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INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE,

FROM

INDIA;

CONTAINING

DISPATCHES

FROM

MARQUIS WELLESLEY AND FROM THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL IN COUNCIL, TO THE SECRET COM-
MITTEE OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS
TO MAJOR-GEN. WELLESLEY, &c.

TOGETHER WITH

*REPORTS OF THE STATE OF OUR
INDIA POSSESSIONS,*

Sent by a French Emissary to General Decaen,
Governor of the Mauritius;

AND

LETTERS

From various Persons in India to their Friends in Great Britain.

Printed by P. HAND, Southampton-street, Pentonville; and
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1805.

PREFACE.

ANOTHER Collection of intercepted Dispatches and Letters is submitted to the curiosity of the Public. They were taken on board the *Hope*, homeward-bound East Indiaman, captured by Rear-Admiral LINOIS, and sent by the Governor-General of the Mauritius to France, where they were published a few days ago in the *Moniteur*.

The information they contain upon the situation of our affairs in India, the rise and progress, the causes and objects of the Mahratta War, is most curious and important : they prove, too, that during the Peace, French Emissaries, or *Commercial Colonels* as they have been called, were sent to India, to intrigue with the Native Powers, to indispose them to our interests, and to stir them up to declare War against us.

The French Government are anxious to represent the English as the authors of this odious and disgusting practice of publishing intercepted Correspondence ; though it would not be difficult to prove that

that they had recourse to it long before the publication of the Egyptian Letters. But which of the two Nations first adopted the practice ; the French may certainly claim the praise of having *improved* upon it : and, of the means devised for obtaining possession of public and private Correspondence, the *merit is all their own*. The robbery of Ambassadors and Couriers exclusively *adorns* the page of French history, and *decks* the annals of the illustrious dynasty of the fourth race.

As the intercepted Correspondence has been published in France, and circulated throughout Europe, there existed no reason for not publishing it in this country. The Translator, however, intended at first to have omitted the private Correspondence : but as it consists of Letters addressed from persons in India to their friends in England, and as those Letters had been circulated over the Continent, he thought it right that they should at last reach their original destination.

London, May 27, 1805.

PUBLIC CORRESPONDENCE.

INTERCEPTED DISPATCHES

FROM INDIA.

DISPATCHES FROM THE MARQUIS OF WELLÉSLEY, TAKEN ON
BOARD THE HOPE, BY REAR ADMIRAL LINOIS.

No. I.—Extract of a Letter from his Excellency the Most
Noble the GOVERNOR GENERAL, to the Right Honourable
Lord HOBART.

November 20, 1803.

“THE operation and result of the events in India, for the last three months, have furnished matter for serious reflection upon the designs of France upon India, and upon the means by which a formidable French Party might establish itself amongst the native Powers. Whatever might have been the interpretation in England of the Convention of 1787, relative to the nature of the French Establishments in India, the circumstances which accompanied the arrival of M. Binot, and of M. Decaen, at Pondicherry, joined to the general conduct of the French at Pondicherry since the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens, have evidently proved that the intention of France was to establish a military and political power in India.

“This intention will appear clear to your Excellency, from the examination of the annexed statement of the establishment formed by the French Government, for occupying the French possessions upon the Continent of India. That establishment sent chiefly from France, in the month of March, 1803, is at present at the Mauritius, under the command of M. Decaen; and the rest has been embarked at Madras for France, under the command of M. Binot, in consequence of the conditions granted to the French, who landed at Pondicherry in the month of June.

“Your Excellency will not fail to remark, that the French expedition, such as it arrived in India, was purely military; and that the French Government had appointed to the Indian service a very extensive military *Etat Major*, capable of furnishing Officers for a considerable army. The intention of the French relative to the rebuilding of their ancient fortifications, or the construction of new works, has not been manifested. But when we consider the extent of the expedition arrived in India, we must of course conclude, that the intention of France was to avail her-

self of every opportunity to reinforce and extend her military resources and power in India.

“ The civil and military government of the Carnatic being in the hands of the Company, the French arrived with M. Binot, have met with great difficulties in their political intrigues: and these difficulties were increased by the situation in which that division of French troops were, on account of the doubtful state of the negotiations which existed between His Majesty and the French Government.

“ The vigilance of the Governor of Fort St. George sustained by those advantages, rendered all communication between the French at Pondicherry, and the native Powers of India, almost impossible; yet there exist many reasons to justify my opinion, that the French have arrived in India with the most hostile disposition, and with a restless solicitude to profit of every occasion to smooth the way amongst the native Powers for their system of political intrigue, and to fix a rival influence there, calculated to weaken the British Power in that part of the Globe.

“ From the information I have received, I have not the smallest doubt that it was the intention of the French Government to disseminate emissaries for political intrigue, and military adventurers in all the courts and camps of the native Powers: and I am convinced that all the questions supposed in my dispatch of the 20th June, would have arisen immediately after the restoration of the French establishment.

“ In order to afford your Excellency an opportunity of judging of the political and military plans of the French who arrived in India in consequence of the Peace of Amiens, I have the honour to annex two papers, one from Pondicherry, sent by the Officer charged with the execution of the restitutions to be made upon the Coast of Coromandel; it was written by M. Le Febvre, formerly an officer in the service of the French at Pondicherry, who accompanied M. Decaen to India, and who, when Colonel Cullen received that paper, was M. Binot's Aid-de-Camp. The Memoire has been presented to the First Consul of the French Republic; and Colonel Cullen has remarked that it was considered at Pondicherry as a secret paper, which he could not have obtained without difficulty. The second paper was addressed to me by M. Muller, who says he has the rank of Chief of Brigade in the army. He arrived at Calcutta soon after news was received at this Presidency, of the renewal of hostilities between Great Britain and France. Having declared, that it was in his power to disclose important things to this Government with respect to the designs of France, and having demanded of him a written communication of that information, he sent me the letter which I have the honour to annex.

“ Although these papers contained propositions in many respects absurd and chimerical, they sufficiently indicate the spirit of those who conceived and approved of them; and indeed the execution of some of these plans ought not to be supposed to be so

visionary, when we shall have well reflected upon the situation of the native armies, as it appears to be at first sight.

“ The causes and the events of the contest in which the British Government in India is at present engaged, against two Chiefs of the Mahratta Empire, have afforded sufficient proofs of the formidable power which French adventurers, and an enterprising disposition in the armies and territories of the native Powers might establish.

“ Your Excellency will assuredly direct your attention to the dispatches sent within the last six months to the secret Committee, and to the Court of Directors, by the Governor General separately, and by the Governor General in Council; and you will not be long in perceiving the rapid and dangerous increase of the military resources of Dowlut Row Scindiah, under the direction of M. Perron, or rather of the rapid and dangerous increase of the military resources of the French in India, under the nominal authority of Dowlut Row Scindiah.

“ If that brigand establishment founded by M. Perron on the banks of the Jumna, had not been to my knowledge, previously in connection with the present Government of France, your Excellency will judge that that circumstance would not be attended with danger, notwithstanding the formation and increase of such a power in India; that power has been entirely prepared for the purpose of giving strong and cordial succour to support the cause of the French in India, and to facilitate the designs of France with equal promptitude and zeal.

“ In fact, the origin and the progress of the civil and military authority of M. Perron must be attributed to the disorder and confusion of the Mahratta empire, the weakness and corruption of Scindiah's council, and to the decline of his real interests and his just power. The Chiefs and Commanders of the French territory are all military adventurers; and they have drawn their resources from unlimited depredations and licentious conquest; yet these features of their character do not appear to be of a nature to make them altogether unworthy of the attestation of the present Rulers of France. Your Excellency will remark upon the subject of the political plans of the French in India, the advantage which M. Perron and his band of French adventurers have derived from the abuse of the nominal authority of the unfortunate Emperor Shah Alum.

“ M. Perron has obtained the exercise of sovereign authority over a territory whose annual revenues amounted to near two millions sterling, and he has negotiated and concluded treaties and alliances with several petty States in his own name.

A true copy.

Signed,

“ M. B. EDMONSTON,
Secretary to the Government.”

No. 2.—To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

“ GENTLEMEN—1. In our dispatches to your Honourable Committee, dated April 12 and June 15, the Governor General in Council manifested his intention to write to your Honourable Committee a separate letter upon the subject of the peace lately concluded between the British Government and the Confederate Mahratta Chiefs.

“ 2. The Governor General intends to transmit in these dispatches, all the papers relative to the pacification, and to communicate to your Honourable Committee the detail of the negotiations between the Honourable Major General Wellesley and the respective Ministers sent to that Officer's camp by the Confederate Chiefs, with the intention of concluding a peace with the British Government, as well as the different important questions arising out of the conditions of the pacification, and the result of the discussions upon the subject of those questions with Dowlut Row Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar; and the intention of the Governor General to combine with that narrative the documents and remarks which may serve to illustrate the principles which have regulated the conduct of the British Government, in prescribing conditions of peace, and in adjusting the different complicated questions relative to the stipulations of the treaties of Deogaum and Serje-Angengaum.

“ 3. The Governor General also intends to enclose in these dispatches the most ample detail of the advantageous operation which results from the general pacification, both to the interests of the Company and to those of the Nation in India.

“ 4. The vast volume of papers which are to accompany these dispatches, and affairs continually pressing, have hitherto prevented the completion of the letter in question. The Governor General being, nevertheless, eager to give your Honourable Committee, as soon as possible, the fullest information upon the situation in which the interests of the British Government have been placed by the conditions of the pacification, thinks it expedient to send to your Honourable Committee by the Company's ship the Hope, as well by the overland packet, the present letter, containing a general *coup d'œil* of the details which will compose the dispatch mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

“ 5. The advantages which result to the British Government from the conditions of the pacification, must be considered as having relation to the cause and object of the war, the increase and consolidation of our continental force and our general resources, and the aggrandisement of our system of political relations, whose effect is extended by the result of several treaties of peace, of subsidy, and alliance, over the general tranquillity and prosperity of the native Powers of Indostan and of the Deccan.

“ 6. The immediate cause of the war arose from the refusal which the confederate Mahratta Chiefs had made to divide and withdraw

withdraw to their usual stations, upon their respective territories, the armies they had collected and concentrated upon the frontiers of our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan, after having declared that the intention of that union was to decide, whether there should be peace or war with the British Government and its allies.

“ 7. Under these circumstances, to continue in the position which the Chiefs appeared determined to maintain, was a manifest proof of the design they had to prevent by hostilities, or by the terror of their arms, the operation of the alliance concluded between the British Government and the Peshwah, and to disturb the tranquillity of the States of the Nizam and of the Company.

“ 8. The union of the confederated forces, and their imposing and menacing position, afforded every advantage to the Chiefs to prosecute the hostile design they had manifested, and placed the confederate Chiefs in a condition to keep in their hands the success of peace or war, and to decide the fate of the Deccan, according to their interests or caprice. At the same time, the position and the situation of Scindiah's army, under the command of his French Officers in Indostan, and the plots which M. Perron was forming with the neighbouring States, and with the subjects of the Company and the Vizier, afforded an additional proof in confirmation of the hostile designs of the confederates, and furnished those Chiefs with additional means of executing their designs.

“ 9. The first object of the war arising out of these causes, was to deprive the confederates of the means which they possessed of executing their illegal designs, and of preventing them from being able to revive the sources of the military and political power which they had employed to disturb the security of our alliances, states, and dependencies.

“ 10. The power of Dowlat Row Scindiah, considered with relation to his means, as being able to affect the security of the British Empire in India, consisted at the commencement of the war in the following branches of military and political resources:

“ 1. In the imposing situation of the military establishment of Scindiah, under the direction of European officers, and particularly in the formidable force of his regular infantry and artillery; under the command of those officers;

“ * 2. In the possession of a rich and vast territory, different forts, magazines, founderies, and arsenals, with a considerable provision of ammunition and military necessaries deposited in convenient situations upon our frontiers, adjoining the weakest part of the British States in Indostan.

“ * The Jaghire of M. Perron on the Doab of the Jumna and the Ganges, and his territorial possessions on the right bank of the Jumna, at Delhi, and at Agra.

Arsenal and Magazine— $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Coel,} \\ \text{Alighur,} \\ \text{Deihi.} \end{array} \right.$
 Foundery—Mutra.
 Arsenal and Magazine—Agra.”

“ 3. In

“ 3. In the establishment of a large body of well disciplined troops, with a formidable train of artillery, under the command of French officers, throughout the extent of that territory ; the head quarters at Coel and Alighur ;

“ 4. In the effective assignment of that territory to a French officer, M. Perron having the chief command of the troops ;

“ 5. In the passive situation of His Majesty's person, Shah Allam, which was under the immediate power of the armed force, commanded by French officers, in the service of Scindiah, and in the exercise of the nominal authority of the Mogul, by those French officers ;

“ 6. In the ascendancy established by the agency of French officers, having command in the troops of Scindiah, in the North West of Indostan, over the Rajahpouts Chiefs of Iyonagour and Ioderpore, and other States and Chiefs in the Northern and Western provinces of Indostan, and over several Seyk Chiefs, and others who occupy the territories from the Junna to the Banks of the Indus ; and in the facility which the advanced posts of M. Perron's army procured to effect an invasion of the British States upon that point,

“ 7. In the facility afforded by the possession of the maritime port of Baroach, to augment the military establishments of Scindia, by receiving there, French or other European officers, ammunition, provisions, and perhaps a body of auxiliary French or other European troops.

“ 8. In the power he possessed of disturbing the tranquillity of the possessions of Guickwars and of the company in the Guzerat, inasmuch as the territory and fortresses of Scindiah are intermixed in that province, and as he has pretensions and influence in that part of the country.

“ 9. In the tranquillity of the State of Poonah being compromised, as well as the stability of our alliance with the Peishwah ; the territories and fortresses of Scindiah being intermixed in the neighbourhood of Poonah and the South of the Tapy river (particularly the territory and fortress of Ahmadnagoun), and Scindiah forming different pretensions to the State of Poonah, and having influence at that Court.

“ 10. In the fortresses and adjoining possessions of Scindiah being so intermixed as to place him in a situation to menace the domains of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and to weaken the influence and power of the British alliance with that Power, besides that Scindiah had different pretensions to the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and consequently might have influence at Hydrabad.

“ 11. In the general grandeur, riches, and strength of the territories of Scindiah and his army, and in the reputation of his military power, by which he had acquired a general influence and ascendancy at Poonah, and over all the Mahratta States and even at Hydrabad, which influence and ascendancy had been for some years, uniformly directed against the British power in India.

“ 12. Under

“ 12. Under this point of view of the situation of the power of Scindiah at the commencement of the war, it became dangerous to the British Empire :—First, by the facility it afforded the French of injuring the British interests in India, either by co-operating with Scindiah, or by the independent means of his French officers and other Europeans.—Secondly, in maintaining a rival and hostile influence in all the territories of India; and particularly amongst our more important dependencies and allies in the western part of India, and by the ability afforded of forming a powerful league of a hostile confederacy amongst the States of the Country against the British Government, and of becoming a powerful and formidable instrument in the execution of the projects which such a union might propose to itself.

“ 12. With the intention of submitting to the particular knowledge of your honourable Committee, the extent and greatness of the danger to which the British Empire was accidentally exposed at the beginning of last war, by the power of Scindiah and the other States to the north of Indostan, and particularly by the existence of the armed French force under M. Perron, joined to the independent possession of a great extent of country in the Doab of the Jumna and the Ganges, the Governor General in Council thinks proper to insert in this place, an Extract of the Instructions of the Governor General to His Excellency the Commander in Chief, dated the 27th July, 1803, a Copy of which was annexed to our dispatches addressed to your honourable Committee, under date of the 1st of August, 1803, the substance of which is mentioned in the 30d and following paragraphs of our dispatches addressed to your honourable Committee, dated the 12th April, 1804.

“ To every person acquainted with the real nature of the British interest and power in India, the North West frontier of Indostan must have appeared to be the most feeble part of our vast empire.

“ The power of the Seyks, as well as of the Mahrattas, and the Rajpouts and other petty States affords a considerable advantage to the invasion of an enemy coming from the most distant parts of the North West of Asia, or the banks of the Indus; and it will be superfluous to remark to your Excellency, that the enterprising spirit of France, or the ambition of Russia, or even the violence and rapacity of the Afghan tribes or other Asiatic nations, which inhabit the Northern and Western countries of Asia, may have conceived plans of invasion in that part, an invasion which would have extremely embarrassed the British power in India.

“ The pre-sentiment of that danger, joined to other motives, has induced me to enter into the arrangements with the Nabob Vizier, which were concluded by the treaty of Lucknow, and which have considerably increased the military, political, and financial resources, as well as the power of the British nation upon the North West frontiers of Oude.

“ The result of these fortunate arrangements has undoubtedly afforded a great increase of security against all the dangers which menaced the stability of our empire over that part of India.

“ Yet, the local position of the territories of Scindiah, the situation and nature of his military forces in Indostan, and the bad and corrupt counsels of that feeble Chief, arrogant and faithless, still afford serious danger to the British interest. The territories of Scindiah between the Jumna and the Ganges, interrupt our line of defence on that side, and some of his principal posts are pushed to the centre of our States, whilst the possession of Agra, Delhi, and the Western and Southern banks of the Jumna, places him in a condition to command almost the whole line of our North West frontier.

“ In case of some considerable increase of the power of Scindiah, or in case he should form some connection with France, or some other enemy of the English, the present position of his territories and forces in Indostan, will furnish him with great advantages in the attack he might make upon the establishments of the Company.

“ However formidable the power of Scindiah would be, in case of an increase of his forces by the junction of another enemy, a more pressing and immediate danger in all its consequences has just arisen from the decline of the local authority of Scindiah in Indostan; and that danger has recently assumed a more alarming aspect, in proportion to the accumulated embarrassments of Scindiah, in the Deccan, and to the decrease and the general decay of his resources, and his power.

“ The regular infantry in the service of Scindiah under the orders of European Officers, is maintained out of the funds proceeding almost exclusively from the territorial possession of that Chief, situated between the Jumna, the Ganges, and the Mountains of Cumaon.

“ A considerable part, not to say all, this territory has been assigned to M. Perron, a French officer who has succeeded M. Duboigne in the chief command of the regular infantry of Scindiah.

“ M. Perron has formed of that territory an independent State, and we may say with reason, that the regular infantry of Scindiah forms the national army. This army is now increased to 39,050 men, (this is the number of the regular infantry under M. Perron, 16,600 of whom were in the Duab in June, 1803.)

“ The inhabitants of the districts comprised in the Jaghire of M. Perron, consider that officer as their immediate Sovereign; and on the other hand the troops maintained by the revenues of the country, regard M. Perron as the immediate executive authority from which the army receives orders, subsistence, and pay. Possessing such means, M. Perron gives law, with the authority of a sovereign State of superior rank, and with the vigour of a military Power, to the petty States which occupy the countries South of the Jumna; and by the terror of his name, and of his
arms,

arms, keeps in vile submission the Rajpout States of Jyenagour and Jordpour, as well as the Gauts and the State of Gohud, and extends his influence even to the Bundelcund, and the territories occupied by the Seiks.

“ Scindia has no direct authority over M. Perron and his regular troops. Several examples must be known to your Excellency, in which M. Perron has openly disobeyed, or systematically evaded the orders of Scindia, particularly in the last crisis of that Chief's Affairs.

“ M. Perron has for some time manifested a systematic disposition to remove all British Officers from the command of Scindia's regular infantry, and to introduce French Officers under his immediate patronage.

“ M. Perron is supposed to possess a considerable fortune; and your Excellency perfectly well knows how strong his desire is to return to Europe, and to dispose of his present command, and his territorial possessions, in favour of some person of the French Nation.

“ It is of importance to add to those considerations, that M. Perron is in possession of the person of the unfortunate Shah Alum, and that he is consequently in possession of the authority of that wretched Prince.—Hence M. Perron could transfer that rich possession, as well as his property of whatever kind it may be, to a French adventurer or officer willing to make such a purchase.

“ Thus, the concurrence of divers extraordinary and irresistible accidents, the imbecility of the personal character of Scindia; the rapacity and wretchedness of his Ministers (who have engaged him in an enterprise of aggrandisement, avarice, and ambition, at a great distance from Indostan, in the Deccan, at Poonah, and in the southern provinces of the Mahratta empire) the treachery of several of his chiefs, whose interest is to turn his attention from the affairs of Indostan, to direct it to those of the Deccan; and the last shocks which his power has received from Holkar, have contributed to the foundation of an independent French state, upon the most feeble point of the Company's frontiers.

“ Under the influence of a succession of French adventurers, that state is exposed to all the intrigues of the French in India, and even to the ambition and hostile disposition of the person who now governs the French nation: never could an instrument of destruction more skilfully contrive to wound the heart of the British empire in India, be offered to the vindictive hands of the First Consul of France.

“ This French state proceeds actually from the person and nominal authority of the Mogul, keeps up the most respectable army of regular native infantry, and the most powerful artillery that exists at present in India (if we except his Majesty's troops and those of the Company) and exercises a considerable influence over the neighbouring States, from the Banks of the Indus to the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges.

“ Supposing we could establish the most intimate amity and alliance between Scindia and the English, and even that Scindia would accede to the treaty of Bassien, and to the general defensive alliance with the Company, the Nizam and the Peishwah, it is impossible to suppose, that the French State would cordially co-operate in supporting the British interest.—Still less can we rely upon that State in a case which should render the demand more pressing, and which should require the most active execution of the principles of general defensive alliance.

“ In case of an attack on the part of France upon the British territories or power in India, we might rely in vain upon a French State, erected under the nominal and ostensible auspices of Scindia, in Indostan; it would not furnish any real succours to the ally of the British power, being at war with France, should even that ally be disposed to assist us at such a crisis.

“ On the other hand, there is no doubt that Scindia would receive the most speedy succours from that state in every enterprise which he might be disposed to undertake, either to reduce the English, or to contribute to the aggrandisement of the French power in India.

“ In addition to these remarks, it is proper to inform your Excellency, that the vicinity of the regular infantry of M. Perron constantly diminishes the population of the Company’s Provinces, and dries up the sources of our agriculture, our manufactures, our commerce, and our revenues; as well as the means of recruiting for the army in that country.

“ In the present crisis, when all circumstances announce the probability of the resumption of hostilities against France, and demand the necessity of having recourse to all possible measures of safety and precaution; the welfare of the British states requires the reduction of the military resources and power of M. Perron, independently of every question that might exist between Scindia and the British Government.

“ In a situation of solid peace, and even of alliance with Scindia, the necessity of providing for our security would justify a formal demand of the removal of so imminent a danger from the frontiers of our States. The refusal of Scindia to comply with such a demand would afford a just motive for war against him; and some vain or false pretext of incapacity on the part of Scindia, either to direct his movements, or to reduce the power of that French State, would authorise the British Government to take upon itself the protection of his own territories, in order to take from his ownhands the most proximate cause of danger and alarm.”

“ 13. If that state had not been, to the knowledge of the Governor General, previously in connection with the Government of France, your Honourable Committee would not certainly deem that circumstance worthy of affecting the views of the Governor General, which he directs to the danger to be feared from the formation and increase of such a power in India. But that power was fully prepared to support, with vigour and sincerity, the cause

of the French in India, and to second the projects of France, with equal promptitude and zeal.

“ 14. The danger arising from the situation of the province of the Rajah of Berar, as well as of his means, which menaced the security of the British empire in India, appeared at the commencement of the war to consist of a military force much inferior to that of Scindia, in point of discipline, but which augmented considerably the general force of the Confederates against the British Government; secondly, in the possession of a vast territory and some fortresses which commanded the states of the Company and those of the Soubahdar of the Deccan in several attackable points; thirdly, in the possession of the province of Cuttack, which enabled the Rajah of Berar to intercept the communication between our northern and southern provinces, to facilitate the invasion of Bengal and the northern Circars, and to obtain the assistance of the French or other European officers or troops who might land in the province of Cuttack: fourthly, in the mixture of the possessions of the Rajah of Berar with those of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, his vexatious pretensions over the Court of Hyderabad, and his influence at that Court: fifthly, in the pretensions of the Rajah of Berar over the Government of Poonah, and the ascendancy and influence which his extraction gives him, conjointly with the general greatness of his states and resources, with his supposed wealth, and with the hostile disposition which the state of Berar had manifested for several years, by opposing the interests of the British empire in India.

“ 15. Under this point of view of the circumstances and means above mentioned, possessed by Dowlut Row Scindia and the Rajah of Berar respectively, and which threaten the security of the British empire in India, the desirable object of an eventual war with those Chiefs were, first with respect to Dowlut Row Scindia, the entire reduction of the regular corps of M. Perron, the incorporation in the British states of all the territory between the Doab and the Ganges, now possessed by M. Perron, the river Jumna becoming thereby the north-west frontier of our dominions on that side; the occupation of Delhi and Agra, and of a chain of posts on the western and southern banks of the Jumna; the free navigation of the Jumna, and the possession of both banks of that River; the permanent exclusion of the Mahrattas from the north-west part of Indostan; the establishment of a system of defensive alliance with the States of Indostan, whose territories, by their local position, might form a barrier between the possessions of the Company and those of the Mahrattas, and ensure the exclusion of Scindia's influence and authority from the north-west part of Indostan; the protection of the person and nominal authority of his Majesty Shah-Alum; the occupation of the port and bay of Baroach, and the territory annexed to it, as well as the reduction of the power in general of Scindia in the Guzzerat the cession of the territories of Scindia, which are mixed with those of our Allies, the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwah; and in general the reduction of the military power and territorial resources of Scindia.

as far as it shall be necessary to our security and the safety and tranquillity of our Allies.

“ Secondly, with respect to the Rajah of Berar, the occupation of the province of Cuttack, and the cession of all the provinces of the Rajah of Berar, intermixed with those of the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

“ 16. The above-mentioned details may be considered as having constituted the necessary object of the war, with respect to its original causes, and that object has properly formed the basis of our demands in the negotiation of peace with the confederated Chiefs.

“ 17. In considering the dangers to which the security of the British Government has been accidentally exposed, at the commencement of the war, by the destructive means already related in the preceding part of this dispatch, which were in the hands of the two principal Mahratta States, your honourable Committee will be able to appreciate justly the advantages which have resulted to the British empire from the permanent removal of those dangers, effected by the successes of the war; and by the conditions of peace.

“ 18. In the moment of our most signal victories, when the repeated and glorious successes of our arms had almost extinguished the power of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and when we possessed sufficient means to overthrow entirely those two states, by the continuance of military operations, at that moment the concessions which the Hon. Major-General Wellesley had orders to demand from the confederate Chiefs, were limited to the extent absolutely necessary to prevent the renewal of the original causes of the war, and to provide for our permanent security, and the faithful execution of the positive engagements contracted before the war or during the continuance of it.

“ 19. It would not have been a just, humane, or honourable policy to have insisted upon reducing the power of the enemy more than is necessary to fulfil the just object of the war, and to guarantee the security of the British Government and its allies. Public duty has required that every possible effort should be made to retain the force of the enemy within the limits which the just interests of the Government and its allies prescribe; but on the other hand, we should have thought that it was equally contrary to the glory and the power of the British Government, as well as our duty, to the orders of the Honourable Company, and to the laws of our country, to prosecute a war which should have for its object revenge, aggrandisement, or ambition, or to pursue a vanquished enemy beyond the just limits of rational security and public faith.

“ 20. Amongst the principal advantages which the late peace gives us, we must reckon the maintenance of the national character in India, by the moderation, the clemency, and the justice which the British Government have manifested in the conditions of peace granted to our enemies, at a moment and in a situation which placed the existence of their states absolutely at our disposal.

“ 21. Imme-

“ 21. Immediately after the reduction of Gawailgher, the Hon. Major-General Wellesley prepared to pursue the Rajah of Berar to Nagpour, the capital of his territories; and arrangements were agreed upon for the invasion of Berar, which was to have been undertaken from the provinces of Sumbalpour, by the Corps under Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, and of Cuttack by Lieut. Colonel Harcourt.

“ 22. The brilliant and decisive successes of his Excellency General Lake, and the entire destruction of the power of Scindia in Indostan, left General Lake the liberty of detaching a force against the possessions of the Rajah of Berar. Thus, conformably to the instructions of the Governor General, General Lake disposed of a considerable detachment, with the intention of invading Berar from the northern part of Indostan.

“ 23. At that period, all the possessions of the Rajah of Berar on the west part of the river Warda, the province of Cuttack and its dependencies, and the provinces of Sunbálpour and Patna were wrested from his domination; and the only strong place in the limits of the territories of which he has been dispossessed, was reduced by the British arms.

“ 24. In this extremity of the affairs of the Rajah of Berar, the British Government granted peace to that Chief under conditions which have been exclusively governed by the consideration of national security and public faith.

“ 25. Before the conclusion of the separate treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, the military power of Scindia had been destroyed in Indostan, and deeply wounded in the Deccan by the brilliant successes of the British army, which had taken the field under his Excellency General Lake and the Hon. Major-General Wellesley; and all the possessions of Scindia in the north of Indostan and in the Deccan have been conquered by the British arms.

“ 26. As soon as Major-General Wellesley had received the treaty of Deogaum, ratified by the Rajah of Berar, all the necessary measures were adopted to employ the whole force under General Wellesley against Scindia. To increase the number of troops, under the command of Major-Gen. Wellesley a considerable force was collected in the Guzerat, under the orders of Col. Murray, destined for an unforeseen attack upon the provinces of Scindia, in the province of Malwa. That force having been, by the conquest of Baroach and Powanghour, and of all the possessions of Scindia, in the province of Guzerat, able to begin acting offensively in the Malwa, was at that period ready to advance directly against Ougein, the capital of Scindia; and it began its march to the frontiers of Guzerat to execute that project.

“ 27. The conclusion of a separate peace with the Rajah of Berar, also placed General Lake in a condition to make preparations for directing the operations of the detachment destined to invade Berar, against the southern possessions of Scindia, by co-operating with the forces under Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Murray.

“ 28. Vigorously pressed on all sides in the rest of his territories, Dowlut Row Scindia sued for peace. Your Honourable Committee will view the conditions of peace granted to Scindia in the extreme crisis in which his affairs were, as founded upon the principles of mildness and patience, as far as they were compatible with our just rights of reasonable indemnity, and with the security of our possessions, and of the states, rights, and interests of our Allies.

“ 29. The concessions made on the part of the enemy, which guarantee in the manner already mentioned, the security of the British Government against the dangers which had existed at the commencement of the War, necessarily afford additional advantages to the cause of the British Government and of its Allies.—The arrangements which had been deemed indispensably necessary for the security of the British Government and its Allies, have increased and consolidated our territorial resources, and those of his Highness the Peishwah and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the only powers who can justly pretend to participate in the conquests of the war, and in the other stipulations of the peace. We may consider these arrangements as a guarantee of the entire accomplishment of the general system of political relations in India; a system which the uniform and approved policy of the Governor General, in obedience to the orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, tended to establish, and which as experience has demonstrated to us, affords the only practicable means of preserving the general tranquillity, and consequently of being able to render the security and prosperity of the British empire in India really permanent.

“ 30. In order to be able to lay before your Hon. Committee a distinct picture of the advantages arising out of the late pacification, the Governor General will relate in regular order the different stipulations of the Treaties of Peace concluded respectively with Dowlut Row Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, accompanied with the remarks which shall be judged necessary, to illustrate the object and effect of each respective article of the Treaty of Partition concluded between the Honourable Company and its Allies, and of the Treaty of Defensive and Subsidiary Alliance between the Honourable Company and Scindiah.

TREATY OF PEACE WITH DOWLUT ROW SCINDIAH.

“ 31. The first article ensures the establishment of permanent friendship between the Contracting Parties.

“ 32. The second article relates to the cession of the rights of Dowlut Row Scindiah, and of his possessions in the Doab, and to the North of those of the Rajah of Jyenagour and Jodepour, and of the Ranah of Gohnd, with the exception of certain districts specified in a subsequent article.

“ 33. By this article, as well as by the third article of the treaties of partition, and by the fourth article of defensive alliance with Scindiah, the authority of the British Government has been

established over all the territories which M. Perron had previously occupied. The provinces which before the war had formed a state governed by French adventurers, and which furnished resources to a numerous corps of regular infantry and a formidable artillery, under the direction of French Officers, form at present a part of the possessions of the Honourable Company, and of the territorial security for the subsidiary payment due by Scindiah to the Company; and the British Government has been placed in a situation to fulfil the original object of rendering the Jumna the frontier of our territories in that part, and of occupying the fortresses of Agra and Delhi, with a chain of posts on the right bank of the Jumna, sufficient to ensure the English the free navigation of that river.

“ 34. By the stipulation of these articles the power and influence of the French and the Mahrattas have been equally excluded from the North-west part of Indostan.

“ 35. The revenues arising from M. Perron's portion of territory between the Jumna and the Ganges have been ascertained per year, amounting to near 56 lacks of rupees, and these revenues are still susceptible of augmentation.

“ 36. It has been impossible to know exactly what was the annual produce of the territory which belonged formerly to Dowlut Row Scindiah or to M. Perron, situated upon the right bank of the Jumna. There shall, however, be sent to the Honourable Court as soon as possible an exact report of the produce of the ceded territories in that quarter.

“ 37. By the third article, the fort and the territory of Baroach, and the fort of Ahmednagour, and the territories dependant upon them, with the exception of certain districts specified in a subsequent article of the treaty, have been also ceded by Scindiah.

“ 38. By the cession of the territory of Baroach, and by virtue of the fourth article of the treaty of partition, an annual revenue of ten or eleven lacks of rupees augments the resources of Bombay, and the communication of Scindiah with the sea is entirely cut off; finally, in virtue of the definitive alliance with Scindiah, that cession forms an additional part of the security for the subsidies on the part of that Chief.

“ 39. By the cession of Ahmednagour, and by the conditions annexed to the restitution of a portion of territory connected with that fortress, the means by which Scindiah intermiddled in the affairs of Poonah, and by which he was enabled to counteract the execution of the alliance between the British Government and the Peishwah, are rendered absolutely null: and Ahmednagour, by the treaty of partition, is ceded to the Peishwah, and will form an important augmentation of the military force of his Highness, under the protection of the Company.

“ 40. By the 4th article of the treaty, Dowlut-Row-Scindiah gives all the territories in his possession, at the commencement of the war, situate between the mountains of Adjuntah, and the river Godawery.

Godawery. By virtue of that convention, Scindiah has renounced the whole of that part of his possessions that was connected with the territory of our ally the Soudahdar of Deccan; and the British Government was enabled, while it assigned these cessions to his Highness the Soubahdar, by virtue of the 6th article of the partition treaty, to encrease and consolidate the territorial power of the general resources of his Highness.

“ 41. By the stipulation of the 5th article, which contains the renunciation of Scindiah of all claims of whatever nature on the British Government and its allies, the Soubahdar of Deccan, the Peishwah and the Guickwar, Dowlut-Row-Scindiah has been stripped of all kind of influence in the internal affairs of the Soubahdar of Deccan, of the Peishwah, and of the Guickwar; and thus has been radically destroyed every dangerous source of intrigue, disturbance, and invasion.

“ 42. The 6th article prescribes the restitution of Dowlut-Row-Scindiah of the fortress of Asyrghour, of the town of Bourhaunpour, of the forts of Powanghour, and of Dohud, and of the territories in the Candeish, and the Guzerat, defended by these forts.—This article proves that the British Government was disposed to make every concession to the enemy, even in the very moment of victory, that could be consistent with our security, and with our good faith towards our allies in the war.

“ 43. By the 7th article of the treaty, Dowlut-Row-Scindiah is authorized to keep the districts of Dholepour, of Barce, and of Rajah Kerrah, situate to the north of the territories of the Rajahs of Igenagour, and of Jodepour, of the Rajah of Goshud, which Scindiah alleges to have for a length of time belonged to his family, as a donation granted by the Kings of Indostan: and by the convention of the same article, it is stipulated that certain members of the family of the last Mahjee Scindia, and certain officers of his government, who had previously possessed Jaghyres, in the territories ceded by the 2d article of the treaty, shall remain in possession of these Jaghyres, or shall receive pensions at the option of the British Government, provided that the annual value of these Jaghyres, and the amount of these pensions do not exceed the sum of 17 lacks of rupees. The same article prohibits the introduction of the troops of Scindiah into the districts of Dholepour, Barce, and of Rajah Kerrah, or into those lands that may chance to be converted into Jaghyres, and destined for the family and the officers of Scindiah. This prohibitory clause has in a great measure obviated the objections to the admission of the authority of Scindiah, in the territories of Indostan, from which it was the principal object of the peace to exclude the power and the influence of that Chief. These concessions were principally founded on a spirit of conciliation and of lenity, which we were anxious to set forth upon that occasion as far as was compatible with our security, and with our just claims and interests. Your Honourable Committee will at the same time perceive the advantages that result to the British Government from the convention, by virtue of

of which the sources of the subsistence of some of the principal branches of Scindiah's family, and of several of his chief officers, are placed under the dominion, and the immediate authority of the British Government.

“ 44. By the 8th article of the treaty, certain districts which have long been in the possession of the family of Scindiah, and which are situated in the territories of his Highness the Peishwah, are likewise restored to Dowlut-Row-Scindiah, on condition that no troops are ever to be introduced into these districts on any pretence whatsoever. The same observations that have been made with respect to the 7th article, are equally applicable to the restrictions of that article of the treaty. Your Honourable Committee will perceive that the defensive and subsidiary alliance concluded with Scindiah since the peace, diminishes the danger of any concession made to Scindiah, by virtue of the stipulations of the treaty of Sirje Anjingaum.

“ 45. By the 9th article of the treaty, all the engagements concluded between the British Government and the dependants of Dowlut-Row-Scindiah are acknowledged and confirmed, except only the restriction which provides that the territory previously belonging to Dowlut-Row-Scindiah, and which is situated to the North of the territories of the Rajahs of Jyenagour, of Jodepour, and of the Ranah of Gohud, shall not be alienated or detached from the possessions of Scindiah by virtue of such engagements.

“ 46. The conditions contained in the 9th article were indispensably necessary, in order to enable the British Government to fulfill the obligations contracted during the war. They were at the same time essential to the security of the principal object of the war, which is the establishment of a system of alliance with the States of Indostan, whose territories, by their local position, may form a barrier between the possessions of the Company and those of the Mahrattas, and assure the exclusion of the authority and the influence of Scindiah in the north-west part of Indostan.

“ 47. With the accomplishment of that object was combined the immediate effect of our successes in the war, by detaching from the interests of Scindiah his tributaries and dependants, and by obtaining their co-operation with the British forces. Of the engagements entered into with the Chiefs of Indostan, and acknowledged by the conditions of the 9th article of the treaty of peace with Scindiah, those that principally contribute to the accomplishment of the last object of our political operations in Indostan, are the treaties concluded with the Ranah of Gohud and the Rajah of Jyenagour.

“ 48. By the treaty with the former, the ancient possessions of the Ranah of Gohud are restored to the representative of the family under the protection and guarantee of the British Government. This Chief is bound to furnish a subsidy for three battalions of British troops, in the proportion of nine lacks of rupees yearly. The possession of the fortress of Gwalior, which commands one of the principal inlets into the North-west part of In-

dostan on the South side, is in a permanent manner transferred to the Honourable Company ; and the British Government possesses the privilege of stationing its troops in all the forts or positions in the territories of the Ranah, whenever the British Government shall deem it necessary, except, however, in those of Gohud.

“ 49. The Ranah of Gohud is bound to employ all her forces and the whole of her power, in conjunction with the British troops, against whatever power may attempt to disturb the possessions of the Hon. Company ; and in case of war, to employ her troops, and make them act under the advice and direction of the officer commanding the armed force of the Company.

“ 50. With a view to preserve in the hands of the British Government the means of repressing the increase of dissensions tending to produce a war, which would require the interposition of our military power, for the defence of the possessions of the Ranah, the British Government reserves to itself the right of acting as sole arbiter in any dispute that may arise between the Ranah of Gohud and any other State or Chief.

“ 51. The Ranah of Gohud having been rescued from prison and from want, and reinstated in the possession of her hereditary states by the assistance and protection of the British Government, it will appear evident to your Honourable Committee that the Ranah of Gohud is interested in the highest degree to preserve her attachment to the Company ; and that the British Government may at all times avail itself of the favourable advantages held out by the local position, the force, and the resources of the territory of Gohud.

“ 52. The treaty concluded with the Rajah of Jyenagour is founded on the basis of reciprocal assistance against external enemies. The Rajah of Jyenagour is bound to employ all his military force and all his resources, in order to repel any attempt at invasion of the possessions of the Honourable Company in Indostan, and a reciprocal obligation is imposed on the British Government, reserving, however, the right of deciding what disputes may arise respecting the means of preventing war.

“ 53. The Ranah moreover binds herself, in case of a war, to act with all her forces in concert with the British forces, and that in the manner that shall be thought most efficient by the officer commanding the British forces.

“ 54. On the other hand, the British Government is bound not to intermeddle in the internal affairs of the Government of the Ranah, nor to exact any tribute whatever from her.

“ 55. By this engagement the Rajah of Jyenagour is released from the payment of the ordinary tribute which Scindia raised from him, and is protected from all exaction for the future, and from all invasion on the part of that chief, or of any other foreign state.

“ 56. These important advantages which result to the Rajah of Jyenagour from the alliance with the Honourable Company, cannot fail of securing his attachment to the interests of the British

ish Government. By virtue of the obligation of that engagement, a detachment of the troops of the Rajah of Jyenagour has been employed in conjunction with a British detachment under the command of Colonel Monson, in driving Jeswut-Row-Holkar from the frontiers of Indostan.

“ 57. A similar treaty has been concluded by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, with the accredited agent of the Rajah of Jodepour, and this treaty has been ratified by the Governor-General. The Rajah, however, of Jodepour on the return of his agent, refused to ratify that treaty, the engagement therefore has been considered as null. The Rajah of Jodepour in withholding his ratification, was guided probably by the fear of the immediate resentment of Jeswut-Row-Holkar who then occupied a position near the territory of Jodepour. Since the retreat of Jeswut-Row-Holkar, the Rajah of Jodepour expressed his earnest wish to conclude the treaty of alliance. The Governor-General, however, did not deem it expedient to renew the engagement. The detail of this business will be communicated to your Honourable Committee in the dispatch to which the first paragraph of this letter refers.

“ 58. The engagements with which his Excellency the Commander in Chief has entered, agreeably to the orders of the Governor-General, with the Rajahs of Mackery and Bhurtful (as stated in the 507th and following paragraphs of our dispatches of the 12th April 1804), and which are also acknowledged and confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut-Row-Scindia, are calculated on the same principles as those of the alliance with the Rajah of Jodepour. The British Government guarantees these chiefs in the independent possession of their respective territories, on condition of their co-operation with the British troops in repelling the invasion of an enemy, and of submitting in every case their disputes to the decision of the British Government before they engage in hostilities.

“ 59. The local position of the territories of these Chiefs is well calculated to strengthen the barrier which the countries of Gohud and Jyenagour present against the attempts of an hostile invasion.

“ 60. The system of alliance established by the British Government in India, affords the means of commanding to a considerable degree, the first causes of the disorder and confusion which had so long disturbed the territories of Indostan, and given encouragement to the vile ambition, the habits of pillage, and the indefatigable violence of the native states of Indostan and the Decan. Had these disorders continued, they might have affected the tranquillity and the safety of the possessions dependant upon the Company. In drying up the sources of the dissensions amongst the petty states of Indostan, and in protecting them from the ambition and rapacity of their more powerful neighbours, these states will be susceptible of encouragement, and will be in a situation to

cultivate the peaceful arts in the independent enjoyment of their respective rights.

“ 61. The extent and effect of this system will by degrees soften the turbulent spirit of the native states of India which join our vast empire ; and the same policy promises to establish the most solid security for the prosperity of our rich possessions, in the concord and tranquillity of the circumjacent powers.

“ 62. All these different treaties having been formally recognised and confirmed by the conditions of the 9th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Row Scindiah, the advantages which result from these engagements may be justly considered as comprised amongst those of the general pacification.

63. The tenth article of the treaty of peace with Scindiah relates to the protection accorded to the subjects of Dowlut Row Scindiah, who still remain under his authority, in order to guarantee them against his resentment, for having manifested a disposition to second the British cause. This stipulation was indispensable to the maintenance of our good faith.

“ 64. The 11th article of the treaty, which ensures the territorial rights of the Peishwah in the Malwa, also establishes the British Government as arbitrator in case of differences arising upon the subject of those rights, between his Highness the Peishwah and Dowlut Row Scindiah.

“ 65. In treating with Dowlut Row Scindiah on the subject of the re-establishment of the Peishwah in the territorial rights, in the province of Malwa, our guarantee and assignment of those rights were naturally established in that stipulation. Yet it was an evident principle of policy to render the states of the Peishwah as distinct as possible, and to shut the door to any intrigue to which any friendly intercourse, or any disagreement might have given birth on the part of the Mahratta Durbars.

“ 66. By the 12th article Scindiah renounces all pretension on his Majesty Shah Allum, and engages to abstain from interfering in the affairs of that Sovereign.

“ 67. Your Honourable Committee is not uninformed, that the late Madajie Scindiah, after having rescued the unfortunate representative of the House of Tamerlane from the sanguinary violence of Golawn Kadir, obtained from his Majesty the office of Vakeel el Mutluk, or first Executive Minister of the Mogul Government, for his Highness the Peishwah ; and that he was himself named to fill the functions of that office under the title of Delegate, and that Scindiah succeeded to the office of Delegated Vakeel el Mutluk, and to the power which his predecessor had over the person and family of the aged and unfortunate Monarch of Delhi. By a lucky intrigue M. Perron had obtained the employment of Commander of the Fortress of Delhi, where the Royal Family has its residence, and thus he secured to himself the person and nominal authority of the Emperor.

“ 68. Notwithstanding his Majesty's total deprivation of power

power, dominion and authority, almost all the states, of every class of people in India, continue to acknowledge his nominal sovereignty. The current money established in every state is coined in the name of Shah Allum. Princes and personages of the highest rank and family still bear the titles, and display the marks of dignity which they have received, themselves and their ancestors, from the Throne of Delhi, under the recognized authority of Shah-Allum; and his Majesty is still considered as the sole legitimate source of such honours.

“ 69. The pride of the numerous classes of Mussulmen in India, is satisfied with the recognition of the nominal authority of the illustrious representative of the house of Tamerlane, over the territories which heretofore formed the vast and powerful empire of Mogul; and the Mussulmen are still disposed to acknowledge the legality of pretensions or demands which emanate ostensibly from the authority of the Imperial mandate.

“ 70. Under these circumstances, the person and authority of his Majesty Shah-Allum, may serve as a dangerous instrument in the hands of any state possessing sufficient power, energy, and judgment to know how to avail itself of it, in the execution of some project of aggrandisement and ambition.

“ 71. The Mogul has never been an important or dangerous instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas: but the increase of the power and influence of M. Perron and the French party, which was augmenting in Indostan, gave a new appearance to the situation of the Mogul, and this unfortunate Prince might have become a powerful aid in the cause of France in India, under the direction of French agents.

“ The intention with which the government of France prepared itself to resume its establishments in India, in virtue of the conditions of the treaty of Amiens were not equivocal, and were manifested by the number and organization of the staff and suite that accompanied the officer named to exercise the principal authority over the establishments restored to the French in this country by the peace. There is not the least doubt that the intention of the French Government was, after the peace, to raise on the foundation of its establishment in India a military and political state; to strengthen and augment it by all possible connections with the native powers, and by all the means of indefatigable intrigues and systematic ambition. It is easy to convince ones self, that the system of introducing French adventurers into the armies of his native states, for the purpose of improving their discipline and their force, presents the most prompt and efficacious means to establish the influence and authority of the French over these states; and to form by little and little an independent power, territorial and military, in the midst of a foreign state. The extent and increase of this system, would, without doubt, have continued as long as the peace held, the principal object of the attention of the French Government in India; and considering the facilities which would have been presented to the

the views and projects of the French by the extent of the territorial and military power, and the independence established under the direction of M. Perron, in the north-west of Indostan, it is not to be doubted that during the continuance of the peace between his Majesty and France, and between the British Government and the Mahratta states, the progress of French intrigue, and the aggrandisement of the power of the French in India, would have been most rapid and most dangerous to our security. In the pursuit of those projects, the French would evidently have found an essential aid in possessing themselves of the person and family of the Emperor Shah-Allum. The name of this sovereign would have been employed to justify every exaction, violence, and usurpation; and under the pretext of re-establishing his Majesty in all his hereditary estates, the power of France in India might have been directed with the intention to overthrow all other states, and to appropriate to itself all territory not protected by alliance with the British nation. The Emperor might have been forced to constitute the territorial possession of France in India an independent sovereignty; and under the pretext of the sovereign authority thus acquired, the conduct of the French Government in India might have become in the highest degree prejudicial to the interests and the safety of the British Empire in this part of the globe.

“ 73. If any doubt could be entertained relative to the progress of the French in this respect, it would be removed by the contents of the papers that have been had at Pondicherry and Calcutta, which have been transmitted by the Governor-General to the Right Honourable Lord Hobart, and of which the annexed copies accompany this dispatch.

“ 74. For the purpose, however, of submitting to the immediate and particular knowledge of your Honourable Committee a distinct proof of the projects of the French Government with regard to the Emperor Shah-Allum, the Governor-General thinks it proper to insert here the translation of an extract from one of the papers mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

“ 75. This paper is called “Memoirs on the present State of India, and of the most efficacious Means for re-establishing the French Nation in its ancient Splendour in that Country.”

“ 76. This paper was obtained at Pondicherry from a French officer named Lefebvre, who accompanied General Decaen to India.

“ Such was the treatment which the Emperor of Indostan, sole remaining branch of the illustrious house of Tamerlane, so revered in all the East, that its sovereignty is universally recognised though its power exists no more, and the English Company itself holds its constitutional power only from its infinite goodness; such was the treatment this Emperor received from a company of merchant adventurers.

“ It is evident that Shah-Allum ought to be incontestibly Sovereign of the Mogul empire, as great grandson of Aureng Zeb, tenth

teenth successor in the direct line from Tamerlane. This great question with respect to the sovereignty of the empire being decided, it remains to be considered whether it were not possible that this unfortunate family may not one day find protectors willing to vindicate their sacred rights, and to break their ignominious chains. It would be then that a mutual alliance and a judicious union of power would secure the permanent sovereignty of the Emperor, and render his immediate subjects, as well as his tributaries happy in the enjoyment of personal safety, and the riches which peace, agriculture, and a free commerce can give.

The English Company, by its ignominious treatment of the Grand Mogul, has lost its right as divan and treasurer of the Empire. The Nabobs of Oude and of Bengal are equally criminal, inasmuch as they have acted as traitors towards their lawful sovereign. Thus the Emperor of Delhi has a real and incontrovertible right, to transfer to whomsoever he chooses, the sovereignty of his States, as well as the arrears due to him from the English. These arrears arise out of the tribute of 26 lacks of rupees which the Company had promised, and including the interest of the country, would amount at present to about 452 millions of livres, tournois, a sum far surpassing the value of the moveable capital of the Company.

“ 77. The preceding observations will serve to demonstrate that it was important to place the person, the family, and the nominal authority of such alliance, under the participation of the British Government; and, consequently, the accomplishment of an arrangement to this effect, has been considered by the Governor General, as the principal object, though not the cause of the war, and as an indispensable condition of the peace.

“ 78. Independently of the abovementioned consideration, having in view the great veneration with which the illustrious descendant of Tamerlane is regarded by all classes of the people, and particularly the Mussulmen; and the state of indignity and wretchedness to which this unfortunate Monarch is reduced, under the domination of the Mahrattas and the French: the Governor General has reflected among the important political advantages resulting from this arrangement on the reputation which the British name would acquire, by giving an honourable and tranquil asylum to the fallen dignity, and decrepid age of the King of Delhi, and by securing the means of comfort to the numerous and afflicted family of his Majesty.

“ 79. By the 13th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Row Scindiah, that Chief engages never to take into, nor keep in his service any Frenchman, nor any subject of any European, or any American power, the Government of which shall be at war with the British Government; nor any British subject, European or native of India, without the consent of the British Government.

“ 80. The observations contained in this dispatch relative to the aggrandisement of the power of the French in India, and to the

the experience of the formidable resistance that has been opposed to the British forces in the last war, by the regular troops of the enemy, under the command of European officers, and composed for the greatest part, of natives of India, subjects of the British Government, demonstrate sufficiently the importance and the advantage there is in excluding perpetually the classes of persons mentioned in this article from the service of the native powers, except as far as the Governor General shall think consistent with the good of the British interest in India.

“ 81. The indefatigable zeal with which the French nation is disposed to pursue all measures that can be prejudicial to the interest of the British Government in India; and the consequent necessity of securing all possible means of excluding French Agents from the States of the native Princes, have been recently manifested by the arrival at Poona of three French Officers, who had clandestinely landed at a post in the Kokun from a French cruiser, (captured afterwards by His Majesty's ship St. Fiorenzo) on 6th Jan. 1804. They were charged with letters and proclamations in Persian, addressed generally to all the native powers of India, with the design of engaging them to unite their forces to destroy the British Empire in that part of the globe.

“ 82. These Frenchmen were arrested by his Highness the Peishwa at the requisition of the British Government, in virtue of the general conditions of the Treaty at Bassein: there were found upon them four of these proclamations. A translation of one of these proclamations is annexed for the information of your Honourable Committee. The prisoners have been sent to Bengal. The Governor General has thought it right not to allow them to go on their parole for some time, for the purpose of giving others a dislike to taking such missions upon them. In virtue of the defensive alliance subsisting with the Peishwa, in the moment of an effective war, in which the Peishwa and the Company are equally engaged as allies, the conduct of the Frenchmen would have authorized the Governor General to treat them as spies, and to have had recourse to the means which the laws of nations guarantee in such cases.

“ 83. It is probable that by examining these individuals, a connection may be found between their mission to this country and some hostile project of the French Government in the Isle of France, directed against the British establishments in India, the execution of which may have been prevented by the success of the last war.

“ 84. The 14th article stipulates the residence of Ministers accredited on the part of the British Government, and on the part of Scindiah.

“ 85. Your Honourable Committee will perceive the advantage of securing a relation by the way of a treaty.

“ 86. The thirteenth article provides for the eventual admission of Row Scindiah to the advantage of a defensive and subsidiary alliance with the British Government, under the same conditions

ditions as those that subsist between the British Government and the Peishwa.

“ 87. My dispatch of the 22d of March, 1804, addressed to your Honourable Committee, contained the effective conclusion of a treaty of defensive and subsidiary alliance with Scindiah, and a copy of the treaty accompanied that dispatch.

“ 88. The general principles on which the treaty of alliance defensive and subsidiary with Scindiah was at all times desirable, were corroborated by the relative state of power and resources at the conclusion of the peace.

“ 89. During the war with the Chiefs of the Confederated Mahrattas, the power and resources of Scindiah were in a great measure reduced, while those of Jeswunt Row Holkar have been augmented by a considerable acquisition of territory, ceded to him by Scindiah, on the condition that he would join the confederation against the British Power. The nature of the differences existing between Dowlut Row Scindiah and Jeswunt Row Holkar prevented the possibility of establishing concord and friendship between these Chiefs.

“ 90. In the effective state of the power of Scindiah at the end of the war, this Chief could not entertain any idea of success in a struggle against Holkar. Thus, without the support of a foreign power, the states of Scindiah would soon have become the property of his rival Jeswunt Row Holkar, and such an accumulation of territorial strength in the hands of this turbulent party Chief would have been altogether incompatible with the tranquillity of India, and the security of the British Government and its allies. The danger which the ministers of Scindiah dreaded on the side of the superior force and hostile disposition of Holkar, induced them, during the negotiation of the conclusion of peace, to express their great and anxious desire to establish a closer connection with the British Government; and the political considerations above-mentioned suggested the utility of offering to Scindiah the participation of the advantages of the defensive and subsidiary alliance concluded with his Highness the Peishwa. The treaty of defensive alliance concluded in consequence between the British Government and Dowlut Row Scindiah, corresponds with all the stipulations of the Treaty of Hyderabad, concluded in the month of October, 1800, with the single exception of the number of the subsidiary forces and their permanent continuance in the territory of the power furnishing the subsidy. The British forces for which Scindiah furnishes a subsidy, consist of six battalions of infantry, or 6000 men, with a proportionate artillery, and those troops are to be stationed near the frontiers of the states of Dowlut Row Scindiah, and to occupy the posts which the British Government shall think most eligible.— They must be kept in readiness for the execution of every service they are bound to perform, according to the conditions of the treaty of defensive alliance. Though it were to be wished that these troops should be stationed constantly in the States

of Dowlut Row Scindiah, the Governor General is nevertheless of opinion, that in the state in which most of the native powers are at present in India, the essential object proposed in the defensive alliance with Scindiah, has been attained by the conditions of the treaty concluded with that Chief.

“ 91. Whatever the remaining power of Scindiah may be, this treaty gives additional strength to the general peace, to the security and grandeur of the British power; and there is no room for any well-grounded fear, that any disorder dangerous to our interests in India, can arise so long as the paralyzed power of Scindiah will depend, with respect to its existence, on the British government. The increase of the hostile power of the Mysore from 1792 to 1798, may, perhaps, have been directed in our favour, and to our security, if it had been possible to engage Tippoo Sul-taan to enter into a subsidiary alliance with the Company at the end of the war in 1792.

“ 92. The power of Tippoo Sul-taan was not, however, reduced by that war to such a point, as to dispose his haughty and vindictive character to listen to any proposition of alliance with the Company. Such has been the reduction of every description of the resources of Scindiah, occasioned by the last war, that his existence as a power in India, depends absolutely on the generosity of the Company, and is incapable of sustaining itself, without our active support. In this state of affairs the power of Scindiah no longer forms an object of apprehension for the British government, and Scindiah can no longer regard with jealousy, the protecting influence of a state, to the clemency of which he is absolutely indebted for the restitution of his estates, and on whose strength he reposes for the security of what he still possesses.

“ 93. The defensive alliance concluded with Dowlut Row Scindiah, in virtue of the stipulations of the Treaty of Bassien, will prevent for the future, all combination between the Mahratta States, which could be of a nature dangerous to the British empire, and will oppose a permanent and insurmountable obstacle to the revival of the military forces of Scindiah, beyond the point which the Governor General shall think consistent with the security of our interests. This important treaty not only deprives Scindiah of every possibility of employing the remainder of his power against the British Government in any case; but it secures to us moreover, the means of availing ourselves of it on every occasion when the security of the British empire in India shall require it. At the first commencement of the negotiation on the subject of the defensive alliance, Scindiah ardently desired the insertion of a stipulation in the Treaty, by which the British Government should engage to employ its influence to obtain from the Peishwa, in favour of Scindiah, the treatment and consideration which were due to his rank, and conformable to usage. Scindiah also expressed a desire, that his rights to the territories which he held by grant of the Peishwa, and of which

which he had taken possession, in consequence of the orders of his Highness, should be recognized in the treaty of defensive alliance, and that the British Government should consent to employ its credit to prevent any act of Scindiah, or his ancestors, from being reversed, as emanating from the authority of the Peishwa, exercised in favour of him or his ancestors.

“ 94. Major Malcolm, the resident at the Court of Scindiah, who negotiated the treaty of defence and subsidy, opposed the insertion of this article, alledging that it was entirely foreign to the nature and object of a defensive engagement. Still the extreme solicitude of Scindiah on the subject, induced Major Malcolm to satisfy the desire of that Chief, on condition that he would consent to certain modifications, the object of which was, to prevent the proposed stipulations from being in any way incompatible with the conditions of the treaty of peace, or with the just rights, the honour and dignity of the Peishwa, and to stipulate that the British Government should remain the arbiter in all cases in which any difficulty should arise as to the stipulations of this article.

“ 95. Scindiah consented willingly to these modifications. This serious solicitude on the part of Scindiah to obtain the guarantee of the British Government with respect to his just claims on the Peishwa, presents a convincing proof that Scindiah placed the most entire confidence in our public faith, our honour, and our equity; and that far from being jealous of the interference of the British Government in his affairs with respect to the Peishwa, or any other power, he seriously solicited our mediation as the sole means of securing his legitimate rights, and supporting his hereditary dignity.

“ 96. The 16th article of the treaty of peace with Scindiah relates to the ratification of the treaty on the part of the Governor General, and prescribes that the orders concerning the cession of the territories stipulated in that treaty, should be delivered to the Honourable Major General Wellesley, at the same time with the ratification of the treaty of peace, but that certain forts which in virtue of the treaty of peace are to be restored to Scindiah, shall not be delivered up to the officers of Scindiah, till information shall have been received that all the territories ceded to the British Government and its allies, have been evacuated by the officers and troops of Scindiah. It is proper to observe, that all the reciprocal cessions and restitutions have effectively taken place.

“ 97. The Governor General now proceeds to resume the considerations with regard to the stipulations of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

“ 98. The first article establishes a permanence of amity between the contracting parties.

“ 99. The second article in connection with the first article of the treaty of partition, cedes to the Honourable Company all the province of Cuttack; comprising therein the port and district of

Balasure. This province unites the territory of Bengal with the Northern Circar. In the hands of an enemy this province would present particular advantages in case of a war against the British Power. It would furnish the means of intercepting the communication between Bengal and all our possessions and dependencies in the Southern and Western provinces of India. That portion of sea coast which the province of Cuttack and the port of Balasure include, would put even a native enemy in possession of the power receiving succours from a European potentate. An auxiliary French force, combined with a Mahratta army, may thus unite on the frontiers of our richest territories, and may give a dangerous blow to the safety of the principal source of the power, the wealth, and the influence of the British Empire in India. Even in the hands of a neutral native power, the province of Cuttack presents a favourable point for the landing of an European hostile force, and for an attack directed against the British states.

“ 100. The mixture and contiguity of the territories of the Company and those of the Mahrattas on the Southern frontier of Midnapore, occasioned continual disputes between the subjects of the two governments, and the open asylum which robbers and criminals could find in the Mahratta territory contiguous to Midnapore, encouraged them to commit all sorts of outrage in the districts contiguous to those of the Company. These facts prove the importance of the cession of the province of Cuttack and its dependencies, independent of their value in point of finances and commerce.

“ 101. The Governor-General cannot yet submit to your Honourable Committee a complete report on the revenue of the territory ceded by this article. This report will be transmitted to the Honourable Court as soon as the necessary informations shall have been received. But according to the statement extracted from the Mahratta registers, the revenues of Cuttack are valued at 16 or 17 lacks a year. In this statement the mixed territories of Midnapore are included.

“ 102. The third article stipulates the cession of all the territories, the revenues of which were received by the Rajah of Berar and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and all the territory which the Rajah of Berar possessed to the West of the river Warda.

“ 103. By the cession of the territory made in virtue of this article, in favour of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, in conformity with the treaty of partition, all the inconveniencies, embarrassments, and risques, arising from the mixture of the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan * have been augmented and consolidated, and distinct limits have been established between the territories of his Highness and those of the Rajah of Berar.

“ 104. The loyal attention which this article, combined with the treaty of partition, manifests for the interests of our ally, the

* There is evidently some omission here.—TRANSLATOR.

Soubahdar of the Deccan has made the most favourable impression at the Court of Hyderabad, and has served to cement the ties of alliance, as well as to place our ally in a situation to act more effectually in our favour.

“ 105. The stipulations of the 4th and 5th articles, which gave up to the Rajah of Berar the forts of Narmulla and Gawcelgour with the districts adjoining these forts, yielding an annual revenue of four lacks of rupees, were the result of a just and generous consideration for the future security of the remaining possessions of the Rajah.

“ 106. By the 6th article, the Rajah of Berar renounces all pretensions of whatsoever nature, to the territories ceded by the preceding articles, and all the territories of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

“ 107. By the last stipulation, the vexatious pecuniary rights of the Rajah of Berar, on the Soubahdar of the Deccan, have been abandoned. These pretensions kept up a continual source of disagreement between the two powers, and afforded the Rajah of Berar the means of maintaining a considerable influence, and of intriguing at the Court of Hyderabad, in a manner injurious to the interests of the British Government.

“ 108. The 7th article provides that the British Government shall be arbiter in all differences which may arise between the Court of Poonah, and that of Nagpou; and those of Hyderabad and Nagpou. By this stipulation, the British Government will be in a situation to decide on the causes of contention between those respective States; and the communication between them, according to this article, will be too limited to allow them to form with success, any intrigue prejudicial to the interests of the British Government.

“ 109. The principal object of this article has been, to meet the desires of the Rajah of Berar, whose Vakeel expressed an extreme desire that the British Government should consent to charge itself with the protection of the Rajah of Berar, against all the pretensions of the Peishwa and the Soubahdar of the Deccan may have upon his territories, and to maintain the rights of the Rajah of Berar, according to the grants by which he held of the Peishwah and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, or in virtue of treaties concluded with these Chiefs.

“ 110. In answer to the proposition of the Vakeel of the Rajah of Berar on this subject, the Honourable Major General Wellesley observed, that without having complete information as to the nature of these pretensions, grants, and treaties, the credit of the British Government could not be pledged in the manner proposed by the Vakeel; however, from deference to the desires of the Rajah of Berar, without running the risk of committing the credit of the British Government, the Honourable Major General Wellesley proposed, that the British Government should be arbiter, with respect to the conditions stipulated in the seventh article of the treaty. The Vakeels consented willingly

to this proposition, observing that the Rajah of Berar had no other security against the usurpations of the Peishwa, but what he expected from the justice and generosity of the British Government.

“ 111. Your honourable Committee will observe, with satisfaction, this proof of the entire confidence which the Rajah of Berar places in the equity and honour of the British Government.

“ 112. The eighth article of the treaty contains the same stipulation with regard to the exclusion of European subjects, Americans, and British subjects, from the service of the Rajah of Berar, that is contained in the treaty of peace with Scindiah; and by the same article, the British Government engages itself not to aid or encourage any of the relations or subjects of the Rajah of Berar in rebellion against that Chief.

“ 113. The ninth article provides, that there shall be residents or ministers accredited on the part of the British Government and the Rajah of Berar, reciprocally.

“ 114. This article is particularly important, on account of the difficulty that had for a long time existed, of obtaining correct information with respect to the conduct and views of the Court of Nagpour.

“ 115. The tenth article of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, which corresponds with the 9th article of the treaty of peace with Scindiah, recognizes and confirms all the engagements concluded by the British Government with the feudatories and dependants of the Rajah of Berar.

“ 116. The object of this stipulation was not only to confirm the advantages the British Government may be able to derive from such engagements, but also to put us in a situation to fulfil the obligations of our public faith towards the persons with whom these engagements had been contracted.

The 701st, and subsequent paragraphs of our dispatch, addressed to your Honourable Committee, dated April the 12th, relate to the engagements concluded by the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack, with certain feudatories and dependants of the Government of Berar. Engagements have been entered into during the war, with the Rajahs of Boad, of Sonepore, and of Rampour, who possess a territory contiguous to the South-west frontier of Cuttack, and command the principal inlets of that province; by these engagements the Rajahs of Boad, Sonepore, and Rampour are exempted from the payment of tribute, and are guaranteed in the possession of their respective territories, provided they shall faithfully perform the duty of tributaries to the Honourable Company.

“ 117. The Commissioners of Cuttack concluded also a treaty with the Rajah of Koonjur, a powerful Chief, whose territory is situated on the northern frontier of the province of Cuttack, and who has ever been considered independent of the Mahratta power, though this Chief has derived a revenue from a part of the province of the Cuttack. Engagements have likewise been entered into

into for the purpose of determining the revenues to be paid to the British Government; the Collector of Midnapore was commissioned to treat on this head with the Zemindars of the district of Mohurbung, and its dependencies, and of certain districts which belonged heretofore to the Rajah of Berar, on the North-east bank of the river Solunrika, and which are intermixed with the territories that constitute the Zemindars of Midnapore.

“ 118. By the nature of these engagements, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, the authority and influence of the Mahratta Government have been completely shut out from the territories in the neighbourhood of Cuttack, and Midnapore, and a Barner established between the province of Cuttack, and the remainder of the territories of the Rajah of Berar, consisting of petty states, exercising in their respective territories an independent authority under the protection of the British Government.

“ 119. The engagements entered into by Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton with the Zemindars of Sumbulpore and Patna, districts formerly belonging to the Rajah of Berar, and situated on the western frontier of Bengal, have been in like manner confirmed by the stipulations of the tenth article of the treaty of Deogaum.

“ 120. The instructions given to Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, the military operations and negotiations of that officer in conformity with these instructions, are contained in one dispatch addressed to your Honourable Committee of the 12th of April, 1804.

“ 121. Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton found it impossible to put in execution the whole plan of political arrangements pointed out in these instructions. This officer, nevertheless, has received every kind of assistance on the part of the inhabitants and land proprietors of the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna, to enable him to prosecute his military operations against the troops of the Rajah of Berar; and the principal Zemindars of these provinces have made the most serious representations to Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, to be freed from the oppressive power of the Mahrattas, in order to their being placed under the protection of the British Government, under such conditions as the British Government should think proper to make. In conformity with his instructions, Lieut.-Col. Broughton engaged, on the part of the British Government, to give these Zemindars a permanent protection against the Berar's Government; and by virtue of these engagements the whole provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna were subjected to the authority of the British Government. Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, however, had judged it proper to leave to the decision of the Governor-General to determine the relations into which these provinces were to enter with the British Government.—Such were the state of the affairs when Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, who was then at Sumbulpore, received the account of the conclusion of the peace with the Rajah of Berar.

“ 122. The conquest, or the alienation in the greatest degree possible, of the territories composing the enemy's State, has been a necessary

a necessary object of the operations of the war, without regard to the future policy of annexing these territories to the British possessions, of distributing them amongst the allies, or of restoring them to the enemy.

“ 123. During the war, it was manifestly a wise policy to straiten, in the highest possible degree, and with the greatest diligence, the political, military, and financial resources of the enemy. Yet at the conclusion of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, from specific cessions, by which the power and resources of that Chief had been reduced to the point which our security required, no advantage could result from the incorporation of the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna with the British dominions. The Governor General at the same time perceived that, tho' the authority of the Berar's Government over those provinces was imperfect, and the revenues he drew from them inconsiderable, the Rajah of Berar would greatly regret the loss of these provinces. For this reason, the Governor-General, wishing to render the stipulation of the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum, as little injurious to the interests of the Rajah of Berar, as the maintenance of our public faith would allow, resolved to restore to the Rajah of Berar the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna (which, in virtue of the 10th article of the treaty of peace, were permanently annexed to the dominions of the Honourable Company); provided the Zemindars of the provinces, with whom Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton had contracted engagements, should be willing to consent to this arrangement; consequently Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton was directed to propose it to all those persons with whom he had entered into engagements.

“ 124. Similar considerations induced us to propose, through the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack, the dissolution of the engagements formed by the Commissioners with the Rajahs of Boad, Sompore, and Rampour, notwithstanding the considerable advantages mentioned in paragraphs 116 and 117, which the connection with these Chiefs secured to the British Government.

“ 125. The whole of these Chief Zemindars, however, without exception, manifested a total aversion to return under the authority of the Mahratta Government, and earnestly solicited the continuance of the protection of the Honourable Company. In such a state of things the maintenance of our public faith rendered it absolutely necessary to confirm the engagements contracted with these Chiefs, and to exclude in future the Mahratta Government from the exercise of any authority over them.

“ 126. Nevertheless, in order to shew a spirit of generosity and conciliation towards the Rajah of Berar, by rendering the stipulation of the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum as little prejudicial to his interests as was compatible with the duty of our public faith, the British Government offered not only to guarantee to the Rajah the payment of a sum annually, equal to the revenues which he derived from the territories alienated from his dominions, but also to grant him a reasonable compensation for the

the loss of power and dominion, occasioned by the alienation of these territories.

“ 127. In pursuance of this resolution, certain articles were prepared to be annexed to the treaty of Deogaum, and were transmitted to the Resident at Nagpore, for the purpose of being accepted by the Rajah of Berar, together with a list of the Chiefs and Zemindars; with whom any engagements had been formed. The proposal of a compensation, however, was not contained in the additional articles; but instructions were sent to the Resident at Nagpore, with an order to communicate to the Rajah this generous offer on the part of the British Government. In these articles the independence in future of the Chiefs and Zemindars named in the list, with respect to the Mahratta power, was particularly recognised.

“ 128. After a lengthened discussion with the Court of Nagpore, on the subject of the confirmation of the engagement concluded on the part of the British Government, with these Chiefs and Zemindars, the Rajah of Berar accepted the list; but he refused to execute the additional articles proposed to be annexed to the treaty of Deogaum.

“ 129. The stipulations of these articles, with the exception of the clause relative to the independence of the Chiefs and Zemindars named in the list, being exclusively in favour of the Rajah of Berar, his refusal to execute these articles was solely to be attributed to a secret determination of the Rajah to refuse every direct renunciation of his authority over the Chiefs in question, and to a supposition of the Rajah, conceiving that the simple accepting the lists of the Chiefs and Zemindars, would not bind him to the acknowledgment of their independence.

“ 130. Consequently, the Resident at Nagpore, conformably to instructions which he had previously received from the Governor-General, demanded of the Rajah of Berar his recognition, in writing, of the engagements entered into by ———, with the Chiefs and Zemindars named in the list; to this, after some discussion, the Rajah consented. The Rajah of Berar having thought proper to decline the generous offer of the Governor-General, it is our intention not to admit him to the benefit of this proposition, unless he shall acknowledge, as he ought, the generosity shewn on this occasion by the British Government.

“ 131. The detail of these affairs will form a part of the dispatches which we propose to send to your Honourable Committee, and to which the first paragraph of this letter relates. In the mean time it appeared necessary to us to give you such a sketch as we have done, of the state of affairs, and to annex to it our remarks concerning the stipulations of the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum.

132. It is not the intention of the Governor-General to establish, in any case, the British authority in the Provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna. The Governor-General is decidedly of opinion, that the advantages to be expected from the reputation which

the justice, the liberality, and the moderation that distinguish this conduct, must attach to the British name, in the eyes of all the states of India, will exceed any that could result to us from the annexation of the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna, to the possessions of the Honourable Company.

“ 133. By the 11th article of the treaty of Deogaum, the Rajah of Berar renounces all adherence to the confederacy formed by him and other Mahratta Chiefs, with a design to attack the Honourable Company and their allies; and he engages not to furnish any aid to these Chiefs, in case the war should continue between them.

134. This article relates to the continuation of the war against Dowlut Row Scindia, after the conclusion of the peace with the Rajah of Berar.

135. Your Honourable Committee will observe, that this article contains a distinct acknowledgment on the part of the Rajah of Berar, on the subject of the confederacy formed by this Chief and Dowlut Row Scindia, with the express intention of making war against the British Government and its allies.

136. The 12th and last article of the treaty of Deogaum relates exclusively to the ratification of this article by the Governor-General.

137. With a view to lay before your Honourable Committee the fullest information with regard to each point connected with the pacification, the Governor-General thinks it proper to annex to this dispatch the following documents :

“ A copy of the minutes of the conferences held between the Hon. Major-Gen. Wellesley and the Vakyls of the Rajah of Berar, on the subject of the conditions of peace to be granted to that Chief;

“ A copy of a letter from the Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Governor-General, dated 17th December, 1803, communicating the treaty of peace concluded with the Rajah of Berar;

“ A copy of the minutes of conferences that had taken place between the Hon. Major-General Wellesley and the Vakyls of Scindia, relative to the conditions of peace;

“ A copy of a letter from the Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Governor-General, dated the 30th of December, 1803, communicating the treaty of peace concluded with that Chief;

“ A copy of the detailed instructions of the Governor-General to the Hon. Major-General Wellesley, dated 11th of December, 1803, upon the subject of the conditions of peace to be granted to Dowlut Row Scindia and to the Rajah of Berar.

“ 138. These instructions did not reach the Hon. Major-General Wellesley till after the conclusion of peace with these Chiefs; but the substance of them had been communicated to that officer in a note dated the 16th of October, 1803, dispatched on the 26th of the same month, and received by Major-General Wellesley, in the month of November.

A copy of a letter from Major Malcolm to the Governor-General, dated the 18th of last February, communicating the defensive and subsidiary treaty concluded with Dowlut-Row-Scindia.

“ 139. The Governor-General thinks it proper to conclude this Dispatch with a recapitulation of the advantages resulting to the British Government in India, from the operations of the war, and the combined arrangements of the pacification, including the treaties of peace, of partition, and of defensive and subsidiary alliance: These advantages may be laid down under the following heads:

“ 1. The reduction of the military power, and territorial resources of Scindia, and of the Rajah of Berar, within limits indispensably necessary for the security of the British Government in India, and of its allies.

“ 2. The destruction of the territorial power of the French, established by Mr. Perron, on the weakest point of the frontiers of the British establishments in India, which, from its internal strength, its military resources, and its political influence, threatened considerable dangers to the British Government.

“ 3. The barrier opposed by the stipulations of the treaty * to the revival of the power of the French, or of their influence in any part of India.

“ 4. The incorporation with the British establishments of the territory lately occupied by the French force, under Mr. Perron. By the acquisition of this territory, our north-western frontier has been strengthened, by extending it to the Banks of the Jumna, and by our occupying on it many important posts and fortresses which command that river: so that the source of our former danger has become an additional security for the British establishments in India.

“ 5. The augmentation of sources of revenues and commerce, which results from the annexation to the British territories of the fertile Countries, situated on the Douab, between the rivers Jumna and Ganges (in which the authority of Mr. Perron had been established), as well as our exclusive right to the whole navigation of the Jumna.

“ 6. The liberation of the Emperor Shah-Allum, out of the hands of the French power established in the north-west part of Indostan. By this liberation, the Government of France is deprived of a powerful instrument, in case of the eventual execution of its hostile designs against the British Empire in India; and the British Government has seized the favourable occasion to conciliate the confidence, and merit the applauses of the surrounding States, by procuring a secure and tranquil asylum for the age of this venerable and unfortunate Monarch, and a suitable maintenance for his numerous and afflicted family.

“ 7. The establishment of the British influence in the north-

* Eighth Article of the treaty of Deogaum.—Tenth article of the treaty of Serje-Augengaum.—Seventh article of the treaty of defensive alliance with Scindia.

west part of Hindostan, and the additional security acquired by the conclusion of the treaties of defensive alliance with the State Rajepont of Jyenagour, and with the petty States in the vicinity of our establishments in that part of India. These states, by virtue of the alliances concluded with them, form a barrier between the British territories and the Mahratta states, and this arrangement, conjointly with the other stipulations of the pacification, insures the permanent exclusion of the influence and power of the Mahrattas from the north-western point of Hindostan.

“ 8. The imposing position which the British Government has assumed by the possession of the fortress of Gwalior, and by the establishment of a subsidiary force on the territory of the Rajah of Gohud, pursuant to the conditions contained in the 48th paragraph of this Dispatch. This branch of the general arrangements of peace, peculiarly contributes to maintain the tranquillity of Hindostan, and to consolidate the barrier established by the exclusion of the power and influence of the Mahrattas from this part of India. The same stipulations in like manner unite our establishments in the Bundelcund with those situated to the north of the province of Gohud, and give an additional security to the navigation of the Jumna, at the same time that they more effectually protect our rich establishments in the Douab against the hostile attempts of any regular state, or the plundering incursions of any enterprising adventurer.

“ 9. The additional means of defence acquired by our system of foreign relations, established in the north-western part of Hindostan, against any attempt that might be made by the northern powers of Asia, or by the French Republic, with the assistance of these powers, with a view to disturb the security of the British establishments in India.

“ 10. The security which results to the British Government from the acquisition of the rich province of Cuttack, comprehending the part Balasore, and all the dependencies of that province; first, by establishing between the province of Midnapore and the Circars of the north, the vicinity of British domains and British authority; and thereby completing the line of communication between the territories under the immediate Government of Bengal, and those subject to the authority of Fort St. George.

“ Secondly, by depriving the French Government of the facilities, which the province of Cuttack, whilst in the hands of a foreign power, affords for the carrying on of intrigues, prejudicial to the British interests, and for the invasion of the British territories, either without or with the co-operation of a native powers.

“ Thirdly, by the advantages which the possession of the province of Cuttack, will give us in case of any dispute with the state of the Berar.

“ Fourthly, by the sources which augment the revenues and the commerce of the British Government, by the possession of this rich and fertile province, and by the influence and reputation which

which we shall enjoy all over India, by the possession of the great Temple of Jaghernauth, and by the just and benignant administration of the affairs of this Temple, which is visited by innumerable pilgrims from all parts of India.

“ [No. 11. has been skipped over.]

“ 12. The acquisition of the port and territory of Baroach, and of the maritime ports belonging to Scindia, in the western parts of India, which afforded to Scindia, and the French officers in his service, the means of communication with the French Government, and to the French an easy access to the Mahratta states, on any point where our military force was less formidable, and our political influence less firmly established than it is in the other parts of India.

“ 13. The degree of security which the possession of the fort and territory of Baroach affords us against any attempt on the part of France, to endeavour to aid by this channel, any native state whatever, with arms and ammunition, or with officers, for the purpose of instructing and disciplining their armies; and to endeavour to carry on intrigues between the Government of France and every native power, by means of the easy communication which the port and territory of Baroach, whilst in the hands of a Mahratta power, would lay open to the indefatigable zeal of French emissaries.

“ 14. The additional security for our establishments and interest in the Guzzerat, which results from the possession of the port and territory of Baroach, and from the renunciation on the part of Scindia of all the claims on our ally the Guickwar.

“ 15. The augmentation of sources, of revenues, and of commerce which have been opened to us by the possession of Baroach and of its districts.

“ 16. The improved situation of our alliances with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and the Peishwah, by virtue of the stipulations of the treaties of peace and partition. By the combined arrangements of these treaties, the power, the territories, and the resources of the Peishwah and of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, have been augmented and consolidated, and their means of fulfilling the conditions of the alliance have been consequently insured. The confidence which these Allies place in the power, the equity, and the moderation of the British Government, has been strengthened and augmented by the experience which they have had with respect to the advantages resulting from the alliances formed for the prosecution of the war, and with regard to those which they have derived from the last stipulation of the peace.

“ The stipulations of the treaties of peace have considerably diminished the causes of dissensions, and the means of political intrigue between our Allies and the Mahratta states, by preventing in future the intermixture of their territories, and consequently the collision of their authority; by exacting from Scindia and the Rajah of Berar the renunciation of the claims which they set up against the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwah, and by giving

giving to the British Government the right of determining all the differences that might arise between these respective Powers. Thus the influence and the ascendancy of the British Government in the Councils of Hyderabad and Poonah have been augmented and established in a permanent manner, not by limiting the authority, by wounding the independence, or by reducing the power of these states, but by virtue of stipulations, which have confirmed and strengthened their respective rights, their authority, and their independence, which have enlarged their dominions, consolidated their power, and augmented their resources; which, in short, have freed them from vexatious and litigious claims; from the violent intrusion of other powers; and have established the sources of a permanent tranquillity and prosperity within the limits of their respective states.

“ Our influence, and our ascendancy in the Councils of these Allies, are now founded upon the solid basis of the entire confidence which they repose in the equity and the moderation of our intentions, and in our protecting power.

“ 17. The high renown and the glory of the British nation in India, acquired by brilliant exploits, which have added lustre to the British arms in the course of the war, and by the clemency, moderation, and public faith which have distinguished the British Councils in the conclusion of peace.

“ 18. The conclusion of a defensive and subsidiary alliance between the British Government and Dowlut Row Scindia, by which the British influence has been completely established on the basis of Scindia's inclination, and the real interests of his government; and by which the most formidable enemy of the British power, during the last contest with the Mahratta Chiefs; has become a powerful ally of the Honourable Company.

“ 19. The power given to the British Government, by virtue of the general stipulations of the treaties of peace, of partition, and of subsidiary alliance, to decide the causes of dissent and dispute between the different Mahratta states; to prevent the re-establishment of any of these states in such a state, as to be able to acquire a formidable power, or to form designs prejudicial to the British Government or its Allies; to communicate or co-operate with our European hostile force, or to carry on dangerous intrigues with the allies, or the subjects of the British Government.

“ 20. The security in which the territories of our allies, the Soubadar of the Deccan, the Guickwar, and the Rajah of Mysore, and those of the Honourable Company are placed, sheltered from the dangers to which they had been exposed by the anarchy and confusion that had existed in the Mahratta empire, and which proceeded from the character and the manners of the Mahratta Chiefs.”

“ 140. The general dispositions of the pacification, combined with the treaties of partition, with the defensive and subsidiary treaty which has been lately concluded with Scindia, with the general state of our foreign relations, and with the internal prosperity of

of the British empire, have finally placed the British power in India in that imposing position with regard to other states, which alone can secure the permanent tranquillity and prosperity of those rich and important establishments.

" 141. By the establishment of our subsidiary forces at Hyderabad and Poonah, with the Guyckwar, Scindia and the Rajah of Gohud, a respectable army of 20,000 men is stationed within the territories, or on the frontiers, of foreign states, and supported by foreign subsidies. This army is always kept up in a state for the field, and ready for actual service in any quarter, and at the shortest notice. This force may be directed against every principal state of India, without apprehension of interrupting the tranquillity of the Company's establishments, and without having occasion to burthen the Governments of India with any considerable augmentation of the established military expences.

" 142. The position, the extent, and the organisation of this military force, combined with the privilege which the British Government possesses of having the power to decide such differences and contests as may arise between the different states with which it is connected by the duties of alliance, place the British Government in a situation to direct the causes of that intestine war, which for so many years has desolated a number of the most fertile provinces of India, has occasioned a constant and dangerous fluctuation of power amongst the native states, has introduced a pillaging and military spirit amongst the inhabitants, and has opened an exhaustless source for a nursery of military adventurers, ready to join the standard of every turbulent Chief, impelled by ambition, plunder, and rebellion. 2 any

" 143. A general bond of union is now established between the British Government and the principal states of India, upon principles which excite in each state an interest to maintain its alliance with the British Government, which prevents the exorbitant aggrandisement of any of these states by an usurpation of their mutual rights and possessions, and which secures to every state the unrestrained exercise of its separate authority within the limits of its defined dominions, under the general protection of the British power.

" We have the honour to be, Honourable Sirs,

" Your very faithful humble servants,

(Signed) " WELLESLEY, J. W. BARLOW, J. UDNEY.

(Signed)

" J. L. SANDERS."

Fort William, July 13, 1804.

No. III.—To the Honourable the Members of the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

" GENTLEMEN,

" The position of a body of troops under the orders of Jeswant Row Holkar, and the conduct and language of that adventurer, required, for the security of the interests of Great Britain and those of our Allies, that an army should be kept in the field under the command

command of his Excellency the Commander in Chief in person, during a considerable lapse of time after the conclusion of the peace with Dowlut Row Scindia and the Rajah of Berar. The most important considerations of policy, and above all of economy, demanded that the most prompt means should be employed to establish the English army in positions which could be considered as permanent in consequence of the peace; and it was therefore necessary to bring Jeswunt Row Holkar to a definitive explanation as to his views, the uncertainty of which might lead to considerable expences, by prolonging the necessity of keeping the British army in the field.

“ 2. The result of these negociations ultimately forced the Governor General and his Council to adopt the most decisive measures to reduce the power and resources of Jeswunt Row Holkar.

“ 3. Your Honourable Committee has been informed of the important concessions granted by Dowlut Row Scindia to Jeswunt Row Holkar, under positive engagements on the part of Holkar to unite his troops with those of the allied Chiefs at war with the English Government. Jeswunt Row Holkar, however, not having effected this junction with Dowlut Row Scindia and the Rajah of Berar during the war, nor having committed any act of aggression against the English Government during the time of the hostilities against these Chiefs, nothing was undertaken on the part of the English Government which could alarm Jeswunt Row Holkar.

“ 4. Although the actions committed by this Chief at Aurenghabad, a town which belongs to our ally the Nizam, and of which we have spoken in the second paragraph of our Letter to the Honourable Committee, dated June 10, 1803,* would have justified a determination on the part of the allies to exact a compensation, the Governor General, in his instructions to the Hon. Major-General Wellesley of June 27, 1803, † a copy of which was annexed to our dispatches to your Honourable Committee of 1st August, positively forbid that officer to commence hostilities against Holkar, for the sole motive of obtaining a compensation for the pillage of Aurenghabad, or for any other incursion of that nature.

“ 5. Towards the end of the war, Jeswunt Row Holkar advanced towards the frontier of our ally, the Rajah of Jyenagour, still following his system of plunder; he took with the greater part of his army a position which indicated the intention of violating the territory of the Rajah of Jyenagour. Other indications of a hostile nature were also manifested by Jeswunt Row Holkar.

“ 6. In December, 1803, Jeswunt Row Holkar wrote to his Excellency the Commander in Chief letters, which, though breathing the arrogance which Jeswunt Row Holkar affected on all

* This Letter is not among those intercepted.

† This instruction is contained in the Letter of 12th April, Sect. 275.

occasions, contained assurances that he was disposed to cultivate the friendship of the British Government.

“ 7. Still the conduct of Jeswunt Row Holkar at this epoch by no means corresponded with his protestations of amity. A letter was put into the hands of the Commander in Chief by the Rajah of Macherry, addressed to this last by Jeswunt Row Holkar, the object of which was to detach him from the alliance of the English Government. A correspondence against the English Government was besides discovered between Holkar and persons who were dependent on the English Government; and information was received that Holkar had massacred in the most barbarous manner three English subjects in his service, on the charge that a correspondence was kept up between one of these officers and the Commander in Chief.

“ 8. The answer which the Commander in Chief gave to the letters his Excellency had received from Jeswunt Row Holkar, expressed the wish of the English Government to abstain from every act of hostility against him, declaring, however, our resolution to repel any attempt on the part of any Chief whatsoever, the object of which should be to molest the allies, or to invade the rights of the English Government. The tenor of these letters was entirely approved of by the Governor General, who, from that time judged it necessary to give the Commander in Chief a statement of the views and intentions he had with respect to Jeswunt Row Holkar, and instructions as to the manner in which he should conduct himself towards that Chief.

“ 9. It appeared to the Governor General indispensibly necessary either to adopt means to reduce Jeswunt Row Holkar, or to enter into a convention with him, which, without compromising the dignity of the English Government or the recognised rights of other Chiefs or States, may engage Jeswunt Row Holkar to abandon his predatory system, and free us from the necessity of a continued expence for the defence of our country and that of our allies against the incursions of this freebooter.

“ 10. The detail of the arguments and considerations which influenced the determination of the Governor General on this subject is too voluminous to admit it to be inserted in this dispatch (*List No. 2*). The Governor General in Council thinks it sufficient to give you the general result of his deliberations on this point, referring your Honourable Committee for these details to the annexed copy of the instructions given to the General in Chief. (*No. 22, to the General in Chief.*)

“ 11. Jeswunt Row Holkar being justly regarded as an adventurer, and a usurper of the rights of his brother Cashu Row Holkar, no arrangement could, conformably to the principles of justice, be proposed between the English Government and Jeswunt Row Holkar, which would have included the formal sanction of the British Government to the usurpations of that Chief and the exclusion of Cashu Row Holkar from his hereditary rights. But on the other hand, there was no obligation on the British Govern-
ment

vernment to vindicate the rights of C. R. Holkar against J. R. Holkar. With the above instructions the British Government was free to treat exclusively with J. R. Holkar according to what the principles of policy and convenience would suggest. In consequence the Governor General definitively took the resolution to authorise the Commander in Chief to conclude a convention with Jeswunt Row Holkar, by which the English Government would engage to leave to Jeswunt Row Holkar the full exercise of his authority, provided only that Jeswunt Row Holkar would engage, on his side, to abstain from every act of aggression and hostility against the English Government, and from every usurpation of the rights of our allies. To effect this arrangement the Commander in Chief had orders to signify to Jeswunt Row Holkar, either by letter or by means of vakeels whom he may be invited to send, that the British Government had the most friendly dispositions towards him, and had no intention to make war on him, if it should not be constrained to it by some act of aggression on his part against the English Government or its allies; that the English Government had contracted, with respect to many Chiefs or Powers of Indostan, an obligation to guarantee them from all exactions and demands not founded on public justice; that we did not admit his pretensions to exact any kind of tribute from those Chiefs or States to be founded on any right of the family of Holkar; and that we should be consequently forced to reject all such demands on the part of Jeswunt Row Holkar; that, with the consent of his Highness the Peishwa, the English Government would be disposed to become mediator in the differences existing between Jeswunt Row Holkar and Cashu Row Holkar, and to regulate the pretensions of the different branches of the family on the principles of equity and justice; that we desired to be in peace with J. R. Holkar, and that we would take care not to meddle with his affairs beyond what may be required for the protection and security of the rights and territories of our allies; and that we demanded on his side but the manifestation of a similar conduct, by abstaining from every measure and operation contrary to it; by withdrawing his troops from his positions, from which he appeared now to be menacing the British Government or its allies, and by revoking all demands on all States and Princes in alliance with the British Government; adding, at the same time, that if Jeswunt Row Holkar had, as an individual, any claim to make good against these states, the English would be disposed to be the arbiter of pretensions of that nature on the principle of equity and justice.

“ 12. It was left to the discretion of the Commander in Chief to determine the degree of guarantee which was to be required of Jeswunt Row Holkar, in case he should subscribe to the arrangement proposed; and he was equally authorised to direct the British forces against him, if he shewed views evidently hostile.

“ 13. These instructions were communicated to the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, with orders to carry them into effect,

If it should so happen that his position should so far approach that of Jeswunt Row Holkar, that his communication with that Chief should be more easy and convenient than those of the General in Chief.

“ 14. Conformably to these instructions, the Commander in Chief addressed a letter to Jeswunt Row Holkar, the 29th Jan. 1804, which expressed in general terms the conditions on which the English Government was disposed to leave him, the peaceable exercise of his authority, and required of him as a proof of the sincerity of his appearances of friendship, that he should withdraw his army from the menacing position it then occupied; that he should return to his states, and that he should abstain from exacting tribute from the Allies of the English Government.

“ 15. The Commander in Chief, moreover, invited Jeswunt Row Holkar to send vakeels to his camp, for the purpose of making known to him his intentions on the subject of the arrangement proposed by the Governor-General, and advanced at the same time to Hindown, a position which commanded the principal ways which led to the possessions of the Company, and from which the army could easily move towards the places which the devastating troops of Jeswunt Row Holkar might menace.

“ 16. On the 27th February, the Commander in Chief received from Jeswunt Row Holkar an answer to the letter his Excellency had sent to that Chief, according to the instructions of the Governor-General: it was conceived in terms which seemed to indicate an intention of acceding to the propositions of the General in Chief, and promised to withdraw his troops from the menacing position they occupied. Jeswunt Row Holkar announced at the same time his intention to send a vakeel to the English camp.

“ 17. At different epochs of the negotiation, letters had been intercepted, addressed from Jeswunt Row Holkar to the allies and subjects of the English Government. These letters contained proofs, that J. R. Holkar sought to excite these persons to revolt, and are also proofs of his intentions to send troops to ravage the territory of the Company (*List, No. 3. Letters of Row Dnyll to J. R. Holkar, and to Golham Mahomed; of Nyming and Beyum-Sumerwo to Holkar; of Holkar to the Rajah of Muchem; of Fullah Dollahbry to the Rajah of Muchem; of Holkar to Myabut Ali Khan; of Husien Alli to the same; of Holkar to the same.*)

“ 18. The Governor-General judges that it is proper to send copies of the intercepted correspondence for the instruction of your Honourable Committee.

“ 19. The Governor-General here resumes the narrative of the negotiation entered into between the Commander in Chief and Jeswunt Row Holkar. In answer to the letters of that Chief, referred to in the 16th paragraph above, the Commander in Chief renewed his assurances of friendship, and pressed Holkar to carry into effect the resolution he had declared to withdraw within the limits of his usurped domains. The Commander in Chief informed

ed him also of the discovery of the correspondence, and warned him of the dangers of such conduct.

“ 20. On the 16th March two vakeels of Jeswunt Row Holkar entered the English camp, and on the 18th of that month had a conference with his Excellency the Commander in Chief. It appeared that the vakeels had not power to conclude any arrangement, only that they had orders to state the propositions of Jeswunt Row Holkar, and to make known to him the conditions the Commander in Chief would offer. The demands made by the vakeels in the name of Jeswunt Row Holkar at this conference were :—

“ 1. That he should be permitted to levy the choul according to the custom of his ancestors.

“ 2. That the antient possessions, formerly the property of his family, such as Etawa, &c. twelve pergunnahs in the Doub, and one pergunnah in the Bundeledund, should be granted to him.

“ 3. That the country of Huriāna, formerly possessed by his family, should be restored to him.

“ 4. That the territory now under his dominion should be guaranteed to him, and that a treaty should be concluded with him similar to that concluded with Scindia.”

“ 21. These pretensions were so extravagant, and in every respect so inadmissible, that they were positively rejected by the Commander in Chief, who expressed how much he was surprized at the conduct of Holkar in proposing conditions so different from those of the Commander in Chief, and so incompatible with the tenor and apparent spirit of his last communications.

“ 22. The Commander in Chief referred the vakeels to the letters before written by Holkar, containing the conditions on which his Excellency was authorised to conclude an arrangement with J. R. Holkar, and required as a preliminary to any negotiation, the return of Holkar within the limits of his territory. The Commander in Chief laid before the eyes of the vakeels the promise expressed by the letter of Holkar to the Commander in Chief, that he would withdraw his troops from their present position, and asked the vakeels whether he could rely on that promise? They answered expressly, that Holkar did not consider that promise as obligatory, farther than as his present demands by the vakeels should be acceded to. The whole of the conversation upon the part of the vakeels during this conference was remarkable for the most insulting arrogance. They had the air of expecting that the Commander in Chief would accede to their desires, after the exaggerated picture they drew of the powers and resources of Holkar, and giving it to be understood that Holkar, while he solicited the Commander in Chief to comply with his demands, was perfectly in a condition to force him to it.

“ 23. After the closing of the conference, the vakeels made known to the Commander in Chief, that though the demands they had

had stated were conformable to their instructions, they were authorised to depart from them for the consideration of lands or money which the English Government might think it proper to assign. The Commander in Chief answered this proposition by referring to that he had already made, and to the condition preliminary to all negociation, that Holkar should retire immediately within his possessions.

“ 24. A little after this conference, the vakeels left the English camp, and returned to that of Jeswunt Row Holkar.

“ 25. Before their departure the Commander in Chief gave them a letter, addressed to J. R. Holkar, in which he repeated the conditions on which Holkar could avoid a rupture; and in which he invited him to send to the English camp a confidential person, furnished with sufficient powers to conclude a treaty with the English Government.

“ 26. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to address to you for reference a copy of the dispatches (*List No. 4, No. 129, from the Commander in Chief, dated 19th March, 1804*), of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, relative to his overtures with J. R. Holkar.

“ 27. During the negociation with J. R. Holkar, the Governor-General received (*List No. 5, Letter from Holkar to Major-Gen. Wellesley, Feb. 1*), a copy of a letter addressed by J. R. Holkar to the Hon. Major-General Wellesley, written in appearance in the commencement of Feb. 1804, in which J. R. Holkar demands expressly as a condition of peace the cession of certain provinces in the Deccan, which he pretends belong originally to his family; adding, in insulting terms, that, in the event of a war, though he was not in a state to resist the English artillery in the open field, he would ravage many hundred cosses, and put them to fire and sword; that he, speaking of the General in Chief) should not have time to take breath, and that a continued war would make calamities rain on many lacks of men by the attacks of his army, which overwhelmed like the waves of the sea.

“ 28. These combined, insolent; and hostile declarations, joined to the equivocal conduct of Holkar, during the negociation with the Commander in Chief, and his base efforts to excite the provinces of the Company to revolt, all appeared to require prompt and extreme measures against this Chief,

“ 29. Still the Governor-General thought it right to await the result of the negociation which the Commander in Chief had orders to open,

“ 30. On the 4th of April the Commander in Chief received the answer of J. R. Holkar to the letters conveyed to him by the General in Chief through the hands of his vakeels.

“ 31. In this letter J. R. Holkar eluded an answer to the propositions that had been made to him by the Commander in Chief, and demanded a communication of the principal articles of the arrangement projected between J. R. Holkar and the English

English Government, before he could send any confidential agents to the English camp.

" 32. A letter was at the same time received from Bhowanny Shunker, first Minister of J. R. Holkar, to Captain Gardner, our officer, who had been previously in the service of Holkar, and afterwards in that of the Rajah of Jyenagur, but latterly had rejoined the English camp, and had been employed by the Commander in chief in the negotiation with Holkar. In this letter Bhowanny Shunker renews the demands the vakeels had before advanced, and which had been positively rejected by the Commander in Chief.

" 33. In answer to the letter of Holkar, the Commander in Chief reminded this Captain of the indulgence and moderation the English Government had manifested towards him, and exhorted him to take the sole rule for his conduct, which was consistent with his true interests, and the preservation of peace with the British Government.

" 34. For the information of your Honourable Committee a copy of this dispatch of his Excellency the Commander in Chief is here inclosed (*List No. 8*).—*No. 134*.—*From the Commander in Chief, with inclosures.*

" 35. At the time of the receipt of the letters in question, J. R. Holkar was at Gimere, a province belonging to Dowlut Row Scindia, whither he had advanced some time before, under the apparent pretext of devotion, having assured the Commander in Chief that he would re-enter his own territory.

" 36. Holkar levied considerable contributions in Gimere, and exerted himself without success to take possession of the fort, while the most considerable part of his forces remained on the frontier of Jyenagur, after having committed ravages on the territory of the Rajah. This circumstance, added to the contents of the letter of J. R. Holkar and Bhowanny Shunker, to the repetition of the extravagant and inadmissible demands already positively rejected by the General in Chief, and to the crafty and evasive conduct of J. R. Holkar in the whole of this affair; this circumstance, I say, shut up the path to any arrangement which would be compatible with the true interests of Great Britain and its allies, and with the national dignity.

" 37. The Governor General in Council thinks it necessary here to suspend his narration relative to the affairs of Holkar, to speak of what has passed between that Chief and Dowlut Row Scindia since the conclusion of the peace.

" 38. The enmity existing between these two Chiefs before the war was not cordially extinguished in either of them, even at the time when they projected a coalition against the British Government; and this hatred was on the part of Scindia much increased by Holkar's breach of his word, to which Dowlut Row Scindia attributed the lamentable issue of the successes of that war. The territory of the latter had been ravaged by Holkar during and after the war, and the vicinity of the numerous and rapacious troops of Holkar

to the most precious territories that remained, added to his fears, and made him desire to increase his resources and his strength, by the acquisition of a part of the territory of the family of Holkar, which he might hope to obtain by the destruction of his rival.—Revenge, interest, and ambition, thus combined to make Dowlut Row Scindia ardently desire the extinction of the power of Holkar.

“ 39. In the different conversations which the Ministers of Scindia had with the English agent at that Court, they represented in very strong terms the immorality, the violence, and the rapacity of J. R. Holkar, and insisted on the necessity of attacking that Chief without more delay.

“ 40. In one of these conferences, the ministers of Dowlut Row Scindia agreed with our resident on the conclusion of the treaty, which had existed between the latter and J. R. Holkar, by the mediation and guarantee of the Rajah of Berar, containing these principal conditions, which are mentioned in the 3d paragraph of his dispatch; and they added, that the most important clauses of that engagement had been fulfilled by Dowlut Row Scindia, who had used every means of conciliating the good will of Holkar; but that, notwithstanding his assurances of amity, Holkar had pursued a conduct entirely opposite to the interests of Scindia, and equally violated the spirit and the text of his engagements; that it was impossible to reckon upon the public faith of Holkar; that he was a freebooter, whom fortune had raised to a height of power which he was incapable of using well; that they could no longer flatter themselves with putting a stop to his ravages, but by cementing with him ties of amity and concord; that so long as he possessed the smallest power, he would be nothing but a chief of brigands; and that if it was necessary to attack him it would be policy to destroy him; that a motive so urgent was necessary to induce Scindia to consider Holkar as any thing but a usurper; but that having once regarded Holkar as a regular Power by treating with him, he was disposed to live in peace and amity with him, provided he would adopt a corresponding conduct. The Minister concluded, by demonstrating the necessity that the two Powers should adopt prompt measures to cut short the turbulence and power of Holkar.—(*List No. 7, Treaty between Scindia and Holkar.*)

“ 41. The treaty referred to in the preceding paragraph (and of which a copy is hereto annexed), consists almost exclusively of concessions by Dowlut Row Scindia in favour of Holkar, and contains no one corresponding concession on the part of the latter, but a general obligation which was necessarily imposed on him. By the nature of this engagement, he was to act with Dowlut Row Scindia as towards a friendly power; yet examining to the bottom all the circumstances of this affair, one cannot suppose that such were the bounds of the obligations to be observed by Holkar; for, however brilliant the successes of Holkar may have been, the means and resources of Dowlut Row Scindia were not compara-

tively reduced to such a state of weakness, as to be forced to purchase an accommodation with a Chief against whom he had every reason to keep up sentiments of the most invincible animosity, whom he considered as a robber; as a usurper, and with whom he could not enter into an accommodation but in the most urgent necessity, inasmuch as he had abandoned the cause for which he had so long fought, in recognizing the legitimacy of the rights of this usurper, making him at the same time concessions of a most political nature, which tended to give Holkar power in the Decan, and in Indostan, equal to his own, and a great extent of territorial cessions, which would give Holkar new means to carry into effect his projects of depredation, without any other obligation on his part but that of living in peace with the family of Scindia. These considerations alone would suffice to shew that J. R. Holkar was bound to subscribe to some separate conditions as the price of so many sacrifices on the part of Dowlut Row Scindia. It is proved that the consent of Holkar to these conditions was demanded and obtained, and that he was to unite his means and resources to those of the confederates, with the unanimous design of destroying the English empire; and this proof is established by many facts and circumstances, which have already been reported in our different dispatches to your Honourable Committee, which it would be useless to repeat after the direct and official avowal of the Ministers of Dowlut Row Scindia, who negotiated the treaty of peace with the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, as is reported in the following extract from the conferences between the Major-General and these Ministers.

“ Major-General Wellesley said, he had been informed of a treaty concluded lately between the Noharja and J. R. Holkar, and he desired to know if that treaty granted any thing to the family of Holkar.

“ Ectul Punt answered, that that treaty recognised the right which Holkar had to a portion of Indostan, but that the right became null since he had failed to fulfil the conditions of the treaty. Gorpara said, they might avow what were these conditions. The effect of them was, that he should co-operate to attack the British Government, and that he had never done so. Ectul Punt says Rajagu Booshah, Rajah of Berar, was the mediator and guarantee of the treaty which he had still in his hands.”

“ Your Honourable Committee will not fail to observe the clear declaration of the Ministers of Scindia (one of whom is the same who held to the English Resident the discourse mentioned in the 40th paragraph above), that the rights of Holkar, to the advantages of his treaty with Dowlut Row Scindia, depended on his joining the latter, and the Rajah of Berar to attack the English powers.

“ 43. Independently of what is to be inferred from this expression of attacking the English powers at the epoch when this treaty was concluded, that engagement bears itself the evidence of its conclusion, not only before the junction of the armies of Dowlut Row

Row Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, at Mulkaipoor, 4th June, 1803; and consequently before our negotiation with those Chiefs, with a view to their returning into their respective dominions; but even before the Rajah of Berar commenced his march from Nayport, the preamble of the treaty bearing that it had been drawn up in that town by Jadoor Row Basker, then first minister of Scindia, and agent at the court of the Rajah of Berar.

“ 44. The Governor General has thought it his duty to detail to you all these circumstances, as forming a body of clear, positive, and irrefragible proofs of the views of the Rajah of Berar, and of Dowlut Row Scindia, being originally hostile to the English Government, and of their real intention to occupy the frontiers of the Nizam with their armies, till they were repulsed by the happy successes of Major-General Wellesley.

“ 45. According to the facts above mentioned, it is now notorious that the interview of the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Row Scindia, at the head of their respective armies, was not for the purpose of determining the question of peace or war with the English Government, but rather to concert the plan of an offensive war already agreed upon with Jëswunt Row Holkar.

“ 46. And relative to the conference between the minister of Dowlut Row Scindia, and our resident detailed above in the 40th paragraph, your Honourable Committee will not fail to pay attention to the effrontery of that Minister who relying on the stipulations of the treaty of Buthampore, demanded aid from the English against Holkar, because Holkar had failed in his engagement to attack the English.

“ 47. On the 5th of February a vakeel dispatched by Holkar arrived at the camp of Dowlut Row Scindia. The Minister of Scindia made known to the acting resident, that the principal object of the vakeel of Holkar was to engage Scindia to an accommodation, and to unite their forces against the English possessions. The Minister added, that Scindia signified in the most positive terms his refusal to embark in that measure; and that tho' he should even be inclined to break his faith towards the English Government, the experience he had acquired of Holkar's contempt for the most solemn engagements, would be sufficient to divert him from any connection with that chief. The minister added, that Scindia had declared to the vakeel of Holkar, that he had no desire to attack him, provided he would withdraw from his estates, and desist from his aggressions against him and his dependants.

“ 48. Reflecting on the enmity subsisting between D. Row Scindia and J. Row Holkar, and the desire testified by the former, that the Government should adopt extremes against Holkar, the assertions of the Durbar of Scindia ought to be received with distrust. The Governor General does not however believe in these assertions, the conduct of Holkar agreeing perfectly with this prospect of a coalition against the English Government.

“ 49. The Governor General has the honour to convey to you enclosed for reference, a copy of the dispatch from Major Mal-

colm, containing the detail of the communication to which the preceding paragraph relates.—(List, No. 8.)

“ 50. Dowlut Row Scindiah, convinced that he could not effectually resist the arms of Holkar, and that the latter would not fail to profit by that weakness to commence hostilities, thought he, should take measures to engage Holkar to a reconciliation, with a view at the same time to receive prompt and authentic details as to the designs of that Chief. In consequence, Dowlut Row Scindiah dispatched a Vakeel to the camp of Jeswunt Row Holkar, with orders to announce to him that Dowlut Row Scindiah was ready to forget his past conduct, and to maintain the relations of peace and amity with him, provided Holkar would not pillage either him or his tributaries; and that in case of failure on this point, he, Dowlut Row Scindiah, would be forced to have recourse to arms. It was moreover given in charge to the Vakeel to obtain the most exact details, touching the designs of Holkar, and to give information of his operations.

“ 51. On the 3d of March the Vakeel of Scindiah was admitted into the camp of Holkar.

“ The Vakeel was received with every mark of distinction, and admitted without delay to a private conference. In the course of this conference, (according to the statement of the Minister of Scindiah to the Resident) Jeswunt Row Holkar, made a formal declaration of his intention to direct his forces against the English possessions.

“ 53. The Vakeel having remonstrated against the attack which Holkar had made on the fortress of Gunere; he endeavoured to justify his conduct in this business, by declaring that the Rajah of Jodpore, to whom he had confided the care of his family on his commencing the war against the English, refused to acquiesce in the propositions made to him, unless the fortress and province of Gunere were put in his possession. He expressed a hope, therefore, that Scindiah would excuse a step dictated solely by necessity, and the view of being enabled to support a war (meaning the war against the English) which menaced the independence of the Mahratta Empire.

“ 54. The Ministers of Dowlut Row Scindiah, on apprizing Major Malcolm of what had passed in their camp betwixt them and the Vakeel of Holkar, added, the communication of a statement they had received from the Vakeel of Scindiah at Naypore, containing similar intelligence, that messengers had been dispatched to Jeswunt Row Holkar, relative to his declaration of his intention to undertake a predatory war against the English.

“ 55. The details of these communications are inserted in the extracts of the correspondence of Major Malcolm, relative to the mission of the Vakeel of Scindiah to Jeswunt Row Holkar, (List, No. 9, Extracts 21, 22.)

“ 56. The combined facts demonstrate that the possessions of the Company, and of our allies accessible to the troops of Jeswunt Row Holkar, were the direct objects of his schemes of pillage. In addition to this consideration, however, the disposition of
Holkar,

Holkar, afforded no sort of security to the Government, or their allies, against the predatory incursions of his troops. The pay of his numerous hordes, far exceeded the pecuniary resources of his usurped dominions; and had hitherto been defrayed by the practice of indiscriminate plunder. It was only therefore by the continuance of the same system of rapine in all the districts adjoining, and hitherto unplundered, that he had the means of overcoming the difficulty, which he must otherwise have experienced, in furnishing subsistence to his tumultuous hordes.

“ 57. During the continuance of the war, the English Government had so widely extended their system of political alliances, that the greater part of the Petty States from which Holkar, and other freebooters had been in the habit of deriving his booty, were the allies of the Government, which considered itself bound to protect them against every aggression.

“ 58. The scarcity occasioned by the want of rain during the season, the operations of the Mahratta armies, previously to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, and the subsequent depredations of the troops of Holkar; all these causes conspiring, had so far spread desolation through almost the whole of the Deccan and the southern provinces of Indostan, that no long interval must have elapsed, before Holkar saw himself in such a situation, as would have compelled him, for the purpose of procuring subsistence, to make an irruption into the territories of the Government, or of the States under its protection.

“ 59. The pillage of the opulent town of Jynagur which in all probability would have been the first object of his attack, would have furnished to Holkar a large supply of pecuniary resources, which by enabling him to keep up a formidable force, would have augmented his opportunities of plunder and devastation, which could only have been put a stop to by dispatching successive bodies of troops to repress his outrages, accompanied by vast inconvenience and expence.

“ 60. The recent peace with Dowlut Row Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, had deprived numerous hordes of plunderers of their favourite employment: Great numbers of these, tempted by the want of subsistence, would have joined Holkar to assist in pillaging the countries to which he directed his march. On this ground it would have been necessary to keep up an army in a state of inactivity, and at the same time on a footing altogether as expensive as if employed in actual service, or else to have our own territories, as well as those of our allies, exposed to the inevitable ravages of a part of Holkar's troops, till, at an immense expence, a body of troops had been sent to repel his incursions.

“ 61. All these circumstances and considerations sufficiently evince that the existence of this horde of adventurers under the command of Holkar, was dangerous to the tranquillity of our possessions, as well as those of our allies, and that a longer continuance of moderation would only have had the effect of encouraging his excesses, and inducing him to extend them to the heart of our dominions, thus involving the Government in great additional

embarrassment and expence. The reduction of this power was therefore not merely a measure of policy and indispensable security, but also of real economy in the application of the finances of the honourable Company.

“ 62. The Governor General accordingly, on receiving the dispatches of the Commander in Chief (alluded to in the 34th paragraph of this dispatch), gave orders to the Commander in Chief and to Major General Wellesley, under date of April 15th, to commence hostilities against Holkar, both in the Deccan and Indostan. The Governor General at the same time notified this determination to Major Malcolm, and instructed him to apprise Scindiah of this resolution. The General has the honour of transmitting to you a copy of all these documents (List No. 10. Extract 16th April to the Commander in Chief, to Major General Wellesley and to Major Malcolm.)

“ 63. The Governor General in Council will lay before your Hon. Committee the state of the military operations, which have had for their object the reduction of the power and resources of Jeswunt Row Holkar, and of the success which have attended these operations up to the latest date of dispatches received.

“ 64. Immediately upon the receipt of the letter which Holkar wrote to Major General Wellesley (of which notice is taken in the 27th paragraph of this dispatch), that officer foreseeing from the complexion of that letter, and the intelligence which he had received of the operations of Holkar in Indostan, that the Governor General would, without delay, give orders for commencing hostilities against this adventurer, felt it to be his duty to lose no time in adopting such measures as would enable him effectually to co-operate in any steps which might have been already taken by the Commander in Chief, conformably to the orders of the Governor General. The principal places then occupied by the partisans of Jeswunt Row Holkar in the Deccan, under the authority of this usurper, were the fort and territory of Chandore. His partizans also possessed some territory in the Candeish, and some districts scattered over the dominions of his Highness the Nizam. The capture of the fort of Chandore was calculated to deprive Holkar of all his possessions, the siege of that place was therefore the first object to which it behoved the operations of the English army in the Deccan to be directed. At that time the state of the districts betwixt Poonah and Chandore, which had suffered the calamities of a severe famine, presented very formidable obstacles to the march of an army in that quarter. Major General Wellesley was afraid also, that if the commencement of hostilities did not take place till after the rainy season, he should not be able to conduct his operations against the possessions of Holkar in the Deccan. He, however, exerted the utmost activity in placing the troops under his command in a state fit for active service.

“ 65. Major General Wellesley conceived that an important object would be accomplished by sending a detachment of English troops into the Guzzerat against the possessions of Holkar

in the Malwa : he accordingly lost no time in sending a reinforcement into that quarter, consisting of three battalions of native infantry. Another motive which induced him to strengthen the troops in the Guzzerat was the probability of the Governor General's having determined to station in that district Scindiah's subsidiary forces, to be furnished agreeably to the terms of the offensive and defensive treaty. With the abovementioned reinforcement, the troops in the Guzzerat consisted of two regiments of European, and six battalions of native infantry ; one of these last consisted of sixteen hundred men.

“ 66. These arrangements, as well as the opinion of Major General Wellesley on the subject of the plan of the operations to be pursued against Jeswunt Row Holkar, have been detached by that officer to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, in a letter bearing date the 23d of April, a copy of which is annexed to this dispatch, for the information of your Hon. Committee.— (No. 11. Letter of General Wellesley to the Commander in Chief, dated the 23d of April).

“ 67. On the receipt of the instructions of the Governor General, dated the 16th of April, Major General Wellesley wrote to Colonel Murray, who commanded the English troops in the Guzzerat, giving such instructions as were requisite to guide him in the operations which General Wellesley had determined to undertake without delay against the possessions of Holkar in the Malwa.

“ 68. Major General Wellesley gave at the same time orders to the Resident at the Court of Dowlut Row Scindiah, instructing him to inform that Chief of the propriety of employing his forces in the reduction of all the places accessible to his arms in the dominions of Holkar. The Resident had at the same time instructions to prevail on Scindiah to dispatch an officer to the army under the command of Colonel Murray, with the view of being employed in providing for its subsistence, and at the same time taking possession of such places as fell into our hands, and Colonel Murray judged proper to intrust to his care. The Resident at the Court of Dowlut Row Scindiah was apprised that according to the opinion of General Wellesley, a detachment of English troops should be united with the army of Scindiah, and he was instructed to provide a certain quantity of artillery, for the future use of Colonel Murray's army.

“ 69. Dowlut Row Scindiah received, with every demonstration of joy, the notification of the resolution of the Commander in Chief to reduce Jeswunt Row Holkar, and the intentions of his Excellency relative to the future division of the territory under the usurped dominion of Holkar, as disclosed to him in the instructions to the Resident of his Court, dated April the 16th (a copy of these is annexed to the present dispatch).— Scindiah promised to use every exertion to co-operate effectually with the English forces; and after some discussions with the Resident on the subject, he consented to the measures which General Wellesley had adopted.

“ 70. Governor General Wellesley in Council, has the honour to subjoin to this document, the instructions given by Major-General Wellesley to Colonel Murray (list number 12, instructions of General Wellesley to Colonel Murray). This document, together with the letter of the said Major General to the Commander in Chief, will put your Honourable Committee in possession of the plan of operations against Holkar, previous to these being carried into execution in the Deccan and the Guzzaret.

“ 71. The Governor-General now resumes the narratives of the proceedings of the Commander in Chief in Indostan, agreeably to his orders of the 16th of April.

“ 72. During the negotiation with Jeswunt Row Holkar, the Commander in Chief continued to advance slowly towards the territory of the Rajah Jynagur, having three objects in view—to accelerate the progress of the negotiations with Holkar; to protect the country of Jynagur from his incursions, and to preserve the English possessions and those of our allies from all inroads in the direction of the Jumna.

“ 73. A strong detachment under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Ball, took a position near Canon, a town situated a few miles to the South West of Delhi, with a view of preventing any body of troops from penetrating into that quarter where the new acquisitions of the English Government are situated.

“ 74. Previous to the Commander in Chief receiving the orders of the Governor General of the 16th of April, he had judged it necessary to adopt some measures to arrest the progress of the outrages of which Holkar was guilty on his return from Adjenere, into the territories of the Rajah of Jynagur, where he occupied a position that threatened the safety of the capital of that province. Holkar had at the commencement of hostilities forwarded his artillery by the way of Malwa, but he remained at the head of a considerable body of cavalry. With a view of protecting the city of Jynagur, and inspiring confidence in the Government and troops of the Rajah, the Commander in Chief formed a detachment composed of three battalions of Native Infantry, under the command of Colonel Monson, of His Majesty's 76th regiment. He marched on the 18th of April in the direction of Jypore. The rout of this detachment was so arranged that a junction could be formed with the main body of the army by one single forced march. On the 21st this detachment arrived under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Monson in the vicinity of Jynagur. He was accompanied by an Officer dispatched by the Commander in Chief, with orders to confer personally with the Rajah of Jynagur on the best means of counteracting the designs of Holkar, and of persuading the Rajah to adopt vigorous and decisive measures to effect that object. The march of this detachment to Jynagur compelled Holkar to take to flight. On the morning of the 23d this Chief suddenly retired from his position, in the interior of Jynagur, and marched with the utmost precipitation to the South. Holkar was pursued in his retreat, by parties of Native Cavalry, commanded by European

ropean Officers, who had orders to observe the movements of Holkar, and to harrass his rear.

“ 75. A sudden halt which Holkar made for two days having made the General in Chief suspect that the retreat was a feigned one, his Excellency advanced with his army, ordering Lieutenant-Colonel Monson to advance before the army with all possible expedition : but, upon the approach of the English troops, Holkar began his march again with the greatest expedition, with all the symptoms of fear and alarm.

“ 76. Holkar continued his retreat with the greatest celerity till he reached the vicinity of Kotah, where he halted. The rapidity of his flight had left the English army so far behind him, that on his part he had nothing to dread from an immediate attack. The detachments of Native Cavalry which had been dispatched before the army, continued their pursuit, and had several skirmishes with his troops. The Officers commanding these parties of cavalry apprised the Commander in Chief that the situation of Holkar during the flight was to the last degree disastrous, that the districts which he traversed had been almost entirely laid waste by former pillage, and furnished only a scanty subsistence to his troops, vast numbers of whom deserted.

“ 77. After the flight of Holkar, the Commander in Chief received a letter from that Chief, in which he renewed his protestations of friendship, and proposed to send a Vakeel to the Commander in Chief. In answer to this overture the Commander in Chief referred him to the propositions that had been made at the opening of the negotiation. Copies of these propositions accompany the dispatches. (List 15.)

“ 78. The Commander in Chief continued his march for several days in the direction to which Holkar had fled, and he was attended by the detachment under the command of Colonel Monson. His Excellency determined on investing the fort-ss of Rampoor, belonging to Holkar, the possession of which by our troops, would deprive Holkar of all his possessions in that part of India. For this purpose his Excellency detached three battalions of infantry, and a regiment of native cavalry, with a corresponding quantity of artillery necessary for undertaking a siege under the command of Lieut.-Col. Don. In a few days the detachment arrived before Rampoor, and on the 16th of May a party of the troops made the assault. The fort was carried with the utmost bravery and promptitude. The dispatches of the Commander, of which a copy is subjoined (List 14), contain the details of the assault, and the capture of Rampoor, which reflect the highest honour on the officers and men employed in this service.

“ 79. It was extremely improbable, after the precipitate flight of Holkar, and his anxiety to avoid the army of the Commander in Chief, and that of Lieut.-Colonel Monson, that an opportunity would be afforded of bringing Holkar to a general action in Indostan. The improbability of Holkar's return to the heights, joined to the information which the Com-
mander

mander in Chief had received of the progress of the preparations in the Guzzerat, and the conviction that the English troops co-operating with those of Scindiah, presented the only means of making some impression upon the territories of Holkar. All these circumstances suggested the propriety of withdrawing the troops from the advanced position which they occupied, and of confining their operations in Indostan to those measures which are necessary for expelling Holkar from that country.

“ 80. With this view his Excellency the Commander in Chief gave orders to Lieut.-Colonel Monson to dispose his forces in such a manner as to render the return of Holkar impracticable in that direction. The means adopted by Lieut.-Colonel Monson were fully adequate to the object of repelling any inroad of Holkar till the proper season for active operations, should arrive. The position of Rampoora and the territory dependant on it was also calculated to prevent the return of that Chief to the situation which he had quitted.

“ 81. A considerable body of troops which Scindiah had sent to Dougine to co-operate with the Commander in Chief, was sent forward to press Holkar, and still more harrass him in his retreat.

“ 82. The Governor General approved the plan which the Commander in Chief had resolved to follow.

“ 83. In the existing state of things it appeared impracticable to the Governor General and Council to push with any activity any operations against Holkar till after the expiration of the rainy season, a period at which those districts which had been ravaged by the Mahratta Chiefs during the wars which preceded the peace of Bassein, and during the late dry weather would be enabled to afford the means of subsistence to the English troops to be employed in destroying the resources and weakening the power of Jeswunt Row Holkar in the Deccan. The Governor General judged that this moment was favourable for withdrawing the troops from the different positions in India, and placing them in their usual garrisons, with the exception of the subsidiary forces which the Government was obliged to furnish to the Peishwa, and to the Guikwar, as well as to Dowlut Row Scindiah, and to the Ranah of Gohud. For the purpose of carrying this resolution into effect, the Governor General issued orders, copies of which are sent for the information of your honourable Committee (List, No. 15).

“ 84. The following disposition of the troops in the undersigned notes will enable the English Government, at the end of the rainy season, to reduce within just limits the power of Jeswunt Row Holkar, without occasioning greater expenditure than what the maintenance of the subsidiary forces at Poona, and those with the Guikwar, Scindiah, and the Ranah of Gohud, requires. This, however, is an expence fully provided for in all the states. Your Hon. Committee will remark with satisfaction what the total amount of the subsidiary troops in the Deccan, constituting a force of 22,000 men, may be employed against Jeswunt Row Holkar, or any other disturber of the tranquillity

of India, without requiring extraordinary succours, or without occasioning any extraordinary addition to the expences of our military establishment *. Your Hon. Committee will not fail to see, and duly to appreciate the advantages of an arrangement, by means of which the expences of so great a proportion of the year in India are defrayed by foreign subsidies. Whilst we mention this, we cannot overlook the constant state of preparation and equipment imposed upon subsidiary troops. Your Hon. Committee will know how to estimate the influence and security which the Government must derive from the establishment of so imposing a force in the heart of the Deccan, and in positions calculated to free us from all apprehension from without, and to maintain tranquillity in the interior of your immense and flourishing possessions in the Indian Chersonese.

" 85. At an early period of the month of last May, the Commander in Chief began his march for his former cantonments, observing only such changes as the situation of our newly acquired territory required.

" 86. It has been remarked in the 74th paragraph of this dispatch, that the Commander in Chief had dispatched a corps of Native Cavalry to observe the movements of Holkar. This corps consisted of two detachments, the one commanded by Capt. Gardner, an officer in the service of the Rajah of Jynagur, and the other by Lieut. Lucan, of His Majesty's 74th Regiment.

" 87. On the morning of the 29th of May, the Captain arrived with his detachment at a post, called Ballokkeiry, where he was informed that the chief partizan of Jeswunt Row Holkar, named Tantia, was encamped with three battalions of infantry, eleven pieces of cannon, two hundred Mowwaters, and three thousand horse, at a distance of about five miles from the position of Captain Gardner. Captain Gardner immediately wrote to Lieutenant Lucan, who held a position about two miles in the rear, informing him of this circumstance, and instructing him to attack the party of Tantia. Lieutenant Lucan lost no time in joining the corps of Captain Gardner, and the two divisions were soon in presence of the enemy.

" 88. Tantia had been apprised at an early hour of the approach of Captain Gardner and Lieutenant Lucan, and had drawn off with his battalions about nine o'clock. He had taken up a strong position, in which he was attacked by the two detachments of Captain Gardner and Lieutenant Lucan, which had been

* At Hid—One European regiment, six battalions of Sepoys, two regiments of Native Cavalry, two companies of Artillery, and one ditto Pioneers.

" At Poona—Six battalions of Sepoys, two companies of Artillery, and one regiment of Native Cavalry.

" With D. R. S.—Six battalions of Sepoys, one regiment of Native Cavalry, and two companies of Artillery.

" With the Guickwar.—Two battalions of Sepoys, and one company of Artillery.

" Total.—One European regiment, three regiments of Cavalry, twenty battalions of Native Infantry, seven companies of Artillery, and one company of Pioneers."

divided into four bodies, with the view of hemming in the enemy on all sides, and preventing his escape. About five o'clock in the afternoon the artillery of Lucan's division arrived, after a march of 35 miles. At that moment the Commander in Chief of Tantia's Battalions demanded a parley, and offered to surrender on condition of being escorted in safety to the Camp of Bappoo. Scindiah, who commanded the advanced body of Dowlut Row Scindiah, and engaging not to serve against the English Government. These conditions being accepted by Captain Gardner, the Battalions took their route by Ballookhery, escorted by a detachment of cavalry from the corps of Captain Gardner and Lieutenant Lucan. This force consisted of 2099 men, including 200 Mewates. Tantia himself had taken to flight on the approach of the divisions of our force.

" 89. On the 2d of June the Governor-General received information that a body of freebooters on horseback had made an irruption into the province of Bundelcund.

" 90. Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcet, who, in consequence of the illness of Colonel Powell and the death of Colonel Polhill, had succeeded to the command of the English troops in the province of Buudeclund, amounting to four hundred and fifty European infantry, four battalions of Sepoys, and two squadrons of Indian cavalry, had sent a detachment of seven companies of Sepoys, a body of Indian cavalry, and the park of artillery, under the command of Captain Smith, to attack a fort about five miles distant from the position of the main body at Hooch.

" 91. On the morning of the 22d of May the enemy's cavalry succeeded in cutting off a part of Captain Smith's detachment, posted in the Pettah of the fort, consisting of Captain Peade, Lieutenant Morris, of the Artillery, two serjeants, two corporals, forty-four artillerymen, and an equal number of Lascars, with the Sepoys attached to the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment, under the command of Lieut. Sillarpie. All this party perished, with the exception of 130 natives, who returned wounded to the camp of Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcet. On the 24th of May, two mortars, 2 twelves and a six-pounder, and all the train of artillery, fell also into the hands of the enemy. Captain Smith returned with the five remaining companies of Sepoys to the camp of Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcet, with the loss of only one man, though the enemy's cavalry made many fruitless efforts to cut off his retreat.

" 92. The details of this disaster are contained in the subjoined copy, (List No. 16.) of the dispatches of Lieutenant Colonel Fawcet, dated the 22d of May.

" 93. Information had at first been received, that this body of cavalry consisted of between 15 and 20,000, under the command of Ameer Kawn, an ancient partisan of Jeswunt Row Holkar. From subsequent advices, however, there was reason to believe, that the party did not exceed 5,000; that it was not under the command of Ameer Khawn; and that the irruption had no connection with the movements of Holkar, but was merely

an assemblage of banditti, who derived their subsistence from plunder.

“ 94. Sometime after, this troop of cavalry attacked the village of Chalpee, and endeavoured to force the passage of the Jumna, but they were repulsed by two companies of sepoy, under the command of Captain Jones. It was afterwards defeated by Lieutenant Colonel Shephard, who commanded a small body of troops lately in the service of Ambaja Inglic. Since that period, this troop of cavalry has entirely evacuated the Province of Bundelcund.

“ 95. Their march from Erictch to Kalpee, and from Kalpee to Rooch, a district chiefly belonging to the Nana of Kalpee, was distinguished by the greatest pillage and cruelty.

“ 96. Lieutenant Colonel Fawcet then moved his detachment in various directions from Rooch, along the River Betwah, from thence to the Jumna, till he reached Kalpee.

“ 97. And during the course of these marches, the troops suffered severely from excessive heat, and want of provisions and forage. A number of excellent officers and soldiers fell victims to the effects of the climate and fatigue.

“ 98. The conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Fawcet, appearing to the Governor General dishonourable to an English officer, as being equally contrary to positive orders, and to his duty, the Governor General gave orders to arrest him, and bring him to a Court Martial. The Commander in Chief, as soon as he received information of the defeat of the detachment, informed Lieutenant Colonel Fawcet that he had transferred the command to the officer immediately under him, till an examination into his conduct had taken place. The Commander in Chief also put under arrest Captain Smith, till his conduct, which did not appear free from blame, was investigated.

“ 99. During these transactions, Captain John Bailey, who conducted, on the part of the Commander in Chief, all business of a Civil or Political nature in the Bundelcund, (as mentioned in a dispatch of the 12th of April,) resided at Bonda, a place situated on the south bank of the River Betwa, and near the centre of that part of the province where the English authority had been established: the forces of Captain Bailey consisted only of a small body of cavalry belonging to Sumshiri-Behaudur, about two hundred cavalry in the service of the Rajah of Immut-Behaudur, and a thousand seapoys, under the command of a European officer, in the service of this last Chief. In spite of the consternation which was spread over the whole province of Bundelcund, by the news of the irruption of the plundering party of horse, the number of which had been greatly exaggerated, Captain Bailie felt that it was his duty to hold out against all hazards, and the Governor-General is convinced, that the preservation of tranquillity in the districts to the south of the Betwa, is chiefly to be attributed to the subordination and confidence which the brave and prudent Captain Bailey inspired on that occasion.

" 100. The day after intelligence was received of the destruction of the detachment under Captain Smith the Commander in Chief advanced from the position which he then occupied, with all his cavalry, with a view of passing the Jumna, and of traversing the Doab, towards the south east, for the purpose of protecting that country against any incursion of the enemy's cavalry.

" 101. In consequence of the recent events in the Bundelcund, the Gov. Gen. thought it necessary to adopt some means for uniformly establishing the British civil and military authority in all the districts of Bundelcund which had been ceded to the Hon. Company by his Highness the Peishwa, with the view of preventing in future any irruptions of the enemy.

" 102. According to the latest accounts, Holkar had retired to a short distance from Angein, constantly pursued by the irregular cavalry, under the command of Captain Gardner, while Lieutenant-Colonel Monson had taken up a position of such a nature, as to preclude the possibility of his return into Indostan.

" There is every reason to hope that during the rainy season, which is about to commence, the motions of Holkar will be so closely watched as to secure the tranquillity of India. In the mean time, the provinces of the Company enjoy the most profound peace, and the Governor-General hopes to be able to regulate every thing connected with Treaties of Peace and Subsidies before the expiration of the rainy season. With a view of accelerating this so desirable object, the Governor-General is preparing to go by water to the High Country, and will set out in a few days; he there expects to meet the Commander in Chief, in the month of August, after which he will have the honour of submitting to your Committee a more circumstantial detail of the arrangements relative to the late Treaties of Peace and Subsidy.

We have the honour to be,

GENTLEMEN,

Your very faithful humble Servants,

(Signed)

WELLESLEY,
G. R. UDNEY,
G. K. BARLOW.

Fort William, June 15, 1804.

P. S. Your Honourable Committee have been apprised by the 548th paragraph of our dispatch of the 12th of April, relative to the undecided discussion between the English Government and Dowlut Row Scindia on the subject of the territory of Gohud and the fortress of Gwalior. Your Committee was at the same time informed by the 621st paragraph of the same dispatch, that a question had been started, and then not resolved, between the English Government and the Rajah of Berar, relative to certain engagements concluded between Lieutenant Colonel Broughton and certain Zaminders, subjects of the Rajah of Berar, in consequence of which these Zaminders had become independent of the authority of the Rajah. It is with satisfaction that the Governor General now announces to you that these discussions have

have been terminated at the couverts of Dowlut Row Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in the most amicable and satisfactory manner. Dowlut Row Scindiah has formally renounced all pretensions to the district of Gohuw, and fortress of Gewalior, and the Rajah of Berar has recognised in the most formal and precise manner the engagements entered into by Lieutenant Colonel Broughton and the subjects of his Government, Signed,

June 15, 1804.

WELLESLEY,
G. M. BARLOW.
G. R. UDNEY
T. BOTHERY, Secretary.

SUPPLEMENT IV.

No. IV.—To the Hon. Major General WELLESLEY, &c. &c.

“ SIR,—1. I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, (dated Camp of Jaum, the 11th and 13th of November, 1803.)

“ 2. I entirely approve of your conduct, in having, without hesitation, received one of the Vakeels of Dowlut Row Scindiah, and also the nature of the reception you gave him. The conference you held with the Vakeel on the 10th of November, was conducted with much judgment. It was right, on your part, to demand full powers from the Vakeels; and it was absolutely necessary to insist upon the renewal of those powers by Scindiah, before the conclusion of any arrangement whatever, leading to peace. At the same time it was prudent to permit the Vakeel to remain in your camp, till he could receive formal powers from Scindiah; and it was proper during his residence in your camp, to permit him to make you any proposition he thought necessary to submit to your consideration.

“ 3. I also approve of your determination to require the Vakeel to withdraw from your camp, if he should not be furnished with the necessary powers within the time prescribed by you; and I think if he does not within the time produce full powers from Scindiah, you ought to compel him to retire from your camp.

“ 4. The same principles will necessarily induce you to refuse to receive in your camp any Vakeel from Dowlut Row Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar, without being furnished with full powers from their respective Chiefs. The circumstance of Dowlut Row Scindiah's having omitted to furnish Jeswunt Row Gaopara with full powers, may have been accidental; but it may also be attributed to the pride of Scindiah, whose arrogance, mortified by the failure of his plans, might seek a consolation in the hope of a momentary triumph in the midst of his own Court, by the acquiescence of the British Government, in his insulting intention of opening

opening negotiations for peace, by the organ of an agent, clothed with no direct or regular authority by any of the Belligerent Powers. The object of Scindiah might also be to gain time in the desperate situation of his affairs.

“ 5. Your wisdom and experience have banished every attempt founded on such insidious projects. After your formal notification to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, of your determination to admit no ambassador in future, not furnished with full powers from his particular master, every attempt to introduce the enemy's emissaries in your camp, under pretence of opening negotiations for peace, will be regarded by you as an insult offered to the British Government; and you will announce to the Confederates your determination to treat all such emissaries as spies, and to punish them according to the known laws of nations. You will call to mind that, in virtue of the treaties of Bassein and Hydrabad, neither the Peishwah nor the Nizam can enter into any separate negotiation without the consent of the British Government, and consequently you will forbid all communication between the enemy and those Princes respectively.

“ 6. The conduct of Appah Dessaye manifests an entire devotion to the interests of Scindiah; and your answers to the perfidious and artful letters of this subtle Mahratta are extremely judicious.

“ 7. You were empowered by my instructions of the 26th and 27th of June, to conclude peace with Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Holkar, conjointly or separately. In the course of the war, we have had sufficient experience not to perceive what are the advantages to be gained by disuniting the interests of those Chiefs; and our present situation enables us to insist on the principle. My notes of the 16th of Oct. will point out to you my desire to conclude separately, peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. — Yet the admitting those Chiefs to a treaty of peace concluded with them conjointly, will not necessarily include the admitting either of them to negotiate exclusively for the other. The treaty may be an instrument made conjointly, although each party has negotiated separately for his own proper interests. To permit any one of the belligerent powers to negotiate for another, would be to establish a durable influence of that power exceeding the limits of the proper balance. I therefore approve of your intention to disunite from each other the interests of Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Holkar.

“ 8. You cannot permit Scindiah to treat either for the Rajah of Berar, or Holkar, except in the utmost extremity of our affairs. You will therefore resist every negotiation of this kind, unless absolutely compelled to yield to it by the pressure of circumstances. The fundamental principles of my recent negotiations and treaties with the Peishwah would be entirely overthrown, by establishing a power in the hands of Scindiah, if he were permitted to negotiate for the Rajah of Berar and Holkar, or for one or other of those Chiefs.

“ 9. In

“ 9. In the present desperate situation of Scindiah's affairs, he ought instantly to perceive, that the only policy by which he may recover any considerable degree of power and territory is, to detach his interests from those of the Rajah of Berar.

“ 10. Holkar has not yet become an open party in the war, and it is certainly convenient to treat him as a friend in every negotiation with the confederates. His conduct, however, is extremely equivocal; and this is one reason more for compelling Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to treat separately for peace.

“ 11. If the war continues with Scindiah, you will remove Appah Dessaye from his present command, or will provide an effectual security against the consequences of the attachment which Appah Dessaye betrays for the cause of Scindiah. In case of the continuation of the war with Scindiah, it is much to be desired that all communication be interrupted between Appah Dessaye and your army.

“ 12. Your letter of the 6th of October, inclosing the letter you received from Balajee Koonjur, reached me on the 1st of November; and your conduct on this occasion has my entire approbation, as has been already announced to you by my private Secretary.

“ 13. On the 26th of October, a dispatch was sent off to you of the date of the 16th of October, relative to the various questions connected with the conditions of peace to be granted to the confederated Chiefs. The detention of the dispatch at Fort William was occasioned by an interruption of the passage of the Dak through the province of Cuttak. This dispatch will inform you what was my opinion at the time on the subject of the conditions of peace. It has not, however, been possible, up to this time for me to obtain a knowledge of the state of the war in every part of India, of the nature of the negotiations with the different Powers, or of the situation and views of the confederated Chiefs, such as I could have desired, to be in a state to give any final instructions on the conditions of peace.

“ 14. The conditions of peace that may be justly demanded will clearly appear, if the causes, the objects, and the result of the war be examined, as well as the present situation of the enemy.

“ 15. The refusal of the Confederates to disperse, and to recall to their usual stations on their respective territories the troops they had assembled and concentrated on the frontiers of our ally, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, after having declared that the design of their junction was to determine if they should have peace or war with the British Government and its allies, was the immediate cause of the war.

“ 16. In this state of things, the confederate armies persisting in the position which the Chiefs appeared determined to maintain, was an unequivocal proof that it was their design to render abortive, by actual hostilities, or by the terror of their arms, the consequences that might result from the alliance concluded
between

between the British Government and the Peishwah, and to disturb the tranquillity of the States of the Nizam, and ultimately of those of the Company. The union of the confederated forces, and their imposing and menacing position, presented to the Chiefs every advantage for pursuing the hostile designs they had manifested, and enabled them to retain in their own hands the alternative of peace or war, and to be the arbiters of the fate of the Deccan, according as their interests or caprice might suggest.

“ 17. At the same time, the state and position of Scindiah's forces, commanded by French officers in Indostan, and the machinations of M. Perron with the neighbouring States, and with the subjects of the Company and the Vizir, gave still farther proofs of the hostile designs of the Confederates, and furnished to those Chiefs additional means for carrying on designs of a similar nature.

“ 28. The first effect of the war originating in those causes has been to deprive the Confederates of the means they possessed of pursuing with effect their illicit designs ; and the general plan of military operations, connected with a digested system of political arrangement, has had for its object the prevention of the Confederates from effecting the revival of the sources of that military and political power which they employed to weaken the stability of our alliances, and to disturb the tranquillity of our dependants and states.

“ 19. The power of Dowlut Row Scindiah, considered in regard to his means as capable of affecting the security of the British Empire in India, may have consisted at the beginning of the war in the following branches of political and military resources.”

“ First, in the favourable situation of the military establishment of Scindiah, under the direction of European officers, and particularly the formidable condition of his regular infantry and artillery, under the command of those officers.

“ Secondly, in the possession of a rich and fertile country, defended by various forts, furnished with magazines, founderies, and arsenals, besides a considerable quantity of warlike stores, at proper posts along our frontiers, and contiguous to the frontiers of the British establishment in India most remarkable for their weakness.

“ Thirdly, in the establishment of a corps of numerous and well disciplined troops, with a formidable train of artillery, under the command of French officers, in the said territory of Indostan.

“ Fourthly, In the possession of his Majesty Sha Allum, who is in the immediate power of the forces commanded by French Officers in the service of Dowlut Row Scindiah, and in the exercise of the nominal authority of the Mogul by those French officers.

“ Fifthly, In the assignment of the said territory in Indostan, made to the French officer commanding those troops.

“ Sixthly,

“ Sixthly, In the ascendancy established by the agency of the French officer commanding the troops of Scindiah, in the North-west of Indostan over the Chiefs Raspoote Jynogour, Joudepour, and over other States and Chiefs in the Northern and Western Provinces of Indostan, and over several chief Seyks, and others who occupy the territory from the Jumna to the River Indus, and in the facility which the advanced posts of the army of M. Perron towards the Indus afforded for assisting an invasion of the British establishments in that quarter.

Seventhly, In the facility which the possession of the maritime post of Baroach afforded to Scindiah for the increase of his military establishment, by the introduction of French or other European officers, of military stores and provisions, and even of a corps of auxiliary troops, consisting of French and other Europeans.

“ Eighthly, In the power of disturbing the tranquillity of the possessions of Guickwar and the Company in the Province of Guzerat, by means of the indented territories and fortresses belonging to Scindiah in that Province, and by his rights and influence in that country.

“ Ninthly, In the power of disturbing the tranquillity of the State of Poonah, and affecting the stability of that State, as well as of our alliance with the Peishwah, by the various territories and fortresses which Scindiah possesses in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and to the south of the River Taptee, particularly the fortress and territory of Amednagour, and by the different claims which Scindiah has on the State of Poonah, and the influence he possesses in that Court.

“ Tenthly, In the fortresses and various mixed possessions, held by Scindiah, and which put him in a condition to menace and disturb the States of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and to defeat the alliance between the English and that Prince, and in the various claims which Scindiah pretends to over the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and his influence at Hyderabad.

“ Eleventh, In the general greatness, in the riches and strength of the States of Scindiah, his army, and the high character of his military power, from which he derives a general influence and ascendancy at Poonah, over all the States of the Mahrattas, and even at Hyderabad itself; which influence and ascendancy have been uniformly directed to the diminution and prejudice of the British power.

“ Twelfth, Under this head the power of Dowlut Row Scindiah at the commencement of the war, was dangerous to the British Empire;

“ First, because of the facility which it gave the French to injure the British interests in India, either by co-operating with Scindiah, or by the personal assistance of their officers, and other Europeans.

Secondly, by maintaining against the British Government a rival and inimical influence among all the native states of India, among its most important allies and dependants in the western districts.

“ 21. The danger arising out of the state of the Rajah of Berar's power, as connected with the same considerations, appeared, at the commencement of the war, to have for its source,

“ 1st, His military force, though far inferior to that of Scindiah, in point of discipline, numbers, and strength of artillery, considerably augment the general force of the confederacy against the British Government.

“ 2dly, The possession of a vast territory, and of a number of forts which command the establishments of the Company, and of the Soubahdar of the Deccan on different weak points.

“ 3dly, The possession of the province of Cuttack, which put the Rajah of Berar in a situation to cut off the communication between the establishments to the North and South, to facilitate the invasion of Bengal and the Circars of the North, and to receive succours either of French and other European officers, or of troops which might debark in the province of Cuttack.

“ 4thly, The intermixture of the possessions of the Rajah of Berar with those of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, his vexatious pretensions at the Court of Hyderabad, and his consequent influence at that Court.

“ 5thly, The pretensions of the Rajah of Berar to the Government of Poonah, and the ascendance and influence which hence resulted to him; added to the general magnitude of his estates and resources; connected too with the riches they afforded him, and the spirit of enmity which the state of Berar had for many years exhibited in the part which it has taken against the interests of the British Government in India.

“ 22. It is not necessary to remark upon the state of the power of Holkar; he has not been considered a party in the present war.

“ 23. It would be equally superfluous to specify the particular object of the war, since this has been sufficiently developed in the preceding paragraphs, relative to the power of the enemy at its commencement.

“ 24. The progress of the war, and the glorious success of our arms in Indostan, the Deccan, the Guzerat, and Orrissa, have been the means of effecting our object in reducing the military and political power of Scindiah, while, at the same time, they have essentially affected the Rajah of Berar, and have placed in our hands the means of establishing the interests of Britain in opposition to those Princes, upon a basis which promises considerable duration.

“ 25. At the period of our last dispatch, we were unable to apprise you of the great losses of Scindiah, and our complete success over him in every point where he has been attacked. These considerations, however, will form the basis of the conditions to be demanded of Scindiah at the conclusion of a peace.

“ 26. The French army, under the immediate order of Mons. Perron in Indostan, have been entirely annihilated. Almost all the regular battalions of Scindiah, in Indostan and in the Deccan, have been either cut off or dispersed by the victories obtained by
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the army under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake at Delhi, upon the 11th of September; at Laswarre on the 1st of November; and under your personal command at Assaye on the 23d of September. Almost all the artillery of Scindia has been either taken or destroyed. The greatest part of the European officers in the service of Scindia are now under the protection of the British power. The territory which Dowlut Row Scindia formerly possessed in the Doab of the Jumna and the Ganges, and which was assigned to Monsieur de Perron for the maintenance of the French army in the pay of Scindia, has been subjected to our authority. Scindia has left the forts of Delhi, Matra, and Agra, with the adjacent territory upon the right bank of the Jumna. We have taken a considerable sum of money (24 lacks of rupees) in the fort of Agra, five lacks at Delhi, besides a number of other sums taken from Aleghour and other places, which were immediately distributed to the soldiers after a variety of combats. The person of his Majesty, Shah-Alum, and the Royal Family, has been put under the protection of the British power, and Scindia has been deprived of all means of profiting by his connection with the Seiks, the Rajepoots, and with the other states and chiefs in the north of Indostan. The alliance of most of these chiefs have been transferred to the British Government. The Begum, Sumroo has placed herself under our protection, and has recalled all her troops which were in the service of Scindia in the Deccan.

“ From the state of the negotiation entered into by the Rajah Ambagee at the date of the last intelligence received from his Excellency the Commander in Chief, there is every reason to believe that Scindia is by this time stripped of that portion of the territorial possessions of Indostan, which were placed under the government of the Ambagee, and that Scindia is left totally without the hopes of deriving protection from the power of that Prince; the maritime port of Baroach and the territories dependant on it. The ports of Mamponner, and of Powanghur, with all the territories of Scindia in the Guzzerat, situated to the north of Baroach, are subjected to our dominion. The district of Godna has been occupied by our troops. The fort and territory of Amednagour, with the town of Bourampoor, and fort Asserghour, have also submitted to the British Government. The fort and the district of Jalnapore, besides other districts in the Deccan, have been occupied by the combined forces of the British Government, and the Souhbadar of the Deccan.

“ 27. The loss which the Rajah of Berar has suffered, must be separately considered in any negotiation to be entered into with that Chief. This loss ought however, in the mean time, to be contemplated in this light, that it has weakened the power of Scindia as confederated against the British Government and our allies in the prosecution of the war.

“ 28. All the territories of the Mahrattas on the frontiers of the

the dominion of the Company from Midnapore, have been wrested from the Rajah, and incorporated with the British possessions. The rich province of Cuttack has also been conquered, and is already nearly organized. The loss of Jaghernaut must tend eminently to lower the consideration of the Rajah of Berar in the eyes of all the Princes of India. With equal reason we may suppose that the military power of the Rajah must have suffered severely in the battle of Assye, and during the disastrous operations, subsequent to his disgraceful retreat to his own territories.

“ 29. As things now stand, the power and dominions of Dowlut Row Scindia have suffered a degree of diminution little short of absolute annihilation, and the Rajah of Berar from the losses he has sustained in various quarters, must trust to the moderation of the British Government for the safety of the rest of his possessions. In prosecuting the war longer, his only dependance would be placed on the exertion of what small remnant of power Scindia still possesses.

“ 30. You have not yet apprised me of the sort of connection which subsists betwixt Scindia and the Rajah of Berar since the separation of their forces. The proposition made by Appah Dessaye, that Scindia should mediate for Holkar and the Rajah of Berar, only proves the existence of a close connection betwixt those chiefs. This representation must have been brought forward either by Appah Dessaye, by Jeswunt Row Gooparce, or by Scindia himself, with the view of promoting their private interests, or with the view of gratifying that haughtiness and vanity by which the Mahratta chiefs are distinguished.

“ 31. It is impossible in the present state of the relations betwixt the two Chiefs, that the one can trust to the other for succour or effectual support, while it is evident that both must suffer by those losses and disgraces to which they have been mutually exposed in the prosecution of their confederacy.

“ 32. Scindia can have no reliance on his own power and resources, in recovering any part of his possessions, or of recovering any of the disasters he has sustained by the prosecution of the war.

“ 33. Scindia can entertain no hope of receiving support from the Rajah of Berar, who can expect nothing but fresh losses, if not absolute destruction from the prolongation of the contest with the British Government, under the circumstances in which he is now placed.

“ 34. It is not at all probable that either Scindia or the Rajah of Berar can look for the least assistance or co-operation from Holkar. If Holkar takes any part in the war, he will in all probability confine his operations to the promotion of his separate interests. There is therefore little reason to dread that Holkar will embark in any important enterprize, whether the object be to promote his own designs or to favour the views of the confederacy. The means which might be employed to conciliate Holkar would in all likelihood be attended with success.

“ 35. It

" 35. It is almost inconceivable that Scindia or the Rajah of Berar could derive any succours from France, even though these chiefs after the defection of Mr. Perron should be disposed to receive such assistance. It is certainly extremely improbable that, under the present circumstances of France both in India and in Europe, she would think of making any attack on any of our settlements in India, on such an extensive scale as could prevent us from carrying on another campaign against Scindia and the Rajah of Berar even when joined by Holkar, if he should take a share in the war.

" 36. On the other hand, the resources of the British Government in India, are amply sufficient to support the expences of another campaign, if it were necessary to place our security on a permanent basis.

" 37. It is however to be infinitely to be desired that the war should be brought to a close, provided those objects can be accomplished which we proposed to ourselves, if peace on a solid foundation can be established.

" 38. The situation of the enemy however, compared with that of the British Government, renders every question relative to the conditions of peace of the highest considerations in policy or justice. There exists on our part no necessity for hurrying on the conclusion of a peace on terms incompatible with our just rights and permanent security.

" 39. The least appearance of a desire on our part precipitately to terminate the war, would probably defeat our object; and a premature ill-arranged peace would open fresh and abundant sources of new wars, from which innumerable disasters might flow, the enemy finding us in a situation destitute of our present advantages, and less able to carry on the contest with vigour and success.

" 40. It is for this reason that the restitution to Dowlut Row Scindia of any part of his conquered territories should be represented as a concession, and as an exercise of the clemency and generosity of the British, proceeding from those principles of moderation and prudence which form the basis of our policy in India.

" 41. It would neither be just, humane, nor honourable to insist on the reduction of the power of Scindia, to a point not necessary to be arrived at in order to terminate war or to re-establish the security of the British power, and that of her allies. The British Government will never reckon that policy consistent with wisdom or the true view of our interests, which is incompatible with humanity and with honour.

" 42. My duty calls on me to restrain the enemy within those bounds which the safety of those high interests committed to my charge demands; but it would be equally injurious to the power and to the glory of this Government to make war from such motives of vengeance, and to prefer the destruction of a conquered people to the maintenance of our own security and defence.

" 43. The state of the war and the conduct of Scindia have certainly been such as to give a strict right to have totally annihi-

lated his power, as inconsistent with our safety. Under the present circumstances, however, I do not think that extremity need be resorted to. With this opinion, I shall communicate to you the conditions on which I am ready to conclude a peace with Scindia.

“ 44. The most advantageous basis of a peace with Scindia would be his absolute accession to a general defensive alliance, and his consenting to receive a subsidiary force from the British Government, on the conditions contained in the treaties of Hydrabad and Bassein, agreeably to the propositions repeatedly made to Scindia by Colonel Collins, at different periods. I transmit you these propositions for your information and guidance.

“ 45. In order to explain my views on the subject of establishing a treaty of peace with Scindia in the most distinct terms, it will be necessary for you to reflect seriously on all the influence of a subsidiary alliance on the part of Scindia, on the general conditions of peace.

“ 46. With this view, as well as to shew you my ultimate determination respecting the cessation of hostilities with Scindia, I think it expedient to draw out three distinct plans of peace with Scindia, modified according to circumstances in each case respectively.

“ A. First, The conditions of peace that would be the most advantageous, provided he did not wish to accept a subsidiary alliance.

“ B. Second, The conditions of peace that must be required of Scindia, in case he wishes to hazard the continuance of war, and declines the subsidiary alliance.

“ C. Third, The conditions of peace to be concluded with Scindia on the basis of a subsidiary alliance.

FIRST PLAN, A.

“ Art. I. (aa). There shall be peace and amity between the British Government, and all its allies and dependencies, and Dowlut Row Scindia.

“ Art. I. All the territories, rights, and claims of Dowlut Row Scindia, situated to the north of the territories of Oudapoor, Judpoor, and Jaenagour, shall be ceded to the Company.

“ II. The Rajahs of Oudapoor and Jaenagour shall be independent of Scindia, and shall be comprehended in the treaty of peace as allies of the British Government.

“ III. Scindia shall renounce his claims over the Ranah of Gohud; and the latter shall be independent of Scindia, and shall be included in the treaty of peace as an ally of the British Government.

“ IV. All the territories now in possession of the Ambajee shall be ceded to the British Government. Ambajee shall be independent of Scindia, and shall be included in the treaty of peace as an ally of the British Government.

“ V. Scin_

“ V. Scindia shall renounce all connection with the Chiefs and territories of Matchery and Bahlpoor, of Calpee and Jausee, with the Chiefs or territories situated between the right bank of the Jumna and the river Sutlege, with the Chiefs and territories of Bundlecund and Boglecund, with every Chief or territory situated to the north of the province of Malwa. Finally, he shall renounce every claim, of whatever description, over those Chiefs and territories.

“ VI. Scindia shall renounce all his claims over the Chiefs and territories of the Seyks.

“ VII. All the Chiefs and states that shall have assisted the British Government during the war shall be protected from all injury, notwithstanding that their territories may have been ceded to Scindia by the treaty of peace.

“ VIII. All treaties concluded by General Lake or Major-General Wellesley, or by the British Government, with any state, during the war, shall be recognised and confirmed by the treaty of peace; and all alliances formed by the British Government during the war shall be sanctioned and confirmed by the treaty of peace.

“ IX. His Majesty Shah-Alum, and the Royal Family, shall be under the protection of the British Government; and Scindia shall renounce all interference in the affairs of his Majesty.

“ X. The fortress of the city of Baroach, with all the territory dependant on it, shall be kept by the Company.

“ XI. The fortress of Powangour, and the fort and district of Champaneer, shall remain in possession of the Company.

“ XII. All the other districts in the Guzaret belonging to Scindia, to the distance of from the sea, shall be ceded to the Company.

“ XIII. The fortress of Amednagour, with the territory dependant on it, shall be ceded to the Peishwah.

XIV. All the territories appertaining to Scindia, situated to the south and the east of the mountains of Adjuntee, comprising the fort and the district of Jalnapore, and all the districts in which Scindiah had joint rights with the Soubahdar of the Deccan to the receipt of revenues, shall be ceded to the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

“ XV. Scindiah shall renounce all pretensions of controul over the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and all the allies of the British Government.

“ XVI. Scindia shall renounce every pretension whatever over the Nizam, the Peishwah, the Guickwar, and all the allies of the Company.

“ XVII. Scindia shall dismiss from his service all Europeans now found there, and shall hereafter receive no European into his service, without the express consent of the British Government.

“ XVII. Scindia shall never keep in his service any native subject of the British Government, without the express permission of that Government.

“ XIX. The

“ XIX. The British Government and Scindia shall mutually keep constant Envoys residing at their respective Courts, to maintain a reciprocal good intelligence.

“ XX. The Fort of Aseerghour, and the City of Boorhanpoor, with all the territories depending on them in Candeish, shall be restored to Dowlut Row Scindia.

“ XXI. The district of Gadra shall be restored to Dowlut Row Scindia.

“ XXII. All the territories and possessions conquered from Dowlut Row Scindia, in Malwa and Candeish, to the north of Taptee, shall be restored to Dowlut Row Scindia.

“ XXIII. All the territories and possessions appertaining to the Peishwa, in Malwa and Candeish, to the north of Taptee, shall be ceded to Dowlut Row Scindia.

“ 47. This Plan might effectually provide ample security against the power of Dowlut Row Scindia; and I seriously request that every effort may be made to obtain all the conditions, or, at all events, that Scindia should be induced to enter into a subsidiary treaty with the Company. If Scindia refuses to listen to any proposition for such an alliance, it will then be necessary to think of the severest condition to be exacted of that Chief, even at the hazard of continuing the war.

“ 48. With the view of enforcing these conditions, the complete method would be to refer to the plan (a. a.) which marks the articles which are to remain without change, by letter (B.)

“ And which determines the modifications which shall be admitted into the several other articles respectively.

Second Plan, B.

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“ XI. The fortress of Powanghour, with the fort and district of Champaneez, shall be restored to Scindia.

“ Art. XII. B.

“ XIII. The fort of Ahmednagour, with a territory depending on it, valued at _____, shall remain with the Peishwah; the rest of the territory of Ahmednagour shall be restored to Scindia, on condition that he will not keep a military force,

force in this district exceeding _____, or more than is necessary to collect the revenues, and maintain the police of the country.

“ Art. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXI. XXII.

“ XXIII. This article perhaps may not be necessary, if the restitutions stipulated for in the preceding articles are made to Scindia. Nevertheless, this article may be accepted by Scindia as a compensation for the territory in the neighbourhood of Baroach, and on the maritime quarter, as is specified in the articles X. and XII. in this plan.

“ 49. This plan (B.) differs from our propositions in the IVth article, which stipulates the cession of the territories possessed by Ambajee, and provides for the independence of Ambajee in the Xth and XIIth articles, relative to the occupation of the territory of Baroach, and the maritime possessions of Scindia in the Guzerat; and in the XIIIth article, which limits the number of forces to be maintained by Scindia in the district of Ahmenagour. The articles XVII, XVIII, and XIX, are also added to your propositions. The independence of Ambajee, and the arrangements concerning the territory he possesses, will probably have already been guaranteed by the Commander in Chief; and therefore this article admits of no qualification.

“ 50. There are many objections to the admission of Scindia to any part of the district of Guzerat. If it were possible to exclude Scindia altogether from the territories of our allies, it would contribute much to the stability of peace. The same reason pleads more strongly against the restitution of any part of the territory of Ahmednagour. We must avoid the re-establishment of the smallest authority of Scindia, in any possession whatever, contiguous to Poonah, or the frontiers of the Nizam.

“ 51. The restitution of Powanghur, Ghampaneer, and Gadra, appears to be less dangerous than any restitution proposed in the Guzerat. The total exclusion of Scindia from any maritime possession appears to be indispensably necessary.

“ 52. Your reasoning relative to the fort of Aseerghour and the city of Boorhanpour, is perfectly satisfactory.

“ 53. The articles XVII. and XVIII. relative to the exclusion from the service of Scindia of all European officers, and of all British subjects, whether European or native, are indispensably necessary.

“ 54. The XIXth article, relative to the residence of Envoys, is equally necessary.

“ 55. The alterations I have made in your propositions are extremely desirable, if not absolutely necessary to our security against Scindia.

“ 56. Nevertheless, you will be better qualified to form a just idea relative to the particular parts of this subject, than it is possible for me to be at this distance. You can also ascertain to what degree Scindia's means of continuing the war have been reduced

duced by our success ; and therefore, though I am inclined to believe, that there is a danger in every concession which passes the limits of this plan (B.) I empower you to change or modify these articles, except the articles IV. XVII. XVIII. and XIX ; but ever have a regard to the spirit and general meaning of my instructions.

“ 57. According to my opinion, the conditions of peace offered to Scindia, in this plan (B.) are not merely just, but even generous, considering the relative situation of the belligerent powers.

“ 58. The principal objects to be regarded in the conditions of peace with Scindia are, to limit his power and his military resources, to break off his connections with France, and to prevent his intercourse with our allies, and take away the means of his menacing our frontiers, and disturbing the interior tranquillity of our establishments.

“ 59. If Scindia will conclude a treaty of peace with the British Government on the basis of a subsidiary alliance, and will enter sincerely into such alliance, I shall have no difficulty in acceding to all that is contained in your propositions, as far as regards the restitution of territory.

“ 60. The articles IV. XVII. XVIII. and XIX. of the two preceding plans admit of no change or modification.

“ 61. To render this subject the more perspicuous, all the articles of the plan (B.) which are to be inserted in this treaty without any change or modification, shall be marked with C. ; and every change or modification shall be determined in the articles which shall be changed or modified.

THIRD PLAN.

Art. I.	}	C.
II.		
III.		
IV.		
V.		
VI.		
VII.		
VIII.		
IX.		

“ Art. X. shall be modified according to your proposition, and we will keep only the fortress and city of Baroach, with a proportionate territory.

“ Art. XI. as it stands in plan B O.

“ Art. XII. shall be put in the plans A and B.

“ Art. XIII. The fortress alone of Ahmednagour, with a sufficient territory, shall be kept.

Art. XIV.	}	C.
XV.		
XVI.		
XVII.		
XVIII.		
XIX.		
XX.		
XXI.		
XXII.		

“ Art. XXIII. It is desirable to make an exchange of the territories of the Peishwa, in Malwa and Candeish, to the north of Taptee, for the districts of Ahmednagour; and if these territories in Malwa and Candeish are not an adequate compensation for Scindia, we might endeavour to indemnify him by a subsequent arrangement. Nevertheless what I have mentioned might, perhaps, furnish a compensation proportioned to the difference which existed between the value of the districts of Ahmednagour, and those which the Peishwa might cede to Scindia in the Malwa and Candeish.

“ 62. If Scindia consents to accept a subsidiary force equal to that stationed at Hydrabad, I should not require any other assignment of territory or of other funds for the payment of the subsidy, than those proposed in this plan (C).

“ 63. In this case you will add to the conditions of the subsidiary treaty, on the part of the Britannic Government, the articles already settled, omitting all assignment of territory, or of other funds, for the payment of the subsidy on the part of Dowlut Row Scindia.

“ 64. However, as it is possible that it might be the wish of Dowlut Row Scindia to assign, by the conditions of the treaty, in form of security for the payment of the subsidy, the whole of the territory, the cession of which is demanded by the British Government by virtue of the foregoing articles, I authorise you to agree to such a proposition on the part of Dowlut Row Scindia, provided that the cession of this whole territory should contain a total renunciation of every right or claim to the sovereignty or authority, on the part of Dowlut Row Scindia, and an acknowledgment of the perpetual rights of the British Government to the sovereignty over that territory, in the same extent of right and of power with which Scindia cedes or recognises this perpetual sovereignty.

“ 65. In the actual state of the affairs of Scindia, it is probable that he may be disposed to seek the protection of a subsidiary force of British troops, from which alone he could have an effectual assistance against Holkar, and even the means of maintaining himself against the tributaries and dependants that will be nominally annexed to his states at the close of the war.

“ 66. As the preceding observations contain all the instructions necessary to put you in a state to negotiate and conclude a peace with Dowlut Row Scindia, and as you have already received intimation of the concessions, which you are to demand from the Rajah of Berar, I shall dispatch this letter to you, reserving to myself the instructions which may hereafter appear necessary, in order to adjust the partition of our conquests with the allies, and to complete the system of a general pacification with the native powers of Hindostan and of the Decan.

“ 67. In reading over this dispatch, I have perceived that I have not spoken at all of an omission in the plan of peace with Scindia, contained in your dispatch of the 11th of November. This omission is supplied in the 8th article of each of the three plans, A, B, C: and as the substance of this article has been submitted to your particular consideration by the notes which were addressed to you on the 25th of October, I trust that this subject will attract your attention in the negotiation of peace with the belligerent powers.

“ I have, &c. (Signed) “ WELLESLEY.”
Fort William, Dec. 11, 1803.

Note to add to the 8th Article.

“ This line shall be drawn with reference to the map of Hindostan by Rennell. The states that are to be comprehended in the conditions of peace are all situated to the north of the line drawn from Juidpore to Berhut, a city in the western extremity of Bundelcund. Measures will also be taken to exclude Scindia altogether from any connection with the chiefs who occupy the provinces of Bundelund and of Bogelcund, and the districts of Guviah, Saháipoor, Chandail, Cháhar, Betouinjah, and Singracola.

Note to explain the meaning of Articles 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th, on the subject of the exclusion of the influence of Scindia from the petty states of Hindostan.

“ The territories of Ambajee extend to Sering, and include Gohud and the district of Kátchwara, yielding an annual revenue of thirteen lacks of rupees. On these territories lie the independent chiefs of Kata.

“ Bhundee, Raggogonth, situated between Kata and Sering; Chunderee, Dubrath, Janse, Cúlby, and Narwa.

“ The other chiefs that are to be declared independent of Scindia, and to be comprehended in the conditions of peace, are the following:

- “ I. The Seyks.
- “ H. Rajpoots, being
- “ 1. Jampoor;

- " 2. Jacpoor;
 " 3. Hadpoor;
 " 4. A petty independent state of Kerawlee;
 " 5. Ditto of Kishenquick and Adjemir;
 " 6. The Chief of Matchery called Rao Rajah, whose capital is Alwar, and with whom a treaty has been concluded by General Lake;
 " 7. The district of Begkancer;
 " And 8. All the territories, in general, to the north of Hodpoor, Kutchwara (a district belonging to Ambajee, which is to be included) and of Behut, so that they may include the defiles leading on this side to Hindostan.

" III. The Jats, whose chief is the Ranah of Gohud and the Bhurt Poor Roja; General Lake has already concluded a treaty with the latter.

" IV. The districts of Bundelcund, of Bhoghilcund, Bopal, Garrah, Chundel, Sahajpoor, Chohun, Bittounjah, Singrawlu.
(See the Map of Hindostan by Rennel.)

" Some petty chiefs may have been omitted in this list, but General Wellesley may apply to Lieutenant Colonel Reynold, who has the most accurate information on the subject of the province of Atalwa and of the adjacent countries.

" A true copy.

(Signed)

" N. B. EDMONSTON,
Sec. to the Government."

No. V.—To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,

" HONOURABLE SIRS,

" From the first favourable moment after the conclusion of the peace with the confederated Mahratta Chiefs, the attention of the Governor-General in Council has been directed to the important object of establishing a general principle, which might regulate the division of our last acquisitions by the treaties of peace with Dowlut Row Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, between the English Government and its Allies, and to apply that principle to the circumstances of those states, which ought to be considered as allies in the war. The Governor-General thinks it now his duty to communicate to your Honourable Committee the sentiments and resolutions of the Governor-General in Council on this important subject.

" 2. With a view to determine and apply the principle of a re-partition of the conquests, it was important to decide—1st. Which were the states of India that ought to be considered as allies in the late war—2dly, Which were the states that had a positive right to share in our conquests—3dly, Whether it was necessary to admit

admit to such participation any of those allies, who had no absolute right to share in our conquests, and how policy and justice might extend that participation.

“ 3. The Governor-General in Council was decidedly of opinion, that the only states that ought, with reason, to be considered as allies of the British Government during the late war, were those of the Peishwah, and of the Soubahdar of the Deccan. The nature of the relations and the engagements existing between the English Government and the states of Mysore and of Guykwar (whose troops, particularly those of the former, were employed for the continuation of the war), were not of a description to place them amongst the number of the allies pointed out in the past treaty of peace between Dowlut Row Scindia and the Rajah of Berar. Neither was it possible that either of these states should entertain any hope of profiting by the result of the war, unless by acquiring a greater degree of security in the peaceable enjoyment of their respective rights and possessions.

“ 4. The Governor-General in Council was decidedly of opinion, that none of the states of India claiming as allies of the British Government, could have a sufficient right to share in the conquests made during the war, simply on the declaration contained in the treaty of peace, that the cessions were generally made in favour of the British Government and its allies.

“ 5. This declaration was inserted in the treaty of peace, together with the clauses relative—1st. To the engagements actually existing between the British Government and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, pursuant to which that Prince has a right, on certain conditions, to share equally with the British Government in the conquest of a war carried on in concert—2dly. To the declared intention of the Governor-General to admit the Peishwa also to a participation of the conquests of the late war, but in such proportion and manner as should be deemed expedient on the conclusion of a general peace. This declaration granted no right of participation to the allies, as they had it not on other grounds.

“ 6. If a contrary principle were admitted, the right of sharing equally with the allies could not justly be denied them, and this right should have been recognized independently of the conduct of the allies during the war. As to the Soubahdar of the Deccan, independently of the fulfilment of the conditions, by which alone he has any right to an equal participation, they are stipulated by a positive treaty. It is not to be supposed that this had not entered into the consideration of any of the contracting parties at the time of the conclusion of the peace.

“ 7. The states of Hyderabad and Poonah being the only states that could be considered as allies of the British Government during the late war, it became necessary to determine, whether, or either, or both these states, had a right to a participation of our conquests; and, on failure of right, whether one, or either, or both, should be admitted from motives of utility or policy to such a participation.

“ 8. By

“ 8. By the third article of the secret and separate treaty of Hyderabad, concluded in October, 1800, his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan has a right, on certain conditions, to share equally with the British Government in the conquests of a common war. With a view, however, to determine whether his Highness enjoyed the right of sharing in the conquests of the late war, it was necessary to inquire how far his Highness had fulfilled the conditions on which this right had been granted.

“ 9. It is declared by the third article of this secret and separate treaty, that, in case of war, his Highness shall have a right to participate equally with the contracting parties in the division of such territories as should be acquired by the success of their united arms, on condition that his Highness the Nabob Aspah-Juh should have faithfully fulfilled all the clauses of the preceding treaty, and particularly those contained in the 12th and 13th articles of that treaty.

“ 10. The obligation imposed on his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan by the 12th and 13th articles, is, that in case of war, his Highness shall furnish an army of 6000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, which shall act with the allied troops; that his Highness shall also use every effort to bring into the field, as speedily as possible, all the forces that he can raise in his dominions, and that his Highness will assemble as many vanjareys* as possible, and shall, to the best of his power, supply his frontier cities with corn. In other words, his Highness is required to unite cordially with the British Government in prosecution of the aforesaid war, and to combine with the armies of the British Power all the forces and resources of his own States, on the condition of his being entitled to an equal share with the British Government, of such territories as should be acquired during the war.

“ 11. Though the conduct of the state of Hyderabad during the late war with the confederated Mahratta Chiefs, has been detailed at length in the course of the account of transactions contained in our dispatches of the 12th of April † to your Honourable Committee, the Governor-General in Council thinks it right for the purpose of demonstrating to you the grounds of his decision on the question respecting the rights of his Highness to participation, to repeat once more on this occasion the reasons that led to it.

“ 12. After the long and urgent solicitations of the Resident at Hyderabad, a body of his Highness's troops, amounting nearly to the number stipulated by the treaty, joined the auxiliary forces, and the general conduct of these troops was conformable to the obligations of the treaty. In other respects, however, the State of Hyderabad has absolutely failed in the duties of an ally, and the conduct of his Highness's officers has been of a hostile nature towards the British Government.

* The Vanjareys are merchants who supply grain to the different armies of the Princes in India; they are a partiscular caste.

† This letter is amongst those intercepted, and appears in this Publication.

" 13. At the commencement of the war, Major-General Wellesley had been invested by his Highness the Nizam with an absolute power over the officers of his Highness's Government in the western part of his States. This power was absolutely of no avail. No attention was paid to the orders of Major-General Wellesley; all the means for supplying the English troops with provisions, for facilitating their movements, and impeding those of the enemy, were insidiously obstructed, or directly refused by them, and they not only neglected to supply their frontier garrisons with corn for the service of the combined troops conformably to an express article of the treaty of Hyderabad; but they also refused to furnish any succours, and did not even suffer any grain to be purchased in the territories of his Highness for the use of the English army.

" 14. His Highness's officer commanding the fort of Dowlatabad refused admission to the sick and wounded of the English troops after the battle of Assye. The Killidar of Harone refused to grant protection under the cannon of his fort to a convoy on its way to the army with ammunition, without a positive order from the Court of Hyderabad on this subject; and the Killidar of the Badnapoor fired on a detachment of English troops on its march to join Major-General Wellesley.

" 15. Though the conduct of his Highness's officers might be attributed, in a great degree, to the weakness of his Government, the sentiments which his Highness Seeunder Jag himself is said to have manifested on this occasion, confirm the suspicion that their hostile conduct was encouraged by his Highness. The Governor General in Council alludes here to a declaration of his Highness to Azimool Omzaah, related by that minister to the Resident at Hyderabad, and communicated in the dispatch of the 13th of October, 1803—" That it was by no means necessary " for him to pay any regard to the remonstrances of the British " Government on the subject of the conduct of his officers; that " no suspicion ought to be entertained with respect to the repre- " sentations that had lately been made to him concerning the " Killidar of Harone, and others, because it was not stipulated " in any part of his engagements that English officers and their " troops should be admitted into the forts of his Government, " and that it was absolutely indifferent whether the Killidar had " admitted them or not."

" 16. These sentiments, which cannot be justified, and those which his Highness, according to the report of the Resident, generally held with respect to the treaty of alliance between the English Government and the States of Hyderabad, and the facts mentioned in the preceding paragraph, are evidently contrary to the engagements undertaken by the treaty of alliance.

" 17. We might add to these facts, that it was evident that his Highness had not, conformably to his engagements, co-operated with the English troops, with all the forces and resources of his state, for the prosecution of the war, and consequently had not fulfilled

fulfilled the conditions by which we had a right to an equal share of the conquests that had been the result of the war.

“ 18. The conclusion of any engagement whatever necessarily supposes the power and disposition of both parties to perform its obligations; thus, in admitting that the conduct of the officers of his Highness proceeded from causes absolutely without the inspection of his Highness, and that the inherent defects and imperfections of his Government had prevented his Highness from applying the resources of his state to the benefit of the common cause, his Highness could not, according to the established principles of reciprocity, either allow himself to claim the advantage of this argument, or make out his rights to an equal participation of conquests, since his incapacity had prevented him from the performance of those conditions of his engagement, which alone could give him that right.

“ 19. Independently of these considerations, the demand of his Highness relative to an equal participation, is annihilated by the tenor of the 15th article of the treaty of Dowlut Row Scindia, agreeably to the actual plan of defence and the engagements for succours between the English Government and Dowlut Row Scindia in this article.

“ 20. It is settled by this article, that if Dowlut Row Scindia should consent to the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty, the expences of the subsidiary forces, consisting of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance, their artillery, their usual equipments, ammunition, &c. should be defrayed out of the revenues of the lands ceded by the 2d, 3d, and 4th article of the treaty of peace. His Highness consequently cannot with reason claim an equal share of the states, charged with the expence of the subsidiary forces that were to be furnished by the British Government to Scindia; and the Governor General in Council is decidedly of opinion, that, according to the true interpretation of the 15th article of the treaty of Surge Anjingaw, combined with the last engagements for succours, concluded lately with Dowlut Row Scindia, his Highness the Soubadar cannot claim any portion of the territories ceded by the 2d, 3d, and 4th articles of the treaty of Surge Ajingaw; inasmuch as the British Government being engaged by the treaty of defence and succours concluded with Dowlut Row Scindia, to employ its power and the resources of its states in defence of the rights and possessions of this Chief; the territories on which the expences of the succours granted were to be raised, ought justly to be considered as assigned for payment of the engagements of the defensive treaty. It was evident also that these territories were equally subjected to other expences depending on the general principles of the pacification, and that from the revenues issuing out of these territories were to be paid the expences of Scindia's principal officers and chiefs, and those of a part of his family, as well as the expences arising out of engagements with the different states of Indostan, and those incurred for the support of the King and of his family.

“ 21. It follows from this that if his Highness the Soubadar of the Deccán had preserved his right to an equal participation of the conquests, he ought also to bear an equal proportion of the expences necessary for the tranquillity of these conquests, and that result from the general principles of the pacification. If, however, the value of all the cessions made to the allies by the treaty of peace, were contrasted with all the expences depending upon this arrangement, there can be no doubt, that the share of the profits of the war coming to his Highness, would be far inferior to what has been assigned him, added to the real acquisition which his Highness has made by the total abolition of the rights of the Rajah of Berar, and of Dowlut Row Scindia, over the Government of his Highness, pursuant to a distinct article included in the treaties of peace with both these Chiefs.

“ 22. Though his Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan, could not be considered as having any right to an equal participation of the territories acquired by the last war, it might be admitted as a question to be ascertained,” “ Whether his Highness had not a right to claim a part of the conquests, proportioned to the succours of troops furnished, for the prosecution of the war?” “ On this subject, it may be observed, 1st. that the conditions on which his Highness grounds his rights of participation are absolute; and that the treaty cannot establish any obligation on our part, dependent upon the partial execution of these conditions on the part of his Highness; and 2d. That no definitive principle of comparison can be established, as to the advantage which our cause may have derived from the co-operation of the troops of his Highness; and that no precise part of the treaty, could be considered as equivalent to the rights of his Highness.

“ 23. According to the facts above established, the sole points which bear relation to the interests of the Soubadar of the Deccan, and which remained to be determined were to ascertain,

1st. Whether his Highness the Soubadar of the Decan, should be admitted to any share of the conquered territories, and whether this question should be decided in the affirmative?

2d. Whether, without paying any regard to the conduct of his Highness's Government during the war, there should be assigned to him a certain territory conformably to his claims of participation in the conquests made during the war; or simply as a gratuitous cession on the part of the British Government, totally unconnected with any rights of equal participation of conquests?

3d. What territories should be assigned to his Highness, if he should be permitted to retain any part of the conquered countries?

“ 24. As to the first point, the Governor General in Council was of opinion, that with a view to political considerations, and to the local situation of a great part of the conquered territories, it was expedient to assign a certain portion of them to his Highness the Soubadar.

“ 25. As

“ 25. As to the second question, as the Soubadar had no positive right to any precise part of our conquests, it appeared just and proper, that the territory to be assigned to the Soubadar of the Deccan should be considered as a gratuitous cession to his Highness by the British Government, and should not be given up to him, in consequence of any right to a participation of the conquests made during the war.

“ 26. The territories which it was proper to cede to his Highness the Soubadar of the Decan, were evidently those situated in the midst of the actual possessions of his Highness, or were contiguous to him.

“ 27. These territories, are, first, the districts in which the Rajah of Berar received the revenues, in common with the Soubadar of the Deccan, and, in general, all the territories formerly subject to the Rajah of Berar, situated to the south of the mountains, on which the forts of Nornulla and Gouergurh lie, and all the western part of the river Murdah, ceded by the 3d and 4th articles of the treaty of Deogaum; excepting those districts alone, which by the 5th article of this treaty, are stipulated to remain under the government of the Rajah of Berar. Secondly, the districts ceded by the 4th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut-Row.Scindiah, viz. those situated to the South of the Adjutee mountains, including in them, the fort and district of Jalnapoor, the city and district of Jalnapoor, the city and district of Gondapoor, and all the other districts formerly belonging to Dowlut-Row.Scindiah, lying between that range of mountains and the river Godavery.

“ 28. These territories have been already given up to the officers of his Highness, by the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, under an express condition on the part of that officer, that the permanent appropriation of these territories ceded to his Highness, should be submitted to the future deliberation of the Governor-General and his Council.

“ 29. Pursuant to the motives detailed in the foregoing parts of this letter, the Governor-General in Council has resolved to annex these territories in perpetuity to the dominions of the Soubadar of the Deccan.

“ 30. The Governor-General in Council proceeds now to explain to your Honourable Committee, his opinion on the question of the right of participation in the acquisitions of the late war, applicable to our ally the Peishwa; and the arrangements which the Governor-General in Council has finally adopted in favour of his Highness, in consequence of the acquisitions resulting from the success of the late war.

“ 31. The treaty of Bassein was made on the basis of the treaty concluded with the Nizam in October 1800; it determines, in case of war, the number of troops which the Peishwa is to furnish, but it does not provide for the participation of his Highness in any of the conquests that might be made during the war.

“ 32. Thus, in supposing even that the Peishwa might have furnished the stipulated number of troops for the prosecution of the

war, he would not have acquired the right to share in the conquests that might result from it ; it was not therefore necessary to enter into any discussion on the question of his Highness's right of participation, founded on the consideration that he had contributed his co-operation to the support of the common cause, as far as the weakness and confusion of his Highness's Government would admit. The peculiar circumstances of his Highness's situation would render such a claim extravagant and unjust,

" 33. The war had taken place in consequence of the measures adopted by the British Government for the re-establishment of his Highness (when exiled and exposed to personal danger) in his lawful states, in his right and the security of his possessions.

" 34. The most just and rational pretensions of the Peishwa were fulfilled, his states having been preserved, by the result of the war; from the violence of his enemies, foreign and domestic. His Excellency in Council then could not perceive any right on the part of the Peishwa, to share equally in the conquests made by the arms and the wisdom of the British Council, during a war undertaken for the defence of the rights and possessions of his Highness, in which they were not only assisted by the efforts of his Highness, but even impeded by the vindictive and suspicious spirit which directed the policy of his Highness. The Peishwa could not expect, in the judgment of the Governor-General, to have a right to participate in the territories acquired with so much difficulty by the English arms, to which his Highness is exclusively indebted for the existence of his power.

" 35. The re-establishment of the Peishwa in his lawful authority, as well as the recovery of the dominions which he possessed before his expulsion from Poonah, and the measures taken to secure his Highness in his states and actual possessions, appeared to the Governor-General in Council, to establish a sufficiently ample participation in the successes of the war, and in the advantages of the peace.

" 36. Political considerations alone suggested the idea of admitting the Peishwa to a participation of conquest.

" 37. The uneasiness with which the Peishwa viewed an intimate connection with the British Government, prevented him from accepting our propositions for the conclusion of a defensive alliance, until the moment when the successful rebellion of Jesswant Row Holkar overturned his Government, and obliged him to abandon his capital.

" 38. The Peishwa has experienced the advantage of this alliance in his re-establishment in the exercise of his lawful authority under the protection of the British arms and the English power.

" 39. However, the Governor-General in Council was of opinion, that the marked offence of the Peishwa could not be entirely dissipated till he should have been satisfied by a longer experience of the moderation and liberality of our proceedings for our allies, that our object was rather to augment than to diminish the power and resources of his government. The cession of a part of our new conquests

conquests to the Peishwa, in the absolute failure on the part of his Highness of any right to participate in them, founded either on the conditions of the treaty, or on the succours his Highness had furnished during the war, appeared in the wisdom of the Governor-General in Council best calculated to impress on the minds of his Highness the most favourable opinion of the equity and liberality of the English Government ; to excite his confidence in its honour and fidelity, and to fix his attachment to the high reputation and character of the British Government in the opinion of all the states of India.

“ 40. For these reasons, his Excellency in Council judged it necessary to assign to the Peishwa as grant, such part of our last territorial acquisitions as could be conveniently annexed to his states, consistently with the security of our own rights and possessions, and with the arrangements which the Governor-General in Council had resolved to take in favour of our ally the Soubadar of the Deccan.

“ 41. His Excellency in Council has consequently resolved that the town and province of Amednagour shall be annexed to the domains of the Peishwa, except that part which has been restored to Dowlut Row Scindia by the terms of the treaty of peace.

“ 42. According to the basis of the observations and resolutions agreed upon in the preceding part of this dispatch, instructions were transmitted to the Residents at the Courts of Hyderabad and that of Poonah, of the date of 30th March, 1804, enjoining their officers to communicate to their Highnesses the Soubadar of the Deccan and the Peishwa the territorial arrangement the Governor-General in Council had resolved to adopt in favour of their Highnesses, and that they should not oppose any objection on the ground of a right of participation in the conquests of the war. The Resident at Poonah was specially enjoined to use every means to make the Peishwa feel all the liberality of the English Government, in assigning to his Highness so considerable a part of its last conquests, particularly as his Highness had no right to a share, founded either on the articles of the treaty or the aid furnished by his Highness for the common cause.

“ 43. The plan of the treaty of participation, drawn up conformably to the resolutions mentioned above, was at the same time transmitted to the residents at Hyderabad and Poonah respectively, with the injunction to obtain the seals and signatures of their Highnesses the Soubadar of the Deccan and the Peishwa, for the separate treaties which were to be made according to that plan.

“ 44. The Governor General in Council, judging the moment favourable for concluding definitively the arrangements of the partition of the conquests, and for obtaining from their Highnesses the Soubadar of the Deccan and the Peishwah the ratification of the treaty of peace concluded with Dowlut Row Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, transmitted to the residents, together with their instructions on the subject of the partition of the conquests, copie

of these treaties, enjoining them to present to their Highnesses the Soubadar of the Deccan and the Peishwa, respectively, the copies of these treaties, that their Highnesses might put their seals to them, in testimony of their acceptance of the terms of the pacification. The residents were besides instructed to send back these treaties, thus legalised, to be placed in the archives of the Government. It was at the same time signified to the residents that the ratification of these treaties should precede the execution of the treaties of partition.

“ 45. Copies of the instructions to the residents at Hyderabad and Poonah, on this subject, are annexed to these dispatches, for the more ample information of your honourable Committee.

“ 46. On the 28th of April the resident at Hyderabad presented himself to his Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan, with the intention of obtaining from his Highness the ratification of the treaties of peace, and the execution of the treaty of partition.

“ 47. His Highness, after having peruse attentively the treaties of peace, put his seal and signature to these documents. The resident then delivered to his Highness the proposed treaty of partition, which, after having been also attentively looked over, was received by his Highness without the least hesitation. At the same time the resident delivered the duplicate of the treaty to his Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan. Immediately after this exchange, the Minister, Azimool Omrah, in the presence of his Highness, expressed the entire satisfaction his Highness felt at the liberal and friendly manner with which the arrangements had been made and guaranteed by the treaty of partition.

“ 48. In the course of the conversation, the resident took occasion to mention to the minister that the territorial cessions assigned to his Highness by the treaty of partition were to be considered as a gift on the part of the British Government, and not as acquired by his Highness by right of partition in the conquests of the war; but no pretension having been shewn by his Highness to an equal partition of the conquests, the resident did not think it necessary to continue the discussion on this subject with the Court of Hyderabad.

“ 49. The treaty of partition executed by his Royal Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan was received at Fort William, 13th May, and was ratified by the Governor General in Council the day following.

“ 50. A copy of the dispatches of the resident at Hyderabad, dated 19th April, communicating the substance of the conference of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, in the execution of the treaty of partition; and a copy of the answer returned to the Resident, with the ratified treaty of partition, according to the authority of the Governor-General in Council, are annexed to the present dispatch for the instruction of your Honourable Committee.

“ 51. Giving attention to the extent and value of the cessions made to the Soubahdar of the Deccan by the treaty of partition, and to the advantages which his Highness derives from the renunciation

nunciation made by the Rajah of Berar, and Dowlut Row Scindia, of all claims on the state of Hyderabad, the Governor-General in Council is decidedly of opinion, that by the Treaty of Partition, the Subahdar of the Deccan has acquired a portion in the conquests and advantages of the war, exceeding far the proportion in which his Highness contributed to its success, and not inferior to what his Highness should have received, if his right to an equal participation of the conquests had been admitted.

“ 52. The Court of Poona manifested, on this occasion, a spirit of chicane and disproportionate pretensions entirely inconsistent with the relative situation of the Peishwa, and with the nature of the obligations imposed on his Highness, by the painful exertions of the English Government, for the re-establishment of his authority, and by the liberality of its conduct in granting to his Highness a portion of the conquered territories, notwithstanding the defect of an absolute right in his Highness to such a participation.

“ 53. When the Resident submitted to his Highness the Peishwa the copies of the treaties of peace for their ratification, informing him, that when his Highness should have ratified these documents, the Resident would communicate to his Highness an arrangement for the cession of the Fort and territory of Amednagur to the state of Poona, his Highness refused to ratify these treaties with his seal and signature, justifying his refusal, by extravagant and unreasonable claims and pretensions.

“ 54. The instructions of the Governor-General in Council, however, authorised the Resident to refuse exorbitant demands, and to destroy the hopes of the Peishwa, who finally consented to recognize the contents of the treaties of peace, by putting his seal to the copies of these treaties which had been presented to him by the Resident.

“ 55. The Resident then submitted the treaty of partition for the acceptance of his Highness. On this occasion the Peishwa renewed his unreasonable claims, and advanced his pretensions to share equally with the British Government the conquests of the war. The Resident had no difficulty in demonstrating to his Highness and his Minister the absurdity of these pretensions; and after some further discussion his Highness consented to withdraw his claims, and put his seal and signature to the treaty of partition.

“ 56. Accordingly, on the 14th of May the Resident at Poona waited on his Highness the Peishwa, who on this occasion, put his seal to the treaties of peace concluded with Dowlut Row Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, and carefully executed the proposed treaty of partition.

“ 57. The copies of the dispatches of the resident at Poona, dated the 10th and 14th of May, communicating the substance of his conferences on this subject with his Highness and his Minister, are annexed to this dispatch, for the information of your Honourable Committee. (E. T.).

“ 58. The

“ 58. The treaty of partition thus concluded with his Highness the Peishwa has been ratified by the Governor-General also.

“ 59. The copies of the treaty of partition thus concluded with their Highnesses the Soubadar of the Deccan and the Peishwa are also annexed to this dispatch for the information of your Honourable Committee (G. H.).

“ We have the Honour to be, Honourable Sirs,

“ Your most humble and most devoted Servants,
(Signed)

“ WELLESLEY,
“ G. H. BARLOW,
“ G. UDNEY.

Fort William, 11th of June, 1804.

No. 6.—To the Honourable the Court of Directors for managing the affairs of the Honourable Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

“ HONOURABLE SIRS,

“ By the letter of the Governor-General in Council, to the Secret Committee of your Honourable Court, dated the 30th of April, 1803, the Honourable Committee was informed that all possible efforts would be made to furnish the funds necessary to the dispatch of the investments of this year, raising for Bengal the sum of 90 lacks of sicca rupees, and raising to the amount of 15 lacks of rupees for the provinces ceded by the Nabob Vizier.

“ 2. It has been at the same time declared to the Honourable Committee that considerable embarrassment had been experienced at the Treasury of Fort William, from the distress occasioned by the demands of the aids which our resources were to furnish at a moment when the collection of the resources was in a great degree suspended.

“ In expectation of the speedy arrival at Fort William of the silver in bars, destined for India by your Honourable Court (the dispatch concerning this advice had previously been received), a considerable remittance of cash had been made to the Presidency of Fort St. George, at the commencement of the month of March, 1804, to relieve the pressing wants of that Department : and the Honourable Governor-General in Council, was enjoined at the same time, to send to Bengal all the funds that should be received from Europe before the end of the month of June.

“ 4. The funds which were expected in India in the course of the month of March and April, having at length arrived at Fort St. George the 26th May, 1804, the sum of two lacks of rupees, and 20,000 Spanish piastres, making part of that remittance, was retained by the Honourable the Governor in Council for the use of that establishment.

“ 5. The Governor-General in Council is assured that the Government of Fort St. George, in departing on this occasion from the orders of his Excellency, was sincerely persuaded that measure
would

would be for the good of the public service. It is necessary, however, to make known to your Honourable Court, that the determination of the Government of Fort St. George to retain a part of the remittances sent by his Majesty's ship the *Phæton* and the *Sir Edward Hughes*, and the late period at which the remainder of the funds brought by these ships arrived at Fort William, checked very much the advances to be made for the Bengal goods, and that it has not been possible to furnish any other ulterior aid for this service since the date of the last dispatch to your Honourable Court.

“ 6. The diminution which the provision of goods for the present year must of course suffer, cannot be determined at present, your Honourable Committee may, however, be assured, that the continuance of the advances to the commercial office shall be renewed at the first moment possible, and that every effort shall be made to prevent any considerable reduction in the shipment of merchantize that may be occasioned by such a suspension.

7. The receipt of the revenues of the present year will commence in the course of this month, and it is to be hoped that the speedy arrival of a fresh remittance of money from Europe will remove the momentary embarrassment that has been experienced in the administration of your finances in this Presidency.

“ We have the honour to be, Honourable Sirs,

“ Your very humble and very devoted servants,

“ WELLESELEY,

“ G. H. BARLOW,

“ G. UDNEY.”

Fort William, 19th July, 1804.

12

DIVERS PAPERS.

No. I.—Copy of a Letter written in M. PERRON'S OWN hand writing, to Colonel LOUIS BOURQUIEN.

(It reached him on the 11th Sept. between nine and ten *a. m.* at the moment he was on his march against the English.)

Louis, come and join me post ; I give you my word of honour—that if you are not satisfied with the propositions I shall make you, you shall have permission to return. Come, and do not destroy the interests of France—France and those of the Prince. I swear by all that is most sacred, that if you are not content you shall have permission to return. Set off, my dear Louis, set off, set off.

(Signed)

C. V. PERRON.

Matra, the 9th, (Sept. 9,) 1803.*

A true copy.

(Signed)

S. G. GUERINNIERE.

No. II.—Copy of a Letter written by BEKET,† PERRON'S Secretary, and signed by the latter, to Captain GUERENNIERE, of the 3d Brigade.

SIR,

I have just heard, with considerable uneasiness, that Colonel Louis Bourquien is become a rebel. The instant you receive this letter arm ; you have a good pair of pistols. Go to Colonel Bourquien, say to him, I have orders from the General to put you under arrest—will you submit, yes, or no. If he says no, blow his brains out immediately without waiting a moment. After that, shew the officers and troops the inclosed paper ; and after you have accomplished that, march with the brigade to join me immediately.

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,

(Signed)

C. V. PERRON.‡

Camp, Sept. 6, 1803.

If you are a Frenchman, and the servant of Mharaja Dowlut Row Scindia, you will execute these orders the instant you receive them.

(Signed)

C. V. PERRON.

A true copy.

(Signed)

S. G. GUERENNIERE.

* On the 5th he had obtained leave to retire to the English. He had not therefore any claim upon M. BOURQUIEN, who remained faithful.—(*Moniteur*)

† This man, an Englishman by birth, appears to have been the interpreter between the English and Perron. A short time after the treason of the latter he entered into the Company's service as Captain of Dragoons.

‡ As it is utterly impossible to convey in a translation the gross incorrectness of orthography and total want of all grammatical accuracy so conspicuous in M. Perron's letters; as they are published in the *Moniteur*, the translator has inserted them in the original language.

No. 1.—Copie de la lettre écrite de la propre main de PERRON au Colonel Louis Bourquien.

Louis venez me joindre en poste, je vous ma parole d'honneur que si vous n'êtes pas content des propositions que je vous ferez que vous ayez la liberté de vous en retourner. Venez ne perdez pas l'intérêt de la France et ceux du prince je vous jure sur tout, ce que j'ai de plus sacré que si vous voulez pas contenter vous ayez la liberté de vous en retourner à Dieu par la partie mon cher Louis par la partie.

Matra le 9.

Signe C. V. PERRON.

(9) 9 7bre 1803.

Four copie conforme, Signe S. G. GUERINNIERE.

No. II.—Copie d'une lettre écrite par BEKET, secrétaire de PERRON, et signée par ce dernier, au Capitaine GUERINNIERE, de la 3. brigade.

MONSIEUR,

Je viens d'apprendre avec beaucoup de peine que le Colonel Louis BOURQUIEN est devenu rebelle à l'instant que vous recevez cette lettre, armes vous avec un bon paire de pistolet; allez chez le Col. BOURQUIEN, dites lui. J'ai des ordres du général de vous mettre aux arrêts voulez vous vous y soumettre oui ou non? S'il répond que non brûlez les cervelles tout de suite sans attendre un instant. Après cela, montrez aux officiers et aux troupes le papier inclus; et après que vous aurez accomplis cela, marchez avec la brigade pour me joindre immédiatement.

Je suis, Monsieur, votre serviteur obéissant.

Signe C. V. PERRON.

Camp. 6 Septembre, 1803.

The above letter did not reach its address, it fell into the hands of M. Drugeon, who sent it after his arrival at Calcutta to M. Guerinniere at the request of the latter, who had been indirectly informed of it. It was accompanied with the following letter.

No. 3.—Copy of the letter of M. DRUGEON to M. GUERRINNIERE.

SIR,

Calcutta, 20 Jan. 1804.

I received the letter you wish to have, at Delhi; I did not think it would have been proper in me to have given it you there, notwithstanding the conduct of M. Louis Bourquien with respect to me. Now that you cannot make a bad use of it, without supposing you would have made a bad one before, I send it you with great pleasure, wishing you the accomplishment of all your desires.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very humble servant

Signed DRUGEON.

P. S. There is a paper in Persian, but as it is with others with which

which I am unacquainted, having no writer in that language; but if you wish to have it, it will not be difficult by sending me a man who can read it.

Have the complaisance to send me a receipt for the letter-I send you. You will oblige me.

A true copy. 14

Signed S. G. GUERINNIERE,

Deposition of Captain SAMUEL J. CAWLEY, Commander of the brig Amphitrite, from Calcutta.

Captain Cawley quitted Calcutta on the 22d December, 1804: he heard the following intelligence:—

Holkar had made an irruption into the province of Bengal; his march has been so rapid and unforeseen, that the Government of Bengal was thrown into alarm, which was further increased in the interior of the province—whilst Holkar ravaged and pillaged every district he visited.

The English, under the command of the General in Chief Lake, hastily collected all the disposeable troops, and succeeded in forcing Holkar to make his retreat into the Mogul states. There was in the month of November a sharp action between Holkar and the English; but the Captain, little conversant in political affairs, paid no attention either to the precise period of the battle, or to the spot where it took place. General Tasier, who had on that occasion two horses killed under him, and received several wounds, died on the field of battle. The English lost also a considerable number of men, chiefly Europeans.

The Captain presumes that the English are in great want of reinforcements; for the 17th regt. of Infantry, arrived from England on board a ship lately anchored in the river, had immediate orders to march against Holkar. No expedition whatever is talked of; and the English, under the present circumstances, cannot detach one hundred men.

Yet the general rumour at Calcutta was, that an expedition was preparing in Europe against the Cape of Good Hope, and that the expedition, after having taken the Cape, would attack the Mauritius.

Admiral Pellew, destined to replace Admiral Ranier, is arrived at Madras, on board of the vessel lately arrived.

When the Captain quitted Calcutta, he left in the river two frigates, the *Wilhelmina* and *Bombay*, of 36 guns each, and three sloops, the *Tinmouth* and *Grapsel*; the name of the third he was ignorant of.

Force of the 27th regiment of Light Cavalry on the 24th of May, 1804.

CAMP OF AGRA.

Etat Major.
A Colonel in Europe,

Two

Two Lieutenant Colonels in Europe.
 Two Majors, one a Lieutenant Colonel, commanding the regi-
 ment, and one in Europe.
 Three Surgeons, two of them in Europe.
 A Quarter-Master.
 An Adjutant, ill, absent.

NAMES of the COM- PANIES.	OFFICERS.		Non-commission- ed OFFICERS and Soldiers.		Total.
	Present	Absent	Present	Absent	
Cowel - -	1	3	42	3	49
The Lieut. Colonels'	1	1	39	5	46
Duries - -	1	1	42	3	47
White - -	2	2	40	3	47
Philpots - -	3	1	38	8	50
French - -	3	-	41	6	50
Milnes - -	3	-	41	6	50
Sandys - -	3	-	41	5	49
	17	8	324	39	388
Total of the Etat Major					10
Grand Total					398

GENERAL VIEW OF THE FINANCES OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY,

ESTIMATES FOR 1801—1802.

Bengal	£. 7,051,164	
Madras	3,899,040	
Bombay	271,852	
Total of Revenues		£. 11,222,029
Bengal	4,582,201	
Madras	4,559,321	
Bombay	1,185,308	
Total of Revenues		£. 10,326,820
The estimated Nett Revenues of the three Presidencies		895,209
Deducting for the Expences of Ben- coolen.		85,840
Remainder		£. 533,485

Deduction for the Interest of Debts . . .	£. 1,342,854
Remainder . . .	809,369
Which appears to be the deficit of the territorial revenues, if we deduct that sum from the estimated produce of the import sales, amounting to . . .	569,527
Remain . . .	<u>£. 31,042</u>

Which appears to be the sum applicable to the purchase of investments, payments of commercial charges, &c. &c.

RESULT OF THE DEBTS AND EFFECTS OF THE COMPANY IN ENGLAND, AND OUT OF ENGLAND.

From the feeble balance at the commencement of this year, the immense succours rendered necessary for India and China, as well as from the expected liquidation of the debt due to the Bank, the balance against the Company on the 1st March, 1802, is estimated to be about . . .

£. 1,434,556

DEBTS IN ENGLAND.

On the 1st March, 1801 . . .	£. 5,393,389
On the 1st March, 1802 . . .	4,822,683
Diminution of the Debt . . .	571,306

EFFECTS IN ENGLAND.

On the 1st March, 1801 . . .	£. 15,404,736
On the 1st March, 1802 . . .	16,802,760
Increase of Effects . . .	<u>£. 1,398,024</u>

Adding that sum to the debts diminished, the amelioration of the affairs of the Company appears to be in that year . . .

£. 1,969,330

CHINA AND ST. HELENA.

China balance in the last year, in favour . . .	£. 1,219,079
This year . . .	1,019,552
Diminution . . .	226,528
St. Helena on the 30th September, 1799, in favour . . .	58,366
In 1800 . . .	77,852
Increase . . .	19,486
Decrease . . .	187,042
	<u>GENE-</u>

GENERAL COMPARISON OF THE DEBTS AND EFFECTS.

Increase of Debts in India	£. 3,034,135
Decrease of Debts in England	571,306
	<hr/>
Nett increase of Debts	£. 2,432,824
	<hr/>
Increase of Property in India	£. 544,369
In England	1,398,024
	<hr/>
Total	£. 1,942,393

To be deducted the decrease of the China and St.

Helena balances	187,042
Nett increase of effects	1,755,551

This sum deducted from the increase of debts, the remainder shews that the affairs of the Company are worse this year than they were last by 707,473

That amount is liable to alteration, upon the definitive arrangement of the Company's claims upon the Government, included in the article of Effects in England, amounting to a sum	3,573,339
Making an increase in that article for this year of	900,899
Total debt in India	18,500,000
Part bearing interest	16,000,000
Annual interest	1,438,791

REVENUE AND EXPENCES ACCORDING TO THE MOST RECENT ADVICES.

REVENUES.

Bengal	7,218,800
Madras	4,250,300
Bombay	270,980
	<hr/>
Total	11,976,180

EXPENDITURE.

Bengal	4,155,667
Madras	4,486,400
Bombay	840,402
	<hr/>
Total	9,246,396

Nett

Nett revenue	2,729,814
Commercial Charges	155,038
Succours to Bencoolen	82,400
	<hr/>
Deducted from the revenues, there remains	2,492,373
Interest of the debt	1,438,791
	<hr/>
Nett remainder of the revenues	1,053,582

NOTE—From another article it appears that the expedition to Egypt from India cost upwards of 1,200,000*l.* which the Company now claims from the Government.

Political Situation of the Mahratta Empire before the Decease of Nana Fernawese in 1800.

Since the assassination of Narain Raow by Ragonaut Raow, and the flight of the latter to Bombay, the English have not ceased to protect that family. Though the two wars consequent upon that intervention have been disastrous, and though they could not succeed in establishing Ragonaut Raow upon the throne, their principles have not varied; and after the death of Madajee Raow in 1795, they succeeded in raising Batjee Raow, the son of Ragonaut Raow. Madajee Scindia had been dead some years before. His nephew, Dowlut Raø Scindia, a young man of 17 years of age, succeeded him. The uncle had left him the Generals and Ministers he had formed; but Sartji Raow Galka, the prince's father-in-law, and other favourites, removed them by their cabals. The ignorance and perverseness of these intrigues have occasioned all the miseries with which, in the end, Scindia has been overwhelmed. There was not the least order in his Durbar, the administration was neglected, and the expenditure far exceeded the revenues. He formed the most ambitious projects, and, without possessing his uncle's talents, wished to execute his great designs.

The family of Ragonaut Raow was held in detestation by the greater part of the nation. Scindia marched with a strong army to Poonah to dethrone the Peishwa. The Pandet Nana was then *Fernawese*, or Chancellor of Batjee Raow. He was the greatest intriguer in the empire,—cunning, adroit, and subtle, like all the Bramins; he governed the Peishwa entirely, and influenced all the other Mahratta Durbars by his intrigues and his immense riches.

Without policy and without money, the army which Scindia had led to Poonah, soon began to embarrass him; and it is probable that it would have fallen before Nana, who had in truth no army, but who was so superior in talents and treasure, if he had not had recourse to treachery. On the 21st of December 1797,

Nana

Nana paid a visit to Scindia with several of his partisans, and upon a signal given they were all arrested. The arrest of Nana, however, was not wholly contrived by Scindia and his Ministers: Amrout Raow, the Peishwa's adopted brother, of whom we shall speak presently, had a very great hand in it. That ambitious man aspired to the office of Furnavese, and he made use of Scindia's hatred and power to seize and confine Nana.

This treachery did not procure Scindia the advantages he expected from it: on the one hand, he had only served as an instrument of ambition to Amrout Raow, who became Chancellor; and on the other, the sums which he extorted from Nana, his adherents, and the inhabitants of Poonah, were not considerable enough to diminish the embarrassments which the maintenance of his army occasioned.

Under these circumstances, it was easy for the different factions which caballed against Scindia, to foment a revolt among his troops. Balla Tantis, his old minister, whom Sourtti Raow Galka had overthrown and imprisoned, the Koua Dada and the Bayes*, were certainly the principal authors of these troubles; but Nana, though imprisoned, was not a stranger to them. The Bayes laid hold of a violation, real or pretended, of one of them by Scindia, to fly from his camp to the tomb of Madajee Scindia. The cavalry of the army, extremely attached to the deceased prince, took the part of the princesses, and a civil war began.

Scindia, in this disastrous situation, applied to the Peishwa to be the mediator between him and the Bayes. Batjee Raow, unadvisedly, suffered himself to be engaged in the affair, which did not concern him, and which might compromise his political existence. He became negotiator between the two parties, and was listened to by neither. When Nana got out of prison some time after, and came to Poonah, the parties made him arbitrator of their differences; but he was not more fortunate than the Peishwa, who availed himself of this opportunity to get rid of his quality of mediator. The war of the Bayes extended throughout the Mahratta empire. The commandants of Delhi and Agra revolted, and the disturbances were not appeased till after the death of Tantis, Kona, and the principal chiefs. This war was the real cause of the fall of Tippoo, who had demanded, by paying for them, succours of the Mahrattas, who suffered him to be overwhelmed. Scindia took his money, and did nothing, because he could do nothing in the critical circumstances in which he was placed. The longer the troubles lasted, the more pecuniary embarrassments increased. He resolved at last to set Nana at liberty; thinking that minister most likely to restore his affairs, either by making him pay dearly for his enlargement, or that he hoped to profit by his ascendancy over his enemies to operate a reconcilia-

* Note. The Bayes are Princesses, wives of the deceased Madajee Scindia.

tion. Another not less powerful cause appears to have contributed to the setting Nana at liberty. The Peishwa Batjee Raow was too feeble to govern without a minister, and he preferred Nana to Amrout Raow, his adopted brother, whose ambitious projects he was acquainted with. Amrout Raow is the son of a Bramin of a high caste; he was adopted at a very early age by Ragonaut Raow, against the wish of the Peishwa and the Government. He did not shew himself unworthy of that honour, and of his good fortune; for when in the troubles which terminated the life of his adopted father, the Court of Poonah wished to carry the latter, contrary to anterior stipulations, to a fort, he flew to his succour, at the head of a weak party, defeated a strong escort, and gave him his liberty, which he did not however long preserve. Amrout Raow, in the end, shared the disgrace of that family, and spent several years in prison. He is as all the Bramins are, cunning, intriguing, avaricious, and ambitious. Having spent some time in European establishments, (with Ragonaut Raow at Bombay) he has acquired an urbanity and behaviour which rendered him very agreeable to strangers, and remembering always the services which the English rendered to his relation, he appears to be much attached to them. His reputation as a soldier and a politician, is so established, that when Amrout Raow was released, Nana, who feared a rival in him, took great pains to have him continued in prison. Subsequent events restored him again to his importance; and since his arrival at Poonah, the old friends of Ragonaut Raow rallied round him.

It was by his intrigues and those of his family, supported by the power of Scindia, that Nana was imprisoned, and that he became Fernavese. He aspires in secret to the Musnud, to which he thinks he has a claim, by being the eldest.—The Peishwa who was jealous of his talents, and who feared his ambition, openly and secretly opposed all his plans; and at length withdrew all his confidence from him—which did not contribute a little to the success of Nana's negociations for the recovery of his freedom.

When Amrout Raow was informed of Scindia's design with respect to Nana, whom he considered as the principal obstacle to his ambitious designs, and whose vengeance he dreaded, he proposed to the Peishwa to send a detachment to intercept him, and to prevent his return; but the Peishwa so far from approving of a measure so contrary to his views, sent a Bramin of distinction to meet the old Minister, and to compliment him upon his release.

After the return of Nana to Poonah, there was a general interview between Scindia and Nana on one side, and the Peishwa Amrout Raow and Holkar on the other. All differences were there terminated in appearance, and protestations of friendship were reciprocally made; though nevertheless, they still hated each other.

In consequence of the Peishwa having deserted them, the Bayes retired from the vicinity of Poonah; Holkar received orders to occupy

occupy his former encampment, and Amrout Raow was forced to disband his army, and to retire to the city.

In reflecting upon these transactions, there is one circumstance which deserves the attention of politicians ; it is the powerful influence of Nana, who, by the mere resources of his genius, without an army, and even without paying before hand what had been stipulated at the time of his arrest, released himself from the hands of his greatest enemy, and reinstated himself in all the dignities and employments he had before possessed. The conditions of his release between him and Scindia were ratified in the most solemn manner, and guaranteed by all the vekeels and the greater part of the public functionaries of Poonah.

This important business being regulated, he took up his residence in the city, and with a pretended repugnance, entered upon his functions anew ; all the persons employed were dismissed, and several of the principal ones were shut up in forts. Amrout Raow, who for the last twelve months had acted as minister and commander in chief, was stripped of all his employments, and received a jaghire of eight lacks of siccas. He retired with much disgust, waiting for a favourable opportunity for recovering his influence.

All these measures were adopted by order of the Peishwah ; but there is no doubt that they were suggested by the minister.

In November 1798, the Governor General Wellesley, communicated to the Peishwah the substance of the treaty of Hyderabad, of the 1st of September in that year, and at the same time demanded the execution of anterior treaties in case of a rupture with Tippoo.

The policy of the English in dividing in 1792 their conquests from Tippoo with the Peishwah and the Nizam, had for its object not only to attach them more strongly to their interests, but to have in the end, and in case of a new war with that prince, allies sufficiently powerful to succour them but too weak to become dangerous to them.

It is known that this expectation of the English was disappointed at the Nizam's Court by the organization of a French party, and by the influence of the person who was at the head (M. Reymond).

Their alliance with the Peishwah was not in a much more favourable situation ; and when they demanded the execution of the treaties, it was impossible for the Peishwah to afford them the least assistance.

Nana, very much devoted to the English, had been reinstated in the ministry ; but the power of Scindia and the other Mahratta chiefs was too preponderating for Batzee Raow to do more than wish success to their arms.

Notwithstanding that, after the taking of Seringapatam, the English thought proper to comprehend him in the second and last partition of the territories of Tippoo. By the seventh article of the treaty of the 22d June 1799, it was stipulated that the Peish-

wah shall be invited to accede to it, and that there shall be eventually ceded to him the districts mentioned in the treaty (yielding about 130,000l. a year) in full sovereignty, on condition, however, that he should place no restriction to it; and that, in one month after it should have been notified to him by the two contracting parties; certain points in dispute between him, the Company, and the Nizam being previously arranged in favour of the latter.

The Peishwah was not in a situation to reject that arrangement; had it even been more disadvantageous to him. The treaty was adopted and executed.

The civil war continued in Indostan and the Deccan with the same fury. Delhi and Agra had been retaken by Perron from the Chiefs of the revolters, who had been beaten in several actions: but they constantly found fresh resources, and order was not established till after their death. Scindia was then engaged in another war with the Rajah of Djaypour; but he had the good fortune to defeat him completely in a battle fought in May, 1800, in the Atjimere. The Rajah commanded his army in person, and after his defeat, he submitted and engaged to pay the sums stipulated by former treaties.

Nana had just departed this life in March, 1800, and this catastrophe served but to increase the troubles which convulsed the Empire. Scindia and Holkar had fallen out, and begun a war which was near ruining them both.

The intercepted dispatches conclude with an extract from the Calcutta Gazettes of October, 1804, relative to the defeat of Lieutenant Colonel Monson by Holkar.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE,

INTERCEPTED

FROM INDIA.

(Published in the *Moniteur* and Supplementary Sheet of the 1st of May, 1805, with the following Prefatory Observations.)

“ COL. DARSONAL who is arrived from the mountains in the corvette *La Delegante*, has brought dispatches from Captain General Decaen.

“ Amongst the prizes taken by Rear-Admiral Linois, is a vessel with several official dispatches. We detest this miserable custom of printing letters found on board vessels; but the custom having been introduced by the English, who were indelicate enough to publish Private Correspondence, even letters from husbands to their wives, written in Egypt, experience has proved that a monster like England must be attacked with the same weapons she makes use of—she will otherwise exercise the right exclusively.

“ The greatest division reigns among the British in India—their finances are in the greatest disorder—the war they are carrying on is disastrous to them, and rages in all its force.

“ The European army in India is less than 12,000 men, so great have been the losses they have experienced.

“ The letters from the Marquis of Wellesley are most curious, and shew the great embarrassment in which the Company is placed.”

Mrs. ——— to Major-General ROBERT STUART, at London.

Doggah, July 6, 1804.

“ A fatality appears to have accompanied this poor Bundelcund army on the outset. I will give you a sketch of this campaign, though it does not constitute the most agreeable part of our operations, and is the only one in which the British troops have failed in maintaining their accustomed superiority.

“ It is about twelve months ago that General Lake, having taken the field, a separate detachment was formed upon the banks of the Jumna, to take possession of Bundelcund. This detachment consisted of four battalions of seapoys, two companies of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry. Colonel Peregrine Powell

had

had the command of it.—Every body expected the immediate reduction of Callinjer, and the entire conquest of that province, the more so as the Chiefs were divided, and half inclined to receive us; yet we were long without hearing of any signal success; and after the great loss which the Commander in Chief had sustained in Europeans, the European regiment of that City was sent by the Marquis of Wellesley, to join Colonel Powell, and to be more at hand, in case General Lake should require a reinforcement. To crown the whole, the Marquis sent what he calls a political Agent, Captain Baillie, a Professor, who does not appear to possess the qualities necessary for that employment.—The operations of Powell were much impeded, for the other interfered with them; and wishing to take Callinjer, and do all by *means of negotiation*, the troops were twice marched within sight almost of the fortress, and twice they retired; by this double retreat the expectations of M. Baillie were defeated, and Callinjer could not be captured. Yes Calpee was taken possession of; and the army in general encamped a few days march from that place in a state of inaction, but in no apparent danger, because they could have collected some force. Colonel Fawcett in consequence joined that army with a squadron of cavalry, and a strong brigade of troops, under the command of Colonel Shepherd, who had entered our army from the service of Ambajee. Yet, either by long inactivity or by the glorious successes of the troops under General Lake, that army was dispirited, particularly the European regiment, which was suffering under sickness. Colonel Pophill died suddenly, and Powell quitted the army from bad health, and extreme chagrin at not having been able to do any thing with such a superior force under his command. I think that if the political agent had not been there, Bundelcund would have been conquered long ago; and poor Powell, without doubt, is of the same opinion. To negotiate with those persons is a folly; besides it was difficult to know where the power resides with which we are to treat. The capital is in the hands of a single person, one of the sons of Ally. Behauder kept the field with a strong army of Bundelcund troops, and Ameer Khan, Holkar's Receiver, and his General, was plundering at the head of some thousand of Mahratta horse. The command of the army having unfortunately (to make use of General Lake's expression) devolved upon Colonel Fawcett, in the month of May, he sent a battalion of the 18th regiment, and a company of artillery, under Nicholas Smith, to take some mutinous forts which had refused to furnish forage; Smith divided his force, and sent three companies, by Fawcett's order, to take possession of one of the places, whilst he proceeded himself against Belah, got possession of the town, and built batteries there; having afterwards left there the artillery with two company's of Seapoys, he encamped at the distance of half a mile, for the night, upon a plain. On that very night Colonel Fawcett received the intelligence that Ameer Khan, at the head of a large body of cavalry, was in the environs: he paid

little attention to it at first ; but he ordered the troops to remain under arms, and desired Smith to send him his battalion, which was at the distance of six miles. The message was a verbal one ; Smith, in consequence, remained in his position till morning ; when, about eight o'clock, Ameer Khan, with a corps of cavalry from 5 to 7,000 men (said at first to be 15,000) after having cut to pieces the unfortunate Europeans and a number of natives that were left in the batteries, attacked Smith in the plain, and forced him to retreat.—Smith joined the main body of the army that was advancing towards him ; the junction was effected with little loss ; fifty-two artillerymen, however, and about two hundred native troops were cut to pieces at Belah. This event is most unfortunate and mysterious ; and we are still ignorant why Smith did not obey the orders he received, and why he did not endeavour to succour his people, having heard the firing. He effected his retreat with his five companies with much courage.

“ When Colonel Fawcet heard that the enemy had got before him, and were going to surprise Calpee, he followed them in two long marches, and then halted for two days to the astonishment of every one of his army. He was soon informed that Ameer had taken Calpee, and was marching against Doab. He received that intelligence which was false for Gospel, and ordered a counter-march of 22 miles to Cunchen Goat, on the Betwa, intending, as he said, to follow Ameer into our Province by that rout, and to pass the Jumna considerably below Calpee ; but having heard at Cunchen Goat that Captain Jones had repulsed the enemy from the Fort of Calpee, he directed his rout to that City, and reached it in the most terrible condition, on account of excessive fatigue and discouragement for having made an apparent retreat before an enemy who had been beaten by Colonel Shepherd with irregular troops. The Commander in Chief being informed of the faults committed by Fawcet, ordered him to give up the command to Wittel ; but the latter being dead, Major Frith was sent to take the command, until Colonel Martendale arrived from Pertoubgun. At the moment I am writing this, I hear that the latter has now the command, and has defeated 10,000 Bundelcund troops ; this is good news, and we stood in need of it to regain our reputation in that Province. If Colonel Fawcet had at first joined Smith instead of keeping his men under arms, he would at least have prevented the country from being ravaged by the enemy, the troops would not have been so harassed, and he would not have lost ten or twelve Europeans a day. I do not exaggerate. General Lake was like a madman, and spoke in very strong terms both to Fawcet and Smith ; the first is on trial at Caunpore, and the second will probably undergo the same fate. On the 17th July, Colonel Martendale gained a complete victory over the Bundelcund troops. General Lake's intention was to take the field again during the cold weather ; but we hope Holkar's force will be annihilated before that takes place. An army under Colonel Murray is advancing to that country from the

the South, and Colonel Monson commands a strong detachment of five battalions of Seapoys on the frontiers of Jeypour; it is at present stationed in a strong defile, called Muchundra, southwest of Kolah and Boadee, where he will remain during the whole rainy season, unless he advances into Holkar's territory. It is said that Holkar intends to play him a trick, and to attack Mutra or Delhi; he is very active, and we have but little force on that side of Lucknow, and the European dragoons at Caunpour. It is supposed that this is not well arranged; but undoubtedly the Commander in Chief knows what he is about, and will prevent any misfortune. The Marquis of Wellesley was to quit Calcutta on the 10th; but I shall not believe that he will undertake the journey till I hear he has set out. He is, I believe, extremely anxious to see the newly conquered countries, as well as to receive the *fraternal embrace* from the Great Mogul; for the little Lord thinks of visiting his Court, if the time will permit him to take so long a journey. I expect that he will remain at Calcutta till he receives news from Europe, and that Caunpour will be the termination of his tour, if he can be absent at all. He will be accompanied in his journey by Major-General Dowdeswell, by the Turkish Ambassador Solomon Aga, from Bagdad, and by some person *still greater*, your friend, King Collins; he will certainly display great brilliancy and pomp. Collins is going to Lucknow, as resident; and Colonel Scott to Delhi, in the same capacity. General Lake has not thought it proper to go to Calcutta; the country is in too unsettled a state. It is surprising with what address Holkar has kept our army on the *qui vive* during the hot weather; at one time he negotiated; at another he was out of reach. It appears that he is the only Mahratta Chief who is well convinced of his interests; by avoiding a battle, he has done infinitely more mischief than he could have done in any other manner. I am glad our enemies have not played us the same game; if they had, they would have been still under arms, and would annoy us terribly.

“ The Governor of the Mauritius has published a number of letters taken on board the Admiral Aplin: his excuse for having done what he avows to be improper is, that the English Governor set the example, by publishing the private letters of Sebastiani to the First Consul. That is not handsome. It appears that the letters had been public, and certainly they were so by their nature, whatever they might be in their form. It is the same, probably, with respect to the letters of Marquis Wellesley and Lord Grenville, which were published at the Mauritius, and consequently found their way to Bengal, though they have not been published in our Gazettes. It is said they contain some state secrets, and disclose the Marquis's sentiments with respect to some distinguished persons in India, sentiments which were not meant to be exposed to the public eye, and still less to the eyes of those against whom they are directed. Perhaps this letter will meet with the same fate; permit me then to be upon my guard

guard with respect to what I say ; for it would be really dreadful for a Major-General and a Lady to be convicted of *criminal correspondence*. I have done all I could to give you an idea of the state of affairs in a country for which you are so warmly interested."

" Our army has returned into cantonments after the capture of Rampoore, (called in our maps Ranlampooe).—This respectable fortress was carried by assault on the 18th of May, and thus finished the campaign. Holkar has retired into his country, having traversed the Chambrise; Scindiah is to join us against Holkar.—Having mentioned so many persons' names, it is prudent for me to omit my own.—Adieu."

Extract from the Private Correspondence found on Board the English Ship, Hope.

Mr. CHARLES CHRISTIE, to * * * * *

Futtyghur, 19th July, 1804.

" I had the pleasure of giving you in my last letters, a detail of our military operations ; now I announce to you with satisfaction, that the peace has been concluded with Scindiah, which, in its consequences and effects, is extremely advantageous to the country, and to our political existence as a power ; for it checks the evils and the grand plan of Bonaparte, which he has formed upon this country, and which has been, as experience has demonstrated, nearly ripe for execution. If the war had continued a year longer, and they had sent French Officers to be placed in the regular battalions of Perron, it is impossible to say who would have had the advantage. The dispute would have been bloody, and we should have had an enemy to combat ten times more numerous than ourselves. The battles of Delhi, Lassawarrey, Assaye, and Argram, ought never to be forgotten. These battles have ensured our establishment in India ; they have given us an immense extent of country ; they have overturned all the designs and influence of the French politics. The incomparable success of our arms ought to be attributed to the bravery and rapidity of the movements of the army under the command of General Lake, who is a brave soldier and full of glory. His army fought with all their heart and soul, because they were fighting French principles which took their rise under French officers ; I hope you will do the same when the invasion shall take place."

M. J. WILKIE, to his Father in Scotland.

Camp at Calpee, 28th July, 1804.

" The war against Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, terminated in February last ; but Holkar, another of the Mahrattah Chiefs, had drawn the sword against us. This curious Chief makes war a matter of private business ; he has large corps of cavalry, who, instead of engaging, gallop from one place to another, and do great injury to the detachments they come up with. Another evil is, that his infantry will never face ours ; thus I cannot tell

when we shall come to a decisive action with him. At present, the Commander in Chief, General Lake, is at his cantonments at Khanpoor, and the major part of the Native regiments are in quarters at Ryan and Delhi."

Mr. ARNOLD, to his Brother at London.

Cbandousey, 26th July, 1804.

"I wrote to you lately of our exploits; I take up now the thread of my narration. Our march in pursuit of Holkar, before the reduction of Rampoorah, was as rapid as circumstances would permit; but as his army consisted entirely of cavalry, and ours of infantry, Europeans, and of the artillery of the country, drawn by oxen, we could by no means come up with him. Yet in the end we succeeded in driving him out of the country, and in sending him back to his provinces. About this time one of his Chiefs, an active partizan (Amyr Khan) entered the province of Bundelcund, (of which a detachment under the command of Colonel Powel had taken possession at the commencement of the war,) at the head of eight or ten thousand cavalry. Colonel Powel was unfortunately obliged to quit the command on account of ill health; the second Colonel, Polhill, died. Thus, through a sort of fatality, the command devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcet. He soon gave an example of his ill conduct; the 24th of May a large party of Amyr Khan's cavalry fell on a detachment and cut it to pieces; Captain Nead and Lieutenant Morris, with Lieutenant Gillespie, were killed. Fawcet, who had at his disposal four battalions of Sepoys, one regiment of Europeans, two squadrons of cavalry, and a great number of irregular cavalry and infantry, during the whole time made not a single movement.

"To complete this scene of disgrace, they exaggerated the number of the enemy, swelling them to 40,000 men; in consequence of which the detachment withdrew to cover Allahabad, a fortress almost impregnable by the best army in Europe, provided with a strong garrison, surrounded on three sides by the Ganges and the Jumnah, at their confluence, and capable of being laid under water to the distance of four miles. This detachment made so precipitate a retreat, that in one day it lost forty Europeans by the heat and fatigue, and successively 108 others. During this retreat, the only enemy they saw was a small detachment of irregular cavalry: they fired on it with a great deal of courage. Fawcet was tried within a few days by a Court-martial: the general opinion is that he will be brokē.

"Amyr Khan, encouraged by the success of this last affair, and by Fawcet's retreat, advanced toward Calpee, with the intention of falling upon our provinces, and laying them waste. Upon this the army returned by rapid marches; the cavalry advancing 18 or 20 miles a day, leaving the infantry 12 days march behind them. This rapid march cost us dear; we lost each

each day 20 or 30 Europeans, and ten times as many natives of every class. The heat was so excessive, that I was myself a witness, that out of seven soldiers who went to a well to quench their thirst, five fell dead. The thermometer was, during several days 110 and upwards. On our arrival at Agra, we learnt that Amyr Khan was traversing the Jumna to Calpee, and menaced Cawnpoor and Futtighur; nevertheless, the ford being too deep, he was not able to put his design in execution, and consequently turned his vengeance against the city. Captain Sydney Jones, at length forced him to retreat; and after some engagements which he had with Colonel Sheppard, he evacuated the province, and joined Holkar, having augmented his force to 10,000 men.

M. CHASE, CHINNERY, M^cDOUALL and Co. to Messrs. BRUCE,
DE PONTHEU and Co. at London.

“ Madras, 5th July, 1804.

“ Our arms have experienced a slight check in an expedition against Holkar, who has surprised and roughly handled a detachment; we are sorry to add that the southern districts continue to be disturbed by the refractory Polygars. A small army is assembling near Tritchnepoly to quell these disturbances.

“ The Tremendous and the Lancaster, ships of the line, have sailed from hence on a cruise. The Phaeton and Terpsichore frigates are going to join them. It is supposed they will cruise off the French Islands.

M. WALTER NANTES to Mrs. CRACRAFT, at Westminster.

“ Diggab, 22d July.

“ I wrote you lately a long letter, but I shall here recapitulate it, in case it should have been taken by the French, whose privateers have lately been very active in the Indian Seas. They have already carried a number of our vessels to the Mauritius which chagrins us the more, as our naval force is superior to theirs here, as well as elsewhere; but the fact is, that their small cruisers have every thing to gain and nothing to lose; hence they attack whatever they meet, and our commerce being of great extent, they must of course sometimes succeed.

“ We have just heard that the Governor of the Mauritius has published all the private letters found on board the Admiral Apelin. I can scarce believe it; but to explain the conduct of the French in this enlightened age! they defy all calculation. I think, my dear Sister, that there would be little public entertainment in the insertion in their Gazettes of our correspondence. I imagine they will only have published such letters as are of a political nature.”

Mr. W. PALMER, to his Son at London.

Mongher, August 2.

“ The conspiracy against Bonaparte appears to have been very

will concerted, and will have the effect that all plots have, which are discovered; it will strengthen the Government it was meant to destroy.

I have little hope of success in Holland, however favourable the disposition of the Dutch may be towards us; for the French can send as large succours thither as they wish. Nor can I conceive how England can fit out an armament proportioned to the enterprise, whilst she is in fear of, an invasion. If she has the power and the courage to carry on offensive warfare, a few ships, and 4 or 5000 men, would be more advantageously employed in conquering the Cape of Good Hope, which would give greater security to our establishments in India.

“Those establishments have just acquired a formidable extension, and demand our protection, either as our immediate conquests, or in virtue of alliances, from the confines of Siam to the East, to the Gulph of Sind to the West, and from the frontiers of the country of the Seyks on the North, to Cape Comorin on the South. How we shall be able to preserve and defend this vast extent of country, I cannot conceive—I think that Lord Wellesley himself will be soon alarmed at the greatness of his conquests; none of which, according to my opinion, will produce revenues enough to defray the expences they occasion.

“The Army of the Coast furnishes 18 battalions of subsidiary troops to the Nizam, the Peishwah and Scindia. A great part of the Bombay troops are stationed in the Guzzerat; none of these armies, as far as I believe, has been augmented—judge of our security on the two coasts, and in the Carnatic. Four new regiments of Native Infantry have been formed in Bengal; nevertheless, since the troops have entered into cantonments, we have not a regiment at our disposal between Calpee and Calcutta—and I think, that at this very moment, there is only the European, and a part of the Native Cavalry, together with the companies of the regiment of European Infantry, which is ruined, that have returned into the Doab.—*If the French could send out an expedition to India, they would without doubt effect a landing upon some part of the two coasts, and would do us very great injury, before we could fight them with success.*”

Mr. R. WALPOLE to his MOTHER at London.

Calcutta, July 25.

“It is now six months since we have received news from Europe, except what is arrived over-land; and during all that time not a single vessel belonging to the Company has arrived—of course the price of all necessary articles is excessive. There is no beer, which constitutes the chief drink, nor claret, nor even cheese. A hat costs 40 rupees, nearly six guineas. If merchandise does not arrive, we, poor Europeans shall all be ruined. The Captain of the first vessel that arrives will make his fortune, for he will sell each article at 300 per cent. profit.

“ You

“ You have no idea how Officers are fatigued throughout India, and gain next to nothing.

“ Imagine that an European newly landed, who is not accustomed to the excessive heat of India, is obliged to march twenty miles a day, and sometimes more, whilst the thermometer even in the tents is from 110 to 120 during the hot winds. The Officers and European soldiers have often the skin of their faces burnt up by the sun and burning winds. These are the least difficulties of an Indian soldier. There is besides an extreme jealousy between the civil and military service; the former possess all the lucrative places, and look upon the military as beings of a lower order, so that Officers of an inferior rank are almost excluded from society. The rise of an Officer is equally slow and uncertain, and it is seldom that he arrives at the rank of Captain before he has been in the service 22 or 23 years.”

Mr. K. J. BLANCKENHAGEN, to his FATHER at London.

*Camp opposite Frey, on the Banks of the Betwa,
26th Feb. 1804.*

“ An unexpected and rapid march of a body of troops from Bombay has re-placed the Peishwah once more in his rights, and by proving to us the power and resources of his enemies, has demonstrated the necessity of weakening them from time to time. An occasion, or rather a pretext for war soon presented itself, which has not only authorised it in the end, but has even rendered it necessary to the safety, and perhaps the existence of our Empire in India. Bonaparte, whose hatred and talents render him the most formidable enemy of our country, has, long since declared, that so long as England shall be able to dispose of the inexhaustible treasures of Indostan, every enterprise of the French to conquer us would be vain. The peace no sooner left him the leisure to wound us secretly, than he sent his emissaries to Schindiah, whose large and disciplined army, at that time at war with the Nizam, our ally, was the most formidable we could have encountered in winter. Happily, the Marquis was informed in time of all that was passing, and did not lose a moment in entering into an offensive war, as the only means of overthrowing the plans formed for our destruction.

(A faithful Translation.)

“ C. BERONY, Secretary and Interpreter
to the Captain General.

“ Seen—Captain General DECAEN.”

Extract of the Private Correspondence found on board the English Prize, *Hope*.

J. MACDONALD to his BROTHER at London.

Campur, 30th June.

“ Though the army has not been actively employed since I wrote to you, we have been all exposed to the wind and burning sun, and have thereby experienced great losses.

“ The

" The natives have perished from the excessive heat and want of water; several, when they have found any, have drank too much, and in consequence have expired. We could easily replace these, but *the Europeans, the number of whom I cannot relate,* it is impossible to replace, and on this account their loss cannot be appreciated, but by those who know how valuable Europeans must be in this country; may the Almighty pardon those who have trifled so strangely with the lives of so many Europeans and natives, to gratify ambition and vanity. According to my weak opinion, we should have preserved the lives and property of many persons, if we had not suffered the army to remain inactive during the cold season, under the command of a Captain General.

* * * * *
 * * * * *
 * * * * * I pray

Heaven, that it be so in this case! Yet I repeat and hesitate not to pronounce, that at the end of three years the finances of the Company in all their parts will be found in a very alarming state, or rather almost irremediable by continuing the war against the Mahrattas. You know that peace is made in India, that the ratifications are exchanged, and God knows what besides; until now, we have acted hostilely against Holkar, and have provoked the war against this Chief, the best and most enterprising soldier of all the Mahrattas, and whose countries are the most distant, and, at the same time, the best fortified. During the time that the negotiations were on the carpet, the army was idle, and strictly speaking more than idle—it was consuming its provisions, which cost twice the value of what we had obtained by the new conquests assigned to defray the expences of the troops. Every country through which we have passed, has sustained losses that could not be repaired in 25 or 30 years.—This is the reason that, in all parts, and upon all occasions, the people conduct themselves like enemies.

" At length, it was determined to send a detachment of our army to join another, commanded by one of Scindiah's Generals.

" The corps that I command is at Matura; the General took from me this command, and left me the choice of demanding another; but it would be difficult to tell you when this nomination will appear;

* * * * *
 * * * * *
 * * * * *
 * * * * * "!!!"

Mr. W. JACKSON, to Mr. WILLIAM JACKSON, Edinburgh.
Calcutta, August 3.

" I have already sent you a copy of the orders that Lord Wellesley had given, respecting the ceremonies to be observed at the time of his brother's arrival at Calcutta; you have heard, I suppose, that the same day that these orders were published, in which

which they speak of the last glorious war, an account was received that a corps of cavalry, of 1600 men, had been entirely defeated, and their commanders wounded and taken prisoners; and, what is still worse, Lieutenant Colonel Monson's detachment has been obliged to make its retreat in the most dangerous state; so that it cannot be the *last* war, which still exists, and of the happy success of which the enemy has more reason to rejoice than we."

SARAH KAUKEL to JOSEPH HAUKEs, Esq. London.

Diggab, 23d July, 1804.

"It is said that there are several ships on their way from England: May they escape the marauders, (French privateers), who have already carried into the Mauritius at least two of our vessels from India. Instead of sending us the private letters, as is the custom, they have, it is said, published them at the Mauritius in the Gazettes, and that as a pretended reprisal founded on the British Government having made use of Sebastiani's letters, addressed to the First Consul, which it pleased him to call private ones. I imagine that this account is exaggerated, and that we shall receive our letters here at some future time."

Mr. GEORGE CURTY to the Rev. RICH. TAYLOR, Kensington.

Calcutta, 3d Aug.

"There is little news in this part of the globe. The *Altea* is taken by two French frigates of 44 guns, *L'Atalante* and *La Belle Poule*. This ship was insured for seven lacs and 700,000 rupees, and was one of the richest ships of India. A precious prize for the *Sans-culottes*; she was valued at 1,500,000 sicca rupees."

Mr. JOHN STRACEY, to ANDREW MACKLEN, Esq. London.

Cacorporel, July 20.

"Since your departure from hence, at the end of the month of May, we were alarmed anew by an invasion of the Mahrattas. Amyr-Khan, at the head of a large corps of cavalry, entered suddenly into the Bundelcund; Captain Head and Lieutenant Morris of the artillery, with five and forty European soldiers, as well as Lieutenant Gillespie with two companies of Sepoys, who attacked a little fort, were cut to pieces. Amyr-Khan proceeded afterwards to Calpée, which he pillaged, and was preparing to pass the Jumma, when he was prevented by Capt. Jones.

"Upon which Amyr-Khan retired, and was in the latter place defeated by Col. Shepperd. Our army returned under the orders of General Lake, last month; but it suffered cruelly in its march from bad weather. Happily you have escaped from the heat of this season, which has surpassed all that has ever been felt; Europeans, Natives, and cattle, all have sunk under it, and numbers have died suddenly in consequence of it, hardly appearing sick before they expired.

"The

"The war continues against Holkar, which will probably afford us sufficient employment; I should be extremely glad that every thing was finished, and that we had peace."

"JAMES HARE, to _____.

Calcutta, 23^d July.

"The war against the Mahrattas is not yet at an end. The army of the Bundelcund has had lately an opportunity of revenging itself for the loss of the artillery-men and sepoy's.

"We have been much amused of late in reading the French translation of letters found on board the Admiral Aplin, addressed to different persons of that city, and particularly with two letters addressed to Lord Wellesley, one coming from his brother, and the other from Lord Grenville; the former accuses the Directors of incivility towards him, who, notwithstanding that he had had business with them, had never even invited him to a dinner: by way of reprisal he calls them prepossessed and weak men, who know not the interest of their country. Lord Grenville's letter turns entirely on domestic political affairs, and on the hope that his party will hold together;—he mentions the differences that exist between Addington and Pitt, and he believes that they will never be adjusted. We have just heard of the conspiracy in France; but we cannot yet form a just idea of it, whether it be true or false. The agents are too public to remain undiscovered; if they had had employed men less marked, I am almost certain that it would have been all over with the First Consul. How much at his case he would have been at the Tower, and what an augmentation for the curious collections that already belong us, if a strong party of Vendéans, disguised as guides, had secured his person and forced him into a boat. Master Wright, who disembarked Pichegru, would have effected his debarkation in England without opposition. It appears that it was not a little trouble to carry off a General in the midst of an army of 500,000 men. As well as I am able to judge from the news that I have had, I rather think that Moreau and Pichegru have not formed a regular plan of action. The speech of the Consul addressed to the Tribunate, contains stronger expressions than Cæsar the Proud."

Mrs. STUART to M. SEASDAL, UXBRIDGE.

Benares, July 18.

"I suppose that you have long since known in England that the Correspondence taken on board the *Aplin*, has been published: at the Mauritius, and sent throughout Calcutta—two only have made their appearance at present; one from M. H. Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, and the other from Lord Grenville: they contain things which must be extremely disagreeable to Lord Wellesley to see published. They publish all the letters that contain political news: it is said that several persons in Calcutta consider this publication as a very unpleasant circumstance; and although

I fear:

I fear the English set the example, yet it is not just to render the opinions of individuals public.—I hope they will be more generous than the English were, and that they will not publish letters that are merely domestic. I have no ambition to see any of my letters in print. Mrs. Bruce has received one of her letters found on board the *Aplin*, which was sent her with an apology for having been obliged to open it; and as a recompence, as I suppose, they sent her a copy of the letters that were published in general; I think that the French conduct themselves well. A Gentleman here has got some miniature pictures, which were sent him from the Mauritius.

(A true Copy.)

“ C. BERONY, Secretary-Interpreter to the Capt. Gen.
“ Seen—the Captain-General DECAEN.”

EXTRACT OF LETTERS SENT FROM INDIA TO CAPTAIN-GENERAL DECAEN, BY M. MULLER, SUB-LIEUTENANT OF THE 18TH DEMI-BRIGADE OF LIGHT INFANTRY.

“ Uncertain, General, of being able to come to you, I avail myself of the departure of a Danish vessel for the Mauritius, to write to you.

“ I am a prisoner of war, and as such subjected to laws which I should not have dared to infringe, had not the English set me the example by violating them the first. Prudence would perhaps have dictated to me not to write to you; love for my country and gratitude to you, have determined me.

“ The circumstances of my departure from Pondicherry will have been communicated to you; I shall not repeat them here. My stay at Madras explained to me the conduct of the English Government with respect to us in India. It was not the political situation of Europe, but that of Indostan and the Deccan, that made them violate the Treaty of Amiens, by not restoring our establishments to us. Their power in this part of the world is immense; but it will remain only so long as they shall have no rival.

“ The Carnatic and the Capital were defenceless. Madras has but a single wall, but Fort St. George can sustain a regular siege. Whilst I was there it might have been taken by a coup de main. There were then only about 800 Europeans of the 34th regiment, and an equal number of Sepoys, as a garrison. There were many guns and few artillerymen; their army was one hundred leagues off, on the point of taking the field against the Mahrattas. Every thing concurred in rendering the enterprize easy upon the first rumour of war.

“ You were gone, and there remained for me nothing but regret.

“ I procured at Madras all the documents possible that could relate to the object of my mission. I sailed in a small open boat, freighted for Coringuy, where I thought I should be able to remove several doubts with respect to the real dispositions of the English.

" I shall not speak to you of my sufferings during this painful voyage ; if I have been of any use, I am sufficiently recompensed.

" I arrived at Coringuy between the 12th and 15th of August, and proceeded immediately to Yanaour, which is only some miles distant. There I was informed of the death of the old Soubahdar of the Deccan, Nizam Aly.

" I had been informed at Madras, that the English were assembling troops in the district of Chickakole : a report was spread that they were destined for Negapatam and Ceylon. I was not deceived with respect to their real intention ; but what I most desired to know was, their force, and the period when it was possible they might take the field. I hoped to be informed at Yanaour, and I was not deceived.

" From all the reports I collected, I saw that that corps, evidently destined to the attack of Cutack, was in a condition to be able to act the beginning of September ; this circumstance shewed me clearly what I had at first only suspected, that the Rajah of Berar was engaged in the war, and determined me to change my first plan, and use all possible speed to reach Cutack.

" I immediately left Coringuy on board a pariat destined for Calcutta, and on the 12th of September, in the night, was anchored near the mouth of the Lake Tjilka, about three quarters of a league off ; I proposed to land at the village of Manniketen—the day began to break, and I was about to embark in the chalop, when to my great surprise we perceived in the South, a squadron bearing down in full sail upon us ; it was Admiral Ranier from Ganjam. The ships anchored about a quarter of a league from us, and from that moment nothing could prevail upon my Lascars to land me. Their fears soon increased when they saw a boat set off from one of the ships, with an officer.

" The boat having boarded us, I soon perceived that the object of the vessel was of a nature very different from what we apprehended. The officer came to obtain exact information with respect to the mouth of the lake ; we gave it him, and in return he informed me who they were, and what they had just done. I learned that Admiral Ranier had debarked at Ganjam troops, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt ; that they had other troops on board as well as artillery and ammunition, which they wished to land in the bay Tjilka, whose mouth, they feared, they had passed in the night. The designs of this fleet depriving me of all hope of landing, I gave up my plan, but with the firm resolution of executing it in some other point.

" I had entertained the idea of landing at Ballasore ; but I could not doubt that that place was attacked by the English ; and on the other hand my Lascars were not sufficiently recovered from their fright to induce them to make a second attempt.

" We anchored some days after at Intjelly ; I took a boat to proceed to Calcutta, where I arrived the very day the declaration of war was published against the Republic.

" The shameful defeat of Perron at Coel, and the capture of the fort of Alighur, have just been announced, and informed me

that hostilities had begun at all points. This news confirms me in the suspicion which General Binot manifested with respect to Perron. I saw then that all was lost, and that the part I was hereafter to play was that of a passive observer.

"Fatigue and chagrin having weakened me, I fell dangerously ill. I had been made prisoner of war; the particulars of that event are too delicate to be mentioned in this dispatch, and I reserve to myself the communicating them to you in proper time and place.

"I was not yet restored to health, when I received orders to repair to our establishment of Chandernagore: it was there that I had time and opportunity to collect the documents relative to Indostan and the Deccan, which I offer you as a proof of good will, and of my ardent desire to be useful to my country; that is my only ambition—the only object of all my actions.

(Conformable to the Originals)

"Captain-General DECAEN.

Documents addressed to General DECAEN.

"Lord Wellesley has decidedly abandoned his plan of visiting Indostan: although he has given no reason, it is certain that it must have been occasioned by unforeseen events; for a part of his equipage, which is very considerable, had ascended the Ganges with one of the two regiments which were to accompany him; his departure was delayed only till the arrival of his brother, who was coming from the Deccan; and it was a short time afterwards that he gave up his journey. You will see that there is no doubt it was occasioned by important events that have happened in Indostan.

"You saw by my last letter, General, the English, masters of almost all Indostan, on the point of getting possession of Rampour, and of annihilating Holkar, with whom they would not enter into any accommodation. At that period, the mass of their army was cantoned in the environs of Caunpour and Futtigur upon the Ganges; their forces were almost concentrated in the Doab. Holkar seemed not to dare to shew himself any where, and the English considered; and still consider him, as they say, "as an adventurer who arrived at the legitimate sovereignty of the country, only by excesses of barbarity and cruelty." Yet whilst they were stating that their honour and their delicacy did not permit them to treat with a man who had under him none but robbers and brigands, the Mahratta Chief began to appear near the Nabadda. He had before sent Amyr-Khan into the Bundelcund, at the head of a body of cavalry. In that incursion, the object of which I am ignorant of, that brave Mahratta officer came up with and cut to pieces a detachment of seven companies of Sepoys, one squadron of native cavalry, and two companies of artillery, under Captain Smith, sent by Colonel Fawcett, (successor to Co-

Jonel Powel) to take a fort near Kook ; he penetrated as far as Calpee, in the midst even of the English cantonments ; he endeavoured, but in vain, to surprise that Prince, and to pass the Jumma. A short time afterwards he quitted the Bundelcund to join Holkar, and to watch the movements of Colonel Monson.

“ The design of the English was, after the taking of Rampour, to join Col. Monson’s corps with Col. Murray’s, who was coming from the Guzerat, with a large body of troops, leaving Colonel Don in the environs of that place.

“ Before I proceed, it will be proper to say a word about Rampour, which is on the left bank of the Sofra, one of the strong places of Radepontel ; it had been besieged for four months by Colonel Dudreney. It then belonged to an independent ally of the Rajah of Joypour. General Perron and Colonel Bourquieu, returning from making war upon this Hindoo Chief, took it by assault, and restored it for a sum of money to Colonel Dudreney, who was then in the service of Holkar. The produce of that city and its dependencies was then about three lacks. Dudreney wishing to quit Holkar, to go into Scindia’s service, gave up that place to General Perron for a lack of rupees ; I know not how and when it was taken from Scindia ; it appears that it was during the invasion of the English. You know in what way it fell into the hands of the English—it is at present blockaded by the Mahrattas, having only a garrison of Sepoys.

“ Jeswunt Row Holkar, who is really an usurper, is severe, cruel, and barbarous ; but he is very active, vigilant, dextrous, and cunning. Since his wars with Scindia, and the troubles in his family, he has been deprived of a great part of his revenues, which have been eighty lacks. At present he does not draw more than ten from his territories ; but he makes up for it by laying all the territories he can surprise under contribution : he only makes war to procure money, which he loves rather too much. His camp is his capital, and his troops his revenues. He is now the only man capable of opposing any resistance to the English ; he may be conquered, or overwhelmed by them, but he will never be made their dupe. Hence the English, who know him well, never would acknowledge him as their Sovereign ; they consider him only as a brigand and robber. Their object in the present war against him, appears to be to draw him out of Indostan, and to place in his stead Kadji Kao ; which for a time would ensure them the dominion of all India, from the Indus to Bengal, and from Settege to Cape Comorin. But so long as Holkar and Amyr Khan live, the English must not consider themselves as quiet possessors of their immense conquests.

“ Amyr Khan is very brave, generous, and liberal to prodigality. He is a Patan adventurer, who is great in all his actions. He began his career with Holkar, whom he has served with a disinterestedness and fidelity unknown in those parts. He commands a Patan Corps, which is sometimes considerable. It is he who appears to direct Holkar in his military operations.—

Besides

Besides a great number of actions in which he has distinguished himself, and which he appears to have managed alone, he has often over-run different parts of Indostan as a partisan. He appears to understand that kind of warfare tolerably well. He has always reached secretly the middle of the country he wished to revenge.

“Up to this time they have not been able to force him to an action, the issue of which would have been doubtful. In the present war he has been seen to return from the Banks of the Jumma, to reconnoitre the movements of Colonel Monson; seize the moment for attacking him with advantage, and force him to a retreat of upwards of 200 leagues.* He is more desirous of reputation than of a great fortune, which appears to have no charms for him, and he is often reduced by his liberality to have recourse to the purse of his friends. He likes Europeans, but it will not do to go to him merely to amass rupees. His good faith and adherence to his word may be relied upon, even when it is contrary to the will of Holkar.—He has European prisoners whom the latter wished to put to death.—Another time, when a neighbouring Chief would only go on his parole to that Mahratta Chief who wished after to detain him, Amyr-Khan opposed it strongly, declaring that he would be his enemy from the moment he committed that treachery; and the Chief was not detained. I will say nothing of the taking of Rampoor; I have already sent you the Gazette, with the particulars of the siege. It is the only event of the war which the English have published: they had taken great pains to conceal the events which followed, though they are known to all the world. Notwithstanding the public reports which have reached Colonel Monson, and which ought to put him on his guard, * * * * *

* * * * * It seemed as if he wished at the commencement of the campaign, after the taking of Rampour, to effect a junction with Colonel Murray, to maintain a communication with Colonel Don, who was in his rear, and who formed an intermediate body between him and the states of Scindia, whence he drew his provisions. For this purpose he ought to have taken possession of and kept the important pass of Makrundra, the only defile which exists in those mountains, by which all provisions and succours from Indostan must pass. He had been marching several days. He had already passed the narrow passes of Makourapass, without having received any news almost of Holkar, who shewed himself no where, when on a sudden he appeared with very considerable force, taking a position calculated to cut him off from all communication with the States of Scindia and Rampoor. Colonel Monson then reduced to great distress for want of provisions, was forced, when he least expected it, to defend himself against

* * I impute the glory of having beat Colonel Monson to Amyr Khar more than to Holkar, because I think, from all I have learnt, that he has greater military talents, and that it is probable he directed the whole affair.

the attacks of the Mahrattas, who were always successful; at last they came to a regular action near Kotta, where the English were completely beat, and lost a great number in killed and wounded. Among the latter was Lieutenent Lucan, who had formerly been in the service of Scindiah, which he left to enter the English service. (Note 2.) After this affair, Col. Monson, had no other resource but to take refuge in Rampour, and to fall back and join Lieutenant Col. Don; but to accomplish this, he had to traverse a very difficult country, and to contend against a numerous and skilful cavalry. He suffered much from the inhabitants, who rose upon him as soon as he was forced to retreat, He was harassed in this manner till his arrival in Rampour, which he did in the most wretched state, having lost his artillery and baggage.

“ He could not remain long at that place on account of the want of provisions and ammunition. After having left a sufficient garrison for its defence, he attempted to make a second retreat to Agra, which was not less disastrous than the first (Note 3). He could not deceive the vigilance of the Mahrattas, nor surpass the celerity of their movements; they hung every where upon his march, after a series of petty actions.—Lieut. Col. Monson was reduced to risk a general action, which was not more successful than that fought at the Makoudra Pass. He sustained a great loss of men, artillery, and particularly deserters. It appears that a whole corps of allied troops refused to succour him;—a body of cavalry sent to his assistance by General Lake, was attacked and dispersed, without being able to effect a junction. In short, he did not reach Agra till after he had been completely routed, and in the same condition in which he reached Rampour, after having lost again all his artillery and baggage which he brought from that city. His loss in men was so considerable, that a regiment, the 2d, I believe, arrived at Agra, reduced to 90 men and one officer.

“ Lieut.-Colonel Monson is at present at Agra, where he is apprehensive of fresh attacks from the Mahrattas.

(Note 2.)—He was recompensed with a Lieutenancy in the 74th infantry.

(Note 3.)—He had about 8000 men under his command. The following is the statement of the troops he had, according to the report published in the Gazette,

2d Battalion of the 2d regiment of Sepoys	6	1000
2d Do. of the 8th ditto	—	1000
1st Do. of the 9th ditto	—	500
2d Do. of the 12th ditto	—	1000
2d Do. of the 14th ditto	—	1000
2d Corps of Indostan cavalry, at least 1500 men each		3000
Artillery, at least	—	400
Though the English do not speak of the Europeans, it is said there was one regiment and some detachments from several others: the whole supposed to be	—	500
A part of the corps under Major Frith, sent to succour Lieutenant Colonel Monson	—	600
Total		<u>9000</u>
We must deduct two battalions and four companies, forming the garrison of Rampour	—	<u>400</u>
There will remain, according to their own confession a disposable force of	—	<u>7600</u>

“ Gen. Lake, having left his army in the position which I have already described, proceeded, with some officers only, to Dyanpou, to receive the Governor General, who was expected daily.— On the first news of the defeat of Lieutenant-Colonel Monson, he sent a corps of cavalry to his assistance; you have seen that he was attacked and defeated before he arrived at his destination.— He returned to his army, which has left its cantonments, and taken the field, although still in the rainy season.

“ Holkar extended himself to the south and north of Chomboul, inciting the people to rise and fall upon the English, and inviting all the Chiefs to join him in delivering Indostan from the depotism of the English.

“ Col. Murray, after having occupied Indowre, was attacked; they say that he was beaten, and forced to a precipitate retreat. But this intelligence requires confirmation. I can guarantee the authenticity of Lieutenant-Colonel Monson's defeat, and of the details that I have given you; I have extracted them, generally, from the letters of English officers who formed a part of this division, or from other letters that came from Indostan.

“ Gen. Wellesley is about to return to the Deccan, to resume the command of his army—we are assured that it is ready to re-enter the country. That of General Lake is already on its march; thus all is still in motion in the north of India. The storm seems as if it would fall wholly on Holkar. He cannot prevent those possessions that remain to him from being invaded by the English; but if he does not depart from that species of war which he has adopted, he will be able for the moment to do them considerable injury, and in the sequel draw them into a position

That sooner or later must bring the greatest disasters upon them, and perhaps the entire loss of all their conquests.

“ This, General, is all that I know concerning the actual state of Indostan. Perhaps it is not impossible that these events may produce some great effects, although Scindia and the Rajah of Jey-pour have not the power of stirring, on account of the position of the English army, which occupies all the important positions in their country. There is no doubt they will declare themselves openly, if the English should experience any considerable losses, or if they see a possibility of breaking their yoke.

Chandernagor, Sept. 30, 1804.

“ Duterre, Courson, Durhone, and Doublet, are still shut up; the first in the fort, and the other three in the goal or common prison.

Twenty-three of our sailors escaped lately from Fort William; they came to Chandernagor, but being unable to remain concealed there, they returned to Calcutta; eleven were retaken a few days afterwards; twelve more made their escape without its being discovered by what means. It is presumed that it was through a hole. Calcrast, the Major of the fort, searched every where himself, but without effect. He took the precaution, in order to prevent the others from escaping, of placing a large number of spies in the prisons.

“ Scindia has long demanded of the Company the restoration of the sums which Perron had taken from him, and the answer was, “ that the Courts were open to the whole world; that justice was done by them, and that he might have recourse to them.” The consequences of this affair were spoken of. But it appears to be abandoned. It is more than a month since it was mentioned. Perron is still at Sinsurat, where he has had a very beautiful house built. He complains of the English, and accuses them of having made him lose a considerable part of his fortune: when he took the command of Deboyne’s party, his whole fortune consisted of 60,000 rupees. His appointments have been during three years 6000 rupees per month, and during the last two years 12,000 rupees. At this time several persons estimate his fortune to be above 40 lacks; it is a certainty that it amounts to more than 30.

“ A month ago a Portuguese ship entered the Ganges, and an English officer went on board to search it. They told him that they had neither French nor Dutchmen. Notwithstanding this declaration, he would himself examine and visit every part. He was rewarded for his trouble by a cudgelling, accompanied by several sabre thrusts. He was carried in a very bad state on board his own vessel. No other officer attempted to undertake a second visit.

“ Some time afterwards a Spanish ship arrived of the Manilla Company. The Captain was asked, if he should take it ill if an officer of the frigate, the Bombay, were to come alongside him, to satisfy himself that there were neither French nor Dutchmen on board.

board. He replied that he had no suspicious persons on board his ship, that they might send an officer, to whom they would make report. The Bombay sent an officer, who contented himself with the declaration which was made to him without leaving his boat.

Dated October 12.

A letter from Agra announces that the English and Mahratta armies are within sight of each other, and on the point of coming to a regular engagement; that Holkar commands in person, and that he has 140 pieces of cannon. We expect the confirmation and the issue of this affair. It is feared that Holkar has determined to wait for General Lake. It is impossible that he should be successful in a pitched battle.

Captain General D. caen.

A TABLE of the PERSIAN WORDS made use of in the public writings, &c. inserted in the different Government Dispatches from Bengal, with their significations :

AUMIL—A man of a certain rank, or proprietor, to whom, under the system of letting out to farm, the receiving of the revenues is entrusted.

BEGUM—This word has the same acceptation in India, as the word Princess in Europe.

BENGAREAHS—Or rather Vangarys, are Corn Merchants, who supply the armies of different Princes in India. They are a particular cast of persons, who enjoy great privileges.

CHOUT—Is the fourth part of the produce of the Land.

COSS—Almost a French league.

CRORE—A Crore is a hundred lacks.

DEFTER—A Register, record, account.

DIVAN—A Council of a Prince collectively, sometimes a Minister.

DOAB—A space of land between two rivers.

DURBAR—A Prince's Court.

DEROCHA—A Deputy, Delegate.

ENAM—A recompence, donation.

HIRCARRAH—A confidential man, frequently employed as a messenger or carrier; sometimes as a spy upon the actions of those about whom they are placed.

HOZOURIES—Courtiers, persons constantly placed near the Prince's person.

JACHYR—An extent of Land granted conditionally for life, or for ever. Jaghyrs are bestowed as rewards for services; there are Jaghyrs attached to different employments, as that of Vizir or first Minister, of Bucksby or Paymaster, Treasurer. In the latter case they cannot be inherited; after the loss of the employment they devolve on the successor.

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- JAGHYRDAR**—Is he who is in possession of a Jaghyr.
- KHALET**—Is a certain number of dresses which among the Mah-rattas the Rajah gives to the Peishwa; and this act invests and establishes him virtually in his employment. The khalets are generally presented at all the durbars, when the prince names the officers destined for any particular employment; they are given equally on the part of the prince to private persons, as a mark of his esteem and respect.
- KILLEDAR**—The commander of a fort.
- LACK**—Equivalent to a hundred thousand.
- MEYVATIS**—Is a tribe of banditti who inhabit the mountainous countries situated on the west of the Jumna, between the parallels of Agra and Delhi, at the distance of 25 miles from the latter city.
- MOONSHY**—An interpreter.
- MUSNUD**—Is properly the carpet which covers the seat on which the princes sit, but generally it signifies the throne.
- NULLAH**—A small river, a brook.
- PEISHWAH**—Gift, present.
- PERGUNNAH**—The division of a province, containing certain portions of land, with cities, villages, &c. appertaining thereto.
- SERDAR**—A civil or military chief.
- SERKAR**—Chief, master, governor.
- SOUBAHS**—Formerly they were Governors of large provinces, or Viceroys in the Mogul Empire; in 1739, under Mahomet Shah, they were made independent, since which time they have preserved that title and their independence.
- SOUBAHIE**—Government, Viceroyalty.
- SOUBAHDAR**—He who possesses a Government or Viceroyalty.
- SUNNUD**—A patent, gift, approbation proceeding from the Royal Authority.
- VAKYL**—An Agent, a man charged with some mission.
- ZEMINDARY**—Territorial property.
- ZEMINDAR**—The Proprietor of any land whatever.

Faithful Translation.

C. BERONY, Secretary.
Interpreter to the Captain General.



