

The Khilafat Movement

Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India

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# The Khilafat Movement

Religious Symbolism and Political  
Mobilization in India

by  
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In Memory of

MARK

As a rose, he lived what roses can:  
A morning's span.

from the French of  
François Malherbe

تو شاہیں ہے پرواز ہے کام تیرا  
ترے سائے آسماں اور بھی ہیں  
اقبال

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## PREFACE

This study of the Khilafat movement has undergone a number of metamorphoses. It started with research for a master's thesis, during which I became intrigued by a number of problems not adequately covered by the available sources in English. It progressed through years of research and writing to emerge as a doctoral dissertation for the Department of South Asia Regional Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. Subsequent years of teaching, rethinking, and rewriting have led to the book in its present form. The standard interpretation of the Khilafat movement emphasizes its international aspect, focusing on the Indian Muslims' pan-Islamic sympathies for the Ottoman sultan-caliph following the defeat of Turkey in World War I. This approach stems from concerns of British imperial policy and also tends to treat Muslims as a monolithic category. What I have done is to study the concerns of the particular Indian Muslims involved in the movement, their attempts to communicate their own sense of Islamic identity to others and hence to create a Muslim constituency within the context of Indian nationalism, using the symbol of the caliph and the opportunity afforded by conditions around the time of World War I. In looking at this particular case of political mobilization, I hope to have illuminated the general problem of the relationship of Islamic religious and cultural identity to nationalist movements.

I am deeply grateful to the many people who helped me during this study. I would first like to thank the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare for the Fulbright/Hays grant for 1967-68 which enabled me to do research for the original dissertation. My thanks go also to the librarians and staffs of the India Office Library, London; the National Archives of India; the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library and the Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi; the UP Government Secretariat Record Room; the Nadwat al-Ulama; and Firangi Mahal, Lucknow; Aligarh Muslim University; the Dar al-Ulum, Deoband; the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society; the Asafiya State Library and Osmania University, Hyderabad.

I would like to thank the many individuals who gave me help and encouragement during the course of my research. Dr. Holden Furber, my advisor, deserves special thanks for his patience and guidance. Donald E. Smith suggested the topic originally. Peter Hardy, Ralph Russell, and the

late Aziz Ahmad provided helpful suggestions. To Khurshidul Islam and his family go my special thanks for taking me into their home in Aligarh and helping me to improve my halting Urdu. To Maulana Muhammad Tayyib, Muhtamim of the Dar al-Ulum, Deoband, and his family, I am grateful for help and hospitality. To the Maharaj Kumar of Mahmudabad, Muhammad Amir Haidar Khan, I am grateful for making his family history and a number of letters available to me. I am thankful to the late Dr. Sayyid Mahmud, the late Zahid Shaukat Ali, Sayyid Ali Zaheer, the late S. M. Tonki, and Qazi Abdul Wadud for lengthy interviews. My thanks also go to S. Bashiruddin and Dr. K. A. Nizami of Aligarh for their interest and help, to Mufti Raza Ansari of Firangi Mahal for permitting me to consult the Abdul Bari papers and his own collection of pamphlets, to V. C. Joshi of the Nehru Museum and to Souren Roy and Miss D. G. Keswani of the National Archives of India for their assistance, and to Dr. M. Mujeeb and Mohibbul Hasan of the Jamia Millia for permitting me to see the Muhammad Ali papers.

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Thomas Graham deserves special thanks for his long-suffering companionship over five years while this work was in progress. It is dedicated to the memory of our son, Mark Emlen Graham.

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## INTRODUCTION

The caliph, successor to the Prophet Muhammad, commander of the faithful, the shadow of God on earth—these exalted titles convey the symbolic importance of the caliphate (*khilafat*) to the community of Islam. In theory, the caliph was both the spiritual and temporal leader of the Sunni Muslims, ensuring the defense and expansion of the rule of divine justice on earth, and in thus furthering God's purpose, helping to assure eternal salvation for all Muslims.<sup>1</sup>

By the end of World War I, however, those titles were about all that remained of the glory of the Islamic caliphate. The Ottoman Empire had been defeated with the other Central Powers, and the victorious European powers were preparing a peace treaty which would divide its territories. The Arabs were seeking independence from their Ottoman overlords, and the Turks themselves were drawing away from their imperial past in favor of a regenerated Turkish homeland. Yet in 1919, Muslims in India launched a movement designed to pressure the British government to preserve the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire as they had been in 1914, and to preserve intact the spiritual and temporal authority of the Ottoman sultan as caliph of Islam. What prompted this romantic adherence to an outdated theory of the caliphate, this apparently naive championship of a pan-Islamic cause already dried up at its source?

Several studies of the Khilafat movement stress its pan-Islamic content as part of a long history of Indian Muslim identification with the Muslim world.<sup>2</sup> Others stress the psychological support pan-Islamic militance offered Indian Muslims in the repudiation of loyalty to British rule and their participation in the predominantly Hindu nationalist movement.<sup>3</sup> This pan-Islamic emphasis, however, presents several interpretive problems, in addition to the rhetorical questions posed above. The first is the question of

extraterritorial loyalty to the community of Islamic believers. The implication is that the Khilafat movement, though nominally supportive of Indian nationalism, was actually working at cross purposes to it, or was, at best, ambivalently nationalist. According to this interpretation, Indian Muslims felt threatened by the development of nationalism and looked to the caliphate for protection and defense, though what form this defense would take is not specified.<sup>4</sup> The present study does not deny the existence of feelings of Islamic brotherhood in the Khilafat movement—there will be frequent examples of the force of such emotion<sup>5</sup>—but rather emphasizes the variety of individual motivations within the movement, as well as its distinctly nationalist character.

The second problem posed by a pan-Islamic interpretation of the movement is that it assumes a monolithic Indo-Muslim response to the fate of the caliphate.<sup>6</sup> The assumption is natural if one's sources are restricted to the statements made by the Khilafat movement's leaders, in English, to their British rulers. But in order to understand better what the Khilafat movement was all about, it is necessary to look at who among the Indian Muslims were involved in the movement, and what was being said to whom at different levels in the political process. Only then can one judge whether the movement was primarily pan-Islamic and as such tangential to Indian nationalism, or whether it was something else: the use of pan-Islamic symbols to forge a pan-Indian Muslim constituency. If it was the latter, then the Khilafat movement can be viewed as a phenomenon of particular relevance to India, one that sought to reconcile Islamic identity with Indian nationality, and hence comparable in many of its aspects to other nationalist, as opposed to supranationalist, movements.<sup>7</sup>

The Khilafat movement was primarily a campaign by a particular group of Indian Muslim leaders to unite their community politically by means of religious and cultural symbols meaningful to all strata of that community.<sup>8</sup> As such, it can be viewed as a quest for "pan-Indian Islam." A united, pan-Indian Muslim constituency, if it could in fact be mobilized, would in turn permit genuine Muslim participation in the Indian nationalist movement. This seeming paradox can be explained in the reasoning of the Khilafat leaders: Muslims in India, if united, could offset their minority status by their ability to bargain from a position of strength, whether with the British government or with the Hindus

in the Indian National Congress. The Congress, needing Muslim support to strengthen the campaign for self-government at this critical period, would have to listen to Muslim desires, recognize minority rights, and make some political concessions.

Muslim self-assertion, in the Khilafatist view, thus did not conflict with Muslim collaboration in Indian nationalism; it actually made it possible. The Khilafat leadership genuinely wished to assist the freedom movement, but their nationalism was based on the premise of Indian Muslim unity, a highly problematic premise, but no more problematic between 1919 and 1924 than the idea of Indian national unity itself. The Khilafat leaders sought to create Indian Muslim unity just as the Congress leaders sought to mitigate the differences within their own movement. These quests were not identical, but they may be viewed as parallel rather than contradictory.

Muslims in India had always been divided by regional, linguistic, class, and sectarian differences. This lack of homogeneity is a factor which needs to be borne constantly in mind while examining the actions and pronouncements of the Khilafat leaders. But Indian Muslims had a common denominator, Islam, and with it a set of symbols of solidarity: the community of believers, the *ummah*; its symbolic head, the caliph; its central place of pilgrimage, Mecca; its scripture, the Quran; its sacred law, the *shari'a*; and its local reference point, the mosque. This common faith and common set of symbols offered a way to articulate a common identity based on religion, and the means for an astute set of political leaders to mobilize Indian Muslims as a political constituency.

To understand the Khilafat movement, it is also important to look at the ways in which that mobilization took place. This was the age of the emergence of the professional politician in India, part journalist, part orator, part holy man. During the Khilafat movement, communication of political issues took place mostly at the local level: in the vernacular press, by oratory on the public platform, in local mosques and bazaars, by means of handbills and pamphlets, in verse,<sup>9</sup> slogan, and song, by processions and demonstrations, many organized by local associations and groupings which were not primarily political, but rather were cultural, religious, or personal networks.<sup>10</sup> The Khilafat leaders toured endlessly, since personal contact between politicians and populace

was important, as was the ability to speak stirringly on any local grievance and to relate it to the national cause.

In short, the major flaw in a wholly pan-Islamic interpretation of the Khilafat movement is that, by concentrating on the efforts of a few Indian Muslims abroad to influence the outcome of the terms of peace following World War I, it neglects the most significant aspects of the movement: the processes of communication going on in India at various levels in the society, new methods of organizing political activity, and the changing styles of religious and political leadership. This study seeks to examine these added dimensions and to arrive at a fuller understanding of the movement.

Before turning to the Khilafat movement itself, it is necessary to review the history of the caliph as a symbol of Islamic solidarity in India in order to understand the significance of the caliphate to those who espoused the cause in 1919.

### *The Caliph as a Symbol of Islamic Solidarity*

The Indian Muslim community is far from united. In the introduction to his study of Indian Muslims, Mujeeb pointedly asks, "Who are the Indian Muslims?" and answers the question, by no means conclusively, by citing innumerable variations based on historic, geographic, tribal, and sectarian differences.<sup>11</sup> Other recent studies of political developments among Indian Muslims also effectively cut the mythical Muslim monolith into its component parts.<sup>12</sup>

This heterogeneity has been an important factor in the community's history from the earliest Muslim conquests in India, and it governed Indian Islam's relationship with the caliphate. Some sultans of Delhi offered symbolic allegiance to the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad before 1258, and even to the later shadow caliphs in Cairo, in return for recognition as righteous sultans.<sup>13</sup> They may have done this out of devotion to the unity of the *ummah*. But even more, the early slave sultans were attempting to gain some form of legitimacy under Islamic law and thus maintain their power over uneasy ulama and factious nobles. The Mughals, according to inscriptions on their coins, assumed the title of caliph within India.<sup>14</sup> This may also be interpreted as an attempt to establish the legitimacy of their line, to enhance their reputation as just rulers.

and to create solidarity among the various elements of the empire.<sup>15</sup>

The Mughals were successful in establishing themselves as the source of legitimacy within India. The British East India Company derived its original authority in India from the Mughal emperor and continued to recognize him, theoretically at least, as suzerain until 1857. Various Indian Muslim princes likewise continued to profess allegiance to the emperor in symbolic ways, even when they were independent of him. The Mughal emperor's name was read in the *khutba*, the sermon during the weekly congregational prayer service, and coinage was minted in his name.<sup>16</sup> Other princes, seeking to establish hegemony in their own regions, turned toward the Ottoman sultan-caliph as a source of legitimacy. One example was Tipu Sultan of Mysore, who sent an embassy to the Porte in 1785-90. His emissaries secured a letter recognizing him as an independent king.<sup>17</sup>

The caliphate, as a symbol of Muslim unity and the supremacy of the *shari'a*, thus had a special significance in the history of Muslim rule in India. The caliph was particularly important in times of political confusion and strife as a source of legitimacy based on the *shari'a*, and as a source of solidarity among the ruler, the ulama, and the nobility. The locus of the caliphate and the person of the caliph mattered little; it was the existence of the caliphate which was essential, as a symbol to which homage was rendered, as a banner for Muslim rulers to wave when threatened by conquest or internal dissension.

When the British finally extinguished Mughal rule after 1857, they eliminated a whole symbolic structure of authority. The Ottoman sultan was the one remaining Sunni potentate, and hence the only possible candidate for caliph. He was the symbol not only of the survival of the rule of Islamic law, but also of past Islamic glory. In the late nineteenth century, for a variety of reasons, a new and widespread acknowledgment of the Ottoman sultan as caliph developed in India. Imams began to read the sultan's name in the *khutba* on Fridays in some Indian mosques. Each time the Ottomans were involved in a war—the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 or the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, Muslims in India launched fund drives for Turkish relief.<sup>18</sup> Such actions did not imply political allegiance to the Turkish ruler, but they were testimony to a sympathy for Turkey which could be exploited in the interests of Muslim solidarity, whether within India or without.

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The British were the first to exploit this pro-Turkish feeling among Indian Muslims. During the 1857 uprising, they obtained a proclamation from the Ottoman sultan calling on Indian Muslims to remain loyal to British rule.<sup>19</sup> They also wished to bolster the Ottoman Empire against Russian encroachment to protect their imperial lines of communication, as they did during the Crimean war and after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78.<sup>20</sup> Thus, for Indian Muslims, their own sentiments and British policies combined to magnify the importance of the Ottoman Empire, and led them to expect British support for the sultan-caliph, an expectation which was later disappointed.<sup>21</sup>

The Ottoman sultan, Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909), shrewdly encouraged the pan-Islamic sentiments of Muslims everywhere in order to bolster his own position against the aggressive European powers and political opposition at home. The chief propagandist of this late nineteenth-century pan-Islamic movement was Jamal-uddin al-Afghani (1838-97). Afghani's pan-Islamism stressed the role of religion as a socially cohesive force, and although he did not initially champion the cause of the Ottoman dynasty, he ultimately came to see the utility of the sultan-caliph as a symbol of Islamic unity. His major goal was fending off Western hegemony, and any form of solidarity among Muslims, or among Muslims and their non-Muslim compatriots, would help attain that goal. Pan-Islam in this anti-Western form was not hostile to nationalism, but was rather a kind of protonationalism.<sup>22</sup>

Afghani visited India several times during his career, but it is difficult to assess the extent of his influence there. As with so much of Afghani's life, the accounts conflict. Some make this fiery orator and perpetual political exile the father of pan-Islam in India and elsewhere. Others have found that his impact on Indian Muslim thought during his lifetime was insignificant. Only later, when certain Indian Muslim leaders saw the relevance of a pan-Islamic issue to their own political needs, was Afghani hailed as their intellectual ancestor.<sup>23</sup>

In the early twentieth century, as the Ottoman Empire was increasingly beset by revolt in the Balkans and attack by covetous European powers, the caliph continued to be a symbol of Islamic solidarity, but now of Islam in danger. This aspect of the symbol was of particular relevance to those Muslims in India who were

descended from, or identified with, the former Mughal ruling elite. This group, again, was by no means homogeneous, nor was its response to the imposition of British rule uniform. The plight of the caliphate, however, seemed to reflect the fate of Islamic rule in India, and by extension, the threatened position of the Muslim elite in the rapidly changing political conditions of the times. In addition, the ulama were concerned that the institution of the caliphate, symbolic of the supremacy of Islamic law, continue to exist. If the concern for the combined temporal and spiritual authority of the sultan-caliph had little to do with the realities of the Turkish situation in 1919, it nevertheless reflected the anxieties of these groups among Indian Muslims. The leadership of the Khilafat movement emerged from among these groups.

### *Pan-Indian Islam and Indian Nationalism*

The study of a group of Indian Muslims who were willing to use Islamic symbols to rally a following, and to espouse the Indian nationalist cause, forms a necessary background to the Khilafat movement itself. For this background, we must look at the cultural and educational movements which arose among North Indian Muslim elites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These movements, and the schools and journals they engendered, provided the organizational basis and the personnel for later Muslim political activities. In raising funds to start schools, and in publicizing ideas for social and cultural reform, these movements evolved styles of leadership, built up organizational networks, and mobilized supporters and opponents. Rivalries for leadership also arose within the various organizations, and these factional conflicts provided the impetus for increased politicization.

Since other studies have gone into greater detail on these Muslim cultural movements and educational institutions<sup>24</sup> and the links between them and later political organization,<sup>25</sup> it will suffice here to concentrate on those organizations and institutions which nurtured the later Khilafat leaders, as these reveal patterns of cultural self-assertion and political mobilization which are of wider application. An examination of the Aligarh movement and of the Deoband and Firangi Mahal madrasas reveals a diversity of response to the imposition of British political and cultural hegemony—a further cause for division among the already heterogeneous Mus-

lim leadership. As each of these movements sought support for its institutions from the wider community, leaders emphasized themes which helped promote Muslims' awareness of themselves as a community, all-Indian and Islamic.

Following the upheaval of 1857, Muslim rule came virtually to an end in India;<sup>26</sup> the Muslim elite had been politically and culturally dispossessed. As British rule spread, English replaced Persian as the language of government and higher education; Muslim charitable endowments (*waqfs*) for schools and other social institutions were resumed by the government; and the practice of appointing *qadis*, judges trained in Islamic law, as advisors to British magistrates was discontinued. Traditional Muslim education lost its source of funds and was no longer a sure avenue to administrative and professional employment. The need for reform of Muslim education was obvious, for without the appropriate education, all roads to prominence, whether political or social, were closed.<sup>27</sup>

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Aligarh movement began as a drive for improved vernacular education, and it always retained a strong attachment to Urdu as the lingua franca of the Muslim community, and to writing and publishing in Urdu. But Aligarh was also the center of English education for the North Indian Muslim elite. English was the medium through which their community could advance into the modern world; it was the language of science, enlightenment, and the government. Aligarh was to be a "Muslim Cambridge," training boys for leadership of the community as well as service to the British Raj.<sup>28</sup> The loyalism of Aligarh was expedient, for Sir Sayyid needed British patronage to establish and expand his college, but it was also a way to reestablish Muslim prominence. The Muslim elite had served the Mughals in administrative and professional capacities and now proposed to do the same in the context of British rule. The Aligarh movement was, for all its opposition to "political agitation," a political as well as a cultural movement. It aimed at producing a cadre of Muslims who would ultimately lead the entire community toward modern education, social reform, and renewed political power. Aligarh's emphasis on the self-awareness of Muslims as a community was even more pronounced in the generation after Sir Sayyid, when the campaign to secure a Muslim university sought to gain support from Muslims of all classes and persuasions from all over

India. What started as an elite educational movement became a means to mobilize a widespread Muslim constituency.

Another, more traditional, movement for reform among Indian Muslims was begun by the ulama. Such institutions as the Deoband School were founded to reform Muslim education and society from within, rather than adopting English education and the infidel culture which accompanied it. Through a return to the sources of the *shari'a*, the Quran and *hadith*, these ulama sought to reform the teaching of Islamic law and to promote its application in contemporary Muslim society. Through the revitalization of Islamic culture, they sought to reestablish Muslims' devotion to religion and confidence in their own past as sources of solidarity. Like the Aligarh movement, but along different lines, the educational movement among the ulama led to greater Muslim self-awareness.

The madrasas sought to train a cadre of Muslim leaders who would assert the importance of the ulama as social arbiters of the community, who would spread traditional education, the observance of Islamic religion, and the injunctions of Islamic law more widely than ever before. In pursuit of these goals, the madrasas established fund-raising networks, promoted publication of religious works and journals in Urdu, gave advice to the public on points of Islamic law, and maintained contact with their graduates throughout India. The new madrasas were traditional in outlook, but modern in organization and pan-Indian horizons.

Both the traditional and the modernist reform movements thus sought in their own ways to mobilize Indian Muslims to reach aims which were neither originally nor ostensibly political. But the organization of the Indian Muslim community, under the leadership of individuals from either movement, created a political force with which their British rulers and Hindu compatriots had to reckon. Although their original aims were apolitical, neither the ulama nor the Aligarh leaders were blind to the political possibilities of Indo-Muslim solidarity.

The development of Muslim political organizations out of these cultural and educational movements is a complex process, combining growing Muslim self-awareness as a community with a series of British policy decisions which affected the Muslim elites directly. Their earlier sense of cultural dispossession was heightened at the beginning of the twentieth century when the govern-

ment of the United Provinces proposed installing Hindi alongside Urdu as the judicial language. Aside from the obvious advantages Muslim lawyers derived from having Urdu as the judicial language in this populous province, Urdu was of great symbolic importance. Its script was a link to the language of the Quran, and its propagation as a lingua franca for Indian Muslims was an important part of both the traditional and modernist reform movements. Even so loyal a Muslim as Muhsin al-Mulk, Sir Sayyid's successor at Aligarh, spoke out against this change in British policy.<sup>29</sup>

Loyalty to British rule, a firm policy of the Aligarh movement, was incorporated into the founding principles of the Muslim League in 1906. This policy was rewarded in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 with the granting of separate Muslim electorates. But then, in response to nationalist agitation, the government revoked the partition of Bengal in 1911, eliminating the Muslim majority province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, thereby removing an important source of administrative posts and political influence for Muslim Bengalis. The leadership of the League thus learned that agitation, as well as loyalty, got results. Thereafter, loyalism and its exponents came increasingly under fire from a growing number of younger Muslim leaders who were willing to combine Muslim self-assertion with the methods and goals of Indian nationalism.

Muslim opposition to the British grew in the years 1911-13, when the series of Balkan wars became another source of anxiety to Muslims. The Muslim press viewed the wars as evidence that the Christian powers were conspiring to crush the Ottoman Empire and the caliph of Islam. Western-educated Muslims had an additional reason to mistrust the British: the refusal to grant the Aligarh Muslim University in 1912. The government, by stalling and then turning down Muslim proposals for a university, turned even loyal Aligarh into a hotbed of resentment.

Among the men who established themselves as the spokesmen for this new current of anti-British feelings were Westernized products of Aligarh, such as Muhammad Ali, and ulama such as Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal, Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan of Deoband, and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. They founded a variety of new organizations designed to raise funds and medical aid for the beleaguered Turks, to preserve and defend Islamic holy places,

and to aid destitute *hajis*. They also publicized their views about Indo-Muslim education, social and political organization, and the happenings in the Middle East in an increasingly popular and outspoken Urdu press. Deeply religious men, sincerely concerned over the future of the Ottoman Empire, they were also politically ambitious. The one quality aided the other goal. They were aware of the opportunities perceived threats to Islam gave them to point out the folly of loyalty to Britain, and to oust their rivals from leading positions in Muslim educational institutions and political organizations. Events in the Middle East and in India thus reinforced each other. It is impossible to say that pan-Islamic sentiments were the sole—or even the prime—reason for the later Khilafat leaders' turn toward anti-British politics.

The prewar patterns of organization reemerged in 1919 when the more palpable postwar danger to the caliphate gave the anti-British Muslim leaders a new opportunity to build their political edifice. A religious issue united the ulama with the Westernized politicians, and helped convince the masses that Islam was in danger. A pan-Islamic symbol opened the way to pan-Indian Islamic political mobilization. Once again, religious faith and anti-British political zeal reinforced each other. Gandhi espoused the Khilafat cause because he saw it primarily as an anti-British issue, a means to bring the Muslims into the nationalist movement, and a big boost to his plans to reorganize and redirect the Congress into a mass movement. He was also drawn to the Khilafatists because he found them kindred spirits favorable to mass political activity. The alliance with Gandhi and the Congress was also a marriage of convenience for the Khilafat leaders, since their recognition by the nationalists as Muslim spokesmen helped establish their claim before Indians and British alike to be the leaders of a united Muslim constituency.

This study of the Khilafat movement will focus first on a few leading individuals and their early careers in cultural movements, where the vision of an Indian Muslim community united for educational and later political action first emerged. The struggle for leadership in these movements led these individuals to evolve a style of political leadership based upon deeply felt and evocative religious beliefs and symbols. After 1919, these leaders mobilized a mass following using the techniques of organization and publicity they had learned earlier, with important consequences for the Indian nationalist movement.

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## EMERGENCE OF THE LEADERSHIP

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, two distinct movements for educational reform arose among Indian Muslims. Both were cultural but potentially political: they arose in response to the imposition of British rule in India, and in emphasizing the need for Muslim cultural regeneration, helped create among Indo-Muslims a greater awareness of themselves as a community.

One movement, led by the ulama, sought to strengthen Islamic culture in India from within through the founding of new madrasas. These madrasas made some reforms in the traditional curriculum, but they were more important as institutional centers which facilitated the organization of the ulama for service to a wider public. Such services included the promotion of basic religious education and the observance of Islamic law in the Muslim community. The other movement, centered at Aligarh, advocated Western education for Muslims, maintaining that self-regeneration was not enough. Education in English and the Western arts and sciences would advance the community more quickly and more surely, and bring additional advantages: employment in government service and the professions, greater attention from their rulers, and ultimately, access to power.

The contrasts between the traditional and the Westernizing cultural movements, however, should not be overstressed. More significant are the parallels in their development which show the interconnection between early cultural and educational movements and later political associations. In the case studies which follow, the main purpose is to examine the early careers of the Khilafat leaders. But a pattern emerged from these studies which may help to elucidate the less tangible dimensions of the development of Muslim politics in South Asia: those having to do with personal emotions, religious beliefs, and their articulation into

ideologies and organizations which could command a following.

The pattern is as follows: The cultural movements of the late nineteenth century sought to found educational institutions in response to, but also within the framework of, British rule. Whether these institutions actually sought British patronage or maintained their independence from government funding, they established a *modus vivendi* with the British administration, and kept aloof from political activity, in order to concentrate on their educational programs.

Rivalries for leadership existed within the various educational institutions, however, based upon personality clashes or upon disagreements over educational policy. Factions formed around individual leaders, with loyalties grounded in blood relationship, religious discipleship, or ideological agreement. One faction would be successful in establishing its control over the educational institution in question, another faction would be outmaneuvered. The established faction was more concerned with maintaining its position within the institution, while the dissident faction was obliged to look beyond the walls of the institution to increase its influence, with the goal of eventually displacing the rival group. The style of the dissidents tended to be more popular and outspoken. In their rivalry for control of an institution, however, both factions turned to broad-based methods of mobilization by calling upon traditional networks of religious discipleship, or by new methods of recruitment—alumni organizations, fund-raising drives, or publications aimed at the entire Urdu-reading public. The rivalries within educational institutions thus gradually spread to become rivalries for community leadership, at first religious and cultural, later political.

The British government, in its position as educational overseer and patron, also got involved, supporting the faction which was more favorable to the administration (actually or potentially) and thereby placing the dissident faction in an anti-British category. British administrators also tended to look upon the activities of the more outspoken leaders as somewhat undesirable, if not explicitly seditious. So rivalries for educational leadership inevitably developed pro- and anti-British dimensions, whether such considerations had been part of the original factional difference or not. As political organizations emerged from their cultural and educational parent institutions, the question of loyalty or opposition to

British rule assumed greater importance. What may well have started as a question of individual taste or emotional predilection became a question of ideological importance. The point is that in explaining the emergence of Indo-Muslim political leadership, differences of personality, of belief, and of cultural policy are just as crucial as the more "rational" considerations such as collaboration or noncollaboration with British rule and competition for government patronage.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Aligarh Movement*

The Aligarh movement, begun by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98), was the most important example of a Westernizing cultural reform movement among Indian Muslims. Even Western-educated Muslim leaders who were not products of Aligarh College often became associated with it as patrons or trustees, or as members of the organizational offshoots of the Aligarh movement: the Muhammadan Educational Conference begun in 1886, the Aligarh Muslim University campaign launched in 1898,<sup>2</sup> and the Muslim League founded in 1906.

Aligarh College was founded by Sir Sayyid in 1875. During his lifetime, Aligarh was an educational center dedicated to the proposition that Muslim advancement could best be served by Western education and a policy of loyal cooperation with the British government. The government was both a source of patronage and accreditation for the college. This precluded all forms of political "agitation." But political activity was not ruled out for the future. For example, at the founding of the Muhammad Educational Conference in 1886, Sir Sayyid stated that the organization was designed to bring together Muslims from all regions of India to discuss their differing problems, in order to promote "national brotherhood."<sup>3</sup> The Educational Conference, like later more overtly political groups, had all-India horizons, and thus helped enhance the Indian Muslims' consciousness of themselves as a community.

Even under Sir Sayyid, however, there were disagreements over the policy of loyalty, chiefly in relation to education. Sir Sayyid insisted that the English principal and staff of the college have ultimate say in all matters of curriculum and discipline. Some of his closest collaborators broke with him over this issue, maintain-

ing that the Muslim trustees should have the greater voice.<sup>4</sup> After Sir Sayyid's death in 1898, the question of government supervision—or actual interference—at Aligarh became a major issue dividing factions at the college. First came the question of who would succeed Sir Sayyid as honorary secretary of the college. Government education officials and the English faculty of the college considered Sayyid Mahmud, Sir Sayyid's son and hand-picked successor, a weak reed. He was eventually shunted aside in favor of Muhsin al-Mulk, a former official in the service of the nizam of Hyderabad and a collaborator of Sir Sayyid. Muhsin was considered at once more capable and more amenable, but even he crossed swords with the government when he led the movement to block the recognition of Hindi along with Urdu as a judicial language in UP. The principal of the college, Theodore Morison, and the lieutenant-governor of UP, who was a patron of the college, felt that such political activity was unbecoming to the honorary secretary and pressured Muhsin to dissociate himself from the Hindi-Urdu controversy.<sup>5</sup>

A second question involving government versus Muslim control at Aligarh arose with the Muslim University campaign. Soon after Sir Sayyid's death, the Sir Sayyid Memorial Fund was established with the aim of raising sufficient money to expand the college into a university.<sup>6</sup> Sayyid Mahmud had first proposed the idea of a Muslim university in 1873. He envisaged an institution "perfectly free from any control by the government, beyond mere supervision."<sup>7</sup> The issue of government control was a constant theme throughout the campaign until the actual founding of the Muslim University in 1920.<sup>8</sup>

Another issue raised during the early university movement concerned the composition of Aligarh's board of trustees. The 1889 college constitution set the number of trustees at seventy, to be appointed for life. All Muslims, the trustees were initially taken from the College Fund Committee, and thus the board was composed of wealthy old patrons of Aligarh.<sup>9</sup> As the years went by, younger men at Aligarh began to complain that these regulations perpetuated the rule of old men. They wished to abolish the provision for life tenure in order to infuse new blood into the Muslim governing body. They also argued in favor of expansion of the board. The alumni of the college wanted a greater say in policy formation at their own institution.<sup>10</sup> The graduates of

Aligarh thus became a force in college affairs. In October 1899, an Old Boys' Association was formed, which by 1903 had gained the right to elect three representatives to the board of trustees.<sup>11</sup> The chief figures among this group were Aftab Ahmad Khan, Shaukat Ali, and Muhammad Ali.

Aftab was from a family that had served the princely states of Tonk and Gwalior. He had studied at Aligarh before going on to Cambridge and the Inns of Court. At Cambridge, Aftab picked the Aligarh movement to be the outlet for his considerable talents. When he returned to Aligarh to practice law, he was appointed a member of the board of management of the college and secretary of the Sir Sayyid Memorial Fund. He was active in the Muhammadan Educational Conference, and in 1904 he was elected secretary of the Old Boys' Association.<sup>12</sup> He also became a trustee of the college, one of a group of Aligarh residents who, because they were on the spot, were able to have more say in college affairs than non-resident trustees. Aftab was dedicated to the idea that Aligarh was the vehicle to carry Indian Muslims toward intellectual and social reform, and ultimately, political activity. Through the Memorial Fund, the Muhammadan Educational Conference, and the old Boys' Association, he worked to spread Aligarh's influence in the community at large.<sup>13</sup>

The Ali brothers, like Aftab, came from a family in the service of a princely state, Rampur, but there the resemblance ceased. Aftab was reticent, straight-laced, and humorless; the Alis were voluble, impetuous, and fun-loving. Their father had died when the youngest of his six children, Muhammad, was less than two years old, leaving his widow, Abadi Banu Begam, to raise her brood with the help of relatives. In vowing to give her three sons a Western education, Bi Amman, as she was affectionately known, braved the wrath of the boys' uncle. He had refused to finance the education of "infidels," so she pawned her gold jewelry to send Shaukat and Zulfiqar to an English-medium school. Her determination won over the uncle, who redeemed her ornaments and financed Muhammad's education as well. All three boys were later sent to Aligarh College to complete their education.<sup>14</sup>

Shaukat Ali, a boisterous, strapping lad, renowned as cricket captain and winner of the Cambridge speaking prize, earned his B.A. from Aligarh in 1894. He joined government service as a subdeputy opium agent, and later financed his more brilliant and

ambitious younger brother's education in England. He was chosen a member of the Sir Sayyid Memorial Fund Committee in 1898, an appropriate outlet for his oratorical talents. He was also an energetic fundraiser, and a trustee of the college.<sup>15</sup>

Muhammad Ali, also noted for his oratory, earned his degree in 1896 and went to England to stand for the Indian Civil Service examinations, but failed. He returned to India in 1902 after taking a B.A. in history at Oxford. He then tried to secure a position on the faculty at Aligarh but Morison turned him down.<sup>16</sup> Undaunted, he entered the service of Baroda state, but like his brother devoted much of his spare time to his alma mater. He spoke frequently in support of Aligarh at public meetings and wrote articles for the *Times of India* on Aligarh affairs. For his eloquence on the platform and in print, Muhammad Ali became the darling of Aligarh students. He was also active in the Old Boys' Association and later became one of the nonresident trustees.<sup>17</sup>

Strong personalities of such differing types active in the same organization inevitably spelled trouble, and a factional dispute erupted within the Old Boys' Association between Aftab's group and the Ali brothers.<sup>18</sup> In 1907 Shaukat and Muhammad organized an Old Boys' Reform League aimed at driving out Aftab's "clique," and their popularity among Aligarh alumni brought them success. By 1912, membership in the Old Boys' Association increased almost fourfold thanks to their efforts, and Shaukat was elected secretary in that year.<sup>19</sup> But aside from personal rivalry, little separated the Aftab and Ali factions in internal matters at Aligarh. Both were staunch defenders of the ultimate authority of the Muslim community in the college, as represented by the board of trustees and the honorary secretary. Both supported Viqar al-Mulk, Muhsin al-Mulk's successor as honorary secretary, in his disputes with the English faculty. Both were viewed with suspicion by the British authorities.<sup>20</sup>

Differences of strategy soon arose between the two groups, however. While Aftab concentrated on consolidating his position within the group of local trustees at Aligarh and within the Muhammadan Educational Conference, the Alis began to mobilize new, but limited, popular support. The Reform League and their campaign to expand the membership of the Old Boys' Association were cases in point. The reconstitution of the board of trustees was another. Besides the abolition of life tenure in favor of

five-year elected terms, they proposed broader voting constituencies for the selection of trustees. The present board of trustees would elect thirty members drawn from merchant and professional classes; the Old Boys' Association—the Ali brothers' preserve—would elect thirty-five members; and ten members would be chosen by various Muslim organizations including the Educational Conference and the Muslim League.<sup>21</sup> The Ali brothers' approach to power in the college was through communitywide politics. Though still focused on Aligarh, their sights soon ranged further afield.

While these forces were contending for power within the college, Aligarh was beginning to depart from Sir Sayyid's apolitical strategy. One result of Western education was more articulate Muslim involvement in public issues. Muhammad Ali pointed out in a *Times of India* article that if the British really wanted to maintain their administrative monopoly, they had made a mistake in educating Indians.<sup>22</sup> Another result was that the various groups at Aligarh and in the Educational Conference began to feel the need for a political organization to represent Muslim interests.

Events in 1906 precipitated political action by the Aligarh establishment. Lord Morley, the secretary of state, had announced that government reforms were under consideration, and so a group of prominent Muslim leaders topped by the cream of Aligarh hastened to Simla to address the viceroy, Lord Minto. Aftab Ahmad Khan and Mr. Archbold, the principal of Aligarh College, made the arrangements in Simla. The Agha Khan, religious leader of the Ismaili Khoja sect and one of Aligarh's most generous patrons, and Muhsin al-Mulk led the deputation. They petitioned the viceroy for reserved seats for Muslims in the reformed Legislative Councils not only in proportion to their numbers in the population, but also commensurate with their past political importance, and asked that selection of these representatives be by separate Muslim electorates. They also asked for high fixed proportions of Muslims in government services and local governing bodies.<sup>23</sup>

Later that year, the All-India Muslim League was founded at the annual Muhammadan Educational Conference meeting in Dacca. Viqar al-Mulk, Muhsin's successor as secretary of Aligarh College, chaired the meeting. Though Muhammad Ali and a number of younger men attended, the League was dominated by rich, respectable, and loyal figures. True to the heritage of the Aligarh move-

ment, the League proclaimed its loyalty to British rule. It planned to continue lobbying for Muslim political rights, such as separate electorates, and its program mentioned promoting amity with the other communities of India, when that was consistent with the first two aims. Muhsin al-Mulk and Viqar al-Mulk were named joint secretaries, and the headquarters of the League was in Aligarh. In 1908 the Agha Khan was elected permanent president of the League.<sup>24</sup>

Muhammad Ali already envisaged a role for the Muslim League transcending its immediate loyalist and separatist program. Speaking in Allahabad in February 1907, he endorsed the Muslim League as an organization which would promote the integration of India, not its disintegration. He compared the Congress and the League to two trees growing on either side of a road:

Their trunks stood apart, but their roots were fixed in the same soil, drawing nourishment from the same source. The branches were bound to meet when the stems had reached full stature . . . . The soil was British, the nutriment was common patriotism, the trunks were the two political bodies, and the road was the highway of peaceful progress.<sup>25</sup>

The flowery imagery was typical of his oratory, but the message was clear. Here was a man who was first and foremost a Muslim, but who would be indignant if his Indian patriotism were impugned. For him, both in politics and in cultural policy, Muslim self-assertion did not conflict with collaboration in Indian nationalism.<sup>26</sup> But the Muslim League was then primarily concerned with taking advantage of the new opportunities offered to Muslims under the British reforms, and still dominated by the firmly loyal figures at Aligarh. It was premature to consider cooperation with Hindu leaders in the nationalist movement. The group Muhammad Ali represented had yet to make good its bid for control of Aligarh, and of the League. They first had to consolidate their position in these institutions, and only then could they branch out toward the Congress leadership.

The Muslim university movement had been in abeyance for a number of years while disputes at Aligarh revolved around issues of control within the college, and while the Muslim community's attention was directed toward the League's campaign for separate electorates. After 1910, however, the drive for a Muslim university revived in earnest, simultaneously with a movement for a Hindu

university at Benares. The university was to be the premier Muslim educational institution in India and the chief vehicle for Muslim advancement, financed by the entire community.

The Muslim University Foundation Committee replaced the Sir Sayyid Memorial Fund in 1911, with the Agha Khan as its president. He then began an extensive tour throughout India on behalf of the University Fund, accompanied by that intrepid fundraiser, Shaukat Ali, who took leave from the Opium Department for the purpose. They traveled in a special railway car, with much fanfare and enthusiastic coverage by the Urdu press wherever they went. As an aid to raising subscriptions from the entire Muslim community, they played up the idea of a Muslim university with affiliated colleges on the Aligarh model all over India.<sup>27</sup>

A Muslim University Constitution Committee was also formed in 1911, chaired by the raja of Mahmudabad, a wealthy UP landlord and patron of the college. Its members prepared a draft constitution as the basis for discussions between Aligarh and the government, and a delegation from the constitution committee met Sir Harcourt Butler, education member of the government of India, at Simla in May 1911. The delegation included Mahmudabad, Viqar al-Mulk, and Aftab Ahmad Khan. It contained no members of the Ali brothers' group.<sup>28</sup>

The Ali brothers, who had no direct knowledge of the contents of the draft constitution, were drawing up a plan of their own. Shaukat wrote urgently to Muhammad that some move was afoot to give the government undue power in the university. He feared that "Aftab and Co." were going to "perpetuate that great mistake," life tenure for the trustees. Shaukat urged his brother to write up another draft constitution:

You must get ready to prepare a really liberal one. All fellows elected through independent electoral bodies. All the Musalman graduates of India must elect some, Old Boys, members of the Conference, benefactors. . . . Mohamed you must save the situation. . . . Life trustees or life fellows will not be tolerated. Every class of Musalmans will have the right to elect his representatives. . . .<sup>29</sup>

Muhammad set forth his proposals for a constitution in his newly founded English weekly, *Comrade*, then published from Calcutta. He dealt with two aspects of the university administration: the relations of the government to the university, and the

relations of the Muslim community to the university. The second point was clearly the more important to him. He acknowledged the need for government supervision, since the Muslims could not risk losing government recognition of their degrees. He was much more emphatic when it came to relations between the community and the university. The university must be controlled democratically by the entire Muslim community through the formation of electoral colleges representing all regions, donors, Muslim graduates, and the Muslim masses. Above all, the university must not remain under the control of a small local group at Aligarh, but must be an institution for promoting the unity of the Muslim community in general. Nevertheless, he did not even mention affiliation. Muhammad was still preoccupied with internal power considerations at Aligarh; government control, if not excessive, was not viewed as a danger.<sup>30</sup>

The issues of government versus community control of the university and whether or not Aligarh University would be an affiliating institution were the points of discussion between the government and Aligarh representatives over the next two years. Sir Harcourt Butler, a close personal friend of the raja of Mahmudabad, felt that it would be wise to grant the Muslims a university, "to carry them enthusiastically with us."<sup>31</sup> The government of India advised London to accept a Muslim university, provided it was under effective government control, and the secretary of state agreed to negotiations on that basis.<sup>32</sup> The Aligarh constitution committee insisted upon the supremacy in university governance of an all-Muslim court of trustees and also made clear provision for the affiliation of schools and colleges to the university.<sup>33</sup> Finally, in 1912, the government decided to maintain a hard line on government control, and vetoed affiliation.<sup>34</sup> The Aligarh committee could not accept the university under those conditions and thus voted against it.<sup>35</sup>

Disillusionment at Aligarh was considerable. By 1912 the constitution committee contained representatives of both the Aftab and Ali brothers' groups, in addition to staunch loyalists like the Agha Khan, wealthy landlords like the raja of Mahmudabad, plus merchants, educators, journalists, and lawyers. This representative body made no secret of its discontent. Muhammad Ali had by this time become a champion of an all-India affiliating institution, and in the pages of *Comrade* continued his insistence on a minimum

of government interference in a Muslim-run university.<sup>36</sup> Aftab maintained that the power of affiliation was not essential, but that Muslim control over the university was, and thus Muslims should abandon the idea of a university for the present.<sup>37</sup> The two factions had come together in opposition to government educational policies at a time when there were also other causes for Muslim discontent.

The period 1911-12 was a particularly significant one in Indo-Muslim political development, and the government's action in halting the Aligarh Muslim university movement in 1912 was an important factor affecting Western-educated Muslim opinion at that time. Other events, both within India and without, led to further disaffection from the policy of loyalty to British rule.

At the Coronation Durbar of 1911, the partition of Bengal was revoked. Here was an instance where agitation, not loyalty, had paid off. Muhammad Ali gave vent to his misgivings in *Comrade*:

If the legitimate facilities afforded to the Musalmans can be taken away and solemn pledges broken at the bidding of a few demagogues with hysterical followings, there is no knowing that the general political status of the community may suffer the same fate. Such are the fears that have begun to assail the minds of even the most temperate and politically conservative sections of the Musalmans.<sup>38</sup>

The Calcutta meeting of the Muslim League in March 1912 passed a resolution expressing regret at the annulment of partition and calling the move an "utter disregard of Muslim feeling." The Muslim League and Muhammad Ali in *Comrade* both claimed to speak for Muslims in general. This claim was not wholly valid, but it is significant. In making the claim, Muslim journals and political organizations were seeking to create a consensus of Muslim opinion they could then represent.

The Tripolitan and Balkan wars in 1911-12 also profoundly disturbed literate Muslims, who read in the Urdu press of a plot by the Christian powers of Europe against the Ottoman Empire, the last great Muslim power. Part of this conspiracy theory was a frequently repeated theme that European agents were touring the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire incognito, urging autonomy for the Arabs.<sup>39</sup> There seemed to be no thought that the Arabs themselves might want autonomy. A rumor also circulated that Italy had

threatened to bomb the Ka'aba in Mecca and the tomb of the Prophet in Medina in order to pressure Turkey into suing for peace.<sup>40</sup>

During the Tripolitan and Balkan conflicts, the Ali brothers devoted a large part of their seemingly boundless energies to collecting subscriptions for Turkish relief and for a Red Crescent Medical Mission to go to Turkey to aid the wounded. This effort was in addition to their involvement with Aligarh affairs, but it increased their influence on the Aligarh campus. Aligarh students followed their lead and contributed generously to the Turkish Relief Fund, and several outstanding students went to Turkey with the Red Crescent Mission in late 1912.<sup>41</sup>

The studied neutrality of the British government during the Balkan conflicts did nothing to reassure emergent Muslim opinion, for had not Britain always been a friend and ally of the Porte? The Anglo-Russian entente had apparently put an end to all that, and the future looked grim for Turkey. In an editorial in *Comrade*, Muhammad Ali urged Great Britain to abandon its "neutral" policy, stop courting Russia, and make alliances with Muslim kingdoms. He warned that Muslim opinion was aroused. But not to appear unduly disloyal, he called upon religious doctrine. Citing the *khutba* "Oh Lord! help him who helps the faith of Muhammad," he commented that hitherto there had been no reason for excluding the British from those who helped Islam.<sup>42</sup> This bolstering of a political argument with a religious appeal was a technique Muhammad Ali was to use with more and more success in the years to come.

An increasingly vocal Muslim press gave widespread coverage to all issues affecting Muslim opinion. In 1912 *Comrade* followed the government of India from Calcutta to Delhi, where it was joined by a new Muhammad Ali enterprise, *Hamdard*, in Urdu. During the first year of *Comrade's* life, its moderate political tone and polished style won it a considerable readership among officials. But Muhammad Ali had been troubled by financial difficulties, and was concerned to increase circulation. A number of helpful readers suggested he make his paper more attractive by including more news of the Islamic world, and such other features as pictures and maps.<sup>43</sup> This advice coincided with his move to Delhi and his consequent need of more funds, but it is doubtful whether econom-

ics was the main reason for his increased outspokenness in writing on Islamic matters. For one thing, his financial worries were alleviated somewhat by a regular grant from the raja of Mahmudabad.<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, news from the Balkans affected Muhammad Ali deeply, and he naturally gave increased coverage to matters which interested him and appealed to his readers.<sup>45</sup> Early in 1913, *Comrade*, hitherto free of government suspicion, had to deposit a stiff security payment for reproducing a Turkish propaganda pamphlet entitled "Come Over to Macedonia and Help Us."<sup>46</sup>

Muhammad Ali's emphasis on the world of Islam was paralleled by a new Urdu newspaper from Calcutta, *al-Hilal*, edited by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Azad was an *alim* turned journalist and a renowned Urdu stylist. He launched his journal in 1912 and specialized in learned disquisitions on religious reform, plus purple prose dealing with Middle Eastern news. *Al-Hilal* achieved great popularity—less because of the former than through the latter, which also featured gory photographs and charts of the Turkish theater of battle.<sup>47</sup>

The third in this eloquent triumvirate was Zafar Ali Khan, an Aligarh classmate of Shaukat Ali's. In 1910, he took over the editorship of his father's Lahore-based paper, *Zamindar*, and changed it from a mouthpiece of the landlords into a passionate organ of young Muslim political assertiveness. Circulation burgeoned.<sup>48</sup> One of Zafar Ali's most potent political weapons was his satirical Urdu verse on the Balkan wars. Political poetry was another technique of popular appeal which would be used successfully in the future.

In the political atmosphere of 1911–12, the Aligarh Muslim university movement, the revocation of the partition of Bengal, and the Tripolitan and Balkan wars were all issues which aroused Muslim opinion. In their responses to these issues, Muslim cultural and political leaders claimed to speak for all-Indian Muslim opinion. The Ali brothers and others were, in fact, seeking to create such an opinion through their journals and through their activities in raising funds for the Muslim university, Turkish relief, and the Red Crescent Medical Mission. After the collapse of the Aligarh Muslim university campaign in 1912, the Ali brothers retained their interest in Aligarh as a base for their communitywide activities, but turned increasingly to other causes, both religious and political.

### *Deoband*

The Dar al-Ulum, Deoband, was founded in 1867, ten years after the suppression of the revolt of 1857 had resulted in the elimination of the shadowy remnants of the Mughal Empire. The quashing of the uprising had also resulted in the destruction of large sections of Delhi, including the madrasa started by Shah Waliullah, the great eighteenth-century Islamic reformer.

The founders of Deoband, as former students of the Delhi madrasa, were heirs to the tradition of Waliullah, with his emphasis on reform of the traditional curriculum and regeneration of the Islamic social order. Armed opposition to infidel rule, which was a lesser part of Shah Waliullah's legacy, had failed. The first generation of Deobandis therefore concentrated on the founding of an educational institution which could lead the Indian Muslim community along the correct religious and social path.<sup>49</sup>

The school started in a mosque in Deoband, a quiet town in northwestern UP, but soon grew into a full-fledged madrasa under the inspired leadership of Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotavi. Though a learned man, Muhammad Qasim's influence on the school was less as a teacher than as an administrator. He was an orator and a leader who formed the policy of the institution. He was joined by Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, a scholar of *hadith*, and Maulana Zulfiqar Ali, an inspector of government madrasas.<sup>50</sup> This link to the government educational network was significant, for Deoband adopted a number of features modeled on the English system: academic organization by departments, a progression of classes, required attendance, regular examinations, and the granting of a degree upon the completion of the full course.<sup>51</sup>

The Dar al-Ulum constantly sought to broaden its influence, and that of the ulama, in the Muslim community. The founding principles of the Deoband school<sup>52</sup> stressed that the school must seek financial support from all levels of Muslim society, not only from princes and big landlords. The injunction to avoid government patronage at all costs was further evidence of the independent attitude of the Waliullah tradition. In this way, the school would remain independent of financial influence and free to carry its mission of Islamic instruction to the community as a whole. Deoband thus asserted its freedom from the government without opposing it. The madrasa was to be strictly apolitical.<sup>53</sup> Deoband

also instituted a Department of Juristic Rulings (Dar al-Ifta) for the promulgation of *fatawa* in reply to legal questions from the community at large.<sup>54</sup> Among other broad-based activities, Deobandis contributed significantly to the development of a new Urdu religious literature.<sup>55</sup>

The reforming tendencies of Deoband are apparent in its attitude toward those Muslims who were turning away from the traditional curriculum toward English education. Maulana Muhammad Qasim was not opposed to Muslims acquiring a knowledge of modern sciences.<sup>56</sup> Basically, there was little conflict of interest between Deoband and Aligarh, for they were meeting different needs: the one was preserving the traditional sciences without condemning acquisition of the new, and preparing men for religious service; the other was providing Western education for Muslims who desired posts in government and the professions.

Much has been made of the political contrast between Deoband and Aligarh, but one should be careful not to assign later political orientations to the first generation at each institution. Aligarhians and ulama both stayed away from the Congress, in spite of the fact that they took differing public stands toward it. When the Indian National Congress was founded in 1885, Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi issued a *fatwa*. In it, he cited the example of the Prophet Muhammad who, upon leaving Mecca, had allied himself with different groups in Medina in order to combat his enemies. Hence it was all right for the Muslims to cooperate with the Hindus to obtain concessions from the British, provided such activity did not violate any basic principles of Islam.<sup>57</sup> But the ulama did not actually participate in the Congress, or even cooperate with it, until much later. Aligarh, by contrast, made no secret of its pro-British leanings and opposed the founding of the Congress as dangerous political agitation. Practically, however, the two institutions were not very far apart. Both were apolitical in order to concentrate on the business of education, and both maintained friendly relations with the government.

Following the death of Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotavi in 1880, new and contrasting personalities rose to the leadership of the Dar al-Ulum. Muhammad Qasim was succeeded as *sarparast* (guide or superintendent) by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, a leading scholar of *hadith* and a mystic. He resided in his native village of Gangoh rather than at Deoband, and there gave lessons in *hadith*

and jurisprudence.<sup>58</sup> The guidance of the madrasa fell to others, among whom was Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan, son of Maulana Zulfiqar Ali.

Mahmud al-Hasan had been among the earliest students at the Dar al-Ulum and was one of Muhammad Qasim's favorite students. On completion of his course in 1873, he joined the Deoband staff and was himself made *sadr-e-mudarris* (principal) in 1890.<sup>59</sup> He too was a scholar of *hadith* but was especially revered as a compelling speaker and leader of men. A small, intense man with piercing eyes and activist temperament, Mahmud al-Hasan later engaged in politics and was known to his followers as the Shaikh al-Hind. Upon the death of Maulana Rashid Ahmad in 1905, Mahmud al-Hasan was also appointed *sarparast*, thereby uniting in himself two of the top offices of the Dar al-Ulum.<sup>60</sup>

The third top office at the school was that of head administrator or *muhtamim*, which office was held after 1896 by Maulana Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad, son of Muhammad Qasim Nanotavi. Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad was a scholar of *hadith* who had studied at the feet of Maulana Rashid Ahmad in Gangoh. Like his father, however, he was less renowned as a scholar than as an administrator, and his prime concern was the preservation and advancement of the madrasa in line with the policies Muhammad Qasim had laid down. He was opposed to the activism of the Shaikh al-Hind, which he saw as a departure from the apolitical tradition of the Dar al-Ulum, and dangerous to the future of the institution. The contrast in their characters explains many of the differences which arose between Mahmud al-Hasan and Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad.<sup>61</sup> The favorite student of Maulana Nanotavi and his own son were in two of the leading positions at Deoband at the time of Maulana Gangohi's death, and Mahmud al-Hasan's appointment as *sarparast* may have exacerbated their personal rivalry. Factionalism based on loyalties to these two figures was an important factor in events at Deoband during the next fifteen years.

Another element in the personal influence of individual Deobandis was the fact that most of them were not only ulama but Sufis, allied chiefly to the Qadiri and Naqshbandi orders. Hence, their links to their followers could assume either the form of a teacher-student relationship, or that of a spiritual guide (*pir*) to a disciple (*murid*), or both simultaneously. The latter relationship was a particularly strong bond, and the operation of such bonds of

loyalty helped spread the influence of Deobandis far beyond the madrasa's walls. These traditional linkages are crucial to an explanation of the influence of religious figures in Indo-Muslim public life. But in addition, a new pattern of organization among the ulama began to emerge at this time.

As *sarparast* of Deoband, Mahmud al-Hasan began the organization of the ulama for more active religious and social service to the Muslim community. The first such effort was the founding of an association of Deoband graduates known as the Jamiat al-Ansar. The second was directed at English-educated Muslim boys whose religious education was deficient or nonexistent. The latter effort resulted in the founding of a Quranic school in Delhi, the Nazarat al-Ma'arif al-Quraniya. Both plans were aimed at the religious needs of Indian Muslims and at increasing the influence of the ulama among Westernized sections of the community, and had no political content. To help him in these activities, the Shaikh al-Hind called back to Deoband one of his old students, a former Sikh with all the zeal of a convert, Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi.<sup>62</sup>

The Jamiat al-Ansar held its first meeting at Deoband in 1910, simultaneously with the convocation of the Dar al-Ulum, for which many old students, their relatives, and religious disciples were assembled.<sup>63</sup> The aims of the Jamiat were ratified at a second meeting on April 15-17, 1911. The members of the association were to be graduates of Deoband, organized to support the madrasa and to see to its financial, educational, and administrative progress. This objective led to government speculation that the association was in reality a lobby of past students and supporters of the Shaikh al-Hind, organized to challenge the administrative policies of the *muhtamim* and his group.<sup>64</sup> The Jamiat also declared it had no political aims: it was strictly religious and cultural. The activities recommended for its members were these: to arrange for religious instruction and teaching of Arabic to Muslim students in government schools and colleges; to arrange for the placement of well-trained imams in mosques; and to promote publication of inexpensive religious books and pamphlets.<sup>65</sup>

Ubaidullah Sindhi later wrote a pamphlet elaborating on the objectives of the Jamiat al-Ansar, and from this it becomes clear that there was more to these religious and cultural activities than is at first apparent. Besides promoting the spread of religious sciences in the community at large, the organization was to help bring

about reforms within the Deoband madrasa itself. The curriculum should be reworked to emphasize the teachings of Shah Waliullah and Shah Ismail Shahid, the nineteenth-century *mujahidin*<sup>66</sup> leader. Greater emphasis would also be given to public speaking and writing. Ubaidullah recommended founding branches of the Jamiat al-Ansar all over the country and actively campaigning for funds. This enlarged organization would permit the ulama to advise all members of the community in both religious and legal concerns.<sup>67</sup>

The specific recommendations for the curriculum at Deoband show that Mahmud al-Hasan's group was trying to bring pressure to bear on the administration faction to reemphasize the more militant aspects of the Waliullahi tradition. Ubaidullah's scheme for broadening the organization shows that he hoped to use new ways to increase the ulama's influence over the religious life of the community. Only one branch of the Jamiat was ever founded, on Ubaidullah's home ground of Sindh, and no further general meetings of the association seem to have been held after 1911. The Jamiat al-Ansar, though it did not mature, represented in embryonic form a new type of organization of ulama. It linked traditional religious figures with their students and disciples, but had all the trappings of modern social and political organizations: a statement of purpose, officers, branches, fundraising, and the like.

The administration faction at Deoband was made understandably nervous by the potential influence of the Jamiat al-Ansar and the challenge it posed to the *muhtamim*'s control over the policies of the institution. They therefore sought to weaken Mahmud al-Hasan's group at the madrasa by getting rid of Ubaidullah. Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad issued a *fatwa* saying that Ubaidullah was an infidel.<sup>68</sup> Maulana Sindhi left Deoband in 1913, and thereafter the Jamiat al-Ansar seems to have faded away completely. The *muhtamim*'s control over the affairs of the madrasa was reaffirmed. Whether the government had a decisive hand in this is open to question, though it certainly was aware of the factions at Deoband and favored the administration, which was more disposed toward British rule.<sup>69</sup>

Mahmud al-Hasan's second major effort aimed at improving the religious instruction of English-educated Muslim boys. Closely related to his objectives in the Jamiat al-Ansar, this effort too would increase the influence of the ulama over the religious life

of the community, and would also presumably secure him external allies in his struggle for control at Deoband.

When Ubaidullah was forced out of Deoband in 1913, Mahmud al-Hasan sent him to Delhi to start a Quranic school. The patrons of this plan from Aligarh were Viqar al-Mulk, Hakim Ajmal Khan, and Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari.<sup>70</sup> Both Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari played important roles as intermediaries between the ulama and the Western-educated section of the community during the years to come. The hakim was the scion of a family of traditional Muslim medical practitioners, whose ancestors had been physicians to the Mughal court. He was also an active trustee of Aligarh College.<sup>71</sup> Dr. Ansari, likewise a trustee of Aligarh, had had his medical training and residency in England before returning to India in 1910 to practice in Delhi. But his two brothers were hakims, and one of them was a former disciple of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. Hence there were close links between his family and Deoband.<sup>72</sup> He was also linked to the Ali brothers. Dr. Ansari organized and led the Red Crescent Medical Mission to Turkey in 1912, aided by the oratorical and fundraising skills of Muhammad Ali.

The Nazarat al-Ma'arif al-Quraniya was set up in Fatehpuri Masjid, a Mughal mosque in the heart of old Delhi, not far from Dr. Ansari's consulting office. Ajmal Khan and Ansari raised financial support for the school from the nawab of Rampur, the begam of Bhopal, and a number of wealthy Muslim traders of Bombay and Karachi.<sup>73</sup> The main purpose of the school was to teach the Quran and the principles of Islamic theology, but plans were also made to prepare instructors of the Quran for schools and colleges, and to make translations of the Quran into different languages.<sup>74</sup> There was nothing political about such activities, but during the two years of its existence, the Nazarat al-Ma'arif gradually became a forum for informal political discussion. Dr. Ansari introduced Maulana Sindhi to Muhammad Ali and Abul Kalam Azad, both leading political journalists, and Ubaidullah later related that during the years 1913-15, he became politically active.<sup>75</sup>

Reasons for greater political awareness on the part of the ulama during this period are not hard to find. The Tripolitan and Balkan wars of 1911-12 had had a traumatic effect on Indo-Muslim opinion. Thereafter, until the outbreak of World War I, there was

much handwringing both in the press and on the public platform about the fate of the sultan of Turkey, who was the caliph of Islam, at the hands of Christian powers. The Deoband ulama were as deeply affected by these events as were other literate Muslims, for any potential conflict between the caliph and their own Christian ruler would seriously strain their apolitical policy and their good relations with the British government.

Perhaps to remain on the good side of the government, and to consolidate their power over the madrasa, the *muhtamim* and his supporters complained to the government that Ubaidullah had dangerous political views and had been concealing his seditious activities behind the facade of so-called religious organizations.<sup>76</sup> By deliberately going to the government with complaints against their rivals, the administration faction accentuated the anti-British propensities of Mahmud al-Hasan and his supporters. Their opposition to the government was sealed by the simultaneity of the upsetting political events in Turkey and the factional struggle at the Dar al-Ulum. Mahmud al-Hasan's faction subsequently engaged in a form of political activity which showed lack of experience in that realm.<sup>77</sup>

In his political activities, however, the Shaikh al-Hind did not seek to organize a following within India, but rather went back to the medieval pattern of seeking Muslim allies from across the Afghan border. Hence while Mahmud al-Hasan's activities during 1915-16 may certainly be labeled anti-British, it is misleading to regard them as foreshadowing postwar Muslim involvement in nationalist politics. In fact, the educational and cultural organizations of the ulama were more conducive to their later political activity than this chimerical scheme.

In September 1915, Mahmud al-Hasan and a group of his followers left Deoband to perform the *hajj* pilgrimage to Mecca. Earlier, Ubaidullah Sindhi had slipped off to Afghanistan under orders from the Shaikh al-Hind. The reasons for this sudden migration form a whole episode in the postwar Rowlatt Sedition Report known as the Silken Letters Conspiracy. Ubaidullah was to set up a base of operations in Afghanistan for an eventual invasion of India by a force of Afghans and Indians, which would presumably be the signal for a revolt against the British Raj by Indian Muslims. Mahmud al-Hasan hoped to secure Turkish aid for the scheme by contacting Turkish authorities in the Hijaz and eventu-

ally going to Constantinople. Ubaidullah and the Shaikh al-Hind were to correspond via messages carried by their sympathizers, innocent-looking travelers such as the one who fell into the hands of the British with the plan of the operation, written on silk, sewn into the lining of his coat. The scheme thus earned its name in the Rowlatt Report.<sup>78</sup>

Later accounts of the episode tend to glorify its participants, but their contemporary professions of innocence were just as vehement as their later tales of revolutionary zeal. Mahmud al-Hasan protested that his trip to the Hijaz was merely for *hajj*, that he had no plans for armed struggle. His decision to leave India, he said, was prompted by the factional quarrels at Deoband, and by suspicions cast upon him for his refusal to sign a loyalist *fatwa* condemning Turkey for its participation in World War I against the British.<sup>79</sup>

Whether the movement enjoyed such widespread support as its later chroniclers and the Rowlatt Sedition Report claim is open to question. Its planning was haphazard. Its security system was full of leaks. The group in Afghanistan got nowhere.<sup>80</sup> Turkey seems to have given little support to the scheme beyond some encouraging words. In any case, the movement was cut short in 1916, when Sharif Husain of Mecca revolted against his Turkish overlords with the encouragement of Great Britain and obliged his allies by arresting Mahmud al-Hasan and his companions. The pretext was the Shaikh al-Hind's refusal to sign a *fatwa* in favor of the sharif's revolt against the sultan.<sup>81</sup> The sharif then turned his Indian prisoners over to the British, who interned them on Malta for the duration of the war.

### *Firangi Mahal*

Firangi Mahal, a jumble of old residences and courtyards in the Lucknow Chauk, had a much longer history than the Deoband school. Founded during the reign of Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707), Firangi Mahal remained from then on one of the most important centers of Islamic learning in the subcontinent. This was thanks chiefly to Mulla Nizamuddin, one of the founding generation, who evolved the *dars-e-nizamiya*, the basic Islamic curriculum taught in Indian madrasas from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Firangi Mahal was still the stronghold of the *dars-e-nizamiya*, with its

emphasis on Arabic grammar, logic, philosophy, and jurisprudence.<sup>82</sup>

The chief figure at Firangi Mahal in the early twentieth century was Maulana Abdul Bari, a descendant of the founding family. He was educated at Firangi Mahal by his father and other ulama and admitted to the Qadiri and Chishti orders of Sufis. He was thus both an *alim* and a Sufi, and in this dual role he could exercise religious influence over a variety of followers. During his career as an *alim* at Firangi Mahal, Abdul Bari taught Quran and *hadith*, and wrote voluminously.<sup>83</sup> As a Sufi he had a large group of disciples, and his correspondence shows the tremendous spread of his influence, from the Northwest to Bengal to Madras.<sup>84</sup> He was also a passionate orator and a leader in the movement to start religious and social organizations of ulama. Like Mahmud al-Hasan of Deoband, Abdul Bari was by temperament an activist.

In 1905, he started the Madrasa-e-Nizamiya at Firangi Mahal. Up until that time, Firangi Mahal had been a family enterprise where instruction was carried on from generation to generation without any fixed institutional structure. Though Firangi Mahal remained a family enterprise, Abdul Bari felt the need for a more formal structure because he was concerned about improving instruction in the religious sciences, both among members of his family and among his Sufi disciples. Reforming instruction by giving it a regularized institutional structure reflects somewhat the trends at Deoband, but the emphasis at Firangi Mahal remained upon the *dars-e-nizamiya*, rather than on the Quran and *hadith* as at Deoband. Abdul Bari also gathered around himself a small group of English-educated young men to teach them the Quran.<sup>85</sup>

Abdul Bari's various organizational activities at Firangi Mahal were motivated by the desire to spread Islamic knowledge and awareness in the community, but the virus of factionalism also infected the Firangi Mahal family. Supporters of Abdul Bari included Maulana Inayatullah, principal of the Madrasa-e-Nizamiya, Maulana Qutbuddin, Bari's nephew and son-in-law, and Bari's cousins, Maulanas Salamatullah and Sibghatullah.<sup>86</sup> Sibghatullah was the publisher of *an-Nizamiya*, the Urdu organ of the madrasa. Inayatullah was the secretary of the Majlis-e-Islah, a short-lived organization of Firangi Mahalis started in 1910. The goals of the Majlis were rather vague, but on the same pattern as the Jamiat al-Ansar. It was an association representing one faction at

the institution, dedicated to reform in the sense of improving Muslims' knowledge of Islam.<sup>87</sup>

Salamatullah was Abdul Bari's chief lieutenant in the Anjuman-e-Muid al-Islam, a second Firangi Mahal association, also started in 1910. The aims of this organization were to work for the religious progress of the Muslim community within the laws of the current government, to help Muslims progress in worldly matters, and to propagate the injunctions of the *shari'a* in the Muslim community. This too compares with the Jamiat al-Ansar in its desire to spread the influence of the ulama as religious guides for the Muslim community. The Muid al-Islam did not seek to found any branches or to raise funds broadly. It was, on the contrary, quite an exclusive association: new members were to be nominated only by the established membership.<sup>88</sup>

The latter provision was probably intended to exclude Abdul Bari's opponents at Firangi Mahal, chief of whom were two brothers, Maulanas Abdul Majid and Abdul Hamid. Both had resigned their teaching posts at the Madrasa-e-Nizamiya and opposed Abdul Bari for his incipient political activism; both were in the government camp.<sup>89</sup> Eventually, in 1918, Abdul Hamid received a grant of 3000 rupees from the British government to set up another madrasa near Firangi Mahal as a rival to the Madrasa-e-Nizamiya.<sup>90</sup> The British naturally favored their sympathizers, but in so doing affirmed Abdul Bari and his followers in their anti-British tendencies. The Turkish troubles similarly intensified their feelings.

Abdul Bari had always been an avid supporter of Turkey, and of the Turkish sultan as caliph of Islam. In 1897, when the Greco-Turkish war ended favorably for Turkey, a large meeting of rejoicing was held by Lucknow Muslims. Abdul Bari took part in the meeting, which passed a resolution of felicitation to be forwarded to the sultan. When Bari performed *hajj* in 1910-11, he also visited Constantinople. He returned from his pilgrimage entranced by Turkey, the last vestige of Islamic greatness.<sup>91</sup> When the series of disastrous Turkish wars began in 1911, Abdul Bari and his madrasa students traveled the UP collecting money for Turkish relief and for the Red Crescent Medical Mission. This activity brought him into contact with politically active Westernized Muslims, such as Dr. Ansari and the Ali brothers, who were engaged in the same effort.

Abdul Bari was first introduced to Shaukat and Muhammad Ali in December 1912 by Shaikh Mushir Husain Qidwai, one of the Maulana's former Quran students. Given the religious enthusiasm of the times, Bari was anxious to cooperate with these two influential men from the Aligarh camp, to mobilize community support for a religio-political cause. On meeting the Ali brothers, Abdul Bari suggested that they, Qidwai, and he form an association dedicated to the cause of preserving the holy places of Islam from harm. The Turks could no longer do the job alone, given the unsettled conditions in the Middle East, but needed the help of Muslims everywhere. He proposed that they call this association the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba (Society of the Servants of the Ka'aba), and seek the membership of all Muslims in India, thereby uniting them in the service of their religion. Through the association, they could raise funds to ensure the safety of Mecca and Medina, and to aid indigent pilgrims to the holy places.<sup>92</sup>

The Ali brothers were impressed by the Maulana's fervor, and particularly by his religious rationale for their pet political ambition: to unite the Indian Muslims behind a popular cause, in this case the sending of relief to Turkey. They agreed to the founding of the Anjuman. In succeeding years, the Ali brothers became the Maulana's religious disciples. Under his influence they read the Quran in Urdu and were deeply moved by it, and they corresponded with Abdul Bari about their religious life.<sup>93</sup>

The Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba was undoubtedly Abdul Bari's most successful organizational effort. It was formed in 1913, shortly after his first meeting with the Ali brothers, with Abdul Bari as president, and Mushir Husain Qidwai and Shaukat Ali as general secretaries. Its chief aims were to maintain the honor of the Ka'aba and the other holy places of Islam, and to defend them against non-Muslim aggression, purposes they proclaimed were "strictly religious, having nothing to do with politics."<sup>94</sup> To accomplish this, the association planned to solicit the membership of every Muslim in India and collect a membership fee of one rupee each per year, found branches of the organization throughout India, and require each new member to take an oath to lay down his life and property in the service of Allah. The money collected from membership dues, which they grandly estimated would be a crore (ten million) rupees at the end of the first year, would be divided into three parts: the first to be given to Turkey to maintain

the dignity and political independence of the sacred places; the second to be given to Islamic schools, orphanages, and missionary societies; and the third reserved for the future defense of the Ka'aba.<sup>95</sup>

Headquarters of the Anjuman were in Delhi, and branches were started in Lucknow, Bombay, and Hyderabad, Deccan, with many smaller local branches in UP and the Punjab. The leaders toured, held meetings, and printed notices constantly in the Urdu press.<sup>96</sup> They raised funds by asking Muslims to give their *zakat* for the work of the Anjuman. Women's meetings were held with the Ali brothers' mother and the wives of Dr. Ansari and Muhammad Ali leading the appeal for moral and financial support. Members wore crescent badges, and the Ali brothers appeared at public meetings wearing flowing green robes, symbolizing their service to Islam. A list of prominent members of the Anjuman included Dr. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Viqar al-Mulk, former secretary of Aligarh college, a number of important ulama and Sufis, and of course, the Ali brothers. In 1913, the Anjuman enrolled over 8000 members.<sup>97</sup> The symbolism and pageantry helped arouse great enthusiasm, even among groups which had not been politically active before. The emphasis was on the religious content of their cause; the holy places and the pilgrimage must be preserved. But the means envisaged to secure their aims were by no means uniquely religious.

All sorts of schemes had been proposed for the use of their prospective pot of gold. One was to purchase ships for a Muslim steamship company to carry pilgrims between Bombay and Jiddah, in competition with the British firm which then had the monopoly of the pilgrim traffic. Another was to build up a Muslim fleet to be located in the Arabian Sea for the protection of the holy places, or at least to give a dreadnought to the Turkish navy for that purpose. Failing all else, they might buy an airplane or two for presentation to Turkey. The Anjuman also hoped to bring about an alliance of all independent Muslim powers to save Islam from annihilation.<sup>98</sup>

In the expenditure of its rather indefinite sum of money, the Anjuman ultimately concentrated on aiding *hajj* pilgrims, a more visible and immediate need than the vague "defense of the Ka'aba." Shaukat Ali went to Bombay and took out a licence as a pilgrimage broker. He assured all pilgrims that their tickets, passports, and every need would be looked after with safety and with dispatch, all commissions going into the Anjuman's fund for destitute *hajis*.<sup>99</sup>

Though its cause was popular, the Anjuman's actual impact was limited. Prospective members balked at taking an oath to give their all, so the oath was changed to a promise to give "all possible help" in the service of the holy places.<sup>100</sup> Nor did the income of the Anjuman reach the crore that the organizers had hoped for. This was the occasion for another factional dispute. The administrative assistant in the head office in Delhi accused the office superintendent of misuse of funds. The bookkeeping of the Anjuman had never been very exact, and the scandal led to a great loss of both confidence and receipts.<sup>101</sup> Abdul Bari threatened to resign as president, and finally the offending employee was dismissed. Dr. Ansari was asked to oversee the work of the Delhi office but declined, pleading the press of work in his medical practice. During World War I, the Delhi office was closed. Abdul Bari informed members not to send any more contributions, as the war prevented continuance of the Anjuman's activities and the money could not be spent.<sup>102</sup>

The Anjuman was, nevertheless, a significant step toward cooperation between the ulama and the Western-educated Muslims, and it provided a pattern for future operations. Through the use of religious symbols, the Ka'aba, the caliph, the crescent, the green robes and banners, public opinion was aroused, meetings held, and funds raised from new sources, ordinary Muslim men and women, both literate and illiterate.

Significantly, the organizational efforts of Deoband and Firangi Mahal followed roughly the same pattern: aiming at increasing the religious and cultural awareness of the Indian Muslim community, the ulama gradually became politically active and anti-British under the pressure of circumstances, both Turkish misfortunes and factional rivalries within the madrasas. The politicization of the ulama was a new development, but by the beginning of World War I it was unmistakable. Even if Mahmud al-Hasan's *hajj* may be interpreted as strictly religious, it is hard to find anything apolitical about the purchase of a dreadnought for the Turkish navy.

During World War I, Maulana Abdul Bari's activities were considerably subdued, since there was little to be gained, except internment, from sending aid to Turkey. In August 1914, he sent a wire to the Ottoman sultan pleading with him either to support Britain or to remain neutral.<sup>103</sup> When war broke out between

Britain and the Ottomans, he refused to sign the anti-Turkish *fatwa*, but he nevertheless attended a public meeting of Lucknow Muslims that declared its loyalty to the British government.<sup>104</sup> The Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba was all but suspended, and the Muid al-Islam remained a small clique of his supporters at Firangi Mahal. In 1916, however, when Sharif Husain of Mecca revolted against Turkey, Abdul Bari refused to believe it at first, but finally had to condemn him as an enemy of Islam.<sup>105</sup> He continued to correspond with a variety of political leaders including the Ali brothers, who were interned, and Gandhi, maintaining that the government was ignoring Muslim religious sentiments, and that something should be done about it.<sup>106</sup> That would have to wait until after the war.

### *Abul Kalam Azad*

In addition to the ulama of Deoband and Firangi Mahal, another *alim* emerged in the period before World War I who would later be a leader in the Khilafat movement. He was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the editor of *al-Hilal* of Calcutta. Azad was not associated with a madrasa and hence does not fit the pattern of institutional development outlined above, but he is an individual whose views, and ability to publicize them, were of great importance in Indian Muslim political life.

Azad is one of the most complex and contradictory figures of the period.<sup>107</sup> An *alim* who early in life rebelled from his scholarly heritage to follow a career in journalism, he later returned to scholarship, in combination with journalism, in order to champion Islamic reform and active involvement of the ulama in the political and social life of the Muslim community. A precocious intellect, a prolific writer, and a consummate stylist of Urdu prose, he also occasionally wrote poetry, and was a persuasive speaker. These talents led him to aspire to a position of religious and intellectual leadership in the community, but other aspects of his personality stood in the way of those ambitions. One of his followers has remarked upon his overweening pride, which led to an aloofness from the public throughout his public life, and a disdain for those whom he felt were undignified or beneath him in intellectual attainment.<sup>108</sup>

Azad was born in Mecca in 1888, son of Shaikh Muhammad

Khairuddin Dehlavi and his Arab wife. Shaikh Muhammad was a respected Sufi of the Qadiri and Naqshbandi orders who had migrated to the Hijaz. The family returned to India in the mid-1890's and settled in Calcutta, under the patronage of one of Khairuddin's disciples, Haji Zakariya, a wealthy merchant of the Surati Nakhudar community of Muslims.<sup>109</sup>

Abul Kalam was educated at home in the *dars-e-nizamiya* by his father. In fact, his father exercised such a stern discipline over his life and studies that the young Azad became rebellious. One of his favorite pastimes was going to a local bookstore, where he became acquainted with the works of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. He first read some of Sir Sayyid's lectures on Islam and then got a collection of his social and educational articles. He boldly ordered a volume of Sir Sayyid's *Tafsir al-Quran*, the commentary on the Quran which had been condemned by most ulama. He later testified that Sir Sayyid's writings led him to question the value of his traditional education. He also read a few works by the Egyptian reformer Shaikh Muhammad Abduh, a former disciple of Afghani, and occasional copies of the Cairo journal *al-Manar*, and thus learned of new religious and educational ideas in the Arab world.<sup>110</sup>

When still quite young, Abul Kalam began to write articles for Urdu newspapers. In 1904 he started a journal of his own, the *Lisan us-Sidq*. In it, Azad published critical articles and regular features on the progress of Urdu and social reform.<sup>111</sup> The chronology of the next few years is uncertain, but Azad made at least one trip to the Middle East, and also served as editor of *an-Nadwa* of Lucknow in 1905-06.<sup>112</sup> Shibli seems to have had some influence on Azad's subsequent career;<sup>113</sup> he urged him to be true to his heritage as an *alim* by continuing to write on subjects related to religious reform.<sup>114</sup>

While still with *an-Nadwa*, Azad received an offer from the *Vakil* of Amritsar to become the editor of that paper. The *Vakil* was one of the best known and stylistically excellent Urdu newspapers of the day. It dealt with national and community problems, and Azad could give his own views wider circulation through its editorial pages. Azad undoubtedly felt he would have greater scope with a newspaper like *Vakil* than an institutional journal like *an-Nadwa*, and so he went to Amritsar. He introduced literary and historical features, and wrote about events in Turkey and the Middle East.<sup>115</sup>

Whether he had time for another trip to the Middle East during

this time is not known.<sup>116</sup> It seems more probable that, instead of having personal contact with Arab and Turkish nationalist figures in the Middle East in 1908, Azad's knowledge of conditions there was derived from his reading of Abduh, Rashid Rida, editor of *al-Manar*, and possibly Afghani. Certainly his later writings on the institution of the caliphate show remarkable parallels with the writings of Rida,<sup>117</sup> rather than any personal contact with Arab nationalist or Turkish opinion on the subject.

After his stint with *Vakil*, Azad worked for *Dar us-Saltanat* of Calcutta, and was in Calcutta at the time of his father's death in 1909. Azad inherited his father's spiritual disciples, and probably settled in Calcutta at that time. Certainly when he decided to publish his famous journal, *al-Hilal*, in 1912, one of its chief patrons was Haji Nur Muhammad Zakariya, son of Shaikh Khai-ruddin's benefactor.<sup>118</sup>

Between 1909 and 1912 Azad began to follow his hereditary calling as a religious leader, but with a difference. He was not only an *alim* and a *pir*, but also a professional journalist. This gave him a claim to a broader network of influence than either his father's circle of *murids* or those literate Muslims who were trained in the religious sciences. *Al-Hilal* aimed at the literate Muslim community in general. Its message was especially meaningful to those who, like Azad, had been influenced by Western ideas and perhaps even renounced their faith, but in this period of political and social stress returned to their religion for new inspiration. Azad described his own mental anguish at the time in the following terms:

On the exterior I was a man who wanted to join religion to reason and intellectual discussion, but inside I had renounced all beliefs, and in practice was a sinner. I was in the last stage of despair, but suddenly a ray of light appeared before me. I cannot say from where had come the hand which pushed me into the darkness, nor can I explain the hand which suddenly pulled me out of it. But it is true that I saw the light and after nine years of search, I found my destination right in front of me. All illusions faded, and I found that belief and repose which I had been seeking.<sup>119</sup>

The meaning of this statement is veiled in the symbolism of light and darkness. Azad gives no details of the persons or circumstances which caused him to recover his faith, but he does say that his emphasis on rationalism, as in his reading of Sir Sayyid's works, had been misleading. Religion is a matter of the heart and can only be felt. His increasing opposition to the Aligarh movement, both intellectually and politically, dates from this period.

*Al-Hilal* began publication in Calcutta on July 12, 1912. For the next four years, through *al-Hilal* and its successor *al-Balagh*, Azad became known throughout India as an exponent of religious reform based almost exclusively on the Quran, and an advocate of political activity by the ulama. Azad's elegant prose had some of the emotional content of verse. His Urdu was replete with Persian and Arabic words, and he loved to repeat the same idea in different ways, emphasizing his thought and showing his linguistic versatility at the same time. Concerning Azad's style, Hasrat Mohani, an Urdu poet and journalist who edited the *Urdu-e-Mu'alla* of Aligarh, once jested:

جب سے دیکھی ابو الکلام کی نثر نظم حسرت میں بھی مزہ نہ رہا

After the prose of Azad has been savored,  
Even Hasrat's verse loses its flavor.<sup>120</sup>

Azad's religious message, as developed in *al-Hilal*, was that the Quran offered solutions for all the political, intellectual, and social problems of contemporary life.<sup>121</sup> He wrote many articles dealing with religious subjects: *harb* (war), *jihad* (religious struggle), and *hajj* (pilgrimage) among others, sprinkled liberally with quotations from the Quran to illustrate his points. Azad later began an Urdu translation and commentary on the Quran, *Tarjuman al-Quran*, which is actually closer in spirit to the work of Sir Sayyid, which he sought to challenge, than it is to traditional Quranic exegesis.<sup>122</sup> Rationalism was a habit Azad found difficult to renounce. It was not only an element in his modernist intellectual explorations, but also—and primarily—an integral part of his traditional philosophical training. His style, both in his articles and speeches, may have been emotional, but he never let his emotions carry him away from the structure of his argument.

Azad's emphasis on literary style and Quranic commentary reflect his strengths, and also a certain ambivalence toward traditional Islamic jurisprudence. His writings in *al-Hilal* contain a similar ambivalence toward the ulama, exponents of that juristic knowledge. While praising them as potential leaders of the community, he nevertheless criticized them for their narrow-mindedness, obscurantism, and factionalism.<sup>123</sup> Azad may have disliked the general run of ulama, but he nevertheless had to be accepted among them in order to lead them along new intellectual

and political paths.<sup>124</sup> In *al-Hilal* he asserted that the ulama had lagged in their guidance of the community because they had yet to find a dynamic leader themselves. Letters poured in from admirers and detractors alike asking if he meant himself as that leader—a position he denied, but perhaps coveted.<sup>125</sup>

Towards Westernized Muslim leaders, Azad's attitude was one of aloofness, if not hostility. In spite of his earlier admiration for Sir Sayyid, he now rejected all that Aligarh stood for. He chastized Western-educated Muslims in the pages of *al-Hilal* for their slavish imitation of European customs and their lack of faith, and he attacked the Muslim League for its sycophancy to the British.<sup>126</sup> At the same time, he knew that a new generation of political activists had arisen within the Aligarh movement, and that in 1912 there was little justification for such charges against men like the Ali brothers.

Azad and the Ali brothers, who supported many of the same causes, could be expected to have been friends. But that was hardly the case. For Shaukat Ali, whom he viewed as his inferior intellectually, Azad had nothing but disdain. Muhammad Ali, however, was a fellow journalist, and had a mind to be reckoned with. He also had an equal facility in Urdu and English, something Azad could not match. But Azad felt that Muhammad Ali's effusions in print and on the podium, which won him great popularity, were undignified. Though they worked simultaneously for the same causes from the time of the Balkan wars through the Khilafat movement, there was always a rivalry between them which prevented their becoming close collaborators. To those who knew him well, Azad referred to Muhammad Ali as a *munshi*.<sup>127</sup>

Most of Azad's political activity at this stage was confined to the pages of *al-Hilal*, where he brought a new sophistication to the art of mingling political and religious messages. In discussing *jihad*, for example, Azad emphasized that it meant struggle in a holy cause. He included in such causes the Muslim's religious obligation to struggle for the freedom of his country.<sup>128</sup> This could be considered an argument in favor of cooperation with the Hindu nationalists, but Azad was thinking in different terms. Muslims should not blindly follow the political lead of the Hindus. They must be confident and actually lead the struggle—not thinking of their minority in numbers, but making up for their minority position by self-assertion, thus gaining acceptance by their Hindu

compatriots as equal partners in the nationalist movement. This was the only way for true Muslims to act.<sup>129</sup>

But the greatest amount of space in *al-Hilal* was devoted to coverage of news from Turkey. During the Balkan wars, Azad extolled the virtues of various Turkish leaders, made constant appeals for the Turkish Relief and Red Crescent funds, and wrote a regular feature column called "Conditions in the Ottoman Empire." In one issue Azad said unequivocally: "We must always remember that the Ottoman Caliph is the guardian of the holy places of Islam, and that support for Turkey is the same as support for Islam." His outspoken championship of Turkey was not contradictory to his appeal for nationalist political activity. Azad realized the emotional value of Islamic news for the solidarity of the Indian Muslim community, a prerequisite for effective political action. News from the Balkans also helped to expand *al-Hilal's* circulation.<sup>130</sup>

Azad's efforts in *al-Hilal* were supplemented by political verse from other authors. One of the contributors of poetry to *al-Hilal* and other Urdu journals was Maulana Shibli, whose verses during the Tripolitan and Balkan wars were examples of a literary form which was to be very important during the Khilafat movement. Throughout the history of Urdu literature, poetry rather than prose had been the prevalent form. Authors could express their deepest feelings through Urdu's fund of traditional poetic symbolism, vague to the foreigner, but evocative to the native speaker. Poetry was thus a powerful medium for conveying political as well as emotional messages. In one of Shibli's most famous political poems, he joined the lament over the fate of Turkey:

حکومت پر زوال آیا تو پھر نام و نشان کب تک  
چراغِ کشتہٴ محفل سے اٹھے گا دھواں کب تک  
قبے اسطنت کے گر فلک نے کر دیئے پرزے  
فضے آسمانی میں اڑیں گی دھجیاں کب تک

مراکش جا چکا، فارس گیا، اب دیکھنا یہ ہے  
کہ جیتا ہے یہ ترکی کا مریضِ سخت جاں کب تک

یہ سیلابِ بلا بلقان سے جو بڑھتا آتا ہے  
اُسے روکے گا مظلوموں کی آہوں کا دھواں کب تک

When a government is in decline, how long  
will its fame and influence last?  
How long does the smoke from a guttering candle last?

If the mantle of the sultanate has been  
tattered by fate,  
How long can this public outrage last?

Morocco has gone, and Persia too, now  
we shall see  
How long Turkey, this "Sick Man" will last.

The flood of misfortune sweeping in from the Balkans  
Has been stemmed by the cries of the oppressed,  
But how long can they last?<sup>131</sup>

In this poem, Shibli likens the greatness of the Ottoman Empire to the smoke from a snuffed candle. The guttering taper evokes the distinguished assembly which has just dispersed, but the smoke too will soon disappear. The tatters of the regal mantle recall the grandeur of earlier times, but also emphasize the disgrace of present poverty. The "Sick Man of Europe" still lives, recalling the great days of Islam, even after Persia and Morocco have been swallowed up by European influence. The flood tide which is engulfing the Balkans has been held up by the oppressed followers of Islam. But at the end of each couplet, he asks "how long" can this state of affairs remain?

The career of *al-Hilal* ended in November 1914, when Azad's reporting on World War I proved too pro-Turkish for a government then at war with the Porte, and his security deposit was

forfeited.<sup>132</sup> A year later, Azad was able to gather another security deposit and start *al-Balagh*, but that too was closed in March 1916. Soon thereafter, he was interned in Ranchi in Bihar, where he remained until January 1920. During his internment, Azad worked on his *Tarjuman al-Quran*.

Although Azad does not fit the pattern outlined above of those who entered anti-British political activity in the pre-World War I period because of institutional rivalries and the quest for followers in that framework, he does fit another pattern: that of the informed individual seeking a cultural orientation which combines elements of East and West—not to imitate the culture of the conqueror, but rather to revitalize his own. Each of the individuals mentioned above—Muhammad Ali, the Shaikh al-Hind, Abdul Bari, and Azad—shared this ambition, and each in his own way sought to revitalize Muslim cultural and social life and to publicize his ideas of how it should be done through educational institutions, cultural organizations, and the press. In this period, therefore, a new style of leadership was evolving among Western-educated Muslims and ulama alike: activist, articulate, and anxious to involve others in their projects, whether cultural or political. The role model was also emerging: part journalist, part orator, part holy man. At about this time, Muhammad Ali remarked to a British friend that it was a pity there were no professional politicians in India.<sup>133</sup> He clearly envisaged this role for himself.

### *New Religio-Political Orientations*

In the period immediately preceding World War I, two religio-political orientations became clear for this new breed of Muslim leader. An emphasis on religious issues and symbols helped bring about an alliance between Westernized Muslims and ulama and widened their popular appeal. An increasingly anti-British sentiment helped prepare for a Muslim entente with the nationalist movement. These trends had already been in evidence in the Ali-garh Muslim university movement and especially in the organizations which blossomed during the Tripolitan and Balkan wars, such as the Red Crescent Mission and the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba. The career of the Ali brothers illustrates the effects of these new orientations, for in 1912-13 they achieved their ambition to

take over both Aligarh and the Muslim League. Their triumph was short-lived, cut short by the war and their internment. But events prior to the outbreak of World War I whetted their appetites for future campaigns and gave them a formula for success.

In 1912, Shaukat Ali had finally succeeded in becoming secretary of the Aligarh Old Boys' Association, and the following year saw a determined effort on the part of the Ali brothers' group to capture the Aligarh board of trustees.<sup>134</sup> Political clashes also reverberated on the Aligarh campus: in the wake of the Turkish wars, a number of Muslim papers called for an economic boycott of European goods. The cry was taken up by Hasrat Mohani, an Aligarh graduate whose poetical and political journal, *Urdu-e-Mu'alla*, was popular with the students there. A number of students were expelled for their *swadeshi* activities and for political speech-making on campus.<sup>135</sup> The members of Dr. Ansari's Red Crescent Medical Mission were given a heroes' welcome at the college following their return from Turkey in July 1913. Also that summer, Muhammad Ali harangued the students on the desecration of the Kanpur Mosque.<sup>136</sup>

The Kanpur Mosque incident of 1913 affords an example of what could be accomplished politically by appeals to the Muslims' religious emotions. The ulama and Westernized leaders were united in their righteous indignation, and together, with the backing of the community, were able to gain concessions from the British government on the grounds of religious justice. The trouble began on July 1, 1913, when the Kanpur municipality demolished the washing place of a mosque in the congested Machli Bazaar area of this UP city to make room for a new road. The Muslims of Kanpur were stunned, and their leaders condemned the action as desecration of a place of worship and hence a threat to Islam. The ulama of Kanpur issued a *fatwa* saying that the washing place was just as sacred as any other part of the mosque, and they asked for its restoration.<sup>137</sup> But Sir James Meston, lieutenant-governor of UP, upheld the local authorities and dismissed the issue as a tempest in a teapot. Muslims regularly entered the washing place of the mosque in question with their shoes on, hence it could hardly be sacrosanct; local emotions would soon calm down, Meston thought. He agreed, however, to visit Kanpur and receive a delegation of local Muslim dignitaries on August 9.<sup>138</sup>

Maulana Azad Subhani of Kanpur thereupon organized a mass

meeting of Muslims for August 3 to ensure that local emotions did not calm down before Meston's visit. Some ten to fifteen thousand souls turned out for the meeting, many carrying black banners, symbols of mourning. Several trustees of the Machli Bazaar Mosque addressed the crowd while spectators wept, and then Azad Subhani himself closed the meeting with a fiery speech. He said that Meston did not believe the Kanpur Muslims were upset, that this meeting would prove to him the genuineness of their emotions, that Islam was in danger, and that it was their duty to save their religion from annihilation by sacrificing their lives, if necessary.<sup>139</sup>

The crowd surged out of the meeting and headed for the mosque to pray. There they found a contingent of police on guard. The rubble of demolition in the new roadbed gave the mob plenty of ammunition, and soon bricks flew. The police fired, and a number of Muslims were killed. Many more, including Azad Subhani, were arrested.<sup>140</sup> The leading Muslim newspapers, such as Muhammad Ali's *Comrade*, Azad's *al-Hilal*, and Zafar Ali Khan's *Zamindar*, attacked the government for interfering with their religion, appealed for funds to aid the bereaved Kanpur families, and turned the dispute from a local one into a confrontation between Islam and the central government.<sup>141</sup>

Meanwhile, indignation at the government's rigid stand began to spread among a remarkable cross-section of Muslim opinion. Not only were emotional ulama like Abdul Bari and eloquent politicians like the Ali brothers affected, but also the raja of Mahmudabad, a wealthy landlord and Muslim Leaguer, and staunchly loyal Muslims such as the Honorable Mian Muhammad Shafi of Lahore and Sir Ali Imam of Patna, a member of the viceroy's council. Shafi advised the government to suspend proceedings against those arrested in Kanpur, and Ali Imam called the UP government's policy "high-handed" and said that nothing short of restoration of the demolished section of the mosque would calm Muslim feelings. Then the Muslim League got into the act with a formal resolution asking the viceroy to intervene.<sup>142</sup>

For once, Muslim opinion was virtually unanimous. Lord Hardinge, the viceroy, began to look upon the incident as a "stupid blunder" by the local government, and decided to go to Kanpur and settle the matter. Overruling Meston, Hardinge agreed to drop charges against the prisoners and to restore the demolished corner

of the mosque.<sup>143</sup> In a jubilant letter to his brother, Shaukat Ali emphasized that by uniting and insisting on the religious nature of the issue, the Muslims had won the day.<sup>144</sup> They also had discovered a pattern for future political campaigns.

Occupied with organizing the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba and with the Kanpur Mosque agitation, not to mention their active interest in Aligarh, the Ali brothers might well have had little time for anything else. Yet they were also engaged in an effort to dislodge the old leadership of the Muslim League. The Muslim League in 1913 was headed by the firm loyalist Agha Khan, the extremely wealthy leader of the Ismaili Khoja sect, who spent most of his time in Europe and was consequently out of touch with current political opinion in India. Equally loyalist was the president of the London branch of the Muslim League, Sayyid Amir Ali, a retired judge of the Calcutta High Court.

The Agha Khan had been elected permanent president of the League in 1908, when its headquarters was in Aligarh. In 1910, however, the headquarters was moved to Lucknow. There the League developed a new leadership that consisted mostly of lawyers, and began to take a more active interest in the national movement. A unity conference of Hindu and Muslim leaders was held in 1910 in Allahabad, in which Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a Congress Muslim barrister from Bombay, played a prominent role. This attempt to bring about an entente cordiale between the Congress and the League came to naught, but later that year the annual session of the League passed a resolution in favor of fuller cooperation with the Congress leadership.<sup>145</sup> In 1912, Sayyid Wazir Hasan became secretary of the League. He was an old boy of Aligarh, protégé of the raja of Mahmudabad, and an acquaintance of Muhammad Ali. From the start of his tenure, Wazir Hasan supported cooperation with the Congress to work toward a greater degree of self-government for India.<sup>146</sup>

The League was thus changing gradually, though the style of most of its membership was quite different from that of the flamboyant Ali brothers. League barristers were interested in the political opportunities offered by the Morley-Minto reforms, and they thus remained cautiously moderate in their pronouncements. Mass organizations did not appeal to their sense of political respectability; orderly debates on constitutional points in the rarified atmosphere of the councils were more to their taste.<sup>147</sup> In the



Muhammad Ali in the uniform of the Red Crescent Medical Mission, 1913

political fervor of 1913, however, the more ardent spirits succeeded in discrediting the still loyalist leadership of the League.

The Agha Khan had said in the *Times of India* in early 1913 that the Ottoman Empire might wisely retire from its European territories after the Balkan wars and build up its strength in Asia Minor. This view raised a storm of protest in the press urging the Agha Khan's ouster as president of the League, because his pronouncement was anti-Muslim.<sup>148</sup> Sayyid Amir Ali of the League's London branch was discredited in another way. Arrayed in a Red Crescent uniform, Muhammad Ali joined the returned medical mission in their triumphant tour of the country. Their stumping featured praise of their own mission's efforts to aid the Turkish wounded and belittling of similar efforts by the British Red Crescent mission, organized by Amir Ali.<sup>149</sup> It was also rumored that Amir Ali had been embezzling Red Crescent funds.<sup>150</sup>

Then, in September 1913, Muhammad Ali and Wazir Hasan slipped quietly out of India and sailed for England, ostensibly to place Muslim views on the university, the Kanpur Mosque, and the Press Act of 1910 directly before the government.<sup>151</sup> Though the Muslim League passed a resolution endorsing their mission after they had left, their sudden departure led to speculation that theirs was not an official Muslim League deputation. Perhaps, it was said, Muhammad Ali just wanted to get out of the country in order to avoid government action against his own press. When they arrived in London, the secretary of state and other officials refused to see them.<sup>152</sup>

Sayyid Amir Ali felt that the younger men were trying to usurp his position as the representative of Indian Muslim opinion in London. He asserted that the Indian League should give him more financial support and more flexibility in matters of policy.<sup>153</sup> He was obviously hurt by the statements maligning his Red Crescent efforts and slighted by the attempt to upstage him. Wazir Hasan countered by saying that Amir Ali should support the views of the Indian League, and that he should increase the membership of the London branch by a number of younger men "whose views tally with mine."<sup>154</sup> Amir Ali resigned his post in a flurry of mutual recriminations.

At the same time, the Agha Khan, who was in Europe as usual, resigned his permanent presidency of the Muslim League. His grounds were that his frequent absences from India left him little

time for his duties as president. All the differing points of view within the League needed to be represented in the leadership, he said, and he did not want to stand in the way of that development.<sup>155</sup> The Agha Khan thus conceded that the seat of the president of the Muslim League had grown too hot for him, and he diplomatically vacated it. Shortly thereafter, the raja of Mahmudabad was elected president of the League.

Another result of this trip to England was that Muhammad Ali and Wazir Hasan succeeded in persuading Jinnah, then in London, to join the Muslim League. They agreed to his proviso that his membership in the League would not imply any change in his loyalty to the Congress or to the national movement as a whole.<sup>156</sup> His influence, added to their own, had helped to bring about the resolution favoring a "suitable" form of self-government for India at the March 1913 session of the League, before Jinnah became an official member.<sup>157</sup> A cautious amendment to the League program, deprecated by Maulana Shibli and Abul Kalam Azad as still smacking too much of loyalism,<sup>158</sup> the resolution was nevertheless a step along the path which led to the Lucknow Pact with the Congress in 1916.

The Ali brothers had placed their distinctive stamp not only on the Aligarh movement, but also on the League. Not everyone was pleased about this state of affairs. Some Aligarh trustees and a group of old boys in government service demanded that Shaukat Ali choose between the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba, with its pro-Turkish penchant, and his position as secretary of the Old Boys' Association. Shaukat declined, claiming that the Anjuman was "purely religious."<sup>159</sup> The brothers symbolized their religious allegiance and rejection of British ways by changing their style of dress from Savile Row's latest to a fashion which promptly caused them to be dubbed "Maulanas." They grew beards, dressed in flowing robes with the crescent badge of the Anjuman, and wore astrakhan caps also adorned with the half-moon. They were indeed on the way to becoming professional politicians.

The growing prospect of hostilities between Turkey and Great Britain in 1914 presented the Ali brothers with a dilemma. "Strictly religious" though their feelings for Turkey might be, they were not blind to the political advantages which accrued to them from using Islamic symbols.<sup>160</sup> Now, their pro-Turkish activities risked landing them in political trouble, in spite of their repeated professions

of allegiance to Britain. Muhammad Ali and Dr. Ansari, banking on the latter's widespread contacts in Turkey, sent a cable to the Ottoman interior minister in August 1914. In a text approved by the British Indian government they urged the Turks to maintain strict neutrality. Then, in a last-ditch effort to prevent disaster, Muhammad Ali requested Abdul Bari to cable the caliph to the same effect.<sup>161</sup>

Shortly thereafter, Muhammad Ali wrote a lengthy article in *Comrade* entitled "The Choice of the Turks." The article discussed the reasons for Turkish grievances against Great Britain. He listed the abandonment of Anglo-Turkish friendship in favor of the Anglo-Russian entente, Britain's protectorate over Egypt, its "neutrality" during the Tripolitan and Balkan wars, and its most recent coup: the seizure of two dreadnoughts, already purchased by Turkey but still being outfitted in British shipyards, for use by the British navy. Muhammad Ali still hoped, however, that the Turks would remain neutral in spite of all these slights, and he closed with an assurance of Indian Muslim loyalty to Britain.<sup>162</sup> The outspokenness of the article nevertheless led the government to take action against *Comrade* shortly after the declaration of war between Turkey and Great Britain in November 1914. Muhammad Ali's security deposit was forfeited, and the paper was shut down.

The government finally decided in May 1915 that it was too risky to have such notorious pro-Turkish agitators as the Ali brothers at large while Britain was at war with the Ottomans. Their effusive political style, eloquence on the public platform, and boisterous good humor made them exciting political leaders, and not only to the student population at Aligarh. Over the previous five years, the brothers had become well known through the pages of *Comrade* and *Hamdard*, the success of their Turkish relief efforts, and the publicity attendant upon the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba and the Kanpur Mosque agitation. They had all but captured the university movement, and had deeply influenced the program of the Muslim League. For the Muslim population to remain docile throughout the war with Turkey, Muhammad and Shaukat had to be put out of the way, just as the other young Muslim publicists, Zafar Ali Khan, Hasrat Mohani, and Abul Kalam Azad, were interned for their ardent pro-Turkish writings.<sup>163</sup> The government interned the Alis under the Defence of India Act and ultimately confined them to Chhindwara, in a remote corner of Central India.<sup>164</sup>

*Political Developments during World War I*

When the British declared war on Turkey in November 1914, they were sufficiently mindful of Indo-Muslim sympathies for Turkey to emphasize that no religious questions were involved in the conflict. The government issued a solemn proclamation to its Muslim subjects: The state of the war was brought about—to the regret of Britain—by the deliberate and unprovoked action of the Ottoman government, not the caliph. To reinforce its point, the government promised that the Muslim holy places in Arabia and Mesopotamia and the port of Jiddah would remain immune from attack, and that there would be no interference with the *hajj* pilgrimage.<sup>165</sup> This declaration was in itself a testimony to the success of those Indian Muslims who had stressed religious issues in their political campaigns in the prewar period. The results of the proclamation were what the government desired: declarations of fidelity to the Raj at Muslim public meetings and *fatawa* of loyalty from a variety of ulama came pouring in.

There was many a slip twixt the British promises and their fulfillment, however. The Arab revolt, the Mesopotamian campaign, the fall of Jerusalem, and the Balfour Declaration effaced, for many Muslims, the so-called immunity of the holy places, and problems of transport during wartime meant that many experienced hardships in performing the *hajj*. Articulate Muslims of the stamp of the Alis and Abdul Bari began to feel that British claims about the nonreligious character of the war were tenuous, if not a total sham.<sup>166</sup>

The British prime minister, Lloyd George, added to their suspicions by dubbing Allenby's conquest of Jerusalem "the last and most triumphant of the crusades"—hardly reassuring rhetoric. Then on January 5, 1918, Lloyd George spoke in Parliament to reassure the Muslim subjects of the empire once again: The Ottoman Empire would not be deprived of Constantinople, nor of "the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race." But the Arabs were "entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions."<sup>167</sup> This was another blow to Indo-Muslim opinion, but not half the one which was delivered after the war when the peace conference started carving up the Ottoman Empire and threatened to take Constantinople away from the Turks.

Meanwhile, political developments among Indian Muslims during the war years followed the patterns which had become apparent in 1912-14 with the tentative *rapprochement* between the Muslim League and the Congress, and the alliance between certain Westernized Muslims and a few ulama in support of Islamic causes. Both trends were advanced by wartime developments, whether the campaigns in the Middle East or the prospect of a greater degree of self-government after the war. On the one hand, the Congress-League entente was ratified in 1916 with the Lucknow Pact, which proposed a joint program of constitutional reforms.<sup>168</sup> On the other, the ulama became increasingly active politically in response to perceived threats to Islam both in the Middle East and in India, and to overtures from activists in the Muslim League. The Ali brothers watched all these developments from the irksome isolation of internment, and their observations provide a commentary on the times and evidence of the gestation of the Khilafat movement.

Another development which served further to alienate the activist Muslim leadership from the government was the revival of the Aligarh Muslim university movement, stalled since 1912. This was of vital interest to the Ali brothers, who found that being removed from the scene diminished their influence on Aligarh events. Symptomatic of this was the acceptance of the government's conditions for the Muslim university in late 1915. The promoters of the Benares Hindu university had agreed to similar conditions, and so it became futile for the Muslims to hold out any longer. A meeting of Aligarh trustees and patrons decided to accept the inevitable, in spite of protests on the part of the Ali brothers' allies, including Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, that such a move should be postponed until after the war.<sup>169</sup> In April 1917, when the Muslim University Foundation Committee reaffirmed its acceptance, the raja of Mahmudabad wrote to Muhammad Ali asking him to support this decision.<sup>170</sup> Muhammad replied in a discouraged tone: "For the present, at least, we are incapable of controlling even a college, let alone the university which we once dreamt of controlling." He therefore continued to argue for postponement of acceptance, and said, furthermore:

I see the need of another institution where we could work out in practice the theories and ideals which we who are the first-born of Sir Sayyid and

Aligarh, so to speak, have long cherished . . . . [M]any of us are inclined to give up Aligarh rather than the dreams they had dreamt there.<sup>171</sup>

Having failed to found university based on popular support and independent of government control, the Ali brothers were now faced with the possibility of breaking with Aligarh once and for all.

When the Muslim University Bill was finally passed in September 1920, providing for a residential and teaching university, minus affiliation, with a large measure of central government control, it immediately became the target of the Ali brothers, who attacked it as a sellout. Writing to Mahmudabad, who had been named the first vice-chancellor of the Muslim University, Muhammad Ali commented dolefully:

I am painfully aware that it is not, as you state, "The long-cherished dream of the Muslims," that "has at last been realized." . . . Surely, Raja Sahib, this was not the university of your dreams any more than mine, nor can we call this the "achievement of a grand and glorious undertaking," to which you and I had both set our hearts. For had that been so, could we not have had our hearts' desire in 1912 instead of 1920?<sup>172</sup>

The Muslim University movement had aimed at the development of a distinguished educational institution which would be the outward and visible sign of Indian Muslim cultural and political regeneration, as well as the center of an autonomous network of Muslim educational institutions throughout India. In both these aims it had failed, but it nevertheless had served as an important vehicle for Muslim political mobilization. The progress of the movement and of its factional disputes had forced men into new forms of political activity. During the course of the university movement, its quarrelsome promoters had tried hard to mobilize widespread Muslim support for the project and for political causes beyond the university walls. Those who finally broke away from the university turned even more toward the mobilization of mass opinion in support of their new cause: the Khilafat.

The importance of the Muslim University in the Ali brothers' lives and in their political scheme of things cannot be overemphasized. They were driven into opposition to British rule by a combination of the Muslim University issue and their pro-Turkish sentiments. They were more concerned with the future of Muslims in India than elsewhere. Their concern for the fate of Turkey in 1911-14 did not cause them to denounce British rule openly; they

continued to profess their loyalty, for tactical reasons at least, even after the outbreak of World War I. The university, however, had been the basis of all their hopes for Muslim advancement in India. British policy toward the university was crucial in their opposition to the government. Now, cut off from the movement which had been their chief avenue to fame, the Ali brothers had to find another issue to sustain their influence. Their religious faith and their politics fused as they turned increasingly toward the themes of religious self-assertion and Islamic solidarity.

In Chhindwara, the Ali brothers devoted most of their time to religious pursuits, such as reading the Quran in Urdu. Muhammad Ali was deeply affected by its "simple grandeur" and "intense directness." It revealed to him a new meaning in life and a new significance in Islam. His reaction was characteristic: "I was literally bursting with my new discovery and felt impelled to shout it to all and sundry."<sup>173</sup> He began in the Chhindwara Mosque, where he and Shaukat in their role as "Maulanas" were occasionally called upon to read the *khutba*. One such reading brought objections from the government, for they had asked God to grant victory and succor to the caliph. But there was little the government could do. "You can't blame me," said Shaukat, "if the Caliph of Islam also happens to be the sultan of Turkey."<sup>174</sup>

For the Ali brothers and ulama alike, the *khutba* became a fairly safe way of registering political discontent during the war years. Normally a *khutba* was based on prescribed formulas which were read out at the Friday congregational prayer service: praising God, blessing the Prophet, praying for the ruler and the community, and enjoining Muslims to follow the straight path. After the fall of the Mughals, the usual practice in Indian mosques was to refer to the Sultan al-Islam in the *khutba*, without mentioning any ruler by name. Sometimes, however, there were more specific references to the sultan of Turkey, with or without using his name, and these became more prevalent during the Balkan wars and World War I. The Ottoman sultan would be praised and prayers offered for the success of his sword and his armies and the destruction of the infidels. Since the government could hardly forbid the *khutba* without being accused of religious interference, and since the imam of a mosque could always plead that he was merely reading a formula, this was an effective means of conveying the message of discontent to all Muslims who went to the Friday prayers.<sup>175</sup>

The Ali brothers' internment did not entirely restrict their political life to the mosque on Fridays, however, as a letter or a visitor might occasionally penetrate the thicket of censorship around Chhindwara. They viewed with pleasure the growing Congress-League cooperation in 1915-16, and Jinnah's efforts leading up to the Lucknow Pact. Muhammad Ali commented that though Jinnah was "too spick and span and has never worked with his people with tucked-up shirt sleeves as we poor mortals have to do," he was on the right track. Those Muslims who objected to cooperation with the Congress<sup>176</sup> were playing into the hands of the government:

. . . we will not lose by conferring with the Hindus as to the future, but by sitting with folded hands and allowing others to settle that future for us. Remember the Moslem League was founded . . . because the future of India was no longer in the hands of others, and we had to depend on our own exertions. Is it not truer still today?<sup>177</sup>

In addition, the brothers were trying to maintain contact with the political scene in order to return to it with renewed influence after the war. One such contact was a mild-mannered Hindu lawyer recently returned from South Africa. Mohandas K. Gandhi was a man with a past history of defending Indian rights against the injustice of the powers that be, and he had developed techniques of proved effectiveness in mobilizing mass support. These qualifications certainly recommended him to the Ali brothers in their current plight and for their future ambitions. Furthermore, he had greatly impressed them by a speech to Calcutta students in 1915 in which he had said, "Politics cannot be divorced from religion."<sup>178</sup> Here, they thought, was a Hindu leader who might listen to Muslim religious grievances with a sympathetic ear, and who certainly agreed that it was important to link religious and political appeals to a mass audience. They tried to get permission for him to visit their Central Indian eyrie without success.<sup>179</sup> But they corresponded with him, and may have urged their spiritual mentor, Abdul Bari, to contact Gandhi.

The Lucknow Pact was an important political event in 1916, but more electrifying for most Muslims was news of the Arab revolt against Turkey. The council of the Muslim League passed a resolution condemning the sharif of Mecca and his followers as enemies of Islam, and hints that the British government might be

involved in the revolt were greeted with consternation.<sup>180</sup> The Ali brothers, in correspondence with Abdul Bari, followed his lead in refusing to believe the news. It was "absurd" that the sharif of Mecca would revolt against the caliph of Islam, regrettable that such news had been erroneously published, and insulting to Islam to entertain such a possibility.<sup>181</sup>

Such a misunderstanding of the Arab cause can only be explained in terms of the importance of Islam to the Indian Muslims' sense of identity. Islam was the Indian Muslims' one common denominator. Their pro-Turkish sentiment was based upon the feeling of Islamic community solidarity, and the fact that the Turkish ruler was acknowledged as caliph, the symbolic head of that community. This feeling may have been romantic in some of its manifestations, but it was nevertheless grounded in the pillars of the faith and made good political sense in the Indian context. The feeling of Islamic brotherhood was one of the few things on which most Indian Muslims—Aligarh or ulama, loyalist or nationalist, conservative or reformist, Hindustani or Deccani—could agree. It gave them a basis for solidarity among themselves to counteract their minority status in the political arena. Their religious identity and their political identity were thus inextricably entwined. It was consequently difficult, if not impossible, for Muhammad Ali or Abdul Bari to understand Arab Muslims for whom ethnic or linguistic identity came first. To an Arab nationalist, the Turk was an imperial exploiter who had usurped the title of "commander of the faithful."

In the fall of 1917, Indian politics reached another peak of excitement. The Muslim League had lent its support to Annie Besant's Home Rule agitation earlier that year. Jinnah was moved to depart from his usual disdain for agitation tactics by the internment of Mrs. Besant, and became president of the Bombay Home Rule League.<sup>182</sup> Then in August, the Secretary of the State for India, Sir Edwin Montagu, announced in Parliament that henceforth the policy of the government would be:

. . . the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.<sup>183</sup>

He then undertook a trip to India to ascertain the views of various

political groups on the form of the future reforms. Groups of all kinds organized deputations to meet him, the most impressive of which was a joint Congress-League grouping which urged the government to adopt the Lucknow Pact. Maulana Abdul Bari also organized a deputation of ulama to meet Montagu.<sup>184</sup>

At this juncture, in September 1917, Mrs. Besant was released, and the action provoked a chorus of demands for the freedom of Muslim internees as well, especially the Ali brothers. Mrs. Besant lent her voice to the appeals, and the Ali brothers' mother, Bi Amman, wrote an affectionate letter to her "sister" thanking her for her support. The Muslim League, in anticipation of his release, elected Muhammad Ali president of their 1917 session.<sup>185</sup> The government offered the brothers their freedom if they would sign an undertaking not to assist the king's enemies and to abstain from violent agitation. They readily agreed, adding, however, that the abstentions could not restrict their freedom to observe "our religious duties as Musalmans."<sup>186</sup> The government, sensing that they were trying to take a mile, decided not to give an inch, and the brothers stayed in Chhindwara. At the 1917 Muslim League session in Calcutta, the empty presidential chair was graced by a photograph of Muhammad Ali. To make up somewhat for his absence, Bi Amman gave a fiery speech in her son's best oratorical style from behind the veil of her *burqa*.<sup>187</sup> This was perhaps the first time a Muslim woman had spoken to a mixed political gathering, as opposed to a women's meeting.

The growing Congress-League cooperation exemplified by the Lucknow Pact and the joint representation to Montagu was called into question by a painful series of Hindu-Muslim riots which racked India in late 1917 and 1918. In September 1917 serious rioting broke out in Shahabad District in Bihar on the occasion of Baqr 'Id, when Hindus objected to the Muslims' sacrifice of cows. Mobs pillaged and burned Muslim villages over an extensive area, with much loss of life on both sides. The Muslim press expressed indignation over the Shahabad riots, which were pictured as an organized Hindu attack against a helpless Muslim minority. It is doubtful whether the attacks were part of a coordinated plan, but the Muslims' indignation helped them organize a response. They held meetings in mosques and collected funds to aid riot victims. Abdul Bari did nothing to allay communal tensions, but rather called upon the ulama to defend Islamic rites and help the Muslims

who had been "oppressed by Indian infidels."<sup>188</sup>

Relations between the two communities continued to be tense for some time thereafter, and the situation was not helped by the fact that in October 1917 the Hindu festival of Dussehra and the Shia Muslim observance of Muharram coincided. Dussehra is the occasion for festive processions, while Muharram is the time for processions of weeping mourners. When these observances coincide, the danger arises of Hindu and Muslim processions crossing paths, and for mob violence to occur.<sup>189</sup> In October of 1917, the communal tinderbox ignited in several places, with the most serious conflagration in Allahabad. In 1918, another series of riots occurred during Baqr 'Id in September.<sup>190</sup> Another communal incident developed in Calcutta in 1918 over a supposed insult to the Prophet published in an English daily newspaper. The ulama of Calcutta called a meeting to protest this slur on their faith and invited Abdul Bari to preside. The government prohibited the gathering, but it went on anyway, and Hindu-Muslim skirmishing broke out as the Muslim protest march passed through a Hindu commercial area. Shooting erupted, several deaths resulted, and hundreds of Muslims were arrested.<sup>191</sup>

All these communal incidents showed the extent to which the ordinary person could be moved by perceived threats to his religion. The constitutional maneuverings of the Congress-League scheme or delegations to Montagu touched him little or not at all, but religious observances were much more palpable. Festivals were important interludes in lives of drab clerical routine or sheer manual drudgery. Little other public amusement could be had so cheaply. If festival observances were curtailed by fiat of the authorities or by intervention by another religious community, crowds of celebrants could turn into violent mobs. This religious emotion represented a vital energy political leaders could not afford to ignore, but it could be harnessed either for constructive purposes or for destructive violence. A fine line separated an agitation from a riot and it was often breached whether by accident or design. Abdul Bari's communal stance in 1917-18 accompanied his emergence as a spokesman for the ulama in the political forum and helped establish his claim to represent the Muslims in UP, Bihar, and Bengal who had been affected by the riots. But it revealed an intransigent side to his personality which should not be forgotten in following his later career. Religious emotion can be a potent

political weapon, but it is a double-edged sword.

The communal tensions of 1917-18 combined with the defeat of Turkey to arouse Indo-Muslim anxieties concerning the fate of Islam both within India and outside. In addition, 1918 had seen the publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, which disappointed both Congress and League circles by not adopting the Lucknow Pact as the basis for the new reforms. The cumulative effect of these events on Muslim politics was to swing the balance of power in the Muslim League away from the moderate, constitutionalist lawyers toward the advocates of religious self-assertion and broad-based political mobilization. It was quite clear that while a small group of leaders could get together and work out an agreement, the government could ignore that agreement with impunity as long as it felt—with some justification—that the leaders were unrepresentative. The point was not lost, at least on some of the League leadership: They needed to establish their claim to represent a united Muslim constituency. But that constituency needed to be created. Muslim community consciousness existed, but there was as yet little linkage between the Muslim political leadership and the bulk of the community. Muslim anxieties about Islam in general and the fate of the caliph in particular, however, provided an issue around which to mobilize opinion. The links in this process of mobilization were the pirs and ulama, to whom average Muslims looked for guidance in all aspects of their lives.

The Muslim League's annual session in December 1918 was held in Delhi, with Dr. Ansari serving as chairman of the reception committee. He had often served as a link between Westernized Muslims and ulama, and on this occasion too he acted as an intermediary. He had been in correspondence with Abdul Bari, and invited him and a number of other leading ulama to attend the League's Delhi meeting.<sup>192</sup> It was the first time the ulama had taken part in an overtly political organization.

The ulama responded favorably to Ansari's invitation because of the clear and present danger to Islam and their self-view as its authoritative representatives, but they were unwilling to join forces totally with the Muslim League. Prior to the League meeting, they met in the Fatehpuri Masjid to spell out their own position. Maulanas Abdul Bari and Qutbuddin of Firangi Mahal and Mufti Kafayatullah of Delhi<sup>193</sup> were the leading figures at this meeting.

Kafayatullah later aired his opinions in a speech before the full Muslim League. Western-educated leaders, he said, might feel that politics was their province and religion the bailiwick of the ulama, but that assumption was false, a product of aping the West. True Muslims had never considered religion and politics as separate entities.<sup>194</sup> This view implies that Westernized political leaders are not quite true Muslims. It also recalls Maulana Azad's earlier line in *al-Hilal*: Political struggle had become a religious duty. According to this definition of politics, the ulama had a leading, if not the leading, role to play.

The ulama passed a series of resolutions at their meeting which indicated that their primary concern was with the religious life of the community. They urged the government to respect the sanctity of the Muslim holy places by seeing that all armed forces were withdrawn from the Hijaz, Damascus, Baghdad, Najaf, and Kerbala. They recalled the government's policy of granting religious freedom to Muslims and stated that the question of the caliphate was one for Muslims alone to decide. They also asked that the interned Muslim leaders be freed, and they deplored the recent riots. Finally, they urged all the ulama to leave their cloisters and join in political activity, since in the question of the caliphate, religion and politics were joined.<sup>195</sup> In other words, the supremacy of the *shari'a* was at stake, and this was the ulama's department.

These resolutions were outspoken and decidedly anti-British in tone, but they also showed that the ulama's concerns were rather different from those of the Westernized politicians. The alliance between the two groups was still tentative, and the ulama ultimately decided to form their own political organization rather than join the League. For both groups, religion and politics were joined, but there was a basic difference in emphasis. The ulama were involved in politics in order to revitalize the Islamic social order. The Muslim League sought allies among the religious leadership in order to consolidate a political following.

The Muslim League meeting was opened by Dr. Ansari, who touched upon both constitutionalist and Islamic concerns in his speech. He voiced the League's objection to features of the Montagu report: they were hurt that the Congress-League plan had not been adopted and opposed "dyarchy," the division of governmental responsibility between the center and the provinces, which kept a number of important subjects firmly under the thumb of the

executive bureaucracy.<sup>196</sup> Ansari claimed that all good Muslim Leaguers were now at one with the nationalist movement. Then he went on to a fiery indictment of the British government's policy toward the sultan-caliph of Turkey, for which his speech was subsequently proscribed by the government.<sup>197</sup>

The resolutions passed by the League session emphasized religio-political issues. The first resolution recalled the principle of self-determination, as enunciated by the Allies during the war, and requested the government to apply it to India. But the other resolutions concentrated on topics of particular interest to Muslims. They called for the release of the Muslim internees and the selection of an Indo-Muslim delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, and voiced apprehensions about the Khilafat question.<sup>198</sup> This last resolution, proposed by Ansari, stated:

The Indian Musalmans take a deep interest in the fate of their co-religionists outside India . . . . [T]he collapse of the Muslim powers of the world is bound to have an adverse influence on the political importance of the Musalmans in this country, and the annihilation of the military powers of Islam in the world cannot but have a far-reaching effect on the minds of even the loyal Musalmans of India . . . .<sup>199</sup>

This early pronouncement of the Khilafat movement showed that League leaders were fully aware of the repercussions of the Turkish situation in India: its implications for Muslim collaboration with the nationalist movement, and its importance in catapulting certain Muslims into prominence.

Within the League, religious activists and barristers agreed, though each group for its own reasons, on the need to mobilize and give direction to the Muslims' anti-British sentiments. Hence, they were able to unite to oust the leadership of the League, which had chosen to voice, rather than ignore, Muslim ambivalence toward the nationalist movement. The raja of Mahmudabad had refused to sign a joint Congress-League statement that objected to certain points in the Montford reforms.<sup>200</sup> He wanted to keep the League from total identification with the Congress, but was attacked for playing into government hands. Wazir Hasan had also come under fire for his alleged half-heartedness during the Home Rule agitation.<sup>201</sup> Mahmudabad and Wazir Hasan were re-elected president and secretary of the League in December 1918, but their influence had been so eroded that they resigned in February 1919.<sup>202</sup>

The Ali brothers continued to vegetate in internment, but even in their absence they were increasingly powers to be reckoned with, as the League moved closer to their point of view under the aegis of their allies and disciples. After the abortive attempt to secure their release in 1917, they had become popular martyrs and seemed to enjoy the role. They kept up a barrage of letters to the government, pleading innocence of any disloyalty or treasonable action, and asking for a public trial. In 1918 the government finally agreed to appoint a commission of inquiry into their case, which called forth another salvo of objections from the brothers: A secret inquiry was unjust; they were not being given the opportunity to reply to evidence against them; and anyway the personnel of the commission was biased.<sup>203</sup> The verdict of the commission, however, was relatively favorable. In the spring of 1919 the commission said that, though they felt the government had been justified in interning the brothers, the war was now over save for the peace treaty and the brothers could thus be released. The government felt otherwise, for antigovernment sentiment was then at a frenzied peak—less over the Turkish question than over the Rowlatt Sedition Bills—and so the brothers once again stayed where they were.<sup>204</sup>

That was the last straw. Frustrated and embittered by four years of internment, Muhammad and Shaukat completed their martyrdom by a final gesture of defiance: They wrote to the viceroy protesting their lot, the deplorable policy of Britain toward Turkey, and the Rowlatt Bills, and proclaimed that henceforth they would refuse to abide by the terms of their internment.<sup>205</sup> They proceeded to speak in the local mosque and write openly to their friends against government policy toward Turkey, for which acts they were locked up in Betul Jail in June 1919.<sup>206</sup> Their imprisonment made them even greater heroes in popular opinion. When they were finally released, just in time for the Amritsar Congress and Muslim League meetings in December 1919, their triumphal journey from Central India to the Punjab left no doubt as to who would lead the Muslims in their postwar political campaign.

The political situation at the end of the war was one that favored the activist Muslim political leadership. Loyal Muslims had consistently lost influence as the war advanced, and the moderate barristers, who were most prominent in working out the Congress-League entente, had come to the point where they too acknowledged the need to rally a popular following. The means to do so

were also at hand, for the Khilafat issue was one that appealed to all strata of the Muslim community. For the ulama, support for the Khilafat was a matter of defense of the *shari'a*; they could no longer remain aloof from political activity. For the Western-educated, the machinations of the Western powers in the Middle East were paralleled by examples of British perfidiousness in a number of matters: the long-standing policies of religious neutrality and freedom, the wartime promises concerning the holy places, the declared war aim of self-determination of peoples. The masses, although they might not know what the Khilafat was, could be impressed with the fact that their religion was in danger. Hence the Khilafat, like many symbols, had different levels of meaning: the rule of Islamic law, the principles of religious freedom and self-determination, or simply the faith of Islam itself.

The Khilafat issue, moreover, was anti-British, and as such it was an issue on which to build Hindu-Muslim cooperation. If the Hindus supported the Muslims in their defense of the Khilafat, the Muslims could become an effective component of the national movement. In 1919-20 Gandhi did just that, as he was seeking allies in his attempt to redirect the Congress toward new tactics and mass organization. The Muslim Khilafatists and Gandhi were the ones who, during the next few years, changed the face of Indian nationalism.

## CHAPTER II

### EMERGENCE OF THE MOVEMENT, 1919-1920

The study of the nascent Khilafat leadership has shown that Muslim political developments in India in the period before 1919 grew out of educational reform movements among Muslims. These movements provided the institutional nuclei for subsequent political organizations, and in addition contained within themselves factional conflicts that led to differentiation in attitudes toward, and styles of, public activity. Struggles for control over educational institutions led some men of the Aligarh movement and some ulama toward Islamic self-assertiveness in cultural and political matters. British policies toward Muslims in India as well as events in the Middle East reinforced this trend. Ulama and Western-educated politicians drew closer together immediately before and during World War I, and in late 1918 they formed a tentative alliance at the annual Muslim League session, where the forces of religio-political activism were in control.

The situation in India at the end of 1918 favored new political initiatives. Among a wide variety of Muslims, discontent was patent. The intercommunal skirmishes of the previous year had increased Muslim anxiety about their cultural and political future in India, and the defeat of Turkey had rekindled their fears for the future of Islam as a world force. In addition, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, by not adopting the Congress-League Lucknow Pact in its entirety, showed the constitutionally minded among the Muslim leadership that agreements at the top of the political pyramid were not enough. Something had to be done to mobilize Muslim discontent, to broaden their constituency.

The prospects for Hindu-Muslim cooperation, however, seemed less bright than they had in 1916. The communal strife had

increased mutual suspicions in several regions. Muslim attention generally seemed riveted on issues that were specifically Islamic, having little to do with the Indian national cause. But these Islamic issues also had anti-British content. Muslim loyalism had been severely eroded, if not extinguished, by the war. The Muslim Khilafat leaders and Gandhi realized this and sought to make the emergent Muslim constituency an important component of an expanded national movement.

Their plans, as they evolved, were aided by the fact that discontent in India was not confined to the Muslim community during this period. Economic and political grievances affected the whole population and signaled a new era of mass political agitation among both Hindus and Muslims. In 1918, the monsoon had failed disastrously and famine prevailed in large parts of India well into 1919. The prices of food grains soared, as did the cost of other necessities. The worldwide epidemic of influenza added to the miseries of the hunger-weakened populace and claimed untold numbers of lives. Government measures to cope with the shortage, including restrictions on the export of food grains, the import of surplus rice and wheat, and public famine relief works, came too late to prevent unrest.<sup>1</sup> In such an atmosphere, political leaders could readily find an audience for their message of disillusionment with British rule.

The government handed the politicians another issue when, in early 1919, it forced the passage of the Rowlatt Bills by the Legislative Council. These measures, designed to extend into peacetime the emergency wartime powers granted to the government by the Defence of India Act, were condemned by Hindu and Muslim leaders alike as taking away with one hand what the Montford reforms had given with the other. The widespread reaction against this act of government duplicity presented a new opportunity for Hindu-Muslim cooperation. Demonstrations against the Rowlatt Bills marked the first time that new techniques of mass political agitation were used, with a limited degree of success, on an all-India basis. But violence broke out during the demonstrations, and the government responded with severe repression, especially in the Punjab. During the year that followed, the Khilafat and Punjab grievances became linked as two compelling reasons for Muslims and Hindus to join in opposing the government.

The year 1919 was one of trial and error in Indian politics. The

Hindu-Muslim entente came into existence, as did two new Muslim political bodies: the All-India Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind. These two bodies largely supplanted the Muslim League on the Indian Muslim political scene until the end of the Khilafat movement. Then, in 1920, debate within the Khilafat Committee and the National Congress led to abandonment of the time-worn technique of petitioning the government for political concessions in favor of the new strategy of noncooperation. From this new organizational and strategic base, a mass political following could be mobilized.

This two-year process, leading up to the agreement on a mass movement of noncooperation, was by no means a smooth one. Disagreements among the leadership persisted, differences of strategy supervened, and misunderstandings arose as to meanings of statements, which varied according to the exponent and the audience.<sup>2</sup> The Khilafat was a symbol which meant different things to different people, but the anti-British nature of the symbol provided some consistency, and on this basis the Hindu-Muslim alliance was built.

### *The Hindu-Muslim Entente*

Efforts to achieve political cooperation between Hindus and Muslims had always been a part of the Indian nationalist movement. Prominent Muslims had taken part in the Congress from its inception, and there were periodic attempts to bring members of the two communities together politically. The Allahabad conference of Hindu and Muslim leaders in 1910, the endorsement of "suitable" self-government by the Muslim League in 1913, and the Lucknow Pact are all cases in point. These efforts at *rapprochement* were undertaken on the Muslim side by a small group of barristers whose cooperation with nationalism was based on devotion to the principle of self-determination, and whose speciality was constitutional negotiation to safeguard Muslim rights. The barristers were now being overshadowed by a group of Muslim leaders who had been alienated from British rule and whose political style featured religious appeals in emotional oratory and journalism, rather than constitutional debates. The barrister leadership of the Congress was similarly confronted at this time with a new type of political leader in the person of Gandhi. He too took political activity out of

the council houses into the fields of Bihar, the mills of Ahmedabad, and the streets of Bombay, concentrating on local issues to organize resistance. This similarity of political styles attracted Gandhi and the new Muslim leadership to each other.

The communal disorder of 1917-18 had done nothing to promote Hindu-Muslim friendship, but it did serve as an object lesson in the damaging effects of Hindu-Muslim antagonism. Thereafter, Gandhi sought to contact a number of Muslim leaders in the interests of communal harmony. One of these was Maulana Abdul Bari, who had his own reasons for seeking out the Mahatma; he wanted to enlist Gandhi's support in the campaign to secure the release of the Ali brothers from internment. They met at Dr. Ansari's home in Delhi in March 1918.<sup>3</sup>

Gandhi listened sympathetically to the Maulana's exposition of Muslim grievances: The Muslims, believing British declarations about the nonreligious character of the war, had shown steadfast loyalty to Britain, had enlisted in large numbers in the army, and had sacrificed their lives fighting against the forces of the sultan-caliph. They had received nothing in return but consistent disregard for their religious sentiments.<sup>4</sup> Gandhi saw in these bruised feelings a way to gain Muslim adherence to the drive for self-government, which he called *swaraj*. He wrote to Muhammad Ali

. . . my interest in your release is quite selfish. We have a common goal and I want to utilize your services to the uttermost, in order to reach that goal. In the proper solution of the Mahomedan question lies the realization of Swarajya.<sup>5</sup>

Gandhi also contacted the viceroy and urged him to give the Alis their freedom, claiming that their release would turn Abdul Bari and his thousands of Muslims disciples into government supporters.<sup>6</sup> This was at best a questionable assertion, but it indicates that Gandhi assigned tremendous importance to the Alis and Abdul Bari among Muslim leaders. They certainly sought to become spokesmen for the entire Muslim community, and Gandhi's recognition of their position is indicative of their partial success, even at this early date. For the moment the Maulana and the Mahatma agreed, but little else was accomplished, for the Ali brothers remained interned during 1918, and Hindu-Muslim relations were not significantly improved. Abdul Bari himself was involved in a communal incident in Calcutta later that year.<sup>7</sup>

In 1919, however, there was a new opportunity for Gandhi and Muslim leaders to help each other. The Rowlatt Bills were introduced into the Imperial Legislative Council on February 6, 1919, and all during the month there were public meetings to protest them, addressed by leading politicians and journalists of both communities, whether of constitutionalist or agitational persuasion.<sup>8</sup> But in spite of the widespread protest and the united opposition of all the Indian members of the Council, the Rowlatt Bills were passed on March 18.<sup>9</sup> The government insisted that law-abiding citizens had nothing to fear from the Rowlatt Act, but the people were not convinced. Rumor was rife that the police would be free to search and arrest whomever they pleased and keep him under lock and key without trial, and that the law abolished the right of appeal and imposed new and severe taxation.<sup>10</sup>

Since legislative opposition could not stop a determined government from passing the bills, Gandhi decided that a new form of protest was necessary. Invoking the technique of *satyagraha*, which he had developed in South Africa and in several local disputes since his return to India, he called on his followers to take a vow refusing to obey the Rowlatt Act and pledging to refrain from all violence.<sup>11</sup> In quest of Muslim allies for his nonviolent movement, Gandhi turned once again to the Ali brothers' camp. He went to Lucknow in March of 1919, where he secured the adherence of Abdul Bari to the principles of *satyagraha*.<sup>12</sup>

The Maulana felt that nonviolent resistance to the British was justified for tactical reasons, since the British had disregarded Muslim religious feelings concerning the future of the Khilafat. At a public meeting in Lucknow, he claimed that the Rowlatt Act was passed especially to keep Muslims from protesting the decisions of the Peace Conference concerning Muslim countries.<sup>13</sup> This linkage of the Khilafat and nationalist grievances was a way to win Muslim support for anti-British agitation, but of questionable value for nonviolence. If nonviolent resistance was justifiable, so too presumably were other forms of resistance, and Abdul Bari's oratory tended more to the passionate than the peaceful.

The Ali brothers also adopted *satyagraha* in their own way, much to Gandhi's chagrin. The Mahatma had urged them to write the letter to the viceroy in which they refused to abide any longer by the terms of their internment. But the intemperate tone of the letter, and of their subsequent pronouncements on the Rowlatt

Bills and the Khilafat, landed the Alis in jail. Gandhi was upset, for he wanted their release, not their imprisonment. He was also nonplussed by the heat of their words, which went against his desire for a totally nonviolent movement.<sup>14</sup>

The alliance between Gandhi and the Ali brothers and Abdul Bari was thus fraught with misunderstandings and personality differences from the first. Gandhi nevertheless supported the Muslims' Khilafat grievances, and the Alis' sympathizers, in turn, supported Gandhi's agitation against the Rowlatt Act. Much has been written about the Rowlatt *satyagraha* and its tragic outcome at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar on April 13, 1919.<sup>15</sup> It is unnecessary to discuss it here in detail, save to comment on its importance for the emerging Hindu-Muslim entente. Hindu-Muslim amity during this agitation was widespread and remarkable, surprising to the government and even to Indian political leaders.

To start the *satyagraha*, Gandhi called for a nationwide *hartal* (general strike) on March 30. He later postponed the strike until April 6, but the delay was ignored in Delhi, and there the first violence occurred. A group of demonstrators met with resistance while urging shopkeepers to observe the *hartal*, a skirmish developed, and then the police arrived and opened fire. A number of people, both Hindu and Muslim, were killed. The following day, the funeral processions met at the scene of the firing and Hindus and Muslims embraced, declaring that their unity had been sealed in blood. Memorial services at the Jama Masjid were attended by an overflow crowd not only of Muslims, but also of Hindus. When Swami Shradhanand, an Arya Samaj leader not known for his friendliness to Muslims, arrived at the mosque, he was quickly propelled to the pulpit and asked to speak. It was an unprecedented display of communal harmony in an urban crowd.<sup>16</sup>

The *hartal* of April 6 was relatively peaceful in Delhi, but there was violence in the Punjab, notably in Amritsar. The Jallianwala Bagh massacre and the imposition of martial law in the Punjab followed, successfully squelching the protest for the time being, but leaving a residue of "Punjab grievances" which would become a national issue in 1920 with the publication of the Hunter Commission's investigation into the massacre.

Elsewhere in India, there were frequent examples of Hindu-Muslim fraternization during *satyagraha* demonstrations. In Calcutta, Hindus were admitted for the first time to the Nakhuda

Mosque, Maulana Azad's home base prior to his internment.<sup>17</sup> In Allahabad, Hindus and Muslims jointly attended a mass meeting in the chief mosque of the city.<sup>18</sup> In Bombay, there was an active campaign by leaders of both communities to sell proscribed literature, including Gandhi's pamphlet, *Hind Swaraj*, and *The Life and Addresses of Mustafa Kemal Pasha*, who was rapidly becoming a new Muslim hero.<sup>19</sup>

The *satyagraha* had afforded a number of impressive demonstrations of intercommunal harmony and popular adherence to nonviolent methods of protest. But the violence in many other instances indicated that strong-arm methods were also used. Rumors were another means of gaining compliance with the *hartal*: Some said that the closure and the wearing of black armbands were because the king had died; others that police, that "Rowlatt Sahib," or that the government had ordered it as a sign of mourning for those fallen in the war.<sup>20</sup>

Such methods helped rally impressive popular support to make a point against the government. The methods were not to Gandhi's taste, however, nor was the violence engendered by his nonviolent movement. He first postponed the civil disobedience campaign and then called it off, saying that he had made a "Himalayan miscalculation." He felt that the people needed further practice in peaceful demonstration before attempting nationwide civil disobedience. Some of Gandhi's Muslim allies were far from pleased. Abdul Bari, in particular, began to question the value of *satyagraha* for Muslims.<sup>21</sup> He and his disciples had been drawn into the fray by connecting the Rowlatt injustices to those against the Khilafat, but now Gandhi and his Hindu followers seemed to be backing down. Hindu-Muslim fraternization slackened somewhat, and the more orthodox of both communities voiced opposition to using mosques and temples for political purposes.<sup>22</sup>

The demonstrations of communal amity had made a great impression, nevertheless. Throughout India could be heard the cry "Hindu-Muslim ki jai!" (victory to Hindu-Muslim unity).<sup>23</sup> The unprecedented scenes of unity had been the product of an emotional upsurge in response to government repression, but the emotion was sincere. On balance, the events of the Rowlatt *satyagraha* indicated that communal cooperation was possible.

An event that affected Hindu-Muslim relations in a somewhat different way was the third Anglo-Afghan war of May and June

1919. Amir Habibullah of Afghanistan had been assassinated in February, and the new amir, Amanullah, attacked India for a variety of rather obscure reasons. The amir cited the injustice of the British in India, and showed his sympathy toward his Indian brethren, Hindu and Muslim, in their revolt against British tyranny. As an excuse for attacking British outposts, he stated that the rising in India was also creating disturbances in Afghanistan. The British felt rather that the amir, caught in internal disorders, had created this diversionary movement on the frontier in order to save his own skin.<sup>24</sup> Whatever the reasons for it, the fray was soon over. But the idea that the ruler of Afghanistan could send a horde of Muslim warriors charging down out of the Khyber Pass to link up with the frontier Muslims excited the primordial fears of the Hindu plainsmen.<sup>25</sup> Such fears were expressed from time to time during the Khilafat movement, and troubled the Hindu-Muslim alliance on more than one occasion.

### *The All-India Khilafat Committee*

Two new all-India Muslim political bodies, the Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind, were founded in 1919. It may properly be asked why such organizations were necessary, particularly given the new emphasis on mobilizing a massive Muslim constituency which was apparent at the 1918 Muslim League session. At that time, lawyers and other constitutionalists, ulama, and followers of the Ali brothers had all joined in denouncing the government's policies toward Turkey. Could not the Muslim League perform the function of rallying the community to the Khilafat banner? It seemed ready for such a task, especially in early 1919, after the resignations of Mahmudabad and Wazir Hasan, when the Ali brothers' allies gained even firmer control of the League.<sup>26</sup> And yet the League was in a parlous state in 1919; its regular membership stood at a meager 777, and during the year, four of the six scheduled meetings of the League Council had to be adjourned for want of a quorum. The League did not succeed in sending its own men to represent Indian Muslim opinion at the Paris Peace Conference, although it did send a deputation led by Jinnah to London to represent Muslim feelings concerning the Khilafat question and the Montford reforms. They returned without having made much of an impression on British government officials.<sup>27</sup>

In contrast to this lukewarm League deputation was the ebullient activity in India to impress the government with the gravity of Muslim concern for the Khilafat. As the emphasis in political activity gradually shifted from respectful petitions to the government toward broad-based mobilization, a number of Muslims felt the need for an association which, unlike the League, was untainted by past policies of loyalism or elitist constitutionalism. Another argument stressed that such an association should be "strictly religious," unalloyed by political considerations, and hence represent the widest possible spectrum of Indian Muslim opinion.<sup>28</sup> These differing rationales show that, even among the advocates of broad-based mobilization in support of the Khilafat cause, there were differences of opinion as to how it should be done.

The first efforts at forming this "strictly religious" organization were made in Bombay by a group of notably loyal and pious men. On March 20, 1919, at a public meeting of 15,000 Bombay Muslims, a Khilafat Committee was formed. The president of the meeting was a wealthy local merchant who had made a fortune trading with the British in lumber and other strategic raw materials during the war, Seth Mian Muhammad Haji Jan Muhammad Chotani. Now that the war was over and shipping facilities were tight, the profits to be made by loyalty to Britain were considerably less. In addition, Chotani was a sincerely religious man, concerned about the future of the Khilafat and the security of the pilgrimage places. He was joined on the Khilafat Committee by the scions of a number of prominent local merchant families, both Sunni and Shia, and a number of important lawyers. The concern shown by both Shias and Sunnis at this stage of the game is significant. It indicates that although the Shias did not recognize the caliph, they shared Sunni anxiety over the decline of Muslim power and the uncertain condition of the holy places. Resolutions at the meeting were mild: they called for Indian Muslim representation at the Peace Conference, asked the government to insure that Constantinople would remain in Turkish hands, and recommended the selection of an all-India Muslim deputation to wait on the viceroy.<sup>29</sup>

The resolutions of the Bombay Khilafat Committee had little in common with the support given by Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers to the Rowlatt *satyagraha*. One section of Muslim leadership still favored respectful petitions, while the other felt that such tactics

were useless. What, said the activists, can be accomplished by deputations? The need was not for exclusive groups of respectable men, but for a vast, organized demonstration of Muslim unanimity on the Khilafat question.<sup>30</sup> They had a point: Chotani's request to take a deputation to the viceroy was turned down on the grounds that Indian Muslim demands were already known to the government and had been adequately represented before the Peace Conference.<sup>31</sup>

Bombarded by these arguments, the Bombay Khilafat Committee and the council of the Muslim League soon came to favor the idea of a broader-based organization. After the viceroy's rebuff to Chotani, another meeting of the Bombay Khilafat Committee was held on July 5, 1919. It resolved to start branches of the Khilafat organization all over India, to hold meetings constantly in order to keep Muslims informed on the Khilafat problem, and to translate Muslim feelings into effective pressure on the government. Their basic program was, first, to urge retention of the temporal powers of the sultan of Turkey as caliph, and second, to ensure his continued suzerainty over the Islamic holy places.<sup>32</sup> The Muslim League Council called for an All-India Muslim Conference, representative of all groups and regions, to draw up a united Muslim program.<sup>33</sup>

The All-India Muslim Conference was to be held in Lucknow in September 1919. To give the meeting both respectability and the widest possible appeal, the invitation was issued over the signatures of a vast horde of conveners, including the Honorable Sir Ibrahim Harun Khan Jafar of Poona, president-elect of the conference, Sayyid Zahur Ahmad of Lucknow, secretary of the Muslim League, Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, a *zamindar* from the Punjab, Sir Fazilbhai Currimbhai of Bombay, Seth Haji Abdullah Harun, a wealthy Karachi merchant, Fazlul Haq of Calcutta, Dr. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan of Delhi, Sayyid Raza Ali, a prominent UP barrister and a Shia, representatives of both factions at Aligarh, and numerous others. The emphasis was on respectability. The invitation called on Muslims of all shades of opinion, whether "politically minded" or not, to attend this conference for the purpose of drawing up a united appeal to the government concerning the Khilafat. It insisted that all those attending the conference would merely be discharging their duty to Islam, and that the meeting should not be considered "hostile to British

interests." There was no mention of mass organization or threat of agitation; this would have been anathema to a good many of the conveners.<sup>34</sup>

Behind the scenes, however, a dispute was developing over the resolutions to be adopted and the methods to be used in pushing the Khilafat program. Symptomatic of this was the quarrel over the presidency of the conference. The raja of Mahmudabad supported the selection of Harun Khan Jafar as president,<sup>35</sup> but Maulana Salamatullah of Firangi Mahal and Hasrat Mohani started a campaign to have Abdul Bari preside. Jafar arrived in Lucknow only to find the subjects committee of the conference still wrangling over the choice of a presiding officer. September 21, the day for the impressive display of Indian Muslim unity, dawned with no agreement over who should preside at the conference. The embarrassing lacuna at the start of the assembly was filled by poetry recitation until someone proposed that Abdul Bari preside in the morning and Harun Khan Jafar in the afternoon. This compromise saved the day.

The quarrel was between the supporters of respectful petition led by Mahmudabad, and those of mass agitation, lined up behind Abdul Bari, but it was basically a question of the prestige of the two individuals. Who presided made little difference in what was to be said as the keynote of the conference, for Jafar's address had been drafted by some of the young Leaguers of Lucknow who had organized the conference, and whose ideas on the Khilafat issue were influenced by those of Abdul Bari. The incident, however, caused a split between Mahmudabad and Abdul Bari, heretofore cordial in their relations, and Mahmudabad's dissociation from the subsequent activities of the Khilafat movement.<sup>36</sup>

The conference was attended by some 400 delegates from all over India and several thousand spectators, and it was certainly representative of a broad spectrum of Muslim opinion.<sup>37</sup> It also succeeded in producing a unified set of demands by virtue of a wide range of resolutions. The first stated that the spiritual position of the sultan of Turkey as caliph of Islam was bound to his temporal power, and thus the proposed division of the Ottoman Empire was an assault upon their religion. The second protested the separation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia from the Ottoman Empire under non-Muslim mandates. The third objected to the internationalization of Constantinople and the partition of Thrace. All

these points, plus a resolution to forward these demands to the British prime minister, were acceptable to those who still believed in petitioning the government.

For those who advocated newer methods, the conference resolved to hold an all-India Khilafat Day on October 17, 1919, to include prayers, fasting, *hartal*, public meetings, and appeals to Hindus for support. Finally, they resolved to form the All-India Khilafat Committee, with headquarters in Bombay and branches down to the village level. Seth Chotani was chosen president, and Shaukat Ali—in absentia—secretary.<sup>38</sup> Though their demands dealt with the Middle Eastern situation, their actions showed that they were also concerned with the Indian Muslim constituency: how to give effect to it, organize it, and galvanize it.

All-India Khilafat Day was to be the first test for those who wanted to organize a mass demonstration of Indian Muslim unity on the Khilafat question. Arrangements for the day showed a considerable degree of centralized planning, as well as the inevitable personal and local variations. The Bombay Committee, and the well-lined pocket of Seth Chotani, helped finance meetings as far away as Calcutta. A publicity committee traveled to the major cities and issued statements to the press, posters, and handbills. The statements included a moderate appeal by Dr. Ansari for fasting and prayers by Muslims all over India, but *hartal* only if proper arrangements were made to ensure its peaceful and voluntary character. Mahatma Gandhi issued a similar statement to Hindus. But Hasrat Mohani called for complete *hartal* and for “monster meetings of protest.” Posters ranged from Abdul Bari’s outspoken appeal in Urdu for prayers, fasting, and meetings to save Islam, which was “facing ruin,” to the mild statement by Chotani and the Bombay Committee inviting Muslims to meet and reaffirm the Lucknow resolutions. Abdul Bari was incensed that the Bombay Committee had refused to endorse his poster and had issued its own instead.<sup>39</sup> The cracks in Muslim unity could not be entirely papered over, even by Khilafat posters.

Khilafat Day was a huge success. The bazaars of India did little business on that day. In Bombay, special prayers for the continuation of the caliph’s temporal powers were offered by both Shias and Sunnis. Gandhi joined the Bombay Khilafat Committee leaders in addressing a public meeting following the prayers, where the Lucknow resolutions were reaffirmed. The observances in Madras

were marked by a mass meeting of approximately 20,000 Muslims and Hindus on the beach.<sup>40</sup> In Calcutta a mass meeting at Town Hall addressed by Fazlul Haq overflowed into the square outside. Elsewhere in Bengal, there were meetings in most district towns and in some villages in the Muslim-majority rural areas.<sup>41</sup> Delhi had the biggest “monster meeting” of them all. Some 50,000 assembled to hear speeches by Dr. Ansari, Mufti Kafayatullah, Swami Shradhanand, and Asaf Ali, a barrister and secretary of the local Khilafat Committee.<sup>42</sup> In the hinterland of Sindh, the *pirs* or local religious leaders were active in organizing protest meetings in villages.<sup>43</sup>

In general, Khilafat Day demonstrated that the Muslim leadership was beginning to reach a broader audience, at least among the urban, newspaper-reading population. The rural and illiterate Muslims still remained outside the political orbit, with the exception of Sindh and some areas of Bengal. Hindu-Muslim unity was also in evidence in various places, but inevitably participation in Khilafat Day was predominantly Muslim.

Khilafat Day, however impressive, had been a one-shot demonstration. Now the serious business of organizing a committee to direct the Khilafat movement had to be faced. An All-India Khilafat Conference was called and assembled in Delhi on November 23-24, 1919, to decide on a plan of action. The delegates numbered about 300, more than half of whom were from UP. The ulama were also heavily represented, since they were in Delhi for the inaugural meetings of the Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind.

The first day, Fazlul Haq presided reluctantly over the passage of four major resolutions.<sup>44</sup> The first called for a Muslim boycott of the peace celebrations planned by the government for December; until Turkey had been accorded a just settlement, no Muslim could conscientiously celebrate the end of the war. The second resolution, proposed by Sayyid Husain of the *Independent*, was the most epoch-making. It declared it the religious duty of all Indian Muslims to withdraw cooperation from the government if the Khilafat were jeopardized by an unjust Turkish peace settlement. The exact ways in which they would “noncooperate” were not spelled out, but a committee was appointed to study the matter.<sup>45</sup> The third resolution, proposed by Hasrat Mohani, was the subject of considerable controversy: If the Turkish peace were unjust, Muslims should institute a progressive boycott of European goods. Gandhi,

who was present as a gesture of Hindu-Muslim solidarity, was joined by Chotani, other merchants, and a number of the more moderate barristers in opposing this measure, but it ultimately passed. Finally, the Khilafat Conference appointed a delegation to go to England to represent the Muslim cause yet again before the home government.<sup>46</sup>

The next day, at a highly publicized joint Hindu-Muslim conference, Mahatma Gandhi was unanimously acclaimed presiding officer. Other prominent Hindus present included Swami Shradhanand, and Pandits Malaviya and Jawaharlal Nehru. In his speech, Gandhi pointedly said that the Hindus were one with the Muslims in the Khilafat movement because the Muslim cause was just.<sup>47</sup> He thus tried to quash rumors of a "deal" between himself and the Muslim leadership wherein the Muslims agreed to stop slaughtering cows—considered sacred by Hindus—if the Congress supported the Khilafat movement.<sup>48</sup> Gandhi sought to base Hindu-Muslim agreement squarely on the ideal of national solidarity, but the rumor hung on. The Khilafat was a symbol on which to focus a variety of Muslim anxieties; the cow served a similar purpose for many Hindus.<sup>49</sup>

These November meetings marked the victory of the UP group that had supported Abdul Bari at the Lucknow meeting in September. They failed in their attempt to get the headquarters of the All-India Khilafat Committee transferred to Delhi or Lucknow, away from the moderating influence of the lawyers and merchants arrayed around Seth Chotani in Bombay, but their triumph in the program resolutions was complete. Boycott of the peace celebrations, of European goods, and noncooperation with the government were all measures which called for massive organization and funding, and widespread agitation. The barristers viewed these tactics with considerable alarm, though they went along with the majority. They placed their trust in a last-ditch effort by the deputation to England. The merchants, needless to say, were very much against the boycott of foreign goods, and determined to fight this resolution at the annual December political meetings.<sup>50</sup>

By late 1919, the Khilafat Committee had set up a rudimentary organization, worked out methods of propaganda and demonstration, and shown the strength of its appeal among urban Muslims, especially in northern India and in some rural areas. Its program was forthrightly radical in comparison with the earlier approach

of the Muslim League. It aimed at broadening the base of Muslim political organization through religious appeals to the populace, and advocated participation by Muslims in the nationalist movement. Essential to these plans was the involvement of the ulama in the political mobilization process. The ulama went along with the politicians to a certain extent, but at the same time they founded their own association.

### *The Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind*

The other new Muslim political organization founded in 1919, the Jamiat al-Ulama, had much the same tactical approach as the Khilafat Committee, but with an essentially different point of view. The ulama viewed themselves as religious guides, not political operatives. Any political activity in which they engaged was to them an extension of their primary role as the custodians and interpreters of Islamic law and religious practice. This attitude is exemplified in the efforts to organize an all-India association of ulama undertaken by Maulanas Abdul Bari and Kafayatullah following the 1918 Delhi Muslim League meetings. Early in 1919, Abdul Bari wrote to a friend that the problem of defending the Khilafat and holy places was essentially one of elucidating the *shari'a*, and thus the ulama should be the leaders of the Muslims in this question. The trouble was that the ulama were not organized into a body to express unified opinions on the law, and thereby to direct Muslim opinion.<sup>51</sup>

This idea formed the theme of Abdul Bari's addresses to various provincial Anjuman-e-Ulama and Sufi gatherings during the year. In Bengal, he quoted passages from the Quran exhorting the believers to support one another, and followed with an eloquent plea for unity among the ulama. Only then could they truly act as spiritual guides for the community.<sup>52</sup> In UP, he appealed for cooperation among ulama representing different schools of thought: Deoband, Bareilly, Badaun, Lucknow, and Aligarh.<sup>53</sup> And at the annual pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaikh Muinuddin Chishti at Ajmer, he took advantage of the presence of throngs of Sufis and their disciples to urge a united pronouncement on the Khilafat question, prayers for the sultan-caliph in all Friday *khutbas*, and the calling of an all-India conference of ulama.<sup>54</sup>

As part of his campaign to promote the unity and organization

of the ulama, Abdul Bari worked hard to secure a unanimous *fatwa* on the Khilafat question. The Khilafat *fatwa* stated that the caliph need not be a Quraish, and that if anyone, Quraish or not (such as Sharif Husain), revolts against the recognized caliph or tries to replace him, it is the duty of all Muslims to help put down the rebel. The *fatwa* also defined the holy places as including all of Arabia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, and declared that all Muslims must fight to prevent non-Muslims from gaining possession of these areas.<sup>55</sup>

But the *fatwa* was not unanimous. Maulana Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad, the *muhtamim* of Deoband, expressed his complete sympathy with the object of the *fatwa*, which was to produce a united statement by Indian ulama on the Khilafat and holy places. Such a *fatwa*, he said, would be a potent means to petition the government. But he went on to object to the anti-British tone of Abdul Bari's *fatwa*, and then argued that it took liberties with the *shari'a*. The Shamsul Ulama of Deoband still believed in appeals to government good will; he refused to sign the *fatwa*. Others who refused to sign were Maulanas Abdul Hamid and Abdul Majid, Abdul Bari's old rivals at Firangi Mahal, Ashraf Ali Thanavi, a distinguished product of Deoband, and Habibur Rahman Khan Sherwani of the Aligarh establishment.<sup>56</sup> Signers of the Khilafat *fatwa* included Maulana Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, a former disciple of Maulana Shibli, Azad Subhani of Kanpur Mosque fame, Shah Sulaiman Phulwari, a leading Sufi of Bihar, the Sufis of Ajmer, ulama from Badaun, and all of Abdul Bari's followers at Firangi Mahal. They were joined by a group of Sindhi *pirs* led by Pir Imamuddin Shah of Sukkur. It was a numerous but hardly all-inclusive endorsement, reflecting the network of Abdul Bari's and Firangi Mahal family disciples among Sufis and ulama in Lucknow, Ajmer, Bihar, and Sindh. The ulama of Deoband, Punjab, and Bengal were conspicuous by their absence.<sup>57</sup>

These attempts to rally the ulama via local bodies and *fatwa* pronouncements finally bore fruit on November 25, 1919, when a group met in Delhi to form the Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind. Abdul Bari presided over the meeting that resolved to promote Indian Muslim unity through the *rapprochement* of various groups of ulama, and agreed to meet again in Amritsar in December, simultaneously with the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Khilafat Committee. Mufti Kafayatullah was elected president of

the Jamiat, and Maulana Ahmad Said of Delhi, secretary.<sup>58</sup>

Kafayatullah, when presiding over the Amritsar meeting of the Jamiat in December, defended the need for a separate organization of ulama, as he had done in similar terms at the Delhi Muslim League in 1918. The ulama, to be sure, could always participate in the Muslim League, as previously, on an individual basis, but they needed an association through which they could speak with a united, authoritative voice, thus increasing their influence in the community.<sup>59</sup> The divines remained wary of subordinating themselves to the Westernized Leaguers.

The rest of the proceedings at Amritsar were devoted to a discussion of the overall aims of the organization. Perhaps to promote unity among the ranks of the ulama, the original aims of the Jamiat were quite general, again emphasizing religious guidance rather than political activism. They included leadership according to the tenets of Islamic law in all matters of religious and community life, political or nonpolitical, strengthening contacts with the rest of the Islamic world, and promoting friendship with non-Muslims of India.<sup>60</sup> A more outspoken list of aims, which included defense of the holy places of Islam, separate *shari'a* courts for Indian Muslims, and independence for India, appears to be of a later date.<sup>61</sup>

In addition to these general aims, the Jamiat discussed some specific measures for immediate action, but the resolutions which emerged were vague. The ulama urged the government to pay careful attention to Muslim views on the Khilafat question, or else they feared that "the government will have great difficulties,"<sup>62</sup> but without going into specifics. In promoting unity among the ulama, Abdul Bari found that he had to tone down his outspokenness. The Jamiat followed him in endorsing Hindu-Muslim amity, but the attitude of the ulama toward the nationalist movement was still highly ambivalent. They were doubtless sincere in their anti-British enthusiasm, but in their emphasis on the correct observance of Muslim law the ulama were concentrating on the religious and legal dimensions of community life, which had always been their separate province. They were not blazing a new political trail, but rather were sticking to an area of influence already charted.

In addition to deciding upon a general plan of action, the Jamiat al-Ulama elected a Constitution Committee and a Central

Working Committee, the personnel of which were a who's who of activist ulama. Prominent on these committees were Maulanas Kafayatullah, Ahmad Said, and Hakim Ajmal Khan of Delhi, Salamattullah of Firangi Mahal, Hasrat Mohani and Abdul Majid Badauni of UP, Akram Khan, the editor of *Muhammadi* of Calcutta, Daud Ghaznavi from the Punjab, Pir Turab Ali Shah from Sindh, and among those from Bombay, a Shia—Hakim Abu Yusuf Isfahani.<sup>63</sup> Abdul Bari, together with his close friends and associates, and the Delhi group of ulama centered around Mufti Kafayatullah and Hakim Ajmal Khan, had thus succeeded in founding an all-India grouping of ulama. The Deoband administration still remained aloof.

The Congress, the Muslim League, the All-India Khilafat Committee, and the Jamiat al-Ulama all met in Amritsar in December 1919 in a joyful demonstration of their new-found sense of national solidarity, and as a direct reply to the government suppression of the national movement that had taken place in the same city in April. An even greater reason for jubilation was the government amnesty to political prisoners, which permitted Shaukat and Muhammad Ali to arrive in Amritsar amid cheers, tears, embraces, and a veritable mountain of garlands.<sup>64</sup>

Pandit Motilal Nehru presided over the Congress meeting, which expressed its full solidarity with the Muslims on the Khilafat issue. Hindus less prone to such selfless brotherhood argued that partition of the Ottoman Empire was an unwarranted attack on the sovereignty of an independent Asian power and hence to be deplored. Another item on the agenda was a heated discussion of the question of whether to support the Montford reforms or not. Gandhi and his followers overcame stiff opposition to the "disappointing" reforms by Tilak and C. R. Das. It is significant that at this juncture Gandhi favored cooperating with the government to implement the reforms.<sup>65</sup> He would change his stand only gradually during the year ahead.

The highlight of the Congress session, however, was an impromptu oration by Muhammad Ali, during which he proclaimed that he and all the other released leaders would rather return to prison indefinitely than see India in chains. He pledged himself to an unending struggle for Indian freedom, citing as a particular ill the Press Act, which had caused him so much grief.<sup>66</sup> Gandhi must have flinched, both at Muhammad's hyperbole and

at the prospect of his returning to prison before they could act in concert.

The Muslim League produced a great deal of talk and little business. Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, a Muslim physician and politician from Amritsar who had been arrested during the April disturbances, returned from jail to deliver a stinging indictment of the Punjab government and a glowing tribute to communal harmony during those troubled times. Hakim Ajmal Khan's lengthy presidential address linked the Amritsar massacre and the Khilafat problem in a brace of antigovernment grievances uniting Hindu and Muslim. The Ali brothers then took the podium and held it for so long that an important discussion on basic reforms in the League's constitution had to be postponed.<sup>67</sup> The brothers seemed less interested in reforming the League now that another all-India Muslim political organization was dedicated to their brand of politics.

Shaukat Ali presided over the Khilafat Committee meeting, a gathering of thousands including the reunited Ali group: the brothers, Dr. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Abdul Bari, Zafar Ali Khan, and Sayyid Husain of the *Independent*. Also on hand were many of the same Hindu leaders who had been present in Delhi in November: Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Swami Shradhanand, and Pandit Malaviya. The Khilafat Committee passed a resolution which stated that if the government agreed to peace terms against the tenets of Islam, they would have to defend their faith. This threat had little substance: Doubtless in response to pressures from the lucrative Bombay faction, the Khilafatists did not specify how they would defend Islam, nor even mention economic boycott and noncooperation, which had been resolved upon in November. They named a blue-ribbon deputation to call on the viceroy to obtain his permission to send delegations to England and to America, and decided to send a delegation to Constantinople to express their devotion to the caliph—in case there was any doubt.

More substantive than these resolutions, which hinted darkly at antigovernment action but then resorted to the time-worn tactic of deputations, was a series of measures designed to build up the Khilafat organization: the committee resolved to start a Khilafat fund with a target of ten lakh (one million) rupees. In addition, they stipulated that the draft constitution of the Khilafat Committee be circulated to all provincial and district branches, which were to

hold meetings to approve it.<sup>68</sup> Such a move was probably aimed at creating provincial and district branches where none had existed before. The Khilafat Committee had to begin spreading its tentacles beyond Bombay and Delhi if its efforts at mass mobilization were to succeed. During the next couple of months, the Khilafatists were busy implementing both types of resolutions, deputation and organizational, thanks to the strenuous efforts of the Ali brothers, who after having been cooped up for four and a half years hit the political trail with all their old élan.

#### *Old Methods: The Khilafat Deputations*

The various Khilafat conferences in late 1919 had resolved in favor of different steps to impress the government with the seriousness of the Khilafat problem in Muslim eyes. These steps fell into two categories: those in accord with the old style of politics, in which a group representing the community called upon government officials, whether in India or England, with a petition in hand; and those designed to redraft the rules of the political game, seizing the political initiative through such tactics as general strikes, peaceful demonstrations, and the ultimate threat of noncooperation with the government.

The Ali brothers had committed themselves to the Khilafat deputations, the first scheduled to meet the viceroy in January 1920, the second to go to England thereafter under Muhammad's leadership. They were nevertheless among the initiators of the new style of politics, and thus they were also building up a popular base of support for what was to come. The delegations asked the government to grant their Khilafat demands, but the preparations for political agitation in India showed that the activist Muslim leaders did not really expect this to happen. The deputations, in fact, seem quite irrelevant to the whole thrust of the Khilafat movement as it developed in India in 1920. This point can be amply demonstrated by looking at the work of the deputations and contrasting it with the political activity that was going on elsewhere.

After Amritsar, the Ali brothers threw themselves into a frenetic round of touring on behalf of the Khilafat cause. Everywhere they went they were received like conquering heroes with slogans of "Hindu-Musulman ki jai!" and "Muhammad Ali-Shaukat Ali ki jai!"<sup>69</sup> They lost no opportunity to articulate a program of de-

mands that became the Khilafat Manifesto<sup>70</sup> and to appeal for funds. Muhammad and Shaukat's first triumphal entry was into Delhi on January 9, 1920. In Ansari's open motor car, they were driven through the main streets of old Delhi, which were decorated with garlands, crescent-emblazoned flags, and archways at the major intersections carrying inscriptions to the greatness of God and the Ali brothers. In Chandni Chawk, a crowd of 50,000 welcomed them as they mounted a platform shaped like the prow of a battleship, painted with the inscription "S.S. Liberty."<sup>71</sup> The crowd also announced the initiation of an all-India purse to be collected as a tribute to the Ali brothers' fortitude during their internment, and to aid them in their financial difficulties. This the brothers refused to accept, but offered to give the money to the Khilafat fund.<sup>72</sup>

From Delhi they went to Lahore for a meeting on January 12 to benefit the Khilafat fund. There was again a gay procession around the city before the meeting, which was attended by prominent Hindus and Muslims of Lahore and hundreds of others who had turned out to see the brothers. A chance to see the Ali brothers in action, especially after their long exile from politics, was not easy to pass up. Muhammad said that their cause was one all Indians could support—that is, the defense of religious liberty. He thus stressed one significance of the Khilafat symbol which would appeal to his urban and interreligious audience; in this interpretation, the Khilafat was not only a Muslim issue, but a national one. Shaukat, whose speciality was passing the hat, appealed for donations to send a deputation to Europe and to finance "action" in India.<sup>73</sup>

The results of the Ali brothers' determined fund drive in January and February were rather disappointing. Their pleas called forth donations and pledges at each of their meetings, but the target of ten lakh rupees was far from realized. When the Khilafat delegation sailed for England, much of the money they took along had come, as usual, from the ample pocket of Seth Chotani, aided by other wealthy and pious merchants such as Haji Abdullah Harun of Karachi. An appeal then went out from Bombay to all the local Khilafat Committees to step up their fund-raising efforts, as even this pot of gold was not unlimited.<sup>74</sup>

While all this was going on, Maulana Azad had been released from internment and arrived in Calcutta from Ranchi on January

13. Garlanded and taken in procession to the Nakhuda Mosque by his followers, he spoke on the Khilafat problem and what to do about it. Though his speech is not recorded, his correspondence from that time indicates that he felt petitions to the government would never get them anywhere. But he was less positive when it came to what new methods should be adopted. Azad, along with the other Khilafat leaders, was certainly looking for new techniques to win a popular following. In contrast to the Ali brothers' enthusiastic speeches, however, his tone was more cautious. He felt that noncooperation was worth trying, but that one should not discard other methods. He thought that the ulama, reluctant to venture on uncharted political seas, must be urged on by means of Quranic interpretation, his speciality; for no movement to arouse the mass of Muslims could succeed without their help.<sup>75</sup> He left Calcutta soon thereafter for Delhi, where the Khilafat deputation was gathering, and met Gandhi for the first time. The Maulana signed the deputation's petition, but he stuck by his opinion of its uselessness and refused to wait on the viceroy.<sup>76</sup>

The Khilafat deputation, led by Dr. Ansari, met the viceroy on January 19, 1920. Its verbose petition was drafted by Muhammad Ali and signed by an impressive group of Hindu and Muslim leaders.<sup>77</sup> They asked the viceroy's permission to send a delegation to England and Europe to plead the Indian Muslim cause before the British government and the Paris Peace Conference. They requested that the caliph's temporal authority remain undiminished, for that was essential to Islam. They wanted the government to stand by its previous pledges regarding Turkish possession of Constantinople and Asia Minor, and the immunity from war of the holy places. The latter they called the *jazirat al-Arab* (the island of Arabia), which includes all Arab lands. These must remain under the caliph, not under non-Muslim mandates or even a puppet such as Sharif Husain. If such a peace settlement were not concluded, their "eternal salvation" would be jeopardized. They professed their loyalty to the government, but warned of "evil consequences" if their case was not heard.<sup>78</sup>

Lord Chelmsford replied that of course he would do all he could to facilitate the voyage of the delegation, but also professed the good faith of his and of His Majesty's government in giving full representation to Indian Muslim feelings before the peace deliberations. The British government was not the only party involved,

after all. He hoped that whatever the peace settlement, Indian Muslims' loyalty would remain as staunch as ever.<sup>79</sup> The deputation could give no such assurance.<sup>80</sup>

Following the Delhi deputation, the Ali brothers resumed their tour, visiting their spiritual mentor in Lucknow, where they received a tumultuous welcome. Abdul Bari received them at Firangi Mahal, and another crowded meeting was held to raise funds for the Khilafat delegation. Soon thereafter, the three of them left for Bombay, where Muhammad sailed for England at the head of the delegation. The other delegates were Maulana Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, making the journey in place of the ailing Abdul Bari; Sayyid Husain, who had recently resigned as editor of the *Independent*;<sup>81</sup> and Hasan Muhammad Hayat, an old friend of Muhammad Ali's who went along as secretary.<sup>82</sup> This group, smaller than the one named by the November Khilafat Conference, was also considerably less a cross-section of Muslim opinion. Rather, it indicated the growing strength of the Ali brothers' group in the All-India Khilafat Committee.<sup>83</sup>

One last act of respectful petition remained. Muhammad Ali and company arrived in England at the end of February 1920, and immediately made appointments with cabinet ministers. On March 2, they spoke with H. A. L. Fisher, Montagu's deputy at the India Office. They repeated the Khilafat demands: the caliph's spiritual and temporal authority must remain unscathed, the Ottoman territories undivided. They emphasized that these demands were purely religious; they were in England as Muslims, not as representatives of the Turks. Fisher asked how they could accept British rule over India if they could not acquiesce to European mandates in the Arab world. Hastily dodging the implications of this, Muhammad Ali said that the two cases were entirely different. Non-Muslim hegemony over the holy places was religiously unlawful, whereas British rule in India was permissible, and Muslims were obligated to remain loyal as long as their religious freedom was respected. The delegation further asked permission to attempt mediation between the Turks and the Arabs. Since this was a religious question, it should be left to Muslims to settle it.<sup>84</sup>

The Khilafat delegation thus laid out its major arguments for British consumption: their whole platform was religious, not political. The temporal authority of the caliph and his suzerainty over the *jazirat al-Arab* were essential to the maintenance of their

faith, and hence nonnegotiable. The British sense of fair play and the religious freedom granted to them under the empire were also called into question by Britain's going back on its prewar pledges. Muhammad Ali here spoke to another interpretation of the Khilafat symbol, an interpretation he thought might tweak the consciences of his Liberal British interlocutors: the caliph was the "Defender of *our* faith."<sup>85</sup> Further, they attempted to score another point, which reveals something of what they hoped to achieve. They claimed to speak for all Muslims in the empire, and, as Muslims, they could play a useful role in peacemaking among their co-religionists. If the British government accepted this claim, the prestige of Indian Muslims would be bolstered both at home and abroad. Any point which enhanced the importance of the Muslims at home out of proportion to their numbers was worth gaining when one was looking forward to increased self-government. This was probably why Muhammad Ali spent so much of the first year of the Khilafat movement away from India, engaged in humble solicitations before the government.

On March 17, they met with Lloyd George, whose rhetoric as prime minister had excited Muslim anxieties during the war. They repeated the irreducible Khilafat demands, saying, however, that their territorial demands did not rule out the "autonomous development" of non-Turkish Ottoman subjects. The prime minister then asked if they were opposed to Arab independence, which—he understood—had been proclaimed by the Arabs themselves. Yes, said Muhammad Ali, but we as Muslims hope to be able to make peace among brethren:

His Majesty has a very powerful lever in his Muslim subjects, which should be used far more extensively than it has in the past . . . I hope that the Amir Faisal, when he looks upon the matter from the point of view of a Muslim, as he is bound to do, will realize that his own personal ambitions and even the ambitions of the Arabs can be entirely satisfied within the scheme of Turkish sovereignty . . .<sup>86</sup>

This argument failed to move the prime minister. The Turks would, at most, get Turkish lands; the Arabs were to have self-determination, as determined by the European powers.<sup>87</sup>

Muhammad's total misunderstanding of the Arab position is understandable when one realizes that the Indian Muslim representatives were really talking about themselves. Since they had to bargain with the imperial government and with their non-Muslim



Muhammad Ali as head of the Khilafat delegation to England, 1920

compatriots using religious arguments to allay political suspicions, it was only natural for them to view the Arab situation in much the same terms. A return to the status quo ante bellum, from their perspective, would restore the power of Islam, not just of the Turks. The Arabs could not help but see the justice of this, they felt. The activist Muslims needed the prestige of a united Islam to symbolize and inspire their own effort to achieve Indian Muslim unity. The Arabs, on the other hand, were not interested in Islamic power, but their own. If Islamic unity meant renewed political subordination to the Turks, they rejected it.

During the rest of their stay in Europe, the delegation kept a headquarter in a fancy London hotel, but journeyed to Paris to interview officials, speak at public gatherings, and meet Muslim delegates to the Peace Conference. They even went to Rome and had an audience with the pope. Their activities seemed designed to keep their names in the newspapers. To make sure of it, Muhammad cabled Chotani for more money for "propaganda purposes." They needed the funds to finance publication of a series of Khilafat pamphlets and to subsidize *Muslim Outlook*, a periodical they had started.<sup>88</sup> They spent a great deal of money on travel, hotels, entertainment, and also contributed generously to the Red Crescent Fund for Turkish relief.<sup>89</sup>

In their speeches, interviews, and writings, the members of the delegation repeated the Khilafat demands and continued to insist on their religious character. Another constant theme was that they did not represent the Turks, but the Indian Muslims. How true this was, they probably did not realize. As time wore on, however, another theme began to appear in their pronouncements, that of unrest in India. In one famous speech, Muhammad Ali spoke of their religious freedom, and of the "big stick" they would use to defend it:

What do we see today? Viscount Bryce wants the Allies to use the argument of the "Big Stick" against the Khilafat . . . . Well, so long as there are your Bryces and your "Big Sticks," we, too, must have some sort of a stick for the defence of our faith . . . . If you think you can please the Muslims of India by allowing the Turks to retain Constantinople in such a way that the Khalifa is worse than the Pope . . . worse, for he would in fact be the prisoner of people of an alien race and faith, then, ladies and gentlemen, you know very little of Islam and the Muslims, or of India and the Indians. (Cheers) That affront shall never be tolerated, and if you think

you can make out that all this "agitation" is "fictitious" and "factitious," then you will be compelling the Indian Muslim soldiery to disprove this lie in a manner that will be far too unambiguous for your tastes or for ours. Beware, beware.<sup>90</sup>

Muhammad Ali juxtaposed and thus seemed to identify Muslim interests with Indian interests. Elsewhere, he claimed that the All-India Khilafat Committee, more than either the Congress or the Muslim League, was truly representative of Indian feelings. It represented a powerful body of opinion that could be mobilized either for or against the government. The tremendous popular enthusiasm for the Khilafat cause all over India should not be ignored.<sup>91</sup>

Muhammad Ali kept in close touch with events in India and was sympathetic with the growing pressure for noncooperation. The more it became apparent to him that effecting any changes in the Turkish peace terms was an unreal expectation, the more he was confirmed in his conviction that the prestige and leadership of Indian Muslims were questions which would have to be settled on the hustings in India, not in the salons and cabinets of Europe. He wrote to Shaukat in May that "the real work lies in India. It is you who have to order us, and not the other way about." The Khilafat Committee must decide on a program of action, not wait for results from Europe. The British were doing nothing to enhance Muslim prestige, so the Muslims would have to do it themselves. Muhammad felt they must lead the noncooperation struggle by making it a religious obligation, a kind of *jihad*. The Khilafat movement in India could also prove to their Hindu compatriots that the Muslims were dedicated to Indian freedom.<sup>92</sup>

The terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, when they were published in May 1920, were all that the Indian Muslims had feared. The Arab countries were to become independent of the Ottoman Empire, and Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia were put under French and British mandates. Eastern Thrace and Smyrna (Izmir) were ceded to Greece, and the Dodecanese Islands to Italy. Though Constantinople remained Turkish, the Straits were internationalized.<sup>93</sup> But the Turks signed the treaty on August 20, 1920, and the Khilafat delegation could do little but fold its tents and return to India.

They arrived in India on October 4, and immediately threw themselves into the noncooperation campaign. Muhammad Ali's dockside message showed all his old bravado, and injected yet

another meaning into the Khilafat symbol: Muslims must learn that success in the Khilafat cause could be achieved only when India is in Indian hands. The Khilafatists' goal had become self-government, and noncooperation was the means to that end. Hindus and Muslims must work together, organize and propagate their message. There could be no holding back.<sup>94</sup> By associating the Khilafat cause with the popular campaign for self-government, Muhammad Ali was doing what he had foreseen all along, and what his brother and other Khilafat workers had been doing in India in his absence. In their drive to create a united Muslim constituency behind their own leadership, and in cooperation with the nationalists, the Ali brothers sought to harness Indian Muslim religious sentiments by means of the Khilafat symbol. The Khilafat now symbolized freedom, whether religious or political; self-government thus became a sacred cause, and noncooperation a religious obligation.

### *New Methods: Noncooperation Considered*

While the Khilafat delegation was making the rounds in Europe, the political situation was developing rapidly at home, although the direction of that development was by no means clear. Factional struggles continued, as did debate over whether to noncooperate or not, and if so, how. The Muslims at Khilafat headquarters in Bombay were involved in a factional struggle between Shaukat Ali and Abdul Bari and friends, and the merchants, with the former consolidating their control at the expense of the latter. A second struggle was going on between the militant Muslims and Gandhi over the new political technique of noncooperation. Once the Khilafat Committee had decided upon noncooperation, it was anxious to begin an extensive campaign against the government, including resignations from the army and police. Gandhi, fearful of the violence such a campaign might bring if it were undertaken without proper preparation, consistently sought to slow the pace and moderate the statements of his Muslim allies. He also had to consider his other flank, the Congress Hindus, who were less enthusiastic, when they were not negative, about noncooperation. He had constantly to reassure them of his faith in the peaceful intentions of his Muslim collaborators, while at the same time trying to interest non-

Muslims in noncooperation by embracing the Punjab grievances as a national issue.

The factional bickering in the Khilafat Committee came to the point of confrontation at the All-India Khilafat Conference in Bombay in mid-February 1920. The Ali Brothers' allies, led by Abdul Bari, tried to consolidate their hold over the Khilafat Committee at the expense of the Bombay merchants, headed by Chotani. The dispute arose over the question of Muslim service in the army. Maulana Abdul Bari was supported by Maulanas Azad Subhani of Kanpur and Daud Ghaznavi of Amritsar, and a number of Sindhi pirs. They held that it was religiously unlawful for Muslims to serve in the Indian army, since there was no guarantee that they would not be used against other Muslim forces, and proposed circulating a *fatwa* to this effect among the troops. Chotani was supported by the president of the session, G. M. Bhurgri of Hyderabad, Sindh; Sir Fazilbhai Currimbhai of Bombay; and Mirza Ali Muhammad Khan, a Bombay solicitor. They were horrified at the illegality of the ulama's proposal, but were effectively put down by an appeal to religion. Mirza Ali Muhammad Khan had put a law book down on the table and started to discourse upon it when one of the Sindhi pirs put a Quran down beside it and asked the committee to decide between the two. There were two kinds of legality symbolized here, and the ulama were upholding the *shari'a*. The odds were against the government code.<sup>95</sup> The All-India Khilafat Committee had begun to shed its mantle of moderate respectability, but the Alis still needed the merchants' money, so they could not altogether ignore their wishes. Further action on the question of resignation from the military was postponed.<sup>96</sup>

The February Khilafat Conference also produced two documents: the Khilafat Manifesto and the constitution of the All-India Khilafat Committee. The manifesto, like the January deputation to the viceroy, spelled out the Khilafat demands and hinted at dire results if the government did not accede to them: the Ottoman Empire must be left as it was before the war, and the *jazirat al-Arab* must remain under the suzerainty of the caliph. They insisted, however, that the second claim did not exclude "genuine Arab self-government," only the present phony arrangement of mandates. As for what would happen if the manifesto were ignored, it would be "futile to expect peace in India." Beyond that, they said, "It is

impossible for the Khilafat Conference to foresee the results."<sup>97</sup> But neither did they project any results in terms of specific action.

The constitution of the All-India Khilafat Committee spelled out four general aims of the organization: to preserve the Khilafat as a center for the Muslim world, to keep the *jazirat al-Arab* free from non-Muslim control, to work in India for the attainment of self-government, and to organize Indian Muslims for religious, educational, social, and economic benefit. The proposed means to attain these ends were rather vague, but also revealing: there was pious talk of promoting friendship and like-mindedness among all the Muslims of the world, as well as more specific mention of working in the national movement, of possible noncooperation with the government and cooperation with their non-Muslim compatriots. The organizational framework set up by the constitution, however, was quite precise. It included a network of Khilafat Committee branches, and outlined detailed procedures for electing executives, raising funds, recruiting volunteers, and electing delegates to the annual meetings.<sup>98</sup> If one can judge any organization by its constitution, this one was clearly oriented toward setting up a political network in India. The first two general aims seemed to be forgotten, or at least hidden, behind the organizational framework designed to implement the latter two.

Soon after the Bombay meeting, the Bengal Provincial Khilafat Conference was held in Calcutta on February 28-29, 1920. It was preceded by a triumphal procession, as Shaukat Ali, Abdul Bari, and Abul Kalam Azad were joggled through flower-bedecked streets. Maulana Azad, on his home turf, presided over the session, delivering his first major political oration since his release. He was joined on the dais by Shaukat Ali, whose inevitable appeal for funds brought forth pledges totaling 20,000 rupees.<sup>99</sup>

Maulana Azad's presidential address was a lengthy analysis of the institution of the Khilafat, the challenges then facing it, and the action incumbent upon Indian Muslims, with arguments gleaned from the Quran and *hadith*. The most comprehensive statement of the Indian Muslims' theoretical position on the Khilafat to date, it exemplified Azad's style in its cerebral and rhetorical approach. Beginning with a definition of the Khilafat as the worldly line of succession to the Prophet, he declared that the purpose of the institution was to organize and lead the Muslim community in the right path, to establish justice, to bring about

peace, and to spread God's word in the world. For all this, it was absolutely necessary that the caliph possess temporal power.<sup>100</sup> Azad's theory, and that of the Khilafat movement, differed significantly from a number of classical theoreticians of the caliphate who had acknowledged that the caliph's temporal power was nonexistent.<sup>101</sup> It was further evidence that the activist Muslim espousal of the Khilafat cause was not grounded in the Middle Eastern situation, nor anything they could realistically do to change it. It was rather based on their own need for a powerful symbol around which to build Indian Muslim solidarity and to rally it into an anti-British constituency.

In support of the hypothesis about the Khilafatists' concern for solidarity and anti-British struggle, Azad's speech emphasized precisely these two themes. He went on to set up a lengthy contrast between societal organization, in which all activities are coordinated and directed by one sovereign, and individuals are bound together as links in a chain; and disintegration, in which unified action is impossible, weakness and revolution rife. He said that the Quran and Islamic law promote the former through congregational prayer, pilgrimage to the centers of the faith, and the institution of the Khilafat to whom all members of the community owe allegiance. Anyone who does not submit to the caliph as imam of all Muslims cannot be considered part of the community, and anyone who revolts from his authority must be chastized. He attempted to bring the Shias into the picture by saying that Sunnis and Shias are agreed on the need to obey the imam;<sup>102</sup> they differ only on the method of choosing him. The duty of all Muslims, therefore, is to uphold and defend the institution of the Khilafat, else they will fall into disunity. They should defend the Khilafat against its non-Muslim assailants by means of *jihad*. He emphasized, however, that *jihad* did not necessarily mean violence; its real meaning was struggle, which could be through peaceful efforts, through the pen and the power of speech in place of the sword. Whatever form it took, it was an absolutely binding duty when the unity of Islam, through the Khilafat and the holy places, was being threatened.<sup>103</sup>

He then took up the reasons for struggle against the British. The scriptural cadence of his style must have made a great impression on his audience: They allow us to pray, a religious duty, but they will not allow us to uphold the temporal power of the Khilafat, a

more important religious duty. They allow us to perform the pilgrimage, but they pay no attention to our cries when they compel the caliph to hand over the pilgrimage places to non-Muslims. They are proud of their religious neutrality, but call us seditious when we object to their blatant transgression of that neutrality. He then drew a contrast between those non-Muslims who (like the British) invade Muslim lands and threaten the Muslim religion, and those non-Muslims who (like the Hindus) live in peace with Muslims. The latter must be treated with friendship and trust, while all friendship with the former must be abandoned.<sup>104</sup>

In this program of "abandonment of friendship," Muslims must be absolutely united. Without unity, they would be like an unruly mob in a bazaar which can easily be dispersed; with unity and discipline, they would be like the orderly rows of worshipers in the mosque on Friday, with hearts raised in one accord in prayer. The Muslims now are like drops of water, not an ocean; pebbles, not a mountain; links, not a chain. How can they overcome this disunity? The Indian Muslims must choose an imam, a learned and pious Muslim, and they must follow him faithfully, rendering implicit obedience to all his commands. The imam must be chosen without delay.<sup>105</sup>

Maulana Azad's suggestion to appoint a kind of "super-*alim*" was not taken up by the Calcutta conference, but the resolutions passed were more outspoken than those of any previous Khilafat meeting. Since all constitutional efforts had failed to secure satisfaction of their demands, Muslims now had to resort to other measures. Another Khilafat Day was proclaimed for March 19, 1920, a day for special prayers, total *hartal*, and one last appeal to the viceroy. Thereafter, the Muslims' religious duty was to sever all connections with the government, including resignation from titles, legislative councils, and civil and military service. In non-cooperation and its corollary, the boycott of British goods, the Muslims called upon their Hindu compatriots for support, but they intended to forge ahead anyway. The Calcutta speeches and resolutions exemplified the increasingly radical tone of the Khilafat clamor, and for the first time proposed specific acts of noncooperation.<sup>106</sup> It is significant to note that the Calcutta Khilafat Conference took place before the Khilafat delegation to England had had a chance to meet with members of the British government.

The conclusion is inescapable that anything the delegation did was irrelevant to what was happening in India.

The resolutions passed by the Calcutta conference caused a flurry in the dove-cotes of the Bombay Khilafat Committee. The leaders assembled in Bengal had apparently taken the initiative in calling the March 19 Khilafat Day and in endorsing noncooperation without consulting the moderates at headquarters.<sup>107</sup> The factions in the Central Khilafat Committee which had clashed at the February 15 meeting now became even more irreconcilable. The Bombay group, increasingly hesitant over the adoption of noncooperation and fearful of violence during the March 19 strike, called a consultative meeting of Hindu and Muslim leaders for March 17. This was condemned as pusillanimous by Abdul Bari, Shaikat Ali, Azad, and others who thought that the time had come for an outright break with all policies of loyalty to Britain. March 19 was to be the last prayerful demonstration; after that, noncooperation was inevitable.<sup>108</sup>

Gandhi felt uneasy at the increasing impatience for action on the part of his Muslim allies. After all, he had led the forces in favor of cooperation with the Montford reforms at the Amritsar Congress and was still formally committed to that policy. Now the Muslims were forging ahead of him in espousing his own technique of noncooperation. And so, early in March, Gandhi issued a statement supporting the Calcutta resolutions, including the call for *hartal* on March 19 and the initiation of noncooperation, but warned against violence. He disagreed, furthermore, with the proposed boycott of European goods. Such a measure was retaliatory, vengeful, and as such, a form of violence he could not condone.<sup>109</sup> Not without trepidation, therefore, did Gandhi endorse the Muslims' espousal of noncooperation. It might be inevitable, but did it have to come so soon?

Khilafat Day, March 19, was a day of strikes, special prayers, and public meetings in major cities all over India, when the Calcutta resolutions favoring noncooperation and boycott were reaffirmed.<sup>110</sup> It did not make the same splash in the press as the demonstrations of the previous April and October, however, and one suspects that all-India *hartals* were beginning to pall. An interesting aspect of this Khilafat Day was the number of techniques used for rallying and controlling crowds. In Bombay, several volunteer corps were mustered and trained to patrol the city and make sure the strike was peaceful. Popular political stars—

Gandhi, Shaikat Ali, even Chotani—circulated during the day to prayer meetings, both to get out the crowds and to urge calm.<sup>111</sup>

In Lucknow, a special prayer was offered in all mosques, a sure way to get a message across to worshipers of all classes. The prayer played upon the Muslims' sense of guilt for fighting against Turkey during the war:

The Khalifa of Thy Prophet . . . appealed to every Muslim to aid in the protection of the faith against non-Muslims . . . [but] we shut our ears to it . . . [R]ather we cut with our profane hands the throats of those who were sacrificing themselves in the cause of God. . . .

Now, however:

Thy enemies have armed troops . . . grand warships, and every material means of strength. But what is their strength before Thy spiritual power? . . . So though we are without means, we want to rise to Thy aid . . . Grant us strength that we may in obedience to Thy commands come into the field against the enemies of the faith with our lives and property . . .<sup>112</sup>

Though the implications of this prayer were somewhat sinister, the *hartal* in Lucknow was peaceful.<sup>113</sup>

One other event of this Khilafat Day requires a digression to comment upon Shia participation in the Khilafat movement. The Shias are an important component of the Muslim population of Lucknow, and there they were exhorted by a group of *mujtahids* to dissociate themselves from the Khilafat movement. The divines' argument was theological: According to Shiism, there had been no caliph since Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet. This argument was challenged, however, by a number of Shia politicians, the most prominent of whom was Sayyid Raza Ali, a UP barrister and Muslim Leaguer. He pointed out that the temporal power of Islamic countries and the independence of the *jazirat al-Arab* are just as important for the Shias as for the Sunnis. He also noted that Shias such as Amir Ali and the Agha Khan had supported the movement since its inception.<sup>114</sup> It is important to note the support given to the Khilafat movement by Shia leaders in UP and Bombay, for it has generally been assumed that they took no part in it. For those Shia leaders interested in maintaining their prominence in the community as a whole, political arguments triumphed over theological ones, and they too jumped on the Khilafat bandwagon. Those who did not—Jinnah, Mahmudabad, and Wazir Hasan among others—abstained from the movement less because they were Shias than because they disagreed with the political methods of the Khilafat leaders.<sup>115</sup>

With the second Khilafat Day behind them, Muslim leaders now had to face the long-term question of noncooperation. Noncooperation resolutions had been passed from several platforms, but the Khilafat Committee as a whole had not yet endorsed it, and other political parties had not even discussed the matter. Nor had any specific steps to implement a noncooperation campaign been decided upon. For the next few months there was no lack of discussion, but the final decision on noncooperation had to wait until September.

The most comprehensive proposals thus far were aired at the UP Provincial Khilafat Conference at Meerut on March 21-23, 1920. The session was dominated by the group of ulama who had been active in organizing the Jamiat: Abdul Bari, Ahmad Said of Delhi, Abdul Majid Badauni, and Azad Subhani of Kanpur. They were joined by a lone representative of Deoband, Habibur Rahman Usmani, who was elected president of the session. They resolved, among other things, to form a committee of ulama to undertake Khilafat propaganda in the villages.<sup>116</sup>

Gandhi then took the podium and announced that a joint meeting of Hindu and Muslim leaders in Delhi had just decided upon a four-stage program of noncooperation: (1) Renunciation of titles; (2) Resignation from government service; (3) Resignation from the police and the military; and (4) Nonpayment of taxes. Each phase of the program should be enacted only after careful preparations, and after the previous stage had been fully carried out, in order to avoid hasty measures and, what was worse, violence. In spite of his caution, the fact remains that Gandhi, in order to keep the Muslims in line behind his nonviolent methods, had had to agree to a program much more comprehensive than he had been willing to contemplate earlier in the month.<sup>117</sup>

Maulana Azad followed the Mahatma and repeated that for the Muslims, "abandonment of friendship" with non-Muslims who attacked their religion was a religious duty. He was absolutely correct in his assertion that the Muslims had not adopted noncooperation at Gandhi's behest, but perhaps to allay some ulama's suspicions to the contrary, he continued to emphasize the Islamic reasons behind the Khilafat movement and noncooperation. It was a coincidence that Gandhi's principles of nonviolent noncooperation accorded with their religious duty, though of course they were grateful for the support of their Hindu friends.<sup>118</sup>

The Hindu-Muslim entente was still tenuous, therefore, when in May 1920 the publication of the Turkish peace terms and the

Hunter Commission Report on the Punjab disturbances further advanced the case for noncooperation. Virtually all Muslims were stunned by the terms of peace. The viceroy issued a statement of sympathy, saying that though the peace terms must be painful to them, he hoped they would keep their loyalty to the crown "bright and untarnished." Such wishful thinking was treated with derision.<sup>119</sup> The Hunter report was greeted with indignation by members of all communities as an attempt to whitewash British repression in the Punjab in 1919. Gandhi began to play up the Punjab atrocities of the year before as a grievance against the government, since his single-minded support of the Muslims' Khilafat demands had found few echoes among his co-religionists.

Gandhi was nervous. The activist Muslims were all for noncooperation, but they tended to regard nonviolence, at best, as an expedient. Now, with the Turkish peace terms out in the open, there was more danger than ever of Muslim emotions getting out of hand before noncooperation had been formally adopted. He must have recalled his "Himalayan miscalculation" of the year before and worried again about the lack of preparation for a movement on an all-India scale. Hindu leaders would be reluctant to adopt the new tactics if the Muslims got violent, and the Hindu-Muslim entente would crumble.<sup>120</sup>

There was good reason for his apprehension. Abdul Bari was anxious and impatient. He had written to Shaukat Ali:

Lessons of forbearance and patience are troublesome. Tell Mahatma Gandhi that while I myself will be guided by his advice, I will not restrain those people who in their haste go against it, although I will not stimulate them, because in spite of entertaining different opinions, I have promised to go by his counsel. But it should be borne in mind that we shall not sit idle relying upon him; but thanking him for his sympathy will fulfill our religious obligations.<sup>121</sup>

Gandhi realized that Abdul Bari, Shaukat Ali, and other Muslim leaders could not be expected to jeopardize their leadership in their own community by letting this wave of emotion go past. It was absolutely necessary to take advantage of the moment to gain agreement by the Congress, the League, and the Khilafat Committee on noncooperation. Then he would have to organize the campaign carefully and gradually, keeping a tight rein on his warhorses. Gandhi, in order to lead, was being led. He even spelled it out:

By helping the Muhammadans of India at a critical moment in their history, I want to buy their friendship . . . . It is expedient to suffer for my Muhammadan brother to the utmost in a just cause and I should therefore travel with him along the whole road so long as the means employed by him are as honourable as his end.<sup>122</sup>

Shaukat Ali and Abdul Bari also realized that the Muslims could not mount a successful noncooperation campaign without Hindu support, and so they temporized. Abdul Bari called the peace terms "outrageous" and the situation "desperate," but urged his followers to restrain themselves until noncooperation had been adopted. Shaukat instructed all local Khilafat Committees to hold meetings to express their views about the "unrighteous" peace terms, but to be patient.<sup>123</sup> If they wanted to help Turkey—and themselves—the Muslims had to be properly organized, and the details of the joint Hindu-Muslim campaign carefully worked out.

The next step toward noncooperation was taken when the Central Khilafat Committee met in Bombay on May 12, 1920, to consider the noncooperation program. All the groups in the three-way tug-of-war were present: Gandhi, the moderate merchants, and Shaukat's enthusiasts. The moderates made a last-ditch effort to have resignation from the police and military struck from the program, but were defeated and withdrew, resigning their posts on the committee.<sup>124</sup> Chotani, the president, stayed out of the controversy by agreeing to abide by whatever the meeting decided. Gandhi no longer backed the moderates, for he realized that cooperation with Shaukat's forces was more important for the future of the mass movement. He spoke forcibly concerning the various stages of noncooperation and the need for nonviolence. He promised that the Hindus would support the Muslims, but only if the Muslims took the lead, and if they were careful not to indulge in needless scimitar-rattling. Shaukat assured the Mahatma that the Muslims would remain nonviolent in order to give noncooperation a fair trial, and Seth Abdullah Harun urged the adoption of noncooperation in order to avoid "independent action"—not completely reassuring pronouncements, but evidence that, for the moment, the Muslim leadership was concerned to keep political action peaceful.<sup>125</sup> Gandhi had won this round; Shaukat and Abdul Bari acquiesced, though they were irked by the need to go slowly.<sup>126</sup>

To ratify the Central Khilafat Committee's decision in favor of noncooperation, an All-India Khilafat Conference was called for June 1-2 in Allahabad, in the activists' center of greatest support, UP. The Allahabad conference would include a joint meeting with

leading Congress members, fresh from their own consideration of noncooperation at Benares.<sup>127</sup> At the Congress Committee meeting in Benares on May 30, however, there was even greater disagreement over noncooperation. Mrs. Besant was flatly against it; Tilak, C. R. Das, and Pandit Malaviya were sceptical about its effectiveness for an all-India movement. Even those like Motilal Nehru and the Punjab leader, Lala Lajpat Rai, who supported noncooperation, could not agree on all the steps to be taken. Ultimately, they decided not to decide and called a special session of Congress for Calcutta in early September, to consider anew whether or not to adopt noncooperation. Gandhi found that he was unable to deliver Congress support to his Muslim friends as he had promised.<sup>128</sup>

The Allahabad meetings of the Khilafat Conference and the attendant Hindu-Muslim consultations were also scenes of heated disagreement. The meetings dragged on for three days in the heat of June, and tempers were stretched to the utmost. A number of leaders, including Tilak and C. R. Das, and even more astounding, Abul Kalam Azad, were conspicuous by their absence. Hindu leaders who had come from the Benares meeting disappointed the Muslims by merely repeating their decision to wait until the September special session for any final verdict on noncooperation. The Muslims, in spite of the decision of the Central Khilafat Committee in May, were divided among themselves. Abdul Bari excitedly blamed Gandhi for going back on his promise of Hindu support; he and the Sindhis were for immediate enactment of all four stages of noncooperation. Sayyid Zahur Ahmad, Raza Ali, and Fazlul Haq were more judicious; they wanted to adopt only the resignation of titles and forget about the rest. Shaukat, Dr. Ansari, and Ajmal Khan were somewhere in the middle, holding out for adoption of the complete program, but in stages.<sup>129</sup>

It was all that Chotani, Gandhi, and a few other level heads could do to keep the Allahabad sessions from dissolving into chaos. The joint Hindu-Muslim meeting was the scene of recriminations between Mrs. Besant and Pandit Malaviya on the one hand, who said they doubted the effectiveness of noncooperation and wanted more time for consideration, and Shaukat Ali on the other, who angrily declared that such procrastination was inexcusable. Even more disastrous was Hasrat Mohani's outburst, when he vowed to join any Afghan army invading India to drive out the British. The Hindus, alarmed by the old Afghan bugaboo, demanded a retraction. But Shaukat, Azad Subhani, and Zafar Ali Khan leapt to Hasrat's defense. Lajpat Rai then declared that if

these were the Muslim feelings, the Hindus could not help them. Gandhi repeated his support of the Muslims, as long as they did not indulge in violence or other "insanity," thereby reprimanding both sides for their intransigence. Gandhi had become the key man in the Khilafat noncooperation movement, the main link between the two communities.

Hindus and Muslims needed each other in order to pressure the British more effectively for self-government, but their mutual distrust was considerable. For the Hindus, Gandhi was the guarantor of Muslim nonviolence; for the Muslims, he was the guarantor of Hindu adherence to noncooperation. The Muslims would profit little if they were the only ones to resign from government posts. For the moment, however, Gandhi's main supporters were Muslims, and the result of the Hindu-Muslim consultations in Allahabad was negligible. Final decision on noncooperation was postponed until the Calcutta special session.<sup>130</sup>

The All-India Khilafat Conference then met to ratify the Bombay decision in favor of noncooperation, and the triumph of Shaukat Ali and Abdul Bari was complete.<sup>131</sup> The conference passed the four-stage noncooperation program and appointed a subcommittee under Gandhi to give effect to it.<sup>132</sup> The meeting also resolved in favor of *swadeshi* activity rather than a boycott of foreign goods, a refinement introduced by the Mahatma, and they voted to establish a Khilafat Volunteer Corps, with branches all over India, for raising funds and preparing the people for noncooperation.<sup>133</sup>

The subcommittee under Gandhi took a step backward before attempting the great leap forward into noncooperation. They composed two letters to the viceroy, appealing to him to espouse the Muslim position on the Turkish peace terms. Otherwise, they would institute noncooperation on August 1. The first letter was signed by Muslim leaders; the second was a personal letter from Gandhi to the viceroy, but both were drafted by Gandhi. The two letters, though a worn-out tactic, were significant in two respects: first, their moderate tone contrasted with the blustering verbosity of the January petition, and reflected Gandhi's importance as a moderating influence on the Khilafat leadership at this stage. Second was the fact that, for all his counsels of moderation, Gandhi had acquiesced in the Muslims' impatience to get started. By calling for the start of noncooperation on August 1, Gandhi and his Muslim subcommittee were anticipating the Congress special session by a month. Once again, Gandhi was following in order to lead.<sup>134</sup>

### *Of Ulama, Sufis, and Hijrat*

While the seemingly interminable meetings and maneuverings leading up to the adoption of noncooperation went on, Muslim religious leaders were rallying their own forces. During the late spring and summer of 1920, while the political leaders were deciding what to do, the ulama and Sufis were active among the populace. Examples of this activity included Khilafat propaganda in the villages of UP and Sindh, and the Hijrat movement of 1920. Also significant was the work of Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan, who was released from his long internment on Malta and returned to India in June 1920.

The Shaikh al-Hind got the Deobandis into the Khilafat movement. Up until this point, they had not been particularly active in what they perceived to be essentially a political movement, in spite of its religious imagery. Abdul Bari, some Delhi ulama, and the pirs of Sindh had been the prime movers in the Khilafat *fatwa* and the founding of the Jamiat al-Ulama. Maulana Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad still refused to renounce his title of Shamsul Ulama.<sup>135</sup> Now, however, Mahmud al-Hasan was met in Bombay by an adulatory welcoming committee which included friend and foe alike: Shaukat Ali, Chotani, Dr. Ansari, Gandhi, Kafayatullah, Ahmad Said, Abdul Bari—and Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad. At such moments, reconciliations are possible. All those present vowed with the Shaikh al-Hind to work for the freedom of India, now a religious obligation for Muslims in view of British policy toward the Khilafat.<sup>136</sup>

Mahmud al-Hasan returned to Deoband and was reinstated as *sadr-e-mudarris*. There was also talk of electing him imam or Shaikh al-Islam of India in order to guide Muslims in matters of the *shari'a*. He was a learned scholar, as well as a martyr in an Islamic cause, but he was also a dying man. He spent the next five months travelling and speaking on behalf of the Khilafat and noncooperation, and was doubtless influential in rallying the ulama to the Khilafat movement. He died on November 30, 1920, in Dr. Ansari's home in Delhi, after having presided over the second annual session of the Jamiat al-Ulama.<sup>137</sup>

In addition to Mahmud al-Hasan, there were other candidates for the imamate of India, an idea which had been proposed by Maulana Azad before the Calcutta Khilafat Conference. One of the hopefuls, of course, was Azad himself, who had apparently made a bid for the office in his speech proposing it. A follower of Azad described the maulana's strategy for opposing the British:

[He thought that] the Muslims would accept the call of the imam if they were told, on the authority of the Quran and hadith, that without an imam, their lives were un-Islamic, and that they would be damned after death. When a great many had submitted to the imam, he would then conclude an agreement with the Hindus and declare *jihad* against the British, and the British would be defeated by the strength of Hindu-Muslim unity. But who would be the Imam? For this office a highly respected man would have to be chosen, one whose integrity was unquestionable and who, in addition, was completely familiar with contemporary conditions. It was clear that the maulana considered himself better qualified than anyone else.<sup>138</sup>

But in order to be selected imam, Azad had to rally the support of other leading ulama, notably Abdul Bari and the Deobandis. When approached, however, Abdul Bari first referred obliquely to suggestions that he become Shaikh al-Islam of India himself,<sup>139</sup> and then seemed to accept Azad's candidacy without committing himself at all wholeheartedly:

A number of people have asked me to accept this position, but I have not agreed because of my poor health, nor will I do so in the future . . . . Maulana Abul Kalam Azad is ready to accept. I have no objection. I am ready to accept him provided it does not divide the Muslim community . . . . I do not want to take the initiative in such a movement, but I would be bound by the ruling of the community as a whole.<sup>140</sup>

Abdul Bari may have been interested in the leadership of the ulama himself, but he realized that agreement would not be easy to reach on any candidate, and that attempts to reach a consensus might lead to infighting among the ulama. We have a caliph, he said, so we should not waste time on such things.<sup>141</sup>

When Mahmud al-Hasan returned from Malta and was approached about the imamate, he modestly declined the honor for himself and agreed that Azad was certainly a capable candidate, but did not offer his endorsement. Given the less than enthusiastic response from the leading activists among the ulama, Azad grumbled that it was impossible to organize such people, and that he would just have to leave the question of the imamate until a later date.<sup>142</sup> The lack of enthusiasm for Azad's proposal reflects the personal nature of the ties among ulama and their students and Sufis and their initiated disciples. Such traditional ties of allegiance are not easily transferable to some more remote figure, unless that figure is of overriding symbolic importance. Abdul Bari was right: they had the caliph; they did not need anyone else.

The best example of the personal influence of religious leaders in popular political mobilization at this time occurred in Sindh, where pirs enjoy a particularly important position among rural Muslims. The pirs are the spiritual and often lineal descendants of the Sufi saints who had converted the Sindh to Islam. The shrines with which they were associated not only benefited from large landholdings and the power that implied, but were habitual meeting places for worship or other purposes. The shrines had been centers of *mujahidin* activity in the nineteenth century, and centers of protest against the government from time to time. As the Khilafat movement gained momentum, a number of Sindhi pirs who had been associated either with Ubaidullah Sindhi's earlier movements or Abdul Bari's Khuddam-e-Ka'aba joined the Khilafat Committee and helped Abdul Bari and Shaukat's forces capture control of it. They also held Khilafat meetings all over Sindh, even in the smallest villages, preaching that their infidel government had taken over the holy cities of Islam, and had defiled them by slaughtering pigs, drinking liquor, and walking with their boots on in the sacred precincts. It was therefore incumbent upon every Muslim to noncooperate with the government, or he would be condemned to hellfire. Among the illiterate, rural Muslim majority, few knew who the sultan of Turkey was or what the Khilafat was all about, but they did know that their religion was in danger, and that the government was somehow responsible. It was a perfect example of tailoring the appeal to fit the audience. Pirs who had not supported the Khilafat movement found their influence slipping, and soon joined the general trend.<sup>143</sup>

At the Provincial Khilafat Conference in Sindh in February 1920, Shaukat Ali, Abdul Bari, and Haji Abdullah Harun shared the platform with a couple of the more influential pirs, Maulana Taj Muhammad Pir Muhammad, and Pir Turab Ali Shah. In the audience were thousands of their devotees, who helped swell the coffers of the Khilafat fund by some 8,000 rupees.<sup>144</sup> Later in the year it was reported that the police were being turned away from Khilafat meetings by "unofficial police"—the Khilafat volunteers. The Khilafatists had become "the most important and the most formidable men in Sindh." And at another meeting, Pir Taj Muhammad made a point that had been implicit for some time: Since Islam had never flourished in subjugation, and since political power is essential for the defense of religion, it is the religious duty of Muslims to attain political power.<sup>145</sup>

The most eloquent example of the influence of religious figures over the Muslim populace, however, was the Hijrat movement in the summer of 1920. As a method of protest against British policy toward the Khilafat, *hijrat*, in this case, migration to Afghanistan, had been discussed at various Khilafat meetings, but was generally disapproved on the grounds that such action could only weaken the Muslim cause in India.<sup>146</sup> Among the rural Muslims of Sindh and the Northwest Frontier, however, ideas of organizing to put political pressure on the British government, or of cooperation with other Indians to secure freedom from that government, were still too sophisticated. They understood from the imams and pirs of their local mosques and shrines that Islam was in danger, and one of the best ways to save their souls was to migrate to a country where their faith was not imperiled. This idea was given added weight by *fatawa* in favor of the migration issued by Maulanas Abdul Bari and Abul Kalam Azad. Their pronouncements were qualified, urging *hijrat* as an alternative, but not a replacement, for noncooperation.<sup>147</sup> Yet thousands took their advice, sold their property, and started for the Afghan border in the blazing heat of July and August.

Soon the Khyber Pass was clogged with caravans of bullock carts, camels, and people afoot, carrying their few worldly belongings toward the promised land. Tribesmen fell upon the stream of migrants, looting their possessions and rustling the livestock. Others were felled by hunger, thirst, and heat. As the tide of immigrants reached 30,000, the Afghan amir issued a proclamation urging no more Indians to come. Eventually, several thousand of disillusioned *muhajirin* returned penniless to the plains of India; many others died en route.<sup>148</sup>

The Central Khilafat Committee was caught unprepared by this spontaneous movement. At first, they hoped it would blow over after a few enthusiasts had gone off to Afghanistan. Shaukat issued a statement on behalf of the committee expressing the hope that all dedicated Muslims would stay in India and work for the cause of noncooperation. Only if it did not succeed would they consider resorting to *hijrat*.<sup>149</sup> By August, however, the tide of emigrants had reached such alarming proportions that the committee had to do something. It belatedly resolved to take over supervision of the movement, but this only antagonized the various local *hijrat* committees who had been organizing the movement, without saving the deteriorating situation.<sup>150</sup>

The eruption of this movement showed the strength of religious feeling among rural Muslims and the energy that could be released by tapping it. The Hijrat movement also demonstrated to the Khilafat Committee the need for control over extensive networks of ulama and Sufis who could arouse and direct popular religious emotion. At this point, the Central Khilafat Committee took under its wing the committee of ulama formed at the UP Provincial Conference in March, making it a subcommittee of the All-India Khilafat organization and supplying it with financing from the Khilafat fund for its village tours.<sup>151</sup> One example of this subcommittee's work was the tour of UP by a deputation of ulama in August 1920. The group included Abdul Majid Badauni, a close ally of Abdul Bari, and Habibur Rahman Usmani from Deoband. They spoke heatedly on the Khilafat and noncooperation before mosque meetings of thousands, and the success of their mission in rallying funds and support proved the effectiveness of the ulama as outriders of the movement.<sup>152</sup>

### *Prologue to Noncooperation*

While the religious leaders were stirring up popular enthusiasm and the Hijrat movement was playing itself out in July and August, the debate in other quarters on the pros and cons of noncooperation continued. On one side were Shaukat and the Mahatma and their close associates, who maintained that now noncooperation was the only way to bring the government to heel. If the consent of the governed were withdrawn, the government, in order to function, would have to listen to their demands. Noncooperation must remain nonviolent, however. Since the government had the monopoly of force, violence was futile and out of the question.<sup>153</sup> On the other side were those who felt that noncooperation was dangerous, impossible, and impractical. They either condemned it outright or else accepted various points in the noncooperation program which they felt were workable for the moment.<sup>154</sup>

In reply to many who urged him to wait until the September special session before instituting noncooperation, Gandhi replied in his inimitable fashion: "When one has unshakeable faith in a particular policy or action, it would be folly to wait for the Congress pronouncement." But this was only a convenient excuse for

what he knew he had to do. He admitted, "I dare not ask [my Muslim countrymen] to wait for any verdict but the verdict of their own conscience."<sup>155</sup> If he wanted to keep the Muslims in line, Gandhi could not hold off noncooperation any longer.

One incident illustrates the reason for his haste. Pandit Malaviya constantly pressured Gandhi to postpone noncooperation and urged Hindus not to join the scheduled *hartal* on August 1. Abdul Bari, fearful that Gandhi would yield to the Pandit's pressure, sent the Mahatma an acrimonious wire bluntly telling him either to use his influence to silence Malaviya or to follow him:

In my opinion if Hindus absolutely abstained from [the August 1] strike and noncooperation, however imperative a religious duty it may be to Muslims, like other things it will prove ineffective. Under these circumstances I am unable to exhort Muslims.<sup>156</sup>

The exasperation of such an important Muslim leader was one more reason for Gandhi to forge ahead with noncooperation before September.

Throughout the summer Gandhi and Shaukat Ali worked tirelessly preparing for the beginning of noncooperation on August 1, and rallying support in anticipation of the voting at the special Congress in September. They toured the country from north to south, stressing the need for noncooperation as the only remedy for the Khilafat and Punjab grievances. They were wildly cheered everywhere, and the nationalist press carried enthusiastic accounts of their meetings. The noncooperation program they were pushing was more extensive than any voiced so far. The first stage was to include not only resignation of titles and honorary positions, but also the boycott of government schools, of elections to the reformed Councils, and of the law courts; the suspension of practice by lawyers, refusal of invitations to all government receptions, and the promotion of *swadeshi* goods.<sup>157</sup>

August 1 marked the beginning of a new era of noncooperation and popular participation in Indian politics. But the opening of the noncooperation campaign was accompanied by a sense of loss, for B. G. Tilak, long an advocate of popular political participation, died on that day. Although Tilak had been lukewarm toward noncooperation, his death contributed to the success of its inception, for all over India even those who had little desire to noncooperate joined the day's *hartal* to honor his memory.<sup>158</sup>

The tide in favor of noncooperation swelled throughout August, as provincial Congress Committees met to decide on their stand before the September session. The first provincial committee to adopt noncooperation as the only possible remedy for the Khilafat and Punjab wrongs was, appropriately enough, the Punjab. Other provinces soon followed. Bombay and Gujarat, headquarters of the Khilafat Committee and homeland of Gandhi, predictably endorsed noncooperation. The Bihar Committee adopted it under the leadership of Mazharul Haq, a leading nationalist Muslim lawyer, and a group of Abdul Bari's Sufi peers from the shrine of Phulwari. Bengal also endorsed it, but with the proviso that each province have a say in choosing its own program, thereby maintaining its independence of Gandhi's direction.<sup>159</sup>

By the eve of the September special session in Calcutta, therefore, Gandhi and his Khilafat collaborators thought they had gathered sufficient support to ensure passage of noncooperation. Opinion was by no means unanimous on all the means to be adopted, however, and they had a heavy floor fight to look forward to before the extensive first stage of noncooperation could be adopted. Their spirits were raised by the news from England that Muhammad Ali was returning home to join the noncooperation campaign. This helped assure a heavy Muslim vote in favor of the entire program. There was no longer any question of further petitions to the government; their sights had shifted toward direct political action in India.

In late 1920, the Khilafat movement was changing with the changing political situation, but its symbolism remained the same. The issues which had aroused the Khilafatists to action were no longer particularly relevant. With the signatures drying on the Treaty of Sevres, the integrity of the temporal power of the caliph and his custodianship of the *jazirat al-Arab* had been lost. They were now only rallying cries. The Indian Muslim leadership continued to refer to these issues in their utterances, however, while their actions turned increasingly toward working out their own fate in the Indian political scene. The caliph, always a symbol of Islamic unity and greatness, now became a virtual icon. This was neither misguided nor romantic, but a deliberate political tactic. In their insistence on the "strictly religious" nature of their demands, the Khilafat leaders could continue to appeal to the British sense of fair play in matters of conscience, and at the same time seal their

alliance with the ulama as a way to reach the pious, still unpoliticized, Muslim masses.

It is essential to realize that, for the Khilafatists, the political and religious components of the movement were inextricably intertwined. The Muslim political leaders were deeply religious men who had a genuine concern for the fate of the Turkish caliph as the symbol of Islamic solidarity and the embodiment of Islamic prestige. Their support for the Khilafat was heartfelt, as it related to their own needs for Islamic solidarity and prestige in India. But their espousal of the cause was also expedient: the Khilafatists knew by experience the advantages to be gained by identifying religious and political causes. The Khilafat grievances provided a political weapon with which to flog the government and a religious banner around which to rally their co-religionists.

The major question at stake in the Khilafat movement was not whether its leaders were sincere or expedient—they were both—nor whether the Indian Muslims would succeed in saving the Khilafat, but what would be the Muslims' political future in India. The alliance between certain Westernized Muslim politicians and politicized ulama over the Khilafat issue was the first step toward organizing a massive Muslim constituency which could be a power to contend with in the nationalist movement. Gandhi had recognized the potential political power of the Muslims in supporting their cause and in seeking their support. The next step for the Khilafatists was to mobilize the support of the majority of Muslims so that the community's potential political power could be actualized.

### CHAPTER III

## NONCOOPERATION AND MASS MOBILIZATION, 1920-1921

The political developments of the previous two years provided a lengthy and uneven prologue to the mass movement as it evolved in 1920 and 1921, and the turbulent character of the movement persisted. With the adoption of noncooperation by the special sessions of Congress and the other political parties in September 1920, those who favored Hindu-Muslim cooperation and new methods of popular mobilization seized the organizations and began an anti-British political movement of all-India proportions. Between the adoption of noncooperation in Calcutta in September and its reiteration in Nagpur in December 1920, the new leadership tried various techniques of mass contact and built upon their organizational networks. Thereafter, the Khilafat and noncooperation movements developed, sometimes along identical paths, but more often along parallel lines. Friction and divisions continued, as personalities expanded to fill new roles, as their statements were variously interpreted, as new methods brought varying results, and as problems arose of controlling a following once it had been mobilized.

The all-India movement in 1920 and 1921 used a variety of methods of noncooperation as outlined by the central leadership, plus a number of regional variations on the noncooperation theme which were not always recommended, or approved, by that leadership. The movement reached its apogee in 1921, with a successful fundraising and membership drive, and with growing popular participation in noncooperation. As the year waned, however, widening cracks appeared in the Hindu-Muslim alliance, with disagreements at the level of the leadership, and violence at the popular level. After examining these developments, one can better

evaluate the various methods of mass contact, and analyze the roles of women and ulama as political mobilizers, the impact of political poetry, and the significance of the volunteer movement.

The Muslim leaders who had been campaigning for noncooperation for almost a year were particularly active in the September decision in Calcutta and thereafter took the lead in evolving methods of mass mobilization. The Ali brothers, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Maulanas Abdul Bari, Mahmud al-Hasan, and Abul Kalam Azad responded to Gandhi's challenge to lead the movement, and sought to demonstrate their own conviction that the Muslims could hold their own in the India of the future by their contribution to the present struggle for self-government. The first step was to enlist the student population in noncooperation, and it was taken, predictably enough, at Aligarh. From these student noncooperators were recruited the Khilafat and National volunteer corps for mass canvassing and crowd control. The ulama tapped their own networks of influence and also reached consensus on a *fatwa* in favor of noncooperation addressed to all Muslims. And the leaders toured urging, with some success, boycott of the reformed Council elections in November.

Gandhi outlined the noncooperation movement in an article in September in which he envisaged a triumphant conclusion to their efforts. For now, he said, the leaders of the movement should concentrate on broadening their base of political support. The Congress and Khilafat organizations needed to be expanded down to the village level, vast numbers of new members recruited, and small contributions secured from everyone. Students and lawyers, workers and peasants, all had to adopt noncooperation. They would set up national schools, law enforcement bodies, and arbitration courts to bypass government institutions. They would organize *kisan* (peasant) groups for peaceful settlement of agrarian disputes, and direct workers into *swadeshi* activities: handspinning and weaving had to be promoted along with the boycott of foreign cloth. Once this massive popular following had been raised and organized, and the peacefulness of the movement assured, the first stage of noncooperation would be complete. Civil disobedience, including boycott of the army, police, and taxes, could begin without danger of violence. The government machinery would falter before this united and nonviolent onslaught, and India would achieve *swaraj* within one year.<sup>1</sup>

The progression of events held remarkably to this pattern during the first half of 1921, as noncooperation advanced through its first stage. Students left their schools and joined volunteer groups, cultivators joined the *kisan* movement, workers struck, handspinning and handweaving enjoyed new vogue, ulama delivered political messages along with the weekly prayers, and women donated precious ornaments to finance the cause. The man in the dusty byroad was aware of a "khilafat" movement.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, however, variations on the noncooperation theme produced some dissonances. The calls for nonviolence and self-discipline to lead to self-government were drowned out by a welter of appeals based on local economic grievances and sectarian religious sentiments. Violence flared here and there, and the central leadership found itself unable to control it, in spite of improved organizational networks.

During the summer of 1921 the movement achieved its greatest triumphs: the successful completion of the fund drive by the Congress, a widespread boycott of foreign cloth, and a dramatic increase in the number of volunteers willing to face arrest and imprisonment for the cause. A series of setbacks, however, dimmed the prospects for civil disobedience: a disagreement between Gandhi on the one hand and the Ali brothers and Abdul Bari on the other on the escalation of rhetoric, ugly riots in several places, and a bloody outbreak among the Muslim population in Malabar, all of which seriously damaged the Hindu-Muslim entente and the noncooperators' ability to pressure the government. But if the leaders were not fully in charge, this was to some extent a token of their success. Their techniques for mobilizing mass support had worked, perhaps too well. The Indian political scene was never quite the same, and the leaders henceforth had to take into account the passionate reactions of their followers.

### *The Special Congress*

The Congress special session in Calcutta in September 1920 demonstrated the lingering differences of opinion over noncooperation, as well as differences of political style among the leaders. Along with the Congress, the Muslim League and the All-India Khilafat Committee had also summoned special sessions. Jinnah, whose opposition to noncooperation was well known, presided over the League. In a brief and sardonic address, he gave Gandhi's

total program short shrift.<sup>3</sup> The Khilafat meeting, under the leadership of Shaukat Ali, was considerably more flamboyant. Following the opening Quranic reading, a local poet recited a lament for the sad plight of Islam, which called forth floods of tears from the delegates. They then passed a series of resolutions endorsing the entire noncooperation program, including a call for a fund of thirty lakh (300,000) rupees, and Khilafat volunteer corps in every province. Maulana Azad emphasized the important role the ulama and Sufis had to play in urging their disciples to support noncooperation.<sup>4</sup>

Overshadowing both meetings was the Congress session, where the real battle for noncooperation was fought. The president of the session was Lala Lajpat Rai, a somewhat lukewarm proponent of noncooperation. Much of his lengthy address was devoted to expressing the discontent of his native Punjab over the Hunter Report, but he also gave good reasons for non-Muslim sympathy with the Khilafat grievances. His arguments were phrased in strictly nationalist terms:

Any further extension of the British Empire in Asia is detrimental to the interests of India. . . . If the British Imperialist has no scruples in using Indian troops in Egypt, Persia, and Mesopotamia . . . why will he have any in using the troops he raises in these countries against us? The Hindu-Muslim problem will become ten times more troublesome and dangerous.<sup>5</sup>

It was therefore in the interests of India that Muslim West Asia remain free. Then too, the masses were ready for something new; the Congress must either lead or be led.<sup>6</sup>

The Subjects Committee of the Congress then met to consider the noncooperation resolution. This committee, some three hundred strong, was divided three ways. First were the all-out supporters of Gandhi's program, including the Khilafatists: Shaukat Ali, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Maulana Azad, Yaqub Hasan of Madras, Zafar Ali Khan from Lahore, and Mazharul Haq from Bihar. Next were those who sought to amend noncooperation to exclude boycott of government schools, law courts, and the Council elections. These included Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya from UP and the Bengali leaders C. R. Das and Bipin Chandra Pal. Third were a small number, such as Jinnah and Annie Besant, who opposed noncooperation altogether. The real struggle was between Gandhi's supporters and the Bengalis, whose amendments would have reduced noncooperation to an ineffectual,

upper-class protest. To the latter, mass politics were anathema, endangering their position as political leaders in a province predominantly rural and Muslim.<sup>7</sup> They were eventually joined by Jinnah, a kindred aristocratic spirit. Fazlul Haq hesitated, but was eventually won over to the side of the noncooperators by Shaukat Ali. For three days, the discussions dragged on. Shaukat and his Khilafat lieutenants lobbied energetically and not always subtly for Gandhi's resolution. When the vote was finally taken, the Bengalis' amendments were defeated by a tiny margin: 148 to 135.<sup>8</sup>

The battle was by no means over, however, for the next day the full Congress met to vote on Gandhi's noncooperation program, versus an amendment by B. C. Pal excising boycott of the Council elections. The final vote gave Gandhi's program 1,855 votes to 873 for Pal's amendment, showing that for all his strength in the Congress as a whole, Gandhi was opposed by a significant number.<sup>9</sup>

This opposition came from a number of quarters. Some felt it was no good starting a mass movement without first building up a mass organization; some felt they should participate in the Council elections, but then obstruct them from within.<sup>10</sup> Others expressed apprehensions about noncooperation for quite another reason. They felt that Gandhi, and the Congress, had been rushed into it by a gang of Muslim enthusiasts. They were given little comfort by Shaukat Ali's statement at the close of the special Congress that as long as the sacred lands of Islam were in the hands of the English, the Muslims could not cooperate with the government. They had decided not to quarrel with the Hindus and to abjure all other violence in order to achieve their ends. The unreflective Shaukat failed to say what would happen if the government gave in to Muslim demands alone.<sup>11</sup>

In his closing statement at the Calcutta session, Lala Lajpat Rai addressed himself to those who objected to being streamrolled by the Khilafatists. The Congress was the one truly national political organization in India, he said; hence all shades of opinion must have their say in its counsels. His Muslim brethren had every right to present their views and to secure the verdict of the Congress; he was glad they had felt free to do so. The Muslims had been the first to adopt noncooperation, and they had now asked the Congress to cooperate with them. The Congress had assented not because of bullying, but because Hindus and Muslims were one in their desire

for *swaraj* through noncooperation. Lajpat Rai thus tried to smooth over any hard feelings as diplomatically as possible.<sup>12</sup>

### *The Development of Mass Contact Methods*

The Calcutta sessions also resolved in favor of the noncooperation program already proposed by Gandhi and his Khilafat allies. The first stage included resignation from all British-granted titles. Government and government-supported educational institutions should be boycotted, and national institutions of learning established to replace them. Lawyers and litigants should boycott the law courts, and national arbitration courts established to settle disputes. Political office-seekers should renounce their candidacy in the upcoming Council elections, and voters should boycott the polls. A *swadeshi* campaign would be pushed with vigor. To support this multifaceted program, a Swaraj Fund would be collected, and volunteer corps on provincial, district, and town levels recruited to canvass for funds and to maintain order.<sup>13</sup> The program thus foresaw not only withdrawal from the government of the consent of the governed, but the replacement of boycotted government bodies by alternative structures involving popular participation. Theoretically, then, political mobilization and education of the populace to govern themselves went together. To gauge the strength of the mass movement, one must examine the student noncooperation drive, the volunteer movement, the increased politicization of the ulama, and the triumphal tours of the leaders.

### *Student Noncooperation*

The withdrawal of students and teachers from government schools and colleges was an important part of the first phase of noncooperation, for if middle-class youth, destined for careers in the bureaucracy and the professions, could be persuaded to cut off their highly advantageous links with the government, it would set an excellent example of self-discipline and sacrifice for the rest of the population. One of the prime targets of the Muslim noncooperators, of course, was Aligarh College, still a loyalist stronghold, about to become a university under government conditions. As soon as Muhammad Ali stepped off the boat from England, he was lusting for a confrontation at his old alma mater. Noncooperation had given him a new chance to realize his old dream of an Aligarh

independent of government control, a cultural center for a revived, self-confident, and powerful Muslim community. On October 12, 1920, the Ali brothers and Mahatma Gandhi descended upon the college and addressed a meeting of trustees, staff, and students in the College Union on the necessity of noncooperation.<sup>14</sup> The same day, they and their sympathizers on the board of trustees sent an ultimatum to the board to give up any further grants-in-aid from the government and to refuse any kind of government interference in the affairs of the college. If the trustees did not comply by October 29, they intended to call upon the teachers and students to boycott the college.<sup>15</sup>

The college authorities scurried to organize their defenses for the showdown. The principal wrote to the parents of Aligarh students, requesting them to come and get their boys before the fateful day.<sup>16</sup> By this move, he hoped to get most of the students out of the way, foiling the noncooperators' plans for a mass walkout.<sup>17</sup> The honorary secretary then called a meeting of the board of trustees for October 27 to reply to the ultimatum of the dissident trustees. The meeting was attended mostly by trustees who were identified with the Aligarh administration. They resolved to reject the ultimatum and agreed to close the college for a month.<sup>18</sup>

Meanwhile, Muhammad Ali, accompanied by religious reinforcements, had ensconced himself in Aligarh's Old Boys' Lodge. He and Maulanas Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Majid Badauni addressed a meeting of students on October 24, urging them not to cooperate with a government which so disregarded their religious duties and sentiments. About one hundred and fifty students then signed a pledge to leave the college, should the trustees veto noncooperation.<sup>19</sup>

On October 29, Muhammad Ali announced the opening of a new, completely independent Muslim national university, the Jamia Millia Islamia. It was inaugurated in the Aligarh College Mosque, with a speech by Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan, who traveled to Aligarh for the day despite his failing health. He emphasized that noncooperation was a religious duty; the students should follow their consciences, not their parents, and support it. He also expressed the hope that the curriculum at the Jamia would combine the English education of Aligarh with the religious training of Deoband.<sup>20</sup>

In his speech on this occasion, Muhammad Ali declared that his

intention was not to start a separate institution, but rather to purify Aligarh College of its sycophancy to the government. He and his student followers remained entrenched in the Old Boys' Lodge and some college rooms for two days, refusing to leave. Finally, on October 31, the college authorities called on the local British officials for help. The police surrounded the occupied building and told Muhammad Ali and his supporters that they could either withdraw peacefully or be forcefully evicted as criminal trespassers. They withdrew to a makeshift collection of bungalows and tents nearby.<sup>21</sup>

Muhammad Ali was thus forced to abandon his dream of reforming his alma mater and to found a new institution. In the first year of its existence, however, the Jamia Millia was hardly an educational institution at all, but rather a training ground for political operatives. Muhammad Ali's lectures on history and English literature tended to become political speeches to indoctrinate his young disciples in the religious background of the Khilafat movement, the need for Indian freedom, methods of noncooperation, and ways of canvassing for money. These students became the nucleus of the Khilafat volunteer corps, which fanned out from the Jamia in small groups, spreading the message of noncooperation, organizing local Khilafat committees, and collecting subscriptions in villages throughout UP. Some went to other provinces in order to proselytize for the Khilafat organization. Many never returned to classes again.<sup>22</sup> The emphasis in Muhammad Ali's teaching at Jamia was on political conditions in India, and on recruitment, organization, and funding. There was little talk of conditions in the Middle East now that the peace treaties had been signed. The caliphate remained a symbol to invoke, but it had receded in importance as a political issue.

From Aligarh, the student noncooperation movement spilled over to other Muslim educational institutions. Islamia College in Lahore was infected, though the administration there, under the aegis of Mian Muhammad Shafi, voted against noncooperation.<sup>23</sup> The Calcutta Madrasa also followed suit, when about half the students walked out on October 29 in sympathy with their Aligarh colleagues. They remained on strike for about two weeks, following which a good many of them returned to classes.<sup>24</sup> Maulana Azad called upon all students to leave government institutions and to devote themselves wholeheartedly to national work for the next

year. To faint hearts he pointed out that there was no need to leave school permanently, for national institutions would be established to replace the iniquitous government ones, and in any case, when *swaraj* was established at the end of the year, all schools would be national.<sup>25</sup> On November 5, Azad announced the founding of a national madrasa, the Madrasa-e-Islamia, in the Nakhuda Mosque, to which about two hundred dissident students from the government madrasa gravitated.<sup>26</sup>

Student noncooperation up to this point had been almost entirely confined to Muslim institutions. When some Muslim students began wondering whether they were to be the only ones to sacrifice their education on the altar of national unity, and to complain of Hindu inaction, Gandhi saw the need for some reciprocal move. He decided to take on Benares Hindu University, in spite of the opposition of its founder and guiding light, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya.<sup>27</sup> Gandhi visited Benares on November 1, spoke to a meeting of students, and was enthusiastically received. Later in the month, Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Ansari went to Benares and helped organize a students' noncooperation committee at the university. Everything seemed set for a walkout, but it never occurred. Kashi Vidyapith, Benares' counterpart to Jamia Millia, was belatedly inaugurated by Gandhi in February 1921.<sup>28</sup> Gandhi had better luck on his home ground of Gujarat, where in Ahmedabad he started the Gujarat Mahavidyalaya with several hundred noncooperating students gleaned from local colleges.<sup>29</sup>

In general, the student noncooperation movement, for all the excitement it generated during the fall and winter of 1920-21, was short-lived. Few were willing to leave their studies permanently or to settle for an unrecognized degree from one of the national institutions. The argument that after one year, when *swaraj* was attained, all educational institutions would be national was generally viewed as wishful thinking.

#### *Noncooperation Volunteers*

Perhaps the most significant effect of student noncooperation was that it provided much of the personnel for the volunteer movement, since striking students were less apt to be found in national schools than in the Khilafat and Congress volunteer corps. Volunteer groups for social service or political work were not unknown in India prior to the noncooperation movement.

Gokhale's Servants of India Society, founded in 1905, had been active in such tasks as maintaining order at public meetings, political pamphleteering, and the organization of district Congress bodies. Its offshoots, the Seva Samitis (service societies), had propagated the message of the Home Rule League in 1916-17, provided volunteers to keep order at pilgrimage fairs, and had even earned the approbation of the UP government for drought and famine relief services. During the Rowlatt *satyagraha* of 1919 the Seva Samitis became more actively political, and were used in many places to induce shopkeepers to observe the *hartal*. In the Punjab, they did relief work following the 1919 disturbances.<sup>30</sup>

Among Muslims, volunteer corps did not start to blossom until the beginning of the Khilafat movement, although the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba had provided the pattern. A few Muslim social service organizations helped keep order at pilgrimages to various Sufi shrines, provided water and refreshments on festival occasions, and did relief work. In Bombay, an extensive Khilafat volunteer network grew during 1919-20. It helped patrol the city on each successive Khilafat Day, and organized processions which welcomed the speakers and led crowds to mass meetings.<sup>31</sup>

By late 1920, the Muslim volunteer corps had grown under the impetus of the Khilafat movement and the adoption of noncooperation. The purpose of these groups was now overtly political, with social service giving way to canvassing for Khilafat funds in outlying districts and helping to form local Khilafat committees. The Khilafat volunteers wore either khaki uniforms or green, Arab-style robes, in imitation of the earlier Red Crescent and Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba gear popularized by the Ali brothers. The Islamic symbolism was carried to their crescent-embazoned armbands and Turkish fezzes. In a few places, the volunteers had a regular regimen of drills and carried swords or wooden staves in processions, an ominous display of force among the nonviolent.<sup>32</sup>

The impact of the volunteer organizations was felt particularly in urban areas and among the student population, but the growth of the volunteer movement in 1920-21 is significant because it increased the ability of the political parties to reach out beyond their previous limits. Middle-class youth, both Hindu and Muslim, got involved in political organizing in lower-class quarters and in smaller towns and villages. Whether they were successful in educating the public or not, the volunteers were moved by public



Muhammad Ali in the uniform of the Khilafat volunteer, 1921

enthusiasm, and this had a profound effect on the volunteers' own political consciousness.<sup>33</sup>

*Mobilization of the Ulama*

In addition to the emergence of student noncooperation and the volunteer corps in late 1920, a third method of mass contact evident at this stage was the mobilization of the ulama. The tempo of their activity had increased with the return of Mahmud al-Hasan to India from internment on Malta, as the divines branched out from consultation with their peers to popular pulpit speaking. The Hijrat movement had proved the ulama's effectiveness in arousing enthusiasm. After that, Mahmud al-Hasan and Abul Kalam Azad had been particularly active among the student population, while Abdul Bari was at his best on the hustings, drumming up Muslim support for noncooperation with a brand of oratory that did little to endear him to the advocates of nonviolence. He pointed out to groups of actual and potential disciples that anyone who cooperated with the British infidels was an infidel himself. All true Muslims must be ready to sacrifice their lives, and the lives of others, for the freedom of India.<sup>34</sup>

Abdul Bari was also active in securing endorsements for a *fatwa* in favor of noncooperation. This *fatwa* stated that any cooperation whatsoever with the enemies of Islam was religiously unlawful. Cooperation included not only membership in Councils, education in government schools, the practice of law, and the holding of honorary titles, but also service in the police and military and the use of goods manufactured by infidels. This was the most uncompromising statement of noncooperation thus far. Published as *The Unanimous Fatwa of the Indian Ulama*, it was soon banned by the government. As for cooperation with Hindus, the *fatwa* stated that it was permissible to have political alliances and friendly relations with non-Muslims who were not hostile to Islam. Muslims may even take the advice of such friendly non-Muslims, but the leadership of an infidel over Muslims is never permitted.<sup>35</sup>

The *fatwa* showed that the ulama were not about to yield leadership of the Muslims to the Mahatma. Their feathers were considerably ruffled when Shaukat Ali, in a flight of rhetorical fancy, referred to Gandhi as an "imam."<sup>36</sup> One could accept Gandhi's advice, to be sure, but Muslims must retain their freedom of action in religious matters. The ulama did not specifically state that

Muslims should also retain their freedom of political action, but this was implied. Supporting this contention is the campaign by the ulama beginning in 1920 for a separate system of *shari'a* courts. National arbitration courts were all very well, but Muslims should have their own.<sup>37</sup>

The Jamiat al-Ulama met for its second annual conference in Delhi on November 19–21, 1920. Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan's presidential address was a stirring call to the ulama to defend Islam at all costs and to work against its enemies in India by leading the community in noncooperation. The ulama responded by signing the *fatwa* and by passing resolutions in support of the full noncooperation program.<sup>38</sup>

At the suggestion of Abdul Bari, the Jamiat approved a unique scheme for collecting funds in which the ulama could be instrumental. Bari's plan was based upon the traditional Islamic system of almsgiving, or *zakat*. Up until that time, said Bari, the Khilafat movement had relied too heavily on the generosity of the big merchants. In order to finance new educational institutions, arbitration courts, and a propaganda organization, there must be adequate funds. The ulama were in a position to impress upon every Muslim his religious obligations, and *zakat* was just as important a pillar of the faith as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage. The ulama should collect *zakat* from every Muslim through local mosques and *anjumans*, and submit it to the Central Khilafat Committee treasury. *Zakat* may be a religious obligation, but Abdul Bari saw in it a political advantage: such funds would help supplant the influence of the merchants on the Khilafat Committee. This proposal also reinforces the impression made by the ulama's desire for *shari'a* courts that they sought an entirely separate nationwide organization of Muslims. Under the *shari'a*, *zakat* was a religious tax, traditionally collected by the ulama. This latter-day *zakat* would be the treasury for the Muslims' own noncooperation effort, and the ulama its collectors.<sup>39</sup>

All these developments, the "unanimous" *fatwa*, the movement for *shari'a* courts, the increasing activism and outspokenness of the Jamiat, signal a greater involvement by the ulama in the political life of the community. Their sometime ambivalence about cooperating with the leadership of the national movement was not out of lack of devotion to the anti-British cause. On the contrary, the ulama were as stridently anti-British as any warm-

blooded nationalist could wish. But their emphasis remained the religious guidance of Muslims, and the promotion of their solidarity and self-consciousness as a community. The divines' closeness to and influence over the consciences of Muslims could not be bypassed by Muslim politicians; they too wished to promote pan-Indian Muslim solidarity within the context of a nationalist alliance. The difference of emphasis on the part of the ulama, however, represented a possible obstacle both to Muslim unity and to the Hindu-Muslim entente. The ulama were thus uncertain, if vital, political allies.

#### *Perambulations, Resignations, Prosecutions*

The Ali brothers and Gandhi continued their indefatigable touring throughout the fall of 1920, promoting the various planks in the noncooperation platform. The tours had been the chief method of rallying popular support heretofore and were to remain so, in spite of the new mobilization of students, volunteers, and ulama. In the days before mass communications, their presence was demanded everywhere, their rambling speeches the major means of propagating the faith, and the ballyhoo attendant upon their visits one of the few forms of mass entertainment available. Wherever they went, they were greeted with cries, "Muhammad Ali-Shaukat Ali ki jai!" and "Mahatma Gandhi ki jai!"

A vignette from these tours illustrates the difference in personality between the strapping, boisterous brothers and the frail, earnest, but slyly humorous Mahatma. Arriving at the Lucknow station, they found the platform a veritable jungle of humanity, all devotees waiting to see them. Gandhi, in his passion for order and nonviolence, refused to descend from the train until the unruly mob had sat down and become quiet. The brothers at once swung into action. Forming a phalanx of two, they sallied forth to clear a path for the Mahatma, grabbing some by the shoulders and seating them on the ground, and generally throwing their generous weight around. In a few minutes, Gandhi could appear before a reasonably orderly crowd. Once outside the station, however, they encountered the same confusion. This time, when they climbed into their awaiting carriage the brothers sat on the coachman's box and gaily received the cheers of their admirers, while Gandhi rode below in the carriage, humbly, but still very visible.<sup>40</sup>

For all his moral earnestness, however, Gandhi too was a crowd

pleaser. If the Ali brothers had their great green cloaks and white astrakhan caps with crescent emblems, he had his simple homespun *dhoti* and cap which, in their denial of dependence on the mills of Lancashire, became a national symbol and uniform.<sup>41</sup> His habits of self-denial may have been a form of moral blackmail to his British adversaries and his erring allies both, but they were worshiped as saintliness by the populace. By his self-sacrifice, he brought himself closer to the privations suffered by the Indian masses. They followed this "simple" man, who was the most complex character imaginable, and trusted him as one of their own, though he had had an advantaged youth, a foreign education, and a career away from India.<sup>42</sup>

As the leaders toured, the names of lawyers renouncing their practices, dignitaries resigning their titles, and candidates withdrawing from the election race trickled into Congress and Khilafat headquarters. The names were significant: Motilal Nehru, Mazharul Haq, Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad, Fazlul Haq, and Swami Shradhanand all supported noncooperation.<sup>43</sup> But the numbers were still few. The movement had a long way to go in expanding its popular base; its impact was still largely among educated and urban groups. Efforts to penetrate the countryside had been only mildly successful.

One reason for this was the predominance of Muslims among noncooperators in late 1920, and their urban concentration in UP and Bombay, where Khilafat activity had made the greatest impression. One cannot deny that Hindu noncooperators were more numerous, but Muslims made more noise. In addition to student noncooperation, this was nowhere more apparent than in the early arrests and prosecutions for noncooperation offenses. In October 1920, Zafar Ali Khan, editor of *Zamindar*, was convicted for inciting to violence in a speech before a Khilafat meeting in the Punjab.<sup>44</sup> Zafar al-Mulk of Lucknow's *an-Nazir* was convicted of sedition, and Tajuddin, editor of *Taj* of Jabbalpur and *Khilafat* of Delhi, was arrested. Other Muslim editors, including Qazi Abdul Ghaffar of *Subah* (Delhi), Akram Khan of *Muhammadi* (Calcutta), and Habib Shah of *Siyasat* (Lahore), had to pay heavier security deposits. And Asaf Ali, secretary of the Delhi Khilafat Committee, was served with a warning in connection with his Khilafat volunteer activities.<sup>45</sup>

The government stated for the record that it had only prosecuted individuals who, through their pronouncements, had departed

from nonviolence. In theory, its policy toward noncooperation was to wait and see, expecting the movement to come apart at the seams by itself. In practice, it helped the process along by singling out Muslims as agitators, and by calling for moderate support: noncooperation was patently unconstitutional, chimerical, and "could only result in widespread political chaos." All the same, the government was "reluctant to interfere with the liberty of speech at a time when India is on the threshold of great advances towards the realization of . . . self-government."<sup>46</sup> Gandhi was quick to point out this divisionary tactic, citing it as evidence of the government's "satanic" nature.<sup>47</sup> Muslims remained staunch supporters of noncooperation, but there was some grumbling in the ranks. Shaikat Ali had to write to Abdul Bari to take heart and remember that the Muslims were following the commandments of God, not of Gandhi, in adhering to noncooperation.<sup>48</sup>

The events of this hectic year were brought to a close by the Nagpur political meetings in December. The annual Congress session marked the final triumph of Gandhi and his noncooperation program, as all his remaining opponents were silenced by the tremendous enthusiasm of the delegates for noncooperation. C. R. Das, leader of the Bengal delegation which had so strongly opposed Gandhi in Calcutta in September, found his supporters so divided that he capitulated to the Mahatma, moved the noncooperation resolution at Nagpur, and saved himself from political oblivion.<sup>49</sup> Jinnah, however, refused to capitulate, and resigned from the Congress once and for all because of his opposition. The renewed noncooperation resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority, as were changes in the Congress constitution and creed proposed by Gandhi. The organization was improved by instituting a compact Working Committee, an All-India Committee of some three hundred members, and provincial committees with local branches down to the village level. The new creed gave up lip service to the British connection by endorsing "the attainment of *swaraj* by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means." Gandhi once again grandly predicted that they would have *swaraj* within a year.<sup>50</sup>

### *Variations on the Noncooperation Theme*

Following the Nagpur sessions, Gandhi spelled out the conditions which had to be met if India was to attain *swaraj* within the

stipulated one-year period. First, noncooperators must be absolutely nonviolent, with no coercion of others, no retaliation in the face of government oppression. Second, Congress must have branches in every village, linked to party organizations at the district and provincial levels. Third, funds must be raised. Women should sacrifice their ornaments, tipplers their jug, and even the poorest his mite, and all these savings should be contributed to the Tilak Memorial Swaraj Fund. Fourth, there must be a spinning wheel in every home for the production of *swadeshi* thread, strengthening the economic independence of the country. And fifth, without Hindu-Muslim unity, nothing could be accomplished.<sup>51</sup> The year 1921, then, was to be one of mass political education, organization, and contribution, from the smallest local unit to the national level. The drive will be examined in the next two sections: first, the effort to spread participation in noncooperation throughout the country, and second, the drive to build a national organizational and unding network for noncooperation activities.

The effort to spread political activity into the countryside produced almost as many variations on the theme of noncooperation as there were local organizations. In areas of agrarian unrest like UP, peasant grievances were tacked onto the noncooperation program by emphasizing that the government was really the friend of the landlord. In Bengal and Assam, labor disputes were brought under the rubric of noncooperation. In predominantly Muslim areas, ulama and Sufis were the chief messengers of the movement, armed with *fatawa* and religious rhetoric. For Hindu audiences, religious symbolism was also employed: the promised *swaraj* became Ramraj or Gandhiraj, the rule of virtue, versus the present Ravanraj, the rule of evil.<sup>52</sup>

#### UP Kisans

One example of these regional variations occurred in UP, where agrarian grievances were skillfully exploited by the noncooperators. Popular unrest among the peasantry had been growing in eastern UP (formerly Oudh) for some time in the face of abuses by the big landlords. Under the *talugdari* system, tenants could lease land for a certain number of years, provided they paid an annual rent and performed other services as occasionally required by the *talugdars*. These services included the giving of unpaid labor, or *begar*, as well as certain dues on festival occasions. The *talugdars*

were prevented by the Oudh Rent Act of 1886 from raising the annual rent beyond 6¼ percent at the end of a seven-year lease period, but special dues and *begar* could be exacted with relative impunity. Another common custom was *nazrana*, the payment of a special fee over and above the rent for the renewal of the lease every seven years. Few tenants could fight these exactions in a court of law, and if they failed to comply, they could be evicted from the land.

In 1919-20, because of straitened economic conditions, the number of evictions grew alarmingly.<sup>53</sup> They reached such proportions that the tenantry of Oudh finally organized, under the aegis of the local Congress, into Kisan Sabhas (Peasant Associations). The noncooperators made their bid for peasant support through these organizations. Tenants attending a Kisan Sabha meeting in Faizabad District late in December 1920 were told that if they adopted noncooperation, there would be no more evictions under Gandhiraj.<sup>54</sup>

The *kisan* movement in UP continued to gain momentum until, on January 5, 1921, in a village near Rai Bareilly, some 3,000 peasants surrounded a *talugdari* estate and demanded that all evictions be canceled. The police arrived and arrested three of the ringleaders. The next day, a larger crowd looted a bazaar nearby and had to be dispersed by firing. On January 7, the mob reassembled with the intention of proceeding to the jail to liberate the three *kisan* leaders. They too were fired upon, and there were several deaths. At this point, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru arrived on the scene and spoke to the crowd, trying to calm them, urging them to avoid violence at all costs; he was then hustled away by the district magistrate. The Rai Bareilly riots showed the noncooperators that it was easier to start an agitation than to stop it. At the same time, it gave them a handle against the government—which, by the shooting, had reinforced the impression that it was defending the interests of the landlords against the peasants.<sup>55</sup>

After this trial by fire, the *kisan* movement became even more active. Government officials noted with nervousness a new spirit of defiance and an increasing degree of politicization among the peasantry. Now, political leaders had no difficulty gathering huge crowds prepared to carry out their orders, particularly if it meant raiding or looting. Gandhi, Nehru, and other Congress leaders continued to urge nonviolence and the payment of rents, but the

more numerous local podium speakers were not above condoning plunder in the name of the new millennium. There were increasing instances of refusal to pay *nazrana* and even rents, in the belief that Gandhiraj was just around the corner.<sup>56</sup> All this prompted the government to push through the Legislative Council a revision of the Oudh Rent Act designed to eliminate *nazrana* and arbitrary eviction.<sup>57</sup> The action cooled the *kisan* movement considerably, but it had made an impact on the rural population in UP. Many believed that Gandhi's *swaraj* had already arrived; others were confirmed in their readiness for political activity.<sup>58</sup>

#### *The Assam Tea Coolies*

In North Bengal and Assam, noncooperation volunteers succeeded in fomenting unrest among the tea plantation workers. Among the tea coolies, as among the *kisans* of UP, economic grievances had been growing. The trade slump following the war had not spared the tea gardens, and many coolies were under- or unemployed. Contract laborers from other parts of India, the coolies were uprooted and subsisted on minuscule wages and even more meager rations. When volunteer groups arrived and told them to quit their foreign employers, many were only too willing to do so. They began the trek back to their homes, believing that noncooperators everywhere would look after them. Soon the exodus, like the Hijrat movement the year before, reached unmanageable proportions, with several thousand destitute laborers collecting at the fetid river port of Chandpur, in East Bengal, awaiting passage on steamers across the vast Gangetic delta. Several people were crushed or drowned in a stampede to board a departing steamer on May 21, 1921. Soon thereafter, cholera broke out among the refugees in the railway and steamer terminals. The authorities, in order to avoid further crushes and to keep cholera from spreading along the rail and river lines, used Gurkha troops to herd the coolies from the stations into camps. Several deaths were reported during the operation. The nationalist press raised an outcry against the callous treatment given these unfortunate victims of forces they did not understand.<sup>59</sup>

The incident discredited the government, but neither was it a credit to the noncooperators. Their greatest success at agitation in rural Bengal had resulted in ridding the Assam tea gardens of some surplus labor, but had done nothing to enhance their support

among the Bengali peasantry. The exodus of the Assam tea coolies was yet another example of the enthusiastic following that could be summoned by the use of local economic grievances. But it was a following that had no idea of the larger aims of noncooperation; it was without organization, and violence was the unfortunate result.

#### *Religious Symbolism: Muslim and Hindu*

Just as economic grievances were used to rouse support for noncooperation in rural localities, so religious appeals were employed to reach audiences previously uninvolved in politics. The ulama and Sufis were the messengers of noncooperation among rural Muslims. Village mosques and shrines were convenient and inviolable meeting places, and local imams or itinerant preachers could always summon a crowd of believers to hear what they had to say. Mellifluous oratory, backed up by the noncooperation *fatwa* of the leading divines, impressed upon the villagers that association with their infidel rulers was religiously forbidden.

The pirs of Sindh had already been active at the village level, and now the ulama of UP organized Khilafat deputations to the villages under the silver-tongued Abdul Majid Badauni, assisted by Pirangi Mahal stalwarts. They toured rural areas in the eastern districts of UP during February and March 1921, speaking on the Khilafat and noncooperation. They urged the boycott of British goods, schools, and law courts, and called on Muslims to form their own *shari'a* arbitration courts.<sup>60</sup>

The ulama were becoming past masters at using religious terminology to make political points. This was evident at the Oudh Khilafat Conference in Lucknow on February 26, 1921. Welcoming the delegates was Maulana Qutbuddin, Abdul Bari's nephew. He defined noncooperation as a *jihad* for Muslims, just as the last war had been a "crusade" for the British—but, he hastened to add, this *jihad* should not include drawing the sword.<sup>61</sup> The use of religious arguments, such as the reemphasis on *jihad* as religious struggle or appeals for religious freedom, had a twofold purpose. It kept the government at arm's length, even though these "religious" speeches were becoming ever more political, and it pulled all Muslims within the vortex of the Khilafat movement. Even those Muslims who were not particularly religious could not quarrel with the demand for religious freedom. This demand could also appeal to the Shia *mujtahids* and their followers.

One problem which continued to plague the Khilafat leaders was how to rally the support of the Shias to the cause. Western-educated Shia leaders had supported the movement for political rather than theological reasons. The *mujtahids*, however, opposed it, for they did not recognize the Khilafat. Then, in March of 1921, at the annual pilgrimage to the shrine at Ajmer, Abdul Bari made an eloquent appeal for Shia support. He played up rumors of British bombardment of the shrine at Najaf in Iraq.<sup>62</sup> If Najaf had indeed been damaged, the Shias' religious freedom was also being threatened, an argument to which the *mujtahids* would have to respond.

The response was not long in coming. The Shias of Lucknow held a huge public meeting to consider what could be done to save their holy places, and a deputation called upon Sir Harcourt Butler, governor of UP, to ask permission to visit Mesopotamia to find out the truth for themselves. Butler assured the deputation that the rumors were false, but Shia doubts remained. In late March, a leading *mujtahid*, Maulana Sayyid Yusuf Husain, issued a *fatwa* in favor of noncooperation for Shias as well. March 20 was declared a mourning day for Najaf, and the draped processions and tearing of hair matched the annual mourning at the time of Muharram in Lucknow. Whether Najaf had been desecrated or not, a sizable portion of Shia opinion had been won over. At a Shia conference in Lucknow in late April, resolutions were passed in favor of the defense of the *jazirat al-Arab* from non-Muslim aggression, and noncooperation with the British for the freedom of India.<sup>63</sup>

Religious appeals helped to construct a pan-Indian Islam, a sense of political identity among the Muslims of India, and for this the ulama were invaluable. But willing messengers of anti-British noncooperation though they were, the divines were still mainly interested in defending and enforcing the *shari'a*. This situation was made clear on April 8, 1921, when the All-India Khilafat Conference met in special session at Meerut, with Shaikat Ali presiding. Much to the embarrassment of the advocates of intercommunal amity, some of the ulama present demanded a resolution defining and limiting the scope of Hindu-Muslim unity, according to the *shari'a*.<sup>64</sup> The Khilafatists were once again faced with divisions in the Muslim camp, and thus with the problematic nature of their position within Indian nationalism.

The Khilafatists' dilemma was exemplified by speeches Muhammad Ali delivered during a tour of the South, in Madras, and before the Majlis al-Ulama Conference at Erode, in Madras Province. In the city of Madras on April 2, Muhammad Ali addressed a huge meeting on the beach and was carried away by a tide of rhetoric. Making a point about the Muslims' devotion to India and the defense of freedom, he stated that if any power invaded India in order to subjugate it, it would be the Muslims' duty to lead the resistance. If, on the other hand, the same power—for instance, Afghanistan—invaded India to help overthrow the British, the Muslims must assist the incursion.<sup>65</sup> This evocation of an Afghan invasion caused a tremor among the Hindus and canceled the point Muhammad Ali wanted to make. The linking of Indian Muslims with Afghan invaders would indeed pose a threat to British rule, but would also, for the Hindu, signal a potential reimposition of Muslim rule.

At Erode, following his Madras speech, Muhammad Ali again was carried away. He emphasized the nonviolence and "absolute docility and peacefulness of our masses." They simply needed to be organized by volunteers, such as the ulama and Khilafat workers there present, and then *swaraj* would surely come in a short time. Indians wanted freedom from foreign rule, but they did not hate their government only because it was foreign; if they had an Indian government which was equally "satanic," they would hate it all the more. In making his point about the morality of the Indian masses, Muhammad inadvertently cast aspersions on a hypothetical Indian government, another rhetorical *faux pas* which was not quickly forgotten.<sup>66</sup>

Religious symbolism or statements which caused anxiety to the other community were by no means a monopoly of the Muslim leadership, however. Gandhi, in a speech at Kakinada during the same tour of the South in April 1921, laid great stress on nonviolence and Hindu-Muslim unity as prerequisites for the attainment of *swaraj*. But when he characterized that self-government, he used the term *dharmaraj*. He especially appealed to the women in the audience: Just as Sita refused the temptations of Ravana, so they should refuse the temptations of luxury, give up their ornaments for the cause and adopt homespun garb. In this way, they would defeat Ravanraj within one year.<sup>67</sup> Though such imagery was doubtless effective in gaining devotees and contributors, Mus-

lims might justifiably have asked Gandhi if he were not advocating a Hindu *raj*.

The movement to spread noncooperation to every village in India and thus see the consummation of *swaraj* within the year had, at its halfway point, met with limited success. In cities such as Delhi and Bombay, well-organized public meetings and volunteer groups could rally—and usually control—vast numbers; though enthusiasm, as in the student noncooperation movement, was more often than not short-lived. In the rural areas, however, the organizational network was still embryonic. To rouse the rural population against the government involved the use of local economic grievances, sectarian religious appeals, or both. This combination of appeals was often quite effective, though the nonviolent character of the movement was difficult to maintain. The religious character of the oratory, furthermore, raised a variety of communal fears. But this was probably inevitable. The point has been made that “In traditional societies, religion is a mass phenomenon, politics is not,” and thus, “religion can serve as the means by which the masses become politicized.”<sup>68</sup> It is difficult to imagine the spread of noncooperation among the politically unsophisticated without the use of religious imagery. Though the success of the movement was limited at this stage, it did represent a pioneering effort in the diffusion of political awareness from urban to rural areas. As such, it was a remarkable breakthrough.

### “Men, Money, and Munitions”

The tremendous variety of appeals and the often disorganized response in the name of the Khilafat and noncooperation showed the leaders the need for an extensive organization, and commensurate funding, to carry out their nonviolent campaign. Therefore, on March 31, 1921, the All-India Congress Committee met in Bezwada to take stock of the achievements thus far, and to decide on future activity. The most important decision came to be known as the “men, money, and munitions” resolution: it called for a massive effort to enroll one crore (10 million) new members in the Congress, to raise one crore rupees for the Tilak Memorial Swaraj Fund, and to propagate the use of twenty lakh (200,000) spinning wheels in the *swadeshi* campaign before July 1. In addition, the committee discussed the advisability of the next stage of noncooperation, civil disobedience. But Gandhi urged that civil disobe-

dience be postponed until their organizational goals had been fulfilled.<sup>69</sup> There was some determined opposition to this cautious line, but Gandhi, as usual, was able to have his way when he promised that once the Bezwada program had been carried out, civil disobedience would follow. When discipline over the masses was assured, then they could call upon soldiers to lay down their arms and cultivators to cease paying taxes.<sup>70</sup>

With just three months to collect such vast sums of money and memberships, the Congress and Khilafat leaders began a hard-sell campaign that often resembled the line of an itinerant huckster at a country fair. An example of this approach is an excerpt from Muhammad Ali’s April 2 speech in Madras:

In three months’ time we want one crore of men and women to be enlisted as soldiers in the good fight—peaceful and bloodless fight . . . . We want one crore of men to be enlisted as members of the Congress. Are you willing to enlist yourselves? Yes. Then four annas is the subscription for one year and I promise you Swaraj within six months. Then we want one crore of rupees from the whole of India for the Tilak Swaraj Fund for national service, for fighting the good fight. And lastly, we want munitions. And what are our munitions for this peaceful fight? . . . . [W]e have a very ancient machine in this country, made by our own village carpenters [the spinning wheel] which kills at a distance of 7000 miles over sea and land. A shot fired from Madras kills [the British textile industry in] Manchester.<sup>71</sup>

The only thing lacking was a guarantee to refund their money if they were not fully satisfied.

The campaign was begun during Satyagraha Week, April 6–13, commemorating the Rowlatt *satyagraha* and the Amritsar massacre of two years earlier. At public meetings throughout India, eloquent appeals were made for Congress memberships, the Tilak Swaraj Fund, and *swadeshi*. Gandhi spoke at meetings in Bombay and Gujarat, appealing especially to women and cloth merchants, and returned to headquarters laden down with ornaments and money to help the cause.<sup>72</sup>

In June, with the deadline growing closer, the appeals became noisier and more frequent. The *Bombay Chronicle* carried an advertisement in mid-June which trumpeted:

SHALL WE FAIL?  
ACID TEST OF SWARAJ  
NOT A MOMENT TO SPARE

It recommended that salaried employees pay one-tenth of their monthly wages, professionals and businessmen one-twelfth of their net annual income as of the end of May, the landed two and one-half percent of the value of their property, and all others not less than four annas to the Tilak Fund.<sup>73</sup>

As usual, the merchant princes of Bombay contributed grandly in the last-minute rush to fulfill the quota. Ardeshir Godrej, a wealthy Parsi manufacturer of safes, reached into his own strong-box and gave three lakhs to the Tilak Fund in late June.<sup>74</sup> The man in the street, however, was less generous. The masses in UP, roused to action by the *kisan* movement during the cooler months, now looked askance at the feverish appeals for funds, and went back to tilling their fields. The provincial quota of almost sixteen lakhs fell far short of realization. Similarly, in the Punjab, Lala Lajpat Rai's tours to every district met with meager response.<sup>75</sup> And when Gandhi toured Sindh in an effort to raise funds, he was sorely disappointed. He was not even particularly successful among Sindh Muslims, the backing of the pirs notwithstanding.<sup>76</sup>

Still, much to the jubilation of the Congress leaders, when the reckoning came on July 1, the Tilak Swaraj Fund had surpassed the one crore target, with pledges totaling one crore and five lakhs. Bombay alone had contributed thirty-seven and a half lakhs, Bengal twenty-five lakhs, and Gujarat fifteen, with the Punjab trailing at five lakhs, and the other provinces far behind. The distribution of donations shows clearly that the bulk of financial support still came from urban areas, from the Gujarati, Marwari, Parsi, and Muslim merchants, and from big contributors in general, not from the mass of poor people whom the leadership had hoped to tap. In addition, the number of pledges actually collected probably fell short of the crore. Nevertheless, the leaders' jubilation, doubtless coupled with some astonishment, was understandable. The movement had received a tremendous boost. There was much less elation over the results of the membership drive, which fell short of the one crore target for four-anna members. The goal of Congress organizations in every village was still remote.<sup>77</sup>

The spinning wheel campaign had also reached its target, and in July Gandhi called for an even greater *swadeshi* effort. Every village home should have a spinning wheel, every Indian wear homespun, and the boycott of foreign cloth be total by the end of July.<sup>78</sup> The completion of this *swadeshi* campaign would prove

that the nation was disciplined and ready for *swaraj*. Only then, Gandhi said, could they safely launch civil disobedience. It is interesting to note Gandhi's changing viewpoint on the question of the boycott of foreign cloth. From his original opposition to the boycott as a form of vindictiveness and therefore violence, he had now come to regard it as a supreme symbol of self-discipline and independence from British ties, and had made it the central feature of noncooperation. In so doing, he also managed to postpone the reckoning on civil disobedience. He even supported the picketing of merchants who did not comply with the boycott and presided over the climactic *walpurgnacht* of the campaign, the huge bonfires of foreign cloth on July 31 and October 9, 1921.<sup>79</sup> Once again, Gandhi was yielding one point in order to gain another.

At their meeting in Bombay on July 28, the members of the All-India Congress Committee patted themselves on the back for the achievement of the Bezwada program, and resolved to concentrate on *swadeshi* activities and the boycott of foreign cloth and to postpone civil disobedience. Delegates from UP and the Punjab opposed Gandhi on this point, wanting an immediate consideration of civil disobedience, but Gandhi's word was law. The committee ruled, however, that it would not hesitate to sanction civil disobedience in any province where the *swadeshi* campaign and other preconditions had been fully met.

An interesting organizational change was made at this Bombay meeting, particularly considering the recent all-out effort to spawn local Congress units. The Working Committee of the Congress was given greater powers to deal with urgent matters which might arise when the All-India Congress Committee was not in session. This executive group of fifteen<sup>80</sup> was thus given virtually complete control over the movement, save for the periodic sessions of the All-India Committee or of the Congress. While trying to spread its tentacles to the smallest villages, the Congress was also becoming more centralized. Gandhi was keeping the reins of power firmly within his grasp.<sup>81</sup>

### *The Khilafat Fund*

While the Bezwada and *swadeshi* campaigns were going on, the Khilafat leaders were engaged in a separate "men, money, and munitions" drive of their own, with the accent on money. To be

sure, they helped in the appeals for the Tilak Swaraj Fund, but they also had their own garden to cultivate. Though the Khilafat and Congress worked simultaneously on noncooperation, their organizations, volunteer cadres, and funds always remained distinct. During this period, therefore, the Ali brothers and their cohorts were engaged in a parallel, rather than an identical, effort with Gandhi and the Congress.

The Ali brothers had had many years of experience in fundraising: for the Muslim university, Turkish relief, the Red Crescent, and the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba. Since early 1920, they had been scouring the country passing the hat, first for the Khilafat delegation, then for national education, and now for *swadeshi* and noncooperation, as well as Turkish relief. At first, most of their financing came from wealthy donors like Chotani, Fazilbhai Currimbhai of Bombay, and Haji Abdullah Harun of Karachi. Later, as the Alis sought to shake off the moderating influence of the merchants, they worked to expand their sources of funds. Volunteers were trained in village-to-village and door-to-door canvassing, and support began to pour in from average Muslims, though it was still not enough to obviate all appeals to the big merchants. One technique used to gather small donations was for tea stall owners to assign their profits on certain days to the Khilafat fund. Another was the sale of Khilafat receipts. These were in one-rupee, five-rupee, and ten-rupee denominations. They resembled rupee notes, but had a picture of the Ka'aba and inscriptions from the Quran. These receipts were tremendously popular and were sold extensively during fundraising drives, until it was discovered that many illiterate donors tried to use them for real currency.<sup>82</sup>

After more than a year of these appeals, some people became suspicious of the Khilafat Committee's perpetual need for money. Even Chotani got tired of continually opening his purse for appeals to his "love for Islam and well-known patriotism."<sup>83</sup> As president of the Central Khilafat Committee, he asked for, and was granted, the power to sanction routine office expenditures and money for "propaganda work" without detailed justification.<sup>84</sup> This tightened his control on the purse strings, but was to cause headaches for the committee's auditors.

Demands for statements and audits of the Khilafat Fund had been made in the press from the beginning. In March 1920, Shaukat promised that a full statement of the Khilafat Fund would soon

be published. Nothing was forthcoming until July, when the Central Khilafat Committee approved a financial statement and appointed a Bombay firm of chartered accountants as auditors.<sup>85</sup> But complaints continued. Many were shocked by the lavish expenditure of the Khilafat delegation in Europe, and wondered if all Muhammad's spending for "propaganda" had not gone into fancy hotels and first-class travel. Shaukat's procrastination in publishing a detailed account of receipts caused so much grumbling that Gandhi finally felt called upon to defend him. The Mahatma denied that the Ali brothers traveled first class during their tours throughout India, and pleaded guilty himself to traveling second class during an illness. As for Shaukat:

I know that it is practically a physical impossibility for Maulana Shaukat Ali to travel third class. He is certainly overindulgent to the [Khilafat] workers, who need not always travel second class. But that is due to his generous nature . . . .<sup>86</sup>

Admitting that Khilafat workers traveled second class when Gandhi made a point of traveling third was damning with faint praise; and evoking Shaukat's generous nature could hardly have eliminated apprehensions. Although large sums had indeed been sent to the Red Crescent in Turkey for the relief of refugees, or been used for Khilafat propaganda in Europe and noncooperation work in India,<sup>87</sup> educated public opinion was nevertheless becoming increasingly sceptical about giving to the Khilafat Fund by the beginning of 1921. The committee accordingly started special funds to aid the Angora (Ankara) government of Mustafa Kemal, and another for the relief of Turkish victims of the war with Greece over Smyrna (Izmir).<sup>88</sup>

The emphasis shifted, therefore, away from the all-purpose Khilafat Fund to the new Smyrna Relief and Angora Funds. Relief to Turkish sufferers from Greek aggression was a concrete goal, heir to a long history of Indian Muslim charity for Turkish relief, and once again contributions poured in. Shaukat was back in harness, traveling around the country with green-robed volunteers, making impassioned appeals for the poor suffering Turks. At the annual pilgrimage in Ajmer they sold out their Khilafat receipts and got generous donations of gold ornaments and watches from the wealthier pilgrims. On another tour, Shaukat would shake hands only with those who bought one-rupee receipts

from his handy bag, and would let those who contributed more kiss his hand.<sup>89</sup>

The Khilafat Committee simultaneously tried to restore confidence in its financial management. A letter to the press pointed out that the Khilafat accounts through the end of 1920 had been audited and were in the process of publication. The president, Seth Chotani, and the auditors subjected the accounts to periodic scrutiny. Hence, there was no danger—"accidents apart"—of misappropriation.<sup>90</sup> As for the unpublished accounts for 1921, the committee issued a public apology explaining that, due to delays by the auditors, publication had not been possible, but this lacuna would soon be filled. The reason for the auditors' delay was not stated—and no wonder; they had objected to certifying undetailed expenditures for "propaganda work" totaling over two and a half lakh rupees, sanctioned by Chotani during the course of the year, and also noted that they still lacked a statement of expenses from the delegation to England.<sup>91</sup>

The funding of the Khilafat movement was thus something of a mystery. The Ali brothers' Midas touch and the Chotani firm's seemingly inexhaustible reserves were not enough to keep up a mass movement for long. Although public enthusiasm for the Tilak Swaraj Fund was high, public confidence in the Khilafat Fund had hit a trough. The need for greater popular support, both emotional and monetary, was only one of the reasons for a greater stridency of tone among Khilafat activists in the summer of 1921.

### *The Weakening of the Hindu-Muslim Alliance*

In addition to their fundraising drive, the Khilafat Committee held a series of meetings in the hot weather of 1921 which demonstrated a new readiness to assert their independence from Gandhi's cautious nonviolent line. On June 2, at the Gujarat Provincial Khilafat Conference in Broach, Muhammad Ali reemphasized his and his brother's devotion to Gandhi's doctrine of nonviolence. He added, however, that while their present policy coincided entirely with the creed of the Mahatma, their religion did not. Islam not only permitted the use of force, but in certain circumstances, such as self-defense, made it obligatory. They thus had to reserve the right to take up arms against the enemies of Islam, should non-cooperation fail.<sup>92</sup> At a meeting of the All-India Khilafat Commit-

tee in Bombay on June 15, it was declared the duty of Indian Muslim soldiers to refuse to serve the British government in any war with Turkey. And a district Khilafat conference held in Belgaum on June 19 also took a tougher line, saying that India should declare its independence if Britain took up arms against Mustafa Kemal.<sup>93</sup>

The reason for this new militance was the combination of Indian political considerations with the alarming news which was again coming in over the wires from the Middle East. After a lull since the Treaty of Sevres the previous summer, the Greco-Kemalist conflict in Asia Minor had heated up, and the British government made little secret of its sympathy for the Greeks. The Indian Muslims were Mustafa Kemal's most numerous cheering section. He was the "sword of Islam" unleashed in order to free the caliph, the "prisoner of the Bosphorus."<sup>94</sup>

The renewal of danger to the heartland of Islam gave the Khilafat leaders new fuel to continue their drive for funding and their quest for pan-Indian Islamic unity. The situation also led to an increasing Muslim insistence on the necessity of measures to promote military and police defections, a feature of the heretofore postponed civil disobedience program. A group of ulama including Azad, Kafayatullah, Abdul Bari, and Azizur Rahman, the *mufti* of Deoband, issued a *fatwa* which reiterated the unanimous non-cooperation *fatwa* of the previous year, including the unequivocal clause: service in the military or the police is religiously unlawful and a particularly great sin, since it involves firing on one's Muslim brethren. The Quran states: "One who kills a Muslim deliberately will be subjected to eternal hellfire." The Prophet said: "Whoever takes up arms against Muslims, he ceases to be a Muslim." This *fatwa* was published and distributed by the ulama and Khilafat volunteers on trains, to police barracks, and in army camps.<sup>95</sup>

The All-India Khilafat Conference, meeting in Karachi on July 8-10, 1921, endorsed this *fatwa*. Muhammad Ali presided, and in a speech more outspoken than his Broach oration,<sup>96</sup> he accused the British of trying to destroy Islam and said that they should be turned out of India. The conference went on to pass a series of resolutions stating that Indian Muslims would shirk "no sacrifice" to uphold the integrity and prestige of the Khilafat, thanking all those already in jail due to government repression, and congratu-

lating Mustafa Kemal for his brilliant victories and heroic efforts. These were little more than reaffirmations, in more extreme form, of previous resolves, but the seventh resolution made the government sit up and take notice:

... in the present circumstances the Holy Shariat forbids every Muslim to serve or enlist himself in the British army or to raise recruits for it ... it is incumbent on all Muslims in general and all ulama in particular to carry this religious commandment to every Muslim soldier in the British Indian Army.<sup>97</sup>

Here was an open declaration that they were going to sow disaffection among the troops. They then went on to say that if the government resorted to hostilities against the Kemalists, Muslims would be compelled to declare civil disobedience in cooperation with the Congress, and at the next session of Congress, they would declare India's independence. A Sindhi pir, Ghulam Mujaddid, went further and said that they should no longer wait for the Congress. An already nervous bureaucracy quickly began to reconsider their "hands off" policy toward noncooperation. They hatched a conspiracy charge against a septet of the most prominent leaders present at Karachi: the Ali brothers, Dr. Kitchlew of Amritsar, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madni of Deoband, Maulana Nisar Ahmad, Pir Ghulam Mujaddid of Matiari in Sindh, and Sri Shankaracharya. They did not arrest the Karachi seven right away, but bided their time and watched their movements.<sup>98</sup>

The Khilafat Committee had not only overstepped the bounds heretofore tolerated by the government, but had also made commitments in the name of the Congress which Gandhi could not have viewed with equanimity. He had been assiduously avoiding any premature call for civil disobedience, especially among the military. His reasons were valid enough: They probably could not yet control a massive civil disobedience campaign, and the government, faced with military disaffection, would surely clamp down. But now he was again faced with the impatience of his Muslim vanguard. If they bolted too far ahead, the whole Congress-Khilafat entente might come apart, regardless of government action. But reining them in was equally dangerous. Therefore, while trying to tone down the Khilafat Conference's resolutions, he nevertheless approved them:

Today, we are striving for Swaraj within the Empire in the hope that

England will in the end prove true, and for independence if she fails. But when it is incontestably proved that Britain seeks to destroy Turkey, India's only choice must be independence. For Muslims, when Turkey's existence is threatened, there is no going back . . . . The duty of the Hindus is no less clear. If we still fear and distrust the Muslims, we must side with the British and prolong our slavery. If we are brave and religious enough not to fear the Muslims, our countrymen, and if we have the wisdom to trust them, we must make common cause with the Muslims in every peaceful and truthful method to secure Indian independence.<sup>99</sup>

With visions of *jihad* dancing in his head, he urged his Hindu coursers forward.

The Hindu-Muslim alliance was definitely in trouble by the monsoon of 1921, but Muslim militance in the face of renewed Christian pressure on Turkey was only one of the contributing factors. We have already seen that there were pressing financial reasons for greater Muslim militance, but there were political reasons as well. The alliance between the Ali brothers and Gandhi and their respective forces, and the Khilafatists' espousal of non-cooperation, had been not only a product of forces external to India, but also of internal political considerations. This was no less true of the breakdown of that entente. Events in India during the spring and summer of 1921 contributed even more to the increasing militance of the Muslim leadership than the campaign in Turkey. These events should be reviewed with some care.

The leaders' respective tours in Madras in April had yielded a number of pronouncements rich in religious symbolism, whether Hindu or Muslim, which had been viewed askance by members of the other community. Muhammad Ali's April 2 speech, in which he spoke of a possible Afghan invasion, was particularly objectionable to Hindu leaders such as Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya.<sup>100</sup> The pandit was quick to point out to the Mahatma that many of the Ali brothers' statements were injurious to the nonviolent character of his movement. But Gandhi, knowing Shaikat and Muhammad, was inclined to chalk up their utterances to the enthusiasm of the moment. In an article in *Young India* Gandhi stated that he too would help the Afghans, to the extent that he would ask Indians not to assist the British, but he would not raise levies for the amir; that would be against his creed of nonviolence. He further maintained that this was what Muhammad Ali really meant in his Madras speech.<sup>101</sup>

By the time of the Broach and Karachi Khilafat meetings, however, the Ali brothers' rhetoric had definitely gone beyond safe bounds. Although their public reasons for this had to do with Turkey, there were private reasons of a more serious nature for their differences with Gandhi's doctrine. In late May, at Gandhi's insistence, the brothers had issued a public apology for any of their pronouncements which might have been construed as violent.<sup>102</sup> But when it became known that the viceroy had had a hand in requesting that apology, the brothers were condemned by their Muslim followers for weakness in the face of government pressure. The apology episode had hurt the Ali brothers where they were most sensitive, by damaging their political following in their own community.<sup>103</sup> They had to adopt an even harder line to make up the lost ground.

#### *The Apology Incident*

A step-by-step account of this Byzantine incident will show why it caused such misunderstanding among the leaders. In April 1921, the new viceroy, Lord Reading, had arrived in India and had adopted the previous government's wait-and-see policy toward the noncooperation movement. Shortly thereafter, however, Muhammad Ali's Madras speech appeared in the news, with its reference to taking up the sword against the British government. This led the authorities to ferret out similar passages from his and Shaukat's past speeches with the idea of eventually prosecuting them for incitement to violence when the time was right. Pandit Malaviya, then visiting the Olympian heights of Simla, also pointed out to the viceroy that references to an Afghan invasion were liable to cause communal friction. But on the other hand, said the pandit, any attempt to prosecute the Alis might lead to equally undesirable disturbances. The pandit was the bearer of a request from Gandhi for an interview with the viceroy to discuss noncooperation in general. He suggested that the viceroy might use the same interview to secure some retraction of the Ali brothers' pronouncements.

Lord Reading, using Pandit Malaviya as an intermediary, replied to the Mahatma. His invitation stated that should Gandhi wish to place the case of the noncooperators before him, the viceroy was perfectly willing to hear it. Malaviya also hinted to the Mahatma that the speeches of the Ali brothers would be discussed.

Before accepting the invitation, Gandhi consulted other Congress leaders, including Muhammad Ali, at a meeting of the Working Committee in Allahabad on May 10. Muhammad urged Gandhi to take along four colleagues to help present their case. For the Mahatma, the maintenance of nonviolence under his control was all-important, and Muhammad was worried that Gandhi and Reading would come to some compromise agreement which would cool the agitation. He may also have been concerned about his own fate. But the invitation was for Gandhi alone.<sup>104</sup>

The Gandhi-Reading interviews took place in Simla in mid-May of 1921. At their second meeting, the viceroy brought up the Ali brothers and their proposed prosecution. He pointed out that they had made statements contrary to the nonviolent doctrine of the Mahatma. Gandhi denied this, and asserted that if his associates had uttered any incitement to violence, he would publicly repudiate them unless they withdrew such statements. Reading then showed him the selected passages from Shaukat's and Muhammad's speeches. Gandhi admitted that the phrases, out of context, could be construed as violent, but was sure that the brothers had had no such intent. He agreed to see them as soon as he left Simla and ask them to express their regrets publicly for any unintentional incitement. The viceroy, on his part, agreed that the government would drop its proceedings against the brothers if they signed a public apology and undertook to abstain from intemperate rhetoric in the future. The government would also issue a communique explaining its attitude, but would retain freedom to prosecute them in the future should they suffer a relapse. Gandhi carefully explained that he was not bargaining for the future of the Ali brothers. The government's intention notwithstanding, it would still be his duty to recall the Alis to nonviolence, for their own honor and that of the cause.<sup>105</sup>

The Mahatma then went to see the brothers, and soon thereafter their apology appeared in the press:

Friends have drawn our attention to certain speeches of ours which in their opinion have a tendency to incite to violence, and we never imagined that any passages in our speeches were capable of bearing the interpretation put upon them. But we recognize the force of our friends' argument . . . . We, therefore, . . . express our regret for the unnecessary heat of some of the passages in these speeches, and we give our public assurance and promise to all who may require it that so long as we are

associated with the movement of non-cooperation, we shall not directly or indirectly advocate violence . . . .<sup>106</sup>

The government then issued its communique saying that though it had decided to prosecute the brothers for their speeches, "it was urged on the government that their immediate object could be obtained" without criminal action. In view of the brothers' public undertaking, therefore, they had suspended proceedings, and would not take action as long as the Alis adhered to that undertaking.<sup>107</sup>

The press reacted quickly. The brothers were accused of cowardice in the face of arrest, and even those papers that applauded their good judgment in repudiating violence had to admit that the government had scored a point.<sup>108</sup> The government gloated. Montagu wrote to Reading congratulating him on his skillful treatment of Gandhi and his "great victory."<sup>109</sup>

The brothers were furious. They denounced the government which had made it seem as if their apology had been issued at the viceroy's bidding. They insisted vehemently after the fact that they had no idea their statement would exonerate them; they had made the apology to their Indian brethren, not the government. Shaukat added that it was absurd to suspect him of retreat in the hour of battle. For him, that was out of the question: "Alas, you can see I am too fat to run!"<sup>110</sup> It seems impossible, however, that they did not suspect something. Rumors of their arrest were in the air, and Gandhi's request for an apology had come immediately after his interview with Reading. In fact, their protestations of innocence ring very hollow. Muhammad Ali had written to a friend in May that Gandhi had received an invitation to meet the viceroy, and "we believe our arrest was on that account postponed."<sup>111</sup>

Gandhi, in an effort to mend the rift between himself and the brothers, wrote in *Young India* commending their courageous action. Some might criticize them, but he for one was convinced of their honesty and fearlessness:

I know they are among much maligned men in India. All kinds of motives are attributed to them . . . . Time, I am sure, will disprove all these charges. But it was necessary that no hasty expression of theirs was used against them to damage their character or good faith. . . . It was in order to safeguard them . . . against any such imputation that I advised them to make the statement. . . .<sup>112</sup>

But he admitted that his reasons for advising the apology were, in part, to keep his movement unsullied: "No non-cooperator can afford to go to prison on a false issue, certainly not on a denial of his faith, i.e., non-violence."<sup>113</sup> This scolding tone only added insult to injury.

Abdul Bari reflected the consternation of many Muslims when he wrote to Gandhi saying that though he had disagreed with his proposal to meet the viceroy, he had not opposed it openly, since he had confidence in Gandhi's judgment. Now, however, Gandhi had made "my brothers" apologize for their violence. "Well done!" Abdul Bari exclaimed, "Now the government will be satisfied!" Gandhi well knew, claimed Bari, that the brothers had done no violence, that they had vowed to abstain from it as long as they were a part of the movement, and that nonviolent noncooperation was a religious duty for Muslims. How then, can a Muslim apologize for fictitious violence? The Mahatma should not lose faith in them, nor cooperate with the government against them.<sup>114</sup>

Under these circumstances, it is understandable why Muhammad Ali, in his Broach and Karachi speeches, went out of his way to emphasize that the apology was not offered to the government but to their fellow noncooperators, and why he also asserted the Muslims' freedom of action: they would remain true to nonviolence, but they would subvert the army whether Congress adopted civil disobedience or not.<sup>115</sup> In order to recoup their following and exorcise the suspicion of cowardice, they had to invite arrest. Gandhi had won a point, but lost the Ali brothers' trust. He could no longer restrain their rhetoric, but had instead to commend the Muslims' bravery, giving the subversion of the military the nonviolent stamp of approval. It is worthwhile noting, however, that he did not himself attend the Karachi Khilafat Conference, the only All-India Khilafat meeting he had ever missed.<sup>116</sup>

#### *The Mappilla Rebellion*

More serious than the bickering and face-saving among the leaders were renewed outbreaks of communal violence, the most serious of which was the bloody revolt in Malabar in August 1921 known as the Mappilla rebellion. In Malabar district, as with the *kisan* movement in UP, political activity during the noncooperation movement was combined with local demands for tenancy reform. Unfortunately, the landlords of Malabar were mostly

Hindu while the peasantry was mostly Muslim. The local Muslim population were known as Mappillas (or Moplals), a community with a long history of armed rebellion against authority.<sup>117</sup>

The Muslim peasantry of this remote region of southern India had been seething with discontent for some time. In 1918 there had been a local rising of some tenants against the arbitrary eviction policies of their Hindu landlords, but no reform of the laws had ensued. Congress leaders in Calicut had organized a Tenants' League which formed branches all over Malabar District, but by mid-1921 the situation of the tenants was no better. It was, if anything, even worse, for the monsoon had failed that summer, and crops were poor.<sup>118</sup>

Other signs of trouble included the presence of a sizable number of demobilized Muslims who had returned from overseas duty, trained in the use of arms and accustomed to concerted action.<sup>119</sup> These provided the nuclei around which grew a number of Khilafat volunteer groups. Clad in khaki and armed with knives and spears, these volunteers held political meetings in support of the Khilafat demands and championed a form of noncooperation which condoned violence, particularly in seeking redress of the tenants' complaints against landlords. Congress and Khilafat leaders from outside Malabar District, desirous of muting the communal overtones of the situation there, tried to stress overall national political goals. In February 1921, Yaqub Hasan, a Khilafatist merchant and politician from Madras, came to Calicut to hold a political meeting in support of noncooperation. The meeting was forbidden by the district magistrate, but when Hasan persisted in his plans and refused to pay a security deposit, he and his three local aides were arrested and sentenced to six months' imprisonment, and all political meetings in the district were banned. By this action the government squelched noncooperation, the Khilafat movement, and the tenants' movement in Malabar, or so it thought.<sup>120</sup>

The local government's estimation of the situation was proved false, however, when in late July a group of police attempted to arrest the suspects in the burglary of a landlord's house. They were prevented from doing so by an armed and well-organized band of Mappillas.<sup>121</sup> The police then moved in on the local Khilafat leaders, suspecting their hand behind the organization of the Mappilla crowd. On August 20, a detachment of police reinforced by

soldiers searched the mosque in the village of Tirurangadi, where three of the leaders were believed to be hiding. A rumor spread that the mosque had been desecrated, or even destroyed, and soon the detachment was surrounded by an angry mob some 3,000 strong. The soldiers had to fight their way out.

Soon the whole district of Malabar was aflame. Gangs of angry Mappillas tore up rail lines, cut telegraph wires, and burned post offices and police stations, carrying off money and arms. They then took to the hills and jungles and adopted guerrilla tactics. Civil authority collapsed and martial law had to be proclaimed, but the forces on hand were inadequate to cope with the situation. The Mappillas proceeded to rape, murder, loot, and burn. Besides estates and plantations, a number of Hindu temples were put to the torch, and the ranks of believers were swelled by means of the sword. During the rebellion Khilafat flags were in evidence, and in a couple of villages "Khilafat kingdoms" were proclaimed.<sup>122</sup>

The results of the Mappilla rebellion were appalling. Disorder was so widespread that martial law had to remain in force for six months. The total breakdown of transport and communications meant that what crops were left could not be marketed, and famine followed in the wake of the fighting. The government added to its share in the total loss of life<sup>123</sup> when, on November 21, 1921, a group of one hundred convicted Mappilla prisoners were herded into a boxcar for transport to jail. When the train reached its destination, fifty-six of them had died of asphyxiation and eight more later succumbed.<sup>124</sup> It was yet another disaster in a wholly disastrous episode.

In its reports on the Mappilla rebellion, the government discounted the economic motivation of the Muslim tenantry and blamed the revolt on religious fanaticism and the political atmosphere: The incident which ignited the flame of rebellion had been the alleged desecration of a mosque. Hindus had borne the brunt of Mappilla ferocity. Visits of noncooperation leaders in previous months had resulted in burgeoning volunteer activity, and the use of Khilafat flags and the proclamation of kingdoms. And finally, the government claimed, the inflammatory speech by Muhammad Ali in Madras in April had led the local Mappilla leaders to believe that the amir of Afghanistan would come to help them in their revolt.<sup>125</sup>

The noncooperators, on the other hand, disowned the Mappilla

rebellion and its violence. They emphasized the economic grievances of the tenants, saying it was poverty that led them to turn on their Hindu landlords, not religious fanaticism. The use of Khilafat terminology could not be denied, but the reason the Mappillas turned to violence was because of their misunderstanding of the noncooperation movement. Had noncooperators not been forbidden from holding political meetings and educating their Mappilla followers, such senseless violence could have been avoided. It was the government's fault for banning political meetings, oppressing the peasants, and provoking them at Tirurangadi mosque.<sup>126</sup> To refute the government's contention that the noncooperators had stirred up the revolt, Yaqub Hasan offered to go to Malabar to help pacify the Mappillas, but the government turned him down.<sup>127</sup>

The government and the politicians were probably both right. The Khilafat movement had indeed come to Malabar, if indirectly and in a distorted form, and noncooperation had made its mark, though the Mappillas were not known for nonviolence. Religious ideology, rather more complex than sheer "fanaticism," also played a role in the revolt, particularly given the martial tradition of the Mappillas and the high value they placed on ritual martyrdom for the faith.<sup>128</sup> But a major cause of the Mappilla rebellion was agrarian discontent, coupled with the failure of the monsoon and incipient famine. The government, by putting off agrarian reform and forbidding political meetings, had been clumsy in its handling of the unrest. Then, by badly misjudging the seriousness of the uprising at Tirurangadi, they allowed the rebellion to get out of hand. Once the conflagration started, the leaders, Yaqub Hasan or anyone else, could do little to control it. Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari expressed horror at the forcible conversions, noting that conversion by the sword was against Islamic law. Gandhi and the Ali brothers appealed to the Mappillas to renounce violence. They were denounced as infidels by the insurgents.<sup>129</sup>

Meanwhile, Hindu opinion had become even more sceptical of Muslim intentions. If invoking the Khilafat and the amir of Afghanistan brought forcible conversions to Islam and independent Muslim kingdoms in Malabar, how could Hindus ever fully trust Muslim support for the national movement? "The Muslim lion and the Hindu lamb will lie down together," commented one Calcutta paper, "but the lamb will be inside the lion."<sup>130</sup> Abdul

Bari replied that such divisions between Hindu and Muslim were just what the government wanted. The authorities had probably provoked the whole thing just to divide the two communities.<sup>131</sup> The suffocation of the Mappilla prisoners in the train in November turned some of the generated hostility back upon the government, but Hindu-Muslim understanding had been irrevocably violated by the Mappilla rebellion. It was not merely a quarrel among the leaders or a short-lived local skirmish, but a bloody and extensive communal battle. Even Gandhi had to admit that mutual distrust and a sectarian spirit were predominant.<sup>132</sup>

The Muslim leadership was divided in its attitude. The Central Khilafat Committee issued a declaration on the occasion of Baqr 'Id which urged Muslims to abstain voluntarily from cow slaughter as a gesture toward their Hindu compatriots. But the ulama hardened their opinion. At the meeting of the Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind in November, the assembled divines publicly refused to believe the tales of forcible conversion carried in the press and demanded a proper investigation. They added, however, that should the reports prove true, they would of course condemn such proselytization.<sup>133</sup>

The summer of 1921 was both the finest hour and the beginning of disaster for the Khilafat movement. The Mappilla rebellion demonstrated the power of mass mobilization, but also its dangers. The leaders viewed their achievement with ambivalence, and it is instructive to analyze the character and effectiveness of the mass movement at this stage.

### *Evaluation of Mass Mobilization: Women, "Priests," Poets, and Volunteers*

#### *Women*

Sir Harcourt Butler once wrote to Lord Hardinge:

The priests and the women are the most important influences in India . . . and I am not very much afraid of the politicians until they play on these two.<sup>134</sup>

Sir Harcourt's observation was astute. The Khilafat leadership had enlisted the support of religious leaders in order to increase their links to the villages. With women's support, the political leaders would have potential contact with every hearth. Women were a powerful opinion group within the Khilafat movement, support-

ing it morally with their firm religious faith and financially with their ornaments. One of the most active and outspoken women was the indefatigable Ali matriarch, Bi Amman. After appearing before the 1917 Muslim League, where she spoke veiled, she later toured with her sons for the Khilafat cause. She advanced to the point where she would appear on a public platform veiled, but then would lift her veil to speak to the crowd, explaining that all those present were like her sons and daughters and thus there was no reason to observe purdah before them.<sup>135</sup>

The Central Khilafat Committee started a women's branch in 1921 which held women's meetings throughout the country during the Khilafat and Tilak Swaraj fundraising campaigns. These meetings were addressed by Bi Amman, Begam Muhammad Ali, and Begam Hasrat Mohani, among others. The women were exhorted to do their duty to God by supporting their men and imbuing their children with religious faith and patriotism. They should economize on household expenses to support the cause and give up the wearing of foreign finery. They responded with gifts of gold bangles, anklets, and earrings for the funds, and gave piles of foreign cloth to feed the bonfires of the *swadeshi* campaign.<sup>136</sup>

Sarojini Naidu, a poet and leading Congress woman, made a particularly eloquent appeal before a women's meeting in Bombay. She emphasized what they already knew, that they were the custodians of Indian culture, supreme in the everyday affairs of life. She went on to show the broader social significance of this fact: only they could bring about a renewed pride in things Indian. *Swaraj* had to begin in their homes; it could not be won by politics alone. They should start by using the spinning wheel and wearing only homespun saris.<sup>137</sup>

When the Ali brothers were under the shadow created by the apology fiasco in late 1921, their women continued to bring in contributions to the cause. During a tour in August, Bi Amman and Begam Muhammad Ali collected generous donations of ornaments from women all over UP.<sup>138</sup> The Delhi branch of the Women's Khilafat Committee, headed by Begams Ajmal Khan and Ansari, held eight women's meetings during Bi Amman's visit and collected over 2,000 rupees.<sup>139</sup> In Bombay, wrote Muhammad Ali, ". . . my wife took up the beggar's bowl and disburdened the Khoja and Memon ladies of some of their superfluous cash in the name of Smyrna and the Khilafat."<sup>140</sup> In the Punjab, women were

enrolling themselves as volunteers and taking part in demonstrations and processions with as much zeal as the men.<sup>141</sup>

Womens' donations also made up a large measure of the Angora Fund. The redoubtable Bi Amman served as president of the Ladies' Conference at the Ahmedabad Congress in December 1921 and went on from there to tour northern India. It was very clear where the Ali brothers' eloquence and determination had come from. She said that the government had enchained India in the twin fetters of slavery and eternal damnation. The people had to choose whether to wear those chains or to work for their national and religious freedom. She appealed to her sisters to give generously for the Angora government of Mustafa Kemal, and once again the Alis' golden touch worked.<sup>142</sup>

These women were particularly helpful in fundraising among other women and in aiding the *swadeshi* effort, facets of political mobilization which may be regarded as particularly "feminine." They recognized the strength that women's traditional roles in the family gave them, and built upon that foundation. Indian woman, for all her subordination to the male in society, is queen in her own realm. She is the arbiter of morals and instructor in basic religious observances and cultural attitudes. She is also viewed as vulnerable, needing to be protected, and this too gives her a way of calling her men to duty to defend her honor and their own. All these women thus remained within the bounds of traditional feminine roles while engaging in a limited form of political activity. Most of their work was done among women, and their appeals and justifications emphasized feminine themes: cultural pride and continuity, religious and moral duty. These were themes especially relevant in the Gandhian era of *satyagraha*, courage through self-suffering; and *swadeshi*, the quest for national economic and cultural self-sufficiency. These women thus gained social acceptance for an expanded role in society, albeit their own female society, and brought political action into many homes in India.

#### Ulama

The "priests," or ulama, were also active in mass political mobilization during the Khilafat movement. With their *fatawa*, or juridical rulings on points of Islamic law, they endorsed the Khilafat demands, the noncooperation movement, and civil disobedience. In mosque oratory, they fired the enthusiasm of Muslims in

the remotest villages. In their efforts to establish Muslim arbitration courts based on the *shari'a*, the ulama not only furthered noncooperation, but also sought to defend the *shari'a* and their own position as the arbiters of Islamic tradition.

Abdul Bari's Khilafat *fatwa* of 1919, the *Unanimous Fatwa of the Indian Ulama* of 1920, and the 1921 *fatwa* urging disobedience among the military and police have already been mentioned. It is questionable, however, whether such learned *fatawa* made a great impression on the rank and file of Muslims, whose understanding of the Khilafat grievances was at best rudimentary. They understood that noncooperation, and later civil disobedience, were religious duties, because their religion and thus their salvation were in danger. The *fatawa* were more indicative of the thinking of the ulama who signed them than of their following.

More important than *fatawa* for political mobilization, therefore, were the speaking tours of the more eloquent ulama. In local mosques the fine points of Islamic law gave way to the sonorous generalities of Urdu rhetoric. Khilafat grievances were reduced to a simple matter of redemption or damnation. The faithful were told that their salvation was being threatened by their British rulers, and thus they should boycott British goods, schools, and law courts and start their own *shari'a* courts. The villagers responded to this "Islam in danger" cry with enthusiasm; money and ornaments poured into the coffers of the Khilafat Fund, and officials noted a decrease in attendance at village schools and an increasing boycott of foreign goods.<sup>143</sup> It is doubtful whether a purely political appeal could have called forth the same demonstrations of support.

The ulama were effective political agents in rallying support for the Khilafat movement and for the strategy of noncooperation, but they were still basically concerned with the defense of Islam. In this, they tended to outrun the noncooperation program. While not necessarily politic, their point of view had a certain logic: if defiance of government authority was a religious duty, why hold back from disobeying the police and refusing to pay taxes? If *jihad* was incumbent upon the faithful, why not resort to force? The ulama were impatient for civil disobedience to begin. But by pursuing mass noncooperation to its logical conclusion in civil disobedience, they risked losing control over their followers, and the government retaliation which the movement had heretofore avoided.

In addition, the ulama's constant appeals for religious justice gave their Hindu compatriots pause. Were the Muslim leaders, and especially the ulama, really dedicated to the cause of Indian freedom, or only seeking to build their own sphere of influence? One interpretation of the ulama's position which has been suggested is that they envisaged a return to the medieval relationship between religion and polity in India. That is, the independent Indian government would presumably control most governmental affairs but, like the sultans, leave control over education and personal law to the separate communities. The ulama, as custodians of the Islamic sciences and interpreters of the *shari'a*, would thus guide the Muslim community in all aspects of life touched by the *shari'a*. This vision was, in effect, a juridical partition of India along religious lines, though it also entailed genuine support for freedom from Britain.<sup>144</sup>

This interpretation is supported by the ulama's efforts to establish separate *shari'a* courts during the noncooperation movement, by their scheme for the collection of *zakat* on a regular basis, and by their attempts to elect an *amir-e-Hind* in 1921. The *amir-e-Hind* idea is thought to have originated with Abul Kalam Azad, and was perhaps a sequel to his 1920 proposal for the selection of an Indian imam. The plan called for the ulama of each province to select their own *amir-e-shariat* and a council of ulama to assist him. These ulama would establish *shari'a* courts in every district and appoint district amirs. Finally, all the provincial amirs would then meet and elect an *amir-e-Hind*.<sup>145</sup>

Practical steps to implement this idea began in Bihar, an area where Abul Kalam's influence was strong. The Bihar provincial Jamiat al-Ulama met in Patna on June 25-26, 1921, to choose their amir and his council. Addressing the meeting, Maulanas Abul Kalam Azad and Azad Subhani of Kanpur outlined the scheme for the organization of the Muslim community throughout India under selected religious leaders and an overall amir. The selection of the Bihar amir was only the first step; other provinces would soon follow. Shah Badruddin of Phulwari, a saintly and retiring Sufi acceptable to all factions, was then elected provincial *amir-e-shariat*. But due to his reluctance to leave his hospice, a vice-amir to do the actual organization work was also appointed. He was Maulana Muhammad Sajjad of Gaya, a close friend and collaborator of Abul Kalam Azad.<sup>146</sup>

Western-educated Muslim politicians had little place in this scheme of things, and in fact the Ali brothers vehemently opposed the *amir-e-Hind* idea. They were supported by Abdul Bari and other ulama who, though desirous of increasing the ulama's influence generally, mistrusted Azad. Ultimately the *amir-e-Hind* plan came to naught, as most provinces failed to follow Bihar's example. The annual session of the Jamiat al-Ulama in Lahore in November 1921 endorsed the idea, but could not agree on the election of an *amir-e-Hind*. They postponed the election until a meeting scheduled for December 1921, but the turnout at that meeting was so meager that no action could be taken.<sup>147</sup>

To summarize the position of the ulama, one may say that they were undoubtedly in favor of Indian freedom from Western rule, but their sphere of influence came first. For all their effectiveness in serving as middlemen during the Khilafat and noncooperation movements, the ulama at times appeared to be working at cross purposes to their Western-educated co-religionists who were allied with the Congress. However, one must bear in mind their fundamentally different orientation to politics. The ulama were still basically concerned with the religious and jurisprudential guidance of the community. Hence they sensed no conflict between their efforts to organize their community under a system of *shari'a* courts and an eventually independent Indian nation-state whose Hindu majority, they envisaged, would also have a separate structure of religious and legal institutions.

The Jamiat al-Ulama scrupulously maintained its autonomy from the other Muslim political organizations in order to articulate the ulama's point of view, but it nevertheless supported the political strategy espoused by the Ali brothers in cooperation with Gandhi. As long as the Westernized Muslims recognized the guidance of the ulama in matters of religion, the two groups could work together. The Ali brothers and their followers offered that recognition, since they needed the support of the ulama to broaden their political influence in the community. They had seized upon the Khilafat issue, among other reasons, because it was an ideal one on which to build an alliance between themselves and the divines.<sup>148</sup>

#### *Urdu Political Poetry*

It is very difficult for someone from a different culture to grasp

the importance and power of Urdu poetry in Indo-Muslim culture.<sup>149</sup> Whether religious, historical, or lyric, the prevalent form of literary expression in India, as in most of the Muslim world, was poetry. The ability to compose poetry extemporaneously and to drop couplets at appropriate points in a conversation were the marks of a truly cultivated individual. One of the favorite forms of social gathering among gentlemen was the *musha'ira* or poetic recitation. Paralleling this elitist tradition of public recitation was the popular tradition of singing devotional poetry at religious festivals and pilgrimage sites. Lyric poetry was thus accessible to the illiterate many as well as to the lettered few. As poetic recitations became part of political mass meetings as well, poetry became a means of communicating between the politicized elite and the throngs in their audiences. It is virtually impossible to estimate the impact of political poetry on the popular mind in terms of actual ideas conveyed or numbers swayed. Poetry, however, was a form of literary expression that spoke to the emotions. As such, it was an ideal medium for reaching the hearts of many Muslims who remained unmoved by political discussion.

The traditional themes and symbols of Urdu poetry were derived from Persian poetics. In love lyrics, the lover is always separated from his beloved; he longs to be near her, but it is impossible. In traditional Muslim society, with its rigid segregation of the sexes, all romantic love is of necessity illicit, its consummation either impossible or dangerous. Hence the imagery used to describe these feelings contains a sense of impending disaster. The moth and the candle are the lover and his beloved. The caged nightingale is the lover imprisoned by his desire, yearning for his nest or his garden abode. His mistress is usually portrayed as haughty and distant, or as downright sinister: a huntress come to entrap the bird and ravage his nest, or a flower-plucker, destroying the beauty of the garden. Common too is the imagery of conviviality: a caravan, an assembly of comrades, or a wine-drinking party represent the state of being in the company of the beloved. In this case, she is doubtless a courtesan, and thus once again someone who can never belong to the poet alone. His feeling of emptiness in separation from her is described in opposing images: the vanished caravan, leaving behind only footprints in the shifting sands, the dispersed assembly, smoke still rising from a guttering candle.

Similar symbols were used in the poetry of religious mysticism. The parallels between sacred and profane love were ever-present in Persian Sufi poetry, where the devotee in search of God was portrayed as a lover searching for his beloved. Just as illicit love in a segregated society could be disastrous, so could devotion to God and the monistic quest for spiritual unity with Him be blasphemous. Sufism had embraced monistic doctrines, but in orthodox Islam, unity of the individual soul with the transcendent God is impossible. Thus Sufi poetry was ambiguous. It could be about earthly love, or divine, or both simultaneously.<sup>150</sup>

It was but a short step to inform such ambiguous imagery with yet another level of significance, a political one. For example, the devastated garden and the vanished luxury and conviviality of wine-bibbing became the vanished glories of Islamic rule. The huntress, at first the oppressor in love, now became a political oppressor. The nightingale in the cage became the patriot yearning for freedom, or later and even more literally, the imprisoned political leader.

The leaders of the Khilafat movement were aware of the possibilities of poetry, and a number of them—Muhammad Ali, Zafar Ali Khan, and Hasrat Mohani—were not only journalists and orators but also poets. Zafar Ali Khan was the editor of *Zamindar* of Lahore, the mouthpiece of Muslim political activism in the Punjab. A regular daily feature of his journal, to which people would turn just as they might to a political cartoon, was his political verse. The titles reflected events of the day ("Martial Law," "The Central Khilafat Committee," and "Swaraj"<sup>151</sup>), but the imagery remained traditional:<sup>152</sup>

هُوَ اللهُ أَحَدٌ كَيْفَ نَعْمَى كَوَيْتَابِ هَيْ كَلْشَن  
قَفْصِ سَعْنَدِ لَيْبُوں كَعْرَاهُونِ كَاوَقْتِ آيَا

The garden is restless to hear the song  
"God is one."  
The time to set the nightingale free from  
his cage has come.

Here, the lover could be imploring his mistress to grant his desires, or the mystic could be calling upon God to release him from the pain of this mortal coil. It was also a cry for India's freedom.

The ambiguity of the imagery was to Zafar Ali's advantage. Whether this was his major consideration in writing political poetry is questionable, but it was certainly hard for the government to indict a journalist for sedition for writing such verses as these:<sup>153</sup>

دَا اَمَانِ نَكِهْ حَسْ كِي فَضَا كَعْلِي تَهَاتَنَگْ  
وَه بَاغِ بُوَا دِي كِهْتِي هِي دِي كِهْتِي تَارَا جِ

مَحْفَلِ مِيں ضِيَا بِي سِرْ نَه سَا قِي هِي نَه سَا سِرْ  
گَلْشَن مِيں نَوَارِ نَه نَه صِلْصِلْ هِي نَه دَرَا جِ

سُو چُو تُو ذِرَا تَمْ كِه مَتَهَارَا هِي سَفِينَه  
كِيُوں هُو گِيَا بَا زِي چِيْ ذَحَارِيْ اَمُوَا جِ

بُجْهَك جَاؤْ گِيَا اَبِ هِي اِكْرَا اَلْهَدْ كَع اَكْ گِيَا  
بِنِ جَاؤْ گِيَا كَرِ فَخَاكِ دَرِ صَا حِبِ مَعْرَا جِ

مِٹِي هِي اُچھَا لُو گِيَا تُو هُو جَا ئِي گِيَا سُو نَا  
كَنْ كَرِ هِي اُٹھَا لُو گِيَا تُو بِنِ جَا ئِي گَا كِي پُھَرَا جِ

The limits of sight were once too narrow  
To gauge that garden now seen in dismay.

In your party is neither bowl nor cup.  
In your garden now sings neither dove nor jay.

Consider then why your ship became  
Of raging waves the thing of play.

But even now if you bow before God,  
And on the Prophet's threshold lay.

Dust will turn to gold in your hands,  
And you will fashion topaz from the clay.

Zafar Ali here recalled the past glories of Islam, using the imagery of the garden and festive wine-drinking. He then described its decline in terms of the loss of natural beauty and conviviality, and the image of a storm-battered ship. The subject could equally well be the lament for a lost love or the travail of the soul yearning for God. The poet was asking his readers to consider their sorry plight as a subject people. He went on to urge them to work for their freedom with the help of God and the Prophet.

Another poet-journalist among the Khilafat leaders was Hasrat Mohani, editor of *Urdu-e-Mu'alla*, a literary and political journal published in Aligarh. He had been interned during the war for his outspoken articles against British rule, but his devoted readership was drawn less to his prose than to his poetry. He was famed for his beautiful love lyrics, but this is an example of his political verse:<sup>154</sup>

رسمِ جفا کا میاب، دیکھئے کب تک ہے  
حُبِ وطنِ مستِ خواب دیکھئے کب تک ہے

تا بکج ہوں دراز سلسلہ ہائے فریب  
ضبط کی لوگوں میں تاب، دیکھئے کب تک ہے

نام سے متانوں کے ہوتے ہیں کیا کیا ستم  
جب بزریر نقاب، دیکھئے کب تک رہے

دولتِ ہندوستان قبضہٴ اغیار میں  
بے عدو و بے حساب، دیکھئے کب تک رہے

'The custom of tyranny successful, how long will it last?  
Love of country in a stupor, how long will it last?

How long will the chains of deception hold fast?  
The stymied anger of people, how long will it last?

What tyrannies in the name of laws are passed.  
'This veiled force, how long will it last?

The riches of India in foreign hands are clasped.  
These numberless riches, how long will they last?

There was nothing covert about this damnation of the British and of Indian weakness. The cry against foreign rule, "How long will it last?" did not hide behind images of flowers, nightingales, and vanished caravans. The refrain also echoed the refrain used by Shibli in his poem about the declining Ottoman Empire.<sup>155</sup> The parallelism of the verses pointed to a connection between the decaying Ottoman Empire and a desire for the end of the British Empire, a connection that would not have been lost on his readers. It was not surprising, therefore, that Hasrat spent a good deal of time in jail, both during World War I and during the Khilafat movement. He commented on this situation in a pithy couplet:<sup>156</sup>

روح آزاد ہے، حنیال آزاد  
جسمِ حسرت کو قید ہے بے کار

My opinions are free and so is my spirit.  
It is useless to lock up the body of Hasrat.

The third poet of the Khilafat movement, and the best known of the three, was Muhammad Ali, who wrote poetry under the pen-

name Jauhar. As can be imagined, Muhammad's life left him little time for poetry, and thus most of his verse was composed during periods of confinement, either during the war or in 1922-23, when he and Shaukat were again imprisoned.

As befits prison poetry, the symbolism of the bird in the cage appeared constantly in Jauhar's verse. The patriot imprisoned, like the caged bird, could not forget the oppressor who has locked him up, and longed for the beauties of the garden of freedom. But on the other hand, imprisonment afforded him leisure he had never had in his frenetic political life:<sup>157</sup>

جو گلچیں یاد رکھو، قیدِ قفس کا غم نہ کرو!  
چین کب اے بلبلِ ناداں تجھے گلشن میں تھا

Grieve not over imprisonment in the cage, but  
do not forget the actions of the plucker of the rose.  
Oh foolish nightingale! When free in the garden,  
When did you ever find repose?

Muhammad Ali's enforced leisure not only gave him time to write poetry, but was also a time for religious meditation. One of his most artful *ghazals* describes the despair and loneliness of his internment, and the solace afforded by religious discussion and observances:<sup>158</sup>

تنہائی کے سب دن ہیں، تنہائی کی سب راتیں  
اب ہونے لگیں اُن سے خلوت کی ملاقاتیں  
ہر آن تلتی ہے، ہر آن تشنیٰ ہے  
ہر وقت ہے دلجوئی، ہر دم میں مدارتیں

کوثر کے تقاضے ہیں، تسنیم کے وعدے ہیں  
ہر روز یہی چسپے، ہر رات یہی باتیں  
بیٹھا ہوا تو بہ کی تو خیر منایا کر  
ملتی نہیں یوں جوہر اس دس کی برساتیں

Every day belongs to loneliness, every night to solitude,  
Every meeting has become a reunion with isolation.

Every instant is a solace, every moment a relief,  
Every minute is heart-warming, a consolation.

The demands of paradise and the promises of heaven  
Are the topics of each day, and each night's consideration.

Sitting idly, Jauhar, it is fine to indulge in renunciation,  
The rains won't hold back thus, in the season of intoxication.

In the final couplet, Jauhar reminded himself that this religious solace for the renunciation of politics was fine for the moment, but just as the rainy season, a traditional poetic image denoting the time for wine-drinking, was inevitable in India, so too his activities would resume. On another level, he is saying that India's freedom was as inevitable as the monsoon rains.

During the Khilafat movement, when popular enthusiasm was at its height, and before he had once again been incarcerated, Muhammad Ali wrote this triumphant *ghazal*:<sup>159</sup>

آخر کو لے کے عرش سے فتح و ظفر گئی  
منظوم کی دُعا بھی کہیں بے اثر گئی  
اگلی سی اب وہ زعم کی طنینیاں کہاں؟  
شب بھر میں کیا بھبھری ہوئی ندی اتر گئی

عالم کا رنگ اورے کچھ اور ہو گیا  
ہم بے کسوں کی آہِ عجب کام کر گئی

صیاد، کیا ہوئی وہ تری نئے احتیاط؟  
مرغِ حنیال کے نہ مرے پر کتر گئی؟

اے یادِ یار تیرے رفاقت رہے گی یاد  
آئی تھی یاس بھی شبِ بھراں، مگر گئی

At last victory has come, granted by Heaven.  
Is the prayer of the oppressed ever wholly without heed?  
Where is that deluge of arrogance of the past?  
In a twinkling, what an overflowing stream has fled!  
The state of the world has been totally changed.  
The sighs of the helpless have done a marvelous deed!  
You have curbed neither my wings nor my imagination.  
Oh huntress, what has become of thy habitual heed?  
Oh my love, I shall always remember your company.  
Despair accompanied our separation, but it has fled.

The imagery here referred to a lover who has gained the affection of his beloved: his prayers have been answered; her arrogance has been dispelled; his sighs have been heard. The huntress has enclosed him in a cage of desire, but he has found comfort in the memory of her companionship. Any British official searching for a seditious message in this poetry would have difficulty finding it, but it was there all the same. The oppressed are the Indians who have been granted victory. British pride has been humbled through God's help. Their nonviolent noncooperation has paid off; their sacrifices have purified them and helped them gain a great following. They courted imprisonment gladly, for prison bars could not dishearten them after such a victory.

It is easy for one unaccustomed to the enthusiasm that poetry arouses in an Indian audience to discount the effects of such verse on mass mobilization. But one must remember the political atmosphere of the times. No longer was the nationalist movement confined to the council houses and bar associations; it had moved into the streets, the bazaars, temple fairs, and mosques. Orderly debate on constitutional questions continued, but was eclipsed in the popular mind by flag-waving processions of khaki-clad volunteers, tinsel triumphal arches, poetic recitations, and endless emotional stump speeches. In a culture rich in popular pageantry, its use for political purposes cannot be discounted, though it is difficult to say exactly how much it counted. Newspaper accounts mentioned that processions contained huge crowds, that poetic laments brought tears to their eyes.<sup>160</sup> Simply because one cannot measure exactly the effect of such techniques on political action, however, does not mean that one can exclude them from consideration.

#### *Volunteers*

If the cadences of Urdu verse contributed to the success of mass mobilization, so too did a good deal of hard-headed organization. The drive to organize local Congress and Khilafat committees and volunteer bodies, and their efforts to raise funds, have already been noted. By late 1921, the volunteer movement had grown enormously. It is in the numbers and activities of these groups that one best sees mass mobilization at work, and in their suppression by the government, testimony to the effectiveness of that work.


To take an example from just one province, the volunteer movement in UP in 1920 had affected twenty-six districts, but in only seven of these districts were there groups of Muslim Khilafat volunteers. These volunteer corps engaged in political work such as maintaining order at meetings and escorting visiting leaders, but there were few attempts to supplant the police, and practically no military drill. Many of the volunteer groups were still primarily engaged in social service work. By late 1921, the number of volunteers increased tremendously in UP, especially among Muslims. The government reported some 16,000 in all. Volunteer corps existed in thirty-six districts, with Muslim groups in thirty-five. Virtually every local Khilafat committee or Congress branch had

its volunteer arm. Their activities included the usual duty at political meetings and in processions, but they also used strongarm methods to oblige merchants to comply with strikes and boycotts. Sporadic incidents of drill training, and in Agra, some "rifle" exercises with bamboo poles, were reported. "National" police forces were organized in several towns. For example, in Lucknow, Khilafat volunteers were found directing traffic alongside the police in Aminabad, the congested central bazaar of the city, often countermanding police orders and contributing to the already snarled traffic. More alarming was the increase in the number of swords, spears, and truncheons in volunteer hands and the increasing tendency for volunteers to lead violent demonstrations. In September, an armed band of Khilafat volunteers tried to prevent the arrest of Maulana Husain Ahmad Madni in connection with the Karachi conspiracy charges.<sup>161</sup>

The number of Khilafat volunteer organizations involved in political agitation also increased in other provinces. In rural areas of Bengal regular training courses were held for volunteers, who helped enforce the boycott of courts and foreign goods. The volunteers also attempted to raise four annas from every villager for the cause, and arm-twisting seems to have been fairly common. In and around Calcutta, the volunteer bodies were large and not very well disciplined. At least the authorities were less concerned about the drilling of volunteers than they were about processions of "riotous riff-raff" in the guise of volunteers. The Khilafat Committee in Bombay was apparently also worried that their troops would get out of hand, and so they merged all separate Muslim bodies in the city into a centralized Khilafat volunteer corps under their direction. In Madras the number of specifically Muslim volunteer groups, whose activities included picketing foreign cloth and liquor shops, increased. Bihar reported a well-organized campaign by volunteers to start village arbitration courts.<sup>162</sup>

The following extract from a nationalist newspaper, even discounting its laudatory tone, indicates the scope of the volunteers' activities as local operatives of the Khilafat movement:

Saharanpur: Parties of Khilafat volunteers are going in different [quarters] of the city from morning till midnight preaching Swadeshi and singing effective poems about Swaraj and the arrest of beloved leaders. The daily preaching before every door has produced the best result. Ladies have vowed to use only Swadeshi cloth and have given up their costly foreign



Khilafat volunteers, Bombay

stuff for Smyrna. They have adopted the [spinning wheel] also. The whole district has warmly responded to the call of the Angora Fund. The ladies are offering their ornaments. The cloth market has been picketed by volunteers.<sup>163</sup>

The increasing strength of the volunteer movement in late 1921 was accompanied by a disturbing slide toward violence. Volunteers were suspected of complicity in the Mappilla rebellion; acts of incendiarism were reported from Orissa; there were grain riots in Meerut and tea riots in Assam; and in Calcutta the arrest of some Khilafat volunteers led to a riot in which the police were attacked. This trend, accompanied by the campaign to sow disaffection among the police and military, finally led the government to crack down on the volunteers. The last straw came on November 17, 1921, when the Prince of Wales arrived in India to begin his long-heralded official visit and was met by a series of protest *hartals* in major Indian cities. The government thereupon outlawed volunteer organizations in the hope of curbing violence and the erosion of police authority. The volunteers were the obvious first target in any effort to stop civil disobedience, for without them the politicians could not hope to control their following.<sup>164</sup>

The Congress and Khilafat Committee executives promptly met and called for defiance of the government order. Not only did the volunteers carry on, they mounted a fresh enlistment campaign. To ensure discipline and nonviolence, all volunteer bodies were amalgamated into a National Volunteer Corps, with uniform regulations: carrying of arms was prohibited, and all volunteers had to take an oath of nonviolence. To appeal to the widest audience, the leaders emphasized that this new campaign was neither mass civil disobedience nor noncooperation, but an assertion of the fundamental rights of public assembly and association.<sup>165</sup> All shades of opinion, from moderates to all-out supporters of civil disobedience, were thus attracted to the cause. Faced with certain arrest, thousands enrolled in the new volunteer bodies. Some 75,000 volunteers stepped forward in UP alone. Volunteers paraded openly, picketed bazaars, organized demonstrations against the royal visit, and went gladly to jail in droves.<sup>166</sup> This overwhelming defiance of government authority reflected the extent of the growth of political involvement.

For the moment, there was euphoria in the Khilafat and Congress camps. With so many volunteers marching off to jail, the cells

and courtrooms of India would soon be so jammed that the government would be unable to function. Perhaps *swaraj* was indeed just around the corner.<sup>167</sup>

The success of the mass mobilization effort by the Khilafat and noncooperation forces in late 1921 was thus assessed by a Muslim who was not involved in the movement:

. . . we should mislead ourselves greatly if we failed to recognize and bear in mind that the success of the non-cooperators' doctrines is not entirely or even mainly due to the use of illegal methods. One important contributory cause of their remarkable success is undoubtedly to be sought in the capacity of the people to believe in the miraculous and the supernatural.<sup>168</sup>

The belief in the miraculous and the supernatural may not be an adequate historical explanation for all that was happening, but the point is well taken. In looking at the causes of the changing nature of Indian politics during these years, it is not enough to cite the political debates of the few, or the economic grievances of the many. Suffusing the whole was popular emotion aroused by a variety of measurable and immeasurable techniques: the linkages of religious discipleship, organization based on local educational and cultural bodies or private networks of influence, and also the sheer enthusiasm engendered by parades, festivals, speeches, poems, and songs. Linking all these elements was the anti-British content of the noncooperation program and the symbols used to promote that program in all its variants: the caliph and the crescent, the spinning wheel and the homespun cloth cap.

## CHAPTER IV

### DECLINE AND FALL OF THE MOVEMENT, 1921-1924

The euphoria in the Khilafat and Congress camps at the end of 1921 was to some extent justified. The first stage of noncooperation had been remarkably successful, and the government was running scared. During the year a wide variety of groups and locales which had never been involved in politics had been affected by anti-British political activity. Central control over the outriders of the movement was often tenuous, but the leaders could point to some solid achievements. The Tilak Memorial Swaraj Fund, the *swadeshi* movement, and the volunteer corps are all cases in point. The government was genuinely worried by the strength of the noncooperation forces, as its decision to crack down on the leadership testifies.

This government action, furthermore, gave the movement a new lease on life. The arrest of the Karachi seven on a flimsy conspiracy charge led to a nationwide campaign in defense of religious freedom: The *fatwa* and the Karachi resolutions which declared it Islamically unlawful to serve in the military and police were proclaimed from every platform. The outlawing of the volunteer corps during the visit of the Prince of Wales led to massive volunteer enlistment in the name of freedom of assembly. Gandhi finally acceded to popular demands for civil disobedience by calling for a trial run in Bardoli, a locality in his native Gujarat where he could oversee the process. With their forces poised for this important second stage of noncooperation, the leaders were optimistic even as they went to jail.

But signs of trouble had already appeared in the Khilafat movement, and by late 1921 it had passed its apogee. The decline was rapid thereafter. The Hindu-Muslim alliance was in serious diffi-

culty after the apology incident and especially because of the repercussions of the Mappilla rebellion. The threat of violence was pronounced among the newly and partially politicized members of the population. This threat, in turn, affected the leaders who bickered and hesitated on the brink of civil disobedience, thereby abdicating leadership as they were being herded into jail. The government may have hastened the process of decline by arresting the leaders, but the process had already begun and was no longer under the control of the government, nor of the leading politicians.

In analyzing the collapse of the Khilafat movement and non-cooperation, one finds the reemergence of factions and divisions which had been submerged by the semblance of unity during the height of the movement. These factions were based, again, on personal rivalries, or on ideological or religious differences, even when there was agreement on overall anti-British purposes. The removal of the Ali brothers left a power vacuum at the head of the Khilafat Committee which others, Muslim moderates and zealots alike, rushed to fill. Congress moderates, in turn, who had been brought back into politics by the appeals for freedom of religion and assembly, tried to usurp some power for themselves by acting as middlemen between the noncooperators and the government in arranging a Round Table Conference. Hindu-Muslim disagreements were not helped by Gandhi's go-slow tactics on civil disobedience, nor by his assumption of "dictatorship" over the movement at the Ahmedabad Congress. But his dictatorship did not last long. Following a bloody riot at Chauri Chaura in UP in early February 1922, Gandhi suspended civil disobedience and non-cooperation, and disarray and disillusionment spread in the ranks. His arrest soon thereafter caused little stir.

With its principal leaders in jail and its plans for mass contact suspended, the movement lost all momentum. The energies which had been generated sought other outlets. The leaders who were left quarreled over the spoils, as the Khilafat Committee was sundered by financial scandal; the Congress split into ideological factions; and the incipient rivalry between the ulama and the Western-educated Muslim politicians for leadership of the Muslim community became more explicit. Communal violence occurred with increasing frequency and new movements with communal bias multiplied: Shuddhi and Sangathan among the Hindus, Tabligh and Tanzim among the Muslims.<sup>1</sup>

Events in Turkey, meanwhile, went their own way. The Kemalists, after winning the battle for Anatolia and wresting a new treaty of peace from the European powers, proceeded to divest the sultan of his temporal powers in the fall of 1922 and to abolish the Khilafat altogether in early 1924. The reaction of Khilafatists to these events is further proof that the Khilafat movement was primarily concerned with the solidarity and political future of Muslims in India. Concern for the Khilafat was an issue both religious and anti-British upon which the Khilafat leaders had built their political following. The realities of the Turkish situation concerned them little. They acquiesced in the abolition of the sultan-caliph's temporal powers in 1922, even though they had insisted all along that a "Vaticanized" caliph was no caliph at all. But when the caliphate was finally done away with, the Khilafat leaders reacted with shock and dismay, for the Turks had finally demolished the foundations of their political edifice. If the British had done the job, the Khilafatists would have had another compelling political grievance against their imperial rulers upon which to base Indian Muslim unity and cooperation with Indian nationalism. But the caliphate was struck down by the "Sword of Islam" himself, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Without their powerful symbol, the Khilafat leaders were without a means to create a united Muslim political constituency. The negative cause of communal defense remained, but it was not a cause which could appeal to those who were also sincere nationalists.

### *Jailward Ho!*

In its drive to remove the Khilafat leaders from circulation, the government began with the Ali brothers and their Karachi colleagues. The Karachi seven were rounded up in mid-September 1921 and charged with conspiracy to tamper with the loyalty of the troops. Special precautions were taken by the government to avoid popular agitation against the arrests. The Bombay police went to Shaukat Ali's quarters at the Khilafat Committee office in the dead of night, awakened him from a sound sleep, and whisked him off to Karachi by special train. Muhammad Ali, still touring with the Mahatma, was taken off the train between Calcutta and Madras and given similar special transport. His train to Karachi avoided all major stations and only halted at whistlestops, but the word got

around and station platforms began to fill with well-wishers chanting "Muhammad Ali—Shaukat Ali ki jai!" In this way, Muhammad once again tasted triumph, albeit bittersweet, which he had missed since the apology episode. Sri Shankaracharya, the only Hindu among the defendants, Dr. Kitchlew, and the three Maulanas, Husain Ahmad Madni, Nisar Ahmad, and Pir Ghulam Mujaddid, were all arrested within two days of the brothers and hustled off to the Karachi jail to await trial.<sup>2</sup>

Mahatma Gandhi issued a statement urging all Muslims to remain calm in the face of this provocation by the government. They should not strike or demonstrate, but rather carry on with the important work of *swadeshi*. The Ali brothers seconded Gandhi's call for calm. In their statements, the brothers not only addressed their followers, but also critics who had become sceptical of their motives. In their willingness to go peacefully to jail, the brothers seemed to claim, they showed beyond a shadow of a doubt their dedication to nonviolence.<sup>3</sup>

The Ali women showed their determination to persevere by replacing their men as touring attractions for the Smyrna Fund and *swadeshi*. Begam Muhammad Ali continued the tour of Madras after her husband had been arrested. Bi Amman wired the Mahatma that she was ready to work till her last breath; efforts to attain freedom should not be relaxed, but redoubled, because of her sons' arrest. She admonished her sons to be brave; they were not alone; God was with them. She stopped off in Lahore en route to Karachi and spoke to a mass meeting where she said that for every worker imprisoned, hundreds would spring up, and asked how the government could imprison them all. She herself was ready to go to jail or even the gallows for the sake of her country and religion.<sup>4</sup>

Reaction to the arrests of the Karachi seven was remarkably calm.<sup>5</sup> Whether this was the result of a renewed dedication to nonviolence, as the leaders claimed, or whether it resulted from a decline in the Ali brothers' popularity is an open question. The viceroy clearly favored the latter interpretation:

There is no doubt that the apologies have weakened their position and their prestige, which were not enhanced by their attempts to bluster and wriggle out of their written statements.<sup>6</sup>

In any case, the remaining Khilafat leadership felt the need for a renewed campaign to further the cause for which the Ali brothers

had sacrificed their liberty. They issued a manifesto affirming support for the Karachi resolution, which called on soldiers and police to resign from government service.<sup>7</sup>

### *The Fatwa Campaign*

This manifesto was the keynote for a new campaign to embarrass the government over the issue of religious freedom. The ulama and the Khilafat Committee quickly organized their troops and stated their rationale: The Karachi resolution was strictly in accord with Quranic injunctions, as it only repeated a *fatwa* previously issued by some distinguished ulama. The government, by arresting the Karachi seven and proscribing that *fatwa*, was guilty of a direct attack on Islam. This could not be tolerated. The *fatwa* must be reprinted and distributed, and the Karachi resolutions proclaimed from every platform and pulpit in India.

The ulama were the first to act on this resolve. In late August, the Jamiat al-Ulama had wired Gandhi asking him to begin civil disobedience to protest the confiscation of the *fatwa*, but he, understandably, demurred. Then in August and September, the Jamiat held a series of public meetings in Delhi attended by thousands of the faithful. The meetings were addressed by such leading ulama as Mufti Kafayatullah, president of the Jamiat, and Ahmad Said, a Delhi *alim* known for his sharp tongue. In condemning the confiscation of the civil disobedience *fatwa*, Ahmad Said said nothing about its content, but rather emphasized that since the *fatwa* was an abstract of God's orders, its proscription was a sacrilege. He called upon the Jamiat al-Ulama to give the word for civil disobedience to begin. Muslims would then quit the army and the police, and any violence that ensued would be the fault of the government.<sup>8</sup>

The zealots among the ulama were opposed by cooler heads in the Khilafat Committee, such as Hakim Ajmal Khan and Abul Kalam Azad, who said that civil disobedience was a political matter which concerned all Indians, not just Muslims. Their opponents accused them of selling out to the Hindus, but they countered by emphasizing that Muslims were at present faced with a challenge to their religious freedom. This could best be met by distributing the *fatwa*, said Azad, and by postponing consideration of civil disobedience until the Jamiat's annual meeting in November.<sup>9</sup>

The campaign to proclaim the Karachi resolutions and the


*fatwa* from every soapbox was more prudent than civil disobedience from several points of view. A purely Muslim civil disobedience campaign could only lead to further division between the communities. Then too, if the ulama could not agree among themselves about the desirability of this extreme measure, they could hardly organize and lead it. Finally, if every Muslim in India adhered to the Karachi resolutions, the government would either have to prosecute everyone or else recognize the Muslims' "purely religious" grievances. By claiming that they asked only for traditionally granted freedom of religion, the Muslims might confound the government's conspiracy case against the Karachi seven.

The *fatwa* campaign generated enthusiasm among Muslims all over India, especially in the areas where the seven defendants had a considerable following. Sympathy for Pir Ghulam Mujaddid ran high in Sindh, where Khilafatist pirs led a heated agitation. The campaign was particularly successful also in UP, home of five out of the Karachi seven. *Fatwa* leaflets turned up everywhere, and resignations from the police were noticeable. At a public meeting in Lucknow under the presidency of Maulana Salamatullah of Firangi Mahal, the fiery oratory was matched by a bonfire of foreign cloth. The Karachi resolution was passed by acclamation, with the support of the Hindus present, who evoked the example of Sri Shankaracharya. In Agra, Hasrat Mohani presided over the provincial Congress and called not only for resignations from the police and army, but a declaration of complete freedom from British rule. In the Punjab and Bengal, however, where Muslim majorities caused the authorities to worry about widespread disaffection from the police, the *fatwa* and *swadeshi* campaigns generated a good bit of enthusiasm, but few actual resignations.<sup>10</sup>

The Working Committee of the Congress added its endorsement to the Karachi resolutions and congratulated the seven on their arrest. Gandhi emphasized, however, that civil disobedience could not begin until the *swadeshi* campaign was complete. Only those government servants, soldiers, and the police who could support themselves—preferably by handspinning and weaving—should resign from their service at the moment. The government reacted to the prospect of sepoys turning in their swords for spinning wheels with amusement.<sup>11</sup>

#### *The Karachi Trial*

The Karachi seven offered no formal defense at their trial, but the



Four of the Karachi Seven

*fatwa* campaign gave them good material for their statements before the court. In fact, they were criticized by some of their noncooperating allies for making lengthy statements that smacked of a formal defense. Others praised them for their conduct in court. They had not denied the charges, and no one could blame them for using the prisoners' dock to appeal for religious freedom, echoing the nationwide *fatwa* campaign.<sup>12</sup>

In his statement, Shaukat blustered: The government had interfered with his freedom of conscience by refusing to give Indians justice in the Khilafat question and the Punjab grievances, so he had no other choice as a Muslim but to withdraw his allegiance from the king, and to do his utmost to remove the British government of India from the face of the earth.<sup>13</sup>

Muhammad's statement also picked up the theme of religious freedom, though more smoothly than his elder brother. First he cited Queen Victoria's post-mutiny proclamation, which guaranteed freedom of religion to all Indian subjects of the empire. Nevertheless, he said, this court is interfering with our religious beliefs. He cited verses from the Quran to the effect that any Muslim who willingly wages war against other Muslims will be relegated to eternal damnation. The *fatwa* of the ulama and the Karachi resolution, which urged Muslim soliders and police to resign from government service, are in accordance with these Quranic injunctions. Muslims cannot obey an earthly power which goes against the laws of Islam. They had been saying this in public from the very beginning of the movement. The government, having tried and failed to twist their earlier statements, now had resorted to a trumped-up charge of conspiracy to put them behind bars. He admitted to proposing and supporting the Karachi resolutions, but argued that all they had done was to follow their religion.<sup>14</sup>

The trial itself was a continuation of the political campaign. The crowds anxious to attend were so large that it had to be held not in a courtroom, but in a public auditorium, which gave the brothers plenty of scope for their theatrical skills. Coming and going to the trial every day, Muhammad and Shaukat waved gaily to the crowds waiting outside. And inside the hall, they refused to rise when the magistrate entered. Why, they asked, should non-cooperators honor a judge of the British government? When their chairs were removed to oblige them to stand, the brothers took off

their long handloom cloaks, spread them on the floor, and sat down.<sup>15</sup>

The government was unable to make the conspiracy charges stick, and ultimately found the six Muslims guilty of the relatively minor offenses, "making statements conducive to mischief" and abetment of same, sentencing them to two years of rigorous imprisonment each. Sri Shankaracharya was acquitted on all counts. Reaction in the press was swift. The Madras *Hindu*, a journal of moderate opinion, criticized the government for bungling the case. The government wished to silence the agitation, but had only succeeded in losing prestige by trying the seven for conspiracy on scanty evidence. The jury, none of whom were Muslims, could only find the defendants guilty of relatively minor charges, thereby partially vindicating them and encouraging their followers.<sup>16</sup>

The defendants themselves were triumphant. Shaukat issued a statement to the press calling on the Muslims to persevere, and God would grant them *swaraj*. Kitchlew was so confident that he declared they would all be freed by *swaraj* and present at the Ahmedabad Congress in December. Sri Shankaracharya tried to make amends for his acquittal to his Muslim friends by reaffirming his—and other Hindus'—support for the Khilafat cause. The *fatwa* campaign gathered steam again after the verdict was delivered. "The *fatwa* prisoners" had become martyrs for the cause.<sup>17</sup>

#### *A New Face at Khilafat Headquarters*

The Karachi convictions left a gap in the chain of command at Khilafat headquarters, a vacancy soon filled by Abul Kalam Azad. When Shaukat was arrested, Azad had volunteered to take his place as secretary of the Central Khilafat Committee, a post to which he was duly elected at meeting of the Khilafat Committee in Delhi on September 22.<sup>18</sup> Azad then threw himself into a frenzy of activity, travel, and stump-speaking. He was in Delhi for the Khilafat and Jamiat meetings in late September and then went back to Calcutta briefly, before rushing off to Bombay to take care of Khilafat Committee affairs. He then went to Karachi for part of the trial, to Agra to preside at the UP Provincial Khilafat Conference on October 25, and to Lahore as president of the third annual Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind meeting on November 18. Besides these two presidential addresses, he spoke frequently on behalf of the Angora

fund and *swadeshi*, and continued to turn out articles for the press.<sup>19</sup>

When the Karachi verdicts were rendered, Azad charged the government with fabricating the case against Shaukat and Muhammad, calling them conspirators merely for advocating a well-known principle of Islam. All Muslims, himself included, could be charged with the same "crime."<sup>20</sup> Their duty was clear: to continue the work for which the brothers had gone to jail, and if necessary, go willingly to prison themselves.

We have no sorrow for their arrest, but we should be jealous of their honour and should be more ready than before for the duty which was theirs as well as ours. In 1915, I was interned nine months after their internment, and at that time I said with sorrow that in this path they had stolen a march over me. Today also instead of sorrowing, we give them congratulations and shall again say that they have outstepped us all.<sup>21</sup>

In addition to his other activities, Azad and one of his lieutenants, Abdur Razzaq Malehabadi, chose this moment to begin a new Urdu weekly in Calcutta, *Paigham*, which first appeared on September 23, 1921. *Paigham* was a less ambitious literary effort than *al-Hilal*, which had first established Azad as a religio-political polemicist, but like it, was aimed at keeping Azad in the role of a leading Muslim opinion maker.<sup>22</sup>

Abul Kalam marked his assumption of office in the Khilafat Committee with an important article in *Paigham*, in which he summarized the accomplishments of the Khilafat movement thus far and called for renewed effort. The Khilafat Committee had united the Muslims of India in support of the Khilafat demands; it had been instrumental in the adoption of noncooperation even before the National Congress; its leaders had toured everywhere and helped organize the country for the implementation of noncooperation; and it had collected vast sums of money for the Khilafat, Smyrna, and Angora funds. Now some of its leaders were in jail, but this was no cause for despair, for much had been accomplished. Still, much remained to be done. No Muslim could remain the subject of a government which ignored his religious freedom. Therefore, he emphasized, the real purpose of the Khilafat movement is Indian freedom. *Swaraj* is yet to come, and the Muslims must work with the Congress to accomplish that goal by the end of December. They must order their lives according to the

*shari'a* and pray daily, calling upon God for guidance in the days ahead. They must remain in the vanguard of noncooperation and *swadeshi*, and they must work constantly to promote communal harmony. Only then would their future as free men in India be assured.<sup>23</sup> This article is significant, for it spells out what Azad and other advocates of Muslim self-assertion such as Muhammad Ali had been implying for years: that wholehearted Muslim participation, or better yet, leadership within the Indian nationalist movement was the key to accommodation with the Hindus and the Muslims' future in an independent India.

Azad returned to this theme in his presidential address before the Agra Khilafat Conference in October, where he summarized the political ideology of the Khilafat movement. The Quran, he said, specifies two kinds of non-Muslims: those who attack Islam with the intent to destroy it, like the British, and those who live in peace with Muslims, like the Hindus. The religious duty of Muslims was not only to defend Islam against its enemies, but also to work in harmony with friendly non-Muslims. Indian Muslims should work with their fellow Indians against their common enemy, the British, and gain independence for India. In fact, the Khilafat grievances only arose because they were under foreign rule. Indian Muslims could not properly follow Islam, or the Khilafat, if they were not free. The major goal of the Khilafat movement was thus Indian freedom. Azad had been saying much the same thing about Indian freedom since his reinterpretation of *jihad* in *al-Hilal* in 1912. His new emphasis on cooperation with, but not subordination to, the Hindus was fully in line with his past thinking on Muslim self-assertion. His interest in the Khilafat was less pan-Islamic than it was a recognition of the Khilafat's symbolic value for Muslim solidarity and self-confidence in India.<sup>24</sup>

Azad continued his formidable speaking schedule throughout November, including the presidential address to the Jamiat al-Ulama in Lahore, where he made an unsuccessful bid to be named the *amir-e-Hind*.<sup>25</sup> Then in early December his home and press in Calcutta were ransacked by the police, and the editor of *Paigham*, Abdur Razzaq Malehabadi, was arrested. Azad himself was arrested on December 10, and was tried and found guilty of inciting disaffection from the government. In his statement before the court he fully acknowledged his offense. In fact, the government had indicted him for two relatively minor speeches in Calcutta, where-

as he had been speaking "revolution" all over the country for the past two years. In Islam, he said, there is no alternative; Muslims must remain free or die. He seems to have been rather disappointed when he was sentenced to only one year in prison, half of what the Ali brothers had merited.<sup>26</sup> Azad was one of the most eloquent spokesmen for the Khilafat viewpoint, but the government was probably right. As a speaker, he adhered to logical argument; hence he was less dangerous than the emotional Alis.

#### *A Princely Visit and Mass Arrests*

As 1921 drew to a close, a number of factors convinced Gandhi that the time had come for a test of civil disobedience. After all, the target date for attainment of *swaraj* was fast approaching, and a number of his political middlemen—most notably the ulama—were impatient at the delay in starting the second stage of noncooperation. But more than that, Gandhi was impressed by the success of the *fatwa* campaign, the spreading popularity of *swadeshi* cloth, and the calm with which the Karachi verdict had been met. At a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee in Delhi on November 4-5, 1921, therefore, Gandhi himself proposed a resolution authorizing civil disobedience, including nonpayment of taxes, but only in districts where everyone had adhered to the *swadeshi* program and demonstrated belief in nonviolence and Hindu-Muslim unity. When some of the delegates chafed at all these conditions, the Mahatma urged them to be patient until November 23, when he himself would inaugurate civil disobedience in Bardoli, part of the Surat District of Gujarat. There, Gandhi felt, he and his closest associates could control the first manifestation of mass civil disobedience.<sup>27</sup>

Before Bardoli, however, the Prince of Wales was due to land in Bombay on November 17 to inaugurate his official visit to India, and Gandhi called for a massive peaceful boycott of the official welcome. The day was marked by peaceful *hartals* in most of the major cities of India, but in Bombay itself disaster struck. Sightseers were molested, tramcars attacked, and shops that did not close were burned and looted by strikers. The police had to resort to shooting, there were several deaths, and rioting continued sporadically for five days. Most unfortunately, the rioting also had communal overtones. Christians, Parsis, and Anglo-Indians, identified as progovernment, were singled out for attack. The riots also did little to reinforce Hindu-Muslim unity, since Gandhi, without

adequate evidence, chastized Muslims for being the major perpetrators of the violence. Gandhi acknowledged his and the non-cooperators' responsibility for the violence, went on a fast of contrition, and postponed plans for civil disobedience in Bardoli.<sup>28</sup>

At this point the government finally dropped its policy of laissez-faire toward the noncooperation movement. There were several reasons for this. First, the *fatwa* campaign, with its emphasis on freedom of religion, had generated considerable sympathy, even among those previously unaffected by the noncooperation movement. Resignations by Muslim policemen, for example, were becoming alarmingly frequent.<sup>29</sup> This, coupled with Gandhi's announcement of the Bardoli civil disobedience, raised the specter of mass civil disorder, a second reason to quash noncooperation at this stage. Third and most immediate, the threat of violence during the visit of the prince thoroughly unnerved government officials.<sup>30</sup>

The government's previous restraint was in significant contrast to its ferocity once it finally decided to root out the noncooperators. All the major leaders were taken into custody, tried more or less summarily, and sentenced for periods ranging from several months to several years. In the Punjab, Lala Lajpat Rai and Dr. Satyapal joined Kitchlew in prison. In Delhi, Asaf Ali and Maulana Ahmad Said were taken into custody. In UP, the Khilafat Committee of Lucknow was decimated, including Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman and Maulana Salamutallah. All prominent leaders in Allahabad, including Pandits Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, a son of Pandit Malaviya, and the editor of the *Independent*, were arrested. In Calcutta, C. R. Das was arrested on the same day as Maulana Azad. The Bengal government even rounded up Mrs. C. R. Das and a number of other women, but the public outcry against the arrest of women was such that they were speedily released.

Following their leaders, volunteers by the hundreds and sometimes thousands filed off to jail. The massive drive to enlist volunteers in defense of freedom of assembly was paying dividends. The volume of arrests only seemed to increase popular sympathy for those jailed. For everyone incarcerated, others signed up as volunteers and joined processions in the streets, courting arrest. The governments of UP and Bengal issued warnings to their local officials not to arrest volunteers indiscriminantly, to avoid overtaxing the courts and jails.<sup>31</sup>

On the eve of the Ahmedabad Congress in December 1921,

popular enthusiasm for noncooperation was seemingly at its peak. The government was clearly worried. Why else would it have lashed out at a movement it had previously tolerated? But in the optimism of the moment, it was easy to ignore difficulties. Hindu-Muslim mistrust had grown since the Mappilla rebellion, and the threat of violence was by no means eliminated by the postponement of civil disobedience. The top leadership as well as their organized cadres of volunteers, the chief means of controlling a following, had been decimated by arrests. The leaders who remained, chief among whom was the Mahatma, disagreed over what to do next.

### *The End of Noncooperation and Civil Disobedience*

Gandhi was certainly aware of the difficulties—not only because of the threat of violence, but more so because he was beset on two sides by dissenting voices. On the one hand were the moderates, represented by Pandit Malaviya, Jinnah, and a group of Bombay merchants and barristers, who were urging accommodation with the government. On the other were the more zealous noncooperators of both communities who wanted immediate civil disobedience. Notable in this vanguard were Hasrat Mohani and ulama such as Abdul Bari.

Muslims were also perplexed by Gandhi's statement blaming them for much of the violence in Bombay on November 17. The Mahatma acknowledged that his relations with the Muslims were slipping since the imprisonment of the Ali brothers, his vital links to the Muslim community:

I can wield no influence over the Muslims except through a Muslim. There are many stalwart and good Muslims I know. But no Muslim knows me through and through as Shaukat Ali does. Now I feel I have to represent him and to speak to the Muslims things I used always to reserve for him. I observe one of my appeals has already been misinterpreted.<sup>32</sup>

Abdul Bari tried to serve in their stead as a middleman between Gandhi and Muslim noncooperators, but he was considerably more thin-skinned. In a statement concerning the Bombay riots, he deplored the violence and said it was opposed to the *shari'a*. Unless such disturbances were avoided in the future, all minorities would

lose faith in Indian self-rule. Abdul Bari may have meant to chastize the Muslims for their part in the assault on other minority communities, but his meaning was unclear. By including Muslims among minorities who would feel unsafe, he turned a lot of the blame back on the Hindus, a defensive reaction which could do little to allay fears on the other side.<sup>33</sup>

But if rifts had appeared in the Hindu-Muslim alliance, there were also renewed disagreements among the leaders in each community. The Khilafat forces had always contained a moderate element which had opposed noncooperation as a tactic and felt that the best hope of securing the limited objective of a revised Treaty of Sèvres lay in petitioning the British government. They had been defeated in 1920 by the Ali brothers' faction and had been quiet since then. Now, however, with the Alis behind bars, the voice of accommodation with Britain began to be heard again. In late November, a deputation of Muslims waited on the viceroy and asked him to use his influence to help secure a revision of the Turkish peace treaty.<sup>34</sup> This was by no means wishful thinking, for since Mustafa Kemal's victories in Turkey the alignment of forces in the Middle East had changed radically, and the European powers were indeed considering revamping the treaty.

Khilafat Committee spokesmen, notably Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, looked askance at this act of respectful petition, and appealed to Muslims to remain true to the cause of noncooperation. They pointed out that the rumored new terms for Turkey did not completely satisfy the Khilafat manifesto, especially the demand for ending the European presence in the *jazirat al-Arab*. Muslims should therefore continue to work for Indian freedom, which was essential if they were to secure justice for Islam.<sup>35</sup> The limited goal of securing a revised Turkish treaty was by no means enough for the nationalists among the Khilafat forces; their sights, as always, were centered on India. From such a perspective, collaboration with the British was unthinkable.

The moderates in Congress also tried to reassert their position vis-à-vis the noncooperators at this juncture. In December 1921, a group masterminded by Pandit Malaviya and including Jinnah approached the viceroy with a proposal for a round table conference. The conference would bring together the government and the noncooperators to discuss redress of the Punjab and Khilafat wrongs, as well as further steps toward "full responsible govern-

ment." Pending the conference, they proposed withdrawal of all recent actions taken against the volunteers as a token of the government's willingness to meet the noncooperators halfway. This proposal was met with sympathy, even relief, among the officials, as evidenced by the reaction of the governor of Bengal, Lord Ronaldshay. He agreed to suspend all prosecutions and release those imprisoned for sedition, if the boycott of the Prince of Wales' visit were dropped.<sup>36</sup>

Gandhi's reply to these initiatives was negative. He asserted that he was not opposed to a round table conference, but stuck to conditions the government could not possibly accept, thereby in effect turning down the proposed conference. He insisted that the noncooperators would do nothing to accommodate the bureaucracy. It was the government which had to indicate its good will not only by withdrawing its actions against the volunteers, but also by an unconditional release of all prisoners, including the Karachi seven.<sup>37</sup> Gandhi undoubtedly saw that he could not sit down at a conference table with the British without yielding the initiative to the moderates in Congress and jeopardizing his command over the noncooperation forces, who were already restive.

These factional differences became even more apparent at the annual sessions of the Congress, Muslim League, and Khilafat Committee in Ahmedabad in late December 1921. During the course of an acrimonious debate over the future of noncooperation and civil disobedience, Malaviya's forces once again pressed a resolution favoring a round table conference, with temporary suspension of civil disobedience, but to no avail. The Congress resolved in favor of going ahead with civil disobedience, including the nonpayment of taxes, under Gandhi's direction. The Mahatma continued to maintain that this resolve did not bar a round table conference. The pandit and Jinnah had to be content with an agreement to hold a meeting in early January to discuss the round table question anew. The Congress Working Committee reaffirmed Gandhi's leadership, going so far as to grant him "dictatorial" powers over Congress policy, and further resolving in favor of a round table conference, but only if the Karachi prisoners were released.<sup>38</sup>

Further opposition to Gandhi's form of civil disobedience came from Hasrat Mohani and a few representatives of the ulama. Hasrat led a move to scrap nonviolent noncooperation altogether in

favor of an immediate declaration of "complete freedom" from Britain, and the use of violence to achieve it if necessary. His small group of Muslim supporters attacked the nonviolent oath required of all volunteers, maintaining that their religion permitted violence, under certain conditions. Gandhi could not permit such a resolution without losing the initiative to the zealots; Hasrat's resolution was voted down by an overwhelming majority after Gandhi had made an eloquent plea for flexibility. Hasrat then tried to get the Muslim League Council to resolve in favor of complete independence. He was supported by his allies among the ulama: Azad Subhani, Abdul Majid Badauni, and Daud Ghaznavi, and opposed by Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, and the UP barristers Zahur Ahmad and Raza Ali. After a heated debate, the League Council turned him down, 36 to 23. In the Khilafat Conference, Hasrat's resolution was ruled out of order by Hakim Ajmal Khan, who finally had to adjourn the meeting to avoid a fist fight between the noncooperators and the supporters of Mohani.<sup>39</sup>

From these debates, it was clear that the Hindu-Muslim alliance behind the policy of noncooperation was in serious straits, and further that there was a widening rift in the Muslim camp between politicians and ulama. Following the Ahmedabad Congress, Abdul Bari queried the Mahatma about his "dictatorial" powers, and was assured by Gandhi that they were meaningless when the Working Committee was in session, and at other times equaled the powers of that committee.<sup>40</sup> Bari was still dissatisfied. The Ahmedabad Congress, he said, had made him realize that it would not be possible for India to get complete freedom in the near future because the Hindus were not interested in a total break with Britain, and those that were—Muslims of his and Hasrat's stamp—were in too small a minority.<sup>41</sup>

Abdul Bari was among those ulama who stuck to the letter of the religious law, even if it meant the abandonment of nonviolence against the government. Khilafatists such as Ajmal Khan and Ansari, however, realized that if Muslim religious enthusiasm got out of hand, the ensuing violence would not only be turned against Britain, but could also have communal repercussions. Their carefully structured alliance with Gandhi would crumble for good, and with it Muslim hopes of a secure place in an independent India. These Muslim noncooperators were hard-pressed. Without the charismatic presence of the Ali brothers, they more than ever

needed the support of the ulama to maintain their contact with the Muslim masses. The slide toward violence seemed inexorable.

With the nationalist alliance teetering on the brink of collapse and or violence, Gandhi began to look more sympathetically at the proposal for a round table conference. Such a conference, or even the preliminary negotiations leading up to it, might buy him more time to organize peaceful civil disobedience.<sup>42</sup> The meeting to reconsider the proposed conference was held in Bombay on January 14, 1922, under the presidency of Sir Sankaran Nair, a former Education Member of the government of India and a leading moderate. Representatives of all political persuasions attended and resolved in favor of pursuing the matter with the government. Gandhi, however, stuck to his conditions: The Ali brothers must be released, and he further reserved the right to continue organizing for civil disobedience while the conference was in session. These conditions were patently unacceptable to the government, and Sir Sankaran Nair showed his opinion of them by walking out of the meeting in disgust. Nevertheless, as a result of this meeting, the Congress Working Committee met and resolved to postpone civil disobedience until January 31, pending results of negotiations with the government. Should the government meet their conditions and the conference be convened, they would then cease all civil disobedience. The government decided against letting Gandhi string them along any longer, and dropped the round table offer on January 26.<sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile, civil disobedience was gathering momentum in spite of Gandhi's hesitation and his attempts to apply the brakes. Finally, he could postpone it no longer. After the government dropped consideration of the round table conference, a meeting was held in Bardoli on January 29, and a resolution passed to withhold revenue payments. Gandhi and his closest followers then began an active campaign to educate the people in Bardoli in the ways of civil disobedience. They issued a daily newsletter in Gujarati, held meetings in every village, and conducted house-to-house canvassing urging withholding of taxes and services from the government. Gandhi still had misgivings about the preparedness of the people for this move, but on February 4 he sent an ultimatum to the viceroy: Either the government revised its policy concerning the Khilafat and Punjab wrongs, and its "lawless repression," or else a no-tax campaign would begin in Bardoli. The government

rejected his terms, and so Gandhi called for civil disobedience to begin in Bardoli on February 6.<sup>44</sup>

While these careful preparations for civil disobedience were going forward, however, the incipient violence of the movement boiled to the surface elsewhere. On February 4, there was a serious riot in the village of Chauri Chaura in northern UP. A crowd of about 2,000 demonstrators, led by noncooperation volunteers, attacked a small force of twenty-two policemen. The police fired, but were overpowered and had to take refuge in the police station. The mob retaliated by setting fire to the station, burning the entire force alive, except for two who escaped the flames only to be beaten to death.<sup>45</sup>

When he heard the news, Gandhi was unnerved. He left Bardoli in a quandary and hurried to Bombay to consult with Malaviya and other moderates. He then summoned a meeting of the Working Committee in Bardoli for February 11, at which noncooperation and civil disobedience were indefinitely suspended. Gandhi then went on a five-day fast of expiation, calling the Chauri Chaura incident a warning from God against hasty action.<sup>46</sup>

The violence in Chauri Chaura was by no means the only, nor even the chief, reason Gandhi suspended civil disobedience. His co-workers in Bardoli had been enthusiastic and wanted to begin civil disobedience after so many postponements and so he had gone ahead, although he was worried that the preparations were inadequate. Furthermore, many of the more zealous noncooperators throughout the country were drifting away from him, veering ever closer to violence. Gandhi had been trying to accommodate them and still maintain some control over the entire movement, but he knew that he was risking the delicate alliance of various national and communal forces in the process. Now, in his discouragement, his growing sense of isolation, and his fear of condoning violence, Gandhi grabbed the excuse that Chauri Chaura offered him to call off the entire movement.<sup>47</sup>

The suspension of noncooperation and civil disobedience was greeted with almost universal consternation. Hakim Ajmal Khan, then serving as president of the Congress, was in Delhi when the decision was taken in Bardoli and wired Gandhi his assent. The hakim was nevertheless upset that Gandhi had not sought the advice of more people before calling off the movement.<sup>48</sup> A number of Muslims were particularly resentful. The Kanpur Khilafat

Committee, at the urging of Maulana Azad Subhani and Hasrat Mohani, decided to defy the Bardoli decision.<sup>49</sup> The Jamiat al-Ulama called a special session for Ajmer in early March 1922 to reconsider its nonviolent stand.<sup>50</sup> Abdul Bari had some strong words for Gandhi:

To me Gandhiji is like a paralytic whose limbs are not in his control, but whose mind is still active. I am doubtful of his [future] success, because he has not yet acquired much success from his [nonviolent] movement . . . . There is general depression all over.<sup>51</sup>

The Maulana was right about the general depression, which affected not only Muslims but also such staunch supporters of Gandhi as Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, then in jail in Lucknow:

Pandit Motilal was furious . . . and expressed his deep resentment and anger at what had happened. He . . . shouted, "Look here what has happened. . . . This ends the movement because some people in a big country like India have lost their mind and committed violence." Jawaharlal . . . did not say anything at that time. However, I could see by his face that he also did not like it and shared his father's views.<sup>52</sup>

Gandhi wrote to the Nehrus to reassure them that he knew what he was doing:

I see that you are terribly cut up over the resolutions of the Working Committee. I sympathize with you, and my heart goes out to father [Motilal]. I can picture to myself the agony through which he must have passed, but . . . I assure you that if the thing had not been suspended we would have been leading not a non-violent struggle but essentially a violent struggle. . . . You are in as disadvantageous a position as I am advantageously placed for judging events in their true proportion.<sup>53</sup>

But Gandhi's sense of proportion was also distorted by his anxiety about the potential violence of the forces he had unleashed.

His influence waned rapidly thereafter, so much so that by the beginning of March 1922 the government finally felt free to arrest and prosecute him for sowing disaffection. The news of his arrest, trial, and sentencing for six years was generally received calmly. Noncooperators attributed this state of affairs to popular devotion to his nonviolent creed. But events of the preceding months pointed less to dedication to the principles of nonviolence than to indifference and disillusionment. In contrast to the crowds and the

public hall necessary for the Karachi trial, Gandhi's trial took place almost without notice in the Circuit House at Ahmedabad on March 18.<sup>54</sup>

### *The Collapse of the Grand Alliance*

Following the suspension of noncooperation and civil disobedience and the imprisonment of Gandhi, what was left of the tenuous alliance between Hindus and Muslims, and between Muslim politicians and ulama, collapsed. The balance of the year 1922 was spent in petty bickering, in which Hindu and Muslim sniped at each other for lack of devotion to the national cause. Westernized Muslims and ulama split over a number of issues, including the continuation of nonviolence; and factionalism rent the Congress and Khilafat Committee. In the case of the Khilafat Committee, the controversy centered on a major financial scandal.

The first discordant note was sounded at the Ajmer meeting of the Jamiat al-Ulama on March 3, 1922, by Maulana Abdul Bari. In an intemperate speech, he complained that nonviolence had failed them, and said that it was time Muslims advanced their own program to achieve their demands. Bari's outburst was approved by a number of ulama who had long felt that Muslims should not have abjured violence altogether. Another supporter was Hasrat Mohani, who stated, without corroboration, that in the noncooperation movement 99 percent of those resigning from government service were Muslims, whose places were taken by Hindus, and that during civil disobedience 95 percent of those arrested were Muslims. Now, he said, the Hindus had let them down again by renouncing civil disobedience. The conference passed a resolution in favor of continuing civil disobedience and another defining the limits of nonviolence according to the *shari'a*. A third resolution, which also waved a red flag in the Hindus' direction, called for the collection of a Malabar reconstruction fund for relief of the Mapillas suffering from government repression.

Others present at the meeting, however, including the staunch Khilafatists Dr. Ansari, Ajmal Khan, and Chotani, disagreed with Bari's violent oratory. Ansari spoke out against the Maulana, calling him "brainless, insincere, and a notoriety hunter."<sup>55</sup> The split between the noncooperators and the zealots was widening along the line which, roughly speaking, divided Westernized Muslims from ulama.

Some Khilafat Committee representatives at the Ajmer meeting prevailed upon Abdul Bari to disclaim his violent pronouncement. Gandhi, in one of his last missions before arrest, rushed from Ahmedabad to Ajmer and pacified the Maulana. Bari then issued a statement to the press:

I had agreed with Gandhiji that until I had become hopeless of the success of the non-violent non-cooperation movement, I would not do anything against it openly or secretly. The proceedings of the Bardoli and Delhi meetings had depressed me and I said so in my speeches. I have now met Gandhiji and he has fully satisfied me that further efforts on our part can make the movement a success. . . .<sup>56</sup>

The friction between Hindu and Muslim over the continuation of nonviolence and the renunciation of civil disobedience was thus smoothed over for the time being, but differences remained. In an open letter to his fellow Muslims entitled "Non-Violence and the Muslims' Duty," Abdul Bari was, at best, ambiguous. He recalled that at the beginning of the movement, he had had his doubts about nonviolence and Hindu-Muslim unity. He still was of the opinion that as long as a third party ruled India, Muslims could get no benefit from cooperating with Hindus. Nevertheless, when India gained independence, Hindu-Muslim unity would be absolutely essential for peace and the running of the government. With Gandhi's help, he had overcome his misgivings about Hindu-Muslim cooperation. Now that Gandhi was in jail, his uneasiness had returned. He warned Muslims against losing their individuality in the quest for Hindu-Muslim unity, and also against reestablishing friendship with the British. In sum, by process of elimination, he seemed to be saying that Muslims should go it alone, but he did not really come to grips with that eventuality.<sup>57</sup>

Although Hindu-Muslim unity had been tenuously salvaged, the damage done to the alliance between the politicized ulama and the Khilafat politicians was irreparable. The wall of personal invective that had been raised between Abdul Bari and Ansari was now made even higher by ideological differences. In mid-March of 1922, Abdul Bari and Hasrat Mohani and their sympathizers met in Lucknow and proposed dropping noncooperation with the British. From their advocacy of violence earlier in the month, they had now gone overboard in the direction of accommodation with Britain. Nevertheless, there was a certain consistency in their stand.

Feeling deserted by their Hindu allies over civil disobedience, they felt free to desert the Congress and deal with the government directly on the question of the revision of the Turkish treaty. Their stand was made easier by the fact that in March the Secretary of State, Montagu, had been forced to resign for permitting the publication of a government of India memorandum favoring the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres.<sup>58</sup>

The ulama's new policy presented Ajmal Khan, Ansari, and the other Muslim noncooperators with a terrible dilemma. Like the Muslim moderates before them, the ulama were now drawing a line between the Khilafat demands for revision of the Turkish peace terms and the means adopted to achieve those demands, noncooperation with Britain and cooperation with the Hindus. At a meeting of the Central Khilafat Committee in Bombay on March 25-26, 1922, the hakim and the doctor tried valiantly to maintain the connection between the Khilafat movement and noncooperation. They pointed out that the proposed revision of the Treaty of Sèvres did not meet the Khilafat demand concerning the *jazirat al-Arab*, which would remain under European control. Ajmal Khan and Ansari also made it clear that their primary concerns were in India. The causes of Islam and India had to go hand in hand, they argued. Had Gandhi and the Hindus not been with them in the Khilafat movement, the government would never have listened to the Indian Muslims. They were now obligated to the Hindus; it would be "sinful" to turn against them for the sake of the Khilafat. The caliphate, in other words, had been a symbolic issue around which to forge Indian Muslim unity and arouse mass participation, but it should not now distract them from building a secure position for Muslims in a future free India. By throwing off the Khilafat façade, however, Ansari and Ajmal Khan shattered what was left of the delicate Muslim political alliance. They alienated the ulama, whose concerns were primarily for the defense of the *shari'a*, for which the Khilafat remained a potent symbol.<sup>59</sup> Without the ulama as allies, the Khilafatists were reduced to an isolated faction, no longer dominant or able to influence a large following.

### *The Khilafat Money Scandal*

The biggest bone of contention among the Khilafat forces, how-

ever, was the treasury. There had been no published financial statement since 1920, and confidence in the accounting system, never high, was now at an all-time low. By July 1922, the Khilafat fund, used for running the Central Committee, had almost ceased to exist, while the Smyrna and Angora funds reportedly contained a balance of rupees sixteen lakhs (1.6 million). The Central Committee, in order to meet current expenses, decided to transfer one lakh to the Khilafat fund, and requested Chotani to send ten lakhs of the balance to Angora. At their October meeting, however, they found that neither the president nor his son, Ahmad Mian Chotani, the treasurer, had complied with their instructions to forward the money to Turkey. Chotani had difficulty explaining himself, and rumors of financial scandal began to circulate. The Working Committee ordered a thorough investigation of the Chotanis' financial dealings with Khilafat monies, and appointed an inquiry committee for the purpose.<sup>60</sup>

The investigation revealed an enormous amount of mismanagement. Money deposited with the treasurer had never been banked; no budgets were ever prepared; nor were any accounts of expenditures rendered to the Working Committee, though accounts were kept—after a fashion. The president had been authorized to sanction expenditures for "propaganda" at his own discretion, and thus the committee's auditors had accepted his accounting under this heading. The inquiry committee, however, called the propaganda account "a tangled skein" which baffled all attempts to unwind it. More than 147,000 rupees had been spent for propaganda since 1920, and out of this, no details were available for items totaling nearly 50,000 rupees. Another 33,000 rupees was listed under such illuminating headings as: "no account will be given" or "paid to a gentleman."<sup>61</sup>

Travel expenditures, another major heading, were detailed enough, and the details were a fascinating chronicle of Shaukat's generosity:

These bills are a compound mixture, in which the physician has entered remedies for all needs: laundryman, barber, medicine, telegrams—on which large sums have been spent, subsidy to newspapers, rewards, tips, press messages, formidable motor hire, and above all, a long string of unknown persons entertained during the journey. . . .

The travel had been by first or second class, almost never by third.

Another 8,000 rupees was used for transporting and feeding an indeterminate number of people who went to Karachi to witness the trial.<sup>62</sup>

The account of office expenditures was in particular disarray. The inquiry committee found few account books, and few entries in those which were available. The secretaries, apparently, had virtual *carte blanche* in hiring and expenditure. There was a staff of fifteen to do the work of three or four, and several imprisoned clerks were still drawing pay. Disbursements included such items as medicine and barbering, and enormous sums for taxis, even though the committee had its own car.<sup>63</sup>

Upon completing its investigation, the inquiry committee leaked its report to the *Aligarh Institute Gazette* and the *Statesman*, papers which were only too glad to play up difficulties in the noncooperation camp. The Khilafat secretaries promptly published their own report to defend themselves. They condemned the inquiry committee for its lack of objectivity and pointed to the press leaks as evidence of its hostility to the cause. They justified the lack of a bank account on the grounds that deposits in a bank would be subject to government confiscation.<sup>64</sup> The disarray in accounting, they claimed, was normal in any organization involved in such a gigantic operation, without time to make hard and fast rules. Accounts had been carefully kept; but many ledgers had disappeared during police raids or had been hidden by the jailed leaders, and some would therefore reappear when the leaders were released. Under the propaganda heading there doubtless were some "misplacements," but since the president had been authorized to sanction these expenditures, his word should be accepted as final. They hotly denied the charge that first and second class were the only modes of travel used, and cited twenty-one cases of third-class travel out of thirty-nine submitted. As for the Karachi trial, they felt sure that the Muslims of India would not object to expenditure for such a historic event.<sup>65</sup>

The fact remained, however, that there were enormous discrepancies in the accounts, and the balance of sixteen lakhs supposedly in the keeping of Seth Chotani and his son had vanished. In trying to straighten out the mess, the Khilafat Committee split right down the middle. On one side were the Chotanis, president and treasurer, the present group of secretaries, and the paid employees of the Central Committee in Bombay. On the other was

the rest of the Working Committee including Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari. The ulama also divided, with Kafayatullah and the Deobandis backing the Delhi leaders, while Abdul Bari, after his initial indignant attack on Chotani, ended by supporting him, perhaps because of the aspersions cast on the Ali brothers by the inquiry committee.<sup>66</sup>

The reckoning came in January 1923, when Ansari and Ajmal Khan confronted Chotani, who admitted that the missing sixteen lakhs had been invested in his family business. Since his association with the noncooperation movement, his government contracts had been canceled and his businesses had been losing money. These financial difficulties had precluded his remitting the money to Angora. He promised to pay back the money to the Khilafat Committee by signing over to them two of his saw mills. The Khilafat Committee appointed a board to take possession of the Chotani empire in May 1923. Then, in an emotion-filled scene, Chotani and son resigned as president and treasurer of the committee. Not a single eye was dry, as all and sundry praised Chotani's sacrifices and begged forgiveness for what they had had to do for the good of the cause. Chotani's assumption of the debt momentarily eclipsed the charges of extravagance leveled against many of the others, but the scandal had hurt them all. The Khilafat organization and its fundraising potential were shattered.<sup>67</sup>

Congress was also bedeviled by a factional dispute in 1922-23. Those in favor of reviving civil disobedience were vocal in their objections to the political lull, but an inquiry committee under Motilal Nehru ruled that the country was not yet ready for civil disobedience. At its Gaya session in December 1922, the Congress split into the "No-changers," still loyal to Gandhi's program, and the "Swarajists," led by Pandit Motilal and C. R. Das, who were in favor of a new step: entry into the Legislative Councils in the upcoming elections, in order to wreck them from within.<sup>68</sup> The Muslims tended to support the "No-changers" for various reasons.<sup>69</sup> Dr. Ansari remained loyal to Gandhi's program as the best way to secure Muslim participation in the nationalist movement; the ulama of the Jamiat remained committed to the noncooperation *fatwa* which, among other things, condemned Council entry. The split in the Congress, by providing further tactical bones of contention, did nothing to further Hindu-Muslim cooperation or Muslim political consensus.<sup>70</sup>

The disintegration of the Khilafat and non-cooperation forces by 1923 was well summarized in this disheartened dispatch to Muhammad Ali from the secretary of the Delhi Congress Committee:

. . . the Bardoli resolution put the machinery very much out of gear. The results which followed form a series of reverses suffered in all directions for a period of nearly eighteen months. The [national] schools . . . had to be closed down; most of the sub-offices disappeared automatically; volunteer corps became demoralized and dwindled to a point of conspicuous insignificance, and the provincial and district treasuries were exhausted. As the culmination of our defeat, communal dissensions and separatist organizations diverted the attention of the people to a form of activity least calculated to promote the spirit requisite for the achievement we had in view.

Today, with our funds at vanishing point, our workers dispirited and financially embarrassed to the point of distraction, and the former adherents little disposed to treat our best efforts with the least regard, it is even with patience and ingenuity inconceivably hard to keep up appearances.<sup>71</sup>

The outlook was decidedly gloomy. Unfortunately, the communal dissensions and separatist organizations he deplored were absorbing the energies of followers and leaders both.

### *The Reappearance of Communalism*<sup>72</sup>

The imprisonment of the leaders, the suspension of noncooperation and civil disobedience, and conflicts among the remaining leaders over what policy to adopt next all combined to leave their following without direction. The passions and energies which had responded to religious appeals and the stimulus of the noncooperation program now found new outlets, perhaps inevitably in the form of communal clashes. Riots increased alarmingly in number and intensity during 1923-24, accompanied by a number of meetings of the leaders to try to reach greater communal harmony. The leaders were not entirely blameless. Communalism was a virus which infected all levels of the political process. If religious symbolism had been a potent factor in political mobilization during the noncooperation movement, now communal clashes were a powerful influence on the thinking and feelings of the politicians. The fears of their followers made it harder for leaders to make intercommunal alliances. Fear of communal annihilation, furthermore,

was a powerful emotion which could be harnessed for political purposes, even though such purposes might be destructive to the cause of national solidarity. National solidarity, one might understandably argue, should not imply the destruction of any cultural or religious group. The Shuddhi, Sangathan, Tabligh, and Tanzim movements, all organized by prominent noncooperators, are cases in point. These movements, emphasizing communal interests, served to exacerbate religious tensions.

Shuddhi and Tabligh were two sides of the same coin. The former was organized by Swami Shradhanand and the Arya Samaj to proselytize among fallen-away Hindus, such as those converted to Islam during the Mappilla rebellion, or other groups of borderline Muslims who had retained many Hindu customs. Shuddhi also aimed at abolishing untouchability by converting outcastes to Arya Samaj tenets, and securing for them access to all wells and temples. Shuddhi thus had a strong social reform element as part of its rationale, and had been a part of Arya Samaj activities since the late nineteenth century.<sup>73</sup> This new Shuddhi effort, however, was directly inspired by the Mappilla rebellion and renewed communal tensions, and the Muslims—especially the ulama—were alarmed. They sensed danger for the future of Islam in the subcontinent if the movement were successful. Their fears were not allayed by the Hindu press, which gave considerable play to the numbers of converts made by Shuddhi missionaries among Rajput, Jat, and Gujar Muslims in western UP and the Punjab.<sup>74</sup>

Consequently, a number of prominent ulama and Sufis, including Khwaja Hasan Nizami of the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya in Delhi and Maulana Abdul Bari, began a Muslim missionary movement: Tabligh. This effort was applauded and abetted by the Jamiat al-Ulama. The Ahmadiya, a Muslim sect headquartered in the Punjab with an active missionary tradition of its own, also cooperated with Tabligh efforts.<sup>75</sup> Preachers were sent to the same borderline Muslim groups and outcastes who were the targets of Shuddhi. Although the purpose of Shuddhi and Tabligh was ostensibly peaceful, in that all religions have a right to seek converts, their methods were provocative; in seeking to proselytize among the same groups, they were on a collision course. Their emissaries came face to face among the Malkana Rajputs of Agra District, Muslims whom Shuddhi sought to reconvert to Hinduism, and whom Tabligh sought to reaffirm in the faith. The

Muslims accused the Aryas of coercion to achieve reconversion and harangued the Malkanas to remain true to Islam. Communal feelings were aroused and the lives of both Swami Shradhanand and Khwaja Hasan Nizami were threatened by one another's followers.<sup>76</sup>

Another Hindu organization and its Muslim counterpart which grew up at the time were the Sangathan (unity) movement, headed by Lala Lajpat Rai, and the Tanzim (organization) effort, brainchild of Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew. These two Punjabis had both supported noncooperation during the movement, but there was never much love lost between them. Lajpat Rai, long a leading member of the Arya Samaj, was a vocal supporter of the Shuddhi movement, which further estranged him from the Muslim doctor. Then, in late 1922 and 1923, the Punjab was the scene of communal skirmishes: Multan in September 1922, and Amritsar in April 1923. There were few deaths and the riots were easily put down, but they were symptomatic of a widespread and growing hostility between the two communities, legacy of the bitter disillusionment following the suspension of noncooperation. After the Multan affray, Lajpat Rai, seconded by Pandit Malaviya, called upon the Hindus to stand together for mutual defense in a new organization, Sangathan. Lajpat Rai did not say defense against whom, but it was not the British he had in mind.<sup>77</sup>

Kitchlew was released from jail in late 1923 after serving his Karachi sentence and promptly started the Jamiat-e-Tanzim, with the declared purpose of organizing Muslims to take a fuller part in the struggle for *swaraj*, following the collapse of the Khilafat organization. His platform called for organization of Muslim volunteer corps, schools, charitable institutions, and even banks, and the collection of an all-India Muslim fund for these purposes. To propagate his cause, Kitchlew started an Urdu daily, *Tanzim*, in Amritsar, which became known for its strident tone when discussing the Arya Samaj, Shuddhi, and Sangathan. The government was not very worried about this organization. It seems to have been largely a one-man operation, and though its goal was *swaraj*, its targets were not British, but Hindu.<sup>78</sup>

These organizations contributed to the growing atmosphere of communal tension. For example, during the Shia Muslim observance of Muharram in August 1923, there were serious Hindu-Muslim riots in Agra and Saharanpur, western UP towns where

Shuddhi and Tabligh cadres had been particularly active. In Agra, the campaign to convert the Malkana Rajputs had exacerbated communal relations to the point where Muslims stayed home during Muharram, traditionally a time of intercommunal mingling, fearing trouble. Their fears were justified. On the day of the Muharram processions, a quarrel broke out when a group of Muslims tried to parade a *taziya* through a Hindu quarter. The Muslims claimed they had police permission; the Hindus cited custom which barred Muslim processions in that locale. Brickbats flew, the *taziya* was knocked to the ground, and Hindu shops were looted. For three days there were knifings, looting, and arson in the narrow lanes of old Agra. The military had to be called in to restore order.<sup>79</sup>

The Saharanpur riots took place under similar circumstances. There too, relations between Hindus and Muslims had been strained by Shuddhi and Sangathan activities. The district magistrate, a Muslim, got the two communities to agree in advance on the route of the Muharram *taziya* processions. One parade was to pass a Hindu temple where there was a sacred tree overhanging the road, but the Muslims promised they would not harm it. When the procession was passing the temple, however, it was discovered that one of their beflagged standards would not fit under the branches of the tree. Several Muslims climbed a nearby wall to push the branches aside, they claimed, or as the Hindus alleged, to cut them. Brickbats flew, the *taziya* procession dissolved into a mob, and Hindu shops were looted. The police fired to break up the mob, and the eventual casualty toll was 10 dead and 238 wounded.<sup>80</sup>

If the pattern of the Saharanpur riot was the same as the one in Agra, the results were far graver. Hindu and Muslim leaders rushed to the spot to justify the actions of their co-religionists. Swami Shradhanand described the "heartrending scene" to the press, likening it to "the deeds of savage and fiendish conquerors," and demanded the removal of the Muslim district magistrate. Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, a Khilafatist editor, retorted that asking for the district magistrate's replacement by an Englishman showed Shradhanand's lack of faith in the Indian people. Pandit Malaviya also visited the scene of the riot and admitted that Shuddhi and Sangathan had embittered local communal feelings, but he maintained that the Hindus had not started the rioting. The local Muslims, on the other hand, accused the Hindus of lying in ambush for the

Muslims, who had no intention of hurting the tree. Nonsense, said the Hindus, the Muslims started it by attempting to cut the branches. It seemed to occur to no one that both groups were at fault and that nothing could be gained by mutual recriminations.<sup>81</sup>

The communal situation went from bad to worse in 1924. There was serious trouble in Delhi in July 1924 during the Muslim festival of Baqr 'Id, but the biggest conflagration occurred in Kohat, a town in the Northwest Frontier Province, on September 9-10. As elsewhere, the incident was deliberately provoked, but whereas in many instances it was not easy to tell who had been the *agents provocateurs*, in Kohat it was clearly the Hindus. This was the more surprising since they were in a marked minority, one-third of the population of the town, in an area where the rural population was almost totally Muslim. Hindu-Muslim relations had been tense for some time, but the immediate cause of the trouble was an anti-Muslim pamphlet published by Jivan Das, secretary of the local branch of the Sanathan Dharma Sabha, a militant Hindu organization. The pamphlet contained objectionable couplets such as this one:

We will build a temple of Vishnu in the Ka'aba  
We will obliterate the existence of the prayer sayers.

Jivan Das was arrested for endangering the peace and the pamphlet was seized and burned by the authorities.<sup>82</sup>

The Hindu reaction was divided: Some condemned the pamphlet and publicly apologized to the Muslims, while others held a protest *hartal* against the burning of pictures of the god Krishna, which adorned the cover of the pamphlet. The Muslims, meanwhile, gathered their forces for a massive demonstration on the day of Jivan Das's trial; the Hindus withdrew to their houses, fearing attack. The Hindu quarter became a virtual armed camp. The magistrate, to stave off violence, released Das on bail on condition that he leave the district until sent for. The Muslims heard that he had been released and protested en masse to the police, but seemed satisfied when told that Das's prosecution had not been dropped, and dispersed. A short while later, however, shots were heard in the bazaar. It seems that some Muslim boys had left the demonstration and run through the bazaar shouting that the Muslims had won their case. The Hindus, thinking that this was the awaited Muslim attack, panicked and opened fire from the roof tops; four Muslim

boys fell, one dead. The Muslim crowd quickly regrouped and the riot was on. Fighting raged for two days. The death toll was twenty Hindus and eleven Muslims.<sup>83</sup>

The communal riots of 1923 and 1924 generated a great deal of handwringing and soul-searching among the leadership. Even though they were not entirely unstained by communal blots, Hindu and Muslim leaders alike tried valiantly during this period to arrest the trend toward violence. In a series of meetings, they passed a number of well-meaning resolutions and drew up plans of action to renew the Hindu-Muslim entente. Unfortunately, the day had passed when agreements among the leaders could bring about accord. They had revolutionized the national movement by arousing mass participation, but now found it was a two-edged sword.

The first of these meetings was the special session of Congress called for Delhi in mid-September 1923. The meeting was hosted by Ansari and presided over by Abul Kalam Azad, released from jail in early 1923. Also attending was Muhammad Ali, recently freed himself. The prime purpose of the meeting was to heal the factional rift in the Congress, but Azad's presence on the podium assured a call for Hindu-Muslim cooperation. He pointed out that since the Bardoli decisions, they had been passing through a period of disillusionment and discord. What was essential now was agreement on a course of action. If some were in favor of renewing noncooperation and others were for entering the Councils, both groups must recognize that these were two means to achieve the same end: national independence. Each party should tolerate the methods of the other, as long as they were united in their goal. So too, each community should tolerate the religious observances of the other in the interests of a greater goal, communal harmony in a free India. The Congress echoed his call for toleration and gave the Swarajists permission to contest the Council elections, thus readmitting the followers of C. R. Das and Motilal Nehru to the Congress fold.<sup>84</sup>

But if Azad and Ansari led the special Congress in calling for Hindu-Muslim accommodation, other Muslim leaders were conspicuous by their absence and did nothing to allay Hindu suspicions. Abdul Bari, pleading illness, stayed away from Delhi and issued this uncompromising statement:

We can sacrifice our all to obtain self-rule except our beloved faith. A Muslim is a Muslim first and last and if any community wants our support

in India it must learn to respect Islam. . . . If the commandments of the *shari'a* are to be trampled underfoot, then it will be the same to us whether the decision is arrived at on the plains of Delhi or the hilltops of Simla. We are determined to non-cooperate from every enemy of Islam whether he be in Anatolia or Arabia or at Agra or Benares.<sup>85</sup>

The Congress next met in Kakinada for its annual December gathering. By this time the Ali brothers were both back in circulation, and Muhammad had been chosen to preside over the Congress, while Shaukat wielded the gavel at the Khilafat Conference. The bulk of Muhammad Ali's very long address was devoted to Hindu-Muslim relations. He stated unequivocally his belief that whatever Muslims or Hindus attempted to do in opposition to, or without the cooperation of, one another, they would fail "ignominiously" to achieve. Lamenting the current state of affairs, he then asked:

What is it that has happened since that staunch Hindu, Mahatma Gandhi, went to jail for advocating the cause of Islam that we must cease to cooperate with his co-religionists? I know that Hindu-Muslim relations today are not precisely those that they were two years ago. But is it possible for any honest and patriotic Indian to say that either community is wholly blameless?<sup>86</sup>

He condemned as petty the issues separating the communities, Shuddhi and Sangathan, Tabligh and Tanzim caused resentment on both sides. What was needed now was for groups to act wholeheartedly in concert. On the local level all over India they needed not Khilafat Committees and Hindu Sabhas, but joint committees to arbitrate disputes and maintain peace. The vernacular press must eschew all virulence and partisanship likely to endanger intercommunal relations. The Muslims must realize, as they had realized during the Khilafat noncooperation movement, that by being Muslims they did not cease to be Indians.<sup>87</sup>

In contrast to Muhammad's broad-minded soul-searching, Shaukat's speech before the Khilafat Conference was blunt, dauntless, and concentrated almost exclusively on Muslim problems. He told them not to be discouraged or disillusioned, but to remain united—as if that were still true—and to continue their efforts on behalf of the Khilafat with enthusiasm and devotion. In that way, they would ultimately win all their Khilafat demands from the greatest enemy of Islam, the British government.<sup>88</sup>

Shaukat's energies may have been undiminished, but his tub-thumping eloquence rang hollowly now. He ignored changed conditions since his imprisonment. The Khilafat had been a useful issue to unite Indian Muslims when all were fearful for its future and the Turks were powerless. Now the Turks had rallied, the Treaty of Sevres had been wiped from the books by the Lausanne settlement, and Indian Muslims were more fearful for their own skins. Just as the Muslim university had given way to the Khilafat as the prime political issue uniting Indian Muslims, so now the Khilafat had been eclipsed by communal self-defense. But the Ali brothers would not espouse communalism as a means to reassert their power over their former constituency, and so they clung to the Khilafat issue, though it no longer served their purpose. In contrast to 1920, when after their release from internment they had been the heroes of the hour, the Ali brothers were in eclipse in 1924. The mass movement had been discredited by its degeneration into violence; their colleagues in noncooperation were trying other methods; and even their attempts to patch up Hindu-Muslim amity were mistrusted. Muhammad Ali, as president of the Congress, came under fire from several Hindu members of the Working Committee, who resented his statements about Shuddhi and Sangathan. They attempted to censure him, but without success. Muhammad Ali also had a falling out with Kitchlew, his fellow Karachi trial defendant, when he castigated the latter's Tanzim activities as partisan narrowness.<sup>89</sup>

When Mahatma Gandhi was released from prison in 1924 following an attack of appendicitis and continuing bad health, the brothers went to him for succor in healing the communal wounds. But they were disappointed. In fact, their differences with Gandhi multiplied. The Mahatma was piqued that the Congress at Delhi and Kakinada had allowed the Swarajists to go ahead with Council entry. He issued a public statement opposing Swarajist policies and called on all his followers, the "No-changers," to rededicate themselves to handspinning and weaving. Muhammad favored the "No-changers," but as Congress president, he did not want to see the Congress split anew and thought Gandhi's statement unnecessarily uncompromising. He wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru in despair, saying that, as a Muslim, he could not even protest by resigning his presidency, since such an action might reflect on Hindu-Muslim relations.<sup>90</sup>

But it was the Kohat riot which, more than anything else, divided the Ali brothers from the Mahatma. When news of the riot hit the headlines in September 1924, Gandhi happened to be staying in Delhi as a guest of Muhammad Ali. He promptly decided to go on a three-week fast, in spite of his ill health, to promote the cause of Hindu-Muslim friendship. Muhammad, backed by the medical opinions of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, pleaded with him not to do it. What would happen to communal amity if the Mahatma died? Having the Mahatma die on his hands was something Muhammad Ali could hardly have contemplated with equanimity.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, Gandhi adamantly went ahead with his fast. The Delhi leaders hurriedly summoned Hindu and Muslim leaders to a unity conference, yet another effort to bridge the communal chasm. The conference met in late September under the presidency of Motilal Nehru and adopted a series of measures to deal with communal violence, including a bill of religious rights guaranteeing freedom of religious expression, inviolability of places of worship, and mutual toleration for such customs as cow sacrifice and temple music. Taking these resolutions to Gandhi, the leaders begged him to break his fast, which he did, but only after the twenty-one days were over.<sup>92</sup>

There was a day of rejoicing when Gandhi breakfasted on October 8, but ironically, that was the day of a serious riot in Allahabad. And meanwhile, Abdul Bari expressed apprehension lest some of the resolutions passed by the unity conference be against the *shari'a*.<sup>93</sup> Later that month, Gandhi and the Ali brothers requested permission to visit Kohat together in order to restore communal friendship, but were turned down by the government. Unfortunately, the matter did not end there, for early in 1925 Shaukat issued a statement blaming the Hindus for the Kohat troubles. In *Young India* of March 26, 1925, Gandhi differed openly with Shaukat, stating that the Kohat Muslims' case was shaky and incomplete. Their friendship was never quite the same after that.<sup>94</sup>

In his newly revived *Comrade*, Muhammad Ali commented ruefully on their "barren record" in the field of communal relations and observed sadly that "The Hindus and Muslims don't seem to have that joint hatred of slavery which is necessary for working out a national program."<sup>95</sup> Kitchlew took over as president of the All-India Khilafat Conference at its annual meeting in December

1924, and used its platform to insult Lajpat Rai and Pandit Malaviya.<sup>96</sup> The Khilafat movement, moribund since 1922, was dead.

### *The Abolition of the Khilafat*

The abandonment of noncooperation and civil disobedience and the burgeoning communal violence thereafter had killed the Khilafat movement as a mass political phenomenon, and with it any semblance of political unity Indian Muslims had been able to muster among themselves, or with their Hindu compatriots. Nationalist Turkey under Mustafa Kemal, meanwhile, went its own way, first abolishing the Ottoman sultanate, and finally doing away with the caliphate itself.<sup>97</sup> The reaction of the Khilafatists in India to these events demonstrates convincingly the totally Indian character of the Khilafat movement. At first they chose to disbelieve or to explain away the Turks' actions. In the absence of any issue to unite Indian Muslims other than blatant self-defense, they clung to the shadow of the Khilafat as a way of maintaining the idea of Muslim solidarity in cooperation with nationalism. When they finally had to acknowledge the disappearance of this last symbol of a united Islam, they began to search for alternatives. Several candidates for caliph were suggested but none achieved general acceptance in India or in the Muslim world. Ultimately the various Muslim leaders had to find new ways to cope with the complex realities of the Indian political situation. The Khilafat was no longer a viable symbol for their aspirations.

In November 1922 the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara struck the first blow at the Khilafat by abolishing the Ottoman sultanate, deposing Sultan Wahiduddin Muhammad VI, and declaring Abdul Mejid Effendi the new caliph. In thus separating the spiritual duties of the Khilafat from the temporal power of the state, the Turks did what Indian Muslims had been opposing in their protests to the European powers since 1919. The reception of the news in India was predictably mixed: The Jamiat al-Ulama refused to believe news coming from such a tainted foreign source as Reuters, and thus avoided issuing any juridical ruling on the subject at first. A number of ulama grumbled that separation of the temporal and spiritual powers of the caliph was against the *shari'a*, but others rejoiced at the reinstatement of an elective Khilafat more in line with the immediate successors of the Prophet, as opposed to the hereditary sultanate.<sup>98</sup>

In any case, Indian Muslims could do little but accept the state of affairs. The tendency was to echo the justification of the Kemalists Turks that Wahiduddin had proven to be a puppet of Britain and other foreign powers and hence did not deserve to remain either sultan or caliph, and to rationalize the separation of spiritual and temporal powers. Ajmal Khan and Ansari refused to be "alarmist," saying that the selection of a new caliph by the Turkish National Assembly was a return to the great tradition of elected caliphs, and this would strengthen his hand, not weaken it.<sup>99</sup>

At the annual meeting of the Khilafat Conference in December 1922, Dr. Ansari as president maintained that the Turks had not really separated the caliph's spiritual and temporal powers, but had only made the sultan a constitutional monarch. In the resolution recognizing the new caliph, the Khilafat Conference expressed its pleasure at the restoration of the ancient practice of electing the caliph. They gave Mustafa Kemal a title: Saif al-Islam (The Sword of Islam), a term used in the past for conquering sultans.<sup>100</sup>

During 1923, it must have dawned on the members of the Khilafat Committee that Mustafa Kemal had no intention of making Abdul Mejid a constitutional monarch, and that they were powerless to do anything about it. The Turks concluded the Treaty of Lausanne with the European powers in July 1923, relinquishing all connection, spiritual or temporal, with the Arab world, in spite of the Indian Khilafatists' continued harping about the subjugation of the *jazirat al-Arab* to European mandates. Then in late October 1923 the Grand National Assembly declared Turkey a republic, with Mustafa Kemal as president and Ismet Pasha as prime minister, thus settling the question of who would exercise the temporal powers wrested from the sultan. Nevertheless, Muhammad Ali, in his Kakinada Congress speech, spoke of the "valiant and God-fearing Turks" and expressed his confidence that

Once they are free from the distractions inevitable after the victories of both war and peace, they will revive with God's assistance the glories . . . of the first thirty years of the Khilafat.<sup>101</sup>

This was a vain hope. When Indian Muslim representatives appealed to Mustafa Kemal to regularize the position of the caliph, the results were disastrous.

The Agha Khan and Sayyid Amir Ali, who had never taken part in the noncooperation movement in India, addressed a letter to

Ismet Pasha in November 1923, writing as officers of the Islamic Association of England. In it, they referred to the present uncertain position of the caliph and the diminution of his authority and prestige. They pointed out that when the Khilafat had been in danger, Indian Muslims supported the Turkish nationalists, believing that they were also fighting for the preservation of the institution which symbolized Islamic solidarity. Now, in repayment—or so it seemed—they appealed to the Turkish government to place the Khilafat "on a basis which would command the confidence and esteem of Muslim nations, and thus impart to the Turkish state unique strength and dignity."<sup>102</sup>

The letter, a diplomatic plea for the restoration of the temporal powers of the Khilafat, was sent to a number of Constantinople papers as well as the Turkish prime minister. Its publication in papers identified with the pro-Khilafat opposition in Turkey caused a furor in the councils of the Turkish government. The Agha Khan and Amir Ali were condemned as "heretics" (they were both Shias). They, and by extension all Indian Muslims, were branded as agents of Britain, seeking the overthrow of the republic and the restoration of the Ottoman dynasty. It is perhaps the ultimate irony that the Indian Muslims should have been regarded as agents of Britain in their championship of the caliph, but that is the way it appeared to Mustafa Kemal, who was seeking an excuse to abolish the caliphate altogether to consolidate his own power against stiff religious opposition in Turkey. Capitalizing on the indignation aroused among the deputies, he summoned the National Assembly on March 1, 1924, and emphasized the need to "cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument." The Assembly voted to depose the caliph, abolish the caliphate, and banish all surviving members of the Ottoman house.<sup>103</sup>

The Khilafat Committee in India was thunderstruck. Their icon, the Khilafat, had been broken, and their idol, Mustafa Kemal, had been the iconoclast. Not knowing quite how to cope with such a thorough repudiation of the symbol of Islamic solidarity, they hurriedly met with the Jamiat al-Ulama and sent a joint wire to Mustafa Kemal. In it they expressed their bewilderment and consternation, and while abjuring any thought of interfering in Turkish affairs, pleaded with the Turkish president not to take final action until a delegation of Indian Muslims could come to Ankara

and present their views. The Turks refused to reconsider their decision, and the delegation never went.<sup>104</sup>

The symbol around which the Ali brothers and the other Khilafatists had built their hopes of Indian Muslim unity and political power had now disappeared. To their followers, the Khilafat Committee and ulama issued a joint statement that there was no reason for discouragement. Even if the Turks were on the wrong course, there were other ways to work for Islamic solidarity. For one thing, they could promote a congress of representatives from all Muslim countries to elect a new caliph. Putting up a brave front, Muhammad Ali said that for them the Khilafat could never cease to exist, and they would have to work all the harder to secure the freedom of the *jazirat al-Arab* from non-Muslim domination and the reestablishment of the Khilafat on a democratic basis.<sup>105</sup>

Others did not agree with the policy of carrying on as if nothing had happened. Some felt that the Khilafat Committee had outlived its usefulness and should merge with the Muslim League. Some thought it should revamp its program and its appeal, dropping altogether the Khilafat banner, and concentrate on the goals of political organization and regeneration of the Indian Muslim community. Kitchlew with his Tanzim program was one of these.

Yet another view was that represented by Abul Kalam Azad, who was reluctant to drop the religious appeal and the collaboration between politicians and ulama the Khilafat issue afforded, but who felt that trying to change the course of events in Turkey was not only futile but also diverted attention from the more important problem of the Muslims' political future in India. He explained his views in a series of closely reasoned articles entitled "The Khilafat Problem and the Turkish Republic," which appeared in Lahore's *Zamindar* in the spring of 1924. Azad said that the Turkish government, by abolishing the Khilafat of the Ottoman dynasty, had merely rectified the unsatisfactory division of spiritual and temporal powers which had existed since 1922. Most Muslims in India were displeased by the abolition because they thought that the institution of the Khilafat had ceased to exist, but this was not the case at all. The Khilafat is not like the papacy; it could not truly exist separated from temporal power. Hence, the most powerful independent Islamic government automatically has the Khilafat vested in it. That government can be in Turkey or anywhere; as long as an Islamic government exists, so too will the Khilafat

continue to exist. The president of Turkey had not been formally recognized as the caliph, but the Khilafat nevertheless continued to reside with the Turkish government.<sup>106</sup> Azad's articles were a good example of his cool-headed casuistry. He also implied criticism of the Ali brothers and many of his fellow ulama for getting emotional about events in Turkey when the real work of the Khilafat movement would continue to be the political organization of Indian Muslims. Leave Turkey to its own fate now, he said, and concentrate on matters closer to home.

But the Ali brothers, mortified at having lost face by the abolition, discouraged by the disappearance of their most appealing political issue, and frustrated by their inability to rally a popular following once again, grew increasingly resentful of the Turks' dirty trick.<sup>107</sup> They refused to accept the deposition of Abdul Mejid, and vented their wrath on Mustafa Kemal. At a meeting of the Khilafat Working Committee in June of 1924, Shaukat exploded: The abolition of the Khilafat was a breach of religious injunctions, and Abdul Mejid's deposition was also illegal. Mustafa Kemal had acted for selfish reasons and should be obliged to take Abdul Mejid back. Muhammad Ali also favored the restoration of Abdul Mejid. Even if the Khilafat were revived in the person of the president of Turkey, as Abul Kalam had proposed, that would be acceptable, if the president were someone other than Mustafa Kemal. The present president of Turkey was a traitor to Islam. The Indian Muslims had given their money and ornaments and had suffered imprisonment, but Mustafa Kemal, that ungrateful atheist, despised all those sacrifices and ignored their entreaties.<sup>108</sup>

This outburst caused consternation among the other members of the committee. Hakin Ajmal Khan and Abul Kalam Azad said they were in no position to judge the reasons for Abdul Mejid's deposition, and any insistence on his reinstatement would only hamper efforts to secure a restoration of the Khilafat itself. They were backed by Kafayatullah and Husain Ahmad Madni, representing the Jamiat al-Ulama. At this juncture, Muhammad Ali quarreled with the ulama, which did not improve his cantankerous image. Muhammad muttered that his judgment was better than that of the ulama. Kafayatullah then objected, saying that he could disagree with them as individuals, but should not deride the ulama as a whole. The meeting continued its acrimonious course, with the Ali brothers battling for their lost influence by sullenly picking at

the suggestions of others. All pretense of unity among Muslim politicians and ulama had disappeared. With the removal of the symbol which represented Islamic unity and the supremacy of the *shari'a*, there was little hope of reviving their alliance. The meeting did, at least, agree to suspend the title "The Sword of Islam" conferred earlier on Mustafa Kemal.<sup>109</sup>

One last episode illustrates the divisive effects in India of further attempts to find a new caliph. There were, of course, numerous possible candidates, even with the elimination of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. In March 1924, King (formerly Sharif) Husain of the Hijaz declared himself caliph, news received with little enthusiasm among the Khilafatists, long accustomed to damning Husain as an instrument of European domination over the *jazirat al-Arab*. Abdul Bari, however, wired the Hashimite chieftain congratulating him, but urged him to secure confirmation by a Muslim world conference. Muhammad Ali thereupon upbraided his spiritual preceptor for seeming to recognize the Khilafat of Husain, an act he regarded as premature.<sup>110</sup>

Then in late 1924 a new figure entered into consideration: Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, the Wahhabi chieftain of the Nejd. Ibn Saud's tribal warriors stormed out of the desert, defeated the Hashimite forces, and took Mecca and Medina while Husain took refuge in Jiddah. With the Hashimites holding the coast and the Nejd the interior, pilgrimage to the holy cities became difficult. Rumor had it that the Wahhabis had destroyed a number of tombs and shrines of saints in the holy cities, in line with their puritanical creed.<sup>111</sup>

These events had the effect of splitting the Khilafat Committee into two hostile factions, the one pro-Hashimite and the other pro-Wahhabi. The Ali brothers and their co-workers denounced Husain as unfit for the Khilafat, since he had lost the holy cities. They championed the candidacy of Ibn Saud, since he had reportedly pledged to form a republican government in the Hijaz and to seek the advice of other Muslim countries in the administration of the holy cities. The Sufis and ulama, headed by Abdul Bari, were wary of Ibn Saud's Wahhabism and denounced the Nejd for the destruction of tombs and shrines. They championed the candidacy of Husain or one of his family, descendants of the Prophet and hence rightful heirs to the Khilafat. The Khilafat Committee proposed sending a delegation to the Hijaz to ask Ibn Saud to hold a world Muslim conference in Mecca; whereupon Abdul Bari

formed a rival organization, the Jamiat al-Khuddam al-Haramain, which selected its own Hijaz delegation.<sup>112</sup>

The Ali brothers and Abdul Bari had come to a parting of the ways, breaking a religious and political partnership that had begun in 1912. Muhammad Ali finally publicly renounced his allegiance to his preceptor in *Hamdard* on January 13, 1926. Abdul Bari suffered a stroke a few days later and died on January 19.<sup>113</sup> Muhammad Ali rushed to Lucknow and wept at his grave, but it was too late. It was also too late for the caliphate.

## CONCLUSIONS

Man is a symbol-using animal.

Kenneth Burke<sup>1</sup>

The Khilafat movement did not succeed in preserving the Islamic caliphate, nor did it succeed in uniting Indian Muslims politically and in forging a permanent Hindu-Muslim nationalist alliance. Was it then a total failure, a romantic pan-Islamic illusion? This study has attempted to look beneath the pan-Islamic rhetoric of the movement, to analyze the different meanings of the Khilafat symbol in the Indian context, the conflicting personalities and motives of the men using that symbol, the variety of uses to which the symbol was put at different times and with different audiences, and the effects which the followers, with their human and thus fallible understanding of the leaders' meanings, had on the direction of the movement.

The attempt on the part of a certain group of leaders to create a self-conscious and unified Indian Muslim political constituency is the central focus of this study. This quest grew out of Islamic cultural and educational reform movements of the nineteenth century. The ulama of Deoband and other newly-founded madrasas and the Western-educated men of Aligarh were all interested in mobilizing Muslim community support for their educational efforts. As they did so, they formed religious societies, social service organizations, and political groupings based on traditional bonds of loyalty or on new methods of rallying public support: fundraising and membership drives, the publication of pamphlets and journals. The important thing about these networks of mobilization was not whether they were traditional or modern (they were in fact a combination of the two), but that they provided structures within the Muslim community which were alternatives to the political and administrative superstructures of British rule. Studying the development of these alternative structures is therefore a key to the understanding not only of the Khilafat movement, but also of the relationship between Islamic self-consciousness and nationalism generally.

As these organizations and the developing Urdu press increas-

ingly promoted a pan-Indian outlook among Indian Muslims, so also factions developed within the various educational movements, based on personal or policy differences. These factional clashes, which first arose over control of educational institutions, ultimately resounded in the political arena as well. Whether pro- or anti-British dimensions had been a part of the original dispute or not, such considerations were not long in appearing, since the British government in India was intimately involved in educational policy and patronage.

As these educational movements developed, therefore, they produced an increasingly self-conscious and politicized group of Muslim leaders endowed with techniques of popular mobilization. In response to factional struggle for power and the pressure of events both within India and the Middle East this group became involved in anti-British political activity. In contrast to the council house and bar association debates and the polite petitions to government of their rivals, this group of activists took political activity into the streets, mosques, and bazaars, and forged a holy alliance between Westernized politicians and politicized ulama. The alternative structures of mobilization thus provided the means for expressing political discontent in terms of the defense of religion, as variously interpreted. The leaders in this way reached groups which had not previously participated in the British-imposed political system.

These alternative styles, techniques, and patterns of organization had already been established by World War I, when the conflict between the Islamic caliphate and their British imperial rulers helped identify the causes of Islam and Indian nationalism. The internment of outspoken Muslim politicians and ulama during the war postponed any popular movement, but the *rapprochement* of Muslim and Hindu nationalists continued. Following the war, the plight of a defeated Turkey and the uncertain future of the caliphate in a European-engineered peace settlement gave ulama and Western-educated Muslims alike an ideal issue on which to unite and build a broad-based movement, based on a pan-Islamic symbol but directed toward Muslim participation in Indian nationalism.

The anti-British nature of the Khilafat symbol was the common denominator in an otherwise variegated movement. The Khilafat's other levels of meaning made it a symbol which could appeal to all strata of the Muslim community. For the ulama, the Khilafat

symbolized the continued supremacy of Islamic law in the world. For the Western-educated moderates, the Khilafat symbolized the principles of religious freedom and self-determination of peoples. For those more extreme in their political orientation, the Khilafat symbolized the futility of any accommodation with Western culture and political institutions. For Muslim laborers and peasantry, the Khilafat symbolized Islam itself, their faith which was endangered by Christian hegemony, and ultimately their chance for eternal salvation. Jawaharlal Nehru, in pointing out that "Khilafat" was related in the popular mind to the Urdu word *khilaf*, "against," had a point.<sup>2</sup> Whatever else it meant, the Khilafat called upon Indians to rally against the government.

The anti-British nature of the symbol, and the political style of the Khilafat leaders, also led to their alliance with Gandhi, who likewise advocated political agitation on a massive scale. Their alliance was an uneasy one from the first, for there were constant clashes between the strong personalities involved, as well as basic differences in technique. The Mahatma's dedication to nonviolence at all costs was not shared by his Muslim allies; his desire to dictate the entire plan of action and its policy was unacceptable to the Muslim leaders. The latter, especially the Ali brothers and Abdul Bari, chafed at Gandhi's attempts to curb their rhetoric, and they were undoubtedly inflammatory in their speeches on several occasions. Gandhi too evidenced insensitivity along the way, especially when he bowed to the viceroy's request and asked for the Alis' apology for certain statements, thereby undermining their hard-won political following and losing their trust. Later, when he canceled noncooperation and civil disobedience, Gandhi misjudged his own following. As the expectations which had been aroused changed to disillusionment, even the Mahatma was unable to prevent the energies generated during the movement from turning toward communal violence.

The methods used by the leadership to mobilize a mass following have also been discussed and evaluated. The rhetoric of stump speaking, the pageantry of processions and personal appearances, the injection of political content into lyric poetry, the role of women and ulama as political intermediaries, and the recruitment and deployment of volunteer corps have all been cited as effective features of the new Indian political landscape. In a relatively short period, Gandhi and his Muslim allies revolutionized the Congress,

temporarily eclipsed the Muslim League, and effected a definite change in the style and direction of Indian nationalist politics. Political activity and organization were carried into the laborers' and women's quarters, the district towns, and some villages of India and gave the British imperial government serious cause for worry. Nonviolent noncooperation and civil disobedience became part of the political vocabulary of the twentieth century. The Indian, and all other anticolonial nationalist movements, were never the same again.

The study of the Khilafat movement has thus indicated certain patterns which are applicable to national movements generally, and to movements of Islamic protest more specifically. That is, Islam as a religion and social order contains within itself certain symbols and networks of influence which allow for the development of alternative structures of mobilization which can operate independently of the state, whether traditional or modern, whether colonial or postcolonial.

In some other respects, the effects of the Khilafat movement were limited. Local organizations were embryonic and were more concerned with local grievances, or with sectarian and personal grudges, than with the overall anti-British and nonviolent purposes of the movement. Violence was always close to the surface and bubbled up frequently. In unleashing popular emotions and forces they could not control, the leaders had changed the national movement irrevocably, often to their own chagrin. The collapse of the Khilafat movement must be seen in this context. The government contributed by arresting the leadership and the Turks contributed by abolishing the caliphate; but the crucial factor was the inability of the nationalist alliance to hold in the face of conflicting pressures from its many constituencies.

Finally, it must be asked whether the political power of a united Indian Muslim community had been manifest during the movement. It seems unquestionable that it was. Muslim solidarity was tenuous, but the voices of opposition to the methods and purposes of the movement were muted and a certain feeling of unity was achieved, albeit temporarily. The Muslims were not only the first to urge, endorse, and act upon noncooperation, but they were also in the vanguard of the movement throughout. Whether as individuals or as a community, Muslim influence on the direction of Indian political activity was profound during this period. Specific

instances have been cited of Hindu appreciation of their efforts, as well as apprehension of their influence. Muslim solidarity and the Hindu-Muslim alliance may have been more emotional than concrete, but emotions are not fictions, but rather the basis for all human relationships, including nationalism.

The national alliance disintegrated, but Muslim community self-consciousness, with or without the Khilafat to symbolize it, had become a factor in Indian politics. All future attempts to cement an Indian national alliance had to take that feeling of Muslim consciousness into account, and did so inadequately. The alternative structures which developed as the vehicles for Muslim consciousness during the Khilafat movement provided the techniques, and much of the personnel, for the development of a specifically Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent later.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Aligarh Archives, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University.
ABP	Abdul Bari Papers, Firangi Mahal, Lucknow.
AIG	<i>Aligarh Institute Gazette</i> .
<i>Ajmal</i>	Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, <i>Hayat-e-Ajmal</i> (Aligarh: Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu, 1950).
<i>Asar</i>	Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, <i>Asar-e-Abul Kalam</i> (Delhi: Azad Kitab Ghar, 1963).
<i>Azad ki Kahani</i>	Abul Kalam Azad as dictated to Abdur Razzaq Malehabadi, <i>Azad ki Kahani khud Azad ki Zabani</i> (Delhi: Maktaba-e-Ishaiat al-Quran, 1965).
BC	<i>Bombay Chronicle</i> .
<i>Bombay HFM</i>	<i>Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement</i> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1957ff.).
CID	Criminal Investigation Division of the Home Department, Government of India.
<i>Comrade Selections</i>	Rais Ahmad Jafri, ed., <i>Selections from Mohamed Ali's Comrade</i> (Lahore: Mohamed Ali Academy, 1965).
FRs	Fortnightly Reports.
IAR	<i>Indian Annual Register</i> .
IOL	India Office Library, London.
JMI	Jamia Millia Islamia Library, New Delhi.
Madni, <i>Naqsh</i>	Husain Ahmad Madni, <i>Naqsh-e-Hayat</i> , 2 vols. (Deoband: Maktaba-e-Diniya, 1953-55).
MAP	Muhammad Ali Papers, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

NAI	National Archives of India, New Delhi.
NM	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Teen Murti House, New Delhi.
NNR	<i>Native Newspaper Reports.</i>
<i>Nuqush</i>	<i>Nuqush</i> (Lahore), Khutut Number 109, 3 vols. (April-May, 1968).
TML	Mazhar Ansari, <i>Tarikh-e-Muslim League</i> (Delhi: Maktaba-e-Jamia, 1940).
UP	United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (now Uttar Pradesh).
UPED	Government of UP, Education Department.
UPGAD	Government of UP, General Administration Department.
UPNNR	<i>UP Native Newspaper Reports.</i>
UPRR	Record Room, UP Government Secretariat, Lucknow.
<i>Zikr</i>	Abdur Razzaq Malehabadi, <i>Zikr-e-Azad</i> (Calcutta: Daftar-e-Azad Hind, 1960).

Standard forms of reference to government files:

Department	Branch	Proceedings	Number	Date	Location
1. Home	(Pol)	A,	248,	June 1921,	NAI.
2. UPED			40,	1918,	UPRR.

Note: Unless specified, all references are to the files of the Government of India.

## NOTES

### INTRODUCTION

1. For discussion of the history and theory of the caliphate, see the following: T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*; H. A. R. Gibb, "Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate," and "Al-Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate," in his *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, pp. 141-65; and E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*.

2. See, for example, Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, part I; Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*, esp. chs. 8-9.

3. William J. Watson, "Muhammad Ali and the Khilafat Movement" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1955). The author's master's thesis, based mainly on English sources, also stresses the pan-Islamic aspect of the Khilafat movement. A study of new sources has led to a reassessment of that thesis. Gail Minault, "The Khilafat Movement: An Example of Pan-Islamic Sympathies among Indian Muslims" (M.A. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1966).

4. See, for example, Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India," p. 37.

5. But as Wilfred Cantwell Smith has emphasized, "Pan-Islam is, and has always been, primarily a sentiment of cohesion. It is not cohesion itself, nor any institutional or practical expression of it." *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 88-89.

6. The most flagrant example of this is A. C. Niemeijer, *The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924*.

7. There were, of course, other comparable pan-Islamic movements at about the same time in Indonesia, Malaya, and elsewhere, but there was little communication among the various movements; each looked to the central lands of Islam from the vantage point of the periphery. It might therefore be worthwhile to examine these movements from a similar point of view as herein: Did the pan-Islamic content of their pronouncements overlay an attempt to reconcile Islamic identity with Indonesian, Malay, or other nationalism? In this sense they would be comparable to the Indian Khilafat movement, but each would also be of specific relevance to the national movements in these countries.

8. Karl Deutsch, in *Nationalism and Social Communication*, discusses different theories of nationalism, and in particular stresses the attachment of individuals to national symbols (p. 23), and the "interlocking relation between those who manipulate those symbols and those who accept them" (p. 27). Clifford Geertz, in "Religion as a Cultural System," has defined religion as "a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating

conceptions of a general order of existence, and clothing those conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." *The Interpretation of Cultures*, p. 90. Geertz' ideas on religious symbolism, coupled with those of Deutsch on the role of symbolism in nationalism, underline the need to look at the use of religious symbolism in political mobilization in the present case.

9. See Gail Minault, "Urdu Political Poetry during the Khilafat Movement."

10. Judith Brown, in *Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915-1922*, discusses the concept of political "sub-contractors," intermediaries between the localities in which they were influential and national leaders such as Gandhi. For the Muslim leaders and their "sub-contractors," see Gail Minault, "Islam and Mass Politics: The Indian Ulama and the Khilafat Movement."

11. M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, pp. 9-25.

12. P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*; Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923*.

13. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, pp. 103-5; Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture*, pp. 3-11.

14. Arnold, p. 159, citing S. Lane-Poole, *Catalogue of Indian Coins in the British Museum*, p. lxxiii.

15. For a more detailed examination of Mughal religious policies as a source of political solidarity, see Gail Minault Graham, "Akbar and Aurangzeb."

16. F. W. Buckler, "The Historical Antecedents of the Khilafat Movement."

17. Khwaja Abdul Qadir, *Waqai-e-Manazil-e-Rum*, p. 62.

18. Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture*, pp. 60, 63; *AIG* (May 4, 1877), 12: 272-74, mentions that Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a staunch supporter of British rule, was the head of a fundraising committee for Turkish relief.

19. Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, "Khilafat aur Hindustan," *Maqalat-e-Sulaiman*, 1: 177; Sayyid Mahmud, *The Khilafat and England*, pp. 58, 80.

20. Ram Lakhan Shukla, *Britain, India and the Turkish Empire, 1853-1882*.

21. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1: 40-41.

22. Nikki Keddie has discussed this point, for the Muslim world in general, in "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism" (paper read before the Annual Convention of the American Historical Association, New York, 1966).

23. It is unnecessary here to go into detail on the career of Afghani, which has been studied by Nikki Keddie in her definitive biography. For his writing about India, see her *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*; see also Aziz Ahmad, "Afghani's Indian Contacts."

24. David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India*. Other recent theses, or theses in progress, are Barbara D. Metcalf's 1975 Ph.D. dissertation on the Deoband Madrasa for the University of California, Berkeley; Edward D. Churchill's thesis in progress for the University of Pennsylvania on the Muhammadan Educational Conference; and Peter Kelly's long-awaited thesis on Punjab Anjumans for the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

25. See, for example, Gail Minault and David Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920"; and Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims*. Robinson's study, however, is much less cultural than political and emphasizes, too much in my opinion, the primary role of British policies in the emergence of Indo-Muslim politics.

26. The extinction of the Kingdom of Oudh and the Mughal Empire in 1856-58 did not eliminate Muslim rule in India, as there were a number of princely states (Hyderabad, Bhopal, Rampur, etc.) where Muslims of the official class might still find employment if they did not wish to serve the British. But once again, one should not forget the importance of the Mughal as a symbol of Muslim power. That symbol was now eliminated.

27. W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, ch. 4. Anil Seal points out, however, that the political and cultural dispossession of Muslims varied greatly from province to province. In Bengal, the subject of Hunter's study, the Muslims had indeed been edged out of power; in UP, however, they were still influential in the administration and professions in the 1880s. It is significant that the loyalist Aligarh movement arose in UP. Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism*, pp. 300-5.

28. Aligarh too became a symbol. See David Lelyveld's excellent study, *Aligarh's First Generation*.

29. For a more detailed treatment of the Urdu language issue as an element in Indo-Muslim politics, see Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion, and Politics in North India*, part III. Robinson's *Separatism among Indian Muslims*, chs. 2 and 3, summarize a variety of developments which aided the growth of Muslim politics in the period before 1906. His research on the effects of bureaucratic reform and the growth of local self-government on the Urdu-speaking elite (both Hindu and Muslim) is highly original. He also sees the practical aspects of the language issue, but pays little attention to the emotional and symbolic importance of Urdu to the North Indian Muslims.

## I. EMERGENCE OF THE LEADERSHIP

1. In making this statement, I am suggesting an alternative viewpoint to that propounded by Anil Seal and others of the Cambridge school,

without, however, wishing to denigrate their contribution to the study of British policies vis-a-vis Indian nationalism. For further discussion of the Cambridge interpretation, see Eugene F. Irschick's review of A. Seal, G. Johnson, and J. Gallagher, eds., *Locality, Province and Nation* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1973) in *Journal of Asian Studies* (February 1975), 34 (2): 461-72; G. Pandey's review of the same work and of Anil Seal, *Emergence of Indian Nationalism* and of Gordon Johnson, *Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1973), in *Indian Economic and Social History Review* (June-September 1974), 11 (1-2): 326-40; and my own review of Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims* in *Indian Economic and Social History Review* (September 1977), 14 (3): 417-20.

2. For a more detailed analysis of the Aligarh Muslim University movement, see Gail Minault and David Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920." I am indebted to David Lelyveld for all references to the Aligarh Archives (AA) and the Aligarh Old Boys' Association Proceedings mentioned herein.

3. J. M. S. Baljon, *The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan*, p. 66, n. 2.

4. S. K. Bhatnagar, *History of the M.A.-O. College, Aligarh*, pp. 113-14.

5. Notes and Orders on M.A.-O. College, Aligarh, UPED, 452, 1893, UPRR; *M.A.-O. College Magazine*, (January 1899), 7(1): 15-21; Bhatnagar, *History of the M.A.-O. College*, pp. 144, 177-78.

6. Bhatnagar, *History of the M.A.-O. College*, p. 129.

7. Sayyid Muhammad Mahmud, "A Scheme for the Proposed Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College," in Yusuf Husain, ed., *Selected Documents from the Aligarh Archives*, pp. 222-23.

8. Minault and Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University."

9. Bhatnagar, *History of the M.A.-O. College*, p. 112.

10. "A new scheme for the selection of Trustees for the M.A.-O. College, Aligarh," from members of the Aligarh Old Boys' Association, October 22, 1907, MAP; A Correspondent (Muhammad Ali), "The Aligarh Dispute," *Times of India*, May 13, July 7 and 26, 1909, MAP.

11. *Aligarh Magazine* (February 1905), 3(2): 74; *Rules and Regulations for the Appointment of Trustees of the M.A.-O. College, Aligarh . . . amended . . . up to 1907* (Aligarh, n. d.), pp. 6-7. I am indebted to David Lelyveld for the latter reference.

12. Habibullah Khan, *Hayat-e-Aftab*, p. 3; Aftab Ahmad Khan Ahmadi, *Diary 1892-93* (Mss.), AA; Bhatnagar, *History of the M.A.-O. College*, pp. 95, 105.

13. David Lelyveld, "Three Aligarh Students," gives more information on the personalities and rivalries at Aligarh.

14. Muhammad Ali, *My Life: A Fragment*, p. 4. Zulfiqar Ali joined government service in Rampur, became a religious follower of Ghulam

Ahmad of Qadian, and did not share his brothers' later activities.

15. Bhatnagar, *History of the M.A.-O. College*, pp. 98, 151, 155.

16. History Sheet on Muhammad Ali, Home (Pol) B, 149, November 1913, NAI; Muhammad Ali, *My Life*, p. 30; Afzal Iqbal, *Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, pp. 33-34.

17. *Times of India*, April 24, 1907, cited in Bhatnagar, *History of the M. A.-O. College*, pp. 193, 210; "The Aligarh Dispute," *Times of India*, May 13, July 7 and 26, 1909, MAP.

18. In 1905, Aftab had to relinquish the secretaryship of the Old Boys' Association. Shaukat Ali, then joint secretary of the association, expected to be named in his place, and was hurt when he was passed over by Aftab and his friends. They declared Shaukat ineligible because his government service kept him from residing in Aligarh. *Report Committee Tahqiqat Muta'aliq b'Old Boys' Association, Madrasat al-Ulum, Aligarh* (Aligarh, 1917), pp. 16-17. I am indebted to David Lelyveld for this reference.

19. *Proceedings*, Aligarh Old Boys' Association, 1908-12.

20. S. P. O'Donnell, Education Secretary, Government of UP, Confidential Report on Conditions at M.A.-O. College Aligarh, Nainital, September 13, 1913, Educ. A, 58-60, October 1913, NAI; Hewett to Butler, June 3, 1911, Educ. A, 1-2, August 1911, NAI.

21. "A new scheme for the selection of Trustees for the M.A.-O. College, Aligarh," October 22, 1907, MAP; see "The Constitution of the Muslim University," *Comrade*, April 15, 1911.

22. Muhammad Ali, "Thoughts on the Present Discontent," from *Times of India*, 1907, in *Selected Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamad Ali*, 1: 12.

23. "Simla Delegation, 1906," AA; Syed Razi Wasti, *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905 to 1910*, pp. 69-72, and app. V; "Muslim Address to Lord Minto, October 1, 1906," in C. H. Philips, ed., *Selected Documents on the History of India and Pakistan*, 4: 190.

24. "Muslim Resolutions at Dacca, December 30, 1906," in Philips, ed., *Selected Documents*, 4: 194; Wasti, *Lord Minto*, pp. 78-79, 84.

25. Muhammad Ali, "The Present Political Situation" and "The Muhammadan Programme," two lectures delivered in Allahabad, February 15-16, 1907, quoted in History Sheet on Muhammad Ali, Home (Pol) B, 149, November 1913, NAI.

26. When Muhammad started his famous weekly journal, *Comrade*, in 1911, its motto was "Comrade of all and partisan of none." In his autobiography, he stated that *Comrade's* purpose was to prepare Muslims to make their "proper contribution to territorial patriotism without abating a jot of the fervour of their extraterritorial sympathies which is the quintessence of Islam." *My Life*, p. 33.

27. Muhammad Ali to the editor of *Dawn Society Magazine*, n.d. (October 1911?), MAP; *Comrade*, January 27, 1912, in Rais Ahmad Jafri,

- ed., *Selections from Mohamed Ali's Comrade*, p. 329.
28. Butler to Hewett, Lt.-Gov. of UP, Simla, May 26, 1911, Educ A, 1-2, August 1911, NAI.
29. Shaukat Ali to Muhammad Ali, Aligarh, March 30, 1911, MAP.
30. *Comrade*, April 15 and June 17, 1911.
31. Butler to Hewett, Simla, May 26, 1911, Educ A. 1-2, August 1911, NAI.
32. Viceroy to Secretary of State, June 10, 1911; Secretary of State to Viceroy, June 18, 1911, Educ A, 1-2, August 1911, NAI.
33. Mahmudabad to Butler, Lucknow, September 9, 1911, Educ A, 12-15, February 1912, NAI; Butler to Hardinge, Calcutta, November 3, 1912, Butler Papers, Mss. Eur. F. 116/40, IOL.
34. Secretary of State to Viceroy, July 12, 1912, Educ A, 4-12, July 1913, NAI. Members of the India Council at this time included Theodore Morison, a former Aligarh principal, and Thomas Raleigh, who among other things was brother-in-law of Theodore Beck, another former Aligarh principal. These men were particularly interested in seeing government control maintained at Aligarh. Eric Ashby, *Universities: British, Indian, and African*, pp. 104-5.
35. Mahmudabad to Butler, August 12 and 13, 1912, Educ A, 4-12, July 1913, NAI; *Muslim Gazette* (Lucknow), September 18, 1912, *UPNNR*, 1912, p. 851. A more detailed coverage of these protracted negotiations is contained in Minault and Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University."
36. *Comrade*, February 12, 1912, *Comrade Selections*, pp. 262-63.
37. *AIG*, September 4 and 25, 1912, *UPNNR*, 1912, pp. 851, 899.
38. History Sheet on Muhammad Ali.
39. *AIG*, October 23, 1912, *UPNNR*, 1912, p. 943; *Muslim Gazette* (Lucknow), January 15, 1913; *Al-Mushir* (Moradabad), February 4, 1913, *Musawat* (Allahabad), July 10, 1913; *Madina* (Bijnor); July 15, 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 42, 103, 699, 727.
40. Mahmudabad to Butler, August 9, 1912, containing clippings from *Comrade*, May 4, 1912, *Hablul Matin* (Calcutta), May 13, 1912, and *AIG*, February 21, 1912, Butler Papers, Mss. Eur. F. 116/40, IOL.
41. Rais Ahmad Jafri, *Sirat-e-Muhammad Ali*, pp. 226-27; *AIG*, June 26, July 10, 1912, *UPNNR*, 1912, pp. 637, 679; Bhatnagar, *History of M.A.-O. College*, p. 313; Choudhury Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 20-21.
42. Muhammad Ali, "Great Britain and the Moslem Kingdoms," *Comrade Selections*, pp. 251-56.
43. History Sheet on Muhammad Ali; Sayyid Abul As to Muhammad Ali, Sirsa, October 17, 1914, MAP.
44. Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* p. 38.

45. Muhammad Ali claimed he had contemplated suicide the night he heard the news that the Bulgarians were only 25 miles from Constantinople. As for circulation of the *Comrade*, in Calcutta in May of 1912 it was 2,570 copies a week and increasing. After the move to Delhi, circulation increased to about 3,000. Muhammad Ali thought of turning it into a daily, but then did not. When the daily *Hamdard* was started, it had a low circulation because its movable type was unpopular. Muhammad Ali then switched to the use of calligraphy, more familiar to Urdu readers, and *Hamdard* too caught on. Government reports do not give circulation figures for it, except to comment that in 1914 its circulation was increasing at the expense of *Zamindar*, which had moderated its tone under threat of closure. Judgment rendered by the Punjab Chief Court in the appeal against the forfeiture of *Comrade's* security, March 3-5, 1915, Home (Pol) A, 3-8, May 1915; M. F. O'Dwyer, Lt.-Governor, Punjab, to R. Craddock, Home Member, Government of India, Simla, May 29, 1915, Home (Pol) A, 34-36, July 1915, NAI; History Sheet on Muhammad Ali; Muhammad Ali, *My Life*, pp. 35, 58.
46. Order by H. C. Beadon, District Magistrate of Delhi, June 8, 1913, MAP; Muhammad Ali, *My Life*, p. 51.
47. *Al-Hilal's* weekly circulation in November of 1914 was 4,300 copies, of which only 300 were read in Calcutta. The rest were distributed all over North India and in Hyderabad, Deccan. J. C. Cumming, Chief Secretary, Bengal, to Home Secretary, Government of India, Calcutta, November 14, 1914, Home (Pol) A, 178-204, and KW, February 1915; History Sheet on Azad, Home (Pol) 42. 1912, NAI; *Al-Hilal*, vols. 1-2 (1912-13). For more on Azad, see pp. 38-45.
48. In 1910, *Zamindar* was a weekly with a circulation of 1,225 copies, which increased to 3,900 in 1911. It then became a daily with a circulation of 5,950, which by late 1913 had increased to almost 15,000. History of the *Zamindar*, Home (Pol) A, 127-37, March 1914; C. A. Barron, Chief Secretary, Punjab, to H. Wheeler, Home Secretary, Government of India, Simla, May 31, 1912, Home (Pol) B, 199-202, June 1912, NAI; Shorish Kashmiri, *Zafar Ali Khan*, pp. 38-41; "The *Zamindar*," *Comrade*, March 23, 1912, *Comrade Selections*, pp. 443-45.
49. For a recent study of the Deoband school, see Barbara D. Metcalf's Ph.D. dissertation (University of California, Berkeley, 1975).
50. Shaikh Muhammad Ikram, *Mauj-e-Kausar*, pp. 198-200, 206-7.
51. Sayyid Mahbub Rizvi, *Tarikh-e-Deoband*, pp. 110-26.
52. For a detailed list of the founding principles of the Deoband school, see Ziaul Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, pp. 25-26.
53. Although the rulers of Hyderabad, Bhopal, and a number of other Muslim princes did contribute, financial support of Deoband was remarkably broad-based. It is significant to note that out of some 2,500 regular

contributors to the school, over one-third were government servants. Thus it seems that Deoband supporters, and its administration, were by no means antigovernment. I am grateful to Barbara Metcalf for this information, gleaned from Deoband's annual proceedings. See Sayyid Muhammad Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1: 55.

54. Dar al-Ulum, *One Hundred Years of the Dar al-Ulum, Deoband*.
55. Faruqi, *The Deoband School*, p. 36.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-31; Manazir Ahsan Gilani, *Sawanih-e-Qasimi*, 1: 286.
57. Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1: 98, 101.
58. Faruqi, *The Deoband School*, p. 43.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46; Ikram, *Mauj-e-Kausar*, p. 201; Husain Ahmad Madni, *Naqsh-e-Hayat*, 1: 132.
60. Faruqi, p. 47; Madni, *Naqsh*, 1: 131-32; Husain Ahmad Madni, *Asir-e-Malta*, pp. 13-14; Report by R. Burn on his visit to the Malta internees, December 14, 1917, Home (Pol) B, 92-101, and KW, July 1918, NAI.
61. Muhammad Tayyib, *Dar al-Ulum, Deoband*, p. 63; Madni, *Naqsh*, 2: 144; Secret Note by the Collector of Saharanpur, November 13, 1915, Home (Pol) D, 47, January 1916, NAI.
62. Muhammad Sarwar, *Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi*, p. 18.
63. Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1: 131; Azizur Rahman, *Tazkira-e-Shaikh al-Hind*, pp. 46-47.
64. Report by R. Burn of his interview with Nasrat Husain, Malta, December 1917, Home (Pol) B, 92-101, and KW, July 1918, NAI.
65. Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1: 132; Rahman, *Tazkira*, pp. 168-69, 171-72.
66. The specific nineteenth-century movement in India was also known as the Indian Wahhabis. For studies of this movement, see Qeyamuddin Ahmad, *The Wahabi Movement in India*; and Ghulam Rasul Mahr, *Jamiat-e-Mujahidin and Sarguzasht-e-Mujahidin*.
67. Jamiat al-Ansar, *Qawaid wa Maqasid; Qawaid wa Maqasid-e-Qasim al-Ma'arif-e-Sind*; Rahman, *Tazkira*, pp. 152-54.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 174-75; Madni, *Naqsh*, 1: 144; Burn's interview with Nasrat Husain.
69. Confidential letter from R. Burn, Chief Secretary, Government of UP, to H. Wheeler, Home Secretary, Government of India, Allahabad, October 28, 1915, and attached note by C. R. Cleveland, Director CID, November 13, 1915, Home (Pol) D, 47, June 1916, NAI; Maulana Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad was awarded the honorific title Shams al-Ulama by the British in 1915. Home (Pol) D, 46, June 1916, NAI.
70. Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1: 136.
71. Abdul Ghaffar, *Hayat-e-Ajmal*.
72. Madni, *Naqsh*, 2: 199-200.
73. Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 32.
74. Rules of the Nazarat al-Ma'arif, *Mashriq* (Gorakhpur), July 1, 1913, UPNNR, 1913, pp. 689-90.

75. Ubaidullah Sindhi, *Khutbat-e-Sindhi*, p. 28, quoted in Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1:230 and Rahman, *Tazkira*, p. 176; Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 31.
76. Note by W. M. Hailey, November 27, 1915, Home (Pol) D, 47, June 1916, NAI.
77. Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1: 135; Faruqi, *The Deoband School*, p. 55.
78. Khaliqzaman, p. 31; Faruqi, pp. 59-62; Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1: 139-42, 200-3; Madni, *Naqsh*, 2: 137-43, 200; Madni, *Asir-e-Malta*, p. 21.
79. Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1: 138; Madni, *Asir-e-Malta*, p. 20; Statement by Mahmud al-Hasan to R. Burn, Malta, December 11, 1917, Home (Pol) B, 92-101, and KW, July 1918, NAI.
80. Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923*, pp. 103-4, 132-34.
81. Statement by Mahmud al-Hasan to R. Burn.
82. Mujeeb, *Indian Muslims*, pp. 407-8; Abdul Halim Sharrar, "Firangi Mahal aur an-Nizamiya," *An-Nizamiya* (Lucknow) (March 1915), 1(1): 1-4.
83. One catalogue of his works lists 110 separate items, most on *hadith*, jurisprudence, the life of the Prophet, and mysticism. Muhammad Inayatullah, *Hasrat al-Afaq ba Vafat-e-Majmua al-Akhlaq*, pp. 11-13.
84. ABP; *Nuqush* (Lahore) Khutut Number 109 (April-May 1968), 2: 5-277.
85. I am grateful to Francis Robinson for sharing his insights on Abdul Bari and the Firangi Mahal family with me; Inayatullah, *Hasrat al-Afaq*, pp. 10-11.
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
87. Majlis-e-Islah, *Ruidad wa Dastur al-Amal*.
88. Anjuman-e-Muid al-Islam, *Dastur al-Amal wa Maqasid*.
89. Abdul Majid went to the government-supported Canning College in Lucknow as a teacher of Arabic, and Abdul Hamid became Pesh-Imam of the Lucknow 'Id-Gah, a job secured via government patronage. The latter also was awarded the title of Shams al-Ulama by the government.
90. Maulana Barakatullah to Sir Harcourt Butler, Lucknow, June 1919, ABP; Jopling, Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow, to Turner, Commissioner of Lucknow, August 7, 1916, UPGAD, 178, 1914; UPED, 315, 1918, UPRR.
91. Inayatullah, *Hasrat al-Afaq*, p. 15.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 16; "Open Letter to the Muslims of India" (containing the program of the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba), ABP.
93. Muhammad Ali to Abdul Bari, Chhindwara, January 16, 1916, in *Khutut-e-Muhammad Ali*, pp. 1-8; Muhammad Ali, *My Life*, pp. 77-80.
94. Letterhead of the Anjuman, ABP.
95. R. Burn, Chief Secretary, Government of UP, to Government of India, September 17, 1913, Home (Pol) A, 100-18, October 1913, NAI.

Constitution of the proposed Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba, *Urdu-e-Mu'alla* (Aligarh), May-June 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 513-16.

96. List of branches of the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba, MAP; *UPNNR*, May-August 1913, *passim*.

97. Advertisement issued by the Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba during Ramzan, 1914; Shaukat Ali, Report of the Anjuman for the year 1913; "Open Letter to the Muslims of India" (containing the program of the Anjuman); Notice of a Ladies' Meeting of the Anjuman, November 6, 1913, ABP.

98. *Muslim Gazette* (Lucknow), July 2, 1913; *Mashriq* (Gorakhpur), May 13, 1913; *Kaisar-e-Hind* (Faizabad), July 16, 1914, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 484, 683; 1914, p. 803; Muhammad Ali to Talaat Bey, Ottoman Minister of the Interior, Delhi, July 8, 1914, MAP.

99. Shaukat Ali, Leaflet outlining the services of the Anjuman to pilgrims, 1913, ABP; Muhammad Ali, *My Life*, pp. 48-50.

100. Shaukat Ali, article in *Muslim Gazette* (Lucknow), July, 9, 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 700-1.

101. In Shaukat's annual report for 1913, the totals of income and expenditure plus balance did not correspond. Shaukat Ali, Report of the Anjuman for the year 1913, ABP; F. Isemonger, Assistant Director, CID, Note on the Anjuman, Delhi, February 20, 1914, Home (Pol) A, 46, May 1914, NAI.

102. M. Ayub Ali Meeruti, "Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba ka Foto" (July 1914); Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Bombay, 22 Rabiul-Awwal, 1333 A.H. (February 6, 1915); Maulana Taj Muhammad Pir Muhammad to Abdul Bari, Karachi, June 28, 1915, and draft of Abdul Bari's reply, ABP; Abdul Bari to the editor of *Hamdam* (Lucknow), November 9, 1916, *UPNNR*, 1916, p. 1013.

103. Abdul Bari to the Ottoman Sultan, August 31, 1914, ABP.

104. Inayatullah, *Hasrat al-Afaq*, pp. 19-20; Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 28.

105. Telegram from Abdul Bari to the Viceroy, *Bombay Chronicle*, June 26, 1916, ABP.

106. Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Chhindwara, June 30, 1916; Abdul Bari to Muhammad Ali, sometime in April 1917; Abdul Bari to Gandhi, in *Hamdam* (Lucknow), sometime in May or June 1918; Home (Pol) D, 6, September 1916, 9, July 1917 and 9, July 1918, NAI.

107. The sources on Azad give conflicting versions of his life, and he has left no less than three autobiographies: the first, a lyrical work written in Urdu during World War I; the second, purportedly dictated to a disciple in prison in the 1920s; and the third, in English, written in later life with the collaboration of his private secretary. For a discussion of the various sources on Azad, see Mushir ul-Haq, *Muslim Politics in Modern India*. The three autobiographies are: (1) *Tazkirah* (2d ed. Delhi: Sahitya

Academy, 1968), see M. Mujeeb, "The Tadhkirah: A Biography in Symbols," in Humayun Kabir, ed., *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: A Memorial Volume*, pp. 134-52; (2) Abul Kalam Azad as dictated to Abdur Razzaq Malehabadi, *Azad ki Kahani, khud Azad ki Zubani*; (3) Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*. The latter was compiled by Humayan Kabir, and the section on Azad's early life was greatly abridged. The full manuscript is on deposit in the NAI and will not be opened until thirty years after Azad's death (1987).

108. Abdur Razzaq Malehabadi, *Zikr-e-Azad*, pp. 118-20, 418.

109. History Sheet on Azad, Home (Pol), 45, 1921, NAI.

110. *Azad ki Kahani*, pp. 70-75, 190-92, 229-30, 271, 376; *Zikr*, pp. 255-58.

111. *Azad ki Kahani*, pp. 240, 253-54, 280-81, 308-310.

112. These dates are the few firm ones available for this period, based on the files of *an-Nadwa*, 2(8) (October 1905)-3(1) (March 1906)

113. For a more detailed study of Shibli Numani and the Nadwat al-Ulama, see my doctoral dissertation, "The Khilafat Movement: A Study of Indian Muslim Leadership, 1919-1924" (University of Pennsylvania, 1972), pp. 101-18. The standard biography of Shibli is Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, *Hayat-e-Shibli* (Azamgarh: Ma'arif Press, n.d.); another more critical work is S. M. Ikram, *Shibli Nama*.

114. *Azad ki Kahani*, p. 291; Ikram, *Shibli Nama*, p. 166.

115. *Azad ki Kahani*, pp. 292-95.

116. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, pp. 5-6; see *Azad ki Kahani*, pp. 299-300.

117. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*, pp. 226-44; Malcolm H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform*, pp. 153-86.

118. History Sheet on Azad.

119. *Zikr*, p. 260.

120. Fazlul Hasan "Hasrat" Mohani, *Kulliyat-e-Hasrat*, p. 152.

121. Azad, "Al-Hilal ki Dawat," *al-Hilal* (October 23, 1912), 1(15): 4.

122. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Quran*, 2 vols., Syed Abdul Latif, tr. and ed. (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962-67).

123. *Al-Hilal* (August 4, 1912), 1 (4): 4.

124. Azad wrote to Abdul Bari asking him to clear up some "strange news" he had heard, that Bari had called the editor of *al-Hilal* an infidel who had no knowledge of religious sciences. Azad to Abdul Bari, 29 Shawwal, 1330 A.H. (October 11, 1912), *Nuqush*, 2:35.

125. Azad, "Musulmanon ki Ainda Shahrah-e-Maqsud," *al-Hilal* (October 9, 1912-November 6, 1912), 1: 13-17.

126. *Al-Hilal* (August 4, 1912), 1(4): 4.

127. *Zikr*, pp. 418-19.

128. *Al-Hilal* (December 18, 1912), 1(23): 11.

129. *Al-Hilal* (September 1, 1912), 1(8): 2-3; Azad, "Al-Hilal Ki Politi-

cal Ta'lim ki Nisbat Ek Khat aur us ka Jawab," *Al-Hilal* (September 8, 1912), 1(9): 7; Azad, "Hamari Qaumi Salahkar," *Al-Hilal* (September 22, 1912), 1(11): 12.

130. *Al-Hilal* (February 19, 1913), 2(7): 105. For the circulation of *al-Hilal*, See note 47.

131. Shibli Numani, *Kulliyat-e-Shibli*, p. 53. For a further discussion of political poetry, see Gail Minault, "Urdu Political Poetry during the Khilafat Movement."

132. History Sheet on Azad; C. R. Cleveland, Director CID, Note re objectionable articles in *al-Hilal*, November 12, 1914, Home (Pol) A, 178-204, and KW, February 1915, NAI.

133. Note by S. H. Fremantle, Collector of Allahabad, November 21, 1915, Home (Pol) D, 6, December 1915, NAI.

134. S. P. O'Donnell, Education Secretary, UP, Report on Conditions at Aligarh, September 13, 1913, Educ A, 58-60, October 1913, NAI.

135. *Urdu-e-Mu'alla* (Aligarh), February-March and April 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 253, 451; R. Burn, Chief Secretary, UP, Report on the attitude of Muslims to the government, September 17 1913, Home (Pol) A, 100-18, October 1913, NAI.

136. O'Donnell, Appendix to Report on Conditions at Aligarh, September 13, 1913, Educ A, 58-60, October 1913, NAI.

137. *Muslim Gazette* (Lucknow), July 9, 16, and August 6, 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 704-5, 734-37, 816-17.

138. Meston to Muhammad Ali May 23, 1913, MAP; Meston to the Viceroy, July 24, 1913, Home (Pol) A, 100-18, October 1913, NAI.

139. *Muslim Gazette* (Lucknow), August 6, 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 815-16.

140. *Leader* (Allahabad), August 7, 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 793-94; Telegram from Meston to Private Secretary of the Viceroy, Bareilly, August 3, 1913; Minute by Sir James Meston on the Kanpur Mosque incident, August 21, 1913, Home (Pol) A, 100-18, October 1913, NAI.

141. *Comrade* (Delhi), August 9, 1913; *Muslim Gazette* (Lucknow), August 13, 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, p. 850; "Inquiry into the present state of Muslim feeling concerning the Caqnpore Mosque incident," September 1913, Home (Pol) A, 100-18, October 1913, NAI. For a more detailed treatment of the press reaction to the Kanpur Mosque incident, see Spencer Lavan, "The Kanpur Mosque Incident of 1913: The North Indian Muslim Press and Its Reaction to Community Crisis."

142. Inayatullah, *Hasrat al-Afaq*, pp. 17-19; Clipping from *The Outlook*, August 30, 1913, MAP; Telegram from Shafi to Sir James DuBoulay, Simla, August 18, 1913; Note by Sir Ali Imam, September 2, 1913, Home (Pol) A, 100-18, October 1913, NAI; Resolution by the Council of the Muslim League, Lucknow, August 31, 1913, MAP.

143. Note by Hardinge, September 8, 1913, Home (Pol) A, 100-18, October 1913, NAI; Hardinge to Butler, October 15, 1913, Butler Papers, Mss. Eur. F. 116/40, IOL; *Leader* (Allahabad), October 15, 22, 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 1112-13, 1145-47.

144. Shaukat Ali to Muhammad Ali, October 24, 1913, MAP; For more on the Kanpur Mosque incident, see Martin Yanuck, "The Kanpur Mosque Affair of 1913."

145. Tufail Ahmad Manglori, *Musulmanon ka Raushan Mustaqbil*, pp. 367-68; Sarojini Naidu, "Portrait of Jinnah," p. 6.

146. Manglori, *Musulmanon*, p. 372.

147. Naidu, "Portrait of Jinnah," pp. 2, 16.

148. *Muslim Gazette* (Lucknow), February 19, 1913; *Leader* (Allahabad), March 11, 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, pp. 172, 226.

149. *Al-Mushir* (Moradabad), July 4, 1913, *UPNNR*, 1913, p. 671; O'Donnell, Appendix to Report on Conditions at Aligarh, Educ A, 58-60, October 1913, NAI.

150. Butler commented acidly: "No Mahomedan can collect public funds apparently without the imputation. This is Pan-Islamism!" Butler Papers, Mss. Eur. F. 116/71, IOL.

151. Muhammad Ali and Wazir Hasan to Sir James La Touche, London, November 4, 1913, MAP.

152. Telegram from Muslim League Council, Lucknow, to Muhammad Ali and Wazir Hasan in London, October 3, 1913, MAP; Note by R. Hughes-Butler, CID, September 20, 1913, Home (Pol) B, 149, November 1913, NAI; Muhammad Ali to Shaukat Ali, London, October 24, 1913, MAP.

153. Amir Ali to Wazir Hasan, October 22, 1913, MAP.

154. Wazir Hasan to Amir Ali, October 24 and 29, 1913, MAP.

155. Agha Khan to Wazir Hasan, November 3, 1913, MAP.

156. Naidu, "Portrait of Jinnah," p. 8.

157. Mazhar Ansari, *Tarikh-e-Muslim League*, pp. 111-15.

158. Shibli, *Kulliyat*, p. 66.

159. *Comrade*, April 18, 1914, *Comrade Selections*, pp. 429-37; *AIG*, February 3, 1914, *UPNNR*, 1915, p. 115; One Hundred Old Boy Government Servants to Shaukat Ali, in *Report Committee Tahqiqat . . .*, app. II, pp. 135-38. I am indebted to David Lelyveld for the last reference.

160. Muhammad Ali, *My Life*, p. 49; Muhammad Ali to Abdul Bari, Delhi, *Nuqush*, 2: 16-18.

161. Text of a cable from Muhammad Ali and Dr. Ansari to Talaat Bey, accompanied by a note from C. R. Cleveland, Director, CID, to Muhammad Ali, Simla, August 24, 1914, MAP; Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 28.

162. Muhammad Ali, "Choice of the Turks," *Comrade*, September 16, 1914, in *Selected Writings and Speeches*, 1: 177-212.

163. Zafar Ali Khan was interned in late 1914 and Hasrat Mohani in early 1916. Shorish Kashmiri, *Zafar Ali Khan*, pp. 51-52; R. Burn, Chief Secretary, UP, to H. Wheeler, Home Secretary, Government of India, concerning Hasrat's arrest, May 24, 1916, Home (Pol) D, 23, June 1916, NAI.

164. W. M. Hailey, Chief Commissioner of Delhi, to H. Wheeler, Home (Pol) D, 36, May 1915; Internment order signed by Hailey, May 15, 1915, MAP; Decision to transfer the Ali brothers to Chhindwara in a note by R. Burn, October 6, 1915, Home (Pol) D, 33, October 1915, NAI.

165. Text of a government announcement concerning the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey, UPGAD, 509, 1914, UPRR.

166. Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Chhindwara, June 30, 1916; Abdul Bari to Muhammad Ali, sometime in April 1917, Home (Pol) D, 6, September 1916, and 9, July 1917, NAI.

167. H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, VI (1924), pp. 1-22, cited in Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1918-August 1920)."

168. For a text of the Lucknow Pact, see "The Congress-League Scheme of Reform, 1916," in Philips, ed., *Selected Documents*, 4: 171; for a discussion of the steps leading up to the pact, see Hugh Owen, "Negotiating the Lucknow Pact."

169. *Al-Bashir* (Etawah), October 26 and November 2, 1915; *Advocate* (Lucknow), October 28, 1915; *Mashriq* (Gorakhpur), November 2, 1915, UPNNR, 1915, pp. 1116-17, 1141-42.

170. Resolutions passed by the Muslim University Foundation Committee, Aligarh, April 8, 1917, Educ D, June 1917, NAI; Mahmudabad to Muhammad Ali, Lucknow, March 31, 1917, MAP

171. Muhammad Ali to Mahmudabad, Chhindwara, April 16, 1917, MAP.

172. Muhammad Ali to Mahmudabad, Aligarh, December 19, 1920, in *Tribune* (Lahore), December 23, 1920.

173. Muhammad Ali, *My Life*, pp. 88-91; Muhammad Ali to Gandhi, Chhindwara, February 20, 1918, MAP.

174. S. M. Chitnavis, Deputy Commissioner, to Muhammad Ali, Chhindwara, February 28, 1916; Reply by Shaukat Ali, February 29, 1916, MAP.

175. Innovations in the *khutba*, Friday prayers, UPGAD, 718, 1914, UPRR.

176. This group was composed of a number of elements from the Muslim League, which was by no means united behind the Lucknow Pact: government servants, Bombay merchants, a contingent from the Punjab Muslim League led by Mian Muhammad Shafi, and the Aftab group from Aligarh. Jinnah's allies were nationalist-oriented lawyers, chief among whom were Wazir Hasan and Raza Ali of UP, Mazharul Haq

of Bihar, and Fazlul Haq of Bengal. P. Biggane, UPGAD, Notes on the Congress-League Scheme, Allahabad, March 12, 1919, UPGAD, 423, 1918, UPRR; *TML*, pp. 140-48, 168-69; Owen, "Negotiating the Lucknow Pact."

177. Muhammad Ali to Maulvi Abdullah Ahmad, Lansdowne, November 19, 1915, MAP.

178. Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 33; D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, 1: 161.

179. F. Slocock, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, to H. Wheeler, Home Secretary, Government of India, Nagpur, March 17, 1916, Home (Pol) D, 38, March 1916, NAI; H. E. Hemingway, Deputy Commissioner, Chhindwara to Muhammad Ali, March 23 and April 1, 1916; Gandhi to Muhammad Ali, April 14, 1916, MAP.

180. *Indian Daily Telegraph* (Lucknow), June 29, 1916, UPNNR, 1916, p. 591; Sir Verney Lovett, *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement*, pp. 104-5.

181. Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Chhindwara, June 30, 1916, Home (Pol) D, 6, September 1916, NAI.

182. Biggane, Notes on the Congress-League Scheme, UPGAD, 423, 1918, UPRR; Naidu, "Portrait of Jinnah," p. 17.

183. "The Secretary of State's Announcement, August 20, 1917," in Philips, ed., *Selected Documents*, 4: 264.

184. Abdul Bari, Leaflet calling a meeting of ulama in Lucknow, 26 Zil-Hijja, 1335 A.H. (October 14, 1917); Abdul Bari to Viceroy, November 17, 1917, ABP.

185. UPNNR, September-December, 1917, *passim*; "Open Letter to Mrs. Besant from the Mother of the Ali Brothers," in *A Collection of Letters* (Delhi: Central Bureau for the Help of Muslim Internees, 1918), pp. 26-34; Biggane, Notes on the Congress-League Scheme.

186. Copies of the undertaking and the Ali brothers' reply, September 7, 1917, MAP.

187. *TML*, p. 189; Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, 1: 218.

188. Lovett, *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement*, pp. 143-50; *Agra Akhbar*, November 14, 1917; *Hamdam* (Lucknow), December 16, 1917, UPNNR, 1917, pp. 809, 889-90; Abdul Bari to Maulvi Tajuddin, Lucknow, October 13, 1917, ABP.

189. G. R. Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, pp. 72-76.

190. H. Ross, Officiating Inspector-General of Police, UP, Report on the disturbances during the Dussehra-Muharram festivals, 1917, UPGAD, 1917, UPRR; Reports on 'Id disturbances, 1918, UPGAD, 597 and 603, 1918, UPRR.

191. Anjuman-e-Muin al-Islam, Calcutta, Leaflet calling protest meetings for September 8-9, 1918; S. M. Dawood to Abdul Bari, Calcutta,

September 21 and October 12, 1918, ABP; see John Broomfield, "The Forgotten Majority: The Bengal Muslims and September 1918."

192. Dr. Ansari to Abdul Bari, n.d. (late 1918), *Nuqush*, 2: 102-3.

193. Kafayatullah had been a student of Mahmud al-Hasan at Deoband, and taught at the Madrasa-e-Aminiya in Delhi. Home (Pol), 366, 1930, NAI.

194. *Ajmal*, p. 185.

195. *TML*, pp. 206-12.

196. Central subjects were defense, foreign affairs, states' relations, communications, customs, commerce and banking, criminal law, census and surveys, and the control of the all-India services. Transferred (provincial) subjects were education, agriculture, public health, and local government. A third category of "reserved" subjects—under the jurisdiction of the provincial government executives—were law and order and land revenue. R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, p. 62; *TML*, pp. 197-200.

197. M. A. Ansari, *Speech Delivered by Dr. M. A. Ansari, Chairman, Reception Committee, at the 11th Session of the All-India Muslim League*.

198. *Ibid.*, p. 21; *Tribune* (Lahore), January 18, 1919.

199. *Bombay Chronicle*, January 2, 1919.

200. Butler to Chelmsford, July 31, 1918, Butler Papers, Mss. Eur. F. 116/49, IOL.

201. Wazir Hasan to Mahmudabad, July 20, 1917; Mahmudabad to Ali Imam, July 25, 1917, Ali Imam Papers, I, pp. 8-9, Karachi University Library. I am indebted to David Page for this reference.

202. CID Reports for January 1919, Home (Pol) B, 160-63, January 1919, NAI. The following year, Wazir Hasan was appointed a judicial commissioner in UP, and Mahmudabad acceded to the wishes of his old friend, Harcourt Butler, who had become lieutenant-governor of UP, by becoming Home Member in his government.

203. The two-man commission of inquiry was composed of Mr. B. Lindsay, the judicial commissioner of Oudh, and Justice Abdur Raul, ex-officiating judge of the Allahabad High Court, a firm loyalist. Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, *Freedom of Faith and Its Price* (London, privately printed, 1920); File dealing with the commission of inquiry, MAP; Iqbal, *Life and Times of Mahomed Ali*, pp. 128-32, Muhammad Ali, *My Life*, pp. 125-29.

204. *Independent* (Allahabad), April 15, 1919; Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Chhindwara, March 28, 1919, *Nuqush*, 2: 58-59.

205. Ali brothers to the Viceroy, Chhindwara, April 24, 1919, Home (Pol) A, 2-32, July 1919, NAI; Text of the letter reprinted in full in Iqbal, *Life and Times*, pp. 133-45.

206. Shaukat Ali to Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman, Chhindwara, May 10, 1919, Home (Pol) A, 2-32, July 1919, NAI; Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari

Chhindwara, May 1 and May 18, 1919, *Nuqush*, 2: 60-65; Muhammad Ali to Dr. Ansari, Chhindwara, May 12, 1919, Home (Pol) B, 494-497, June 1919; Report from Central Provinces, CID Reports for June 1919, Home (Pol) B, 701-4, June 1919, NAI.

## 2. EMERGENCE OF THE MOVEMENT, 1919-1920

1. *BC*, January 17, 29, February 24, and September 3, 1919; *Independent* (Allahabad), February 22-23, 1919; *Tribune* (Lahore), April 28, 1920; FRs for Second Half of January and Second Half of March 1919, Home (Pol) D, 42, February 1919, and 49, April 1919, NAI.

2. Saying different things to different audiences, according to their level of understanding, is by no means a new, or particularly devious, rhetorical technique. For a discussion of this tradition in an Islamic context, see Nikki R. Keddie, "Symbol and Sincerity in Islam."

3. Inayatullah, *Hasrat al-Afaq*, pp. 22-23; Ansari to Abdul Bari, March 22, 1918, ABP. Gandhi and Abdul Bari may have met earlier, at the Lucknow Congress and League meetings in Lucknow in 1916, but I have found no documentary evidence of this.

4. Abdul Bari to Gandhi, *Hamdam* (Lucknow), May 21, 1918, Home (Pol) D, 9, July 1918, NAI; see Abdul Bari to Gandhi, n.d., *Nuqush*, 2: 14-15.

5. Gandhi to Muhammad Ali, November 1918, Home (Pol) D, 3, December 1918, NAI. I am indebted to Judith M. Brown for this reference.

6. Gandhi to J. L. Maffey, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, January 1 1918, *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 14: 280-81.

7. See p. 59.

8. Notable were Annie Besant in Madras, Surendranath Banerjee in Calcutta, Mian Muhammad Shafi in Lahore, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari in Delhi, and Pandits Motilal Nehru and M. M. Malaviya in Allahabad. *BC*, February 6, 8, 14, and March 5, 1919; J. H. Broomfield, *Elite Conflict in a Plural Society*, p. 141, n. 34; *Ajmal*, pp. 199-200; *Independent*, February 5, 7, 1919; CID Report re Satyagraha Movement in UP, April 10, 1919, UPGAD, 262, 1919, UPRR.

9. Jinnah, Mazharul Haq, and Pandit Malaviya promptly resigned their Council seats in protest. *Independent*, April 2 and 7, 1919.

10. Chief Secretary, UP, to all Commissioners and District Magistrates, Lucknow, April 13, 1919; UP Government Report re Rowlatt Agitation, April 1919, UPGAD, 262, 1919, UPRR.

11. Satyagraha vow, *BC*, March 3, 1919; M. K. Gandhi, "Satyagraha—Meaning and Efficacy," in C. F. Andrews and Girija K. Mookerjee, *The Rise and Growth of Congress in India (1885-1920)*, app. A, pp. 185-86.

12. Gandhi's speech delivered at a meeting of Muslims in Bombay, May 10, 1919, in *Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement* (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1965), vol. 3, part 1, p. 125.

13. CID Report for March 1919, Home (Pol) B, 148-52, April 1919, NAI; CID Report re Satyagraha Movement in UP.

14. O. S. Ghate to Gandhi, Chhindwara, March 14, 1919, MAP; Gandhi to O. S. Ghate, May 8, 1919, *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 15: 290; Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Chhindwara, May 18, 1919, *Nuqush*, 2: 61-65; Gandhi to Muhammad and Shaukat Ali, Sabarmati Ashram Letters, no. 6622. I am indebted to Judith M. Brown for the last reference.

15. See especially Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers* (House of Commons and Command), 1920, vol. XIV, Cmnd. 687, "Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate Disturbances in the Punjab" (Hunter Committee Report); *Congress Punjab Inquiry Report, 1919-20* (Bombay: Karnatak Printing Press, 1920); Ravindar Kumar, ed., *Essays on Gandhian Politics: The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919*.

16. *BC*, April 1-2, 1919; *Independent*, April 6, 1919; Delhi Report, April 23, 1919, CID Reports for May 1919, Home (Pol) B, 494-97, June 1919, NAI. For an account of Swami Shradhanand's career, see Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations*.

17. *Independent*, April 15, 1919.

18. *Ibid.*, Extra, April 7, 1919; UP Government Report re Rowlatt Act Agitation, April 1919.

19. *Independent*, April 10, 1919; Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, 1: 248-49.

20. Reports from Punjab, March 31, 1919; Madras, April 20, 1919; UP, April 18, 1919; and Bihar, May 17, 1919, FRs for Second Half of March, First Half of April, and First Half of May 1919, Home (Pol) D, 49, April 1919, 46 and 48, July 1919, NAI.

21. Abdul Bari to Gandhi, May 10 and September 3, 1919, Sabarmati Ashram Letters, nos. 6603 and 6844. I am indebted to Judith M. Brown for these references.

22. *Independent*, July 11, 1919; Reports from Bombay, April 30-May 4, May 16-19, and UP, May 2, 1919, FRs for Second Half of April and First Half of May 1919, Home (Pol) D, 5, November 1919, NAI.

23. *Independent*, October 12, 1919; Bengal Report, FRs for First Half of November 1919, Home (Pol) D, 5, November 1919, NAI.

24. Adamec, *Afghanistan 1900-1923*, p. 112; the Amir's *firman* cited in Viceroy to Secretary of State, May 4, 1919, in Philips, ed., *Selected Documents*, 4: 491-92; proclamation by the viceroy, in *Independent*, May 13, 1919.

25. On hearing the news from the frontier, some Hindu merchants in Delhi began burying their jewels. Delhi Report, May 16, 1919, FRs for First Half of May 1919, Home (Pol) D, 48, July 1919, NAI.

26. Fazlul Haq was chosen interim president, and the secretary and

joint secretary were Sayyid Zahur Ahmad and Chaudhury Khaliquzaman, both young Lucknow lawyers favorable to the Ali group.

27. Sayyid Zahur Ahmad, *Annual Report to the All-India Muslim League for 1919; Independent*, November 18, 1919; *BC*, November 18, 1919.

28. Editorial, "The All-Indian Muslim League," *Independent*, April 20, 1919.

29. *BC*, March 20, 1919; *Independent*, March 26, 1919.

30. Editorial, "Mr. Montagu and the Muslims," *Independent*, June 8, 1919.

31. Chotani to Private Secretary of the Viceroy, Bombay, June 26, 1919; Reply by the Private Secretary, Simla, July 5, 1919, both in *Independent*, July 24, 1919.

32. This demand was tantamount to keeping the Ottoman Empire as it had been before the war. Justification for the *status quo ante bellum* demand was that suzerainty over the holy places included not only the Hijaz (for Mecca and Medina), but also Syria and Palestine (since Jerusalem is a holy place), and Mesopotamia (for the Shia shrines at Najaf and Kerbala). Mushir Husain Qidwai to the editor of *Morning Post* (London), Woking, Surrey, June 4, 1919, reprinted in *Independent*, July 18, 1919.

33. *TML*, p. 235.

34. Invitation to the All-India Muslim Conference, Lucknow, September 21, 1919, *Independent*, September 7, 1919; *BC*, September 9, 1919.

35. Jafar was member of the Imperial Legislative Council and president of the Anjuman-e-Islam of Poona. Mahmudabad to Sayyid Zahur Ahmad, Lucknow, September 5, 1919, *Independent*, September 16, 1919.

36. Khaliquzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 47-49. Ibrahim Harun Khan Jafar, *Khutba-e-Sadarat* (Presidential Address to the All-India Muslim Conference, Lucknow, September 21, 1919); UP Report, September 30, 1919, FRs for Second Half of September 1919, Home (Pol) D, 15, November 1919, NAI; Interview with Mahmudabad, *Independent*, March 16, 1920; Editorial, "The Raja of Mahmudabad's Position," *Tribune*, March 23, 1920.

37. Those present included Mahmudabad and Abdul Bari, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, barristers such as Fazlul Haq and Raza Ali, merchants such as Seth Chotani, Abbas Tyabji, the retired Chief Justice of Baroda, journalists such as Sayyid Husain, editor of Motilal Nehru's *Independent* of Allahabad, and Hasrat Mohani of *Urdu-e-Mu'alla* (Ali-garh), and a variety of ulama, as well as Sirs, Honorables, and Khan Bahadurs. *BC*, September 27, 1919.

38. *BC*, September 23, 1919; *Independent*, September 26, 1919; Khaliquzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 48.

39. *Independent*, October 12 and 16, 1919; *BC*, October 13 and 16, 1919; *Tribune*, October 17, 1919; Bombay Report, October 16, 1919, FRs for First Half of October 1919, Home (Pol) D, 14, November 1919, NAI.

12. Gandhi's speech delivered at a meeting of Muslims in Bombay, May 10, 1919, in *Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement* (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1965), vol. 3, part 1, p. 125.

13. CID Report for March 1919, Home (Pol) B, 148-52, April 1919, NAI; CID Report re Satyagraha Movement in UP.

14. O. S. Ghate to Gandhi, Chhindwara, March 14, 1919, MAP; Gandhi to O. S. Ghate, May 8, 1919, *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 15: 290; Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Chhindwara, May 18, 1919, *Nuqush*, 2: 61-65; Gandhi to Muhammad and Shaukat Ali, Sabarmati Ashram Letters, no. 6622. I am indebted to Judith M. Brown for the last reference.

15. See especially Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers* (House of Commons and Command), 1920, vol. XIV, Cmnd. 687, "Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate Disturbances in the Punjab" (Hunter Committee Report); *Congress Punjab Inquiry Report, 1919-20* (Bombay: Karnatak Printing Press, 1920); Ravindar Kumar, ed., *Essays on Gandhian Politics: The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919*.

16. *BC*, April 1-2, 1919; *Independent*, April 6, 1919; Delhi Report, April 23, 1919, CID Reports for May 1919, Home (Pol) B, 494-97, June 1919, NAI. For an account of Swami Shradhanand's career, see Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations*.

17. *Independent*, April 15, 1919.

18. *Ibid.*, Extra, April 7, 1919; UP Government Report re Rowlatt Act Agitation, April 1919.

19. *Independent*, April 10, 1919; Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, 1: 248-49.

20. Reports from Punjab, March 31, 1919; Madras, April 20, 1919; UP, April 18, 1919; and Bihar, May 17, 1919, FRs for Second Half of March, First Half of April, and First Half of May 1919, Home (Pol) D, 49, April 1919, 46 and 48, July 1919, NAI.

21. Abdul Bari to Gandhi, May 10 and September 3, 1919, Sabarmati Ashram Letters, nos. 6603 and 6844. I am indebted to Judith M. Brown for these references.

22. *Independent*, July 11, 1919; Reports from Bombay, April 30-May 4, May 16-19, and UP, May 2, 1919, FRs for Second Half of April and First Half of May 1919, Home (Pol) D, 5, November 1919, NAI.

23. *Independent*, October 12, 1919; Bengal Report, FRs for First Half of November 1919, Home (Pol) D, 5, November 1919, NAI.

24. Adamec, *Afghanistan 1900-1923*, p. 112; the Amir's *firman* cited in Viceroy to Secretary of State, May 4, 1919, in Philips, ed., *Selected Documents*, 4: 491-92; proclamation by the viceroy, in *Independent*, May 13, 1919.

25. On hearing the news from the frontier, some Hindu merchants in Delhi began burying their jewels. Delhi Report, May 16, 1919, FRs for First Half of May 1919, Home (Pol) D, 48, July 1919, NAI.

26. Fazlul Haq was chosen interim president, and the secretary and

joint secretary were Sayyid Zahur Ahmad and Chaudhury Khaliqzaman, both young Lucknow lawyers favorable to the Ali group.

27. Sayyid Zahur Ahmad, *Annual Report to the All-India Muslim League for 1919; Independent*, November 18, 1919; *BC*, November 18, 1919.

28. Editorial, "The All-Indian Muslim League," *Independent*, April 20, 1919.

29. *BC*, March 20, 1919; *Independent*, March 26, 1919.

30. Editorial, "Mr. Montagu and the Muslims," *Independent*, June 8, 1919.

31. Chotani to Private Secretary of the Viceroy, Bombay, June 26, 1919; Reply by the Private Secretary, Simla, July 5, 1919, both in *Independent*, July 24, 1919.

32. This demand was tantamount to keeping the Ottoman Empire as it had been before the war. Justification for the *status quo ante bellum* demand was that suzerainty over the holy places included not only the Hijaz (for Mecca and Medina), but also Syria and Palestine (since Jerusalem is a holy place), and Mesopotamia (for the Shia shrines at Najaf and Kerbala). Mushir Husain Qidwai to the editor of *Morning Post* (London), Woking, Surrey, June 4, 1919, reprinted in *Independent*, July 18, 1919.

33. *TML*, p. 235.

34. Invitation to the All-India Muslim Conference, Lucknow, September 21, 1919, *Independent*, September 7, 1919; *BC*, September 9, 1919.

35. Jafar was member of the Imperial Legislative Council and president of the Anjuman-e-Islam of Poona. Mahmudabad to Sayyid Zahur Ahmad, Lucknow, September 5, 1919, *Independent*, September 16, 1919.

36. Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 47-49. Ibrahim Harun Khan Jafar, *Khutba-e-Sadarat* (Presidential Address to the All-India Muslim Conference, Lucknow, September 21, 1919); UP Report, September 30, 1919, FRs for Second Half of September 1919, Home (Pol) D, 15, November 1919, NAI; Interview with Mahmudabad, *Independent*, March 16, 1920; Editorial, "The Raja of Mahmudabad's Position," *Tribune*, March 23, 1920.

37. Those present included Mahmudabad and Abdul Bari, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, barristers such as Fazlul Haq and Raza Ali, merchants such as Seth Chotani, Abbas Tyabji, the retired Chief Justice of Baroda, journalists such as Sayyid Husain, editor of Motilal Nehru's *Independent* of Allahabad, and Hasrat Mohani of *Urdu-e-Mu'alla* (Ali-garh), and a variety of ulama, as well as Sirs, Honorables, and Khan Bahadurs. *BC*, September 27, 1919.

38. *BC*, September 23, 1919; *Independent*, September 26, 1919; Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 48.

39. *Independent*, October 12 and 16, 1919; *BC*, October 13 and 16, 1919; *Tribune*, October 17, 1919; Bombay Report, October 16, 1919, FRs for First Half of October 1919, Home (Pol) D, 14, November 1919, NAI.

40. *BC*, October 18, 1919; Madras Report, November 3, 1919, FRs for Second Half of October 1919, Home (Pol) D, 16, November 1919, NAI.
41. *Tribune*, October 19, 1919; Bengal Report, FRs for Second Half of October 1919, Home (Pol) D, 16, November 1919, NAI.
42. *Independent*; *BC*; *Tribune*, all October 22, 1919.
43. *BC*, October 23, 1919; Seth Haji Abdullah Harun, *Khilafat Day in Sind* (Karachi: Sind Provincial Khilafat Committee, 1919).
44. Haq's inaugural address, originally drafted by Asaf Ali of the Delhi Khilafat Committee, was deemed too outspoken by the Bengali leader, and he refused to deliver it. Finally, Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, a young journalist, produced a draft that was read, mostly by the Qazi himself. Delhi Report, December 2, 1919, FRs for Second Half of November 1919, Home (Pol) D, 5, January 1920, NAI; *Bombay HFM*, vol. 3, part 1, p. 237.
45. This committee included, among others, Maulana Abdul Bari, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Fazlul Haq, and Hasrat Mohani.
46. This group included the raja of Mahmudabad, Fazlul Haq, Raza Ali, Sayyid Husain, Dr. Ansari, Seth Chotani, and Maulana Abdul Bari, quite a cross-section of Muslim opinion. They never went, but were supplanted by Muhammad Ali's delegation. *BC*, November 25, 1919; *Tribune*, November 29, 1919; *Bombay HFM*, vol. 3, part I, pp. 239-40.
47. Khaliquzzaman, p. 50; *Independent*, November 29, 1919; *BC*, November 26, 1919; *Bombay HFM*, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 240-41.
48. CID Reports for October 1919, Home (Pol) B, 360-63, October 1919, NAI.
49. Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations*, "Cow and Conflict," pp. 76-88.
50. Ibn-e-Ahmad, Barrister-at-Law, to Dr. Ansari, Allahabad, December 20, 1919, Ansari Papers, JMI; Bombay Reports, December 3-11, 1919, and January 3, 1920, FRs for Second Half of November and Second Half of December 1919, Home (Pol) D, 5 and 45, January 1920, NAI.
51. Abdul Bari to unnamed person, sometime in early 1919, ABP.
52. Abdul Bari, "Presidential Address to the Anjuman-e-Ulama, Bengal, Chittagong," *an-Nizamiya* (Lucknow) (December 1918), 4(9): 1-13.
53. Abdul Bari, *Khutba-e-Sadarat (Presidential Address to the Anjuman-e-Ulama, U.P., Kanpur, 14 Rajab, 1338 A.H. [April 1, 1920])* pp. 1-2.
54. The annual *urs*, or commemoration of the death of a Sufi saint, is the occasion for a pilgrimage of devotees to his tomb. The shrine of Muinuddin Chishti is one of the most important Sufi shrines in India, and the Chishti order of Sufis one of the oldest established orders in the subcontinent. Abdul Bari was a Chishti, with links to Ajmer. His words thus had considerable influence with the pilgrims there. Report of a public meeting in Ajmer, April 4, 1919, to consider the question of the

- Khilafat, attended by pilgrims to the *urs* and presided over by the Diwan of the Dargah Sharif, Ajmer, ABP; *Independent*, April 27, 1919.
55. Abdul Bari, *Ulama-e-Hind ka Fatwa Masala-e-Khilafat Par*; UP Report, February 19, 1919, FRs for the First Half of February 1919, Home (Pol) D, 16, March 1919; CID Reports for March 1919, Home (Pol) B, 148-52, April 1919, NAI.
56. Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad to Abdul Bari, 10 and 22 Jumada al-Awwal, and 22 Jumada us-Sani, 1337 A. H. (February 11, 23, and March 25, 1919), ABP; UP Report, March 6, 1919, FRs for Second Half of February 1919, Home (Pol) D, 17, March 1919, NAI.
57. Maulana Muhammad Sulaiman to Maulana Salamattullah, Gawa 27 Rabi-us-Sani, 1337 A. H. (January 30, 1919), ABP; CID List of Names of Maulvis signing Abdul Bari's *fatwa*, March 15, 1919, Home (Pol) B, 415-26, August 1919, NAI; *Independent*, March 22, 1919.
58. "Proceedings of the Jamiat al-Ulama Meeting, Delhi, November 25, 1919," Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind, *Mukhtasar Halat-e-Imiqad-e-Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind*, pp. 2-5; Sayyid Muhammad Mian, *Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind Kya Hai?* 2: 5-8.
59. "Proceedings of the Jamiat al-Ulama Meeting, Amritsar, December 28, 1919," Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind, *Mukhtasar Halat*, pp. 6-11; Mian Jamiat, 2: 8-12.
60. "Asasi Usul o Aghaz o Maqasid o Zawabit-e-Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind." Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind, *Mukhtasar Halat*, p. 16; Mian, *Jamiat*, 2: 16.
61. Mian, *Jamiat*, 1: 10ff.; Faruqi, *The Deoband School*, pp. 68-69.
62. Mian, *Jamiat*, 2: 13-14.
63. "Proceedings of the Jamiat al-Ulama Meeting, Amritsar, January 1, 1920," Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind, *Mukhtasar Halat*, p. 14; Mian, *Jamiat*, 2: 15.
64. *Tribune*, December 29, 1919; Abdul Majid Daryabadi, *Muhammad Ali: Zati Diary ke Chand Warq*, 1: 81; Muhammad Ali to Pande, Rampur, January 3, 1920, MAP.
65. *TML*, pp. 264-65; *Bombay HFM*, vol. 3, part 1, p. 250.
66. *Tribune*, January 6, 1920.
67. *BC*, December 30, 1919; Hakim Ajmal Khan, *Khutba-e-Sadarat* Presidential Address, All-India Muslim League, Amritsar, December 29, 1919; *Ajmal*, pp. 213-18; *TML*, pp. 253-60; Sayyid Zahur Ahmad, *Annual Report of the All-India Muslim League for 1919*, p. 5.
68. *Independent*, *Tribune*, both January 6, 1920.
69. *Independent*, January 9, 1920.
70. For these demands, see the summary of the Khilafat deputations's demands to the viceroy, p. 86.
71. *Independent*, January 11 and 13, 1920.
72. Letter issued by Hakim Ajmal Khan, President, and Tajuddin,

Secretary, All-India Atiya Qaumi Ali Baradaran, Delhi, January 8, 1920, ABP; BC, March 9, 1920.

73. *Tribune*, January 14, 1920; Punjab Report, January 15, 1920, FRs for First Half of January 1920, Home (Pol) D, 78, January 1920, NAI.

74. At the All-India Khilafat Conference in Bombay on February 15-17, 1920, it was announced that subscriptions promised the Khilafat Fund were as follows: Sindh, 5 lakhs; Bengal, 4 lakhs; UP, 4 lakhs; and Bombay, 11 lakhs. There was obviously some delay in collecting these pledges. CID Reports for January 1920, Home (Pol) D, 52, February 1920; Bombay Reports, January 17-21, 1920, January 31-February 2, 1920, and February 17-28, 1920, FRs for January and February 1920, Home (Pol) D, 78, 79, January 1920, and 88, 89, July 1920, NAI.

75. Azad to Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Ranchi, January 3, 1920, in Ghulam Rasul Mahr, ed., *Tabarrukat-e-Azad*, pp. 103-6; CID Reports for June 1920, Home (Pol) D, 13, July 1920, NAI.

76. *Asar*, p. 48; Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 52-53.

77. Prominent signers of the petition were Ansari, Ajmal Khan, the Ali brothers, Azad, Abdul Bari, Jinnah, Mahmudabad, Gandhi, Swami Shradhanand, Pandit Malaviya, and Motilal Nehru.

78. Text of the address presented by the Khilafat Deputation to the viceroy, *Independent*, January 21-22, 1920.

79. Text to the viceroy's reply to the Muslim Khilafat deputation, January 19, 1920. *Independent*, January 21, 1920.

80. *Independent*, *Tribune*, both January 22, 1920.

81. Husain, who had moved the noncooperation resolution at the November Khilafat Conference, had frequently differed with Pandit Motilal Nehru over editorial policy at the *Independent*. The Pandit felt, "Syud . . . will soon put the *Independent* in hot water just for the sake of a strong adjective." Motilal Nehru to Jawaharlal Nehru, Nainital, June 5, 1919, Nehru Papers, NM.

82. Inayatullah, *Hasrat al-Afaq*, pp. 26-27; Daryabadi, *Muhammad Ali*, pp. 81-83.

83. The Khilafat delegation in England was later enlarged by a few others from India, including Mushir Husain Qidwai from Lucknow, and they were backed by Muslims resident in London, such as Amir Ali and his Red Crescent organization. The enmity between Amir Ali and Muhammad Ali seems to have been overcome by their common concern for the fate of the Khilafat. Abdur Rahman Siddiqi to Shaukat Ali, April 29 and May 13, 1920; Muhammad Ali to Shaukat Ali, Paris, June 25, 1920, and London, August 12, 1920, MAP.

84. M. H. Abbas, *All about the Khilafat*, pp. 88-104. The government eventually turned down their request to send a delegation to Middle Eastern countries.

85. Muhammad Ali, *Selected Writings and Speeches*, 2: 19.

86. Rafiqur Rahman, *Muhammad Ali, Life and Speeches*, pp. 90, 108.

87. Text of interview between Indian Khilafat delegation and the prime minister, Lloyd George, March 17, 1920, in Rahman, pp. 86-108.

88. Cable to Chotani mentioned in Muhammad Ali to Shaukat Ali, London, March 11, 1920, MAP; for the pamphlet series, see Indian Khilafat Delegation listings in the bibliography.

89. Muhammad Ali to Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay, cables dated London, August 4 and 29, 1920, MAP.

90. Muhammad Ali, "A People's Right to Live," speech delivered in Essex Hall, London, March 23, 1920, in *Selected Writings and Speeches*, 2: 20-21.

91. Muhammad Ali to editors of *Morning Post* and *Daily Telegraph* (London), March 23, 1920, in Muhammad and Shaukat Ali, *Freedom of Faith and Its Price*, pp. 27-28.

92. Muhammad Ali to Shaukat Ali, London, May 6, 1920, MAP. Muhammad Ali's dedication to both Islam and Indian nationalism was eloquently summarized by him in a statement before the round table conference in London, at the very end of his life:

I have a culture, a polity, an outlook on life—a complete synthesis which is Islam. Where God commands I am a Muslim first, a Muslim second, and a Muslim last, and nothing but a Muslim. . . . But where India is concerned, where India's freedom is concerned, I am an Indian first, an Indian second, and nothing but an Indian. . . . I belong to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric. One is India, and the other is the Muslim world . . . . We as Indian Muslims . . . belong to these two circles . . . and we can leave neither.

Muhammad Ali, *Selected Writings and Speeches*, 2: 465

93. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, pp. 100-2.

94. *Independent*, October 9, 1920; BC, October 7, 1920; *Mussalman* (Calcutta), October 15, 1920, Bengal NNR (July-December, 1920), pp. 421-422.

95. Report on the All-India Khilafat Conference, Bombay, February 15-17, 1920, Home (Pol) D, 30, March 1920, NAI.

96. P. C. Bamford, *Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements*, p. 150.

97. Text of the Khilafat Manifesto, *Tribune*, March 2, 1920; *IAR 1921*, pp. 10, 161-62.

98. Jamiat-e-Khilafat, *Dastur-e-Asasi-e-Jamiat-e-Khilafat-e-Hind*.

99. *IAR 1921*, pp. 99-100; Bengal Report, FRs for Second Half of February 1920, Home (Pol) D, 89, July 1920, NAI.

100. Abul Kalam Azad, *Masala-e-Khilafat wa Jazirat al-Arab*, *passim*. English translation, Mirza Abdul Qadir Beg, *Khilafat and Jazirat al-Arab* (Bombay: Central Khilafat Committee, 1920).

101. See Gibb, "Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate," in *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, pp. 142-43; Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, pp. 38-43.
102. Azad's equation of *khalifa* with *imam*, however, is one with which Shias would surely differ.
103. Azad, *Masala-e-Khilafat*.
104. *Ibid.* *Tark-e-mawalat*, his term, meaning "abandonment of friendship," can also be translated as "noncooperation."
105. Azad, *Masala-e-Khilafat*.
106. *BC*, March 3, 1920; *Independent*, March 3, 1920; Bengal Report for Second Half of February 1920, Home (Pol) D, 89, July 1920, NAI.
107. Copy of a letter from Abdul Bari, Azad, Shaukat Ali, and Mushir Husain Qidwai in Calcutta to Chotani in Bombay; Cable from G. M. Bhurgri to Amir Ali, CID Reports for March 1920, Home (Pol) D, 89, March 1920, NAI.
108. Bombay Report, March 16, 1920, FRs for First Half of March 1920, Home (Pol) D, 90, July 1920, NAI; Abdul Bari to Chotani, March 11 and 13, 1920, ABP.
109. Gandhi to the editor of *Bombay Chronicle*, Sabarmati Ashram, March 7, 1920, *BC*, March 9, 1920.
110. *Ibid.*, March 20, 1920; *Independent*, March 21, 1920.
111. *BC*, March 20, 1920
112. Translation of the text of a special Khilafat prayer offered in Lucknow mosques on March 19, 1920, Home (Pol) B, 48, April 1920, NAI.
113. *Independent*, March 25, 1920.
114. Sayyid Raza Ali, "The Khilafat and the Shia Mujtahids," *Independent*, March 26, 1920; S. Raza Ali to the Viceroy, Allahabad, June 29, 1920, *BC*, June 30, 1920.
115. Mahmudabad to Shaukat Ali, Delhi, March 18, 1920, *Tribune*, March 21, 1920; Editorial, "The Raja of Mahmudabad's Position," *Tribune*, March 23, 1920.
116. *BC*, March 24, 1920; *Independent*, March 25 and 27, 1920; Notes re Meerut Khilafat Conference, March 21-23, 1920, Home (Pol) D, 49, October 1920, NAI.
117. Notes re Gandhi, Pan-Islam, and the Hindu-Muslim Entente, CID Reports for May 1920, Home (Pol) D, 78, June 1920, NAI.
118. Notes re Meerut Khilafat Conference, Home (Pol) D, 49, October 1920, NAI.
119. Message of H.E. the Viceroy to the Muslim People of India, May 15, 1920, *IAR 1921*, p. 185; *Independent*, May 23, 1920.
120. Message from Gandhi after the decision of the San Remo Conference on the Turkish Treaty, *Independent*, May 2, 1920; Editorial, "The Turkish Peace and Non-Cooperation," *Tribune*, May 21, 1920.
121. Abdul Bari to Shaukat Ali, Lucknow, May 14, 1920, Home (Pol)

- D, 112, June 1920, NAI.
122. Abbas, *All about the Khilafat*, pp. 351, 345.
123. *Independent*, May 18 and 25, 1920.
124. G. M. Bhurgri, Badruddin Abdullah Koor, Mirza Ali Muhammad Khan, Rahmatullah Chinoy, and Sir Fazilbhai Currimbhai, all members of the Central Khilafat Committee in Bombay, resigned following this meeting. *Hindu* (Madras), May 21, 1920; *Independent*, May 23, 1920. Other members of the Khilafat Committee Executive Council were Seth Chotani, president, Shaukat Ali, secretary, Abdul Bari, Abul Kalam Azad, Seth Haji Abdullah Harun, Dr. Ansari, Hasrat Mohani, Yaqub Hasan of Madras, and Pandit Rambhuj Dutt Chaudhuri of Lahore. List of Members of the Executive Council of the Central Khilafat Committee, n.d., ABP.
125. *Tribune*, May 16, 1920; Bombay Reports, May 16 and June 1, 1920, FRs for May 1920, Home (Pol) D, 94 and 95, July 1920, NAI.
126. Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Bombay, May 18, 1920, *Nuqush*, 2: 67-69; Extract from a report by the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, on the Khilafat Agitation up to August 3, 1920, Home (Pol) D, 31, August 1920, NAI.
127. Invitation to the All-India Khilafat Conference, Allahabad, dated Bombay, May 23, 1920, *Nuqush*, 2: 75-77.
128. *IAR 1921*, p. 115; Note re All-India Congress Committee and Khilafat meetings in Benares and Allahabad, CID Reports for June 1920, Home (Pol) D, 13, July 1920, NAI; *Jamnabhum* (Masulipatnam), 1: 28-29 (June 17 and 24, 1920).
129. UP Report, June 16, 1920, FRs for First Half of June 1920, Home (Pol) D, 96, July 1920; Proceedings of the Joint and Central Khilafat Conferences held in Allahabad, June 1-3, 1920, Home (Pol) B, 109, July 1920, NAI.
130. *Ibid.*; *BC*, *Independent*, both June 3, 1920.
131. Of 300 delegates to the Allahabad meeting, 200 were from UP, where the Bombay merchants had little influence, and the Alis and Abdul Bari were strong. Home (Pol) B, 109, July 1920, NAI.
132. Included in the committee were Gandhi, Shaukat Ali, Hasrat Mohani, Dr. Kitchlew of Amritsar, Hakim Abu Yusuf Isfahani, a Bombay Shia, and Haji Ahmad Siddiq Khatri, the other secretary, with Shaukat, of the Central Khilafat Committee.
133. Resolutions passed by the Central Khilafat Conference, Allahabad, June 2, 1920, *IAR 1921*, p. 195; *BC*, June 5, 1920; Home (Pol) B, 109, July 1920, NAI.
134. *Letters from the Central Khilafat Committee of India and Mahatma Gandhi to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India*, June 22, 1920; Bombay Report, June 16-17, 1920, FRs for First Half of June 1920, Home (Pol) D, 96, July 1920, NAI.

135. Note re Deoband and Non-Cooperation, CID Reports for May 1920, Home (Pol) D, 78, June 1920, NAI; Habibur Rahman Usmani, *Khutba-e-Sadarat* (Presidential Address at the Muzaffarnagar District Khilafat Committee meeting, May 7, 1920).

136. *BC*, June 9, 1920; Bombay Report, June 16-17, 1920; Madni, *Naqsh*, 2: 235-36.

137. Madni, *Naqsh*, 2: 235-36; Rahman, *Tazkira*, pp. 283-86; Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq*, 1: 209-13; *Independent*, July 21, 1920.

138. *Zikr*, p. 24.

139. Notably by Gandhi during the Bari-Gandhi interviews in March 1919. Bombay Secret Abstracts, Special Branch, Delhi, May 3, 1919, in *Bombay HFM*, vol. 3, part 1, p. 139.

140. Abdul Bari to Abdur Razzaq Malehabadi, in *Zikr*, p. 37.

141. Text of a telegram by Abdul Bari, n.d. (at the time of the special Congress, September 1920), ABP.

142. *Zikr*, pp. 35-36, 39. It is risky to accept the testimony of only one source for any of Azad's activities, but the government too felt certain that Azad wanted the title of imam for himself. CID Reports for June 1920, Home (Pol) D, 13, July 1920, NAI.

143. Bombay Report, February 17-28, 1920, FRs for First Half of February 1920, Home (Pol) D, 88, June 1920; Vivian, Assistant Director, CID, Report on Muslim Situation in Sindh, June 5, 1916, Home (Pol) A, 193-94, and KW, September 1916; Karachi CID Report, April 1, 1920, Home (Pol) A, 342, and KW, May 1920, NAI. I am indebted to Judith M. Brown for the last reference.

144. Bombay Report, March 1-9, 1920, FRs for Second Half of February 1920, Home (Pol) D, 89, June 1920, NAI.

145. Karachi CID Report, April 1, 1920; Bombay Report, July 16-18, 1920, FRs for First Half of July 1920, Home (Pol) D, 105, July 1920, NAI.

146. Note re All-India Congress Committee and Khilafat meetings in Benares and Allahabad, CID Reports for June 1920, Home (Pol) D, 13, July 1920, NAI.

147. Abdul Bari's *fatwa* stated: "Every Muslim residing here should adopt non-cooperation, but if [that is] impossible, should proceed for *hijrat*." Statement dated August 18, 1920, ABP. And in a letter to the Khilafat Conference, Hyderabad, Sindh, he said that *hijrat* was lawful but not obligatory, and that "the majority of ulama is of the opinion that either non-cooperation or *hijrat* should be acted upon." *Independent*, July 24, 1920. Azad's *fatwa* appeared in the daily *Ahl-e-Hadith* of Amritsar on July 30, 1920, and is reproduced in Mahr, ed., *Tabarrukat*, pp. 203-6, English translation in Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*, app. B, pp. 343-44.

148. Northwest Frontier Province Report, August 14, 1920, FRs for

First Half of August 1920, Home (Pol) D, 11, August 1920, NAI; *Tribune*, August 21, 1920; *BC*, September 10, 1920.

149. Shaukat Ali to the press, *BC*, July 5, 1920.

150. Resolutions passed at a meeting of the Central Khilafat Committee, August 10, 1920, *Tribune*, August 13, 1920; Editorial, "Hijrat," *BC*, September 21, 1920.

151. See p. 98. Prominent in this subcommittee were Maulanas Salamattullah of Firangi Mahal, Abdul Majid Badauni, Azad Subhani of Kanpur, Abdul Kalam Azad, Daud Ghaznavi, and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani of Deoband. Resolutions passed at August 10, 1920, meeting of the Khilafat Committee, *Tribune*, August 13, 1920; Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Bombay, July 7, 1920, *Nuqush*, 2: 70.

152. *Independent*, August 22, 1920.

153. Editorial, "The Khilafat and Non-Cooperation," *Tribune*, June 11, 1920; M. Gandhi, *The Khilafat Question*, 1 (July 21, 1920), 5 (August 18, 1920).

154. Babu Bhagwan Das to President, All-India Congress Committee, Benares, August 31, 1920, AICC Papers, File 13/1920, NM; Report re Current Politics, CID Reports for August 1920, Home (Pol) D, 110, August 1920, NAI.

155. Editorial, "The Special Congress and Non-Cooperation" (quoting a speech by Gandhi in Madras), *Tribune*, August 20, 1920.

156. Copy of a telegram from Abdul Bari to Gandhi, n.d. (late July, 1920), ABP; same telegram mentioned in Report by the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, August 3, 1920, Home (Pol) D, 110, August 1920, NAI.

157. *Tribune*, July 18, 1920; *BC*, July 27, 1920; Punjab Report, July 31, 1920, FRs for Second Half of July 1920, Home (Pol) D, 106, July 1920, NAI.

158. *BC*, August 2, 1920; Report by Commissioner of Police Bombay, August 3, 1920; Bombay Report, August 16-17, 1920, FRs for First Half of August 1920, Home (Pol) D, 11, August 1920, NAI.

159. *Tribune*, August 10, 1920; *BC*, August 17, 1920; Gandhi, *The Khilafat Question* (September 1, 1920), 8: 8-16; Report from Bombay, August 31-September 1, 1920; Bihar, September 3, 1920; and Bengal, FRs for Second Half of August 1920, Home (Pol) D, 112, August 1920, NAI; Notice of the Bihar Provincial Congress Meeting, Bhagalpur, August 28-29, 1920, ABP.

### 3. NONCOOPERATION AND MASS MOBILIZATION, 1920-1921

1. M. Gandhi, "Swaraj in One Year," *The Khilafat Question* (September 22, 1920), 10: 3-7.
2. Jawaharlal Nehru conjectured that since the word *khilaf* in Urdu means "against" or "opposed to," people in rural areas thought the Khilafat movement meant "opposed to the government," and had no idea of the caliphate. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Autobiography*, p. 69.
3. *TML*, p. 274; *IAR 1921*, pp. 217-18; Bengal Report re the Special Congress, FRs for First Half of September 1920, Home (Pol) D, 70, September 1920, NAI.
4. *Tribune*, September 9, 1920; *IAR 1921*, p. 236; Bengal Report re the Special Congress, Home (Pol) D, 70, September 1920, NAI.
5. Lala Lajpat Rai, "Presidential Address at the Special Congress, Calcutta, September 4, 1920, *IAR 1921*, pp. 67-68.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 80; *Tribune*, September, 5, 1920; Bengal Report re Special Congress, Home (Pol) D, 70, September 1920, NAI.
7. For a detailed account of Bengali politicians' attitudes at this time, see Broomfield, "The Non-Cooperation Decision of 1920: A Crisis in Bengal Politics," esp. p. 241.
8. *BC*, September 8, 1920; *IAR 1921*, p. 105; Bengal Report re Special Congress, Home (Pol) D, 70, September 1920, NAI; *Ajmal*, pp. 230-31.
9. *BC*, September 9 and 11, 1920; Gandhi, *The Khilafat Question* (September 15, 1920), 9: 3-11.
10. *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), September 10, 1920, *Bengal NNR* (July-December 1920), pp. 300-2; *Independent*, September 17, 1920; R. A. Gordon, "Non-Cooperation and Council Entry, 1919-1920."
11. Bombay Report, September 16-20, 1920, FRs for First Half of September 1920, Home (Pol) D, 70, September 1920, NAI; *BC*, September 11, 1920.
12. *BC*, September 11, 1920.
13. *BC*, October 8, 1920; *IAR 1921*, pp. 125-28.
14. *Tribune*, October 15, 1920.
15. Nine Trustees to Sayyid Muhammad Ali, honorary secretary of Aligarh College, October 12, 1920, signed by Shaukat and Muhammad Ali, Dr. M. A. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Muazzam Ali, Amir Mustafa Khan, Haji Muhammad Musa Khan, Muhammad Ismail Khan, and Sayyid Zahur Ahmad, in *Independent*, October 15, 1920.
16. Dr. Ziauddin to the parents of Aligarh Students, in *Tribune*, October 21, 1920.
17. *BC*, October 28, 1920.
18. *BC*, October 29, 1920; *Tribune*, October 30, 1920; UP Report,

- November 2, 1920, FRs for Second Half of October 1920, Home (Pol) D, 66, December 1920, NAI.
19. *AIG*, November 1, 1920; *Independent*, October 27, 1920.
20. Mahmud al-Hasan, *Khutba-e-Sadarat aur Fatwa-e-Tark-e-Mawalat*; Abdul Ghaffar Madhawi, *Jamia ki Kahani*.
21. *AIG*, November 1, 2, and 4, 1920; *BC*, November 5, 1920; UP Report, November 2, 1920, Home (Pol) D, 66, December 1920, NAI.
22. Sayyid Abid Husain, "Jamia Millia ke Maqasid," *Jauhar*, Jamia Jubilee Number (Delhi: November 1946), pp. 80-81; personal interviews with former Khilafat volunteers: S. M. Tonki, Aligarh, January 13 and 15, 1968, and M. Husain, Hyderabad, Deccan, March 3, 1968; Shaukat Ali to Muhammad Ali, Bombay, April 4, 1921, inquiring when he can send his first batch of "student propagandists" for Bombay, Sindh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madras. MAP.
23. *Tribune*, October 24, 1920; *BC*, October 28, 1920; Mian Muhammad Shafi to Sir William Vincent, Home Member, Government of India, Lahore, October 25 and 26, 1920, Home (Pol) A, 210-16, and KW, December 1920; Punjab Reports, November 15 and 30, 1920, FRs for November 1920, Home (Pol) D, 74, December 1920, and 33, January 1921, NAI.
24. *Independent*, November 3, 1920; *IAR 1921*, pp. 134-35.
25. Azad, *Talimi Tark-e-Mawalat ka Maqsad*.
26. *Zikr*, pp. 45-47, 66-67.
27. *Independent*, October 19, 1920; *Vakil* (Amritsar), November 27, December 9, 11, and 13, 1920, *Punjab NNR* 1920, nos. 49 (6g), 51 (6e and f), 52 (8b).
28. *Independent*, November 14 and 25, 1920, January 20 and February 12, 1921; *IAR 1921*, p. 135; UP Report, December 1, 1920, FRs for Second Half of November 1920, Home (Pol) D, 33, January 1921, NAI.
29. Bombay Report, October 17-18, 1920, FRs for First Half of October 1920, Home (Pol) D, 59, December 1920, NAI; *BC*, November 18, 1920.
30. P. Biggane, UPCID, Report on the Seva Samiti Movement in UP, Allahabad, December 18, 1919, UPGAD, 604, 1920, UPRR.
31. *Ibid.*; *BC*, March 18 and 20, 1920.
32. P. Biggane, UPCID, Note on the Volunteer Movement in UP, Allahabad, November 5, 1920, UPGAD, 604, 1920, UPRR; H. P. Tollinton, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, to H. McPherson, Home Secretary, Government of India, re Volunteers in Delhi, October 27, 1920, Home (Pol) A, 248-82, June 1921, NAI.
33. Nehru, *Autobiography*, pp. 69, 77-78; interviews with former Khilafat volunteers, see note 22 above.
34. Translation of a speech by Abdul Bari in Lucknow, October 15, 1920, Home (Pol) D, 4, March 1921, NAI; Abdul Bari to Gandhi, 13 Zil-Hijja, 1338 A.H. (August 28, 1920), ABP.

35. *Muttajiqā Fatwa-e-Ulama-e-Hind* (Bombay: Central Khilafat Committee, 1920).

36. *Mashriq* (Gorakhpur), November 1, 1920. quoted in *AIG*, December 1, 1920.

37. Bombay Report, November 1, 1920, FRs for Second Half of October 1920, Home (Pol) D, 66, December 1920, NAI.

38. Mahmud al-Hasan, *Paigham-e-Sadarat* (Presidential Address, second annual Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind); *Tribune*, November 23 and 24, 1920; Mian, *Jamiat*, 2: 37-39.

39. Telegram by Abdul Bari, Lucknow, November 8, 1920, ABP; *Tribune*, November 12, 1920; Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Muslim Institutions*, pp. 120-21.

40. Daryabadi, *Muhammad Ali*, 1: 84-85; Gandhi, *The Khilafat Question* (October 20, 1920), 14: 5-7.

41. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, pp. 180-81.

42. Two of the most helpful studies of Gandhi as a personality and a politician are Erik Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth*; and Judith M. Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*. One of Brown's major points is that Gandhi's charisma, or as here, his ability to manipulate national symbols, was only a part of his political appeal. A more potent political weapon, in her view, was his ability to form alliances with local political leaders; it was they whom the masses followed.

43. AICC Papers, File 5/1920, NM: Resignations in connection with Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Agitation, November 27, 1920, UPGAD, A, 189, 1920, UPRR.

44. *Tribune*, October 5 and 29, 1920; *Independent*, October 2 and 29, 1920; *Zafar Ali Khan ka Mukammal Muqaddima*.

45. List of persons prosecuted in connection with the Non-Cooperation Movement, AICC Papers, File 5/1920, NM.

46. S. P. O'Donnell, Home Secretary, Government of India, to all local governments, January 28, 1921, Home (Pol) D, 3, and KW, July 1921, NAI; Resolutions by the Government of India re its policy towards non-cooperation, Simla, November 6, 1920, UPGAD, 636, 1920, UPRR.

47. Gandhi, *The Khilafat Question* (November 17, 1920) 18: 3-8.

48. Shaikat Ali to Abdul Bari, Bombay, January 15, 1921, *Nuqush*, 2: 71-72.

49. Broomfield, "The Non-Cooperation Decision of 1920," p. 252.

50. Central Provinces Report re Nagpur Congress, FRs for Second Half of December 1920, Home (Pol) D, 77, February 1921, NAI; *TML*, p. 281; Nehru, *Autobiography*, pp. 67-68; *IAR 1921*, pp. 169, 179-80.

51. Gandhi, *The Khilafat Question*, 26 (January 12, 1921), 31 (February 23, 1921).

52. *Independent*, April 12, 1921.

53. In 1918-19, the number of eviction notices in Oudh had been 23,614, in 1919-20, the number grew to 43,490, and in the last half of 1920 alone the number was 36,008. Amendment of the Oudh Rent Act, UP Revenue Department, 45, 1921, UPRR.

For articles on the Oudh *talugdars*, see Thomas R. Metcalf, "From Raja to Landlord, the Oudh Talukdars, 1850-1870," and "Social Effects of British Land Policy in Oudh," in Robert E. Frykenberg, ed., *Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History*, pp. 123-41, 143-62; Peter Musgrave, "Landlords and Lords of the Land: Estate Management and Social Control in Uttar Pradesh, 1860-1920."

54. J. C. Faunthorpe, Commissioner, Lucknow, to Chief Secretary, UP, January 14, 1921, UPGAD, 50, 1921, UPRR; *Tribune*, December 25, 1920; UP Report, January 2, 1921, FRs for Second Half of December 1920, Home (Pol) D, 77, February 1921, NAI.

55. *BC*, January 11, 13, 14, and 22, 1921; A. G. Shireff, District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly, Report re the Rai Bareilly riots, January 29, 1921, UPGAD, 50, 1921, UPRR.

56. Report re Agrarian Movement in UP, February 1, 1921; Brief Résumé of Political Activities in each Police Circle, Rai Bareilly District, January-February 1921; J. A. St. John Farnon to A. G. Shireff, January 19, 1921; A. G. Shireff to J. C. Faunthorpe, February 27, 1921, all in UPGAD 50, 1921, UPRR; "Report on Non-Cooperation in UP," *Independent*, April 24, 1921.

57. Amendment of the Oudh Rent Act, UP Revenue Department, 45, 1921, UPRR.

58. UP Reports, April 18 and May 7, 1921, FRs for April 1921, Home (Pol) D, 51, June 1921, and 13, July 1921, NAI. For further details on the UP *kisan* movement, see William F. Crawley, "Kisan Sabhas and Agrarian Revolt in the United Provinces, 1920 to 1921." And for details on the Government's attempts to combat the *kisan*-noncooperator alliance, see Peter Reeves, "The Politics of Order: Anti-Non-Cooperation in the U.P., 1921."

59. *BC*, May 13, 26, and 30, 1921; Bengal FRs for Second Half of May and First Half of June 1921, Home (Pol) D, 46 and 64, June 1921, NAI.

60. *Independent*, February 10 and 24, 1921; *BC*, March 9, 1921.

61. *Independent*, March 2, 3, and 6, 1921; Daryabadi, *Muhammad Ali*, 1: 96-98.

62. Najaf was the tomb of Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet, and like Kerbala, it was a major Shia shrine. *Independent*, March 20 and 22, 1921; Draft speech by Abdul Bari, sometime in March 1921, ABP

63. *Independent*, March 10, 19, 23 and April 1, 1921; *BC*, May 7, 1921; Alleged Bombardment of Najaf, Home (Pol) B, 482-90, May 1921, NAI.

64. *Independent*, March 17, 1921; Extract from a Report re the Khilafat Agitation, April 18, 1921, CID Reports for April 1921, Home (Pol) D, 54, June 1921, NAI.

65. *Independent*, April 14, 1921; *Muhammad Ali: His Life, Services and Trial* (Madras: Ganesh, n.d.), p. 167.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 171; *Independent*, April 10, 1921; Madras Report, April 18, 1921, FRs for First Half of April 1921, Home (Pol) D, 51, June 1921, NAI.
67. *Independent*, April 12, 1921.
68. Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Political Development*, p. 124.
69. Resolutions passed by the All-India Congress Committee, Bezwada, March 31, 1921, *BC*, April 4, 1921.
70. *IAR 1921-22*, pp. 147-49; Gandhi, *The Khilafat Question* (March 9, 1921), 33: 15; Bamford, *Histories*, pp. 26-28.
71. *Hindu* (Madras), quoted in *Independent Hindustan* (London) I, 1 (July 1921), p. 7.
72. *BC*, April 7, 11, and 26, 1921; Report on the Progress of Non-Cooperation, April 25, 1921, CID Reports for April 1921, Home (Pol) D, 54, June 1921, NAI.
73. *BC*, June 13, 1921.
74. *BC*, June 28, 1921.
75. Reports from UP, July 2, 1921; Punjab, June 15 and 30, 1921, FRs for June 1921 Home (Pol) D, 64, June 1921, and 1, July 1921, NAI.
76. *Bombay HFM*, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 378-91; Bombay Reports, May 16 and June 3, 1921, FRs for May 1921, Home (Pol) D, 46, June 1921, NAI.
77. *BC*, July 1, 1921; *Independent*, July 5, 1921; *IAR 1921-22*, p. 175; *Mussalman* (Calcutta), July 1, 1921; *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), July 2, 1921, *Bengal NNR* (July-December, 1921), p. 64; Bombay Report, July 16, 1921, FRs for July 1921, Home (Pol) D, 18, July 1921, NAI.
78. This deadline was later extended to the end of September.
79. Report of the Secretaries of the Indian National Congress for 1921, *BC*, December 28, 1921; *BC*, July 5, 23, 29, August 2, 24, and October 9, 10, 1921; Bombay Report, July 16, 1921, Home (Pol) D, 18, July 1921, NAI.
80. The members of the Congress Working Committee at that time were Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Vijayaraghavachariar, C. Rajagopalachari, Jammalal Bajaj, C. R. Das, K. C. Kelkar, K. Venkatapayya, V. J. Patel, Lala Lajpat Rai, Rajendra Prasad, Dr. M. A. Ansari, Umar Subhani, Muhammad Ali, and Hakim Ajmal Khan. Bamford, *Histories*, p. 34.
81. *BC*, August 1, 1921; *Independent*, August 2, 1921; *Bengalee* (Calcutta), July 31, 1921; *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), August 3, 1921, *Bengal NNR* (July-December 1921), pp. 191-92, 195-96; Bamford, *Histories*, pp. 32-33.
82. *BC*, March 12, 1920; *Independent*, April 9, 1920; Bombay Report re Khilafat Movement, Home (Pol) D, 112, June 1920; Reports from Bengal and Bombay, December 17-20, 1920, FRs for First Half of November and First Half of December 1920, Home (Pol) D, 74, December 1920, and 35, February 1921, NAI.
83. Bombay Report, November 1, 1920, FRs for Second Half of October 1920, Home (Pol) D, 66, December 1920, NAI.

84. *Tribune*, August 13, 1920.
85. Note re Khilafat Fund Collection, CID Reports for February 1920, Home (Pol) D, 75, February 1920, NAI; Shaukat Ali to the editor of the *Bombay Chronicle*, March 27, 1920, *BC*, March 29, 1920; *Independent*, July 15, 1920.
86. Gandhi, *The Khilafat Question* (January 12, 1921), 26: 6.
87. Letter from Chotani attaching a report from Rev. Robert Frew, Representative of the British Red Crescent in Turkey, *BC*, November 30, 1920; *Tribune*, December 17, 1920; Chotani to Shaukat Ali, London, May 1921, saying that in all £11,000 had been remitted to Turkey for the Smyrna Relief Fund and the Red Crescent, in *Independent*, May 19, 1921; *Independent*, August 27, 1921; M. A. Ansari, Report of the 1921 Khilafat Deputation, June 15, 1921, MAP.
88. Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Bombay, January 29, 1921, *Nuqush*, 2: 72-73; Bengal Reports for March and Second Half of April 1921, Home (Pol) D, 45 and 65, June 1921, NAI; *Independent*, January 13, 1921.
89. Mazhar Siddiqi, *Ruidad-e-Anjuman-e-Aghanat-e-Mazlumin-e-Smyrna wa Angora*; *Independent*, March 27, 1921; *BC*, May 6, 1921; Bamford, *Histories*, p. 182.
90. It should be noted that the treasurer of the Central Khilafat Committee was Seth Ahmad Mian Chotani, the president's son and a member of his family firm. Muzaffar Ali to the editor of the *Bombay Chronicle*, Bombay, August 18, 1921, *BC*, August 19, 1921.
91. Messrs. S. B. Billimoria and Co., Chartered Accountants, to Chotani, Bombay, July 8, 1921; Secret Report by one Kowasji to the CID, both in Home (Pol) 155, 1922, NAI.
92. Muhammad Ali, "Gujarat Provincial Khilafat Conference Speech," in Ali and Ali, *For India and Islam*, pp. 8-15; *Independent*, June 7, 1921; Bombay Report, June 18, 1921, FRs for First Half of June 1921, Home (Pol) D, 64, June 1921, NAI.
93. *IAR 1921-22*, p. 25; Note by W. H. Vincent, June 23, 1921, Home (Pol) 45, 1921, NAI.
94. Muhammad Ali, "Save Us from Our Friends," in Ali and Ali, *For India and Islam*, pp. 70-72.
95. English translation of the leaflet, "The Religious Fatwa of the Ulama of India"; Tassaduq Husain of the CID, Report dated June 25, 1921, both in Home (Pol) 137, 1921, NAI.
96. See p. 138.
97. *Independent*, July 24, 1921.
98. *BC*, July 20, 1921; *Independent*, July 23 and 24, 1921.
99. *Independent*, July 6, 1921.
100. "Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya is terrified at the current rumour of an Afghan invasion, and undoubtedly there is a division in the inner cabinet of the non-cooperators on this point. . . ." Sir Harcourt Butler to

Sir Geoffrey Butler, Nainital, May 9, 1921, Butler Papers, Mss. Eur. F. 116/41, IOL.

101. Gandhi, "The Afghan Bogey," quoted in *Independent*, May 8, 1921; Interview with Muhammad Ali re "The Afghan Bogey," *BC*, May 11, 1921.

102. *BC*, May 30, 1921; *Independent*, June 1, 1921.

103. Reading to Montagu, Simla, July 7, 1921, Reading Papers, Mss. Eur. E. 238/3/II, p. 57, IOL.

104. Reading to Montagu, May 14 and 19, 1921, Reading Papers, Mss. Eur. E. 238/10/II, nos. 187a, 199, IOL; Extract from a Report re Gandhi-Reading Interviews, May 25, 1921, CID Reports for May 1921, Home (Pol) D, 55, June 1921, NAI; *BC*, May 17 and August 2, 1921; *Independent*, August 2, 1921.

105. Reading to Montagu, May 14 and 19, 1921; Excerpts from speeches by M. Ali and S. Ali containing references to *jihad* or taking up the sword against Britain, MAP; Similar extracts in Home (Pol) 112, 1922, NAI; *Independent*, June 1, 1921.

106. *BC*, May 30, 1921; *Independent*, June 1, 1921.

107. *Independent*, June 2, 1921.

108. *Independent*, June 5, 1921; *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), June 1 and 4, 1921, *Bengal NNR* (January-June 1921), pp. 679-81; UP Reports, June 4 and 18, 1921, FRs for Second Half of May and First Half of June 1921, Home (Pol) D, 46 and 64, June 1921, NAI.

109. Montagu to Reading, June 1, 1921, Reading Papers, Mss. Eur. E. 238/3/I, 9, IOL.

110. *Comrade Selections*, pp. 162-65; *Independent*, August 14, 1921.

111. Muhammad Ali to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome, May, 1921, App. to Montagu to Reading, December 22, 1921, Reading Papers, Mss. Eur. E. 238/3/I, p. 302, IOL.

112. Gandhi, "The Brothers' Apology," *Young India*, quoted in *BC*, June 3, 1921.

113. *Ibid.*

114. Abdul Bari to Gandhi, Lucknow, June 2, 1921, ABP.

115. *Independent*, June 7 and 13, 1921; *BC*, July 20, 1921.

116. *Independent*, July 6, 1921; Reading to Montagu, Simla, August 25, 1921, Reading Papers, Mss. Eur. E. 238/3/II, 21, IOL.

117. There has been a rash of recent articles about the Mappillas, their history, and their various rebellions. See Stephen F. Dale, "The Mapilla Outbreaks: Ideology and Social Conflict in Nineteenth Century India," and "The Islamic Frontier in Southwest India: The Shahid as a Cultural Ideal among the Mappillas of Malabar"; Conrad Wood, "Historical Background of the Moplah Rebellion," and "The First Moplah Rebellion against British Rule in Malabar"; Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "The Mapilla Rebellion, 1921: Peasant Revolt in Malabar."

118. V. Madhavan Nair, "The Moplah Riots: The Agrarian Aspect," *BC*, September 27, 1921; L. V. O'Donnell, Report on Land Tenure in Malabar, May 8, 1922, Home (Pol) 23, and KW, 1922, NAI.

119. *BC*, September 19, 1921.

120. *BC*, February 17, 1921; *Independent*, February 19, 1921; The Khilafat Movement in Malabar District, Home (Pol) 185, 1925; Madras Reports, February 2 and 17, 1921, FRs for Second Half of January and First Half of February 1921, Home (Pol) D, 42, 43, April 1921, NAI.

121. The Khilafat Movement in Malabar; Extract from Madras FRs, August 6-13, and 20, 1921, Home (Pol) 241/1A, 1921, NAI; Speech by Sir William Vincent, Home Member, Government of India, September 5, 1921 in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers* (House of Commons and Command), Cmnd. 1552, 1921, "Telegraphic Information Regarding the Moplah Rebellion," p. 50.

122. *BC*, August 25, 26, and September 3, 1921; *Independent*, August 25 and 28, 1921; John J. Banninga, "The Moplah Rebellion of 1921"; Government of Madras Publicity Bureau, "Malabar and the Moplahs," in Cmnd. 1552, pp. 40-41.

123. According to official figures (usually below actual totals), 2,339 Mappillas were killed, 1,652 wounded, 5,655 captured, and 39,348 surrendered to the police or military, but these totals do not mention their victims or other destruction. Question in the Legislative Assembly re Number of Casualties in the Moplah Rebellion, Home (Pol) 128 IV, 1923, NAI.

124. Cmnd. 1552, p. 32.

125. The Khilafat Movement in Malabar, Home (Pol) 185, 1925; Maj. Gen. J. T. Burnett-Stuart, Commander of Madras District to Headquarters, Southern Command, Poona, dated September 27, 1921, Home (Pol) 241/1A, 1921, NAI; Cmnd. 1552, pp. 49-51.

126. T. Prakasan and T. V. Venkataraman Iyer, "Non-Official Report on the Malabar Disturbances," *IAR 1922-23*, II, pp. 825-32; Editorial, "Lord Reading and Malabar," *BC*, August 26, 1921; C. Rajagopalachari, "Report on the Moplah Disturbances," *Independent*, September 23, 1921.

127. *BC*, August 27, 1921.

128. See the two articles by Stephen F. Dale.

129. Prakasan and Iyer, "Non-Official Report," p. 829; *Independent*, September 18 and 22, 1921; *BC*, September 3, 1921.

130. *Indian Mirror* (Calcutta), August 31 and September 3, 1921; *Bengalee* (Calcutta), September 6, 1921, *Bengal NNR* for week of September 10, 1921; *Desh* (Lahore), August 29, 1921; *Kesari* (Lahore), *Punjab NNR* 1921, nos. 36 (15a), 38 (350).

131. *Independent*, October 27, 1921.

132. Gandhi, "Hindu-Muslim Unity: Is It a Camouflage," *Young India*, quoted in *BC*, October 26, 1921.

133. UP Report, September 3, 1921, FRs for August 1921, Home (Pol) 18, August 1921, NAI; *BC*, November 22, 1921.
134. Butler to Lord Hardinge, Rangoon, January 16, 1916, Butler Papers, Mss. Eur. F. 116/53, IOL.
135. *Independent*, September 28, 1921. For a more detailed look at the political activities of Bi Amman and other Muslim women, see Gail Minault, "Purdah Politics: The Role of Muslim Women in Indian Nationalism, 1911-1924," forthcoming in Hanna Papanek, ed., *Purdah in South Asia: The Segregation of Women*.
136. Shaukat Ali to Chotani, Karachi, October 23, 1921, MAP; *Independent*, January 10, 11, and May 2, 1920; *Telegraph* (Calcutta), February 5, 1921, *Bengal NNR* (January-June 1921), p. 161; *BC*, April 11 and July 21, 1921.
137. *BC*, April 25, 1921.
138. Muhammad Ali to Abdul Bari, Bombay, August 3, 1921, MAP; Collections through Begam Muhammad Ali, Central Khilafat Committee, n.d. (1921), MAP; *BC*, August 9 and 11, 1921; *Independent*, August 10 and 12, 1921; UP Report, August 17, 1921, FRs for August 1921, Home (Pol) 18, August 1921, NAI.
139. *Independent*, September 28, October 19, and November 21, 1921.
140. Muhammad Ali to T. A. K. Sherwani, in *Independent*, August 18, 1921. Khojas and Memons are two trading castes of Muslims, the former Ismaili Shias and the latter Sunnis.
141. Weekly Report on Non-Cooperation Activities in the Punjab, January 26, 1922, AICC Papers, File 2/1922, NM.
142. Bi Amman, "Khutba-e-Sadarat" (Presidential Address before the All-India Ladies' Conference, Ahmedabad, December 30, 1921), in Abdur Razzaq Qureshi, ed., *Nava-e-Azadi*, pp. 199-202.
143. Brief Resume of Political Activities in each Police Circle, Rai Bareilly District, January-February, 1921, UPGAD, 50, 1921, UPRR.
144. For a detailed treatment of this interpretation, see Peter Hardy, *Partners in Freedom—And True Muslims*.
145. Bamford, *Histories*, p. 168; Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Bihar and Orissa, Report re a Conference of Ulama held at Patna, June 25-26, 1921, Home (Pol) 180, 1921, NAI.
146. Report re a Conference of Ulama held at Patna.
147. Bamford, *Histories*, pp. 169, 179; Bihar Report, October 3, 1921, FRs for September 1921, Home (Pol) 18, September 1921; CID Report re Election of an Amir-e-Shariat, Home (Pol) 551, 1922, NAI. The latter meeting took place after the arrest of Azad and a number of other activist ulama.
148. See also Gail Minault, "Islam and Mass Politics: The Indian Ulama and the Khilafat Movement."
149. This section contains a number of ideas treated in more detail in Gail Minault, "Urdu Political Poetry during the Khilafat Movement." I am particularly indebted to the works of Ralph Russell and Khurshidul Islam for the observations which follow. For a detailed discussion of the content and imagery of Urdu lyric poetry and the society which produced

- them, see Ralph Russell and Khurshidul Islam, *Three Mughal Poets*, chs. 4-5; and Ralph Russell, "The Pursuit of the Urdu Ghazal."
150. Russell, "The Pursuit of the Urdu Ghazal," pp. 114-16.
151. Zafar Ali Khan, *Baharistan*, pp. 226, 256-57, 163.
152. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
153. *Ibid.*, pp. 163-64.
154. Fazlul Hasan "Hasrat" Mohani, *Kulliyat-e-Hasrat Mohani*, pp. 138-39.
155. See pp. 43-44.
156. Fazlul Hasan "Hasrat" Mohani, *Qaid-e-Farang*, p. 134.
157. Ali Javad Zaidi, ed., *Urdu Men Qaumi Shairi ke Sau Sal*, p. 185.
158. Muhammad Ali, *Kalam-e-Jauhar*, pp. 72-73.
159. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-4.
160. Examples are myriad; see especially accounts of meetings on Khilafat Day, October 17, 1919, in *BC*, October 18, 1919; and *Independent*, October 22 and 24, 1919; or accounts of stumping tours by the Ali brothers in *Independent*, January 11-13, 1920; *Tribune*, January 14, 1920; and *BC*, February 23-24, 1921.
161. T. A. L. Scott O'Connor, UPCID, Note on the Volunteer Movement in UP, Allahabad, May 27, 1922, UPGAD, 604, 1920, UPRR; Shaikh Ali Hasan, *Tarikh-e-Mahmudabad*, vol. 3, part 2, 159-160.
162. Volunteer Movement in India, Home (Pol) 327/I and 327/IV, 1922; Bihar Report, March 17, 1921, FRs for First Half of March 1921, Home (Pol) D, 64, June 1921, NAI; *Independent*, February 11, 1921.
163. *Independent*, October 6, 1921.
164. S. P. O'Donnell, Home Secretary, Government of India, to All Local Governments, Delhi, November 24, 1921, UPGAD, 604, 1921, UPRR.
165. *BC*, November 25, 1921; *Independent*, November 27, 1921; Bamford, *Histories*, p. 43.
166. *Independent*, December 17, 1921; Report from Secretary of UP Congress Committee to General Secretary of Congress, Allahabad, January 20, 1922, AICC Papers, File 3/1922, NM; T. A. L. Scott O'Connor, UPCID, Note of Volunteer Movement in UP, May 27, 1922, UPGAD, 604, 1920, UPRR.
167. Reports of Congress Work in Various Provinces, AICC Papers, Files 2, 3 and 6/1922, NM; H. D. Craik, Home Secretary, Government of India, to Chief Secretary, UP, Delhi, December 28, 1921, UPGAD, 604, 1921, UPRR.
168. Sir Abdur Rahim, Note on the Present Political Situation in Bengal, November 28, 1921, enclosed in a letter from Chief Secretary, Bengal, to Home Secretary, Government of India, November 30, 1921, Home (Pol) 415, 5, 28 November 1921, NAI. I am indebted to Diana Tonsich for this reference.

#### 4. DECLINE AND FALL OF THE MOVEMENT, 1921-1924

1. See pp. 193-95; and Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, pp. 136-72.
2. Muhammad Ali to Bi Amman, Karachi Jail, September 20, 1921, in Muhammad Sarwar, ed., *Khutut-e-Muhammad Ali*, pp. 26-33; *BC*, September 16, 1921; *Independent*, September 20-22, 1921.
3. *Independent*, September 11 and 29, 1921; *BC*, September 21, 1921; *Paigham* (Calcutta), 1: 2-4 (September 30-October 14, 1921); Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Karachi Jail, October 15, 1921, *Nuqush*, 2: 73-75.
4. *Independent*, September 25, 28, and 29, 1921; *BC*, September 27 and October 3, 1921.
5. FRs for September 1921, Home (Pol) 18, September 1921, NAI.
6. Reading to Montagu, Simla, September 15, 1921, Reading Papers, Mss. Eur. E. 238/3/II, p. 108, IOL.
7. Signers of the manifesto included Gandhi, Abdul Bari, Azad, Dr. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Azad Subhani, Hasrat Mohani, Seth Chotani, Yaqub Hasan, Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, Sarojini Naidu, Vallabhbhai Patel, Lala Lajpat Rai, C. Rajagopalachari, and Anasuyaben Sarabhai. *BC*, October 5, 1921; *Paigham* (Calcutta), 1: 2-4, p. 20.
8. C. A. Barron, Chief Commissioner of Delhi, to H. D. Craik, Home Secretary, Government of India, Delhi, September 2, 1921, Home (Pol) 137, 1921; Delhi Reports, August 16 and September 2, 1921, FRs for August 1921, Home (Pol) 18, August 1921, NAI.
9. Report of Central Khilafat Committee and Jamiat al-Ulama meetings, Delhi, September 21-22, 1921, Home (Pol) 137, 1921; Delhi Report, October 1, 1921, FRs for September 1921, Home (Pol) 18, September 1921, NAI; *BC*, September 24, 1921; *Independent*, September 27 and 29, 1921; *Paigham* (Calcutta), 1: 2-4.
10. *BC*, September 19, 1921; Reports from Punjab, October 15 and 31, 1921; Bengal, October 1921; and UP, October 20 and 31, 1921, FRs for October 1921, Home (Pol) 18, October 1921, NAI; Fazlul Hasan "Hasrat" Mohani, *Khutba-e-Sadarat* (Presidential Address, Agra Provincial Conference, October 22-23, 1921); *BC*, October 3, 1921.
11. *BC*, October 6, 1921; Extract from *Young India*, October 29, 1921, in Home (Pol) 303, 1921; Bombay Report, October 16, 1921, Home (Pol) 18, October 1921, NAI.
12. Editorial, "Mr. Muhammad Ali," *Independent*, November 1, 1921.
13. *Independent*, October 6, 1921.
14. *BC*, October 8, 1921; *The Historic Trial of the Ali Brothers, Dr. Kitchlew, Sri Shankaracharya, Maulana Husain Ahmad, Pir Ghulam Mujaddid, and Maulana Nisar Ahmad*, 1: 50-75.
15. *The Historic Trial*, 1: 1-3; 2: 20.
16. *BC*, November 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8, 1921.
17. *Ibid.*; Telegram from Abdul Bari to Muazzam Ali and H. M. Hayat, November 2, 1921, ABP; Reports from Bombay, November 4, 1921; and

- Bengal, First Half of November 1921, FRs for November 1921, Home (Pol) 18, November 1921, NAI.
18. *BC*, September 24, 1921; Shaukat Ali to Seth Chotani, Karachi Jail, October 23, 1921, MAP.
19. *Independent*, October 21, 1921; *Paigham*, 1(5) (October 21, 1921), 9 (November 18, 1921).
20. *Independent*, September 25, 1921; *Paigham*, 1(1) (September 23, 1921); *Zikr*, pp. 80-82.
21. *Independent*, September 23, 1921.
22. *Zikr*, pp. 78-80; *Paigham* (September 23, 1921), 1(1): 2-4.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-8.
24. Abul Kalam Azad, *Khutbat-e-Azad*, pp. 28-54; see Haq, *Muslim Politics in Modern India*, pp. 101-3.
25. See pp. 153-54.
26. Abul Kalam Azad, *Qaul-e-Faisal*; *BC*, February 10, 1922.
27. *BC*, November 7, 1921; Bombay Report, November 18, 1921, FRs for November 1921, Home (Pol) 18, November 1921, NAI; Bamford, *Histories*, pp. 40-41.
28. FRs for November 1921; *BC*, November 18, 19, and 22, 1921; *Independent*, November 22 and 24, 1921.
29. A Calcutta meeting on November 13 attended by some 200 policemen produced thirty resignations by Muslims, and in UP fifty-five Muslims resigned from the police force during November. Report from Bengal, First Half of November, 1921; UP Reports, November 18 and December 3, 1921, FRs for November 1921.
30. Butler to Reading, Lucknow, November 22, December 12 and 13, 1921, Reading Papers, Mss. Eur. E. 238/23/I, nos. 623, 701, 706, IOL; Butler to Reading, January 12, 1922, Butler Papers, Mss. Eur. F. 116/57, IOL; Note by Vincent, Home Member, Government of India, on the Non-Cooperation and Volunteer Movements, November 10, 1921, Home (Pol) 303, 1921, NAI.
31. *IAR 1921*, pp. 37-50; *BC*, December 5, 8, and 9, 1921; *Independent*, December 6-8 and 20, 1921, FRs for December, Home (Pol) 18, December 1921, NAI; Reports of Non-Cooperation Activities in Various Provinces, AICC Papers, Files 3 and 6/1922, NM.
32. *Young India*, quoted in *BC*, November 28, 1921.
33. Abdul Bari to the press, Lucknow, November 25, 1921, *BC*, November 26, 1921.
34. *Independent*, December 2, 1921.
35. Statement signed by Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Seth Chotani, A. H. S. Khatri, and Sayyid Mahmud, *BC*, January 12, 1922.
36. *IAR 1922*, p. 50; Bamford, *Histories*, p. 44.
37. *BC*, December 21, 27, and 30, 1921.
38. Proceedings of the National Congress, Muslim League, and Khilafat Conference in December 1921, Home (Pol) 461, 1921, NAI; Text of Working Committee Compromise Resolution, Ahmedabad, December, 1921, ABP.
39. Proceedings of the Congress, December 1921; Bamford, *Histories*,

- pp. 44-48; *TML*, pp. 293-95; *Ajmal*, pp. 257-62; *Jamnabhumi* (Masuli-patnam) January 5, 1922, 3(5): 6.
40. Telegram from Abdul Bari to Gandhi, Bombay, December 31, 1921; Reply by Gandhi, Ahmedabad, January 1, 1922, ABP.
41. Answer to a question asked to Abdul Bari re the Ahmedabad Congress, ABP.
42. Sir George Lloyd, Governor of Bombay, to Reading, January 5, 1922, Reading Papers, Mss. Eur. E. 238/24, IOL.
43. Résumé of the General Political Situation in India since the Inception of Non-Cooperation, Home (Pol) 678, 1922, NAI; *BC*, January 18, 1922; *IAR* 1922, p. 56.
44. *BC*, February 2, 1922; Bombay Report, February 2, 1922, FRs for January 1922, Home (Pol) 18, January 1922; Bardoli Resolutions and Civil Disobedience, Home (Pol) 489, 1922, NAI.
45. Riots in Chauri Chaura and Bareilly, Home (Pol) 563, 1922; UP Report, February 15, 1922, FRs for February 1922, Home (Pol) 18, February 1922, NAI.
46. *BC*, February 13-14, 1922; Bombay Report, February 18, 1922, FRs for February 1922.
47. *Ibid.*; CID Reports re Postponement of Civil Disobedience at Bardoli, Home (Pol) 580/II, 1922, NAI; Gandhi to J. Nehru, Bardoli, February 19, 1922, Nehru Papers, NM.
48. *Ajmal*, pp. 265-67.
49. *Ibid.*; *IAR* 1922, p. 59.
50. *Ajmal*, p. 268; Kafayatullah to Abdul Bari, Delhi, February 21, 1922, ABP.
51. Statement by Abdul Bari in reply to a question about the Bardoli decisions, ABP.
52. Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 63.
53. Gandhi to J. Nehru, Bardoli, February 19, 1922, Nehru Papers, NM.
54. FRs for March 1922, Home (Pol) 18, March 1922, NAI; *Bombay HFM*, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 465-67, 472; Francis Watson, *The Trial of Mr. Gandhi*, pp. 149-66.
55. CID Report on the Special Session of the Jamiat al-Ulama, Ajmer, March 3-5, 1922, Home (Pol) 501, 1922, NAI; Mian, *Jamiat*, 2: 50-51; Bamford, *Histories*, p. 193.
56. *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), March 11, 1922; *Tribune*, March 12, 1922.
57. Abdul Bari, *Fitna-e-Irtidad aur Musulmanon ka Farz*; Abdul Bari, *Fitna-e-Irtidad ki Rok Tham*.
58. Split Between Non-Cooperators and Ulama, Home (Pol) 501, 1922, NAI; L. F. Rushbrook Williams, *India in 1921-22* (Calcutta: Government of India, 1922), p. 104.
59. Bamford, *Histories*, pp. 190-98; Khilafat Agitation and Turkish Peace Terms, Home (Pol) 860, 1922; Split Between Non-Cooperators and Ulama, Home (Pol) 501, 1922, NAI.
60. Chotani to Abdul Bari, Bombay, September 16 and November 16, 1922; Report of a Meeting of the Central Khilafat Committee, Delhi,

October 16, 1922, ABP; Bamford, *Histories*, pp. 205-8.

61. Firozuddin, Abdur Rahman Ghazi, Abdul Jabbar Khan, Muhammad Alam, and Sayyid Muhammad Husain, "Report of the Khilafat Account Enquiry Committee," originally published in Urdu in *AIG*, January 18, 1923, tr. Tasadduq Husain of the CID, in Home (Pol) 15, 1923, NAI.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.* It was also rumored that the younger Chotani had lost some of the money betting at the track.
64. *Comrade* (Delhi) (April 10, 1925), NS2(14-15): 217.
65. A. H. S. Khatri, Sayyid Mahmud, and Muazzam Ali, "Detailed Statement Issued by the Secretaries of the Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay, Concerning Khilafat Funds," MAP.
66. Abdul Bari to Chotani, n.d. (May 1923), ABP.
67. Proceedings of a meeting of the Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay, May 26-27, 1923, Home (Pol) 15/III, 1923, NAI; "Khilafat Funds and Seth Chotani," *Comrade* (Delhi), April 10, 1925, NS2 (14-15): 216-18.
68. The story of the Swaraj party, or the Swarajist faction of the Congress, is an important and interesting chapter in the history of Indian nationalism. It is mentioned here only in passing in order to show its place in the disintegration of the noncooperation movement. For further details, see P. Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress*, 1:252-79; Richard Gordon has written a Ph.D. thesis for Oxford University on the Swaraj party. See also his published articles (in the bibliography).
69. With one notable exception: Hakim Ajmal Khan supported Council entry. Note by Hakim Ajmal Khan, Delhi, October 27, 1922, MAP; *Ajmal*, pp., 270-72.
70. Proceedings of the All-India Congress Committee meeting, Calcutta, November 21-24, 1922, AICC Papers, File 8/1922, NM; Bihar Report, January 7, 1923; Bengal Report for First Half of January 1923, FRs for December 1922 and January 1923, Home (Pol) 18, December 1922, and 25, 1923, NAI; Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims*, pp. 337-41.
71. Secretary of the Delhi Provincial Congress Committee to Muhammad Ali, December 14, 1923, MAP.
72. Louis Dumont defines communalism by distinguishing it from nationalism: ". . . it is something like nationalism, in which the nation, so to speak, is replaced by the community. In other words, communalism is the affirmation of the religious community as a political group." Louis Dumont, "Nationalism and Communalism," p. 47.
73. For details on the history of Shuddhi, see Kenneth W. Jones, "Communalism in the Punjab: The Arya Samaj Contribution"; Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, pp. 136-58.
74. Lala Lajpat Rai, *A History of the Arya Samaj* p. 120; Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 69-71; Abul Kalam Azad, "Fitna-e-Irtidad aur Musulman," *Zamindar* (Lahore), April 15, 1923, in Mahr, ed., *Tabarukat*, pp. 207-13; Abdul Bari to Gandhi, 5 Ramzan 1342 A. H. (April 10, 1924), ABP.
75. On the Ahmadiya, see Spencer Lavan, *The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective*, esp. ch. 6.

76. Mian, *Jamiat*, 2: 57-59; Abdul Bari to the Nizam of Hyderabad, n.d., ABP; Maulvi Abdul Latif Minai of the Nizam's government to Abdul Bari, June 9, 1922, ABP; Majlis-e-Numaendagan-e-Tabligh, Agra, to Abdul Bari, March 3, 1923, ABP; Report of a mass meeting of Rajputs held by the Majlis-e-Numaendagan-e-Tabligh, Agra, March 11-12, 1923, ABP, Note on the Tabligh Movement, October 4, 1924, Home (Pol) 6/IX, 1924, NAI.
77. Punjab Reports, October 15 and November 15, 1922, FRs for October and November 1922, Home (Pol) 18, October and November 1922; Disturbances in Amritsar, April 1923, Home (Pol) 125, 1923; Report by the Director CID re Hindu-Muslim Relations, June 11, 1925, Home (Pol) 184, 1925, NAI.
78. Notes on the Tanzim Movement, September 24 and October 4, 1924, Home (Pol) 6/IX, 1924, NAI; *Jamiat-e-Markaziya-e-Tanzim ka Dastur al-Amal* (Amritsar: Aftab Barqi Press, 1924); Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 171.
79. Agra Riots in August 1923, UPGAD, 530, 1923; *Agra Akhbar*, August 28, 1923; *Leader* (Allahabad), September 2 and 9, 1923, clippings in UPGAD, 530, 1923, UPRR.
80. Confidential letter from the Commissioner, Meerut Division, to G. B. Lambert, Chief Secretary, UP, dated Saharanpur, August 27, 1923, UPGAD, 530, 1923, UPRR.
81. *Indian Daily Telegraph* (Lucknow), September 4, 1923; *Madina* (Bijnor), September 9, 1923; *Leader* (Allahabad), September 10, 1923; *Hamdam* (Lucknow), September 18, 1923, *Pioneer* (Allahabad), October 10, 1923; all clippings in UPGAD, 530, 1923, UPRR.
82. Government of Northwest Frontier Province to Foreign Department, Government of India, September 13, 1924, Home (Pol) 249/VIII, 1924, NAI.
83. Kohat Riots, Home (Pol) 249/VIII, 1924; Sir Charles Inness, Report re Kohat Riots, Home (Pol) 37/II, 1925, NAI; Statement re Hindu-Muslim disturbances in India during August and September 1924, UPGAD, 520, 1924, UPRR; Sayyid Muhammad Habib, President of the Punjab Khilafat Committee, Report on the Kohat Riots, October 1, 1924, MAP.
84. Abul Kalam Azad, *Presidential Address to the Special Session of Congress, Delhi, September 15, 1923*; see Shorish Kashmiri, ed., *Khutbat-e-Azad*, pp. 107-83; *Asar*, pp. 73-77; Khaliqzaman, *Pathway*, p. 68.
85. Abdul Bari, Statement to the Press, September, 1923, ABP.
86. Muhammad Ali, "Presidential Address to the Annual Congress Session, Cocanada, December 1923," in Rezaul Karim, ed., *Muslims and the Congress*, p. 169.
87. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-20; this speech has also been reprinted in *Selected Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali*, 2: 107-89.
88. Shaukat Ali, *Khutba-e-Sadarat* (Presidential Address, Kakinada Khilafat Conference, December 1923).
89. CID Report on the Ali Brothers, December 27, 1923, Home (Pol) 15/IV, 1923, NAI; Agenda of the All-India Congress Committee Meeting, Sabarmati, June 27, 1924, MAP.
90. Muhammad Ali to Jawaharlal Nehru, Aligarh, January 15, 1924,

- and Matheran, June 15, 1924, Nehru Papers, NM; Gandhi, "A Fundamental Difference," in P. Sitaramayya, *A History of the Indian National Congress*, 1: 269-71.
91. Muhammad Ali had other problems on his mind at this time as well. He was working feverishly day and night in order to revive his old papers, *Comrade* and *Hamdard*, and his mother was seriously ill. She too begged Gandhi not to undertake his fast, to no avail. Bi Amman died in November 1924 at the age of 81. Iqbal, *Life and Times of Maulana Mohamed Ali*, pp. 316-21.
92. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, 2: 148-55; Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 77-78; Resolutions passed at the Unity Conference, Delhi, September 26-October 2, 1924, AICC Papers, File 25/1924, NM.
93. Abdul Bari to Pandit Motilal Nehru with copies to Muhammad Ali and Mufti Kafayatullah, Lucknow, September 29, 1924, ABP.
94. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, 2: 179; Exchange of telegrams between Gandhi and the Private Secretary to the Viceroy, October 28, 1924, MAP; see Home (Pol) 249/VIII, 1924, NAI; Muhammad Ali, "Vaqiah-e-Kohat," *Hamdard* (Delhi), January 13-15, 1925, in Jafri, ed., *Maqalat-e-Muhammad Ali*, 2: 105-36; Muhammad Ali, "Kohat," *Comrade* (Delhi), April 10, 1925, NS 2(14-15): 208-14.
95. Muhammad Ali, "Communal Representation," *Comrade*, February 6, 1925, NS 2 (6): 78.
96. CID Report re All-India Khilafat Conference, Belgaum, December 23, 1924, Home (Pol) 167/III, 1924, NAI.
97. For a summary of the Turkish nationalists' war of independence and Mustafa Kemal's policies, see Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ataturk as Founder of a State." For the steps in the abolition of the caliphate and its repercussions in the Islamic world, see Sylvia G. Haim, "The Abolition of the Caliphate and its Aftermath," in Arnold, *The Caliphate*, pp. 205-44.
98. Viceroy to Secretary of State, November 15, 1922, on views of prominent Muslims re developments in Angora, Home (Pol) 721/II, 1922; "Most Secret" Extract from Introductory Statement on the Khilafat Question, Home (Pol) 60, 1923; Bihar Report, November 18, 1922, FRs for November 1922, Home (Pol) 18, November 1922, NAI.
99. Viceroy to Secretary of State, November 15, 1922; Reports from Delhi, November 15, 1922; Bombay, December 1-5, 1922; and Punjab, November 30, 1922, FRs for November 1922.
100. Resolutions of the Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind and All-India Khilafat Conference, Gaya, December 1922, *IAR 1922-23*, 1, pp. 917-27, 937-43.
101. Muhammad Ali, "Presidential Address before Cocanada Congress," in Karim, ed., *Muslims and the Congress*, p. 197.
102. Toynebee, *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, 1: 571-72; see text of the letter in French from *Stanboul*, December 5, 1923, in Home (Pol) 197/II, 1923, NAI.
103. Henderson, British High Commissioner in Constantinople, to Lord Curzon, December 12, 1923, Home (Pol) 197/II, 1923, NAI; Toynebee, *Survey*, pp. 53-63; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 254-59; Lord Kinross (John P. D. Balfour), *Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation*, pp. 384-86.

104. Telegram from Shaukat Ali, President of the Khilafat Committee, and Mufti Kafayatullah, President of the Jamiat al-Ulama, to Mustafa Kemal, Bombay, March 11, 1924, MAP; Report of a meeting of the Khilafat Working Committee, Bombay, May 10, 1924, Home (Pol) 167, 1924, NAI.

105. Statement Issued by Central Khilafat Committee and Jamiat al-Ulama re situation in Turkey, March 11, 1924; Muhammad Ali, Speech Delivered at Aligarh Mosque, March 7, 1924; Muhammad Ali, Presidential Address, Khilafat Conference, Calcutta, March 19, 1924, MAP.

106. Abul Kalam Azad, "Masala-e-Khilafat wa Jumhuriya Turkiya," *Zamindar* (Lahore), May 11-15 and June 8-11, 1924, in Mahr, ed., *Tabarrukat*, pp. 214-60; Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 69; Haq, *Muslim Politics in Modern India*, pp. 102-3.

107. Private woes also played a role in the heavy impact the abolition of the Khilafat had on the brothers. Less than a week after the Grand National Assembly's fateful decree in March, Muhammad Ali's favorite daughter, Amina, died of tuberculosis. And in April Shaukat Ali was taken seriously ill and was close to death. He recovered, but it is obvious that any one of these events would have been unsettling; their conjunction was devastating. Iqbal, *Life and Times of Maulana Mohamed Ali*, p. 323.

108. CID Report of a Meeting of the Khilafat Working Committee, Delhi, June 23, 1924, Home (Pol) 167, 1924, NAI.

109. CID Report of Khilafat Working Committee Meeting, Delhi, June 23, 1924; Report of a Meeting of the Central Khilafat Committee, Delhi, June 24-25, 1924, Home (Pol) 167, 1924, NAI; Jamiat-e-Khilafat, *Ruidad* (Proceedings of the Meetings of the Khilafat Working Committee and Central Committee, Delhi, June 23-25 and July 19, 1924).

110. Text of a telegram from Abdul Bari to Muhammad Ali Zain al-Raza, son of the Wali of Jiddah, n.d. (March 1924), ABP; Muhammad Ali, Statement to the Press, March 29, 1924, MAP; Abdul Bari to Muhammad Ali in Reply to the Latter's Press Statement, n.d. (Late March 1924), ABP.

111. Abul Kalam Azad, "Amir ibn Saud aur Haramain Sharifain," in Mahr, ed., *Tabarrukat*, pp. 261-85; Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, pp. 231-33.

112. Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 80-84; Inayatullah, *Hasrat al-Afaq*, pp. 29-30; Two Letters from Abdul Bari to Bradaram (Muhammad Ali?), n.d. (sometime in 1924), MAP; Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, *Masala-e-Hijaz*.

113. Daryabadi, *Zati Diary*, 1: 220-34, also cited in Iqbal, *Life and Times of Maulana Mohamed Ali*, p. 340.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. Kenneth Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*, p. 1.
2. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 69. This observation does not appear in the American edition of Nehru's autobiography, *Toward Freedom*.

## GLOSSARY

*alim*. One possessing *ilm*, knowledge of Muslim theology or jurisprudence; pl., *ulama*.

*amir*. Leader, chieftain, commander.

*anna*. One-sixteenth of a rupee.

*Baqr 'Id*. The annual commemoration of Ibrahim's sacrifice of Ishmail (the Islamic version of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac), for which animal sacrifice, usually of cows or goats, is practiced.

*begar*. Corvee, unpaid labor rendered to the landlord by a tenant farmer.

*begam*. Lady, a title equivalent to "Mrs." used by Muslim women; in the case of the begam of Bhopal, a title indicating ruling status.

*burqa*. An all-enveloping garment worn by women in purdah in order to go out in public without being recognizable.

*chauk*. Square, market, bazaar, or business quarter of a city, also the location of a police station. The chauk in Lucknow, mentioned herein, has these features, but is also a colorful quarter famed for its artisans and courtesans.

*crore*. Ten million (10,000,000).

*Dar al-Ifa*. The department established at the Deoband madrasa for the promulgation of juristic rulings (*fatawa*).

*dars-e-nizamiya*. Traditional course of study at Indian madrasas which emphasized Arabic, philosophy, and jurisprudence; named for Mulla Nizamuddin of Firangi Mahal, its originator.

*dhoti*. Loincloth.

*Diwali*. Hindu festival of lights, twenty days after Dussehra, commemorating Rama's return home to Ayodhya with Sita after defeating Ravana.

*Dussehra*. Hindu festival commemorating Rama's victory over Ravana, king of the powers of evil.

*fatwa*. Ruling on a point of Islamic law; pl., *fatawa*.

*ghazal*. Lyric love poetry in the form of rhyming couplets.

*hadith*. Body of traditions of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.

*hajj*. Annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

*haji*. Pilgrim, one who has performed *hajj*.

*hakim*. Practitioner of traditional Muslim medical science.

*harb*. War.

*hartal*. Strike.

*hijrat*. Migration, especially to an Islamic country from enemy territory.

*imam*. Religious leader, also one who leads prayers in the mosque.

*jazirat al-Arab*. "The island of Arabia," the Arab lands bounded by the Mediterranean, the Tigris-Euphrates, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea.

- jihad*. Struggle or effort toward a determined objective, usually in defense of a religious cause; holy war.
- Ka'aba*. Shrine of the sacred black stone in Mecca.
- khalifa*. Caliph, successor to the Prophet Muhammad as head of the Muslim community.
- khilafat*. Caliphate, the line of succession to the Prophet Muhammad.
- khutba*. Sermon read during the Muslim congregational prayer service on Fridays.
- kisan*. Peasant.
- lakh*. One hundred thousand (100,000).
- madrassa*. Islamic theological school.
- masjid*. Mosque.
- maulana*. Title used by an alim.
- maulvi*. Title equal to *maulana*, also used for Muslim lawyers.
- mufti*. Exponent of Muslim law, one who issues *fatawa*.
- muhajir*. An emigrant, one performing *hijrat*; pl., *muhajirin*.
- Muharram*. The first month of the Muslim lunar calendar, or, more specifically, the tenth day of the Muslim month of Muharram, a period of mourning observed by Shias as the death anniversary of Husain, grandson of the Prophet, murdered at Kerbala.
- muhtamim*. Administrator.
- mujahid*. One who wages *jihad*, holy warrior; pl., *mujahidin*.
- mujtahid*. An interpreter of Islamic law, a term used in India to refer to Shia ulama.
- mulla*. Title equal to *maulana*.
- munshi*. Clerk or scribe; as a title, an educated man; as a perjorative, "scribbler."
- murid*. Disciple, follower of a Sufi *pir*.
- musha'ira*. A gathering for poetic recitation; a contest for extemporaneous poetic composition based on a set rhyme scheme.
- nawab*. Muslim prince or big landlord.
- nazrana*. Fee paid to the landlord by the tenant over and above the rent, for the renewal of his lease on the land.
- nizam*. Governor, ruler, or prince, as the nizam of Hyderabad.
- Parsi*. Member of the Zoroastrian faith in India.
- Pir*. Spiritual guide, religious preceptor, a Sufi or the descendant of a Sufi saint. In Sindh, powerful landowning religious figures associated with Sufi shrines.
- pardah*. The custom of veiling and secluding women.
- qadi*. A judge trained in Islamic law.
- raj*. Rule, empire, kingdom.
- Sadr-e-Mudarris*. Head teacher, principal.
- sangathan*. Unity, solidarity.
- sarparast*. Guide, supervisor, patron.

- satyagraha*. Lit., "soul force" or "truth force," nonviolent resistance, a form of political agitation which became known, inaccurately, as "passive resistance."
- Seva Samiti*. Service society, a volunteer social service agency.
- shams al-ulama*. Honorific title; lit., "sun of the ulama."
- shari'a*. The sacred, divinely revealed law of Islam.
- sharif*. A nobleman, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, also the hereditary chieftain of the city of Mecca.
- Shia*. The partisans of Ali, the fourth caliph, who form a distinct sect in Islam.
- shuddhi*. Reconversion to Hinduism of one who has embraced another religion; lit., purification.
- Sufi*. Islamic mystic.
- sultan*. Military commander or temporal ruler.
- Sunni*. Orthodox Muslim.
- swadeshi*. The movement to promote goods made in India; lit., "own country."
- swaraj*. Self-government, self-rule, also self-discipline.
- tabligh*. Conversion, proselytization, missionary activity.
- talukdar*. Large landholder in Oudh, now part of UP, but before 1856 an independent Muslim kingdom.
- tanzim*. Organization, consolidation.
- taziya*. Model of Husain's tomb at Kerbala, carried in procession by Indian Shias on the tenth day of the month of Muharram.
- ulama*. Pl. of *alim*; theologians, jurists, religious teachers.
- ummah*. The community of Islamic believers.
- urs*. The annual commemoration of the death of a Sufi saint, and the occasion for a pilgrimage to his tomb.
- waqf*. Charitable endowment or pious foundation.
- zakat*. Alms, tithe, a percentage of a Muslim's annual income given for religious charities.
- zamindar*. Landlord.

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