



HUMĀYŪN ON THE THRONE

HUMĀYŪN BĀDŠĀH

BY

S. K. BANERJI, M.A., PH.D. (LOND.)

READER IN INDIAN HISTORY, LUCKNOW UNIVERSITY

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

SIR E. DENISON ROSS

FORMERLY DIRECTOR, SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL
STUDIES, LONDON

HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1938

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

AMEN HOUSE, LONDON, E.C. 4
EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK
TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPETOWN
BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS

HUMPHREY MILFORD

PUBLISHER TO THE
UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

It was with great pleasure that I accepted Dr S. K. Banerji's invitation to write a few words by way of introduction to his Life of the Emperor Humāyūn, seeing that it was under my supervision, at the School of Oriental Studies, London, that he prepared his P.H.D. thesis on the early years of Humāyūn's reign. During the two years that he spent here I had ample opportunity of seeing his work and formed a high opinion of his capacity and enthusiasm.

Since his return to India he has become Reader in Indian History at the Lucknow University, and he has devoted such leisure as his duties permitted him to the expansion of his thesis and a continuation of the life of Humāyūn, with a view to producing a full and definite history of that gifted but unfortunate monarch. The present volume brings the story down to the defeat of Humāyūn at the hands of Shēr Shāh in 1540 and his consequent abandonment of his Empire: the rest of the story will be told in a second volume which is under preparation.

The fact that Dr Banerji will now have at his disposal two important works—Dr Commisariat's *History of Gujerat* and Vol. IV of the *Cambridge History of India*—goes to prove how great is the activity of scholars in this particular field at the present time.

The materials for the history of Humāyūn are very rich comprising as they do not merely special biographies and special Mughal histories like the *Akbar-nāma* but also the local histories of kingdoms with which Humāyūn was in contact or conflict. Dr Banerji has, I believe, consulted every available authority in Persian, Arabic and Hindi and has of course made full use of English writers on Indian History. The task he seems to have set himself

is to supply not merely the facts but also a kind of running commentary on all the main events of Humāyūn's life. He delights in weighing in the balance the evidence of conflicting authorities and in setting out in tabular form the possible reasons for or against whatever action or inaction Humāyūn is responsible for. At the end of several chapters he moreover supplies a useful chronological summary of the events therein dealt with.

Especially full are Dr Banerji's chapters on Humāyūn's dealings with Sultān Bahādūr of Gujrāt, and here he has had at his disposal a number of texts which were not known (or available) to Erskine or Bayley when they wrote on this subject. The details of the great battles of Chausa (1539) and Qanauj (1540) are well put together and are accompanied by carefully prepared sketch plans illustrating the progress of the fights.

I have not yet had the opportunity of seeing more than the proofs of this volume, but I feel sure that the bibliography will be found complete and if, when the book is finished, the index is up to the standard of the text, students will have a really comprehensive work of reference for this important period.

In conclusion I wish to congratulate Dr Banerji on what he has already achieved and to say how much I look forward to the appearance of this volume.

E. DENISON ROSS

LONDON

28 December 1937

PREFACE

This book on Humāyūn Bādshāh has grown out of the thesis approved by London University in 1925 for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I have utilized these thirteen years to recast the entire thing. The original six chapters have been expanded into twenty; faulty or untenable reasoning has been omitted; useless details have been excised; and the conclusions re-sifted.

This volume deals, primarily, with three great men of the period: Humāyūn the Mughal, Shēr Shāh the Afghān, and Bahādur the Gujrātī. Besides dealing with their political achievements, I have attempted to assess their contributions to Culture and Administration. Humāyūn's noble mission in founding Dīn-panāh, Shēr Shāh's lofty ideals of government, and Bahādur's solicitude for the well-being of the Gujrātīs, provide a set-off to the narrative of their political exploits or their selfish schemes against one another. I have also indicated the political relationship of a Muslim king to his Muslim or non-Muslim neighbours.

New light has been thrown on several controversial questions: the succession question after Bābur's death; Humāyūn's relation with his rival, Mahdi *Ḳhwāja*, and the *Ḳhaṭībā*, Bābur's minister; Kāmran's occupation of the Punjāb and his relations with Humāyūn; the strategic importance of Humāyūn's march to Gwālior, to Sārang-pūr, to Ujjain, and to Mandasōr; Shēr Ḳhān's behaviour on the battlefield at Dadrah; Humāyūn's continued neglect of Shēr Ḳhān till July, 1537; Humāyūn's march against Shēr Ḳhān to help Mahmūd of Bengal; and Shēr Ḳhān's occupation of Rohtāsgarh, and his behaviour towards the Rājā. Without laying claim to finality of views, I may state that my conclusions represent careful evaluation of the data available.

I would like to mention the two special features of this book: (1) the brief description of important towns like Chunār, Kālinjar, Gaur, Jaunpūr, etc., and (2) at the end of most chapters, a list of principal events with their dates.

I have sacrificed manner to matter and have avoided prolixity of language as best I could. I have attempted to spell correctly and mark diacritically every proper name or unfamiliar word. Where there is more than one spelling prevalent, I have selected either Mrs A. Beveridge's spelling in the *Bābur-nāma*, or that adopted in the *Cambridge History of India*, Vols. III and IV. In words like Shāh Jahān, Jahāngīr, Jalāluddīn, I have adopted the Indian pronunciation and rejected the spellings Jehān or Jelāl, prevalent in Irān and hence considered more correct.

I have always maintained that the study of the Mughals is not merely of academic interest: it is intensely practical, and, I may add, purposeful. Mughal Culture and Civilization filtered through India's mediæval society; Mughal art and architecture enriched India's artistic heritage; and Mughal ideas and ideals of government influenced the development of Indian polity. Thus our present, which has its roots buried in its past, bears an unmistakable Mughal impress; and it is the duty of the historian properly to assess the Mughal contribution to the evolution of our national life. In the next volume, I hope to finish the political history of the rest of Humāyūn's reign, and to take up topics like Humāyūn's religion, Mughal painting and literature, Mughal art and architecture, and the Mughal system of administration.

I am deeply indebted to Sir E. Denison Ross, formerly Director of the School of Oriental Studies, London, for making me share in his love for the Mughals, for initiating me into the methods of research, for his affectionate guidance of my work in London, and for helpful discussions on the various problems that arose in the course of study. I cannot adequately express my

gratitude to him for contributing an Introduction to this book. It is a melancholy fact that the book could not be published in the lifetime of Sir W. Haig at whose suggestion it was thoroughly revised and to whom I was indebted for several valuable suggestions.

I owe the two pictures, which are photographs of those preserved in the Alwar State Library, to the patronage of Alwar Durbār. My grateful thanks are due to Major Prior, the Prime Minister, and to my esteemed friend, Mr Babu Prasad, the Customs and Excise Commissioner and Assistant Advisory Minister of the State.

I am indebted to the editors of the journals who published several chapters of my book and permitted me to incorporate them in the present work: *Indian Culture*, Calcutta, *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Calcutta, *The Journal of Indian History*, Madras and *The U. P. Historical Society Journal*, Allahabad.

I must here mention the help I obtained from Mr N. Bose and my pupil, Mr K. Mathur, B.A. (Hons.), M.A., ex-Fellow of Lucknow University, in revising the manuscript. Both of them went patiently through the self-imposed task and many improvements in expression and in the treatment of the subject are due to them. Mr Mathur also read the proofs. My thanks are also due to Dr Radha Kumud Mukherji, M.A., PH.D., P.R.S., Professor of Indian History, University of Lucknow, for his helpful suggestions. I should also like to record the enormous patience shown by the Modern Art Press in dealing with my numerous corrected proofs. But for the manager's interest in its printing, my book would not have been published so early. Lastly, I should like to thank the Oxford University Press for agreeing to be the publishers of my book.

S. K. BANERJI

The University
LUCKNOW
January 1938

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
<p>I HUMĀYŪN, THE PRINCE (1508-30 A. D.) ...</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">The birth of the prince, its significance—his mother, Māham Bēgam—the prince's education—study of languages—administrative and military training—the battle of Pānipat—a campaign against the eastern Afghāns—the battle of K̄hānwah—governor of Badaḳhshān—sudden return to Āgrā—stay in Sambhal—the prince's illness—Bābur's illness and death.</p>	I
<p>II HUMĀYŪN'S SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE (December, 1530 A. D.)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Humāyūn nominated as successor by Bābur—the <i>K̄halifā's</i> dislike for him—choice of Mahdi K̄hwāja for the throne—Mahdi K̄hwāja's personage and career—his arrogance and evil intentions—the <i>K̄halifā's</i> rejection of him—Mrs Beveridge's substitution of Md. Zamān M. for Mahdi K̄hwāja—her reasons—our difficulties in accepting her arguments—later history of the <i>K̄halifā</i> and Mahdi K̄hwāja.</p>	17
<p>III THE OPENING YEAR OF HUMĀYŪN'S REIGN— EXPEDITION TO KĀLINJAR (1530-31 A. D.) ...</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Humāyūn's accession to the throne—rewards and festivities—the boundaries and the state of the Mughal kingdom—the problems for the Mughals and their solutions—Humāyūn's campaign against Kālinjar—its geography and past history—end of Humāyūn's campaign—terms of treaty with the Rājā.</p>	28
<p>IV HUMĀYŪN'S FIRST EXPEDITION AGAINST THE AFGHĀNS (1532-33 A. D.)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Sultān Mahmūd Lōdī's attempts to fight against the Mughals—the Afghāns in South Bihār—their rebellion against Ibrāhīm Lōdī under Daryā K̄hān Nūhānī and under his son, Sultān Muhammad Shāh—the Sultān's death and accession of his minor son, Jalāluddīn—Shēr K̄hān, minister and tutor—the jealousy between Shēr K̄hān and the Nūhānīs—the Nūhānī desertion to the ruler of Bengal—advent of</p>	37

Sultān Mahmūd Lōdī to S. Bihār—the battle of Dadrah—Shēr Ḳhān's part in the battle—Humāyūn at Chunār—Shēr Ḳhān's wealth and power—the treaty of Chunār between Humāyūn and Shēr Ḳhān—Humāyūn's return to Āgrā.

V HUMAYŪN'S EARLY RELATIONS WITH KĀMRĀN
(1514-33 A. D.) 51

Kāmrān, governor of Kābul and Qandahār—Bābur's policy of treating him as almost Humāyūn's equal—At Humāyūn's accession, Kāmrān not granted any additional territory—the prince's attack on Lahore and its occupation—Erskine's mistaken views of Kāmrān's relations with Humāyūn—Kāmrān's coins do not support Erskine's views—Humāyūn did not resent Kāmrān's attack on Lahore—retention of Lahore and Multān by Kāmrān—complimentary verses exchanged.

VI THE FOUNDATION OF DĪN-PANĀH, July, 1533—
April, 1534 A. D.—THE STATE FESTIVITIES 58

The festivities at Āgrā—their effect on Bahādur—Māham Bēgam's illness and death—her character and work—the foundation of Dīn-panāh—Humāyūn's object in founding the city—the ruins of Dīn-panāh as seen to-day—*Masjid-i-Qila-i-kohna* and *Shēr Mandal*—the 'mystic' feast—Hindāl's marriage and feast—Bēga Bēgam's protest against Humāyūn's neglect of his wives.

VII MUHAMMAD ZAMĀN MIRZĀ'S REBELLION—
SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE AFGHĀNS,
1534 A. D. 68

Muhammad Zamān M. and Muhammad Sultān M.—their previous history—rebellion and capture—prosperity of the Afghāns under Shēr Ḳhān—his policy towards his countrymen—his relations with the ruler of Bengal and Maḵdum-i-Ālam, the governor of Hājīpūr—his campaigns against Bengal—Humāyūn's march against the Afghāns followed by a hasty return.

VIII BAHĀDUR SHĀH OF GUJRĀT (1526-37 A. D.) 74

Gujrāt—its geography, products, industries, and past history—its rulers—Bahādur's career as prince—in Sultān Ibrāhīm's camp—invited to be king of

CHAPTER	PAGE
Jaunpūr and of Gujrāt—his choice of the latter—Bahādur's achievements—success against the neighbouring Muslim kings, the Portuguese, and the Rājputs of Chitōr—the first siege of Chitōr followed by a treaty—the capture of Ajmēr and Nagore—the second siege of Chitōr and its capture by the Gujrāt king.	
IX SULTĀN BAHĀDUR SHĀH OF GUJRĀT AND THE PRINCELY REFUGEES FROM THE MUGHAL KINGDOM (1534 A. D.)	90
The Afghān refugees in Bahādur's court—Ālam Ḳhān Jīghat and Ālam Ḳhān Alāuddīn Lōdī—Ālam Khān Alāuddīn's pretensions to the Delhi throne—the Mughal refugees—Md. Zamān M.—the rivalry between the Afghān and the Mughal refugees—the Afghān attacks on the Mughal kingdom—the battle of Mandrāel and death of Tātār Ḳhān—Bahādur and Md. Zamān M.	
X THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HUMĀYŪN BĀDShĀH AND SULTĀN BAHĀDUR SHĀH OF GUJRĀT (1534-35 A. D.)	99
Humāyūn's first letter requesting Bahādur not to harbour fugitives from Delhi—Bahādur's first reply assuring Humāyūn of the fulfilment of his request—Humāyūn's second letter protesting against Md. Zamān's reception by Bahādur and warning him of serious consequences—Bahādur's second conciliatory reply—Humāyūn's third letter and Bahādur's reply—Humāyūn's fourth letter—the general question of sheltering refugees by a neighbouring king and his reference to events in Tīmūr's time—Bahādur's fourth letter written in a boastful strain—other stray verses used in the correspondence—Mediæval Muslim Diplomacy and the Muslim States' attitude towards the Hindu States—the political refugees.	
XI HUMĀYŪN'S MARCH TO UJJAIN—THE CAPTURE OF CHITŌR BY BAHĀDUR SHĀH, March, 1535 A. D.—THE BATTLE OF MANDASŌR, April, 1535 A. D.	118
Humāyūn's march to Sārangpūr and Ujjain—Bahādur's gunner, Rūmī Ḳhān—Humāyūn proceeded to Mandasōr—the Mughals besieged the Sultān—Bahādur's flight to Mandū.	

CHAPTER	PAGE
XII THE FLIGHT OF BAHĀDUR SHAH—THE FALL OF MANDŪ, CAMBAY, and CHAMPĀNIR (1535 A. D) ...	130

The proposed settlement between Humāyūn and Bahādur—sudden attack of the Mughals on Mandū and Bahādur's flight—the sack of Mandū and its consequences—Bahādur's flight continued to Chāmpānir, Cambay, and Dū—Bahādur and the Portuguese—Humāyūn's capture of Chāmpānir—completion of the Mughal conquest of Central Gujrāt.

XIII HUMAYŪN AT CHĀMPĀNIR—THE FALL OF AHMADĀBĀD—THE MUGHAL ADMINISTRATION OF GUJRĀT (1535 A. D.)	146
--	-----

Humāyūn obtained possession of large wealth—its distribution among his followers and its consequences—a mad scheme of conquest of the South and Humāyūn's severe punishment of the ring-leaders—Humāyūn remitted land-revenue—its consequences—Imād-ul-Mulk's rebellion and defeat—the distribution of *jāgir* among the Mughal officers—Askari was appointed Viceroy—Humāyūn's stay in Mālwa.

XIV THE RECOVERY OF GUJRĀT BY SULTĀN BAHĀDUR SHĀH, AND RETREAT OF HUMAYŪN FROM MĀLWA (1535-36 A. D.)	158
--	-----

Dissipation among the Mughal officers—revolt of the Gujrātīs—the Mughal loss of Navasārī, Surat, Broach, Cambay and Pātan—Askari at Ahmadābād—flight of his foster-brother to Bahādur—the Sultān's attack on Ahmadābād—Askari's retreat first to Chāmpānir, and then to Āgrā—Humāyūn's evacuation of Mālwa—the defects in Humāyūn as administrator—the Rājput recovery of Chitōr.

XV THE DISAFFECTION OF THE MIRZĀS (1536-40 A. D.)	169
--	-----

Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's flight to Sindh and Lahore—his return to Gujrāt—his aspiration to succeed Bahādur—the opposition of the Gujrātīs—Muhammad Zamān's second flight to Sindh—reconciliation with Humāyūn—Muhammad Sultān M.—genealogy—rebellion in Humāyūn's absence—Hindāl's victories—Muhammad Sultān's flight to Bihār-kunda.

XVI SHER SHĀH'S EARLY CAREER (1472-1536 A. D.) ... 179

Farīd's early days—study at Jaunpūr—eminence of Jaunpūr—Farīd's administration in his *jāgīr*—his principles of administration—an estimate of his work—Farīd in Sultān Ibrāhīm's court at Āgrā—as *mansabdār*—quarrel with his brother and neighbour, Muhammad Ḳhān Sūr—Farīd with Sultān Muhammad Shāh—his services to his master—Muhammad Ḳhān Sūr's attempt to deprive him of his *jāgīr*—Shēr Ḳhān's success with the help of the Mughal soldiers—Shēr Ḳhān befriends Muhammad Ḳhān—Shēr Ḳhān in Bābur's court—again in Sultān Muhammad's service—his ministry under Sultān Muhammad and his son, Jalāluddīn—the Nūhānī desertion to Bengal—Sultān Mahmūd Lōdī's arrival, defeat, and retirement,—Shēr Ḳhān's victories against Bengal—the battle of Surajgarh.

XVII HUMĀYŪN'S INVASION AND CONQUEST OF BENGAL (July, 1537—August, 1538 A. D.) ... 195

Humāyūn's stay in Āgrā—reasons—Mahmūd Shāh, king of Bengal—his defeats at Shēr Ḳhān's hand—asked the Portuguese for help—Shēr Ḳhān forestalled it by an immediate attack—Humāyūn, in his turn, attacked the Afghāns—reasons for his stay at Chunār instead of a rapid march to Bengal—the fall of Chunār—Shēr Ḳhān's capture of Gaur and removal of wealth to Rohtāsgarh—Humāyūn's settlement with Shēr Ḳhān—not carried out by either party—Humāyūn's meeting with Sultān Mahmūd of Bengal—march to Bengal—Jalāl Ḳhān Sūr's opposition at Tehagarhi—Humāyūn reached Gaur.

XVIII HUMĀYŪN AT GAUR, AND HIS RETREAT TO CHAUSA (August, 1538—April, 1539 A. D.) ... 211

Humāyūn's first reforms and later neglect of administration—his prolonged stay in Gaur, renamed Jannatābād—his perilous situation—Hindāl's indiscretion at Āgrā—murder of *Shaiḳh* Buhlūl—Shēr Ḳhān's capture of Tirhoot, Benares, Kara, Bahraich, Qanauj, and Sambhal,—Humāyūn's retreat from Gaur in three divisions—Askari and Muwaiid Bēg act as his advisers—Humāyūn's march to Chausa—further attempt at settlement—frustrated by a sudden attack on the Mughal camp.

CHAPTER

XIX THE BATTLES OF CHAUSA, June 26, 1539 A. D.,
AND OF QANAUJ, May 17, 1540 A. D.

The description of the first battle—Shēr K̄hān surprised and surrounded the Mughal camp—the battle ended in a Mughal rout—Shēr K̄hān went to Gaur and assumed sovereignty—Humāyūn reached Āgrā—made preparations for a second battle—Kāmran's hostility and departure to Lahore—Humāyūn proceeded to Qanauj—the two armies faced each other for several weeks—the movements leading to the actual battle—its description—the causes of the Mughal defeat and criticism of Haidar Mirzā's statements in the *Tārīkh-i-Rashidi*.

XX THE KING'S FLIGHT TO ĀGRĀ AND TO THE
PUNJĀB—REASONS FOR HIS FAILURE AS
KING

TABLE OF HIJRA AND CHRISTIAN YEARS	.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
INDEX

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS, DIAGRAMS AND SKETCHES

Humāyūn on the throne	<i>Frontispiece</i>
The genealogy of Sulaimān Mirzā	12
The genealogy of Isān Tīmūr Sultān and Tūkhṭā Būghā Sultān	14
Bābur, Humāyūn and Mirzā Hushiyāi	<i>facing page 17</i>
The comparative distance of Bahādur's and Humāyūn's camps from Ahmadābād, position 1	119
The same, position 2	123
The movements of the Mughal army near Ahmadābād	154
The distribution of <i>jāgīr</i> in Gujrāt among the Mughal officers	155
The genealogy of Muhammad Sultān Mirzā and his sons	175
The Mughal and the Afghān camps at Chausa	228
The Afghāns attack on the Mughals at Chausa	229
The battle of Qanauj, position 1	244
The battle of Qanauj, position 2	245
The battle of Qanauj, position 3	246

ABBREVIATIONS

- A. A.—Abul Fazl: *Āin-i-Akbarī*, 3 Vols., edited by H. Blochmann and H. S. Jarrett. Bibliotheca Indica Series.
- ABBĀS—Abbās K̄hān Sarwānī: *Tuhfa-i-Akbar Shāhī* or *Tārīkh-i-Shēr Shāhī*. MS. Copy, Or. 164 of the British Museum or the Copy of the Allahabad University.
- A. H. G.—Abdullāh Muhammad bin Omar: *The Arabic History of Gujrāt*, edited by Sir E. Denison Ross, J. Murray, London, 1910.
- A. N.—Abul Fazl: *Akbar-nāma*, text and English translation, edited by H. Beveridge. Bib. Ind. Series. Persian MS. Copy, Add. 27247 of the Br. Museum.
- A. T. W. H. G.—Mīr Abū Turāb Walī: *The History of Gujrāt*, edited by Sir E. Denison Ross. Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1909.
- BADĀŪNĪ—Abdul Qādir Badāūnī: *Muntaḥhab-ut-Tawārīkh*, text and translation of the Bib. Ind. Series. Persian text also published by Newal Kishore Press. MS. Copy, Add. 6581 of the Br. Mus.
- BARNES—Ernest Barnes: An article on 'Dhāra and Mandū' in the J. R. A. S. B. B., 1903, Vol. XXI.
- BIB. IND.—The Bibliotheca Indica.
- B. L. H. P.—Browne: *The Literary History of Persia*, 4 Vols. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1908.
- BR. MUS.—The British Museum Library, London.
- B. M. A.—Baḫtāwar K̄hān: *Murāt-ul-Ālām*. MS. Copy 23530 of the Br. Mus.
- B. N.—*The Bābur-nāma*, English translation by Mrs Beveridge. Luzac, 1922.
- CAMPOS—Campos: *The History of the Portuguese in Bengal*. Butterworth, 1919 A. D.
- C. H. I.—*The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, edited by Sir W. Haig. The University Press, Cambridge, 1928.
- COMMISSARIAT—Commissariat: The articles on 'A Brief History of the Gujrāt Sultānate' in the J. R. A. S. B. B., 1918-19 A. D.
- DANVERS—Danvers: *The Portuguese in India*, 2 Vols. Allen & Co., 1894.
- DORN—Dorn: *The History of the Afghāns*, English translation of Nimatullāh's *Maḫzān-i-Afāghina*. J. Murray, 1829.

- E. H. I.—Erskine: *The History of India*, (Bābur and Humāyūn) 2 Vols. Longmans, 1854 A. D.
- ELLIOT—Elliot and Dowson: *The History of India as told by its own Historians*, 8 Vols. Trubner & Co., 1872.
- FARISHTA—Mulla Muhammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh: *Tārīkh-i-Farishta*, MS. Copy, Add. 6569 of the Br. Mus., another in possession of the author. Printed edition of Newal Kishore Press.
- F. D. P. P.—Fenshawe: *Delhi, Past and Present*. J. Murray, 1902.
- GARCIA—'Garcia d'Orta of Bombay,' an article in J. R. A. S. B. B., 1922-23 A. D.
- G. H. N.—Gulbadan Bēgam: *Humāyūn-nāma*, edited by Mrs Beveridge, Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, 1902.
- H. H.—Lachmī Narain Shafiq Aurangābādī: *Haqīqathāw-Hindustān*, MS. Copy 93 of Bankipūr Oriental Library.
- H. R. T. B.—*Haft-Risāla-i-Taqwīm-i-Buldān*. MS. Copy, 43 of the Imperial Library, Buhār Section, Calcutta.
- IBN BATUTA—H. A. R. Gibb: *Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa*. G. Routledge, 1929.
- JAUHAR—Jauhar: *Tazkwat-ul-Wāqīāt*, MS. Copy 16711 of the Br. Mus. Translation by Stewart, Bangabasi Press, 1904.
- J. R. A. S. B. B.—*The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Bombay Branch.
- J. B. O. R. S.—*The Journal of the Bihār and Orissa Research Society*.
- KENNEDY—Kennedy: An article on 'Hidāya' in the *J. R. A. S.*, 1835.
- ḲHWĀNDAMĪR—Ḳhwāndamīr: *Humāyūn-nāma*, MS. Copy Or. 1762 of the Br. Mus. and extracts of the translation in Elliot and Dowson, Vol. V, pp. 116-26.
- ḲH. T.—Sujan Rai: *Ḳhulāsāt-ut-Tawārīkh*, MS. Copy 5559 of the Br. Mus.
- M. A. S. M. I.—Moreland: *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*. W. Heffer, Cambridge, 1929.
- M. R.—Mullā Abdul Bāqī Nahāvandī: *Maāsir-i-Rahimī*. Bib. Ind. Series, 1924.
- M. S.—Sikandar Ḳhān bin Ahmad: *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, several MS. Copies, (1) Add. 27253 of the Br. Mus., (2) of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, (3) of Alwar State Library.
- M. U.—Shāh Nawāz Ḳhān: *Maāsir-ul-Umarā*, 3 Vols. Bib. Ind. Series, 1891.
- QANUNGO—Qanungo: *Shēr Shāh*. M. C. Sarkar & Co., 1921.
- RĀS MĀLĀ—Forbes: *Rās Mālā*, 2 Vols., edited by H. G. Rawlinson. Oxford University Press, 1924.

- R. S.—Ghulām Husain Salīm: *Riyāz-us-Salātin*. Bib. Ind. Series, 1890.
- R. T.—Tāhir Muhammad: *Rauzat-ut-Tāhīrīn*, MS. Copy Or. 168 of the Br. Mus.
- SARAN—P Saran: An article on 'The Date and Place of Shēr Shāh's Birth' in J. B. O. R. S., Vol. XX, Part I, 1934.
- T. A.—Nizāmuddīn Ahmad: *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, MS. Copy Add. 6543 of the Br. Mus. Printed edition of Newal Kishore Press.
- T. N.—Minhāj-i-Sirāj: *Tabaqāt-i-Nāsirī*, Persian text or the English translation. Bib. Ind. Series.
- T. A.—Mullā Muhammad Ahmad and Jāfar Bēg Āsaf K̄hān: *Tārīkh-i-Alfi*, MS. Copy Or. 465 of the Br. Mus.
- TĀRĪKH-I-DĀŪDĪ—Abdullāh: *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, MS. Copy Or 197 of the Br. Mus.
- TIEFFENTHALER—Father Tieffenthaler: *Description de l'Inde*, printed copy (of 1786 A. D.) in the Imperial Library, Calcutta.
- U. R. I.—Gauri Shankar Ōjhā: *Udaipūr Rājya ka Itihās*, 2 Vols., (in Hindī). Vaidic Press, Ajmer, 1928

CHAPTER I

HUMAYŪN, THE PRINCE—1508-30 A. D.

Before the birth of his son, Bābur's career had been a chequered one. He succeeded his father, Umar Shaiḫ Mirzā, as the ruler of Farghāna in 1494 A.D., but immediately after got involved in a desperate struggle with his two uncles. Providence seems to have averted Bābur's danger by the spread of an epidemic in the enemy's camp and by the removal of his two uncles by death. Two years later, he became the ruler of the far-famed Samarqand, only to lose it immediately after. Once more fortune smiled on him and in 1500 A.D., he became the chief of Samarqand. A much more powerful enemy appeared now. Shaibānī K̄hān, the head of the Uzbegs, defeated Bābur at the battle of Sar-i-pul, and drove him out of Samarqand (1501-2 A.D.). Three years later (October, 1504 A.D.), Bābur obtained possession of Kābul and Ghaznī. At Kābul, on March 6, 1508 A.D., his eldest son Nasīruddin Muhammad Humāyūn *Mirzā* was born.¹ The birth of the son was of some significance to the father. The Tīmūrids were scattered over the whole of Central Asia, and were, one by one, succumbing to the Uzbek onslaughts or to domestic foes. The last to fall were Sultān Husain Bāi-qarā (1506 A.D.) and his sons (1507 A.D.) and, at the beginning of 1508 A.D., Bābur was the only Tīmūrid who could pride himself on being a chieftain of a considerable area. His rule had been popular and he had asserted himself against Muqīm Arghūn and his minister Bāqī Chaghānīānī. Now, in March, 1508 A.D., the birth of a son established his position considerably. He was not to be looked upon as a mere adventurer who conquered, established peace and

¹ 4th *Zul-qada*, 913 A. H.

order for a while, and then sank into oblivion. The birth of a son ensured the continuity of his line and the principles of his government. The occasion was marked by rejoicings amidst which he assumed the higher title of *Pādshāh* in preference to that of the *Mirzā* so long used by him. Bābur himself describes the assumption of sovereignty thus: "All the bēgs, small and great, brought gifts; such a mass of white *tankas* was heaped up as had never been seen before." The chronograms¹ 'Shāh-i-firūz qadr,' (Shāh of the victorious opulence), and 'Pādshāh-i-saf-shikan,' (rank-breaking king) indicate the significance of the birth of a son to Bābur.

Mrs. Beveridge misses the connexion between the birth of Humāyūn and his father's assumption of the title of *Pādshāh*.² When she says, "The order of events forbids,"³ it is not clear to us how she could maintain this position and reject the following explicit statement of Gulbadan Bēgam, Humāyūn's sister and talented author of the contemporary work, the *Humāyūn-nāma*: 'That same year His Majesty was pleased to order the Āmīrs and the rest of the world to style him Emperor (*Pādshāh*). For before the birth of Emperor Humāyūn, he had been named and styled Mirzā Bābur...In the year of His Majesty Humāyūn's birth he styled himself *pādshāh*.'⁴

Humāyūn's mother was Māham Bēgam. Bābur married her in Herāt (1506 A. D.) when he went on a visit to Sultān Husain Bāi-qarā. She was a relation of the Sultān and was descended from Ahmad of Turbat-i-Jām, a distinguished saint of Ḳhurāsān. These two facts indicate that she was a *Shīa*.⁵ The difference of sect did not

¹ Other chronograms were (i) *Sultān Humāyūn Ḳhān*, (ii) *Ḳhush bād*. *Ḳhush bāsh* as given by some, would be wide of the mark by nearly 3 centuries. *پادشاه صف شکن* gives only 853. Beveridge proposes to add *in* (he) to make it 913.

² See *B. N.*, p. 344.

³ *Ibid.* no. 2.

⁴ p. 90.

⁵ Sultān Husain was an ardent follower of *Shīism*. See Brown's *Literary History of Persia*, Vol. IV, p. 63.

mar the cordial relations of the husband and the wife ; for according to Mrs. Beveridge,¹ she was to Bābur what Ayisha was to Mahammad. We shall consider Mrs. Beveridge's surmises of the ignoble birth of Māham in the following chapter.

We are not given the details of the commencement of the prince's study but we know that a Muslim child begins its studies at the age of 4 lunar years, 4 months and 4 days.² A scholarly family like that of Bābur, would be expected to follow the usual custom. Humāyūn was Bābur's favourite child. Gulbadan Bēgam quotes Bābur's words, ' Māham ! although I have other sons, I love none as I love Humāyūn.'³ Bābur, then, must have paid due attention to his son's education. In the *Bābur-nāma* we get glimpses of his interest in his son's studies, for example, when in January, 1526 A. D., before the battle of Pānipat, he captured Milwat,⁴ he presented some of the books of Ghāzī Kḥān Lodi's library to Humāyūn. Again, in his letter to his son,⁵ he criticises the word Al-amān as applied by Humāyūn to his newly-born son, then his last letter, its style and spelling, and finally advises him to give up ornamentations which obscure the real meaning. As he says,⁶ ' In future write without elaboration, use plain clear words. So will the trouble to thy readers be less ' ! He sent on other occasions⁷ some of his own compositions to the prince.

Humāyūn is supposed to have picked up four different languages—Turkī, Arabic, Persian and Hindī. Turkī was his mother-tongue and spoken by most of his relations, male and female, who all had recently migrated from Turkistān. The study of Arabic was compulsory for every

¹ G. H. N., p. 256.

² See Law's *Promoticon of Learning in India*, Vol. I, p. 128 and Herklot's *Islām in India*, (Oxford University Press edition), Ch. IV.

³ G. H. N., fol. 17-a.

⁴ In the Jhelam District. Jarrett calls it Malot, see Vol. II, p. 325.

⁵ B. N., pp. 624-8, written in November, 1528 A. D.

⁶ B. N., p. 627.

⁷ e.g., January, 1528 A. D.

Muslim; in fact, the initiation into studies was made through the Arabic Qurān.¹ Every child had to learn it by rote and recite its verses in religious assemblies. In Persian, a *diwān* of his has come down to us containing a large number of *ghazals* and *rubāīs* of his composition.² In several of the Persian works—the *Akbar-nāma*,³ Turāb Wali's *Tārīkh-i-Gujrāt*,⁴ Farishta's general history⁵ and others,—may be found stray verses of the prince. He had also a taste for mathematics, philosophy, astronomy and astrology.⁶

But studies did not form the sole occupation of the prince. When Bābur undertook a campaign against the Lodīs of India, Humāyūn was expected to take his full share in it. On the battlefield of Pānipat, fought on April 20, 1526 A. D.,⁷ he commanded the right inner wing of the army and with him were other tried warriors like Ḳhwāja Kalān and Hindū Bēg. How the battle was won by noon by Bābur's artillery and tactics may be read elsewhere. We shall be content to remark that Humāyūn played a responsible part in the battle.

After the battle, the prince was sent to take possession of the city of Āgrā, one of the two capitals of the Lodī Empire. He reached there on May 4, and finding that the enemies—Malik Dād Karāni, Millī Sūrdūk and Firūz Ḳhān Mewāti—intended to resist him, he prepared to lay siege to the city until Bābur arrived. Although the town and its treasury were at his disposal, he stayed outside the town guarding the roads leading into it and preventing his men, who had grown somewhat slack in discipline since the battle of Pānipat, from plundering the inhabitants.

¹ See Herklot's *Islām in India* by Crooke, Chap. IV.

² One such may be seen in the Bankipore Library.

³ See pp. 127, 179, 271, 278, 362, 368.

⁴ Ross's edition, p. 7.

⁵ Newal Kishore Press edition, pp. 243-44.

⁶ The subject will be taken up more fully when dealing with his character and learning.

⁷ 8th *Rajab*, 932 A. H.

A day or two later, he obtained a victory over Bikra-mājīt of the Gwālior family, the Rājā dying on the battle-field. The vanquished offered him 'the famous diamond which 'Alāuddīn must have brought,' and which has now been identified with the *Kōh-i-nūr*. When the prince offered it to Bābur, the latter generously allowed him to retain it. Bābur gives the details of the diamond. He says that it was 8 *misqāls* in weight and was appraised as equal in value to two and a half days' food for the whole world. According to the Indian weight-measures of his time, which he himself gives,¹ the weight of the diamond comes to 3½ tolas. When Bābur arrived a few days later and the garrison surrendered, he at first proposed to inflict capital punishment on the chiefs of the garrison; but when others interceded for one of them, Malik Dād Karāni, Bābur in his characteristic generosity pardoned them all, restored their goods, and took them into favour. Another instance of his generosity may be mentioned here. Ibrāhīm's mother, who was also a captive, was granted a *pargana* worth seven lakhs of double *dāms* or 35,000 rupees a year.

After he had occupied the region commanded by Delhi and Agrā, he set about to reward his followers. Humāyūn as the eldest son got the highest reward, viz., 70 lakhs of *dāms*, an uncounted treasure-house, and the *jāgīr* of Sambhal in addition to Hisār Fīrūza already granted during Bābur's march through the Punjab to the battle-field of Pānipat. Since Farishta mentions the same amount to be equivalent to 3½ lakhs of rupees,² it is clear that Bābur was counting in double *dāms*.³ All the other generals and soldiers were rewarded according to their ranks and the distinctions attained in the battle. But Bābur did not stop here. After rewarding his immediate followers, he sent rewards to his relations in Samarqand, K̄hurāsān, Kāshghar and Irāq, the holy men of Samarqand, K̄hurāsān,

¹ See *B. N.*, p. 517.

² *N. K.* Press edition, p. 206.

³ For a full discussion of Bābur's coins see Erskine, *History of India*, Vol. I, Appendix E.

Makka and Madīna and, as if these were not enough, he sent 'one *Shāhrukhī* for every soul in the country-side of Kābul and the valley-side of Varsak,¹ man and woman, bond and free, of age or nonage.'² This extravagance earned him, according to Farishta, the title of *qalandar* or *dervīsh*, and Bābur seems to have accepted it with good grace; for at the Ajudhya mosque is inscribed the line: 'Bābur, the *qalandar*, is well known in the world as king.'³ The extravagance was deprecated by the Indian nobles,⁴ and it caused financial embarrassment to the king 2½ years later. Bābur himself records, 'By this time (October, 1528 A.D.) the treasure of Iskandar and Ibrāhīm in Delhi and Āgrā was at an end.' He had to tax the stipendiaries to the extent of 30 per cent. The empty treasury was one of the chief causes of Humāyūn's troubles in his reign. Humāyūn never realized his father's mistake and caused further depletion of the State resources by generous grants to his followers and relations.

After the battle of Pānipat, Humāyūn undertook an eastern campaign against the Afghāns. Bābur was faced with two problems, each demanding his immediate attention: one, the Afghān affairs in the east, and the other, the Rājput affairs in the south-west. Humāyūn volunteered to undertake a campaign against the Afghāns and thereby relieved his father considerably. He was given an independent command, and he proceeded rapidly to meet the enemy who had gathered at Jājmau near Cawnpore under Nasir Khān and Ma'rūf Farmūlī. So serious an account was taken of the Mughal valour⁵ that at the prince's

¹ In Badakhshān.

² *B. N.*, p. 523. There is a description of the arrival of these presents at Kābul in Gulbadan's *Humāyūn-nāma*. Farishta points out that one *shāhrukhī* contained one *misqal* which is slightly less than half a *tola* of silver. According to Mirzā Haidar, one *shāhrukhī* equals 5 double *dāms*.

³ See my article *Bābur and the Hindus* in the *U. P. Historical Society Journal*, 1936 A. D. for the full inscription.

⁴ *G. H. N.*, fol. 9b.

⁵ For Sultān Bahādur's opinion see Abu Turāb Wali's *History of Gujrāt*, p. 5 and *Arabic History of Gujrāt*, p. 229.

approach, the Afghāns melted away. They behaved in such a cowardly manner that Humāyūn could pursue them to a distance of 200 miles or more.¹ At Kharīd he halted, and retracted his steps to Jaunpūr, the Mughal headquarters near the eastern frontiers. He tried to do further service by conciliating the Afghān chief Fath Ḳhān Sarwāni and sending him to Bābur in company with Mahdi Ḳhwāja. Fath Ḳhān, however, left the Mughals for Mahmūd Lōdī of Bihār.² This was because he was not satisfied with the title Ḳhān-i-Jahān conferred on him but craved for his father's title of Āzam Humāyūn, which Bābur was not willing to grant because of the anomaly that would arise in calling his eldest son Humāyūn, and a mere Afghān nobleman, *Āzam* or the greater Humāyūn. Other desertions followed, *e.g.*, Biban, Bāyazīd and Shēr Ḳhān; but the specific reasons for their doing so have not been mentioned. At least in one case Humāyūn's success may be recorded. He was able to satisfy Jalāl Ḳhān Jīghat's son, Ālam Ḳhān, and bring him along with him to Āgrā.

At the commencement of the new year 1527 A. D., Humāyūn was recalled by Bābur to his aid against Rānā Sāngā, who was rapidly approaching the Mughal frontiers at Biāna. On January 6, he rejoined his father at Āgrā.

At the battle of Ḳhānwah (Khānua), he retained the chief command of the inner right wing and after the battle, he was rewarded with the grant of the 'contents of the Alwar treasury.'

Almost immediately afterwards, the prince was ordered to proceed to Badaḳshān, which had been acquired on the death of his cousin, Wais Ḳhān Mirzā, in 1520 A. D. During the last seven years, the administration of the province had been neglected and now an effort was made to remove some of its defects. There were two other reasons for Humāyūn's appointment. Firstly, most of his

¹ From Jājmau to Kharīd in Ballia District.

² *B. N.*, p. 652.

soldiers who had fought at K̄hānwah came from the other side of the Hindūkush and were unwilling to stay in India; hence in order to retain their services, he had to transfer their commander. Secondly, Bābur always entertained a hope for the reconquest of Balkh, Hisār and Samarqand, and desired Humāyūn either to accomplish it himself¹ or to wait for his arrival.

Historians mention a discreditable act done by Humāyūn at Delhi. He opened 'several treasure-houses and without permission took possession of their contents.' Bābur severely reproached him for this unseemly conduct. Mrs. Beveridge considers this misconduct to be one of the reasons why the *Khālīfā*² began to doubt Humāyūn's administrative capacities and proposed a change of the ruling dynasty at Bābur's death.³

Humāyūn stayed in Badaḡshān for more than two years⁴ (1527-29 A. D.). He tried to introduce orderly government and organized an expedition against Samarqand. But his stay there was too short to bring about any appreciable success. The raiders and disturbers of peace continued to exist. The expedition, too, did not fully succeed. Humāyūn in alliance with the local chiefs, Sultān Wais Kūlābī and his younger brother Shāh Qulī, collected 40,000 men and captured Hisār and Qabādīān, both situated on the north side of the Amū river (Jan. 1529 A. D.). This was probably the northernmost point ever reached by a Mughal prince of India. The subjugation of Central Asia remained a favourite preoccupation of the Mughal rulers till Shāh Jahān's time; but the success achieved by his successors was much less than had been secured by Humāyūn.

In July 1529 A. D. Humāyūn left his post and came to Āgrā. Erskine and Mrs. Beveridge accuse the prince of desertion and suggest the complicity of his mother Māham

¹ *B. N.*, p. 625.

² Bābur's chief minister.

³ This question is discussed later on.

⁴ *A. N.*, p. 114, makes it one year. It is very likely that he spent the earlier half of his time in Kābul.

Bēgam in this move. They think that Māham wanted Humāyūn's presence at the capital to prevent any plot¹ or intrigue against him.

First of all, let us take up the question whether he exposed the frontier to any risk by his departure. We have already seen that he had formed local ties by enlisting the sympathies of Sultān Wais and his brother in his favour. The Sultān's daughter was married to a Mirzā¹ and an extension was made beyond the river Āmū, along the northern boundary of the Mughal territories. Before Humāyūn crossed the Indus, he had sent Mirzā Hindāl and his tutor Faḡhr Alī as his substitute. Between his departure from Badaḡhshān and Hindāl's arrival, there was a short interval of a few days only. Faḡhr Alī's presence ensured orderly government and so long as Sultān Wais was attached to the Mughal cause, no fear was entertained in that quarter.

The *Akbar-nāma* mentions an attack from outside during Hindāl's regime, but it came from an unexpected quarter. Saīd Ḳhān of Kāshghar, son of Sultān Ahmad M., Bābur's maternal uncle and hence his cousin, seeing that the province was being ruled by a boy of ten, thought of annexing it, and forthwith marched against it. He besieged Qila-i-Zafar for three months, and then raised the siege in sheer disgust and returned to Kāshghar. We do not know of any other attack on Badaḡhshān in Bābur's reign. Hence it is safe to conclude that Humāyūn did not expose the frontier province to any danger by his departure.

Next, the question arises whether he had any sound reason for leaving his post and going to Āgrā. At least, his mother does not seem to have counselled Humāyūn to come to Āgrā; for she herself had been away from her husband for sometime past² and hence had not been in

¹ His daughter Haram Bēgam was married to Mirzā Sulaimān, Wais Mirzā's son.

² See *B. N.*, pp. 686-7, where the arrival of Māham is mentioned.

a position to know of the intrigues hatched against Humāyūn in the Court at Āgrā. Haidar Mirzā, a contemporary author and relation of Bābur,¹ who ruled in Kāshmir for ten years, gives the following reasons for the prince's departure: 'Bābur *Pādshāh* recalled Humāyūn Mirzā into Hindustan He sent for Humāyūn in order that he might have one of his sons (continually) by him so that if he were to die suddenly, there would be a successor near at hand.'² Erskine and Mrs. Beveridge disbelieve this statement, because they do not expect a wise ruler like Bābur to withdraw the governor from a frontier province without making adequate arrangements. Similarly, relying on Ahmad Yādgār's *Tārīkh-i-Salātīn-i-Afāghina*,³ they disbelieve the statement of Bābur's protracted illness and give him at least one year's good health and activity before his final breakdown and death. The first argument we have already refuted. Bābur must have known that in recalling Humāyūn and allowing him to make some local arrangements he was not running any risk. The second argument needs closer attention. When did Bābur finally break down? According to Farishta,⁴ Bābur had been ill since *Rajab* 936 A. H. (February, 1530 A. D.) and died ten months later on 5th *Jamādal-awwal* 937 A. H. (26th December, 1530 A. D.). Taking the statements of Ahmad Yādgār and Farishta together, we may allow good health to Bābur till February, 1530 A. D., when he fell ill and died ten months later. So that in July, 1529 A. D., when Humāyūn returned from Badaḡshān, Bābur was in good health.

Then, had he any reason to send for the prince? According to Gulbadan Bēgam and Abul Fazl,⁵ he was

¹ Being son of his mother's sister, Ḳhūb-nigār Ḳhānam. See *B. N.*, pp. 21-22.

² *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, p. 387. Edited by Ellias and Ross. For text see Or. 157. (B. M. MSS.).

³ *Elliot*, Vol. V, pp. 40, 42, 43. Ahmad Yādgār's father was Mirzā Askari's minister in Gujrat. The history was written in Jahāngir's reign.

⁴ *Farishta*, Newal Kishore Press Edition, p. 211.

⁵ *G. H. N.*, fol. 16a; *A. N.*, p. 115.

anxious for Humāyūn's return not because of his ill-health but because of the death of a favourite son of his called Anwar or Alwar. There was also another reason. Humāyūn had in several of his letters referred to his intention to 'retire,' and Bābur felt annoyed at it and advised him to disabuse his mind of any such idea in these words, 'As for the "retirement," spoken of in thy letters—retirement is a fault for sovereignty; . . . retirement matches not with rule.'¹ In order to persuade him to give up his whim, he desired his return to him. Of course, the ostensible reason that he mentioned in his letter was quite characteristic of a war-worn and doting father, that he was getting weary and infirm and desired the presence of a son by his side. Sometimes before the prince's arrival, he had already spoken of his intention of abdicating in favour of his eldest son.² A lifelong adventurer like Bābur may be excused if the continuous strife for more than 30 years made him think of resigning his kingdom to his son who had now come of age, being twenty-two. The proposal of abdication by the *dervish*-like Bābur should surprise no one. Could any other king compose the lines?³—

“ Though I be not related to *dervishes*,
 Yet am I their follower in heart and soul.
 Say not a king is far from a *dervish*,
 I am a king but yet the slave of *dervishes*.”

The feasts given by the king on the arrival of Humāyūn whom he acclaimed 'an incomparable companion' is a proof, if any further proof be needed, of Bābur's approval of his son's return.

Bābur did not neglect the Badakhshān affairs. After a while, when his fatherly yearnings were satisfied by the prince's stay, he thought, owing to state exigencies, of sending back Humāyūn who had already achieved some success and had extended the Mughal territories beyond


¹ N., p. 1

² G. H. N., fol. 15b.

³ See Erskine, *Bābur*, p. 431 and Beveridge, *Akbar-nāma*, p. 279.

the Oxus. But Humāyūn refused to go to such a distant place and Bābur, it appears, willingly accepted the refusal. The king's next choice fell on *Ḳhalīfā* Sayyid Nizāmuddīn Alī, who also refused. Then he adopted the only possible solution, viz., of handing over the province to Wais Mirzā's son, Sulaimān Mirzā. Sulaimān had a hereditary claim, going, according to the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*,¹ as far back as 3000 years.

His immediate ancestry may be indicated thus :



Bābur took further action in Sulaimān's interest. He rebuked Saīd Ḳhān of Kāshghar for molesting one who was a son to both of them and asked him to leave him alone. In handing over the province to a relation, he still had his old scheme in view, viz., the reconquest of Central Asia. He hoped Sulaimān would allow him a free passage through his dominions. It is possible that the march to Lahore in 1529-30 A. D. mentioned by Mrs. Beveridge on the authority of Ahmad Yādgar, was a part of this scheme. That he could not carry it out was due to reasons which need not be discussed here.

After a stay for some time with his parents, Humāyūn was allowed to go to his fief in Sambhal. For six months

¹ p. 203.

² He claimed to be a Shāh from his distant ancestor, Sultān Shāh Muhammad. He was a Mirzā on his father's side; also a Ḳhān through his father's mother, Sultān Nigār Ḳhānam. Bābur refers to the tradition that the family claimed descent from Alexander of Macedon. See *B. N.*, p. 22

he remained there at the end of which period he fell seriously ill.

It became imperative to remove him immediately to Āgrā, where the best medical aid was available. He was first taken to Delhi, and thence to Āgrā by boat. On the way, at Muttra, he was met by his distracted mother.¹ At Āgrā, the patient was placed under treatment of the best physicians of the day, but it was of no avail. Mir Abul Baqā,² a prominent *Fāzil* of the day, who was highly respected by the king, and later on by his son, suggested the giving away in charity of some precious article which the prince loved most, meaning, of course, the diamond which he had obtained at Gwālior. Bābur accepted the suggestion; but instead of the diamond considered himself to be the object loved most by his son, and hence proposed to sacrifice his own life.

The actual ceremony by which the malady was transferred has been described by the king's daughter.³ He walked round the prince's bed while prayers were offered to *Hazrat* Alī in words like 'O God! If a life may be exchanged for a life, I who am Bābur, give my life and my being for Humāyūn.' From the next day, he began to fast in order to make the sacrifice effective; and it is said that, shortly after, he felt that his prayers had been accepted. Bābur fell ill and his malady grew worse and worse, while Humāyūn showed signs of gradual recovery. At last he fully recovered and met the king who had been lying ill in his bed.

Bābur suffered, if Farishta is to be believed, from a protracted illness of ten months which ended in his death. The prince, an inexperienced youth of 22, did not take his

¹ Gulbadan describes the meeting as between Jesus and Mary.

² Connected with K̄hwāja K̄hwānd Mahmud (K̄hwāja Nūrā) of Kāshmir. See *Tārīkh-i-Rashidī*, 478.


³ Gulbadan must have been then a child of eight years. S. R. Sharma has written an interesting article in the *Calcutta Review*, September, 1936, under the heading 'the story of Bābur's death.'

father's illness seriously, and went on an expedition to Kālinjar. The following is an inscription on one of the rocks there:

'Muhammad Humāyūn, Bādshāh-i-Ghāzī, dated the last day of the sacred month of *Rajab* 936 A. H.'¹

When his father's condition grew worse, he was recalled. On his return, he found that the king had grown very feeble. Regretting his absence from the king's side, he broke down and earnestly requested the physicians in attendance to cure his father.²

During the few months yet vouchsafed to the king, he celebrated the marriages of two of his daughters, Gul-rang Bēgam and Gul-chihra Bēgam, with Īsān Tīmūr Sultān and Tūkhtā Būghā Sultān respectively. The genealogy of the Sultāns is given below:



These were two of his last acts in the interests of the family. Afterwards his malady increased. Realizing that his end was approaching, he gathered all his chiefs,—Abul Fazl specially mentions K̄hwāja K̄halifā,³ Qambar Alī Bēg, Tardī Bēg and Hindū Bēg—placed Humāyūn on the throne in their presence, and desired all to acknowledge him as his successor and to be faithful to him. Turning to Humāyūn, he entrusted him with the welfare of his kinsfolk and people. His last directions were, 'Do naught against your brothers, even though they may deserve it.'⁴ Three days later, on December 26, 1530 A. D.,⁵ he expired.

¹ 30th March, 1530 A. D.

² *G. H. N.*, fol. 17-b.

³ Sayyid Nizāmuddīn Ali, Deputy to the King.

⁴ *A. N.*, p. 117.

⁵ 5th *Jumād-al-awwal*, 937 A. H.

With regard to Bābur's sacrifice of his life for the sake of his son, the following observations may be made:

(a) It was a common belief in mediæval times that a malady could be transferred from one person to another by prayers and intercessions. This belief still persists in some parts of the world.

(b) Bābur besought Alī's intercession. It shows the breadth of his view; for generally a *Sunni* avoids Alī's selection out of the four early *Khalīfās*.

(c) The transference of the malady was a slow process. Humāyūn took several weeks to recover, while Bābur had suffered for several months before the gravity of his disease was realized.

(d) It was not the prince's malady that was transferred. He suffered from high fever while Bābur's complaint was a disorder of the intestines. His physicians considered it to be the effect of the poison administered by Sultān Ibrāhīm Lōdī's mother, four years back.

Bābur was buried in Chār Bāgh or Ārām Bāgh at Āgrā. His corpse was removed, in Shēr Shāh's reign, to Kābul, by the dead king's Afghān queen, *Bībī Mubarika*.¹ The tomb now lies in a terraced garden on the slope of a hill called Shāh-i-Kābul. It is the beauty-spot of the city and the rendezvous of holiday-makers. His relations lie buried around him. His descendants have embellished the burial garden, and Shāh Jahān may be specially mentioned for having constructed the beautiful mosque in the neighbourhood. 'The tomb-stone itself is a low grave-covering, not less simple than those of his relations.' The standing slab has an inscription put up by Jahāngīr.

The chronology of the last 19 months is given below:

1. Arrival of Humāyūn from Badaḡshān, July, 1529 A. D.²
2. The prince's stay in Āgrā, July and August, 1529 A. D.
3. The prince repairs to Sambhal, August, 1529 A. D.

¹ B. N., p. 710.

² B. N., p. 687.

4. Stay at Sambhal (Bābur at Lahore for a while),
August to January, 1530 A. D.
5. The prince falls ill at Sambhal, January, 1530 A. D.
6. The prince removed to Āgrā, end of January, 1530 A. D.
7. Bābur's sacrifice, February, 1530 A. D.
8. Humāyūn recovers, March, 1530 A. D.
9. Humāyūn at Kālinjar, March to August, 1530 A. D.
10. Humāyūn recalled to Āgrā, August, 1530 A. D.
11. The celebration of Gul-rang and
Gul-chihra's marriages, September, 1530 A. D.
12. Humāyūn nominated as successor, 23rd December, 1530 A. D.
13. Bābur's death, 26th December, 1530 A. D.

Bābur, the most important personage in the empire. By his long service, good administration and arrangement of campaigns and battles, he had made himself indispensable to the king.¹ He possessed the four ranks of *Amīr*, *Vakīl*, *Sultān* and *Khālīfā*. He bore the three family titles of *Sayyid*, *Khawāja* and *Barlās Turk*, all signifying high lineage. He was also well-connected; his younger brother, Junaid Barlās was married to Shahr-Bānū, one of Bābur's sisters; his daughter, Gulbarg Bēgam was married to Shāh Husain *Arghūn* of Sindh while his son, Muhibb Alī married Shāh Husain's step-daughter Nāhīd.² The *Khālīfā's* prestige and honour may be judged from the fact that when he and his wife, Sultānam, visited Gulbadan Bēgam,³ the latter stood up to receive them. The minister invited her to dinner, made a present of 6000 *Shahrukhis* and five horses, while his wife gave 3000 *Shahrukhis* and three horses. After the battle of *Khānwah* he received the title of *مقرب الحضرت السلطانی اعتماده الدوله الخاقانی* "the intimate with the *Hazrat Sultān* and the prop of the *Khāqān's* empire."

Unfortunately for Humāyūn, the *Khālīfā* at first did not agree to place the prince on the throne, in spite of his avowal at the dying king's bed-side. He nominated *Sayyid Mahdī Khawāja*, Bābur's *brother-in-law* and husband of *Khān-zāda Bēgam*. This would explain the delay.

The *Khālīfā* must have had very strong reasons for the rejection of the prince; for he must have been sensible of the risk he was running for the Empire by setting aside Humāyūn's claims. The Mughals had been settled in India for five years only and their hold on the outlying parts was insecure and uncertain; a change in the ruling

¹ See the *Bābur-nāma* (abbreviated as *B. N.*), pp. 564-65 and 568 for his ability and organisation, e.g., in the battle *Khānwah*.

² *G. H. N.*, p. 37. Nāhīd was Qāsīm Kōkāh's daughter. Her mother, Hājī Bēgam, had married Shāh Husain *Arghun*. The *Am-i-Akbari* (abbreviated as *A. A.*) by Blochmann, p. 420 gives Muhibb Alī's career.

³ Then a child of 6 years.

dynasty, at such a time, might spell disaster. But probably the minister was convinced of the prince's worthlessness. There were other reasons also. Humāyūn's plunder of the Delhi treasures, on his way to Badakhshān (1527 A. D.)¹ had been to the *Khālīfā* an unpardonable offence; it had been aggravated further in his eyes by the knowledge that only recently, on two occasions, i.e., after the battles of Pānipat and Kḥānwah, Humāyūn had been lavishly rewarded.² Then again, probably, being unaware that Humāyūn had left Badakhshān with the king's permission, he had accused the prince of dereliction of his duties. And also, as the king's deputy,³ he disliked the enormous influence exercised by the *Shīa* Queen, Māham Bēgam on Bābur.⁴ The *Īrānī-Tūrānī* rivalry, a common feature in later Mughal history, is noticeable here in a mild form.⁵ Other Tūrki nobles might have intensified his dislike for the queen. Taking all these reasons together, the *Khālīfā* must have satisfied his political conscience that in rejecting Humāyūn he was furthering the interests of the State.

But the *Khālīfā* went one step further. He rejected not only the eldest son but all the other sons as candidates for the throne.⁶ Kāmran, the next son, was Humāyūn's junior by 6 years, Askari by 8 and Hindāl by 10; so

¹ B. N., p. 583.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 522, 579.

³ *Vakil.* Badāūni has *وزیر مطلق*

⁴ As indicated by her being placed in charge of Hindāl, son of Dildār Bēgam, another wife of Bābur and sitting on the throne with him. In Humāyūn's reign also she exercised enormous influence. She was a relation of the illustrious Sultān Husain Bāi-qarā and descendant of Ahmad Jām *Zinda-pīl*. See the *Amal-i-Sālih*.

⁵ Rivalry between Bairam Kḥān and Māham *Anaga* in Akbar's reign, is only a repetition of this earlier phase.

⁶ See the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (T. A.) (Newal Kishore Press edition), p. 193. The relevant sentences are:

امیر نظام الدین خلیفہ کہ مدار کارخانہ سلطنت برآو بود از شاهزادہ جوان بخت ہمایون میرزا بواسطہ بعضے امور کہ در معاملات دنیا واقع می شود بیم و هراس داشت بسلطنت ایشان راضی نمی شد و هرگاه به سلطنت پسر بزرگ راضی نہ باشد به پسران خورد کئے راضی خواهد بود -

except the eldest, the other princes were in their teens. Could it not have been possible that one of the younger three sons, placed on the throne under his tutelage, would have proved to be a good ruler? The *Ḳhalīfā*, older than Bābur, his close associate for the last 35 years¹ and his chief adviser in all his Indian campaigns, must have appreciated Bābur's worth as none else could have; and yet he thought of depriving his illustrious house of the eminence which was its due. Should we conclude that his dislike was wholly personal and that it outweighed all his appreciation of the merits of the Bāburids?

The *Ḳhalīfā's* nominee, as already mentioned, was *Sayyid* Muhammad Mahdi *Ḳhwāja Tirmīzī*, who was the husband of *Ḳhān-zāda Bēgam*, Bābur's five-year-older sister. He had a distinguished lineage, a record of meritorious service, belonged to the religious House of *Tirmīz*, and was probably related to *Māham Bēgam*, Bābur's queen. As far back as 1510-11 A. D., he had acted as Bābur's *Dīwān-begī* and gone to *Buḳhārā* with 10,000 men. In the Indian campaigns he was always with his master. On the battlefields of *Pānipat* and *Ḳhānwah*, he commanded the left wing and *Humāyūn* the right. Immediately after the first battle, he was placed in charge of the party sent to occupy *Delhi*, just as *Humāyūn* was in command of the forces sent to *Āgrā*. It is thus clear that he was a distinguished nobleman who had attained his present distinction by the record of at least 20 years' meritorious service.

Being the husband of *Ḳhān-zāda*, Mahdi *Ḳhwāja* was, again, an eminent personage. Both *Ḳhān-zāda* and *Māham Bēgam* exercised influence in the palace, and on Bābur as well as on his kingdom. Being Bābur's elder sister, *Ḳhān-zāda's* influence was more than that of the queen. Mahdi *Ḳhwāja*, as the husband of one and a relation of the other, exercised control over all their actions, selfish or unselfish.

¹ His name first occurs in *B. N.* in the year 1494-95 A. D.

Hence Mahdi *Ḳhwāja* was a good choice. By lineage, service, experience and connexion with Bābur's family, he was fit to sit on the Mughal throne. Belonging to a religious order, he was expected to be as successful as Shāh Ismā'īl and Shāh Tahmāsp in Persia; and his long association with the liberal Bābur might be a guarantee for the continuance of the enlightened system of Mughal Government.

How Mahdi *Ḳhwāja's* candidature was, after all, superseded by that of Humāyūn is given in the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī*¹ and may now be briefly narrated. The author of the work obtained the facts from his father, Muhammad Muqīm *Herāvī*, an eye-witness to most of the particulars. The *Ḳhalīfā* passed over Humāyūn (and his other brothers), in spite of Bābur's open nomination of him for the succession, and chose Mahdi *Ḳhwāja*, the king's brother-in-law, as the candidate. The king had not yet expired, but the bright prospects turned the *Ḳhwāja's* head, and he assumed haughty airs. Once when Muhammad Muqīm² was present in the *Ḳhwāja's* camp, the minister called on him, and had hardly stayed for some time when a command for attendance came from the king. The *Ḳhwāja* accompanied him to the door, and when out of ear-shot, forgetting the presence of Muqīm, soliloquized thus, 'God willing, my first act (as king) would be to flay you and the other traitors.'³ After the utterance of these words, he recollected the presence of some person, turned round, and saw Muqīm just behind him waiting to pass out. The *Ḳhwāja* pulled him by the ear and cried out, 'O *Tājīk*,⁴ it is the red tongue

¹ Corroborated by Abul Fazl also.

² His official rank was *Dīwān-i-buyūtāt*, and he acted as the librarian to the royal library.

³ The text is *إنشاء الله اول ترا پوست كدم-----عنقريب إنشاء الله*

پوست نمی حرامان کشیده خواهد شد -

⁴ A term of abuse. Originally, a freed slave who set about as a tiller of ground.

that gives the green head to the wind,'¹ meaning thereby that if he be wise, he would not wag his tongue, or he would suffer death. On obtaining his leave, he straightway went to the minister, related all that had occurred and ended by saying, 'If in spite of there being a prince like Humāyūn or his able and courageous brothers, you turn your eyes from loyalty and desire to place an unknown family on the throne, what other results could be expected but these!' The minister now realised the danger, sent for Humāyūn, and asked Mahdi *Khawāja* to retire to his house, where no one was to visit him. He was also forbidden admittance to the king's *darbar*. When the king expired, his death was kept a secret, and further deliberations took place on the question of succession. They were cut short by an Indian nobleman named *Ārāish Khān* who pointed out the dangers of the throne remaining vacant. Humāyūn ascended the throne on December 30, 1530 A. D.

This is the story in brief, as told by Nizāmuddīn Ahmad, the author of the *Tabaqāt*, and a trusted warrior, as well as *Bakhshī* of Akbar's reign. He is a person of remarkable restraint and has been commended by all historians, contemporary or later. The source of the story is also unimpeachable because his father had suffered from the *Khawāja's* rudeness and must have remembered the full details. As the whole intrigue went against Humāyūn, it was only Akbar's and Abul Fazl's love of truth that allowed it a place in the official narrative, viz. the *Akbar-nāma*.

Mrs. Beveridge is not satisfied with the details. Firstly, she considers Nizāmuddīn to be a late author, being born 20 years after Bābur's death and relating the story some 60 years after its occurrence. Secondly, it seems incredible to her that the *Khawāja* alone should be planning the rejection of the four princes, passing over all the *Timūrids*, and favouring one who was neither the one nor the other. Mahdi *Khawāja* did not belong to any ruling dynasty, nor was he personally illustrious. A wise and

¹ The text is اي تاجيك زبان سرخ سرسبز مي دهد بر باد

experienced minister would not make the mistake of proposing him for the throne. Thirdly, even the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbari* is not accurate in its description of the *Ḳhwāja*. The appellations of 'dāmād' and 'jawān'¹ are inapplicable to him.

At the same time, she does not reject the whole description. What she suggests is, that the author, either deliberately or unconsciously, suppresses the name of the *Ḳhalīfā's* original candidate, and that the name of Mahdi *Ḳhwāja*, who had nothing to do with the intrigue, has been mentioned as the result of afterthought. She regards Muhammad Zamān *Mirzā*, Bābur's eldest son-in-law as the *Ḳhalīfā's* nominee who, in her opinion, is above the last two objections and who was a Tīmūrid, next to the four sons, closely allied to Bābur, also young in age, being 35 years old. His wife Masūma Sultān Bēgam was a Tīmūrid by double descent, and hence she was useful in adding to her husband's rank or dignity. Mrs. Beveridge grants him sovereign status after the Ghāgra campaign (April, 1529 A. D.), on the evidence of Bābur's own statement.² She continues, 'in honouring the *Mirzā* thus, the king's intentions were to leave the son-in-law in charge of Hindustān, and himself to move on to Kābul, or to other territories further north, i.e., more important parts of his empire.' Māham Bēgam's knowledge of her husband's wishes led her to recall Humāyūn to Āgrā; and his arrival there led Bābur to put off, for sometime, the north-west campaign as well as the installation of Zamān *Mirzā* as the Viceroy of Hindustān. Humāyūn's illness, Bābur's sacrifice, and his declaration of succession in favour of the prince, all following one another in quick succession put a stop to the consideration of the *dāmād's* being a claimant to the throne. It is only Nizāmuddīn's erring imagination

¹ *T. A.*, p. 193, I, 16.

² *B. N.*, p. 662. The words are, 'He was presented with a royal head-to-foot (*Ṣarōpā*), a sword, and a belt, a *tipūchāq* horse and an umbrella.' The quotation indicates bestowal of distinguished rank, but no sovereign power. When Ḳhurram was given the title of Shāh-Jahān by his father, he had hardly any sovereign power.

that invented the name of Mahdi *Khawāja*, gave him the attributes of a bully, and made his own father suffer.

This, in brief, is Mrs. Beveridge's argument in favour of Bābur's son-in-law's being the *Khālīfā's* nominee. Her scholarly presentation of the case makes it an instructive, if not convincing, reading. Our difficulty in accepting her suggestion that Muhammad Zamān *Mirzā* should be read for Mahdi *Khawāja*, arises from the following considerations:—

(a) No contemporary chronicler suggests the name of Muhammad Zamān *Mirzā*. On what authority, then, could a modern writer propose the substitution?

(b) Why strain the meaning of the word, 'dāmād' to such an extent as to demand the substitution of a new name for the existing one? The word 'dāmād' is comprehensive enough to include several marital relations, e.g., son-in-law, brother-in-law, father-in-law, the true connotation being, as the *Bahār-i-ajam* indicates, husband as opposed to wife. It would be unscholarly to confine it to the restricted sense in which it is used in modern Urdu as prevalent in India. There are two writers who explicitly mention the exact relationship of the *Khālīfā's* nominee with Bābur. Gulbadan Bēgam, the king's daughter, calls him 'yazna' or brother-in-law, and Khwāndamīr, in his work, the *Habīb-us-Siyar*, mentions that he was married to Bābur's elder sister, *Khān-zāda* Bēgam. Both of them name the person as Mahdi *Khawāja*.

(c) Similarly, we need not be too critical about the question: who would fully justify the appellation of 'jawān'? Age alone does not make a 'jawān'; it makes for a 'jawān.' It is possible that a man of 30 may not justify the description, whereas it may eminently become a person of 50 or more who possesses sound health, active habits, and fresh outlook on life; so it could well be applied to Mahdi *Khawāja*, though he might be on the wrong side of 50.

(d) She emphasises the need of a Tīmūrid for the throne of Delhi. Mahdi *Khawāja* was not, while Muhammad

Zamān *Mirzā* was, a descendant of Tīmūr. If this be the sole criterion, then, leaving aside prince Humāyūn, for whom the *Ḳhalīfā* had a personal dislike, there were many Tīmūrīds available. First of all, there were Kāmṛān and his two younger brothers. They were too young to have played any prominent part in the contemporary politics; and the *Ḳhalīfā* might be supposed to have entertained no hostile ideas about them. Then there were Muhammad Sultān *Mirzā* and his children, who were all Tīmūrīds by double descent. What was more, they were closely related to Sultān Husain *Bāi-qarā* and his brother. There were others also, *e.g.*, (i) Muhammad Sulaimān and his son Ibrāhīm *Mirzā*, (ii) Yādgār Nāsir *Mirzā*, Bābur's nephew, (iii) *Mirzā* Sayyidī Ahmed, his son Sultān Ahmed and grandson Abdul Bāqī and (iv) Kichik *Mirzā*.¹ Then there were the descendants of Sultān Hussain *Bāi-qarā* himself. Thus, if a Tīmūrīd alone were desired, there were many candidates to choose from. Among them Muhammad Sultān *Mirzā* was undoubtedly the most elderly and experienced; he took a prominent part in all the principal battles fought in India and was a double-descendant of Tīmūr.² If a substitution is to be suggested, why not prefer this more seasoned and experienced relation to Muhammad Zamān *Mirzā*?

But the entire discussion is based on conjecture and hence we leave it at that. We have, therefore, refrained from discussing Mrs. Beveridge's statements against Humāyūn's heedlessness, or Mahdi *Ḳhwāja's* disloyalty to Bābur. Suffice it to say that we accept Nizāmuddīn's statement in full. We may summarise our reasons:

(a) He is a straightforward writer whose veracity is generally above doubt and unimpeachable. The incident is well-authenticated, being related by a responsible official

¹ See *B. N. Index*.

² After the battle of *Ḳhānwah*, he was given the title,

برادر عزیز ارشد کامگار منظور انظار عنایت حضرت آفریدگار

of the State, who may be credited with the accuracy of statement.

(b) Mahdi *Ḳhwāja* was proposed by the *Ḳhalīfā*, because (1) he wanted to have nothing to do with the Bāburids or Tīmūrīds; he desired the accession of one who would work with him in close association for the welfare of the State; (2) the *Ḳhwāja* was a *Sayyid*, belonging to a religious order esteemed by the Muslim world,¹ and was a noted nobleman with a record of distinguished service to his credit.²

(c) Mahdi *Ḳhwāja* was a friend to the *Ḳhalīfā* and would counteract Māham Bēgam's excessive influence in the palace himself or through his wife Ḳhān-zāda Bēgam.

The *Ḳhalīfā* had the best of intentions in proposing the change and could not have foreseen the vain conceit that would turn his nominee's head. He realised his foolishness in time and immediately rectified his mistake by supporting Hūmayūn.

Very little is known of the later history of the *Ḳhalīfā*, or Mahdi *Ḳhwāja*. It is believed that the former continued to be the minister, and found his fears of rough treatment at Hūmayūn's hands to be groundless. His younger brother, Junaid *Barlās*, was for a time governor of Jaunpur and other provinces.³ The *Ḳhalīfā* died in Hūmayūn's reign, and his wife remained a member of the royal household and after Hūmayūn's exile made a pilgrimage to Makka. His sons, Muhibb Alī Ḳhān⁴ and Ḳhālid Bēg⁵ flourished in Hūmayūn's reign.

Mahdi *Ḳhwāja*, too, continued to live and, as Ḳhān-

¹ Safavi kings of Persia belonged to another religious order of this kind.

² The title bestowed on him after the battle of *Ḳhānwah* reads as
جاء نقابت دستگاه رفعت پناه اینتخار آل طه رئیسین عالی
See the *Haft Risāla-i-Taqwīm-i-Buldān* (H. R. T. B.)

His name in official documents was to precede that of Muhammad Sultān *Mirzā*.

³ B. N., p. 544. Erskine: *Hūmayūn*, pp. 10, 122, 131.

⁴ A. A. (Blochmann), p. 420.

⁵ G. H. N., p. 159

zāda's husband, remained a member of the royal family. Seven years later his sister, Sultānam, was married to Hindāl *Mirzā*, when the *Khwāja* made large presents which are described by Gulbadan Bēgam in detail.¹ It is believed that he died in Kābul and was, shortly after, followed by his wife. Both of them lie buried close to Bābur's grave.²

It is pleasant to find that neither of the two personages, concerned in the intrigue against the prince, suffered in any way, and that their wives and relations were treated with genuine kindness and affection by Humāyūn.

¹ *G. H. N.*, pp. 126-27.

² There is an inscription on a marble tablet set up by Mahdi *Khwāja* at *Amir Khusrau's* tomb at Delhi. There the *Khwāja* has been called 'the Sayyid exalted in dignity and majesty.' See the *Epigraphica Indo-Moslemica*, 1915-16, for Beveridge's article on 'Mahdi *Khwāja*.'

CHAPTER III

THE OPENING YEAR OF HUMĀYŪN'S REIGN— EXPEDITION TO KĀLINJAR—1530-31 A. D.

Humāyūn was a young man of 23 when he ascended the throne of Delhi (December 30, 1530 A. D.). Like most of the mediæval kings, he signalized his accession by a generous gesture towards his subjects by retaining the officers of the preceding reign in their respective posts and rewarding his ardent supporters by an increment of salary¹ and conferment of titles. Honours were also bestowed upon the high *amīrs* or the princes of his family. Thus, Kāmṛān was allowed to remain governor of Kābul and Qandahār with a semi-independent status. To Askari, the third brother, was transferred Humāyūn's own province of Sambhal,² and to the youngest, Hindāl, was granted Bābur's favourite retreat of Alwar. The distant Badakhshān remained with Sulaimān Mirzā, while the eastern frontiers were guarded by Sultān Junaid Barlās,³ from his headquarters at Jaunpūr.

The event was further marked by joyous feasts and bestowal of largesse. On the very first occasion, a boatful of gold was distributed, the distribution being made in large trays. The chronogram کشتی زر 'kashtī-i-zar,' indicates the double significance of the occasion. The other chronograms giving the year of accession, 937 A. H. are همایون بود وارث ملک وے 'Humāyūn būd wāris-i-mulk-i-wai'

¹ The *Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārikh* (Kh. T.) writes:—

جمهور خلایق و عموم طوائف را از انعام خود بهره مند ساخت - بموجب سپاه را علی العموم ده بست و ده سی و ده چهل فرمود - ایک ساله بموجب از خزانه داده از خود راضی و شاکر ساخت -

² At present, a tahsil in the Moradabad District (U. P.).

³ He had married Bābur's sister, Shahr-bānu Bēgam.

and خَيْرِ الْمُلُوكِ 'khair-ul-mulūk,'¹ one asserting Humāyūn's claims to the throne and the other proclaiming him one of the best rulers of the country. If they were penned at the time of accession, they should be taken as mere panegyrics of a courtier.

At the outset, it would be proper to indicate the boundaries of the Mughal kingdom that Humāyūn inherited. On the north-west, the river Oxus defined the boundary, and the provinces of Balḵh, Qūndūz and Badaḵshān former part of the Delhi empire along with Kābul, Ghazni and Qandahār. The far-famed Herāt probably belonged to Persia.

*The boundaries
of the Mughal
kingdom.*

In India proper, the Punjāb and Multān had been occupied early by Bābur.² Even before his occupation of the Punjāb, Bābur had considered it to belong to himself, he being the lineal descendant of the great Tīmūr. To the jurist of modern times, his claims might appear as flimsy, but, he himself was serious enough to put them forward. The south-western limit of the Mughal kingdom under him may be taken to correspond roughly to that of the modern Punjāb. Thus, while Abohār, Sirsā, Hānsi and Hisār were included in his territory, places like Ganeshgarh, Hanumāngarh and Jitpurā lay beyond it.³ To the south of Multān lay the extensive kingdom of Sindh, then under the suzerainty of the Arghūns, Shāh Bēg and his son, Mirzā Shāh Husain.

In order to maintain a strong government, Bābur's policy had been uniformly to appoint his elder sons to the north-west or western regions of his kingdom. Accordingly, he had appointed Humāyūn as the governor of Badaḵshān, Kāmṛān of Kābul, Ghazni and Qandahār, and Askari of Multān. As already stated Humāyūn continued his father's policy of allowing Kāmṛān to

¹ According to Persian *Abjad*, the numerical figures added come to 937 A. H.

² For Bābur's conquest of Multān, see Erskine, *History of India*, Vol. I (*Bābur*), p. 398.

³ Any good map of India would indicate the places.

govern, undisturbed, the territories he possessed; afterwards, he strengthened his hands by adding the provinces of the Punjāb and Multān, which extended his administrative sphere as far east as the river Sutlej. As also stated previously, the provinces of Sambhal and Alwar he made over to Askari and Hindāl respectively. Alwar, Dhōlpūr and Gwālīor and further east, Kālpī, Kālinjar, and Benāres formed the southern frontiers of the kingdom.¹ Thus, as we proceed eastward, the Mughal territory, south of the river Jamnā, decreased in extent, until at Allāhābād it practically coincided with the river.

The *Doāb* between the Jamnā and the Ganges, commanded by the two capitals, Delhi and Āgrā, on the west, and Allāhābād, Chunār and Benāres on the east, was the prize secured after the victories of Pānipat and Khānwah. On the north of the Ganges, Sambhal, Bahrāich, Lucknow, Ajudhya, Gorakhpūr and Ballia roughly indicated the boundaries. The Mughal control over these districts was maintained from their headquarters at Jaunpūr, where the governor resided.

The kingdom had been hastily acquired and its provinces loosely knit. It is true that there was no popular outburst against the new-comers; yet in the matter of government, it was not all smooth sailing for them. The administrative system was inefficient.² Bābur's plans were crude and a provincial administration consisted of a governor, a *Diwān* and minor officials like the *Shiqdār* and *Kotwāl* at its headquarters. As a support to these officials, there were the local *jāgirdārs* who had received *jāgīrs* from the State on feudal terms. This simple machinery was all that Bābur could conceive of. The defect in his system was that he never thought of linking the rural areas to the Central government. Of the subjects, the Hindus and most of the country Muslims had accepted the Mughal

¹ Bābur's campaigns against Chandēri (1528 A. D.) and consequential territorial arrangements had only an ephemeral importance.

² C. H. I., Vol. IV, page 21 has, 'the scheme of Government was still *saiḥī* (by the sword) not *qalamī* (by the pen).'

supremacy as a matter of course; the former, because the change of rulers did not affect them; and the latter, because the Mughal culture was more welcome to them than that of the Lōdis. There was, however, one very strong element of opposition in the country, viz., the Afghāns. They had been the rulers of the country since the days of Buhlūl Lōdī and had, in still earlier periods, contributed to the military strength of the Government.¹ Since the establishment of the Muslim rule in North India, the Afghāns had been able to build up their reputation and had set themselves up as a political force in the country.² They had invited Bābur not to rule, but to help them in deposing Sultān Ibrāhīm Lōdī, and raising some other member from among them as ruler. At first Bābur was willing to place Ibrāhīm's uncle, Ālam Ḳhān Alāuddīn on the throne of Delhi, but the latter's incompetence made the scheme unworkable. The rapid successes that ended in his victory at Pānipat, the support that he obtained from the Indian Muslim nobles like Dilāwar Ḳhān, Āraish Ḳhān,³ Mullā Muhammad Mazhab, Ismāil Jilwāni, Malik Bīban Jilwāni, Mahmūd Ḳhān Nūhānī and Shāh Muhammad Farmūlī and the quiescence of the ryots made him change his views and he decided to keep his conquests to himself. He had expected that the past record of his military prowess and administrative fairness would make him worthy of being accepted by the Indians; and his expectations were fulfilled except in one quarter. The Afghāns in India were solidly opposed to him and regarded him as a usurper of their ruling privileges. They were a selfish group and did not realise that their hereditary eminence during the Lōdī rule was undermining their own character as well as the self-respecting instincts of the non-

¹ Cf. The reigns of Muhammad Shāh and Ālam Shāh of the Sayyid dynasty.

² Ghiyāsuddīn Balban (1266-87 A. D.) garrisoned his fortresses that guarded the roads to Bengal, with the Afghān soldiers. The earliest Muslim conquerors of Bengal were Khaljis, generally included among the Afghāns.

³ *F. N.*, p. 463. Āraish Ḳhān's name again occurs at the time of deliberation held at Bābur's death. See *G. H. N.*, fol. 20a.

Afghāns. To all efforts of Bābur and Humāyūn¹ towards conciliation they showed indifference. They yearned for the full privileges of rulership and refused to remain content with the favours bestowed on them by the new rulers.

Thus this Afghān antipathy had really started from his father's days. It could have perhaps been eradicated by the consistent pursuit of a threefold policy of (i) carrying on continuous military expeditions against them, (ii) undertaking prudent administrative measures which would make no distinction between the different classes or creeds, and (iii) spreading the superior Mughal culture in all parts of the kingdom. The Afghān opposition was undoubtedly the most serious problem which Humāyūn had to face. There were other political problems, too, calling for his immediate attention after his accession, of which one was the existence of certain potentates on the borders of his kingdom, among whom may be mentioned the following:—

*The problems
for the
Mughals.*

- (1) Mirzā Shāh Husain Arghūn, who had recently subdued the Langās and approached close to the Mughal frontiers.²
- (2) Mahārānā Ratan Singh who had succeeded his father, the far-famed Mahārānā Sāngā.
- (3) Bahādur Shāh of Gujrāt who had extended his territories in all directions and annexed Mālwa.
- (4) The minor king Jalāluddīn Nūhānī and the Afghāns of South Bihār. The minister of the State was Shēr Khān, a man of remarkable ability and talent.
- (5) Nasrat Shāh of Bengal, son of the more famous Alāuddīn Husain Shāh.

Humāyūn was willing, at least for the present, to leave these potentates alone; for he had not the ever-impelling instinct of a conqueror. But it was known that some of

¹ For a few such efforts, see *B. N.*, pp. 527, 537, 544.

² See Erskine; *Bābur*, pp. 390-91.

them were jealous of his good fortune and would not lose any opportunity of creating trouble for him.

There was yet another political problem which required his constant attention. From the princes downwards, everyone loved power and pelf and aimed at autonomy in the district or the province assigned to him. For instance, Kāmṛān would have nothing to do with his elder brother except to be under his nominal submission. As the guardian of the frontier provinces, he certainly relieved Humāyūn of anxiety, so far as the political relations with Persia or Central Asia were concerned; but the semi-independent status of the prince made his capitals Kābul and Qandahār look like rivals to Delhi and Āgrā and hence, to some extent, divided the resources of the Mughals. In later years Askari and Hindāl too, at times, imitated their elder brother's ambition and lust for power, causing distress and damage to the kingdom.

But Humāyūn's worst enemies were his brother-in-law, Muhammad Zamān Mirzā, and cousin, Muhammad Sultān Mirzā, and his large progeny. They were a set of high-born, but restless princes, who, proud of their lineage, were ever bent on adventure and caused unrest everywhere.

The solution of the problems is not far to seek. A constant vigilance on the part of the king was imperative. While he should initiate a benign policy towards the loyal and the faithful, towards the recalcitrant he must be relentless and cruel and wage a continuous war. Also, he should not make any distinction between the rebels, be they the Afghāns, or his brothers, or other relations. Had Humāyūn followed this judicious course, the unrest within the kingdom would have speedily come to an end, and his external foes like Bahādur Shāh would have dared not create any trouble for him.

But the king himself was so soft-hearted as not to be able to punish any of the Mirzās, much less his brothers. The Afghāns he ignored, either because he considered Shēr Kḥān, the ablest of them, to be favourably inclined

towards the Mughals, or because he himself ruled over Afghānistān, their ancestral home and hence, he thought, there was nothing to be afraid of them. He failed to realize that the Indian Afghāns had formed a large community of great political importance and that the Afghāns of Kābul and Qandahār did not owe direct allegiance to him but to Kāmṛān. So long as Kāmṛān was indifferent to the interests of the Mughal kingdom, Humāyūn was running some risk in neglecting them.

Humāyūn's troubles began almost from the commencement of his reign. Muhammad Zamān Mirzā, his brother-in-law and husband of his elder half-sister, Masūma Sultān Bēgam, rebelled.¹ The rebellion quickly subsided, because Humāyūn's munificence and Bābur's choice of him as successor had disposed the nobles in his favour. The Mirzā submitted and was pardoned.

Humāyūn realized that the *Khalifā's* deliberations and Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's rebellion indicated dissatisfaction in some quarters and that it was necessary for him to

*The campaign
against
Kālinjar.*

prove his worth to his followers by achieving some striking success. Fortunately, he had an easy way of accomplishing it. At the end of Bābur's reign, he had been conducting a campaign against the Rājā of Kālinjar. Bābur's serious illness, which resulted in his death, had recalled him to Āgrā and thus Kālinjar had been out of his mind for several months. Now when he had some leisure, he thought of renewing the campaign.

The celebrated fort of Kālinjar stands perched on a hill-top in the south-eastern extremity of Bundelkhand.²

*The geography
and past history
of Kālinjar.*

The hill is isolated from the adjacent range of Bindhāchal by a chasm or ravine some 1,200 yards wide. It is 1,200 feet above the sea-level and several hundred feet high from the plains below. The top of the

¹ A. N., p. 123 and the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, Or. 157 (British Museum), fol. 328a.

² To-day, it is included in the district of Bāndā.

hill which forms a plateau is four or five miles in circuit and is fortified by a rampart.¹ Just below the rampart, the scarp of the rock for some 150 feet is nearly perpendicular, and so an easy access to the summit is by no means possible. Numerous rock-cut tanks are to be seen at the top, but the quality of their water is not supposed to be good.

It is a holy place for the Hindus and is supposed to have existed in the *Satya-yūga* under the name of Ratnakūta, in the *Trētā*, of Mahāgiri, and in the *Dvāpara*, of Pingālu. The present name, Kālinjara, occurs in the *Mahābhārata*, in Ptolemy's geographical work, and also in the *Shiva-Purāna*. The word is supposed to be one of Shiva's names, Kālanjara, 'he who causes time to grow old.' There are Shiva *lingas*, Jaina statues, caves and inscriptions² all over the place.

In the Muslim period, we see its Chandēl ruler fighting in Jaipal's camp against the ruler of Ghaznī in 978 A. D. and later on, taking part in the battle of Peshāwar in 1008 A. D. Fifteen years later, Mahmūd besieged Kālinjar, but failing to capture it, made terms with the Rājā, Nanda.³ Prithvī Rāj of Delhi defeated the Chandēl ruler of his time in 1182 A. D., when the latter removed his capital from Mahōba to the hill-fortress. Qutbuddīn, Iltūtmīsh and Nāsiruddin Mahmūd attacked the place but their successes do not seem to have been permanent; for the Chandēl chief continued to rule till the close of the 13th century. The history of the next two hundred and thirty years is obscure.⁴

In 1531 A. D. Humāyūn made a fresh attempt to occupy the fort of Kālinjar. The siege lasted for some

¹ The description would apply to the fort of Chitōr or Gwālior also. Mandū fort has a much larger space at the top.

² One of the inscriptions reads as:

محمد همايون بادشاه غازی سلخ رجب المرجب ۹۳۶ هـ

The date would correspond to 30th March, 1530 A. D.

³ The full description may be read in the *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, pp. 21-22.

⁴ Much of the account is taken from the *Imperial Gazetteer of India* and Thornton's *Gazetteer*.

time, when the Rājā purchased peace by an offer of twelve *man* or 6,720 *tolas* of gold.¹ The *Humāyūn's campaign against Kālinjar.* Rājā was then made a grandee of the Mughal kingdom.²

A discrepancy between the two official records, written about the same time, may be noted here. Abul Fazl, followed by most other writers, dates the Rājā's submission in the *Hijra* year 937 (1530-31 A.D.), while the *Tārīkh-i-Alfi* post-dates it by two years. The political insignificance of the Rājā and the express mention in the *Tārīkh* that the siege was of short duration, prevent us from inferring that the campaign lasted for two years, and thus reconciling the two authorities. We choose to follow Abul Fazl, because he is supported by most of the contemporary writers.

Humāyūn's gain in the expedition to Kālinjar was much greater than the mere acquisition of 12 *man* of gold or 67,200 rupees.³ However welcome the treasure might be to him, it was merely a portion of what he had spent on the festivities that were held at the time of his accession. But his success had a great political significance. The submission of an ancient Rājput family like the Chandēl added to the dignity and prestige of the victor, who could now assume the title of *Ghāzī*⁴ and boast of having extended the bounds of the Mughal kingdom.

The chronology of the reign is as follows:—

- (a) Humāyūn's accession December 30, 1530 A. D.
- (b) Humāyūn at Āgrā and Delhi Jan.-June, 1531 A. D.
- (c) Humāyūn at Kālinjar July-August, 1531 A. D.

¹ Bābur's measure of weight as given in *B. N.*, pp. 517-18 is 14 *tolas* = 1 *seer*; 40 *seers* = 1 *man* or *manbān*. See Mrs. Beveridge's note also.

² Or as expressed by Nizāmuddīn Ahmad in his *Tabaqāt-i-Akbārī*, p. 194 دأخل دولت خرواهان شد

³ Taking one *tola* of gold equal to ten rupees of modern times, in value.

⁴ *i.e.*, the conqueror.

CHAPTER IV.

HUMĀYŪN'S FIRST EXPEDITION AGAINST THE AFGHĀNS (1532-33 A. D.)

From Kālinjar, Humāyūn straightway went to Chunār, then in the possession of the Afghāns. But before we deal with his Chunār expedition, it is necessary to say a few words about his opponents.

In the battle of Pānipat, where Sultān Ibrāhīm Lōdī was defeated and killed, the Afghāns suffered a serious loss, losing between 15 to 50 thousand of their men, according to different estimates.¹ Ibrāhīm's brother, Sultān Mahmūd Lōdī, made an attempt to recover the supremacy of the Afghāns by combining with Rānā Sāngā, with 10,000 followers but to no effect. Then he retired with the Rānā and remained with him hoping to lead another expedition against the Mughals. But the Rānā's death on the 30th January, 1528 A. D. (*Samvat* 1584),² shattered his hopes and made him seek shelter elsewhere.

Meanwhile there had gathered a strong body of the Afghāns in South Bihār owing to the short-sighted policy of Sultān Ibrāhīm. The death of his brother Sultān Jalāl-uddin, Minister, Miān Bhua,³ and Āzam Humāyūn Shirvāni, 'one of the first nobles and lord of a standard and kettle-drum and commander of a force of 30,000 horse,'⁴ produced a sense of insecurity among the Afghān nobles and led to the rebellion of a few of them. The first to rebel were Āzam Humāyūn Lōdī, the governor of Lucknow, and Islām Ḳhān, Āzam Humāyūn Shirvāni's

¹ See *B. N.*, p. 474. According to the *Dorn*, p. 79, Ibrāhīm's tomb was visited by pilgrims from as distant a place as Narwar or Qanauj.

² See the *Udaipūr Rājya ka Itihās* by G. S. Ojha, Vol. I, pp. 583-84.

³ Differently worded by different writers, e.g., *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, p. 248, calls him Bhoda.

⁴ *Dorn: History of the Afghāns*, p. 74.

second son. The rebellion was not very successful, but Ibrāhīm's continued tyranny¹ enraged others. Daryā Khān Nūhānī, the governor of Bihār, who was so far loyal, Khān Jahān Lōdī, Miān Husain Qarmali, raised their heads. Daryā Khān behaved like an independent prince, but out of regard for the solidarity of the Afghān State, he assumed no royal titles. After his death (*circ.* 1521 A. D.), his son Bahādur Khān succeeded to the governorship. So long as Ibrāhīm lived, he followed his father's policy and refrained from proclaiming his independence, but after the Sultān's death, he called himself Sultān Muhammad Shāh, struck coins and read *khutba* in his name (1526 A. D.). Thus, in Bihār, the Nūhānīs were the most important tribe among the Afghāns, but there were others also, *e.g.*, the Qarmalis and the discontented Lōdīs.

Sultān Muhammad died two years later and his son, Jalāl Khān, succeeded him as Sultān Jalāluddīn Shāh. As he was a minor, he was controlled by his mother, *Dūdū* as regent, and Shēr Khān, as *atāliq* and *vakil*. So long as the mother lived, there prevailed unity and harmony in the State, cordiality between the Sultān and his minister, and between the Afghāns of Bihār and Bābur. *Dūdū* and Jalāl saw Bābur² in May 1529 A. D. who agreed to grant to Jalāl most of Bihār that remained after reserving land worth one crore of double *dams* or five lakhs of rupees³ revenue as *khālsa*, and after granting a *jāgīr* of fifty lakhs of double *dams* or two lakhs and a half of rupees revenue to Mahmūd Khān Nūhānī, who obtained it as a reward for his services under Askari, at the battle of the Gogra or Ghāgra,⁴ fought a few days earlier, on May 4.

The difficulties of Sultān Jalāl lay in the fact that his small State was hemmed in by two powerful kingdoms,

¹ The latest being the assassination of Shaiḫ Hasan Qarmali at Chandēri; see *C. H. I.*, p. 249.

² *B. N.*, pp. 664, 676.

³ For an idea of the coins of the time, see Erskine: *Bābur*, Appendix E.

⁴ Bābur gives to the river more than one name, *e.g.*, Sarū on p. 667, Gagar p. 602 and Kakar p. 465.

i.e., Delhi and Bengal, and that he had befriended the rulers of both. Although he had no share in the battle of the Gogra, fought between Bābur and the other Afghāns, aided by the Bengal army, yet Bābur writes of Nasrat Shāh's influence on the young Sultān, in words such as these: 'Jalāl K̄hān whom the Bengali Nasrat Shāh must have held as if eye-bewitched.'¹ When Bābur patched up peace with the ruler of Bengal on May 19, 1529 A. D. and retired to Āgrā in the following month, the cloud that had hung over the Afghān State cleared away for the time being.

Dūdū died a few months later.² With the death of this wise and peace-loving lady, there arose a bitter quarrel between the Nūhānīs, including king Jalāl, and Shēr K̄hān. The Nūhānīs were so jealous of the minister's ascendancy in the State, that they preferred to surrender themselves to any neighbouring king rather than submit to him. But to which of the two kings, Bābur or Nasrat, were they to offer their submission? They selected Nasrat for reasons that may be summed up as follows:—

- (a) The Mughal king was looked upon as a usurper of the Afghān sovereign rights and privileges and hence no alliance with, or submission to him could be thought of. If Shēr K̄hān had been to the Mughal court in the past, so much the worse for him.
- (b) Bīban and Bāyazīd, two of the Afghān nobles, had led opposition against the Mughals and hence they were popular. A submission to Bābur would mean fight with such Afghāns, a course not welcome to the Nūhānīs.
- (c) So far Nasrat Shāh had behaved like a friend and taken part in the battle of the Ghāgra, on behalf of the Afghāns. But there was no certainty that he would continue to be friendly. The mutual recriminations between the Nūhānīs and

¹ *B. N.*, p. 664.

² *Circa*, 1529 A. D.

Shēr Khān had weakened the Bihār State; and Nasrat Shāh being nearer than the Mughāls might take advantage of this fact and threaten to invade Bihār, hence he was to be feared more.

- (d) Already the relations between Nasrat Shāh and Shēr Khān had become strained. The causes of this were the latter's ability, and his close friendship with Maḥdūm-i-Ālam, governor of Hājipūr, i.e., North Bihār, on behalf of the ruler of Bengal. The Nūhānīs turned against Shēr Khān's friend, i.e., Maḥdūm, and went over to his enemy, the king of Bengal.

For these reasons, Sultān Jalāl and the other Nūhānīs surrendered themselves to Nasrat Shāh, whom they regarded as their benefactor and friend.

Now let us return to Sultān Mahmūd Lōdi. In 1528 A. D., after Rānā Sāngā's death, he left Chitor, came to Bihār, and launched an ambitious campaign against the Delhi kingdom (February 1529 A. D.).

His army consisted of three divisions: the first under Bīban and Bāyazīd to move in the north against Gorakh-pūr; the second under Shēr Khān to capture Benāres from Jalāluddīn Sharqī,¹ a protege of Bābur, and then to pass on to Jaunpūr, where stayed Sultān Junaid Barlās, the governor; and the third under Mahmūd himself, his objective being to take the famous fort of Chunārgarh. It seems that some success had been achieved; for Jalāl had retreated to Korā² where he met Bābur. If the *Dorn* be believed³ even Jaunpūr fell into Mahmūd's hands, Junaid, the Mughal governor, retreating westward, and the whole territory up to Lucknow was occupied by the Afghāns. But then Bābur came immediately after, in March 1529

¹ The descendant of the Sharqī kings, being the son of the last king, Sultān Husain Shāh. Mrs. Beveridge wrongly calls him an Afghān.

² About 86 miles west of Jaunpūr.

³ p. 102.

A. D. and the enemy raised the siege of Chunār and fled pell-mell.¹ Mahmūd, for the time being, retired eastward.²

The Afghān leader appeared on the scene again. After Jalāl Nūhānī's desertion of the Afghān cause, when Shēr K̄hān, single-handed, was trying his utmost to save the small State from the threatening dangers, the chief nobles again invited Mahmūd. The glamour of Mahmūd's pedigree counted for much with even the democratic Afghāns and though they acknowledged Shēr K̄hān's ability as administrator³, they looked for some one else who could boast of belonging to a more illustrious family. The invitation to Mahmūd went from a number of distinguished nobles, whose names Abbās gives in his work.⁴

With the appearance of Mahmūd Lōdī in 1530 A. D., Shēr K̄hān retired to his old *jāgīr*,⁵ but this the other nobles would not allow; for they knew his worth. Noticing that Mahmūd was surrounded by the older chiefs, turbulent but without experience of orderly administration, Shēr K̄hān knew how futile it was to hope for good results under such conditions. So when the *farmān* reached him asking him to join his new master, he did not stir. But Mahmūd himself went to Shēr K̄hān and brought him along with him for the new venture he had decided upon.

Before proceeding any further, let us sum up the Afghān situation at the opening of Humāyūn's reign. The Nūhānīs had retreated eastward. Mahmūd Lōdī, the new leader, had launched a campaign only a year ago which had failed dismally. The only able administrator was Shēr K̄hān, who had enriched the State treasury, recruited soldiers devoted to himself, protected the ryots, and worked

¹ B. N., pp. 653-54.

² According to Qanungo, the author of the *Shēr Shāh*, to Bengal. See pp. 81-82.

³ The latest proof of which was Shēr K̄hān's quiet possession of Chunār in 1529 A. D. How cleverly he accomplished it may be seen in Abbās Sarwānī's work, the *Tarīkh-i-Shēr Shāhī*.

⁴ See Elliot and Dowson, Vol. V, p. 347.

⁵ It speaks of Shēr K̄hān's unselfishness that his personal *jāgīr* consisted of nothing more than what he had inherited from his father, plus Chunār.

day and night for the good of his countrymen. He had also acquired for himself vast riches, so that among the Afghāns he was by far the richest person. But he was a mere Sūr¹ and his grandfather a horse-dealer, and hence he was denied leadership.

At this stage Mahmūd organized a new campaign. He made great preparations. Every Afghān, willingly or unwillingly, joined him. A year later (1532 A. D.), when the Afghān army seemed ready, a rapid march was undertaken to the west. So quick were the Afghān movements that, almost unchecked, they proceeded more than 250 miles. Junaid retreated, and the Afghāns advanced as far as the present Nawābganj *tahsil* of the Bāra-Banki district. It was this advance that caused Humāyūn to agree hurriedly to the Rājā of Kālinjar's terms and hasten to meet the Afghāns.

The actual battle took place at Dadrah in August 1532 A. D.² which proved an easy affair. The Mughals were victorious, and in the general rout, the Afghāns lost two of their chief generals, Bāyazīd Qarmali and Ibrāhīm Khān Yusuf-Khail.³

¹ Even Humāyūn, according to the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdi*, once sneered that Shēr Shāh was low-born هنوز بري قلقچي گري از د نرند (though a king), he yet smells of a common soldier. قورلقچي or more correctly قورلقچي is a Tūrki word signifying a soldier or policeman.

² The *Tārīkh-i-Alfi* (Or. 465 fol. 555b), mentions the year 939 A. H. (1542-43 A. D.), also *H. R. T. B.*, No. 40 of Buhār section of Imperial Library, Calcutta. Hence we are unable to accept Qunungo's date, July, 1531 A. D. We put the battle at the beginning of the Muslim year because the *Tārīkh-i-Alfi* mentions it first among the year's events.

The battlefield has been differently named, Dadrah by Illahdād Faizi Sirhindi, Lucknow by Abbās, on the bank of the Sani or the Gūmti by Jauhar. Dadrah was a *mahal* in Lucknow *Sirkar*. See *A. A.* (Tr.), Vol. II, p. 178. It is now a village in Nawābganj *tahsil* of the Bāra-Banki district. Qunungo mentions the place as Dauroh.

³ Abbās, Dorn, *H. R. T. B.* by Illahdād Faizi and Jauhar add the name of Bīban to the list of the killed. Jauhar calls him a Lōdi. But Abbās later on makes him live and join Shēr Khān.

Who was Bīban? There seem to be three of them: one, the sister-in-law of Bāyazīd Qarmali; the second, Bīban Khān Jalwāni, one of the chief commanders of Mahmūd; and the third Bīban Khān Lōdi. Probably the last was killed at Dadrah.

What was Shēr K̄hān's part in this battle? It seems strange that where Shēr K̄hān, the victor against the large Bengal army on several occasions, was present, there should be such a stampede.

Shēr K̄hān cannot be made responsible for the Afgān movements on the battlefield. The supreme commander was Sultān Mahmūd, who was incapable of fighting a battle. His chief advisers were Bīban K̄hān Jalwānī and Bāyazīd Qarmali, both brave soldiers but not prudent commanders.¹ Shēr K̄hān was thus under a cloud and resented his neglect. He felt that he was not wanted. He was not even placed among the chief commanders and Bihār, which had prospered under his administration, was partitioned among the Afghān nobles without any reference to him. He was only consoled with the assurance that when the Jaunpūr province would be conquered, the *jāgīrs* of the nobles would be transferred there and he would be assigned the whole of Bihār. In fact, a *farmān* to that effect was granted to him in advance. There were two other distinguished Afghāns, *Masnad-i-Ālī* Āzam Humāyūn, Sultān Mahmūd's father-in-law, and *Masnad-i-Ālī* Isā K̄hān, both wise and experienced officers; but like Shēr K̄hān disappointed at being neglected.² Hence the Afghān camp lacked cohesion and unity of action.

Shēr K̄hān had thus sufficient cause for annoyance. His services were not fully recognised; he was thrown into the background and his whole work undone. There was plenty of bustle and enthusiasm in Mahmūd's camp but there was no prudent strategist or tactician.

¹ Abbās's words, with reference to Bāyazīd Qarmali, are میاں بیبن و بایزید قرملی جمعیت بسیار دارند و نام مردانگی خود پیدا کرده اند اما بی شعور اند و اصلا در امور ملکی نمی رسند -

² According to Abbās, they had joined the army— سبب شرم افغانی و عجز و خرویش -

Having foreseen the consequences of the coming battle with the well-trained Mughals, Shēr K̄hān now strove to save himself and his countrymen. He wrote to Hindū Bēg, Humāyūn's general,¹ that he was a loyal servant of the Mughals; that his presence in the Afghān camp was under compulsion; and that on the battlefield he would not engage in the fight and thus he would be the primary cause of the Afghān defeat.²

Qanungo, the author of the *Shēr Shāh*, disbelieves the statement, though it is supported by most of the contemporary historians.³ He gives several reasons for his opinion which may be summed up as follows:—

- (a) The alleged desertion is inconsistent with Shēr K̄hān's noble character.
- (b) The writers have all copied from the garrulous author of the *Tārīkh-i-Shēr Shāhī* and hence they are not independent authorities.
- (c) Many of the writers make mention of the treachery in the description of Shēr Shāh's career, but fail to mention it in the description of Humāyūn's reign. This omission is suspicious and discredits their statement of the desertion.
- (d) The accusation of treachery is always ready at hand to explain any national defeat. It is too cheap a statement to be always credited.
- (e) Even a modern historian like Elphinstone has rejected the imputation of treachery to Shēr K̄hān.

We might have added some more arguments, *e.g.*, (1) that there is no mention of Shēr K̄hān's treachery in the *Akbar-nāma*; (2) that the first mention of the treachery is made by a writer some 48 years after the battle; (3) that

¹ Hindū Bēg seems to be the chief of Humāyūn's military staff, while Junaid Barlās continues to act as governor of Jaunpūr.

² Abbās.

³ pp. 73-74.

there is some resemblance of language in Abbās's, Nizām-uddīn's and Farishta's writings, and since Abbās is the earliest among the writers, the others may be supposed to have copied his statement.

To us, however, the above reasons are not fully convincing. It would be bad logic, (1) to dismiss every charge of treachery made by the contemporary historian as an explanation of a national disaster,¹ (2) to interpret the omission of a fact from records as its non-existence, (3) to assert that the narration of the same fact by the succeeding writers only implies *slavish* copy of the statement made by the earliest of them. Let us now state the positive reasons that lead us to reject Qanungo's conclusions that Shēr K̄hān was not present on the battlefield:—

- (a) It was a mighty venture in which all the Afghāns, willynilly, took part. Isā K̄hān and Āzam Humāyūn² could not absent themselves, nor could Shēr K̄hān.
- (b) Shēr K̄hān was met in his *jāgīr* by Sultān Mahmūd and a *farmān*, conferring the province of Bihār on him after the Sultān's capture of Jaunpūr, was handed over to him. No doubt it was a tardy recognition of his merits but Shēr K̄hān could hardly refuse support, specially when the Sultān himself had gone to him.
- (c) His actions while technically termed treacherous to his race, actually benefited it in the long run. The Mughals counted upon the friendship of some Afghāns, Shēr K̄hān being the chief among them, and patronized and favoured them in every respect. One of the reasons of Shēr K̄hān's continued success for the next five years was the absence of interference from the

¹ Would anyone assert that Sirājuddaula was not betrayed by Mir Jāfar at Plassey or Sadāshiva Rao *Bhao* at Pānipat?

² Sultān Mahmūd's father-in-law.

Mughals, who interpreted his success as that of a Mughal nobleman.

(d) Shēr K̄hān looked upon himself—and rightly too—as the future saviour of his countrymen and had nothing but contempt for the worthless Sultān and his ill-advised commanders. Why should he not prove the facts by abstaining from the battle where he had no immediate touch with the Sultān? The latter's discredit would mean the restoration of his legitimate dignity and influence in the State. Shēr K̄hān was highly popular and hence he had no difficulty in regaining his former eminence. So the Afghān writer, Abbās, while stating the truth of the so-called treason, does not curse or denounce him.

(e) Even supposing that all other writers copy Abbās, it will not be wise to reject his statement. He has usually great admiration for his hero, defends his measures for the capture of Rohtās,¹ and absolves him of Puran Mal's murder.² Being a Mughal courtier, his statement of Shēr K̄hān's criticisms of Bābur's system of government³ was highly unpalatable to his master, the Emperor Akbar, but he does all this, probably because he thought that he was putting forth the whole truth, *viz.*, the correct interpretation of Shēr K̄hān's actions. Similarly, though he adored his hero, he admits that on the present occasion he could not speak entirely in his favour.

After the battle of Dadrah, Sultān Mahmūd resigned lead; for his poverty and love of pleasure made him

¹ See Elliot and Dowson, Vol. IV, p. 362.

² *Ibid.*, p. 402.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

unfit for such a responsible task. Hence he retired into private life, settled down at Patna and passed the next ten or twelve years in dissipation,¹ entirely unmindful of the stirring events that were shaping the destiny of his countrymen. He died in 949 A. H. (1542-43 A. D.).

From Dadrah Humāyūn next proceeded to Chunār.

The rocky fort of Chunār, lying 16 miles south-west of Benāres and 18 miles east of Mirzāpūr, commands a strategic position on the Ganges. Situated on the southern bank, the rock juts out into the river and deflects its course to the north. The fort, perched on the rock 100 to 150 feet high, is 750 yards in length and 300 in breadth. The river is navigable at the foot of the rock,—and according to Thornton,²—even for crafts of 50 or 60 tons. Although the rock was not of much height, its steepness would make its storming hazardous.

The place is traditionally connected with the brother of Vikramāditya of Ujjain, Bhartrināth, who had chosen the solitary wooded rock as the site of his hermitage. In the Muslim period, it was captured, lost and recaptured several times; one mutilated inscription recording its capture by the Hindus, is still extant. The noted mediæval buildings and works are the antique Hindu palace at the highest point of the rocky eminence, a well sunk to a great depth in the solid rock and the mausoleum of the local Muslim saint, Shāh Qāsim Sulaimān.

Chunār came into prominence in the beginning of the sixteenth century when Sultān Ibrāhīm Lōdī located there the central treasury of the kingdom and Tāj Ḳhān

¹ Abbās's words are

سلطان بکنیزان رقاس بسیار میل بود و اکثر اوقات به لهر و لعب مشغول می بود

² *The Gazetteer.*

Sārangḡhānī¹ was placed in charge of its fort and its treasures. Bābur also attached some importance to it. He visited it in May, 1529 A. D., and though Tāj Ḳhān was perfectly submissive to him,² he appointed Sultān Junaid as its governor, Muhammad Zamān M. taking his place as governor of Jaunpūr.³ Tāj Ḳhān's rights appear to have been ignored, except that he continued in the fort as a subordinate official.⁴ After his return to Āgrā in June, 1529 A. D., Bābur never again visited his eastern dominions; Muhammad Zamān M., too, had moved off to the capital, and Sultān Junaid was again left by himself to solve the problems of the east as best he could. He must have gone to Jaunpūr, leaving the loyal Tāj Ḳhān in possession of Chunār as before. Junaid was pleased with Shēr Ḳhān also and had helped him in reclaiming his *jāgir* from Muhammad Ḳhān Sūr, in his first year of appointment, *i. e.*, 1527 A. D.

Tāj Ḳhān was accidentally killed by his eldest son, Ahmad, in 1529 A. D., and then Ahmad and his two brothers had a long quarrel with their step-mother, Tāj Ḳhān's wife, Lād *Malika*, in which she had the upperhand; for her wise administration and lavish distribution of reward to her followers generally retained their loyalty to her. Thus worsted, the sons thought of a novel plan to deprive the *Malika* of her independence. They proposed her marriage with Shēr Ḳhān, and agreed to surrender the fort of Chunār to him. To Shēr Ḳhān, the *Malika's* wealth was as welcome as herself and the *Malika* also appears not to have been unwilling to accept him as her husband.⁵ So all parties agreed and the nuptials were celebrated and each

¹ *A. N.* and the *Mirāt-ul-Ālam* (*M. A.*) call him Jamāl Ḳhān Ḳhāssa-ḡhail Sārangḡhānī.

² *B. B.*, pp. 654, 657.

³ Junaid was governor of Jaunpūr from 1527 A. D. till his death in 1537 A. D. with this short interval. He was present at the battle of the Gogra.

⁴ See *Erskine*, Vol. II, p. 131.

⁵ As a young wife, she was probably not very happy in her relations with the old Tāj Ḳhān.

one got what he or she wanted:¹ Shēr K̄hān wealth, Lād a husband, and the sons the satisfaction of seeing Lād in subservience to her husband.

The possession of the Chunār fort, is a landmark in Shēr K̄hān's career. Abbās expresses

کار او استحکام یافت صاحب قلعه شد و خزانه بدست آر آمد
و جمیعت سوارها پیاده (sic.) بسیار شد

(Tr.)—'His affairs were more firmly established; for he now owned a fort, possessed treasure, and his followers, both horsemen and footmen, considerably increased in number.'

All this had happened in Bābur's reign, in the year 1529 A. D. Now Humāyūn, after the victory of Dadrah in August, 1532 A. D. came forward to claim Chunār for himself. He sent Hindū Bēg² with a contingent; for he did not expect any opposition from Shēr K̄hān. But the latter would not willingly yield and so he himself moved forward and laid a siege to the place. Shēr K̄hān placed his second son Jalāl K̄hān³ in charge of the defence and himself withdrew to Bahārkunda, in the interior of Bihār.⁴

The siege lasted for four months, September to December, 1532 A. D. and then Humāyūn, realising the likelihood of a prolonged stay on the eastern frontier, grew restless. Both the parties had come to know of Bahādur's war preparations and hostile intentions against Delhi. The king had left his capital sometime past and it would not be prudent to prolong his absence. Shēr K̄hān, always supplied with every information by his spies, was aware of the growing complexities and of the king's anxiety to return. So he resolved to turn to his

¹ Abbās estimates it at 150 *mans* of gold (8 lakhs and 40 thousand rupees) besides 150 costly jewels and 7 *mans* of pearl.

² To give his full name, Mr. Hindū Bēg Qūchīn. He was with Bābur since 1519 A. D.

³ The later Islām Shāh, the ruler of Delhi, and successor to Shēr Shāh.

⁴ Qanungo, 142 n.

⁵ Jauhar's *Tazkirat-ul-wāqāt* (T. W.) translated by Stewart, p. 1.

advantage these developments in the situation and secure advantageous terms for himself. Without any further delay, therefore, he himself came forward to propose terms. He was willing to hold the fort under the Mughal suzerainty and place 500 Afghān retainers under his third son, Qutb Khān¹ at the disposal of the king for service. Humāyūn was agreeable but suggested that the commander of the contingent should be the valorous Jalāl Khān. To this Shēr Khān would not agree. He pointed out that he himself needed Jalāl Khān's aid in facing so many of his enemies. The king did not probably attach much importance to the valour displayed by an Afghān, who was looked down upon by the Mughals; so he accepted all the terms of Shēr Khān and returned to Āgrā in January, 1533 A. D.²

The chronology of the several incidents mentioned above may be stated here :

	A. D.	A. H.
(1) Humāyūn's accession to the throne	Dec. 30, 1530	937
(2) Humāyūn's stay at Delhi,	January-June, 1531	937
(3) Humāyūn at Kālinjar,	July-August, 1531	938
(4) The battle of Dadrah	August, 1532	939
(5) Humāyūn at Chunār	September-December, 1532	939
(6) The treaty of Chunār	December, 1532	939
(7) Humāyūn's return to Āgrā	January, 1533	939

¹ *A. N.* has at p. 123, Abdur-Rashīd instead of Qutb Khān but, later on, at p. 151 puts down the name of Qutb Khān also. The first may be the real name, the latter signifying only a title. See the *Erskine*, Vol. II, p. 12.

² *G. H. N.*, p. 112, n. 2.

CHAPTER V

HUMĀYŪN'S EARLY RELATIONS WITH KĀMRĀN (1514—33 A.D.)

As stated before, when Humāyūn, at Bābur's death (December, 1530 A. D.), became the ruler of Delhi, Kāmrān continued to be the governor of Kābul and Qandahār. They were born of different mothers. While Humāyūn's mother was Māham Bēgam, a descendant of Shaikh Ahmad of Turbat-i-Jām and relation of Sultān Husain Bāiqarā, whom Bābur had married at Herāt in 1506 A.D., Kāmrān was born of Gulrukh Bēgchik, whose parentage, contrary to his usual method, Bābur has not given.¹ He married her two years after Humāyūn's birth on May 6, 1508 A. D. Kāmrān was born six years later, *i.e.*, in 1514 A. D. and his younger brother Askari in 1516 A. D.

As to his eldest son, Humāyūn, so also to his younger sons, Kāmrān and Askari, Bābur gave a thorough education. Besides studying languages they underwent military and administrative training. Thus Kāmrān was appointed governor of Kābul at the age of 15, Hindāl of Badaḡhshān at 11 or 12, Askari commanded a division at the battle of the Ghāgra at the age of 13, and Humāyūn at the battles of Pānipat and Ḳhānwah at the ages of 18 and 19 respectively. Other details show the policy which Bābur uniformly followed in the matter of education of his children. In 1522 A. D., when Kāmrān was merely a child of 8, Bābur specially wrote a verse on Muslim Law

¹ Bābur's 3 other wives were:

(a) Masūma Sultān Bēgam, whose daughter of the same name was married to Muhammad Zamān Mirzā.

(b) Dildār Āghācha, mother of Hindāl.

(c) Bibi Mubāraka, a Yūsufzāi lady.

entitled *Dar Fiqha-i-Mubaiyan* for his instruction.¹ When after the capture of Milwat,² in January 1526 A. D. he inspected the fort, the first thing that he did was to visit Ghāzi Khān's³ library and to choose some books for Humāyūn and Kāmran. Again, in January 1529 A. D., he sent his Indian verses to Humāyūn and Kāmran and the alphabet of the Bāburī script to Hindāl, then a child of 10 or 11.⁴

The above non-preferential treatment of the children tended to foster a spirit of cordiality among the brothers, a spirit which was reinforced by Bābur's dying instructions to Humāyūn to preserve and promote the cohesion among the members of the family.⁵

It thus happened, therefore, that at Bābur's death, Humāyūn had his domestic policy practically pre-determined by his father. He would not dislodge Kāmran from the government of Kābul and Qandahār, where he had been virtually ruling for the last five years. His removal might have been useful to him; for the direct allegiance of the Kābulis and the Qandahāris to himself would have been of great help to him, as it had been to Bābur in facing the rebellious Afghāns of India. Humāyūn was practically a stranger to the Kābuli Afghāns and, of course, in India, he was hated by the Afghāns who thought he was the son of a usurper who had deprived them of their privileges of rulership. Kāmran had thus an advantage over his brother; for he directly ruled over the warlike Afghāns of Kābul.

Humāyūn might have realised the disadvantage of not removing Kāmran but under the influence of his father's

¹ *B. N.*, p. 438.

² See Malot in the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*. Situated in 31°50' N. 76° E. in Hushiarpur district. There is another fort of the same name in the Jhelam district, which Mrs. Beveridge wrongly identifies with this fort of Daulat Khān. See *B. N.*, p. 461.

³ Ghāzi Khān was the eldest son of Daulat Khān Lōdī, the governor of the Punjab:

⁴ *B. N.*, p. 642.

⁵ See *G. H. N.*, fol. 19b.

sentiments he did not effect any change. Matters, however, did not end here. Bābur had, in the fullness of his generosity, divided the inheritance between Humāyūn and Kāmṛān as 6 to 5. Certainly, he had a precedent in his own uncle's case. The eldest, Sultan Ahmad Mirzā as the ruler of Samarqand had the largest share; the second, Sultan Mahmūd Mirzā had slightly less; while the third, Umar Shaikh Mirzā and the fourth, Ūlugh Mirzā had considerably smaller shares.

So, when Humāyūn came to the throne, it was expected that he would increase Kāmṛān's *jāgīrs* considerably beyond their existing limits.¹ Unfortunately, he was busy with more important affairs and let this matter remain in abeyance for nearly two years.

Kāmṛān, on the other hand, like all ambitious youths, grew impatient of any delay. When he found the king engaged elsewhere, he took matters into his own hands and proceeded to act independently. He collected an army and marched to Lahore, where Mīr Yūnas Alī, the governor, stubbornly opposed him till he was captured. Qarācha Bēg, one of Kāmṛān's chief nobles, went to Yūnas Alī pretending to be displeased with his master and then on a suitable opportunity captured him. The surrender of the place automatically followed. Kāmṛān was willing to continue Yūnas in the office, but the latter declined and was then allowed to go to Humāyūn. Erskine³ has very strongly criticised Kāmṛān's actions in these words: "No sooner did Kāmṛān, who was at Kābul, hear of his father's death than disdaining the ample dominions he had enjoyed under his father and in the possession of which his brother had consented to confirm him collected an army and in the true spirit of brotherhood among Asiatic princes marched for Hindustān, under pre-

¹ See *B. N.*, p. 625.

² Kāmṛān's possessions in 1530 A. D. were less than half the present size of Afghānistān. He did not possess the province of Herāt, neither any territory to the north of the Hindūkush nor any to the south of Qandahār.

³ *The History of India*, Vol. II (Humāyūn), p. 6.

tence of congratulating Humāyūn on his accession, but in reality to try the strength of his sword and to see whether his own good fortune might not raise him to the throne of Delhi itself." To us, it appears that there are two glaring inaccuracies in the statement:

(1) Erskine's theory of the rupture between the two brothers cannot be maintained at least for the first eight years of Humāyūn's reign. Kāmṛān desired neither to contest the throne of Delhi nor to act as an independent prince. Humāyūn, on his return to Delhi, added not only Lahore, Multān, and other eastern districts up to the Sutlaj to his dominion, but also Hisār Fīrūza, which was regarded as the heir-apparent's *jāgīr* in the Mughal period.¹ The coins, too, of the period bearing the names of both the brothers and the mintage town and year also support our statement. Of the eight coins preserved in the British Museum, six are dated, the latest being issued in 946 A.H. = 1539—40 A.D. One of the inscriptions reads:

عدل محمد کامران بادشاه غازی

and

محمد همايون غازی السلطان الاعظم المكرم تعالی الله ملكه و سلطانه

Tr.

'The justice of Muhammad Kāmṛān Bādshāh-i-Ghāzī' and 'Muhammad Humāyūn Ghāzī, Sultān the Great and Illustrious, may God bless his territory and Sultānate.'

These coins are stamped by Kāmṛān in Lahore or in some other town in his *jāgīr*. Kāmṛān calls himself *Bādshāh* after the example of his father who then owned only the single province of Kābul. Humāyūn bore the more common title of Sultān.²

The true relation between the two brothers is clear from the phrase, '*as Sultān-al-āzam*' added to Humāyūn's name. It signifies that Humāyūn was the greater of the two.

¹ See Beni Prasad's *Jehāngīr*. If the statement is correct, since no son was born to Humāyūn, Kāmṛān was indicated as his successor.

² We have seen in the Kālinjar inscription that as a prince, he called himself Bādshāh-i-Ghāzī.

The titles, Shāh, Sultān, etc., were so indiscriminately bestowed on princes and even on nobles that among Bābur's and Humāyūn's grantees there must have been at least two dozen with these titles.

As we have pointed out, in compliance with Bābur's wishes, viz., to recognize Kāmran's importance, Humāyūn bestowed on him the provinces of Kābul, Qandahār, Multān, Hisār Fīrūza and others and the right of coinage. He also gave him permission to use the title of Bādshāh. Such grants were a common feature in Mughal India. Even so late as the middle of the 18th century, the East India Company and the Nawābs of the provinces issued coins, though they acknowledged the suzerainty of the Emperor of Delhi.¹

(2) The second inaccuracy occurs where Erskine terms Kāmran's territories of Kābul and Qandahār 'ample dominions.' The two provinces together would be less than half the size of the present insignificant Afghānistān. Kāmran's *jāgīrs* were so small that an addition was expected.

¹ The last six rulers of Oudh were called Shāhs or Bādshāhs, but they were wholly subordinate to the East India Company. A few mediæval examples may also be given. The *Murāt-i-Sikandari* refers to the grant of the title of Shāh by Bahādur Shah of Gujrāt to Nizām-ul-mulk of Ahmadnagar who had submitted to him. Similarly Shāh Jahān had granted to Muhammad Ādil of Bijāpur the title of Shāh. Perhaps the most striking parallel is afforded by the coins of Ghiyāsuddīn Ghūrī. There are many gold and silver coins in which the names of Ghiyāsuddīn and his brother Muizuddīn Muhammad Ghūrī jointly occur. Let us take one of these coins. In a gold coin (see Thomas's *Chronicles of the Pathān Kings of Delhi*, p. 12), dated 592 A. H. = 1195 A. D., on the obverse side can be read

السلطان الاعظم نياث الدنيا و الدين ابو الفتح محمد بن سام

and on the reverse السلطان المعظم معز الدنيا والدين ابو الظفر محمد بن سام

Now we know that the actual ruler was Ghiyāsuddīn Muhammad bin Sām while his younger brother Muizuddīn Muhammad bin Sām was his commander-in-chief and governor of a province. (See *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, p. 38). It was the magnanimity of elder brother that allowed regal titles to the younger brother, but all the same the head of the family was the elder brother, commanding allegiance of all other members of the family including Muizuddīn. Ghiyās's headship was so recognised a fact that the bestowal of titles on Muiz never clouded the issue.

We may further point out that the opposition of Humāyūn's governor Mīr Yūnas Alī to Kāmṛān was due to the latter's impatience. What a little patience on his part might have obtained from the king without any bloodshed, he sought to obtain by a display of brute force. This was resented by Yūnas who, as a loyal servant of the Delhi throne, considered it his duty to oppose such a high-handed procedure. He was probably unaware of the late king's desires and Humāyūn's acquiescence.

Abul Fazl fully bears out our views.¹ He says, 'His Majesty *Jehānbāni* (i.e., Humāyūn) partly because the sea of his liberality had been set in motion and partly from a desire to observe the precepts of his Majesty *Gētī-sitāni* (Bābur) made over the province to him.'

Thus, the affair ended in peace and goodwill. A *farmān* was issued confirming the grant of Kābul, Qandahār and the Punjāb. In grateful acknowledgment of it, Kāmṛān wrote the following lines:—

حسن تو دمدمم افزون بادا - طالعت فروخ و میمون بادا
 هر غبارے که زراعت خیزد - نور چشم من محزون بادا
 گرد کان از ره لیلی آید - جاء او دیده مجنون بادا
 هر که گرد تو چو پر کارنگشت - از ازین دائره بیرون بادا
 کامران تا که جهانواست بقا - خسرو دهر همایون بادا

Translation :

May thy beauty grow each moment,
 And thy destiny be happy and glorious.
 The dust that rises on thy path,
 Illumines the eyes of this afflicted.
 The dust that rises on Laila's path,
 Its rightful place is Majnun's eyes
 He who did not turn round thee like
 (the outer leg of a pair of) compasses

¹ See *A. N.*, p. 125.

Is outside this circle.¹
 Kāmṛān, so long as this world lasts,
 Let the monarch of the Age be Humāyūn.²

Humāyūn was so much pleased with the verses that he made a further gift of Hisār Fīrūza, a territory which had been granted to himself as a reward for his first victory on the Afghāns under Hamīd Ḳhān in February, 1525 A.D.³ The grant to Kāmṛān must have been made in 939 A. H. = January, 1533 A.D., soon after Humāyūn's return to Āgrā.

To recapitulate our conclusions :

(1) Up till 1538 A.D. Kāmṛān was loyal to his elder brother. This is attested by the coins of the period.

(2) Some addition to Kāmṛān's *jāgīrs* of Kābul and Qandahār was desired by Bābur and agreed to by Humāyūn.

(3) In his impatience to increase his *jāgīrs*, Kāmṛān exerted force against the governor of Lahore and captured him.

(4) Humāyūn, on his return to Āgrā, made amends for the delay, confirmed Kāmṛān's possession of Lahore and added Multān to it.

(5) Cordial relations subsisted between the brothers as evidenced by Kāmṛān's verses of panegyric in honour of Humāyūn and by the latter's grant of Hisār Fīrūza to the former.

¹ *I.e.*, he who does not belong to Humāyūn's court, has nothing to do with the Mughal empire.

² My English rendering differs in one or two lines from that of Beveridge's.

³ *B. N.*, p. 466.

CHAPTER VI

THE FOUNDATION OF DIN-PANĀH JULY, 1533— APRIL, 1534 A.D.—THE STATE FESTIVITIES.

Humāyūn returned to Āgrā in January, 1533 A.D., after achieving a threefold success, as he conceived it, namely, (1) obtaining the title of Ghāzī by defeating the Rājā of Kālinjar, (2) defeating the Afghāns at Dadrah, and (3) making a treaty with Shēr Ḳhān and allowing him to call himself a Mughal nobleman.

One of the reasons of Humāyūn's early return to the capital was the report that Sultān Bahādur Shāh of Gujrāt had hostile intentions against Delhi. Bahādur's rapid successes were alarming in themselves. He had taken Mandū in March 1531 A. D.; uprooted Silhadi of Raisen,¹ a prominent nobleman of Mālwa in April 1532 A. D.;² occupied Ranthambhōr;³ and granted Chandērī, Bhilsa and Raisen to an Afghān nobleman, Ālam Ḳhān of Kālpī,⁴ who had taken shelter with him.

With a view to impressing Bahādur and other neighbouring kings with his glory, on his return, Humāyūn, at the instance of his mother, Māham Bēgam, held a series of festivities to celebrate his signal success in the east. Public durbars, illuminations, State banquets and street decorations were the main features of the celebrations. Under Māham's orders the meanest citizen of Āgrā had to

¹ Another famous mediæval fort, now in a state of neglect. Its situation is in 23°20' N. and 77°47' E. The origin of the name is Rājavāsīnī or the 'royal palace.' It is now the headquarters of the eastern districts of the Bhopāl State in central India. *B. N.*, p. 598, spells it as Rāśīng.

² *Rāmzān*, 938 A. H.

³ At present, in the Jaipur State, about 220 miles, South of Delhi.

⁴ He is different from Ālam Ḳhān, Ibrāhīm's uncle, who had taken shelter with Bābur and desired to be ruler of Delhi in place of his nephew.

decorate his quarters. In fact, street decorations on a large scale,¹ according to one writer, were initiated by this lady.² The festivities continued for several days and ended with the bestowal of *ḵhilats* and horses on a number of nobles. If Nizāmuddīn Ahmad, the author of the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, be believed, 12000 of the *ḵhilats*³ with gold buttons were distributed, (January, 1533 A. D.).

In order to make further impression on Bahādūr, Humāyūn moved southwards and went to Gwālior⁴ with his seraglio and stayed there for two months, (February and March, 1533 A. D.). Humāyūn indulged in another series of festivities and organized *durbārs* as if to announce to Bahādūr that though he was ever ready to face the Sultān and had actually come out to meet him, he was not averse to peace. The nobles entertained the king and he was weighed in scales against coin. He was found to weigh 15000 *misqātī tankas* equivalent to one maund thirty-eight seers and two chhataks of our time. Public processions were held, consisting of a large number of elephants, camels, and horses. Free food was supplied to the public.

These demonstrations made some impression on Bahādūr; for he gave up his projects and made a treaty with Rānā Vikramājīt Singh of Chitor who was made to purchase a respite by a surrender of territories, a large sum of money, and the precious jewels⁵ obtained by the late Rānā Sāngā from the late king of Mālwa. The treaty with Rānā Vikramājīt was concluded on March 24, 1533 A. D. To Humāyūn the capture of Ranthambhōr⁶ and the humiliation of the Rānā were distasteful, but at the moment he

¹ Called *أئين بندي*

² *G. H. N.*, fol. 22b.

³ *G. H. N.* puts the number at 7000. *The Tabaqāt-Akbarī (T. A.)* calls the *ḵhilat* *بالا پوش* the outer garment.

⁴ 72 miles, s. e. of Āgrā.

⁵ A crown, a jewelled belt and a necklace.

⁶ 8 miles, n. e. of Sewai Madhopur railway junction in the Jaipur State. The fort is situated on an isolated rock 1578 feet above the sea-level, surrounded by a massive wall strengthened by towers and bastions.

was not quite ready to launch a new campaign, and so he remained quiet.

The cause of Humāyūn's hesitation seems to be the illness of his mother, Māham Bēgam. She had been suffering for some time past from some abdomen trouble. It grew so serious that Humāyūn had to cut short his stay at Gwālīor and repair to Āgrā where he arranged for a better treatment for his mother. All efforts, however, proved futile and she died on May 8, 1533 A. D.¹

Māham was a remarkable lady and wielded a great deal of power during her husband's and son's reigns. Born a *Shia*, and related to the cultured Sultān Husain Bāīqarā, she was a fit spouse for the illustrious Bābur. Her importance may be judged from the following facts:— (1) her accompaniment with her husband to Samarqand when Bābur conquered it in 1511 A. D. or when later on he was driven out of it, (2) the fact of her being the only queen who was allowed to sit by the side of the king on the throne of Delhi;² (3) Bābur's decision that she was to be the guardian of the child expected to be born to Dildār Āghācha.³ He paid no regard to the fact that Māham already possessed a son in Humāyūn, while Dildār had none. The newly born child was named Hindāl and placed under Māham's care; (4) the part played by her in her son's reign. It was she who organized many of the social functions of the palace and of the kingdom, and partly controlled the administration.

After Bābur's death Māham hardly ever left Āgrā.⁴ Muhammad Ali Asas, probably her brother,⁵ was made the superintendent of Bābur's tomb and sixty reciters of the Qurān were appointed. As a pious widow she interested

¹ 13th *Shawwāl* 939 A. H. As Mrs. Beveridge points out Gulbadan Bēgam wrongly assigns 940 A. H. to her death.

² *A. N.*, p. 114. Beveridge has wrongly translated *تخت* into 'table.'

³ *B. N.*, p. 374.

⁴ During the late trip to Gwālīor, many ladies had accompanied Humāyūn but probably Māham had stayed behind.

⁵ *G. H. N.*, p. 110 n. 3.

herself in the maintenance of her husband's tomb. Gulbadan Bēgam mentions that she especially looked after the food prepared twice daily for the attendants and the visitors. She further adds that the quantity of meat needed daily—an ox, two sheep, and five goats in the morning, and five goats in the afternoon—was provided by the widow.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Providence denied her the fulfilment of her only desire during her widowhood, viz., the birth of a male child to Humāyūn and the consequent stability of the Mughal throne. In her anxiety to have a grandson, she was ever negotiating new marriages for her son, though most of her proposals fell through because of Humāyūn's disapproval.¹

At the end of the usual period of mourning, viz., forty days or more after his mother's death, Humāyūn went to Delhi in July 1533 A. D. Even now he did not think of waging a war against Sultān Bahādur but occupied himself with a peaceful measure, viz., the foundation of a new city. The site he selected was the historic plain of Indraprastha,² associated with the Pāndavas of the Mahābhārata. It commanded a better situation than the old Lōdī town in the south-west.³ His new capital would be close to the river Jamna. The old ruins of Fīrūzābād, Sirī, Kīlūgarhī,⁴ and even the abandoned houses in the Lōdī Delhi, would supply him with sufficient building materials. The spurs of the Ārāvalli hills afforded him protection in the west while the space enclosed between them and the river, some six miles in width, was enough for the city to develop in. None of the previous Delhis, e.g. Qila-i-Rai Pithaura, Sirī, Jahānpanāh, Fīrūzābād, had these two ad-

¹ See *G. H. N.*, fol. 21b.

² Popularly called Indarpat. It was one of the five villages granted to the Pāndavas, the other four being Pānipat, Sōnpat, Bāghpat and Tilpat. See Fenshawe: *Delhi Past and Present* (F. D. P. P.)

³ Now indicated by the three Lōdī tombs.

⁴ Kīlūgarhī has been differently spelt. The proper form is Kīlūgarhī, meaning a fort, or *garhī* by the side of water. It was founded by Kaiqubād in 1287 A. D. by the bank of the Jamna, south of the present Purāna Qila.

vantages nor the later Shāhjahānābād.¹ The capital had the further advantage of being close to the saint Nizāmud-dīn *Aulia's* tomb. The area around it is considered sacred by the devout, and Humāyūn's city might share the sanctity on account of its situation. The site, thus, was an ideal one.

The foundations of the new city were laid in *Muharram* 940 A. H. (July 1533 A. D.). It was named Dīn-panāh, 'the Asylum of the Faith' and was completed in nine months, *i.e.*, by *Shawwāl* 940 A. H. (April, 1534 A. D.). The chronogram, *Shahr-i-pādshāh-i-Dīn-panāh* gives 940 A. H. as the year of its completion.

Ḳhwāndamīr² has given a description of the foundation of the city. While Humāyūn was staying in Gwālior, it had occurred to him that he should found a new city in Delhi which would contain a citadel with lofty walls and palaces of several storeys situated amidst delightful gardens and orchards. So on his return and at an auspicious hour³ chosen by himself, he laid the first stone-brick on the earth and after him, the *Mashāikh*, *Sayyids*, learned *maulavis*, and the elders of the city, placed more stone-bricks in the foundation. One and all of them enthusiastically supported the king's scheme, and the throng was so great that there was hardly any room for more. Thus the architects, masons, and labourers, could hardly cope with the demand of brick-stones and mortar.

* It was no foolish vanity that had stirred Humāyūn to build a new capital. He had found that the Delhi of the Lōdis breathed too much of class distinction or sectarianism. In Buhlūl Lōdī's time, every Afghān looked upon himself as a ruler and regarded all others as inferior.

¹ A glance at the map of Delhi attached to *F. D. P. P.* would make my point clear.

² Author of the *Humāyūn-nāma*. See *Elliot*, Vol. V, pp. 124-26.

³ Humāyūn was an expert astronomer and could calculate the movements of the planets. Later on he had himself selected the time of his marriage with Hamīda Bēgam. See *G. H. N.*, fol. 43b.

Sikandar Lōdī's bigotry was revolting to a liberal Muslim.¹ His new city was to be the haven for the wise and intelligent from all countries and the name, 'the Asylum of the Faith,' was to attract the pious of all denominations. Dīn-panāh, like Muhammad Tughluq's Daulatābād, was to announce the new Imperial policy of toleration and fair dealing to all. But Humāyūn did not make a fetish of his ideal; and unlike Muhammad Tughluq who gave preference to the foreigners over his own subjects,² he accorded a welcome to the learned—poets, *sufis*, historians, philosophers, etc.—who arrived from all parts of the Muslim world. He was so successful in his patronage that a very large number of the intellectuals gathered in his court, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that in his time the centre of Muslim culture was Delhi and not any town of Persia, Turkey, or Central Asia, and that every aspirant to literary or philosophic fame sought the patronage of the Mughal court.³ It was the liberal outlook of the cultured king that improved the tone of society in this remarkable way.

It may further be pointed out that the foundation of Dīn-panāh was meant indirectly to express Humāyūn's strong disapproval of the *Safawi* or Ottoman policy of tyranny and religious persecution.⁴ Hence Humāyūn's court was thronged by the refugees from both the countries.

The ruins of Dīn-panāh or Purāna Qila as it is called to-day, have been preserved by the Archaeological Department of the Government of India. The old city has

¹ For Buhlul's reign see the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* in *Elliot* IV, pp. 436-37 for Sikandar's, *Elliot* IV, p. 439 and the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Newal Kishore edition), pp. 163 last line, 16, 170-71. Also *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, pp. 240, 246.

² See the *Ibn Batūta* translated by Gibb, p. 184. Muhammad Tughluq called every foreigner *Azis* or 'the Honourable.'

³ This question of Mughal patronage of Muslim learning has been discussed at length by M. Ghani in his book, '*a history of the Persian language and literature at the Mughal Court,*' Part II, pp. 166-83.

⁴ For a brief description of the cruelties Brown: *Literary History of Persia* (*B. L. H. P.*), Vol. IV, pp. 55-56, 71-73, 96-97 may be consulted.

almost disappeared. The citadel may yet be located; for *Din-panāh* or *Purāna Qila* the outer walls are almost entire. It is three furlongs long and a furlong and a half wide. At one time, water from the Jamna surrounded it on all sides, as is clear from the causeway at the western entrance. The walls are lofty being about 40 feet in height and the entrance gate and the distant *Lal Darwāza*¹ are imposing structures and eloquent of the builder's design and ambition. How efficient Humāyūn's Public Works department was may be judged from the fact that the walls were completed in nine months, July, 1533 to April, 1534 A. D.

After Humāyūn's expulsion from India, in Sher Shāh's time were added the two existing buildings, *Masjid-i-Qila-i-kohna* and *Shēr Mandal*, the former being the *Jāmi Masjid* of the citadel and the latter being used for secular purposes. Humāyūn after his return made good use of both of them. He continued the first as a *Jāmi Masjid* and utilised the second as a library. It was in *Shēr Mandal* that Humāyūn stumbled, on the stairs, and died of the accident on January 24, 1556 A. D.

Two months after the completion of the citadel, in June 1534 A. D. a third series of feasts and durbars was held; in which *khilats*, titles, and other honours, were again bestowed on the princes and nobles. A long list is given by K̄hwādamīr. Hindāl and Yādgar Nāsir Mirzā² each got a crown, a costly *khilat*, and an Arab horse with gold trappings. Others who received *khilats* were Abdullah Sultān, Sultān Ali Mirzā, Amīr Mubārizuddīn Faqīr Ali, and Mirzā Qāsīm Arghūn. Qāsīm Arghūn also got the *togh*³ or the pennant of horse's hair and Yusuf Bēg, son of Amīr *Taghāi* a costly shaggy carpet.⁴ *Ustād* Ali Qulī, the

¹ Which can be seen from the *Purāna Qila*. It is believed that Humāyūn had left it incomplete and that it was his successors, Shēr Shāh and Salīm Shāh who completed it. The incomplete portions must have been the buildings within the citadel.

² Son of Bābur's third brother, Nāsir Mirzā.

³ See picture of Tumantogh or Chatrtogh in *A. A.*, Vol. I, Plate IX., at the end.

⁴ زبلوچه in Persian.

master-gunner, got a crown, a gold-embroidered *ḵhilat*, a golden dagger with belt, and an Arab horse.

Sultān Bahādūr regarded the foundation of Dīn-panāh and the citadel as a reply to his many campaigns which are to be dealt with later. So he set about to soothe the alarmed king and sent an envoy with a message of friendship and good will.¹ Humāyūn must have been greatly relieved; for he immediately responded by sending an equally cordial reply. The mutual assurance continued for some time after.²

After the completion of Dīn-panāh, Humāyūn returned to Āgrā in July 1534 A. D. At the request of the ladies of the palace, specially of his aunt, Ḵhān-Zāda Bēgam, two more feasts were arranged. One has been called by Mrs. Beveridge the 'mystic' feast.³ The other was Hindāl's marriage feast. Both were confined to the women of the palace or to those related to the nobles. Initially the idea of the celebrations had occurred to Māham Bēgam but she was now dead and her place was taken by Ḵhān-Zāda Bēgam. The full description of the feasts may be read in Gulbadan's work. At the first, there was, on the ground floor in the middle of a large octagonal hall, a tank with a platform where young men, pretty girls, musicians, and sweet-voiced reciters, were seated. The king and his sister, Ḵhān-Zāda, were assigned the jewelled throne presented by Māham Bēgam, who, if she had been alive, would herself have taken Ḵhān-Zāda's place. The palace, of more than one storey, was throughout highly decorated. On the first floor, there were three rooms termed, the Houses of (1) Dominion, (2) Good Fortune, (3) Pleasure. Large sums of money were distributed to the members of the

¹ Ḵhwāndamīr, a protege of Humāyūn, misinterprets it as a message of submission. According to him, the envoy.

که از پیش والی گجرات آمده عهدنامه اطاعت و انقیاد آورده بود بتشریفات فاخره سرفراز گردید.

Notice that the word *wālī*, governor, has been used for Bahādūr instead of Sultān or Shāh.

² A. H. G., p. 227.

³ According to Mrs. Beveridge, it commemorated Humāyūn's accession to the throne. We do not know the reasons of her statement.

palace, and other people who included all classes, *e.g.*, the Mirzās, chiefs, nobles, theologians, *dervishes*, grey-beards, soldiers, devotees, the poor, and the needy. It ended with a banquet and distribution of *ḳhilats* to the selected persons of the assembly.

The second feast was of greater importance; for it united Mahdi *Ḳhwāja's* family with Humāyūn's own. The actual marriage of Hindāl with Mahdi's sister, Sultānam Bēgam had already been celebrated in the lifetime of Māham Bēgam but the festivities had to be postponed owing to her illness. Now, Ḳhān-Zāda proposed that these should take place. She was greatly interested in the bride, not only because she was her husband's sister, but also because she had acted as her guardian and brought her up from the time she was a child of two. The marriage affords an example of Humāyūn's magnanimity towards his rivals and opponents. Here we see that he was not prejudiced by Mahdi *Ḳhwāja's* intrigues against his accession, and bore no malice or ill-will towards him. Gulbadan describes, in detail, the various gifts to the bridegroom and the bride, which included jewellery, costly dresses, furniture, articles from the royal workshops,¹ horses, elephants, and slaves from various countries—Turkey, Circassia, Russia, and Abyssinia.

After these festivities were over, Humāyūn continued at Āgrā for sometime longer. He would occasionally go with his ladies to the other side of the Jamna where a large number of pavilions had been set up for their use. The king would stay in one of them and the hostess and all other ladies would gather round him and pass the evening in merriment. On these occasions, amidst the crowd of women, the wives of the king would find themselves rather ignored. Once, one of them, Bēga Bēgam² protested against the neglect saying, '...How

¹ Indicated by the word کارخانہ. It cannot mean workshops, because they could not be presented.

² According to *G. H. N.* she was Humāyūn's chief queen, at this time. Later on, after the battle of Chausā, she fell into Shēr Shāh's hand but was restored to the king.

long will you think it right to show all these disfavours to us helpless ones? We, too, have hearts. Three times you have honoured other places with visits, and you have run day and night into one in amusement and conversation.¹ The king felt annoyed and kept quiet for the moment; but after a few days he got all the wives and sisters together and pleaded that as he was an opium-eater they should not be very exacting with him; that these assemblies were meant to please the elder women, aunts and grand-aunts, i.e., those who had once enjoyed happy days but were now, as widows, ignored by the world. He then proceeded to obtain a signed declaration from Bēga Bēgam and the other ladies, in which they were made to say that they were content with their lot whether he attended to them or not. The ladies felt helpless and signed, Bēga Bēgam only murmured a few words of disapproval but dared not refuse her signature. His desire to ameliorate the hard lot of his '*wali-nimatān*' speaks well of Humāyūn, the man. He would sacrifice his own pleasures and those of his queens for the sake of his elder widowed relations. It was really a continuance of his father's policy, the only difference being that whereas Bābur used to visit them on Friday afternoons,² Humāyūn preferred the Sunday and Tuesday evenings.

The chronology of the events related in this chapter may be given here:—

		A. D.	A. H.
1.	Humāyūn in Agrā	January 1533	939
2.	Humāyūn in Gwālior	February & March 1533	939
3.	Humāyūn on Agrā	April 1533	939
4.	Death of Māham Bēgam at Agrā	May 1533	939
5.	Humāyūn's stay in Agrā	May & June 1533	939
6.	Humāyūn went to Delhi, beginning of	July 1533	939
7.	Foundation of Dīn-panāh, end of	July 1533	940
8.	Completion of Dīn-panāh	April 1534	940
9.	Festivities at Dīn-panāh	June 1534	940
10.	Message from Bahādur	June 1534	940
11.	Humāyūn's return to Agrā	July 1534	940
12.	Mystic feast, end of	July 1534	941
13.	Hindāl's marriage festivities, beginning of	August 1534	941

¹ G. H. N. fol. 30a.

² G. H. N. fol. 11b.

CHAPTER VII
MUHAMMAD ZAMĀN MIRZĀ'S REBELLION—
SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
AFGHĀNS, 1534 A. D.

The foundation of Dīn-panāh (April, 1534 A. D.) and the exchange of messages with Bahādur Shāh of Gujrāt (June, 1534 A. D.) made Humāyūn's position more secure and impressive among the rulers of India. And his festivities and recent munificence went a long way towards weaning his nobles and subjects from his disgruntled relatives, among whom may be specially mentioned Muhammad Zamān Mirzā and Muhammad Sultān Mirzā and the latter's sons, Ūlūgh Mirzā and Shāh Mirzā. They were ever ready to create a disturbance. Humāyūn's kindly nature and his father's dying injunctions, however, prevented him from taking any extreme disciplinary step against them, and so when at his accession, some four years back, they had risen in rebellion, he had defeated them, ignored their crimes, and gone ahead with his conciliatory policy and confirmed their *jāgīrs*. Thus Muhammad Zamān Mirzā got back his *jāgīrs* in Bihār and Muhammad Sultān those in Qanauj.¹ To Zamān, Humāyūn was especially kind; for he was the king's brother-in-law, being married to his half-sister, Masūma Sultān Bēgam, and was a young Timurid of distinguished lineage and considerable abilities. Humāyūn made him the governor of Bihār and did a special honour to Masūma by giving her the most costly tent during his campings out of Agrā. Humāyūn hoped that such a generous gesture to the Mirzā and Masūma Sultān² would be appreciated and would tend to foster peace and harmony in the family and thereby in the Mughal kingdom.

¹ See *Erskine*, Vol. II, p. 13 and *G. H. N.*, fol. 22b.

² She was Bābur's eldest daughter and older than Humāyūn by a few months. See *G. H. N.*, 29b.

In July 1534 A.D. when the political sky was clear and the king was expecting a long term of peace, the two Mirzās raised their heads and allied themselves with another less distinguished prince, Wali Khūb Mirzā.¹ Humāyūn's prestige helped him to crush the enemy completely. A Mughal army proceeded to Bihār and took Muhammad Zamān M. prisoner. At the same time Muhammad Sultān M. and his two sons Ūlūgh M. and Shāh M. were captured. The king who had once mercifully condoned their treasons, determined not to show them favour any further. He ordered the three principal Mirzās, Zamān, Sultān and Wali Khūb to be blinded with fire-pencil,² and so long as the operation be not performed, they were to be kept in prison along with the two other Mirzās, Ūlūgh and Shāh. The prisoners were entrusted to Mirzā Yādgār Bēg *Taghāi*, maternal uncle, as well as father-in-law of Humāyūn.³ Wali Khūb M. and Muhammad Sultān M. were blinded but Muhammad Zamān M., by reason of his youth, prevailed upon his jailor to show mercy to him and spare him the misery of being blinded. The *taghāi* agreed and thus he became the cause of incalculable suffering to Humāyūn and the Mughal kingdom; for Muhammad Zamān M. escaped and fled to Bahādur Shāh of Gujrāt whom he incited to attack the Mughal dominions.

Having crushed the Timurid rebels of Bihār, Humāyūn desired to reduce Afghāns of the province also to submission.

On his last contact with the Mughals Shēr Khān had made terms with Humāyūn and had been permitted to retain Chunār. From that date—December, 1532 *The Afghāns.* A. D.—Shēr Khān's affairs had brightened. Since the Nūhānīs and Sultān Mahmūd Lōdī had retired, he made himself the leader of his countrymen.

¹ Farishta calls him Nuḡwat Mirzā.

² The process of blinding has been described by Erskine. See *E. H. I.*, Volume II, 14 n.

³ Mirzā Yādgār Bēg's daughter Bēga or Hāji Bēgam was married to Humāyūn.

Nasrat Shāh¹ of Bengal was succeeded by his son, Alāuddīn Fīrūz, in 1532 A. D.; but Mahmūd, Nasrat's brother and Fīrūz's uncle, who had been generously treated by the late king whom, however, he had ill-repaid by his rebellious conduct,² developed the ambition of seizing the throne and so after four months, when an opportunity occurred, he killed Fīrūz, and usurped the throne in May, 1533 A. D. under the title of Sultān Ghiyāsuddīn Mahmūd Shāh.

The usurpation of the throne by Mahmūd Shāh was not liked by some of his nobles, chief among whom was his brother-in-law,³ Maḥdūm-i-Ālam, the governor of Hājīpūr, in Bihār. So when Mahmūd ascended the throne, a conflict with Maḥdūm became inevitable. The latter in order to strengthen his position cordially reciprocated the advances of Shēr Ḳhān and thus between the two, the closest attachment grew up. Having thus secured an ally, Maḥdūm adopted a more defiant attitude towards Mahmūd and set about making preparations for a war in order to punish him for the murder of his late master's son. Mahmūd, in his turn, ordered Qutb Ḳhān, the governor of Mungīr, to crush Maḥdūm but in the actual battle he did not fare well and was defeated by his opponent, aided by Shēr Ḳhān. Qutb was sent again with better equipment and as Shēr Ḳhān was not by Maḥdūm's side Qutb obtained a decisive victory, and Maḥdūm was killed on the battlefield. But Bengal could not profit by his vast wealth; for under a presentiment of his approaching end, Maḥdūm had transferred the whole of it to Shēr Ḳhān.

In the meantime, Shēr Ḳhān's strife with his master, Jalāluddīn and other Nūhānīs had reached a climax, and Jalāl and his clansmen continually found themselves worsted. Hence they thought of surrendering their

¹ Called also Nasīb Shāh. *The Riāz-us-Salātīn* (R. S.), p. 139 points out the correctness of the name Nasrat and not of Nasīb.

² As early as 933 A. H. = 1526-27 A. D. he had rebelled against Nasrat Shāh and issued coins in his own name.

³ *Yazna*, sister's husband according to R. S.

heritage to the king of Bengal, in the hope that Mahmūd Shēr Khān as Shāh after disposing of Shēr Khān would allow Bihār to be governed by the Nūhānīs under the suzerainty of the king of Bengal.

Shēr Khān gained considerably from the defection of the Nūhānīs. For it left him master of the situation and made him highly popular with his non-Nūhānī countrymen who realized his solicitude for the welfare of his people as contrasted with the mean desertion of the Nūhānīs.¹

To proceed with the task of ameliorating the condition of his subjects, Shēr Khān invited every Afghān, even from distant Afghānistān with the idea that every Afghān would find shelter and protection in his territory. Shēr Khān planned a definite scheme of public welfare and utilized the public wealth as well as his private treasure for the purpose. The chief features of the scheme were:—

(a) The provision of employment for every indigent Afghān.

(b) Every Afghān was to do hard work in his own interest as well as in that of the State. The individual would thereby become more efficient and respected and the State would benefit by his exertions.

(c) Vagrancy was to be put down with a strong hand. An idler or shirker of work was to be severely punished, if necessary, capitally.

(d) In order to maintain a unity of purpose and avoid wastage or duplication, the whole organization was to work under his supervision, which would remove the great defect of an Afghān democracy, namely, a weak foreign policy. He would vigilantly protect the interests of his countrymen and if necessary, defend their rights against aggressors.

¹ According to Qanungo, Jalāl Nūhānī went over to Mahmūd Shāh in 1533 A. D.; according to Erskine, 4 years earlier. No other writer records the date of the flight.

Mahmūd Shāh did not stop with the death of Makhdūm but turned his attention to Shēr K̄hān. More than one war followed. In the first Qutb K̄hān, the general on behalf of Mahmūd, mentioned *Shēr K̄hān's wars with Bengal.* already, was killed and in the second, his son, Ibrāhīm, was signally defeated at the battle of Surajgarh, 11 miles west of Mungīr, on the river Ganges, in March, 1534 A. D. On both the occasions, Shēr K̄hān extended his territories first from Barh¹ to the river Kiul and then fifty miles further east up to almost Mungīr itself.

Let us now turn to Humāyūn. He was staying at Āgrā till the beginning of September, 1534 A. D. He must have been fretfully watching Shēr K̄hān's movements and getting uneasy at his attempt at uniting his people; though at times he lulled himself into the belief that Shēr K̄hān was a nobleman of the Mughal kingdom and his conquests indicated the extension of the kingdom itself. Humāyūn did not therefore move against Shēr K̄hān.

But there was another reason why Humāyūn could not proceed immediately against Shēr K̄hān. Bahādūr Shāh after exchanging cordial messages with Humāyūn, had turned hostile and between Shēr K̄hān and Bahādūr Shāh there had developed the political understanding that when Humāyūn would attack the one, the other would be more active. It will be remembered that it was Bahādūr Shāh's activities in the north that had forced Humāyūn to the treaty of Chunār with Shēr K̄hān and now when Shēr K̄hān won victories, the same fear of Bahādūr prevented him from moving against the Afghāns of Bihār.

With the death of Qutb and defeat of his son, however, Humāyūn realized that no further delay was advisable. He thought the completion of Dīn-panāh would keep Bahādūr quiet and he would be able to finish his Afghān expedition in a brief campaign. So in

¹ Situated 34 miles east of Patna.

September, 1534 A. D. he collected an army and went as far as Kanar¹ in the Kālpī district. There he heard a great deal of the renewed activities of Bahādur; how he had laid the second siege to Chitōr; extended a ready welcome to Ālam Ḳhān Ālāuddīn² and his son Tātār Ḳhān, and later on to Muhammad Zamān Mirzā, who had escaped from prison and fled to Bahādur³ followed by Yādgar *Taghāi*; and finally, how Bahādur was organizing a mighty campaign against Delhi. Reluctantly therefore and rather injudiciously, Humāyūn hastened back to Āgrā determined to face once for all this persistent menace and in one well-directed campaign to end it for good.

The following dates may be noted:—

- | | |
|--|-----------------------|
| (1) Rebellion of Mahammad Zamān M. and
Muhammad Sultān M. | July, 1534 A. D. |
| (2) The defeat and capture of the Mirzās | August, 1534 A. D. |
| (3) Humāyūn's march to the east | September, 1534 A. D. |
| (4) Humāyūn's return to Āgrā | November, 1534 A. D. |

¹ See *A. A.*, Vol. II, p. 184.

² Ibrāhīm Lōdī's uncle, who had been, for some time Bābur's candidate for the throne of Delhi.

³ November, 1534 A. D.

CHAPTER VIII

BAHĀDUR SHĀH OF GUJRĀT (1526-37 A. D.)

Gujrāt comprises to-day the Gujrāt speaking regions, *viz.* the peninsula of Kāthiāwād and Cutch, the districts and states of the Bombay Presidency from Pālanpūr to

Gujrāt. Damān, *i.e.*, the country lying between $20^{\circ}9'$ and $24^{\circ}43'N.$ and $68^{\circ}25'$ and $72^{\circ}22'E.$ The total area is more than 40,000 sq. miles of which nearly half consists of the Kāthiāwād peninsula. In mediæval times, Gujrāt had a wider political connotation and included the subordinate provinces of Sindh and K̄hāndēsh and after 1531 A. D., of Mālwa also. The principal town, Ahmadābād, situated on the river Sābarmatī, occupies the neck of the peninsula. The mainland is intersected by several other rivers, of which the principal are the Māhī, the Banās, the Narbadā, and the Tāptī.

The province has hardly any high mountains, the Narbadā and the Tāptī flowing through hillocks of low elevation. The western extremities of the *The hills of Gujrāt.* Vindhya and the Sātpūra ranges, Dungarpur Girnār and the Pālitānā hills and Mount Ābū,—these constitute the elevated and hilly regions.

The province is rich in its products and its ports, Diū, Gogo, Cambay, Broach, Surat, Nāvsārī, Bulsar, and *Its products.* Damān, were world-famous in the Muslim days. The customs duties paid by the Persian merchants alone at these ports reached the figure of 60,000 rupees.¹

Iron ore is found in the peninsula and at the mouth of the Tāptī and cornelian of good quality in abundance in Rājpipla. Several agricultural crops are produced, namely rice, wheat, barley, millets, and gram. But the

¹ See *M. S. (B. M.)* fol. 145a.

most valuable crop is cotton, of which a large quantity is raised. The date-palm and the palmyra flourish throughout the country. Of fruits many varieties prevail, of which jack, mango, musk-melon, and water-melon, are well-known. The figs and the huge adansonia useful to the coastal fishermen as floats for their nets may also be mentioned. In Abul Fazl's words, 'From the numerous groves of mango and other trees, it (Gujrāt) may be said to represent a garden.'¹

Gujrāt was a thriving centre of industries and art crafts. The mother-of-pearl inlay work, painting, seal-engraving, have been mentioned by the *Āin-i-Akbarī*.

Similarly, various kinds of skilled work in gold embroidery on cotton or silk, such as *Chirah*, *Fotah*, etc., and velvets and brocades, were manufactured and various imitations of those imported from Turkey, Europe, or Persia, were made. Excellent swords and daggers, bows and arrows were made in the province and there was a brisk business in jewellery. Silver was imported from Turkey and Mesopotamia.

The history of Gujrāt goes into the distant past. Sri Krishna is said to have retreated to Dwārakā, at the extreme end of the Kāthīwād peninsula, and died there.

Coming to a more recent period, we know that the peninsula under the name of *Surāshtra* and also the mainland were included in Asōka's empire. The Saka chiefs of *Surāshtra* were again made tributary in the time of Samudra Gupta and Chandra Gupta II in the 4th century A. D.

With the fall of the Guptas, Western India came under the control of the Maitraka tribe, who fixed their capital at Vallabhi.² In Harsha's time (606-47 A. D.), Vallabhi acknowledged his suzerainty.

¹ A. A., Vol. II, p. 239. Lane-Poole in his *Mediaeval India*, Ch. VII, expresses the same sentiment.

² See Forbes: *Rās Mālā*, Vol. I, p. 20, n. 1. The town was situated 20 miles west of Bhavanagar and 25 miles south of Satrunjaya hills.

After the death of Harsha, when India broke up into small independent principalities, Gujrāt also set itself up as a separate kingdom. The Chālukya or Solankī dynasty, founded by one Mūlrāj, continued till 1242 A. D., when its last ruler Bhīma Dēva II died. Bhīma is remembered for a victory that he obtained on Muhammad Ghūri in 1179 A. D., though fifteen years later, Muhammad's general Qutbuddīn Aibak took revenge by winning a victory and plundering the rich country.

After Bhīma Dēva's disappearance, the Baghela ministers of the Solankī chiefs came into prominence. Visāla Dēva became an independent ruler in 1243 A. D., and it was his great grandson, Karna Dēva¹ who was defeated by Alāuddīn's generals, Ūlūgh Ḳhān and Nusrat Ḳhān in 1287 A. D.

Henceforward Gujrāt formed part of the Delhi kingdom. Its last governor was Zafar Ḳhān appointed in 1391 A. D. By 1396 A. D., he secured his position and when he found that the rival puppet kings of Delhi, Mahmūd Shāh and Nasrat Shāh, both of the Tughluq dynasty, were constantly fighting against each other, he assumed independence (1396 A. D.), though the actual title of Sultān Muzaffar Shāh was adopted eight years later in 1404 A. D.²

Bahādur Shāh belonged to this dynasty. He was the grandson of the equally famous Sultān Mahmūd Begarha (1458-1511 A. D.). As a prince, Bahādur was noted for his ability and energy. Annoyed because his father, Muzaffar Shāh II, (1511-26 A. D.), refused to treat him on equal terms with his elder brother, Sikandar Ḳhān, the heir-apparent, he left

*Bahādur Shāh
as prince.*

¹ *Rās Mālā*, Vol. I, p. 272, gives the following genealogy about him:

Visāla Dēva
|
Arjūna Dēva
|
Sārang Dēva
|
Karna Dēva

C. H. I., Vol. III, the chapter on Gujrāt.

the kingdom, and passing through Mewāt¹ reached Delhi, in the beginning

Everything was in a state of trouble and confusion there; for Bābur had crossed the Indus, the first and last time, imprisoned Daulat Khān, occupied the whole province of the Punjāb, and was fast approaching Pānipat.

Bahādūr moved to Sultān Ibrāhīm's camp, situated several miles to the south-east of the battlefield. The prince was welcomed by the Sultān and he took up the Lōdī cause.² This made him popular with the Bahādūr Khān in Sultān Ibrāhīm's camp. Afghān army and so the Sultān grew jealous and cold. When Bahādūr discovered this, he refrained from further activity and in the actual battle fought on April 18, 1526 A. D., he remained merely a spectator. He was impressed by Bābur's skill and his followers' valour on the battlefield.³ Several years afterwards, he was unwilling to come into direct conflict with the Mughals, observing that the Indians as compared with the Mughals were like glass against stone and in any impact between the two, it would be the Indians who would suffer.⁴

Immediately after the defeat of the Afghāns, Bahādūr was offered the throne of Jaunpūr. At the end of Sultān

¹ See *A. H. G.*, p. 128. where the writer says:

التمس بهادر من ابيه ان يكون له من وطيفة المعاش ما لاخيه سكندر

This contradicts the same writer's statement on page 121.

فالتمس (بهادر) من والده ان لم يزد على ما بدده من الرولية فيساويه فيها باصغر اخوته سناً سكندر -

The former seems to be the more correct statement. According to *M. S.*, Bahādūr's *Murshid*, *Hazrat Shāh Shaikh Jiu* died immediately after and Sikandar made the derisive remark 'the master died and the disciple became a wanderer.'

² *A. H. G.*, p. 128 has ركب بهادر بغاصته وارقل في اثرهم

وادركهم وقتل الكثير منهم (the Mughals) رجع بالاساري ولم يفت منهم احد

³ See *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 3. He is incorrect in his statement that Bahādūr reached Ibrāhīm's camp on the day of the battle. I have followed *A. H. G.*, pp. 120-21, see also p. 229.

⁴ *A. H. G.*, p. 229.

Ibrāhīm's reign there was plenty of unrest, and the eastern Afghāns under the leadership of Bahādūr K̄hān Nūhānī, rebelled against him. Those who had gathered at Pānīpat saw nothing but defeat and death of their master because of the superior skill of the foe. Impressed by this superiority of the foreigner they were in search of an abler leader than the Nūhānis could supply. Hence their request to Bahādūr to ascend the throne of Jaunpūr.

But in Gujrāt also, Bahādūr was needed, his father, Muzaffar Shāh, having died on April 7, 1526 A.D., 11 days before the battle of Pānīpat. The nobles were not unanimous in their selection; some favoured Sikandar, the heir-apparent, some the second son Bahādūr, and a few the third son Latīf K̄hān. Being on the spot, Sikandar K̄hān succeeded but his supporters, Imād-ul-Mulk K̄hushqadam, and K̄hudāwand K̄hān al-Ījī, and those who were not in his favour, all got alarmed at his insensate idiocy.¹ He was assassinated by Imād-ul-Mulk on April 12, 1526 A. D., after a reign of 5 days.

As mentioned above, there were several parties favouring the remaining princes. A large number of nobles headed by Tāj K̄hān Narpālī² favoured Bahādūr; a few, headed by Qaisar K̄hān,³ Latīf K̄hān; but the two most important of the ministers, K̄hudāwand K̄hān al-Ījī and Imād-ul-Mulk K̄hushqadam,⁴ who had raised Sikandar to the throne and then murdered him, were in favour of Muzaffar Shāh's youngest son, Nasīr K̄hān.⁵ They tried

¹ A. H. G., p. 133. He would strike at his shoes or sugar-cane sticks, bound together, with his sword and name some nobleman, whom he thought he was beheading. The author's words are كان اذا جرب سيفاً يرميه على خف او قصب سكر مجموع في عقد قال هذا فلان فلان فتعاشه جماعت من المسلمين في تجرية السيف

² A. H. G. calls him الوزير الكبير

³ Also called الوزير الكبير

⁴ A. H. G., p. 133, ll. 3-4.

⁵ A. H. G., p. 133, ll. 20-25. M. S. points out that Imād was the first murderer of a Gujrāt king, also that henceforth no king would die in his bed. The latter statement is not true.

to win over the other nobles by a lavish grant of titles but as it was not accompanied by any *jāgīr*, it did not reconcile them. Next Imād-ul-mulk wrote to the neighbouring chiefs, Imād-ul-mulk of Berār¹ and Rānā Sāngā and also to Bābur,² to support his government.³ Since it might mean loss of independence for Gujrāt, some patriots headed by Tāj Khān Narpālī⁴ combined to frustrate his plans. They sent Pāyanda Khān to Bahādur with an offer of the throne of Gujrāt. He met Bahādur at Bāgh Pat,⁵ and delivered his message. Bahādur preferred the throne of his native kingdom to that of the distant Jaunpūr, explained the situation to the accompanying Jaunpūrī nobles, offered excuses and obtained permission to part with them. After a rapid march, he reached Ahmadābād and ascended the throne on July 11, 1526 A. D.

One of his first actions was to secure and execute Imād-ul-mulk Khushqadam⁶ and the other assassins of Sikandar; Latīf also disappeared about this time, the infant ruler, Nasīr Khān, entitled Mahmūd Shāh II, was murdered, and another adult brother, Chānd Khān left for Mandū. So Bahādur was left without any rival in his kingdom.

Sultān Bahādur Shāh ruled for nearly 11 years (July 1526—February, 1537 A. D.) and is remembered as one of the most distinguished rulers of Gujrāt and deserves, along with his grandfather, Sultān Mahmūd Begarha, a place among the renowned kings of India. At the time of his accession, he was reputed for ability, energy, and piety,

*Bahādur as
king.*

¹ Alāuddīn Imād Shāh who ruled 1504-29 A. D.

² Bābur was offered a *crore* of *tankas* in cash. See *M. S.* fol. 130b.

³ In which, *M. S.* includes the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Bahādur Shāhī*; This precious history seems to have completely disappeared.

⁴ Tāj Khān is remembered as the builder of the marble tomb of Shāh Ālam, the son of Qutb-ul-Ālam, the great saint of Ahmadābād. See its photograph in *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, plate 27.

⁵ Situated in 28°56' N. and 77°17' E. The name is incorrectly written in *M. S.* as Bāgh-i-Pānipat. The *Mirāt-i-Ahmadi* makes Bahādur reach the Jaunpūr kingdom before his return to Gujrāt, which is unlikely.

⁶ *A. T. W. H. G.* says, he was flayed alive.

and known to be deeply devoted to *Hazrat Shāh Shaiḡh Jiu*¹ and his successor.

With Bahādur's accession, Gujrāt entered on one of its most brilliant periods. Bahādur was merely a youth of twenty and almost immediately after his accession started on a career of campaigns and conquests. After restoring tranquillity to his kingdom, he launched upon a protracted warfare against his neighbours. It will suffice to record here his successes with a brief description of some of them :—

(1) In 1527-29 A. D., in response to an appeal from Alāuddīn Imād-ul-mulk of Berār and Muhammad II of Khāndēsh,² Bahādur forced Burhān Nizām Shāh (1509-53 A. D.) to retreat and acknowledge him as his suzerain and read *ḡhutbah* in his name.

(2) In 1530-31 A. D., he faced the Portuguese who had already captured Damān. In the naval conflict near Diū, the Portuguese were repulsed.

(3) In 1531 A. D., in alliance with Rānā Ratan Singh, he put an end to the independence of Mālwa. In the past, *i.e.* in Muzaffar's time, Mahmūd II of Malwa (1511-31 A. D.) was treated with the most generous consideration. In Mahmūd's interest, so far back as 1518 A. D., 19,000 of the Rājput̄s, who kept him in bondage, were massacred at Mandū, and Gujrāt contingents were placed in the different parts of Mālwa.

But with the accession of Bahādur, the friendliness had changed at first into indifference and then into hostility and for both these changes, Mahmūd had to thank himself. He gave shelter to Chānd Khān, one of Bahādur's

¹ It was at *Shaiḡh Jiu*'s death and Bahādur's departure that Sikandar's sneering remark *پیر مرا مرید چوگی هوا* was made. The *Shaiḡh*'s full name was Sayyid Jaāluddīn Shāh Shaiḡh Jiu. He was the grandson of Qutb-ul-Ālam Sayyid Burhān-ud-dīn.

See the *Mirāt-i-Ahmadi* (Gaekwād's Oriental Series) Supplement, p. 24 for a description of the *Shaiḡh*'s life. Born 853 A. H. = 1449-50 A. D.; died in 931 A. H. = 1524 A. D.; and lies buried at Batwah.

² Muhammad was Bahādur's nephew, being the son of his sister.

brothers,¹ and pretender to the throne of Gujrāt and this in spite of repeated protests from Bahādur.² To add to his crime, he attacked some of the districts of the Rānā. So the two combined and proposed an invasion of Mahmūd's kingdom. Bahādur still hoped that the Mālwa ruler would come to his senses and concede the surrender of Chānd K̄hān. There were repeated promises but the actual surrender was never made. At last Bahādur, seeing that no compromise was forthcoming, took Mahmūd prisoner and annexed his kingdom in March, 1531 A. D.³

(4) In the same year, he granted to Burhān Nizām of Ahmadnagar and also to his nephew, Muhammad of K̄hāndesh permission to affix the title of *Shāh* to their names. People would style him, as pointed out by Burhān, *Shāh-in-Shāh* or the *Shāh* of the *Shāhs*. *Amīr* Barīd-ul-Mumālīk of Bīdar⁴ also, according to the *Mirāt-i-Sikandari*, seems to have submitted to Bahādur by reading *khutbah* in his name.

¹ Muzaffar Shāh's family is shown:
Muzaffar Shāh (1511-26 A. D.)

Sikandar K̄h.	Bahādur K̄h.	Latīf K̄h.	Chānd K̄h.	Nasīr K̄h.	Daughter =	
					Ādil K̄hān of K̄hāndesh.	
					Muhammad II.	

C. H. I., Vol. III, p. 711 makes Nasīr K̄hān and Muhammad two different personages; also Chānd K̄hān as younger to Nasīr K̄hān. The histories do not support these assumptions.

² See *A. H. G.*, pp. 195-96 for the full description. Even on the last day of his kingship, just before his surrender, to Bahādur, Mahmūd requested Rai Rai Singh to escort Chānd K̄hān to a safe refuge. Mahmūd's reason for this solicitude was that Muzaffar Shāh had entrusted Chānd K̄hān to him and he would not be false to his benefactor whatever might happen to him. See also *M. S.* fol. 142.

³ *A. H. G.* gives the date of Mahmūd's imprisonment as the 10th *shabān* and Bahādur's annexation of Mālwa as Friday, the 12th *Shabān* 937 A. H. = 31st March, 1531 A. D. The *Tabaqāt-i-Akbari*'s date is 12th *Ramzān* 938 A. H.

⁴ *M. S.* fol. 132a calls him Barīd Shāh. According to *C. H. I.*, it was Amīr's successor, Alī (1542-71 A. D.), that first assumed the title. For Burhān Nizām's request for the title of Shāh, see *M. S.* fol. 142b.; for Muhammad of K̄hāndesh, fol. 145a.

(5) The *capture of Raisen*, May, 1532 A. D.—Next Bahādur turned against the semi-independent Rājput chiefs of Mālwa. In the last twenty years or more they had brought the whole kingdom under their control and divided the eastern districts amongst themselves.¹ The chief of them was Silhadi, the Lord of Raisen.² Bahādur who was bitterly opposed to the non-Muslims outside his kingdom,³ turned against Silhadi, who had given him umbrage by keeping in his harem a large number of Muslim women. Silhadi interested the Gujrāt nobleman, Nassan Khān in his favour and when Bahādur paid no heed to his pleadings, took the extreme step of turning a Muslim, called himself Salāhuddīn, and obtained initiation into the Muslim faith from Nūruddīn Burhān-ul-mulk Banbāni.⁴ But Bahādur did not spare him even then. So he retracted his profession, returned to his brother, Lakshman Singh, who had been left in charge of the fort and both of them died fighting along with most of their Rājput

¹ Hence called the *Purabiya* Rājputs.

² Ojha, the author of the *Udaipur Rajya ka Itihas* (U. R. I.), says that Raisen was in his brother, Lakshman Singh's possession. Probably, the latter was Silhadi's deputy.

³ Bahādur's policy towards the Hindus was not without some redeeming features:—

- (a) He had promised to redress Silhadi's wrongs against Mahmūd Khalji of Mālwa.
- (b) Hindu heirs were granted stipends of their parents see *A. H. G.*, p. 247, 1, 17.
- (c) Hindus were freely appointed to trusted commands; even the aboriginal tribes were treated with consideration. These explain why Bahādur's subjects in rural districts paid him revenue of their own accord and also why the *Kōlis* and the *Bhils* of Cambay, acting in his favour, attached Humāyūn's camp.
- (d) He gave a Sanskrit name, *Sangār* (Sringār) *Mandap* to his *Durbar* Hall and thus pleased his Hindu subjects. See *Bailey's History of Gujrāt*, p. 329.
- (e) Bahādur had allowed Ratan Singh's minister, Karma Singh to repair a temple at Satrunjaya in Kāthiāwād. See Ojha *U. R. I.*, Vol. I, pp. 391-92.

⁴ *M. S.* fol. 147b, *A. H. G.*, p. 224. The latter says that Silhadi accepted Islam in Bahādur Shāh's presence. But Bābur's memoirs names him Salāhuddīn in the description of the battle of Kāhāwah. Silhadi's defect appears to be his inclination to Islam as well as to his clansmen.

followers. The women had performed the *jauhar* ceremony before the death of their male relations. The fall of Raisen, mostly due to the artillery fire of Rūmī Khān,¹ his master-gunner, took place at the end of *Ramzān*, 938 A.H. (= May, 1532 A.D.)

Bahādur had hardly any territorial ambition in crushing Silhadi; for he gave most of the Rājput's *jāgīrs* including the districts of Chandēri, Bhilsa, and Raisen to Ālam Khān Lōdī, the late governor of Kālpī under Ibrāhīm. Ālam Khān had been turned away by Humāyūn and had taken shelter with Bahādur. In return for the grant of *jāgīrs* to Ālam Khān, Bahādur wanted him to crush the influence of the *Purabiya Rājputs* and establish that of his master instead. It seems that Kālpī also had been conferred on Ālam but probably his hold on this district was merely nominal.

(6) The *first siege of Chitōr*, 1533 A.D.—Before describing Bahādur's first siege of Chitōr, it seems advisable to give a brief history of the recent events in the State. Rānā Sāngā died on January 19, 1528 A.D.² and was succeeded by Ratan Singh, whom Tod represents³ as a vainglorious youth for his boastful command that the gates of Chitōr should never be closed, for 'its portals were Delhi and Mandū.' But probably there is too much colour in his picture of the Rānā.

*The previous
history of
Chitōr.*

¹ A person of outstanding personality. Commissariat in his article on 'a brief History of the Gujrāt Sultānate,' (*H. G. S.*) in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. Bombay Branch (J. R. A. S. B. B.) 1918-19 furnishes many interesting details but is wrong in taking Rūmī Khān to be a European. *A. H. G.* also gives details on pp. 218-20; thus we know that his name was Amīr Mustafā bin Behrām of Constantinople; on his arrival at Diū, he was welcomed by the governor and later on by Bahādur; he was given *jāgīrs* in Ranir and Surat and later on Diū was added to it. *A. N.* also pays him a great compliment در فتح حصرون حصین

در فتح رورگار برد 'was the paragon of age in conquering strong forts and sky-high castles.' The *Tazkirat-ul-Umarā* supports *A. H. G.* in the details of Rūmī Khān's father. Erskine is mistaken in calling him Khudāwand Khān Rūmī.

² See *U. R. I.*, p. 383.

³ See Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. I, p. 247.

Be that as it may; he had a short reign, dying in 1531¹ A.D. of a wound received in a family brawl started by himself.²

As he left no son, he was succeeded by his younger brother Vikramāditya, (Bikramājī) who was, as prince, lord of Ranthambhōr³ and was prepared to surrender the place to Bābur, so far back as October 1528 A. D., in return either for Biāna or for the throne of Chitōr. Vikramāditya was wholly unworthy of his illustrious father or even his reckless brother. Tod represents him as insolent, passionate and vindictive and accuses him of favouring his personal followers and seven thousand wrestlers whom he had engaged in his service. The Rājput *sardārs* whom he ridiculed, retired in sullen disgust to their *jāgirs* determined to have nothing to do with their new Rānā. Left to himself and his favourites, Vikramāditya neglected the administration of his State to such an extent that by the people of the kingdom his reign was nick-named '*Pappa Bai ka raj*.'⁴

Bahādur Shāh had long had a covetous eye on Chitōr. He had so long refrained from an expedition; for both the Rānās, Sāngā and Ratan Singh, had been courteous to him, one congratulating him on his accession and the other obtaining his permission to repair a temple at Satrunjaya.⁵ But the new Rānā seemed to ignore him and the rest of the world. Only once did he stir to render aid to Silhadi against the Sultān of Gujrāt. But Vikramāditya was so lazy that beyond some half-hearted movements, he made no serious efforts to save Silhadi. But his movements angered Bahādur, who now, when the Rānā's nobles had deserted him, found an excellent opportunity of attacking him.

¹ U. R. I., p. 393.

² Tod, Vol. I, p. 247. Erskine wrongly assigns to him a reign of five years.

³ B. N., pp. 616-17. U. R. I., Vol. I, p. 394.

⁴ 'Lady-father's rule.' The Rānā is addressed in his State as Father but Vikramāditya was a *Bai*, 'lady,' because he remained confined to the palace. See Tod, p. 248. Also C. H. I., Vol. III, p. 530.

⁵ U. R. I., p. 391.

Bahādur's campaign started with the capture of Ranthambhōr¹ by Rūmī Ḳhān. His other generals like Muhammad of Ḳhāndēsh, Ḳhudāwand Ḳhān, and Alaf Khān, captured the other minor forts, Gāgraum, Kanōr, Tilhati, and Pergusa. He himself followed at a greater leisure in November 16, 1532 A. D.² Before he reached Chitōr, the Rānā's ambassadors had come with an offer of tribute and surrender of the districts, recently acquired by the subjugation of Mālwa. But the Sultān, correctly informed of the state of the Rānā's army by his own cousin, Narsingh Deva,³ paid no heed to his *vakils'* representations; he urged Tātār Ḳhān Lōdī, Alāuddīn Ālam Ḳhān's son, to hasten with a further contingent of Gujrātī troops instead. This he did so promptly that he reached Chitōrgarh on the 30th January, 1533 A. D. 4 days in advance of the other generals.⁴ The Sultān followed. According to the *Tārīkh-i-Bahādur Shāhī*, Bahādur had assembled such a vast army that a complete siege of the fort, never attempted before, was now possible.

Bahādur placed the siege operations in charge of Rūmī Ḳhān, a gunner of outstanding ability and renown. On his first arrival at the Gujrāt coast in 1531 A. D., he was taken into service with all his followers. Henceforth his promotion was rapid and a short while after his enlistment, he succeeded Malik Tūghān,⁵ the son of the more renowned Malik Ayāz,⁶ as the governor of Diū. But Mustafā Rūmī Ḳhān was a man of insatiable ambition and hankered after further rewards, e.g., the gift of a fort like Ranthambhōr or Chitōr. The former had been promised by the Sultān before its capture, but afterwards he changed his mind, as it was represented to him that

¹ A. H. G. discusses the question whether Ranthambhōr was taken earlier than Chitōr and comes to the conclusion that it was. See p. 228.

² U. R. I., p. 395.

³ *Ibid.* I reject the other name, Medinī Rao, who had died in 1528 A. D.

⁴ C. H. I., Vol. III, makes them arrive on February 14, which is unlikely.

⁵ A. H. G., p. 220, speaks of his extraordinary physique and strength.

⁶ The victor of the battle of Chaul. See C. H. I., Vol. III, p. 312.

the bestowal of an impregnable fort like that of Ranthambhōr on a stranger was inadvisable; it was then given to another noble, Nassan Ḳhān.¹ Rūmī Ḳhān seems never to have forgiven Bahādur for the nonfulfilment of his promise.

The fort of Chitōr or Chitrakūt situated in 24°53' N and 74°39' E is about 500' high and at the top, forms a plateau 3½ miles in length and half a mile broad; near by flows the river Gambhīr. Tradition assigns the foundation of the fort to Bhīma, the second of the Pāndava brothers. Originally, it belonged to the Mōrī Rājput̄s from whom Bappa Rāwal had captured it in 734 A. D. For the next eight centuries or more, till 1567 A. D., Chitōr had remained the capital of the Mewār State. In that year the seat of the government was removed to Udaipūr.²

Chitōr was thrice captured and sacked by the Muslims; once by Alāuddīn in 1303 A. D., the second time by Bahādur Shāh in 1535 A. D., and lastly by Akbar in 1567 A. D. It is to the credit of Mewār that it survived such tremendous shocks and continued to wage almost continuous war for another half a century or so.

To-day the fort is nothing but a collection of ruins, unfolding to an archæologist a wonderful tale of chivalry, devotion, piety, and sacrifice, commencing from the days of the Mōrī Rājput̄s. Its ruins are too many and we would be content merely to mention the two *stambhas*—Kirti and Jaya, the three gates—Rāmā Pōl, Lākhōta Bāri, and Suraj Pōl, and the temples dedicated to Krishna and Kālikā. The huge ramparts, the various *tāls*, and the innumerable cenotaphs, add to the picturesqueness of the place.

In the neighbourhood of Chitōr on the west, is situated the bridge built by Alāuddīn in the name of his son, Ḳhizr

¹ A. H. G., p. 229.

² Even at the present day, 'Chitrakūt' *i.e.*, Chitōr is inscribed on the Rānā's coins.

Khān; and 7 miles to the north lies the village of Nagari, which served Akbar for his camp, a fact attested, to this day, by a pyramidal column called by the vulgar people, Akbar's *dia* or lamp.

Rūmī Khān opened his siege by capturing a hillock commanding the fort and taking his guns there. By continuous firing, he unnerved the besieged. He also ran mines and made covered pathways for the approach of his soldiers. Rānī Ḳarnāvati, the Rānā's mother¹ had appealed to Humāyūn for help but since no response came except the king's advance to Gwālior and stay there for two months,² she was forced to purchase peace on humiliating terms, *viz.* the surrender of the conquered districts of Mālwa, the jewelled crown and belt taken from Mahmūd II, 10 elephants, 100 horses, and five crores of tankas. Bahādūr for the present retired.³ The treaty was signed on March 24, 1533 A. D.⁴

(7) *The capture of Ajmēr and Nagore, 1533 A. D.*,— Bahādūr turned next to a more northern part of Rājputāna, where he captured Ajmēr and Nagore.⁵ Certainly the capture of Ranthambhōr, Ajmēr, and Nagore, drove a wedge into Rājputāna, dividing it into two halves, to either of which, Bahādūr could turn at his leisure.

¹ Tod is mistaken in calling her Udai Singh's mother. *B. N.* calls her Padmavati. *U. R. I.*, p. 396 calls her Karnāvati.

² February and March, 1533 A. D. *Farsihta*, p. 213, l. 24 has

استعانت نمود - انحضرت از دارالملک دهلی بقصد گوشمال بهادر شاه و اعانت وانا حرکت فرموده بعد از آنکه بنواخی گوالیار رسید بنابر اقتضای وقت درماه توقف کرده آخر بجانب آگره برگشت

It is probable that Bahādūr was led to sign a treaty with Rājputāna on account of Humāyūn's advance to Gwālior.

³ *U. R. I.*, p. 396 n. has put in a curious anecdote that on retirement, Bahādūr had carried with him, the infant Udai Singh in order to make him his successor but the Rājput followers of Udai, getting wind of the matter, spirited him away. For the details of the treaty see *M. S.*

⁴ 27th *Shabān* 939 A. H.

⁵ At present, in the Jōdhpūr State. In mediæval times, it lay on one of the few main routes from Delhi to Gujrāt. In 'sayer' or commercial duties alone, it paid nearly a lac of rupees to the Jōdhpūr government. Situated in 27°10' N. and 73°53' E. and distant 250 miles from Delhi.

(8) *The second siege of Chitōr*, November, 1534—March, 1535 A. D., followed by its capture.—Since the Rānā had not profited by the respite granted during the last 20 months and continued to be as careless as before and the *sardārs* still as indifferent, Bahādur again turned towards him and fought a battle at Loicha.¹ There the Rānā's vassals deserted him and he was signally defeated. Then the Sultān brought again a large army to Chitōr and settled round the fort. Even with the approach of the enemy, the Rānā made no effort to rally his men. The task was left to be done by his mother, Karnāvati, who appealed to the disgruntled *sardārs*, to bestir themselves for the defence of their homes, if not of their chief. The appeal had its effect and the *Sisōdias* gathered from all parts of Mewār. The unpopular Vikramāditya and the infant Udai Singh both were removed to Boondi and the direction of the defence was entrusted to Rāwat Bāgh Singh of Devlia-Pratāpgarh. The Rāwat, realizing the insignificance of the Rājput garrison, abandoned all idea of an offensive and concentrated his whole attention on defence. The different gates were entrusted to the different chiefs. He himself took his post at the Bhairava gate and placed Solankī Bhairava Dās at Hanumān Pōl and Jhāla Rāj-rānā Sajja of Dailwārā at Ganēsh Pōl.

As on the previous occasion, Bahādur entrusted the attack to Rūmī Ḳhān. Instead of trying to take the place by assault or starving the garrison, Rūmī Ḳhān occupied the neighbouring hillock at the south-western extremity of the fort and carried his guns to the top. From there he started a withering fire which blew away some twenty-two yards of the defences in the direction of Bika-khoh early in March, 1535 A. D. While the Hāda leader, Arjun, was defending himself to death, the besiegers rushed in other directions, *i.e.*, towards Bhairava Pōl, Suraj Pōl and Lākhōta Bāri. At the first gate Bāgh Singh was the commandant, who was killed with his nephew Rāwat Narbad. The other

¹ In the Boondi State. Situated in 25°17' N. and 75°34' E.

sardārs were also killed, at the other gates. The *Udaipur Rajya ka Itihas* mentions the death of the following chiefs :

1. Bāgh Singh of Devlia-Pratāpgarh,
2. Solankī Bhairava Dās of Daisūrī,
3. *Rājranā* Sajja of Dailwārā,
4. Rāwats Duda, Satta and Kamma, the *Chandāwats*,
5. Mālā of Sōngarh,
6. *Rāwat* Dēvī Dās,
7. *Rāwat* Bāgh,
8. *Rāwat* Nanda,
9. Dodia *Bhānd*.

According to the *Khiāts*, the Rājput chronicies, the Rājput̄s lost 32,000 men and their women performed the *jauhar* ceremony and burnt themselves to death. After the capture of the fort, on 3rd *Ramzān* 941 A.H. (=8th March, 1535, A.D.), Bahādur granted it, not to Rūmī Ḳhān whom he had promised it when the siege had begun, but to Burhān-ul-mulk Banbāni. Thus Rūmī Ḳhān was disappointed for the second time and this intensified the offence he had taken.

We shall see in the next chapter how Rūmī Ḳhān took his revenge by playing Bahādur false and ruining his cause.

CHAPTER IX

SULTAN BAHĀDUR SHĀH OF GUJRĀT AND THE PRINCELY REFUGEES FROM THE MUGHAL KINGDOM (1534 A. D.)

Bahādur Shāh came to the throne in 1526 A. D. His reputation for munificence and other princely virtues had been so great that needy persons from all parts of India flocked to his realm. The recent revolution threw most of the Afghāns out of employment, who till then had formed the ruling class. Both the common Afghāns and the nobility gathered in Bahādur's court, the former as ordinary soldiers¹ and the latter in a more dignified capacity. Of these Afghān nobles, two have been specially mentioned. One was Ālam Ḳhān Jighat, the late governor of Kālpī. He supported Bābur in 1529 A. D. against the Afghāns of Bihār. For some unrecorded reason, he was dissatisfied with Humāyūn and fled to Bahādur, who granted him, after the fall of Raisen² in May 1532 A. D., the territory round it in addition to Bhilsa³ and Chandērī.⁴ It was hoped that under him, the *jāgīr* would form a distant part of the Gujrāt kingdom. It will be noticed that after the annexation of Nagore, Ajmēr, Ranthambhōr, and Mālwa, the Gujrāt kingdom had a common boundary with the Mughal kingdom for some distance. Ālam Ḳhān Jighat remained faithful to his new master, and fought against Humāyūn till he was captured and disabled by him.

The second Afghān noble mentioned in the history of

¹ After Bahādur's death, they went away to serve under Shēr Ḳhān.

² In lat. 24°41' long 78°12'.

³ In lat. 23°59' long 74°6'.

⁴ In lat. 23°22' long 77°56'.

Gujrāt was Sultān Ālam Ḳhān Alāuddīn Lōdī. He had a son named Tātār Ḳhān. Alāuddīn was Sultān Buhlūl Lōdī's son and during Ibrāhīm's last days, was a candidate for the Delhi throne. Bābur supported him at first but when he discovered his incompetence he put him aside, and fought for his own hand against Sultān Ibrāhīm of Delhi. Thus after the battle of Pānipat, we find Alāuddīn not as the king of Delhi but as a prisoner in the distant Qila-i-Zafar in Badaḳhshān.¹ From there he managed to escape to Gujrāt where he was accorded a cordial reception by Sultān Bahādur.

Ālam Ḳhān Alāuddīn had not entirely forgotten about his royal pretensions; only now in Bahādur's court, they were pressed by his son. Tātār Ḳhān was an active youth of considerable merit and at every suitable opportunity he harped on his father's claims to the Delhi throne. Bahādur favoured Tātār for his military qualities² but did not pay much heed to his pleadings. Tātār's ambition was to obtain the throne of Delhi for his father, and he was sanguine that Bahādur, after the precedent of his father, Muzaffar, who had returned Mālwa to Mahmūd II, would restore Ālam Ḳhān to his heritage. There were several reasons why Bahādur was not keen on Tātār's project:—

- (a) Ālam Ḳhān had never actually sat on the throne of Delhi and so could not claim the sympathy which Mahmūd II of Mālwa had secured from Muzaffar.
- (b) Bābur had put him down as incompetent. Bahādur, who might easily have supported Tātār himself, hesitated to support his father, a worthless prince.

¹ Erskine: *History of India*, Vol. II, Humāyūn (E. H.), p. 41, considers him dangerous because of his birth and pretensions.

² An example had occurred when starting several days after Muhammad of Khandesh and Khudāwand Ḳhān, he reached Chitōr earlier. He showed military skill in capturing two places Tilhati and Perkūsah and also two of the gates of Chitōrgarh.

(c) Before his flight to Bahādur, Alāuddīn had lived for several years in prison. In 1534 A. D. he was not known to have any local influence in Mughal India.

(d) In asserting Alāuddīn's claims, Bahādur would have to fight the renowned Mughal troops. He hesitated to do so; for he himself had seen them fight on the battle-field of Pānipat and noticed their superiority. He was convinced that no purely Indian troops, including the Afghāns, would be able to cope with the Mughals.¹ Tātār Khān protested against this opinion by representing that Bābur's veterans had now degenerated into luxury-loving dandies, and hence they would not be able to contend with Bahādur's invincible troops.² But, for the present Bahādur would not stir.

Next there arrived in November, 1534 A.D. a still more distinguished personage in Muhammad Zamān Mirzā, the eldest son-in-law of Bābur. He was older than Humāyūn by several years and had earned distinction in Bābur's Bihār campaign. He had twice rebelled, once immediately after Humāyūn's accession and then in July, 1534 A. D. To Bahādur, his supreme qualification was that he was a Mughal and a close relation of the ruler of Delhi. Bahādur welcomed him, attended to his personal needs,³

¹ See *A. H. G.*, p. 229.

² *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 5 has

آن مغلان که حضرت سلیمانی دیدہ اند بصرانت خود نماندہ اند - بنار و نعمت پروردہ و بعیش و تنعم بسر بردہ - پیش کردہ اینہا را تاب مقارعت سپاہ نصرت پناہ و پادشاہ جوان کہ ہرگز شکست نغوردہ و پیروز بودہ نماندہ

³ See Badauni (Newul) Kishore Edition), p. 92 for the cartloads of candied conserve of roses (گلقد) sent to Muhammad Zamān M. for the treatment of his heart-ache.

and placed him at the head of all the Mughals that had gathered in his court.¹

Thus Bahādur Shāh had two sets of men, each with the ambition of recovering Delhi; one, the Afghāns of whom Tātār Ḳhān (on behalf of his father) might be considered the leader, and the other, the Mughals with Muhammad Zamān M. at their head. By supporting any of the parties, the utmost gain that Bahādur would achieve would be the right of suzerainty over the kingdom of Delhi. In following his father's example of restoring a neighbouring kingdom to its prince, he was in the present case running a much greater risk than his father, and it is also possible that if Tātār Ḳhān should realize his dream of making his father an independent ruler, even the formality of acknowledging Bahādur's suzerainty would cease to be observed.²

The rivalry between the two parties hastened matters. Muhammad Zamān M., who had recently arrived, was not yet ready for a move and so Tātār Ḳhān could forestall him by proposing an expedition into the Mughal territory. Bahādur was pleased with his rapid march and subsequent capture of the outposts and gates of Chitōrgarh and was prepared to supply him with resources from his kingdom. He permitted him to proceed to Ranthambhōr which was to serve him for a base and allowed him a *crore* of Gujrāfī *tankas* to spend on gathering recruits from all parts and, when he was ready, to march out and threaten Agra. In order to distract the Mughals from the main objective, two subsidiary campaigns were also projected,

¹ A. H. G., p. 230, 1, 4 has

من کان منهم فی دیوانه جمعهم تحت لوائه فصار امیراً علی السنقالات

A. T. W. G. H., p. 5 has

که جذب سپاه مغول سازد و جنگیان کار آمدنی را بطرف خود کشد

² M. S. fol. 159a, 1.5 has

درین امر اراده او (Tātār Ḳhān) این بود که من بادشاه زاده ملک دهلی ام و از فتح این جنگ مملکت دهلی بتصرف من درآید لشکر بسیار از افغانان گرد من جمع میشود تا آنزمان همایون بادشاه و سلطان بهادر جنگ خواهند کرد یکی شکست می یابد و در قوت دیگری فتوری برود - آنزمان میتوانم از عهد او برآمد - عنان سلطنت ملک دهلی بدست من خواهد افتاد

one under Ālam Ḳhān Alāuddīn himself, and the other under Burhān-ul-mulk Narpālī. The former was to aim at the capture of Kālinjar not yet fully subjugated by Humāyūn,¹ and the latter was expected to create disturbance in the Delhi district or further west in the Punjāb.²

A rumour of some such expedition had reached Humāyūn, which compelled him to return hurriedly from Kanar³ and postpone, for the present, his campaigns against the Afghāns. When he reached Āgrā, he found that he had returned none too soon; for the enemy had already come forward to confront the Mughals.

Humāyūn's quick return frustrated to some extent Bahādur's design; for during his absence in Bihār, the three divisions of Tātār, Ālam, and Burhān-ul-mulk, would have scored success, and the goal, namely, the capture of Āgrā, might have been achieved. It seems that Bahādur Shāh had expected that the divisions would succeed and that he would be able to complete the discomfiture of the Mughals by a campaign against them in person. He had instructed Tātār Ḳhān to remain on the defensive and wait for his arrival. The actual conclusion, *viz.*, the complete annihilation of Tātār, had never entered his calculation.

What happened may be briefly told here. Tātār Ḳhān boldly went forward, unmindful of the enemy's strength, captured Biāna,⁴—a notable achievement—and sent ravaging columns even to the gates of Āgrā. There was panic in the city till Askari and Hindāl arrived from Delhi

¹ We have seen that Humāyūn was satisfied with the perfunctory submission of the Rājā on payment of an indemnity of 12 '*mans*' of gold.

² See *A. N.*, p. 128.

³ In the Kālpi District.

⁴ Situated in 26°57' and 77°20' E., 53 miles S. W. of Āgrā, it forms a railway junction. In mediæval India it contained a particularly strong fort as is clear from the remains even to-day. The rocks stretching north and south make the place easy to defend, and therein lies its strategic importance. For the first 3 centuries of Muslim rule it remained the headquarters of a province. When Sultān Sikandar Lōdī founded Āgrā as his capital, the importance of Biāna declined.

with some 18,000 soldiers under the distinguished Mughal commanders like Qāsim Husain Sultān, Zāhid Bēg,¹ and Dōst Bēg. They recovered Biāna,² Tātār Ḳhān retreating to Mandrāel.³ There he waited confidently; for he possessed an army of 40,000 men.⁴ Probably he yet dreamed of establishing another Lōdī dynasty at Āgrā and later on at Delhi with his father as its first king. But he was soon disillusioned. Within a few days his select troops, as stated by the author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, melted away, at the prospect of a battle. There was nothing to wonder at it. The soldiers had been hastily collected by a lavish distribution of Gujrāt wealth and hence they lacked discipline. They had forced their commander to retire from Biāna, and now when Tātār was eager for a contest they deserted him altogether.

Thus, at Mandrāel, Tātār Ḳhān saw the end of his dream of securing the throne of Delhi. He was left with 3,000 horse only.⁵ Hindāl advanced from Biāna with 5,000 Mughal troops and a fierce battle took place from which Tātār could not fly lest he should have to face Bahādur's wrath for disobeying his orders for a defensive campaign. So Tātār fell with some 300 of his followers (November, 1534 A. D.).

With the death of Tātār Ḳhān the main project of an attack on Āgrā fell through; the two subsidiary contingents working against Kālinjar and Delhi also failed in their purpose. The commanders realized that they were widely separated from each other so that no co-ordination was possible between their movements; and singly each failed to make any impression on the Mughals.

¹ Humāyūn's brother-in-law, having been married to the queen, Bēga Bēgam's sister. In *G. H. N.*, p. 134 n.4.

² From Khurāsān Ḳhān, one of Gujrāt noblemen.

³ Situated in 26°18' N. and 77°18' E. *A. H.*, Vol. II, p. 190, calls it Mandlāer.

⁴ *M. S.* makes it a select army of 30,000 men.

⁵ *A. N.* and the *Farishta* has 10,000, *T. A.* has 300.

The direct result of the battle so far as the relations between the two kings, Bahādur and Humāyūn were concerned, was practically nil. Humāyūn did not complain of Bahādur's aiding Tātār Khān nor did Sultān Bahādur follow the defeat up by other expeditions. Humāyūn kept quiet on the subject, guessing probably that it was purely the outcome of the mad-cap Tātār's enthusiasm. Humāyūn ignored the other two expeditions also. For the present, he remained perfectly satisfied with the complete discomfiture of the enemy in all the three quarters.

But for Bahādur, it was not so easy to get out of the war; for he had complicated matters by receiving Muhammad Zamān Mirzā, who had been put into prison for the serious crime of treason against Humāyūn. Let us here recall a few facts. In June 1534 A.D. after the foundation of Dīn-panāh, Sultān Bahādur had sent a message of congratulations to Humāyūn and the latter had responded by generously permitting him to retain all his late conquests viz., Mālwa, Raisen, Ranthambhōr, Ajmēr, and Nagore and professing amity and good will.¹ The reception of Muhammad Zamān M. by Bahādur a few months later nullified all the steps taken to maintain cordiality between the two kingdoms.

Muhammad Zamān M., we have seen, had rebelled in 1531 A.D. as well as in 1534 A.D. Humāyūn had ignored the first rebellion and had allowed him to continue as governor in Bihār. He had hoped that his generosity would have a salutary effect on his brother-in-law. But the ever-restless Muhammad Zamān M. was not won over and three years later, he combined with Muhammad Sultān M. and made a more serious effort to overthrow the government of Humāyūn. Humāyūn by his prompt measures nipped the rebellion in the bud, defeated the combined enemy in the battle at Bhōjpūr, and captured both the leaders. He

The consequence of the battle.

Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's affairs.

¹ A. H. G., p. 227.

did not repeat his previous generosity, threw them into prison, and in order to put an end to all their political aspirations, gave orders to the jailor, his own uncle Mirzā Yādgar Bēg *Taghāi*,¹ to blind them along with another prince, Wali Khūb Mirzā.² Muhammad Sultān M. and Wali Khūb M. were blinded. But Muhammad Zamān M. escaped the penalty by the partiality of the *Taghāi* or his men³ and a few days later he escaped⁴ to Bahādūr Shāh. The *Taghāi* also, for fear of encountering the king's wrath at the neglect of his orders, followed Muhammad Zamān M. and reached Bahādūr's court at Chitōr in November, 1534 A. D.

To such a prince, who had twice sinned against the king of Delhi, Bahādūr Shāh offered a ready welcome, only a few months after his last message of goodwill to Humāyūn. This was naturally taken by Humāyūn as a change of heart and initiation of a new policy, not friendly to himself. Humāyūn felt disappointed but hesitated to undertake hostilities against his erstwhile friendly neighbour. He therefore contented himself with only making a demonstration by moving out to Gwālior and staying there for a couple of months.⁵

The historian of to-day recognizes that Humāyūn should have replied to Bahādūr by going to the aid of the

¹ He was Humāyūn's maternal uncle as well as father-in-law and it was his daughter, Bēga Bēgam, who was captured by Shēr Shāh in 1539 A. D.

² *T. A.*, p. 194, l. 23, records Humāyūn's orders for the blinding of Muhammad Sultān M.

³ *T. A.*

⁴ *A. N.*, p. 124 says he escaped by showing a forged letter.

⁵ *A. N.* gives the date of moving out to be November 8th, 1534 A. D. (beginning of *Jumādai-awwal* 941 A. H.). *The Rauzat-ut-Tāhirin* (R. T.), the British Museum or 168, fol. 614b, l. 3 makes Humāyūn proceed straightway from Gwālior to Mālwa. Its words are

بعزم رزم سلطان بهادر بجانب گوالیار ومندرشانان

G. H. N., fol. 23b refers to the length of stay as two months. It appears that Humāyūn had stayed in Gwālior at least twice, the period of stay being, on each occasion, two months. Farishta's reference on p. 213 (last line) is to the first occasion. The second occasion is the one we are now considering. On either occasion Humāyūn's object was to make a demonstration as a warning to Bahādūr. See Humāyūn's letter

besieged Rājput̄s of Chit̄or, but he could not rise above the political convention of his day which forbade his rendering aid to an *infidel* engaged in a war with a faithful. Hence, another of Humāyūn's half-measures, viz., a move out to and a long stay at Gwālīor. He had hoped that just as on a previous occasion, a demonstration on his part had served to put Bahādur on his guard and had made him sign a treaty and retire from Chit̄or so the present one would also have its effect. But Bahādur did not abandon the siege this time and Humāyūn in his turn had to pass on to Sārangpūr with a more grim determination.

CHAPTER X

THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HUMĀYŪN BĀDŠHĀH AND SULTĀN BAHĀDUR SHĀH OF GUJRĀT, 1534-35 A. D.

We have already noticed that two months after the completion of Dīn-panāh, in April, 1534 A.D., Bahādur Shāh sent a message of congratulations to Humāyūn. He reciprocated Bahādur's friendly gesture by sending him his own envoy, who submitted presents and spoke to him on 'diverse matters. He referred particularly to the welcome Bahādur Shah had accorded to Tātār Khān, Ālam Khān Alāuddīn's son. He emphasised sincerity as the *sine qua non* of friendship and assured Bahādur that his master, the Bādshāh, would not harbour any run-aways from Gujrāt; for by harbouring them he would be putting an end to the friendly relations subsisting between the two kingdoms. He would therefore expect that Bahādur, too, would not shelter fugitives from Delhi. In the end the envoy remarked that the welfare of the two kingdoms depended on mutual considerations; and that man's existence in this world is brief. The world, therefore, should be regarded as a place of worship to God.¹

Bahādur treated the envoy very courteously, put him up near his palace, provided him with every comfort and luxury, and fixed for him a liberal allowance both in cash and in kind. The envoy was so much pleased that at one time he thought of permanently staying with Bahādur rather than return to his master. However, the time for his return came and Bahādur sent with him magnificent presents² for Humāyūn,

¹ A. H. G., p. 228.

² *Ibid.*; one sentence may be quoted

وبذل له من النقد والقباش وما يصلح به المعاش

and wrote a reply of which only one short sentence has come down to us through Abdullāh, the author of the *Arabic History of Gujrat*, namely, *to hear is to obey*, (السمع والطاعة) meaning, that as now he had known of Humāyūn's wishes, he would certainly carry them out.

The effect of this early correspondence was salutary; for Humāyūn, in return for this submissive reply, as it were, approved of Bahādur's retaining all that he had conquered in Mālwa.

All this happened in the year 940 A.H. The following year, 941 A.H., when Humāyūn went to Kālpī in September, 1534 A.D., its governor, Ālam Ḳhān, instead of submitting to the Mughals, fled to Gujrat. Bahādur knew of the hostile relations between Humāyūn and Ālam Ḳhān¹ and yet he received him. Not only that, he added to his *ḡagīr* by the grant of Raisen, Bhilsa, and Chandēri. Again, he added various dignities to Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's rank when he reached Chitōr during its siege by Bahādur. It is thus clear that a change had occurred in Bahādur Shāh's mind, viz., that though he was not prepared actually to declare a war against the Mughals, he was making preparations for it and biding his time for a suitable opportunity. He cherished also the hope of forestalling and playing the aggressor against the Mughal intruders into India, if he could but complete his preparations.

Humāyūn wrote his second letter from Kālpī in a firmer tone and referred solely to Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's reception. He began by remarking that the reception amounted to the negation of Bahādur's pledge of sincerity and that it would lead to serious consequences for which Bahādur would

¹ *Ibid*, p. 230. كانت بينه (Ālam) وبين همايون رقة
 رقة suggests 'slight acquaintance.' This view can hardly be maintained; for B. N. has references to Ālam Ḳhān of Kālpī as early as 1526 A.D. See p. 523.

have to be responsible. He ended by quoting the Prophet's saying that a pledge was a part of one's faith.¹

Humāyūn received Bahādūr's reply at Āgrā in November 1534 A.D. It was unusually conciliatory in tone and to some extent incompatible with his future plans such as had been foreshadowed by his welcome to the Mughal refugees. The only explanation that can be given is that he was not yet fully prepared for a breach, because he was preoccupied either with the Rājput war or in recruiting soldiers for a future Mughal war.

Bahādūr began his reply with an Arabic verse,

حاشا عهدكم تضاع - وسلوكم لا يستطاع

Tr.

God forbid, your promises be neglected;

For I cannot afford to be forgotten by you.

Bahādūr's second reply. and then went on to say about Muhammad Zamān M. that he had been welcomed under the impression that he was like a son to the king.² Bahādūr promised that henceforward he would try to please the Mughal king by carrying out his wishes.³

Actually, however, he proceeded with his military preparations and did not part with any of the refugees, to the retention of whom Humāyūn had objection; and he therefore sent a reminder from Āgrā on the subject.

Humāyūn's third letter. Humāyūn's next letter is in the form of an allegory in which two philosophers are questioned: who is the most helpless person in the world? One of them answers, 'He who has no friend.'

(من لا صديق له). The other, however, corrects him, "No!

¹ A. H. G., p. 230 has حسن العهد من الايمان

² The *Mirzā* was older than Humāyūn. Of course being a king, Humāyūn might be looked upon as a father to every one of his subjects including the *Mirzās*.

³ A. H. G., p. 230 has سيكون ما يرضيكم which may literally be rendered, 'soon that will happen which will please you.'

the most helpless man is he who had a friend but has managed to lose him." Humāyūn himself then pointed at the moral of the story by saying that a thousand friends were too few and one enemy was too many, meaning that Bahādur should not be so foolish as to lose his friendship. Humāyūn ended with the oft-quoted verse,

درخت دوستی بنشان که کام دل ببار آرد
نهال دشمنی برکن که رنج بیشمار آرد

Plant the tree of amity, that it may bear fruit, namely,
(the fulfilment of) the heart's desire,

Uproot the sapling of hostility that yields countless ills.¹

Bahādur's reply as seen in the *Arabic History of Gujrat*, has been characterised as rude by Abdullāh. The Bahādur's
third reply.

Sultān began by mentioning the five reasons that generally lead to war :

- (a) the desire of creating a kingdom where none existed before
- (b) the desire of protecting and safeguarding the territory that one possessed,
- (c) the zeal which prompted one to attack the unjust possessor of a kingdom with the sword of justice,
- (d) the desire of adding to the wealth that one already possessed,
- (e) the most mischievous of all, viz., an attempt to fill the earth with strife out of a love of conquest and plunder, and out of arrogance towards the submissive.

He added that none of the above reasons had actuated him² and that his pleasure lay in distributing wealth in order to beat up recruits for a Holy war. He then quoted a verse

نیست مازا در در عالم با کسی رنج و عذاب
هر که با ما رنج دارد رحمتش بسجار باد

¹ Beveridge's rendering of the first hemistich is, 'Plant . . . amity that the heart's desire may bear fruit.'

² Not a very sincere statement.

Tr.

In neither of the two worlds¹ have I any ill-will against others;

If some one else has any against me, let God's mercy be in abundance on him.

He finished with another verse

چو مهمان خراباتی بعزت باش بارندان
که در درکشی جانا گرت مستی خمار آرند

Tr.

While a guest of the tavern, be decorous to the other wine-bibbers,

Otherwise when drunkenness leads to crop-sickness, thou wilt be in trouble.

The text of Humāyūn's fourth letter is given in Abu Turāb Wali's *History of Gujrat*, the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* and Abul Fazl's *Akbar-nāma*.

The substance may be given thus:—

After salutation etc., let it be known that Qāzī Abdul Qādir and Muhmamad Muqīm reached here and informed us about your pledges and engagements. We, who believe in unity and concord, could not imagine that you would transgress the Qurānic verse, 'O ye, that believeth, abide by your agreements' or that you could ignore the verse, 'verily, the best of the pacts are a part of the Faith.'

We sent Salāh-ul-mulk Maulāna Qāsim Ali and Ghiyāsuddīn Qūrchī, to represent on our behalf that if you meant to be firm in the path of friendship and unity, it were well that you should either send to us those rebellious men who had taken refuge with you or drive them away at least from your dominion, so that the other subjects in our kingdom be not led astray (by this example of disaffection) from the path of devotion and loyalty.

I awaited the receipt of a proper reply so that the dust of suspicion and hostility be washed away by the pure water

¹ This or the next.

of concord and the tree of sincerity might bear fruit in the garden of mutual aid. When my envoys returned in the company of Nūr Muhammad Khalīl (Bahādur's agent), they did not bring any proper explanation of your pledges and we felt surprised.

Regarding Muhammad Zamān M., you have quoted precedents in justification of your action, e.g., how in spite of the amity and alliance that existed between Sultān Sikandar Lōdī of Delhi and Sultān Muzaffar, your father, Alāuddīn and other princes and nobles had left Āgrā for Gujrāt and had been received with an attention befitting their rank, without causing any breach in the relation between the two kings. Similarly, you argue, 'what harm if Muhammad Zamān M. stays with me?' No similarity exists between the two cases and it is strange that you mention one as analogous to the other. You will best prove your steadfastness to treaties and obligations by accepting my advice. Therefore, either return those contemptible fellows or drive them away from your kingdom. If you act up to my suggestion, it will be as apparent as the mid-day sun that your heart is in accord with your profession; otherwise what reliance could be placed on your letters of agreement. Verse,

ای آنکه لاف میزنی از دل که عاشقست
طوبی لک از زبان تو با دل موافقست

Tr.

O thou, that boasteth of a loving heart,
Greetings to thee, if thy heart and tongue accord.

Perhaps the Sultān knows that *Sāhib-Qirān* Tīmūr long desisted from invading Turkey in spite of the provocations he had received from *Ilderim* Bāyazīd, because the latter was engaged in fighting the Christians of Europe.¹ But when the *Qaisar* (Bāyazīd) gave shelter to Qarā Yūsuf

¹ The Emperor of Bizantium and his allies.

Turkmān and Sultān Ahmad Jalair,¹ Tīmūr made several, though fruitless, attempts to prevent him from showing them any favour and to persuade him to drive them away from his kingdom. The *Qaisar* paid no heed to Tīmūr's words, with what consequence, is known to all. Verse (repeated),

درخت دوستی بنشان که دل ببار آرد
نهال دشمنی برکن که رنج بے شمار آرد

Tr.

Plant the tree of amity that it may bear fruit, namely,
(the fulfilment of) the heart's desire;

Uproot the sapling of hostility that yields countless ills.²

Verse,

گر در سزای سعادت کسی است - زگفتار سعد بش حرفی بس است
To one who resides in the mansion of felicity

Is enough one single word from Sadī's discourses.

Verse,

ترا این بسندست اگر بشنوی - که گر خار کاری سمن ندردی³

Tr.

This will suffice (as advice), if only you listen to it,
By sowing thorn, no jasmine can be reaped.

Since your letter, sent by Muhammad Muqīm, contained alarming news and references to tortuous measures, we had made the determination of going to Gwālior. When Nūr Muhammad K̄halīl brought me your agreement, I myself went through it and after I had granted the *conge* to him, I sent Shaikh Ibrāhīm, one of my confidants, with my answer to your letter. I hope, as soon as he fulfils his

¹ See *A. N.* (Tr.), p. 296 for Beveridge's note on these two persons. Qarā Yūsuf was the ruler of Āzarbāijān and Sultān Ahmad K̄hān Jalair of Baghdād.

² Beveridge draws attention to the fact that the couplet was first written by Shāh Ismāīl to Shaibānī K̄hān of Turkistān.

³ The word بسند 'sufficient' has wrongly been put down in *A. T.* *W. H. G.* as پسند See p. 8.

mission, he will be given leave to depart.¹ Peace be on him who follows the Guidance.²

Humāyūn, even at this stage, was not wholly alienated from Sultān Bahādur. When Nūr Muhammad Ḳhalīl reached Humāyūn's court with his master's reply to his letter and various gifts including a manuscript copy of the Qurān beautifully written and artistically illuminated, the king took the Qurān in hand and praised its calligraphy. But almost immediately, he turned to the subject of agreement and asserted his own sincerity in the matter by an oath on the Holy Book. When Nūr Muhammad Ḳhalīl on his return to Gujrāt made mention of Humāyūn's sincerity in Sultān Bahādur's court, the courtiers disbelieved him.

After going through Humāyūn's letter, Bahādur, who himself was illiterate, ordered his scribe, Mullā Muhammad Lāri, to draft a suitable reply touching every point mentioned in the letter. The Mullā, it is said, had served Humāyūn in the past and had an especial grudge against him.⁴ Hence he wrote an impertinent reply, read it artfully when the Sultān and his young companions were in their cups. Most of the young courtiers approved of the reply as Gujrāt's challenge to Delhi. The king, from the little that he understood,⁵ could foresee the trouble that would arise but out of timidity kept quiet. The scribe sent it post-haste. The next morning when the ministers came to know of the contents of the letter already despatched, they realized the danger the letter portended, and prevailed on the Sultān to send some noblemen to overtake the courier. The nobles

¹ The relations between two eastern kings were determined by the length of stay of the envoy of one at the other's court.

² Muhammad, the prophet, used to end his letters thus.

³ *The Mirāt-i-Sikandari* (M. S.).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ As Bahādur had no education, he cannot be supposed to have fully understood the meaning of the ornate sentences of the *munshi*. As M. S. puts it

چوں سلطان امی بود جواب مراسله آنچه ملا محمد منشی نوشته آورد رقیف بر قیوم و حسن
آن نایافته حکم با ارسال نمود

sent were Malik Nassan and Wajih-ul-mulk but the pursuit proved fruitless and they returned from the pass of Narwar.¹

Bahādur's fourth reply may be briefly given as follows:—

After praise to God and salutation to the Prophet, etc., take notice that your messenger arrived here in company of Nūr Muhammad K̄halīl, the confidant of the Exalted Majesty (Bahādur), and was received in audience. He presented the strangely-worded letter and we became aware of its vain contents. Therein you write that Qāsim Ali and Ghiyās-uddīn were sent to suggest the expulsion of those who have taken shelter here so that our sincerity and friendship be proved. Now all this is a lie. Your representatives never breathed a word on the subject except that they spoke approvingly of my steadfastness to the pledge of friendship. If we had the slightest idea that you had had such a motive for sending the message, matters would not have been allowed to come to such a pass as to permit you to proceed boldly to Gwālior. What mad ambition or impossible notion is this? All are aware of your brotherly behaviour² towards Muhammad Zamān M., the best of the great Sultāns and the gifted of the famous *K̄hāqāns*. As soon as you got an opportunity, you turned your face from (the path of) sincerity and harmony and broke your plighted faith. With the rest of the world, Muhammad Zamān M. had come to know how when Sultān Mahmūd Khaljī of Mālwa fled from the Rājput̄s and sought shelter with my revered father, Sultān Muzaffar, extreme generosity and patronage were shown to him. So the Mirzā also under a similar expectation tendered his homage to this court and complained against the oath-breakers.³

¹ Narwar,, situated in 25°39' N. and 77°58' E. was an important halt on one of the routes between the north and the south India. At one time, the town was 14 or 15 miles in circumference, but from Sikandar Lōdī's time, when a massive wall surrounded it, it reduced to a mile and a half in circumference.

² Written ironically.

³ Bahādur includes Humāyūn among them.

As we are upholders of the Faith and dispensers of justice, we, in accordance with the Prophet's words, 'help your brother, be he a tyrant or an oppressed,' accorded our patronage to him. Our sincere faith in God's aid makes us hope for the realization of Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's desires and ambitions. In the presence of Qāzī Abdul Qādir and Mūtaman-uz-zamān, Khurāsān Khān,¹ without any previous reference from us on the subject, you, of your own accord, asserted the sincerity of your pledge, by swearing on the Holy Book. When we heard of it, we believed you and put trust in your pledges with the result that the consideration of affairs on your side was postponed and we turned to cross over to the island of Diū in order to uproot the Europeans.² You, working under a false notion and a fancied provocation,³ thought it to be a suitable opportunity (of carrying out your hostile intentions) and forgetting to act in accordance with the Qurānic verse, 'thou shalt not break thy oath after its confirmation,' boldly rode forth to Gwālīor. When we became aware of your movements, we turned back with our troops. Then you also realized on a little reflection that an advance towards us was not possible and beyond your power and so you returned, the only result of the broken pledge being that some of the provinces were added to our dominions.⁴ Treacherously, you represented our return as due to Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's arrival. I had made no mention whatever of it, but you thought I had, and then wrote of having accepted my unwritten apology—a proceeding, not heard of before. Of course your protestations (about pledges and sincerity) would be appropriate in a way; for from your correspondence and movements, your courage

¹ He has been referred to in Humāyūn's letter as Muhammad Muqīm. *A. H. G.*, p. 240 ll. 6-7 and *A. N.*, p. 131 gives the name as well as the title.

² Really, the Portuguese. *Farishta*, Vol. II, p. 222, l. 9, notes that Bahādur had captured their big gun, the largest that had been seen in India. His words are, *که به کلانی آن توپ در دیار هندوستان نبود*

³ Lit. *وجدان* means ecstasy.

⁴ An incorrect statement.

can well be gauged. For example, whereas some description of your own achievements would have been more proper, you bring in your seventh ancestor. But then, so far, you have achieved nothing worth mentioning. Well, if your object (in referring to your ancestor) was to relate historical romances or narratives, then in accordance with the proverb, that, 'all novelties are delicious,' you should have referred to some of my deeds; for there is no parallel in history of so many deeds being achieved in such a brief space of time.¹ Verses:

چو تیغت ندارد زبان در مصاف - مکن ز آنچه تیغ زبان را بلاف
 چو تیغ تو بی گوهرست ای پسر - بشمشیر گوهر صلاف از پدر
 اگر کوتاهی پای چوبین میند - که در چشم طفلان نمایی بلند

Tr.

If thy sword hast no tongue (to speak of your valour),
 Do not trouble the sword of thy tongue by mere boast.
 If thy sword hast no lustre, my son!
 Do not brag of thy father's noble descent.
 If thou art short-statured, do not tie wooden legs² to
 thy feet,
 To look tall in children's eyes.

By the grace of God, so long as I am ruler of this country, no king dare challenge my army. Why do you, who have so far only faced a few Afghāns, give yourself trouble?

It is advisable, that acting on the proverb, 'Let not Satan mislead you,' you drive away vanity from your head.

Verse,

که مغروری کلاه از سر کند دور - مبادا کس بزور خویش مغرور
 Tr.

Pride throws away the crown from the head,
 Let none boast of his strength.

¹ Though uttered in a boastful vein, there is some truth in the statement.

² Stilts.

Events in the immediate future will tell what the Almighty desires. Verse.

زاهد شراب کوثر و حافظ پیدالہ خواست - تازہ میانہ خواستہ کردگار چیست

Tr.

The ascetic asked for the nectar¹ of the Paradise and Hāfiz for the cup (of wine);

Which of the two God prefers, is yet to be seen.

The letter concludes here. It will be noticed that of the eight letters mentioned above, the first six are fragmentary in character. There are one or two stray passages mentioned by other writers, which we have not been able to incorporate accurately in any of the above letters. Still, as they partly reveal the minds of the respective kings we insert them here.

Farishta² attributes the following verses to Humāyūn

ای کہ هستی غنیم شهر چتور - کافران را چه طور میگیری
پادشاه رسیدہ بوسر تو - تو نشستہ چتور میگیری

Tr.

O thou that art Chitōr's foe

How art thou occupied in seizing the infidels?

A king has arrived³ at thy head,

And thou seated in hope of seizing Chitōr.

Farishta also notes Bahādur's answer, put in rhyme,

من کہ هستم غنیم شهر چتور - کافران را بجور میگیرم
هر کہ بکند حمایت چیتور - تو باین کش چه طور میگیرم

Tr.

I that am foe to the city of Chitōr

Am seizing the infidels by force

He who succours Chitōr

Thou shalt see, how I seize him too.

¹ Lit. 'wine.'

² (Newal Kishore Press edition), Part I, p. 214, l. 8.

³ Lit. 'reached.'

The *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*¹ has given another stray verse, quoted also by the *Tazkirah-i-Bukhārāi*.² According to the latter, these were written by Humāyūn. The verse is

زغصه غنچه صفت ته بته ولم خون است -
که با وجود یکی نسبت درمی چون است -

هرگز نکندم یاد تو تا زار نگویم - کم یاد کنم از تو که بهیاری نگویم

Tr.

From grief every fold of my heart has turned into blood
(To think) that in spite of our oneness, duality is attributed to us.

I never recollect you without weeping bitterly,
(Nay), I seldom recollect you (for fear) that I may have to weep much.³

Here ends the correspondence. Before attempting the description of the war it led up to, we shall dilate on the twin question of mediæval Muslim Diplomacy and Religious-political attitude of the Muslim victor towards the Hindu vanquished. The following observations may be made in this connexion:—

(a) The States were not usually represented by ambassadors or consuls permanently stationed in each other's capital. Envoys were specially sent when occasion arose and their stay might be prolonged either at the pleasure of the king who desired to shower continued favours on them or by the envoys themselves in order to send political information to their masters. In the latter case, in order to check the spying, the king had to dismiss them.⁴ The

¹ Fol. 154b.

² See the MS. with the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.

³ These lines must have been written at an earlier stage when cordial relations subsisted between the two kings.

⁴ The most noted example of it occurred in Shāh Jahān's time, when the envoys to Persia were instructed to supply news to him. Shāh Abbās II had to dismiss the Mughal envoys in order to make his preparations in secret for the recovery of Qandahār. See B. P. Saxena: Shāh Jahān, p. 223. The official relations between the two kingdoms

normal business of an envoy was to carry the various gifts and a congratulatory epistle, in which was included the description of the various events in his master's State. On his dismissal and return, he would be accompanied by another envoy from the land visited for his own master. Very often an envoy took a year or more to return.

(b) Muslim rulers in India usually made some distinction between a Muslim and a Hindu State. The latter, if the *Hidāya* or the work on the Muslim Jurisprudence¹ is to be literally interpreted, was outside the Muslim code of International Equity and a Muslim king² was not permitted to maintain permanent peace with an 'infidel' State.

In spite of their overwhelming number³ the Hindus, caste-ridden as they were, could play no aggressive part in the contemporary politics: nor could they defend themselves from Muslim attacks. They therefore had to acquiesce in arbitrary dictations which were a common feature of the political practice adopted by the Muslim State in India towards its weak Hindu neighbours. We may cite here two cases by way of example:

(i) After the treaty of 1533 A. D. with the Rānā of Chitōr, when he surrendered some territory besides paying a large indemnity, Bahādur Shāh for no reason whatever except an ambition to conquer an 'infidel' kingdom, destroyed Chitōr two years later.

(ii) Bahādur's grandfather, Sultan Mahmūd *Begarha* cruelly forced his tributary and obedient chief, Mandalak of Girnār, to embrace Islam.⁴

¹ See the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain*, 1835 A. D., p. 81-135, Kennedy's article on the *Hidāya*.

² To quote Kennedy in this connexion, 'the making war on infidels being a duty incumbent on all true believers, a Muhammadan prince was not at liberty to conclude a permanent peace with the infidels because such a peace would be an infringement of the positive command of God which enjoins war to be carried on against the infidels.'

³ It should be remembered that in the United Provinces, where the Muslims had the headquarters of their empire, the Hindus number even to-day something like 85 per cent. of the total population.

⁴ For full details see *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, p. 305.

Such instances of wanton bigotry, however, were few and far between. No doubt early Muslim annals of India were stained by religious vandalism. But, if once a Hindu State accepted Muslim suzerainty, its subjects were left alone and the victors generally respected their institutions and practices and earned their gratitude.

The picture of Muslim religious bigotry has generally been overdrawn. It should be remembered that if the Muslims had really carried out extensively the policy of destruction of temples, as ascribed to them by some writers, there should not have existed, after several centuries of Muslim rule, any temple in the heart of the Muslim empire for Aurangzib to destroy. Four explanations for the occasional outbursts of Muslim iconoclastic zeal suggest themselves to us.

In the first place, their monotheism and intense hatred for idol worship. Inspired by instinctive disdain for idolatry, the victorious Muslim army could not repress its extreme disapproval of the religion of the vanquished. This alone furnishes the explanation for three-fourths of the temple destruction that took place during the Muslim rule in India.

In the second place, even the most liberal-minded of Muslim rulers had to sanction or approve of the demolition of a temple on political considerations, namely, to enlist the co-operation of the clerical party which guided the religious thought of Muslim India. Under this explanation we may instance the demolition of the temple of Rāma at Janamsthān in Ajudhya in Bābur's time.¹ The *mullahs* were the chroniclers, and they being actuated by religious bigotry magnified this policy of their royal patrons.

In the third place, in his zeal to win the applause of the Muslim world, a Muslim ruler adopted the policy of religious persecution against the non-Muslims. It is said

¹ The subject of the demolition of Rama's temple in Ajudhya has been fully discussed in the author's article on 'Bābur and the Hindus' published in the U. P. Historical Society Journal, 1936, A. D.

that Aurangzīb's religious policy was guided by some such consideration. But whether the Muslim world appreciated his persecutions is a different question.¹

In the fourth place, the desire of possessing the sacred places of the enemy and erecting their own mosques instead, e.g., the *thakurdwārā* of Prithvī Rāj at Delhi was converted by Qutbuddīn into the *Quwwat-ul-Islām Masjid*.² Very often in the course of a war a temple was deliberately or otherwise desecrated, and the Hindus abandoned it on that account. The Muslims either occupied it or utilized its materials for their own use.³ Sometimes even an old deserted Muslim building was similarly utilized, e.g., Shēr Shāh's *Purāna Qila* was largely built out of the materials provided by the remains of Ālauddīn's *Sirī*.⁴ Such a conversion of the enemy's houses of worship was not the feature of conquest in India alone. In Spain, Saracenic mosques were converted into churches, the most famous being the great mosque of Cordova which has been used as a Christian church since 1238 A.D.⁵

In the light of the above explanations, the picture of Muslim fanaticism generally drawn deep by the clerical party responsible for mediæval Muslim history may be brought to its proper perspective. The commonplace historical errors of Muslim bigotry should be rectified, the hitherto unquestioned contemporary verdict on men and their affairs be modified, and a great deal of communal misunderstandings clouding our national life be clarified.

When a Hindu State was attacked by a Muslim ruler, the other Hindu chiefs very often refrained from going to

¹ The anti-theocratic policy of Sultān Muhammad Tughluq is said to have been popular with the rest of the Muslim world.

² See Sayyid Ahmad: *Asār-us-Sanādīd*, pp. 11-13.

³ Consult Fergusson: *Indian Saracenic Architecture*, Vol. II, p. 201.

⁴ See Fenshawe: *Delhi, Past and Present*, p. 253. For the situation of *Sirī* consult 'map of country round Delhi' in the pocket of the book.

⁵ Consult Fletcher: *History of Architecture*, the last chapter on the *Moslem Architecture* written by Richmond.

its aid for fear of drastic penalties.¹ Nor could a neighbouring Muslim State help it; for the Muslim public opinion strongly protested against such an attitude of a sister Muslim State towards its Hindu neighbour. For the sake of illustration it may be mentioned that there is a tradition in Mewār that an appeal was made for help by Rānā Vikramāditya's mother to Humāyūn Bādshāh² against Bahādur Shāh. Possibly it was made. Bahādur was in a fix but his *maūlavīs* assured him that Humāyūn would not help Mewār for the simple reason that no Muslim could uphold an 'infidel' cause against another Muslim.

Thus we discover a uniformity of political policy pursued by the Muslims towards the non-believers. We also read into it religious bigotry. For the war against the Hindus was styled *jihād*, the leader, at the end of the war, a *ghāzī*, and those who were killed *shuhadā* or martyrs. Political considerations, in the main, dictated this policy. The appeal to religion alone could weld the small number of the Muslims who otherwise could not have subjugated a vast country like India.

On the subject of the political refugees no uniform written law was in force. If the fugitive was a Muslim with no political pretensions, he was allowed shelter in a neighbouring Muslim State. He remained unnoticed so long as he did not meddle with the politics of the State, he had come from or gone to. In Bābur's and Humāyūn's reign, thousands of the Afghāns took shelter with the king of Bengal but neither of the Mughal kings made it a cause of war. Similarly when the refugees took shelter with Bahādur Shāh, no serious notice was taken of the fact.³

The political refugees.

¹ To illustrate, the reason given for the first siege of Chitōr by Bahādur Shāh, is Rānā Vikramāditya's futile attempt to succour Silhadi during the siege of Raisen.

² See Todd: *Rājasthan* (Routledge popular edition), Vol. I, p. 250.

³ A. H. G., p. 237, says that with Tātār K̄hān were 40,000 Afghāns. The actual number might have been smaller.

But when the fugitive was a personage of exalted rank and with high political pretensions, prone to intrigue and nursing a hostile feeling against the ruler of his own State, he was treated differently. The safety of the ruler needed some check on the activities of the refugee and hence a demand was generally made for his extradition from the State which had given him shelter. Such a demand was treated by the protector of the refugee according to the measure of his strength. If strong, he resisted the demand,¹ if weak, he surrendered the refugee. Bahādur Shāh destroyed Mālwa, because his brother Chānd K̄hān had taken shelter there and the ruler, Sultān Māhmud, would not surrender him.

Humāyūn also had ignored the flight of Ālam K̄hān of Kālpī, and mildly protested against Tātār K̄hān's reception at Bahādur's court but determined to make Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's flight and shelter with Bahādur the cause of a campaign. Similarly, if Bahādur had felt himself strong enough to face the Mughals, he would have waged a war against Humāyūn if the latter had granted protection to any of the discontented nobles of Gujrāt.²

It is one of the redeeming traits of the escutcheon of the mediæval Muslim kings that while they often waged war against one another for mere trifles, they *sometimes* showed extreme charity towards their weaker neighbours. Sultān Mahmūd *Begarha* of Gujrāt, whose fierce bigotry we had an occasion to mention of, behaved with a generosity, rarely known, to two of his neighbours. One of them was the infant king, Nizām Shāh Bahmanī (1461—1463 A. D.). When he was attacked by Mahmūd Khaljī of

The occasional generous behaviour towards a brother Muslim king.

¹ Timūr's demand of Bāyazīd for the surrender of Qarā Yūsuf and Sultān Ahmad Jalair was not attended to. Neither did Sultān Bahādur pay any heed to Humāyūn's demand for the surrender of Muhammad Zamān M., nor Sultān Mahmūd of Malwa to Bahādur's demand for the surrender of Chānd K̄hān.

² But Bahādur had no courage to oppose when Razi-ul-mulk, a Mālwa nobleman, intrigued with Humāyūn in favour of Chānd K̄hān. See *A. H. G.*, p. 195.

Mālwa (1436—1469 A. D.), Mahmūd Begarha came to his rescue and forced the Khaljī ruler to retire. More than once Mahmūd Begarha acted as a protector and got nothing more than the grateful thanks of the Bahmani government for all the trouble he had taken. Again he indirectly helped Sultān Ghiyāsuddīn of Mālwa, who had just succeeded his father, the unscrupulous Mahmūd Khaljī, by disapproving of the proposal of invading Mālwa broached by his Gujrāt nobles, remarking that with him it was a matter of principle not to invade a State which had just lost its ruler.¹ In the preceding century, Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq had similarly refrained from molesting the Bahmanī kingdom on Alāuddīn Bahman Shāh's death in 1358 A. D.

But the best examples of generosity are furnished by the sixteenth century. Muzaffar Shāh II of Gujrāt (1511-26) captured Mandū by massacring 19,000 of the Rājput̄s and then, instead of annexing the State, restored it to its ruler, Mahmūd II in 1518 A. D.² Bahādur Shāh also was agreeable to the separate entity of the Mālwa kingdom, he only insisted on the surrender of his fugitive brother, Chānd Khān, and a personal interview with the Mālwa ruler. To this the latter never agreed³ and thus brought about the extinction of his kingdom. Again, Humāyūn, marched against Shēr Khān in Bengal in order to restore it to its dispossessed and wounded king, Ghiyāsuddīn Mahmūd. In pursuance of this praiseworthy object, he had to shut his eyes to the more advantageous offers of Shēr Khān.⁴ Last, but not least, the loan of a large army by Shāh Tahmāsp of Persia to Humāyūn for the reconquest of his territories is another instance in point.

¹ See *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, pp. 304-5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 319.

³ The reason being that he could not agree to Chānd Khān's surrender. *A. H. G.*, p. 1. 4 has قد اسلمه له مظفر شاه نرعاية له even in his last moments Mahmūd tried to save Chānd Khān. See also p. 196, l. 5.

⁴ *Vide infra*, Chapter XVII.

CHAPTER XI

HUMAYÜN'S MARCH TO UJJAIN—THE CAPTURE OF CHITOR BY BAHĀDUR SHĀH, MARCH, 1935 A. D.—THE BATTLE OF MANDA- SOR, APRIL, 1535 A. D.

By the time the correspondence between Humāyūn and Bahādur Shāh ended, Humāyūn reached Sārang-pūr (January, 1535 A. D.), where he stayed for more than a month. Humāyūn's march through the eastern Mālwa alarmed Bahādur so much that he thought of raising the siege of Chitōr, of returning to his capital or Mandū, and of making a serious preparation to face Humāyūn. But his minister, Sadr Ḳhān,¹ relying on the Muslim tradition mentioned in the last chapter, dissuaded him from the course, and assured him that Humāyūn would not attack him while the latter was engaged in a war with a non-Muslim.² The expected happened.³

It must not, however, be supposed that Humāyūn was here meekly carrying out the wishes of the Gujrātīs; for, though technically he did not violate the Muslim convention of refraining from an attack on a brother-in-faith engaged in a war with the unbelievers, actually he gained an advantage over his enemy. Being certain of Bahādur's

¹ Farišta in Part I, p. 215, l. 4 calls him Sadr Jahān Ḳhān and again in Part II, p. 222 last line calls him Haidar Ḳhān. M. S. calls him son of Malik Rāji (راجی) A. H. G., p. 238 qualifies him as

الامير الكبير الفاضل الكامل

² The *Farišta*, Part II, 223, l. 2, the *Tāriḳh-i-Alfi* (Or. 465) fol. 526b., l. 4, the *Muntaḳhab-ut-Tawāriḳh* by Yūsuf, fol. 160a, l. 3, the *Zabdat-ut-Tawāriḳh*, fol. 92, l. 1, agree in saying that when Humāyūn heard of Bahādur's deliberations with his nobles, he decided not to molest him.


According to Bakhtāwar Ḳhān's *Mirāt-ul-Ālam* (B. M. A.) it was Bahādur who requested Humāyūn to refrain from an attack during the siege of Chitōr, and Humāyūn agreed.

³ Humāyūn, probably, never realized the advantages that he threw away by not proceeding immediately to the aid of the Rājputts; for he might have, if he had chosen, earned their permanent gratitude by a timely aid.

occupation at Chitōr, he safely proceeded to Ujjain¹ in February, 1535 A. D., and stayed there till the end of the siege of Chitōr on March 8, 1535 A. D. The advantages that he thus secured may here be stated :

(a) He occupied a part of the enemy's territories and obtained a hold on its resources. Ālam K̄hān Jighat who had gone to aid Bahādur at Chitōr, must have lost his *jāgīr*.²

(b) Humāyūn by his stay at Sārangpūr and at Ujjain was able to win over the Mālwa people, including the *Purabiya* Rājput̄s whom Bahādur had offended. That he was for the present rather anxious to reconcile the people to himself than fight Bahādur is clear from his march in a south-westerly direction to the important Hindu town of Ujjain. If Bahādur's camp had been his objective, he would have proceeded due west or north-west, shortening his distance from the enemy as well as from the Gujrāt capital, Ahmedābād.



Mandūgarh

¹ Ujjain, situated in 23° 11' N. and 75° 47' E. on the Sipra, is one of the seven sacred cities of the Hindus. It served as the capital to the semi-mythical Vikramāditya. Its chief temple is that of Mahākālī, on the site of the famous structure destroyed by Iltutmish in 1235 A. D. Nearby at Kāliadaha, lies an old pleasure-resort of Jahāngīr, now repaired and used by the Mahārājā Scindia of Gwālīor.

² Which consisted of a stretch of land, from Chandēri, Bhilsa and Raisen.

(c) He placed himself between Mandūgarh and the Gujrāt army and thus made it impossible for his adversary to reach the Mālwa capital without passing through his camp. The diagram given on the previous page will illustrate this statement.

(d) Even after the capture of Chitōr if Bahādur were to attempt to reach Ahmadābād along with his heavy guns, it would be easy for the lightly-equipped Humāyūn to out-distance him.

(e) In a war between Bahādur and the Mughals, it was possible for Humāyūn to receive some indirect support from the Rājput̄s who surrounded the Sultān in the north and in the west. They must have sent provisions to him; for there was never any difficulty about the supply of provisions to the Mughal camp, and they were friendly to him.

Chitōr fell on March 8, 1535 A.D.¹ after a siege of more than three months.² The city was abandoned to plunder for three days and then a proclamation for the protection of life and property was made.

*The fall of
Chitōr, March 8
1535 A. D.*

The fortifications, which had suffered from Rūmī Ḳhān's bombardment, were repaired and strengthened, guns mounted, and a year's provisions stored.³ Its governorship was again denied to Rūmī Ḳhān, and was to be bestowed, perhaps temporarily, on *Malik Nassan Ḳhān*.⁴

¹ = 3rd *Ramzān*, 941 A. H. Most of the writers mention the date, the only exceptions being (a) *U. R. I.* which omits it and (b) *A. T. W. H. G.* which puts it down as happening in 942 A. H.

² *A. H. G.* in the same breath makes two contradictory statements (1) that the garrison was put to the sword *وضعوا السيف* and (2) Bahādur proclaimed peace to all. See p. 239, l. 1.

³ *Ibid.* If the statement is correct, in the war between Bahādur and Humāyūn, when Chitōr was recovered by the Rājput̄s, the provisions must have been placed at Humāyūn's disposal. Bahādur never profited by them and actually lost the battle of Mandasōr because of starvation in his camp.

⁴ *M. S.* fol. 159b, l. 12. ...It seems that *Malik Nassan* was the permanent incumbent of Ranthambhōr and was temporarily placed at Chitōr in charge of the repairs. After their completion he would revert to his old post. The *Rauzat-ut-Tahirin* (Or. 168) fol. 614b, l. 15, is wrong in saying that Chitōr, after its capture, was handed over to Rūmī Ḳhān.

U. R. I. refers to some coins of Rānā Vikramāditya on which could be traced the word *Sultān* and it presumes the word refers to Bahādur Shāh. But it makes no suggestion as to their relation with each other.

Rūmī Ḳhān was a person of outstanding merit. He was in charge of the naval ports and the artillery of Gujrāt, and took a prominent part in the conduct of the campaigns or sieges.¹ It was feared that if he were placed also in charge of impregnable forts like Chitōr he would grow so powerful as to endanger the very existence of the Gujrāt kingdom. It was a natural fear of the people of the country, themselves weak in the manipulation of heavy guns and marvelling at the wonderful skill of some of the foreign gunners.² These foreigners, if loyal, would make their master great; but, they, if disloyal, would ruin him.

Free from the work of the siege, Bahādur found himself in an alarming situation. His army reduced in number and removed far from the capital was suffering from the after-effects of a protracted campaign. The Rājput̄s looked sullen, though exhausted. They might rise against Bahādur.³ What was more, Humāyūn at Ujjain had cut him off from the capital of Mālwa and threatened his hold on Gujrāt; and lastly, Rūmī Ḳhān, ambitious, unscrupulous, discontented, was ready to sell his master.⁴

Certainly, the proper course for Bahādur to adopt in such a crisis would have been to get rid of the undesirable Rūmī Ḳhān, either by undertaking the conduct of the campaign himself, or by entrusting it to some other loyal commanders. If Rūmī Ḳhān resented the supersession, he

¹ *E.g.*, at Chitōr; according to *A. H. G.*, p. 230 شرح رومی خان فی عمله
Similarly at Ranthambhōr, *A. H. G.*, p. 227

سلط رومی خان علیه نعمت عملا لا یطیقه من فی القلعة

A. N. on p. 151, l. 2 has

(رومی خان) در فتح حصرون حصین وقلاع سماری ارتفاع یگانه روزگار بود

² Another gunner, named Scott has been referred to by *A. H. G.*, p. 234, ll. 21-23. He had become a Muslim at Bahādur's instance. It describes how he had proposed to aim at one of Humāyūn's guns and succeeded in dismantling it. He was rewarded with 7 *mans* of gold by Rājā Narsingha Dēo.

³ Actually the fear was never realized; for Rānā Vikramāditya continued to neglect the administration and died in 1536 A. D. at the early age of 16. See *U. R. I.*, p. 401.

⁴ *A. H. G.*, p. 239, ll. 6-7. سار ظاهره مع سلطان و باطنه مع صاحب دهلی

could have been dismissed, imprisoned, or even put to death.¹

If Bahādur had been left to himself he might have risen to the occasion. But since his declaration of war with the Mughals, he had been shirking a bold policy. At the battle of Pānīpat, he had seen the Mughals win with the aid of their guns and so he attached too much importance to guns and gunners. He did not see the logical conclusion of his ideas in this respect. If artillery were to be the chief weapon of winning victories, the foreigners, controlling the ordinance department, were bound, sooner or later, to control their masters, and ultimately to become the very rulers of the land.²

Maybe, he was not blind to the risk of employing foreigners but he felt alarmed at the advance of the Mughals, and thought that without the foreign gunners, he could not stand for a day against them, but with their help, he might be able to check their advance for a while. The alternative course, namely, submission to Humāyūn, his superior in military organization, the patriot in him forbade him to adopt. Hence the vicious circle: he must fight the Mughals; to fight the Mughals he must engage the foreign gunners; and the foreign gunners would, sooner than later, imperil his kingdom.

Next, granting that he must fight the Mughals, obviously, the best course was to engage forthwith and break through their lines. It is possible that he might have effected his escape.³ For his army not yet weakened—nay—flushed with the success at Chitōr might have faced the Mughals with great courage and confidence. This was the course suggested to him by Tāj K̄hān Narpālī and Sadr K̄hān, two of his prominent nobles; but Bahādur


¹ As actually done by Humāyūn, later on.

² For the next two centuries nothing untoward happened. The strong central government kept foreign adventurers under control. It was only when the central administration broke down, that the skilled foreign organizations of the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and lastly the English took advantage of the situation.

³ As his army under the command of Sadr K̄hān did *after* the defeat at Mandasōr.

did not consider it wise to ignore the advice of Rūmī Ḳhān, who, now as a traitor¹ and in league with Humāyūn, counselled him against it.

Humāyūn now moved on to Mandasōr² and thus secured the additional advantage of getting closer to Ahmadābād, the capital of Gujrāt,³ as would be clear from the diagram below.



¹ Bahādur Shāh might have or might not have known the full extent of Rūmī Ḳhān's treachery but he felt helpless in either case.

² Situated in 24°4' N. and 75°5' E. on the bank of a tributary of the Sipra, and a railway station on the B. B. & C. I. Railway. There is a large tank outside the city, by the side of which, the two armies encamped. Its fort was founded by Alāuddīn Khaljī. Holkar, after his defeat at Mahīdpūr, made his treaty with the English here in 1818 A. D.

³ Jauhar *Aftābchī* is very unreliable here. He says (see B. M. 1611) that—

- (a) (fol. 4b, 1.8) Humāyūn stayed at Tilwar while Bahādur besieged Chitōr.
- (b) (l. 9) Bahādur returned to Gujrāt. This is impossible from the relative positions of Bahādur and Humāyūn.
- (c) (l. 11) The battle took place at Mori in Būrhānpūr district. This would have no meaning and take away both Bahādur and Humāyūn from their objectives.
- (d) (fol. 25a) It was Humāyūn who proposed to besiege Bahādur. His interest lay in fighting an immediate battle as R. T. (B. M. Or. 168) fol. 614b, l. 4 puts it

(همایون) بعزم رزم باسلطان بهادر بجانب گوالیار و مندو شناختند

from which it is clear that his purpose was to meet Bahādur in an immediate battle.

Though Bahādur realized that he had been out-manceuvred, he had no other choice than to march forward and meet him. Thus both the armies encamped at Mandasōr by the side of a large tank.¹ Small skirmishes took place in which Bahādur suffered reverses, which so much damped the spirit of his soldiers that he gladly accepted Rūmī Khān's suggestion of encamping in an open field and entrenching in the Turkish fashion, viz., surrounding the camp with carts, waggons, and artillery,² and then again with a ditch round them. Bahādur's object in listening to Rūmī Khān's advice, as has been observed above, was to prevent his desertion. The Sultān also hoped that his alliance with Shēr Khān and with the king of Bengal might bring in some unexpected relief for him.³

Thus Bahādur willingly suffered a long siege. He was so strongly entrenched and fortified that Humāyūn's first assaults made in the hope of putting an immediate end to the war were repulsed with heavy casualties. He then grew wiser, refrained from a direct attack on the enemy's fortifications, and turned his attention to cutting off supplies to the garrison.⁴ As every information regarding the Gujrātī camp was furnished to him by the treacherous Rūmī Khān, the task was easily performed.

¹ The *Mirāt-ul-Ālam* (B. M. 23530) fol. 279b, l. 11 and *A. H. G.*, p. 239, l. 10. This meeting according to the *Haqiqat-hā-Hindustān* took place on the 6th *Shawwāl* 941 A. H. = 10th April, 1535 A. D.

² Since the entrenchment was constructed with the help of the gun-carriages and country carts, the encampment was called *ارابه*. See *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 14 and *A. H. G.*, pp. 249 and 263. The gun-carriages have been called by Farishta *ارابه آتش بازی*. In Arabic, a cart-driver is called *عربه جی*.

³ For Shēr Khān see *A. H. G.*, p. 237, beginning with the sentence *فی اوائل ظهور شیرشاه کانت بینه و بین سلطان مراسلة بسابق معرفة*. *A. N.*, p. 148 says

چنانچه سلطان بہادر بچراتی بدست سوداگران امداد خرج کردہ پیش خود طلبید

For the king of Bengal see Khondamīr: *Humāyūn-Nāma* (Or. 1762) fol. 150a, l. 11 or the *Riyāz-us-Salātin*, pp. 137-38.

⁴ See *M. S.* fol. 159b for an illustration. Mehtar *Banjāra*, who was carrying provisions for the besieged garrison under an escort of 5000 soldiers, was captured by the Mughals, *A. H. G.*, p. 240, ll. 9-10 also mentions the capture.

The siege lasted for 16 days from the 10th to the 25th April, 1535 A.D.¹ Bahādur was so ill-served by his commissariat department, if he had any, that at the close of this short period his horses were dying in large numbers² and men starving. When Bahādur's garrison was reduced to these straits, he deliberated with his chief advisers, and with their consent³ at last determined on a flight.

Bahādur's flight took place on April 25, 1535 A. D.⁴ Before his departure he took care to destroy his jewellery, guns, and animals. The Sultān shed bitter tears when his favourite elephants, *Sharzah* and *Pat-singār*, or his chief cannon, *Laila* and *Majnūn*, were destroyed.⁵ While this destruction was taking place in Bahādur's camp, Rūmī K̄hān slunk away to Humāyūn, and set his alarm at rest by explaining to him the cause of the uproar and confusion that prevailed in the Gujrāt camp. Even then, during the remaining portion of the night and some portion of the following morning, Humāyūn remained on horseback

¹ If the actual meeting of the two armies took place on the 6th *Shawwāl* 941 A. H., as mentioned by the *Haqiqathār-Hindustān* and if Bahādur fled from Mandasōr on the 21st *Shawwāl*, the total period of the siege comes to 16 days only. Thus I am forced to reject Jauhar who prolongs the siege to 3 or 4 months. *T. A.*, p. 196, l. 7, the *Farishta*, Part II, p. 223, l. 11, Yūsuf: *Muntakhab* (B. M. 25786) fol. 160b, l. 2, all put it to 2 months. They probably include the total period from 3rd *Ramzān* to 21st *Shawwāl* 941 A. H.; even then it comes to 1 month and 18 days.

Ū. R. I. gives the date of Bahādur's capture of Chitōr as 3rd *Ramzān* and his flight from Mandasōr as 20th *Ramzān*. At the same time he mentions the period of the siege as lasting for 2 months. Thus one fact is inconsistent with the other.

² *M. S.* makes two statements in this connexion:

(a) The flesh of 4 horses would feed only two soldiers.

(b) The horses had nothing else to chew than one another's tails.

³ An exception should be made of K̄hudāwand K̄hān al-Ijī, Bahādur's minister as well as of tutor (الخووند). He estimated Gujrāt kingdom to be half of the whole country (هند) and could not agree to his master's flight. See *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 15, ll. 1-3.

⁴ 21st *Shawwāl* 941 A. H. The chronogram ذل بهادر indicates one year too many. Such slight discrepancies are excusable.

⁵ *M. S.* fol. 160b. and *A. H. G.*, p. 232. We have attached no importance to the anecdote described by either of them that a box fell into Bahādur's hand in which were found some salt and coal and a few tattered clothes, blue in colour. As soon as Bahādur saw this, he got terrified and fled away.

with 30,000 men¹ to guard against any surprise attack of the enemy. That he made no attack on the distressed and terror-stricken enemy may be owing to one or more of the following reasons:—

(a) He was too chivalrous to take advantage of his adversary's weak position. Humāyūn could not forget the Sultān's past glory and achievements, and hence this consideration for him.

(b) He had great respect for Bahādur's military qualities, and did not desire to risk an unnecessary attack, when the slow but steady process of starvation was helping his cause. If this consideration weighed with Humāyūn it shows that he was not correctly apprised of the affairs of the Gujrāt camp and that he possessed no efficient system of scouting in his army. Humāyūn did not stir even when Rūmī Ḳhān supplied him with necessary information.

(c) He desired to keep his army under control during the night and lead it to the enemy's camp in the morning. He actually did so, but could not follow his father's principle of iron discipline; for he gave a free permission to plunder and secure captives. The only condition that he made was that no captive was to be killed.²

Bahādur Shāh escaped with five followers³ among whom, it is mentioned, were the faithful Muhammad of Khāndēsh and Mallu Ḳhān entitled Qādir Shāh Mandūālī. His path lay through risk and danger, and Humāyūn's army stood between him and his two capitals, Mandū and Ahmadābād. So he had recourse to stratagem to ensure his safety. Instead of proceeding direct to the south, he proceeded northward, *i.e.*, towards Āgrā and then after proceeding a few stages, turned round to take the road to

¹ *A. N.*, p. 132, *A. H. G.*, p. 241.

² *A. H. G.*, p. 241. ثم اباح الاربعة نهياً و أسراً لاقتل

ارابه (Arābah) here means the camp.

³ The remaining three according to *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 15, were Alph Ḳhān Dutāni and two horse-guards. According to *A. H. G.*, p. 240, 1, 22, the number was 'less than ten.'

Mandū.¹ Thus he eluded pursuit and safely reached Mandū.²

The rest of the Gujrāt army gathered under Sadr Khān and Imād-ul-Mulk, and proceeded by a more direct route to the same destination. It speaks of the courage and military skill of the two generals that they proceeded southwards not as vanquished fugitives but as commanders of 15 to 20,000 soldiers, with banners unfurled, and drums beating. So firmly did they march that Humāyūn, who followed them with several thousand followers,³ desisted from attacking them. It is rather strange that though Humāyūn thought Bahādur to be present in Sadr Khān's army, he refrained from an attack, and was content only to follow it at some distance. What was Humāyūn's hesitation due to? Was it that Humāyūn took pity on Bahādur and did not desire to add to his distress; or was it that he wished to have a small casualty list and gain his end by a discreet pursuit from a distance? Whatever the reason, one is confident that Humāyūn's faint-heartedness had nothing to do with it.

On the morning following Bahādur's flight, Humāyūn obtained possession of his camp, when it was found that the destruction ordered by him before his departure had not been completed. Practically, the camp had been left entire.⁴ Its splendour surprised the Mughals. Abū Turāb Wali describes the royal enclosure as having a circumference of a mile.⁵ The tent-cloth con-

¹ See *A. H. G.* Also *A. N.*, p. 132. Compare Bahādur's flight with that of Shivāji when the latter escaped from Agrā in 1665-66 A. D. Shivāji also followed a round-about route.

² Bahādur reached there on 14th *Zulqada* = 19th May, 1535 A. D. See *A. N.* Tr. by Beveridge, p. 304.

³ The number of soldiers in Humāyūn's army has been variously put down as 2 or 3000 to 30000 men. Jauhar *Aftābchī's* figure is 3 or 4000.

⁴ One would like to enquire as to what prevented the plunder of the Gujrāt camp. Are we to conclude that Sadr Khān's departure in the morning was immediately followed by Humāyūn's entry?

⁵ *A. T. W. G. H.*, p. 2 has *قرب نیم کره*. *A. A.* describes Akbar's encampment; the royal seraglio, the audience hall, and the *naqqār khānah* together occupying a length of 1530 *Ilāhī gaz*. One, such *gaz* equalled 33 inches.

sisted of velvet, silk, and brocade, the ropes of silken cords, and the pegs of gold and silver. At the sight, Humāyūn is said to have exclaimed, 'Why should it not be so, he is the lord of both Land and Sea.' The author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandari* puts it in a slightly different form, 'Delhi relies on its wheat and millets for revenue while Gujrāt counts upon its corals and pearls.'

Of the numerous Gujrāti captives, secured by the Mughals, two distinguished personages have been specially mentioned, Ḳhudāwand Ḳhān al-Ijī,¹ one of Bahādur's foremost ministers, and Jām Fīrūz, the ex-ruler of Thatha and Bahādur's father-in-law.

Ḳhudāwand Ḳhān² had served four kings, attained eighty years of age, and owing to debility was unable to ride a horse. But he possessed indomitable courage, supervised his army from a palankeen, and in the conference in which Bahādur's flight was discussed he voted against the proposition. After the break-up of the Gujrāt army, infirm and old as he was, he was captured by the Mughals and carried to Humāyūn. His age, length of service, learning, and valour, moved Humāyūn's heart and in a short while, Ḳhudāwand Ḳhān became one of his principal courtiers and advisers in the Gujrāt campaign. Humāyūn was especially pleased with his learning, and profited by his discourses on *hadīs* or Muhammad's sayings.

Jām Fīrūz had lost his State to Shāh Bēg Arghūn³ in 1521 A. D. and since then had been staying with Bahādur. Humāyūn carried him about for a time but subsequently

¹ Briggs, the translator of the *Farishta*, has made a confusion by mixing up three persons into one (1) Mustafā Rūmī Ḳhān, (2) Rūmī Ḳhān Safar, the builder of Surat castle in 1542-43 A. D., as a protection against the Portuguese who molested the Muslim pilgrims, (3) Ḳhudāwand Ḳhān Al-Ijī. Similarly Erskine (pp. 49, 76, 82) confuses Rūmī Ḳhān and Ḳhudāwand Ḳhān. Many interesting details about the last personage may be obtained from Mr Commissariat's article on 'A Brief History of the Gujrāt Sultanate' in J. R. A. S. B., 1918-19 A. D.

² The four kings would be (1) Mahmūd Begarha, (2) Muzaffar II, (3) Sikandar, (4) Bahādur.

³ C. H. I., Vol. III, p. 501.

put him to death during an alarm when a general rising of the inhabitants took place at Cambay.¹

Two other results that followed the victory of Mandasōr may also be indicated. The one was the flight of Muhammad Zamān M. Finding that Bahādur, in his distress, could be of no further help to him, he deserted the Gujrāt camp for 'fresh woods' and found a place in Lahore during the temporary absence of Kāmran from there. He remained there causing disturbances till the return of the prince.

The other result was the recovery of Chitōr by the Rājput̄s. Rānā Vikramāditya² was sent for from Boondi and again placed on the throne of Chitōr in 1535 A. D. For a year more he ruled, and was then murdered at the age of 16³ by his cousin, Kuṅwar Banbīr Singh.⁴

The three prominent dates of this chapter are given below:—

- (1) The fall of Chitōr
3rd *Ramzān* 941 A. H. = 8th March, 1535 A. D.
- (2) The meeting of the two kings at Mandasōr,
6th *Shawwāl* 941 A. H. = 10th April, 1535 A. D.
- (3) Bahādur's defeat and flight from Mandasōr,
21st *Shawwāl* 941 A. H. = 25th April, 1535 A. D.

¹ We have omitted from the text the story of Bahādur's parrot, which, when brought to Humāyūn's court, repeatedly cried out 'Rūmī K̄hān *harām k̄hōr*,' i.e., Rūmī K̄hān, the traitor. See *M. S.* fol. 161a and *A. H. G.*, p. 235. We need not conclude from *M. S.*'s next sentence حضرت آشیانی چون مضمون این عبارت از ترجمانے معلوم کرد that Humāyūn did not understand the Urdu language. He had been now, for more than ten years in the country and hence we may conclude that he knew the language.

² *R. T.* makes the mistake of calling him, Rānā Sāngā.

³ *U. R. I.*, p. 401.

⁴ The relation of Vikramāditya with Banbīr is thus indicated:

Rānā Rai Singh
|

Rānā Sāngā
|

Rānā Vikramāditya

Kr. Prithvī Rāj
|

Kr. Banbīr

CHAPTER XII

THE FLIGHT OF BAHĀDUR SHĀH—FALL OF MANDŪ, CAMBAY AND CHĀMPĀNĪR, 1535 A. D.

We have noticed in the last chapter that the two Gujrāt generals, Sadr Khān and Imād-ul-Mulk, reached Mandūgarh by May, 1535 A. D., followed by Humāyūn. Bahādur slipped in unnoticed a fortnight later, that is, by the 19th of May.¹ A subsequent contingent of the Mughals under the command of Yādgar Nāsir Mirzā, Hindū Bēg, and Qāsim Husain Sultān, also joined the camp of Humāyūn by that time. Humāyūn, a lover of natural scenery, preferred to encamp at Nālcha,² 6 miles north of Mandū. Nālcha had a plentiful supply of water from wells, tanks, and a small stream that fell into the Narbadā; and as its elevation was more than two thousand feet from the sea-level, its climate also was bracing.

With the arrival of the other Mughal generals, Humāyūn set to work out the plans of a siege. The task was a huge one; for Mandūgarh³ is a hill
Mandū. fortress of about 23 miles in circumference, 2079 feet high from the sea-level, and everywhere protected by battlements.

¹ See *A. N.*, p. 304 and n. 4.

² Situated in 22°25' N. and 75°27' E. It contains noble ruins of many splendid edifices raised principally by Mahmūd Khalji I who ruled from 1436-69 A. D.

³ It had been the capital of Mālwa from Hūshang Shāh's time (1405-1435 A. D.) to its extinction in 1531 A. D. Its principal buildings are (a) Hindōla *Mahal* with its steeply sloping buttresses, (b) Jahāz *Mahal* probably so called because it overhangs a lake, (c) The magnificent *Jāmi Masjid* built by Hūshang Shāh and his mausoleum by its side, (d) The picturesque palaces of Bāz Bahādur and Rūpmati. Beneath her bower is a drop of several hundred feet. The river Narbadā flows in its neighbourhood.

Sir Thomas Roe, during a visit to Jahāngīr, resided in a mosque near the Jahāz *Mahal*. See the *Archæological Report of the Year 1912-13 A. D.*, pp. 148-51.

Both Humāyūn and Bahādur realized the difficulties of their situation. Humāyūn's difficulty was that a regular siege of the usual type would not enable him to take a fortress of such gigantic dimensions, and defended by a large garrison. Bahādur found that he had been completely cut off from Gujrāt, and what he could at the most hope for, was a prolonged resistance but that, too, would eventually end in a surrender. It is true that Bahādur still had a large army¹ and a few faithful commanders,² but he feared that they also might desert him.

So both the parties were inclined to some compromise. Humāyūn broached the subject first. He sent Sayyid Amīr with Bairam Ḳhān to Bahādur³ to say that since the rainy season had started, it was not proper for Bahādur to keep the Mughals under the canvas. What he proposed was that Gujrāt, being the hereditary dominion of the Sultān, might remain with him, but that the rest of his territories including Mālwa be surrendered to himself. Humāyūn, however, frankly admitted that the immediate reason for his proposal was the inconvenience of an open encampment.

As might be expected, the proposals were received well by Bahādur with the result that further negotiations were entrusted to the accredited agents of the two kings; Maulānā Muhammad Farghali acting on behalf of Humāyūn and Sadr Ḳhān on behalf of Bahādur. It was settled that the two representatives would meet at the Blue Road,⁴ midway between Nālcha and Mandū. The Mughals made one more concession, namely, allowed two of the respect-

¹ The number of his soldiers was now reduced from 20,000 to 15,000. See *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 16.

² Besides Sadr Ḳhān and Imad-ul-Mulk, there were Qādir Shāh and Alam Ḳhān Lōdī of Kālpi. According to *A. H. G.*, p. 241, Qādir Shāh was the commandant of the place.

³ *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 17. The *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn Shāh* by Allahdād Faizi correctly indicates Sayyid Amīr as Humāyūn's agent but wrongly (a) specifies the place of negotiation to be Mandasōr instead of Mandū, (b) indicates that Bahādur was to pay tribute.

⁴ نیلی سبیل See *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 16.

able Gujrātī *maulavis* to join in the proceedings in support of Sadr Ḳhān. They were Shāh Qutbuddīn Sukrullāh and Shāh Kamāluddīn Fathullāh, father and uncle, respectively, of Abū Turāb Wali, the author of the *History of Gujrāt*.

Surprising as it may appear, Sadr Ḳhān would not agree to Humāyūn's terms, and so Humāyūn made a personal appeal to the two *maulavis* to intervene and counsel Bahādur Shāh or his agent, Sadr Ḳhān, to yield to him. They proved better negotiators and impressed Humāyūn with their piety and earnestness, so that a slight modification of the terms was agreed upon, namely, the addition of Chitōr to Bahādur's dominion. Three reasons may be assigned for Humāyūn's ready agreement: (a) It cost him nothing. (b) He had no ambition of possessing Chitōr. His relations with the Rāj-pūts were cordial, and he had no desire to bring them under subjection. (c) He knew that Bahādur in the present state of his political weakness would not be able to retain Chitōr. Thus we see here that Humāyūn acted diplomatically by feeding Bahādur's vanity in allowing him to retain Chitōr. Later on, Humāyūn saw with approval and satisfaction the Rāj-pūts' recovering the place.

Humāyūn ended the negotiations by confirming, in a personal letter, the grant of Gujrāt and Chitōr to the Sultān and settling that Bahādur should leave Mandū by the Lowanī gate in the west and Humāyūn would enter later by the Delhi gate in the north.¹

Bahādur made the technical blunder by accepting Humāyūn's terms, and by proclaiming to his soldiers that the war would end on the *following* day and thus allowed the Mughals an opportunity of capturing the place, if they chose, that very night. Actually in the small hours,² the Mughals got on to the top of the fortress with the help of

¹ See Art: *Dhār and Mandū* by Ernest Barnes in *J. R. A. S.* (Bombay Branch), 1903, Vol. XXI and the map at the end.

² *A. T. W. H. G.* has *دو گھڑی آہر شب*

700 ladders. Qādir Shāh ran from his tower¹ to inform his master. The attendants² would not allow him to enter but the Sultān recognizing him by his voice, called him in. When the Sultān realized the situation he mounted a horse and came out. Qādir Shāh and two or three police officers followed him on foot. Silhadi's son, Bhūpat Rāi, also joined him. Rūmī Khān had incited the Rājput to desert Bahādur by reminding him of his father's cruel fate and assuring him that Humāyūn would restore to him all that his father had lost and, possibly, grant something in addition. Bhūpat refused, however, and joined Bahādur.³ He was loyal to the Sultān and was prepared to sacrifice his all in his cause.

Since a stiff opposition from the garrison still continued in the 'three-gate *bazaar*,'⁴ Bahādur commanded Bhūpat to attack the enemy and joined him himself on a piebald horse striking its rider with a dagger⁵ snatched from an armour-bearer. He had a mind to return and continue the combat. But Qādir Shāh pointed out its futility, the Mughals being there in large numbers under the direct command of Humāyūn. He persuaded the Sultān to repair to the citadel, Sōnghar,⁶ still retained by the Gujrātīs. When Bahādur arrived there, he realized that that portion of the fort also must fall into the hands of the enemy, and so he let himself down from the citadel and fled with five or six followers, (June 1, 1535 A. D.).⁷

¹ مورچہل Ordinarily means an outpost, but here the secondary meaning of 'a tower' is to be preferred.

² پورده داران in Persian.

³ I prefer *A. T. W. H. G.*'s version to *M. S.*'s or *A. H. G.*'s suggestion of treachery on the part of Bhūpat, the reason being that Turāb's father and uncle were present on the occasion and Turāb, later on, became an honoured official of the Mughals. Bhūpat had now stayed with Bahādur for three years or more, after his father's murder.

⁴ سه دروازه بازار

⁵ نیچہ

⁶ Sōnghar is a semi-detached hillock in the west, which served as a citadel. See Barnes's article and the map at the end.

⁷ The date is conjectural. Presumably the rains had started early that year.

During his flight Bahādur narrowly escaped capture; for he was recognized by an Uzbek soldier, Nūrī,¹ belonging to Qāsim Husain Sultān's division who spoke to his commander about his suspicion. But Qāsim Husain feigned disbelief and remarked, 'how could a Sultān have only three or four men as followers?' So he let Bahādur escape.²

Sadr K̄hān continued the struggle at the Delhi gate and then retreated to the citadel where Ālam K̄hān also joined him. Humāyūn acted with a stern ferocity towards the inhabitants of the city of Mandū, now in his possession, and gave up the city to plunder.³ This continued so long as Humāyūn wore a red robe and was relaxed only when *Ustād* Manjhū the famous musician of Gujrāt, humoured him with melodious songs; then he changed his dress from red to green indicating security for the inhabitants. The hideous butchery⁴ stopped at once, and peace and order reigned once more in the city.

This cruelty had the effect of terrorizing the garrison, and bore fruit immediately. Sadr K̄hān and Ālam K̄hān after their retreat to Sōnghar had continued the struggle and paid no heed to Humāyūn's assurance that if they surrendered, their lives would be spared. Now, when the gruesome tale of Humāyūn's severity reached them, they submitted. No harm was done to Sadr K̄hān, except that he was placed under surveillance. The captive gave word that he would not leave the Mughal camp, and he observed

¹ There are several variants of the name.

² The usual reason given for this generosity on the part of Qāsim Husain is that he had served Bahādur in the past and did his duty with him *now* by turning against his *present* master.

³ *A. N.* says, the plunder lasted for three days but possibly *M. S.* and *A. H. G.*, p. 233, are more correct in restricting it to one day only.

⁴ *M. S.* and *A. H. G.* both have given some account of Manjhū. Later on he fled to Bahādur, who remarked on his arrival that even in his present landless condition he was so pleased with his return that he felt he had got back his whole kingdom.

Regarding the massacre *M. S.* describes how

در یک ساعت چوبهای خون در هر کوچه و بازار شهر هندو روان شد

the condition so faithfully that when later on, at Cambay, efforts were made to rescue him he refused to leave. Unfortunately, his honesty did not save him from death. The Mughal jailors, fearing lest other attempts should be made in his favour, killed him as well as Jām Fīrūz, the ex-ruler of Thatha. Humāyūn when he heard of this, lamented the death of the high-souled and god-fearing nobleman and inflicted capital punishment on the murderers. Ālam Ḳhān Lōdī did not receive the same consideration as Sadr Ḳhān; for though his life was spared, he was hamstrung and disabled for life.

We may pause here to reflect on Humāyūn's cruelty after the capture of Mandū and its effect on the people.

(a) The cruelty is strikingly incompatible with Humāyūn's general character. Usually he was kind and affable. On two occasions only and both taking place during the Gujrāt campaign, we find him somewhat different: now, and once again during his stay at Cambay he gave orders for plunder and slaughter.

(b) Humāyūn did not inherit this ferocity from his father, Bābur, who generally spared the inoffensive inhabitants and even punished his own soldiers if they molested the people.¹

(c) The reputation of the Mughals depended on the superior culture as well as on greater humanity which they usually displayed. The entire policy of the Mughals after the battle of Pānipat aimed at conciliating the Afghāns and other people of the country. The senseless cruelty at Mandū and later on at Cambay was a direct negation of this liberal policy.

(d) This cruelty might have been largely responsible for the alienation of the people of Mālwa and of Gujrāt from the Mughals. It might also explain why the two provinces were lost soon after their occupation.

¹ See *B. N.*, pp. 380 and 383.

(e) In both Mālwa and Gujrāt, the local rulers treated their Hindu and Muslim subjects impartially. The Hindus in fact predominated in Mālwa; and in Gujrāt, too, there were Hindu nobles who were more loyal and devoted than the Muslims. The example of Bhūpat Rāi is in point. He was more faithful to his master than the Turkish gunner, Mustafā Rūmī Khān. Rājā Nar Singh Dēo's loyalty is another example. When the Sultān heard of his death, he exclaimed that the fort—Chāmpānīr—would now fall; for the Rājā was the real commandant of the fort² and not the bookish, impractical Iḳhtiyār Khān.

(f) This cruelty would also explain the rise of the whole population, rural as well as urban, in Bahādur's favour and speedy recovery by him of his lost territory. The people got frightened at Humāyūn's cruelty and rallied round their old master.

(g) If Humāyūn had stayed a little longer in Gujrāt, he might gradually have brought about a change in the people's attitude towards the Mughals. As it was, the Mughals got no chance, and were driven out of Gujrāt before they could settle down and organize an administration.

From Mandū Bahādur fled to Chāmpānīr, and so Humāyūn followed him there.

Chāmpānīr, named after the Champak tree,³ lies mostly in ruins, but it once served as a capital.⁴ Its situation is in 22°29' N. and 73°32' E. about 25 miles north of Baroda. Its most prominent features are:

Chāmpānīr. (a) Pavagarh or Pavangarh, a fortified hill of great strength on the north-east, (b) the citadel Bhādar, (c) a large lake (now called *Barā Talāo* but probably named in the 16th century after Imād-ul-Mulk) fed by a

¹ A. H. G., p. 235. M. S. calls him Bir Singh Deo.

² A. H. G. has رجل القلعة

³ See the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*.

⁴ See Commissariat's article on 'A Brief History of the Gujrāt Sultānate' in *J. R. A. S. (Bombay Branch) 1918-19 A. D.* He mentions the interesting fact that the last coins issued from Chāmpānīr mint were those issued by Humāyūn in 1535 A. D.

canal from the eastern hills and (d) its *Jāmi Masjid*, a magnificent specimen of the massive Muslim architecture of the western India.

Chāmpānīr was called by Mahmūd Begarha, Muhammadābād in contradistinction to Gīrnār called after its conquest, Mustafābād.¹ In his time, it was noted for its silk-weaving industry and manufacture of sword-blades but its glory lasted for 50 years only. From the beginning of the 17th century it gradually decayed and to-day it is covered with wild growth. Its unhealthy climate has baffled all attempts at colonization.

To revert to our narration, Bahādūr took shelter in the fort while Humāyūn halted in the open, near the large tank,² called Imād-ul-Mulk's, 11th *Zulhijj*=13th June, 1535 A.D. and after a few days entered the town³ but not the fortress. Bahādūr found it impossible to stay here also. But before leaving it, he entrusted *Masnad-i-Ālī* Abdul Azīz Āsaf Ḳhān with his women, treasure, and other valuable property, and asked him to take them to Diū. He next set fire to the town and then left for Cambay. Humāyūn, who was now in possession of the town, readily put his soldiers on to extinguishing the flames, and earned the gratitude of its inhabitants.

Bahādūr had practically lost everything. What was his object now? It appears that he had lost faith in the Mughals since their attack on Mandū during negotiations, and so, now, instead of resigning to the inevitable, namely, submission to Humāyūn, he was following an illusory course.

A part of this scheme we have already noted, namely, sending his women, and treasure with Āsaf Ḳhān to Diū. The rest we shall describe here. He hoped to send Āsaf Ḳhān as an embassy to Sulaimān I, the ruler of

¹ Mahmūd was called *begarha* or 'two forts' because of his conquest of these two forts—Gīrnār and Chāmpānīr.

² At the Pipli gate.

³ *A. H. G.*, p. 243, ll. 24-25. The fort remained in the possession of the Gujrātīs for another couple of months or so.

Turkey. Turkey had been friendly to Gujrāt, and in Mahmūd Begarha's reign, the Sultān of Turkey had rendered great help to the local fleet in fighting the Portuguese. Bahādur hoped that Turkey would continue its generous policy towards him.

So Āsaf Khān left the Indian shores with ten large ships each containing 250 men besides the crew,¹ and skirting the Persian coast, reached the Kuria Muria islands and thence went to Jedda. From there Bahādur's letter of appeal for aid and the accompanying gifts were sent to Sultān Sulaimān. The Sultān listened to his request and decided to comply with it. But on account of the powerful resistance by the Portuguese who swarmed the Indian Ocean, he could not afford to be hasty. Actually a Turkish fleet was sent under Sulaimān Pāshā al-Ḳhādim but it arrived at the Gujrāt coast after Bahādur's death. The expedition failed partly because of Sulaimān Pāshā's cruelties to his own co-religionists and partly because of the incompetence of Sultān Mahmūd III, (1537-54 A. D.).²

Bahādur had another difficulty to face, and it was in part his own creation. He had inherited a dislike to the Portuguese from his predecessors and the Portuguese by strengthening the fortifications at Diū had given him offence. He built a large fleet which stood him in good stead when the Portuguese attacked him in 1531 A. D.³ He repulsed them and then tried to guard against future attacks by forming a combination with some of the Muslim States of

*Bahādur and
the Portuguese.*

¹ The largest among the boats was called درياسرا *

² For fuller details see *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, pp. 336-37 and Danvers: *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. I, pp. 425-35. The latter seems to have made no distinction between the two Sulaimāns, one the Sultān of Turkey, and the other the Pāshā and commander of the fleet. Probably Bahādur had not meant that the Turks should fight against the Portuguese first. But in the time of Mahmūd III, they had no other work to do.

³ See the article: *Garcia d'Orta of Bombay in J. R. A. S. (B. B.)*, pp. 204-5. It was Malik Tūghān, Rūmī Khān's predecessor, who defended himself against the Portuguese governor, Nuno da Cunha.

the south.¹ The Sultān's plan was discovered by the Portuguese and their relations with him grew more strained. Now, the Sultān was anxious to take Diū from them or reduce their military strength by demolishing the fortifications of the island.

Diū is an island situated in 20°43'N. and 71°2'E. and separated from the southern extremity of the peninsula of Kāthiāwād by a narrow channel.² East to west it is seven miles, and north to south, about two, the total area of the island being 20 sq. miles. The population in the sixteenth century must have been more than 50,000 but now it has dwindled to less than half.

The fortress, situated at the eastern extremity of the island, was an imposing structure, specially after the improvements introduced by Dom João de Castro at the close of a war with Gujrāt in 1545 A. D.

Owing to the advantages which its position afforded, the Portuguese had been fired early with the ambition of establishing their mastery over the island. This the Gujrāt rulers were not prepared to allow. Hence the rupture with them.

It should have been apparent to Bahādur that a simultaneous fight on land and at sea on an extensive scale could not be carried on against superior enemies. Of his enemies, the Mughals were stronger than him on land, and the Portuguese at sea, being masters of the Arabian sea. So if he had really hoped to receive aid from Sultān Sulaimān I of Turkey, it was necessary for him to have made peace with the Portuguese by making it clear to them that his objective was Delhi and not Diū. Then and then alone the Turkish fleet could have reached the

¹ *M. S.* fol. 169a, l. 6, says,

میگویند این خصومت فرنگیان بسطان ازین جهت بود که سلطان بسلاطین دکن نوشته بود که از آن جانب شما بیاید و از اینجانب ما تا بنادر گجرات و دکن در تصرف فرنگیان رفته بگردیم

² Danvers has given in Vol. I a picture of the island opposite p. 400.

Indian shore and rendered aid to Bahādur in his wars against the Mughals.¹

Possibly Bahādur had realized his difficulties and so, though the Portuguese had transgressed the laws of the land by strengthening the fortress walls with stone in place of the former wooden palisades,² under the treaty of December 23, 1534 A. D.³ at Bassein,⁴ between Malik Tūghān and Nuno da Cunha,⁵ he continued to be on friendly terms with them.

From Chāmpānīr Bahādur fled to Cambay,⁶ a town of considerable importance in the sixteenth century,⁷ being famous for its manufacture of agate, cornelian, and onyx ornaments. Sometime back in the port, Bahādur had gathered a fleet of 100 warships⁸ in order to fight the Portuguese but he was now afraid that at his departure these might fall into the hands of the Mughals. So he burnt them and then passed on to Diū, where four months later, a fresh treaty was signed between Bahādur and Nuno in October 25, 1535 A. D., by which the surrender of Bassein to the Portuguese was confirmed, the Portuguese agreeing, in return, to help him on land or at sea⁹ against the Mughals or Rūmī Kḥān.¹⁰ Before anything more could

¹ We have already pointed out above that when the fleet arrived, Mahmūd turned it against the Portuguese; for by 1538 A. D. all quarrels between the Mughals and the Gujrātīs had come to an end.

² See *A. H. G.*, p. 251, l. 20 and p. 252, ll. 4-5. Also *M. S.*

³ *J. A. R. S. B. B. Garcia*, p. 205.

⁴ Possibly Bahādur's engagement at Chitōr gave the Portuguese this opportunity.

⁵ Malik Tūghān had reverted to his old post after Rūmī Kḥān's departure. Nuno was Viceroy of Goa from 1529-39 A. D. See the *Danvers*, Vol. I, Ch. XV.

⁶ According to *T. A.* and *G. H. N.* Bahādur went to Cambay via Ahmadābād and so did his pursuers.

Cambay is situated in 22°18' N. and 72°40' E. at the head of the Gulf of Cambay, on the north of the estuary of the river Māhī, 52 miles south of Ahmadābād.

⁷ Though in the next, Surat took its place in importance. See the *Imperial Gazetteer of India* under Cambay and Surat.

⁸ See *A. H. G.*, p. 243, ll. 12-13.

⁹ The *Danvers*, Vol. I, p. 407.

¹⁰ *A. H. G.*, p. 251, l. 16 and p. 258, l. 1. Danvers thinks that the revenue of the port of Diū remained with Bahādur.

happen, Bahādur's fortune, as we shall presently see, took a favourable turn.

Humāyūn also reached Cambay in the evening, a few hours after Bahādur's departure.¹ At first he announced protection to all, and Sayyid Sharīf Gilāni,² the governor of the town, showed him consideration befitting his royal position. But the good intentions of the king were frustrated by a late night attack organized by Malik Ahmad Lād, a Gujrātī nobleman in alliance with the Bhīls and Kōlis.³ The attack was so sudden that though forewarned by an old woman whose son was a captive with the Mughals, they were taken by surprise. The poor aboriginal cave-men, who chose to plunder rather than make use of opportunity and crush the enemy, helped themselves to the loot in the Mughal camp. Abul Fazl makes mention of the loss of Hātīf's poem entitled the *Timūr-nāma*, transcribed by Sultān Alī and illustrated by Bihzād.⁴ It has later on recovered.

After the first surprise was over, it was easy for the disciplined Mughal troops to disperse and kill the raiders. Humāyūn then grew fierce and took a savage revenge on the innocent inhabitants of the place⁵ and for three days, he allowed the town to be sacked by his followers without any restriction. It was at this time that the two distinguished captives, Sadr Ḳhān and Jām Fīrūz, the ex-ruler of Thatha, were done away with.

At Cambay, Humāyūn halted. His conquest now extended up to the very land's end and he seems to have reflected on the following lines :

(a) Except for the solitary fort of Chāmpānīr, the whole of the central Gujrāt had come into his possession.

¹ *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 19. .

² *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 20. Sharif prevented his slave from carrying out his project of killing the few Mughal *darbāris* in Humāyūn's court by gathering the excited mob of the city.

³ *A. H. G.*, p. 244, calls them rough people, who lived in caves, wore no shoes and hardly any clothes, but went well-armed.

⁴ See Beveridge's comments in *A. N.* (tr.), p. 309 n. 2.

⁵ See *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 21 and Commissariat's article.

(b) Sultān Bahādur Shāh was now a beggar and had placed himself at the mercy of the Portuguese, and as no amity was possible between the two, the Sultān and the Portuguese, he should pay no more attention to Bahādur.

(c) What was next needed was the consolidation of his conquests and completion of the occupation of the central Gujrāt by capturing Chāmpānīr and organizing its civil administration. These measures would mollify the people. He must rear his political edifice on the goodwill of the people.

(d) He had been told of the enormous treasures of Chāmpānīr, and it would be prudent on his part to stop all other work and concentrate his whole attention on the capture of the place and its riches.

(e) Having driven a wedge between the north and south Gujrāt, he would be able to subjugate either part at his leisure.

So Humāyūn left Bahādur to his fate, and turned to complete his conquest by the capture of Chāmpānīr¹ about the beginning of July 1535 A. D. All this time, a Mughal contingent lay encamped there, maintaining a nominal siege. When Humāyūn reached there, steps were taken to complete the cordon of investing troops and prevent the garrison from getting any supplies. The thorough siege did not produce appreciable effect for some time; for the besieged garrison led by their two leaders, Ikhtiyār Khān and Nar Singh Dēo, offered a vigorous resistance. They possessed powerful guns also,² worked by celebrated gunners.³ The siege dragged on for more than two

¹ G. H. N. says that from Cambay Humāyūn went to Baroda and next to Chāmpānīr. But she gives no reason for his journey to Baroda.

² A. T. W. H. G., p. 22, says that iron balls of 1, 2 or 3 *mans* were used. If *man* would indicate the weight of Shāh Jahān's time, then Dārā's guns used at Qandahār in 1653 A. D. were less powerful than these Gujrātī guns at Chāmpānīr.

³ E.g., the achievements of Scott. See A. H. G., p. 234, l. 21 and M. S. fol. 164a, l. 4. Erskine calls him San Jago. Notice also how Rūmī Khān repaired one of Bahādur's guns, shortened the barrel and fired to a longer distance. See A. H. G., p. 234 and M. S. 163b, l. 13.

months.¹ At last Nar Singh Dēo, the actual organizer of the defence died.² Iḳhtiyār Ḳhān was left alone and though he was more of a scholar³ than of a soldier, he doggedly continued the defence. Suddenly, fortune favoured Humāyūn. He discovered how through a jungly and unfrequented path near Halol in the west, the wild men of the neighbourhood supplied food to the garrison. He realized that it would not be possible for the Mughal soldiers to imitate these wild denizens of the fort by clambering up the inaccessible path to a height of 60 or 70 yards. So Humāyūn got 70 or 80 large nails driven into the wall at midnight to the right and left of the ascent at distances of a yard or so. Since the place was far away from the main quarters of the garrison, situated in the east, and moreover as it was considered inaccessible, no sentries had been placed there to guard against a surprise attack from that direction. The Mughals used the nails as rungs of a ladder, and about 300 of the escaladers including Humāyūn who was the 41st, got to the top of the fort. At the same time a fierce artillery fire was opened to distract the enemy. The Mughal attack succeeded and Iḳhtiyār Ḳhān retreated to the citadel, Pavagarh, in the east. Humāyūn who had some respect for the commandant's learning, granted him easy terms, and allowed him either to stay with him or to return to Bahādur. Iḳhtiyār surrendered and stayed with Humāyūn. The date of the fall of Chāmpānīr is given in a chronogram both by Abul Fazl and by Badāūnī. The former has *ارل هفتده مه صفر* 'the first week of the month of *safar*' which according to *Abjad*

¹ *A. N.*, p. 137, says the siege lasted for four months which might be correct; for it started in *Zulqada* and ended in *Safar* of the next year, 942 A. D. We do not think that the siege dragged on for more than a year as Beveridge suggests. The author of *A. T. W. H. G.*, whose father and uncle were eye-witnesses and who himself was a high official in Gujrāt in Akbar's time, says that the siege lasted for '3 or 4 months.'

² See *A. H. G.*, p. 235, ll. 5-7, for Bahādur's praise for him. He calls Nar Singh 'the man of the fort.'

³ *M. S.* has *مرد ملائی خوش طبع و منجم و معمای و شاعر بود* See also *A. T. W. H. G.*, p. 21. *A. H. G.*, p. 245, ll. 17-19.

gives the year 942 A. H.¹ The latter gives 'It (the date of capture) was 9th *Safar*.' The year works out to be 942 A. H. Of these two chronograms, giving slightly different dates, we think Abul Fazl's to be more correct. The day of capture has been given by a third writer, Abu Turāb Wali, to be a Friday.² He is a reliable writer; for his father and his uncle were present, as we have seen, in the Gujrāt campaign, and Turāb also was an honoured official in Akbar's time. Hence 6th *Safar* 942 A. H.,³ being a Friday, would be a more correct date than 9th *Safar* of Badāūnī's.

Ikhtiyār K̄hān later on explained to Humāyūn that the resistance of the Gujrātī garrison might have been further prolonged if only his conscience had approved of it. His hesitation was due to the fact that he could not discover any canonical decree which would give a clear verdict in favour of either the continuation of war or the abandonment of hostilities, when the surrounding districts were already in the possession of a Muslim king.⁴ Humāyūn must have appreciated the subtleties of the problem, himself being a man of erudition.⁵

Thus Humāyūn concluded his conquest of central Gujrāt.

The several events narrated in this chapter may be chronologically stated here:—

- (a) Bahādur's flight from Mandasōr
21st *Shawwāl*, 941 A. H. = 25th April, 1535 A. D.
(b) Sadr K̄hān's arrival at Mandū
27th *Shawwāl*, 941 A. H. = 1st May, 1535 A. D.

¹ We see no reason why *س* should be read *س* as suggested by Beveridge. The capture of Chāmpānīr took place after a siege of 2 or 3 months in 942 A. H. and not 943 A. H. Both A. N. and A. T. W. H. G. support our statement.

² P. 24 صبح جمعه بود

³ = 6th August, 1535 A. D.

⁴ بادشاه اسلام refers to Humāyūn.

⁵ M. S. fol. 161a says that the author's father was in charge of the royal library. From him he had learnt that the king never rested from the study of books, neither had his father any rest. The words are

پادشاه را یک ساعت از مطالعه کتاب فراغ نبود و مرا یک لحظه از خدمت آنحضرت فرست نه

- (c) Humāyūn's arrival at Nālcha
2nd *Zulqada*, 941 A. H. = 5th May, 1535 A. D.
- (d) Bahādur's arrival at Mandū
16th *Zulqada*, 941 A. H. = 19th May, 1535 A. D.
- (e) Bahādur's flight from Mandū
28th *Zulqada*, 941 A. H. = 1st June, 1535 A. D.
- (f) Bahādur's arrival at Chāmpānīr
7th *Zulhijj*, 941 A. H. = 9th June, 1535 A. D.
- (g) Humāyūn's arrival at Chāmpānīr
11th *Zulhijj*, 941 A. H. = 13th June, 1535 A. D.
- (h) Bahādur's flight from Chāmpānīr, followed by Humāyūn
13th *Zulhijj*, 941 A. H. = 15th June, 1535 A. D.
- (i) Humāyūn's return to Chāmpānīr
29th *Zulhijj*, 941 A. H. = 1st July, 1535 A. D.
- (j) The fall of Chāmpānīr
6th *Safar*, 942 A. H. = 6th August, 1535 A. D.

CHAPTER XIII

HUMAYŪN AT CHĀMPĀNĪR—FALL OF AHMADĀ- BĀD—THE MUGHAL ADMINISTRATION OF GUJRĀT, 1535 A. D.

After the fall of Chāmpānīr, Hūmayūn stayed his career of conquest for a while. Two reasons can be assigned for this pause:

(a) As a result of his campaigns during the last ten months practically the whole of Mālwa and central Gujrāt had come into his possession. He now thought that it would be wiser for him to suspend all military activities and to mollify and conciliate the people by giving them a sound system of civil administration. A successful administration, he thought, would automatically reduce the rest of the Gujrāt kingdom to submission and loyalty; for the province was in a state of flux, its ruler a forlorn fugitive at Diū and its *jāgīrdārs* biding their time; and in such circumstances the good will of the people was the only thing needed to make the whole of Gujrāt his own.

(b) At Chāmpānīr, Humāyūn got possession of a huge mass of wealth belonging to Sultān Bahādur. He had now to distribute a portion of it among his followers, and preserve carefully the rest for future State needs. The wealth made him forget about the campaigns.

Some of Humāyūn's followers, however, flushed with a series of military successes, did not want to stop short of their victorious career. They decided that if their king would not lead them, they would do without him. They counted about 400 in number, formed a plan for the conquest of the Deccan and at the end of a state banquet in the gardens of Halol,¹ departed to carry out their ill-conceived scheme.

¹ A suburb of Chāmpānīr, at its western extremity.

When he was told of their scheme Humāyūn grew indignant, and his indignation was not without reason.

Firstly, no permission had been obtained from him for the expedition, and he was unaware of its definite objective. As king, he was responsible for the safety of his followers, and he resented being overridden in this way. Any unnecessary sacrifice of human lives would make him unpopular in his kingdom and make it difficult for him to enlist recruits in future.¹

Secondly, indisciplinary conduct such as this would demoralize the Mughals, encamped, as they were, far from their homes in a country which yet remained unsubdued.

Thirdly, the conduct of the four hundred nobles would very likely lower the prestige of the Mughals because their wild scheme, started in ignorance and without sufficient support, might fail and endanger their safety. In passing, we may briefly describe here what the scheme was. The *Akbar-nāma* mentions the conquest of the Deccan as the objective of the nobles who probably wanted to conquer one of the Muslim States into which the Bahmani kingdom had split up. If they meant to conquer any of the four States of Ahmadnagar, Golconda, Bīdar, and Berar, it would appear that such a scheme was too audacious and difficult of realization; for each of them was governed by an efficient and capable ruler.² A defeat at the hands of any of them would prove disastrous to the Mughal cause in the Deccan. Bījāpūr, perhaps, was the State they had determined on, because it had been in a state of chaos since 1534 A. D. Ismāīl Ādil

¹ Cf. Ikhtiyār-ud-dīn Muhammad bin Baḫtiyār was extremely unpopular after his failure in Assām. See the *Tabaqāt-i-Nāsiri*. (Buhār library copy No. 3587), p. 156. Firūz Tughluq and the people of Delhi grieved the death of thousands of followers in Bengal and Sindh.

² Ahmadnagar was ruled by Burhān Nizām Shāh	1509-53 A. D.
Golconda was ruled by Qutb Shāh	1502-43 A. D.
Bīdar was ruled by Amir Ali Barīd	1504-42 A. D.
Berar was ruled by Daryā Imād Shāh	1529-62 A. D.

Thus every one of them had ruled prosperously for more than thirty years.

Shāh had died in that year and had been succeeded by Mallū, his eldest son. But as he was a shameless debauchee, he was deposed by the chief minister, Asad Khān, in favour of the next brother, Ibrāhīm, in March 1535 A. D.¹ But it was not possible for the Mughals to reach Bījāpūr by land without passing through some of the other prosperous States.² Moreover, none of the five Muslim States had given any provocation to the Mughals, and it would therefore be against all canon of Mughal diplomacy and public morality to attack a Muslim kingdom simply in an aggressive spirit.³

Humāyūn had to prevent the expedition to the south which was about to be undertaken with little knowledge of the geography of the country. He determined to punish the nobles for their defection in much the same spirit in which his father would have done in similar circumstances. Accordingly, as soon as Humāyūn heard of the disappearance of the four hundred nobles from among his followers, he sent ten thousand troops to discover them, and force them to return. The troops carried out the instructions and brought back the desperadoes—a motley group of 'book-bearers, armour bearers, ink-horn bearers, and the like.' Humāyūn who was never a statesman, inflicted sanguinary punishments on these pseudo-adventurers. Some were beheaded or trampled under elephant's feet, while others suffered the loss of their noses, ears, or limbs. When one considers together the crime committed and the insignificant position of the criminals, one is inclined to agree with Erskine⁴ who condemns Humāyūn for his barbarous punishments. But at the same time one

¹ See Haig's articles in the *Indian Antiquary* of 1920 A. D. on the *Nizām Shāhī kings of Ahmadnagar*.

² See *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, map facing p. 432, showing the distribution of the five kingdoms.

³ The Mughals freely attacked the Hindu States, e.g., Bābur attacked Mēdini Rao of Chandēri, Humāyūn the Rājā of Kālinjar, Akbar Rānī Durgāvati of Chaurāgarh; but they did not attack a Muslim State without some tangible cause.

⁴ See Erskine: *The History of India*, Volume II (Humāyūn), p. 69.

would not accuse Humāyūn of such a revolting levity as Abul Fazl has treated the whole matter with.¹

It was sunset by the time the miscreants had been punished. During the *maghrib* or sunset prayers, the *Imām*, righteously indignant, read, at the end of the first genuflexion, the chapter of the Qurān, entitled the Elephant (الغيل).² The *Imām*, probably desired to impress upon the hearers the sanctity of the *Kaba* as much as the tyranny inflicted by the rich delinquents. But his selection of the chapter was unfortunate; for the expression 'the possessors of the elephant' was taken by Humāyūn to be a reference to himself and in a temper as he was, he immediately after the prayers were over, ordered that the *Imām* be trampled to death by an elephant. *Maulāna* Muhammad Farghali interceded for the *Imām* but in vain.³ Later, after the *Imām* was dead, Humāyūn, in his cooler moments realized that he had been hasty in his judgment and had punished an innocent though foolish man.⁴

Thus Humāyūn did not start his work of restoring order to Gujrāt under happy auspices. The *Imām's* death and the sufferings of four hundred men must have cast a gloom on his followers. In order to buoy them up he

¹ We may be excused for quoting a few of Abul Fazl's lines given on p. 140

و برخی را (که سراز خط ادب بیرون برده بودند) ببرداشتن باز سراز تن اختصاص دادند
جماعه (که دست از پا نشناخته بغیال فاسد دست زده بودند) بیدست و پا گشتند و فرقه
(که از خود بینی گوش بر او امر بادشاهی نداشته بودند) گوش و بینی را بر جا نیافتند و طایفه
(که سرانگشت عزیمت بر حرف خطا نهاده بودند) نقش انگشت در مشمت ندیدند

² It is one of the shortest chapters and may be quoted here in full:—
In the name of Allāh, the Beneficent, the Merciful

- (1) Have you not considered how your Lord dealt with the possessors of the elephant?
- (2) Did he not cause their war to end in confusion?
- (3) And send down (to prey) upon them birds in flocks,
- (4) Casting them against hard stones,
- (5) So He rendered them like straw eaten up.

³ Not because, as Erskine suggests, that the king 'was probably still labouring under the effects of his previous excesses.'

⁴ If there was any allusion to the recent executions it was to the just retributions that visited these 'possessors of the elephant,' meaning the desperadoes. But Humāyūn misunderstood the reference by attributing it to himself.

distributed some portion of the large store of wealth of Gujrāt at Chāmpānīr. In order to save time, the distribution was conducted with the help of a pair of scales or a shield.

Humāyūn was not much of a loser by this extravagance; for he obtained other stores of treasures from sources disclosed by Ālam Khān¹ of Dhandhuka.² A large cistern, when drained of its water, was found to be full of gold, and a well when similarly treated, yielded gold and silver bars. Humāyūn, recklessly generous like his father, divided the wealth of the cistern among his followers. He might have justified his liberality on the grounds that he was emulating the example of his august father;³ that he hoped his followers would be encouraged thereby; and that there were other hoards of treasures available for the State use.

Some critics, however, have charged Humāyūn with a reckless extravagance and condemned his action on the following grounds:—

- (a) Although he might have regarded the rewards as an atonement for his injudicious punishments, actually no wrong can be righted by the commission of another wrong or indiscretion.
- (b) Any unearned reward debases the recipient. An indiscriminate distribution in shieldful would put the zealous and the lazy on the same footing with the consequence that the efficiency of the army would suffer.
- (c) A large acquisition of wealth during the progress of a campaign adversely affects the morale of an army and leads to debauchery and other vices. In a modern army the possession by soldiers in active service, of large amounts of wealth is discouraged.

¹ This Ālam Khān is a different personage from the two Ālam Khāns mentioned above.

² In Kāthīāwād. Situated in 22°23' N. and 71°59' E.

³ Who had squandered the wealth of Agrā on the Muslims of the western world. See *B. N.*, pp. 522-23.

(d) The people of the province must have resented this reckless waste of Gujrāt wealth.

So far as the people of the province were concerned, Humāyūn's specific act of kindness to them consisted in forgoing the land-revenue to enable the farmers to repair their fortunes. But his motive went unappreciated. The Gujrātī villagers sent in deputation their elders to suggest to Sultān Bahādur to send some one to collect the revenue that was due to the government. This is a significant fact in several ways:—

Firstly, it is a remarkable illustration of the honesty of the people. They did not want to deprive the government of its legitimate income.

Secondly, though Humāyūn considered Bahādur's cause a lost one and abandoned his pursuit, the Gujrāt people had not lost faith in their ruler and sent him, of their own accord, resources to enable him to mend his fortune.

Thirdly, the people of Gujrāt could not tolerate the idea of their rich country's merging in the larger kingdom of Delhi; for then the importance of the larger towns of Gujrāt¹ would diminish.

Fourthly, the people did not want that the resources of Gujrāt should be utilized elsewhere in the Mughal kingdom. If the province maintained its separate entity, its wealth would benefit the Gujrātīs alone.

Lastly, as most of the elders were Hindu, this deputation bears a remarkable testimony to the loyalty of the Hindu subjects to their Sultān. One would not expect so much devotion from them to the Sultān who had destroyed the Hindus of Raisen and of Chitōr. But, probably they preferred a Gujrātī Sultān to the foreign Mughals. The loyalty of the Hindus may be explained, on the one hand, by the solicitude of the Sultān for the welfare of his subjects, and on the other, by the fact that the Gujrāt Hindus formed a separate body, having no concern

¹ The antiquarian researches of the archæological department amply prove this importance from the rich remains of the various towns of Gujrāt.

with the Hindus of the other parts of the country. Hence their unflinching loyalty to Bahādur Shāh. Sultān Bahādur, who even now was in Diū, could not for some time accept the offer of the deputation for want of a suitable nobleman who would undertake the task of the collection of land-revenue. But at last, Imād-ul-Mulk came forward to do the work on condition that no-one would question him how he spent the revenue realized or distributed *jāgīrs* among his followers. The condition was accepted and Imād-ul-Mulk met with an immediate success. He had started with seventy followers but by the time he reached Ahmadābād, the band increased to 10,000 and a little later it swelled to 30,000 men. What large sums of money he had to spend on the collection of any army may be understood from the remark in the *Akbar-nāma*, that each pair of horses cost him a lakh of Gujrātī *tankas*. Help came also from other quarters, *e.g.*, Mujāhid Khān of Jūnāgarh¹ came with 10,000 soldiers. Humayun could not but notice this ominous move on the part of Imād-ul-Mulk, so he also moved forward. Imād, a brave commander as he was, did not wish to remain cooped up in Ahmadābād, and suffer as his master, Bahādur, had suffered at Mandasōr. The battle was fought at Mahmūdābād.² Imād opened the attack and drove away Askari who was in charge of the van-guard; but later on, other commanders, *e.g.*, Yādgar Nāsir Mirzā, Hindū Bēg, and Qāsim Husain Khān, arrived with large contingents, and Imād was utterly defeated. When Humāyūn arrived to inspect the field, he found some 4000 Gujrāt soldiers lying stretched on the field, and also that his own casualty list was a long one. Such a fiercely-contested

¹ Jūnāgarh, situated in 21°21' N. and 70°36' E. near Girnār hills is one of the ancient and picturesque towns of India. The present town known as Mustafābād was founded by Mahmūd Begarha.

² The name of the battlefield is given by Farishta and the battle has been described by *T. A.* on p. 198. Nizāmuddīn's father was actually present on the battlefield. See also Commissariat's article.

The town, commonly spelt Mehmādābād, is situated 17 miles south-east of Ahmadābād and contains the tomb of Mahmūd Begarha's minister, Mubarak Sayyid. Fergusson has extravagantly praised the tomb. See Burgess: *The Architectural Antiquities of Western India*, p. 69.

battle could not be repeated. So Humāyūn was anxious to know whether the last battle had been fought or others were going to follow. He was considerably relieved when he was assured by Ḳhudāwand Ḳhān, the aged minister, that since Imād had commanded in person at the battle of Mahmūdābād, it might be presumed no other battles would be fought at least under Imād's leadership.

Since the Gujrāt army had been shattered, the capital, Ahmadābād,¹ lay at the feet of the Mughals. But Humāyūn avoided an immediate entry; for he feared, as pointed out by Askari, that it might lead to a wholesale plunder of the town. The Mughal army halted on the first day at Kānkariya *tāl*, about a mile to the south-east, and the next day moved on to Sarkhej,² and on the third halted at Batwā.³ Askari had, however, been ordered to enter the capital and protect the inhabitants. At Batwā, Humāyūn was shown, at *Hazrat* Qutb-ul-Ālam's tomb,⁴ the relic of the saint's miracle known among the populace as *لوه لکر پتھر* *i.e.*, 'iron, wood and stone' all in one. That Humāyūn was not anxious to enter the Gujrāt capital at once is clear from his march for these three days. Instead of pushing on north-west for another mile from Kānkariya *tāl*, he went to Sarkhej and then turned south-east. The following sketch will make our point clear.

With the fall of Ahmadābād, the second stage of the conquest of Gujrāt was completed, the first having ended with the fall of Chāmpānīr. The peninsula of Kāthiāwād


¹ The glories of Ahmadābād have been described in 'The Muhammadan Architecture of Ahmadābād' 2 volumes by Burgess. Situated in 23°2' N. and 72°35' E., it is said to have contained 900,000 souls in the days of its prosperity. It was founded by Ahmad Shāh (1411-43 A. D.) on the site of the older city of Asāwal. According to Farishta, it contained 360 wards.

² Situated about 5 miles south-west of Ahmadābād. It contains the tombs of Mahmūd Begarha and Shaikh Ahmad Khattri.

³ Situated 6 miles south of Ahmadābād.

⁴ Qutb-ul-Ālam died in 1543 A. D. He was a Bukhārā Sayyid. The genealogy of the Bukhārā Sayyids has been given in 'Ahmadābād Architecture,' Part II by Burgess on p. 15.

and other districts on the south-east yet remained to be conquered; but Humāyūn did not consider the comple-



tion of the conquest to be as necessary as the partition of the conquered province among his nobles.

He began with Askari whose prudence in not entering the town on the first day after the victory at Mahmūdābād had pleased him. He therefore made him his viceroy, with headquarters at Ahmadābād¹ and Hindū Bēg as his adviser. Other postings were:—

Names of persons.	Name of the place or places where posted.
1) Yādgar Nāsir M. ...	Pātan. ²
2) Qāsim Husain K̄hān	Broach, ³ Surat and Navasāri. ⁴
(3) Dōst Bēg Ishaq Āqā	Baroda and Cambay.
(4) Mir Bachka Bahādūr	Mahmūdābād.
(5) Tardī Bēg ...	Chāmpānīr.

¹ Why at Ahmadābād is explained by Farishta in these words

احمدآباد کہ آہ کریمہ لم یغلق مثلہا در شان اوست

But Jahāngīr, a widely-travelled king, gives quite a contrary opinion in his memoirs. See the *Memoirs of Jahāngīr* by Rogers and Beveridge, Vol. II, p. 13.

² Known at first as Anhilwāra and later on as Nehrwāra or Nahrwāla situated in 23°51' N. and 72°10' E.


³ For interesting details of Broach, Cambay, and Chāmpānīr, among other books, may be consulted Burgess: *Muhammadan Architecture of Bharoach, Cambay, Dholka, Chāmpānīr, and Mahmūdābād in Gujrāt.*

⁴ Navsāri situated in 20°57' N. and 75°56' E. is an ancient town and was the headquarters of the Parsees in mediaeval India.

We may briefly indicate the special features of the arrangement:

- (a) Humāyūn did not set apart any land as *khāl̥sa* or crown-land.
- (b) He put Mirzā Askari in charge of the administration with almost plenary powers.

This was what Kām̥rān also had possessed. Such an autonomous system of Mughal administration in Gujrāt, he



hoped, would be in keeping with the parochial instinct of the Gujrātīs and would also ensure the Mughal hold on the province. He further hoped that the arrangement would provide against the efforts that might be made in future for the resuscitation of Bahādur's sovereignty.

(c) In the allotment of territories Humāyūn had neglected Kathiawād and the eastern districts of the province. The desire for controlling the coast arose from the large sea-borne trade that flowed through the Gujrāt ports. If time had allowed, he would have extended the Mughal influence over Kathiawād coast-land also. For the present he desired to avoid a contact with the eastern neighbours, and so let the eastern districts alone.

Humāyūn now turned to Mālwa; for there, too, he had to introduce some system of administration. We have seen how his measures at Mandū had alienated the people from him. He hoped that now he would be able to make amends for his past blunders.

When he reached there, he found the province seething with discontent and disaffection. Three prominent chiefs of Mālwa, Mallu Ḳhān of Mandū¹ one of Bahādur's henchmen, Sikandar of Satwās², and Mihtar Zambūr of Hāndia,³ had combined to attack the Mughal garrison under Darwesh Alī *Kitābdār* posted at Ujjain. The commandant persisted in the defence till he was killed in one of the skirmishes. Then the survivors retreated towards the approaching king's army.

The first thing Humāyūn had now to do was to recover his lost territories in Mālwa. Judiciously he selected Mandū as his headquarters depriving Mallu Ḳhān of the local influence and threatening the other two rebellious chiefs by its nearness to their headquarters.

But could not a still better arrangement than the king's stay in Mālwa be thought of? Let us briefly review the conditions prevailing in north India. We notice two significant facts:—

One was the rebellion of the Mirzās, that is Muhammad Sultān Mirza, his sons, and grandsons, in the Āgrā district. It had spread, sometime, as far east as Oudh.

¹ Situated in 22° 32' N. and 76° 43' E. Under the Mughals it formed a *mahal* in the *Sarkār* of Hāndia, in the *subah* of Mālwa.

² On the southern bank of the Narbada about 15 miles e. s. e. of Indore.

³ Hāndia would be less than 100 miles from Mandū and Satwās much nearer.

The other was the rapid rise of Shēr Khān. Taking advantage of Humāyūn's pre-occupation, Shēr Khān had turned to the east, bought the battalions of Surajgarh (1534 A. D.), and extended his dominions to Mungīr.

In such circumstances, was it judicious on the part of Humāyūn to confine his attention to Mālwa alone and neglect the more important part of the kingdom? He had two very good alternatives to act upon: either he should have restored Bahādur to Gujrat as his deputy and annexed Mālwa to the Delhi kingdom, Chitōr, no doubt regaining its independence;¹ or he should have apportioned Mālwa too among the Mughal and the Mālwa nobles and made his fourth brother, Hindāl, its Viceroy, just as he had appointed Askari, Viceroy of Gujrat. Then, freed from the worries of the settlement of the newly conquered provinces, Humāyūn would have had leisure to return to Āgrā and aim at the restoration of political equilibrium in north India. If this course had been adopted, there would have been no cause for the dissatisfaction shown by Hindāl later on, nor could Shēr Khān have had any opportunity of growing so powerful as to portend danger first to Bengal and then to the Mughal kingdom itself.

Humāyūn's return to Mālwa had one salutary effect: it immediately quieted the situation.² He sent for his seraglio and proposed an indefinite stay there. It is very likely that if he had had the opportunity of a longer stay there, he would have inspired loyalty among the people by his benignant administration and amiable disposition. But his hopes were not realized; and a few months later he had to depart for Āgrā. As we shall see in the following chapter, Mālwa and Gujrat went out of hand soon after his departure.

¹ Jauhar approves of this policy. The *Tazkirat-ul-Wāqīāt* (B. M. Add. 16711) has

او (بهادر) را از جانب خود نمایند که نیکنامی آن بر صحیفه روزگار بیادگار بماند

² As *A. N.* on p. 142, puts

.....

CHAPTER XIV

RECOVERY OF GUJRĀT BY SULTĀN BAHĀDUR SHĀH, AND RETREAT OF HUMĀYŪN FROM MĀLWA, 1535—36 A. D.

For three months after Humāyūn's departure from Gujrāt, there was peace in the province.¹ There was an opportunity for the Mughals of displaying their constructive ability by giving the people an intelligent and systematic government. But Askari and his merry companions, however, indulged in a series of riotous banquets and other festivities which became the fashion among the lesser nobles and officials. This frivolity among the Mughals demoralized the tone of the civil administration. No one took his duties seriously. Dissatisfied with the Mughals, the Gujrātīs seriously thought of making an effort for the restoration of their king, Bahādur Shāh. If the Mughals had endeavoured to bring about such reforms as would have proved conducive to the well-being of their subjects, they not only would not have lost some of their territories but would have acquired some more, and established their hold on the affections of the people.² But they denied themselves this opportunity, and the disaffection against them grew apace.

The disaffection started at Navsārī where Abdullāh Khān governed as Qāsim Husain Sultan's agent. The Gujrātī rebels led by Nūruddīn Khān Jahān of Shirāz and Rūmī Khān Safar, the builder of the fort of Surat, occupied Navsārī as well as Surat, so that Abdullāh Khān had to retreat to Broach. Qāsim Husain, alarmed at the strength

¹ See *A. N.*, p. 142.

² It is thus that the early Muslim empire had spread to the remotest corners of north India at the beginning of the thirteenth century—as would be clear from a perusal of the *Tabaqāt-i-Nāsiri*.

of the enemy's force, retreated immediately to Chāmpānīr, sixty-five miles further north, and thence to Ahmadābād; for those who had started from Navsārī, the total distance covered during the retreat was more than a hundred and fifty miles. How the Mughals had deteriorated may be inferred from this continuous retreat. Qāsim Husain Sultān, the chief commander, was a relation of Humāyūn, having descended from the illustrious Sultān Husain Bāīqarā,¹ and had rendered distinguished service at the battle of Kḥānwah as commander of the right wing, and had been granted the coveted governorship of Badāūn. A man with such a record beat a hasty retreat! It was an indication of the general panic that had overtaken the Mughals.

The other retreats were those of Dōst Bēg from Cambay and Yādgār Nāsir Mirzā from Pātan. Both of them joined Askari, so that except Champānīr where the indomitable Tardī Bēg² held on, the Mughals had evacuated all other places which were immediately occupied by Sultān Bahādur's men. How hasty some of the evacuations were is apparent from the fact related by most of the writers, that two of Bahādur's loyal nobles Daryā Kḥān and Muhāfiz Kḥān whilst passing by Pātan on their way back from their posts at Raisen, found the place empty of the Mughals, stayed there, and informed Bahādur that Pātan had been recovered. It is a surprise that Humāyūn, who was much nearer the place than these officials of Raisen, made no efforts to save Pātan or any other town lately under the Mughal occupation.

The Mughals in Gujrāt and in Mālwa now stayed in the three headquarters, Ahmedābād, Chāmpānīr, and Mandū, lying at distances of 70 and 120 miles from each other. Considering that Bābur's outposts were sometimes fixed at

¹ See *B. N.*, pp. 550 and 556. Qāsim Husain's genealogy may be indicated thus:

Sultān Husain Bāīqarā

 |
Ayisha Sultān Bēgam = Qāsim Sultān Shaibānī

 |
 Qāsim Husain Sultān

much greater distances from his base, Kābul, *e.g.*, Bhīra in 1519 A. D. and Siālkot and Lahore in 1525 A. D., it should not have been impossible for Humāyūn to station the Mughal forces at the three places, and re-occupy gradually the recently lost territories. But the demoralization amongst the Mughals made it impossible for them to hit upon any constructive and fruitful scheme of reoccupation.

What was wrong with the Mughals?

(1) As mentioned above, the Mughal headquarters at Ahmadābād could not control and co-ordinate the activities of the different officials in the different districts, which alone could have borne down the less belligerent but more united Gujrātīs.

(2) The riotous life led by Askari and his merry friends had a disintegrating effect. It led, on the one hand, to mutual strife and bickerings; on the other, to disrespect for the Viceroy from the only district commander now left, namely, Tardī Bēg.

To illustrate how deeply these private squabbles had affected the situation, we shall refer to the following incident.¹ One evening, in a banquet, while wine was in free circulation, Askari, completely drunk, stated that he was the *Shadow of God* (ظل الله) meaning a king. Gazanfar, who was his foster-brother and companion for years together, jokingly whispered to the next 'you are, only just now you are drunk,' (هستی مگر خویش مستی). All those sitting near-by, burst into laughter. Askari being at some distance, could not follow the joke, and when it was explained to him, got furious and threw Gazanfar into prison. When the latter saw that the prince's rage was persisting, he escaped to Bahādur, told him that the Mughals were thinking of retreating from Gujrāt, and suggested that that was the most suitable opportunity for an attack on them.

¹ See T. A. (N. K. Text), p. 198.

² The *Rauzat-ut-Tāhirin* has a slightly different form.

انچه میفرمائی هستی اما از خویش نیستی

Still worse was the attitude of Hindū Bēg. It was on account of his long service under the Mughal kings,¹ and his varied experience that Humāyūn had chosen him as Askari's adviser. But Hindū Bēg acted very unwisely; for he advised Askari, sometime before the incident, to assume sovereignty by reading *khutbah* and issuing coins in his name. Hindū Bēg might have had some political reasons for his suggestion, namely, the desire of satisfying the Gujrātīs who desired to have a king of their own, who would maintain the integrity of the Gujrāt kingdom. But was he not aware that Askari would never make a good ruler? Could Askari have really maintained himself independently of Delhi?² It must be remembered that Central Asia or Afghānistān usually supplied recruits to Kāmran, Humāyūn, Shēr Khān, or Mahmūd Shāh of Bengal. Gujrāt usually recruited from the other Muslim countries, *e. g.*, Egypt, Arabia, and Eastern Africa. These recruits were no match for the more robust and skilled fighters of the north. If Bahādur with all his ability and devoted loyalty of his subjects could not make a stand against Humāyūn, could the frivolous Askari, far removed as he was from the real seats of Mughal power and counting mostly on doubtful local support, withstand the onslaughts of Delhi? Tardī Bēg was prudent enough to foresee the futility of the suggestion, and decided to oppose it. He wanted Humāyūn alone to be the sovereign of the Mughals and all others to be subordinate to him.

The only result of Hindū Bēg's suggestion was to confuse Mirzā Askari, who no doubt rejected Hindū Bēg's

¹ Dating as far back as 1500 A. D., see *B. N.*, p. 122. He had been in Humāyūn's service since 1526 A. D.

² Is it possible that Hindū Bēg did not want Askari to sever all connexions with Delhi or to act in hostility to Humāyūn's interests? High-sounding titles were sometimes adopted by chiefs who were by no means wholly independent. The rulers of Khāndēsh and Ahmadnagar, though entitled *Shāh*, were subordinate to Sultān Bahādur. Kāmran, as we have mentioned above, used the titles of *Bādshāh* and *Ghāzī* but was really subordinate to the ruler of Delhi. If this is what Hindū Bēg desired Askari to do, would the measure have satisfied the Gujrātīs; also why was Tardī Bēg hostile to Askari?

advice but still continued to ruminate on it. It never assumed a practical shape and the majority of the Mughals heard nothing more than a vague rumour.

To sum up our conclusions: Hindū Bēg suggested to Askari to become independent of Delhi in order to rally the Gujrātīs round the prince, but the incapable Askari was unfit for the task, and so he rejected the suggestion, but continued to dream of it till on a festive occasion he gave expression to his dreams, which led to the unreasonable imprisonment of Gazanfar, his flight, and transfer of allegiance to Bahādur; and which raised in Tardī Bēg's mind a suspicion that Askari had accepted Hindū Bēg's suggestion. Naturally Tardī Bēg decided to oppose Askari. •

Let us now turn to Gazanfar. This hot-headed person, life-long companion of the prince, now forgot all Askari's past kindnesses, resented his recent imprisonment, and divulged all the facts about the weakness of the Mughals to his new master, *e.g.*, the incapacity of the prince, divisions that prevailed in the Mughal camp, and the readiness of his followers to evacuate Ahmadābād on some excuse. He emphasized his statements by suggesting that he might be placed under duress till the Sultān was satisfied about the correctness of his information, and that if it be found false he might be put to death.

Gazanfar's flight boded ill for the Mughals; for he carried with him 300 of his followers. Many others followed his example of desertion and fled to Bahādur. Askari had evidently fallen on evil days. Left only with the lukewarm Mughal loyalists at Ahmadābād, he had to face the rising tide in favour of Bahādur. Tardī Bēg would not render any aid after his (the Mirzā's) indiscretion: he was ashamed to write to Humāyūn after Gazanfar's desertion.

For some time the Mirzā stayed at Ahmadābād hoping that the dark cloud which had hung over him would disappear: fortune might smile on him: succour might come from some unexpected quarter. But how unfortunate he

was in some respects we have already seen. Although he had rejected the idea of kingship, Tardī Bēg would not render any support. From Raisen Daryā Ḳhān and Muhāfiz Ḳhān could come to occupy Pātan; but Humāyūn, who was staying much nearer, did not care to come to his aid; his own foster-brother incited Bahādur to act against him.

Assured of success by Gazanfar, Bahādur landed at Diū, advanced towards Ahmadābād, and encamped at Sarkhej. Askari, too, went there and fought a battle in which the very first cannon ball fired by the Mughals brought down Bahādur's standard. Although the battle remained indecisive during the day, at nightfall the prince retreated across the Sābarmatī.¹ The enemy pursued and at Mahmūdābād was fought a skirmish between Bahādur's vanguard and Askari's rear commanded by Yādgār Nāsir M. After the skirmish, Askari hurriedly crossed the river Māhī but in crossing, he lost many of his followers. Bahādur went back from the other side of the river. The prince safely reached the foot of the fort of Chāmpānīr and entered the city. He represented to Tardī Bēg that money was so urgently needed for a further campaign that he could not wait for Humāyūn's reply to his appeal. Tardī Bēg refused to part with any money and reported to the king about Askari's misdeeds, adding that he had evil intentions in Gujrāt and probably an eye on Āgrā also, to which place he was now proceeding. What were Askari's intentions? And was the information that Tardī Bēg had sent to Humāyūn correct?

(a) The *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* decidedly puts the blame of the whole affair on Tardī Bēg and says that Askari had no evil intentions.²

(b) The *Tārīkh-i-Farishta* which generally copies the *Tabaqāt* differs here. It says that Askari's intentions

¹ We have followed T. A.; A. N. and A. H. G. maintain that no battle was fought. If they are correct, the Mughals ran away without striking a blow.

² P. 199, ll. 14-17.

were to make himself king, and he needed money to accomplish his design.¹

(c) The *Akbar-nāma* says that Askari asked for a grant of money, and when it was refused, he determined to capture Tardī Bēg, get possession of the wealth, establish the sovereignty in his own name,² and then try once more to fight Bahādur, who was encamped on the bank of the Māhī about 15 *cos* from Chāmpānīr. If he were successful so far so good. If not, since Humāyūn preferred to stay in Mālwa, he would go with his companions to Āgrā, lying unoccupied by any prince.³

(d) Badāūnī's *Muntaḥhab* says that Askari wished with the help of Hindū Bēg to read *ḵhutbah* in his own name, and without much fighting he left for Chāmpānīr, and that Tardī Bēg wrote to Humāyūn about Askari's hostility.

(e) Abu Turāb Wali's *Tārīkh-i-Gujrāt* says that when the prince and his party reached Chāmpānīr, Tardī Bēg at first treated them generously, gave each one a horse, and arranged banquets in their honour. But he expressed his inability of supplying any portion of the royal treasure without the king's permission. Since the Mirzā intended to do him harm, he turned hostile and forced them to leave the vicinity, by firing guns at their camp.

(f) Abdullāh's *Arabic History of Gujrāt* also makes a similar statement, *viz.*, that Tardī Bēg met the Mirzās and when he was told that they were anxious to fight Bahādur, he returned to procure some money for them. But then he discovered some deep-laid scheme of confining him in order to secure the wealth of Chāmpānīr for Askari, and then of proceeding to Āgrā to carry out measures against Humāyūn.

In the light of the opinions expressed above on the subject, it is possible to arrive at some definite conclusions.

¹ On p. 216 it has میرزا بدان قصد که قلعه چانپانیر و خزانه بادشاهی که در آنچه بود متصرف گشته خطبه و سکه گجرات بلکه جاهای دیگر بنام خود کند متوجه آنجانب شد

² P. 144, l. 3 has و سلطنت بنام عسکری مقرر شود

³ و حدود دارالخلافت آگره خالیست

(1) On the question of fight against Bahādur: it is clear that Askari was anxious to meet Bahādur again and retrieve his military reputation. In order to beat up recruits and pay his old soldiers he needed money. Since he himself had none, he implored Tardī Bēg to spare him some. This Tardī Bēg refused to do. Hence a natural bitterness grew up between Askari and his friends and Tardī Bēg. In their desperate plight they felt indignant and plotted for his capture; for then alone could they secure the wealth.

Tardī Bēg, on the other hand, knowing full well that the prince was good-for-nothing, rightly refused to part with what Humāyūn had entrusted to him. Askari, as Viceroy, had plenty of opportunities of consolidating his government but wasted his time in banquets and drinks. That such a fool could not be able to improve his fortunes by the mere acquisition of wealth was certain; rather he would waste it in further dissipation.

(2) On the question of sovereignty:—Tardī Bēg having no confidence in Askari gave him no credit for loyalty to Humāyūn. Hindū Bēg, perhaps, for wider political considerations desired to obtain for his immediate master a royal title. Askari, fearing lest Hindū Bēg's suggestion should be misconstrued, did not accept it. We must give credit to the prince for having acted with prudence here. Later on, when Askari found that the nearest commander, Tardī Bēg, had been indifferent to his cause and that Humāyūn, too, remained unconcerned, his indignation got the better of prudence, and he determined, in a childish spirit, as it were, to punish both Tardī Bēg and his brother by immediately proceeding to Āgrā and creating mischief there. He thought that if Humāyūn, even then, tarried in Mandū, he would interpret it to the people at Āgrā as his intention to remain there permanently on account of the salubrity of the climate of the place, and thus would gradually incite the people against him. It is true that Askari would not be a direct gainer from such a course of action: for firstly Humāyūn could not be easily sur-

planted by any of his younger brothers and, secondly, even if he were, it would be his next brother, Kāmṛān, that would step in and not Askari.

For fear of disaffection in Āgrā, Humāyūn had to take notice of Askari's movements, and he felt that he had no other alternative than to follow and overtake his misguided brother. That Askari's movements were only the half-hearted efforts of a disappointed and excited prince is evident from the fact that, though he had several days' start of Humāyūn, he did not press on to Āgrā, and allowed Humāyūn to overtake him at Chitōr. Reconciliation took place between the two brothers, in which the part played by the royal harem must have been great; and the whole party moved on to Āgrā.

The defects in Humāyūn as administrator during his stay at Mandū¹ must have become obvious to the reader by now, and before closing the chapter we may sum them up:

In the first place, Humāyūn made no arrangements to remove the large wealth deposited at Chāmpānīr. This would not have been a difficult task, and if he had desired, the whole of it could have been stored at Āgrā or at Delhi against future contingencies. The more sagacious Shēr Khān, a couple of years later, was able to remove the wealth of Gaur to Rohtāsgarh. Why could not Humāyūn do it? The result of his negligence was that it fell, after Tardī Bēg's retreat, back into Bahādur's hand.²

In the second place, he made no arrangements to ensure the continuity of the Mughal system of government in Mālwa. The province was completely evacuated and no governor or garrison was left behind.

In the third place, before his departure for the north, he did not revise his opinion of Bahādur, excuse his past

¹ It seems that Humāyūn became addicted to opium about this time. See *G. H. N.*, fol. 30b. and the *Farishta*, p. 216, l. 17.

² See *R. T.* (B. M. Or. 168) fol. 614b.

actions, and arrive at some workable proposition. If only he had tackled Bahādur cleverly, he could have secured several advantages, *e.g.*, the recognition of the Mughal suzerainty in Gujrāt; a break-up of the alliance between Bahādur and Shēr Khān; and an alliance between Delhi and Gujrāt against the Portuguese.

In the fourth place he maintained no efficient Intelligence Department with the result that he was not correctly informed either of Askari's measures, actions or motives, or of Bahādur's rapid recovery of his lost territories.

In short, Humāyūn was a poor reader of the future. He betrayed lack of statesmanship and allowed his enemies an opportunity of queering the pitch for his cause in Gujrāt. He could have averted his doom by a proper and skilful co-ordination of his moves. Not only thereby could he have broken up the secret alliance between Bahādur and Shēr Khān, but he could have also befriended Bahādur, and hoist Shēr Khān with his own petard by exploiting against him Bahādur's friendship so far coveted by Shēr Khān. But he let the grass grow under his feet, and his misfortunes were not long in coming.

An accidental result of Humāyūn's Gujrāt campaign may, in passing, be noted here, namely, the recovery of Chitōr by the Rājput's of Mewār, whether with Humāyūn's help as stated by Tod or without his help. Both the *Rauzat-ul-Tāhirin* and the *Udaipur Rājya kā Itihās* mention that the recovery was made immediately after Bahādur's defeat at Mandasōr, *i.e.*, in Rānā Vikramāditya's time who died in 1536 A. D. Thus it may be presumed the Muslim possession of Chitōr lasted for a few months only.

Whether Humāyūn helped the Rājput's in the recovery of their fortress-capital or not, one fact is clear, namely, he showed no signs of resentment at it and ever afterwards his relations with them were cordial, as shown by their sheltering him during his flight in Shēr Shāh's reign.

The chronology of the later events of the Gujrāt campaign is:—

The fall of Chāmpānīr, 6th *Safar* 942 A. H. = 6th August, 1535 A. D.
Humāyūn's stay at Chāmpānīr for a month and a half, till the end
of *Rabiul-awwal* 942 A. H. = till 29th September, 1535 A. D.

The capture of Ahmadābād *Rabiul-ākhir* = October, 1535 A. D.
The distribution of *ḡājir* and the nobles taking up their posts, took
a month and a half up to the beginning of *Jumādāl-ākhir* = up to
27th November, 1535 A. D.

Humāyūn arrived at Mandū end of *Shabān* = 22nd February,
1536 A. D.

The breaking out of the Gujrāt rebellion . . . beginning of *Ramzān* =
23rd to 29th February, 1536 A. D.

The Mughals retired to Ahmadābād end of *Ramzan* =
23rd March, 1536 A. D.

Their arrival at Chāmpānīr beginning of *Shawwāl* =
1st April, 1536 A. D.

Askari started for Āgrā¹ end of *Shawwāl* = 21st April, 1536 A. D.
Askari's stay at Chitōr *Zulhijj-Zulqada* = May and half
of June, 1536 A. D.

Tardī Bēg surrendered Chāmpānīr² beginning of *Zulqada* =
22nd April, 1536 A. D.

Tardī Bēg reached Mandū, middle of *Zulqada* = 8th May, 1536 A. D.
Humāyūn started for Chitōr 3rd week of *Zulqada* =
middle of May, 1536 A. D.

Humāyūn reached Chitōr middle of *Zulhijj* = 8th June, 1536 A. D.
Humāyūn reached Āgrā 18th *Safar* 943 A. H. = 9th August,
1536 A. D.

¹ Erskine does not seem to be correct when he makes Askari start for Āgrā in 943 A. H. The correct date may be calculated on the basis of the following considerations:—

² *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, p. 333 gives 25th May, 1536 as the date of surrender and Bahādur's entry to the fort.

G. H. N. fol. 39, l. 17 says that the king rested at Āgrā for a year and the *Farishta*, p. 216, l. 20 that Humāyūn started for Jaunpūr on the 18th *Safar* 944 A. H., so that Humāyūn must have reached Āgrā by 943 A. H. Then Askari Mirzā must have started at the end of 942 A. H.

CHAPTER XV

THE DISAFFECTION OF THE MIRZĀS,

1536—40 A. D.

Both Muhammad Zamān M. and Muhammad Sultān M. were the grandsons of Sultān Husain Bāīqarā, the renowned ruler of Herāt, and were steady supporters of the Mughal throne in Bābur's time. But towards Humāyūn, their attitude was one of unmitigated hostility.¹ Humāyūn had twice pardoned them; but making light of his magnanimous treatment they pursued an obstructive course until they ruined themselves, the king, and the kingdom.

Let us turn to Muhammad Zamān M. first. We saw him last in Bahādur's camp. At Mandasōr he fought on behalf of the Sultān. On the eve of the Sultān's flight, Md. Zamān M. separated in order to carry out Bahādur's instructions to create disturbances elsewhere to distract Humāyūn's attention.

Md. Zamān M. first went to Sindh but found its able ruler, Shāh Husain Arghūn, (1523-54 A. D.), so firmly established on his throne and so keen on his duties that he took his advice and turned towards Lahore, where Kāmran, its governor, was absent, conducting a campaign in Qandahār. Kāmran possessed Multān, Kābul, and Qandahār also. Unable to govern all the four provinces personally, he had placed the last two under *Khawāja Amīr Kalān*.² Now, Shāh Tahmāsp, the able successor of Shāh Ismāīl, was like his father, an ambitious monarch, keen on expanding his kingdom and on possessing Qandahār. He sent a large army under his brother, Sām Mirzā, aided by

¹ See *Supra*, Ch. II and VIII.

² He was a life-long friend of Bābur, who recommended him to Humāyūn also. The former partook of banquets at his place and overlooked his impudence in writing uncomplimentary couplets about India. See *B. N.*, pp. 371-72, 375, 525-26, 627.

two other high officers, Aghziwār K̄hān, the Mirzā's tutor, and Sultān Murād Afshār. For eight months, *K̄hwāja Kalān* suffered a siege and then Kāmran arrived with 20,000 men. The enemy retreated one stage to the west, and so the two Mughal sections had an opportunity of combining. Then they moved westward, and utterly defeated the Persians, Aghziwār K̄hān having been captured and put to death, (January 25, 1536 A. D.)¹

It was while Kāmran was engaged on Qandahār, that the mischief-seeker, Muhammad Zamān M., reached Lahore. At first he resorted to negotiation for its surrender. When it failed, he laid siege to it. The siege was not progressing well, when he heard of Kāmran's return. He had to fly precipitately to Delhi, where he lingered for several months even after Humāyūn's arrival at Āgrā, (August, 1536 A. D.). But when he saw no prospects of success, he thought of the province of Gujrāt, which had treated him generously in the past.

In the meantime Bahādur had died childless, (February 13, 1537 A. D.). Md. Zamān M., whom the late Sultān had treated as his brother,² hastened to Ahmadābād, thinking that his death would make an opening for him. First of all, he obtained possession of some of the unspent State treasure, carried it in 700 golden chests, and collected 12000 Mughal³ and other soldiers from the north. He then approached the ladies of Bahādur's harem, bemoaned the Sultān's death, tore his garments, and would not be consoled by any words of the ladies. Bahādur's mother honoured him by the grant of 300 *saropas*. But when he asked them to support his cause, they correctly pointed out that in Gujrāt at least no royal inmate of the harem had taken interest in the question of succession, and it was best

¹ 1st *Shabān* 942 A. H. The Shāh made a second attempt a few months later under his direct command. *K̄h.* Kalān surrendered, but Kāmran reappeared and captured the fort from the Persian governor, Budāgh K̄hān Qājar.

² *A. N.*, p. 146 says, 'He also called himself the son of Sultān Bahādur's mother.'

³ The despicable Gazanfar now joined Md. Zamān M.

for them to keep themselves aloof, and accept what the nobles would ultimately decide.

Next, in order to win them over, he talked of avenging the late Sultān's murder by waging a war against the Portuguese: later, he adroitly changed his attitude, went to Diū, and by heavy bribery coaxed the people to read *ḵhutbah* in his name in the chief mosque¹ of the island.

But Md. Zamān M. in the eyes of the Gujrātīs possessed two defects which debarred him from the throne. Firstly, his personal character: he had grown ease-loving, prone to wine, opium, and *bhāng*.² Being a distinguished personage, he was continually entertained, and in return he squandered the treasure that was in his possession. Such a man could not have been expected to prove a worthy successor to the ever-active Bahādur. Secondly, he was a foreigner. He represented the very Mughals whom Bahādur had opposed with all his might, almost to the last breath of his life. The Gujrātīs took pride in the wealth and culture of their province.³ To them, Md. Zamān M. was as good a foreigner as Humāyūn, though the former's services in Bahādur's wars against Chitōr and against the Mughals deserved recognition in other ways.

Besides, the late Sultān had already nominated his own successors. His immediate successor was to be the ever-faithful Miran Muhammad Shāh of Ḳhāndesh, son of Bahādur's sister. The late Sultān had also recognized Mahmūd, the son of his brother, Latīf Ḳhān, by nominating him as Miran Muhammad Shāh's successor. The nobles had such a regard for their late Sultān that they accepted his double nomination without a demur, however unusual it might have appeared. Md. Zamān M. for some

¹ Called *Safā* mosque by *A. N.* See tr., p. 325 n. 2. Most of the description is from *A. T. W. H. G.*

² Hemp of which an intoxicating potion is made.

³ For the excellence of Gujrāt architecture consult the Archæological reports of the western circle published by the department. For some of the other details, see *A. A.*, Vol. I (tr.), pp. 75, 88, 92, 143 and Vol. II, pp. 239-41.

time faced the opposition of the nobles, and it is very likely that if he had boldly proceeded immediately to Ahmadābād, he might have been able to seize it. But he delayed too long. In the meantime, Imād-ul-Mulk, a nobleman who had risen from a slave, boldly came forward, and swore that he would, if properly supported, take Md. Zamān M. prisoner or drive him out of the province. By his earnest eloquence, he moved the two most influential nobles, Iḳhtiyār Ḳhān¹ and Afzal Ḳhān, who obtained for him the deputyship of the rightful heir,² and the authority of distributing *jāgīr* among his recruits, according to their importance or service. He then proclaimed a *jāgīr* of a *lakh* of *tankah* for a horseman who would join his army with three horses.³ The result was that though at the start of his campaign, he had only nine troopers to lead, in a month's time the number reached forty thousand.

Eucouragement also came from the prospective ruler. Miran Muhammad, who had been away to Mandū, on a career of conquest, reminded his supporters of his legitimate claims to the throne. Iḳhtiyār Ḳhān and Afzal Ḳhān were in his favour, but Imād-ul-Mulk was not; for he feared that with Miran Muhammad's appearance amidst the Gujrātīs the importance of Ḳhāndesh would grow at the expense of Gujrāt, and Ahmadābād would be reduced to a *mufassal* town. The two ministers satisfied him by pointing out that the succession of a Gujrātī was assured by Bahādur's second nomination of Mahmūd as Muhammad's successor. In order to satisfy Imād-ul-Mulk further, they

ancestors to the very founder of the Gujrāt dynasty would be mentioned. Imād-ul-Mulk was now completely satisfied.

Having solved the question of succession, he went forward to meet Md. Zamān M. and stopped when he came within a few miles of the Mughal camp, in the hope that the foe would open the attack. But Md. Zamān M. showed no such sign. Instead he made all the preparations of undergoing a siege, dug trenches around, and made Hisāmuddīn Mīrak, *Mir Khalīfā's* son,¹ his deputy and commander-in-chief. Hisāmuddīn carried on the defence, fought several skirmishes, and let his master escape one day, by distracting the enemy with repeated attacks. When all was finished, he joined Md. Zamān M. himself. They were driven out of the country, and thus Imād-ul-Mulk redeemed his promise.

Md. Zamān M. was again a wanderer, and turned to Sindh once more. He could do no mischief there. As he was a dissolute person, the life of a vagrant would not suit him; and so being altogether disappointed, he at last determined to fall back upon the generosity of his relation, the king of Delhi. Thus he returned to Āgrā, which he had left for Bahādur's camp some three years before.

Unfortunately, he could not immediately meet Humāyūn who had moved eastward (August, 1537 A. D.). But being in a mood of self-condemnation Md. Zamān M. had lost all patience, and hence persuaded his wife, Masūma Sultān Bēgam, who was present at Āgrā, to plead his cause. To her request of pardon for her husband, Humāyūn gave a gracious reply, promising a complete reconciliation. Md. Zamān M., thus assured went forward to meet him in his camp.

He was received with great honour. The full descrip-

¹ It was *Mir Khalīfā* who had raised objections to Humāyūn's accession after Bābur's death. Now we find his son supporting interests other than Humāyūn's.

time faced the opposition of the nobles, and it is very likely that if he had boldly proceeded immediately to Ahmadābād, he might have been able to seize it. But he delayed too long. In the meantime, Imād-ul-Mulk, a nobleman who had risen from a slave, boldly came forward, and swore that he would, if properly supported, take Md. Zamān M. prisoner or drive him out of the province. By his earnest eloquence, he moved the two most influential nobles, Iḳhtiyār Ḳhān¹ and Afzal Ḳhān, who obtained for him the deputyship of the rightful heir,² and the authority of distributing *jāgīr* among his recruits, according to their importance or service. He then proclaimed a *jāgīr* of a *lakh* of *tankah* for a horseman who would join his army with three horses.³ The result was that though at the start of his campaign, he had only nine troopers to lead, in a month's time the number reached forty thousand.

Eucouragement also came from the prospective ruler. Miran Muhammad, who had been away to Mandū, on a career of conquest, reminded his supporters of his legitimate claims to the throne. Iḳhtiyār Ḳhān and Afzal Ḳhān were in his favour, but Imād-ul-Mulk was not; for he feared that with Miran Muhammad's appearance amidst the Gujrātīs the importance of Ḳhāndesh would grow at the expense of Gujrāt, and Ahmadābād would be reduced to a *mufassal* town. The two ministers satisfied him by pointing out that the succession of a Gujrātī was assured by Bahādūr's second nomination of Mahmūd as Muhammad's successor. In order to satisfy Imād-ul-Mulk further, they proposed that the *ḳhutbah* would be read in Miran Muhammad's name in the following form:

میران محمد شاه ابن اخت بهادر شاه بن مظفر شاه بن محمود شاه
 الى آخرة اهداء اسامي سلاطين ماضى بتمام نمود
i.e., instead of mentioning Miran Muhammad's paternal ancestors after his name, the name of Bahādūr and his

¹ Possibly, the late defender of Chāmpānīr.

² Miran Muhammad Shāh of Ḳhāndēsh.

³ There may be some exaggeration in this statement.

ancestors to the very founder of the Gujrāt dynasty would be mentioned. Imād-ul-Mulk was now completely satisfied.

Having solved the question of succession, he went forward to meet Md. Zamān M. and stopped when he came within a few miles of the Mughal camp, in the hope that the foe would open the attack. But Md. Zamān M. showed no such sign. Instead he made all the preparations of undergoing a siege, dug trenches around, and made Hisāmuddīn Mīrak, *Mīr Khalīfā's* son,¹ his deputy and commander-in-chief. Hisāmuddīn carried on the defence, fought several skirmishes, and let his master escape one day, by distracting the enemy with repeated attacks. When all was finished, he joined Md. Zamān M. himself. They were driven out of the country, and thus Imād-ul-Mulk redeemed his promise.

Md. Zamān M. was again a wanderer, and turned to Sindh once more. He could do no mischief there. As he was a dissolute person, the life of a vagrant would not suit him; and so being altogether disappointed, he at last determined to fall back upon the generosity of his relation, the king of Delhi. Thus he returned to Āgrā, which he had left for Bahādūr's camp some three years before.

Unfortunately, he could not immediately meet Humāyūn who had moved eastward (August, 1537 A. D.). But being in a mood of self-condemnation Md. Zamān M. had lost all patience, and hence persuaded his wife, Masūma Sultān Bēgam, who was present at Āgrā, to plead his cause. To her request of pardon for her husband, Humāyūn gave a gracious reply, promising a complete reconciliation. Md. Zamān M., thus assured went forward to meet him in his camp.

He was received with great honour. The full descrip-

¹ It was *Mīr Khalīfā* who had raised objections to Humāyūn's accession after Bābur's death. Now we find his son supporting interests other than Humāyūn's.

tion of his reception has been given by Abul Fazl.¹ At first the high officials of the kingdom went forward to welcome him on behalf of the king and then at a day's march from the royal camp, Askari and Hindāl met him, both according him a formal welcome by a *ṣalute*—Askari by raising his hand up to his breast and Hindāl by putting his hand on his head. Then they escorted him during the rest of the journey, and saw him to his assigned tent. The next day, he met the king, who did him the rare honour of conferring on him twice in the same meeting a special *ḵhilat*, decking him with a belt and a sword, and presenting him with a horse.

Undoubtedly, Humāyūn showed a great deal of self-control and forbearance in dealing with one who had never given one kind word or thought to him. Abul Fazl also commends Humāyūn's behaviour in glowing sentences of which we shall quote one only. 'In short, his Majesty Jahānbānī Jannat Āshyānī in spite of rebellion so great that (even) to pardon it were improper, became an expounder of the Divine ethics and returned good for evil.'²

We do not fully agree with Abul Fazl. One may extol Humāyūn for his forgiving nature and generosity; but all that is generous is not always prudent. We may briefly analyse our view. Md. Zamān M. should not have been leniently dealt with; firstly, in view of his having been pardoned twice before and having caused a protracted war between Delhi and Gujrāt; and secondly, because he could not have been relied upon; for he had always been neglectful of his duties. Humāyūn had to thank the Mirzā for the disaster he met at Chausa two years later, because Md. Zamān M. let the enemy overpower the king's camp from the start of the battle. Humāyūn should have foreseen the difficulties which Md. Zamān M. would create for the State by his pretensions to high lineage and his irresponsible conduct. In fact, Humāyūn betrayed a softness which has always been incompatible with the stern duties

¹ *A. N.*; p. 150.

² *Ibid.*

same prison. So when the latter escaped together with the jailor, Md. Sultān M. also secured his freedom. He escaped to his *jāgīr*.

Almost immediately after, Humāyūn got absorbed in the Gujrāt affairs and completely overlooked Md. Sultān Mirzā's escape. As may be seen from the genealogy above, Md. Sultān M. had a large progeny, and so though he himself was disabled by the total or partial loss of vision, his sons carried on his policy of opposing Humāyūn. They first attacked Bilgrām,¹ situated on the other side of the Ganges,² and forced the local officials, Khusru³ *Kokultāsh's* sons to retire. Md. Sultān M. then made Bilgrām his headquarters⁴ and sent two of his sons to operate further eastward. The eldest son, Ūlūgh M. pushed on due east and occupied district after district of the Mughal territory till he reached Jaunpūr. Shāh M., the second son, crossed the Ganges, worked in the south-east, and extended his control as far as Kara-Mānikpūr. The territory thus acquired was some two hundred miles in length and less than a hundred in breadth.⁵ It was decided to control this large stretch of newly conquered territory by setting up headquarters at Bilgrām, Jaunpūr, and Kara-Mānikpūr.

It was a serious matter for the Delhi kingdom: for, at the least, it meant the loss of two provinces. Hindāl, apprehending that any further delay would lead to their permanent alienation for which he would not be forgiven by the king, made efforts to recover the lost provinces and suppress or drive away the Mirzās. He was able to accomplish his task without much difficulty; for Sultān M., with a view to strengthening his government in all parts of his

¹ In the Hardoi district of the United Provinces.

² Jauhar has given a good description of Md. Sultān M. and his children's mischievous activities in his *Tazkirat-ul-Wāqiāt*.

³ Khusru was in Bābur's service and took a share in the battles of Pānipat and Kḥānwah.

⁴ The *Tāriḫ-i-Humāyūn Shāhi* by Allāhdād Faizi Sirhindī gives some useful minor details.

⁵ In Akbar's time it comprised two of his *subahs*.

conquered territories had split up his army, one section to work at a distance with Ūlūgh M. at Jaunpūr, and the other, somewhat nearer, with Shāh M. Hindāl did not miss this opportunity, made a rapid march, crossed over to Bilgrām, mainly by the exertions of Toqlān Bēg, and met Shāh M. in a battle, before his elder brother could come up with the other section of the army. Hindāl won a complete victory.¹ Then he pushed on to meet Ūlūgh M. Two months later they met at Ajudhya, and Hindāl again won a victory.² The Mirzās now took to flight in sheer despair. Hindāl's pursuit forced them to leave the Mughal dominions and seek refuge with the Afghāns in Bihārkunda.³

Hindāl, in his pursuit, halted at Jaunpūr. Without instructions from Humāyūn, he did not think it advisable to plunge into Bihār and annoy the rising Afghāns. Fortunately for him, Humāyūn reached Āgrā soon after; and so putting off the question of the administration of Jaunpūr, Hindāl hurried back to the capital, to meet Humāyūn and give an account of his stewardship.

Md. Sultān M. remained with the Afghāns for the next two years, during which period Shēr Khān first conquered Bengal, and then defeated Humāyūn at Chausa, (June 26, 1539 A.D.). Then the Mirzā realized that his protector had grown so powerful as to eclipse every individual Mughal chief. He therefore gave up all hopes of supplanting Humāyūn by himself or by any of his sons, and thus having grown wiser he hastened to join Humāyūn and the other Mirzās who had gathered at Āgrā. But he could not continue to be loyal. The very next year when the Mughals met Shēr Shāh again at Bilgrām (May 17, 1540 A. D.), he and his sons played traitors and fled away from the battlefield.

¹ According to Jauhar, a westerly storm helped the Mughals by blowing dust into the eyes of the enemy.

² With Hindāl was *Shaiḥ* Buhlūl who wanted to disperse the enemy with his incantations. See *T. W.*

³ The word Bihārkunda seems to be a corruption of the Hindi word Bihār-khanda meaning Bihār region.

To conclude: the Mirzās were an unworthy set, proud of their lineage, prone to plague their neighbours, and always a menace to the Mughal king. Humāyūn owed many of his political troubles to them. Having colluded¹ with the enemies of the Mughals, they caused incalculable loss to the kingdom. The ruinous Gujrāt campaign is in point. Not only did it mean a disaster to the Mughals in one particular province, it encouraged Humāyūn's worst enemy, namely, Shēr K̄hān, who literally hounded Humāyūn out of Hindustān.

While closing this chapter we may remark that it was Humāyūn's misplaced generosity² towards the Mirzās that was responsible for their rebellions and misdemeanours. 'Kingship knows no kinship' should have been the guiding maxim of the king in his relations with the Mirzās.

¹ *E.g.*, Md. Zamān M. took refuge with Bahādur Shāh; Md. Sultān M. with the Afghāns. Each tried to bring disaster to the kingdom in collusion with its enemies—Bahādur and Shēr K̄hān.

² We have already indicated how generously Humāyūn had treated Md. Zamān M. and how the Mirzā had brought disaster to the king at Chausa. Similar was his treatment of Md. Sultān M.

CHAPTER XVI

SHER SHĀH'S EARLY CAREER [1472—1536 A. D.]

As there is an excellent monograph on Shēr Shāh,¹ we shall content ourselves with describing his achievements before he came into conflict with Humāyūn in 1537 A. D.


Farīd—the future Shēr Shāh—was born [circ. 1472 A. D.] in an Afghān family. His father *Miān* Hasan, a *mansabdār*, had four wives and eight children.² Infatuated by the charms of his youngest wife, he neglected his Afghān wife and her eldest son Farīd.³ Farīd could not brook his father's neglect, and left for Jaunpūr, in 1494 A. D., for study.⁴

In the fifteenth century Jaunpūr had come into prominence under the patronage of the enlightened Sharqī kings.⁵ It had developed into a splendid and magnificent seat of culture and learning catering for the intellectual needs of the northern India. There had sprung up some twenty schools of thought, each having on its rolls several hundred scholars. In fact, Jaunpūr had begun to challenge

Jaunpūr and its eminence.

¹ By Dr K. R. Qanungo. Some of his dates and events have been corrected by Dr P. Saran in the Bihār and Orissa Research Society Journal of March, 1934 A. D.

² The genealogy as given by Abbās Sarwānī in his *Tārīkh-i-Shēr Shāhī* is given here.



Dorn: *History of the Afghāns* slightly differs.

Miān Hasan was a *mansabdār* of five hundred and had been granted the *parganas* of Sahasrām and Khawāspūr Tānda in *jāgīr*. Hasan's father, Ibrāhīm, also had been a *mansabdār* of five hundred with *jāgīr* in Nārñōl. See the Dorn, p. 81.

³ Dr Saran corrects Qanungo by pointing out that Farīd's mother was neglected after Miān Hasan's settling down in Bihār.

⁴ According to Saran, Farīd had already learnt reading and writing.

⁵ Both Sultān Ibrāhīm Shāh Sharqī and Husain Shāh Sharqī were noted authors.

the cultural eminence of Delhi and was popularly known as the Shīrāz of India.¹ Its claim to the intellectual leadership of the contemporary India is borne out by the fact that it produced a number of scholars who led men and movements. Muhammad Jaunpūrī was the founder of the Indian *Mahdavi* movement laterly known as the *Alāī* movement of the sixteenth century. He suffered for his preachings, left his home, and died in distant Farrah in Afghānistān. But his tenets survived him and continued to influence some of the acute minds of India. At one time, Shaikh Mubārak, father of Abul Fazl, the historian, was among his chief adherents. Again, Jaunpūr possessed in Shēr Shāh the finest specimen of its culture which added to the bead-roll of our national heroes a personage, who by his lofty ideals and principles sustained India's claims to political eminence in mediæval times. Muhammad Yazd was another brilliant product of Jaunpūr. He worked up a spirited opposition against Akbar and gave a *fatwā*—canonical decree—for his deposition, [1581 A. D.], strongly condemning his religious vagaries. Even after the loss of its political glory on the transference of the administrative headquarters to Chunār, Jaunpūr continued to maintain and enrich its intellectual traditions.

In the realm of architecture also Jaunpūr made a striking contribution by boldly cutting itself adrift from the matter-of-fact and conventional building traditions. In the entire range of Muslim architecture the three extant mosques of Jaunpūr—(i) *Atala Devi*, (2) *Lāl Darwāza*, (3) *Jāmi masjid*—stand out as unique monuments, representing the distinguishing features of the Sharqī style of architecture²—the high sloping entrance gates of the mosques, sloping buttress-like propylons in the central facade projecting far above the roof of the *iwān*, the massive west wall, the

*Jaunpūr
architecture.*

¹ See *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, p. 259.

² For a detailed study consult *Fuhrer's Sharqī Architecture of Jaunpūr*.

storeyed cloisters several deep aisles arranged round extensive courtyards. The Jaunpūr school of architecture began and ended with the Sharqī dynasty, and amongst the later rulers it was only Akbar who reproduced, though feebly, some of the Sharqī features in his *Jāmi Masjid* at Fatehpur Sikrī.

To such an intellectual centre, Farīd went; for though the Sharqī patronage was no more available, Jaunpūr was humming with scholars and students; and the discarded and distracted Farīd found solace in such a vigorously intellectual atmosphere. So earnestly did he address himself to his studies that in three years' time, (1494-97 A. D.), by virtue of his scholarship he secured for himself the position of a *maulavi*—a rare distinction among the Afghān *mansabdārs*.¹ We get a glimpse of the studies of that day in the contemporary writings. The standard Persian works, the *Gulistān* and the *Būstān* of Shaikh Sadi, the *Sikandar-nāma* of Nizāmī, and the Arabic work *Kāfiya* with commentaries, formed the basis of a student's studies, though they were supplemented by biographical and historical works like the *Shāh-nāma* of Firdausi.

At the end of the period, fortune smiled on Farīd. His well-wishers persuaded his father, who had come to his patron, Jamāl Khān, at Jaunpūr, to resign his tenure of *jāgīr* to Farīd and content himself with the personal service of Jamāl Khān.

Thus began Farīd's administrative career. For the next twenty-one years, (1497—1518 A. D.), he remained in the *jāgīr*, and in its management he seems to have been inspired by such broad principles of government as characterize the work of a true administrator. We shall refer here to only a few of them:—

لا ملک الا بالعدل ولا عدل الا بالسیاست

¹ Abbās's words are

د علم و فہم و عقل و فراستی کہ او دارد در قوم سر رسید یکے ندارد

Tr. (There could be) no state without justice and no justice without punishment.

Later on he added another maxim:

بادشاهان را باید که صفحه احوال برقم عبادت بآرایند تا ملازمان
ورعیت میل عبادت نمایند

Tr. It is incumbent on kings that they should illumine the pages of their careers with (the spirit of) devotion or service, in order that their servants and subjects may develop a love for service.¹

(2) Consideration for the ryots' welfare and hence fixation of their land-revenue at a moderate figure but realization in full, *i.e.* without any arrears.

(3) Officials to be kept in proper control. Recognition of small perquisites for them, *e.g.* the settlement officers and revenue officers to be allowed fees for measurement and tax collection and food for the day.²

(4) The *zamīndārs* to be kept well in hand (i) If they were "mere individuals," any disobedience or highway robbery on their part was to be sternly punished and the culprits to be exterminated. For example, he rejected the insincere offers of submission from such wretches and destroyed them, killing the men, enslaving their families, and bringing settlers from elsewhere to the ruined villages.³

(ii) If they formed a group of individuals, knit together by bonds of caste or brotherhood, a more lenient treatment was to be accorded. He would bear down their opposition, and if the rebels repented, restored their property, and treated them with consideration.

¹ For several of such ideals see the latter part of Abbās's work.

² Abbās puts down the perquisites as *محصلا نه و خوراک محصلا نه*

³ See Moreland: *The Agrarian System of Moslem India* (M. A. S. M. I.), page 70.

Abbās's words are:

مفسدان گنهگاران را تاخت و تمامی متبرداران را بقتل رسانید و زنی و بچه ایشان را بند کرد و

We may briefly indicate the three main features of his administration :

(a) He evolved a scientific system of land-assessment by gradually abandoning the four sharing system that had prevailed so long, viz., (1) *khēt-batāi*, (2) *kankūt*, (3) *batāi* or *bhāoti*, (4) *lānk batāi*.¹ As every one of them depended on an estimate of the produce and not on an actual measurement, he thought it led to fraud or deception.

Instead, he introduced a careful measurement and then on its basis, fixed the assessment.² He was not, however, an aggressive reformer, and if some ryots preferred sharing, he allowed it to operate in their case.

(b) He maintained some two hundred horsemen in his service for keeping peace and order. These were in addition to those that served the king of Delhi at Jaunpūr or at the capital.

(c) He was accessible to the humblest of his subjects and encouraged them to represent their grievances to him. If on inquiry an official was found guilty, he was severely dealt with.

Thus in the administration of his *jāgīr* Shēr Shāh's statesmanship was on its trial. He gave evidence of qualities that at once mark him out as an administrator. His solicitude for the welfare of his ryots, his masterful control of the *zamindārs*, his strict supervision over his officials, and, above all, his vigorous and intelligent system of land assessment, are some of the features of his administration that indicate that Farīd had at this early stage of his career developed and demonstrated an unmistakably national outlook, and seemed cut out for the rulership of India which he eminently justified.

His land assessment, *inter alia*, sustains his claim to statesmanship. No government should ever hope to suc-

¹ See *A. A.* (Tr.), Vol. II, page 44 for the explanation of the terms.

² See *M. A. S. M. I.*, pp. 69 and 71.

ceed in India—an agricultural country *par excellence*—which fails to place rural economy in the forefront of its political programme. Not only does the stability of the rural life in India conduce to the material well-being of the people; not only does it justify the existence of the State institutions; it also constitutes the mainstay of the State resources. And it is to the lasting glory of Shēr Shāh that he set afoot what are termed in modern phraseology the rural development schemes. He ran to meet and solved to a great extent some of the agrarian problems awaiting their solutions at the hands of the present government.

Again, in his policy towards the *zamīndārs* we discover the germs that later on quickened into an Afghān Democracy under his inspiring leadership. He took the earliest opportunity of bearing down the refractory and individual *zamīndārs*, but respected and recognized, as a rule, the group-opinion. Much to his credit, he anticipated some of the fundamental and sound principles of a modern Democracy, namely, the majority opinion should be respected, and the individual vagaries militating against the healthy growth of democratic institutions ruthlessly checked.

Although he always respected the legitimate aspirations of his subjects and allowed them opportunities of influencing his State policy, as a trustee for his people he redeemed his moral obligation of looking to their best interests. He thought he alone was responsible for their well-being. In fact, he comes very much nearer Plato's Philosopher-king, who being the sole representative of his people, expresses the *general will* and carries it out. Like the good Shepherd he reared and protected his sheep.

These remarks may appear as mere *obiter dicta* here, but a careful analysis of his character, personality, and political achievements—which does not form a part of our present study—will lend support to them.

In short, his management of his father's *jāgīr* gives us an earnest of his future administration which was a

natural and systematic evolution of the principles he had brought to bear upon his work in Sahasrām and Khawās-pūr-Tānda.

But as luck would have it, in 1518 A. D. his fame cost him his stewardship. His step-mother, now the favourite of *Miān* Hasan, who had two sons of her own, growing jealous of Farīd's success, got her weak-willed husband to dismiss his able son from the *jāgīr*. This was against the pact agreed upon at Jaunpūr, but *Miān* Hasan, worried by a cantankerous domestic atmosphere, decided to break his word, and take back the management of the *jāgīr* into his own hand. Farīd regarded the resumption as a breach of faith, and reprehended his father's conduct. With faith in his own ability, he went straight to Āgrā to wait upon Sultān Ibrāhīm Lōdī. He represented to him his grievances, and tried to persuade him to transfer the *jāgīr* from the *Miān* to himself. He was unsuccessful and stayed there patiently to bide his time.

The opportunity came sooner than he might have expected; for his father died a few months later, (1525 A. D.), and now Sultān Ibrāhīm gladly recognized his ability by granting him his father's rank and *jāgīr*. On his return to his *parganās*, however, he found that it was no easy task to get the full possession of the estate; for Muhammad Khān Sūr, the powerful *mansabdār* of the neighbouring *jāgīr* of Chaund, was with Sulaimān, Farīd's step-brother and rival. Muhammad Khān's object was to bring the brothers into conflict, weaken and destroy them individually, and finally occupy the *jāgīr*, himself. Partly because he saw through the move and partly because he was not equal to meeting Muhammad, Farīd sprang upon his rival a surprise by going over to Sultān Muhammad Nūhānī of Bihār.¹ The disaster of Pānipat had changed the entire situation (1526 A. D.). The Afghān hegemony

¹ The original name of Sultān Muhammad has been variously written, e.g., Pahār Khān, Par Khān (Dorn), Bahār Khān (Abbās), Behār Khān (Erskine), Bihār Khān (Mrs. Beveridge), Bahādur Khān (C. H. I., Vol. III).

under the Lōdis at Delhi had been supplanted by the Mughal dynasty with Bābur as its first ruler. In this state of confusion, the Afghāns had for the time acknowledged Sultān Muhammad as their leader. By taking shelter with this leader of the Afghāns, Farīd overreached Muhammad Khān Sūr and retained his *jāgīr* for himself.

Farīd served his new master with his characteristic zeal and devotion. He once risked his life to save his master from the attacks of a ferocious tiger. His loyalty was adequately rewarded: the Sultān took him into his confidence, appointed him tutor to the prince, Jalāluddīn Nūhānī, and conferred upon him the title of Shēr Khān. He was held up as an example of courage and sagacity.

Shēr Khān, however, was not satisfied with his present lot, and it may well be that he was thinking more about his *jāgīr*. He found that let alone any question of a further grant of land to him as a reward for his faithful services, even the existing territory was not guaranteed against the future machinations of Muhammad Khān Sūr, and that the Sultān, in the state of confusion prevailing at the time was not prepared to displease one of his chief nobles for his sake. So after two years' waiting, Shēr Khān returned to Sahasrām to think out some other way of rescuing his small estate.

After Shēr Khān's departure, Muhammad Khān had the opportunity of poisoning the Sultān's mind against him. He made capital out of Shēr Khān's continued absence¹ and suggested to the Sultān that as a punishment, his estate should be taken away and transferred to someone else. Sultān Muhammad in view of Shēr Khān's services to himself declined to interfere but allowed Muhammad Khān to act as an intermediary and to bring the issue to a satisfactory conclusion. Thus authorized, Muhammad Khān went to Shēr Khān's *jāgīr* with the object of

¹ Either Shēr Khān had gone away without permission or exceeded his leave of absence. Abbās's words are اورا اصال رقع شد i.e., he grew indolent. It suggests some sort of negligence.

dividing it amongst the brothers. He invited Shēr K̄hān to give his consent to his project. Shēr K̄hān ably pointed out the administrative fallacy in the proposal by saying that the division of an estate as prevalent amongst the Afghāns of Rōh¹ could not be applied to a *jāgīr*; for the latter belonged to the State and was in exchange for military services rendered. Since the service was indivisible, the estate must also remain indivisible; and that it was only the king's *farmān* that legalized the right to the *jāgīr* and nothing less than a *farmān* could take it away; finally as Sultān Ibrāhīm Lōdī's *farmān* had granted the entire estate to him, no one else had any right to take it away or alter it.² The pleading was essentially sound but Muhammad, bent on carrying out his own design, refused to give a patient hearing. The result was a fight between them, in which Shēr K̄hān was worsted. But though vanquished, he continued 'to argue,' obtained help from an entirely alien quarter, *e.g.*, Sultān Junaid Barlās, the Mughal governor of Jaunpūr, defeated Muhammad K̄hān, regained his own territories, and even overran his foe's (1527 A.D.). Shēr K̄hān, however, did not adopt any retaliatory attitude on the occasion or betray any greed for adding to his estate at the expense of his neighbour. On the other hand, he set a bound to his success. He had noticed that the presence of the Mughal soldiers had dimmed his popularity. No sooner did he recover his estate than he hastened to thank his benefactors, the Mughals. He rewarded them and persuaded them to withdraw to their territory. Having accomplished this much, he turned to the remaining portion of his task, *viz.*, to win over his foe. He wrote a genuinely kind letter to Muhammad K̄hān and followed it up by making an offer of restoring to him the whole of his territory. Muhammad was over-

¹ The whole of the hilly region of north-eastern Afghānistān was called Rōh and according to one writer, it was only another term for روه (hill).

whelmed by Shēr K̄hān's magnanimity and returned to his *jāgīr*. He determined never again to raise the question of Shēr K̄hān's estate, but to remain a friend of his generous benefactor.

Shēr K̄hān's appeal for help to the Mughals had been regarded as such a heinous crime by the Afghāns that even his magnanimity for Muhammad K̄hān, his foe, and his causing the Mughals to withdraw from his territory could not enable him to retrieve the esteem in which he had been held as Sultān Muhammad's minister by the Afghāns. So Shēr K̄hān set to work in another direction. He broadcasted his opinions on the deplorable political situation of the Afghāns in general and suggested remedies. He dilated on the selfishness of every individual Afghān, condemning how each was actuated by the sole ambition of unjustly possessing another Afghān's property with the result that one and all of them had lost esteem in his eyes as well as in the alien's. The remedy for such an unhealthy state of affairs, he continued, was obvious. The rich must be taught to be more patriotic, induced to help the poorer Afghāns by employing as many of them as possible in their service, and told to work with each other in unison. The speeches enabled Shēr K̄hān to recover his popularity and reputation.

Having thus secured and stabilized his position in his *jāgīr*, Shēr K̄hān set to familiarize himself with the Mughal system of administration. He had profited by the aid rendered by the Mughal governor and hence was eager to study their system of government. Accordingly, he went to Āgrā in 1527 A. D. Actually, he was disappointed to see the Mughal administrative practice. He thought the Mughals to be corrupt and oppressive on the poor, *i. e.*, the cultivator and the soldier, and traced the evil to the ruler's lack of personal interest and to too great a dependence on his officials. Whether these observations of Shēr K̄hān's, ignorant as he yet was of the Mughal affairs, be sound or not he freely gave expression to them and in the city his views were known to all. It is said that Bābur disliked

his free expression of opinion and independent spirit¹ and at one time thought of throwing him into prison; but the officials, Junaid and the *Ḳhalīfā* possibly because they were bribed, felt interested in him, and allowed him to leave Āgrā without getting into any difficulty.

Shēr Ḳhān's journey to Āgrā had not been fruitful. He failed to reconcile himself to the Mughal system, and after his return from Āgrā concluded that his connexions with the Mughals had ended for good. So he turned again to his Afghān master, Sultān Muhammad, who probably had waited all this time for his return. He warmly welcomed Shēr Ḳhān and excused his long delay. He not only had been kind to Shēr Ḳhān in the past out of a feeling of gratitude for his services to himself and the State, but had done him a favour by refusing to listen to his rival, Muhammad Ḳhān's suggestion of punishment made during his absence. Now when Shēr Ḳhān came back to him, he reinstated him in his post and appointed him tutor to the minor prince, Jalāluddīn (1528 A. D.).

A few months later, Sultān Muhammad died (1528 A. D.), but his death did not mean any material change to Shēr Ḳhān; for Jalāluddīn's mother, Dūdū Bībī, who had become the regent after her husband's death, had perfect confidence in him. So Shēr Ḳhān's ministry, which might now be termed deputy-rulership, continued. Shortly afterwards, Dūdū Bībī also died. Shēr Ḳhān's ability and influence with the boy-king increased his power; and as a conscientious minister he was busily engaged in the various political struggles and reforms of the State. Some of them may be briefly described below:—

(a) He had to save the small Afghān kingdom of South Bihār from the more powerful ruler, Nāsiruddin

¹ B. N. does not record any such unfavourable opinion of the king. Qanungo disbelieves most of Shēr Ḳhān's speeches as well as his behaviour at Bābur's dinner table. See B. & O. R. S. Journal of the year 1921 A. D.

Nasrat Shāh, (1518—1533 A. D.). Shēr K̄hān first of all appealed to the Shāh's magnanimity and asked him to take pity on Jalāl, a mere boy, and leave him alone. But this bore no fruit, and he had to devise other ways. The nearest governor on behalf of the Bengal ruler was Maḵhdūm-i-Ālam,¹ connected with the king, and reported to be enormously rich and also eminently just. Shēr K̄hān cultivated friendship with him, which grew to be so intimate that it alarmed Nasrat Shāh, who turned from the Afghāns of Bihār, fell upon his brother-in-law, and killed him. Shēr K̄hān thus lost in him one of his well-wishers but also gained a little; for the large wealth hoarded by Maḵhdūm-i-Ālam, a wise and careful administrator, came into his possession.

Then a long struggle took place between Nasrat Shāh and Shēr K̄hān, which ended in the latter's victory, (1529 A. D.). The Bengal ruler retired for the time, leaving Shēr K̄hān alone.

(b) In the midst of his wars, another source of trouble, so long dormant, became noticeable. With all his ability, Shēr K̄hān was considered to be a commoner, *i.e.* devoid of aristocratic blood,² and since he was nothing less than a dictator, the numerous nobles, who had inherited rank from Sultān Buhlūl's time, *i.e.* those belonging to Lōdī, Nūhānī, and Qarmalī tribes, resented his dominance in the State. They planned to kill him. The scheme failed owing to the vigilance of Shēr K̄hān and his spies, of whom he had maintained a large number. But it indicated to him the intensity of the prejudice which these high-born nobles bore against him. So he next attempted to reconcile them by sharing power with them. He proposed a division of work and offered them either of the two tasks, the other to be left to him (1) the protection of

¹ Nasrat's brother-in-law, his sister being married to Maḵhdūm.

² Miān Ibrāhīm, Shēr K̄hān's grand-father, before being a *Mansabdār* had been a dealer in horses and as such was thought to be low-born. Later, when Shēr K̄hān became king, it was claimed that he was a lineal descendant of the Shansabānī kings of Ghūr.

Bihār against the attacks from Bengal, and (2) the internal administration of the country. The Nūhānīs refused to perform either; instead, they straightway went over along with their leader, Jalāluddīn to Nasrat Shāh, surrendering, at the same time, their territories to him. This was the worst course for them to choose; for now they appeared as traitors to their ciontrymen whom Shēr Khān had been striving hard to save from the clutches of their powerful eastern neighbour. So at the conclusion of his long contest with the Nūhānīs, he came out successful and his rivals withdrew in shame and ignominy. The Nūhānīs did not end their treachery here, but incited the Bengal ruler to make further attacks.

(c) Shēr Khān, for some time now, was the sole administrator of the country but he knew that the age-long prejudices of the Afghāns against low birth, would not permit him to assume any regal title, and so he contented himself with the lesser title of the *Hazrat-i-Ālā*. But he patiently carried on his work of administration by (1) improving the lot of his *ryots*, (2) rallying the Afghāns round him by providing everyone with some sort of service, and (3) improving the finances of his small State, by cutting down the expenses and developing its resources. He was so earnest in his work that he placed all his personal wealth at the disposal of the State. His own resources were considerable; for he had recently obtained Chunār with its treasures and also other large sums of money.¹

(d) His schemes suffered suspension, for some time at least, with the arrival of Sultān Mahmūd Lōdī (1529 A. D.) at the invitation of the prominent Bihār nobles. His advent was an eye-opener to him; for, instead of relying on him who had saved them from the Bengal invasions, who had placed his all unreservedly at their disposal, and who had considerably improved the lot of all classes of people, they preferred to choose a rather obscure and un-

¹ We have already mentioned how he had obtained *Makhdūm-i-Ālam*'s wealth. His marriage with the rich heiress Gohar Gosāin and gift from Bibi Fath Malika may be mentioned in this connexion.

known person merely on the ground of his birth and lineage. This gave a rude shock to all his aspirations, and he chose to retire to his humble *jāgīr* rather than join the newly chosen leader. But the other nobles did not foresee that Shēr K̄hān would take such a step; they would not allow him to retire; for they knew full well that without him they could achieve nothing. So the new Sultān Mahmūd as their mouthpiece tried to win him over (1) by giving him a written assurance of granting him the whole of south Bihār as soon as some other territory was obtained for himself and the other Afghāns; and (2) by going to his *jāgīr* and making him join in the coming Afghān expeditions against the Mughal territory. Shēr K̄hān joined unwillingly, and the expedition brought forth no result. Three years later, Mahmūd relapsed into obscurity (1532 A. D.).

With Mahmūd's disappearance, Shēr K̄hān's prospects again looked up. He was recalled to the charge of the State. With his advent, the invasions from the east ceased and resources of the State improved. There was only one possible danger, an invasion from the Mughals. He had hoped that after his decidedly friendly attitude to them at the recent battle of Dadrah (August 1532 A. D.), the Mughals would welcome his lead in Bihār. His hopes were not wholly realized; for Humāyūn, after the battle of Dadrah besieged him at Chunār (February to June, 1533 A. D.) and Shēr K̄hān got off on easy terms at the end of the siege.

Humāyūn was next occupied elsewhere, and Shēr K̄hān got respite to organize the administration of the country and retaliate on the hostile Bengal. While observing about his administration, Abbās especially commends his achievement in turning the unruly Afghāns into tried soldiers. His industry and sagacity reconciled all classes including the nobles who had till 1529 A. D. refused to recognize him as their leader and had invited Mahmūd. Although he now became the idol of the Afghāns, he refrained from assuming any regal title; for, having obtained all the power he cared for, he did not wish to alarm his

Mughal or Bengālī neighbours or annoy some of his old-fashioned subjects by the assumption of a high-sounding title, to which, according to them, he had no claim.

(e) Next Shēr K̄hān thought of invading Bengal. Already as a result of his previous victories his territories had extended up to as far east as Surajgarh.¹ In 1534 A. D. he fought a battle near it as a result of which he added further territories as far as Mungīr. Two years later he added more territories in the same direction as far as Sikrigalli² (February, 1536 A. D.). Thus, in the four years that he was allowed to work without obstruction, he not only organized the administration but more than doubled the size of the Afghān dominion.

How this growth of the Afghān power alarmed Humāyūn and precipitated his invasion of Bihār and Bengal will be related in the following chapter.

The chronology of Shēr K̄hān's early career³ is:—

Farid was born in	1472 A. D.
„ studied at Jaunpūr	1494-97 A. D.
„ in Miān Hasan's jāgīr	1497-1518 A. D.
„ in Agrā	1518-25 A. D.
Miān Hasan's death	1525 A. D.
Farid in his jāgīr	1525-26 A. D.
„ with Sultān Muhammad Nūhānī	1526-27 A. D.
Shēr K̄hān returned to his jāgīr	1527 A. D.
„ „ lost and recovered his jāgīr; Muhammad K̄hān Sūr was befriended	1527 A. D.
„ „ in Agrā with Bābur	1527 A. D.
„ „ in his jāgīr	1528 A. D.
„ „ with Sultān Muhammad	1528 A. D.
The death of Sultān Muhammad and Dūdū Bibī	1528 A. D.
The death of Maḥdūm-i-Ālam	1529 A. D.
Shēr K̄hān's fight with Nasrat Shāh	1529 A. D.
Jalāluddīn Nūhānī's retreat to Bengal	1529 A. D.
The arrival of Sultān Mahmūd Lōdī in Bihār	1529 A. D.

¹ Situated on the southern bank of the Ganges and on the old Grand Trunk Road, about 20 miles W S W., of Mungīr.

² Situated 35°10' N. 87°43' E. on the south bank of the Ganges about 268 miles by river from Calcutta. According to *Dorn*, p. 99, his army obtained so much of plunder on this occasion that not one of them was in need of a horse or a camel.

³ The authorities of Shēr Shāh's reign are very sparing in their dates and much of the chronology put in above has been arrived at from internal evidences.

The battle of Dadrah	August, 1532 A. D.
Mahmūd retired and Shēr Ḳhān again succeeded to the leadership 1532 A. D.
Humāyūn besieged Chunār	February-June, 1533 A. D.
The death of Nasrat Shāh 1533 A. D.
Battle of Surajgarh 1534 A. D.
Further victories of Shēr Ḳhān against Bengal 1536 A. D.

CHAPTER XVII

HUMĀYŪN'S INVASION AND CONQUEST OF BENGAL (JULY, 1537--AUGUST, 1538 A. D.)

We have seen in the previous chapters¹ that Humāyūn returned to Āgrā in August, 1536 A. D., and that Muhammad Zamān M. and Muhammad Sultān M. continued to plague the Mughals with their insurrections in and outside the kingdom for a considerable period. The disturbances, however, eventually came to an end. Md. Zamān M. retreated to Gujrāt hoping to succeed Bahādūr who had died in February, 1537 A. D., and Md. Sultān M. went away to the Afghāns in Bihār-kunda.

After his return from Mandū, Humāyūn stayed in Āgrā for a year,² from August, 1536—July, 1537 A. D. There were several reasons for this:—

(a) Bahādūr had recovered Gujrāt during March—April, 1536 A. D. Humāyūn waited at the capital to watch carefully his future movements. If he resumed his schemes against the Delhi kingdom, the capital might be in danger and it would not be advisable for Humāyūn to move elsewhere.³ After Bahādūr Shāh's death in February, 1537 A. D., when Md. Zamān M. went to Gujrāt and attempted to usurp its throne, it was again not safe for Humāyūn to leave the capital lest Md. Zamān M. with his seven years' hostility against him should also launch an attack against Āgrā.

(b) An element of indolence in his own character might have held him up so long in Āgrā. It has been pointed

¹ Chapters XIV and XV.

² See G. H. N., *Badāūnī, Mirāt-ul-Ālam, Zabdat-ut-Tawārīkh*.

³ On a previous occasion Āgrā was threatened by Tātār Khān, Ālam Khān's son, and Humāyūn had to repel him by sending Askari M. and Hindāl M. See *Supra*, Chapter IX.

out that at Mandū Humāyūn had increased his daily dose of opium and had become a confirmed opium-eater,¹ and that his stay at Āgrā was due to nothing but indolence. This may be partly but not wholly true. Humāyūn seemed to work by spurts. After his first campaign against the Afghāns,² he lingered in Delhi to found his capital, Dīn-panāh.³ After a strenuous campaign in Gujrāt, he let time drift at Mandū during February—May, 1536 A. D., and now after a hurried retreat to Āgrā, he did not move for a year. We thus observe a period of inertia between two periods of intense activity.

In this connexion it may be remarked that Humāyūn was not a man of dissolute habit, who revelled in wine and dissipation. The complaint of his queen, Bēga Bēgam, was rather otherwise, *viz.* that he neglected his wives in entertaining his sisters, widowed aunts, and grand-aunts. Nor did his addiction to opium interfere with his later campaigns in Kābul and, in India. He recovered Kābul from his brother, Kāmran, and won splendid victories over the Afghāns in the Punjāb. His occasional sloth might not, therefore, have proved to be a very grave defect in him after all. Whatever might have been the reasons for his prolonged stay in the capital, Humāyūn had now to bestir himself once more to check Shēr Ḳhān's activities in Bengal.

Hindū Bēg has been accused of falsely reporting that everything was quiet on the eastern front, which delayed Humāyūn's attack on the Afghāns by a year or so.⁴ The news, however, that Shēr Ḳhān's Bengal war had ended and that he had undertaken the more peaceful task of consolidating his administration⁵ might have justified Hindū Bēg's report to his master. Similarly, it would be a mistake to think that Hindū Bēg had deceived

¹ G. H. N. Humāyūn's words, as quoted by his sister, are, 'I am an opium-eater.'

² See Chapter IV.

³ For its description see Chapter VI.

⁴ Abbās: *Tārīkh-i-Shēr Shāhī*.

⁵ See chronology at the end of the last chapter.

his master by mentioning that Shēr K̄hān was a Mughal nobleman and that his achievements only served to enhance the credit of the Delhi kingdom. Shēr K̄hān's measures would belie any such statement; for it was known to everybody that Shēr K̄hān had been consolidating the Afghāns and conducting campaigns against the ruler of Bengal. It was also known that Shēr K̄hān had paid no tribute to the Delhi kingdom either for the old territory in Bihār or for the new additions. His treaty after the first siege of Chunār, December, 1532 A. D., when he had promised to provide the Mughal king with a contingent under one of his sons, remained a dead letter for the last 3 years or more, and now he was again rapidly extending his territories towards the east. Thus Humāyūn could have no misconception of Shēr K̄hān and his political ambitions. If, therefore, he delayed an attack on him, it was not because he trusted Shēr K̄hān as an ally but because he himself was pre-occupied elsewhere. Besides, when Humāyūn finished his Gujrāt campaign, Shēr K̄hān had also finished his in Bengal, and Humāyūn could not attack him during a peace. Shēr K̄hān had given him no provocation, and had specifically professed, however falsely, to be a well-wisher of the Mughals. Humāyūn waited for some overt act on Shēr K̄hān's part which could give him an excuse and an opportunity of challenging him. This opportunity came his way the very next year (1537 A. D.).

In order to understand how the opportunity came we should review the history of Bengal during the preceding four years. Nasrat Shāh, the ruler of Bengal, was murdered in 1533 A. D. and succeeded by his minor son, Alāuddīn Fīrūz. The latter ruled for three months only, and was then murdered by Nasrat's brother, Ghiyās-uddīn Mahmūd. Though he had made his way to the throne through bloodshed he was expected to be an able ruler; for during his brother's reign he had wielded almost royal power in the greater part of the kingdom. Actually, he proved a sad failure. Unlike his father, Husain Shāh,

he was a dissolute and inefficient king. Campos¹ states on Faria y Souza's authority² that his concubines alone numbered 10,000. In Nasrat Shāh's time Shēr K̄hān had already won several campaigns. Now with the inefficient Mahmūd on the throne, he reopened his war and with a much better prospect. Mahmūd was repeatedly beaten in war. Seeing no other way, he sought the help of the Portuguese of Chinsura. They came in 1536 A. D., and defended the passes of Teliagarhi and of Sikrigalli; but Shēr K̄hān worked round the enemy's flank and threatened Gaur, the capital of Bengal. So Mahmūd was obliged to desist and make a hasty treaty, surrendering 13 lakhs of rupees worth of gold. Shēr K̄hān was not content with his success; for he desired to put the ruler of Bengal absolutely out of his way before the Portuguese should have time to come to his aid. They had been for some time engaged in a conflict with Bahādur Shāh of Gujrāt, and after his death, feared an attack from Sultān Sulaimān of Turkey in alliance with Bahādur's successor.³ Hence at that moment they could render no aid to Mahmūd but promised to do so in the year following.⁴ Shēr K̄hān, who had seen the Portuguese display their valour at Teliagarhi and at Sikrigalli, was naturally anxious to forestall them, and so he determined to carry out an immediate attack on him on the pretext that the promised annual tribute had not been duly paid.⁵

Humāyūn who had been patiently watching the developments in the east realized that his opportunity had arrived, and immediately made preparations to start for the east. He entrusted Delhi to *Mir Faḫr Alī*, the stubborn

¹ Campos: *History of the Portuguese in Bengal*, p. 31.

² His work is named *Asia Portuguesa* and was published in the seventeenth century. Danvers: *The Portuguese in India* gives a meagre description on pp. 42-43.

³ This invasion actually took place in 1538 A. D. See *Danvers*, p. 426.

⁴ Shēr K̄hān's information bureau had correctly informed him that Mahmūd's request for help had been answered by the Portuguese, and they had promised to come the next year, i.e., 1538 A. D.

⁵ See *Campos*, p. 40.

antagonist of Prince Kāmṛān at Lahore,¹ whose staunch loyalty deserved this signal recognition. *Mir* Muhammad *Bakshi* was placed at Agrā. In order to maintain his communications with the two capitals, he posted his cousin, Yādgar Nāsir M., to Kālpī, Nūruddīn Muhammad M. to Qanauj, and Hindū Bēg to Jaunpūr. Having made these arrangements he started on the 18th *Safar*, 944 A. H., (27th July, 1537 A. D.)² accompanied by a number of nobles, of whom the chief were Askari M., Hindāl M., Tardī Bēg, Bairam Ḳhān, Qāsīm Husain Ḳhān, and Jahāngīr Qulī Bēg.³ Rūmī Ḳhān accompanied as the chief gunner. Md. Zamān M. joined him at Chunār.⁴ Humāyūn's seraglio also, as was the mediæval custom, went with him.

Chunār was one of the important headquarters containing a large amount of wealth and was considered by Shēr Ḳhān the gate to Bihār and Bengal. As the Afghan leader had moved towards the east, planning a campaign on an extensive scale, Humāyūn decided to attack it. When he reached Chunār in November, 1537 A. D. he found, as he had expected, that it was not commanded by Shēr Ḳhān in person but by his second son, Jalāl Ḳhān, and brother, Ghāzī Ḳhān Sūr.⁵

When Humāyūn reached the foot of the fort he heard of Shēr Ḳhān's movements in the east, and it was apprehended by some of his followers that the Afghān chief might finish his campaign with the capture of the capital, Gaur. Hence it was debated whether he should press on

¹ See *Supra*, Ch. V.

² There is a discrepancy about the date. Some give 942 A. D. others 943 or 945 A. H. *A. N.* is silent on the point. The correct date is given by *Farishta* and *Riyāz-us-Salātin*. For *Farishta* see R. A. S. B. MS. No. 135 fol. 162b, l. 15; for *Riyāz* see R. A. S. B. edition, p. 141, l. 4.

³ For the full list consult any of the following histories:—*Akbar-nāma*, *Zabdat-ut-Tawārikh*, *Rauzat-ut-Tāhvirin*.

⁴ *Tārikh-i-Alfi* makes him join on the return march. This cannot be true; for he died at the battle of Chausa before the Mughal army reached Chunār.

⁵ *Riyāz* omits the name of Jalāl and *A. N.* calls him Qutb Ḳhān. They forget that much of Jalāl's reputation depended upon his valiant defence at Chunār, and that he was selected as Shēr Shāh's successor for his ability and courage.

eastward and relieve his fellow-king of Bengal, or should stay where he had arrived, capture the place, and then move forward. There was a sharp difference of opinion among his officers; the Turkī and other foreign commanders, mostly young in age, recommending the latter course; while the senior and more experienced officers led by Dilāwar Khān supported the former. Humāyūn sided with his countrymen, and for this decision he has been severely criticized. It is said that he stands condemned on his own statement, that he preferred to side with the Turkī youths rather than follow the sagacious advice of his Afghān well-wishers.¹ It may be observed that it is always possible to be wise after the event. In favour of Humāyūn's decision, however, the following observations may be made:—

- (a) He had the bitter experience of Gujrāt. There he had reached Cambay without subjugating Chāmpānīr or most of the other districts. The campaign, which had begun with a spectacular series of conquests, ended in a speedy loss of the whole province.
- (b) Shēr Khān attached great strategic importance to Chunār, and had been opposed to its surrender to the Mughals, five years back.² Now that Humāyūn had at last determined to break with him, it was best for him to commence hostilities by attacking a place, the enemy attached so much value to. Its fall would signal the end of the Afghān kingdom of south Bihār. Incidentally, if the treasure had not yet been removed from Chunār, it might come into his possession.
- (c) He could never have foreseen that Sultān Mahmūd, son of the illustrious Alāuddīn Husain Shāh, and himself an experienced ruler of the extensive

¹ See *Abbās*.

² See Chapter IV.

kingdom of Bengal, would speedily succumb to Shēr K̄hān. On the other hand, he would expect that Mahmūd would prove fitter than Nasrat Shāh, who had been murdered for his tyranny.¹ Mahmūd had wielded royal powers during his brother's reign, and though he had waded his way to the throne through blood, his previous experience was expected to stand him in good stead; and he had already occupied the throne for five years. For this reason Humāyūn would think that Shēr K̄hān's war against Bengal would continue for some time.

- (d) It should also be remembered that in November, 1537 A. D., Humāyūn was engaged in his own affairs against the Afghāns, and as such was not directly concerned with the question, whether Mahmūd would be able to resist Shēr K̄hān. Humāyūn's interest in Mahmūd dated from his meeting with him after the fall of Gaur into the hands of the Afghāns.
- (e) Humāyūn had failed to judge of Shēr K̄hān's abilities as leader. He was aware that he was an able administrator and skilful commander; but he could never realize that the very Afghāns, whose vast number had been defeated only a few years back by a handful of Turks,² would now dare face the very same Mughals with confidence, in spite of their having no king to lead them. In short, Humāyūn had not been able to observe the vast changes brought about by Shēr K̄hān in the Afghān character.
- (f) There may be some truth in the *Maḳhzan-i-Afāghinah's* statement³ that the suggestion made by

¹ See *C. H. I.*, Vol. III, p. 273.

² The battle of Pānipat was fought twelve years back and that of the Ghāgra only nine years back.

³ See Dorn: *History of the Afghāns*, p. 107.

the Afghāns for a rapid march to Gaur was prompted more by the greed for plunder than by any sound reason. If so, Humāyūn might have hoped to satisfy them after the fall of Chunār with its treasure and the subsequent conquest of Bengal.

- (g) Supposing Humāyūn had passed by Chunār, where would he have stopped? He would have to go across the whole of Bengal, before he could meet Mahmūd and render him aid. Would he have been justified in dragging on the war to the eastern extremity of northern India?¹

It will thus be seen that Humāyūn's misreading of the situation was mainly due to an under-estimate or misconception of Shēr Ḳhān's abilities. There having been no pressing appeal from the king of Bengal, he elected to proceed in a leisurely but thorough manner.

In the meantime, Shēr Ḳhān after conquering the rest of the territory between Mungīr and Gaur,² (July—October, 1537 A. D.), arrived at and besieged Gaur. It will thus be seen that from November, 1537 A. D. both Shēr Ḳhān and Humāyūn were engaged in sieges at Gaur and at Chunār respectively. Although Humāyūn had hoped that, manned as he was by superior gunners, he would easily capture the fortress, its siege actually lasted for six months, (October, 1537—March, 1538 A. D.), in which Jalāl Ḳhān showed the greatest heroism. It might have been indefinitely prolonged but for the ruse of Rūmī Ḳhān, who severely flogged a slave, and sent him to the

¹ Md. Ghūrī's rapid extension of Muslim territory does not afford an exact parallel. His task was easy as the opposers were divided into small principalities. In the present case the Afghāns formed a united body, whom it was difficult to ignore and through whose territory it was difficult to pass.

² According to *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdi*, his march lay north of the Ganges through Tirhoot. In one of the survey maps entitled *Gorakhpur and N. Bihār frontier* issued by the Survey of India Department, Muzaffarpur is put as an alternative name for Tirhoot.

fortress, where he caused the garrison to believe by the bleeding scars caused by the cuts, that he was a deserter. As he was also a gunner, he noticed the weak points of the defence, and on his return reported to Rūmī Ḳhān. Thus informed, Rūmī Ḳhān changed his tactics, attacked from the river side, mounted guns on a raised platform formed by tying several boats together, and by a heavy bombardment forced the besieged to surrender. It was the gunner's last notable achievement; for immediately after this he disappears from the scene. Partly because of the jealousy of the other commanders at his being given the supreme conduct of the siege,¹ and partly because of the excessive cruelty which he had perpetrated on the three hundred of the captured Afghān gunners, he was poisoned in June, 1538 A. D.² Humāyūn, essentially kind by nature, must have been horrified to see the wanton amputation of the right arms of the captured prisoners, and must have ordered the gunner's death. According to the *Tazkirat-ul-Umarā*, the death of Rūmī Ḳhān took place in the year 945 A. H. which commenced on the 30th May, 1538 A. D. so that Rūmī Ḳhān lived for two or three months, (March—June, 1538 A. D.), after his last success.

The capture of Chunār was only a prelude to what might prove an arduous campaign. What was coming next? Shēr Ḳhān found that his guidance was necessary in so many directions, that after making every arrangement for the conduct of the siege, he placed Ḳhawās Ḳhān in charge of the operations, and himself went westward. So that he was not very far from the Mughal camp when the news of the fall of Chunār reached him. Humāyūn next captured Benāres. From there he sent back Hīndū

¹ *T. A.*, page 200 says 'حضررت اورا مطلق العنان ساخته' the king had made him the sole commander or organizer of (the siege).'

² *Jauhar*, p. 14 gives both the reasons. I reject *A. N.*'s statement when it blames Muwaiid Bēg Dūldāi for the amputation. Similarly I reject *T. A.* and *Tārikh-i-Alfi* when they make Humāyūn responsible for the amputation. The former says that

قرهچیان که دران قلعه بودند بعمک اشرف مقطوع الید گشتند

Bēg, the governor of Jaunpūr, since Junaid Barlās's death in 943 A. H., (June 20, 1536—June 10, 1537 A. D.). The governor was honoured with the title of *Amīr-ul-umarā* and the grant of a golden chair.¹

Humāyūn stayed for sometime at Benāres and Shēr K̄hān at the town of Bihār.² Both were agreeable to come to some amicable settlement; Humāyūn, because he found that his plan of subjugating the Afghāns would not fructify immediately; for it had already taken six months to capture one fort; Shēr K̄hān, because, as an ever-cautious general, he was always willing to adopt peaceful methods even if they brought forth less striking results. In order to press his terms to a better advantage, Humāyūn went nearer the Afghān territory and stopped at Maner on the river Sōn. The terms³ Humāyūn offered to Shēr K̄hān were that the latter should surrender all the Afghān territories in Bihār or in Bengal and accept a small *jāgīr* in Rohtāgarh, in Chunār or in Jaunpūr. Shēr K̄hān, the victor of so many battles, the organizer of all that was good and noble in the Afghān government, the idol of the Afghān people and of his Hindu subjects, rightly considered the terms to be inadequate. Humāyūn probably realized it and later on made a more reasonable suggestion, viz., the surrender by Shēr K̄hān of the Afghān territories in Bihār and the retention by him of his conquests in Bengal on payment of an annual tribute of ten lakhs of rupees. Shēr K̄hān not being prepared to risk his all, was willing to accept them for the present. He knew that Bihār as an Afghān province was too close to the Mughals to be allowed peace and security

¹ *Baddūni*, R. A. S. B. text, 348 ll. 20-21.

² There is much confusion about the name of the place where Shēr K̄hān stayed about this time. It has been called Bihār-kunda, Jhār-kand (Jauhar) or Chār-kand (G. H. N.). Possibly Bihār-kunda is only another form of Bihār-khand and means the land of Bihār. The writer of the article: *Routes—Old and New—Bengal: Past and Present*, July-September number, 1924, draws attention to the fact that the word Bihār-kunda is used in Todar Mall's rent-roll. The old city of Bihār is nowadays named Bihār Sharif.

³ See *Dorn*, p. III.

and too small to satisfy the aspirations of the teeming Afghāns. So, if he had to surrender any portion, he desired it to be the western portion of his territory. Bengal, large and fertile, though as yet not wholly conquered, would be sufficient for the Afghān requirements, and lay further away from the Mughal dominion. So both appeared satisfied; Humāyūn by an accession of territory and Shēr Ḳhān's agreement to pay tribute, and Shēr Ḳhān by a prudent exchange of the large for the small. The negotiations had been so amicable that Humāyūn sent a *ḳhilat* and a horse for the Afghān leader.

But with all the good-will on both the sides the negotiations did not mature. The ratification of a treaty in mediæval India involved much delay. Before this particular treaty could be ratified, there came the news of the fall of Gaur¹ to Ḳhawās Ḳhān. It changed the entire political situation. Shēr Ḳhān was elated, while Humāyūn was approached for help by the vanquished Mahmūd, first through a messenger and then by himself shortly after in the Mughal camp at Maner. We are not given the details of the meeting between Humāyūn and Mahmūd. We only know that the ex-king, wounded as he was, appealed to Humāyūn's generous instincts, and besought him to conduct a campaign for his benefit. He gave him assurance of its success, since the districts as opposed to the capital, Gaur, were yet loyal to him. The statement might have some truth in it; for, with a long administrative experience as prince and as king, he might have had some hold on the country.

Humāyūn gave the ex-king an honourable reception in his camp, listened patiently to his appeal, and gave up the settlement awaiting a ratification. All this he did, not for any earthly gain—Mahmūd did not promise him anything, either in land or in money—, but simply because he

¹ Gaur fell on Monday, the 6th *Zulqada*, 944 A. H. = 6th April, 1538 A. D.

felt it to be a moral obligation to succour his fellow-king,¹ even though it might mean the loss of Bihār and ten lakhs of rupees a year.

There was also a second reason for this change in Humāyūn's attitude towards the Afghāns. So far Shēr K̄hān had surrendered no territory. When Humāyūn's men went to obtain possession of Rohtāsgarh where lay the recently-transferred treasure of Bengal, it was refused, and they returned without securing the surrender of the fort.

Shēr K̄hān, too, seemed indifferent to the breaking off of the negotiations. Even before the settlement of the terms, he had secured Rohtāsgarh from a local Rājā, and after the fall of Gaur, had transferred all its wealth to it. He prized its possession and was unwilling to relinquish it to the Mughals, and when they went there, they had to return disappointed.

After the failure of negotiations, he made much of his surrenders and supplications to Humāyūn. He made a lengthy speech to his Afghān followers, pointing out how he had presented to the Mughals the very home of the Afghāns in India, surrendered the insignia of sovereignty, and agreed to pay tribute for his possessions in Bengal. His sole object in making such sacrifices was to appease them and thereby obtain a haven of safety for the Afghāns. He further stated that Humāyūn had considered it to be a fair settlement and agreed to the terms, but that then, all of a sudden and for no cause whatever he had changed his mind. The only conclusion that he could draw was that Humāyūn was bent on the total destruction of the Afghāns. If such were his intentions, he had no other

¹ In the 15th and 16th centuries, we get several examples of such a succour, e.g.:

- (a) Mahmūd Begarha rendered aid to Nizām Shāh Bahmanī.
- (b) Muzaḥfar Shāh of Gujrāt rendered aid to Mahmūd II of Mālwa.
- (c) Shāh Tahmāsp of Persia rendered aid to Humāyūn to recover Qandahār. Is the last a recognition of Humāyūn's gesture towards Mahmūd of Bengal?

choice than to fight to a finish for the very existence of the Afghāns.

We need not discuss at length whether Humāyūn wanted to destroy the Afghāns or conquer Bengal for the Mughals. We know that even if the first object had initially moved him, he abandoned it later on and was prepared to make terms with the Afghāns. Next, when a still weaker person, *viz.* Mahmūd, had appealed to him, he had thrown away all the advantages obtained from the Afghāns, and gallantly gone to help one who had offered him nothing so far. If the wounded and heirless Mahmūd's death¹ rendered Humāyūn's generous gesture ineffectual and compelled him to include Bengal in his kingdom, Humāyūn surely could not be blamed for it.

Humāyūn proceeded eastward. He himself possessed a large army, and the fugitive Sultān Mahmūd had also some followers. As it was impossible to make commissariat arrangement for the whole army if it remained together, the king made two divisions of it. One group, formed of some thirty thousand troops, was placed under Muwaiid Bēg, Sultān Muhammad Dūldāi, Jahāngīr Qulī Bēg, Mir Buzka, Tardī Bēg, Biri Barlās, Mubarak Qarmalī, etc.; the other under his direct command was to remain about seven *cōs* in the rear. The Mughals suffered from one serious blemish, namely, they had no efficient Intelligence department. Actually while Humāyūn was staying at Patna during his march and the other division under Muwaiid Bēg was camping seven *cōs* eastward, the latter came across Shēr Ḳhān's men. Muwaiid Bēg was an incompetent commander, possessing no initiative. Instead of attacking the enemy immediately, he hesitated. Cowed probably by Shēr Ḳhān's reputation, he consulted Humāyūn, who was staying behind, and thus let slip his opportunity.

So far, *i.e.*, up to Patna, Humāyūn followed the route his father had taken, though it was not the old Grand Trunk

¹ Mahmūd's children had been murdered by the Afghāns.

Road which proceeded from Benāres to Sahasrām (Sasarām), and then struck north-east through Ghatauli and Dāūdagar to Patna. It had the advantage of being the shortest route to Bengal. It also enabled the Mughals to keep close to the Ganges. The river communication facilitated heavy transport, including the carriage of the large number of the non-combatants, and women and children.

From Patna eastward, the road followed the course of the Ganges by Bārḥ, Nawāb-ganj, Surajgarh, Mungīr, Bhāgalpūr, and Kahalgaon (Colgaon). At the place mentioned last, Sultān Mahmūd died, it is said, of a broken-heart but more probably of the wound received during the flight from Gaur. His corpse was taken to Gaur and buried in Sadullāhpur, one of its suburbs.¹

Shēr Khān in the meantime was busy transferring the Bengal wealth from Gaur to Rohtāgarh, and in order to accomplish this work, he had ordered his son, Jalāl Khān, to make a stand at Teliagarhi and defend the place as long as it was possible without any risk to his army. At Mungīr, Humāyūn knew of Jalāl's resolve to resist him.

Teliagarhi is a fort and a pass combined, and the river Ganges skirts it on the north. At present it lies close to the East India Railway line about seven miles east of Sāhibganj. In the sixteenth century it was a place of strategic importance and was known as 'the key of Bengal.' From Tieffenthaler's sketch of the place, it is clear that the narrow space between the Ganges and lower slopes of the Rājmahal hills, was occupied by the fort and battlemented walls on the two flanks, leading to the hills on one side, and to the river on the other. On the hill side the walls ended on a rapid rivulet.²

¹ See *Malda Gazetteer*, p. 20.

² Raymond, the translator of *Siyar-ul-mutaḥḥhirin* has a poor opinion of its strength. See *Bengal District Gazetteer: Santal Parganas*, p. 284.

The name comes from the Hindi word *telia* which means black, as the place is full of black stones.

Here it was that Jalāl Ḳhān made a stand against the whole Mughal army. He had been forbidden to take the offensive or make any attack on the Mughals; for a defeat might frustrate Shēr Ḳhān's plans. But Jalāl, who was an impetuous youth, lost all patience, and disdainful of the cautious advice of his *amīrs* who had reminded him of his father's instructions, came into the open, fought with a section of the Mughals, and killed Mubārak Qarmālī and Abul Fath Lanka and a considerable number of soldiers. He was satisfied with this achievement, and then confined himself to the defence. The enemy's heroism, the strength of the pass, and the occasional setting in of the rains, delayed Humāyūn for a month (June, 1538 A. D.). Shēr Ḳhān utilized the period in transferring his wealth. When it was accomplished, he recalled Jalāl Ḳhān. The Afghāns retired so quietly that the Mughals were unaware of their movements—another proof of the inefficiency of their scouting system—and when next they moved forward, they found no trace of their enemy and occupied the empty fort.

Henceforward, to Humāyūn's good fortune, he had an easier journey and met with no opposition. Along the whole distance from Teliagarhi to Udhanāla, about thirty-five miles, the hills are so close to the river Ganges, that it was always possible for a determined enemy to obstruct the Mughal invaders at every step. But Shēr Ḳhān was just then occupied in crossing or skirting the Jhārkhand¹—a term used for the unexplored wooded territory stretching for about eighty miles south of the Ganges—and was in no mood to fight with Humāyūn. This explains why the Mughals were able to pass easily from Teliagarhi to Sikrigalli. Sikrigalli, like the other place, consists of a narrow, winding road of nine to twelve feet in width, cut through a rock and hemmed in on both sides by impenetrable jungle. There were fortifications also so that

¹ Jhārkhand is a general term for a large wooded territory. Shēr Ḳhān, according to Qanungo, went to Shērpūr and thence struck westward. His object was to reach Sarath, follow the Grand Trunk Road, and reach Sahasrām and Rohtāgarh.

Sikrigalli formed another formidable barrier to the passage into Bengal. As against the *garhi* or the fortifications of the former place, the long lane of Sikri suggests the gullet, hence it has been called *galli*.

Humāyūn reached Gaur, probably without crossing the river which then flowed east of Gaur,¹ in about a month and a half, (middle of August, 1538 A. D. = 945 A. H.).

A list of the important dates of this chapter is given here:—

- (1) Humāyūn started from Āgrā 18th *Safar* 944 A. H. =
27th July, 1537 A. D.
- (2) Humāyūn reached Chunār, *Jumādāl-awwal* 944 A. H. =
October, 1537 A. D.
- (3) The siege of Chunār by Humāyūn, *Jumādāl-awwal-
Shawwāl* 944 A. H. = October, 1537 A. D.
—March, 1538 A. D.
- (4) Humāyūn at Patna *Zulhijj* 944 A. H. = May, 1538 A. D.
- (5) The death of Rūmī Ḳhān, *Muharram* 945 A. H. =
June, 1538 A. D.
- (6) Shēr Ḳhān's conquest from Mungīr to Gaur
Safar to Jumādāl-awwal = July-October, 1537 A. D.
- (7) Shēr Ḳhān besieged Gaur, *Jumādāl-ukhhrā-Zulqada*
944 A. H. = November, 1537 A. D.
- (8) The fall of Gaur 6th *Zulqada* 944 A. H. = 6th April, 1538 A. D.
- (9) Shēr reached Gaur *Zulqada* 944 A. H. = April, 1538 A. D.
- (10) Shēr removed treasures from Gaur to Rohtāsgarh
Muharram-Safar 945 A. H. = June-July, 1538 A. D.
- (11) Humāyūn reached Teliagarhi
1st *Muharram* 945 A. H. = end of May, 1538 A. D.
- (12) Humāyūn stayed at Teliagarhi
Muharram 945 A. H. = June, 1538 A. D.
- (13) Humāyūn reached Gaur
20th *Rabiul-awwal* 945 A. H. = 15th August, 1538 A. D.

¹ See *Mālda Gazetteer*, p. 85.

CHAPTER XVIII

HUMĀYŪN AT GAUR AND HIS RETREAT TO CHAUSA (AUGUST, 1538 TO APRIL, 1539 A. D.)

Humāyūn reached Gaur in the middle of August, 1538 A. D. Since Sultān Mahmūd was dead and his children had been murdered by Jalāl Ḳhān, he himself had to take over the charge of the government. In order to show respect to the late ruler, he had his corpse brought from Kahalgaon (Colgaon) to Sadullāhpur, and buried it there.¹

Gaur to-day is marked by a number of mounds and though at one time it stretched over an area of fifteen to twenty square miles, no single village in the locality bears the name to-day. Both the names, Pāndua and Gaur, seem to have been completely forgotten.

But in the mediæval days Gaur² or as it was called alternately, Lakhnauti or Lakshmanāvati, played an important part in the history of Bengal. Founded by one of the Pāl kings, it stood at the confluence of the Mahānanda and the Ganges, so that the latter flowed to the east of the town, instead of west, as it does to-day. After the Pāls came the Sēna kings, of whom the last, Lakshman Sēna, is said to have given the name Lakhnauti to the place.

After Iḳhtiyāruddīn Muhammad bin Baḳhtiyār's occupation of Bengal,³ he retired to Gaur and made it his capital. It remained so till Shamsuddīn Iliyās Shāh's reign, 1343-57 A. D. When Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq of Delhi invaded Bengal in 1353-54 A. D., Iliyās prudently retired to

² Situated 20°52' N. and 80°10' E., some ten miles S. W. of English Bāzār town.

³ In 1197-9 A. D. *C. H. I.* Vol. III, p. 46 puts it in 1202 A. D.

Pāndua on the other side of the river and later on to Ikdāla, on the Brahmaputra, and allowed Fīrūz Shāh to bestow in his vanity the name of Fīrūzābād on the unconquered Pāndua. After Fīrūz Shāh's retreat, Iliyās settled down at Pāndua which continued to be the capital of Bengal till Jalāluddīn Muhammad Shāh's (Jadu's) reign, 1414-31 A.D. He returned to Gaur which remained the capital till Humāyūn's time.

To-day, Gaur lies in ruins as a site of antiquarian interest. The *Ādīna Masjid*, the two *Sōna Masjids*, the *Fīrūz Minār*, the *Dākhil Darwāza*, the *Qadam Rasūl*, tombs of Akhi Sirājuddīn and Shāh Nimatullāh *Walī*, and the three tanks of *Sāgardīhi*, *Piyāsbāri*,¹ and *Kumhirpīr*,² are of considerable interest to the archæologist. Several of these monuments, e.g., the *Minar*, the *Darwāza*, the sacred foot-print, and the Akhi's tomb, are ascribed to Sultān Alāuddīn Husain Shāh (1493-1518 A.D.) and to his son, Nāsiruddīn Nasrat Shāh, (1518-1533 A.D.). In Sadullāhpur, the suburb to the north-west, lies the tomb, as already stated, of Sultān Mahmūd, whom Humāyūn went to succour.

Humāyūn changed the name of Gaur. The word Gaur sounded like the Persian word *گور* which signifies a grave,³ and so he changed the name to *Jannatābād*, the abode of heaven. Shēr Khān's long siege of it accompanied by a thorough plunder⁴ and now its occupation by the Mughals, had drained it of its wealth. The inhabitants had been reduced to such an abject state of poverty that they had not money enough to clear the city of the debris or of the putrid corpses that befouled the atmosphere. So Humāyūn, on its occupation, gave directions for cleaning the city and repairing the public buildings.

¹ Its water was reputed to be so poisonous that criminals condemned to death were made to drink it. See *A. A.* Vol., II, p. 123.

² So named because its crocodiles were believed to represent a saint and disciples. See *Mālda Gazetteer*.

³ For the pun on the word see T. A. (N. K. Text), p. 331, l. 2.

⁴ See *Dorn*, p. 106 where the author says, 'All Bengal fell a prey to the Afghāns, who unrestrained, were occupied in seizing the wearied and unarmed.'

He then wanted to make a settlement of the conquered provinces. But Shēr Ḳhān, with whom it was to be made, had gone far to the west; and so in his absence, he made a makeshift arrangement by distributing the districts of the province among his nobles, hoping that the assurances of Sultān Mahmūd, that the country was loyal to him and not to Shēr Ḳhān, would prove true. All this took one month from his arrival in the middle of August, 1538 A. D.¹

This is all that can be mentioned about Humāyūn's Bengal administration, omitting, of course, his determination of the order of precedence of the different Muslim monarchs by assigning them places in his court in relative proximity to his throne.² In fact, almost all the Muslim historians are out to accuse him of gross negligence in administration. In their own characteristic fashion, they tell us that after a month, Humāyūn gave up stirring out of his palace, and all except those who could meet him in the palace, 'waited to get a glimpse of him as of a new moon and even then their desire was not fulfilled.'³ The *Ḳhulāsat-ut-Tawāriḳh*⁴ tells us that in the palace he held many festive assemblies (جشن) but was careless of State matters. The *Tārīḳh-i-Dāūdī* wishes us to believe that a woman was the cause of all this, one said to be the most beautiful lady of her day, who was presented to Humāyūn by Shēr Ḳhān with the object of keeping the Mughal king's attention away from the concerns of the State. Nimatullah, the author of the *Maḳhzan-i-Afāghina*, says that Shēr Ḳhān decorated the palace in Gaur in diverse ways to engage the king's interests. Again, some writers make two almost contradictory statements in the same breath, namely (1) Humāyūn stayed in Bengal because he liked the

¹ = 20th *Rabiul-awwal* 945 A. H.

² R. T. says that he had assigned to the Sultān of Turkey the seat next to him on the right and to the Shāh of Persia on the left and to the king of *Tūrān* a seat near the throne. The reforms mentioned by Ḳhwāndamīr are of an earlier date. See *Elliot and Dowson*, Vol. V, pp. 119-24.

³ See *Jauhar*.

*

⁴ *Jauhar* agrees with him. See *Stewart's* translation, p. 18.

country, and (2) diseases took heavy toll of his men; the country was thus unsuitable. They deepen the picture by saying that the king was unaware of all this, and in blissful ignorance continued to enjoy his time in *Jannatābād*.

It is difficult to believe the picture these writers have painted with relish of Humāyūn's doings during his eight-month sojourn in Bengal. Humāyūn's moral character had always been above reproach, and the decorations Nimatullah speaks of could not have kept him engaged all day and night for full eight months. Nor does it stand to reason that Humāyūn was so much engrossed in frivolities that he would betray stoical indifference to the sufferings said to have been caused by diseases to his camp and soldiery. In fact, the entire picture of Humāyūn's moral turpitude, as it were, drawn by these writers is so incongruous with his general character that we feel disposed to reject it *prima facie*. And we are further strengthened in our opinion by the fact that the account of his Bengal campaign, coming as it does, in the main, from the Afghān sources, must necessarily have been vitiated by personal prejudices and political passions. A devil's advocate always deepens a crime: he cannot but damn.

No doubt, Humāyūn had no constructive scheme up his sleeve: nor did he attempt to evolve any. Yet, it is hard to imagine, that he possessed no political acumen or administrative sense. At any rate, we should be prepared to credit him with the foresight an average Mughal trooper showed, namely, the foresight of realizing that Bengal was absolutely unsuitable for the Mughals on account of its bad climate. We may be permitted to put forward some suggestions and surmises on the point in the absence of very specific and strong arguments. In the first place, Humāyūn was a man of generous instinct. He cared for his brothers, one of whom—Askari—was with him. With Babūr's words constantly ringing in his ears¹ it is difficult

¹ See *G. H. N.*, fol. 19b, *A. N.*, p. 119.

to believe that he would willingly endanger the health or life of Askari. Nor would he be a callous witness to the death of so many followers. In the second place, as we have seen, he had hoped that the links in the chain of communication between Delhi and Gaur would stand. This might to-day be regarded as an abortive hope but as long as he was not informed of the desertion of his two governors, Hindāl and Nūruddīn at Tirhoot and Qanauj respectively, he was justified in relying on the arrangements he had made. Their departure was not immediately communicated to him and for this, the defective information bureau of the Mughals was responsible.

In the third place, even now he could not realize how formidable or how determined his enemy was. He regarded Shēr K̄hān as a great civil administrator and benefactor of the Afghāns. But he was not aware that he was also invincible in war; and he probably argued that the successes, achieved by Shēr K̄hān so far, were after all against the weaker ruler of Bengal and not against the Mughals.

In the fourth place, we may fancy that the earlier part of his stay at Gaur was a period of ill health. It would furnish an explanation for the limitations and shortcomings of his work in Bengal, namely, the neglect of the administration, the lack of touch with his soldiery, and his continued stay in Gaur even when his men and animals were dying in large numbers. Thus he would find on his recovery, say after four or five months, that the military situation had changed for the worse. By evacuating Tirhoot, Hindāl had allowed Shēr K̄hān an opportunity of extending and consolidating his territories, in the regions to the west of Bengal.

Humāyūn must have shuddered to think of the disaster Hindāl's indiscretion foreboded for the kingdom. He therefore sent *Shaiḫ* Buhlūl to dissuade the prince from his seditious intentions and persuade him to come to the king's aid. The negotiation was absolutely necessary; for, supposing Shēr K̄hān had been defeated or had

allowed the Mughals to pass through unimpeded to Delhi, would it have been possible for Humāyūn to resume the reins of government at Delhi without opposition from the many miscreants, Zāhid Bēg, Khusru Bēg *Kōkultāsh*, *Hāñ* Muhammad, son of Bābā Qushqa, Nūruddīn Muhammad, with Hindāl at their head?

Humāyūn's conquest of Bengal, judged from the results it led up to, was a failure. He failed to realize the two objects that had initially moved him—the restoration of Bengal to its rightful ruler, Sultān Mahmūd, and the annihilation of the Afghāns. Now he appeared selfish in annexing Bengal and possibly North Bihār. By his continued inactivity he allowed his foe to come in between himself and Delhi. Lastly he stultified his attitude towards the Afghāns by his cancellation of the late negotiations with Shēr Kḥān, to whom he thus allowed an opportunity of working up the Afghān sentiment to a desperate degree against himself. Above all, his long absence from the capital had encouraged many an ambitious spirit under the vain Hindāl to rise up in arms against him. In short, his Bengal campaign was one of the presages of the doom which was soon to overtake the Delhi kingdom.

Shaiḵh Buhlūl's embassy to Hindāl failed to produce any satisfactory result. Instead of going to the aid of his eldest brother, the king, Hindāl at Zāhid Bēg's suggestion,¹ chose to place himself on the throne and when the *Shaiḵh* protested, he killed him.² Shēr Kḥān too, noticing how matters were taking a turn in his favour, went forward, captured Benāres, killed *Mir Fazli*, the governor, and thus broke the third link in the chain of the Mughal

¹ Zāhid Bēg was Humāyūn's brother-in-law, and had been offered the governorship of Bengal. He insolently refused and Humāyūn threatened to kill him. So Zāhid fled and set Hindāl against the king.

² The year of the *Shaiḵh's* death is given by the chronogram

قدماس شهيدا

'verily the martyr died' = 945 A. H. Probably the death occurred in the beginning of January, 1539 A. D. How partial Gulbadan Bēgam is to her full brother, Hindāl, may be seen from her assertion that the *Shaiḵh* was killed for his treachery to the Mughals. It is not likely that the *Shaiḵh* who was the spiritual guide to Humāyūn would turn against his royal disciple.

communications, the first two having already been broken in the loss of Tirhoot and in the desertion of his post by the governor of Qanauj. Besides, about this time Hindū Bēg, the governor of Jaunpūr, died, and further dislocation took place in the work of administering the eastern provinces. The acting governor, Bābā Ḳhān Jalair, either did not possess the requisite authority of a permanent incumbent or was too weak to exercise his power. But this defect disappeared after the accidental arrival of a brave nobleman in Yūsuf Bēg, son of Ibrāhīm Bēg Chabuq. Shēr Ḳhān had ordered Jalāl Ḳhān to move forward and capture the place. The two Mughāl chiefs together now put up a brave fight in which Yūsuf was killed, but before his death he had done the good service of putting heart into Bābā Ḳhān, so that even after Yūsuf's death, the other continued to defend himself, and sent an appeal for aid both to Humāyūn and to his governors, at Delhi and at Āgrā. The king's situation did not allow him to move out of Gaur. *Mīr Faḡhr Ali*¹ and *Mīr Muhammad Munshi*, the governors of Delhi and Āgrā respectively, stepped in to render aid. *Mīr Muhammad Munshi* requested Hindāl to go forward, and he himself proceeded to Kālpī to stir up Yādgar Nāsir M.. Yādgar Nāsir M. willingly promised to supply money and food for the relieving force, and also proceeded to meet Hindāl M. on the border of the Āgrā district to discuss plans to be adopted to relieve Bābā Bēg and fight the Afghāns.

In the meantime Zāhid Bēg who had met Nūruddīn at Qanauj, persuaded him to go along with him, and the two together reached Hindāl M.. Hindāl had been cogitating in his mind whether he should yield to *Mīr Faḡhr Ali*'s and Yādgar Nāsir Mirza's persuasions, when the two rebels (Zāhid Bēg and Nūruddīn) reached him.² He acted up to their evil counsel and slackened his

¹ According to Erskine, *The History of India*, Vol. II, p. 160, *Mīr Ali* was acting under the guidance of Yādgar Nāsir M., the governor of Kālpī.

² For some interesting details, see C. H. I., Vol. IV, pp. 31-32.

preparations for a campaign. It was now that *Shaiḥh Buhlūl*¹ arrived only to suffer death for attempting to stop Hindāl from rebellion.

Even now, Humāyūn's cause was not lost; for though Hindāl M. assumed the title of a king,² the ladies of the palace as well as the two deputies continued to exercise their influence. Amongst the ladies, Hindāl's mother, Dildār Bēgam's efforts have been specially mentioned. On the day of Hindāl's accession, she put on a blue robe as a sign of mourning and when the *Mirzā* asked her the reason, she answered, 'Why do you care for me? I am wearing mourning for you; you are young and on account of the instigation of unreflecting sedition-mongers, you have lost the true way; you have girded your loins for your own destruction.'³ Hindāl, who had been primarily responsible for Buhlūl's destruction and gone very far towards rebellion, paid no heed to his mother's protests.

Mir Muhammad *Munshi*⁴ also protested, but he could not be expected to succeed where Hindāl's mother had failed. Still, it is said, becoming desperate, he addressed Hindāl thus, 'You have killed Buhlūl, why do you delay about me?'⁵ *Mir* Faḥr Ali had gone to Yādgar Nāsir M. at Kālpī after Hindāl's rebellion and finding him in a more reasonable mood the two together decided not to let Delhi, at least, pass into the hands of Hindāl. So avoiding Āgrā where Hindāl had proclaimed himself king, they reached Delhi. Now realizing that he had missed the

¹ *Shaiḥh* Buhlūl was the elder brother of *Shaiḥh* Muhammad Ghaus of Gwālior. He has been extolled by all the contemporary writers, e.g., Abul Fazl and Badāūnī. Only the author of the *Tāriḥh-i-Rashidi* speaks of him as a sorcerer.

² There are no coins extant in his name. This was probably due to the state of confusion in the kingdom; also to the fact that he had reigned for a very brief period.

³ See *A. N.*, p. 339.

⁴ Called also Badakhshi and Bakhshi. Probably he came from Badakhshan and as the king's deputy was specially interested in the office of the *Bakhshi*.

⁵ Both the *Shaiḥh* and the *Mir* were acting together in collecting supplies and money for the campaign.

opportunity of securing Delhi, Hindāl moved towards it, but anticipated as he was, failed in his object. Hindāl now determined on a siege and the defenders on a stubborn resistance. They were fully aware that, left to themselves, they would be no match for the more numerous besiegers, and so they wrote to Kāmṛān informing him of Hindāl's doings and their present condition, and implored him to come to their aid. Kāmṛān was in two minds: he had not been able to decide whether he should act on behalf of Humāyūn or himself. He at last decided that he should punish Hindāl for his pretensions, and forthwith proceeded towards Delhi with a large and well-trained army. When he reached Sonpat, about twenty-seven miles to the north-west of Delhi, Hindāl lost heart, abandoned the siege, and took shelter in Alwar. Kāmṛān pushed on and reached Delhi. But the cautious Faḫr Ali, little realizing the object Kāmṛān had in view, refused him entrance into the fort and tactfully persuaded him to deal with Hindāl first. Hence Kāmṛān marched towards Āgrā and reached there in a few days. Hindāl now saw the frustration of all his plans and, in a mood of contrition, let his mother, Dildār Bēgam, bring him into Kāmṛān's presence with the hangman's rope round his neck. The submission secured for him and his followers a pardon.

After the suppression of Hindāl's sedition, it seemed very likely that Humāyūn would now be getting some reinforcement. At Āgrā more than one prince had been present—Kāmṛān, Hindāl, and Yādgar Nāsir, the last-named having arrived from Delhi. Of these, Kāmṛān was ruling over a hardy race, and possessed a fairly extensive territory, stretching from the Hindūkush to the Punjāb. If he alone had made up his mind to go to Humāyūn's aid, he would have been able to rescue him from his miserable plight.

The princes met and deliberated, made some slight demonstration by moving their camp to the eastern bank of the Jamna, as if a campaign were about to start in right earnest. But it all ended in smoke. Possibly they

abandoned the campaign because they could not decide on the prince who would conduct it, none being willing to obey another. Thus, Humāyūn, left in the cold, had to shift as best he could for himself.

Let us for a moment take stock of Shēr Ḳhān's activities. He had already taken possession of Benāres, later planned an extensive campaign and captured Kara,¹ Bahraich, Qanauj, and Sambhal, one after another. Even Jaunpūr, so stoutly defended by Bābā Bēg Jalair, now fell. So that by the middle of January, 1539 A. D. (*Shabān*, 945 A. H.), the whole of North India between the Kōsi and the Ganges, a stretch of territory more than five hundred miles in length came into his possession. Three facts may be noticed in this connexion, (1) the territories south of the Jamna and immediately north of it remained in the possession of the Mughals, (2) in Bihār, all territory from the Himālayas to the wild Gondwāna was occupied by the Afghāns, and hence if Humāyūn wished to retrace his steps to Delhi, he must pass through the enemy's territories; (3) wherever possible Shēr Ḳhān introduced civil administration and fiscal regulations immediately after the conquest of a district, and thus secured the good will of the population, which stood him in good stead in his future campaigns.

Realizing that he was left alone with his hopes shattered, and a reduced and suffering army, Humāyūn made just one feeble effort to get out of his predicament. He divided his army into three divisions, sent one with Dilāwar Ḳhān Lōdī, the Ḳhān-Ḳhānān, in advance, to Mungīr; retained the second with himself to follow the Ḳhān-Ḳhānān at greater leisure; and the third, about five thousand in number and consisting of picked soldiers² was to be left behind at Gaur under Jahāngīr Qulī Bēg. We cannot approve the measures as sound. His army of

¹ Variouslly spelt as Kurrah, Karra, etc. It is situated on the Ganges, 40 miles N. W. of Allāhabād.

² *T. A.* (N. K. Text), p. 204, l. 3 and *Badāūnī* (N. K. Text), p. 93, l. 29, have پنج هزار کس انتخابی

emaciated and fever-stricken soldiers could have had some chance of winning a victory against the Afghāns, if only it had been kept together. By dividing it into three groups, he weakened it still further. The result of these ill-conceived measures may easily be imagined. The Ḳhān-Ḳhānān, when he arrived at Mungīr, had to fight against Ḳhawās Ḳhān; he (Ḳhān-Ḳhānān) was defeated and captured practically with his whole army. Similarly, Jahāngīr Qulī Bēg stayed in peace at Gaur till Shēr Ḳhān's arrival. The Afghāns then captured the place, and the whole garrison surrendered to the enemy. The Mughal contingent was at Shēr Ḳhān's orders exterminated.

When Humāyūn realized the failure of his first measure, he appealed to Askari, who had accompanied him, to save him from the perilous situation, and agreed to grant him any four requests that he would make. Askari's first instincts were to ask for a plenty of dancing girls, eunuchs, and articles of pomp and sensual indulgence, but later he changed his mind and asked for soldiers, noted noblemen, and monetary resources to maintain the army during the march. All this Humāyūn gladly—and let us fancy with a feeling of gratitude—granted, and added to Askari's list of officers, the names of Qāsim Qarācha Ḳhān, Toglān Bēg *Kōka*, and Bābā Bēg *Kūrbēg*. Thus equipped, Askari marched as an advance-guard, a few miles ahead of the main army, along the northern bank of the Ganges, reached opposite Kahalgaon (Colgaon), and a few days later opposite Mungīr,¹ where the king joined him soon after.

Up to that point the Mughal army had been marching along the left bank of the river. As the Ganges in the sixteenth century flowed east of Gaur and the Bhāgirathī on the west, he must have crossed the former somewhere, possibly near the capital, and so far had met with no trouble.

¹ *G. H. N.* fol. 32b.

By this time (March, 1539 A. D.), further losses were reported to him, namely, of Ajudhya and Chunār, and the Mughal governor of Jaunpūr accompanied by Mīrak Bēg and Mughal Bēg fell back eastward to join the main Mughal army proceeding westward. The arrival of the large contingents of troops gave rise to the food problem. Although Humāyūn was well-supplied with money, the provision ran short, and price of grain rose several-fold.¹

At Mungīr, a new adviser appeared. Instead of relying on Askari, whom he had himself entrusted with the conduct of the army, Humāyūn now listened to Muwaiid Bēg. We do not know his qualifications in military matters. All the same, he came forward to make the astounding suggestion that the king should not change his route but adopt the one that he had followed on the onward journey. Although Humāyūn knew of the dangers of passing through a hostile territory, he did not very much care about the route, chose to please his favourite, and accepted his suggestion.² So the whole army crossed the Ganges and proceeded along the right or southern bank, by the main highway, *viz.*, the Grand Trunk Road of mediæval times.

Such imprudence on his part cost him much; for, though he got the benefit of a better road, and hence of a rapid retreat, it also gave his enemies an advantage. It was thoroughly under Shēr K̄hān's control, and henceforth all the movements of the Mughal army and of Humāyūn himself were communicated to Shēr K̄hān by his vigilant scouts. Also, in contrast with the more northern route which would have meant the crossing of narrower rivers and so far as the Ganges was concerned, no crossing until within a hundred miles of Āgrā or

¹ *Ibid.* T. A., p. 201. *Badāūnī*, p. 94. One principal reason for the shortage was that most of the Mughal *amīrs* had lost their *jāgīrs* in Bengal and Bihār.

² It was opposed by most of the other nobles. See *Erskine*, Vol. II, p. 156.

Delhi, Humāyūn chose the southern route. Should he have desired to recross the Ganges, it would have been difficult to do so; for the enemy controlled the locality and possibly the bridges on the river. A vigilant and active enemy would entirely cut off the Mughal army at such a juncture. It was in fact Humāyūn's choice of the southern route that made Shēr K̄hān decide to engage himself in a battle with the Mughals.

Thus aimlessly and in blissful ignorance, Humāyūn made his way to Bihiya,¹ a subdivision of Bhōjpur, and thence to Chausa, where he again crossed the river. We consider Humāyūn's performance fairly creditable in view of the fact that the Afghāns were in the neighbourhood, and confusion prevailed in the Mughal camp.²

Now, Shēr K̄hān realized that his opportunity had arrived. He gave up the Fabian policy of caution and boldly prepared for a series of contests with the Mughals. If we are to believe the Mughal writers, in most of the skirmishes Shēr K̄hān was worsted. But the Afghān reverses did not improve matters for Humāyūn. The enemy maintained the pursuit, hovered round the Mughals in camp or on the march, and kept them constantly engaged on land or water, carrying away, if possible, their guns or provisions.³ The skirmishes continued till Humāyūn reached Chausa and crossed over to the other side.

Shēr K̄hān, who had stayed behind for some unexplained reason, arrived before the whole Mughal army had crossed over. Humāyūn noticed his arrival, and as he was greatly disgusted with the persistent guerilla tactics of the enemy, he thought of putting an end to further annoyance, by meeting him in an immediate battle. So he recrossed the Ganges and came over to the eastern bank. Shēr K̄hān, whose heart must have rejoiced at

¹ Bihiya to-day is not situated on the Grand Trunk Road as it now follows a more southern course. It is situated 20 miles east of Bhōjpur.

² It was now the beginning of April, 1539 A. D. = *Zuqada*, 945 A. H.

³ The largest cannon of the Mughals named *Kōh-shikan* was thus taken away by the enemy.

this foolhardiness of the king, receded some distance in order to make the landing of the Mughals easy. It speaks of his chivalry that he did not try to attack Humāyūn while the latter was crossing the river. Probably, Shēr Khān hoped for a complete victory and hence he refrained for the present from inflicting any injury.

Humāyūn committed another blunder in putting off the battle. He could have hoped to succeed by making an immediate attack only. After the crossing was over, he realized the demoralized condition of his army, grew wiser, and delayed the battle. It is clear that in these circumstances he had better continued his march absolutely ignoring Shēr Khān's irregular warfare. Now, he played again into the hands of his enemy.

For the present, Shēr Khān also would not take the offensive, and so the two armies lay facing each other for three months, from April to 26th June, 1539 A. D. (*Zulqada* to 9th *Safar*, 946 A. H.).¹

Humāyūn made one more attempt to resettle his quarrel with Shēr Khān but it was too late. We have seen that when he was strong and Shēr Khān had accepted his terms, he himself broke them. Now when he was weak and his army in hopeless disorder, how could he hope for the same considerations from his enemy? Still, the cautious and shrewd Afghān leader did not reject the king's offer immediately, even when Humāyūn added that for the sake of his prestige, the Afghāns were to pretend to retreat with the Mughal troops in pursuit.² He let Humāyūn open the negotiations. The terms offered, if *Fariṣhtā* and *Nizāmuddīn* are to be believed, were somewhat better than on the previous occasion; for instead of Bengal alone, Shēr Khān was now to be allowed to retain both Bengal and *Bihār* and was

¹ *Fariṣhtā*, p. 217, l. 8. *T. A.*, p. 201, *Badāūnī*, p. 350, l. 17. *R. T.* fol. 616, l. 6, *Riyāz-us-Salātin* (R. S.), p. 145, l. 2, *Mirāt-ul-Ālam* (M. A.), all put the period as one of 3 months.

² See *Dorn*, p. 119.

not to pay any tribute,—an acknowledgment of the Mughal suzerainty by reading the *khutbah* and striking coin in the king's name being considered sufficient. All other territories were to be surrendered. Shēr K̄hān considered the king's proposal and suggested a minor modification only, namely, the addition of Chunār to his territory, as it already belonged to him. But the imprudent king, forgetting his miserable plight and throwing all foresight and prudence to the wind, refused the request on the sentimental ground that the capture of the fort represented the firstfruits of his Bengal campaign, and hence it could not be surrendered. The result was that the negotiations fell through.

Once again just before the actual battle, Humāyūn made the last attempt of concluding a treaty by sending *Mulla Mīr* Muhammad Parghari,¹ a follower of the murdered *Shaiḳh* Buhlūl and favourite of the king. Shēr K̄hān, too, sent *Shaiḳh* Khalīl, a descendant of Farīd *Shakarganj*.² The king was so struck by his piety that he too nominated him as his ambassador and charged him to negotiate on his behalf also. Thus entrusted with work by both the parties, he fell a prey to Shēr K̄hān's shrewdness; for in an interview he was put the straight question, whether the Afghāns should make peace with the Mughals or not, and he forgetting his charge on behalf of Humāyūn straightway gave his opinion that they should not. Naturally, Shēr K̄hān then closed the negotiations.

Humāyūn's wanton disregard of the events around him may be judged when it is remembered that Shēr K̄hān's men³ had been rapidly spreading over North India. Lucknow was now added to the Afghān kingdom, and arrangements were being completed to collect revenue in the territories east of Qanauj.

¹ *T. R.* speaks well of him. See pp. 398-469.

² One of the Chishti saints. He had preceded Nizāmuddīn *Aulia* as the spiritual guide of his followers.

³ *Dorn* mentions the nobles, Haibat K̄hān Niāzi and Jalāl K̄hān Jalū, to be in charge of the operations.

After the break-off of the negotiations, Shēr Ḳhān grew bold and pointed out to his nobles the state of confusion that prevailed in the king's army. But even now he did not propose to go beyond the bounds of prudence and caution. So far, he had been digging trenches round his camp, and now when he determined to attack the Mughals, he proposed to do so by stealth. The announcement of the attack was received with great acclamations, testifying to the popularity of the leader and to the very much changed character of the Afghāns.

Fortune also smiled on Shēr Ḳhān. After a stay of three months, the rains had set in, and the Mughals held up between the two rivers, the Ganges and the Karamnāsā, found themselves flooded in the low ground that they had chosen for their encampment. There seemed no help for it; for Shēr Ḳhān commanded the situation and was sure to take the fullest advantage of any attempt made by the Mughals to shift their camp.

Having secured this strategic superiority Shēr Ḳhān next tried to put the Mughals off their guard; for they were strongly protected by two rivers, and it needed great skill to cross over and attack them.

He thought out a novel plan, *viz.*, to attack Mahāratha Cherō. The Cherōs are an aboriginal people who, along *The Cherōs.* with the Bhars and Savars, had been a dominant race, before the advent of the Āryans, in the Shāhabād district of Bihār. Even when the Āryans conquered and ousted them from the fertile parts, they continued to occupy the hilly and jungly tracts.² Some of the Cherō chiefs existed even in Muslim times and one of them, probably the most powerful that lived about this time, *i.e.*, in 1539 A. D., has been called by the *Tārīkh-i-Shēr Shāhī*, Mahāratha. The *Shāhabad District Gazetteer* says of him, 'the power of this chief appears to have been considerable; it is said in the *Maḳhzan-i-Afāghina* that he

¹ *Abbās*, fol. 43, l. 9 has قلعه خام از گل راست میگرد

² See *Shāhabād District Gazetteer*, p. 19.

used to descend from his hills and jungles and harass the tenants round about and that he closed the door to Gaur and Bengal.' The depredations of the Cherō chief were intolerable to an administrator like Shēr K̄hān¹ and so while he lay idle opposite Humāyūn's camp, he planned out a campaign against Mahāratha. Of course, he could not carry it out so long as he had not dealt with the Mughals. But he tried to fulfil his desire by throwing the enemy off its guard.

On the 25th June, 1539 A. D. (8th *Safar*, 946 A. H.), he collected his men and gave out that he was proceeding to fight the Cherō chief.² This news spread in the Mughal camp and the king, as in his Gujrāt campaign, when Bahādūr was besieging Chitor, proposed to be neutral. After midnight, he came back with his army and surprised the Mughals in their sleep, and thus gave a rude shock to their sense of security.

The next chapter gives the description of the battle.

The chronology of the events described in this Chapter is:—

- (1) Humāyūn reaches Gaur
20th *Rabiul-awwal*, 945 A. H. = Middle of August, 1538 A. D.
- (2) Humāyūn's stay in Gaur, *Rabiul-awwal* to
Shawwāl 945 A. H. = August to end of March, 1539 A. D.
- (3) The death of *Shaiḳh* Buhlūl
Rajab, 945 A. H. = Beginning of January, 1539 A. D.
- (4) Jaunpūr captured by the Afghāns
Shabān, 945 A. H. = Middle of January, 1539 A. D.
- (5) Ajudhya and Chunār captured by the Afghāns
Ramzān, 945 A. H. = Beginning of March, 1539 A. D.
- (6) Bābā Bēg etc. joined the Bengal Mughals
Shawwāl, 945 A. H. = Middle of March, 1539 A. D.
- (7) Humāyūn reached Chausa
Zulqada, 945 A. H. = Beginning of April, 1539 A. D.
- (8) The encampment at Chausa
Zulqada, 945 A. H. to 9th *Safar*, 946 A. H.
= April to 26th June, 1539 A. D.
- (9) Shēr K̄hān marched against Mahāratha
8th *Safar*, 946 A. H. = 25th June, 1539, A. D.

¹ *Shāhabād District Gazetteer*, p. 20, quotes *Tārīkh-i-Mushtāqī* to point out that of the three great works that Shēr Shāh had set for himself, one was the destruction of Mahāratha. We know of the work, *Wāqiat-i-Mushtāqī*, but not of any under the above name.

² *Dorn*, p. 120 says the ruse had been repeated for the last five or six days in succession.

CHAPTER XIX

THE BATTLES OF CHAUSA, JUNE 26, 1539 A. D., AND OF QANAUJ, MAY 17, 1540 A. D.

Let us now study the details of the surprise attack referred to in the last chapter. On the evening of June 25, 1539 A. D., *i.e.*, the 8th of *Safar*, 946 A. H., it was Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's turn to act as the head of the night watch. In spite of the warning that Ḳhawās Ḳhān had moved out of his camp with a large army,¹ he neglected his duty and was sleeping elsewhere, and the men under him followed his example, so that the whole camp lay unguarded and at the mercy of the enemy.




FIG. 1

In Fig. 1, we have indicated the respective camps of the Mughals and the Afghāns. It will be seen that the two armies had encamped on the same side of the river Ganges and on opposite sides of its tributary, the Karamnāsa, and

¹ See *Jauhar*, p. 24.

they were guarded on the flanks by the two rivers, the Afghāns being more secure than their enemies. The Cherō land lay to the south of the Karamnāsa.¹

Shēr Khān's movements were so well-timed that almost simultaneously, the three divisions, commanded by Shēr Khān himself, by Jalāl Khān, his son, and by Khawās Khān, the captor of Gaur, attacked the Mughal camp (see Fig. 2). Jalāl Khān attacked the Mughals nearest the




FIG. 2

¹ See the two district *Gazetteers*. In Ghāzīpūr, Bīrpūr, opposite Bāra on the Ganges was once their headquarters, and in Shāhabād, Rohtāsgarh was in their possession. The southern part of the Shāhabād district is hilly and infertile, and formed the refuge of the Cherōs.

town of Chausa, Shēr. K̄hān the centre of the enemy, and K̄hawās K̄hān went round the Mughal camp and the stable,¹ to the bank of the Ganges, and demolished one of the bridges.² By these skilful tactics, Shēr K̄hān completely surrounded the enemy before they were aware of the fact. This attack caused panic and uproar in the Mughal camp. The Mughals found themselves completely hemmed in, and the bridges either broken or in the possession of K̄hawās K̄hān's men. As the rainy season had set in, the rivers had widened, obliterating the traces of the ford that lay near the Mughal camp. Even the Karam-nāsa tributary was unfordable.

While the enemy's attack had been on, most of the Mughal commanders were not yet ready to take the field. Muhammad Zamān Mirzā, whose culpable negligence was the cause of the Mughal ill-luck, disappeared early, being drowned in trying to cross the river and escape from the battle. A few others, Bābā Bēg Jalair, Tardī Bēg, and Kōch Bēg, hastily got up to inform Humāyūn of the critical situation. The king had already got information of the commotion, but took some time in dressing and making ablution. He was mounting his horse when Tardī Bēg etc., reached him.

By this time the panic had spread, and the Mughals had been scattered in all directions. The king had to restore order, and the only way by which he could prevent the flight of his men was to destroy the remaining bridges, which they had made use of for crossing over. However urgent Humāyūn's decision might appear, the actual result was that none of the bridges was available for a Mughal retreat. The ford also, as mentioned above, was submerged and could not be used at this time of the year.

Humāyūn next rode forward, beating his war-drum, hoping, now that all means of escape had been stopped,

¹ نغاس

² It was a perilous venture and Shēr K̄hān, instead of giving orders to some one of the nobles to undertake the task, asked for volunteers. K̄hawās K̄hān alone responded.

his followers, consisting of brave people from all parts of the Muslim world including Turkey, Asia Minor, Irāq, etc., would rally and face the Afghān attack. Only about 300 brave followers responded to his call. The number was too small to encounter the army of Shēr Khān, 70,000 strong. The king, undeterred, determined to make a stand and offer resistance. He continued the unequal contest, wounded an elephant, though in striking it he lost his lance, and received a wound from some one seated on another elephant. Behind his back, even those 300 followers were melting away. Since the king would not realize the danger that now surrounded him, some Mughal follower caught hold of the reins of his horse, and led him out of the thick of the fight. But with the bridges broken or in the possession of the enemy, it was difficult for him to escape from the slaughter around him. He reached the bank and attempted to cross the river on the back of an elephant, but the current was so strong that he was dislodged from his seat. Providentially, a water-carrier named Nizām noticed him and with the aid of his leather water-bag helped him to the opposite bank.¹ Askari also reached there, though the details of his escape are not available.

These two were amongst the few who had been lucky enough to escape; for a much larger number lost their lives on the battle-field or in trying to cross the river. The Afghāns had gained the day and the demoralized panic-stricken Mughals were cut down in hundreds in their attempt to fly from the dreaded pursuers. The number of deaths was so large that no attempt has been made to compute the figure.

We may give here the particulars of a few casualties among the distinguished personages who figured in the campaign. We have noticed the death of the ever-turbulent Muhammad Zamān Mirzā. Amongst the other

¹ While taken across the river, he learnt the name of the water-carrier and out of gratitude compared him with Nizāmuddīn *Aulia*, the patron saint of Delhi.

generals who perished were three *maulavis*, Muhammad Parghari, Jalāluddīn of Tattah and Qāsim Ali *Sadr*.¹ Similarly when Humāyūn was informed of the troubles of Bēga or Hājī Bēgam, his chief queen,² he sent four nobles, Tardī Bēg, Bābā Bēg, Kōch Bēg, and *Mīr* Bachka Bahādur. They attempted to fight their way through the Afghān crowd and in doing so all except Tardī Bēg were cut down. He alone returned to Humāyūn. The *Tazkirat-ul-umarā* mentions the death of one *Mīr* Pehlwan Badaḡshī.

As regards the women casualties, Gulbadan Bēgam has mentioned the names of a few who were either drowned or could not be traced. They included two wives of the king, (1) Chānd Bībī and (2) Shād Bībī; one daughter, Aqīqa by his chief queen Bēga Bēgam; and a relation, Āyisha Bēgam, daughter of Sultān Husain Bāīqarā.

Amongst the women captives of Shēr Ḳhān, was Bēga Bēgam, the king's principal queen. In the midst of the confusion and slaughter that prevailed everywhere, the Afghān leader made all arrangements for her protection and safety. He also issued a general order forbidding the killing or enslavement of any Mughal women or children.³ They all were to be sent to Bēga Bēgam's pavilion, and guards were posted to protect them from injury. When Shēr Ḳhān became king he sent these refugees home. Bēga Bēgam, too, was restored to Humāyūn together with a statement that no violence had been committed on her or, for the matter of that, on any other Mughal woman. Humāyūn took the Afghān leader at his word and received the queen back. Bēga Bēgam or as she was later called,

¹ Under the Mughal kings, the *maulavis* also had a military rank and used to be present on a battlefield. For a description of Akbar's *mansabdāri* system, see V. Smith: *Akbar, the great Mogul*, pp. 362-4. Abul Fazl was a *mansabdār* of 4000.

² As she had gone on *hajj* several times, she has been called *Hājī* Bēgam. In her later life, she was in charge of her husband's tomb. *Arab sarai*, situated near the tomb was built by her. It could accommodate 300 Arabs.

³ How far in advance of his times was Shēr Ḳhān? Enslavement of a captured or dead soldier's family was a recognized custom in the east. When Akbar made a similar law in 1562 A. D., he was following his predecessor's lead. For Akbar's decree see *A. N.*, Vol. II, part I, p. 159.

Hājī Bēgam was dearly loved by Akbar, to whom she was like a second mother.

When Shēr Ḳhān had completed his victory, he offered prayers to the Almighty and uttered the following lines:—

خدایا توانا و توانگر توئی - توانا و درویش پرورد توئی
فرید حسن را تو شاهی دهی - سپاه همایون بماهی دهی

Tr.

O, Lord, Thou hast power and pelf
And supporteth the poor *darwesh*.

Thou hast chosen to bestow sovereignty on Farīd,
Hasan's son,
And throw Humāyūn's men to be devoured
by the fishes (alligator, crocodile, or tortoise).

Shēr Shāh slightly altered the words of the famous lines of Sadī's *Būstān* to suit the occasion.¹ The poet's words are:

که پروردگار تو توئی - توانا و درویش پرورد توئی
یکه را بر آری رشاهی دهی - دگر را از شاهی بماهی دهی

Tr.

O Lord, Thou art omnipotent and supremely rich,
And supporteth the poor *darwesh*.

Thou exalteth one and bestoweth kingship on him,
Another, thou throweth from kingship to the
fishes of the sea.

Be it said as a tribute to his magnanimity that Shēr Ḳhān refrained from pursuing and slaughtering the Mughals. Instead, he departed eastward to Gaur, and captured the Mughal contingent of 5000, left behind under Jahāngīr Qulī Ḳhān.

The question of kingship then came up. Masnad-i-*Alī Isā Ḳhān Kakbūr* suggested the issue of a *Fath-nāma* to which Shēr Shāh objected on the ground that it could not be issued in the absence of a crowned leader. *Isā*

¹ *Dorn*, p. 123, credits Shēr Ḳhān with a much longer speech.

Ḳhān, who had desired the *Fath-nāma* to be in the name of the community and had never meant it to be issued in an individual's name, read the reference to the crowned headship to mean Shēr Shāh's desire to be promoted to kingship; and himself came forward to satisfy him by proposing the higher honour for him. Īsā Ḳhān was promptly supported by Āzam Humāyūn Sarwānī and Miān Biban Lōdī. The other Afghāns carried the proposal with acclamation.

Thus Shēr Shāh's long-cherished dream of sovereignty was at last realized. His full title as king was *Sultān Shēr Shāh as-Sultān-i-Ādil Abul-Muzaffar Farīd-ud-duniyā wad-dīn*.¹

Then he committed two acts of cruelty justified, probably, on state exigencies. One was the death of Jahāngīr Qulī Ḳhān and his five thousand followers for some time captives at Gaur. The other was the death of Dilāwar Ḳhān, Ḳhān-Khānān. It may be remembered that the latter had been captured at Mungīr, more than a year ago,² and thrown into a dungeon. The Afghāns hated him for his loyalty to the Mughals and desired his death. In order to accomplish it in a natural manner, they had given him half a seer of coarse and uncooked barley as his daily food. But the unwholesome food did not kill him. So he was now put to death. His followers, many of them being Afghāns, were either released or taken into service. Shēr Shāh remained in Bengal for the next few weeks in order to improve the Afghān system of administration.

Let us now turn to Humāyūn. After reaching the other side of the Ganges, somewhere near Bīrpūr, he rapidly rode to Chunār. Wounded and mentally depressed as he was, he could not stay there for long. Instead, he hastened to Arāil.³ Even now he had some faithful

¹ No coin supports Abbās when he asserts that Shēr Shāh took the title *Shāh-i-Ālam* or quotes the rhyme said to have been stamped on some of his coins: — *شاه الله باتی ترا باد دائم = بما شیر شاه بن حسن سوز قائم*

² See the last chapter; probably in March, 1538 A. D.

³ Close to Nainī station on the E. I. Railway.

followers. Rājā Bīrbhān, a zamindar from the neighbourhood, came with 5,000 or 6,000 followers, fought in Humāyūn's rear against *Mīr* Farīd Gaur, and gave his master an opportunity of escaping. He also gave them food by opening a market for their benefit. So under his protection, the Mughals rested for a few days, replenished their stores, and purchased new horses. Then they reached Kara¹ where again they stayed for a few days, and obtained provisions for themselves and provender for their horses. Next finding that the banks of the Ganges at Qanauj were strongly occupied by the Afghāns, he abandoned his intention of proceeding along the Ganges, chose now the Jamna instead, and for further safety crossed over to its south bank at Kālpī. Fortunately for him, the Afghāns who met him on the way under Shāh Muhammad Qarmali did not molest him.

All this time Humāyūn's number of followers was dwindling by desertion, and even amongst those who stayed with him some appeared to be apathetic. For example, Qāsim Qarācha's son had arranged for a number of gifts to be presented to Humāyūn on his arrival, but Qāsim counselled him against wasting so much wealth on a fleeing fugitive, and so the son reduced the number of gifts. Humāyūn, either because he had come to know what had passed between the father and the son, or because the gifts had been grudgingly offered, declined to accept them except an embroidered saddle, which he kept and eventually presented to Kāmrān. It is a striking example how Humāyūn bore up in adversity. Instead of getting angry with Kāmrān who had betrayed him, he was anxious to enlist his support for his future schemes by offering him a present.

At Kālpī Humāyūn heard that Shēr Shāh had again come forward as far as Chausa, (*Safar*, 946 A.H.²=middle of July, 1539 A.D.). Fearing lest he should fall into the

¹ Situated 40 miles N W. from Allāhabād, on the Grand Trunk Road and the Ganges. It was here that Alāuddīn Khaljī killed his uncle, Jalāluddīn Fīrūz.

² *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* (T. R.). The month of *Safar* extends from 18th June to 17th July.

hands of the enemy, Humāyūn hastened his retreat to Āgrā.

At Āgrā he met his brother, Kāmṛān. Hindāl was lurking at Alwar in shame at his past misbehaviour. Kāmṛān brought him to the king's presence and obtained forgiveness for him. Humāyūn took no notice either of his desertion of his post at Tirhoot or of his subsequent assumption of sovereignty at Delhi. It speaks well of Humāyūn that he continued to treat the prince as affectionately as before. With Humāyūn, Askari, too, had arrived, so that all the four brothers now gathered together. Muhammad Sultān M. also now came and joined the king.¹ Muhammad Sultān M. had done all he could to injure Humāyūn, and had even gone over to the Afghāns in Bihār. When he found that he had outstayed his welcome in Bihār and that the Afghāns had nothing but scorn for him, he returned to Humāyūn at Āgrā, a sadder but wiser man. He is not known to have rebelled again in Humāyūn's reign.

Many ladies and practically all the leading Mughal nobles and royal relations also arrived at Āgrā. Gulbadan Bēgam tells us how affectionate her meeting was with Humāyūn, her brother, and how glad he was that he had not taken her to Bengal; for then, like many others, he might have lost her. She also describes the king's meeting with Dildār Bēgam, her mother and Hindāl's, and tells us that, though Kāmṛān presented her full brother to the king, it was mainly through Dildār's intercession that he was pardoned.

We have seen that in the battle of Chausa Humāyūn had received a wound. It had continued to fester so he remained confined to the palace for 40 days.² Kāmṛān, too, fell ill. Even after Humāyūn came round, Kāmṛān did not come to his normal self. This augured ill for Humāyūn. His own troops had been wiped out either by disease in Bengal or on the battle-field of Chausa. He had fondly

¹ See *Tārīkh-i-Alfi*, fol. 567b, l. 11.

² *G. H. N.*, fol. 33b.

hoped that Kāmṛān, like a dutiful brother, would place his 20,000 veteran soldiers, all in excellent health, at his disposal, and thus give him an opportunity of crossing his sword for the second time with the Afghān foe.

But Kāmṛān would not agree to Humāyūn's proposal; he considered him to be incompetent for the task, because of his loose tactics and defeat at Chausa, and his childish sentimentalism in permitting Nizām, the water-carrier and saviour of his life, to sit for a few hours¹ on the throne and help himself to the State treasures. Kāmṛān therefore proposed that if another campaign was to be undertaken, it should be under his own command and not that of Humāyūn. Even when Humāyūn pressed for his leadership on grounds of prestige, Kāmṛān remained obdurate.

Kāmṛān did not recover from his illness, though he was placed under the treatment of 'the most celebrated *hakīm* of the time, viz., *Mir* Abul Baqā. When four months had passed and his malady grew worse depriving him of the use of his limbs and the power of speech, he grew anxious to return to Lahore. Humāyūn tried to argue but it only produced a contrary effect on him, namely, suspicion of poisoning² and eagerness to hasten back to the Punjāb.

To Humāyūn's appeal that during the period of his illness, he might be allowed the use of his army, Kāmṛān made a very feeble and grudging response. He allowed 3000 men only under *Mirzā* Abdullāh Mughal to stay with Humāyūn, and the rest, under the command of *Khwāja* Kalān, he took with him to Lahore. It is said that Kāmṛān's perversity was partly due to the evil counsel of the *Khwāja*, who disapproved of any extended campaign in the Gangetic region,³ just as he had done in Bābur's time.⁴

Kāmṛān's refusal to lend his army to his brother was also partly actuated by considerations of his own safety.

¹ G. H. N. makes it 'two days.'

² *Ibid* fol. 36b.

³ See T. R. But the question may be put, whether Lahore was less warm than Agrā or other towns situated in the Gangetic valley.

⁴ See B. N., pp. 525-6.

He had been twice attacked by the Persians, once under the direct command of the Shāh, in 1535 A.D. and again in 1537 A.D.¹ He did not wish to place his whole army at the disposal of his elder brother; for then the Persians might be emboldened to launch another campaign against him. The barren discussions and arguments between the two brothers occupied seven months from the middle of July, 1539, to the 15th of March, 1540 A.D. (*Rabiul-awwal* to the 7th *Zulqada*, 946 A. H.).


At this desperate juncture Muhammad Haidar Mirzā, Humāyūn's cousin, arrived.² He had gone to Bābur as early as 1509 A.D.³ and for the last four years had been staying with Kāmran,⁴ where he had also enjoyed the company of *Shaiḫ* Nūra.⁵ He had identified himself for the last thirty years or more with the Tīmūrīds; and now when their head, Humāyūn, was imploring Kāmran to stay by his side he was pained to see the Mirzā act in a churlish manner. So when Humāyūn turned to him and made a similar appeal for his stay, he consented. He also concurred in his argument that the fall of Āgrā would entail the evacuation of the rest of the Mughal provinces, including Kāmran's territory of Lahore. In choosing to stay with Humāyūn, Haidar incurred Kāmran's displeasure and lost the deputyship that he had enjoyed at Lahore, *i.e.*, the conduct of all Kāmran's affairs.

Kāmran's departure was looked upon as a public calamity by the Mughals and so, as many as could, sent

¹ See Erskine: *The History of India*, Vol. II, pp. 101 and 104.

² His relationship with Humāyūn may be indicated.

Yūnas Ḳhān



³ See *B. N.*, p. 350.

⁴ 1536-40 A. D. The earlier date is given by *T. R.*, p. 16.

⁵ *T. R.* devotes a number of pages to describe the *Shaiḫ's* greatness, *e.g.*, See pp. 389, 395-7, 397-8, 399-400.

their women and children to Lahore, considering it to be a safer refuge than Agrā. Gulbadan Bēgam mentions how Kāmran requested her to accompany him, which she angrily refused at first, but later on, under the king's command, agreed to.

While the two brothers discussed and argued for full seven months, the vigilant Shēr Shāh had gone back to Bengal, effected further improvements in administration, and now again came to the front. He advanced slowly, adding the districts he marched through, to his well-organized kingdom. His soldiers occupied Lucknow and Qanauj, and he arrived at the latter place, immediately after (February, 1540 A. D.).

With the news of Shēr Shāh's advance, a feverish activity siezed the Mughals and on paper at least, Humāyūn could count 90,000 followers, all provided with horses. How many of these men had actually seen a battle or been under fire was a different matter. Most of them being raw recruits, were easily collected on liberal promises, but any serious work in the war, if it came about, could hardly be expected of them.

With this large number of men in his train, Humāyūn reached Bhōjpur on the west side of the river. The faithful Bīrbhān of Arāil had accompanied him to Agrā and now to Qanauj. He noticed the inadequacy of his master's preparations and suggested that if Humāyūn felt diffident of his success in the approaching contest, he might retire to the mountainous Panna State,¹ more than two hundred miles to the south of the main high-way, take shelter in its forests, train his men for war, wait for his opportunity, and when it came, pounce upon the Afghāns. Humāyūn rejected the advice; for though it might provide him with a safe shelter, the waiting game would not suit either his recruits or his purse. If he desired to wipe off the disgrace of the late defeat at Chausa, he must fight an open battle and that too, at the earliest date possible.

¹ See *Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. XIX.

At this stage, Humāyūn's hopes for a turn of his fortune received a fleeting encouragement. His generals, Yādgar Nāsir Mirzā and Qāsīm Husain Sultān, the *jāgīr-dārs* of Kālpī¹ and Etāwah respectively, defeated and killed Shēr Shāh's son, Qutb Khān, when he was advancing to Āgrā. As against Bīrbhān, they convinced Humāyūn that an opportune moment had arrived to defeat the enemy. Acting on their advice, he moved on towards Qanauj.

Humāyūn reached Bhōjpur,² in Qānauj *Sirkār*, halted and pitched his camp there. Shēr Shāh lay encamped on the other side of the Ganges opposite Qanauj. The distance between Bhōjpur and Qanauj—about 23 miles—prevented either of the parties from making any attempt at a night attack. Thus, a month passed, April, 1540 A. D. = *Zulhijj*, 946 A. H.—*Muharram*, 947 A. H.). During his march, Humāyūn had been able to raise the number of his followers to 200,000.³

We are not told the exact date of Humāyūn's march forward to Qanauj. It must have been early in May, 1540 A. D. (end of *Muharram*, 947 A. H.) and when he reached there he found Shēr Shāh encamped on the other side. Shēr Shāh, eager for an engagement, proposed through a *vakīl* that since both the parties desired for an honourable contest, they must arrange to come to an early conflict and hence one of the two opposing forces should be allowed to cross over to the enemy's side. He further added that he was prepared to cross the river if Humāyūn would make room for him, or if the king so desired, he would retire a few miles in order to make way for him. Humāyūn never wanting in physical courage and eager to show his pluck possibly to retrieve his reputation, at once agreed to cross over to the Bilgrām side of the river.

¹ A portion of Kālpī had lately been bestowed on Kāmran in order to interest him in the future Mughal campaigns. The expectations were not realized.

² Situated on the Ganges, about 23 miles N. W. of Qanauj.

³ T. R. But possibly Haidar M. had included the non-combatants in the number.

While the Mughals were engaged in crossing the river, some among Shēr Shāh's followers pointed out to him that it was an excellent opportunity for attacking the enemy. Those who have read the description of the march of a Mughal army in a state of confusion would appreciate the soundness of the Afghān suggestion.¹ But the cool, chivalrous, and self-reliant Shēr Shāh rejected the suggestion, and told them to prepare for an open battle; for in the next battle that he would fight, he would neither apply any artifice nor make any surprise attack by night.

It is useless to blame Humāyūn for this decision. His dependance on raw recruits and Kāmran's refusal to support his cause made his defeat inevitable. If he had crossed over in bravado, he is to be condemned, but possibly he took his men across the river, in order to prevent their deserting him later on. If so, he might be excused for his decision. It may be observed that except the guilty Muhammad Sultān Mirzā and his adherents, no Mughal soldier, not even a raw recruit, went over to the enemy even when pressed hard by them in battle. If they gave way, it was only to fly to their homes or other places of safety.

Although Humāyūn had gone over to the other side, the expected battle did not take place immediately. Both the parties marked time; Humāyūn because he dared not attack the Afghān veterans, and Shēr Shāh because, like the cautious general that he was, he awaited the return of Khāwās Khān, who was at the moment completing his success against the distant Cherōs. There was a secondary reason for the postponement of the issue. Like an experienced commander, Shēr Shāh knew that in another month or so, the monsoon would break and the Mughal camp, situated near the bank, would be deluged. The Mughal soldiers would die of disease and their cattle be

¹ Notice how Mahābat Khān captured Jahāngīr while the latter was crossing the river Jhelam.

unfit to draw the heavy cannon.¹ A victory for the Afghāns would inevitably follow.

Thus the battle remained in abeyance till the first heavy shower, which occurred on the 15th May or the day following. It completely swamped the Mughal camp with rain-water. As more showers might follow, a change of the site became necessary. Haidar Mirzā, on whose judgment Humāyūn mainly depended and who for this reason, had been made generalissimo, chose some higher ground in the neighbourhood. His plan was that a demonstration was to be made in order to induce the enemy to attack the Mughal army. If the Afghāns failed to stir out, the next day the demonstration would be repeated while simultaneously the camp was to be shifted to the neighbouring high ground.

The first demonstration was fixed for the following day, (the 17th May, 1540 A. D. = 10th *Muharram*, 947 A. H.). Shēr Shāh was cleverer than Humāyūn or Haidar Mirzā and was well-informed of the enemy's plans. Of course, he forthwith decided to avail himself of the opportunity of starting the battle, and as soon as he saw the Mughals coming out of their camp, led his soldiers into the field. By his quick decision, he deprived the Mughals of the use of their heavy guns, one of their main weapons of winning a victory.

The Mughals were not at first so anxious for a battle as to change the site of their encampment. Only a portion of the army met the Afghāns on the field but the prospects of a clash of arms drew the others in.

Haider M. has minutely described the battle which ensued and is usually accepted as the chief authority. We however have not been able to accept all his statements. For example, his estimate of the respective strength of the armies, namely Mughal 40,000, and Afghān 15,000, can

¹ Some of the larger cannon used balls from 500 to 5000 *misqāl* in weight. 1 *misqāl* is equal to 1-3/7 dram. According to Bābur, 1 *misqāl* = 5 *māshās* = 5/12 *tola*.

be accepted only with a great deal of reservation. Firstly, as the demonstration was arranged with a motive other than war, the whole Mughal army was not placed in the field in the early stages of the battle. The Afghān number, too, appears to be inconceivably small. We have been told that Shēr Shāh had recruited every able-bodied Afghān.¹ We had better reverse Haidar Mirzā's estimate of the two respective armies.²

Similarly, when Haidar M. records, 'Not a cannon was fired—not a gun. The artillery was totally useless,' he has not clearly stated why it was so. The reason for not firing the guns was that they had not been brought out to the battlefield. The Mughals' object was to move to some higher ground and hence in the demonstration the heavier guns had been left out. When the battle commenced, the Mughals were taken by surprise and failed to utilize them. There were, of course, the lighter pieces from the start of the contest.

The battle took place on the 17th May, 1540 A. D. The Mughal army hastily got together and continually reinforced from the base had three main divisions; the central where Humāyūn and Haidar Mirzā, the generalissimo, commanded, the left nearest the river under Hindāl, and the right, covering the high ground, under Yādgar Nāsir M. The vanguard was placed under Askari. There were five thousand matchlock men placed under Muhammad Khān Rūmī, Ustād Ahmad Rūmī, Hasan Khaliḡā, and the sons of the late Ustād Alī Qulī. There seems to be no Mughal flying bodies to undertake a flank movement nor any large reserve.


The Afghāns were divided into seven divisions. Shēr Khān himself took his stand at the centre with a trench running in front of him. On his right were the two Jalāls, namely Jalāl Khān, Shēr Shāh's son, and Jalāl Khān Jalū,

¹ Dorn, p. 104.

² C. H. I., Vol. IV, has accepted Haidar Mirzā's description and figures.

with the brave Niāzīs under them. Similarly, on the left stood Ādil Khān, Shēr Shāh's eldest son, with the Kirānī Afghāns. The fourth and the fifth divisions, placed at the extreme ends, were to imitate the *tulghamā* movements of the Mughals and while the battle progressed, to attempt at surrounding the enemy from the flanks and the rear. The vanguard was commanded by Khawās Khān and Barmazīd Gaur, while a division was kept in reserve.

THE BATTLE OF QANAUJ, MAY 17, 1540 A. D.
POSITION I.




A indicates the Mughal encampment immediately after crossing the river. B indicates the highground to which the Mughal camp was to be shifted.

The battle opened, not on the whole front, but by an Afghān attack on the Mughal left only,¹ the Afghān object

¹ A. N., p. 165, l. 1.

probably being to cut the Mughals off from the river and their base. A sanguinary contest took place here between Hindāl M. and Jalāl K̄hān Sūr, in which the latter was wounded and fell from his horse and his army was routed. Shēr Shāh, noticing the state of confusion in Jalāl K̄hān's division, for a moment thought of leaving the central command and proceeding to his son's aid. But he was persuaded by Qutb K̄hān Shāhūkhail Lōdī not to commit the mistake, lest the king's absence at the centre should be misunderstood by his men as defeat and they might lose heart. Shēr Shāh, therefore, sent other commanders. Hindāl having won the initial success, could not push it home. For with the arrival of other Afghān contingents, the Niāzis reformed their ranks and renewed the contest.

THE BATTLE OF QANAUIJ, MAY 17, 1540 A. D.
POSITION 2.




A indicates the Mughal encampment immediately after crossing the river. B indicates the highground to which the Mughal camp was to be shifted.

The two vanguards also came into clash and Askari, unable to bear the brunt of the enemy's attack, fell back

upon the main army, to some extent covering the Mughal musketeers and stopping their firing.

THE BATTLE OF QANAUIJ, MAY 17, 1540 A. D.
POSITION 3.



A indicates the Mughal encampment immediately after crossing the river.
B indicates the highground to which the Mughal camp was to be shifted.

But the heaviest reverses for the Mughals occurred on their right. Yādgar Nāsir and Qāsīm Husain were driven back by Ādil Khān and Sarmast Khān. Yādgar had to fall back upon the centre and the Afghāns taking advantage of the situation, turned round the enemy's wing, and sent a division to its rear.

The Afghāns were getting an upper hand in their right also. Hindāl who had opened the battle so brilliantly,

had, for some unaccountable reason, been unable to press forward. Jalāl, strengthened by the arrival of fresh reinforcements, reformed his line and advanced. Hindāl was gradually pushed back. The fourth division on a suitable opportunity, turned round the enemy and went to its rear.

The pressure from the Afghāns drove the non-combatants who stayed at the Mughal base, on to the main army. The discipline of the hastily got-up army of the Mughals was not up to the mark and now the panic-stricken fugitives made it worse. Neither could the soldiers play their part, nor the matchlockmen theirs. And Haidar M. at his wit's end, allowed the whole non-combatant crowd to mingle with the soldiers and also to press forward by unloosening the leathern chains which had secured the gun-carts in front but now were of no use.¹ The reason for Haidar's decision has not been stated. It is very likely that he considered himself helpless at the onrush of the crowd from behind, and that as the day was practically lost, it did not matter how the non-combatants were killed, whether in the rear, or in the ranks or later on during the flight.

Be that as it may; the result of this indiscipline was that the loose crowd came in between the two opposing armies and hastened to end the contest. So far as the Mughals were concerned, the soldiers could not fight in such a state of confusion, and the musketeers or the artillerymen could not fire. The Afghāns, on the other hand, continued their work, only it now changed from warfare to slaughter. Haidar M. describes the magnitude of the Mughal loss by saying that out of one contingent of one thousand retainers, only eight arrived safe on the other bank.

It would be evident from the above description that the Mughals were defeated by the Afghāns adopting against

¹ Jauhar. Elias and Ross, p. 476 reject *Aftābchī's* statement for insufficient reasons.

them their own *tulghama* tactics, evolved fourteen years ago at the battle of Pānipat. This brilliant result was caused partly by the supreme military skill of the Afghāns and partly by Humāyūn's unwise decision of crossing over to the eastern bank putting the river behind him.

The causes of Humāyūn's defeat at this battle may be indicated here:

(a) Humāyūn himself must be held primarily responsible for the disaster. On the battlefield he had surrendered the supreme command of his army to his cousin, Haidar M. That at Qanauj he was suffering from some mental disorder is evident from the hallucinations to which he was subject at this time. He is reported to have observed to *Mir* Rajiuddīn Safavī that

جماعۃ درویشان در محل تاختن بر دهن اسپان سپاه میزدند

Tr.

During the course of attack, a host of *darweshes* were striking at the mouths of the horses of our soldiers.

As far as we are aware no such ascetics were utilized by Shēr Shāh in the battle and their presence must be ascribed to Humāyūn's imagination. Bearing in mind the king's incompetence, it is to be regretted that he did not agree to Kāmran's proposal of permitting him to take his place as commander in this battle.

(b) Another factor that contributed to Humāyūn's failure was the inexperience of the hastily collected army. The veteran soldiers that had won the previous victories for the Mughals either had become superannuated, or had died in Bengal, or at the battle of Chausa, or had accompanied Kāmran to Lahore. The raw recruits gathered at Qanauj could not achieve a victory. In this connexion it may be noted that the Mughal generals, Hindāl, Qāsim Husain, etc., were not wholly incompetent, and we attach no value to Haidar Mirzā's statement that Humāyūn's officers were cowards, and did not unfurl their standards for fear of an attack from the enemy. Similarly his state-

ment that 'not a man, friend, or foe had been wounded' when the Mughals were routed, is also to be rejected.

(c) Another reason for the Mughal loss was Humāyūn's foolhardiness in crossing the river. If he had chosen to remain on the western bank, the loss of life at the close of the conflict might have been considerably smaller. Similarly the choice of the low sandy ground by the river for his camp was an unhappy choice.

(d) Above all, the absence of discipline in the Mughal camp accounts for their defeat. The end of the battle came much too soon because of the irregular camp-followers, *viz.*, the *ghulāms*. There is much truth in Haidar's words, 'many *amīrs* of illustrious name perished, and all from want of concert and control. Every one went or came at his own will.'

Under such disadvantages it would have been nothing short of a marvel if a victory had been secured against the alert and self-reliant Shēr Shāh. The heaven's judgment was eminently just on this occasion.

CHAPTER XX

THE KING'S FLIGHT TO ĀGRĀ AND THE PUNJĀB,—REASONS FOR HIS DEPOSITION FROM KINGSHIP

When the battle was over, and the Afghāns were pursuing the retreating Mughals, Humāyūn accompanied by his attendant, Jauhar, managed to reach the bank of the Ganges. The river was broad and unfordable, but Humāyūn noticed an old elephant on the bank with a royal official seated in the howdah. He was a eunuch who had acted as the superintendent (or keeper) of the king's elephants and bore the name of *Khawāja Kāfūr*. Both Humāyūn and his attendant were taken on to the howdah, but the driver, out of cowardice or treachery, refused to stir, and so at Kāfūr's suggestion, he was beheaded by Humāyūn on the spot. The eunuch now took his place and led the animal across the river. It was not easy to reach the high and steep western bank. As no suitable landing place was available, the other Mughal fugitives tied their turbans, and thereby helped Humāyūn to get down to the bank. Amongst the helpers, Shamsuddīn Atkah Ḳhān has been specially mentioned. Later on he was suitably rewarded, and he became one of the trusted nobles of the kingdom.

Askari M., Hindāl M., and Yādgār Nāsir M., soon joined Humāyūn, and all of them together set out for Āgrā. Up to Bhongāōn¹ they followed the Grand Trunk Road. Here the party met with a considerable amount of opposition; for the inhabitants of the village were 'in the habit of plundering a defeated army.' In the mêlée that ensued Yādgār Nāsir was wounded by an arrow, and on his request to Askari to go forward and punish the villagers,

¹ In the Mainpuri district. Situated 27°15' N. and 79°14' E.

the latter got offended. A quarrel ensued between the two Mirzās in which each horse-whipped the other. However, the villagers were punished, and the party proceeded on its journey.

It now left the highway and went probably by the present road that leads to Āgrā *via* Mainpuri and Fīrūzābād. The party at last reached Āgrā. Humāyūn did not immediately go to his palace, situated opposite the present site of the Tāj and later on destroyed by Shāh Jahān to make room for his projected Māhtāb Bāgh, but proceeded to the residence of the renowned saint, Sayyid Rafiuddīn Safavī,¹ and was content with the simple fare provided by the saint. Ashamed of his failure, Humāyūn avoided a visit to his palace, and instead, sent for his people to visit him at the saint's residence.

The brothers, except Kāmṛān, and several other Mirzās had gathered at Āgrā. But their deliberations had to be cut short; for the Afghāns were still pursuing them, and it was dangerous for them to delay at Āgrā. Hence, reluctantly they left for Sīkrī,² on their way to the north-west. At Sīkrī, something very suspicious happened; an unknown hand shot an arrow which nearly found Humāyūn, and when he sent two of his attendants to search for the assailant, both returned wounded. The occurrence convinced Humāyūn of the unfriendly feelings of the neighbouring villagers, and so he hurried on to Bajajuna; on the river Kanbīr.³ Although Humāyūn had lost his sovereignty, he had not shorn himself of royal pride and hauteur, and carried himself as king so far as his followers were concerned. An incident that happened here will illustrate this. In the course of his flight the faithful *Mir*

¹ Abul Fazl's mother belonged to the family. Rafiuddīn was one of the learned divines who later on gave the *fatwah* for Puran Mal's death in Shēr Shāh's reign. As he was a Safavī and 'Hasan and Husaini' Sayyid, he had probably *Shia* tendencies.

² See Sarkar: *India of Aurangzib*, p. xcvi. Sīkrī lay on the main road from Āgrā to Delhi.

³ Neither Bajajuna nor Kanbīr can be located. There is one Bajna, south-west of Khair in Aligarh district, but we are not sure whether Humāyūn traversed the district.

Fakhr Alī once inadvertantly. passed in front of Humāyūn. This aroused him, and he ordered his death. Of course the poor *Mir*, loyal as he was, corrected himself, and, deeply humiliated, fell back to the rear.

At Bajauna, the rumour of the pursuit of *Mir* Farīd Gaur, the Afghān general, reached Humāyūn, and at Askari's suggestion, the party moved again. It was a painful journey when the men were exposed to rain and suffered from exhaustion, starvation, and disease. Humāyūn, in his own interest, made some kind of arrangement, and ordered that he was to be guarded by a detachment on both the wings, and that several noblemen should cover the rear. But even now he would not allow anyone to go ahead of him, and threatened to destroy the house of anyone who did so. It speaks well of the loyalty of his followers that they bore with the vanity of Humāyūn.

No doubt, every follower in Humāyūn's train did not behave decently on all occasions. There were occasionally serious lapses of discipline. For example, Chōbta Bahādur, a nobleman, forcibly obtained possession of a common trooper's horse which, even at the king's command, he refused to surrender. So Humāyūn ordered his death, and the order was carried out. For the next few days, the severed head of Chōbta Bahādur was carried on the point of a spear as a warning to the recalcitrant. The execution had a salutary effect, and for the rest of the journey he had no trouble from his own followers.

If Jauhar is to be believed, Humāyūn's route lay through Alwar. He might have reached Delhi, but his stay must have been of a short duration. The Afghāns had continued to press on him, and so they kept him moving on. Shēr Shāh had occupied Āgrā. These facts destroyed the chance of Humāyūn's stay at Delhi, and he was forced to fly westward, halting next at Sirhind.

Since by this time Shēr Shāh had occupied Delhi as well, we may conclude that Humāyūn had relinquished the throne of Delhi to Shēr Shāh.

Before concluding the present study of Humāyūn, it seems advisable to sum up the reasons that led to his removal from the throne.

(a) Humāyūn had been neglecting his duties for some time past. We have noticed that at the end of the Gujrāt campaign he had chosen to retire to Mālwa rather than stay in Gujrāt or withdraw to Delhi. Next, during his stay at Gaur or Jannatābād, sloth and lassitude—due to whatever causes—had grown on him. Instead of immediately returning from Bengal, he continued to linger, shut himself up in his palace at Gaur, and let the provinces of the kingdom slip one after another from his grasp. His defeat at Chausa is the direct result of his prolonged stay in malarious Bengal and indifference to administration.

(b) As the head of the Tīmūrīds and Pādshāh of the Delhi kingdom allegiance from his brothers and from the Mirzās was his due. But his brothers were disloyal, and several of the Mirzās also had at one time or the other played him false. Some of them may be mentioned here.

(1) The first was Muhammad Zamān M. who from the day of Humāyūn's accession till his (the Mirzā's) death at Chausa in 1540 A. D. had been the cause of woe to Humāyūn. He was the direct cause of the Mughal campaign against Sultān Bahādur of Gujrāt, and neither he nor Humāyūn profited by it. Under Bābur, his age, experience, high lineage, royal antecedents, long service, and the respect due to his wife as the eldest daughter of the king, had cast a glamour around him that he scarcely deserved. His ignominious death at Chausa was a fitting end to his discreditable record throughout the reign of Humāyūn.

(2) The second malefactor was Muhammad Sultān M., who always associated himself with Muhammad Zamān M., and vied with him in doing harm to Humāyūn. We have described a part of his evil record in the previous chapter. The rest is told when it is mentioned that on the eve of the battle of Qanauj he deserted and kept aloof till Kāmran returned to Kābul where he joined him.

(3) All the three brothers, Kāmṛān, Askari, and Hindāl, are to blame for their hostility or indifference to their brother. Kāmṛān was the worst offender; for his indifference towards Humāyūn affected Mughal interests most. In the earlier years he had been faithful, but during Humāyūn's stay in Bengal, he was vacillating between his duties towards the kingdom and his own selfish interests. Humāyūn's defeat at Chausa inclined him towards Kāmṛān whose guiding principle henceforth was to care for himself only and to oppose the elder brother. This attitude continued till he was incapacitated by the loss of eye-sight in 1553 A.D. His cardinal mistake was to ignore the position of his elder brother, and the natural consequence of it was the passing away of the kingdom into the hands of the Afghāns, who were the sworn enemy of the Mughals.

Askari and Hindāl were only the understudies of Kāmṛān. Their resources were small and their abilities of an inferior order. Askari did harm to himself and to Humāyūn in Gujrāt by neglecting the administration of the province, which had been entrusted to him as Viceroy. Later on, he made amends by remaining loyal to Humāyūn in Bengal and also during his retreat to Āgrā. In both the losing battles he was present and played a considerable part. It was only when he lost hope of Humāyūn's return to fortune during the latter's wanderings in Sindh that he turned to his full brother, Kāmṛān. He had thus a better sense of duty towards Humāyūn as the head of the family than Kāmṛān.

Hindāl, the full brother of Gulbadan Bēgam, was usually a staunch supporter of Humāyūn's interests. During Humāyūn's Gujrāt campaign, he was left behind at Delhi as the deputy of the ruler. As such, his record was creditable. He fought more than one battle against Muhammad Sultān Mirzā and his sons, and also fought in alliance with Askari against Tatār Khān at Mandrāel in 1534 A.D. But he also had proved disloyal. His disaffection had commenced with his desertion from Tirhoot,

when he went to Delhi and assumed the sovereign titles. To his other crimes, he added that of the murder of *Shaiḡh* Buhlul, Humāyūn's spiritual preceptor. Hindāl's disaffection seriously affected Humāyūn's interests. For while Hindāl's pretensions continued, Kāmran could not proceed to Humāyūn's aid, and without their help, it was not possible for Humāyūn to extricate himself from his difficulties in Bengal. After Humāyūn's defeat at Chausa, Hindāl's good sense returned, and ever afterwards he remained faithful to him. It was while fighting for Humāyūn against Kāmran that he was speared to death in November, 1551 A. D.

While discussing the three brothers' behaviour, we may also consider Humāyūn's attitude towards them and its consequences. He was magnanimous to them and to the other Mirzās to an unusual degree. Bābur's dying words were, 'the cream of our testamentary directions is this, "Do naught against your brothers even though they may deserve it"'¹ and Humāyūn acted in obedience to the wishes of his father. We have had several illustrations of Humāyūn's behaviour towards the Mirzās in the preceding pages. A modern historian with an acute political bias will condemn Humāyūn and pronounce his generosity to be entirely misplaced. This is not the place to discuss fully the character of Humāyūn. Suffice it to say that he was a scholar by inclination and habit, and hence matters of martial interest were not to his taste. He is a specimen of the Bāburid culture and not of Central Asian ferocity. His defects are glaring, but we shall see that some of his merits are also equally worthy of notice.

(c) The true reason of Humāyūn's expulsion will be clear from the following considerations. The Mughals under Bābur had been welcomed in Samarqand, Kābul, and Delhi in recognition of the higher standard of Mughal culture. It was Bābur's lofty moral principles that set a stamp of superiority on his administration. His strict

¹ *A. N.*, p. 117.

sense of justice,¹ his love of fair play,² his intense desire to protect the people,³ and his democratic ideas,⁴ had made a deep impression on his subjects. His was a more social, more tolerant, more intellectual, and more martial regime, and Bābur's subjects were proud of him. With Humāyūn's accession, the principles underlying the administration did not alter except in one respect, namely, the military. Kāmran gradually appropriated the different fighting elements of the Muslim world with the result that Humāyūn was left with the aged veterans or the country recruits.

Humāyūn, even then, might have prospered but for the rise of a new power, namely, the Afghāns, under the inspiring leadership of Shēr Shāh. The Afghān leader assimilated all the good features of the Mughal administration, *e.g.*, he maintained a personal touch with the people, protected them against official malfeasance, maintained the Mughal Dīn-panāh as capital, and effected several other improvements, namely, personal supervision of the administration,⁵ systematic revenue settlement, erection of forts, named after the ruler Shērgarhs, throughout the kingdom for the protection of the *ryots*, garrisoning them with small detachments termed *fauj*, and opening up of roads, which in turn, led to improvement in trade.

After Shēr Shāh's death, his system continued under his son and successor, Salīm Shāh. But after his son's death the Afghān system broke down, and Humāyūn had a chance again to bid for the throne. Luck favoured him, and once more he sat on the throne of Delhi. This recovery was achieved as much by the prowess of Bairam Khān as by Humāyūn's innate goodness; for the people were hoping for a more enlightened regime through his accession. The full story will be related in the following volume.

¹ For illustration see *B. N.*, pp. 67, 87 and 383.

² The author's article, 'Bābur and the Hindus' may be read in the *U. P. Historical Journal* of 1936 in this connexion.

³ *B. N.*, p. 390.

⁴ Notice his relations with his nobles, *e.g.*, Khwāja Kalān, on the different occasions, especially at the festive gatherings.

⁵ He had noticed Bābur's carelessness in this respect. See Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, Vol. IV, p. 330.

TABLE OF HIJRA AND CHRISTIAN YEARS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
INDEX

TABLE OF HIJRA AND CHRISTIAN YEARS

A. H.	A. D.	First, Muharram, corresponds to
937	1530	August 25
938	1531	August 15
939	1532	August 3
940	1533	July 23
941	1534	July 13
942	1535	July 2
943	1536	June 20
944	1537	June 10
945	1538	May 30
946	1539	May 19
947	1540	May 8

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historians have generally put Humāyūn down as a failure, and their verdict appears to be justified in view of the sad end to his life. Lane-Poole picturesquely closes his appreciation of Humāyūn with the following words: 'he tumbled through life, and he tumbled out of it.' Vincent Smith is of opinion that, 'Humāyūn, although a cultivated gentleman, not lacking in ability, was deficient in the energetic promptitude of his versatile father.' No doubt these observations contain some truth, but they have resulted in a gross misreading of his character and objects. Humāyūn has been held up as a pleasure-loving sovereign lacking kingly virtues and steeped in dissipation. Some regard him as a perpetrator of 'ferocious massacres and cruel punishments.'

But a scientific evaluation of the contemporary sources redeem the entire picture. Humāyūn emerges as a scholar and lover of the Arts, intensely humane and morally unimpeachable, possessed of soldierly qualities and of a general's strategy. And yet he fails: he fails on account of the defects of his qualities. The present work frankly confesses that if it has stressed Humāyūn's virtues, it has also exposed his defects. A balance has been struck.

The foundation of Dīn-panāh objectifies the generous and enlightened character of the king. His humane instincts are in full evidence throughout his career. He treated the *Khalīfā* and his nominee, Mahdi Ḳhwāja, generously; he released his captives in Gujrāt as a token of his appreciation of Manjhū's Gujrātī songs. His attitude towards his brothers and towards the Mirzās was extraordinarily lenient. He granted very liberal terms to Shēr Ḳhān in his first eastern campaign. It was in the unselfish and laudable instinct of helping a brother king, the forlorn fugitive Mahmūd, that he proceeded to Bengal against Shēr Ḳhān.

And these frequent demonstrations of his generosity wove a political web that Humāyūn found it difficult to unravel. In fact, in all his doings, a painful struggle between his head and heart is obvious in which the latter almost always triumphed. The present work has analysed this struggle into four stages, (1) Humāyūn as prince and the first four years of his reign when his mother was alive. In this period, he sought to consolidate his position on the throne. He undertook expeditions against Kālinjar (1530-31 A. D.), and against the Afghāns (1532-33 A. D.), conciliated Kāmrān (1533 A. D.), and suppressed rebellions headed by the Mirzās (1534 A. D.). (2) His Gujrāt campaign and relations with Sultān Bahādur Shāh (1534-36 A. D.). Although his campaign ultimately failed, it revealed him as a general and strategist. His march to Sārang-pūr, to Ujjain, and to Mandasōr, outwitted the Sultān, and his siege operations at Mandasōr were conducted on approved lines. (3) His

Bengal campaign and his dealings with the Afghāns in general, and with Shēr K̄hān in particular (1537-38 A. D.). He started from Agrā with the determination of subduing the Afghāns, but denied himself the first-fruits of his campaign by going back upon the terms of the treaty agreed upon between himself and Shēr K̄hān under the generous impulse of helping the wounded Mahmūd of Bengal against Shēr K̄hān. (4) The battles of Chausa (June 26, 1539 A. D.), and of Qanauj (May 17, 1540 A. D.), and his expulsion from his kingdom. These battles are a *denouement* of the tale that had woven itself in the preceding years. His recent neglect of army and of administration, by no means due to any dissipation on his part, hastened the issue.

In short, the main strength of this work lies in its clear analysis of the political dilemma in which Humāyūn found himself on account of the development of a close league between Bahādur and Shēr K̄hān: one would renew his activities if the other was attacked by Humāyūn. And there was no getting over it.

Among the contemporary authorities, Abul Fazl's *Akbar-nāma*, Jauhar's *Tazkirat-ul-Wāqāt*, Gulbadan Bēgam's *Humāyūn-nāma* and *The authorities bearing on all these four stages.* Nizāmuddīn Ahmad's *Tabaqāt-i-Akbari*, have been utilized with profit throughout all the four stages. All of them are contemporary works, and the first three were commenced at Akbar's suggestion in 1587 A. D.

Of these Abul Fazl's work is by far the best and most reliable. Abul Fazl wrote under State patronage, and hence had all the facilities the State could place at his disposal. He obtained material from the record office and 'from the old members of the illustrious family and the servants of the State.' *The Akbar-nāma.* Abul Fazl himself says, 'I examined both prudent, truth-speaking old men and active-minded, right-actioned young ones and reduced their statements to writing. The royal commands were issued to the provinces that those who from old service remembered with certainty or with adminicle of doubt, the events of the past, should copy out their notes and memoranda and submit them to Court.' Amongst the mediæval historians, Abul Fazl was the most gifted. He possessed a sound historical imagination which he brought into play while writing the *Akbar-nāma* and thus throws considerable light on Mughal culture and military strength.

Gulbadan Bēgam's history, though a small incomplete book of 82 folios, each page of which consists of 15 lines, is a precious work. Gulbadan is Humāyūn's sister and is the only woman writer of the *Gulbadan Bēgam's* period. Her descriptions of (1) Bābur's affection *Humāyūn-nāma.* for Māham Bēgam and for Humāyūn, and his sacrifice of life for the latter, (2) Māham Bēgam's interest in Humayun's reign, (3) the 'mystic' feasts and Hindāl's marriage feasts (4) Humāyūn's return journey from Gaur (5) the record of losses among Humāyūn's

women after the battle of Chausa, are extremely vivid. Her quotation of Humāyūn's words about Hindāl, after the Mirza's rebellion at Āgrā, may be given as a sample of Humāyūn's softness of heart. Humāyūn is made to say, 'Hindāl is my strength and my spear, the desirable light of my eyes, the might of my arm, the desired, the beloved . . . what shall I say to Mirzā Muhammad Hindāl about the affair of my Shaiḫ Buhlūl? What was to be has been! Now there is no anger in my heart against Hindāl.' But she is not devoid of faults. (1) Her spelling of words is not always in the orthodox style; (2) her dates are not always correct: this is because she wrote the memoirs more than forty years after the occurrence of the events; (3) her love for her full brother, Hindāl, made her blind to his defects. When even the Mirzā's own mother regretted Hindāl's rebellion against Humāyūn, the Bēgam justified his murder of Shaiḫ Buhlūl, and gives the false plea of the Shaikh's intrigue with Shēr Ḳhān. Her work has not been so far utilized by any biographer of Humāyūn.

Jauhar too is a contemporary historian. As he served Humāyūn only in a menial capacity and accompanied him for more than twenty-five years, he developed an exaggerated notion of his master's abilities *Jauhar's Tazkirat-ul-Wāqiat*. and put down the most trivial incidents connected with him. As he himself says, 'Let no one reprove me for degrading the importance of history because I write such things. In another case I would not have written them; but since they were done by an Emperor, and I myself saw and heard them I thought it right to conceal nothing, and to transmit these matters for the information of posterity; as if they had been of the utmost consequence.' Though sometimes he loves to deal with petty details, occasionally he rises to the level of a true historian. (1) He regrets that at the end of the Gujrāt campaign, it did not occur to Humāyūn that Bahādur might be utilized as his Deputy in Gujrāt and Mālwa. If this suggestion of his had been adopted, much of Humāyūn's later troubles would never have occurred. (2) He correctly gives both the reasons for Rūmī Ḳhān's removal by poison, (a) the jealousy of the other nobles, and (b) the disgust that the Mughals felt at Rūmī Ḳhān's cruelty to the captive Afghān gunners. (3) He points out Mirzā Haidar's blunder in allowing the non-combatants to come in between the two contending armies. It silenced Humāyūn's guns and made it impossible for the Mughals to continue the fight. But Jauhar suffers from a failing memory, and at times he makes silly mistakes. One such has been indicated on p. 123, n. 3. He must have had a very poor topographical knowledge of the Deccan, otherwise his location of the encounter between Humāyūn and Bahādur in the Burhānpur district is inconceivable. Similarly, the prolonging of the siege at Mandasōr to three or four months does not seem to be correct.

Nizāmuddīn Ahmad's *Tabaqāt-Akbarī* also has a high place among the mediæval histories of India. As pointed out by Dowson, 'It is

one of the most celebrated histories of India and is the first that was composed upon a new model in which India alone forms the subject matter of the work, to the exclusion of the histories of other Asiatic countries.' Both Farishta and Shāh Nawāz Ḳhān, the author of the *Maāsir-ul-Umarā*, have highly praised Nizāmuddīn's work. According to Farishta, 'of all the histories that he consulted, it is the only one he found complete.' Shāh Nawāz says, 'This work cost the author much care and reflection in ascertaining facts and collecting materials, and as Mir Masūm Bhakkārī and other persons of note afforded their assistance in the compilation, it is entitled to much credit.' He is a straightforward writer, and is esteemed even by the irascible Abdul Qādir Badāūnī. We have accepted Nizāmuddīn's version of the *Khalīfā's* move to set aside Humāyūn and his brothers from the throne, and place Mahdi Ḳhwāja as Bābur's successor; we have not been able to see eye to eye with Mrs Beveridge in her suggestion that Nizāmuddīn deliberately suppressed Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's name and inserted instead that of Mahdi Khwāja's. Nizāmuddīn gives interesting details of (1) Muhammad Sultān M. and Muhammad Zamān Mirzā's activities. (2) Humāyūn's return journey and negotiations with Shēr Ḳhān just before the battle of Chausa and makes a pun on the word کور. But even such a careful writer is not free from blemishes; (1) he is usually too plain in his descriptions and lacks in human touch; and (2) one or two of his facts are disputable, e.g., when he makes Humāyūn responsible for the amputation of the Afghān captives.

Though written later than the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, the *Tārīkh-i-Farishta* enjoys the reputation of being a reliable history. Muhammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh wrote his history at the suggestion of Ibrāhīm Ādil Shāh, and so in his work we find a great deal of space allotted to the description of the rulers of the South Indian States. In a historian's language, 'He is free from prejudice and partiality; he does not even flatter the prince in whose reign he lived; and though not entirely without sectarian bitterness when noticing Sayyids and though not exempt from Muhammadan bigotry, when speaking of the wholesale massacre of the defenceless Hindus, he is more divested of that feeling than any other author of his own religious creed who recounts similar atrocities.' To Farishta we are indebted for several facts. (1) Bābur's illness during the last ten months of his reign; (2) the stray verses exchanged between Humāyūn and Bahādur; (3) Bahādur's prowess in capturing the biggest gun of the time possessed by the Portuguese; (4) his intentions to render some sort of aid to the Mahārānā of Chitōr against Bahādur; (5) the battle of Mahmūdābād fought between Askari and Imād-ul-Mulk; (6) the exact date (18th *Safar*, 944 A. H.), when Humāyūn started for his last Bengal campaign.

While it is true that the *Bābur-nāma* cannot serve as a primary source for Humāyūn's reign, it gives us a good picture of him as prince.

In fact, for the first five chapters, it has been one of our main authorities.

The Bābur-nāma. In the remaining chapters, we have had occasions —as the footnotes indicate—to consult it. It is the Bible of the Mughal history of India, and any fact quoted from or supported by it is placed beyond all doubt. 'In this history I have held firmly to it that truth should be reached in every matter, and that every act should be recorded precisely as it occurred. From this it follows of necessity that I have set down of good and bad whatever is known concerning father and elder brother, kinsman and stranger.....' In a study of Humāyūn's imitation of his father, the *Bābur-nāma* has proved very useful. The memoirs truly embody Bābur's career, 'for it has the rare distinction of being contemporary with the events it describes, is boyish in his boyhood, grows with his growth, matures as he matures.' Such a biography would naturally have a hold on Humāyūn and considerably mould his character.

Ḳhwāndamīr (Ḳhondamīr) like his grandfather, Mīrḳhond is a well-known figure among the Muslim historians. His full name was Ghiyās-uddīn Ḳhwāndamīr bin Humāmuddīn. He has written several works including the *Humāyūn-nāma*, the most famous being the *Habib-us-Siyar*. He was born in Herāt in 880 A. H., and died in Gwālior in 941 A. H. His history, the *Humāyūn-nāma*, though it deals only with the first three years of Humāyūn's reign, was written at the king's desire. Humāyūn's words as quoted by the writer are, 'It seems proper and desirable that the inventions of my auspicious mind, and the improvement of my enlightened understanding, should be arranged in a series and written down.....' The details regarding the foundation of Dīn-panāh are mainly taken from Ḳhwāndamīr's work.

Among the secondary authorities we have laid under contribution the following works, viz., (1) Abdul Qādir Badāūnī's *Muntaḳhab-ut-Tawāriḳh*, (2) Mulla Muḥammad Ahmad and Jāfar Bēg Āsaf Ḳhān, etc.'s *Tāriḳh-i-Alfi*, (3) Abul Fazl's *Āin-i-Akbarī*, (4) Tāhir Muḥammad's *Rauzat-ut-Tāhīrīn*, (5) Allāhdād Faizī Sirhindī's *Tāriḳh-i-Humāyūn Shāhi*, (6) Nūr-ul-Haqq's *Zabadat-ut-Tawāriḳh*, (7) Baḳhtāwar Ḳhān's *Mirāt-ul-Ālam*, (8) Muḥammad Yūsuf's *Muntaḳhab-ut-Tawāriḳh*, (9) Sujān Rai's *Ḳhulāsāt-ut-Tawāriḳh*, (10) the *Haft Risāla-i-Taqwīm-i-Buldān*, (11) the *Haqiqatḥāi-Hindustān*. All these are useful works giving details and confirming the other historians. Occasionally a useful date and some additional dates are given. Badāūnī clearly indicates that the *Khaliḳā* was Bābur's Deputy and Prime Minister of the realm; also that Humāyūn left behind under Jahāngīr Qulī Ḳhān 5000 of his select soldiers. The *Tāriḳh-i-Alfi* has enabled us to fix the date of the battle of Dadrāh. But usually it disappoints the reader. The arrangement of the narration from year to year is unsound, and some of the details are misleading or incorrect. Thus Muḥammad Zamān M., who, we know, was drowned at the end of the battle of Chausa, is made to live longer and

join Humāyūn at Chunār after the defeat. Similarly, Humāyūn is made responsible for the amputation of the captive Afghān gunners. Even the statement that the Kālinjar campaign took two years to complete is not supported by any other historian. Altogether its fame belies its merit. Abul Fazl's *Ain-i-Akbari* supplies details about places, e.g., the correct spelling of Dadrah, the situation of Kanar, the description of Gaur and Gujrāt, the land-revenue system before Shēr Shāh's time, etc. Of the others, the *Rauzat-ut-Tāhīrīn* supports *Khwāndamīr* in the description of Humāyūn's estimation of the relative value of the Muslim kings of the world. It also clearly states that Humāyūn's object in marching to Gwālīor and to Mālwa was to conduct a campaign against Bahādūr. The *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn Shāhi* gives interesting details about the Mirzās. The *Mirāt-ul-Ālam* wrongly thinks Bahādūr to have appealed to Humāyūn not to attack him while he was engaged against the Rājput̄s at Chitōr. The *Zabdat-ut-Tawārīkh* states that after the Gujrāt campaign he stayed in Āgrā for a year. Then when he started on the Bengal campaign, it gives the list of the nobles that accompanied Humāyūn. The *Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārīkh* gives a copious description of the rewards granted on Humāyūn's accession, also of the feasts held by Humāyūn in his palaces at Gaur. The *Haft Risāla-i-Taqwīm-i-Buldān* gives the titles granted by Bābur after the battle of Kḥānwah, and we know from it those that were granted to the *Khalīfā*, Mahdī Khwāja, Muhammad Sultān M., *Ustād* Alī Qulī Kḥān, and Mustafā Rūmī Kḥān. The *Haqīqathāi-Hindustān* confirms the date of the battle of Mandasōr.

For the Gujrāt campaign we have excellent materials in Arabic, Persian, Hindi and Portuguese. The *Arabic History of Gujrāt* by Abdullāh Muhammad bin Omar edited by Sir E. Denison Ross and the *The authorities for the Gujrāt campaign*. *Tārīkh-i-Sikandarī* by Sikandar bin Ahmad, born 1553 A. D., are valued works and have been freely consulted. Both the authors mention histories that they had consulted but which are supposed not to exist to-day, e.g., *the Tārīkh-i-Bahādūr Shāhi*. The small printed work called the *Tārīkh-i-Gujrāt* written by Abū Turāb Wālī is also a contemporary work. Abū Turāb's father and uncle, Shāh Qutbuddīn Shukrullāh and Shāh Kamāluddīn Fathullāh respectively, were noted divines, and took part in the negotiations between the two kings as Bahādūr's representatives. Tod's *Annals and Antiquities of Rājasthān* and Ojḥā's *Udaipūr Rājya ka Itihās*, though modern works, have given us many details from the Rājput point of view. Similarly Danvers's *History of the Portuguese in India* gives details of Bahādūr's clash with Nuno da Cunha, the Viceroy of Goa (1529-39 A. D.). The *Mirāt-i-Ahmadi*, text and translation by E. C. Bayley and of the Gaekwad's Oriental series, several articles in the historical journals, e.g., '*Dhāra and Mandū*,' '*A brief History of the Gujrāt Sultānate*' and '*Garcia d'Orta of Bombay*' have provided us with a few historical and geographical details.

In dealing with Humāyūn's Bengal campaign, we had the advantage of consulting Dr Qanungo's *Shēr Shāh* and the *Cambridge History of*

India, Vol. IV, Chap III. The main authorities are (1) Abbās K̄hān

The authorities for the Bengal campaign.

Sarwānī's *Tārīkh-i-Shēr Shāhī*, also called *Tuhfa-i-Akbar Shāhī*, (2) Nimatullāh's *Maḥẓan-i-Afāghina* or its translation by Dorn, (3) Ghulām Husain Salīm's *Riyāz-us-Salātīn*, (4) Campos's *History of the Portuguese in Bengal*, (5) Father Tieffenthaler's

Description de l'Inde. Most of Shēr Shāh's chronology is obtained from internal evidences. Some corrections have been made by Dr P. Saran in his article on 'The date and place of Shēr Shāh's birth' in the Bihar and Orissa Research Society Journal. We have incorporated them. Similarly, the survey maps of the Government of India, old as well as new, have enabled us to determine Humāyūn's route on the outward and return journeys. Here, some help has also been obtained from an excellent sketch of the old routes in Bengal, *Past and Present Journal* of July-September, 1924 A. D. Several district Gazetteers of Bengal proved useful, e.g., the *Mālda Gazetteer* in suggesting that Humāyūn did not cross the Ganges in reaching Gaur; the *Santal Parganas Gazetteer* in giving a topographical description of the river Ganges from Teliagarhi to Sikrigalli; the *Shāhabād Gazetteer* for a description of the *Cherōs*, the *Patna Gazetteer* for the details of Bihār Sharif and the rise of Patna town.

For details of the battle of Chausa we have to depend on some of the authorities mentioned above, e.g., the *Jauhar*, the *Akbar-nāma*, etc., and for the battle of Qanauj, mostly on Haidar Mirzā's *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*. Though we accept his narrative of the battle, we have differed from some of his comments. It seems to us that he has shoved some of his blunders on the shoulders of the Indian officers and men.

Among the modern works on Humāyūn, we may mention (1) Erskine's *History of India*, 2 volumes (Bābur and Humāyūn), (2) Rushbrook Williams's *An Empire Bulder of the Sixteenth Century*, (3) Law's *Promotion of Learning in India*, Vol. I, (4) Browne's *The modern works. Literary History of Persia*, 4 vols., (5) Moreland's *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, (6) Numismatic Catalogues of the Mughal Coins in the British Museum, (7) Sarkar's *India of Aurangzib*, (8) *The Imperial Gazetteer*, several volumes, (9) Elliot and Dowson's *History of India by its Own Historians*, Vols. IV, V and VI, (10) Ghani's *History of Persian Language and Literature at the Mughal Court*, 3 vols., (11) *The Cambridge History of India*, Vols. III and IV. All of them are useful books and give a good picture of the times.

APPENDIX I

A LIST OF THE OTHER WORKS CONSULTED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE BOOK

1. ABDULLAH—The Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī, MS. Copy Or. 197 of the Br. Mus.
2. AHMAD YĀDGĀR—The Tārīkh-i-Salātin-i-Afāghina, MS. Copy Or. 1939 of the Br. Mus. or its translation in Elliot and Dowson's History of India, Vol. V, pp. 1-66.
3. Archaeological Reports published by the Government of India.
4. BAYLEY, E. C.—History of Gujrāt, Allen & Co., London, 1886.
5. BENI PRASAD—History of Jahāngīr, Indian Press, Second Edition, 1930.
6. BURGESS, J.—The Ahmadābād Architecture, Part I, W. Griggs, London, 1900.
7. BURGESS, J.—The Muhammadan Architecture of Bharaoch, Cambay, Dholka, Chāmpānīr and Mahmūdābād in Gujrāt, W. Griggs, London, 1896.
8. FENSHAWE, H. C.—Delhi, Past and Present, J. Murray, London, 1902.
9. FERGUSSON, J.—History of India and Eastern Architecture, 2 vols., J. Murray, London, Second Edition, 1910.
10. FLETCHER, B. F.—A History of Architecture on the Comparative Method, B. T. Batsford Ltd., London, Sixth Edition, 1921.
11. FORBES, A. K.—Rās Mālā, edited by H. G. Rawlinson, Oxford University Press, London, 1924.
12. FUHRER, A.—The Sharqi Architecture of Jaunpūr. The Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1889.
13. GHULĀM HUSAIN KHĀN—Siyar-ul-Mutaḥḥhirīn. Printed text by Newal Kishore Press. Translation published by Cambray & Co., Calcutta, Reprint, 1902.
14. GIBB, H. A. R.—The Travels of Ibn Battūta, G. Routledge, London, 1929.
15. HAIG, W.—The Historic Landmarks of the Deccan, Pioneer Press, Allahabad, reprint, 1919.
16. HERKLOTS, G. A.—Islam in India, edited by W. Crooke, Oxford University Press, London, new edition, 1921.
17. IBN HASAN—The Central Structure of the Mogul Empire, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1936.
18. IRVINE, W.—The Army of the Indian Moghuls, Luzac, London, 1903.

19. KHOSLA, R. P.—The Mughal Kingship and Nobility, Indian Press, Allahabad, 1934.
20. MACLAGAN, E.—The Jesuits and the Great Washbourne, London, 1932.
21. MINHĀJ-I-SIRĀJ—The Tabaqāt-i-Nāsiri, 1864.
- 21(a). RAVERTY, H. G.—Translation of Series, London, 1881.
22. ALI MUHAMMAD KHAN—Mirāt-i-Ahmad Ali (Gaekwad's Oriental Series) 1927.
23. MORELAND, W. H.—India at the Death of Akbar, Macmillan, London, 1920.
24. MORELAND, W. H. & CHATTERJEE, A. C.—A Short History of India, Longmans, Green, London, 1936.
25. MULLĀ ABDUL BĀQĪ NAHĀVANDĪ—Maāsir-i-Rahīmī, Bib. Ind. Series, Calcutta, 1924.
26. MULLĀ SĀLIH KAMBO—Amal-i-Sālih or Shāhjahān-nāma, Bib. Ind. Series, Calcutta, 1923.
27. SARDA, H. B.—Mahārānā Sāngā, Scottish Mission Press, Ajmīr, 1918.
28. SAYYID AHMAD KHAN—Āsār-us-Sanādīd (in Urdu), Nāmī Press, Cawnpore, third edition, 1904.
29. TARA CHAND—Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, Indian Press, Allahabad, 1936.
30. THOMAS, E.—The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi, Trubner & Co., London, 1871.
31. THORNTON, E.—A Gazetteer of the Territories under the Government of the East India Company. Allen & Co., London, 1857.
32. TRIPATHI, R. P.—Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, Indian Press, Allahabad, 1936.
33. SMITH, V.—Oxford History of India, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1923.

APPENDIX II

ARTICLES OF THE JOURNALS CONSULTED

1. BANERJI, S. K.—Bābur and the Hindus, Journal, The U. P. Historical Society, 1936.
2. BARNES, E.—Dhāra and Mandū, Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay Branch, 1903.
3. BEVERIDGE, H.—Mahdi K̄hwāja, Epigraphica Indo-Moslemica, 1915-16.
4. COMMISSARIAT, M. S.—A Brief History of the Gujrāt Sultānate. Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay Branch, 1918-19.
5. KENNEDY—Hidāya, Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, 1835.
6. HAIG, SIR W.—The Nizām Shāhī Kings of Ahmadnagar, Indian Antiquary, 1920.
7. RICHMOND—Moslem Architecture, the Last Chapter in Fletcher's History of Architecture.
8. SARAN, P.—The Date and Place of Shēr Shāh's Birth, Journal, Bihar and Orissa Research Society, 1934.
9. ————Garcia d'Orta of Bombay, Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay, Branch, 1922-23.
10. ROSS, SIR E. D.—The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507 and 1517, Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, 1921.
11. ————Routes, Old and New Bengal, Past and Present, July-September, 1924.

INDEX

- Abbās, 43 n. 1-2—author of the *Tārīkh-i-Shēr Shāhī*, 44—garrulous, 44—acceptance of his statements, 46—absolves Shēr Shāh of Puran Mal's murder, 46.
- Abbās II Shāh, *see* Shāh Abbās.
- Abdul Azīz, Āsaf Ḳhān, Masnad-i Āli, *see* Āsaf Ḳhān, Masnad-i Āli, Abdul Azīz.
- Abdullāh Ḳhān, Qāsim Husain Sultān's agent, retreated from Navsārī, 158.
- Abdullāh Muhammad bin Umar, the author of the *Arabic History of Gujrat*, 100, 102, 164.
- Abdul Qādir Badāūnī, *see* Badāūnī, Abdul Qādir.
- Abdul Qādir, Qāzī, Sultān Bahādur's agent, 103, 108.
- Abul Baqā, *Mir*, the most celebrated *hakim*, 237.
- Abul Fazl, author of the *Akbar-nāma* and the *Āin-i-Akbarī*,—mentioned, 9, 103, 141, 143, 144, 164, 174—mentions the *Ḳhalīfā* to be by Bābur's bed-side, 14—corroborates Nizāmuddīn's story about the *Ḳhalīfā*'s conspiracy against Humāyūn, 21 n.—his love of truth, 22—his date of the Rājā of Kālinjar's submission, 36—bears out the author's views about Kāmrān's relations with Humāyūn, 56.
- Abū Turāb Walī, the author of the *History of Gujrat*, mentioned, 103, 132, 144, 164.
- Ādil Ḳhān, Shēr Shāh's eldest son, commanded an Afghān division at the battle of Qanauj, 244.
- Afzal Ḳhān, a Gujrat nobleman, won over by Imād-ul-Mulk, 172.
- Aghziwār Ḳhān, a Persian commander, defeated and killed, 170.
- Ahmad, Shaikh of Turbat-i-Jām, 51.
- Ahmad Mirzā, Sultān, 53.
- Ahmadābād, its comparative distance from Chitōr and Ujjain, 119 and from Chitōr and Mandasōr, 123—protected by Askari, 153—description, 153 n. 1.
- Ahmad Lād, Malik, a Gujrātī nobleman, organized a night attack at Cambay, 141.
- Ahmad Yādgār, the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Salātīn-i-Afāghina*, his statement about Bābur's health, 10—mentioned, 12.
- The Āin-i-Akbarī*, 75.
- Ajmēr, captured by Bahādur Shāh, 87.
- Ajudhya, Bābur's mosque at, 6—the battle of, 177—captured by Shēr Ḳhān, 222.
- Alāī movement, 180.
- Alāuddīn Fīrūz, Nasrat Shāh's son, 70—reigned for four months, deposed by Mahmūd, 70.
- Ālam Ḳhān of Dhandhuka, disclosed treasures to Humāyūn, 150.
- Ālam Ḳhān Alāuddīn Lōdī, Bābur's candidate for the throne of Delhi, 31, 91—parentage, 91—kept as prisoner in Badaḳhshān, 91—led a campaign against Kālinjar, 94.
- Alāuddīn Imād-ul-Mulk of Berar, implored help of Bahādur, 80.
- Ālam Ḳhān Jighat (Lōdī) of Kālpī, son of Jalāl Ḳhān Jighat, 7—expelled from the Delhi kingdom, 83—granted *jāgir* by Bahādur, 83—lost his *jāgir*, 119—

- captured and hamstringed at Mandū, 135.
- Alwar, granted to Hindāl, 28—Humāyūn in, 252.
- Atal Devi Mosque, mentioned, 180.
- Aqīqa, Humāyūn's daughter, lost at Chausa, 232.
- Arāil, a town, 234.
- Arāish K̄hān, an Indian nobleman, 22.
- Āsaf K̄hān, Masnad-i-Ālī Abdul Azīz, entrusted with Bahādur's women and treasures, 137—went to Jedda, 138.
- Askari, younger than Humāyūn by eight years, 19—was granted Sambhal at Humāyūn's accession, 28—governor of Multān, 29—a commander at the battle of the Ghagra, 38, 51—given a thorough education by Bābur, 51—appointed viceroy of Gujrāt, 154—his failure, 158—causes of his failure, 160—rejected Hindū Bēg's suggestion to make himself sovereign, 162—fought a battle at Ahmadābād, retreated, 163—no money available for a second battle, 165—proceeded to Āgrā, 165—welcomed Md. Zamān M., 174—accompanied Humāyūn to Bengal, 199—placed in the advance-guard, 221—at the battle of Qanauj, 243-45—quarrel with Yādgar Nāsir M., 251.
- Āyisha Begam, lost at Chausa, 232.
- Bābā K̄hān (Bēg) Jalair, the acting governor of Jaunpūr and its defender against Shēr K̄hān, 220—at Chausa, 230.
- Bābā Bēg K̄urbēg, one of Askari's officers, 221—at Chausa, 232.
- Bābur, Zahiruddīn Muhammad, early career, 1-2—assumption of the title of *Pādshāh*, 2—fought the battle of Pānipat, 4—bestowed the *Kōh-i-nūr* diamond on Humāyūn, 5—grant of *ḡāgir* to Ibrāhīm's mother, 5—rewards to the Mughal soldiers and the select people of the Muslim world, 5-6—the battle of K̄hānwah, 7—his *darwesh*-like temperament, 6, 11—an inscription on Bābur's mosque in Ajudhya refers to him as *qalandar*, 6—appointed Sulaimān M. governor of Badaḡhshān, 11-12—sacrificed his life for Humāyūn, 13—death, 14—the malady considered to be the effect of poison, 15—buried at first in Āgrā and later on in Kābul, 15-16—Multān occupied by, 29—his policy of appointing the eldest sons to the north-west regions, 29—his system of provincial administration, 30—supported by some Indian nobles, 31—efforts to conciliate the Afghāns, 31-32—visited by Jalāl Nūhānī and his mother, Dūdū, 38—wrote a verse on Muslim Law for Kāmran's benefit, 51—division of the inheritance between Humāyūn and Kāmran, 53—his love for Māham Bēgam, 60—tomb at Āgrā, 15, 60-61—his corpse removed to Kābul, 15-16—demolition of Rāma's temple in Ajudhya, 113 and n. 1—distance of some of his outposts from Kābul, 160.
- Bachka Bahādur, *Mir*, posted at Mahmūdābād, 154—at Chausa, 232.
- Badāūnī, Abdul Qādir, gives the chronogram of the date of the capture of Chāmpānīr, 143-44—mentioned, 164.
- Bāgh Singh, Rāwat of Devlia-Pratāgarh, defender of Chitōr, 88, 89.
- Bahādur K̄hān Nūhānī, *see* Sultān Muhammad Shāh Nūhānī.

- Sultān Bahādur Shāh, king of Gujrāt—a potentate on the Mughal border, 32—report about his hostile intentions, 58—his rapid successes, 58, 80-89—treaty with Rānā Vikramāditya, 59—his activities forced Humāyūn to sign the treaty of Chunār with Shēr K̄hān, 72 and to return to Āgrā, 73—career as prince, 76-79—in Sultān Ibrāhīm's camp, 77—a spectator at the battle of Pānipat, 77—was offered the throne of Jaunpūr or Gujrāt, 77-78—went to Gujrāt, 79—career as king, 79-89—policy towards the Hindus, 82, n. 3—captured Ranthambhōr, 85—the first siege of Chitōr, 85, 87—granted terms to Rānī Karnāvati, 87—captured Ajmēr and Nagore, 87—gave shelter to the Delhi nobles, 90-92—reluctant to accept Tātār K̄hān's proposals, 91—reasons, 91-92—at last granted permission to conduct a campaign, 93-94—correspondence with Humāyūn, 99-111—alarmed by Humāyūn's march to the eastern Mālwa, 118—fall of Chitōr, 89, 120—did not grant Chitōr to Rūmī K̄hān, reasons, 121—his alarming situation, 121—the proper course for him, 121-23—undergoes a siege at Mandasōr, 124—his flight to Mandū, 125-27—the splendour of his camp, 127-28—besieged at Mandū, 130—the proposed settlement between him and Humāyūn, 131—attacked by the Mughals, 132—his flight to Chāmpānīr, 136 sent his women and treasures with Āsaf K̄hān with instructions to proceed to Turkey, 137-38—left for Cambay, 137—His relations with the Portuguese, 138-40—loyalty of the people of Gujrāt for him, 151-52—recovered some districts, 158-59, also Ahmadābād, 163.
- Bairam K̄hān, accompanied Humāyūn to Bengal, 199—mentioned, 256.
- Bajauna, a town, 251-2.
- Banbīr Singh, Kunwar, his genealogy, 129, n. 4—murdered Vikramāditya, 129.
- Bassein, treaty of, between Bahādur and Nuno da Cunha, 140.
- Batwa, its situation, the tomb of *Hazrat* Qutb-ul-Ālam, 153.
- Bāyazīd, an Afghān nobleman, 39—acted in alliance with Biban, 40—deserted the Mughals, 7.
- Bāyazīd, *Ilderim*, 104.
- Bāyazīd Qarmali, 42 and n. 3.
- Bēga Bēgam, Humāyūn's chief queen, 232—captured by the Afghāns at Chausa, and later on restored, 232.
- Beveridge, Mrs A. S., points out Māham's affectionate relations with Bābur, 3—her reasons for the *Khalifa's* dissatisfaction with Humāyūn, 8—accuses Humāyūn of deserting his post in Badaḡhshān, 8—mentions Ahmad Yādgar, 12—disbelieves some portions of Nizāmuddin Ahmad's story, and suggests Md. Zamān's name for Mahdi K̄hwāja, 22-4.
- Bhojpūr, (1) in Bihār, 223, (2) in Qanauj *Sarkar*, 239-40.
- Bhongāōn, 250.
- Bhua, *Miān*, Sultān Ibrāhīm's minister, 37.
- Bhupat Rai, Silhadi's son—in Bahādur's army, resisted Rūmī K̄hān's incitement to desert to the Mughals, 133.
- Biāna, description of, 94 n. 4—battle of, 94—mentioned, 7.
- Biban, an Afghān nobleman, 39—acts in alliance with Bāyazīd, 40

- the three Bibans of the period, 42, n. 3—deserted the Mughals, 7
- Bihya**, a subdivision of Bhōjpūr, 223—
—in Humāyūn's time situated on the Grand Trunk Road, 223 n. 1-2.
- Bihzad**, illustrated Hātifi's poem, 141.
- Bīrbhān**, Rājā, protected the Mughal rear, 235—accompanied Humāyūn to Qanauj, 239—his proposal of retreating to Panna, 239.
- Birpur**, 234.
- Bikramājīt**, the Rājā of Gwālior, died in battle, 4—his family surrendered the *Kōh-i-nūr* diamond, 5.
- Bikramājīt**, Mahārānā, *see* Vikramāditya, Mahārānā.
- Buhlūl**, *Shaiḡh*, sent by Humāyūn to Hindāl, 215—killed, 216, 255—a chronogram giving the year of death, 216 n. 2—particulars, 218 n. 1.
- Burhān Nizām Shāh**, forced by Bahādur to retreat, 80—acknowledged Bahādur as suzerain, 80—allowed to call himself the Shāh, 81.
- Chāmpānīr**, description, 136—Bahādur fled to—, pursued by Humāyūn, 136—called Muhammadābād by Mahmūd Bēgarha, 137.
- Chānd Bibī**, Humāyūn's wife, lost at Chausa, 232.
- Chānd Kḡhān**, given shelter by Mahmud II of Mālwa, 80-1—cause of end to the independence of the Mālwa kingdom, 116.
- Chausa**, Humāyūn reached, 223—the battle of, 228-33.
- Cherōs**, aboriginal people of the Shāhabād district of Bihār, 226-7.
- Chitōr** (or Chitrakūt), description, 86—its present condition, 86-7—the first siege of, 85-7—the second siege of, 88-9—its fall, 89, 120—regained by the Rājputs, 129, 167.
- Chōbta Bahādur**, forcibly took possession of a trooper's horse, killed by Humāyūn, 252.
- Chunār**, description and past history, 47—commandant Taj Kḡhān, and after him, Lād *Mahka*, 47-8—Shēr Kḡhān came into possession, 48-9—besieged by Humāyūn, 49—treaty of—between Humāyūn and Shēr Kḡhān, 50—the later Mughal headquarters, 180—defended by Jalāl Kḡhān, 199—besieged by Humāyūn, 200—reasons, 200-2—its capture, 203—recovered by the Afghāns, 222, 225.
- Dadrah**, battle at, and defeat of the Afghāns, 42.
- Darwēsh Ali Kṡtābdār**, a Mughal officer, posted at Ujjain, 156.
- Daryā Kḡhān** a Gujrātī nobleman, occupied Pātan, 159.
- Daryā Kḡhān Nūhānī**, governor of Bihār, raised head against Ibrāhīm, 38—died, 38.
- Daulat Kḡhān Lōdī**, imprisoned by Bābur, 77.
- Dilāwar Kḡhān**, Kḡhān-Kḡhānān, Daulat Kḡhān's son—his advice to proceed direct to Bengal, 200—in command of a Mughal division, 220—captured by Shēr Kḡhān and put to death, 221, 234.
- Dildār Bēgam** (Āghācha), Bābur's wife,—Māham to be the guardian of her child, 19 n. 4, 60—in mourning on the day of Hindāl's accession, her speech, 218—secured pardon from Kāmran, 219.
- Din-panāh**, Humāyūn's capital, foundations laid, July, 1533, the walls of the citadel completed, April, 1534, 62—reasons for its foundation, 62-3—its present

- ruins, 63-4—Bahādur's views, 65
—mentioned, 196.
- Diū, description, 139—mentioned, 85,
137, 140, 163.
- Dorn, his statement on the capture
of Jaunpūr by Mahmūd Lōdī, 40
—see also other foot-notes.
- Dōst Bēg Ishaq Āqā, posted at
Baroda and Cambay, 154—
retreated to Askari, 159.
- Dūdū Bībī, Sultān Muhammad Shāh
Nūhānī's wife, acted as regent in
Jalāluddīn's reign, 38, 189—met
Bābur, 38—died, 38, 189.
- Erskine, the author of the *History of
India*, 2 Vols. (Bābur and Humā-
yūn), accuses Humāyūn of deser-
tion from Badaḳhshān, 8—
criticizes Kāmran's actions, 53—
the author's criticism, 54-6.
- Faḳhr Ali, *Mir*, Hindāl's tutor, 9—
in Badaḳhshān, 9—Humāyūn's
deputy in Delhi, 198, 217-8—
rebuked by Humāyūn, 252.
- Farghali, Maulānā Muhammad,
Humāyūn's agent, 131—his fruit-
less intercession for the con-
demned *Imām*, 149.
- Farīd Gaur, *Mir*, an Afghān general,
attacked Humāyūn's rear, 235—
mentioned, 252.
- Farīd Ḳhān, see Shēr Shāh.
- Farishta, Muhammad Qāsim Hindū
Shāh Astarābādī—his state-
ment about Humāyūn getting 3½
laks of rupees in reward, 5—his
language resembles Abbās's, 45—
his *Tārīkh* mentioned, 13, 163.
- Fazli *Mir*, the governor of Benares
killed by Shēr Ḳhān, 216.
- Firdausī, 181.
- Gaur, description, 211-2—present
state, 212—historical buildings,
212—its name changed to Janna-
tābād, 212, 214—the Ganges
flowed east of it, 211, 221.
- Gazanfar, Askari's foster-brother,
annoyed Askari by his remarks;
was imprisoned, 160—flight to
Bahādur, 160—divulged Mughal
weakness, 162.
- The Ghagra (Gogra), battle of, 38, 51.
- Ghiyāsuddīn, Sultān of Mālwa, 117.
- Ghiyāsuddīn Qūrchī, Humāyūn's
agent, 103, 107.
- The Grand Trunk Road, of Humā-
yūn's time, 207-8, 222.
- Gulbadan Bēgam, the authoress of
the *Humāyūn-nāma*, 2—her
reasons for Humāyūn's return
from Badaḳhshān, 10—descrip-
tion of Bābur's sacrifice of life
for his son's, 13—calls Mahdi
Ḳhwāja *Yazna*, 24—describes
Mahdi Khwāja's presents on the
occasion of Hindāl's marriage, 27
—describes Māham Bēgam's
interest in the maintenance of
Bābur's tomb at Āgrā, 60-1—
describes the 'mystic' feast and
Hindāl's marriage feast, 65-6—
justifies Hindāl's murder of
Shaiḳh Buhlūl, 216 n. 2—enu-
merates the women casualties at
Chausa, 232.
- Gulrukh Bēgchik, Kāmran's mother,
her parentage not known, 51.
- Haidar Mirzā Dūghlāt, Muhammad,
Bābur's cousin, 9—gives reason
for Humāyūn's departure from
Badaḳhshān, 10—the author of
the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, 12—stayed
with Humāyūn to make prepara-
tions for a second battle with
Shēr Shāh, 238—appointed gene-
ralissimo by Humāyūn, 242—
description of the battle of
Qanauj criticized, 242-3—his
demonstration developed into
battle, 242.
- Hasan, *Miān*, Shēr Shāh's father, a
mansabdār, 179—dismissed Farīd
from his *jāgīr*, 185.

Hātifi, his poem entitled the *Timūr-nāma*, 141.

Hazrat Shāh Shaiḵh Jiu, see Jiu, Hazrat Shāh Shaiḵh.

Hājī Bēgam, see Bēga Bēgam.

Hidāya, 112 and n. 1.

Hindāl Mirzā, Abūl-Nāsir Muhammad, younger than Humāyūn by ten years, 19—governor of Badakhshān, 9—married to Mahdi Khwāja's sister, 27—granted Alwar in *jāgir*, 28—the alphabet of the Bāburī script sent to him, 52—placed under Māham Bēgam's care, 60—obtained a crown in reward, 64—defeated and killed Tātār Khān, 95—welcomed Md. Zamān M., 174—defeated Md. Sultān M. and his sons, 176-7—accompanied Humāyūn, 199—appointed governor of Tirhoot, 215,—deserted his post, 215, 254-5—did not agree to help Humāyūn, 217-8—Āgrā taken from him by Kāmran; his misconduct excused, 219—at the battle of Qanauj, 243-5.

Hindū Bēg, present at the battle of Pānipat, 4—on Humāyūn's military staff, 44 and n. 1—joined Humāyūn, 130—at the battle of Mahmūdābād, 152—appointed Askari's adviser, 154—advised Askari to assume sovereignty, 161—his reasons, 161 and n. 2—his report about Shēr Khān, 196-7—succeeded Junaid Barlās as governor of Jaunpūr, 199, 203-4—made *Amir-ul-Umarā*, 204—death, 217.

Humāyūn Bādshāh-i-Ghāzī, Nāsir-uddīn Muhammad, date of birth, 1—his mother, 2—education, 3-4—a commander at the battle of Pānipat, 4—obtained the *Kōh-i-nūr* diamond from Gwālior, 5—grant of Hisār Fīrūza and

Sambhal in *jāgir*, 5—conducted an eastern campaign against the Afghāns, 6-7—commanded a division at the battle of Khānwah, 7—appointed governor of Badakhshān, 7—opened treasure-houses at Delhi, 8—returned from Badakhshān, 8—in his *jāgir* at Sambhal, 12—fell ill and brought to Āgrā; recovered—expedition to Kālinjar, 13—in Āgrā when Bābur died, 17—the *Khalijā's* conspiracy against him, reasons, 18-9—its failure, 22—accession to the throne, 22, 28,—his later treatment of the *Khalijā* and Mahdi Khwāja, 26-7—festivities at his accession, 28—the campaign against Kālinjar, 34-6—assumption of the title of the *Ghāzī*, 36—the battle of Dadrah, 42—besieged Chunār, 49—the settlement between Humāyūn and Shēr Khān, 50—early relations with Kāmran, 54—exchange of verses with him, 56-7—grant of Hisār Fīrūza to him, 57—return to Āgrā, 58—reasons, 58—held festivities, 58-9—stay in Gwālior,—weight, 59—started for the east, 72-3—return to Āgrā, reasons, 73—stay in Gwālior, 97 and n. 5—correspondence with Bahādūr, 99-111—appealed to by Rānā Vikramāditya's mother, 115—march to Ujjain and Mandasōr *via* Sārangpūr, 118-9, 123—the advantages secured, 119-20, 123-4—his mistake in not helping the Rājputs, 118 n. 3—besieged Bahādūr at Mandasōr, 124—in communication with Rūmī Khān, 124—Bahādūr's flight, 126—Humāyūn did not attack him, reasons, 126—besieged Bahādūr at Mandū, 130—proposed settlement, 131-2

—the Mughal night assault on Mandū, its capture, 132-4—the city plundered, 134—its effect, 135-6—pursued Bahādur to Chāmpānīr and Cambay, 136, 137, 141—return and capture of Chāmpānīr, 142-3—punished his followers for indisciplinary conduct, 146-7—its justification, 147-8—executed an *Imām*, 149—distribution of wealth obtained at Chāmpānīr, its criticism, 150-1—the battle of Mahmūdābād, 152—the fall of Ahmadābād, 153—postings of the Mughal officers, 154—return to Mālwa, 156—stay at Mandū, 156—criticism of his arrangements, an alternative suggestion, 156-7—rendered no aid to Askari, 163—on Askari's leaving Gujrāt, he also abandoned Mālwa, met Askari in Chitōr, 166—his defects as administrator, 166-7—stay in Āgrā, reasons, 195-6—besieged Chunār, 200—reasons for not directly proceeding to Bengal, 200-3—the capture of Benares, 203—proposals of settlement with Shēr K̄hān, 204—dropped on Sultān Mahmūd's arrival, 205—reasons for Humāyūn's change of mind, 205-6—his route to Bengal, 207-8—Jalāl Sūr's opposition at Teliagarhi, 209—reached Gaur, 210—the first administrative measures, 212-3—later neglect and its causes, 213-4—fruitless conquest of Bengal, 216—deserted by Kāmran, Hindāl and Yādgār Nāsir M., 218-21—the three divisions of his army, 220—Askari acted as leader of the advance-guard, 221—reached Chausa, 223—the negotiations with Shēr K̄hān, 224-5—the battle of Chausa, 228-33—

retreat to Āgrā, 234-6—pardoned Hindāl, 236—proposal of a second battle with Shēr Shāh, 237—Kāmran could not be persuaded to stay with him 237—but Haidar M. was, 238—march to Bhōjpūr, 239-40—and to Qanauj, 240—his acceptance of Shēr Shāh's suggestion of crossing over to the Bilgrām side of the Ganges, 240—his hallucination, 248—the causes of the Mughal defeat, 248-9—retreat to Āgrā, Delhi and Sirhind, 250-2—the causes of his dethronement, 253-6.

Ibrāhīm Lōdī, Sultān, defeated and killed at the battle of Pānipat, 37—his mother was granted a *pargana*, 5—short-sighted policy, and rebellion of his nobles, 37-8 his treasure located in Chunār; 47—at first welcomed Bahādur but later on, grew jealous of him, 77—Farīd in his court, 185—his *farmān*, 187.

Ibrāhīm, *Shaiḳh*, Humāyūn's agent, 105.

Ikdāla, for sometime capital of Bengal, situated on the Brahma-putra, 212.

Ikhtiyār K̄hān, the commandant at Chāmpānīr, 142—the fort surrendered, 143—reasons for surrender, 144—won over Imād-ul-Mulk, 172-3.

Imād-ul-Mulk, conducted Bahādur's army to Mandū, 127—raised an army for him, 152—was defeated at the battle of Mahmūdābād, 152—opposed Md. Zamān M., 172-3—favoured Miran Muhammad, 172-3.

Imād-ul-Mulk K̄hushqadam, a Gujrāt nobleman, supported Sikandar K̄hān and then killed him, 78—

- favoured Nasir K̄hān—was executed, 79.
- Indraprastha, *see* Dīn-panāh.
- Jahāngir Qulī Bēg, accompanied Humāyūn to Bengal, 199—was left behind in Gaur, 221—captured and killed by Shēr K̄hān, 221, 233, 234.
- Jājmau, situated near Cawnpore, 6—Afhāns gathered there to oppose Humāyūn but later on fled away, 6.
- Jalāl K̄hān Jalū, at the battle of Qanauj, 243.
- Jalāl K̄hān Sūr, Shēr Shāh's son, defended Chunār, 199—his heroic stand, 202—defended Teliagarhi, 209—murdered Sultān Mahmūd's children, 211—in command of an Afghān division at Chausa, 229 and at Qanauj, 243-7.
- Jalāluddīn Nūhānī, Sultān, a potentate on the Mughal border, 32—ancestry, 38—met Bābur, 38—difficulties, 38-9—submission to the ruler of Bengal, 39, 71—reasons, 39-40—ascended the throne of South Bihār, 189-90.
- Jām Fīrūz, the ex-ruler of Thatha, captured by Humāyūn, 128—put to death, 128-9, 141.
- Jamāl K̄hān, 181.
- Jāmi Masjid of Jaunpūr, 180.
- Jannatābād, the name given to Gaur, 212, 214.
- Jaunpūr, description, 179-80—architecture, 180-1—its capture by Shēr K̄hān, 220.
- Jiu, Sayyid Jalāluddīn *Hazrat Shāh Shaiḳh*, Bahādūr's preceptor, 80 and n. 1.
- Junaid Barlās, Sultān, married to Bābur's half-sister, 18, 28 n. 3—governor of Jaunpūr, 26, 28, 44 n. 1—retreated when attacked by Mahmūd Lōdī, 42—helped Shēr K̄hān with soldiers, 187—possibly bribed by him, 189—death in 943 A. H.
- Kahalgaoon (Colgaon), situated on the Ganges, 208—Mahmūd died there, 208, 211.
- Kālinjar, Humāyūn's first expedition, 13—an inscription on one of its rocks, 13—Humāyūn's second expedition, 34-6—geography and past history, 34-5—the Rājā's submission, 36.
- Kamāluddīn Fathullāh, *Shāh*, Bahādūr's agent, 132.
- Kāmran, his rejection as nominee by the *Khalifa*, 19—governor of Kābul and Qandahār, 28—nominal submission to Humāyūn, 33—Bābur's writing a verse for his benefit, 51-2—Bābur's division of the inheritance between Humāyūn and Kāmran, 53—occupied Lahore, 53—no desire to rule over Delhi, 54—his coins, 54-5—his verses, 56—was granted the Punjab and Hisār Fīrūza, 56-7—rendered aid to K̄hwāja Kalān and defeated the Persians, 170—went to Faḳhr Alī's aid and then passed on to Āgrā, 219—pardoned Hindāl, 219—did not agree to Humāyūn's lead in another battle against Shēr Shāh, reasons, 237—fell ill and returned to Lahore, other reasons, 237-8.
- Kanbīr, an unidentified river, 251.
- Kara, 235.
- Karamnāsā, a tributary of the Ganges, 226—the Mughals and the Afghāns encamped on opposite sides of, 228.
- Karnāvati, Rānī, Rānā Vikramāditya's mother, made peace terms with Bahādūr, 87—appeal to Humāyūn, 115.
- Kennedy, article on *Hidāya*, 112, n. 1 & 2.
- K̄hālīd Bēg, the *Khalifa's* son, 26.

- The *Ḳhalīfā*, see Nizāmuddīn Ali *Ḳhalīfā*, Sayyid,
- Ḳhalīl, *Shavḳh*, a descendant of Farīd Shakarganj—Shēr Ḳhān's agent as well as Humāyūn's, 225—frank answer to Shēr Ḳhān, 225.
- Ḳhān-zāda Bēgam, Bābur's elder sister, married to Mahdi Ḳhwāja, 20—organized the 'mystic' feast and Hindāl's marriage feast, 65-6.
- Kharid, in Ballia district, 7.
- Ḳhawās Ḳhān, the captor of Gaur, 205—at Chausa, 229-30—fought against the Cherōs, 241.
- Ḳhudāwand Ḳhān al-Ijī, a Gujrāt nobleman, at first supported Sikandar Ḳhān and then murdered him; supported Nasīr Ḳhān, 78—captured by Humāyūn, 128—details of him, 128—mentioned, 153.
- The *Khulāsat-ut-Tawāriḳh*, 213.
- Ḳhurāsān Ḳhān, Mūtaman-uz-Zamān, see Muhammad Muqīm.
- Ḳhwāja Kāfūr, a eunuch who acted as superintendent of the king's elephants, 250.
- Ḳhwāja Kalān, *Amīr*, present at the battle of Pānipat, 4—acted as Kāmran's deputy in Kābul and Qandahār, 169—attacked by Shāh Tahmāsp, suffered siege for eight months, 169-70—returned to Lahore with Kāmran's army, 237.
- Ḳhwāja Mahdi, see Mahdi Ḳhwāja.
- Khwāndamīr, a Mughal courtier and poet—author of the *Humāyūn-nāma*, 62 and n. 2—mentioned, 213 n. 2.
- Lakhnauti, another name given to Gaur, 211.
- Lal Darwāza masjid, in Jaunpūr, 180.
- Lāri, *Mulla* Muhammad, Bahādur's scribe, 106—had been in Humāyūn's service and bore a grudge against him, 106—wrote an impudent letter on behalf of Bahādur, 106.
- Latīf Ḳhān, Bahādur's younger brother and claimant for the throne of Gujrāt, 78.
- Lucknow, occupied by Shēr Ḳhān's soldiers, 239.
- Māham Bēgam, Humāyūn's mother, 2—her parentage, 2—influence in the palace, 20—and in the State, 60—a Shia, 19—influence on Bābur, 19 and n. 4—held a series of feasts, 58—street decoration first introduced by her, 59—illness and death, 60—her interest in the maintenance of Bābur's tomb, 60-1.
- Mahāratha, a Cherō chief, 226, 227.
- Mahdi Ḳhwāja, the *Ḳhalīfā*'s nominee for the throne of Delhi after Bābur's death, 20—Ḳhān-zāda Bēgam's husband, 20—ancestry, services to Bābur, 21—ultimately rejected by the *Ḳhalīfā*, 22—later history, 26-7.
- Mahmūdābād, description, 152 n. 2—the battle of, 152.
- Mahmūd II of Mālwa, Sultān, helped by Muzaffar II of Gujrāt, 80—gave shelter to Chānd Ḳhān, Bahādur's brother, 116—attacked Rānā Ratan Singh's districts, 81—captured and his kingdom annexed by Bahādur, 81—mentioned, 107.
- Mahmūd *Begarha*, Sultān, a noted king of Gujrāt, 79—his bigotry, 112—generosity towards the neighbouring kings, 116-7.
- Mahmūd Shāh Ghiyāsuddīn, Sultān, king of Bengal, succeeded Alāuddīn Fīrūz, 70—war against Maḳhdum-i-Ālam, 70—campaigns against Shēr Ḳhān—was defeated, 72, 198—expected by Humā-

- yūn to fight well, 200-1—met Humāyūn at Maner, 205—the cause of change in Humāyūn's attitude towards Shēr Ḳhān, 205-6—died at Kahalgaon, 208—was buried in Sadullahpur, 208, 211—his children murdered by Jalāl Ḳhān Sūr, 211.
- Mahmūd Ḳhaljī**, Sultān, of Mālwa, 116, 117.
- Mahmūd Ḳhān**, Latif Ḳhān's son, was declared Miran Muhammad Shāh's successor, 171.
- Mahmūd Ḳhān Nūhānī**, 38.
- Mahmūd Lōdī**, Sultān, Sultān Ibrāhīm's brother, combined with Rānā Sāngā and fought against the Mughals at Ḳhānwah, 37—invited by the Afghāns of S. Bihār, 40—led more than one unsuccessful campaign against the Mughals, 40-2—the battle of Dadrah, 42—retired into private life, 47—death, 47.
- Mahmūd Mirzā**, Sultān, 53.
- Māhtāb Bāgh**, 251.
- Mahḡdūm-i-Ālam**, his friendship with Shēr Ḳhān, 40—relationship with Mahmūd Shāh of Bengal, 70—disliked Mahmūd's usurpation, 70—friendship with Shēr Ḳhān, 70—was killed in battle, 70—his wealth bequeathed to Shēr Ḳhān, 70, 190—mentioned, 190 n. 1.
- The *Maḡhzan-i-Afāghina*, 201, 213, 226.
- Malik Ayāz**, the governor of Diū and victor of the battle of Chaul, 85 and n. 6.
- Malik Dād Kirāni**, opposed Humāyūn in Agrā, 4—pardoned by Bābur, 5.
- Malik Tūghān**, see Tūghān Malik.
- Mallu Ḳhān**, see Qādir Shāh Mandūālī.
- Mandalak**, the chief of Girnār, forced to embrace Islam, 112.
- Mandasōr**, description, 123, n. siege of, 125.
- Mandrāel**, the battle of, 95,—consequences, 96.
- Mandū**, description, 130 and n non-ratified treaty of—bet Humāyūn and Bahādur, 13
- Manjhu**, *Ustād*, a noted musician Gujrāt, appeased Humāyūn his music, 134.
- Masūma Sultān Bēgam**, Bā eldest daughter, married Muhammad Zamān M., 23 n. 2—specially honoured Humāyūn, 68.
- Miān* Hasan, see Hasan *Miān*.
- Mihṭār Zambūr**, of Hāndia, 156
- The *Mirāt-i-Sikandari*, a historical work by Sikandar bin Mahmud, mentioned, 81, 103.
- Mir* Fazli, see Fazli *Mir*.
- Mir* Muhammad *Baḡhshī*, see Mahmud *Baḡhshī*, *Mir*.
- Mubārak**, Shaiḡh, a Mahdavi,
- Muhāfiz Ḳhān**, a Gujrāt noble occupied Pātan, 159.
- Muhammad Baḡhshī**, *Mir* M Humāyūn's deputy at Agrā, 196
- Muhammad Jaunpūri**, the founder of the Indian Mahdavi movement, 180.
- Muhammad Ḳhān Sūr**, a Bihār man and *mansabdār* of Cl 185—at first opposed to 185—later on became his 187-8.
- Muhammad Lāri**, *Mullā*, see *Mullā* Muhammad.
- Muhammad Muqīm**, Ḳhurāsān Mūtaman-uz-Zamān, Bah agent, 103, 105, 108 and 1
- Muhammad Muqīm Herāvī**, uddīn Ahmad's father, 2 n. 2.
- Muhammad Parghari**, *Mullā* A Parghari, *Mullā Mir* Muhs

- Muhammad Shāh, Miran, of K̄hān-dēsh, Bahādur's nephew, 80 and n. 2—allowed by Bahādur to call himself Shāh, 81—acted as Bahādur's commander at Ranthambhōr, 85—in Bahādur's company fled from Mandasōr, 126—declared heir by Bahādur, 171.
- Muhammad Yazd, *see* Yazd Muhammad.
- Muhammad Sultān Mirzā, a Tīmūrid by descent, 25—restless, 33—his rebellion against Humāyūn, 69, 175—captured, imprisoned and blinded, 69—genealogy, 175—title granted by Bābur, 175—had a large progeny, 176—was defeated by Hindāl, 177—fled to the Afghāns in Bihārkunda, 177—deserted Humāyūn on the battlefield of Bilgrām, 177, 241—joined Humāyūn at Āgrā, 236
- Muhammad Zamān Mirzā, relationship with Bābur, qualifications, 23—the *K̄halifā's* nominee, according to Mrs Beveridge, 23—the author's criticisms, 24-5—one of Humāyūn's enemies, 33—first rebellion, 34—pardoned and made governor of Bihār, 68—second rebellion, and capture, 69, 73, 96—flight to Bahādur, 73, 97—made leader of the Mughal party in Bahādur's court, 92—subject of correspondence between Humāyūn and Bahādur, 99-111—flight to Sindh, 169 and to Lahore, 129, 169-70—reappeared in Gujrāt, took possession of its treasure-houses and claimed kingship, 170-1—the Portuguese read *khutbah* in his name, 171—his disqualifications, 171—opposed by Imād-ul-Mulk, 172—left Gujrāt, 173—joined Humāyūn at Chunār, 173-4, 199—his reception described, 174—the cause of the disaster at Chausa, 174—in charge of the night watch at Chausa, 228—was drowned in crossing the Ganges, 230.
- Muhibb Ali K̄hān, the *K̄halifā's* son, 26.
- Mustafā Rūmī K̄hān, *see* Rūmī K̄hān, Mustafā.
- Muwand Bēg, in command of one of Humāyūn's retreating divisions, 207—incompetent, allowed Shēr K̄hān to escape, 207—his suggestion that the route of the onward journey should be followed, 222.
- Muzaffar Shāh II, Bahādur's father, 76, 78—his death, 78—his treatment of Mahmūd II of Mālwa, 80, 117—mentioned, 104, 107.
- Nagore, a town, 87 and n. 5.
- Nar Singh Deo, the organizer of defence at Chāmpānīr, death, 143 and n. 2.
- Narwar, 107 and n. 1.
- Nasir K̄hān, Bahādur K̄hān's youngest brother, 78—a Gujrātī party in his support, 78—was murdered, 79.
- Nasrat Shāh, Nāsiruddīn, his influence on Jalāluddīn Nūhānī, 39—the submission of the Nūhānīs to him, 39—reasons, 39-40—succeeded first by Alāuddīn Fīrūz and then by Mahmūd, 70, 197.
- Nassan K̄hān Malik, a Gujrātī nobleman, Silhadi sought his help, 82—was granted Ranthambhōr, 86—mentioned, 107.
- Nizāmī, his work, the *Sikandar-nāma*, 181.
- Nizāmuddīn Ahmad, the author of the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, 21—his father, Md. Muqīm Herāvi, 21 and n. 2—his description of the

- Ḳhalifā's* conspiracy, 21-2—Mrs Beveridge's criticisms, 22-3—the author's acceptance of his statement and reasons, 25-6—his description of the battle of Dadrah resembles that of Abbās, 45—mentions the distribution of *ḳhilats*, 59—his history mentioned, 163 and in several footnotes.
- Nizāmuddīn Alī Muhammad, *Ḳhalifā*, other titles, *Sayyid*, *Sultān*, *Hakīm*, *Ḳhwāja*, 17—importance, 18—refused governorship of Badaḳhshān, 11—at the dying Bābur's bedside, 14—rejection of Humāyūn and choice of Mahdī Ḳhwāja for the throne of Delhi, reasons, 20-1—abandonment of the scheme, 22—later history, 26—mentioned, 189.
- Nūra, *Shaiḳh*, 238 and n. 5.
- Nūr Muhammad Ḳhalīl, Bahādur's agent, 104, 105, 106, 107.
- Nūruddīn Ḳhān Jahān of Shirāz, led the Gujrātī rebels against the Mughals, 158.
- Nūruddīn Muhammad M., the governor of Qanauj, 199—went to Hindāl in Āgrā, 215-6, 217.
- Pāndua, situated in the neighbourhood of Gaur, 211-2.
- Parghari, *Mullā Mir* Muhammad, a follower of Shaiḳh Buhlūl, Humāyūn's agent, 225—perished at Chausa, 232.
- Pāyanda Ḳhān, a Gujrāt nobleman, met Bahādur at Bagh Pat and welcomed him to Gujrāt, 79.
- Prithvī Rāj, his *thākurdwārā*, 114.
- Purānā Qīla, 63, 114. See also Dīpanāh.
- Qādir Shāh Mandūālī (Mallu Ḳhān), accompanied Bahādur in his flight from Mandasōr, 126—warned Bahādur of Mughal assault on Mandū, 133—local influence in Mandū, 156.
- Qanauj, Nūruddīn, the governor of, 215—captured by Shēr Shāh, 220—Shēr Shāh's arrival at, 239—the battle of, 243-7—causes of Humāyūn's defeat at, 248-9.
- Qanungo, K. R., disbelieves Shēr Ḳhān's desertion at Dadrah, 44—his reasons, 44-5—the author's criticisms, 45-6—his book on Shēr Shāh, 179 and n. 1.
- Qarācha Bēg, one of Kāmran's nobles, 53.
- Qara Yūsuf Turkmān, 104-5 and n. 1.
- Qāsīm Alī Salāh-ul-Mulk, *Maulāna*, Humāyūn's agent, 103, 107.
- Qāsīm Husain Ḳhān, Sultān, arrived in Humāyūn's camp, 130—allowed Bahādur to escape from Mandū, 134 and n. 2—a Mughal commander at the battle of Mahmūdābād, 152—posted at Broach, Surat and Navsārī, 154—retreated to Ahmadābād, 159—ancestry, 159 and genealogy, n. 1—accompanied Humāyūn to Bengal, 199—defeated and killed Qutb Ḳhān, Shēr Shāh's son, 240—at the battle of Qanauj, 246.
- Qāsīm Qarācha, 235.
- Qutb Ḳhān, governor of Mungh, killed Maḳhdūm-i-Ālam, 70—was killed in a battle with Shēr Ḳhān, 72.
- Qutb Ḳhān Sūr, Shēr Ḳhān's son, 50—to be in Humāyūn's service, 50—killed, 240.
- Qutbuddīn, converted Prithvī Rāj's *thākurdwārā* into a mosque, 114 and n. 2.
- Qutbuddīn Shukrullāh, *Shāh*, Bahādur's agent, 132.
- Qutb-ul-Ālam, *Hazrat*, description and tomb, 153 and n. 4—a relic of the saint's miracle, 153.

- Rafiuddīn Safavī, *Sayyid*, a renowned personage of Agrā,—stay of Humāyūn with him, 251.
- Rajjuddīn Safavī, *Mir*, 248.
- Zānā Sāngā, approached the Mughal frontiers, 7—combined with Mahmūd Lōdī, 37—death, 37, 83—his successor, Ratan Singh, 32, 83.
- Ranthambhōr, capture of———by Sultān Bahādur, 85.
- Ratan Singh, Mahārānā, succeeded Sāngā, 32, 83—in alliance with Bahādur crushed Mālwa, 80—character, 83—death, 84.
- The *Rauzat-ut-Tāhīrīn*, 167.
- Rohtāsgarh, taken by Shēr K̄hān from a local chief, 206—not surrendered to the Mughals, 206—the wealth of Gaur transferred to, 208.
- Rūmī K̄hān Mustafā, parentage, 83 n. 1—career in Gujrāt, 85—captor of Raisen, 83, and Ranthambhōr, 85—conducted the two sieges of Chitōr, 87-8—Chitōr not granted to him, 121—his merits, 121—turns a traitor, 123—his suggestion to undergo a siege at Mandasōr, 124—supplied information to Humāyūn, 124—incited Bhupat Rāi to desert Bahādur and join Humāyūn, 133—accompanied Humāyūn to Bengal, 199—captured Chunār, 203—poisoned, 203—reasons, 203.
- Rūmī K̄hān Safar, the builder of Surat fort, led the Gujrātī rebels against the Mughals, 158.
- Sadī *Shaiḡh*, the noted Persian poet, his works, *Gulstān* and *Būstān*, 181.
- Sadr K̄hān, Bahādur's minister, 118—his assurance that Humāyūn would not attack him, while engaged against the Rājput̄s, 118—suggested immediate attack on the Mughals, 122—conducted retreat to Mandū, 127—Bahādur's agent, 131—continued the struggle at Mandū, 134—submission to Humāyūn, 134—placed under surveillance, 134—killed at Cambay, 135, 141.
- Saīd K̄hān of Kāshgarh, relationship with Bābur, 9—desired to annex Badaḡhshān, unsuccessful siege of its capital, 9—Bābur rebuked him, 12.
- Sajja, *Rājranā* of Dailwārā, defended Ganēsh Pōl, 88.
- Salāhuddīn, *see* Silhadī.
- Salāh-ul-mulk, *see* Qāsim Ali.
- Saran, P, corrects some of Qanungo's dates and events, 179 n. 1.
- Sarkhej, its geographical situation, 153, 154.
- Shād Bibī, Humāyūn's wife, lost at Chausa, 232.
- Shāh Abbās II, 111 n. 4.
- Shāh Jāhān, 111 n. 4.
- Shāh Mirzā, son of Muhammad Sultān Mirzā, occupied Mughal territory as far as Kara-Manikpūr, 176.
- Shāh Tahmāsp, *see* Tahmāsp, Shāh.
- Shaiḡh Buhlūl, *see* Buhlūl, Shaiḡh.
- Shamsuddīn Atkah K̄hān, helped Humāyūn in escaping after the battle of Qanauj, suitably rewarded, 250.
- Sharif Gilānī, Sayyid, the governor of Cambay, welcomed Humāyūn, 141.
- Sharqī dynasty of Jaunpūr, 179-81.
- Shēr Shāh, name Farid K̄hān, genealogy, 179 n. 2—early career, 179-81—management of his father's *jāgir*, his administrative principles, 181-5—in Sultān Ibrāhīm's court, 185—succeeded to his father's *jāgir*, 185—Md. K̄hān Sur's hostility, 185-6—took shelter with Sultān Md.,

- 186—saved his life from a tiger and hence entitled Shēr K̄hān, appointed tutor to Jalāluddīn; return to his *jāgīr*, 186—Md. K̄hān authorized to partition it, Shēr K̄hān refused to agree, obtained Mughal help and defeated Md. K̄hān and then befriended him, 187-8—visited Bābur's court, studied the Mughal administrative system, 188—and then fled away, 189—repaired to Sultān Md.; ministry in Jalāluddīn's reign, 189—came into possession of Chunār by marrying Lād *Malika*, 48-9—took part in the battle of Dadrah, 42—primary cause of the Afghān defeat, 44—Qanungo's refutation, 44-4 and the author's criticisms, 45-6—the treaty of Chunār, 50—difficulties, 189-92—after Mahmūd Lōdī's retirement acknowledged as leader, 192—the two wars with Sultān Mahmūd of Bengal ended with the battle of Surajgarh, 193—extension of territory, 193—besieged Gaur, 202—negotiations with Humāyūn, 204—Shēr K̄hān failed to observe terms, 206—speech to his followers, 206—transferred wealth to Rohtāsgarh, 208—captured Benāres, 216—introduced civil administration in the conquered provinces, 220—captured Ajudhya and Chunār, 222, Lucknow, 225—collected revenue east of Qanauj, 225—fought battle at Chausa, 228-33, defeated the Mughals, 231, generous treatment of Bēga Bēgam and the other Mughal ladies, 232—became king, 234—his full royal title, 234-5—killed Jahāngīr Qulī K̄hān and Dilāwar K̄hān, 234—reached Qanauj, 240
- waited for K̄hawās K̄hān' return, 241—the battle of Qanauj, 243-7 occupied Delhi, 252—administration, 256.
- Sikandar bin Muhammad (Manjhr Akbar), the author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, 95, 128.
- Sikandar of Satwas, 156.
- Sikandar K̄hān, Bahādur's elder brother—succeeded Muzaffar Shāh and reigned for five days, 78.
- Sikandar Lōdī, Sultān, 104.
- Sikrī, 251.
- Sikrigalli, a pass, 198—description, 209-10.
- Silhadi (Salāhuddīn), the lord of Raisen, 82—turned Muslim and died fighting against Bahādur, 82-3 and n. 4.
- Sīrī, Alauddīn K̄haljī's capital, 114.
- Sulaimān Mirzā, ancestry, 12—Badaḳhshān granted by Bābur, 12—married to Haram Bēgam, 9, n. 1—continued to govern Badaḳhshān, 28.
- Sultān Ahmad Jalair, 105 and n. 1.
- Sultān Alī, transcribed Hātīf's poem, 141.
- Sultān Ibrāhīm Lōdī, *see* Ibrāhīm Lōdī, Sultān.
- Sultān Muhammad Shāh Nūhānī, Daryā K̄hān Nūhānī's son, 38—originally called Bahādur K̄hān, 38—rebellion against Ibrāhīm Lōdī, 78—after Ibrāhīm's death, assumed royal titles, 38—acknowledged by the Afghāns as leader, 186—died, 38, 189.
- Surajgarh, geographical situation, 193 n. 1—the battle of, 72, 193.
- Tahmāsp, Shāh, his generous help to Humāyūn, 117.
- Tāj K̄hān, commandant of the Chunār fort, 48—killed by his son, Ahmad, 48—his widow Lād *Malika* married Shēr K̄hān, 48-9.

- 'Tāj K̄hān Narpālī, a Gujrātī nobleman, favoured Bahādur, 78—suggested immediate battle with the Mughals, 122.
- ʿAmūr, *Sāhib-Qurān*, 104.
- Tardī Bēg, posted at Chāmpānīr, 154—opposed Askari's assumption of sovereignty, 161—reported to Humāyūn about Askari's doings, 163—accompanied Humāyūn to Bengal, 199—at Chausa, 230—sent to succour Bēga Bēgam, 232.
- The *Tārīkh-i-Bahādur Shāhī*, 85.
- The *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, Nimatullah, author of, 214.
- Tātār K̄hān, son of Ālam K̄hān Alāuddīn, sought shelter with Bahādur, 91—took part in the first siege of Chitōr, 85—urged his father's claims on Delhi, 91—led a campaign against Āgrā, captured Biāna, 94—fought the battle of Mandrāel and was killed, 95.
- The *Tazkīrah-i-Bukhārāī*, 111.
- The *Tazkīrat-ul-Umarā*, a Persian work, 203.
- Teliagarhi, a pass, 198—description, 208—Humāyūn was opposed here by Jalāl K̄hān Sūr, 209.
- Tieffenthaler, Rev., his sketch of Teliagarhi, 208.
- Tirhoot, Hindāl governor of, 215—possibly another name for Muzaf-farpūr, 202, n. 2.
- Tod, his description of Ratan Singh's character, 83 and Vikramāditya's, 84.
- Toglān Bēg *Kōka*, one of Askari's officers, 221.
- Tūghān, Malik, son of Malik Ayāz, appointed governor of Diū, 85.
- The *Udaipūr Rājya kā Itihās*, 89, 167.
- ʿUjjain, Humāyūn's march to, 119—description, 119, n. 1.
- Olugh Mirzā, (1) Bābur's uncle, 53, (2) son of Md. Sultān Mirzā, occupied territory up to Jaunpūr, 176.
- Umar Shaiḵh Mirzā, 53.
- Vikramāditya (Bikramājīt or Vikramājīt), his treaty with Bahādur, 59—as prince, held Ranthambhōr in *jāgīr*, 84—negotiation with Bābur about exchange of *jāgīr*, 84—character,—made an ineffectual effort to help Silhadī, 84.
- Wais K̄hān Mirzā, governor of Badakhshān, 7—death, 7—ancestry, 12.
- Wais Kūlābī, Sultān, a local chief in Badakhshān, 8—his daughter, Haram Bēgam married to Sulaimān, 9, n. 1.
- Wali K̄hūb Mirzā, rebelled against Humāyūn, 69—imprisoned and blinded, 69, 97.
- Yādgar Bēg *Taghāī* Mirzā, maternal uncle and father-in-law of Humāyūn, 69—acted as jailor, 69—allowed Muhammad Zamān to escape to Bahādur, 69, 97 and himself followed him, 97.
- Yādgar Nāsir Mirzā, joined Humāyūn at Mandū, 130—at the battle of Mahmūdābād, 152—posted at Pātan, 154—retreated to Askari, 159—the governor of Kālpī, 199—willing to help Humāyūn, 217—defeated and killed Qutb K̄hān, Shēr Shāh's son, 240—at the battle of Qanauj, 243, 246—wounded at Bhongāōn, 250—quarrel with Askari, 251.
- Yazd, Muhammad, 180.
- Yūnas Alī, Mir, the governor of Lahore, 53—captured by Kām-rān, allowed to go to Humāyūn, 53—reason of his opposition to Kām-rān, 56.
- Zāhid Bēg, Humāyūn's brother-in-

law, was displeased with him, Zamān Mirzā, Md., *see* Muhammad
 joined Hindāl, 216 and n. 1— Zamān Mirzā.
 suggested Buhlūl's death, 216. Zambūr, Mihtar, *see* Mihtar Zambūr.