

BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN'S  
HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE  
VOLUME VII

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THE MUGHUL EMPIRE

THE HISTORY AND CULTURE  
OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE

THE  
MUGHUL  
EMPIRE

GENERAL EDITOR

R. C. MAJUMDAR, M.A., Ph.D., D. LITT. (Hony.)

*Vice-President of the International Commission for a History  
of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind set up  
by UNESCO; Hon. Fellow of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta;  
Hon. Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society  
of Great Britain and Ireland;  
Hon. Fellow of the Asiatic  
Society of Bombay;*

*Hon. Head of the Department of History,  
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay;*

*Formerly Vice-Chancellor, University of Dacca,  
Principal, College of Indology, Hindu University, Banaras,  
and Visiting Professor of Indian History, Universities  
of Chicago and Pennsylvania (U.S.A.)*

ASSISTANT EDITORS

J. N. CHAUDHURI, M.A., Ph.D.,

*Formerly Lecturer, Brahmananda Keshabchandra College, Barrackpur*

S. CHAUDHURI, M.A., Ph.D.,

*Lecturer, Calcutta University.*



1974

BOMBAY

BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN

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FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1974

Wells College Library,  
Aurora, New York

PRINTED IN INDIA

BY

V. VARADARAJAN

AT ASSOCIATED ADVERTISERS & PRINTERS,  
505, TARDEO ARTHUR ROAD, BOMBAY-400 034

AND

PUBLISHED BY

S. RAMAKRISHNAN, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN,

KULAPATI K. M. MUNSHI MARG,

BOMBAY-400 007

954  
H 67  
V. 7  
Cop. 2

CONTRIBUTORS

R. C. MAJUMDAR  
M.A., PH.D., D.LITT. (Hony.)

(LATE) A. L. SRIVASTAVA  
M.A., D.LITT.  
*Formerly Professor, Agra University*

S. ROY  
M.A., PH.D.  
*Formerly Professor of Islamic History, University of Calcutta*

J. N. CHAUDHURI  
M.A., PH.D.  
*Formerly Lecturer, Brahmananda Keshabchandra College, Barrackpur*

ABDUR RASHID  
*Formerly Professor, Aligarh University*

(LATE) G. S. SARDESAI  
B.A.

H. R. GUPTA  
M.A., PH.D., D.LITT.  
*Formerly Professor and Head of the Department of History,  
Punjab University, Chandigarh*

A. K. MAJUMDAR  
M.A., D.PHIL.  
*Formerly Director, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay*

RAGHUVIR SINGH  
M.A., LL.B., D.LITT.

N. VENKATARAMANAYYA  
M.A., PH.D.  
*Deputy Director (Epigraphy), Department of Archaeology, Hyderabad*

(LATE) RAO SAHIB C. S. SRINIVASACHARI  
*Professor of History, Annamalai University*

SHRI RAM SHARMA  
*Formerly Professor, D. A. V. College, Lahore, and Lecturer,  
University of Punjab*

S. K. CHATTERJI  
M.A., PH.D., D.LITT. (Hony.)  
*National Professor*

M. G. BHAGAT  
M.A., LL.B., PH.D.  
*L.I.C. Bombay*

G. S. TALIB  
M.A.  
*Reader in English, Kurukshetra University*

S. G. MALSHE

M.A., PH.D.

*Professor of Marathi, S.N.D.T. University, Bombay*

S. A. GAVASKAR

M.A.

*Professor of Marathi, Khalsa College, Bombay*

K. R. S. IYENGAR

M.A., D.LITT.

*Ex-Vice-Chancellor, Andhra University, Waltair*

S. V. JOGA RAO

M.A., PH.D.

*Head, Department of Telugu, Andhra University Postgraduate Centre, Guntur*

S. SRIKANTA SASTRI

M.A., D.LITT.

*Professor of History (Rtd.) University of Mysore*

S. K. NAYAR

M.A., PH.D.

*University of Madras*

S. H. RITTI

M.A., PH.D.

*Professor and Head, Department of Ancient Indian Culture,  
Karnatak University, Dharwar*

ABDUS SUBHAN

M.A., PH.D.

*Lecturer, Maulana Azad College, Calcutta*

(LATE) B. B. MAJUMDAR

M.A., PH.D.

*Formerly Principal, H. D. Jain College, Arrali, Professor of History  
(University Grants Commission)*

M. W. MIRZA

M.A., PH.D.

*Formerly Professor and Head of the Department of Arabic, Lucknow University*

P. N. CHOPRA

M.A., PH.D.

*Editor, The Gazetteer of India*

S. K. SARASWATI

M.A.

*Formerly Professor, Hindu University, Varanasi*

ASOK KUMAR DAS

M.A., LL.B., PH.D. (London)

*Diplomate in Museology, Director, Sawai Man Singh II Museum, Jaipur*

## IN MEMORIAM

KULAPATI DR. K. M. MUNSHI

This is the first volume of this series (out of ten so far published) which appears without a Foreword from the pen of its inaugurator, the late lamented Kulapati Dr. K. M. Munshi. He died full of years and honours, and his activities and achievements are only too well-known. His death is mourned by all classes of people from one end of India to the other and also abroad. But it has been an irreparable loss to the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan which sponsored not only the project of publishing this historical series but many other books calculated to promote a knowledge of the culture of India. To me the loss is also a personal one. I still cherish the memory of my first meeting with Dr. Munshi in 1945. I was surprised to receive an invitation to meet him at Bombay, for I was a complete stranger to him at the time. Far greater was my surprise when I listened to him explaining the ideals and method envisaged by him for the publication of a series of ten volumes on the history and culture of the Indian People, laying particular stress on the two words 'culture' and 'people'. I need not expatiate on this, as he has himself expressed, in the Foreword to the First Volume, his own concept of the scope of this series. These lines would bear repetition. "Some years ago", wrote Munshiji, "I defined the scope of history as follows:

"To be a history in the true sense of the word, the work must be the story of the people inhabiting a country. It must be a record of their life from age to age presented through the life and achievements of men whose exploits become the beacon-lights of tradition; through the characteristic reaction of the people to physical and economic conditions; through political changes and vicissitudes which create the forces and conditions which operate upon life; through characteristic social institutions, beliefs and forms; through literary and artistic achievements; through the movements of thought which from time to time helped or hindered the growth of collective harmony; through those values which the people have accepted or reacted to and which created or shaped their collective will; through efforts of the people to will themselves into an organic unity. The central purpose of a history must, therefore, be to investigate and unfold the values which, age after age, have inspired the inhabitants of a country to develop their collective

will and to express it through the manifold activities of their life. Such a history of India is still to be written.”

I was very much surprised to hear all this from one who was not a professional historian. But my surprise reached its climax when he requested me to accept the post of the General Editor, for we never met each other before.

I accepted his offer and since that day up to the very end of his life—a long period of twenty-five years—our relations had always been very cordial. Though I generally lived in Calcutta, I visited him from time to time in connection with the publication of this history and was always his guest. Our discussion on some disputed points of what I wrote was always carried on in a very cordial spirit. He used to read the type-script of each volume before it was published. Occasionally, though very rarely, when he felt some difficulty in accepting some statement in any volume, he discussed the matter with me. There was a tacit understanding between us that no objection would be made to any statement which is based on fact and supported by reasonable argument. In other words, we both agreed to accept, without hesitation, whatever is proved to be true by all canons of historical criticism, however unpleasant or disagreeable it might appear to any of us. Munshiji never violated this agreement or understanding. I specially lay stress on this point, as I have learnt from personal experience that men in high position in India seldom exhibit this spirit. When, as the whole-time Director, I prepared the draft of the *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, sponsored by the Government of India, I met with constant interference and obstruction from men in authority, having no knowledge of history, and I could not help contrasting their attitude with that of Dr. K. M. Munshi. When this unpleasant situation was reported to Munshiji by an important member of the Board of Editors for the compilation of the *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Munshiji said: “Leave the matter of writing to Dr. Majumdar as I have done, and don’t interfere with his freedom, subject to the final discussion and decision by the Board of Editors.” If Munshiji’s advice were followed, the *History of the Freedom Movement in India* would have been published fifteen years before it has been actually published, and several lakhs of rupees would have been saved.

Munshiji’s attitude was put to a severe test when I prepared the first draft of the role played by Mahatma Gandhi in the struggle for freedom of India in Vol. XI. He read through it and invited me to Bombay. I stayed in his house and we read together all the

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relevant portions line by line. We had discussions on many points, but ultimately with a few minor changes in expressions, he agreed to my draft. I mention this incident in detail, for I knew that he was a great devotee of Mahatma Gandhi and his views on some points were different from mine. But the fact that he still accepted my draft after I convinced him by facts and arguments, revealed to me what I consider to be one of the noblest traits in his character. He had already earned my love and respect, but to this was now added admiration for a very high degree of intellectual integrity—so very rare in the leaders of Free India.

It will ever remain a matter of deep regret to me that Munshiji did not live to see the completion of this cherished project of his. My only consolation is that he saw nine volumes comprising seven thousand five hundred pages already published, and this, the tenth volume, already in the press. Whether I shall live long enough to bring out the one remaining volume, I cannot say, but if I do, the day of its publication, and completion of Munshiji's dear project, will be the proudest and happiest day of my long life.

March 1, 1974

R. C. MAJUMDAR



# P R E F A C E

By

DR. R. C. MAJUMDAR

(*General Editor*)

The reasons for the postponement of the publication of this and the next volume (Vols. VII and VIII) till after Vols. IX, X and XI were published have been stated in the Preface to Vol. IX of this series (p. xxxiv).

This, the seventh volume of the series, deals with the period from 1526 to 1707 A.D. during which the Mughuls gradually established their authority over nearly the whole of India. This is the brightest Chapter in the history of Muslim rule in India, which began in the 13th century A.D. and covers a period of nearly six hundred years in north and five hundred years in south India. The Mughul rule is distinguished by the establishment of a stable Government with an efficient system of administration, a very high development of architecture and paintings and, above all, wealth and splendour such as no other Islāmic State in any part of the world may boast of.

So far as the Hindus were concerned, there was no improvement either in their material and moral conditions or in their relations with the Muslims. With the sole exception of Akbar, who sought to conciliate the Hindus by removing some of the glaring evils to which they were subjected, almost all the other Mughul Emperors were notorious for their religious bigotry. The Muslim law which imposed many disabilities and indignities upon the Hindus, mentioned in Vol. VI (pp. 617-20), and thereby definitely gave them an inferior social and political status, as compared to the Muslims, was followed by these Mughul Emperors (and other Muslim rulers) with as much zeal as was displayed by their predecessors, the Sultāns of Delhi. The climax was reached during the reign of Aurangzīb, who deliberately pursued the policy of destroying and desecrating Hindu temples and idols with a thoroughness unknown before or since. Such disclosures may not be liked by the high officials and a section of the politicians, but it is the solemn duty of the historian to state the truth, however unpleasant or discreditable it might be to any particular class or community. Unfortunately, political expediency in India during this century has sought to destroy this true historic spirit. This alone can explain the concealed, and mostly unsuccessful, attempt to disparage the statements about the Hindu-Muslim relations made in Volume V

(pp. 497-502) and Vol. VI (pp. 615-636), though these were based mainly on Muslim chronicles and accounts of a Muslim traveller, supported by contemporary Indian literature.

The difficulty of writing the true history of Hindu-Muslim relations as well as the editorial policy followed in this matter has been stated at some length in the Preface to Vol. VI (pp. xxix-xxx) of this series. The same policy is followed in this volume also.

It is very sad that the spirit of perverting history to suit political views is no longer confined to politicians, but has definitely spread even among professional historians.

In the present volume, reference has been made in some detail to the Muslim bigotry in general and the persecution of the Hindus by Aurangzīb in particular (pp. 233-36, 305-6). Although the statements are based on unimpeachable authority, there is hardly any doubt that they will be condemned not only by a small class of historians enjoying official favour, but also by a section of Indians who are quite large in number and occupy high position in politics and society. It is painful to mention, though impossible to ignore, the fact that there is a distinct and conscious attempt to rewrite the whole chapter of the bigotry and intolerance of the Muslim rulers towards Hindu religion.\* This was originally prompted by the political motive of bringing together the Hindus and Musalmans in a common fight against the British but has continued ever since. A history written under the auspices of the Indian National Congress sought to repudiate the charge that the Muslim rulers broke Hindu temples, and asserted that they were the most tolerant in matters of religion. Following in its footsteps a noted historian has sought to exonerate Mahmud of Ghazni's bigotry and fanaticism, and several writers in India have come forward to defend Aurangzīb against Jadunath Sarkar's charge of religious intolerance. It is interesting to note that in the revised edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, one of them, while re-writing the article on Aurangzīb originally written by Sir William Irvine, has expressed the view that the charge of breaking Hindu temples brought against Aurangzīb is a disputed point. Alas for poor Jadunath Sarkar, who must have turned in his grave if he were buried. For, after reading his *History of Aurangzīb*, one would be tempted to ask, if the temple-breaking policy of Aurangzīb is a disputed point, is there a single fact in the whole recorded history of mankind which may be taken as undisputed? A noted historian has sought to prove that the Hindu population was better off under the Muslims than under the Hindu tributaries or independent rulers. "While some historians have sought to show that

\* Cf. *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies*, Vol. III (1964), p. 58.

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the Hindu and Muslim cultures were fundamentally different and formed two distinct and separate units flourishing side by side, the late K. M. Ashraf sought to prove that the Hindus and Muslims had no cultural conflict." But the climax was reached by the politician-cum-historian Lala Lajpat Rai when he asserted that "the Hindus and Muslims have coalesced into an Indian people very much in the same way as the Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Danes and Normans formed the English people of today."\* His further assertion that "the Muslim rule in India was not a foreign rule" has now become the oft-repeated slogan of a certain political party. I have discussed the question in some detail elsewhere\*\* and need not elaborate the point any further.

The policy adopted in regard to this question in this and the preceding volumes, and discussed at some length in Vol. VI (pp. xxix-xxx), was most eloquently expressed by Jadunath Sarkar as far back as 1915 in his Presidential speech at a historical conference in Bengal. The following is a literal English translation of the original Bengali passage:

"I would not care whether truth is pleasant or unpleasant, and in consonance with or opposed to current views. I would not mind in the least whether truth is or is not a blow to the glory of my country. If necessary, I shall bear in patience the ridicule and slander of friends and society for the sake of preaching truth. But still I shall seek truth, understand truth, and accept truth. This should be the firm resolve of a historian."

I may conclude this topic by referring to the views expressed by Jadunath Sarkar and Dr. Rajendra Prasad at a much later date when Dr. Rajendra Prasad launched a scheme to write a comprehensive national history of India on a co-operative basis, and requested Jadunath to become its chief editor. Jadunath wrote to him on 19 November, 1937: "National history, like every other history worthy of the name and deserving to endure, must be true as regards the facts and reasonable in the interpretation of them. It will be national not in the sense that it will try to suppress or white-wash everything in our country's past that is disgraceful, but because it will admit them and at the same time point out that there were other and nobler aspects in the stages of our nation's evolution which offset the former. . . . . In this task the historian must be a judge. He will not suppress any defect of the national character, but add to his portraiture those higher qualities which,

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\* *Young India*, pp. 73-5.

\*\* *Historiography in Modern India* (Asia Publishing House), pp. 48, 54-7.

taken together with the former, help to constitute the entire individual."

In his reply to the above, dated 22 November, 1937, Dr. Rajendra Prasad wrote: "I entirely agree with you that no history is worth the name which suppresses or distorts facts. A historian who purposely does so under the impression that he thereby does good to his native country really harms it in the end. Much more so in the case of a country like ours which has suffered much on account of its national defects, and which must know and understand them to be able to remedy them."

An apt illustration of the truth of the observation in the last sentence is furnished by the religious bigotry of the Mughul Emperors. If we consider the relevant facts of history as discussed in this volume, in an open mind, without either any rancour or resentment on the one hand, and a desire to suppress the truth on the other, we can never deny that religious bigotry contributed to a very large extent to the downfall of the mighty Mughul empire. If we realize fully this great historical truth we may learn a valuable lesson from the teachings of history which might serve as a useful guide in shaping our destiny in future. If we deny it out of misguided sentiments, it would be a perversion of historical truth. For, the rebellion of the Rājputs, who were a pillar of strength to the Mughul Emperors, against Aurangzīb, and the rise of the Marāthās and Sikhs as great military powers—the three great events which brought about the decline and fall of the Mughul empire—were direct consequences of the bigotry of the Mughul emperors in general and of Aurangzīb in particular. It is not perhaps a mere coincidence that the reign of Aurangzīb, during which the religious bigotry reached its climax, was followed almost immediately after his death by a rapid process of decline and disintegration of the Mughul Empire. It is true that other causes were also at work, such as the fratricidal wars of succession. We should remember, however, that there were similar wars also just before Aurangzīb ascended the throne, but the Mughul Empire survived it—because it could still count on the loyal support of the Rājputs and had not to encounter the opposition, either of the Rājputs or of the Marāthās and the Sikhs whom Aurangzīb's bigotry had converted into deadly enemies.

It is, however, only fair to point out in this connection that in spite of his religious bigotry and cruelty to his father and brothers Aurangzīb must be regarded as a very able ruler. For it was he who had extended the southern boundary of the Mughul Empire which then included the vast region from the Hindu Kush and the

## PREFACE

Himalayas to Cape Comorin, for a near parallel to which we have to look back to the Maurya Empire that flourished about 2000 years before. The Mughul period should also be credited with great artistic achievement whose extant remains far exceed in skill and grandeur those of any other period in the history of India. A visible embodiment of its brilliance is the Taj Mahal of Āgra, which is justly regarded as one of the eight wonders of the world. The Mughul paintings have also received a world-wide renown.

Finally, India during the Mughul period enjoyed a proverbial reputation for wealth and splendour and attracted a large number of visitors from Europe who have left records of their impression.

Next to the Mughuls, the Rājput States in the north, the five Sultānates of the Deccan arising out of the ruins of the Bahmani Kingdom, and the Hindu Empire of Vijayanagara in South India played the dominant role in history at the beginning of the period. The end of the period witnessed the rise of the two great powers, the Marāthās and the Sikhs who were destined to play the most prominent role in the eighteenth century, which would be described in the next volume.

One of the most characteristic features of the period is a galaxy of great personalities who have left a deep impress upon the political history of India. These are Bābur, Sher Shāh, Hemchandra (Himu), Akbar, Chānd Sultān, Rānā Pratāp Singh, Nūr Jahān, Shivājī, Bājī Rāo and Guru Govind Singh, who have secured a permanent niche in the shrine of Indian history and of whom any country might well feel proud.

This volume may claim the credit of rescuing from oblivion the name of Himu or Hemchandra, a forgotten Hindu hero who began his life as a greengrocer, and by dint of his own efforts and personality ascended the throne of Delhi—the only Hindu to do so since the Battle of Tarain in 1192 A.D. Historians of India have so far done scant justice to his personality and achievement with the result that he is hardly known to Indians today as a remarkable and distinguished person during the Medieval Age. For this reason his career has been discussed in some detail in an Appendix (pp. 97-101).

To the distinguished names in the political field mentioned above we may add those of Tulasī-dāsa and Tānsen, whose influence still persists, respectively, over Hindi literature and classical music of India.

This volume gives a brief account of fourteen local vernacular literatures, most of which were yet merely at their formative stage. There is a popular view that special credit for the rise and growth of many of them is due to the Muslim rulers. An eminent Muslim scholar, for example, has expressed the view that the development of Bengali literature was rendered possible only by the enlightened rule of Hussain Shāh, the Sultān of Bengal, whose rule ended in A.D. 1519 after Bābur had begun his expeditions against India and only seven years before the first Battle of Panipat. A faint echo of such sentiments will be found in Vol. VI of this series (pp. 219, 513). The Editor, however, feels, after a very careful study of the materials now available, that Hussain Shāh has no reasonable claim to be regarded as the promoter of the development of Bengali literature. Other claims of a similar nature in respect of the development of other vernacular literatures have hardly any basis to stand upon.\*

It is remarkable that the patronage of Muslim rulers has not been even claimed, except in a very few cases, as a contributing factor to the development of other vernacular literatures of India. So this development must be regarded as essentially due to the operation of natural laws in the evolution of Indian literature. It is also very noteworthy that the local vernacular literatures show few traces of Muslim influence except a large number of loanwords from Arabic and Persian languages. This would be evident from a comparison of British influence on Bengali literature in the 19th century with that of Muslim influence during the preceding six centuries.

The Editor takes this opportunity to place on record his high esteem of the scholarship of G. S. Sardesai of international fame, and C. S. Srinivasachari, who wrote, respectively, Chapter IX (Shivājī) and Chapter XVI (European Settlements), of this volume. Both of them passed away long ago and it reflects great credit on them that their writings required, comparatively speaking, so little changes to bring them up to date. The Editor had the advantage of revising Sardesai's Chapter in the light of his published work, the "*New History of the Marathas*" (1957), and took the liberty of adding some comments on the views of the learned scholar. The Editor also notes with deep regret the recent death of Prof. Biman Bihari Majumdar, the author of the section on Hindu Religion in Chapter XX and Dr. A. L. Srivastava who contributed Chapters I (Sources), XVIII (Law and Legal Institutions)

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\* The whole question has been discussed by the Editor in an article contributed to the *Srivastava Memorial Volume*.

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and XXII (Economic Condition). Both of them were alive when the volume was sent to the press. Dr. Srivastava himself corrected the proofs of his three chapters and it is a matter of great sorrow that he passed away before the publication of this volume. The death of these four scholars has left a void in Indian scholarship which it would be difficult to fill up. The Editor takes this opportunity to place on record his deep sorrow at the death of these four leading historians and his high appreciation of the great services rendered by them to the cause of Indian history and culture.

The Editor also takes this opportunity to place on record his deep regret at the death of Dr. A. D. Pusalkar, M.A., LL.B., Ph.D., the Assistant Editor of the first six volumes of this series. He was a great scholar and a specialist in the domain of Puranic and Epic literature, as would be amply evidenced by the four chapters contributed by him to the first volume of this series, as well as his learned publications on *Bhāsa* and the *Epics* and *Purāṇas*. The Editor recalls with pleasure and gratitude his loyal and ungrudging services and has no hesitation in saying that the success of this series is largely due to the care and devotion with which he had performed his duty. He was associated with the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan for over twenty years as its Assistant Director and Assistant Editor of this series, and donated his library of valuable books to the Bhavan. A man of very modest disposition and loving nature, he was a life-long bachelor and may be truly said to be a God's good man. He died on 6 June, 1973, at the age of 68, leaving a large number of friends to mourn his loss. May his soul rest in peace.

The Editor conveys his sincere thanks to all the contributors of this volume and places on record his high appreciation of the services rendered by them in the preparation of this volume and maintaining the standard of this series.

Dr. Jadunath Sarkar had very kindly agreed to write the two Chapters (VIII, X) on Aurangzīb, and it is a matter of great regret that he passed away before he could do the work himself. The Assistant Editor, Dr. J. N. Chaudhuri, who was closely associated with him, and had the benefit of his oral instructions, wrote the Chapters on the basis of Sir Jadunath's monumental work on Aurangzīb.

The Editor notes with regret that in spite of his best efforts he could not establish contact with Prof. Abdur Rashid who wrote Chapters VI and VII (Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān) and Prof. M. W. Mirza who wrote the section on Islām in Chapter XX, both of whom

were in Pakistan, and could not revise the proofs of their articles. The Editor had not, therefore, the advantage of discussing with Prof. Rashid some points on which serious differences of opinion made this course a very desirable one. He has therefore kept unaltered the text of Prof. Rashid and expressed his own views in the footnotes.

The Editor begs to convey his thanks to 'The Associated Advertisers & Printers, Bombay,' for the great care they took in maintaining the high standard of printing and get-up of this series, and to Shri B. Srinivasa Rao for the great care and ability with which he corrected the proofs at the initial stage. The Editor also thanks the editors of various journals for their appreciative reviews of the preceding volume. He also thanks the Archaeological Department of the Government of India, and the Indian Museum, Calcutta, for lending photos for illustrations. Special thanks are due to H. E. the Governor of West Bengal, Mr. A. L. Dias, I.C.S., for his personal interference in removing the difficulties created in respect of some of the photos supplied by the Indian Museum.

In conclusion, the Editor places on record his high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by the two successive Assistant Editors, Dr. J.N. Chaudhuri and Dr. S. Chaudhuri. Dr. J.N. Chaudhuri had to give up his work for troubles in his eyes and the work was taken up by Dr. S. Chaudhuri. The thanks of the Editor are due to both of them as also to Dr. C. M. Kulkarni, for their valuable assistance in the preparation of this volume.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## ABBREVIATIONS

(In addition to those used in Vol. VI)

- Ain *Āīn-i-Akbarī* by Shaikh Abu-'l-Fazl. English translation published by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, in the Bibliotheca Indica Series. Vol. I by Blochmann and Vols. II and III by Jarrett.
- Bib. Ind. Bibliotheca Indica Series published by A.S.B. (*Asiatic Society of Bengal*).
- I. O. India Office.
- M. T. I. *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh* by 'Abdul Qādir Badāūni also known as *Tārīkh-i-Badāūni*. English translation (Bib. Ind.)—Vol. I by Lt. Col. Ranking, Vol. II by Rev. W. H. Lowe, Vol. III by Lt. Colonel Haig.

## CHAPTER I

### THE SOURCES

The sources for the Mughul period are full and copious. We have not only the chronicles of the reigns of all the Mughul monarchs from 1526 to 1707, but often more than one work dealing with the history of each reign. These contemporary works, mostly in Persian, were written by court historians (who had access to the State papers and other documents) and sometimes by other competent writers who were interested in the history of their times. There are also quite a few general histories of Muslim rule in India from the advent of Islām as a political force in this land to the time of the Mughul emperor during whose reign these works were written. It is worthy of note that there are two autobiographies written by the rulers themselves, e.g., the *Tūzuk-i-Bāburī* by Bābur and the *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī* by Jahāngīr. Shāh Jahān, though he did not write his autobiography, had the history of his reign written under his supervision, and it was read out to him during the progress of its composition. Another peculiarity about the sources of the period is the fact that there is extant at least one history written by a woman, besides the poetical and literary compositions left by a few cultured princesses. These compositions are entitled *Dīwāns*. Fourthly, quite a large number of royal *farmāns* and official orders of various descriptions, dating from the time of Akbar, and many semi-official papers have survived, unlike those of the Sultanate period, and serve as the most reliable source of some aspects of Mughul history. Fifthly, the sources of the period include statistical surveys and accounts of the empire and the first Imperial Gazetteer in the world, and revenue rules, regulations and statistics called the *Dastūr-ul-Amal*. Sixthly, there are court bulletins and news-papers described as *Akhbārāt-i-darbār-i-mu'alla*. Several hundreds of these are preserved in the Rājasthān Archives, and elsewhere. Seventhly, many important officers and secretaries (*munshīs*) have left behind a series of collections of historical letters to serve as models of epistolary style for posterity, which are available to us in several volumes, called by various names—*Inshā* or *Maktūbāt* or *Ruq'āt*. These are of great historical value. Eighthly, we have a few accounts of the description of the country, its physical aspect, towns, rivers and mountains, and other important details which throw a flood of light on the condition of the times. Ninthly, there is a good deal of religious litera-

ture, called *Malfūzāt*, which gives a clear indication of the social and religious life of the age. And finally, a stream of European missionaries and travellers, besides those from Islāmic countries, who visited India from time to time have recorded their observations in dozens of volumes. These observations supplement the information contained in the works referred to above, and, in some particulars, serve as correctives to them. At least from the time of Akbar onward every happening and transaction at the court and, in fact, all that the emperor said or did were recorded then and there every day, and preserved in the Royal Record Office. Unfortunately, this kind of valuable material has perished. Time, weather and human neglect have also wrought havoc with all types of written records. Still, what remains of the various categories of historical and literary sources is enormous and can scarcely be mastered by a syndicate of scholars in the course of a lifetime.

## I. LITERARY SOURCES

### *A—Turkī, Persian and Arabic*

#### (i) *Chronicles, Memoirs and Letter Books*

The first work of the period entitled *Tūzuk-i-Bāburī* or the Memoirs of Bābur is by Bābur himself, who had laid the first stone in the foundation of the Mughul empire in India. It is his autobiography, written in Turki, during his leisure. Unfortunately, it is not complete, and all the known copies have three gaps—from 1508 to 1519, from 1520 to 1525, and from 1529 to 1530. The text was edited by N. Ilminski in 1857 and subsequently from a facsimile of the more reliable Hyderābād Codex by Mrs. A. S. Beveridge in 1905. The *Tūzuk-i-Bāburī* was so popular throughout the Mughul period that it was four times translated into Persian—first by Zain Khān, next by Pāyandah Hasan (in the time of Humāyūn), a third time at Akbar's orders by 'Abdur-Rahīm Khān Khānān, and lastly, by Mīr Abu Talib Turbatī during the reign of Shāh Jahān. It is easily the most important authority on Bābur's reign, and on the early life of Humāyūn. The author's style is at once plain and graceful, and the entire work reads like a novel. It is characterized by candour and freshness. Bābur has frankly mentioned his faults, foibles and vices as well as his virtues, besides describing political and military events and giving pen-pictures of notable celebrities of the age. He has given a detailed description of the physical features and social and economic conditions of the country, its animals and birds, flowers and trees. Nevertheless, it will be uncritical to take for granted all that he has written in this re-

## THE SOURCES

markable book. For example, in order to magnify the importance of his victory over Ibrāhīm Lodī, he writes that whereas he had come with 12,000 men, all told, Ibrāhīm Lodī brought an army of one lakh of men and one thousand elephants into the field. He had, moreover, a foreigner's and an invader's prejudice about the country, its people and civilization. Notwithstanding these and similar deficiencies, the third volume of the Memoirs is considered the most authentic and valuable authority on the history of the third decade of the sixteenth century and the condition of India during that epoch. The *Tūzuk-i-Bāburī* has been reckoned "among the most enthralling and romantic works in the literature of all time."

The next important source of information on Bābur and Humāyūn is the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* (Persian)<sup>1</sup> of Bābur's cousin Mīrzā Muhammad Haidar Dughlāt, who was a friend and admirer of Bābur. It was completed in A.D. 1551 (958 A.H.). As the author was an eye-witness of many of the incidents described by him, especially Bābur's struggle, Humāyūn's contest with Sher Shāh, the battle of Bilgrām, his flight and the affairs of Kāshmir, the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* supplements the *Tūzuk-i-Bāburī* and the *Humāyūn-nāma*, and constitutes a first-rate authority on the reigns of Bābur and Humāyūn. Then follow the well-known historian Khvānd Amīr's two works, *Habīb-us-Siyar* and *Humāyūn-nāma*. The author was born in Herat in A.D. 1475 (880 A.H.) and died at Gwalior in A.D. 1534 (941 A.H.). The *Habīb-us-Siyar*, lithographed at Tehrān (1855) and at Bombay (1857), throws welcome light on Bābur and on the first three years of Humāyūn's rule. *Humāyūn-nāma*<sup>2</sup> was written at the suggestion of that ruler and describes in detail the history of the first three years of his reign. It must be reckoned as the first-rate authority for that period, Humāyūn's initial difficulties and plans. Another equally contemporary work is the *Ahsan-us-Siyar*<sup>3</sup> by Mīrzā Barkhwardār Turkmān which describes Bābur's relations with Shāh Ismā'īl of Persia. The *Shaibānī-nāma*,<sup>4</sup> written in Turkī by Muhammad Sālih, is an authority on Bābur's relations with that Uzbek ruler. The text was edited and translated into German by H. Vambéry in 1885. It was also edited by P. M. Melioransky and A. N. Samoïlovich in 1908. The *Tārīkh-i-'Ālamārāi 'Abbāsī*<sup>5</sup> of Iskandar Munshī in Persian, lithographed at Tehrān (1896), is valuable for the relations between India and Persia in the sixteenth century. The *Humāyūn-nāma*<sup>6</sup> of Gulbadan Begam, Bābur's daughter, was written (A.D. 1587) in Persian at Akbar's desire and is a first-rate authority on the domestic relations of the first two Mughul rulers with their wives, sons, daughters and other members of the family, and on their social and harem life.

reign. The work was published by the Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow, in April, 1913.

(4) *Inshā-i-Abu-'l-Fazl*,<sup>15</sup> also called *Maqtūbāt-i-Allāmī*. This contains official despatches written by Abu-'l-Fazl. It is divided into two parts, the first of which contains Akbar's letters to 'Abdullah Khān Uzbek of Turān, Shāh 'Abbās of Persia, the ruler of Kāshghar, the divines of Mecca, the wise men of Europe, Rājā 'Alī Khān of Khāndesh, Burhān-ul-Mulk of Ahmadnagar, and his own nobles such as 'Abdur-Rahīm Khān Khānān, Khān A'zam Mīrzā Azīz Kūka, etc. The second part consists of Abu-'l-Fazl's letters to Akbar, Dāniyāl, Mīrzā Shāh Rukh, the Khān Khānān, etc. It is a very valuable collection and throws fresh light on many incidents and matters which have been only very briefly alluded to in the *Akbar-nāma*.

Khvāja-Nizām-ud-dīn Ahmad, the next great writer of the age, was the author of *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*,<sup>16</sup> a general history from the beginning of the Muslim rule to the thirty-ninth year of Akbar's reign. It is divided into three volumes and is published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in the Bibliotheca Indica Series. The first volume commences with the advent of Islām to India and gives the history of the Sultanate period. The second volume describes the reigns of Bābur, Humāyūn, and Akbar, and the third gives the history of provincial kingdoms in the country. The author belonged to an influential family which held high posts under Bābur and Humāyūn. Nizām-ud-dīn himself was Akbar's *Mīr Bakshī* and a highly polished courtier, enjoying friendship of the orthodox as well as liberal-minded Musalmāns of all grades of society. He was liked by Abu-'l-Fazl and also by 'Abdul-Qādir Badāūnī. In fact, the latter considered him one of his best friends. The work of such a polished courtier was bound to be a cautious chronicle with no comments of his own. Nevertheless, it is of considerable importance, particularly with regard to the history of Gujarāt during Akbar's reign.

The *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh* or *Tārīkh-i-Badāūnī*,<sup>17</sup> by the famous historian 'Abdul-Qādir Badāūnī, son of Mulūk Shāh, is a general history of the Muslim world in three volumes. The first volume contains an account of Bābur and Humāyūn. The second volume is exclusively devoted to Akbar's reign and comes down to 1594. It is an unusually frank and critical account of Akbar's administrative measures, particularly religious, and his conduct. It was consequently kept concealed till that emperor's death, and was published after Jahāngīr's accession. The book is written from the point of view of a bigoted Sunnī Musalmān, and gives a biassed account of

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the development of Akbar's views on religion and his religious policy. It serves as a corrective to the liberal presentation of the great emperor's latitudinarian views by Abu-'l-Fazl. The third volume describes the careers, lives and works of Muslim saints and scholars.

The book is defective in dates and sometimes in the presentation of the sequence of events.

The *Takmāl-i-Akbar-nāma*<sup>18</sup> by 'Ināyat-Ullāh is a continuation of Abu-'l-Fazl's *Akbar-nāma* beginning with the 46th regnal year where Abu-'l-Fazl's work stops on account of his death, and comes down to the death of Akbar in October, 1605. It was obviously completed in 1605 A.D. It is a dry chronicle and omits the account of many happenings between 1602 and 1605.

The *Gulshan-i-Ibrāhīmī* alias *Tārīkh-i-Fīrishta*,<sup>19</sup> of Mulla Muhammad Qāsim Hindu Shāh, was written in 1606-07 (1015 A.H.). It is a general history of Muslim India and comes down to the accession of Jahāngīr. It also describes the history of provincial kingdoms, particularly the Deccan Sultanates, during the medieval age. Although it is a compilation based on the works of earlier writers, particularly Nizām-ud-dīn Ahmad's *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, yet it gives at places fresh information which is not found in other works. The author was an eye-witness of many events that took place in the Deccan and of which he has left an account. The work was lithographed—first in Bombay in 1832, and later by the Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow, in 1864 and again in 1905.

*Tārīkh-i-Haqqī* of 'Abdul-Haqq was written in 1596-97. The author was the father of Nūr-ul-Haqq who wrote *Zubdat-ut-Tawārīkh*. He was an orthodox Musalmān and was opposed to Akbar's liberal religious policy. He also wrote a series of letters which were subsequently collected and published under the title of *Maktūbāt-i-Hazrat 'Abdul-Haqq*. The copy of *Tārīkh-i-Haqqī* is preserved in the Sarasvatī Bhavan Library of Udaipur. The *Zubdat-ut-Tawārīkh* of Shaikh Nūr-ul-Haqq, written during the early years of Jahāngīr's reign (Ms. copy in the Sarasvatī Bhavan Library, Udaipur), is a work of value for the reigns of Akbar and Jahāngīr. 'Alāhdād Faizī Sarhindī wrote two valuable chronicles, named *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn Shāhī* and *Akbar-nāma*.<sup>19a</sup> Both are well-written works, and supply useful details about the reigns of these two monarchs. The details regarding the siege and capture of Asīrgarh in the *Akbar-nāma* are valuable. Some extracts from Faizī Sarhindī's *Akbar-nāma* are translated in Elliot and Dowson's *History of India*, Vol. VI. Hasan Beg Romlu's *Ahsan-ut-Tawārīkh*, written in

A.D. 1577, is a contemporary work on Persia and Mīrzā 'Alā-ud-daulah Qazvīnī's *Nafāis-ul-Maāsir*, written in A.D. 1575, gives biographical accounts of Persian poets of Akbar's time. A manuscript copy of this work is available in the Rāmpur Library. Among the works written at Akbar's suggestion is the well-known chronicle, 'Abbās Sarwānī's *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī*<sup>20</sup> alias *Tuhfā-i-Akbar Shāhī* written in 1587. It deals principally with the reign and administration of Sher Shāh and is indispensable.

Among the general histories of the period, mention may be made of *An-nūr-us-Sāfir*<sup>21</sup> of Muhi-ud-dīn 'Abd-ur Qādir, written about 1603, and *Rauzat-ut-Tāhirin*<sup>22</sup> written in 1605, which are available in manuscript form. Muhammad Āmīn's *Anfāul-i-Akbhār*<sup>23</sup> is a general history of the Muslim world and was completed in A.D. 1626. Yahyā-bin-'Abdul Latif's *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh*<sup>24</sup> gives an account of Bābur, Humāyūn and Akbar. It was written towards the end of Akbar's reign and is available in manuscript form in the Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna. The *Wāqaya* or *Hālāt-i-Asad Beg* by Asad Beg (Aligarh Ms.) was written about 1631-32. It is primarily a memoir of the author, but it also gives an authoritative account of the murder of Abu-'l-Fazl and the pursuit of his murderer, Bīr Simha Deva Bundelā, and of the conspiracy to place Khusrav on the throne by setting aside the claim of Salīm (Jahāngīr).

By far the most authoritative work of the reign of Jahāngīr is the *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*, which is that emperor's autobiography written by himself in two volumes. When the narrative of the first twelve years of his reign was completed, it was bound and presented to the emperor's sons and nobles. Jahāngīr himself wrote his Memoirs for nearly 17 years, after which the work was entrusted to Mu'tamid Khān who continued it to the beginning of the 19th year. It is the foremost authority on Jahāngīr's personality and character, and the events of his reign. Jahāngīr is unusually frank in recording the incidents and happenings, but sometimes he suppresses inconvenient truths and glosses over certain others, such as his revolt against his father, the circumstances of Khusrav's death, and his marriage with Nūr Jahān. Nevertheless, no student of the history of the period can do without the *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*.<sup>25</sup> Next in importance are Mu'tamid Khān's *Iqbāl-nāma* in three parts and *Tatimma Wāqi'āt-i-Jahāngīrī*<sup>26</sup> of Muhammad Hādī. The first part of the former deals with the history of the Tīmūrid dynasty till the end of Humāyūn's reign, the second describes the reign of Akbar, and the third that of Jahāngīr, and comes down to the accession of Shāh Jahān. It is a most valuable work, for the author was not only a

contemporary writer but also held the important post of *Bakhshī* in Jahāngīr's reign, and was employed on several other responsible duties. After Jahāngīr's death he showed partiality for Shāh Jahān and displayed antipathy towards Nūr Jahān. The fourth work, in point of importance, is the *Maāsir-i-Jahāngīrī*<sup>27</sup> written by Khvāja Klāmgār Ghairat Khān. It describes Jahāngīr as a prince, and its second part supplements the *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*. Then we have the *Intikhāb-i-Jahāngīr Shāh*<sup>28</sup> by an anonymous author. The Ms. is preserved in the Rāmpur Library.

The reign of Shāh Jahān is covered by several first-rate court chronicles. The earliest work is the *Pādshāh-nāma* of Muhammad Amīn Qazvīnī, alias Amīnāī Qazvīnī, written at Shāh Jahān's orders. It covers the first ten years of his reign and was completed in A.D. 1636. It is a detailed history containing a minute account of all events, happenings and transactions. The next work, too, is entitled *Pādshāh-nāma*<sup>29</sup> and was written by the famous historian 'Abdul-Hamīd Lāhaurī, whose reputation as a writer was next only to that of Abu-'l-Fazl. In his two-volume work, he describes Shāh Jahān's life and activities, first as a prince and then as a ruler, for the first twenty years of his reign. It is the primary authority and a most detailed work on the period with which it deals. The third work, also entitled *Pādshāh-nāma*,<sup>30</sup> is by Muhammad Wāris, a pupil and assistant of 'Abdul-Hamīd Lāhaurī. When 'Abdul-Hamīd became weak and incapacitated by age, Wāris was commissioned to complete his master's *magnum opus*, and he wrote a complete history of Shāh Jahān's reign. For the first twenty years of the reign he followed Lāhaurī, but as far as the last ten years of the reign were concerned, Wāris wrote an independent volume. It is as good an authority for these ten years of Shāh Jahān's reign as 'Abdul-Hamīd's is for the earlier twenty years. Then we have the *Shāhjahān-nāma*<sup>31</sup> of 'Ināyat Khān, whose original name was Muhammad Tāhir. It comes down to 1657-58 (1068 A.H.), the year of Aurangzīb's seizure of power and occupation of the palace-fort of Āgra. The book is written in plain style and constitutes a valuable authority. The fifth history of the reign is entitled '*Amal-i-Sālih*<sup>32</sup> of which the author was Muhammad Sālih Kambū. He describes Shāh Jahān's career from his birth to his death in A.D. 1666. Like the other works of the reign, the '*Amal-i-Sālih* gives at the end a biographical account of the Sayyids, Shaikhs, learned men, physicians, poets and calligraphists of Shāh Jahān's time, and a list of the princes, nobles and commanders, arranged according to their respective ranks. The sixth chronicle is the *Shāhjahān-nāma*<sup>33</sup> written by Muhammad Sādiq Khān, a

*Wāqāyānavīs* formerly attached to Shāh Jahān's establishment during his expedition against Rānā Amar Simha of Mewār. This work deals with the history of Shāh Jahān from his accession to the date of his deposition and imprisonment, and is written in a simple style.

Although during the twenty-first year of his reign Aurangzīb forbade the writing of history, yet we have several valuable volumes dealing with his reign. The first of these is the '*Ālamgīr-nāma*<sup>34</sup> written by Mīrzā Muhammad Kāzim. It is an official history of the first ten years of the reign when there was no prohibition against history-writing, and is based on State records and other documents. It is full and authentic, and is a primary authority for the period with which it deals. The next work is the *Maāsir-i-Ālamgīrī*<sup>35</sup> by Muhammad Sāqī Musta'id Khān. It is a complete history of Aurangzīb's reign and is based on State papers and documents. The third work is the *Zafar-nāma-i-Ālamgīrī*,<sup>36</sup> also entitled the *Wāqī'āt* or *Hālāt-i-Ālamgīrī*, written by 'Āqil Khān Rāzī. It comes down to the year 1663, and is reliable. Then we have the *Aurangzīb-nāma*,<sup>37</sup> a poem composed by a soldier whose pen-name was *Haqīrī*. It describes Aurangzīb's war of succession and comes down to the execution of Dārā. The *Muntakhab-ul-Lubāb*<sup>38</sup> of Muhammad Hāshim Khāfi Khān is a general history of the Tīmūrid dynasty, and gives a complete history of the reign of Aurangzīb.

There are two valuable histories of Aurangzīb's reign written by two Hindu officers. The first is entitled *Nuskha-i-Dilkūshā*<sup>39</sup> by Bhīmsen, who was mostly employed in the Deccan and was an eye-witness of many facts and incidents recorded by him. The work is particularly of value for the Mughul activities in the Deccan from 1670 to 1707. The second is entitled *Futūhāt-i-Ālamgīrī*<sup>40</sup> written by Īshwar Dās, who was posted as a civil officer in Jodhpur. The work is of great value for the history of Rājasthān from 1657 to 1698. The *Fathiyya-i-abriyya*<sup>41</sup> of Shihāb-ud-dīn Ahmad Tālish is a diary of Mīr Jumla's invasion of Cooch Bēhar and Assam. The *Tārīkh-i-Shāh Shujā'ī*<sup>42</sup> of Mīr Muhammad Ma'sūm, too, is invaluable for the history of Bengal during the viceroyalty of Shujā'. It comes down to April, 1660. The *Waqā'ī* of Niamat Khān 'Ālī<sup>43</sup> describes the siege of Golconda of 1687 in a highly flourishing style. The *Ahkām-i-Ālamgīrī*<sup>44</sup> by Hamīd-ud-dīn Khān gives Aurangzīb's anecdotes and orders, and throws a flood of light on his personality and character. There are two regional histories of great importance. They are *Mīrāt-i-Armadī*<sup>45</sup> of 'Alī Muhammad Khān in three volumes. It is a first-rate authority on Gujarāt during the Mughul times and contains copies of many royal *farmāns*

and other orders. The second is *Tavārīkh-i-Bangāla*<sup>46</sup> of Salīm-ullah. Then we have an important *Dastūr-ul-Amal*<sup>47</sup> or the official manual containing statistics, office procedure, administrative regulations and other useful miscellaneous information. It is of priceless value for the administration of the empire under Aurangzīb. There are several hundred news-letters, entitled *Akbhārāt-i-darbār-i-mu'alla*,<sup>48</sup> i. e. news-letters from the imperial court, which are preserved in several manuscript libraries. They are the very raw materials of history, and no serious student of Aurangzīb's reign can dispense with them. Finally, we have a large number of historical letters, some of which have been collected and bound in book-form. Some of these are: *Ādāb-i-'Ālamgīrī*, *Ahkām-i-'Ālamgīrī* (by 'Ināyat-ullah Khān), *Kalimāt-i-Tayyibāt*, *Kalimāt-i-Aurangzīb*, *Zāhir-ul-Inshā*, *Bahār-i-Sakhun*, *Haft Anjuman* and *Ruq'āt-i-Hamīd-ud-dīn Khān*.<sup>49</sup>

On the dynastic history of the provinces, we have numerous works which it is difficult to enumerate, far less describe, here in detail. Many of these relate to the provincial kingdoms of the Deccan. Prominent among them are the *Burhān-i-Maāsir*<sup>50</sup> of Sayyid 'Alī Tabātabā and *Tārīkh-i-Muhammad Qutb Shāhi*,<sup>51</sup> written about 1680 by Habīb-ullah. It gives an account of the kingdom of Golconda. The *Tārīkh-i-'Ālī 'Ādil Shāh Sānī*<sup>52</sup> is a history of Bijāpur, written at the request of an English officer. The *Muhammad-nāma*<sup>53</sup> is a valuable account of the 'Ādil Shāhī kingdom of Bijāpur, written by Zahūr bin Zahūrī in A.D. 1641. The *Tazkirāt-ul-Mulūk*<sup>54</sup> of Mīrzā Rafī was written during the reign of Jahāngīr. The first and the last of these works have been described in Vol. VI (p. 7) of this History Series.

We have several works dealing with western India. *Tārīkh-i-Sind* alias *Tārīkh-i-M'asūmī*<sup>55</sup> was written during the early days of Jahāngīr's reign. The *Baglān-nāma*<sup>56</sup>, another history of Sind, was written about A.D. 1624. The *Tārīkh-i-Tāhirī* of Tāhir Muhammad and the *Tuhfat-ul-Kirām* of 'Alī Sher Kānī' are noticed in Vol. VI of this History Series. For Gujarāt we have the *Mīrāt-i-Sikandarī* of Sikandar bin Muhammad, written in 1613, and the celebrated *Mīrāt-i-Ahmadī* by 'Alī Muhammad Khān already referred to. Then there is the *Tārīkh-i-Gujarāt* of Mīr Abu Turāb Valī, and finally the Arabic history of Gujarāt, entitled *Zafar-ul-Walīh bi Muzaffar wa Alih*<sup>57</sup> by 'Abdullāh Muhammad bin 'Umar al-Makkī, written soon after A.D. 1611. As for Bengal we have *Bahāristān-i-Ghāibī* written by Shitāb Khān during the reign of Shāh Jahān. The next work is the *Riyāz-us-Salātīn* by Ghulām Husain Salīm, written in 1787-88. Salīm-ullah's history of Bengal entitled *Tavārīkh-i-Ban-*

*gāla* is a useful compilation. A valuable work dealing with Bengal is the *Tārīkh-i-Shāh Shujā'ī* already referred to. The *Tārīkh-i-Assam* dealing with Mir Jumla's campaign is an important history.

For Kāshmīr Mīrzā Haidar Dughlāt's *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, already described, is valuable. Then we have the *Tārīkh-i-A'zamī* written about 1748 by Mullā Muhammad A'zamī and the *Tārīkh-i-Kāshmīr*<sup>58</sup> by Haidar Malik (1578). The *Lataif-ul-Akhhār*<sup>59</sup> by Badi-uz-Zamān gives an account of Mughul expeditions to Qandahār. The *Jinat-ul-Fardus*,<sup>60</sup> written in A.D. 1714, gives the history of the different provincial dynasties of India.

During the age of Akbar (1556-1627) numerous other works of history were produced, and, although they were not primarily intended as works of Mughul history, they throw considerable light on the period in which they were written. A very important work of this category is the *Maāsir-i-Rahīmī*<sup>61</sup> of Mullā 'Abdul-Bāqī Nahāvandī in three volumes. Written in A.D. 1616, it is primarily an account of the life and activities of 'Abdur-Rahīm Khān Khānān. The second volume is a history of the Tīmūrīd dynasty and comes down to the time of Jahāngīr. It also gives an account of the life of numerous poets patronised by the Khān Khānān, and extracts from their compositions. Some of the general histories dealing particularly with the two Afghān dynasties (viz., the Sūr and the Lodī), but throwing at the same time considerable light on the history of the Mughuls, particularly Akbar and Jahāngīr, are: (i) *Makhzan-i-Afghānī* or *Tārīkh-i-Khān-Jahānī-wa-Makhzan-i-Afghānī*<sup>62</sup> of Khvāja Ni'mat-Ullāh, (ii) the *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī* or *Tārīkh-i-Salātīn-i-Afāghina*<sup>63</sup> of Ahmad Yādgar, (iii) *Tārīkh-i-Dā'ūdī*<sup>64</sup> of 'Abdullāh and (iv) *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*<sup>65</sup> of Yahiyā bin Ahmad (which deals with the Sayyid dynasty).

No serious student of Mughul history can ignore the celebrated work entitled *Tārīkh-Khāndān-i-Tīmūrīd*,<sup>66</sup> an anonymous production preserved in manuscript form at the Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna. It relates to the history of the Tīmūrīd dynasty, and comes down to the 22nd year of Akbar's reign. Its distinctive feature is that it is profusely illustrated and gives an idea of the development of the Mughul School of painting in India. Muhammad Hādī Kāmwar Khān's *Tazkirat-us-salātīn-i-Chaghtaia*,<sup>67</sup> written in A.D. 1724 is very important for the accurate chronology that it gives of the events of the early years of the 18th century. Then we have Shāh Nawāz Khān's *Maāsir-ul-Umrā*,<sup>68</sup> a dictionary of the Mughul Peerage, which is a mine of information about the careers of nobles and officers of the Mughul period. It is a compilation based on contem-

porary sources and was completed in A.D. 1780. The *Dabistān-i-Mazāhib*,<sup>69</sup> written in 1648 by one Muhsin Fānī, is the only comparative study of religions that flourished during the Mughul period. It is equally helpful for a knowledge of religious discussions held at Akbar's court. There are a few other general histories, such as *Subh-i-Sādiq*<sup>70</sup> of Mirzā Muhammad Sādiq Isfāhānī, *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh*<sup>71</sup> of Muhammad Yūsuf Atakī, *Mīrāt-i-Jahān-Numa*<sup>72</sup> of Shaikh Muhammad Baqā, *Mīrāt-ul-‘Ālam*<sup>73</sup> of Bakhtāwar Khān, *Lubbut-Tawārīkh*<sup>74</sup> of Vrindāvana Dās, *Khulāsat-ut-Tawārīkh*<sup>75</sup> of Sujān Rāi Khattirī, and *Tārīkh-i-Alfī*<sup>76</sup> by Jaffar Beg and Āsaf Khān (in five volumes written at Akbar's orders in 1588-89).

(ii) *Farmāns*

There are five valuable collections of royal *farmāns* dating from the time of Akbar. They are: (i) *Jarīdāta-i-Farmān-i-Salātīn-i-Delhi* (Aligarh Ms.); (ii) *Imperial Farmāns*,<sup>77</sup> ed. K. M. Jhaveri, that is, the *farmāns* granted by Akbar and his successors to Viṭhal Nāth Gosvāmī of Mathurā and Vrindāvana and his descendants; (iii) *The Mughuls and the Jogīs of Jakhbar*,<sup>78</sup> edited by B. N. Gosvāmī and J. S. Grewal, containing the *farmāns* of Akbar and his descendants relating to free grants of land to the Nāth Jogīs of Jakhbar in Punjab; (iv) *The Parsees at the court of Akbar and Dastūr Meharjī Rānā* (ed. J. J. Modi, Bombay, 1903), which includes copies of Akbar's and Jahāngīr's *farmāns* of *Madad-i-Ma‘āsh* grant to the Pārsī priests of Navsārī, and (v) *A Descriptive List of Farmāns, Manshurs and Nishāns addressed by the Imperial Mughuls to the Princes of Rājasthān* (Published by the Directorate of Archives, Government of Rājasthān, Bikāner, 1962). This gives English translations of ninety-three *farmāns* from the time of Akbar to that of Shāh ‘Ālam II to the rulers of Bikāner, besides a very large descriptive list of documents of Jaipur, Sirohī and Jodhpur. These are of priceless importance for a history of the Mughul age. To these five collections may be added *A Descriptive List of the Vakīl Reports addressed to the Rulers of Jaipur, Vol. I (Persian)* (Government Press, Bikaner, 1967). This work is of equal value.

(iii) *Dīwāns, Mathnavis and Kulliyāts*

There are numerous *Dīwāns*,<sup>79</sup> *Mathnavis*<sup>80</sup> and *Kulliyāts*<sup>81</sup> of Mughul rulers, princes, princesses, nobles, officials, scholars and poets. They are so large in number that for lack of space, it is not possible to enumerate them here. All that can be done is to mention the names of a few prominent works of this category. For example, among nearly 300 *Dīwāns* or collections of poems some are those of Bābur, Humāyūn, Kāmran, Dārā Shukoh, Qutb Shāh,

Shāh 'Ālam, Zib-un-Nisā, etc. Among the *Kulliyāts*, at least twenty-nine were written by the notables of the period. Thirty *Mathnavis* belonging to the period are preserved in various manuscript libraries. The works of these three categories give a clear idea of the literary achievement of the Mughul period. They also throw considerable light on social and religious conditions.

(iv) *Malfūzāts*<sup>82</sup>

There is one more class of Persian literature, entitled *Malfūzāt*, which deals with the lives and teachings of Muslim saints and *sūfīs*. It can only be briefly noticed: (1) *Siyar-ul-'Ārifīn* or biographical accounts of fourteen Chishtī and Suhrawardī saints, compiled by Hamīd bin Fazullāh in 1536; (2) *Akhbār-ul-Akhyār*, by Shaikh 'Abdul Haq Muhaddis Dehlavī, published in 1914; (3) *Zad-ul-Mut-tāqīn* or biographical accounts of Shaikh 'Alī Muttaqī and Shaikh 'Abul-Wahhāb, by the same author (Ms., Rāmpur); (4) *Akhbār-ul-Āsfiya* which consists of biographical notes of 250 *sūfīs*, by 'Abdus-Samad in 1605-16 (Ms., Aligarh Muslim University Library); (5) *Gulzār-i-Abrār* consisting of biographical accounts of Shattarī *Sūfīs*, by Muhammad Ghausī Shattarī, written in 1613 (Ms., Rāmpur); (6) *Manāqib-ul-Akhyār*, by Muhammad Qāsim (Ms., Rāmpur), gives the biography of Sayyid Jamāl-ud-dīn *alias* Khvāja Dīwāna Sayyid Atāi; (7) *Kalimāt-us-Sādiqīn*, by Muhammad Sādiq Kāshmirī Hamadānī, written in 1614 (Ms., Patna), which gives biographical accounts of 125 saints buried at Delhi; (8) *Tabaqāt-i-Shāhjahānī*, by Muhammad Sādiq Hamadānī (Aligarh Muslim University Library Ms.) consists of biographical notes of 87 *sūfīs*; (9) *Hazarat-ul-Quds* by Badrud-dīn Sirhindī. It is a biographical dictionary of the Naqsh-bandī saints, which has been translated into Urdu by Khvāja Ahmad Husain Khān, Lahore, 1923; (10) *Safīnāt-ul-Aulīyā*, by Dārā Shukoh, completed on 21 January, 1640, consists of biographical notes of orthodox Caliphs, Imāms, *Sūfīs* etc., Kanpur 1884; *Safīnāt-ul-Aulīyā*, by Dārā Shukoh, completed in 1642-43 (Ms., Lakhnau University Library)—this work gives the biographies by Mjan Mir and his disciples; (12) *Risālah-i-Haqnūma*, by Dārā Shukoh, N. K. Press, Lucknow; (13) *Maj-Ma'āl Bahrain* (Sir J. Sarkar, Sec., National Library Cal., Ms.) by Dārā Shukoh; (14) *Sirr-i-Akbar* (Dacca Ms.) by Dārā Shukoh; (15) *Munīs-ul-Arwāh*, by Jahānāra Begam, written in 1681 (Ms., Rāmpur)—it describes the life of Mu'in-ud-dīn Chishtī and gives biographical notes of some of his disciples; (16) *Sāhibiyā*, by Aparāo Bholānāth, written in 1641, which gives an account of Mullāh Shāh and is partly translated into Urdu, vide Oriental College Magazine, Lahore, August, 1937; (17) *Siyar-ul-Aqtāb* by Ilah-diyah, written in 1646-57, which gives biographical

## THE SOURCES

notes of 27 Muslim saints; (18) *Mīrāt-ul-Asrar*, by 'Abd-ur-Rasul Chishtī, written in 1654, which gives biographical accounts of a large number of Muslim saints (Ms., Patna); (19) *Mīrāt-i-Madāri* or biography of Shāh Madār of Mahanpur (Kanpur), written in 1654 by 'Abd-ur-Rasul Chishtī (Ms., Patna); (20) *Chishtiya-i-Bihishtiya* of 'Alā-ud-dīn Muhammad Chishtī Barnavī, written in 1655-56, which consists of biographies of *Sūfīs* of the Chishtī Order; (21) *Manāqib-ul-Hazarāt* by Muhammad Āmīn Badakhshī which gives biographical accounts and teachings of Naqshbandī *Sūfīs* (Ms., belonging to Dr. S. A. A. Rizvī); (22) *Riyāz-ul-Auliyā*, by Muhammad Baqa Sahāranpurī, written in 1679-80, which gives biographical notices of the first four Caliphs, Imāms and *Sūfīs* (Ms., Rieu, III, 975 a); (23) *Kalid-i-Makhāzin*, by Shaikh Muhammad Ghaus of Gwalior (Ms., Rāmpur), deals with the doctrines of *Sūfīsm*; (24) *Irshād-ut-Tālibīn*, a treatise on *Tauhid-i-Wujudī*, by Shaikh Jalāl-ud-dīn Thānesarī (Ms.); (25) *Mabda wa Ma'ād* (N.K. Press, Lucknow) by Mujāddid Alf Sānī; (26) *M'arif-i-Ladunīya*, a work on *Wahadt-ul-Wujud* (Ms., Rāmpur); (27) *Maktubāt-i-Imām Rabbānī*, by Mujāddid Alf Sānī in 3 vols. (N.K. Press, Lucknow); (28) *Makalma Bābā Lāl wa Dārā Shukoh*, Dialogues of Bābā Lāl and Dārā Shukoh, compiled in 1652, Delhi, 1885; (29) *Malfūzāt-i-Shāh Kalimullāh Akbarābādī*, a saint of the 17th century, opposed to Mujāddid.

### B.—Sanskrit<sup>83</sup>

In the extant Sanskrit and Hindī sources, there is hardly anything contemporary with the reigns of Bābur and Humāyūn. From the time of Akbar, however, Sanskrit and Hindī scholars produced many works of historical and literary value. For example, we have a Sanskrit history of Akbar's reign, entitled *Sarvadeśavrittānt Sangrah*, called popularly *Akbar-nāma*, by Mahesh Thākur. Next to it are the *Akbar Shāhī Śrīngār Darpaṇ* by Padma Sunder, the *Bhānu Chandra Charitra* by Siddhi Chandra Upādhyāya and *Hirā Saubhāgyam* by Deva Vimala, which describe the visits of Jain monks to the court of Akbar. The *Karamchand Vamshatkirtanaka-Kāvya* by Jayasoma Upādhyāya notices some important events of Akbar's reign and his relations with certain Jain monks. The *Kṛipāras Kos* of Śānti Chānd confirms Akbar's religious and other liberal policies as given by court chroniclers. The *Sūrjan-Charitra Mahākāvya* by Chandrasekhar describes the exploits of Rāi Sūrjan of Ranthambhor. The *Amar Kāvya Vamśāvali* by Raṅghod Bhatt gives the history of the Rānās of Mewār and their relations with Akbar, and the *Vīra-bhānudaya Kāvya* is a history of the Vāghelā kings of Bhātt (Rewah) and their relations with the Mughuls. Kṛishṇa Gaṇaka and a few other Sanskrit writers were patronised by Jahān-

gīr. There are numerous Sanskrit works of the time of Shāh Jahān, particularly those of Jagannātha Paṇḍit, the Poet Laureate of Sanskrit, Vedāngarāja and Kavīndrāchārya Sarasvatī. Jagannātha Paṇḍit wrote *Jagadādharan*, *Asaf Vilāsa* and *Bhāminī Vilāsa*, *Ras Gaṅgādhar*, *Gaṅgā Laharī* and several poems on Shāh Jahān and Asaf Khān. Shāh Jahān, like his grandfather, patronised Sanskrit scholars and poets some of whom adorned his court. Numerous Sanskrit scholars from the time of Akbar to that of Shāh Jahān produced, with or without court patronage, a large number of works on religion, philosophy, poetics, astronomy and other subjects which no serious student of Mughul history can afford to ignore.

C.—*Hindī, Bengali, Oriyā, Gujarātī and Assamese*

Among the Hindī works, *Dalpat Vilāsa* by Prince Dalpat Simha of Bikāner, *Jahāngīr Chandrikā* by Keshav Dās, *Vīra Simha Deva Charitra* by the same author, *Nainsi Khyāt* by Mohta Nainsi (written during the reign of *Mahārāja Yaśovant Singh* of Jodhpur), *Amar Vaṁshāvalī* and *Chhatra Prakāsh* by Lāl Kavi are of special value and throw considerable light on the history of the age. *Ardhkathā* or *Ardhkathānak* by Banārasī Dās, a Jain writer and poet, born in 1643 V.S. (1586 A.D.), produced his autobiography in verse. The author flourished in the times of Akbar, Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān and his account is important for the political, social and economic conditions of the age. He wrote other books, viz., *Banārasī Vilāsa*, *Nām-Mālā* and *Nātak Sāmaya Sār*. The poetical works of great Hindī masters from Tulsī Dās and Sūr Dās to Bhushan, covering the entire Mughul age are too many to be enumerated, but they are of value for a cultural and literary history of the period. There is considerable contemporary literature on the *bhakti* movement in Hindī, Bengali, Oriyā, Gujarātī and Marāṭhī, which is indispensable for a correct understanding of the religious condition of the Hindus during the Mughul period. The most important works of this category are the *Bhaktamāl*, by Nābhadās, and *Chaurāsī Vaiśṇav Ki Vārtā*. In the Rājasthānī dialect of Hindī we have several works, important among them being *Rānā Rāso* and *Rāj Vilās*, besides *Nainsi Khyāt* already referred to. There are a few well-known works in other modern Indian languages also. For example, we have in Bengali *Śrī Chaitanya Maṅgala* by Kavi Jayānanda who flourished in the last quarter of the fifteenth century A.D. *Chandī Kāvya* by Mukundarām, popularly known as Kavi Kaṅkan, throws a good deal of light on the social and cultural condition of Bengal. The *Maṅgal Chandīr Gīta* by Dvija Mādhab written about 1579, *Chaitanya Bhāgavat* by Vṛindāvana Dās Ṭhākur, *Chaitanya-Charītāmṛita* by Kṛishṇadās Kavīrāj Gosvāmī and *Chaitanya-Maṅgala* of

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Lochan Dās are useful. In Oriyā too there are a few contemporary poetical works, such as *Hari-vamśa* by Achuta Nand Dās, *Ichh-watī Haran* by Banamāli Dās, *Kāñchi-Kāvēri* by Purushottam Dās and *Sasisena* by Pratāpa Rāi which give a graphic picture of the social condition of Orissa. Narsī Mehtā's and Akho's works in Gujarātī are of some value, and so are those of Prema Nand, who was considered the greatest poet of Gujarāt in the 17th century.

There are a few works of historical value in Assamese. They are: (1) *Buranji* from Khunlun and Khunlai, Eng. tr. in Ms. from the Ahom language, in Assam Govt. Secretariat; (2) *Kāmarūpar Buranji*, Ed. S. K. Bhuyān, Assamese text; and (3) *Purānī 'Āsām Buranji*, Gauhāti, 1930.

### D.—Marāṭhī

The Marāṭhī sources assume importance from the time of Shāh Jahān and are indispensable for Aurangzib's reign. The *Śiva-Chhatrapatichen Charitra* of Krishnaji Anant Sabhāsad gives an account of the life and activity of Shivājī. *Jēdhayanāchī Sakhāvalī* comes next in importance. The *91 Qalmī Bakhar* by Dattajī, a chronicler of Shivājī, is a work of great value, and has been ably edited by V. S. Wakaskar (Baroda, 1930). *Śivakālin-Patra-Sār-Sangraha* in three volumes contains valuable letters and other documents. The work gives a full chronology and an index. *Śiva-Charitra Sāhitya*, in eight volumes, consists of letters and other documents for the period not covered by the above *Sangraha*. An equally important collection is entitled *Śiva-Charitrā Pradīpa*. It contains valuable documents and is ably edited by D. V. Apte and S. M. Divekar (Poona, 1925). There are several other works, such as *Chitra Gupta Bakhar*, *Śiva-Digvijaya*, *Chitnis Bakhar*, *Śiva Pratāpa Shedgāonkar Bakhar*, *Moreyanāchī Bakhar*, *Jedhé Karinā*, *Powādas* and *Tanjavur cha Śilalekh*. These have been rejected by Sir J. N. Sarkar as unreliable. *Sri Sampradayāchī Kāgadpatre* (edited by S. S. Deo, Dhulia, 1915), *Karvir Chhatrapati Gharānyāchyā Itihāsāchī Sadhane*, Vols. I, II (Ed. M. V. Gujar, Poona, 1962) and *Aitihāsik Sānkrina Sāhitya*, in several volumes (Published by the Bhārat Itihās Samshodhak Maṇḍala, Poona, 1931-1946) are of great value for the period, 1680-1707 A.D.

## II. ARCHAEOLOGICAL SOURCES

The archaeological sources for the period consist of—(1) *Reports of the Archaeological Survey of India*, Vols. I-XXXIII, ed. by Alexander Cunningham, Simla and Calcutta, 1865-87; (2) *The Annual Reports of the Archaeological Survey of India*, New Im-

*perial Series from 1902-1903 to date*, Ed. by Sir John Marshall and others; (3) *The Moghul Architecture of Fatehpur Sikri*, described and illustrated in 4 volumes, by E. W. Smith, Government Press, Allāhabād, 1894-98; (4) *Akbar's Tomb, Sikandrah, near Agra*, described and illustrated, by E. W. Smith, published by the Government Press, Allāhabād, 1909; (5) *History of Indian and Eāstern Architecture*, by James Fergusson, revised and edited, with additions by James Burgess and Rhene Spiers, 2 Vols., published by John Murray, London, 1910; (6) *Moghul Colour Decoration of Agra*, described and illustrated, by E. W. Smith, Allāhabād Government Press, 1901; (7) *Indian Architecture: Its Psychology, Structure and History from the first Muhammadan Invasion to the present day*, by E. B. Havell, London, 1913; (8) *Handbook to Agra and the Tāj* by E. B. Havell (Longmans, 1912); (9) *Mathurā, a district Memoir*, by F. S. Growse, 1883; (10) *Delhi Fort, a guide to the Buildings and Gardens*, Calcutta, 1929; (11) *Mosque of Wazīr Khān, Lahore*, (J.I.H., Vol. X); (12) *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon* by V. A. Smith, 2nd Ed., Oxford, 1950; (13) *The Archaeology and Monumental Remains of Delhi*, by Carr Stephen, Calcutta, 1876; (14) *Transactions of the Archaeological Society of Agra*, 1874, Delhi; (15) *Indian Architecture* by Percy Brown, Vol. II (Islamic Period), 4th Ed., Bombay, 1964.

The number of inscriptions of the period is not considerably large. The Archaeological Department of the Government of India has published Arabic and Persian Inscriptions in the *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica* (1907-1938). It may be noted that all these inscriptions, arranged chronologically with summaries, are given in V. S. Bandrey's *A Study of Muslim Inscriptions* (Karnātak Publishing House, Bombay, 1944).

As regards Numismatic sources, we have several important modern publications describing the coins of the period. These are of great value in settling conflicting dates, and also throwing light on the economic condition of the age. These works are:

1. Edward Thomas, *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, illustrated by coins, inscriptions and other antiquarian memoirs (London, Trübner, 1871). This work furnishes some information about the coinage and history of the Mughul age also.

2. Lane-Poole, Stanley, *The Coins of the Mogul Emperors of Hindustan in the British Museum*, London, 1892.

3. Wright, H. Nelson, *A Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum*, Calcutta, Vol. III, Oxford, 1908.

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4. Whitehead, R. B., *Catalogue of Coins in the Punjab Museum*, Lahore, Vol. II, Oxford, 1914.
5. Brown, C. J., *Catalogue of Coins in the Lucknow Museum*, 2 Vols., 1920.
6. Hodivala, S.H., *Historical Studies in Mughul Numismatics*, Calcutta, 1923.
7. Rodgers, C.J., *Copper Coins of Akbar* (*JASB*, Part I, 1880, 1885).
8. Rodgers, C.J., *Mogul Copper Coins* (*JASB*, Part I, 1895).
9. Rodgers, C.J., *Rare Copper Coins of Akbar* (*Indian Antiquary*, 1890).
10. Whitehead, R.B., *The Mint Towns of the Mughal Emperors of India* (*J. Pro. A. S. B.*, 1912).
11. White King, L., *Novelties in Moghal Coins* (*Num. Chron.*, 1896).
12. Dames, M.L., *Some Coins of the Mughal Emperors* (*Num. Chron.*, 1902).
13. Habīb, Arfān, *The Mughal Currency System* (*Medieval India Quarterly*, Vol. IV, pp. 1-21).

There is considerable contemporary material on painting. Reference has already been made to the *Tārīkh-i-Khāndān-i-Tīmūriā*, which is profusely illustrated and which traces the evolution of the art of Mughul painting in India. There are numerous other profusely illustrated works on the history and literature of the times of Akbar, Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān. They are preserved at Jaipur and several other Ms. libraries in India, England and some other Western countries. There are numerous extant portraits of the Mughul emperors, princes, and some of the queens and princesses in the Indian Museum, Calcutta; Victoria Memorial, Calcutta; Kalā Bhawan, Banāras; Jaipur; British Museum; South Kensington Museum; and India Office Library. The mural paintings and decorations can be seen in the Mughul buildings of the period. Several modern scholars from Coomaraswamy to N. C. Mehta have made a special study of the Mughul art. The works of Percy Brown and Moti Chānd are of special value in throwing light on the technique of Mughul painting. V. A. Smith rightly observes that there is enough contemporary material on Mughul art for writing more than one volume.

## III. ACCOUNTS OF FOREIGN VISITORS

More European monks, travellers, merchants and adventurers visited India in the sixteenth, seventeenth and the early years of the eighteenth centuries than ever before, and quite a few have left valuable descriptions of their observations. These accounts cannot be accepted at their face-value, for some of them are mere *bazar* gossip, and certain others are vitiated on account of their racial, religious and national prejudices. Nevertheless, they are of value, for the foreigners noted what appeared to Indian historians as commonplace things and unworthy of being recorded. To the foreigners, however, these were novel and interesting. Hence the value of the foreign accounts. But it is not possible, for lack of space, to notice these accounts in detail. All that can be done here is to give a list of these works:

1. *The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral Sīdī 'Alī Ra'īs in India, Afghānistān, Central Asia and Persia during the years 1553-1556*, is the first in point of time. His account, translated by A. Vambéry (Luzac & Co., London, 1899) throws light on Humāyūn's last days and death, and on the accession of Akbar.

2. *Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius*, by F. Anthony Monserrate, S. J., (1580-1583); Latin Text published in *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, III, No. 9, 1914; English translation by J. S. Hoyland, 1922.

3. J. H. Van Linschoten, *The Voyage of John Huyghen Van Linschoten to the East Indies*, Ed. A. C. Burnell (Vol. I) and P. A. Tiele (Vol. II), Hakluyt Society, Vols. 70-71, London, 1885.

4. Travels of Ralph Fitch (1583-91) and John Mildenhall (1599-1606) in *Early Travels in India*, Ed. by W. Foster, 1921.

5. *The Annual Relation of Father Fernão Guerreiro, S. J., (1607-8)*; Abstract Translation by H. Hosten, S. J., in *Journal of the Punjab Historical Society*, VII, 50.

6. *The Voyage to the East Indies, etc. of François Pyrard, of Laval (1608-9)*; translated into English by Albert Gray & Ball in two vols., Hakluyt Society, London.

7. *Early Travels in India of W. Hawkins (1608-13), W. Finch (1608-11), N. Withington (1612-16), T. Coryat (1612-17), E. Terry (1616-19)*, Ed. by W. Foster, 1921.

8. *A Journal of the Fourth and Sixth Voyage of Sir James Lancaster (1610-11)* in Purchas, IV, pp. 214-15.

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9. *Account of the Sixth Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton* (1610-11) in Purchas, III, pp. 115-94.

10. *The Voyage through India, Persia, etc.* of Master Joseph Salbancke (1609-10) in Purchas, III.

11. *Description of Hindustān and Guzarāte* (Gujarāt) by Eredia de Manuel Godino (1611); English translation by H. Hosten in *J.R.A.S.B. (Letters)*, Vol. IV, 1938.

12. *Histoire des choses plus memorables advenues, etc.* Vols. 1-3. By F. Pierre du Jarric. Wr. 1614 A.D., Ed. and translated into English in 2 Volumes, by C. H. Payne under the title of *Akbar and the Jesuits* (1926), and *Jahāngīr and the Jesuits* (1930), London.

13. *The Voyage to East Indies*, by Nicholes Dowton (1614-15), Ed. W. Foster, London, 1939.

14. *Richard Steel & John Crowther, 'Journall', 1615-16.* *Purchas His Pilgrims*, IV, 266-80.

15. *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India (1615-19).* Ed. by W. Foster, London, 1936.

16. *Jahāngīr's India* (The Remanstrantie of F. Pelsaert); translated from the Dutch by W. H. Moreland and P. Geyl. Cambridge, 1925.

17. *Voyage of Peter Floris to the East Indies (1611-15).* Ed. by W. H. Moreland, Hakluyt Society, 1934.

18. *Voyage of Thomas Best (1612-14),* Ed. by W. Foster, Hakluyt Society, 1934.

19. *Pieter Van Den Broeke at Surat (1620-29)* in *J.I.H.*, Vol. X, pp. 235-50, Vol. XI, pp. 1-16, 203-18.

20. *The Travels of Pietro Della Valle in India (1623-24),* 2 Vols., Ed. Edward Grey, Hakluyt Society, London.

21. *De Laet, De Imperio Magni Moglis, sive India vera Commentarius ex variis Auctoribus Congestis, Leyden, 1631;* translated into English by J. S. Hoyland, and annotated by S. N. Banerjee, *The Empire of the Great Mogal*, Bombay, 1928.

22. *The Travels of Peter Mundy, Vol. II (1630-34),* Ed. by Richard Temple, Hakluyt Society, 1914.

23. *The Travels of Sebastian Manrique (1629-43),* 2 Vols., Ed. by C. E. Luard and Fr. H. Hosten, Hakluyt Society, 1926 and 1927.

24. *The Voyages and Travels, etc.* of Albert Mandelslo (1638-39), Ed. Adam Olearius, 2nd ed., London, 1669.

25. *Travels in the Mogul Empire* (1656-1688), by François Bernier, Ed. by A. Constable, Oxford University Press, 1914.

26. *Travels in India* by Jean Baptist Tavernier (1640-67); translated and edited by V. Ball in 2 Vols. Macmillan & Co., London, 1889. Second Ed. revised by V. Crooke, London, 1925.

27. *Storia do Mogor* of Niccolao Venetian Manucci (1653-1708); translated into English and edited by W. Irvine, Vols. I-IV, 1907-8.

28. *Travels of M. de Thevenot* (1667) in the Levant, in three parts, Eng. translation, 1686.

29. *John Marshall in India* (1668-72), Ed. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Oxford, 1927.

30. *A Geographical Account of the Countries round the Bay of Bengal*, by Thomas Bowrey (1669-79), Ed. R. C. Temple, Hakluyt Society, 1905.

31. *A New Account of East Indies and Persia* by John Fryer (1672-81), Ed. W. Crooke, 3 Vols., Hakluyt Society, 1909, 1912, 1915.

32. *The Diary of William Hedges* (1681-87), 2 Vols., Ed. Col. Henry Yule, London.

33. *A New Account of the East Indies* by Alexander Hamilton (1688-1723) in 2 Vols., London, 1724.

34. *A Voyage to Surat in 1689* by Ovington, London, 1696. Ed. by H. G. Rawlinson, London, 1929.

35. *The Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri* (1695), Ed. S. N. Sen, National Archives of India, 1949.

36. *The Norris Embassy to Aurangzib* (1699-1702), Harihar Das, Ed. S. C. Sarkar, Calcutta, 1959.

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## THE MUGHUL EMPIRE

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35. Bib. Indica, Calcutta, 1870-73.
36. Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, Ms.
37. Hyderābād Asafiya Library Ms.
38. Bib. Indica, Calcutta, 1869; this narrative of Aurangzīb's reign is not original
39. B.M. or. 23. Also National Library (Sarkar Collection), Calcutta.
40. National Library. (Sarkar Collection), Calcutta; it is described in Sir J. Sarkar's *Studies in Mughal India*.
41. Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, Ms.
42. Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, Ms.
43. Text lithographed at Lucknow, 1259 A.H.
44. Text ed. by Sir J. Sarkar and translated by him as *Anecdotes of Aurangzīb* (2nd ed.).
45. Text in 3 vols. published in Gaekwād Oriental Series, Barodā.
46. Bib. Indica, Calcutta, 1918.
47. National Library (Sarkar Collection Ms.), Calcutta.
48. National Library (Sarkar Collection Ms.), Calcutta.
49. National Library (Sarkar Collection Ms.), Calcutta.
50. Hyderābād Ms.
51. National Library (Sarkar Collection Ms.), Calcutta.
52. National Library (Sarkar Collection Ms.), Calcutta.
53. Kapurthalā Ms.
54. National Library (Sarkar Collection Ms.), Calcutta.
55. Sarasvatī Bhavan Library, Udaipur Ms.
56. Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, Ms.
57. Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, Ms.
58. A. S. B. Calcutta Ms.
59. National Library (Sarkar Collection Ms.), Calcutta.
60. Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, Ms.
61. Text (Bibliotheca Indica), Calcutta.
62. Sarasvatī Bhavan Library, Udaipur, Ms.
63. Sarasvatī Bhavan Library, Udaipur, Ms.
64. Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, Ms.
65. Text (Bib. Indica), Calcutta; Eng. Trans. by K. K. Basu, Barodā.
66. This is the only copy known to exist.
67. A.S.B.' Calcutta M.; and also Sarasvatī Bhavan Library, Udaipur, Ms.
68. Bib. Indica, Calcutta, Text in 3 vols., Vols. 1-2, translated by H. Beveridge and Beni Prasad.
69. Text lithographed by N. K. Press, Lucknow, 1904, Eng. Trans. by David Shea and Anthony Troyer, Paris, 1948.
70. Written in 1636 A.D., Habibganj Ms.
71. Written in 1646 A.D., Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, Ms.
72. Written in 1682 A.D., Rāmpur Ms.
73. Written in 1667 A.D., National Library (Buhar Section), Calcutta Ms.
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75. Written in 1695 A.D., Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, Ms.
76. A.S.B., Calcutta Ms.
77. The *farmāns*, date from 1577 to 1805; published in Bombay, 1928.
78. Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1967.
79. For *Dīwāns*, see *Mughals in India*, Vol. I by D. N. Marshall, *passim*.
80. See *Mughals in India* by D. N. Marshall, Vol. I, 1967, *passim*.
81. See *Mughals in India* by D. N. Marshall, Vol. I, 1967, *passim*.
82. See *Mughals in India* by D. N. Marshall, Vol. I, 1967, *passim*.
83. For Sanskrit Works, see *Akbar the Great*, Vol. I (1962) by A. L. Srivastava, pp. 538-39.

## CHAPTER II

# BĀBUR

### I. *Early History*

The early history of *Zahīr-ud-Dīn Muhammad Bābur*, which was a tissue of romantic successes and surprising reverses, belongs to Central Asia. The blood of two great conquerors flowed in his veins; he was fifth in descent from *Tīmūr*, 'the earth-shaker', while through his mother he could trace his ancestry from *Chingīz*, the terrible.<sup>1</sup> His mother, *Qutluq Nigār Khānum*, was the daughter of *Yūnus Khān* who was descended from *Chaghatāi Khān*, the second son of *Chingīz Khān*. On the death of *Sultān Abū Sa'id Mīrzā*, a great-grandson of *Tīmūr* and *Bābur's* grandfather, his extensive dominions covering *Khurāsān* and *Transoxiana* were divided among his sons (1469). The fourth son, 'Umar Shaikh *Mīrzā*, the father of *Bābur*, obtained the kingdom of *Farghāna*.<sup>2</sup> Here the founder of the *Mughul* empire was born on 14 February, 1483, and inherited his father's precarious throne at the tender age of eleven years and a few months. The petty kingdom of *Farghāna*, that 'weak child separated from the mother-empire' of *Tīmūr*, could hardly satisfy the ambition of the young prince whose dream was *Samarqand*, the proud capital of his great ancestor. After a hard struggle of three years against his cousin *Baisunqur Mīrzā*, he was able to capture it in November, 1497, after a siege of seven months; but he could not hold it for more than a hundred days, as he had to leave *Samarqand* for *Farghāna* to quell a rebellion led by *Azun Hasan* and *Ahmad Tambal* who acted in the name of his younger brother *Jahāngīr Mīrzā*. *Bābur* failed and now lost both. He recovered *Farghāna* in June, 1498, and won *Samarqand* for the second time in November, 1500, not from a *Tīmūrid* rival but from *Shaibānī Khān*, the chief of the *Uzbeks*. *Bābur* then made peace with *Jahāngīr Mīrzā* by ceding parts of *Farghāna*, but the latter ultimately occupied the whole of it. For the next twelve years the main episode in *Bābur's* life was his struggle with the *Uzbeks*. In May, 1501, he was badly defeated by *Shaibānī Khān* at *Sar-i-pul* and forced to surrender *Samarqand* and give his eldest sister *Khānzāda Begam* in marriage to the enemy. He was now once more a throneless wanderer and retired to *Tāshkent* under the shelter of his maternal uncle *Sultān Mahmūd Khān*. With his two uncles, *Mahmūd Khān* and *Ahmad Khān*, he made several attempts on *Farghāna*. *Ahmad*

Tambal, finding himself no match for such a Tīmūrid-Mongol coalition, invited Shaibānī Khān who ultimately inflicted a crushing defeat upon the two Khāns (the uncles of Bābur) in the battle of Archiyān (June, 1503).

The battle of Archiyān moulded the future history of Bābur: it gave a new orientation to his ambition and policy. He bade last farewell to the land of his birth and set out to try his fortune beyond the Hindu Kush away from the grasp of his arch-enemy. He turned to Kābul which was captured in 1501 by Muqīm the Arghūn from its legal ruler 'Abdur-Razzāq, son of Ulugh Beg, who had inherited it from his father Sultān Abū Sa'id. Bābur's army was now reinforced by the arrival of the Mongol deserters from the camp of Khusrav Shāh who had been driven from Qunduz by Shaibānī. Probably Bābur won the Mongols over to his side, and had they not joined his standard, the conquest of Kābul might not have been possible. In October, 1504, he crossed the Hindu Kush and took Kābul from the Arghūn usurper almost without any opposition.<sup>3</sup>

The bloodless conquest of Kābul was the turning-point in Bābur's career. He had now a place under the sun, a base from which he could turn his attention either west to Samarqand or east to Hindusthān. It was from Kābul that he first had the lure of the fertile plains of India, and the idea of conquering it seized his mind. This did not mean the abandonment of his ambitions in Central Asia. It was not by choice but by force of circumstances that the grandson of Abū Sa'id laid the foundation of an empire in Hindusthān.

It was a few months after the conquest of Kābul that Bābur made his first invasion into the territory of Hindusthān. In January, 1505, he set out by the Khyber Pass for Peshāwar and instead of crossing the Indus marched on to Kohāt. From Kohāt he marched towards Bangash and finally reached the Indus at Tarbila.<sup>4</sup> The raid, which was confined to fighting against the Afghān tribes and ravaging the banks of the Indus, lasted four months, and in May, 1505, Bābur returned to Kābul by way of Ghaznī.

The alarming growth of the power of Shaibānī Khān, who had captured Khiva and was threatening Balkh, at last moved Sultān Husain Mīrzā Baiqara, the renowned king of Herāt, who called on the Tīmūrid princes for a joint attack upon the Uzbek enemy. Bābur hastened from Kābul in response to the invitation, but on the way, at Kahmard, he received the report of Sultān Husain Mīrzā Baiqara's death (5 May, 1506). Nevertheless he pushed on and after a march of eight hundred miles met on 26 October the

two sons of the late sultān on the river Murghab and accompanied them to Herāt; but in spite of the lavish offers of hospitality the fashionable and cultured princes did not make proper winter arrangements for his army, whereupon he left on 24 December for Kābul, undertaking a perilous journey through the snow-clad passes. On his return he put down a conspiracy of the Mongol troops to place his cousin Wais Mīrzā, son of Sultān Mahmūd Mīrzā, on the throne. Shaibānī Khān did not miss the golden opportunity of attacking Khurāsān and took Herāt in June, 1507.

The arch-enemy of Bābur was now at the height of his power: he had humbled the Mongols as well as the Tīmūrīds. It was a critical juncture for the prince of Kābul, the only Tīmūrīd State that survived the fall of Herāt. Bābur, who was fully alive to the strategic importance of Qandahār, responded to the call of Shāh Beg and Muqīm Beg, the sons of Zū-'n-Nūn Arghūn, governor of Qandahār under Sultān Husain Baiqara, for military aid against the Uzbegs. As he approached Qandahār, Bābur found the Arghūn princes hostile, but he took the city and put them to flight. He had soon to leave Qandahār as Shaibānī Khān was hastening towards the city at the invitation of the fugitive Muqīm. Bābur deemed it expedient to keep himself away from the Uzbegs and diverted his energies to making a raid into Hindusthān. Shaibānī came and took Qandahār, but left for the north on account of the rebellion of one of his chiefs. In September, 1507, Bābur had set out for the Indus and, marching down the Kābul river, advanced as far as Mandrāwar,<sup>5</sup> but returned to Kābul on account of disagreement among his nobles according to Abu-'l-Fazl, but more probably due to the retirement of Shaibānī. The raid of 1507, though barren, was very significant; it was symptomatic of the way in which Bābur turned from the West to the East, from the arid steppes of Central Asia to the fertile plains of Hindusthān.

It was after the retirement of Shaibānī from Qandahār and on his return to Kābul that Bābur abandoned the title of Mīrzā (prince) and styled himself Pādīshāh (emperor) and thus asserted the headship of the Tīmūrīds. The birth of his son Humāyūn gave the death-blow to the partisans of the house of Ulugh Mīrzā who organized a formidable rebellion in favour of 'Abdur-Razzāq, but Bābur gave them a severe defeat and put them to flight. The rest of the year 1508 and the whole of the next year he spent quietly in arranging the internal economy of his petty kingdom.

In 1510 the perpetual menace to Bābur by the ever-waxing power of Shaibānī was suddenly removed. The latter came into

conflict with Shāh Isma‘il, the Safavī ruler of Īrān, and was badly defeated. Shaibānī was killed and his army was annihilated. This news raised high hopes in the mind of Bābur. He could now expect to recover his lost territories. Leaving Nasīr Mīrzā in charge of Kābul, he reached Qunduz in January, 1511. Here he received an embassy from the Safavī king, Shāh Isma‘il of Īrān, who offered his friendship and sent back his sister Khānzāda Begam who had fallen into the hands of the Persians. Bābur sent Wais Mīrzā to Īrān with congratulations, thanks and presents. The Shāh agreed to help Bābur on condition that he should read the Shāh’s name in the *khutba* and stamp it on his coins together with those of the Twelve *Imāms*.<sup>6</sup>

With Persian auxiliaries Bābur took Bukhārā; his cousin Haidar Mīrzā had already driven the Uzbegs out of Farghāna. The road to Samarqand now lay open and from Bukhārā Bābur marched direct to the capital of Tīmūr and proclaimed himself king amidst popular rejoicings. His popularity soon waned in Sunnī Samarqand which bitterly disliked his concessions to Shi‘ism in his compact with the Shāh. The Uzbegs under ‘Ubaid-ullah Khān, nephew of Shaibānī, taking advantage of Shāh Isma‘il’s preoccupation in the affairs of Āzarbāijān and the growing coolness between him and Bābur due to the latter’s failure to fully satisfy the Shāh’s Shi‘ite zeal, attacked Bukhārā. Bābur thereupon marched against the Uzbegs but was defeated at Kul-i-Malik in the vicinity of Bukhārā (May, 1512). Bābur lost not only Bukhārā but also Samarqand to the Uzbegs, and retired to Hissār (in Badakhshān). Shāh Isma‘il had meanwhile sent an army under Najm Beg to assist Bābur against the Uzbegs.<sup>6a</sup>

The combined forces of Najm Beg and Bābur marched towards Bukhārā, taking Khuzar and Qarshī on the way. The Uzbegs had entrenched themselves in the fort of Ghazdawān which Najm Beg besieged. The garrison was well-provisioned against a long siege, while the Persian troops badly suffered from winter and scarcity. Najm Beg therefore decided to raise the siege and withdraw, as Bābur and others advised him, but next day the Uzbek army, greatly reinforced, surprised the Persians. The Persian army was thrown into confusion and badly defeated and Najm Beg was slain (November, 1512). Bābur, who was in command of the rear-guard, escaped to Hissār. Persian historians accuse Bābur of treachery in the battle, and his son Humāyūn, while at the Persian court, was taunted by reference to his father’s treachery at Ghazdāwan. It is quite probable that Bābur remained coldly neutral as he had no love lost for the Persian ally who had exacted too great a price for

his help. From Hissār, where the Mongols had rebelled against him, Bābur went to Qunduz, but as he had no hope of recovering Hissār, he crossed the Hindu Kush and returned to Kābul (1514).

Nasīr Mīrzā, who had been left in charge of Kābul, was now appointed to Ghaznī, but his death shortly after occasioned a revolt of local chiefs and Mongol troops, which Bābur quelled. For the next four years, 1515-1518, the history of Bābur is comparatively uneventful. He was now merely the chief of a petty kingdom. He realized at last that Central Asia was a lost field to him; he was no match for the Uzbeks, specially after Shāh Isma‘īl’s tragic defeat at Tabrīz in August, 1514, at the hands of the Ottoman Turks, as there was now no prospect of Safavīd-Tīmūrid alliance against them. But he was too optimistic to despair, and too ambitious to remain inactive, and turned his eyes towards the East as a probable compensation for the lost dominions in the North. These quiet years were spent in preparation for that ultimate goal, in punitive expeditions around Kābul, as well as in organizing his army, for which he utilized the services of a Turk named Ustād ‘Alī Qulī. The battle of Ghazdawān therefore finally moulded Bābur’s destiny. Since the conquest of Kābul in 1504 the idea of the conquest of India had been in his mind, but after Ghazdawān the thought of carving a kingdom in India was forced on him. If the battle of Archiyān turned him from Farghāna to Kābul, that of Ghazdawān turned him from Kābul to India. But for Shaibānī Khān and the Uzbeks, the founder of the Mughul empire in India might have died as a Tīmūrid ruler of Samarqand.

## II. *Conquest of Hindusthān*

Both the great ancestors of Bābur, Chingīz and Tīmūr, had invaded India. The raid of Chingīz had touched only the fringe of the country, but the invasion of Tīmūr caused wide-spread anarchy in Hindusthān, as the kingdom of Delhi had already become a shadow of its former self. The Sayyids were hardly the persons to cope with the prevailing anarchy and dislocation and gave way to the Lodīs. The kingdom of the Lodīs was a loose confederacy of semi-independent governorships held by the *amīrs*, the leaders of the Afghān tribes, and the king ‘was no more conspicuous than a royal oakling in a forest of oaks’. The first two Lodīs managed the turbulent nobles: Buhlūl, by respecting the sentiments of the Afghāns, wedded to the ideal of tribal polity, and Sikandar, by a policy of tempered firmness. But Ibrāhīm, who came to the throne in 1517, was ambitious, tactless, arrogant and impatient; he tried to play the monarch, even to those who detested monarchy. He

thus alienated the sympathy of the Afghān nobles who raised the standard of rebellion. The Punjab and Jaunpur openly revolted and the Rājputs also defeated him.<sup>7</sup>

While the king of Kābul was preparing for the realization of his long-cherished dream of the conquest of Hindusthān, the Hindusthān of Ibrāhīm Lodī offered him the most favourable circumstances. Outside the Lodī kingdom there were the Muslim kingdoms of Multān, Sind, Gujarāt, Mālwa, Khāndesh, and Bengal in Northern India while in the Deccan the Bahmanī empire had been split into five States, viz., Berar, Bīdar, Ahmadnagar, Bijāpur and Golconda. The notable Hindu States were Rājasthān and Orissa in the north and Vijayanagara in the south. The Muslim kingdoms were very weak because of their internal divisions and mutual jealousies. The Rājput confederacy led by Rānā Sangrām Sinhā of Mewār had grown to be a great political force, almost ready to make a bid for the Delhi empire. The great expansion of the kingdom of Vijayanagara under Krishna Deva Rāya (1509-1530), who had humbled the power of Orissa, caused not a little anxiety to the Muslim powers of the Deccan. Such was the Indian scene when Bābur seriously turned to invade the country.

Early in 1519 Bābur made a sudden raid on Bājaur, besieged it, and stormed it after a spirited struggle. To strike terror into the heart of the Afghān tribes, he put the inhabitants to the sword, to which reference will be made later. At the same time, with a view to conciliating them, he married the daughter of a Yūsufzāi chief. He crossed the Swāt, and fording the Indus, made his way almost unopposed to the Jhelum. Most of the local chieftains and the fort of Bhera submitted. Bābur regarded the Punjab as his own by hereditary right from Tīmūr, who had conquered it, and instructed his troops not to do violence on the people or their flocks and crops. He sent an embassy to the court of Ibrāhīm Lodī asking for the recognition of his claim to the Punjab, but his envoy Mullā Murshid was detained at Lahore by the governor of the Punjab, Daulat Khān, and the letter remained undelivered. Bābur left Hindū Beg in charge of Bhera and came back to Kābul on 31 March, attacking and subduing the Gakkhars on the way. The expedition bore no permanent result—it was rather a reconnoitring raid; and no sooner had he left than his officer Hindū Beg was expelled.

Bābur himself states that from the year 925 A.H. (A.D. 1519), when he took Bājaur, to the year 932 A.H. (A.D. 1526), he led his army five times into Hindusthān. Bābur thus regarded the ex-

pedition of early 1519 as his first Indian invasion. There is no disagreement about his fifth expedition which led to the battle of Pānīpat, but we are not told which expeditions Bābur regarded as second, third and fourth. Abu-'l-Fazl regards the raids of 1505 and 1507 as the first and second and that of early 1519 as the third, but could not be definite regarding the fourth. If we take into consideration the earlier raids of 1505 and 1507, we find that Bābur made altogether seven expeditions into Indian territory.

The same year, 1519, in September Bābur crossed the Khyber and advanced as far as Peshāwar, subduing the Yūsufzāi Afghāns on the way. But he had to hasten back to Kābul on receipt of the report that the ruler of Kāshghar was advancing on Badakhshān. This was Bābur's fourth raid into Hindusthān and most probably Bābur regarded it as his second.<sup>8</sup>

In 1520 Bābur made his fifth expedition (third according to Firishta and probably also to Bābur) into Hindusthān. He marched out of Kābul through Bājaur, crossed the Indus and reached Bhera where he punished those who had revolted against him. Crossing the Jhelum he advanced on to Siālkot, which submitted, and then marched on Sayyidpur which offered resistance. Bābur stormed it, put the inhabitants to the sword, and took the women and children into captivity. The expedition came to an abrupt end because Bābur had to return to Kābul which was threatened by Shāh Beg Arghūn, ruler of Qandahār.

Bābur realized the necessity of having Qandahār as a base before he should lead his troops into Hindusthān. It would be almost indispensable for a ruler of Kābul and the Indian kingdom as the first line of defence against the growing power of Safavī Persia. Qandahār was held by Zū-'n-Nūn Beg Arghūn on behalf of Sultān Husain Mīrzā Baiqara of Herāt, but after the fall of Herāt and Zū-'n-Nūn Beg's death, his sons Muqim and Shāh Beg secured independent possession of it. Already in 1517 Bābur had made an unsuccessful attempt on it. On his return to Kābul from the Indian raid, he laid siege to Qandahār (1520) but could not take it. Next year also he made another unsuccessful siege. Shāh Beg, as he failed to persuade Shāh Isma'īl to interfere against Bābur, left Qandahār for Sind where he was able to carve out an independent kingdom. Bābur accordingly marched to Qandahār, took it without any opposition on 6 September, 1522,<sup>9</sup> and left his younger son Mīrzā Kāmran in charge. Garmsīr also fell into the hands of Bābur. Badakhshān, too, had come to his hands in 1520 on the death of his cousin Wais Mīrzā, when Bābur, setting aside the claim of the

former's son Sulaimān Mīrzā, had appointed his own son Humāyūn to its government.

Bābur was now free to turn his attention to Hindusthān. There the position of Ibrāhīm Lodī was growing more and more precarious on account of the revolt of his nobles and relations. The most serious enemies of the Sultān were 'Ālam Khān, his uncle, and Daulat Khān Lodī, viceroy of the Punjab, both of whom appealed to Bābur for help. 'Ālam Khān, who had been living at the court of Sultān Muzaffar of Gujarāt, went to Kābul and begged Bābur to advance to the Punjab and place him on the throne of Delhi. Daulat Khān, apprehending that Sultān Ibrāhīm would soon deprive him of his position, sent messengers to Bābur, offering to acknowledge him as his sovereign and asking his aid against Ibrāhīm. Bābur responded to Daulat Khān's appeal and undertook his sixth invasion of Hindusthān (1524).<sup>10</sup>

Passing through the Khyber Pass and the Gakkhar country, Bābur crossed the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenāb and advanced within ten miles of Lahore. There he was encountered by the Lodī army under Bihār Khān, Mubārak Khān and others. The Afghān army was defeated and Lahore fell into Bābur's hands. He then pushed on southwards to Dīpālpur which he stormed. Here he was joined by Daulat Khān and his sons, Ghāzī Khān and Dilāwar Khān, who had been driven from Lahore. Bābur gave Daulat Khān, Julundur and Sultānpur as assignments. This could hardly satisfy Daulat Khān who wanted a free hand in the Punjab. He had sought an ally but found a master, and along with his son, Ghāzī Khān, left Bābur in silent indignation and began to intrigue against him. Dilāwar Khān, who remained loyal to Bābur, was now given Sultānpur. To the pretender 'Ālam Khān, Bābur gave Dīpālpur. Bābur was proceeding eastwards towards Sirhind but, considering his forces inadequate, retreated to Lahore and then returned to Kābul.

No sooner had Bābur left than Daulat Khān came out of his retreat, seized Sultānpur and drove 'Ālam Khān from Dīpālpur. 'Ālam Khān, who still harped on his claim to the throne of Delhi, escaped to Kābul and offered Bābur the formal cession of Lahore and the territory west of it on condition that Bābur would place him on the Delhi throne. The king of Kābul accepted the offer and sent instructions to his generals in the Punjab to help 'Ālam Khān in his attack on Delhi. Bābur could not accompany 'Ālam Khān to Hindusthān as he had to go to Balkh to the aid of Shāh Isma'īl against the Uzbegs who had besieged it. 'Ālam Khān, after his re-

turn to India, abandoned the alliance with Bābur and joined hands with Daulat Khān who offered him his help and allegiance. With the assistance of Daulat Khān and his son, Ghāzī Khān, 'Ālam Khān marched on Delhi and surprised Ibrāhīm Lodī's camp at night, but was ultimately routed. With his army dispersed, 'Ālam Khān made good his escape.

Bābur meanwhile had driven the Uzbeks from Balkh and now turned his attention to Hindusthān. On 17 November, 1525, he set out on his last and most momentous Indian campaign. On the way he was joined by Humāyūn from Badakhshān and Khvāja Kilān from Ghaznī. When he crossed the Indus on 16 December, the entire army amounted to twelve thousand men including non-combatant camp followers. As Bābur advanced towards Siālkot, Daulat Khān and Ghāzī Khān, who were overrunning the Punjab, escaped to Milwat. Bābur blockaded the strong fortress and forced Daulat Khān, who had girded himself with two swords as a challenge against the invader, to capitulate. Ghāzī Khān fled, leaving his precious library to the enemy. Dilāwar Khān proved faithless towards his father and again joined Bābur. 'Ālam Khān Lodī also joined Bābur in a forlorn condition and Bābur considered it expedient to make political use of an Afghān pretender. Lahore and its dependent territories fell into Bābur's hands and the first stage of his campaign was brought to a close.

The road to Delhi now lay open. As Bābur advanced towards his goal by way of Sirhind and Ambāla, Sultān Ibrāhīm also advanced from Delhi with a big army to meet the invader. Two advance parties of the Afghāns fell upon the Mughul army: the first under Hamīd Khān, which came into contact with Bābur's right wing, was completely routed by Humāyūn, then only eighteen years old, in his 'maiden battle'; the second under Dāūd Khān and Hātīm Khān was similarly routed. Bābur, having crossed the Sutlej near Rūpar, proceeded to Ambāla and from there two marches along the Yamunā brought him to the historic city of Pānīpat where he came within the sight of the enemy. Here Bābur encamped and prepared himself for the battle.

Bābur stationed the army in such a way that the town of Pānīpat sheltered his extreme right while his left was protected by a ditch and an abatis. His centre was strengthened by a line of some seven hundred movable carts, tied together by ropes of raw hide, and between every two carts there were five or six breastworks for the protection of the match-lock-men and artillery-men. The

line was not continuous but passages were provided wide enough for a hundred and fifty horsemen to march out abreast.<sup>10a</sup>

For eight days from 12 April to 19 April the two armies stood face to face. With a view to drawing the enemy into battle, Bābur sent out four or five thousand men on 20 April to attempt a night surprise, and though it failed on account of the negligence of the troops, it had the desired effect of making the enemy move. On 21 April at dawn the Afghāns were on the move in battle array. As Bābur noticed it, he bade his men take their station and drew them up according to the traditional formation of the Turks and the Mongols.

Bābur took his position in the centre. The right centre was led by Chīn Tīmūr Sultān and the left centre by the Chief Minister Mīr 'Alī Khalīfa. Humāyūn, assisted by Khvāja Kilān, commanded the right wing and in charge of the left wing were Muhammad Sultān Mīrzā and Mahdī Khvāja. On the right and left extremities of the entire line there were two flying columns to wheel round on the enemy and take them in the flank and rear. The van was commanded by Khusrav Kūkultāsh and Muhammad 'Alī Jang, and the reserve by 'Abd-ul-'Azīz, the Master of the Horse. Along the front of the entire line, protected by the palisade of carts and breastworks, were placed the artillery under Ustād 'Alī on the right side and the musketeers under Mustafā on the left. From his key position in the centre Bābur could have a view of the activities of the entire army.

Ibrāhīm Lodī had with him a force of 100,000 men and 1,000 elephants while Bābur's army was 24,000 strong.<sup>11</sup> The Afghān army came straight on at a rapid march, and as they came near his defences, they hesitated and halted, but the ranks behind still pressed forward and caused great confusion among the whole force. Bābur seized the opportunity and sent out his flanking columns to wheel round the Afghāns and deliver a violent attack on their rear, while his right and left wings charged straight on. Bābur sent timely reinforcement to the left wing under Mahdī Khvāja which was hard pressed, as well as to the right wing which felt the brunt of the Afghān attack. From the centre Ustād 'Alī with his artillery and Mustafā with his match-locks began their action. Ibrāhīm's centre gave way and the Afghāns, beset on all sides by arrows and fire and crowded into a narrow space with no room to use their arms, could neither advance nor retreat. The battle ended at noon when the Afghāns were completely routed and took to flight, leaving some twenty thousand dead, including Sultān Ibrāhīm Lodī. The superior generalship and strategy of Bābur, the higher discipline and

morale of his troops, and the discontent rampant among the Afghān troops were the secrets of his easy victory. The efficacy of Bābur's artillery at Pānīpat has been over-estimated; it seems Bābur had only two guns and, even if he had more, it appears from his own description that he won at Pānīpat a bow-man's victory.<sup>12</sup> The importance of the battle, great as it was, has also been exaggerated. It sealed the fate of the Lodī dynasty and marks the completion of the second stage of Bābur's conquest of India. It did nothing more; it could not finally decide the fate of Hindusthān.

From the field of Pānīpat Bābur marched to Delhi. On 27 April, 1526, the *khutba* was read in his name in the Jami' Mosque and the king of Kābul was hailed as the Emperor of Hindusthān.<sup>13</sup> From Delhi Bābur proceeded to Āgra which Prince Humāyūn had already captured. Āgra became Bābur's new Samargand. Here Humāyūn presented him a big and precious diamond which he had received from the family of the late Rājā Vikramajit of Gwalior as a mark of gratitude for his chivalrous treatment. This has been identified with the world-famous *Koh-i-Nūr*.<sup>14</sup> Bābur, however, affectionately returned it to his son as a gift.

Bābur had won the throne of Delhi but not yet the empire of Hindusthān. The various Afghān leaders rose against the Mughul usurper from different centres: Sambhal, Bayāna, Mewāt, Dholpur, Gwalior, Rāprī, Etāwa<sup>15</sup> and Kālpī. They found a pretender in Ibrāhīm Lodī's brother, Mahmūd Lodī. Nāsir Khān Lohānī and Ma'rūf Farmūlī still held Kanauj and the country beyond the Gaṅgā (Ganges), and the Afghāns in Bihār had set up Bihār Khān, son of Daryā Khān, as their king. Besides, Bābur experienced much difficulty in procuring provisions for his army on account of the hostility of the people, and his officers, weary of the oppressive summer of Hindusthān, murmured for the cool air of Kābul. Bābur discouraged their timid conservatism and his eloquence hushed all dissentients; Khvāja Kilān, the only notable exception, was sent to Ghaznī as its governor.

The Afghān chiefs now realized that, unlike Tīmūr, Bābur had come to conquer and not merely to raid, and many laid down their arms; among them were such notable Afghān leaders as Shaikh Bāyazīd and Mahmūd Khān Lohānī. Bābur had now two major enemies to face: the Afghāns of the East who had set up Bihār Khān as their king, and the Rājputs in the south-west under Rānā Saṅgrām Simha of Mewār. The Afghān menace seemed more imminent and Humāyūn was sent with an expeditionary force against them. In a brilliant campaign Humāyūn took Jaunpur, Ghāzipur and Kālpī; and

line was not continuous but passages were provided wide enough for a hundred and fifty horsemen to march out abreast.<sup>10a</sup>

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Gwalior was obtained by treachery. About this time (December, 1526) Bābur narrowly escaped death from poison mixed with his food by Sultān Ibrāhīm's mother through royal servants.

Bābur now turned his attention to the arch-enemy, Rānā Saṅgrām Simha. This undisputed leader of the Rājput confederacy was an indefatigable fighter, with one arm and one eye lost and eighty scars in his body. He had sent a friendly embassy to Bābur at Kābul and offered his help against Ibrāhīm, but the situation had now changed and Saṅgrām Simha lost no time in declaring war against his rival for the mastery of Hindusthān. Bābur declared his first *jihād* (holy war) against the 'infidels' and sent reinforcement to Bayāna which had been besieged by the united forces of Hasan Khān of Mewāt and Rānā Saṅgrām Simha. On 11 February, 1527, Bābur himself marched against the enemy and encamped at Sīkrī where he was joined by the garrison from Bayāna. In some skirmishes which followed, the Rājputs inflicted defeat upon his advance-guard. Rāprī and Chāndwār<sup>16</sup> fell into the hands of the Afghāns; Sambhal and Kanauj were abandoned; Gwalior was besieged by the Hindus; and the Indians who had joined his ranks began to desert. It was at this critical juncture that Bābur made the memorable renunciation of his besetting sin, wine, and restored the morale of his troops by a stirring oration.<sup>17</sup> He then pushed on and met the enemy near Khānuā, a village some thirty-seven miles west of Āgra.

Here on 17 March, 1527, the battle took place.<sup>18</sup> Bābur employed the same tactics that he had employed at Pānīpat. Along the front of the line were placed groups of carts, connected together by chains of iron and breastworks of wheeled wooden tripods fastened by ropes of hide, and behind them were the artillery and the match-locks. As at Pānīpat, Bābur himself commanded the centre. On the right of the centre was Chīn Timūr Sultān and the right wing was led by Humāyūn. The left wing was under the general command of Khalīfa who was assisted by Mahdī Khvāja and Muhammad Sultān Mīrzā. Mustafā with his match-locks was posted in front of the right wing while Ustād 'Alī with his ordnance stood in front of the centre. On the two extremities were the flanking columns (*Tulghama*). Of the numerical strength of Bābur's army there is no estimate, and though the Mughul estimate of the Rājput army numbering 200,000 was exaggerated, there can be no doubt about their preponderating numerical superiority. According to Tod, the Rānā could place himself at the head of seven Rājās, nine Rāos, one hundred and four chieftains, eighty thousand horsemen and five hundred war-elephants.<sup>19</sup> Its accuracy may, however, be doubted.

The battle began about half-past nine in the morning with a magnificent charge by the Rājput left wing upon the Mughul right. The timely reinforcement under Chīn Tīmūr Sultān saved the hard-pressed right of Bābur. Mustafā brought forward his tripods and culverins and opened fire upon the assailants. With fresh reinforcements from the centre and Mustafā's fire, the Mughul right repulsed the increasing attacks of the enemy and inflicted heavy losses upon them. The Rājputs now fiercely charged the Mughul left wing, but it stood fast while the flanking column wheeled round and fell upon the rear of the enemy. The Mughul artillery (match-locks and stone missiles discharged by 'Alī Qulī) began to rain death, but the Rājputs by the sheer weight of superior numbers maintained unceasing pressure. Bābur had to send his reserve and then led his centre forward. The Rājputs then made the last desperate charge upon the Mughul right and left wings. In the evening, after ten hours' hard contest, the Rājputs were completely routed, and the Rānā, badly wounded, took to flight. The battle of Khānuā is probably even more important than the battle of Pānīpat; the one broke the unstable power of an Afghān dynasty, while the other shattered 'India's most splendid chivalry', the powerful Rājput confederacy, which was making a bid for the mastery of Hindusthān. The battle of Khānuā decided the issue in favour of Bābur and marked the most important stage in his conquest of Hindusthān. Āgra and not Kābul became henceforward the centre of his power.

Bābur now assumed the title of 'Ghāzī' and, with a view to reducing Mewāt, marched into its capital, Alwār (7 April, 1527). Humāyūn was despatched to Badakhshān with a large force to keep his trans-Indian territory secure. Towards the end of the year Bābur led his troops against Medinī Rāi, a Rājput chief of influence and king-maker in Mālwa, who held the great fortress of Chanderī on the north-east of Mālwa. He encamped before Chanderī on 21 January, 1528, and, after a week of fruitless negotiation for peace, besieged it on the 28th. After a desperate fight Bābur took it next morning in spite of the heroic sacrifice of the garrison, which was almost tantamount to suicide.

On 2 February, 1528, Bābur set out on an eastern campaign against the Afghāns under Bīban who had routed the Mughul army in Ajodhyā and seized Lakhnau. Arriving at Kanauj, he crossed the Gaṅgā (Ganges) in the middle of March by constructing a pontoon bridge, defeated the Afghāns, and hotly pursued them as far as Ajodhyā. Bīban escaped to Bengal, and Bāyazīd as well as Ma'rūf also took to heels. But in the beginning of the next year Bābur had to set out on his second great eastern campaign against a formid-

able coalition of the Afghān chiefs who had all rallied under Sultān Mahmūd Lodī, the brother of Ibrāhīm Lodī, in Bihār, and gathered an army of 100,000 men. It was the last great stand of the Afghāns against the Mughul usurper. In three months the Mughul army arrived at Chunār (April, 1529), when Mahmūd, who was besieging it, took to flight. Sher Khān abandoned Banāras, several Afghān leaders surrendered to Bābur, and Mahmūd Lodī, finding himself deserted, sought refuge with the Bengal army which was massed on the frontier. Sultān Nusrat Shāh of Bengal had only recently sent an envoy to Bābur at Āgra offering his submission, and Bābur had no intention of invading his territory. Bābur, however, was bent on chastising the Afghān rebels, and as he moved eastward, he found the Bengal troops standing in his way at the confluence of the Gaṅgā (Ganges) and the Gogra. On 6 May, 1529, was fought the battle of Gogra, Bābur's third great battle in Hindusthān. He brilliantly forced the passage of the Gogra under heavy fire from the Bengal artillery, while 'Askarī, crossing at a different place, attacked the flank of the Bengal army. After a fierce struggle the enemy, attacked in front, rear and flank, broke and fled. The battle of Gogra is the supplement to the battles of Pānīpat and Khānuā; these three battles made Bābur master of Northern India. The battle of Gogra frustrated the last stand of the Afghāns. Ma'rūf and several other Afghān chiefs joined him, while Bīban, Bāyazīd and Mahmūd Lodī retired. Jalāl Khān, the late boy-king of Bihār, acknowledged Bābur as overlord and a treaty of peace was concluded with Nusrat Shāh, by which Bābur's sovereignty in Bihār was recognized. All seemed quiet in the eastern front. This was the last exploit of Bābur's stormy career.

Bābur seemed to have never lost his trans-Indian ambition, the dream of Samarqand. The report of the battle of Jām (26 September, 1528) in which Shāh Tahmāsp had inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Uzbegs revived it, and in his letter to Humāyūn, dated 13 November, 1528, Bābur enjoined his son to undertake an expedition against the Uzbegs in Hissār, Samarqand or Marv as might seem advisable. Humāyūn marched upon Samarqand and occupied Hissār, but he ultimately failed, when Shāh Tahmāsp left for the west against the Turks. Bābur was highly displeased at the failure of his son. Probably with a view to remaining near his father whose health was failing, Humāyūn suddenly left Badakhshān and arrived at Āgra on 27 June (1529). Sa'īd Khān, the ruler of Kāshghar, marched on Badakhshān and besieged Qil'a Zafar. Bābur was highly displeased at his son's conduct and sent Mīrzā Sulaimān to his father's

kingdom and compelled Sā'id Khān to recognize him as the prince of Badakhshān.

Humāyūn retired to his *Jāgīr* at Sambhal, but after six months fell seriously ill and was brought to Āgra. The skill of the best physicians failed to cure him and Bābur, in accordance with the suggestion of the saint Mīr Abū Baqā to sacrifice the most precious thing in his possession, offered to sacrifice his life. He walked three times round his sick son and exclaimed that he had borne away the disease.<sup>20</sup> Shortly after, Humāyūn recovered and Bābur, whose health had already been failing, was taken ill, and this illness continued for two or three months. Mīr Khalīfa, who had a poor opinion of Humāyūn, made an attempt to place Mahdī Khvāja, Bābur's brother-in-law, on the throne, but he revised his opinion on account of the arrogance of his nominee.<sup>21</sup> Bābur nominated Humāyūn as his successor, and a few days later, passed away on 30 December, 1530.

### III. *Personality of Bābur*

Inheriting, as a boy of eleven, but the shadow of a petty kingdom in Central Asia, Bābur died at the age of forty-eight, master of extensive dominions, stretching from the Oxus in the West to Bihār in the east and the foot of the Himālayas in the north to Mālwa and Rājasthān in the south. He could now compare himself with the Sultān of Turkey and the Shāh of Persia. His permanent place in history rests no doubt upon his conquests in Hindusthān which paved the way for the foundation of an empire that excelled, in glory and greatness, the ephemeral structure of Chingiz as well as the ill-cemented empire of Tīmūr whom he emulated. It is, however, in the military sense that Bābur can be regarded as the founder of the Mughul empire in India. The monarchy of Bābur's ideal was 'a divine inheritance'—the sacrosanct monarchy of Tīmūr; the monarchy that he established in reality was a 'human compromise'. He had neither the time to organize nor the genius for reconstruction; he failed in the task of the re-creation of a new theory of kingship and the foundation of a stable, centralized polity for his far-flung empire. As in Kābul, so in India, the government that he set up was *saifī* (by the sword) and not *qalamī* (by the pen). A considerable part of the empire, about one-fifth, was held by old 'zamīndārs and rāis' in full internal sovereignty. The territory directly under his authority he assigned to his great *amīrs* who were responsible for the administration of the area under their control; the monarch had only nominal authority over local administration. In fact, Bābur adopted the old obsolete administrative machinery of the Lodīs. He was an organizer of victory but not an organizer of polity, great conqueror but no 'architect of empire'. If he is 'the

link between Tamerlane and Akbar', Bābur in this respect seems rather nearer his famous ancestor than his truly great grandson.

Bābur is one of the most fascinating characters of history. With iron nerves and robust optimism he combined the virtues of industry, daring and vigour. Love of action was the dominant note of his character: from the age of eleven he never observed the Ramzān twice in the same place. Intrepid as a soldier, a great strategist as a general, prompt to take advantage of the enemy's weakness as a commander, he became an organizer of victory. He had little regard for the sanctity of human life: the massacre of Bājaur, the cold-blooded murder of prisoners, and the inhuman punishments which are referred to in his *Memoirs* only prove that he inherited the Mongol ferocity and Turkish savagery of his ancestors. Yet he was capable of generosity and chivalry on occasions. He possessed a joyous nature, strong affections, faculty of judging men and events, and a charming personality. He was fond of gardening and architecture, and proficient in music. He was an orthodox Sunnī, though for political reasons he had to conform to some Shi'ite rites. To compare Bābur's 'moral courage' in this respect with Akbar's religious eclecticism is as inaccurate as it is unjust. Though not a zealous bigot like the Safavī Shāhs of Persia, he could never dream of the *sulh-i-kull* (universal toleration) cult of his grandson. True to his age, he rejoiced in the glory of *Jihād* (holy war against infidels) and the majesty of the title of *Ghāzī*. To him Sunnism was the 'pure faith', Shiism 'heresy', and a Shiah was 'a rank heretic'. With righteous satisfaction he justifies and records the cruel massacre of Bājaur because the victims were infidels.<sup>22</sup> An incorrigible but repentant drunkard, he was keenly sensitive to the beauties of nature. His description of the flora and fauna of Hindusthān reveals his quickness of observation and his marvellous interest in natural history. The sweeping condemnation of Hindusthān—its people as well as its culture—betrays as much his superficial acquaintance with, as his supreme contempt for, the land he conquered to stay in. His mind was as active as his body. In him were combined the vigour and stubbornness of the Mongol, the hardihood and capability of the Turk, and the culture and suavity of the Persian. He was a master of Turkī, his mother tongue, as well as Persian, the language of culture, the 'French' of Muslim Asia. His autobiography in Turkī is a permanent contribution to literature. He was a poet of no mean order in both the languages. He wrote a *Dīwān* in Turkī and a collection of *Masnavīs* called the *Mubayyin* which is a treatise on Muslim law. He was the author of a Turkī treatise on prosody which was discovered in 1923 in a manuscript found in Paris.

Though he conquered Hindusthān and laid the first stone of the splendid fabric of the Mughul empire, he had no love lost for the country. He sighed for the hills of Farghāna, the blue domes and glittering minars of Samarqand, and the verdure and flowers of Kābul, where, by his own choice, he lies buried.<sup>23</sup> The first Mughul emperor of India died, as he had lived, as a Central Asian.

## APPENDIX

(Note by the Editor on Foot-note 12 and the passage in p. 35 to which it relates)

The author of this chapter has challenged the generally accepted view about the size and nature of Bābur's artillery and the very important role it played in his victories at Pānīpat and Khānuā. As this is a very important question, a more detailed discussion is necessary. So far as the general view is concerned, it would suffice to refer to Rushbrook Williams and Denison Ross, two of the latest writers on the subject, who had before them the English translation of the *Bābur-nāma* by A. S. Beveridge whom the author cites as his authority. The following sentences from the description of the battle of Pānīpat in *An Empire Builder of the 16th Century* by L. F. Rushbrook Williams leave no doubt about his view that the artillery played a very great role—greater than bow and arrow—in Bābur's victory at Pānīpat:

“The ordnance and match-locks poured in a withering fire from the centre” (p. 136). “Ustād ‘Alī and Mustafā (in charge of Bābur's artillery) rained death upon the crowded ranks, and the unfortunate Afghāns fell by thousands beneath the swords and arrows of the Mughals. . . . . For some hours the slaughter continued” . . . . . “a total death-roll of some twenty thousand. . . . . a terrible testimony alike to the skill of the leader and to the deadliness of his scientific combination of cavalry and artillery” (p. 137).

As regards ‘Khānuā’, Rushbrook Williams writes:

“Along the front of the line were the artillery-men and the musketeers, secure in the shelter of the chained wagons and of the tripod-like breastworks. Mustafā, with the match-locks and culverins, was posted in advance of the right wing, while Ustād ‘Alī, with the heavy ordnance, held the ground in front of the centre.” (p. 149). “Mustafā, the artillery-man, trundled his culverins and his tripods into the open field, and from this position of advantage commenced a destructive fire with small-calibre ordnance and match-locks. So great was the effect that the morale of the discomfited Mughals was restored” (p. 153). “Thus supported, and aided in addition by Mustafā's deadly firearms, the Mughal right beat off all attacks and inflicted severe losses upon the enemy.” (p. 154). “On the one hand the Mughal artillery caused fearful carnage in the crowded Rājput ranks, and on the other, the unceasing pressure of superior numbers reduced Bābur's men almost to their last gasp”.

(p. 154). (There was) “a clear passage down the middle for Ustād ‘Alī’s ‘great balls’. Simultaneously, it would appear, a strong body of match-lock men was brought from the right wing, whose fire supplemented the efforts of Ustād ‘Alī. This clever manoeuvre was crowned with success. The charge of the household troops forced back the Rājput centre, and the firearms blasted a lane of death into the thick of the foe. The match-lock-men then advanced from behind the artillery, trundling their tripods in front of them, and the ground was quickly occupied by the Mughal infantry. The Pādshāh in person now ordered a general advance in the centre. The guns were moved forward, and Ustād ‘Alī redoubled his activities.... On the left, where the pressure was greatest, the Rājputs came within an ace of breaking through. But the advantage gained by their antagonists was too marked, and the toll taken by the artillery was too severe. Sullenly the Rājput chivalry ebbed back”. (pp. 154-5).

Denison Ross writes in the *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. IV.

1. *Re. Pānīpat*

“Between every pair of guns there were six or seven movable breastworks (*tura*) for the protection of the matchlock men” (*CHI*. IV. 12). “At this juncture Bābur ordered his gunners to open fire, and then the main attacking force of the Afghāns found themselves exposed to arrows on either flank and to shot or bullets in front”. (p. 13).

2. *Re. Khānuā*

“The artillery line was commanded by....Mustafā Rūmī, the Turkish gunner, who brought forward the carts and guns..... and broke the enemy’s ranks”.<sup>24</sup> (*CHI*. 17).

These descriptions are based on Bābur’s own account in his autobiography, which is, of course, the most important and, in this case, the sole authority available to us. Unfortunately, a few crucial words in Turkish (the language in which the book is written) are obscure and have been differently interpreted by different scholars. Mrs. Beveridge, in her translation of the book, refers to the matchlock men and guns at Pānīpat, but in a foot-note states that Bābur could not possibly have a large number of guns with him, and adds, “he can be read as indicating that he had two guns only” (pp. 468-9, f.n. 3). But her translation contains the following: “Ustād ‘Alī-qulī made good discharge of *firingī* shots”, “Mustafā made excellent discharge of *Zarb-zan* shots.” In a foot-note she observes:

“The size of these artillery at this time is very uncertain. The word *firingī* is now (1826 A.D.) used in the Deccan for a swivel. At the present day, *zarb-zan* in common usage is a small species of swivel. Both words in Bābur’s time appear to have been used for field cannon”. (pp. 473-4, f.n. 3).

As regards Khānuā also we read in the translation of Beveridge:

“This Mustafā of Rūmī had the carts brought forward and broke the ranks of pagans with match-lock and culverin”. Again in ornate

language we are told that "the match-lock men poured a ruddy crepuscle of the blood of those ill-fated pagans. . . . Ustād 'Alī-qulī did deeds of valour, discharging stones of such size. . . and, were such stones discharged against a hill, broad of base and high of summit, it would become like carded wool. Such stones Ustād 'Alī-qulī discharged at the iron-clad fortress of the pagan ranks and by this discharge of stones, and abundance of culverins and match-locks (?) destroyed many of builded bodies of the pagans. The match-lock men of the royal centre, in obedience to orders, going from behind the carts into the midst of the battle; each one of them made many a pagan taste of the poison of death." (pp. 570-71).

So it would appear that even according to this translation—which broadly justifies the accounts of Rushbrook Williams and Denison Ross—the role played by artillery, both match-lock and guns, was a very important one. Besides, the description is hardly compatible with the view that Bābur had only two guns.

As regards the importance of the battle of Pānīpat, also, the view taken in this chapter differs from those of many, including Rushbrook Williams, who observes about the battle of Pānīpat that "from the political point of view it was eminently decisive." (p. 137).

1. Bābur never boasts of his Mongol ancestry; he invariably refers to the Mongols with supreme contempt, though he owed a great deal to them.
2. We accept the version of Bābur. *Khvānd Amīr*, Bk III, Ch. iii, p. 192 and *Firishta*, Vol. I, p. 191 say that he was the sixth son of Abu Sa'īd Mīrzā.
3. Muqīm Arghūn married a daughter of Ulugh Beg.
4. In the *sarkār* of Bhakkar under the *sūba* of Multān, Jarrett, *Āin-i-Akbarī*, ii, p. 334.
5. On the Alingār river in Lamghān, Cf. Raverty, *Notes on Afghānistān*, p. 103.
6. *Habīb-us-Siyar*, Bk., III, Ch. iv, p. 66; *Tārīkh-i-'Alamārāi 'Abbāsī*, p. 30; *Ahsan-ut-Tawārikh*, p. 127. R.S. Poole, *British Museum Catalogue of Coins of Persian Shāhs*, 1887, pp. XXIV *et. seq.*
- 6a. Some historians hold the view that Najm Beg was sent by the Shāh to punish Bābur for his failure to propagate Shiism in his territories (Mrs. Beveridge, *Memoirs of Bābur* II. Transl. p. 359; Rushbrook Williams, *Bābur*, pp. 106-7), but this does not seem probable. In that case, the Persians would not have so strongly complained of Bābur's treachery in the battle of Ghazdawān. Out of political expediency the Shāh could not have alienated Bābur in the face of the grave Uzbek menace.
7. Tod, *Annals*, Ed. by Crooke, Vol. I, p. 349. For details of Ibrāhīm's reign, vide Chapter IX of Vol. VI of this series.
8. *Firishta* regards the two invasions of 925 A.H. (A.D. 1519) as the first and the second (Brigg's *Firishta*, Vol. II, pp. 35-6).
9. Darmesteter—La grande inscription de Qandahār, *Journal Asiatique*, 1890, p. 210.
10. Fourth according to *Firishta* (Vol. II, pp. 37-8) and probably Bābur as well. Abu-'l-Fazl also suggests that this was the fourth; he does not recognize

## THE MUGHUL EMPIRE

- the invasion of September, 1519, and that of 1520. A. N.: Eng. Trans., Vol. 1, pp. 234-40.
- 10a. Rushbrook Williams, p. 129.
  11. Ahmad Yādgār puts the Afghān force at 50,000 cavalry and 2,000 elephants and the Mughul army at 24,000; A.S.B. text, p. 95. Bābur, in his autobiography, estimates Ibrāhīm's army at 1 lakh horsemen and 1,000 elephants and his own army at 12,000 only, including non-combatants. It is not possible properly to ascertain the size of Bābur's artillery.
  12. The wrong translation of the word *araba* as gun-carriages (but which really means baggage carts) has been responsible for the impression that Pānīpat was a triumph of artillery. Vide A.S. Beveridge, *Bābur-nāma* f.n. 3 pp. 468-9; *Pānīpat* by C. Collin Davies in *Encyclopaedia of Islām*, Vol. III, pp. 1025-26. (Cf. Appendix by the Editor).
  13. A. S. Beveridge, *Bābur-nāma*, Vol. II, p. 476.
  14. See *Nature*, 1890, 1891; *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, April, 1899, pp. 370-389.
  15. 26° 58' N., 78° 36' E., 44 miles south-west of Mainpuri town.
  16. Chāndwār is an ancient place of considerable historical importance, standing on the left bank of the Yamunā at a distance of three miles south-west from Firūzābād (*Agra Dt. Gazetteer*, Allahabad, 1905).
  17. While the naïvete of his vow should not be doubted, it must be confessed that he broke it; vide *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, p. 128. The statement of S. Lane-Poole that 'he never took wine again' (*Bābur*, p. 153) seems incorrect.
  18. A. S. Beveridge, *Bābur-nāma*, III, pp. 558, 563.
  19. See *Annals and Antiquities of Rājasthān*, Ed. Crooke, Vol. 1, pp. 348-57 for the battle according to the Rājput version. (It is, however, interesting to record in this connection that the army of the Rānā included twelve thousand horse led by Hasan Khān Mewātī and ten thousand horse led by Mahmūd Khān, son of Sikandar Lodī, and the former died fighting (*Bābur*, *Memoirs*, pp. 562, 573). This is, perhaps, the only instance known in Indian history of Muslim nobles fighting with an army under a Hindu king against the Muslims.) [Editor, whose attention was drawn to this passage by Dr. A. K. Majumdar].
  20. Bābur believed he had done so; it was generally believed at the time. A picture illustrating the incident occurs in *Tārīkh-i-Khāndān-i-Timūriya*, reproduced by A. S. Beveridge in the *Humāyūn-nāma*, p. 104.
  21. *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, Eng. Trans. II, pp. 41-44.
  22. The Bhopal document in which Bābur prescribes for his son Humāyūn a policy of perfect toleration towards the Hindus and the Shīahs and even advises him to refrain from cow slaughter seems to be spurious. For contrary view see Dr. Syed Mahmūd, *The Indian Review*, August, 1923, pp. 498-99.
  23. He was buried at Āgra where he died. Several years later his body was removed to its present grave at Kābul.
  24. Sir Jadunath Sarkar also holds similar views. Cf. *Military History of India*, Calcutta, 1969; pp. 50-52.

## CHAPTER III

# HUMĀYŪN

Four days after the death of Bābur on 30 December, 1530, Humāyūn ascended the throne at the age of twenty-three.<sup>1</sup> The history of Humāyūn, except towards the end, offers a record of unsuccessful struggle for dominion—a tragedy of errors and failures. Humāyūn's personal character and the circumstances in which he was placed equally contributed to this. From the very beginning, Humāyūn was beset with troubles. As there was no fixed law of succession among the Timūrids, not only Humāyūn's brothers but every prince of royal blood aspired to the throne or sovereign power: the arch-enemy Kāmran and his understudy 'Askari, the vacillating Hindāl, and the two grandsons of the grand monarch of Herāt—that arch-rebel Muhammad Zamān Mīrzā, Humāyūn's brother-in-law, and his political disciple, Muhammad Sultān Mīrzā, Humāyūn's cousin. Bābur's occupation of India was 'unrooted, military and the sport of war'. The army was a heterogeneous body of adventurers—Chaghatāi, Uzbek, Mughul, Persian, Afghān and Hindusthānī. The nobles (*amīrs*) were too conscious of their own importance and authority, while the more prominent of them did not consider the throne beyond the range of their ambition. On the borders of the infant Mughul kingdom were two powers to reckon with: the kingdom of Gujarāt which was fast growing into a menacing factor under Bahādur Shāh and the Afghāns who had rallied in Bihār and considered Humāyūn as but a usurper's son. In Sher Khān Sūr they produced a truly great leader who might have proved a serious rival to Bābur. His indolent son was hardly the pilot to steer the ship of State on such a stormy voyage.

The history of Humāyūn is a drama in four acts. The first act offers the story of the hectic ten years from 1530 to 1540 during which he struggled for defending his dominion; the second unfolds the tragedy of exile from 1540 to 1545 when he had no place under the sun and sought his fortune in Sind, Rājasthān and in Persia; the third tells the story of the period from 1545 to 1554, when from his bases at Qandahār and at Kābul, he made preparations for the recovery of his dominion; and the fourth deals with the restoration during 1555-1556 when he recovered the throne of Delhi and a fragment of his kingdom.

## I. STRUGGLE (1530-1540)

In accordance with Bābur's dying advice to be generous towards his brothers, Humāyūn allowed Mīrzā Kāmṛān to govern the territories of Kābul and Qandahār, as well as the western Punjab, while he assigned Sambhal to his third brother 'Askarī, and Alwar to the youngest, Hindāl. The position of Humāyūn was full of peril; he had to face the combined opposition of the Afghāns, nominally under the leadership of Sultān Mahmūd Lodī, the brother of the late Sultān Ibrāhīm Lodī, but under the actual command of Bīban Khān Jalwāni and Shaikh Bāyazīd Qarmalī, 'heroes of a hundred battles'. From Bihār, now their vantage ground, they had marched triumphantly towards Lakhnau and forced Sultān Junaid Barlās, the Mughul governor of Jaunpur, to retire. Due to indiscipline, disunion and treachery among the Afghāns, Humāyūn easily won a victory at the battle of Dadrah (1532),<sup>2</sup> and the main force of the Afghāns was routed and dispersed. There was, however, Sher Khān, who had deserted them and thus served Mughul interest at the battle,<sup>2a</sup> but was in possession of the strategic fort of Chunār on the Gaṅgā (Ganges), south-west of Banāras. Humāyūn marched to Chunār and laid siege to it. The siege lasted for four months when Humāyūn, anxious to return to Āgra on account of the aggressive movements of Bahādur Shāh of Gujarāt, accepted the terms of Sher Khān who agreed to hold Chunār as a vassal of the Mughul emperor (December, 1531).

After returning to Āgra, Humāyūn, generous brother as he was, not only acquiesced in Mīrzā Kāmṛān's occupation of Lahore during his absence but added Multān and Hissār (Fīrūza) to his territory. In August, 1533, he laid the foundation of a new city in Delhi named Dīnpanāḥ (believed by some to be the site of old Indraprastha) which was completed in nine months. This brief respite was soon disturbed in July, 1534, when Muhammad Zamān Mīrzā and Muhammad Sultān Mīrzā, who had rebelled soon after Humāyūn's accession but had been kindly pardoned and reinstated in their *jāgīrs*, again raised the standard of rebellion in Bihār. They were defeated and imprisoned; Sultān Mīrzā was blinded but Zamān Mīrzā escaped to the court of Sultān Bahādur in Gujarāt. Humāyūn now turned his attention again towards Sher Khān and marched up to Kānār in Kālpī district, but had to hasten back to Āgra on account of the alarming successes of Bahādur Shāh who had entered into a pact with Sher Khān that each would open a second front for his ally when attacked by the Mughuls.

Bahādur Shāh, who had annexed Mālwa to his kingdom (1531) and had next year taken from the Rājput chief Silhādi his territory of Rāisen, Chanderī and Bhilsa, captured Ranthambhor and in January, 1533, laid siege to the fort of Chitor. Humāyūn, who had received an appeal for help from the Rājputs, was not prepared to meet Bahādur but made a diplomatic move to Gwālior which possibly prompted the Gujarāt king to make peace with the Rānā who offered it as he failed to receive active help of the Mughul emperor (March, 1533). Bahādur, however, took Ajmer and Nāgaur and in November, 1534, broke the treaty by an unprovoked siege of Chitor. Bahādur's conquest in Rājasthān thus became a direct menace to the Mughul territory. Bahādur also gave great offence to Humāyūn by harbouring notable Afghān leaders like 'Ālam Khān 'Ālāud-dīn Lodī, a son of Sultān Buhlūl Lodī, who had once contested the throne of Delhi, and his ambitious son Tātār Khān who still harped on his father's claims. Bahādur even sent or rather subsidized a three-pronged campaign led by them, directed against Kālinjar, Delhi and Āgra, and, though Tātār Khān was able to take Bayāna and his advance columns raided the gates of Āgra, the entire project ended in a fiasco at Mandrel where he was badly defeated by 'Askarī and slain (November, 1534). Last but not the least, Bahādur warmly received the disaffected Mughuls led by that faithless arch-rebel Muhammad Zamān Mīrzā, and added insult to injury by sending a most insolent reply to Humāyūn's demand for his extradition.<sup>3</sup> There was now no other way for even slow-moving Humāyūn but to move.

In November, 1534, Humāyūn moved from Āgra to Gwālior where he halted for two months expecting that this would induce Bahādur to raise the siege of Chitor. When this proved fruitless, Humāyūn, as expected by Bahādur Shāh, allowed him to conquer Chitor, the capital city of an infidel ruler, but took advantage of Bahādur's pre-occupation by invading his dominion and proceeding to Sārangpur and then to Ujjain in the very heart of Mālwa. After the fall of Chitor (8 March, 1535) Humāyūn moved northward towards Mandasor where Bahādur came down to meet him. The Gujarāt sultān, relying upon the advice of his mastergunner Rūmī Khān, now a traitor conspiring with the enemy, remained on the defensive and entrenched himself behind a bulwark of baggage carts instead of giving battle in the open field as his nobles suggested. Besieged by the Mughul troops, their supplies cut off, the Gujarāt troops found themselves in a prison of their own making and one night Bahādur fled towards Māndū (25 April, 1535).<sup>4</sup> Not until the next morning was the real situation revealed to the victorious

Mughuls who, after plundering his camp, pursued him to Māndū. Humāyūn laid siege to Māndū but realizing the difficulties of besieging such a gigantic fortress, twenty-three miles in circumference and defended by a large garrison, he opened negotiation for peace on condition that Bahādur should retain Gujarāt and surrender the rest of his territories to the Mughul emperor.<sup>5</sup> Negotiations were going on and there was prospect of peace when the Mughuls, taking advantage of the consequent relaxation in the Gujarāt garrison, made way into the fort through one of its unguarded parts and threw the enemy into confusion. Bahādur, roused from sleep, offered some resistance but, considering discretion as the better part of valour, slipped away to Chāmpāner. Humāyūn meted out a most severe treatment to the people of Māndū: the lanes and bazars of Māndū ran red with blood. The reduction of Māndū put Humāyūn in possession of the whole of Mālwa. Emboldened by these successes, Humāyūn invaded Gujarāt with a force of thirty thousand horsemen. As soon as he reached the environs of Chāmpāner, Bahādur left the fort in charge of Ikhtiyār Khān and, adopting the scorched-earth policy, set fire to the town and fled north to Cambay. Humāyūn pursued Bahādur as far as Cambay, but missed the enemy narrowly as Bahādur had left for Diu a few hours earlier. In revenge for a night attack on the Mughul camp by the Kolīs, Humāyūn sacked the town of Cambay for three days. Considering him as a spent force, Humāyūn now left Bahādur to his own fate and returned to Chāmpāner to undertake the siege of the fort which his officers had begun on his first arrival there on 13 June, 1535.

The celebrated fortress of Chāmpāner towers over the level plains of the eastern portion of Gujarāt. With some of its sides formed of nearly perpendicular and precipitous rocks and the deep and almost impenetrable jungle covering its foot, the fort was considered impregnable in medieval warfare. The provisions of the fort, we are told by the chroniclers, were sufficient against a siege of ten years. The Mughuls, who were not well-equipped for siege operations, realized that the fort would not surrender in spite of their best efforts. Accidentally some villagers, who used to supply food secretly to the garrison, fell into the hands of the Mughuls while they were reconnoitring their position and were forced to reveal the way to a vulnerable point of the fort. Here, at the advice of Bairam Beg, Humāyūn arranged for escalade by driving iron spikes into the mortar between the stones; and one night, as the garrison were not so vigilant to guard this side, three hundred Mughuls scaled the walls of the fort, Humāyūn being the forty-first.<sup>6</sup> At dawn, attack was made on the fort in all directions and the

*coup de main* so terrified the defenders that three hundred Mughuls seized the gate. Many of the garrison were killed, their provisions fell into the hands of the Mughuls and munitions ran short, and Ikhtiyār Khān, who had taken refuge in the upper citadel, surrendered the fort (August, 1535). All the treasures of Gujarāt sultāns, accumulated in the fort by generations, fell into the hands of the victorious troops.

After the conquest of Chāmpāner, Humāyūn became master of all Gujarāt as far as the Māhī, but he was so busy in enjoying the booty that he did not take steps to consolidate his rule, not even to collect revenue. The chiefs and people of Gujarāt offered to pay revenue even to their exiled king at Diu. Bahādur availed of this sentiment and deputed 'Imād-ul-Mulk with this duty as well as with the task of organizing an army of opposition. As he was marching to Ahmadābād, he found himself at the head of a considerable army of fifty thousand horsemen. Humāyūn now left Chāmpāner to meet the enemy. His advance guard under Mīrzā 'Askarī was defeated by 'Imād-ul-Mulk, but in the battle that ensued at a place between Nadīād and Mahmūdābād the latter was routed by the main body of the Mughul army. Humāyūn marched triumphantly to Ahmadābād and this marks the climax of his successful career in Mālwa and Gujarāt.

Humāyūn now took some steps to settle the government of the newly acquired province. He appointed Mīrzā 'Askarī viceroy of Gujarāt with his headquarters at Ahmadābād, and the veteran Hindū Beg as his adviser. Officers were posted at strategic places: Chāmpāner, Pātan, Cambay, Barodā, Broach and Surat. Rejecting the sound advice of his counsellors to restore Gujarāt to Bahādur in view of the alarming situation in Bihār and Bengal, Humāyūn marched on towards Diu in pursuit of Bahādur, but the rebellion of local chieftains in Mālwa forced him to proceed to Māndū. His arrival at Māndū restored Mughul authority without serious opposition, but after these great successes he relapsed into his chronic lethargy and opiated idleness at the attractive and luxurious capital of Mālwa. Taking advantage of this inactivity of his enemy, Bahādur issued out of his retreat. Humāyūn's conquest of Gujarāt was hardly more than a military occupation and immediately after he left for Mālwa, a counter revolution began in favour of Bahādur Shāh who was supported by the local chiefs and the people and joined by his scattered troops. The country was in revolt against the invader. The Mughul officers were driven from Navsarī, Broach, Surat, Cambay and Pātan (December, 1535). Mīrzā 'Askarī, the

viceroys of Gujarāt, was only imitating his master in the neglect of his duties and himself aspired to sovereign power, while his foster-brother Ghaznafar deserted after an angry quarrel to Bahādur and revealed to him the precarious position of the Mughuls. In response to appeals of his followers to recover his territory, Bahādur marched towards Ahmadābād and at Sarkhej, opposite the capital, he fought an indecisive battle with 'Askarī who was bent on retreating rather than maintaining his position at the capital. After a skirmish near Mahmūdābād<sup>7</sup> between Bahādur's vanguard and his rear, 'Askarī crossed the river Māhī and after severe loss reached Chāmpāner where he expected reinforcement in men and money. Its loyal governor Tardī Beg Khān answered 'Askarī with a gallant refusal and the pretender took the road to Āgra with a view to establishing his authority there. Bahādur now advanced towards Chāmpāner and Tardī Beg, unable to resist or acting on instruction from Humāyūn, retreated to Māndū taking with him as much of the treasure as he could (25 May, 1536). At long last, Humāyūn left Māndū in haste for Āgra, and at Chitor overtook his delinquent brother whom he pardoned and carried to the capital. With Tardī Beg's retreat from Chāmpāner ended Mughul domination in Gujarāt, and after Humāyūn's departure from Māndū, Mālwa fell into the hands of Mallū Khān, a nobleman of the late sultāns of Mālwa and Bahādur's governor. Gujarāt and Mālwa were as easily and rapidly lost as they had been conquered.

On his return to Āgra in August, 1536, Humāyūn found the situation embarrassing. That stormy petrel, Muhammad Zamān Mīrzā, was still at large, though after his return from Bahādur's camp at Mandasor, his attempt at the capture of Lahore had proved futile and Hindāl had just subdued Sultān Mīrzā and his sons. Sultān Mīrzā had escaped from prison and established himself at Bilgrām near Kanauj while his eldest son occupied territory in the east as far as Jaunpur, and his second son extended his authority in the south-east as far as Karā-Mānikpur. Hindāl, who had been left in charge at Āgra, marched against the rebels, met them piecemeal, before they could unite their forces, at Bilgrām and then at Awadh, and pushed on to Jaunpur, while Sultān Mīrzā with his sons retired to Bihār among the Afghāns.

The danger-spot of Humāyūn's empire was Bihār, the vantage-ground of the Afghāns who, after the battle of Dadrah and the retirement of the old leaders, found a great leader in Sher Khān, that grandson of a petty and unsuccessful horse-dealer of Roh, who hardly deserves the contemptuous remark of the Mughul historio-

grapher.<sup>8</sup> During the four years (1533-1536) while Humāyūn was mainly engaged in Gujarāt and Mālwa affairs, Sher Khān not only consolidated his position in Bihār, of which he became the king in all but name, but extended his power at the expense of the effete monarchy of Bengal. He had inflicted several crushing defeats upon the Bengal army, notably at Sūrajgarh (1534), as a result of which he became master of the territory from Chunār to Sūrajgarh. In 1536 he made a surprise attack on Bengal's capital through Jhārkhanda route and forced Sultān Mahmūd to conclude peace on payment of huge indemnity.

Humāyūn, after his return from Māndū, wasted one full year, partly because of his chronic indolence and partly because he still harped on the idea of recovering his lost kingdom in Gujarāt and Mālwa in which he was offered the alliance of Burhān Nizām Shāh of Ahmadnagar. He, therefore, remained satisfied with the report of Hindū Beg, whom he had despatched to Jaunpur for this purpose, that all was quiet on the eastern front. Legally, the only offence that Sher had given to the Mughul emperor was the departure of Qutb Khān, his son and hostage with the Mughuls (according to the Treaty of Chunār, of December, 1531), during Humāyūn's Gujarāt campaign, but this was not deemed sufficient by Humāyūn to serve as the *casus belli*. Like Bahādur, Sher Khān availed himself of the inactivity of the Mughul emperor and, tearing that 'scrap of paper' he had signed, made a second invasion of Bengal with a view to crushing Sultān Mahmūd before the latter could secure the promised Portuguese help. It was this invasion of Bengal which made Humāyūn realize at the eleventh hour the gravity of the situation and decide to lead an expedition against his astute adversary.

Accompanied by Mīrzā 'Askarī, Mīrzā Hindāl and the prominent nobles, and with a big army, Humāyūn marched from Āgra in July, 1537.<sup>9</sup> On the way he received the submission of the incorrigible rebel Muhammad Zamān Mīrzā who, after his failure to seize the throne of Gujarāt on Bahādur's death, joined the Mughul camp. The army proceeded partly by land and partly by water along the Yamunā (Jumnā) and the Gaṅgā (Ganges) and reached the environs of Chunār. With the help of Rūmī Khān, the celebrated military engineer of Bahādur Shāh, now in his service, Humāyūn laid siege to the fort which was gallantly defended by Jalāl Khān for about three months until it fell, thanks to a stratagem of the Turkish gunner. Rūmī Khān flogged a slave and sent him to the fort where he was able to convince the garrison that he had fled because of the cruelty of his master and, after studying the

vulnerable points of the fort, escaped to the Mughul camp. Rūmī Khān then moved a floating battery close to that portion of the fort, where a breach was made, and by a severe bombardment forced the garrison to surrender.

The capture of Chunār was an admirable military triumph but a tremendous strategical blunder. A prompt direct march to Gaur might have prevented the fall of the Bengal monarchy and the consequent growth of Sher Khān's power. During the period Humāyūn wasted at Chunār he allowed his enemy to work according to his plans. Sher Khān besieged Gaur but, leaving Khavāss Khān in charge of the operations, proceeded to Bihār in order to keep watch over the Mughuls. Humāyūn marched from Chunār to Banāras and encamped in its neighbourhood. He now decided to follow a more vigorous plan of operations and march towards Bengal with a view to checking Sher Khān. Yet he attempted compromise with his adversary by offering him Chunār, Jaunpur and any other place except Bengal and Rohtās on condition of payment of tribute. At Muner, on the confluence of the Son and the Gaṅgā, he was met by Sultān Mahmūd, the fugitive king of Bengal, who further incited him to march without delay before Sher could become absolute master of Bengal. Sher Khān also became indifferent to the offer of peace as he received the report of the fall of Gaur (6 April, 1538) and he now transferred all his wealth to the fort of Rohtās which he had obtained by a stratagem to redress the loss of Chunār. Consequently, the negotiation fell through. At Patna, Humāyūn was advised by his nobles to postpone the Bengal campaign until the rains were over, but urged by Mahmūd he proceeded further. Sher Khān, who was very near the Mughul army, was pursued, but he made good his escape and reached Gaur. On his arrival at Bhāgalpur, Humāyūn despatched a force of about 5000 or 6000 men to clear the road at the pass of Teliyāgarhī, but the Mughuls found it already occupied by Jalāl Khān, son of Sher, and being routed by a surprise attack were driven back on the main army at Kahalgāon (Colgong). Sultān Mahmūd died here but Humāyūn pushed on, and as he arrived at the pass, he found it abandoned by Jalāl Khān on instruction from his father who had meanwhile arrived safely in South Bihār. Humāyūn therefore could, without opposition, march through Teliyāgarhī to the capital of Bengal—a capital, devastated, ruined and strewn with corpses (15 August 1538).<sup>9a</sup>

Humāyūn's conquest of Bengal proved his undoing. He re-named the city of Gaur as Jannatābād and parcelled out the kingdom among his nobles. But as at Māndū after the successful Gujarāt and

Mālwa campaigns, so at Gaur, his Jannatābād (abode of paradise), he fell a victim to his chronic lethargy and dreamed at opium-eater's paradise while his enemy was working his ruin. Indeed, Humāyūn's entry into Bengal's capital was no triumph but a strategical defeat, and Gaur proved the grave of his empire—a grave which his astute adversary had dug for him. From his safe Jhārkhanda base, Sher Khān now cut off the communications of Humāyūn with Delhi and the desertion of his post by Mīrzā Hindāl at Tirhoot in North Bihār and that at Kanauj by Mīrzā Nūr-ud-dīn completely blockaded the Mughul emperor at Bengal's capital. Sher Khān, taking advantage of the situation of which he was mainly the author, took Banaras, sent his son Jalāl Khān to besiege Jaunpur, and invested Chunār, while his generals ravaged the whole country as far as Kanauj. Even Jaunpur fell after stubborn resistance and, as 'Abbās Sarwānī says, the whole country as far as Kanauj and Sambhal fell into the hands of the Afghāns.<sup>10</sup> Humāyūn could expect help from no quarter. The loyal governors of Delhi and Āgra, Mīr Faqr 'Alī and Mīr Muhammad Bakshī, persuaded Hindāl and Yādgar Nāsir Mīrzā at Kālpī to move towards the east in aid of the emperor. But their efforts were foiled by the arrival of the Mughul nobles under Zāhid Beg who had indignantly refused Humāyūn's offer of the government of Bengal and had abandoned him, and now, in collaboration with Mīrzā Nūr-ud-dīn, incited Hindāl to assume royal power. Under their influence Hindāl executed the venerable Shaikh Buh-lūl whom Humāyūn had sent from Gaur to reconcile his rebel brother. Hindāl now advanced to seize Delhi but was prevented by the arrival of Mīrzā Kāmran who pursued him to Āgra, drove him to his *jāgīr* at Alwār and forced him to offer submission. If any one could save Humāyūn at this critical juncture, it was Mīrzā Kāmran who had at his disposal the resources of Kābul, Qandahār and the Punjab intact, but he remained coldly neutral. The brothers indeed led a campaign as if to help Humāyūn, but after a few marches returned to Āgra. Mīrzā Kāmran was selfish and hostile, Hindāl a rebel, and Yādgar Nāsir Mīrzā was both incapable and lukewarm. The voice of the loyal governors of Delhi and Āgra proved but a cry in the wilderness. All these circumstances awakened Humāyūn from his torpor and forced him to leave 'the abode of paradise' in Bengal.<sup>10a</sup>

Probably towards the end of March, 1539,<sup>11</sup> Humāyūn set out from Bengal for the capital, leaving Jahāngīr Qulī Beg at Gaur with a force of five thousand men. 'His troops were demoralized by dissipation, disheartened by inaction, and reduced by sickness'. As he marched along the left bank of the Gaṅgā, he received the

disheartening report of the defeat and capture of his vanguard under Dilāvar Khān Lodī at Mungir. Humāyūn then sent Mīrzā 'Askarī in advance and joined him at Mungir where, against the counsel of experienced officers, he crossed the river over to the southern bank which was entirely under the Afghān control. Sher Khān and the Afghāns were in close pursuit but there was no regular engagement and the Mughul army was able to reach Chausa in Shāhābād district with but little opposition from the enemy. Here again Humāyūn committed a blunder by not attacking the Afghāns immediately before they could be ready, and played into the hands of his adversary who was waiting for the rains. The two armies lay encamped for about three months. Humāyūn's position became extremely critical; the rains were coming and there was no hope of succour from any quarter, and he therefore opened negotiations for peace. The terms are variously stated in different chronicles. It appears that Humāyūn allowed Sher Khān to retain Bengal and his old *jāgīr* in Bihār as well, on condition of Sher's acknowledgement of the Mughul suzerainty by striking coins and reading the *khutba* in his name. Negotiations for peace were in progress and there was consequent relaxation in the Mughul camp, when suddenly at break of dawn Sher Khān, after a feigned night attack on Mahāratha Chero, attacked the Mughul army and completely surprised it (26 June, 1539).<sup>12</sup> Many were killed asleep, many who attempted to escape were drowned in the swollen waters of the Gaṅgā, and Humāyūn who owed his life to his personal valour and to the generosity of a water-carrier, somehow reached Āgra with Mīrzā 'Askarī. The army was completely annihilated; it was a disastrous and absolute defeat.

After this easy victory Sher Khān hastened to Bengal and destroyed the Mughul army and its leader left by Humāyūn at Gaur. He again assumed the royal title, struck coins and read the *khutba* in his own name.<sup>13</sup> At Āgra, Humāyūn excused the veiled hostility of Kāmran and the open rebellion of Hindāl and tried his best to combine his brothers in a joint attack against Sher Shāh, but they simply deliberated and did not act. Mīrzā Kāmran would not lend his troops but under his own command and retreated to Lahore on the pretext of illness. 'Seven months were wasted in weary indecision, until the opportunity was lost, and Sher Shāh was on the Gaṅgā (Ganges), ready for war'.<sup>13a</sup> Sher Shāh had meanwhile consolidated his position in Bengal and then marched again along the bank of the Gaṅgā. Humāyūn hastily collected a big army mostly consisting of rabble and, encouraged by the defeat of Sher's advance guard under his son Qutb Khān at Kālpī which was still held by

Yādgār Nāsir Mīrzā, marched towards Kanauj to meet his adversary. The two armies remained for about a month facing each other with the Gaṅgā between them, until Humāyūn crossed it to give battle, as there were already considerable desertions from the Mughul camp. Various estimates are given in different chronicles as to the strength of the belligerents, but there is no doubt that the Afghān army was much smaller, about half in number.<sup>14</sup> As the Mughul camp in the lowland near the river was flooded owing to rains which came rather early that year, at the suggestion of Haidar Mīrzā, Bābur's cousin who had recently joined Humāyūn and was now his virtual commander, the Mughul army decided to move to a higher ground. It was during this manoeuvre on May 17, 1540, when the artillery and a portion of the army were being transferred, that Sher fell upon the Mughuls and put them to confusion. Disaffection and indiscipline among the soldiers as well as half-heartedness of the nobles, combined with bad management, added to the confusion in the Mughul army. Except the initial success obtained by Hindāl Mīrzā, who was placed in the left, against Jalāl Khān, everywhere the Mughuls were defeated: Mīrzā 'Askarī at the vanguard and Yādgār Nāsir Mīrzā in the right were forced to fall back upon the centre, while Jalāl Khān, strengthened by reinforcements, pushed Hindāl back and the numerous non-combatants at the rear forced by the Afghān attack pressed on the centre and broke the chains fastening the guns and wagons. Meanwhile an Afghān division turned round the Mughul army and reached its rear, thus encompassing the entire army of the enemy. The confusion became so terrible that any action became impossible: the battle became a rout. The artillery became thoroughly inactive, not a gun could be fired as Mīrzā Haidar regrets. Though we cannot too literally accept his statement that the enemy did not discharge an arrow, it has to be confessed that it was rather an one-sided game. The Mughuls fled to the Gaṅgā; many were killed by the Afghān army in pursuit and many who escaped the sword of the enemy were drowned in the river.

Humāyūn crossed the Gaṅgā on an elephant and with a small number of his followers returned to Āgra. The rude behaviour that he received on the way from the people of Bhongāon<sup>15</sup> and afterwards from the villagers near Rohtak<sup>16</sup> testified to the declining prestige of the house of Timūr in Hindusthān. In the Punjab everything was in disorder. Humāyūn had nothing to expect from the hostile Kāmran, the untrustworthy 'Askarī and the half-hearted Hindāl. 'The nobles were discontented; the peasantry, a prey to misrule and anarchy; the Afghāns hard in pursuit'. From

Āgra, he went to Delhi and, after a very short stay, left for Lahore via Sirhind with the hope of persuading Kāmṛān to make a combined effort against Sher Shāh. The brothers met and deliberated, but could not combine. It was a mighty gathering of the Mughuls but five months were wasted in uncertain planning and barren talk. Humāyūn's plan of going to Badakhshān, via Kābul, fell through on account of the opposition of Kāmṛān. Haidar Mīrzā made the suggestion to take shelter in the Punjab hills and try fortune in Kāshmīr, while Hindāl Mīrzā proposed to march to Sind and Gujarāt and from that base to make a renewed bid for the throne of Delhi. Humāyūn was rather inclined towards Haidar Mīrzā's view. During these heated debates Mīrzā Kāmṛān was secretly making terms for himself with Sher Shāh and openly received his envoy,<sup>16a</sup> but Sher Shāh would not give the Punjab to a Mughul, even though it was Kāmṛān. Humāyūn also made negotiation for peace with Sher Shāh who had now taken Āgra and Delhi, on condition that he should retain the Punjab, which Sher contemptuously dismissed with the remark that he should go to Kābul. Meanwhile the Afghān leader had reached Sultānpur and, as the Afghāns crossed the Beas, Humāyūn with his panic-stricken followers, to whom it was like the Day of Resurrection as Gulbadan describes it, left Lahore (end of October, 1540). Even now Humāyūn thought of moving to Kāshmīr but on account of lack of support from his officers as well as Kāmṛān's hostility the idea was abandoned in favour of Hindāl's proposal to go to Sind.<sup>17</sup> Even at this juncture Humāyūn rejected the counsel of his followers to finish his arch-enemy Mīrzā Kāmṛān who parted with him near Khushāb after an angry quarrel over the precedence in entering a defile and left for Kābul. Hindāl and Yādgar Nāsir Mīrzā also followed suit and went south for Multān but, harassed by the Baluchis, they joined Humāyūn near Uchh. Sher's general Khavāss Khān was hard in pursuit of the Mughuls to drive them out of the Punjab. After a weary journey down the Indus, Humāyūn reached Bhakkar which was in the dominion of Shāh Husain Arghūn, the ruler of Sind, and encamped at Rohri opposite Bhakkar (26 January, 1541). The second period of his history began—the period of exile.

## II. EXILE (1540-1545)

Humāyūn called upon the governor of Bhakkar to deliver the fortress. As the governor replied that he was a mere subordinate to Shāh Husain, ruler of Sind, Humāyūn sent envoys to Shāh Husain at Tatta to persuade the latter to join him in an invasion of Gujarāt. After considerable and calculated delay Shāh Husain

replied through his messenger that Humāyūn should go to Hājkān<sup>18</sup> where provisions would be available and he would present himself before Humāyūn at the earliest convenience. The nobles of Humāyūn suspected this proposal as a stratagem of Shāh Husain to drive him out of his territory as Hājkān had never been properly subjugated by the Sind ruler. Accordingly Humāyūn laid siege to the fort of Bhakkar and sent Mīrzā Hindāl to attack Sehwān. After the siege had continued for five or six months without any effect, Humāyūn, suspicious about Hindāl's movements and also because of famine raging in the area, marched to join his brother. He met Hindāl at Pātar<sup>19</sup> where, in spite of his brother's bitter protest, he married Hamīda Bānū, the daughter of Hindāl's tutor and spiritual guide. Mīrzā Hindāl, in disgust and on invitation from the governor of Qandahār, deserted Humāyūn and took the road to Qandahār. Humāyūn was therefore obliged to return to Rohrī and it was with difficulty that Yādgār Nāsir Mīrzā was prevented from joining Hindāl. Leaving the affairs of Bhakkar in charge of Yādgār Nāsir, Humāyūn now turned his direction to Sehwān, which he reached on 6 November, 1541. Shāh Husain had adopted the same plan as he had done in Bhakkar; he had laid waste the surrounding country and cut off all supplies and he himself encamped in the vicinity of Sehwān. Humāyūn besieged the fort for several months against heavy odds. His army suffered much on account of the scarcity of provisions and desertion began in his camp. Yādgār Nāsir Mīrzā, whom he had left in charge of the siege of Bhakkar, had been won over by Shāh Husain on promise of his daughter's hand and his kingdom. All these compelled Humāyūn to raise the siege of Sehwān (4 March, 1542)<sup>19a</sup> and make a hasty retreat to Bhakkar where he found no better prospect. Yādgār Nāsir threatened to attack him openly, and scarcity of provisions made the situation hopeless. There was little to hope for in Sind and much to fear from Shāh Husain who could have no love lost for Bābur's son<sup>20</sup> and risk an Afghān invasion into his territory by a barren Mughul alliance.

In this miserable plight Humāyūn threw himself on the protection of Rājā Māldev of Mārwar who had invited him to Jodhpur and promised him assistance. Proceeding by Uchh and the fort of Dilāwar,<sup>21</sup> Humāyūn reached the vicinity of Bikāner on 31 July, 1542, after a horrid journey in which many died and all suffered exceedingly, as Jauhar says. To his great surprise Humāyūn found the Rājā hostile. Probably the threat of an Afghān attack forced him to revise his policy. Māldev had offered his invitation and help at a time when Sher Shāh was preoccupied elsewhere. Humā-

yūn responded to it too late, after one year, when Sher Shāh had settled his affairs in the Punjab, Mālwa and Bengal, while the Mughul resources had become weaker. Sher Shāh sent an envoy to Māldev asking him to capture Humāyūn, and self-interest, seasoned with Rājput chivalry, induced Māldev to stage a march of Rājput troops against the Mughuls.<sup>21a</sup> Humāyūn was accordingly forced to leave Māldev's territory and turn towards Jaisalmer whose Rājā also proved hostile. Pursued by Māldev's troops, fatigued with thirst and hunger, the Mughuls arrived at 'Umarkot where the Rānā received them with hospitality and agreed to help Humāyūn to conquer Bhakkar and Tatta. After a stay of about a month and a half, Humāyūn started on an expedition to Sind at the head of the Mughul and Rājput troops. A few days later, on the way, he received the report that on 15 October, 1542, Hamīda Begam had given birth to a son at 'Umarkot, the celebrated Akbar of history.<sup>22</sup>

Humāyūn took the pleasant city of Jūn and remained there for nearly nine months. Shāh Husain opposed him with a formidable army. Though no major battle but only skirmishes took place, the situation of the Mughuls became precarious. The arrogant behaviour of some Mughul nobles alienated the Rājputs who left Humāyūn. One of his prominent noblemen, Mun'im Beg, deserted him, and desertion to the enemy became frequent and contagious. It was at this critical juncture that Humāyūn was joined by his valued servant Bairam Beg who had separated from him after the disastrous battle of Kanauj and made an adventurous escape from the clutches of Sher Shāh. From this time onwards Bairam Beg becomes Humāyūn's chief counsellor and guide. On his advice Humāyūn concluded a treaty with Shāh Husain who agreed to allow Humāyūn passage through his territory to Qandahār and supply him with money and other requisites for the journey.

On 11 July, 1543, Humāyūn left Jūn for Sehwān and from there via Gandāva and Sibī advanced as far as Shāl (Quetta). He could not proceed to Qandahār in view of the hostile attitude of Mīrzā Kām-rān but retreated southwards to Mastung. Mīrzā Kām-rān had ousted Hindāl from the government of Qandahār and carried him as well as Yād-gār Nāsir Mīrzā, who had arrived from Sind, to Kābul. He then sought the alliance of Shāh Husain Arghūn by proposing to marry his daughter and instructed Mīrzā 'Askarī, whom he had appointed governor of Qandahār, to oppose Humāyūn. The idea of going to Qandahār was given up and, on the advice of Bairam Beg, who was a Shiah and whose ancestors were related to, and in alliance with, the former rulers of Īrān, he decided to go to

Persia. In extreme haste Humāyūn departed from Mastung, leaving the child Akbar to the tender mercy of his uncles. From Garm-sīr he wrote a letter to Shāh Tahmāsp of Persia asking permission to visit him but, pursued by Mīrzā 'Askarī's men, he entered the Shāh's territory before he received his reply (January, 1544).

It was not until August, 1544, that Humāyūn could meet the Shāh at his summer capital between Abhar and Sultānīya. Along the entire route wherever he had halted he had been given regal reception and a grand reception was held at the court to welcome him, but they were rather studied displays of the Shāh's magnificence than expressions of honour to his dethroned guest. Humāyūn remained at the Shāh's court for a few months during which he had to suffer humiliation and insult, and was forced by threat of violence to make a confession of the Shiah faith and agree to spread Shiahism in India. In lieu of this sacrifice, the zealous Persian monarch agreed to render him military help for the recovery of his territory in Afghānistān on condition that Qandahār should be restored to Persia. The Shāh's treatment of Humāyūn was marked by a curious compound of courtesy and insult, hospitality and hostility, generosity and meanness.

Reinforced with 14,000 Persian troops Humāyūn arrived at the vicinity of Qandahār on 21 March, 1545,<sup>22a</sup> and laid siege to it. As the siege went on, he sent Bairam Khān<sup>23</sup> on a diplomatic mission to Kābul with a view to winning the Tīmūrid princes and nobles over to his side. Mīrzā 'Askarī surrendered the fort on 3 September, 1545, and Qandahār was made over to the Persians as stipulated. But the Persian troops declined to render any further help to Humāyūn, who was now being joined by his followers but had no shelter. Pressed by sheer necessity, he made a sudden attack on Qandahār one month later, expelled the Persian garrison, and took it in violation of his agreement with Shāh Tahmāsp. The occupation of Qandahār was the turning point in the history of Humāyūn. He had now a place under the sun and a base for further operations. Thus ended the second period of his history, the period of exile. He could now think of recovering his kingdom in Afghānistān and ultimately his dominions in India. The significance of Humāyūn's Persian exile is indeed very great. Without it the restoration of the Mughul power in India would not have been possible. Not only was diplomatic relation established between the Safavī and Mughul courts, but it led to closer contacts between Īrān and India whose full significance was realized in the reign of Akbar.

## III. RETURN

Humāyūn appointed Bairam Khān to the government of Qandahār and set out for Kābul. On the way Mīrzā Hindāl joined him and, as he advanced, desertion in his camp forced Mīrzā Kām-rān to escape to Sind by way of Ghaznī, and Humāyūn entered Kābul without any opposition (18 November, 1545) and met his son Akbar after an interval of about two years. The occupation of Qandahār and Kābul made Humāyūn master of southern Afghānistān.

In March, 1546, Humāyūn set out on a campaign in Badakhshān (Northern Afghānistān) whose ruler Mīrzā Sulaimān had recently been set free from Kām-rān's bondage at Kābul. Humāyūn took 'Askarī with him and ordered execution of Yādgār Nāsir Mīrzā who had rejoined his service but had shown signs of disaffection. Humāyūn's campaign met with success; at Tīrgīrān he defeated Sulaimān and forced him to escape to Kūlāb. Humāyūn then advanced to Kishm and from there to Qil'a Zafar, but on the way fell dangerously ill which caused disaffection in the army and encouraged Kām-rān to move out of Sind. Reinforced by his father-in-law, Shāh Husain, Mīrzā Kām-rān returned to Afghānistān, took Ghaznī, whose governor Zāhid Beg he put to death, and marched upon Kābul. Kābul also fell into his hands and Mīrzā Kām-rān began a reign of terror, brutally killing and executing many of the followers of Humāyūn. Winter was at its worst, but Humāyūn had to hurry back towards Kābul. He besieged the city and the siege continued for several months. The contest was bitter, so much so that Kām-rān placed Akbar on the battlements, exposed to his father's gun and musket shots. Realizing, however, that it was impossible to hold the city, he fled through a hole made in the fort wall (27 April, 1547), narrowly escaping capture by Hājī Muhammad or, according to Jauhar, Mīrzā Hindāl who pursued him. He first went to Mīrzā Sulaimān but, failing to win him over to his side, approached the Uzbek chief Pīr Muhammad Khān of Balkh, and with his help captured much of the territory of Badakhshān. Humāyūn accordingly set out on a second campaign against Badakhshān (June, 1548). By way of Andarāb, where he was joined by Mīrzā Hindāl who arrived from Qunduz, he proceeded to Tāliqān and besieged it. Mīrzā Kām-rān, failing to secure further help from the Uzbeks, surrendered the fort after some resistance (17 August, 1548) and rendered homage to Humāyūn who pardoned him and granted him Kūlāb, north of the Oxus, as his *jāgīr*, which, however, was considered as an insult by the ex-king of Kābul and Badakhshān. In October Humāyūn returned to Kābul.

In February, 1549, Humāyūn led a campaign against Balkh and the Uzbeks, his hereditary enemies. Though he was joined by Mīrzā Hindāl and Mīrzā Sulaimān on the way, Mīrzā Kāmran refused to come to his aid. Humāyūn, after gaining some successes against the army of Pīr Muhammad Khān, was able to reach Balkh and was on the point of taking the city when the bogey of Kāmran's attack on Kābul told upon the morale of the Mughul officers and, as they retreated, they were hard-pressed by the enemy from behind and many were killed. The retreat became a rout and the campaign ended in a tragic fiasco. Mīrzā Kāmran now marched against Mīrzā Sulaimān, took Tāliqān and Qil'a Zafar, and attacked Mīrzā Hindāl, but was afterwards forced to withdraw into the Hazāra country on account of the combined opposition of Hindāl and Sulaimān.

In the middle of 1550 Humāyūn marched from Kābul towards Ghurband to chastise his incorrigible brother. He was surprised by Mīrzā Kāmran in the Qibchaq defile<sup>24</sup> and in the battle that followed Humāyūn lost many of his soldiers and was himself wounded. Kāmran made a hurried march to Kābul, took it and held it for three months. Kābul believed Humāyūn dead, while he was waiting in Andarāb. With the help of reinforcements sent by Mīrzā Sulaimān's wife, Humāyūn marched against Kāmran who rejected his terms, fought the battle for Kābul and won it. Mīrzā Kāmran fled and Mīrzā 'Askarī, who had joined Kāmran, was captured and banished.<sup>25</sup>

The battle for Kābul had been won but the problem of Kāmran remained. He was now joined by one of Humāyūn's most prominent officers, Hājī Muhammad Khān. To meet this dangerous situation Humāyūn recalled from Qandahār Bairam Khān who was able to conciliate Hājī Muhammad and bring him to his master. Humāyūn, who had on account of adversity and misfortune become wiser and sterner and put Yādgār Nāsir to death and banished 'Askarī, now executed Hājī Muhammad. Mīrzā Kāmran gathered the Afghāns under him and stirred up strife in the territory between Kābul and the Indus. During one of these engagements on 20 November, 1551, Mīrzā Kāmran surprised his brother at night at Jiryār in Nangnahr and, though he was defeated,<sup>25a</sup> Mīrzā Hindāl was killed in action. Humāyūn pursued him but he fled to the Punjab and sought shelter with Islām Shāh who treated him with cold neglect. Ultimately he took refuge with Sultān Ādam, the Gakkhar, who after some hesitation surrendered him to Humāyūn who had reached the Indus on receiving report from the Gakkhar

chief.<sup>26</sup> On the advice of his nobles Humāyūn had Kāmṛān blinded and gave him leave to proceed to Mecca (1553).<sup>27</sup> 'The great material of sedition and strife', as the Mughul imperial historian calls him, Mīrzā Kāmṛān has been more sinned against than sinning, and so far as Kābul was concerned he was rather 'the defender of rights than their assailant'.<sup>27a</sup> Humāyūn now planned to lead an expedition into Kāshmir where the short-lived Mughul rule under Haidar Mīrzā had been overthrown two years ago, but on account of the opposition of his nobles he returned to Kābul by way of Peshāwar (December, 1553).

During Humāyūn's stay in Afghānistān he was greatly helped by Bairam Khān in the consolidation of Mughul power. While all around there was frequent commotion and strife, Qandahār was ably maintained by its governor as the undisputed base of Mughul operations. In 1554 Bairam left Qandahār for Kābul to join Humāyūn in his Indian campaign for which he had been making preparations. He was now master of Qandahār, Kābul and Ghaznī. His brothers were no longer on the scene and 'there was now no rival to the throne and no noble behind and above the throne.' When he received the report of Islām Shāh's death and the anarchical condition of Hindusthān on account of the accession of the boy king Fīrūz and the outbreak of civil war among the Afghāns,<sup>28</sup> he realized that the time had come for making a renewed bid for the throne of Delhi. The third chapter of his life ends here.

#### IV. RESTORATION

With an army of about 3,000 men, Humāyūn set out and reached Peshāwar on 25 December, 1554. He was soon joined by Bairam Khān, but Sultān Ādam, the Gakkhar, refused to attend on the ground that he had already concluded a treaty with Sikandar Shāh Sūr, who now held the Punjab after the murder of Fīrūz, and had surrendered his son as a hostage. Tātār Khān Kāshī, who held the fort of Rohtās for Sikandar Shāh, abandoned it on hearing of the advance of the Mughul army. Humāyūn marched on to Lahore and the Afghāns of the city took to flight. The Mughul force under Shāh Abu-'l-Ma'ālī defeated the Afghāns at Dipālpur, while the main army under Bairam Khān had driven the Afghāns at Hariāna<sup>29</sup> and as he proceeded to Jullundur, the enemy retreated. Sirhind also fell into the hands of the Mughuls. Alarmed at the rapid progress of the Mughuls, Sikandar Shāh now despatched an army of 30,000 horse towards Sirhind. Bairam Khān, not unnerved by the enemy's superiority, hastened from Jullundur to give battle and

crossed the Sutlej before the arrival of the enemy. Towards sunset, the two armies met at Māchīwārā in Ludhiāna district, and the battle began. As it grew dark at night, it became impossible for soldiers on either side to fight. Accidentally, fire broke out in the village in which the Afghān army had drawn up.<sup>30</sup> It enabled the Mughuls to see clearly every motion of the Afghāns and discharge arrows at them, whereas the Afghāns, who had no view of the enemy, shot at random, and ultimately failed to maintain their ground and took to flight (May, 1555).

Bairam Khān marched at the head of the victorious Mughuls to Sirhind and took it. The battle of Māchīwārā was but a big round in the struggle between the Mughuls and the Afghāns; the battle for Delhi was yet to be fought. On learning of the defeat of the Afghāns, Sikandar Shāh marched from Delhi with an army of 80,000 horse and a big train of artillery and war elephants, and encamped at Sirhind. Bairam Khān, whose forces amounted to seven or eight hundred horse,<sup>31</sup> appealed to Humāyūn at Lahore to come to his aid but, on account of illness, Humāyūn could not arrive at Sirhind before 27 May, 1555. The two armies remained encamped opposite each other for twenty-five days during which occasional skirmishes took place. On 22 June, Khvāja Mu'azzam, Atga Khān and others advanced and fell in with Kālā Pahār, the brother of Sikandar Shāh, and the battle began. The Afghāns concentrated their main attack on the division of Bairam Khān who stood on the defensive, while the two Mughul divisions under Shāh Abu-'l-Ma'ālī and Tardī Beg Khān wheeled round the enemy, and in a short time the Afghān army became a mass of confusion and took to flight. The Mughul troops, who were vastly inferior in number,<sup>32</sup> pursued the defeated Afghāns to a long distance and killed many of them, and a pyramid was made of the heads of the slain. Sikandar fled to the Siwālik hills. Māchīwārā and Sirhind undid the work of Chausa and Kanauj which had put an end to the empire of Bābur; they sealed the fate of the Afghān empire of Sher Shāh.

From Sirhind Humāyūn proceeded towards Delhi. When he reached Samānā, he appointed Shāh Abu-'l-Ma'ālī, governor of the Punjab, and despatched him to Lahore. Meanwhile Sikandar Khān, the Uzbek, had occupied Delhi. Humāyūn accordingly left Samānā and on 23 July, 1555, re-entered the city of Delhi. He now distributed offices and commands to his faithful servants. Atga Khān took Hissār which surrendered after a siege of twenty-three days, while 'Alī Qulī Khān suppressed Qambar 'Alī, an unknown Mughul

adventurer, who headed a rebellion at Badāūn, and put him to death, though he had appealed to Humāyūn for pardon which the king was willing to grant. Haidar Muhammad Ākhta Begī took Bayāna after treacherously putting to death its Afghān governor Ghāzī Khān, the father of Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr, though he surrendered after he had received promise of pardon. The conduct of 'Alī-Qulī Khān and Haidar Muhammad offers but typical examples of the weakness of the royal power and the overpowering influence of an irresponsible and lawless aristocracy.

On account of Abu-'l-Ma'ālī's misbehaviour, Humāyūn placed the government of the Punjab in the nominal charge of prince Akbar but under the real control of his guardian Bairam Khān. On learning of the advance of Bairam Khān and Akbar, Sikandar, who had meanwhile come out of the hills, retired to the fortress of Mānkot. When they arrived at Hariāna, they received the report of Humāyūn's accident.<sup>32a</sup> On 24 January, 1556, in pious response to the sacred call of the *mu'azzin* for evening prayer, Humāyūn, while hurriedly coming down from his library, stumbled out of the stairs and, two days later, in the picturesque words of Lane-Poole, he tumbled out of life as he had tumbled through it.

The brilliant conquests of his father and the unique genius of his son have eclipsed the manifold good qualities of Humāyūn, but there is no doubt that his many virtues could not compensate for his serious defects. Generous and kindly in disposition, affable and urban in manners, possessing social bonhomie and ready wit, brave and chivalrous in temperament, cultured and fond of learning and the arts,<sup>33</sup> as became the son of Bābur, Humāyūn was the very flower of humanity and the model of a gentleman, the knight-errant of the Mughul dynasty. The very virtues of his character bred some of his defects; his charity bordered on prodigality, his affection, on weakness. He lacked resolution and sustained energy; his lethargy was chronic and contagious and he had no steady sense of duty and self-respect: 'he revelled at the table when he ought to have been in the saddle'. Daring as a soldier, he did not possess the superior talents of a general. He was equally deficient in the gifts of diplomacy and statesmanship. Māndū and Gaur revealed the obverse of the medal. A distinct improvement in his character is discernible after the period of his exile when some of his fatal defects which cost him his throne seemed to have been toned down. The author of the Tīmūrid restoration of 1555 was different from the gay prisoner of the harem who lost Gujarāt, Mālwa and Bengal; Kābul did not prove a second Māndū. He was a pious Muslim,

rigid in the observance of rituals and regular in his devotions, with a mixture of mysticism and superstition in him—a liberal Sunni with predilection for the Shīahite faith.<sup>34</sup> In some traits Humāyūn, who loved opium probably more than the throne, resembles his bohemian grandson who practically abdicated in his loyalty to the wine cup. With all his weaknesses and failings, Humāyūn has a significant place in Indian history which is not, perhaps, always duly appreciated. The well-timed restoration of the Mughul power was a real achievement which paved the way for the splendid imperialism of Akbar, while the Indo-Persian contact, which he reinforced and stimulated, was a factor of far-reaching consequence in the history of Indian civilization.

1. Dr. S. K. Banerji ascribes this delay of four days in Humāyūn's accession to Mīr Khalīfa's plot to place Mahdī Khvāja on the throne, but from Nizām-ud-Dīn Ahmad, who is our authority for the incident, it appears the Khalīfa's attempt was made while Bābur was still alive (*Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, Eng. Trans. Vol. II, p. 43).
2. Dadrah on the Gumti in the Musafirkhana *tahsil* of the Sultanpur district and not the Dadrah in the Nawabganj *tahsil* of the Bara-Banki district, as S. K. Banerji suggests (*Humāyūn Bādshāh*, Vol. 1, p. 42, f.n. 2). According to Dr. Qanungo (*Sher Shah*, p. 72) the battle took place at Dauroh, and according to the *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. IV, pp. 21, 49, at Daunrūā on the river Sai, 15 miles east of Jaunpur. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, Vol I, p. 450, suggests Deunruh. Ishwari Prasad, p. 50, f.n. 1, has Daurah. The MSS. of Jauhar (Sarkar; British Museum; India Office; Rylands Library, Manchester) give the word in such a way that it can be read both as Daurah and Dadrah, but Faizī Sirhindī's recension of Jauhar (India Office MS.) has clear Dadrah; and Dadrah on the Gumti fits in with the description of Jauhar. Details are given in the writer's *Bairam Khān*, pp. 48-49 (In the press).  
The date 1532 is given in the *Akbar-nāma* I, p. 289, and *Tārīkh-i-Alfī*, I.O.MS., fol. 406b: 939 A.H., August, 1532-July, 1533. The year 1531 is based on the statement of Gulbadan Begam.
- 2a. According to some chronicles he remained aloof.
3. *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, pp. 239-241; Abū Turāb, *Tārīkh-i-Gujarāt*, pp. 9-11.
4. *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. trans. I, p. 303, but *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, p. 246, gives the date 20 Ramazan, 941/25 March, 1535. The *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. IV, p. 22, seems to accept this date.
5. Abū Turāb, *Tārīkh-i-Gujarāt*, p. 16.
6. Fortieth according to some chronicles. There is a picture depicting the siege of Chāmpāner in the *Tārīkh-i-Khāndān-i-Tīmūriya* at the Oriental Public Library, Patna.
7. 22° 50' N., 72° 48' E.
8. For the early history of Sher Shāh, see the next chapter.
9. There is a discrepancy among the chroniclers about the date of this campaign. The correct date seems to be that given by Firishta (Vol. I, p. 216): 18 Safar, 944/27 July, 1537, and confirmed by the *Riyāz-us-Salātīn* (p. 141). The Dacca University *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, edited by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, p. 166, has curiously the incorrect date, July, 1538 (945 A.H.), and wrongly states in f.n. 2 that the *Riyāz-us-Salātīn* gives 945 A.H., on p. 143. What the chronicle states there is that Humāyūn left Bihār for Gaur in the beginning of 945 A.H. and he had already undertaken in 944 A.H. the siege of Chunār which surrendered after six months. See p. 141. Cf. Chapter IV, p. 74 and f.n. 20.

- 9a. According to *Firishta* I, p. 216, Humāyūn, after he was met by Sultān Mahmūd, marched towards Bengal in the beginning of 945 A.H. As 945 A.H. commences on May 30, 1538, we may fix June, 1538, as the date of the battle of Teliyāgarhī. After the battle the Mughul army returned to Kahalgāon. Sultān Mahmūd died here. We are told by Jauhar (*British Museum MS. ff. 16a-17a*) that Hājī Muhammad was sent from Kahalgrām to reconnoitre the position of the enemy at the pass. Hājī Muhammad found the pass under the occupation of Jalāl Khān; and it was only after the departure of Jalāl Khān that Humāyūn started from Kahalgrām and reached Gaur in a few days. From the above description of Jauhar it appears that Humāyūn probably reached Gaur early in July, 1538. The Afghān chronicles suggest a later date. According to the *Makhzan-i-Afghānī* (Dorn I, 115) and 'Abbās (E. & D. IV. 367) Humāyūn was detained after the battle of Teliyāgarhī for one month and then he left for Gaur.
- So, from the above, July, 1538, appears to be the correct date. Dr. S. K. Banerji (*Humāyūn* I, 213, f.n.) gives definite date Rabi' 1, 20, 945/15 August, 1538, but I have not been able to find out his authority, nor does he mention it. Ishwari Prasad gives the date as June, 1538.
10. *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī* (Sir J. N. Sarkar's transcript), p. 152.
- 10a. *Akbar-nāma* I, pp. 339-40.
11. The chronology of Humāyūn's expedition to Bengal, as given in the chronicles, is confusing. As already stated above, Humāyūn reached Gaur probably early in July, 1538, and both Jauhar and Gulbadan state that he stayed there for 9 months. Calculating 9 lunar months, we find Humāyūn set out from Bengal at the end of March, 1539.
12. The treachery of Sher Khān is related not only by a neutral historian like *Firishta* (Vol. I, p. 217), but by the Afghān chroniclers as well: *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī*, pp. 158-162, *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* pp. 184-5; (MS. Sarkar); *Makhzan-i-Afghānī* (A.S.B. MS.) f. 98a. *Tārīkh-i-Salātīn-i-Afāghina*, pp. 153, 197, 199. (Somewhat different account is given in Ch. IV. [Ed.]).
13. *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī*, p. 172. *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, pp. 185-86. Coins struck in 945 A.H. (May, 1538-May, 1539) exist, from which it seems that he had assumed royal title earlier. See *Islamic Culture*, 1936, pp. 127-30.
- 13a. *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, Elias and Ross, pp. 471-72.
14. *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, Elias and Ross, pp. 476-77. *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, Vol. II, p. 45; *Firishta*, Vol. I, p. 218; Ahmad Yādgar, pp. 155-56, 203-4.
15. In the Mainpuri district, 27° 15' N, 79° 14' E.
16. 28° 54' N, 76° 38' E.
- 16a. *Akbar-nāma*, I, 358-59.
17. Haidar Mirzā was able to carve out an independent kingdom in Kāshmīr, though short-lived (1541-1551).
18. *Āin-i-Akbarī*, Jarrett, Vol. II, new ed., p. 341.
19. About 100 miles (fifty *kos*) south of Rohri.
- 19a. *Akbar-nāma* I, p. 369.
20. Shāh Husain's father, Mirzā Shāh Beg Arghūn, had been deprived of Qandahār by Bābur. See the last chapter.
21. In Bahawalpur State, Punjab, 28° 44' N, 71° 14' E.
- 21a. Cf. Abu-'l-Fazl A.N. I. 37. Other reasons have been suggested for change of Māldev's policy. For example, Syāmaldās states in the *Virvinod* (II, 809) that Humāyūn's party slaughtered cows, on which Māldev asked them to get out of his territory.
22. We accept the date of Akbar's birth as given by Gulbadan Begam, Abu-'l-Fazl and 'Ārif Qandahārī, p. 16. For the other view see *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1886, pp. 80-85 and *Indian Antiquary*, November, 1915, pp. 233-44.
- 22a. *Akbar-nāma*, I, p. 459.
23. The Shāh of Persia had conferred on him the title of Khān.

## HUMĀYŪN

24. Near Ghurband.
25. In 1551 'Askarī went to Mecca and remained in exile till his death in 1558.
- 25a. *Akbar-nāma*, I, p. 582, *Nizām-ud-dīn*, II, p. 127.
26. The Gakkhars ruled in the territory between the Indus and the upper courses of the Jhelum.
27. He went to Mecca by way of Sind and died there on 5 October, 1557.
- 27a. This view is not likely to be accepted by all; cf. e.g. Ishwari Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 319. S. K. Banerji, who at first accepted the view, seems to have changed his mind (Vol. II, pp. 281-82). But in judging Kāmran we should remember that we know Kāmran only from the writings of the Mughul historians of Akbar's court who could not but be somewhat biassed against the arch-enemy of their patron's father. Badāūnī takes a different view (I.585). [Ed.]
28. For details, vide the next chapter.
29. 31° 38' N and 72° 52' E, in Hoshiarpur district.
30. Bāyazīd, pp. 191-92. Some chronicles suggest that the Afghāns kindled fire with a view to obtaining a view of the enemy which does not seem probable.
31. Jauhar, India Office MS. f. 52a.
32. According to Jauhar, Aligarh MS. (Sir J. N. Sarkar's transcript), p. 224, the number was 5,000. The highest estimate puts it at 10,000.
- 32a. *Akbar-nāma*, I, 662.
33. He took interest in astrology, mathematics and literature and wrote good verses. The *Dīwān-i-Humāyūn* in MS. was exhibited by Professor Sayyid Hasan Askari at the Indian History Congress, Calcutta, 1939. See Proceedings, pp. 1674-75.
34. Khvānd Amīr, *Humāyūn-nāma* (*Qānūn-i-Humāyūnī*), pp. 31-44; Gulbadan Begam, *Humāyūn-nāma*, English Translation, pp. 118-26; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh* (Eng. trans.) Vol. I, pp. 467-68 and Vol. III, pp. 6-10; *Firishta* (Lucknow text), Vol. I, p. 243.

## CHAPTER IV

# SHER SHĀH AND HIS SUCCESSORS

### I. SHER SHĀH (1538-1545)

Sher Shāh is one of the most striking and redoubtable figures in medieval Indian history. From an humble beginning in life he eventually revived the Afghān power in Northern India by defeating and ousting the Mughul emperor Humāyūn, and gave his newly established empire a well-organized administration, hitherto rare in medieval Indian history.

Farīd, as was his original name, was the grandson of Ibrāhīm Sūr, an obscure Afghān of Roh in the Sulaimān Range. According to Abu-'l-Fazl, Ibrāhīm was a horse-dealer,<sup>1</sup> but as he could not prosper in his business there, he, along with his son Hasan, migrated to India during the later part of the reign of Sultān Buhlūl Lodī with a view to improving his fortune in Hindusthān.

But, as ill-luck would have it, he did not thrive here also; he could not rise to any higher position than that of a Commander of forty horsemen only, with assignments of some villages in the barren *parganā* of Nārnaul under Jamāl Khān Sārangkhānī of Hissār Fīrūza. On his decease, his son Hasan succeeded to his *jāgīr*.

Farīd was born of the first wife of Hasan. The date of his birth is usually given as about 1486; but the modern historians hold different views on the subject. No medieval historian, on whom the modern scholars depend for reconstruction of the history of Farīd, mentioned the exact date of his birth. Among the modern historians Dr. P. Saran, without any indication of evidence from earlier sources and depending mainly on two late works of the nineteenth century—*Jām-i-Jam* written in 1839 and *Āsār-us-Sanādīd* (1846) of Sir Sayyid Ahmad of Aligarh—holds that he was born in A.D. 1472;<sup>2</sup> but as these are very late works, it is neither reasonable nor safe to depend upon them in the absence of any such information from the earlier historians. Writing during the reign of Akbar, 'Abbās Sarwānī stated that Farīd was "born during the time of Buhlul" (1451-1489),<sup>3</sup> but this statement is too vague to arrive at an exact conclusion. From the meagre materials available about Ibrāhīm it is reasonable to hold that he migrated to India in his old age almost at the fag-end of the reign of Buhlūl when it was not possible for him to reap the advantage given to Afghān recruits during the early part of the reign of this monarch,

and hence he could not rise to any higher position than that of the Commander of forty horsemen with a small *jāgīr* in the *parganā* of Nārnaul. Having due consideration to these facts it is not unreasonable to fix Farīd's birth about A.D. 1486.<sup>4</sup>

About his place of birth, also, the modern scholars are not in agreement. Dr. P. Saran is of opinion that he was born at Bajwāra, whereas Dr. Ishwari Prasād and Dr. K. R. Qanungo hold that his birth took place in the *parganā* of Nārnaul.<sup>5</sup> According to the *Makhzan*, his birth-place is Hissār,<sup>6</sup> but no earlier historian like 'Abbās Sarwānī or Abu-'l-Fazl mentioned the place of his birth. It is quite in keeping with the implication of Abu-'l-Fazl's writing<sup>7</sup> to say that Farīd was born in the *parganā* of Nārnaul where his father and grandfather lived and which he appears to have remembered so much in his later years as to establish in it a fortified district headquarters and build a mausoleum over the grave of his grandfather. On the other hand, no evidence is forthcoming to show his interest for Hissār.

Hasan's abilities attracted the attention of Jamāl Khān, who after his transfer to Jaunpur as governor, conferred the *parganās* of Sasarām and Khavāsspur Tāndā (in the modern Shāhābād district of Bihār) upon him as a *jāgīr* for the maintenance of five hundred troopers.

By his four marriages Hasan had eight sons, of whom Farīd and Nizām were born of his first wife, an Afghān lady, and Sulaimān and Ahmad were the sons of his youngest wife, originally a slave-girl. The boyhood of Farīd was far from happy and peaceful. His father had great attachment for his youngest wife, to the neglect of his first wife. The indifference and unkindness of the father and too much jealousy of the step-mother appeared so unbearable to Farīd that he left Sasarām and went to Jaunpur which was, in those days, an important centre of Muslim learning and culture, and where its *madrasas* gave free board and lodging to the Muslim students. There he studied both Arabic and Persian languages, including the well-known Persian works, the *Gulistān*, the *Bustān* and the *Sikandarnāma*. It is likely that he learnt there Hindī and arithmetic as well.

His efficient administration of his father's *jāgīr* on the very first occasion leads one to the natural assumption that he might have had opportunities of acquiring experience of civil administration also during his long period of absence from Sasarām.

He had come to Jaunpur about 1501, and on having a reconciliation with his father through the mediation of his well-wishers, he

left for Sasarām probably in January, 1518. Dr. Qanungo holds that “the key to the situation that compelled Miān Hasan and Sulaimān’s mother to agree to a reconciliation with Farīd and also induced them to appoint him temporarily to the charge of the *parganās*, lay in the political crisis of the Lodī Sultanate after the death of Sultān Sikandar in November, 1517.”<sup>8</sup>

On his return, Farīd acted as his father’s deputy in the *parganās* of Sasarām and Khavāsspur Tāndā, and during this period (c. 1518-1522) he administered justice to all, punishing the unruly *Zamīndārs* and the unscrupulous and oppressive officials, and protecting the ryots from all kinds of oppression and tyranny, as he realized “that the stability of every administration depended on justice, and that it should be his greatest care not to violate it, either by oppressing the weak or by permitting the strong to infringe the laws with impunity.”<sup>9</sup> Fully aware that agriculture was the principal source of wealth, he encouraged cultivation in all possible ways and took steps to protect the cultivators from oppression. He said, “if the ruler cannot protect the ryots from oppressors, it is sheer injustice and shame to receive rents from them.”<sup>10</sup> His personal care for the peasants and far-sighted revenue reforms increased cultivation and satisfied them. By his indefatigable industry he established peace, prosperity and happiness in his father’s *jāgīr*. Little did he know then that he was thus serving a period of apprenticeship for the role of a monarch in the future.

The successful administration and growing fame of Farīd roused the jealousy of Sulaiman’s mother all the more, and, despite his brilliant achievements, his father, who was under her spell, was alienated from him. Finding the position intolerable Farīd resigned his post and proceeded towards Āgra, the then capital of the Lodī Sultanate.

He succeeded there in obtaining a patron in Daulat Khān, an influential *amīr*, through whom his case was put before Sultān Ibrāhīm for taking possession of his father’s *jāgīr*. But the Sultān turned down this request, saying, “he must be a bad man indeed who should complain against his own father”.<sup>11</sup> However, it so happened that Hasan died soon after, and Daulat Khān was able to procure a royal *farmān* in favour of Farīd on the strength of which the latter got possession of his father’s *jāgīr*.

On his arrival at Sasarām, Sulaimān, his step-brother, fled to Muhammad Khān, the *jāgīrdār* of Chaund,<sup>12</sup> and sought his assistance. To counteract this, Farīd entered the service of Bihār Khān

Lohānī, who, after the battle of Pānīpat in A.D. 1526, declared his independence in South Bihār and took the title of Sultān Muhammad.

Farīd worked very hard in the service of his master and won his favour. We learn from Firishta and 'Abbās Sarwānī that Sultān Muhammad bestowed the title of Sher Khān on him for killing a tiger single-handed in a hunting excursion.<sup>13</sup> He also discharged his duties efficiently as the deputy-governor (*vakīl*) of South Bihār and tutor (*ataliq*) of Jalāl Khān, minor son of Sultān Muhammad, in which capacities he had been appointed.

The rapid rise of Farīd was looked upon askance by some and specially by Sulaimān, his mother, and Muhammad Khān of Chaund through whose machination he was deprived of his *jāgīr* and compelled to leave Sasarām. He went to the Mughul camp (A. D. 1527), and, rendering useful service to Bābur during his eastern campaigns, he got back his *jāgīr* through his assistance (A.D. 1528). In the following year circumstances compelled him to join the Afghān rebels led by Mahmūd Lodī, the son of Sultān Sikandar Lodī, against Bābur, but he offered his submission again, as did many of the Afghān leaders, after their attempts had ended in a fiasco.

On the death of Sultān Muhammad in A.D. 1528, his minor son Jalāl was installed in his father's place with his mother Dūdū as the regent. But his capital was seized by Mahmūd Lodī in the same year. He was, however, restored in his position as a vassal of the Mughul emperor by Bābur after the submission of the Afghāns as mentioned above.

As it was not possible for Dūdū to manage the multifarious duties of the State, Sher Khān, who had already proved his administrative ability, was appointed as the Deputy (*nāib*) in A.D. 1529. Dūdū having died in the beginning of 1530, all the duties of State devolved on him, and although he performed them efficiently, he aimed at centralization of all powers in his own hands.

He created a strong party of his own and won the support of the greater part of the army to his cause. His position was further strengthened by the acquisition of the important fortress of Chunār, situated on the bank of the Gaṅgā (Ganges) south-west of Banāras, by his marriage with Lād Mālka, the childless widow of Tāj Khān, the commandant of the fort (A.D. 1530). After this, he took possession of the *parganā* of Chunār. In the same year, as a result of another marriage with Gauhar Gossain, the childless widow of Nāsir Khān Lohānī of Ghāzīpur, he got an enormous wealth of three hun-

dred *mans* of gold.<sup>14</sup> Thus, by the end of 1530, he became a powerful factor to be reckoned with.

On the personal request of Sultān Mahmūd Lodī, Sher joined him against the Mughuls, as resistance was not feasible, but, at the same time he secured a *farmān* from him for the kingdom of Bihār, thus acting against the interest of Jalāl. In the ensuing battle between Sultān Mahmūd and Humāyūn, fought at Dadrah<sup>15</sup> on the bank of the Gomatī (c. September, 1531), he treacherously deserted the Sultān. This battle "marks a turning point in the career of Sher Khān and his relations with the Mughuls . . . . The almost total destruction of the Afghān army in this battle doomed the Lodī cause for ever, and Sher emerged as the forlorn hope of the Afghāns, whose hatred of the Mughuls was diverted to a new channel by him."<sup>16</sup>

After thus crushing the power of the Afghāns, Humāyūn was not inclined to leave the strategic fortress of Chunār to an Afghān, although the latter had served the interest of the Mughuls on the day of the above-mentioned battle. Humāyūn opened negotiations with Sher for its surrender, but, on finding the latter unwilling to comply with this, it was besieged. When the siege was in progress, Humāyūn was perturbed at the news of the hostile activities of Bahādur Shāh of Gujarāt, and, accepting the nominal submission of Sher, he raised the siege and left the place (December, 1531). It was a great triumph for Sher, as he not only remained in possession of the fortress but got sufficient time to strengthen his position further to enable him to give his opponent a crushing defeat which eventually cost the latter his throne.

The Lohānī Chiefs, who were extremely jealous of the growing power of Sher, became restive and wanted to get rid of him by any means. His alliance with Makhdūm 'Ālam, the rebel Bengal governor of Hājīpur, brought about an invasion of South Bihār by Sultān Mahmūd Shāh of Bengal, particularly with the intention of punishing Sher, and this "had the secret support of the Lohānīs."<sup>17</sup> But the deputy-governor of South Bihār succeeded in winning a decisive victory over the army of Mahmūd, and took possession of the territory of Bengal up to the neighbourhood of Sūrajgarh. He had also received immense accumulated treasure which Makhdūm had deposited with him for safe custody before his defeat and death.

The defeat of the Bengal army was a blow to the Lohānīs whose chance of deliverance from the control of the deputy-governor vanished with it. Jalāl, also, was impatient of his tutelage and dictatorship. The Lohānī chiefs conspired to assassinate him, but the

latter was too careful and cautious to be thrown off his guard. Accompanied by Jalāl, they then left South Bihār and went to Sultān Mahmūd of Bengal who had been burning with rage to take revenge for the discomfiture of his army at the hands of Sher.

The Sultān of Bengal made a huge preparation to crush him. The expeditionary force was placed under the command of Ibrāhīm Khān, an eminent commander, and, accompanied by Jalāl, it moved out of Mungir which had become the base of operations for this campaign. A decisive battle was fought between Sher and the Bengal army on the strategic plain of Sūrajgarh, a few miles east of Barh and about eighteen miles west of Mungir. It ended in a complete victory of Sher; Ibrāhīm fell fighting and Jalāl fled to Sultān Mahmūd (A.D. 1534).

The victory was undoubtedly a great feat on the part of Sher, and, besides his military success in routing the Bengal army for the second time, it had far-reaching political consequences. It humbled the power and prestige of Mahmūd to a great extent and Sher came to possess a wide territory on the southern bank of the Gaṅgā (Ganges) from Sūrajgarh to Chunār. After this, his ambition soared higher up. Dr. Qanungo has rightly said: "But for the victory of Sūrajgarh, the son of a nondescript *jāgīrdār* of Sasarām would perhaps never have emerged from his obscurity in quest of a crown."<sup>18</sup>

Apprehending no sudden attack from the west, as Humāyūn was busy in his Gujarāt campaign against Bahādur Shāh, Sher moved against Mahmūd Shāh before the rainy season of 1535 and conquered the territory as far as Bhāgalpur.

In the following year he again opened his campaign against Mahmūd and proceeded towards Gaur, the capital of Bengal. At Teliyāgarhī, he had to meet with a strong opposition of the Bengal army and their Portuguese allies. Leaving a detachment there under his son Jalāl Khān, he advanced through the unfrequented Jhārkhand route and surprised the Sultān of Bengal by suddenly appearing before his capital city. If Mahmūd would have taken courage to withstand his adversary, it would have been very difficult for Sher to capture Gaur with its impregnable fortifications, but Mahmūd was frightened beyond measure and acted with cowardice by offering terms of peace to the invader. By the terms of the treaty, Sher received thirteen lakhs of gold pieces and a wide territory from Kiul to Sakrigalī, ninety miles in length with a breadth of thirty miles at various places.

These achievements enhanced considerably his power and prestige, and on the fall of Bahādūr Shāh of Gujarāt, some of the Afghān chiefs, who looked upon him as their future hope, also joined him. The weakness of Mahmūd having been completely revealed, Sher was bent upon another invasion of Bengal and this he undertook on the pretext of the Bengal Sultān's non-payment of the annual tribute (1537).<sup>19</sup> He proceeded to Gaur and laid siege to it. After leaving Jalāl Khān and Khavāss Khān in charge of the siege operations, he went to Chunār, and, strengthening its defences, removed his family and treasures to the hill fort of Bharkunda, fifty miles south of Chunār.

Humāyūn's anxiety knew no bounds when the alarming news of Sher Khān's activities in the east reached him. Although slow to act, he, after necessary preparations, left Āgra and proceeded against Sher. But instead of marching straight to Bengal, he made the fatal mistake of first besieging the fort of Chunār. Had he gone direct to Gaur and rendered assistance to Mahmūd, as requested, he might have saved the Bengal monarchy and utilized its services in future to his advantage.

The siege of Chunār dragged on, despite heavy bombardment of Rūmī Khān, and, in the meantime, Sher pushed on with his work in Bengal according to his plan.

After heroic defence for about three months, the fort of Chunār fell in March, 1538.<sup>20</sup> But Sher soon compensated this loss by the capture of the impregnable fort of Rohtās in Bihār by a stratagem. Instead of sending Afghān families and his treasure for safe custody in this fort, as had been arranged with its Rājā, he sent armed men in *dolis* into it and they, by a sudden sally, overpowered the garrison and occupied it.<sup>21</sup> His men obtained success in Bengal also, and he received the happy tidings of the capture of Gaur and flight of Sultān Mahmūd.

After the capture of Chunār, Humāyūn opened negotiations with his adversary for a compromise and end of hostility, but it eventually fell through, and he marched towards Bengal. At Muner (on the Son), Sultān Mahmūd, the fugitive king of Bengal, met him and he was assured of every possible assistance.

As soon as Sher received information of Humāyūn's movements, he started towards Gaur, narrowly by-passed the emperor near Patna, and sailed swiftly from Mungir to Gaur, reaching there much earlier than the arrival of the Mughul army at Colgong (Kahalgām), twenty-three miles west of Teliyāgarhī. He despatched his own son

Jalāl Khān with some other officers immediately to defend the pass of Teliyāgarhī, where, on their arrival, the Mughul advance party suffered a defeat and fell back on the main army of Colgong.

Not unnerved by the fear of Mughul arms, Sher celebrated his coronation at Gaur (1538) and assumed the title of Farīd-ud-duniyā Wa-dīn Abu-'l Muzaffar Sher Shāh, as Sultān.<sup>22</sup> After this, on completion of his arrangements, he evacuated Gaur and went to Rohtās by the Jhārkhand route. Jalāl Khān, too, had been advised to leave Teliyāgarhī at a particular time according to his plan.

Humāyūn occupied Garhī without any opposition and thence he arrived triumphantly at Gaur (June, 1558).<sup>22a</sup>

Sher did not waste his time at Rohtās but made extensive preparations for an offensive against the Mughuls. His plans exhibited wonderful dexterity and foresight. He despatched Khavāss Khān to recover the lost places of Bihār and watch the movements of Humāyūn, while he himself proceeded westward from Bihār. He laid siege to Banāras and captured it. Jaunpur and Chunār were also besieged but they held on, and were closely blockaded. One detachment under experienced and capable officers was despatched against Bahrāich and they expelled the Mughuls from that part of the country. Sher's activities did not stop there; he ravaged and conquered the whole country as far as Kanauj, and, according to 'Abbās, Sambhal also was occupied by his invading forces.<sup>23</sup>

Humāyūn wasted precious time (about nine months) in Bengal, and such thoughtlessness and want of foresight on his part at a time when his powerful adversary was utilizing all his resources to topple him down proved most disastrous to him. At last, the alarming news of his opponent's activities and the rebellion of his brother Mīrzā Hindāl roused him from torpor, and, leaving Jahāngīr Qulī Beg with an army of five thousand, he left Gaur (1539). Reaching Mungir, he crossed the Gaṅgā (Ganges) against the advice of his veteran officers and marched by the southern bank of the river which was under the control of the Afghāns. He marched up to Muner without any hindrance, but during his westward march from that place he suffered from their attacks on his flank. At last, he reached Chausa, situated close to the east bank of the Karmanāsā and ten miles south-west of Buxār.<sup>24</sup>

Sher pitched his camp on the western side of this river close to its junction with the Gaṅgā (Ganges). With what skill and foresight he made his plans and acted up to them can be understood from his actions. He had harassed the Mughuls from behind on their

march from Muner and then crossed the Karmanāsā ahead of them to occupy a position from which he could keep an eye on the possible Mughul aid coming from the west, crossing the Gaṅga (Ganges) there, and, at the same time, prevent the crossing of the Karmanāsā by Humāyūn till rains worsen his position, of which he (Sher) would take the fullest advantage. Skirmishes went on between the hostile armies from day to day for a pretty long time. Humāyūn's position grew worse; "disease, hardship, and fear of the enemy prompted many of his soldiers to desert for their homes."<sup>25</sup> The anxiety of approaching monsoon perplexed him further, and, news from Delhi and Āgra being unfavourable, there was no hope of relief from those quarters. So, he commenced negotiations for peace with his foe, which, according to Jauhar, finally broke off due to the emperor's refusal to give up Chunār.<sup>26</sup>

Sher did not sit idle indefinitely but hit upon a plan of surprising the Mughuls. He gave out that he was proceeding against Mahāratha Chero, the leader of an aboriginal tribe in modern Shāhābād district, who had been defying him, and, after marching a few miles in that direction at night, crossed the Karmanāsā about five miles below Humāyūn's position, unnoticed by the Mughuls, and, in the early dawn of June 26, 1539, fell upon the Mughuls from three sides. The surprise was complete; many were killed in their bed asleep, and many of those who took to flight were drowned in the Gaṅgā (Ganges). Humāyūn was able to gather about three hundred men, with whose assistance he fought gallantly, but was wounded in the left arm, and carried towards the Gaṅgā (Ganges), where Nizām, a water-carrier, saved him from drowning with the help of his *masak* or inflated leather bag. Such was the sad plight of the emperor who reached Āgra with difficulty, via Allāhabād and Kālpī.

The loss of the Mughuls, both in men and war-materials, was heavy. Eight thousand men were killed, the Mughul army being "practically destroyed",<sup>27</sup> and the whole camp equipage, stores and artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. Sher's treatment towards the captive *begam* of Humāyūn and other Mughul women was full of sympathy and respect.

The Afghān victory at Chausa was decisive and had far-reaching consequences. Dr. Qanungo says: "The horizon of Sher Khān's ambition widened immensely; twelve months before he would have been glad to hold Bengal as the vassal of the Emperor. Now he won by this single stroke the whole territory of the Sharqī kingdom of Jaunpur in addition to the kingdoms of Bengal and Bihār in in-

dependent sovereignty, and could legitimately claim equality with the Emperor. So Delhi was no longer such a far cry for the victor."<sup>28</sup>

Sher then proceeded to recover Bengal. Jahāngīr Qulī, the Mughul governor there, had taken his post at Garhī which was besieged. It was soon occupied and Jahāngīr Qulī was treacherously slain along with his followers.<sup>29</sup> Gaur was next captured, and, although Sher could not spend time to establish his authority over the whole of Bengal, it appears that his rule extended "over the country comprising Gaur and Sharīfabād, Sātgāon and Chittāgong."<sup>30</sup> It appears that during his stay in Bengal, his second coronation took place at Gaur with pomp and grandeur (1539).<sup>31</sup>

After appointing Khizr Khān as governor of Bengal, he left this province and proceeded with his further plan of action. He marched towards Kanauj, and on his way, sent a detachment under his son Qutb Khān to harass the Mughul forces from behind, if the emperor happened to move towards Jaunpur or Kanauj by way of Kālpī and Etāwa. But Qutb was attacked and slain by the Mughuls near Kālpī.

On his return to Āgra, Humāyūn endeavoured his utmost to unite his brothers to fight against the mighty Afghān foe, but Kām-rān did not render any assistance. Despite diverse difficulties, the emperor gathered together a large army and a park of artillery and marched towards Kanauj where the enemies had been active.

At the Bhojpur ferry, thirty-one miles north-west of Kanauj, Sher foiled the attempt of the Mughuls to cross the Gaṅgā (Ganges) by means of a bridge of boats. Humāyūn then changed his plan and, proceeding towards Kanauj by marching along the western bank of the river, he encamped at the vicinity of Kanauj. For about a month the two hostile parties remained encamped on the two sides of the Gaṅgā, (Ganges) confronting each other—the Mughuls on the western bank and the Afghāns on the eastern bank. As there was a large number of desertions from the Mughul camp, Humāyūn considered it better to face the enemies in an open fight before his fighting strength dwindled abnormally low. He therefore crossed the river and encamped on a low-lying ground which was unluckily flooded by unusually early rains, necessitating the removal of the camp to an elevated ground in front. When on May 17, 1540, the Mughul army moved according to plan, Sher advanced to attack them. According to Mīrzā Haidar, who commanded one division of the Mughul army in this encounter, known as the battle of Bilgrām or the battle of the Gaṅgā,<sup>32</sup> the Mughul force numbered about 40,000 and the Afghān army was less than 15,000.<sup>33</sup>

The Afghān assault was started by Jalāl Khān from the right wing but he was worsted by Hindāl Mīrzā and some other Mughul commanders. Sher sent sufficient reinforcements there immediately, and this wing, thus strengthened, made a vehement attack on the enemies who were forced to fall back on their centre. Barmazīd Gaur and others commanding the left wing of the Afghān force pushed the Mughul right wing into the rear, driving the innumerable camp-followers into the centre which was still firm behind the artillery-carriages. But the pressure of the huge number of camp-followers from the right, left and rear was too much for the centre to bear and in the midst of disorder and confusion, the artillery became inoperative. By a rear assault, the Afghāns made the position of the Mughul army more untenable and compelled them to take to flight; many were slain on the way by the pursuing Afghān army and many were drowned in the Gaṅgā (Ganges). Sir Jadunath Sarkar has justly observed: "It was not a battle at all but a helpless panic flight, which covered the Mughals with unspeakable disgrace."<sup>34</sup>

They had left behind in the battlefield immense war-materials including artillery which fell into the hands of the victors.

After leaving the battlefield, Humāyūn crossed the river on an elephant with difficulty and fled in panic to Āgra. Then he went to Lahore, pursued by the Afghāns. Even at such a critical moment, his earnest attempt to unite his brothers did not bear fruit and Kāmran did not cease from his unbrotherly actions. Humāyūn next proceeded to Sind. Thus continued his life of wanderings from place to place, and being disappointed everywhere, he, at last, left India and took shelter with Shāh Tahmāsp of Persia.

Sher had despatched Barmazīd Gaur in pursuit of Humāyūn, and on completion of necessary works at Kanauj, he himself marched towards Āgra. Barmazīd Gaur had taken possession of the latter city before his chief's arrival there and slew a number of non-combatant Mughuls. On reaching there, Sher reprimanded his general for his cruelty, and sent him and Khavāss Khān to continue the pursuit of Humāyūn. A detachment under Shujā'at Khān was also sent to besiege Gwālior. Next he went to Delhi which had been occupied by Nasīr Khān, another commander, and during his stay there, he commenced the work of its resuscitation by embellishing it with new structures.

From Delhi he marched to Lahore in quest of Humāyūn. He had already received information of the inability of the ex-emperor to unite his brothers and their retreat in different directions, viz, Humāyūn towards Sind, Hindāl towards Multān by a different route,

and Kāmṛān towards Kābul. He did not stay at Lahore long but moved westward quickly, driving away the Mughuls. From the bank of the Chenāb he sent a detachment to pursue Hindāl, then he went to Bhera and thence to Khushāb where he halted. Khavāss Khān went against Humāyūn but he was advised not to engage him in battle, but only to drive him out of his dominion. Qutb Khān, another general, was sent against Kāmṛān with similar instructions. Khavāss Khān pursued Humāyūn as far as Mithankot, situated on the confluence of the Sutlej with four other rivers of the Punjab, and then returned to rejoin Sher Shāh at Khushāb. Here the Baluch chiefs Fath Khān, Isma'il Khān and Ghāzī Khān offered their submission to the Afghān sovereign.

Sher Shāh next launched a campaign against the Gakkhars, inhabiting a mountainous region between the upper courses of the Jhelum and the Indus. They were inimical to the Afghāns and their country occupied a strategic position through which an invader from the north-west might suddenly enter the Punjab which was then in Sher's possession. So, for security and safety of his dominion, an offensive had to be undertaken, and the Gakkhar country was invaded and ravaged. A proper site was then found out for the construction of a fortress with a view to guarding the northern frontier and keeping the Gakkhars under control. A gigantic and impregnable fort was built ten miles north-west of the town of Jhelum and named Rohtās, after his famous strong fortress in Bihār. It was completed by his son Islām Shāh.

On receipt of information of the rebellious attitude of Khizr Khān, governor of Bengal, and his marriage with a daughter of the deceased Sultān Mahmūd, Sher started at once for Gaur. Khizr Khān was completely surprised, put in chains and imprisoned (A.D. 1541). A man of keen insight as Sher was, he remodelled the administration there in such a way that rebellion might not recur in future.

The province was divided into several *sarkārs* and over each of them, he appointed a Chief *Shiqdār* (*Shiqdār-i-Shiqdārān*), a Chief *Munsif* (*Munsif-i-Munsifān*), and a *Qāzī*. The Chief *Shiqdār* was primarily in charge of law and order within his jurisdiction, except the big towns where *Kotwāls* performed these duties. The former also tried criminal cases and had under him an army to be utilized, if necessary, for enforcement of law and order. The duty of the Chief *Munsif* was to try civil cases specially with regard to revenue matters. He also supervised the work of the *parganā-āmīns*. Each *Sarkār* was subdivided into several *parganās*, over each of which

there were one *Shiqdār*, one *Āmīn*, one treasurer and two clerks for maintaining accounts. Over the whole province Sher appointed Qāzī Fazīlat as *Āmīn-i-Bāngalā* "who was not a *Sipah-Sālār* but a Qāzī writ large....to maintain the unity and smooth working of the provincial administration as an arbitrator",<sup>35</sup> for settlement of disputes among the Chief *Shiqdārs*. His "hold on the administration of Bengal was further clinched by the establishment of *thānās* or military outposts of imperial troops changed yearly by him."

Haibat Khān Niyāzī, governor of the Punjab, suppressed the rebel leader Fath Khān Jāt who had been in possession of the strong fort of Kot-Kabula in the Lakshmi Jungle (modern Montgomery district) and had been carrying on depredations on the roads between Delhi and Lahore. Fath Khān was defeated, imprisoned and put to death. Haibat Khān also conquered Multān with its dependencies and expelled the Baluchis. His achievements so pleased his master that he was conferred the title of A'zam Humāyūn, with a command of 30,000 horse. Upper Sind with its strong fortresses of Bhakkar and Sehwan also fell into the hands of Sher's victorious army (A.D. 1543).

In 1542 Sher Shāh had invaded Mālwa whose possession he coveted. The cause of this invasion is not far to seek. It was his expansionist policy that was mainly responsible for this attack on the neighbour, whose independence had always been looked upon askance by all the rulers of Delhi and, as it controlled the road from the south to the north, its possession was all the more necessary for them. Sher therefore marched towards Mālwa by way of Gwālior, the fort of which had been besieged by his army a year ago. Its Mughul commandant now surrendered after long resistance for want of provisions. Sher then proceeded to Sārangpur where Qādir Shāh, the king of Mālwa, offered his submission to him. Thence he proceeded to Ujjain in company with Qādir, took possession of this city and offered him the governorship of Lakhnāwatī.<sup>36</sup> But the ex-king of Mālwa, being apprehensive of Sher's intention, fled to Mahmūd III of Gujarāt. From Ujjain, Sher proceeded to Māndū and Dhār which he occupied easily. The subsequent attempt of Qādir for the recovery of his dominion ended in fiasco.

On his way back to Āgra by way of Ranthambhor, Sher took possession of this well-known fortress from its commandant by peaceful means.<sup>37</sup>

The brunt of his next attack fell on Purana Malla of Rāisen, a mighty fortress, twenty-seven miles east of the modern town of Bhopāl. This fertile principality had grown into importance by the

acquisition of Chanderī. There is no doubt that it fell within the ambit of Sher's policy of aggrandizement and hence political factors were mainly responsible for his invasion. There was also an alleged accusation against Purana Malla of enslaving Muslim women and keeping them in his harem.

The campaign was started by the siege of Chanderī in January, 1543. Despite gallant resistance of the Rājputs, Chanderī was captured by Jalāl Khān, who, overcoming the stiff opposition, also occupied the territory between Chanderī and Bhilsa. Sher himself proceeded to Rāisen and laid siege to the fortress. Though subjected to heavy bombardment, the garrison defended it with all their might, and the siege was protracted. At last, on an assurance from him that Purana Malla and his followers with their property would be allowed to move away in safety on their surrendering the fort, they came out of it but were treacherously attacked by the Afghāns, and for this act of perfidy, Sher Shāh must share the responsibility. In order to save the honour of their women, the Rājputs had recourse to the ghastly step of killing them by their own hands and then they gave up their lives, fighting gallantly against the enemies (June, 1543).

On the fall of Rāisen, Sher made up his mind to invade Mārwar, then the most powerful kingdom in Rājasthān, whose boundary at Jhajhar was only about thirty miles from Delhi. Its king, Māldev Rāthor, a capable general and an energetic ruler, extended his kingdom by the annexation of various places like Mertā, Jaitaran, Siwāna, Jālor, Tonk, Nāgaur and Ajmer, the last two of which had formerly belonged to the Delhi empire. The existence of such a powerful kingdom on the border of the Delhi empire was considered as a serious menace to its safety. Moreover, some of the disaffected Rājput chiefs, who had suffered defeat and loss of their territories at the hands of Māldev, incited the Afghān ruler to invade Mārwar. The latter was not also well-disposed towards the ruler of Mārwar, as he had not acted up to his desire by capturing Humāyūn and handing him over to the Sultān.

Fully aware of the strength of his opponent, Sher made military preparations on an extensive scale, and, in the autumn of 1543, set out against Mārwar with a huge force of 80,000 horse, unprecedented in any of his campaigns. Māldev went forth to oppose his enemy with an army of 50,000 horse, and, according as the exigencies of the moment demanded, he concentrated them in the *parganā* of Jaitaran, about fifty-six miles east of Jodhpur, the capital of Mārwar. So, instead of marching to the enemy's capital,

as had been his previous plan, Sher halted in the village of Samel, in the above-mentioned *parganā*, facing the army of Māldev. For a month the two parties lay opposite to each other, and, in the meantime, the position of Sher became critical owing to difficulties of food supplies for his huge army. The ruler of Mār-wār was in an advantageous position and the initiative of action lay with him. To get rid of this uncomfortable situation, Sher took recourse to a stratagem. He caused letters to be addressed to himself, as if written by Māldev's generals, promising him their assistance, and had them dropped near the camp of the Rāthor King in a silken bag. Becoming aware of the contents of the letters, suspicion about the fidelity of the generals upset the king, who, with the greater part of his troops, fell back towards Jodhpur. But, realizing the deceit played upon them by the enemy, the gallant Rājput generals like Jaita and Kupa resolved to fight with their valiant followers against Sher and die an honourable death. In the sanguinary battle which ensued, the laurels of victory rested with the Afghān Sultān, but at a great cost, with a heavy toll of lives. Jaita and Kupa with their brave warriors fell fighting desperately; the Rāthor King realized the artifice of his adversary only too late.

After this victory, Khavāss Khān took possession of Jodhpur and Māldev was pursued from place to place, but he succeeded in evading capture. The Afghān army occupied the territory of Mār-wār from Ajmer to Mount Ābu. Leaving Khavāss Khān in supreme command of his forces in Mār-wār and making necessary arrangements for the administration of the newly conquered territories, Sher marched towards Mewār (1544). He occupied, without any resistance, the fort of Chitor, the keys of which were delivered to him by the commandant on behalf of *Mahārānā* Uday Singh. For the sake of proper administration, Chitor and its dependencies were formed into a separate *Sarkār*.

Sher's next military expedition was directed against Kālinjar in Bundelkhand. The motive behind this expedition has been differently stated by the medieval historians. Firishta says that the *Rājā* of Kālinjar, who had witnessed the treachery of Sher against Purana Malla, did not submit and assumed a hostile attitude.<sup>38</sup> 'Abbās says that as Kirat Simha, the *Rājā* of Kālinjar, did not come out to meet him, "he ordered the fort to be invested."<sup>39</sup> According to Ahmad Yādgar, the author of *Tārīkh-i-Salātīn-i-Afāghina*, the reason for Sher's attack on Kālinjar was the refusal of its *Rājā* to give up Bīr Simha Deva Bundelā who had taken shelter with him.<sup>40</sup> But the fugitive referred to was probably *Rājā* Bīr Bhān of Arāil<sup>41</sup> who had been friendly to Humāyūn; and with this correc-

tion, the reason adduced by Ahmad Yādgār appears to be quite satisfactory.

Sher marched on Kālinjar and invested the fort in November, 1544. Despite great efforts, it could not be captured, and the siege lasted for months together. On the day of the final assault the besiegers were engaged in throwing hand-grenades inside the fort. One of the grenades, after striking the fort wall, exploded, and, rebounding, fell into a heap of ammunition near the place where Sher was standing. There was an explosion and Sher was most severely burnt and carried to his camp. Even when he was thus hovering between life and death, he did not forget to give instruction to his officers to continue the assault and capture the fort. It fell about the same evening and he was highly elated to hear this news. But the icy hand of death snatched him away the same night in the midst of his career of triumphant marches (May 22, 1545).

His body was temporarily interred near Kālinjar and afterwards carried to Sasarām to be laid in the permanent resting place, already constructed by the emperor himself.

At the time of his death, he left an empire comprising almost the whole of northern India, save Kāshmir, Gujarāt and Assam. It was roughly bounded by the Indus on the west, the Gakkhar country on the north-west, the Himālayas on the north, Assam on the east and the Vindhya on the south.

Not only did he thus establish an empire by dint of his great military skill, wonderful courage, ability and resourcefulness, but, with his usual skill and promptitude, he made necessary arrangements for its smooth and efficient administration. At the helm of affairs was the Sultān himself, and although, like his predecessors, he was a despot and centralized all power in his own hands, he was a benevolent despot whose primary aim was to do good to his subjects, irrespective of caste or religion. As it is not humanly possible to conduct all affairs of the empire single-handed, he appointed several ministers to assist him in his multifarious duties. In fact, these ministers occupied the position of secretaries rather than ministers, as they had no power of initiative or final determination of any policy or transacting matters of importance without Sultān's orders. Among the ministers, mention may be made of *Dīwān-i-Wizārat*, *Dīwān-i-Risālat*, *Dīwān-i-'Arz* and *Dīwān-i-Inshā*. The *Dīwān-i-Wizārat* was in charge of the *Wazīr* and primarily dealt with finance. The *Dīwān-i-Risālat* "dealt with religious matters, pious foundations, stipends to deserving scholars and men of piety. This office was presided over by the *Sadr-us-Sudūr*, who generally was also the

*Qāzī-i-mumālīk*; in the latter capacity he controlled the department of justice."<sup>42</sup> The *Dīwān-i-'Arz* was under the '*Āriz-i-mumālīk* who was in charge of recruitment and organization of the army as well as their payment. The *Dīwān-i-Inshā*, dealing with government correspondence, was in charge of *Dabīr-i-Khās*. Mention may also be made of the *Barīd-i-mumālīk* who was the head of the intelligence department.

In spite of the paucity of materials regarding the highest administrative unit in the empire of Sher Shāh, we find that there were military governorships in cases of Ajmer, Mālwa and the Punjab. Bengal was at first administered likewise, but the lesson of a bitter experience in this distant province taught him to adopt a more prudent measure and he abolished the post of the military governor, as stated before, dividing the whole province into several *Sarkārs* with *Āmīn-i-Bāngalā* (civilian Viceroy) at the top for smooth running of the administration. The provinces were divided into *Sarkārs*, each of which was sub-divided into *parganās*. Over each *Sarkār* there were one Chief *Shiqdār*, one Chief *Munsif*, and a *Qāzī*. The Chief *Shiqdār* (*Shiqdār-i-Shiqdārān*) was in charge of law and order in the *Sarkār* and had a body of troops to assist him in his work, when necessary. He also tried criminal cases regarding infringement of law and order and supervised the work of the *Shiqdārs* in his jurisdiction. The Chief *Munsif* (*Munsif-i-Munsifān*) tried civil cases, specially arising out of revenue matters and supervised the work of the *parganā-āmīns*.

Over each *parganā*, there were one *Shiqdār*, one *āmīn*, one *fotadār* (treasurer) and two clerks. The *Shiqdār* was entrusted with the duty of maintaining law and order in the *parganā* and assisting the *āmīn* with his army, if necessary, to enforce collection of revenue. The duty of the *āmīn* was to conduct survey of lands, their assessment and collection of revenue. He was to discharge his function as "an impartial umpire between the State demanding revenue and the individual *ryots* paying it".<sup>43</sup> Of the two *Kārkuns* or clerks, one was to write accounts in Hindi and the other in Persian.

The Sultān introduced the system of transferring the officers of the *Sarkārs* and *parganās* every two or three years.

The land revenue system of Sher Shāh has earned an undying fame for him and it became the basis of future agrarian systems in India. He had acquired sufficient experience in survey, assessment and settlement of land revenue in his father's *jāgīr* at Sasarām, and when he occupied the throne as an emperor, he came

with his system successfully tested. In some regions steps were taken for survey of lands, and revenue was settled according to the fertility of the soil, based on the experience of the past average yield and the expected produce of the land. In many parts of the kingdom there was no survey, and revenue was fixed at a definite share of the produce. Although there are differences of opinion among the modern historians about the government's share of land revenue, it appears from the *Āin-i-Akbarī* and the *Makhzan*<sup>44</sup> that it was less than one-third and probably one-fourth<sup>44a</sup> of the average yield of the land, payable either in cash or in kind, preference being given to the former method. The Sultān's instructions to his revenue officers were to show leniency at the time of assessment but to be strict at the time of realization of rent. Due consideration was, however, given in cases of damage to crops caused by movement of troops and to paucity of yield, nature's vagaries like drought, etc. A *Kabulīyat* (deed of agreement) containing the tenant's right in the land and his liabilities was taken from him, and the government issued a *pāṭṭā* (title-deed) to him stating similar terms and conditions. Sher tried to do away with the authority of the middlemen and establish a direct relation with the tenants who were encouraged to pay their dues direct to the government treasury. But there were also *Jāgīrs* and *Zamīndāri* systems. As he considered agriculture to be the main source of prosperity of his empire, he took special interest in the welfare of the cultivators and took steps against any oppression or harassment to them. His salutary reforms benefited the peasants, enhanced cultivation, and increased the revenue of the empire. Other sources of revenue included customs duties, *Jizya*, *Zakāt*, cesses on a variety of articles and *khums*.

Sher Shāh's currency and tariff reforms contributed a great deal towards the improvement of the economic condition of the country. The currency was then in a deplorable condition due to the paucity of current coins, the debasement in regard to their metal, and absence of any fixed ratio between the coins of gold and those of other metals. He took steps to remodel the currency. Coins of gold and mixed metal were abolished, and separate coins of gold, silver and copper of fixed standard were issued. He executed gold coins of 168.5 grains, 167 grains and 166.4 grains and his silver rupee, which weighed 180 grains, contained 175 grains of pure silver. He also issued a large number of new copper coins, subsequently known as *dām*. The silver rupee and the copper *dām* had their sub-divisions of halves, quarters, eighths, and sixteenths. The ratios between the silver coins and various gold coins were fixed; the rate of exchange between the copper *dām* and the silver

rupee was 64 to 1. These currency reforms removed the long-felt inconvenience and difficulties of the general public and the business community. "The reformed system of currency of Sher lasted throughout the Mughul period, was maintained by the East India Company down to 1835, and is the basis of the . . . British currency" (up to 1947).<sup>45</sup>

Sher Shāh also facilitated trade and commerce by abolishing many vexatious imposts on merchandise and by realizing duties on them twice only, viz., once at the frontier when a commodity was imported, and again at the place of its sale.

The Sultān acquired great reputation as a lover of even-handed justice. Even if any of his relatives or grandees committed any offence, he did not hesitate to punish him in the same manner as he punished an offender belonging to the ordinary strata of the society. He heard cases in original as well as of appeals. Next to him was the Chief *Qāzī* of the empire, who heard primarily cases of appeals, but cases at the initial stage were also not outside the purview of his court. Besides, as head of the judicial department, he had to conduct the administration of his department. The headquarters of the *Sarkārs* and probably other important cities had *Qāzīs* who tried criminal cases. As has been stated before, criminal cases regarding infringement of law and order were tried by the Chief *Shiqdārs* in the *Sarkārs* where the Chief *Munsif* heard civil cases, specially of revenue disputes, and similar cases were disposed of by the *āmāns* in the *parganās*.

The police system of Sher Shāh was simple, and, according to the Persian historians, worked well, achieving the objective aimed at. The *Shiqdār-i-Shiqdārān* and the *Shiqdār* had to maintain peace and order within their jurisdictions. In the villages, the system of local responsibility was followed and the village headmen had to bear the responsibility for crimes committed within their jurisdictions. If they could find out the culprits or produce them within the stipulated time, the latter were duly punished, but if the headmen were unable to do so, they themselves would have to face the punishment for such crimes. 'Abbās says that the headmen "used to protect the limits of their own villages, lest any thief or robber, or enemy of their enemies might injure a traveller, and so be the means of their destruction and death".<sup>46</sup> About the effect of the system, Firishta says, "such was the public security during his reign, that travellers and merchants, depositing their property on the roadside, lay down to sleep without apprehension of robbery".<sup>47</sup>

One of the greatest contributions of Sher Shāh was his construction of roads connecting important parts of his empire with his capital. They were necessary for a variety of causes, viz., the imperial defence, quick and regular despatch of news to the emperor, improvement of trade and commerce, and convenience of the travelling public. The longest road built by him (fifteen hundred kos) ran from Sonārgāon (near Dacca), via Āgra and Delhi to the Indus; the second road ran from Āgra to Jodhpur and the fort of Chitor, the third from Āgra to Burhānpur, and the fourth from Lahore to Multān. For the convenience of the travellers, shade-giving trees were planted on both sides of these roads. *Sarā'īs* were established along them at intervals of four miles and separate arrangements provided for both the Hindus and the Muslims. These *Sarā'īs* not only served as rest-houses for travellers but also as stations of *dāk chaukī*. Sher Shāh had a well-organized espionage system and his spies used to send him through the *dāk chaukī* prompt information of every important matter even from the remotest part of his empire. Such a system of conveyance of information by means of *dāk chaukī* was not new to our country but he revived and improved it to a considerable extent. This department was under *Dārogā-i-Dāk-Chaukī* and under him there were innumerable news-writers and news-carriers. The efficiency of this department contributed much to the successful administration of this monarch.

Fully aware of the defects of the feudal levy, the Sultān realized the necessity of a strong and well-equipped standing army under his direct control. The system of feudal levy was not discontinued but the well-organized imperial army added to his strength and power. His army consisted of different nationalities including the Hindus, but the Afghāns formed the most predominant element. He took personal interest in the recruitment of soldiers and revived 'Alā-ud-dīn's systems of branding the horses and recording the descriptive roll of every soldier in order to guard against proxies. His earnest effort was to maintain as much direct touch with the soldiers as possible, hearing their grievances and removing them, when necessary. All payments were made to them individually by the government. In order to minimize the risk of any military rising, his reforms further aimed at establishing an official relation, in lieu of any personal attachment, between an ordinary soldier and his officers.

Sher Shāh's military strength under his direct control consisted of 1,50,000 cavalry, 25,000 infantry, and a park of artillery,

besides 5,000 war-elephants. Contingents of imperial troops were maintained at the strategic places of his empire; each of these divisions known as *fauj* was under the command of a *faujdār*.

The Sultān was a stern disciplinarian and maintained strict discipline in his army.

In spite of the stormy days that he had to pass through, he was fond of architecture, and the buildings which he constructed exhibit his grandeur of design and fine artistic taste. His own mausoleum at Sasarām is one of the most beautiful structures built in India during the medieval period. "The style may be described as intermediate between the austerity of the Tughluq buildings and feminine grace of Shāh Jahān's masterpiece."<sup>48</sup> The magnificent mosque in the Purānā-Qil'ā in Delhi also bears testimony to Sher's superb ideas and taste for fine workmanship. In the field of constructing fortresses, he has left a deep impress of his military engineering by his gigantic and magnificent fort named Rohtās in the district of Jhelum.

It is admitted by all that Sher Shāh worked very hard, attending to minute details, promoted efficiency in the machinery of the State and was one of the greatest and most capable administrators of medieval India. But on a careful scrutiny of his elaborate regulations we do not find anything entirely new or original in them except in certain features of his land revenue system. He was thus more a reformer than an innovator. He did not create any new ministry; his administrative divisions and sub-divisions were taken from the past. He did not also introduce anything new either in the administration of justice or in judicial organization. His systems of espionage and *dāk chaukī* were borrowed from his predecessors. Under 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī the system of espionage was carried to frightful perfection, and the institution of *dāk chaukī* is also attributed to him. In regard to the army, Sher Shāh revived the system of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī with improvements, where considered necessary. In addition to reviving 'Alā-ud-dīn's system of branding of horses, he instituted the practice of recording the descriptive roll of every soldier to put a stop to the practice of sending proxies. Among the Sultāns of Delhi it was 'Alā-ud-dīn who first devised the scheme of measurement of lands and tried to improve the system of assessment prevalent in the country, but it was neither so comprehensive nor so well-intentioned as that of Sher Shāh. The system introduced by the latter had many salient features, new and original, and primarily aimed at the welfare of the peasants and increase of cultivation.

Although Sher Shāh was mainly a reformer, he infused a new spirit into the old institutions, improved them, wherever necessary, and supervised the actual workings with plodding industry in order to turn the whole machinery of State into an instrument of popular weal.

Judged by his wonderful activities and outstanding achievements he undoubtedly occupies a high place among the crowned heads of medieval India. From the son of an ordinary *jāgīrdār* harassed by serious obstacles and active oppositions even of his own men, he advanced step by step by sheer merit till he acquired the throne of Hindusthān and revived the Afghān rule by expelling Humāyūn from India.

As a soldier, he possessed indomitable courage, extraordinary patience and untiring energy, and, as a general, he had that rare quality of a leader's personal magnetism which endeared him to his followers whom he led from victory to victory and, with whom he toiled and mixed together, sharing their hardships and privations, when necessary. His rapidity of movements and the tact and foresight that he displayed in his campaigns were beyond the imagination of his adversaries who had to face discomfiture. As far as possible, he tried to avoid open engagements and made sudden sallies on the enemies to take them by surprise. He did not also hesitate to outwit them by cunning and craftiness. Despite the ignoble means which he followed at times, his successes dazzled the eyes of his contemporaries and raised him to the pinnacle of glory.

But his achievements as a ruler outweigh those as a general, and his place in history rests more on his constructive genius displayed in his administrative policy than for victories in the battle-fields. He had a thorough grasp of all the departments of administration and they showed the salutary effect of his reforming hands. He reorganized the district administration and, in the case of Bengal, provincial administration, too; he reformed the land revenue and currency systems, police, intelligence, and army departments, and duties on merchandise were made conducive to trade and commerce. He kept in check the individualistic spirit of the Afghāns—a hard task, indeed, beset with almost insuperable difficulties—and utilized their services to an extent which no ruler in medieval India prior to him could do.

A benevolent ruler as he was, he aimed at the welfare of his subjects. W. Crooke says, "Sher Shāh was the first who attempted to found an Indian Empire broadly based upon the people's will. . . . He had the genius to see that the Government must be popu-

larized, that the king must govern for the benefit of his subjects, that the Hindus must be conciliated by a policy of justice and toleration. . . . 'No Government, not even the British, has shown so much wisdom as this Pathān' as Keene says."<sup>49</sup>

Though he was an orthodox Sunnī in his private life, his general policy towards the Hindus, who formed the majority of his subjects, was one of toleration and good will, as he had enough of prudence and foresight of a true statesman to realize that, unless he could win over their sympathy and co-operation, the stability of his empire would be at stake. He allowed the Hindus to follow their religious tenets without any interference of the government, and many of them were employed both in his civil and military departments. A large part of his infantry consisted of the Hindus and one of his best and trusted generals was Barmazīd Gaur whom he sent to pursue Humāyūn after the battles of Chausa and Bilgrām.

Considering from different aspects his love and sympathy for his subjects, care for the peasantry, liberal outlook, sense of even-handed justice, indefatigable industry, devotion to duty even at the cost of personal rest and comfort, and, above all, his constructive statesmanship, he must be accorded a position much ahead of his predecessors in medieval India and next only to that of Akbar.

## II. ISLĀM SHĀH (1545-1554)

Of the three sons of Sher Shāh, Qutb Khān, the youngest, had pre-deceased his father, and 'Ādil Khān, the eldest, and Jalāl Khān, the second, were at Ranthambhor and Rewa,<sup>50</sup> respectively, at the time of their father's death. Jalāl Khān, who had given sufficient proof of his courage, industry and military abilities, and who was available nearer, was chosen by the nobles as the successor of his father in preference to 'Ādil Khān, who, in spite of his physical strength, was indolent and ease-loving, and not so easily available.

Jalāl Khān arrived at Kālinjar on May 26, 1545. He was crowned on the same day, and assumed the title of Islām Shāh. Then he went to Āgra, the imperial capital, and in order to enlist the sympathy and co-operation of the soldiers, he gave them two months' pay.

'Ādil Khān refused to give up the fort of Ranthambhor and was reluctant to go to the capital to settle the differences with his

brother amicably. But on receiving assurance of safe return from eminent nobles like Qutb Khān Nāib, Khavāss Khān, 'Isā Khān Niyāzī, and Jalāl Khān bin Jalu, he proceeded to meet his brother. In the meantime, Islām Shāh had made a plan to murder him, but it did not succeed. Thereafter, Bayāna, situated about fifty-three miles south-west of Āgra, was assigned to him, but the Sultān again changed his mind and there was therefore no real reconciliation between the brothers. Islām Shāh secretly arranged to bring his brother a prisoner, but the four nobles, mentioned above, took up his cause and made a plot to dethrone the sovereign. 'Ādil Khān's luck did not turn in his favour in the ensuing battle near Āgra, and, having suffered a reverse there, he fled towards Bundelkhand, never to be heard of again, while Khavāss Khān and 'Isā Khān Niyāzī retreated towards Mewāt. At Fīrūzpur, in Mewāt, they were able to defeat the Sultān's army sent in pursuit of them, but the royal army having been soon reinforced, they were compelled to retreat to the Kumāon hills.

The conspiracy to raise 'Ādil Khān to the throne made the Sultān suspicious about most of his nobles. Jalāl Khān bin Jalu and his brother were put to death; Qutb Khān, another supporter of 'Ādil Khān, having been delivered over by Haibat Khān, the governor of Lahore, with whom he had taken shelter, was sent along with many other suspected nobles to Gwālior. Most of them were subsequently murdered. Such punishments on the nobility alarmed the rest and aroused the old tribal jealousies which Sher Shāh had kept in check. The powerful Niyāzīs under the leadership of Haibat Khān Niyāzī arrayed a strong party of opposition against the Sultān and proceeded to Ambāla; Khavāss Khān also joined them. But finding that Haibat Khān was ambitious to seize the throne in the event of success against Islām Shāh, Khavāss Khān, who was in favour of 'Ādil Khān, withdrew his forces on the day of the battle, the natural consequence of which was that Haibat was defeated in the battle fought near Ambāla. He was pursued from place to place and eventually took shelter in Kāshmir, but his mother and daughters who had fallen into the hands of the royal force, were ill-treated and ultimately put to death.

Khavāss Khān had gone back to the Kumāon hills and taken refuge with its *Rājā*, but, on his subsequent surrender to the Sultān, he was killed in an ignoble manner.

The Sultān was too severe on the nobles of his father's time whom, by his tact and foresight, he might have turned into his supporters and utilized, like his great father, in the service of the

empire; but he considered them to have grown too much, almost overshadowing the Crown. His severity and unwonted harshness broke the spirit of the Afghāns on whom he was loth to place confidence. He appointed men of his own choice, many from the Sūr clan, in the various key positions of the empire. Ahmad Khān Sūr was appointed governor of Lahore; 'Isā Khān Sūr was posted in Mālwa in place of Shujā'at Khān; Qāzī Fazīlat was removed from Bengal and replaced by Muhammad Khān Sūr; Ghāzī Khān Sūr was placed in charge of Bayāna; while his son Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr received charge of Āgra. A very high rank in the army—that of a command of 20,000, with the charge of *Sarkār* Sambhal—was bestowed on the Sultān's cousin and brother-in-law Mubārīz Khān, who, later on, proved to be a great sore in the body-politic, endangering its peace and tranquillity.

The Sultān was careful enough to watch the movements of the Mughuls, and when he learnt that Humāyūn had crossed the Indus, he, in spite of his illness, prepared to face the enemy, but the latter returned to Kābul. Islām Shāh then went back to Gwālior which was his favourite place. Here a conspiracy was made by his disaffected nobles to assassinate him, but it was foiled, and the ring leaders were put to death. He had also escaped another attempt on his life in the early part of his reign.

After a reign of nine years and six months he died on 22 November, 1554.

Like his father, Islām Shāh was a strong administrator and strict disciplinarian. He could not brook the idea of disobedience or any action against him, and insisted on implicit obedience from everyone, to whatever rank he might belong. His punishments to those who were implicated or suspected to be implicated in any action against him were severe. His authority was well-established in the empire and the efficiency of his espionage system and *dāk chaukī* contributed to this success to a large extent.

He was very particular in maintaining the prestige and dignity of the King's position. As the use of scarlet tents was the privilege of the Sultān alone, he forbade their use by the nobility or anybody else.

He not only followed the administrative policy of Sher Shāh but improved it, where deemed necessary. Detailed regulations were issued regarding every department of the government like general administration, revenue, and religion, whether these were agreeable to the *Shar'iyat* or not, for the guidance of the officers

and their subordinates. Darbārs were held in all districts on Fridays when the military officers, *āmīns* and other officials used to make their obeisance with reverence to the shoes and the quiver of the Sultān.<sup>51</sup>

For better organization and efficiency, he introduced the graded system in the army and there were different units, ranging from those of fifty to twenty thousand. Above fifty and below twenty thousand, there were units of two hundred, two hundred and fifty, five hundred, five thousand, and ten thousand.<sup>52</sup>

His keen knowledge of the military strategy may be realized from his construction of Mānkot<sup>53</sup> in the Siwālik Hills, about one hundred and one miles north-east of Lahore, for the defence of the Punjab and keeping the Gakkhars in check.

He added to the number of *sarā'īs* by constructing one *sarā'ī* between every two *sarā'īs* of his father, and a rest-house, a mosque, and water-carriers were provided in them. Arrangements were also made for supplying uncooked and cooked food to the Hindus and the Muslims respectively. Orders were at the same time issued for the proper upkeep and maintenance of the *sarā'īs* and gardens constructed by Sher Shāh.

Besides his capabilities as a general, he was a steadfast administrator who worked with utmost devotion and industry in the interest of the empire. His reign may be said to be a continuation of that of his father, and in spite of the stormy days that he had to pass through, peace and prosperity prevailed in his empire. He encouraged cultivation and looked to the welfare of the peasantry as his father.

Although he was an orthodox Sunnī in his private life, his work as a ruler was never obsessed by his religious views, and he kept politics apart from religion.

But in spite of his abilities as a ruler, it must be admitted that he was at times a poor judge of men and was swayed by feelings of unwonted cruelty and vindictiveness as he showed in his treatment towards the experienced and veteran nobles of his father's time. His appointment of Mubārīz Khān, who proved to be unworthy of his confidence, was a glaring instance of a mistaken choice, pointing to his poor knowledge and experience of human character, for which his son and successor had to pay dearly, and which was, to a great extent, responsible for the serious troubles that set in after him.

## III. FĪRŪZ SHĀH (1554)

Islām Shāh was succeeded by his minor son Fīrūz, but Mubāriz Khān, son of Sher Shāh's younger brother Nizām and brother of the minor king's mother, Bibi Bāī, murdered him and ascended the throne with the title of Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh.

Such a tragic death might have been averted had Islām Shāh acted on his own initiative without waiting for his wife's consent for the removal of his brother-in-law whose evil intentions he could gauge beforehand.

## IV. MUHAMMAD 'ĀDIL SHĀH (1554-1556)

'Ādil Shāh (also called 'Adlī Shāh) tried to conciliate the nobles and the army by a profuse distribution of wealth and titles, where necessary. But his murder of the rightful sovereign had its repercussions, and it sounded the death-knell of the Sūr dynasty. He was weak and incompetent to wield the sceptre and hold in check the disintegrating forces. But he appointed as *Wazīr* a very capable person called Hīmū, a Hindu, who, hailing from Rewārī, belonged to the Dhūsar caste, and from a humble start in life, had occupied, during the reign of Islām Shāh, the posts of *Shahna* or Superintendent of the Delhi market, the head of the Departments of Intelligence and Posts (*Dārogā-i-Dāk-Chaukī*), and afterwards high military command. But the weakness of the Sultān and his worthlessness let loose the centrifugal forces, and in different parts of the empire there were military upheavals which rocked it to its foundation.

Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr, son of Ghāzī Khān, and brother-in-law of the Sultān, who was in charge of Āgra, revolted. He defeated the army which 'Ādil Shāh had despatched against him and moved with his victorious forces to Delhi which was captured. Thereafter he assumed the regal title and it was not possible for 'Ādil to displace him. Ahmad Khān Sūr, another brother-in-law of the Sultān and governor of Lahore, took the title of Sikandar Shāh and declared his independence. Muhammad Khān Sūr, governor of Bengal, also revolted and assumed the title of Shams-ud-dīn Muhammad Shāh Ghāzī. The empire, which had been built by Sher Shāh and maintained with care by Islām Shāh, thus fell to pieces, and it was parcelled out into four main divisions—Delhi and Āgra under Ibrāhīm Shāh; the Punjab under Sikandar Shāh; Bengal under Shams-ud-dīn Muhammad Shāh; and the territories from the vicinity of Āgra to Bihār under Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh.

Not satisfied with the Punjab alone, Sikandar marched against Ibrāhīm for the possession of Delhi and Āgra and defeated him at Farah, about twenty miles from Āgra, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the forces of his opponent. Sikandar then took possession of both Delhi and Āgra (A.D. 1555).

The rivalry and hostility among the Afghāns not only jeopardized the peace and security of northern India but also afforded Humāyūn a good opportunity for the recovery of his lost possessions there. From Kābul, he started on his Indian expedition in November, 1554. On hearing of his advance, Tātār Khān Kāshī evacuated the fort of Rohtās without any attempt to defend it. In February, 1555, Humāyūn occupied Lahore, too, without any opposition while another detachment of his forces defeated the Afghāns at Dīpālpur. The Mughuls also occupied Jullundur and their advance guard proceeded towards Sirhind. This rapid progress of the Mughul army was due to Sikandar Shāh's preoccupation in his struggle against Ibrāhīm. The alarming situation in the Punjab roused the former to action, and he despatched a force of 30,000 horse against the enemies with whom an open encounter took place at Māchīwārā, in Ludhiana district. But the Afghāns were defeated and the Mughuls captured Sirhind. Sikandar then marched in person at the head of 80,000 cavalry and met the Mughul army at Sirhind. Despite the vast superiority of his forces in number, he was defeated before the superior generalship and military tactics of his enemies (June 22, 1555) and was compelled to retreat to the Siwālik hills. The Mughuls marched triumphantly to Delhi and occupied it.

Taking advantage of misgovernment by the Mughul governor in the Punjab, Sikandar came out of his retreat to recover his territories, but, being unable to achieve anything tangible, he took shelter in the fort of Mānkot.

In spite of the Mughul menace there was no cessation of hostility among the Afghāns, and Ibrāhīm renewed his strife with 'Ādil Shāh. Hīmū, the Wazīr of 'Ādil, defeated him twice—once near Kālpī and, again, near Khānuā—and compelled him to seek refuge in the fort of Bayāna which was besieged; but, as Muhammad Shāh of Bengal had created an alarming situation and was marching towards Kālpī, 'Ādil Shāh recalled his minister who, thereafter, joined his master at Kālpī. Muhammad Shāh was defeated at Chhapparghāttā, about twenty miles from Kālpī, and forced to take to his heels. 'Ādil Shāh occupied Bengal, and, after retaining Shāhbāz Khān as governor there, he came back to Chunār which he had made his residential capital.

Taking advantage of the death of Humāyūn (January, 1556) and the accession of young Akbar, Hīmū proceeded from Gwālīor to Āgra with a huge force and occupied it easily, as its governor Iskandar Khān Uzbek fled to Delhi out of fear, without offering any resistance. Next, he marched on Delhi and took possession of it after defeating its governor Tardī Beg Khān.

Emboldened by his successes and being in possession of Delhi, Hīmū assumed independence, with the title of Rājā Vikramāditya, and in order to gain the support of his Afghān officers and soldiers he made a lavish distribution of wealth among them. Next he took necessary steps to withstand the Mughuls who had been proceeding against him. But his advance guard was defeated by that of Akbar under the command of 'Alī Qulī Khān and his artillery fell into the hands of the enemies. This discomfiture did not in any way dispirit him and he marched on with a huge force consisting of infantry, cavalry, artillery and war-elephants to the memorable battlefield of Pānīpat, where he met his adversaries on 5 November, 1556. The numerical strength of Hīmū's army was decidedly much above that of his opponents.

The battle began with a bold charge by Hīmū on the Mughuls whose right and left wings were thrown into confusion. Then, with the help of his 1500 war elephants he dashed against the enemies' centre and, although the fight appeared to be in his favour, it continued unabated, when an arrow pierced his eye, making him unconscious. This decided the fate of the day, as his army, considering him dead, fled pell-mell in all directions. While he was being carried to a safe place by his elephant-driver, he was captured by Shāh Qulī Mahram, a Mughul officer, and taken to Akbar who, at the request of his guardian and protector, Bairam Khān, first struck him with his sword and, then, the protector followed him, severing his head from the body.<sup>54</sup>

The victory of the Mughuls was thus complete, and it not only decided the fate of Hīmū but also of the Afghāns. Delhi and Āgra soon fell into the hands of the victors.

Meanwhile Sikandar had been active in the Punjab, defeating Khizr Khvāja Khān at Chamīarī, about thirty-five miles from Lahore, and driving him to the latter place. Not content with sending relief, Akbar and Bairam Khān proceeded against Sikandar who, therefore, took refuge at Mānkot which was also besieged. He held on for about six months, depending on the strength of the fort as well as in expectation of a diversion to be possibly created by 'Adil Shāh who was still in possession of Chunār. His expectation

came to naught at 'Ādil's defeat and death in a battle against Khizr Khān Sūr of Bengal (1557), and this disquieting news disheartened him so much that he surrendered, receiving an assignment in Bihār, whence he was expelled within a short time by Akbar and died about two years later in Bengal. Ibrāhīm Sūr took refuge in Orissa where he met his doom about ten years later (1567-1568).

Thus disappeared the different Sūr rivals from the political arena of northern India which, by their selfish designs, had been converted into an unhappy land of turmoil and confusion, and their exit made room for the re-establishment of the Mughul rule under the strong but benevolent regime of Akbar.

## APPENDIX

( BY THE EDITOR )

### HĪMŪ—A FORGOTTEN HINDU HERO

Neither fate nor historians have been kind to Hīmū to whom reference has been made above (pp. 94-96). Historians, medieval and modern, have done scant justice to, and failed to show due appreciation of, the unique personality and greatness of a Hindu who, during the heyday of Muslim rule in India, worked his way from a grocer's shop to the throne of Delhi, and, but for an accident in a battle which turned victory into defeat, might have founded a Hindu ruling dynasty, instead of the Mughuls, in Delhi. Although his career is known to us almost exclusively from the writings of historians who looked down upon him as an upstart Hindu and an arch-enemy of their patrons, the Mughul rulers, yet enough has been preserved in their chronicles<sup>55</sup> to show that bare historical justice demands that the career of this great Hindu should be impartially reviewed as a whole, separately, as an important episode in the history of medieval India. For, there is no doubt that he furnishes the only shining example of a Hindu, born and brought up as such in a Muslim State, who once dominated the political stage of North India by sheer merit and personality without any advantage of birth or fortune. As no such attempt seems to have been made in any general history of India so far, no apology is needed for the short sketch of the life and activities of the great Hindu Commoner, Hemchandra, called by his Afghān followers after his accession to the throne of Delhi, Hīmū Shāh.

Hīmū was born in a poor family of Dhansār section of the Bāniyā caste, living in a town in the southern part of Alwar. Ba-dāūnī calls him "the greengrocer, of the township of Rewāri in Mewāt, whom Islām Shāh had gradually elevated from the position of Police Superintendent of the bazars and confirmer of punishment, and had by degrees made into a trusted confidant". In other words, Hīmū, originally a grocer (or hawker) by profession in a small township in Alwar, somehow came to the notice of Islām

Shāh who, satisfied with his ability, successively promoted him to the posts of Superintendent of the Delhi market (*Shahna*), and head of the Departments of Intelligence and Posts (*Dārogā-i-Dāk-Chaukī*). Islām Shāh also trusted him with important and confidential business, involving military commands.

The death of Islām Shāh, as stated above (p. 94), was followed by a period of troubles. His minor son, who succeeded him, was murdered by Mubāriz Khān who ascended the throne with the title of Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh. But this regicide was hopelessly incompetent, and rebellions broke out in all quarters. Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr, governor of Āgra, Sikandar Sūr, governor of Lahore, and Muhammad Khān Sūr, governor of Bengal, revolted and assumed royal titles. Other chiefs also broke into revolt from time to time.

Emperor 'Ādil Shāh had already recognised the great abilities of Hīmū and appointed him his Prime Minister, leaving the heavy burden of administration on his shoulders.

Mughul historians like Abu-'l-Fazl and Badāūnī paint the character of Hīmū in the blackest colour and represent him as having won the confidence of the king by ignoble means. But this is only natural for those who rightly looked upon Hīmū as the greatest enemy of the Mughuls. But in view of the abilities displayed by Hīmū, we should not put any faith in these slanders. In any case, in this great crisis of the empire 'Ādil practically left the full control of political and military affairs in his hands. It reflects great credit upon Hīmū that the Afghān ruler relied upon a Hindu officer in preference to the great chiefs of his own tribe, and that Hīmū proved equal to the task imposed upon him. He had to fight constantly in order to put down the rebel chiefs, and always won victories, sometimes against heavy odds.

The account of the battles fought and victories won by Hīmū is given by Abu-'l-Fazl and Badāūnī. As both of them hated Hīmū as an upstart and painted him in the blackest colour, as noted above, their unrestrained praise is all the more valuable as a testimony to the valour and military skill of Hīmū. Abu-'l-Fazl writes: "Battles took place between Hemū and Ibrāhīm, who was a claimant for the Sultanate, and the former was always victorious. Sultān Muhammad, who had assumed the kingly title in Bengal, was also defeated, and was made to tread the land of annihilation. Hemū also engaged in conflicts with Tāj Kararānī and Rukn Khān Nūhānī and defeated them. He fought two and twenty battles with the opponents of Mubāriz Khān, and was victorious in all of them."<sup>56</sup>

Badāūnī gives more details. Thus when Tāj Khān, aided by two other chiefs, openly broke into revolt, Hīmū, we are told, fought a desperate battle with them, gaining victory (p. 541).

Regarding the more formidable rival Ibrāhīm Sūr, Badāūnī says: "Hīmūn, regarding Ibrāhīm as his own especial prey, considered it essential to overthrow him; Ibrāhīm came out to oppose him ready for battle, and taking up a strong position showed a resolute determination to withstand him, such as perhaps Rustum, if anyone, dis-

played before. But for all this, by the decree of the Almighty he was not successful. . . . Ibrāhīm Khān after this defeat, leaving Kālpī, made straight for Baiāna with all speed, and Hīmū pursuing him arrived at Baiāna. . . . Ibrāhīm Khān, taking a body of the Nuhāni and Afghān cultivators and landholders of Baiāna, again went out to meet Hīmūn and, making a night attack upon him, the following morning fought a fierce battle with him near to the township of Khānwah, ten *krohs* distant from Baiāna, but could not prevail against his destiny."<sup>57</sup>

Ibrāhīm Khān then shut himself in the fortress of Bayāna "a fort of exceeding loftiness and strength". Hīmū kept up the siege for three months and made inroads on the districts of Bayāna on all sides, pillaging and destroying. While thus engaged, news reached Hīmū that "Muhammad Khān Sūr, governor of Bangāla, had assumed the title of Sultān Jalāl-ud-Dīn, and was marching with an army like the ants and locusts for multitude from Bangāla, and having reduced Jaunpūr was making for Kālpī and Āgra. Just at this juncture an urgent summons arrived from 'Adlī to Hīmūn in these words: 'At all costs come to me at once as I am confronted by a powerful enemy.' Hīmūn thereupon abandoned the siege". But before he could proceed very far, Ibrāhīm attacked him but was defeated. Then, after some time, Ibrāhīm, after obtaining reinforcements again advanced against Hīmū, was again defeated, and finally abandoned the struggle.<sup>58</sup>

Hīmū then advanced quickly to join his master 'Ādil Shāh's forces sent against the other rebel, Muhammad Khān of Bengal. Badāūnī thus describes the situation: Muhammad Khān, "confidently relying upon his superior force to overcome the forces of 'Adlī, had drawn up his cavalry and infantry and elephants to a number surpassing all computation, and was every moment expecting victory, when suddenly the scale turned against him, and Hīmūn swept down upon him like a comet, and no sooner did he reach the ranks of the picked elephants after crossing the river Jamna, than he swooped down upon the army" of Muhammad Khān, taking them unawares and practically annihilated the army. "The greater part of his *Amirs* were slain; while the rest took to flight." Muhammad Khān vanished for ever.<sup>59</sup>

Hardly had these revolts been suppressed when Humāyūn returned to India to recover his lost throne. 'Ādil sent Hīmū northwards to oppose him, while he himself retired to Chunār. Humāyūn, as stated above, succeeded in re-establishing himself for a few months. When he met with his fatal accident, in January, 1556, Hīmū remained in the field on behalf of 'Ādil Shāh to prevent Akbar from taking effective possession of his father's kingdom. When Akbar was formally proclaimed at Kalānaur as Pādshāh, Tardī Beg was appointed governor of Delhi. Hīmū advanced by way of Gwālior and Āgra to Old Delhi, and "inflicted a severe defeat on the Mogul forces, capturing 160 elephants, 1,000 Arab horses, and an immense quantity of valuable booty. He thus gained possession of both Delhi and Āgra."<sup>60</sup>

It was at this stage that Hīmū's ambitions soared high and he wistfully looked towards the sovereignty of Hindusthān. According to Abu-'l-Fazl, Hīmū's "victories impressed him with evil ideas" and his capture of Delhi "increased his arrogance so that his intoxication became madness".<sup>61</sup> Other Muslim chroniclers of old expressed the same view, and many modern historians of India seem to hold the same opinion. V. A. Smith, who takes a more liberal view, observes: "Hēmū, who had won Delhi and Agra in the name of his master Adalī, now began to reflect that his sovereignty was a long way off, that he himself was in possession of the army and elephants, and that it might be better to gain a kingdom for his own benefit rather than for that of his absent employer."<sup>62</sup> No one today can reasonably claim to know the thoughts in Hīmū's mind. But a little reflection will show that there was nothing unreasonable or immoral in the aspiration of Hīmū. No doubt personal ambition played a great part, but it may not be altogether wrong to think that he was also inspired by the idea of founding a Hindu *rāj*. This is supported by his assumption of the title Vikramāditya.

The opportunities, as V. A. Smith points out, were really very good, and the recent examples of Bābur, Sher Shāh and Humāyūn (after his return from exile in Persia) within living memory, demonstrated the feasibility of a bold military adventurer seizing the throne of Delhi. Hīmū's chances of success cannot be reasonably regarded as much less than that of any one of these. This view is strongly supported by the details of the second battle of Pānīpat which decided the fate of Hīmū, to which reference has been made above (p. 96).

Whatever might have been his motive or justification, Hīmū decided upon his course of action and made preparations accordingly. He won over the Afghāns, who accompanied him, by distributing the spoils of war among them. He occupied Delhi with their concurrence, declared his independent status in a practical manner by ascending the throne, with the imperial canopy raised over his head, issued coins in his name, and assumed the historic name Vikramāditya or Rājā Bikramjit.

Bairam Khān, the guardian of minor Mughul ruler Akbar, was advised by his counsellors to retire from India, but, disregarding their advice, he decided to advance against Hīmū, whose army greatly outnumbered that of the Mughuls. The battle between them was fought at Pānīpat, on 5 November, 1556. V. A. Smith gives the following account of the battle: "Each army was drawn up in three divisions. On November 5 Hēmū succeeded in throwing both the right and the left wings of his opponents into confusion, and sought to make his victory decisive by bringing all his mountain-like elephants to bear on the centre of the enemy, commanded by Khān Zamān. Probably he would have won but for the accident that he was struck in the eye by an arrow which pierced his brain and rendered him unconscious. An Indian army never could survive the loss of its leader, on whose life its pay depended.

Hēmū's soldiers at once scattered in various directions and made no further attempt at resistance."<sup>63</sup>

V. A. Smith rightly uses the word 'accident'—and it is undoubtedly a mere accident that deprived Hēmū of victory, throne and life. While Smith thinks that Hēmū had every chance of winning the battle, Sir Wolseley Haig asserts that the Mughul forces "would certainly have been overpowered had not Hēmū's eye been pierced by an arrow."<sup>64</sup> More or less the same view has been held in this volume also (above, p. 96). It may, therefore, be reasonably held, that Hēmū's failure was, in a great measure, due to that unknown and unknowable factor, called fate or destiny, which plays no inconsiderable part in the affairs of men. Hēmū was captured in an unconscious state and met with a tragic end, as described above (p. 96).

V. A. Smith writes:

"Bairām Khān desired Akbar to earn the title of Ghāzī, or Slayer of the Infidel, by flashing his sword on the captive. The boy naturally obeyed his guardian and smote Hēmū on the neck with his scimitar. The bystanders also plunged their swords into the bleeding corpse. Hēmū's head was sent to Kābul to be exposed, and his trunk was gibbeted at one of the gates of Delhi."<sup>65</sup>

But the tragedy did not end here. The forces of Akbar conquered the *Sarkār* of Alwar wherein was situated the home of Hēmū. The Mughul officer, who conquered it, proceeded to the township where Hēmū's family lived.

Abu-'l-Fazl, the trusted friend of Akbar and chronicler of his reign, describes what happened in the following words: "The place was strong and there was much fighting, and the father of Hēmū was captured and brought alive before the Nāsir-al-mulk. The latter called upon him to change his religion. The old man answered, 'for eighty years I have worshipped my God, according to this religion. Why should I change it at this time, and why should I, merely from fear of my life, and without understanding it come into your way of worship?' Pir Muhammad treated his words as if he heard them not, and answered him with the tongue of the sword."<sup>66</sup>

Such was the noble end of the family of Hēmū, a great Hindu who was born in humble life, but made his way to the throne of Delhi by dint of sheer ability and military skill—a unique episode in the history of India during Muslim rule. Unfortunately, Hēmū's history has been written almost wholly by his enemies who dreaded him most, and, far from doing justice to his greatness, they have tarnished his name with unmerited odium. It is time to resuscitate the memory and give a true account of the life of Hemchandra, really a great hero, whose dreams and achievements have been forgotten by his countrymen.

## THE MUGHUL EMPIRE

1. *Akbar-nāma*, I, 326 (English translation).
2. P. Saran, *Studies in Medieval Indian History*, pp. 40-46; *Journal of Bihār and Orissa Research Society* (1934), pp. 108-122.
3. 'Abbās Sarwānī, MS., p. 12, Elliot, IV, p. 308.
4. K. R. Qanungo, *Sher Shāh and His Times*, Vol. I, pp. 9, 24-25, Ishwari Prasad, *The Life and Times of Humāyūn*, pp. 94-95.
5. P. Saran, op. cit., p. 38, Ishwari Prasad, op. cit. p. 94 (1956 Edition). K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 9-10, 25-28.
6. *Makhzan-i-Afghānī*, MS., F 204b.
7. Abu'l-Fazl, *Akbar-nāma*, Vol. I, p. 327 (English translation).
8. K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 39-40.
9. Briggs, *Firishta*, Vol. II, p. 100.
10. 'Abbās, MS., pp. 28-29 as quoted in Qanungo's *Sher Shāh and His Times*, Vol. I, p. 52.
11. Briggs, *Firishta*, Vol. II, p. 101.
12. The *parganā* of Chaund comprised a portion of modern Shāhābād district and the greater portion of modern Mīrzāpur district.
13. Briggs, *Firishta*, Vol. II, p. 103, 'Abbās, MS., p. 62.
14. *The Makhzan*, MS., p. 19.
15. For the name of the place and the date of the battle, cf. Ch. III, f.n. 2, 2a.
16. K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 108-109.
17. *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, (Dacca University), Edited by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, p. 160.
18. K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 142.
19. J.J.A. Campos, *History of the Portuguese in Bengal*, p. 40.
20. The fort was not besieged by Humāyūn before the second week of January, 1538. For its siege and capture, vide Jauhar's *Tazkirat-ul-Wāqī'āt*, MS., pp. 21-24, Elliot IV, 339, V, 139-140; Elphinstone, *History of India*, 6th edition; pp. 446-447; K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 175-178.
21. Briggs, *Firishta*, pp. 114-117.
22. *Islāmic Culture*, 1936, pp. 127-130, Introduction, *Catalogue of Coins collected by Sayyid A.S.M. Taifur*, Dacca Museum, Dacca, 1936; E. Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathān Kings of Delhi*, p. 393; H. N. Wright, *The Sultāns of Delhi and their metrology*, pp. 269, 270, 323.
- 22a. Cf. Chapter III, f.n. 9a and 11.
23. 'Abbās, Elliot, IV, p. 368.
24. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Military History of India*, p. 63.
25. Ibid.
26. Jauhar, *Tazkirat-ul-Wāqī'āt*, pp. 36-37.
27. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Military History of India*, p. 64.
28. K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 205.
29. *Akbar-nāma*, English translation I, 345, *Riyāz-us-Salātīn*, text, 147.
30. *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, edited by J. N. Sarkar, and published by the Dacca University, p. 174.
31. *The Makhzan*, MS., p. 35; *Firishta*, text, p. 226; *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, text, p. 230.
32. The battle was fought near Bilgrām, three miles away from the Gaṅgā (Ganges) and opposite Kanauj.
33. Haidar's description of the battle may be seen in *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, Elias's trans., pp. 475-77.
34. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Military History of India*, p. 64.
35. K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 314.
- 35a. Ibid.

## SHER SHĀH AND HIS SUCCESSORS

36. *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, pp. 271, 592.
37. *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, p. 231; Briggs, *Firishta*, II, pp. 117-118.
38. *Firishta*, text. 228.
39. 'Abbās, MS, p. 237; Elliot, IV, p. 407.
40. Elliot, IV, p. 407, footnote.
41. Arāil is situated on the right bank of the Yamunā and opposite to Allahabad fort.
42. *The History and Culture of the Indian People* (Bhārātīya Vidyā Bhavan), Vol. VI, p. 449.
43. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Mughul Administration*, p. 116.
44. *Āin-i-Akbarī*, II, pp. 63, 66; Elliot IV, p. 399, footnote.
- 44a. According to P. Saran, "Sher Shāh used to charge one-third of the produce as revenue" (*Studies in Medieval Indian History*, p. 85). Reference, however, should be made to an important innovation of Sher Shāh, namely, schedules (*ray'*) of the assessment rates for the different kinds of crops (*Rabi* crop, *Kharif* crop, etc.). In other words, land was divided into several classes according to the nature of the crops cultivated therein, and the rate of assessment was fixed for every one of them. For details, cf. *ibid* (Editor).
45. *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, II, pp. 145-146; vide, also E. Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathān Kings of Delhi*, pp. 408-409; H. N. Wright, *Catalogue of Coins in the Indian Museum*, Calcutta, II, pp. 11-12, 84-109.
46. 'Abbās, Elliot, IV, p. 421.
47. Briggs, *Firishta*, Vol. II, p. 125.
48. *A History of Fine Arts in India and Ceylon*, p. 406.
49. *Memoirs of the Races of the North Western Provinces of India*, II, 97.
50. About 85 miles south-east of Kālinjar.
51. Badāūnī, text, Vol. I, pp. 384-385.
52. *Ibid*, p. 385.
53. Mānkot was built in about two years, and it had four forts and four townships.
54. Briggs, *Firishta*, II, p. 189; *Dacca University Studies*, November, 1935; pp. 67-101. See Appendix.
55. For example, Abu-'l-Fazl's *Akbar-nāma* (Reference below is to the English translation by H. Beveridge, Vol. II; Calcutta, 1912) and 'Abdul-Qādir Badāūnī's *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh* (Reference below is to the English translation by G. S. A. Ranking, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1898).
56. Beveridge, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
57. Ranking, *op. cit.*, pp. 548-9.
58. *Ibid*, pp. 552-3.
59. *Ibid*, p. 555.
60. V. A. Smith, *Akbar The Great Mogul* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 34-5.
61. Beveridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 50.
62. V. A. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-7.
63. *Ibid*, pp. 38-9.
64. *CHI*, IV, p. 72.
65. V. A. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
66. Beveridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-2.

## CHAPTER V

### AKBAR (1556-1605)

#### I. PERIOD OF TUTELAGE

The news of Humāyūn's death was concealed by Bairam Khān<sup>1</sup> in order to prepare for the unopposed succession of Akbar. A man resembling Humāyūn and dressed up like him made public appearance while the Turkish admiral Sīdī 'Alī Ra'īs, who happened to be at Delhi, left for Lahore<sup>1a</sup> and assured the people of Humāyūn's recovery. On 14 February, 1556, Akbar ascended the throne at the age of thirteen years and a few months.<sup>1b</sup> The task before the young emperor and his veteran guardian was very difficult and complicated. His hold on the kingdom, only recently recovered, was very uncertain. The small army under Bairam Khān had but a precarious hold on certain districts in the Punjab; and both the army and the nobility were heterogeneous bodies of uncertain loyalty. Three Afghān princes of the Sūr family still contested the sovereignty of Hindusthān. Hīmū, the Hindu general, who nominally acted on behalf of his Afghān master but aspired to sovereign power, further complicated the situation. The fairest parts of Hindusthān were devastated by a frightful famine and an epidemic plague.

Immediately after Akbar's accession, Bairam Khān, who held the reins of government, had to arrest Shāh Abu-'l-Ma'ālī, a favourite noble of Humāyūn, who at first refused to attend the emperor's court and misbehaved when he did attend it.<sup>2</sup> Bairam wanted to execute him but, at the young sovereign's intercession, the culprit was sent to Lahore in confinement. Bairam Khān then resumed his activity against Sikandar Sūr and from Kalānaur proceeded with Akbar up to Dahmīrī (modern Nūrpur in Kāngra district) where they remained for about three months in order to keep watch over the Sūr 'pretender'. But the arch-enemy was neither Sikandar, who had become a spent force after Māchīwārā and Sirhind, nor Ibrāhīm Sūr, whose ambition had been frustrated by Sikandar at Farah, nor even the musician king 'Ādil Shāh who was at Chunār, but his powerful lieutenant Hīmū.

Hīmū must be regarded as a very remarkable personality among the Hindus in medieval India. By his uncommon ability and commanding talent Hīmū had raised himself from an humble

shop-keeper at Rewārī to the cabinet of 'Ādil Shāh who made him his first minister and chief commander. It is said that he fought 'two and twenty' battles with his master's opponents and was victorious in all of them. Nominally acting on behalf of 'Ādil Shāh, Hīmū really aspired to carving out a Hindu kingdom on the ruins of Muslim power. The accession of young Akbar offered him the opportunity for striking at Delhi. With a huge body of cavalry and elephants, he marched from Gwālior to Āgra whose governor Iskandar Khān, the Uzbek, failed to defend it against the superior force of the invader and fled to Delhi. Hīmū took Āgra and then advanced on Delhi. Tārdī Beg Khān, the governor of Delhi, gave battle. The Mughuls began by routing Hīmū's vanguard and right wing but Hīmū suddenly made such a violent charge on the Mughul centre that Tārdī Beg who commanded it failed to resist and fled from the field of battle. This broke the morale of his army, the flight became general and Delhi fell into Hīmū's hands.

When the report of the fall of Delhi reached Akbar at Jullundur, the majority of his nobles advised an immediate retreat to Kābul as the enemy's force was far stronger. But the hero of Māchīwārā and Sirhind was not to abandon so easily the throne of Hindusthān; Bairam, rejecting all defeatist counsel, decided to give battle. Leaving Khizr Khvāja Khān at Jullundur to subdue Siskandar Sūr, Akbar and Bairam marched towards Delhi. At Sirhind, they were joined by the fugitive governors, Iskandar Khān, Tārdī Beg Khān and 'Alī Qulī Khān, who had been forced to leave Sambhal. Here Bairam Khān took the drastic step of executing Tārdī Beg Khān for his failure at Delhi while Akbar was away on hunting. Some modern historians follow Firishta in justifying it on the ground of State necessity and there can be no doubt that Bairam Khān's bold step calmed all disaffection among the nobles and restored unity and discipline to the army which were so essential for the infant Mughul State at that critical juncture. A dispassionate study of the contemporary chronicles, however, reveals that the Shiah Bairam wanted to remove a powerful Sunnī rival, and Tārdī Beg Khān's failure at Delhi, due to cowardice or negligence or indiscretion, offered him the opportunity when State necessity coincided with self-interest; and afterwards Bairam exacted from the emperor a reluctant approval of his action.<sup>3</sup>

From Sirhind, Akbar and Bairam advanced towards Delhi to meet the enemy who was now master of Delhi and Āgra. Hīmū at the height of his power gave up the mask, took the title of Rājā Vikramāditya and made his Afghān soldiers call him Hīmū Shāh. The defeat of his advance guard and the capture of his

artillery by 'Alī Qulī Khān did not dishearten Hīmū who marched on with a huge cavalry of 50,000 Afghāns and Rājputs and 1,500 elephants. On 5 November, 1556, the two armies met face to face on the historic battlefield of Pānīpat. The Mughul army, which was positively inferior in number, did not possess more than 25,000 horse. Hīmū began the battle with a vehement charge on the Mughul ranks which threw the wings into confusion. He then directed his attack with all his elephants against the centre commanded by 'Alī Qulī Khān. In spite of their valiant efforts, the Mughuls under 'Alī Qulī Khān could not stand the onset of Hīmū. He was on the point of gaining victory when an arrow struck him in the eye and pierced his brain and he fell unconscious in the saddle. This turned the tide of the battle. Hīmū's army lost its morale and dispersed. Two thousand were killed during retreat and all of Hīmū's elephants fell into the hands of the Mughuls who obtained a complete and decisive victory. The battle sealed the fate of the Afghāns and completed the work of Māchīwārā and Sirhind. The story of the Mughul empire now begins.

Hīmū was captured by Shāh Qulī Khān Mahram who brought him to the presence of Akbar at a short distance from the field of action. Bairam Khān begged him to slay Hīmū with his own hand in order to gain the reward of *jihād* (crusade against infidels) and the title of *ghāzī* (hero combating infidels). Akbar accordingly struck Hīmū with his sword and Bairam Khān followed him. The story of Akbar's magnanimity and refusal to kill a fallen foe seems to be a later courtly invention.<sup>4</sup> The humane and liberal emperor of Hindusthān who preached *sulh-i-kull* (universal toleration) was not born but made.

After the victory of Pānīpat Akbar made his triumphant entry into Delhi. Bairam Khān appointed his servant Pīr Muhammad Sherwānī to suppress Hājī Khān, an officer of Sher Shāh, who was acting independently in Alwār and to capture the family and property of Hīmū which were there. Hājī Khān fled before the arrival of the Mughul army and Hīmū's wife also escaped, but Pīr Muhammad captured his vast wealth and his octogenarian father whom he put to death on his refusal to accept Islām.

Meanwhile Sikandar Sūr had defeated Khizr Khvāja Khān at Chamiārī (in Amritsar district), driven him back to Lahore and begun to collect taxes with Kalānaur as his headquarters. Bairam Khān promptly sent Iskandar Khān, the Uzbek, now styled Khān 'Ālam, to assist Khizr Khvāja Khān and on 7 December, 1556, he and Akbar left Delhi to deal with the enemy. They proceeded on

to Dahmīrī, but Sikandar retreated to the hill country of the Siwāliks and took refuge in the strong fortress of Mānkot<sup>5</sup> which Islām Shāh had built at enormous cost as a bulwark against Gakkhar aggression. Bairam Khān besieged the fort but its natural advantages and store of provisions enabled Sikandar to resist the Mughuls for about six months. But Sikandar relied more on the Afghāns in other parts of the country who, he expected, would create diversion. The defeat and death of 'Ādil in the battle near Chunār with Khizr Khān Sūr of Bengal and the suppression of Rukn Khān Lohānī and Jalāl Khān Sūr by 'Alī Qulī Khān, Khān Zamān, unnerved Sikandar who surrendered the fort on 25 July, 1557, and left for Bihār and then for Bengal where he died two years later.

Akbar marched to Lahore where he remained for four months. Bahādur Khān put down the Balūch disturbances in Multān and Bairam executed Takht Mal, rājā of Mau (Pathānkot), for his alliance with Sikandar. In December Akbar left for Delhi and on the way at Jullundur, Bairam Khān, then aged more than fifty, married his nineteen year old cousin Salīma Begam.<sup>6</sup> After crossing the Sutlej, Akbar learnt of the growing power of Hājī Khān who had fled from Alwār to Ajmer, established his authority there and was marching on Hissār. Bairam Khān accordingly sent to Hissār reinforcement under Pīr Muhammad Khān, whereupon Hājī Khān escaped to Gujarāt and the Mughuls took possession of Ajmer. Akbar returned to Delhi on 14 April, 1558.

Early in 1557 Qiyā Khān Gung had been sent to capture the famous fort of Gwālior, 'the pearl in the necklace of the castles of Hind', which was held by Bahbal Khān, an officer of 'Ādil Shāh. Qiyā Khān laid siege to the fort but the garrison did not surrender even after a continued siege for months. In November, 1558, Bairam Khān sent from Āgra reinforcement under Habīb 'Alī Khān which alarmed Bahbal Khān who surrendered the fort in January next year. The same year Khān Zamān annexed Jaunpur after an easy victory over Ibrāhīm Sūr. After an effort of one year Habīb 'Alī Khān besieged the fort of Ranthambhor which Islām Shāh's officer Jajhār Khān had just sold to Rāi Surjan, a servant of Rānā Uday Singh of Chitor, but the siege had to be raised on account of the downfall of Bairam Khān. Similarly a grand expedition under Bahādur Khān, which Bairam sent for the conquest of Mālwa and proceeded up to Siprī in Gwālior State, was recalled early in 1560.

For four years (1556-1559) Bairam Khān had bravely piloted the ship of the Mughul State against enormous odds. But the re-

verse of the medal offers a less pleasing record. The scandalous conduct and misdeeds of 'Alī Qulī Khān, who had enticed a page of Humāyūn and disregarded the order of Akbar, required drastic punishment. But Bairam Khān passed over his guilt while he put to death Musāhib Beg for lesser fault and approved of the execution of Khvāja Jalāl-ud-dīn Bujūq by Mun'im Khān for personal and trifling cause.

Pīr Muhammad Khān had gradually raised himself by loyal services to the position of Bairam Khān's right-hand man. He was also appointed tutor to the prince and won royal favour and confidence, so much so that he became almost as powerful as Bairam Khān himself. Bairam would brook no rival and availed of the earliest opportunity for dismissing the upstart. One day he even insulted his patron by refusing admission when he made a courtesy visit to his house during his illness. Pīr Muhammad Khān was at first sent in confinement to Bayāna and then allowed to go on pilgrimage to Mecca by way of Gujarāt. Though Bairam Khān was amply justified in discharging this ungrateful servant, Akbar was displeased.

After Pīr Muhammad's dismissal Bairam Khān appointed Shaikh Gadāī, a Shiah of no eminence to the important position of *Sadr-us-Sudūr*. This appointment raised a storm of indignation among the orthodox Muslims who, to quote Badāūnī, 'flew into a rage at the advancement, honour and unseasonable exaltation of Shaikh Gadāī.' The unbecoming treatment which Bairam Khān, under Shaikh Gadāī's influence, meted to Shaikh Muhammad Ghaus when he visited Āgra in April, 1559, highly displeased Akbar who revered the Shaikh (Muhammad Ghaus) and afterwards became his disciple.<sup>7</sup>

The chronicles deal at great length with the circumstances that led to Bairam Khān's downfall. In spite of their differences in minor details they reveal one fact: the root cause of the regent's fall was the desire of the prince to be the king in fact as in name. As Akbar advanced in years to manhood he found that he was a mere puppet in the hands of his guardian who did not consult him in the gravest matters of public importance and did not allow him the least power in financial affairs, so much so that his personal expenses were sanctioned by Bairam with stringency. Akbar wanted to set himself free and this could be done only by the dismissal of his all-powerful guardian, for Bairam would not have tolerated subordination to one whose obedience he had so long enjoyed. This desire of the young emperor to drop the pilot

was further strengthened by a series of incidents which highly displeased him and completely alienated him from his valued guardian.

From the very beginning the precocious ward had begun to differ with his powerful guardian. As early as May, 1557, Bairam Khān suspected that Akbar had begun to dislike him; he misinterpreted the accidental running of two royal elephants near his tent as an attempt on his life and held Atga Khān responsible for the displeasure with which he was occasionally treated by his young sovereign. The execution of Tārdī Beg Khān and Musāhib Beg, the dismissal of Pīr Muhammad Khān, the cold treatment of Shaikh Muhammad Ghaus and the two elephant incidents (1559-60) when Bairam put to death two drivers of the royal elephants—on the first occasion, because a drunken royal elephant had wounded one of Bairam's elephants, and, on the second, another royal elephant had rushed towards the boat of the minister on the Yamunā where he had been airing—all these added to the displeasure and vexation of the growing ward and made him all the more conscious of his real position.

Bairam Khān was harsh in temper, overbearing in manner, arbitrary, dictatorial in method, highly ambitious and jealous of power, and would brook no rival. His administration, though efficient, was marked by high-handedness and nepotism. A Shiah, who had raised the Shiah Shaikh Gadāī to the highest position in the State, he was disliked by the majority of the Muslims in Hindusthān who were Sunnīs, while he had incurred the jealous hostility of not a few among the nobles by his exalted position, though he obtained it by his superior merit.

The leaders of the opposition against the regent, however, formed a small faction whose personnel was drawn from the members of the harem and their relations or more properly Akbar's foster-relations known as *Atga-Khail*: Māham Anaga, the chief nurse of the emperor who had risked her life when the prince was thrown open to the gun shots of Mīrzā Kāmran at Kābul,<sup>7a</sup> her son Adham Khān, her relations Shihāb-ud-dīn Ahmad Khān, governor of Delhi, and Mīrzā Sharaf-ud-dīn Husain, and Jījī Anaga who had suckled the prince, her husband Shams-ud-dīn Atga Khān with his brothers and sons as well as Hamīda Begam, the queen-mother. They were mainly inspired by jealousy and self-interest and availed of the growing discontent against the regent and hoped to monopolize power should they be able to overthrow him.

The dismissal of so powerful a man like Bairam Khān by the young emperor was not an easy task. A secret plot was made by

Akbar and the opposition party so that Bairam Khān might be taken by surprise and would have no time to prepare for opposition. The chronicles differ as to the comparative share of Akbar and the Māham Anaga junto in the plot for the dismissal of the great minister. It seems that the decision for dismissal was mainly Akbar's own and he himself took the initiative and in this action, which required great firmness and much address, he had to take the help of, and was absolutely helped by, the harem party which was hostile to the minister. The dismissal of Bairam Khān was achieved by a *coup*, decided on and to a great extent planned by Akbar, prepared by the harem cabal and worked by all who were hostile to the Khān Khānān.

On 19 March, 1560, Akbar and the collaborators left Āgra on the pretext of hunting, taking with them Abu-'l-Qāsim, son of Mīrzā Kāmran, whom Bairam might use as a pretender. As his mother was lying sick at Delhi, Akbar made this his motive to proceed to that city. At Delhi the enemies of Bairam did their utmost to hasten his dismissal. Shihāb-ud-dīn Ahmad Khān made arrangements for the defence of the city, and officers from all directions were called to join the emperor. Atga Khān was the earliest to arrive and others followed.

On receiving Akbar's message from Delhi,<sup>7b</sup> Bairam Khān was surprised and immediately sent envoys to the emperor begging his pardon and assuring him of loyal service in future. But Akbar imprisoned his envoys and then refused him permission to interview. The die was now cast. The followers of Bairam advised him to march on Delhi and seize the emperor's person but the great minister refused to disgrace his old age by rebellion after passing a lifetime in loyal service.<sup>8</sup> Early in April he left Āgra announcing that he was going on pilgrimage to Mecca. The harem party, however, got alarmed and induced Akbar to march against Bairam and send Mīr 'Abdul-Latīf with a message that, as he had taken the reins of government in his own hands, Bairam should proceed to Mecca and that due provision would be made for his expenses there. On the way Pīr Muhammad Khān joined the emperor from Gujarāt and he was sent with a large force towards Nāgaur 'to pack Bairam as quickly as possible to Mecca.' From Nāgaur which he had reached by way of Alwār, Bairam went to Bikāner to avoid Rājā Māldev of Mārwar who was hostile to him; but the studied insult which his enemies had meted to him by appointing his dismissed servant gave him provocation. Against the explicit warning of Akbar he turned his direction towards the Punjab and 'crossed the Rubicon'.<sup>9</sup>

Bairam placed his family at Tabarhinda (modern Bhatinda), and proceeded towards Jullundur via Dīpālpur and Tihāra, 27 miles west of Ludhiana. Akbar now recalled Pīr Muhammad Khān and appointed Atga Khān with a large force to deal with the rebel minister. Atga Khān defeated Bairam in a battle at Gunāchaur in Jullundur district (August, 1560) and forced him to flee to the fortress of Tilwāra in the Siwalik hills. Meanwhile Akbar in person had marched to Sirhind. Here Mun'im Khān joined him from Kābul and was appointed to the office of *vakīl* with the title of Khān Khānān which Bairam had so long held. The royal troops besieged the fortress of Tilwāra, but after a short resistance Bairam offered to surrender on condition that he would be assured of safe conduct to the emperor. In October, 1560, at Hājīpur (in Hoshiarpur district) he presented himself before Akbar who received him kindly and offered him the alternatives of service as his personal companion or as a *jāgīrdār* of Kālpī and Chanderī and pilgrimage. Declining to serve where he had ruled, the great minister chose the second and left for Gujarāt where at Pātan he was assassinated on 31 January, 1561, by some Afghāns led by one Mubārak Khān whose father had been killed at the battle of Māchīwārā in which Bairam was in command. There is no positive evidence in support of the suggestion of Count Von Noer that the enemies of Bairam who had worked for his downfall might have had a hand in it. Bairam's family became stranded and it was not before September, some eight months after the tragic incident, that they reached the court. Bairam's infant son Mīrzā 'Abdur-Rahīm grew up in royal favour and gradually rose high in position till he became the Khān Khānān in 1584.

The services of Bairam to the Mughul dynasty were great; his gifts and ability, undisputed. He was the real author of the Mughul restoration and without him Akbar could hardly have retained his throne. His exit from the stage of Mughul history marks the end of an epoch, the age of military conquest, the age of Bābur. A new era with a new orientation commences in Indo-Islāmic history, the age of Akbar.

Some modern historians regard the dismissal of Bairam Khān as premature and state that for the next four years Akbar remained under a 'petticoat government of the worst kind.' They exaggerate the influence of Māham Anaga both in bringing about Bairam's downfall as well as during the period immediately following. True, the harem party and Māham Anaga in particular secured important positions as the natural reward of the great services they had recently rendered, but it is inaccurate to say that Akbar

became a victim of the harem cabal. It would be more accurate to say that the period immediately following the downfall of Bairam Khān was marked by an attempt made by the harem party to dominate Akbar who, however, revealed his own personality and was able to assert himself without any serious difficulty and within a short time. Akbar used Māham Anaga for his own purpose and he overthrew her when she proved hostile to his policy and interests.<sup>10</sup> The buffet which struck down the audacious Adham Khān did not make Akbar a man, as Count Von Noer states; it was the man who struck the buffet.

Akbar now undertook the conquest of Mālwa which had been interrupted by the events leading to Bairam Khān's downfall. The choice of commanders was unfortunate and proves the unmistakable influence of Māham Anaga and the harem party. The Mughul army led by Adham Khān, his foster-mother's son, and Pīr Muhammad Khān invaded Mālwa and marched unopposed to Sārangpur where at last the musician-king Bāz Bahādur, a voluptuary *par excellence*, gave battle but, deserted by his Afghān officers who were discontented, was easily defeated by the superior army of Akbar and put to flight (29 March, 1561). All his treasures, elephants and his harem fell into the hands of the victors but his beloved, the famous Rūpamatī, the romantic theme of artists and poets, took poison to evade the clutches of 'her conqueror rude.' The two commanders, who, according to Badāūnī, considered human beings as 'leeks, cucumbers and radishes', perpetrated acts of barbaric cruelty, massacring the prisoners and putting to death even their wives and children—not even sparing Sayyids and holy men with copies of the Qur'ān in their hands, as Badāūnī expresses with righteous indignation. Adham Khān, puffed up with pride at his easy success, behaved as if he were independent. He sent to the emperor a report of his victory and only a few elephants, himself appropriating the rest of the spoils. Akbar resented this insolence and personally marched to Sārangpur to punish the delinquent who, being taken by surprise, surrendered to the emperor. Adham Khān was excused through the intercession of Māham Anaga who did not hesitate to kill two innocent girls of Bahādur's harem as they were witnesses to her son's scandalous conduct. Though not immediately, Adham Khān was recalled from Mālwa and Akbar made over the command to Pīr Muhammad who reduced Bijāgarh with general massacre and then invaded Khāndesh where Bāz Bahādur had taken refuge. He captured the fort of Asīrgarh and proceeded as far as Burhānpur, massacring or enslaving the people and destroying towns and villages on the way, but was defeated by a coalition of three

powers: Mubārak Khān of Khāndesh, Bāz Bahādur and Tufāl Khān, the *de facto* ruler of Berār. As he was retreating towards Mālwa he was drowned while crossing the Narmadā, the just retribution for the sighs of the orphans, the weak and the captives, as Badāūnī affirms. The confederate army pursued the Mughuls and drove them out of Mālwa, and Bahādur recovered his kingdom. In 1562 a second army sent by Akbar under 'Abdullah Khān, the Uzbek, invaded Mālwa and compelled Bāz Bahādur to flee to Chitor. 'Abdullah Khān took Māndū and restored Mughul authority in Mālwa. Bāz Bahādur remained a fugitive at various courts until November, 1570, when he surrendered to Akbar at Nāgaur and joined his service.

Early in 1561 Khān Zamān and his brother Bahādur Khān suppressed a formidable uprising of the Afghāns under Sher Khān, son of 'Adil Shāh, who marched from Chunār with a big army but suffered total defeat near Jaunpur. Khān Zamān behaved like Adham Khān and appropriated the spoils. Akbar would not tolerate such a gross infringement of his prerogative and marched from Āgra towards Jaunpur (July, 1561). Alarmed at this the brothers paid homage to Akbar at Karā and returned him all the spoils including the elephants. Akbar pardoned them and re-instated them in their position. The emperor then sent Āsaf Khān to the important fortress of Chunār which the Afghāns surrendered without any resistance.

In November, 1561, Atga Khān was appointed *vakīl* or the prime minister. This appointment displeased Māham Anaga and Mun'im Khān who had been holding the position since the discharge of Bairam Khān. The harem party was now broken into two groups: the Māham Anaga group and the party of Atga Khān.

In the middle of January, 1562, Akbar made a pilgrimage to the tomb of the famous saint of Ajmer, Khvāja Mu'in-ud-dīn Chishtī. On the way Rājā Bihārī Mal of Amber paid homage to the emperor and offered him the hand of his daughter. Akbar agreed and during his return journey the marriage was celebrated at Sāmbhar. Mān Singh, the nephew and adopted son of Rājā Bhagwān Dās, the heir of Rājā Bihārī Mal was taken into the royal service. The princess afterwards became the mother of Emperor Jahāngīr. This pilgrimage to Ajmer, which henceforward Akbar made annually until 1579, is a landmark not only in Akbar's but also in Indo-Muslim history. The Rājput alliance was not merely the stroke of a diplomat to win the support of militant Hinduism; it was the beginning of a new orientation of State-policy, the first expression of that doctrine of *sulh-i-kull* (universal toleration) which his great Per-

sian tutor Mīr 'Abdul-Latīf Qazvīnī had infused into Akbar. He was not to be the head of a community but all people. No Muslim ruler before, not even Sher Shāh, with all his benevolence, held this exalted conception of State and kingship so definitely and vividly.

On his way from Ajmer, Akbar sent Mīrzā Sharaf-ud-dīn Husain to take the fort of Merta, then held by Jai Mal for Rānā Uday Singh of Mewār. The fort surrendered to the Mughuls after a siege of several months and a stubborn fight offered by Jai Mal's commander Dev Dās.

The appointment of Atga Khān as *vakīl* had provoked the displeasure of the Māham Anaga group and the malcontents found in the unscrupulous Adham Khān, freshly embittered by his recall from Mālwa, a pliable instrument for the fulfilment of their desires. On 16 May, 1562, the hot-headed youth, accompanied by a few ruffians, burst in upon Shams-ud-dīn as he sat in the hall of audience and murdered him. Adham Khān then rushed to the inner apartment where he was caught by Akbar, just roused from sleep by the tumult, who only replied to the murderer's explanation to palliate his crime by striking him down with a heavy blow of his fist. Adham was twice thrown from the terrace by royal order and put to death. Akbar himself broke this news to Māham Anaga who made the simple but dignified reply that he did well, and forty days later followed her son to the grave. In grateful remembrance of his foster-mother who had once risked her life for his sake on the battlement of Kābul and sheltered him from the cradle to the throne, Akbar raised a noble mausoleum at Delhi where mother and son lie interred.

Akbar meted out magnanimous treatment to the conspirators. They were pardoned and both Shihāb-ud-dīn Ahmad and Mun'im Khān, the ringleaders, were reinstated in their position. The *Atga-Khail* or the Atga group who thirsted for vengeance were removed from court by employment in an expedition against the Gakkhars. As a result of this expedition Akbar's protege Kamāl Khān was given back the Gakkhar country lying between the upper courses of the Jhelum and the Indus which had been seized by his uncle Sultān Ādam.

The Adham Khān affair is not the beginning of Akbar's assertion of his own individuality; it is the logical end of a policy which he had been following since 1557 when the great Bairam had begun to feel the weight of his personality. In 1560 he overthrew his all-powerful guardian who had maintained his throne; in 1562 he overthrew the Māham Anaga group who had assisted him to

drop his pilot but abused the power he had bestowed on them. Two years later he revealed the same strength of character when he did not hesitate to order death sentence on his maternal uncle Khvāja Mu‘azzam for having murdered his wife. The Rājput alliance and Akbar’s prohibition in 1562 of the practice of enslaving prisoners of war were expressions of that marked individuality of the young emperor. In 1563 Akbar abolished the tax on Hindu pilgrims to holy places and early next year he took the revolutionary step of abolishing the *jizya* or poll-tax on non-Muslims. ‘It was an assertion of Akbar’s will and conscience against a tradition of all the Muslim conquerors of India, sanctioned by centuries of custom, against all his advisers’ (Binyon).

Already Akbar had begun to inquire about the view of his subjects by nocturnal visits among them in disguise and on one occasion in 1561 he was recognized. Next year he appointed a capable officer of Islām Shāh Sūr, on whom was now conferred the title of I‘timād Khān, to remove the abuses that had crept into the administration of the reserved (*khālisa*) lands, and this was followed in 1564 by the appointment of Muzaffar ‘Alī Turbatī, who had served under Bairam Khān and gained experience in the local revenue administration of a *parganā*, as the *Dīwān* or the finance minister of the empire. He had also curtailed the authority of the *Sadr-us-Sudūr* when he appointed Muhammad Sālih of Herat to that position (1562). He was replaced in 1565 by Shaikh ‘Abdun-Nabī who, however, disappointed Akbar’s hope for reformation in the administration by lavish abuse of his power. He was dismissed in 1578 when the office was shorn of its ‘ancient dignity’ as Akbar substantially curtailed the powers of the *Sadr*. Ultimately in 1582 he effected further curtailment of the power and authority of the *Sadr-us-Sudūr* by appointing six provincial *Sadrs*.

## II. EARLY CONQUESTS

Akbar now seriously undertook the work of conquest. He was a self-confessed annexationist; in his ‘Happy Sayings’ his ideology is clearly expressed: ‘A monarch should be ever intent on conquest, otherwise his enemies rise in arms against him’. Without scruple and even without provocation he invaded kingdom after kingdom and annexed them to his expanding empire. The people whom he conquered were reconciled to his rule because they enjoyed the blessings of peace which Akbar extended to them. The policy of expansion had been initiated by his valued guardian under whom Ajmer, Gwālior and Jaunpur had been annexed and it was followed by Akbar when he sent the expedition for the conquest of Mālwa

(1562). But from 1564 onwards when he began his attack on Gondwāna, Akbar systematically pursued a policy of expansion which did not end until the fall of Asīrgarh in 1601. In fairness to Akbar it has to be conceded that, though most of his wars were motivated by earth-hunger, yet all of them cannot be dismissed as purely annexationist in nature. Some of them were what Mommsen calls defensive-offensive: as for example, his conquest of Bengal and his wars in the North-West Frontier; and at least one of his conquests can be justified: the conquest of Gujarāt which he undertook in response to an invitation from that quarter.

Āsaf Khān, the governor of Karā, was entrusted with the task of subduing the kingdom of Gondwāna or Garha-Katanga now included in Madhya Pradesh, bounded, according to Abu-'l-Fazl, on the east by Ratanpur, a dependency of Jhārkhanda or Chota Nāgpur, and on the west by Mālwa, while Pannā (the Bhath kingdom) lay north of it, and the Deccan, south. It was then ruled by Rānī Durgāvati, a princess of the famous Chandel dynasty of Mahobā, as regent for her son Bīr Nārāyan. She was a capable and benevolent ruler, a good shot and a courageous leader; she possessed an army of 20,000 cavalry and 1,000 elephants and had defeated in battle Bāz Bahādur and the Miyāna Afghāns. The advance of the Mughul army alarmed Durgāvati's soldiers, many of whom deserted. The rānī, however, made a gallant stand at Narhī to the east of Garha<sup>11</sup> against the Mughuls in spite of their overwhelming superiority in number. She was easily overpowered, received two wounds from arrows and stabbed herself to death to avoid disgrace. Two months later, Āsaf Khān marched on the capital Chaurāgarh<sup>12</sup> and defeated Bīr Nārāyan who, though wounded in the battle of Narhī, offered battle and was slain. Two women who escaped death at *jauhar*—one of them being Rānī Durgāvati's sister, Kamalāvati—were sent to Akbar's harem. Āsaf Khān obtained rich spoils in gold, coined and uncoined, and in figures of men and animals, jewels, pearls as well as 1,000 elephants and he followed the evil example of Adham Khān in appropriating the major portion.

Towards the end of 1564, Akbar laid the foundation of a town which he named Nagarchain (the city of repose) on the site of the village of Kakrālī, seven miles to the south of Āgra.<sup>13</sup> It became his favourite resort where he received even ambassadors from abroad, but was deserted some years later when Fathpur Sikrī became the capital of the empire. About this time Akbar began also the restoration of Āgra by building a new fort of stone to replace the old crumbling brick fort. We are told by Abu-'l-Fazl that Akbar erected at Āgra 'more than five hundred buildings of masonry after the

beautiful designs of Bengal and Gujarāt, which masterly sculptors and cunning artists of form have fashioned as architectural models'. Most of them were demolished by his grandson when he reconstructed the fort.

Akbar's work of conquest was now seriously interrupted by a formidable rebellion of the Uzbegs. The Uzbegs in Akbar's service formed a party; in a sense they were the hereditary enemies of the Tīmūrīds as it was they who had driven Bābur from Transoxiana.<sup>14</sup> They had joined the Indian expeditions of the Tīmūrīds and entered their service but their loyalty to the dynasty was lukewarm and uncertain. Khān Zamān and his relations were proud of their lineage from the royal line of Shaibān.<sup>15</sup> They resented Akbar's preference to Persians who were appointed to high positions at court while they were placed far away in the eastern provinces requiring constant exertion. As bigoted Sunnīs they were hostile to the Persians who were mostly Shīahs but it would not be quite proper to describe the Uzbeg rebellion as a protest of Sunnī orthodoxy against Akbar's liberal policy towards the Shīahs and the Hindus, as a modern author has suggested.<sup>16</sup> It was the protest of a lawless aristocracy, accustomed to the laxity of Humāyūn's days, against centralised government which Akbar was building, leavened by the racial factor and to a certain extent by personal ambition. The Uzbeg officers comported themselves like veritable satraps aspiring to independence. At one stage the rebels were in communication with Akbar's half-brother Mīrzā Hakīm, but there is no evidence of their complicity with 'Abdullah Khān, the famous Uzbeg chief of Bukhārā. The prominent Uzbeg officers were 'Alī Qulī Khān, Khān Zamān who was governor of Jaunpur and their leader, his brother Bahādur Khān, their uncle Ibrāhīm Khān who held Surhūrpur, north of Jaunpur, Iskandar Khān whose fief was Awadh and 'Abdullah Khān who had succeeded Pīr Muhammad Khān in the government of Mālwa.

Already in 1561 Khān Zamān had shown the complexion of his allegiance and again in 1564 after his surprising victory over the Afghāns in full force under Fath Khān, who had invaded and occupied Bihār, he dismissed Akbar's messengers who demanded assurance of his allegiance with an evasive reply. In Mālwa 'Abdullah Khān showed symptoms of revolt. In July, 1564, Akbar marched through Narwar to Māndū, overtook the fleeing rebels near the city and drove him into Gujarāt. He sent an envoy to Chingīz Khān, ruler of Southern Gujarāt, requesting extradition of his fugitive officer or at least his expulsion. Chingīz Khān sent a polite reply asking pardon for the refugee and promising his expulsion if he

were not forgiven. At Māndū Akbar received in marriage the daughter of Mubārak Shāh, ruler of Khāndesh. He appointed Qarā Bahādur Khān, a cousin of Haidar Mīrzā, the historian, to the government of Mālwa and returned to Āgra on 9 October.

The evasive reply of Khān Zamān and the misconduct of 'Abdullah Khān bred suspicion in Akbar's mind about the Uzbegs in general. Early in 1565 Akbar sent Ashraf Khān to bring Iskandar Khān to court but Iskandar proceeded to Jaunpur, taking with him Ibrāhīm Khān from Surhūrpur, and there under the leadership of Khān Zamān the Uzbegs decided on a systematic campaign against the emperor. Iskandar and Ibrāhīm marched on Kanauj and defeated the Mughul troops at Nīmkhār in Sitāpur district. Khān Zamān and Bahādur besieged Majnūn Khān Qāqshāl at Mānikpur who, though reinforced by Āsaf Khān from Chaurāgarh, was unable to maintain himself against the enemy. Akbar immediately sent Mun'im Khān to his aid and on 24 May himself set out from Āgra with a large force. He joined Mun'im Khān at Kanauj and made a rapid march on Lakhnau and forced Iskandar to evacuate it. Alarmed at this, Khān Zamān raised the siege of Mānikpur and fled eastwards. Ultimately the Uzbegs took their stand near Hājipur whence they negotiated with the Afghāns of Rohtās and Sulaimān Kararānī, sultān of Bengal, for help. Akbar marched to Jaunpur and replied by sending an emissary to Mukunda Dev, rājā of Orissa, asking him to attack Sulaimān if the sultān would help the rebels, to which he agreed. But Akbar's situation became complicated by the sudden defection of Āsaf Khān on 16 September as he was called to account for the spoils of Gondwāna. Khān Zamān now sent Iskandar and Bahādur into the territory north of the Gogra to divide the royal troops. Akbar despatched Mīr Mu'izz-ul-Mulk to Khairābād in Sitāpur district to arrest their aggression, while he himself proceeded to Allāhabād. Finding Akbar equal to the situation, Khān Zamān sent a messenger to Mun'im Khān asking pardon and a reconciliation was patched up on condition that Khān Zamān should send his mother and uncle to court and he should not cross the Gogra as long as the imperial army would remain in that neighbourhood. Meanwhile in spite of these negotiations Mīr Mu'izz-ul-Mulk and Rājā Todar Mal who had joined him, forced on Bahādur and Iskandar a battle in Khairābād and suffered an ignominious defeat. Akbar, however, extended general amnesty to the Uzbegs and recalled as well as reproved his officers.

On 24 January, 1566, Akbar left Jaunpur for Banāras, inspecting on the way the important stronghold of Chunār. No sooner had Akbar set out than 'Alī Qulī Khān violated the conditions of

peace, crossed the Gogra, marched to Muhammadābād and sent a force to take Ghāzīpur and Jaunpur. Akbar turned back to chastise the faithless Uzbek who, however, fled to the hills. But Bahādur had advanced on Jaunpur, captured Ashraf Khān and released his mother and then, plundering Banāras, retreated across the Gaṅgā (Ganges). Akbar hastened to Jaunpur and declared it his headquarters, determined to quell the rebellion root and branch. Khān Zamān was alarmed and again opened negotiation for submission and pardon. Akbar, weary of the long campaign, forgave the rebels and reinstated them in their positions. On 3 March, 1566, he left for Āgra.

The storm apparently subsided but it broke again early next year when the Uzbeks, who were in secret communication with the ruler of Kābul, encouraged him to invade India and Khān Zamān read the *khutba* in his name at Jaunpur. In a family conclave held at Surhampur the Uzbek leaders decided on a renewed campaign. Khān Zamān, taking advantage of Akbar's absence in the Punjab where he had marched in November, 1566, to ward off Mīrzā Hākim's invasion, invaded Kanauj and besieged the fort of Shergarh, near Kanauj, where the Mughul officer Mīrzā Yūsuf Khān had taken refuge. Bahādur Khān attacked Āsaf Khān and Majnūn Khān at Mānikpur while Iskandar and Ibrāhīm marched on Awadh. On 23 March, 1567, Akbar left Lahore for Āgra and on 6 May marched from Āgra on Shergarh. Khān Zamān escaped to Mānikpur. Akbar despatched a force under Rājā Todar Mal and Muzaffar Khān against Iskandar Khān in Awadh, while he himself marched towards Mānikpur to deal with the main body of rebels. At Rāe Bareli he learnt that Khān Zamān and Bahādur Khān had crossed the Gaṅgā (Ganges) with a view to proceeding to Kālpī.<sup>17</sup> On 7 June he marched on from that town, disregarding the murmuring reluctance of his troops weary of incessant campaigns, and on arrival at Mānikpur ferry he despatched the main body of his troops under Rājā Bhagwān Dās and Khvāja Jahān to Karā while he, with some 1500 men, displayed extraordinary courage in crossing the swollen river. Meanwhile the Uzbeks had crossed the Gaṅgā (Ganges) and on their way to Karā encamped in the neighbourhood. On 9 June at dawn Akbar surprised the Uzbeks who could not suspect his arrival and had spent the whole night in a dissolute carousal. They marched off without offering battle, but Majnūn Khān and Āsaf Khān were despatched in advance to intercept them. In the battle that followed, the Uzbeks resisted for some time but were ultimately defeated.<sup>18</sup> Khān Zamān was slain and Bahādur Khān was taken captive. Bahādur was executed and some ring-leaders were trampled to death and a reward of one gold *mohur*

was paid for every Uzbek's head. Akbar then marched to Allāhabād and on to Banāras which was sacked because it closed its gates against him. From Banāras he marched to Jaunpur and conferred the assignments of Khān Zamān and other Uzbek chiefs on Mun'im Khān. Meanwhile Todar Mal and Muhammad Qulī Khān Barlās had besieged Iskandar in Awadh and driven him to the Afghāns at Gorakhpur.<sup>19</sup> The great Uzbek rebellion, the gravest menace in the early years of Akbar's reign, came to an end. On 18 July, 1567, Akbar returned to Āgra.

Hardly had the Uzbek menace been surmounted when Akbar had to face another rebellion, though less formidable, organized by the Mīrzās. They were Tīmūrid princes, descended from 'Umar Shaikh Mīrzā, the second son of Tīmūr while Akbar was descended from the third son Mīrān Shāh. The doyen of these Mīrzās, Muhammad Sultān Mīrzā who was a grandson (daughter's son) of Sultān Husain Mīrzā, the grand monarch of Khurāsān, joined Bābur's service. In the reign of Humāyūn he with his sons Ulugh Mīrzā and Shāh Mīrzā gave the emperor not a little trouble.<sup>20</sup> Both these sons died before Akbar's accession, so that the family now consisted of Muhammad Sultān Mīrzā and his other sons, Ibrāhīm Husain Mīrzā, Muhammad Husain Mīrzā, Mas'ūd Husain Mīrzā and 'Āqil Husain Mīrzā as well as two grandsons Ulugh Mīrzā and Shāh Mīrzā, sons of the deceased Ulugh Mīrzā. Rebellion against the Mughul emperor was their political creed; in Akbar's reign they shifted the theatres of their activities from Sambhal and the neighbourhood to Mālwa and then to Gujarāt. They were given assignments in the districts of Sambhal and A'zampur. During the invasion of Mīrzā Hakīm, when Akbar, already exhausted with the task of suppressing the Uzbek revolt, was away in the Punjab, the Mīrzās, true to their tradition, raised the standard of revolt, and marched plundering through the country at the head of a hastily collected swarm of disaffected persons and partisans and even threatened Delhi whose gates were closed by Tātār Khān. Mun'im Khān marched from Āgra, captured Muhammad Sultān Mīrzā whom he imprisoned at Bayāna and compelled the other Mīrzās to retire to Mālwa. There their designs were favoured by independent Rājput chiefs and they were able to take some important towns and districts including Ujjain. After the final suppression of the Uzbek revolt, Akbar left Āgra on 31 August, 1567, for Dholpur and Gwālior and on reaching Gāgraun on the Mālwa frontier sent Shihāb-ud-dīn Ahmad Khān to deal with the troublesome Mīrzās. Shihāb-ud-dīn marched on Ujjain and the Mīrzās fled to Māndū and from there they took refuge with Chingīz Khān who was then supreme in Gujarāt.

In September, 1567, Akbar undertook one of the most famous military operations of his life, the siege and capture of Chitor. To the ruler of Northern India the importance of Rājasthān was great: through it lay the route to Gujarāt, the Narmadā valley and the Deccan and without the possession of its strong fortresses he could not feel himself secure. The key to Rājasthān was Mewār whose capital Chitor was the 'sanctuary of Rājput freedom'. Akbar had come into contact with the Rājputs as allies; he was now to meet the Rājputs in arms. The solemn vow of the rānās of Mewār, that they would not sully their blood by matrimonial alliance with any Muslim ruler nor diminish the honour of the house of Bāppā Rāwal by acknowledging his sovereignty, wounded the imperial pride of Akbar who found in the hospitality the rānā had extended to Bāz Bahādur and the assistance he had rendered to the rebellious Mīrzās in Mālwa his *casus belli*. The Rājput annals refer to an unsuccessful attempt before that of 1567 when Chitor was saved by 'the masculine courage' of its queen, but Muslim chronicles are absolutely silent on it.

Legend and history are equally eloquent in praising the grandeur and strength of the historic fortress of Chitor, the handiwork of both art and nature, which stands on a long narrow hill, lying almost exactly north and south and about 500 feet above the surrounding plain. Its length is about three miles and a quarter and its greatest breadth, half a mile.<sup>20a</sup> In the time of Akbar the city was on the hill within the fort. On 23 October, 1567, Akbar pitched his camp before Chitor.<sup>21</sup> On the approach of the Mughul army rānā Uday Singh, the unworthy son of a worthy father who had fought gloriously against the emperor's grandfather, abandoned the capital and took refuge in the defiles of the Arāvallī hills. But this did not facilitate the capture of the fortress in which there was a strong garrison commanded by Jai Mal of Bednor who had bravely resisted Sharaf-ud-dīn Husain in Merta. A month elapsed before the fort was completely invested and the three batteries constructed. Akbar made many unsuccessful attempts to take it by direct assault which caused heavy loss of 200 men a day and he decided to proceed by means of mines and *sābāts* (covered ways) which were completed at enormous cost, more than a hundred men being killed daily. On 17 December two mines were fired and, as one exploded, the Mughuls rushed into the breach when suddenly the second exploded and killed 200 of them, half of them being officers, while the garrison, which lost only 40, easily repaired the breach. Akbar realized that success required greater caution, planning and perseverance and the siege was protracted. On the night

of 22-23 February, 1568, a general attack was made on the fort from all sides and several breaches were made. In the early hours of 23 February, Akbar observed at the breach a man of commanding presence, armed in mail, directing the restoration and defence of the works. He immediately fired at him with his favourite gun *sangrām* and the Rājput fell shot through the forehead. Not until the next morning did Akbar come to know that he had brought down the 'lion of Chitor'. The Rājputs immediately withdrew from the ramparts and the fire that broke out in several places within the fort during the night was rightly explained by Rājā Bhagwān Dās as the *jauhar*, 'the last awful sacrifice which Rājput despair offers to honour and the gods.'

The mantle of Jai Mal now fell on the young and gallant Patta of Kailwa, but with his fall Chitor also fell. Early in the morning Akbar entered the fortress in triumph and ordered a general massacre 'which ceased only for lack of victims' in the afternoon, for each bazaar, each street and each house was a fortress and centre of resistance. Thirty thousand were slain; among them was the gallant Patta who fell after he had displayed 'prodigies of valour.' One thousand musketeers from Kālpī managed to escape, to the utter indignation of Akbar, by a stratagem, passing themselves off as Akbar's troops. To expiate 'the sin of the slaughter of Chitor' Akbar honoured the memory of his vanquished adversaries by erecting the statues of Jai Mal and Patta mounted on elephants which he placed at the gate of Āgra fort.

Akbar made over the government of Mewār to Āsaf Khān, left Chitor on 28 February and after a pilgrimage to Ajmer returned to Āgra on 13 April. An expedition sent to besiege the fortress of Ranthambhor was recalled in order to deal with the Mīrzās who, forced to leave Gujarāt on account of disagreement with Chingīz Khān, invaded Mālwa and besieged Ujjain. The advance of the Mughul troops under Ashraf Khān forced the Mīrzās to retreat to Māndū and they were pursued across the Narmadā. They then escaped again to Gujarāt where the assassination of Chingīz Khān and the consequent confusion in the country opened to them fresh prospects for their ambitions.

Akbar now took important steps to improve the administration (September, 1568). The *Atga-Khail* ('foster-father cohort') held extensive fiefs in the Punjab and their leader Khān Kalān was governor of the province. Akbar broke up the confederacy by dispersing them. The government of the Punjab was made over to Husain Qulī Khān who was transferred from Nāgaur. Khān Kalān

was sent to Sambhal, his younger brother Qutb-ud-dīn Muhammad Khān to Mālwa, and Kanauj was assigned to another brother Sharīf Khān. Mīrzā 'Azīz Kūka, the son of Khān Kalān, was allowed to retain his assignment of Dīpālpur in the Punjab. These measures he adopted with a view to preventing the gathering of relations and prolonged service of officers at the same place. Shihāb-ud-dīn Ahmad Khān was called from Mālwa and placed in charge of the reserved lands as Muzaffar Khān, the revenue minister, was overworked. Shihāb-ud-dīn abolished the annual assessment of land revenue, which was expensive and led to corruption, and established group-assessment (*Nasaq*) of a village or a *parganā* as a whole.<sup>22</sup>

Towards the end of the year, Akbar was able to send an expedition for the conquest of Ranthambhor, the great stronghold in Rājasthān, which had been invested as early as 1558 but the siege had to be raised on account of the imbroglio with Bairam Khān. On 8 February, 1569, Akbar pitched his tent before the fort which was held by Rāi Surjan Hāra, chief of Būndī, as a vassal of the rānā of Chitor. The fortress, which was remarkable for its height and strength, was also well-provisioned. Akbar opened the siege with *sābāts* (covered ways) and fifteen huge mortars were dragged to the hill Ran which commands the fortress. There is a discrepancy between the version given in the Muslim chronicles and that in the Rājput annals. According to the former, Akbar's mortars caused breaches in the walls of the fort and destruction of the houses within it. Rāi Surjan took a lesson from the fate of Chitor, sent his two sons to Akbar asking his pardon and surrendered the fort on 21 March, 1569. Abu-'l-Fazl boasts that Akbar conquered the fort in a month whereas 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī had taken one year. According to the Rājput version, as the garrison did not show any sign of surrender Rājā Bhagwān Dās and Mān Singh seduced Surjan to transfer his allegiance to the Mughul emperor and Mān Singh, accompanied by Akbar in the guise of a mace-bearer, secured access to the fortress to discuss the matter. Akbar was, however, recognized and terms were negotiated in his presence and Surjan agreed to surrender the fort on conditions which were favourable to him: Surjan was to join Akbar's service and be placed in charge of fifty-two districts; the chiefs of Būndī were to be exempted from the duty of sending a bride to the royal harem and payment of the *jizya*; they should have the privilege of entering the hall of audience fully armed and were to be exempted from prostration (*sijda*); their temples should be respected; their horses should not be branded; they should not be required to cross the Indus and should be

placed under the command of a Hindu leader; and Būndī should remain their permanent capital. In the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible either to reject or to accept the Rājput version definitely. It does not, however, appear improbable as it was not unlike Akbar, who had no scruple to employ diplomacy where his sword was not enough. Rāi Surjan was at first given a command in Gondwāna and then appointed governor of Banāras, including Chunār, with the rank of a commander of 2,000. Akbar made over the fort of Ranthambhor to Mihtar Khān and returned to Āgra on 10 May, 1569, after making his annual pilgrimage to Ajmer.

During his march on Ranthambhor, Akbar had ordered Majnūn Khān Qāqshāl to capture the fortress of Kālinjar, the stronghold which had cost the life of Sher Shāh and was then held by Rājā Rām Chand Bāghela of Rewah who had already been reduced to obedience by Āsaf Khān, the conqueror of Gondwāna and had demonstrated it by surrendering his minstrel Tānsen to the emperor. The fort was invested but the rājā, taking lessons from the devastated battlements of Chitor and the fall of Ranthambhor, surrendered it without offering any serious resistance (August, 1569). Akbar granted him a *jāgīr* near Allāhabād and placed Majnūn Khān Qāqshāl in charge of the government of Kālinjar.

After the fall of the strong Rājput fortresses, Jodhpur and Bikāner judged it expedient to make submission. In November, 1570, while the emperor was encamped at Nāgaur, Chandra Sen, son of Rājā Māl Dev of Jodhpur and Kalyān Mal, rājā of Bikāner, with his son Rāi Singh paid homage to the emperor who received in marriage the niece of the rājā of Jodhpur. Rāwal Har Rāi of Jaisalmer also entered into matrimonial alliance with the Mughul emperor by offering him the hand of his daughter. Partly by his sword, partly by the threat of his mailed fist as well as magnanimous diplomacy, Akbar was able to establish his supremacy over the Rājputs who gradually reconciled themselves to Mughul rule and found in their conqueror a beneficent protector under whose banner they fought the battles of the empire from the glaciers of the Hindu Kush to the marshes of Bengal. The ruthless victor of Chitor succeeded in healing the wounds which his soaring ambition had inflicted. Rājasthān was indeed Akbar's testing ground for exhibition of his mastery in arms, diplomacy and statesmanship.

In spite of these brilliant successes, Akbar had no peace of mind as he was still denied the blessing of a son, several children born to him having died in their infancy. He prayed fervently at the shrines of Ajmer and Delhi for an heir to his throne. He now

approached the venerable Shaikh Salīm Chishtī who lived at Sīkrī, 23 miles to the west of Āgra, and was assured by him of the early fulfilment of his prayers. Early in 1569 the daughter of Rājā Bihārī Mal was found to be with child and she was sent to the Shaikh's hermitage at Sīkrī where, on 30 August, she gave birth to a son who was named Salīm in honour of the saint. In the course of a few years the royal nursery was enriched by new arrivals in succession: in November, a daughter was born to him and on 7 June, 1570, Prince Murād saw the light. Two years after, on 10 September, 1572, was born a third son at Ajmer in the house of Shaikh Dāniyāl whom he named after the saint. Two daughters also were born after Dāniyāl. These three sons of Akbar all attained mature age.

In pursuance of a vow, Akbar set out on foot on pilgrimage to Ajmer to offer thanks for the birth of Salīm (20 January, 1570). From Ajmer he returned to Delhi where he inspected the splendid mausoleum of his father which had been recently built, thanks to the affectionate fidelity of a wife, Hājī Begam. In September he set out again on pilgrimage to Ajmer where he repaired and enlarged the fortifications and began construction of buildings for himself and his nobles. On 3 November he left for Nāgaur<sup>22a</sup> where he stayed a few months and received the homage of the Rājput States of Jodhpur, Bikāner and Jaisalmer as well as that discrowned fugitive Bāz Bahādur of Mālwa. From Nāgaur he arrived at Pāk Pattan in the Punjab to visit the shrine of Shaikh Farīd Shakarganj (March, 1571). From there he returned to Ajmer by way of Hissar and on 9 August, 1571, arrived at Sīkrī which he now decided to make his capital as the auspicious place where his two sons Salīm and Murād had been born. The resources of his expanding empire and the artistic genius of India and Persia were employed to convert the petty, quiet hamlet into the crowded proud metropolis which even in its lost glory was regarded by Fitch in 1585 as much greater than Elizabethan London. From the time when it was built until 1585 when it was abandoned, Sīkrī, which was named Fathpur after the conquest of Gujarāt, remained the capital of Akbar's empire.

Akbar had become supreme in Northern India and he could now turn to extending his dominion to the sea in the west as well as in the east. The conquest of Mālwa and the supremacy over Rājasthān opened the road to Gujarāt whose anarchical condition invited foreign invasion. Muzaffar Shāh III, the nominal king, was a mere puppet in the hands of ambitious and unscrupulous nobles who partitioned the kingdom among themselves and were often at war with one another. One of these, I'timād Khān, who

had already sought Akbar's help and intervention in 1567 against his rival Chingīz Khān, invited him in 1572, hard-pressed by Sher Khān Fulādī whom Muzaffar Shāh joined at Ahmadābād, to put an end to the anarchy in Gujarāt by annexing it to the Mughul empire. But Akbar had more than one reason for his invasion of the kingdom. Gujarāt had been in temporary Mughul occupation under Humāyūn and its recovery would be quite legitimate for his successor. The rebellious Mīrzās, who had returned to Gujarāt after the assassination of Chingīz Khān, entered upon his inheritance by defeating his son and made themselves masters of the southern portion of the kingdom. It was high time for Akbar to suppress these incorrigible rebels and strike at their power before they should usurp the whole kingdom. Besides, Gujarāt lay on the road to Mecca and Medina, and in the interest of the pilgrim traffic its security was essential. It intervened between the Portuguese territory and the Mughul empire and its weakness might as well offer an opportune soil for the aggression of the Portuguese who were already masters of the western coast of India and the Arabian Sea. With its fertile soil, flourishing ports and extensive foreign trade, the rich kingdom of Gujarāt could not but attract the ambitious sovereign, who could secure through its ports a window for his land-locked empire.

On 2 July, 1572, Akbar set out from Fathpur Sikrī for Ajmer from where he sent Khān Kalān with 10,000 horse as an advance guard and himself followed by leisurely marches. Through Nāgaur and Merta he marched to Sirohī where he made a charge on the Rājputs as one of them had made a murderous attack on Khān Kalān, and in the fight that ensued 150 of them were slain. He then left for Pātan, after sending Rājā Mān Singh towards Īdar in pursuit of the sons of Sher Khān Fulādī. On 7 November Akbar reached Pātan where he received the homage of the people. He then marched on towards Ahmadābād and on the way at Jotāna, two stages from Pātan, he received the fugitive Muzaffar Shāh who had left Sher Khān Fulādī as the latter had, on the approach of Akbar, raised the siege of Ahmadābād and fled to Saurāshtra. Shortly after, I'timād Khān and other noblemen came to pay him homage. On 20 November, Akbar reached the capital of Gujarāt and he made over the government of the country to the north-west of the river Māhī to Khān A'zam and of the southern portion, where the turbulent Mīrzās had established themselves, to I'timād Khān.

On 8 December Akbar left Ahmadābād for the wealthy port of Cambay where he had the first sight of the sea and came into contact with the merchants of Portugal, Turkey, Sýria, Persia and

Transoxiana. Akbar then turned his direction towards the Mīrzās: Ibrāhīm Husain who held Barodā; Muhammad Husain, Surat; and Shāh Mīrzā, Chāmpāner. On reaching Barodā Akbar despatched an army under Shāhbāz Khān towards Chāmpāner and a large force under Sayyid Mahmūd Khān Bārha towards Surat. He rapidly marched towards the Māhī to intercept Ibrāhīm Husain who was moving towards the north and contacted the enemy who was at Sarnal on the opposite bank. At heavy risk and with a following of 200 men only, he crossed the river at night and as he entered the town Ibrāhīm Husain, who had 1,000 troopers, left it by another gate. Akbar made an intrepid pursuit of the enemy and the battle that ensued was fought 'man to man, hand to hand' and 'more resembled a tourney than a battle.' At one stage Akbar's life was in imminent danger when he was directly attacked by two of the enemy's troopers. Ibrāhīm Husain Mīrzā was ultimately defeated and escaped under cover of darkness.

Akbar next undertook the investment of Surat. Ibrāhīm Husain's wife, with her young son Muzaffar Husain, escaped to the Deccan and the commandant of the fort surrendered it after a resistance of one month and a half on 26 February, 1573. Akbar again came into contact with the Portuguese, who had come in response to an invitation of the Mīrzās but, finding them a spent force, paid a friendly visit to the emperor.

Meanwhile Muhammad Husain Mīrzā and Shāh Mīrzā, in combination with Sher Khān Fulādī, laid siege to Pātan. Khān A'zam, joined by the fief-holders of Mālwa and Chanderī, marched to the relief of Sayyid Ahmad Bārha, the Mughul commandant, and forced the rebels to raise the siege and inflicted on them a major defeat on 22 January, 1573. Sher Khān fled to Junāgarh and the Mīrzās, to the Deccan.

On 2 April Akbar returned to Ahmadābād. He made over the government of the whole of Gujarāt to Khān A'zam and that of Mālwa to Muzaffar Khān Turbatī and proceeded towards his capital. On the way at Sirohī he received the report of the death of that arch-rebel Ibrāhīm Husain, who after leaving Gujarāt had been creating trouble in the Punjab and was defeated by the Mughul governor Husain Qulī Khān. Husain Qulī was then engaged in the siege of Nagarkot but he had hastened to oppose Ibrāhīm after making a favourable peace with its rājā, Bidai Chand, on condition of acknowledgement of Akbar's sovereignty. On 3 June Akbar returned to Fathpur Sikrī and found the head of Ibrāhīm Husain.<sup>22b</sup> His brother Mas'ūd, with his eyes sown up, was brought as a captive to the emperor who however pardoned him.

Hardly three months had elapsed before Gujarāt was again aflame and Mughul authority was challenged by a confederacy of rebels. Muhammad Husain Mīrzā, who had returned from the Deccan soon after Akbar's departure, invaded Surat and captured Broach and Cambay. Ikhtiyār-ul-Mulk and the sons of Sher Khān Fulādī, in conjunction with the rājā of Īdar, took Ahmadnagar. The rebels jointly advanced on Ahmadābād and besieged Khān A'zam. On receipt of this disconcerting news Akbar left Fathpur Sīkrī on 23 August with an army of 3,000 and, marching by way of Ajmer and Merta with lightning speed, reached the vicinity of Ahmadābād on 2 September, thus covering a distance of about 500 miles in eleven days which caravans took two months to complete. The enemy was taken by absolute surprise and Muhammad Husain was reluctant to believe the report of the arrival of Akbar whom his scouts had left at Fathpur Sīkrī just two weeks back. The amazed Mīrzā sent Ikhtiyār-ul-Mulk with a force of 5,000 horse to prevent Khān A'zam from sallying out of Ahmadābād and himself drew out his forces for battle. The battle remained long undecided but ultimately Akbar gained a complete victory over the enemy who had 15,000 men. Muhammad Husain was wounded and captured and shortly after put to death. The Mughuls, who were resting after the victory and expecting Khān A'zam, were surprised by the sudden arrival of a new foe, Ikhtiyār-ul-Mulk, who hastened to the Mīrzā's aid. Akbar, in spite of great consternation in his army, attacked the enemy, routed his vanguard and forced him to retreat. Ikhtiyār-ul-Mulk lost battle as well as life. A minaret was made of 1,000 heads of the slain. In the evening the Mughuls had a second surprise when a fresh army was observed proceeding towards them: it however proved to be the force of Khān A'zam who now joined the emperor. Akbar then made his triumphant entry into Gujarāt's capital and turned his direction to the final settlement of Gujarāt affairs. An army was sent to Broach and Chāmpāner in pursuit of Shāh Mīrzā who now disappears from history. Rājā Todar Mal was appointed to restore order in the financial administration of the province by revising the revenue settlement. Akbar returned to Fathpur Sīkrī on 5 October, 1573, after an absence of only 43 days. The second campaign of Gujarāt is the most amazing military achievement of Akbar's life.

With the expansion of his kingdom Akbar realized the necessity for its consolidation. The year 1573 saw the inauguration of far-reaching reforms in the administration of the empire by the introduction of the branding system (*dāgh*), the conversion of the assignments (*jāgīrs*) into reserved lands (*khālisa*)<sup>23</sup> and fixing the

rank (*manṣab*) and gradation of pay of the officers of the State. First introduced by 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī and revised by Sher Shāh, the branding of horses in every officer's due contingent was aimed at stopping the fraud of false musters when baggage ponies hired or borrowed would be produced, an evil from which the Mughul army suffered even in its most palmy days; and the system continued till the breakdown of the Mughul government in the middle of the eighteenth century. The institution of the *manṣab* system led to the establishment of a well-regulated bureaucracy which with certain modifications remained the basis of Mughul administration. All officers were placed in ranks ranging from the commander of 10 up to 5,000 horsemen with the exception of princes and a few nobles who were given commands of 7,000. The other measure of Akbar, the conversion of the assignments into reserved lands, was of a revolutionary nature. Akbar wanted to bring the whole of his kingdom under his direct administration and pay all his officers in cash with a view to removing the evils arising from the assignment system. In the absence of a correct valuation of the empire, the assignment system proved defective in its working: the two valuations made early in his reign were 'corruptly falsified'; over-valuation of the assignments led to discontent in State service. The whole empire was divided into circles, each estimated to yield a crore of *dām* (Rs. 250,000). The experiment lasted for five years and in 1579/80 a new and precise valuation of the empire was made and the assignment system was revived. Akbar's policy of absolute centralization received a check.

The Sūrs, who held Bengal at Akbar's accession, maintained friendly relations with him, but in 1564 Tāj Khān Kararānī, an officer of Sher Shāh, overthrew them. Under his brother Sulaimān (1565-72) there was a revival of the Bengal sultānate and his authority extended from Cooch Behār to Purī and from the Son to the Brahmaputra. Sulaimān was shrewd enough to acknowledge Akbar's sovereignty by reading the *khutba* in his name. After Sulaimān's death in 1572 his elder son Bāyazīd succeeded him but after a few months he was put to death by the Afghān nobles who raised Sulaimān's younger son Dāūd to the throne.

Inheriting his father's vast treasures and grand army, Dāūd defied Akbar's authority by reading the *khutba* in his own name, invading Mughul territory and destroying the fort of Zamāniyā in Ghāzīpur district. On instruction from Akbar, then in Gujarāt, Mun'im Khān marched on Patna, but Dāūd's Minister Lūdī Khān bought him off with gifts and delusive assurances of loyalty. Akbar disapproved Mun'im's conduct and sent further reinforcement.

Mun'im Khān now besieged Patna where Dāūd, after murdering Lūdī Khān, had shut himself up. As the aged Khān Khānān experienced difficulties, Akbar set out on 20 June, 1574, from Āgra by boat while the army marched by land and on 4 August arrived at Patna with a large flotilla carrying elephants and guns.

Akbar quickly perceived that the strength of Patna lay on Hājīpur on the north bank of the Gaṅgā (Ganges) from where it drew its supplies. On 7 August he took it after a few hours' assault. In the fall of Hājīpur, Patna read its doom. That very night Dāūd fled and Patna also fell into the hands of the Mughuls. Akbar pursued the fugitive Afghāns upto Daryāpur<sup>23a</sup> and then returned with much booty in treasures and 265 elephants. He proceeded towards Delhi and sent Mun'im Khān with 20,000 men to conduct the campaign. Sūrajgarh, Monghyr, Bhāgalpur and Colgong (Kahalgām) fell in quick succession and Mun'im Khān marched triumphantly through the fortified pass of Teliyāgarhī into Dāūd's capital Tāndā (25 September).

Dāūd fled to Orissa and Mughul authority was easily established in Ghorāghāt (Dinājpur-Bogrā), Sātgaon (Hooghly) and Burdwan. The Mughul soldiers, weary of incessant campaigns, were reluctant to proceed further but Todar Mal persuaded them to march on and their reluctant commandant in Tāndā, now in senile decay, to join them and make a decisive end of the war. Dāūd, encouraged by the dissensions and apathy in the Mughul camp, was also proceeding to meet the invaders. They met at Tukaroi, nine miles south-east of Dāntan, in Midnapur district. Dāūd began the battle (3 March, 1575) with a vigorous offensive: a furious elephantry charge. The Mughul van was dispersed, Khān 'Ālam was killed, the centre was broken and Mun'im Khān was wounded. Todar Mal, who alone held the Mughul left wing, rallied the shaken divisions and made a successful charge on the Afghān vanguard. He then dispersed the Afghān right wing and the left wing also was ultimately defeated. Dāūd could not maintain his position and fled to Cuttack. The Afghāns suffered a complete rout. On 12 April Dāūd made his submission to Mun'im Khān at Cuttack and delivered his nephew as a hostage at the Mughul court, and he was given a considerable portion of Orissa in fief. The victory of Tukaroi, however, led to the *de jure* annexation of Bengal to the Mughul empire, though the effective establishment of Mughul authority was still far off.

Mun'im Khān hurried to the north to recover Ghorāghāt which had been occupied by the Afghāns during his absence. He transferred his capital from marshy Tāndā to pestilential Gaur where the

Mughuls died in hundreds until Mun'im Khān returned to Tāndā just to die (23 October, 1575). In utter indiscipline, born of terror, the Mughul officers and troops evacuated Bengal and retreated to Bhāgalpur. Dāūd issued from his retreat, took Bhadrakh and Jaleswar and recovered the whole of Bengal. Akbar sent Khān Jahān, governor of the Punjab, with Todar Mal as his lieutenant, to deal with the situation. The Bengal officers were, with great tact, persuaded by Todar Mal to rally under the Shiah governor. Junaid Kararānī, Dāūd's cousin, had raised his head in South-East Bihār, and 'Īsā Khān was supreme in Bengal. It was with difficulty that Muzaffar Khān, governor of Bihār, held Hājīpur. Khān Jahān, however, advanced and captured Teliyāgarhī from Dāūd's commandant. Dāūd was forced to retire into the fortress of Rājmahal. Here Khān Jahān, reinforced by the army of Bihār, gave battle on 12 July, 1576. After a stubborn and long-wavering fight, the Afghāns were completely routed and their leaders slain. Dāūd's veteran general Kālā Pāhār fled wounded and Dāūd himself was taken prisoner and executed. His head was received by Akbar one stage from Fathpur Sīkrī as he was proceeding to Bengal to deal with the situation personally. The battle of Rājmahal overthrew Dāūd and the Kararānī dynasty but it did not result in the effective Mughul conquest of Bengal. Mughul authority was established in towns but the country at large remained at the mercy of the dispossessed Afghāns and local Hindu chiefs. Bengal remained under Akbar rather as a territory under military occupation than an integral part of the empire with settled administration.

Before the fall of Dāūd at Rājmahal, Akbar had to face his indomitable foe in Rājasthān. Chandra Sen, son of Rājā Māl Dev of Jodhpur, had taken up arms in March, 1574 and not until 1576, two years later, could the Mughuls bring about the capitulation of Siwāna, the fulcrum of his resistance. But it was Rānā Pratāp Singh of Mewār, the chivalrous grandson of Rānā Sangrām Singh, who voiced the discontent of sullen Rājasthān. 'Race feeling taught him to hate the foreigners, ancestral pride to despise them and high martial spirit, his grandsire's legacy, to resist them.' Succeeding his father in 1572, he disciplined his troops in the art of guerilla warfare and was master of Udaipur, his new Chitor, Kumbhalgarh (Kumalgarh) and Gogunda. Akbar needed no *casus belli*: to the emperor liberty is license, as Bryce has well expressed. In April, 1576, he sent from Ajmer Rājā Mān Singh and Ghiyās-ud-dīn 'Alī, known as Āsaf Khān, against the Rānā. They marched through Mandalgarh towards Gogunda, but were opposed by Rānā Pratāp at Haldīghāt. Here, near the pass, the memorable battle was fought on 21 June.

We have a graphic account of the battle from the historian Badāūnī who was present in the field.

Pratāp Singh advanced with a force of three thousand horse which he arranged in two divisions. One of these, under Hakīm Khān Sūr, charged the Mughul vanguard and dispersed it and put the Rājputs in the Mughul left wing under Rāi Lon Karan to flight. Badāūnī who could not distinguish the friendly from the enemy Rājputs shot arrows indiscriminately for, as Āsaf Khān remarked, 'on whichever side they may be killed, it will be a gain to Islām.' The second Rājput division, led by the Rānā himself, charged Qāzī Khān at the entrance of the pass and threw his force into confusion. The battle raged from early morning till midday, but the desperate valour of the Rājputs was ultimately unavailing against a superior force 'with a numerous field artillery and a dromedary corps mounting swivels.'<sup>23b</sup> Pratāp lost the battle with a considerable loss. Gogunda fell into the Mughul hands.

Akbar regretted the escape of the Rānā and even suspected loyal Mān Singh of connivance. He was, however, able to establish effective Mughul authority in the southern part of Rājasthān. Sirohī was occupied, the principality of Īdar was reduced to obedience and Akbar received the submission of several minor chiefs: the rulers of Bānswārā and Dūngarpur, the latter offering the emperor the hand of his daughter. In 1577 the chief of Būndī was subdued and next year Madhukar, the Bundelā chief of Orchha, who had been defying the imperial authority, surrendered and acknowledged Akbar's sovereignty.

Akbar was determined to overthrow the Rānā of Mewār. In October, 1578, a considerable force under Shāhbāz Khān was despatched against Pratāp Singh. The Mughuls seized Kelwāra, defeated the Rājput garrison at Kumbhalgarh and captured Gogunda and Udaipur. The Rānā retired to the remote fastness of Chavand and from that base began to recover his territories. Kumbhalgarh was recovered and the chiefs of Bānswārā and Dūngarpur acknowledged the Rānā's sovereignty. Shāhbāz Khān made a renewed attempt at suppressing the Rānā who retired to the hills, but the Mughuls returned unsuccessful. Six years later another expedition was sent by Akbar under Zafar Beg and Jagannātha, the Kāchhwāhāh, which met with the same fate. Akbar's preoccupation in the Punjab, the troubles in the north-west frontier and the bogey of Uzbek invasion prevented the emperor from undertaking active campaign against an enemy who harassed and exhausted the invaders by guerilla tactics. Before his death in 1597 the Rānā had recovered all his

territory except Ajmer, Chitor and Mandalgarh. In 1600 Akbar made another attempt against Mewār when the expedition led by Prince Salīm and Rājā Mān Singh defeated Pratāp's successor, Amar Singh, and devastated the country; but the expedition came to an abrupt end due to the recall of Mān Singh whose services were urgently required in Bengal.

In 1577 Gujarāt became the scene of a revolt led by Mihr 'Alī, an ambitious servant of Ibrāhīm Husain Mīrzā, who set up his youthful son Mīrzā Muzaffar Husain as the puppet king of the country. The rebels took Barodā and the governor Vazīr Khān was unable to resist them. Todar Mal drove the rebels to Cambay and defeated them at Dholka and the Mīrzā retired to Junāgarh. But as soon as the Rājā left, Muzaffar Husain returned, defeated Wazīr Khān at Sarnāl and besieged him at Ahmadābād. But Mihr 'Ali was killed by a stray bullet and so the Mīrzā raised the siege and withdrew. He fell into the hands of Rājā 'Alī Khān of Khāndesh who ultimately surrendered him to Akbar's envoy. Akbar replaced the weak and inefficient Vazīr Khān by Shihāb-ud-dīn Ahmad Khān in the government of Gujarāt.

The same year Akbar undertook an important reform: the reorganization of the mints. The various provincial mints were placed under the management of high officials and the famous artist and calligrapher 'Abdus-Samad was appointed Master of the Mint to exercise general supervision over the department.

### III. RELIGIOUS POLICY

By the year 1578 Akbar's religious belief had ceased to be a mere personal affair. No aspect of Akbar's character and history has been the subject of so much interest and controversy as his faith and religious policy. The influence of heredity upon the development of Akbar's religious ideas should not be unduly exaggerated: there was wide difference between the indifferentism of his early Central Asian ancestors, the unorthodoxy of his grandfather, the superstitious mysticism of his father and the rational eclecticism and dreamy mysticism of the great Akbar. A mystic as well as a rationalist, Akbar was sincerely religious and an earnest seeker after truth. From early youth he was fond of the society of *faqīrs* and *yogīs*. From 1562 for long eighteen years he made annual pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaikh Mu'īn-ud-dīn Chishtī at Ajmer. He had early come into contact with Sūfī literature and thoughts: Hāfiz and Rūmī were read to him and he maintained this contact in advanced years.

Behind the conqueror and the diplomat there lay a melancholy soul, suffering from 'internal bitterness' and 'lack of spiritual provision', yearning for truth. The Jesuit Fathers found him melancholic. In his 'Happy Sayings' Akbar tells us how one night his heart was weary of the burden of life, when suddenly between sleeping and waking a strange vision appeared to him and his spirit was somewhat comforted. Such visions came to him from time to time. According to Abu-'l-Fazl, as early as 1557, when Akbar was barely fifteen, during the siege of Mānkot he had experienced religious ecstasy when suddenly he broke away from the camp into a distance where he spent many hours in solitary meditation.<sup>23c</sup> Seventeen years later as he would often listen to Mīr Sharīf reading books on spiritual lore, tears would roll down his eyes. Badāūnī tells us that he passed whole nights in praise of God and 'would sit many a morning alone in prayer and meditation on a large flat stone in a lonely spot'. In his eager search for truth, Akbar imbibed a passionate love for philosophical discussions and only the pressure of duties forced him to abstain from them and 'return from the errancy into the infinite'. In the liberal Shaikh Mubārak and his two sons, particularly Abu-'l-Fazl, 'the king's Jonathan', as the Jesuits call him, Akbar found his true spiritual companions. Abu-'l-Fazl, who according to Badāūnī 'set the world in flames', was a true eclectic whose heart was equally drawn towards the sages of Cathay, the ascetics of Mount Lebanon, the Lamas of Tibet, the *padres* of Portugal, the *mūbids* (Zoroastrian theologians) of Persia and the secrets of the Zend Avesta.

All these led to the foundation in 1575 of the '*Ibādat-Khāna* (House of Worship) at Fathpur Sīkrī where religious discussions were held every Friday evening. It was confined to Muslims and was divided into four sections, occupied by four classes of members: the nobles of the court, Shaikhs or ascetics, Sayyids or descendants of the Prophet, and the '*Ulamā* or jurists. The violent intolerance of the orthodox party led by Shaikh 'Abdun-Nabī and Makhdūm-ul-Mulk and bitter differences between the Sunnīs and Shīahs disgusted the emperor and alienated him from orthodox Islām. Of course he showed his interest in pilgrimage by arranging Gulbadan Begam's journey to Mecca (1575) and next year he himself intended to proceed on pilgrimage. But Akbar was passing through a mental crisis, and 'the internal bitterness', which is referred to in one of his 'Happy Sayings' as having been experienced in his twentieth year, he was in all probability experiencing in the twentieth year of his reign. In January, 1578, he expressed his abhorrence of meat diet<sup>23d</sup> and in April at Bhera, on the bank of the Jhelum, occurred the famous hunting incident: when after ten days' preparation birds and

beasts within a circumference of fifty miles had been encircled for 'monstrous slaughter', Akbar all on a sudden broke the hunt and set free all animals: 'not the feather of a finch was to be touched.' 'A strong frenzy' seized him and he distributed alms and gold to *faqīrs*. A garden was laid and a structure raised to commemorate the hallowed spot where, sitting under a tree, he had experienced the call.

In October, 1578, discussions in the *'Ibādat-Khāna* were revived with renewed vigour and the House of Worship had become a Parliament of religions where the Sūfī, the philosopher, the orator, the jurist, the Sunnī and the Shiah, the Brāhman and the atheist (*Chārvāka*), the Jain and the Buddhist, the Christian and the Jew, the Sabaeen and the Zoroastrian and others met and debated under the presidency of the Mughul Caesar. The bitter differences among the *'Ulamā* in these debates, which revealed their shallow pride as well as the narrowness of orthodox Islām, further weakened his faith in it and he decided to take all religious matters in Islām into his own hands. The series of brilliant military successes had given him mastery over a considerable portion of Northern India and he had already adopted measures for its consolidation by the establishment of a centralized government. The time had arrived when the king as the secular head of the State should be the head in spiritual matters as well. The exalted conception of sovereignty that he held necessitated it, and the Tīmūrid tradition pointed to it. On Friday, 26 June, 1579, emulating the Caliphs and his illustrious ancestor Tīmūr, Akbar mounted the pulpit of the mosque at Fathpur Sikrī and recited the *khutba* composed by Faizī in verse which ended with the words: *Allahu Akbar*. Some modern authors believe with Badāūnī that Akbar made ambiguous use of these words to mean both God is great as well as Akbar is God. But Akbar was no Mansūr-al-Hallāj for whom he had little respect. Like several Muslim rulers before him, Akbar claimed that he was the agent of God, Khalīfatu'l-lāh; he never laid claim to divinity.<sup>23e</sup>

On 2 September, 1579, Akbar took the final step when he became the *Imām* and the *Mujtahid* of the age by the famous *Mahzar* (Declaration) which he obtained from the *'Ulamā*. It determined the rank of just king as higher than that of *mujtahid* (highest authority on law) and declared that Akbar as the just ruler (*sultān-i-ādil*) could decide between *mujtahids*, if they differed in opinion on any religious question, by accepting any of the conflicting views and that his decision was final and binding. Also it empowered him to issue new orders which the people must obey, provided they were in conformity with the Qur'ān and were for the benefit of the people. This document was drafted by Shaikh Mubārak and sign-

ed reluctantly, according to Badāūnī, by five others, the principal 'Ulamā and prominent theologians of Hindusthān. It made Akbar, who was the temporal head of the State, the Supreme Head of the Church or more properly the Islāmic faith in India as well. The *mahzar* was really 'the funeral oration of the 'Ulamā' as it overthrew the nimbus of their legal and spiritual power. It was the natural corollary to Akbar's ideal of royal absolutism. It led to the virtual assumption by Akbar of the title of the Caliph and is closely connected with the 'pulpit incident.' Some of his coins also bear the title of exalted Caliph and we are told by 'Ārif Qandahārī that in all the mosques of the Mughul empire the *khutba* mentioned him as *Amīr-ul-muminīn*. The decree had its significance in the outer Islāmic world as well. It was a vindication of Akbar's sovereign authority and a challenge to the Sultān-Caliph of Turkey, the juridical head of Islām in whose name the *khutba* was recited at Mecca and Medina. It was a reply to the Safavī Shāhs of Persia as well, who posed as the perpetual patrons of the Mughul dynasty because both Akbar's father and grandfather had sought and obtained Persian help on condition of accepting the Shiah faith. Akbar's authority was now superior to that of the *mujtahids*, the highest ecclesiastical and juridical authorities of the Shiah.<sup>24</sup> The decree, however, did not at all involve Akbar's repudiation of Islām: it was as a Muslim king that Akbar could decide between the conflicting views of the *mujtahids*. Neither was Akbar invested with infallibility. The scope of the decree was limited: the king should accept one of the conflicting views and any new order he might issue must be in conformity with the Qur'ān and for the benefit of the people.

There can be no doubt that the declaration displeased the 'Ulamā and orthodox Muslims. Soon after, Akbar made his last pilgrimage to Ajmer and he showed extraordinary reverence to a stone brought from Mecca, carrying an impression of the Prophet's foot. Akbar, however, had definitely become estranged from orthodox Islām. The creed of his birth could no longer satisfy his enquiring spirit; and contact as well as acquaintance with diverse creeds made him a confirmed eclectic. The influence of the Hindu wives of his household had been strengthened by the Brāhmans, particularly Debī and Purushottam, who participated in the debates of the 'Ibādat-Khāna and instructed the emperor in the secrets of Hinduism. Akbar was converted to belief in transmigration. He gave private interviews to several Hindu *yogīs* from whom he made enquiries about the secrets and spiritual questions regarding Hinduism.

Zoroastrianism found its able exponent at the *'Ibādat-Khāna* in its theologian Dastūr Māhyārjī Rānā whom Akbar had met in Gujarāt in 1573 and who arrived at the court in 1578. His influence was so great that it was believed Akbar had become a convert. A sacred fire was established in the palace. In 1580 Akbar began to prostrate himself publicly before the fire and the sun. In this the emperor was influenced also by Bīrbal, who gave emphasis to sun-worship, and by the Hindu ladies of his harem who performed *homa*. Persian festivals were revived and the solar *Ilāhī* era, with Persian names for months and days, was adopted in 1584.

In response to Akbar's invitation the first Jesuit mission from Goa arrived on 28 February, 1580, at Fathpur Sikrī,<sup>25</sup> and was received with gracious respect. It consisted of Father Rudolf Aquaviva, an Italian, Antony Monserrate, a Spaniard, and Francis Henriquez, a Persian convert who acted as the interpreter. Akbar showed profound reverence for a copy of the Bible which the Fathers presented and made respectful salutation to a picture of the Madonna. He appointed Abu-'l-Fazl to translate the Gospel and Monserrate to give Murād 'a few lessons in Christianity.' The emperor built for them a chapel in the palace and held prolonged discussions with them on Christianity. The Fathers took part in the discussions at the *'Ibādat-Khāna* where they used very strong words about Islām and its Prophet, so much so that Akbar had to give them mild warning. Akbar was highly impressed by Christianity, though he was not convinced of the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Virgin birth of the Son and the Incarnation. The Fathers hoped that they had discovered the Second Constantine in the Mughul Caesar, for in their zeal and bigotry they could not properly understand him and failed to notice the varied appeals to which he equally responded.

Akbar invited and in 1582 received a Jain delegation as well which consisted of Hīravijaya Sūri, Bhānuchandra Upādhyāya and Vijayasena Sūri. Jainism, with its doctrine of non-violence, made a profound impression on him and influenced his personal life. He curtailed his food and drink and ultimately abstained from flesh diet altogether for nine months in the year. He renounced hunting which was his favourite pastime, restricted the practice of fishing and released prisoners and caged birds. Slaughter of animals was prohibited on certain days and ultimately in 1587 for about half the days in the year.

Already Akbar had become acquainted with Sikhism and came into contact with its *Gurus*, Amar Dās (died 1574) and Rām Dās (died 1581). He found in the *Granth* only love and devotion to God.<sup>26</sup>

These studies and discussions on religions of various hues confirmed the growing eclecticism of the emperor who, as Badāūnī points out, found truth in all religions and realized that it was not the monopoly of Islām.<sup>27</sup> The idea gained ground among the people that 'Akbar was the *Sāhib-i-Zamān* who would remove all differences of opinion among the seventy-two sects of Islām and the Hindus.' The turbulence of schisms grieved him and he sought the way for its subsidence. He had so long strayed in the maze of jarring creeds and he would now find out the path. The zero hour had arrived in Akbar's spiritual evolution and early in 1582 he promulgated the *Dīn-i-Ilāhī*. It is difficult to define the Divine Faith, for its author did not define it. It was neither inspired by Revelation nor based on any well-defined philosophy or theology. It was deism modified by Hindu and predominant Zoroastrian influence, a religion without priests and books, 'an ethical rationalism leading to the ideal of mystic union of the soul with the divine,' in which respect it was based on the Sūfī idea of absorption of the soul in the Divine Being. It enjoined such ethical and social reforms as recommending alms-giving and sparing of animal life, permitting remarriage of widows, prohibiting child-marriage and marriage among close relations as well as forced *satī*, recommending monogamy, enforcing chastity and controlling gambling and drinking by restricting the sale of drink. The *Dīn-i-Ilāhī* was definitely an attempt at religious syncretism, as much a child of Akbar's spiritual development as a product of the age, following as it does the movement of Kabīr and Nānak. The syncretism was not quite happy because, though Akbar was 'a rare jeweller and seeker after truth,' his knowledge could neither be systematic nor thorough, acquired as it was through ears. He sought for light in the variegated and jarring creeds of man, but could not find it.

Though Akbar asserted what Gibbon calls 'a necessary fiction' that he was God's vicegerent and, if we are to believe Badāūnī, demanded from his followers 'readiness to sacrifice property and life, honour and religion', he was no zealot and regarded religion as a matter of private conscience. As the bigoted chronicler himself affirms: 'His Majesty was convinced that confidence in him as a leader was a matter of time and good counsel, and did not require the sword.' Unlike the 'Abbāsīd Caliph Ma'mūn, Akbar did not become intolerant in the name of toleration to push the child of his own fancy; he forced it on none and he did not persecute orthodox belief in a fever of authoritarian rationalism. The charge of persecution of Islām laid at his door by the bigoted annalist of Badāūn and the equally bigoted Jesuit Fathers is quite natural.

The fundamental of Akbar's religion, *sulh-i-kull* (universal toleration), was equally obnoxious to Sunnī orthodoxy and Jesuit Catholicism. The Fathers were anxious to prove that Akbar was about to embrace Christianity by describing him as an enemy and persecutor of Islām. Most of the charges made by Badāūnī do not stand the test of scientific criticism. From the Muslim chronicles as well as Jesuit accounts we find that throughout the reign of Akbar and even after the promulgation of the *Dīn-i-Ilāhī*, Muslims could pray, observe fasts and festivals, give the name of Ahmad and Muhammad to their children and go on pilgrimage to Mecca, though Badāūnī would have us believe to the contrary. In Islām politics and religion fuse, and the question naturally arises how far the destruction of mosques or their conversion into stables in certain places<sup>27a</sup> was a campaign against disintegration or an attack on Islām. The Bengal rebellion of 1580 which began with the slogan of Islām in danger suggests the former. It is certain that Akbar must have received the greatest opposition to his religious beliefs from the orthodox Muslims for 'in religious societies toleration is no virtue, it is the despised offspring of lukewarmness or indifference'. This affected to a certain extent the emperor's feeling towards them. In fact, Akbar, with his principle of universal toleration, was far in advance of his age. As the historian Freeman says: 'In his age he stood alone, not only in Islām, but in the whole world; Catholic and Protestant Christendom might both have gone and sat at his feet'.<sup>27b</sup> No wonder that the *Dīn-i-Ilāhī* could obtain hardly twenty-five converts of note and died with its author. The 'ethical rationalism' of Akbar, which was to have united all, pleased none; it was many centuries too soon. It appealed neither to the Hindus nor to the Muslims. Hinduism moved on in the old track while reactionary Islām, championed by Shaikh Ahmad, became triumphant with Shāh Jahān. It would, however, be rash to describe the *Dīn-i-Ilāhī* as 'a monument of Akbar's folly', because it was not a 'monument of his wisdom'. It was a failure; none-the-less it was sublime.

Some modern writers<sup>27c</sup> maintain that the *Dīn-i-Ilāhī* was not a new faith but a reformation of Islām. The Divine Faith ignored both the Prophet and the Qur'ān. Its ceremonial law and theological doctrines were considerably different from those of Islām. As an eminent authority has remarked: 'The religion of Akbar is not to be looked upon as a reform but a denial of Islām—a break with its traditions more decided than that which manifests itself in the doctrines of Isma'il'.<sup>28</sup> In one of his 'Happy Sayings' Akbar confesses that he is no longer a Muslim. He ignored revelation and

rejected the Islāmic doctrines of Resurrection and Judgment. He believed in the doctrine of transmigration of souls and in the worship of the sun which Islām does not admit. But in his letter to the Sharīfs of Mecca, written not long before 1582, and in his two letters written in 1586 to 'Abdullah Khān, ruler of Bukhārā, Akbar maintains that he is not only a good Muslim but a champion of Islām: he was not prepared to risk his empire for the sake of his personal religion. There was a tradition also that Akbar died a Muslim as Sir Thomas Roe states. The Jesuit writers record the truth when they say: 'Among the people there are various opinions regarding the emperor; some holding him to be a Christian, others a heathen, others a Muhammadan. The more intelligent however consider him to be neither Christian nor heathen nor Muhammadan, and hold this to be the truest'.<sup>28a</sup> Akbar went very far with Hinduism and Jainism as well as with Zoroastrianism and Christianity but everywhere he 'stopped upon the threshold'. In reality Akbar was born a Muslim but died, as he had lived, an eclectic.

#### IV. CONQUESTS IN NORTH INDIA

As if to doubt the efficacy of the consolidation of his authority, Akbar had to face the alarming force of disintegration from three quarters: Bengal, Kābul and Gujarāt rose almost simultaneously to arms. The Bengal revolt came first and it was the most serious of the three. It was primarily and in reality a struggle between the crown which was asserting its power and the nobility whose authority was curtailed, a challenge of aristocratic force against centralized government. But the Bengal rebellion assumed a cloak in which it appeared as a conflict between orthodox Islām and Akbar's heterodoxy. To Monserrate it was 'a war chiefly undertaken against the religion of Christ', while other Jesuit writers ascribe it to Akbar's devotion to Christianity.<sup>28b</sup> The rebellion obtained support from the Afghān chieftains of Bengal who regarded Mughul occupation as nothing but usurpation. There is truth in the contention of R. D. Banerji that "what Abul Fazl terms 'the rebellion of Bengal officers' was really another Afghan war during the reign of Akbar."<sup>28c</sup> The rebellion did not remain confined to Bengal; it spread like infection to Bihār, Orissa, Ghāzīpur, Banāras, Allāhabād, Awadh and Katehr (Rohilkhand).

Muzaffar Khān Turbatī, the governor of Bengal, with a view to building the administration of the province and guarding the interests of the State, revoked unauthorized alienation of land and enforced the branding of horses to stop the prevalent fraud of false

musters. He decreased the pay of the troops in Bengal by 50 per cent and in Bihār by 30 per cent. All these measures were adopted on instruction from the centre and they were well-motivated as well as necessary, but they were carried out by the Mughul governor and his lieutenants without tact and moderation and with undue severity.<sup>28d</sup> The result was a mutiny of the Mughul officers which first began in Bihār and then spread to Bengal. The Bengal officers left Tāndā and on 28 January, 1580, openly raised the standard of revolt. The rebels planned, with a view to giving some legality to their agitation, to raise Mīrzā Hakīm to the throne and considered the pretender of Kābul, a worthless drunkard, the champion of orthodox Islām! Resumption of *suyūrghāl* lands (grants made by way of charity) was regarded as an encroachment on Islām, and the newly-appointed *qāzī* of Jaunpur, Mullā Muhammad Yazdī, issued a decree enjoining on all Muslims to rise in revolt against the crowned infidel of Fathpur Sīkrī who had assumed the title of *Imām*. Thus the rebellion of the malcontent party of Bihār and Bengal assumed the garb of a struggle between Islām in danger and heresy in triumph.

The rebellion was led by the Qāqshāls, one of the proudest of the Turkish tribes. The Bengal mutineers crossed the Gaṅgā at Rājmahal and joined with the Bihār rebel force at Teliyāgarhī where they defeated the imperialist army sent by Muzaffar. The rebels besieged Muzaffar in Tāndā, captured him and put him to death. The *khutba* was recited in the name of Muhammad Hakīm, and Bābā Khān Qāqshāl was appointed viceroy of Bengal. Bengal and Bihār were lost to the empire.

Muhibb 'Alī Khān of Rohtās relieved Tirhut from the rebel Bahādur Badakhshī. Todar Mal met the rebels at Monghyr. At first they besieged him, but on arrival of fresh reinforcement under Khān A'zam raised the siege and took to flight. An imperialist force recovered Bihār from M'asūm Khān Kābulī who had to evacuate Gayā as well on the approach of Todar Mal. Order was thus restored in Bihār by the end of 1580, but jealousy between the two imperial commanders, Khān A'zam and Shāhbāz Khān, delayed the recovery of Bengal. Qutlū Khān Lohānī, a lieutenant of Dāūd, defeated several Mughul officers and set up an independent principality in Orissa. The rebel leader of Bengal, Bahādur Kheshgī, was soon killed in an engagement and this was followed by other losses: the death of Bābā Khān Qāqshāl from cancer and the poisoning of Sharaf-ud-dīn Husain by his rival M'asūm Khān Kābulī. M'asūm Khān Farankhudī, who had recently deserted the royal cause and opened a second front for the rebels from Jaunpur as his base, was

badly defeated by Shāhbāz Khān in Awadh (January, 1581), while Allāhabād, where the infection had spread, was recovered from the rebels under Niyābat Khān and the rebellion in Katehr was suppressed by 'Āin-ul-Mulk who defeated the leader 'Arab Bahādur.

Their third front was broken when on 10 August the imperialist troops made their triumphant entry into Kābul and drove the pretender to the hills.

In April, 1582, Khān A'zam was sent as the governor of Bengal. Taking advantage of his absence, the Bengal rebels entered Bihār and took Hājipur. On his return from court Khān A'zam finally expelled them from Bihār, recovered Teliyāgarhī (March, 1583) and pursued them to the Kātī Gāng near Rājmahal. Dissensions, however, broke out among the rebels, particularly between M'asūm Khān Kābulī and the Qāqshāl clan, but operations were delayed by the recall of Khān A'zam, and it was not until several months later, on 26 November, 1583, that his successor Shāhbāz Khān could defeat M'asūm Kābulī and drive him to East Bengal. Shāhbāz Khān even pursued him to 'Īsā Khān's territory of Vikrampur (Dacca district) and demanded of 'Īsā Khān his surrender, but that wily chief simply detained him for several months by delusive promises of expulsion or surrender, defeated him in a battle on 30 September, 1584, and forced him to retreat to Tāndā. In 1585 Akbar sent strong reinforcement with a view to suppressing 'Īsā Khān but mutual jealousies of the imperial commanders hampered the work of pacification. The Afghāns moved out from Orissa and Dastam Qāqshāl besieged Ghorāghāt. With the return of Shāhbāz Khān to Bengal in January, 1586, the tide turned. He won over most of the Afghāns by diplomacy and thus isolated 'Īsā Khān who was obliged to make peace. M'asūm Kābulī sent his son to the emperor's court and proceeded to Mecca, and the last flame of the Bengal revolt was put out (1587). The *de jure* authority of Akbar over all Bengal was acknowledged.

Until the death of Muhammad Hakīm in 1585 Kābul was the plague-spot of Akbar's empire. On Humāyūn's death the territory of Kābul, including Ghaznī, became the appanage of his younger son Mīrzā Muhammad Hakīm, but the government was really in the hands of his guardian Mun'im Khān. Sulaimān Mīrzā of Badakhshān, on hearing of Humāyūn's death, made an attempt to seize Kābul. Mun'im Khān asked for help and when Sulaimān Mīrzā learnt that Akbar's troops had crossed the Indus, he opened negotiations for peace and retired on condition that his name should be recited in the *khutba* and that the other side of the Bārān should belong to Badakhshān.

For the next four years peace reigned in Kābul but trouble began in 1560 when Mun'im Khān was recalled to Akbar's court on the occasion of Bairam Khān's rebellion. 'Intrigue followed intrigue, and crime succeeded crime.' Mun'im Khān, who was re-appointed to the government of Kābul, hastened with an army towards that country but on the way at Jalālābād he was defeated by the prince's mother Māh Chūchak Begam and retreated to court in disgrace. Māh Chūchak Begam then herself assumed the government.

The situation in Kābul became far worse with the arrival of that 'stormy petrel', Shāh Abu-'l-Ma'ālī, who, after his failure to create strife in Hindusthān by setting up Mīrzā Hakīm as a pretender to the Delhi throne, sought shelter with Māh Chūchak Begam and obtained an influential position in the government. But his ambition overleaped itself; he gathered round him the malcontents of Kābul and slew the queen-mother. Muhammad Hakīm secretly asked help of Sulaimān Mīrzā who marched towards Kābul, defeated and seized Abu-'l-Ma'ālī on the bank of the Ghurband river and delivered him to Muhammad Hakīm who had him hanged on 13 May, 1564.

Hakīm now became a puppet in the hands of Sulaimān Mīrzā who assumed all power and fortified his position by giving Hakīm his daughter in marriage. The nepotism and highhandedness of Sulaimān raised a storm of protest and led to the expulsion of all Badakhshānīs. Mīrzā Sulaimān thereupon marched on towards Kābul with a large army. Hakīm escaped to Peshāwar and, pursued there by Sulaimān, came to the Indus and appealed to Akbar for help. Akbar sent the officers of the Punjab under its governor Khān Kalān who marched on to Jalālābād, took it from Sulaimān's officer and forced Sulaimān to beat an inglorious retreat to Badakhshān. Mīrzā Hakīm was restored to power by imperial aid but he compelled Khān Kalān to leave Kābul. Encouraged by the return of the imperial officers, Sulaimān made another attempt on Kābul and besieged the fort. Hakīm escaped to the Indus and, taking advantage of the revolt of the Uzbegs in Hindusthān with whom he was in secret communication, he crossed the river and, passing through Bhera with plunder and rapine, appeared before Lahore. Akbar himself set out from Āgra on 16 November, 1566. Ten days later he reached Delhi and as he advanced he learnt near the Sutlej that the invader had already retreated. Meanwhile Mīrzā Sulaimān had continued the siege of Kābul but Hakīm's officer M'asūm Khān put the Badakhshānīs to great straits. Sulaimān there-

fore made peace with M'asūm Khān and the prince of Kābul returned to his capital.

Hakīm in reality began to rule Kābul as an independent prince. In 1578 Akbar sent a mission to his half-brother with a view to persuading him to acknowledge his sovereignty, but Hakīm did not respond. On the contrary he opened the western front for the rebels of Bihār and Bengal two years later. The Bengal rebels were in collusion with him and read the *khutba* in his name. Hakīm received invitation to invade India from some officers of Akbar's court as well, who wanted to raise him to the Mughul throne. It was suspected that Shāh Mansūr, the revenue minister, was the leader of this treacherous conspiracy. Akbar accordingly suspended him from office and dispersed his colleagues, but he was afterwards pardoned and reinstated. Two reconnoitring expeditions of Mirzā Hakīm into the Punjab led by Nūr-ud-dīn and Shādmān failed in December, 1580, and the prince then personally invaded the Punjab. Passing through Rohtās which rejected proposal of surrender, Hakīm appeared before Lahore on 6 February, 1581. The valiant and ever loyal commander Mān Singh strongly defended it against the invader. Hakīm, who had counted on an uprising in his favour, was not joined by anybody and, when he heard of the advance of Akbar, beat a hasty retreat.

Early in February, Akbar had set out from Fathpur Sīkrī with a considerable force against the invader. Shāh Mansūr, who had been pardoned and reinstated, accompanied the emperor. At Sonpat near Delhi he was met by Malik Sānī who had been formerly in the service of Mirzā Hakīm. This revived Akbar's suspicion against Mansūr; fresh evidence of his complicity and treasonable correspondence with Mirzā Hakīm was brought. Mansūr was accordingly hanged at Kot Kachhwāha near Shāhābād in Karnāl district. Recent writers on Akbar, relying too much on the version of Father Monserrate, regard Shāh Mansūr guilty of treason, but it is difficult to reject the version of Nizām-ud-dīn and Badāūnī who state that the letters, on the basis of which Mansūr was executed, were forged, while from Abu-'l-Fazl we learn that Akbar regarded as forgeries the previous letters, which were found by Mān Singh in Shādmān's baggage, proving Mansūr's treasonable complicity with Mirzā Hakīm. According to Nizām-ud-dīn and Badāūnī all the letters were forged by Mansūr's enemies. Shāh Mansūr's policy of economy and rigour made him unpopular and the nobles, who were too glad to see his downfall, must have prejudiced Akbar against him. The emperor afterwards regretted the 'judicial murder' which he had unconsciously committed.<sup>29</sup>

Near Sirhind Akbar learnt of the retreat of Mīrzā Hakīm but he marched on. On reaching the Indus by way of Kalānaur and Rohtās, he began the construction of the fortress of Attock. From here he sent an army under Rājā Mān Singh, though under the nominal command of Prince Murād, towards Kābul. On 12 July he himself crossed the Indus and set out for Peshāwar. Mīrzā Hakīm was severely defeated by Prince Murād in Khurd Kābul near Kābul, and fled to Ghūrband. On 10 August, 1581, Akbar made his triumphant entry into the historic city of Kābul. He left it after a week, after having pardoned and reinstated his rebellious half-brother to the government.<sup>29a</sup> On 1 December, the emperor returned to his capital.

Kābul continued to be a source of anxiety to Akbar particularly because of the Uzbek supremacy in Central Asia. The menace became imminent when civil war between Mīrzā Sulaimān and Shāh Rukh led to the Uzbek annexation of Badakhshān in 1584. The death of Mīrzā Hakīm in July 1585 relieved Akbar of a critical situation, and Kābul was formally annexed to the Mughul empire.

A serious revolt in Gujarāt followed the rebellion in Bengal and Mīrzā Hakīm's invasion. In the pages of the Mughul historians it was merely the rising of a pretender; in reality it was the feeble protest of Gujarāt for its loss of independence. On a similar occasion the people of Gujarāt had stood behind Bahādur when he recovered his territory from the Mughuls under Humāyūn. King Muzaffar III, who had been kept in Mughul custody since his capture in 1572, had in 1578 eluded the vigilance of the imperial servants and fled to Saurāshtra. In 1583 when I'timād Khān had just arrived in Gujarāt as its new viceroy, Muzaffar raised a formidable rebellion against the Mughul authority, joined by Gujarāt officers groaning under the burden caused by the enforcement of the branding regulations by the retiring viceroy Shihāb-ud-dīn Ahmad Khān. I'timād Khān, finding the situation grave, sought the help of his retiring predecessor, but before he could settle terms with the reluctant Shihāb-ud-dīn, Muzaffar had captured Ahmadābād where the people made common cause with him (September, 1583). Muzaffar granted titles and *jāgīrs* to his followers and was joined by Sher Khān Fulādī. Qutb-ud-dīn Muhammad Khān, governor of Broach and Barodā, marched against the invader from Broach but was defeated at Barodā by Muzaffar who forced Qutb-ud-dīn to surrender on promise of safe conduct but violated it by putting him to death. Muzaffar then marched to Broach and took it, and the wealth as well as property of Qutb-ud-dīn fell into his hands. People began

to gather round him and he was able to raise an army of 30,000 men.

Akbar accordingly sent Mīrzā Khān, son of Bairam Khān, to Gujarāt. In January, 1584, he defeated the 'pretender' seriously at Sarkhej and made his triumphant entry into Ahmadābād. The report of this victory reached Akbar while he was returning to the capital from Allāhabād which he had just founded. He conferred on the young Mīrzā Khān, then twenty-eight years old, the title of Khān Khānān. Mīrzā Khān then pursued Muzaffar to Cambay and drove him first to Barodā and then to Nāndod where he inflicted a severe defeat on him and forced him to take to flight (March, 1584). But, for about ten years the ex-king offered stubborn resistance, hoping to recover his throne. He was hotly pursued until in 1593, 'hounded like a wild beast', he was captured. Khān A'zam, then viceroy of Gujarāt, took Junāgarh where he had taken refuge and Muzaffar fled to Cutch. But Khān A'zam pursued him there and forced the chief of Cutch to reveal Muzaffar's hiding place. Muzaffar was captured but on the way, a day after his capture, he committed suicide to save his honour. Thus ended the last effort of reviving the old kingdom of Gujarāt.

At the end of 1585 Akbar was comparatively free to undertake seriously the conquest of Kāshmir. The Mughul emperors had always an eye on Kāshmir with its cool climate, running streams and charming gardens. Bābur had sent a small unsuccessful expedition against the country and Mīrzā Haidar, who had advised Humāyūn to occupy it as a *point d'appui* for the recovery of Hindusthān, established himself and ruled in Kāshmir for ten years (1541-1551). As early as 1559 Ghāzī Khān who was the *de facto* ruler of Kāshmir, anxious to establish friendly relations with Akbar, sent his envoy Nusrat Chakk who waited upon the emperor and his guardian. But Bairam Khān replied by despatching an expedition next year under Mīrzā Qarā Bahādur which was seriously defeated near Rājāorī by the infantry of Ghāzī Khān.

After the inglorious end of his first attempt Akbar postponed the conquest of Kāshmir for a more opportune moment, but he did not fail to maintain regular contact with her rulers. In 1568 we find Akbar's ambassadors Mīrzā Muqīm and Ya'qūb at the court of Husain Shāh who treated them with all honours and had to tolerate the arrogance of Mīrzā Muqīm who, by virtue of his position as the Mughul envoy, interfered in the domestic affairs of the country. Husain Shāh, with a view to pleasing Akbar, sent with the envoys his daughter to the Mughul emperor who however rejected her.

In 1578 Akbar sent Mullā 'Ishqī and Qāzī Sadr-ud-dīn to 'Alī Shāh, successor of Husain Shāh, at whose court they remained until they were sent back to the imperial court. The *khutba* was read and coins were struck in Kāshmir in Akbar's name and 'Alī Shāh sent along with the imperial ambassadors his own envoy Muhammad Qāsim with rich presents and the daughter of his nephew for Prince Salīm.

In January, 1580, Yūsuf Shāh, 'Alī Shāh's son, on being overthrown by his cousin Lohar Chakk, sought shelter with Akbar. A few months later Akbar ordered Rājā Mān Singh and Mīrzā Yūsuf Khān to assist Yūsuf in recovering his kingdom. Meanwhile the report of imperial intervention alarmed the Kāshmir nobles who informed Yūsuf that they would restore him to his throne if he would abandon Mughul assistance. Accordingly he left Siālkot for Kāshmir and was joined by his supporters at Baramgalla. At Sopur Yūsuf defeated Lohar Chakk on 8 November, 1580, and recovered his kingdom without Mughul assistance. Akbar was outwitted and deprived of any immediate pretext for intervention in Kāshmir.

At the end of 1581 after his successful Kābul campaign Akbar sent from Jalālābād Mīrzā Tāhir and Sālih 'Āqil as envoys to Kāshmir. Yūsuf Shāh received them with spectacular respect and sent them back with his third son Haidar Khān to wait on Akbar. Haidar remained at court for one year. Three years later Yūsuf Shāh sent on Akbar's demand his eldest son Ya'qūb who arrived at court on 19 February, 1585. Ya'qūb however became suspicious of Akbar's designs and fled to Kāshmir. In October Akbar sent from Kalānaur Hakīm 'Alī and Bahā-ud-dīn to summon Yūsuf to court or at least to send Ya'qūb. In December while Akbar was encamped at Hasan Abdāl, the envoys returned: Yūsuf did neither come nor send his son. Accordingly on 31 December, 1585, an army under Mīrzā Shāh Rukh and Rājā Bhagwān Dās with 5,000 horse was despatched to Kāshmir.

The imperial force immediately marched by the Pākhlī route and reached the Buliyan Pass, some fifty miles west of Bāramūla, but they found the road closed by Yūsuf who had already reached there. Severe cold, scarcity of provisions, difficult communications as well as rain and snow exceedingly harassed the Mughuls who decided on peace. Yūsuf also agreed and saw Rājā Bhagwān Dās on 24 February, 1586, and offered his submission to the emperor. But his son Ya'qūb, joined by his nobles, offered resistance. The Kāshmiris were however defeated by Madhu Singh, son of Rājā Bhagwān Dās, at the Kuarmat Pass and were forced to offer the

following terms: coins were to be struck and the *khutba* recited in Akbar's name and 'the mint, the saffron, the silk and the game should be imperial.' The report of the Yūsufzāi disaster broke the morale of the Mughul leaders who readily accepted them and Yūsuf Shāh was taken by Rājā Bhagwān Dās to Akbar at Attock on 7 April, 1586. Akbar disapproved of the treaty, imprisoned Yūsuf and made him over to Rājā Todar Mal, though the Kāshmir sultān had been assured of safe conduct by Bhagwān Dās. The treacherous imprisonment of Yūsuf is a dark blot on the character of the chivalrous Akbar.

Ya'qūb continued to challenge the imperial authority and Akbar accordingly sent another expedition under Qāsim Khān on 8 July, 1586. The Mughul army passed by the defile of Bhimbar and then marched through Rājāori. Neither the nobles nor the people gave solid support to Ya'qūb who retired to Kishtwār. Qāsim Khān easily defeated a Kāshmiri force and entered Srīnagar on 15 October, 1586, and the *khutba* was recited in Akbar's name. Kāshmir was now formally annexed to the Mughul empire. Ya'qūb continued to resist for the next three years. In 1586 he made two unsuccessful attempts on Srīnagar and next year his third attempt was foiled by Mīrzā Yūsuf Khān, governor of Kāshmir. In 1589 while Akbar was returning from Kāshmir, Ya'qūb surrendered to him at Sopur on 7 August and the last spark of Kāshmir independence was put out.

The death of Mīrzā Hakīm and the annexation of Kābul were immediately followed by troubles in the North-Western frontier. Like his predecessors Akbar had to face the ever-lasting frontier problem. The tribes inhabiting what was until recently known as the North-West Frontier province were absolutely independent. As Kābul ceased to be the centre of disturbances, Akbar turned his attention towards making the frontier secure by suppressing the Raushanāis and the various Afghān tribes of Swāt and Bājaur. The Raushanāis were the followers of Bāyazīd who set aside the authority of Qur'ān and founded a new creed. His doctrine, which was extreme pantheism, shows a curious mixture of lofty ethics and crude barbarity. Bāyazīd obtained many followers among the Afghān tribes of Tirah. After his death in 1585 his youngest son Jalāl-ud-dīn became the leader of the Raushanāis. In 1581 while Akbar was returning from Kābul, he saw the emperor and was kindly received but he escaped and created troubles ('raised the standard of revolt' in the words of Mughul historians) in the country west of the Indus. The Raushanāis infested the routes between Kābul and the Punjab and the Khyber route was so effectually

blocked by them that 'Abdullah Khān, Uzbek's envoy to Akbar, could not pass through it. Akbar accordingly appointed Mān Singh to the government of Kābul with directions to suppress the Afghān tribes leavened with a new spirit.

On 22 August, 1585, Akbar himself left Fathpur Sīkrī for the Punjab with a view to keeping watch over the frontier as well as to conducting campaigns for the conquest of Kāshmir. On 31 December Akbar sent from Attock, simultaneously with the Kāshmir expedition, Zain Khān at the head of a considerable force to Swāt and Bājaur. Zain Khān pushed on to Bājaur while another force despatched by the emperor entered and devastated the Sāmāh, the country of the Mandārs, lying between Peshāwar and the Swāt river. Zain Khān chastised the Yūsufzāis of Bājaur and advanced to Chak-darah on the Swāt river where he erected a fortress. As his troops were much depressed by continued marching, Zain Khān asked for reinforcements. Akbar directed Rājā Bīrbal, who had already been despatched to Bājaur through the Sāmāh, and Hakīm Abu-'l-Fath to join Zain Khān in Swāt. No sooner had the reinforcement arrived than disagreement began between the generals. Zain Khān was in favour of holding and strengthening Chak-darah and making it a base for further operations against the Afghān tribes. But the rājā and the Hakīm contended that their task was not to occupy the country but to harry it and so they should return to the royal camp at Attock. They also opposed Zain Khān's suggestion to return by the Malakhand Pass, the road they had come by, and decided to withdraw by the difficult route through the Karakar and Malandarāi Passes. The Mughuls were subjected to much opposition and harassment by the Yūsufzāis and Mandārs during their retreat through the Karakar Pass but the opposition became virulent when they reached the Malandarāi Pass further south. The furious attack of the Yūsufzāis broke the morale and discipline of the Mughul force and the retreat became a disastrous rout. Eight thousand men, about half of the army, perished, including Rājā Bīrbal. Zain Khān, after a stubborn rear-guard fight in which he suffered defeat, managed to escape, and with Hakīm Abu-'l-Fath led 'the shattered remnant of the army' into the royal camp at Attock (24 February, 1586). Akbar was so overwhelmed with grief at the death of Rājā Bīrbal that he took no food for two days and nights. It should however be noted that Akbar himself was primarily responsible for the disaster in appointing a wit and a physician to such a difficult command.

Akbar however sent Todar Mal with a large army to retrieve the disaster. Todar Mal erected strong forts in the Yūsufzāi terri-

tory and devastated it. Rājā Mān Singh had inflicted several defeats on the Raushanāis on his way to Kābul but towards the end of 1586, led by Jalāl-ud-dīn, they formed a confederacy with the Yūsufzāis, the Mohmands, the Khalils and other tribes, invested Peshāwar and completely closed the Khyber route. Mān Singh defeated Jalāl-ud-dīn near 'Alī Masjid in the Khyber Pass and he fled towards Bangash. But throughout the year 1587 the Afghān tribes were active under Jalāl-ud-dīn who was joined by the Afrīdīs and the Orakzāis as well.

The transfer of Mān Singh to Bihār late in 1587 and the appointment of Zain Khān as warden of the Western Marches marked the beginning of a more vigorous policy. Akbar was determined to uproot 'the thornbrake of the Tārīkīs' and despatched several batches of troops from different centres in order to capture Jalāl-ud-dīn. In 1588 Zain Khān led strenuous campaigns into Swāt and Bājaur. He entered Bājaur by an unknown route, surprised Jalāl-ud-dīn who made a narrow escape, erected forts at different places and after desultory fighting for eight months forced the Afghāns to submit. He then entered Swāt by a secret route, surprised the Afghāns as they were celebrating the *Qurbān-i-'Īd* (31 October, 1588) and strengthened his position by erecting forts at Chak-darah, Malakhand and other places. Meanwhile Sādiq Khān, who had been despatched to Tirah, won over the Afrīdīs and the Orakzāis who undertook to preserve peace in the Khyber. Jalāl-ud-dīn fled to Turān as he had lost all influence over the Afghāns. Altogether Zain Khān's campaigns of 1588 maintained peace in the frontier for the next three years and in October, 1589, Akbar could make a peaceful journey from Attock to Kābul.

Early in 1592 the frontier trouble revived when Jalāl-ud-dīn returned from Turān, stirred up strife in Tirah and won back the Afrīdīs and the Orakzāis. The failure of Qāsim Khān to chastise them encouraged the Raushanāis and the Yūsufzāis to raise their heads again and they were joined by the hitherto friendly Gagiyāna and Muhammadzāi tribes, who invaded Peshāwar. Zain Khān surprised and dispersed them and drove the Yūsufzāis and the Raushanāis from Bājaur, where they had escaped, to Kāfiristān. Next year he marched into the Kāfir country, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Afghāns in which 400 were killed and 7,000 taken prisoners, took the fort of Ganshāl and received the submission of their leaders.

The campaigns of 1592-93 ensured peace for just three years. In May, 1596, there was recrudescence of the Raushanāis who made

the Khyber route unsafe. Qulīj Khān's failure to suppress them led to the reappointment of Zain Khān to Kābul early next year. The frontier troubles continued even after the death of Jalāl-ud-dīn in 1600. As late as 1602 Takhta Beg had to suppress a 'rebellion' of the Afrīdīs, Pāni, Orakzāi and Sūrī tribes in Tirah under Ahdad who became the leader of the Raushanāis after Jalāl-ud-dīn's death. In reality, the Afghān tribes remained unconquered and the great campaigns of Mān Singh and Zain Khān could not uproot 'the thorn-brake of the Tārīkīs', though they subdued them for a time. The Mughul sword could neither crush the martial instincts of the Afghāns nor solve the problem of their over-population.

Akbar's policy was to build up a scientific frontier for the Mughul empire. This required the maintenance of imperial control over Kābul and Qandahār, the two gateways to Hindusthān as well as over the tribes inhabiting the north-west frontier region. Kābul was annexed to the Mughul empire after Mīrzā Hakīm's death in 1585, but the frontier problem became grave and menacing on account of the ascendancy of 'Abdullah Khān Uzbek of Bukhārā who occupied Badakhshān in 1584 and incited the frontier tribes to rise against Akbar. The series of vigorous campaigns against these tribes, the annexation of Baluchistān and the acquisition of Qandahār in 1595 enabled Akbar to keep the frontier altogether secure against foreign aggression from Persia and particularly from the Uzbeks of Central Asia.

After the conquest of Kāshmir, Akbar naturally turned towards the conquest of Sind in the west and Orissa in the east, the two kingdoms in Hindusthān which still remained independent. The conquest of Sind and Baluchistān was imperative as a base of operations for the recovery of Qandahār which was in Persian hands. As early as 1574 the fortress of Bhakkar had been surrendered to the Mughuls. Towards the end of 1586 Sādiq Khān, governor of Multān, besieged Sehwān but Jānī Beg, ruler of Sind, offered submission by sending tribute to Akbar at Lahore. Jānī Beg however renounced his allegiance and asserted independence. In 1590 Khān Khānān 'Abdur-Rahīm was appointed to the government of Multān with direction to conquer Sind. The Khān Khānān invaded the country and besieged Sehwān. Jānī Beg had meanwhile advanced against the Mughuls with a big army, war-boats and a park of artillery and he fortified the Pass of Nasarpur. The Khān Khānān accordingly raised the siege and marched by land and water to meet the enemy. In October, 1591, he inflicted a severe defeat on Jānī Beg and then returned to complete the siege of Sehwān. As Jānī Beg advanced to help the hard-pressed garrison, he was op-

posed and defeated by the Khān Khānān on the way. But he continued to resist from a new stronghold some forty miles away. The Khān Khānān attacked him there and forced him to make peace by surrendering Tatta and Sehwan and agreeing to pay homage to Akbar at court. In 1593 he came to the Mughul court at Lahore. He was kindly received and was appointed governor of Multān and afterwards of Sind. He accepted the Divine Faith of the emperor.

In the east the great pro-consul of Bihār, after settling the province, led the campaign in April, 1590, for the conquest of Orissa and reached Jahānābād (modern Arāmbāgh in Hughli district) by way of Bhāgalpur and Burdwan. Qutlū Khān Lohānī, the Afghān ruler of North Orissa, despatched a large force to Rāipur in the Bānkurā district. The Afghāns surprised and badly defeated the Mughul advance-guard under Mān Singh's son, the inexperienced Jagat Singh. But the sudden death of Qutlū Khān shortly after disheartened the Afghāns. His minister Khvāja 'Isā raised his young son Nasīr Khān to the throne and he made peace with the Mughuls on condition that the *khutba* was to be recited and coins were to be struck in Akbar's name and Purī, including the temple of Jagannāth, was to be made reserved lands under the emperor. On 15 August the boy-king paid homage to Mān Singh.

But after the death of the regent the treaty of 1590 was repudiated by the Afghāns who captured the temple of Jagannāth and took Purī. In November, 1591, Mān Singh marched again by land and river and was joined by Sa'id Khān, governor of Bengal. At Benapur, one day's march from Jaleswar, a severe and contested battle was fought on 18 April, 1592.<sup>30</sup> The Mughuls ultimately gained the victory and Mān Singh made his triumphant entry into Jaleswar where the *khutba* was recited and coins stamped in Akbar's name. The Afghāns retreated southwards and continued to resist. Though Sa'id Khān left him, Mān Singh marched into Orissa, took Cuttack, secured the surrender of the fort of Aul by Qutlū Khān's officer and received the submission of the Tīla rājā at Kalkalghātī. But Rāmchandra Dev, the rājā of Khurdhā, the greatest of the Orissa chiefs, still held at Sārangarh. Mān Singh raided the Khurdhā territory and compelled Rāmchandra to submit. A Mughul force despatched by him recovered Jaleswar which had meanwhile been captured by the Afghāns. Sārangarh capitulated in June but it was not until January, 1593, and after the despatch of an expedition under Jagat Singh that Rāmchandra Dev personally waited on Mān Singh. The conquest of Orissa was now completed but, as in Bengal, what the Mughuls could establish was military occupation rather than effective rule.

Meanwhile Kāshmir had become the scene of serious disturbances. During his first visit to that province in 1589 Akbar had made necessary arrangements for its administration. The revenue administration of the province was the root of the trouble: the high assessment of Akbar caused grave discontent. The malcontents elected as their leader Yādgar, the cousin of the governor Mīrzā Yūsuf Khān, who asserted independent authority and coined money in his own name. In July, 1592, Akbar left Lahore for Kāshmir and halted at Bhimbar where he received the head of Yādgar who had been captured and executed. On 14 October he entered Srīnagar. On the resignation of Mīrzā Yūsuf Khān due to difficulties in revenue administration, the entire province was converted into reserved lands (*Khālisa*). About five years later, in 1597, Akbar made his third and last visit to Kāshmir.

In 1595 Akbar's conquest of the northern portion of the Indian sub-continent (excluding Assam) was completed by the annexation of Baluchistān. In December, 1594, Mīr M'asūm, the historian, led the campaign. The *zamīndārs* of Gandava offered their submission and in February, 1595, the Mughuls besieged the fort of Sibī, held by the Parni Afghāns and shortly after forced the garrison to surrender the fort. The country up to the border of Qandahār, Cutch and Makrān came into the possession of the Mughuls. Two months later occurred the bloodless conquest of Qandahār.

## V. FOREIGN POLICY

Qandahār was the Alsace of medieval Asia, the bone of contention between India and Īrān in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Safavī monarchs regarded Qandahār as an appanage of Khurāsān and considered Mughul occupation as nothing but usurpation. At Akbar's accession it was governed by Bairam Khān's agent Shāh Muhammad Qilātī. In 1558 a large Persian force led by Sultān Husain Mīrzā invaded Qandahār and took possession of it. For the next thirty-six years it was to remain in Persian hands. On account of his preoccupation in India and the troubles in Kābul and the frontier, Akbar could not make any attempt at the recovery of Qandahār. By the year 1590 he had become the paramount sovereign of Northern India, Kābul had been annexed to his empire and the Raushanāis had been subdued for the time being. The Uzbegs had become supreme in Khurāsān and were threatening the Safavī kingdom. It was the time to strike a blow and recover Qandahār. Akbar apprehended as well the capture of Qandahār by the Uzbegs in which case Kābul and the Punjab would be insecure. Accordingly in 1590 he sent an army under 'Abdur-Rahīm to recover

Qandahār, but the Khān Khānān turned to the conquest of Sind, probably as a prelude to the conquest of Qandahār. This postponed the Qandahār expedition and circumstances made any expedition unnecessary. Muzaffar Husain Mīrzā, who held the government of Qandahār, feared the prospect of an Uzbek invasion and might also have learnt of Akbar's plan to recover Qandahār. Shāh 'Abbās was then in no position to send him reinforcements. Muzaffar Husain, therefore, refusing the offer of help by 'Abdullah Khān who had sent him an envoy, surrendered the fort on 18 April, 1595, to Akbar's officer Shāh Beg Khān and left for the Mughul court. 'A populous country came into possession without a battle', as Abu-'l-Fazl states. In July Zamīn Dāwar and Garmsīr were also taken by Shāhi Beg Khān, but they were recovered by the Persians in 1603.

In spite of Qandahār, round which the Mughul-Safavī diplomacy centred, there was almost regular diplomatic intercourse between Āgra and Qazvīn or Isfāhān. Under Akbar the Mughul-Safavī relationship, which had been that of client and patron, entered upon a new phase. Akbar's toleration of the Shīahs and the Sunnīs alike toned down the religious animosity of the Safavī monarchs who were zealous champions of Shīahism, while the building up and consolidation of the great Mughul empire under him raised the prestige of the dynasty abroad, and both Shāh 'Abbās and 'Abdullah Khān Uzbek sought his alliance against each other.

Early in the reign Bairam Khān had sent Shāh Ghāzī Sultān as envoy to Shāh Tahmāsp. He saw the necessity of establishing cordial relationship with the Safavī court, especially now when the boyking was beset with a crop of difficulties in Hindusthān and required the Shāh's moral support. Shāh Tahmāsp received the envoy with honour and in 1562 sent his cousin Sayyid Beg on embassy to Akbar with a letter offering condolences for the death of Humāyūn and congratulations on his accession and emphasizing the necessity of cementing the bond of friendship between the two kingdoms. In 1564 Akbar received another envoy from Shāh Tahmāsp who came with a letter and rarities of Īrān. Early in November, 1572, during his march from Sirohī to Pātan, Akbar received Yār 'Alī Beg, envoy from Sultān Muhammad Khudābanda, Shāh Tahmāsp's eldest son and governor of Khurāsān, who probably sought the support of Akbar in the coming war of succession in Persia. The death of Shāh Tahmāsp in 1576 was the signal for the outbreak of civil war and anarchy, followed by a succession of weak rulers, during which diplomatic intercourse between the Mughul empire and Persia was stopped. But under Shāh 'Abbās (1587-1629) a closer contact was established between Āgra and Isfāhān. Shāh

Tahmāsp would look on Akbar as the son of Humāyūn who had sought shelter at his court and during his lifetime Akbar's supremacy over Hindusthān had not been fully established. Shāh 'Abbās found Akbar the paramount sovereign of almost all Hindusthān and naturally sought his alliance, hard-pressed as he was in the west by the Ottoman Turks and in the east by the Uzbegs under their powerful king 'Abdullah Khān who overran and captured Khurāsān. In 1591 Shāh 'Abbās sent his envoy Yādgār Sultān Rūmlū who arrived at the Mughul court on 16 May with choice presents and a supplicatory letter to Akbar, asking for his military help and at least his moral support. Akbar could not agree to send an auxiliary force for the recovery of Khurāsān from the Uzbegs, as some of his nobles suggested, though he would have thereby cleared his father's as well as grandfather's debt to the Safavī dynasty. For he did not consider it politic to go against the powerful Uzbek king with whom he was in alliance and whose hostility would mean grave menace to the frontier of the Mughul empire. Yādgār Sultān remained at Akbar's court for three years and a half. On 2 December, 1594, Akbar gave him leave and sent with him Zīyā-ul-mulk Qazvīnī and Abū Nāsir Khvafī as envoys to the Shāh with curiosities of Hindusthān and a letter full of instructions and written in a most patronising spirit which reminds one of the letters that Shāh Tahmāsp had addressed to the Emperor Humāyūn. Akbar's envoys were given a splendid reception at Qazvīn by Shāh 'Abbās. They remained in Persia for a few years until 1597-8 when they obtained leave and the Shāh sent Mīnūchihr Beg with a letter and choice presents to the Mughul court. The capture of Qandahār by the Mughuls in 1595 did not sever diplomatic connection. The envoy arrived at the Mughul court in November, 1598. In his letter the Shāh referred to his activities against the Uzbegs in which he expected Akbar's good wishes and support. Next year Shāh 'Abbās sent from Herāt Mīrzā 'Alī Beg on embassy to Akbar with a letter informing him of his victory in Khurāsān after the death of 'Abdullah Khān. 'Alī Beg arrived at court on 11 March, 1599, and both he and Mīnūchihr Beg remained at court until 4 April, 1601, when they obtained leave. Akbar sent with them his own envoy Ma'sūm Khān Bhakkarī and they arrived in Persia in 1602. Ma'sūm Khān remained at the Safavī court for more than a year and returned in 1604.

As a kingdom contiguous to Kābul, Badakhshān was of importance to the Mughul empire under Akbar as a buffer State between it and the Uzbek kingdom rapidly increasing under 'Abdullah Khān. Mīrzā Sulaimān of Badakhshān, who had been recognized by Bābur in 1530, gave a lot of trouble to his grandson by his re-

peated attempts on Kābul, but the growing power of the Uzbegs compelled him and his grandson to seek the alliance of Akbar and take shelter at his court. In 1561 he sent an envoy to Akbar asking for his help against the Uzbegs who had killed his son Mīrzā Ibrāhīm. In 1575 Sulaimān, expelled by his rebellious grandson Mīrzā Shāh Rukh, sought Akbar's protection. Akbar treated him kindly and offered him the government of Bengal which he refused as he expected the emperor would help him recover his kingdom. In disappointment Sulaimān left for Mecca next year. Mīrzā Shāh Rukh sent to Akbar two envoys who arrived at his court on 9 July, 1577, and next year Akbar gave them leave and sent with them his own envoys to Badakhshān. Badakhshān ceased to be a buffer State when, in 1584, it was annexed by the Uzbegs and Mīrzā Shāh Rukh sought refuge at Akbar's court. 'Abdullah Khān objected to Akbar's giving him protection and this caused not a little anxiety to the Uzbek king. In 1587 Mīrzā Sulaimān, who had gone to Badakhshān a second time, was forced to leave for India and sought shelter at the Mughul court.

No other factor moulded Akbar's trans-Indian policy so much as the growing power of the Uzbegs in Transoxiana. It affected his activities in India as well to a considerable extent. It was the bogey of an Uzbek invasion which was mainly responsible for Akbar's long stay in the Punjab from 1585. It encouraged the frontier tribes to raise their heads against the authority of Akbar; in fact, they were subsidized by 'Abdullah Khān who twice received at his court Jalāl-ud-dīn, the leader of the Raushanāis. To a certain extent it served as a brake on the progress of Mughul arms in the Deccan inasmuch as it prevented Akbar's leading the campaign personally even when mutual jealousies of commanders brought about a deadlock there. The bitter hostility between Shāh 'Abbās and 'Abdullah Khān strengthened the position of Akbar who was approached by both for help. 'Abdullah Khān always sought to gain the support of Akbar and Akbar was equally anxious to be on friendly terms with 'Abdullah; the two feared each other and therefore the grandson of Bābur and the scion of Shaibānī Khān remained allies.

In 1572 'Abdullah Khān sent his first envoy, Hājī Altamash, with presents and a letter to Akbar. The object was to gain the support of Akbar against other princes of Turān. This first embassy was rather coldly received by the emperor who dismissed the envoy afterwards without sending his own to 'Abdullah. According to Abu-'l-Fazl, Akbar disliked the maintenance of diplomatic relations with 'Abdullah as he intended to conquer his ancestral territory in Central Asia. Possibly Akbar, who was then too much

engaged in his own affairs in Hindusthān, did not want to incur the suspicion of Shāh Tahmāsp.

Five years later in 1577 arrived the second embassy from Bukhārā. It was the period of civil war, anarchy, and weak succession in Persia after Shāh Tahmāsp's death and 'Abdullah suggested an invasion of that country. Akbar sent his envoy Mīrzā Fūlādi with a reply to 'Abdullah stating that he could not agree with him in regarding 'difference in law and religion' as *casus belli* and go against the Safavīs with whom he was in alliance. Here was a great opportunity for Akbar to recover Qandahār, but Akbar wanted to keep the balance and prevent the Uzbegs from growing too powerful: a feeble Persia would be a menace to the Mughul empire.

In 1585 after the annexation of Balkh and Badakhshān by 'Abdullah and the absorption of Kābul into the Mughul empire, the territories of 'Abdullah and Akbar became contiguous and the situation became more critical. The Uzbeg king, alarmed by Akbar's campaigns in the frontier and his continued stay on the bank of the Indus as well as Mīrzā Shāh Rukh's presence in India, sent Mīr Quraish who arrived at the Mughul court on 11 March, 1586. Akbar's support or at least his neutrality was badly needed by 'Abdullah in his campaign against Khurāsān. On 2 September Akbar gave Mīr Quraish leave and despatched Hakīm Humām with a letter to the Uzbeg court. Ultimately an agreement was reached between the two. It seems Akbar approved 'Abdullah's invasion of Khurāsān and 'Abdullah promised not to support or subsidize the Afghān tribes of the frontier.<sup>30a</sup>

About three years later Hakīm Humām returned in 1589 with a letter from 'Abdullah in which he thanked Akbar for his moral support in his recent conquest of Khurāsān; and he sent his envoy Ahmad 'Alī Atālīq who however died in India. On 4 January, 1591, Maujavī Husain arrived at the Mughul court on embassy from Bukhārā. He too died in India and 'Abdullah Khān became anxious at the unusual delay in the return of his envoys. On 14 June, 1596, Akbar sent his ambassadors Khvāja Ashraf Naqshbandī and Shaikh Husain of Lakhnau with a letter to 'Abdullah in which he regretted the death of 'Abdullah's two envoys and assured him of his friendship and informed him that he did not help Shāh 'Abbās, who had sent his envoy Yādgār Sultān asking for his help, on account of his consideration for 'Abdullah and that for the same reason he did not support the rebellion in Badakhshān and grant Shāh Rukh any fief in Kābul or Kāshmir. 'Abdullah Khān received Akbar's envoys with respect and on 30 July, 1597, sent them back

with his own envoy Mīr Quraish. Akbar's envoys returned to court on 29 April, 1598, but Mīr Quraish returned home from the way on learning of the death of his master. With the death of 'Abdullah Khān in February, 1598, Akbar was relieved of the Uzbek menace, for he had nothing to fear from his son 'Abdul-Mūmin. The nobles advised Akbar to invade 'Abdullah's territory but he did not agree. Akbar had never any serious intention of conquering Badakhshān and Transoxiana, the home of his ancestors. He followed an Indian policy and thoroughly abandoned the Central Asian outlook of his grandfather and even of his father.

Diplomatic intercourse between Turkey and India could not be regular on account of the geographical situation of the two countries. The Turkish admiral Sīdī 'Alī Ra'īs was present at Delhi at the time of Humāyūn's tragic end and Akbar's accession. Sīdī 'Alī was no accredited envoy, but Bairam Khān availed of the opportunity of despatching a letter in the name of Akbar in 1556-57 to Sulaimān the Magnificent through the admiral. In the letter Akbar addresses the sultān as the 'Caliph on earth sent by God' and states that, though there had been no diplomatic connection between the sultān of Turkey and the Mughul emperor, there had always been the desire to maintain such relations and that is why he is despatching this letter to the sultān 'to bind the chains of union and love' through the admiral, though he had no commission from his master, and he hopes that the sultān will also respond to his wishes and maintain communication with the Mughul court. It does not appear that the sultān of Turkey responded, for he had no interest in any alliance with the Mughul emperor. Akbar also, as he established his supremacy over India and as the Turkish power declined after the death of Sulaimān (1566), did not regard Turkish support as of importance. On the contrary, he viewed with jealousy that the *khutba* was recited in Mecca and Medina in the name of the sultān of Turkey and threw a challenge to him when in 1579 he assumed the titles of *Imām* and *Khalīfa*. Akbar expressed his desire to Rudolf Aquaviva to form an alliance with the king of Portugal against the sultān<sup>30b</sup> and he asked 'Abdullah Khān of Bukhārā to enter into a coalition against the Ottoman Turks while he promised Shāh 'Abbās help against them (1586).<sup>30c</sup> In reality Akbar considered the Sultān-Caliph of Turkey as his great rival.<sup>30d</sup>

Of the European powers Akbar had diplomatic relations with the Portuguese who had already established their authority on the western coast of India with Goa as their capital. In 1572 during his visit to Cambay he met some Portuguese merchants who came to pay their respects. Next year during his siege of Surat he came

into contact with the Portuguese who had come as the ally of the garrison but cleverly posed themselves as friends and sent their envoy Antonio Cabral to Akbar who, however, received them kindly. According to the Portuguese version Akbar had also sent his envoy to the Portuguese viceroy and a treaty, satisfactory to both parties, was concluded. Akbar wanted to be on friendly terms with the Portuguese who controlled the pilgrim traffic to Mecca by their domination of the Arabian Sea which had virtually become the Portuguese lake. In 1578 the Portuguese viceroy of Goa sent the same Antonio Cabral as ambassador to the Mughul emperor and Akbar's discussion with him on religious matters led ultimately to the despatch of the first Jesuit mission to his court in 1580. Akbar sent his envoy Hājī 'Abdullah and the Portuguese Government responded by the despatch of this mission which has already been referred to. The mission terminated in February, 1583, when Father Rudolf left the Mughul court. Seven years later Akbar despatched a letter to the viceroy of Goa through the Greek sub-deacon Leo Grimon, asking for a second mission to his court. It was well received at Lahore in 1591 but the Fathers realized the impossibility of converting Akbar in spite of his professed sympathy for Christianity, and shortly afterwards it came to an abrupt conclusion. In 1594 Akbar invited a third mission from the viceroy of Goa who sent it, in spite of the reluctance of the provincial authority to risk a third attempt, on account of the possibility of good results of a political character. The mission consisting of Father Jerome Xavier, a grand-nephew of St. Francis, Father Emmanuel Pinheiro and Brother Benedict de Goes arrived at Lahore on 5 May, 1595, and, with varying personnel, remained at the Mughul court till Akbar's death in 1605. Akbar showed the same reverence for the Christian faith and permitted the Fathers to preach the Gospel and even convert people. But he was least inclined to embrace Christianity and gave more attention to political and military affairs than to religious discussions. Though this caused not a little disappointment to the Fathers, the viceroy of Goa received in 1598 instruction from the king of Spain to maintain the mission at the Mughul court. Akbar also tried to utilize the services of Xavier and Benedict de Goes to obtain during the siege of Asīrgarh guns and munitions from the Portuguese at Chaul which of course they refused as it was un-Christian and as they were in alliance with the ruler of Khāndesh. From the Deccan Akbar also despatched in March, 1600, an embassy to Goa purely with a view to gaining political alliance. The Portuguese alliance with the sultāns of the Deccan caused grave concern to the emperor and he wanted to check their influence by the establishment of Mughul authority in the

Deccan. At one time he even thought of securing the help of the Deccan sultānates against them. In reality Akbar considered the Portuguese as his most powerful enemy in India as he states in his letter to 'Abdullah Khān<sup>30e</sup> but he considered it politic to maintain friendly relations with them.

Akbar had no proper diplomatic relations with England, though some Englishmen visited his court. Elizabethan England had already begun to take interest in Indian trade and in 1585 a party of three Englishmen, John Newbery, a London merchant and member of the Levant Company, Ralph Fitch, another London merchant, and William Leedes, a jeweller, arrived at Fathpur Sikrī. Newbery carried with him a letter from Queen Elizabeth, written in February, 1583, in which she addresses Akbar as 'the most invincible and most mighty Prince, King of Cambaie' and recommends to him Newbery and his companions favourable reception, friendly treatment and suitable privileges.<sup>31</sup> The object of their visit was commercial. They were England's pioneers in India. Of them Fitch has left a valuable account of his travels and to him Āgra and Fathpur Sikrī appeared much larger and more populous than Elizabethan London. Leedes was taken into the royal service at Fathpur Sikrī. In 1603 another Englishman, John Mildenhall, also a merchant, arrived at Āgra with a letter from Queen Elizabeth. He presented Akbar twenty-nine horses and some jewels and asked of him friendship with Queen Elizabeth, permission for the newly founded East India Company to trade in his kingdom and his neutrality in the event of English and Portuguese ships fighting on his coasts. But the Portuguese Fathers at the Mughul court prejudiced the mind of Akbar against the English whom they described as 'a complete nation of thieves.' Ultimately, according to his own version, Mildenhall was able to exact from Akbar a favourable treaty but there is no doubt that he could not gain any concession from the emperor. The negotiations opened by Newbery and Mildenhall, however, led ultimately to the despatch of a duly accredited embassy to Jahāngīr.

## VI. CONQUESTS IN THE DECCAN

Akbar had his eye on the Deccan long before he sent regular expeditions for the expansion of the Mughul empire into the South which ultimately proved to be the *fata morgana* under his great-grandson, leading to his own ruin and the ruin of his empire. Akbar's ambition for supremacy over the whole Indian sub-continent demanded it; the policy of the previous Muslim rulers like 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī pointed to it; and the Portuguese influence at the courts of the Deccan sultānates made it imperative on the emperor who needed no

*casus belli*. Akbar had always reckoned the Portuguese as a power, controlling important parts of India's seaboard and growing as a menace to the Mughul empire, and he considered it essential to counteract their influence at the cabinets of the Deccan sultānates. Chronic jealousy and frequent wars between these States offered Akbar the favourable ground for the fulfilment of his imperial ambition. Of the five offshoots of the Bahmanī empire, Ahmadnagar, Bijāpur and Golconda concerned Akbar. Berār had been annexed by Ahmadnagar in 1574 and Bīdar was too insignificant to attract attention. Besides, there was the kingdom of Khāndesh which was the outpost of Mughul invasion into the South.

As early as 1564 Akbar had sent from Māndū an envoy to Mubārak Shāh II of Khāndesh, demanding the hand of his daughter. Mubārak sent his daughter and agreed to surrender Bijāgarh and Hindiya and recognize Akbar's sovereignty by reciting his name in the *khutba*. During his campaign in Gujarāt in 1573 Akbar despatched envoys to the courts of Khāndesh and Ahmadnagar and four years later, in 1577, the emperor received letters and an envoy from the Nizām Shāhī court in response to an embassy which he had sent. About this time, in February, 1577, Akbar despatched an expedition under Shihāb-ud-dīn Ahmad Khān against the new ruler of Khāndesh, Rājā 'Alī Khān, who reversed the policy of his predecessors, Mubārak II (1535-66) and Muhammad II (1566-76) by assuming the title of Shāh and refusing to pay tribute. The expedition, however, was withdrawn shortly after as Rājā 'Alī Khān paid tribute.

It was not until 1585 that Akbar secured some pretext for interference into the Deccan affairs. The dictatorial rule of Salābat Khān, the minister of Murtazā Nizām Shāh of Ahmadnagar, disgusted the nobles, some of whom fled to Akbar's court and sought his help. In 1585 Akbar ordered Khān 'Azam, governor of Mālwa, to invade Berār but it was not until the next year that he could actually carry out the royal order. He invaded Berār, sacked its capital, Ellichpur, but had to retreat to Nandurbār after fighting an indecisive battle at Chandur<sup>31a</sup> on account of the combined opposition of the troops of Rājā 'Alī Khān and the Nizām Shāh. He banked on the help of the Khān Khānān, governor of Gujarāt, which he failed to secure, and the expedition came to a barren end.

The Deccan enjoyed a respite for about three years after which circumstances in Ahmadnagar invited Akbar's aggression. On 14 June, 1588, Murtazā Nizām Shāh I was murdered by his son Husain who succeeded him but was himself deposed and murdered on 1 April, 1589, by the nobles who raised to the throne Ismā'il, the

son of Burhān-ud-dīn, the younger brother of Murtazā Nizām Shāh, now a refugee at Akbar's court. This aroused the ambition of Burhān-ud-dīn to secure the throne of Ahmadnagar and offered Akbar the pretext for interference into its affairs. Akbar sent him to Mālwa with instructions to Khān A'zam and Rājā 'Alī Khān of Khāndesh to help him secure the Ahmadnagar throne. Burhān, however, refused Mughul assistance to avoid inconvenient and humiliating obligations and invaded Berār with his own troops, but he was defeated and retreated to Khāndesh. His second attempt, in which Rājā 'Alī Khān substantially helped him and secured for him the help of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shāh II, proved successful. Ismā'il was taken captive after the victory of Burhān and Rājā 'Alī at the battle of Rohankhed.<sup>32</sup> Burhān deposed him and sat on the throne of Ahmadnagar as Burhān Nizām Shāh II (May, 1591). Burhān, whom Akbar regarded as his protege, far from proving his obedient vassal, asserted his independence.

Akbar was outwitted and so, in August, 1591, he sent ambassadors to the courts of Khāndesh, Ahmadnagar, Bijāpur and Golconda. In 1593 Faizī and the other envoys returned from the Deccan. None of the sultāns agreed to acknowledge Akbar's sovereignty, though Rājā 'Alī Khān sent his daughter for marriage with Prince Salīm and the sultāns of Bijāpur and Golconda were good enough to present rich gifts to the emperor. Burhān did not even accord Akbar's envoy Faizī an honourable treatment. It was high time that Akbar should send an expedition and he appointed the Khān Khānān and Sultān Murād to this command, assisted by Mīrzā Shāh Rukh and Shāhbāz Khān. Dissensions between the imperial leaders, however, delayed operation. Murād wanted the officers of Mālwa to join him in Gujarāt, his province, and march from there to the Deccan, while the Khān Khānān wanted to proceed from Mālwa, where he was then stationed, and refused to act as a mere follower of the prince.

Meanwhile the course of events in Ahmadnagar offered Akbar the *casus belli* which he had long sought for. On the death of Burhān Nizām Shāh II in April, 1595, his elder son Ibrāhīm succeeded him but a few months after he was slain in a battle. Ibrāhīm's infant son Bahādur was imprisoned by Miyān Manjhū and the Deccanis; they raised to the throne a youth named Ahmad who was represented as the son of Muhammad Khudābanda, sixth son of Burhān Nizām Shāh I (1509-1553). But Chānd Sultān, daughter of Husain Nizām Shāh I and widow of 'Alī 'Ādil Shāh I of Bijāpur, championed the cause of the lawful heir, Bahādur. The African nobles, who supported another candidate, besieged Miyān Manjhū in Ahmadnagar who sought the help of Sultān Murād, governor of Gujarāt.

The prince, who had been preparing for a campaign in the Deccan, marched without delay and at Chandur,<sup>33</sup> some sixty miles from Ahmadnagar, where he was joined by the Khān Khānān, Rājā 'Alī Khān also joined the imperial force, though rather reluctantly, because his real sympathies were with the Deccan kingdom. The Mughul army arrived before Ahmadnagar on 26 December, 1595, and, instead of coming as allies, they came as invaders, as Firishta justly comments, and besieged the city.

Miyān Manjhū, who regretted the appeal he had made to the Mughuls, retired from Ahmadnagar, and Chānd Sultān took the helm of affairs in her own hand. The jealousy and dissension between the Mughul commanders, the heroic defence of the fort by the 'noble queen' and the encouragement the garrison received from Rājā 'Alī Khān, who sent secret messages to them, made the progress of the siege slow. In response to the call of Chānd Sultān, the nobles rallied round her. Ikhlās Khān marched from Daulatābād with 10,000 horse but in the vicinity of Paithan on the Godāvari the Mughuls defeated him. Ābhang Khān marched from the southern frontier with 7,000 horse but was badly defeated by the Khān Khānān's troops with heavy loss. In the doom of Ahmadnagar the sultāns of Bijāpur and Golconda read their own and they sent a big army which was advancing from the Bijāpur frontier. The Mughuls, therefore, had recourse to digging mines with a view to destroying the defences but treachery helped the garrison who, being informed in time, destroyed the mines by countermining. Meanwhile the confederate army of Bijāpur and Golconda was approaching the city and scarcity of provisions prevailed in the Mughul camp. Sultān Murād accordingly offered terms of peace to Chānd Sultān: the Mughuls would raise the siege of Ahmadnagar provided Berār was ceded to them. Reluctantly Chānd Sultān agreed and peace was concluded on 23 March, 1596.<sup>34</sup> The Mughuls raised the siege of Ahmadnagar and retired to Berār and the first act in the drama of Akbar's Deccan campaign ended.

The peace thus concluded proved a mere truce. There were causes of complaint on both sides, but the terms of peace were actually violated, against Chānd Sultān's advice, by the rulers of Ahmadnagar who, encouraged by the approach of the Bijāpur and Golconda army, whose help they had sought, made an attempt to expel the Mughul troops from Berār. The Khān Khānān moved with an army of 15,000 horse against the Deccanis, and at Āshti near Sonpet a hardly-contested battle took place on 8 and 9 February, 1597. The battle began late in the afternoon. Suhail Khān, the commander of the Bijāpur troops, made an artillery at-

tack with such vehemence that the two wings of the Mughul army were defeated and put to flight and Rājā 'Alī Khān of Khāndesh, who commanded the Mughul left, was slain with his officers and 500 of his men. The Khān Khānān and Shāh Rukh Mīrzā who commanded the centre ably stood their ground, pushed back the troops of Ahmadnagar and captured the Bijāpur artillery. Next morning the Khān Khānān with 7,000 men, who had assembled at night, inflicted a severe defeat upon the Bijāpur troops who, with Suhail Khān wounded, fled.

The victory of the Khān Khānān was not however followed by any remarkable progress of the Mughul arms in the Deccan, particularly because of the dissension between the two commanders which led to the recall of the hero of Āshti to court. In 1598 the Mughuls gained some minor successes; they took Gāwīl, Narnāla, Kherlā and other forts in Berār. Next year Akbar sent to the Deccan Abu-'l-Fazl who arrived at Burhānpur in May but failed to persuade Bahādur, son and successor of Rājā 'Alī Khān of Khāndesh, to join the imperial army. On 12 May, 1599, Prince Murād died of delirium tremens and his younger brother Prince Dāniyāl was appointed to the Deccan command, but his movement was so leisurely that he did not reach Burhānpur until 1 January, 1600. Taking advantage of this situation, the Ahmadnagar troops besieged the Mughul commandant at the fort of Bīr.

Akbar, who was now freed from the bogey of Uzbek invasion because of the death of 'Abdullah Khān in February, 1598, left Āgra on 29 September, 1599, with 80,000 horse and despatched the Khān Khānān to join Dāniyāl in the Deccan. Dissension in Ahmadnagar favoured the Mughul cause. Chānd Sultān was opposed by Ābhang Khān and she opened negotiations with Abu-'l-Fazl by which she agreed to surrender Ahmadnagar if the Mughuls would remove Ābhang Khān. Ābhang replied by despatching an army which invaded Berār and advanced as far as Ellichpur, but was ultimately defeated by the Mughuls.

The arrival of Prince Dāniyāl at Burhānpur in January, 1600, added fresh complication to the intricate situation. Bahādur refused to wait on him and shut himself up in the fort of Asīrgarh and the enraged prince summoned the officers of Berār to reply to Bahādur's insolence. Akbar, who was now in Mālwa on his way to the Deccan, sent orders to the prince to march towards Ahmadnagar and he himself hastened towards Burhānpur to deal with the defiant Bahādur. On 8 April Akbar appeared before Burhānpur and the very next day he despatched Khān A'zam to besiege the fort of Asīrgarh.

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Dāniyāl and the Khān Khānān accordingly marched towards Ahmadnagar. Ābhang Khān proceeded to oppose them but ultimately retreated to Junnār. On 21 April the Mughuls besieged the fort without opposition. Chānd Sultān, who advised peace with the Mughuls by surrender of the fort, was put to death by a riotous faction which was opposed to her policy. With her fall the star of Ahmadnagar sank. The defences of the fort were destroyed by mines and the Mughuls stormed it on 28 August. The fall of Ahmadnagar alarmed Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shāh II of Bijāpur who sent an envoy to Akbar to conciliate him and agreed to give his daughter in marriage to Prince Dāniyāl.

Bahādur, who had enough provisions in the fort of Asīrgarh to stand a siege, opened negotiations with Akbar just to gain time so that the Mughuls would be compelled to raise the siege on account of scarcity of provisions, but Akbar saw through the design and demanded unconditional surrender. On 21 June a Mughul force captured the Sāpan hill from which the enemy harassed the besiegers and a second overture for peace was also rejected in September. But the progress of the siege was remarkably slow and Abu'l-Fazl was sent to infuse fresh vigour into the besiegers. The garrison was, however, reduced to great straits on account of the congestion of men, animals and stores and a pestilence broke out which took a huge toll of lives. This miserable plight of the besieged enabled the Mughuls to capture on 9 December the fort of Mālīgarh, situated to the north-west of the main fort and on the lower slopes of the hill. These circumstances compelled Bahādur to agree to Akbar's proposal to meet him at his camp for negotiation on condition that Khāndesh would be restored to him and the members of the royal family would be released. On 21 December Bahādur came to Akbar's camp. He had left instruction to the garrison not to surrender and consequently he refused to surrender the fort. Akbar had tried to secure the help of Portuguese artillery through the Jesuits but failed. He therefore detained Bahādur and coerced him to write to the garrison for delivering the keys of the fort. Yāqūt, the Abyssinian commandant of the fort, loyal to Bahādur's instruction, disregarded his master's letter from Akbar's camp delivered to him by his son Muqarrab Khān, and, on the refusal of every other member of the royal family to sit on the throne for its defence, committed suicide. The garrison, largely bribed by Akbar's officers, lost morale and surrendered the fort to the Mughuls on 6 January, 1601.<sup>35</sup> In the siege of Asīrgarh Akbar stands guilty of an act of treachery; he was not treache-

rous by nature but when expediency demanded it, he did not hesitate to use it as a weapon.<sup>36</sup>

Akbar made over the government of Khāndesh to Dāniyāl and ultimately Khāndesh, Berār and the annexed portion of Ahmadnagar were combined as the viceroyalty of the Deccan under the prince. A large portion of Ahmadnagar remained independent under Murtazā Nizām Shāh II, the son of Shāh 'Alī, third son of Burhān I, as the nominal ruler but with Malik 'Ambar as the real power with whom the Mughuls made peace after minor engagements.

## VII. REVOLT OF SALĪM

Akbar intended to deal with the kingdom of Bijāpur, Golconda and Bīdar but he had to leave the Deccan in April for the North where Salīm was in active mutiny. On 23 August, 1601, the emperor reached Āgra. His profligate son, who had disliked his bestowing favour on Dāniyāl, became impatient of the delay in securing the throne. As early as 1591<sup>36a</sup> he had displayed shameless eagerness to grasp sovereign power and nine years later, taking advantage of Akbar's preoccupation in the Deccan, attempted a *coup de main*. Salīm's revolt was not a protest of orthodox Islām against the heterodoxy of Akbar and Abu-'l-Fazl. Salīm did not champion the cause of Islāmic orthodoxy, as Count Von Noer states. When Akbar set out for the Deccan, the prince had been left in charge of the capital and entrusted with the task of suppressing the Rānā of Mewār in collaboration with Rājā Mān Singh. But he neither seriously carried out his father's instructions nor listened to his brother-in-law who advised him to accompany him to Bengal where he was transferred to deal with the rebellion of the Afghāns. He first made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Āgra and the Punjab and then crossing the Yamunā on 23 July, 1600, made for Allāhabād, evading an interview with his grandmother who hastened after him to dissuade him from his purpose. On arrival at Allāhabād he took possession of the treasures of Bihār amounting to 30 lakhs of Rupees and seized the territory from Kālpī to Hājīpur where he appointed his own officers. He sent an evasive reply to his father's letter from the Deccan. On his return to the capital Akbar opened negotiations with his rebel son but Salīm advanced towards Āgra at the head of 30,000 horse and reached Etāwa. Akbar despatched a letter of remonstrance and threat ordering the prince to return to Allāhabād and then offered him the government of Bengal and Orissa. Salīm disregarded the offer but returned to Allāhabād (May, 1602) where he set up as an indepen-

dent monarch. He sent his envoy to Āgra to negotiate peace with his father who could hardly agree to his extravagant demands. Besides he struck coins in his own name and had the audacity to send specimens to confirm his sovereign powers. This fresh provocation moved Akbar to action which paternal affection as well as policy had so long prevented. He recalled from the Deccan his valued counsellor Abu-'l-Fazl who deeply resented the prince's foolish and shameless conduct and assured his sovereign that he would bring the 'king of Allāhabād' bound to court and immediately left for the capital. Salīm, who was jealous of the power and influence of the great minister, regarded him as his personal enemy and saw his impending doom. He apprehended that Abu-'l-Fazl's influence might cause Akbar to adopt a sterner attitude and even to take the extreme step of disinheriting him. He was determined to destroy Abu-'l-Fazl and commissioned Bīr Singh, the rebel Bundelā chieftain of Orchha, for this purpose. On 19 August 1602, the loyal bandit intercepted Abu-'l-Fazl between Sārāī Bīr and Antri<sup>37</sup> and with 500 horsemen fell upon the great minister, overpowered his insufficient escort and after severing the head from his body, sent it to Salīm at Allāhabād. It is strange to relate that this cultured prince received it with barbaric delight and treated the savage murder of the greatest savant of Muslim India with supreme contempt. Stranger still, even in his autobiography, which must have been written later and in calmer moments, he refers to the incident—tragic beyond measure—with almost brutal cynicism.

Akbar became furious and heart-broken. He had lost Rājā Bīrbal, the brilliant wit and poet, in 1586 due to his own mistake and in 1589 he had been deprived of two of his valued servants: Todar Mal, the great financier and Rājā Bhagwān Dās, the valiant commander. In 1593 his faithful counsellor Shaikh Mubārak died and two years later he lost his valued Poet Laureate Faizī; but the loss of Abu-'l-Fazl, his devoted counsellor and constant friend, overpowered him with grief and rage. For three days he abstained himself from appearing in public and he cried like a helpless child. The emperor ordered that the culprit should be hunted down and his head brought to court. Bīr Singh was hotly pursued and almost captured in the fortress of Erachh<sup>38</sup> but he managed to escape. This heightened the indignation of Akbar who deputed Asad Beg to investigate into the matter and Asad Beg reported great negligence on the part of the officers concerned.

Salīma Sultān Begam, the gifted widow of Bairam Khān and Akbar's cousin and wife, now offered her good offices to reconcile Salīm to his father. She went to Allāhabād and, succeeding in her

mission, returned with the prince who was received by his grandmother one stage from Āgra and led into his father's presence. Salīm presented 12,000 gold *mohurs* and 770 elephants to Akbar who forgave his profligate son deserving capital punishment, received him kindly by a warm embrace and even designated him heir apparent. In October, 1603, Salīm was deputed to lead an expedition against the Rānā of Mewār but he expressed his reluctance and was permitted to return to Allāhabād. At Allāhabād Salīm gave himself up to opium and wine and committed the worst barbarities; he had the news-writer who reported his misdeeds flayed alive in his presence and one of his associates was castrated and another beaten to death. The other son of the emperor, Dāniyāl, who had just married a daughter of the 'Ādil Shāh of Bijāpur, drank himself to death at Burhānpur in April, 1604.<sup>39</sup> Akbar himself set out for Allāhabād to punish his recalcitrant son, but he had to return to Āgra due to the serious illness of his mother who died on 10 September. Akbar deeply mourned her loss and discontinued his movement against Salīm who, by the persuasion of Mīr Sadr Jahān as well as due to the necessity for remaining at court to counteract the intrigues of Khusrav's partisans, agreed to submit and on 16 November arrived at court with rich presents for his father. Akbar welcomed him at the public audience but afterwards reproached him for his misconduct and imprisoned him in a room for ten days during which he was deprived of opium and wine. Thus ends the rebellion of Salīm whom Akbar could probably never forgive in all sincerity as the blood of Abu-'l-Fazl flowed between the grieved father and the unrepentant son.

Meanwhile at court there was a strong party led by Khān A'zam and Rājā Mān Singh who favoured the succession of Salīm's son Khusrav and induced Akbar to set aside the claim of his father. Khusrav was Khān A'zam's son-in-law and Rājā Mān Singh's nephew. Besides, Salīm's misconduct had created an unfavourable opinion of him as heir to the throne.

#### VIII. DEATH OF AKBAR — HIS PERSONALITY

On 3 October, 1605, Akbar fell ill with dysentery and the efforts of his best physician Hakīm 'Alī failed to cure him. Khān A'zam and Rājā Mān Singh now became alert and conspired to seize Salīm when he would next visit his dying father, but the prince was informed in time and was able to return safely from the court. The right of primogeniture had become customary in the Tīmūrid family and the two leaders were outvoted in a conference of the nobles, the majority of whom decided in favour of Salīm. The

Sayyids of Bārha supported his cause and the Rājputs of Rājā Rām Dās, the Kachhwāhā, guarded the treasury in his interest.

On 21 October, when at last Salīm visited his dying father, he could not speak; he made a sign asking his son to place the imperial turban on his head and gird himself with Humāyūn's sword. At midnight on 25-26 October the great monarch passed away, and next morning his body was borne in state to the garden of Bihishtābād (Sikandra), some six miles from Āgra, where he had commenced to build his own mausoleum.

“Happy the writer who shall tell the history of Catherine II”, exclaimed Voltaire. A similar remark might be made with greater justice in regard to Akbar who is ‘one of the hinges of history’ and was great in an age of great rulers: Elizabeth of England, Henry IV of France, Sulaimān the Magnificent of Turkey and Shāh ‘Abbās the Great of Persia were his contemporaries. We have contemporary portraits of the emperor: one from the pen of the Jesuit Father Monserrate and one from that of his son Jahāngīr and several from the brush of his court painters. Akbar was a man of medium height with broad shoulders, dark sparkling eyes, open forehead, long arms and wheat-coloured complexion. He was strongly built, neither thin nor stout. His eyebrows were narrow, eyelids heavy. His nose was of middle size and his nostrils were wide. Below his left nose was a mole of the size of a pea. His head drooped slightly over his right shoulder. His voice was loud, his conversation witty and animated. Normally he was dignified: when he laughed, he was distorted; in his wrath he was majestic. Altogether he was kingly and was easily recognized as the king in any assemblage of men.

The titanic and complex personality of the great Mughul is not easy to portray. Akbar was by nature humane and gentle, though occasionally he could be violent and cruel as when he ordered the general massacre of the vanquished garrison of Chitor and put a luckless lamp-lighter to death for the crime of having fallen asleep close to the royal couch. Chivalrous and just to all men, fundamentally sincere and straightforward, charitable and generous to a fallen foe, he could be perfidious and unscrupulous when expediency demanded it, as we find him in his treatment of Yūsuf Shāh of Kāshmir and Bahādur Shāh of Khāndesh. Genial and sociable, possessed of a magnetic personality and winning manners, he had ‘super-abundant capacity for sympathy’ and genius for gaining the love and affection of his people and the respect and admiration of his enemy. Moderate in his diet, he took but one full meal a

day. A temperate drinker, he was fond of fruit; he disliked and ultimately abstained from flesh food. Possessed of radiant energy, he was essentially a man of action. Equally efficient in riding, polo and swordsmanship, he was an unerring shot and had practical knowledge of the mechanical arts. A true Tīmūrid in his dauntless personal courage, he would expose himself in battles and sieges and would not hesitate to risk his life by attacking a mighty tiger or by hand-to-hand challenge of the enemy as in the battle of Sarnāl. He possessed the essential qualities of a general: capacity for strategy and practical knowledge of war to a remarkable degree as well as swiftness of military movements that was perfectly Alexandrine. His mastery of speed and surprise was revealed in his wonderful *blitzkrieg* in Gujarāt. The siege of Chitor revealed him as an exact marksman. The Kābul campaign showed his mastery of detail and that of Bengal, where he defeated the Afghāns during the full rains, proved his contempt of time-honoured custom. His Central Asian policy, by which he maintained the balance by playing off ‘Abdullah Khān of Bukhārā against Shāh ‘Abbās of Persia, befriending both but helping neither, is well worthy of the *Roi Soleil* and testifies to his mastery in diplomacy. A man of soaring and boundless ambition, he was a self-confessed annexationist, an antithesis of the great Asoka whom he resembles in so many respects. He was an indefatigable worker at the trade of a king and would only sleep for three hours at night. His mind was as active as his body. Sincerely religious and God-fearing, he was a rationalist and a dreamer, a mystic and a seeker after truth: he covered under his inexhaustible energy a soul melancholy. Of his two inscriptions on the walls of the portico of the *Buland Darwāza*, one records the date of his proud conquest of Khāndesh and the Deccan and the other reminds all of the transitoriness of worldly things. He had an infectious enthusiasm for religious and philosophical discussions. He could neither read nor write, but he was not ignorant as Badāūnī would have us believe. Monserrate, who was impressed by his splendid versatility, testifies that in spite of his illiteracy, he was yet most learned (*doctissimus eruditissimusque*).<sup>40</sup> He was a man of many interests and varied tastes. He had books read to him on poetry, history, philosophy and theology and he had a prodigious memory. He took interest in music and to him the art of painting was a means to the realization of the greatness and glory of God. He not only laid the real foundation of the Mughul empire and conferred on the subjects of his far-flung dominion the blessings of *Pax Mughuliana*, but he was also the founder of Mughul polity and he made his capital the veritable Mecca of culture and civilization rivalling, if not surpassing,

in grandeur Herāt of Sultān Husain Mīrzā Baiqara, the *grande monarque* of Central Asia. Architecture and gardening, calligraphy and painting, music and the minor arts, history and poetry, theology and philosophy, all were represented at his sumptuous court. He laid the foundation of the Mughul school of painting and the Mughul style of architecture. Persian as well as Hindī literature had a glorious revival under his generous patronage. Kausarī, the court poet of Shāh ‘Abbās the Great, even regrets that the centre of Persian literature had shifted from Persia to Hindusthān. Even Sanskritic studies did receive his positive encouragement.<sup>40a</sup> Indeed Akbar took an important part in the evolution of Mughul civilization by the happy fusion and harmonious blending of Persian and Indian cultures; he himself was the very symbol of that synthesis.

Yet it has to be confessed that Akbar’s knowledge, acquired through ears, could neither be methodical nor co-ordinated. He was a man of original ideas and bold conceptions. His administrative and military reforms reveal his constructive ability and organizational power. In his social reforms—the abolition of forced *satī*,<sup>41</sup> encouragement of widow remarriage and prohibition of child marriage—he anticipated the ideas of modern times. He believed in the divinity of kingship in regarding royalty as a ‘light emanating from God’ and by his character and work he raised the prestige of monarchy. He was a statesman *par excellence* with a masculine intellect, profound knowledge of human nature, judgment of problems and a vision of things afar: he could hear the beating of drums coming from a distant mart. He was the first Muslim ruler, Sher Shāh excepted, who accepted the responsibilities of government with the welfare of the governed as its objective. He gave a new orientation to Indo-Islāmic history. Few monarchs have come nearer to the ideal of a father of his people. As the apostle of *sulh-i-kull* (universal toleration) he stands unique. In his boyhood there were the fires of Smithfield in England, his contemporary was Philip II of Spain and he was followed a century later by the monarch of the Dragonnades. While the Duke of Alva by the stroke of his pen was massacring millions of people for their resistance to the authority of Rome, Abu-’l-Fazl was enunciating that ‘persecution defeats its own purpose.’ Like the *Buland Darwāza* that he built at Fathpur Sīkrī, Akbar towers far above his contemporary sovereigns and, with all his vices, he remains not only as one of the grandest monarchs known to history but ‘one of the few royal figures that approach the stature of great men.’

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1. *Badāūnī*, Tr. by Ranking, Vol. I, p. 2.
- 1a. Vambery, *The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral Ali Rai's*, pp. 56-58.
- 1b. Hodivala, *Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics*, pp. 265-66; 'Ārif Qandahārī, *Tārīkh-i-Akbarī*, pp. 40-41.
2. There is a picture by the famous artist Khvāja 'Abdus-Samad illustrating the incident, at the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Reproduced in Percy Brown, *Indian Painting under the Mughals*, p. 55.
3. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, June 1952, pp. 147-156.
4. This conclusion is not based on the statements of later chroniclers like Ahmad Yādgār and Van den Broecke as Vincent Smith has done in *J.R.A.S.*, 1916, pp. 527-34, but on the evidence of two really contemporary authorities: Bāyazīd Biyāt and 'Ārif Qandahārī, supplemented by other chroniclers. For a full discussion see *Dacca University Studies*, November 1935, pp. 67-101.
5. Town in Kāshmir State 32° 38', 75° 24'; Thornton, *Gazetteer of India*, London, 1886.
6. Her mother was a daughter of Bābur. See the article on Salīma Begam in *J.A.S.B.*, 1906, and A.S. Beveridge, *Humāyun-nāma*, pp. 276-78.
7. The conflicting accounts in the chronicles make it difficult to say whether he was a saint or a charlatan.
- 7a. *Tab. Akbarī*, Eng. Transl. II, p. 112; *Tārīkh-i-Alfī*, I. O.Ms., ff. 423-4.
- 7b. Vide *Tab. Akbarī*. Eng. Transl. II., p. 238. The message runs thus; 'As I have come to such distance without consulting you, my attendants have become uneasy (lit. fallen into suspicion). It is best and proper if you will soothe them so that they may serve with composure of mind.'
8. Vincent Smith is wrong in his statement that Bairam Khān died as a young man of thirty-six or thirty-seven, *Akbar the Great Mogul*, p. 46, n. 2. See *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 1949, pp. 191-195.
9. Two chronicles assert that Bairam Khān proceeded to the Punjab with a view to going to Mecca by way of Qandahār and Mashhad, holy for the Shīahs, the road to Gujarāt being controlled by Māl Dev, rājā of Jodhpur, who was hostile to Bairam, *Ma'dan-i-akhbār-i-Ahmadī*. f. 183 b and *Khāfī Khān*, Vol. I, pp. 146-47.
10. See *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. I, 1921, pp. 327-44. Also *Ma'dan-i-akhbār-i-Ahmadī*, f. 177 a and *Zubdat-ut-Tawārīkh*, I O.Ms., f. 103 b.
11. In Jubbulpūr district. 23° 10' N., 79° 57' E.
12. In Narsinghpur district. 22° 46' N., 78° 59' E.
13. See *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1904, 'A Forgotten City.'
14. Vide Chapter II.
15. For the Shaibānīds see Lane-Poole, *The Mohammadan Dynasties*, pp. 270-72.
16. *Cambridge Shorter History of India*, p. 346.
17. Firishta suggests that they wanted to retire to Mālwa with a view to joining the rebellious Mirzās or forming an alliance with the sultāns of the Deccan, Briggs, Vol. II, p. 227; Text, Vol. II, p. 256.
18. The site of the battle named by Abu-'l-Fazl as 'Sakrawal' and Nizām-ud-dīn and Badāūnī as 'Mankarwal' cannot be properly identified.
19. He remained there until March 1572, when through the intercession of Mun'im Khān he obtained pardon and was granted Lakhnau as his fief where he died shortly after. 'Abdullah Khān who had escaped from Gujarāt and joined Khān Zamān in Jaunpur had already died.
20. See Chapter III.
- 20a. *Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, Rājputāna*, p. 132.
21. Major Price and Beveridge (*Akbar-nāma*, Eng. Trans. Vol. II, p. 464) and following them Vincent Smith also gave the incorrect date, 20 October.
22. *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. Trans. Vol. II, p. 333; Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 85.

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- 22a. Haig reads Nāgaur as Bāgor as he considers that Akbar should not have proceeded in a north-westerly direction from Ajmer when his objective lay to the south-west. But besides the MSS. of the *Akbar-nāma*, Nizam-ud-dīn, Badāūnī, Firishṭa and 'Abdul-Bāqī state that Akbar left Ajmer for Nāgaur.
- 22b. *Tab. Akbarī*, Eng. Trans. II, p. 403.
23. Moreland has rightly objected to the translation of *khālisa* as 'crown lands', *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 29, n. 1.
- 23a. A town in Patna district.
- 23b. Tod. *Annals and Antiquities of Rājasthān*, Ed. by Crooke, I, p. 394.
- 23c. *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. Trans. II, p. 93.
- 23d. *Ibid.*, III, p. 332.
- 23e. *Āin-i-Akbarī*, Trans. by Jarrett, III, p. 394; *Badāūnī*, Trans. by Lowe, II, p. 213; *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. Trans., III, p. 397.
24. See *J.R.A.S.*, 1924, pp. 591-608, where Buckler emphasizes the importance of the 'declaration' in relation to the outer Islāmic world. There is no reason to believe, as Buckler does, that the early Mughul emperors acknowledged the sovereignty of the Safavī Shāhs or that the latter asserted the right of overlordship over the former. On this point see Tripathi, *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, pp. 156-58, and S. Ray, *Humāyūn in Persia*, pp. 58-60. See also Hollister, *The Shī'a of India*, pp. 133-34, London, 1953.
25. The date as given by Luis de Guzman is here accepted. See Maclagan, *The Jesuits and the Great Mogul*, p. 42.
26. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Vol. II, pp. 97, 105-9.
27. Lowe, *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh*, Vol. II, pp. 263-64.
- 27a. *Ibid.*, p. 308; Maclagan, *The Jesuits and the Great Mogul*, p. 62.
- 27b. Freeman, *History and Conquests of the Saracens*, pp. 199-200.
- 27c. Von Noer, Havell, Yusuf Ali and following them M. L. Roy Chowdhury; Sri Ram Sharma and A. L. Srivastava rather do not consider it a religion.
28. Goldziher, *Mohammed and Islām*, p. 330.
- 28a. Maclagan, *The Jesuits and the Great Mogul*, p. 34. The Jesuit sources are Peruschi, du Jarric and *Informatione*.
- 28b. Maclagan, *op. cit.*, p. 34; Monserrate, *Commentarius* (Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, iii, 1914), fol. 42a.
- 28c. R. D. Banerji, *History of Orissa*, Vol. II, p. 3.
- 28d. See *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. III, p. 431. '[Akbar]...had ordered for the encouragement of the army that the pay of the soldiers should be increased by 100 per cent. in Bengal and 50 per cent. in Bihār. The Khwāja [Shāh Mansūr]...did not understand the situation and took upon himself the responsibility of issuing an order to the effect that in Bengal the increase should be 50 per cent and in Bihār, 20 per cent. Muzaffar was bound by the order and made out the accounts from the beginning of the year, and so instituted heavy demands'. As pointed out by Beveridge in *Akbar-nāma*, III, footnote, p. 431, Mansūr reduced the pay and apparently Muzaffar made the reduction take effect from the beginning of the year and so demanded repayment of the excess. Therefore it comes to this that 'Muzaffar decreased the pay of the troops in Bengal by 50 per cent. and in Bihar by 30 per cent'. The pay was already increased and Muzaffar reduced it and demanded repayment. Shāh Mansūr was responsible for this measure, but in Bengal Muzaffar executed it. For tactlessness and severity, see J. N. Sarkar—*History of Bengal*, II, published by Dacca University, p. 196; *Badāūnī*, Eng. Trans., II, pp. 288-89.
29. Cf. *J.A.S.B.*, 1915, pp. 201-04; *Tab. Akbarī*, Eng. Trans., II; pp. 545-7, 553-4; *Badāūnī*, Trans. by Lowe, II, pp. 298-303; *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. Trans., III, pp. 501-505. *Maāsir-ul-Umarā*, Vol. I, pp. 656-7.
- 29a. *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. Trans., III., pp. 541-2; *Badāūnī*, Eng. Trans. by Lowe, II, p. 303; *Tab. Akbarī*, Eng. Trans., II, p. 551.
30. *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, p. 209, has 10 April, 1592 which seems incorrect. The battle took place on 31 Farwardīn or 6 Rajab, 1000 A.H., which yields

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- 18 April, 1592. The error has been probably due to calculation based on Beveridge's conversion of 5 Jumāda II, 1000, into 11 March, 1592 at p. 927, A.N., iii.; it should be 19 march.
- 30a. 'Abdur Rahim, Mughal Relations with Central Asia, *Islamic Culture*, January 1937, pp. 81-90; R.C. Verma, *Foreign Policy of the Great Mughals*, pp. 58-59.
- 30b. Hoyland and Banerjee, *Commentaries of Fr. Monserrate*, p. 172.
- 30c. *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. Trans., III, p. 758.
- 30d. For rivalry and jealousy over the Caliphate issue, Cf. Arnold, *The Caliphate*.
- 30e. *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. Trans., III, pp. 757-8.
31. The letter is reproduced in J. C. Locke, *The First Englishmen in India*, London, 1930, pp. 31-32. It is the earliest communication between the Governments of the two countries.
- 31a. In Ellichpur district.
32. 20° 37' N. and 76° 11' E.
33. 20° 19' N. and 74° 15' E.
34. *Burhān-i-Maāsir*, Eng. Trans. in *Indian Antiquary*, November 1923, p. 345.
35. The above date is given by Abu-'l-Fazl who himself was present at the gate of the fort. According to the inscription on the front wall of the Jāmi' Masjid in the fort, the date was 26 January, 1601.
36. The siege of Asirgarh has been a controversial point in Akbar's history. The Jesuit version of the incident is at variance with that of the Muslim chronicles. After careful examination Payne has come to the definite conclusion that the 'Jesuit references to the Deccan campaigns are vague and inaccurate.' The exhaustive researches of Payne have conclusively overthrown V. A. Smith's charge against Abu-'l-Fazl that he was guilty of deliberate perversion of the truth. According to Du Jarric, Muqarrab Khān, the commandant's son, was killed by Akbar when he reported his father's refusal to surrender the fort, while according to the Muslim chronicles he committed suicide to avoid the critical situation. For a detailed discussion see Payne, *Akbar and the Jesuits*, pp. 248-258; *Akbar-nāma*, Eng. Trans., Vol. III, pp. 1168-69; *Indian Antiquary*, 1918, pp. 180-83; and V. A. Smith, *Akbar*, pp. 272-86 and 297-300. V. A. Smith unjustly accused Abu-'l-Fazl without consulting the *Akbar-nāma*; Abu-'l-Fazl, indeed, does not conceal the fact of Akbar's treachery and his recourse to bribery.
- 36a. *Badā'ūnī*, Lowe, II, p. 390.
37. Sarāi Bīr is about 12 miles from Narwar while Antrī is about 6 miles away from it, Blochmann, *Ā'in-i-Akbarī*, Vol. I, XLVIII. Abu-'l-Fazl's tomb is at Antrī.
38. On the Betwa in Jhānsī district.
39. *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*, Rogers and Beveridge, Vol. I, pp. 34-35, and V. A. Smith, *Akbar*, pp. 331-32. The supplement to the *Akbar-nāma* gives the date as March, 1605.
40. *Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius* by Father Anthony Monserrate, S. J., edited by Rev. H. Hosten, S. J., in *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, iii, No. 9, Calcutta, 1914, p. 643.
- 40a. J. B. Chaudhuri, *Muslim patronage to Sanskrit learning*, pp. 86-88.
41. Akbar saved the widow of Jai Mal, a cousin of Rājā Bhagwān Dās, from *satī* forced on her by her son whom he punished by imprisonment.

## CHAPTER VI

### JAHĀNGĪR

Jahāngīr was born on Wednesday, 9 September, 1569,<sup>1</sup> at Fathpur Sikrī. A child of many prayers,<sup>2</sup> he was named Muhammad Sultān Salīm, though Akbar always, whether drunk or sober, addressed him as 'Shaikhu Bābā.' His early education was entrusted to a famous Muslim divine, Maulānā Mir Kalan Harvī, and later to Shaikh Ahmad, the prince's foster-father, and to Qutb-ud-dīn Muhammad Khān Atga. In 1582, Akbar put him in charge of the famous 'Abdur Rahīm Khān-Khānān, son of Bairam Khān. Jahāngīr acquired proficiency in Persian and Turkish and became an excellent calligraphist. He also showed considerable interest in history, geography, botany, zoology and art. As was customary with the Tīmūrid princes of those days, Prince Salīm was placed in nominal charge of large detachments of the army in the important Kābul campaign of 1581, when he was only twelve years of age. In the following year, he was placed in nominal charge of the departments of justice and public celebrations.

At the age of fifteen, Salīm was married to Man Bāi, daughter of Rājā Bhagawān Dās of Amber. She died in 1604, to the utter grief of Salīm, who recalls her "perfect intelligence" and "her excellences and goodness" with affection in his *Memoirs*.<sup>3</sup>

Salīm's relations with his father, who had always doted on him, were estranged when he came of age. His indecent eagerness to grasp power, his jealousy of Abu-'l-Fazl and Akbar's dislike of his excesses were primarily responsible for this. Reference has already been made in the preceding Chapter to Salīm's open revolt against his father, the murder of Abu-'l-Fazl at his instigation, court-conspiracy against him in favour of Khusrav's succession, Salīm's reconciliation with Akbar and accession after the latter's death. On his accession, Salīm assumed the name Jahāngīr (Holder of the World) and the title of Nūr-ud-dīn (Light of the Faith).

Jahāngīr ascended the throne in the fort of Āgra on 3 November, 1605, at the age of thirty-six. His triumph over Khusrav and his partisans was not marred by any acts of retaliation. Friends and political opponents were all alike recipients of favours. Bīr Singh Bundelā, the murderer of Abu-'l-Fazl, was raised to the dignity of a commander of 3000. The sons and relatives of his

patron saint, Shaikh Salīm Chishtī, were given ranks and offices beyond their hopes and abilities, and this caused much heart-burning among the older officers. "Jahāngīr", says Asād Beg, "began to win the hearts of all the people and officers, and to rearrange the withered world."

One of Jahāngīr's earliest orders, which he mentions with pardonable pride in his *Memoirs*, was the setting up of a chain of justice made of pure gold, thirty *gaz* long, with sixty bells upon it. One end was attached to a battlement of the fort of Āgra and the other to a stone column on the bank of the river. Anyone who failed to secure justice might pull the end outside the fort in order to draw the attention of the Emperor so that the latter might redress his grievances. Later European writers speak of it as a piece of "silly make-believe" and doubt if it were ever used by a person in distress. This criticism is not fair. The chain was a symbol of Jahāngīr's determination to dispense justice fairly and firmly without fear or favour, and whatever his shortcomings may have been—and they were many—he remained true to his ideal of a justice-loving ruler. Asād Beg judiciously remarks: "For the consolation of the hearts of his people, he suspended the chain of justice and removed the rust of oppression from their hearts". The chain of justice was an emblem of his accessibility and of his desire to redress wrongs.

Another of his important acts was the issuing of the Twelve Ordinances for the better government of the country. It is best to let Jahāngīr speak for himself.

"I also gave twelve orders to be observed as rules of conduct (*dastūru-l-amal*) in all my dominions—

"1. Forbidding the levy of cesses under the names of *tamghā* and *mīr bahārī* (river tolls), and other burdens which the *jāgīrdārs* of every province and district had imposed for their own profit.

"2. On roads where thefts and robberies took place, which roads might be at a little distance from habitations, the *jāgīrdārs* of the neighbourhood should build *sarā'īs* (public rest-houses), mosques, and dig wells, which might stimulate population, and people might settle down in those *sarā'īs*. If these should be near a *Khālīṣa* estate (under direct State management), the administrator (*muta-ṣaddī*) of that place should execute the work.

"3. The bales of merchants should not be opened on the roads without informing them and obtaining their leave.

“4. In my dominions if anyone, whether unbeliever or Musalman, should die, his property and effects should be left for his heirs, and no one should interfere with them. If he should have no heir, they should appoint inspectors and separate guardians to guard the property, so that its value might be expended in lawful expenditure, such as the building of mosques and *sarā'īs*, the repair of broken bridges, and the digging of tanks and wells.

“5. They should not make wine or rice-spirit (*darbahra*) or any kind of intoxicating drug, or sell them; although I myself drink wine, and from the age of 18 years up till now, when I am 38, have persisted in it. When I first took a liking to drinking I sometimes took as many as twenty cups of double-distilled spirit; when by degrees it acquired a great influence over me I endeavoured to lessen the quantity, and in the period of seven years I have brought myself from fifteen cups to five or six. My times for drinking were varied; sometimes when three or four sidereal hours of the day remained I would begin to drink, and sometimes at night and partly by day. This went on till I was 30 years old. After that I took to drinking always at night. Now I drink only to digest my food.

“6. They should not take possession of any person's house.

“7. I forbade cutting off the nose or ears of any person, and I myself made a vow by the throne of God that I would not blemish anyone by this punishment.

“8. I gave an order that the officials of the Crown lands and the *jāgīrdārs* should not forcibly take the ryots' lands and cultivate them on their own account.

“9. A government collector or a *jāgīrdār* should not without permission intermarry with the people of the *parganā* in which he might be.

“10. They should found hospitals in the great cities, and appoint physicians for the healing of the sick; whatever the expenditure might be, it should be given from the *Khālīṣa* establishment.

“11. In accordance with the regulations of my revered father, I ordered that each year from the 18th of *Rabi'ū-l-awwal* which is my birthday, for a number of days corresponding to the years of my life, they should not slaughter animals (for food). Two days in each week were also forbidden, one of them Thursday, the day of my accession, and the other Sunday, the day of my father's birth. (He held this day in great esteem on this account, and because it was dedicated to the sun and also because it was the day on which

Creation began. Therefore it was one of the days on which there was no killing in his dominions).

“12. I gave a general order that the offices and *jāgīrs* of my father’s servants should remain as they were. Later, the *manṣabs* (ranks or offices) were increased according to each one’s circumstances by not less than 20 per cent. to 300 or 400 per cent. The subsistence money of the *aḥadīs* was increased by 50 per cent., and I raised the pay of all domestics by 20 per cent. I increased the allowances of all the veiled ladies of my father’s harem from 20 per cent. to 100 per cent. according to their condition and relationship. By one stroke of the pen I confirmed the subsistence lands of the holders of *aimas* (charity lands) within the dominions, who form the army of prayer, according to the deeds in their possession. I gave an order to Mirān Ṣadr Jahān, who is one of the genuine Sayyids of India, and who for a long time held the high office of Ṣadr (ecclesiastical officer) under my father, that he should every day produce before me deserving people (worthy of charity). I released all criminals who had been confined and imprisoned for a long time in the forts and prisons.”<sup>4</sup>

A careful analysis of these ordinances shows Jahāngīr’s genuine desire to ensure to his subjects freedom of person and security of life and property, and his solicitude for their material and moral welfare. The fact that these regulations did not in effect serve the purpose they were intended for, at least to the degree desired by Jahāngīr, does not detract from his honest and sincere desire to promote the happiness and prosperity of his subjects without distinction of class or creed. The regulations are “remarkable for the humanity, justice and political sagacity which pervades them.”

The reign which opened with such promise was marred by the rebellion of Jahāngīr’s son, Khusrav. The attempt to place Khusrav on the throne failed; father and son were reconciled and Jahāngīr, either from policy or large-heartedness, restored his son to his former favour. Khusrav, whom Jerry describes as a “gentleman of a very lovely presence and fine courage” and of great personal charm and well-educated, was immature and inexperienced. The affection bestowed upon him by his father and grandfather and the people of the court and the camp had made him wilful and restive. The fact that he had nearly succeeded in displacing his father had roused his ambition and filled him with a grievance. Jahāngīr did all that was possible to set Khusrav’s mind at rest, but at the same time maintained a careful watch over his movements. Khusrav, petulant and peevish, constantly brooding over the loss of a position

for which he had neither the claim nor the talents, and encouraged by his companions who kept his resentment alive for their personal ends, escaped from Āgra on 6 April, 1606. He made his way to the Punjab, raising troops on the way. The anxiety of Jahāngīr, when he heard of this, was genuine. "My distress arose", he says, "from the thought that my son without any cause or reason had become my enemy, and that if I did not exert myself to capture him, dissatisfied and turbulent men would support him, or he would of his own accord go off to the Uzbeks or Kizilbashes (Persians) and thus dishonour would fall upon my throne."<sup>4a</sup>

Jahāngīr followed Khusrav in person. Khusrav had neither the capacity to organise a successful revolt nor moral and material support of any influential party in the State. The people seem to have liked and loved him as a prince but had no desire to have him as their ruler.

When the prince reached Lahore, the governor closed the gates against him and resisted all the attempts of the rabble Khusrav had collected. Hearing that imperial reinforcements were coming, Khusrav raised the siege and tried to cross the Chenab. His army, ill led, ill equipped and ill organized, was defeated at Bhairowāl. The prince tried to make a dash for Kābul, but the whole country was up against him. He was captured and conducted to Lahore, where he was presented before Jahāngīr in fetters.

Khusrav, trembling and weeping, wanted to fall on the feet of Jahāngīr, who sternly ordered him to stand in his place, and put him in confinement. He further directed a double row of stakes to be set up from the garden to the city and several hundred of the rebels were impaled thereon. Two leading rebels were punished more severely. Hasan Beg was sewn up in the fresh hide of an ox and 'Abdur-Rahīm in that of an ass. Others were let off with lighter punishments.

Arjun, the fifth *Guru* of the Sikhs, an innocent helper of Khusrav, was unwittingly drawn into the whirlpool of this palace intrigue. Khusrav on his way to Lahore had stayed at Taran Taran and was well received by the *Guru* who felt compassion for him and gave him Rs. 5,000. The *Guru* was at first fined by the Government, but as he refused to pay the fine, he was sentenced to death. The death of the *Guru* sowed the seeds of hatred between the Sikhs and the Muslims which the passage of time did not diminish. The execution of the *Guru* was not an act of religious persecution, but it was politically unwise and the Mughuls paid a heavy penalty for it.<sup>5</sup>

Prince Khusrav was later ordered to be blinded, after an insurrection was attempted in his favour. But Jahāngīr afterwards relented and, under the treatment of a Persian physician, Khusrav regained the sight of one eye.

Akbar had succeeded during his lifetime in coercing or cajoling the proud Rājput rulers into acknowledging the supremacy of the Mughuls. Rājput soldiers and statesmen had distinguished themselves by their reckless and romantic courage on many battlefields, and by their wisdom and knowledge of the country and its people in the council-chamber. But the Rājput State of Mewār held aloof and continued to wage an unequal fight against superior Mughul organization and resources. The failure of Mughul military operations against Mewār towards the end of Akbar's reign was in a large measure due to the half-hearted way in which Jahāngīr as Prince Salīm had conducted the operations; his rebellion later called a halt to any further advance.

The first military expedition undertaken by Jahāngīr was against Rānā Amar Singh of Mewār. An army of 20,000 horse was despatched under the command of Prince Parvīz and Āsaf Khān (Ja'far Beg). A battle was fought at Dewar but its issue was doubtful as both sides claimed victory. The rebellion of Khusrav, which occurred during the course of this war, necessitated the withdrawal of the army.

A second expedition was sent in 1608 under the command of Mahābat Khān, but in spite of some initial success the Mughuls made no effective headway against the Rājputs. In 1609 Mahābat Khān was replaced by 'Abdullah Khān, "a valiant soldier, a rash commander and a cruel and rebellious sort of man." The war dragged on till 'Abdullah Khān was sent as governor of Gujarāt and the command given to Rājā Basu. Jahāngīr was thoroughly dissatisfied with the halting way in which the operations were being conducted and appointed Khān A'zam 'Azīz Kuka and Prince Khurram to the command of the forces operating against Mewār. As was inevitable, Khurram and 'Azīz Kuka quarrelled and the latter had to be recalled. The command then devolved on Prince Khurram who now carried on the operations in right earnest. Bit by bit, the country was devastated and the Rānā's supplies were cut off, while the net closed round him. The spirit of Rānā Amar Singh was broken and he submitted in desperate straits. Jahāngīr accepted the submission, graciously received Rānā Amar Singh's son, and restored Mewār, including Chitor, to the Rānā but on the express condition that Chitor was neither to be repaired nor re-forti-

fied. Jahāngīr was rightly very jubilant over the successful conclusion of the long campaign which had taxed the resources of the empire to the utmost. His treatment of the fallen foe was both magnanimous and wise. Now that the hereditary enemy of the Mughul family had rendered submission, Jahāngīr could afford to be generous. He complacently closes his account of the campaign with the following remarks: "My lofty mind was always desirous, as far as possible, not to destroy the old families."

Akbar had to put an end to his personal conduct of the Deccan campaign after the siege of Asīrgarh in 1601 on account of Salīm's rebellion. After Akbar's return the campaigns were carried on indifferently and further advance and consolidation were rendered impossible by the senseless factiousness of Mughul officers. When Jahāngīr turned to the Deccan after his armies had been relieved from the Mewār campaign, he found himself faced with the famous Malik 'Ambar, one of the ablest soldiers, administrators and statesmen the Deccan has produced.

Malik 'Ambar was an Abyssinian by birth. He had served for a long time under the Nizām Shāhī rulers and by sheer ability and force of character had risen to the highest position in the kingdom. After the fall of Ahmadnagar he retired to Khirki with a scion of the reigning family, Murtaza Nizām Shāh. His loyalty to the Nizām Shāhī dynasty was equalled by his intense dislike of the Mughuls, and he devoted his energy to the difficult task of rebuilding the shattered administration of the Nizām Shāhī kingdom. He raised a strong and well-disciplined army and organized the revenue system on the model of Rājā Todar Mal's settlement in the north. He was the first Deccan statesman to conceive the possibility of raising a people's army out of the Marāthā peasantry and to the "traditional mode of warfare (of the Mughuls) he opened a new system of tactics which was remarkably successful during his lifetime."

Malik 'Ambar started by recovering some of the territories lost to the Mughuls in the time of Akbar. In 1608 Jahāngīr sent the Khān Khānān to the Deccan. The Khān having failed to compose the differences amongst the Mughul officers, Prince Parvīz was appointed governor of Khāndesh and Berār (1609). He had neither the talent nor the energy and inclination for strenuous military pursuits. Thomas Roe, who visited him there, has left a graphic account of the pomp and ceremony of the court of Parvīz. The Prince delighted in show but was slow in action. The campaign, which now assumed a defensive character, dragged on without much

success from 1609 to 1615. The Khān Khānān, Khān Jahān Lodī, Khān Zamān, Mān Singh and ‘Abdullah Khān were tried in turn. They failed and frittered away their energies in senseless recrimination against each other to the advantage of the enemy. The Khān Khānān was again put in charge of the operations in 1612, and won some successes, but he was ultimately relieved of his command by Prince Khurram whose military fame, owing to the brilliant conclusion of the Mewār expedition, was then at its height.

Prince Khurram reached Burhānpur in 1617 and Jahāngīr moved to Māndū at the same time. The presence of the Mughul prince in the Deccan with a superbly equipped army filled the Deccanis with dismay. The long and disastrous war had sapped the material resources of the Nizām Shāhī kingdom, and when Khurram proposed peace on the payment of tribute and the restoration of the lost territory, the offer was readily accepted by ‘Ambar as well as the Bijāpur ruler. The territory of Bālāghāt was ceded to the Mughuls and the keys of the forts of Ahmadnagar and other strongholds were delivered. Khurram appointed his own officers to the recovered territory and retired to Māndū amidst great rejoicings and festivities. But all that Khurram had succeeded in doing was to patch up a peace with the recalcitrant forces of the Deccan kingdoms. “Nothing could”, writes Beni Prasad, “conceal the stern reality that the expenditure of millions of rupees and thousands of lives had not advanced the Mughal frontier a single mile beyond the limits of 1605.”<sup>5a</sup>

How temporary the peace was became evident when by 1620 the astute Malik ‘Ambar won back all that he had lost by the previous treaty. In 1621, the relations between Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar became strained and both kingdoms sought the Mughul alliance. The Mughuls closed in with the offer of Bijāpur, and Malik ‘Ambar proceeded to harass the territories of that State. His death in 1626 at the age of eighty (lunar year) sealed the fate of Ahmadnagar and opened up the Deccan to Mughul designs. Mu‘tamid Khān, otherwise very hostile to Malik ‘Ambar, has testified to his great qualities in the following oft-quoted words: “This ‘Ambar was a slave, but an able man. In warfare, in command, in sound judgement, and in administration he had no rival or equal. He well understood the predatory (*Kazzāki*) warfare, which in the language of the Dakhin is called *bargi-giri*. He kept down the turbulent spirits of that country, and maintained his exalted position to the end of his life, and closed his career in honour. History records no other instance of an Abyssinian slave arriving at such eminence.”<sup>6</sup>

One of the important military achievements of the Mughul armies under Jahāngīr was the capture of Kāngra. The fort of Kāngra, perched on the crest of a lofty hill, had long defied all earlier attempts against it. Tradition declares that it had been attacked no less than fifty-four times.

In 1615, Murtaza Khān and Suraj Mal were commissioned to capture the fort. Suraj Mal was accused of hampering the operations and recalled. On the death of Murtaza Khān, Suraj Mal was again placed in command, but this time he broke into open revolt, allied himself with the hill chiefs, and plundered the imperial territory. Rājā Bikramajit was next sent into the valley and he succeeded in recovering the lost imperial prestige. The Rājā of Chambā, who had helped Suraj Mal, submitted and Suraj Mal's property was confiscated and given over to Jagat Singh. The siege of Kāngra now began in right earnest, and, after a stout resistance of fourteen months, the garrison surrendered on 16 November, 1620. Jahāngīr visited the fort a year later with some Muslim divines, and to celebrate the occasion a mosque was built in the fortress.<sup>6a</sup>

In 1611 Rājā Kalyān, son of Rājā Todar Mal, subdued Khardā in Orissa. The Rājā submitted but rebelled in 1617, and his territory was finally annexed to the empire. In 1615, Khokhar was captured with its valuable diamond mines. In 1617, the Jām of Navānagar and Bahara, two Cutch chiefs, were subdued, and three years later Kishtwār, to the south of Kāshmīr, submitted to the Mughuls.

The Afghāns had not been fully reconciled to the loss of their political power in India at the hands of the Mughuls. Though a rising of the Afghāns on an all-India scale was out of the question, ambitious Afghān officers were constantly chafing against the Mughul yoke. In 1599, 'Usmān Khān had rebelled in Bengal, and though Mān Singh put down the rising, the Afghāns continued to give trouble in the earlier years of Jahāngīr's reign. Frequent changes of provincial governors, the distance of Bengal from the capital, and the fact that Jahāngīr's attention was diverted to more serious and larger issues nearer home were responsible for the easy and indifferent manner in which the Afghān rebels were treated. But on 1 April, 1612, Jahāngīr was informed of the victory against the Afghāns and the death of the leader 'Usmān, "the last of the brave Afghāns."

Bengal, one of the most difficult provinces of India to conquer and consolidate, had taxed to the utmost the military power of Akbar because of its distance from Delhi and the power of the irrecon-

cilable Afghān nobility, who, on being uprooted from the Gangetic plain, had found refuge there. In order to consolidate the newly conquered province Akbar had entered into a friendly alliance with Nara Nārāyan, the ruler of Cooch Behār, on the north-east of Bengal, in 1579. The domestic troubles of Cooch Behār led to its division into two States and weakened it considerably. Also the original friendly alliance soon became an instrument of imperial expansion in that region, and by 1596, Cooch Behār had become politically subject to the Mughuls. With the appointment of 'Alā-ud-dīn Islām Khān as the governor of Bengal, a change came over the attitude of the Mughuls towards their erstwhile ally, the ruler of Cooch Behār, who was reduced to the position of a tributary vassal in 1609.

Lakshmī Nārāyan of Cooch Behār, having lost his independence, turned to avenge his humiliation by inciting the Mughul governor against his turbulent cousin, King Parīkshit of Kāmṛūp. The Mughul governor was not slow in taking advantage of his invitation and in 1613, after a nine months' campaign, he succeeded in conquering Kāmṛūp. Direct contact of the Mughuls with the Āhom kings of Assam began after the fall of the kingdom of Kāmṛūp. Imperialistic designs, border disputes and the desire of the Mughuls for active trade relations with Assam, which the latter did not encourage, ultimately led to the invasion of Assam.

At the end of the rainy season of 1615, a large Mughul force was sent under Sayyid Abū Bakr. The army moved to Kohata, the frontier town on the Bar Nadi, and halted there for reinforcements. The struggle opened with an attack on Kajali, the Āhom frontier post on the south-west, and the defeat of the Assamese. The Mughuls moved up to Saurdhara but, in spite of initial victories, they could not retain the initiative. The Mughul army met with a serious defeat and the campaign closed ignominiously. The Āhom king retaliated by creating trouble in Kāmṛūp and made the consolidation of the rule of the Mughuls difficult by inciting the local chiefs against them.

One of the most fascinating figures of Mughul India, around whom fact and fiction have woven a web of romance, was the famous Nūr Jahān, whom Jahāngīr married in 1611 and who survived him by eighteen years. Mīrzā Ghiyās Beg, the father of Nūr Jahān, belonged to a noble family of Tehran, and his father had served as governor of Yazd under Shāh Tahmāsp. The family fell on evil days after the death of Ghiyās's father, and Ghiyās Beg migrated to India in search of employment and fortune. On his way to India, near Qandahār, under very distressing circumstances, his daughter,

Mihr-un-nisa, was born in 1577. Mirzā Ghiyās travelled to India and was presented by Malik Mas'ūd to Akbar at Fathpur Sikrī. Being a talented and experienced man, he soon rose in the estimation of the Emperor and was appointed *dīwān* or superintendent of the household. "He was considered", says Mu'tamid Khān, "exceedingly clever and skilful, both in writing and in transacting business. He had studied the old poets and had a nice appreciation of the meaning of words; . . . his generosity and beneficence to the poor was such that no one ever turned from his door disappointed. In taking bribes, however, he was very bold and daring."<sup>6b</sup>

At the age of eighteen Mihr-un-nisa was married to 'Alī Qulī Beg Istajlu, better known as Sher Afgan (the tiger thrower), who had first served under Shāh Isma'il II and had then come to India and taken service under Akbar. In the reign of Jahāngīr, 'Alī Qulī Beg received a suitable *manṣab*, was styled Sher Afgan and given a *jāgīr* in Bengal. It was reported to Jahāngīr that Sher Afgan was insubordinate and disposed to rebellion. Qutb-ud-dīn, who was sent to Bengal as governor in 1606, confirmed the reports of Sher Afgan's disloyal intentions and was instructed to send him to the court. But Sher Afgan slew Qutb-ud-dīn during an interview and was killed by the followers of Qutb-ud-dīn. Mihr-un-nisa was sent to the capital and entrusted to the care of Jahāngīr's mother. Jahāngīr has been accused of complicity in the murder of Sher Afgan, but there is no evidence in contemporary records to substantiate the charge. "A careful perusal of contemporary chronicles", writes Dr. Ishwari Prasad, "leaves upon our minds the impression that the circumstances of Sher Afgan's death are of a highly suspicious nature, although there is no conclusive evidence to prove that the emperor was guilty of the crime."<sup>7</sup> Four years after the death of her former husband, Mihr-un-nisa was married to Jahāngīr. She received the title of Nūr Mahall and later on of Nūr Jahān, by which title she is most popularly known. The young widow, whose charm of personality was indescribable, and who had profound attachment to Jahāngīr, soon gained ascendancy at the court. Her success raised her ambitions, and as her husband's mental and physical powers declined, her influence and her active participation in State affairs increased. Mu'tamid Khān's plain account is both authentic and reliable: "All her relations and connexions were raised to honour and wealth. No grant of land was conferred upon any woman except under her seal. In addition to giving her the titles that other kings bestow, the Emperor granted Nūr Jahān the rights of sovereignty and government. Sometimes she would sit in the balcony of her palace, while the nobles would present themselves, and

listen to her dictates. Coin was struck in her name, with this superscription: 'By order of the King Jahāngīr, gold has a hundred splendours added to it by receiving the impression of the name of Nūr Jahān, the Queen Begam.' On all *farmāns* also receiving the Imperial signature, the name of 'Nūr Jahān, the Queen Begam', was jointly attached. At last, her authority reached such a pass that the king was such only in name. Repeatedly he gave out that he had bestowed the sovereignty on Nūr Jahān Begam and would say, "I require nothing beyond a *sir* of wine and half a *sir* of meat." It is impossible to describe the beauty and wisdom of the Queen. In any matter that was presented to her, if a difficulty arose, she immediately solved it. Whoever threw himself upon her protection was preserved from tyranny and oppression; and if ever she learnt that any orphan girl was destitute and friendless, she would bring about her marriage, and give her a wedding portion. It is probable that during her reign no less than 500 orphan girls were thus married and portioned."<sup>8</sup>

One immediate effect of Nūr Jahān's influence was the rapid promotion her brother (Āsaf Khān) and father (I'timād-ud-daula) received. But both of them amply deserved the confidence which the emperor reposed in them by reason of their outstanding personal abilities. Even without Nūr Jahān to help them, they would have pushed their way up. But Nūr Jahān accelerated their promotion and the Mughuls gained greatly by the ability and the devotion of these two highly gifted and talented officers. In 1612, Arjumand Bānū Begam, better known as Mumtāz Mahall, daughter of Āsaf Khān, was married to Prince Khurram. "This marriage", says Beni Prasad, "symbolised the alliance of Nūr Jahān, I'timād-ud-daula, and Āsaf Khān with the heir-apparent. For the next ten years this clique of four supremely capable persons practically ruled the empire. What has been called Nūr Jahān's sway was really the sway of these four personages."

Nūr Jahān's political career may be divided into two periods. From 1611 to 1622, she exercised on the whole a sobering and beneficent influence in politics. Her parents, who had seen the vicissitudes of life, had a restraining influence on her. During this period, she worked in close collaboration with Prince Khurram whose cause she furthered. In 1620, Lādli Begam, Nūr Jahān's daughter by her former husband, was betrothed to prince Shahryār. This introduced an unbalancing factor in her relationship with Khurram. The latter had won a position for himself in the court and the camp; he no longer stood in need of the support of Nūr Jahān, and in fact resented her interference. From 1622 Prince Khurram and Nūr Jahān drifted

apart. Jahāngīr fell more and more under the exclusive influence of Nūr Jahān and the older nobility fretted and fumed at the power and influence of her family. Mahābat Khān had the courage to represent to the emperor: "Has His Majesty read in any of the histories of ancient sovereigns that there was a king so subject to the will of his wife?" "But the influence of Nūr Jahān," the author of *Intekhab-i-Jahāngīr Shāh*, regretfully declares, "had wrought so much upon his mind that if 200 men like Mahābat Khān had advised him simultaneously to the same effect, their words would have made no permanent impression upon him." Mahābat Khān favoured the cause of Prince Khurram who was feared as a rival by Nūr Jahān and Prince Khusrav alike. Prince Khurram succeeded in getting the custody of this ill-fated prince, took him to the Deccan, and in January, 1622, Jahāngīr was informed from Burhānpur that Khusrav had died of colic. According to De Laet, Khusrav was murdered in his bedroom by one Raza, at the instance of Prince Khurram. Khusrav was hurriedly buried in Burhānpur, but later his mortal remains were transferred to Allāhabād, and buried in a garden which came to be known as Khusrav-bāgh.

Jahāngīr's health was rapidly deteriorating and Nūr Jahān and Khurram both looked about for allies. Khurram refused to be diverted to the Qandahār campaign; he wished to be near the scene of action in case of his father's death. He seized some of the *jāgīrs* of Nūr Jahān and Prince Shahryār and, when his father reprimanded him and warned him of the consequences of his impudence, he turned a deaf ear. "He persisted in his perverse course", Jahāngīr writes, "and, preferring the way of disobedience to the path of duty, took a decided step on the road to perdition by marching upon Āgra." Khurram hoped to capture Āgra before it could be put in a state of preparation, but in this he did not succeed. He reached Fathpur and plundered the country. The rebels marched towards Delhi but were defeated near Balochpur in 1623. The Prince retired to Mālwa and thence to the Deccan.

Failing to get help from Malik 'Ambar, Khurram occupied Bi-hār and captured Rohtās. But at Allāhabād he found the imperial officers alert and went back to the Deccan. Finally, despairing of success, he wrote to his father begging forgiveness for his conduct. Jahāngīr accepted Khurram's submission on condition of his surrendering the forts of Rohtās and Asīr and giving his two sons, Dārā and Aurangzīb, as hostages. Khurram complied and proceeded to Nasik. The rebellion of Khurram had seriously affected the prestige of the empire, hampered the military operations for

the recovery of Qandahār and wasted the resources of the State in men and money.

The humiliation of Khurram gave secret joy to Nūr Jahān, but the prominent part played by Mahābat Khān in liquidating Khurram's rebellion and Mahābat's alliance with Prince Parvīz was not to her liking. With the object of separating them, Mahābat Khān was ordered either to proceed to Bengal or to repair to the court. Various charges were brought against him. He was said to have realized large sums of money due to the State and also from the *jāgirs*; he had not sent to the court the elephants obtained in Bengal; and, finally, he was guilty of contumacy in betrothing his daughter to the son of Khvāja Umar Naqshbandi, without the previous permission of the emperor, who visited his wrath on the young man by openly disgracing him and seizing all that Mahābat Khān had given him.

Mahābat Khān obeyed the royal summons and came north from the Deccan with 4000 brave Rājputs personally attached to him. Jahāngīr was then on his way to Kābul and was encamped on the banks of the Jhelum. Āsaf Khān, who was with the emperor, crossed over to the other side with the troops, women and children, but before the emperor could go across, Mahābat Khān captured the bridge and stationed 2000 of his Rājputs there, while he himself proceeded to the royal camp and placed the emperor practically under arrest. When Nūr Jahān heard of it, she collected her officers, bitterly reproached her brother and attempted to cross the river. The attempt failed though Nūr Jahān later succeeded in joining her husband in captivity. Āsaf Khān fled and shut himself in the fort of Attock and later on submitted to Mahābat. Nūr Jahān was now left entirely to her own resources, but she did not lose her nerves and continued "to work against Mahābat both in private and in public." Mahābat Khān throughout behaved with courtesy towards the emperor. He had no backing except of his Rājputs and there was no prince of the royal blood in his hands at the time to serve as a trump card. Jahāngīr on the return journey from Kābul succeeded in going over to Rohtās and Mahābat Khān, whose temporary chagrin had forced him into the disloyal course, submitted.<sup>9</sup> He was ordered to release Āsaf Khān and to proceed against Prince Khurram, who had retired into Sindh and was again on the war-path. Mahābat went and joined the Prince who later left for Nasik. Jahāngīr's health was now completely shattered and while returning to Lahore he died on 7 November, 1627.

National and personal considerations had induced Akbar to cultivate relations of friendship with the Portuguese. But he

does not appear to have gained much advantage from the courtesy shown to the Jesuit Fathers or the concessions granted to the Portuguese. At one time Akbar wrote to 'Abdullah Khān Uzbek that he intended to drive the Portuguese into the sea. After the capture of Asīrgarh, Akbar's enthusiasm for them appears to have cooled but relations were not estranged. Jahāngīr desired to maintain friendly relations with them and he sent an embassy to Goa in 1607, and another in 1610. He was, however, thoroughly annoyed with the Portuguese when in 1613 they seized four imperial vessels near Surāt. Failing to get satisfaction, Muqarrab Khān, the governor of Surāt was ordered to chastise the Portuguese. The Mughul commander wisely and skilfully managed to come to terms with Downton, the English sea-captain, so as to remedy his own naval impotence—the weakest point in the Mughul armour. This enabled the Mughul commander to inflict a naval defeat on the Portuguese. The privileges granted to the Portuguese were withdrawn, the churches at Āgra and Lahore were forcibly closed and the Portuguese living in the empire were arrested, wherever they could be found. The Jesuits, however, succeeded in restoring harmony in 1615.

Jahāngīr came into contact with the Jesuits during the lifetime of his father. He always treated the Jesuit Fathers with great courtesy and consideration and they held high hopes of his conversion to Christianity. But Jahāngīr was too good a Muslim and too proud a Mughul to accept baptism. It has been alleged that Jahāngīr's conciliatory attitude was due to the hopes of Portuguese assistance in case his peaceful succession to the throne was contested. That he sided with the Fathers in their debates with the Muslim divines was due to the delight it gave him to see the *mullahs*, always rigid and self-opinionated, worsted in polemical disputes. The veneration he showed to the pictures of Jesus and Mary was due to his personal passion for works of art and to the average Muslim's respect for Christ. He followed the policy of his father in contributing large sums for the erection of churches and showing general toleration for the Christian faith. At Āgra about twenty baptisms took place in 1616, and he permitted the baptism of the sons of his brother, Prince Dāniyāl, who after four years abjured the Christian faith. Father Xavier died in 1617, and Pinheiro in 1618. They were succeeded by Father R. Corsi and Joseph de Castro. The Jesuit mission now assumed the character and functions of an embassy aiming at outplaying the English and furthering the interests of the Portuguese at the court. But the Portuguese power was already on the decline. They had lost the opportunity of establishing their authority and influence in the east owing to their arrogant con-

tempt for oriental people, while their pride and religious intolerance made them feared and despised.

Captain Hawkins arrived at Surat in August 1608, with a letter from James I, King of England, and a present of 25,000 gold pieces. In spite of the opposition of the Jesuit Fathers, Hawkins was well received by Jahāngīr. He could speak Turkish and Persian and was in a better position to win over the Mughul emperor. His mission, however, was a failure and he left in 1611. Paul Canning appeared at the court in 1612 and was followed in 1615 by William Edwards. Both of them met with the same difficulties which Hawkins had to face. The most important and the best known English plenipotentiary who came to Jahāngīr's court was Sir Thomas Roe, "a gentleman of good education, a polished courtier, and a trained diplomatist." Well-qualified for the task assigned to him, which was the negotiation of a treaty giving security to English trade, Roe remained in India for three years but did not succeed in achieving his object. His account of his mission and that of his Chaplain, Terry, constitute a very important source of information about the manners of the court and of the social and political conditions of the time.

Bābur brought to India "an unfulfilled ambition" for conquering the ancestral lands of the Tīmūrīds, and this ambition, coupled with the exigencies of the external defence, found expression in the Mughul policy towards the Persian empire and the Central Asian Princes. The danger of Uzbek expansion towards India impelled the Mughuls to co-operate with the Persian empire, and frustrated the attempts of the Ottoman Sultāns to draw them into a religious alliance of Sunnī powers against the Shīahs of Persia. The Mughuls, further, were estranged from the Uzbeks on account of the latter's traditional hostility to the House of Tīmūr and their constant propaganda against the Mughuls among the tribesmen of the north-west.

The relations of the Persians and the Mughuls were usually friendly. There were, however, two grounds of conflict—Qandahār was coveted by both owing to its strategic and commercial importance, and the Shīah States of the Deccan, with whom the Mughuls were often at war, were on good terms with Persia.

Jahāngīr's reign opened with an unsuccessful attempt by the Persians to occupy Qandahār. That the attack was not wholly unexpected is evident from Jahāngīr's remark: "It occurred to me that the death of His Majesty Akbar and the unreasonable outbreak of Khusrav might put an edge on their design, and that they might

attack Qandahār.” A semblance of friendship was maintained after this incident, as the Shāh alleged that he had no knowledge of the affair and sent his officers to apologise for the indiscretion of his frontier governors. In April, 1611, the Shāh sent a formal embassy and a letter which closed with the prayer “that the tree of hereditary friendship and assiduousness and the garden of intimacy and regard may acquire great splendour and greenness.” Jahāngīr sent an embassy in return in 1613, and several more embassies were exchanged. It is very difficult to determine the nature of the Shāh’s diplomacy. He was very much interested in preserving the independence of his allies in the Deccan and he looked with jealousy at the rapid extension and growing prosperity of the Mughul empire. The Deccan rebellion of 1621 might have been connected with the Shāh’s attack on Qandahār a few months later, but Dr. Beni Prasad thinks this unlikely. The Shāh could only assist his Deccan allies by creating diversions on the north-west frontier and by occupying Qandahār. He had received ambassadors from Kish and Makrān and hoped some day to extend the boundary of his empire to the right bank of the Indus. It is a significant fact that the Nizām Shāhī envoy, Jaish Khān, was with the Shāh during the siege of Qandahār. Certain entries in Jahāngīr’s *Memoirs* leave no doubt that he was aware of these intrigues. Although Jahāngīr talks a great deal about strengthening the fortifications of Qandahār, little could be done owing to the attitude of Prince Khurram, and Qandahār fell after a feeble resistance in 1622. It has been suggested by Dr. Beni Prasad that Prince Khurram was in secret intrigue with the Shāh. Khurram knew that with the loss of Qandahār Jahāngīr would be busy in suppressing the wave of unrest in Afghanistan and amongst the frontier tribes, and that this would leave him a comparatively open field in the south. This, of course, may be a mere conjecture; it is supported only by the evidence of one letter which Prince Khurram sent to the Shāh to seek his assistance. The Shāh, who was anxious to maintain good relations with the Mughuls after the Qandahār affair, openly declined to help Khurram and advised him to make peace with his father.

Jahāngīr was too indolent to follow an ambitious foreign policy in Central Asia. He did not maintain the usual relations with the rulers of Mawarun Nahr (Trans-Oxonia) probably on account of his desire to be more closely allied to Persia.

In 1621, the mother of the king of Bukhārā sent a letter to Nūr Jahān who replied to it and sent some Indian rarities as presents. Shortly afterwards, a formal embassy arrived. During

these years relations with Persia had become strained and Jahāngīr could only look to the Uzbek ruler for support, who in turn hoped to humble Persia with the help of the Mughuls. But Jahāngīr's death made further progress of the alliance impossible.

Akbar's religious policy caused considerable stir amongst Muslims of all shades of opinion. Some saw in his new religion an attempt to deprive the Muslims of the dominant position they enjoyed in Indian society, while others thought it was a potential threat to the integrity of their creed and the solidarity of their *millat* (religious community). In particular, the orthodox scholars (*ulema*) and the pietists saw in it a great danger to their religion. The *ulema*, consequently, protested against Akbar's regulations, the most important among them being Mulla Yazdi, a Shiah divine, and Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, popularly known as the Mujaddid Alf-i-Sani. At the time of Jahāngīr's accession Shaikh Farīd, otherwise known as Nawāb Murtazā Khān, played a very important part in making him promise to uphold the *shar'iyat*. In a letter written by the Shaikh of Sirhind to Nawāb Murtazā Khān, the Shaikh congratulated him on the death of one (Akbar) who was antagonistic to Islām and the accession to the throne of the emperor of Islām (Jahāngīr). In the same letter he exhorted the Musalmans to assist the new emperor and to help him in making the laws of the *shar'iyat* current in the country and in strengthening Islām. This help was to be rendered by all means available, by words and by actions. Similarly in another letter to the Khān-i-A'zam, the Shaikh, in a pathetic manner, draws his attention to the evil and un-Islāmic practices introduced in Islām and expresses the fear that though at present the emperor is not hostile to Islām yet he may revert to the policy of his forefathers. It was in an atmosphere charged with such hopes and fears that Jahāngīr ascended the throne. In addition to the fear of internal disintegration, the infiltration of a large number of Shiahs had alarmed the pietists. During this period, therefore, not only was an attempt made by the orthodox to re-establish the laws of *shar'iyat* but also to fight the Shiah heresy.

Jahāngīr, in spite of the promises that he had made, remained tolerant in religious matters like his father. In his *Memoirs* he says that an "audacious speculator" suggested to him the reimposition of the *jizya*. Jahāngīr repudiated this suggestion and punished the speculator. In the subsidiary regulations issued some time after his accession, he ordered his officials not to enforce Islām on anyone. Like his father he was fond of religious discourses, though he did not give as much time to them as Akbar had done. Roe and Terry testify to the fact that he accorded equal welcome to Chris-

tians, Jews and Muslims. Hindu festivals like Rākhi, Daśahrā etc. were celebrated as in old days. The *tulā dān* (weighing of the emperor against gold) was also observed.

Certain cases are cited as evidence of Jahāngīr's orthodoxy and fanaticism born of the fear and suspicion of the times. For example, it is asserted that Jahāngīr allowed daily allowances to new converts. When he learnt that in certain localities Muslim girls were converted to Hinduism and married to Hindus, he put a stop to it and punished the guilty. From this it is inferred that Jahāngīr attempted to stand forth as a protector of the true faith. In this he was only following an old custom, for Muslim law does not permit the marriage of Muslim girls to non-Muslims. The protection of the Muslim minority obviously was a source of strength and vitality to the Mughuls. That he declared the forcible conversion of Hindus to be illegal<sup>9a</sup> shows that he stood forth equally as their defender.

New temples and Christian churches were freely built during his time, though now and then, during a campaign, religious places suffered at the hands of zealous or fanatical soldiers. Hindu pilgrims freely visited their shrines. Coryat puts the number of persons visiting Hardwar at 4,00,000 while Roe puts it at 5,00,000. Jahāngīr was particularly tolerant towards the Christians.

Jahāngīr's attitude towards the Sikhs has been a matter of controversy. A careful perusal of contemporary evidence shows that the Sikh religious leaders suffered because they interfered with politics, which was a dangerous game and might have constituted a menace to the State unless suppressed in time. There is no evidence to show that he persecuted the Sikhs as such. The following remark of Dr. Beni Prasad deserves attention: "The melancholy transaction (punishment of *Guru Arjun*) has been represented by Sikh tradition as the first of the long series of religious persecutions which the Khalsa suffered from the Mughal emperors. In reality, it is nothing of the kind. Without minimizing the gravity of Jahāngīr's mistake, it is only fair to recognize that the whole affair amounts to a single execution due primarily to political reasons. No other Sikhs were molested. No interdict was laid on the Sikh faith. *Guru Arjun* himself would have ended his days in peace if he had not espoused the cause of a rebel."<sup>9b</sup>

It should be borne in mind that it was the explicit policy of Akbar to compose religious differences and Jahāngīr followed this policy consistently<sup>9c</sup> without interfering with the Muslim creed. His attitude towards the Sikhs was part of the same policy. He con-

fined Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind in the Gwālior prison, first, because the Shaikh was accused of considering himself equal to the Pious Caliphs and, secondly, because he refused to perform the *sijda* (prostration) to the Emperor. Jahāngīr later on realized his mistake and released the Shaikh and made amends for the punishment meted out to him. Similar treatment was meted out to Shaikh Ibrāhīm Bābā. In both cases the punishments were due to the jealousy and the fear excited by these Muslim divines amongst the less important members of their profession and the influence which they wielded on their devoted Afghān and other Muslim disciples. Dr. Beni Prasad is wrong in asserting that Ahmad Sirhindi repented or promised loyalty.<sup>10</sup> It was Jahāngīr who realized his mistake.

Jahāngīr is accused of having persecuted the Jains of Gujarāt. This was mainly due to the fact that their leader, Mān Singh, had sided with Khusrav and had prophesied the fall of the Mughul empire. Moreover, the Jains were accused of having put up temples and other buildings which were reported to have become centres of disturbances. Their religious leaders were also accused of immoral practices.

When Jahāngīr visited Ajmer in the eighth year of his reign, the temple of Bhagwat was destroyed. Dr. Beni Prasad says that this was done from disgust, and also out of deference to Muslim sentiment. The Mughul emperors were never superstitious and had a high aesthetic sense. But whenever any practice was calculated to play on the simplicity or credulity of the poor folk, they put a stop to it.

The admission of Hindus to the higher public service continued. Of forty-seven *Manṣabdārs* above the rank of 3,000, six were Hindus (i.e. 12 per cent). Governors and *Dīwāns* were still appointed from amongst the Hindus. Jahāngīr shared the zeal of his father for the reformation of Indian society. The public sale of intoxicants like *bhāng* and wine, and the castration of children in Bengal and Assam were prohibited. The total suppression of gambling was ordered and *Satī* was prohibited.

There is considerable difference of opinion about Jahāngīr's personal religion. Some regarded him as atheist and others, as eclectic. Some regarded him as a Christian, though superstitious, and some, a member of the *Dīn-i-Ilāhī*. He could not have been all these things together, or, as Professor Sharma remarks, "even by turns." Jahāngīr believed in Islām, but not in mere dogma. He was fond of Sūfistic and Vedāntic philosophy. The Jesuit and

Christian accounts are confused, being saturated with narrow-mindedness and fanaticism. It was impossible for the European visitors of the time, who were accustomed to persecution at home, to comprehend the spirit and content of Mughul toleration. Contemporary religious Muslim literature gives Jahāngīr a good testimony. Blochmann's verdict that superstition was his real religion is belied by the whole attitude of Jahāngīr in life.<sup>11</sup>

Jahāngīr, in spite of his shortcomings, strove honestly to maintain the integrity of his empire and to follow the principles of toleration and justice enunciated by his father. His love of ease and indulgence in drink are well known. Capricious, wilful and occasionally cruel and superstitious, he had redeeming virtues. These were a high sense of justice, loyalty and affection for his family and friends, generosity, recognition of merit, and energy and firmness when the occasion demanded it; and they made up for his defects of character and early training. His hold on the government, except in the last years of his life when his health broke down, never relaxed. Neither Nūr Jahān nor the other cliques really dominated over him so far as the principles of foreign and domestic policy were concerned.<sup>12</sup> In a fit of wrath, he was sometimes guilty of acts of cruelty, but as a rule he was affable, humane and just. According to Jerry, his character appeared "to be composed of extremes; for sometimes he was barbarously cruel, and at other times, he would seem to be exceedingly pure and gentle". Under his enlightened patronage there was an all round progress in industry and commerce, while painting, literature and architecture also flourished during his reign. "The political side of Jahāngīr's history is interesting enough, but its best virtue lies in its artistic development."

1. For slight divergence of views on the date, cf. Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir*, Second Edition, 1930, p. I, f.n. 1.

The conversion of dates in Hijra Era to those of Christian Era is done in two ways, with a difference of about ten days. The dates adopted here are those given in *CHI*. The author of this Chapter, like Beni Prasad, followed the other system, but it has been changed (Editor).

2. For details, cf. Prasad, *op. cit.* pp. 3-8.

3. For a detailed account of this marriage and the other marriages of Jahāngīr, cf. *ibid*, pp. 29 ff.

4. *Tūzūk-i-Jahāngīrī*, Tr. by A. Rogers, ed. by H. Beveridge, 2nd Ed. pp. 7-10.

4a. *HIED*, VI, p. 273.

5. This version is not probably the true one, but is somewhat coloured by the legend that later grew up in the Sikh community, and has been narrated at length in the *Transformation of Sikhism* (pp. 31-34) by G. C. Narang. Beni Prasad's account seems to be more reasonable. He says: "The Emperor was at first disposed to take a lenient view of the affair, but he fell at last into the snares of Arjun's enemies. The Guru was sentenced to death and to confiscation of his property including his hermitage." (*op. cit.* p. 149). (For a more detailed and somewhat different account, cf. Chapter XI—Editor).

- 5a. Op. cit. p. 282.
6. The statements in this chapter attributed to Mu'tamid Khān are to be found in his work *Iqbāl-nāma* (translated in *HIED*, VI, pp. 393-498). For the passage quoted, see pp. 428-9.
- 6a. Jahāngīr "formally desecrated the temple by sacrificing a cow." *CHI*. IV, p. 169. The incident is described by Beni Prasad with full reference to authorities (op. cit. p. 313). Jahāngīr himself gloats over it in his memoir, Rogers and Beveridge, II, p. 223 (Editor).
- 6b. *HIED*, VI, p. 404.
7. The account given above is very sketchy. A romantic legend grew up round this affair which has been fairly summed up by Beni Prasad (op. cit. p. 176). He has discarded the legend and reconstructed the true history which agrees with the view given here, but adds more details (pp. 174-80). The suspicion hinted by Ishwari Prasad, in the passage quoted, is based, among others on the fact that Mihr-un-nisa, after the tragic death of her husband, was taken to the harem of Jahāngīr, and not sent to live with her father who was in the capital, and held high office. For a full discussion of the historical value of the romantic story, cf. pp. 180-82 of Beni Prasad's book (Editor).
8. Cf. *HIED*, VI, pp. 399, 405; Beni Prasad, op. cit. p. 183-96.
9. The account is materially different from that given by Beni Prasad, op. cit., pp. 387-410 (Editor).
- 9a. No evidence is cited in support of it, and it is belied by the author's own statement, a few lines above, that Jahāngīr "allowed daily allowances to new converts." The author further states, a few lines above, that the emperor not only stopped but punished the conversion of the Muslim girls to Hinduism and their marriage with the Hindus. It is excused by the author on the ground that in this he was merely following the Muslim custom. But did the emperor show the same attitude to the conversion of Hindu girls to Islām and their marriage with the Muslims which equally violated the Hindu custom? (Editor).
- 9b. Beni Prasad, op. cit., pp. 149-151.
- 9c. It is difficult to accept this statement. Reference may be made to foot-notes 6a and 9a above (Editor).
10. Op. cit., p. 433, f.n. 4.
11. In the chapter, as originally written, some views were attributed to Beni Prasad which might wound the religious susceptibilities of the Muslim community. I have omitted it, because the author did not cite any authority, and the words he probably had in view do not, in my opinion, bear the interpretation he put upon them. The following passage contains Beni Prasad's view about the personal religion of Jahāngīr (Editor).
- "The latitudinarianism revealed by the Jesuit records is fully borne out by Jahangir's diary. He often appeals to God, but never mentions the name of the Prophet. If he observed the Shab-i-barat or Id, he celebrated the Hindu festivals, Diwali, Dasahra, Rakshabandhan and Shivaratri with the regularity, eagerness, and splendour of a Hindu court. He rejoiced with all his heart at the Persian vernal festival of Nauroz which the orthodox Aurangzeb promptly abolished. He dates his diary generally according to the Persian solar era. He violated orthodox tradition in ordering a translation of the *Quran*. He scandalized all good Muslims by presenting hogs to Christians. His heresy gave rise to the rumour that he was an atheist at heart." (op. cit. pp. 41-2).
12. This is contradicted by the statement of Mu'tamid Khān which the author quotes on pp. 185-6 and regards as both authentic and reliable (Editor).

## CHAPTER VII

### SHĀH JAHĀN

Shah Jahān was born on Thursday, 15 January, 1592, at Lahore. He was brought up by Akbar's childless wife Ruqaiyah Begam. Intelligent, quick-witted and gifted with an excellent memory, he nevertheless showed very early his predilection for the profession of arms rather than the pursuit of knowledge. In 1606 when he was fourteen years of age, he was left in charge of the capital with a Council of Regency while his father went to the Punjab in pursuit of his rebellious son, Khusrav. During the lifetime of his father, he won his laurels as a successful organiser of victories in the Mewār, Deccan and Kangrā campaigns. Up to 1622 he worked in close collaboration with Nūr Jahān, but then he fell out of favour, broke into rebellion and, though reconciled to his father, was sent to the Deccan where he received the news of his father's death.

Nūr Jahān intended to place her favourite, Shahryār, on the throne either out of sheer spite for Shāh Jahān, for whom she had developed an intense dislike, or because Shahryār promised to be a pliant tool who would allow her to keep the direction of affairs in her hands. Āsaf Khān would not agree to this; he was equally interested in his own son-in-law, Shāh Jahān, who was certainly the ablest, the most experienced and the most popular of all the sons and grandsons of Jahāngīr.

Since Shahryār had proceeded to Lahore at the time of Jahāngīr's death, Āsaf Khān, as a stop-gap arrangement, proclaimed Dāwar Bakhsh, son of Khusrav, as emperor, and the *khutba* was read in Dāwar's name near Bhimbar. Shahryār assumed the royal title at Lahore; he seized upon the royal treasures which were there and secured troops and supporters by lavish expenditure of seventy lakhs of rupees within one week. When Dāwar Bakhsh arrived near Lahore, he was met by the army of Shahryār. Shahryār was defeated; he fled into the city and was captured and blinded. Tahmurs and Hoshang, sons of Prince Dāniyāl, were also captured and put in confinement to preclude the possibility of a rising in their favour. Āsaf Khān in the meantime had sent Banarsi, a trusted runner, to Shāh Jahān and summoned him to the capital. When Shāh Jahān was informed of the defeat of Shahryār, he wrote to Āsaf Khān to "send out of the world" his

rivals Dāwar Bakhsh, Shahryār, Gurshasp, Tahmurs and Hoshang. The order was faithfully carried out.<sup>1</sup>

Shāh Jahān ascended the throne on 24 February, 1628, and assumed the title of Abu-'l Muzaffar Shahbuddin Muhammad Sahib-i Kiran-i Sani. The coronation was celebrated by the usual round of lavish festivities and distribution of offices, titles and stipends. The reign which opened with the execution of Shāh Jahān's brothers and nephews was destined to close in circumstances, similarly tragic, finally ending in the death and disgrace of Shāh Jahān's sons and grandsons. Muhammad Sālih Kambū, the author of *'Amal-i-Sālih*, justifies the execution of the princes in the following callous and unemotional manner: "It is entirely lawful for the great sovereigns to rid this mortal world of the existence of their brothers and other relations, whose total annihilation is conducive to the common good. . . ., and leaders, spiritual and temporal, justify the total eradication of rival claimants to the fortunate throne on grounds of expediency and the common welfare."

In the first year of his reign Shāh Jahān had to face the rebellion of Jujhār Singh, son of Rājā Bīr Singh Deo, the Bundelā chief who had risen to prominence in the reign of Jahāngīr and on whom that emperor had showered favours for the murder of Abu-'l-Fazl. The wealth and position which Bīr Singh Deo had secured "without labour and without trouble" and the fact that he had his *jāgir* in his own country, had made him restless and ambitious. His son Jujhār visited Shāh Jahān at Āgra and was confirmed in the rank of 4000 *zat* and 4000 *sawar*. But suspecting that an inquiry would be made into the unauthorised gains of his father, Jujhār secretly left Āgra, and proceeding to Orcha, his stronghold, broke into open rebellion. Mahābat Khān was sent against him and Jujhār, realising the futility of fighting against the imperial forces, submitted. He was pardoned and sent off on service to the Deccan. Jujhār, however, had no intention of serving as a vassal of the Mughuls; he soon after attacked Bhīm Nārāin of Garha and compelled him to surrender the fort of Chaurāgarh. Later on he put Bhīm Nārāin to death and took possession of the fort with all the valuables it contained. On the complaint of Bhīm Nārāin's son, the emperor sent Jujhār an order to surrender to the imperial officer the territory he had acquired along with ten *lakhs* of rupees out of the spoils secured by him. Before this order could reach him, Jujhār had removed his family from Orcha to the fort of Dhāmoni and had also directed his son, Bikramajit, to escape with his troops from the Bālāghāt, where he had gone in service with the Mughul army.

Prince Aurangzib was put in nominal command of the army of 20,000 troops which was commissioned to reduce the rebels. Jujhār fled from Dhāmoni to Chaurāgarh after blowing up the buildings round the fort and garrisoning it with a small force of his followers. He was closely pursued by the Mughul army and, losing all hope of successfully holding his ground against the imperial forces, he put most of the women to death and fled into the jungle, where he and his son were killed by the Gonds. A close search was made after Jujhār's death for the treasures which he had buried in the forest or thrown into the wells; and in a very short time two million eight hundred thousand rupees of treasure were unearthed. "In all about ten million rupees were credited to the royal exchequer." Besides these gains the chief *zamindār* of Gondwānā consented to pay five lakhs of rupees in cash and goods to the imperial commanders. The fort of Jhansi was captured soon after.

Though the rebellion of Jujhār, the Bundelā chief, was suppressed, in 1639 Champat Rāi of Mahoba began to make incursions into the Mughul territory and this made the road to the Deccan very insecure. 'Abdullah Khān was sent against him. Champat Rāi defied the Mughul forces for a long time. 'Abdullah Khān was replaced by Bahādur Khān, and finally, through the intercession of Pahār Singh, son of Bīr Singh Deo, Champat Rāi offered his submission.

Rājā Bāsū of Maū Nūrpūr had served Jahāngīr faithfully and had received favours at his hands. His successor, Jagat Singh, had been similarly honoured and had been confirmed in his dignities by Shāh Jahān. Jagat Singh served with distinction in Bangash and Kābul, but his son, Rājārūp, began to show a refractory attitude. Jagat Singh, at his own request, was permitted to return home to bring his son back to the path of fealty. But Jagat Singh all along had been in sympathy with his son, and once back in the security of his own tribe, Jagat preferred rebellion to loyalty. A strong force was sent against him in 1641. He offered terms which were refused, and one of his forts being captured and another besieged, he was forced to submit. Dr. Banarsi Prasad Saksena has instituted a comparison between the rising of Bīr Singh Bundelā and Jagat Singh; this is neither fair to Jagat Singh nor true to facts. Jagat Singh deserved well of the Mughuls because of his past services, and important officers interceded with the emperor on his behalf. Bīr Singh was an upstart who had attained to his rank as a reward for the murder of Abu-'l-Fazl, and public opinion was generally against him. It was not mere cupidity but political

and military considerations which impelled Shāh Jahān to extirpate the house of Bīr Singh, though the treatment meted out to the survivors cannot be justified.<sup>2</sup>

The rebellion of Khān Jahān Lodī gave much more trouble to Shāh Jahān than the Bundelā rising. Khān Jahān had been sent to replace Mahābat Khān during the latter's absence in the north towards the close of Jahāngīr's reign. When Khān Jahān took over charge of the Deccan, he placated the Nizām Shāh by surrendering the Bālāghāt to him for three hundred thousand rupees. On Jahāngīr's death he wavered between Nūr Jahān and Shāh Jahān, and by his discourtesy to the messenger sent by Shāh Jahān to secure his adherence, he gave the new emperor serious cause for resentment. Khān Jahān next moved from Burhānpur to Māndū and captured that fort; but he was deserted by his Rājput officers and made his submission to the emperor, who graciously pardoned him, confirmed him in the governorship of Berār and Khāndesh, and commissioned him to proceed to the Deccan to recover the lost territories. But Khān Jahān prevaricated and was removed to Mālwa. When later on Khān Jahān appeared at the court and received a very cold reception, he felt slighted and was also alarmed about his safety. Fearing that he would be arrested and disgraced, and conscious of his own guilty conduct in the Deccan, he secretly escaped from Āgra. His party was overtaken by the imperial forces near Dholpur. The Afghāns put up a stout fight, but they were outnumbered, lost courage, and fled from the field. Khān Jahān abandoned his entire camp and treasure, and crossing the Chambal with his two sons and four Afghān companions, he went to Gondwāna and then, passing through Berār, entered the kingdom of Ahmadnagar. On reaching Daulatābād, he was well received by Murtazā II (Nizām Shāh) who assigned him the *parganā* of Bir and advanced him money for his expenses. The presence of Khān Jahān in the Deccan gave new hope to Murtazā II and raised the fears of the Mughuls. Shāh Jahān was fully alive to the danger, and, to avoid jealous conflicts between the imperial officers, he crossed the Narmadā and decided to supervise the operations personally. During the campaign that followed, the Afghāns suffered heavily, though Mughul losses were equally great. Khān Jahān was driven from Bir. He fell back on Shivgāon and then pushed on to Daulatābād. The imperial armies ravaged the Nizām Khān's territory. Famine stalked the land and Murtazā, disillusioned about Khān Jahān, gave him the cold shoulder. Khān Jahān left Daulatābād with the intention of proceeding to the Punjab, but the imperial officers were vigilant and pursued him ruthlessly till he was

driven out of Mālwa, and after very heavy losses fled towards the north-east and, after a hard fight, was compelled to fly to Kālinjar. He reached the river Sindh in utter misery, but, like a brave Afghān, he preferred death on the battlefield to rotting in prison or dangling from a scaffold. He turned back upon his pursuers and was overpowered and cut to pieces. His head was sent by 'Abdullah Khān to the court. For sixteen months Khān Jahān had held out to save his honour and his dignity. "His miscalculated action", says Dr. Saksena, "not only brought ruin on himself, but accelerated the downfall of the declining, almost moribund, kingdom of Ahmadnagar."

The Portuguese had secured the grant of the site of Hooghly in 1537<sup>2a</sup> and soon raised a flourishing and well-defended port at the entrance of the commercial highway of Bengal. Helped by the disturbed political condition of Bengal and the weakness and cupidity of the Mughul governors, they "became a rich and affluent community, enjoying almost independent jurisdiction." They secured the seas in league with the pirates of Chittagong and plundered and devastated the neighbouring towns; and "often penetrating forty or fifty leagues up the country, they carried away the entire population of villages on market days and on occasions when the inhabitants were assembled for celebration of marriages or some festival. With piracy and brigandage they combined religious fanaticism of the worst sort, and came to be universally feared and despised."

The Portuguese had been left alone by Jahāngīr. Shāh Jahān, however, started a ruthless campaign against them. Not only had they not helped him when he had gone to Bengal as a rebel prince; they had cooperated with Parvīz, and Manvel Tavers had played him false by seizing his boats and carrying away some of his female slaves. As Shāh Jahān's attention was occupied elsewhere, the retribution was delayed till 1632.

The struggle with the Portuguese was precipitated by two events. The first was the plunder of a village near Dacca in East Bengal (now called East Pakistan or Bānglā Desh) and assault on a Mughul lady by a Portuguese from the Magh territory in Eastern Bengal. The second was the complaint made to Qāsim Khān, the Governor of Dacca, by a Portuguese merchant at Sāt-gāon named Afonso. The latter "who had made a claim to certain land in Hooghly, applied to Qāsim Khān in 1632 and held out the promise of a rich booty if the settlement were taken, which would be an easy task." Qāsim Khān now formally proposed that the Portu-

guese should be suppressed and Shāh Jahān sanctioned an expedition against them. Qāsim Khān planned the campaign carefully and with 600 boats, 1400 horsemen, 90 elephants and a large force of infantry blocked the passage to Hooghly, both by land and sea. An attempt to bring about an amicable settlement through the Fathers of the Society of Jesus failed. The Portuguese were unwilling to carry out the demands of the Mughul commander and decided to fight. The Mughuls failed to capture the fort by assault and the Portuguese held out till the arrival of Afonso, the Portuguese; but with the coming of Mughul reinforcements, further resistance became impossible and the Portuguese left Hooghly in a body by boats and the place was occupied by the Mughul forces. The Portuguese suffered heavy losses. Ten thousand persons lost their lives and 14,400 Indians from Hooghly and the neighbouring *parganās* were set free. Severe punishment was meted out to those taken as prisoners; some were executed, others were imprisoned, and the rest were given the choice between death and conversion. Shāh Jahān's treatment was severe, but the Portuguese richly deserved their fate. Shāh Jahān has been accused of religious fanaticism, but he had cogent political, military, humanitarian and economic reasons for the policy he followed in extirpating the Portuguese pirates in Bengal. The innocent inhabitants of Bengal had suffered no end of miseries at their hands. Bernier gives a bad certificate both to Portuguese priests and laymen.<sup>3</sup>

Among the minor annexations of this period, "Little Tibet" may be mentioned. Jahāngīr's attempt to conquer it had failed. The ruler of "Little Tibet" had afforded asylum to the Chaks, the original rulers of Kāshmir. In 1634 Abdāl, the ruler of Little Tibet, agreed to acknowledge the supremacy of the Mughuls and have the *khutba* read in Shāh Jahān's name. Four years later, he repudiated the treaty. When an army was sent against him, he submitted and paid an indemnity of one million rupees.

At the time of Shāh Jahān's accession Cooch Behār was ruled by Bīr Nārāyan, son of Parīkshit, and Kāmrup was in the nominal charge of a Mughul officer, Shaikh Zāhid. The Āhom ruler of Assam had continued to give offence to the empire by sheltering its runaway officers and subjects and by his interference in the domestic affairs of Kāmrup. Bīr Nārāyan began the fray. Aided by the Āhom king, he attacked Kāmrup, occupied Hājo, its capital, and drove out the Mughuls. Then Islām Khān, the new governor, drove away Bīr Nārāyan and regained the lost territory. The imperial forces then pushed into Assam, occupied the strong Āhom outpost of Kajli, and advanced successfully up to Samdhara. Here

the Mughuls met with a stout resistance. They were pushed back from the fort and defeated with heavy losses at Duminsila in November, 1639. The fort of Kajli was lost. But both parties were anxious for peace and a treaty of friendship was concluded.

The petty chiefs of Jharkhand were very head-strong and rebellious, and Shāh Jahān ordered 'Abdullah Khān to reduce their ring-leaders one by one. Pratāp, the *zamīndār* of Ujjainiya near Buxar, was the first to be dealt with. His fort of Bhojpur was reduced after a siege of six months and he was captured and executed. Next, Bohra Lachman of Ratanpur was forced to surrender.

Rājā Pratāp of Palamau had become haughty and behaved disrespectfully towards Shāyista Khān, the new governor. When Shāyista Khān reported the matter to the court, the emperor ordered him to drive away Pratāp and to "clear the country of the filth of his existence". In October, 1646, a large army was sent to Palamau; Pratāp submitted after some desultory fighting, paid an indemnity, and was granted a *manṣab*.

Bhagirath Bhil and Marvi Gond rebelled one after another. Both chiefs were defeated and their fortresses were occupied. An attempt was made in 1635 to subdue Garhwāl, but the imperial army met with a heavy disaster. In 1654, another attempt was made as a result of which the Rājā of Kumāūn submitted, and in 1659 Medhi Singh, son of the Rājā of Sirinagar (Dehradun district) came and offered his submission. The tribes on the north-west frontier, in spite of the presence of Abdāl and later on of his son, 'Abdul Qādir, were generally peaceful.

Towards the end of Jahāngīr's reign diplomatic relations with Persia had been broken owing to the occupation of Qandahār by the Persians; but the Shāh seems to have been anxious to revive them. After Jahāngīr's death, Shāh Jahān sent an embassy to Shāh Safi of Persia to offer condolence on the death of Shāh 'Abbās. Shāh Jahān in his letter reminded him of the old friendship between the two dynasties and stated that the late Shāh had treated him in the "days of his vicissitudes" as an uncle should treat a nephew. But in spite of the embassies, which were exchanged in a spirit of cordiality, Shāh Jahān had his eyes on Qandahār and was actively plotting to profit by the unrest that followed the death of Shāh 'Abbās and the youth and inexperience of the new Shāh.

The death of Shāh 'Abbās had, in fact, revived the hopes of vengeance which all anti-Persian rulers had been cherishing. An attempt was once more made to form an anti-Persian league, but Shāh Jahān, like Akbar, flirted both with Persia and her enemies.

He was anxious to get back Qandahār, which had considerable strategic importance for the Sindh frontier of the Mughul empire and was the meeting ground of trade-routes. It was said that 14,000 caravans passed through Qandahār every year. He may also have considered himself honour-bound to recapture a place which had been lost through his negligence and ambition. Equally keen was his old hereditary ambition to occupy the ancestral lands of the Mughuls. In the beginning Shāh Jahān wished to get back Qandahār by diplomatic efforts and to conserve his resources for the recovery of Transoxiana, with Persian co-operation if possible, and without it if necessary. It was not till he was disappointed in this direction that he openly approached Persia's enemies with the proposal for an alliance. The Shāh's differences with the governor of Qandahār gave Shāh Jahān the wished-for opportunity.

'Alī Mardān Khān, the Persian governor of Qandahār, had been in arrears with his revenues; he had naturally sought to taken advantage of the disturbed state of the country. He was summoned by the Shāh to appear at the court, but avoided doing so. On being dismissed from office, 'Alī Mardān sought the assistance from the Governor of Kābul and the commander of Ghaznī. In 1638 he surrendered Qandahār to the Mughuls and received from Shāh Jahān, as a reward for his treachery, one *lakh* of *tankas* for himself and two *lakhs* for his brother and the officers of his army. Elaborate preparations were now made by Shāh Jahān to hold the fort against the Persians. Bust and Zamindaar were also subdued. The Shāh was too busy at the time in the west to take any effective measures for the recapture of Qandahār. In a letter to the Shāh sent in 1638, Shāh Jahān justified the occupation of Qandahār, apologised for any misunderstandings that may have been caused by his action, and advised the Shāh to forget the incident. No diplomatic intercourse took place between the two empires till after the death of Shāh Safi.

Shāh Jahān later on sent an embassy to secure Persia's neutrality for his projected Central Asian campaign. There was a strong anti-Mughul party at the Persian court, but the Shāh also feared the Sunnī powers of Central Asia and preferred to remain a silent observer. When Nazr Muhammad Khān escaped to Persia, Shāh Jahān wrote to Shāh 'Abbas II explaining the causes which had led to the Mughul campaign and expressed the hope of ultimately conquering Samarqand and Bukhārā.

In December, 1648, the Shāh turned towards Qandahār. Mughul prestige was then very low owing to the disastrous failure of the

Mughul military venture in Central Asia. The Shāh also succeeded in securing Turkish neutrality during his eastern campaign. The Persian expedition started in winter as the Shāh was aware of the unpopularity of a winter campaign amongst the Indian troops. The fort of Qandahār was occupied by the Persians in February, 1649. Shāh Jahān sent three different expeditions against Qandahār in 1649, 1652 and 1653 but the Mughuls could not recapture the fort.

No diplomatic relations were maintained with Persia during the rest of Shāh Jahān's reign. At the outbreak of the war of succession in 1658, Murād and Dārā tried to enlist the support of the Shāh, who actually moved his troops to Qandahār. But the success of Aurangzīb was so rapid that the Shāh had to withdraw his troops. The following comments on the Qandahār expeditions by Sir Jadunath Sarkar are worthy of note: "These three futile sieges cost the Indian treasury over ten crores of rupees and ruined the Mughul prestige in the eyes of all Asia. The Persian king could rightly boast that the rulers of Delhi knew how to steal a fort by means of gold, but not how to conquer it by strength of arms. Throughout the rest of the reign, the rumour of a projected invasion from Persia used to throw the court of Delhi into the greatest alarm." Mughul failure against Qandahār is a sad commentary on the degeneration that had set in the Mughul army. Spoilt by a life of ease and luxury, and with its discipline undermined by the pettiness and the factious spirit of its commanders, the Mughul army had lost both strength and morale. Another cause of failure was the inefficient and ineffective artillery of the Mughuls. Above all, the meddling of Shāh Jahān and a divided command made the successful pursuit of the campaign an impossibility.<sup>4</sup>

Shāh Jahān's reign began with an unfortunate incident which openly disturbed Mughul relations with the rulers of Transoxiana, that had been amicable since the treaty of friendship between 'Abdullah and Akbar. Nazr Muhammad Khān, the restless brother of Imām Qulī of Bukhārā, who was governor of Balkh, attacked the province of Kābul. The Mughul troops offered a stout resistance, and on the approach of reinforcements Nazr Muhammad had to beat a hasty retreat. Imām Qulī hastened to offer apologies for his brother's conduct in a letter to Shāh Jahān. The latter sent Turbat Khān to Balkh in 1633 with a letter expressing regrets on the Khān's having delivered an unwarranted attack on a Sunnī power. Shāh Jahān, however, thanked him for the offer of help against the Persians. The letter was full of the sectarian bias which Shāh Jahān was trying to exploit in support of his designs against Persia.

Shortly after 'Alī Mardān's surrender of Qandahār, Shāh Jahān sent Prince Shujā' and Khān Dauran with a large body of troops to Kābul as a precautionary measure against a Persian attack. These movements frightened Nazr Muhammad Khān and he appealed for help to his brother, Imām Qulī. Central Asian historians insist that Shāh Jahān intended to capture Balkh as he was aware of the hostility between the two brothers, but Indian historians deny this charge. Shāh Jahān, on receiving a protest from Imām Qulī, wrote back to assure him of his peaceful intentions. "I had only come to Kābul for hunting", he wrote, "but if my brothers do not like it, I will go back."

Imām Qulī, who had lost his eyesight, abdicated, and Nazr Muhammad proceeded to Bukhārā. But the people of Bukhārā detested Nazr and a rebellion and a civil war followed. Shāh Jahān, taking advantage of this, captured Kahmard in 1645. Nazr, who was hard-pressed by the rebels, applied to Shāh Jahān for help. Prince Murād was sent to Balkh with a large army. The campaign opened well and Qunduz was captured in June, 1646. From there the imperial armies proceeded to Balkh. Nazr was alarmed; he snut himself up in the fort of Balkh and refused to meet Murād. But he ultimately fled to Persia and Balkh fell into the hands of the Mughuls.

Neither Murād nor the Indian troops took kindly to their new surroundings. Murād proved inefficient and was recalled by Shāh Jahān. Governing these provinces was, in fact, more difficult than conquering them; and the task was rendered still more difficult by the mutual jealousies of the Mughul commanders, the inveterate and sullen hostility of the people to the new and foreign regime, the unpopularity of 'Alī Mardān and the presence of the Hindus. Nazr returned with some Persian troops and concluded peace with Aurangzīb who had replaced Murād. The Mughuls had to retire to India in October, 1647, and the army suffered heavily on the homeward march.

Thus ended the wild dream of the Mughul emperors for the reconquest of their Central Asian homeland. It had brought nothing but disaster, famine and death both to the Indians and the Turānians. The losses of the empire could not be calculated in men and money alone. Its prestige in Central Asian affairs had vanished and the myth of its invincibility was shattered. The fear of a Mughul invasion of Turān, which had kept its rulers in wholesome fear, now completely disappeared. Shāh 'Abbās, as we have seen, took advantage of the situation and captured Qandahār. A wave of unrest swept through Afghānistān, and the north-west tribesmen could not

be easily kept in hand now. We need not be surprised that with the failure of the Balkh campaign and the loss of Qandahār, the power of the Mughul emperors began to dwindle in Afghānistān, and the tribes got an opportunity to foment dissensions and intrigues for their own ends by playing off the Mughuls and the Persians against each other. The Abbdālis allied themselves with the Persians and the Ghilzais fell back on the Mughuls for support. This perpetual warfare encouraged the inherent lawless tendencies of the population, and "broke the thin web of administration, so ably cast by Akbar over Afghānistān." The Central Asian venture also coincided with a nationalist revival in Afghānistān, and the country gradually slipped into anarchy and confusion, which even the strong hand of Aurangzīb could not control. The healthy stream of the young Afghān recruits to the Mughul army also dried up; hereafter, it could only make drafts for its shock battalion on the Muslim man-power of Northern India and the Rajputs.

This disastrous expedition also had other far-reaching results. The famine and plague which it left behind in Central Asia ruined the prosperity of the people and weakened the Government. The age-long trade and commerce between India and Bukhārā and Samarqand suffered disastrously. The occupation of Qandahār by the Persians and the virtual state of war that followed it during the reign of Aurangzīb diverted trade and commerce from the northern passes to the ports of southern and western India to the great advantage of the Europeans and a corresponding loss to the Mughul treasury.

With Shāh Jahān's accession to the throne, the Deccan policy of the Mughuls entered a new phase; it became more vigorous and purposeful. Apart from political differences, the Deccan rulers had pronounced Shiahite leanings and were suspected of allegiance to the Shiah rulers of Persia. The death of Malik 'Ambar came as a blessing to the Mughuls. In 1630 his unworthy son, Fath Khān, the minister of Ahmadnagar, informed the Mughuls that in order to protect his own life he had placed his master, the Nizām Shāhī king, in confinement. Shāh Jahān in reply instructed him to "rid the world of such a worthless and wicked being." Fath Khān complied with this order and then placed a ten-year old minor prince, named Husain Shāh, on the throne. Shāh Jahān next asked Āsaf Khān to secure the submission of the Sultān of Bijāpur, who had not so far acknowledged the imperial authority, and in case of non-compliance, to conquer his kingdom. In 1631 Āsaf laid siege to Bijāpur but was compelled to raise it after twenty days for lack

of provisions. The open country suffered terribly at the hands of the Mughuls.

The emperor left the Deccan for Āgra on 14 April, 1632. Āsaf was succeeded by Mahābat as the commander of the Deccan expedition. Mahābat laid siege to the fortress of Daulatābād. Fath Khān began to waver in his allegiance to the Mughuls and tried to postpone a decision. Finally the Khān Khānān won him over by a bribe of ten and a half lakhs and secured the surrender of the Daulatābād fort (1633). The nominal young king, Husain Shāh, was condemned to life-long imprisonment at Gwālior and the Nizām Shāhī kingdom came to an end. The Mughuls, however, failed to take the fortress of Parendra and retreated to Burhānpur on account of the rains.

Shāh Jahān's imperialistic designs could not be satisfied without crushing Bijāpur and Golconda. He called upon the rulers of these countries to acknowledge his suzerainty, to pay tribute as a mark of submission, and to abstain from interfering in the affairs of the now defunct kingdom of Ahmadnagar. Shāh Jahān himself arrived at Daulatābād on 2 March, 1636, and collected an army of 50,000 men for attacking Bijāpur and Golconda. Alarmed by these preparatory movements, 'Abdullah Qutb Shāh of Golconda formally recognised the suzerainty of Shāh Jahān. He promised to pay an annual tribute, to strike gold and silver coins in the emperor's name, and to have it read in the *khutba* (Friday sermon).

The king of Bijāpur did not, however, come down so low and would not barter away his independence. Three imperial armies marched into his kingdom from three sides. But the Bijāpuris fought with the valour of despair and ultimately, tired of war, both sides opened negotiations for peace, which was concluded on the following terms: 'Ādil Shāh acknowledged the overlordship of the emperor and was allowed to retain his ancestral kingdom. He got fifty *parganās* yielding an annual income of eighty *lakhs* of rupees from the territory of the late Ahmadnagar kingdom. A sum of twenty *lakhs* of rupees in cash and kind was demanded from him as annual tribute, and he was required to abstain from molesting the kingdom of Golconda, which was now under imperial protection. Shāhjī Bhonsle was not to be allowed to hold any office in the Bijāpur State unless he surrendered the Nizām Shāhī forts which he had occupied during the war.

The emperor set out for Māndū on 21 July, 1636; three days later he sent his eighteen-year old son Aurangzīb as the Viceroy of the Deccan. The Mughul Deccan at this time consisted of the four

provinces of Khāndesh, Berār, Telingāna and the recently annexed Nizām Shāhī territory. The four provinces contained sixty-four hill forts and their total revenue was five crores of rupees. Thus the war of 1635-37 had "enriched the Mughul treasury with tribute amounting to two crores of rupees, and added to the empire a territory which, when cultivated, yielded a revenue of one crore."

After one year's successful government during which the territory of Baglan and Shāhjī's forts were acquired, Aurangzīb returned to Āgra in 1637. In 1644, he was dismissed from his post and deprived of his rank and *jāgīrs* by the emperor. In 1653, Aurangzīb was again sent across the Narmadā as the Subādār of the Deccan. During the nine years following his dismissal in May, 1644, the administration of the Deccan had collapsed; the revenue had fallen to such an extent that they were not even sufficient for the normal expenditure of the Government. Aurangzīb, on his return, was therefore faced with a serious financial situation. In order to meet the expenses of the administration he drew upon the cash reserves in the treasuries of the Deccan. He proposed to Shāh Jahān that he and his higher officers should be assigned *jāgīrs* in other provinces, and that the cash portion of his salary should be made a charge on the flourishing treasuries of Mālwa and Surāt. Shāh Jahān agreed to the first proposal, but did not grant Aurangzīb's request for monetary assistance. The *jāgīrdārs*, whose lands were thus taken by Aurangzīb, complained to Shāh Jahān, who angrily wrote back to Aurangzīb: "It is unworthy of a Mussalman and an act of injustice to take for yourself all the productive villages of a *parganā* and to assign to others only the less productive lands."

After improving the finances to some extent Aurangzīb devoted himself to promoting agriculture and to ameliorating the condition of the peasantry. In his measures in this direction, which have made his viceroyalty "memorable for ever in the history of land-settlement in the Deccan," he received valuable assistance from an able officer named Murshid Qulī Khān, the Dīwān of the "Bālāghāt." Murshid Qulī Khān divided the Deccan Province into two parts for fiscal purposes. Each part was to have its own Dīwān. He extended the system of Todar Mal to the Deccan and thus revived and revitalised the work of Malik 'Ambar. The normal life of the villages was restored by bringing together and rehabilitating the scattered *ryots*. A regular gradation of village and local officers was established. *Amīns* were appointed to measure the land and to prepare a record of holdings, distinguishing arable from waste land. New *muqaddams* (headmen) were appointed in the villages to look after the interests of the peasants and to help in collecting the re-

venue. Advances in cash were given to the poorer *ryots* for the purchase of agricultural implements. In backward and thinly populated areas Murshid Qulī retained the system of fixed payment per plough; while in other places he introduced the system of *batai* (*metaqar* system) for which there were three rates. The system of assessment by *jarib* was also introduced and came to be known during generations as "the *dhara* of Murshid Qulī Khān."

After this Aurangzīb decided to crush the independence of Bijāpur and Golconda. Their independence was more offensive to Mughul imperialism now than half a century earlier; and Aurangzīb, young and ambitious, wanted to pursue the imperial plans in the Deccan to their logical conclusion. The fact that the Deccan princes professed the *Shiah* creed and looked for patronage to the Shāh of Persia rather than to the emperor of Hindusthān gave him the necessary public support. The tribute from the Sultān of Golconda had always been in arrears and Aurangzīb demanded a certain part of the Sultān's kingdom in lieu of the arrears. The emperor also took offence at the conquest of Carnatic by the two kingdoms. A plausible excuse for war was found in the Golconda king's treatment of his officer, Mīr Jumla, who sought and secured imperial protection with the help of Aurangzīb while his family was detained by the Golconda ruler.

Aurangzīb reported these matters to Shāh Jahān and solicited his permission for attacking Golconda. Shāh Jahān reluctantly sanctioned the invasion in case Muhammad Amīn, son of Mīr Jumla, was still detained by Golconda. Aurangzīb declared war on Golconda without even giving Abu-'l-Hasan Qutb Shāh time to consider Shāh Jahān's letter.

Prince Muhammad Sultān, son of Aurangzīb, entered Hyderabad in January, 1656. Abu-'l-Hasan shut himself up in the fort of Golconda and Aurangzīb laid siege to it, fully determined to reduce the fort and to annex the kingdom. Abu-'l-Hasan, in despair, appealed to Shāh Jahān, who adopted a more accommodating attitude under the influence of Dārā and Jahānārā Begam. Aurangzīb, much against his wishes, was ordered to raise the siege and to evacuate the occupied territories. He had no alternative but to comply and raised the siege of Golconda on 9 April, 1656. A peace was immediately concluded. Prince Muhammad was married by proxy to Abu-'l-Hasan's daughter; Abu-'l-Hasan swore on the Qur'ān to obey the emperor and received in return a letter of pardon from Shāh Jahān along with rich robes of honour. Aurangzīb remitted ten *lakhs* out of the twenty-five *lakhs* of indemnity money, but the Sul-

tān had to cede the district of Rāmgīr. Mīr Jumla was taken into imperial service and appointed prime minister in place of Sa'd-ullah Khān.

The conquest of Bijāpur next engaged Aurangzīb's attention. Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh of Bijāpur died on 16 November, 1656, and was succeeded by his son, a youth of eighteen years. Aurangzīb solicited Shāh Jahān's permission for invading the kingdom on the ground that the new king was not the son of the dead ruler but a boy of obscure origin. The emperor granted him full powers to "settle the affairs of Bijāpur in any way he thought fit." But Shāh Jahān had merely suggested an invasion of Bijāpur while Aurangzīb was bent upon annexing the whole territory. Sir J. N. Sarkar has rightly remarked that the war thus sanctioned was wholly unrighteous. Bijāpur was not a vassal State; and the Mughul emperor had no legal right either to confirm or to question the succession of the Bijāpur king. The true reason for Mughul interference was the helplessness of its boy-king and the discord among his officers.

Mīr Jumla and Aurangzīb laid siege to Bidar. It was bravely defended, but submitted in April, 1657. The city of Kalyani was then besieged by the Mughuls in May, 1657. A heroic defence was offered by Dilāwar Khān, but he was at last compelled to capitulate. With Bidar and Kalyani in Mughul hands, the way was open for an attack on Bijāpur itself. At this favourable moment, when the prize was nearly in Aurangzīb's hands, Shāh Jahān sent an order for the cessation of hostilities. The Bijāpur agents had intrigued at the Delhi Court, and Dārā, who was jealous of his brother's success, brought about a change in the emperor's mind. His untimely intervention checked the Mughul advance, and peace was concluded in 1657. The Bijāpur Sultān surrendered Bidar, Kalyani and Parendā, and agreed to pay an indemnity of one and a half *crores*, of which Shāh Jahān subsequently remitted half a *crore*.

The disorders following the illness of Shāh Jahān and the war of succession saved the Deccan for the time being from the onslaught of the Mughuls. For about twenty years after his succession Aurangzīb's attention was concentrated on other affairs and the Deccan Sultānates were left alone to heal, as best they could, the wounds of the late war. But their recovery was slow and only partial. The rising power of the Marāthās and the growing demoralisation and corruption of the officers of the two kingdoms made the process of recovery difficult. It is hard to say how Aurangzīb's plan of annexing the two States would have affected the growth of Marāthā power or contributed to the stabilisation of Mughul rule in the Dec-

can. That Shāh Jahān's action in calling a halt to Aurangzīb's military campaign was inopportune and unwise, no one will deny.

Orthodox Muslim religious opinion, which began to take shape from the time of Jahāngīr, as is shown for example by the writings of the Mujaddid Alf-i Sāni and 'Abdul Haque Muhaddis-i Dehlavi, coloured the attitude of Shāh Jahān towards his non-Muslim subjects in general and his personal religious views in particular. As an orthodox Muslim he did much to restore the position of the Musalmans in the body politic. Shāh Jahān never gave up the basic policy of toleration and forbearance, which had stood the test of time. In his reign, some contemporary Muslim writers declare, the arrogance and boldness of the Hindus increased and in several places mosques were converted into temples and Muslims were converted to Hinduism; and there was a challenge even to the representation of Musalmans in the services, particularly in the revenue department. This awakened the fears of the Musalmans and Muslim public opinion was organised by Muslim divines. Shāh Jahān was unable to resist the pressure of Muslim opinion or the influence of the divines. The rising tide of Marāthā militant movement also alarmed Shāh Jahān and his officers. In religious matters he was more uncompromising than Akbar or Jahāngīr and his policy was comparatively more straight, firm, and bold than that of his predecessors. The deep conflict between the *Ahl-i-Shariat* or the orthodox and the followers of the mystic philosophy or the *Ahle-Tariqat* was demonstrated towards the end of his life over the question of succession, and was typified in the opposite personalities of Dārā Shukoh and Aurangzīb.<sup>5</sup>

Shāh Jahān's education had been carried on under liberal teachers of the *Sūfī* (mystic) school, but later on, he became more orthodox and less tolerant. He married no Hindu princess and was thus free from what Sharma calls "the mellowing influence" of the *harem*, an influence which had softened the fibre of the Mughuls and had made them complaisant and dependent on the Indian elements in the population. Shāh Jahān, like Fīrūz Shāh, started his reform of Muslim society by eradicating un-Islāmic practices. The *sijda* or prostration to the emperor was abolished and the *zaminbos* (kissing the ground) form of salutation was introduced. This, too, was later replaced by *chahar tasleem* (four salutations). This reorganisation of the Court ceremonial was intended to give it a Muslim atmosphere, and Muslim festivals were more regularly celebrated. Alms were distributed during the months of Rajab, Shaaban and Rabi'ū-l-awwal. Offerings were sent to Mecca under a Mīr Hajj. In his letter to the ruler of Golconda, Shāh Jahān spoke of himself as the

leader of the Sunnīs and the destroyer of all those who did not conform to his ideas of Islām. He also suppressed heretical practices among the Afghāns. But some of the older practices were preserved as being expedient and less harmful. The *jharoka* ceremony was continued, the *tulā dān* was observed, and astrologers were maintained at the court. Painting was patronised, but the wearing of the imperial likeness in the turban was discontinued.

It has been affirmed that Shāh Jahān ordered that only Muslims were to be recruited to the public services. This is not correct. In the tenth year of his reign, the percentage of Hindu *Manṣabdārs* was 16 as against 12 in the time of Jahāngīr. It was destined to rise still higher, but towards the end of the reign the percentage of Hindu *Manṣabdārs*, which had at one time touched 38, began to decline, first on account of the Marāthā wars and, secondly, owing to the clamour of the Musalmans.

Shāh Jahān did not reimpose the *jizya* but he revived the pilgrim-tax for a short while. He forbade the completion of certain temples and prevented the building of new temples. This policy was also reviewed later on. Certain temples were destroyed, but this was due to local prejudices and to the fact that some of them were utilised against the State. Prohibition of conversion to Hinduism and Christianity was justified as a defensive measure; inquiries made in Bhambar, an adjoining area, revealed that 4,000 Muslim women had been converted to Hinduism. Laws against blasphemy were made more stringent. On the whole, Shāh Jahān was more anxious than his predecessors to uphold Muslim religion and to exalt Muslim society, but his orthodoxy was neither militant nor narrow-minded. He tried to hold the balance between the policy initiated by Akbar, on the one hand, and the demands of the fanatical and orthodox Muslim divines, on the other.<sup>6</sup>

Shāh Jahān's last years were embittered by the war of succession among his four sons, and he dragged on his life in captivity for seven and a half years after Aurangzīb's accession. No sons of the same father and mother could have been more unlike each other in temperament, in outlook on life, in manners and in morals, than the four sons of Shāh Jahān. None of the great Mughul emperors attained to such grandeur and success as Shāh Jahān,<sup>7</sup> and none was destined to greater humiliation and suffering at the end of his reign.

Dārā, the eldest son, was most favoured by his father. He was 43 years of age when the war of succession started. Of comely appearance and dignified deportment, courteous in conversation and

extremely liberal, he was steeped in Muslim mysticism and Hindu pantheism. His father had bestowed on him the unprecedented military rank of 60,000 *zat*, the command being greater than "even the combined commands of all the younger brothers." He had been allowed to rule his province as a viceroy through his agents, and the highest honours were showered not only on him but also on his sons and adherents. As a consequence, Dārā never acquired experience in the art of administration or of war. He established no contacts with the people or the nobility, and in the hour of trial he was deserted by the officers who mattered. Both Manucci and Bernier refer to Dārā's irascibility, stubbornness and vanity. He entertained, says Bernier, "too exalted an opinion of himself, and believed he could accomplish everything by the powers of his own mind." The jealousy of Dārā's brothers and the fear they entertained of him are voiced by the contemporary historian 'Āqil Khān Razi. "Dārā Shukoh was appointed by Shāh Jahān as his heir apparent. His Highness, on account of his arrogance and pride . . . began to suppose, in fact to believe, that he was, by right and hereditary claim, the ruler of the extensive empire of Hindustān . . . and he made it his object to put an end to the existence of his brothers, who were co-heirs and partners in the kingdom and throne."<sup>8</sup> Flattery had made him vain; prosperity tended to make him ease-loving, and owing to the partiality shown to him by his father he became arrogant and over-confident.

Shāh Jahān fell ill with strangury in September, 1657. Despairing of his life, the emperor made his last will and commended Dārā as his heir apparent to the care of his officers. The news of his illness, which was at first kept a secret, reached the three brothers in their respective provinces—Shujā' in Bengal, Aurangzīb in the Deccan and Murād in Gujarāt. Shāh Jahān recovered slightly in November, but this made no difference to the march of events.

Of the three princes, Shujā' was the first to crown himself and to march towards Delhi from Bengal. Murād followed suit in December, and formed an alliance with Aurangzīb, who was more cautious in his moves. Sulaimān Shukoh, the eldest son of Dārā, was sent with Rājā Jay Singh against Shujā'; two other armies were also despatched, one to oppose Aurangzīb, and the other to oust Murād from Gujarāt.

Murād was a vain, pleasure-loving, and indolent prince who cared more for "the nourishment of the body" than for active life of the battlefield or diligent application to duty. He started his new career by killing 'Alī Naqī, his revenue minister, and sacking

the city of Surāt in order to equip himself for the forthcoming struggle for the throne. After entering into a treaty of alliance with Aurangzīb by which Punjab, Afghānistān, Kāshmīr, Sindh and one-third of the war booty were promised to him, Murād started from Ahmadābād on 7 March, 1658, and joined Aurangzīb at Dīpālpur on 24 April.

Aurangzīb had from the beginning been very cool and cautious, and had no intention of rebelling against his father. But the conduct of Dārā and the hasty action of his other two brothers left him no alternative but to enter the arena and make a bid for the supreme power.<sup>9</sup>

Jasvant Singh, who had been sent south by Shāh Jahān and Dārā, was encamped at Dharmat, fourteen miles south-west of Ujjain. Here, on 5 May, the rival armies came face to face. In the fierce battle that followed, Aurangzīb won a decisive victory by his superior generalship and an efficient and scientific combination of artillery and cavalry. It was the omen of his irresistible march to power.

On the day following the battle the Princes reached Ujjain. They then marched on to Gwālior where they arrived in June. Here they learnt that Dārā had personally moved to Dholpur and obtained command over all the ferries of the river Chambal. Aurangzīb, with the help of a local *zamīndār*, found a little-used ford at Bhanduli, 40 miles east of Dholpur; he crossed the river without any opposition and started on the road to Āgra. Dārā, foiled in his design of preventing his rivals from crossing the Chambal, had no alternative but to fall back. The two armies came face to face with one another at Sāmogarh, eight miles east of Āgra fort. Dārā was advised not to risk a personal defeat by taking charge of the army command, but he paid no heed to the advice. The battle commenced about noon on 8 June, 1658, in the fearful heat of the Indian sun. Dārā's Rājput officers fought with undaunted courage and nearly carried the day; but the faulty tactics of Dārā, the indiscipline of his army, and his bad generalship brought a final and irretrievable disaster to the imperial army. Dārā lost nearly 10,000 soldiers, innumerable horses and elephants, and 19 Muslim and Rājput officers of the highest rank. Beaten and humbled, he escaped to Āgra where he arrived at 9 p.m. and shut himself up in his house. When summoned by Shāh Jahān to see him, the heart-broken prince declined. "I cannot show my face to your Majesty in my present wretched plight", he replied; "permit me to go away with your farewell blessing on the long journey that is before me."

Dārā left Āgra for Delhi and the victors soon after arrived and encamped in the garden of Nūr Manzil outside Āgra. Shāh Jahān opened the gates of the Āgra fort after a siege of three days, Aurangzīb took possession of it, and then set out in pursuit of Dārā. By the time he reached Mathurā, he found that the pretensions of Murād had grown so high that, if unpunished, he would jeopardise Aurangzīb's chances of success. Murād was arrested and sent to Salimgarh; later on, he was confined as a State-prisoner in the fort of Gwālior. After three years' captivity Murād was tried for the murder of 'Alī Naqī on a complaint by his son and beheaded in the fort of Gwālior.

Dārā had marched on to Lahore when he heard of the capture of Āgra by Aurangzīb. There he assembled an army of 20,000 men and sent out parties to guard the ferries of the Sutlej. Aurangzīb sent an officer eastward to capture Allāhabād and another to the Punjab, while he himself stayed in Delhi for three weeks to organize the administration. He was formally crowned emperor at Delhi on 31 July, 1658.

The Mughul empire reached its greatest prosperity in the reign of Shāh Jahān. "The means employed by Shāh Jahān in these happy years", the author of *Lubbut Tawarikh* says, "to protect and nourish his people, his knowledge of what made for their welfare, his administration by honest and intelligent officers, the auditing of accounts, his care of the crown-lands and their tenants and encouragement of agriculture and the collection of revenue, together with his punishment and admonition of evil-doers, oppressors and malcontents—all tended to the prosperity of the empire." Muslim writers hold him up as an ideal Muslim monarch, and call him the pillar of the *Shar'iyat*, "the defender of religion, and the restorer of the waning fortunes of Islām." But contemporary European travellers, though testifying to the extent and the prosperity of his empire, "depict him as a despicable creature whose only concern in life was how to indulge in his bestial sensuality and monstrous wickedness." Elphinstone describes the age of Shāh Jahān as "the most prosperous ever known to India...together with a larger share of good government than often falls to the lot of Asiatic nations." V. A. Smith is extremely critical and unfair in his indictment of Shāh Jahān. "In affairs of state", he says, "Shāh Jahān was cruel, treacherous and unscrupulous. He had little skill as a military leader...His justice was merely the savage, unfeeling ferocity of the ordinary Asiatic despot, exercised without respect for persons and without the slightest tincture of compassion."

These deprecating remarks do scant justice to Shāh Jahān's qualities of head and heart.<sup>10</sup> Whatever his weaknesses as a prince, he proved a firm and capable ruler, who (so Bernier tells us) "reigned not so much as a king over his subjects but rather as a father over his family and children." As emperor he led a strenuous life; this is proved by the minute details of his daily routine recorded in contemporary Persian accounts. He personally supervised the minutest details of the administration and appointed men of the highest ability and uprightness of character as his ministers. The military campaigns were organised and the details were worked out by him personally with care and assiduity. Many abuses in the *manṣabdāri* and revenue system were removed by him, and never was security of life and property greater, nor justice more quick and fair, than in Shāh Jahān's reign. A loving father, a doting husband, a loyal friend, a capable ruler and wise statesman, Shāh Jahān deserved a better end. He was harsh and vindictive to his enemies, but kind and generous to his friends. He punished the unruly and recalcitrant with severity, amounting to cruelty, but he was affable, kind and forgiving to those who sought his friendship or forgiveness. His supreme endeavour was to eradicate lawlessness and rebellion, to guarantee security of life and property to his subjects, and to promote their material and moral welfare. Orthodox as a Muslim and anxious to fortify and strengthen the Muslim *millat*, he was never unfair to, or unmindful of, the interests of his non-Muslim subjects.<sup>11</sup> He loved pomp and show and considerably increased the royal retinue, the State-establishments and the magnificence of the court. The Peacock Throne, the Tāj Mahal, the Āgra Fort and numerous other works of architecture and art testify to his wealth as well as his aesthetic sense. He was an excellent calligraphist. His patronage of men of letters and of artisans and craftsmen was in keeping with the traditions of his family. Poets, philosophers, scholars, artisans—all flocked to his court and received his favours. He recognised merit and rewarded it generously. Poetry, music, painting, dancing, astronomy, mathematics and medicine flourished under the generous and intelligent patronage of the emperor. He was fond of Hindu music and patronised Hindu poets like Sundar Dās, Chintāmani and Kavīndra Āchārya. Amongst the royal musicians were Lāl Khān, son-in-law of the famous Tān Sen, Jagannāth, who received the title of Mahā-Kavi-Rāi, Sukh Sen and Sur Sen. Shāh Jahān's solicitude for the welfare of his subjects showed itself best in measures for famine relief in Gujarāt, Kāshmīr and the Punjab. Soup kitchen and alm-homes were established in Burhānpur, Ahmadābād and Surāt. At Burhānpur Rs. 5,000 were distributed amongst the poor every Monday. Taxes amounting to 70 lakhs were remitted. In

Kāshmir, Rs. 1,00,000 were distributed amongst the poor besides the provision of Rs. 200 worth of cooked food daily. Ten free kitchens were established in the Punjab. His treatment of his rivals at the time of his accession, as we have seen, is a great blot on his character; his aggressive wars were a great drain on the imperial treasury. But in the features of Shāh Jahān the Mughul artists have succeeded in expressing that calmness and grandeur which so forcibly strikes us in the Tāj Mahal, the greatest Indian architectural achievement of all times.

1. This is in accordance with the testimony of the Indian authors. There is, however, a story, recorded by some European travellers and in the annals of Persia, that Dāwar Bakhsh was not actually killed but managed to escape by substituting another man in his place. For details, Cf. B. P. Saksena, *History of Sharjahan of Delhi*, p. 62, f.n. 88 (Editor).
2. Op. cit. pp. 102-3. It is, however, difficult to justify the author's comment and observations for distinguishing the nature of the two rebellions.
- 2a. The date is given as c. 1579 by V. A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, (1919), p. 395.
3. For a more detailed account and a less favourable view of Shāh Jahān's conduct, cf. *CHI*, IV, pp. 190-192. The passage quoted is in p. 191.
4. For a detailed and critical discussion of the causes of the Mughul failure against Qandahār, cf. Saksena, op. cit. p. 235.
5. The view that Shāh Jahān "never gave up the basic policy of toleration and forbearance" is belied by the author's own statements that follow. Further, this discussion, on the basis of which the author makes the categorical statement, in the last para of this chapter, that Shāh Jahān "was never unfair to, or unmindful of, the interests of his non-Muslim subjects", is definitely opposed to well-authenticated facts if we remember, as we should, that the liberty to follow his own religion was regarded by every Hindu as his chief 'interest', more highly valued than any other privilege. The following passage in Dr. Saksena's book (every statement of which is substantiated by reference to authorities in the footnotes) is more in accordance with known historical facts:

"The practice of desecrating and destroying Hindū temples, though it was revived in the reign of Jahāngīr, became systematic under Shāh Jahān. He first ordered, in January 1633, the demolition of the newly built temples in his whole Empire, especially at Benares, and this order was (in September-October) followed by a total prohibition for the erecting of new temples or the repairing of old ones....."

"Further, systematic efforts were made at the instance of the Emperor to convert the Hindūs both by persuasion and by force. The former included tempting offers of service and rewards. Shāh Mīr Lāhaurī and Muhibb 'Alī Sindhī were especially commissioned with this work of proselytisation. They presented new converts to the Emperor, who conferred on them titles and distinctions, or assigned special allowance to them. The Hindūs were strictly forbidden to influence or dissuade their relations from turning Musalmān. Two cases of conversion among the nobility are worth notice...."

"There are two instances on record in which government officials were transferred or dismissed on account of their religious convictions (concrete instances given)." (Saksena, op. cit. pp. 293-5).

To the above statement may be added the fact that a pilgrim tax was imposed on the Hindus (Manrique's account, Vol. II. p. 147). (Editor).

6. The whole of this paragraph is a special pleading in favour of Shāh Jahān unsupported by facts and arguments. For example, no evidence is cited to prove that the Hindu temples were destroyed because "some of them were

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utilised against the State." Again, one fails to understand how prohibition of conversion to Hinduism and Christianity may be justified as a defensive measure. The last two sentences of this para are somewhat self-contradictory, and, in any case, do not deserve serious consideration from the point of view of the justification of Shāh Jahān's religious policy.

7. This is true only in respect of the artistic achievements.
  8. No evidence is cited to prove that it was a deliberate policy of Dārā to kill his brothers, nor is it easy to understand how 'they were co-heirs and partners in the kingdom.'
  9. It is, at best, a gratuitous assumption. Sir Jadunath Sarkar does not take such a view in his monumental work on Aurangzīb.
  10. For a moderate and reasonable view between these two extremes, cf. Saksena, *op. cit.*, pp. 296 ff.
  11. Cf. foot-note 5 above.
- N.B.—The Editor alone is responsible for all the above foot-notes [Ed.].

## CHAPTER VIII

### AURANGZĪB ( 1658-1680 )

#### I. FATE OF DĀRĀ

Muhyi-ud-din Muhammad Aurangzīb, the third son of Shāh Jahān and Mumtāz Mahall, gained two grand victories in the war of succession, the first, at Dharmat, fourteen miles south-west of Ujjain, on 15 April, 1658, and the second, at Sāmogarh, eight miles east of Āgra fort, on 29 May; and then, after capturing the fort of Āgra and imprisoning his father there, he ascended the throne at Delhi on 21 July, 1658, with the lofty title of Abu-'l Muzaffar Muhyi-ud-dīn Muhammad Aurangzīb Bahādur 'Ālamgīr Pādshāh Ghāzī.

His father and ex-emperor, "the most magnificent of the Mughul emperors", had to pass the remainder of his life as a prisoner in the Āgra fort. Aurangzīb's youngest brother, Murād, had been arrested on 25 June, and confined as a state-prisoner in the fort of Gwālior. But, even then, the new emperor did not feel secure about his own position, as many of his enemies were still active to strike him.

From Sāmogarh, Dārā had proceeded to Delhi and thence to the Punjab where he expected more co-operation and assistance than in any other place, while his eldest son, Sulaimān Shukoh, after defeating his uncle Shujā' at Bahādurpur, five miles north-east of Banaras, on 14 February, 1658, and concluding a peace with him at Monghyr, was marching towards Āgra.

Had Dārā, instead of moving to the Punjab, marched eastward and, uniting with his son, advanced against Aurangzīb, he might have created an alarming situation for his brother. But that was not to be, and his wrong move ruined his cause. An astute general as Aurangzīb was, he guarded against the possible junction of the father and the son. The followers of Sulaimān found their path to the west blocked, and disheartened by the news of Dārā's discomfiture at Sāmogarh and his flight to the north-west, deserted in large number, making his position very precarious.

Reaching Lahore, Dārā raised his men to 20,000 and despatched some of them to guard the ferries at Talwandī and Rūpar on the Sutlej, as well as to keep him informed of the enemy's movements. But as he was wanting in requisite courage and also did not get time enough to rally proper opposition to his brother's forces, he

fled from place to place as soon as he heard of the enemy's approach. The emperor had deputed Bahādur Khān to pursue him. Then he appointed Khalil-ullāh Khān, the governor of the Punjab, with orders to take up the pursuit more vigorously. When "Bahadur Khan crossed the Sutlej by surprise at Rupar....Dara's generals fell back from that river to Govindwal on the Beas. But when Aurangzib from Delhi reached the Sutlej, Dara fled from Lahore (18 August) to Multan, with his family and treasure, by boat. Once more Dara's courage failed before Aurangzib; he despaired of success and his despair infected his troops."<sup>1</sup> From Multan he fled from one place to another in Sind, all the while losing large number of his troops from desertions, and finally, he left this province at Badīn, proceeding over the Rann of Cutch towards Gujarāt. Meanwhile, the alarming news of Shujā's advance towards Āgra had forced the emperor to turn back from the environs of Multan for Delhi.

After his coronation (21 July, 1658), Aurangzīb had assured his brother Shujā' of the possession of Bihār in addition to that of Bengal, but the latter, finding the deplorable plight of his father as well as of his brother, Murād, could not place reliance on his brother's promise, and when he heard of Aurangzīb's absence far away from the capital, he considered this a suitable opportunity to conquer as far as Āgra and release his father. Early in November, 1658, he marched out of Patna with an army of 25,000 cavalry and a park of artillery. Taking possession of the forts on the way, he reached Khajuhā, in the Fatehpur district, in Uttar Pradesh, on 30 December, 1659. Here his path was barred by Muhammad Sultān, the eldest son of the emperor.

Arriving at the environs of Delhi in November, 1658, Aurangzīb sent reinforcements to his son, and himself advanced to meet his brother at Khajuhā. On the night before the battle, Mahārājā Jasvant Singh, who was the commander of the emperor's right wing, all on a sudden, attacked and plundered the imperial camp and thereafter went back with his 14,000 Rājput followers to his own country. But the imperial position was saved by the emperor's wonderful coolness and tactful handling of the situation and Shujā's hesitation to act in time.

In the encounter (5 January, 1659) the imperialists assembled 50,000 to 55,000 men whereas Shujā's army numbered 23,000. The battle started at 8 a.m. by an offensive from Shujā'. The imperialists were driven to such an unfavourable position that they would have given way, but the cool courage, promptitude and superior tact

of the emperor turned the impending defeat into a decisive victory, and Shujā' was compelled to take recourse to flight. His army also fled away, leaving their camp equipage and artillery as the victor's prize.

Aurangzīb sent Muhammad Sultān and Mīr Jumla in pursuit of Shujā' who fled to Monghyr, via Banaras and Patna, and thence to the Malda district through Sahibganj and Rajmahal.

After making Tāndā<sup>2</sup> his base of operations, Shujā' tried to check the advance of the imperialists and won over Muhammad Sultān, by offering him the hand of his daughter Gulrukh Bānu. He also succeeded in recovering Rajmahal and compelled Mīr Jumla to fall back from his position at Belghata, opposite Jangipur, towards Murshidabad. But when the information of the approach of another imperial army under Dāūd Khān, the governor of Bihār, to the assistance of Mīr Jumla, reached him, he left Rajmahal and came back to Tāndā (January, 1660). Sometime after, Muhammad Sultān deserted him and joined the imperialists but only to pass the rest of his life in imprisonment. Now all was over with Shujā'. He had no other alternative but to take a precipitate flight to Dacca before Mīr Jumla's net could completely close round him. But even there, his position was not secure because of enmity of the local *zamīn-dārs*. As such, he was forced to leave Bengal and take shelter with the Magh Rājā of Arakan. Here he conspired to seize the throne of his benefactor and then to proceed to recover Bengal. But the plot having leaked out, he tried to take to his heels but was pursued and slain (February, 1661).

After great hardship, Dārā had arrived at Ahmadābād where, with the assistance of Shāh Navāz Khān, the governor of the province, he raised his army to 22,000 and marched towards Āgra. On the way, on receipt of an invitation from Jasvant Singh who promised to join him with his Rājput followers, he proceeded in the direction of Ajmer. But Jasvant Singh was meanwhile won over by the emperor, and Dārā had no alternative but to fight with his brother who had already arrived at the vicinity. At the pass of Deorāi, four miles south of Ajmer, he was once more defeated by Aurangzīb (March, 1659) and compelled to go back towards Ahmadābād. But unable to find refuge anywhere in Gujarāt, he crossed the Rann once again and entered the southern coast of Sind (May, 1659). Here, too, his position was miserable, as Aurangzīb's pursuing army and local officers closed his path from the north, east and south-east. Dārā moved towards the north-west, crossed the Indus and proceeded towards Persia, via the Bolān pass and Qandahār.

While on the way to Dādar, nine miles east of the Bolān pass, his beloved wife, Nādira Bānū, succumbed to terrible hardship and illness. Overwhelmed with grief, the bereaved prince sent her corpse to Lahore for burial, accompanied by his most faithful officer, Gul Muhammad, the soldiers still remaining with him. But to crown his misery, the ungrateful Malik Jīvan, the chieftain of Dādar, whom he had once saved from death sentence and whose hospitality he accepted, seized him along with his second son Sipihr Shukoh and two daughters, and delivered them to Aurangzīb's general Bahādur Khān.

Brought to Delhi, Dārā and Sipihr Shukoh were paraded through the streets with ignominy, and subsequently the former was tried by the court theologians on a charge of apostasy from Islām. He was found guilty and put to death (30 August, 1659).

Dārā's eldest son, Sulaimān Shukoh, who had taken refuge in Garhwāl, was captured and brought to Delhi in January, 1661. He was then sent as a state-prisoner to Gwālīor where he was put to death (May, 1662) by overdoses of opium.

At the instigation of Aurangzīb, a complaint was instituted against Murād by the second son of 'Alī Naqī for the murder of his father, and the prince, having been declared guilty, was beheaded in the fort of Gwālīor on 4 December, 1661. Thus, after removing his rivals one by one, Aurangzīb firmly secured his position, although the means to the end are open to severe criticism.

He had celebrated his coronation for the second time on 5 June, 1659, after his decisive victories against Shujā' and Dārā at Khajuhā and Deorāi, respectively. On this occasion, not only grand banquets and dazzling illuminations enlivened the function, but many officers and nobles were promoted and new appointments made.

## II. AURANGZĪB AND NORTH INDIA

The long "reign of Aurangzīb is naturally divided into two equal parts of about 25 years each, the first of which he passed in Northern India and the second in the Deccan. During the earlier of these two periods the centre of interest lies unmistakably in the North.... because the most important developments, civil and military, concerned this region.... In the second half of the reign the situation is reversed: all the resources of the empire are concentrated in the Deccan; the Emperor, his court and family, the bulk of the army, and all his best officers live there for a quarter century, and Hindustān sinks back to a place of secondary importance.... the

administration in Northern India naturally falls into decay at the withdrawal of the master's eye and the ablest officers; the people grow poorer; the upper classes decline in morals, intelligence and useful activity; finally, lawlessness breaks out in most parts",<sup>3</sup> indicating the beginning of that great anarchy which prevailed throughout the eighteenth century.

After his second coronation, the emperor gave his attention to alleviate the economic distress of the people. The prolonged war of succession and consequent disorder and confusion in the civil administration threatened the economic ruin of almost the whole of Northern India and grain was selling at exorbitant prices, beyond the reach of the ordinary people. The inland transit duties (*rāhdārī*) at every ford, ferry or provincial boundary, and the octroi (*pāndārī*) levied in large towns like Āgra, Delhi and Lahore, on articles of food and drink brought for sale from outside, enhanced the troubles as they not only hampered free movement of commodities within the country but also increased their prices. The emperor abolished both of them in the crown lands, and the assignees (*jāgīrdārs*) and landholders (*zamāndārs*) were asked to do so in their respective estates. By the abolition of *rāhdārī* alone, the government suffered a loss of twenty-five lakhs of rupees in revenue in the crown lands per annum. As a result of these measures, there was free movement of commodities from one place to another and their prices fell considerably. Many oppressive and burdensome *abwābs* (cesses) over and above the regular land revenue and customs duty were also abolished. Although forbidden again and again by various rulers like Fīrūz Tughluq, Akbar and Jahāngīr, they re-appeared every time after some intervals. The important *abwābs* or cesses were perquisites, gifts and subscriptions exacted by the officials in their own interest, fees and commissions realized for the State on various occasions, licence-tax for certain trades, duties on local sale of commodities and some special imposts on the Hindus, viz., the pilgrim's tax, a tax on the occasion of the birth of a male child, and a tax for throwing the bones of the dead into the Ganges. Although they were abolished by Aurangzīb and his actions showed his pious intention to do good to the people, his edicts could not be duly enforced in all regions, especially in far off places where the people suffered almost as before.

From 1661 to 1667 the emperor received embassies from many Muhammadan powers outside India which had trade relations with Mughul India, congratulating him on his victories over his rivals and accession to the throne. Such embassies came from the Sharīf

of Mecca, the Safavī king of Persia, the kings of Balkh, Bukhārā, Kāshghar, the petty chieftains of Urganj (Khiva), Shahr-i-nau, the Turkish governors of Basra, Hadramaut or Southern Arabia to the north-east of Aden, Yaman and Mocha, the ruler of Barbary and the Christian king of Abyssinia. One embassy also came from Constantinople in 1690. Aurangzīb's "policy at the beginning was to dazzle the eyes of foreign princes by the lavish gift of presents to them and their envoys, and thus induce the outer Muslim world to forget his treatment of his father and brothers, or at least to show courtesy to the successful man of action and master of India's untold wealth, especially when he was so free with his money."<sup>4</sup>

Although Shāh 'Abbās II, the Safavī king of Persia, sent a grand complimentary embassy in 1661, his relation with Aurangzīb became strained later on, leading to a complete rift due to the former's overweening pride, and aggravated by the religious difference between the two sovereigns, Shāh 'Abbās II being a Shiah and Aurangzīb an orthodox Sunnī. Farbiyat Khān, the Indian envoy, was rudely treated and humiliated at the Persian Court, and the Persian emperor threatened an invasion of the Mughul empire; though it did not materialize, Aurangzīb had to be very vigilant on the north-western frontier. With the death of Shāh 'Abbās II in 1667, the danger of Persian invasion disappeared, as during the rest of the reign of Aurangzīb, Persia was too weak to strike.

The relation between Aurangzīb and Shāh Jahān since the latter became a captive in the Āgra fort on 18 June, 1658, was very bitter. During the period of this captivity of the father, the son never visited Āgra and his treatment of the former was a pitiable instance of open disregard for decorum and canons of morality and justice. Shāh Jahān gradually realized the position into which he had been cast by the cruel hand of destiny. He was closely surrounded by the emperor's guards and his movements within the fort were watched with strict vigilance. Acrimonious letters were exchanged between the father and the son, and when the attempts of the former to correspond with Dārā and Shujā' were detected, they made his position worse still. His bonds of captivity were tightened and writing materials were withheld from him; whatever he desired to write, had to be written through government staff, and such correspondence passed through government agents. There were sordid wranglings between the father and the son over the crown jeweleries and those left by Dārā in the Āgra fort, and Aurangzīb took possession of them in spite of Shāh Jahān's remonstrances. The correspondence between them became so bitter that the father, without

further complaint, at last resigned to the inevitable. The heart-rending news of the sad end of Dārā, Shujā', Murād and Sulaimān Shukoh gave him rude shocks, one after another, but he bore them with extraordinary patience. He spent his time in prayer, religious discourses, reading the *Qur'ān* and performance of all other duties according to the canons of Islām. It was a great solace to him to receive till the last moment of his life the loving care of his eldest daughter, Jahānārā, who shared with him all sorrows and miseries, consoling him with tenderness of a mother and daughter combined in one. Deprived of liberty, bereft of all powers and stricken down with bereavements, he only waited for deliverance from such a sad and gloomy existence, and at last it came on 22 January, 1666, at the age of seventy-four, after an illness continuing for about fifteen days.

During the first decade of Aurangzīb's reign there were a few disturbances in his empire, but they were local and not of much importance, and were easily put down. Champat Rāi of Bundelkhand, who had rebelled against the emperor, was hunted from place to place and eventually, unable to defend, he stabbed himself to death (1661). A disputed succession in Navānagar in Saurāshtra led to the intervention of the Mughul suzerain. The *faujdār* of Junāgarh after a desperate fight against the usurper Rāi Singh, killed him, and restored Rājā Chhatra Sāl, Jām of Navānagar, in his possession (A.D. 1663). Rāo Karan of Bikāner, who had defied the emperor's authority, was forced to submit and pardoned.

The territorial expansion of the Mughul empire, initiated and continued by the predecessors of Aurangzīb, went on during his regime also, and the early years of his reign witnessed the extension of the empire in various directions. In 1661, Dāūd Khān, the governor of Bihār, invaded Palāmau in South Bihār, then inhabited mostly by the Cheros, a Dravidian people, and conquered it. It was annexed to the *Sūba* of Bihār. In 1665, as the result of a mission from the Mughul governor of Kāshmir, the ruler of little Tibet or Ladakh, out of fear, acknowledged the suzerainty of the Mughuls, built a mosque at his capital and minted coins in the name of the emperor.

A great military expedition was undertaken by the imperialists on the north-eastern side, in Assam. A branch of the Shān race, the Āhoms, who had been originally inhabitants of Upper Burma, migrated to Assam in the thirteenth century, conquering a part of the Brahmaputra valley. They went on expanding their kingdom in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries till they held sway up to

the Bar Nadī river on the north-west and the Kalāng river on the south-west. They were very hardy, worshipped demons and were feudally organized, but in the course of their stay in Assam, they began to be influenced by Indian civilization and the Hindu religion. By the conquest of Kuch Hājo, embracing the present districts of Goālpārā and Kāmṛūp in Assam, in the early part of the seventeenth century, the eastern boundary of the Mughul empire had extended up to the Bar Nadī. Thus a conflict between the Mughuls and the Āhoms was almost inevitable, and as a matter of fact, much desultory fighting went on between them in the course of which the Āhoms raided the eastern frontier of the Mughul empire. At last, a peace was concluded in 1638, according to which the Bar Nadī was recognized as the boundary between the two kingdoms.

During the war of succession, taking advantage of the defenceless condition of the frontiers, the Āhoms as well as the Rājā of Cooch Behār sent expeditionary forces to occupy the Mughul district of Kāmṛūp from the east and west, respectively. Afraid of attacks from two sides, and without any hope of reinforcement from Bengal, Mīr Lutf-ullah Shirāzī, the *faujdār* of Gauhāti, fled away to Dacca, leaving the district in a defenceless state. The Āhoms occupied Gauhāti, without any resistance, and much booty, including 140 horses, 40 pieces of canon and 200 matchlocks, fell into their hands. They plundered the whole district and drove away the troops of Cooch Behār, and thus the whole of Western Brahmaputra valley came into their possession (A.D. 1658).

After the civil war, the emperor appointed Mīr Jumla as viceroy of Bengal (June, 1660) with orders to punish the miscreants and recover the Mughul territories. Having completed necessary preparations, the viceroy started from Dacca early in November, 1661, with 12,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry and a flotilla of more than three hundred war-vessels. At first he went to Cooch Behār, the capital of which was occupied without any resistance, as the Rājā and his officers had fled away in terror. After a successful campaign in this kingdom and annexing it to the Mughul empire, Mīr Jumla proceeded against Assam. Although his path lay through forests and innumerable streams, he marched forward bearing all hardships and captured many forts of the enemies, viz, Jogīguphā, Gauhāti, Srīghāt, Pāndu, Beltalā, Kājali, Sādharā and Simlā-garh. In a naval engagement he destroyed their navy and finally reached Garhgāon, the capital of the Āhom kingdom, on 17 March, 1662. The Āhom king, Jayadhwaj, had fled away, leaving his capital at the mercy of the invaders. Immense booty was captured by the imperialists in the course of the Assam campaign.

The Mughul general made necessary arrangements for keeping hold over the conquered territories during the ensuing monsoon. A strong garrison was maintained in the occupied Āhom capital and outposts were established for guarding the routes. As the river near Garhgāon was shallow, the Mughul fleet had to be anchored at Lakhau, about eighteen miles north-west of that town, while the general himself with the main army halted at Mathurāpur, a village on a high ground, seven miles south-east of Garhgāon. Such a separation of the land army and the navy became the cause of terrible sufferings of the imperialists.

The Āhoms still retained sufficient strength to give blows to their enemies. They resumed offensive and surprised the Mughul outposts by night attacks; even Garhgāon was not spared. During the rainy season the Mughul occupation of Assam was extremely precarious; the country was flooded, communications were cut off, the outposts isolated and the imperial army remained practically "in a state of siege". Communications between the Mughul army and the navy were also cut off by the enemies who concentrated their attacks on Garhgāon, which was repeatedly attacked and saved only by the exertions and gallantry of the Mughul soldiery.

To add to the misery of the Mughuls, a serious epidemic broke out at Mathurāpur, levying a heavy toll of lives in Mīr Jumla's camp. The disease spread to the whole of Assam and 230,000 of its inhabitants succumbed to it. The life at Mathurāpur being intolerable, the Mughul army came back to Garhgāon, leaving many of the sick who could not be carried for paucity of transport. But the refugees infected the army at Garhgāon, making the situation worse.

"Through all these dark months of alarm, suspense and even despair" the Mughul navy at Lakhau successfully maintained its touch with Gauhāti and through it with the headquarters of Bengal. When the monsoon was over, Mīr Jumla with great difficulty succeeded in re-opening communication with the fleet and provisions were sent in large quantities under escort from Lakhau to Garhgāon. In place of famine, the Mughul camp was now in plenty.

Resuming operations against the enemies, the Mughul general marched to Tipām via Solāguri. But he was attacked with fainting fits which were soon followed by high fever and pleurisy. His troops refused to proceed further and enter the pestilential hills of Nāmrūp where Jayadhwaj, the Āhom king, had taken refuge. The situation of the latter, too, became very miserable by the desertion of many of his notables and he made overtures of peace to Mīr Jumla, who gladly received them, and a treaty was concluded be-

tween the two parties. By it, Jayadhwaj consented to send a daughter to the imperial harem, pay an annual tribute and a heavy war-indemnity including 20,000 *tolas* of gold, 120,000 *tolas* of silver,<sup>5a</sup> to give hostages for full payment of the indemnity, and to cede more than half of the province of Darrang.

Thus "judged as a military exploit, Mīr Jumla's invasion of Assam was a success."<sup>6</sup> It was no doubt gained at great hardships and immense loss of lives but the Mughul general shared all sufferings with the common soldiers and steered successfully through all adverse circumstances with uncommon perseverance and fortitude. He was attacked with a serious malady, consumption, which had developed from his pleurisy. Over-exertion and unhealthy climatic conditions of the country ruined his health beyond recovery, and when he was on his way to Dacca after his successful expedition, he expired on 31 March, 1663.

The Mughuls retained the conquests of Mīr Jumla till 1667 when the Āhom king, Chakradhwaj, after sending two detachments down the banks of the Brahmaputra, succeeded in capturing the Mughul forts one after another, in rapid succession. Even Gauhāti itself fell into his hands and its *faujdār* was taken prisoner. It became the headquarters of an Āhom viceroy. The Mughuls were thus driven back to the river Monās. For many years the attempts of the imperialists to recover their lost position failed, in spite of the appointment of Rājā Rām Singh, the son and successor of Mīrzā Rājā Jay Singh, with supreme command over the expeditionary forces in Assam and his stay at Rāngāmāti for several years. He was ultimately recalled in 1676. Although in 1679, the Mughuls recovered Gauhāti by bribery, the Āhom king, Gadādhār Singh, retook it in 1681, and thus Kāmṛūp was finally lost to them.

In 1662 the rājā of Cooch Behār had reconquered his kingdom by expelling the Mughul army of occupation, but, in 1664, out of fear, he again offered his submission to the imperialists and paid an indemnity of five and a half lakhs of rupees to Shāyista Khān, the new Governor of Bengal. Later on, taking advantage of serious dissensions and disorders within the kingdom, the Mughuls conquered its southern and eastern portions, including the present districts of Rangpur and Western Kāmṛūp.

One of the most brilliant achievements of Shāyista Khān as governor of Bengal was the conquest of Chittagong. The Fenny river formed the boundary between the Mughul empire and the Magh kingdom of Arakan but the Magh pirates, in conjunction with the Feringis or Portuguese adventurers and their half-caste off-

springs, who used frequently to come to Bengal by the river-route, not only committed depredations and other heinous acts here, but also carried off the people, some of whom were employed in pillage or some other degrading pursuits, and sold others as slaves. The raids of these pirates rendered Deltaic Bengal desolate, causing serious damage to imperial prestige and heavy loss of revenue. Situated between Arakan and Bengal, Chittagong was a convenient base of operations of these miscreants, and it was of utmost necessity to bring it under the control of the imperial administration. With this end in view, Shāyista Khān built a new navy of three hundred war-vessels and made proper arrangements for the protection of Dacca against any possible attack by water. Next, in November, 1665, he captured the island of Sandwip. Meanwhile, he had been trying hard to win over the Feringis by liberal offers of service, and a serious quarrel between them and their Arakanese chiefs facilitated his design. All the Feringis of Chittagong fled with their family and property to the Mughul territory, where they were treated with liberality.

A strong expeditionary force was then sent from Dacca to Chittagong under Buzurg Ummid Khān, a son of Shāyista Khān, and admiral Ibn Husain. The imperial fleet consisted of 288 vessels of their own and about 40 vessels of the Feringis, as auxiliaries. It was planned that the land army and the navy should co-operate with each other. The Maghs were defeated in three naval engagements, and in the last of these, fought near the fort of Chittagong, the Arakanese navy suffered a heavy discomfiture; several ships were sunk and one hundred and thirty-five captured by the imperialists. The fort of Chittagong was then besieged and captured, the garrison having surrendered after the resistance of a day only (26 January, 1666).

The conquered territory was placed under direct imperial administration. The name of Chittagong was changed to Islāmābād and it became the headquarters of a Mughul *faujdār*. The most important benefits of the victory were the release of thousands of Bengal peasants who had been kidnapped and held there as serfs and the increase of cultivation in the areas so long rendered desolate by the oppressions of the Maghs and Feringis.

The north-western frontier had all along been a source of trouble to the Mughul empire. The various Afghān clans like the Afrīdīs, Yūsufzāīs and Khattaks living in that hilly region were notorious for highway robbery from time immemorial. Their lands being arid and less productive, they found it more profitable for their

sustenance to plunder the inhabitants of the plains and rich traders who happened to pass through their country. Finding it too difficult to keep them under control by force of arms, the Mughul emperors bribed these hillmen with a view to maintaining peace and keeping the routes in the north-western frontier open to traffic. Aurangzīb paid the various border chiefs six lakhs of rupees annually, but even these bribes did not always succeed in maintaining peace in that hilly region where new leaders arose and used to plunder the Mughul territory. The trouble commenced early in 1667, when the Yūsufzāis living in the Swāt and Bājaur valleys and the plain of northern Peshāwar, rose in arms under their leader Bhāgū who crowned a pretender under the title of Muhammad Shāh and crossed the Indus near Attock. Entering the Hazāra district he attacked the Mughul outposts there, while other Yūsufzāi bands ravaged the western Peshāwar and Attock districts, and then coming over to the south bank of the Indus at Hārūn, they attempted to hold the ferry there with a view to preventing the Mughul army from crossing into the tribal territory. But they were severely beaten back by Kāmil Khān, the commandant of Attock, and the Mughul territory on the south side of the Indus was thus cleared of the enemies (April, 1667). In the following month Shamsheer Khān, another commander, crossed the Indus, and, marching into the Yūsufzāi country, gained several victories over them and destroyed many of their farms and homesteads. Muhammad Āmīn Khān who was next invested with the supreme command to punish these rebels, inflicted such severe blows on them that they remained quiet for some years.

In 1672 there was another rising in the frontier region. The Afrīdī Chieftain, Akmal Khān, crowned himself king and declared a holy war against the imperialists, inviting all the Pathāns to join him in this national struggle. The Khyber pass was closed and the rebels attacked Muhammad Āmīn Khān, then governor of Afghānistān, at 'Alī Masjid, cutting him off from the stream from which he received his supply of water. Their severe assaults in the hilly region were too much for the Mughuls to bear and they were thrown into utter confusion. The imperialists suffered heavy discomfiture and immense losses in men and property. Muhammad Āmīn Khān and some of his high officers somehow succeeded in escaping to Peshāwar. Such a grand victory enhanced the fame and resources of Akmal Khān and lured more recruits to his banner. The rebellion spread in the entire frontier regions; the Khattak clan, also, joined the Afrīdīs, and Khūsh-hāl Khān, the poet and leader

of the former, became the guiding spirit of this national struggle of the Pathāns.

The defeat of Āmīn Khān gave a rude shock to Aurangzīb who degraded him and sent Mahābat Khān as governor of Afghānistān. But the new governor avoided any risky action and entered into a secret understanding with the rebels not to molest each other; and so the Khyber pass remained closed as before. Highly displeased, the emperor sent Shujā'at Khān with a large force to punish the rebels but he was defeated and killed in the Karāpā pass on 22 February, 1674.

The situation became so alarming that the emperor himself proceeded to Hasan Abdāl, near Peshāwar, for directing the operations. Mahābat Khān was removed from the governorship and all possible actions were taken against the rebels. The emperor used both arms and diplomacy with much success. Many clans were bought over with presents, pensions and posts in the Mughul army, while the more refractory clans like the Ghorai, Ghilzāi, Shirāni and Yūsufzāis were crushed by arms. The imperial commander, Uighur Khān, won repeated victories over the Afghāns and created awe and panic among them. The position of the Mughuls improved sufficiently by the end of 1675 and Aurangzīb left Hasan Abdāl for Delhi after his stay at the former place for a year and a half.

He appointed Amīr Khān, the son of Khalil-ullāh, governor of Kābul in 1677. This choice was most befitting. Amīr Khān, who had already distinguished himself by his capabilities, governed Afghānistān with singular tact, energy and efficiency till his death in 1698. By his diplomacy and conciliatory policy he succeeded in restoring order in the frontier and keeping the Khyber pass open to traffic. His success was to a great extent due to the tact and wise counsel of his wife.

His policy of paying subsidies to the tribal leaders and creating dissensions among the clans bore fruit, leading to the break-up of the confederacy under Akmal Khān, and on the death of the latter, the Afrīdīs submitted and came to terms with the emperor. But the unbending and high-spirited Khattak leader, Khūsh-hāl Khān, continued the struggle for many years more, undaunted by the inimical actions of the Bangashes, Yūsufzāis and his own son Ashraf who had joined hands with the Mughuls. Alone did he fight for the cause of Pathān independence till he was betrayed by his son, culminating in his capture and imprisonment by his enemies. The war of Aurangzīb on the north-west frontier thus came to a successful end, though at a heavy cost. Sir Jadunath Sarkar is per-

fectly justified when he says: "Ruinous as the Afghān war was to imperial finances, its political effect was even more harmful. It made the employment of Afghāns in the ensuing Rājput war impossible, though Afghāns were just the class of soldiers who could have won victory for the imperialists in that rugged and barren country. Moreover, it relieved the pressure on Shivājī by draining the Decan of the best Mughul troops for service on the N.W. frontier."<sup>7</sup> Taking advantage of this diversion of the imperial forces, the Marāthā king conquered Carnatic (1667) without any opposition.

### III. ORTHODOXY AND BIGOTRY

No one can possibly underestimate the great influence exerted on the life and activities of Aurangzīb by the orthodox reform movement in Indian Islām started by Mujāddid Alf-i-Sānī Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindī (1563-1624), the aims of which were regeneration and rejuvenation of Islām in strict accord with the *shar'iyat* and "the establishment of a true Islāmic State conforming to Islāmic ideas and practices in all its activities. . . ."<sup>7a</sup> While a prince, Aurangzīb came into contact with Khvāja Muhammad M'asūm, son of Mujāddid Ahmad Sirhindī. He held him in high esteem and sought his advice on important matters of Muslim theology. After his accession to the throne also, he maintained his contact with the Khvāja and his son Muhammad Saifuddīn as well, and their influence had much to do in bringing him within the fold of the orthodox school and shaping his puritanic state policy.

Aurangzīb had claimed the throne as the champion of Sunnī orthodoxy against the liberal-minded Dārā whom he considered to be a heretic. It was neither his personal caprice nor any political or material gain that shaped his policy. As a zealous Sunnī Muslim, he believed in the Islāmic theory of Kingship according to which the ruler is to enforce strictly the Qur'ānic law in the administration of his empire, or in other words, as a pious Muslim, he considered it to be his duty to "exert himself in the path of God" i.e., to carry on *jihād* (holy war) against infidels and convert his realm from *dār-ul-harb* (non-Muslim land) to *dār-ul-Islām* (realm of Islām). In pursuance of this ideal, he reversed the policy enunciated by Akbar, the Great, in regard to his non-Muslim subjects, who, in consequence, suffered from various social, political and economic disabilities and felt degraded because of the inferior position they held in the empire. Such discriminatory measures alienated the sympathy and good will of the vast majority of his non-Muslim subjects, eventually undermining the foundation on which rested the political fabric of the empire.

In 1659 he issued a number of ordinances for restoring the Muslim law of conduct according to the teaching of the *Qur'ān*. He discontinued the practice of inscribing the *kalima* (Muhammadan confession of faith) on the coins lest they were defiled by men of other faiths, and abolished the celebration of the new year's day (*naurūz*) of the Zoroastrian calendar—a custom followed by the Mughul emperors in imitation of the Persian kings. The cultivation of *bhāng* (*cannabis Indica*) was forbidden throughout the empire. Censors of public morals (*muhtasibs*) were appointed in all big cities to enforce the Qur'ānic law and put down the practices forbidden in it, like drinking of wine, gambling and illicit traffic of women. Their duties also included punishment of Muslims for heretical opinions, blasphemy, omission of obligatory prayers and Ramzān fast. In enforcing orthodoxy the emperor did not spare the Sūfis and Shiahs, where deemed necessary. Among the important sections of the Muslim population who suffered serious persecution for heresy was the Isma'īlia or Bohra community of Gujarāt.

In 1668 the emperor forbade music at his court and the court musicians and singers were pensioned off. The royal band was not, however, discontinued. The ceremony of weighing the emperor on his two birthdays, according to the lunar and solar calendars, against precious articles like gold and silver, and the practice of *Jharokā-darśan*, a custom according to which the Mughul emperors used to appear every morning at the outer balcony of their palace to receive the salute of the subjects, were discontinued, as these were un-Islāmic. The emperor also forbade the customary rejoicings on his birthdays and on the anniversary of his coronation.

Although every endeavour was made to enforce his regulations and elevate his subjects, it was not possible to achieve the desired result, as they were not yet prepared to follow his high ideals of puritanical morality. Drinking and gambling were so much deep-rooted in the country that it was simply impossible to stamp out these evils by a stroke of the pen. The orders regarding the courtesans and dancing girls either to get themselves married or leave the empire were also not effective. Similarly, the emperor's edict prohibiting the rite of *satī* or burning of a Hindu widow along with the dead body of her husband, could not be duly enforced owing to strong opposition of the people.

In a *farmān* granted to a priest of Banaras in 1659, Aurangzīb 'avowed that his religion forbade him to allow the building of new temples, but did not enjoin the destruction of old ones'. In 1664 he forbade old temples to be repaired, and on 9 April, 1669, an

order was issued to the governors of the provinces "to demolish the schools and temples of the infidels and put down their teaching and religious practices strongly."<sup>8</sup> Besides innumerable temples throughout the empire, even the famous Hindu temples of Viśvanātha at Banaras, of Keshav Dev at Mathurā, and Somnāth at Pātan were destroyed. Even the loyal State of Jaipur was not spared, and sixty-six temples were razed to the ground at Amber.

An order was issued re-imposing the *jizya* tax on the Hindus from 2 April, 1679, "with the object of spreading Islām and overthrowing infidel practices."<sup>9</sup> It was a commutation tax, i.e., the price of indulgence, and had to be paid by an assessee in person with marks of humility. For its assessment and collection the non-Muslim population was roughly divided into three grades; the first grade having an income above 10,000 *dirhams* had to pay 48 *dirhams*, the second, whose income was from 200 to 10,000 *dirhams* paid 24 *dirhams*, and the third, i.e., those whose income fell below 200 *dirhams* paid 12 *dirhams* a year, the value of a *dirham* being a little more than a quarter of a rupee. It appears that the *jizya* hit the poor non-Muslim population most, as the rate of taxation in their case was heavy in proportion to their income. Women, children below fourteen, slaves, beggars and paupers were exempted from this tax. Of the monks, the heads of wealthy monasteries only had to pay; government officials were, however, exempted from this tax.

Aurangzīb ignored all protests and remained adamant in realizing the *jizya*. He felt gratified when many Hindus, unable to pay it, embraced Islām.

Various other measures were adopted to put pressure on the Hindus with a view to increasing the number of converts to Islām. By an edict in April, 1665, the customs duty on the commodities brought in for sale was fixed at 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* for Muslim merchants and 5 per cent. for the Hindu merchants. In May, 1667, this duty in the case of Muslim traders was abolished, whereas it was retained at the old rate of 5 per cent. on the Hindus. The emperor offered rewards and posts in the public service, liberation from imprisonment and even succession to property under dispute in favour of those who would embrace Islām. In 1671 an order was passed for the dismissal of all Hindu head-clerks and accountants, and replacing them by Muslims, but due to paucity of qualified Muhammadans the emperor, later on, allowed half of these posts to be held by the Hindus. In 1668 all Hindu religious fairs were prohibited, and in March 1695 another order was passed for-

bidding the Hindus, except the Rājputs, to ride in *pālkīs* (palanquins), on elephants and good horses; they were also forbidden to carry arms.<sup>9a</sup>

All these discriminatory measures of the emperor produced far-reaching and disastrous consequences, impairing the stability of the empire. The affected Hindu community became highly discontented, and opposition to the destruction of their holy temples was offered in Rājasthān, Bundelkhand, Mālwa and Khāndesh, and many converted mosques were demolished or the call to prayer was stopped. In certain places the *jizya* collectors were assaulted and driven out.

#### IV. REACTION AGAINST BIGOTRY

The first great Hindu reaction against the emperor's policy of persecution occurred in the district of Mathurā. Early in 1669, the sturdy Jāt peasantry under their leader Gokla of Tilpat took up arms against the imperialists and killed 'Abd-un-Nabī, the oppressive *faujdār* of Mathurā. They then sacked the *parganā* of Sādābād and created disorder and confusion in the neighbouring district of Āgra also. A strong reinforcement under Ra'dandāz Khān was of no avail and the emperor himself proceeded to the disturbed area. Gokla mustered 20,000 men and fought valiantly but was at last overpowered by Hasan 'Alī Khān, the Mughul commandant of Mathurā. The Jāt leader was put to death and the members of his family were converted to Islām.

In 1672 the formidable rising of the Satnāmīs took place in the districts of Nārnaul and Mewāt. The Satnāmīs were a peaceful sect, believing in the unity of God, mostly employed in agriculture. They were honest, industrious and formed a brotherhood, calling themselves Satnāmīs, Satnām meaning good name. As they used to shave their head and face including eye-brows, they were popularly called *Mundiyaś*. A petty quarrel near Nārnaul between a Satnāmī cultivator and a Mughul foot-soldier of the local revenue collector led to the outbreak. The high-handedness of the soldier was too much for them to bear and the wrangling soon developed into a religious war against the Mughuls. The Satnāmīs defeated the imperialists on several occasions and took possession of the town and district of Nārnaul. When these alarming news reached the emperor, he sent there a large force under Ra'dandāz Khān, equipped with artillery. The Satnāmīs fought with courage and determination but could not succeed against the well-organized and well-equipped Mughul force. Two thousand men of this sect fell fighting

on the field and many of them were killed during the pursuit. The rebellion was thus crushed and the affected areas brought under control.

Aurangzīb's policy of intolerance and religious persecution roused the Sikhs to take up arms against him. He passed an order for the demolition of the Sikh temples and expulsion of the Sikh Guru's agents from the cities. Tegh Bahādur, the Sikh Guru, offered open opposition and encouraged the Hindus of Kāshmir in their resistance against forcible conversion to Islām. But he was siezed and taken to Delhi where he was imprisoned. On his refusal to embrace Islām, he was put to death after torture for five days (December, 1675).

The Sikhs were thus turned into bitter enemies of the Mughul government. Govinda Singh, the next Guru and the only son of Tegh Bahādur, was determined to avenge his father's cruel murder. He devoted his time and energy in transforming the Sikhs into a military community and instituted the custom of baptism with a new oath. Those who accepted this baptism were known as the *Khālsa* (pure) and the members were required to put on a distinctive dress, keeping five things on their person, viz., *Kesh* (hair), *Kangha* (comb), *Kripān* (sword), *Kachha* (underwear) and *Kara* (iron bangle). They were to give up all restrictions about caste, food and drink. "The Sikhs felt themselves to be a chosen people, the Lord's elect. Everything was, therefore, ready for converting the sect into a military body obedient to its chief to the death, . . . and ever ready to surrender the individual conscience to that of the guru."<sup>10</sup>

In the hilly regions of the northern Punjab, Guru Govinda fought against the local Muslim chiefs and Hindu rājās who had been asked to co-operate with the imperial forces in suppressing him, and won some victories over them. His stronghold at Ānandapur was besieged five times, and at last he had to leave it to take refuge in the plains, hotly pursued by the imperialists. His four sons were slain and he had no alternative but to proceed to the Deccan through Bikāner. He came back to Northern India after the death of Aurangzīb and joined Bahādur Shāh in the war of succession with his brothers. He also accompanied Bahādur Shāh to the Deccan and, while encamped at Nānder on the Godāvarī, he was murdered by an Afghān follower (1708).

He was the tenth and last Guru of the Sikhs. Before his death, his instruction to his followers was to get themselves organized into a military democracy, without having any more need of a Guru.

## V. FIGHT WITH THE RAJPUTS

Aurangzib was on the look-out for a suitable opportunity to establish direct control over Mārwar, one of the most powerful Hindu States in Northern India. The reasons behind his motive were that it occupied a position of strategic importance, as through it lay the shortest military and commercial routes from the Mughul capital to the rich cities and ports of Gujarāt, and, secondly, such a powerful State was not only a menace to the safety of the empire but it might also offer stubborn opposition to his cherished religious policy. Its Mahārājā, Jasovanta Singh Rāthor, who had fought against Aurangzib in the battle of Dharmāt and committed treachery against him prior to that of Khajuhā, was afterwards appointed by the emperor in responsible positions. Since the death of Rājā Jay Singh of Amber in 1667, he occupied the foremost place among the Hindu peers in the Mughul court. While commanding the Mughul frontier posts in the Khyber pass and the Peshāwar district, he died at Jāmūd on 10 December, 1678, without an heir. This offered Aurangzib an opportunity to give effect to his contemplated design. On hearing of the Mahārājā's death, he took steps to seize Mārwar and place it under direct rule of the Mughul government. He himself went to Ajmer to supervise the actions. As the State was then without a head and many Rāthor officers and troops were in Afghānistān, no resistance could be offered, and Mārwar was easily brought under imperial control. The emperor then went back to Delhi (2 April, 1679), and on that very day re-imposed the *jizya* on the Hindus. Meanwhile, he learnt that the two widowed queens of Jasovanta had given birth to two posthumous sons, but he remained adamant in his purpose without any thought of legitimate succession. Indra Singh Rāthor, the chieftain of Nāgaur and grand-nephew of Jasovanta Singh, was recognized as the Mahārājā of Mārwar on payment of a succession fee of thirty-six lakhs of rupees, and as he had no local support, the Mughul generals and other officers in occupation of the country were kept there for his assistance.

Towards the end of June, the family of Jasovanta Singh, including the surviving son Ajit Singh, reached Delhi, the other child having died a few weeks after birth. The rights of Ajit Singh had been urged before the emperor more than once. According to one opinion, Aurangzib ordered that the child should be brought up in the royal harem till he would come of age when his rights would be duly recognized; and according to another version, "the throne of Jodhpur was offered to Ajit on condition of his turning Muslim. Such a proposal would be quite in keeping with Aurangzib's past policy, as he had lately given the zamīndārīs of Jogigarh, Deogarh, and

Mau to those among rival claimants who had agreed to accept Islām.”<sup>11</sup> In 1703, also, we find the same policy pursued by the emperor when he offered the Marāthā throne to the captive Marāthā prince Shāhū.<sup>12</sup> This extraordinary proposal was too much for the loyal Rāthors who made up their mind to rescue Ajit even at the cost of their lives. At such a critical juncture, they were fortunate in having a leader of rare ability like Durgā Dās, the son of Jasovanta’s minister Askaran, and “the flower of Rājput chivalry.” He was a man of undaunted heroism, inflexible determination, unswerving loyalty, and combined in himself all the requisite qualities of an efficient general.

Aurangzīb sent a strong force to seize Ajit and the Rānīs. While the Mughuls besieged the mansion of Jasovanta in Delhi, a band of brave Rāthors opposed them with all their might, and another party under Durgā Dās stealthily came out of the mansion with Ajit and his mothers in male attire and rode away towards Mārwar. Although he was overtaken by the imperialists at a distance of nine miles, a band of Rājputs under Ranchhor Dās Jodhā opposed them to the last man and, overcoming all opposition, Durgā Dās and his party reached Mārwar. Ajit was kept in a safe place of hiding. Baffled in his attempt to seize Jasovanta’s son, Aurangzīb took a milkman’s baby in his harem and proclaimed him to be true Ajit. Durgā Dās’s protege was declared fictitious and Indra Singh was removed for his incapacity; but Mārwar was far from subdued. The Rāthors had taken up arms against Mughul oppression, and Aurangzīb again went to Ajmer (25 September, 1679), despatching his son, prince Akbar, with a large army against the Rāthors. Success attended Mughul arms and all the great towns including Jodhpur were plundered and temples destroyed.

Mahārānā Rāj Singh of Mewār realized the gravity of the situation, and could well understand that his State would be the next victim of imperial aggression. He had been asked to pay the *jizya* tax for his entire State and this was as humiliating as vexatious. Added to these was also his deep concern for the safety of Mārwar whose queen and mother of Ajit was a Mewār princess. But ere he could strike, the Mughul general, Hasan ‘Alī Khān, with seven thousand chosen troops attacked Mewār. Unable to defend the plains, the Mahārānā deserted them and retired with his men to the hills. The Mughul army occupied his capital Udaipur and the fort of Chitor, and destroyed the temples there. Pursuing the Mahārānā, Hasan ‘Alī defeated him and inflicted heavy losses on him (22 January, 1680).

The emperor who had been guiding the military operations then left Udaipur and returned to Ajmer, leaving prince Akbar in Mewār

and another force in Mār wār. But the Mughul troops in Mewār and Mār wār were too far to combine for any united action, if need be. Moreover, the troops under prince Akbar were too small for the territories to be controlled. The Rājputs carried on guerilla warfare, raiding the Mughul outposts, cutting off their supplies and thus creating terror among the Mughuls. Even Akbar's camp near Chitor was once surprised at night. After this the Mahārānā proceeded to the Bednor district, threatened Akbar's communications with Ajmer and defeated him; the losses suffered by the imperialists on this occasion were very heavy. These reverses infuriated the emperor who transferred the prince to Mār wār for his slackness and incapacity, placing prince A'zam in charge of Chitor. A grand plan was made to enter into the hills of Mewār from three directions under the leadership of three princes, A'zam, Mua'zzam and Akbar, but it did not eventually succeed, as the princes could not act up to the plan. As Akbar could not fare better in Mār wār than in Mewār, he despaired of success. Disgusted with censures from his father and removed from Mewār, and finding no other means of improving his situation, he hailed the invitation of the Rājputs in wresting the crown of Delhi from his father with their assistance. Both Durgā Dās and Mahārānā Rāj Singh assured him of their support but the death of the Mahārānā (22 October, 1680) delayed the project for some time. Jay Singh, the son and successor of Rāj Singh, also agreed to lend his support to the prince who, on 1 January, 1681, proclaimed himself emperor of Delhi, and on the following day, marched with his Rāthor and Śisodiā allies against his father who was then at Ajmer. Aurangzīb had great affection for this son and was rudely shocked by his conduct. He had then a meagre force with him, and had Akbar arrived at Ajmer in haste without whiling away his time in pleasure, the emperor's position would have been extremely critical. But a fortnight's delay, which was solely due to his care-free movements, was fully utilized by Aurangzīb in calling reinforcements and strengthening his position. Meanwhile, despite paucity of his men, he had gone out of Ajmer and taken up his stand at a place ten miles south of it.

As Akbar advanced nearer his father, desertions followed from his camp in large number, but 30,000 Rājputs remained faithful to him. Arriving at a distance of three miles from his father's camp, he halted there for the night for a battle on the next morning. During the night the shrewd emperor took to diplomacy for winning over the prince's adherents. Tahavvur Khān was the right-hand man of Akbar, but the father-in-law of the former then held a high office under Aurangzīb, who had a letter written by him to

his son-in-law, promising him pardon, in the event of his coming over to the side of the imperialists, but in case of his non-compliance, his family then held as hostages in the imperial camp, would be materially injured. Highly perturbed, Tahavvur Khān secretly left his tent to meet the emperor but was slain by the imperial attendants.

Meantime, the emperor had written a false letter to his rebellious son, commending him for bringing the principal Rājputs with him, according to his (emperor's) plan, so as to have them crushed between the imperial army and those of the prince in the next day's battle. As intended, the letter was dropped near the Rājput camp, and it upset Durgā Dās when he read it. He went to Akbar for an explanation, but when informed that the prince was asleep, he sent men to call Tahavvur Khān only to learn that the latter had already left for the imperial camp. Believing treachery on the part of the prince, the Rājputs fell on his camp, looted as much as they could and hurried towards Mewār. After this, most of his other troops also deserted him and joined the emperor. When Akbar awoke and found himself in a helpless condition, he retreated hurriedly towards Mewār with some members of his family and the treasure he could carry.

As soon as the real matter came to light, Durgā Dās lent his helping hand to the prince and took him under his protection. Evading the Mughul pursuers, he escorted Akbar successfully through Rājasthān, Khāndesh, and Baglāna to the shelter of the Marāthā king, Shambhujī.

Aurangzīb's plan of action in Mewār was considerably affected by the prince's flight to the Deccan, and he was eager to patch up a peace with the Mahārānā for personal supervision of strong military operations against his son in the Deccan. On the other hand, the Mahārānā also earnestly desired peace, specially because of extensive devastation of his cornfields by his enemies, threatening the whole population to starvation. He visited prince Muhammad A'zam (14 June, 1681) and concluded a treaty with him. According to its terms, Mewār was restored to Jay Singh with the title of Rānā and a *manṣab* of 5,000. He had to cede the *parganās* of Mandal, Pur and Bednor to the Mughuls in lieu of the *jizya* imposed on his kingdom. But Aurangzīb's war with Mārwar continued for about twenty-seven years more. After the treaty with Jay Singh, the emperor sent a powerful force under prince A'zam to pursue Akbar and he himself proceeded hurriedly towards the Deccan, reaching Burhānpur on 13 November, 1681, and Aurangābād on 22 March, 1682.

## VI. AURANGZĪB AND SHIVĀJĪ

During the first half of his reign, as the emperor had been busy in the north, he left the administration and military operations of the Deccan in the hands of his viceroys. The two States of Bijāpur and Golconda were then in process of decay, but on account of paucity of fighting forces in the Deccan, absence of firm determination and a strong and vigorous policy on the part of the Mughul viceroys, as also lack of mutual co-operation and support of their officers, these States could not be annexed to the empire till the emperor's personal presence there in the second half of his reign.

The third kingdom in the Deccan was that of the Marāthās created by the zeal and untiring efforts of their leader Shivājī, whose father, Shāhjī Bhonsle, originally a small *jāgīrdār* under the Sultān of Ahmadnagar, became later on a king-maker there, but after his defeat by the imperialists in 1636, entered the service of the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultān as a leading Hindu general.

A detailed account of Shivājī will be given in the next Chapter. Imbued with an uncommon spirit of adventure and love of independence from his early life, Shivājī moved freely among the sturdy people of the Māvāls or western belt of the Poona district, "hardened himself to a life of privation and strenuous exertion", and after gathering recruits from these healthy and brave men, he commenced his activities for the building up of an independent kingdom.

The continued illness of Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh from 1646 to his death in 1656 afforded Shivājī a good opportunity to carry out his designs and he captured, one by one, several Bijāpur forts, viz., Torna, Kondhānā (Sinhgarh), Rohirā, Chākan, and Purandar and built the fort of Rāigarh, three miles from Torna. He also surprised Shambhūjī Mohite and took possession of Supa, south-east of Poona. The year 1656 saw his conquest of the State of Jāvlī in the Mahābaleśwar range and this acquisition not only opened his path for further conquests in the south and south-west but also secured him the service of many Māvle infantrymen from it. Here he acquired also a vast accumulated treasure which immensely increased his financial resources. Two miles west of Jāvlī, he constructed a new fort for the protection of this area and named it Pratāpgarh. These were followed up by his important exploits in north Konkan where the rich towns of Kalyān and Bhiwāndī and the fort of Māhulī came into his possession, and in this way he got a firm footing in northern Konkan. "By the year 1659 he had extended his domi-

nions in the uplands or *Desh* to the southern limit of the Satara district, and in Konkan from Mahuli to near Mahad."<sup>13</sup>

The Bijāpur government sent Afzal Khān in 1659 to capture the Marāthā leader dead or alive, but Afzal Khān himself was slain and the Bijāpur army sustained severe losses. This wonderful feat not only enhanced the self-reliance of the Marāthā chief but also increased his power and prestige, and rudely shocked the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultānate. Next he took possession of South Konkan and the Kolhāpur district.

But next year (1660), he was besieged in the fort of Panhāla by the Bijāpur general, Sīdī Jauhar, and compelled to evacuate it.

Taking advantage of the Mughul invasion of Bijāpur and the diversion of the imperial forces, Shivājī had raided Mughul territories in the districts of Ahmadnagar and Junnar (1657) and even plundered the wealthy city of Junnar. Aurangzīb, who was then viceroy of the Deccan, took prompt action against him. He was surprised and routed, and Marāthā villages ravaged. When Bijāpur concluded peace with the imperialists, Shivājī, too, submitted to them. Although Aurangzīb forgave him for the time being, he could not place reliance on his adversary's plighted words and waited for an opportunity to strike him after the war of succession.

After his accession to the throne, Aurangzīb sent Shāyista Khān as viceroy of the Deccan with instruction to crush Shivājī. Commencing his campaign early in 1660, the new viceroy took possession of Poona, the fort of Chākan, Kalyān and north Konkan in the course of about a year and a half, but the Marāthā chief gave him a serious blow by a surprise night attack on his residence in Poona on 5 April, 1663, wounding him and slaying, among others, one of his sons and six women of his harem. In January, 1664, Shivājī sacked Surat, a very wealthy port in the Mughul empire, and returned with a rich booty exceeding one crore of rupees in value.

Highly perturbed, Aurangzīb transferred Shāyista Khān to Bengal and sent Jay Singh of Amber, one of the greatest generals and diplomats of the age, with Dilir Khān, an efficient general, to put down Shivājī and chastise 'Ālī 'Ādil Shāh II for his evasion of the conditions of the treaty of 1657 and his secret aid to the Marāthā chief. By his wonderful tact and skilful handling of the situation, Jay Singh succeeded in securing the support and ungrudging assistance of those whom Shivājī had antagonized in one way or the other, and thus creating a ring of enemies around the latter, the

Mughul viceroy and generalissimo of the Deccan made Shivājī's position extremely precarious. Next, the fort of Purandar, where the families of the Marāthā officers had been kept, was besieged, while another Mughul detachment was sent to plunder and burn the villages of Mahārāshtra.

At last, finding it very difficult to defend the fortress any longer, Shivājī personally visited Jay Singh and concluded the treaty of Purandar with him (12 June, 1665), whereby he ceded twenty-three of his forts to the imperialists, retaining twelve only for himself, acknowledged the suzerainty of the Mughul emperor and promised to serve him loyally in the Deccan. The Marāthā chief served the imperialists with complete loyalty during their invasion of Bijāpur shortly afterwards.<sup>14</sup>

On Jay Singh's advice and assurance of safety, Shivājī paid a visit to the emperor in his court at Āgra on 12 May, 1666. There he was ranked as a *manṣabdār* of 5,000 only, and feeling highly humiliated at this, he made a loud protest in the open court accusing the emperor of breach of faith, and swooned. For this unusual conduct, he was kept under guard and forbidden to attend the court. It was after three months of captivity at Āgra that eluding the vigilance of the guards, he managed to escape with his son in two baskets of sweetmeats (19 August, 1666) and reached Rāigarh in the guise of a mendicant on 12 September.<sup>15</sup>

After his successful termination of war with the Marāthā chief, Jay Singh had proceeded against Bijāpur and conquered, one by one, many of 'Ādil Shāhī forts. In spite of harassments by the guerrilla tactics of the Bijāpur army, he advanced within twelve miles of the fort of Bijāpur, but was unable to capture it by a *coup de main*, on account of timely and energetic actions of the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultān by strengthening its defences and taking other measures to the detriment of the imperialists. Consequently, Jay Singh decided to retreat and this he had to do against severe harassments by his enemies, besides two severe battles with them. He returned to his headquarters at Aurangābād incurring heavy losses and without achieving anything. His irate master censured and recalled him to court. His disgrace and recall were also partly due to the suspicion of the emperor about his secret aid to the escape of Shivājī from his confinement at Āgra. Broken-hearted at this humiliation and disappointment, the unlucky general died on the way at Burhānpur on 28 August, 1667.

## AURANGZĪB

For more than three years after his return to Rāigarh, Shivājī did not take up any offensive against the Mughuls, and a formal peace was effected in 1668 with the emperor who conferred on him the title of *Rājā*. But in 1670, he renewed his military operations against the imperialists and captured the fort of Sinharh which was followed up by his seizure of Kalyān and other places of north Konkan. The quarrel between Shāh 'Ālam, the Mughul viceroy of the Deccan, and his general Dilir Khān rendered it difficult for the imperialists to oppose the Marāthā chief effectively, and the latter moved on with his plundering raids from place to place. He sacked Surat for the second time in October, 1670, and carried away rich booty in cash and kind. Next, he conducted most daring raids on Aurangābād and the Mughul provinces of Baglāna, Khāndesh and Berār, and captured Sālher, an important fort on the borders of Khāndesh and Gujarāt.

The emperor was much worried by his daring successes and, recalling Shāh 'Ālam, appointed Bahādur Khān as viceroy of the Deccan (1672). But during the five years of his viceroyalty Bahādur Khān could not improve the position of the Mughuls there. Shivājī achieved success after success. He conquered Jāwhar and Rāmnagar, the two States in the Kolī country, south of Surat, and levied *chauth* (blackmail, one-fourth of land revenue) in various places of the Deccan. Confusion and disorder in the Bijāpur kingdom, following the death of 'Ali 'Ādil Shāh II in December, 1672, and the Afghān risings in the north-west frontier, necessitating the transfer of the best Mughul troops from the Deccan, gave the Marāthā chief opportunities for successful military operations. From 1672 to 1678, the Mughul generals carried on desultory fightings with him without any tangible result. On 6 June, 1674, he performed his formal coronation ceremony at Rāigarh with great pomp and grandeur, spending a huge sum of money on the occasion.

In 1677 he concluded an alliance with Golconda, and conquered Gingee and Vellore with a vast territory in the Madras, Carnatic and the Mysore plateaus which greatly augmented his power, prestige and financial resources. His successful career came to an end with his death in April, 1680, but the spirit he had infused into the people of Mahārāshtra survived his death, and Aurangzīb could not cope with them even after his strenuous efforts for a quarter of a century with his headquarters in the Deccan.

1. J. N. Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzib*, 3rd edn. Calcutta, 1962, p. 72.
2. Four miles west of the old fort of Gaur.
3. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, Calcutta, 1916, pp. 1-3.

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4. Ibid, p.115.
5. Ibid, p.196.
- 5a. Ibid, Ch. XXXI, Section 18. According to *CHI*, 420,000 tolas of silver (IV.235). This statement in *CHI* is also by J. N. Sarkar. As this was published (probably also written) later, it may be taken as his later view and a more correct one. (Ed.)
6. Sarkar, p. 203.
7. Ibid, pp.281-282.
- 7a. Mohammad Yasin, *A Social History of Islāmic India, (1605-1748)*, Lakhnau, (1958), p.150.
8. *Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV*, p.241.
9. Ibid., p.242.
- 9a. For a detailed account of Aurangzib's bigotry, cf. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, Ch. XXXIV, Sections 9-17 and Appendix V.
10. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p. 358. For a detailed account, cf. Ch. XI.
11. Ibid.. p.374.
12. *CHI*. IV, p.247.
13. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. IV, Calcutta, 1930, p. 42.
14. For further details, cf. next Chapter.
15. For discussion on this date, cf. next Chapter.

## CHAPTER IX

# SHIVĀJĪ

### I. THE RISE OF THE BHOSLES

The origin of the Bhosle (also called Bhonsle) clan of the Marāthā caste and even the derivation of their name are shrouded in mystery. They claimed descent from the Śísodīa Rāṇās of Chitor and Udaipur, and possibly a branch of their family migrated to the south after the kingdom of Chitor had been devastated by Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī early in the fourteenth century.<sup>1</sup> So far as the Marāthā history is concerned, the Yādavas of Devagiri, later named Daulatābād, the Bhosles of Verul and the Nimbālkars of Phaltan near Palara, are the three Marāthā families which are connected with the rise of Shivājī. Of these, the Yādavas were the descendants of the renowned rulers of Devagiri who were subjugated by 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī of Delhi towards the end of the thirteenth century. The descendants of this ruling Yādava family took service with the Nizām Shāhīs of Ahmadnagar. This city was invaded and captured by the Emperor Akbar in 1600, and the Nizām Shāhī kingdom was on the point of extinction, when an able organizer named Malik 'Ambar, an Abyssinian minister of that State, came to its rescue. 'Ambar made friends with the Hindus and, using their best talent and cooperation both for war and administration, he improved the revenues of that kingdom and successfully opposed the Mughul advance for a quarter of a century. In this grand political struggle Shivājī's father, Shāhjī, and grandfather, Malojī, were closely associated with Malik 'Ambar, so that they gradually realized their strength and asserted their power in the course of time.

Lukhjī Jādhava of Devagiri had a clever daughter named Jijā Bāi, who was married in 1605 to Maloji Bhosle's son, Shāhjī, a brave soldier of fortune, who long exerted himself in upholding the falling fortunes of the Nizām Shāhī against the Mughul onslaught.<sup>2</sup>

Marāthā history in its initial stages is, thus, an unbroken struggle of three generations of the Mughul emperors striving to put down the three generations of the Bhosle family. In this trial of strength, Malojī and his son, Shāhjī, prepared the ground, of which Shivājī, the offspring of Shāhjī and Jijā Bāi, took advantage. The three emperors, Jahāngīr, Shāh Jahān and Aurangzīb, attempted to subjugate the Deccan and the Bhosles stood forth to defend it, al-

though the parties were unevenly matched, the Bhosles being poor in resources compared with the might of the emperors. Malojī and Shāhjī acquired lands under the Nizām Shāhī regime, rendering service in return. The Bhosles soon made themselves indispensable to the rulers of the Nizām Shāhī State. 'Ambar patronized them and used their services in keeping the Mughuls at bay. In the battle of Bhatvadi near Ahmadnagar in 1624 Malik 'Ambar inflicted a crushing defeat upon the combined armies of Delhi and Bijāpur. Shāhjī, who took part in this battle, won distinction and gained valuable experience. Thereafter for several years Shāhjī ably defended the Nizām Shāhī State against the all-powerful Shāh Jahān. Shāh Jahān, after years of war, succeeded in 1636 in extinguishing the kingdom of Ahmadnagar and expelling Shāhjī from his homeland. The latter sought service under the Sultān of Bijāpur on condition that he should no longer live in Mahārāshtra.

Shāhjī's later life was spent in the regions once ruled by the Hindu sovereigns of Vijayanagara which had been devastated by the Muslims in 1565. Later on, when Shāhjī established his position at Bangalore and Kanakagiri, he had to deal with the various Hindu chieftains of the old Vijayanagara State. Here he imbibed the tradition of Hindu independence and resistance to Muslim aggression. Shāhjī's wife, Jijā Bāi, carried in her vein a similar tradition of her Yādava ancestors. Thus their son Shivājī was fired from early days with the same spirit of independence. Shāhjī died in 1664 in Bijāpur service by an accident while hunting.

## II. SHIVĀJĪ'S EARLY LIFE

Shivājī was born on 6 April, 1627, in the fort of Shivner near Junnar.<sup>3</sup> His mother Jijā Bāi gave birth to six sons, of whom the eldest, Sambhājī, and the youngest, Shivājī, alone grew up to old age. Shāhjī and his father-in-law, Lukhājī, often faced each other in open battles, as the latter deserted his master Nizām Shāh and joined the Mughul emperor. But the spirited lady, like a pious wife, elected to follow her husband's fortunes and refused to go to her father's home for her delivery, when picked up by him after a battle on a high road in her advanced pregnancy. In that sad plight she took her residence in fort Shivner, then under her husband's jurisdiction. In this fort was Shivājī born. Her eldest son, Sambhājī, lived with his father and shared his labour in Bijāpur service. Shāhjī thereafter deserted Jijā Bāi and married a second wife, Tukābāi, of the Mohite family of Supa. She gave birth to a son named Ekojī or Vyankojī, who later became the founder of the kingdom of Tanjore. When hard pressed by the emperor

Shāh Jahān in 1636, Shāhjī had to flee for life after entrusting the management of his paternal *jāgīr* of Poona and the care of his wife Jijā Bāi and her young son Shivājī to his trusted agent Dādājī Kondadev, a clever officer in Bijāpur, who discharged the duty of guardianship most creditably.

The early life of Shivājī was full of peril and adventure. For the first nine years of his life, a period of war conducted by his father against the Mughul emperor, the young boy and his mother had to wander from place to place in imminent danger of being captured and punished. Shāh Jahān's officers succeeded in capturing Jijā Bāi, but she cleverly managed to have her son concealed in an out of the way village. Later, she was released on payment of a large fine. It was in 1636 when a formal treaty was concluded that the son and the mother found a safe and settled residence at Poona where Dādājī built them a commodious house, *Lāl Mahāl*, as it later came to be known in history. Here Shivājī lived for some ten years, until they removed to their newly built fort Rāigarh, which became his first capital for the original *jāgīr*. Twenty years later, about 1667, Rāigarh became the formal residence of Shivājī, where his coronation took place.

The common education of those days was imparted to Shivājī as soon as he came into a settled life. He was taught reading, writing and arithmetic,<sup>3a</sup> and heard portions of the *Rāmāyana* and *Mahābhārata* expounded to him by the family preceptors. He was fond of *Harikīrtana* and devotional music, and attended the sermons of Sant Tukārām, then living and preaching in the vicinity of Poona. Shivājī received his best education, not through books and classes as in the present day, but in the wide world, by personal contact and practical experience. Intense love of religion was a trait he developed by the sight of Muslim atrocities and the reports he heard about them. He later introduced compulsory recitations of the war chapters of the *Rāmāyana* by all his fort garrisons.

Shivājī's success in life was, however, mainly due to hard and incessant knocks he had to share with his mother in his early days. Proud of her Kshatriya extraction, with vivid memories of her royal ancestors of Devagiri and their splendour, chastened by years of suffering ever since her marriage and now practically deserted by the husband, this spirited lady developed in her son a spirit of defiance and self-assertion and became to him a veritable guardian angel. All her life's ambition and solace now entirely centered in this boy's well-being and good fortune. Shāhjī had defied a powerful emperor for years; why may not the son imitate the same course?

The mother and the boy constantly talked of wild plans which the shrewd Dādājī wholeheartedly supported. In addition, he imparted to Shivājī his own tact and circumspection gained during the course of his management of the Poona *jāgīr*, which in itself supplied a ready field for experiment. Dādājī was not merely a clerk or a competent accountant. A strict disciplinarian and taskmaster, he was, in addition, a noble character, well versed in the politics of the day with a buoyant spirit for organizing national resources and a hatred for foreign domination with its persecution of the Hindus. He had long served the Bhosle family through weal and woe as their trusted friend and adviser. He was imbued with a deep love for the peasantry and felt a keen anxiety for ameliorating their lot.

Thus the young Shivājī looked up to these two, his mother and the guardian, for guidance in life. The secluded hilly regions of the Māvāls (the western valleys of Poona) offered him plenty of outdoor occupation and opportunity for adventure. Constant exposure to rain, sun and cold and the rough life in the midst of wild nature hardened the young boy's body and mind. Riding, wrestling, spear-games, swordsmanship, swimming through torrential streams, became his main occupation and he developed from his early childhood an intimate comradeship with man and nature away from the temptations of vice and luxury of court life. He made friends with companions of his age and wandered with them through hills and dales, organizing measures for defence. The art of disguise was in those days highly perfected for purposes of protection and the needs of life. Shivājī himself could dexterously imitate the voices of birds and beasts. He could quickly cover long distances on foot or riding, eluding pursuit and enduring privations. His rambles were intensive and deliberate for acquainting himself with secret paths, recesses and strongholds of the long Sahyādri range of the Deccan plateau. With eyes and ears ever alert, he gained first-hand knowledge of the sentiments of the people, their joys and sorrows, their occupations and resources, their needs and comforts.

Dādājī's first concern was to make Shivājī a real master of the people. He gave him useful hints as to how he should appear properly attired and behave among assemblages of village *panchāyats* and on public occasions. Dādājī proclaimed to the people that they were to look up to Shivājī for all their needs as well as for the redress of their grievances.

## III. THE FIRST EXPERIMENT IN SWARĀJ

The *jāgīr* entrusted by Shāhājī to the care of Jijā Bāi and Dādājī extended over the regions known as the Māvāls mentioned above, namely the valleys to the west of Poona, roughly extending from Junnar to Wai. Dādājī raised a local militia for guarding the lives and property of the inhabitants and, along with Shivājī, toured the villages making inquiries and deciding disputes on the spot. The land revenue system, initiated by Akbar under the directions of Todarmal, had been already adopted in the Deccan by Malik 'Ambar and now Dādājī adopted it for the territories of the *jāgīr*. Dādājī took measures to destroy wild animals that damaged the crops; fresh lands were brought under cultivation; gardening and tree-planting were specially encouraged. All this work of development which greatly enhanced the welfare of the people and were carried out in Shivājī's presence and in his name proved for him a valuable preparation in practical methods of government in his future life. It fostered a sense of emulation and self-help among the people, eliminated their usual lethargy and despair, and instilled into them a bright new hope. Friends and comrades of varied capacities quickly flocked round the new boy-master to share his labours, willing to make any sacrifice that might be demanded. Shivājī's vision expanded. He began to dream of grand prospects outside the limits of his *jāgīr*. He held secret consultations with his comrades in arms, planning to make fresh acquisitions, repairing buildings, garrisons and forts, raising funds by daring night attacks on private and public treasures. Buried wealth was cleverly traced and carried away. It became a strong belief throughout the land that Goddess Bhavānī appeared before the young hero and communicated to him the exact location of secret hoards. Earnest work earned quick results.

Shivājī possessed a persuasive tongue with which he at once won peoples' hearts. He was alert and foremost in jumping into a risk and facing the consequences. He held secret conferences with his companions and anxiously deliberated on the liberation of his homeland from Muslim control so as to put an end to the wanton persecution of the Hindus. Shivājī's court historian thus summarizes his sentiments:

“Why should we remain content with what the Muslim rulers choose to give us? We are Hindus. This whole country is ours by right, and is yet occupied and held by foreigners. They desecrate our temples, break holy idols, plunder our wealth, convert us forcibly to their religion, carry away our women folk and children, slay the cows and inflict a thousand wrongs upon us. We will suffer this

treatment no more. We possess strength in our arms. Let us draw the sword in defence of our sacred religion, liberate our country and acquire new lands and wealth by our own effort. Are we not as brave and capable as our ancestors of yore? Let us undertake this holy mission and God will surely help us. All human efforts are so helped. There is no such thing as good luck and ill luck. We are the captains of our fortunes and the makers of our freedom.”<sup>4</sup>

The pious Jijā Bāi blessed these sentiments. She daily witnessed how complete darkness prevailed under Muslim government, where there was no law, no justice; the officials acted as they pleased. Violation of women’s honour, murders and forcible conversions were the order of the day. News of demolition of temples, cow-slaughter and other atrocities poured upon the ears of that lady so constantly that she used to exclaim: “Can we not remedy this evil? Will not my son have the strength to come forth boldly to resist it?” The Nizām Shāh had openly murdered Jijā Bāi’s father, his brothers and sons. Bājājī Nimbālkar, the ruler of Phaltan, a scion of the old Paramāra race, was forcibly converted by the Sultān of Bijāpur. The Hindus could not lead an honourable life. This spectacle moved the lady and her son to righteous indignation. An intense feeling of revolt took possession of their minds. Shivājī prayed for strength, dreamt bright visions and entered upon a wild career full of hope and promise without caring for consequences. He possessed an in-born capacity of judging the character of men almost at first sight. He mixed with all kinds of men and picked up suitable helpmates, and converted to his views even those who were leading evil lives. His sympathy and selflessness and his earnest endeavour to serve his land appealed to all, so that within a few years the contrast became glaring between the improved conditions of his paternal *jāgīr* and the disorder prevailing in the Muslim-ruled region outside. Soon a compact, well-knit geographical unit of a small *swarājya* came into being in which law and order prevailed, duties of officials were clearly defined, justice quickly rendered, honest work well rewarded and where life and wealth were perfectly secure. All this had profound effect upon the ruling class and even Shivājī’s father in far-off Bangalore.

#### IV. FIRST CONFLICT

Shāhjī was employed by ‘Ādil Shāh in the conquest of the Karnātak regions, which once formed part of the Vijayanagara empire. Shāhjī thus became the helpless instrument for conquering the Hindus and pouring the wealth of Hindu shrines into the Muslim coffers of Bijāpur. Stories of this fresh spoliation reached the ears

of Jijā Bāi and Shivājī and caused them extreme distress. In the meantime, the activities of Shivājī and Dādājī in the Māval lands enraged the ruling authorities of Bijāpur and induced them to take prompt measures to put down the revolt. Shāhjī felt extreme annoyance at the turn the affairs were taking both in his own sphere at Bangalore and in the Deccan. Jijā Bāi and Dādājī had Shivājī married about the year 1640 to a girl from the Nimbālkar family, named Saibai. Soon after this event, the atmosphere became tense for Shāhjī as mentioned above. His own position as a loyal servant of Bijāpur and his son's revolt could not go together. Very probably, Shāhjī was called upon to account for the impropriety and asked to restrain his son. As Shivājī was yet too young to appear as the author of the mischief, the mother and the regent Dādājī were held mainly responsible for the reported disloyalty and sedition. In such circumstances, Shāhjī invited to Bangalore, for a personal deliberation, Jijā Bāi and Dādājī under the plea that he was anxious to see his newly wedded daughter-in-law and his young son. The party was away from home for nearly two years (1642-43), when the whole family and establishment of Shāhjī met together at Bangalore. Shāhjī, one may gather, discussed the situation fully and freely. Jijā Bāi, finding it awkward to put forth any decided plan of action, employed her sojourn, it seems, in visiting the famous shrines of the south and avoided discussion. She certainly felt no regret for the revolt her son was organizing in the interest of national honour. The authorities of Bijāpur fully knew what was going on. 'Ādil Shāh commanded Shāhjī to pay a personal visit to his court at Bijāpur with all his family and there receive the Government's decision on the course to be followed in future. Shāhjī therefore paid a visit to Bijāpur about the year 1643, and spent some time there in answering charges preferred against himself and his management of the Poona *jāgīr*. The defiance attributed to Shivājī in not making the prescribed bow when he attended the *Darbār*, appears to have occurred at this time. It was also during this visit that Shivājī is said to have restrained a butcher slaughtering a cow in a public thoroughfare. Small though in itself, the incident reveals the audacious and uncompromising trait in Shivājī's character. When he perceived a vital wrong being perpetrated, he at once punished the wrong-doer, reckless of consequences. At Bijāpur, Shivājī retaliated the outrage on a cow and would perhaps have been imprisoned had he not managed to run away unnoticed to his homeland. He lost no time upon his return in forming an independent State of his own wherein full political and religious freedom would prevail without molestation from the Muslim overlords. While at Bangalore the subject was doubtless fully discussed and again also at Bijāpur,

with what outcome we have no means of knowing. It seems there was no way for a compromise. The father and the son probably formed an understanding between them how best to ward off the danger apprehended from the Bijāpur atrocities. The father would answer that he was not responsible for what his son did and that he was powerless to punish him. This was indeed the reality. At heart, Shāhjī probably approved the way the son was following and even encouraged him by lending him some trained loyal officials from Bangalore to organize a proper government for the *jāgīr*. Elephants, infantry, cavalry with flags and insignia of royalty, in addition to the treasure for immediate need, were, say Parmānand and Sabhāsad, despatched from Bangalore by Shāhjī for his son's use. Shyamrāo Nilakanth Peshwā, Sonopant Dabir and other officials of Shāhjī's trust were sent for duty in Mahārāshtra.

How money was collected for this venture and how ingeniously the plan was put into execution by gradual steps and careful forethought must now be told. Seven years of efficient management of the Māval *jāgīr* now began to yield fruit in the shape of a regular substantial income, which Shivājī utilized in maintaining infantry, repairing and garrisoning forts and improving the administrative machinery. Already a band of young enthusiastic comrades flocked around him to share his labours and execute his commands. One such was Kanhoji Jedhe,<sup>5</sup> Deshmukh of Kari, a leading and respectable chieftain in the employ of Bijāpur and well known to the Bhosles for a long time. With Kanhoji's help, Shivājī, after his return from Bijāpur, easily acquired possession of all the twelve Māval forts, west of Poona, along with fort Rohida and fort Sinhgarh which he strongly garrisoned. He immediately started building a new fort which he named Rāigarh and made it the principal seat of his government. These activities during the two years 1644-1645 could no longer be concealed from the knowledge of the Shāh of Bijāpur, who took immediate steps to restrain Dādājī and disgrace Shāhjī. The Shāh called upon Kanhoji Jedhe to remain faithful on pain of death.

Shivājī replied to the Shāh's challenge, saying that he was not disloyal; he was merely putting his turbulent lands in a state of defence and bringing peace so essential for the development of this hilly country. Shivājī was, however, busy, running from place to place, securing recruits for his plan, forming friendships, encouraging, persuading, threatening and coercing people so that they soon began to talk of him as a heaven-sent leader. In 1646 the Shāh of Bijāpur was attacked by paralysis which kept him bed-ridden

throughout the remaining decade of his life, an incident which directly favoured the task of Shivājī.

## V. INDEPENDENCE TAKES SHAPE

Shivājī's guardian, Dādāji Kondadev, died in 1647 and left Shivājī entirely to his own resources. He now set about his work with greater vigour and allowed no break in his undertaking. He soon managed to capture two strong forts near Poona, Chākan in the north and Purandar in the east, both of great strategic importance. The guardian of Purandar was one Nilopant Sarnaik, a long-standing friend of the Bhosle family whose shelter Shivājī sought during the rains of 1648. When, during the Divāli celebration of that year Shivājī and his family were admitted into the fort as friendly guests, Shivājī managed to persuade his host and his brothers to accept him as their master, resigning their traditional service to Bijāpur. This illustrates to what different artifices Shivājī had recourse in accomplishing his object.

Next, Shivājī one dark night surprised Sambhāji Mohite of Supa, an important wealthy mart, south-east of Poona. Sambhāji Mohite's sister, Tukābāi, was the second wife of Shāhji and so Shivājī's step-mother. Sambhāji offered but little resistance. He was captured and despatched to Bangalore, as an undesirable neighbour.

Shivājī had now two main objects in view,—first, to secure the utmost welfare of the people in his charge, and secondly, to have well-guarded frontiers which he could easily hold. He was careful not to attempt any expansion at the sacrifice of security. He proclaimed his independence in a curious fashion. He began to use a new seal on all official papers issued by him with a significant motto, which ran thus:<sup>6</sup> "This seal of Shiva, son of Shāh, shines forth for the welfare of the people and is meant to command increasing respect from the universe like the first phase of the moon." This seal is found attached to papers dating 1648 onward, so that one may conclude that this novel plan of Shivājī began to take shape about that year.

Similarly papers are found in which Shivājī's title *Chhatrapati* and the seals of his ministers thereon are mentioned.<sup>6a</sup> This proves that a small cohesive independent State with ministers and officials charged with definite duties came into being some time before 1653, although the final shape took many years to be completed and was announced only at the time of his formal coronation.

A serious danger, however, threatened the whole project. Bijāpur could not take all this lying down. In 1648 the Ādil Shāhī forces led by Mustafā Khān, under whom served Shāhjī, were fighting before the fort of Gingee. One night, the chief commander Mustafā suddenly raided Shāhjī's camp and made him a captive under the orders of the Shāh. He was then sent to Bijāpur for trial and threatened with death if he did not restrain his son Shivājī from the wicked course he was following. Shāhjī was then called upon to restore Sinhgarh and Bangalore, the former held by Shivājī and the latter by his elder son Sambhājī. This was the move the king of Bijāpur adopted to crush Shāhjī and his two rebellious sons. The father accordingly wrote to Shivājī to give back Sinhgarh and save his life. The elder son Sambhājī also was similarly approached in regard to Bangalore. At the same time, Bijāpur forces arrived at both these places to put down the rebellious brothers and take charge of the two important posts. The two brothers fought valiantly at both places and maintained their positions, inflicting severe losses upon the opponents. But Shāhjī was a prisoner in Bijāpur upon whom the Sultān could easily wreak his vengeance. Shāhjī wrote pressing Shivājī to save his life by restoring Sinhgarh. Jijā Bāi interceded with Shivājī for saving her husband's life and reluctantly the latter yielded and gave back the fort to Bijāpur.<sup>7</sup>

In the heart of the Māval country there ruled an ancient Deshmukh family named Moré in Satara District with their seat of authority in Jāvlī in the Mahābaleśvar range. Proud of their allegiance to Bijāpur, the Morés moved heaven and earth to put down this new Bhosle upstart, of a low origin in their estimation. So the inevitable clash came as Shivājī could not allow such an inimical rival to remain as his neighbour. For years, Shivājī used all his arts of persuasion and amity, as he had done in other cases before, in persuading the Morés to fall in with his plan of national uplift. Failing to conciliate them, Shivājī ultimately made up his mind to teach the Morés a lesson such as others could never forget. Early in 1656 Shivājī attacked Jāvlī and immediately captured it after killing its main defender Hanumant Rāo. Some members of their family ran to different places for safety. Shivājī negotiated with them, but failing in his endeavours to win them over, he in a short time killed three more of their large family, Yasvant Rāo and his sons Krishnajī and Bājī.<sup>8</sup> The Bijāpur authorities could not save them. One member alone named Pratāp Rāo escaped to Bijāpur where he was taken under shelter and whence he continued for some time to cause pin-pricks to Shivājī's rising career. The

short work which Shivājī did with the Morés conveyed a wholesome lesson to all who would not willingly accept his plan. Here was a born leader to whom it was wise to submit. Such a belief engendered by this episode of the Morés and soon widely proclaimed outside, strengthened Shivājī's hands in all his future plans and projects, now mostly undertaken against foreign powers. No Marāthā clansman dared hereafter to stand in opposition to Shivājī. A small compact little kingdom soon came into being, comprising roughly the present districts of Poona and Satara. Written evidence gives 1653 as the time of the completion of this first phase of Shivājī's *swarājya*. To protect this new conquest of Jāvlī, Shivājī erected a new fort and named it Pratāpgarh, which can now be sighted from the present hill station of Mahābaleśvar.

## VI. AFZAL KHĀN OVERCOME

Shivājī quickly followed up his conquest of Jāvlī by descending into north Konkan and capturing Kalyān, its chief city, a wealthy mart of Ādil Shāhi's west coast regions. He also seized by means of accurate planning a large treasure which was on its way from Kalyān to Bijāpur. In the course of this affair a young fair Muslim lady, the daughter-in-law of the Governor, fell into the hands of Shivājī's officers and was presented by them for Shivājī's acceptance as a trophy of the war. Shivājī disapproved this wicked action of his subordinates, reprimanded them severely, and allowed the lady to return to her home, duly protected by his own escort. This unprecedented generosity, rare in the Muslim annals of India, enhanced Shivājī's reputation far and wide as the great respecter of the fair sex.

Having arranged the administration of north Konkan, Shivājī rapidly turned to the south, inspecting Dabhol, Shringarpur, Prabhavali, Rajapur, Kudal and other places on the coast with a view to fortifying it as a line of defence for his projected dominion. A few years later he erected the strong naval forts, a marvel of giant work even today, of Suvarnadurg, Vijayadurg, Sindhudurg (Malvan), and lastly Kolaba, and created a powerful navy with ship-building yards and arsenals for purposes both of defence and trade. Shivājī's ingenuity in this respect presents a striking contrast to the unpardonable neglect of the Mughul emperors for the naval defence of India. They paid no attention to what the Europeans were doing by establishing fortified factories on both the west and east coasts which ultimately proved so dangerous to the existence of the empire. Shivājī borrowed the plan from the Europeans, made friends with them and utilized their skill for his own purpose.

A turning point occurred in the politics of India about the year 1656-57. Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh died on 4 November, 1656, with the result that his State began to decline and was attacked by Aurangzīb in 1657. At Āgra, Emperor Shāh Jahān was suddenly taken ill, giving rise to a fratricidal war, in which out of his four sons, Aurangzīb became victorious and proclaimed himself Emperor at Delhi in July, 1658. In view of these changes Shivājī manoeuvred his course with courage and fortitude as the sequel will show.

The widowed queen of Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh decided to take vigorous measures to put down Shivājī's power by capturing him alive or dead. For this purpose she selected an intrepid soldier of her court and a declared enemy of Shivājī's family. She called Afzal Khān to her presence, promised him ample reward, supplied him with a strong well-equipped force and commanded him to employ all possible means to bring Shivājī, dead or alive, to Bijāpur. Afzal Khān, leaving his headquarters in September, 1659, came sweeping against Shivājī, pulling down Hindu shrines on the way and plundering the prosperous regions of Shivājī's domains. Shivājī received full details of the Khān's atrocities through his spies and, unable to encounter the Khān in an open contest, took his residence at his new fort of Pratāpgarh in the midst of hills and planned to overcome his opponent by some subtle stratagem.

The Khān, learning that Shivājī had gone to Pratāpgarh, pitched his camp at Wai, about 25 miles east of the latter's position. Agents of the two moved freely between them for some time negotiating for a personal meeting between the two for a solution. After several discussions, the Khān, confident of his strength, agreed to meet Shivājī below the fort of Pratāpgarh in a specially erected tent with a decorated canopy. The meeting took place on the afternoon of Thursday, 10 November, 1659. The Khān possessed a powerful body and felt confident of overcoming in a personal grip his small slim Marāthā antagonist, twenty years his junior in age. Shivājī similarly took all precautions for meeting any eventuality. He wore an iron cuirass of chains under his vest, a metal cap over his skull, concealed under the turban with a long white flowing robe overall, having broad sleeves, covering a dagger in one hand and tiger-claws on the other. After receiving his mother's blessings, Shivājī boldly set forth on his dangerous venture to meet his antagonist. As he walked in, the Khān rose and, in his first embrace, gripped him tightly in his left arm and stabbed him with a dagger in the right hand. With great presence of mind, Shivājī saved the blow, ripping open the Khān's bowels with the tiger-

claws and instantly bringing him to the ground. The whole affair was finished in a moment. As the bearers picked up the Khān's body to carry it away in his palanquin, they were quickly disabled by Shivājī's men, who severed the Khān's head and exhibited it from a high mast of the topmost bastion of the fort. It was by then the dusk of the evening, and concealed Marāthā parties, at a given signal, rushed out of the woods and routed the Khān's armies both in the wild passes of the hills and in the plain of Wai.<sup>9</sup>

The tragic episode caused favourable repercussions for Shivājī far and near. Bijāpur now lay practically prostrate before him, and he at once became a power to be reckoned with. The fort of Panhāla in the heart of Mahārāshtra became now Shivājī's objective, as it was the last strong post belonging to Bijāpur in his onward march. It took Shivājī some years more to come into possession of this renowned fortress.

## VII. SHĀYISTA KHĀN AND PLUNDER OF SURAT

Shortly after getting rid of Afzal Khān, Shivājī had to face a new danger. A new figure had come to occupy the Mughul throne at Delhi, who took prompt measures to put down ruthlessly the rising power of this Marāthā rebel. Aurangzīb nominated his uncle, Shāyista Khān, to the Government of Deccan and sent him well-equipped to annihilate Shivājī while it was not yet too late. Afzal Khān was finished in November, 1659, and in the following January, Shāyista Khān arrived at Aurangabad and, quickly advancing seized Poona, making Shivājī's palace his own residence. He also captured Kalyān and north Konkan which Shivājī had possessed a short while before. The Khān's strength was irresistible, being fully backed by the whole might of the Mughul empire. For three long years, Shivājī was so hunted out in all directions that he became a homeless wanderer and was at a loss how to get out of this almost hopeless situation. In this darkest hour Shivājī's innate ingenuity alone saved him and he succeeded in turning the whole game against the Khān. He employed secret agents to obtain minute details about the arrangements and disposition of the Khān's camp and hit upon a bold plan of a surprise attack at night. With about fifty clever and intrepid followers, he entered the Mughul general's harem on the evening of 15 April, 1663. After midnight, when the guards and the Khān's family were asleep and enveloped in darkness, Shivājī and his companions attacked the inmates in their beds, cutting and hacking indiscriminately. The noise and confusion that resulted was indescribable; several were killed and wounded; the Khān himself, it was later discovered, escaped with

only his forefinger lost. One of his sons, forty attendants, and six women were killed. The incident proved eminently successful for Shivājī's purpose. Without undergoing a large-scale fighting, he struck terror into the heart of his opponents. The mortified emperor at once transferred the Khān to Bengal and the Mughul hold slackened in the Deccan. Shivājī, now breathing freely, resumed his onward career without check.

For a time after the departure of Shāyista Khān, Shivājī roamed fearlessly as an invincible conqueror. His spies wandered far and wide, bringing news of treasures and wealth of cities and of the weak links in the Mughul Government. His head spy, Bahirji Nāik, reported to Shivājī that of all the rich Mughul possessions Surat was the most undefended and contained enormous wealth. It was the richest port of western India and was highly prized by the emperor as an important port which was used by pilgrims to Mecca. Shivājī established a secret camp near Nasik with specially selected five thousand stalwarts; and without disclosing his destination he left the base on 1 January, 1664, and proceeded north through the coastal regions. He suddenly appeared at Surat and planted his flag at its eastern gate. On the previous day he had issued a warning to the local Governor and the richest merchants to pay a certain amount which he demanded or stand the consequences of his wrath for non-compliance. The warning was not heeded and, in addition, the Governor contrived a foul attempt on Shivājī's life on the third day of his arrival. In retaliation, Shivājī let loose hell upon the hapless town, burning and sacking in every possible way. Houses were dug up and set on fire, chests were broken open and heaps of money carried away. He took care to inflict no wanton cruelty upon innocent inhabitants. Possession of wealth was the only crime which he punished. On 9 January, hearing that Mughul armies were coming upon him from Burhānpur, Shivājī hurriedly returned with such booty as could be easily conveyed. No estimate of value of what he carried away is recorded. Possibly Shivājī himself never made an exact calculation, but the plunder must certainly have been in the neighbourhood of a crore of rupees, possibly double that amount. It was taken straight to Rāigarh and utilised to fortify that giant structure of his future capital.

Immediately on his return from Surat, Shivājī learned the sad news of his father's death near Harihar in the present Mysore territory. This made Jijā Bāi altogether disconsolate, and Shivājī was at great pains in dissuading her from undertaking the self-immolation of a *satī*.

Shivājī's sack of Sūrāt was the severest blow to Aurangzīb and a direct affront to his power and prestige. The emperor lost his peace of mind and at once decided to send a fresh expedition against Shivājī and annihilate him for good.

### VIII. SHIVAJI SUBMITS TO JAY SINGH

Aurangzīb placed this new expedition under Mirzā Rājā Jay Singh with Dilir Khān to assist and probably to spy. The famous Italian traveller Manucci, then residing at Delhi, was pressed into service and accompanied the General as an officer of artillery. A splendidly equipped force commanded by Jay Singh left the base in December, 1664, and arrived at Poona in March following, when Shivājī, entirely unaware of these moves of the emperor, was engaged in consolidating his southern possessions and conducting a war against Bijāpur, where he had just overcome Khavās Khān and Bājī Ghorpāde who had come against him on behalf of that State. He killed Bājī Ghorpāde and, early in 1665, led a large naval expedition with fighting ships of large calibre on the Malabar coast and secured plunder from ports like Bassur. In February, he visited Karwar and while engaged in his devotions to the deity of Gokarn he learned of the terrible attack upon his homelands by Mirzā Rājā Jay Singh. Shivājī at once proceeded to Rāigarh and set about devising measures against this new danger.

Jay Singh carried out his undertaking with all the vigour and loyalty he was capable of. He secured implicit obedience and ungrudging help from all the chiefs and powers whom Shivājī had overawed, and he actively supported those who had suffered from Shivājī's aggression, like the sons of Afzal Khān. So Shivājī found himself paralysed in all directions, unable any longer to oppose the formidable tactics now employed against him.<sup>9a</sup> Jay Singh established a complete hold on the north Poona regions and besieged Purandar with such vigour that Shivājī could no longer conduct any operations in open. Complete surrender was his only recourse with only such grace as the Mughul Generalissimo would choose to grant. Shivājī made approaches to Jay Singh and appealed to his religious sentiment. But the latter turned a deaf ear to all his entreaties and declined even to receive his visit, until all his possessions were conquered.

In this situation Shivājī, with an anxious heart, held constant deliberations with his mother and advisers and decided to throw himself upon Jay Singh's mercy. He lost no time and fearlessly proceeded unarmed to Jay Singh's quarters below fort Purandar on

11 June, 1665, just after his (Shivājī's) valiant captain, Murar Bāji, and many of his brave Māval soldiers had lost their lives in defending that fort against overwhelming forces led by Dilir Khān. Shivājī was well received on arrival and after a formal talk, was directed to meet Dilir Khān. Shivājī then called on the Khān as he was conducting the siege and won his sympathy by his extreme humility and sweetness of manner. The three then met for consultation and a treaty was concluded on 12 June settling the terms of Shivājī's submission. He agreed to hand over twenty-three of his important forts, keeping twelve minor ones for himself and to serve the emperor loyally, fully co-operating in the war against Bijāpur which Jay Singh was now to undertake; Shivājī's son, Shambhūjī, was to be created a *panjhazāri manṣabdār* with a suitable *jāgīr*. Jay Singh advised Shivājī to win the emperor's favour by a personal visit to his capital and receive his pardon. Jay Singh thus hoped to bring about a permanent reconciliation between the two, a vain hope as it proved eventually.

Shivājī personally handed over to Jay Singh's son, Kirāt Singh, at Sinhgarh the keys of that fort. In the following November, Shivājī joined Jay Singh with his force and co-operated in the war upon Bijāpur; but for various reasons the war ended in failure.

Jay Singh made full reports to his master on his transactions with Shivājī and explained how it was impossible to put him down with their force and how it was advantageous to win him over and turn him into a serviceable ally. With this view he requested the emperor to receive Shivājī in a personal audience and employ his services in defending the Marāthā country which had never been fully conquered. Aurangzīb, although not very sanguine on the outcome of such a visit, agreed to Jay Singh's proposal and invited Shivājī to his presence on a solemn promise that no harm would befall him. During the early months of 1666 the subject was hotly debated between Shivājī and his counsellors; there was a strong sentiment that he should not undertake the risk of just walking into the lion's den. The treaty of Purandar was almost a stage-managed affair; it meant no humiliation to Shivājī, as he was neither openly beaten nor his power extinguished. Jay Singh strongly advised Shivājī to go and meet the emperor and induce him personally to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the Hindus after the manner of his great ancestor Akbar.

In view of the antecedents of Aurangzīb, Shivājī did not hope to be able to convert the emperor to his views, but there were other weighty considerations which impelled him to undertake the ven-

ture. Such a visit would enable him to obtain a first hand impression about the inherent strength of the empire, to study men and matters on the spot and thus to make it feasible for him to carry into effect his life's mission of a Hindu *pādshāhī*. He meditated on the subject anxiously in his own mind and spent days in consultation with his mother and advisers. He was constantly in touch with Jay Singh who sent solemn oaths about his safety and so did his son Rām Singh who served at the court. The decision was taken and communicated through Jay Singh to the emperor who paid a lakh of rupees for the expenses of Shivājī's journey and assured that Shivājī would be accorded the honours of a *Shāhzāda* during his absence from home. On Monday, 5 March, 1666, Shivājī took his departure from Rāigarh accompanied by some of his intimate helpmates and a retinue of about 300 souls all told.

### IX. THE WONDERFUL ESCAPE

The emperor, proud of his victory over Shivājī, was to celebrate his accession at Āgra on 12 May, 1666, taking his seat on the peacock throne, as his father Shāh Jahān had died in the preceding January. Shivājī was to be received in a full *darbar* on that occasion. He arrived at Āgra by slow marches in time. The *Diwān-i-Am* of Āgra presented that day a unique spectacle; all the Mughul splendour was displayed. Through some mistake Shivājī was rather late in arriving at the *darbar* and was led to the emperor's presence when he had repaired to the *Diwān-i-khās*. The Prime Minister, Asad Khān, led Shivājī with his son to the presence. Both made their obeisance and offered the customary *nazar* whereupon they were taken back and asked to stand in the third row of the nobles. Shivājī noticing this affront burst out in a sort of open defiance complaining of the breach of the terms that were agreed upon. The emperor noticed Shivājī's demeanour and sent Rām Singh to pacify him. In the meantime, Shivājī left his place and moved to a corner, vehemently protesting and imprecating, a scene unprecedented in the imperial court. The emperor closed the *darbar* and asked Shivājī to be taken away. It was evident that Shivājī had committed a gross offence by defying the emperor so publicly. A strict guard was placed on his residence in Rām Singh's garden, and his movements were restricted.

Both parties now began to exercise their ingenuity to end the deadlock and smoothen matters. What was possible for the emperor to do? One of these three alternatives—(1) to put Shivājī to death; (2) convert him to Islām and employ him in imperial

service; or (3) to conciliate and send him back. The emperor asked for Jay Singh's advice, and after long deliberation, decided upon the first course—how best to accomplish it without incurring public blame or the Rājput hostility being the only question that he revolved in his mind. With this object, it was decided to remove Shivājī to a new residence, more secluded, where his end could be accomplished without a public scandal. During all this time Shivājī, too, exercised his brain to the utmost in finding some means of escape, fully gauging the emperor's intentions. From 12 May to 18 August, Shivājī remained in confinement at Āgra, devising ways for extricating himself and his son out of the situation. Ultimately, he hazarded a contrivance and succeeded in effecting his escape. After pretending illness for some time, he sent away most of his followers with instructions to shift for themselves. He and his son, on the afternoon of 19 August, squeezed themselves in two separate baskets of sweetmeats hanging from an elastic bamboo on the shoulders of porters, and were carried away without being detected by the guards on duty.

In the darkness of the evening Shivājī proceeded towards Mathurā in the north, eluding the search parties that were set in motion after his escape had been detected about noon the next day, thus gaining a clear start of about 18 hours. "Instead of moving due south-west from Āgra, through Mālwa and Khāndesh or Gujrāt, he travelled *northwards* to Mathurā, then *eastwards* to Allahābād, and finally south-westwards through Bundelkhand, Gondwānā, and Golkondā, describing a curve east of the public highway to the Deccan, in returning to Rajgarh," and appeared before his mother at Rāigarh in the garb of a wandering mendicant on 12 September, that is 25 days after he had left Āgra.<sup>10</sup> It was the most thrilling exploit of all his wonderful deeds, which has for ever added a super-natural glow to his unique personality. It immediately resounded throughout the country, making Shivājī an all-India figure, divinely endowed with extraordinary powers. The incident simultaneously exposed the emperor's craft, still further adding to his evil repute for cunning and cruelty. Shivājī's reputation, on the other hand, reached its zenith for having outwitted the cleverest and mightiest of the emperors.

Aurangzīb felt extremely mortified at Shivājī's escape and rued the event to the end of his days. He cited this to his sons as an instance wherein a trifling negligence led to incalculable harm. He suspected Jay Singh and Rām Singh of being privy to Shivājī's plans and disgraced them both. He appointed his son Mu'azzam, to the Government of the Deccan with Jaswant Singh to assist him.

Jay Singh was recalled and he died at Burhānpur on his return journey.

For some time after his return Shivājī took no active or aggressive measures and spent a year or two in reorganizing his resources. The new governor, Mu'azzam, adopted a policy of conciliation and gave no provocation to Shivājī. A formal peace was arranged, the emperor conferred the title of 'Rājā' on Shivājī, and on his behalf the young Shambhūjī was sent to the Mughul camp at Aurangabad, serving there on behalf of his father in consonance with the treaty of Purandar. It seems Shambhūjī at this time tasted the pleasures of luxury and vice, which later ruined his career.

Shivājī also effected a peaceful understanding with Bijāpur and Golconda, both purchasing his goodwill by agreeing to pay him the stipulated annual amounts of *chauth*. Thus Shivājī was accepted as an independent ruler in Mahārāshtra.

#### X. A FRESH WAVE OF FANATICISM

Shivājī spent two years in comparative quiet and would have possibly continued inoffensive, had not a fresh impulse of fanaticism seized the emperor once more to which reference has been made above (pp. 233-36). On 9 April, 1669, he issued general orders for demolishing all Hindu schools and temples and putting down all their religious teaching and practices. All Hindu fairs and ceremonies were forcibly banned. The famous temple of Kāśī Viśveśvar was pulled down in 1669 and that of Keshab Rai in 1670, the news of which flashed like lightning throughout India. New grand mosques arose on the sites of both the temples which stand to this day, visible for miles as one travels to Banaras and Mathurā. Shivājī and Jijā Bāi received these reports with sorrow and consternation and stood forth boldly to resist the emperor in retaliation. As Sinhgarh was the key fort of Deccan politics personally handed back by Shivājī five years ago, he now attacked it openly, killed its guardian, the Hindu Udaibhān, and wrested it from the Mughul possession, although in the venture Shivājī lost his best comrade, Tanajī Malusare, whose heroism Mahārāshtra commemorates to this day. This capture of Sinhgarh was effected in February, 1670, and was quickly followed up by Shivājī's seizure of the Mughul territories of Kalyān and other places of north Konkan. In April, Shivājī collected a large plunder by raiding several important Mughul towns. He declared he was taking revenge for the emperor's attack on the Hindu religion. Once more he turned his attention to Surat

and plundered it for full three days in October, 1670. He continued such devastation upon the Mughul dominions for full three years.

In this new phase, war continued and severe fighting took place between Shivājī and the emperor's veteran commanders, Dāud Khān, Ikhlās Khān, Mahābat Khān and others. It was round Salher that a great contest raged, as it was a key fort on the borders of Khāndesh and Gujarāt which commanded important routes of communication. Shivājī captured this fort in 1671 and the Mughuls put in heroic efforts to wrest it back, causing a heavy toll of dead and injured and an immense sacrifice on both sides. In this fight for Salher the Marāthās fought artillery duels on a large scale, and Shivājī's Prime Minister, Moropant Pingle, earned a unique name for valour, which bards have permanently commemorated.

One must pass over minor episodes in Shivājī's career—his renewed war against Bijāpur, his capture of the fort of Panhāla in 1673 and so on, which rendered the three years' period (1670-1673) one of severe strain and labour for Shivājī. Such a strain, however, called forth the best qualities of Marāthā character—spirit of sacrifice and co-operation, and a sense of national unity, which Shivājī's unique leadership evoked in his followers and which for a time made the Marāthā name respected all over India. This is Shivājī's greatest achievement.

## XI. THE GRAND CORONATION

Thus, after thirty years of hard struggle Shivājī now reached a stage in which it became possible to legalize his position as an independent sovereign ruler—a complete master of his homeland. Such a consummation was devoutly wished for a long time and a formal ceremony was considered the best means of proclaiming its realization and, at the same time of reviving an ancient tradition. The neighbouring powers looked upon Shivājī as an upstart, a vagabond, and a plunderer. He was prevented from exercising authority on equal terms with neighbouring powers, or exacting revenue from his own subjects as a legal master. For more than twenty years he owned a separate kingdom and exercised power over it, but this *de facto* position required a formal announcement.

There was, however, some difficulty. Shivājī had to prove that he was a Kshatriya and therefore entitled to be formally crowned. It was discovered that the Rānās of Udaipur preserved the old Kshatriya tradition and the Banaras Brāhmaṇas performed coronation rites for them in Vedic chants. Shivājī sent a strong deputation to Udaipur and secured evidence that his own house

## SHIVAJĪ

was descended from the Śísodīa clan of Udaipur; he also obtained sanction from the Banaras Pandits for his formal coronation. One learned priest of the Bhaṭṭ family of Banaras named Viśveśvara alias Gaga took a rational view of the subject, declared that Shivājī had proved by his action that he was a Kshatriya and himself came to Rāigarh to conduct the coronation rites for him.

Grand preparations were made. Guests gathered in large number—agents of foreign States, local magistrates, priests, and friends. A gorgeous throne of octagonal shape with profuse decorations was constructed and suitable edifice befitting a capital town had been completed. Saturday, June 16, 1674, was fixed as the auspicious day for the ceremony, although minor rites had started long before.

An elaborate programme was drawn up and punctually carried out. The prescribed rites according to ancient tradition were gone through with Vedic incantations befitting a Kshatriya hero. Shivājī was weighed in gold and the amount of 16,000 *hons* (equal to about 140 lbs. weight of his body) was distributed in charity. The English ambassador, Oxenden, who attended the ceremony at Rāigarh with presents from the East India Company, has left a detailed description of what he saw and heard. It is, perhaps, the most authentic account available of that event.

The cost of the ceremony together with the construction of the throne is estimated by Sabhāsad at Rs. five crores. This probably includes the cost of the fortifications and buildings of the capital, as well as its tanks and the streets, of which one notices the ruins today. The ceremony alone cost about 50 lakhs and was attended by some fifty thousand people, all being fed with sumptuous meals for some weeks. Jijā Bāi fortunately lived long enough to see this signal fulfilment of her life's cherished ambition—an independent Mahārāshtra. She died just eleven days after the grand function.

It is instructive to notice the permanent marks of royalty assumed by Shivājī on this occasion in order to announce the formation of his sovereign State. The erection of forts and the organization of an armed force and the navy are the usual requisites of an established kingdom and need not be mentioned. But the royal insignia and the particular titles he devised as marks of the Marāthā ruler together with the cabinet of eight ministers nominated by him require some explanation:

- (1) *Kshatriya-Kulāvataṃsa* (Head of the Kshatriya Kula),
- (2) *Simhāsanādhīśvara* (Lord of the Throne),

- (3) *Mahārāja* (Emperor),  
 (4) *Chhatrapati* (Lord of the Umbrella),

are the four Sanskrit titles which Shivājī assumed at the time of his coronation. In addition, Shivājī introduced a new era of his own dating from his coronation, and on that account received the appellation "founder of an era" (*Śaka-Kartā*).

Another significant measure instituted by Shivājī was his cabinet of eight ministers, each with a department of his own. Most of these ministers were appointed long ago as Shivājī's *Swarājya* began to take shape. The whole scheme was completed and announced at the time of his coronation with regulations and duties properly defined.

The eight ministers were:

- (1) *Peshwa* (Prime Minister), Moro Trimal Pingle.
- (2) *Muzmudar* (Amātya) Revenue Minister, Rām Chandra Nilkanth.
- (3) *Surnis* (Sachiv) Finance Minister, Ānāji Datto.
- (4) *Waqenavis* (Mantri) Home Minister, Dattaji Trimbak.
- (5) *Sarnaubat* (Senāpati) Commander-in-chief, Hambir Rāo Mohite.
- (6) *Dabir* (Sumant) Foreign Mnister, Rām Chandra Trimbak.
- (7) *Nyāyādhīs* (The Chief Judge) Rāoji Niraji.
- (8) *Panditrāo* (Minister for Religion) Raghunāth Pandit.

The salary of the Prime Minister was 15,000 *hons* a year, and of the rest ten thousand—a *hon* being worth about Rupees three and a half. This works out the Premier's salary at Rs. 4,375 per month in the coin of those days, quite a substantial amount if the purchasing power of money at that time is taken into account. The salary for a minister was Rs. 3,000 per month.

Shivājī appears to have borrowed this departmental division from ancient Hindu scriptures which have prescribed it. Shivājī was an autocrat and allowed no definite independent powers to his ministers.

The Hindu character of Shivājī's *Swarājya* was clearly marked. He excluded all foreign elements. Instead of Urdu and Persian which were the court languages for centuries past, Shivājī introduced Marāthī and coined Sanskrit technical terms for administrative purposes. Thus came into being the famous *Rāja-Vyava-*

*hāra-Kośa*, a dictionary of official terms. This was composed by a panel of experts under the supervision of Raghunāth Pandit Hanumante. The elaborate Sanskrit introduction to this dictionary is worthy of serious study. Similarly, forms of address in official and private correspondence, office regulations, seals for Government documents and similar innovations were brought into force so as to complete the scheme of this new kingdom.

This coronation ceremony marks a distinct stage in the life of Shivājī. While it gave him a new and reliable status, it increased his responsibilities in no small measure and involved him into fresh risks. While the Hindu world in general rejoiced in his achievements, there were others who became bitter in their enmity towards him. The Mughul emperor in particular started a virulent campaign to put down this new rival striving to uproot his kingdom. The year of the Coronation itself did not pass off peacefully. Bahādur Khān pressed Shivājī from the east. To counteract this move, Shivājī carried fire and sword through the Koli country of north Konkan, Baglan and Khāndesh. He also turned his attention to the Portuguese of Goa and captured their important post of Ponda. Nearer home, he captured the Bijāpuri fort of Satara and established the seat of his guru, Rāmdās, in the neighbouring fort of Parli, thereafter known as Sajjangarh.

## XII. THE LAST GREAT VENTURE IN KARNATAK

With all the splendour and demonstration of Shivājī's coronation and the lofty titles of full sovereignty assumed by him, his actual dominion was hardly more than two hundred miles in length and far less in breadth. Even the whole Marāthā country had not come under his control. The Siddis of Janjira and the Portuguese were his constant enemies on the west coast. The Mughul pressure from the north was increasing. Even his brother Ekoji in the south had imitated him and announced his sovereignty at Tanjore in a similar coronation ceremony. Expansion of his dominion thus became a necessity for Shivājī. He was the regenerator of the Hindu religion, but all the peninsular lands of South India, essentially Hindu in character, had been long under Muslim rule. The emperor had barred his way effectively in the north. So the south alone remained free for his ambition. There were other considerations which equally influenced his march southward.

The south was loosely held by the two States of Bijāpur and Golconda. During Shāhji's days the rulers of these tried to extend their sway throughout the southern region, but their scheme had

collapsed and when Shivājī appeared on the scene as the defender of the Hindus, these southern lands began lustfully to look up to him for a helping hand. The situation rapidly changed when in 1672 the rulers of both Bijāpur and Golconda died, leaving disputed successions and inevitable anarchy behind. Bijāpur, all along a Shiah State, fell under the Sunnī Pāthān power of Bahlol Khān who would rather sell the State to Aurangzīb and his nominee Dilir Khān than let it fall into the hands of Shivājī. The condition of Golconda was even worse. There 'Abdullah Qutb Shāh held a precarious headship with the help of two astute, clever, Hindu ministers Mādanna and his brother Ākkanna. There was no Muslim chief strong enough to preserve order in the State and save it from the greed of the Mughul emperor. The two Hindu ministers therefore came forth boldly to uphold Qutb Shāh and for several years so ably managed the administration that its revenues improved and it began to enjoy peace and prosperity. This Hindu regeneration of Golconda excited the extreme ire of Aurangzīb at a moment when Shivājī's coronation had exasperated him beyond measure. Finding their position untenable, the two Hindu ministers decided to make a common cause with Shivājī as the only means of self-preservation.

There was another complication contributing to this fresh move. It was a grievous sight for an acclaimed hero like Shivājī to find his own step-brother Ekoji, ruler of Tanjore, holding himself a bond-slave of Bijāpur and working openly against Shivājī's work of Hindu uplift. Ekoji's wise and capable minister, Raghunāth Pānt Hanumante, tried his utmost to dissuade Ekoji from the evil course he was following. He had with him a number of Muslim counsellors always working in the interest of the Pathān ruler of Bijāpur and preventing Ekoji from making a common cause with Shivājī. On this point Ekoji and Raghunāth Pānt fell out so severely that the latter resigned his post in disgust, refused to be a party to the wicked policy of his master, and left Tanjore for seeking fortune elsewhere. He first visited Bijāpur and, dissatisfied with the policies that he found developing in that State, went to Golconda. There he made friends with the ministers Mādanna and Ākkanna and concerted a grand scheme both of preserving the Muslim status of the Qutb Shāh and extending the cause of Hindu regeneration in the south with the help of Shivājī. The east coast regions sorely needed some power to give them peace and order. The scheme of conquest launched by Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh had broken down after his death. The Nāyakas of Tanjore and Madura and other minor rulers were looking askance for some one to give

them protection. Here was an opportunity for Ekoji to stand forth boldly for co-operation with his brother and extend his pro-Hindu campaign to the south, which had been begun in Mahārāshtra. But Ekoji did not respond and Raghunāth Pānt felt the urge and seized the opportunity. He induced 'Abdullah Qutb Shāh to receive a visit from Shivājī and make an alliance of defence and offence with him for carrying out the conquest of the southern lands in co-operation.

This was in the year 1676 when the whole politics of the peninsula was in a fluid state. Having secured willing assent to his scheme from the men in power at Golconda, Raghunāth repaired to Rāigarh and there discussed with Shivājī the pros and cons of this new venture. It was heartily welcomed by Shivājī who found in the Pandit just the sort of a co-operator that he needed in order to extend his *Swarājya* to regions outside Mahārāshtra.

Shivājī welcomed Raghunāth Pānt's proposal enthusiastically as it afforded a new channel for national uplift and the regeneration of the decaying Hindu prestige. Messengers hurried between Rāigarh and Golconda arranging the details of the forthcoming visit. Adequate preparations were quickly made to put the grand project into shape and the machinery set in motion with definite duties assigned to the various agents. The Hindus of the south became enthused with the prospective liberation from Muslim domination. Hanumante returned to Golconda immediately.

Shivājī left Rāigarh at the beginning of January, 1677, having already despatched strong parties of armed forces to subjugate local Muslim chiefs who were suspected of working against the main scheme. A ceremonial visit of a Hindu potentate to a Muslim capital was a unique event in the annals of India and Shivājī knew how to influence the Muslim world with his beneficence and sobriety. He enforced strict discipline and orderliness upon his followers, all carefully selected and tutored in advance. He reached Haidarabad early in February, and left it early in March, 1677. A most enthusiastic reception with plenty of entertainment and hospitality was extended to him. Shivājī had several ceremonial and private visits and frank talks with the Sultān. An agreement was concluded between them for jointly resisting the Mughul advance and dividing the new conquests between them half and half. Shivājī agreed to pay to the Shāh a yearly tribute of 6 lakhs of *hons*.

From Haidarabad, Shivājī proceeded to the eastern regions with Qutb Shāhī contingents, paying devotions to the several shrines on

the way. Shivājī appeared before Gingee, then held by a Bijāpuri captain, who surrendered the fort after receiving suitable provision for him. Shivājī constructed new fortifications for Gingee, the remnants of which we see at this day. He then advanced against Vellore which was captured after a year's effort. Shivājī then journeyed to the south where deputations met him from the French of Pondicherry and the Nāyaka of Madura. He then arrived at Tirumalvadi on the Coleroon, about ten miles north of Tanjore, where his brother Ekoji ruled.

Here Ekoji came on a visit to Shivājī in July and lived with him for a week. Ekoji did not show any inclination to fall in with Shivājī's views or accept his demand for a half share in the paternal acquisitions. Although a gentle, benevolent character, Ekoji was entirely guided by Muslim advisers who had then sympathies for Bijāpur, and Shivājī's work of national uplift in no way appealed to Ekoji. Suspecting he might come into trouble Ekoji escaped under cover of darkness one night and returned to Tanjore without obtaining a formal leave. Thereupon Shivājī sent his agents to Tanjore to explain matters and, finding that the subject could not be quickly finished, Shivājī left matters in the hands of his *Senāpati* Hambir Rāo Mohite with strong forces, and his representative Raghunāth Pānt, and himself returned to Mahārāshtra where his presence was urgently needed. On the way, he seized most of Ekoji's possessions in the Mysore plateau.

Ekoji at Tanjore decided to try his luck in an open fight and attacked Hambir Rāo Mohite at Valigandpuram on 16 November, when in a severe engagement, he was routed, losing heavily in life and property. When Shivājī learned of this result he at once wrote a long conciliatory letter to his brother explaining how foolishly he brought that trouble upon himself, and how it would be wise for him to retrace his steps. Ekoji's wife, Dipābāi, was a shrewd, wise lady who brought about a reconciliation between the two brothers and induced Ekoji to entrust his administration to Raghunāth Pānt. The Muslim advisers were dismissed. As Shivājī died soon after, all the grand results planned and expected of this extensive Karnātak venture fell to the ground. The only benefit that accrued from it to the Marāthā nation was that during Shambhūji's and Rājārām's reigns these Karnātak conquests of Shivājī proved of immense benefit. When Aurangzīb conquered the Marāthā lands, Shivājī's son, Rājārām, found a hospitable shelter at Gingee and the Mughul danger was warded off.

XIII. SHAMBHŪJĪ'S DEFECTION AND  
DEATH OF SHIVĀJĪ

This Karnātak expedition proved to be Shivājī's last great achievement. Thereafter his health and the state of affairs both deteriorated. Dilir Khān began to exert severe pressure upon the Marāthā dominions. Shivājī's son, Shambhūjī, now aged twenty-two (b. 1657), had been misbehaving for some time and was kept under close supervision for a time at Shringarpur near Sangameshwar (Konkan). He was also sent to Sajjangarh to be reclaimed under Rāmdās's care. He, however, succumbed to the temptations, secretly offered to him by Dilir Khān, of some splendid prospects under the Mughul Government. Without sufficient forethought or regard for consequences, Shambhūjī suddenly escaped from Panhālā on 13 December, 1678, along with his wife Yesubāi, and was enthusiastically welcomed by Dilir Khān near Pandharpur. They together attacked Bhupālgarh, east of Satara, where, Shambhūjī knew, Shivājī had deposited valuable treasure and a number of Marāthā families for safety. They captured the fort in April, 1679, and committed a fearful slaughter of inmates that fell into their hands. From Bhupālgarh they proceeded to Bijāpur which was saved from falling into the Mughul hands mainly through the timely help rendered by Shivājī. Discomfited before Bijāpur, Dilir Khān and Shambhūjī turned their steps towards Panhālā. In the meantime Shivājī had employed secret agents to induce Shambhūjī to return. At Tikota, a few miles west of Bijāpur, Dilir Khān perpetrated severe atrocities by plundering and slaughtering innocent population, including women and children. A similar scene was repeated at the next mart of Athni, when the suffering people appealed to Shambhūjī for protection. Shambhūjī made strong protests to the Khān which he resented and a severe rupture came about between them. Some of Shambhūjī's friends in the Khān's camp warned him that the Khān intended a foul game against him of handing him over into the emperor's hands as a prisoner. This terrified Shambhūjī so much that he left the Mughul camp at night with Yesubāi in male attire. As he was proceeding to Bijāpur, Shivājī's agents met him and brought him to Panhālā, where he arrived on 4 December after an absence of nearly a year.

The year 1679 strained Shivājī's nerve in another direction also. Aurangzīb issued a fresh order reimposing the *jizya* on all the Hindu population of India from 2 April. It was an open challenge as much to Shivājī as to the many Rājput chiefs of North India. The latter in resentment started a dreadful war against the emperor, which in the long run he was at severe pains to bring to an end

(pp. 238-41). Shivājī also wrote a letter to Aurangzīb making a strong protest, couched in vigorous terms, against the unwise measure and the wrongs which it imposed upon the innocent population. He wrote: "God is the Lord of all men and not of the Muhammadans only. Islām and Hinduism are only different pigments used by the Divine Painter to picture the human species."<sup>11</sup>

Unfortunately, Shivājī did not live long enough to follow up the noble words with a suitable action. And now approached the saddest moment of Shivājī's life. He well knew Shambhūjī did not possess the capacity to preserve what he had secured in a lifetime of tremendous labour and activity. He could not, however, reclaim his son. Upon the latter's arrival at Panhālā Shivājī visited him and gently tried to impress upon his mind what responsibility rested on him in his prospective inheritance. He employed a large staff to prepare accurate lists of all his property and possessions—of every item, trivial or costly. But Shambhūjī did not rise to the occasion and his conduct immeasurably distressed his father's last days.

Greatly disappointed in mind and much emaciated in body, Shivājī kept strong guards to watch Shambhūjī at Panhālā and repaired to his *guru* at Sajjangarh to seek solace. But what could Rāmdās do to relieve the Rājā's misery? The two lived and discussed together for a month. In February, 1680, Shivājī proceeded to Rāigarh where the sacred thread ceremony of his son Rājārām was performed in March. A week later, on 23 March, Shivājī had an attack of fever from which he never recovered. He expired at noon on Sunday, 4 April, 1680 (on the previous day, according to some). Out of his eight wives married mostly on political grounds, Puttabāi became *Satī*. One Sakwarbāi long survived him keeping company to Yesubāi (Shambhūjī's wife) in the emperor's imprisonment. Soyrābāi was put to death by Shambhūjī. The others had predeceased their husband.

#### XIV. CONCLUSION

What the earnest endeavour of one man can achieve in this wicked world is illustrated in Shivājī's life narrated so far. It has not been possible, within the limited space, to give a more detailed account of all the varied activities and achievements of that unique personality. Only the main incidents and their prominent features could be attempted. But even these will doubtless prove the divine gift of genius which Shivājī possessed and which baffles analysis.

## SHIVĀJĪ

“On more than one occasion he so recklessly plunged into a venture that he had burnt his boats and made retreat impossible for himself. Today, after the lapse of three centuries from his birth, even the most severe critic is bound to admit that though Shivājī’s dynasty is extinct and his State has crumbled into dust, yet he set an example of innate Hindu capacity and left a name which would continue to fire the spirit of man and shine forth as an ideal for ages yet unborn.”<sup>12</sup>

We have now before us for study records and eulogies referring to Shivājī from the pen of those who came in direct contact with him—poet Parmānand, Rāmchandra Pānt Amātya, Raghunāth Pānt Pandit Hanumante, and not a few European traders and travellers who visited him in India in one connection or another. The Amātya has left a piece of writing elaborately describing the polity and personality of Shivājī, a unique production in Marāthī. Saint Rāmdās often gives vivid pen pictures which appear to pertain to no other person but Shivājī, whose valour, circumspection, selflessness, and devotion to religion are now attested to and scattered throughout his writings. Krishnāji Anant Sabhāsad, a member of Shivājī’s court, composed an elaborate faithful account of Shivājī’s life and achievements, which is of inestimable value.<sup>13</sup>

Did Shivājī aim at a Hindu Empire for India? A look at Shivājī’s whole life closely discloses his intense regard for religion. He indeed cared more for religious emancipation of his land than mere political dominion. Rāmdās has exquisitely described this spirit of Shivājī in his work *Ānandvana-Bhuvan*. The religious persecution practised by Muhammed ‘Ādil Shāh and Aurangzīb moved Shivājī intensely and influenced all his actions. He at the same time realized that religious freedom could not be obtained without political power, and to that extent he exerted himself in freeing his homeland from Muslim control. As a result of his visit to the emperor’s court he was perhaps convinced of the hollowness of the Mughul empire, and thereafter exerted himself in bringing India under Hindu control. The imposition of *chauth* on lands outside his immediate sway was a means to that end. His coronation ceremony and the grand title he assumed suggest his intention of establishing a Hindu empire, certainly by degrees according to his means. His expedition to the Karnātak was a clear move towards a Hindu India, in which he roped in Qutb Shāh of Haidarabad. He had all but engulfed the State of Bijāpur also. His public protest against the imposition of *jizya* explains his attitude in unmistakable terms. If he had been vouchsafed a little longer span of life, he could have brought about the deposition of Aurangzīb, so clearly emphasized a

little later by his son Shambhūjī in his Sanskrit letter to Rām Singh. 'This kingdom belongs to Gods and Brāhmans', 'Hindustan is essentially a land of the Hindus', and similar phrases scattered throughout Sanskrit and Marāthi literature are sentiments actuated by Shivājī's endeavour, so closely followed after him by the Peshwās also. Mahadaji Sindhia indeed felt the glory of having achieved some of these dreams when he attained supreme power at the court of Delhi.

At the same time Shivājī was never actuated by a hatred of the Muslims. He was no bigot and allowed equal freedom to all faiths. He was served as zealously by the Muslims as by the Hindus. The Muslim saint, Bābā Yākut of Kelsi, was treated as his *guru*. Mulla Haidar was his confidential secretary. Ibrāhim Khān, Daulat Khān and Sidi Misri were his naval commanders. A large Muslim population lived under him in equal contentment with their brother Hindus. He respected the personal honour of a Muslim as his own. He built a mosque opposite his palace at Rāigarh for the use of his Muslim subjects. Shivājī's ideals were broad and philanthropic, embracing the highest good of all. He respected all holy men equally. Wherever he travelled in his expeditions, it was his particular passion to contact the holy men and preachers of the various localities; he valued their blessing to which he attributed his success. While he intensely respected Rāmdās, it cannot be maintained that in political affairs he was influenced by that *guru*. They were both exalted characters and worked in different spheres in their own ways. Rāmdās was a great practical teacher; he did not meddle in politics.

Shivājī's administrative measures were a marvel of his time and far in advance of his age. He strictly prohibited grants of land in lieu of military or other service, thereby avoiding the patent evils of the *jāgīr* system. While the Mughul administration continued blindly on the same old model built up by Akbar, Shivājī had created innovations in almost every branch. His division of official work among eight ministers, his system of forts for the defence of his realm, his organization of the navy, his army regulations including those for discipline and plunder, his compilation of the *Rāja-Vyavahāra-kośa*, his imposition of the system of *chauth* are all measures of his own creation, utterly unlike what was then in vogue. Shivājī lavished money like water on repairing old forts and constructing new ones, about 250 in all, which particularly suited the geographical situation of the Marāthā region. Each fort was a self-sufficient unit with plenty of water supply and cornland enclosed, so that when besieged, each fort could stand defence by a small gar-

riason for any length of time. The sonorous and significant names given to these forts reveal Shivājī's ingenuity even in this detail and remind us even today what their use and grandeur must have been at that time.

The annual revenue of Shivājī's dominions has been roughly calculated at seven crores of rupees, possibly much less in actual realization. It may be roughly put down that all the peninsular lands, south of the river Tāpti, either wholly or partially owed allegiance to Shivājī.

Many writers, particularly the western, represent Shivājī as a plunderer and a rebel, conveying thereby that he was no steady or confirmed ruler, but a pest to the society. This is entirely a wrong view. Every patriot striving to free his land from foreign domination is bound to be a rebel until his position becomes stabilized. Shivājī never committed wanton atrocities during his raids and never harassed innocent population. He subjected Muslim lands to plunder and devastation only when he was at war with those powers. Shivājī's plunder had the nature of a war levy of our modern days.

Glowing tributes have been paid to Shivājī's character as a national hero alike by foreign biographers and his own countrymen, both of his own day and during recent times of advanced historical research. The French envoy, Germain, who visited Shivājī near Tanjore, wrote in July, 1677:

"The camp of Shivājī was without pomp, without women; there were no baggages, only two tents of simple cloth, coarse and very scanty, one for him and the other for his prime minister."

But what his formidable antagonist, emperor Aurangzīb, himself wrote upon hearing of Shivājī's death is no small praise; he said:

"He was a great captain and the only one who has had the magnanimity to raise a new kingdom, while I have been endeavouring to destroy the ancient sovereignties of India. My armies have been employed against him for nineteen years and nevertheless his State has been increasing."

Insistence on order, obedience and strictest discipline were the main characteristics of Shivājī's rule. Bernier, Tavernier, Khāfi Khān, Grant-Duff, Elphinstone, Temple, Acworth, W.S.M. Edwards, Sir Jadunath Sarkar and other scholars and writers have all given Shivājī glowing tributes regarding him as unequalled by any hero in recent Indian history. He was not only the maker of the Marāthā

nation but the greatest constructive genius of medieval India. No Bacon had appeared in India to point out a new way to human advancement. Even Rāmdās did not dream of a new path. Shivājī alone understood how to organize his national resources. He called the Marāthā race to a new life of valour and self-reliance, of honour and hope. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that he is the creator of the Marāthā nation, as Sir Jadunath had aptly put it, "the last great constructive genius and nation-builder that the Hindu race has produced." Jadunath further observes:

"He called the Marāthā race to a new life. He raised the Marāthās into an independent self-reliant people, conscious of their oneness and high destiny, and his most precious legacy was the spirit that he breathed into his race. He has proved by his example that the Hindu race can build a nation, found a State, defeat enemies; they can conduct their own defence, protect and promote literature and art, commerce and industry; they can maintain navies and ocean-trading fleets of their own and conduct naval battles on equal terms with foreigners. He taught the modern Hindus to rise to the full stature of their growth. Shivājī has shown that the tree of Hinduism is not really dead, that it can rise from beneath the seemingly crushing load of centuries of political bondage; that it can put forth new leaves and branches. It can again lift up its head to the skies."<sup>14</sup>

1. For an elaborate account of the political and social conditions of Maharashtra and the rise of the Bhosles, see G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, 1957, Vol. I, pp. 17-92.
2. Highly eulogistic accounts appear to have been recorded in Sanskrit about the exploits of Maloji and Shahji, after Shivaji's reputation had been fully established. Vide *Sanads and Letters*, pp. 211-215, and the unique Sanskrit composition known as Sambhājī's *dān-patra*. Paramananda follows in the same strain in his *Śiva Bhārat*.
3. Most of the old records support this date corresponding to 2, *Vaiśākh Śuddha, Raktākshī Samvatsara Śaka* 1549. However, on the basis of some epigraphical and astrological evidence, some scholars favour the date 19 February, 1630. Recently Setu Madhavrao Pagadi has suggested that Shivājī was born on 25 April, 1628. J. N. Sarkar accepts Monday, 10 April, 1627 (*Shivaji and His Times*, Ch. II, Section 3, which also discusses other dates).
- 3a. According to J. N. Sarkar he was illiterate (op. cit. Ch. XVI, Section 9).
4. Cf. Sardesai, op.cit., Vol. I, p.97, (First Edition).
5. The well-known '*Jedhe Chronology*' was discovered among the old papers of this family. Kanhoji Jedhe was asked by Shāhji to help Shivājī. See G.S. Sardesai, op.cit., p.89.
6. Cf. G.S. Sardesai, op. cit., pp. 104-5 for a slightly different version.
- 6a. *Ibid.*
7. Cf. *Śiva Bhārat*, Ch. XVI, 45.
8. (Editor's Note).

The oldest and contemporary account of the capture of Javli, written by Shivājī's courtier, Krishnajī Anant Sabhāsad, differs materially from the

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version given in the text which is based on the accounts of later writers. The conclusion arrived at by Sir Jadunath Sarkar after a comparison of all available texts, seems to be more in consonance with facts. His reconstruction of the episode may be summed up as follows:

The ruler of Javli was a boy of sixteen and the State was ruled by the Diwān, Hanumant Rāo Moré. An agent of Shivājī met the latter on a false pretext and treacherously slew him at a private meeting. He escaped unscathed and quickly brought Shivājī to the scene with a vast army. Javli was captured after six hours' fighting, and several members of the Moré family were taken prisoner, but the boy king Krishnajī, with his younger brother Bājī, took refuge in Raigarh, a fort belonging to Javli. Shivājī invested the fort and gained possession of it by negotiations. The boy king and his brother were carried away by Shivājī to Poona and there the former was beheaded. The younger boy escaped and later, in 1665, joined Jay Singh for war against Shivājī.

Sir Jadunath's comments on this episode are also worth quoting: "The acquisition of Javli was the result of deliberate murder and organised treachery on the part of Shivājī. His power was then in its infancy; and he could not afford to be scrupulous in the choice of the means of strengthening himself. In exactly similar circumstances, Sher Shāh, his historic parallel, used similar treachery in gaining forts in South Bihār as the first step to a throne.

"The only redeeming feature of this dark episode in his (Shivājī's) life is that the crime was not aggravated by hypocrisy. All his old Hindu biographers are agreed that it was an act of premeditated murder for personal gain . . . . Even Shivaji never pretended that the murder of the three Mores was prompted by a desire to found a 'Hindu swaraj', or to remove from his path a treacherous enemy who had repeatedly abused his generous leniency.

"This last touch of infamy it has been left to the present generation to add . . . the twentieth century admirers of the national hero." J. N. Sarkar, *Shivaji and His Times*, Third Edition, pp. 44-45. (The last para has been omitted in the Sixth Edition (1961) ).

(In spite of his great respect for the author of this chapter, G.S. Sardesai, the Editor feels obliged to add this note as a corrective to the impression that might be otherwise left on the mind of the readers).

9. Opinions differ on the vital point, viz. who struck the first blow, Afzal Khān or Shivājī, and on this depends the answer to the vexed and much-discussed question whether the slaying of Afzal Khān was a treacherous murder or an act of self-defence on the part of Shivājī. On this also, the opinion of Jadunath Sarkar (op. cit., pp. 72-3), supporting the version given in the text, seems to be a fair one (Editor).
- 9a. It appears from some newly discovered documents that Shivājī had been receiving help from the Portuguese of Goa in his struggle against the Mughuls, but Jay Singh succeeded in winning over the Portuguese who no longer dared help Shivājī openly. This might have been a contributing factor to the submission of Shivājī. Cf. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, XXI, pp. 187-8.
10. This is the latest view on the route followed by Shivājī during his escape and the date of his arrival at Rāigarh. According to the older view, based on Marathi records, which was endorsed by both J. N. Sarkar in the earlier editions of his book *Shivaji and His Times* and G. S. Sardesai, the author of this Chapter, in his draft written long ago, Shivājī passed through Mathurā, Allahabad, Vārānasi, Gayā and, even Jagannāth Purī, and returned to Rāigarh on 20 November, 1666 (*Shivaji and His Times*, Third Edition, 1929, pp. 153-56). The view given above in the text is quoted from the sixth edition of this book published in 1961, pp. 149-53. It is based on a spy's report received at Delhi on 14 November, 1666, to the effect that Shivājī had reached his home "25 days after escaping from Agra", thus fixing the date of his arrival at Rāigarh on 12 September. Relying on this, and in consideration of the short duration of the journey, J. N. Sarkar has revised his old views and discussed the whole question in detail in an Appendix to Chapter VI of the sixth edition of his book (pp. 157-9).

In his *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. I, published in 1946, Sardesai states that Shivājī, after leaving Mathurā, travelled through the country of

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the Gonds on to Golconda and Bijāpur and reached Rāigarh "on 12 September, 1666, or on the 25th day after leaving Agra". But, evidently, through oversight, he gives the date of Shivājī's flight from Agra on 17 August, instead of 19 August (Vol. I, pp. 178-80), which is given by Sarkar and others, on independent grounds, and is in agreement with the interval of twenty-five days between the date of the flight from Agra and arrival at Rāigarh.

11. For the full text of the letter, cf. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzīb*, Vol. III, Ch. XXXIV, Appendix VI.
12. J. N. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji* (New Ed.), pp. 103-4 and 113.
13. The estimate of Shivājī which follows may appear to many as somewhat exaggerated, particularly as there is no reference to many of the statements on which the observations are based. Unfortunately the eminent writer of this chapter passed away before the Editor had any opportunity of discussing the subject with him. The Editor, out of regard for the late lamented scholar, G. S. Sardesai, who wrote this chapter, thought it best to leave it as it is, particularly as it follows more or less the views expressed by him in his scholarly work, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. I, published in 1946.

For a more proper estimate of Shivājī, reference may be made to J. N. Sarkar's two books mentioned above.

14. J. N. Sarkar, *Shivaji and His Times*, Chapter XVI, Section 9.

## CHAPTER X

### AURANGZĪB ( 1681-1707 )

#### I. THE DECCAN

After Shivājī's funeral, his younger son Rājārām, a boy of ten, was crowned at Rāigarh by his mother Soyṛā Bāi with the help of a party at the capital. But another party in the State was against this succession and Shambhūjī, the eldest son of Shivājī and step-brother of Rājārām, succeeded in securing the throne of his father, overcoming all opposition (18 June, 1680). Rājārām and his mother were imprisoned, but the latter was subsequently put to death.

Shambhūjī continued his father's policy of raiding the Mughul territories in the Deccan, and in the winter of 1680-81, he plundered north Khāndesh and the suburbs of Burhānpur. An attempt was also made in November, 1681, to capture the fort of Ahmadnagar, but it did not succeed. He had given shelter to prince Akbar and promised him Marāthā aid in capturing the throne of Delhi. Such was the Mughul-Marāthā relation on the eve of Aurangzīb's arrival in the Deccan. Reaching there, the emperor made an extensive plan to invade Mahārāshtra from different directions and launched a vigorous offensive with a view to giving it a stunning blow. Sayyid Hasan 'Ālī was sent to north Konkan, Shihāb-ud-dīn Khān with Dalpat Rāi to Nāsik on the western frontier, Rūh-ullah Khān and prince Shāh 'Ālam to Ahmadnagar district to guard that side against any possible Marāthā attack; and prince A'zam was directed to proceed towards Bijāpur to cut off any assistance coming to the Marāthās from that direction. But in spite of all these, the emperor could not gain anything substantial in 1682, and all the detachments had to be recalled in April, 1683.

Thus, even after a year of his arrival in the Deccan, the emperor could not achieve anything decisive. He was rudely shocked by the unfilial conduct of his son Akbar whom he had loved so dearly. "In truth, he was at this time passing through a domestic and mental crisis; his faith in his family had been totally shaken and he did not know whom to trust or where he would be safe. Hence his policy for some time after was hesitating, suspicious, watchful and seemingly capricious or self-contradictory."<sup>1</sup> But Shambhūjī's invasion of the Portuguese territory at this time and conclusion of

a treaty with the Mughuls gave Aurangzib a temporary respite to think of another offensive against the Marāthās.

In the meantime prince Akbar, who had been highly disappointed at the vain expectation of aid from the Marāthā King, decided to proceed to the Portuguese territory and thence to sail to Persia for refuge. After leaving his residence at Pāli, he went to Bāndā in Sāvantvādi and then to Bicholim, about ten miles north of Goa. Purchasing a ship he embarked at Vingurlā (November, 1683), but Durgā Dās and Kavi-Kalash, Shambhūji's prime minister, persuaded him to come back, holding out fresh hopes of support from the Marāthā King. He wasted another year (1684) in the Ratnagiri district, making repeated requests to Kavi-Kalash to meet him and decide on future actions. The internal condition of the Marāthā kingdom was then extremely gloomy. Neglecting his duties Shambhūji was indulging in luxury of low tastes, and the government was greatly distracted by the jealousy of the Marāthā nobility against Kavi-Kalash, who was a Brāhman of Kanauj in northern India and hated as a foreigner at the Marāthā Court. Added to these, there were rebellions in the State and desertions of officers. In these circumstances, it was not possible for prince Akbar to secure necessary Marāthā assistance to fight against his father.

Taking advantage of confusion in the Marāthā kingdom, Aurangzib started another offensive against it in September, 1683. The Sīdī of Janjira was asked to watch the movements of Akbar and prince Shāh 'Ālam was despatched at the head of a grand army to lead the main attack on the Marāthā territory and penetrate into Sāvantvādi and South Konkan. Another detachment under Shihāb-ud-dīn was posted at Poona from which he raided Nizāmpur in the Kolāba district. Prince A'zam was sent to Nāsik for guarding the road to Bāglāna and Khāndesh, while Khān Jahān proceeded from Bīdar to Akalkot to prevent any possible aid coming to the Marāthās from Golconda and Bijāpur, and the emperor himself went to Ahmadnagar.

Entering the Belgaum district Shāh 'Ālam captured some forts, cities and a large quantity of booty. Then he crossed the Rāmghāt pass, twenty-six miles west of Belgaum, and proceeded into the plains of Sāvantvādi. After arrival at Bicholim he demolished the mansions and gardens of Shambhūji and Akbar, and planned to occupy Goa by treachery, but this was a serious blunder, as it caused rupture with the Portuguese who stopped supply of grain to the prince by sea. The invading army then moved northwards, sacking and burning the towns and villages, and turning south again, they re-

turned to the north of Goa. Their progress was stopped by famine, and so the prince was compelled to return to the Rāmgāt pass where one-third of his men and a large number of horses, elephants and camels perished through pestilence. Harassed by the enemies from different directions the prince reached Ahmadnagar on 18 May, 1684, and judged by the net result of his campaign the achievement was not at all worthy of serious notice.

But the Mughuls achieved much better results in other quarters. The Marāthās were defeated on several occasions and much of their territory occupied. Many Marāthā captains joined the imperialists, and two wives and one daughter of Shambhūjī were captured and confined in the fort of Bahādurgarh. After making a vain dash into the Mughul territory in June, 1686, and finding no ray of hope in future, prince Akbar hired a ship at Rājapur and sailed for Persia in February, 1687, reaching the Persian Court at Isfāhān in January, 1688. After thus sending him out of the Indian territory, Durgā Dās returned to Mārwar.

During the regime of Sikandar 'Ādil Shāh (1672-1686), the last of the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultāns, the Bijāpur kingdom suffered seriously from various troubles, viz, maladministration and internecine quarrels among the nobles, which paved the way for its final extinction. Taking advantage of the rivalry between the Deccani party led by Khavāss Khān and the Afghān party led by Buhlūl Khān and eventual disorder in the kingdom, the imperialists, on the request of the Deccani party, then out of power, took up their side, and invading Bijāpur took possession of Naldurg and Gulbarga (1677).

The condition of Bijāpur steadily deteriorated from day to day. On the death of Buhlūl Khān on 23 December, 1677, Sīdī Mas'ūd, another influential Bijāpur noble, became prime minister and regent with the assistance of the Mughuls. He made peace with them who imposed terms, suiting their purpose, viz., Bijāpur should be guided by the orders of the emperor; it must not form any alliance with Shivājī; and Sikandar's sister, Shahr Bānū, popularly known as Pādishāh Bībī, should be sent to the Mughul court to be married to a son of the emperor (prince A'zam).

But Mas'ūd could not improve the dilapidated condition of the kingdom. On the other hand, by a secret alliance with Shivājī, he provoked the wrath of the imperialists who invaded Bijāpur, conquered some of its territories and made extensive raids on it, sacking and committing excesses. Such was the pitiable condition of

the 'Ādil Shāhī kingdom before the arrival of the emperor in the Deccan.

Convinced of the assistance that the Marāthās had been getting from Bijāpur, the emperor despatched a strong force against it under prince A'zam (1682). But he could achieve very little to his credit; he raided the frontier and occupied the fort of Dhārūr, about one hundred and forty miles north of Bijāpur fort. His feeble campaign was confined to the region north of the river Nīrā and he was recalled to court (June, 1683).

Finding it impossible to set right the bankruptcy, chronic anarchy and other troubles in the kingdom, Mas'ūd left the court in disgust in November, 1683, and sent his formal resignation from his fort of Adonī early in 1684. Āqā Khusrav, who stepped into his position, died in October of the same year. Surrounded by dangers from within and without, specially of Mughul aggression, Sikandar 'Ādil Shāh took vigorous steps for the defence of Bijāpur and entrusted this important task to his brave general and new prime minister, Sharza Khān.

Aurangzīb, who had been bent upon annexing this decadent State, wrote to 'Ādil Shāh, calling upon him "as a vassal, to supply provisions to the imperial army promptly, allow the Mughal troops a free passage through his territory, supply a contingent of 5 or 6 thousand cavalry for the emperor's war with the Marathas, abstain from helping or harbouring Shambhūji, and expel Sharza Khan from his country!"<sup>2</sup> In the meantime the Mughuls had been appropriating parts of Bijāpur kingdom and establishing their outposts in them. Mangalvide and Sāngola with their environs were occupied in May, 1684. But the emperor's grim determination to swallow the whole of this State led him to follow a more vigorous policy. Thus a serious rupture with 'Ādil Shāh seemed imminent. The latter sent a spirited reply to the emperor and acrimonious letters passed between them for some time, the interval being utilized by both the parties for their necessary preparations for the ensuing conflict. On the request of 'Ādil Shāh, Abu-'l Hasan, the Sultān of Golconda, promised to help Bijāpur and a Marāthā contingent from Shambhūjī reached it on 21 February, 1685. The Mughul siege of Bijāpur fort commenced on 1 April, 1685, and prince A'zam reached there with a large army on 14 June to take over the supreme command of the entire operation. The Bijāpur army defended their capital with all their valour and strength and whenever possible, they went out to attack the besiegers, and also succeeded in bringing provisions and reinforcements from outside. In this distress of 'Ādil Shāh

aid came to him from the Sultān of Golconda, Shambhūjī for the second time, and ex-minister Mas'ūd who had established himself as a semi-independent ruler at Adonī.

Prince A'zam proceeded close to the fort on 29 June, and within a month, he had to wage three severe battles with the Bijāpur army. For paucity of provisions a famine broke out in his camp but he continued the siege with determination in spite of his father's direction to return. The emperor then sent him all possible relief in regard to provisions, money and munitions with a strong escort under Ghāzī-ud-dīn Fīrūz Jang. But even after a siege of fifteen months, the fort could not be captured, and discord and jealousy among the officers hampered the progress of the siege-operation. Realizing the absolute necessity of his personal presence for the successful prosecution of the siege, the emperor went to the Rasūlpur suburb, west of the fort, on 3 July, 1686. The fort was closely beleaguered, and the siege was pressed in right earnest. The emperor himself worked hard in supervising the operations and infusing fresh spirit into his men.

On the other hand, the garrison was suffering badly from shortage of provisions causing the death of many men and animals. There was no possibility of succour from any quarters and the future of 'Ādil Shāhī monarchy was extremely gloomy. The garrison lost heart and it shrank to 2,000 men only. It was therefore not worth while to resist any more and Sultān Sikandar surrendered on 12 September, 1686. He left the throne of his ancestors and went to the emperor in his camp at Rasūlpur where he was well received. He was enrolled as a Mughul peer with the title of *Khān*, and an annual pension of one lakh of rupees.

Aurangzīb entered the evacuated city of Bijāpur on 19 September and erased the pictures and Shiah inscriptions on the walls of the palace and the 'Relic Shrine' (*Āsār-i-sharīf*). The kingdom was annexed to the Mughul empire and all the 'Ādil Shāhī officers were taken over into its (Mughul) service.

Sikandar was at first confined in the fort of Daulatābād and then carried with the camp of Aurangzīb as a captive. He died a premature death on 3 April, 1700.

Golconda was no less an attraction for the Mughul imperialistic design than Bijāpur. For about thirty years after the accession of Aurangzīb to the throne it enjoyed immunity from attack from the imperialists, as it "had not been so openly hostile to the empire as Bijāpur,"<sup>2a</sup> and the Mughuls were pre-occupied with the

'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom and Marāthās. But on the accession of Abu-'l Hasan, the last ruler of the Qutb Shāhī dynasty, in 1672, various factors contributed in helping the emperor's policy of aggrandizement towards this State. Abu-'l Hasan spent his time in the company of courtesans and dancing girls, and the whole administration was practically run by the Brāhman Prime Minister Mādanna and his brother Ākkanna. The predominance of the Hindu influence in the court of Golconda and its alliance with the Marāthās were highly offensive in the eyes of the emperor. Although compared with Bijāpur, Qutb Shāh paid his tributes more regularly, he was also long in arrears. The incident which hastened open rupture was the interception of his letter to his agent in the imperial camp in which he had accused the emperor for his attack on Sikandar 'Ādil Shāh "a helpless orphan", and promised to send an army of 40,000 under Khalil-ullāh Khān to the assistance of Bijāpur. Offended at this, Aurangzīb sent Shāh 'Ālam with a large army to launch an attack on Hyderābād (July, 1685), but this army was held up at Mālkhed by the Qutb Shāhī force for more than two months. In October there was a change in the situation owing to the defection of Mīr Muhammad Ibrāhīm, the commander-in-chief of Golconda, who had been bribed by the Mughuls. This defection not only disheartened his army who fled back to Hyderābād but also made the defence of the latter well-nigh impossible, and the Sultān fled post-haste to the fort of Golconda. Shāh 'Ālam took possession of Hyderābād. Feeling helpless, Qutb Shāh submitted and was pardoned by the emperor on the following conditions:—(a) the Sultān must dismiss Mādanna and Ākkanna, (b) he must cede Mālkhed and Serum to the emperor, and (c) pay one crore and twenty lakhs of rupees in settlement of previous dues and also an annual tribute of two lakhs of *hūns*.

But this peace did not last long. Qutb Shāh put off the dismissal of Mādanna and Ākkanna and at this, the discontented Muslim nobles, headed by Shaikh Minhāj and two widows of 'Abdullah Qutb Shāh, caused the murder of both of them in the streets of Golconda; their houses were plundered and the members of their families ruined.

Aurangzīb was not at all willing to allow Golconda to remain independent, however submissive it might be. On the fall of Bijāpur (12 September, 1686) he was free to resume his operations against it, and on 28 January, 1687, he reached the vicinity of Golconda. After occupying Hyderābād, the Mughul army laid regular siege to the fort of Golconda (7 February, 1687) in which the

Sultān had taken refuge. Encamped north-west of the fort, the emperor personally supervised the operations.

But the emperor's arms were paralysed, though temporarily, by bitter personal jealousies in the imperial camp. Shāh 'Ālam's softness to save Abu-'l Hasan from utter humiliation on the one hand, and his eagerness to deprive his brother A'zam of the credit of capturing Golconda on the other, led him to indulge in secret negotiations with Qutb Shāh's agents. The matter, however, leaked out and the irate father imprisoned his son with his family and confiscated his property. Moreover many Shiah's and orthodox Sunnīs as well were not in favour of this war "between Muslims." But nothing could deviate the emperor from his strong determination and he pushed on the siege in all earnestness, in spite of heavy rainfall, tempest, famine, pestilence, repeated sorties of the enemies and their incessant fire from the walls of the fort. Three mines were carried under the bastions of the fort and filled with gunpowder, but when fired, the first one was misdirected and took the life of 1,100 imperialists, the second produced the same disastrous effect, and the third, when fired, did not explode, as the enemies having discovered it, had filled it with water. The garrison defended with undaunted heroism and the investment continued without any ray of hope. The emperor issued a proclamation, annexing the Qutb Shāhī kingdom, and posted his own officers in all parts of it with a view to stopping supply of provisions or any other form of relief to the garrison. Despite this, it was not possible to attain success and at last, the imperialists took recourse to bribery. Having been seduced, 'Abdullah Pānī, surnamed Sardār Khān, an Afghān officer in the fort, opened the postern gate on 21 September, 1687, at 3 o'clock in the morning, allowing the Mughuls to enter into the fort. The only officer who opposed the imperialists was 'Abdur-Razzāq Lārī, surnamed Mustafā Khān, who had refused with scorn all the alluring offers of the emperor and fought with uncommon bravery till he was covered with seventy wounds.

Abu-'l Hasan met his fate with calmness, consoled the members of his family and then left his palace for good. He was taken by prince A'zam to the emperor who, after accusing him for his corrupt government and favouring the Brāhmans, sent him as a State-prisoner to the fortress of Daulatābād with an annual pension of 50,000 rupees. The booty acquired by the emperor at Golconda amounted to about seven crores of rupees in cash, besides other valuables like gold, silver and jewels, and the State was annexed to the Mughul empire.

Aurangzīb then took steps to conquer the unoccupied territories and forts of Bijāpur and Golconda and brought in his possession Sāgar, Adonī, Karnūl, Rāichūr, Serā, Bangalore, Bankāpur, Belgaum, Wandiwāsh and Conjeevaram in the course of a year.

According to historians like Elphinstone<sup>3</sup> and Smith<sup>4</sup> the annihilation of the Sultānates of Bijāpur and Golconda without first crushing the Marāthā power with their assistance was impolitic on the part of the emperor. They are of opinion that it "freed the Marāthā Chiefs from any fear of local rivalry" which Aurangzīb might have used profitably against the Marāthās. "But", says Sir Jadunath Sarkar, "this criticism misses the cardinal fact of Deccan politics in the 17th century. From the day when the emperor Akbar launched forth into a policy of conquest south of the Vin-dhyas to the day when Aurangzīb rode in triumph into the fallen capital of the last of the Qutb-Shahis, the Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda could never for a moment forget that the sleepless aim of the Mughal Emperor was their final extinction and the annexation of all their territories. . . . A union of hearts between Bijapur or Golkonda and the Mughal empire was a psychological impossibility."<sup>5</sup> He holds further that it would not have been possible for the two decadent Sultānates to check the Marāthās, who had organized themselves into a powerful national State, more effectively than the emperor himself could do.<sup>6</sup> The views of Sir Jadunath Sarkar reflect more correctly the real situation in the Deccan than those of Elphinstone and Smith and may be accepted in all fairness.

During the period when the emperor was seriously engaged in utilizing the full military resources of the empire against Bijāpur and Golconda, Shambhūjī did not make any well-thought-out plan to overcome the Mughul menace that hung so heavily on him and other Deccani powers.

While he was plunged into drinking and merry-making at Sangameshwar, twenty miles north-east of Ratnagiri city, without even due care for his own safety, he was surprised and captured by Muqarrab Khān, a Mughul Officer, on 1 February, 1689. His Prime Minister Kavi-Kalash and twenty-five chief followers with their wives and daughters were also taken prisoners. Dressed as buffoons, Shambhūjī and Kavi-Kalash were brought to the imperial camp at Bahādurgarh in a long procession with drums and trumpets. The emperor offered to spare the life of Shambhūjī if he would surrender his forts, let him know where he had hidden his treasures and disclose the names of the imperial officers who were

in league with him. Publicly insulted and degraded, and driven to despair, he disdainfully rejected the offer of life, abused Aurangzīb and asked for one of his “daughters to be given to him as the price of his friendship.”<sup>7</sup> After severe torture for more than three weeks, both Shambhūjī and Kavi-Kalash were put to a cruel and painful death on 11 March, 1689.

On the capture of Shambhūjī, his younger brother Rājārām was enthroned at Rāigarh on 8 February. The imperialists soon laid siege to it, but Rājārām managed to escape out of it in the guise of a hermit and went to Gingee (1 November). Rāigarh fell on 19 October, and Shivājī’s surviving widows and other members of the Marāthā royal family including Shambhūjī’s son, Shāhū, a boy of seven, were taken prisoners.

“Thus, by the end of the year 1689, Aurangzib was the unrivalled lord paramount of Northern India and the Deccan alike. Adil Shah, Qutb Shah, and Rajah Shambhuji had all fallen and their dominions had been annexed to his empire.”<sup>8</sup>

“All seemed to have been gained by Aurangzib now; but in reality all was lost. It was the beginning of his end. The saddest and most hopeless chapter of his life now opened. The Mughal empire had become too large to be ruled by one man or from one centre. . . . His enemies rose on all sides; he could defeat but not crush them for ever. Lawlessness reigned in many parts of Northern and Central India. The administration grew slack and corrupt. The endless war in the Deccan exhausted his treasury. Napoleon I used to say, ‘It was the Spanish ulcer which ruined me’. The Deccan ulcer ruined Aurangzib.”<sup>8a</sup>

The emperor’s long stay in the Deccan (for quarter of a century) with best of his officers, and his prolonged wars there with consequent drain of wealth and man-power, leaving the administration of provinces in Northern India in charge of second-rate officers with limited resources and insufficient troops, ushered in disastrous consequences for the empire. Centrifugal forces were let loose by the emperor’s long absence from the capital and the lack of a strong administration at the centre. Besides the risings in the Jāt territories, Rājasthān, Bundelkhand and Mālwa, rebellions broke out in Gondwāna, Bihār and Bengal, resulting in utter lawlessness and anarchy which ultimately sapped the foundation of the Mughul empire.

## II. NORTH INDIA

After Aurangzīb's departure to the Deccan the Mughul officers continued to be in possession of the cities and strategic places of Mārwar, but the Rāthor patriots who occupied the hills often came down to the plains, attacked the Mughul outposts, cut off their convoys, and rendered communication and cultivation almost impossible. From 1681 to 1687 it was a people's war in Mārwar carried on by the Rāthor patriots under different leaders without any central authority and common plan of action, as Ajīt Singh was a minor and Durgā Dās absent in the Deccan. Their primary aim was to wear out the imperialists by their guerilla tactics. Durgā Dās returned from the Deccan in 1687 and then conducted the operations against the imperialists. With the aid of Durjan Sāl Hārā of Būndī, the Rāthors not only obtained some brilliant successes in Mārwar, but also defeated the governor of Ajmer and raided the Mughul territories in Mewāt and the neighbourhood of Delhi. But it was not possible for them to recover Mārwar whose Mughul governor, Shujā'at Khān, maintained the imperial hold on it by arms as well as by his clever policy of paying the Rāthors *chauth* or one-fourth of the imperial custom-duties on merchandise.

The emperor was anxious to bring back Akbar's daughter Safiyat-un-nisā and son Buland Akhtar, both of whom had been left with the Rāthors by their father in 1681. After successful negotiations by Shujā'at Khān with the intermediary of the historian Iswar Dās Nāgar, Safiyat-un-nisā was delivered to her grandfather in 1696, and the emperor was delighted to learn that Durgā Dās had made necessary arrangements for her education in Islāmic theology by appointing a Muslim mistress from Ajmer. In 1698 Buland Akhtar was also delivered to his grandfather. As a result of all these, Durgā Dās was appointed a *manṣabdār* of three thousand and the commandant of Pātan in Gujarāt, and Ajīt Singh received the *parganās* of Jhālor, Sānchor and Siwānā as his *jāgīr*, with a *manṣab* in the imperial army, but did not get back his kingdom.

The last stage of the struggle lasted from 1701 to 1707, at the end of which Ajīt Singh marched in triumph to Jodhpur, the capital of Mārwar. Although a reconciliation had been made between the Mughuls and the Rāthors, as mentioned above, it did not last long as the two parties were distrustful of each other. Aurangzīb ordered the governor of Gujarāt either to arrest Durgā Dās or kill him. Alarmed at this information, the Rāthor hero rode away to Mārwar, and joining Ajīt Singh, again took up arms against the Mughuls. But they could not achieve anything to their credit and

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there were serious disagreements between Durgā Dās and his master for the imperious temper and want of tact of the latter. On the other hand, surrounded by enemies on all sides, Aurangzīb made peace with Ajīt by giving him Merta as his *jāgīr* (1704). In the following year Durgā Dās also offered his submission to the emperor who gave him back his rank and post in Gujarāt. But in 1706, taking advantage of a Marāthā invasion in Gujarāt, followed by a serious defeat of the Mughuls, Ajīt and Durgā Dās once more raised the standard of rebellion. Unable to cope with his enemies, the latter fled to the Kolī country, but Ajīt defeated Muhkam Singh of Nāgaur who had fought on behalf of the Mughuls. Receiving information of Aurangzīb's death in March, 1707, Ajīt Singh rode with his forces to Jodhpur, and defeating the Mughul army of occupation, took possession of it. The Rāthor army also recovered Sojāt, Pālī and Merta, and thus after long and sustained efforts, the valiant Rāthors succeeded in getting back their motherland from the clutches of the Mughul imperialists.

The effect of the Rājput wars of Aurangzīb was disastrous to the empire. They not only cost heavy losses of men and money but the imperialists could not also eventually achieve the desired success. "Damaging as this result was to imperial prestige, its material consequences were worse still."<sup>9</sup> It was an act of political indiscretion on the part of the emperor to provoke the two leading Rājput clans into hostility and thus lose their devoted and gallant service in the north-west frontier or in the Deccan. The examples of the Rāthors and Śisōdīas were followed by the Hārā and Gaur clans and the trouble then spread to Mālwa also, endangering the most important Mughul road through Mālwa to the Deccan.

The spirit which Gokla had infused among the Jāts did not go in vain. Capable leaders like Rājārām of Sinsanī and Rām Chehrā of Soghor stepped into his place. They trained their men in open warfare, built mud-forts in inaccessible forests and carried on plundering raids even in the suburbs of Āgra. Rājārām attacked and killed the famous Mughul commander Uighur Khān (1687). He also plundered the tomb of Akbar at Sikandra, and according to Manucci, dug out the bones of the great emperor and burnt them.<sup>10</sup> In July, 1688, while fighting for a party in an internecine war between two Rājput clans, he was killed by a Mughul musketeer fighting under the Mughul *ḡaujdar* of Mewāt who had taken up the cause of another rival party. The Jāt strongholds of Sinsanī and Soghor were then captured by the imperialists in 1690 and 1691 respectively.

Rājārām's place was occupied by his nephew Churāman who strengthened his army, and committing daring raids on the Mughuls, increased his resources. About 1704 he re-occupied Sinsanī but lost it again in October, 1705. He continued his resistance against the imperialists with great patience and courage even after the death of Aurangzīb. By uncommon tenacity and firm determination, the Jāts eventually founded a powerful kingdom of their own, viz., that of Bharatpur which the Mughuls were unable to subdue.

Another outbreak of a serious nature was led by Chhatra Sāl, the son of Champat Rāi of Orchha, in Bundelkhand. He had served as a petty captain in the Mughul army under Rājā Jay Singh and fought creditably in the Deccan. But inspired by Shivājī's example, he made up his mind to follow a similar adventurous life and carve out an independent kingdom for himself. He sought service under the Marāthā hero, but according to his advice, returned to his own country where the Hindus had been seething with discontent against Aurangzīb's religious policy of intolerance and destruction of temples, and were in need of a strong and capable leader. They received him cordially and elected him king of Bundelkhand.

He defeated the Mughuls and raided Dhāmoni and Sironj and began to realize *chauth* from the neighbouring Mughul territories. The emperor's preoccupation in the Deccan gave him an opportunity to further his designs and he captured Kālinjar and Dhāmoni. His raiding activities extended throughout Mālwa and finding it difficult to check his rebellious movements, the emperor made peace with him, appointing him a *manṣabdār* of 4,000 with a post in the Deccan. But after the death of Aurangzīb in 1707, he came back to Bundelkhand to resume his activities for the establishment of an independent kingdom.

Pahār Singh, a Gaur Rājput petty chieftain in Western Bundelkhand, raised the standard of rebellion in 1685 and plundered the villages of Mālwa. Although he was defeated and slain, the rising continued under his sons Bhagwant and Devi Singh, and then by other leaders. The hostile activities of this Gaur family were eventually stopped by granting them service under the imperial government (1692).

In Bihār, a rebellion was led by Gangā Rām Nāgar, the revenue officer of the estates of Khān Jahān, in Allahābād and Bihār, while the Khān was serving in the imperial army in the Deccan. Sacking the city of Bihār, Gangā Rām besieged Patna, but was ulti-

mately forced to leave Bihār. He then went to Mālwa and looted Sironj in October, 1684, but died soon after.

About the middle of the seventeenth century two kingdoms, Deogarh and Chāndā, came into importance in Gondwāna. Both these States had enormous wealth which roused the greed of the emperor whose religious bigotry, moreover, influenced his policy towards them. Even conversion of the Deogarh Rājā to Islām did not improve his position. At last he raised the standard of rebellion, and in alliance with the Marāthās, fought against the imperialists in 1701, and though defeated, did not submit. On the death of Aurangzīb, he was successful in extending his kingdom.

In Bengal the English East India Company rose in arms against the Mughuls. The grievances of the English included the demand by Mughul authorities of an *ad valorem* duty of 3½ per cent. on the actual merchandise imported, in lieu of the lump sum of Rs. 3,000 per annum into which it had been commuted during the viceroyalty of prince Shujā', unauthorised and illegal exactions and oppressions of the local officials. The English, unable to redress all these alleged grievances, resolved to protect themselves by force. The war broke out in October, 1686. After a few skirmishes the English left Bengal for Madras (February, 1689). Eventually, in 1690 peace was concluded between the Mughul government and the English; and at the invitation of Ibrāhīm Khān, viceroy of Bengal, Job Charnock, the new English Agent, settled at a place now known as Calcutta (24 August, 1690).

### III. THE TRIUMPH OF THE MARĀTHĀS

It is a pity that Aurangzīb could never gauge the real strength of the Marāthās, neither in the early stage of their rise nor in the subsequent stage of their growth. He had been acquainted with the uncommon audacity and daring exploits of Shivājī as far back as 1657. The Marāthā chief then raided not only the Mughul districts of Ahmadnagar and Junnār but also sacked the rich city of Junnār. He was then routed and Aurangzīb got him within his reach but did not take necessary steps to prevent his future growth. Even after his accession to the throne, Aurangzīb did not proceed to the Deccan till 1681, although, in the meantime, alarming news of the subversive activities of the Marāthā chief had reached him on many occasions. His long dependence on his officers in that faroff region against such a subtle adversary was not at all justified and Shivājī thus got ample opportunities to fulfil his cherished ambition of establishing a powerful national State. It does not also

speak well of the efficiency of the Mughul government that such an inveterate enemy of the empire could escape from the vigilance of the imperialists! It was not till the flight of prince Akbar to the court of Shambhūjī that the emperor considered it necessary to proceed to the Deccan in person. But by that time the Marāthās became too powerful to be subdued and, in spite of the execution of Shambhūjī, the Marāthās were up in arms against imperial aggression for the preservation of their national independence. Aurangzīb was slow to realize their unusual potentiality and dug his own grave, fighting against them.

In 1690 and 1691 the emperor devoted his attention chiefly towards taking possession of the southern and eastern portions of the late Bijāpur and Golconda States. But he was soon faced with the 'people's war' in Mahārāshtra. After the flight of Rājārām to the fort of Gingee, it became the centre of Marāthā activities in the east coast, while in the west, Mahārāshtra proper, resistance to the Mughuls was organized by the leaders there. In the eastern theatre of war Prahlād Nirājī was the King's supreme agent, and in the west, the Marāthā leaders were Rāmchandra N. Bāvdekar, Shankarjī Malhār and Parashurām Trimbak. Rāmchandra Bāvdekar was created dictator (*Hukūmatpanāh*) with full authority over the commanders and other officials in Mahārāshtra. Two generals of outstanding ability, Dhana Jādav and Santājī Ghorpare, conducted operations against the imperialists, moving from one theatre of war to another in the Deccan. By their guerilla tactics, they inflicted heavy losses on the Mughuls who, being unable to ascertain the movements of their enemies, were thrown into great confusion. "The difficulties of Aurangzīb", says Sir Jadunath Sarkar, "were multiplied by this disappearance of a common head and a central government among the Marāthās, because every petty Marāthā captain now fought and plundered in a different quarter on his own account. The Marāthās were no longer a tribe of banditti or local rebels, but the one dominating factor of Deccan politics, and an enemy all-pervasive throughout the Indian peninsula, elusive as the wind, the ally and rallying point of all the enemies of the Delhi empire and all disturbers of public peace and regular administration throughout the Deccan and even in Mālwa, Gondwāna and Bundelkhand. The imperialists could not be present everywhere in full strength; hence, they suffered reverses in places."<sup>11</sup>

Rājārām had been besieged in the fort of Gingee by the Mughul commander Zu-'l-Fiqār Khān in September, 1690. But the latter could not blockade this vast fort completely and hence supplies to it could not be prevented. On the other hand, the Marā-

thā bands roving around cut off the supplies of the Mughuls and harassed them in all possible manner. Finding the position intolerable, Zu-'l-Fiqār Khān gave up the siege and asked for reinforcements which reached him in December, 1691. The siege was unsuccessfully renewed in the following year, and it was abandoned on two more occasions under difficult circumstances, the imperialists having suffered awfully due to repeated attacks of the Marāthā army under Dhana and Santā. Zu-'l-Fiqār renewed the siege in earnest in November, 1697, and captured it on 8 January, 1698. Rājārām escaped and fled first to Vellore and afterwards to Vishālgarh.

But the Mughul-Marāthā war did not cease with the fall of Gingee, and it continued in the western theatre.

Despite the severe shock to the Marāthās caused by the capture and execution of Shambhūjī and flight of Rājārām to Gingee, they ere long recovered from despondency and, on 25 May, 1690, gained their first important success near Sātārā where the Mughul general Sharza Khān was captured with his family and entire camp and baggage by the joint actions of Rāmchandra, Shankarjī, Santā and Dhana. After this, Rāmchandra and Shankarjī regained the fortresses of Pratāpgarh, Rohirā, Rājgarh and Tornā in the same year and Parashurām recovered Panhālā in 1692. By surprise attacks, Santā and Dhana harassed the imperialists with a view to wearing them out as far as possible. After dividing his forces Santā sent 4,000 cavalry under Amrit Rāo to raid Berār and he himself proceeded with 6,000 cavalry towards Mālkhed, collecting *chauth*. The Marāthā roving bands were active throughout 1694 and 1695, making the position of the Mughuls very miserable. In December, 1695, Santā surprised the Mughul general Qāsīm Khān who had been directed to intercept him while carrying a rich booty to north-western Mysore. Inflicting a severe defeat upon him, the Marāthā general plundered his camp, and one-third of his army fell during the encounter or retreat. Qāsīm Khān committed suicide and the rest of his army had to give up all they possessed and promised a ransom of twenty lakhs of rupees. In January, 1696, Santā achieved another success over the Mughuls by defeating and slaying the Mughul general Himmat Khān and plundering his baggage.

But a civil war between Santā and Dhana weakened the strength of the Marāthās and gave the Mughuls a temporary respite. Both these generals were rivals for the post of the commander-in-chief (*Senāpati*). Though Santā was a general of extraordinary

capacity and dash, he was ill-tempered and insubordinate which gave great offence to Rājārām and his nobles at Gingee, the result of which was that he (Santā) was attacked by his king and Dhana near Conjeevaram (May, 1696). But Santā succeeded in defeating both of them. Unfortunately, in another battle between the two rival generals in the Sātārā district, Santā was defeated owing to the defection of most of his followers for his insolence (March, 1697). Deserted by his followers, he fled from the battlefield, but was murdered in June while taking his bath near the Mahādev hill (in the Sātārā district).

In July, 1697, the imperialists suffered great misery due to the heavy flood of the Bhīmā river which washed away their camps at Pedgāon and Islāmpurī, and except the fall of the fort of Gingee in January, 1698, nothing of importance happened in regard to Mughul-Marāthā contest for some time more. In 1699 when, after making plans for raids through Khāndesh and Berār, Rājārām marched out of the fort of Sātārā, he was intercepted four miles off Parenda by the imperialists under Bīdar Bakht, and after a sanguinary battle, was defeated and driven towards Ahmadnagar. Although the Marāthā king's raid into Khāndesh and Berār was thus nullified, one division under the leadership of Krishna Sāvant plundered certain places near Dhāmoni.

Rājārām died at Sinhgarh on 2 March, 1700, and a dispute over succession arose between Shivājī III, the son of the senior widow Tārā Bāi, and Shambhūjī II, the son of Rājas Bāi, another wife of the late King. Through the ability and influence of his mother, Shivājī III was recognized as King, but he was a minor, and the real power passed into the hands of his mother whose uncommon bravery, strength of character, power of organization, and administrative ability saved the Marāthā State from the awful crisis.

Although during the past decade the Mughuls had conquered Kalyān and some other places in the northern Konkan, they could not achieve as much success as they should have gained in view of internal dissensions in the Marāthā State. Aurangzīb could not see any end of his war in Mahārāshtra, and so, in May, 1695, he sent his son Shāh 'Ālam to northern India to take over charge of the Punjab, Sind and Afghānistān, while he established his own headquarters at Brahmapurī in the heart of the Marāthā country for more vigorous operations against the enemies. But even then he was unable to attain the desired result. By their guerilla tactics the Marāthās made the life of the Mughuls extremely miserable and forced them to be on the defensive in Mahārāshtra and

Kannāḍa. Unable to follow the rapid movements of the enemies, the imperialists became bewildered and terror-stricken. Many Mughul officers were compelled to agree to pay *chauth* to the Marāthās, while some others entered into private understanding with them for sharing the plunder of the imperial territories. Sir Jadunath Sarkar correctly depicts the Mughul position when he says, "The Mughul administration had really dissolved and only the presence of the emperor held it together, but merely as a phantom rule."<sup>12</sup>

In these circumstances Aurangzīb decided to besiege and capture the Marāthā forts in person, one after another, but this policy also did not succeed, as when he occupied one fort, another went out of his possession, and this continued till the rest of his life, undoing his labours and huge expenditure of money and loss of lives. "His soldiers and camp-followers suffered unspeakable hardship in marching over flooded rivers, muddy roads and broken hilly tracks; porters disappeared, transport beasts died of hunger and overwork, scarcity of grain was ever present in the camp and the Marāthā and Berad 'thieves' (as he officially called them) not far off. The mutual jealousies of his generals ruined his cause or delayed his success."<sup>13</sup> Five years and a half (1699-1705) he spent in besieging the eight Marāthā forts, Sātārā, Parlī, Panhālā, Khelnā (Vishālgarh), Kondhānā (Sinharh), Rājgarh, Tornā, Wāgingerā, and five other places of less importance.

After making necessary arrangements for fighting the Marāthā roving bands, he proceeded to Sātārā, capturing Basantgarh on the way. The fort of Sātārā fell on 21 April, 1700. After this, Parlī and Panhālā were captured by bribery in June, 1700, and May, 1701, respectively. Khelnā (Vishālgarh) and Kondhānā (Sinharh) were also captured, not by arms but by gold, and they fell in June, 1702, and April, 1703, respectively. Rājgarh, Tornā and Wāgingerā were taken possession of between 16 February, 1704, and 27 April, 1705.

The long and continuous hard labour of the emperor even in the ripe old age was too much for him to bear and he fell very ill while encamped at Devapur, on the bank of the Krishnā, after the capture of Wāgingerā. But he recovered from this illness, and proceeded slowly to Ahmadnagar, arriving there on 21 January, 1706.

His long warfare in the Deccan for a quarter of a century resulted in utter desolation of the country and caused indescribable misery to the people. Manucci, an eye-witness, says, "Aurang-

zīb withdrew to Ahmadnagar, leaving behind him the fields of these provinces devoid of trees and bare of crops, their places being taken by the bones of men and beasts. Instead of verdure all is black and barren. There have died in his armies over a hundred thousand souls yearly, and of animals, pack-oxen, camels, elephants, etc., over three hundred thousand. In the Deccan provinces from 1702 to 1704 plague (and famine) prevailed. In these two years there expired over two millions of souls."<sup>14</sup>

The Marāthās followed the emperor during his journey to Ahmadnagar, attacking his men from the rear and cutting off their food supplies. By this time they became very powerful and were no longer a band of plundering light horsemen; they were equipped with artillery, musketry and other necessaries of a regular army like the Mughuls. They succeeded in establishing their mastery not only over nearly the whole of the Deccan but also in some places of Central India. Unable to cope with them, the imperialists were forced to be on the defensive. In 1706 the Marāthās raided Gujarāt and plundered Barodā which was then a rich trading centre. Even the emperor's camp at Ahmadnagar was not immune from attack, and it was besieged in May, 1706, when they were driven back with great difficulty. The province of Aurangābād was ravaged on many occasions, and a large Mughul convoy was plundered on the way from Aurangābād to Ahmadnagar; Dhana attacked Berār and Khāndesh. Thus the long and continuous endeavours of the emperor to crush the Marāthās proved futile and Marāthā nationalism flourished with all its vitality as a triumphant force. In the midst of these confusions and disorders, suffering from bereavements due to the death of two beloved daughters, one daughter-in-law, one sister and two nephews, and deep anxieties for the gloomy future of the empire, specially because of an apprehended civil war among his sons, Aurangzīb breathed his last in his nineteenth year at Ahmadnagar in the morning of 3 March, 1707 (Friday).

He was interred near the tomb of saint Shaikh Zain-ul-Haqq at Khuldābād, four miles west of Daulatābād.

#### IV. GENERAL REVIEW

##### 1. *The Empire*

Before the death of the emperor in 1707, the Mughul empire consisted of twenty-one provinces or *sūbas*, of which one was Kābul, fourteen were situated in northern India and six in the Deccan. The provinces in northern India were Āgra, Ajmer, Allāhabād,

Awadh, Bengal, Bihār, Delhi, Gujarāt, Kāshmīr, Lahore, Multān, Tatta (Sind), Mālwa, Orissa; and those in the Deccan were Berār, Khāndesh, Aurangābād, Bīdar or Telingāna, Bijāpur and Hyderābād. The empire extended from Kābul and Kāshmīr on the north-west to Chittagong and the Monās river (west of Gauhāti) on the north-east; on the west coast, it extended to the northern frontier of Goa and on the south, its boundary stretched to the Coleroon river (north of Tanjore), but the emperor's authority was disputed in Mahārāshtra, Kannada, Mysore and eastern Karnātika. Excluding Kābul (Afghānistān) the land revenue of the empire about 1690 was nearly thirty-three crores and forty five lakhs of rupees. Other important sources of income to the government were *zakāt* (tithe from the Muslims), *jizya* (poll-tax from the Hindus), customs duty, salt tax and spoils from war. Aurangzīb was a believer in the Islāmic theory of taxation and hence remitted those taxes which were not sanctioned by the Islāmic law. The imposition of the *jizya* on the Hindus compensated to a certain extent the loss of revenue on account of the abolition of many illegal taxes and *abwābs*.

The volume of foreign trade of the Mughul empire was too inconsiderable to form an important factor in its economy. The principal exports from India were common cotton cloth (called calicoes), plain or printed, muslin or very fine cotton fabrics, silk, indigo, saltpetre and pepper. Small quantities of white sugar from Hooghly and slaves from Bengal and Madras were also exported. Besides, towards the end of the seventeenth century "silk taffetas and brocades began to be exported in large quantities, and a distinct improvement in the dyeing and weaving of silk was effected in Bengal by the English Company."<sup>15</sup> The main imports into the country were silver and gold (in specie), copper, lead, high-class woollen clothing from Europe (specially France), glass-ware, spices, viz., cloves, nutmegs, cinnamon and cardamom from the Dutch Indies, superior variety of tobacco from America, horses from Persia and Khurāsān, slaves from Abyssinia and wine and curiosities from Europe. Besides, fresh and dried fruits from Central Asia and Persia, musk and porcelain from China, pearls from Bahrein (Persian Gulf) and Ceylon, and elephants from Pegu and Ceylon were also imported into this country. But, on the whole, the total volume of import trade was small and the government income from import duty was about thirty lakhs of rupees only per annum. Indian economy was basically self-sufficient and India had a favourable balance of trade. Whatever was imported was paid for by export of cotton goods supplemented by a small variety of raw produce. The traders had

to import precious metals into India to pay for commodities exported from India.

## 2. *Personality of Aurangzīb*

Aurangzīb was a man of small stature with olive-coloured skin and a large nose. In his old age he had white round beard. He led a very simple, well-ordered and pious life, slept little and worked so hard even in his extreme old age that it was a wonder to his contemporaries. He held daily courts, sometimes twice a day, besides wednesday trials, and worked to the minute details, even personally writing orders on letters and petitions and dictating official replies. The Italian physician, Gemelli Careri, who came to India during his reign and saw him in 1695, "admired to see him endorse the petitions [of those who had business] with his own hand, without spectacles, and by his cheerful smiling countenance seem to be pleased with the employment."<sup>16</sup>

He had a wonderful memory and retained almost all his faculties intact to the end of his life, except slight shortage in hearing and lameness of the right leg due to an accidental dislocation in October 1700, and unskilful treatment of the doctor.

He was an expert calligraphist, had a passion for reading books and maintained his studious habit till the last day of his life, utilizing the meagre leisure that he could get in the midst of his extremely busy official duties. He was not only a master of Arabic and Persian but could also speak Turkī and Hindī fluently. "His extensive correspondence proves his mastery of Persian poetry and Arabic sacred literature, as he is ever ready with apt quotations for embellishing almost every one of his letters. . . . To his initiative and patronage we owe the greatest digest of Muslim law made in India, which rightly bears his name,—the *Fatawa-i-Alamgiri* and which simplified and defined Islamic justice in India even after.

"Besides book-learning, Aurangzib had from his boyhood cultivated control of speech and action, and tact in dealing with others. As a prince, his tact, sagacity and humility made the highest nobles of his father's Court his friends; and as Emperor he displayed the same qualities in a degree which would have been remarkable even in a subject."<sup>17</sup>

He was free from the habit of drinking wine, and other habitual vices of his contemporaries. The number of his wives was within the Qurā'nic limit of four; of them Dilras Bānu and Aurangābādī Mahal died in 1657 and 1685, respectively; Nawāb Bāi led a

retired life at Delhi after 1660, and Udaipurī was his only companion after the death of Aurangābādī in 1685. He was ever faithful to his conjugal love, and weakness for women never tarnished his name. He was a devout Muslim and followed all the precepts and observances of his religion with sincerity and strictness. His stern and austere mode of living according to the injunctions of Islām was highly admired by his co-religionists who looked upon him as *zinda pīr* or living saint.

But the way in which he secured the throne is hard to defend. It is true that, possessed of financial and military resources, and in the absence of the law of primogeniture, the Mughul princes were generally eager to establish their claim to the throne by the trial of strength, and instances of cruelties to vanquished claimants are not wanting; but such precedents do not in any way exonerate Aurangzīb from severe condemnation for his treatment to his brothers and father. Only this much may be said in his favour that he did not kill his father, instances of which, though rare, are not altogether wanting in history.

He possessed uncommon physical strength and unusual bravery, of which he gave proof even at the age of fifteen when he faced a furious elephant alone. Added to these, he had dogged tenacity, coolness of temper, presence of mind, rapidity of movement and a calculating spirit which are so necessary for an efficient general, and these gave him success in the battles against his brothers. He braved all risks with a cheerful mind and coolness of temper, and encouraged his men even in the midst of thickest dangers. When, on the night previous to the battle of Khajuhā, Jasvant Singh deserted him with his Rājput followers, committing depredations, he received the information with coolness, and without the least excitement, took steps to maintain his own position and prevent confusion spreading among the rest of his army. In the thickness of fight next day he extricated himself and his men from critical situations with his unusual coolness of temper and eventually came out successful.

As an expert strategist, he took advantage of any opportunity which he could get out of the mistakes and weaknesses of his adversaries. He did not also hesitate to take recourse to stratagem and political cunning to serve his own end, as was found during the Rāthor-Śisōdiā alliance with his rebellious son Akbar. By a false letter to the latter and contriving to let it fall into the hands of the Rājputs, he turned the whole table against his enemies. He was a skilful diplomat whose subtle activities were too much for

his enemies to cope with. A man of inflexible determination, he used to cling to his object with extraordinary patience till his endeavours were crowned with success.

An indefatigable worker like him never felt satisfied without personally accomplishing the duties of the State even to the minute details as best as he could, according to his own ideas and likings, with the least dependence on others. But in doing so, he forgot the limitations of his own capacity for work and such a spirit moreover engendered in him too much of self-confidence and suspicion of others, even of his own sons. The inevitable result of this suspicious nature was over-centralization of power and excessive interference by the emperor which destroyed the initiative and sense of responsibility of his ministers and other high officers, and reduced them to the position of clerks, merely to register his will and follow his dictates. As a natural consequence, deterioration in efficiency of administration crept in, specially with his growing old age.

He retained the military character of his government from the beginning to the end, and did not chalk out any well-planned programme either for the social and economic welfare of his subjects or for their cultural regeneration by the advancement of learning and development of arts, such as music, painting and architecture. He ought to have realized that such an empire resting on mere physical force cannot last long, and signs of its decay and dismemberment were visible even during his lifetime.

As a tool of the orthodox reform movement, and obsessed by a narrow conception without due consideration for the welfare and stability of the empire consisting of men of diverse castes, creeds and religions, he adhered to the policy detrimental to it, paving the way for its downfall. He cannot be called a benevolent despot as he had no solicitude for the well-being of all his subjects, irrespective of caste, creed or religion. In utter disregard of the interests of the overwhelming majority, he performed his duties in a way which showed that, as an emperor, his main consideration was for the Sunnī Muslims only. Such discriminatory policy proved fatal to the empire. He never understood "the eternal truth that there cannot be a great or lasting empire without a great *people*, that no people can be great unless it learns to form a compact *nation* with equal rights and opportunities for all."<sup>18</sup>

"In spite of his untiring labours", says Dr. Yasin, "Aurangzib was a colossal failure and we find that during his time people were neither good men nor good Muslims; he being the only good Musalmān but a bad ruler of a state of composite races, creeds and cultures.

Aurangzib's recipe might be excellent from the view-point of a Mujaddid; but it killed the patient nevertheless. In striving after the substance of Islam, Aurangzib reduced the Muslim empire to a shadow before he breathed his last leaving a legacy of communal bitterness to posterity."<sup>19</sup>

Aurangzib was not a political genius and lacked the qualities of a true statesman who could initiate a policy and enact laws for moulding the life and thought of his contemporaries as well as of future generations. He could realize the futility of his work before his death and, full of remorse, he wrote to prince A'zam: "The days that have been spent except in austerities have left only regret behind them. I have not at all done any (true) government of the realm or cherishing of the peasantry.

"Life, so valuable, has gone away for nothing."<sup>20</sup>

### 3. *India at the end of Aurangzib's reign*

Taking a broad view of the state of things at the death of Aurangzib, with which the period dealt with in this volume comes to an end, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in spite of brilliant qualities of head and heart which enabled that emperor to extend the Mughul empire over the whole of Deccan and South India, the grave defects of his character are mainly responsible for the sudden collapse of the mighty empire which then included nearly the whole of India and Afghānistān. Like waves in the ocean the Mughul empire reached the highest point only to break down, and Aurangzib must share both the credit and discredit for the same, at least to a very large extent. But it was not merely the fall of an empire but also the end of an epoch which ushered in a period of decline and distress after a century of peace and prosperity—generally speaking—"under the strong and wise government" of three generations of emperors before Aurangzib. Peace and security—"the sole justification of the Mughul empire"—no longer existed in India at the time of Aurangzib's death. Political unrest and insecure roads ruined agriculture, trade and industry in a large part of the country. "The financial exhaustion of the empire in these endless wars left Government and private owners alike too poor to repair buildings and roads worn out by the lapse of time." "The labouring population suffered not only from violent capture, forced labour, and starvation, but also from epidemics which were very frequent during these campaigns." "The starving and exasperated peasantry took to highway robbery as the only means of living." "Trade almost ceased in the Deccan during the unhappy

quarter of a century.” When Aurangzib retired from his last campaign in the Deccan in 1705 “the country presented a scene of utter desolation”, of which a vivid picture has been drawn by two eye witnesses, the foreign traveller Manucci, a passage from whose writings has been quoted above, and Bhimsen. Arts and crafts could flourish only in the walled cities, and in some regions, both in Deccan and South India, “village industries and industrial classes together died out.” Even the provinces in North India, where peace prevailed, in Bengal for example, the absence of a strong central Government gave a golden opportunity to the Provincial Governors to make their fortune by fleecing the traders, merchants and craftsmen in various ways, and few of them failed to make good use of it. The sad picture, of which this is merely an outline, has been brilliantly drawn by the greatest Indian historian, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, in the last two chapters of his monumental work, the *History of Aurangzib*, in five volumes. The readers may form from them a fair idea of the state of things in India in the year 1707 with which this volume closes.<sup>21</sup>

1. J. N. Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzib*, p. 279.
2. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. IV (1930), p. 368.
- 2a. *Ibid*, p. 405.
3. Mountstuart Elphinstone, *The History of India* (6th Edition), p. 649.
4. V. A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India* (3rd Edition), p. 421.
5. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. IV, pp. 5-6.
6. *Ibid*, pp. 6-7.
7. *Ibid*, p. 479.
8. *Ibid*, p. 484.
- 8a. J. N. Sarkar, *Studies in Mughal India*, p. 50.
9. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p. 424.
10. *Storia do Mogor*, N. Manucci, translated by W. Irvine, II. 320.
11. *CHI*, IV, p. 290.
12. *Ibid*, p. 296.
13. *Ibid*.
14. Quoted in *CHI*, IV, p. 300.
15. J. N. Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzib*, p. 458.
16. *Churchill's Voyages*, IV, 222.
17. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. V, (1924), p. 475.
18. *Ibid*, p. 495.
19. Mohammad Yasin, *A Social History of Islamic India*, p. 171.
20. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. V, p. 259.
21. The Editor is responsible for this para which is based on Chapter LXII of the last volume of the *History of Aurangzib* by Jadunath Sarkar. The passages within quotation marks are from pp. 440-45. For the account of Manucci, cf. *Storia do Mogor*, Vol. IV, p. 252. Two passages from the Persian work, *Nushka-i-Dilkushā* by Bhimsen are quoted in *CHI*, Vol. IV, p. 300.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE SIKHS

#### I. *The Muslim Oppression in the Punjab at the time of Nānak*

Reference has been made above<sup>1</sup> to the religious doctrines preached by Nānak (1469-1538) and other medieval saints like Chaitanya, his contemporary, and Kabīr whom he acknowledged as his spiritual guide. All of them founded separate religious sects which flourish even today. But there is one fact of great significance which distinguishes the followers of Nānak from those of the other two. These latter have all along been members of purely religious sects, but the political and military achievements of the Sikhs, as the followers of Nānak are called, have largely overshadowed their religious outlook and spiritual character. The latter aspect, namely the religious evolution of Sikhism which took place under Nānak and the Gurūs who succeeded him as the leader, will be discussed in the Chapter on religion, while the rise and growth of the political and military power of the Sikhs under the same Gurūs form the subject-matter of this Chapter.

Broadly speaking, the political-cum-military power of the Sikhs may be regarded as a reaction against the intolerance and bigotry of the Muslim rulers leading to the oppression of the Hindus.<sup>2</sup> As such, this requires a little elaboration, with special reference to the Punjab.

The Muslims of Central Asia had been invading and ruling over the Punjab, the homeland of the Sikhs, for nearly five hundred years before the foundation of Sikhism. The Punjab suffered the most as all the foreign invading hordes passed through it to the rich plains of the Gaṅgā or to the south. Nearly seventy Muslim invasions<sup>3</sup> had taken place during five hundred years preceding Nānak. The lot of the Hindus during this long period was one of great misery and suffering. Forcible conversion, destruction of Hindu temples, imposition of taxes like the *jizya* and pilgrimage tax upon the Hindus, and restrictions upon the building of new temples and repairing old ones were only some of the disabilities under which the Hindus were groaning. "Throughout the journey from the coast to Fatehpur, for instance, the Fathers found that the Hindu temples had been destroyed by the Mohammedans."<sup>4</sup>

As a rule, Hindus were not given generally any post of responsibility in civil and military administration. They could be employ-

ed only in the lowest posts in the revenue department, because they were familiar with the intricacies of local record-keeping. Hindus were called *Kāfirs* or infidels. At times, restrictions were imposed upon them in the matters of diet, dress and transport, so that they could easily be distinguished from Muslims and could be treated according to their inferior status. They were required to put marks on their foreheads or clothes. Even during the reign of Akbar, Husain Khān, Governor of Lahore, had decreed that "the Hindus should stick patches of different colours on their shoulders, or on the bottom of their sleeves, so that no Muslim might be put to indignity of showing them honour by mistake. Nor did he allow Hindus to saddle their horses but insisted that they use packsaddles when riding."<sup>5</sup> In general, Hindus could not wear rich clothes and ride on fine horses. In Dera Ghazi Khan district a Hindu could ride only on a donkey.

Nānak was twenty years old when Sikandar Lodī (1489-1517) ascended the throne. Even as a prince, Sikandar wished to prohibit the Hindus from bathing in the sacred tank of Thāneswar.<sup>6</sup> As a king, he broke into pieces the idols of the temples of Jwālāmukhi and Kāngra and gave them to butchers to be used as weights. He forbade Hindus from bathing at the *ghāts* on the Yamunā. Barbers were ordered not to shave Hindus. Hindu temples were destroyed on a large scale and Hindus were forcibly converted to Islām. Justice was publicly denied to them. Law of blasphemy was strictly enforced, and for any criticism of Islām capital punishment was inflicted. Bodhan, a Brāhmin, was executed by Sikandar Lodī for saying that Hinduism was as good as Islām.<sup>7</sup> Bribery and corruption were rampant. Nānak observed: "Justice hath taken wings and fled."<sup>8</sup> "This age is like a drawn sword, the Kings are butchers; goodness has taken wings and flown."<sup>9</sup> "There is no one who receiveth or giveth not bribes; the King administers justice only when his palm has been greased (filled)."<sup>10</sup>

Gurū Nānak was also an eye-witness to the treatment meted out to the people by Bābur when he invaded India in 1521. Nānak was at Sayyidpur, now called Eminabad, 80 kilometres from Lahore, in the Gujranwala District. Bābur ordered a general massacre of the people and thousands of persons were taken prisoners. The barbarous treatment of prisoners, in the camp, particularly of women, broke the tender heart of Nānak. In his agony he even took God to task. He said:

"Thou, O Creator of all things,  
Takest to Thyself no blame;

Thou hast sent Yama disguised as the great Moghal, Babar.  
 Terrible was the slaughter,  
 Loud were the cries of the lamenters.  
 Did this not awaken pity in Thee, O Lord?  
 Thou art part and parcel of all things equally, O Creator:  
 Thou must feel for all men and all nations.  
 If a strong man attacketh who is equally strong,  
 Where is the grief in this, or whose is the grievance?  
 But when a fierce tiger preys on the helpless cattle,  
 The Herdsman must answer for it."<sup>11</sup>

Bābur exempted Muslims from the payment of stamp duties which Hindus alone paid.<sup>12</sup> His officers demolished Hindu temples and constructed mosques in their places at Sambhal,<sup>13</sup> Chanderi and Ayodhyā, and broke to pieces Jain idols at Urva near Gwālior.<sup>14</sup>

## II. *Martyrdom of Gurū Arjun*

During the pontificate of the third Gurū, Amar Dās (1552-74), the Sikhs had to suffer a great deal of annoyance and oppression from the local Muslim population. But though urged by his disciples to stand up against the tyranny, the Gurū refused, saying, "it is not proper for saints to take revenge." The liberal-minded Akbar was very sympathetic to the Sikhs, but far different was the attitude of his successors. It has already been related how the fifth Gurū, Arjun (1581-1606),<sup>15</sup> was executed by Jahāngīr for helping his rebellious son Khusrav with money. This event proved to be the turning point in the attitude of the Sikh Gurūs towards the Muslim rulers. They resolved not to submit meekly to their oppressions but to defend their rights by arms, and thus began the process of transformation of the Sikhs into a military power. In view of this, the whole incident must be described in some detail, even at the risk of some repetition,<sup>16</sup> with special reference to the attitude of Jahāngīr towards the Sikhs.

Khusrav had already met Gurū Arjun in the company of his grandfather, Akbar, and when after the unsuccessful rebellion against his father, Jahāngīr, he fled to the Punjab, he waited on Gurū Arjun at Taran Tāran. The interview is thus described in the autobiography of Jahāngīr:

"In these days when Khusrav passed along this road, this foolishly insignificant fellow (Arjun) proposed to wait upon him. Khusrav happened to halt at the place where he lived. He came and met him. He discussed several matters with him and made on

his forehead a finger-mark in saffron, which in the terms of Hindus is called *Qashqa* and is considered propitious."<sup>17</sup>

Applying the *tilak* implied only honourable reception and not blessing the Prince with sovereignty. Mohsin Fani says that the Gurū offered prayers for the Prince.<sup>18</sup> The prayer indicated a wish for the safety of the individual, as the Prince was on his journey, and not for his cause. The Gurū was an embodiment of moral virtues and could not bless a son in rebellion against his father. He could not forget the case of his own elder brother who had revolted against his father. The Gurū could never contemplate involving himself in the struggle for the throne. This was a political matter and the Gurū had nothing to do with it.<sup>18a</sup>

The Prince then begged the Gurū to help him with money. Gurū Arjun replied that his money was meant for the poor and not for princes. Khusrav humbly pleaded that he was also very poor, needy, forlorn and in distress, and did not possess even travelling expenses for his proposed flight to Kābul. The Gurū was moved at the Prince's sad plight, humility and the dangerous state he was in, being hotly pursued by the Mughul army and the emperor himself. According to Macauliffe, Khusrav was provided with a few thousand rupees. Beni Prasad in his *History of Jahangir*<sup>19</sup> puts this amount at Rs. 5,000/-.

After the capture of Khusrav, Jahāngīr wreaked his vengeance on his supporters and followers. The list of Khusrav's supporters submitted to Jahāngīr contained the name of Gurū Arjun. According to the Sikh tradition, the emperor's wrath was aroused by Diwān Chandu Shāh whose offer for the marriage of his daughter with the Gurū's son, Har Govind, had been earlier turned down. This might be one of the factors. Jahāngīr himself was opposed to Gurū Arjun, possibly because of his manner of living and the deepest devotion of his disciples. He writes in his Memoir:

"A Hindu named Arjun lived at Govindwal on the bank of river Beas in the garb of a saint and in ostentation. As a result many of the simple-minded Hindus as well as ignorant and foolish Muslims had been persuaded to adopt his way of living and he had raised aloft the standard of sainthood and holiness. He was called Gurū. From all sides cowboys and idiots became his fast followers. This business had flourished for three or four generations. For a long time it had been in my mind to put a stop to this vain affair (*dukan-e-batīl*) or to bring him into the fold of Islam."<sup>20</sup>

Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1546-1624), the head of the Naqshbandi order, was extremely jealous of Gurū Arjun's popularity and power. He greatly incited Jahāngīr, when he halted at Sirhind in pursuit of Khusrav, against the Gurū.<sup>21</sup>

Gurū Arjun was summoned to Lahore, fined two lakhs of rupees and ordered to efface certain verses in the *Ādi Granth*. The Gurū declined to do either. Jahāngīr writes: "I ordered that he should be summoned. His residences, camps and sons were given over to Murtazā Khān. His property and cash were confiscated. I issued instructions that he should be put to death by torture."<sup>22</sup> Mohsin Fani, who was born only nine years later, in 1615 A.D., writes that Gurū Arjun was tied in the burning sun over hot sand and was tortured.<sup>23</sup> The severest heat of May overhead, hot sand under him and boiling water thrown on his naked body caused blisters all over. On 30 May, 1606, he took leave to bathe in the cold water of the Ravi flowing just below the Fort where he was kept a prisoner. Reciting his own composition, *Sukhmani*, and repeating God's Name, he had a dip, but being exhausted and famished, he collapsed in water. He was only 42 years old then.

The Sikh tradition considers it an act of religious persecution only. It is true that the Sikhs at this time formed only a religious society. They had no political consciousness. So the question of having any political aspirations does not arise. The authority of the Mughul emperors was fully accepted and implicitly obeyed. The Sikh allegiance to the State was complete. Akbar's patronage to the Sikh Gurūs was highly appreciated and their loyalty to the Mughul empire was firm. It is also a fact that Jahāngīr was biased against the Sikh religion. In spite of this, in matters religious, he held, on the whole, liberal views. If Gurū Arjun had not embroiled himself in the Khusrav affair, it appears likely that the emperor would not have taken any notice of the Sikh movement. He did not persecute the Sikhs. Beni Prasad in his *History of Jahangir* declares it a political execution.<sup>23a</sup>

Sir Jadunath Sarkar writes: "Arjun in a weak moment blessed the banners of Khusrau, the rival of Jahangir for the Mughal throne, and even gave money help to that prince. On the defeat of the pretender, Jahangir fined the Gurū two lakhs of rupees for his disloyalty to the king *de jure*. The Gurū refused to pay the fine and stoically endured imprisonment and torture which were the usual punishments of revenue defaulters in those days. Worn out by being forced to sit in the burning sand of Lahore, he died in June 1606."<sup>24</sup>

III. *Gurū Har Govind (1606-1644)*

But whatever view we might take of Jahāngīr's motive and action, the martyrdom of Gurū Arjun had a profound effect on the future history of the Sikhs. His son and successor, Har Govind, a lad of eleven years, received his father's last injunction: "Let him sit fully armed on his throne and maintain an army to the best of his ability." Har Govind immediately hung by his sides two swords signifying *Piri* and *Miri*. One symbolised spiritual power and the other temporal. He told a follower: "In the guru's house religion and worldly enjoyment shall be combined." "My seli (rosary) shall be a sword-belt and I shall wear my turban with a royal aigrette," he declared.<sup>25</sup> He armed and drilled some of his sturdy disciples, and, in due course, from an inherited bodyguard of 52 soldiers came to possess a stable of seven hundred horses, three hundred horsemen and sixty gunners (Topchi).<sup>26</sup> He sanctioned and encouraged the use of meat and took to hunting.<sup>27</sup> He was a fine hunter, for he understood the ways of the beasts of the forest. He loved to chase and stalk wild boar. He excelled in hunting deer. Directly the affairs of the community were over, he would mount his charger and go into a dense jungle. At nightfall he would return home with the carcasses of the animals he had killed. These he caused to be distributed among his disciples and the poor people living near his place.

The young Gurū preferred gifts of arms and horses. He built a fort at Amritsar, called Lohgarh, or the steel fortress. In front of Hari Mandir, in 1609, he constructed *Akāl Takht* or God's throne. There he sat on a throne in princely attire, administered justice like a king in court and accepted presents. He narrated stories of deathless bravery, while some professional bards sang ballads of unrivalled heroism, especially of Rājput chivalry. The tales of the valour of Jaimal and Patta of Chitor being of recent origin, were sung with zeal and zest.

This was the beginning of militarism or the transformation of Sikhism. To the symbols of sainthood was added the paraphernalia of sovereignty including the umbrella and the crest. With meditation and preaching were included riding, wrestling and hunting. "The genial disposition of the martial apostle," says Cunningham, "led him to rejoice in the companionship of a camp, in the dangers of war, and in the excitements of the chase."<sup>28</sup> The Gurū created a government of his own like that of the Mughuls. All his disciples formed a separate and independent entity, and had nothing to do with the agencies of the Government of the day. Thus, the Sikhs

came to occupy a kind of a separate State within the Mughul State, the position of which was securely established by the fiscal policy of Gurū Amar Dās and Gurū Arjun and his own armed system.

Har Govind established congregational prayers which not only added to the religious fervour of the Sikhs, but also strengthened the spirit of amity and cooperation among them. According to Mohsin Fani, when a Sikh wished for God's favour or gift, he would come to an assembly of the Sikhs and request them to pray for him. Even the Gurū himself asked the Sikh congregation (*Sangat* or *Anjuman-e-Sikhan*) to pray for him.<sup>29</sup>

The royal style and warlike activities of the Gurū once more aroused the anger of Jahāngīr. Mohsin Fani writes: "He (Har Govind) had to contend with difficulties. One of them was that he had adopted the soldierly life, wore a sword against the practice of his father, kept a retinue, and took to hunting. The Emperor demanded the balance of the fine which he had imposed on Arjun Mal. He sent Har Govind to Gwalior and kept him there for twelve years. Even saltish food was not allowed to him. During that period Sikhs and *Masands* used to go there and pay homage below the walls of the fort. At last the Emperor graciously set him free."<sup>30</sup> This legend of twelve years' period of the Gurū's captivity is not accepted by some writers on the ground that six children were born to him by his three wives in 1613, 1615, 1617, 1618, 1619 and 1621.<sup>31</sup> They hold the view that though he was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment, he was set free after three years in 1612. His fellow-prisoner in the Gwālīor fort, the Raja of Kahlur (Bilaspur), had offered shelter to the Gurū's family in his State. Har Govind's disciples selected a site between the Siwalik Hills and river Sutlej and named it Kirātpur. Here they constructed some buildings, and it was to this place that the Gurū returned immediately after his battles with the Mughuls.

During his captivity Gurū Har Govind had learnt some elementary lessons in the art of diplomacy from his fellow prisoners, all of whom belonged to high aristocratic families. After his release in 1621, therefore, we find Har Govind playing the role of a friendly collaborator of Jahāngīr. Mohsin Fani says: "Hargovind was always attached to the stirrup of the victorious Jahāngīr."<sup>32</sup> It is surmised that the Gurū was invested with some sort of supervisory powers by the emperor over the Punjab affairs and was given command of a Mughul contingent consisting of 400 horse, 1,000 foot and 7 guns. In addition to this, Har Govind's personal contingent swelled considerably. Pathān mercenaries from the north-west

under their leader Paindā Khān joined the Gurū's banners in large number. There seems to be no doubt that Jahāngīr would have conferred upon Har Govind a high *Manṣabdārī* rank, but the Gurū could not accept it owing to his position as the religious leader of a great community. Gurū Har Govind accompanied the emperor in his visit to Kāshmīr. While returning *via* Rajauri, Jahāngīr died in 1627. According to Mohsin Fani, Har Govind offered his allegiance to the new Emperor, Shāh Jahān, and was allowed to return to Amritsar.<sup>33</sup>

Shāh Jahān was an orthodox Muslim. In 1632, while returning from Kāshmīr, he found that some Hindus of Rajauri, Bhimbar and Gujarāt accepted Muslim girls as wives and converted them to their own faith. The emperor stopped such marriages and Muslim women, already married, were seized from their husbands who were fined and, in certain cases, even executed. They could retain their wives only on their embracing Islām. As many as 4,500 such women were recovered. In 1635, it was reported to the emperor that a Muslim girl, Zinab, had been converted, given the new name of Gangā and was taken as a wife by Dalpat, a Hindu of Sirhind. The woman, along with her seven children—one son and six daughters—was taken away and the man was executed.<sup>34</sup> Kaulan, a daughter of the *qāzī* of Lahore, had also run away from home, embraced Sikhism and taken shelter with Gurū Har Govind, who immortalised her by constructing a new tank at Amritsar named after her, Kaulsar.

The Sikh Gurūs alone had provided leadership to the down-trodden Hindus of the Punjab. Such men as had suffered for having converted wives looked up to Har Govind for guidance and support, and he was not a man to shirk his duty and responsibility. The Gurū decided to defy the emperor's authority, and an opportunity soon offered itself. About 1634 Shāh Jahān was busy hunting in the jungles of Jallo lying between Lahore and Amritsar. Gurū Har Govind was also hunting there. According to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, "...the guru entered the same area in pursuit of a game, and his Sikhs quarrelled with the servants of the imperial hunt about a bird. The two parties came to blows, and in the end the imperialists were beaten off with slaughter."<sup>35</sup>

Shāh Jahān was not going to tolerate such an effrontery, and regarded it as an act of rebellion. Har Govind's supervisory office was taken away and the Mughul contingent was called back. "An army was sent against the audacious rebel, but it was routed with heavy loss, at Sangrana, near Amritsar, 1628."<sup>36</sup> Under emperor's orders "larger and larger armies were sent against the guru."<sup>37</sup> The Gurū

“gained some success at first.”<sup>38</sup> About this time the Gurū was to celebrate the marriage of his daughter. Enormous quantities of sweets were prepared on this occasion. Just then a Mughul force attacked him. After a sharp scuffle the Gurū retired to Jhabāl, eight miles south-west of Amritsar, where he performed the nuptial ceremony in haste on the fixed day of the marriage. The Mughuls fell on the sweets like a bird of prey. When they were surfeited, Gurū Har Govind suddenly fell on them, killing many including their commander Mukhlis Khān.

The Gurū's fame spread far and wide. “Many men came to enlist under the guru's banner. They said that no one else had power to contend with the Emperor.”<sup>39</sup> Har Govind retired to the northern parts of Amritsar district. There he selected a site for his residence. A township sprang up soon after and was called Sri Hargobindpur.

The matter remained at a standstill for a couple of years when Har Govind was again involved in trouble with the Lahore Governor. One of the Gurū's most devoted disciples, named Sādh or Sādhurām, had been sent to Central Asia to bring horses.<sup>40</sup> On his return journey he was accompanied by Mohsin Fani from Kābul to Punjab. Sādh had three fine Iraqi horses with him. Two of them, named Gulbāgh and Dilbāgh, were seized by Khalil Beg,<sup>41</sup> the Lahore Governor. A devoted Sikh, Bidhi Chand, in disguise took up service in the Lahore fort as a groom. In course of time he managed to escape with both the horses. A force was despatched against Har Govind who retired to Lahara and repulsed the Mughul contingent. Expecting reprisal, the Gurū took shelter in the Lakhi Jungle lying between Ferozpur and Bhatinda. As anticipated, a strong contingent of the Governor of Jullundur pursued the Gurū into the impenetrable retreat. The Sikhs lay in ambush and defeated the enemy, but at the loss of 1,200 Sikh soldiers.

This victory emboldened the Gurū, who now returned to Kartarpur near Jullundur.<sup>42</sup> Paindā Khān deserted the Gurū and took up service under the Lahore Governor. An expedition under the command of Mir Badehra and Paindā Khān was despatched against the Gurū. They were joined by the Jullundur troops. The Gurū had only 5,000 soldiers with him.<sup>43</sup> In a hard-fought battle both the enemy commanders were killed. One soldier with a drawn sword rushed upon the Gurū. He warded off the blow and then assaulted him exclaiming, “not so, but the sword is used thus,” and with one stroke cut off his head.

It was impossible for Gurū Har Govind with his slender resources, to remain for long in open defiance of the Government. "Whatever he possessed was lost,"<sup>44</sup> says Mohsin Fani. "After the battle of Kartarpur he went to Phagwārā. As this place also was not far from Lahore, it was difficult for him to stay there. He hurried to Kiratpur situated in the Punjab hills. This territory belonged to Rājā Tārāchand who had thrown off allegiance to Emperor Shāh Jahān."<sup>45</sup>

Gurū Har Govind had remained fully busy in warfare from 1634 to 1640, a fairly long period if we consider his meagre resources. Several Rājput princes of the Kāngra and Chamba hills had also revolted against Shāh Jahān. The Gurū was not disturbed at Kirātpur. He spent the remaining two years of his life in converting Musalmans to Hinduism. Mohsin Fani writes that "in those hills up to the borders of Tibet and Khotan the name Musalman had disappeared."<sup>46</sup> Mohsin Fani, who met the Gurū at Kirātpur, further says that the ambassadors of the hill rājās waited upon Har Govind, and they did not know even the name of Shāh Jahān though Delhi was known to them.<sup>47</sup>

Gurū Har Govind died on 3 March, 1644.<sup>48</sup> His activities were not appreciated and properly understood by the upper classes. They hinted that he had fallen short of the lofty ideals of his predecessors in matters religious and spiritual, and pointed out that he had not composed and added a single verse to the Holy *Granth*. He was dubbed as one who had been lured by the glamour of arms and love of politics. They complained that he was occasionally cooperating with the enemies of their faith. Most of the Hindus considered it beneath the dignity of a religious preceptor to indulge in hunting and sport. His encouragement of meat diet and travels in Muslim countries deeply offended caste-ridden orthodox Hindus. The Sikhs grumbled that the Gurū did not stay continually at Amritsar and led a roving life. As the people of the Punjab could not think of any opposition to the mighty Mughuls, they considered Gurū's war-like acts as wasteful and useless. They said that in spite of his so-called victories the Gurū was driven from pillar to post, and eventually forced to seek refuge in the hilly region at Kirātpur.

The fact was generally ignored that the Gurū was trying to change the age-long mentality of the Hindus of meekly submitting to the oppressor, and that after six hundred years of bondage he was awakening his fellow countrymen to the realisation that irrespective of consequences the people should rise against a Government to get their wrongs redressed. His acceptance of the high

office under Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān was a fine stroke of diplomacy and political sagacity. It disarmed suspicion of the local Government and afforded him an excellent opportunity to augment his military resources. The organisational evolution of Sikhism from the standpoint of religion and spiritualism was almost complete during the time of Gurū Arjun. The execution of Gurū Arjun and Gurū Har Govind's imprisonment had clearly shown that a hard lot was in store for the new religion. Gurū Har Govind had a clear conception of the changing circumstances, and had realised the necessity of playing an active role in the political life of the community. He had a clear conception that militarily he had little chance of success against the unlimited resources of the Mughul empire. Yet he considered it beneath his dignity to accept a passive role, which was nothing short of degradation. He inaugurated a policy which was sure to lead the most down-trodden people slowly but surely to political and military advancement. But his contemporaries failed to comprehend it, and they misunderstood him and misrepresented his work. In reality, Gurū Har Govind rendered a unique service to his country by showing the true path of deliverance from political bondage. After all, spirituality must inspire a person to resist the wrong with courage and boldness.

Not much is known of the next two Gurūs, Har Rai (1644-61) and Har Kishan (1661-64), grandson and great-grandson, respectively, of Har Govind.

#### IV. *Gurū Tegh Bahādur (1664-75)*

Tegh Bahādur, the youngest son of Har Govind, succeeded Har Kishan in 1664. At this time, Aurangzīb was determined to establish an Islāmic State in India and took various repressive measures against the Hindus, which have been mentioned in detail in Chapter VIII, Section III. *Kalimāt-i-Tayyibāt* says that a Sikh temple in a village in the Sirhind Division was turned into a mosque.<sup>49</sup> Many other *Gurdwārās* were demolished.<sup>50</sup> During Aurangzīb's stay in the Punjab in 1674-5 local officials terrorised the Hindu population and converted them to Islām in large number. In Kāshmir thousands of Paṇḍits were forced to embrace Islām. This aroused the intensity of Gurū's love for religious freedom. In order to infuse courage in the hearts of the Hindus and his disciples he undertook a tour of the East Punjab telling them neither to fear nor frighten others. This created confidence and courage in the minds of the people. Some of the Kāshmirī leaders in sheer helplessness called on Gurū Tegh Bahādur and told him of their sad plight. He advised them to inform the emperor, through their governor, to convert Tegh Bahādur first and then all of them would embrace Islām.<sup>51</sup>

Aurangzīb's mind was already prejudiced against the Sikhs. It was now reported to him that the Gurū was infusing the spirit of rebellion among the Kāshmīrīs as well as the sturdy Jāt peasantry of the Punjab. The Gurū was also accused of making Mussalmāns his disciples. It was further alleged that Tegh Bahādur claimed to have possessed the power of performing miracles which was opposed to the tenets of Islām. Aurangzīb had just suppressed one of the most terrible revolts of the frontier tribes and was not prepared to witness another rising in the Punjab. He therefore decided to teach the Sikhs a lesson and summoned Tegh Bahādur to Delhi. When he arrived together with five disciples<sup>52</sup> he was asked either to perform miracles or embrace Islām. The Gurū denied that he could perform miracles and rejected the latter, repeating "Give thy life, but do not give up thy faith" (*Sar diya par sir na diya*). In order to terrorise the Gurū into submission, one of his disciples, Bhāi Mati Dās, was tied to two posts, and thus making him stand erect, his body was sawn across from head to loins. Another disciple was boiled alive. The other three fled away, but Gurū Tegh Bahādur remained firm in his resolve. He was put in chains and then beheaded on 11 November, 1675.

#### V. Gurū Govind Singh (1675-1708)

Gurū Govind, the son and successor of Tegh Bahādur, ushered in a new phase of the Sikh movement. The murder of his father and great-grandfather, the imprisonment of his grandfather, and the wretched condition of the Hindus made him realise that the people must themselves find their own salvation against the tyranny of a cruel and corrupt Government.

So Gurū Govind was determined to put an end to the religious oppression of the Mughul Government. His fight was with the Government and not against Islām. Its clear proof is that he recruited Pathāns in his service and won the support of Muslim saints like Pir Budhu Shāh of Sādhaura. Sa'id Beg and Maimu Khān fought on his side against the Mughuls, while Nabi Khān and Ghani Khān saved him from capture by the Mughul army. Qāzī Pīr Muhammad did not confirm Gurū's identity and Rāi Kalha looked after him. He wanted to create national awakening in the Punjab as it had been done in Mahārāshtra by Shivājī. The time chosen was opportune. Aurangzīb was involved in a life and death struggle in the Deccan with the Marāthās. The Punjab was in the charge of Prince Mu'azzam who lived in Kābul. The Governors of Lahore and Kāngra had failed to crush him. The Government at Delhi was in a state of disorganisation. The hill rājās were in revolt against the

Mughuls. A better time could not be expected to fulfil his life's mission, and the Gurū was not the man to miss it. He had first tried to instill his ideas into the heart of the warrior class of Rājputs of the Siwalik Hills. He soon discovered that the caste-ridden and class-dominated Rājputs would not respond to his appeals and would not fit in his ideology. He therefore turned his attention to the down-trodden masses. He believed that he would be able to achieve his objective by stirring the latent faculties of the human will which possessed the elasticity of rising to the loftiest height as well as sinking to the lowest depth. The Gurū made full use of the strong sentiment which had been manifesting itself in the Sikh community in the form of sincere devotion and loving obedience for the person of the Gurū.

The Gurū, while reading the Purāṇas had been deeply struck by the idea that God had been sending a saviour at critical times to save the virtuous and destroy the evil-doers.<sup>53</sup> He believed he had been sent for the same purpose. This is proved by two sayings of the Gurū in *Bichitra Nāṭak*. According to one,<sup>54</sup> the Gurū was in a state of communion with God when he heard the divine command, and the other contains his acceptance of the mission and admonitions to his disciples to fulfil it.<sup>55</sup> In the *Chandī Charitra* the Gurū says that in the past God had deputed Durgā to destroy the evil-doers,<sup>56</sup> and this duty had now been assigned to him. He was eager to get her blessings. He sang "the praises of Chandī so that they might be chanted for warlike purposes, and that even cowards on hearing her story might obtain courage and the hearts of the brave beat with fourfold enthusiasm. Such being the achievements of a woman, what ought not a brave man to accomplish?"<sup>57</sup> The learned *Paṇḍits* in the service of the Gurū advised him to perform the grand ceremony of Homa. "He invited Pandit Kesho from Benares to conduct the ceremony on the hill of Nainadevi,"<sup>58</sup> close to Ānandpur. The ceremony began on the *Durgā Ashṭamī* day, two days before *Dusehra* festival in October, 1698, and lasted for full six months. At the close of this period the sacred days of the worship of goddess (*Navrātras*) began on 21 March, 1699. "When all the *ghee* and incense had been burnt, and the Pandit had tired himself out by mumbling *mantras* by the million without being able to produce the goddess, the Guru came forward with a naked sword and, flashing it before the assembly, declared: "This is the goddess of power!"<sup>59</sup> This took place on 28 March, 1699, the *Durgā Ashṭamī* day.

The congregation was then asked to move to Ānandpur where on the New Year Day of 1st *Baisākh*, 1756, Vikrama Samvat, (30 March, 1699), he would create a new nation. All the persons would

be fed from *Gurū kā Langar* and after the grand function they would be entertained to a sumptuous feast. Thousands of persons assembled there. The Gurū remained absorbed in meditation and contemplation. On the morning of 30 March, he sought God's blessings and entered a specially constructed canopy where a huge congregation was seated. The Gurū delivered the most stirring speech on saving religion which was in great peril, and about his divine mission. The Gurū first dwelt on the Government policy of religious persecution. He then explained why, in order to safeguard their spiritual and temporal rights, the people should not depend on the sovereign or princes, but take up this duty themselves. They should individually feel for the national wrongs done, and collectively organise means to withstand it. "The *Kāl* (*Age*) had reached such a stage that success would come only if a brick could be returned with a stone."<sup>60</sup> Humility and service alone were not adequate in this age. To goodness was to be added not only condemnation of evil but also destruction of the evil-doers. Love of a neighbour must accompany the punishment of the trespasser. Service of saints implied annihilation of tyrants as well. Helping friends meant harming enemies too. God, *Guru*, and the Sword formed the Holy Trinity in place of Brahmā, Vishṇu and Śiva to lead to victory. The age when salvation was needed after death had passed. Salvation was to be obtained in this very life, here and now.

In his ecstasy the Gurū sang the praises of the sword. "God subdues enemies, so does the sword; therefore the sword is God, and God is the sword."<sup>61</sup> Addressing the sword he said:

"I bow with love and devotion to the Holy Sword.  
Assist me that I may complete this work.  
Thou art the subduer of countries, the  
Destroyer of the armies of the wicked.

\* \* \* \*

I bow to the Sword and Rapier which destroy the evil.

\* \* \* \*

Thy greatness is endless and boundless;  
No one hath found its limits.  
Thou art God of gods, King of kings,  
Compassionate to poor, and Cherisher of the lowly."<sup>62</sup>

After this stimulating oration, the Gurū flashed his sword, and said that 'every great deed was preceded by equally great sacrifice; the Holy Sword would create a heroic nation after supreme sacrifice.' He then inquired if anyone in the congregation would offer his head

in the service of God, Truth and Religion. This sent a thrill of horror in the audience, and there was no response to the first and even to the second call, repeated in a sterner voice. At the third call one Dayārām, a Khatri of Lahore, rose in his seat and expressed his willingness to lay down his life. He was led into the adjoining tent and asked to sit there quietly. The sword-blade was dipped in a cauldron of blood of goats, and the Gurū, returning to the assembly with the dripping sword in his hand asked for another head. Dharamdās, a Jāt, offered his head and the same procedure was repeated. After five men<sup>63</sup> had offered to make the sacrifice and been taken away, the Gurū re-entered the assembly room with all of them, dressed in the same kind of fine clothes, and gave them a baptism called *pahul* of water sweetened with sugar cakes and stirred with a double-edged dagger. They were designated Five 'Beloved Ones' and termed 'Khālsā.'

Each of the five letters in the Persian word Khālsā has a significance. The first two, *kh* and *a*, stand, respectively for *Khud* or oneself and the *Akal Purkh* (God). The third letter, *l*, signifies *Labbaik*, meaning the following questions of God: "What do you want with me? Here am I. What would you have?," and the reply of the *Singh* (devotee): "Lord, give us liberty and sovereignty." The fourth letter, *s*, signifies *Sahib* (Lord or Master). The last letter is written either as *a* or, more usually, *h*. The former signifies *Azadi* or freedom and the latter refers to *Huma*, a legendary bird.

Gurū Govind Singh provided his followers with five jewels which were within reach of everybody. They were five *K*'s—*Kesh* or long hair, *Kangha* or comb, *Kirpan* or sword, *Kara* or steel bracelet, and *Kachcha* or a pair of knicker-bockers.<sup>64</sup> Their salutation was to be

*Wah-e-Guru ji ka Khalsa*  
*Wah-e-Guru ji ki Fateh.*<sup>65</sup>

Gurū Govind Singh enjoined that every Sikh must fight against cruelty and tyranny, and should help the poor and protect the weak. He inspired them with the belief that every Singh serving the *Panth* was bound to be victorious, and while engaged in a righteous cause was to consider himself a tower of strength equal to the power of one lakh and a quarter hosts. He must always be prepared to lay down his life because his victory lay in the moment of his death.

The creation of the *Khālsā* was an epoch-making event in the religious and political history of the country. It marked the beginning of the rise of a new people, destined to play the role of defenders

against all oppression and tyranny. The severities of the high caste people over their brethren, the Sudras, were set at naught as soon as one joined the ranks of the *Khālsā*, where all were equal and ready to render one another all help and useful service. Their main problem was to destroy the organised oppression and the tyrannical despotism of the Mughul Government. It was a gigantic task for the small community of the *Khālsā*. Under the direction of the Gurū, the *Khālsā* took up the profession of arms and the results were most surprising. The people, lowliest of the low, who had lived for centuries in a state of servility now turned into doughty warriors, the praises of whose physique and valour were sung by all the world, including their bitterest foes.

In order to enhance the feelings of self-respect and the spirit of human dignity, Gurū Govind Singh severely dealt with the institution of *Masands*, or tithe-collectors, on this occasion. For some time past they had become haughty, corrupt and greedy, and treated the Sikhs with contempt and insolence. Many of them acted as Gurūs and kept all the offerings for themselves. With this money they indulged in personal trade or other lucrative business. Gurū Govind did not believe in dismissing some and reforming the others. He also ignored the prospect of financial loss for the time being. Nor did he feel afraid of the united opposition of the *Masands*. He forthwith abolished this office and instructed the Sikhs to make offerings personally to the Gurū on the occasion of a visit or at the time of general gathering on the days of *Baisākhi* and *Diwāli*.<sup>66</sup> Thereby not only were the Sikhs freed from humiliation, but a close personal contact was established between the Gurū and his disciples.

Then began a series of battles<sup>67</sup> in which the Gurū had often to face heavy odds, but in many cases the victory was on the side of the *Khālsā*. *Ānandpur* was five times invested.<sup>68</sup> The most serious siege took place in the autumn of 1704. Under orders of Aurangzīb, Vazīr Khān, the Governor of Sirhind, made full preparations to wipe out the *Khālsā*. The Governor of Lahore, several rājās of the Kāngra hills, and a host of neighbouring Nawābs and Jāgīrdārs joined the expedition. *Ānandpur* was besieged. Provisions ran short and there were frequent desertions. At this juncture Vazīr Khān opened negotiations for Gurū's safe evacuation. Solemn assurances were given on the Qur'ān, and an autograph letter from Aurangzīb was produced as a proof of the Governor's sacred oath.<sup>69</sup> Final agreement was arrived at about the middle of December, 1704. The Gurū sent ladies and his two younger sons under proper escort towards Nahan in Sirmur State. The second batch of evacuees along with his two

elder sons and a small number of followers under the Gurū himself came out of the fort.

Unluckily torrential rain began. The river Sarsa was heavily flooded. Both the parties were held up on its bank amidst bitter cold and rain and wind. The enemy considered it a Godsend to efface the Gurū and his followers. They threw their solemn pledges to the winds, and made a vehement assault on the Gurū at nightfall. In the confusion and darkness, the Gurū's mother and his two younger sons, Zorawar Singh (born 1696) and Fateh Singh (born 1699) were separated. They fell into the hands of the Governor of Sirhind. The children were pressed to embrace Islām. They spurned the offer and were bricked up alive in the fort wall, and then beheaded on 27 December, 1704.

The Gurū and his two elder sons, Ajit Singh (born 1686) and Jujhar Singh (born 1690), managed to cross the river Sarsa, with only forty followers.<sup>70</sup> The current swept away many of them as well as a large number of the Gurū's manuscripts and his own compositions, not to speak of other property. They took shelter at Chamkaur in a mud-built house which was immediately besieged. In the struggle that ensued on 22 December, 1704, the Gurū lost both of his sons, three of the 'Beloved Ones' and thirty-two other followers. Govind Singh was left with only five Sikhs, who in accordance with his earlier commandment assumed the role of the Gurū in the interest of the *Panth* and ordered him to escape. The Gurū did so in the disguise of a Muslim saint.

His wanderings from Chamkaur to Nander, about 1500 miles away, present a tale of many hairbreadth escapes, unparalleled sufferings, marvellous courage and inflexible determination. Near Māchīwārā, he was found lying hidden in bushes, exhausted with hunger and fatigue, by two Pathāns, Nabī Khān and Ghani Khān. They entertained him and escorted him safely to a distance of about 40 miles. Rāi Kalha of Jagraon kept him as a guest and then let him pass through his territory in safety. Sikh stragglers began to join him. A short engagement, the last, was fought in the wastes of Firozpur district. In it forty deserters from Ānandpur, smitten with remorse, fought desperately, and were all killed. A tank was constructed in their memory called *Muktsar* or the reservoir of salvation. While at Dina, the Gurū received a letter from Aurangzīb demanding his presence at his Court in the Deccan to account for his doings. To this he gave a spirited reply in Persian verse containing 111 couplets called *Zafarnāma* or Epistle of Victory. In it he bitterly criticised the emperor for the persecutions, wrongs and

sufferings inflicted upon him and his father. He justified his revolutionary activities by saying: "When all the remedies have failed, it is lawful to resort to the sword."

Gurū Govind Singh halted at Talwandi Sabo, now known as Damdama Sāhib, for nine months. At this place he completed *Ādi Granth* by adding 116 hymns composed by Gurū Tegh Bahādur, including one couplet alleged to be his own composition. His own *Granth* called the *Dasam Granth* was also given a shape here. The Gurū was a prolific writer. Many of his manuscripts were lost while crossing the river Sarsa. The rest were included in the *Dasam Granth*. It consists of several parts, each in a different language but all in *Gurmukhi* script. The *Hikāyats* and *Zafarnāma* are in Persian. *Jāp*, *Akāl Ustat*, *Chaubis Avtār*, *Brahmā Avtār*, *Rudra Avtār*, *Krishna Avtār*, *Rāma Avtār*, *Śrī Mukhilak Swayyas*, *Pakhyan Charitra* and *Bichitra Nāṭak* are in *Brajbhāshā*, i.e. pure Hindī. *Chaṇḍī ki Var* is in Lanhde Punjabi, while a number of hymns are in pure Punjabi.

At Talwandi, Gurū Govind received a reply to his letter addressed to Aurangzīb. The emperor expressed regret for the Gurū's sufferings and invited him to meet him. The Gurū was anxious to get Vazīr Khān punished for his atrocities, and also wanted to study on the spot in what manner the Marāthās under Tārā Bāi were harassing the emperor. He conveyed his acceptance of the invitation and set out on his long journey. He was in Rājasthān when he heard that Aurangzīb had died on 3 March, 1707. He turned back towards Āgra.

Aurangzīb's eldest son, Mu'azzam, 65 years old, had come from Kābul to Delhi and declared himself emperor under the title of Bahādur Shāh. The Gurū pressed Bahādur Shāh to punish Vazīr Khān. "The Emperor asked him to wait for some years until his government was fully established."<sup>71</sup> The Gurū was asked to go with the emperor to the Deccan. He, therefore, joined his camp accompanied by his wife, Sāhib Devī, some infantry and two to three hundred cavalry.<sup>72</sup> Finding the emperor unyielding, the disappointed Gurū left him in despair at Nander, the headquarters of Madho Dās Bairāgi, alias Bandā Bahādur. He reached there in August, 1707, and stayed for over a year. Bandā was sent to the Punjab to chastise Vazīr Khān of Sirhind, while Mātā Sāhib Devī returned to Delhi.

On the other hand, Vazīr Khān was also plotting against the Gurū's life. Two Pathān boys, who were in the service of the Gurū, were set on him. One day finding him alone, they severely stabbed

him in August, 1708. The condition of the wounds grew worse in October, 1708. The Gurū realized that his end had come. He called together his disciples and gave them his last injunctions. He told them that everything in this world happened according to the will of the Almighty. He expressed satisfaction at the fulfilment of his mission. As the Gurūship was hereditary in his family, and he had lost all his children, Gurū Govind Singh thought it best, in order to avoid all possible family feuds as well as impostors in future, not to vest this high office in any person, and abolished it as summarily as he had done in the case of *Masands*. He declared that he was entrusting the *Khālsā* to the care of *Akal Purkh* (God). In matters spiritual the *Holy Granth* would be their guide, while their secular affairs would be regulated by holy *panchāyats* meeting before the sacred *Granth*. He instructed them that whenever any important question affecting the *Panth* was to be decided, a Sikh congregation was to be held, and from the whole assembly five persons<sup>73</sup> were to be elected to settle the issue. In the counsels of Five Beloved Ones he would be present in spirit. Their verdict called *Gurumata* was to be regarded as the judgment of the Gurū. It was to be passed by the whole assembly, and its execution was binding upon the whole *Panth*. Any infringement was to be considered sacrilegious. He asserted that God had destined the *Khālsā* to be the future rulers of the country, and for the realisation of this object they must continue the struggle unabated.

Following the practice of Hindu saints and sages who at the divine call would sit in a *samādhi* and expire, the Gurū had prepared a funeral pyre within an enclosure. He banned admission into it. With folded hands he bade a dramatic farewell by uttering the salutation which he had himself coined, "*Wah Guru Ji ka Khālsā, Wah Guru Ji ki Fateh,*" quietly walked away, entered the walled fence and bolted its door from inside. The congregation stood aghast. In a while the pyre was seen ablaze,<sup>74</sup> and amidst tears and sobs of the assemblage softly rose the dirge of *Sat Śrī Akāl* (The Immortal Almighty is True). This happened on 7 October, 1708.<sup>75</sup> The Gurū had not yet completed forty-two years of his life.

"Thus we see," says Sir Jadunath, "that the Mughal Government under Aurangzib did succeed in breaking up the guru's power. It robbed the Sikhs of a common leader and a rallying centre."<sup>76</sup>

It should be remembered, however, that immediately after Gurū Govind's death, equally dynamic leadership, of course in affairs mundane, and with much greater success, was provided by Bandā Bahādūr. Gurū Govind Singh's desire, "Mother dear, I have been con-

sidering how I may confer empire on the Khālsā," was realized, though for the time being, temporarily, in nineteen months. On 12 May, 1710, Vazīr Khān was dead and gone. The entire province of Sirhind between the Sutlej and the Yamunā lay at the feet of the Khālsā. They set themselves up as rulers and issued their own coins. They rose again within forty years, and then ruled over the Punjab for nearly a hundred years. It was indeed a miracle of the highest magnitude!

Though the Gurū could not break the shackles of bondage and slavery in his own lifetime, as he died young, yet he had freed the souls of his followers and filled their minds with love for freedom and democracy. He had dispelled the fear of authority and destroyed the awe of an alien Government. He had the satisfaction that in the hearts of his disciples the seeds of a general revolution were germinating, and that it would break forth with greater fury if the sanctity of their rights was not admitted, and if they were not allowed a free hand in matters of their conscience. He was sure that he was leaving behind in Khālsā, an army of free, brave, selfless and sacrificing soldiers who would smile in sufferings, laugh in misfortunes, support the weak and innocent, fight against tyranny like lions in war and act as lambs in peace.

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1. Vol. VI, pp. 561-71.
  2. These have been discussed in Vol. VI, pp. 625-636.
  3. Nearly seventy Muslim invasions had taken place up to the time of Nānak, as follows:  
Arabs, 6—Sind in 636-7, Arabs in the Kābul Valley in 664, Broach, Debal, Baluchistān, Sind in 711.  
Alptigīn, 1.  
Sabuktigīn, 3.  
Mahmūd, 17.  
Shihāb-ud-dīn Ghūri, 10—Multan 1175, Anhilwara 1178, Peshawar 1179, Lahore 1181, Sialkot 1185, Lahore 1186, Tarain 1191 and 1193, Kanauj 1194, Khokhars 1206.  
Mongols, 25—Chingīz Khān 1220, Lahore 1250, Multan 1270, Prince Muhammad killed 1286, Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī defeated them 1292, in the reign of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī 12 invasions, Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq defeated them 1324, in the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq 6 invasions, Tīmūr 1398-99, Bābur 4.
  4. Sir Edward Maclagan, *The Jesuits and the Great Mogul*, p. 28.
  5. Sri Ram Sharma, *Religious Policy of the Mughals* (1962), p. 14.
  6. Abdulla, *Tārīkh-i-Daudī*, HIED, IV. 439-40.
  7. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, I. 170. Cf. above, Vol. VI, p. 147.
  8. *Tārīkh-i-Firishta*, I. 281.
  9. *Selections from the Sacred Writings of the Sikhs* (London, 1960), p. 82.
  10. Macauliffe, op. cit.
  11. Rag Asa, *Adi Granth*, p. 360. *Selections from the Sacred Writings of the Sikhs*, pp. 86-7.
  12. *Tūzuk-i-Bāburi*, II. 281.
  13. ASI, XII. 26-7.
  14. *Memoirs of Bābur*, II. 340.
  15. The name is also written as 'Arjan.'
  16. For a short account of this episode, see p. 179.
  17. *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī* (Naval Kishore Press, Lucknow), Persian Text, p. 35.

## THE SIKHS

18. *The Dabistan*, p. 234.
- 18a. As the Sikh Gurūs did not always eschew politics, this explanation is not very convincing (Editor).
19. Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir*, p. 130.
20. *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī* (Persian Text), p. 35.
21. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, I. p. 59, f.n., 25.
22. *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*, p. 35.
23. *The Dabistan*, p. 234.
- 23a. Cf. p. 193.
24. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzib*, 1954 edition, p. 156.
25. Macauliffe, op. cit., IV. p. 2; Sir Jadunath Sarkar, op. cit., p. 156.
26. *The Dabistan*, pp. 235-6.
27. Gurū Har Govind's contemporary, Mohsin Fani, writes: "At last Hargobind, son of Arjun Mal, took to meat eating and hunting, and most of his disciples adopted his way." He narrates a story. A Pratabmal admonished his son who was inclined to become a Musalman thus: "If you want to get full freedom in eating, you may better join Sikhism where there is no restriction about food." (*The Dabistan*, p. 223).
28. Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs*, p. 50.
29. *The Dabistan*, p. 239.
30. *Ibid*, p. 234.
31. But the wives of the Gurū might have been allowed to stay with him (Editor).
32. *The Dabistan*, p. 239.
33. *Ibid*.
34. Abdul Hamīd Lāhorī, *Bādshāh-Nāma*, ii, 57-58; Aminai Qazvini, *Bādshāh-Nāma*, ms., 444-45, 562; Muhammad Salih, 'Amal-l-Sālih, ii, 64, 246-47; Khāfi Khān, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubāb*, i, 510.
35. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, op. cit., 1954 edition, p. 156.
36. *Ibid*. Sir Jadunath's date, 1628, is obviously wrong.
37. *Ibid*.
38. *Ibid*.
39. Quoted with approval by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Ibid*.
40. Mohsin Fani says that while going on his mission Sadh had not reached far beyond Amritsar, when he was informed that his only son was lying seriously ill, and he was requested to return. Such was his devotion to the Gurū that he replied: "If he should die, there is wood enough in the house for his cremation. I am going on Guru's business and I will not return." His son passed away, but he did not come back. *The Dabistan*, p. 239.
41. Mohsin Fani says: "Khalil Beg's high-handedness did not bring him prosperity. The same year his son who was responsible for this act died, and he himself suffered insults, and disgrace." *Ibid*.
42. *Ibid*, p. 235.
43. M'Gregor, *History of the Sikhs*, I. 59.
44. *The Dabistan*, p. 235.
45. *Ibid*.
46. *Ibid*.
47. *Ibid*.
48. *Ibid*. The author gives the date on the authority of Mohsin Fani (*ibid*. p. 237). But both Sir Jadunath Sarkar (op. cit., p. 156) and CHI (IV. 245) give the date as 1645 (Editor).
49. *Kalimāt-i-Tayyibāt*, p. 115.
50. Khāfi Khan, II. 651-2.
51. Sukha Singh, *Gur Bilas*, p. 81.
52. Macauliffe, op. cit., IV (1909 Edition), pp. 373-4.
53. There is a well-known verse in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (IV. 8) exactly to this effect (Editor).
54. *Bichitra Nāṭak*, VI; Macauliffe, op. cit., V. 299.
55. *Bichitrā Nāṭak*, VI; Macauliffe, op. cit., V. 300-301.
56. Macauliffe, op. cit., V. 82.
57. *Ibid*, p. 83.
58. Teja Singh and Ganda Singh, *A Short History of the Sikhs*, I. p. 68.
59. *Ibid*.
60. *Gur Bilas*, quoted by I. B. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, II. p. 95.
61. Macauliffe, op. cit., V. 83.
62. *Ibid*, pp. 286, 287, 289.

## THE MUGHUL EMPIRE

63. The third was Sāhib Chand, a barber of Nangal Shahidan of Hoshiarpur District. The fourth was Himmat Chand Kahar (water-carrier) of Sangatpura in District Patiala, and the fifth was Mohkam Chand Chhimba of Buria in Ambala District. (Ganda Singh, *Mākhiz-i-Tawārīkh-i-Sikhān*, i, 8).
64. In many of these external observances a deep purpose can be traced. Gurū Govind Singh wanted to make the Sikhs a fighting people, and therefore he deemed it necessary that their heads should be properly guarded from sword cuts and *lāṭhi* blows by means of long hair and turbans. Comb was required to keep beards in proper shape so that they would look impressive and manly. The steel bracelet was a constant reminder to a Sikh that his spirit was equally strong and unbending. *Kirpān* was for self-defence as well as for the protection of the weak and the oppressed. The *Kachha* was more suitable and more convenient for fighting purposes than the long dhoti of Hindus and loose trousers of Muslims. Above all, the Gurū aimed at giving his Sikhs a separate identity which he could not conceal for fear of death, and would remain steadfast and stable.
65. It means: "This Khālsā is Thy Own, O Lord, and so is the Victory." The idea was to keep the Sikhs in a buoyant spirit, because by this mode of salutation a strong link was established between the *Khālsā* and Victory, these two being the offspring of the Lord.
66. Khazan Singh, *History and Philosophy of the Sikh Religion*, i. 181.
67. Ten battles are recorded by the author of the *Battles of Guru Gobind Singh*, which were fought by the Gurū after creating the *Khālsā*. Of these, five took place at Anandpur, two at Chamkaur, and the rest at Nirmoh, Basali and Muktsar. Cf. Sunder Singh, 32-68.
68. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
69. Gurū Govind Singh hints at it in his letter addressed to Aurangzīb, called *Zafarnāma*.
70. This number is given by Gurū Govind Singh in *Zafarnāma*.
71. Khazan Singh, *op. cit.*, I. 196-7.
72. Khāfi Khān, 652; M'Gregor, i, 99.
73. In India 'five' has been the sacred number from time immemorial. "*Panchon men Parmeshwar hai*" is an old saying, indicating the presence of Divinity in five. *Panchāyats*, or councils of five elders, were common in northern India.
74. Khazan Singh, *op. cit.*, i, 201-4.
75. The date is given by I. Banerjee as 18 October, 1708 (*Evolution of the Khalsa*, II, p. 151), and November, 1708, by Jadunath Sarkar (*CHI*, IV. p. 322) [Editor].
76. J. N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

## CHAPTER XII

# HINDU RESISTANCE TO MUSLIM DOMINATION

### I. MEWĀR

#### *Their finest hour*

With the death of *Mahārānā* Sanga, a new chapter opens in the history of Mewār. The unfortunate country suffers from weak administration, disputed succession, and invasion, first by Gujarāt and then by a far more formidable foe, Akbar, who after winning over a few chieftains of Rājasthān, sets out to conquer Mewār, the last bastion of Hindu power in North India. Here the great Emperor is faced by the determined resolution of one man, Pratāp Singh, and all the resources of the vast Mughul empire cannot force this great *Mahārānā* of Mewār to bow his head to the alien Mughul ruler. The *Mahārānā* loses battles, but never gives up the principle for which he stands—independence, and he regains for posterity the soul of India. The great Shivājī will be proud to claim him as his ancestor, and the revolutionary movement in Bengal in the twentieth century will draw inspiration from his untiring fight against foreign domination. With *Mahārānā* Sanga the pomp and splendour of Mewār as a political power passes away—under *Mahārānā* Pratāp it blazes into a glory that can never fade.

#### *Ratna Singh (1528-1531)*

*Mahārānā* Sanga had seven sons (by different wives), four of whom had predeceased him and his eldest surviving son, Ratna Singh, succeeded to the throne (1528). But before his death *Mahārānā* Sanga had promised Karmavatī, the step-mother of Ratna Singh, the fort of Ranthambhor to her sons, Vikramāditya and Uday Singh, and she took possession of that fort in the name of her minor sons, with her brother Sūrya Mal of Hādā (or Harā) clan as their guardian. She also took away with her the golden crown and belt which the *Mahārānā* had taken from the Sultān of Mālwa.

Soon after his accession, Ratna Singh demanded the golden crown and the belt and also requested Karmavatī and her sons to return to Chitor. She refused to do either and opened negotiations with Bābur.<sup>1</sup> She offered Bābur Ranthambhor and the golden crown and belt in exchange of Bayāna and agreed to accept his overlord-

ship. Later on Bābur records that he agreed to help Vikramāditya to gain his father's kingdom.<sup>2</sup>

These negotiations led to no other result than to increase the hostility between Ratna Singh and Sūrya Mal. But other events demanded his attention.

Chānd Khān, the brother of Sultān Bahādur of Gujarāt, was given asylum at Mālwa, and Sultān Mahmūd of Mālwa refused to surrender him to Bahādur. He worsened his position by attacking Mewār at this time to regain some territories lost to Mālwa during *Mahārānā* Sanga's time. Ratna Singh had little difficulty in throwing out the invaders, after which he invaded Mālwa and reached Sārangpur. In the meantime, Sultān Bahādur of Gujarāt had started his campaign against Mālwa and opened negotiations with the *Mahārānā*. Later, the *Mahārānā* visited Bahādur's camp and received from the latter "thirty elephants, many horses and one thousand five hundred dresses of gold brocade."<sup>3</sup> Thereupon the *Mahārānā* returned to Mewār, leaving some of his officers and soldiers with Bahādur, to help him against Sultān Mahmūd of Mālwa.

But the trouble with Sūrya Mal, the guardian of Ratna Singh's step-brothers, increased, and ultimately the latter began to hatch plans to murder him.<sup>4</sup> He is said to have invited Sūrya Mal to a hunt near Būndī. One day they went out for pig-sticking with a few attendants. Suddenly Ratna Singh attacked Sūrya Mal and in the scuffle that followed both of them died (1531).

#### *Vikramāditya (1531-1536)*

After Ratna Singh's death, his step-brother Vikramāditya ascended the throne of Mewār. He is described in all the Rājasthān chronicles and traditions as a stupid young man, who replaced bodyguards with wrestlers, and so insulted the nobles that they left the court in disgust. The tales of his stupidity may be exaggerated, but his ineptitude soon showed itself with fateful consequences for Mewār.

Sultān Bahādur of Gujarāt, determined to punish Silahdi for having Muslim women in his seraglio, invested the fort of Rāisen.<sup>5</sup> When their condition became precarious, Silahdi's son Bhupat went to Mewār for help and Vikramāditya advanced with a large force. Bahādur Shāh first sent a force under two officers to contain the *Rānā*, but later thought his presence absolutely necessary and left Rāisen and joined his force which was opposing Vikramāditya. Vikramāditya seems to have taken alarm, and sent two persons to

Bahādur's court, ostensibly to parley, but in reality to find out the Muslim strength. On their reporting that the Gujarāt army was greatly superior, Vikramāditya lost heart and immediately fled to Chitor. He was closely pursued by the Gujarāt army, but Bahādur decided to capture Rāisen first, which he did soon after. Chanderī, Bhīlsa, Gāgraun and other places fell to Bahādur after the conquest of Rāisen, while Vikramāditya allowed his army to be immobilized in the fort of Chitor. All this time Bahādur was actively preparing for the siege of Chitor by collecting troops, arms, artillery and ammunition.

Bahādur sent an advance army under his officers (1532) and when this advance force arrived at Mandasor, they were met by Vikramāditya's envoys, who agreed to cede to Bahādur whatever the *Rānā* held of Mālwa and further stipulated that "whatever tribute may be imposed on him he will pay; whatever duty is imposed on him he will perform, and he acknowledges himself a subject of the Sultān, and will never be disobedient."<sup>6</sup>

In the meantime, stung by Vikramāditya's insult, some of his nobles, headed by Medinī Rāi of Chanderī and Narsing Dev (a nephew of *Mahārānā* Sanga) had joined Bahādur, and the latter, apprised of the division among the Mewār nobles and remembering the *Rānā's* attempts to help the besieged garrison of Rāisen, refused to accept the terms<sup>7</sup> and ordered his general to advance. This he did, expecting an attack by the *Rānā*,<sup>8</sup> but he was allowed to invest Chitor without any opposition (1533). Soon the Muslims carried forays near the fort and captured two of its outer gates. In vain did Karmavatī send envoys to Humāyūn for help.

Ultimately, in desperation, Karmavatī, who had saved Bahādur's life when as a prince he was in exile at Mewār, appealed to him, promising to cede the conquered districts of Mālwa, and surrender the golden crown and belt of Mālwa kings, and give him ten elephants and 100 horses and one hundred *lakhs* of *tankahs*.<sup>9</sup> Bahādur accepted these terms and returned to Gujarāt (24 March, 1533) which had during his absence been invaded by Nizām Shāh.

Peace between Mewār and Gujarāt was, however, short, as faced with a hostile Mughul power, Bahādur felt the urgency of possessing the strong fort of Chitor, or at least to crush the power of Mewār to such an extent that there could be no combination of Mughuls and Śisōdias against him. Thus he sent a strong force under Tātār Khān Lodī (a grandson of Sikandar Lodī) and others towards Āgra and the Punjab and himself proceeded to invest Chitor. The energetic measures adopted by Humāyūn foiled Bahā-

dur's ambitious plans. Humāyūn moved through Mālwa to Sārangpur, capturing on his way the fort of Rāisen. At this point Bahādur took counsel of his officers as to whether to raise the siege of Chitor and face Humāyūn, or continue the siege. His counsellors correctly advised him to concentrate his energies on capturing Chitor, as Humāyūn was not likely to attack him while he was fighting a 'holy war' against the infidels. This prediction proved remarkably accurate, and Humāyūn, after advancing up to Gwālior, calmly awaited there the result of the grim tragedy that was unfolding at Chitor, for reasons discussed in the next chapter.

The Rājput soldiers were not prepared for the second siege of Chitor. The nobles, alienated by the buffoonery of Vikramāditya, had retired to their fiefs. So when the news of the Gujarāt army's advance towards Chitor came, the fort was hardly in a state of defence. In this grave predicament, the Queen-mother issued a stirring appeal to the nobles. "Up to now Chitor has remained in the possession of the Śiśodias", Karmavatī wrote to the nobles, "but now it seems the day of her destruction has arrived. I am handing over this fort to you, preserve it if you can, deliver it if you must. Remember, even if your king is worthless, the destruction of the royal dynasty can only bring disgrace to you."<sup>10</sup>

The nobles gallantly responded to this call. They found, however, that the provisions could not last for more than a few months, and a council of war decided to defend the fort to the last, but to remove Vikramāditya and his younger brother Uday Singh to Būndī.

This flight of Vikramāditya from the besieged fort has been a matter of reproach but there is no doubt that the decision to remove him to a place of safety was the correct one. Chitor was doomed, and if he had died sword in hand, in a final sortie, the Śiśodias would have for ever perished as the Chāhamāna Hammīr of Ranthambhor. Indeed, one of the fatal defects in Hindu defence had been up to now their suicidal reliance on the so-called impregnable strongholds. As Klauswitz remarked, a besieged garrison is as helpless as a marooned man-of-war. This dictum was fully realized later by *Mahārānā* Pratāp, who never allowed the mobility of his action to be impeded by the fear of losing a fortress. For the present, the Mewār nobles stuck to their ancient military tradition, but forbore from sacrificing the life of the king and the next heir, around whom alone, in case of defeat, the nation could rally again.<sup>11</sup>

The rest of the story can be briefly told. Bahādur's artillery, directed probably by Turkish gunners, breached part of the bastion.