by Shaker Beg, Lieutenant-Governor (Mutesarif) of Baghdád, Rauf Beg, Secretary (Mámoun), Hamdy Beg, Attaché (Madeer) for Foreign Affairs, together with several subordinate officers of different grades.

His Excellency entered the city in state at an early hour, being met by all the principal employés of the Government and representatives from the Consulates of England and France.

On the third day after his arrival, the firman of his appointment was publicly read at the Government House (Serai), when His Excellency addressed the assembly, telling his audience that he had come hither with an earnest desire to benefit the country and enrich the people; that he proposed to introduce many changes and reforms which, he hoped, would be beneficial, changes which, perhaps, they might not at first altogether approve, but which they would appreciate when they had experienced the advantages that would accrue to them therefrom.

He commenced his career by the abolition of the following taxes, which are said to have been peculiarly local, and have proved obstructive and oppressive:—

1st.—Ihtisab, or octroi duty levied on all produce brought into the city gates for sale in the market.

2nd.—Talibiyah, a tax on the native craft on the rivers.

3rd.—Khums Hatab, a tax of 20 per cent. on fuel brought to the city on rafts and in boats.

4th.—Roosbukár, the tax on irrigation wheels of the Arab cultivators.

In lieu of these taxes, he has established one of 10 per cent. on the produce of gardens and fields.

His Excellency is organising several new Councils (Mejlises), of which the members are to be paid, instead of, as heretofore, working gratuitously, with the opportunity of making what they could—a source of corruption and trouble.

He has introduced the Wilayet system and I have the honour to forward a copy (with translation) of a communication which has been addressed to the Foreign Consulates on this subject.

His Excellency has deputed an officer, Serri Effendi, to re-open an old canal called "Kemaniah" from the Euphrates into the "Seglawieh" canal, which falls into the Tigris, with the view to forming a channel of communication between the two great rivers, to be conducted by means of small steam vessels which it is proposed to bring from Europe for the service.

He has also deputed a steamer to proceed up the Euphrates to endeavour to arrange for the ultimate * opening of the navigation of that river, with which object he proposes

* In May 1872 Midhat Pasha himself ascended the Euphrates, from the head of the Saglawiyah, canal to Muskarah, in the Turkish steamer "Furat." He was accompanied, as a guest, by Captain Powell of the late Indian Navy, the commander of the Residency steamer "Comet." An account of the voyage by the latter exists; it shows that the difficulties of navigation encountered were extreme, notwithstanding a high river.

to remake the embankments of the Jezair territory and so confine the water of the river to its own bed, and prevent the inundations which yearly immerse a large tract of country to the south, and reach even to the town of Busserah.

These inundations convert the whole of that country into a tract of unhealthy and unproductive marsh, while the loss of the water from the bed of the river renders the latter unnavigable.

His Excellency's mind seems earnestly bent on various schemes for the improvement of the country.

He at once recognizes the two great wants, *viz.*, security of property and means of communication with the world (from which the country is at present excluded), and of the transport of produce.

He contemplates the construction of a railway hence to Kerbella as a step in this direction in connection with the navigation of the Euphrates, the importation of several steamers for river and sea navigation, so as to connect the province with Suez, of machinery for cleaning the river channels and also for various manufactures, as well as for irrigation.

I waited on His Excellency, accompanied by officers attached to this Political Agency and Consulate-General and the members of the British community, on the day after his arrival and have since paid a private visit.

Administration of Midhat Pasha in Turkish 'Iraq, 1869—72.

Official information regarding the actual achievements of Mid-hat Pasha at Baghdad is scanty, but the blank is supplied by the almost contemporaneous writings of a very intelligent and reliable English lady traveller, from which the following* extracts are taken.

It would appear that, besides and beyond its other misfortunes, Bagdad had the ill luck a few years since to pass through the hands of an improving Pasha, Midhat, author of the famous constitution of 1877, which is now regenerating Turkey.

That singularly unhappy statesman (unhappy, I mean, in his plans) was sent by the Sultan Abdul Aziz to try his prentice hand upon Bagdad, before being allowed his way with Constantinople and the Empire. He was an honest man, by all accounts, and sincerely anxious for his country's good, but half educated and belonging to that school of Turkish politicians, which thinks to Europeanise the Empire by adopting the dress and external forms of Europe. He seems to have been allowed almost unlimited credit for improvement and full liberty in all his schemes, nor can it be denied that some of them were, in their design, excellent. Only he was incapable of working out the detail of what he planned, or of at all counting the cost of each adventure. They have consequently, one and all, led only to the most impotent if not the most disastrous conclusions. His first scheme was a good one. He wished to establish communication with Aleppo by the Euphrates, and in that view built the forts we saw at Ana, Rumady and elsewhere, to protect the road, while he ordered steamers from England to navigate the river. The forts, though unnecessarily large, answered their purpose and still exist; the boats, with one exception, have disappeared, either left to rot at Bussora or never fitted out with their engines. The sole representative of the Euphrates fleet draws too much water to ascend the river except at flood, and her regular trips were abandoned almost as soon as begun. Midhat also established, with some success, a tramway between Bagdad and its suburb Kasmeyn, which still runs. So far so good. But his next venture was not equally

*Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, vol. I, pages 194—97, and her *Pilgrimage to Nejd*, vol. I, pages 15—17 and 18.

reasonable; indeed, it shows the unreality of his claim to be considered a serious statesman. He had heard, or perhaps seen, that the fortifications of Vienna and other towns in Europe had been pulled down, to make room for the cities they emitted and which were outgrowing them; and, arguing from this fact that all walls were out of date, he proceeded to level those of Bagdad. I dare say he thought them insightly and feared lest they should remind strangers of the dark age of the world, before gunpowder and the Ottoman Empire were invented, the age of Haroun al Rashid. He seems, too, to have had a curious idea of occupying his soldiers in this work and of paying them their arrears in bricks, a rather unsaleable article, one would think, in a country where little is built and nothing at all mended. Be that as it may, the walls of the Caliphate were "removed" and the city left open to all who chose to enter, thieves wolves and Bedouins, for it is but a few years since Bagdad was threatened with sack by the Shammar. The townsmen protested, but the thing was done. Bagdad is now as defenceless as any of the villages near it.*

Not content with this, Midhat conceived the unfortunate thought of benefiting the whole country by a huge canal, in imitation of the irrigating works once fertilising Southern Mesopotamia. Engineers were engaged, labour impressed, a special tax for the cost levied, and Midhat himself, before his term of office came to an end, had the satisfaction of opening the new canal in person, after the fashion of dignitaries in Europe. But, oh cruel fate, at the first flooding of the river, instead of a beneficent stream to fertilise the thirsty earth, behold it was a deluge that entered. Midhat Pasha with his spade let in the flood and converted Bagdad into an island, standing in a pestilential marsh and obliged at certain seasons to communicate with the outer world by means of boats. This was enough. The Porte saw the necessity of his recall and entrusted him instead with the reorganization of the Empire. Yet, such is the power of virtue, Midhat has left behind him not altogether an evil name even in Bagdad. They narrate of him still that he went away without a shilling in his pocket and left his watch in pawn for the sum necessary to hire his horses for the journey. An honest man, in a land of dishonesty: an enthusiast, in fact, not a knave.

* * * *

A man of a very different sort, but one whom we were also interested to see, was Midhat Pasha, just arrived at Damascus as Governor-General of Syria. He had come with a considerable flourish of trumpets, for he was supposed to represent the doctrine of administrative reform, which was at that time seriously believed in by Europeans for the Turkish Empire. Midhat was the protégé of our own Foreign Office, and great things were expected of him. For ourselves, though quite sceptical on these matters and knowing the history of Midhat's doings at Bagdad too well to have any faith in him as a serious reformer, we called to pay our respect to, partly as a matter of duty, and partly, it must be owned, out of curiosity. It seemed impossible that a man who had devised anything so familiar as parliamentary government for Turkey should be otherwise than strange and original. But in this we were grievously disappointed, for a more essentially commonplace, even silly talker, or one more naively pleased with himself, we had never met out of Europe. It is possible that he may have adopted this tone with us as the sort of thing which would suit English people, but I don't think so.

* The old palace of Ctesiphon, one of the wonders of the world, had almost shared the fate of the city walls when the foreign consuls interfered. Midhat's soldiers were already at work. Yet this is the representative of progress in Turkey, a man of letters, who writes French and English well and contributed his paper lately to the *Portnightly Review*. (Lady Anne Blunt).

We kept our own counsel of course about our plans, mentioning only that we hoped to see Bagdad and Bussora and to go on thence to India, for such was to be ultimately our route. On the mention of these two towns he at once began a panegyric of his own administration there, of the steamers he had established on the rivers, the walls he had pulled down and tramways built. "Ah, that tramway," he exclaimed affectionately. "It was I that devised it, and it is running still. Tramways are the first steps in civilisation. I shall make a tramway round Damascus. Everybody will ride in the trucks. It will pay five per cent. You will go to Bussora. You will see my steamers there. Bussora, through me, has become an important place. Steamers and tramways are what we want for these poor countries. The rivers of Damascus are too small for steamers, or I should soon have some afloat. But I will make a tramway. If we could have steamers and tramways everywhere Turkey would become rich." "And canals," we suggested, maliciously remembering how he had flooded Bagdad with his experiments in this way. "Yes, and canal, too. Canals, steamers and tramways are what we want." "And railways." "Yes, railways. I hope to have a railway soon running alongside of the carriage road from Beyrout. Railways are important for the guaranteeing of order in the country. If there was a railway across the desert we should have no more trouble with the Bedouins. Ah, those poor, Bedouins, how I trounced them at Bagdad. I warrant my name is not forgotten there." We assured him it was not.

* * * *

On the whole, we went away much impressed with Midhat, though not as we had hoped. He had astonished us, but not as a wise man. To speak seriously, one such reforming Pasha as this does more to ruin Turkey than twenty of the old dishonest sort. Midhat, though he fails to line his own purse, may be counted on to empty the public one at Damascus, as he did at Bagdad, where he spent a million sterling on unproductive works within a single year.

At the present day Mid-hat Pāsha is remembered in Turkish 'Irāq chiefly as the leveller of the walls of Baghdād, as the promoter of the Baghdād-Kāzimain tramway, and as the creator of the "new town," or more correctly southern suburb, of Karbala. The demolition of the Baghdād city wall, an undoubted offence against the antique and the picturesque, was even from the practical point of view a measure of questionable expediency, not so much on military grounds as from considerations of octroi; but the Kādhimain tramway, though a small undertaking, has proved extremely useful. The extension given to Karbala, though marring the old-world aspect of the town, especially in comparison with Najaf, must have greatly improved it as a place of human habitation. The intended railway to Karbala was not built.

Outside the towns, apart from certain reforms relating to the land tax, the greatest performance of Mid-hat Pāsha was his completion of measures which had been begun from the Aleppo end, some years previously, for the protection of the direct caravan route between Aleppo and Baghdād. "It was he who continued the line of "guard houses as far as Rumādy, and made of Ana for Bagdad what Deyr

"has become for Aleppo,—the head-quarters of a detached military force in "possession of the Euphrates route. Caravans have since that time passed "in more or less security down the valley. At the same time possession "was taken of the few towns existing on the Tigris." *

Mid-hat Pāsha called into existence the small town of Ramādi on the Aleppo route endowing it besides with a fine caravanserai and military barracks; and the extension of the telegraph to the same place may also, not improbably, have been due to his initiative. The fort which he built opposite to 'Anah for the reception of a garrison that was to dominate a section of the Euphrates valley and Aleppo road is still, though now unoccupied, a striking feature of the landscape. In spite of all his efforts, however, a round-about way to Constantinople by Mūsal and Diyārbakr continued, for some years after his departure, to be preferred to the short route by Aleppo as being more safe. Time has justified his work, however, and the Aleppo or Euphrates route is now almost universally followed by travellers between Baghdād and Constantinople and is as safe as any in the country.

Mid-hat Pāsha founded an Industrial School at Baghdād in conjunction with an orphanage; it still exists and, though it has produced no striking results, must supply a real need. Two Turkish Government schools were also opened at Baghdād in his time. The improvement of the main bazaar of Baghdād, and the lighting of the bazaars, some of the adjoining streets and the bridge of boats there at night with kerosine lamps are reforms attributed to Mid-hat Pāsha. He instituted a Municipality at Basrah and endeavoured by erecting new Government buildings to draw the native town from the site which it still occupies down to the banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Mid-hat Pāsha's reception of the Shāh of Persia on a pilgrimage to the Holy Cities in 1870-71 has been mentioned already, and his annexation of Hasa in 1871 will be noticed further on.

Upon the whole Mid-hat Pāsha and his administration appear to have been rather too severely summed up by one of his successors in office, who † observed: "Three things are necessary in a governor, who would

* Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, 1879, Vol. II, page 182.
† Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, Vol. II, page 7.
There are numerous points of resemblance between Mid-hat Pāsha and a later Wāli of Baghdād, Nāzim Pāsha, afterwards Turkish Minister of War and generalissimo of the Turkish forces in the war of 1912-13 with the Balkan States and Greece, who was sent by the "Union and Progress" Government of Turkey to 'Irāq in 1910, with extensive powers, to regenerate the province. Both revelled in municipal improvements which involved the destruction of existing buildings; both made abortive attempts to establish navigation on the Euphrates, the earlier by means of steamers, the later by means of motor boats; and both seriously endangered Baghdād city, the one by cutting a canal, the other by attempting to construct a gigantic dyke to control floods. For neither, apparently, had undertakings which were devoid of the sensational element and merely useful very much attraction; in each of them patience and true insight were equally lacking; but both were honest men and both were called subsequently to high office in Europe.

"effect real good in the department he administers—'*vouloir, savoir, et "pouvoir*!' Mid-hat had the first and last qualifications, but not the second. "He was a half-educated man." Mid-hat Pasha was at least scrupulously honest, and the story which represents him as obliged to sell his watch and chain at the end of his government in order to obtain the means of returning to Constantinople seems well authenticated.

Lawlessness at Basrah, 1872.

In the early summer of 1872 a state of lawlessness existed in Basrah town more discreditable to the local authorities than even the insecurity which had prevailed in Baghdad city in 1866. It was described as follows by Mr. Robertson, Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Basrah, writing on the 26th May 1872 to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad:

I have in my late demi-official letters informed you of the almost daily and nightly occurrence of robberies in and about Basrah during the past two months. On the night of the 17th instant some 40 or 50 men surrounded and tried to enter Messrs. Lynch and Company's office. A person next door saw a man trying to break open a window, and fired a pistol at him. The report brought up a guard of twelve men stationed near the North gate. The robbers attacked the soldiers, killed two of them, and went away apparently scatheless.

I wrote to the Acting Mutesarif mentioning this occurrence and stating that, in the event of a house occupied by any person under the protection of this Vice-Consulate being robbed, I should call on the local authorities to make good the property stolen. In his reply he promises to take all the measures in his power to protect the property of British subjects, but denies the Government's liability to refund the value of property stolen.

Were the thieves who infest Basrah ordinary thieves, committing occasional robbery by stealth and by eluding the vigilance of a fairly effective police, the Acting Mutesarif would doubtless be quite right in declining to accept extraordinary responsibility; but the existing state of affairs being notoriously the result of feebleness and indifference on the part of the authorities and of collusion between their subordinates and the thieves, I trust that, should occasion occur, you will support me in the position I have taken up.

The robbers are an organised body of about one hundred men. Their Chiefs—Alwan, Suhein, Mahomed, and Ibrahim Agha—a Turk from Constantinople, formerly an employé in the sarai,—are well known to the police. Yet these men accompanied by a few of their followers, with arms concealed under their abbas, walk about Basrah and sit in the coffee houses within the town daily. The police either fraternize with or affect not to see them, and private persons, being liable to arrest if found carrying arms, are entirely at their mercy. Of late they have adopted the custom of sending messages to persons of known means demanding sums of money, varying from 100 to 500 Shamis, and threatening assassination if their demands be not complied with. Such is the fear which the feebleness of the authorities has allowed them to inspire that the sums so demanded are invariably paid. Khoja Ibrahim Mukdassi Eyas, the procurator to the French church, called on me this morning to say that he had received a demand for 100 Shamis and to ask my advice as to whether he should pay it or not. I told him not to; but his fears will, I fancy, outweigh my advice.

Some of the most influential men at Basrah,—Shaikh Sulaiman Zobeyr, Kasem Chalebi, the Nukeeb and his brother, Syad Mahomed Syud,—who are on bad terms with the Mutesarif, Saeed Effendi, are accused of encouraging and protecting the robbers, with a view to obtaining the Mutesarif's removal. This I do not suppose to be the case; but it is at the same time certain that were Shaikh Sulaiman and the Nukeeb so inclined, they could easily put a stop to the robberies. I believe, indeed, that they have offered to do so, if allowed to bring two hundred armed men from Zobeyr; but the Mutesarif, being more afraid of them than of the robbers, has declined their services.

Internal administrative arrangements in Turkish 'Irāq. 1861—76

Government of Basrah, 1863—72.

The semi-independent Pāshalīq of Basrah, of which the creation in 1850 was obviously connected with the Turko-Persian frontier delimitation proceedings of 1840—52, seems not to have survived very long the cause which brought it into existence. The date of its abolition is uncertain; but by 1863 Basrah had been reduced to the status of a Qāim-Maqāmlīq, that is, to a district forming the charge of a Qāim-Maqām or civil official of the same grade as that of Mutasallim under the older system of nomenclature, which had now passed away. Munīb Pāsha, the Qāim-Maqām of Basrah in 1863, was, as we have already seen, subject to the orders of the Pāsha of Baghdād. In the years immediately following 1863, as has been related above, Nāmiq Pāsha endeavoured to extend the limits of Basrah at the expense of the Muntafik Shaikhdom, but failed. One of his designs in the same connection must have been realised, however, not long after his departure; for by 1872 the Muntafik Shaikh of the day, Nāsir Pāsha, had become Mutasarrif of Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh and to be discharging the duties of a Turkish official.

Annexation of Hasa and formation of a Wilāyat of Basrah, 1871—72.

In 1871, as described in the chapter on the history of Hasa, that distant and detached region in Eastern Arabia was occupied and annexed to Turkish 'Irāq by Mid-hat Pāsha and became a Mutasarrifīk or civil division.

In 1874, a rebellion broke out in Hasa, in the suppression of which valuable services were rendered to the Porte by Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik Shaikh and Turkish Mutasarrif of Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh, who seems to have been, for an Arab chief, a man of unusual capacity and enlightenment. Nāsir Pāsha's local influence being considered sufficient to make the incorporation of the Muntafik districts with Basrah a safe proceeding, if only the conditions were acceptable to the Shaikh himself, advantage was

taken of his loyalty to combine them in 1875, together with the existing districts of Basrah and the new Hasa division, into a Basrah Wilāyat of which Nāsir Pāsha was appointed the first Wāli. It is said that he paid £70,000 as the price of his nomination. Nāsiriyah town, now the capital of the Muntafik Mutasarrifilik, was founded by Nāsir Pāsha, after whom it was named; and under his rule the town of 'Amārah on the Tigris, which was included in his jurisdiction, began to rise into notice.

As might have been foreseen, the combination in one person of full official powers and supreme local influence was found inconvenient; Nāsir Pāsha fell under suspicion of the Porte; and after a short tenure of the Basrah Wilāyat, he was summoned to Constantinople and detained there, nominally as a trusted adviser of Government, but really as a political prisoner. He was succeeded as Wāli of Basrah by 'Abdullah Pāsha, a Kurd, who retained office until 1879.

Regularisation of the civil administration of Turkish 'Irāq. 1869.

In mentioning the appointment of Mid-hat Pāsha as first "Wāli" of Baghdād, it has been indicated that part of his mission was to introduce a new system of civil government: this was the *symmetrical "Wilāyat" system which then already existed in other parts of Turkey and which now covers the greater part of the Ottoman dominions.

The following translation of a letter addressed by Mid-hat Pāsha, soon after his arrival, to the foreign Consulates at Baghdād, explains how the system was intended to work in relation to foreign representatives:

Translation of a letter from His Excellency Midhat Pasha, Governor-General of Turkish Arabia, to Her Britannic Majesty's Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, dated Baghdad, 5th Safer 1286, 5th Mais 1285, 17th May 1869.

As the Walayet system has been founded and enforced in all other provinces in the Turkish dominions, the Baghdad Province is likewise now reformed on the same system; consequently, the mode of administration has been altered in order to facilitate affairs that may occur. I deem it necessary to explain the mode of such administration. Baghdad Walayet is divided into nine different subordinate Governments (Mutesrifilik). The Baghdad Province (Sinjak) is counted as one of the Subordinate Governments (Mutesrifilik). This place being assigned at head-quarters of the Walayet, therefore the * separate Offices of Secretariat (Mānomlik) and Agency

*See page 1446 *ante* text and footnote. An account of the system, in its application to Mesopotamia, will be found in Volume II of this Gazetteer, page 534, article "Turkish 'Irāq." There have been some modifications of detail in the system since its first introduction: *e.g.*, there is now no longer a Mutasarrif of Baghdād distinct from the Wāli.

†The translation here is not very happy. The offices of Mu'āwin and Mudir-al-Umūr-al-Ajnabiyah still exist. The former officer is what his title denotes, "Adjoint du Vali" or Assistant Wāli; the latter, the "Director of Foreign Affairs," is the Wāli's Foreign Secretary. The Mu'āwin is an executive officer occupying himself, under the Wāli, with internal affairs; the Mudir is the medium of communication with Foreign Consuls and is (or ought to be) the expert of the Wilāyat in questions of treaty rights, privileges of aliens, etc.

(Mudeerlik) for Foreign Affairs have been established for conducting the business of Government.

In transacting the important affairs of the subjects of your Government in other provinces (Sinjak), whenever anything may occur requiring settlement, it must be conducted in the same manner as is carried on here. In order to facilitate the business, it is necessary that the same should be communicated for settlement to the Lieutenant-Governor (Mutesarif) on the spot; and in case of the affair not being arranged on the spot, it may be referred to the head-quarters of the Wahayet. In conducting business of your subjects with the Government, the affairs, or the claim, shall be represented by an official communication, as the case may require, either to the Sub-Government (Mutesarifik) or Agency (Mudeerlik) for Foreign Affairs, and, if necessary, it may be communicated directly to myself, and, in my absence, to the Secretariat (Mâmoulik).

Turkish Government steamers, 1863—76.

Several matters of local administration in Turkish 'Irâq, mostly belonging to the earlier years of the Sultanate of 'Abdul 'Aziz, call for notice in passing.

References in official correspondence show that as early as 1863 the Turkish Government possessed steamers on the rivers of Mesopotamia and made use of them for administrative purposes; but no details are ascertainable of their number, size or kind, or of the manner in which they were obtained. They seem to have been occasionally attacked, or at least threatened, by the Arab tribes. In 1867 a line of river steamers under the Turkish flag, run as a commercial concern but under official direction, was constituted under the name of the Oman-Ottoman Administration. The former Government steamers of which perhaps there were only two the * "Baghdâdi" and the "Basrah" were evidently transferred to the new Administration; but the concern is frequently described as a "Company", and the capital may have belonged in part to private individuals. In 1869 the "Mûsal," "Furat," and "Rusâfah," built at Antwerp to the order of Nâmiq Pâsha about 1866, were added to the Oman-Ottoman fleet. Two more steamers, one of which was named the † "Muskarah" were subsequently added, bringing the number up to seven. After the commencement of Midhat Pâsha's rule at Baghdâd the steamers of the Administration were used almost exclusively for commercial purposes.

Official exportation of grain to Jiddah, 1864—66.

Nâmik Pâsha, during his administration of Turkish 'Irâq, seems to have been required by his Government to arrange for the regular exportation of a certain quantity of grain to Jiddah in the Red Sea with the

* The "Baghdâdi" was built in 1859.

† The "Muskarah" was built at Trieste in 1871; by 1883 she was useless and dismantled. The other new steamer was the "Tilafar;" she was destroyed by fire at Basrah in 1884.

object of preventing scarcity at that great pilgrim port. In the Muntafik troubles of 1864 large amounts of grain collected for this purpose by the Turkish authorities were plundered; and two years later, the orders for export being still in force, there were serious complaints at Baghdád of inconveniences and abuses to which they gave rise. In this connection Colonel Kemball, the British Political Agent at Baghdád, reported as follows at the end of November 1866:

> Owing to the operations of the Local Government to effect the promised supply of grain to Jeddah, the prices of wheat and barley have risen to double the ordinary rates, and considerable discontent has been engendered in consequence amongst the town populations. This feeling is justified by the well-founded conviction that the distress which is experienced is not the result of any real scarcity, but has been occasioned by the competition of the Government and the monopoly to which it has had recourse of the means of transport in order to secure the consignments required. Appeals made to His Excellency by deputations of the people, including a mob of women, have been productive of little relief, and His Excellency observed to the French Consular Dragoman that high prices ruling temporarily were in the present case no evil, seeing that, owing to a famine in India, grain might otherwise be drained out of the country. It may be inferred that His Excellency's measures have been taken with a design, the more especially that the shipments to Jeddah for the current year have been completed, and that the grain now somewhat prematurely stored is destined for exportation next autumn. I need hardly inform your Lordship that Nanik Pasha's fears, real or pretended, with respect to the famine in the distant districts of Bengal, are wholly groundless. No vessels have come this year to Bussorah to carry away grain to India, though the charterers of one or two vessels seeking their annual cargoes for the Mauritius have been this year disappointed. I have before expressed an opinion that the supply of grain to Jeddah, regarded as a mercantile speculation and freed from Government action, could, under proper management, be turned to excellent account in developing the resources of this country, but in the sense of encouraging extended cultivation, and not by hampering trade and agriculture, as under the existing system.

Turkish post between Basrah and Baghdád, 1864.

In the summer of 1864 Námiq Pásha established a service of Arab messengers to run twice a week between Basrah and Diwániyah, and it may safely be assumed that the latter place was at the time connected in some similar or superior fashion with Baghdád. It is probable that this post was instituted for official purposes only, and it may have been only a temporary expedient for the rapid transmission of news during the military operations of that year, when Diwániyah was an important garrison and troops had been sent to Basrah also.

Confiscation by the Turkish Government of the pay of their employés for August 1866.

At the present day, when money is required in Turkey for public expenditure which cannot be met from the ordinary resources of the State, subscriptions are commonly invited; and these are sometimes collected from public servants, after their consent has been obtained by official pressure, in the form of deductions from their pay. Fifty years ago the

procedure was more drastic, witness the following extract from a despatch written by Colonel Kemball at the end of 1866: "The salaries of "all Government servants (from the highest to the lowest employé, in- "cluding the private soldier), which were sequestrated by the Porte for the "month of August, have aggregated for the whole province * 4,456 purses, "which amount has already been forwarded to the capital in specie. The "forced contribution demanded from the population, and aggregating "7,000 purses, is in course of collection."

Provincial indications were thus not wanting of the progress of the central exchequer towards bankruptcy.

The Baghdád-Basrah Wilayat Budget, 1874.

The revenue of the Baghdád-Basrah Wilayat for the year 1291 (corresponding roughly to 1874 A. D.) was £T. 648,435, while expenditure amounted to £T. 255,880, the former exclusive of customs house receipts and the latter inclusive of military, marine and telegraph expenditure. If these † figures are correct, there would seem to have been in the 30 years that have since elapsed a serious diminution of revenue and a very large increase in expenditure.

General British interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1861–76.

British commercial navigation of the Tigris, 1861–79.

The navigation of the Tigris by the British steamer "City of London," which Messrs. Lynch & Co. sent out from England in 1861 or 1862, was at first opposed or even prevented by the Turkish authorities at Baghdád. This necessitated a fresh application to the Porte by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, of which the outcome was another Vizirial letter, obtained in July 1862. Its purport was identical with that of the letter of 1861, and it sufficed to put an end, for the moment, to the obstruction offered by the Baghdád local authorities to the running of the "City of London."

In 1864, however, on its becoming known that Messrs. Lynch proposed to place a second steamer, the "Dejleh," upon the Tigris, a serious controversy arose. Colonel Kemball, the British Political Agent at Baghdád, learning that the Turks intended to oppose the employment of the "Dejleh," wrote to Námiq Pásha, referring to the freedom of

* The "purse" was worth about £5.

† See Guary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, vol. I, page 339, and compare vol. II of this Gazetteer, article "Turkish 'Irāq," page 857. Customs receipts were apparently about the same in 1874 and 1903.

navigation enjoyed by British commercial vessels in Mesopotamia and asking him to specify any objections that he entertained. Nāmiq Pāsha, in reply, argued that the number of steamers under the British flag authorised to ply on the rivers was restricted to two, and that, as there were already the "Comet" and the "City of London" upon the Tigris, another could not be added. Evidently the British Political Agent referred to the settlement of 1846, which covered all British commercial vessels; and in accordance with which alone the question of the "Dejleh" ought to have been settled, while the Pāsha had in his mind the Farmān of 1834, which related exclusively to British Government vessels and so had no bearing at this time except on the "Comet," which belonged to the Indian Navy. The discussion was soon transferred to Europe, where the British authorities, under some misconception of the facts of the case, at first inclined to accept the Turkish view of the case and to withdraw the "Comet" from Mesopotamia to make way for the "Dejleh." On Colonel Kemball's pointing out, however, that the "Dejleh," owned by Messrs. Lynch, had not and could not have been sent—as was assumed by the Porte in an official note to the British Embassy—to replace the "Comet," which belonged to the Government of India, the course of the argument was changed; and in the end the "Dejleh" was allowed to run, irrespective of the presence of the "Comet."

In 1867 the practical monopoly of steam navigation on the Tigris enjoyed by Messrs. Lynch was challenged by the Oman-Ottoman line, of which the formation has already been mentioned; but the competition of the new Company or Turkish Department, whichever it may have been, was ineffectual.

In 1874, on Messrs. Lynch & Co.'s proposing to turn the "City of London" into a store ship and to replace her by a new steamer and a steam launch, the Porte revived their old objections and arguments. They contended that there was no distinction between the British Government and Messrs. Lynch; that only two steamers under the British flag might be on the Tigris at the same time; and that, as this number was already exceeded by the presence simultaneously of the "Comet," the "City of London" and the "Dejleh," Messrs. Lynch could not claim the right of making an addition to their fleet. The Turkish note was referred to Colonel Herbert, who explained once more the character of the "Comet," besides exposing various misstatements; and his views were adopted by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. At length, on the 31st March 1875, orders were obtained from the Porte

authorising Messrs. Lynch to replace one of their old steamers by a new one, and also to employ a steam launch in exceptional cases and when the river was low.

Messrs. Lynch & Co. appear as early as 1870 to have assumed, perhaps on * taking other capitalists into partnership, the style of the "Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company"; but this designation has never been recognised by the Turks, who to the present time insist on describing the Company as "Lynch's."

Donation by an Indian Nawáb for clearing the Husainiyáh Canal, 1863.

By 1863 or probably earlier, the Husainiyáh Canal, on the clearance of which large sums were spent by His Highness the Mír of Sind between 1836 and 1842, had again become choked with silt. A sum of about £10,000 having been devoted to the purpose of clearing it by "an Indian Nawáb, since dead,"—not otherwise described but in all probability a British subject, — Námiq Pasha, on whom the duty of expending the money had somehow devolved, deputed the "Egyptian trained engineers on his staff to make an estimate of the work and report upon the best mode of carrying it into effect."

Injuries to and claims of British subjects, 1866.

In 1866, as has been shown in the section on the internal history of the province, British subjects or dependants were among the sufferers by various burglaries which occurred in Baghdád city; and it does not appear that they obtained any substantial redress.

In August 1866 a somewhat amusing correspondence took place between the British Political Agent at Baghdád and the local authorities with reference to a bale of 65 pieces of calico, the property of a British subject and worth 425½ Qráns, which had been plundered more than a year before on the road between Ba'qúbah and Shahrabán. Some of the robbers were captured, in his own jurisdiction, by Taqi-ud-Dín Pasha, Governor of Kirkúk, who recovered from them the sum of 145 Qráns and remitted it to Baghdád, remarking that the balance was due by their associates, who were still at large. Colonel Kemball, however, demurred to a settlement on these lines and in writing to Námiq Pasha observed: "I beg, however, to submit to Your Excellency that the "practice of holding each robber responsible for his share of property "plundered in company is scarcely just. In commercial transactions the "liability of a partner may very properly be limited to the amount of "capital he may have contributed to the concern; but such a principle "could hardly be extended to malefactors, and I venture to hope that

*The "Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company" was incorporated, however, in April 1861.

"Your Excellency will be pleased to compel the individuals actually in "custody to make good the balance still due to Agha Mahomed "Hussain."

Proposed British Euphrates Valley Railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf 1871-72.

Mr. Andrew, the sanguine and energetic originator of the Euphrates Valley Railway scheme, did not abandon hope when in 1857, as already mentioned, the Company formed at his instance failed to secure a financial guarantee for its enterprise from the British Government. Though the concession obtained from the Porte had expired, Mr. Andrew remained in communication with British and Turkish Ministers and other influential persons on the subject of the scheme, and from 1866 to 1870 he pressed it with great earnestness. The Indian Mutiny and the completion of the Suez Canal furnished fresh arguments in the case, and much stress was now laid on the facilities which the line would afford for * relieving or reinforcing the British garrison in India by a route alternative to, and more rapid than, that *viâ* the Red Sea.

In 1867 the advantages of a Euphrates Valley Railway were summarised by Mr. Andrew as follows:—

It would connect the Mediterranean with Bussorah, at the head of the Persian Gulf, between which place and Kurrachee and Bombay regular communication is now maintained by a line of steamers subsidised by the Indian Government.

Making Kurrachee the European port of India in place of Bombay, it would save about 1,000 miles in the distance between England and India, and would reduce the time occupied in the journey almost by one half.

It would save the Government large sums in sudden emergencies, by the facilities it would afford for the transport of troops and stores.

It would enable troops from England to be landed at Kurrachee in about 14 days, and in two or three days more, at Lahore, Peshawar, or Delhi, when the Indus Valley railway system is complete.

It would render the invasion of India all but impossible.

It would subject an enemy advancing towards the North-Western Frontier of India to easy attack in the flank and rear.

It would render the resources of England so promptly available in the East, that Chatham and Portsmouth might be made the bases of operations as easily as Kurrachee

* It argues extreme optimism on the part of the promoters of the Railway that they should have expected Turkey willingly to consent, at least for long, to the frequent passage of considerable bodies of foreign troops through remote districts where her own military power was of the slightest. And insufficient thought seems to have been given to the false situation in which Turkey would have been placed, during a war between Britain and Russia, through the use by Britain for military purposes of a railway running through Turkish territory, the idea of moving foreign troops across Turkey from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was not a new one; see Dr. J. W. Winchester's *Note on the Practicability of advancing an Army from Europe into Asia by the Provinces of the Euphrates and Tigris* in the transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, Volume VI, September 1841 to May 1844.

and Bombay; and any hostile movement directed against us, whether from without or within our Indian frontier, might thus be effectually checked before it could assume formidable proportions.

It would put an end to the present dangerous isolation of Persia, and would relieve that country from the undue pressure to which she is subjected by Russia; and it would afford her a short, cheap, easy and safe outlet on the Mediterranean for her trade with Europe, in place of the existing long, expensive, and difficult route by the Black Sea, which is entirely at the mercy of Russia.

It would be easily defensible, both terminal of the railway being on the open sea.

The length of the Railway, from Sea to Sea, would be about 800 miles.

The country does not present any serious engineering difficulties; the cost of the entire line being estimated at from £8,000 to £10,000 per mile.

The capital which would be required would not exceed 8½ millions.

In 1870 Mr. Andrew sought further to strengthen the case for the Railway by insisting on the advantages in relation to British postal communications, trade, and political prestige which it would confer, and of the services which it might render to the cause of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The Porte were believed to be favourable to the construction of some railway connecting Mesopotamia with the rest of Turkey; but there was reason to think that they would prefer a line leading from Baghdád through Asia Minor to Constantinople to one ending on the Mediterranean.

At length, on the 23rd June 1871, a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed "to examine and report upon the whole "subject of railway communication between the Mediterranean, the Black "Sea, and the Persian Gulf." This Committee, which was presided over by Sir Stafford Northcote, sat at different times in 1871 and 1872. It examined a large number of important witnesses, besides taking into consideration reports specially obtained from many British consular officers in Turkey. Among those who gave evidence before the Committee were Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Lords Sandhurst, and Strathnairn, ex-Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Bartle Frere, ex-Governor of Bombay; Sir H. C. Rawlinson, Sir A. B. Kemball, Captain Felix Jones, I.N., and Captain Selby, I.N., political and topographical experts; Mr. Thomas K. Lynch (who had accompanied his brother Commander Lynch to Turkish Iráq in 1841 and had afterwards engaged in trade at Baghdád), Mr. R. Paul, and Mr. E. Dawes, merchants of local knowledge and experience; and Mr. W. Mackinnon, Chairman of the British India Steam Navigation Co. Among the consular officers consulted were Colonel Herbert, the British Political Agent at Baghdád.

who recommended a line from Aleppo to Baghdad *viâ* Birijik, Nisibin and Mâsal; and Mr. W. Gifford Palgrave, the Central Arabian explorer, who had become British Consul at Trebizond.

The following extracts from the Select Committee's report will serve to show the scope of their investigations and the nature of their conclusions.

The evidence which your Committee have taken, and to which much more might have been added, has satisfied them that there is no insuperable obstacle in the way of the construction of a railway from some suitable port in the Mediterranean to some other suitable port at or near the head of the Persian Gulf; that there is more than one port which might be selected at either end of the line; that there are several practicable routes; that there would be no difficulty in procuring the necessary supply of labour and of materials for constructing a railway; and that there need be no apprehension of its being exposed to injury by natives, either during the process of its construction or after it shall have been completed. They find, too, that there is reason to expect the sanction, if not the active concurrence, of the Turkish Government in any well conceived project that they may be presented to them.

* * * *

Several witnesses have discussed the relative advantages of the various termini, both on the Mediterranean and on the Persian Gulf; the principal question with regard to the former being whether Alexandretta or Suedia should be preferred; while with regard to the latter, there have not only been questions between different ports, such as Bussorah, Mohammerah, Core Abdullah, Grane, and Bushire, but the further question, whether the line should not be carried along the whole northern shore of the Gulf, so as to establish direct communication with the Indian railway system at Kurrachee.

* * * *

As regards the terminus on the Persian Gulf, your Committee are decidedly of opinion that it would be better to carry the line to some point where it might be brought into communication with the steam-vessels which are now under Government subvention to carry the mails, and which ply from the Indian ports to Bussorah, than to continue it along the coast to Kurrachee by a very expensive and probably unremunerative route. Of the particular ports which have been mentioned, they are inclined to prefer the port of * Grane, but upon this point, as well as upon the selection of a port on the Mediterranean, they think that a local inquiry, conducted by competent scientific authorities, with a special reference to the purpose in view, would be desirable.

Passing from the question of the termini to that of the route itself, your Committee find that the arguments in favour of, and against, the Euphrates and the Tigris routes respectively may be thus stated:—

The Euphrates route is considerably the shorter, would be the cheaper to make; and, assuming an equal rate of speed, would afford the quicker passage for persons, troops, or mails passing between England and India. The Tigris route might attract the larger amount of traffic, and would connect itself better with the projected Turkish system.

Upon the whole, your Committee are of opinion, that, if the enterprise were to be regarded simply as one affecting British interests, it would be the wisest course to

* *i.e.*, Kuwait.

adopt the shortest and most direct line not open to very obvious objections, and that one of the two routes by the way of the Euphrates should be preferred, bearing in the those who are interested in the improvement of the communications with the towns on the Tigris or further east, to connect those towns with the main line by one or more branch railways, and by the use of the water communication which exists between the two rivers. But if other considerations are to be taken into account, and if the co-operation of the Turkish Government is to be sought in the construction of a railway, it may well happen that that Government may see reason to prefer the route by way of the Tigris, and any such preference ought to be a material element in the determination of the question.

Your Committee, therefore, having arrived at the conclusion that there is no probability of any line being constructed by unassisted private enterprise, have now to consider the following question:—

Is it worth the while of England to undertake the making of a line in conjunction with Turkey; and is there, in that case, a probability that a practical arrangement can be made?

There can be no doubt that if the Government of England were to give its support, in the form of an adequate guarantee, the Turkish Government would give its general countenance to the undertaking, whatever might be the route that was chosen. It is the opinion of many very competent witnesses that it would be worth the while of this country to give such a guarantee, even though it should involve a considerable pecuniary sacrifice. Others are of a different opinion; and, though admitting that England would derive certain advantages from the opening of a railway through Mesopotamia, do not consider that those advantages would be of sufficient importance to justify a serious national expenditure.

Among the witnesses whose evidence tends most strongly to support the policy of incurring the cost or risk of a national guarantee, your Committee may mention Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord Strathnairn, Sir H. Bartle Frere, Sir Donald Macleod, Mr. Laing, Colonel Sir H. Green, Colonel Malcolm Green, Captain Tyler, R.E., Mr. W. Gifford Palgrave, etc.

Among those who suggest considerations tending to throw doubt on the propriety of such an expenditure, your Committee would call attention to the evidence of Lord Sandhurst, Sir H. Rawlinson, Major Champain, etc.

Your Committee have had laid before them a Despatch from the Government of India, expressing an earnest desire that it may be found practicable to carry out the project, which, it is observed, would be of considerable, but not of paramount, importance to the interest of that country. They infer from it that the Indian Government while it would be prepared to avail itself of the railway if made, and of course to pay for the services it might require, would object to join in any direct or indirect expenditure for the purpose of obtaining its construction.

* * * * *

Your Committee are decidedly of opinion that, if any steps are to be taken towards the construction of a line, the best course will be for Her Majesty's Government to place themselves in communication with the Government of Turkey, with a view to some arrangement of the nature above described; and that the two Governments should jointly undertake a survey for the purpose of deciding upon the precise route to be adopted.

Your Committee have not obtained full information as to the cost of any of the lines which have been proposed, but they think it probable that the sum of £10,000,000 would be amply sufficient to cover the expense of the shortest route at all events.

What then are the advantages which the country might expect to gain from this possible expenditure? They are principally those to be derived from the more rapid transmission of mails, and from the possession of an alternative and more rapid route for the conveyance of troops, and from the great commercial advantages, both to India and England, which the opening up of the route would confer.

The amount of time that might be saved in the transmission of mails from England to Bombay is variously estimated by different witnesses, some placing it at four days, others as high as seven or eight days, but it must of course materially depend upon, first, the length of the railway, and secondly, the rate of speed at which the trains can travel, which again depends partly upon the gauge to be adopted, and thus the question is resolved into one of cost. Captain Tyler, R.E., who has gone carefully into the question, states the saving of distance by the Euphrates route from London *viâ* Brindisi and Scanderoon to Bombay, as compared with that *viâ* Brindisi, Alexandria, and Suez at 733 miles, and estimates the saving of time at 92 hours. The adoption of Kurrachee as the point of debarkation, instead of Bombay, would of course materially enhance the saving, and during the season of the monsoon the gain would be increased by avoiding the Indian Ocean.

With regard to the conveyance of troops, your Committee have taken the opinions of several highly competent witnesses, Lords Strathnairn and Sandhurst, successively Commanders-in-Chief in India, Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir Bartle Frere, and others. As respects the comparative advantages of the proposed railway route and the route by the Suez Canal for the purpose of the ordinary reliefs, some difference of opinion prevails. The advantage of gaining some days in point of time is counterbalanced, in the opinion of some witnesses, by that of being able to send the men from the point of departure to that of destination without transhipment. Lord Sandhurst and Sir Henry Rawlinson prefer the Suez route on this ground. On the other hand, Lord Strathnairn and Colonel Sir Henry Green consider that in the winter the shorter route would be the preferable one. But nearly all the witnesses concur as to the importance of having a second or alternative route available in case of the first being impeded or in case of an emergency arising, which might call for the rapid dispatch of troops, especially if they were wanted in the north-west of India.

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Speaking generally, your Committee are of opinion that the two routes, by the Red Sea and by the Persian Gulf, might be maintained and used simultaneously; that at certain seasons and for certain purposes the advantage would lie with the one and at other seasons and for other purposes it would lie with the other; that it may fairly be expected that in process of time traffic enough for the support of both would develope itself, but that this result must not be expected too soon; that the political and commercial advantages of establishing a second route would at any time be considerable and might, under possible circumstances, be exceedingly great; and that it would be worth the while of the English Government to make an effort to secure them, considering the moderate pecuniary risk which they would incur. They believe that this may best be done by opening communications with the Government of Turkey in the sense indicated by the semi-official correspondence to which they have already drawn attention.

It does not appear whether any action was taken at Constantinople by Her Majesty's Government on this report, nor, if so, what difficulties in the way of an understanding with Turkey or of raising capital for the enterprise were encountered. But with the presentation of the Select

Committee's report the scheme for a British railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf disappeared finally from the public view.

The general lawlessness which prevailed at Basrah in 1872, as already described, culminated in an outrage of a very unusual and daring character against the mail steamer "Cashmere," the property of the British India Steam Navigation Company, while lying at anchor in the port under the protection of the Turkish Government.

Piracy committed on the British mail steamer "Cashmere" at Basrah, 1872.

In the small hours of the morning of the 15th June 1872 the vessel was suddenly boarded, from three boats, by a gang of 28 pirates, the foremost of whom obtained access to the deck by pretending to be passengers. The "Cashmere's" rifles and ammunition were in different parts of the ship and could not be got at once the pirates were in possession of her, consequently there was no resistance. The robbers, after inflicting enough personal injuries with cold steel to terrorise the crew, rifled the vessel and disappeared with remarkable celerity. A native fireman, Isma'il Khán, was killed in the attack, his head being almost severed from his body by a sword-cut as he emerged from the stoke-hole, and a dozen other persons on board were wounded, including five Europeans, among whom were the ship's Clerk (Mr. Bradford), dangerously stabbed with a dagger, and the Chief Engineer (Mr. Mackenzie), whose hand was crippled. Specie to the amount of Rs. 42,050 and property belonging to the officers and crew to the value of Rs. 5,552 were carried off, making a total loss of Rs. 47,602.

It was subsequently ascertained that the gang which committed this piracy was a composite one, comprising Hasáwis from Hasa, Ka'ab from 'Arabistán, Muntafik from the Euphrates, inhabitants of the Maqám quarter of Basrah town, negroes, and others. The leader of the enterprise was Jásim-bin-Khalaf, a native of Hasa; among his lieutenants was Muhammad-al-Hájj, probably a Muntafik; and 'Alwán, another Hasáwi bad character well known at Basrah, became an accessory after the fact. The presence of people from Maqám among the raiders explained the excellence of the information possessed by the gang and their quickness in getting at the treasure on board, for Maqámis were employed to a considerable extent about British steamers visiting the port.

The plunder was divided by the pirates at Sarají; and on the night following, a boat from the Turkish corvette at Basrah fell in with a suspicious craft off Hamdán and endeavoured to stop her, but was beaten off with the loss of one man killed and five wounded.

Rafif Pasha, the Turkish ruler of Baghdád, took energetic action; and before long the Turkish authorities had arrested a large number

of persons at Basrah. Muhammad-al-Hāij was captured at Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh; and an active search for Jāsim-bin-Khalaf was set on foot by Nāsir Pāsha, Shaikh and Mutasarif of the Muntafik country. Some of the pirates sought refuge in 'Arabistān, in the chapter on the history of which province an account of the proceedings taken to obtain their surrender will be found. About the beginning of 1873 between 30 and 40 prisoners were brought to trial before a Turkish Court at Basrah, with the result that 16 were convicted, of whom 9 were condemned to death and 4 to imprisonment for life. Seven of the capital sentences, after confirmation from Constantinople, were carried out at Basrah on the 26th June 1873, the criminals—among them Muhammad-al-Hāij—being publicly hanged at different places in the town. Eight more of the offenders were reported to have met, in the meantime, with violent deaths of various kinds; 6 were in prison; and only 7 remained to be accounted for. 'Alwān had been captured at an early stage of the proceedings in the Bahrain islands, to which he at first escaped; his arrest was effected by the Shaikh of Bahrain at the request of the British Political Resident at Būshehr; and he was sent to Basrah in His Britannic Majesty's gunboat "Hugh Rose" and handed over to the Turkish authorities. Jāsim-al-Khalaf, the ringleader and supposed murderer of the fireman, was found by the Turks in Hasa and brought to Basrah in August 1873. The result of the trials of Jāsim and 'Alwān is not on record; but, whatever it was, enough had been done to ensure respect for the British mercantile flag. The "Cashmere" case is remembered in Turkish 'Irāq to the present day as an impressive example of British retribution.

Part of the specie plundered had been traced by the Turkish authorities with very little delay; and eventually the specie recoveries reached a total value of Rs. 31,347, those made in Turkey amounting to Rs. 17,917 and those in Persia to Rs. 13,430, which left a balance of Rs. 10,703 unrecovered under this head. The shippers and consignees of the specie were all native merchants.

Messrs. Grey, Paul and Company, the Agents at Būshehr of the British India Steam Navigation Company, from the first urged that the Turkish Government should be held responsible for making good the entire losses occasioned by the piracy. This view was endorsed by the Government of India, who held that the peculiar circumstances of the attack, taking place as it did in a large Turkish port and under the guns of a Turkish man-of-war, warranted exceptional treatment of the case. But Her Majesty's Government, advised by the Law Officers of the Crown,

considered that to demand compensation from a Government on account of the misdeeds of criminals within its jurisdiction would be to create an inconvenient and even dangerous precedent. Accordingly, though Raûf Pâsha had verbally admitted the responsibility of the Porte for affording compensation in full, and though Colonel Herbert, the British Political Agent, had already lodged with *Rudif Pâsha, Raûf Pâsha's successor, a claim for Rs. 10,703 on account of the specie and Rs. 5,553 on account of the other property unrecovered, as also for Rs. 1,000 as compensation to the family of the murdered fireman and £200 and £25 as compensation to the Clerk and Chief Engineer respectively, no representations were made at the Porte on the subject, and nothing was obtained.

The settlement of the "Cashmere" case entailed heavy work, extending over many months, on the British representatives in Turkish 'Irâq: on Colonel Herbert, the Political Agent at Baghdâd, to whose energy and determination the satisfactory result obtained was mostly due; and on Mr. Robertson, the British Agent at Basrah, by whom the proceedings at that place and in 'Arabistân were watched, and in part conducted, under Colonel Herbert's supervision. Good assistance was rendered, in Turkish 'Irâq, by Raûf Pâsha, the Wâli of Baghdâd; by Nâsir Pâsha, Shaikh of the Muntafik, who had presented himself at Basrah only four days after the piracy; by Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmân Effendi, Naqîb of Basrah; and by Qâsim-az-Zuhair, Chalabi, President of the Merrantile Court at Basrah. Colonel Herbert received the thanks of the Government of India, and was commended by Her Majesty's Government, for his successful handling of matters; and the recommendations which he made on behalf of his principal coadjutors were accepted. Mr. Robertson's official position was improved by the change of his title from "British Agent" to "Assistant Political Agent" at Basrah; the acknowledgments of the Government of India were conveyed to Raûf Pâsha; and in 1874 suitable presents were given to the others, the Muntafik Shaikh receiving a double-poled tent, and the Naqîb and the Chalabi a gold watch and chain each. His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was directed to thank the Turkish Government for their satisfactory treatment of the case.

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* Rudif Pâsha was well spoken of after his departure: he "had a way of hanging "malefactors who were condemned to death, and doing other unpleasant things with "promptitude and thoroughness, which gave Mesopotamia a new start in civilization." (Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, vol. I, page 138.)

British official enterprises and establishments in Turkish 'Irāq, 1861-76.

Institution of a British mail service between Turkish 'Irāq and India, 1862-63.

The institution of a British mail service between Baghdād and Basrah in 1862-63, its improvement in 1866 and 1876, and the establishment of regular British Indian post offices at Baghdād and Basrah in 1868 are described in the Appendix on Mail Communications, which may be consulted. Annexure No. 2 to that Appendix contains a description of the contracts for the carriage of the British mail between Baghdād and Basrah granted by the British Government from 1863 onwards, to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. (Messrs. Lynch). No Turkish post offices as yet existed in the province; and there was not even any public mail service, except the British Dromedary Post, connecting Mesopotamia with the outer world. The British Indian Post Office had thus a large share in inaugurating, by its enterprise, a new economic, social, and even political era in Turkish 'Irāq.

Maintenance of the British Dromedary Post.

The British Dromedary Post between Baghdād and Beirūt was still maintained; but the contribution of Rs. 200 a month towards its cost, granted by the Government of India in 1844, was withdrawn in 1871. Formerly letters from Baghdād to India had been sent by this line, but the establishment of a direct British mail service between Turkish 'Irāq and India deprived it of that part of its custom, besides providing an alternative line of communication between Baghdād and Europe longer, but not very much slower, than that by Damascus. From 1871, accordingly, its usefulness being diminished and its revenue impaired, this old institution began to decline; but it was not finally abolished during the reign of 'Abdul 'Azīz.

Construction, by British agency, of the Constantinople-Baghdād, Baghdād-Tehrān, and Baghdād-Persian Gulf lines of telegraph, 1861-65.

Great as was the effect of the institution of postal services, that of the establishment, almost simultaneously, of telegraphic communication between Baghdād and Constantinople, Baghdād and Persia, and Baghdād and India was probably even greater. The lines were constructed by British agency, but, within the limits of the Ottoman Empire, on behalf of the Turkish Government, to whom on completion they were handed over. A full history of the work will be found in the Appendix on the Telegraphs of the Persian Gulf; and here it will be sufficient to mention, by way of chronology, that communication was opened between Baghdād and Constantinople in June 1861, between Baghdād and Khanaqīn on

the Persian frontier in October 1864, and between Baghdád and Fáo below Basrah, the point of union with the Persian Gulf telegraph system, in January 1865.

Part played in the enterprise, in Turkish 'Iráq, by British officials.

British officials with local experience of Turkish 'Iráq played, from the first, an important part in the arrangements for the Mesopotamian sections of the work. Sir H. Rawlinson, formerly British Political Agent at Baghdád and at this time Envoy to the Court of Persia, participated in the preliminary discussions at Constantinople in 1859, contributing an unrivalled store of knowledge and information. On the 15th December 1860 Colonel Kemball, British Political Agent at Baghdád, arrived at Constantinople, having been deputed by Her Majesty's Government, with the assent of the Porte, to examine and report on the partially completed line from Constantinople to Baghdád, a duty which he performed most thoroughly, making a tour along the whole line from Scutari to Baghdád between the 9th January and the end of April 1861.

From 1863 to 1865 Colonel Kemball was associated in the further measures for extending the telegraph from Baghdád to the Persian Gulf; and in March-April 1863, accompanied by Mr. Greener, a professional electrical engineer, he made a reconnaissance lasting a month along the approximate line to be followed as far as Basrah and supplied a sketch map and itinerary, in consequence of which a route *viâ* Hillah, Diwáníyah, Hammár and Qúrnah was adopted. A further more minute survey of the country between Diwáníyah and Hammár was made a little later by Lieutenant Bewsher, I.N.,* and Mr. Johnston, British Vice-Consul at Basrah, on a downward journey from Baghdád to Basrah.

In the subsequent actual construction of the line Colonel Kemball was necessarily dependent on the co-operation of Námiq Páshá, the Turkish Governor of Baghdád; and, in carrying it through the territory of the then semi-independent Muntafik tribe, he often chafed considerably at the difficulties and delays occasioned by the policy of his Turkish colleague. Sir F. J. Goldsmid observes:† "... the Political "Agent, in undertaking to look after the work, so far as British interests "were concerned, had heaped upon himself a not inconsiderable amount of

* Sir F. J. Goldsmid, writing in 1874, remarks: "These two zealous and intelligent officers are now no more. Lieutenant Bewsher, worn out in body, came home, and died at Mentone in 1869. Mr. Johnston took leave in failing health in 1868, and when about to return to his duty in the following year, was wrecked in the *Cawnpur* in September. He reached Basrah to die there in November."

† *Telegraph and Travel*, pages 103-4.

"labour. Fortunately for the success of the cause, he was able and willing "to take in hand all difficulties of minor detail, as those of sheer political "character; and while infusing a spirit of earnestness into the local "executive, and luring a loth Administration to conciliate instead of "irritate the proud and turbulent Arabs, he did not neglect the smaller "but very essential facts . . . "

At the end of 1863 some telegraph operatives on the Hillah section were robbed by a gang of mounted Dhafir Bedouins and Muntafik matchlockmen led by a slave of Shaikh Mansūr of the Muntafik tribe, who was then in rebellion against the local Government; but the Turkish authorities undertook to indemnify the sufferers. In the beginning of 1864 boats with telegraph materials required at Diwāniyah were detained at Basrah by the[troubles between the Muntafik and the Turkish administration'; and the mission by the Pāsha of an officer named Muhammad Bey, who was supposed to have special experience in dealing with Arabs, seems to have yielded no result. At length, in June of that year, Shaikh Fahad, the new Shaikh of the Muntafik, sent a relative of his own to pass the boats up the Euphrates; but whether the passage was safely effected may, in the light of a despatch written by Colonel Kemball on the 13th July, be doubted.

As regards the telegraph, despairing now, after nearly a year's trial of the] ability of Namik Pāsha to 'open the way for its construction, I believe that one of the only courses left to the Porte to effect this object is either that I should be permitted at length to act independently and to negotiate directly with the Arabs for a safe conduct, or that a campaign should be undertaken and vigorously prosecuted with a sufficient force to subdue the districts on either banks of the Euphrates from Diwanieh to the sea. I adhere to the conviction I have uniformly expressed that, with the good will of the Turkish officials, British Agents dealing directly with the Arabs would experience no difficulty in carrying out the undertaking. But under Namik Pāsha's rule the proposed policy would be certainly impracticable. The occurrences at Fao on the occasion of the landing of the cable have served to illustrate the extreme jealousy of His Excellency at anything like independent action on our part, and *Your Excellency is aware that every offer from me to place myself in communication with the revolted Chiefs personally or by letter, with the view of furthering our telegraphic purposes to (sic) induce their submission to Turkish authority, has been systematically rejected on the ground of His Excellency's aversion to every form of foreign intervention; nor, in a patriotic point of view, perhaps could His Excellency be blamed for preferring the second course to which I have referred, but its adoption would occupy time, and would probably entail a greater sacrifice of revenue and a greater substantive outlay than the Porte would be willing to incur.

Before concluding this despatch, I beg Your Excellency to pardon me for alluding to a matter of a personal nature. Great disappointment is naturally felt in England

* His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

at the non-completion of the Mesopotamian telegraph, and, success being taken as the test of efficiency, the discredit of failure is to a certain extent, I understand, reflected upon myself. How far my efforts have been rightly directed Your Excellency can alone judge, but if they could have been so fortunate as to gain your approval, I respectfully hope that in the measures under contemplation I may be honoured with Your Excellency's support and permitted at least to accomplish a task of which, having been once entrusted with its execution, I could not but feel it a disparagement to be relieved at the last stage.

In August 1864, without thought of the expedition which he was then sending against the Sheikh of the Khazā'il, Nāmiq Pāsha instructed Sāmi Effendi, a Turkish officer who acted jointly with Colonel Kemball in telegraph matters, to inform Colonel Kemball by letter that the Pāsha "had determined to resume operations for the construction of the telegraph" and to invite him to depute English engineers and form working parties for the purpose; but it was now the turn of the British Political Agent, though materials sufficient to finish the line had lately been received at Basrah, to insist on delay. He justified his action to the Under-Secretary of State for India in the following terms:

Already Namiq Pāsha has proposed to me to resume operations for this purpose; but as His Excellency is preparing a military expedition to coerce Shaik Mazhūr, the powerful Chief of the Khazail tribe, located not far from Samaweh, and as the rebel Montefiq Chief, Mansour, who is still at large, may probably join the Khazail, drawing with him the disaffected portion of his own tribe, I do not feel equally sanguine with His Excellency of tranquillity being restored; nor should I be justified, I believe, in exposing my European employés under canvas, to the malaria of the marshes, until materials shall have been distributed along the banks of the Euphrates and until the weather shall have become cooler, conditions both of which will need a full month to be realized. A brief delay at this season, with the view of certifying our objects, must be comparatively immaterial; but did any considerable portion of stores fall into the hands of revolted Arabs, or become swamped in the river, the work must necessarily be postponed for another year, and the risks of such a contingency would, of course, be imminent pending the issue of the plans now under prosecution by His Excellency.

All difficulties, however, were in the end surmounted; and in October 1865 Colonel Kemball was able to report: "The Mesopotamian sections "of the telegraph from Baghdād to Fāo have, I believe, uniformly worked "well as double lines since the date of their construction. The inspector "in charge of those sections, Mr. Carthew,* is an efficient officer. The "mode of maintenance, as in the first instance established, differs only "from the system generally prevailing in Turkey by the reduplication of "the Chaoushes in the persons of native 'Mussoyers,' or escorts, at these

* Mr. Carthew was a retired non-commissioned officer of Artillery. See Sir F. J. Goldsmid's *Telegraph and Travel*, page 68.

"points where the administration of the country is vested in Arab "Sheikhs."

Attitude of Nāmiq Pāsha towards British interests, 1863-68.

We had formerly occasion to remark the hostility which British political intervention and general enterprise excited in the rulers of Turkish 'Irāq under the Sultanate of 'Abdul Majid; and it must be confessed that the prestige acquired by the British Government through the successful establishment of mail and telegraph services in the reign of 'Abdul 'Aziz was not, any more than the virtual monopolisation of commercial steam navigation on the Tigris, calculated to assuage the dislike with which the Turkish authorities were accustomed to regard manifestations of British activity in the province. The continual intervention of the British Political Agent in tribal and other internal affairs, though made inevitable by his responsibility in regard to telegraph construction, must have been extremely irritating to the local authorities; and the state of matters revealed in the following extract from a despatch of Colonel Kemball, dated 4th May 1864, need cause, therefore, no surprise.

From the known sentiments of Namik Pasha, I believe his real aim to be to force on this issue. His dread of the extension of British influence among the Arabs amounts to mania, of which the exhibition is no longer disguised. Thus, when advised from the best sources that the elders of the Muntefik only needed my assurance of the sincerity of Nāmik Pasha's concessions as regarded both the resumption of their lands and the treatment of themselves in order to make their submission, I tendered my mediation in that sense, and submitted to His Excellency drafts of the letters I proposed to write to them (of which I enclose copies). His Excellency, while admitting their probable efficacy, replied that the example of the Lebanon, after the occupation of Syria by Ibrahim Pasha, had determined him to decline foreign intervention on all occasions and in any form whatever, nor could he be persuaded of the want of parallelism or analogy in the two cases."

Again, when more recently informed by a telegraphic despatch from Shebli Pāsha at Dewanieh that the heads of the Muntefik families proposed to address me collectively in order to ask my mediation, His Excellency immediately sent to desire that I would reject their application and refuse to answer it.

This course I have declined to adopt as needlessly discourteous to my correspondents, but I have assured His Excellency that their letter when received should be immediately laid before His Excellency and that His Excellency's decision, provided it were not coupled with any matter of a nature to commit or compromise myself, should be faithfully communicated to them. I deemed it right to specify this condition, because, on the last occasion, when, with His Excellency's sanction, I addressed Sheikh Nasser and Munsoor (*vide* despatch No. 16, dated 26th March, 1864), His Excellency privately urged the former Chief, then, as now, his guest at Baghdad, not only to repudiate my interference, but even to adduce the telegraph as the cause of the existing disturbances. To this suggestion, of course, Sheikh Nasser, perceiving the trap that was laid for him, declined to accede, but,

without betraying my knowledge of His Excellency's procedure, I ventured to profit by a hint to myself in the same sense in the course of conversation, in order to point out the futility of His Excellency's argument. Not only, I observed, was an afterthought of this nature inconsistent with the hostility displayed by the Arabs in plundering a large quantity of Government grain destined for Jedda (an act which could hardly have been prompted by their aversion to the telegraph), but, on the contrary, the appeal made to myself by the rebellious Chiefs and their kindly and useful demeanour towards Mr. Johnston and the officers * of the *Comet* on a late occasion, the trip having been undertaken in concert with Samee Effendi, sufficiently refuted the motives attributed to them; while, on the other hand, His Excellency could not be ignorant of the universal belief that His Excellency had purposely composed the existing embroglio in order to bar a work from which he was supposed to be averse. His Excellency then assured me that I had misapprehended his meaning, but I mention the circumstance, lest, in order to justify his policy and to excuse the delays it has occasioned, Namik Pasha should have had recourse to such an argument in his communications with the Porte. I need hardly, I believe, assure Your Excellency that the insinuation it conveys is wholly unfounded; nothing could be more friendly than the present disposition of the Arab tribes towards the English, or more willing, I am satisfied, than would prove their co-operation in a measure known to have emanated from the authority of His Majesty the Sultan, were it not their aim by every means in their power, including, of course, the stoppage of the boats laden with materials, to discredit Namik Pasha with the Central Government.

Removal of the British Government steamer dépôt from Magil (Küt-al-Farangi) to Basrah, 1869-73.

Being called on by the Government of India in 1869 to suggest economies in the expenditure of the British Political Agency at Baghdad, Colonel Herbert, the Acting Political Agent, proposed that the coal store and dépôt of the British Government steamer "Comet" at Magil or Küt-al-Farangi should be removed to Basrah: this would make possible the substitution of a single door-keeper for a Balúch guard of one Jamadar and seven men which was maintained at Magil on account of its isolated situation, and there would also be a saving in lighter hire. Moreover, under the new arrangement, the Commander of the "Comet" would have a dépôt and jetty of his own instead of sharing the accommodation at Magil, where only one steamer could be alongside at a time, with Messrs. Lynch & Co. That firm, who were now the proprietors of Magil, who received a rent of Rs. 100 a month from Government on account of the space there occupied by the "Comet's" stores, and who feared that on the cessation of the British Government's connection with the place their own title to it might be assailed by the Turkish authorities, remonstrated early in 1873 against the proposed change. They represented it as regrettable, because the estate had for 100 years been regarded as British ground and as closely associated with the British name and prestige; and their contentions were supported by

* *Vide* enclosure to despatch No. 19, dated the 5th April 1864.

Sir H. Rawlinson, and to some extent by the Secretary of State for India. But it was too late; Colonel Herbert had already agreed with one Hájí Ibrahim for a suitable site and building at Basrah, connected with the town and new Turkish Government buildings by good roads, on an annual rent of Rs. 1,200; and on the 30th June 1873 the new dépôt was occupied. No attempt was made by the Turks, apparently, to oust Messrs. Lynch from Magil, which the firm were entitled to own under the recent law of 1867 legalising the possession by foreigners of immoveable property in Turkey.

The British Government steamer "Comet."

It has been shown that the British Government steamer "Comet" was dragged by the Turkish Government into the discussions which took place in 1862-64 regarding the right of the British commercial firm of Messrs. Lynch & Co. to place a second steamer on the Tigris; and that in 1864 it was all but decided, in consequence of some misconception, to admit certain Turkish claims by withdrawing the "Comet" from Mesopotamia altogether.

In 1868 the substitution of a new vessel for the "Comet," which had been condemned as unsafe so far back as 1862, was reported by the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Iráq to have become a matter of great urgency; and the Government of India suggested to Her Majesty's Government that the consent of the Porte to the proposed step might be sought. This was done; and the Porte, in a note dated 13th July 1869, agreed to "the replacement by another ship of the 'Comet,' a vessel of the Royal Navy stationed on the rivers of Mesopotamia."

The question of ways and means then arose; and it was found that a new vessel, similar in size to the "Comet," would cost Rs. 61,200 to purchase and Rs. 3,039 a month to maintain. In February 1870 a Resolution was recorded by the Governor-General of India in Council recommending that, as a substitute for the "Comet," a small steam launch worth Rs. 10,000 or 12,000, with an establishment costing Rs. 6,000 a year at the utmost, would suffice; and copies of this Resolution were sent to the Marine Department and to the Acting Political Agent in Turkish 'Iráq. The latter authority earnestly solicited a reconsideration of the question, urging that the increased number of Turkish steamers on the Tigris was a strong reason for replacing the "Comet" by a vessel of equal importance. Colonel Herbert added that the Turkish authorities were doing their best to drive the vessels of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company off the river, and pointed out that, if they succeeded in this, the Government vessel attached

to the Political Agency would become the sole means available of keeping up postal communication with Basrah, and so with India. He also submitted that another point deserving serious consideration was the moral support afforded by the presence of a British Government vessel at Baghdád to British commercial enterprise, and mentioned that so lately as 1869, when a portion of the country was in a state of revolt and an attempt at insurrection was made in the city of Baghdád, the "Comet" was regarded as a means of escape in case of need. These arguments did not prevail with the Governor-General of India in Council, by whom a fresh Resolution to the following effect was adopted on the 15th June 1870:

> The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, on a reconsideration of this question, is of opinion that it is not necessary at the present time to replace the *Comet* even with a steam launch. There is ample facility for carrying the mails in the English and Turkish steamers which are now plying on the *Euphrates; and there is little likelihood, with the increase of civilization in Asiatic Turkey, that a British vessel of war should be required, as the Political Agent considers that it possibly might be, as a place of refuge for British subjects at Baghdád. His Excellency in Council in this Department is accordingly of opinion that the *Comet* should be at once put out of commission, her crew discharged, with the exception of such men as may be wanted to look after the vessel, and that the recommendation of substituting a steam-launch for the *Comet* be cancelled.

Another reason given for the decision so reached regarding the "Comet" was that "her presence was avowedly distasteful to the feelings of a faithful ally"; but it would have been difficult to point out any substantial advantage that had accrued to the British in Turkish 'Iráq from the intimate relations and friendly sentiments thus assumed to exist.

Colonel Herbert's contentions were approved and enforced, however, by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who pointed out that the opportunity offered "for replacing the rotten vessel by a sound one" was not likely, if let slip, to recur—a point already raised by the Government of Bombay, who had remarked that "it would "be difficult in the face of the opposition of the Turkish Government, and "possibly of other Powers, to restore to England her privileges once "surrendered on account of considerations of economy." At length it was decided by the Government of India, "solely from deference to the views of the Secretary of State," not only to replace the "Comet" but to replace

* *Sic.* The confusion of the Euphrates with the Tigris would seem to indicate that the local situation in Mesopotamia had on this occasion been somewhat superficially studied.

her by a vessel of similar size. No practical steps to this end were taken, however, till some years later.

Meanwhile, as has already been mentioned in connection with the question of an addition to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's fleet, the status of the "Comet" was once more called in question by the Turkish Government, who affected—as in 1864—to confound her with Messrs. Lynch's vessels. At last, on the 31st March 1875, a note was obtained from the Porte in which the "Comet" was clearly distinguished from Messrs. Lynch's steamers, and it was stated with reference to her:

Pour ce qui est du bâtiment de la Marine Royale la *Comet*, il continuera, comme par le passé, à rester sur les rivières de la Mésopotamie suivant l'entente précédemment établie.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de *Votre Excellence cette décision de la Sublime Porte qui a été déjà communiquée télégraphiquement au Gouverneur-Général de Baghdad.

The "Comet," after the abolition of the Indian Navy in 1863, became a vessel of the Bombay Marine. In 1873 she was commanded by Mr. Powell, a retired Lieutenant of the late Indian Navy without any commission; her armament consisted of two 9-pounders only, mounted fore and aft, and her crew was composed almost entirely of Oriental Christians, Turkish subjects.

Prohibition of the firing of salutes by the "Comet," 1873.

Prior to 1863, that is, during the existence of the Indian Navy, the "Comet," according to the testimony of Commander Felix Jones and Sir A. Kemball, constantly fired salutes, and no exception was ever taken by the Turkish authorities to her doing so; but later, one of her two guns having been dismounted to give more room on deck, the practice was discontinued. It was revived by Colonel Herbert, Acting Political Agent, about 1871, in which year the "Comet," being at Basrah on the anniversary of the Sultán's accession, honoured the day with a salute,—a courtesy that seemed to be appreciated by the Turkish Naval Commodore of the station. In 1873, however, in consequence of the "Comet" having fired a salute of 13 guns on the return of the Political Agent from a tour, objections were raised by Rashíd Páshá, Wáli of Baghdád, and the question was reported to Constantinople. Colonel Herbert alleged that the salute was fired in strict accordance with old usage; but His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople inclined to the view that, Baghdád being not an open sea-port but a large town situated on a river far in the

* His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

interior of the country, the wishes of the Turkish authorities in the matter must be respected. On further examination of the question it was found that the practice of firing salutes from the "Comet," which carried less than 10 guns, was not in accordance with the Admiralty Regulations; and the Foreign Office pronounced Colonel Herbert to have acted injudiciously in reviving it after it had become obsolete,—an opinion in which the Government of India concurred.

Visit of H. M. S. "Philomel" to Qûrnah and question of the freedom of the Shatt-al-'Arab, 1874.

In 1874 the question of the right of foreign warships to navigate the Shatt-al-'Arab above Basrah arose from a visit paid by H. M. S. "Philomel" to Qûrnah at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates.

To a complaint made by the Wâli of Baghdâd on the subject the British Political Agent replied: "It has always been supposed that the "Shat-el-Arab is a free river, and practically it certainly is so, and can "scarcely be otherwise. Kurna being a chief depôt for the exportation of "dates, sea-going craft under foreign flags are in the habit of there taking "in their cargoes, *etc.*"

The Wâli rejoined: "It needs no comment that the part from Basrah "to Kurna is not a free river, but the Turkish side with its dependencies "to the point below Basrah on the Shat-el-Arab and, specially, both banks "above Basrah being the real possession of the Ottoman Government, the "entry of foreign merchant vessels, and specially vessels of war into such "a river as this, of which the fountain-head and outlet are situated within "the dominions of the Ottoman Government, unless it be with the "consent and acquiescence of the Government, is according to rules "inadmissible."

It seems that the matter went no further, and that no conclusion was reached.

Reconversion of the British Political Agency in Turkish 'Irâq into a Residency, 1872.

Under a notification, dated the 22nd August 1873, by the Government of India in the Foreign Department, the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irâq regained the rank of Resident of which he had been deprived in 1812. In the notification it was declared that "the officers "holding the highest political appointments will be graded as Residents "in three classes, and the salaries to be drawn by them will be local, and "attached to the appointments they hold." Under the new scheme the "Political Agent, Turkish Arabia" was placed at the head of the second grade of Residents, the other Residencies in that class being the Persian Gulf, Nepal, and Gwalior; but though the status of Resident was then conferred on him he still continued to be officially addressed as Political Agent.

A list of the Political Agents and Residents at Baghdád during the period will be found in the Appendix on Diplomatic and Consular Representation.

Status of the British official representative at Baghdád, 1874.

In the same year a demand by the Wáli for a list of the employés of the British Consulate-General at Baghdád brought on a discussion regarding the status of the local British representative himself. The Wáli's demand was connected with a Turkish regulation whereby, in the absence of exceptional arrangements, the number of privileged * Dragomans and Qawwáses to be employed by foreign Consulates-General in the Ottoman Empire is limited to four of each. Colonel Herbert, who had perhaps been accustomed to regard all the members of his staff as under his protection, whether Turkish subjects or not, twice declined to furnish the Wáli with the desired statement, assigning as a reason that the employés in question were not consular subordinates but belonged to the establishment of a "Political Agent under Her Majesty's Government of India." He then reported the dispute to higher authority. In addressing His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople he contended "that the office of the Resident preceded that of Consul at "Baghdád, and that, the post being recognised by the Foreign Office and "consequently at Constantinople only in its consular capacity, loses, in the "eyes of those with whom it is of much importance the Political Agent "should possess much influence, its diplomatic and political character;" he quoted the instructions given to Major Rawlinson in 1844 with reference to the dual character of his appointment; and finally he suggested that the nature of his post under the Indian authorities might be expressly recognised by the London Foreign Office, the British Embassy at Constantinople, and the Sublime Porte.

The Government of India expressed themselves on the subject as follows:

With reference to this question, we would remark that since the year 1798 the Government of India has been represented by a Diplomatic Agent at Baghdad, whose denomination has been sometimes Resident and sometimes Political Agent, and that although the Sublime Porte has never formally recognised any other officer than a Consul or Consul-General, and although the treaties between Great Britain and Turkey contain no stipulations on this subject, the position of the Political Agent of the Government of India has been formally and officially recognised by the Local Government at Baghdad. From this fact, and from the continuance of the office for three-quarters of a century without any objection on the part of the Turkish Government, we consider that the

* They are "privileged" in the sense of being, though Turkish subjects, entitled to the protection, within certain limits, of the power to which the Consulate employing them belongs. There is no limit to the number of "unprivileged" employés.

acquiescence and consent of the Sublime Porte may be fairly presumed to have been accorded to the arrangement.

The distinction of the Consular from the diplomatic functions is valuable and should not, in our opinion, be obliterated in the manner suggested by Colonel Herbert. We would express a hope that the position hitherto enjoyed for so long a period by the Political Agent may not be disturbed.

The opinion of the Foreign and India Offices, however, as communicated to Colonel Herbert, was that it would be inexpedient to raise any question of his status as Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, and that "the "requirements of the case in reference to his public establishment would be "met by the excess over the number fixed by the Consular Regulations* "being sanctioned by the Porte in the manner provided for in them."

In connection with the question of salutes by the "Comet" already discussed, the Government of India made the following remarks bearing on the position of their Political Agent at Baghdād in the Indian official hierarchy: "Colonel Herbert's right to be saluted on proper occasions is "quite a different question. As a Political Agent with the status of a "Resident he is entitled under Her Majesty's Order in Council of 23rd "January 1860 to a salute of 13 guns."

Removal of Colonel Herbert from the Baghdād Political Agency, 1874.

Apart from his assertion of a right to be saluted by the "Comet" at Baghdād and his claims to a status higher than that of Consul-General, Colonel Herbert had come into conflict with Rashīd Pāsha, Wāli of Baghdād, over various matters. Among these were the freedom of navigation of the "Comet" in Mesopotamian waters and the protection by the British authorities of natives of Bahrain residing or domiciled in Turkey. It was considered that Colonel Herbert, notwithstanding his success in the "Cashmere" case, had on the whole displayed want of tact and inability to cope with the difficulties of his position, and that his attitude towards the Turkish authorities had been unnecessarily irritating. Her Majesty's Government accordingly signified a wish that, in the interests of the public service, he might be transferred to some other appointment for which he was better fitted. The Government of India concurred and made arrangements for his transfer; but at the same time they urged the desirability of obtaining the removal of Rashīd Pāsha also from Baghdād, as his tone to the British representative had been extremely discourteous and was unlikely to improve in consequence of Colonel Herbert's removal.

British representation at Basrah, 1861-73.

The post of British political representative and Vice-Consul at Basrah was held until 1862 by Mr. R. Rogers, ex-purser of the "Comet," who had

* By "Consular Regulations" is meant, of course, the Turkish Regulations in regard to Foreign Consulates.

succeeded Mr. J. Taylor in 1858, on the transfer of the latter as Consul to Diyārbakr. Mr. Taylor's salary, originally Rs. 200 per mensem, had been increased in 1856, with retrospective effect from 1854, to Rs. 400; and the pay of his successors was at the increased rate.

Mr. Rogers died in 1862, and, on the recommendation of Colonel Kemball, Mr. W. Johnston, a junior partner in the firm of Messrs. Lynch & Co., was appointed in his place. In April 1868, Mr. Johnston proceeded on sick leave from which he returned only to die at Basrah at the end of 1869.

Mr. P. J. C. Robertson, an assistant in the same firm, who had been nominated by Colonel Kemball to act for Mr. Johnston, was confirmed in the appointment on the latter's death and held it on the same condition until 1873, when, as already mentioned, his designation was changed from that of "British Agent" at Basrah to that of "Assistant Political Agent."

Assistant Political Agency at Basrah, 1873.

This alteration, effected by a notification of the Government of India on the 17th July 1873, was suggested by the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq as a reward to Mr. Robertson for his excellent work in the "Cadmeen" case. Its primary object was to improve Mr. Robertson's position in the estimation of travellers, especially of travellers from India, in whose minds the title of "British Agent" was likely to be associated with posts held by non-Europeans; but, though it carried with it no immediate increase of pay, the change had also the effect of making Mr. Robertson a member of the Indian political service.

Position of the Native Agent of the Baghdād Political Agency, 1868.

In February 1868 Nāmiq Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of Baghdād, complained of the general behaviour of Mr. Michael Minas, who had been appointed British Vice-Consul at Baghdād in 1859, as rude and disrespectful, and requested that some other person might be chosen as a medium of communication between the British Consul-General and himself. Sir A. Kemball declined to remove Mr. Minas on a general and unproved charge and asked Nāmiq Pāsha to specify instances of misconduct on his part; but the Governor merely ignored this reply and refused to transact business with Mr. Minas. Mr. Minas had been a paid employé of the Political Agency for 24 years; the complaint was the first ever preferred against him by a Turkish authority; and the grounds of it were a mere matter of conjecture. They appeared to be connected with a case of the robbery of a British Indian, in which Mr. Minas had been obliged to remonstrate with Nāmiq Pāsha on the laxness of the Turkish executive, and had possibly been betrayed into

undue warmth of language. Nāmiq Pāsha, after two months, withdrew his complaint; but at this juncture he was transferred from Baghdād; and his successor, Taqi-ud-Din Pāsha, declined to recognise Mr. Mīnas as Vice-Consul, or as possessing any other quality than that of Dragoman.

Sir A. Kemball referred the matter to the British Embassy at Constantinople, but their reply was: "No Berat can be asked for (for) a "Vice-Consul in a place where there is a Superintending Consular Officer. "If the Vice-Consul is recognised as the medium of communication "between you and the Turkish authorities, we have no right to claim more. "The Vice-Consul at Constantinople is not officially recognised as such "by the Turkish Government, though he holds his office by Foreign "Office appointment."

Thenceforth Mr. Mīnas was described only as "Native Agent."

Official residence of the British representative at Basrah, 1861.—75.

We have seen that negotiations were at one time entered into by the Government of India for the purchase from Colonel Taylor, the proprietor, of the estate of Magīl or Kūt-al-Farangi, where the depôt of the British Government steamers in Mesopotamia existed from 1839 to 1871, but that they were abortive. A portion of the estate was rented by the Government of India, however, for occupation by the British representative at Basrah until 1870, in which year Mr. Robertson, the British Agent, left Magīl and settled in a house on the site of the present British Consulate at Basrah, on the right bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, a short way below the mouth of the 'Ashār creek. In 1874 the property occupied by Mr. Robertson was bought by an individual, who was described in the deed of transfer as "Hāji Ibrāhim-bin-'Osmān-bin-'Abdul Wāsi', Maimani, residing in Mahallat-al-Pasha, Basrah," but whose name in India, where he was born, was Hāji 'Umr-bin-'Osmān-bin-'Abdul Maula. He was the local agent of an Indian firm principally owned by certain 'Osmān Vydina; and the name which he assumed at Basrah was identical with that of an infant son of the head partner in the firm, for whose benefit, it seems probable, the property had really been purchased. This complication, or possibly fraud, is not without importance in connection with the later history of the estate.

By an agreement executed in August 1874 between Mr. Robertson and "Hāji Ibrāhim," the latter undertook to build a new house on the property and to let it to Government during such time as the said Government might choose to retain them, in consideration of a yearly rent of Rs. 1,200 to be paid in quarterly instalments. In 1875 the Hāji repented of the bargain and asked that either the rent might be raised or

the house restored to him; but, after legal advice had been taken, his request was refused.

We now pass to matters having especial reference to British Indian subjects and interests in Turkish 'Irāq.

Pension of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, 1865-66.

The Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah was the third son of the Nawāb Shams-ud-Daulah, who was the second son of Sa'ādat 'Ali Khān, Nawāb Wazīr of Oudh. In 1835 the Government of India instructed their Resident at Lucknow to use his influence to obtain for the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, his two brothers, and his two sisters, from the King of Oudh pensions to replace one of Rs. 2,400 a month offered to their mother, who had recently died. One reason assigned for this act of intervention was that the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah's branch of the Oudh royal family had exceptional claims on the good offices of the British Government. The King of Oudh, then Nasīr-ud-Dīn Haidar, readily acceded to the suggestion and granted a pension of Rs. 2,500 a month to the descendants of the Shams-ud-Daulah, payable to them through the British authorities, in which the personal share of the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah was Rs. 625 a month. About 1843, or perhaps so early as 1839, the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah removed from India to Turkish 'Irāq and took up his residence at Baghdād, where after 1844 he drew his pension from the Treasury of the Political Agency.

The annexation of Oudh to British India occurred in 1856. It was followed in the same year by the British war with Persia, in which the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah was held to have rendered valuable services, though not of a personal nature, to Government and to have displayed a hearty good-will towards their cause; and in 1857-58, during the Indian Mutiny and insurrection in Oudh, in which many of his relatives were compromised, the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah showed conspicuous loyalty. In 1859, in recognition particularly of the aid given by him during the Persian War—the real importance of which, however, was somewhat questionable—the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah's personal pension was doubled, being raised to Rs. 1,250 a month.

The Nawāb seems, nevertheless, to have felt himself straitened in his circumstances; and in 1865, during a visit to England in which he found favour in high quarters and was made a G.C.S.I., he submitted a memorial requesting that his pension might be further increased. At length in October 1866, when he had been more than a year in Europe, the Secretary of State in Council directed that his allowances should be enhanced to Rs. 2,500 a month for life from the 21st October 1865.

The Nawáb was at this time the only surviving son of the Shamsu-l-Daulah, of whose family he had, even in the lifetime of his elder brothers, been regarded as the head; and he was now an old man without any children.

Disposal of the pension and property of Nawáb Táj Mahall, 1875-76.

An important legal case, known from the name of the successful claimant as "Kulsum Nisa's," arose in Turkish 'Iráq on the death in 1875 of Nawáb Táj Mahall, a relict of King Nasíru-d-Dín Haidar of Oudh, who had predeceased her in 1837. Under an Agreement entered into with the King of Oudh in 1829, somewhat similar to that of 1825 by which the Oudh Bequest was constituted, the Government of India had bound themselves to pay Táj Mahall a pension of Rs. 72,000 a year for life, and, after her death either to continue the pension to her heirs or to pay to them the capital sum the interest on which it represented.

Táj Mahall, after the decease of her royal husband without issue by her, married a certain Kalb-i-Husain, to whom she bore one daughter, Mazharah Begum. Mazharah Begum became the wife, first, of one Ja'far Husain, by whom she had one daughter, Kulsum Nisa Begum, the future claimant; and afterwards, Ja'far Husain having died, she married his brother Mehdi Husain. It may be noted that Kalb-i-Husain himself contributed not a little to the estate of Táj Mahall's descendants for he left her a house at Cawnpore, various houses and gardens at Lucknow, and promissory notes to the value of Rs. 1,56,000 deposited in the Bank of Bombay.

In 1859 Táj Mahall left Lucknow on a pilgrimage to Karbala, whence she did not return to India, but where on the contrary she settled, acquired some immovable property, and lived until her death in 1875. During the whole of her residence in Turkish 'Iráq her pension was paid to her there through the Treasury of the British Political Agency. At the time of her decease she possessed, in addition to her hereditary pension the property left her by her husband Kalb-i-Husain, the immovable property acquired by her at Karbala, certain immovable property in Oudh, and certain moveable property in Turkish 'Iráq. Her estate, the capitalised value of her pension alone being approximately £150,000, was thus a very valuable one.

Exclusive succession to it was claimed on behalf of her granddaughter Kulsum Nisa Begum, who was still a minor, as also by Ramzán 'Alí Khán, a surviving brother or half-brother of Táj Mahall herself, who conceived that he had a better right. The claims of Kulsum Nisa Begum rested on the Shi'ah law of inheritance, supplemented by a

deed of gift purporting to be executed in her favour by Tāj Mahall, but declared by the opposite party to be spurious; those of Ramzān 'Ali Khān, on a denial of the legitimacy of Kulsum Nisa Begam, in which he was apparently countenanced by the Nāwab Iqbāl-ud-Daulah.

It is unnecessary to enter on the history of the case much further than to remark that it gave rise to great legal and practical difficulties both at Baghdād and in India, and that it was ultimately decided at Lucknow in favour of Kulsum Nisa Begam, who was held to be the true grand-daughter, and as such the heir under Shi'ah law, of Tāj Mahall.

The suit was of no political importance, but the great value of the subject-matter, the minority of Kulsum Begam, and the protracted nature of the proceedings occasioned misrepresentations and intrigues among the Indian community in Turkish 'Irāq by which the British Political Agent was at times seriously embarrassed. One of the most difficult points falling to be settled at Baghdād was that of the guardianship of the minor; it was conferred by Colonel Nixon on Ramzān 'Ali Khān, the rival claimant of Tāj Mahall's estate, in preference to Mehdi Husain, Kulsum Nisa Begam's uncle and step-father, who was then in India,—an arrangement at variance with the view taken of the affairs of the family by the Court of first instance in India. Colonel Nixon also held Ramzān 'Ali Khān to be the heir entitled to Tāj Mahall's estate in Turkish 'Irāq, a decision which was afterwards indirectly invalidated by the action of the Indian judicial authorities.

A final settlement was not reached until 1879, or even later.

The Oudh Bequest, 1861—76.

Difficulties in the administration of the Oudh Bequest.

Against certain political difficulties of an international character to which it was feared that the existence of the Oudh Bequest might give rise, precautions were taken, as we have seen, in 1852; but neither then nor at any later period, did those difficulties assume a material shape. Before long, however, the place of apprehended political complications was taken by real difficulties of a practical and administrative order, to the origin and perpetration of which the unfortunate loss from view of the true terms of the Bequest contributed not a little; and premonition of those difficulties occurred, as we have seen, as early as 1854.

1860-67. About 1860, during the Political Agentship of Colonel Kemball at Baghdād and under the influence, it would appear, of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, who resided at Baghdād and who was himself a nephew of King Ghāzi-ud-Din Haidar, the founder of the Oudh Bequest, certain changes were introduced into the local administration of the Bequest as formed by Major Rawlinson. A "kind of Sub-Bequest" was constituted by the combination of one-third of the Karbala and one-third of the Najaf allotment into a fund, amounting to about Rs. 3,300 per mensem, of which one-third was distributed to Indians at Karbala, one-third to Indians at Najaf, and one-third to Indians at Kadhimain. An Indian gentleman was appointed at Karbala to distribute the Indian money there and at Najaf, and another Indian gentleman at Kādhimain to conduct the Indian distribution at that place: the former received an allowance of Rs. 255 a month, the latter one of Rs. 280, from the Indian fund. These Indian distributors were empowered to superintend the general affairs of the Indian communities with which they were in relation, and were granted the titles of "Honorary Agent at Karbala" and "Honorary Agent at Kadhimain," apparently by the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq on his own authority. Supervision of the Indian distributions seems to have been exercised by the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, with the approval of the Political Agent; but it is not certain that this supervision began before 1867, in November of which year instructions were issued for the Nawab's guidance by Colonel Sir A. Kemball, who soon afterwards relinquished charge of the Baghdād Political Agency. The extent of the confidence reposed by Colonel Kemball in the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah is illustrated in the closing words of the instructions: "Do what you think advisable and expedient, because "trust is placed in you, and you are at liberty to use your discretion. "Should any complaint be made against you through enmity, falsehood, "ill-will, prejudice and self (? selfish) hatred, it will neither be listened "nor credit given to."

In the uncertainty that prevailed, under the corrupt version of the Agreement of 1825, as to the proper destination of the funds, the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah felt impelled, during his visit to London, to submit to the Secretary of State for India a written representation on the subject, of which the following is a translation:

I now come to mention the bequests of two ladies of the seraglio of the former King of Oudh, Ghazee-ood-deen Hyder. These ladies during life received a monthly allowance of Rs. 5,000 each, and died without children or heirs. They left wills

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bequeathing their allowances to Mujtaheds at Kerbella and Nejeff, to be distributed by them to poor and indigent persons. This testamentary disposition was after their deaths carried into effect, and every month Rs. 10,000 is paid through the Residency at Baghdad into the hands of the Arabian and Persian Doctors of the Faith at Kerbella and Nejeff, who are not more honest than they need be. Hereto the following particulars are to be noted:—In the first place, it is impossible to know and distinguish who are *bond fide* Mujtaheds, seeing that there is no list by which to recognize them. They are not like Bishops and Archbishops in England, who are possessed of credentials from the Government or the public showing their authority. So far from that, any beggar or destitute wretch belonging to Arabia or Persia who may chance to set himself up and twist several yards of black cloth or white cloth round his head, and take a long staff in his hand and wear a flowing beard, and collect a parcel of dissolute bullies about him, may call himself a Mujtahed, and there is nothing outwardly nor inwardly to prove it except his beard, his staff, and his turban.

Secondly.—All this money goes in misplaced and meaningless expenditure, and for most unholy purposes. Every penny of it goes into the hands of rich people who don't want it, or *canaille*, or bullies, or rogues, or Arabian and Persian merchants who possess landed estates and wealth and all that agriculture and commerce can give them—legitimate incomes and gains of all kinds. Meantime the natives of India, who, poor creatures, are a most numerous body, many of them of good and noble families, the descendants of Princes and Noblemen, and have taken up their residence at Kerbella and Nejeff and become residents there, and pass their lives in starving poverty, are shut out from participating in this money. A miserable trifle only, so small that it is not worth mentioning, is given to them, just to keep up the pretence of relieving them; and now this is wrung from the Mujtaheds of the country only by force and threats.

Now the Arabs and Persians are neither friends nor subjects of the English Government, whereas the natives of India are, as is evident; and it little accords with good sense and justice to fatten one's enemies and starve one's friends. Further, what claim or right have the Arabs and Persians to the money of India? What says the proverb? "The earth from a well must be used for that well." The people of India reap no good nor advantage from the Arabs and Persians; then why should benefits and advantages flow from the natives of India to the Arabs and Persians? The proverb says, "Give to those that give to you." Besides all this, the Arabs and Persians, even while enjoying benefits from the people of India, are not grateful for them, but, on the contrary, return ingratitude, as I with my own ears have heard again and again. Meantime all this money is expended in debauchery and unlawful things and folly, and leads to thousands of quarrels and disturbances, as I know well and have seen with my own eyes. The Residents at Baghdad, both past and present, are well acquainted with the facts and I request that a corroboration of my statement may be obtained from them, so that all doubt in the matter may be cleared up. In this way the curtain will be withdrawn, and the good and bad of the question will be clearly known. Sir Henry Rawlinson is well acquainted with the circumstances, but Sir Arnold Kemball is even more so, for he has gone thoroughly into the matter and sifted it; and I desire that enquiry may be made of these officers, for knowledge of a thing is better than ignorance of it. It

is a duty to make a searching enquiry into the circumstances, for the money is drawn from India and is knowingly directed to unlawful purposes.

I would suggest, then, that either this alms should altogether be withheld from Arabia and be expended in India, especially in the province of Oudh, as being originally Oudh money, for which reason it ought to be disbursed there; nay, it should be restricted to the poor persons of the Royal Family of Oudh, in which case the target of right would be hit in the centre. It would then be as with the gates of Somnath, which after ages were brought back to their own places.

If, however, it should be thought proper to carry out the testaments of the deceased persons, and, right or wrong, disburse the charity in Arabia, then a suitable plan must be devised, so as at the same time to perform the bequests of the parties who left the charity, and to take care that the money should be expended on worthy objects; and the unique plan is that the disposal of the charity should be placed in the hands of the Resident at Baghdad, so that he should carry out whatever might appear to him right and proper after he had made due investigation. Let him appoint as distributor of the charity whomsoever he may consider a trustworthy and respectable person, and let him have the absolute discretion as to the division of the charity, and as to who are to be the recipients and the shares they are to get. Let him show no favor to Arab or Persian, or the natives of India, and have no respect to the length or breadth of their beards or their turbans. Righteousness depends upon the inward qualities, and not upon their being born of this or that nation. Let the money be all given to the natives of India, with a special distinction in favour of those of Oudh, or let it be divided into two portions, and let one be given to natives of India and the other to Arabs and Persians, on condition that they be respectable persons in their conduct and acts.

In case the charity is wholly confided to the charge of the Resident at Baghdad, many excellent works for the public good might be done with it, as colleges and rest-houses for travellers, and hospitals for all the visitors to the mosques and travellers from India; and the name and memorial of these good works would endure in those districts for ever, and the names of the founders of the charity would be commemorated and the English Government would be blessed, and the people of India would, as it were, find a house in these remote parts and pass their time in repose; for so long as those shrines remain in the world, the resort of the natives of India to them will never cease, and the shrines are and will be co-existent with the world.

It must be added that the small * sum which the English Government take year by year from the natives of India, *viz.*, five shillings a head, might be deducted from the amount of this charity, it being so large that the Government should lose nothing, and the collections should be made without scandal and the people too be spared, and so this charity would be the means of repose and contentment to all, and no brawling would take place about it. Another disbursement might be duly made from this charity for the interment of persons deceasing without heirs.

* The reference seems to be to the fees for consular registration of British subjects.

The undeniably important suggestions contained in the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah's memorandum were referred at the beginning of 1867 to Sir A. Kemball, British Political Agent at Baghdād, for report. That officer, after correcting an error into which the Nawāb had fallen regarding the origin of the Bequest, and mentioning that the monthly amount for distribution had been increased (by the falling in of new items) from Rs. 8,333 to Rs. 9,451 a month, explained that the money was now disbursed at each of the Holy Cities through a Chief Mujtahid—Mīrza 'Alī Naqi at Karbala and Saiyid 'Alī, Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, at Najaf—assisted by a number of sub-distributors of the Political Agent's selection, of whom there were 19 at the former and 6 at the latter place; and that receipts were obtained from the sub-distributors, as well as from the Chief Mujtahids, "to anticipate, as far as might be practicable, the misappropriation of the monies by the primary recipients." Sir A. Kemball, who had probably consulted the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah on his return to Baghdād in regard to the details of his scheme, continued: 1867.

> The selection of the Mujtaheds depends solely upon popular preference, necessarily very much divided in its exhibition, and guided or misguided as often by the intrigues and ambitious pretensions of the individual as by his assumed pre-eminence in the knowledge of the law, or austerity in devotional exercises. I should add, however, that the Mujtaheds preferred for Nejeff and Kurbella respectively by my predecessor were those being Turkish subjects, but of Persian extraction, who at the time enjoyed the highest repute, the latter being still the almoner of these endowments, and the former, deceased, having been succeeded by a Mujtahed who was chosen by my *locum tenens* during my absence in England in 1866.
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> As regards the appropriation of the monies in question, there is every ground to believe in the accuracy of the information communicated by the Nawab. Nothing is assigned to the support, strictly speaking, of the shrines. The Mujtaheds are virtually irresponsible; their own friends, relatives, and adherents are, of course, favoured, and in any case the recipients are for the most part in the enjoyment of independent means of subsistence, while Indian nobleman and a crowd of Indian devotees and pilgrims of all ranks exist on charity and in a state of absolute destitution.
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> Did, then, the terms of the Agreement referred to justify, as I suppose, the assignment of these charitable grants for the benefit of Indian Mujtaheds and Mujawurs, I should be disposed certainly to recommend the adoption of this measure, if not exclusively, to an extent at least more in proportion to the needs of the latter. In doing so I am sensible of the increased labour and responsibility which such an arrangement would entail upon this Agency: the Nawab Ikbal-ood-dowlah proposes that the funds thus rendered available should be assigned in various proportions: *1stly*, to provide subsistence to indigent resident Mujawurs, to relieve the immediate wants of poor pilgrims, widows, and orphans, being Indians (among whom under emergency the preference should be given to natives of Oudh), and to defray, in the case of such persons deceased, the ordinary charges of interment, etc.; *2ndly*, to construct rest-houses and hospitals at the principal places of resort and finally, should the means

be found adequate, to establish schools and orphanages for Indian children. The machinery he suggests for giving effect to these plans consists in a Committee composed of the most respectable resident Indians, who should supervise the distribution of the monies now to be entrusted to the agency of Indian Mujtehids, the whole being placed absolutely and unreservedly under the control of the British Resident. The last condition would, however, entail additional and very onerous duties on this officer; and, efficient as may be the machinery proposed in other respects, I would even suggest the advisability of an Assistant (Covenanted or Uncovenanted) being specially appointed to administer the endowments in question, whose salary, wholly or in part, should properly and legitimately, as, indeed, admitted by the Nawab, constitute a first charge thereon.

The only objection which occurs to myself is the risk of provoking the susceptibilities of the Turkish Provincial Authorities, and more especially of a functionary of the stamp of Namik Pasha; but as the experience of 15 years has not justified my former apprehensions of inconvenience and embarrassment, so in the future, under the direct management of a responsible British Officer, must there exist even less ground to anticipate such a result; while in the event of interpellation, it may be presumed that no difficulty would be experienced in satisfying the Porte of the charitable and bonâfide character of the new arrangement.

The Government of India concurred with the Political Agent at Baghdad in regarding a transference of the benefits of the Bequest from Turkish 'Iráq to India as entirely out of the question; but they were unable to approve of his recommendations that the system of distribution should be modified, and their letter to the Secretary of State for India on the subject, which was dated 7th August 1867, proceeded as follows:—

If the money is misapplied by the priests, the fault lies on them and on the defident foresight of the deceased Ghazee-ood-Din Hyder; the British Government can have no responsibility at all in the matter. Ghazee-ood-Din Hyder, looking solely to his own spiritual welfare and not to the temporal welfare either of pilgrims or of any one else, contracted with the British Government for the investment in perpetuity of certain funds as an endowment for the Sheeah Shrines at Kurbullah and Nujuff, and he indicated "the Moojtahids and Moojawurs of those places" as the persons to whom the endowment should be payable. Therefore, so long as there may exist a class of persons recognizable as the Moojtahids and Moojawurs of Kurbullah and of Nujuff, the Government of India, we consider, is bound to make payment to that class at either place, and could not modify or limit such mode of payment without betrayal of its trust.

The only considerations which could, in our opinion, be admissible to an equal bearing with the specific terms of the trust, would be the general welfare of humanity and the preservation of peace among nations. By Sir Henry Rawlinson's arrangement now in force, the Government of India not only fulfils the particular engagement it entered into with King Ghazee-ood-Din Hyder, but also satisfies its general political obligations towards allied nations by so checking the distribution of the fund as to prevent the Sheeah fanatics from embroiling Persia with Turkey. It therefore seems to us that the present arrangement, on grounds alike of justice and of expediency, ought to be strictly maintained; and that it is most undesirable to allow any opening to further

discussion on a subject to which, for several reasons, it is not desirable to attract unnecessary attention.

There are some minor arguments which might be used in favour of letting things lie as they are. Were the Nawab Ikbal-ud-Dowla's proposals and Sir A. Kemball's recommendations to be carried out, the British Government would undoubtedly be lending itself to the promotion of the interests of the Mahomedan religion among the natives of India—a course directly opposed to all its recent policy; and it would be encouraging the emigration of its subjects to Turkish Arabia—an object which politically cannot be regarded as expedient.

The Government of India recognised that, as Sir A. Kemball pointed out, the words "or persons who have its charge" in the English translation of the Agreement of 1825 as ratified by Lord Amherst were at least an* interpolation; but their enquiry into this point unfortunately did not lead, as it might have done, to the discovery of the part of the Agreement authenticated by the King of Oudh's own seal. Instead, arguing from the defective version of the Agreement then relied upon, which, besides wrongly introducing "Mujāvirs" into the question, omitted the clause that required the Mujtahid recipients to distribute the money to "deserving persons," the Government of India arrived at the conclusions detailed above. They also quoted, as an analogy supporting their view of the case, the terms of a particular endowment founded at Lucknow by King Ghāzi-ud-Dīn Haidar,—that of the "Imāmbārah-i-Najaf-i-Ashraf."

The Secretary of State for India, in November 1867, agreed with the more general conclusions of the Government of India, observing:

that, with reference to the terms of the deed of 1825, it is not incumbent on the British Government to do more than pay the money regularly to the recipients specified in that deed, namely, the high † priests in charge of the shrines; that such payment is a good and sufficient payment; and that the Government has not undertaken, and cannot now undertake, to control the ultimate distribution of the money by the chief priest among the devotees who may frequent, or reside at, the places of pilgrimage in question.

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* The Government of India thought, at this time, that the insertion was not without significance; but such a view has ceased to be tenable since it became known that the Persian word, of which the English phrase was given as a parenthetical explanation, was itself only an erroneous transcription of two Persian words having different sense.

† The facts of the Oudh Bequest case being now better known, it is perhaps unnecessary to remark here that the Mujtahids are not, and never were, in charge of the shrines.

Complaints concerning the administration of the Bequest, 1875-76.

In 1875 dissatisfaction with Saiyid 'Ali's distributions at Najaf was voiced by a number of the residents of that town, belonging chiefly to religious and ecclesiastical professions, who alleged that the Mujtahid treated the charity of which he was the channel as if the money were destined solely for himself and his relations, and demanded his dismissal in favour of some new nominee. The complaint was not the first of its kind to be received; indeed for twenty years protests of a similar character had been incessant. The British Political Agent summoned Saiyid 'Ali to Baghdād, where he was confronted with his principal accusers; but Colonel Nixon, while he admonished the Mujtahid and advised him to make his distributions publicly in future, considered that the Government orders of 1867 in regard to the Oudh Bequest did not warrant his further intervention in the matter. On the aggrieved parties petitioning the Government of Bombay through His Highness the Āgha Khān, Colonel Nixon informed that Government of the facts and of his views in regard to the impossibility of interference.

Interests of European powers other than Britain in Turkish 'Irāq, 1861—76.

French scheme of commercial navigation on the Tigris, 1864.

The only discoverable reference to European activity, other than British, in Turkish 'Irāq during the period appears to be the following, which occurs in a despatch of 1864 from the British Political Agent at Baghdād to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, relating to the obstacles raised by the Turkish authorities to an increase in the number of the British commercial steamers on the Tigris.

> I take this opportunity to mention to Your Excellency that for some time past a French Company has proposed also to navigate the Tigris with steamers carrying the national flag. While Namik Pasha supposed that no limit would be assigned to the number of English vessels His Excellency seemed disposed to encourage such a speculation, but latterly, to the disappointment of the parties concerned, His Excellency has stated that the privilege conceded to Her Majesty's Government, being both in its origin and in its nature exceptional, it could not be arrogated by any other nation. The reply of the French party to this argument is, that, however valid the exception in the case of the public vessels of a foreign State, it could not be extended to the merchant vessels of the State without conferring a general right under "the most favoured nation" clause; and, acting upon this view of the case, they have now referred the question for decision to Constantinople.

Nothing more was heard, however, of the projected French enterprise in question.

is the new class of public men was greater impatience of foreign guidance and control, as distinguished from foreign information and advice.

Perhaps the most conspicuous defect in the administration of the country was the inefficiency of its civil employés of all grades and in all branches. This was especially the case at the beginning of the period, but it cannot be said that any appreciable improvement took place up to the end of it. The civil services, if they may be dignified by the name of services, were more neglected than the military; appointments in them were determined by favouritism and bribery; merit and experience obtained no recognition; there was no fixity in the tenure of posts; and venality in office was the rule rather than the exception.

Features of the period in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905.

Under 'Abdul Hamíd the local Majlis or Council, in part elective, by which every executive officer from the Wáli down to the Mudír was assisted, grew to be a factor of more than nominal importance in the government of the country. In some of these bodies the Jewish and Christian communities were represented, and a certain amount of good resulted from the association of these with the predominant Muhammadan element in the discussion and despatch of business. But it was found that the Councils, while they afforded little protection against the misdeeds of evil officials, were apt to obstruct the action of those of the better sort; and it was alleged that their existence even increased the area of active bribery and corruption. They required in fact, to render them really useful institutions, more public spirit and a higher civic morality than were to be found in the people; but they were not without their uses as a means of education in self-government.

Considerable freedom of speech and opinion in public questions seems to have existed in Turkish 'Irāq in 1878, there being as yet no organised system of espionage in the province; and official personages and measures were criticised openly and without hesitation. The Deputy who represented Baghdád in the first Turkish Parliament was one of the most advanced politicians of the day and was distrusted by the Court party at Constantinople. In the respects just mentioned there was probably retrogression, rather than advance, as the reactionary

principles and severe methods of 'Abdul Hamid's Government gradually declared themselves.

Effects of the Russian war of 1877-78 in Turkish 'Irāq.

The chief effect of the Russo-Turkish war in Turkish 'Irāq was to denude the province almost entirely of its military garrisons, and in a great degree of its Gendarmerie, the only real police. Much energy was shown by the Turkish authorities in dragging conscripts to the colours; and even on country roads gangs of men collected for military service were to be seen, marching in fetters and under guards to the nearest recruiting centres. The result of the removal of the troops was not, as might have been expected, universal anarchy and license, though tribal fighting and highway robbery possibly flourished on a greater scale than usual; but a sense of the weakness and instability of the Turkish Empire became widely diffused and gave rise, for a time, to exaggerated fears of general disorder.

The net result of the war on foreign trade in Turkish 'Irāq was difficult to estimate. On the one hand the credit and purchasing power of Turkish subjects undoubtedly declined; on the other, in consequence of a check to commerce between Russia and Persia, the transit trade through Turkish 'Irāq to the latter country was stimulated.

Foreign travellers seem to have found the people of the province, both Arab tribesmen and Turkish officials, rather more communicative than at ordinary times; and in 1878, notwithstanding a locally prevalent impression that Turkey had been forced into an offensive-defensive alliance with Russia and might be obliged shortly to enter into hostilities with Britain, British travellers in the country were everywhere well received and well treated.

General state of Turkish 'Irāq about 1878.

Rural conditions.

Turkish 'Irāq in the early years of 'Abdul Hamid was still a wild and uncivilised province, much more so than at the present day. As an

illustration of this it may be mentioned that the Mesopotamian lion, now apparently extinct, then still existed.

So lately as 1874 a lion and two or three lionesses had been* shot from the deck of one of the British river steamers on the Tigris.

The Turkish authorities had made some progress, however, in pacifying and settling the country; and the situation in this respect was summed up, in 1878, in the following well-considered words:—

> I have no sympathy with the Turks in Arabia, and still less with their administration. It is utterly corrupt; but I do not think their theory of government there is a bad one. The protection of the peaceable tribes and the repression of the warlike ones; encouragement to all who will cultivate the soil; security for the high roads and military occupation of the villages; alliances entered into with the Bedouin chiefs, and inducements offered them to act as the police of the desert;—nothing, in idea, could be better or more European. It is only in practice that the Turks fail, and that, I fear, from incurable causes. Yet they have not wholly failed. From a military point of view, the Pashas can boast with some truth that, compared with twenty years ago, no country has made more rapid steps towards civilisation. The power of the Bedouin tribes has within that period been seriously checked, if not broken; and it is quite conceivable that in another 20 years, at the same rate of progress, the Anazeh will have disappeared from the upper Syrian desert, and the Shammar have been reclaimed to settled life in Mesopotamia. On the day when the alluvial valley of the Euphrates shall be completely cultivated, and their access to the river cut off in summer, the true Bedouins must retire to the Nejd, whence they came, or abandon their independent life. Turkish optimists are excusable if they count on this. But for my part, I do not believe in the regeneration of Turkey, or even in the maintenance of its military power for any length of time.

Urban conditions.

In the towns perhaps the most remarkable feature of the time was a sudden movement in the direction of modern education among the large indigenous Jewish community of Baghdád, whose mother tongue is Arabic. When a Jewish school was founded there in 1864 by the Alliance Israélite Universelle of Paris, it was at first regarded with some suspicion by the more old-fashioned Jewish families; but its later progress was rapid. By 1878, under the management of M. Garat, himself a native of Baghdád educated at Paris, it had attracted 172 pupils; the instruction given was excellent; and the curriculum included the English

* Captain Clements, who afterwards commanded the *Blanche Lynch* took part in this adventure. The animals were found on a piece of land cut off by floods at a part of the river where there was no jungle. One of the lionesses sprang into the water and was killed in attempting to board the steamer. A lion and a lioness were killed near Dair-az-Zor on the Euphrates at the end of 1877. Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, Vol. II, pages 280-281.

language as well as French. After 1878 its popularity still continued to increase.

Administrative organization of Turkish 'Irāq, 1878-1905.

Territorial divisions in 1878.

The territorial divisions of the province of Turkish Arabia in 1878 were, * perhaps, as follow. There were two Wilāyats: one of Baghdād, one of Basrah. The former included Mutasarriflīks of Mūsal, Kirkūk (then known as Shehrizōr), and Sulaimāniyah, besides Qāim-Maqāmliqs of Kadhimain, Dilaim, 'Anah, Sāmarrah, Khurāsān, Khānaqīn, Mandalī, and 'Azīziyah. The latter consisted of a headquarters division including Fāo (a Mudīrlīk), Qūrnah (a Qāim-Maqāmliq), etc., and of Mutasarriflīks of Hillah (embracing Karbala, Najaf, and even 'Amārah), Muntafik, and Hasa. The Shaikh of the Muntafik was Mutasarrif of the division named after his tribe.

Formation of a Wilāyat of Mūsal, 1879.

At the beginning of 1879 the northern districts of the Baghdād Wilāyat were separated from the rest and erected into a separate Wilāyat of Mūsal. The result was a great reduction of the Baghdād Wilāyat in size and importance.

Combination and separation of the Baghdād and Basrah Wilāyats, 1880-1886.

In the spring of 1880 the Baghdād and Basrah Wilāyats were fused into one, with headquarters at Baghdād: in other words there was a reversion to the system prevailing before 1875. But it was of short continuance, and in the spring of 1884 two separate Wilāyats of Baghdād and Basrah were reconstituted. As we shall see further on, British influence was employed in 1881 to discourage the retention of the whole province in the form of one huge unwieldy Wilāyat. On the re-institution of Basrah as a Wilāyat in 1884 Karbala and Najaf (if ever included) were excluded from it, and 'Amārah figured in it as a Mutasarriflik, instead of a Qāim-Maqāmliq as formerly. At the end of 1886 a fresh separation of the Baghdād and Basrah Wilāyats took place, which must have been preceded by another recombination.

Corruption and other faults of the Turkish administration.

Corruption was very prevalent in the Turkish administration, as the † extracts which follow, referring to the year 1878, will show; but

* See Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. I. pages 323-334. But his account seems open to doubt on account of the very peculiar inclusion of Karbala and Najaf in the Basrah Wilāyat.

† Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. I. pages 247-228 and 245.

there were honourable exceptions to the rule among the higher Turkish officials.

Of the many instances illustrative of the prevailing habits of the official class, which were given to me whilst I was in Baghdad, I may mention one. A certain Governor of a District within the Pashalik, kept up a large establishment, his harem being on an extensive scale, seven horses standing in his stable, and his staff of servants being considerable. As his official salary was but fifteen pounds Turkish a month, and he had no private fortune, his friends marvelled much how he could do all this, entertain Arab Sheiks in a profuse, hospitable fashion, and make presents to influential people at Baghdad, without ever appearing to be straitened for want of money. But the Philosopher's stone which he worked was not at all mysterious to those who were admitted within his immediate circle. He hardly attempted any disguise . . . . .

I have been told of three directors of the Baghdad Custom House who retired on their means after a short term of office. As their pay was very small, and as they received it very irregularly, it was creditable to their frugality that they could lay by a competency in the course of a couple of years of office. They lived well, and kept up a certain state as became important public functionaries while serving their country. They entertained, I was informed, great pashas in a friendly way, and even at times administered to their personal necessities. How all this could be done out of a salary of some eight or ten pounds a month, which was seldom paid as it fell due, it is not easy to say.

Another* traveller, writing two years later, observed :—

Ce n'est pas au Caire d'ailleurs, ce n'est pas à Constantinople ou dans les villes du littoral de la Méditerranée, caravan-sérails cosmopolites où affluent les Levantins et les Européens, que l'on peut apprécier la valeur de la régénération de la Turquie sous l'influence des idées occidentales.

La crainte de la France et de l'Angleterre, un certain vernis que l'Oriental prend facilement au contact des Occidentaux, donnent au monde officiel, en partie composé de fils d'Arméniens, de Grecs ou de Syriens convertis à l'islamisme, une souplesse féline qui trompe les plus habiles. Si l'on veut étudier l'administration turque dans toute sa beauté il faut aller loin de l'Europe, loin des regards chrétiens, il faut venir à Bagdad par exemple, cette deuxième capitale de l'empire, et suivre dans ses rapports avec la population cette armée de concussionnaires éhontés qui constitue le corps des fonctionnaires turcs.

Anti-foreign spirit in Turkish official circles.

As after the promulgation of the Tanzimât in 1839, so after the proclamation of the Turkish constitution in 1876, increased antipathy to European foreigners seemed to take possession of the Turkish official

* Madame J. Dieulafoy's *La Perse, la Chaldée et la Susiane*, page 584.

class. In 1880 it was * observed, with special reference to Baghdad :—

Tels sont les Turcs de la nouvelle école ; ils ont tous les défauts de leurs prédécesseurs et n'en ont pas la franchise ; en revêtant l'habit et le pantalon de la réforme, ils sont devenus faux et hypocrites. Gardez-vous de vous fier à ces aimables convives qui partagent avec vous les meilleurs vins de France, et dégustent, en maillant Mahomet et le Koran, la viande de porc ou la cuisine impure des Francs. Ils seraient les premiers à massacrer les Européens s'ils se croyaient sûrs de l'impunité, car, s'il est un sentiment vivace chez les musulmans, et chez les Turcs en particulier, c'est le fanatisme religieux qui se réduit aujourd'hui à la haine du chrétien. Le Turc nous hait de toute la force de son âme ; il nous hait parce que nous sommes les représentants de ces infidèles dont un lui apprend à redouter jusqu'au contact ; il nous hait parce que nous représentons possession des terres d'où ses ancêtres nous ont autrefois chassés ; il nous hait parce que, malgré les préjugés et l'éducation, il reconnaît dans ce chrétien méprisable, dans ce chien fils de chien, son supérieur et son maître.

* * * *

La situation des Européens, à quelque nationalité qu'ils appartiennent, est en ce moment-ci très précaire dans la Turquie d'Asie. Un chrétien est-il molesté, maltraité, assassiné : les plaintes de son consul restent sans effet, et l'on n'arrête jamais le coupable ; si le prévenu est livré à la justice par la victime ou par sa famille, les juges l'acquittent, le code Napoléon à la main. Les Anglais eux-mêmes, toujours si forts et si respectés en Orient, sont insultés tous les jours et ne peuvent avoir raison de l'inertie de l'administration ottomane.

Various instances of the xenophobic spirit here referred to will be found in the remaining sections of this chapter.

Official exportation of grain to Jiddah, 1878.

The practice of exporting grain from Turkish 'Iráq to Jiddah under official arrangements still continued in 1878. The revenue derived by the Government from the cultivated lands of the province was paid for the most part in kind, and the disposal of the Government grain, which tended to accumulate in large quantities, being often locally unsaleable, was no trifling administrative problem. In the more remote districts the wheat and barley collected in the Government granaries simply rotted there, or was consumed by rats, or used as fuel, from year to year. The grain paid in at less inaccessible centres was partly issued as rations to troops and partly sent in chartered steamers to Jiddah, where and at Makkah it found a market owing to the constant demand for provisions created by the going and coming of huge numbers of pilgrims in a poor country.

* Madame Dieulafoy's *La Perse, la Chaldée et la Suziane*, pages 584-85 and 588. A third illustration of an outbreak of xenophobia after internal reforms or *quasi* reforms in Turkey was supplied by the events following the re-establishment of the Turkish constitution in 1908. The connection between liberalism in internal politics and dislike of foreigners is not easy to explain. It seems to show itself only in the Turkish, as distinguished from the other Muhammadan elements of the Ottoman Empire.

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Government of the Baghdād Wilayāt, 1876-1905.

Some information regarding the Wālis of Baghdād during the period is derivable from the writings of travellers and from other sources.

'Akif Pāsha, about 1878.

'Akif Pāsha—apparently the next Wāli after Radif Pāsha, who ruled the Wilāyat in 1874 and bore a good reputation,—was a man of a different stamp from his predecessor. He was a Turk of the old school; polite, and on the surface amiable, but in his last post, in Europe, he had gained an undesirable notoriety in connection with massacres of Bulgarians. It was* written of him in 1878:—

> Akif has the reputation of being the most corrupt Pasha that ever ruled in Baghdād, but this is saying a great deal. He has been only eight months in office, yet, according to common report, he has already amassed £50,000 in money, besides jewelry, horses and much other wealth in kind. Let us hope that the sum is exaggerated. It is difficult all the same to believe that the sixty or seventy Arabians, which compose his stud, have been bought and paid for out of the income of the Vāly's office.

He was removed from Baghdād in the spring of 1878, on account of riots there which will be mentioned further on.

Qadri Pāsha, 1878.

'Akif Pāsha was followed by Qadri Pāsha, a self-educated man, who talked French fluently, had a passable knowledge of English, and was a regular reader of the London "Times." He belonged to the school of Mid-hat Pāsha, whom however he affected to despise; and he was a special protégé of Vafiq Effendi, another leader of the liberal party, who procured for him his appointment to Baghdād. Qadri Pāsha made a favourable impression on the European travellers who were brought into contact with him; he seemed to be endowed with capacity, energy, and probity; and great hopes of an improvement in the administration of the Wilāyat were entertained at the commencement of his rule. It does not appear whether Qadri Pāsha succeeded in satisfying the expectations that he had raised; but it was noted in the beginning that European politics seemed to interest him more than the affairs of his province. It was one of his maxims that religious toleration in Turkey was not enough and that real religious equality must be introduced.

* Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, Vol. I, page 203.

Later Wālis, 1880-1905.

Subsequent Wālis of Baghdād, of whom less is known than of the two just mentioned, were:—

'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha	1879.
Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha	1880-1881.
Mustafa 'Asīm Pāsha	1887-1890.
Sirri Pāsha	1890-1892.
Hasan Pāsha	1892-1896.
Ata Ullah Pāsha	1896-1898.
Nāmiq Pāsha	1898-1902.
Faizi Pāsha	1902-1904.
Abdul Wahhāb Pāsha	1904-1905.
Majīd Pāsha	1905.

Of these Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha was said to have been officially implicated, at a previous time, in a massacre of Christians at Aleppo; and at Baghdād his relations with the representatives of the European nations were most unfriendly, even the ordinary exchange of ceremonial courtesies being to some extent suspended in his time. It was remarked of him in 1881 by Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdād, that he was enfeebled by age and that his principal characteristic was a fanatical dislike of all Europeans; and about the end of 1886, according to Colonel Tweedie, he was "permitted to retire, laden with years and riches, to his native Aleppo." Basrah was included, during his whole term of office, in the Baghdād Wilāyat.

Faizi Pāsha was a military officer of advanced age, but energetic disposition; he commanded the Baghdād Army Corps as well as governing the Wilāyat.

'Abdul Wahhāb Pāsha, an Albanian, was a highly incompetent governor; his policy was anti-foreign; and his conduct elicited, on various occasions, strong protests from the British, French, and Russian representatives at Baghdād.

Internal affairs of the Baghdād Wilāyat, 1876-1905.

Plague at Baghdād, 1876-77.

Baghdād city, as well as other towns and places in the Wilāyat, suffered from a serious visitation of bubonic plague in 1876 and 1877. The events connected therewith are discussed in the Appendix on Epidemics and Sanitary Organisation.

'ABDUL HAMÍD II.

From 1876.*

A succinct account of the general history of Turkey during the reign of 'Abdul Hamíd II, who was a brother of the ex-Sultán Murád, and who was proclaimed Sultán in succession to that prince on the 31st August 1876, will make the affairs of Turkish 'Iráq during the period now to be dealt with more intelligible.

When 'Abdul Hamíd ascended the throne there was unrest in the Balkan provinces; reforms and the grant of local autonomy were proposed as remedies, but were rejected by the new ruler; and meanwhile Russia was preparing for decisive action on behalf of the Christian nationalities in Turkey. At the end of 1876 it was suddenly announced that the Sultán had conferred on Turkey a liberal constitution, extending to the whole Empire; and the Porte declined to give effect to the suggestions made by an International Conference, then assembled at Constantinople, for the better government of the European provinces of Turkey. Russia, unsatisfied by the vague prospects of an improved general administration held out by the new Turkish constitution, declared war against Turkey on the 24th April 1877 on the question of the European provinces; and Britain, scandalised by recent Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria and by the failure of Turkey since 1875 to meet her financial obligations, observed a strict neutrality.

The invasion of Turkey by Russian forces followed; Plevna, where alone the Turkish army offered an effective resistance, fell in December 1877; an armistice was arranged at Adrianople on the 31st January

* The principal authorities for this period in Turkish 'Iráq are official; among them may be mentioned Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Turkish Arabia Affairs, 1601—1905*, printed in 1905, and Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's *Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistan*, 1912. Unofficial sources of information are: Mr. G. Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, 1878; Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, 1879, and *Pilgrimage to Nejd*, 1881; Mr. J. C. McCoan's *Our New Protectorate—Turkey in Asia*, 1879; Commander V. L. Cameron's *Our Future Highway to India*, 1880; and Madame Jane Dieulafoy's *La Perse, la Chaldée et la Susiane*, 1887. With reference to irrigation and hydraulic questions generally Sir W. Willcocks' *Re-creation of Chaldea*, 1903, and *Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, 1911, may be consulted.

1878; and on the 3rd March a Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey was signed at San Stefano. The chief terms of the settlement were the complete severance of Roumania, Servia and Montenegro from the Ottoman Empire; the creation of an autonomous Bulgaria, still tributary to Turkey, but reaching from the Euxine to the Ægean; and the payment of a war indemnity.

A critical period followed, during which a Russian army remained encamped outside Constantinople, while certain of the powers manifested their dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty as being too favourable to Russia. A British fleet was sent to the Bosphorus, and in the United Kingdom the military reserves were called out. At length Russia, influenced partly by a fear that Austria might fall upon her line of communications in flank, agreed to a revision of the Treaty of San Stefano; and the result was an International Congress which assembled at Berlin on the 13th July 1878. Meanwhile on the 4th June an agreement had been concluded between Britain and Turkey, whereby the former power undertook—subject to conditions—to defend the Asiatic dominions of the latter, and received in return—also on conditions—possession of the island of Cyprus. The Treaty of Berlin signed on the 13th July 1878, which was the outcome of the Congress, modified the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano in favour of Turkey. Roumania, Servia and Montenegro received their independence, and a war indemnity of 300,000,000 roubles was assigned to Russia; but the new autonomous and tributary Bulgaria was confined to the north of the Balkans, some more southern districts which by the Treaty of San Stefano would have been included in Bulgaria being constituted instead a separate autonomous and tributary principality under the name of Eastern Roumelia.

Some interchange of communications seems to have taken place in 1877 between the Sultán of Turkey and the Amír of Afghanistan. The former sovereign seems to have appealed to the latter for help against the Russians, advising him incidentally to disregard the occupation of Quetta by the Government of India and to cultivate good relations with the British. The Amír is stated to have replied that he could afford no aid, and somewhat ironically to have referred the Sultán to the British Government for the assistance of which he stood in need.

The Turkish constitution of 1876 ended abortively. It was soon suspended; a Parliament convened under it was dissolved; and its principal author—Midhat Pasha, ex-Wáli of Baghdád—was exiled from the capital. The provisions of the Treaty of Berlin relating to improvement of the Turkish administration also remained, to a great extent

unfruitful. German military and financial advisers were engaged, and British officers were obtained for the reorganisation of the Gendarmerie; but no real amelioration of the prevailing conditions was observable.

Egyptian affairs, though prominent from 1879 to 1882, including the deposition of the Khedive Ismá'íl, the establishment of a temporary Anglo-French condominium in Egypt, the revolt of 'Arabi Pāsha, and the British occupation of Egypt, did not greatly affect the political life of the Ottoman Empire. More important to Turkey were the establishment in 1881 of a Public Debt Department, under international control, which placed her relations with her external creditors on a sound basis, and "the bloodless revolution of Philippopolis," which resulted in the fusion of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria.

From 1890 onwards Turkey became a prey to troubles which were mostly of a semi-external, semi-internal character. Crete was disturbed; and Cretan affairs led in 1897 to a war between Turkey and Greece, in which Turkey was easily victorious and obtained a modification of the common frontier besides an indemnity of £4,000,000, while Greek subjects were deprived of extra-territorial privileges which they had till then enjoyed in Turkey. In 1898 four of the powers with which Crete had been placed *en dépôt* appointed Prince George of Greece to govern the island as Chief Commissioner.

An Armenian* revolt in the autumn of 1894 was quelled with extreme rigour; and a scheme for an Armenian settlement proposed by Britain, France and Russia was checkmated by widespread massacres of Armenians throughout Asia Minor in 1895, in which it was estimated that 200,000 persons perished. A massacre of 3,000 Armenians, not entirely unprovoked, occurred at Constantinople in 1896.

The relations of the Turkish Government with their Muhammadan subjects were also, in places, unhappy: after 1892 there were frequent insurrections in Yaman and constant troubles in Albania.

By 1903 the state of Macedonia had become such as to necessitate the adoption by Austria and Russia of a joint programme of reforms for that province but in its application, this programme was ineffectual.

There was also occasional friction between Turkey and foreign powers. In 1901 a brief occupation by France of Mitylene was required in order to

*Already in 1878 the Armenian question had begun to make its appearance. Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin bound the Porte to carry out reforms in the Armenian districts, to protect the Armenians against the Circassians and the Kurds, and to report progress periodically to the Powers

obtain a settlement of the claims of some French subjects; and difficulties occurred with Britain in 1901-02 in regard to the hinterland of Aden, and in 1906 in regard to the Egyptian frontier. The only foreign country maintaining constant good relations with Turkey was Germany, who directed Turkish military policy, acquired a predominant influence at Constantinople, and did not interest herself adversely to Turkey in the Armenian question.

Towards the end of the period a "Young Turkish" party was in course of formation which aimed at subverting, and at a later period did actually subvert, the power of 'Abdul Hamid.

The character of 'Abdul Hamid as ruler was* described as follows in 1878.

> His habits are simple in the extreme and he commits no excesses. His attention to the affairs of Government is unremitting; he is even nervously anxious to know everything, even details which would be much better left to competent subordinates. He gives his ministers no rest; after being in council with him for the greater part of the day, he sends for them again at night, and reconsiders the matters already fully discussed. He is, in truth, fairly chargeable with fidgetiness and over-anxiety, but, assuredly, not with neglect or disregard of the interests of the State. His intentions are good; his desire is to do what is right and best for the Empire in its great extremity, but his inexperience in public affairs tells woefully against him. This is the real source of the vacillation which is at times painfully evident; he is never sure that a measure which has been resolved upon was not, after all, a mistake; and it is just as likely to be abandoned as carried through.

The same assiduous attention to official business continued to characterise 'Abdul Hamid throughout his reign; but his ignorance was soon replaced by knowledge; and he came to be distinguished, as he grew in experience, by the astuteness of his diplomacy and the relentlessness of his methods, which were based on espionage and secrecy.

A feature of the beginning of 'Abdul Hamid's reign was the emergence in public life of a new non-hereditary class of civil and military Turkish administrators. To this class belonged General 'Osmān Pāsha, the defender of Plevna; Ghāzi Mukhtār Pāsha, the most successful Turkish leader after 'Osmān Pāsha in the Russian war; and a number of the civil ministers of State of the epoch. These *novi homines* displaced, to a great extent, a select order of high-born Pāshas who had enjoyed, under previous Sultāns, a virtual monopoly of power. A trait remarked

* Gaury's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. II, page 320.

Insurrections at Karbala and Najaf, 1877.

In the summer of 1877 there were serious risings against the authority of the Turkish Government at Karbala and Najaf, attributable to the denudation of the Wilāyat of troops in consequence of the Russo-Turkish war.

At Karbala, it seems, the townspeople refused to furnish conscripts for the army, and even to pay taxes; and the Radif there, being locally recruited, broke into open mutiny. In the town itself, as in the days of the Yārāmāz supremacy before 1843, anarchy reigned; Arab factions fought out their feuds in the public street; and foreign settlers, Persian and Indian, were exposed to considerable danger. Resistance to the Government was prepared, and even travellers and traders approaching the town were fired on from the surrounding date plantations. A column of about 400 regular infantry from Baghdād, with two or three guns, eventually fought its way into the town, suffering some loss but inflicting greater. Months later houses ruined by artillery fire and trees felled to facilitate the operations were to be seen outside Karbala. In the second half of August the Turkish force was in occupation of the town, where the bazaars were at one time closed as a protest against their tyrannical behaviour; but the Radif mutineers still held out in some of the adjoining date groves, made raids upon passing caravans, and supplied their wants by seizing specie and provisions. On the 24th August the Turkish troops attacked the mutineers, and had two men killed, but returned with five rebel heads which were set up in various public places. Another Turkish assault on the 25th resulted only in the loss of an officer killed and several men wounded. On the 26th, about 600 Banī Ḥasan from Hindīyah and some 'Anizah having arrived to the assistance of the Turks, it was found that the mutineers had evacuated their position; and on the next day the rebel entrenchments were demolished.

During the crisis the Wāli of Baghdād, 'Ākif Pāsha, asked Colonel Nixon, the British Political Agent, that British subjects at Karbala might be warned against joining the rebels; this was an entirely superfluous request, but a caution was duly conveyed to the British Indian community through Haidar 'Ali Khan, the Honorary British Agent on the spot.

About the same time disorders occurred at Najaf, from which place, after a rupture with the Turkish garrison, the turbulent local faction of the Zugurd, the sworn enemies of the Shumurd, retired to Kūfah. Here they made ready to defend themselves by force; but they were in

the end induced by a deputation consisting of 'Ulama of Najaf and Shaikhs of the Arab tribes of Hindiyah, sent by Colonel Hâji Bey, the Turkish Commandant of the Najaf garrison, to make their submission. In suppliant guise, uncovered, and with the fillets of their head-dresses unbound and lowered to their necks, they returned to Najaf and threw themselves at the feet of the Commandant, who thereupon wisely granted them a free pardon. A prominent part in the mediation which had this happy issue was played by Saiyid 'Ali, Bahr-ul-'Ulûm, the Mujtahid Distributor of the Oudh Bequest, whose intervention was solicited by the military Commandant, and with whom Colonel Nixon was also in correspondence; his nephew, Saiyid 'Ali Naqi, was one of those who took part in the deputation to Kûfah.

This trouble lasted only two or three days; but there seems to have been also at Najaf an insurrection, similar to that at Karbala, in connection with conscription and taxation. It collapsed, however, on the arrival of a detachment from the Turkish column at Karbala and the arrest of some 30 persons implicated, who were imprisoned.

In 1879 a garrison of four companies of infantry was maintained at Najaf, and a larger force at Karbala.

Grain riots at Baghdâd, 1877-78.

In 1877 there were large shipments of grain from Baghdâd to Bombay and England, and local prices doubled, to the consternation of the populace. The spring harvest was thought to be precarious, and the impressment of transport and carriers for the Russian war prevented the importation of food stuffs from a distance. In these circumstances the Wâli of Baghdâd was ordered by the Government at Constantinople to prohibit the exportation of grain and did so; but the embargo was violated by merchants, and nine native vessels proceeding down the river with grain were seized and plundered by the people. The whole garrison of Baghdâd at the moment consisted of a single infantry battalion and a few artillery; but peace was restored without difficulty, and an order by the British Political Agent enjoining strict observance of the embargo by British subjects produced a sedative effect. This was in 1877.

Exporters, finding that prices had again fallen and expecting that the embargo would presently be removed, then began to purchase and stock large quantities of grain,—proceedings which greatly exasperated popular feeling.

In February 1878 a European trader, alleging that he had obtained special permission from the Wâli, loaded grain on the British river steamer *Blosse Lynch* for despatch to Basrah, and removal of grain in native

boats was rumoured to be taking place. A party of rioters left Baghdād for Ctesiphon to intercept the native boats supposed to be engaged in removing grain, but they failed to discover any having grain as cargo. A crowd also besieged the custom house, off which the *Blosse Lynch* was lying, threatening to destroy the vessel unless the grain on board her were relanded. With the assent of the British Political Agent the *Blosse Lynch's* cargo was discharged; and the result was to avert a general outbreak and pillage, which, in the absence of a sufficient military force, had at one time appeared imminent. By April 1878 all danger of scarcity was past, and matters had resumed their ordinary course.

These disturbances led, as already mentioned, to the removal from Baghdād of the Wāli, 'Akif Pasha, who seems to have been held accountable by the Turkish Government for their occurrence.

State of Baghdād in 1878.

The general condition of Baghdād city in the spring, 1878, was backward and depressing. Trade appeared to be stagnant; there was an absence of life and activity of all kinds; and violence was prevalent in the immediate environs. There was no passable hotel or even inn. A traveller was unable to obtain bills on Musal, Diyārbakr, or Alexandretta; and though a small joint-stock bank, the "Baghdad Banking Company" existed, there were no banking facilities except such as wealthy Jewish merchants and British commercial firms between them could supply. Within two days, just outside the town, a Turkish official was knocked off his horse and dangerously wounded, his assailants taking the horse, and a Turk was set upon and received injuries that were expected to prove fatal. In the country tribal fighting and highway robbery were rife.

Naqībs of Baghdād.

The Niqābat of Baghdād was held from 1873 to 1898 by Saiyid Salmān, whose predecessor was Saiyid 'Ali. On the death of Saiyid Salmān in 1898 his brother Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān succeeded to the office.

Tribal affairs in the Baghdād Wilāyat, 1876-1905.

Little information is available regarding tribal affairs in the Baghdād Wilāyat after the accession of 'Abdul Hamīd, the reason probably being that the Arab tribes had declined in political importance, and that their concerns had ceased to interest the British representative. Whereas they had formerly levied war against the Turkish Government, ravaged

whole districts, and even threatened Baghdád itself, they were now unable to do more than commit raids and robberies in the desert and on the outskirts of the settled tracts.

Misbehaviour of the Hamawand, about 1896.

A partial exception to this general change existed in the Kurdish Hamawand tribe near the Persian border. In 1886 Colonel Tweedie, the British Resident at Baghdád, reported of them as follows:

> At the time of writing, indeed, as periodically during many years past, the frontier of the Baghdád and Mosul Pashalliks is dangerous from the raids of the Hamáwánd or Ahmedáwand Kurds. Within the present year, this great postal line has once or twice been closed because of them, to other than the largest Káfilas; and Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mosul, when passing over it lately, reported that his "escort ranged from one hundred and thirty mounted infantry to twenties and fifteens besides Dhákhilas (*gens d'armes*), according to the state of the road." "The Hamáwands," he added, "have created a regular scare all along the line; and although there are large numbers of troops moving about, they never seem to come up with them." And yet, this thorn in the side of two great Governments is represented by a horde of barely five hundred fighting men. Armed with Martinis, and mounted on mares "lifted" from the Shammar, they are as ubiquitous, as mischievous, and as difficult to touch as swarms of wasps. Only the other day an officer was wounded, and a soldier killed, by them near Sulimániah.

The Northern Shammar, to 1889.

The Northern Shammar continued for long to be ruled by Shaikh Farhán-bin-Safók; and the history of that Shaikh and his near relations illustrates the degeneracy and disintegration which had now set in among the Arab tribes of Turkish 'Iráq. Shaikh Farhán, who had succeeded to the Shaikhship on or soon after the murder of his father in 1847, appears at a later time to have spent some years, probably as a political *détenu*, at Constantinople, where he learned Turkish and became imbued with Turkish ideas. After his return to Mesopotamia he was again recognised as Shaikh; and he eventually received an allowance of £3,000 a year from the Turkish Government on condition of maintaining order in the tribal area and inducing his people to adopt a more settled life. To promote the latter object he himself took up a fixed residence at Sharqát on the Tigris, where he was found established in 1878; but no progress had then been made in inuring the Shammar to agriculture, as was hoped might be done. The Shaikh had by that time obtained the title of Pásha, and his younger sons were being instructed in the Turkish language.

A large proportion of the Northern Shammar seem to have been always dissatisfied with Shaikh Farhán, partly because his mother was a Baghdád woman, and partly on account of his Turkish proclivities and of

the manner in which he lent himself to Turkish designs of reducing the tribe to civilisation. The result was that, from time to time, he lost the support of his most useful dependents,—those, namely, who were most firmly attached to their Bedouin independence. A younger brother of Shaikh Farhān, 'Abdul Karīm, whose mother was of a noble family of desert Arabs, once seriously disputed the chiefship with him; studiously insulted, flouted, and harassed the Turkish authorities; and for a time successfully evaded capture. In the end, however, about 1875, 'Abdul Karīm was surrendered to the Government by Shaikh Nāsir of the Muntafik, then an aspirant to the Wālīship of Basrah, with whom he had taken refuge, and was hanged at Mūsal. Another younger brother, 'Abdur Razzāq, whose political sentiments resembled those of 'Abdul Karīm, met his death about the same time at the hands of the Turks. In 1875 'Abdul Karīm's full brother Fāris, then about 24 years of age, returned from Najd, where he had found a temporary asylum, and quickly secured the allegiance of a part of the tribe in opposition to Shaikh Farhān. In 1877 Fāris entered into negotiations with the Turkish authorities at Dair-ar-Zor with the object of obtaining a Government subsidy in return for his aid in tribal matters, and of securing official support against Shaikh Farhān and his elder sons, 'Isa and Mijwal. Fāris received a visit in 1878 from Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt, who were then travelling in the country, and on whom his open, frank character and high spirit made a very favourable impression; and oaths of Bedouin brotherhood were even exchanged between him and Mr. Blunt.

About 1886 a desperate raid was made on the Shammar by the Dilaim and proved much more sanguinary than such affairs generally are. The Dilaim, though the assailants were defeated; and, as living under the law, were called heavily to account by the Turkish authorities.

The later course of Shammar affairs is obscure; but it appears that in 1889 there was trouble between the Northern Shammar and the Turkish Government, and that Farhān, who was still Shaikh, adopted a policy of submission.

Tribal disturbances near Karbala, 1902.

On one later occasion, in October 1902, the peace of the Wilāyat was seriously disturbed, the country between Karbala and Musaiyib being given up for two or three days to warfare between 'Anizah nomads and the settled Mas'ūd tribe. The latter were assisted by Bedouins of the Northern Shammar who were at the time encamped in their territory. Captain Cox, the Surgeon of the British Residency at Baghdād, had a

narrow escape at Musaiyib from being robbed by a body of the combatants; but order was presently restored by the despatch of a Turkish cavalry detachment to the spot from Hillah.

Government of the Basrah Wilāyat, 1876-1905

Wālis of Basrah.

The following is a list, possibly incomplete, of the Wālis who governed Basrah during its existence as a Wilāyat: the dates given are, in some cases, only approximate.

'Abdullah Pāsha	
Zāhit Pāsha	1875-1879
(Wilāyat in abeyance)	1879-1880
Sālih Pāsha	(1880-84 and in 1886)
Commodore 'Ali Rīza Pāsha (acting)	1884
Shaban Pāsha	1884
Hidāyat Pāsha	...
Hāfiz Muhammad Pāsha	1891-92
Hamdi Pāsha	1893
Emīn Pāsha	1894-1896
Hamdi Pāsha (2nd time)	1897
'Arif Pāsha	1898
Muhsin Pāsha (acting)	1898
Hamdi Pāsha (3rd time)	...
Muhsin Pāsha	1899—January 1900
Mustafa Nūri Pāsha	1900-01
Fakhri Pāsha (acting)	1901—September 1904
Mukhlis Pāsha	1904
	from December 1904

Of the earlier of these Wālis little except their names is known.

'Abdullah Pāsha, who was a Kurd, tried to introduce sugar cultivation from Egypt with the help of the Khedive; but he evidently did not succeed.

It was the failure of a coercive policy put in force against the Muntafik by Zāhit Pāsha which led to the temporary abolition of the Basrah Wilāyat in 1880.

Hamdi Pāsha, 1894-1900.

Hamdi Pāsha, who held charge at Basrah almost continuously from 1894 to 1900, was an honest man and on the whole a satisfactory administrator, but neither brilliant nor popular. He belonged properly to the naval service. A hot temper and an arbitrary disposition made him many enemies; and his efforts to check peculation and bribery rendered him unpopular with his subordinates. His ultimate removal seems to have been chiefly due to the intrigues of the Naqīb of Basrah.

who was his personal enemy, and whose brother, Saiyid Tālib, was sent to Constantinople to undermine the Wāli's position. The Shaikh of Kuwait, too, was induced to represent that the difficulties between himself and the Turkish Government arose from the employment of Hamdi Pāsha as a medium; and charges connected with the proceedings of a German Railway Commission at Basrah seem to have been brought against the unfortunate official by Muhsin Pāsha, the Military Commandant at Basrah, who coveted the Wāliship for himself.

Emni Pāsha and 'Arif Pāsha, who governed the Wilāyat in the intervals of Hamdi Pāsha's administration, appear both to have fallen quickly into disgrace. Complaints against them were investigated by Muhsin Pāsha, afterwards Wāli but then holding a military appointment at Baghdād, who was sent from Baghdād for the purpose, and who thereafter acted for a short time as Wāli, pending the return of Hamdi Pāsha.

Muhsin Pāsha, 1900-1901.

Muhsin Pāsha was a soldier of some intellectual attainments; he had risen in the Turkish military service by merit; and he had held the position of Chief of the Staff in the 7th (Yaman) Army Corps. His plausible policy in regard to Kuwait, however, which may be learned from the chapter on the history of that Arab principality, though consistently pursued during two years with the support of the Naqīb of Basrah, and crowned at one moment with seeming success, ended in total failure. A favourite scheme of Muhsin Pāsha was the construction of a road from Basrah to Fāo through the date plantations on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab; but heavy expenditure in acquiring land and building bridges was involved, and it was not carried out. The idea of the road was military rather than administrative, but its execution would have given the Turkish authorities a strong hold on the riverain villages and might have contributed to the suppression of piracy on the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Nūri Pāsha, 1901-1904.

Mustafa Nūri Pāsha, who succeeded Muhsin Pāsha, was Military Commandant as well as Wāli of Basrah. He showed considerable firmness and energy in grappling with internal difficulties that prevailed in his time, as will be described hereafter.

Fakhri Pāsha, 1904.

Fakhri Pāsha, the temporary successor of Nūri Pāsha both as Wāli and Commandant, was a military officer of good education. He used great severity in dealing with violent crime at Basrah, where he is still remembered by the name of Abu Gawāni or "the Man of Sacks," it having been alleged that he caused criminals to be tied up in sacks and

secretly drowned in the river. He also opened the pacific negotiations with Ibn Sa'ūd by which the Turkish campaign in Central Arabia, as described elsewhere, was eventually brought to an end.

Mukhlis Pāsha, 1904-05.

One of the candidates for the Wālīship of Basrah on the departure of Nūri Pāsha was Tālib Pāsha, brother of the Naqīb of Basrah. At Constantinople he had indited a long memorandum on the proper policy of Turkey in Arabia; but his claims, though supported by a palace clique under Abul Huda, did not prevail; and the choice of the Government fell upon Mukhlis Pāsha, a former Commandant of the Gendarmerie of Salonika. Mukhlis Pāsha brought to a successful conclusion the negotiations with Ibn Sa'ūd begun by Fakhri Pāsha.

Internal affairs of the Basrah Wilāyat, 1876-1905.

Naqībs of Basrah: Saiyid Muhammad Sa'īd, 1874-1896, and Saiyid Rajab, from 1896.

Saiyid Muhammad Sa'īd was Naqīb of Basrah from 1874 to 1896. He succeeded a brother named Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān, whose coadjutor he had been; and a considerable part was played by him in the foreign politics of the Wilāyat. In 1886 he was nominated Vice-President of the Administration of Civil List Properties at Basrah, but declined the salary of £40 a month attached to it, saying that the honour of serving his master the Sultān was in itself a sufficient reward. He was not a man of high moral principle, and his relations with Hamdi Pāsha, one of the most honest of the Wālis of Basrah, were bad in consequence. In 1890 he was permitted by the Porte, on the plea of advanced age, to nominate his eldest son, Saiyid Rajab, to act for him in the duties of the Niqābat. In that year he held the rank of Istāmbūl Pāyasi, and had obtained as decorations the Osmanieh and the Mejidieh of the first class,—the former in recognition of political services performed by him in Qatar. Besides Saiyid Rajab he left two sons, Saiyid Ahmad and Saiyid Tālib, of whom the former—considered the ablest member of the family—was officially employed by the Turkish authorities at different times in matters relating to Najd and Kuwait, while the latter once held the Mutasarriflik of Hasa and after his dismissal from that post enjoyed a measure of Court favour at Constantinople.

Saiyid Rajab succeeded to the Niqābat of Basrah on the death of his father in August 1896.

In 1892 great insecurity prevailed in the town of Basrah. In April the prisoners in the Turkish Jail overpowered their guards and 18 Arab criminals, including a notorious assassin, succeeded in making their escape. On the night of the 3rd of May a gang of marauding Arabs broke into a shop, killed two men, wounded another, and carried off bodily a safe containing cash and other valuables. Disorder in Basrah town, 1892.

In 1901 there was a general outbreak of lawlessness in the Basrah Wilāyat, which was intensified— if not caused—by failure of crops and agricultural distress. Three burglaries on a large scale, committed in Basrah town by gangs of 20 to 25 armed Arabs, were unmistakable signs of faulty administration and probably contributed, as such, to the removal of Muhsin Pāsha from the Wālishīp. Under Nūri Pāsha, the next Wāli, order was promptly restored in the town and the immediate neighbourhood. Lawlessness in the Basrah Wilāyat, 1901.

Tribal affairs in the Basrah Wilāyat, 1876-1905.

While the behaviour of the Arab tribes in the Baghdād Wilāyat showed, as we have seen, a marked improvement during the period, tribal affairs in Basrah seemed to remain on as unsatisfactory a footing as ever. It should be remembered that under Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha as Wāli, that is, from 1880 to 1886, Basrah formed part of the Baghdād Wilayat.

In 1878-79 the Bani Lām were divided among themselves owing to a feud between Mizbān, the principal chief of the tribe, and his half-brothers Mūsa, 'Āqil and Humaidi: a son of Mūsa had been slain by Mizbān. In March 1878 a battle took place on the *Tigris between the contending factions, who apparently held opposite sides of the river, for, the British Political Agency Steamer "Comet" happening to pass, they utilized her as cover against each other, and maintained a running fight across her as she proceeded upstream against the current. In March 1879 fighting still continued; but Shaikh Mizbān and Mūsa had gone to 'Amārah, in obedience to a summons from the Mutasarrif, to have their differences arranged. Raids and counter-raids were carried on by their partisans in their absence, and little hope was entertained that the Turkish official would be able to effect a reconciliation. Bani Lām troubles, 1878-79.

*Geary, the authority for this seems to place the scene of this incident too far down the river, *viz.*, between the Āl Bū Muhammad country and Qurnah. See his *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. I, page 110.

At this juncture Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt made an adventurous journey through the Banī Lām country from the Tigris to 'Arabistān. They encountered great incivility on the part of Bunniyah, a son of Shaikh Mizbān, whose manners were those of a barbarian and a robber; and their property, if not their lives, were at one time in some danger before they finally quitted the domains of the Banī Lām.

Āl Bū Muhammad disturbances, 1878-80.

While the Banī Lām were thus at war among themselves, the adjoining Āl Bū Muhammad addicted themselves to robbery on the Tigris. In their case the trouble began with the retirement into the marshes of the Shaikh of the tribe, taking with him a year and a half's revenue which he had collected from his fellow tribesmen but had no intention of paying to the Government. The rupture between him and the Turkish officials was the signal for a crop of outrages upon river-borne traffic, which he probably did not instigate, but which the perpetrators cunningly calculated would be set down to his account. In March 1878 nine persons were murdered on board a boat which the Āl Bū Muhammad plundered; and it became necessary to organise the native sailing vessels on the river into larger fleets, which were conveyed through the dangerous zone by Turkish steam vessels. The Turkish, but not the British, river steamers were themselves threatened with attack; and, as the country was denuded of troops owing to the war, no operations against the Āl Bū Muhammad could be undertaken at the time.

In 1880, the Shaikh of the Āl Bū Muhammad being then Saihūd, robbers of that tribe attacked the British river steamer "Khalifah" on the Tigris; but this incident and the proceedings to which it gave rise will be related more fitly in another place.

Muntafik rebellion, 1881.

In 1881, Nāsir Pāshā, Shaikh of the Muntafik, being then in honourable detention at Constantinople, the Muntafik tribe rose in open rebellion against the Turkish Government. They had been giving trouble to the authorities for a year or more, and the ill-success of strong measures taken by the Wālī of Basrah against them had led to the suppression of that Wilāyat. Consequently it now rested with the Wālī of Baghdād to restore order.

At the middle of June the situation was serious. Telegraphic communication between Basrah and Baghdād had been interrupted by the rebels. There were only 1,500 Turkish troops at Nāsiriyah, the principal place in the Muntafik country, and the difficulty of reinforcing them was extreme, for the garrison of Baghdād, the military headquarters of the whole province, was already reduced to 850 men, etc.,

300 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 250 artillery. On the 10th of June a body of 1,000 Arabs endeavoured to cut an embankment about three miles north of Nāsiriyah with the design of flooding the town, but they were repulsed with loss after a two hours' engagement. The next day the rebels attacked Nāsiriyah itself, but were beaten off, a large number of them being killed and wounded.

It seemed doubtful whether the best policy of the Turkish Government in this emergency might not be to appoint one of the tribal Shaikhs of the Muntafik to be Mutasarrif of Nāsiriyah. Two seem to have been available: Mansūr Pāsha, who for some reason had taken flight, and Falah Pāsha, a son of the absent chief of the tribe. It was believed that such an appointment would secure an immediate collapse of the revolt, and resumption of payment of revenue; but it might on the other hand restore the Muntafik and their Shaikhs to the position of virtual independence which they had occupied in the reign of the Sultān 'Abdul 'Azīz. The local Turkish officials seem to have been in favour of strenuous action against the rebels; while the Porte, possibly under the advice of Nāsir Pāsha at Constantinople, were in favour of conciliation. What policy was in the end adopted is not clear; but the Muntafik question for a time again dropped out of notice.

It will be apparent from the preceding that between the years 1878 and 1881 the Banī Lām, the Āl Bū Muhammad, and the Muntafik, the only important tribes in their part of the country, were more or less simultaneously in a state of excitement or insubordination very detrimental to the general peace. Though concerted action among them was not in question, there was reason to think that the attitude of the one was to some extent influenced by that of the other; and the trouble among the Muntafik, in particular, tended to create disorder beyond the limits of their tribal territory.

Disturbances near 'Amārah, 1883.

In the spring of 1883 there were disturbances on the left bank of the Tigris near 'Amārah, and exceptional measures became necessary on the part of the Turkish authorities for the protection of navigation.

Āl Bū Muhammad rebellion under Shaikh Saihūd, 1892.

In 1892, for causes which are not ascertainable, the Āl Bū Muhammad tribe under Shaikh Saihūd again rose against the Turkish Government. Telegraphic communication between Bāghdad and Basrah was interrupted; several native boats were plundered between Qal'at Sālih and Gūrnah; the Turkish steamer "Mūsal" was fired on, and could not pass through the disturbed zone; and 'Azair (Ezra's Tomb) was placed in a state of defence. On this occasion no British steamer was molested.

The Mutasarrif of 'Amarah would have detained the "Blosse Lynch" there, being unable to furnish her with a guard, but she proceeded on her way to Basrah without accident; and the "Khalifeh", which had been supplied with a Turkish guard at Basrah, made the ascent to Baghdad without interference on the part of the tribesmen. On the Wali of Baghdad proceeding to the spot with troops, either the rebellion collapsed or its manifestations were transferred to a distance from the river.

Rebellion of Shaikh Hasan-al-Khaiyún of the Bani Asad, 1899-1900.

In April 1899 trouble broke out in a new place on the lower Tigris in the form of depredations committed by Shaikh Hasan-al-Khaiyún of the Bani Asad tribe, whose followers numbered about 600 men, on the river between 'Amarah and Qurnah. This chief had formerly received an allowance from the Turkish Government for the protection of the river and telegraph from Qal'at Salih to Qurnah; but intrigues by some of the Muntafik Shaikhs and insubordination on his own part had led to its forfeiture some years before 1899; and, early in the Walilship of Hamdi Pasha at Basrah, he had become a rebel and an outlaw. No settlement with him could be effected under Hamdi Pasha; but in May 1900, after the appointment of Muhsin Pasha to Basrah, he offered his submission, which appears to have been accepted.

Turkish raid on the Al Bú Muhammad, 1903.

In November 1903 a serious affair resulted, below 'Amarah, from a new allotment of state lands on lease by the Turkish revenue authorities. Rice lands had been transferred from the Al Bú Muhammad tribe, whose payments were in arrears, to the 'Azairij, friends of the Bani Lam, and to the Sulakh; and the enforcement of the transfer had been entrusted by the Mutasarrif of 'Amarah to a military officer, the troops under whose command, it was said, proceeded to massacre a number of the Al Bú Muhammad, men, women, and children. The Wali of Basrah visited 'Amarah on learning of this affair, suspended the Mutasarrif, and restored the transferred lands to the Al Bú Muhammad; and the Bimbashi alleged to be responsible for the massacre was ordered to be tried by court martial.

Rebellion of Sa'dún Pasha of the Muntafik, 1900-03.

In 1900 Sa'dún Pasha, one of the chiefs of the Muntafik tribe and nephew of Nasir Pasha, erstwhile Wali of Basrah, became seriously embroiled with the Turkish authorities in consequence of events external to Turkish 'Iraq. Sa'dún Pasha was at this time a mere professional marauder rather than a politician.

By a successful foray on adherents of the Shammar Amir of Northern Najd, as described in the chapter on the history of Kuwait, Sa'dún Pasha nearly brought about, in the summer of 1900, a serious collision

on the western border of Turkish 'Irāq between the Shaikh of Kuwait, to whose interest he was attached, and Ibn Rashīd; and one of the conditions on which the latter chief was persuaded by the Turkish authorities to retire to his own country was that satisfaction should be obtained for him from Sa'dūn Pāsha by the Ottoman Government.

1900. The Turkish commander sent against Sa'dūn Pāsha in fulfilment of this pledge was Muhammad Fāzil Pāsha, Dāghistāni, who was a relative of the celebrated Caucasian leader Shāmil, and who had during the war of 1877-78 transferred his allegiance from the Tsar to the Sultān. He was accounted one of the best officers in the Baghdād Army Corps, the cavalry of which were under his command; but in his operations against Sa'dūn Pāsha he failed to justify his reputation. The Muntafik freebooter, who had a stronghold at Sakhariyah in the desert to the west of the Euphrates, but who sometimes, when hard pressed, took refuge in the marshes of Mesopotamia, was not caught; and in December 1900 he disappeared in the direction of the Dhafir country, or of Kuwait.

1901. Two months later Sa'dūn Pāsha again emerged from obscurity as a leader in the invasion of Central Arabia by the Shaikh of Kuwait; and, after the defeat of the invaders and their return home, Muhammad Pāsha was sent once more from Baghdād to hunt him down.

1903. No actual military movement seems to have taken place, however; and nothing more was heard of Sa'dūn Pāsha until 1903, towards the end of Nūri Pāsha's Government of Basrah. In that year the restless Muntafik leader crossed into Mesopotamia and began to harass the settled tribes there with claims for payment of blood-money in cases more than forty years old, and with other unreasonable demands. A written remonstrance by the Wāli of Basrah having failed to deter him from his objectionable proceedings, a military detachment was sent to Shatrah to intervene between Sa'dūn Pāsha and the tribes; but, owing to mismanagement on the part of the officer commanding the party, a brawl arose at a meeting; and 50 Turkish soldiers were massacred together with several officers, including the commandant. Muhammad Pāsha was then despatched against Sa'dūn Pāsha for the third time, and arrived at Nāsiriyah in the beginning of November. His operations were no more effective, however, than on former occasions,—a circumstance which was now attributed to his having married a relative of Sa'dūn Pāsha, but which was probably due rather to the deficiency of cavalry in his force. In December the outlaw escaped to Kuwait territory; but this time he received no countenance from the Shaikh of Kuwait.

1905. In January 1905 Sa'dūn Pāsha was understood to be suing for a pardon from the Porte; but before long he was again guilty of causing disturbances on Turkish soil. Mukhlis Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, then confiscated his landed property and endeavoured to arrest him. His capture, however, could not be effected.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Kuwait and Najd, 1876—1905.

The relations of Turkish 'Irāq during this period with Kuwait and Najd are described fully in the chapters on the history of those territorial divisions. The outstanding features of the time were firstly persistent efforts by the Turkish authorities, between 1899 and 1902, to incorporate Kuwait with the Basrah Wilāyat, and secondly a Turkish campaign in Qasīm in 1904, followed by a Turkish pacific occupation of that district which ended pitiably in 1906.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Persia, 1876—1905.

Question of Shalhah Island, 1877—84.

The indeterminate state of the Turko-Persian boundary, which the united efforts of Britain and Russia, exerted over a period of thirty years, had failed to remedy, continued under 'Abdul Hamid to give rise to occasional difficulties.

1877. The chief controversy that arose during the period was one relating to Shalhah. This island first made its appearance, as a mud-bank, about the year 1870; and its aspect in 1877, when it came under dispute, and its history up that time were described by Surgeon-Major Colvill of the Baghdād Political Agency in the following terms:

> The Shallah Island is about thirty-two miles below Mohammerah, and six miles above and within sight of the Turkish Custom House at Dawasir. Shallah appears to be no name but in Arabic a generic term meaning out-growth, and it is well it should have been applied in this case, for this is really no island but a bank, which had it been left alone would even now have been covered by every tide.
>
> The bed of the Shat-el-Arab at this point is broader than usual, being about three thousand yards wide on account of the bank on the Persian side forming a sort of bay, and the island is about one thousand yards from the Persian and two thousand from the Turkish shore, and situated as it were in the mouth of this Persian bay. The

result is that, whatever it might have been originally, the whole force of the current now is between the island and the Turkish bank, while the bay is fast filling up: even now a man can wade at low tide from the island to the Persian bank, and there is no question but that in a few years more the island will become a portion of the Persian mainland. To describe the island would be to take a piece of swampy alluvial soil two, three or say even four acres in extent, for I could not well measure it; form this into a parallelogram twice as long up and down the river as broad, and surround it with an embankment of clay and reeds sufficient to keep out the ripple of the high tides but with slits to allow of irrigation; surround this with a fringe of bulrushes in extent three times the area of the parallelogram, but at high tide under water sufficient to float a boat; and we have a very fair idea of Shalhah Island. The Persian bank of the Shat-el-Arab opposite this island is low and apparently uninhabited, while the Turkish side is abrupt and covered with a forest of date trees, and is the private property of His Excellency Nasir Pasha. Thus Nasir Pasha as private proprietor of the opposite bank built the embankment of clay and reeds on the island and in 1876 planted some offshoots of date trees, while two or three cultivators sowed melons and gourds, but never permanently lived there. That Nasir Pasha had some ulterior object in view in making this embankment is certain, for the place is so wretched that not a family of cultivators, however poor, would accept the island as a gift on condition of having to live there permanently.

Turkey, embarrassed at the time by war with Russia, eventually agreed to evacuate Shalhah, provided that no buildings should be erected on it by Persian subjects until the question of the country to which it belonged had been settled by an international Frontier Commission. The Persians on their part renounced a design which they had formed of occupying the island in force. Nāsir Pāsha was directed to arrange for the evacuation of the place; Surgeon-Major Colvill was sent down from Baghdād to see that the evacuation was properly carried out; and it was apparently understood that the island should not, pending a final settlement, be cultivated by subjects of either side.

The question of Shalhah was raised again in 1884, there being then no Basrah Wilāyat, by the Mutasarrif of Basrah, who claimed that the island belonged neither to any Persian subject nor to Nāsir Pāsha personally, but that it was the property of the Turkish Government, who now wished to turn it to account. It was found on investigation at this time that Shalhah, since its evacuation in 1877, had been in the possession of cultivators from the Persian side owing allegiance to the Shaikh of Muhammareh. In 1884 it carried date trees bearing fruit, but the only buildings on it were mud huts. The Shaikh of Muhammareh tried to avoid the discussion which the Mutasarrif of Basrah wished to force on him by asking to be addressed through the Persian Consul at Basrah, and not directly; but, on the failure of this ruse, and on an announcement by the Mutasarrif that he intended to take the island by force, Shaikh Miz'al caused some thousands of his Arabs to be collected on the Persian mainland opposite 1884.

Shalhah, where they awaited the arrival of the Turks. A Turkish gunboat, full of troops and carrying the Mutasarrif, appeared in due course; but when the Mutasarrif saw the number of the Arabs assembled, he thought better of his threats and passed on down the river to Fao. Next day the gunboat returned to Shalhah, but the Arabs on the Persian shore were still there and engaged, as before, in noisy war-dances; so he pursued his way upstream to Failiyeh, and there landed and interviewed the Shaikh. On the Mutasarrif's demanding the reason of the concourse of Arabs near Shalhah, Shaikh Mix'al at first pretended that they had been sent there to catch partridges alive for His Royal Highness the Zill-us-Sultán, the Persian Governor-General of 'Arabistán; but, as the Mutasarrif would not accept this explanation, he in the end "declared roundly that the island was Persian and should remain so as long as he had breath in his body." The Mutasarrif, who had no effective reply to make to this, then withdrew; and Shalhah was left in *de facto* possession of Persia.

Presence of Persian subjects on the right bank of the Shatt-el-'Arab.

A peculiar circumstance with an important bearing on Turko-Persian frontier relations is the residence on the Turkish side of the Shatt-el-'Arab of numerous Arab tribesmen who regard themselves "and are commonly regarded" as subjects of the Shaikh of Muhammarah and therefore of the Persian Government, and as foreigners in Turkey. The facts have been well * described as follows:—

> The position of the Shaikh *vis à vis* the Arab tribes dependent on Persia but resident in Turkey presents many anomalies, but has the sanction of usage and ancient custom. The members of such tribes are liable to military service and the Shaikh has not infrequently called them up for operations against the Beni Turuf and other recalcitrant tribes: the obligation is doubtless distasteful to the tribesmen, but the right of the Shaikh to demand it has never been disputed by them, and important landowners, Turkish subjects, such as the Naqib's family, Ahmad Effendi, Sayid Talib, and others have, in virtue of engagements dating from the time of Shaikh Haji Jabir, personally made themselves responsible for the collection and despatch of levies, a proceeding naturally very distasteful to the Turks.
>
> In tribal matters, the jurisdiction of the Shaikh is unquestioned by such tribesmen and in cases of blood feuds, as in other questions in which tribal law prevails, his intervention is necessary to effect a settlement, the idea of taking such cases to a Turkish Court of Law being wholly foreign to Arab ideas. This, again, is galling to Turkish susceptibilities.
>
> In return, the Shaikh grants to such tribesmen as live in his lands in Turkey, and such men are very numerous, the customary tribal exemptions from grazing taxes "Vergi" or "Miri" taxation, and from other imposts of a minor character, but

* See Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's *Précis of the Relations*, etc., pages 57-58.

important in the aggregate. Many of them, too, even though actually in possession of Turkish certificates of nationality (which documents are considered by Arabs as purely administrative documents having no bearing on tribal questions) have the right, handed down from father to son, to cultivate wheat lands in the Ahwaz district and Arabs of the Ka'ab and Muhaisin tribes living in Abul Khasib and Zain will be found in December and January ploughing their lands as far north as Wais.

We thus have the quaint anomaly of Arab tribesmen, in possession of certificates of Turkish nationality and liable to Turkish military service, training for which they may have actually undergone, acknowledging simultaneously liability to service under the Persian flag, and proceeding annually 100 miles and more from their homes in Turkey to cultivate lands in Persia which they and their forefathers have tilled for generations.

Questions of reciprocity seldom arise between Persia and Turkey, in regard to this frontier at all events, in connection with the treatment of Arab tribes, since no Arab tribes subject to Turkey reside in Persian territory, though, as has been shown, the reverse is very extensively the case.

Persian subjects, refugees, pilgrimages and trade, 1877—78

A number of questions of a general nature were agitated from time to time between Turkey and Persia, and were all simultaneously pending in 1877, when war broke out between Turkey and Russia.

One of these was the interpretation to be placed on the Convention of 1875 between Turkey and Persia in regard to the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the consular representatives of either country in the other. It seems to have been claimed by Persia that the rights of jurisdiction conferred on her consular officers in Turkey was precisely similar to those enjoyed by the Consuls of various European powers under Capitulations; but the contention was apparently denied by the Porte, it was not supported by the British Government, and it failed to be established.

A Persian grievance was the continued residence at Baghdád of Mirza 'Abbás, a fugitive brother of His Majesty the Sháh, whom the Turkish Government had, it was alleged, given a written promise to remove to some other place. The matter being strongly pressed in 1877, when the Persian Prince had already been *many years at Baghdád, an assurance was given that he would be obliged to make Constantinople his place of residence; but he preferred to make his peace with the Sháh and returned to Tehrán.

Not long after the Sháh's own pilgrimage to Turkish 'Iráq in 1870-71, there was much indignation in Persia on account of annoyances inflicted, and extortions practised, by officials of the Turkish Government

*According to one authority he had been there since the accession of Násir-ed-Dín Sháh to the Persian throne in 1848.

and of the Constantinople Board of Health on Shi'ah pilgrims to the shrines of 'Ali and Husain in Turkish 'Irāq. The Persian Government took advantage of popular feeling to prohibit such pilgrimages by Persian subjects altogether, and an effort was made to divert the stream of religious devotion (with its accompanying profits) to Mashhad in the Persian province of Khurāsān. This prohibition of pilgrimages in Turkey was either soon withdrawn or not long respected, and the attempt to substitute Mashhad for Najaf and Karbala was a failure; but for several years there was a marked falling-off in the number of Persian pilgrims to Turkish 'Irāq, and the effect on the internal trade of the province was unfavourable in an appreciable degree. At length, in 1875, the main grievances of the Persian pilgrims were removed by an agreement between Turkey and Persia regulating quarantines and the admission of corpses for burial from Persia, and dealing with the subjects of passports and fees; and the pilgrimages quickly recovered their former attraction for Persians.

The importation of salt from Persia into Turkey was prohibited, and the importation of tobacco subjected to special conditions, by Agreements executed between the two countries in 1875 and 1878. The restrictions were arranged in the interest of the public revenues of Turkey, in which the receipts from salt and tobacco monopolies are important items.

Turkish fort at Fāo, 1885—1905.

In December 1885 the Wāli of Basrah informed the British Assistant Political Agent at that place that it was the intention of the Turkish Government to construct a large fort at Fāo; and in May 1886 a Turkish military detachment of 160 men (probably a nominal battalion) was stationed there, and building materials were collected.

1887.

When Colonel Murdoch Smith, Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph, visited Fāo in 1887, he found the construction of the fort in active progress. The work promised to be a strong one, and it was evident that it would completely command the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab, from the channel of which it was only 500 yards distant.

It will be remembered that the British and Russian Ambassadors at Constatinople informed the Porte, before the Treaty of Erzeroum (1847) was ratified, that Persia had undertaken to abstain from constructing fortifications on the Persian bank of the Shatt-el-'Arab so long as Turkey did not erect any on the Turkish shore opposite to Persian territory: this assurance was obtained by the mediating Govern-

ments from Persia at the special instance of the Porte. The construction of a Turkish fort at Fão being regarded as a menace to British interests, a remonstrance on the subject was addressed to the Turkish Government in August 1887; but it was not well received by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The British contentions, in view of the history of the engagement annexed to the Treaty of Erzeroum, were as below:

It follows from the above facts, that the Turkish and Persian Governments stand mutually pledged to one another to abstain from fortifying on either side the banks of the Shat-el-Arab, and that Great Britain and Russia, who were the means of obtaining for the Porte this engagement from the Persian Government, have a direct interest and right to watch over its faithful observance by the contracting parties on whose behalf they intervened at the time.

It is possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs may be unaware of these facts. Or he may perhaps argue that the engagement being a reciprocal one, the Turkish Government have the option of departing from it with no other consequence than that of leaving the other party free to do the same. Her Majesty's Government cannot admit, in view of the history of the negotiations, that such a connection (? construction) is valid in International law, or that the Porte can free itself from the engagement which it took to the British and Russian mediators as well as to the Persian Government without previous arrangements with them.

And, setting the legal question aside, Her Majesty's Government, being interested in the integrity both of Persia and the Ottoman Empire and having regard to the fact that British subjects are largely interested both in the trade of Bassrah and Mohammerah, would greatly regret the construction of opposing fortifications on either bank of the river, which must constitute a menace to its peaceful navigation and under certain circumstances become a source of danger to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, or between either of them and Great Britain.

Discussions continued until the 31st July 1888, when the Turkish Government delivered their final reply in the following terms:—

We have perused your note of reply stating that the construction of fortifications at Fão is contrary to the decision arrived at when the treaty of Erzeroum was concluded, viz., that no fortifications should be made on the banks of the Shatt-el-'Arab, and declaring that any modification of this decision must be subject to the concert of the mediating powers. It is needless to explain that the agreement arrived at on this subject was not a reciprocal understanding, but Turkey at that time, in her own interests reserved to her own institution the right of constructing fortifications on those banks and brought about the engagement that so long as Turkey should not fortify the right bank of the river, Persia should abstain from building forts on her left bank. Now that Turkey has had forts made, Persia is released from her engagement and is also free to construct forts on her own ground and has no right to object. And this agreement being between the two Governments, there is no kind of engagement *vis à vis* the mediating powers, and the two Governments aforesaid are not dependent on their consent, and the construction of these works is no violation of any treaty between the two countries.

As it was evident from the tenor of this communication that the Turkish Government meant to persist in their design of fortifying Fáo, Sir H. D. Wolff, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrán, suggested that a British naval squadron of some strength should visit the Persian Gulf; and the demonstration which he recommended was decided on in principle, but was deferred (and eventually not carried out), lest umbrage should be given to Russia, already irritated by the opening of the Kárún River to navigation under British auspices.

1889. In February 1889, at the instance of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the Persian Ambassador at the Porte addressed a note in the following sense to the Turkish Government:

It is clear that the construction of fortifications on the Shatt-el-'Arab is contrary to the Convention concluded through the mediation of Russia and England at the time of the exchange at Constantinople of the ratifications of the treaty of Erzerum, dated the 21st March 1848.

No action contrary to the provisions of the Convention can be legitimate without the consent of the two signatory powers of the above mentioned treaty, as well as that of the mediating powers, having been obtained.

Now this action, in opposition to the said Convention, whose provisions are at present in force, has given rise to strong remonstrances on the part of England and Persia, and it is submitted that the fact that no attention is yet being paid to these remonstrances cannot naturally serve to maintain the friendly sentiments which exist between the two countries.

No result, however, followed from this communication, or from further remonstrances by the British Ambassador; and work on the Fáo fort continued, with occasional interruptions due to extraneous causes, during 1889. Drawings and plans of the work were made about this time by a clerk of the British telegraph station at Fáo, who succeeded in obtaining access to it.

1890. In 1890, under orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the East India Squadron, His Majesty's ships "Sphinx", "Griffon", and "Redpole" visited Fáo. On the 11th March Commander Boldero of the "Sphinx", accompanied by Commander Blaxland, proceeded on shore to visit the Turkish Officer in command of the fort; but, immediately that his boat touched land, the ramparts of the fort were manned by riflemen who, under the orders of an officer, opened fire on the British party. No one, fortunately, having been hit, Commander Boldero decided not to reply to the fire but to return to his ship. Under orders from the Admiral he demanded an explanation from the Commandant of the fort, who answered, without making any reference to the firing by his men, that

he had received no official information of the intention of the British officers to visit the fort; that he had orders from his military superiors at Basrah not to allow any one to enter or approach the fort; and that there was a quarantine cordon. The matter was also reported by the British Consul at Basrah to Constantinople with the result that Commander Boldero was admitted to the fort on the 22nd March, and that an assurance was subsequently given that the Turkish officer responsible for the firing had been removed from his command and sentenced to six month's imprisonment.

1890-94. At the time of Commander Boldero's visit the Fāo fort, though it was not a large work and had been under construction for nearly four years, was still incomplete; the embrasures were unfinished, no shields were in position, and there were no mountings for guns. In 1892 and 1893 work on the fort was resumed in a desultory fashion, with the consequence that in August of the latter year the British Ambassador at Constantinople expressed to the Porte a hope that they would "give orders for the prompt "discontinuance of the work in question, for, should the fort be completed "and steps taken towards arming it, Her Majesty's Government would "regard such action as one of hostile preparation which they would be entitl-"ed to resent, and which would justify them in taking necessary measures "for counteracting it". In November 1893 the British objections were renewed, and an assurance was received that orders for stopping the work would be issued; but it was not actually discontinued until May 1894.

1905. The fort remained unarmed with artillery, and in 1905 the strength of the garrison was only about 45 rifles.

It may be mentioned that the Persian Government, throughout the controversy, showed entire indifference on the subject of the fort, and that the whole burden of opposing its construction was consequently borne by the British Government.

Other Turkish posts on the Shatt-al-'Arab, 1890-94. Between 1890 and 1894 small military guard-houses were built by the Turks on Shamshamiyah Island; at Kūt-az-Zain, on the Turkish bank, nearly opposite to the mouth of the Kārūn; and at another place on the Turkish side, apparently Gat'ah, between Kūt-az-Zain and Dawāsir. These erections were of burnt brick, one storey high, with a loopholed parapet surrounding the roof. There was talk in 1890 of the construction of a Turkish fort, similar to that at Fāo, at or near Kūt-az-Zain; but this scheme was not carried into effect.

Projected transfer of the Basrah quarantine station to Fāo. In 1891 the Turkish Government proposed to transfer the Basrah quarantine station to Fāo. The ostensible object was to prevent evasion

quarantine station to Fão. 1891-97.

of the payment of quarantine fees at Basrah by travellers who might disembark at Muhammarah and proceed thence—as many undoubtedly did—by land or by small boat to Basrah; but in reality the Turkish authorities aimed at establishing their ascendancy over the waterway of the Shatt-el-'Arab, a purpose which the construction of a Turkish fort at Fão had not sufficed to effect; and it was also hoped, apparently, to strike a telling blow at the commercial prosperity of Muhammarah. The scheme, which was inimical to British commercial as well as political interests, was opposed by Her Majesty's Government, was resisted by the British and Russian delegates on the Constantinople Board of Health, and failed to be carried into execution. It was brought forward again in 1894 and continued to be cherished by its originators for some time longer, being revived in 1897; but in vain. Practical and scientific considerations were in no wise in its favour, for vessels declared to be bound for Muhammarah, a Persian port, could not legally be stopped at Fão.

Collection of Turkish customs at Fão from vessels bound for Muhammarah. 1893-94.

In 1893 the Turkish authorities at Fão made an audacious attempt to treat the Shatt-el-'Arab below Muhammarah as a Turkish river and began to interfere with its navigation in a manner contrary to the treaty of Erzeroum (1847). One of the first cases which arose was that of a British Indian sailing vessel which, having arrived in the Shatt-el-'Arab with a cargo of charcoal for Muhammarah, was stopped at Fão and placed in quarantine there for 24 hours. The master was obliged to sign a paper, to him incomprehensible, for production at the Turkish custom house at Dawáir further up the river, and was required to deposit one of his sails as a pledge of compliance. At Dawáir no attention was paid to the Fão paper, and the vessel was allowed to proceed to Muhammarah. On her return seaward from Muhammarah with a cargo of dates she ran direct to Fão, where exception was taken to her not having called at Dawáir, and a certificate (presumably of payment of export duty in Persia) obtained from the Shaikh of Muhammarah was rejected as insufficient. The vessel returned to Dawáir; but the Turkish customs authorities there refused to grant the certificate demanded by those at Fão; and the master accordingly sailed to Basrah and lodged a complaint at the Assistant Political Agency. The British Assistant Political Agent, thinking that there had been some mistake, referred to the Turkish Mudir of customs at Basrah, from whom he received the unexpected reply that as Muhammarah was a Turkish port, he had received orders to take customs duty on all cargo

landed there." The Wāli of Basrah was then addressed, but he merely echoed the assertions of the Mudir; and the effect of a communication made by him to the Persian Consul at Basrah was similar. The Turkish claims should not have come entirely as a surprise, for as early as 1891 there had been whispers at Basrah of renewed Turkish pretensions to Muhammareh, and so far back as that year tonnage and quarantine dues had been claimed, and blackmail extorted, at Fāo from native vessels bound for Muhammareh.

Turkish customs were paid at Fāo, under protest, by two British Indian sailing vessels of which the destination was Muhammareh, one of them being probably that of which the case has been described above.

At the instance of the Shāh of Persia an energetic protest was at once made by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, apparently in consultation with the Russian Embassy there, on the subject of the Turkish claim to Muhammareh. Meanwhile a curious statement was made by M. de Butzow, the Russian Minister at Tehrān, to the effect that shortly after the conclusion of the treaty of Erzeroum an explanatory note had been extorted by the British and Russian Chargés d'Affaires at Constantinople from a Persian Commissioner, in which it was admitted that the treaty did not confer possession of Muhammareh upon Persia. The Turkish Ambassador at Tehrān affirmed that such a document existed and had never been rejected by Turkey, while the Shāh's Government asserted that it must in any case be disallowed as not authorised by proper Persian authority. The Porte, however, promptly admitted that they had no claim to Muhammareh, and the fact or fiction of the Persian Commissioner's admission was thus rendered of no importance. In explanation of the conduct of their local officials on the Shatt-el-'Arab, the Turkish Government seem to have given prominence to a distinction between duty on cargoes consigned directly to Muhammareh and others imported there from a Turkish port or through Turkish territory, but the question was not further pursued. The Turkish demands on vessels bound to or from Muhammareh ceased; and it was found unnecessary to send a British gunboat to Fāo for the protection of British Indian shipping there, as had been proposed.

The Mujtahids of Turkish 'Irāq and

The personal extravagance of Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh, ruler of Persia, the acceptance of large loans by Persia from the Russian Government, the re-organisation of the Persian customs on a European basis by means of European agents, and the levying of duties on wines and spirits in

Persian affairs, 1903-05.

place of an absolute interdict on the sale of liquor excited in 1903 acute dissatisfaction among the Persian Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala,—the chief of whom, though residing on Turkish soil, are the real leaders in all Persian religious movements, and exercise an ascendancy over the Persian mind which is not possessed by any authority in Persia itself.

Early in 1903 some of the Mujtahids in Turkish 'Iraq addressed a remonstrance to the Shah, desiring him to modify his policy; but it passed almost unheeded, the Persian Consul-General at Baghdad being merely directed to visit Karbala and Najaf and to convey His Persian Majesty's salutations to certain of the Mujtahids, together with an assurance that matters had been misrepresented to them. Muhammad-al-Garawi (Sharabiyani), Haji Muhammad Husain, Mirza Khalil (Mamaghani) and Mulla Muhammad Kazim (Khurasani) were the Mujtahids who took the most active part in the agitation against the policy of the Persian Government. In the month of June 1903 riots broke out at Tabriz against the Armenian liquor-sellers and the Belgian customs officials of that place; and tumultuary risings at Isfahan and Yazd ensued, in which numerous Babis were cruelly murdered. These disturbances were attributed by the Government of Persia to incitement by the Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala; and subsequent inquiry by British officials in Turkish 'Iraq showed that the Persian Mujtahids, among whom the Sharabiyani was the most prominent figure, though disavowing anti-Christian and anti-European sentiments, did at least approve of the wholesale "execution" of Babis. The Shah, on the occurrence of the outbreaks, telegraphed to the Mujtahids through the Persian Consul-General at Baghdad, assuring them that all the measures taken by his Government were in the interests of the Persian realm. To this communication the Mujtahids promptly replied by condemning, though in measured terms, all imitation of European methods, as well as the latitude allowed in Persia to heretics and unbelievers; they intimated not obscurely, that the adoption of certain other measures then believed to be contemplated—probably the collection of the land-revenue by European machinery—would cause a religious revolution in Persia; and they besought the Shah to repay the Russian loans, and not to depreciate the currency by unlimited coinage of silver. The Persian authorities distrusted the loyal professions of the Mujtahids, for they had, it was said, been shown a document signed by the Sharabiyani and others which conveyed approval of the lawless proceedings at Tabriz; nevertheless a courteous though evasive reply was returned by the Shah to the Mujtahids, in which he professed readiness

to be guided by them in religious matters, but deprecated their interference in affairs of state. Eventually a manifesto signed by some of the Mujtahids and dated the 3rd of August 1903 reached Persia, in which the molestation of foreign subjects was prohibited as unlawful, and the Bábi and liquor questions were described as matters within the province of the civil authorities, about to be satisfactorily regulated, but on the 14th September a document of a different character was issued by certain of the fraternity, in the form of a bull of excommunication directed against the Grand Vazír, the Atabaig-i-A'zam, who was identified with the policy to which they objected. Facsimiles of this paper, produced at Calcutta by a photographic process, were shortly in circulation over the length and breadth of Persia; and, if they were not a direct cause of the Atabaig's downfall, they at least made his return to power impossible. It was even stated that, if the obnoxious minister had not been dismissed, a similar sentence would shortly have been pronounced against his royal master. In these proceedings the Mujtahids seem to have allowed themselves to be made the tools of the political enemies of the Atabaig; but their motives were probably patriotic.

At an earlier stage of the controversy the Mujtahids had attempted to bring pressure to bear on the Sháh through the Sultán of Turkey; but the Persian Government quickly borrowed this weapon from the armoury of their critics, and, with the hope of bringing about their expulsion from the Holy Cities, denounced the Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala to the Porte as friends of the British. The expedient was skilfully chosen, and its effect was enhanced by a prohibition which the Mujtahids had rashly enacted, at the end of 1903, against the use of the Hail route to Makkah by Shí'ah Muhammadans during the continuance of hostilities between Ibn Rashíd and Ibn Sa'úd; this order of theirs was represented by the Persian Government to the Porte as having been issued in the interests of the Shaikh of Kuwait and of "his friends," the British Government. A few months later the Russian representative at Constantinople seems to have complained of the dangerous activity of the Mujtahids' agents in Persia and Central Asia. Accordingly, in June 1904, some of the Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf were threatened by the Turkish authorities with deportation to Madínah; and a secret inquiry was instituted by the Turkish authorities into their relations with foreign powers.

Alarmed by these proceedings, and weakened by the death in December 1904 of their leader the Sharabiyáni, whose funeral all but

caused a riot against the Turkish authorities at Najaf in consequence of interference with it by the Turkish sanitary staff, the Mujtahids appear from this point onwards to have modified their tone. They had already been persuaded to issue a fulmination against the "Habl-ul-Matin," a Persian newspaper published at Calcutta, of which the political views corresponded with their own, and in which what purported to be a correspondence between certain of them and the Sultan of Turkey had appeared; and they now virtually rescinded their interdict on pilgrimages by the Hāil route. Subsequently, in March 1905, on the occasion of fresh anti-foreign outbreaks at Mashhad and Kūchān, they despatched loyal telegrams, enjoining the priesthood and people of Persia to support the throne,—a step which seemed to produce some sedative effect, and which removed, for the time being, the friction that had arisen between them and the Persian Government.

Piracies on the Shatt-el-'Arab, 1868-1905.

Other matters of common interest to Turkey and Persia were piracies which, for a number of years during the period now under consideration, were frequent on the Shatt-el-'Arab.

Cases of piracy, 1880-1895.

On the 3rd January 1880 the Superintendent of the British Telegraph Station at Fāo, when proceeding to Basrah in a boat with two of his clerks, was attacked by a gang of eight Arabs at a place about twelve miles below Basrah. The members of the party, surprised while asleep, were beaten and wounded, besides being deprived of property valued at Rs. 1,070. One of the Superintendent's boatmen stated that he had recognised in the leader of the pirates an Arab named Bakhākh-bin-Sabhān of the Muhaisin tribe, a well-known bad character under the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Muhammarah. Zuhdi Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, and Hāji Jābir, Shaikh of Muhammarah, were immediately apprised of the occurrence by the British authorities and requested to take action. The guilt of Bakhākh was denied by Shaikh Jābir; but, the Government of India holding it to be clearly proved, a fine of £150 was realised from his family through the Shaikh. In the meantime the whole of the stolen property, except some cash, had been recovered by Shaikh Miz'al, a son of Hāji Jābir. Efforts were made also to obtain the surrender of Bakhākh for punishment, which

Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, had demanded; but they seem to have been fruitless, the man having fled to the marshes.

In October 1888 two British Indian sailing vessels were attacked by pirates at Ziyādīyah on the Turkish side of the river; three persons were killed, two were wounded, and property to the value of Rs. 3,000 was carried off. Certain Turkish subjects were prosecuted in this case, but were not convicted, the influence of the manager of certain Civil List estates having been exerted in their favour. 1888.

The British Indian vessel "Chaturpasa," a Batil from Kach, was plundered on the 6th November 1889 near the island of Hāji Salbūq, all moveable property, including the cash and even the sails of the boat, being taken; one person was killed on board, and four were wounded. In this case the pirates, about twenty in number, were stated to be from the Persian bank; but, though the Shaikh of Muhammareh took steps to trace them, they were not discovered. 1889.

On the 12th December the "Daulatpasa," another British Indian sailing vessel, was stripped of all portable effects, including $700 in specie; but in this case there was no loss of life or personal injury. The scene of the piracy was Khast; but none of the robbers, whose number was about thirty, could be traced.

On the next day an unsuccessful attempt was made at the same place on the British Indian Batil "Fly," and the offenders this time seemed to belong to Turkish territory, but the Wāli of Basrah maintained that they were from Persia.

On the 13th September 1890 the "Harsingha" and "Sukarpasa," owned by British subjects resident at Gwādar, were plundered near Baraim, a village on the Persian island of 'Abbādān by a gang of about forty pirates, apparently from the Persian side. Two persons were killed and three wounded; and all movables, among them cash to the value of Rs. 860, were taken. There were two or three Turkish soldiers and clerks on board, passengers from Fāo to Basrah, but they gave the crew no assistance against the robbers. In this instance the Wāli of Basrah and the Shaikh of Muhammareh each asserted that the pirates belonged to the other's jurisdiction. 1890.

In 1895, within the Shatt-el-'Arab and in the vicinity of its mouth, Persian and Arab as well as Indian vessels suffered at the hands of pirates; and some of the attacks made were of a most savage and murderous character. One derelict was picked up containing only corpses. 1895.

Among the victims of this year was the "Haripasa" of Jámnagar, an Indian State, which was attacked near Fáo on the 19th September, had four men killed and three wounded and was plundered of property worth Rs. 3,400. The robbers in this instance appeared to be Nasúr Ka'ab of the Persian bank; and after some enquiries had been made by the Mudír of Fáo, the Turkish authorities repudiated all responsibility. The Shaikh of Muhammareh, on his part, showed a strong disinclination to take action, and only one arrest was made under his orders.

In none of the above cases was any satisfaction obtained, the Turkish and Persian authorities invariably trying to cast upon each other the responsibility for each fresh outrage.

Preventive measures and repression of piracy, 1896.

This unsatisfactory state of matters obliged the British representatives at Basrah and Muhammareh to insist that the local authorities at those places should take effectual measures for policing the river. The result was the establishment, during 1896, of posts at which native vessels could anchor for the night in safety, and the introduction by the Turkish and Persian authorities of nocturnal patrolling by armed boats. The posts instituted on the Turkish side were at Sangar, Shamahamiyah Island, Kút-az-Zain, Ziyádiyah, Fáo, and a place between Ziyádiyah and Fáo; and half a company of Turkish regulars, under two officers, were distributed over them. On the Persian bank posts were located at Hárthah, Juruf, Baraim, Shatait, Manyúhi and Qasbeh, as well as other places; and strenuous injunctions were issued by the Shaikh of Muhammareh to the inhabitants of his river-bank villages to protect British Indian sailing craft. In the autumn H. M. S. "Lapwing" was stationed in the Shatt-el-'Arab. These precautions, together with the semblance of concerted action between the authorities on the opposite banks which they produced, had an excellent effect; and after their institution only a few unimportant cases of piracy were reported. One serious crime occurred off the bar of the river, in which the master of a vessel was killed, two traders were wounded, and goods and cash to the amount of Rs. 5,000 were plundered; but this was apparently before the measures described above were taken. In December 1896 a Persian boat from Dilam which went aground near Baraim was attacked, two or three persons on board being more or less wounded and the cargo looted; but the only other complaint during the latter part of the year referred to a Kuwait vessel which was threatened or annoyed near Qasbeh, but which apparently suffered no loss.

No reparation was obtained in the two last mentioned cases, both of which belonged to the Persian side.

In 1897, the vigilance of authorities having apparently been relaxed, there was a recrudescence of piracy. Recrudescence of piracy, 1897.

In May of that year three piracies were committed on Kuwait vessels at the mouth of the river, and in one of these a member of the crew was killed and property worth Rs. 5,500 carried off.

On the 6th September one Persian sailing vessel was looted by another outside the river; but H. M. S. "Pigeon" and the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence," which happened to be near the spot, at once set off in pursuit; and the "Lawrence," on the second day, succeeded in capturing the offenders. Four of the pirates, who were Persian subjects, were handed over to the Persian authorities and were sentenced to six months imprisonment each; and the guilty vessel and its contents were sold, the proceeds being handed over as compensation to the injured party, some of whom had been severely wounded.

The next case was a graver one: it was that of the "Kaliyanpasa," a British Indian sailing vessel, which was attacked on the river at Saihán on the night of the 1st December. In this affair one British Indian and one 'Ománi subject lost their lives, and a quantity of valuable property was carried off. Saihán is in Turkish territory, but the pirates seemed to belong to the Persian side. The only person arrested was a Persian subject who was not really implicated, and whom the Turkish police seized for reasons of their own. The case remained under enquiry for some time, but it was never settled.

These events necessitated more stringent preventive measures, in which the lead was taken by the British authorities. H.M.S. "Redbreast" was stationed in the river in September 1898 and remained until January 1899. The Turkish and Persian authorities were also induced to exert themselves. In September 1898 the number of river-side posts occupied by military in Turkish territory was increased to 13, and the Turkish armed steamers "Álús" and "Zuhaf" were equipped for service; but this by no means spontaneous display of energy was not considered a sufficient reason for acceding to a request made by the Porte in November 1898 for the withdrawal of the British gunboat. On the Persian side the Shaikh of Muhammareh raised the number of his posts to 12, at each of which a Ballam was stationed and the Persian flag hoisted; and all movement of private Ballams at night in the waters adjoining the Persian bank was prohibited. It was suggested by the British authorities that the headmen of villages should be warned that they would be held responsible for piracies committed Increased precautions against piracy, 1898-99.

by those under their authority, and that in doubtful cases reparation would be exacted from the inhabitants of both banks; but, though representations in this sense were made to the Wáli of Basrah by Mr. Wratislaw, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, it is uncertain whether the desired steps were taken by the Wilāyat.

Cessation of piracy, 1897-1900.

For three years, from the end of 1897 to the end of 1900, there was a complete cessation of piracy in the Shatt-el-'Arab. In each year at least one British gunboat remained more or less continuously in the river during the season of date exportation; and her presence was no doubt the chief cause, directly and indirectly, of the improved state of affairs.

Revival of piracy, 1901-1904.

When piracy began again in 1901, the methods of the pirates had changed. From that year onwards outrages were mostly confined to the slack season, when no British gunboat was at hand; and they occurred chiefly on the bar outside the river, over which the Turkish and Persian authorities maintained little or no surveillance.

The first piracy on the Shatt-el-'Arab after 1897 was committed on the 27th January 1901 on the "Hussaini," a Bahrain boat, while she was lying aground off Ma'āmir upon the Turkish side of the river; the loss in property on this occasion was considerable, but there were no fatalities. The next case happened on the bar of the Shatt-el-'Arab on the 4th November 1901, when the "Yāsmin", a sailing-vessel owned by a Khōjah British subject of Bandar 'Abbās, was attacked by a Ballam containing 20 pirates; after the boat had been plundered she was abandoned by the crew from fear of a second attack, but she was recovered again in the neighbourhood of Kharag Island. The third victim in 1901 was the British Indian Ghunchah "Fadarath," which was pillaged on the bar on the 27th of December. The offenders in these three cases were stated to be Ka'ab Arabs under the leadership of one Khalaif of Faddāghiyah in Turkish territory; but, though a correspondence took place between the Wáli of Basrah and the Shaikh of Muhammareh, none of them were brought to justice.

On the 8th April 1902 the "Fath-al-Khair" of Bahrain was attacked, also on the bar, and looted; one of her people was wounded; and the crew were kept prisoners for two days and compelled to give up their cash, which they had secreted. Immediately after, a Būshehr Mashwa was plundered, probably by the same gang, who were said to be residents of Dorah and Faddāghiyah on the Turkish bank of the Shatt-el-'Arab. On the 27th May the "Hussaini" of Kuwait, which

had shipped specie to the amount of Rs. 15,000 at Muhammareh, was held up and robbed off Būbiyān Island by a boat which had followed her from the Shatt-el-'Arab, one man being killed; and the pirates, in this instance also, were said to be men of Dorah and Faddāghīyah. Possibly for this reason a visit paid by the Shaikh of Kuwait to the Shaikh of Muhammareh, in connection with the case, was productive of no result. On the 29th May one of the Shaikh of Muhammareh's water patrols gave chase to two Ballams which had approached a Būshehr boat in a suspicious manner; but the men in the Ballams fired on the patrol boat and ultimately took refuge in the Hājiyah creek near Faddāghīyah, the inhabitants of which village turned out to their assistance.

At the time of these events the Shaikh of Muhammareh had only one armed boat between Qasbeh and the mouth of the Bahmanshīr; and the Turks had discontinued the use of armed boats altogether. The Shaikh, however, now sent his steamer "Irān" to Qasbeh and stationed two armed Ballams between the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab and the mouth of the Bahmanshīr, besides a Būm at the entrance of the Shatt-el-'Arab. The Turkish steamer "Ālūs" was put on duty on the river, but was of little service, as her engines almost immediately broke down. H. M. S. "Sphinx" was ordered to co-operate with the local authorities. A temporary cessation of piracy ensued, but the perpetrators of the recent attacks remained undiscovered and unpunished.

Before the end of the date season outrages recommenced. On the night of the 25th November, 1902, H. M. S. "Assaye" being then engaged in investigations at the bar outside river, the "Fath-al-Khair" of Masqat, registered at that port as a British vessel and flying the British flag, was boarded by pirates on the Turkish side of the Shatt-el-'Arab near Ma-'āmir and plundered; the mate was killed; and the master was stabbed in several places. The pirates in this case were 10 or 12 Arabs and negroes, who were said to belong to the Persian side.

On the 3rd of February 1903 a Kuwait vessel, carrying a master, 5 sailors, and a merchant as a passenger, was attacked in Khor Mūsa and captured after a fight lasting 4 hours. The occupants were killed, with the exception of one of the crew, and the boat was looted. This piracy was attributed to natives of Dorah on the Shatt-el-'Arab, four or five of whom were believed to have been killed or wounded in the engagement. No satisfaction was obtained by the sufferers in any of the piracies of 1902 or 1903.

At the beginning of 1904, the trouble was renewed. On the 30th of January a Karachi sailing vessel, the "Sogarparsa," while moored at the quarantine station within sight of Basrah was boarded by a gang of 20 men who arrived in a Ballam: they wounded the master with knives and carried away the effects and money of the crew. At this time the Turks were again without any system of water patrols, even at Basrah, and their land police was inefficient; protection of property on the river at Basrah consequently depended on private watchmen, who at night frequently exchanged shots with prowling thieves. A very serious case occurred on the 3rd February in the early morning. The vessel attacked in this instance was the "Fath-as-Salámat" of Karachi, of 153 tons register, and the scene of the outrage was the outer side of the Shatt-el-'Arab bar, about 10 miles from Fáo. The "Fath-as-Salámat" had sailed from Ma'ámir, up the river, on the 1st of February with a cargo of dates, and had been followed by her assailant, a Bům carrying 20 men, from Qasbeh, where it had been lying at anchor for three days previously. The pirates made free use of their fire-arms, killing 2 and wounding 2 of the "Fath-as-Salámat's" crew of 15: after plundering the vessel they scuttled her and damaged her small boat and left the occupants to drown. The survivors of the crew succeeded however, in plugging the bottom of the small boat: and they were picked up by the British steamer "Dwina," which conveyed them to Basrah. The material damage in this case, including the loss of the "Fath-as-Salámat," was estimated at Rs. 25,000. According to information received, three of the pirates belonged to Qasbeh and ten of them to a place at the mouth of the Hindiyán River, and the stolen property had been secreted at the latter of these. H.M.S. "Lapwing" accordingly proceeded to the mouth of the Hindiyán and searched the houses of a settlement there, but without success, heavy weather which caused delay in landing having given the inhabitants ample time to remove the evidences of their guilt after the "Lapwing" was sighted. A reward of Rs. 1,000 was offered by the British authorities for information leading to the conviction of any of the offenders, but no evidence was forthcoming; and eventually His British Majesty's Consul at Basrah reported that nothing more could be done in this or in the "Sogarparsa" case. The Persian Government complained of the proceedings of the "Lapwing" at the mouth of the Hindiyán and were informed in reply that the sovereign rights of Persia would be scrupulously respected, but that the action of His Britannic Majesty's ships in the repression of piracy could not be subjected to restrictions.

In August 1904, H. M. S. "Merlin" was sent to patrol the Shatt-el-'Arab, and about the same time an effort was made by the British Government to induce the Turkish and Persian authorities to co-operate in a serious manner for the purpose of tracing and arresting local pirates. The Shaikh of Muhammareh, whose posts and patrols were on the whole more effectively maintained than those of the Wāli of Basrah, was willing to act with the Turks, and suggested that he should be authorised to arrest bad characters on either bank of the river. The Porte also showed a disposition to enter into some arrangement. But the Persian Government declined to commit themselves to anything in the nature of an extradition treaty with Turkey, and the British proposals fell to the ground.

Failure of a British attempt to promote co-operation between the Turkish and Persian authorities, 1904.

The natural sequel of deficient co-operation was the renewal of trouble immediately on the departure of H. M. S. "Sphinx" from the river at the beginning of January 1905. On the 11th of that month an ordinary piracy was committed on a Kuwait boat in the Shatt-el-'Arab; and at the beginning of March a more serious attack took place on a Bahrain boat not far from Basrah, accompanied by the murder of the captain, who was a subject of the Shaikh of Kuwait. There were also one or two minor cases. A lull followed, which appeared to be partly due to the settlement by the Shaikh of Muhammareh of some 1,500 'Idān tribesmen on waste lands in the neighbourhood of Qasbeh.

After 1898, the year in which the British Government first took a share in policing the Shatt-el-'Arab during the date season, the river and its approaches were fairly safe during the busy months; but piracies continued to occur at uncertain intervals, some of them attended by loss of life, without a single one of the perpetrators being brought to justice or any compensation obtained for material losses. Indian vessels under the British flag were particularly exposed to violence by small gangs, as their crews, besides being timorous, were generally unarmed. Nevertheless there was an increase in the number of Indian craft calling at Basrah, which was attributable in part, to the increased security of the river during the date season.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with European foreign powers other than Britain, 1876-1905.

The only European power besides Britain represented at Baghdād at the beginning of the period was the French Republic. Very import-

ant archæological excavations were carried on at Tallo from 1877 to 1900 by Mr. E. de Sarzec, who was during part of that time French Vice-Consul at Basrah, and during part of it French Consul at Baghdad. Russia at first showed no signs of interest in the province; but the Armenian community, though outwardly loyal to the Turkish Government, were supposed to have Russian proclivities; and it was believed that the Russian Government kept themselves informed of affairs in Turkish 'Irāq through Armenian agents.

Later in the reign of 'Abdul Hamid the attention of various European powers was turned to Turkish 'Irāq, and a Russian Consulate-General and several Foreign Consulates were established, as shown in the Appendix on Diplomatic and Consular Representation.

United States of America, 1885-1900.

In 1885 an American Archæological Mission visited Turkish 'Irāq; and thereafter, from 1888 to 1900, excavations were carried on at Nifar by American archæologists working under the auspices of the University of Pennsylvania.

Russia, from 1883.

The power next to Britain having most connection with the province was, before the inception of the Baghdād Railway scheme, Russia; and Russian instigation was suspected in the case of an attempt by the Turkish authorities in 1883 to prevent the navigation of the Tigris by British vessels.

Germany, from 1903.

Afterwards Germany, in consequence of the Baghdād Railway arrangements occupied the second place; but during the period with which we are concerned neither German nor Russian interests materialised locally to an appreciable extent. Archæological excavations on a large scale were, however, carried on at Babylon from January 1899 by a German Mission under the direction of Dr. Koldewey.

Russian war vessel's visit to Basrah, March 1900.

It may be mentioned that the stay of the Russian war vessel "Gilyak" at Basrah from the 5th to the 13th March 1900 was made the occasion of a somewhat ostentatious display by the Russian Consul from Baghdād, and that the regulation period of quarantine was reduced in her favour by the Turkish authorities from 10 to 5 days. The Board of Health at Constantinople, however, on the representations of the British delegate, soon afterwards agreed to extend the relaxation to all foreign warships calling at Basrah; and the permanent benefit of the concession thus reverted chiefly to the British navy.

Questions of navigation in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905.

It will be convenient to treat all navigation questions of the period in Turkish 'Irāq together, though the interests involved were partly Turkish and partly foreign.

In 1876 the "Dejleh," belonging to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Messrs. Lynch), was sunk in the Tigris by striking the wreck of a native vessel which she had herself sent to the bottom two years earlier. All efforts to refloat her failed, though divers and apparatus were sent out from England for the purpose; and after some delay her owners replaced her by the "Blosse Lynch," a two-funnelled steel vessel, 225 feet in length and 29 feet in beam, with a tonnage of 383. The new steamer, built by Messrs. Rennie & Company of London, cost £22,000 before she was put together at Messrs. Lynch's Msgil workshops near Basrah, and several thousand pounds more were spent on her erection there. She was of more ambitious design than any of her predecessors, but her greater size was not without attendant disadvantages.

Lynch and Company's fleet, 1876–78.

In 1878 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company had two steamers running on the Tigris and the net profit of their operations was said to be about 25 per cent. per annum.

Turkish river steamers in 1878.

The Turkish Government steamers on the Tigris in 1878 numbered seven; and in 1879 they were under the management of the Turkish Naval Commodore at Basrah; but their administration frequently changed hands, and in all circumstances it was haphazard and inefficient. It was the custom of the Turkish administration to send one vessel up the Euphrates each year upon the spring floods; but the date of her starting from Basrah was always uncertain, and the voyage, which generally extended to Birijik was unremunerative. The officers of most of the Turkish vessels were at this time British, and the annual net earnings of the Turkish flotilla were believed to be at the rate of 8 per cent., notwithstanding the unbusiness-like manner in which its affairs were conducted.

Proposed Turkish dam across the Tigris, 1879.

The snow-fall in the mountains of Armenia in the winter of 1778-79 was very deficient, with the result that the level of the Tigris in the following summer was unprecedentedly low. To prevent injury to rice cultivation on the lower reaches of the river the Wali of Baghdad formed the extraordinary resolution of throwing a temporary dam across the main channel at 'Azair (Ezra's Tomb), by which navigation between Baghdad and Basrah would have been made impossible without transhipment. The scheme drew vehement protests from the merchants of all nationalities at Baghdad, who represented that the loss to the Turkish Government in customs revenue would be greater then the gain in (or rather saving of) agricultural receipts, and that the navigation

of the Tigris might be permanently affected. These arguments did not prevail with the Wilāyat; but, when the project was on the eve of execution, it was suddenly prohibited by orders from Constantinople.

Attack by Arabs on the "Khalifah," 1880.

On the morning of the 8th July 1880 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co.'s steamer "Khalifah," while passing up the Tigris with the British mails, a light general cargo, and about 80 passengers, was attacked by Arab marauders a few miles from 'Amir. The Arabs suddenly appeared in some long grass on the bank and opened a brisk fire on the steamer, which they maintained for about 40 minutes, following by land and attempting to board her, but without success. The commander, Captain Clements, and the chief engineer, Mr. Cole, clung manfully to their posts, and the Arabs at last abandoned the pursuit. On board a native quartermaster and one passenger were killed and Captain Clements was wounded, being shot through the lungs. The perpetrators of the outrage were Āl Bū Muhammad tribesmen, subject to the authority of Shaikh Saihūd. No motive could be assigned for this wholly unprecedented attack, except the usual Arab fondness for plunder, coupled in this instance perhaps with a desire on the part of the Āl Bū Muhammad to draw attention to their grievances against the Turkish Government, which at the time had proscribed them as rebels. The "Blosse Lynch", which passed down the river shortly afterwards was not molested. The "Khalifah" on her next journey from Baghdād to Basrah was provided with a Turkish guard of 30 soldiers, and a Turkish gunboat was ordered to Basrah.

Representations were immediately made at Constantinople, and the Porte promised that an expedition would be sent against the offending tribe, and that the river would be patrolled by an armed Turkish steamer. In August 1880 it was reported that Shaikh Saihūd, who had retired to an island named Abu Shadar in the marshes between the Tigris and the Euphrates above their junction at Qūrnah, had succeeded in repulsing an attack made on him at the instance of the Turkish authorities by his elder brother, Shaikh Wādi, and another relation. His followers suffered little loss, but of the attacking force seven were killed and twenty were wounded. The ends of the only creek giving access to the Shaikh's retreat were guarded by the Turkish steamers "Basrah" on the Tigris and "Rusāfah" on the Euphrates. Later Sālih Bey, the Mutasarrif of Amārah, proceeded against Shaikh Saihūd with regular troops; but the Shaikh fled without encountering them, and it soon became evident that the prospects of his being captured were small. His stronghold at Abu Shadar, however, such as it was, was destroyed.

The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. gave notice that they would claim compensation for the outrage; and Colonel Miles, the British Resident at Baghdād, continued to press, both locally and through Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, for effectual punitive measures; but the Wāli of Baghdād seemed timid and disinclined to authorise coercive proceedings; and he even proposed to withdraw the Turkish military guards which had been furnished to the British steamers. Eventually one Haji Mutair, said to have been concerned in the attack on the "Khalifah," was captured, and in February 1881 he was condemned to death by the Turkish Courts; but the sentence long remained unexecuted, pending an appeal by him to Constantinople, the final result of which is not known. The case continued to be pressed by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and by the British Resident at Baghdād, but without further success. The local Turkish authorities seemed more anxious to conciliate Shaikh Saihūd than to punish him; they represented him as having emigrated to Persia, though in reality he was still hiding in the Tigris marshes; and it was reported that they had offered him the lease of certain state lands on condition of his appearing in person, but he did not take advantage of the proposal, which perhaps covered a design to seize him by treachery. The Porte insisted that subsequent reports by the British Resident at Baghdād, who described the situation as insecure and asked that British war vessels might be sent to Basrah, were incorrect; and they asserted on the authority of the Wāli of Baghdād that "the safety of the river left nothing to be desired." A few years latter, as we have seen, Shaikh Saihūd gave more trouble to the Turkish authorities.

Question of the right of British steamers to tow barges, 1880-81.

Meanwhile a controversy had arisen in regard to the right of British river steamers to tow barges on the Tigris. About the beginning of 1880 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co., after giving six months' notice of their intention to do so, began to employ barges; but in March of that year, after one barge had been in use for three months and another had made several trips, the Wali of Baghdād objected to the practice and intimated that barges might not be towed until special permission had been received from Constantinople.

The Wāli's argument, which the Turkish Government at once adopted, was that that Messrs. Lynch's concession (or rather what the Porte regarded as such) admitted of the British Company's running two steamers only, and that, as barges were not mentioned in the Farmān considered (by the Porte) to be Messrs. Lynch's, none could be employed

without express sanction from the Turkish authorities. On the part of the Company it was contended that no exception had been taken in the past to the towing of native boats by British steamers, when required, and that there was no difference in principle between the towing of native boats and the towing of barges; that the right to run steamers implied the right to use steamers in any way that steamers could be employed, which included the towing of barges; and, finally, that barges were towed by the steamers of the Turkish flotilla. The upshot of the discussion seems to have been that in 1881 the use of barges by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. was permitted, but only for so long as a scarcity then existing in Mesopotamia should continue.

During the negotiations the historical and legal basis of the British navigation rights in Mesopotamia was thoroughly examined by Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdad, who placed his conclusions on record in a lucid and able despatch. It was pointed out by Mr. Plowden that, in addition to local permissions and grants of various sorts, there existed in Article 22 of the Capitulations of 1861 between Britain and Turkey, confirmed by the Commercial Treaty of 1861, a general warrant for free British navigation in all Turkish waters.

Protection of British steamers on the Tigris, 1883.

In April 1883, in consequence of disorders which then prevailed on the Tigris near 'Amārah, Turkish military guards were again supplied to the British river steamers, on which they travelled as deck passengers.

Attempt by the Turkish Government to prevent British navigation on the Tigris, 1882.

In May 1883 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. wished to add a new vessel, the "Mejidieh," to their fleet; but the Wali of Baghdad asserted, in correspondence with the British Resident, that the Company were entitled to possess two vessels only, and that, when they found it necessary to replace one of their ships, it must be by a ship of the same size. The "Mejidieh," it may be observed, was supposed to be a larger steamer than any yet employed by the Company; but, though her beam exceeded that of the "Blosse Lynch" by 6 feet in order to give a shallower draught, her length was less by 10 feet and her tonnage by 10 tons. The objection as to size being thus disposed of, fundamentally unjustified and unreasonable as it appeared, the Wali under orders from Constantinople resorted to the argument that, under the terms of their (supposed) concession, the Company had not the right to navigate the Tigris at all, but only the Euphrates; and on the 14th June 1882 he officially requested Colonel Tweedie, the British Resident, to prevent Messrs. Lynch's steamers from entering the Tigris. The Resident

accordingly made a telegraphic reference on the subject to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

On the 28th June a British* steamer was prevented from loading cargo at Baghdād, and the Resident was informed by the Wāli on the same day that he had received orders by telegram from Constantinople to prohibit the entry of British steamers into the Tigris. Colonel Tweedie asked that execution of the orders might be deferred as the matter was then under discussion at Constantinople, but the Wāli replied: "I have "the honour to repeat the intimation already made to you that, as Messrs. "Lynch and Company's privilege applies to the Euphrates only, the "Ottoman Government have finally prohibited their keeping steamers on "the Tigris." As the "Mejidieh," however, then at Baghdād, had arrived before receipt of the Turkish Government's instructions, she was allowed to discharge her cargo. The Wāli added: "Final orders have "been given to the Captain of our steamer at Qūrnah and others that "henceforward it is requisite that no cargo should be given to Lynch's "steamers; also that should they desire to run on the Tigris and come up "again to Baghdād, it will be necessary to obstruct them and give them "no way to enter the Tigris."

The British Resident remonstrated, referring to the serious consequences to which the steps threatened might give rise, and protesting against the interference with the British mail service involved; but the Wāli answered that he was merely acting under instructions, and that the British mails could be sent by Turkish steamer.

On the 5th July, in accordance with the Turkish pretensions, gendarmes were sent on board the "Mejidieh," which was preparing for her downward voyage; cargo and passengers were prevented from approaching the vessel; and various means of insulting and annoying the officers and crew were employed. Native merchandise intended for shipment by the "Mejidieh" was conveyed instead, at the dictate of the Turkish customs officials, to the Turkish steamer "Furāt." On the 6th July the "Mejidieh" left Baghdād for Basrah with the British mails, but otherwise quite empty and so light as to be dangerous for navigation. The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, who had at all times carried Turkish official despatches and specie gratis, and who were under contract for delivery of goods and had chartered tonnage at Basrah for their onward transit, were naturally much aggrieved by

*This steamer is called in the correspondence the "Mosul," but the "Mejidieh" may be meant. There was a Turkish steamer "Mūsal."

this unceremonious treatment, and hinted at claims for damages, which they hoped would be supported by Her Majesty's Government. The British Resident accordingly sent a further short official protest to the Wáli, but it passed unheeded. Perceiving signs of excitement in the town, which he feared might lead to disturbances endangering the life and property of all Europeans at Baghdád, Colonel Tweedie conferred with his French and Russian Colleagues on the subject of his difficulties with the Wilâyat; and the former promised to aid him by addressing the Wáli officially, but the latter gave it as his opinion that there was no danger and declined to take any action.

In the 14th July a British mail steamer, apparently the "Khalifah," arrived at Baghdád from Basrah. A Turkish guard was immediately placed on board her, and neither crew nor passengers were allowed to land. The landing of the British parcels mail was also prevented. The same evening Colonel Tweedie sent a Dragoman to remonstrate with the Wáli in a friendly and unofficial manner on his proceedings; but on all points the Wáli "was firm and determined, though courteous, "and what he said about the parcels mail merely was that he would "compel them (*sic*) to go down to Basrah and be brought up here again "on board a Turkish steamer." On the 15th July the "Khalifah" left Baghdád for Basrah, the Turkish authorities being apparently afraid to prevent her departure by force, as they had threatened to do; she seems to have carried a letter mail, but no cargo or passengers.

The effects of the proceedings of the Turkish authorities was described by the British Resident as a "blow now daily being inflicted on "our visible (and invisible) power in the presence of all Her Majesty's "native Indian subjects here, and others." He further observed, generally:

> In the eyes of these practical and untutored people, it simply looks as if war had broken out between England and the Porte, and the hostilities had for three weeks been all confined to one side. Of course this is a wrong view, but nowhere do appearances go for more than here.
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> Already, as I am credibly informed, the Ottoman Navigational Bureau has, on the strength of our trade having been stopped and all traffic diverted for a short time into its hands, greatly raised its rates for freight, much to the disgust of some of the very capitalists and traders who have been conspiring to bring about the present coup. The truth is, if the navigation of the Tigris between Basrah and Baghdád were, by any possibility, to fall within the power of Turkish maladministration and rapacity, it would gradually collapse. No capitalists having large ventures would hold themselves

very long at the mercy of so uncertain a Government as this. And the trade of the country would subside to its pristine channels, namely small native crafts run by people too poor and obscure to think of anything better than getting on as best they could, now submitting to extortion, now eluding it through bribery or cunning, and leading, generally, the precarious lives to which Asiatics are as a rule habituated.

Meanwhile active measures had been taken by the British Government, at Constantinople and in London, for the removal of the embargo on British navigation. On the 4th August the Turkish Ambassador in London, Musurus Pāsha, informed Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that "the Porte had decided on revoking for the present "the measures taken by the authorities at Baghdād with regard to the "navigation of the Tigris by Messrs. Lynch and Co.'s vessels," but he explained that this decision was subject to three conditions:—

1. That it was not to be considered as in any way prejudicing or derogating from the rights claimed by the Porte in regard to the navigation of the Tigris.
2. That the question of those rights and of the extent and nature of the privileges conceded to the Company should be examined and discussed between the two Governments.
3. That there should be no question of claims for compensation on account of what had taken place.

To the last of these conditions Lord Granville informed the Turkish Ambassador that he was unable to assent.

On the 4th August opposition to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co.'s operations in Turkish 'Irāq was suspended; and on the 20th August it was finally withdrawn. From observations made by the Turkish Ambassador in London to Sir J. Pauncefote on the 15th August, it appeared that the documents relating to British navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates, and especially those constituting the arrangement of 1846, were differently construed by British and Turkish authorities; but it does not seem that the discussion of their proper effect was carried to a conclusion, or that any common agreement as to their meaning was reached.

The interference of the Turkish Government with British navigation in 1883 appeared to be partly due to the intrigues of local* aspirants to a monopoly of navigation on the Tigris, as mentioned by Colonel Tweedie; but the discovery by the Porte, apparently in 1881, that the Farmān of 1834 referred to the Euphrates and not to the Tigris, may

* A Jewish firm at Baghdād were stated to have applied for and obtained a concession for navigation.

have had something to do with it; and it was also remarked that it synchronised with the first appearance of a Russian Consul at Baghdád, where there were few if any European Russian subjects and where Russian trade did not exist.

Formation of an Ottoman Navigation Company, 1892.

In 1892 the formation of an Ottoman Company for the Navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates was authorised by Imperial Edict. This scheme, which had been incubating since 1883, and which had appeared to be on the point of * realisation in 1888, appeared to be connected with another for irrigating lands on both sides of the Tigris which had been purchased by the Dáirat-as-Saniyah or Administration of the Sultán's Civil List. It was understood that the new Company, of which the capital was expected to be about £100,000, would enjoy the full support of the Turkish Government and would employ four steamers. Two steamers were in fact ordered in London by the Turkish Ministry of Marine, a circumstance which sufficiently attested official patronage; but one of them was lost with all hands on the voyage out, and the other was diverted to Constantinople.

Impaired navigation of the Tigris and attempted or suggested remedies, 1898-99.

About 1898 more than usual difficulty began to be experienced, in the low season in navigating the Tigris between Qúrnah and 'Amárah, and also between Kút-al-'Amárah and Baghdád. On the lower of the two sections mentioned, that generally known as "the Marshes," the deterioration was caused by the irrigation canals of the Arabs, which—having their head-openings directed upstream and being, as regards their management, under no scientific supervision—showed a constant tendency to enlarge and to draw off more and more water from the river, so diminishing its depth and flooding the country on both sides.

The Turkish authorities made some efforts to combat the evil; but the funds allotted by the Turkish Government were insufficient, and the Arab owners of the canals resented official interference with their property. In the winter of 1898-99 some Turkish officials employed on the work were attacked and stripped by tribesmen, and had to fly for their lives with gunny-bags as their only clothing.

In 1899 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co., who saw their interests seriously threatened, proposed that the Porte should be moved to give immediate attention to the state of the river, especially between Qúrnah and 'Amárah, to take measures for closing the more injurious of the canals, and to insist that the heads of all irrigation cuts should be altered so as to face downstream. They also suggested that an engineer from

* The promoters in 1888 demanded the suppression of the British steamers, but this could not be obtained.

the Indian establishment, whose salary should be paid by the Indian and Home Governments jointly in equal shares, should be attached to the British Residency at Baghdād to advise as to the works required and to superintend their execution. This scheme was referred to the Government of India and to the Resident at Baghdād for opinion, but was disapproved on its being pointed out by the latter authority that an expenditure was involved which the Turkish Government would probably be unable to meet, that the irrigation of the Sultān's private domains would be affected, and that there would certainly be opposition on the part of the Arab tribes.

Question of the towing of barges by British steamers, 1892-99.

The question of the employment of barges as adjuncts to the Euphrates and Tigris S. N. Co.'s steamers meanwhile remained undecided. Barges were employed by them, but on sufferance only; and in 1892, on the formation of the new Ottoman Navigation Company already mentioned, the local representative of Messrs. Lynch, who were never backward in pressing for increased facilities, suggested that the removal of all restrictions on the use by them of barges might be sought; but the time was considerd by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to be inopportune for making such a request.

In 1899, on the ground of the impaired navigability of the river, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. again moved for distinct permission to use barges in the low season or, preferably, to be allowed to employ a third steamer. In June of that year Sir N. O'Conor, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, was successful in obtaining, on the plea of a deterioration in the navigability of the Tigris which the Turkish Government were unable to remedy, the issue of a Vizirial letter to the Wāli of Baghdād allowing the towing of barges by the British steamers. In August the permission granted was again withdrawn under orders from H. M. the Sultan; but, as no directions were given to prevent the use of barges by the British Company, the latter were authorised by Her Majesty's Government to continue the practice when there was an accumulation of cargo, unless prohibited officially and in writing.

The question thus remained, though His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople claimed that the permission given could not be revoked, virtually *in statu quo ante*.

Congestion of cargo at Basrah, 1902-03.

At the end of 1902 there was a considerable accumulation of cargo at Basrah due to the inability of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co., with restricted means of transport, to forward the goods consigned to them for conveyance to Baghdad as quickly as they were received.

On the 1st December 1902 the quantity of unforwarded goods lying in their warehouses at Basrah was 2,526 tons. The difficulty was aggravated by insecurity on the river, which had led the Turkish Government to forbid, temporarily, the carriage of valuable goods in native sailing craft. In these circumstances Colonel Newmarch, the British Resident at Baghdád, suggested that application should be made to the Porte on behalf of the Company for authority to make use of a third steamer; but it does not appear from the records of the Government of India whether action in this sense was taken at Constantinople. By September 1903 the accumulation had been worked off and the arguments founded on it had lost their validity.

Institution of the (Turkish) Hamidiyah Navigation Office, 1904-05.

For many years the Turkish commercial steamers on the rivers of Mesopotamia had been worked by the Oman-Ottoman Administration, which was a branch of the Turkish Ministry of Marine; but early in 1904 the existing vessels, engineering plant, offices, and other property of the Administration were transferred to the * Dáirat-us-Saniyah, or Administration of the Sultán's Civil List, in consideration of a payment of £T. 9,500. The new department of the Civil List Administration thus formed was styled the Hamidiyah Navigation Office; and it benefited, necessarily, by the personal interest which the Sultán had in its successful working. The steamers taken over by the office at its formation were four,—the "Baghdádi," "Furát," "Rusáfah," and "Músal,"—with two barges; and two new steamers, the "Hamidiyah" and "Burhániyah," built in Scotland, were added in the first year, together with four new barges. The two new steamers, though not up to contract specifications, were first class modern boats, fitted with electric light and search lights, and in all respects superior to anything possessed by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. Official influence was exerted, not without success, to divert custom from the British Company to the Sultán's line; and it was anticipated that competition would result in a lowering of freights by which trade generally, including the trade of British merchants, would benefit.

Application by Messrs. Lynch for permission to run a third steamer, 1905.

In September 1905 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. applied, through the British Resident at Baghdád, for the assistance of His Majesty's Government in obtaining permission to run a third steamer on the Tigris; but the British Ambassador at Constantinople considered that the request could not, at the time, be preferred with any hope of success.

* A full account of the Dáirat-us-Saniyah in Turkish 'Iráq will be found in Vol. II of this Gazetteer, article "Turkish 'Iráq", pages 861—68.

In October 1905 there was a project on foot for a lease of the management of the Turkish Hamidiyah Navigation office for 30 years to Mr. C. Theodoridi of Constantinople, steamship agent, and Sir George Mackenzie, capitalist, of the British firm of Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie & Co. of Basrah, in return for a loan of £T 100,000. The annual net earnings—after provision had been made for insurance, for interest at 5 per cent. per annum on the loan, for payment of 3 per cent. per annum to a sinking fund, and for all out-of-pocket expenses — were to be divided between the Civil List Administration and the lessees in the proportion of nine-tenths and one-tenth. This scheme, including as it did a monopoly of navigation rights on the Tigris, Shatt-el-'Arab and Euphrates except as against Messrs. Lynch, would have brought all river transport in Turkish 'Irāq under British control and would have introduced, at the same time, the salutary element of effective competition which had till then been wanting. The negotiations, however, seem to have ended in failure.

Lease of the Turkish steamers sought by Sir G. Mackenzie, 1905.

Questions of irrigation and river control in Turkish Irāq, 1876—1905.

Irrigation and the controlling of the Euphrates and Tigris so as to prevent floods are questions of vital, if not supreme, importance in Turkish 'Irāq; but it was only in the reign of 'Abdul Hamid that they first began to receive the attention they deserved.

The Euphrates.

The principal problems connected with the Euphrates related, firstly, to a movement of the river westwards, out of its proper channel running through Hillah, into another, known as the Shatt-el-Hindiyah, passing by Tawairij and Kūfah; and secondly, to a tendency on the part of the river to break through its left bank above Musaiyib and deluge the country between there and Baghdād.

In 1878 rather more than half the water of the Euphrates still, as in 1849, followed the Hillah channel; but by 1886 the main stream had[8] set down the Hindiyah, with the result that agriculture on the former channel was threatened with extinction, while

[8] Sir W. Willcocks attributes this change in part to the closing of the Saqlawiyah canal by Midhat Pasha; see next paragraph in the text and page 12 of Sir W. Willcocks' *Irrigation of Mesopotamia*.

the country on the new course of the river had become exposed to destructive floods. The services of M. Schumderfer, a French engineer, having been obtained by the Turkish Government, a small barrage was thrown across the Hindiyah near its head in 1890 or 1891, and the deviation of the river from its old course was partially and temporarily checked. In July 1903, however, the central portion of this barrage * gave way; and by the following year practically the whole water of the Euphrates was flowing down the Hindiyah.

In former times the Saqlāwiyah canal, leaving the left bank of the Euphrates a short way above Fallūjah and entering the Tigris a few miles below Baghdād, provided an escape for the surplus waters of the former river, and in 1838 its depth was sufficient to allow of the passage of a British steamer. At a later period this canal was closed at its head by Mid-hat Pāsha, Wāli of Baghdād, to prevent the floods which in the season of high river it brought down into the neighbourhood of Baghdād, and this object was in a considerable degree attained; but breaches thereafter occurred at various places on the left bank of the Euphrates, inundations from which from time to time reached the walls of the provincial capital. In 1877 £12,008 was said to have been spent in strengthening the Euphrates embankments at different points; nevertheless, in the spring of 1878, the country to the north-west of Baghdād was flooded by water escaping from that river, most of which eventually found its way into the Tigris.

The Tigris.

Certain difficulties connected with the control of the Tigris have already been mentioned in connection with navigation. It may now be added that in 1886 much alarm was caused to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company by a project for the construction of a new canal from the right bank of the Tigris at Dujailah, a few miles below Kūt-al-'Amārah, of which the purpose was to water lands recently acquired for the Sultān by the Administration of the Civil List. Messrs. Lynch seem to have apprehended a diversion of the river on a large scale, similar to that of the Euphrates into the Shatt-al-Hindiyah, to which they made reference; and, in consequence of their representations, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to communicate with the Porte. Whether the projected canal was subsequently made, with or without modification, by the Dāirat-as-Saniyah does not appear from the Government of India's archives. The importance of the question had probably been exaggerated.

* Possibly the passage had never been closed in the centre; see Sir W. Willcocks' *Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, page 12.

Sir W. Willcocks' projects for the irrigation of Mesopotamia, 1903—05.

At length the question of Mesopotamian irrigation and river-control was taken in hand, at first in a private manner, by the eminent English engineer Sir W. Willcocks, by whom the Assouan barrage on the Nile was designed, and who had been Director-General of Reservoirs in Egypt. On the 25th March 1903 he delivered, at a meeting of the Khedivial Geographical Society at Cairo, a *lecture on the "Re-creation of Chaldea" in which he stated the conclusions at which he had arrived in regard to the irrigation of Turkish 'Irāq. His information in regard to the country was at that time chiefly drawn from the writings of Commander Felix Jones, I. N. In the winter of 1904-05 Sir W. Willcocks visited Baghdād and spent several weeks in investigating the physical and agricultural conditions of the province. Returning to Egypt he drew up a report in which he discussed the question of bringing the whole country from Hīt and Sāmarrah to the Persian Gulf under perennial irrigation, and advanced for immediate consideration two preliminary projects, depending one upon the Tigris and the other upon the Euphrates. These initial schemes contemplated the fertilisation of a million acres of land at a cost of seven and a half million pounds sterling; and Sir W. Willcocks anticipated a handsome return on the outlay. The Euphrates project was brought to the notice of the Sultān by the British Ambassador at Constantinople in June 1905, and was received not unfavourably, but with the remark that the magnitude of the undertaking would necessitate the formation of a Company, and that until the terms required by the Company were known no opinion could be pronounced as to the permissibility of the scheme. His Majesty, however, desired to be supplied with a summary in Turkish of Sir W. Willcocks' proposals.

Question of land communications in Turkish 'Iraq, 1876—1904.

Baghdād Aleppo route.

In 1878, notwithstanding the measures taken by Mid-hat Pāsha a few years previously to assure the safety of the direct route by the

*The present writer may be pardoned for mentioning a series of coincidences personal to himself. He was present at Sir W. Willcocks' original lecture at Cairo in 1893; he enjoyed with Sir W. Willcocks the hospitality of the British Residency, then under Colonel Newmarch, at Baghdād in 1905; and at a later period, in 1909—11, when Sir W. Willcocks had been appointed Adviser to the Turkish Ministry of Public Works in Turkish 'Irāq, he was brought as Resident at Baghdād into official relations with him.

Euphrates valley between Baghdád and Aleppo, it was still insecure. In July 1878 a caravan travelling by that line was plundered near Mi'ádin to the extent, it was said, of £3,000. A circuitous route by Mûsal and Diyárbakr was still, in 1878, that most frequented by travellers between Baghdád and Aleppo; and on it post horses for hire were maintained by the Turkish Government. From Baghdád to Mûsal the way lay by Kifri (Salâhiyah), Kirkûk and Arbil, and there were 13 changing stations. The charge for horses was 3½ piastres (about 7d.) per "hour," and the number of post "hours" between Baghdád and Mûsal was 100. By degrees, however, the greater directness and convenience of the Euphrates valley route prevailed; its safety was gradually established; and, by the end of the period now under consideration, it had completely superseded its rival, and travelling carriages had begun to ply upon it.

The Baghdád Kádhimain tramway, 1878—1880.

The tramway inaugurated under Mid-hat Pásha between Baghdád and Kádhimain continued to flourish, throughout the period, as a commercial enterprise; and in 1878 it was stated that, though the fare for the journey was only 2½d., the line paid cent. per cent. annually upon an original cost of £18,000. Shares in the concern, the purchase of which had been forced by Mid-hat Pásha upon his unwilling official subordinates, could no longer be purchased at Baghdád, for there were no sellers. The light in which the tramway was locally regarded in 1880 was thus described by a* traveller:

> La répulsion instinctive des Turcs pour toutes les manifestations du génie occidental n'empêche pas les Bagdadiens de tirer beaucoup de vanité de leur tramway que ne se sont jamais enorgueillis les Français du percement de l'isthme de Suez, ou les Américains de l'exécution du chemin de fer de New-York à San-Francisco.

Establishment of a Turkish post between Baghdád and Damascus, 1881.

In 1881 the Turkish Government instituted postal communication by camel between Baghdád and Damascus, running side by side with the old British Dromedary Post; it provided a more rapid line of correspondence between Baghdád and Constantinople than that by Mûsal and Diyárbakr; and it probably soon superseded the latter for the conveyance of letters. Further information in regard to this post, which continued in existence up to the end of the period, will be found in the Appendix on Mail Communications.

British railway schemes in Turkish Iráq, 1878-1879.

The scheme for a Euphrates Valley Railway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, abandoned by British promoters in 1872 after sixteen years of endeavour during which they failed to enlist the

*Mme. Dieulafoy in *La Perse, la Chaldée et la Susiane*, page 586.

financial support of the British Government, was succeeded by another British project for a Tigris Valley Railway. With this later scheme the name of the Duke of Sutherland was associated; and Mr. Andrew, hopeless of the success of his own earlier project, appears to have lent it his support. The alignment which it was intended to follow was one by Diyārbakr, Mūsal, and Baghdād to Kuwait, and a guarantee by the British Government of a return on £20,000,000 capital to be expended was sought; but it could not be obtained, and the new project went the way of its predecessor. One of those who interested themselves in it, as also in other competing schemes, now not less than nine in number, was Commander V. L. Cameron, R. N., who in the winter of 1878-1879 travelled and made surveys in the country to be traversed by the line.

German Baghdād Railway scheme and concession, 1898—1903.

In 1898 it was reported that a concession for a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was being sought at Constantinople in the name of Count Kapnist, a Russian subject, and there was reason to think that Russia aimed at establishing a coaling station at Kuwait. This scheme, however, if it really existed, did not take shape; and its sole result was the conclusion of an important Agreement, as described in the chapter on the history of Kuwait, between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the British Government. But about the same time, on the occasion of a visit paid by the German Emperor to Turkey, rumours became current, which were not taken very seriously at the time, of a German project for connecting Baghdād with Constantinople by railway. The scheme was a natural corollary of the rapid development of German railway enterprise in Asia Minor since the foundation of the Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie by the Deutsche Bank and Würtembergische Vereins bank in 1889.

1898—1903.

We cannot here enter on a detailed account of the steps by which German financiers eventually secured a concession for extending the Anatolian railway system from Konia to the Persian Gulf, or of the circumstances in which British financiers, though offered an opportunity, which in the opinion of the leading British statesmen ought to have been accepted, abstained from participating in the enterprise. Suffice it to say that preferential rights in respect of the project previously conveyed to the Anatolian Railway Company were confirmed by the Turkish Government at the end of 1898; that in 1899 an Agreement, in general terms, between the Porte and the Company was signed; that, after an examination of the proposed *tracé* and commercial prospects of the line by a German Technical Commission in 1899-1900, a draft Convention was submitted by the Company; that on the 21st January 1902 a Convention came

into existence; and that finally, on the 5th March 1903, a revised and definite Convention was concluded, authorising the enterprise and prescribing in great detail the manner of its execution. In the Convention of 1903 it was laid down that the concessionnaire, viz., the Anatolian Railway Company "formera une société anonyme ottomane sous le nom de "Société Impériale ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, qui remplace "era la Société du Chemin de Fer ottoman d'Anatolie pour tout ce qui con- "cerne la nouvelle ligne de Konia au Golfe Persique avec ses embranche- "ments, et qui sera régie pas les statuts ci-annexés." Statutes governing the constitution and proceedings of the Bagbdad Railway Company were accordingly attached to the Convention and signed along with it.

1905. Up to the end of 1905 no construction or work under the concession had as yet taken place in the province of Turkish 'Irâq.

Bearing of the Baghdâd Railway on British interests.

Setting questions of detail aside, we may observe that the aspect of the scheme most nearly concerning Britain was its ultimate effect on the British military, political, and commercial position in the Persian Gulf. It was generally considered that the completion of a railway from Constantinople to the shores of Persian Gulf under auspices predominantly, if not exclusively, German and Turkish involved a potential menace to that position; and it was therefore held necessary to prevent the execution of the scheme, if possible, unless and until a sufficient share in the control of the railway should be obtained by Britain, and in any case to oppose the formation of a port at the Gulf terminus of the line except under conditions which would preclude its becoming a danger to British interests. At first, however, these opinions did not command universal acceptance.

The views of the Government of India on the general question were conveyed to His Majesty's Government in February 1904 in a despatch from which the following is an extract:—

> We differ from the views that have been expressed in some quarters upon the construction of the Baghdad Railway as a flank defence to the position of Great Britain in Southern Persia and the Gulf, and we deprecate the idea that our political and strategical interests in those regions can only be adequately protected by an understanding with Germany. In our view the interests of Germany in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf are more likely to be antagonistic than favourable to our own; and we see no sufficient ground for thinking that there is any International combination to which we should look as a buttress to our interests or influence in that quarter. These views are expressed independently of the question, which has never been referred to us for opinion, of the ultimate completion of the German Asia Minor Railway to the Gulf; for we presume that it is an accepted principle with His Majesty's Government that, should the line ever be continued south of Baghdad, this cannot be done without

British co-operation and consent; and that no terminal port can be selected, unless a similar consent has been obtained, and unless the port is made open and international in character; further, if these views are also entertained by His Majesty's Government, we think that nothing but good could result from Germany being made acquainted with them, lest, when her railway reaches Baghdad, she might complain of having been kept in ignorance of British policy and intentions.

The construction of the projected, and at length authorised, railway involved the raising of large amounts as capital; the engineering difficulties of certain sections of the line were known to be great; and the security to investors consisted in financial guarantees for construction and working such as the Turkish Government were able to give. By some British authorities it was hoped that these obstacles, the importance of which would be greatly enhanced by the abstention of Britain from participation in the scheme, might suffice to bring the undertaking to a standstill before it had gone very far; but these hopes were vain. Germany could not but be sensible of the inconveniences and dangers of isolation with reference to the Baghdad Railway; but, confident in her political and financial ability to carry it through successfully, even single-handed, she did not desist from the enterprise.

The only visible effect produced by the attitude of Britain was postponement of a decision as to the point where the railway should reach the Gulf. As related in the chapter on the history of Kuwait, the German Technical Commission which visited that port at the beginning of 1900 seem to have favoured the selection of Kâdhamah in Kuwait Bay as a terminus; but a difficulty was thrown in the way of this by British diplomatic representations made to the Porte and to the German Ambassador at Constantinople in April 1900, with reference to the political status of Kuwait. In the autumn of 1901, when the Anatolian Railway Company approached the Turkish Government with definite proposals for a Baghdad Railway Convention, they suggested, it would seem, a terminus on the lower Shatt-al-'Arab near Fão instead of one at Kuwait. The Porte, however, were loath to assent to this arrangement, which appeared to imply doubt as to the validity of their claims to sovereignty over Kuwait; and finally in the Convention of 1903 it was laid down, as a compromise and by way of shelving the difficulty for a time, that the line should run from Baghdâd by Karbala and Najaf to Zubair and Basrah, and that from Zubair it should be prolonged to a point on the Persian Gulf "a déterminer d'un commun accord entre le Government Impérial ottoman et le concessionnaire."

British relations with Arabs and Persians in Turkish 'Iraq, 1876-1905.

It is impossible that British officials, residents, and travellers in Turkish 'Irāq should not be brought into contact with the Arabs who form almost the entire population of the province, and with the Persians of whom important communities exist at Kādhimain, Karbala, and Najaf; but the relations which thus arise are generally regarded with extreme suspicion by the local Turkish authorities. This was particularly the case after the Russian war of 1877-1878.

Turkish suspicion of British dealings with the Arab tribes, 1877.

In 1877 official obstacles were thrown in the way of a journey which Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt wished to make, and eventually succeeded in making, among the Arab tribes of northern Mesopotamia. The attitude of the Turkish authorities in this connection was* described a follows:—

> The Turkish Government has always been very jealous of foreign intrigues among the Bedouin tribes, whom it is their policy to keep as children in ignorance of all that passes in the outer world. It has equally been their policy to sow dissensions among them; and, as I have already described, by good fortune or good management, the most dangerous tribes were this winter hotly engaged in civil war. It would be a pity, the authorities doubtless thought, that so satisfactory a state of things should be interfered with by more busybodies from Europe, who might possibly inform the Bedouins of the ill turn things had taken for the Sultan in Bulgaria, and of the denuded state of the garrison towns and military roads of Syria. "Divide and rule" was an excellent motto; and Europeans had before now attempted to unite the tribes against Ottoman rule, or patch up peaces between them out of foolish humanitarian motives. Moreover, any day might bring the news of a crisis in the affairs of the Empire; and England was known to have her eye on the Euphrates. What then more likely than that ours should be a semi-official mission, to spy out the nakedness of the land?

Nevertheless the intercession of foreign Consuls was still sometimes desired by Arab notables who had difficulties with the Turkish Government; and in this very year Sumair, an outlawed Shaikh of the Northern Shammar tribe, had recourse to the good offices of Colonel Nixon, the British Resident at Baghdād; but the result of his application is not recorded.

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* Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, vol. I, pages 110-111.

Local feeling towards the British Government, 1878

The feelings of the more civilised non-Turkish inhabitants of the province were * delineated by a British traveller in 1878 as more favourable to the British Government than indicative of fervent loyalty to the Porte. He remarked :—

> ... men of old Baghdadi families, Muslimans in religion, and Arabs and Christians, seemed to think that the days of the Sultan's rule were numbered, and that his independence was already a thing of the past.
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> * * * *
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> I was more than once asked confidentially by good Mohammadans why England did not come and take possession of the country, and keep it from the Russians? Everybody, I was told, would be glad of the change, for the conscription and the war-taxes had made the people very discontented. If England, they said, took over the country, it would soon prosper; trade would increase at once; and there would be no conscription. I found that the splendour and civilization of Bombay filled a large place in the popular imagination in Baghdad; and that the trade and prosperity, and fine buildings of that city, were attributed to the fact that the port of India was under British rule. The Arabs who visit Bombay every year for purposes of trade are by no means few, and on their return they give glowing accounts of its wealth and magnificence, which far exceed, it must be allowed, anything to be seen in the Baghdad of this degenerate age. To exchange the yoke of the Sultan for that of the British would not be regarded by the Arab-speaking population of this region as a misfortune, but rather the reverse; and it is the opinion of men who have had abundant opportunities of forming a correct judgment that no one, not actually an official or a soldier, would raise a finger to prevent such a consummation. But it is quite another question whether, the exchange once made, the nomadic Arab population would long willingly submit to be ruled by Kaffirs, especially when acted upon from without by accomplished intriguers. A British annexation of the country, were such a thing politically possible or desirable, could only be made permanent by a tedious war. But our ambition does not lie that way; aggrandisement in that part of the world would be the last thing to suggest itself to any English statesman. On that very account I was the more struck with the number of the inquiries which were made as to the possibility of the country being brought some day under British rule. The deduction is two-fold; that the population has in one way or another acquired a conviction of the mildness and justice which characterise our sway, and that public opinion is gradually preparing the way for great changes.

British intervention in the Muntafik difficulty, 1881.

In 1881 Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdād, was led by the troubles which then convulsed the Muntafik country and endangered, indirectly, navigation and trade on the Tigris as well as on the Euphrates, to suggest intervention by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. Mr. Plowden, remarking that the influence of the Muntafik might in certain eventualities be of the utmost value to British interests, and that their friendship was worth an effort to secure, recommended as a remedy for the existing disorders the re-institution of

* Geary in his *Through Asiatic Turkey*, vol. I, pages 273-274.

the Basrah Wilayat abolished in the previous year, and the appointment to it of Nāsir Pāsha, who had held charge of it not many years before, but had been removed and was detained at Constantinople for political reasons, and who, Mr. Plowden thought, would be a strong and capable ruler, friendly to British interests.

This attempted revival of methods which might have answered in the days of Major Rawlinson and Captain Kemball was, however, a failure; Nāsir Pāsha was not repatriated or restored to power at Lord Dufferin's suggestion; and the restoration of the Basrah Wilāyat did not take place till three years later, by which time the counsels of the British Ambassador had probably been forgotten.

Case of Qāsim Pāsha-az-Zuhair, 1883.

In 1883 the question arose of extending the good offices of the British Government to Qāsim Pāsha-az-Zuhair, Chalabi, of Basrah,—the same who in 1872 had performed valuable services* in bringing to justice the pirates who attacked the British mail steamer "Cashmere," and in recovering part of the property plundered on that occasion. The Chalabi had subsequently, in consequence of quarrel with a Wāli of Basrah, been summoned to Constantinople; and he was there detained with the rank of Member of the Council of State, much in the same manner as Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik. British aid in obtaining his release having been requested, through the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, by the Chalabi's friend Shaikh 'Isa-bin-Qirtās, who was about to undertake the journey to Constantinople, arrangements were made by the Government of India for introducing the Shaikh to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy there. The British Chargé d'Affaires found, however, that his intervention was more likely to prejudice than to advance the Chalabi's interests, and he therefore abstained from action. According to the statement of 'Isa-bin-Qirtās on his return to Basrah, evidently unsuccessful, the cause of Qāsim Pāsha's detention was a suspicion on the part of the Sultān that he had been plotting to hand Basrah over to the British, but he was well treated at Constantinople, and a reconciliation had taken place there between him and Nāsir Pasha, Muntafik, like himself a political *détenu* from the Basrah Wilāyat, with whom he had formerly been at enmity.

Attitude towards British consular officers enjoined by the Porte on the Wāli of Baghdād, 1884.

A so-called secret circular from the Grand Vizier of Turkey was received in 1884 by the Wāli of Baghdād, in common with the Wālis of Yaman and other provinces of the Empire, in which British foreign policy was strongly criticised and the recipient was enjoined to exercise reserve in his dealings with foreign consular representatives, especially those of Great Britain. There was reason, however, to think that the instructions

Vide page 1460 *ante*.

in regard to the treatment of Consuls really meant nothing, and that the circular had been drafted simply in order that it might be divulged, with the object of producing an impression on the mind of the British Government.

Applications by Muntafik tribesmen for British protection, 1899-1902.

In 1899 Sulaimān Baig, the son of Mansūr Pāsha, a former Shaikh of the Muntafik tribe, approached Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah with a view of obtaining British protection, by which "nationality" was probably meant, for himself; but his advances were declined by Mr. Wratislaw. In 1902 similar steps were taken by other leading members of the same tribe through the medium of an Indian Muhammadan. The applicants in the latter case seem, after meeting with a rebuff from the British representative at Basrah, to have addressed themselves unsuccessfully to the Russian Consul-General at Baghdād.

Relations of British officials with the Persian Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf, 1903.

In 1903, on the advice of Sir Arthur Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, an effort was made through the British Residency at Baghdād to moderate the action of the Persian Mujtahids at Karbala and Najaf, whose influence was being exerted, as has already been described, to promote opposition in Persia to measures of the Shāh's Government. Sir A. Hardinge thought that the chief motive by which the Mujtahids were actuated might be fear of Russian preponderance in Persia; and he hoped that, by a friendly and sympathetic attitude on the part of the intermediary employed, these reputed leaders of Persian public opinion might be induced to explain their real views and objects, which were somewhat obscure, and even to address him a letter on the subject. The message below, after being approved by Lord Lansdowne, His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was accordingly communicated verbally in July 1903 to Āgha Muhammad-al-Garāwi, Sharabiyāni, through Mirza Muhammad Hasan, Muhsin, then First Dragoman of the British Residency at Baghdād and afterwards British Vice-Consul at Karbala, than whom no one more suitable for the accomplishment of such a mission could have been chosen:

> The British Government is a firm supporter of the independence of Persia; their political interests are identical with those of that kingdom; their administration of the Oudh Bequest is, to take a small matter, one of the many proofs of their respect for the Muhammadan religion, which is that of millions of their subjects; and they will never favour measures which could injure or weaken Persia. But they strongly deprecate all appeals to religious hatred as likely to do Persia more harm than good. Whatever may be said against the Persian tariff, it has been agreed to, not only by the Russians, but also by England and Turkey, and can only be changed by negotiation with those three powers, which at present would entail great difficulties. If the Hazrat have any complaints against the Persian administration, let them address them

to the Shah or Grand Vizier in a respectful manner, and in the meantime discourage all language by the clergy here which might be misunderstood by the ignorant as inciting to riots or violence.

The result, however, was disappointing; the Sharabiyáni merely said that he had already sent injunctions to all the Mujtahids in Persia to keep quiet and to prevent disturbances; and that, while he was willing to correspond with Sir A. Hardinge, he thought, as a tribute to his dignity and importance, the first letter should be written by the British Minister. He seemed to have confidence in the British Government and to believe that they were really the friends of Persia; but his reluctance to seek help of unbelievers could not be concealed.

The matter went no further, Lord Lansdowne foreseeing little advantage from a correspondence with the Mujtahid, even if one could be instituted. At the end of 1903 Sir A. Hardinge, in returning to Tehrán from the Persian Gulf where he had met Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, passed through Baghdád. An opportunity was thus afforded him of studying, more nearly on the spot, the question of the influence of the Mujtahids and their characteristics.

Case of 'Abdul 'Ali, Herati, 1903.

In the summer of 1901 an Afghán named 'Abdul 'Alí, a native of Herati, was expelled from Tehrán for complicity in a conspiracy against the Atabaig-i-A'zam, the Sháh's principal Minister. 'Abdul 'Alí drifted to Constantinople, and from Constantinople to Baghdád; and eventually in May 1903, after waiting on the British Resident at Baghdád, who gave him no encouragement, he proceeded to Karbala. Arriving there he joined in the agitation which was then being conducted by the Persian Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf against the existing Government of Persia. There was some reason to suppose that he was financed by the Amín-ud-Dauleh, who was a political rival of the Atabaig. The Persian Government, probably because the man was an Afghán subject, applied to His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehrán for his removal from the Holy Cities; and on the 8th July 1903 Sir A. Hardinge, in a telegram, asked Colonel Newmarch, the British Resident at Baghdád, to arrange for his voluntary departure elsewhere. It was expected that the Persian Government would also move the Porte to order his deportation. On the 16th July 'Abdul 'Alí was despatched to India at the expense of the British Government, and there he remained until after the fall of the Atabaig and his supporters. In October 1904 'Abdul 'Alí was informed that the Persian Government had no objection to his returning to Turkish 'Iráq, and the Commissioner in Sind was authorised to provide him with a passage to

Baghdād in case he elected to go there; but he preferred to remain in India. Sir A. Hardinge had contemplated the possibility of his being employed as a confidential agent in dealings with the Mujtahids; but Colonel Newmarch was relieved at the man's decision not to return, for he regarded him as a useless and even dangerous instrument, and he held that, his identity and connection with the British authorities being well known, it would have been impossible to use him as a confidential agent.

We turn now to matters of political interest in which the Turks were the active, the British the passive party.

Supposed employment of the influence of the Naqīb of Baghdād among British Muhammadans, 1889—1905.

In 1880 the Naqīb of Baghdād, then Saiyid Sulaimān or Salmān, visited Constantinople, where he remained for about six months as the guest of the Sultān of Turkey and was treated with high distinction. The prestige which the Naqīb of Baghdād derives from his descent from Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir, Gilāni, and from his custodianship of the tomb of that saint at Baghdād, extends to all parts of the Sunni Muhammadan world, including Afghanistān, India, and Northern Africa; and in Turkey his religious position at the time in question was so exalted that even the Shaikh-al-Islām at Constantinople was obliged to kiss his hand. The Sultān 'Abdul Hamid attached much importance to his own position as Khalifah or head of the Muhammadan faith; and it was his policy to extend his religious influence as Khalifah, through media such as the Naqīb of Baghdād and by other means, to Muhammadan countries including the British dominions, in which there could be no question of his exerting political authority. When Saiyid Sulaimān was about to return from Constantinople to Baghdād it was reported to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople: "Il est possible que l'on se serve de "ce personnage pour travailler les populations des Indes. Il serait par "conséquent prudent que le Consul-Général de Sa Majesté à Bagdad "reçoive pour instructions de surveiller les mouvements de Seid Selman "Effendi;" and the attention of the British Resident at Baghdād was "accordingly directed to the matter.

A number of years later different members of the Naqīb's family, as mentioned in the Appendix on Religious Sects, travelled extensively in India, and even in Afghanistān; but it was not established that their proceedings had any political intention or effect; indeed the tendency of the evidence collected was rather to show that the objects of their activity were pecuniary and personal.

In May 1898 Saiyid Sulaimān died and was succeeded in the Naqībat of Baghdād by his brother* Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān.

Turkish naval activity, 1898-99.

In April 1899 Hamdi Pasha, who was by training a naval officer and held the rank of Vice-Admiral, was re-appointed to the Wālīship of Basrah, which he had previously held; and a sort of naval re-organisation or expansion was attempted by the Porte, partly, it may be presumed, by way of preparation against the imaginary danger of a British descent by sea on Turkish 'Irāq, which appears never to be absent from the Ottoman official mind. The Turkish corvette "Zuhāf" had a few months previously visited Lingeh, ostensibly in connection with local disturbances there; and it was now announced that the Turkish flotilla at Basrah was about to be augmented, and that Harbour-Masterships would shortly be created at Baghdād, Kūt-al-Amārah and 'Amārah on the Tigris, at Nāsiriyah and Sūq-ash-Shuyukh on the Euphrates, at Qūrnah at the junction of the two rivers, and at Kuwait and other places in the Persian Gulf, while Basrah itself would be raised to the status of a "préfecture de port principal." Complications which supervened at Kuwait, and which are fully detailed in the history of that principality, prevented the complete execution of this programme; but, in so far as it related to Turkish 'Irāq, it was carried out in its entirety,—except that no vessels were added to the existing flotilla.

Turkish manifestations of anti-British feeling, 1905.

Strongly anti-British sentiments and conduct were remarked in 1905 on the part of Turkish officials generally at Baghdād and Basrah and necessitated remonstrances at Constantinople. The chief causes seemed to be recent displays of British activity in the Persian Gulf, including the tour there of Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, in 1903, and an Anglophobe campaign which was being waged in Egypt by a section of the native press of that country. The prevalent feeling showed itself partly in a disposition to attribute all trouble between the Turkish administration and the Arab tribes of Mesopotamia to British intrigues.

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*Since the establishment of a non-religious Government in Turkey (1909—1912) there has been, apparently, no question of the employment of the Naqīb of Baghdād or his relations as propagandists of the Khalīfatic principle abroad. The family, whose importance in Turkey has been greatly reduced with that of religious interests in general, regard the altered state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire with intense, though concealed, dissatisfaction; and their relations with the British Residency, though necessarily reserved and somewhat distant, have been characterised by unmistakeable friendliness. Their attitude, in fact, has been the attitude natural towards a power in whose territories their prestige has not been subverted as it has been in Turkey.

Questions relating to British Government vessels in Turkish 'Irāq. 1876–1905.

It will be remembered that in 1874 exception had been taken by the Porte to the ascent of the Shatt-al-'Arab from Basrah to Qūrnah by British men-of-war. The discussion at that time was apparently closed by a request on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople "that, if at any time the Sublime Porte should wish to "propose new regulations, or to alter a practice that has prevailed, in "reference to the presence of ships of war in any part of the Sultan's "dominions, due notice of it may be given to Her Majesty's Government "who will not fail to give such instructions as will ensure from the "Commanders of British ships of war every respect for the rights of the "Sublime Porte."

Right of British war vessels to navigate above Qūrnah or Basrah, 1881.

In 1881 the question was re-opened, in a somewhat vague manner, by a communication from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs; the questionable statement was made that British war vessels had never ascended "the river" higher than Qūrnah without the previous consent of the Turkish authorities; and it was suggested that, with a view to avoiding any "conflict," orders should be given by the British authorities to prevent British vessels of war from passing above Qūrnah. It appeared probable that there was some mistake in the Turkish communication as made or reported, and that what the Porte really wished was that British men-of-war should be forbidden to visit the Shatt-al-'Arab above Basrah; but the communication was dealt with according to its literal purport, orders being issued merely that British war vessels were not to proceed beyond Qūrnah. Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdād was opposed even to this restriction, for though warships of the class ordinarily calling at Basrah could hardly pass above Qūrnah and were not known to have attempted to do so, he thought that it might be advisable that a gunboat of the Royal Navy should be substituted for the "Comet" to patrol the Tigris,—an idea which may have been suggested to him by the Arab attack on the "Khalifah" in the previous year.

Even the visits to Basrah of gunboats of the British Navy, though the port was frequented by ocean steamers, were not regarded with equanimity by the Porte. In 1883 the Turkish Ambassador in London

Question of British war vessels at Basrah, 1883–1886.

enquired the reason for the presence of a British ship of war in Basrah waters: he was informed by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, "in deference to the wishes of the Sublime "Porte, British ships of war do not proceed further up the Shatt-al-'Arab "than Kurna, but Her Majesty's Government are not aware of any "regulation precluding such ships from visiting Basrah." In December 1885 two British gunboats being then simultaneously at Basrah, the meaning of their visit was anxiously demanded by the Turkish Government from the British Embassy at Constantinople, and assurances were given that it had no special object.

Turkish objections to the use of the "Comet" on the Tigris above Baghdad, 1885—1894.

In April 1885, with the previous approval of the Government of India and Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdād, undertook in the Residency steamer "Comet" a tour upon the upper Tigris reaching Tikrīt on April 29th. On the return journey however the "Comet" stranded on May 1st at a place named Waushaush and the Resident returned to Baghdād; but the opportunity was taken by the Porte to protest against the employment of the "Comet" above Baghdād. In a note dated 11th July 1885 Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, explained that the British Consul-General at Baghdād had merely proceeded up the river to visit a part of his consular district, and expressed a hope that no objection would be raised to the *stationnaire* of the Consulate-General ascending the river again for the same purpose, if previous notice were given to the local authorities. This note was accepted by the Porte without demur.

In 1894, a serious disturbance having taken place at Sāmarrah, where the lives of British Indian subjects were reported to be in danger, Colonel Mockler, the British Resident, went there in the "Comet" after giving notice to the Wāli, who made no objection. The Porte, however, complained of the action of the Resident and were referred in reply to the note of 1885, to which they had taken no exception at the time or later. It was further urged on them that the use of the "Comet" in a manner so reasonable and purely on grounds of convenience, was not a legitimate subject of protest; the Consul-General's voyage had been necessitated by the interests of British subjects and had been made with the approval of the Wāli; and it was hoped that, in the circumstances, the Porte would acquit Colonel Mockler of blame, and that they would not object to the occasional use of the "Comet" by Her Majesty's Consul-General for the purpose of visiting places in his consular district on the Tigris above Baghdād. The Turkish Govern-

ment, however, replied that the employment of the "Comet" on the upper river was, in their view, objectionable, because it might be cited as a precedent in support of a claim for the grant of similar privileges to the vessels of other foreign nations.

Discourteous treatment of the "Comet" by the Turkish authorities, 1893-1894.

In December 1893, the "Comet" visited Basrah, where she was docked for survey and her machine guns were replaced by others of a newer pattern which had been sent from India. Every opportunity was allowed to the Turkish officials of seeing what was done. Nevertheless, the Wāli of Basrah having given orders that she was to be watched, the "Comet" was at three different points in the ascent of the river to Baghdād called on to stop by the Turkish police, with threats that she would be fired on if she did not. Her Commander, however, disregarded the challenges; and afterwards, when representations were made to the Wāli of Baghdād concerning this "demonstration of puerile insolence," he expressed regret at its occurrence. The Turkish authorities had, however, the temerity to question the truth of the British Commander's account of the facts. Colonel Mockler, the Resident, in reporting the matter to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, described it as too trivial to call for diplomatic action.

Official questions between Turkish and British authorities in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876—1905.

The attitude of the Turkish authorities towards British interests in Turkish 'Irāq during the whole of this period was generally one of obstruction, and occasionally one of active malevolence. Illustrations of this fact will be found in what has gone before, as well as in what follows.

Murder of Mr. Milne and proceedings thereon, 1881—1888.

On the 6th January 1881, Mr. James Milne, a former employé of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, who had entered on business on his own account at Baghdād as a general engineer, was fatally stabbed in one of the principal streets of Baghdād. He was a man of inoffensive character; but there was enmity between him and Muhammad Sālih, an influential Muhammadan of the town, on account of a Christian prostitute name Faridah, whom Milne had married; and Muhammad Sālih had threatened to be revenged on him.

On the night of the crime Mr. Plowden, the British Resident, wrote to the Wāli, requesting that effectual measures might be taken for the

discovery, arrest, and punishment of all persons implicated therein. On the next day, the 7th January, Mr. Plowden telegraphed to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, urging that the Porte should be moved to issue stringent orders for the vigorous handling of the case without fear or favour. On the 8th and 9th the Resident investigated the case and collected evidence; but almost the only material fact disclosed was that one Ahmad, a servant of Muhammad Sálih, had visited the house of the deceased on the day of the murder and had probably ascertained the victim's intended movements. Mrs. Milne and a servant who was with Milne when he was attacked showed themselves "most reluctant to say anything which might possibly connect Muhammad Sálih with the crime"; but the former, having expressed fear of Muhammad Sálih and a wish for protection, was sent for safety on board the "Comet". On the 9th January Mr. Plowden telegraphed to the Foreign Office urging that the formation of a special Commission, including two European members, should be arranged for the investigation of the case; he mentioned that a menial of the Residency establishment had been obliged to leave Baghdad for fear of Muhammad Sálih; and he reported that the action of the British authorities in the case was being keenly scrutinised. On the 10th January the Resident wrote a second time to the Wáli, asking for copies of the depositions so far recorded in the case, protesting against Muhammad Sálih's alleged release on bail, and demanding his re-arrest. On the 11th the Wáli replied; he merely ignored the request contained in Mr. Plowden's letter, stated that prompt and energetic measures were being taken, and asked that a Dragoman might be sent to watch the proceedings. The same day the Wáli requested that Mrs. Milne might be sent to Court to give evidence, accompanied by an official; but the Resident did not comply. On the 12th January Mr. Plowden again wrote to the Wáli, repeating his request for copies of the depositions taken and his demand for the arrest of Muhammad Sálih. On the same day he telegraphed to the Foreign Office, reporting that even Englishmen at Baghdad were afraid to give evidence against Muhammad Sálih. On the 14th he conferred with his French and Russian colleagues; they concurred in his proposals for a Mixed Commission and telegraphed to their respective Governments supporting them. The Wáli replied on that day to Mr. Plowden's last letter; he argued that Muhammad Sálih could not be arrested except on evidence, and that evidence was not forthcoming in consequence of the refusal of the Resident to let Mrs. Milne appear; and he complained of Mr. Plowden's having instructed the British

Dragoman not to sign the depositions taken in Court. Two days later Mr. Plowden rejoined that, if evidence was not forthcoming, it was because the action of the police had been perfunctory and inefficient in the highest degree, and that, the police being under the control of the Wilâyat, a very grave responsibility rested on His Excellency.

In reporting the case at length to the Foreign Office, Mr. Plowden justified such of his actions as might appear open to criticism by explaining the peculiar features of the régime then existing at Baghdâd. There was absolutely no prospect of foreigners obtaining justice in the Turkish Courts or of the Turkish police doing anything to secure the perpetrators of even the worst crimes against them. This had been fully proved by other recent cases, and the Resident was supported in his attitude by the opinion of his* foreign colleagues.

Mrs. Milne eventually appeared in the Turkish Court to give evidence, and Muhammad Sâlih was taken into custody. He and his servant Ahmad were tried; but, while the latter was convicted and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, the former was acquitted on the ground that there was no proof of his complicity.

At the urgent instance of Lord Dufferin, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, the proceedings of the Baghdâd Court were quashed by the Court of Appeal at Constantinople on an application for revision, and a fresh trial was ordered. But the result of the second trial was the acquittal of both accused on the 19th June 1882, and they were then released on bail.

Renewed representations by the British Embassy procured the transfer of the case for retrial to Diyârbakr; but again the proceedings ended without a conviction.

The judgment of the Diyârbakr Court was annulled, like those preceding it by the Court of Appeal at Constantinople; and in 1887 or 1888 a final trial was held at Aleppo, which terminated in favour of the accused. Of the guilt of the prisoners there seems to have been no moral doubt; but the wealth and influence of Muhammad Sâlih, aided doubtless by racial and religious feeling availed to frustrate the demands of justice.

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* Madame Dieulafoy probably reflects the French official view of the case when she says (*La Perse, etc.*, page 588): "Dernièrement encore, un mécanicien qui arrivait de Newhaven a été poignardé en plein jour. Le consul anglais a fait connaître le nom de l'assassin et a désigné les témoins du crime. Peine perdue: le coupable, un Turc naturellement, vaque à ses affaires; il n'a jamais été question de l'arrêter, moins encore de le mettre en accusation."

Opposition of the Turkish authorities to the British Post Offices at Baghdad, and Basrah chiefly in 1881—1887.

During the greater part of the period under review, especially between 1881 and 1887, persistent attempts were made by the Turkish authorities to obtain the abolition, or obstruct the working, of the British Post Offices at Baghdad and Basrah; but as related in the Appendix on Mail Communications, they were defeated with but small loss of advantages previously enjoyed.

Question of official tours by the British Resident, 1885.

In the Barāat or *exequatur* granted by the Porte to the first British Resident at Baghdād in 1802 it was distinctly ordered that, "should "the said Consul find it necessary to travel into any part of the country, "either by land or by sea, at any stations or ports he may arrive at no "one shall molest him or his servants, or cattle or baggage, or anything "connected with him;" and until the year 1885 no opposition seems to have been offered by the Turkish authorities to the free movement of any British official in the province. Numerous and extensive tours were made by Mr. Rich, Colonel Rawlinson, and Colonel Kemball during their tenure of the Baghdād Residency or Political Agency, as also by Commander Felix Jones; and down to a much later period, even, journeys by British officials in the country were treated as a matter of course.

In 1876 a proposal by Colonel Nixon to travel on the Persian frontier was approved by the Government of India in principle, but for some reason the tour was not carried out; and Colonel Miles, in 1879, visited the towns of Karbala and Najaf, where, notwithstanding the existence of a large British Indian community, the Political Agent had not been seen for some years. In 1881 Mr. Plowden sought permission to make the frontier tour for which Colonel Nixon had previously obtained sanction, but which he had not executed; it was granted; and in the summer of 1881 Mr. Plowden, who had then lately visited Karbala and Najaf, travelled to Kirmānshāh in Persia, and thence by Sulaimāniyah, Kōi Sanjāq and Arbil to Mūsal, whence, being taken ill, he returned by raft on the Tigris to Baghdād. In 1882 Colonel Tweedie, as Acting Resident, visited Karbala. In 1884, Mr. Plowden proposed a fresh tour on the Persian frontier to the south east of Baghdad and to Musal in the north; the assent of the Government of India and of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was given; and scientific instruments were provided for his use. However, unless his abortive trip up the Tigris in April 1885, already referred to, be reckoned, no part of the scheme would seem to have been carried out.

In 1885 Colonel Tweedie, having succeeded Mr. Plowden as Resi- 1885.
dent, proposed to substitute a tour to Karbala and Najaf for that on the Persian frontier. It was at this time that the Turks first raised objections to movements by the Resident in camp. The Government of India accorded their sanction as usual to the Resident's proposals; but Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador found it necessary to request him to abandon his intended journey to the Holy Cities, "in view of the strong political objections raised by the Porte." Colonel Tweedie at once addressed the Ambassador, Sir W. White, on the subject of this prohibition, submitting that the right of the British Consul-General at Baghdād to move about freely in the Wilāyat had always hitherto, been asserted and maintained; that there were large British Indian communities in, and numerous British Indian pilgrims to, Karbala and Najaf; that the adequacy of the arrangements for the protection and supervision of these by means of an honorary un-official Agent at Karbala depended on effective surveillance by the British Consul-General at Baghdād, which could not be exercised from a distance; that acquiescence in the Turkish objections to his visiting Karbala and Najaf might result in his being prevented from going to Mūsal a much more remote place, where there was a British Vice-Consulate under his control; and finally, that if his movements were now to be, for the first time, restricted to journeys between Baghdād and Basrah, his usefulness, especially as an officer of the Government of India, would necessarily be much diminished. In consequence of these representations a note was presented to the Porte, in June 1886, drawing attention to the necessity which the British Consul-General at Baghdād was under, with a view to the proper performance of his duties, of visiting from time to time the consulates under his orders, and of attending on the spot to the affairs of the British Indian subjects under his jurisdiction. A reply was received to the effect that the Wālis of Baghdād, Basrah, and Mūsal had been instructed to afford the British Consul-General every assistance that he might require within their respective districts.

Colonel Tweedie availed himself of these orders to make, in the winter of 1886-1887, a very long tour lasting from October to February, in the course of which he visited Abu Ghurāib, Hit, Tikrīt, Kirkūk, Sulaimāniyah, Kōi Sanjāq, Arbīl, Mūsal, Sinjār, Dair-az-Zor, 'Ānah, Hit, Rumādi, Rahaliyah, Shifāthah, Karbala, and Najaf; and he would have continued it to Basrah, *viâ* the country of the Khazā'il, Muntafik, and

Dhafir, had not changes in the Turkish administrative staff demanded his return from Najaf to Baghdád. On this journey Colonel Tweedie amassed a large quantity of valuable and interesting information, much of which he embodied in a report. At the outset he was somewhat hampered in his intercourse with the people of the country by the commander of a Turkish police escort sent with him from Baghdád, who watched his every movement, and whose appearance had a repellent effect on some of the Arabs met with, "he looking on them as of the nature "of *Feræ Naturæ*, and they on him as a kind of executioner and tax-"gatherer in one. This made them but surlily civil, and indeed they "looked truculent enough to cut one's throat for the sake of the gilt "buttons on his cloak, which they, no doubt, thought were gold."

The right of free movement by the British Resident, thus re-established, was not again called in question by the Turkish authorities; and Colonel Newmarch during his Residentship (1902-1906) made numerous useful journeys in different parts of the country.

It may be mentioned that in 1897, Colonel Loch, then Resident, proposed three tours for sanction by Her Majesty's Government, *viz.*, one from Basrah to Háil and Jauf-al-'Amir in Central Arabia, a second between Baghdád and Músal *viâ* Kirkúk, and a third from Baghdád to Kirmánsháh and thence through Luristán to Ahwáz. The first of these was prohibited on the ground that it might excite the suspicion of the Ottoman Government and provoke accusations of British intrigue in Najd, and the third was disallowed as lying chiefly in Persian territory, but the second was permitted as unobjectionable.

Direct landing from steamers at the British Residency, Baghdád, prohibited, 1888-89.

It was until 1888 the invariable custom that Indian officials and other travellers to Baghdád who were guests of the British Resident, as also their luggage, should be dropped with the mails at the Residency by the British steamers before reaching the customs house. In the year mentioned, however, exception was taken to the practice by the Turkish authorities on the ground that it might give cover to evasion of customs duty, and Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople directed that it should be discontinued.

Prohibition of the importation of loaded cartridges from abroad, 1891.

Reference may be made to a matter of minor importance which had a bearing on the amusements of British subjects, and even officials, in Turkish 'Iráq. The Commercial Treaty of 1861 between Britain and Turkey permitted the importation into Ottoman territory from abroad of fowling-pieces and small quantities of gunpowder for private use; and in 1863 a Turkish ordinance had been issued freeing *bond fide* sporting

weapons and ammunition from every restriction. This ordinance was, however, abrogated by a regulation made in 1870, and with it all other existing rules; and thereafter, though the exclusion of sporting requisites from the country was not strictly enforced, difficulties were of occasional occurrence. In 1887 a gun and some cartridges addressed to Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, were detained for a time in the local customs house, but were finally released on an order from the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and a rifle and ammunition consigned in the same year to Major Mockler, who held the same post, were similarly treated. In 1891 Lieutenant Stratton, a successor of Mr. Robertson and Major Mockler, having obtained a pass from the Wali, ordered 2,000 shot cartridges from India; but they were impounded by the Turkish Customs at Basrah for return to the port of shipment under a regulation prohibiting the entry of loaded cartridges of any kind into Turkey; Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople informed the Resident at Baghdád, through whom the matter had been referred to him, that no action was possible. Sportsmen in Turkish 'Iráq thus laboured under an irksome restriction, ammunition being either unprocurable locally or, if procurable, of doubtful quality.

Vexatious interference with British Indian sailing vessels on the Shatt-al 'Arab 1893—98.

In 1893 a system of harrassment of British Indian sailing vessels on the lower Shatt-al 'Arab was initiated by the Turkish authorities: it was evidently a part of their scheme for asserting absolute Turkish jurisdiction over the whole river in which the construction of a fort at Fáo and the attempted recovery of customs duty there and at Dawásir on goods consigned to Muhammarah were also elements.

1893.

In the autumn of 1893, the season for the exportation of dates having begun, the Turkish Mudir at Fáo began to oblige the crew of every British Indian sailing vessels proceeding up the river to deposit in his charge, pending their return seawards, all the firearms in their possession except four which they were allowed to retain for defence against pirates; the reason alleged was that surplus arms might be sold by the owners to natives of the country. Money was also extorted from the depositors at the time of returning their arms to them. The British authorities had not been consulted in regard to this innovation affecting their subjects.

1894.

In the autumn of the following year wholesale blackmailing of British Indian craft began. It had for long been a custom, though an irregular one, that native sailing vessels from the Persian Gulf, even if bound for Muhammarah, should stop at Fáo and be subjected there to the requirements of the Turkish quarantine regulations; and it now

became a practice on the part of Turkish officials at Fáo, other than those of the Quarantine establishment, to invade the detained vessels and extort money from the crew on the pretext that the possession of arms, gunpowder, tobacco, snuff, etc., which they carried for their personal use, was illegal in a Turkish port. No receipts were granted for payments, and it was plain that the sums exacted merely went into the private pockets of the extortioners; but the Turkish Government had no motive for checking the abuse, which conduced to the establishment of their authority over the river. In this year several vessels which neglected to halt at Fáo were boarded further up the river by Turkish quarantine officials and subjected to extortion and vexatious delays. Seizures were also made at Fáo and at Basrah, on board British Indian craft, of arms carried for self-defence; and, on objections being raised by the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, he was informed that the Turkish police were not aware of the nationality of the vessels. Difficulties were also raised in regard to the non-possession by native Indian boats of bills of health granted at the ports from which they sailed. Accordingly, in June 1895, a notice was issued by the Assistant Political Agent, advising masters of British Indian sailing vessels to fly their flag night and day during the whole of their sojourn in the Shatt-al 'Arab, to provide themselves in future with bills of health at their ports of departure, not to pay any money to Turkish officials without obtaining a receipt, and to report at once to the British Consulate at Basrah any irregular treatment which they might experience at the hands of the Turkish authorities. The notice also stated that vessels from the Persian Gulf bound for Muhammarah were not subject to Turkish sanitary control on the way and need not stop at Fáo, but that those of which the destination was Basrah or another Turkish river port should do so, and comply with the Turkish quarantine regulations.

1895. In autumn, 1895, there was a renewal of the difficulties which had become customary at that season. Turkish soldiers boarded British Indian vessels on pretext of searching for "illicit" arms and refused to leave until they had been satisfied with bribes; and other kinds of extortion in money and kind took place. The matter was now raised at Constantinople, but at first without result.

1896. Sir P. Currie, the British Ambassador at the Porte, in reporting on the subject to Her Majesty's Government in February 1896, remarked: "There can be no doubt that the Foreign Missions at Constantinople

"have hitherto maintained, and the Turks have accepted, the principle "that foreign merchant ships in Ottoman waters are assimilated to foreign "domiciles in Ottoman territory and cannot be boarded without the "consent of their Consular Representatives" but he doubted, for reasons unconnected with Turkey, the expediency of basing a protest on this ground. At length, in May 1896, he was instructed to inform the Turkish Government that, until a British ship passed upstream beyond the Khaiyain creek—the place above which both banks were considered to be Turkish territory—or until it touched a point on the right or western bank within the Turkish dominions, it could not properly be subjected to interference, whether on sanitary or on other grounds, by Turkish officials; and that the searching of British vessels for arms could be allowed only at Basrah or at Fão, in the presence of a British Consular Officer. Meanwhile, however, the Porte had ordered the Wáli of Basrah to disregard all British remonstrances, and to direct his subordinates at the mouth of the Shatt-al 'Arab to continue stopping and inspecting all vessels that entered the river, whatever their nationality and destination, and without regard to whether they had entered Turkish jurisdiction or not.

It was then resolved by Her Majesty's Government to locate a British consular representative at Fão; but the Turkish Government refused to recognise such an appointment; and on the 22nd September it became necessary to inform them that, unless they granted recognition, a British man-of-war would be sent to Fão. At this juncture some British Indian sailing vessels bound for Muhammarah were again intimidated by the Turkish authorities and obliged to put in at Fão, where quarantine dues were recovered from them; and the proceedings of the Mudir of Fão was sustained by the Wáli of Basrah, who stated that that official was merely acting in obedience to his orders. These events precipitated matters; Captain Whyte, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, proceeded in person to Fão; and on the 23rd October, Her Majesty's Ship "Lapwing" arrived there. On the appearance of the "Lapwing" the annoyances complained of ceased, and it became known to many masters of British Indian sailing vessels for the first time that interference with them by the Turkish officials at Fão was in many cases irregular.

Finally, in December 1896, an exchange of notes took place between the Porte and the British Ambassador at Constantinople, of which the result seems to have been an understanding that any searches of British

vessels which it might be necessary to make should be carried out at Basrah, that British vessels should enjoy perfect liberty to proceed direct to Muhammarah or to any other river port in Persian territory, and that they could not be compelled under any pretext to stop at Fão on their way either to Muhammarah or to Basrah.

1897. The "Lapwing" apparently remained in the neighbourhood of Fão until March 1897, when she was withdrawn, having accomplished the purpose for which she was sent. A Turkish *stationnaire*, in the shape of a wooden sailing vessel carrying three guns, had in the meantime been placed at Dawāsir some distance above Fão; but, in view of the settlement reached, it was considered unnecessary to press for her removal, as had at one time been suggested.

1898. In 1898, plague having broken out in India some time before and quarantine having been imposed at Basrah, the officials of the Turkish sanitary post at Fão proceeded to violate the understanding of 1896 by obliging British Indian sailing vessels to stop at Fão and undergo quarantine there. A threat of renewing the British demand for consular representation at Fão induced the Porte, however, promptly to countermand the proceedings in question.

Abuse of quarantine on the Shatt al-'Arab, 1890—1905.

A weapon of which the Turkish authorities freely availed themselves to obstruct British navigation and trade, as also to damage Persian interests and assert their own mastery on the Shatt-al-'Arab, was the imposition of quarantine restrictions on foreign vessels. The first instance of abusive procedure of this kind was in 1890, when an attempt was made to penalise or prevent the landing of passengers at Muhammarah by British steamers bound from the Persian Gulf to Basrah. The orders in this case seem to have been issued by the Turkish Government without reference to the Constantinople Board of Health, the only competent authority in the matter; and a protest sufficed to bring about the withdrawal of the interdict. Other examples of the use of sanitary precautions as a political stalking-horse to the detriment of British and Persian interests will be found in the immediately preceding paragraph and in the earlier section of this chapter on Persian relations; and the restraints placed on commercial activity at Basrah from 1896 onwards, generally more onerous than was warranted by the findings of the latest international Sanitary Conference, and to that extent open to the suspicion of being political in their object, may be learned on reference to the Appendix on Epidemics and Sanitary Organisation.

British official matters and interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876—1905.

Rank in the Indian Political Service of the British representative at Baghdād, of 1880.

In a reorganisation of the Government of India's Political Service effected by a notification in the Foreign Department dated 19th February 1880, the British representative in Turkish 'Irāq was again graded as a Resident of the second class; and in the table appended to the notification his appointment was specified as that of Resident, instead of Political Agent as formerly. From this time, accordingly, "Resident" seems to be his correct appellation; but it may be mentioned, to illustrate the confusion prevailing on the subject, that the copy of the notification sent him was itself addressed to "the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia."

A list of the incumbents of the Baghdād Political Agency or Residency during the period will be found in the Appendix on Diplomatic and Consular Representation. Mr. Plowden (1880—1885) was the first member of the Indian Civil Service appointed to Baghdād since the death of Mr. Rich in 1821, and his successors during the period were all military officers.

General status and extent of jurisdiction of the British Resident at Baghdād, 1884—1888.

In 1884, apparently in consequence of a refusal by the Porte to recognise certain British consular districts in Turkey as being of the extent claimed by the British authorities, information on particular points was required from various consular officers in a circular letter from Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. In answer to this circular Mr. Plowden, the Resident at Baghdād, replied that in his own Barāat (or Turkish *exequatur*) and in the Barāats of the Vice-Consuls at Basrah and Mūsal the only places mentioned were "Baghdād," "Basrah," and "Mūsal," respectively; but that in practice no attempt had been made by the Turkish authorities to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the officers in question by limiting it to the town in which they were located. In his own case, no objection had been taken to his intervening in affairs at Basrah and Mūsal, beyond the limits of Wilāyat of Baghdād, as they stood since its reduction in 1879-1884. Mr. Plowden suggested that, if a favourable opportunity should occur, the Porte might be moved to amend the Barāats of the British Consular representatives in Turkish 'Irāq in such a manner as to make it clear that the district of the Consul-General at Baghdād included the whole Wilāyats

of Baghdád, Músul and Basrah, that of the Vice-Consul at Basrah the whole Wilâyat of Basrah, and that of the Vice-Consul at Músul the whole Wilâyat of Músul. It does not appear that action on this recommendation was found practicable.

In 1887 on a complaint made by the Resident that the Wâli of Basrah during a visit to Baghdád had omitted to call on him, Sir W. White, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, remarked that Colonel Tweedie, as Consul General at Baghdád, was not accredited to the Wâli of Basrah and, for that, and for other reasons, was not entitled to expect a visit from him in the circumstances described. Colonel Tweedie, on receiving this reply, raised once more the question of the dual nature of the Baghdád appointments, last discussed in 1874. He remarked that the British representative at Baghdád was, primarily, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia on behalf of the Government of India, and, secondarily, Consul-General of Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the Pashâlîq of Baghdád; that ever since the consular title had been conferred on him the Ottoman Government had shown a tendency to ignore his status as Resident and treat him merely as a Consul-General; and that, as the dominions of the Baghdád Pashâlîq had recently been reduced by the separation therefrom of Basrah and its districts, so the duties and responsibilities of the British representatives at Baghdád were being gradually curtailed and restricted, with the result that his influence in the country was being destroyed. The tendency was now to regard him as Consul for the Baghdád Wilâyat only, whereas what in Colonel Tweedie's estimation was required, especially in the circumstances of the time, was a "vigorous unfettered "Political Agent in the Government of India's sense, pervading with his "person, his influence, and his money every portion of the Ottoman "Empire lying within reach of the Persian Gulf." The principal questions raised by Colonel Tweedie's letter were, firstly, that of the official status of the Resident in future with reference to Basrah, and, secondly, that of the steps needed to save his official position from disintegration. Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in forwarding the correspondence to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made, among others, the following observations:

The position of a Foreign Political Resident in an independent country like the Turkish Empire is most anomalous, and its very origin, unrecognised as it is by the Sublime Porte, is for me a matter of pure conjecture. * * So far as Her Majesty's Embassy is concerned, Colonel Tweedie is a Consul-General and nothing else, nor has he ever been recognised by the Sublime Porte in any other capacity. His

Berat and Firman are the same as those accorded to other Consular officers; and he enjoys the same privileges as other Consular Officers * * Any attempt to obtain his recognition as a political Resident would inevitably rouse the strongest feelings of jealous resentment on the part of the Imperial Government, which could only be allayed if at all, by re-assuring explanations of the duties and position of such a functionary.

It appeared to Sir W. White that either the position and duties of the "British Political Resident" in Turkish 'Iraq should be defined, with a view to an attempt being made to obtain their recognition by the Porte, or that the advisability of abolishing the title should be considered. The India Office, on being consulted deprecated any change in the nature of the Baghdâd appointment; while the British Ambassador at Constantinople stated, in reply to an enquiry by the Foreign Office, that the Resident's usefulness had not in his opinion been diminished because, though Basrah had been removed from the Baghdâd Wilâyat, a British Consul existed there who corresponded with and acted under the Consul-General at Baghdâd. Sir W. White also remarked: "The Sublime Porte does "not recognise the jurisdiction of a Consular Officer outside of the single "Wilâyat in which he is appointed to reside, for which he holds a Berat "exequatur; and Her Majesty's Embassy has never succeeded in obtaining "any deviation from this hard-and-fast rule since it was laid down."

The following were the orders on the case finally communicated to Sir W. White by the Marquis of Salisbury in March 1888.

Colonel Tweedie is probably not aware of the objections that would certainly be raised by the Porte to the recognition of this title, inasmuch as, according to diplomatic precedent, it might be taken to imply that the chief authority of the district in which the Consul-General resides has a semi-independent position similar to that of the former Princes of Servia or Roumania, or of the present Khedive of Egypt or Prince of Bulgaria.

So long as the Political Agent was the representative not of the British Government, nor a branch of that Government, but of the East India Company, this objection did not apply with the same force.

There can be no doubt, however, that in former times the Governors of the distant provinces of the Empire did, in fact, hold a position of far greater independence than is now the case. The progress of centralisation in the administration of the Ottoman Empire has of late years been very marked; and there is a continual tendency to limit the authority of the provincial Governors and to bring them into more complete dependency on the Government at Constantinople. There is, as Your Excellency has more than once noticed, a no less marked increase of jealousy of foreign interference, of the privileges and immunities of the foreign Consulates, and of the rights of protection which they have acquired by agreement or usage.

These symptoms, which Colonel Tweedie seems to imagine to be personal to himself are equally observable in other parts of Turkish dominions; and no advantage

would be gained by endeavouring to claim the formal acknowledgment of a title which, while it properly marks Colonel Tweedie's position in the Indian service, is not in accordance with general international usage.

It may, perhaps, be questioned whether the British Political Agent at Baghdad has ever held that acknowledged position as a diplomatic representative which Colonel Tweedie seems to imagine now attached to the office; and whether the considerable and influence enjoyed by some of his predecessors have not, in great measure, been the result of the personal good-will and respect of the Ottoman authorities.

There can, however, be no question as to the importance of the interests which are entrusted to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad in the capacity as Agent of the Government of India. They were the original causes of the creation of the office, and are the main reason, at all events, of its continuance. In the protection of those interests, and in discharge of the duties connected with them, Colonel Tweedie will, I am convinced, always have, as heretofore, Your Excellency's full support and assistance whenever he may require them.

Colonel Tweedie should understand that the position which he holds and the immunities he enjoys, as Her Majesty's Consul-General differ widely from what are accorded to Consular Officers in most European countries, and would be considered as belonging only to a diplomatic appointment. But considerable moderation and judgment are necessary in the exercise of rights which took their origin in concession and comity, and which it is often in the power of the territorial authority to defeat in practice, even while they are acknowledged in principle. An attempt to assert them too ostentatiously and to procure their extension is sure at the present moment to excite suspicion and jealousy both at Constantinople and on the spot, and to occasion increased hostility and obstructiveness in the transaction of business.

The Government of India remarked, with reference to these orders in a despatch to the Secretary of State for India, in June 1888;

We have no doubt that Her Majesty's Government will take any steps which may be thought necessary to guard against the possible risk of general decrease of British influence in Turkish Arabia owing to the contraction of the geographical limits of the *eilayate* to which its consuls are accredited. As far as Indian interests are concerned, we are of opinion that they can be sufficient protected by the Political Resident without any further recognition of his title by the Sublime Porte.

Lord Salisbury's letter of the 26th March 1888 to Her Majesty's Ambassador and Plenipotentiary at Constantinople appears us to meet the requirements of the case, and we concur with your Lordship in not considering it necessary to move further in the matter.

Question of the use of the title "Resident," 1903-1904.

In connection with the King-Emperor's birthday in November 1903 Colonel Newmarch, the British Resident, wrote letters to his foreign colleagues at Baghdad which he subscribed with the double title of Resident and Consul-General. The French, German and Russian consular representatives thereupon sent him identical communications requesting that he would not use the style of Resident, but only that of Consul-General, in addressing them. Colonel Newmarch reported the matter to the Government of India and asked for instructions: it

appeared from the Residency archives that Mr. (afterwards Sir Trevor) Plowden during his incumbency of the Baghdád appointment had generally employed both titles in his correspondence with his foreign colleagues, and that no objection had been made by them, though they in their replies addressed him simply as Consul-General. Since Mr. Plowden's departure in 1885 the dual title had fallen into disuse in correspondence with foreign Consulates; but Colonel Newmarch in reviving it had at first experienced no opposition. The question was referred to His Majesty's Government, by whom it was finally ruled in January 1904, that the title "Political Resident" should not be used by the British representative at Baghdád in communications to the Ottoman authorities or the Consular body. On receipt of these orders Colonel Newmarch replied to the identical letters of his foreign colleagues in a communication ending with the word: "In future, therefore, you will be addressed by me only in my capacity of Consul-General."

Reprehensible conduct of Colonel Nixon, British Political Agent at Baghdád, 1877-78.

An instance of something approaching insubordination on the part of the British Political Agent occurred at Baghdád in 1877. The case, though not creditable, calls for notice, as illustrating certain dangers incidental to divided control which all other Political Agents and Residents at Baghdád, both before and after Colonel Nixon, have been able to avoid.

Colonel Nixon seem to have disliked Mr. Robertson, Assistant Political Agent and Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Basrah, who was under his orders; and in 1875 he preferred charges against him to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and suggested his removal. Sir H. Elliot did not support Colonel Nixon's recommendations, and the only result of the reference was that Mr. Robertson was admonished concerning a tendency he had shown to raise unnecessary difficulties with the Turkish authorities. The Government of India were left in ignorance of these proceedings with regard to one of their officers. In 1877, Mr. Robertson having been temporarily transferred by the Government of India to Maqat as Acting Political Agent at that place, Colonel Nixon proceeded of himself to instal a successor to Mr. Robertson at Basrah in the person of a Mr. Carter.* It seems probable that his object was to prevent the return of Mr. Robertson, for,

*Mr. Carter, who was an employé of a local British firm and who eventually died at Basrah, was known as "the White Shaikh" on account of a remarkable personal influence over Arabs which he was believed to possess.

in informing His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Mr. Carter's willingness to accept the post *on permanence*, he observed: "If approved, I would beg your Lordship will intimate your sanction to "the Indian Government from whom pay is drawn, and (by whom) "promotions appear now to be made." The Government of India, having become aware of Colonel Nixon's irregular action, informed him that Mr. Carter's appointment must be regarded as provisional only, and called upon Colonel Nixon himself for an explanation of his conduct. Colonel Nixon replied by referring to a Foreign Office Circular under which he was empowered, in certain conditions and for certain purposes, to appoint Pro-Consuls, and added: "My position here is somewhat "peculiar, for, while my desire is to act in strict accordance with the "wishes of the Indian Government, still it must be remembered that I "have also to act in subordination to the English Foreign Office and our "Ambassador at Constantinople." This defence drew from the Government of India the following severe observations:

> The explanation contained in your letters above quoted is not considered satisfactory by the Government of India. The substantive office held by Mr. Robertson, before his transfer to Muscat, was that of Assistant Agent. The salary and allowances attached to that office are defrayed by the Government of India, and all appointments thereto, whether officiating or permanent, vest in His Excellency the Viceroy in Council and no other authority. It is true that the Assistant Political Agent for Turkish Arabia usually receives from the Foreign Department of Her Majesty's Government the rank and powers of Vice-Consul, but his Vice-Consular appointment carries with it no stipend, and is secondary to his substantive one.
>
> Accordingly in nominating Mr. Carter as successor to Mr. Robertson, and recommending him for appointment as Vice-Consul, without the previous sanction of the Government of India, you exceeded your own authority and ignored the authority of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council.
>
> The Governor-General in Council is glad to learn from your letter under acknowledgment that the apparent disrespect in your proceedings was unintentional; but, while acquitting you of intentional disrespect, His Excellency in Council is constrained to regard your proceedings as wanting in intelligence and care.*

On the 30th July 1877 the Government of India informed Her Majesty's Government and Colonel Nixon that the appointment of Mr. Carter to Basrah was not approved by them, and that Captain E. A. Fraser from Bûshehr had been ordered to relieve him.

* This communication concluded with the phrase, "I am to add that, on further consideration His Lordship is not prepared to appoint your son to the office" (*i.e.* the Assistant Political Agency at Basrah).

Colonel Nixon's error described above was, however, venial in comparison with a second into which he fell. In November 1877, Captain Fraser having been recalled to India and Mr. Robertson's return to Basrah being imminent, Colonel Nixon wrote almost simultaneously to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department and to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, opposing Mr. Robertson's re-appointment to Basrah. In his letter to the Ambassador he revived his complaint against Mr. Robertson which had been dealt with and disposed of in 1875, accused him of "an unconciliatory disposition," and suggested that he should be transferred permanently to the Government of India or receive Consular employment elsewhere." Such a presentation of the case was inexcusable, for it had already been very clearly explained to Colonel Nixon by the Government of India that Mr. Robertson was an officer of the Indian establishment, and that the Basrah appointment was an appointment under the Government of India. The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department replied that Mr. Robertson could not be removed; but the representations made by Colonel Nixon to the Embassy obtained the qualified support of the Foreign Office.

The matter having come into discussion between the Foreign Office and the India Office, however, Colonel Nixon's proceedings underwent a general illumination; and the question then arose whether he could be allowed to remain at Baghdad. His term of service under the Political Department of the Government of India had expired in 1877, on his attaining the age of 55 years; but, on representations made by the Foreign Office, he had been granted a special extension of two years to the 1st July 1879. His record was brought under review by the Government of India, and it was recalled that he had in 1876 been severely reprimanded for his conduct towards Captain Warner, commanding the "Comet," and that his action in Kulsūm Nisa Begam's case—to be described hereafter—had been characterised by the highest authorities in India as feeble and obstructive. The Government of India suggested the cancellation of his special extension of service, and His Majesty's Secretary of State for India left the action to be taken in this respect to their discretion. Sir H. Layard, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople interposed on Colonel Nixon's behalf, representing that he appeared to have been much liked at Baghdād and to have stood well with the Turkish authorities and that consequently his presence in Turkish 'Irāq was useful in the state of affairs then prevailing; but His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declined to

intervene. Eventually, in August 1878 the Government of India addressed Colonel Nixon, commenting on the inadequacy of certain explanations which he had offered, and informing him in the following terms of the decision at which they had arrived:

> His Excellency the Governor General in Council is of opinion that it would be ineffectual either to explain a second time the impropriety of referring elsewhere than to the Government of India for orders regarding appointments under this Government, or to pass a second censure on you for the error. It appears certain that you find great difficulty in keeping separate your relations with two quite different superiors, and in maintaining the necessary distinction. Having regard, therefore, to the material inconvenience and confusion in public business which are caused by your inability to comprehend the position which you and your subordinates hold in Turkish Arabia and your double functions with two Governments, His Excellency in Council has determined that you should be transferred from Baghdad to an appointment in India.

But in the end, Colonel Nixon having tendered an apology for his conduct, it was accepted by the Government of India, the orders for his transfer were rescinded, and he was allowed to finish his service at Baghdád.*

Relations of the British Residency at Baghdád with the Local Government and Foreign Consulates, 1889.

In 1889 the practice of paying an official visit in uniform to the head of the Local Government on the birthday of His Majesty the Sultán of Turkey was revived by Major Talbot, the Acting British Resident at Baghdád, and M. Pegnon, the French Consul, after it had fallen into desuetude for some years. It had ceased, apparently in the time of Taqi-ud-Din-Páshа, a fanatical Wáli of Baghdád, visits by Dragomans having been substituted for visits by officers; and with it the exchange of official visits by the representatives of European powers at Baghdád on the fête days of their respective countries had been discontinued. The first step towards a return to the former more friendly custom was taken by Major Talbot, who paid

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* It is possible that Colonel Nixon, like his less fortunate predecessor Colonel Taylor, was unlucky in the parts of his conduct which came most conspicuously under official notice. More than one traveller alluded to the Anglo-Indian hospitality which distinguished his house at Baghdád. Lady Anne Blunt observing: "Colonel Nixon is hospitality itself, and his doors seem always ajar to take in unfortunate strangers like ourselves, arriving grimed and weather-worn in an otherwise inhospitable city" (*Bedouins of the Euphrates* Vol. I. page 180). See also Commander Cameron's *Our Future Highway*, Vol. II, page 285. Mr. Geary remarked, with reference to a more important point: "Colonel Nixon, the present Political Agent at the Baghdad, is an Anglo-Indian officer of great experience, who has a natural gift, developed under Sir Henry Lawrence, for conciliating the affection of orientals"; and again: "The British Political Agent was, I noticed, saluted with great respect, and even cordiality, by people of all classes and creeds, Mussulman, Christian, and Jewish" (*Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. I, pages 141—42 and 203).

an official visit in uniform to the French Consulate on the 14th July 1888; and on the 17th April 1889, on the occasion of His Majesty the Sultán's birthday, the British, French, and Persian representatives called in uniform on Mushir Nasrat Pásha, the acting head of the Baghdád Government, on an understanding that the compliment should be returned at the first opportunity.

Accordingly, on the 24th May 1889, the birthday of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress, an open air reception was held at the British Residency after sunset, the month being Ramadhán, which was attended by the Wáli of Baghdád and Mushir Nasrat Pásha; by the French, Russian, American, and Persian Consuls; by the Armenian, Chaldæan, and Syrian clergy; by all the European British subjects and other Europeans in Baghdád; and by an unusually large concourse of British Indian subjects, and of Christian and Muhammadan natives of Baghdád in general.

Question of supplying an Assistant to the Resident at Baghdád, 1881-1891.

In February 1881 the question of providing a European Assistant to the Resident at Baghdád was raised by Mr. Plowden, who was then in charge; but the Government of India replied that they were not prepared to strengthen the staff. In July of the same year Mr. Plowden returned to the point, but without success, and was authorised to fill up the appointment of Native Agent in the Residency, which he had apparently left vacant in the hope that a European Assistant would be sanctioned. In 1883, Mr. Plowden being then on leave in England, a memorandum written by him was forwarded by the Secretary of State to the Government of India, and in it the request for an Assistant at Baghdád was reiterated on the following grounds;

> There is no officer in the Indian Political service who has to deal single-handed with so large a charge as that entrusted to the Resident in Turkish Arabia and Consul-General in Baghdad. The country under my political supervision measures about 140,000 square miles, and it is part of my duty to keep the Imperial and Indian Governments informed of all political events of importance which may happen throughout this extensive country, of the movements of the Kurds in the North and North-East, of the condition of affairs on the Turco-Persian Frontier, and of the relations of the Arab tribes towards each other and towards the Ottoman officials. I have to correspond with the Local Ottoman officials, with the Foreign Consuls, French, Russian, and Persian (with the two former the correspondence is in French which I have to translate myself), with my two Assistants at Basrah and Mosul, with the Resident in the Persian Gulf, with the Governments of India and Bombay, with the English Foreign office and the Ambassador at Constantinople, and occasionally also with the Minister at Tehran. I have also the charge of an Indian Post Office, which is largely used as a channel for the import of valuable merchandise, and of a Treasury. And whereas in India the duty of personally certifying the balances of cash in the Treasury on the last day of the month and submitting the Treasury and stamp accounts on certain fixed dates, is ordinarily assigned to a young Assistant Magistrate, at Baghdad the duty devolves upon me.

It hampers me very much, for it obliges me to be present in Baghdad on certain specified days. Petty litigation and petty disputes among the British Indians take up a further large share of my time. Then I get a number of telegrams, necessarily in cipher, for every open telegram is seen by the Turkish authorities, and which have to be answered in cipher. The English and the Indian Governments do not use the same code so that I have sometimes to communicate the same message in two different ciphers, and as I am obliged by stringent orders to do cipher work entirely by myself, all other business has in the interval to be put aside.

* * * * * * * *

Naturally, I have frequent business with the Vali and other Ottoman officials. Very little can be done in Baghdad by despatch writing and at the same time it is not always convenient or proper that I should go in person to the Vali or his subordinates. And yet I have no person on whom I can rely to send in my place. The Native Agent and the Armenian Dragoman are local Christians who carry no weight and who are really afraid of the Vali. I am most reluctant to send them for they can rarely get anything done, and yet practically I have no choice. Contrast my position with that of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. I have at least as much work to do and yet while I am single-handed, the Resident at Bushire has an Assistant Resident (until lately he had two), and a Treasury officer of the status of an Extra Assistant Commissioner. There is no comparison between my work and that of the French Consul at Baghdad, the proportion is as ten to one, and yet the latter is allowed by his Government an European Assistant carefully trained in the Oriental College at Paris.

Moreover, the value of Baghdad as a field for training a young Political Officer is worthy of some consideration. He would have an unrivalled opportunity of learning Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, of mixing with Orientals of many and various types, and of seeing what Muhammadanism is like in a country where Islam is the dominant faith. I cannot help thinking that, if Baghdad were nearer India, the necessity of giving the Resident an Assistant would have been recognised long before this, and I am strongly of opinion that the public interests suffer through the omission to appoint one.

The reply of the Government of India to the Secretary of State was to the following effect :—

It would undoubtedly be useful to the Resident, and advantageous to the Government of India, to add an Assistant to the Residency Staff. At the same time we are not satisfied that the work of the Baghdad Residency and Consulate is sufficiently heavy to justify the expense which would be incurred in creating a fresh appointment in our political service, as proposed by Mr. Plowden. We shall endeavour, however, to depute to Baghdad from time to time any young officer who may not be required for more urgent duty elsewhere.

Colonel Tweedie about the same time, while in acting charge at Baghdad, suggested that one or two Sunni Muhammadan attachés from India might be added to the Residency instead of a European Officer.

At length in 1891, in submitting a scheme for the reorganisation of the Oudh Bequest by which a considerable amount of additional work would be thrown on the Residency, Colonel Tweedie, who had become Resident, referred to an opinion expressed by Colonel Kemball in 1867

and represented that, if his own proposals were accepted, the addition of an Assistant to the Residency staff would certainly be required. But he did not base the suggestion exclusively on the increase of work which might be expected to attend the alteration of the Oudh Bequest arrangements, as will appear from the following extracts from one of his letters:

> The only second commissioned officer we now have is the Residency Surgeon. As it happens, Brigade-Surgeon Bowman is not without experience of civil charges, and his readiness to help in non-professional work deserves the fullest recognition. But his successor may not be equally qualified for the performance from time to time of political, consular, judicial, treasury, duties; and in any case the charge of an important Residency, or even the assisting of the Resident in his daily duties and correspondence, does not form properly part of a Medical Officer's role, especially when, as is here now and usually the case, that Medical Officer practices his profession equally in Russian, French and Osmanli circles.
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> Firstly, there are *general* grounds. Russia is fast projecting her shadow over the Tigris and Euphrates. In May of last year she re-established a Consulate here after it had been in abeyance for three years. The other day a young gentleman of the same nationality and social status as the Consul, fresh from the Oriental College, St. Petersburg, which has made him a good Persian linguist to start with, arrived at Baghdad as Secretary or Assistant. Two Frenchmen similarly officer the Consulate of France, and yet the subjects of the latter Consulate at Baghdad and Mosul fall short, I believe, of a hundred; while the stream of pilgrims from newly made Russian provinces, if now beginning, is only just beginning to flow towards Karbala and Najaf. On the other hand, the British Resident with a clientèle (English, German, Greek, Afghan, Indian) counted by thousands; with as many calls on him from the side of Europe as of India, and with the seaport of Bussorah for an outpost; has no one except an over-occupied medical officer to confide in; no one to assist him in his secondary duties so that he may engage the more in cultivating and extending through intercourse with all classes that personal influence on which so much is here dependent: most serious of all; no one to whom he can fittingly entrust the Residency, with all its multifarious responsibilities and contingencies, on his moving out were it but to Karbala or Bussorah.

Later, however, Colonel Tweedie allowed that, until a serious increase in work connected with the Oudh Bequest or in the touring duties of the Resident occurred, the question of adding an Assistant to the Residency might be suffered to remain in suspense; and it apparently dropped for the time being.

Appointment of a Commercial Assistant to the Resident at Baghdad, 1904-1905.

In November 1904 Major Newmarch, then Resident, represented the difficulty he experienced in drawing up trade reports and disposing of the consular work of the Residency, besides performing the more important political duties which occupied most of his time. The result of his application was the appointment to Baghdad in 1905 of an Assistant to the Resident for Trade and Commerce, whose salary was debited in equal moieties to the Government of India and to His

Majesty's Government; but the new officer was not invested with consular powers. The first occupant of the post thus created was Mr. J. C. Gaskin, who had been for a number of years employed under the Government of India in the Persian Gulf in different capacities; but it was suggested that his successors should be supplied from the Levant Consular service.

The British Government steamer "Comet," 1880—1894.

It will be remembered that so far back as 1868 it had been decided to replace the Residency steamer "Comet" by a new vessel, and that in 1869 authorisation for doing so had been obtained from the Porte, but that delay due to various causes supervened.

1880—1884.

It was only in 1880 that it was at last decided to build a new vessel; and in 1882, before it was ready, the "Comet" had become unserviceable. A steamer named the "London" was accordingly hired for the Resident's temporary use, but she foundered in the Shatt-al-'Arab without reaching Baghdád; and, though efforts were made to obtain a suitable steam launch as a substitute, none could be got. When the successor of the "Comet", built at Bombay, was finished, it was found that she had been made too large for the navigation of the Tigris; the result was further delay. At last the new vessel was ready: her cost was Rs. 93,494, towards which His Majesty's Government apparently contributed £3,000; she was armed with two Nordenfelt guns; and the long familiar name of "Comet" was perpetuated in her. There was some doubt as to the manner in which the replacement of the old by the new "Comet" would be received by the Turkish authorities, but permission was granted by the Porte on condition that both vessels should not be in the Tigris at the same time. The old "Comet" was accordingly broken up at Baghdád, and* the new ship entered the river in October 1884.

1887—1889.

In 1887, the "Comet" having grounded during a voyage, Colonel Tweedie, the Resident, suggested that she should be removed elsewhere and a vessel more suitable to the rivers of Mesopotamia supplied for Baghdád; but, as she could not be utilised at any other place or sold (except at a great loss), and as Her Majesty's Government would have to be consulted regarding her disposal, the suggestion was negatived by the Government of India. In 1889 Colonel Tweedie again remarked on the unsuitability of the "Comet" and urged her replacement by a steam launch, which would be more economical and more useful. Afterwards,

* The new "Comet" was taken back to Bombay and lengthened in 1904-5. Her length is now (1912) 131 feet 8 inches, her gross tonnage 182 and her draught 3 feet, to 3 feet 6 inches. In 1909 she was provided with bullet-proof steel plating, completely protecting the bridge-deck, guns, and engine-room.

his meaning having been misunderstood, he explained that he was far from advocating the "Comet's" removal "except as a companion "measure to Baghdād being furnished with another vessel, built on differ- "ent lines and administered less as a unit in a great department (Indian "Marine) than as a means of carrying out certain reasonable duties in "Ottoman waters;" and he anticipated that, if the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's steamers one day ceased to run, the "Comet" would be invaluable as a despatch boat and a means of transport. Such being his views, he was informed that the replacement of the "Comet" presented many difficulties, and that no immediate action would be taken.

In the meantime a proposal to station the "Comet" principally at Basrah had fallen through, in consequence of the rejection of a scheme for the appointment of the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah to be Consul at Muhammareh also, under which the services of a British Government steamer on the Shatt-al-'Arāb and Kārūn would frequently have been required.

1893-1894.

In the winter of 1893-1894, as already mentioned in another connection, the two Nordenfelt machine-guns forming the "Comet's" armament were exchanged at Basrah for others of a newer pattern, taking the Martini-Henry cartridge.

Question of a launch for the Baghdād Residency, 1904-1905.

In 1904 Major Newmarch, the Resident, asked to be furnished with a launch for short journeys on the river at Baghdād, representing that the need for some such convenience was now great in consequence of the removal of the Residency from the centre to the outskirts of the town. The Government of India were willing to provide a launch; but His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople thought that great difficulties might arise if the Porte were approached on the subject of this proposed addition to the Residency establishment, and suggested other methods. The matter was arranged, but not till after 1905, when a motor launch by Thornycroft was supplied.

British military guard at Baghdād, 1878—1905.

It has been shown that in 1861 the Indian military guard of the Baghdād Residency consisted of only 10 men, having been reduced from a former strength of about 30 on the institution of a small mounted escort for the Resident, recruited locally.

1878—1882.

In 1878 the military guard, which had to watch the Residency building, in which there was a Treasury, as well as their own quarters and the stables of the mounted escort which were then at some distance from the Residency, was found to be too small for the duties required of

it and was increased to 16 rifles. In May 1882 it was raised to 25 of all ranks, including a Native Officer.

1882–1885. In 1883 the Porte complained of the increase; and at the beginning of 1884 Mr. Plowden, the Resident, reported on the question, giving the history of the guard and its fluctuations from the first, explaining the circumstances which necessitated its presence and governed its strength, and deprecating any reduction of it as a concession to Turkish demands. For the better part of a century the guard had been annually relieved without remark on the part of the Turkish authorities; and Mr. Plowden was inclined to attribute the objections now raised to the influence of the Wali, Taqi-ud-din Pasha and other leading Turkish officials at Baghdad, whose dispositions were intensely anti-British, and to the policy of the Turkish Government of the day, which aimed at the suppression of foreign influence in all parts of the Empire. The facts of the case having been explained to the Porte, nothing more was said upon either side; but in March 1885, on the arrival of the yearly relief of the guard by British steamer, the Turkish Chief of Customs at Baghdad expressed to the Dragoman of the British Residency a doubt, eventually overcome, whether in the absence of special authority from Constantinople he would be justified in allowing them to land with their arms.

1914. At the beginning of 1904 an atrocious and discreditable affair took place in the Residency guard, which during the hundred years of its existence had hitherto remained, so far as is known, free from serious crime.

During the absence of Major Newmarch, the Resident, on a winter tour, Jamadar Ghulam Din, the Native Officer commanding the guard, which was then a detachment from the 125th (Napier's) Rifles, disappeared; and for some time no trace of him could be found. The Jamadar, as a strict disciplinarian, was not very popular with his own men; and there was also considerable feeling against him in the regiment as a whole, on account of his having been promoted into it with a commission from the 9th Bombay Infantry, in which he had been a non-commissioned officer. At length, on the 11th February, information was given by a Lance-Naik of the detachment named 'Abdul Karim which resulted in the discovery of the Jamadar's body, buried with his hand lantern in a Khan or warehouse on the further side of the river rented by Mr. D'Arcy of the Persian Oil Company: the corpse bore fourteen dagger wounds. Enquiry showed that the murder was probably the result of a conspiracy in the detachment.

On th 18th February Lance-Naik 'Abdul Karim suddenly ran amok and shot dead three of his comrades of the guard and two Afghan Qawwáses belonging to the Residency establishment. The only motive that could be assigned for the deed was that he feared the consequences of disclosures which he had made to the Resident concerning some of the men in the detachment, and thought to anticipate revenge. From the Residency he retired to the quarters of the detachment in the town, where he established himself on the roof and threatened to shoot anyone who came near; but Major Newmarch and Captain Cox, the Residency Surgeon, having approached him by a neighbouring roof, persuaded him to give himself up.

The guard as a whole appearing untrustworthy on account of these occurrences, and the death of the Qawwáses having caused among the Afghans of Baghdád a ferment that greatly alarmed the Turkish authorities and was only allayed by the influence of the Naqíb, Major Newmarch handed over 12 men of the guard suspected of complicity in the murder of the Jamadar, as also Lance-Naik 'Abdul Karím, to the Turkish authories for temporary custody; the remainder he confined to their own lines, where a Turkish guard was posted for their protection. A Turkish guard was also, at Major Newmarch's request, sent to the Residency as a provisional substitute for the Residency guard, and remained until the 21st March, when a new detachment from the 120th Bombay infantry arrived from India under the command of Captain Fisher.

In the case of the Jamadar's murder no evidence could be obtained warranting the commitment of any person for trial. The most plausible theory, on the few facts ascertained, was that the victim had been decoyed to the Khán where his body was found, and where the only resident was an Afghan caretaker named 'Abdullah, and there murdered by 'Abdullah and another Afghan named Akram, possibly with the assistance of a boatman named 'Abbás who was a Turkish subject.

The circumstances of the murders committed by Lance-Naik 'Abdur Karím were investigated by Major Newmarch; and the accused was tried at Baghdád on the 19th April by Mr. G. B. Piggott, the Judge of His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Consular Court in the Ottoman Dominions, who travelled from Constantinople for the purpose. This was the procedure approved by the Government of India, to whom His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had recommended that the case should be disposed of either by the Supreme Consular Court, or by the High Court of Bombay, or by an Indian Court-Martial. The result of

the trial was the conviction of the prisoner, who was sentenced to death; but his punishment was afterwards commuted to imprisonment for 20 years with hard labour, the maximum penalty that could be inflicted under the Ottoman Order in Council, and he was removed to India to undergo his sentence there.

The remaining men of the guard were sent back to India and discharged from the army; 'Abdullah and Akram, the two Afghans supposed to have been implicated in the murder of the Jamadar, were deported to India and thence to Afghanistan; and pensions, payable till death or remarriage, were granted to the Arab widows of the two murdered Qawwass.

It should be mentioned that the Turkish authorities showed a strong disposition to retain in their custody the men of the guard handed over to them who were suspected of complicity in the murder of the Jamadar, and claimed that the whole of the suspects in that case should, on account of the Turkish subject Abbas being one of them, be dealt with by the Turkish police and courts. The demand was successfully resisted, however, by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; the prisoners in question were retransferred to British custody; and on the 23rd April the outgoing detachment left Baghdad for India in charge of Captain Fisher.

At one stage of the affair the Resident called on the Commander of the "Comet" to furnish a lascar guard for the custody of sepoy prisoners in the Residency. The Commander complied with the requisition; but a strong protest against it was lodged by the Director of the Royal Indian Marine on the ground that "the action of the "Resident was illegal, inasmuch as the crew of the *Comet* was neither "enrolled under the Indian Marine Act nor subject to the Indian "Articles of War, and that had it been necessary to use force, the "Officer Commanding the *Comet* might have been involved in serious "consequences." These objections were overruled by the Government of India, however, who remarked:

The Government of India are advised that the action of the Resident was not illegal, and that the matter was one for him to deal with purely from the standpoint of expediency. As he considered that he could not trust the prisoners to a guard of their brother soldiers, it was incumbent upon him to take any step he considered necessary, in reason and good faith, for their safe custody. He was competent, therefore, to require for that purpose the aid of any officer or man serving under the Government of India, and the fact that the lascars were not subject to the Marine Act or Articles of War does not alter the position. The Government of India, therefore, consider it unnecessary to issue any instructions to restrict the Resident from employing lascars as a guard in future. The Resident must be the sole

judge of the expediency of such a measure, and the propriety of any similar action taken by him in reason and good faith cannot be questioned. In these circumstances the responsibility for any untoward circumstances arising from the employment of lascars would rest with the Resident.

The Residency building at Baghdád.

On the 1st April 1905 the British Residency at Baghdád was transferred from the place where it had been established at a date earlier than 1840, on the river front about the middle of the town, to a more eligible site further down the river, but on the same (that is, the eastern) bank.

The old Residency had its advantages and was thus described by a traveller * in 1878:

> By far the pleasantest place in Baghdad is the British Residency, a beautiful old house built round two large courtyards and having a long frontage to the river. There is a delightful terrace overlooking the water, with an alley of old orange trees and a Kiosque or summer-house and steps, leading down to a little quay where the circular boats are moored. Inside, the house is decorated in the Persian style of the last century, one of the most elaborate and charming styles ever invented, with deep fretted ceilings, walls panelled in minute cabinet work, sometimes inlaid with looking glass, sometimes richly gilt. Only the dining room is studiously English, in deference to Anglo-Indian prejudice, its decorations, apparently fresh from Maple's, forming a theme for admiration for the Bagdadis who come to pay their respects to Her Majesty's Consul-General.

The building was the property of the Nawáb Iqbál-ud-Daulah at the time of his death in 1887 and was held on lease from him at a rent of R4,014 a year, towards which the Government of India contributed R1,884, the Resident R1,200, the Residency Surgeon R570, and His Majesty's Government R360. After the death of the Nawáb the property continued to be leased on the same terms from his trustees. In 1896 the building was bought by Ágha Muhammad, himself a trustee, who was also British Agent at Kádhimain, for R1,24,750; and from the 1st May of that year the rent was increased to R1,090 per annum, of which R2,550 was borne by the Government of India (who also allowed a sum not exceeding R1,200 a year for repairs), R1,400 by the Resident, R570 by the Residency Surgeon, and R470 by His Majesty's Government. The lease was renewed for three years on these terms in 1899, and once again for three years in 1902, on the old conditions for the first year but on a monthly rent of R460 for the second and R580 for the third year, exclusive of the allowance for repairs.

* Lady Anne Blunt (*Bedouin's of the Euphrates*, Volume I, page 188).

Meanwhile various disadvantages of the old Residency had made themselves felt. The site was central, with reference to the town; but the quarters of the military guard were in another place; the Residency building was falling into decay; and, in so far as the Resident was concerned, the arrangement under which he occupied a few rooms in what was otherwise a public office was inconvenient on account of the want of privacy. The disposition of the rooms and courtyards was appropriate from the point of view of a Muhammadan nobleman possessing a large harem, but it was unsuitable for the quarters of a British Officer. Moreover, the proprietor, after 1896, was an Honorary British Agent whose management of affairs under the Oudh Bequest had given rise to unfavourable comments; his intentions were uncertain, but it was believed that he wished to get the property into his own hands; and it was undesirable that the British Resident (and it might be said the British Government) should lie under any obligation to him. In event of his refusing to renew the lease, it was doubtful whether other suitable premises could be found at Baghdád, at least on any reasonable rent.

In these circumstances Colonel Meckler, the Resident, drew attention in 1892 to another property belonging to the late Nawáb Iqbál-ud-Daulah, which also had passed into the hands of Ágha Muhammad; this was a river bank estate of about three acres which he suggested should be acquired by the Government of India as a site on which to construct a new Residency of their own. Matters moved slowly; but in 1900 the purchase of the land at a cost of R36,000 was sanctioned and effected, the property being registered in the Turkish Land Records Department, on the analogy of the British Consulate at Basrah—in regard to which there had been a long controversy with the Porte—in the name of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople. The construction of the buildings, including public offices, quarters for the Resident, a separate house for the Residency Surgeon, military barracks and guard-house, a hospital, a post office, servant's houses, stables, godowns and a high enclosure wall, was entrusted to Messrs. Herman & Co. of Karachi, by whom it was completed between 1902 and 1905 at a total cost of R3,24,303. The new Residency was satisfactory in all respects, except that the public offices and the Resident's quarters were again included under the same roof, and that a house projecting further in the direction of the river was subsequently constructed by the Naqib of Baghdád immediately

upstream of it, which considerably impaired the amenity of its situation. When finished, it was the most imposing edifice in Baghdād.

Difficulties were at one time created by the local Turkish authorities in connection with the retaining wall of the terrace on the river, which they asserted would interfere with the course of the stream; but their objections were frivolous, and by the intervention of His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople they were removed.

Representation of British interests at Karbala and Kādhimain, 1876-93.

The question of the representation of British interests at Karbala and Kādhimain during the greater part of the period now under consideration was very closely bound up with that of the administration of the Oudh Bequest, as will be apparent on reference to a later section of the present chapter in which that subject is discussed. In 1877 the affairs of the domiciled British Indian colony at Karbala, always a large one, were superintended by Haidar 'Ali Khān, an Indian nobleman, a native of Lucknow, and a connection it is understood of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, who was styled in correspondence the Honorary British Agent; and a similar position was held at Kādhimain by Muhammad Husain Khān, a son of Ghulam Muhammad Khān, of Arcot. Haidar 'Ali Khān was succeeded at Karbala by Muhammad Taqi Khān, another son of Ghulam Muhammad Khān, about 1884; and in 1888, on the death of Muhammad Husain Khān, the Kādhimain appointment was conferred on Āgha Muhammad, the son of the deceased. Muhammad Taqi Khān and Āga Muhammad were generally described as "Honorary Agents" of the Residency; and so in a sense they were, for the British Government paid them nothing; but, as is explained elsewhere, they were allowed to pay themselves salaries out of the Oudh Bequest, under which they were "Indian Distributors." Their work was to represent the Resident in all local matters and to supervise the legal business, disputes, etc., of resident British Indians; and a functionary for the performance of these duties was undoubtedly necessary at Karbala; but at Kādhimain, only a short distance from Baghdād, the need for one —apart from the distributions under the Oudh Bequest carried on there until 1902—was open to question.

Difficulties frequently arose from the unofficial character of the Agencies and from their non-recognition by the Turkish authorities. In 1879 Colonel Miles, the Resident, after a tour to Karbala, advised that Haidar 'Ali Khān, the Agent there, while remaining Honorary, should be invested with consular *status quo* at Karbala and Najaf, and provided with a small staff; but the proposal was negatived by His Majesty's Government on the ground of expense. In 1885

Mr. Plowden, then Resident, advocated the creation of British Consular Agencies at Karbala and Kâdhimain; but the time was considered inappropriate for moving in the matter on account of discussions in regard to new Consular Agencies which were already in progress between His Majesty's Government and the Porte.

In 1890 Colonel Tweedie, as Resident, in proposing a reorganisation of Oudh Bequest arrangements, made further suggestions on the subject; and the terms of his reference may be quoted verbatim, as throwing considerable light on the character of the Karbala Agency at that and at an earlier period:

> At Karbala, on the contrary*, not only is it impossible for the Residency to be left unrepresented; but one of the wants of the present time is the provision of a better agency than we have had there hitherto. This twofold statement requires some exposition. *Imprimis*, Karbala, as already noted, is three days by ordinary travelling from Baghdad. Next, some four or five thousand British Indian subjects (omitting Kashmiris, but not mere pilgrims) are settled there. Cases are therefore frequent in which immediate action or protection on the part of the Residency is demanded. Perhaps an Indian commits a murder, or is murdered, or dies suddenly, leaving mule-loads of valuables; perhaps another is pressed as a conscript, or sent to prison. Out of this might naturally issue the proposal to retain in situ the present Indian Distributor, Muhammad Taki Khan, gazette him Agent, and pay him from imperial revenue. But not to touch again on the contingency [illegible], if Nawab Sir Ikbal-ud-Daula's Will should stand, of this man's finding himself now a principal executor under it, with all his amiable qualities, and all his prestige as an Indian of position, it is perfectly impossible to regard him as in our sense an official. In Dr. Bowman's memorandum a glimpse of him is given, also a typical instance of how a factotum lodged in his skirts has been suffered to fleece people. Under the old régime he simply was a post set up by the Nawab Sir Ikbal-ud-Daula at Karbala. With the Nawab's influence (at time possibly even wealth) to back him, there is no doubt that he could by innumerable circuitous methods protect at Karbala those having to be protected, and constrain even the town officials; many of whom may have owed their appointments to Sir Ikbal-ud-Daula's interests with their Government. But all that is ended. What is now required for Karbala (*cum* Najaf) is an out and out official, transferable elsewhere at any time; whose status should be that of an Attaché posted to this Residency, and available for service chiefly at these two important centres. Some may hold that because our subjects there are Shias, the Attaché should be a Shia also. With deference I am here inclined to differ. A European would be out of his element; but as the Ottoman officials of the two towns in question, as of this country generally, are chiefly Sunnis; and as it would be on his personal influence and acceptance with them that our representative's power of helping Indians in their affairs with the Local Government would turn, I think he should be a Sunni. A coin of the realm is as good for Ottoman officialdom in the hand of a Shia as of a Sunni. But for an employé with no secret service fund to aid him the more in touch he is personally with the authorities the better for those depending on him. Dr. Bowman also, as will be observed, records it in his memorandum, and the truth of it may be taken as absolutely certain, that

* *Viz.*, in opposition to Kâdhimain and Najaf.

among all the Indians settled in Karbala not one is to be looked for possessed of the smallest qualifications to serve the Government there as salaried agent. I knew Muhammad Taki Khan's predecessor; and unstable as is the present Distributor, the other was even more so. Had it been possible to set up a stronger one out of existing material, or without bringing this whole subject exhaustively under the review of Government, Muhammad Taki Khan would not all this time have been left in office.

In the same year a case occurred in which the Turkish authorities absolutely declined to recognise or deal with the Agent at Karbala; the occasion was the arrest of three Indians by the Turkish police. In 1891 Colonel Tweedie further remarked:

The Residency Agent at Karbala cum Najaf as (*a*) naturally of weak and circuitous character; (*b*) generally in but feeble health; (*c*) an Indian; (*d*) a [illegible] (*e*) invested with no very definite, or recognised official, status, is unequal to the task of influencing two potent Mujtahids or fathers of his religion. I say this not to disparage him. Not only do I know of no one better than he, but I know of no one at all among Indians domiciled at Karbala fit to fill his very peculiar situation, supposing him to resign it.

Colonel Tweedie's representations did not, however, result in any change of system chiefly perhaps in consequence of the Government of India's declining, for the time being, to authorise any changes in the administration of the Oudh Bequest.

Appointment of a British Consular Agent at Karbala, 1893.

In 1892 Colonel Tweedie's successor in the Residentship, Colonel Mockler, again represented the matter, requesting that an *exequatur* should be procured for the Agent at Karbala; and, it having been explained to His Majesty's Government that the Agent's salary would, as heretofore, be paid from the Oudh Bequest, the proposal was adopted. On the 10th August 1893 the Porte instructed the Wāli of Baghdād to recognise the British Agent at Karbala as a Consular Agent. Muhammad Taqi Khān had in the meantime been succeeded by his nephew Āgha Ibrāhim, a brother of Agha Muhammad, who consequently became the first British Consular Agent at Karbala. In 1894 the Wāli of Baghdād paid a visit to Karbala, where he treated Āgha Ibrahim—largely, it was thought out of personal considerations—with marked civility and attention.

Appointment of a British Vice-Consul at Karbala and abolition of the Kādhimain Agency, 1902-03.

After this no change occurred until 1902, when Major Newmarch, as Resident, undertook a radical reform of the Oudh Bequest arrangements. As mentioned in another place, he abolished the irregular and (by the Turks) unrecognised Agency at Kādhimain, along with emoluments of the Agent (as Indian Distributor) under the Oudh Bequest; and, while he recommended the retention of a British representative at Karbala and

provisionally continued the salary allowed to the existing Agent from the Oudh Bequest, he proposed that the salary of the post should in future be paid from Government revenue, and that there should be a change of personnel. His recommendations ran as follows:

> The question of the future payment of the Consular Agent at Karbala is a somewhat important matter. I think it would be a great pity if the post were abolished, for in the charge of a competent man it might be a very useful and important outpost. The present incumbent is in my opinion unsuited for the charge. He cannot talk Hindustani, he is not in my opinion sufficiently intelligent or energetic, and he has been too much implicated in the scandals arising out of the Oudh Bequest to render his retention there expedient.
>
> If any suggestions from me are allowed, I would recommend that he be succeeded by a Shiah Muhammadan of good family from India, who has had some official experience either in the lower grades of the Civil Service or in a Native State. It is essential he should know Persian well and it would be good if he knew enough English to write a confidential letter.
>
> I do not suggest the appointment of a European officer, because his position would be insupportably lonely and might in times of religious excitement be even dangerous. Moreover, I imagine that the cost of his appointment and maintenance would be considerably greater than that of a Mahomedan. To a Shiah, residence at Karbala should be most acceptable, and there are probably many worthy Deputy Collectors in India who would gladly spend their pensions and die there.

The outcome of Major Newmarch's proposals was the establishment of a British Vice-Consulate at Karbala on the 1st November 1903, with the assent of the Porte, under Mirza Muhammad Hasan Khán Muhsin, an intelligent and well educated British subject of an Afghan but Persianised family, born in Turkish 'Iráq. The cost of the Vice-Consul's salary and establishment became a charge on Indian revenues exclusively, no contribution to it being made payable by Her Majesty's Government.

British Assistant Political Agency at Basrah and its elevation (1879) from a Vice-Consulate to a Consulate, 1876-98.

We have seen that in 1873 the designation of Mr. Robertson, the British Agent (and Vice-Consul) at Basrah was altered to that of Assistant Political Agent, and that he was at the same time admitted to the Indian Political Service. In 1877, as has been described in another connection, a question arose as to the exact position of Mr. Robertson with reference to the Indian and Home Governments, which was then defined. In October of that year the Basrah appointment was formally brought on the graded list of the Political Department of the Government of India.

In 1879, on an application from Mr. Robertson supported by the Resident at Baghdád, his consular status was enhanced from that of Vice-Consul to that of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, subject to the proviso, laid down by the London Foreign Office, "that the appointment

"gives Mr. Robertson no claims upon Her Majesty's Government for his "services as His Majesty's Consul, and he will remain as heretofore "under the jurisdiction of His Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdád."

In 1884 a question arose as to the necessity of obtaining a Turkish *exequatur* as Consul in the name of every Assistant Political Agent appointed to take charge, temporarily or permanently, at Basrah. The occasion was the absence on leave of Mr. Robertson, the substantive Consul, during which application had been made for a fresh *exequatur* in the name of Lieutenant H. Ramsay, one of the officers nominated to officiate in his place. The Government of India were informed, on the authority of Her Majesty's Foreign Office, that, when a permanent Consul holding an *exequatur* for the post existed, it was within the competence of Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to make an acting appointment without reference to the Porte.

In 1885 Colonel Mockler, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, having entered into direct correspondence, in his capacity as Consul, with Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Tweedie, the Political Resident at Baghdád, protested against the innovation; and it was ordered by the Government of India that the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah should transmit his consular correspondence to the Foreign Office through Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate-General at Baghdád. In 1888 Colonel Tweedie remarked that orders were being sent direct by the Foreign Office to the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, and the Government of India informed both the officers concerned that all correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Basrah Consulate should take place, under flying seal, through Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdád.

Transfer of the Basrah appointment from the Government of India to Her Majesty's Government, 1897-98.

At the end of 1897 Mr. G. S. Mackenzie, London, a partner in the firm of Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie & Co., at Basrah, approached Her Majesty's Foreign Office with reference to the frequency of changes in the personnel of Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate at Basrah. A table attached to his letter showed that charge of the Consulate had changed hands 19 times in 16 years. He contended that under such a system the officers appointed had no time to acquire the requisite influence over local Turkish officials and the native community, and that the result was disadvantageous to British trade.

The Government of India, on the matter being referred to them, considered that changes must inevitably be frequent so long as the appointment was filled by officers on the graded list of their Political Department, as that Department was then organised; and they therefore suggested the

transference of the post to Her Majesty's Government with a view to its being manned in future from His Majesty's Consular Service. At the same time they offered a money contribution for the maintenance of the Consulate equal to its whole average cost during the previous five years, and intimated their willingness that Her Majesty's Government should adjust the relations of the Consul at Basrah with the Resident at Baghdád, to whom he had hitherto been subordinate.

These proposals were accepted by Her Majesty's Government. The Indian contribution was fixed at £1,400, a charge which was to be liable to revision at the end of five years; and Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah was placed under the superintendence of the Political Resident at Baghdád in his character of Consul-General. The British Indian Post Office at Basrah was retained, in connection with the Consulate, at the expense of the Government of India; but an Indian Sub-Treasury which had existed in the Consulate was closed. The first Consul under the new arrangements was Mr. A. C. Wratislaw, who assumed charge of his duties at Basrah on the 12th December 1898.

Allowance for a medical officer at Basrah, from 1890.

The need of medical arrangements for the benefit of the British community at Basrah, which had long been felt, was emphasised by the death of Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent, and his two children from cholera in August 1889; and in the following year his successor, Captain Ravenshaw, met with an accident and could obtain no skilled assistance. There was a small resident British community, and the number of Europeans on board British vessels lying in the port was at times considerable. In these circumstances the Government of India agreed to contribute R100 per mensem towards the salary of a private medical practitioner whom the British mercantile firms at Basrah proposed to engage for their employés, on condition of his affording his services to Government servants at Basrah. Dr. Eustace, Dr. Jagamdham and Dr. Dobbyn were the first medical men employed at Basrah under the combined arrangement. The contribution of the Government of India to the doctor's salary merged in the payment of £1,400 a year which, after 1898, they made to Her Majesty's Government on account of the Basrah post.

Official residence of the British representative at Basrah, 1875-1903.

It will be remembered that in 1875 the British representative at Basrah was accommodated in a hired house for which rent, at the rate of R100 a month, was paid to an ostensible owner, Hájí Ibrahim, regarding whose title to the property there was some doubt. The lease was not terminable except by consent of the tenant, and the Assistant

Political Agent's position was therefore legally a strong one. But about 1883, in view of the dissatisfaction of the Hâji, which had been vigorously manifested in 1878 and 1881, the Government of India directed the Political Resident in Turkish 'Iraq to report what other arrangements for a house could be made; and meanwhile the rent paid to the Hâji was increased to ₹250 a month on an understanding that no objection should be made to the retention of the house by Government during the year 1884. Good sites on which a house might be built by Government were available on the further bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab at Gardilân, Tanûmah, etc., but there were obstacles in the way of their purchase, and a fresh lease of the house occupied by the Consulate had to be taken for the year 1885, and apparently for subsequent years. Eventually, in consequence of recommendations made by Colonel Tweedie as Resident in 1885, the Government of India in 1890 decided to buy the premises for so long hired, together with other land, for ₹65,000. The great delay in reaching this decision was due to difficulties regarding validity of title and other points, which were at last overcome.

When the time arrived for registration of the transfer of ownership, the Turkish authorities tried to insist that some private individual should be entered in their official records as the owner, and objected strenuously to the property being shown as acquired by the Government of India, Her Majesty's Secretary of State, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, or even "the British Consul." Their obstruction seems to have been prolonged from 1890 or 1891 until 1895, when His Majesty the Sultân at last, by an Iradé, sanctioned the registration of the property in the name of the British Embassy at Constantinople.

About 1900, owing to subsidence of the foundations, the Consulate building became uninhabitable; and in 1901-02 the Consul had to take up his abode temporarily in a hired building. The Basrah appointment had in the meantime passed to Her Majesty's Government; but the Government of India, in view of the bad state of the building at the time of its transfer, undertook to reconstruct it at their own expense; and a new and good building on the same site was completed in 1903, under arrangements made by them, at a cost of about £4,000. A special agreement was made as to the division of the cost of future repairs between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, the post office rooms in the building being regarded as the property of the latter.

His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Mûsal, 1875-1905.

Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Mûsal, founded before the middle of the 19th century, continued in existence during the greater part of the period now under review and remained under the superintendence of the Political Resident at Baghdâd as Consul-General; but its affairs came little under notice, owing to the non-existence of British subjects or material interests at Mûsal. The erection of Mûsal into a Wilâyat in 1879 increased the importance of the Vice-Consulate; but so late as 1886 the Vice-Consul himself was, as a rule, the only British subject resident in the Mûsal Consular district.

The British representative at Mûsal in 1878 was Mr. J. F. Russell, who had served under Sir Samuel Baker in equatorial Africa, and who was a son of the distinguished journalist Dr. Howard Russell. He was succeeded by Mr. W. S. Richards, who remained in occupation of the post from November 1883 to December 1885; and Mr. Richards was followed by Mr. H. H. Lamb.

Proposed British Consular Agency at Fão, 1894-1896.

At the end of 1894, in view of the persistent harassment of British Indian vessels on the lower Shatt-el-'Arab by the Turkish authorities, already described, Colonel Mockler, Resident at Baghdâd, suggested that an officer of the British Telegraph Station at Fão should be appointed British Consular Agent there during the season of the exportation of dates, *viz.*, in the months of September, October and November, in each year. The Government of India approved of the suggestion, and Her Majesty's Government adopted it and allotted a sum of £30 per annum for the remuneration of the post. In 1896 Colonel Mockler, by a letter of authority, appointed Mr. Mungavin of the Indo-European Telegraph Department to be British Consular Agent at Fão; but the Porte refused to recognise the appointment. On the 22nd September 1896 a note was addressed to the Turkish Government informing them that unless the point were conceded, a British war vessel would be sent to Fão for the protection of British interests; and a month later H. M. S. *Lapwing* proceeded thither. At length, in December 1896, satisfactory assurances having been received from the Porte in regard to the future treatment of British Indian vessels, as related elsewhere, the demand for a British Consular Agency at Fão was withdrawn.

The British Indian Post offices in Turkish 'Irâq, 1873-1905.

The affairs of the British Indian Post Offices in Turkish 'Irâq are fully related in the special Appendix on Mail Communications. After 1899 there were complaints of irregularity and unpunctuality in the carriage of the British mail by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam

Navigation Company, which did not cease on the conclusion of a new contract with the Company in 1904.

Special British Indian interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876—1905.

Nawab Iqbāl-ud-Doulah and his affairs, 1876-1887.

The powerful personality of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Doulah of Oudh, G.C.S.I., looms through our pages from time to time, in connection especially with the Oudh Bequest and the British Agencies at Karbala and Kādhimain; and a few words may be said in regard to himself and his personal affairs. His history up to 1866 has been given already in an earlier section of the present chapter. Two interesting pictures of the Nawāb are given by British travellers of the time and may be quoted *in extenso*.

* The Nawab Ikbal-ood-Doulah was, some forty years ago, King of the Oudh for a few days, but his right to the succession being overruled by the British Government, he left Lucknow and India, and took up his abode at Baghdad. He visited Europe on two or three occasions, and in London maintained in argument with the India Office, ineffectually of course, his right to the throne of Oudh. A pension of seven or eight thousand rupees a month, paid him by the British Government out of the revenues of the Oudh, forms only a portion of his income, his private property being considerable. He is a man of strong good sense and active mind; if he had remained on the throne of Oudh the misgovernment which furnished Lord Dalhousie with an excuse for the annexation of that country would most probably never have existed. The Nawab is commonly spoken of as "the King of Oudh," and he enjoys great influence, which he turns to the best account. He is regarded as the head of the large community of Indian Mussulmans settled in Baghdad; and at Kerbella, and Nejaf, by his tact and personal ascendancy keeps his countrymen out of much mischief into which they might very easily fall in a country where "moral order" is as yet almost unknown, and where Arabs and Persians, and Turks, and Christians, are all in a state of antagonism. The services rendered by His Highness to the British Political Agent in controlling and guiding the eight or ten thousand "Hindis" settled in the vicinity of the holy places, and in keeping the pilgrims from India out of harm's way, have been cordially acknowledged by the Government of India from time to time, and recently an addition to his pension has been granted him as a mark of appreciation.

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‡ Bagdad is an abode of political exiles from India, Mussulmans who dislike living under Christian rule, and who have settled here as the nearest place of refuge

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* Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Volume I, pages 640-641.

† This seems to be erroneous; see page (1475) *ante*.

‡ Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, Volume I, pages 212-15. The talented authoress dedicated this book of hers to the Iqbāl-ud-Doulah.

in Islam. Their position is a pleasant one, for they enjoy the double advantage of religious agreement with the Bagdadis and of foreign protection as British subjects. Many of them are very well off, living on the revenues of their lands in India, and a few are on excellent terms with the Consul General. Of these the most remarkable, by his birth, his wealth, and still more by the dignity of his private character, is the Nawab Ikbalet Dowlah, the dispossessed and pensioned king of Oudh. With him we are now staying, at his "desert-house" near Kazmeyn, the first step on our journey northwards. I hardly know how to speak of the Nawab without seeming to say too much. He is an old man now and a philosopher, and he would not care to have his good deeds paraded, and yet I cannot help recording what I feel about him, that, little as he affects the character of ex-king, he is the most truly dignified personage I ever met. In manner and way of living he is very simple, having something of the Bedouin contempt for appearances, along with the more real absence of pretension of a well-bred Englishman of fifty years ago. He has travelled much and seen much, and understands the European way of thinking as well as that of eastern people, having besides considerable originality of his own independent of any school of ideas. In conversation he is most agreeable, constantly surprising one with unexpected turns of thought and new ways of saying things, and, if we had been able to understand him better, I am sure we should have found him full of the best sort of wit. He is besides a kind and charitable man. His position in Bagdad is a great one, so great, from a moral point of view, that it may well console him for the loss of his former sovereignty and the splendours of his court at Lucknow. Here at Bagdad he has real power, the power of doing good, and real freedom to say what he thinks right to consuls, pashas, doctors of divinity and all alike, down to the poor Bedouins who live at his gates. I fancy his advice is asked on most of political difficulties of the Soul, where his knowledge of men and cities, so essential a part of wisdom in the East, and his wit in expressing his ideas enable him to speak without offence many truth than is often heard in those high places. The consequence of this is that his name is a power in Baghdad, and that he has made himself friends in all classes of society. Amongst the rest, Ferhan, the Shammar Chief, is his sworn ally; and, whenever the Shaykh comes to town, it is to the house of his brother the Malek el Hind, or King of India, as the Arabs call the Nawab. This circumstance is most fortunate for our plans, as now we shall start for the desert with letters of recommendation, which ought to give us the best possible reception there.

The "desert-house," where we are enjoying so pleasant and so unceremonious a hospitality, is one of the many owned by the Nawab in and about Bagdad. It stands quite alone, in the barren plain which surrounds the town, and is about half a mile distant from the mosque of Kazmeyn. The towns-people, who are very timorous about venturing outside the city at night, think the Nawab foolhardy in the extreme to live in such a spot; but to him as to us the isolation of the house is its principal charm. He generally, however, lives in Bagdad, but comes here from time to time to make a retreat, partly philosophical, partly religious, among the ulemas and doctors of theology of Kazmeyn, for the mosque is a sanctuary and place of repute among pious shiahs.

The house itself is as original as its situation, and was built from the Nawab's own designs. It is constructed like a fortress, with high walls and a single entrance, a very necessary precaution against common robbers as well as marauders from the desert. Above, on the upper story, the rooms are placed, some with the windows facing outwards, after the fashion of Turkish rather than of Arab buildings, others looking on to a terrace, over which there is yet a second story. The entrance is through a courtyard, with stables on either side and dovecotes inhabited by thousands of white pigeons. The ground-floor is merely a basement, and stone steps lead up

from the court to the apartments. These consist mainly of small rooms furnished with carpets only; but the drawing-room is large and is so peculiar that I have made a plan of it. Its shape is that of a cross, each of the three shorter ends being occupied by a window, so that the upper half of the room is almost a lantern. The recesses are filled up with broad divans, on which it is pleasant to sit and look at the view.

The originality of the Nawáb Iqbál-ud-Daulah appeared as markedly in his testamentary dispositions as in any act of his life. So early as 1847 the bestowing of his property after his death began to weigh upon his mind, and he expressed to the Political Agent, Major Rawlinson, his wish to make a will whereby, after providing for his wife and some old servants and for the maintenance of the tombs of himself and his only son (who predeceased him), his estate should be transferred in trust to the British Resident at Lucknow for the benefit of some of his relations in that city. He also asked that he might be allowed to deposit the will which he would make with the British Political Agent at Baghdád, and to appoint the Political Agent who might be in office at the time of his demise to be his official executor. The matter having been referred to the Government of India, the desired permission was granted by them in 1848; but it does not appear that any will was deposited by the Nawáb in the Political Agency until 1875. The will then deposited seems to have been attested by the Residency Surgeon and two other English witnesses in 1883.

In 1884 the Nawáb requested that Government of India Promissory Notes for R1,00,000 of which he was the holder might be enfaced for payment of interest at the Government of India's Treasury at Baghdád; and the request was granted, as a personal favour, though the payment of such interest at places out of India was contrary to practice and could not be claimed as a right. In 1885 the Nawáb was anxious for the transfer of the Notes to the name of the Resident, by whom the interest accruing thereon should be applied to the maintenance of his (the Nawáb's) tomb after his death, and for the continuance of payment at Baghdád of the interest in question. The Government of India, however, decided that the concession regarding the place of payment was personal to the Nawáb and must cease at his death; they pointed out that the Promissory Notes could easily be deposited in a bank in India, whence the local executor or trustees could obtain the interest as it fell due by drawing bills on the bank; and they apparently prohibited the Resident at Baghdád from undertaking any responsibility in regard to the Nawáb's tomb.

The Nawáb Iqbál-ud-Daulah died at Kádhimain on the 21st December 1887. His will was found to be eccentric and obscure; but it is

unnecessary to enter at length here on its provisions. Briefly, it seemed to devote nearly all the property of which he died possessed to the upkeep of his tomb at Kâdhimain, and of the house containing it, for ever; and it purported to constitute the British Resident at Baghdâd manager of a trust fund into which the bulk of the estate was to be formed for the purpose just mentioned. In the management of the trust Muhammad Husain Khân, British Agent at Kâdhimain, and Muhammad Taqi Khân, British Agent at Karbala, and others were apparently to be associated with the Resident.

The Government of India were anxious to respect, in so far as possible, the wishes of the late Nawâb; but the will bristled with difficulties which only a court of law, upon proper proceedings being taken, could have resolved. Under Muhammadan law the deceased was not competent to dispose by will as he had done, of more than one-third of his estate; and some of the subsidiary dispositions which he made were in themselves legally invalid. It was not clear, moreover, that the Resident was actually appointed executor; and if it were held that he was, the directions in this respect were so worded that they could only apply to the Resident holding office at the time of the Nawâb's death, in his personal capacity. These serious difficulties apart, the Government of India thought it undesirable that a British official in a foreign country should be made responsible for the management of a trust such as that contemplated in the will; and they accordingly instructed the Resident not to take upon himself the obligation.

Interim charge of the estate was assumed, however, by the Resident in his character of Consul-General; and a receiver was appointed for its administration. The Turkish authorities evinced much interest in the disposal of the estate and a strong desire to take charge of the immoveable portion of it through the Turkish Land Records Department, which provoked from Colonel Tweedie, the Resident, a remark that, "if the heirs of the late Nawâb once let his property or its money "proceeds pass out of British into Osmanli custody, they may consider it "gone from them for ever, and as little worth going to law about as if it "were situated in the moon."

In 1889 a suit for invalidation of the will was brought in the High Court of Calcutta, the plaintiffs being nine of the Nawâb's next-of-kin, and the defendants the British Government and the native trustees mentioned in the document itself. In 1890, an application for probate of the will was filed in His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Consular Court at Constantinople by the native trustees in question, and was

opposed by the plaintiffs in the suit at Calcutta. Eventually, in 1891, a compromise was arranged between the parties, under which two-thirds of the whole estate was assigned to the next-of-kin and one-third to the native trustees under the will. There was breach of faith, and consequent delay, in carrying out the agreement; but at length, by the end of May, 1896, all claims had been adjusted. Some, if not all, of the shares of the next-of-kin were* purchased from them by Āgha Muhammad, the British Agent at Kādhimain, in his own name, but, as it became known at his death in 1903, out of trust funds. Among the items which he thus acquired was the British (Old) Residency.

Kulsūm Nisa Begam's case, 1876-1879.

The dispute between Kulsūm Nisa Begam and Ramzān 'Ali Khān in regard to the great inheritance of Nawāb Tāj Mahall still continued at the end of 1876.

The judgment of the court of first instance in India, passed on the 26th October 1876 in favour of Kulsūm Nisa Begam, was affirmed on appeal; and by April 1878 her original adversary, Ramzān 'Ali Khān, was dead; but, as Ramzān 'Ali Khān left a son named Saiyid Ahmad Husain, and the possibility of an appeal to the Privy Council still remained, neither the pension of Nawāb Tāj Mahall nor the capital amount for which it was liable to be commuted could be safely paid to either party by the Government of India, who were anxious to discharge themselves of the liability; and this position of dead-lock lasted until 1879.

Meanwhile Kulsūm Nisa Begam proceeded to raise loans at Baghdād on the strength of her provisionally established title; and the Government of India directed their Political Agent at Baghdād to notify that they would accept no responsibility for the repayment of such loans, to advise Kulsūm Nisa Begam to proceed to India, and to do what he could to prevent her incurring debts or contracting an imprudent marriage. In May 1879 Kulsūm Nisa Begam announced her intention of marrying her first cousin, Saiyid 'Askar Hussain, to whom she had long been betrothed, and of remaining permanently in Turkish 'Irāq. The Government of India, who seem to have regarded her in the light of a ward, consented; and the marriage took place on the 5th June 1879.

* There is no doubt that the trust has since been corruptly administered, being under no disinterested supervision; but the Nawāb's tomb and the house in which it is are still (1912) decently maintained, though very little of the large endowment seems to be spent on them.

In 1879 it was alleged, in a newspaper, that some jewellery belonging to Nawáb Táj Mahall's estate had been misappropriated by Ahmad 'Ali Khán, Native Agent in the Baghdád Residency, whom the Political Agent, Colonel Nixon, seems to have sent to Karbala to take charge of the personal effects of the deceased. The Nawáb Iqbál-ud-Daulah was also charged with complicity in the alleged fraud. Ahmád 'Ali Khán was tried, but must have been acquitted.*

Movements of Ayúb Khán, 1888.

Ayúb Khán, a member of the ruling Bárakzai family of Afghanistan, whose removal to India, after his last unsuccessful †attempt to assert his pretensions in Afghanistan, had been ordered by the British Government, arrived at Baghdád from Tehrán on the 28th March 1888 and left for India on the 28th April.

The Oudh Bequest, 1876-1905.

In the period now under review the affairs of the Oudh Bequest attained a prominence and importance which necessitate its consideration apart from all other British official concerns in Turkish 'Iráq. The influence of the Nawáb Iqbál-ud-Daulah in its management remained very powerful until his death in 1887; and the system of a distribution of the bulk of the proceeds of the Bequest through one selected Mujtahid at Karbala and one at Najaf, adopted in the beginning, as also the plan of treating one-third of the proceeds as a separate fund for the relief of Indians, which came into vogue as already explained about 1866, remained in force until 1902.

Mujtahid-Distributors and the influence of the Iqbál-ud-Daulah, 1876-1887.

The Mujtahid-Distributor at Karbala was, until his death on the 13th December 1891, Mirza Saiyid Abul Qásim, Tabatabáyi, known as the Hujjat-ul-Islam, a Persian subject, whose appointment dated from 1872. The corresponding authority at Najaf was, until 1881 when he died, a certain Saiyid 'Ali, Bahr-ul-'Ulum on whom the post had

* Ahmad 'Ali Khán, better known as Ahmad Agha was brought into the Residency as Native Agent on the retirement of Mr. Michael Mina (*see* page 1473 *ante*) in 1875. There was great opposition to his introduction on the part of certain Armenian members of the Residency office establishment, and it culminated in his being accused, in 1876, of having purloined some property which had been officially handed over to an Indian in a case of inheritance. A formal enquiry, held by Colonel Nixon, Surgeon-Major Bowman, Mr. Baitt (First Officer of the "Court") and the Nawáb Iqbál-ud-Daulah, sitting as a Committee, resulted in the exoneration of Ahmad 'Ali Khán, and the dismissal of the head clerk (Mr. Johannes Thaddeus) by order of the Government of India.

Ahmad 'Ali Khán who was an Indian and belonged to a distinguished Oudh family, died at Baghdád, at an advanced age, in August 1910. He was at his death the doyen of the Indian community at Baghdád, conspicuous for his loyalty to His Majesty the King-Emperor, and a general favourite in European society. His son Sayyid 'Ali Khán was made a *Nawáb* on the occasion of the Imperial Darbar at Delhi in 1911, at which he was present.

† *Vide* page 2012 *post*.

been conferred in 1858 or 1859; he was succeeded by Saiyid Muhammad, Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, a Turkish subject. These Mujtahid-Distributors were all, it would appear, nominated by the British Political Agent or Resident at Baghdād on the recommendation of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ūd Daulah; and the Nawāb's position with reference to the Bequest was greatly fortified by this circumstance.

The separate Indian Fund, 1877-1881.

The separate fund for the relief of Indians, which had existed in practice for a number of years, was placed on a regular footing in 1877 by means of letters which the Mujtahid-Distributors at Karbala and Najaf addressed to the British Political Agent at Baghdād. In these they signified their desire that one-third of the amounts payable to them, or over Rs. 3,000 in all, should be deducted for the relief "through the British Residency" of poor Indians at Karbala and Najaf and Kādhimain, especially such as were of noble family. The letters, which were almost identical in their wording, can hardly have been the spontaneous production of the Mujtahids; and, in view of the contents of his own memorandum of 1866, it is difficult not to see in them the finger of the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah. The proposed arrangement received the immediate assent of Colonel Nixon, the British Political Agent, who also undertook its execution in so far as that depended upon himself. The receipts given by the Mujtahid-Distributors to the Political Agency Treasury at Baghdād included the amounts assigned by them for the relief of Indians; and the Indian Fund was consequently regarded, with perfect correctness, as existing under their sanction. Distribution to Indians seems to have taken place on lists of names prepared after enquiry. The Kādhimain Indian list is known to have been revised in 1881, "when "Mr. Plowden, in concert with the Nawab Sir Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, or "perhaps the latter only under instructions from the former, went "through it, and made such changes in it as seemed necessary."

Investigation of the position and conduct of the Mujtahid-Distributors, 1882-1883.

In October 1882 Colonel W. Tweedie, then officiating as Resident in the absence of Mr. Plowden, visited Karbala and enquired on the spot into the reputation of the Mujtahid-Distributors there and at Najaf, Mirza Abul Qāsim and Saiyid Muhammad, and into the local working of the Bequest. He found that:—

(1) "Although the name and rank of Mujtahid was conceded by "all reasonable persons to both these scholars, yet not their "greatest admirers could claim for them pre-eminence over "several of their brethren who might be mentioned;

(2) "on the contrary the acceptance by them of this* mundane
"care and duty formed, in the eyes of many, a lamentable
"defection from the type of character proper to them;

(3) "according to the general belief, both of them took care that
"if, for the above or other reasons, their receipts in presents
"from the pious suffered diminution, the Oudh money
"passing through their hands should be properly taxed in
"compensation for it."

In 1883 Colonel Tweedie, on relinquishing charge of the Residency, recommended to the consideration of Mr. Plowden a statement which he had received from Rāja Bāqir Husain of Faizābād, Oudh, a visitor to Karbala and Najaf and a worthy, wealthy, and entirely disinterested man, in which it was stated that the proceeds of the Bequest were being misapplied "to the detriment of the right parties entitled to be benefited and to (? of) the British name;" that the money was being appropriated mainly to the enrichment of the Mujtahid-Distributors and the support of their relatives and friends, the poor deriving but little advantage from it; and that the two Distributors employed were not Mujtahids (doctors of theology) but only Tullāb (students). The writer suggested that lists of truly indigent Indians at the shrines should be prepared, and that none of those whose names were entered should receive less than Rs. 2 a month,—the actual rate of distribution to the poor being then half or quarter of a rupee per mensem.

Effect of the death of the Iqbāl-ud Daulah, 1887.

The Nawab Iqbāl-ud-Daulah died in December 1887, his last visit to Karbala and Najaf having been paid in company with the British Resident in 1881; and his decease was followed by that of his trusted friend, Muhammad Husain Khān, the Indian Distributor and British Honorary Agent at Kādhimain. The death of the Nawāb, to whom the existence of the separate Indian Fund—at first on an informal, but later on a regular and defined basis—and the arrangements for its working were undoubtedly due, profoundly influenced the course of Bequest affairs. Whatever may be thought of the propriety of his interference, its results seem to have been on the whole beneficial; and his disappearance from the scene was followed by a change for the worse in the attitude, already unsatisfactory, of the Mujtahid-Distributors, who had been accustomed to defer to his advice, and by a growth of abuses.

The successor of Muhammad Husain Khān as Indian Distributor and British Honorary Agent at Kādhimain was his son Āgha Muham-

*Viz., the administration of the Bequest.

mad, who had until then been Persian writer in the British Residency at Baghdād. Colonel Tweedie was careful to warn Āgha Muhammad, in informing him of his appointment, that its duration might be temporary, and to advise him not to alter the scheme of Indian distribution at Kāẓhimain arranged by the late Iqbāl-ud-Daulah without first consulting the Resident.

Attempted reform of the distribution arrangements by Major Talbot, 1889.

In March 1889 Major A. C. Talbot, who was then officiating for Colonel Tweedie as British Resident, visited Karbala and Najaf and enquired into numerous complaints which had been made in regard to the Hujjat-ul-Islām's distributions at the former place; these complaints were of old standing and seemed to be well-founded. Major Talbot found that this Mujtahid-Distributor was deeply in debt; he had borrowed Rs. 13,000 from the Sarrāf of the British Residency on the security of the Oudh Bequest payments due to him up to the end of the month of August following; and he was said to owe Rs. 10,000, bearing interest at 42 to 48 per cent. per annum to an Astrābādi named Hasan, son of Hāji Mehdi. Mirza Abul Qāsim contended that these debts had been contracted for charitable purposes; but subsequent enquiries by Colonel Tweedie showed that they owed their origin to his three sons, "over whose borrowings and ongoings he was too weak and bookish to exercise adequate control." In regard to the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, the Mujtahid-Distributor at Najaf, it appeared to Major Talbot that he, instead of running into debt, had "gone to the opposite extreme of making himself a rich man out of the Bequest." Complaints against him, also, poured into the Residency.

Major Talbot having informed the Hujjat-ul-Islām that a continuance of the state of affairs discovered would necessitate a reference to the Government of India which might have disgreeable consequences, that Mujtahid was induced to agree to the preparation of a regular list of payees and to the submission of the payees' receipts, verified by the British Agent at Karbala, to the British Residency at Baghdad. The Resident was also successful in persuading the Residency Sarrāf to reduce the interest on his loan to Mirza Abul Qāsim to 12 per cent. a year; and he thought that the Mujtahid would be well advised to consolidate his debts, but did not press him in this respect.

An admonition was addressed by Major Talbot to the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm at Najaf, to whom also he suggested the drawing up of lists.

On the whole Major Talbot regarded the condition into which the affairs of the Oudh Bequest were drifting as "a crying scandal," but one with which it was very difficult to deal. His impressions were

recorded in a memorandum, dated 2nd May 1889, in which by way of a final recommendation he remarked:

> It would probably also be an advantage in some ways to have the bequest distributed by a committee, as being more public and with a better chance of satisfying varying interests than the present arrangement, which, in being entrusted to one man, is not in accordance with the terms of the bequest. This, however, must be a reform from with'n, which Mirza Abu'l Kasim might be advised to propose himself as relieving him of a thankless responsibility, though not one which it would be possible to carry out without his consent.

A list for the regulation of payments at Karbala was eventually drawn up in September 1889; but it does not appear whether any was prepared at Najaf.

Attempted reform of the distribution arrangement by Colonel Tweedie, 1889-90.

On return to his post from leave, Colonel Tweedie endeavoured to give effect to the suggestions of Major Talbot regarding the creation of committees. After several interviews with the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, and communications with the Hujjat-ul-Islām through common friends, small committees were appointed at Karbala and Najaf, consisting of the Mujtahid-Distributor at each place, the British Agent at Karbala, and a third member. The unofficial member at Karbala was Saiyid Hasan, Hakimzādah, a disinterested Persian gentleman of that town; at Najaf it was an equally disinterested and highly respected Shi'ah merchant of Baghdād. The results obtained may be described in Colonel Tweedie's own graphic words:

> At Najaf the result proved nil. The "highly respected Baghdad merchant", wishing to remain "highly respected", played dummy, in which he was seconded by our "Honorary Agent", whose rôle and nature it is to make everything pleasant to everybody, and so the Bahru'l Ulum remained as unruffled as his ways of distribution remained unstraightened. At Karbala the independent member tried to bring about reform, thereby exciting in the highest degree the animosity of the Hujjatu'l Islam and all his party. Seeing this, I resolved, after several months of patient trial, to have done with the "Committee", the net product of which may be thus stated:—(1) distribution through the Hujjat-ul-Islam at Karbala and the Bahru'l Ulum at Najaf certainly is what Major Talbot called it in his memorandum, a "crying scandal";—(2) every attempt to improve it founded on the fallacy of those two Mujtahids, or any other Mujtahids to whom may be afforded in lieu of them a similar opportunity of making money, being inclined to pay out to others sums which they can by any possibility keep to themselves is fore-doomed to failure. The idea of making over to a Mujtahid the distribution of money is anything but a business man's idea.
>
> A Mujtahid's proper occupation is study. Outside of that, if a Mujtahid at all, and not a mere pretender, he is a child, (and) the entrusting to him of money for division surely leads to the gathering round him of parasites (to say nothing of the members of his own family) for the purpose of taking it from him.

At the beginning of 1890 Brigade-Surgeon R. Bowman, the Medical Officer of the Baghdād Residency, who had eleven years' experience of the country, visited Karbala and Najaf and reported, at the desire of Colonel Tweedie, on the state of Bequest affairs. He referred, in concluding his report, to the possibility of establishing a school for Indian children, and a dispensary for the treatment of poor Indians, at Karbala at the cost of the Oudh Bequest.

State of affairs in 1890.

In regard to the distribution by the Mujtahids, great dissatisfaction prevailed in 1890 and was not of recent origin. Colonel Tweedie and his predecessors had received representations at various times "not "directly only from individuals, but circuitously through the Ottoman, "Persian, Bombay, and even Hyderabad Governments, . . . to "the effect that the two Mujtahids appointed to distribute this money "treated it as their own, bought lands with it, and diverted it in other "ways from its proper uses." The admonitions addressed to the Mujtahid-Distributors by Major Talbot, and after him by Colonel Tweedie, had produced no effect; the committees formed to control or support them had been a failure; and, though nominal rolls of payees were submitted from both Karbala and Najaf, they were of little or no practical use. In regard to these rolls Colonel Tweedie observed:

> . . . doubt remains: (1) how many of the recorded names are real; how many dummies? (2) Of those that are real, how many merely are the wives, children, or servants of the Mujtahid distributors, that is, these distributors themselves in different forms? (3) How many names are those of persons without due claim to benefit by the bequest, such as landowners and thriving shopkeepers?
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> * * * *
>
> The difficulty of course centres in the accounts. The Mujtahid-Distributors postpone submitting them: and then, with the strong ground behind them that "the poor" are suffering, press by post and telegraph for the prompt issue of more money. In my humble opinion, if the present system of distribution is to be maintained, the calling for rolls of recipients, or at all events the professing to check such when they are before us, is but little likely to conduce to satisfactory results.

An objectionable feature of the distributions, as made, was the payment of considerable amounts to the Kilid-dārs and other officials of the Shi'ah Shrines at Karbala and Najaf, who had other sources of income, and among whom immense sums were often divided by wealthy pilgrims from India and other places.

The distributions made of the separate fund for Indians were open to criticism in different respects, particularly with reference to a large sprinkling of the late Iqbal-ud-Daulah's relations and their dependants

among the recipients of relief at Kādhimain, and to the undue proportion of the Fund swallowed up by the Agencies at Kādhimain and Karbala and their hangers-on. The monthly cost of the Kādhimain Agency alone, which had an establishment of eleven persons besides the Indian* Distributor, was Rs. 488½.

Change of system recommended by Colonel Tweedie, March 1890.

In March 1890 Colonel Tweedie addressed the Government of India and advocated an entire change of system in the Bequest. He represented that the existing arrangements, to some extent workable in the lifetime of the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, had now ceased to be so, remarking:

> Two facts of themselves here go far towards furnishing the explanation. One, the perplexity which must necessarily be felt by a British officer when circumstances require him to single out a Mujtahid for a money trust. The other, the even greater difficulty, or rather impossibility, of his controlling from Baghdād two such nominees (the subjects of other Governments) in a matter of money. Every Mujtahid has his own circle. One who is on the rise to-day may be on the wane to-morrow; perhaps from a suspicion of larceny; perhaps though showing signs of worldliness. A Mujtahid whose reputation for rectitude and benevolence is unquestioned may, after a large monthly sum shall have been entrusted to him, become an altered character.

Colonel Tweedie's representations were, in effect, that the separate distributions to India at Kādhimain, Karbala, and Najaf should be discontinued, the Indian paupers at Kādhimain being left to emigrate to Karbala and Najaf, where all resident Indians could take their proper place among persons entitled to benefit by the Bequest; that the Indian Distributorships at Kādhimain and Karbala should be abolished; and that the proceeds of the Bequest should be allotted among the Mujtahids and Mujāvirs of Karbala and Najaf by the British Resident, who would prepare and revise lists of them with the help of an Assistant Political Agent (to be added to the staff of the Residency), of unofficial local committees (which might be expected to grow up), and of the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād.

It should be mentioned that these proposals, besides to some extent anticipating others which were adopted in 1903, were strictly in accordance with the terms of the Agreement of 1825 as known to the Baghdād Residency at the time. The copy of the Agreement preserved in the Residency archives not only followed the incorrect bilingual version, but contained an interpolated "va" between the words "Mujtahidān"

*It was remarked that the sum overtly passing into the pockets of the family of Agha Muhammad, Agent at Kādhimain, whose uncle, Muhammad Taqi Khān, was Agent at Karbala, was Rs. 678 a month in salaries and allowances; and it was suspected that this did not fully measure the degree in which they benefited by the Bequest.

and "Mujāvirān," and was therefore a highly misleading document. Under its terms a distribution of the proceeds of the Bequest by the representative of the British Government among "Mujtahids" *and* "Mujāvirs" of Karbala and Najaf would have been permissible, and the British representative would not have been precluded from dealing direct with such of the beneficiaries as were only Mujāvirs,—a term considered by Colonel Tweedie to include all resident Indians.

Orders of the Government of India on Colonel Tweedie's recommendations, May 1890.

In May 1890 the Government of India, after considering Colonel Tweedie's arguments, informed him, with a reference to the orders of 1867, that they did not desire to interfere in any way with the distribution of the fund after it had been made over to the proper recipients specified in the deed of 1825, that this had been their consistent attitude for many years, and that they had no desire to change it. In regard to the distribution to Indians at Kādhimain, Colonel Tweedie was asked to report whether it had been instituted under the direction of the Mujtahid-Distributors or otherwise: in the former case there were no grounds, the Government of India remarked, for their intervention; in the latter there must have been some departure from the orders of 1867, authority for which should be shown.

Colonel Tweedie in reply explained that, in raising the matter, he had been actuated by a doubt whether the *de facto* Mujtahid-Distributors at Karbala and Najaf could be considered the proper recipients under the Agreement of 1825; and he described how the separate Indian Fund had come into existence with the concurrence of the Mujtahid-Distributors.

No further orders were passed on the case by the Government of India.

Further attempted reforms by Colonel Tweedie, 1891.

Early in 1891 Colonel Tweedie, in view of the disinclination of the Government of India to a change of system, made a fresh effort to improve the working of the actual arrangements. At the time when he took action the Karbala allotment under the Bequest had been paid to the end of September, and the Najaf allotment to the end of October 1890. A good basis of distribution existed at Karbala in the shape of the list of payees drawn up in September 1889; but the nominal roll at Najaf had not been scrutinised or verified for some years. It was known that at Najaf the Mujtahid-Distributor had been borrowing funds on the strength of his connection with the Bequest; and, both there and at Karbala, persons accustomed to benefit by the distributions had begun to raise money on the security of the future payments which they expected to receive.

Colonel Tweedie accordingly issued funds, completing payment of the Karbala allotment to the end of 1890, for distribution in accordance with the list of 1889 in the presence of the British Agent, Karbala; but he withheld the arrears due at Najaf until now and proper lists of Mujtahids and Mujāvirs at that place should have been prepared by the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm with the assistance of the Agent. He offered, or rather threatened, in case of difficulties arising, to proceed to Karbala and Najaf himself. In March 1891 the Agent, after a month's delay during which he did nothing towards executing his instructions, represented to Colonel Tweedie that the only means by which affairs could be brought into order was payment of all arrears up to date; and the Resident, though he inferred from the request that the Karbala allotment for the last quarter of 1890 had already been disposed of in some unavowable way, directed payment to be made to the Mujtahid-Distributors to the end of February 1891.

These proceedings were duly reported by Colonel Tweedie to the Government of India, for information; but at Najaf, unfortunately, the attempt at reform was thwarted by the greed, arrogant behaviour, and even violence of the Mujtahid-Distributor, who completely overbore his colleague, the Agent; and later the Resident reported of the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm: "He and his Karbala colleague are helping themselves harder than ever."

Re-examination of the question of the Bequest-arrangements by the Government of India, 1890-1891.

Meanwhile the question of the Oudh Bequest had been taken up by the Honourable G. Curzon, M. P.,—afterwards Lord Curzon and Viceroy of India,—who had visited Karbala and Najaf at the beginning of 1890, had spent a day at each place, and had discussed the Bequest with Colonel Tweedie and with Saiyid Hasan, Hakimzādah, the unofficial member of the Committee instituted at Karbala in 1889. Mr. Curzon wrote in October 1890 to Lord Lansdowne, then Viceroy of India, suggesting that the working of the Bequest might be investigated. He had been informed by the Hakimzādah that the Mujtahid-Distributor at Karbala misappropriated the money there, while the British Agent remained neutral, and that the Hakimzādah's own action in exposing his colleagues on the Committee had involved him in great odium.

By this time petitions by post and telegraph on the subject of the management of the Bequest had begun to reach the Viceroy of India and His Majesty's Secretaries of State for India and Foreign Affairs; and representations of the kind became, from this time onward, so common as hardly to merit notice in what follows.

The Legislative Department of the Government of India, being consulted by the Foreign Department unofficially, were inclined to think that there was much in Colonel Tweedie's letters deserving of serious consideration; and that, under the terms of the Bequest, Government were bound to take reasonable pains to secure that the stipulated payments under the Bequest were made to the persons intended to be benefited.

A reference was made also to Colonel Jarrett, Secretary to the Board of Examiners, Calcutta, who was requested to furnish an accurate English translation of the Agreement of 1825, together with his opinion as to the meaning of the terms "Mujtahid" and "Mujāvir." The version of the Agreement supplied to Colonel Jarrett appears to have been the corrupt bilingual text, or, if others were sent him, he did not take them into consideration. His rendering of the crucial passage in the Agreement was: "One-half shall be paid on account of Najaf the Noble, and "the other half on account of Karbala the Sublime, into the hands of "the supreme theological doctors who are continuous residents near the "holy shrines"; and he thought that Colonel Tweedie was inclined to give an undue extension to the meanings of the words "Mujtahid" and "Mujāvir."

In March 1891, the result of the enquiry from Colonel Jarrett was communicated to Colonel Tweedie, who was asked to say, the correctness of Colonel Jarrett's translation being assumed, "who were the recognised "Mujtahids resident at the shrines, and whether it would not be possible "to pay the money to them collectively, or to a Committee selected by "them from time to time." Mr. Curzon was duly informed of the steps taken on his representations.

In May 1891, Colonel Tweedie, who was then on the eve of relinquishing the Residentship in Turkish 'Irāq and of retiring from the service, replied to the reference. He admitted that Colonel Jarrett's interpretation of the (supposed) correct text as referring to "Mujtahids resident at the shrines," not to "Mujtahids and Mujāvirs at the shrines" was correct; but he criticised the importation by the translator of the adjectives "supreme" (with reference to doctorhood) and "continuous" (with reference to residence) which he did not find in the Persian. As regards the meaning of the word "Mujtahid" he referred to the greatest Mujtahid of the day, Hāji Mirza Muhammad Shirāzi, of Sāmarra, and obtained an answer from him; as also, through the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād, from Saiyid Muhammad Taqi, a Mujtahid of Kādhimain. The latter remarked in his disquisition "And the Mujtahid has grada-

tions," from which Colonel Tweedie deduced "the impossibility of a [too] hard and fast line being drawn between, so to speak, the Bachelor and the Master of (theologic) Arts." He also submitted two lists, obtained from different sources, of persons at Karbala and Najaf reputed to be Mujtahids; but he did not comment on them. With reference to the practical suggestion conveyed in the Government of India's letter he remarked:

> One thing may be ranked with the impossible, and that is, that the body of Karbala and Najaf Mujtahids, or so-called Mujtahids, shall ever, whether under the lead of this Residency or independently, act in concert, like a Committee, for the partition of the money among themselves, or for its dispensation to the poor. The prevailing feeling among them one towards another is too surcharged with odium theologicum and scholastic rivalry to admit of that. If a meeting of them were to be convened for such a purpose, they would not attend it, but each send a servant. This Mujtahid's adherents and expectants and the other's would at the same time hang about the meeting place: any day a tumult might happen.

Further discussions, enquiry by Major Jennings, and opinion of Colonel Mockler, 1892.

Colonel Tweedie had already, in February 1891, expressed the important opinion that a mere change of the personnel of the Mujtahid-Distributors would be useless, saying: "..... as far as I can judge, the "expedient of appointing other than the present Mujtahid distributors, "even were we quite free to try it, would yield no better results."

Colonel Mockler, who succeeded Colonel Tweedie in the Baghdad Residency, was requested demi-officially, in January 1892, to inform the Government of India of his opinion in regard to the practical points at issue in the case, *viz.*, the proposed distribution of the proceeds of the Bequest among a number of Mujtahids at Karbala and Najaf instead of their payment to one Mujtahid at each place, and the proposed abolition (by a process of gradual reduction) of the separate Indian Fund, particularly of the branch of it at Kâdhimain.

In March 1892 Major R. H. Jennings, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, visited Baghdâd, and Colonel Mockler took the opportunity to obtain fresh information in regard to opinion and feeling at Karbala through him. In the meantime the Mujtahid Distributor at Karbala, Mirza Abul Qâsim, had died, and Colonel Mockler had appointed his son Saiyid Muhammad Baqir, Tabatabâyi, in his place. Major Jennings, who was accompanied by Mr. Townley, Secretary of Her Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehran, then travelling in the country, was instructed to interview, if possible, Shaikh Zain-ul-'Âbidin, the greatest Mujtahid of the day at Karbala, who was understood to have telegraphed to the Government of India alleging that Saiyid Muhammad was not a Mujtahid. In this mission Major Jennings was successful; the Shaik

at a private interview admitted having telegraphed to the Viceroy of India protesting against an alleged intention on the part of the British Resident to make the distributions in future "without a Mujtahid;" he asserted that the only universally recognised Mujtahid at Karbala was himself; and he indicated that he would be willing to accept the post of Mujtahid-Distributor at Karbala. Major Jennings reported, as the result of his enquiries, that Saiyid Muhammad Bāqir was undoubtedly a genuine and much respected Mujtahid; that Shaikh Zain-ul-'Ābidīn was unsuitable for the post of Distributor, that at Najaf no better Distributor than the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, the actual incumbent, who had worked well, was available; and that the distributions, as carried out at Karbala and Najaf were satisfactory, but that a representative of the Residency should be deputed from Baghdād to attend them.

Eventually Colonel Mockler informed the Government of India of his opinion that "the present distribution satisfied all, but a very few, and that it would be difficult to better it." After remarking that only one-sixth of the whole money was distributed to Indians at Kādhimain, while another sixth went to Indians at Karbala, he described the Kādhimain distribution as "absolutely within the terms of the bequest, and a most useful, beneficial, and politic measure," adding: "It gives us a "most excellent Native Agent at Kādhimain who settles all disputes "among the large Indian population there, saving the Residency immense "labour. It relieves the wants of needy Indian scholars, pilgrims, and "pious but indigent settlers; provides for the deportation of pauper Indians "at the rate of 15 to 20 weekly from Baghdad to Basrah; gives us a "tremendous hold on the fanatical neighbouring population of Shia "Kādhimain, and, having now become an institution, is *objected to by* "*nobody* (except Colonel Tweedie). My Native Assistant, Mr. Marine "(a Christian), personally superintends or assists the Native Agent "in this distribution, and, under his excellent tact and *régime*, no com-"plaint is ever raised....."

On these data the Government of India decided, and informed the Resident officially, that no change in the arrangements need be undertaken, at least during the lifetime of Shaikh Zain-ul-'Ābidīn, by whom it was evident that difficulties were likely to be created.

Renewed discussions, 1894.

Later it was proposed by Colonel Mockler, the Political Resident, in order to avoid the difficulty of drawing up lists of Mujtahids, that he should be empowered to appoint Muqassims (or Distributors) who should make payments in the presence of Nāzirs (or Supervisors), the latter being held responsible that in the distribution lists only such pay-

ments were entered as were made in their presence, and no others. The Government of India sanctioned this arrangement as a temporary measure; but at the same time they pointed out that "the Bequest was intended to benefit those residents at the shrines at Najaf and Karbala who were regarded as Mujtahids", and remarked: "It must be clearly understood that the ultimate object to be aimed at is that the recipients of the income of the bequest shall be limited to members of the class specified above." Instructions were accordingly given for preparation of a list of Mujtahids, which should be revised from time to time. This was in 1894, after which much time passed without any list being submitted by the Political Resident.

Enquiry by Major Newmarch into the working of the Oudh Bequest, 1902.

The question of the Oudh Bequest lay dormant for ten years; but it had not been settled. It was raised again, in a very energetic manner, by Major L. S. Newmarch, soon after his appointment as Resident at Baghdád in March 1902.

The state of matters which he found prevailing was described by Major Newmarch as discreditable and unsatisfactory in the extreme. The proceeds of the Bequest were not paid direct to the Mujtahid-Distributors at Karbala and Najaf, nor to the Indian Distributors at Kádhimain and Karbala, but to the Jewish Sarráf of the British Residency at Baghdád, who periodically produced a receipt from each of the Mujtahid-Distributors for half of the whole amount. The portion of the Indian Fund destined for Karbala and Najaf was sent to the Indian Distributor at Karbala not direct, but through the Indian Distributor at Kádhimain. Accounts of the distributions made were submitted, but greatly in arrear, *e.g.*, the account of the Mujtahid-Distributor at Karbala for the quarter ending 31st October 1901 was not received at Baghdád until April 1902; and the accounts, such as they were, revealed a lamentable misapplication of the money, both by the Mujtahids and by the Indian Distributors.

Each of the Mujtahid-Distributors retained for himself Rs. 600 *per mensem*, and to this there could be no objection. But large amounts were admittedly paid to relations and dependents of the Distributors, both Mujtahid and Indian; considerable sums were shown as going to females who did not appear in person to receive them; and there were entries, chiefly relating to "deposits" which suggested malversation by members of the distribution staff. Employés on the Baghdád Residency establishment who had little or nothing to do with the work of the Bequest were in receipt of remuneration from the Indian Fund. The following statement was made to Major Newmarch in confidence by an

individual well acquainted with the facts, Saiyid Hasan Hakīmzadah, and was corroborated by information from other sources:—

> The late and present distributors at Karbala used to put down in the accounts fictitious names and take the money themselves. * * * They do it still, only more so. They enter the names of their children, servants, negroes and others as receiving certain amounts, but these amounts are pocketed by the distributor. This is still the practice. Another practice of the distributor is to enter the names of really poor persons as receiving (*e. g.*) Rs. 10 per mensem, but the poor man really only gets one rupee and the distributor keeps the balance. The poor man is really paid one rupee for his signature and is told that if he discloses the fact, his name will be struck out altogether.

The staff under the Indian Distributor at Kādhimain now consisted of nine persons, that of the Indian Distributor at Karbala of thirteen, not counting servants; the former official now paid himself at the rate of over Rs. 300, the latter at the rate of over Rs. 290 a month; and Āgha Hasan, a brother of Āgha Muhammad, had slipped into the position of "Assistant Distributor" at Kādhimain on a salary of more than Rs. 50 per mensem. Each of the Indian Distributors, who were also Agents of the British Residency at Baghdād, had surrounded himself with "a little court," in which a place was found even for salaried "Medical Attendants"; and, when the Agent at Karbala went to Najaf to superintend the proceedings of the Mujtahid Distributor there, his journey was "a kind of royal progress", debited of course to the Oudh Bequest. The supervision exercised by the Karbala Agent over the Mujtahid Distributors was, moreover, a farce: he admitted to Major Newmarch "without any apparent sense of shame, that he did not super-"vise the distribution at all, that he was never present at it, but left it "all in the hands of one of his Munshis, who was himself a stipendiary "of this trust fund." "Muhammad Ibrahim Khan had signed his name "in English on every page of the distribution account, and when I "asked him what this meant, he frankly admitted that it meant nothing "that his signatures were put on each page of the account several "days after the distribution, at which he was never present, had been "completed." The superintendence of the Kādhimain distribution by Mr. Marine, the Residency Dragoman, was found to have been equally futile and perfunctory.

Preliminary reforms by Major Newmarch, 1902.

Major Newmarch immediately grappled with the abuses described above and removed them in so far as it was in his power to do so. The separate Indian Fund having been already condemned by the Government of India as an irregularity, Major Newmarch reduced the portion of it devoted to Kādhimain from about Rs. 1,800 to Rs. 800 a month,

of which Rs. 350 was allotted for the maintenance of the Kâdhimain Agency and Rs. 450 for the continuance of such allowances to poor Indians at Kâdhimain as could not be immediately abolished; but the Agent was dissociated by the Resident's orders from the distribution of the latter allotment. The portion of the Indian fund affected to Karbala and Najaf was similarly cut down from about Rs. 1,800 a month to Rs. 450, the whole of which was appropriated to the upkeep of the Karbala Agency. Major Newmarch, it should be observed, did not think that the maintenance of the Agencies at Karbala and Najaf was a justifiable charge on the Oudh Bequest. He contemplated the eventual abolition of the Kâdhimain Agency, and the payment of the Agent at Karbala in future from some other source; but it was not practicable to dismiss both Agents on the spot without the sanction of Government, and without other arrangements having been made for the representation of British interests at Karbala.

Recommendations by Major Newmarch to the Government of India, September 1902.

Major Newmarch's general views concerning the position of the British authorities in relation to the Oudh Bequest were summed up in his first letter on the subject, addressed to the Government of India in September 1902, in the following paragraph:—

> Of course the original idea of the distribution was that the money should be devoted more to the really poor and less to the distributors, who from the very earliest times appear to have appropriated as much as they could for themselves and their relatives. The appointment of a supervisor from time to time to check these distributions has only produced friction between the distributor and himself, endless complaints, and counter complaints, then a new supervisor or may be a new distributor, and then the same story over again. In many cases, and specially of late years, the supervisor appears to have been worse than the supervised.
>
> The idea of the distribution is benevolent, but I am satisfied that it is practically impossible to supervise it effectually, and I therefore think that it should be abolished. It seems to me that the only distribution with which the Government of India or its officers are concerned is the distribution of the Bequest among the Mujtahids, and I am of opinion that if you go beyond that distribution, we are travelling outside the limits of the Bequest and undertaking duties and responsibilities which are unnecessary, undesirable, and impossible.

His chief proposals which he had reason to expect would be acceptable to the Government of India, were:—

(1) That a list of Mujtahids who are permanent residents at Karbala and Najaf should be prepared and revised from time to time, including any Mujtahid who may have added himself to the number, and striking off any who may have ceased to reside at those places or who may have ceased to deserve the title of Mujtahid.

(2) To distribute the whole of the Bequest among the Mujtahids on this list, either in equal shares or in such proportion as may hereafter be determined.

(3) To stop the distribution at Kâdhimain.

(4) To take no official cognisance of any distribution other than that (already indicated) among the Mujtahids.

While admitting the great difficulty of determining who was a Mujtahid and who was not, Major Newmarch recommended that Mujtahids for the purposes of the Bequest should be chosen by the Resident, whose selection should be final. Another possible course was to leave the nomination of Mujtahids to vacant allowances under the Bequest to the Mujtahids themselves; but this, he apprehended, would result in the formation of a Persian clique and the total exclusion of Indian and Arab Mujtahids. At a later time he suggested that nominations to vacant allowances should be made by the actual holders of allowances, but should be subject to the approval of the Resident. Colonel Newmarch thought that ultimately all Mujtahid beneficiaries under the Bequest should receive allowances of equal amount, and that the number of Mujtahid recipients at Karbala should be not less than ten, and the same at Najaf, to prevent the concentration of excessively large amounts in the hands of individuals.

Further reforms by Major Newmarch, 1902-03.

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the sanction of the Government of India, Major Newmarch proceeded to carry out the policy which he recommended in regard to Mujtahids. After collecting information with reference to the theological and other qualifications of all who pretended to Ijtihâd at the Holy Cities, he offered shares under the Bequest to those of the best repute; and these were accepted by a number of very respectable Mujtahids, though not by any of the highest standing. By May 1903 the separate distribution to Indians had been abolished, even at Kâdhimain, and the Mujtahids shown below were regularly receiving the monthly Bequest allowances shown opposite their names:

At Karbala.		*At Najaf.*	
1. Saiyid Muhammad Baqir, Hujjat-ul-Islâm, the original Mujtahid Distributor . . .	Rs. 1,500	1. Saiyid Muhammad, Bahr-al-'Ulûm, the original Mujtahid Distributor . . .	Rs. 1,500

2. Sayyid Hāshim, Qazwīnī.	each Rs. 500	2. Mulla Ali, Nahāvandi.	each Rs. 350
3. Shaikh Husain, Mazandarānī.		3. Shaikh Muhammad Hasan, Jawāhiri.	
4. Sayyid Ja'far, Tabatabā'i.		4. Shaikh Abdullah Mazandarānī.	
5. Shaikh Ali, Yazdi.		5. 'Abdul Husain.	
6. Sayyid Murtaza Husain.		6. Sayyid Muhammad Hindi.	
7. Sibte Hussain.		7. Muhammad Karim Khurāsāni.	

Orders of the Government of India on Major Newmarch's recommendations, July 1903.

In July 1903 Major Newmarch's proposals, already in a great measure executed, were approved by the Government of India in the following terms:

. . . you correctly stated the general view of the Government of India, which is, that the income of the Bequest should be distributed under the supervision of the Political Resident to a certain number of Mujtahids residing permanently at the shrines of Karbala and Najaf, and that it is not a mere charitable grant for the benefit of the poor of those places. It is noticed with satisfaction that the distribution at Kadhimain has entirely ceased, as this diversion of a portion of the funds of the Bequest was inconsistent with the declared policy of the Government of India and unjustifiable under the terms of the Bequest. The funds available should ultimately be distributed in equal shares, so far as this can be effected without undue liability to Mujtahids who are permanent residents at Karbala and Najaf, and no official enquiries will be taken of any distribution other than that by the Mujtahids themselves. Your provisional selection of Mujtahids is accepted by the Government of India, who agree* that the difficulty of choosing a suitable person on a vacancy occurring may, in future, as a general rule, be met by obtaining the approval of the remaining recipients to the successor suggested, subject to the consent of the Political Resident with whom the final appointment must always remain, and who will have the power of removing on sufficient grounds any Mujtahid from the list of recipients. The number of Mujtahids should probably not be less than ten or more than twenty at each place; the lower limit may, ... be observed for the present at Karbala.

It was further intimated to Major Newmarch "that the Government "of India appreciate the industry and thoroughness with which, in "face of considerable difficulties, you have treated this troublesome and "complicated piece of work, and I am to congratulate you on the "satisfactory results of your efforts."

Basis and effect of Major Newmarch's reorganisation.

The basis of Major Newmarch's scheme, and of the orders passed thereon by the Government of India, was the corrupt bilingual text of the Agreement of 1825, in which there was no indication of the purpose

* Major Newmarch had modified his original views on this point.

of the Bequest by the King of Oudh in favour of the Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf. Consequently, in all that was done and ordered in 1903, it was assumed that the Mujtahid recipients under the Bequest were unfettered by its terms in their disposal of the money, and that the Government of India, under whose auspices they were selected and maintained as beneficiaries, were not concerned with their conduct in disposing of it. of the Bequest arrangements, 1902-05.

The reorganisation effected by Major Newmarch did not, apparently, result in the distribution of the income of the Oudh Bequest in a manner which could be described, from a charitable or philanthropic standpoint, as better than before. Such, indeed, was not the object of his scheme, which aimed only at bringing the administration of the funds into accordance with the terms of the Agreement of 1825, as then understood, and at abolishing abuses due to the intervention in the past of British authorities. In both of these latter respects his action was effective and successful. Protests against the new arrangements were received in the shape of petitions to the King-Emperor, the Viceroy of India, and other authorities; but, in view of the number of personal interests adversely affected by the change, such manifestations of feeling were inevitable and possessed little significance.

Owing to the predominance of Persians—generally retaining their Persian nationality—among the Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf, and to the influence then wielded in Persia by the more important among them, the radical reorganisation of the Oudh Bequest in 1902-03, had important political aspects to which no reference has yet been made. Major Newmarch was conscious of these; he expected to acquire some influence over the Mujtahids through the power vested in him of selecting from among them the recipients of allowances under the Oudh Bequest; and in June 1903, in an official letter, he remarked that Sayyid Muhammad Bāqir of Karbala and Sayyid Muhammad, Bahr-al-'Ulūm, of Najaf were now on very friendly terms with him and deferred to his authority. A similar appreciation of the position had been arrived at by Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, who thought that the influence of the Mujtahids at Karbala, and Najaf might be utilised, through the British Residency at Baghdād, to prevent riots and disturbances in Persia and to frustrate Russian policy in that country. Political aspects of the reorganisation of the Bequest, 1903-05.

The cases of two or three Persians were recommended by Sir A. Hardinge to Major Newmarch for favourable consideration; and in a couple of instances the latter was able, though he could not reconcile

his action with the principle of non-interference with the distribution of Oudh Bequest money by the Mujtahids, to induce one of the recipients to make a monthly allowance to these protégés. In a third case, however, in which the assignment of R500 a month (or £400 a year) to one Shaikh Muhammad Mehdi in the character of a Mujtahid was suggested by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān to the Government of India, Major Newmarch felt himself obliged to deprecate compliance with the suggestion, on the ground that the Ijtihād of Shaikh Muhammad Mehdi was at least doubtful, and that a pronouncedly political handling of selections to Oudh Bequest allowances would not conduce to the establishment of that influence over the Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf which it was desired to secure.

Mujtahid beneficiaries under the Bequest, April 1906.

In April 1906 the Mujtahid beneficiaries under the Oudh Bequest at Karbala and at Najaf were as follow :—

Karbala.

1. Sayyid Muhammad Bāqir, Tabatabāyi (till 1902 sole Mujtahid-Distributor).
2. Shaikh 'Ali, Yazdi.
3. Sayyid Muhammad Hāshim, Qazvini.
4. Sayyid Murtaza Husain, *Lahori.*
5. Sayyid Muhammad Kāzhāni.
6. Sayyid 'Ali, Tangkābani.
7. Sayyid Muhammad Bāqir, Behbehāni.
8. Kalb-i-Bāqir, *Indian.*
9. Sayyid Husain, Qumi.

Najaf.

1. Sayyid Muhammad, Bahr-ul-'Ulūm (till 1902 sole Mujtahid-Distributor and at that time old and very nearly blind).
2. Shaikh 'Abdullah, Māzandarāni.
3. Sayyid Muhammad Hasan, Jawāhiri.
4. Mulla Muhammad Kāzim, Khurāsāni.
5. Shaikh 'Abdul Hasan.
6. Shaikh Fath Ullah Shari'at.
7. Sayyid Abul Qāsim, Ishqāwari.
8. Akhund Mulla Ali, Khurāsāni.
9. Sayyid Abu Turāb, Khurāsāni.
10. Āgha Shaikh Mehdi.

Annexure No. I. Journey of English Travellers to Baghdād, 1583.

EXTRACT FROM FITCH'S JOURNAL.

In the yeere of our Lord 1583, I Ralph Fitch of London marchant being desirous to see the countreys of the East India, in the company of M. Iohn Newberie marchant (which had beene at Ormus once before) of William Leedes Ieweller, and Iames Story Painter, being chiefly set fourth by the right worshipfull Sir Edward Osborne knight, and M. Richard Staper citizens and marchants of London, did ship my selfe in a ship of London called the Tyger, wherein we went for Tripolis in Syria: and from thence we tooke the way for Aleppo, which we went in seven days with the Carouan. Being in Aleppo, and finding good com-

pany, went from thence to Birra, which is two dayes and an halfe travaile with Camels.

* Birra is a little towne, but very plentiful of victuals: and neere to the wall of the towne runneth the riuer of Euphrates. Here we bought a boate and agreed with a master and bargemen, for to go to †Babylon. These boats be but for one voiage; for the streame doth runne so fast downewards that they cannot returne. They carie you to a towne which they call ‡Felugia, and there you sell the boate for a little money, for that which cost you fiftie at Birra you sell there for seuen or eight. From Birra to Felugia is sixteene dayes iourney, it is not good that one boate goe alone, for if it should chance to breake, you should have much a doe to saue your goods from the Arabians, which be alwayes these abouts robbing: and in the night when your boates be made fast, it is necessarie that you keepe good watch. For the Arabians that bee theeues will come swimming and steale your goods and flee away, against which a gunne is very good, for they doe feare it very much. In the river of Euphrates from Birra to Felugia there be certaine places where you pay custome, so many Medines for a some or Camels lading, and certaine raysons and sope, which is for the sonnes of § Aborise, which is Lord of the Arabians and all that great desert, and hath some villages upon the river. Felugia where you unlade your goods which come from Birra is a little village: from whence you goe to Babylon in a day.

Babylon is a towne not very great but very populous, and of great traffike of strangers, for that is the way to Persia, Turkia and Arabia: and from thence doe goe Carovans for these and other places. Here are great store of victuals, which come from Armenia downe the riuer of Tygris. They are brought vpon raftes made of goates skinnes blowne full of winde and bordes layde vpon them: and thereupon they lade their goods which are brought downe to Babylon, which being discharged they open their skinnes, and carry them backe by Camels, to serue another time. Babylon in times past did belong to the kingdome of Persia, but nowe is subject to the Turke. Over against Babylon there is a very faire village from whence you passe to Babylon upon a long bridge made of boats, and tyed to a great chaine of yron, which is made fast on either side of riuer. When any boates are to passe up or downe the riuer, they take away certaine of the boates until they be past.

The ‖ Tower of Babel is built on this side the riuer Tygris, towards Arabia from the towne about seuen or eight miles, which tower is ruinated on all sides, and with the fall thereof hath made as it were a little mountaine, so that it hath no shape at all: it was made of brickes dried in the sonne, and certaine canes and leaues of the palme tree layed betwixt the brickes. There is no entrance to be seene to goe into it. It doth stand upon a great plaine betwixt the rivers of Euphrates and Tygris.

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* Doubtless Birijik.
† Meaning Baghdád, as will appear further on.
‡ Fallujah.
§ Evidently Abu Rish.
‖ The reference is clearly to 'Akr Qúf.

By the river Euphrates two dayes iourney from Babylon at a place called Ait, * in a fielde neere vnto it, is a strange thing to see: a mouth that doth continually throwe foorth against the ayre boyling pitch with a filthy smoke: which pitch doth runne abroad into a great fielde which is always full thereof. † The Moores say that it is the mouth of hell. By reason of the great quantitie of it, the men of that countrey doe pitch their boates two or three inches thicke on the outside, so that no water doth enter into them. Their boates be called Dance‡. When there is great store of water in Tygris you may goe from Babylon to Basora in 8 or 9 dayes: if there be small store it will cost you the more dayes.

Basora in times past was vnder the Arabians, but now is subject to the Turke. But some of them the Turke cannot subdue, for that they holde certaine Ilandes in the riuer Euphrates which the Turke cannot winne of them. They be theeues all and have no setled dwelling, but remoue from place to place with their Camels, goates and horses, wiues and children and all. They have large blew gownes, their wiues eares and noses are ringed very full of rings of copper and siluer, and they weare rings of copper about their legs.

Basora standeth neere the gulfe of Persia, and is a town of great trade of spices and drugges which come from Ormus. Also there is great store of wheate, ryce, and dates growing thereabout, wherewith they serue Babylon and all the countrey, Ormus, and all the partes of India. I went from Basora to Ormus downe the gulfe of Persia in a certaine shippe made of boordes, and sowed together with cayre, which is threede made of the huske of Cocoes, and certaine canes or strawe leaues sowed vpon the seames of the bordes which is the cause that they leake very much. And so having Persia always on the left hande, and the coast of Arabia on the right hande we passed many Ilandes, and among others the famous Ilande Baharim§ from whence come the best pearles which be round and Orient.

Ormus is an Island in circuit about fiue and twentie or thirtie miles, and is the driest Island in the world: for there is nothing growing in it but only salt: for their water, wood, or victuals, and all things necessary come out of Persia, which is about twelue miles from thence. All the Ilands thereabout be very fruitfull, from whence all kinds of victuals are sent vnto Ormus. The Portugales haue a castle here which standeth neere vnto the sea, wherein there is a Captain for the king of Portugale having vnder him a conuenient number of souldiers, whereof some parte remaine in the castle, and some in the towne. In this towne are marchants of all Nations, and many Moores and Gentiles¶. Here is very great trade of all sortes of spices, drugs, silke, cloth of silke, fine tapestrie of Persia, great store of pearles which come from the Iste of Baharim, and are the best pearles of all others, and many horses of Persia, which serue all India. They haue a Moore to their king which is chosen and gouerned by the Portugales. Their women are very strangely

* Hit.
† i.e., Mahammadans.
‡ Danak.
§ i.e., Barain.
¶ Probably meaning Hindus ("Gentoos").

attyred, wearing on their noses, eares, neckes, armes and legges many rings set with iewels, and lockes of silver and golde in their eares, and a long barre of golde vpon the side of their noses. Their eares with the weight of their iewels be worne so wide that a man may thrust three of his fingers into them.

Here very shortly after our arriuall wee were put in prison, and had part of our goods taken from us by the Captaine of the castle, whose name was Don Mathias de Albuquerque; and from hence the eleuenth of October he shipped us and sent us for Goa vnto the Viceroy, which at that time was Don Francisco de Mascarenhas.

Letter from Fitch.

"Louing friends Master Poore, etc. Since my departure from Aleppo, I have not written vnto you any letters, by reason that at Babylon, I was sicke of the fluxe, and being sicke, I went from thence for Balsara, which was twelve dayes journey downe the riuer Tygris, where we had extreme hot weather, which was good for my disease, ill fare, and worse lodging, by reason our boat was pestered with people. In eight daies that which I did eate was very small, so that if we had stayed two dayes longer vpon the water I thinke I had died: but comming to Balsara, presently I mended, I thanks God. There we stayed 14 dayes, and then we imbarked our selues for Ormuz, where we arrived the fifth of September, and were put in prison the ninth of the same moneth, were we continued untill the 11 of October, and then were shipt for this citie of Goa in the captaines ship.

Letter from Newberie.

My last I sent you, was the 29 of May last past from Aleppo, by George Gill the purser of the Tiger, which the last day of the same moneth came from thence, and arriued at *Feluge the 19 day of Iune, which Feluge is one dayes journey from hence. Notwithstanding some of our Company came not hither till the last day of the last moneth which was for want of Camels to cary our goods: for at this time of the veere, by reason of the great heate that is here, Camels are very scant to be gotten. And since our comming hither we have found very small sales, but divers say that in the winter our commodities will be very well sold, I pray God their words may proove true. I thinke cloth, kersies and tinne have never bene here at so low prices as they are now. Notwithstanding if I had here so much readie money as the commodities are woorth, I would not doubt to make a very good profite of this voiage hither, and to Balsara, and so by Gods helpe there will be reasonable profite made of the voiage. But with halfe money and halfe commoditie may be bought here the best sort of spices, and other commodities that are brought from the Indies, and without money there is here at this instant small good to be done. With Gods helpe two dayes hence, I minde to goe from hence to Balsara, and from thence of force I must goe to Ormus for want of a man that speaketh the Indian tongue. At my being in Aleppo I hired two† Nazaranies, and one of them hath bene twise in the Indies, and hath the language very well, but he is a very lewde fellow and therefore I will not take him with me,

* *i.e.*, Fallujah

† Nasrānis, *i.e.*, Oriental Christians.

Here follow the prices of wares as they are worth here at this instant.

From Babylon the 20 days of July 1583,

Yours,

John Newbeie.

ANNEXURE NO. II. CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH RESIDENCY AT BAGHDAD.*

Appointment and Letter of Instructions to Mr. Jones from Mr. Secretary Ramsay.

Dated the 5th July 1798.

From W. Ramsay, Esq., Secretary,
To Harford Jones, Esq.

Reason of Mr. Jones's Appointment.

It having been judged advisable by the Secret Committee, with the consent and approbation of his Majesty's Ministers, [that] under the present aspect of Affairs and the rumours which have prevailed, that the French might endeavour to penetrate to India either by the Red Sea or the Persian Gulph, that a Resident should be established at the Court of the Pashaw of Bagdad, you have been selected for that purpose.

Instructions for his Route

and

You will therefore proceed with the greatest Expedition to Vienna, where you will collect every Information that is to be obtained concerning the destination and progress of the French Force now in the Mediterranean. With such Intelligence you will proceed without delay to Constantinople, where your Enquiries must be repeated (especially through the Medium of our Ambassador there, to whom you will have letters of Introduction) as also on your Route from thence; and all such Information as you may collect you will, immediately on your arrival at Bagdad, forward in Cypher to Aden on the Coast of Arabia or to Mocha, as may be judged advisable, there to meet Commodore Blankett, who is dispatched from this Country with a Naval force for the purpose of watching the Straits of Babel Mandeb and the Persian Gulph, and obstructing the Progress of the French should they attempt to penetrate to India by either of those Routes.

Correspondence with Commodore Blankett.

Correspondence.

You will also immediately forward to the Government of Bombay a Copy of the like Information, together with the dispatches with which you may be entrusted by the East India Company and His Majesty's Ministers.

* Taken from copies in the original letter-book of the Baghdad Residency in 1919.

It will be necessary that you should continue from time to time to forward both to Commodore Blankett and the Government of Bombay such Information as may in any way relate to the objects of your Mission.

Conduct to be observed on Mr. Jones's arrival at Bagdad.

You will take care to notify in due form your arrival to the Pashaw of Bagdad; and, having presented him with such presents as may be usual, and that you think will be acceptable to him, you will proceed to inform him that you have been deputed by the East India Company to strengthen the friendship that has always existed between him and the Company; and, should the appearance of affairs render it necessary, you will point out to him the fatal Consequences which must ensue to his Dominions and the Turkish Empire in general, should the French be permitted to enter or pass through any part of the Turks Dominions or be suffered to obtain a footing there, or in Egypt. You will endeavour to prejudice him against such attempt on the part of France, and also to engage him to oppose it by all the Means of which he is possessed, either by his own Resources or his Influence with the Beys of Egypt and the wandering Tribes of the Desert.

Future objects of the Mission.

You will endeavour by all the Means in your Power to collect every Information respecting the Population, military force, Resources, and Commerce of the Territories subject to the Pashaw of Bagdad, or to any Shieks or Princes under his Influence, as also of the Persian and Egyptian Governments, or of any independent Princes inhabiting Arabia, or of any of the Parts through which an inroad might be made into India, either by the Inhabitants or strangers.

In short you will endeavour to collect Information of every particular that you imagine can in any Way be useful, either to the East India Company or to Great Britain in General.

Fund for the Expenses of the Mission to be supplied by the Government of Bombay.

You will also from Time to time transmit the Information so collected to the Government of Bombay, and to the Chairman for the Time being of the East India Company, with whom also you will keep up a regular correspondence. Directions will be given to the Government of Bombay to furnish you, from Time to time, with such funds as may enable you to carry into Execution the objects of this Expedition; and a salary suitable to your Rank and standing in the Service and the necessary Expenses of your Mission will be settled as soon as the requisite Information can be obtained to enable the Court of Directors to determine on the subject.

The Hon'ble the Secret Committee rely on Mr. Jones's zeal, etc.

The Secret Committee rely on your Vigilance and Zeal in Carrying into Execution the Measures here pointed out, and in keeping a watchful Eye upon all Matters any Ways connected with or relating to your Mission or the Interests of the Company in general.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

W. RAMSAY,

Secretary.

East India House, London,

The 5th July, 1798.

Letter from the R. H. Henry Dundas to the Pashaw of Bagdad.

Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, Treasurer of His Majesty's Navy, First Commissioner for the Affairs of India, Member of His Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, etc., to His Highness Soliman Pashaw of Bagdad and Bussora, etc., etc., etc.

Illustrious Sir,

Notification of H. Jones's Appointment.

The English East India Company under whose Government the British Territories in India are placed having appointed Mr. Harford Jones their Resident at your Highness' Court, I have received the Commands of the King my Master to inform your Highness that this appointment has met with His Majesty's full and cordial approbation.

Mr. Jones sent to Bagdad to strengthen the friendship and good understanding between the Pashaw and the Hon'ble Company.

It is His Majesty's warmest Wish that Mr. Jones's Residence at Bagdad may prove agreeable and satisfactory to your Highness, and that it may in all respects answer the Purpose for which it is intended, namely, to strengthen and increase the friendship and good understanding which have so long and so happily subsisted between your Highness and the English East India Company. This being the object of Mr. Jones' Mission, I feel satisfied that your Highness will honour him with that degree of Confidence and favour which may tend to render it of mutual Advantage to your Highness and the East India Company.

Circumstances require the strictest union and Concert between them.

I cannot disguise to your Highness that the present Circumstances of the World appear to require that the strictest union, concert and unreserved Friendship and Alliance should be forthwith established between your Highness and the East India Company for your respective safety, Happiness and Preservation. Everything that is dear to your Highness and to them is threatend and coveted by that Enemy to the Peace, Tranquillity, and Existence of all States and Princes, the Republican Government of France. This restless and detestable Power, after exciting the People in all the States immediately surrounding them to revolt against their lawful Princes and Governors, and having in too many Instances succeeded in driving these last into Exile, sometimes even in putting them to death, and in all in robbing them of their Wealth, Treasures, and Possessions, is now said to have its favorite General, and an army most notorious for these horrid proceedings, to execute the same system of devastation and Plunder in the rich and happy Provinces of the East. It is against these Plunderers and subverters of all Governments that the King my Master has now been obliged to defend himself for six Years, during which, by the Vigor of his Army and the Blessing of God, he has resisted their Plans of destruction in every part of his vast Dominions. Should these Enemies of

all Princes bend their steps of Desolation towards the Territories now so happily placed (under) your Highness' Government, it is only by acting against them with the same determined spirit manifested by the King my Master and in Concert (with) the East India Company that your Highness can expect to (preserve) the Power and Wealth you now enjoy, for whatever false promises they might hold out to the Country, they would certainly avail themselves of the first opportunity to dispossess you of both to excite your People to Rebellion, and to deprive your Highness of Liberty, and perhaps of Life, in the same Manner as they did their own unfortunate and virtuous King whom they deposed, imprisoned, and murdered before they declared War against the King my Master with a view of the same horrid Purposes. Fresh attrocities.

That God may ever preserve your Highness from these or any Misfortunes, and enable you with Health and increasing Happiness to fill your present high Situation, is the Wish of the King my Master and, with this sentiment, I bid your Highness Farewell.

Your Highness's faithful and affectionate Friend,

HENRY DUNDAS.

London,
fourth of July, 1798.

Letter from the Hon'ble the Chairman to the Pashaw of Bagdad.

Copy of a letter from the Hon'ble Jacob Bosanquet, Esq., Chairman of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Hon'ble United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, to His Highness Soliman Pashaw of Bagdad and Bussora, etc., etc., etc,

After Compliments.

In these times of particular Felicity be it known to your Highness that the Hon'ble the English East India Company, regarding with the greatest satisfaction the long and uninterrupted Friendship and good understanding which has so long subsisted between them and your Highness, have resolved, in the hope of its being satisfactory to you, and for the purpose of cementing and increasing an Amity so desireable, to appoint one of their Servants to reside at your Highness's Court in the renowned and ancient City of Bagdad, and, believing that the Appointment of Mr. Harford Jones, who has the honor of being known to your Highness, would be the most agreeable selection that we could make amongst our Servants for this honorable Mission, We have, with the approbation of His Majesty's Ministers, appointed Mr. Jones to reside at Bagdad, and have given him the most positive and particular Instructions to omit no opportunity during his Residence at your Highness's Mr. Jones's Appointment.

Court, by such attention to your Highness's Wishes as may be in his power, of carrying into effect the intention of this honourable and friendly Mission.

Diabolicalness of the present French Government.

We presume Your Highness, to be sufficiently and accurately informed of the Overthrow of the Ancient and monarchial Government of France, and the desolation and Destruction which the French by their Intrigues and their Armies have spread over many parts of Europe by exciting in the lower order of people a Spirit of discontent and Rebellion towards their ancient Governors and Governments, and by trampling, with the assistance of those become Converts to their principles, on all Systems moral and divine, substituting in the place of order, anarchy, in the place of Justice, Cruelty and oppression, and in the place of Religion, Licentiousness and Atheism.

Necessity to the Pashaw to be on his guard against the schemes of it.

It cannot escape a person of your Highness's Penetration and Judgment that all regular Governments are equally interested to prevent the Extension of Principles which strike at their very essence and Basis: but, as these Principles in the persons at present in power in France are connected with an unbounded Ambition and an insatiable Thirst for Plunder, which may induce them to undertake enterprizes the most distant and extraordinary, which will commence under the Specious Mask of Friendship and Protection and conclude, as has been experienced by all Countries which have suffered French Interference, (with the destruction) of everything valuable and sacred.

Offer of friendly Assistance in case of Need.

We therefore esteem it an act of Friendship to assure your Highness that, if they should be attempted to be put in Practice in the Countries under your Government or Influence, we will, whenever you desire us to do so, afford you any assistance in our Power towards Suppressing them; and we shall give the necessary directions to our Governments in India for that Purpose, as well as for their Communicating frequently with your Highness and paying the strictest attention to all your Requests. We doubt not, however, that your Highness's Vigilance and Exertions on such an occasion would render any such Assistance from us unnecessary.

Confidence placed in Mr. Jones.

We have directed Mr. Jones to acquaint your Highness of the present state of the Polities of Europe, and, as we have the greatest Confidence in his Zeal for our Service, We entreat your Highness to regard whatever he may say to you, by our order, as authentic and to be depended on.

We very Sincerely and heartily wish your Highness every sort of happiness, and that your Glory and Grandeur may daily increase.

JACOB BOSANQUET,

Chairman.

GIVEN under the GREAT SEAL of the EAST INDIA COMPANY in the CITY of LONDON on the sixth day of July in the year 1798.