

L/PS/20/C248/B

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P. 5805

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L/PS/20 C248B

PRÉCIS  
ON  
NAVAL ARRANGEMENTS  
IN THE  
PERSIAN GULF.  
1862-1905.

By J. A. Saldanha, B.A., LL.B.

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## CHAPTER I.

## Introductory.

*The Indian Navy and the Persian Gulf.*

The first of the ships that opened British commercial intercourse with the Persian Gulf started from the Surat factory of the East India Company. Here was established a small marine, that afterwards developed into the *Bombay Marine*, called since 1830 the *Indian Navy*, which was abolished in 1862. To this Indian Navy we are mainly indebted for the breakdown of the Portuguese power on the Persian Gulf, the protection of the British commerce against the rivalry of the Dutch and the French, the suppression of piracies and the establishment of maritime peace, and security of navigation by its surveys, in the Gulf. The record of its origin and rise, its struggles and victories is given in the exhaustive and admirable history of the Indian Navy by C. R. Low. We must be content here with only a synopsis of the principal events in the Gulf in which the Indian Navy figured and the surveys done by its officers in the shape of two statements.

## PERIOD I.

## The early voyages and the Bombay Marine, 1616-1831.

Year.	Events.	Official publication.	Low's History of the Indian Navy, volume I.
		<i>Selection from State papers 1600-1800 with Summary.</i>	
		<i>Summary.</i>	
1616	... The East India Company's ship <i>James</i> despatched to Jask with Edward Crook and factors on a mission to Persia by the Surat factors.	Pages iv and v	
1618	... A trading vessel despatched from Surat to bring Persian silks	Page xiv	... Page 29
1620	... Fight between the East India Company's ships and Portuguese frigates off Jask, in which the English win ultimately.	Page xvi	... Page 31
1622	... Capture of Ormuz by the English in co-operation with the Persians. The East India Company's fleet plays an important part.	Page xvii	... Page 38
1628	... Captain Swanley proceeds to the Gulf with a squadron of 5 (f.) ships carrying the Mughal Ambassador to Persia, and also the English Ambassador Sir D. Cotton. Instructions to him to capture Portuguese ships.	Page xx	... Page 47
1640	... A factory opened at Basrah.. ..	Page xxi	... ..
1653	... Defeat of the East India Company's fleet off Jask by the Dutch.. [Soon afterwards peace concluded with the Dutch.]	Page xxiii	... ..
1684	... Sir Charles Grantham, Vice-Admiral, sails in his flagship <i>The Charles II</i> from Bombay to Gombroon; but finding the Dutch fleet in great force there returns.	Page xxviii	... Page 72
1759	... The French destroy an English sloop at Gombroon, and capture the East India Company's factory.	<i>Summary</i> , page xlii and <i>Selections</i> , No. C.	Page 153
1765-66	... Capture of the <i>Lally</i> and <i>Fort William</i> by the Kaab.—Despatch of a fleet against the Kaab.—The expedition a failure.	<i>Summary</i> , pages xlvii—xlviii. <i>Selections</i> , No. C.1 et seq.	

## PERIOD I.

The early voyages and the Bombay Marine, 1616-1831—*contd.*

Year.	Events.	Official publication.	Low's History of the Indian Navy, volume I.
1767 ...	Expedition against the Island of Ormuz.—Disastrous end ...	Summary, page xix. <i>Selections</i> , No. CLXXI.	
1768 ...	Expedition against the Karack Island.—Failure.	Summary, page C. <i>Selections</i> , Nos. CLXXVII and CLXXVIII	Page 164.
1774 ...	Siege of Basrah by the Persians. The East India Company's ships fight with Persian and Kab ships.	Summary, page liv. <i>Selections</i> Nos. CCIX and CCXI.	Pages 166 <i>et seq.</i>
About 1798 ...	Lord Wellesley established fortnightly postal communication between Bombay and Basrah by means of cruisers.	.....	Page 524.
1803 ...	Capture of the East India Company's ship <i>Fly</i> by the French off the Island of Keen and its subsequent adventures.	.....	Pages 223 <i>et seq.</i>
1805-6 ...	} Expeditions against the Joasmis ... .. }	Persian Gulf Pre- cis, 1801-53.	Chapter X.
1809-10 ...		Chapters XIV, XV and XXVI	
1820-21 ...		.....	
1828-30 ...	Services of the Indian Navy on the Arab coast ..	.....	Pages 310-335.

## PERIOD II.

The Indian Navy, 1832-1862.

Year.	Events.	Official publica- tions.	Low's History of the Indian Navy, volume II.
1830 ...	Persian Gulf Squadron, about 1830, kept at a strength of 4 or 5 ships.	.....	Page 18.
1834 ...	In 1834 the squadron consisted of only two cruisers, the <i>Amherst</i> and <i>Elphinstone</i> . The Beni Yas Chief Khalifa bin Shakbut, taking advantage of the weakness of the English squadron, equips a large fleet of his own in order to contest the supremacy of the Gulf with the English. Outbreak of piratical spirit in the Gulf.	.....	Page 18.
1835 ...	Gallant fight of the <i>Elphinstone</i> with the Beni-Yas fleet and its victory.	.....	Pages 19 <i>et seq.</i>
1838 ...	The British squadron increased ... ..	.....	
1835-53 ...	Regular cruisers of the Indian navy ships in the Gulf, especially the Pirate coast has a wholesome effect and results in the Maritime Truces and Peace agreements of the Arab Chiefs.	.....	Pages 24 <i>et seq.</i>
1838 ...	The <i>Hugh Lindsay</i> , the first steamer visiting the Gulf, goes on a cruise round the Pirate coast and produces a deep impression. Persian Gulf Squadron about this time kept at a strength of 4 or 5 cruisers.	.....	Page 25.

PERIOD II,

The Indian Navy, 1832-1862.—*contd.*

Year.	Events.	Official publications.	Low's History of the Indian Navy, volume II.
1835-53 ...	Maritime truces and perpetual peace agreement signed by the Pirate Chiefs and as a result the constant watch of the cruisers of the Indian navy.	Persian Gulf Précis, 1801-53, Chapter XLIII and XXIX.	Pages 24 <i>et seq.</i>
1838-39 ...	Expedition to the Gulf.—Occupation of Karrack.—Removal of the Bushite Residency to Karrack.	<i>Ibid.</i> , Chapters LXIV and LXV.	Pages 98 <i>et seq.</i>
1830-41 ...	Great strain on the Indian Navy on account of Persian affairs and necessity of keeping a watch on the Arab coast threatened by Kurshed Pasha.	<i>Ibid.</i> , Chapter XLIV.	Page 108.
1842 ...	Evacuation of Kharrak. Removal of troops to Bombay ...	<i>Ibid.</i> , Chapter LXVIII.	Page 168.
1856-57 ...	The Persian War.—Expedition into the Persian Gulf and Arabistan.	<i>Persian Coast and Islands Précis</i> , 1854—1905, Chapter III.	Pages 337 <i>et seq.</i>

*1.—Statement of the survey work done by the officers of the Bombay Marine and Indian Navy in the Persian Gulf.*

Year.	Officers employed.	Region covered by the survey.	Low's History of the Indian Navy.	Reports or memoirs.	Charts.
			<b>Volume I.</b>		
1772	Lieutenant Robinson and Lieutenant Porter (in the <i>Fox</i> ).	Mekran and a port of Persia.	Pages 185 <i>et seq.</i>	MS. of the survey in existence some 70 years ago.	
1785	Lieutenant John McCluer.	The Persian coast as far as Shat-el-Arab and then as far as Basrah, also a plan of the cove of Maskat, drawings of various parts of the coast.	Pages 188-189...	.....	2 sheets.
1820	Captain Guy with Captain Brucks.	Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf.	Pages 404 <i>et seq.</i>	A memoir of Captain Guy's survey drawn up by Lieutenant Houghton in the India Office.	
1820-30	Captain Brucks with Lieutenants Haines, Kempthorne, Cogan, Pinning, Ethersey, Whitelock and Lynch.	Persian Gulf ...	Pages 405 <i>et seq.</i>	.....	14 Charts (see page 406 of Volume I of Low's History of the Indian Navy.
...	Captain Brucks ...	.....	.....	Memoir descriptive of the navigation of the Persian Gulf ( <i>Bombay Selections</i> No. 24, pages 527-534.)	
...	Lieutenant Kempthorne	.....	.....	Notes on identification of places touched at by Nevrchus, on the ancient commerce of the Gulf and on a visit to the ruins of Thar-e, <i>M. G. S. Journal</i> V, page 26; <i>Bombay G. S. Journal</i> I, page 194, XIII, page 125.	
			<b>Volume II.</b>		
...	Lieutenant F. White'lock	.....	Page 85 ...	Description of the islands at the entrance of the Gulf. Narrative of a journey in Oman, <i>R. G. S. J.</i> , VIII (1838), <i>Bombay G. S. J.</i> , I (1836-37).	
1835-40	Lieutenant J. R. Wellsted (with Lieutenant F. White'lock).	Oman, Arabia, and Mesopotamia.	Pages 85-86 ...	(1) Narrative of a journey into the interior of Oman <i>R. G. S. J.</i> , VII, 1837. (2) Travels in Arabia, 1838. (3) Travels to the city of the Caliphs, 1840.	
1833-37	Captain Haines, with Lieutenants Sanders, Crutenden, Grieve Rennie and Dr. Hulon (in the <i>Palinurus</i> ).	South coast of Arabia.	Page 80 <i>et seq.</i>	Memoirs to accompany the chart of the south coast of Arabia by Captain Haines. Parts I and II, <i>R. G. S. J.</i> , IX, page 125 and XV, page 104.  Short memoir of the proceedings of the East Company's Brig <i>Palinurus</i> , <i>R. G. S. J.</i> , XVI, page 109.  Journal of an excursion into Dofar by Midshipman Crutenden, <i>B. G. S. J.</i> , I.  Crutenden's Journal, dated <i>Palinurus</i> , March 10th, 1835 ( <i>MS.</i> in the India Office.)  Account of the Kuria Muria Islands, <i>R. G. S. J.</i> , XI, page 16, <i>Bombay G. S. J.</i> , III.	<i>South-East Coast of Arabia</i> , by Haines, 3 sheets (1836), <i>North-East Coast of Arabia</i> , by Saunders and Grieve (1840), <i>Kuria Muria Islands</i> , by Haines (1837), <i>Gulf of Masora</i> , by Grieve, 2 sheets, 1847.
1844-48	Captain Sanders with Lieutenants Fell, Constable, Ward, Whish, and Assistant Surgeon H. J. Carter (Naturalist and Geologist). The work completed by Lieutenant Grieve in 1848 assisted by Lieutenant Ward.	South coast of Arabia.	Pages 214 <i>et seq.</i>	<i>Dr. Carter's works:—</i> (1) Account of the ruins of El-Belled (in Dofar). <i>R. G. S. J.</i> , VII, page 225 (with a plate and addition). (2) Notes on the Garrah tribe. <i>Journal of Bombay Br. R. A. S.</i> , II. (3) Notes on the Mahrah tribe with vocabularies of their language and further notes on the Garrah, <i>Ibid.</i> (4) Description of the Frankincense tree of Arabia, <i>Ibid.</i> (5) Geographical description of south-east coast of Arabia, with an essay on the comparative Geography of that coast. <i>Bombay Br. R. A. S. J.</i> , III. (6) Igneous Rocks of Maskat and its neighbourhood, etc. <i>Ibid.</i>	

I.—Statement of the survey work done by the officers of the Bombay Marine and Indian Navy in the Persian Gulf—contd.

Year.	Officers employed.	Region covered by the Survey.	Low's History of the Indian Navy.	Reports or memoirs.	Charts.
1859 ...	Lieutenant Whish ...	Harbour of Bahrein...		Memoir of Bahrein, Bo. G. S. J., XVI, page 40. Descriptive sketch of the island of Jibbles, Kuria Muria Bay, Bo. G. S. J., XV, 1859.	
1857-60 ...	Lieutenant C. Constable with Lieutenant Stiffe.  Lieutenant A. W. Stiffe ...	Persian Gulf ...	Pages 403 et seq.	(1) Memoir relative to the Hydrography of the Persian Gulf, Bo. G. S. J., XII, page 98 (1854-56). (2) Letter on the Physical Geography of the Persian Gulf, Bo. G. S. J., XV (November 1858). (1) A visit to the hot springs of Basher near Maskat. Bo G. S. J., XV. (2) Report on the line of telegraph from Ras Jask to Basrah. Bo. G. S. J., XVII.	

II.—Surveys in Turkish Arabia and Arabistan.

1826-30 ...	Lieutenant Henry Ormsby	Lower Tigris ...	Volume II, pages 32 et seq.	His adventures are described in Wellsted's <i>Travels to the City of Caliph.</i>	
1837-46 ...	Captain Henry Blossé Lynch with his brother Michael Lynch, Lieutenants Felix Jones, Campbell, Selby and Grounds (in the <i>Nitocris, Nimrod Assyria</i> ).  Commander Felix Jones who succeeded Captain Lynch (1846-1855).  Lieutenant Collingwood who acted after Commander Felix Jones had left until arrival of Captain Selby (April 1861—April 1862).  Captain Selby who succeeded Commander Felix Jones (1849-55—1862), with Lieutenants Collingwood and Bewsher.  Lieutenant Bewsher, 1862-65.	The Mesopotamian rivers and towns.  (1) The Tigris from Bagdad to Samarra Course of the ancient Nahrwan Canal.  Old bed of the Tigris and vicinity of Median wall and Pyscus of Xenophon.  Country between the Tigris and Upper Zab, including the runs of Nemuch.  Shat-el-Arab from Basrah to Marghil and course of the Hindiah canal.	Pages 44 et seq...  Pages 408 et seq.	(1) Note on a part of the river Tigris between Bagdad and Samarra and R. G. S. J., IX, page 471 (1839). (2) Note accompanying a survey of the Tigris from Ctesiphon to Mosul. <i>Ibid</i> , page 441. (3) Memoir of the river Euphrates, in 3 parts to accompany the map. Bo. G. S. J., VI., page 169. (4) Memoir of the country between Bagdad and Hamrié Hills by Lieutenant Grounds. <i>Ibid</i> , Vol. VI. (1) Account of ascent on the Tigris, 1846, G. R. G. S. J., XVII, page 1.  Preliminary remarks on the Nahrwan canal, with a glance at the past history of its province. Bo. G. S. J., IX, May 1849—August 1850.  Researches in the vicinity of the Median wall of Xenophon and along the old course of the river Tigris. <i>Ibid</i> , X, September 1850—June 1852.  Brief observations forming an appendix to the map of Bagdad.  All his work appears to have been lost.	Map of the Tigris on a scale of 12 inches to a degree.  Accompanied by a map.  Maps lost, but original maps and field books were procured from Bagdad and redrawn by Lieutenant Collingwood.
			Pages 414-415..	(1) Account of the ascent of the rivers, R. G. S. J., XIV, page 219. (2) Memoir by Captain Selby (lost).	
			Page 414 ...	Memoir on the part of Mesopotamia between Sheriat-el-Beytha on the Tigris and Tel Ibrahim.	7 maps.

## CHAPTER II.

## Movements of British men-of-war on the Gulf, 1863—1905.

2. The following statement shows the British men-of-war that visited Maskat and the Persian Gulf and the special services they were engaged in from 1863 to 1905.

Year.	Names of the ships.	Period during which detained in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman.	Important service engaged in.
1863-64 ...	Bombay Marine ship <i>Clyde</i> ... " " <i>Hugh Rose</i> .	.....	Employed in laying the Submarine Cable.
1864-65 ...	.....	.....	.....
1865-66 ...	H. M. S. <i>Highflyer</i> ... " <i>Berenice</i> .	.....	Both these ships were engaged in operations against the Wahabis on the Katf and Oman coasts. (See Chapter IV of the <i>Maskat Précis</i> , 1856—1872.)
1866-67 ...	.....	.....	.....
1867-68 ...	Bombay Marine ship <i>Hugh Rose</i>	.....	.....
1868-69 ...	H. M. S. <i>Vigilant</i> ... With Bombay Marine ships <i>Hugh Rose</i> , <i>Sinde</i> and <i>Clyde</i> .	.....	Employed in operations against the Bahrein Chief Mahomet bin Khalifa, May to Septe-ber 1868 (see Chapter VII of the <i>Bahrein Précis</i> , 1856—1872.)
1869-70 ...	Bombay Marine ship <i>Clyde</i> ... " " <i>Hugh Rose</i> . " " <i>Dalhousie</i> .	.....	The firing on the <i>Clyde</i> at Maskat. The <i>Hugh Rose</i> and <i>Dalhousie</i> sent to Maskat in connection therewith. (See Chapter X (iii) of the <i>Maskat Précis</i> , 1856—1872.)
1871-72 ...	H. M. S. <i>Bullfinch</i> ... " <i>Maggie</i> . " <i>Vulture</i> . " <i>Lynx</i> . " <i>Nimble</i> .	.....	Cruised along the Pirate Coast and about the Bahrein island to watch the progress of the Turk'sh movements on the Hissa and Katif Coasts.
1872-73 ...	" <i>Vulture</i> ... " <i>Maggie</i> ... " <i>Lynx</i> ...	At Bahrein in February 1873 ... At Maskat in April 1873. At Bahrein in March 1873.	.....
1873-74 ...	" <i>Columbine</i> ... " <i>Riflesman</i> .	.....	The <i>Columbine</i> stationed at Bahrein. The <i>Riflesman</i> landed a party at Gwadar to protect the Indo-European telegraph.
1874-75 ...	(1) H. M. Corvette <i>Briton</i> ... (2) " Ship <i>Philomel</i> . (3) " " <i>Riflesman</i> . (4) " " <i>Maggie</i> . (5) " " <i>Nimble</i> . (6) " " <i>Daphne</i> . (With the Bombay Marine ships <i>May Freer</i> and <i>Hugh Rose</i> ),	(2), (3), (5) and (6) left in 1875-76 and (5) was relieved by the <i>Arab</i> .	The demand for reparation of losses suffered by the rebellion in Omana had to be supported by naval demonstration before Warka in July 1874, in which the <i>Philomel</i> , <i>Maggie</i> , <i>Nimble</i> , <i>May Freer</i> and <i>Hugh Rose</i> were engaged. The fleet then co-operated with the Sultan's force in capturing the fort of Masnaab.  The <i>Nimble</i> , <i>Maggie</i> , <i>May Freer</i> and <i>Hugh Rose</i> employed at Bahrein against Nasir-ben-Moharek and the Beni Hajeer. (See Chapter XVI of the <i>Bahrein Précis</i> , 1854—1904.)
1875-76 ...	H. M.'s Gunboat <i>Arab</i> ... " " <i>May Freer</i> .	.....	The <i>May Freer</i> co-operated successfully in watching ships coming from Basrah. The <i>Riflesman</i> carried Seyyed Turki from Maskat to Gwadar.  The presence of <i>Daphne</i> at Maskat in August 1875 prevented outrages from Belouirs on the Bataiah Coast. All these vessels except the <i>Vestal</i> visited Basrah.

Year.	Names of the ships.	Period during which detained in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman.	Important service engaged in.
1876-77 ...	H. M.'s Gunboat <i>Vestal</i> .		
	" " <i>Rifeman</i> .		
	" " <i>Arab</i> .		
	" " <i>Teazer</i> .		
	" " <i>Daphne</i> .		
1877-78 ...	" " <i>Rifeman</i> ...	.....	The ships were especially employed at Maskat and Basrah. The <i>Teazer</i> was employed in overawing the rebels at Matrah and Maskat. The <i>Arab</i> was also sent for protection of Maskat. In October 1877 the <i>Vulture</i> destroyed a flotilla of private boats on the Katif Coast.
	" " <i>Teazer</i> .		
	" " <i>Arab</i> .		
	" " <i>Daphne</i> .		
1878-79 ...	" " <i>Teazer</i> .		In March 1878 the Naval Commander-in-Chief visited Maskat and Lingah in the <i>Euryalus</i> .
	" " <i>Vulture</i> .		
	" " <i>Spartan</i> .		
1879-80 ...	" " <i>Beacon</i> ...	.....	
	" " <i>Vulture</i> .		
	" " <i>Ready</i> .		
1881-82 ...	(1) H. M. S. <i>Beacon</i> ...	(1) left in May 1882, and ...	
	(2) " <i>Ranger</i> ...	(2) took her place, but was removed in October, when	
	(3) " <i>Ready</i> ...	(3) came.	
	(4) " <i>Dryad</i> ...	(4) and (5) continuously in the Gulf.	
	(5) " <i>Woodlark</i> ...		
1882-83 ...	(1) " <i>Dryad</i> ...	(1) left in July 1882 ...	
	(2) " <i>Woodlark</i> ...	(2) and (3) continuously in the Gulf.	
	(3) " <i>Arab</i> ...		
	(4) " <i>Eclipse</i> ...	(6) left in May 1882.	
	(5) " <i>Philomel</i> ...	(5) joined in December 1882.	
	(6) " <i>Ready</i> ...	(2) and (3) continuously in the Gulf.	
1883-84 ...	(1) " <i>Woodlark</i> ...	(1) left in November 1883 ...	
	(2) " <i>Arab</i> ...	(2) left in July 1883.	
	(3) " <i>Philomel</i> .		
	(4) " <i>Dragon</i> .		
1884-85 ...	(1) " <i>Philomel</i> ...	(1) left in October 1884 ...	
	(2) " <i>Dragon</i> ...	(2) left in January 1885.	
	(3) " <i>Ranger</i> ...	(3) joined in January 1885.	
	(4) " <i>Briton</i> ...	(4) was in the Gulf from 21st December to 24th March.	
1885-86 ...	(1) " <i>Osprey</i> ...	(1) joined in May 1885 and left in March 1886.	
	(2) " <i>Reindeer</i> ...	(2) joined in August 1885.	
	(3) " <i>Ranger</i> ...	(3) left in October 1885.	
	(4) " <i>Philomel</i> ...	(4) joined in September and left in January 1885.	

Year.	Names of the ships.	Period during which detained in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman.	Important service engaged in.
1886-87 ...	(1) H. M. S. <i>Reindeer</i> ... (2) " <i>Kingfisher</i> ... (3) " <i>Sphinx</i> ... (4) " <i>Woodlark</i> ... (5) " <i>Osprey</i> ...	(1) At the station, August 1885 to June 1886. (2) April to July 1886 and again from August 1886. (3) May to August 1886 and again from September 1886 to March 1887. (4) June to December 1886. (5) Joined 25th January 1887.	(1), (2), (3), (4) engaged in April to June 1886 in operations against slavers. Rear-Admiral Sir F. Richards visited Maskat and the Persian Gulf.
1887-88 ...	(1) " " ... (2) " <i>Sphinx</i> . (3) " <i>Kingfisher</i> . (4) " <i>Ranger</i> . (5) " <i>Turquoise</i> .	(5) Joined in February 1888 ...	The <i>Osprey</i> was despatched to the Arab coast in view of the Persian activities that side to wean over the tribes from the British influence. In July 1887 the <i>Ranger</i> proceeded in order to protect British subjects to Suweik on the Batineh coast, which had been seized by rebels.
1888-89 ...	(1) " " ... (2) " <i>Ranger</i> . (3) " <i>Sphinx</i> . (4) " <i>Kingfisher</i> .	....	
1889-90 ...	(1) " <i>Kingfisher</i> ... (2) " <i>Sphinx</i> . (3) " <i>Griffon</i> ... (4) " <i>Redpole</i> . (5) " <i>Mariner</i> ...	(1) and (2) stationed on the Gulf in 1889-90. (3) and (4) visited the Gulf on special service. (5) Joined in March 1890.	....
1890-91 ...	(1) " " ... (2) " <i>Sphinx</i> . (3) " <i>Cossack</i> . (4) " <i>Broadrick</i> . (5) " <i>Griffin</i> .	(1) Left in June 1890 ...	....
1891-92 ...	(1) " <i>Sphinx</i> ... (2) " <i>Redbreast</i> ... (3) " <i>Brisk</i> .	(3) Relieved (1) temporarily in February 1892. (2) In the Gulf, November to December 1891.	....
1892-93 ...	(1) " <i>Sphinx</i> ... (2) " <i>Cossack</i> ... (3) " <i>Brisk</i> .	(1) Proceeded to Bombay to pay off in March 1893 and was relieved by (3). (2) Joined in October 1893 and left in March 1893.	The <i>Cossack</i> was detailed on duty in January 1893 to Bandar Abbas, where she remained for a fortnight.
1893-94 ...	(1) " <i>Sphinx</i> ... (2) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (3) " <i>Cossack</i> . (4) " <i>Brisk</i> .	(1) Proceeded to Bombay to dock in November 1893, when her place was taken by (2) and then by (3).	<i>Lapwing</i> sent to Bahrein in November 1893 to restore general confidence.

Year.	Names of the ships.	Period during which detained in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman.	Important service engaged in.
1894-95	(1) H. M. S. <i>Sphinx</i> (2) " <i>Pigeon</i> . (3) " <i>Lapwing</i> (4) " <i>Bramble</i>	(1) Proceeded to India in April on relief by (2) and returned in May 1894.  In October 1894 (3) relieved (1) and was in turn relieved in November 1893.  (4) Proceeded to Maskat from Bombay in February 1895.	During the rebellion at Maskat in February 1895, the <i>Sphinx</i> having arrived at Maskat on February 18th, a truce was obtained for removing British subjects to a place of safety. The <i>Lawrence</i> brought the Resident to the place and the <i>Bramble</i> reached there a few days later. (See <i>Maskat Précis, 1892-1905</i> , Chapter IV.)
1895-96	(1) " <i>I</i> . (2) " <i>Pigeon</i> (3) " <i>Sphinx</i> . (4) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (5) " <i>Brisak</i> .	(1) Left in March 1895  (2) and (3) were specially sent to the Gulf.  (5) Relieved 4 about February 1896.	The <i>Sphinx</i> , <i>Pigeon</i> and <i>Plassey</i> employed in operations against the Ali-bia-Ali tribe at Zohara in July to September 1895. (See <i>Sahrain Précis, 1854-1904</i> , Chapter XXXIV.)  In March 1896, Major Saddler visited Dhofar in the <i>Brisak</i> to endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the rebels and the Sultan at Maskat. (See <i>Maskat Précis, 1892-1905</i> , Chapter VIII (iii).)
1896-97	(1) " <i>Sphinx</i> (2) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (3) " <i>Redbreast</i> . (4) " <i>Cossack</i> . (5) " <i>Brisak</i> .	(2) relieved by (1) and was placed on Shat-el-Arab in autumn until relieved by (3).	The <i>Brisak</i> and <i>Cossack</i> (with the <i>Lawrence</i> ) employed in connection with the rebellion in Dhofar. (See Chapter VIII of the <i>Maskat Précis, 1892-1905</i> .)  The <i>Lapwing</i> placed on the Shat-el-Arab in the autumn.
1897-98	(1) " <i>Sphinx</i> (2) " <i>Pigeon</i> . (3) " <i>Cossack</i> . (4) " <i>Redbreast</i> . (5) " <i>Lapwing</i> .	(1) the only gun-boat in the Gulf at first.	The <i>Pigeon</i> placed on the Shat-el-Arab from June to December 1897, almost continuously to protect the British Indian boats from pirates. After this, it proceeded to the Mekran coast with a party, who took part in the expedition in connection with Mr. Graves' murder. (See <i>Mekran Précis</i> .)  The <i>Lapwing</i> effected the capture of arms and ammunition on board the <i>Baluchistan</i> . (See <i>Arms Trade Précis, pages 11 et seq.</i> .)
1898-99	(1) " <i>Sphinx</i> . (2) " <i>Pigeon</i> . (3) " <i>Redbreast</i> . (4) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (5) " <i>Eclipse</i> .	(1) and (2) in the Gulf in the early part of the year. <i>Brisak</i> left in May, and (4) took his place. (1) returned in June and left in October on relief by (2).  (5) visited the Gulf in February 1899 with the Commander-in-Chief.	The <i>Redbreast</i> placed on duty on the Shat-el-Arab from October.  For many years no large ship had visited the Gulf and the presence of the <i>Eclipse</i> was believed to have had a good effect.  The <i>Sphinx</i> , <i>Redbreast</i> and the <i>Eclipse</i> were employed in January and February 1899 in connection with the crisis at Maskat. (See Chapter XVIII of the <i>Maskat Précis, 1892-1905</i> .)
1899-00	(1) " <i>Sphinx</i> (2) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (3) " <i>Pigeon</i> . (4) " <i>Melpomene</i> . (5) " <i>Pomona</i> . (6) " <i>Eclipse</i> .	At first (1) was at Maskat, and (2) at Bushire. Subsequently they changed places. Then (3) joined and remained at Bushire till September; (3) relieved by (4) which was relieved by (5) in January.	.....
1900-01	(1) " <i>Sphinx</i> (2) " <i>Highflyer</i> . (3) " <i>Redbreast</i> . (4) " <i>Cossack</i> . (5) " <i>Pigeon</i> . (6) " <i>Cossack</i> . (7) " <i>Assaye</i> . (8) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (9) " <i>Racoon</i> .	(2) visited Bushire and Bander Abbas with His Excellency Rear Admiral Bosanquet in March 1901.  (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) only visited Maskat.	The <i>Redbreast</i> placed on duty on the Shat-el-Arab from September to December 1900.

Year.	Names of the ships.	Period during which detained in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman.	Important service engaged in.
1901-02 ...	(1) H. M. S. <i>Marathon</i> . (2) " <i>Pomone</i> . (3) " <i>Fox</i> . (4) " <i>Perseus</i> . (5) " <i>Cossack</i> . (6) " <i>Pigeon</i> . (7) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (8) " <i>Redbreast</i> . (9) " <i>Assaye</i> . (10) " <i>Sphinx</i> . (11) " <i>Amphithrite</i> .		
1902-03 ...	(1) " <i>Pomone</i> . (2) " <i>Redbreast</i> . (3) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (4) " <i>Amphithrite</i> . (5) " <i>Cossack</i> . (6) " <i>Assaye</i> . (7) " <i>Fox</i> . (8) " <i>Renown</i> .		
1903-04 ...	(1) " <i>Hyacinth</i> . (2) " <i>Argonaut</i> . (3) " <i>Fox</i> . (4) " <i>Pomone</i> . (5) " <i>Perseus</i> . (6) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (7) " <i>Sphinx</i> .		
1904-05 ...	(1) " <i>Fox</i> . (2) " <i>Merita</i> . (3) " <i>Sphinx</i> . (4) " <i>Lapwing</i> . (5) " <i>Porpoise</i> . (6) " <i>Redbreast</i> .		



## CHAPTER III.

## Naval arrangements on abolition of the Indian Navy, 1863—1871.

- (i) Difficulties experienced in the Persian Gulf for want of a local Navy after the abolition of the Indian Navy in 1862: the Shahs desire to have a Navy.\*

3. On the abolition of the Indian Navy at the end of 1862, it was agreed by the Secretary of State for India that the duty of protecting British interests in the Indian Seas, and specially of maintaining the maritime peace in the Persian Gulf, of overawing the slave traders on the East Coast of Africa, and of cruising in the Red Sea, should devolve upon vessels belonging to the Royal Navy. Practically, however, this change was not found to work well. The limits of the East India Station were so extensive, the climate in many parts so detrimental to health, and the calls made by local authorities upon the Commodore for ships of war were often so numerous, that an efficient supervision was out of the question. There was always more work than the squadron could undertake, and the shortcomings of the new system were brought to the notice of the Supreme Government. We may note the various occasions on which the Government of Bombay and the Political Agents under its control were crippled for want of naval means to enforce their orders.

4. In July 1863, Her Majesty's ship *Pantaloön*, which, under the new arrangement, had been stationed in the Red Sea, was taken away, and for some months the Commodore was unable to send a substitute, his squadron having been weakened by the necessity of sending several sloops to the eastward. Nothing then remained at the disposal of the Resident at Aden, but the Government Steamer *Victoria* and this vessel was under orders in September for the Mekran Coast to lay out a special survey in accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of State. Meanwhile the slave trade in the Red Sea was being carried on with increased activity, and the British merchants at Hodeida were trembling for their safety, in consequence of an anticipated attack by the Aseers, the most powerful tribe in Yemen, and the knowledge that no vessel was available for their protection. The absence, too, of a ship of war at Aden had been severely felt on the occasion of the stranding of the Peninsula and Oriental Company's Steamer *Rangoon*. Had there then been a steamer available, it was probable that she could have been tugged into harbour at once, but as it was, she had to wait till help was forthcoming, to the great risk of her hull. Upon these grounds the Government of Bombay urged the Secretary of State to follow the example by which the *Pleiad* had been allotted to Zanzibar, and the *Clyde* and *Sir Hugh Rose* temporarily to the Persian Gulf, and to allow a similar indulgence for Aden.

The Government of India, in bringing these facts to the notice of the Home authorities, contented itself with expressing a wish that the Admiralty would be speedy in providing for the defence of the Indian Seas. To these references the Secretary of State replied that, by the separation of the East India and China Stations of the Royal Navy, and by the union of the latter to the Cape of Good Hope Station, there was every reason to expect that the Admiral at Bombay would be better able in future to meet the calls made upon him for the Indian Seas. Should the force at the disposal still prove to be insufficient, it would be his duty to ask for additional ships from the Admiralty. Sir Charles Wood, however, saw no reason for giving the local Residents permanent control of war ships, and therefore not only declined to accede to the application of the Bombay Government for a steamer at Aden, but recalled the *Pleiad* from Zanzibar, and ordered that the *Clyde* and the *Sir Hugh Rose* should only be kept in the Persian Gulf so long as their services were required in laying the submarine cable.

\* Borrowed partly from a note by Mr. Girdlestone, dated 23rd February 1869.

5. On the 20th of March 1864,

Political Proceedings, May 1864, Nos. 156-158.

Mr. Colquhoun, Her Majesty's Consul-General at Cairo, wrote direct to Colonel Merewether, the Agent at Aden, that he had Lord Russell's instructions to request him to use any means at his command for procuring the release of Mr. Cameron and his fellow-prisoners from the captivity in which they had been arbitrarily detained by Theodore, King of Abyssinia. To this Colonel Merewether answered, that it was quite out of his power to render the assistance asked of him, as there was no Government steam vessel in the harbour, and no man-of-war on the station. The *Hornet* had been at Aden for a short time, but had only recently been recalled to Bombay, and, so far as he knew, there was no likelihood of its being replaced. The matter was at once laid before the Supreme Government, and, in accordance with the suggestion of the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, the responsible officer on the Bombay Coast was asked to send a man-of-war to the nearest

Political Proceedings, July 1864, Nos. 165-4.

which might be addressed to the

Political Proceedings, July 1864, Nos. 161-62.

King. Meanwhile a requisition for help, based on the rumour of an outrage in the Red Sea to a vessel bearing the British flag, had been made to the Commodore, and he had pleaded more urgent employment elsewhere as his reason for not complying with the application.

6. On the 13th of May 1864, the Government of Bombay forwarded, for

No. 15 of that date; also Political Proceedings of Government of India, May 1864, Nos. 169-70.

the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, certain suggestions made by the Political Agents at Zanzibar and Bushire for more effectually stopping the exportation of slaves from the east coast of Africa. In his Memorandum on the subject, Colonel Pelly, speaking for the Persian Gulf, remarked that he had not possessed the means during the past year of seizing slaving craft entering these waters, but from what he had heard, he entertained little doubt that numerous slaves had in this, as in all previous years, been imported from Africa. Judging by the dates, it seems likely that these papers had come under the notice of the Secretary of State before he wrote his despatch of June 30th, 1864.

No. 52, dated 23rd October 1865, with enclosure from Government of Bombay to Secretary of State.

But his arguments had evidently not satisfied the Bombay Government, for, on the 9th December 1864, it addressed a circular letter to the Political Agents within its jurisdiction, enquiring whether they still deemed it needful to retain "a small steamer or other vessel" for their respective requirements. The Resident at Aden replied that, out of eighteen months ending with the 14th of September 1864, the total length of stay of all the vessels of the Royal Navy which had come into the harbour, had not amounted to three months. During the prevalence of the south-west monsoon, the rendezvous was far away at Trincomalee. But even if a ship of the Royal Navy could be spared for Aden all the year round, of which he saw no probability, he would still wish to have some smaller craft at the Resident's uncontrolled disposal to take him at all seasons wherever his presence might be needed. The Resident at Bushire observed that, though the Government had expressly constituted the holder of his office arbitrator in all differences arising amongst the Chiefs of the Arab Coast, whether at sea or on land, he was in reality powerless to perform his functions in the absence of suitable means of locomotion. In the season of the pearl fishing, from April to October, when disputes were frequent, the ships of the Royal Navy were forbidden by the standing orders of the Admiralty from cruising in the Gulf. The Arabs would not be slow to take advantage of the Resident's inability to roam about at will, and so the Gulf would in time become as insecure as ever it had been in old days. He therefore trusted that the Resident might have at his command a vessel to enable him to discharge his political duties properly. The Agents at Maskat and Zanzibar were equally in favour of the measure. Accordingly the Bombay Government forwarded their answers *in extenso* to England, and, as an additional proof of the necessity for granting the concession, called attention to the hostile attitude of the Wahabees in Oman at the date of sending its despatch.

7. In May 1865, Mr. Calvert, the Acting Consul at Jedda, represented

Political Proceedings, June 1865, Nos. 99-101.

through the Bombay Government that many of the ships which carried pilgrims

from the Straits Settlements to the Red Sea were systematically overcrowded, in violation of the provisions of Act XXI of 1858, and he suggested that cruisers should be stationed off the Babel Mandeb Channel to search any vessels sailing under British colours, so as to ascertain whether the passengers on board were in excess of the number sanctioned by law. To this proposal the Government of India replied that it had no vessels for this duty, even if it were expedient so to employ them.

8. During the same year repeated applications were made by the Political Agent for the permanent retention of a man-of-war at Aden, for the control of the tribes in the neighbourhood, and especially of the predatory Foodhrees, who, it was thought, could best be coerced from the sea-board. The urgency of the case was again pressed upon the Secretary of State by the Government in the Office Memorandum from Home Department, Home Department, and in August 1866 No. 3552, dated 9th August 1866. an answer was returned that the Lords of the Admiralty could not undertake to keep a ship constantly on the station, but that the spot should be visited as often as was compatible with the other duties of the squadron.

9. Towards the end of 1865 a body of Wahabees made an inroad upon Sohar and other places under the dominion of the Sultan of Maskat, and it was necessary for the Resident to decide quickly what mode of punishment should be adopted. Colonel Pelly himself was in favour of blockading the Wahabee ports of Ojair and Katif, and the intermediate Island of Demaum, on which were fortifications commanding Katif. In putting this plan into practice, however, there was this difficulty, that the time of the *Highflyer*, the only vessel available in the Persian Gulf, was limited, and both Captain Pasley, who commanded her, and the Resident were disinclined to initiate operations which they could not be sure that it would be convenient to carry to a conclusion. "To act otherwise," remarked the latter, "would be to confirm the impression already too prevalent of our absence of naval power, and would leave our ally, the Sultan, more than ever liable to Wahabee aggression." It was therefore thought wiser in the end to attack Katif and Demaum after giving time to the offenders to make satisfaction had they chosen to do so, but from want of sufficient force the measures taken were not wholly successful. In reporting the results of the *Highflyer's* cruise to the Government of Bombay, the Commodore took occasion\*

\* The Government of India, in commenting on these proceedings, expressed its opinion that Colonel Pelly certainly ought to have sailed with Captain Pasley, or if his presence at Maskat was imperative, that the attack on Demaum, when a partial failure was experienced, should have been postponed.

Political Proceedings April 1866, Nos. 1-3.

ed his sense of the disadvantages under which captains of Her Majesty's ships cruising in the Persian Gulf laboured for want of officers acquainted with the local politics, the habits and feelings of the maritime tribes, and the navigation of this difficult arm of the sea. As the Resident was not able on every occasion to be present with an expedition, he therefore suggested the propriety of having a class of officers to act as sailing masters and interpreters in the Gulf or elsewhere on the Arabian Coast, and to be at the disposal of Her Majesty's ships whenever their services were required. Mr. B. H. Ellis, in a Minute on the same subject, recommended that the evil should be remedied by increasing the strength of the Political Staff in the Persian Gulf, and leaving the duty of navigating Her Majesty's ships to skilled Arab pilots. In this view the Government of India coincided, and two assistants were subsequently allowed to Colonel Pelly.

10. There are several indications that in the disturbances which were rife at Maskat after the death of Syud Thoweynee in the spring of 1866, the local authorities were put to great straits for want of adequate naval force on the first outbreak, when the property and even the lives of British subjects were in greater danger. The *Berenice*, an armed steamer was the only craft on which the Christian families resident at Maskat could take refuge, and she had to start

away from the harbour after dark, in order not to attract attention. When the news of the insurrection reached Bombay, the *Coromandel*, a steam transport belonging to the Bombay Marine, was the only vessel available for the moment, and some days elapsed, indeed, before she was pronounced ready for sea. Almost simultaneously with her arrival at Mussendom, but not till after the refugees from Maskat had reached that port, came

Political Proceedings, April 1866, Nos. 31-48.

Her Majesty's ships *Highflyer* and *Octavia*. These latter at once set out on a cruise, and their presence along the Western Coast of the Persian Gulf had a marked influence in preserving order. The *Clyde* and *Hugh Rose* were told off as guard-boats at Gwadar and Mussendom, it being contrary to the orders of the Admiralty to leave a vessel of war for the permanent defence of these telegraph stations. These arrangements, promptly sanctioned and carried into effect, tended in some degree to relieve the Resident's anxiety; but the risk which had been run made him recur in forcible language to the absolute necessity of giving him greater resources for compelling obedience to his orders. "The way to provide for the maritime police of the Gulf," he wrote to the Bombay Government towards the end of March, "is to have an armed vessel at the disposal of your representative in the Gulf—such vessel to be adapted for coasting work, to be efficiently armed and manned from England, and to be under the orders of the Indian Government. Her Majesty's troops come out to India for long terms, and serve under the Indian Government; work would be much facilitated if the same rule obtained in regard to Her Majesty's ships of war. If this cannot be, then the next best thing might, perhaps, be to have an Indian Naval Staff Corps serving aboard vessels built for the Indian Government, but built in England with all the modern fittings and improvements of the English Dockyard."

11. The removal of Her Majesty's Ship *Lyra* from Aden in April 1866 was

Political Proceedings, June, 1866, No. 90.

the cause of another strong appeal from the Government of Bombay to the Secretary of State. The Foodhlee tribe had not then tendered their submission, and there was no saying what their next move would be. Under these circumstances, though the Governor in Council did not think the case sufficiently urgent to justify him in countermanding the orders of the Commodore, he intimated plainly his desire that Aden should not continue to be deprived periodically of its means of protection. The place which was formerly the head-quarters of a squadron stood its chance now of having a ship of war for four months in the year. Yet its importance was as great as ever, and actually the French, with fewer interests to serve and less commerce to protect, had for nearly three years past maintained a fully equipped gunboat on the station. Finally the argument that the western coast of India was, during the south-west monsoon, unhealthy for English sailors, and that on this account Trincomalee was the place of resort during the hot and rainy season, did not apply to Aden, where there was never any great amount of rain or heat, but, on the contrary, a refreshing sea breeze which kept down the thermometer both by day and by night.

12. The coercive measures which it had been found necessary to adopt of

Proceedings, October 1866, No. 178.

late in the Persian Gulf had made the European inhabitants of Zanzibar apprehensive lest the Arabs, who annually came to that port in great numbers, armed to the teeth, should wreak their vengeance on an unoffending and defenceless population. They therefore, in August 1866, entreated through Colonel Playfair, Her Majesty's Consul and Political Agent, that, during the approaching season, some vessel might be permanently stationed off the island. After some correspondence,

Political Proceedings, March 1867, No. 243.

Political Proceedings, March 1867, No. 88 and No. 225.

Her Majesty's Ship *Wasp* was told off to this service, but did not arrive at Zanzibar apparently till late in November. In February 1867 the dubious aspect of affairs at Shahah, where the rivals of the tribe in possession were blockading the harbour, made the Resident at Aden again send an earnest requisition for a ship of war to be placed at his disposal. In the absence of the *Highflyer*, which had sailed away during the previous November, he had nothing to rely upon but the steam-boat *Victoria*, which, though she carried four guns, had no trained crew to work them. The answer he

received from the Commodore at Bombay on the 9th of March was, that the only vessel at his disposal was for the moment in dock, but that it was hoped she would be ready for sea by the end of the month, when she would be at once despatched to Aden to watch the progress of events.

13. In the beginning of December 1867, Colonel Pelly called the attention of Government to a serious breach of the peace which had just taken place in the Persian Gulf at the instigation of the Chiefs of Aboothabee and Bahrein. He animadverted on the fact that the *Hugh Rose*, which was not able to run under steam more than eight hours consecutively, and which was manned by a native crew was the only vessel at hand for enforcing peace amongst his turbulent neighbours. Notwithstanding the weakness of his position he advised that Aboothabee should be blockaded, in order that the Chief and his tribesmen might be debarred from the pearl fishery, and so be put to sensible loss; but the Government of Bombay at once replied that such a course, however desirable, was out of the question when there was not the means to carry it through efficiently. Every available ship on the station had been sent to Annesley Bay in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition; but the want was so imperative, that the Government of India at once enquired from Commodore Helth whether he could not detach one vessel from his squadron.

14. Meanwhile the Shah of Persia, who was utterly without the power to protect his subjects' property at sea, had been cogitating over the expediency of obtaining from Europe some small ships of war, and in the end had inclined to the plan suggested by Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran of getting out armed steamers at intervals from England and having them commanded by English officers. But to this project the Supreme Government saw objections, and in the interests of Persia, equally with those of India, recommended the establishment of a small marine force exclusively for operations in and about the Persian Gulf. "Such a force," it was remarked in the despatch on the subject, "would more effectually secure the Shah's real interest than any force of his own, while it would give stability to our ascendancy in the Gulf, which, ever since the abolition of the local navy, there has been some risk of our losing, and would exclude all pretext for the intervention of other powers. . . . It is chiefly from the absence of such a force that present political complications between the Governments of Persia and Maskat and between several of the maritime tribes have arisen, and it is in our opinion impossible for the peace of the Gulf to be maintained and trade protected unless the Resident at Bushire has at his command the means of enforcing the terms of the maritime truce. The question is one of vital importance to our political position in the Gulf, and it is matter of much regret to us that, when the Indian Navy was abolished, some special arrangements were

not made by the maintenance of a small force for the protection of our interests in these seas." The question was referred for the opinion of the Lords of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs, both of whom were opposed to any change in the existing system. The old arguments which led to the abolition of the Indian Navy were reiterated, and a further point was raised, that it was of importance for vessels of war, which might at any time be brought into contact with vessels of other European Powers visiting Indian Seas, to be under the direct control of the Government at home, and under the responsibility of the Senior Naval Officer of the station. The Secretary of State for India, however, left it for the consideration of the Supreme Government whether a certain number of gun-boats commissioned by the Admiralty, and manned mostly by lascars, and native marines, but under the orders of the Indian authorities, might not answer the purpose. He had reasons to believe that such a measure, if acceptable to the Viceroy and his Council, would meet with no opposition at home.

14-A. As regards the ambition of the Shah of Persia to purchase gunboats, the Minister at Teheran was told that she should endeavour to dissuade the Shah from

Political Proceedings, February 1868, Nos. 137-39.  
Political Proceedings, June 1868, Nos. 111-16.  
Letter from Colonel Pelly to the Government of Bombay, No. 56 of 1868, paragraph 10.  
Secret despatch No. 15, dated December 4th, 1868, with enclosures.

carrying out his idea, but if he could not do so he might offer the services of a naval officer, who should proceed to Tehran and advise the Persian Government as to the cost and other details of the construction of vessels. Persia was to pay for this officer's journey and give him a daily allowance of Rs. 35. The Shah declined this offer.

15. In 1869 one of the Maskat Sultan's rivals plundered Bunder Abbas, sacked the Government House and then got away by sea. This event naturally increased the Shah's desire for a navy, and the Minister at Tehran reported that the Persian Government wished to obtain vessels of war from France, one of the objects being the recovery of Bahrein. Much as Government objected to the establishment of a Persian Navy in the Gulf, it was thought less desirable that this Navy should be established by another European power, and it was resolved, if necessary, to give the Shah one ship, but he appears to have abandoned the idea.\*

(ii) Arrangements for a naval force for the Gulf.

16. The arrangements finally made by the Home Government are shown in the correspondence received with the Duke of Argyll's despatch No. 235, dated 31st August 1869.

17. It appears that the Secretary of State for India had assented to a proposal that a capitation grant of £ 10 per man should be paid yearly out of the Indian funds, on account of six of Her Majesty's vessels to be employed in Indian waters in general, three of which would be detailed for constant and exclusive service in the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters, to be under the immediate control of the Government of India, the other three also being at their disposal whenever, and so far as, the requirements of the Imperial service would permit. But as the payment of a capitation rate for a variable number of men would involve the keeping of elaborate accounts between the India Office and the Admiralty, and entail much clerical labour, the Admiralty proposed that a fixed sum of £ 70,000 should be paid yearly out of Indian funds for the above service from date to be named hereafter, it being understood that no larger sum was at any time to be chargeable against the Indian Government without the previous assent of the Secretary of State for India in Council, and that the Admiralty would bear the whole expense of the wear and tear of the hulls, rigging, machinery, and stores of the ships.

Should any doubt at any time arise on the part of the Indian Government as to the stipulated number of six vessels having been maintained as agreed upon, the Admiralty would consider themselves bound to establish the fact, and a proportionate reduction of the contribution would be made if the number of ships should not have been kept up.

It was understood that the Indian Government would defray all expenses which might be incurred *on shore* by the officers and men of Her Majesty's ships whilst they might be employed on any service, in compliance with requisitions from the India Office.

With regard to the repair and maintenance of Her Majesty's ships to be employed in Indian waters, it was to be understood that the free use of the dockyard at Bombay should be given to all Her Majesty's ships on the station, that the Indian Government should pay the expense of labour incurred and materials supplied at that dockyard with regard to the three vessels to be employed exclusively in the Persian Gulf and waters adjacent, and that the said three vessels should always be supplied with coal at the cost of the Indian Government.

18. A copy of the instructions which the Admiralty proposed to address to the Senior Officer of Her Majesty's Ships on the East India Station, relative to

\*The idea was revived in 1883, when Murteza Khan, son of the Minister Mukber-ed-Dowleh, was sent to Europe to purchase a gun-boat and two small steamers. He arranged for the construction by a German firm of a gun boat *Persepolis* and a steamer (*Susa*). For description of *Persepolis* see Curzon's *Persia*, volume II, pages 394-95. On page 350 of the same volume will be found description of the *Susa*.

the duties of the officers in command of the vessels employed on the service above referred to, was transmitted for the consideration of the Duke of Argyll—

*Draft Instructions for the Senior Officer on the East India Station.*

You are to place yourself in communication with the Governor-General of India, the Governors of the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the Governors of Mauritius and Ceylon, and you are to communicate with them freely as occasion may require, co-operating with them in the most cordial manner for the benefit of the Queen's service and for the protection of British trade and possessions.

2. You will comply with any requisitions for naval assistance which they may make upon you, and which it may be in your power to afford consistently with your opinion of the other requirements of the service on the station. Should the nature of those requirements render non-compliance with the demands of the local authorities at any time inevitable, you will, on all such occasions, explain, as far as you consider your instructions from the Admiralty will allow you, the nature of the circumstances which prevent a compliance with requisitions from Indian authorities.

3. You will appropriate *three* of the small vessels under your orders for the *suppression of the slave trade* on the east coast of Africa.

4. In consequence of an arrangement with the Indian Government, a portion of the cost of the naval squadron on the East India Station, consisting of *six vessels in addition to the three above mentioned*, will be paid out of the *Ind'ian revenues*.

5. Of those six, you at once will detach three gunvessels or gun-boats, steamers, for constant and exclusive service in the Persian Gulf.

6. They will, when necessary, visit Bombay for repair or sanitary or other purposes according to such orders as you may give from time to time.

7. These three vessels are to maintain the police of the waters of the Persian Gulf and to prevent the Arab Chiefs of the coast from rendering the trade and navigation insecure by their piratical expeditions. These Chiefs are bound by treaty not to engage in hostilities at sea.

All expeditions for this purpose will be restrained by these gun-boats, and the Chiefs will not be allowed to engage in the slave trade.

8. As difficulties are apt to arise suddenly, requiring prompt action, the Commanders of these gun-boats are to consider themselves at the disposal of the British Resident, or such other local authority as the Government of India may appoint, for the maintenance of the maritime police of these waters, and for the support of British authority.

9. The Resident or other local authority will be well acquainted with the habits of the people and well qualified to judge as to the course to be pursued in dealing with the Native Princes and people, and Commanding Officers will understand that they are not to adopt any aggressive measures without the sanction of such authority.

10. Commanding Officers will be themselves responsible if they undertake any hostile operation without a reasonable prospect of success, or when the lives of the men under their orders might be unduly exposed to danger.

11. Commanding Officers of ships employed in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian and Red Seas are to comply with the requisitions of the Viceroy of India and the Governors of Madras and Bombay, and such other local authorities as the Government of India may determine.

12. If compliance with these requisitions should, in exceptional cases, interfere with the order of the Senior Officer, they must look to the relative importance of the services, and exercise their own discretion, bearing in mind the Admiralty instructions, Article 44, Chapter 44, page 336, and reporting their proceedings and their reasons for the course they may adopt.

13. The general rule for the guidance of Her Majesty's Naval Officers on this station as on all others is, that acts of hostility are not to be engaged in without the authority of the Senior Officer of the station, but it is so obvious that this rule cannot apply to the vessels employed under the circumstances above explained in the Persian Gulf.

14. Native Princes and people with whom Naval Officers may have to communicate are to be treated with courtesy and consideration.

15. You will be charged generally with the protection of trade, and the defence of the coast and shipping, and the execution of measures for the suppression of the slave trade, so far as these several duties depend on the assistance of ships of war.

16. The Senior Officer will make Bombay his head-quarters, visiting, from time to time, Calcutta, Trincomallee the Mauritius, and other parts of the station, and will, as far as possible, avoid keeping the squadron at Bombay during the rainy and unhealthy season

17. You will make such arrangements for the disposition of the squadron, changing the stations of the ships, including those employed in the Persian Gulf, as may appear to you to be best calculated to preserve the health and efficiency of the crews, and you are in all cases to endeavour to keep the local authorities informed of any orders which you may give for the removal of any vessel (especially those in the Persian Gulf) for sanitary reasons or otherwise.

19. The Duke of Argyll agreed to the terms proposed and approved of the draft instructions above quoted, but suggested that the arrangement might be considered temporary and provisional (Despatch to the Admiralty dated 26th August 1869.)

(iii) Instructions for the guidance of Officers Commanding Her Majesty's Ships employed on special service in the Persian Gulf.

20. In May 1871 Captain E. F. Ladders, Commander of Her Majesty's *Bullfinch*, informed Colonel Pelly that he had been sent to assist in the duties hitherto performed by the vessels belonging to the Indian Government and forwarded the following instructions received from his Commander-in-Chief:—

Dated on board the *Forte* at Bombay, 11th April 1871.

*Instructions by JAMES HORSFORD COCKBURN, Esq., Rear-Admiral of Her Majesty's Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels employed, and to be employed, on the East India Station, to be observed by Officers Commanding Her Majesty's Ships employed on special service in the Persian Gulf.*

The vessels employed on this service are to maintain the police of the waters of the Persian Gulf, and to prevent the Arab Chiefs of the Coast from rendering the trade and navigation insecure by their piratical expeditions. These Chiefs are bound by Treaty not to engage in hostilities at sea.

All expeditions for this purpose are to be restrained by Her Majesty's gun-vessels, and the Chiefs are not to be allowed to engage in the slave trade.

2. As difficulties are apt to arise suddenly, requiring prompt action for the maintenance of order in these waters, you are to consider yourself at the disposal of the British Resident or Political Agent for the support of British authority.

3. The Resident or other local authority being well acquainted with the habits of the people, and well qualified to judge as to the course to be pursued in dealing with the Native Princes and people, Commanding Officers will understand that they are not to adopt any aggressive measures without the sanction of such authority.

4. Commanding Officers will be themselves responsible if they undertake any hostile operation without reasonable prospect of success, or when the lives of the men under their orders might be unduly exposed to danger.

5. The general rule for the guidance of Her Majesty's Naval officers on this station as on all others is that acts of hostility are not to be engaged in without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, but it is obvious that this rule cannot apply to the vessels employed, under the circumstances above explained, in the Persian Gulf.

Native Princes and people with whom Naval officers may have to communicate are to be treated with courtesy and consideration.

By Command of the Commander-in-Chief.

(Sd.) E. HARRIS,

*Secretary.*

21. It will be noted that the main objects of employing Royal Navy vessels in the Gulf are indicated on the above instructions to be (1) policing the waters of the Gulf and restraining piracies and hostilities by sea by the Arab Chiefs and (2) preventing the Chiefs from engaging in slave trade.

## CHAPTER IV.

**Rules for the relief of Royal Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf, 1874-75.**

22. The following rules were issued by Rear-Admiral A. Cumming, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces, to the Commanding Officers of Her Majesty's ships in the Gulf on 1st May 1874.

The ships detailed for service in the Persian Gulf and adjacent water requiring more constant relief and change in order to keep them in an efficient state, and also for sanitary purposes, the following orders with respect to these vessels are to be carried out as far as possible by the senior officer of the Gulf Squadron, and he will fully report from time to time in his letters or proceedings the steps he takes in consequence:—

1. Three ships will be detached for service in this division. Of these two are constantly to be kept in the Gulf or the adjacent waters as may be necessary; the third ship is to be allowed to be absent either at Kurrachee or Bombay, or on passage to or from either of those ports.

2. Each ship composing the squadron is to be relieved in succession, and, if possible, each ship should visit Kurrachee or Bombay every four months.

3. On a ship leaving for Kurrachee or Bombay, the senior officer remaining in the Gulf should be informed on what date she would probably sail again for the Gulf, and arrangements made as to the port to which she should return. This port should, as a rule, be on the east coast, in order that her arrival may be telegraphed from Gwador or Charbar to the other stations, and all ships should call at one of these ports for this purpose.

Should, however, the senior officer have ordered the ships to proceed direct to Muscat, he must make arrangements for her arrival being made known as soon as possible.

Should the ship be delayed at Kurrachee or Bombay, the senior officer in the Gulf should be informed, with as little delay as possible, either by letter or telegram.

4. The Commanding Officer of the ship leaving the Gulf should be informed of any stores, provisions, or money which it may be necessary to bring from Kurrachee or Bombay for the ships remaining, timely demands being forwarded by each ship to Bombay as directed in Article 8.

5. Great care is to be taken by the ship when at Kurrachee or Bombay to obtain sufficient stores, provisions and money, to last until their return to one of those ports; few things being obtainable in the Gulf except fresh provisions.

6. Orders should be sent by telegraph, or otherwise, to Charbar or Gwador, as to the destination of the ship arriving, and the senior officer will make arrangements for the departure of the next ship from the Gulf.

7. The ship visiting Kurrachee or Bombay should be allowed to remain 10 days or a fortnight, but every effort is to be made for her return at the time fixed previous to her departure from the Gulf, and any delay is to be immediately reported as directed in Article 3.

8. Ships should visit Kurrachee in preference to Bombay when no Dockyard work is necessary. Demands are to be sent to the contractors at Bombay for such provisions as will be required of Kurrachee, stating by what date these stores should be at that port. These demands should be sent as early as possible as special arrangements have been made with the British India Steam Navigation Company for freight, and this Company will place any stores in the Custom House at Kurrachee to await the arrival of the ship requiring them, should they arrive before her.

Timely demands should also be sent for any stores required from the Bombay Dockyard and they will be forwarded and stored in a similar manner to the provisions.

9. The Commanding Officer of the ships in this division will be careful to keep the senior officer as well as the Commander-in-Chief constantly acquainted with their movements. The Political Resident in the Gulf is also to be informed of the movements of the ships.

The requisitions made by the Political Resident and Agents of course must be most carefully attended to, but should they materially interfere with the system of relief, Commanding Officers should point out to these officers what appears to them the best means for meeting both requirements, informing them that these orders have been given with the view of affording an efficient squadron, and requesting their co-operation in attaining this object.

10. In making passages steam should be used in accordance with the Admiralty instructions and circulars, but the senior officer may grant permission for the most economical speed being exceeded in urgent cases.

11. All expenses for telegrams, freight, storage, etc., incurred in carrying out these orders are to appear in the monthly return of unauthorized payments.

12. A copy of these orders is supplied to the Commanding Officer of each ship in the Gulf Squadron—when finally relieved, he is to transfer them to his successor.

Dated *Glasgow at Sea*, the 15th May 1874.

*Extract, paragraph 3, from a letter from REAR-ADMIRAL A. CUMMING, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in India, to COLONEL H. K. BURNE, Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department, Calcutta.*

*Paragraph 3*—I sincerely trust that the plan of relief which I am endeavouring to institute will meet with the approval of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, and that the Political Resident and Agents in the Persian Gulf may be enabled to assist the Commanders of Her Majesty's ships in carrying this out. It is, I am sure, quite impossible to maintain a healthy and efficient squadron in those waters, unless periodical change is allowed, and when this is done, I have but little doubt but that we shall constantly have two out of the three ships ready for any emergency, and this appears to meet the requirements contained in your letter No. 11 of 3rd February 1871, addressed to the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

No. 1474-P., dated Fort William, the 11th July 1874.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

COPY forwarded to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, for information and guidance.

23. The second portion of Rule 9 of the rules for the guidance of commanding officers of Her Majesty's vessels in the Persian Gulf is as follows:—  
Political A., February 1875, Nos. 276-278.

"The requisitions made by the Political Resident and Agents of course must be carefully attended to, but should they materially interfere with the system of relief, commanding officers should point out to these officers what appears to them the best means for meeting both requirements, informing them that these orders have been given with the view of affording an efficient squadron, and requesting their co-operation in attaining this object.

The "system of relief" above referred to is that of the three ships of which the Gulf squadron consisted, each ship was to be relieved in succession, and, if possible, to visit Kurrachee or Bombay every four months.

24. On the 20th August, Colonel Ross sent an urgent telegraphic requisition to the Senior Naval Officer, to the effect that the presence of a man-of-war was very urgently required at Bahrein. It was ten days before the vessel detailed for the service left Karachi, and three weeks before she reached Bahrein. Meanwhile a dangerous crisis had occurred, and it is said that the only reason for not immediately complying with the requisition was that it would interfere with the system of relief.

25. On this statement of fact Colonel Ross argued that the system of rigorously carrying out the rules for the relief of these vessels might cause serious difficulties to the political position in the Gulf, and he suggested that

"it should be understood what class of duties is to be considered of paramount importance by the Naval Commanders and to what extent it is intended they should exercise the discretionary authority vested in them, where important requisitions are made by the local representatives of the Government of India."

26. The Government of India passed the following orders on the suggestions made by the Resident (No. 246-Political, dated 26th January 1875):—

No. 246-P., dated Fort William, 26th January 1875.

From—C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secy. to the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.,  
To—LIEUT.-COL. E. C. ROSS, H. B. M.'s Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1055-219, dated 18th September 1874, inviting attention to certain points connected with the rules for the relief of the Naval Squadron in the Persian Gulf.

2. From the papers submitted it appears that, on the 20th August last, you sent an urgent telegraphic requisition to the Senior Naval Officer, to the effect that the presence of a man-of-war was very urgently required at Bahrein. The vessel did not leave Kurrachee for ten days and only reached Bahrein in three weeks. Meanwhile a crisis had occurred and it is said that the only reason for not immediately complying with the requisition was that it would interfere with the system of naval relief.

3. On this statement you represent that the system of relief if rigorously carried out might cause serious difficulties to the political position of the British Government in the Gulf, and you therefore suggest for consideration that "it should be understood what class of duties is to be considered of paramount importance by the Naval Commanders, and to what extent it is intended they should exercise the discretionary authority vested in them, when important requisitions are made by the local representatives of the Government of India."

4. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council directs me to state that the system of relief in such a service as that of the Persian Gulf is of very great importance, and that it is not to be departed from or set aside except under grave emergency. Neither of the cases referred to by you (*vis.*, the threatened attack on Bahrein and the disputes on land between the Chiefs of Shargah and Ras-ool-Khymah) appears to have been of sufficient importance to necessitate exposing the crews of Her Majesty's vessels to unusual hardships.

5. His Excellency in Council thinks that the requirements of such cases will be sufficiently met by the following arrangements. All written or telegraphic requisitions should be treated as ordinary or urgent and carried out in ordinary course or urgently so far as the rules of relief admit. If you consider any requisition to be so emergent as to require immediate compliance without regard to the rules of relief, you should say so distinctly in the requisition, and should telegraph to Government the fact of your having done so with your reasons. Government can then exercise a control if the requisition be deemed injudicious. But you should be careful to note that nothing short of a grave crisis to which all rules must bend would justify you in exercising the discretion hereby given.

6. With reference to your letter of the 20th July last, to the address of Captain Garforth, the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Squadron, I am directed by His Excellency in Council to observe that you no doubt unintentionally went beyond your proper province in commenting upon the condition of Her Majesty's Ships *Philomel* and *Daphne* as to supplies of shot and shell, etc., matters as to which the Senior Naval Officer is responsible to Government.

27. Rear-Admiral Cumming addressed the Government of India (Marine Department) \* expressing his thanks for the support so readily tendered to assist him in his endeavours to carry out a regular system of relief in the ships of the Persian Gulf Squadron. He thought that the arrangements detailed in paragraph 5 of the Government of India orders above quoted, whereby a difference between "ordinary" and "urgent" requisitions was drawn, would tend materially to diminish the difficulties then experienced in carrying out the onerous duties required of the small squadron in the Persian Gulf. He further explained that the delay in the particular case complained of by the Resident was due to the vessel in question having had to await the arrival of new boats from Bombay, he having lost three in a cyclone when on passage to Karachi from the Persian Gulf.

\* Political A, May 1875, No. 339.

## CHAPTER V.

## East India Station Standing Orders, 1832.

28. The following extracts taken from "East India Station Standing Orders," dated 25th April 1832, issued by the Admiralty are those which chiefly concern the Persian Gulf and the suppression of the slave trade:—

A. Political E., January 1834, Nos. 262-73.

## ARTICLE IV.

A printed correspondence, which you will find in the records of the station, relates to the arrangement entered into with the India Office for the maintenance by the Imperial Government of a force of six ships in Indian waters, north of an imaginary line drawn from Cape Guardafui to Point de Galle, and thence south of the Nicobar Islands to Cape Salang, for service in the Persian Gulf, in the Red Sea, on the coast of Arabia, and in the Bay of Bengal.

These vessels are to be employed in carrying out the requisitions of the Indian Government for the protection of their trade and the maintenance of their interests in those waters, and, in making arrangements for the execution of these services, you will be guided by the draft instructions approved by the Secretary of State for India in Council in paragraph 7 of India Office letter of 26th August, 1839,\* addressed to the Admiralty, which will be found in the printed correspondence alluded to above.

A subsidy of 70,000*l.* per annum is paid by the Indian Government to Imperial Funds for the performance of these services, but in the event of the absence for any period of the year of one or more of the six vessels which the Admiralty have undertaken to maintain in Indian waters, one-sixth of the proportion of the annual 70,000*l.* payable for such period will be deducted for each of the vessels so temporarily withdrawn, irrespective of the size of the vessel or the number of men included in the complement.

With the view of an accurate account being kept of the payments due to the Admiralty, you are to furnish a quarterly return on the prescribed form, showing the dates of the employment of the respective vessels within the above limits, sending a duplicate at the same time to the Accountant-General and Controller of Navy Pay.

Of these six ships you will detach three gun-vessels or gun-boats for constant and exclusive service in the Persian Gulf, and they will, when necessary, visit Bombay for repair, sanitary or other purposes, according to such orders as you may give from time to time, observing that, by the agreement with the India Office, the Indian Government have undertaken to pay the expense of labour incurred and materials supplied at Bombay Dockyard in the case of three vessels detailed exclusively for service in the Persian Gulf.

These vessels are to maintain the police of the waters of the Persian Gulf, and to prevent the Arab Chiefs of the coast from rendering the trade and navigation insecure by their piratical expeditions. These Chiefs are bound by treaty not to engage in hostilities at sea. All expeditions for this purpose will be restrained by these vessels, and the Chiefs will not be allowed to engage in the slave trade.

As difficulties are apt to arise suddenly requiring prompt action, the commanders of these vessels are to consider themselves at the disposal of the British Resident or such other local authority as the Government of India may appoint, for the maintenance of the maritime police of these waters, and for the support of British authority.

The Resident, or other local authority, will be well acquainted with the habits of the people, and well qualified to judge as to the course to be pursued in dealing with the native princes and people. Commanding officers should not resort to aggressive measures without due consideration, and the sanction of the above authority.

Commanding officers of ships employed in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian and Red Seas are to comply with the requisitions of the Viceroy of India and the Governors of Madras and Bombay, and such other local authorities as the Government of India may determine; but it is desirable that on all missions undertaken on the requisitions of Political Residents an officer from the Residency should accompany the ship so employed. If compliance with these requisitions should in exceptional cases interfere with the orders of the Senior Officer, officers are to be guided by Article 413, page 137, of the Queen's Regulations, and are to report their proceedings giving the reasons for the course they may adopt.

*In dealing with requisitions involving hostile operations officers employed in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian and Red Seas will be guided by Article V.*

\* *Vide paragraph 18 above.*

ARTICLE V.

You are not to undertake, nor is any officer in command of one of Her Majesty's ships under your orders to undertake, any hostile operations without Their Lordships' express authority, except on a requisition from the Viceroy of India, or in a case where British life and property are at stake and require immediate naval interference. If an officer commanding one of Her Majesty's ships should receive a requisition from the Viceroy of India to undertake any hostile operation, he should at once communicate with you, if within reach of a telegraph. If he cannot do so, he should act upon the requisition. This rule does not apply to the vessels employed in the Persian Gulf under the circumstances explained in Article IV, but, in any circumstances, whether in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere, commanding officers will be themselves responsible, if they undertake any hostile operations without a reasonable prospect of success, or when the lives of the men under their orders might be unduly exposed to danger.

ARTICLE VIII.

Your attention is drawn to the papers which will be found in the records of the station in regard to—  
Ceremonies.

- (a) The correspondence in 1851 as to salutes in Indian waters.
- (b) The arrangement made in 1881 that the Viceroy's flag at the main indicates his personal presence; at the fore, the presence of a Governor; at the mizzen, a Chief Commissioner or Political Officer.
- (c) The modification, in favour of certain Chiefs in the Persian Gulf, of the orders given in 1881 as regards salutes. (A. L., 15th March 1882.)

ARTICLE IX.

No ship is to proceed up the Shat-el-Arab at the head of the Persian Gulf further than Kournah near the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates, and only so far after receiving the usual permission.  
Tigris and Euphrates navigation.

ARTICLE XI.

The Book of Instructions (dated 1865) furnished to the Captains and Commanders of Her Majesty's ships and vessels employed in the suppression of the slave trade, contains copies of the several treaties and conventions between Great Britain and foreign countries for the suppression of the said traffic, and of the various Acts of Parliament and other documents necessary for your knowledge. This book with copies of Their Lordships' further instructions, dated 1st January 1876, A, B, and C, and of the various treaties, engagements, and Acts of Parliament which have come into operation since the instructions of 1865 were issued (including the Treaties of 1873 and 1875 with the Sultan of Zanzibar), will be found with the records of the station.  
Slave trade.

You are to be strictly governed by these documents in your conduct towards vessels suspected of being engaged in the slave trade and you will take care that the Captains and Commanders of the vessels under your orders strictly attend to the same, more specially when the suspected vessels are under French colours.

You will distribute the ships and vessels under your command, which are all supplied with slave-trade warrants, in such manner as may appear to you most advisable for the fulfilment of the service to which they are appointed, and in doing so you will not fail to call the attention of the commanders to the nature of the duties assigned to them, and to impress upon their minds the importance of their using on the one hand the most zealous exertions for carrying into full effect the object of the British Government in concluding the several treaties and conventions, by putting an end to the traffic, in slaves and, on the other hand, of their observing the greatest care and vigilance not to exceed the provisions of the treaties and not to afford to foreign subjects or to foreign Governments any just cause of complaint in regard to their proceedings in the exercise of the power entrusted to them.

You are to transmit to me by every opportunity reports of all foreign vessels detained by you or by the cruisers under your orders furnished with instructions for that purpose, detailing therein the circumstances which have induced you or the commanders to visit such vessels, and afterwards to release or detain them as the case may be; and you are to cause a return in duplicate to be forwarded annually (according to prescribed forms) of the vessels detained upon the station under your command for being engaged in the slave trade.

My Lords desire that you will instruct the commanding officers of the several cruisers under your orders to be very careful in the preservation of the Foreign Slave-Trade. Warrants with which they may be furnished, and as it is necessary that all such warrants should be personally addressed to the officers actually in command of Her Majesty's cruisers, you are, whenever the commanding officers of any vessel may be changed, or if the vessels should be removed from the station under your orders, to cause the warrants to be returned to me, together with all papers connected therewith.

When boats are detached from ships to cruise in search of slave vessels great caution is to be exercised, and they are never to be so detached in localities where, from the prevailing winds and weather, they may be exposed to danger or have difficulty in obtaining supplies. It is also to be borne in mind that many of the Arab dhows are manned with large crews of desperate men and detached boats should on no account be allowed to engage in unequal contests with them. Boats' crews should be armed and ready to resist attack. Whenever it is practicable a second boat should lie off ready to support the first, if necessary.

Officers and men are to be prohibited from sleeping on shore in unhealthy places or from cutting wood or doing any work on shore which the natives can be hired to do at a reasonable rate.

#### ARTICLE XII.

Her Majesty's ship "London" is stationed at Zanzibar for service of the East African Squadron, more particularly in connection with the suppression of the slave trade. She is intended to be a floating depôt and the store ship, and a receiving ship for invalids and prisoners. She is also fitted as a floating factory, with appliances for the repairs of engines.

She is provided with boats (steam and sailing), which may be employed within a reasonable distance of the ship in the suppression of the slave trade, but they should never be employed on such service singly.

In order to preserve the health of the crew, they may be sent to the Seychelles Island, when any suitable opportunities occur for their conveyance thither and for their return within a reasonable period; and you are at liberty to send any of the ships of the squadron to visit the Cape of Good Hope for a fortnight or three weeks, when a favourable opportunity offers, should the crews require change of climate.

It is considered expedient, on sanitary grounds, that the officers and crew of the "London" should be relieved after a period of service at Zanzibar of about eighteen months or two years, and when the time approaches for their relief attention should be drawn to the subject, with a view to the necessary arrangement being made.

The "London" should be inspected by you once in each year and whenever opportunities occur, and special reports of her sanitary and general condition should be sent for Their Lordships' information.

## CHAPTER VI.

## Royal Navy vessels on Indian seas: Reduction, their duties, condition, etc., 1884-89.

- (i) Reduction in the number of Her Majesty's vessels maintained in the Indian seas and on the Indian subsidy, 1884-89.

29. In addressing the Secretary of State on the 15th August 1884, the Government of India said that they were of opinion that when the special Indian Marine despatch vessel should be ready, the number of Her Majesty's vessels at present maintained in the Indian seas should be reduced to five, of which two should be exclusively employed in the Gulf, so as to admit of one being occasionally absent at Bombay while refitting. It was also considered that with this reduction of strength there should be a proportionate reduction of the annual subsidy of £70,000 now paid to the Admiralty for naval services rendered to India. In addition to the saving thus obtained, there would be a saving in the coaling and repairs of one of Her Majesty's vessels now employed in the Persian Gulf, and it was thought that these savings would be found more than sufficient for the maintenance of the Indian Marine despatch-boat.

30. Under date the 3rd December 1884, the Secretary of State enquired what further reduction could be borne in Royal Navy ships, so as to release a portion of the subsidy, to meet the probable demands on the Admiralty for torpedo and gunboat defences for Aden.

In discussion it was noted that no proposal could be approved which would have the effect of reducing the Persian Gulf squadron below 3 (*viz.*:—1 Indian Marine\* despatch-boat, 1 R. N. ship in Gulf, 1 refitting for the Gulf.) The Secretary of State was informed accordingly.

\* See Chapter VII.

31. The discussion regarding Persian Gulf requirements in the way of warships still continued. On the one hand, the Government of India held that 5 of Her Majesty's ships plus the new despatch-boat for the Resident in the Gulf was the number required; on the other hand, the joint India Office and Admiralty Committee inclined to the opinion that reduction was possible, and in this view were supported by Captain Hext, for some time Senior Naval Officer in the Gulf.

The latter thought that India paid the Admiralty an immense sum annually and got next to nothing in return: he strongly held that the *Sphinx* and the despatch-boat *Lawrence* were quite enough for the Gulf service, and that two gun-boats instead of one might with perfect safety be suppressed. Under these circumstances, the opinion of Colonel Ross was asked for on the proposals.

32. Colonel Ross in replying to the contemplated reductions thought that in a temporary emergency it would be possible to carry on with two vessels; the proposed reduction would, however, be permanent and difficult to rectify if it proved a mistake. He thought that any further reduction of combatant vessels would be unwise and imprudent both for practical reasons and because it would look like indifference to our position in the Gulf. In support of this it was mentioned that during the Egyptian war our gun-vessels visited the Arab Coast infrequently and this caused comment.

Finally Colonel Ross thought that the present force was the minimum compatible with efficiency and that further reduction would mean loss of status which the money saving would not justify.

33. On the other hand, Captain Hext was of opinion that the whole work of the Gulf could be done by our own despatch-boat the *Lawrence*,† plus one man-of-war the *Sphinx*. In support of this he argued that if three obsolete gun-boats steaming seven knots could do the work 15 years previously, with the power of the chiefs unbroken, and piracy common, then two fast vessels with

† As regards the *Lawrence*, see Chapter

modern guns steaming 12 knots would do the work now. The Resident with the *Lawrence* at Bushire could reach Maskat in 48 hours instead of in 80 in one of the old Admiralty "tools." Piracy, as formerly understood, was unknown and ships were little required; all three of them were out of the Gulf looking for slave dhows for 4 months in the year. Captain Hext was of opinion that with another ship like the *Lawrence* in the reserve, the *Sphinx* taken over from the Admiralty, and for the Indian Government to do all the work, it would be much better done and at a saving of £15,000 a year.

Pro. No 292, *ibid.*

34. In despatch No. 2, dated the 8th March 1887, the Government of India stated:—

"We have again considered whether some further reduction could not be made, and we have arrived at the conclusion that the number of vessels may well be reduced to four.

One vessel is required for the Bay of Bengal, another should be stationed at Aden, a third in the Persian Gulf, and there should always be a vessel at Bombay ready for service in the Persian Gulf. In this manner the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal would each be watched by a ship of war, and there would always be a vessel in reserve, ready to reinforce or relieve the vessel in the Gulf, or for service elsewhere, if required, and this number we think sufficient for the ordinary requirements of India so far as our Government is concerned.

We accordingly recommend that the squadron of six vessels be reduced to four, a proportionate reduction being made in the subsidy of £70,000 which the Government of India are now required to pay to the Admiralty, the saving then effected will amount to £23,332, or about 3 lakhs, and will cover the expenditure which we have to provide for; thus, without actual increase to the Indian Marine expenditure, admitting of a substantial improvement to the naval defences of India."

35. In consequence of the difficulties which were constantly arising between the Indian and Home Governments, in connection with the adjustment of expenditure incurred on account of the repair, docking, etc., of Royal Navy vessels on the East India station, a committee assembled in 1888 and made the following proposals:—

External A., June 1888, Nos 25-36.

1. That 4 vessels be employed continually on Indian waters, of which one shall always be in the Persian Gulf.
  2. That an annual subsidy payment of £38,500 be made by the Government of India to the Admiralty, subject to a deduction of £28-15-0 a day for each vessel below the complement.
  3. That the Government of India pay also the cost of extra coal consumed when in service under requisition by the Indian authorities.
  4. That a further payment of 5 per cent. a year towards replacement be made on the cost price of the *Sphinx*, and of any future vessel constructed under special design exclusively for service in the Persian Gulf.
  5. That when a vessel has been in dock for more than 30 days, she shall cease to be reckoned in the complement.
  6. That all repairs be effected at the cost of the Admiralty, subject, in the case of vessels that have served in the Persian Gulf, to a proportionate contribution by India.
  7. That no charges be made for docking, except where actual outlay is incurred.
36. The Admiralty approved of these proposals, but as it was very probable that the cost would proportionately increase if newer types of vessels carrying more expensive complements were substituted for the vessels now on the East India station, they were of opinion that the report of the committee should be adopted for one year, and that the question should be re-opened for any revision of the subsidy which might be necessary.

37. It was found, however, from a return of the number of vessels in Indian waters during the quarter ending 30th June 1888, that more than one vessel had been at one and the same time in the Gulf during the quarter referred to. The India Office pointed out this irregularity to the Admiralty and added :—

External A., February 1889, Nos. 224-232.

"That it is stated that these vessels are entitled to have repairs in respect of their Gulf service affected at the expense of India. This will have the effect of throwing upon Indian revenues a greater expense for repairs than was intended, when the new arrangements were agreed to, it being then contemplated that only one vessel at a time should be employed in the Persian Gulf."

38. The Admiralty upon this instructed the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East India Station, to employ only one vessel at a time in future in the Persian Gulf, except at the request of the Government of India or in case of emergency.

External A., June 1889, Nos. 51-52.

39. In acknowledging these orders, the Naval Commander-in-Chief stated :—

"That in case I should find it necessary to station cruisers off the Arabian coast for the suppression of the *slave trade*, they will be considered as on special service and receive instructions to take no part in the politics of the Persian Gulf, except in case of extraordinary emergency."

(ii) Duties of the Persian Gulf squadron. Charge on account of coal supplied to these ships while cruising outside of the Persian Gulf, 1887.

40. The total charges incurred in the operations for the suppression of the slave trade for the season ending October 1885 was Rs. 1,066-10-8, of which a sum of Rs. 576 was on account of the carriage of coal to H. M. S. *Osprey* and *Ranger* while engaged in watching for slave dhows on the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

External A., April 1887, Nos. 172-174.

The Secretary of State was informed that the whole amount should be met by Her Majesty's Government, but the Admiralty demurred to the item Rs. 576 being debited to the Imperial exchequer on the grounds that it was "opposed to the spirit of the agreement of 1869, with regard to the maintenance of the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf, etc."

41. In discussion it was shown that in the present case the vessels were withdrawn from their proper duty to perform work with which the Government of India had no concern. It was therefore thought that "expenditure when employed in suppressing slave trade should be paid by the Admiralty, and further that the subsidy for the time so employed should be stopped." Colonel Ross expressed the hope that special slave trade arrangements would be made, as "it would not be always convenient for the vessels of the Persian Gulf squadron to be employed on this service."

42. It was therefore submitted that the Government of India should stand out against paying this money, and that in replying to the Secretary of State it should be pointed out that the coal in question was not sent for the use of Her Majesty's ships cruising in the Persian Gulf, but for the use of those ships cruising off Ras-el-Had at the mouth of the Gulf of Oman and outside the Persian Gulf, for the exclusive purpose of suppressing the slave trade.

(iii) Limits of the Persian Gulf Station, 1887.

43. With reference to the intimation made to the Secretary of State that as the Political Officers in the Persian Gulf did not protest against the employment of Her Majesty's vessels outside the Gulf in connection with the slave trade, the Government of India would not press the claim for Rs. 576 incurred in coaling the vessels in question, Colonel Ross explained :

External A., September 1887, Nos. 140-143.

"That these vessels do not as a rule go beyond the limits of the Persian Gulf; and that it is scarcely within the legitimate functions of the Political Officers to object to the vessels proceeding on the service referred to, unless inconvenience were caused or other interests affected."

Colonel Ross added that the movements of the ships in question were effected under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer and not at any requisition of the Political Officers, though the latter were kept informed of the changes in arrangements.

(iv) Inefficient condition of vessels of the Royal Navy on East India Station, 1887.

44. In despatch No. 14 (Marine Department), dated the 29th July 1887, the Government of India drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the inefficient condition of the vessels which formed the Royal Naval squadron on the East India station. This had been brought prominently to the notice of the Government of India on nearly every occasion that a vessel of the Royal Navy squadron had been required to proceed to sea during the south-west monsoon, and again quite lately when war with a European power seemed possible. From age, want of speed, weakness of armament, and antiquity of type, some of the vessels of the East India squadron were quite unsuitable for modern war purposes, and experience had proved that they were by no means fully efficient even for the police of the seas against slave traders and pirates, who used fast-sailing dhows, particularly during the south-west monsoon, or in a strong breeze, when there was no watch for fast-sailing native craft. It appeared doubtful whether there was one ship out of the squadron, which could average a speed of 10 knots between Bombay and Aden even in fair weather, while, excepting the *Sphinx*, not one could make Aden in the monsoon direct from Bombay without going south. Many vessels which had been attached to the squadron were virtually worn out when coming on to the station, and cost a needlessly large sum in repairs and refit; and in some cases their Indian commission had been their last.

45. In support of these statements, the following recent instances of the inefficiency of the vessels of the squadron, both for police and ordinary duties, had been brought to light. In August 1886 several small dhows were reported to be running slaves off the Arabian coast; the *Kingfisher* of the Persian Gulf squadron was required elsewhere; the complement of the *Sphinx* would not admit of her detaching boats to cruise; and the *Woodlark*, the only other available vessel, was not considered by the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, suitable for use, as she could barely steam against the monsoon. Again, in July 1883, when the S. S. *Knight of the Bath* was wrecked off the Arabian coast, it happened that there was no man-of-war at Aden which could be sent to the rescue. The *Woodlark* and the *Philomel*, then in the Persian Gulf, were at liberty; but as they were not powerful enough to steam against the monsoon, it had been necessary to despatch the I. M. S. *Amberwitch* from Aden, to search for the shipwrecked crew and to convey them to Bombay.

46. Finally, an extract from Lord Brassey's Naval Annual for 1886\* was appended as showing the views of the Government of India regarding the in-

\* Pages 50-51.

efficiency for war purposes of some portion at any rate of the squadron:—

"Among the duties undertaken by the Navy, for which it is necessary to employ vessels of a type not suited to the more important services which would be demanded from the Navy in war, I may particularly mention the police of the seas in the Persian Gulf. The service is most trying to British crews, and it could be performed efficiently by the Indian navy in vessels manned by native crews under British officers, the contribution from the Indian Government, fixed at £70,000 a year, is a bad bargain for the British Admiralty."

The Government of India therefore urged on the attention of the Home Government, the necessity for steps being taken to replace the ships on the station by serviceable and efficient vessels of war. An opportunity of commencing this most desirable change would very shortly present itself, for the commissions of the *Ranger* and the *Kingfisher* would expire in October and January respectively. It had been heard that it was in contemplation to re-commission them, but the Government of India expressed the hope that two really efficient war vessels might be substituted for these ships.

## (v) Orders affecting Royal Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf, 1883.

47. In telegrams dated the 1st October and 6th November 1888, the Admiral, East India Station, had intimated that the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf complied with *requisitions*, but did not receive *instructions* from the Political Resident there. The Admiral said that he could not accept a request made by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf as coming from the Viceroy, and, further, that if three ships should be required in the Gulf, he (the Admiral) must consider the arrangement lately made, by which the number of Royal Navy vessels at the disposal of the Government of India had been reduced to four, to have failed.

48. In replying to the Admiral, the Government of India observed that the 4th Article of the East India Station Standing Order, dated the 25th April 1882, explained that the subsidised vessels of the Royal Navy were to be employed in carrying out the requisitions of the Government of India, and clause 7 of the article very clearly directed that the commanders of the vessels in the Persian Gulf were to consider themselves *at the disposal of the British Resident, or such other local authority as the Government of India might appoint*. These directions had been repeated in paragraph 4 of the report of the Committee recently appointed to consider the question of the subsidy to be paid by the Indian Government for the Royal Navy vessels placed at its disposal by the Admiralty.

49. Although it had been arranged that the four subsidised vessels would ordinarily be stationed, one in the Bay of Bengal, one at Aden, one in the Persian Gulf, and one at Bombay ready for service in the Gulf, yet the Governor-General in Council considered that this implied that the vessels might occasionally be all employed in any particular way which the Government of India might deem proper. It was therefore pointed out that the demand for a third vessel for temporary service in the Gulf, should she be required there, did not affect the arrangement lately made for reducing the number of subsidised Royal Navy vessels to four, or infringe any of the conditions attached to the arrangement.

## (vi) British vessels of war in Basrah waters, 1883.

50. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had telegraphed to the Turkish Ambassador in London on the 7th March 1883 saying that the Governor-General of Baghdad had informed him that a British man-of-war named *England* had arrived at Basra on the 26th February, and he desired to know the reason for the presence of the ship in Basra waters. It was afterwards reported that the ship which the Turkish authorities complained about being in Basra waters was *H. M. S. Eclipse*, which the Admiralty supposed had visited Basra like other vessels of war at the instance of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. Earl Granville informed the Turkish Ambassador of the matter and observed that

"In deference to the wishes of the Sublime Porte, British ships of war do not proceed further up the Shat-el-Arab than *Kurnah*,\* but Her Majesty's Government are not aware of any regulation precluding such ships from visiting Basra."

\* As to our vessels going as far as Kurnah, see *Turkish Arabia Provinces, 1801-1905*, Chapter XIV (ii) and (iii).

(vii) Visit of *H. M. S. "Sphinx"* to Muhammerah in June 1889.

51. Certain false representations having been made at Tehran regarding the visit of the *Sphinx* to Muhammerah, the Chargé d' Affaires had communicated to Amin-ul-Mulk the contents of a telegram received from Colonel Ross, saying that the *Sphinx* had returned to Bushire on the 13th and that she visited Muhammerah to convey His Excellency's and Saad-ul-Mulk's instructions and stayed there only a few hours. It was also pointed out to the Amin that the Persian Foreign Office Agent when he hauled down the British flag from a British steamer, and was preparing to seize another British steamer, never reported

his proceedings to Tehran; but he lost no time in sending false information about the British Resident at Bushire, and the British despatch-boat *Sphinx*, when they were only assisting in carrying out the Amir's own orders, and in preventing a very serious question assuming still more serious dimensions. Colonel Ross would have been perfectly justified in sending the *Sphinx* to replace the British flag on the *Iran* by force, and in protecting the *Blosse Lynch* from seizure; that he did not do so had been an additional proof of his courteous and conciliatory nature, and of his friendly feeling towards Persia. It was suggested to the Amin, in a private and unofficial way, that it might be well perhaps to replace the Foreign Office Agent at Muhammerah by a more intelligent, conciliatory and straightforward functionary.

(viii) Communications between naval officers and naval chiefs or officials. Operations on land by naval officers to suppress the trade, slaves, 1898-99.

52. In June 1898 Commander Baker of H. M. S. *Sphinx* observed a native vessel which he suspected of being engaged in slave traffic, close in shore, abreast of the village of Sinna, in the territory of the Sultan of Maskat. Endeavours were made to overhaul the vessel, but the crew succeeded in effecting a landing before the *Sphinx* could reach her.

Commander Baker then sent away two boats, one fully armed to intercept the fugitives on land and to prevent their escape, the other with side arms to deliver a message from Commander Baker to the Sheikh of Sinna. The Sheikh came out surrounded by followers armed with Martini-Henry rifles, swords and spears, and a collision was only avoided by the bold front shown by the officers in command of the landing parties.

53. Ultimately Lieutenant Robinson landed unarmed with the interpreter under the protection of the cutter and a landing party lying off the beach in a boat, and interviewed the headman, with the result that the fugitive crew of the *badan* were handed over to Commander Baker. On examination they proved mostly to be Arabs and were allowed to resume possession of their vessel.

53-A. The Sultan of Maskat complained of these proceedings to Major Fagan, and as they were considered irregular, Her Majesty's Government, on the recommendation of the Indian Government, directed that, save in exceptional circumstances, all intercourse between naval officers and native chiefs or officials at Maskat and in the Persian Gulf should be conducted through the medium or with the knowledge of the Political Officers.

53-B. Stress was also laid on the rule already recognised, that in the absence of exceptional circumstances naval officers should undertake no active measures on land without the previous approval of the responsible political officers, and that naval officers are responsible to the superior political commanders for the exercise of the discretion left to them (Secretary of State's despatch No. 43, Secret, dated 16th December 1898).

CHAPTER VII.

Bushire Residency Steamers.

The *Hugh Rose*. The *Sphinx* commissioned for the Persian Gulf. The R.I.M. *Lawrence* especially built for the Residency.

54. Up to October 1876 an Indian Government steamer was attached to the Bushire Residency. In April 1874 application was made to replace the *Hugh Rose*, the last of the Residency steamers, by a vessel of a superior class. The only mention about its withdrawal that can be found in the records is contained in the Gulf Administration Report of the Persian Gulf for 1876-77, in paragraph 30 of which it is stated:—

"The Residency steamer was withdrawn in October 1876. A steam cutter has since been placed at the disposal of the Residency for quarantine duties in connection with the plague in Mesopotamia."

55. In April 1877 Colonel Prideaux asked for a vessel to be sent to Bushire to be employed in quarantine duties. The Indian Government steamer *Dalhousie* was sent on 8th August 1877, the *Dalhousie* being required for the transport of troops, left Bushire for Bombay.

56. In January 1898 the Political Resident (Colonel Ross) represented the necessity for a special despatch vessel being attached to his Residency to save him being dependent on Royal Navy vessels when occasion required him to take trips by sea to places under his political control. He reported the request three years after, adding that—

"by substituting a suitable despatch vessel, not subject to withdrawal, for one of the three gun vessels told off for the Persian Gulf, it would in all respects be advantageous to the interests of Government as well as to the naval service."

His representations were supported in the Government of India's despatch to the Secretary of State of 27th May 1881, which proposed that the cost of the vessel (about £25,000) should be met by the withdrawal from the Indian station of one of Her Majesty's gun-boats, a saving of about £ 5,000 a year being effected by the measure.

57. The Home Government asked for particulars as to the nature of the duties to be performed by the proposed despatch vessel and whether they would be strictly non-combatant; and in reply the Government of India, after having consulted Colonel Ross, explained what the vessel's duties would be and said that they would be strictly *non-combatant*. It was suggested, however, that she should carry small swivel guns for saluting purposes and one gun for signalling (despatch No. 3 Political, dated the 9th January 1882).

58. In reply, the Government of India were told that His Majesty's Ship *Sphinx*, especially constructed for service in the Gulf, was about to be despatched there for the purpose.

59. The Government of India, however, in their despatch No. 15 Political, dated 29th January 1884, pointed out that the provision of an improved class of gun-boat for naval duties in the Gulf did not help Colonel Ross in what he wanted, which was a purely non-combatant despatch vessel to be at his disposal when he had to move about the Gulf.

60. In a despatch from the Secretary of State, His Lordship concurred in the opinion expressed by the Government of India that the gun-boat *Sphinx*, recently constructed for service in the Persian Gulf, did not render the provision of a despatch vessel unnecessary. The Government of India were requested to prepare designs of the vessel required, when steps would be taken to construct the vessel in England.

Plans for the new despatch vessel were duly prepared and approved by Colonel Ross.

61. The R. I. M. S. *Lawrence* was the ship that came out of this project. It was, however, found to consume an enormous quantity of coal, a defect which is much in the way of its frequent use.

(ii) Question of arming the *Lawrence*.\*

62. The duties of the Indian Marine Service as defined in the Indian Marine Service Act of 1884 are —

- The transport of troops,
- Guarding of convict settlements,
- Suppression of piracy,
- Survey of coasts and harbours,
- Visiting of light-houses,
- Relief of wrecked or distressed vessels,

and other local objects.

63. This Act also empowers the Governor-General in Council to make laws for persons employed, or serving, in, or belonging to, Her Majesty's Indian Marine Service, but such laws cannot be applied to any offence unless the vessel to which the offender belongs is at the time of the commission of the offence within Indian waters.

The term "Indian waters" includes the high seas between the Cape of Good Hope on the west and the Straits of Magellan on the east.

64. The Act further provides that in case a state of war exists between Her Majesty and any foreign power it shall be lawful for Her Majesty by proclamation or Order in Council to direct that any vessel belonging to Her Majesty's Indian Marine Service, and the men and officers from time to time serving thereon, shall be under the command of the Senior Naval Officer of the station where for the time being such ship may be; and that while any such vessel is under such command, such vessel shall be deemed, to all intents and purposes, a vessel of war of the Royal Navy, and the men and officers from time to time serving in such vessels shall be under such Naval Discipline Act or Acts as may be in force for the time being, and subject to such regulations as may be issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India in Council.

65. Subsidiary to the Indian Marine Service Act of 1884, which was passed in England, is the Indian Marine Act of 1887, passed in India, which lays down laws and regulations for persons serving in the Indian Marine, and which prescribes punishments for misconduct in the presence of an enemy.

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66. With paragraph 24 of despatch No. 100, dated 26th June 1885, the Government of India forwarded to the Secretary of State a letter from the Director, Royal Indian Marine, suggesting that armaments should be provided for two new vessels then being built in England for the Royal Indian Marine and intended for service in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf respectively as "the work both ships will be employed on renders this very desirable." The Government of India stated that they agreed with the Director, Royal Indian Marine, and recommended the provision of an armament.

67. In reply the Secretary of State said that the ship for the Persian Gulf had been sanctioned on the understanding that the duties to be performed by it were strictly non-combatant, and that it should be unarmed, but His Lordship went on to remark that as regards the question of armament the same principles applied to both vessels; that in the event of war these vessels would probably receive their complement from the Royal Navy, and that he considered it advisable to provide them with such fittings as would enable them to be rapidly and easily armed, *the guns being provided but kept in store until required*. This in his opinion was all that was necessary, and His Lordship then made the following important observations:—"It is not desirable to do anything which would induce the belief that the Indian Marine is a combatant force. It would indeed scarcely be acting in good faith to do so, since the Marine Regulation Act was passed on the understanding that the duties to be performed were mainly those of transport and communication. The armaments which should be ready on emergency, and when the vessels of the Marine came under the direct authority of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, should be kept in store in India, and be returned into store when no longer required under such authority. Should any fighting be necessary in ordinary times in the Persian Gulf, it must be done by Her Majesty's ships of war stationed there. It would be almost certain to produce complication, if the civil officer were placed in a position to make war, as it were, from his own yacht. On the other hand, it will be advantageous that the vessels should be so constructed as to be capable of being useful in time of war."

68. The Secretary of State's decision to keep the armaments in reserve was communicated to those concerned, and the Government of India replied to His Lordship concurring

\* Paras. 62-75 taken from the Précis in Secret E., August 1896, Nos. 82-83.

in the decision that it was not necessary to arm all the vessels of the Indian Marine, but pointing out that it was desirable that some of them should have guns on board if only for saluting purposes, and that the vessels in the Persian Gulf, at Aden and at Port Blair, might at any moment be engaged with slave dhows, or with tribes when rescuing wrecked ships, or in the suppression of piracy, the latter being one of the duties laid down for the Indian Marine Service in the Indian Marine Service Act.

69. The question of Royal Indian Marine vessels carrying armaments again came up in 1892 when another vessel\* for this service was being built in England. In connection with the armament which this vessel (which was one of 3,300 tons) should carry, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty recommended what armament should be provided, but remarked that they assumed "that it is only on an emergency that a transport belonging to the Indian Government would become a sea-going armed vessel, and that their opinion would previously be asked as to how it was proposed to utilise her, for they hold a strong opinion that no sea-going armed vessel belonging to the State should be in commission unless she is under the control of the Admiralty."

70. In reply to the above the Secretary of State forwarded to the Admiralty a copy of his despatch to the Government of India, No. 249, dated 30th September 1885, regarding the armaments for the vessels for Aden and the Persian Gulf, which he remarked settled the question.

71. The desirability of keeping the armament of the vessel in the Persian Gulf on board the *Lawrence* was again brought to notice in 1892 when some complications were apprehended at that place. In a letter dated 31st July 1892 the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf urged that "the fullest possible advantage of the *Lawrence's* presence in the Gulf is not taken, so long as she is considered to be a non-combatant vessel. With only one man-of-war on the station often for considerable periods outside the Gulf, it is evident that the police duties of the upper waters must be inadequately performed, especially during the hot weather when they are most likely to be required, and when Her Majesty's ships require a cooler climate. The piracies committed by the Beni Hajir are petty if it is true; but they require watching lest they should develop into something more serious, and patrolling the neighbourhood of Bahrein would no doubt act as a check upon them. A patrolling ship, however, must have the power to act if necessary, and this under present conditions the *Lawrence* legally has not."

72. At this time, however, the guns of the *Lawrence* were on board and in making a representation‡ to the Secretary of State, the Government of India explained that it was originally intended that the *Lawrence* should be a purely non-combatant vessel, but that the Indian Marine Act passed in 1887 seemed to warrant the arming of a Royal Indian Marine vessel for particular service such as the *Lawrence* was employed on, and that steps were accordingly taken to place her guns on board. His Lordship's orders were then requested whether in the event of acts of piracy or any hostile complications being apprehended in Indian waters, and no Royal Navy ship being present in the Persian Gulf, or available at the moment the *Lawrence* or any other Royal Indian Marine ship, might be placed at the disposal of the Senior Naval Officer of the station.

73. The Secretary of State replied in his despatch No. 7 of 12th January 1893. He said that there did not appear to him to be anything in the Indian Marine Act of 1887 which warranted the arming of the *Lawrence* in the manner described. He admitted that this Act contained provisions for the punishment of "misconduct in the presence of the enemy" which were inserted in case Indian Marine vessels should be employed in the suppression of piracy and other like services at times when, under section 6 of the Act of 1884, their crews would not be subject to the Naval Discipline Acts, but he added that "the existence of these provisions cannot be held to warrant the arming of Indian Marine vessels without the sanction of Her Majesty's Government." He further pointed out that in the case of the *Lawrence* it had been distinctly laid down that she should be strictly non-combatant; that the reason why she was prepared and fitted for an armament was that in the event of war she might be available for service under the authority of the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the manner prescribed by the Act of 1884, and that instructions had been given that the armament until required in that manner should be kept in store in India. He also observed that the same course had been followed as regards the armament of the *Warren Hastings*, in regard to which the Admiralty had stated that they held "a strong opinion that no sea-going armed vessel belonging to the State should be in commission unless she is under the control of the Admiralty."

74. Finally, he observed that the foregoing as well as previous despatches show clearly that it has never been the intention of Her Majesty's Government that any of the Royal Indian Marine vessels should be used for fighting purposes otherwise than as provided for in the Act of 1884, that is to say, when a state of war exists between Her Majesty and any

foreign power it shall be lawful for Her Majesty by proclamation, or Order in Council, to direct that any vessel belonging to the Indian Marine, and the officers and men from time to time serving thereon, shall be subject to the command of the Senior Naval Officer, and whilst under such command shall be regarded as belonging to the Royal Navy. In obedience to the above the *Lawrence* was disarmed.

75. In 1896 there were troubles at Bahrein in connection with which the Senior Naval Officer enquired whether he could use the *Lawrence*, but the decision was that he could not.

76. In 1903 Lord Curzon's Government represented to the Secretary of

Secret E., September 1903, Nos. 69-70.

State the advisability of seeking permission from the Admiralty for temporary commissioning, under a special flag for service in the Persian Gulf, for the suppression of illicit traffic in arms of precision of the R. I. M. S. *Lawrence*.

77. The reply of the Secretary of State (No. 88-Mily., dated 26th June 1903) shows the objections to the course proposed:—

After due consideration in Council of Your Excellency's Marine Despatch No. 7, dated 9th October 1902, in which you represent the advisability of seeking permission from the Admiralty for the temporary commissioning, under a special flag, for service in the Persian Gulf, for the suppression of illicit traffic in arms of precision, of the Royal Indian Marine Steamship "*Lawrence*," I caused a reference on the subject to be made to the Admiralty.

2. The Lords Commissioners referred to the Solicitor to His Majesty's Treasury as to the legal aspects of the question. His opinion is, and the Lords Commissioners concur in his opinion that the course proposed by your Government can only be adopted in the event of a war with a foreign power, and that legislation on the lines of the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 is necessary in order to enable the vessels of the Royal Indian Marine to be placed at the disposal of the Admiralty "from time to time as occasion requires."

3. Being desirous, however, if possible, of discovering a method of utilising the services of the "*Lawrence*" in the manner proposed, the Lords Commissioners again referred to the Solicitor to the Treasury as to the extent of the powers conferred by the Indian Marine Service Act of 1884 as regards the arming of vessels of that service at times other than when a state of war exists. In conference with the Legal Adviser of this Office the Solicitor to His Majesty's Treasury expressed the opinion that, provided nothing is done to militate against the well recognised understanding that the Royal Indian Marine is a non-combatant service required mainly for transport and communications, there are no legal objections to the arming of a vessel of the establishment when considered necessary for the express purpose of performing the duties which come within the scope of the Act of 1884; that it is not necessary for the officer in command of the vessel to hold a commission from the Admiralty in order to enable him to be placed under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer in so far as regards the employment of his vessel upon those duties; but that it is doubtful whether the prevention of smuggling is one of the duties contemplated by the Act.

4. Apart from the legal question, I do not consider that the necessity for legislation on the lines of the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 has in the present case been shown. I am prepared to agree with Your Excellency's Government that it is desirable that our powers of patrol in the Persian Gulf should be increased, though no formal representation on the subject has yet been addressed to me, but I am not satisfied that the best means of attaining this object is by the employment of the "*Lawrence*." The occasions on which the Political Resident will require the use of a despatch-boat are likely to become more frequent, and it appears to me undesirable to take any steps which would tend to deprive that official of the exclusive claim to the service of the "*Lawrence*." Conversely, it might well happen, should any scheme be sanctioned whereby the "*Lawrence*" could be placed under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer, that at a time when the Naval Officer was counting on the co-operation of the vessel for police purposes, she might be urgently required for the use of the Political Resident.

5. Moreover, the work of maritime police control is of a special character requiring expert handling. Experience has shown that legal difficulties are apt to arise in the case of a seizure of arms at sea, and these difficulties may develop into delicate international questions, should vessels flying foreign flags be found to be implicated in the illicit traffic in arms. I doubt whether the officers of the Royal Indian Marine should be called on to discharge duties involving so peculiar a responsibility without some previous course of special training, and, as at present advised, I am of opinion that the patrol of the Gulf for police purposes should continue to be entrusted to vessels of the Royal Navy under the exclusive control of the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

6. I am the more disposed to adhere to this decision owing to a recent proposal of the Admiralty to employ vessels of smaller draught in the Persian Gulf, which forms the subject of a separate despatch. I anticipate that this course will considerably assist your Government in the employment of police patrols and that the illicit traffic in arms of precision will be effectually dealt with by ordinary recognised means.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## New arrangements for the employment of subsidized vessels for service in the Persian Gulf, 1895 to 1903.

78. In 1895 there were some changes made in the arrangement for the employment of subsidized vessels in the Gulf. A new agreement was arrived at with the Admiralty under which India pays an increased subsidy to the Admiralty towards the maintenance of a naval force in Indian waters (Secretary of State's despatch No. 66, dated 26th June 1895; India Office letter, dated 26th June 1895, and Admiralty letters, dated 30th July and 24th October 1895). The amount of the subsidy is £100,000 per annum, and was based on the cost of the following ships, *viz.*,—

* Replaced in 1904 by	" Fox "	Tons.	" Marathon "*	...	2,950 tons	} 6,605.
† " "	" Perseus "	... 4,360	" Brisk "†	...	1,770 "	
	" Lapwing "##	... 2,135	" Pigeon "##	...	755 "	
	" Sphinx "	... 805	" Sphinx "	...	1,130 "	
Total tonnage of present subsidised ships—		8,430.				

79. The subsidised ships are under the control of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, who is however required to comply with the wishes of the Government of India as to their employment, and they are not to be employed without the consent of the Government of India south of a line drawn from Cape Guardafui to Point de Galle, and thence south of the Nicobar Islands to Cape Salang. The Government of India also pays for the coal and repair of the "Sphinx" which is habitually employed in the Persian Gulf, and for coal † for the other vessels when employed under requisition from the Government of India: other vessels besides the "Sphinx" are often employed in the Persian Gulf.

A. May 1891, Nos. 917-922.

† See also—

A. September 1900, Nos. 1322-1327.

A. October 1901, Nos. 1366-1376.

A. January 1902, Nos. 37-38.

B. December 1903, Nos. 1323-1324.

} Marine  
Department.

80. In his despatch No. 91, § dated 3rd July 1903, the Secretary of State intimated that he had approved in principle a proposal to substitute vessels of smaller draught for the larger vessels available for employment in the Persian Gulf, and that the employment of not more than three vessels, including the "Sphinx" for that service. He added that details had yet to be settled. The Government of India replied that they had no objection to the changes. ¶

§ No. 141 in Secret E., September 1903, Nos. 113-114. (Foreign Department.)

B. December 1903, Nos. 1323-1324.

¶ On the distinct understanding that no increase to the annual subsidy was involved.

81. In pursuance of the above, the Naval Commander-in-Chief made the following suggestions which he proposed should take effect from the 1st October 1904:—

- (a) that the "Sphinx", 1,130 tons; "Lapwing", 805 tons; and "Redbreast", 805 tons, be considered the subsidised ships instead of the "Fox", 4,360 tons; "Perseus", 2,135 tons; "Lapwing", 805 tons; and "Sphinx", 1,130 tons;
- (b) that, except with the consent of the Government of India, these vessels be not employed south of a line drawn from Aden, south of Sokotra, to Bombay;
- (c) that yearly, during the months of May to September, each of the three ships in turn be allowed to proceed to Colombo for a change, and to enable the men to be put through their musketry course.

Total tonnage of these three ships = 2,740.

81-A. The views of the Government of India were expressed in the following despatch :—

No. 8, dated Simla, the 3rd November 1904.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council,

To—The RIGHT HON'BLE ST. JOHN BRODRICK, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

We have the honour to refer to paragraph 3 of your military despatch No. 91,\* dated 3rd July 1903, in which it is stated that the details of the arrangements for the employment of the vessels of the Royal Navy for which a contribution is paid by India, would be settled in conference by representatives of the India Office and Admiralty.

2. We have recently received a communication on the subject from the Naval Commander-in-Chief who proposes that :—

- (i) His Majesty's ships *Sphinx*, *Lapwing* and *Redbreast* should, with effect from October 1st, 1904, be the ships for which the annual subsidy is paid instead of the *Fox*, *Perseus*, *Lapwing* and *Sphinx*;
- (ii) these vessels should not, without the consent of the Government of India, be employed south of an imaginary line from Aden passing south of Sokotra to Bombay;
- (iii) each ship in turn should be stationed at Colombo from May to September annually in order that the musketry course may be carried out, the European crew being sent to the naval camp at Diyatalawa.

These proposals, which are now referred for your consideration, have been accepted by us subject to any decision that may be arrived at by you in communication with the Admiralty.

3. We would here explain that political requirements necessitate the presence of three vessels in the Persian Gulf. Of these, one is required at the head of the Gulf during the summer months to check piracy during the date season, a second on the pearling banks and in the shallow waters around Bahrein, and a third at the mouth of the Gulf between Maskat, Henjam and Bander Abbas. Under the proposals of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, by which one ship proceeds annually to Colombo, only two vessels will be available for these services. We would therefore suggest that, in addition to the three gunboats referred to above, a special light draught vessel should be provided to police the pearl banks in the neighbourhood of Bahrein and to be available for service in the creeks and

† *Vide* your telegram of the 15th March 1904.

existing gunboats are unable to enter. If such a vessel were ordinarily stationed at Bahrein, it would no longer be necessary to provide the special boat † proposed for the

‡ *Vide* correspondence ending with your Secret Despatch No. 33, dated the 5th August 1904. use of the Political Agent, and any difficulty arising out of the employment of an armed ship not sailing under the King's Commission, would thus be avoided. The additional vessel which we now suggest could be manned by a native crew under charge of a petty officer and the Political Agent's military guard could be made available for shipment should occasion arise. At the request of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran we are now construct-

§ Secret E., February 1905, Nos. 1539-1545.

ing five sea-going steam § cutters for the use of the Belgian Customs Department in the Persian Gulf, and this display of maritime activity on the part of the Persian Government is an additional cause for rendering the presence of such a vessel as we have suggested desirable.

4. We also consider that, as none of the subsidised vessels can be spared for employment in the Gulf of Aden, the imaginary line referred to in paragraph 2 (ii) above should run from Dhofar, south of Sokotra, to Bombay.

5. We wish to bring to your notice that the tonnage of the vessels for which the annual contribution will now be paid is reduced from 6,605 tons to 2,740 tons, and, as stated in paragraph 37 of our military despatch No. 141, dated 12th September 1901, we trust that when the financial relations between the United Kingdom and India are reconsidered in 1906, the views expressed in paragraph 314 (3) of the report of the Royal Commission and in Mr. Buchanan's reservation may be taken into consideration by His Majesty's Government.

CHAPTER IX.

Movements of the British *versus* Foreign men-of-war, 1901-05.

(i) Movements of His Majesty's ships in connection with Maskat.

82. In April 1901, when the French ships-of-war the *Jean Bart* and *Infer-*

Secret E., September 1901, Nos. 1-27.

*net* visited Maskat and Sur, and before His Majesty's Ship *Cossack* was ordered to Sur, grave inconvenience was experienced by the Political Agent at Maskat in consequence of his inability to obtain the services of a man-of-war to proceed to Sur. The Government of India therefore suggested to Rear-Admiral Bosanquet that instructions might issue to the effect that commanders of His Majesty's ships, when passing up or down the Persian Gulf, should if requested by the Consul at Maskat, place their services at the disposal of that official if possible and provided that their sailing orders were not of an urgent nature, and also that the Consul at Maskat should be kept informed as far as possible of the movements of the ships in the Gulf.

83. No special instructions were, however, issued to Commanding Officers of His Majesty's ships to place their services at the disposal of the Consul at Maskat when possible, and if so requested, but it was pointed out that in the printed Standing Orders issued for the guidance of the squadron in the East Indies Command, it was laid down that "it will be the duty of all captains to pay prompt attention to every requisition from the Indian Government, or their authorized agent," and further that "as difficulties requiring prompt action are apt to arise suddenly, the Commanders of His Majesty's ships on this division (Persian Gulf) are to consider themselves at the disposal of the British Resident, or such other local authority as the Government of India may appoint, for the maintenance of the Maritime Police of these waters and for the support of British authority."\* These would appear to meet the wishes of the Government of India on the point.

The senior officer in the Persian Gulf was directed to keep the Political Agent informed of the movements of ships on his division so far as it may be possible to forecast them.

The Naval Commander-in-Chief pointed out that if the Consul had lately

Secret E., January 1902, Nos. 9-15.

been kept in ignorance of the whereabouts and movements of vessels in the Gulf, it was due to the concentration of ships in the north of the division, and that when a vessel was stationed in the vicinity of Maskat, as is usually the case in normal times, her Commanding Officer was always very ready to assist the local Consular and Political authority in this or any other matter.

(ii) Cruise of large men-of-war in the Persian Gulf, 1901-05.

(a) *Cruise of the Highflyer, 1901.*

84. In recent years a great deal of importance has been attached by foreign nations competing with the British in the Persian Gulf to making a display of large men-of-war on its shores. However poorly off these nations might be at home in the number of such ships, their display is calculated to make a deep impression upon the natives, who know nothing of the naval strength of the several powers in Europe except what they see with their own eyes. Hence the British Government in order to counteract the impression produced by the visits of foreign cruisers in the Gulf, have taken opportunities to despatch some of their large vessels to the Gulf, in addition to the vessels of the Indian Navy that are attached to the Persian Gulf squadron.

85. In 1901 His Majesty's Ship *Highflyer*, with Rear-Admiral Bosanquet on board, made a cruise in the Gulf. The Rear-Admiral writing demi-officially on 20th April 1901 from Trincomali to Mr. W. R. Lawrence (late Private Secretary to His Excellency Lord Curzon) gave a short account of his cruise in the Persian Gulf on the *Highflyer* in company with the *Sphinx*. The *Highflyer* was the largest ship, with heaviest guns, that had visited the Gulf, and appears to have made a great impression on the people at the ports it visited, namely at Sur,

Secret E., July 1901, Nos. 91-92.

Vide paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 28 above.

Maskat, Bushire and Bandar Abbas. Admiral Bosanquet was struck with the paucity of the British influence in the Gulf: wherever one goes, whether from Sur north to Bushire or south again to Ormuz and Jask, there are splendid remains of Portuguese forts and houses, and yet their occupation is more than 200 years past.

(b) *Visit of the Russian cruiser Varyag and His Majesty's Ship Amphitrite, 1901-1902.*

86. In December 1901 the Russian cruiser *Varyag* visited Maskat, Bandar Abbas, Lingah, Bushire, Muhammerah, Basrah and Koweit. It was one of the

Secret E., August 1902, Nos. 1-43.

largest ships that had ever visited the Persian Gulf and, as it made as much display as possible, its sight and movements made a deep impression on the people. In order to counteract this impression, the Government of India, at the suggestion of Colonel Kemball, after communicating with the India Office and the Admiral at Bombay, arranged that one of the large British men-of-war on her way to China should visit Maskat and the Gulf. His Majesty's Ship *Amphitrite* (Captain Windham), which sailed from England on 6th May 1902, was accordingly ordered to call at Maskat and Bandar Abbas. It was a first class cruiser of 11,000 tons.

87. His Majesty's Ship *Amphitrite* arrived at Maskat on 8th June 1902, after calling at Dhofar, Kuria Murria and Madruka on her way from Aden. After exchanging the usual formalities at Maskat, the cruiser showed its flag at Sur, again at Maskat, Seeb and Barka. It then visited Bahrein, Bushire, Koweit, the Pirate Coast, and Khor Fakan. Major Cox who, under orders of the Secretary of State, accompanied Captain Windham, concluded his report of the cruise (dated 28th June 1902) stating that His Majesty's ship in question had visited the Persian Gulf at a time when the climate was the cause of a good deal of distress to the ship's company, fresh as it was from a cold English spring; but that from a local point of view Government might rest assured that the *Amphitrite's* visit was productive of much good. Her Commander, Captain Windham, who thoroughly appreciated the object of his mission, laid himself out in every way, by hospitality to visitors, by throwing his ship open to sightseers and by the liberal exercise of the search light, to impress the natives and make his cruise effective. If the experiment could be repeated for a year during winter, it would, Major Cox suggested be an excellent measure.

88. The suggestion of Major Cox was communicated with approval by the Secretary of State to the Admiralty, who promised to keep it in view as opportunity

Secret E., October 1902, Nos. 83-87.

arose.

(c) *Visit of the Russian cruiser Askold and His Majesty's Ships Renown and Fox, 1902-03.*

89. In December 1902 the Russian first class cruiser *Askold* (6,000 tons) visited Maskat, Bandar Abbas, Lingah, Bushire, Basrah and Koweit. The Govern-

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 213-227.

Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 96-102.

ment thought that the cruise of a first class British battleship would be politically advantageous now, and so it was arranged that His Majesty's Ship *Renown* should visit Maskat, Bushire, and Bandar Abbas, but not Koweit on account of the draught of water. It left Bombay for the Gulf on 25th January 1903.

It called at Lingah, as well as Bandar Abbas, both of which ports are visited generally by French and Russian ships. The Naval Commander-in-Chief also directed, at the request of the Government of India, that His Majesty's ships passing up and down the Gulf during the cool season shall show the flag at Lingah as well as at Bandar Abbas.

(d) *Cruise of His Excellency Lord Curzon in the Gulf.*

90. Lord Curzon's cruise on H. M. S. *Hardinge* accompanied by the squadron of H. M. ships *Hyacinth*, *Fox*, *Pomone* and *Argonaut* answered well the purpose of counteracting the impression made by visits of foreign men-of-war in the Gulf. On account of this cruise is given in the *Précis on International Rivalry and British Policy*.

## CHAPTER X.

## Salutes to be fired from His Majesty's ships to Native Chiefs and Political Officers in the Persian Gulf.

91. In October 1879 the Marine Department forwarded to the Foreign Department for consideration a letter from the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the subject of the salutes from Her Majesty's ships in Indian waters, to which the officers in the diplomatic service of the Government of India were entitled, and the right of such officials to fly flags at sea, and what flag they should fly.

92. In the matter of salutes, the Marine Department was of opinion that the regulation laid down in the Secretary of State's despatches No. 135, dated 27th December 1877, and No. 12, dated 21st February 1878, and Foreign Department Notification No. 2-D. C. P., dated 1st January 1877, would meet all requirements. (The notification modified by the despatches fixed the royal salute, barring the actual presence of the Sovereign, at thirty-one guns.)

93. Reference was made by the Naval Commander-in-Chief to the practice obtaining in the Persian Gulf of firing irregular salutes, and of political officers flying their flags on Her Majesty's ships. The Commander of H. M. S. *Daphne* reported to the Commander-in-Chief that on visiting Basrah, he found that on a former occasion the Vice-Consul and Political Agent had been saluted with nine guns, and he therefore did the same. He also observed H. M. S. *Arab* leaving Maskat with the Officiating Political Agent on board, and flying a jack with a device in the centre. As these practices seemed to be irregular, he asked for instructions as to the salutes the Political Agents in the Persian Gulf were entitled to, and on what occasions, if any, they were permitted to hoist their Jacks on board Her Majesty's ships.

94. The Naval Commander-in-Chief, in forwarding this, said he only asked for information on these matters, in order that he might be able to give such instructions to the Commanding Officers of vessels in the Persian Gulf, as will ensure uniformity of procedure which did not at that time appear to exist.

95. The Government of India requested the Resident, Persian Gulf, and Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, to report what was the practice hitherto adopted in regard to salutes and the flying of flags in the Persian Gulf.

96. The Resident replied, in his No. 385, dated 4th November 1879, as follows:—

(1) *As to salutes.*—When paying official visits to, embarking on board of, or disembarking from Her Majesty's vessels in course of duty, the Resident was saluted with thirteen guns, and the Political Agent, Maskat, with eleven (as laid down in Government orders on the subject of salutes) within the limits of their jurisdiction, provided the ship was a saluting one, *i.e.*, carrying more than ten guns.

Since 1871, when Her Majesty's ships were substituted for those of the Bombay Marine, the actual practice had been somewhat different. Admiral Cockburn relaxed the standing orders, and allowed the Naval Commanders discretion as to saluting (His Excellency's order lays down that when it is considered necessary, or on particular occasions, salutes might be fired even by ships carrying fewer than ten guns—when a salute be deemed necessary by the Captain, or requested by the local authorities). The result of this order was that Naval Commanders saluted political officers and foreign flags or not according to their individual taste and judgment, and there has been a want of uniformity in consequence. Hearing that a fresh order had been issued, the Resident asked the Senior Naval Officer to furnish him with a copy. Under this new order salutes to political officers in the Persian Gulf were virtually abolished unless specially asked for.

(2) *With regard to flags.*—It had always been usual for the Naval Commanders to allow the Resident and the Political Agent, Maskat, when on duty on board Her Majesty's ships to display the flag they are authorized to fly on shore Notification No. 2519-G., dated 15th December 1875). There was no special authority for this practice, which rested on long usage, and was wholly dependent on the courtesy and consideration for the public interests of the Naval Commanders, who knew the advantage and convenience of the custom. The Resident thought that this was of greater practical importance to keep up than salutes, as it not only supported the political officers morally, but was useful in showing the inhabitants, the Agents, &c., when they were in the neighbourhood, and notifying their tour all round the coast.

97. The new naval order of 1879\* about salutes gave a list of certain salutes to be fired for particular Chiefs, and directed—

"These salutes (with the exception of that to the Sultan of Maskat) are to be fired by Her Majesty's ships, though they may have less than ten guns, but no other salute is to be fired by any of Her Majesty's ships in the Persian Gulf, carrying less than ten guns, except at the express request of the Political Resident."

98. With reference to this order Major Euan Smith recommended that all gun-boats should salute the Sultan of Maskat's flag once a year, as had always been done, as well as on first arrival at Maskat.

In this suggestion Colonel Ross concurred, as the Sultan would feel hurt if the salute were not continued.

99. On the same subject Mr. Robertson observed:—

(1) That the Shaikh of Koweit was not included in the list, but he recommended that he should be given five guns.

(2) Haji Jabir Khan, Governor of Mohammerah, only got five guns, but he had always received nine.

(3) As regards salutes generally, Mr. Robertson recommended that the power of requisitioning a salute should not be confined to the Resident alone, but should be extended to other political officers, who might request salutes up to nine guns when necessary.

In this last suggestion Colonel Ross agreed, and recommended that the power of requisition should be extended to the Political Agent, Maskat, Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, and Assistant Political Agent, Basrah.

\*Table of salutes.

Names.	No. of guns.	REMARKS.
Sultan of Maskat	21	Under sanction of Government.
Chief of Bahrein	5	In accordance with custom on visiting Government vessels.
" " Abu Thabi	5	Ditto.
" " Debay	3	Ditto.
" " Umm-ul-Kowein	3	Ditto.
" " Ajman	3	Ditto.
" " Shargah	3	Ditto.
" " Ras-ul-Khywah	3	Ditto.
Arab Governor of Bandar Abbas	5	Ditto.
" " Lingah	5	Ditto.
" " Mohammerah	5	Ditto.

Colonel Ross remarked in conclusion that the various Turkish vessels of war invariably saluted on all occasions.

100. The Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, replied, No. 146, dated 6th December 1879, forwarding a letter from Mr. Robertson, much to the same purport as that of Colonel Ross, that the salutes had practically been left much to the discretion of the commanders of vessels. Mr. Robertson thought it, politically, highly desirable that ships should both salute and fly the flags of political officers when on board in discharge of their duty; and in this opinion Colonel Miles concurred.

101. Colonel Ross having also sent his correspondence with the Senior Naval Officer about the new saluting orders to Colonel Miles, forwarded Colonel Miles' reply with his No. 392, dated 11th November 1879. Colonel Miles considered that the practical abolition of the Sultan of Maskat's salute, without a special request on each occasion made by the Resident, would be undoubtedly detrimental to His Highness' prestige, and would lead the Arabs to think he was in disgrace. Besides this the Sultan would soon know that other Chiefs continued to get salutes, and this would cause a feeling of irritation which it would be desirable to avoid. He also thought that as there were occasions when salutes to political officers had a useful and beneficial effect, it would not be advisable that they should be abolished as they were practically so by the new order.

102. These reports were forwarded to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and in his reply dated 4th April 1881, he stated that an attentive perusal of the correspondence on the subject of firing salutes and carrying flags in the Persian Gulf led him to think that the difficulties which had arisen on the subject were caused rather by the caprice of the naval authorities than from any real necessity.

The real causes of the objection made by the Admiralty to vessels of few guns firing salutes were shown by him to be the following:—

When the old small smooth-bore guns were superseded by rifled guns of large calibre, and where one gun took the place of twenty or thirty of the old guns, the question of salutes became a serious one—

*1st.*—Because a ship with a few large guns could not fire a salute with safety to her men.

*2nd.*—Because salutes were a cause of considerable detriment to rifled guns of precision.

The Admiralty, therefore, opened the question with the Foreign Maritime Powers, and the consequence was an enormous international reduction in salutes, both on the occasions when required and the number of guns fired, and an order that the old rule, of ships with few guns not saluting, was to be more strictly adhered to.

This being now the established rule all over the world, the Naval Commander-in-Chief saw no reason why it should be broken in the Persian Gulf, and he thought that, without any great detriment to the public service, saluting, except under most extraordinary circumstances, might be abolished for the present.

Meanwhile, and as it would perhaps be unwise to lay down a hard-and-fast rule that Her Majesty's vessels were not to salute at all, he suggested that the Residents should be requested to be as chary as possible in asking for salutes.

103. As regards the question of officials carrying a flag when embarked on board men-of-war, it appeared to the Naval Commander-in-Chief that the meaning of such an emblem was not understood. He observed that such a flag was rarely carried in European waters, and then only to denote respect for the high position or great office of the personage on board—the standard of England to denote the presence of Royalty—the Admiralty flag to denote the presence of the Lords of the Admiralty; while in the Persian Gulf every official hoisted the flag of the Viceroy which, when seen afloat by a man-of-war, was entitled to a

salute of thirty-one guns, and, next to the Royal standard, ordered to be treated with the highest marks of respect.

There could, therefore, he thought, be no question that the Viceroy's flag should never be hoisted *at sea*, except to denote the presence of the Viceroy himself, and the use of any other flag by lesser officials was, he considered, as meaningless as if every Lieutenant in command of a gun-boat was to hoist an Admiral's flag whenever he was sent on a mission.

104. The Government of India (Military Department) replied as follows :—

No. 561-S., dated Simla, the 23rd June 1881.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military (Marine) Department,

To—His EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL W. GORE JONES, C.B., Commander, Her Majesty's Naval Forces, East India Station.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter, dated the 4th April 1881, and to state that the two questions of requiring Her Majesty's ships in the Persian Gulf to fire salutes in the case of the Political Officers and native Chiefs of the Gulf, and to carry flags when the former are on board, have been very carefully reconsidered by the Government of India, and that the Governor-General in Council, while concurring in Your Excellency's opinion that, under the circumstances explained in your letter, these salutes may be discontinued, does not desire to make any change in the practice of allowing the political representatives of this Government to hoist their flag in the manner prescribed. It is considered important that the presence of officers of Government in positions of responsibility and power, such as the Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, the Political Agent at Maskat and other Political Officers, who have hitherto been entitled to display a flag when afloat, should be made generally known at the places visited by some mark of distinction, and the Government of India anticipate no difficulty or misapprehension as regards the flying of the distinguishing flag, in view of the instructions contained in the Notification\* of the 14th June 1880.

\* Home Department No. 1008.

105. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty informed the India Office that they saw no objection to the arrangement proposed, *viz.*, "that the firing of salutes shall be discontinued, but that the existing regulation as to the hoisting of the Governor-General's flag by the Government officers in position of responsibility shall remain in force" (letter dated 16th September 1881).

Political A., November 1881, Nos. 96-97.

106. The above orders were at first taken as applying to all classes of salutes. But the discontinuance of salutes was very keenly felt by the Trucial Chiefs. The matter was brought to the notice of Government by Colonel Ross, and it was pointed out by him that apparently the objections as to firing salutes did not apply where the number of salutes to be fired was not more than five which could not cause much injury or inconvenience.

Political A., March 1882, Nos. 218-220.

The Commander-in-Chief thereupon passed orders that salutes should be continued to the Trucial Chiefs as hitherto.

107. In 1896 Captain Saddler was asked by Captain Baker of the *Sphinx* whether he should fire a salute to the Sultan's flag on arrival at Maskat. It was a non-saluting ship like the *Lapwing* and *Pigeon*. Captain Saddler thought that they should fire a salute once a year as the *Cossack* and *Brisk* did: the Arabs did not understand the distinction between a saluting and non-saluting vessel and mis-interpreted any omission to salute.

Secret E., August 1896, Nos. 79-81.

108. The following reply was given to Colonel Wilson by Mr. Barnes :—

Demi-official letter dated Simla, the 16th July 1896.

From—H. S. BARNES, Esq., C.S., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—COLONEL F. A. WILSON, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your demi-official letter to Talbot, dated the 6th February 1896, on the question of salutes to the flag of the Sultan of Maskat.

It has been ascertained, by reference to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, that under existing orders only vessels authorised by the Queen's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions (see paragraph 47) fire salutes in the Persian Gulf, except as follows:—

- (a) Other ships than those alluded to above may salute under very special circumstances on requisition, such cases being specially reported to the Naval Commander-in-Chief.
- (b) Salutes of not more than 5 guns are given to the chiefs who are under the influence of the British Government when visiting Her Majesty's ships, even when such ships are precluded by the general instructions from firing salutes.

Of the ships now on the East India Station only the first four in the marginal list carry such guns as to be classed under paragraph 47 of the Admiralty Instructions as saluting vessels.

- |                         |                       |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| (1) <i>Bonaventure.</i> | (5) <i>Sphinx.</i>    |
| (2) <i>Marathon.</i>    | (6) <i>Redbreast.</i> |
| (3) <i>Cossack.</i>     | (7) <i>Lapwing.</i>   |
| (4) <i>Brisk.</i>       | (8) <i>Pigeon.</i>    |

The Admiralty Instructions on the subject were issued after discussion with Foreign Maritime Powers, and there are particular objections to firing the longer salutes. It is understood from Sadler's letter that the Sultan has not himself raised the question, and unless he does so, or unless you have good grounds for supposing that he has noticed and taken umbrage at the fact that some of our ships do not salute his flag, matters had probably better be left as they are. But if you are of opinion that a special concession is, on political grounds, really desirable, you may of course make an official representation.

109. In February 1900 the Resident submitted the following list of salutes to be fired in the Persian Gulf for the consideration and approval of the Government of India (letter No. 62, dated 19th February 1900):—

External A., May 1901, Nos. 120 135.

*Memorandum of salutes fired in the Persian Gulf.*

	Guns.
At noon on 24th May each year ... Birthday* of Her Majesty the Queen ...	31
At noon on 1st January each year ... Proclamation* Day of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen, Empress of India ...	31
..... Birthday† of His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia ...	21
At termination of official visit by ... His Highness the Sultan of Maskat ...	21
Ditto ... His Excellency the Governor of Bushire ...	17
Ditto ... Political Resident in the Persian Gulf ...	13
Ditto ... Political Agent at Maskat ...	11
Ditto ... Agents and Consuls-General and Commissioners and Consuls-General ...	11
Ditto ... Consuls-General ...	9
Ditto ... Consuls ...	7
Ditto ... Shaikh of Kuwait ...	5
Ditto ... Shaikh of Bahrain ...	5
Ditto ... Shaikh of Abu Thabi ...	5
Ditto ... Shaikh of Debay ...	3
Ditto ... Shaikh of Shargah ...	3
Ditto ... Shaikh of Ajman ...	3
Ditto ... Shaikh of Um-al-Kawain ...	3
Ditto ... Shaikh of Ras-al-Kheima ...	3
Governor of Muhammara ...	5
Governor of Bundar Abbas ...	5
Governor of Lingah ...	5

\* Everywhere in the Persian Gulf.  
† Fired when the vessel is in any Persian port.

110. The Government of India after obtaining some further information from the Resident, wrote to the Secretary of State as follows (No. 70, dated 9th May 1901):—

We have the honour to forward copies of the papers noted in the enclosed list regarding the salutes to be fired by British ships of war in the Persian Gulf and at Maskat. The salutes for the Governors and the Arab Chiefs appear to have been fixed without reference to Her late Majesty's Government, and the authority for them is the Standing Order\* of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, No. 94, dated the 2nd April 1899, which, so far as can be traced from the information before us, was issued without authority of Her Majesty's Government or of the Government of India. These salutes were, however, implicitly approved by the Government of India, and that Her Majesty's Government were aware of them is shown by the Marquis of Hartington's Political despatch No. 57, dated the 2nd June 1881, on receipt of which Lord Ripon's Government determined that salutes should no longer be required from the small vessels employed in the Persian Gulf. The orders now in force lay down that only vessels authorised by the King's Resolutions and Admiralty Instructions (paragraph 47) should fire salutes in the Persian Gulf, except as follows:—

- (a) Order ships may salute in every special circumstances on requisition. Such cases being especially reported to the Naval Commander-in-Chief.
- (b) Salutes of not more than 5 guns are given to the chiefs who are under the influence of the British Government when visiting British ships of war, even when such ships are precluded by the general instructions from firing salutes.

2. Your Lordship will observe that, in the list forwarded with the letter from our Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 62, dated the 19th February 1900, it is proposed to give the Shaikh of Kuwait a salute of 5 guns. We see no objection to this, as it is desirable to provide for the contingency of his visiting one of His Majesty's ships. We, therefore, ask that formal sanction may now be accorded to all the salutes noted in the list referred to which are not already provided for by the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions and the Army Regulations, India, that is to say, the salute on the Birthday of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, when the vessel is in any Persian port, and the salutes to the Governor of Bushire, the Arab Chiefs and the Governors of Muhammara, Bandar Abbas and Lingah. The salute of 17 guns for the Governor of Bushire appears to be decidedly extravagant, but inasmuch as it is in technical accordance with the King's Regulations, and is alleged to have been given for some time past, we do not at present see the grounds for refusing it. We would suggest, however, that a reference be made to Sir Edward Ross as to whether it was conceded during his time.

111. The Secretary of State conveyed the sanction of His Majesty's Government to the salutes as given in the list prepared by the Resident in his letter

External A., August 1902, Nos. 12-23.  
No. 62, dated 19th February 1900.

*Salutes for the British and French representatives at Maskat.*

External A., May 1901, Nos. 120-135, and Article 18 of the Queen's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions.

112. Under the Army Regulations the salutes fired to Consular officers are:—

						Guns.
To a Consul	...	...	...	...	...	7
To a Consul-General	...	...	...	...	...	9

At Maskat the Political Agent of the Government of India gets 11 guns in his dual capacity as Consul and Agent of the Government of India.

113. In 1897 M. Ottavi, then French Vice-Consul at Maskat, asked the Political Agent at Maskat whether in the event of his paying an official visit to H. M. S. *Cossack*, he would receive the salute he received from the Sultan of Maskat and from vessels of his own Government, *viz.*, 9 guns. The matter was referred for the orders of the Resident and he informed the Political Agent that in view of the fact that French vessels had given him (the Resident) a salute of 13 guns, which he as a Resident of the Government of India is entitled to receive from vessels of Her Majesty's Navy, he was of opinion that the same courtesy should be extended to the representative of the French republic in Maskat. Under the circumstances the request of M. Ottavi for a salute of 9 guns was complied with.

114. When M. Ottavi was raised to the position of a Consul he demanded from the Sultan the same salute as the British representative, that is 11 guns, a demand which was complied with by His Highness.

115. In 1900 M. Ottavi refused to return the official visit of the Commander of the *Cossack*, because the latter was unable to accord him the 11 gun-salute which he claimed. The Commander's action was fully supported by the Naval Commander-in-Chief. M. Ottavi seems to have referred the matter to the French Government, but what action was taken by them it is not known. No further claim was made by M. Ottavi for the 11-gun salute.

116. M. Laronce, who succeeded M. Ottavi, ranked as Vice-Consul, but received salutes of 9 guns from French men-of-war. One of the American men-of-war fired the 11-gun salute to the American Vice-Consul, and acting Consul Mr. Mackirdy, while another American man-of-war accorded him the salute of 7 guns.

117. Major Cox thought that the salute of 11 guns accorded to the British Political Agent was a source of embarrassment to the Consular representatives of other countries. He therefore proposed that either he should be authorized to inform foreign men-of-war that his salute was only 7 guns, while still receiving the 11 guns salute from British men-of-war, provided the representatives of other powers agreed to accept from British vessels purely their *Consular* salutes, or that the French or American Governments should be asked to state what salutes should be accorded to their representatives at Maskat.

118. The Government of India decided, however, not to take any action on these proposals. So long as our ships gave the French representative the salute fixed by the regulations, it matters little what practice the ships of other nations followed, while it would not be politic to abandon a salute of 11 guns which the latter accorded to our representative. It is just well that foreign men-of-war should recognize that our representative at Maskat is something more than a Consul, and so long as they continued to recognize this, the Government of India saw no adequate grounds for protest (Foreign Department letter No. 2476-E., dated 16th December 1902, with demi-official of 20th December 1902 to Major Cox).

#### *Salutes for the Vice-Consul at Bandar Abbas.*

119. When the H. M. S. *Pomone* visited Bandar Abbas in March 1902, it fired a salute of 7 guns to the Vice-Consul, Captain Boxer, although as Vice-Consul he was not entitled to the honour. Colonel Kemball was of opinion that for political reasons it was desirable that the practice, thus fortuitously instituted, should be continued. The Government of India agreed with the Resident. There appeared to be two alternative methods by which this could be effected, namely:—(a) either to raise the rank of Vice-Consul to that of a Consul, or (b) to move the Admiralty to instruct the commanders of His Majesty's ships to continue the salute of the Vice-Consul, as a special arrangement. The Government of India asked for instructions of His Majesty's Government.

120. In the meanwhile they requested the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, to instruct Captain Windham of H. M. S. *Amphitrite*, when he visited Bandar Abbas, to accord to His Majesty's representative the same salute as was given by the *Pomone*.

121. The Admiralty issued instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, as a special arrangement, to continue the practice of saluting his Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bandar Abbas with 7 guns.

## CHAPTER XI.

## Steam-launches for Political Officers.

## (i) Steam-launch for the Resident on the Persian Gulf.

122. In July 1876 a steam-launch was placed at the disposal of the Resident in the Gulf for quarantine purposes. This was only a temporary measure, but the Resident continued somehow to keep it until 1882, when he asked for a new one, more suited to the place. The necessity for a good steam-launch at Bushire was unquestionable. The Resident had to pay official visits on board Her Majesty's vessels visiting the Persian Gulf and as these vessels had to anchor several miles from the shore, a safe sea-boat was absolutely necessary.

General A., September 1877, Nos. 315-318.

A., Political E., June 1883, Nos. 133-141.

123. The Government of India accordingly asked the Secretary of State to authorize Messrs. White & Co., of Cowes, to construct a life-boat pinnace, 37 or 38 feet in length, of the description supplied by them to the Admiralty and cause it to be despatched either direct to the Persian Gulf on board the vessel then preparing for the Gulf or to Bombay in one of Her Majesty's ships (despatch No. 17, dated 7th May 1883).

External A., September 1884, Nos. 114-118.

The Resident received the steam pinnace ordered in July 1884.

124. The Resident at Baghdad at the suggestion of Mr. Robertson had proposed to transfer the old steam-boat of Bushire to Basrah. But as the Government of India thought that the necessity for maintaining a steam-boat at Basrah had not been proved, they decided to sell the old boat at Bushire.

External A., January 1889, Nos. 101-109.

External A., April 1885, Nos. 201-203.

125. The boat obtained in 1884 was, on account of her deteriorated condition, replaced by a new one in 1903, constructed at the Bombay dockyard at a cost of Rs. 24,000.

External A., July 1903, Nos. 130-31.

External A., August 1903, No. 123.

## (ii) Steam-launch for the Resident at Baghdad.

126. *Vide* Chapter XII (xvii) of *Turkish Arabia Précis*, 1801—1905.

## (iii) Proposed steam-launch for the Consul at Muhammerah, 1904-05.

127. During Lord Curzon's tour in the Persian Gulf it was decided that it was necessary to provide the Consul at Muhammerah with a light draught launch suitable for touring on the Karun and Shat-el-Arab. Sir A. Hardinge brought the matter to the notice of the Marquess of Lansdowne.

128. The Secretary of State for India thereupon asked for an estimate of the cost of providing a suitable vessel; but as the London Foreign Office suggested that it might be possible to hire one when required, Messrs. Lynch and Co., who had a steam-launch, were addressed on the subject, but stated that they could not spare it for the purpose required.

Secret E., August 1904, Nos. 400-449 (No. 443).

Secret E., January 1905, Nos. 143-157.

129. The Government of India then proposed to build a new steam-launch at a cost of about Rs. 54,000 in the R. I. M. Dockyard at Bombay on the understanding that one half of cost was met from the Imperial Treasury (despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 238, dated 8th December 1904).

Secret E., January 1905, Nos. 143-17 (No. 155).

130. The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, however, were not satisfied of the necessity for incurring so considerable a capital expenditure with a consequent annual charge for maintenance (Treasury to the Foreign Office, dated 13th March 1905).

Secret E., June 1905, Nos. 600-606.

## (iv) Suggestion to utilize the three torpedo-boats, lying at Bombay, for the use of the Consular Officers in the Gulf.

131. In his letter No. 96, dated 18th February 1905, Major Cox

proposed that the three torpedo-boats lying idle at Bombay should be utilized for service in the Persian Gulf, one at Maskat, one on the Shat-el-Arab, and the third at Bushire to be at the disposal of the Political Agent at Koweit, Bahrein and Bandar Abbas. The Government of India, however, informed the Resident that "the torpedo-boats in question cannot at present be spared" (No. 2,78-E. A., dated 8th June 1905).

## CHAPTER XII.

## Surveys in the Persian Gulf from 1871.

132. A comprehensive account of the survey operations carried out by the Indian Navy in the Persian Gulf as well as the Indian waters was compiled by Mr. Clements Markham in 1871 (see synopsis in Chapter I above).

See—  
(1) *Foreign Department Proceedings, General A., August 1871, Nos. 25-33.*  
(2) *The Indian, Surveys, by C. Markham.*  
(3) *Low's History of the Indian Navy.*

133. The question was then being discussed as to continuing or revising the work done by the Indian Navy. The opinions of the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia and the Resident in the Persian Gulf were called for, through the Bombay Government, as to the necessity of further surveys in the waters of the Persian Gulf. Their reports are interesting as showing what they considered was needed at the time, and as indicating the directions in which surveys may have yet to be made, and are therefore printed *in extenso* below:—

General A., March 1872, Nos. 18-20.

No. 99, dated Bagdad, 10th November 1871.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. HERBERT, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia,

To—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department.

With reference to Government Resolution No. 4606, dated 27th September, which reached me on the 25th ultimo, I have the honor to report that, having no official connection with the Persian Gulf, I am not in a position to offer an opinion as to the necessity of further surveys thereof further than to state that, so far as the trade of this country is concerned, no complaints have ever reached me from the commanders of vessels as to the insufficiency of the existing charts, nor during three years I have resided in Turkish Arabia have I heard of any accident to any vessel in consequence of such.

So far as I am informed the charts in use are considered excellent, the landmarks and soundings being clearly and accurately laid down.

As regards this country itself, which from its historical associations its capabilities with reference to agricultural and commercial enterprise, and its geographical position, is of the greatest importance, there can, I think, be no doubt that it would be very desirable to complete the survey.

The map now being compiled by Lieutenant Collingwood will be drawn from surveys of the two great rivers, the *Euphrates and Tigris*, and the intervening country, but all the vast tracts of the province to the north and north-east, and that portion that lies between the Tigris and the Louriستان Range, have yet to be surveyed.

The task of undertaking this work would, I imagine, properly appertain to the Ottoman Government, but it is highly improbable that it will ever initiate such an undertaking, though possible it might be proposed to it by Her Majesty's Government with such offers of assistance in surveyors, etc., as might be deemed expedient.

As regards the *Shat-ul-Arab*, I would not recommend that any special expense be at present incurred on a further survey, though, if that of the Persian Gulf be undertaken, the work might (with the consent of the States on either bank, Persia and Turkey) be extended to Busreh.

It seems probable that, in the course of comparatively few years, Koweit may become the principal port of this country in the place of Busreh.

I imagine that if it be decided to construct a railway to connect the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, Koweit will be the position chosen for the terminus on the Gulf.

But even though this be not so, it is not impossible that a navigable canal may be made from Busreh to the head of a large creek that runs inland from the harbour of Koweit to near Zobair, and this would complete the water communication between that harbour and the capital, Bagdad.

The harbour of Koweit is said to be one of the finest in the world—to be easily entered, and very safe, while its climate is as salubrious as that of Busreh is unhealthy.

I had a conversation on this subject some little time ago with His Excellency Midhut Pasha, and found him fully alive to the importance of the project which had already attracted his attention.

He is now proceeding to Busreh where it is probable he will remain some days, and will perhaps find time to make enquiries on the spot.

If this be accomplished, a further survey of the Shat-ul-Arab will be wholly unnecessary.

No. 1301-387, dated on board H. M.'s *S. Hugh Ross*, off Bahrein, 14th December 1871.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LEWIS PELLY, C.S.I., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Resolution of Government as per margin, communicating to me a call from the Government of India for my opinion as to the necessity for further surveys in the waters of the Persian Gulf.

2. The question seems to me to be a nautical and professional one. Any opinion I may have arrived at on it will be accepted as that of a landsman, whose duties, however, have required his frequent cruising in most parts of the Gulf during a period of between nine and ten years.

3. The question further appears to me regardable from two points of view:—

*1st.*—That of complete and scientific accuracy, and

*2ndly.*—That of the practical requirements of navigation at the present time.

4. Regarded from the first point of view, a survey cannot, of course, be too accurate or complete; and there are doubtless some areas of water particularly on the Arabian side of the Gulf, which have not been completely surveyed, and where the navigation is more than ordinarily intricate. But these areas are away from the ordinary track of vessels, and I should not be prepared to advise further outlay on the survey in detail so long as other surveys of more immediately practical necessity remain uncompleted, and many of this latter character appear to be indicated in the able and exhaustive despatch of Mr. Clement Markham, dated the 18th of February 1871.

5. Regarding the question from the second point of view, *vis.*, that of the practical requirements of navigation at the present time, both observation and hearsay lead me to consider that the present surveys are sufficiently, and indeed remarkably, accurate in their soundings, delineation of coast lines, and cross-bearings. This opinion applies especially to the later charts revised by Commancer C. G. Constable and Lieutenant A. W. Stiffe.

6. At the same time there are a few points to which, if it be the intention of Government to establish a Marine Survey Department, I would, under correction, direct attention. And these points I will now briefly enumerate:—

*1st.*—There is reported to be a sunken rock off Ras Noo at the entrance of the Gwador Bay, and on which one or more vessels have touched: the existence or position of this rock or shoal should, I think, be certainly determined as the governmental and mail steamers have constant need for passing close to it.

*2ndly.*—Some navigators allege that certain shoal patches off the coast in the neighbourhood of Koh-Mobareck are not accurately laid down. I myself incline to doubt whether these allegations are well founded, but it might prove satisfactory to determine the point.

*3rdly.*—I have heard it stated that there is a shoal patch off the western end of the island of Larrack, and which is not laid down, but I am uncertain as to whether this patch does or does not exist.

*4thly.*—The existence of two shoal patches marked on the chart on the starboard as you enter the Angaum Sound from the eastward have, I believe, been questioned. I myself incline to think that these patches are accurately laid down, but as the Angaum Sound is likely to be increasingly used, it would be advisable to dispose definitively of the question.

*5thly.*—It is reported that the Bassidore bank off the western end of the island of Kishm is silting up, and that soundings smaller than any marked on the chart have been struck on this bank. It seems probable that a mud bank similar like that of Bassidore would be liable to silt, and it might be well to revise the present soundings.

*6thly.*—The shoal known as the Pollior Shoal marked on the chart about midway between the island of Froor and Ras Boostanah should, I think, be resurveyed in detail, and a separate chart be made of it. The masters of native craft say they have no knowledge of this shoal. Some of our own navigators assert that the shoal has sufficient water on it for steamers of considerable draught to cross it. In my opinion the shoal indub-

ably exists, but as it lies on the direct track of steamers calling at Lingah and passing thence up and down gulf, the determination of this shoal seems very desirable. It is also alleged that between the shoal and Ras Boostanah, there are one or more patches close inshore, which are not marked on the chart. This question might also be determined simultaneously with that of the Pollior Shoal.

*7thly*.—Some few years ago a merchant craft was burnt and sunken in the four and half fathom line a little to the southward of the entrance of the inner roads at Bushire. This wreck still lies in the fair-way channel of vessels passing to and fro the Busreh river from Bushire; and it would be very convenient for commerce if the wreck were blown up or otherwise removed.

*8thly*.—There are the channels leading into the *Shat-ul-Arab* or *Busreh* River, and rather more to the westward another Khore or creek called *Core Abdoollah*, from which,

*Vide* my Report No. 1190-339, dated 13th October 1871.

passing in a south-westerly direction, lies the harbour of Koweit. As already submitted in a previous report, I think that the question of a railway from the Mediterranean to the head of the Persian Gulf may sooner or later attract increased attention to the shore line thus summarized. And as Mr. W. Parkes, Civil Engineer, has recently favoured me, after personal, though hurried, inspection of its localities, with his opinion on this shore line, I venture to subjoin his remarks as being of far more practical weight than any which I could pretend to offer:—

"We made a successful attempt to enter Koweit and an unsuccessful one to enter *Core Abdoollah*,

"The latter was provoking, but I do not think it is of much real consequence, because I am sure it would be impossible to speak confidently of that place as a terminus for the railway without much more information than at present exists. The doubtful points are precisely those which require a systematic survey for their solution.

"The cause of our failure was this: Captain Avern and myself had quite understood that the pilot would take the ship up to the head of the *Core*, but when we had gone a short distance he got frightened and refused to go further. We had already found that the chart was useless as a guide. There is not a single fixed point visible from which we could determine our position. So all we could do was to come out again.

"Will you allow me to suggest that it would be very desirable to have the positions of the buoys at the entrance to the *Shat-el-Arab*, and of the Telegraph Station at *Fao*, accurately determined by independent solar observation. The correctness of the chart would thus be tested, and if it was verified it would be really useful, which it is not at present.

"The head of Koweit Bay is undoubtedly suitable for a station for Indian Mail Steamers, and the necessary accommodation could be afforded at no extravagant cost, but it is *probable* *Core Abdoollah* would answer still better, and it certainly deserves further examination.

"The chart of Koweit is faulty. We distinctly saw a spit running nearly across the head of the Bay of which the chart gives no indication; and in another part I found the depths decidedly less than shown on the chart. The mole of showing the hills on shore is also misleading. They will offer no impediment to the railway approach as I had feared they might. The shore due north of the town of Koweit will not do for the station as I had hoped.

*9thly*.—Proceeding southward from Koweit along the Arabian shore line, we come on a length of reefy, dirty ground, which appears to have been left partially unsurveyed. There is, I believe, a channel inshore of these reefs, and I am told that a Turkish steamer of light draught recently passed down the channel to *Kateef*, but this tract is so apart from our present ordinary lines of navigation that, as I observed before, I should not deem myself justified in advocating any immediate outlay on its survey.

*10thly*.—A survey of the reefs on the shore lines of *Kateef* and *Bahrein* has already been ordered by Government, and the Turkish Commodore informs me it is his intention to organize a Turkish survey of the *Ojair* and *Kateef* shore line, and then to draft the officers of the survey into the ships of the squadron in view to providing every ship with a competent Turkish pilot.

*11th*.—Passing round *Ras Rekkam* to the southward of *Bahrein*, we open a wide indentation of coast between that Cape and the shore line known as the *Pirate Coast*. This indentation is sprinkled with frequent islets and reefs, in the survey of which great labour was, I believe, expended by the survey officers of the late Indian Navy. It is possible that the survey of this intricate indentation may not be complete, but I should not be prepared to recommend further outlay on it for the present.

7. In conclusion, when we consider the climate and intricacies of the Persian Gulf, and that the survey of it was executed with sailing vessels, and wholly without the aid of steam, it is, in my opinion, astonishing how accurate and in what detail the survey is found to be.

134. A survey of the shore lines, Katif and Bahrein, had already been ordered by the Government of India.

*Survey of the Katif and Bahrein Coasts, 1873-74.*

135. In January 1873 the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, asked for instructions with regard to the proposed survey of the Katif Reef channels by the Officer Commanding H. M.'s Schooner *Constance*. Colonel Herbart, Political Resident, Baghdad, was therefore asked to ascertain from the Pasha whether there were any objections to the proposed survey. The reply was that our Ambassador at Constantinople telegraphed to the effect that the Porte authorized the survey. The Pasha wished, however, that a Turkish corvette should accompany H. M.'s schooner. Colonel Ross did not think this necessary, but the Government directed (till 24th March 1873) that the survey might proceed with or without a Turkish corvette, and that if a corvette wished to accompany the survey boat, no objection should be taken.

136. While the survey-boat was proceeding to make the survey, Colonel Ross instructed its commander to communicate to the Turkish local authorities at Katif the nature of his operations before landing to survey, and if any objection should be raised, to inform them that the operations were being undertaken with the cognizance of the Porte. The Government of India approved of these instructions (letter No. 985-P., dated 16th May 1873).

137. A complaint was then made by the Porte that the survey officers had landed on the Nejd coast. When enquiries were made, Colonel Ross reported that neither the surveying vessel nor any of her boats had come within 5 miles of the Nejd coast, that the survey had till then been confined to channels of approach to Bahrein, and that no attempt had yet been made to survey the coast of Katif or Nejd (telegram of 31st July 1873).

138. Colonel Ross, however, represented that the survey party would probably require to land on the Katif coast in order to measure base lines and erect temporary triangular posts, and in order to avoid any further misapprehension on the part of the local authorities at Nejd, he recommended that the commander of the survey vessel should be furnished by the Governor General of Turkish Arabia with explicit written permission to land. This request, the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, was desired to move the Ottoman Government to grant (letter No. 2265-P., dated 23rd September 1873).

139. The Turkish Governor General, Irak, was pleased to comply with this request and directed Faiz Pasha Mutasarrif and Commander of the Force at Nejd (Hasa) to show proper respect and give necessary aid to the British survey officers, as they had been authorised to land on the seashore simply for the purpose of making a chart of the coast (Rudif Pasha's letter, dated 23rd November 1873).

140. Thereafter the Schooner *Constance* appears to have made the survey of the Katif coast unobstructed. In March 1874 its commander reported that he was there surveying the coast to the north and westward of the Turkish district. In consequence of bad weather he had twice to put in for shelter under Ras Tanurah on the Katif coast, but apparently no protest was raised against his movements by the Turks.

*Survey of the approaches of the Shat-el-Arab and the Bamishir, 1888-1890.*

141. In November 1888 Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran proposed to the Government of India that a survey should be made of the Bamishir river from its mouth to Muhammerah, to ascertain how far it could be used as an alternative to the Shat-el-Arab. As no vessel was immediately available Colonel Ross visited the mouth of the Bamishir in December 1888 and made a rough survey of the river.

142. As to a complete survey of the river, the British Minister telegraphed to the Viceroy on the 2nd January 1889:—

"A rough survey has been made locally. This will, I think, do for the present, as the Governor of Arabistan is hostile and might make mischief. French have appointed Consul at Bushire. Queen has invited Shah to England. Russians still very active and might make mischief."

143. In February 1890, the British Minister, at the instance of the Resident at Bushire, proposed to the Government of India that a survey of the Bamishir should be made. The Shah had no objection to the proposal.

144. A survey was made, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, of the approaches of the Shat-el-Arab and the Bamishir as a preliminary step to the survey of the latter by R. I. M. ships the *Lawrence* and the *Comet*. The former survey was completed in December 1890, and also an examination and rough sketch was made by Lieutenant Dunn of the Bamishir river, which established the fact that there was no prospect of obtaining a channel for ocean steamers by that river. And as the *Lawrence* was required by the Resident elsewhere, no further survey was made.

145. The Turkish Government complained to the British Ambassador that British gun-boats had been taking soundings near the Fao fort without giving previous notice to the local authorities. It was ascertained by the Resident at Baghdad that the operations complained of were connected with the recent survey, but that no soundings had been taken within four miles of the fort, except such as the ordinary practice of seamen would require for the safe navigation of their vessels (despatch No. 42, dated 11th March 1891, to the Secretary of State).

146. Our records from 1892 to 1899 are practically silent as to any survey operations conducted in the Persian Gulf. As regards surveys since the year 1900, we must read Chapter IX of the *Précis on International Rivalry and British Policy*.



