

THE MANSABDĀRĪ SYSTEM
AND THE MUGHUL ARMY

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PREFACE

SOME fifteen years ago I conceived the idea of writing a history of Shāh Jahān's reign on a somewhat extensive scale, feeling that that reign had been neglected by historians, or unfairly dealt with. When I came in contact with the original sources I found that there was a great deal more that the modern historians had neglected—something that was of fundamental importance. As I followed up the clue I was more and more convinced that the customs, practices and institutions, which constituted the framework of Mughul Court life, had been systematically ignored by modern writers, who impassively confined themselves to conventional methods. I felt that an understanding of the true spirit of the civilization was a more important task than writing a glowing account of the wealth and glory, pomp and pageantry of Shāh Jahān's court, although the latter would certainly appeal to the easy-chair dilettante. The Mughul Indian empire was, in many respects, a unique phenomenon in the world's history ; and we could do no justice to it by showing off its external splendour or recording its

feats of arms, its victories and triumphs. We could better understand the *Zeitgeist* by studying the elements of which the Mughul court life was composed.

Thus the scope of my treatment was widened, and Shah Jahan's reign made room for an intensive study of the Mughul empire from Babur to Aurangzeb. The plan of research which I now placed before me is set forth in the Introduction, which follows. The result was that my history of Shah Jahan's reign, which had proceeded no further than his Coronation,¹ had to be shelved as a matter of secondary importance..

The *Mansabdari* System and the Mughul Army were the first to claim my attention. My articles on these subjects appeared in 1930,² followed by other articles on the Mughul Treasury,⁸ with which we are not here concerned. Since that date several writers have written on the *Mansabdari* in various periodicals. All the extant literature on the subject, that has fallen under my notice, including an article or two that appeared before I wrote, are briefed on the next page.

* In *J. I. H.*. VII, 327-44.

* In *J. I. H.*. IX, pp. 132-72, 279-305.

* Since published with corrections, amendments and additions under the title *Imperial Treasury of the Indian Mughuls*,

1. Ram Prasad Tripathi	"The Army Organization of Akbar"	<i>Indian Historical Records Commission</i> , Vol. V, Jan., 1923, pp. 56-66.
2. Dashrath Sharma	"Akbar's Cavalry—(1) The Zat and Sawar Ranks."	<i>J. I. H.</i> , V, 359-66.
3. T. W. Haig	"Military Organization of the Mughal Empire."	<i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , III, 626-29.
4. C. S. K. Rao Sahib	"A Note on the Mughal Military Terms Zat and Sawar."	<i>J. I. H.</i> , XIV, 205-21.
5. W. H. Moreland	"Rank (<i>mansab</i>) in the Mogul State Service."	<i>J. R. A. S.</i> for October, 1936, pp. 641-65.
6. C. S. K. Rao Sahib	"Some Notes on Mughal Mansabs."	<i>J. J. H.</i> , XVI, 50-62.
7. Sri Ram Sharma	"The Organization of Public Services in Mughal India (1526-1707)."	<i>Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society</i> , XXIII, 1937, Part II.

Note.—Nos. 1 and 2 preceded the publication of my articles.

Among these the place of honour belongs to Moreland, whose thesis is, within its limits, the ablest exposition of the subject so far, and constitutes a distinct advance on all its predecessors. He has made an earnest effort to understand the constitution and significance of the *mansabdari* and its historical development. Besides offering an intelligent appreciation of known facts, he has brought to light certain data which illustrate the working of the system, confirming many of my conjectures and hypotheses, and making the whole system coherent and consistent.

Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib has also done useful spade work, specially in his later article, "Some Notes on Mughal Mansabs."

During the last fifteen years I have been raking historical records and documents for facts and figures bearing on this subject, and an enormous quantity of material has come together—a great deal more than I can ever hope to use. Further, I have come to think that a difficult and obscure subject like the *Mansabdari* can best be studied against its historical background, and in the light of such analogous phenomena and illustrative details as are available. Again, although I have seen no reason to modify my views on the main points, I feel that my previous treatment was inadequate. The fresh material adduced by Moreland, with his opinions and interpretation, has to be considered, a great deal of new evidence has to be incorporated, and the whole field surveyed from a comprehensive standpoint. So, I think the time is ripe for a thorough overhauling of the whole question once more, leading to a much fuller treatment of the whole subject. As a result my previous articles have had to be completely remodelled, and in the main rewritten.

This accounts for the long interval of three years that has elapsed between the publication of my

Imperial Treasury of the Indian Mughuls and this monograph.

I may say in conclusion that nothing like completeness or finality is claimed for the conclusions reached ; since still there are many points which can only be cleared up as evidence grows and facts gather. But I have made an effort to bring together relevant facts, and have offered my opinions, of which the reader can judge for himself from the facts and the authorities cited.

In quotations I have preserved the original spellings of the authors quoted. The present writer's approval of such spellings is not necessarily implied. The reader will also please bear in mind that many of the authors quoted from use a different system of transliteration from that adopted in this book.

Price has had to be raised considerably owing to heavy cost of material and printing, and the difficulty in getting paper.

I acknowledge the appreciation implied in the selection of this work by the Punjab University as suitable for the M.A. Course in History (Mughul Period of Indian History).

Thanks are due to the Hon'ble. Sir Azizul Huque, Commerce Member, Government of India, for his

kindly registering my name as a publisher and granting me adequate supply of paper for this and other books.

LAHORE

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TRANSLITERATION

In writing Arabic, Persian, Urda and Hindi words, I have followed the system adopted and recommended by the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, with a few necessary additions and modifications. The additional signs used by me are neither original nor arbitrary. They are in fact well-established, being sanctioned by general usage in standard works. The signs are as under :—

Consonants

		تھ		th
J	to be omitted at beginning of words ; elsewhere it is <i>hamza</i> , and should be represented by an apostrophe (J) ; as, احمد (Ahmad), جرأت (<i>jur'at</i>), فائدة (<i>ffi'ida</i>).	ث		t
		تھ		th
		ث		§
V	b	ج		j
بھ	bh	جھ		jh
پ	p	ڀ		ḥ
پھ	ph	ڀھ		<u>kh</u>
ٲ	t	د		d

Bj	dh	ع	—
5	4	I	<u>gh</u>
aj	ḏh	U9	f
3	5	J	q
J	r	ك	k
J	r	كه	kh
رھ	rh	گ	g
j	z	گھ	gh
&	zh	J	l
3		r	m
uT	s	0	n
س ^A	<u>sh</u>	و	w or v
ص	§	8	h
u ³	?	ی	y
k>	t		
ظ	?		

Diacritical Marks and Vowels

— a

“ i

— u

Long	{	ا—	ā
		و—	u
		و—	o (as in <i>jjy roz</i>).
		ی—	I
		ی—	e (as in <i>پیش pesh</i>).
		ای—	a (as in <i>مرتضی Murtaza, اعلی a'ld</i>)

Diphthongs

و— au (as in *اورنگ aurang*).

jj— ai (as in *سليمان Sulaiman*).

The silent *j* after *_* is represented by *w* thus :
خوش (khwush), *خواب (khwab)*, *خود (kjiwud)*.

The imperceptible *8* at the end of some Persian words is not transliterated ; thus *بنده* is *banda*, not *bandah* ; *wta.* is *khana*. not *khanah*. When pronounced, it is written ; as, *گناه* (*gunah*).

Geographical names, both Oriental and European, have been written in the form used in well-known Maps and Atlases ; and in case of Indian place-names I have adopted more particularly the spelling in the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, 26 Vols. (Oxford, 1907-09).

ABBREVIATIONS

- Ā'in.* —Abu'l-Fazl, *Ā'in-i-Akbari* (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 2 Vols.
- Ā'in*, tr.—English translation of above in 3 Vols. (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta). Vol. I by H. Blochmann and D. C. Phillott, Vols. II and III by H. S. Jarrett.
- Al. N.* —Muḥammad Kazim *bin* Muḥammad Amin Munshl, *'Ālamgir Nama* (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- A. N.* —Abtfl-Fazl, *Akbar Nama* (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.
- A. N.*, tr.—English translation of above by H. Beveridge (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.
- A. S.* —Muhammad Ṣalih Kambo, *'Amal-i-Salih* or *Shah Jahan Nama* (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.
- Bernier.—Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire A.D. 1656-1668* ; tr. Archibald Constable and Vincent A. Smith. Oxford University Press, 1916.
- B.M. MS.—British Museum Manuscript.

B. N.—*Badshah Nama*, Vols. I (i & ii) and II by Mulla ‘Abdu’l-Hamld Lahorl (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta); and Vol. III (MS.) by Muhammad Wariş.

B. N. E.—*The Babur-Nama in English (Memoirs of Babur)* by Zahlru’d-Dln Muhammad Babur Padshah Ghazi, tr. Annette Susannah Beveridge. London, 1921.

Budayunl.—‘Abdu’l-Qadir *bin* Muluk Shah Budayunl, *Muntakhabu t-Tawarikh* (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.

Budayunl, tr.—English translation of above by G. S. A. Ranking (Vol. I), W. H. Lowe (Vol. II), and T. W. Haig (Vol. III) (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).

De Laet.—*The Empire of the Great Mogol*. A translation of De Laet’s “Description of India and Fragment of Indian History” by J. S. Hoyland, annotated by S. N. Banerjee. Bombay, 1928.

E. & D.—Sir H. M. Elliot and Prof. John Dowson, *History of India as told by its own Historians*, 8 Vols. 1867-77.

Horn.—Paul Horn, *Das Heer und Kriegswesen der gross Moghuls*. Leiden, 1894.

- Irvine, *Army*.—William Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration*. London, 1903.
- c7.A. S. B.—*Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*.
- J. I. H.—*Journal of Indian History*, Madras.
- J. R. A. S.—*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*.
- L. E. A.—*Loan Exhibition of Antiquities*. Delhi, 19H.
- M. A.—Muhammad Saqī Musta'idd Khan, *Ma'asiri-^lĀlamgirt* ; ed. Ahmad 'All (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- Mandelslo.—*The Voyages and Travels of J. Albert de Mandelslo into the East Indies*. Rendered into English by John Davies of Kidwelly. Second edition. London, 1669.
- Marco Polo.—*The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian* ; tr. and ed. Colonel Sir Henry Yule, 2 Vols. Third edition, revised by Henri Cordier. London, 1921.
- M. L.—Muhammad Hashim Khan. “Khaff Khan”, *Muntakhabu'l-Lubab* (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.
- Monserrate's *Commentary*.—*The Commentary of Father Monserrate, S. J., On his Journey to the Court of Akbar*, tr. J. S. Hoyland,

- annot. S. N. Banerjee. Oxford University Press, 1922.
- Af. U.—Nawwab “Şamsamu’d-Daula” Shah hJawaz Khan. *Maasirul-Umara*, 3 Vols. (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- Mulakhkhas*.—Muhammad Tahir, “Ashna”, “TnSyat Khan *Mulakhkhas* (A history of the first thirty years of Shah Jahan’s reign, condensed from *Badshah Nama*). MS.
- Peter Mundy.—*The Travels of Peter Mundy, in Europe and Asia, 1608-1667*, ed. Lt.-Col. Sir Richard Carnac Temple (Issued by the Hakluyt Society). 1914. Vol. II: *Travels in Asia, 1628-1634*.
- Platts.—John T. Platts, *A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi, and English*. London, 1911.
- P. U. L.—Punjab University Library, Lahore.
- Purchas.—*Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes*, by Samuel Purchas, 20 Vols. Glasgow, 1905.
- Roe.—*The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India 1615-19*; ed. Sir William Foster. London, 1926.
- R. Y.—Regnal Year.
- Steingass.—F. Steingass, *A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary*. London, 1930.
- Storia*.—Niccolao Manucci, *Storia do Mogor, or*

- Mogul India (1653-1708)*, tr. William Irvine, 4 Vols. London, 1907-08.
- Tabaqat*.—*The Tabaqat-i-Akbari* of Khwajah Nizamuddin Ahmad, ed. B. De and M. Hidayat Hosain (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- Tabaqat*, tr.—English translation of above by B. De (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- Timur's Institutes*. — *Institutes Political and Military*, written originally in the Mogul language, by the Great Timour, improperly called Tamerlane; tr. Major Davy; pub. Joseph White. Oxford, 1783.
- Tuzuk*.—*Toozuk-i-Jehangeeree*, ed. Syud Ahmud, Aligarh, 1864.
- Tuzuk* (R. & B.).—English translation of above by Alexander Rogers and Henry Beveridge, 2 Vols. London, 1909 and 1914.
- %afar Nama*.—Sharafu'd-Din 'All Yazdl, *Zafar Nama*; ed. M. Ilahdad (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta). 2 Vols.

- NOTE: (1) —4,000/3,000, etc. —The *mansab* or rank of 4,000, etc., personal and 3,000, etc., horse.
- (2)—Titles are always given within double inverted commas, except when a man's title is better known than his name, in which case his title is freely used as a name.

CHRONOLOGY

In the reigns of Babur and Humaynn Islamic or *Hijri* dates were observed, and no other calendar was recognized. This era may therefore be taken up first :

The Muslim Era

The Muslim or the *Hijri* era began on July 16, 622 A.C. The year, which is lunar, consists of the following twelve months, and comprises 354 days (or, in a leap year, 355 days, with 30 days to *Zu'l-hijj*).

	Days
<i>Muharram</i>	30
<i>Safar</i>	29
<i>Rain* I</i>	30
<i>Rabi* II</i>	29
<i>Jumada I</i>	30
<i>Jumada'II</i>	29
<i>Rajab</i>	30
<i>Sha'ban *</i>	29
<i>Ramazan</i>	30
<i>Shuwwal</i>	29

			Days
<i>Zu'l-qa'd</i> 30
<i>Zu'l-hijj</i> 29 (or 30 in leap year).

It must be remembered, however, that the rule according to which the months have alternately 30 or 29 days, is true only approximately and in long calculations. Variation in latitude and longitude sometimes makes a difference in the number of days in a month, so that a month may begin a day earlier in one place than in another. The actual appearance of the moon plays an important part in the determination of Muslim dates. We often have two consecutive months of 30 or of 29 days in practice- Thus is explained much of the prevailing confusion about *Hijri* dates.

It must also be noted that the day, according to the Muslim calendar, consists of the period from sunset to sunset (and neither from sunrise to sunrise, which is the Hindu practice, nor from midnight to midnight, which is the modern European method of calculation); so that 'Friday evening \ or 'Friday night' in the mouth of a Muslim historian means the evening or night occurring between Thursday and Friday, and not the one between Friday and Saturday.

Akbar's Ilahi or Divine Era

In XXIX R. Y., Akbar introduced, with slight modifications, the Persian calendar, which was based on solar calculation, and called it *Ilahi* or Divine era. The order had retrospective effect, so that the era began with the year of his accession, 963 A.H. (= 1556 A.C.). The Persian names of the months were retained, and the number of days in a month varied from 29 to 32 :—

<i>Farwardin</i>	<i>(Mah-i-Ilahi)</i>	<i>Mihr</i>	<i>(Mah-i-Ildhi)</i>
<i>Urdibihisht</i>	Ditto	<i>Āban</i>	Ditto
<i>Khurdad</i>	Ditto	<i>Āzar</i>	Ditto
<i>Tir</i>	Ditto	<i>Dai</i>	Ditto
<i>Amurdad</i>	Ditto	<i>Bahman</i>	Ditto
<i>Shahriwar</i>	Ditto	<i>Isfandarmuz</i>	Ditto

In the reign of JahSngir the *Ilahi* calendar was followed, though *Hijri* dates are often met with in the histories.

When Shah Jahan came to the throne, he felt that the *Hijri* dates had been sadly neglected by his predecessors, and consequently reinstated them in the official histories and in court life. Persian parallel dates are, however, occasionally mentioned by Shah Jahan's historians. The *Nauroz* and the *Td-i-Gulabl* (13 *Tir*) as well as the Solar Weighments,¹ which

¹ See below.

were calculated by the solar calendar, continued to be regularly celebrated. *

In Aurangzeb's time a further change was made in the same direction ; *viz.*, even the *Nauroz*, a relic of the Persian calendar, was discarded, and only *Hijri* dates and festivals were observed. Solar Weighments,¹ however, were still kept, and occasionally we hear of *'Id-i-Gulabi* (13 Tir).²

Regnal Years

From Akbar's time on it was customary with Mughul historians to record events under regnal years, the first regnal year (I R. Y.) beginning theoretically on the Coronation day, but practically on a near date arbitrarily fixed to suit certain adjustments. When so adjusted, it was rigidly adhered to.

Akbar was enthroned on Friday, 2 *Rab* VII, 963 A.H. (= 14 February, 1556), but his first regnal year (and consequently the *Ilaht* era) began on 11 March, 1556—that being the next *Nauroz*—*i.e.*, 25 days later. Jahangir followed the same practice and shifted the anniversary of his coronation from October 24 to March 10-12, to make it synchronize with *Nauroz*. The New Year Festival (1 *Farwar*-

¹ See below.

• • *Al. N.*. 404 ; *Af. A.*, 50.

din), to which the coronation anniversary was linked, corresponded in reality to the vernal equinox, and ought to have occurred every year on 11th March (Old Style) or 21st March (New Style). In actual practice we find that in the reigns of Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan it fell on date between 9th and 12th March (Old Style; or 19th and 22nd March (New Style).¹

Shah Jahan's coronation took place on 8 *Jumada* II, 1037. As he calculated his regnal years by the lunar calendar, *Jumada* II was fixed upon as the Coronation day; and the *Nauroz*, now automatically uncoupled from it, was independently celebrated every year.

Aurangzeb was crowned on 24 *Ramazan*, 1069 (second coronation), but he shifted his coronation anniversary a few days forward to make it coincide with the *Id* festival (1 *Shawwal*). and to save the festivities from the fasts.

¹ The reader should note that in 1582 the New or Gregorian Calendar was introduced in the Roman Catholic countries in Europe, and the dates were advanced by ten days; though England kept to the Old or Julian Calendar till 1752. R. & B., instead of consistently following either the Old or the New Style in their parallel Christian dates, get mixed up between the two systems, and use the old dates for R. Y/s I, II and XIII-XIX, and new dates for R. Y.'s III-XII—which is not defensible on any ground.

Birthdays

The Mughul emperors celebrated their birthdays, both solar and lunar, by a great festival, the main feature of which was the weighing of the King's person against gold, silver and other commodities. These festivals are spoken of in these monographs as those of Solar or Lunar Weighment. Considerable latitude was observed in fixing the dates of these celebrations every year.

CHAPTER I

THE *MANSABDARI* SYSTEM OR THE 'MILITARY ARISTOCRACY'

'THE institution of the' Army and the *Mansabdari*
1 System interpenetrate each other, so that the one is unintelligible without the other. These two, again, have a far-reaching effect on the texture of Mughul Indian society, since the only aristocracy in the land was the military peerage graded according to the *mansab*, and more than half the population in a court town or a camp was composed of soldiers, their dependants, and the camp-followers—*i.e.*, the 'army'. This will go to show the great importance of the army from the political as well as the social standpoint.

Again, it is an important feature of the Mughul administration that all civil officers, high and low, were chosen from the holders of the military rank, *i.e.*, the *mansabdars*. So we find that the *mansabdari* system is the army, the peerage and the civil administration all rolled into one. The *mansab*, although primarily a military rank, really constituted the terms in which official hierarchy, and incident-

ally social status, was expressed. A *mansab* did not by itself imply any particular office. Sometimes the conferment of a *mansab* was equivalent to mere grant of a source of income to a person by way of recognition, it may be, of purely professional services or skill (as those of a physician or a poet).

In a sense the history of the Mughul army is the history of the *mansabdari* system; and yet the latter system covers a much wider field than the army, while some portions of the army were not under *manşabdars*.

Before we deal, therefore, with the composition of the army, it is necessary to form a tolerably clear idea of the graduated organization, at once military, official and aristocratic, known as the *mansabdari* system, and its incidents and implications.

The *mansab* is a somewhat unique institution. The idea conveyed by a *mansab* in Mughul times was a complex one. Generally, it defined the recipient's order of precedence, or position in society or public service—rank, in a general sense.

What adds to the difficulty is the fact that the *mansabdari* is not a stationary phenomenon, but a living growth; so that we have to study it in the course of its development, and explain its main features at each stage from Babur's reign to the end of Aurangzeb's.

In its most highly developed form—for instance, in the reign of Shah Jahan—a full *mansab* is expressed thus: *Chahar hazari sat wa si hazar suwar*, or more briefly, *Chahar hazari si hazar suwar*, which means 4000 personal and 3000 horse rank. We will denote it thus: 4000/3000. Or, if the *sat* and *suwar* ranks were equal: (1) *Chahar hazari sat wa chahar hazar suwar*, (2) *Chahar hazari sat wa suwar*, or (3) *Chahar hazari chahar hazar suwar*', i.e., 4000 personal and 4000 horse, or 4000/4000 according to our notation.

A few peculiarities may be noticed first: (1) The *sat*, i.e., personal rank is always either equal to, or higher than, the *suwar*, i.e., horse, rank.¹ (2) The order in the lists and consequently the order of precedence follows the *sat* and not the *suwar* rank; the former being presumably more important, so that 4000/2000 was considered higher than 3000/3000.

¹ In the whole range of Mughul history I have found only five instances where the *suwar* rank exceeds the *sat* rank. They are as follows:

- (1) Hasan Qilij 300/500 (*A.N.*, III, 826).
- (2) 'Ali Muhammad 300/400 (*Tuzuk*, 159; *R. & B.*, I, 325),
- (3) Yusuf Khan 1,000/1,500 (*Tuzuk*, 185; *R. & B.*, I, 375).
- (4) Sayyid Sulaiman 600/900 (*B.N.*, II, 746).
- (5) Khan Firoz Jang 7,000/10,000 (*M.A.*, 481).

I have no doubt they are all errors of transcription.

In case of a *du aspa si aspa* rank (see below) the *suwar* rank is in fact doubled, and would thus sometimes exceed the *Zdt* rank. See *Mir'atu'l-Istildh* by Rai Anand Ram "Muhlis" (P. U. L. MS.), f. 15a-6.

Further, in some lists, such as Abn'l-Fazl's in *Ā'in*, only the *sat* rank is given. (3) There may be a *sat* rank without any *suwar* rank, though it is rare ; but there never is a *suwar* rank without a *sat* rank.

Now, what exactly is meant by 4000 personal and 3000 horse rank ?

I have no doubt the contemporary historians understood the theory and practice of the *mansabdari system* ; but, much to our regret, none of them—not even Abu'l-Fazl—has cared to explain it fully. What they saw before them in actual practice seemed so obvious to them that they took the knowledge of the principles for granted, and contented themselves with a statistical account of the details. The contemporary European travellers—at least one of whom was a *mansabdar* himself—have not paid sufficient attention to the subject either, and some, like Manucci, only succeed in making it obscurer. Among modern writers, Blochmann (*Ā'in*, tr., I, 249-59) was the first to attempt a working solution of the system. Later William Irvine (*Army*) and Dr. Paul Horn (*Das Heer und Kriegswesen der gross Moghuls*, Leiden, 1894) made a special study of the Mughul army. Since I wrote my original articles on the *Mansabdari System* and the Mughul Army in 1930, several writers have written on the

subject.¹ Some progress has no doubt been made, but much of the ravelled skein still subsists, and the thread is far from running clear. Obscurities and difficulties remain, which require patient labour to dissolve them.

Let us take the question in its simplest form. Take 500/0, i.e., 500 *sat* with no horse rank—there are only two such examples in the list of *mansabdars* at the end of *B.N.*, I (which includes rank-holders down to 500 *sat*). We ask the natural question, what is the individual or the article for which the number 500 stands? It does not stand for rupees, as Manucci assumes (*Storia*, II, 369-74). Does it stand for horsemen, as Irvine, the editor, says, correcting him (*ibid.*, 369, f. n. 1) ?

We may begin with a rapid survey of the results obtained by previous writers. Dr. Paul Horn, presumably misled by Blochmann (who, in the list on pp. 257-58, translates *dah hazari*, eta as the 'commander* of 10,000, etc.) assumes throughout his discussion (pp. 11-21) that the *sat* rank, which alone is given in Abu'l-Fazl's list, is not only the same as *suwar* rank but represents the number of horsemen actually entertained by the officer. This misapprehension, at once so obvious and so fundamental, not only vitiates Dr. Horn's whole account

¹ See Preface.

of the *mansabdari* system (pp. 11-21), but also renders totally invalid all the calculations by which he tries to square the rank of an officer with the unit or units found under his command in a battle field (pp. b7-8).

Irvine corrects Blochmann's error and makes it sufficiently clear in his list on p. 8, and again on the following page, that the rank mentioned is the *sat* and not the *suwar* rank ; but goes on to say that from the cash salary of his *sat* rank 'the officer had to maintain his transport, his household, and some horsemen' (italics ours). Hence Irvine, on p. 5, speaks of the *suwar* rank as 'a number of extra horsemen'—a phrase repeated by other writers like V. A. Smith (*Akbar*, p. 364).

Irvine takes no definite position, but wavers between the various hypotheses. Fairness requires that he should be quoted *in extenso* :

'Indeed, if the totals of all the personal (*sat*) *mansabs* in existence at one time were added together, we should arrive at so huge an army that it would have been impossible for the country, however heavily taxed, to meet such an expense.....
..... The inference I wish to draw is, that from the grant of rank it does not follow that the soldiers implied by such rank were really added to the army. The system required that a man's rank

should be stated in terms of so many soldiers; but there is abundant testimony in the later historians that *mansab* and the number of men in the ranks of the army had ceased to have any close correspondence.

Thus it seems to me a hopeless task to attempt, as Dr. Horn does, p. 39, following Blochmann (*A'in*, I, 244-47), to build up the total strength of the army from the figures giving the personal (*sat*) rank of the officers (*mansabdars*)..... If we reckoned the number of men in the *suwar* rank, for whom allowances at so much per man were given by the State to the *mansabdar*, we might obtain a safer estimate of the probable strength of the army.¹

Irvine is unable to tell us what the *sat* rank really is, and what was its *raison d'etre*. But we must remember that he was a pioneer in the field.

Another author, Hermann Goetz, just touches upon this subject in his *Epochen der indischen Kultur*. Nearly all the available space in his account is taken up by an unconscionably long excerpt from Bernier, for which one could have gone to Bernier himself. All that he himself has to say on this difficult and intricate subject is the following:

‘Der Feudalismus weicht dem Beamtenwesen, freilich in einer eigenartigen Prägung. Die feudale

¹ *Army*. 58-59.

Militarverfassung bleibt als Susserer Rahmen bestehen, aber sie wird ihres Wesens entkleidet dadurch, dass Truppenstellung und Lehen ihr entzogen werden. Die bisherige Gruppierung nach der Truppenmacht der einzelnen Grossen wird zu einer leeren Rangordnung, weiterhin zu einer Gehaltsordnung und erst an letzter Stelle einer militSrischen. Dass also z. B. die Stellung eines Offiziers uber tausend Mann (Hazari) nur den Rang bei Hof bezeichnet ; dieser Offizier bekommt jedoch einen Gehalt, der fur die Stellung von vielleicht 600 Mann berechnet ist, und de facto ist er vielleicht zur Stellung von 300 Mann wirklich verpflichtet. Ein Zivilbeamter hat dann eben auch einen solchen Hofrang und eine solche Gehaltsklasse, seine militarische Stellungspflicht sind dann daher 0 Mann. Zum anderen aber wird diesen Offizieren und Beamten die direkte Verwaltung ihrer Lehen (Dschaglr) entzogen, die ihnen zwar als Bezahlung zugewiesen werden, von denen sie aber nur die Einkunfte von der Finanzverwaltung Oberwiesen erhalten.’¹

In a book of such an imposing size, by an author of Goetz’s position, written so late as 1929, the cursory treatment accorded to the subject is disappointing in the extreme. Apparently the author

¹ Hermann Goetz, *Epochender indischen Kultur*, Leipzig, 1927. p. 467.

has not considered the matter worth a serious inquiry. Nor does he show any acquaintance with the original authorities.

Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib, writing as late as 1935, makes the suggestion that the *sat* rank represents infantry, and the *suwar* rank cavalry, to be maintained by the *mansabdar*¹ This suggestion can best be taken up when we have traced the development of the *mansabdari* system, and cleared the ground for a reasonable understanding.

It must be conceded that the Persian historians' loose and inexact way of speaking is partly responsible for the confusion that prevails. For instance, while the A'in list of *mansabdari* purports to give the *sat* rank only,² the *Tabaqat* list, which is very nearly a reproduction of it, gives mostly *sat* ranks, but describes, as if inadvertently, some of the ranks as *suwar**

Again, BudayUnt speaks of *aimadars*, *i.e.* holders of subsistence allowances, as *hazaris*, *pan-sadis* and *sadis* These look like holders of the ranks of 1000, 500 and 100 respectively ; but they are nothing of the sort. They mean only holders of 1000, 500 or

¹ *J. I. H.*, XIV, 219-21.

¹ The reason of this will be apparent later on.

¹ For a fuller notice of it see below.

* BudKyUm, II. 274.

100 *bighas* of land respectively.¹ BudayunI himself held 1000 *highas of* land, and calls himself humorously a *hazari*? But the only rank he ever held was of 20.

In any case, Messrs. Blochmann, Irvine and Horn having failed us, we can only fall back on the *A'in*. From the *A'in-i-mansabdar* (Text, I, 179 ; Blochmann, 248) we know that a holder of the rank 500/0 belongs to the third class. And on reference to the list in *A'in* (Text, I, 180-85 ; Blochmann, 257-58),³ we find that such a rank-holder drew Rs. 2,100 *p.m.* as his cash salary and had to maintain horses, elephants, beasts of burden and carts belonging to the emperor detailed there. It should be carefully noted that this list in *A'in* gives only the *sat* ranks, and has nothing to do with the *suwar* rank. Blochmann has, by an unlucky oversight, translated *dah hazari*, etc., as the 'commander of 10,000', etc. It is only an oversight, since Blochmann, we know, fully understands the distinction between the *sat* and *suwar* rank (see pp. 251 and 596). But the slip has proved rather serious, since it has misled later writers on the subject.

It follows from the above that an officer with-

¹ Lowe translates this passage as if these meant lands yielding income worth 1000, 500 or 100 rupees respectively. But that is not correct.

² BudSyuni, II, 342.

³ Given below.

out a *suwar* rank would be under no obligation to maintain any horsemen. Again, it is not quite correct to describe the *sat* rank as a brevet rank, as Blochmann does (p. 258); since the former, although it carries no command with it, carries a fixed salary, while the brevet rank usually carries neither.

After a careful perusal of the list, however, we are not in a position to say what substantive the cardinal numeral 500, e.g., qualifies. All we know is that a man holding the *sat* rank of 500 with no *suwar* rank draws a certain salary and has to maintain some animals and a certain amount of transport. The figure 500 is, therefore, no better than a formula, by which the salary and the obligations of the *mansabdar* could be definitely ascertained from the schedule.

The *mansab* is called *sat*, i.e., self, because it regulates the allowance for himself (and his household) as distinguished from that for the cavalry enlisted by him.

A *sat* rank without any *suwar* was, however, as we have said, above, exceedingly rare. Usually an officer with a personal rank had also a horse rank, equal or smaller. This brings us to the earlier question, what is meant by 4000/3000?

We know now what 4000 *sat* stands for. The question remains, what are we to understand by 3000 horse? Well, it means that the *mansabdar* with

3000 horse rank had to maintain a number of horse-men, either 3000, or a fixed proportion of it. This proportion possibly varied from period to period and from occasion to occasion. In Shah Jahan's time, for instance, the usual practice was that where a *man-sabdar* held *jagir* in the province in which he served he had to present for the *dagh* horsemen equivalent in number to one-third of his horse rank; e.g., an officer with the rank 3000/3000 had in such a case to brand 1000 horse. If, however, he was told off to serve in a province of the Empire other than that in which his *jagir* was situated, he had to present only one-fourth of his horse rank; so that a 4000/4000 officer branded in this case only 1000 horse. At the time of the despatch of an expedition to Balkh and Badakhshan (*Rabi** II, 1056- A.H.), in view of the difficulties and of the distance of the seat of operations, a further concession was made, and it was decided that during that campaign officers need only brand one-fifth: an *amir* with 5000/5000 branded on that occasion only 1000 horse (*B.N.*, II, 506).

SECT. I : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

We have yet a great deal more to say both about the *sat* and the *suwar* rank, but before we enter into the details, we must try to understand the prin-

principles underlying the system. In order to understand the *mansabdan* properly, we must study it in its historical perspective. The Mughul institutions, we must remember, had their roots deep in the customs and practices of the Mongols of Central Asia. We must go back not only to Timur, from whom the Indian Mughuls traced their descent, but as far back as Chingiz Khan, whose *tura* was always considered the great norm or standard throughout Mughul history. Facts and details, otherwise obscure, will become clear in the light of their historical antecedents, and much of the terminology used in the period will find its natural explanation in the language used by the historians of Chingiz Khan or Qubla-i-Qa'an.

Moreland goes as far as to assert that 'Babur brought the Timurid system to northern India.'¹ We are not prepared to subscribe to this proposition, because we know that the *mansabdari* system was, to all appearance, of long standing in India in Sher Shah's time,² and Budayuni tells us that the branding rule was as old as the reign of 'Ala'u'd-Din Khalil.⁸

^x Article. "Rank (*mansab*) in the Mogul State Service" in *J. R. A. S.* for October, 1936, p. 649. ¹ See Sect. II below.

• Budlyhni, II, 190. According to Mr. Haig the *dagh o mahalli* originated with the Saljaks in Transoxiana and Persia (Article in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, III, 627 (2)); but the following instance belongs to the Ghaznavi period, and so is earlier : From the Persian poet, Farruq, we

Besides Babur had no time to study or reform the system of military organization, nor do we hear any thing of it in his *Memoirs*. So we cannot say that Babur brought it in to India. The true explanation is that the stream of Mongol inroads into Western India, which lasted from 1221 to 1327, and the slow infiltration consequent upon it, familiarized the people with the Mongol principles of recruitment and organization, and led to their gradual assimilation and final adoption. It probably received formal recognition as early as the reign of 'Ala'u'd-Din Khalji (1296-1316).

The idea of a military aristocracy, which is the distinguishing feature of the Indian *Manisabdar*, is to be found in the constitution of Chingiz Khan's army. Prof. B. Ya. Vladimirtsov says in his excellent monograph, *Life of Chingiz-Khan*: Chingiz Khan founded 'the constitution of his Empire on a strictly aristocratic basis.....In the same way as an aristocratic family or clan is the head of a tribe, so, in the system of Chingiz, the "golden clan" (*altan uruk*),

have a *qasida* on branding of the colts, written on the occasion of one of the great branding functions annually held by Amir AbU'l-Muzaffar Chighani at or near ChighSnSn (in Transoxiana). He was said to possess 18,000 brood-mares. [*Chahar Maqala of Nizami* (ed. Mirza Muhammad, pub. Luzac & Co., London, 1910), pp. 36-37. Browne's translation (*J.R.A.S.* for 1899, p. 766) is defective; and I have preferred the variant < 3 to رهی as it gives better sense.] This shows that branding on a very large scale was customary in Transoxiana in X-XI centuries A.C.

with its vassals and followers, is the head of all the Mongol tribes, of all the "generations living in felt tents," of all peoples, of all the world. At the head of the imperial clan is the Emperor who is the head of his own clan, and of the aristocracy that has joined him, much rather than the head of the people, or of the nation. Chingis-Khan never conceived of himself as a popular leader. He was and remained the leader of an aristocratic clan, that had unified all the Mongol aristocracy. His messages, speeches, decrees and statutes are never addressed to the people, but always to the princes, noyans and bagaturs' (pp. 65-66).

The simple arrangement is that a chieftain of a tribe offers the services of his men, becomes an officer in the army, and in case of victory shares the spoils.

We possess no details for this period, but at the time of the entry, there must have been a march-past, when men, mounts and equipments were examined, and if found satisfactory admitted into the army.

Sir H. H. Howorth tells us in his *History of the Mongols* that the Mongol 'army was composed of nomades who constantly led the lives of soldiers, carrying their hearths about with them; they could live anywhere where their horses and cattle could find pasture. To this was superadded

the discipline enforced by Jingsis. Each tribe was divided into sections of ten men, each section with its commander, nine chiefs of ten men chose the tenth as a centurion, who had, besides his own command of ten, supervision of the hundred; nine centurions similarly chose a battalion commandant, and ten of these latter a divisional commander, who led a body of 10,000 men, in Mongol phrase a *tuman*. No man could change his section or company or regiment, and the most implicit obedience to orders was insisted upon from all, and at the command of the Khan, the most potent general at once submitted to the bastinado or to execution. This implicit obedience was the secret of many of their successes, as it was in those of Rome and in our day those of Prussia. If a commander of ten was unfit for his post, Jingsis removed him and put another in his place, and so through the higher ranks, and he exhorted his chief commanders to come to him once a year to receive instruction and advice. He counselled them to instruct their children well in riding, archery, and the art of plunder, as they would have to rely on their bravery for a livelihood just as merchants rely on their merchandise. "I give," he said, "the command of troops to those who join courage to skill. To those who are active and alert I confide the

care of the baggage; to the dullards I confide a pole and make them tend the cattle. It is thus I have won my victories, and my sons will continue victorious if they follow my example." Each man beside his bow, arrows, and axe, carried a file to sharpen the points of the arrows, a sieve, an awl, needles and thread. The picked troops also carried sabres slightly re-curved, and had their heads and body protected by leathern armour covered with pieces of iron.'¹

This was the prototype on which the Mughul army was modelled, and here we have the beginnings of what later came to be known as the *mansab*. We see here also the origin of the periodical muster of contingents, which was such a picturesque feature of the Mughul court in India.²

The decimal division of the army was probably much older than Chingiz Khan's time.⁸

The Mongol empire reached its meridian in the reigns of the two brothers, Mangn Qa'an (1251-59 A.C.) and Qubla-i-Qa'an (1260-94 A.C.). The latter, says Sir H. H. Howorth, 'was the sovereign of the largest empire that was ever controlled by one man.'⁴ Marco Polo, who was at the court of Qubla-i-Qa'an in 1275-92, has the following: 'You see, when

¹ H. H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, Part I, pp. 108-9.

• See p. 26 *et seqq.* below.

• Marco Polo, I, p. 264, n. 2.

¹ *History of the Mongols*, Part I, 252.

a Tartar prince goes forth to war, he takes with him, say, 100,000 horse. Well, he appoints an officer to every ten men, one to every hundred, one to every thousand, and one to every ten thousand, so that his own orders have to be given to ten persons only, and each of these ten persons has to pass the orders only to other ten, and so on ; no one having to give orders to more than ten. And every one in turn is responsible only to the officer immediately over him; and the discipline and order that comes of this method is marvellous, for they are a people very obedient to their chiefs'.¹

Qubla-i-Qa'an had, Marco Polo tells us, 'twelve great Barons to whom he hath committed all the necessary affairs of thirty-four great provinces'. They choose the governors for these provinces, and 'can dispose of the movements of the forces, and send them whither, and in such strength as they please.' They may be called 'The Supreme Court', which 'forms the highest authority at the Court of the Great Kaan.'²

The next great landmark in our history is Timur. Clavijo speaks of Timur's army as follows: 'As regards the Tartar army which every day and all day waits on the orders of Timur following his Highness wheresoever he goes, this is organized

¹ Marco Polo, I. 261.

² *Ibid.*, 430-31.

after the following fashion. The host is divided into Captaincies: and there are captains of one hundred and of one thousand and of ten thousand men. Over the whole force is a single commander in-chief, as with us may be the Constable of Castile. When any warlike expedition is on foot those captains each are called on, and by the number sent for it is known how great the force assembled is to be.¹

But much fuller information is to be found in the *Institutes* of Timur.

The authenticity of *Malfūzāt-i-Amir Timur*, to which the *Institutes* (*Tuzukat-i-Timur*) forms an appendix, has been called in question by Rieu and others after him. In 1047 A.H. Mir Abu Talib al-Husaini Turbati presented to Shah Jahan a Persian translation, made by himself, of the *Malfuzat*, which was in Turkish, and which he said he had found in the library of the ruler of Yemen. It is certainly strange that no copy of the Turkish original is found in any library in the world today, nor any notice of it in the historical literature of the period. Still I find it rather difficult to believe that a man should have coolly taken it into his head to weave such a complicated fabric as the *Institutes* (with which alone we are concerned here) out

¹ *Embassy to Tamerlane*, 300.

of his own fancy, and dared to palm it off as a Persian translation of Timur's autobiography at an enlightened court like Shah Jahan's, where there must have been Turkish scholars, who could have easily detected the fraud

This, however, is not the place to adjudicate finally on the merits of this vexed question. We can only say that the book, as it stands, is a repository of the most valuable information of the first importance, and, whether Timur wrote it or somebody else, no student of the period can afford to ignore it

Having cleared our conscience with these remarks, we proceed to draw on this valuable work for such information as is relevant to our subject.

Timur had, we are told definitely, 313 officers, great and small, on his army list.

Under the *Amirul-Umara* (Commander-in-Chief), who himself was the deputy of the Emperor, stood the twelfth *amir*, who commanded 12,000 horse, and was, in turn, the deputy of the C.-in-C. Under him again came the eleventh *amir*, who was in command of 11,000 horse, and was deputy of the twelfth *amir*. Thus in descending order we have besides the C.-in-C. twelve *amirs* with commands of from 12,000 to 1,000, each being the deputy of the one immediately above him.

Four of these *amirs* were *beglarbegis*.¹

"Each of these *amirs* had an "expectant" *amir* appointed, who was to take his place and rank if he died. He was called *muntagiru'l-amarat* (*amir* in expectation).²

These may be considered, in modern language, to be Commissioned Officers. The N.C.O.'s consisted of the following :

Mingbashi or *amir hazara* (commander of 1,000)

Yuzbashi (" " 100)

Unbashi (" " 10)³

There were 100 of each of these in the army, 300 in all. Thus the total number of officers came to 313.⁴

The twelve *amirs* remind us of Qubla-i-Qa'an's twelve barons mentioned above, who were probably originally military leaders or generals.

Similarly the *mingbashi*, the *yuzbashi*, and the *unbaṣhi* are also to be found in Qubla-i-Qa'an's time, and probably originated in Chingiz Khan's army. In continuation of the passage already quoted from Marco Polo,⁵ we have the following, which we give as it stands with its lacunæ due to defective text: 'Further, they call the corps of 100,000 men a *Tuc*; that of 10,000 they call a *Toman*; the thousand they

¹ *Institutes*, 270-72,

* *Ibid.*, 268.

» *Ibid.*, 228-30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 272. So in the text and the translation. But an army 100,000

strong should have 100 *mingbdshis*, 1,000 *yuzbashes* and 10,000 *unbashes*—which, along with the 13 *amirs*, comes to 11,113 officers, and not 313.

*Pp. 17-18 above. x

call ; the hundred *Guz* ; the ten ¹

The reader, who has followed us, will readily see *that *Guz* here stands for *yuz* (which is Turkish for 100); and the words left out are respectively *ming* (*i.e.*, 1,000) and *un* or *on* (*i.e.*, 10). *Tuc*, however, is a new word, not met with elsewhere in such a context. It is the Turkish word *toq* or *togh* meaning 'the horse-tail or yak-tail standard which among so many Asiatic nations has marked the supreme military command. It occurs as *Taka* in ancient Persian, and Cosmas Indicopleustes speaks of it as *Tupha*. The Nine Orloks or Marshals under Chinghiz were entitled to the *Tuk*, and theirs is probably the class of command here indicated as of 100,000, though the figure must not be strictly taken. Timur ordains that every Amir who should conquer a kingdom or command in a victory should receive a title of honour, the *Tugh* and the *Nakkdra*. Baber on several occasions speaks of conferring the *Tugh* upon his generals for distinguished service. One of the military titles at Bokhara is still *Tokhsabai*, a corruption of *Tugh Sahibi* (Master of the Tugh).'² Yule goes on to say that the decimal

¹ Marco Polo, I, 261.

¹ Yule's note in Marco Polo (pp. 263-64), where he also gives the authorities, which I have omitted. In Mughul India we have two kinds of *Toq*: *Chartoq*, adorned with the tails of the Tibetan yak, and *Tumantoq*, which was similar, but a little longer. 'Both', adds AbU'lFazl, 'are flags of the highest dignity, and the latter is bestowed upon great nobles only'¹

division of the army 'passed into nearly all the Musulman States of Asia, and the titles *Min-bashi* or *Bimbashi*, *Yuzbashi*, *Onbashi*, still subsist not only in Turkestan, but also in Turkey and Persia. The term *Tman* or *Tma* was, according to Herberstein, still used in Russia in his day for 10,000.'¹

We see that the *mingbashi* and *Amir* I held an equal command, but the status was different, as they belonged to different categories.

Promotion from the ranks and from a lower rank to a higher rank always followed distinguished service in the field of battle, and was systematic and gradual.² A *mingbashi* could be promoted to be *Amir* I, so that the barrier between the N.C.O.'s and the Commissioned Officers was not insurmountable.³

Among the common troopers, again, those who distinguished themselves by bravery were known as *bahadurs*. While the salary of a private was fixed 'at the value of his horse', that of the *bahadur* was 'estimated at the value of from two to four horses each'.⁴

(A'in, I, 46; Blochmann, 52). See pictures in A'in (Blochmann, pl. IX. nos. 4 and 7). These will be fully dealt with under "The Imperial Insignia" in author's *Arms and Jewellery*.

¹ Marco Polo, I. 264.

¹ *Institutes*, 274 and 292.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 274.

⁴ The reader will please note this, as we shall meet with similar distinctions in the Mughul Indian army.

The salary of an *unbashi* was ten times the salary of a trooper, that of a *yuzbashi* twice that of an *unbashi*, and that of a *mingbashi* thrice that of a *yuzbashi*.¹

As a practical application of this system we have the sons and other relations of TImUr holding the following ranks.²

Muhammad JahSnglr			
(Heir-apparent)	12,000 horse
‘Umar Shaikh	10,000 „
MIran Shah	9,000 „
Shah Rukh	7,000 „
Grandsons		From 7,000 to 3,000	„
Other relatives		Amirates from VII to I	

The number of horses to be kept by each should be noted in particular:³

Private	2
<i>Bahadur</i>	Not given
<i>Unbashi</i>	5
<i>Yuzbashi</i>	10
<i>Mingbashi</i>	Not given
<i>Amir</i> I	110
„ II	120
„ III	130

¹ *Institutes*, 232-33.

* *Ibid.*, 240-42.

* *Ibid.*, 292-96.

<i>Amir</i> IV	140
....
....
<i>Amiru'l-Umara</i>	300 or more.

In the Mongol army 'each man had several horses,' says Howorth (Pt. I, p. 110).

But this was not all the army which fought under Timur. What we have so far dealt with is Timur's own or special army. He describes the 313 officers as his *naukaran-i-khdsu'l-khas*.¹ his special or personal servants.² They were directly under him.

Apart from these there were what we may call auxiliaries : soldiers levied from various tribes serving under their own chiefs. There was no organic connection between Timur's army and these forces. For these auxiliaries there were different rules, and the honours and distinctions their chiefs received were also different.

We are told that forty tribes submitted to Timur altogether: out of these twelve drew salary (*tamgha*), and received a special treatment. These tribes had their own *amirs* appointed by Timur, and some even had *amiru'l-umaras* appointed from among them :

¹ Note the word *naukar*. We meet with this word in this sense in Persian military history and in some historians of Akbar's reign. The word is freely used for a trooper elsewhere in the *Institutes* also, e.g., on pp. 312-20.

² *Institutes*, 268. Major Davy's translation, generally satisfactory, is not quite exact on this point.

for instance, he appointed four *amiru'l-umaras* from the Barias tribe ; and Amir Mu'ayyid of the Arlat tribe, who was Timur's brother-in-law, was also made *amirul-umara*)

Musters

Musters were very common in the reigns of the Greater Mughuls in India. The march-past of the army of a prince or of a great noble in the reign of Shah Jahan, for instance, must have been a magnificent sight ; and we should love to have an eye witness account which could help us to visualize the picturesque ceremony. Unfortunately no such word picture has been vouchsafed to us.

Such parades, however, were also common outside India and before Mughul times. We must remember that the Mongol military system, which descended from ancient times, was copied in Turkestan, Persia and India - in fact in all Western Asia ; so that the features of the organization and the forms and ceremonies are markedly similar.

The following are, therefore, of interest :

Timur once held a big review of his army, which is described in *Zafar Nama*? We learn here, incidentally, small details of the form and ceremony observed. Princes, *amirs* and *riiuns* brought their

¹ *Institutes*, 308-12.

⁸ I, 506-16.

soldiery for inspection. As each one's turn came, he alighted from his horse, went down on his knees and offered praises and prayers, making a present at the same time.

The next landmark in our history is a review in Persia in 1476. We possess an '*Arz Nama* (Account of the Parade) by Jalalu'd-Din Muhammad *bin* As'ad Davani (830-908 A.H.= 1427-1502 A.C.), the author of *Akhlaq-i-Jalalz*, the substance of which, with useful critical notes and explanations., has been given by V. Minorsky under the title "A Civil and Military Review in Fars in 881/1476" in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* (University of London), Vol. X, Part i (1939), pp. 141-78. This is a graphic description of a review held by Prince Sultan Khalil Aq-qoyunlu near Band-i-Mir in Fars (a short distance to the south of the ruins of Persepolis), of which the author was an eye-witness. Sultan Khalil was governor of the province of Fars on behalf of his father, Uzun Hasan.

The army reviewed consisted of (1) the holy men, the learned, the Sayyids, the *Qazis*, and their following, (2) the *amirs*, the courtiers, and civil and military officers of state, and their troops, and (3) *Naukars* of the Private Household (*Naukaran-i-khassa*).

The holy and learned men received special favours, and were treated as a privileged class. They

came in their characteristic costumes,-attended with banners, trumpets, etc.

The procedure was that the Sultan sat on the throne surrounded by courtiers and officers, and the musicians were in attendance. The *Sadr*, on horse back, stood below to introduce the dignitaries according to their rank. 'The tavajls shouted in the royal camp and delivered the call.' Every noble or *amir*, who was presented, dismounted, knelt down on a rug spread for him on the roadside, recited prayers and praises and presented a *peshkagh*, usually a horse.

The numbers brought by the *amirs* or officers are not usually given in this document. In the few cases where they are given we notice that there are no round numbers—hundreds or thousands but all sorts of odd figures. We must remember that this was only a provincial review.

Further, some *amirs* are described as *amir-i-a'gam*, some others are *amir-i-kabir*, while some are simply *amirs*.¹ Again, some have the title *riu'in* (from Mong, *noyan*, master, lord). M. Minorsky tells us that 'in this form the term *amir-nuyan* "a full general" survived in Persia till 1920.'²

The following item is more important than either of the foregoing :

Before Sultan Sa'id Khan joined battle with Mirza Aba Bakr at Kgshghar in 920 A.H. (= 1514

¹ P. 162.

• P. 162. f.n. 2.

A.C.), he held a review of his army, of which we possess a somewhat full report in *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*.¹

Altogether the army of the Khan consisted of over 4,700 men, 'besides those who stayed behind with the women and children and the baggage, and those who were strong enough to guard the roads.'

Here also we find that *tavajis* conducted the muster and counted the army, and scribes (*bakhshis*) wrote down the numbers.

The officers consisted of three classes: (1) *Amirs* who were 'commanders of regiments and detachments. They mustered contingents varying, according to their resources and influence, from 40 to 200 men each. We notice incidentally that in one case well-armed retainers are specifically so mentioned, showing that attention was paid to equipment. (2) Many *Mirzadas* (sons of Amirs), we are told, had no retinue, and 'were entered as single individuals'. (3) Other chiefs, who were neither *amirs* nor *amirs'* sons, had each his own tribe and following. They were experienced and trustworthy men. It is worthy of note that one of these was at one time at the head of a regiment of 3,000. These chiefs are spoken of by the author as *sar-khril*, *sardar* or *kalantar*. All these mean a chief or leader. (4) In addition to the above there were men 'who had

¹ Tr. by Elias and Ross, 305-10.

no following, but were quite alone; yet they had distinguished themselves above the rest by their courage in many battles and engagements, and thus they had acquired the name of "heroes" [*bahadur*].¹

Now, in this classification of armed forces, I think, we see a close parallel to the *umara*, the *mansabdars* and (possibly) the *ahadis* of the Indian system. The similarity is too close to be accidental. We must not imagine, however, that Mughul India borrowed the system, at any time, from Persia, as V. A. Smith seems to think.² As we have said before, the system originated in Central Asia, and spread to all Western Asia and India.

It is possible that in the times of Chingiz Khan and his descendants and again in Timtir's days the number of horsemen entertained by an officer corresponded to his nominal command. In less strenuous times that followed and under less powerful rulers, the round numbers, it appears, could not be kept up. In the musters in Persia and Transoxiana that we have noticed, we find that the chiefs and chieftains were allowed to bring to the muster as many men as they could get or equip, so that we get all sorts of odd numbers constituting a tribal leader's regiment.

¹ See p. 23 above.

* *Akbar*, 362, n. 5.

SECT. II : THE MANŞABDARI SYSTEM IN INDIA

In the reigns of Sikandar Lodi and Ibrahim Lodi there were officers with ranks up to 10,000 and 12,000. For instance, we read in *Tarikh-i-Sher Shah* that Sikandar Lodi conferred Jaunpur on Jamal Khan 'and ordered him to keep up 12,000 horse, and to assign them *jagirs*. Jamal Khan, who was much pleased with Hasan Khan's good service, took him with him, and gave him in *jagir* the *parganas* of Sahsardm, Hajfpur, and Tanda, near Benares, to maintain 500 horsemen.'¹

Lower down we learn that 'Azim Humayun Sarwani'² 'maintained a large number of followers' in the *pargana* of Cawnpore,³ and Daulat Khan, the son of Budhu (who had been brought up in his house) 'held the command of 12,000 horse, and was in great favour with Sultan Ibrahim.'⁴ This Daulat Khan tried to get Farid (*i.e.*, Farid Khan, the future Sher Shah) a command of 500 but was at first unsuccessful.

Again 'Muhammad Khan Sur Daud-Shah-Khail, governor of the *pargana* of Chaundh', commanded 1,500 horse.⁶

Our history of the *mansabdari* system in India

¹ E. & D., IV, 310.

• So written in E. & D., but in the Persian text we have A'zam HumSyUnSarwani, which is also found in other histories.

⁸ E. & D., IV, 321.

* *Ibid.*, 321.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 323.

should properly begin with Babur. Unfortunately, however, nothing definite is known of its working under Babur and Humayun. Of course in the histories we come across the *amirs* and *mansabdars*, and even the *amiru'l-umara*; but the positive information of the kind we require is not available.

We may, however note in passing the following item of interest :

In the *Qanun-i-Humayuni* we have a graded list of the nobles and officers of Humaytin's court, couched in characteristically quaint language (which we may ignore): (1) The Emperor, (2) His relations and brethren, and (? foreign) princes at the court, (3) Shaikhs and Sayyids, learned and holy men, (4) The greater *amirs*, (5) Intimate courtiers and *ichkis*¹ who held a *mansab*, (6) The other *ichkis*, (7) Heads of clans and *yuzbegis*, (8) Champions (or single cavaliers), (9) *Tahwiliars* (cash-keepers or treasurers), (10) Soldiers (*jawarian-i-jarga*), (11) Menial servants, (12) Doorkeepers, watchmen, etc.²

This list corresponds to what is called warrant of precedence »n modern civil lists.

¹ Messrs. Beveridge and Bains Prashad indulge in much speculation regarding the correct form of this word and its meaning. Guesses are useless, when definite information is available. Pavet de Courteille gives the word as *ichki*, and explains it as 'intime, interieur*'. (*Dictionnaire Turc Oriental*). So here it would mean 'an intimate associate*', 'one belonging to the inner circle of court or family*.

* *QSnun-i-Humayunl* of Khwandamir. text, ed. M. Hidayat Hosain, pp. 43-44 ; tr. Bains Prashad, pp. 31-32. A.N., I, 359.

Sher Shah's reign, turbulent and stormy as it was, presents some points of interest. Here, as in the reigns of the Lodls, we read now and again of officers with military commands; e.g., Shaia'at Khan was a 'lord of 10,000'.¹

Further, Sher Shah seems to have realized that the system of military recruitment, as current in his time, was rotten and required a thorough overhauling. He tried to reorganize the system of *jagir* on a stabler basis; and reintroduced branding² and tried to make it effective. We are told in *Waqi'at-i-Mushtaqi*, for instance, that 'he resumed the rent-free tenures, and made new grants on his own part'.³ Again, 'he received his nobles and soldiers, and made inquiries as to the horses brought to receive their brands. Then he went out and made a personal inspection of his forces, and settled the allowances of each individual by word of mouth until all was arranged.'⁴ Again, 'at the branding time every man came forward and showed his horse [? equipment] and rendered his account'.⁵

From fugitive notices in *Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi* we get occasional glimpses of significant facts. The story of Shaia'at Khan, who was an *amir* of 10,000, is a case in point: When assigning *jagirs* to his soldiery, he

¹ E. & D. IV, 426.

² E. & D. IV, 549.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 551.

⁸ See Chapter II, Sect. i.

* *Ibid.*, 550.

kept a share for himself from the portion assigned to them. There was an outcry. Two thousand of them, 'men of repute, both horse and foot', decided to send their representative to Sher Shah; but before he arrived at court, Sher Shah had learnt of the matter through his spies. Being enraged he administered a strong rebuke to Shaja'at Khan, but pardoned him, treating it as his first offence. He ordered him to redress the grievance immediately, threatening him in case of disobedience with severe punishment and confiscation of his *jagir*.

From this story, of which only a summary is given here, we learn (1) that Shaja'at Khan had probably full 10,000 troopers under him, so that his command was not nominal, (2) that a *mansabdar's* following consisted of both cavalry and infantry, (3) that by Sher Shah's orders a portion of a *mansabdars jagir* was assigned to the soldiery, on which the *mansabdar* could not lawfully encroach, (4) that the soldiers had a monthly salary, paid presumably out of the *jagir* above mentioned, (5) that Sher Shah had enacted and promulgated regulations to the effect 'that the chiefs rights and those of his soldiery might be distinct, and that the chiefs might respect the rights of the soldiers'.¹

From the language used in the passages cited

¹ E. & D., IV, 425-27.

above (Persian text) I am inclined to think that the full contingent signified by the command was entertained by the commander, at least when Sher Shah's reforms came into effect.

It is worthy of note that in none of these passages does the word *mansab* occur in the Persian text, a *mansabdar* being just spoken of as *sahib-i-duwazda bazar suwar*, *sahib-i-dah hazar suwar*, etc. It appears that the word (in this sense), so common in later histories, had not yet emerged into being. The words *umara* and *umarai*, are, however, used, though somewhat naively—e.g., in the story of Shaja'at Khan.

The period from Babur's successful invasion of India to the early years of Akbar's reign was one of conquests and unsettled government, during which the old tradition of *mansabs* or commands continued to be followed in a rough and ready sort of way. Neither Babur nor Humayun had leisure to look into the basis of the military organization, or to think of reform with a view to its stability; and Sher Shah did not live long enough to make his reforms effective, or their results permanent.

For Akbar's reign we have much fuller information.

Sher Shah's rule was too short to effect a permanent change in the system. The branding practice, already a dead letter before Sher Shah's time,

languished again as soon as his strong hand was no longer there to enforce it; so that by the time Akbar came to the throne the nominal command of the *amir* or *mansabdar* had once more been reduced to a fiction, and signified nothing. In many cases, as Budajuni tells us, the *mansabdars* indulged in luxury and extravagance and were more intent on amassing wealth than on equipping their contingents or considering the welfare of the peasantry. The result was that efficient soldiery was non-existent.¹

It was to the task of ending or mending this chaotic state of things that Akbar addressed himself. Drastic reformer as he was, it was not possible even for him to cancel the whole *mansabdari* at one stroke—scrap the peerage directory, that is to say—and start afresh. That would have been too violent a break with the past, and would have led to revolution and disaster. As we shall see, even the *via media* which he adopted was beset with difficulties, which would have proved insurmountable to a man less determined than Akbar.

In the remedy that he adopted for this difficult state of things we witness the birth of the double *mansab*—He converted the unitary organization of the *mansab*, which had descended from immemorial times, into a dual one. He let the existing *mansab*

¹ Budajuni, II, 190. Aho A.N., III, 68.

stand as it was, and attached to it an obligation to maintain an establishment of horses, elephants, beasts of burden and carts, for which the *mansabdar* received a fixed salary.¹ This he called the *sat* rank. The officer who held this *mansab* alone had to entertain no cavalry. But such officers were so rare that their number was negligible. Nearly every *mansabdar* had in addition to the *sat* rank a *suwar* rank. This meant that he had to maintain some horsemen to fight for the emperor. The *suwar* rank never exceeded the *sat* rank, and equalled it only in a few cases. It was generally lower, and often much lower, than the *sat* rank. A *mansabdar*, say, of 1000/500 enjoyed the sounding title of *hazari*, though his contingent was only half that number. The high rank flattered the vanity of the commander, and the small number of the troopers required lightened his burden. To prevent the *mansab* from becoming a

¹ See below. There was nothing new or original about this. *It is the custom of Timur says Clavijo. ' to give in charge his stud of horses and his great flocks of sheep each to someone of his nobles who must see to their wants, giving pasture in the lands they personally possess. One noble thus may have in charge a thousand head of cattle and another ten thousand. Even when the time comes for Timur to regain possession of his own it should appear that the number falls short or that their condition anywise be wanting, his Highness will seize whatsoever that lord may possess and very probably in addition put him to death, for such is his rule and ordinance' (*Embassy to Tamerlane*, 300). This reminds one also of the daily review of Emperor's animals, which was a feature of the Mughul Indian court.

purely honorary affair and a simple sinecure, however, an establishment of transport was attached to it as an obligation against a fixed salary. This could be easily enforced, and thus by a prudent stroke of policy transport was placed on a sound basis. After making these concessions Government felt justified in insisting on the number of horsemen each holder of *suwar* rank was required to maintain. Thus some order was evolved out of the chaos that existed. This was the policy underlying the double *mansab*; and this was the *raison d'être* of the *sat mansab*.

The reader will not find all this set out in so many words in the Persian histories. It is only by reading between the lines and by interpretation that we arrive at these results.

What the historians actually tell us is as follows :

As early as XI R.Y. (973 A.H.=1566 A.C.) Akbar found that the revenues entered in the state registers since the time of Bairam Khan were largely in excess of the real ones, which led to corruption and hardship. And the whole *jagirs* system, and the recruitment of the army which was intimately connected with it, were correspondingly chaotic. Under royal orders, Muzaffar Khan made a new assessment according to revised estimates. As the branding department, Abn'l-Fazl goes on, ' had not then

emerged into being, at this time the number of attendants for all the officers [*umara*] and servants of the threshold was fixed, so that every one should keep some persons in readiness for service. There were three classes of the ordinary soldier assigned to the officers [*umara*]. The first class had 48,000 *dams* a year, the second 32,000 and the third 24,000.¹

Beveridge remarks² that this has no connection with the new revenue assessment, mentioned above, and Moreland half agrees with him.³ But a connection appears when we see that with a more correct assessment of revenues a more precise allocation of *jagirs* became possible; and when the position and resources of a *jagirdar* became more defined, the State could insist on the *mansabdar* doing service with a definite number of cavalry—which had before been impossible.

We agree with Beveridge, however, that the salaries fixed here are not easy to understand. He rightly says that these cannot be the salaries of the soldiers. Nor has Blochmann⁴ an explanation to offer. Perhaps it was only a temporary scale,

¹ A.N., 11,270; Tr.. 403.

⁸ *Ibid.*, f. n. 1.

⁸ Article on "Rank (*mansab*) in the Mogul State Service," 651-52.

⁴ Pp. 373-74 and p. 374, f. n. 1. He is copying apparently from *M.U.*, III, 222; and does not know that the original is in *A.N.*—\$nd he misreads

^A قلب or قلنت^{<*}.

which was later revised and considerably modified; so that it cannot be verified from the tables in *A'in* given below. This scale of salaries corresponds roughly to the *sat* rank salary of an officer holding the rank of 10 (!)

But these measures seem not to have been effective. For in XVIII R.Y. (931 A.H.= 1573 A.C.) the branding rule was considered again. Todar Mai, we are told, approved of it, but Mun'im Khan and Muzaffar Khan (who had just been appointed *vakil* or prime minister) were reluctant to carry it out under the direction of Shahbaz Khan Kanboh. Nevertheless, the branding rule was promulgated, and orders were issued appointing *karorls* in the whole empire, converting all lands into *khalisa*, and fixing the grades of all officers of state. The enforcement of these orders, it was realized, depended upon 'the steadiness, the service, the loyalty, disinterestedness and energy of the officers'.¹

Still neither the revenue reforms nor the *dagh* system made progress. The conversion of *jagir* into *khalisa* lands was not effected. The quality of the soldier and the condition of the peasant remained what it was.

Some two years later Mirza Koka was called from Gujarat to help forward and popularize the

* *A.N.*, III, 68-69; *BudaySni*, II, 173.

dagh (XXR.Y.: 983 A.H-1575A.C.). He, like most of the rest, showed no readiness for the task. He was degraded from his amirate in consequence and placed under surveillance.¹

So we see against what heavy odds Akbar carried on this uphill task. The nobility and the ministry, whose own interests were vitally affected, were bound to kick against a disciplinary measure of such far-reaching importance: as we might expect, they gave neither countenance nor co-operation to Akbar's proposals. The recalcitrant ones like Shaia'at Khan. Mirza 'Abdullah, Mir Mu'izzu'l-Mulk, Qasim Khan *koh-bur*, Dost Muhammad Baba Dost, and Muhammad Amin *sahibi taujih* were sent to Bengal, where Mun'im Khan "Khan Khanan" was to find *jagtrs* for them.²

Budayuni is writing of the same occasion in the following passage: 'Shahbiz Khan, the *Mir Bakhshi* introduced the custom and rule of *dagh u mahall* [*dagh & mahalll* in text], which had been the rule of Sultan 'Ala-ud-din Khilji, and afterwards the law under Sher Shah. It was settled that every Amir should commence as commander of twenty (Bwti), and be ready with his followers to mount guard, carry messages,² etc., as had been ordered; and when

¹ A.N., III, 147-48.

² *Ibid.*

³ The word in the text is *jd-ro muljar*. Lowe's translation is not

according to the rule he had brought the horses of his twenty troopers to be branded, he was then to be made a commander of 100 (*Cadi*), or of more. They were likewise to keep elephants, horses, and camels in proportion to their command (*manqab*), according to the same rule. When they had brought to the muster their new contingent complete, they were to be promoted according to their merits and circumstances to the post of commander of 1000 (*Hazari*), or 2000 (*Duhazdri*), or even of 5000 (*Panjhazari*), which is highest command; but if they did not do well at the musters they were to be degraded. But notwithstanding this new regulation

satisfactory, and Blochmann is so puzzled that he leaves a blank in his rendering of this passage on p. 252 (bottom) of his translation of A'in, I. The correct form of this Turkish phrase seems to be *jar o buljar* (or *buljar*)* *Jar*, call, proclamation; *buljar* (or *buljar*), promise, place of refuge, rendezvous of troops, battle field. Hence the phrase *jar o buljar* signifies 'call and response', 'military duties', 'active service', etc.

The words are written in various ways. The bigger dictionaries like Vullers and *Farhang-i-Anandrdj* have the forms I have adopted. *Risala i-Fa?lu'llah Khan* has *char* instead of *jar*; so has *A.N.* (11,268*); while JalMu'd-Din Muhammad's *'Arf -Ndma* has *jar*. As for the second word, KamSlu'd-Din 'Abdu'r-Razzaq's *Matla'-iSa*dain wa Majma'i-Bahrain* (ed. Muhammad Shafi*, p. 131) has *buljar*; while Mrs. Beveridge (*B.N.E.*, 599, n. 2; 636, n. 5; 638, n. 4; and 668) recognizes *buljar*, *buljar* and *muljar*, the Turkish text of *Baber-Nameh* (ed. Ilminski) having *buljar* on pp. 459 and 460, and *muljar* on pp. 435 and 479. *A.N.*, (II, 268) has *buljar* and *B.N.* (I, ii, pp. 107, 108 and 109) has *mulchdr*, which Irvine (*Army*, 278) understands to mean 'approach by trenches'. The compound word occurs in *Timur's Institutes* (pp. 232 and 272), where it is written *char pulchar* and *char o pulchar* respectively, and hesitatingly translated by Major Davy as 'duty', 'service'. The BudSyUni text, in the passage before us, has *jar o muljar*.

the condition of the soldiers grew worse, because the Amirs did as they pleased. For they put most of their own servants [*khaskhelan*, special servants(?)] and mounted attendants [*bargiran*¹] into soldiers' clothes, brought them to the musters, and performed everything according to their duties.² But when they got their *jagirs* they gave leave to their mounted attendants [*bargiran*¹], and when a new emergency arose, they mustered as many "borrowed" soldiers as were required, and sent them away again, when they had served their purpose. Hence while the income and expenditure of the *man abdar* remained *in statu quo*, "dust fell into the platter of the helpless soldier", so much so, that he was no longer fit for anything. But from all sides there came a

¹ The word in the text is *bdrgir*, which has a somewhat technical significance. According to Abu'l-Fazl, a *bargir* or *bdrglrsuwdr* was a soldier who was fit for cavalry service, but could not be trusted with the keeping of a horse. He was furnished with a horse when his services were required (A'in, I, 144; Blochmann, 147). Irvine says, 'the recruit was supposed, at any rate so far as the State was concerned, to furnish his own horse.....Along with his horse the man brought his own arms and armour, the production of certain items of which was obligatory. In actual practice, however, the leaders often provided the recruits with their horses and equipment. When this was the case the leader drew the pay and paid the man whatever he thought fit. Such a man, who rode another's horse, was called a *bdrglr* (load-taker); while a man riding his own horse was in modern times called a *silahdar* (weapon-holder)' (Army, 47). See also the article on *Bargeer* in *Hobson-Jobson* (p. 69a).

¹ Perhaps it would be better to translate : brought them to the musters to satisfy the requirements of their *mansab*.

lot of low tradespeople, weavers and cotton-cleaners, carpenters, and greengrocers,¹ both Hindu and Musalman, and brought borrowed horses [with their equipments], got them branded, and were appointed to a command, or were made *Kroris*, or *Ahadis*, or *Dakhilis* to some one²; and when a few days afterwards no trace was to be found of the imaginary horse and the visionary saddle [*yaraq*, equipment], they had to perform their duties on foot.’³

We learn incidentally from the same writer that Qaidi of Shiraz, who had come from Mecca and found rapid favour at Akbar’s court, once submitted that the branding system introduced by the emperor was very irksome to the people. From that day he fell from grace, and served no longer.⁴

The branding business was now vigorously pushed forward in all parts of the empire. Khwaia Ghiyasu’d-Din ‘All Asaf Khan was ‘sent off on 20 *Bahman* [end of XXIII R.Y.] to carry out the branding regulation in Malwa’.⁵

Next we find Muhibb ‘All Khan ‘strenuously

¹ The word is *baqqal*, which, in India, means ‘a grain-merchant, corn-chandler* (Platts).

¹ Here again the rendering is apt to mislead. The following would give a better sense : and having got a *mansab*, could become a *karoji*, an *ahadi* or a *dabjiili*.

⁸ Budfiyuni, II, 190-91; Tr. Lowe. 193 94.

⁴ BudSynnl, III, 315.

⁶ A. N., III, 264 ; Tr.. 384.

carrying on the work of the *dagh'* in Bihar (XXIV R.Y.).¹

The enforcement of the branding regulation led to rather unfortunate developments in Bengal. Budayuni says, 'In this year [988 A.H.] Muzaffar Khan arrived in Bengal, and began a course of great strictness in his administration, and commenced wrongdoing and oppressing the Amirs of that district [province], and confiscated many of their *jagirs*. He practised the *dagh-u-mahall* [*dagh o mahalli*] in the Court fashion, and the settlement of accounts in the old manner.....And Babd. Khan Qaqshal, and Khalidi Khan, who were nobles of great importance, however much they tried to escape the *dagh*, and begged to have their *jagirs* confirmed, did not obtain their request. But Muzaffar Khan with a view to getting back the money from the *jagir*, which Khalidi Khan had acquired through neglecting the *dagh-u-mahall*, put him in prison and ordered him the bastinado.'² The big *jagirdars* and others with them rose in open rebellion and in course of the fighting that ensued Muzaffar Khan was captured and killed with tortures.³ It may, however, be remarked that the branding regulation

¹ A. N., III, 286 ; Tr., 420.

» Budayuni, II, 280 ; Tr., 288-89.

• *Ibid.*, p 282 ; Tr., 290.

was only one of the many contributory causes of this outbreak, which are neatly summarized in Smith's *Akbar* (pp. 184-85).

Under the year 989 A.H. Budayuni records that Shahbaz Khan paid his respects to the emperor at Panipat. He was in high feather; for he had, during the period of his absence, of his own initiative, given away all the country from Garhi (in Bengal) right up to the Punjab to people as *jagir*, and had given away *mansabs* at will. On being questioned, he declared: 'If I had not thus won over the soldiery, they would have revolted with one consent. Now the empire is yours and the army is yours. You may give what you like to whom you will, and take away appointments [*mansabs*] and *jagirs* from whom you please.'¹

SECT. III: MAIN FEATURES

Having taken a general historical survey, we are now in a position to consider the salient features presented by the *mansabdari* in the several reigns, taking note of the changes which were introduced by each emperor. The *sat* and the *suwar* rank will have to be dealt with separately.

» Budayuni, II. 296; Tr., 304-5.

Zat Rank

The main frame-work of the whole system took shape in the latter half of Akbar's reign. Much of the development took place behind the scenes, as it were; so that we only see glimpses of it wherever there is an odd mention or a casual notice. But all the time a cast-iron system was being moulded by successive efforts. We get a complete view of it in the *A'in*, as it stood in XL R.Y. (1003-4 A.H.), when Book II of *A'in* was completed.¹ There we can study the conditions and obligations of the *sat* and the *suwar* rank.

The *Zat* rank first:—All *mansabdars* at a given time fell into three classes. Thus Abn'l-Fazl:

و در خور سوار [و از کما بیشمی سوار] در ماهواره دگر گونگی
رفت - هر کرا سوار موافق منصب باشد اولین پایه داد و نیمه و زیاده
o* b و کمتر 31 ان را سوم چنانچه جدول باز گوید*
(Text, I, 179).

Translation: The monthly [*sat* rank] salary of the *mansabdar* varies with his *suwar* rank. An officer with equal *sat* and *suwar* rank was placed in the first class, one with a lower *suwar* rank down to half the *sat* rank got a second class, while another with a yet

¹ *A'in*, I, 231; Blochmann, 594. There are, however, anomalies. Some of the items in it were only true in 993 A.H., as Blochmann (256, n. 1) points out.

lower *suwar* rank belonged to the third ; as is shown in the table.

In the table on Text, I, 180-85 (Blochmann, 248-9), which follows, the *mansabdars* above 5,000 personal are not thus classified, as they all belong to the first class. For the other ranks, the monthly cash salary of each of the three classes is given. Blochmann thinks (p. 251) that the classes of salaries in the table do not refer to the three classes described in the quotation from Abn'l-Fazl given above, on the ground that the difference in the salaries of the three classes is inappreciable ; and Dr. Paul Horn follows in his footsteps (p.16). But there is no other classification to which these different salaries can correspond. Besides, the last words of the text quoted above, where the table is clearly referred to, place the matter beyond doubt.

Out of these emoluments were to be maintained horses, elephants, beasts of burden and carts belonging to the state, the number and specification of each being given in the table. This was technically known as the *khurak-i-dawabb*. Out of the balance the *manṣabdar* had to maintain his household.

This maintenance charge was calculated according to the following scale, given in Ā'in, Book II,

Ā'in 2 (B.L Text, 1, 177-8) :—

HORSES:	<i>Dams</i>
<i>'Iraqi</i>	680
<i>Mu jannas</i>	560
<i>Turki</i>	480
<i>Yabii</i>	400
<i>T azi</i>	320
<i>Jangla</i>	240

ELEPHANTS :

<i>Shereir</i>	1,100
<i>Soda</i>	800
<i>Man jkola</i>	600
<i>Karha</i>	420
<i>Phandurkiya</i>	300

BEASTS OF BURDEN AND CARTS :

Camels	240
Mules	240
Carts	600

It is now time to give the table so often referred to above :—

50 THE MANSABDARI SYSTEM AND THE MUGHUL ARMY

ESTABLISHMENTS AND SALARIES

No.	Zat Rank	Horses						Ele		
		'Ir&qi	Mujannas	Turki	Yās	Tuzi	Jangla	Shergir	Sada	Manjhōs
1	10000	68	68	136	136	136	136	40	60	40
2	8000	54	54	108	108	108	108	35	50	36
3	7000	49	49	98	98	98	98	30	42	29
4	5000	34	34	68	68	68	68	20	30	20
5	4900	33	33	67	67	67	67	20	30	19
6	4800	32	32	66	66	65	65	20	29	19
7	4700	31	31	65	65	63	63	19	29	19
8	4600	31	31	63	63	62	62	18	28	19
9	4500	31	30	61	61	61	61	18	28	19
10	4400	30	29	60	60	59	59	18	28	19
11	4300	29	28	59	59	58	58	17	27	19
12	4200	28	27	58	58	57	56	16	26	19
13	4100	27	27	56	56	56	55	16	26	18
14	4000	27	27	54	54	54	54	16	25	18
15	3900	26	26	53	53	52	52	16	24	18
16	3800	26	26	51	51	51	51	16	23	18

'Steingass assigns ten camels to a *qitār*: but we know from A'in
 'That the salaries of 4900 and 4800 should be equal, class for class, is
 1,27,000; II, 26,800; III, 26,700.

CORRESPONDING TO THE 2ĀT RANK

PHANTS		Beasts of Burden and Carts			monthly Salary in Rupees		
Karha	andur ^۳	۳۰ ۲۰ ۱۰ ۰	۳۰ ۲۰ ۱۰ ۰	Carts	Classes		
					I	II	III
40	20	160	40	320	60,000
34	15	130	34	260	50,000
27	12	110	27	220	45,000
20	10	80	20	160	30,000	29,000	28,000
19	10	77	19f	157	27,600	27,400	27,300
19	9	77	19	152	27,600	27,400	27,300*
18	9	75	19	151	26,800	26,600	26,500
18	9	74	18	148	26,400	26,200	26,100
17	8	72 3/5	18J	145	26,000	25,800	25,700
16	7	71	184	142	25,200	25,000	24,800
16	7	69 3/5	18	139	24,400	24,200	24,000
16	7	68	17J	136	23,600	23,400	23,200
16	6	68	17}	133	22,800	22,600	22,400
15	6	65	17	130	22,000	21,800	21,600
15	6	63 3/5	16{	127	21,400	21,200	21,100
15	6	62	161	124	20,800	20,600	20,500

(l, 147, top) that it contained only five. improbable. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's edition of *A'in* has for 4800:

52 THE MANSABDAR] SYSTEM AND THE MUGHUL ARMY

ESTABLISHMENTS AND SALARIES

No.	Zdt Rank	Horses						Ele-		
		■ I	Mujannas	Turki	Yabu	09 i	Jangla	Sherf&r	Soda	Manjhota
17	3700	25	25	50	50	50	49	16	J ³	17
18	3600	25	25	49	48	48	47	16	23	17
19	3500	24	24	47	47	47	46	16	23	17
20	3400	23	23	46	46	46	44	16	22	17
21	3300	22	22	45	45	44	43	15	22	17
22	3200	21	21	44	44	42	42	15	21	17
23	3100	20	20	43	43	41	40	15	20	17
24	3000	20	20	40	40	40	40	15	20	16
25	2900	19	19	39	39	39	39	15	19	16
26	2800	18	18	38	38	38	38	15	18	14
27	2700	17	17	37	37	37	37	14	17	13
28	2600	17	17	36	36	35	35	13	15	12
29	2500	17	17	34	34	34	34	12	14	12
30	2400	17	17	33	33	33	33	12	13	11
31	2300	16	16	33	33	32	32	12	12	10
32	2200	16	16	32	32	31	31	11	12	9
33	2100	15	15	31	31	31	31	10	12	9
34	2000	15	15	30	30	30	30	10	12	
35	1900	14	14	29	29	29	30	10	12	9

54 MANŠABDARI SYSTEM AND THE MUGHUL ARMY

ESTABLISHMENTS AND SALARIES

No.	Zdt Rank	HORSES						Ele		
		'Iraāqī	Mujan ³	Turki	2 s	razi	Jangla	f ^g 4 Col	/ Saada	Δ ³ % la
36	1800	14	13	28	28	28	29	10	11	9
37	1700	14	13	27	27	27	27	9	11	9
38	1600	13	13	26	26	25	25	9	10	9
39	1500	12	12	24	24	24	24	8	10	8
40	1400	12	12	24	24	23	23	8	10	8
41	1300	12	12	23	23	23	22	8	10	7
42	1200	n	11	22	22	22	22	7	9	7
43	1100	ii	11	22	22	21	21	7	9	7
44	1000	10	10	21	21	21	21	7	8	7
45	900	10	10	20	20	20	20	7	8	6
46	800	10	14	17	17	9	3	7	8	5
47	700	6	13	9	13	14	7	5	6	4
48i	600	5	7	11	9	4	4	4	3	5
49j		4	7	8	8	4	3	4	2	4
50	500	4	6	8	8	4	...	3	4	2
51	400	3	4	5	6	2	...	2	2	2

¹The figures I have adopted here are more suitable than those given MS. which is supported by Sir Sayyid Ahmad KhSn.

•Blochmann's text gives 1.751. which is an incongruous figure. I have Sayyid Ahmad. Two MSS. in P. U. L. give 1,750

CORRESPONDING TO THE ?AT RANK.-(continued)

PHANTS		Beasts of Burden and Carts			Monthly Salary in rupees		
Karha	Phaṣṭurkṭ	Carts	Carts	Carts	Classes		
					I	II	III
7	2	27	6	56	11,400	11,350	11,300
7	2	26	51	54	11,225	11,000	10,800
* 7	2	25>	51	52	10,600	10,400	10,200
7	2	24	5	50	10,000	9,800	9,700
7	2	23J	41	49	9,600	9,400	9,300
7	2	23	41	48	9,200	9,100	9,050
7	2	22I	45	46	9,000	8,900	8,800
7	2	22	41	44	8,700	8,500	8,400
7	2	21	41	42	8,200	8,100	8,000
7	2	20	4	40	7,700	7,400	7,100
5	2	17J	3	34	5,000	4,700	4,400
4	1	15f	3	27	4,000	3,700	3,600*
2	1	13	2	21	3,500	3,200	3,000
2	1	14	2	15	2,800	2,750	2,700
2	1	10	2	15	2,500	2,300	2,100
2	1	5	...	12	2,000	1,700*	1,500

in Blochmann's table. I have followed the reading in Blochmann's preferred 1,700, which is given by him as a variant, and is adopted by Sir

ESTABLISHMENTS AND SALARIES

No.	Zāt Rank	HORSES						Ele-		
		'Irdāqī	Mujannas	Turk!	Ydbu	'Tazi	Jangla	Šhergīr	Soda	Manjhola
52	350	3	4	4	4	2	...	1	1	2
53	300	3	3	3	4	2	...	1	1	2
54	250	3	3	3	4	1	...	1	1	2
55	200	2	3	3	3	1	...	1	2	1
56	150	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	125	2	2	2	3	2	1	1
58	120	2	2	2	3	2	1	1
59	100	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
60	(Yut- fcdsAi) 80	2	1	2	2	1	1	1
61	60	1	1	2	2	1	1	1
62	50	1	1	2	2	1	1	1
63	40	1	2	2	1	1	1	...
64	30	...	1	1	2	1	1
65	(Tar- kash- band) 20	...	1	1	1	2
66	10	*a.	...	2	2

*Blochmann has 1.305 here (!) and no suggestion to offer. I have as in two MSS. in P.U.L.

*1 have corrected Blochmann's 1.400 to 1,300, which is found not adopted by Sayyid A mad.

CORRESPONDING TO THE $\bar{A}T$ RANK—(continued)

PHANTS		Beasts of Burden and carts			Monthly Salary in Rupees		
<i>Karha</i>	£	<i>Qitirs</i> of camels	<i>Qitirs</i> of $\bar{A}T$	Carts	Classes		
	1 £				I	II	III
3	i	41	...	11	1,450	1,375*	1,350
2	i	4	...	10	1,300*	1,250	1,200
2	...	3}	...	8	1,150	1,100	1,000
2	...	3	...	7	975	950	900
...	...	2	...	6	875	850	800
2	...	21	...	5	780	760	750
2	...	21	...	5	745	740	730
1	...	2	...	5	700	600	500
2	...	2	...	3	410	380	350
1	...	1}	...	2	301	285	270
1	...	1}	...	2	250	240	230
...	...	11	...	1	223	200	185
1	...	11	...	1	175	165	155
1	...	11	...	1	135	125	115
...	100	82}	75

corrected it to 1,375, which I find in Sir Sayyid Ahmad's table, as well only in his own MSS. and >1 but also in one MS. in P.U.L. and is

NOTE

In the construction of this Table, I have not confined myself to the copying out of the figures accepted as correct by the editor of the Bibliotheca Indica Text. Minor improvements have appeared to me possible here and there. It is impossible, for instance, that the first class salary of a lower rank should equal or exceed the third class salary of a higher, or that the salary of a lower class should equal or exceed that of a higher one. Acting on this principle, I have allowed myself the latitude offered by the variants given in the foot-notes of the B.I. Text (I, 185-6), and have also consulted other MSS. of the work available at P.U.L., besides Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's valuable printed edition. Some of the variants (which I have adopted) give a better sense and consistency to the whole scheme. In these cases I have not hesitated to depart from Blochmann's text readings. Of course I have refrained from needless interference.

Abu'l-Fazl has been generous enough to give us fuller information about the salary of a *mansabdar* of 100 *sat*. The monthly salary of an officer with 100/100 rank, he says (Text, 1, 179), is Rs. 700, while that of a rank-holder of 100/0 (who is generally

counted as a *dakhiliY* is Rs. 500. For every increase of 10 in the horse rank the officer gets an addition of Rs. 20 to his monthly salary. So we can construct the following scale:—

<i>Mansab</i>	Monthly pay in Rs.	Class
100/100	700	I
100/90	680	II
100/80	660	II
100/70	640	II
100/60	620	II
100/50	600	II
100/40	580	III
100/30	560	III
100/20	540	III
100/10	520	III
100/0	500	III

For the sake of clearness we have added the class in the third column. The reader will notice at once that this corresponds with the rule given for the classification and with the schedule on pp. 56-57 above ; for the first-class officer gets Rs. 700, the second-class one from Rs. 680 to Rs. 600, and the third-class one from Rs. 580 to Rs. 500. So not only do we get yet another proof of the fact that these are the classes referred to in the table, but we get a further bit of information not given in the said

¹ Blochmann's translation of this passage (p. 248) is defective, and has misled Hom (p. 15).

table, presumably for brevity — viz., that the salaries entered in II and III class columns in that table are the *minimum* salaries for those classes respectively.

The reader should bear carefully in mind that the salary detailed here is for the *sat* rank, and although it varies with change in *suwar* rank, is *not* the *suwar* rank pay in any sense. The caution is all the more necessary since Dr. Horn is deceived into imagining (pp. 15-16) that the increase of Rs. 20 for every 10 horses added to the horse rank is for the maintenance of the 10 horses thus added; while Rs. 500 alone throughout the ascending scale is the salary of the *sat* rank. The way in which our interpretation fits in with the other known facts makes it abundantly clear that his explanation is not possible. Our interpretation receives further corroboration from an unexpected quarter.

‘The custome is,’ says Hawkins (Purchas, III, 44-5), ‘they [the *mansabdars*] are allowed so much living to maintaine that Port which the King hath given them, that is to say; they are allowed twentie Rupias of everie horse by the Moneth, and two Rupias by the Moneth for every horse Fame, for the maintenance of their Table. As thus: A Captaine that hath five thousand horse to maintaine in the warres, hath likewise of Fame other five thousand, which he is not to maintaine in the warres,

but only for his Table, allowed upon every horse by the Month two Rupias, and the other five thousand, twenty Rupias by the Month: and this is the pay which the greater part of them are allowed.'

Hawkins means to say that an increase of 10 horses to the horse rank will increase the *sat* rank salary of the *mansabdar* by 20 rupees, and will entitle him in addition to 200 rupees, monthly salary of the 10 horsemen entertained by him. 'Horse Fame' is Hawkins' picturesque translation of *sat* rank. The *sat* rank salary agrees with the scale given by Abu'l-Fazl. It is to be noted, however, that this scale does not apply to any rank other than 100. Abu'l-Fazl, to be fair to him, makes the scale applicable to that rank only; but Hawkins seems to make it general. He seems to think that if a *mansabdar* of 5,000/0 gets the *sat* salary, 28,000 rupees (see Table), a *mansabdar* of 5000/2,500 will get 33,000 rupees as his *sat* rank salary, and one with the rank 5,000/5,000 38,000 rupees—which is not the case (see Table).

To return: Dr. Horn's view of the matter lands him in the obviously absurd position that the *mansabdar* with the horse rank 0 is the best off pecuniarily.

The scale of salaries given in Abu'l-Fazl's table

seems to have remained in force through JahSnglr's reign. Although we possess no *dasturul-'amal* or directory of Jahangir's or Shah Jahan's time, as we do of Aurangzeb's,¹ we learn that early in Shah Jahan's reign the scale of *sat* rank salaries was materially revised. For this important information we are indebted to Moreland's enterprise and research. He has done great service by bringing to light some *farmans* of Shah Jahan's time, which he found in the archives of Jaipur State; and we owe a debt of gratitude to him for having examined them with care and patience, and stated his results with commendable clearness and precision. His conclusions are so well worked out that we can safely transcribe them without discussion or comment. But before doing so it will be convenient to take up the schedule of Aurangzeb's reign, which we possess in its entirety. The following list is taken from a carefully transcribed copy of a carefully written book by a well-informed man:

juyi ot-y*. by امين ايجزى خان (P. U. L. MS.), probably written soon after Aurangzeb's death; and I have verified the results by comparison with a few other MSS. dealing indirectly with the subject.

^x See below.

TABLE OF YEARLY SALARY OF THE ZAT RANK

No	zat Rank	YEARLY SALARY					
		First Class		Second Class		Third Class	
		Dams in thousands	Rupees	Dams in thousands	Rupees	Dams in thousands	Rupees
1	20,000	40,000	10,00,000
2	15,000	30,000	7,50,000
3	12,000	24,000	6,00,000
4	10,000	20,000	5,00,000
5	9,000	18,000	4,50,000
6	8,000	16,000	4,00,000
7	7,000	14,000	3,50,000
8	6,000	12,000	3,00,000
9	5,000	10,000	2,50,000	9,700	2,42,500	9,400	2,35,000
16	4,500	9,000	2,25,000	8,700	2,17,500	8,400	2,10,000
11	4,000	8,000	2,00,000	7,700	1,92,500	7,400	1,85,000
12	3,500	7,000	1,75,000	6,700	1,67,500	6,400	1,60,000
13	3,000	6,000	1,50,000	5,700	1,42,500	5,400	1,35,000
14	2,500	5,000	1,25,000	4,700	1,17,500	4,400	1,10,000
15	2,000	4,000	1,00,000	3,700	92,500	3,400	85,000
16	1,500	3,000	75,000	2,700	67,500	2,400	60,000
17	1,000	2,000	50,000	1,900	47,500	1,800	45,000

TABLE OF YEARLY SALARY OF THE ZAT RANK—(contd.)

No.	Zit Rank	yearly Salary					
		First Class		Second Class		Third Class	
		Ddms in thou sands	Rupees	Ddms in thou sands	Rupees	Ddms in thou sands	Rupees
18	900	1,500	37,500	1,450	36,250	1,400	35,000
19	800	1,250	31,250	1,200	30,000	1,150	28,775
20	700	1,100	27,500	1,050	26,250	1,000	25,000
21	600	950	23,750	900	22,500	850	21,250
22	500	800	20,000	750	18,750	700	17,500
23	400	500	12,500	480	12,000	460	11,500
24	300	400	10,000	380	9,500	360	9,000
25	250	350	8,750	330	8,250	310	7,750
26	200	300	7,500	280	7,000	260	6,500
27	150	250	6,250	230	5,750	210	5,250
28	100	200	5,000	180	4,500	160	4,000
29	80	140	3,500	130	3,250	120	3,000
30	60	100	2,500	95	2,375	90	2,250
31	50	85	2,125	80	2,000	75	1,875
32	40	70	1,750	65	1,625	60	1,500
33	30	55	1,375	50	1,250	45	1,125
34	20	40	1,000	35	875	30	750

This list, we are glad to find, tallies completely, as far as they cover the same ground, with the one reproduced by Irvine from some *dasturu'l-'amals* (British Museum MSS.) on p. 8 of *Army*. These *dasturu'l-'amals* were prepared about the same time as *Malumatul Āfaq*.

Our MS. gives the salaries in *dams* only. We have added the equivalents in rupees to facilitate comparison with the list on p. 8 of *Army* on the one hand, and with the *sat* rank salary table of Akbar's time given above¹ on the other- It should be remembered that although the *sat* salaries for Akbar's time are given in rupees in the *A'in* list, 'all accounts of salaries', we are told, 'are made out in *dams*; but at the time of making out the estimate he [the soldier] receives one half in rupees, reckoned at thirty-eight *dams* each. Half of the remainder is paid in muhurs at nine rupees each, and the last quarter is given in *dams* for stores. When the value of the rupee was raised to forty *dams*, the soldiers, through His Majesty's kindness, received *dams* at the same rate.'²

Now we can return to Moreland's documents. A *farman* of Shah Jahan dated 1630 contains a schedule of emoluments and assignments for eleven

¹ Pp. 50-57 above.

² *A'in*, I, 196; Blochmann, 275.

different ranks and classes. It gives totals of the *ḡāt* rank salary of the officer and the pay of his troopers, from which Moreland has correctly deduced the two items separately. We are here concerned with the *sat* rank salary only. The following comparative table taken from Moreland¹ gives in *dams* the *sat* rank salary of the *mansabdars* in Akbar's time (col. 1), in 1630 (col. 2), and in Aurangzeb's time (col. 3).

Comparative Table of Zat rank salaries per annum (in thousands of dams).

Rank and Class	Akbar's reign	1630	Aurangzeb's reign
600 II	1320	862 5	900
400 II	840	478 5	480
400 III	720	462	460
300 II	600	379 5	380
300 III	576	363	360
200 II	456	313 5	280
200 III	432	280 5	260
150 III	384	254 1	210
100 II	288	198	180
80 III	168	122 1	120
50 III	1104	75	75

The differences between items in col. 2 and col. 3 are trivial and unimportant. So the new scale which

¹ Article in *J.R.A.S.* for October, 19 36, p. 657.

we find in force about the time of Aurangzeb's death was introduced as early as 1630 A.C. or sometime between 1627 and 1630.

From another set of three assignment orders of Shah Jahan in favour of Raja Jai Singh (dated 1048 A.H., *Rajab*, 1060, and *Ramazan*, 1060, respectively) we learn that the *sat* salary for the rank 5,000 (I class) on those dates was one crore *dams*, which conforms exactly to Aurangzeb's schedule.

This is abundant proof that the new scale of salaries which is found both in *Ma'lumatu'l-Āfaq* and the directories consulted by Irvine¹—which refer to the period round about Aurangzeb's death—was in force throughout the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, and was introduced as early as 1630 or even a year or two earlier.

On comparing the *sat* rank salaries of Akbar's with those of Shah Jahan's or Aurangzeb's time, the first idea that strikes us is that Akbar's *mansabdars* drew a much higher pay. This is of course true, but it is more than counterbalanced by the fact that while in Akbar's time a *mansabdar* got only 5% over the pay of his troopers, in the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb he pocketed the pay of two troopers out of every three, or three troopers out of every four; so that a

¹ B. M. MSS. Or. 1690 and Or. 1641.

mansabdari was a much less profitable business in Akbar's time than in the later reigns, there being practically no *sat* rank without a *suwar* rank.¹ Further we must remember that in later times the *mansabdari* list was much heavier, and not only included several higher ranks but contained a much larger personnel for any given rank. Besides perhaps Akbar felt that after conforming rigorously to the new rules his *mansabdars* deserved a generous scale of pay.

Another misunderstanding should be cleared up.

Irvine has the following: 'When reading this table of pay, which shows the sanctioned allowances for a year of twelve months, it must be remembered that few of the officers received the whole twelve months' pay, the number of month's pay sanctioned per annum ranging from four to twelve.'² As the author is talking here of the *sat* rank salary, I find no authority for this statement- All that Abu'l-Fazl says is, that 'every year one month's pay is subtracted on account of the horse, the value of which is raised fifty per cent, above prime cost, and for accoutrements; but, as much care is shown in buying horses, this increase is not productive of any

¹ For a fuller computation see p. 82 below.

* *Army,...*

loss for the soldier.’¹

As we shall see,² in Shah Jahan’s reign, the salary of *suwar* rank was paid for from 12 to 5 months in the year. But that has no application to the *sat* rank. The reason was obvious too : the pay varied with the number of horses kept. So the reader will please note that the salary in the *A'm* list was paid for all the twelve months in the year, notwithstanding Irvine’s remark.

It may be noted that the *mansabdars* had to maintain not only the transport indicated against each rank in our list, but also the emperor’s elephants as well as various other animals kept for amusement and curiosity. Abu’l-Fazl tells us that the emperor ‘put several *halqas* in charge of every grandee [*amir*], and required him to look after them. The fodder also is now supplied by the government. A trustworthy clerk has, besides, been appointed, who is in charge of the correspondence of this branch ; he looks after the receipts and expenditure and sees that the orders of His Majesty are carried out.’³

The following evidence is from European travellers : Monserrate says, ‘He [the emperor]

¹ *Ā’in*, I, 196 ; Blochmann, 275.

* See pp. 84-85 below.

⁸ *Ā’in*, I, 135 ; Blochmann. 133-34.

charges them with the maintenance of a certain number of elephants, horses, camels, panthers, fallow-deer and doves, which they have to produce before him on a stated day every year.¹

When travelling near Etawa, Peter Mundy saw some rhinoceroses kept and fed for the emperor. The following occurs in his itinerary under date 20th December, 1632: 'After I was past through, it was told mee the Kinge had sent thither two great Rynocerosses to bee kept and fedd, which I was then ignorant of, otherwise I had seene them, but now it was too late, it being neere night, and 5 or 6 course back.'²

SUWAR RANK

Towards the end of Akbar's reign we meet, for the first time, with a double rank, *i.e.*, a *sat* and a *suwar* rank distinctly so indicated. The formal inauguration of the *suwar* rank is not found in any history. We see the beginning of it in the following entries :

In 993 A.H- Princes Salim, Murad and Daniyal received, respectively, the *mansabs* of 12,000, 9,000, and 7,000? Nine years later, Abn'l-Fazl records

¹ *Commentary*, 90. This passage will be quoted at fuller length below (Chapter II, Sect. i).

¹ Peter Mundy, II, 186.

• BudfiyUni, II, 342.

under 1002 A.H. that 'on 7 Farwardin 10,000 cavalry were assigned to the Prince-Royal. Five thousand (of them) received *jagirs* in Bengal. Among them were.....[here follows a list of names]. Four thousand (received *jagirs*) near Lahore the capital. Among them were.....[another list of names]. One thousand *Ahadis* were appointed who received pay monthly from the (imperial) treasury.'¹

This means that Prince Salim's *sat* rank was increased to 12,000 on the former date, and that he received the *suwar* rank of 10,000 on the latter. The persons named are the smaller *mansabdrs* who were to serve with the prince.²

This is the first place where we find the indication of a *suwar* rank. In fact it is only by putting the two passages together that we get the composite rank of Prince Salim, which would otherwise have passed unnoticed. Some time before this date the *suwar* rank must have been silently evolved, of which this is the first concrete instance.

Another peculiar feature here is that 1,000 *ahadis* are included in the *suwar* rank. This is perhaps the only instance of the kind. We must remember that the recipient was the heir-apparent.

The following regulation, promulgated in 1004

¹ A.N., III, 649-50; Tr. 998-99.

* For the rules regarding smaller *mansabdrs* serving under bigger ones see below : Ch. II, Sect, i, I *Mansabdrs* and their followers.

A.H., shows that *suwar* rank was well established by that date : all holders of *sat* rank were divided into three classes according as the *suwar* rank (1) equalled the *sat* rank, (2) was less but not less than half the *sat* rank, or (3) was less than half the *sat*—and their salaries were fixed.¹

Obviously, it was meant as a further inducement to the *mansabdars* to bring to the muster as large a contingent as possible. For an officer with a high *sat* rank might be content with a low *suwar* rank, but with a sufficiently high *suwar* rank his *sat* rank salary would increase, which was in addition to the percentage he got on the *suwar* rank pay²—and his status would be higher.

Here is the second award of a double *mansab* : On 29 *Dai*, XLI R.Y. (1005 A.H.) Mirza Shahrukh's rank was fixed at 5,000 *sat* and half that number (*i.e.*, 2,500) *suwar*; and Ujjain and some choice places of Malwa were taken from Shah Baz Khan and given him as *jagir*³

On p. 721 of *A.N.*, III, we have the rank of Sultan Daniyal clearly given as 7,000 *sat* and *suwar*—a form which was henceforward to be adopted in subsequent histories and official records. ' 1

¹ *A.N.*, III, 671. Also *Ā'in*, I, 179; Blochmann, 248. See pp. 47-48 above and the tables on pp. 50-57 (end columns).

¹ See under Sect. iv: Troopers' Pay.

¹ *A.N.*, III, 717.

During the period 1010-14 A.H. I have counted 37 bestowals of *sat* and *suwar* rank, distinctly so mentioned, in *Akbar Nama*. So towards the end of Akbar's reign it had become common form.

In all these cases we have no doubt the holders of the *suwar* rank had to maintain the full number of cavalry denoted by that rank. In fact, considering the enormous difficulties that had had to be overcome before this solid ground was reached, one would think the number was rigidly adhered to.

But if we study the *mansabdari* lists in *Ā'in* or in the *Tabaqat*, we find a unitary rank, which is presumably the *sat mansab*. Here and there, as we have said before, the author of the *Tabaqat* speaks of an officer maintaining so many troopers. Ignoring these exceptions, the lists take no notice of *suwar* rank. This is intelligible ; for we have seen that the *suwar* rank made its appearance about 1002 A.H., and the *Tabaqat* and *A'in* lists were compiled in 1001-2 and 1003-4 respectively, and must refer to the years preceding these dates.

Jahangir

This reign started on the solid foundation laid by Akbar. But there is no evidence that Jahangir appreciated the difficulties that his father had encountered in placing the *mansab* on a tolerably

sound basis. As it is, his reign opened with a heavy shower of *mansabs* on high and low, and we see that a copious stream of awards flowed throughout the reign. Nobody seems to have thought of the consequences, no minister found it to his interest to suggest a change, check or reform.

Jahangir, shortly after his accession, issued a general order regarding confirmation and assignment of *jagirs*. Here it is in his own words, in all its graphic detail:—‘As it was my desire that many of the Akbar! and Jahangir! officers should obtain the fruition of their wishes, I informed the bakhshis that whoever wished to have his birthplace made into his jagir should make a representation to that effect, so that in accordance with the Chingiz canon (*tura*) the estate might be conveyed to him by *al tamgha* and become his property, and he might be secured from apprehension of change. Our ancestors and forefathers were in the habit of granting jagirs to everyone under proprietary title, and adorned the farmans for these with the *al tamgha* seal, which is an impressed seal made in vermilion (*i.e. red ink*). I ordered that they should cover the place for the seal with gold-leaf (*tilaposh*) and impress the seal thereon, and I called this the *altun*¹ *tamgha*.’²

¹ More correctly, *altun*. which I find in more carefully written MSS.

**Tuzuk*. 10; R. & B., I, 23.

The double rank is the usual form of the *mansab* conferred in this reign. The earliest instance of a double rank which Moreland found in *Tuzuk* was 'between p. 60 and p. 71' of R. & B., I¹—probably the 5,000/5,000 bestowed on Mirza Ghazi.² But I have found earlier instances: Fifteen days after his accession Jahangir appointed Sharif Khan *Vakil* and Grand Vizir, and bestowed on him the title "Amiru'l-Umara", and the rank 5,000/5,000.³ And the rank of Aqa Mulla, brother of Asaf Khan, was fixed at 1,000/300.⁴

But this is only by the way. The fact is that although up to about p. 27 of *Tuzuk* (i.e., during the first six months of Jahangir's reign) only the *sat mansabs* are usually given, we should not think that these *zat* ranks have no corresponding *suwar* ranks. They are so given only for brevity.

The current of double *mansabs* was established, as we have seen, late in Akbar's reign; and from p. 27 of *Tuzuk* onward the double rank is usually given.

But nobody seems to have troubled about the conformity of the *suwar* rank of an officer to the contingent maintained by him. The number of awards recorded by Jahangir himself and his collaborators.

¹ Moreland's article, p. 642.

² *Tuzuk*, 6.

* *Tuzuk*, 33; R. & B., I, 71.

* *Tuzuk*, 27; R. & B., I, 58.

makes any reasonable conformity impossible. We have no definite data to go upon. One example is, however, available: Shah Beg "Khan Dauran", who held the rank 6,000/5,000 (see *Tuzuk*, pp. 131 and 266) came from Kabul and 'passed in review a thousand Mughal cavalry, most of whom had Turk! horses, and some 'Iraq and some Mujannas horses.' Jahangir was much pleased that in spite of many disabilities Khan Dauran 'could show this body of well-mounted men.'¹

We see that the cavalry brought to the muster is just one-fifth of the horse rank. And this turn out was considered exceptionally good. This is just about what we expected.

Towards the end of the reign the fact of the *suwar mansab* must have largely drifted into fiction.

Two- or Three-Horse Rank

In this reign another feature appeared in the *mansab*. Double ranks and even high double ranks had become so common that a further distinction was considered necessary in special cases.

In X R.Y. Mahabat Khan and Khan Jahan were appointed to serve in the Deccan, and these officers took their leave in the month of *Mihr*. As a mark of special distinction '1,700 horse of those under the

¹ *Tuzuk*, 257; R. & B., II. 61.

command of Mahabat Khan were ordered to have assignments (*tankhwah*) for two or three horses given them.¹ This means that out of the total *suwar* rank of Mahabat Khan 1,700 became *du-aspa si-aspa*. This is the earliest instance of a *du-aspa si-aspa suwar* rank on record. And from the somewhat naive terminology used here we can guess that the form of expression had not yet crystallized.

We may incidentally remark that Mahabat Khan did not do so well in the Deccan as was expected; and the *du-aspa si-aspa* distinction was withdrawn, and the additional salary, which had been paid on account of it, was ordered to be deducted from his *jagir*.² We know, however, that in XIX R.Y. Mahabat Khan received the rank of 7,000/7,000 (2-3h.).³

A similar instance is the following, which occurs under XII R.Y.: Owing to certain misbehaviour on the part of 'Abdullah Khan "Firoz Jang" Jahangir 'ordered the Diwans to change one thousand of his two-horsed and three-horsed cavalry into one-horsed, and to deduct from his *jagir* the difference (of pay), which came to 7,000,000 dams.⁴ We do not know his *suwar* rank, nor his *du-aspa si-aspa*—which confirms our opinion that all conferments of

¹ *Tuzuk*, 147; R. & B., I, 299.

• *Tuzuk*, 190.

² *Ibid.*, 391.

' *Tuzuk*, 208; R. & B., I, 421.

the latter are not recorded.¹ All we know is that on p. 344 of *Tuzuk* he receives the *sat* rank of 6,000.

So we can be sure that up to the end of this reign the 2-3 horse was a special privilege, which was sparingly awarded and jealously guarded.

In the *mansabdar* list for Jahangir's reign given in Section V the reader will notice that very few *amirs* have the distinction of 2-3 horse. As none of the princes is recorded as having this distinction, the probability is that all such cases are not given in the histories. Still it must be admitted that this honour remained very select to the end of Jahangir's reign.

We may remark here, by way of explanation, that in 2-3 horse rank the number of men and horses were doubled.³

Shah Jahan

When Shah Jahan came to the throne he found things heading the wrong way. Jahangir's administration, which had dwindled into Nnr Jahan's rule, had brought confusion and chaos into the finances of the empire and the military organization, which constituted the first charge on them. If Jahangir

¹ See below.

³ For fuller details see pp. 85-86 below.

had just managed to keep things at the level to which Akbar's strenuous efforts had brought them, Shah Jahan would not have been so sore bested. As it is, he found himself confronted with very nearly the same difficulties as his grandfather before him, with the difference that Jahangir's impotent policy of *laissez-faire* and drift had given the military aristocracy a sort of prescriptive right based on acquiescence and established usage. The result was that Shah Jahan found it impossible to screw up the *mansabdari* administration again to the pitch to which Akbar had carried it. What he did under the circumstances bears witness to his statesmanship and foresight, although it must be said to the credit of Akbar's administrative capacity and strength of character that his successors could not even continue to build on the solid foundation laid by him.

On the subject of Shah Jahan's reforms the histories, official and non-official, are silent. In these we find nothing but reckless awards of *mansabs*, which point to a continuation of his father's policy. It is true that the stream of awards flowed even more profusely in this than in Jahangir's reign, and gathered momentum as it went. But Shah Jahan seems fully to have realized the gravity of the situation and adopted some important restrictive measures by way of remedy. He knew

he could not start a second time with confiscation of existing *mansabs* and *jagirs*. But with a sure hand he managed to introduce the following reforms:

We have already noted the drastic reductions in the *sat* rank salaries, which were in force in 1630 A.C. Secondly, as we shall see under Troopers' Pay,¹ the salary of an ordinary trooper was reduced to 8,800 *dams* a year in or before 1630 A.C. and to 8,000 *dams* a year in or before 1048 A.H.²

But he could go no further—at least, not directly. To insist on the maintenance of a full contingent corresponding to the *suwar* rank of an officer was beyond his power. Towards the end of Jahangir's reign, we guess, the strength of an average contingent must have fallen considerably below 25% of the *suwar* rank, while full *suwar* rank salary was drawn by the officer.⁸ Sh5h Jahan could only save the situation by fixing a percentage and insisting on it as the irreducible minimum. He issued orders that when the *mansabdar* served in the province where his *jagir* was situated he must maintain a contingent corresponding to one-third of his *suwar* rank; and if he was posted elsewhere the strength

¹ Sect. iv below.

• See p. 98 below

• See pp. 67-68 above.

of his regiment must not be less than one-quarter of his *suwar* rank. We learn of this rule incidentally from the passage in *B.N.*, where the author is speaking of the expedition to Balkh and Badakhshan (XIX R.Y.), and says that although those are the rules, owing to the distance of those regions, the *mansabdars* appointed to this expedition were given the special privilege of branding only one-fifth of their horse rank.

We do not know when the J-and-1 rule was promulgated. The words used by 'Abdu'l-Hamid are c—of *از ضوابط ایی دولت والا* (*B.N.*, II, 506) which may mean 'among the rules of this empire is the following,' or 'among the rules current in this reign is the following'. Moreland, who has consulted other European scholars also, thinks that the words do not furnish conclusive proof that the regulation was made by Shah Jahan, but it is probable that it was.¹ The question turns on the meaning we attach to the word *daulat* here. In a similar passage (*B.N.*, I, i, p. 113, 1. 17) the author uses the word *safyanat* in much the same way; and there it means more clearly, I think, 'reign'. So I incline to the view that the word *daulat* in the passage before us means 'reign'. And all the probabilities of the case point the same

¹ Article, p. 655.

way. So although this rule is mentioned under XIX R.Y.(1056 A.H.), it was probably introduced quite early in the reign.

Shah Jahan, on the occasion of his coronation (1037), bestowed the rank 8,000/8.000 (2-3h.) on Yaminu'd-Daula Asaf Khan *in absentia*. In the following month, on the first Nauroz of the reign, he brought to the muster 5,000 well-mounted and well-equipped cavalry, and received in consequence an increase of 1,000/1,000 (2-3h.), his total rank now becoming 9,000/9,000 (2-3h.).'

Under the previous rank his nominal regiment would be 16,000 strong. The 5,000, which he passed for muster, is thus just under 1/3 of his *suwar* rank. This seemed to qualify him for the horse rank 9,000 (2-3h.), *i.e.*, for 18,000 horse. The quota required seems to be just between 1/3 and 1/4. Was the J-and-i rule already in force ?

To proceed: This rule was bowing before the inevitable. It meant that a *mansabdar* who produced 25 or 33 troopers got the pay for 100 troopers, and coolly pocketed the emoluments of the remaining 75 or 67, which was over and above his *sat* rank salary ; whereas Akbar had insisted on full strength of the contingents and got 100 troopers when he paid for 100 troopers, allowing only 5% on the pay for

¹ J3.N., I, i, 113 and 193.

odd expenses.¹ On the face of it, it was not a favourable arrangement from the point of view of state finance; but it proves that Shah Jahan boldly faced a desperate posture of affairs, brushed away all delusions, and resolved impossible theories into solid facts.

Next Shah Jahan introduced a rule by which the salary varied with the remount. A little preliminary explanation is necessary before this rule can be stated in an intelligible form.

The term *yak-aspa* is used either ambiguously or technically by the authorities; so that if we are not careful we are likely to get confused. The ordinary *suwar* rank with which we have so far dealt² was called *yak-aspa* (i.e., with one horse), as distinguished from *du-aspa* *si-aspa* (with two or three horses). This does not mean that each soldier had one horse in the former, and two or three horses in the latter, case.

We have seen that from Mongol times the horse was an extremely important factor in the efficiency of the army. The question of Remount, therefore, received full attention in the military organization

¹ So we can understand that the *suwar* rank was a much more profitable business under Shah Jahan than under Akbar.

* Excepting a couple of items in Jahangir's reign (p. 77 above).

of Mughul India from the first: A trooper with two or more horses deserved and received better treatment and higher emoluments than one with only one horse. Whether a soldier could supply and keep one horse or more depended of course upon his means and resources. The rules in Akbar's time were as follows: *Yak-aspa* troopers, says Abn'l-Fazl, 'mustered formerly up to four horses, but now the order is not to exceed three.

Every *Dahbasht* had to muster 2 *chahar-aspa*, 3 *si-aspa*, 3 *du-aspa*, and 2 *yak-aspa* troopers [i.e., 10 troopers with 25 horses], and the other Mansabdars in the same proportion. But now a Dah-bashi's contingent consists of 3 *si-aspa*, 4 *du-aspa*, and 3 *yak-aspa* troopers [i.e., 10 troopers with 20* horses].²

Shah Jahan introduced the following rule⁸: The salary of *yak-aspa suwar* rank was to be paid not always for 12 months in the year, but for 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6 or 5 months, according to the number of remounts in the contingent. In other words, while the number of horsemen remained constant, the number of horses maintained by them varied with the number of months for which the salary was

¹ Blochmann has wrongly 18, which I have corrected to 20.

¹ A'in, 1, 188; Blochmann, 260-61.

• We do not know when.

drawn. From the details given by 'Abdu'l-Hamid Lahori (*B.N.*, II, 507) we have constructed the following table :—

A *mansabdar* with' 4,000 or 3,000 *suwar* rank, who had to maintain, say, 1,000 horsemen, had to keep

Number of months for which salary drawn	<i>Si-aspa</i>	<i>Du-aspa</i>	<i>Yak-aspa</i>	Total number of horsemen	Total number of horses
12	300	600	100	1,000	2,200
11	250	500	250	1,000	2,000
10	...	800	200	1,000	1,800
9	...	600	400	1,000	1,600
8	...	450	550	1,000	1,450
7	...	250	750	1,000	1,250
6	...	100	900	1,000	1,100
5	1,000	1,000	1,000

Now about *Du-aspa si-aspa*: The 2-3 horse rank, as we have seen, made its appearance towards the end of Jahangir's reign. It grew more common under Shah Jahan. 'Abdu'l-Hamid tells us, in continuation of the passage already referred to, that if the *suwar* rank was *du-aspa si-aspa*, the number both of horses and horsemen was doubled. Thus an officer with the horse rank 4,000 (2-3h.), who drew salary for 12 months, had to maintain under the 1/4 rule

600 <i>si-aspa</i>	}	i.e., 2,000 horsemen with 4,400 horses ;
1,200 <i>du-aspa</i>		
200 <i>yak-aspa</i>		

and so on with 11, 10. etc., months.

So the salary of the *tabinan* in *du-aspa si-aspa* rank was exactly double the salary in the corresponding *yak-aspa* rank—a fact incidentally verified by a statement in *B.N.* (I, i, 113).

Aurangzeb

In this reign no change of any importance seems to have taken place. That a statesman like Aurangzeb did not venture a single step further towards reform during his long reign of half a century shows that Shah Jahan had gone as far as a prudent monarch could go.

The following rule of minor importance may, however, be noted. It was ordered in this reign that s f-rank-holders from 300 down should, hence forth, have no *suwars*, those on duty and *zamlndars*¹ excepted.² In later times no *suwars* were given to *mansabdars* under 500.³

¹ 'There are also in this empire other lords who call themselves *zamlndars*—that is, "lords of land" Among them are many powerful men who could place in the field, more or less, forty thousand soldiers, matchlockmen, archers, and spearmen. Such men do not maintain cavalry: the greater number live in the midst of jungles, and these usually pay no revenue, unless it be taken by force of arms. At this day, taking the whole Mogul empire, these rajahs, great and petty, and the *zamlndars*, exceed five thousand in number* (*Storia*, II, 444).

¹ M. A., 77.

¹ *Mir'atul'Istildh* by Rai Anand Ram Mukhlis. P. U. L. MS., f. 15a,

Conditional and Unconditional Suwar Rank

Before taking leave of *suwar* rank we may note the following: Rai Anand Ram Mukhlis, who wrote about 1157 A.H., tells us that *suwar* rank is of two kinds, unconditional and conditional. The former is the rank conferred along with the *zāt* rank, and the latter goes with the post which the *mansabdar* at the time holds. For instance, if he is a *faujdar* of a certain place, and that appointment carries 500 *suwars*, he gets that *suwar* rank, and holds it so long as he keeps that post.¹

Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib's theory

Now we are in a position to deal with the theory propounded by Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib. He makes the somewhat naive suggestion that the *zāt* rank represents infantry and the *suwar* rank cavalry.² Such a delightfully simple explanation of such a complicated and troublesome question would indeed be most welcome, and we should be spared so much fruitless speculation and discussion—only if the contention could be proved, or at least a reasonable case made out for it.

The basis of Mr. Rao Sahib's argument is the following passage in *Tuzuk*: 'On this day Baqir

¹ *Mir'atu'l-Istīlāh*, P.U.L. MS. f. 156.

• *J.I.H.*, XIV. 219-21.

Khan [whose *mansab* at this time was 1,500/500'] arrayed his men and passed them before me in order. The great Bakhshis recorded (the number as) 1,000 horse and 2,000 foot, and reported to me. Having promoted him to the mansab of 2,000 personal and 1,000 horse, I entrusted the duties of faujdar of Agra to him.'²

This passage does appear at first sight to support Mr. Rao Sahib's theory. But surely we are not justified in giving our assent to a principle of such far-reaching importance without convincing evidence and cogent proof.

We must begin by noting that the instance cited stands severely alone. I have not found a second example to support it. And the parallel of the Hyderabad State adduced by Mr. Rao Sahib is, in my opinion, beside the point.

The author of this suggestion has not thought of the consequences to which his theory would inevitably lead. If he had worked it out to its logical conclusions he would have seen the untenability of the hypothesis.

If every sat rank meant infantry, calculating from De Laet's list, we should arrive at infantry numbering over a million towards the end of Akbar's reign, when strict conformity*was insisted upon.

» *Tuzuk*, 287 ; R. & B., II, 120.

' *Tuxub*, 327 ; R. & B., II, 199.

But, as we shall see in the next chapter, Akbar's Infantry, which constituted the fighting force, consisted of no more than 12,000 matchlock-bearers. Again, the total of *zat* rank in the *Mansabdari* list at the end of XX R.Y. of Shah Jahan's reign comes to about half a million, and seeing that rank-holders under 500 are not included, the figure would certainly exceed a million. But the *Badshah Nama* tells us clearly that the Infantry at that time comprised 40,000 *tufangchis*, gunners and *bandars*, 10,000 of which were at court, and 30,000 in the provinces and in fortresses.¹ Where are the million odd men we have calculated ?

All writers on the subject—Blochmann, Horn, Irvine, Moreland—agree that the Mughul infantry was an insignificant force ; and this is supported by the figures in the Persian histories.

Again, if we study the figures for Shah Jahan's expeditions to the Deccan and Kandahar, we find that in the large army equipped for the Deccan expedition there is no infantry, or it is so insignificant that it is not considered worth a separate mention ;^a and in the case of the Kandahar expeditions, the total *zat* rank of the *mansabdars* deputed, which should be the infantry on Mr. Rao Sahib's hypothesis, amounts to a figure between three and four

¹ *B.N.*, II, 715.

^a Ch. II, Sect. iii.

lakhs; while as a matter of fact we know that the foot which accompanied those expeditions numbered just 10,000, which is quite in keeping with other known facts.¹

If we look at it from another point of view, the infantry corresponding to the *zat* rank would in all cases be paraded at the musters along with the cavalry required. We hardly hear of any *mansabdar* bringing infantry to the muster.² In the few examples we have had occasion to note—and there are many more in the histories—we find that even where details of contingents are given, infantry is not mentioned.³ And yet a large foot regiment often outnumbering the cavalry would be required in each case according to this theory.

In 'Akbar's reign we hear a great deal of the *mansabdar's* inability to bring to the *dagh* the cavalry corresponding to his rank, so much so that the *suwar* rank was created as a sort of compromise; and in later reigns the number of the cavalry fell so far below the *suwar* rank that in Shah Jahan's time we find J-and-i rule in operation. If infantry corresponding to the *zat* rank had been *de rigueur*, we

¹ *Ibid.*

¹ The instance cited by Mr. Rao Sahib is one of the very few exceptions.

⁸ See the account of the contingents of Prince Salim (p. 71), of Esh Beg "Khan DaurSn" (p. 76), and of Asaf Khan (p. 82). *

should hear of complaints and representations against that hardship too—and possibly consequent relaxation or reduction. But histories are silent. Besides, Mr. Rao Sahib's hypothesis is quite inconsistent with the whole theory of *mansabdari*, as Moreland and the present writer have tried to work it out, and the burden of finding out an alternative *raison d'etre* of *suwar* rank lies heavily on Mr. Rao Sahib.

If the *eat* rank entailed so much infantry, such a simple thing would find prominent mention in the histories, directories, etc., of the period, notably the *Ā'in*. Not a hint of it is to be found anywhere.

Again, if *eat* rank means infantry, we shall be reduced to the position that before Akbar introduced *suwar* rank, the whole army consisted of infantry—which is contrary to known facts.

Against all this overwhelming evidence, both direct and circumstantial, we have just one case cited by Mr. Rao Sahib.' Not only does this case stand alone, but it can be rebutted by the following instance, which is equally definite and clear: 'On the 25th [*Farwardin*, XII RY.]', says Jahangir, 'the contingent of I'timadu-d-daulah passed before me in review on the plain under the jharoka. There were 2,000 cavalry well horsed, most of whom were Moghuls, 500 foot armed with bows and guns, and

fourteen elephants. The bakhshis reckoned them up and reported that this force was fully equipped and according to rule.¹ We are not told here what I'timadu'd-Daula's rank was at this date. But we know that on X New Year's Day he got the rank 6,000/3,000* and that early in XIV R.Y. he was promoted to 7,000/7,000.³ So his personal rank on the date in question was at least 6,000, though we cannot be sure of the exact horse rank, of which there may have been silent promotions in the interval. On Mr. Rao Sahib's theory 6,000 infantry ought to have been paraded by I'timadu'd-Daula on this occasion, whereas we have only 500 foot (archers and musketeers). The fact of the matter is that in the case cited by Mr. Rao Sahib the correspondence of numbers is purely accidental: It was only an attempt on the part of Baqir Khan to outdo his competitors and make a bid for the emperor's special favour. The infantry which was not required¹ was mustered as a *coup de grace*. Similarly in the instance cited above the 500 infantry was no more required by the rules than were the fourteen elephants. And no theory can be based on these appendages which were voluntary contributions, just meant for a

¹ *Tuzuk*, 185; R. & B., I, 374-75.

• *Tuzuk*, 137; R. & B., I, 280.

• *Tuzuk*, 267; R. & B., II, 82.

flourish.

With all respect for Mr. Rao Sahib's scholarship and judgement, we must say that his contention stands unproved.

In conclusion we may quote Moreland's opinion. After discussing the idea of two contingents for the *zat* and the *suwar* rank, and giving the views of Messrs. Horn, Irvine and Vincent Smith on the point, he writes as follows: 'An alternative account has, I understand, been current in India for some time, but the first place where I have found it in print is an article by Mr. Abdul Aziz in the *Journal of Indian History* for August, 1930 (pp. 138-163). According to this account, the official descriptions mean just what they say: personal rank was purely personal, and by itself involved the maintenance of no troopers, the number of which was denoted, or indicated, by the trooper rank; and an officer with "double rank" had to maintain only one contingent, not two. I do not propose to review the arguments advanced by Mr* Abdul Aziz; taking them as a whole, they seem to me to come very near to actual proof, or, at the least, make this view definitely more probable than that offered by Irvine. In a later number of the same *Journal* (August, 1935, pp. 205 ff.) Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib arrived independently at the same conclusion regarding trooper tank, and

proceeded to argue that personal rank denoted the strength of a contingent of infantry which every officer had to maintain out of his salary. I hope to discuss the latter contention in the journal where it appeared, and here I will say only that in my judgment the case for infantry contingents is not established.¹

SECT. IV: TROOPERS' PAY

Now we can deal with the troopers and their emoluments. It is a somewhat complicated question, and should be handled with care and patience.

The rules and the scale varied in the different reigns ; so that it will be convenient to treat of the subject chronologically.

It should be noted, says Moreland, that 'the ordinary trooper owned his horse (or horses) and his arms and other equipment ; the pay was more than a personal wage, for it covered a complete fighting unit.'²

Akbar

We may begin by saying that five p.c. of the troopers' pay went to the *mansabdar* under whom they served, which reimbursed him 'for various expenses'.³

¹ *J.R.A.S.* for October, 1936, pp. 644-45,

* Article, p. 658.

¹ *Ā'in*, I, 196 ; Blochmann, 275.

A *yak-aspa* trooper, in this reign, received the following salary according to the kind of his horse :

Kind of horse	Monthly pay of trooper in rupees
<i>'Iraqi</i>	30
<i>Mujannas</i>	25
<i>Turki</i>	20
<i>Yabu</i>	18
<i>Tazl</i>	15
<i>Jangla</i>	12

In 1004 A.H. a scale of salaries based on the nationality of the trooper was laid down.¹ It may be tabulated as follows :

Nationality of trooper.	<i>Si-aspa</i>		<i>Du-aspa</i>		<i>Yak-aspa</i>	
	Monthly	Yearly	Monthly	Yearly	Monthly	Yearly
Mughul, Afghan and Indian	<i>Dams</i> 1,000	Rs. 300	<i>Dams</i> 800	Rs. 240	<i>Dams</i> 600	Rs. 180
Rajput	800	240	600	180

¹ A.N., III, 672; Tr..1032.

Ignoring the special scale for the Rajputs, and calculating on the basis of 3 *si-aspā*, 4 *du-aspā* and 3 *yak-aspā*, which was the rule, we get the total salary, 2,400 rupees a year for 10 troopers with 20 horses: in other words, 240 rupees or 9,600 *dams p.a.* for an average trooper. With this average we shall compare the salary during the succeeding reigns.

We have no reason to think that these salaries (after a deduction of 5 p.c. already mentioned) were not paid actually to the troopers during this reign.

Jahangir

There is no evidence that any changes were introduced in this reign, as the Persian histories are silent. Presumably the same rules continued in operation, and there is nothing even to show that they were properly enforced. There is, however, testimony of European witnesses.

Hawkins, as we have seen, gives 20 rupees p.m., or 240 rupees *p.a.*, as the salary of a trooper.¹ Roe's statement is at variance with it:—The rank of Mir Jamalu'd-Din Husain Anjū, he says, 'was esteemed at 5,000 horse, the pay of everie one at 200 *rupies* by yeare, wherof hee kept 1500 and was allowed the surplase as dead pay' (P. 210). By this quaint

¹ See pp. 60-61 above.

language Roe means that the rank of Jamalu'd-Dln was 5,000/1,500, which is not far wrong; for we know from *Tuzuk* (p. 156; R. & B., I, 318) that this gentleman enjoyed at this time the rank 5,000/3,500. The only definite thing that we learn from this passage, however, is that 200 rupees was the yearly salary of a trooper—as against 240 rupees given by Hawkins. The rest is all confusion, for Roe does not understand the system or its dual character.

Neither Hawkins nor Roe tells us whether the salary given by them is of a *yak-aspa*, a *du-aspa* or a *si-aspa* trooper, or else an average of all three. Nor can we reconcile Hawkins' statement with Roe's by assuming that the salary was 240 rupees in Hawkins' time (1609-11) and had been reduced to 200 rupees when Roe was writing this (1616); because, as we shall see,¹ the pay was 220 rupees in 1630 A.C. and 200 rupees in 1048 A.H. The gradual reduction seems to point to Hawkins' figure being the correct one; but no corroboration is available.

In another place, Roe says that each horse is maintained 'at five and twentie pounds sterling by the yeere.'³ The queer language used does not enlighten us much; but since £25 *p.a.* cannot be the sat rank salary per horse, it can only be the trooper's

¹ See below.

¹ Roe's Letters, Purchas, IV, 437,

pay. If so, we get Rs. 250 *p.a.*, which is much nearer Hawkins' figure than his own previous one.

Shah Jahan

For this reign, as for the previous one, the histories are silent. But, thanks to Moreland's Jaipur documents, we know that troopers' pay engaged the attention of Shah Jahan quite early in the reign. From a *farman* of 1630 A.C. Moreland has correctly deduced 8,800 *dams* as the yearly salary of a trooper; and from another *farman* of 1048 A.H. he works out 8,000 *dams* as the yearly salary.¹ We must assume that these are the average salaries of a trooper, like the one we have calculated for Akbar's time. If so, the salary was reduced from 9,600 *dams p.a.* to 8,800 *dams* quite early in the reign, and again to 8,000 *dams* by 1048 A.H. We see that Shah Jahan's drive for economy, where it could be effective, was persistent and determined. Sound statesman that he was, he felt his way as he went.

When comparing the salaries of Akbar's with those of Shah Jahan's time, the reader will please remember that Akbar got the services of one trooper by paying the salary of one, while Shah Jahan had to pay for three or four (and sometimes five) troopers to serve the same end.

¹ Article, pp. 646 and 656.

So far things are clear. But, as we have noticed above, in this reign another rule was also in force by which the number of horses varied with the number of months for which the salary was drawn. We do not know when this rule was introduced or how long it continued to operate. But it seems to be in consistent with the fixed 1-horse, 2-horse and 3-horse salaries which seem to have continued in force from Akbar's reign to the end of Aurangzeb's.¹

One odd item may be tagged on here: We learn from Muhammad Waris that in 1058 A.H. Sha'ista Khan was allowed to draw 5 lakhs of rupees *p.a.* in cash from the Gujarat treasury as the salary of 3,000 *si-bandi* horsemen. It comes to Rs. 166f as the yearly salary of this particular kind of trooper.²

Aurangzeb

Here Irvine has some useful information to give. Basing his calculations on elaborate tables in some *Dastu.ruI-'A mats* of Aurangzeb's later years (B.M. MSS.), he arrives at 8,000 *dams* or 200 rupees as the yearly salary of a horseman. He continues: '*Dastur-ul-Aml*, B.M. 6599, fol. 1446, tells us that the number of horses to men among the troopers (*tabinan*->-

¹ See below.
² *B.N.*, III, f. 20a. For *si-bandi* troopers see Irvine, *Army*, 166, and the authorities cited there.

baradari)¹ was according to the rule of *dah-bist* (lit. “ten-twenty”), meaning apparently that the total number of horses was double that of the number of men. The scale was as follows:—

3 three-horsed men	=	9 horses
4 two-horsed men	=	8 horses
3 one-horsed men	=	3 horses
10 men		20 horses

That is, with 1,000 men there would be 2,000 horses. The pay of the men with the extra horses was higher, but not in proportion. Thus, a one-horsed man received 8,000 D. or Rs. 200 a year (Rs. 16.10a.8p. per mensem), while the two- or three-horsed man got 11,000 D. or Rs. 275 a year (Rs- 22.14a.8p. per mensem).²

The horse-and-trooper scale here is the same as in *Ā'ln*, given above. Does it mean that it continued unchanged right down to the end of Aurangzeb's time? Bernier corroborates it by saying that ‘two horses are generally allowed to one trooper, in order that the service may be better performed; for in those hot countries it is usual to say that a soldier with a single horse has one foot on the ground.’³ If this rule continued, we cannot reconcile it with

¹ Moreland says (Article, p. 661, n. 1) he has seen the MS., and the word there is not *barddari*, but *barawardt*. It is certainly a more likely reading.

* Army, 10.

⁸ Bernier, 212.

Shah Jahan's 'Rule of Months', as Moreland calls it ; for under this Rule the number of horses' is double the number of horsemen only in the case the salary was drawn for 11 months in the year.

Further, why should a two-horsed man get the same salary as a three-horsed man, *viz.*, Rs. 275 a year. Irvine's *Dasturu'l-Amals* are not available to us, and we do not know exactly what they say. Is it permissible to guess that Rs. 275 is the average salary of two-horsed and three-horsed troopers, the actual salary of the two being something like Rs. 250 and Rs. 300 respectively ?

Manucci, who belongs to Aurangzeb's reign, places the salary of a trooper at 30 rupees *p.m.* and Bernier says, 'he that keeps only one horse shall not receive less than five-and-twenty *roupies* a month, and on that footing he [the emperor] calculates his accounts with the *Omrahs*.¹

The question is often asked whether the soldiers were regularly paid. In this connection the following is of interest :

'In later times,' says Irvine, 'pay due from the imperial treasury to the *mansabdars*, as well as that due from the *mansabdars* to the private soldiers, was always in arrears. In fact, we should not go far wrong, I think, if we asserted that this was the case

¹ *Storia*, II, 376.

* Bernier, 217.

in the very best times.¹ The remark, as far as it applies to the later Mughul times, is in all probability correct ; but its extension to ‘the very best times’ is, I think, unjustified. Irvine made a special study of the later Mughul times, and all the examples cited here² belong to that period. We have no evidence that payments were not regular in the earlier reigns. In fact it appears that even as late as the early part of Aurangzeb’s reign the soldiers were paid regularly enough. From the cautious and judicious Bernier we have the following: ‘It is also important to remark the absolute necessity which exists of paying the whole of this army every two months, from the *omrah* to the private soldier; for the King’s pay is their only means of sustenance. In *France*, when the exigencies of the times prevent the government from immediately discharging an arrear of debt, an officer, or even a private soldier, may contrive to live for some time by means of his own private income; but in the *Indies*, any unusual delay in the payment of the troops is sure to be attended with fatal consequences; after selling whatever trifling articles they may possess, the soldiers disband and die of hunger. Towards the close of the late civil war, I discovered a growing disposition in the troopers to sell their horses, which they would, no

¹ *Army*, 13.

> *Ibid.*, 13-14.

doubt, soon have done if the war had been prolonged. And no wonder ; for consider, My Lord, that it is difficult to find in the *Mogol's* army a soldier who is not married, who has not wife, children, servants, and slaves, all depending upon him for support (Pp. 220-21).

Towards the end of Aurangzeb's reign, as we all know, things were on the down grade. The following account from the pen of Niccolao Manucci is certainly graphic, though possibly somewhat exaggerated : 'The generals and officers keep to no fixed rules in paying their soldiers, for to some they will give twenty or thirty rupees, to others forty, fifty, or a hundred. Usually they make great promises, but not even a half is received, each one paying according to his caprice and the reputation that he is emulous of acquiring for his efficient retinue or establishments. The wretched soldiers naturally agree to anything, all the more readily since they have no other means of livelihood. All this contributes much to the bad payment of everyone that is so common ; for the money they get comes to them only in driblets, and when all is said and done it does not come to a great deal. For in respect of one year's service they receive six or eight months' pay. Even that is not all in coin ; they are always foisted off as respects two months' pay with clothes and

old raiment from the household. Over and above this, there is almost always due to them the pay for two or three years' service. The soldiers are obliged to borrow money at interest from the *scprafs*, or money-changers. These men lend to them, it is true, but it is hardly ever without a command from the general or officer; and these latter have an understanding with them about the profit from interest, which they share between them.

Sometimes the soldiers sell their papers to these money-changers, who for a note of hand for one hundred rupees will give them twenty or twenty-five. It is by these and such-like extortions that these generals ruin the wretched soldier, who, unable to find other means of gaining his bread, is forced to remain on in his service. Speaking generally, it is impossible for them to escape such extortions, for these disorders reign throughout all the princes' establishments. If anyone resigns service at his own request, they deduct two months' pay.¹

The *mansabdar* had in addition to maintain a subordinate establishment. Irvine has the following, based on a MS. written in 1118 A.H.:—

‘An establishment of farriers, blacksmiths' forges, and surgeons had to be maintained by each *mansabdar*, according to the following scale..... The *Mirat-*

¹ *Storia*, II, 378-79.

i-Ahmadi, ii, 118, states that thirty men on foot were required to be entertained for every 1000 of *mansab* rank. These included water-carriers, farriers, pioneers, matchlockmen and bow-men' (*Army*, 52-3).

Now that we have dealt with the *sat* and the *suwar* rank salary at length, we may remark that, as regards payment of salary, *mansabdars* were of two kinds. Usually a *mansabdar* was assigned a *jagir*, the assessed income of which was equivalent to the total of his *sat* salary and the pay of his *tabinan*. Occasionally the pay was disbursed in cash from the treasury in lieu of the income of the *jagir*. 'A certain number of officers and soldiers, chiefly those of the infantry and artillery, who were, as a rule, on the pay list of the emperor himself, were paid in cash. This seems to have been the case in all reigns up to quite the end' (*Army*, 14).

SECT. V. MANS ABOĀRD̄ FIGURES

We may now consider the actual number of *mansabdars* of each rank. This varied not only from reign to reign, but from year to year, from month to month and from day to day ; for the conferment of a *mansab* was a daily occurrence at the Mughul court. It is obvious, therefore, that a survey of these statistics is possible only at a certain

given date, more or less arbitrarily chosen.

We propose to take up each reign in order, and take our stand in each case at a selected point (or points) of vantage.

Akbar

During this reign the *mansabdari*, as the reader has seen, passed through vicissitudes and stages of reconstruction ; so that we can only take stock of it as it stood towards the end of that reign. The following details stand out :

The *sat* ranks ranged from 12,000 down to 10. The top ranks were of course held by the princes. The maxima reached by them are as follows :

Salim12,000/10,000	Budaytini, II, 342 and A.N., III, 649-50.
Murad 9,000	Budayuni, II, 342.
Daniyal 7,000/7,000	A.N., III, 721.
Khusrau10,000	„ „ 839.

In these cases and those that follow it need not be supposed that these ranks were held by these princes and nobles at the same time. The apparent anomaly of a grandson enjoying a higher *mansab* than two sons (his uncles) is thus explained. Khusrau got this *mansab* a few months before Akbar's death, when both Murad and Daniyal had passed away.

Next to Akbar's sons and grandsons came the

very *elite* of the nobility, who were either the emperor's special relations or men with a particularly distinguished record.

Raja Man Singh
(whose sister was married to Salim)7,000/6,000 A. N., III, 839.

“Khan-i-Azam”
Mirza 'Aziz Koka
(Akbar's foster-brother) 7,000/6,000 ,, ,, 806.

Beveridge says (*A.N.*, Tr., III 1257, f. n. 3) that according to the I. O. MS. of *A.N.* Mirza Shah Rukh (who, as we have seen, enjoyed the rank of 5,000/2,500) was given the rank 7,000/5,500. But this must be a mistake, for Jahangir says, 'I promoted Mirza Shahrukh, grandson of Mirza Sulaiman, (once) the ruler of Badakhshan, who was nearly related to my family, and held the rank of 5,000 in my father's service, to the rank of 7,000.'¹

Over thirty officers attained to the rank of 5,000 at one time or another.

Abu'l-Fazl's list, which comes down to XL R. Y. (1003-1004 A.H.), gives the following numbers for the various ranks.

¹ *Tuzuk*, 11; R. & B., I, 26-27.

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Rank	Number of Rank-holders
10,000	1 (Salim)
8,000	1 (Murad)
7,000	1 (Daniyal)
5,000	30
4,500	2
4,000	9
3,500	2
3,000	17
2,500	8
2,000	27
1,500	7
1,250	1
1,000	31
900	38
800	2
700	25
600	4

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F

J

Rank	Number of Rank-holders	
500	46	1 5 X 1 R. Y.
400	18	
350	19	
300	33	
250	12	
200	81	
150	53	
120	1	
100	250	
80	91	
60	204	
50	16	
40	260	
30	39	
20	250	
10	224	
Total	1,803	

(A'in, I, A'in 30, pp. 222-32 ; Blochmann, 320-595).

The ranks given here, the reader is reminded, are *zat* ranks in all cases. Abu'l-Fazl takes no account of *suwar* rank.

Next we have a *mansabdari* list in the *Tabaqat* of Ni?amu'd-Din Ahmad, which comes down to XXXVIII R. Y. (1001 A.H.), and which gives *mansabdars* of 500 and above. This list gives all *mansabdars* dead or alive in the regnal year above mentioned. Here in many cases the ranks of the *amirs* are not given, they being only described as *amirs*. In the majority of cases the *zat* rank is specifically given; and in seven cases the rank given is specified as the *suwar* rank.

Although both these lists refer to approximately the same time, there are irreconcilable discrepancies. The *A'in* list, as far as it goes, is authentic, clear and definite.

Further, important *mansabs* were awarded during the last decade of Akbar's reign. A list compiled by me includes over sixty conferments during this period. Probably there are more. But this is only a running record.

As in all these lists living and dead recipients are mixed up, no serviceable estimate of the *mansabdari* strength (at any given time) in Akbar's reign can be constructed from them.

The only *mansabdari* list which purports to give

the peerage figures, as they stood at one time, is the one given by *De Laet*. The time assigned is the end of Akbar's, or the beginning of Jahangir's, reign. Relevant portions of the list are as follows:

Rank	Number of Rank-holders
5,000	8
4,500	9
4,000	25
3,500	30
3,000	36
2,500	42
2,000	45
1,500	51
1,000	55
700	58
500	80
400	73
350	58

Rank	Number of Rank-holders
300	72
250	85
200	150
150	242
100	300
80	245
60	397
40	298
30	240
20	232
10	110
4	741
3	1,322
2	1,428
1	950

(*The Empire of the Great Mogot* ; tr., J. S. Hoyland ; annot., S. N. Banerjee ; p. 113).

The last four items, as the editor points out, are *Ahadis* with 4, 3, 2, and 1 horse respectively, the total number being 4,441.

Now, in the first place, De Laet makes no distinction between *&at* and *suwar* rank and commits the usual mistake of assuming the rank to signify the contingent maintained by each *mansabdar*; and, multiplying each rank by the number of the rank holders and adding up the results, arrives at a total of the Mughul army,¹ dropping a hint, however, that the contingents given are only those required in theory, and are rarely maintained in practice. As the reader knows, this assumption is unwarranted, and the proviso unnecessary. In the list given above I have refrained from giving his totals, as they are misleading and useless.

The second point is that while there is a rough sort of correspondence between the *Ā'ln* and the *Tabaqat* lists, De Laet's list stands apart: while the former two give practically all conferments of *mansabs* in Akbar's reign, the latter gives only the *mansabs* held in or about 1605.

If we compare the *Ā'ln* list with De Laet's, we are struck by the fact that with one important and two unimportant exceptions De Laet's figures are far in

¹ Nor does the editor object to this unlawful procedure.

excess of Abu'l-Fazl's, the more so considering the fact that in case of ranks above 500 the *A'in* list gives all *mansabdars* dead or alive in XL R. Y., many of whom must have died before 1605. But we know that necessary reforms having been effected, and the *mansabdari* placed on a sound footing, new *mansabs* were freely granted in the fifth decade. Some of these are set down in *A.N.*, but many more, particularly the lower ranks, must have gone unrecorded. Abu'l-Fazl, writing apparently in XL R. Y., says, 'Scarcely a day passes away on which qualified and zealous men are not appointed to mansabs or promoted to higher dignities. Many Arabians and Persians also come from distant countries, and are honoured with commissions in the army, whereby they obtain the object of their desires.'¹

Now for the exceptions : The important exception is the case of 5,000 rank, where the number in the *A'in* list is 30, while that in De Last's is 8. This seems out of keeping with the general position ; but if we look closer, it can be explained. We learn from Blochmann's biographies and other sources that out of the 30 in the *A'in* list only the following seven were living at Akbar's death :

- (1) Sul(an Khusrau.
- (2) Mirza Shah Rukh.

¹ *A'in*, I, 232; Blochmann, 595.

- (3) Mirza Rustam.
- (4) "Khan-i-A'zam" Mirza 'Aziz Koka.
- (5) Sa'id Khan.
- (6) "Khan Khanan" Mirza 'Abdu'r-Rahim.
- (7) Raja Man Singh.

Out of these Nos. (1), (4) and (7), as we know, were promoted to higher ranks. This leaves four. The following received 5,000 rank in the last decade :

(1) Zain Khan Koka	A.N., III, 701.
(2) Sadiq Khan	" " "
(3) Jagan Nath	" ,, 786.
(4) Abu l-Fazl	»» ,, 805.
(5) Shah Beg Khan	" ,, 815.
(6) Qilij Khan	" ,, 820.
(7) Raja Bikramajit (Rai Patr Das)	" ,, 826.

Out of these Nos. (1), (2) and (4) died before Akbar's death, leaving four alive. Thus we get eight *mansabdars* of 5,000, who were living in 1605. And De LaSt has eight I

We have tested this case, first, because it is exceptionah and De Last's figure *prima facie* seems unlikely, secondly, it relates to a high and important *mansab*, all conferments of which were presumably recorded in *A.N.* We cannot apply the same test to other *mansabs*, because the record of lower

mansabs in *A.N.* cannot be complete. De Laet having stood the test triumphantly in this case, we feel some confidence in his figures for other ranks, though we cannot verify them from any other source.

De Lagt, we may remark in conclusion, does not give the ranks of the princes and nobles above 5,000. Again, the following *mansabs* are not in De Laet's list : 1,250, 900, 800, 600, 120 and 50. Possibly these were discontinued in the fifth decade. And 20 and 10 were presumably discouraged, so that their numbers fell.¹ These are the two unimportant exceptions referred to above.

Writers from De Last downwards have tried to base an estimate of the Mughul army on the *mansabdari* lists. We can now see how absurd that procedure would be.

We may presume that towards the end of Akbar's reign every *mansabdar* had a *zat* and a *suwar* rank distinctly fixed; and in all probability he entertained cavalry corresponding to his *suwar* rank. Our information about the *suwar* rank of the *mansabdars* being practically nill, however, no estimate of Akbar's army can be based on that rank.

¹ We see that towards Aurangzeb's time the rank 10 disappeared altogether.

Jahangir

The following *sat* ranks of 1,000 and above are mentioned in the histories : 40,000, 30,000, 20,000, 15,000, 12,000, 10,000, 8,000, 7,000, 6,000, 5,000, 4,500, 4,000, 3,500, 3,000, 2,500, 2,000, 1,800, 1,700, 1,500, 1,400, 1,300, 1,200, 1,000.

We see that the upper limit, which had touched 12,000 in Akbar's reign, shot up to 40,000 in this.

The Persian chronicles of this reign offer no comprehensive *mansabdari* list giving the whole *mansabdari* personnel at any one time. The following facts are culled from a rather full list of *mansab* awards which I have compiled from contemporary histories. In all cases in the following tables only the highest ranks reached in the reign are given :

PRINCES

No.	Rank-holder	Rank	Authority
1	Parvez ...	40,000/30,000 ...	<i>Tuzuk</i> , 360.
2	<u>Khurram</u> ...	30,000/20,000 ...	" 195
3	ShahrySr ...	12,000/8,000 ...	" 347
4	DSwar <u>Bakhsh</u> ...	8,000/3,000 ...	" 361

NOBLES.

No.	Rank-holder	Rank	Authority
1	MirS Shah Rukh ...	7,000	<i>Tuzuk, II</i>
2	I'timadu'd-Daula ...	7,000/7,000	„ 267
3	“ <u>Kh</u> 5n-i-A 'zam” Mirza 'Aziz Koka ...	7,000/5,000	„ 355
4	Mahabat <u>Khan</u> “ <u>Khan Khanan</u> ” ...	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	„ 391
5	“ <u>Khan Khanan</u> ” 'Abdu'r- Raḥim ...	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	„ 412
6	Āṣaf <u>Khan</u> ...	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	„ 414
7	Qilij Khan ...	6,000/5,000	„ 96
8	Murtaza <u>Khan</u> ...	6,000/5,000	„ 117
9	Islam <u>Khan</u> ...	6,000/6,000	„ 125
10	<u>Khan</u> Dauran ...	6,000/5,000	„ 131 & 266
11	Khan Jahan ...	6,000/6,000	„ 184
12	*Abdullah <u>Khan</u> ...	6,000	„ 344
13	I'tibar <u>Khan</u> “Mumtaz <u>Khan</u> ” ...	6,000/5,000	„ 359

Awards of the rank 5,000 (not counting occasions where only *suwar* rank was promoted with the same *sat* rank) are about 50.

Just as for 1605 we had De Laet's list (dealt with above), so for 1609-11 we have Hawkins'. William Hawkins, who was at Agra from 16 April, 1609, to 2 November, 1611, is *a very* important eye-witness. He was a *mansabdar* himself, and presumably knew the working of the system from inside. Under the circumstances we should expect an authoritative statement from him. What we actually get is something different. He says: 'As Christian Princes use their degrees by titles, so they [Mughul Princes and Nobles] have their Degrees and Titles by their number of horses.'

'They that be of the fame of twelve thousand Horsemen', he continues, 'belong to the King, and his Mother, and eldest Sonne, and one more, who is of the bloud Royall of Uzbeck, named Chan Azam. Dukes be nine thousand Fame, Marquesses five thousand Fame, Earles three thousand, Viscounts two thousand, Barons a thousand, Knights foure hundred, Esquires an hundred, Gentlemen fifty. Yeomen from twentie down-wards. All they that have these numbers of Horsemen, are called Mansabdars, or men of Livings, or Lordships. Of these there be three thousand, that is to say, foure be of twelve thousand Horse a-piece, and they be the King, his Mother, Sultan Pervis, Prince, and Chan Azam. Of nine thousand Aorsemen there

be three, that is to say, Sultan Chorem, the Kings third Sonne, Chanchanna, and Kelich Chan. Of five thousand there bee eighteene, named Hasuff Chan, Chan Ichan, Abdula Chan, Raga Manging. Ray Durga, Raga Sursing, Ramadas Rechuva, Raga Bassu, Emirel Umera, Mahabet Chan, Chan Dowran, Sedris Chan, Hogio Bey Mirza, Mirza Cazi, Ettebar Chan, Abulfet Dekenny, Jelam Cully Chan, Sheik Ferid. Of three thousand there be two and twentie, to wit, Chan Ale mjmirza Ereg, Imirza Darab, Hogio Jahan, Hogio Abdal Hassan, Mirza Gaysbey, Mirza Shemchadin, Mirza Chadulla, Seffer Chan, Kazmy Chan, Mirza Chin Kelich, Saif Chan, Lalla Bersingdia, Mirza Zeady, Mirza Ally Ecberchuly, Terbiat Chan, Mirza Laschary, Mirza Charucogly, Mirza Rustem, Ally Merdon Badur, Tasbey Chan, Abulbey. The rest bee from two thousand downwards till you come to twentie Horses, two thousand nine hundred and fiftie. Of Horsemen, that receive pay monethly, from sixe Horse to one, there be five thousand, these bee called Haddies. Of such Officers and men as belong to the Court and Campe, there be thirtie sixe thousand, to say, Porters, Gunners, Watermen, Lack eyes, Horse-keepers, Elephant-keepers, Small shot, Frasses, or Tent men, Cooke, Light bearers, Gardiners, Keepers of all kind of Beasts. All these be payd monethly out of the Kings Treasurie, whose

Wages be from ten to three Rupias.

All his Captaines are to maintaine at a seven-nights warning, from twelve thousand to twentie Horse, all Horsemen three Leckes, which is three hundred thousand Horsemen : which of the Incomes of their Lordships allowed them, they must maintayne.¹

In order to test the details here given by Hawkins I have made a rough-and-ready sort of list of *mansabdars* according to the ranks they held about 1609-11; and I find that Hawkins' account, accurate in many details, is yet full of serious mistakes, especially in the upper orders.

Now for details :—

12,000: The Emperor, although at the head of the aristocracy *ex officio* (from the times of Chingiz Khan and TImUr), was never included in the *mansabdari* list, and certainly never had a *mansab*. Nor was any lady given any *mansab* as far as we know. Parvez probably had 12,000 rank at this date; but Mirza 'Aziz Koka "Khan-i-A'zam" never rose higher than 7,000; and Hawkins ought to have known that no nobles as a rule went beyond that rank. So three entries out of four are wrong.

9,000: I regret I have not found this rank men-

¹ Pureshas, III (William Hawkins), pp. 29-30.

tioned anywhere in *Tuzuk*, and it probably never existed in this reign. As for the names. Khurram was promoted from 8,000/5,000 straight to 10,000/5,000 in *Muharram*, 1020 (= March, 1611), when Hawkins was still at Agra (*Tuzuk*, 93), and ‘Abdu'r-Rahim “Khan Khanan” got only 6,000 *zat* in May, 1612, when Hawkins had gone (*Ibid.*, 108) ; while Qillj Khan barely attained to 6,000/5,000 during Hawkins’ stay at Agra (*Ibid.*, 96). So here all the three entries are fictitious.

Hawkins has altogether omitted the ranks 7,000 and 6,000; although we know definitely that “Khan-i-A‘zam” Mirza ‘Aziz Koka enjoyed the 7,000 *zat* rank¹ at this date, and Qilij Khan, to whom Hawkins assigns 9,000, got the rank 6,000/5,000 when Hawkins was staying at Agra. Again, I do not understand why he has given the rank-holders of 3,000 in full, and omitted altogether those of 4,500 and 4,000, both of which are more important, the latter carrying a large personnel besides.

Now as regards his lists for 5,000 and 3,000: The numbers in Hawkins’ list are slightly in excess of those in mine in both cases—which can be explained by a likely supposition that all awards are not recorded in *Tuzuk*. Here the mistakes are fewer and

¹ *Tuzuk*, 70. R. & B. wrongly translate the rank of 7,000 as 7,000 rupees (I. MW-

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not so serious. The entries under 5,000 are, I think, substantially correct, excepting one or two possible exaggerated ranks, and one or two others which can not be verified. The list for 3,000 is not so satisfactory. The better part of it cannot be verified from *Tuzuk*. The rest is either correct or likely to be correct (the actual *mansab* not being given in the histories).

We had expected Hawkins' statement would occupy the same position for 1609-11 as the De Laet list did for 1605; but its contents do not justify that position. On the whole this document is unsatisfactory, specially in the upper ranks.

Shah Jahan

This is the only reign for which we possess *mansabdari* tables, properly digested and classified.

'Abdu'l-Hamld, who wrote a history of the first twenty years of Shah Jahan's reign, gives a full list of awards of *mansabs* in each of the two decades; and Muhammad Salih, who compiled a complete history of the reign, has a comprehensive list at the end of '*Amal-i-Salih*'. All these lists give both *sat* and *suwar* ranks.

'Abdu'l-Hamld's *manšabdari* lists show every sign of being carefully prepared, the *mansabdars* who died during the decade being clearly so mentioned, with the date or year of their death marked against

their names. Muhammad Salih's list, on the contrary, is often careless. Apparently it gives all *mansabdars* of the reign whether dead or alive at the end of the reign ; and, what is worse, the dead ones are not so indicated in all cases. Besides I have also noted a few omissions. So the A.S. list is not entitled to the same respect as the *B.N.* ones, and is not nearly as useful.

The following table, which is compiled from all the three lists, gives the *mansabs* of the princes and the *umara* of rank above 5,000 :

PRINCES

No.	क- ०००	रानक				III Decade*
		I ००००	० ००००	० ००००	० ००००	
4	DSrS Shukoh	15,000	...	20,000/20,000 (1-0,000 2-3 h.)	...	1,10,000 (30,000 2-3 h.)
5	Shah Shuja'	12,000	...	15,000/15,000 (5,000 2-8 %)	...	1,15,000 (2-8 %)
6	Aurangzeb	12,000	...	15,000/15,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	...	20,000/20,000 (2-8 %)
7	Murad Bakhsh	12,000	...	15,000/15,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	...	20,000/20,000 (2-8 %)
8	Sulaiman Shukoh	12,000	...	15,000/15,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	...	20,000/20,000 (2-8 %)
9	Spahr Shukoh	12,000	...	15,000/15,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	...	20,000/20,000 (2-8 %)
10	Zainu'd-Din	12,000	...	15,000/15,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	...	20,000/20,000 (2-8 %)
11	Sultan Muhammad	12,000	...	15,000/15,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	...	20,000/20,000 (2-8 %)

* B.N., I, ii, 292-93.

• *Ibid.*, II, 717-18.

• A.S., III, 448-50.

NOBLES

No	Rank-holder	Rank		
		I Decade ¹	II Decade ¹	III Decade*
1	"Yaminu'd-Daula" Asaf Khan "Khan Khanan"	9,000/9,000 (2-3 h.)	9,000/9,000 (2-3 h.)	..
2	Mahabat Khan "Khan Khanan" ..	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.) ^{>}
3	Khan Jahan Lodi ..	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)
4	Khifin Dauran Bahadur "Nusrat Jang" ..	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	..
5	Khwaia Abu'l-Hasan...	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)
6	A'zam Khan ..	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	6,000/6,000	6,000/6,000.
7	'Abdullah Khan Bahadur "Firozjang" ..	6,000/6,000	6,000/6,000	..
8	Afzal Khan. <i>Dastur-i-</i> A'zam ..	6,000/4,000	7,000/4,000 [7,000/7,000 in A.S. list]	..
9	Ali Mardan Khan "Amiru'l-Umara	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)
10	Sa'id Khan Bahadur "Zafar Jang"	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	1 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)

14	Islam Khān 'Jumdatu'l-Mulūk'	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)
12	'Allami Sa'dullāh Khān "Madaru'l-Mahamm"	...	7,000/7,000	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.) [«]
5	Sayyid Khān Jahān Bartha	6,000/6,000 (2-3 h.) [7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.) in A.S.]	...
14	Sayyid Jalāl Bukhari, <i>Ṣadrū's-Ṣudūr</i>	6,000/2,000	...
15	Khusrau, son of Nazr Muḥammad Khān	6,000/2,000	6,000/5,000.
16	Maharaja Jaswant Singh	6,000/6,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)
17	Rustam Khān Bahadur "Firoz Jāng"	6,000/6,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)
18	Mu'azzam Khān	5,000 [—]

¹ *B.N.*, I, ii, 292-93.

» *Ibid.*, II, 717-18.

• A.S., III, 448-50.

• The highest rank achieved by Sa'dullāh Khān was either 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.) or 7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.). The authorities are in conflict, and not always consistent. See *B.W.*, III, *if.* 186, 23a and 416; *A.S.*, III, pp. 62, 69, 100, 108 and 449.

In the following table are given the numbers of *mansabdars* of ranks from 5,000 to 500 in the first and the second decade of the reign respectively :

Rank	NUMBER OF RANK-HOLDERS					
	I Decade ¹			II Decade ¹		
		Dead	Alive		Dead	Alive
5,000	25	(10	15)	20	(5	15)
4,000	30	(12	18)	20	(10	10)
3,000	38	(12	26)	44	(10	34)
2,500	17	(5	12)	11	(6	5)
2,000	48	(9	39)	51	(10	41)
1,500	47	(17	30)	52	(17	35)
1,000	80	(34	46)	97	(27	70)
900	19	(5	14)	23	(5	18)
800	52	(15	37)	40	(10	30)
700	49	(13	36)	60	(8	52)
600	45	(14	31)	30	(5	25)
500	134	(25	109)	114	(14	100)

» *B.N.*, I. ii. 293-328.• *Ibid.*, II. 719-52.

Muhammad Salih's list, which stands on a different basis and applies to the whole of the reign, is summarized below as far as ranks 5,000 to 500 are concerned. This list is of doubtful utility and perhaps of impeachable authenticity. For the sake of completeness it is given here for all it is worth.

Rank	Number of Rank-holders ¹
5,000	32
4,000	31
3,000	57
2,500	24
2,000	66
1,500	72
1,000	138 [Correct : 128]'
900	31
800	81
700	77 [Correct : 76]'
600	57
50G	180 [Correct : 175]*

¹ A.S., III, 450-89.

¹ Where the totals given in A.S. are wrong, I have given correct ones within square brackets.

Note.—I have not distinguished the dead from the living in the above list, because Muhammad Salih has not noted *all* the dead ones. So giving the number of those mentioned by him as dead would mislead the reader.

The reader will notice that the ranks in this reign range up to 60,000 in case of princes and to 9,000 in case of nobles. But if we look a little closer, we shall find that both these limits are extreme cases. Dara Shukoh enjoyed the rank 30,000/20,000 (10,000 2-3 h.) up to 23 *Rabi' I*, 1066. Within two years from that date his rank rose by two successive strides to 60,000/40,000 (30,000 2-3 h.). This extraordinarily rapid promotion was due partly to the fact that the emperor thought the prince was practically in the act of succeeding to the throne, and partly (as was indeed actually expressed) to the emperor's appreciation of the prince's devotion and service during the former's illness, which brought revolution and struggle in its train, and which upset all the plans and calculations of the aged emperor.

Asaf Khan's *mansab* (9,000/9,000 (2-3 h.)) is equally exceptional. Asaf Khan's energetic and unscrupulous action at Jahangir's death had gone a long way towards checkmating Nur Jahan's plans and ambitions, and securing the throne to Shah Jahan. No wonder that Asaf Khan occupied a

unique position among the nobility : not only had nobody else an equal rank either with or after him, but none was considered worthy of even the next highest rank of 8,000.

As for the lower limit, no *mansabdars* below 500 are considered eligible for entry in these lists.

Aurangzeb

For this reign it will be sufficient to give the holders of the higher ranks in a tabular form.

PRINCES

(a) SONS

No.	Rank-holder	Rank	Authority
1	Muljammad Mu'azzam Shah 'Alam ...	40,000/40,000	M.A., 370.
2	Muhammad KSm Bakhsh ...	40,000/40,000	.. 473.
3	Muhammad Sulṭan ...	20,000/10,000	.. 139.
4	Muhammad A'zam ...	20,000/ 9,000	.. 156.
5	Muhammad Akbar ...	10,000/ 2,000*	.. 121.

¹ The text, which says 22,000/2,000, seems wrong. Reading 8,000 for 20,000 as his previous rank, I think this must be 10,000/2,000.

(b) GRANDSONS

No.	Rank-holder	Rank	Authority
6	Bedar Bakht ...	15,000/12,000	M.A., 470.
7	Muhammad Mu'izzu'd-Din ...	12,000/10,000	.. / 470.
8	Muhammad 'Azim ...	10,000/ 2,000	.. 347.
9	Rafi'u'lQadr ...	8,000/ 7,000	.. 347.
10	Muhyiu's-Sunnat ...	7,000/ 2,000	.. 470.

NOBLES

No.	Rank-holder	Rank	Authority
1	Nijabat Khan ...	7,000/7,000 ...	AZ.N., 54.
2	Khan Jahan "Amiru'l-Umara" ...	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.) 130.
3	Mu'azzam Khan "Mir Jumla" ...	7,000/7,000 5,0002-3 h.)	.. 741.
4	Ja'far Khan ...	7,000/7,000 (4,0002-3 h.)	.. 869.
5	Raja Jaf Singh ...	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.) 907.
6	Asad Khan "Jumdatu'l-Mulk" ...	7,000/7,000 ...	M.A., 302.
7	Khan Firoz Jang ...	7,000/7,000 ¹ 302.
8	Sambha Ji ...	7,000/7,000 316.

¹ On p. 481 of *M.A.* we have it that his rank was increased to 7,000/10,000, which is absurd. I have therefore retained his lower rank.

NOBLES— (Contd.)

No.	Rank-holder	Rank	Authority
9	Shaikh Nizam of Hyderabad "Muqarrab Khan" "KhSn Zaman Fath Jang"	7,000/7,000 ...	M.A., 324.
10	Sahu, son of Sambha Ji ...	7,000/7,000 ...	" 332.
11	Sharza "Rustam Khan"...	7,000/7,000 reduced to 6000/6000 ...	" 480.
12	Daler Khan ...	7,000/7,000 ...	" 481
13	Khalilu'llSh Khan "Umdatul-Mulk" ...	6,000/6,000 (2-3 h.) ...	AZ. AT., 119.
14	Rana Raj Singh ...	6,000/6,000 (1,000 2-3 h.)	" 194.
15	Mahabat Khan ...	6,000/5,000 (3,000 2-3 h.)	" 754-55.
16	Asad, son of Mulla Ahmad ...	6,000/6,000 ...	" 925.
17	Muhammad Amin Khan	6,000/5,000 reduced to 5,000/5,000 ...	Al.A , 121.
18	Bahadur Khan "Khan Jahan Bahadur" ...	6,000/6,000 (5,000 or 6(X)02-3 h.) ...	" 124.
19	Muhammad Ibrahim "Mahabat Khan" ...	6,000/6,000 ...	" 269.
20	Ismail Khan ...	6,000/5,000 ...	" 369.
21	Kh3n-i-'Alam, son of Khan Zaman Fath Jang	6,000/5,000 ...	" 384.
22	Searza "Rustam Khan"...	7,000/7,000 reduced to 6,000/6,000 ...	" 480 (See also p. 280).
23	Da'nd Khan ...	6,000/6,000 ...	" 483.
24	Ibrahim Khan ...	6,000/6,000 ...	" 496-97.
25	Sayyid Sar-afraz Khan ...	6,000/6,000 ...	" 513.

SECT. VI: ALLOWANCES, SALARIES AND
IN'AMS.

We may wind up with a rapid survey of emoluments received by till Princes and the higher nobles. Luckily some figures for the reign of Shah Jahan are available, which will just suffice to give a general idea.

The Princes had daily allowances before they were old enough to receive a *mansab*. At the time of Shah Jahan's coronation the daily allowances of his sons were fixed as follows :

Dara <u>Shukoh</u>	Rs. 1,000.
<u>Shah Shuia</u> *	Rs. 750.
Aurangzeb	Rs. 500.
Murad <u>Bakhsh</u>	Rs. 250. ¹

In the ensuing tables we give some *mansabs* and their corresponding salaries, and as some of the rank-holders had different ranks and salaries at different times, the period or year has also been indicated.

* *B.N.*, I, i, 96-97.

PRINCES

6 Z	5 at 8 3 4 5	Ti=0	Rs	Sa b x g. g.	Authority
H	COI S x	I 10 H a 2 3 1068A. H.	8 1 1000 (10.000 2-3 h.) ... 3 1 40,000 (30,000 2-3 h.)	2 3 2 3 2 3 2	B.N., II, 715. A.S., III, 238 and B.N., III, 121a. A.S., III, 270 71.
CM	Shah of Gt	1068A. H.	1068A. H.	3 2	A.S., III, 238 and B.N., III, 121a.
B	Shah of Gt	1068A. H.	1068A. H.	3 2	A.S., III, 270 71.
4	m	X	1068A. H.	3 2	B.N., II, 715.

1 For this the Prince received *jdgir* worth Rs. 2,57,50,000 pa., if the Persian text has the correct figure.

NOBLES

No.	Rank-holder	Time	Rank	Salary p.a.	Authority
1	"Yaminu'd-Daula" Khan Asaf ...	I & II Decade	9,000/9,000 (2-3 h.)	16*20, crore <i>dams</i> = 40,50,000 rupees ...	B.N., I. i, 193 & II, 258.
2	Khan DaurSn BahSdur "Nusrat Jang" ...	I Decade ...	6,000/6,000 (2-3 h.)	10*80 crore <i>dams</i> =27 lakhs of rupees ...	B.N., I. ii, 247.
	" "	II Decade ...	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	12 crore <i>dams</i> =30 lakhs of rupees ...	B.N., II, 427.
8	'AH MardSn Khan "Amiru'l-Umara" ...	II & III Decade ...	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.) ...	12 crore <i>dams</i> =30" lakhs of rupees ...	B.A., II, 321 & III, 41*.
4	'Allami Sa'dullSh Khan "	II Decade 1060 A.H. ...	7,000/7,000 ... 7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.) or 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)* ...	12 crore <i>dams</i> =30 lakhs of rupees ... 12 crore <i>dams</i> =30 lakhs of rupees ...	B.N., II, 715. B.N., III, 416 & A.S., III, 108.

¹ His *jagir* had the yearly income of 50 lakhs of rupees.

¹ See f.n. 4 on p. 127 above.

These emoluments include not only the *sat* and *suwar* rank salaries but also in many cases *iriam* or gratuity, which is often distinctly stated as such. It came up to a tidy amount in many cases: in case of Prince Dara Shukoh, for instance, it went up, towards the end, to 20 crore *dams*.¹

In the case of the Princes, the salaries, even without the *in'ams*, are far in excess of what we can calculate for their *mansabs*. But then this was a privileged class, and considerable latitude seems to have been allowed.

As regards the nobles, the pay corresponds fairly accurately to the *mansab*. We need only examine one case by way of illustration. The pay of the rank 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.), which was enjoyed by several nobles of the highest rank in the third decade, may be calculated as follows:—

<i>Zat</i> rank salary	1'40 crore <i>dams</i>
<i>Suwar</i> rank salary (10,000	
+ 2,000, i.e., 12,000	
troopers at 8,000 <i>dams</i>	
each)	9'60 crore „
	11 crore <i>dams</i>

These *amirs* drew 1 crore *dams* as *iriam* in addition, their total emoluments becoming 12 crores.

* A. S., III, 265.

Sa'dullah Khan's earlier salary, however, presents some difficulty. His salary could not be 12 crores when his rank was 7,000/7,000 and 11 crores when it was 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.). We know that his rank in II decade was 7,000/7,000,¹ and that he received successive promotions of rank in the succeeding years, till his rank stood at 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)² and his salary at 11 crores. On the Nauroz falling on 18 *Rain'* I, 1060, one crore *dams* was sanctioned as *iriam*, his total emoluments now becoming 12 crores.³ In the light of these facts the salary entry on p. 715 of *B.N.*, II, which is apparently copied by Muhammad Salih, must be wrong.

In one or two instances the *jagirs* granted yielded even more than the total sanctioned emoluments. Dara Shukoh and Asaf Khan are examples. But both these, as has been noted above,⁴ are exceptional cases.

Let us now realize for a moment what these figures mean, and what was the net salary of each *amir* after the state obligations had been met. Taking the same example for our illustration, an officer who drew 12 crores or 30 lakhs of rupees, saved, at a

* *B.N.*, II, 715 ; *A.S.*, II, 558 ; *B.N.*, III, 416.

» *A.S.*, III, 62. 69. 100 | *B.N.*, III, 186. 23a.

• *B.N.*, III, 416 ; *A.S.*, III, 108.

⁴ Pp. 130>31 above.

liberal estimate, half his *sat* rank salary, viz., 70 lakh *dams*, and at least two-thirds of his *suwar* rank salary, viz., 640 lakh *dams*, i.e., altogether over 7 crores or 17½ lakh rupees. The Viceroy of India gets 2½ lakhs of rupees p. a. today. Add to this the fact that on Moreland's findings the purchasing power of money in the Mughul period was more than four times what it is today. The 17½ lakhs becomes 70 lakhs of modern money.

But these are only a few—the more striking—examples. Other *amirs* in our table drew salaries on the same scale; so did the lower rank-holders, who are not included in our lists. As the rank decreased, the personnel of it increased. The total of salaries disbursed must have come up to a very high figure.

The third decade of Shah Jahan's reign, we must remember, was the culminating point of Mughul Indian wealth and prosperity. I may quote the following from my *Imperial Treasury of the Indian Mughuls*: 'The third decade was perhaps the most prosperous in Mughul Indian history: a larger value in gems and jewels changed hands at the court of Delhi during the years 1648-58 than at any other period of Indian history before or since.'

Some rough indications can be gathered from the following facts: On the first *darbar* held in the newly-built Delhi palace, which fell on a

Nauroz (Monday, 18 *Rabi*I, 1060, and following days) presents worth 15 lakhs were accepted. Again, the value accepted from princes and nobles in XXVIII R.Y. totalled nearly 15 lakhs¹ and that in XXIX R.Y. came to 20? while in R.Y. XXX the maximum of nearly 1 crore was reached'' (P. 538).

We see the aristocracy rolling in wealth, and pomp and circumstance surround the Mughul court. The Emperor is on his throne, and all seems right with the empire. The court historians consider it a breach of manners to talk of anything but power, riches and prosperity ; and the superficial observer is deceived. But it does not require much acumen on our part, with subsequent history before us, to perceive that the canker of insolvency was gnawing at the heart of the empire, and the foundation of the financial fabric was sapped. This is just what we should have expected. The expenditure was rapidly outrunning the revenues, and the ageing monarch was losing control of the finances. No treasury in the world could stand this strain.

Only Shah Jahan's kindly disposition and temperamental munificence drew a veil across the ugly situation, and the people were on the whole content ed and happy.

¹ *B.N.*, III, f. 99a.

» *Ibid.*, f. 108a.

• *Ibid.*, f. 123b.

We can hear some unpalatable truths from an author, who wrote at a much later date, safely sheltered alike from public gaze and royal patronage. Khafi Khan, summing up at the end of Shah Jahan's reign, makes the following free and outspoken comment: After recounting the names of the highest rank-holders, and giving the numbers for some lower ranks, he says that there were no more *khalisa* or *jagir* lands to be given away, the treasury balances were at a miserable ebb, and the lists of the *mansabdars*, big and small, knew no end. The jagir-holders and those who drew cash salaries were alike in desperate straits, complaints were useless, and they had to content themselves with a *manṣab* without a revenue.¹

With the advent of Aurangzeb things wore a grimmer aspect. Even if this reign had been one of unbroken peace and prosperity—which it was not—the top-heavy *mansabdari* system would have come down with a crash. Nothing could be done to avert, or even delay, the impending disaster. There was no abatement in the award of fresh *mansabs*, and the salaries remained on the same high level. Whether they could be paid regularly or not was another matter.

We have no historian to tell us of the exact state

¹ *M.L.*, II, 759-60.

of things in the early part of the reign ; but we know that there were no reforms or retrenchments. As the reign wore on, military operations in all parts of the empire, notably in the Deccan, constituted an ever-increasing strain on the royal treasury. Khafi Khan, writing under 1103 A.H., says, the greater portion of the cash reserve has been depleted, and there are no balances to meet the excessive demands of the salary-holders.¹ In the words of Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar, 'the salaries of the soldiers and civil officers alike fell into arrears for three years.....The result was that the entire land in the empire proved insufficient for the total amount of *jagir* needed to satisfy the dues of all the officers included in the swollen army-list.....Even when the grants of land in lieu of salary were drawn up by the Pay Office, they remained for years as mere orders on paper, the actual delivery of the villages to the grantees being impossible'.¹

Again, Khafi Khan tells us that the *mansabdars*, who were charged with feeding the emperor's animals, had such poor *jagirs* that they were themselves in daily fear of starvation. After much exertion and effort they obtained a small *jagir*, which was often barren, and the income from it could not

¹ *M.L.*, I, 411.

* *History of Aurangzib*, V, 448-49.

pay more than half or a third of the cost of feeding the animals, not to speak of the maintenance of the *mansabdar's* family. The cost of feeding the king's animals was demanded from the *mansabdar's* agents, who were imprisoned, abused and insulted. Their remonstrances to the emperor were fruitless; and very often the agents had to resign their posts.¹

All this is about the maintenance of the king's animals, that is, about the *sat* rank salary, from which the king's transport and the *mansabdar's* private establishment were to be met. We are told nothing about the more important matter, the troopers' pay.* Nor is there anyone to inform us whether the *mansabdars* maintained the full quota of cavalry required under Shah Jahan's i-and-i rule. From what we know of the state of things, it is more than doubtful if the state could enforce this rule or possessed sufficient funds to pay for the cavalry at that exorbitant rate. Things reverted pretty nearly to what they were before the reforms of Sher Shah and Akbar, with the added stigma of helpless failure.

SECT. VII: CLASSIFICATION OF MANŞABDĀRS

The peerage consisted of a single graded list of rank*holders, in which the princes were naturally placed at the top, often by themselves. But no

¹ *M.L.*, II, 602-3.

¹ For this see remarks on p. 102 *et seqq.* above.

division was shown in the names that followed. Yet those above a certain rank were known as *umara-i-kibaf*, *umara-i-'igam* or *nu'inan-i-wala tabar*. Next came the *umara*; and last came the *mansabdars*, who were at the bottom.

The ranks ranged from 10 to 12,000 in Akbar's time. In later reigns the rank -0 was scrapped, and the upper limit, as we have seen, rose much higher. Ranks above 7,000 were, as a rule, reserved for princes.¹

I have not come across any original authority clearly indicating the lines demarcating the *umara-i-'igam* from the ordinary *umara*, and the latter from the *manşabdars*.

We take up the latter first: The line of distinction between *umara* and *mansabdars* has been drawn in a different place in the various reigns. NigSmu'd-Din Ahmad, at the end of his *mansabdari* list, remarks, that he has applied the title *amir* to every officer who has 500 retainers, *i.e.*, holds 500 rank, and that all officers mentioned in his list are *amirs*.² I

¹ The only exception to this rule has already been noted (Pp. 130-31),

* This is what I take to be the sense. As the language used is somewhat queer, and there are variants, I give the Persian text. One MS. has پوشیده نه ماند که هرکسی از ملازمان درجه که پانصد نوکر دارد اطلاق امارت و امرائی برو نموده و هرکسی که مذکور شد مرتباً او از پله امارت بالا است -

understand in the author's opinion all rank-holders of 500 and above were *amirs*.

Abu'l-Fazl's *Mansabdari* list seems to imply a division of the *mansabdars* into three classes: (1) From top to 500 (inclusive), (2) From 400 to 200 (inclusive), and (3) From 150 to 10. Without basing too much theory on this, we can say that the first class corresponds to the class which Nizamud-Din calls *amirs*, the rest being all *mansabdars*. So we can be sure that in Akbar's time the *amirs* began at 500.

In Shah Jahan's reign we find a different state of things; though we do not know when the change was introduced. Manucci, in his account of the *Mansab* (*Storia*, II, 369-77), applies the term *umara* to rank-holders from *hazari* upwards (pp. 372-74 and particularly 377). Similarly Bernier, speaking of the *umara*, in the passage quoted below, begins with *hazari* and goes on to *duwazda hazari* (p. 212), and, again, refers to their rank as 'from one to twelve

Another has

پوشیده نه ماند که هرکس از ملازمان درگاه که از پانصد نوکر کمتر دارد
اطلاق امارت و امرائی بیرونه نموده و هرکس که مذکور شد مرتبه او
از 12 Mb OjUl «/Jb ست -

The sense is not much affected by the variant. In the *Bibliotheca Indica* edition of the *TabaqUt* the text is sophisticated by a very small error, which has spoilt both the text and the translation, which follows it (*Text*, II, 456; *Tr.*, 11,684).

thousand * (p. 213). This testimony is indirectly supported by *B.N.* In the list at the end of Vol. I, after the ranks of the Princes, we have the following heading¹

نوینان مکان J دیگر منصبداران (jli (Jlfr x* L-«lJ

where the list seems to include three classes: (1) *Nu'nan* or *Umarā-i-i am*, (2) *Umarā* and (3) *Mansabdans*. Now this list, as has already been mentioned in the above discussion, does not go below the *fat* rank of 500. When we know from the heading that this list includes *mansabdars* also, and, further, that the line is to be drawn either at 500 or at 1,000, the inference seems justified that the officers in this list below 1,000 are *mansabdars*. From this cumulative evidence the conclusion is irresistible that *amarat* ranged from 1,000 upwards, at least during the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb.

The reader no doubt remembers that in Timor's army the line demarcating the "Commissioned" from the "Non-Commissioned" officers ran clear at 1,000. In fact this was the only rank where there was a duplication, the lowest *amir* and the *mingbashi* being both commanders of 1,000. This precedent seems to have been followed, consciously or unconsciously, in Shah Jahan's time.

¹ *B.N.*, I, ii, 292.

In this reign, as in Akbar's, various lines of distinction were drawn for various purposes. For position and precedence at the durbar we find that *tmansabdars* below 200 along with *ahadis*, bowmen, matchlockmen and some followers of *amirs* stood in the *khas o'am* courtyard, which was enclosed by a railing of painted wood, while *mansabdars* of 200 and above, *umara*, ministers, Rajas, ambassadors and other officers were stationed, near or far from the throne according to their degree, in the *khas o'am* hall, which was enclosed by silver rails.¹

The court historian, 'Abdu'l-I amlid, in his peerage list, does not go lower than 500.

In the reign of Aurangzeb things continued much the same. A few rules of procedure may be noticed. It was ordered that rank-holders from 20 to 100 should be made to stand,² and those from 200 to 900 need not attend in person.⁸ This last rule shows at least that *mansabdars* below 1,000 were treated differently from those above that line, presumably because the latter were *amirs*. Again, as we have said above, rank-holders of 300 and under were given no *suwar* rank; later this applied to all officers under 500.⁴

¹ *B.N.*, I, i. 222; Bernier. 261.

* *Af.A.*, 83. It is not clear what is meant, since all *mansabddrs* stood in court.

¹ *Ibid.*

* See p. 86 above. •

In this connection it is worthy of note that in the table of the *zat* rank pay based on the *dasturu'l-amals* of Aurangzeb's time (given above) we find a jump in pay between the *zat* rank of 400 and 500, and then another between 900 and 1,000—which shows that special importance attached to the promotion to the *zat* ranks of 500 and 1,000; though it must be admitted that the promotion from 800 to 900 also carried an excessive increase which is clearly out of scale. This seems to fit in with the scheme as we have conceived it. These remarks, however, apply only to the table given on pp. 63-64 above. The table in the *A'in* furnishes no basis for any such inference.

As regards the line demarcating the *amirs* from the 'great *amirs*', I regret I have no evidence to build an opinion on. Blochmann seems to think that when Nizamud-Din Ahmad talks of *umara-i-kibar*, he means 'probably' rank-holders of 5,000? No authority is available.

Similarly Irvine's statement that *amirs* from 3,000 to 7,000 were *umara-i-kibar*² stands without proof.

A remark on the use of the terms *manṣabdar* and *mansab* may not be out of place here. '*Manṣabdar*', in a general sense, means simply a rank-holder, and

¹ Blochmann. 597, f.n. 2 and 598, f.n. 1.

¹ *Army*. 9.

is often so used as to include all officers. The word منداوب in the heading in *B.N.*, I, quoted above, shows that '*mansdbdar*' sometimes included *umara*. In fact we ourselves in this discussion have often used the term in the wider sense, for the sake of brevity. In a stricter sense, of course, a *mansdbdar* stands lower than an *amir*. Conversely '*amir*' is occasionally used for *mansdbdar* in the general sense, i.e., any rank-holder ; as in Buda'uni.

■ Again, the word *mansab* is often used specifically for *mansab-i-zat* as distinguished from *mansab-i-suwar*, as by Abul-Fazl in the passage quoted on p. 47 above.

I Below follows an account of the *mansabdari* system by a careful writer who observed the actual working of it in practice.

Bernier's description of the Mughul peerage and the way in which it was created and recruited is clear ; and his remarks on their condition, their number, their state and their etiquette are full of interest. Although the following passage involves some repetition of what has been said above, it deserves to be quoted in full. He begins with the *umarā* :

'It must not be imagined that the *Omrahs* or Lords of the *Mogol's* court are members of ancient families, as our nobility in *France*. The King being

proprietor of all the lands in the empire, there can exist neither Dukedoms nor Marquisates ; nor can any family be found possessed of wealth arising from a domain, and living upon its own patrimony. The courtiers are often not even descendants of *Omrahs*, because, the King being heir of all their possessions, no family can long maintain its distinction, but, after the *Omrah's* death, is soon extinguished, and the sons, or at least the grandsons, reduced generally, we might almost say, to beggary, and compelled to enlist as mere troopers in the cavalry of some *Omrah*. The King, however, usually bestows a small pension on the widow, and often on the family ; and if the *Omrah's* life be sufficiently prolonged, he may obtain the advancement of his children by royal favour, particularly if their persons be well formed, and their complexions sufficiently fair to enable them to pass for genuine *Mogols*. But this advancement through special favour proceeds slowly, for it is an almost invariable custom to pass gradually from small salaries, and inconsiderable offices, to situations of greater trust and emolument. The *Omrahs*, therefore, mostly consist of adventurers from different nations who entice one another to the court ; and are generally persons of low descent, some having been originally slaves, and the majority being desti*

tute of education.¹ The *Mogol* raises them to dignities, or degrades them to obscurity, according to his own pleasure and caprice.

Some of the *Omrahs* have the title of *Hazary*, or lord of a thousand horse ; some, of *Dou Hazary*, lord of two thousand horse ; some, of *Penge*, lord of five thousand horse ; some, of *Hecht*, lord of seven thousand horse ; some, of *Deh Hazary*, lord of ten thousand horse ; and sometimes an *Omrah* has the title of *Douazdeh Hazary*, lord of twelve thousand horse ; as was the case with the King's eldest son. Their pay is proportionate, not to the number of men, but to the number of horses,² and two horses are generally allowed to one trooper, in order that the service may be better performed ; for in those hot countries it is usual to say that a soldier with a single horse has one foot on the ground. But let it not be supposed that an *Omrah* is expected to keep, or indeed that the King would pay for, such a body of horse as is implied by the titles of *Douazdeh* or *Hecht Hazary* ; high-sounding names intended to impose on the credulous, and deceive *Foreigners*. The King himself regulates as well the effective number that each *Omrah* is to maintain, as the nominal number

¹ A rather sweeping remark, and on the whole unjust.

¹ The pay of the *suwdr* rank is obviously meant, and the reference seems to be to the *si aspa*, *du aspa*, and *yak aspa* soldiers.

which he need not keep, but which is also paid for, and usually forms the principal part of his salary.¹ This salary is increased by the money that the *Omrah* retains out of every man's pay,² and by what accrues from his false returns of the horses he is supposed to provide: all which renders the *Omrah's* income very considerable, particularly when he is so fortunate as to have some good <*Jah-ghirs*, or suitable lands, assigned to him for the payment of his salary: for I perceived that the *Omrah* under whom I served, a *Penge-Hazary*, or lord of five thousand, whose quota was fixed at five hundred horses,³ had yet a balance over after the payment of all expenses, of nearly five thousand crowns a month, although, like all those who have no *Jah-ghirs*, he was a *Nagdy*, that is to say, one who drew his pay in cash from the treasury. Notwithstanding these large incomes, I was acquainted with very few wealthy *Omrahs*; on the contrary, most of them are in embarrassed circumstances, and

¹ This will cause confusion, unless the reader is very careful. 'The effective number' seems to refer to the actual number of horsemen maintained, i.e., 1/3, 1/4 or 1/5 of the *suwHr* rank according to rules; while 'the nominal number' apparently refers to the *ʔat* rank. Bernier seems to imagine, however, that this number represents horsemen—a common mistake. But we must remember that Bernier is labouring under the difficulty of trying to explain a special system, in non-technical language, to an audience which is totally unfamiliar with it.

¹ The 5% mentioned on p. 94 above.

⁹ Dlnishmand Khan's rank was 5,000/2,000, and he had to maintain 500 horse according to the 1/4 rule. •

deeply in debt ; not that they are ruined, like the nobility of other countries, by the extravagance of their table, but by the costly presents made to the King at certain annual festivals, and by their large establishments of wives, servants, camels, and horses.

The *Omrahs* in the provinces, in the armies, and at court, are very numerous ; but it was not in my power to ascertain their number, which is not fixed. I never saw less than five-and-twenty to thirty at court, all of whom were in the receipt of the large incomes already mentioned, dependent for the amount upon their number of horses, from one to twelve thousand.

It is these *Omrahs* who attain to the highest honours and situations of the State,—at court, in the provinces, and in the armies ; and who are, as they call themselves, the Pillars of the Empire. They maintain the splendour of the court, and are never seen out-of-doors but in the most superb apparel; mounted sometimes on an elephant, sometimes on horseback, and not unfrequently in a *Paleky* attended by many of their cavalry, and by a large body of servants on foot, who take their station in front, and at either side, of their lord, not only to clear the way, but to flap the flies and brush off the dust with tails of peacocks ; to carry the *picquedent* or spittoon, water to allay the *Omrah's* thirst, and sometimes account-

books, and other papers. Every *Omrah* at court is obliged, under a certain penalty, to repair twice a day to the assembly, for the purpose of paying his respects to the King, at ten or eleven o'clock in the morning, when he is there seated to dispense justice, and at six in the evening. An *Omrah* must also, in rotation, keep guard in the fortress once every week, during four-and-twenty hours. He sends thither his bed, carpet, and other furniture; the King supplying him with nothing but his meals. These are received with peculiar ceremony. Thrice the *Omrah* performs the *taslim*, or reverence, the face turned toward the royal apartment; first dropping the hand down to the ground, and then lifting it up to the head.

Whenever the King takes an excursion in his *Paleky*, on an elephant, or in a *Tact-Ravan* (or travelling throne, carried upon the shoulders of eight men, who are cleverly relieved from time to time when on the march by eight others), all the *Omrahs* who are not prevented by illness, disabled by age, or exempted by a peculiar office, are bound to accompany him on horseback, exposed to the inclemency of the weather and to suffocating clouds of dust. On every occasion the King is completely sheltered, whether taking the diversion of hunting, marching at the head of his troops, or making his progresses from one city to another. When, however, he confines

his hunting to the neighbourhood of the city, visits his country house or repairs to the mosque, he some times dispenses with so large a retinue, and prefers being attended by such *Omrahs* only as are that day on guard' (Bernier, pp. 211-15).

The author then goes on to talk of the *mansabdars* :—

' *Mansebdars* are horsemen with *manseb* pay, which is a peculiar pay, both honourable and considerable ; not equal to that of the *Omrahs*, but much greater than the common pay. Hence they are looked on as petty *Omrahs*, and as being of the rank from which the *Omrahs* are taken. They acknowledge no other chief but the King, and have much the same duties imposed upon them as the *Omrahs*, to whom they would be equal if they had horsemen under them, as formerly was sometimes the case ; but now they have only two, four, or six service horses, that is, such as bear the King's mark ; and their pay is, in some instances, as low as one hundred and fifty *roupies* per month, and never exceeds seven hundred.¹ Their number is not fixed, but they are much more numerous than the *Omrahs* : besides those in the provinces and armies, there are never less than two or three hundred at court' (*Ibid.*, 215).

¹ Some of the statements in this sentence are either ill-informed or obscure. We find no authority for them.

We learn incidentally that the number of *umara* about Aurangzeb's court at Bernier's time was about twenty-five or thirty, and that of the *mansabdars* about 200 or 300. The entire *mansabdari* personnel was divided into two classes: (1) Those present at court (*hazir-i-rikab*), and (2) those on duty in the provinces (*ta'inatian*). The officers were periodically transferred from one list to the other.

SECT. VIII: THE MUGHUL ARISTOCRACY AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

The *mansabdari* system was an interesting institution socially. It was an aristocracy, but it differed from the other aristocracies in history in that the nobility and the *jagir* appertaining to it were held, both in theory and practice, at the pleasure of the emperor, and were in all cases limited to a life tenure; and—what is even more important—all cash and valuables belonging to a *mansabdar* escheated, at his death, to the crown, in theory the owner and heir of all real and personal property in the country. The descendants of the deceased *mansabdar* were occasionally, however, given a small rank by way of opportunity to prove personal merit, or some cash or allowance as a means of sustenance—in both cases, a pure act of grace.¹

¹ This is the generally accepted opinion. But Sir Jadunath Sarkar contends with considerable show of reasoning and plausibility that in

Economically this redistribution of wealth at the end of each lifetime was something of an approach to some of the communistic ideals. Though based on the oriental theory of king as a shadow of God [*Zillu'l-ldh*), it was, as a factor in social and economic history, much in advance of the times. In fact the theory of divine kingship enabled the social philosophers to get over the difficulties found to be all but insurmountable by the modern socialists and communists.¹

The Mughul aristocracy, whether it appears as an ornament of the imperial court, embroidering the central figure of the emperor, or, else, as itself a cynosure of dependents and admirers, is a picture without which Mughul life and art would have missed much of their colour and beauty.

Again, the Mughul nobility constituted a sort of agency through which the ideals of art and morals

reality there was no escheat in Mughul India, what is commonly known as such being only a temporary expedient to settle the outstanding accounts between the State and the deceased. The Emperor, Sir adunath holds, never claimed to be heir of a dead subject's property, except when he died heirless.

The point is too big to be pronounced upon lightly; and adequate discussion will take us too far afield. We, therefore, content ourselves with referring the reader to Sir J. N. Sarkar's *Mughal Administration* (Second Series) (Patna University, 1925), pp. 46-50.

¹ Str J. N. Sarkar holds the opposite view on this point. He has a proper opinion of the Mughul nobility as a class. See *Mughal Administration*, p. 52-4,

and manners, which were supposed, according to the ideas of the time, to coalesce in the personality of the emperor, were diffused among the lower classes. The court etiquette was the official code of manners, which was followed in smaller assemblies on a gradually diminishing scale down to audiences given by private men as a purely social function.¹

The standard of life was set by the court and its *entourage*. It constituted the *style*. The habits and customs of the people, their ideas, tendencies and ambitions, their tastes and pleasures, were often unconsciously fashioned on this model. The peerage acted as the conduit-pipe for this stream of influence. The patronage of art and culture followed the same lines; and even where the interest was not genuine the enlightened pursuits were followed and encouraged as a dogma dictated by fashion. The current of public opinion and social conventions was set by the practice followed at the court or by the nobility.

Probably the best contemporary account of the Mughul aristocracy is Pelsaert's. There is an air of mystery and romance about his description of Mughul nobility, its life and ways. The picture is

¹ In the old Mughul houses still surviving at Agra, Delhi, or Lahore, one sees a miniature replica of a many-columned *diwUnkhana* with a *bijou* flower-garden in front of it and many other details characteristic of the domestic architecture of the period.

in parts overdrawn, but on the whole there is some thing singularly well-informed about the graphic details.

Speaking of the nobles in Mughul India, he says, ' their position is as unstable as the wind, resting on no firm foundation, but rather on pillars of glass, resplendent in the eyes of the world, but collapsing under the stress of even a slight storm.

Their *mahals* are adorned internally with lascivious sensuality, wanton and reckless festivity, superfluous pomp, inflated pride, and ornamental daintiness, while the servants of the lord may justly be described as a generation of iniquity, greed and oppression, for, like their masters, they make hay while the sun shines. Sometimes while they [the nobles] think they are exalted to a seat in heaven, an envious report to the King may cast them down to the depths of woe. Very few of them, however, think of the future, but they enjoy themselves to the uttermost while they can. As a rule they have three or four wives, the daughters of worthy men, but the senior wife commands most respect. All live together in the enclosure surrounded by high walls, which is called the *mahal*, having tanks and gardens inside. Each wife has separate apartments for herself and her slaves, of whom there may be 10, or 20, or 100, according to her fortune. Each has a

regular monthly allowance for her *gastos* [expenditure]. Jewels and clothes are provided by the husband according to the extent of his affection. Their food comes from one kitchen, but each wife takes it in her own apartments ; for they hate each other secretly, though they seldom or never allow it to be seen, because of their desire to retain the favour of their husband, whom they fear, honour, and worship, as a god rather than a man. Each night he visits a particular wife, or *mahal*, and receives a very warm welcome from her and from the slaves, who, dressed specially for the occasion, seem to fly, rather than run, about their duties. If it is the hot weather, they undress the husband as soon as he comes in, and rub his body with pounded sandalwood and rosewater, or some other scented and cooling oil. Fans are kept going steadily in the room, or in the open air, where they usually sit. Some of the slaves chafe the master's hands and feet, some sit and sing, or play music and dance, or provide other recreation, the wife sitting near him all the time. They study night and day how to make exciting perfumes and efficacious preserves, such as *moss&ri** or *falonj* [‘presumably named from the seed

¹ My friend, Principal Muhammad Shafi* of the Lahore Oriental College, makes a shrewd guess, and interprets *mosseri* as *mufarrih* (exhilarating medicine), s and f being closely alike in German text, as in old English printing.

falanja, which is used as a perfume.'—Footnote],¹ containing amber, pearls, gold, opium, and other stimulants; but these are mostly for their own use, for they eat them occasionally in the day-time, because they produce a pleasant elevation of the spirit. In the cool of the evening they drink a great deal of wine, for the women learn the habit quickly from their husbands, and drinking has become very fashionable in the last few years. The husband sits like a golden cock among the gilded hens until mid night, or until passion, or drink, sends him to bed. Then if one of the pretty slave girls takes his fancy, he calls her to him and enjoys her, his wife not daring to show any signs of displeasure, but dissembling, though she will take it out of the slave-girl later on.

Two or three eunuchs, or more, who are merely purchased Bengali slaves, but are usually faithful to their master, are appointed for each wife, to ensure that she is seen by no man except her husband; and, if a eunuch fails in this duty, he, with everyone else to blame for the stranger's presence, is in danger of losing his life. They are thus held in high esteem by their master, but the women pay them still greater regard, for the whole management of the *mahal* is in their hands, and they can give or refuse whatever is

¹ The same gentleman reads this word as *philonia* (L. *Philoniwn Romanum*), which Jahangir used to take (*Tuzuk*, 124*5; R. & B.»I, 308).

wanted. Thus they can get whatever they desire—fine horses to ride, servants to attend them outside, and female slaves inside the house, clothes as fine and smart as those of their master himself. The wives feel themselves bound to do all this, in order that what happens in the house may be concealed from their husband's knowledge; for many, or perhaps most of them, so far forget themselves, that, when their husband has gone away, either to Court, or to some place where he takes only his favourite wife, and leaves the rest at home, they allow the eunuch to enjoy them according to his ability, and thus gratify their burning passions when they have no opportunity of going out; but otherwise they spare no craft or trouble to enable them to enjoy themselves outside. These wretched women wear, indeed, the most expensive clothes, eat the daintiest food, and enjoy all worldly pleasures except one, and for that one they grieve, saying they would willingly give everything in exchange for a beggar's poverty.

The ladies of our country should be able to realize from this description the good fortune of their birth, and the extent of their freedom when compared with the position of ladies like them in other lands; but this topic lies outside the scope of my task, and I shall now speak of the houses which are built here. They are noble and pleasant, with

many apartments, but there is not much in the way of an upper story except a flat roof, on which to enjoy the evening air. There are usually gardens and tanks inside the house ; and in the hot weather the tanks are filled daily with fresh water, drawn by oxen from wells. The water is drawn, or sometimes raised by a wheel, in such quantity that it flows through a leaden pipe and rises like a fountain ; in this climate water and plants are a refreshment and recreation unknown in our cold country. These houses last for a few years only, because the walls are built with mud instead of mortar, but the white plaster of the walls is very noteworthy, and far superior to anything in our country. They use unslaked lime, which is mixed with milk, gum, and sugar into a thin paste. When the walls have been plastered with lime, they apply this paste, rubbing it with well-designed trowels until it is smooth ; then they polish it steadily with agates, perhaps for *a* whole day, until it is dry and hard, and shines like alabaster, or can even be used as a looking-glass.

They have no furniture of the kind we delight in, such as tables, stools, benches, cupboards, bedsteads, etc. ; but their cots, or sleeping places, and other furniture of kinds unknown in our country, are lavishly ornamented with gold or silver, and they use more gold and silver in serving food than we do,

though nearly all of it is used in the *mahal*, and is seen by scarcely anybody except women. Outside the *mahal*, there is only the *diwan-khana*, or sitting place, which is spread with handsome carpets, and kept very clean and neat. Here the lord takes his seat in the morning to attend to his business, whatever it is, and here all his subordinates come to salaam him. This is a very humble salute, in which the body is bent forward, and the right hand is placed on the head; but persons of equal rank or position merely bend the body. If strangers desire admittance, their names are first announced, and they are then introduced. After saluting, they take seats appropriate to their position in a row on each side of their host, and that so humbly that they seem unlike themselves, for it is more like a school of wise and virtuous philosophers than a gathering of false infidels; and no one will move from his place, though they should sit the whole day. There is a certain gravity in their mode of speaking; they make no loud noise, and do not shout or use gestures. If they talk secrets, which they do not wish to be heard by everybody, they hold a handkerchief, or their girdle, before their mouths, so that neither speaker shall be touched by the other's breath. Everyone leaves as soon as he has obtained an answer to his request, but friends,

acquaintances, and persons of position remain until the lord retires into the house, or unless the audience is prolonged until meal-time, though there are no fixed hours for meals. Before eating they first wash their hands; then the table-cloth is brought and spread on the floor. The food consists of *birinj* [dressed rice], *aeshalia* [? *shulla* or *shu'la*], *pollseb* [*pulao*], (yellow, red, green, or black), *zueyla* [? *thuli*, spiced wheaten cakes], *dupiaza* [meat with onions, etc.] ; also roast meats, and various other good courses, served on very large dishes, with too little butter, and too much spice for our taste. The *tsaftergir* [? *safracki*, table-servant, or *sharbatdar*, butler¹], or lead servant, sits in the middle, and serves each guest according to his rank, the senior first. In eating, they use little in the way of spoons or knives except their five fingers, which they besmear up to the knuckles soldier-fashion, for napkins are not used, and it is very bad manners to lick the fingers. Each guest confines himself to the portion served before him; no food is touched with the left hand; and little or nothing is drunk while eating, whether water or wine, until they have said their prayer and washed their hands. Alike at mid day and in the evening the guests rise and take their

¹Thus the Editor. Principal Shafi* suggests *chSshnigir* as the more likely reading of this corrupt word.

leave with scanty compliments, saying merely, God grant a lasting blessing on the house I and the host i then goes into his *mahal* to sleep until the evening, when he usually comes out again to the sitting-place.. Such are the usual customs, but detailed descriptions such as this must show some discrepancies. Some rich people, and many who are economical, take their meals in the *mahal* in order to save the heavy cost of the outside service ; and again they cannot hold their reception when they are in the King's camp, because they are on duty continuously from morning to night. Some of the nobles, again, have chaste wives, but they are too few to be worth mentioning ; most of the ladies are tarred with the same brush, and when the husband is away, though he may think they are guarded quite safely by his eunuchs, they are too clever for Argus himself with his hundred eyes, and get all the pleasure they can, though not so much as they desire' (*Pelsaert, Jahangir's India*, 64-8).

We have placed before the reader the whole of this account, unabridged and entire ; because we have wished to be fair both to the reader and to the author. The inclination to omit the more risky passages has been resisted in the belief that an author is best judged by the integral piece.

It is our duty, however, to drop a word of caution to the reader : None can deny that the spicy

scandal of the purple patches reads like a chapter from the *Arabian Nights' Entertainments*. There is also perhaps a conscious or sub-conscious seeking after effect in these sensational disclosures. But we have no wish to be unfair to the author.

In fact, we think, the verisimilitude which characterizes these details points to the personal experience of the author as their source. And this is supported not only by the fact that Pelsaert had effective knowledge of Persian, but also by the evidence that he, during his seven years' stay at Agra (1621-27), did not live a straight life. Mr. Moreland, the Editor, tells us that 'some years after his death, an inquiry was held into irregularities at the Dutch factory in Agra, and the report, in dealing with the immoral life of the staff, observed incidentally that Pelsaert's private life also had been open to similar censure' (Pelsaert, Introduction, xii).

In view of these revelations one is driven to conclude that Pelsaert mixed freely with certain class of womankind at Agra, and, basing his generalizations on his experience, arrived at an indiscriminate condemnation of all classes, including the highest, with which presumably he had no opportunity to associate.

Further, it is an accepted principle of the law of equity that a man who seeks equity must himself

come into court with clean hands. Obviously it is much more true that a man who occupies or appropriates the judgement-seat must himself come with clean hands. This raises a presumption against the author of this diatribe.

Not prejudice or ignorance but passion is the refracting medium which distorts Pelsaerts vision of things. Making every allowance for the seducing influences of wealth and luxury, and the laxity of the moral standard sanctioned by fashion and prestige, we do not at all see our way to subscribe to the charge.

But we can find no fault with the excellent description of the houses of the nobility and their furniture. In the details of their daily life, their manners and customs, we have a fine commentary on the amenities of private and social life among the higher classes. We can judge better of the ethos of a people by these externals of social life than by setting up a school for scandal.

SECT. IX : SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SYSTEM

A few characteristics of the *manṣabdarl* mode of recruiting the army may next be noted :

The *mansabdarl* system of raising an army may be said to be a sort of compromise between the

ancient system of tribal chieftainship and the mediaevalfeudal system of levying forces. Certain chiefs were under certain conditions made responsible for the levy, and the force under each chieftain belonged wholly or mainly to his own clan, at any rate in the early period. It was, therefore, an advance on both those earlier systems, for it combined to a certain extent their advantages. The loyalty of the men to their chief was assured by racial kinship, and a large army became possible without a gigantic central organization for its recruitment and upkeep, while there was not much fear of the chief's revolting or assuming independence.

The system had some further advantages: The *mansabdars* holding civil or military offices in the provinces (*i.e.*, the *taznatian*, as distinguished from those about court, who were called *hazir-i-rikab*) who, in many cases, held *jagirs* in their place of appointment, constituted an automatic distribution of forces, handy for all military or administrative contingencies

Again, each unit, from its composition, could be utilized precisely for the purpose to which it was best suited; so that the best use was made of every ounce of fighting strength. This finds an apt illustration in Bernier's remarks about the RajpUt rajas, where he describes how one unit of the Mughul

army could be, and often was, diplomatically used against one enemy, and another against another. The Rajas, he says, 'are necessary to keep in check such *Rajas* as are not in the *MogoVs* pay; to reduce to submission those who take up arms rather than pay tribute, or refuse to join the army when summoned by the *Mogol*' 'It is the King's policy,' he goes on, 'to foment jealousy and discord amongst the *Rajas*, and by caressing and favouring some more than others, he often succeeds, when desirous of doing so, in kindling wars among them.' Again, 'they are always at hand to be employed against the *Patans*, or against any rebellious *Omrah* or governor.' 'When ever the King of *Golkonda*,' he continues, 'withholds his tribute, or evinces an inclination to defend the King of *Visapour* or any neighbouring *Raja* whom the *Mogol* wishes to despoil or render tributary, *Rajas* are sent against him in preference to *Omrachs*, who being for the most part *Persians*, are not of the same religion as the *Mogol*, to wit *Sounnys*, but *Chias*, as are the Kings of *Persia* and *Golkonda*' (p. 210).

Further, 'the *Mogol* never finds the *Rajas* more useful than when he is engaged in hostility with the *Persians*. His *Omrachs*, as I have just remarked, are generally of that nation, and shudder at the idea of fighting against their natural King; especially because

they acknowledge him as their *Imam*, their *Calife* or sovereign pontiff, and the descendant of *Aly*, to bear arms against whom they therefore consider a great crime.

The *Mogol* is also compelled to engage *Patans* in his service by-reasons very similar to those I have assigned for employing *ragipous*' (p. 211).

The policy detailed above, which would have been impossible without a clan system in the units, is not unknown to the British Indian military administration of to-day, where we find regiments recruited on the basis of castes and tribes, and somewhat similar use made of them.

From the political point of view, the *mansabdari* system, besides assuring the steady loyalty of the officer, who always felt his direct dependence on the emperor, was, in its very theory, a standing safeguard of efficiency and discipline. The very insecurity of rank and wealth acted as a powerful incentive for individual distinction : every *mansabdar* knew that his promotion and reduction ever depended upon the quality of his service.

The *mansabdari* system of recruitment made a wise use of the attachment of men to their leaders : tribal patriotism occupied the place of territorial patriotism.

This system of military organization had a touch

of the Chivalrous. Just as in the machine age of industrial history we deplore lack of originality, individual initiative and pride, so in the modern armies, where perfect mechanical action constitutes the ideal of efficiency, we look in vain for an expression of personality and individual enterprise—which was a distinguishing feature of the age of chivalry. Every soldier must have realized that the honour of his division and therefore of his tribe (which constituted it) was staked on the issue of the battle. The ideal of tribal honour must have appealed where there was no national unity to look to.

There was something morally beautiful, to use a Greek expression, in the age of chivalry.

On the other hand, there were some natural disadvantages: The military organization had no organic centre, and lacked the cohesive force which we find only in a national army. Uniformity was lacking; and efficiency must have varied from unit to unit.

The official list of the *Mansabdars* resembles a modern 'Civil List', or rather the 'Army List', more closely than a 'Peerage' in a modern European country, where genealogy is the prominent feature.

A bigger peerage meant (1) a larger total of estates or *jagirs* assigned; or (2) a larger total of cash expenditure from the treasury; or of both; and (3) a

bigger army in case of need.

Socially it meant a bigger aristocracy, and economically a somewhat wider distribution of wealth within the upper classes.

CHAPTER II

THE MUGHL ARMY

INTRODUCTORY : THE MONGOL ARMY

“THE background of the Mughul Indian army is to be sought in the Mongol army of Central Asia in the twelfth century A.C. As before, we may begin with Chingiz Khan.

Prof. Vladimirstov thus describes the organization of Chingiz Khan's army : ‘ He [Chingiz Khan] began with the organization of his army, which by now presented a very considerable force. In accordance with an immemorial usage, he divided it into thousands, hundreds and tens. Experienced leaders, personally known to the Khan, were appointed to be commanders of the thousands and hundreds. The new post of *cherbi* was instituted, to look after the supplies. A Guard corps (*keshik*) was organized that was to be the Khan's personal guard as well as a *corps d'elite*. Its organization was on a strictly aristocratic basis; it was recruited from “young men, agile and well shaped, from the families of noyans, chiliarchs and centurions, as well as from

free-men (*tarkat*).”

The Guard included a picked thousand of “braves,” *bagaturs*. In battle this corps was to be always in the front line ; in time of peace it mounted guard. Chingis knew only too well how easy it was for nomads in the steppe to become the victims of an unexpected attack, which might at a single blow put an end to the most grandiose enterprise. This knowledge made him pay particular attention to the organization of the efficient protection of the Khan’s headquarters (*ordu*). The institution of the aristocratic guard and the appointment of chiliarchs and centurions laid the foundations of the military organization of the steppe aristocracy. The nobles ceased to be the undisciplined heads of a disorderly militia. An iron discipline was introduced, in the guards as well as in the thousands of the line, and enforced with the same severity at his head quarters.’ ¹

Again, ‘all the Mongols now formed one organized army. They were all divided into hundreds and into thousands which were united into groups of two, three, or five thousands and into larger units—army corps—myriads (*tumen*). The individual clans and tribes were grouped or divided for that purpose, forming units which could muster the requisite

number of soldiers at the shortest notice. At the head of each unit Chingis-Khan placed men he knew personally and trusted, and who were as a rule kins men of the men under their command. This policy preserved the clan constitution from decomposition, while giving it at the same time a regular, if rudimentary, military skeleton. In the place of men who had become chiefs by chance were placed commanders of the same aristocratic origin, but bound by their service to the Khan and by military discipline. In accordance with immemorial Mongol usage the army was divided into three sections : the Centre (fed/), at the head-of which was placed Naya; the Left, or Eastern, Wing (*Jun-gar*), commanded by Mukali; and the Right, or Western, Wing (*barungar*) commanded by Bogurchi.’¹

Chingiz Qian’s personal bodyguard—the most important part of his army—is thus described : ‘In the same year 1206 Chingis-Khan completed the organization of his Guard, which of course’ was based on strictly aristocratic principles. The end he had in view was not only to have a reliable personal guard for his movable headquarters and a picked corps of soldiers, but an institution that would, under his personal guidance and constant control, become a nursery of trusty lieutenants. He knew

each man personally and could give him tasks in accordance with his individual aptitudes.

All the guardsmen (*keshikten*) were to be of noble blood “Now that the Sky has ordered me to govern all nations, let there be recruited from the myriads, thousands and hundreds, ten thousand men, archers and others, to be my personal guard (*keshik*). These men, who will be attached to my person, must be chosen from among the sons of nobles or of free men (*tarkat*) and must be agile, well-built and hardy.....Each chiliarch, centurion or decurion who opposes this order, will be considered guilty and punished.” The Guard was given special privileges and honorific distinctions. “A guardsman of my bodyguard (*keshik*),” it is laid down by Chingis, “is superior to an external (i.e. ‘of the line’) chiliarch ; his family are superior to external centurions and decurions. If an external chiliarch regards himself as the equal of a *keshiktu* of my bodyguard, engages in a dispute or fight with him, he shall be punished.” All the guardsmen were in the personal cognizance of the Emperor, who himself settled their suits. “The commanders of the bodyguard may not without my explicit permission punish their subordinates on their own account. If a misdemeanour is committed by a guardsman it must be at once reported to me, and then who deserves being be-

headed, will be beheaded ; who deserves being beaten, will be beaten.”¹

We may incidentally remark here that myriarchs, chiliarchs, centurions and decurions, *i.e.*, the leaders of 10,000, 1,000, 100, and 10 respectively, are analogous phenomena in ancient Greek and Roman military history.

The reader is already familiar with the salient features of Timor's army,² which, therefore, need not detain us.

SECT. I : THE MUGHUL INDIAN ARMY

Now we can turn to Mughul India.

When Babur came to India he found here a system of charging military levies on the basis of the revenues of a territory. We shall hear more of it under Akbar.

Sher Shah's army is thus described in *Waqi'at-i-Mushtaqi* : ‘ His forces were numerous, and of every kind of horse and foot. Every man who came was entertained. 25,000 infantry and *lafganddrs* were attached to his person ; 7,000 *lafganddrs* were in the fort of Handu (Mandu ?) ; 3,000 *lafganddrs* were at Chitor ; 1,800 at the fort of Rantambhor ; 500 at the fort of Bayana ; 1,000 *lafganddrs* at Gwaliyar (Gwalior) ; and 1,000 infantry at the fort of Rohtas. It

^x *Ibid.*, 66-68.

• See pp. 18-26 above.

was known that a suitable garrison was maintained in every fort in the country. The force of horse under the royal command consisted of 150,000, some of whom were appointed on service, and others were sent to their own homes.’¹

But full details, as usual, are only available for Akbar’s reign.

It must be understood at the outset that in theory all able-bodied citizens of the empire were potential soldiers of the imperial army. In the Account of the Twelve Provinces (*Ahwal-i-duwazda Suba*) in *A’in*, I, 386-596, Abn’l-Fazl, among other things, gives the number of cavalry and infantry respectively (with an occasional mention of elephants, artillery and boats in some cases) which can be raised from every *sarkar* and from every province ; separate figures for each *mahal* being also given in many cases. Naturally enough the cavalry in these estimates is vastly outnumbered by the infantry.² This constituted the total effective man-power in the country, which was calculated by Abn’l-Fazl as over forty-four lakhs (Text, 1, 175).

¹ E. * D., IV, 551.

**The high figures for infantry in each district and province, shown in Volume II of the *A’ini-Akbari*’ says Irvine, ‘can only be accepted under considerable reservation. These numbers can only represent the men called on to render strictly local duty, and they must have consisted almost entirely of villagers armed with long pikes, or swords and shields, perhaps even with only an iron-bound bambu staff (*lathi*)’ (*Army* %162).

Horn's remarks on the subject are just : ' Allerding's ist eine solche Truppenmasse niemals wirklich gleichzeitig verfügar gewesen, und andererseits wire doch die Zahl der waffenfähigen Männer damit nicht erreicht worden, da dieselbe zweifelsohne mehrmals grosser gewesen sein muss' (p. 40).

These figures refer to a sort of military reserve corresponding roughly to militia levies in England or to *landsturm* in Germany.

In practice, however, the army was recruited according to well-defined rules, and the numbers of the soldiers actually enrolled were regulated by an elaborate system, a brief outline of which has already been placed before the reader.

Speaking in modern language, the Mughul army was composed of cavalry, infantry and artillery. But the importance attached to each of these arms of the service in Mughul times, and the efficiency of each were so unequal that it is better to follow Abn'l-Fazl's classification of the army into (1) *Mansabdars* (with the horsemen under them), (2) *Ahadis* (gentlemen-troopers), and (3) *Piadagan* (infantry, which was a great miscellany including, among other things, artillery).¹

¹ This is for brevity. If we wish to be more exact, there were three other classes of cavalry also: (1) The *Bar&wardl* troops, 'worthy but poor; they receive the means of keeping a horse, and have lands assigned to themselves, without being obliged to mark their horses with the Imperial

THE MUGHUL ARMY

Cavalry, which was constituted by (1) and (2), was by far the most important part of the army—the chief factor determining the fighting strength of the empire. ‘Although the infantry, which has various types of arms,’ says Monserrate, ‘is entirely a fighting force, yet the cavalry is regarded as in every way the flower of the army’ (*Commentary*, 88). Irvine’s remarks on the subject cannot be improved upon: *The army was essentially an army of horsemen. The Moghuls from beyond the Oxus were accustomed to fight on horseback only; the foot-soldier they despised; and in artillery they never became very proficient. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, when the French and English had demonstrated the vast superiority of disciplined infantry, the Indian foot-soldier was little more than a night watchman, and guardian over baggage, either in camp or on the line of march. Under the Moghuls, as Orme justly says, “Hist. Frag.,” 4to, p. 418, the strain of all war rested upon the numbers and goodness of the horse which were found in an army’ (*Army*, 57).

brand * (Blochmann, 241). (2) The *Dakhili* troops. ‘Some commanders. * says AbU’l-Fs?!, ‘who find it troublesome to furnish men, get a number of such soldiers as accept the Imperial brand. Such troops are called *Dakhilis*’ (Blochmann, 241). 3) *Kumakis*. ‘Some commanders also receive auxiliaries. Such reserves are called *Kumakis* * (Blochmann, 242).

But these three classes are so insignificant that in a general estimate like that of Sfaith Jahn’s total forces by *Abdu’l-Hamid Lahori II, 715) for instance, they are not considered worthy of mention.

I. *Mansabdars and their followers.*

Much the greater part of the cavalry consisted of *Mansabdars* and their *Tabins*.

The quality of the Mughul army, therefore, depended upon the leaders chosen under the *mansabdari* system and the soldiers recruited and presented by them. The government, speaking generally, rested upon their loyalty and their efficiency.

The way in which the *mansabdars* were selected and promoted, and the horsemen recruited and presented is well described by Irvine :

*Single men who resorted to the Court in the hope of obtaining employment in the army, were obliged first to seek a patron. A man generally attached himself to a chief from his own country or of his own race : Mughals became the followers of Mughals, Persians of Persians, Afghans of Afghans, and so forth. On this point there were certain customary rules, which are thus stated by Khushhāl Chand, Berlin MS. 495, fol. 1072. A noble from Mawara-un-nahr recruited none but Mughals ; if from Iran, he might have one-third Mughals and the remainder Sayyads and Shekhs. or if he took Afghans and Rajputs, of the former he might entertain one-sixth and of the latter, one-seventh of his total number. Nobles who were Sayyads or Shekhs

might enlist their own tribe, or up to one-sixth they might take Afghans. Afghans themselves might have one-half Afghans and the other half Mughals and Shekhzadahs. Rajputs made up their whole force of Rajputs' (*Army*, 36).

Again, 'according to a man's reputation or connections, or the number of his followers, would be the rank (*mansab*) assigned to him. As a rule, his followers brought their own horses and other equipment; but sometimes a man with a little money would buy extra horses and mount relations or dependents upon them. When this was the case, the man riding his own horse was called, in later parlance, a *silahdar* (literally, equipment-holder), and one riding somebody else's horse was a *bargir* (burdentaker). The horses and equipment were as often as not procured by borrowed money; and not unfrequently the chief himself made the advances, which were afterwards recovered from the man's pay. The candidate for employment, having found a patron, next obtained through this man's influence an introduction to the *Bakhshi-uUmamalik* or *Mir Bakhshi*. in whose hands lay the presentation of new men to the emperor, and on his verdict a great deal depended as to the rank (*mansab*) which might be accorded' (*Army*, 36-37).

The remarks of Bernier are equally interesting.

‘It must not, however, be inferred,’ he says, *that offices of trust and dignity are exclusively held by those of the *Mogol* race, or that they alone obtain rank in the army. These situations are filled in differently by them and strangers from all countries; the greater part by *Persians*, some by *Arabs*, and others by *Turks*. To be considered a *Mogol*, it is enough if a foreigner have a white face and profess Mahometanism; in contradistinction to the Christians of Europe, who are called *Franguis*, and to the *Indous*, whose complexion is brown, and who are *Gentiles*’ (p. 3).

Again the same writer: ‘These armies are composed either of natives, such as *Ragipous* and *Patans*, or of genuine *Mogols* and people who, though less esteemed, are called *Mogols* because white men, foreigners, and *Mahometans*. The court itself does not now consist, as originally, of real *Mogols*; but is a medley of *Usbecs*, *Persians*, *Arabs*, and *Turks*, or descendants from all these people; known, as I said before, by the general appellation of *Mogols*. It should be added, however, that children of the third and fourth generation, who have the brown complexion, and the languid manner of this country of their nativity, are held in much less respect than new coders, and are seldom invested with official situations: they consider themselves happy, if

permitted to serve as private soldiers in the infantry or cavalry' (p. 209).¹ Yet we are told in the sequel that the Mughuls 'form the principal force of the kingdom' (p. 211).

We might go further back: The way in which candidates in general were presented to the Emperor and their appointments sanctioned is thus described in A'in (Text, I, 158). The procedure applies to enlistment of horsemen directly recruited,² to *ahadis*, to *mansabdars*, and to officers of the imperial work shops :

Men from Tnran, Iran, Turkey and Europe, and from India and Kashmir come in search of appointment. The officers fix their salary ; and the *Bdkhshis* present them to the Emperor.

The horsemen, on joining, do not bring their own horses ; the *Ahadis* being the only exception. The salary originally proposed is suitably altered and sanctioned, being often increased. A number is presented every day, sometimes more, sometimes less. On Monday the candidates left over in the preceding week are inspected.

¹ On this question of the bearing of a fair complexion on patronage and promotion, the following extract from the same author is amusing : *The women [of Kashmir] especially are very handsome ; and it is from this country that nearly every individual, when first admitted to the court of the *Great Mogol*, selects wives or concubines, that children may be whiter than the *Indians* and pass for genuine *Mogols* *(404).

• It is difficult to say which class these horsemen belong to, unless they are the *Barawardi*, or possibly, *Ddihili*, troops.

Special *Bitikchis* (writers) similarly present *Ahadls*.¹

The *umara* often solicit a *mansab* for some of their servants. Eligible candidates are accepted and given a suitable rank. But this applies only to those whose monthly salary is fifty rupees and above.

Employees of every workshop (*karkhana*) have their monthly salaries fixed in this meeting, and their duties pointed out to them.²

The bulk of the army, however, was, as we have said, recruited and presented by the *mansabdars*.

The delegation of the duties of recruitment and administration of the army to the *mansabdars*, while it relieved the central government of the expense and worry of a heavy establishment, offered a strong temptation to corruption and abuse. 'False musters,' says Irvine, 'were an evil from which the Moghul army suffered even in its most palmy days. Nobles would lend each other the men to make up their quota, or needy idlers from the bazaars would be mounted on the first baggage pony that came to hand and counted in with the others as efficient soldiers' (*Army*, 45).

¹ For the rest about an *Ahadts* appointment both in this *Ain* and in *Ain 4* (Book II) see elsewhere.

* Blochmann's translation of this *Ain* (pp. 169-70) is disappointing. What we have given is a summary rather than a translation, and is drawn directly from the text.

As we have seen in the last chapter, Akbar tried hard to eradicate this evil, and succeeded to a large extent; but the efficiency of the army was on the decline in Jahangir's reign, though Shah Jahan, again, introduced changes and reforms, which restored some measure of soundness and discipline to the military fabric. Thus the quality of the military organization varied from reign to reign.

The procedure adopted in Akbar's time was as follows:

When a new man was appointed to a *mansab* it was his duty to enroll the number of horsemen required under the rules; and these were examined at a muster to make sure that men, horses and accoutrement came up to the required standard. In strictness the recruit furnished his own horse, but in practice the *mansabdar* often supplied him with horses and equipment.

For the sake of identification of the men and the horses the following rules were strictly observed;

'A *Chihrah* or descriptive roll of the new *mansabdar* was first of all drawn up, showing his name, his father's name, his tribe or caste, his place of origin, followed by details of his personal appearance' (*Army*, 47-48).

The *manṣabdar's chihra*, however, is not mentioned in *A'in*. Was it introduced later?

The troopers' roll (*Chihra-i-Tabinan*) was then prepared. The procedure is fully described in the *A'in*. It applies apparently not only to a *mansdbdar's*, but to all cavalry :

His Majesty 'ordered that upright *Bitikchis* should make out descriptive rolls of the soldiers and write down their peculiar marks. Their ages, the names of their fathers, dwelling-places, and race, were to be registered

Every one who wishes to join the army, is taken before His Majesty, in whose presence his rank is fixed, after which the clerks make out the *Tallqa*.

Dakhili troops are admitted on the signature of the *Mansabdars*.

His Majesty has also appointed five experienced officers who have to look after the condition of the men, their horses, and the stipulated amount of pay. His Majesty has the men assembled in an open place, and receives the several descriptive rolls, when the men with their horses are handed over to the above five officers. The amount of their pay is then entered at the bottom of the descriptive rolls, and is countersigned ¹ by those officers, which serves as a proof, and prevents fraudulent alterations. Each roll is then handed over to the inspecting Darogha.

¹ I should substitute *sealed *for *countersigned *; *sikka* is the word in the text.

He takes them in the manner; described above to His Majesty, who orders the pay to be increased or decreased.....When the roll is thus certified, it is also signed by the *Waqi'a Nauns*, the *Mir 'Arz*, and the officer commanding the guards.¹ On the strength of this certificate, the Darogha of the *dagk* (brand) marks the horses' (Blochmann, 265; Text, I, 190-91).

The specimen of the *Chihra-i-T alinan* copied by Irvine from a *Dasturu'l-'Amal* (B.M. MS. No. 6599, fol. 163a) gives the name of the soldier, his father's name, and his personal appearance; to which is appended a brief description of the horse (*Army*, 48). This apparently represents later practice.

Last of all came the *Chihra-i-Aspan* (Descriptive roll of horses). It was an elaborate description of the horse or horses, setting forth in detail the class to which the horse belonged in a highly elaborate system of classification, and describing minutely the marks on the horse's body.

But in the case of the horses the descriptive rolls were not a sufficient safeguard against fraud. For 'horses answering the description in the rolls were even hired and substituted for the old ones' (Blochmann, 266). So the imperial brand was placed on

¹ This is not quite accurate. It appears from the text that the *Waqi'a Nawis* signed while the other two officers only affixed their seals.

the right thigh of the horse, while the *mansabdar* had his own brand imprinted on the left (*Storia*, II, 376; Blochmann, 265-66). For a description of these brands at different periods see Blochmann, 147-48, 265-66, and Irvine, *Army*, 49-51.

This proceeding was known as *Dagh-o-mahalli*, or simply *Dagh*.

These brands and descriptive rolls were obviously meant for reference when the same *mansabdar's* cavalry was presented for review a second time. There were elaborate rules for periodical musters: Every *mansabdar* who held a *jagir* had to present his horses after three years,¹ failing which his *jagir* was docked to the extent of i'. The officer who drew his salary in cash had to renew his *dagh* every eighteen months. The *umara* whose *jagirs* were situated in a remote place were given a concession: the interval between two *daghs* was not to exceed twelve years in any case. Yet, after a lapse of six years they lost & of their *jagir*; so the free concession really extended to six years only.

If a man gets an increase of *mansab*, and three years have passed since the muster, he draws his enhanced *sat* salary from the date of increase, but his additional cavalry cannot receive any pay until it has

¹ Not ¹ every year*, as Blochmann translates by a slip (p. 266), and Irvine uncritically copies (*Army*, p. 54).

passed through the *dagh*¹ (*A'in*, Text, 191-92).

The second and later musters were technically known as *dagh-i-mukarrar* or repetition of the brand (*lit.* repeated brand).

The following passage from Monserrate's *Commentary*, although it contains a few misstatements of facts, has the merit of being an eye-witness account of the working of the *mansabdari* system and the entire military organization: 'Although the infantry, which has various types of arms, is entirely a fighting force, yet the cavalry is regarded as in every way the flower of the army. Hence the King spares no expense in order permanently to maintain an efficient, and, as far as possible, perfectly-equipped force of cavalry to guard the empire. There are forty-five thousand cavalry,² five thousand elephants and many thousand infantry, paid directly from the royal treasury. In addition to these there are troops whose command is inherited by their chief officers from father to son, like an hereditary estate ;⁸ these troops, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and elephant detachments, are paid by their commanding officers out of the revenues of the provinces which they

¹ For more elaborate and somewhat different rules, which prevailed in later times, the reader is referred to *Army*, 54.

¹ These probably included the *ahadis* and all other horsemen who were directly recruited, mentioned in *A'in* (1, 158). See p. 185 above.

¹ This, of course, is not correct.

hold from the King. For the ancient usage and custom still obtains that territory acquired by conquest can be granted by the King to anyone he likes, not on perpetual tenure, but to be held at his pleasure. Hence the government of such territories is vested in nobles on condition that they pay some stated tribute to the royal treasury.¹ These nobles distribute in their turn cities, townships and villages to their companions-in-arms, and pay the royal tribute either by appropriating the revenues of certain districts to this purpose, or by direct taxation. The King takes great care, in the assignment of territories, to grant each noble a district large enough to enable him to maintain due state and dignity and to support properly his share of the military forces. Thus he, for instance, who has to maintain two brigades receives a richer province than he who has to maintain only one. The Mongols retain their ancestral system of dividing their troops into regiments, each under its own hereditary chief. In Persian these regiments are called *Lascar.' Each regiment-commander has his own bazaar; these bazaars are called in the Tartar language 'Urdu,' or as the Portuguese pronounce it 'Ordæ.' They are

¹ Payment of cash *tribute' of this kind by a *mansabdar* is not heard of elsewhere ; unless a cash tribute from some semi-independent or half-subjugated chiefs is meant.

named after the regiment-commander, for example the “Urdu (Orda), *i.e.* regiment of Mancinus.” Hence, although all the cities and lands in the empire belong to the King, and the whole army obeys him as commander-in-chief : yet most of the troop’s have their own generals and officers, to whom they are attached—as has already been pointed out—by an hereditary allegiance. This fact supplies constant cause and opportunity for conspiracy and treason. Wherefore, in order to prevent the great nobles becoming insolent through the unchallenged enjoyment of power, the King summons to court¹ those whom he learns to have become enriched by the revenues of their provinces, and gives them many imperious commands, as though they were his slaves—command, moreover, obedience to which ill suits their exalted rank and dignity—For he charges them with the maintenance of a certain number of elephants, horses, camels, panthers, fallow-deer and doves, which they have to produce before him on a stated day every year. When they are dismissed once more to take charge of their provinces, he does not allow them to reside for long in one place ; and in order to prevent their abusing their power he himself appoints the

¹ By this Monserrate probably means the periodical musters and the officers’ visits to the capital on occasions of transfer to a new appointment or dismissal to an expedition. *

judges and governors of the cities and towns,¹ who have to report to him how the great nobles behave.’²

This survey of the subject by an outside observer from a detached point of view is refreshing, and has high corroborative value.

Within a *mansabdar's* division there was no classification into regiments. All were immediately under the *mansabdar*, with whom every soldier had personal relations—which formed the basis of the entire system. As Dr. Paul Horn rightly remarks, ‘Nummerisch bestimmte Verbände, unseren Compagnieen, Bataillonen u.s.w. entsprechend, gabes nicht’ (p. 11).

Nor was the numerical strength of each arm placed on anything like a regulated basis. The

¹ By these *Mansabdar* apparently means the *Wdqi'a-Nawis*, news-writer, recorder or intelligencer. There was one appointed to each province. In Jahangir's time the duties of the *Waqi'a-Nawis* and the *ba&hshi* were discharged in many cases by the same person. Bernier, who visited India during the first decade of Aurangzeb's reign, has the following: ‘It is true that the Great Mogol sends a *Makea-Nevis* to the various provinces; that is, persons whose business it is to communicate every event that takes place: but there is generally a disgraceful collusion between these officers and the governor, so that their presence seldom restrains the tyranny exercised over the unhappy people’ (p. 231). In the histories of Aurangzeb's reign like *M.A.* and *M.L.* we find more often the form **u>aqi'a-nigar* which means the same thing. A *wdqi'a-nauns* often accompanied an army going on an expedition.

There were fourteen of these recorders or diarists at the central court, whose duties and method of work are set out in detail in A 10 of Book n of *AM*

■ *Commentary*. 88-90.

numbers of archers, sabremen, etc., were not fixed. 'Für die Starkeverhältnisse der einzelnen Waffengattungen unter einander,' says the same writer, 'waren bei Bildung einer Armee, keine Regeln vorgeschrieben' (p. 43).

It is to be noted, however, that lower *mansabdars* could serve under higher *mansabdars*. Under an *amir* of 10,000 personal rank could serve a *mansabdar* of up to 1,000 personal rank, under one of 8,000 up to 800, under one of 7,000 up to 700, under one of 5,000 up to 500, and under a *mansabdar* of 500 an officer of up to 100 personal rank. In case of ranks lower than 500 such inclusion was not admissible (A'tn, text, 175). Perhaps this rule applies only to disposition of forces in the battle-field.

The *mansabdars* and their followers, looked at as a whole, were a composite body, each unit of which had certain distinguishing characteristics of its own. We have no doubt the Emperor knew well how to make appropriate use of each. We have already seen in a quotation from Bernier why and under what circumstances the Rajputs and Pathans were considered specially valuable as a source of military strength. Apart from those reasons, the Rajputs were highly prized both for their fighting qualities and for their staunch fidelity and a delicate sense of honour.

Babur's remarks are interesting in this connection. 'Among the Moghuls,' he says, 'the Institutions established by Chingiz Khan have continued to be strictly observed down to the present time. Every man has his appointed station ; those appointed to the right wing, the left wing, or the centre, have their allotted places, which are handed down to them from father to son. Those of most trust and consequence are stationed on the extremities or flanks of the two wings' (*Memoirs*, Leyden, Erskine, and King, I, 165-66).¹

The Barha Sayyids had acquired from the time of Akbar a right to fight in the vanguard,² which they must have won by special distinction in the method of warfare peculiar to that position in the line of battle.

Monserrate, who was at Akbar's court in 1580-82, has the following: 'The methods of warfare employed by the Persians, Mongols, Chacattaei [Chaghata'i], Osbechii [Uzbegs], and Turquimanni [Turkomans] differ very greatly from those of the Gedrosii [People of Gujarat and part of Rajpntana], or again from those of the Balochii [Baluchis], or

¹M. Pavet de Courteille, who is translating from the original Chaghata'i, renders the last sentence differently: 'Les plus estimés parmi ceux de la droite sont stationnés aux extrémités de cette aile' (*Mémoires de Baber*, I, 216).

• Blochmann, 426.

from those of the Indians. For the cavalry of the Gedrosii, who are called Rasputi [Rajputs], and of the Indians, who are called Rati [Maharattas], all ride on little ponies hardly as big as donkeys. Arriving in this manner at the place of battle, they dismount and await the attack of the enemy armed with short spears (or rather javelins) and light shields. The Musalmans say that these Rasputi and Rati know how to die, but not how to fight. The Balochii ride on camels and use bows and arrows.*¹ Again, 'the Mongols, Persians, Parthians, Turk?, Sogdians, Bachtrae and Scythians (or Tartars) all use the same fighting tactics. To pass over details, they are most dangerous when they seem to be flying in headlong riot. For, turning round on their horses, although they are going at full gallop, they fling their javelins with such deadly aim that they can transfix the eye of an enemy.'^a

4

Further, we know that different peoples not only had different ways of fighting, owing¹ to "their national peculiarities, but in some cases specialized in the use of certain arms. This must have qualified them for certain special operations, and for certain positions in the army drawn in battle-array.

The composition of a unit, *i.e.*, of a *mansabdar's* regiment, differed according to the two rules known

¹ *Commentary*, 83-84.

¹ *Ibid.*, 85.

to be in existence. Irvine, relying on *Mir'at-i-Ahmadi*, II, 118, tells us that 'the *Tabinan*, if horsemen, must be one-third Mughals, one-third Afghans, and one-third Rajputs; if infantry, two-third archers, and one-third matchlockmen' (*Army*, 9).

Manucci is totally unreliable on this subject; yet the following quotation from him seems to support the above statement: 'A man getting the pay of a *hazari* in the first class is obliged to keep two hundred and fifty horsemen of different races—that is to say, sixty-four Pathans, sixty-four Mughals, sixty-four Rajputs; the remainder are Saiyids, Shekh-zadahs, and so forth. The regulation still observed up to this day was made by King Akbar' (*Storia*, II, 375).

Irvine has already¹ given us certain rules about the classes and respective numbers of men to be recruited by *mansabdars* of different nationalities or tribes. The authority on which he draws bears date 1161 A.H. The *Mir Qt-i-Ahmadi* was written in 1174 AH.

Another class of horsemen is to be noticed, which has had no place in our classification, but formed part of the cavalry,—*viz.*, the *Rozinadqrs*, *i.e.*, men with daily sahyr. 'Rouzindars,' says Bernier, 'are.

¹ See pp. 182-83 above.

also cavaliers, who receive their pay daily, as the word imports; but their pay is greater, in some instances, than that of many of the *mansebdars*. It is, however, of a different kind, and not thought so honourable, but the *Rouzindars* are not subject, like the *Mansebdars*, to the *Agenas*-, that is, are not bound to take, at a valuation, carpets, and other pieces of furniture, that have been used in the King's palace, and on which an unreasonable value is sometimes set. Their number is very great. They fill the inferior offices; many being clerks and under-clerks; while some are employed to affix the King's signet to *Barattes*, or orders for the payment of money; and they scruple not to receive bribes for the quick issuing of these documents' (pp. 215-16).

Manucci in the same strain: 'There is still another mode of payment called *ruzindar* (*roztnahdar*)—that is, pay by the day given to infantry and cavalry. Yet, although they have this name, they are not thus paid: several months are allowed to elapse' (*Storia*, II, 377).

II. *Al}adis*

The *Ahadis* were gentlemen troopers, a special class of horsemen, 'Who were generally round the Emperor's person, and owed allegiance to no one else.

Probably a higher standard of efficiency and general worth was set up for an *Ahadi* than for an ordinary horseman in a *mansabdar's* ranks. The pay of an *Ahadi* seems to have varied considerably. It appears from a passage in Budayuni that in the pre reform days of Akbar's reign there were *du-aspa*, *yak-aspa*, and *nim-aspa ahadis*. In the last case two *ahadis* had one horse between them, and shared the salary, which was six rupees !¹ He cites this as an instance of a scandalous state of things.

The *Ā'in* says that many *ahadis* drew more than 500 rupees *per mensem*? We have it in *Tuzuk* (p. 5 : R. & B., 1, 10, top) that Jahangir, on his coronation, raised the salary of the *ahadis* by fifty *per cent*. From a passage in *B.N.*, III (f. 24a) we calculate the salary of an *ahadi* in 1059 A.H. at Rs. 50 *p.m.* Irvine tells us, on the authority of Danish mand Khan, that in 1120 (= 1708) Bahadur Shah 'ordered the enlistment of 4,700 extra *Ahadis* at Rs. 40 a month.'⁸ In view of this Abn'l-Fazl's 500 could at best be the maximum.

The *Ahadi* could muster up to five horses in Akbar's reign ; the maximum at the beginning of Jahinglr's reign, however, was apparently only four (De La&t, pp. 113 and 118) ; though Hawkins places

¹ *MwaatinOu't-Tawariih*,
• *Army*, 44.

II. 191.

• • *A'in*. I. 187.

the limit at six (Purchas, III, 30).

Horn is not far wrong when he describes the *Ahadis* as 'ein besonderes Gardecavallerie-corps' (p. 20). We agree with Irvine, however, that though this is partially true, there was not any formal recognition of them as such (*Army*, 43). The duties of the *Ahadis* were of a more miscellaneous character than those of Emperor's body-guard, properly so called. 'Most clerks of the Imperial offices,' says Blochmann (p. 20, f.n. 1), 'the painters of the court, the foremen in Akbar's workshops, etc., belonged to this corps.' 'Many of them [the *Ahadis*],' he says elsewhere (p. 256), 'were on staff employ in the various offices, store-houses, Imperial workshops; others were employed as adjutants and carriers of important orders.' 'Unter Akbar wurden sie,' says Dr. Horn, 'nur sehr selten in grdsrer Masse im Kriege verwendet, besonders nicht, wenn der Kaiser nicht selbst mit im Felde war, und dienten gewöhnlich einzeln als Feldjager u. dgl.' (p. 20).

Practice in this respect seems, however, to have varied, for we notice that in Shah Jahan's reign *Ahadis* were often sent into the fighting line, where they were well distributed over the different parts of the army. As many as 5,000 *Ahadis* accompanied each one of the three expeditions sent by the Emperor to Kandahar (1649-53 A.C.). The numbers

thus contributed generally Consisted of *Barq-andaz* and *Tir-andaz Ahadis*, half and half.

Irvine speaks of the *Yakka-taz*, which term was possibly used as an equivalent for an *Ahadi*. Again, the body-guard, or defenders of the imperial person, he tells us, were the men called *USala Shahi*, and these he further proceeds to distinguish from *Yasawals* or armed palace guards.

The household troops, he says on the authority of *Siyar*, amounted, towards the end of the eighteenth century, 'to 40,000 men, all cavalry, but usually serving on foot in the citadel and in the palace. They consisted then of several corps besides the *Ahadis*, such as the *Surkhposh* (wearers of red), the *Sufyani* (Royal), the *Wala Shahi* (High Imperial), the *Kamal-posh* (Blanket Wearers) ' (p. 44).

We do not meet with these names in histories of the earlier period. The presumption is that these bodies came into existence in the later Mughul times.

The number of *Ahadis* in Akbar's time is not known. At Jahangir's accession the number was, according to De Last (*Empire of the Great Mogol*, 113), 4,441, and, according to Hawkins (*Purchas*, UI, 30), 5,000.

We know from *B.N.* (II, 715) that the total number of *Ahadis* in Shah Jahan's time, or rather at

the end of the 20th regnal year, was 7,000.

There was a separate establishment for the *Ahadis*, with a *Diwan*, a *Bakhshi*. and the rest. At their head was one of the great *amirs*.

The candidates were presented direct to the Emperor. In case of acceptance the usual procedure of *yad-dasht* and *ta'liqa* was followed, descriptive roll was prepared, and the salary fixed. Then the security was taken; and once more the applicant was presented to the Emperor, who generally increased the salary originally fixed.

The *Ahadis* were mustered every four months.

The *Ahadi* generally found his own horse at the beginning of service; but later, if a substitute became necessary, it was supplied by Government, either free or at a price. Horses of *Ahadis* who were dead¹ were often thus given away to other *Ahadis* who had lost a horse.²

III. *PiQdagan* or 'Infantry'

As a part of the fighting strength of the empire, this arm of the service was insignificant. But it is not really correct to render the word '*Piadagan*- by 'infantry.' It is true that these *Piadagan* included »the force called *Piada tufangchi wa ban-dar*, which

¹ *Raftagan* is the word in text.

• A 'in, text, I, 158 and 187; Blochmann, 170 and 259-60.

often accompanied the rest of the army to the battle field, and also some *Dakhili* troops. But the *Piadagan* included also many other classes of men who had no more to do with fighting than a modern civil servant. Irvine, following the historians of the later Mughul period, translates 'infantry*' by '*Ahsham*'—a word not used in this technical sense in the earlier period. We are following Abu'l-Fazl in retaining the term *Piadagan*.

We give below, in outline, Abu'l-Fazl's classified description of the *Piadagan*, drawing upon other authorities, where available, for illustration and corroboration :

(1) *Bunduqchis* (Matchlock-bearers).

A *bitikchi*, a treasurer, and a *darogha* formed the establishment. The senior *Bunduqchis* (*Sar-guroh*) got a higher pay—from 260 *dams* to 300 *dams p.m.* The salary of the rest ranged from 110 *d.* to 250 *d. p.m.* (*A'in*, text, I, 188). It will be noticed that this pay, ranging between three and seven rupees a month, is miserable. See Bernier's remarks about the quality of this service quoted later.

This is practically the only class which may be described as 'infantry.*'

The total number in Akbar's time was 12,000' (*Ibid.*).

According to *B. N.* (II, 715), Shah Jahan's army

included, at the end of 20th regnal year, 40,000 *tufangchis*, gunners, and *ban-dars*, 10,000 of which were at court, the remaining 30,000 being in the provinces and in fortresses.

A number of this infantry, varying from 9,000 to 10,000, accompanied each of the three expeditions to Kandahar already referred to.

Bernier has the following about the matchlock-men :

‘The foot-soldiers receive the smallest pay ; and, to be sure, the musketeers cut a sorry figure at the best of times, which may be said to be when squatting on the ground, and resting, their muskets on a kind of wooden fork which hangs to them. Even then, they are terribly afraid of burning their eyes or their long beards, and above all lest some *Dgen* [jtnn], or evil spirit, should cause the bursting of their musket. Some have twenty *roupies* a month, some fifteen, some ten ’ (p. 217).

These salaries are much higher than the scale quoted from *Ā'in* above.

Bernier, talking of the infantry, continues : ‘I do not think that in the army immediately about the King, the number can exceed fifteen thousand, including musketeers, foot artillery, and generally, every person connected with that artillery. From this, an estimate may be formed of the number of

infantry in the provinces ' (p. 219).

(2) *Darbans* (Porters).

One thousand of these guarded the palace.

(3) *Khidmatiya*.

One thousand *Khidmatiya* remained alert round the *Daulat-khana*. and awaited orders. The caste to which they belonged was notorious for highway robbery and theft. They were formerly known as *Mawts*.

Jahangir mentions these as *Piadaha-i-khidmatiya* in *Tuzuk*, p. 303 (R. & B., II, 152). Their chief in time of Akbar had the title "Khidmat Rai." In *Tuzuk* Rai Man is mentioned as their head (*Sardar-i-Piadaha-i-khidmatiya*) [Text, p. 205 (R. & B., I, 414), p 268 (R. & B., II, 83), and p. 303 (R. & B., II, 152)].

(4) *Mewras*.

These also numbered one thousand, and came from Mewat. They were fast runners, could fetch and carry across long distances, and were expert at detective work.

According to Khafi Khan (*M.L.*, I, 243) Akbar was the first to introduce a regular service of *Dak Mewras*.

Couriers are thus described by Father Monserate : *Amongst the despatch-runners are certain couriers who in one day can run on foot as far as a

horseman can ride at full speed. They are said to have their livers removed in infancy, in order to prevent their suffering from shortness of breath. They practise running in shoes made of lead, or train themselves by repeatedly lifting their feet and moving their legs (whilst remaining standing still in one place) till their heels touch their buttocks. When their leaden shoes are removed, they are seen to be magnificent runners, by the help of whose swiftness the King can very rapidly and regularly obtain news or send orders on any matter touching the peace of his realm' (Monserrate, 212).

Is Father Monserrate here referring to the *Dak Mewras* we are talking of ?

(5) *Shamsher-baz*.

Bravery and agility were their distinguishing characteristics. They could perform remarkable feats of arms. Different classes of these specialized in certain feats and tricks, and in particular ways of offence and defence.

Their skill and courage, on which Abu'l-Fazl dwells with eloquence, must have made them an acquisition to the fighting line.

Yet the *Shamsher-baz* denotes more a profession than a service ; for we are told that the total number exceeded 100,000, of which a picked 1,000 was always ready for service at court.

The *Sadi* (commander of 100) of these held the rank of an *Ahadi* or a still higher one. The monthly salary of a *shamsher-baz* ranged from 80 to 600 *dams*.

Sword-play continued to be a favourite profession in India down to quite recent times. For quotations from eye-witnesses of exhibitions of single-stick and sword-play in India as late as the first half of the nineteenth century, see Irvine, *Army*, 186.

(6) Wrestlers.

Persian and Turani wrestlers and boxers, Indian athletes, performers of Gujarat known as *mats'* stone-throwers and others constituted this number. Wrestling matches were daily witnessed at court. The pay of a wrestler was between 70 and 450 *dams p.m.*

(7) *Chelas* (Slaves).

These were originally, apparently, prisoners of war, or children rescued from famine—in many cases Hindus converted to Islam.

We are told in *Akbar Nama* that early in XXVII R.Y. Akbar set free many thousands of slaves. They remained, however, in royal service, and were

¹ *Mai* is 'a professional wrestler or boxer (the offspring of an outcast Kshatriya by a Kshatriya woman), a pancratiast ; prize-fighter ; an athlete ; a gymnast ; a tumbler ; an acrobat ' (Platts, 1061)

henceforth called *Chelas*)

The *Chelas* were divided into sections, subjected to a systematic training at court, and finally brought up to a career of useful service. Many from each section were promoted to other ranks of the army, and some even attained to an amirate.

The pay of a *Chela* ran from a *dam* to a rupee *per diem*.

Is Manucci referring to these *Chelas* when he says? 'It is the habit of these kings to have usually in their service, seven thousand slaves of different nations, and some among them are established as chiefs to govern and guide the rest. The king gives them names, and in my time these chief slaves were called as follows.' After a list of names he continues: 'These are the names of the king's principal slaves. They are all gentlemen troopers, and have good pay. Set over all the slaves are two captains, and the horsemen are three thousand in number, the foot or infantry four thousand. They have various employments, both within the household and in other duties connected with it. They are resorted to when some *coup* has been decided on; it is they who write about it, and execute the royal commands. In addition, they are used as spies to report what is going on, as well among the nobles as

the common people' (*Storia*, II, 357-58).

Monserrate has the following: 'Zelaldinus [Jalalu'd-Dln, i.e., Akbar] maintains, and gives a liberal education to, many noble boys and youths who have lost their fathers; and in this he might well be imitated by other princes' (*Commentary*, 207).

It appears that the *Chelas* were entertained not only by the emperor but also by the princes and the nobles. *Among the slaves of the princes are some who are gentlemen soldiers and hold good positions. Some are purchased, others offer themselves to serve in that station' (*Storia*, II, 412). 'As a counterpoise to the mercenaries in their employ,' says Irvine, 'over whom they had a very loose hold, commanders were in the habit of getting together, as the kernel of their force, a body of personal dependents or slaves, who had no one to look to except their master. Such troops were known by the Hindi name of *chela* (a slave). They were fed, clothed, and lodged by their employer, had mostly been brought up and trained by him, and had no other home than his camp. They were recruited chiefly from children taken in war or bought from their parents during times of famine. The great majority were of Hindu origin, but all were made Mahomedans when received into the body of *chelas*.

These *chelas* were the only troops on which a man could place entire reliance as being ready to follow his fortunes in both foul and fair weather' (*Army, U*).

The reader who is interested in the subject is referred to a useful collection of notes by Sir R. C. Temple (*Indian Antiquary*, XXV, pp. 199-204 and 228-31) on the various senses in which the word *chela* and its variants have been used, by Hindus and Muslims respectively, during the last four centuries.

(8) *Kak&rs* (Litter-bearers).

These bore the *palkl*, the *sukhasan*? the *chaudol* and the *doll*. Their special skill lay in the fact that they carried their heavy burden up hill and down dale with the utmost comfort to the rider.

The best *Kahars* came from the Deccan and from Bengal.—Several thousand *Kahars* were always at court.

Pay of a head *Kah'ar*: 192 *d.* to 384 *d.* Pay of an ordinary *Kahar* : 120 *d.* to 160 *d.*

¹ Blochmann (p. 264) has wrongly *singhasan*, which is a kind of throne. In another place AbU'l-Fazl, after spelling out the word with elaborate clearness, says that a *sukhdsan* is 'a crescent-shaped litter covered with camlet or scarlet cloth and the like, the two sides of which have fastenings of various metals and a pole supporting it is attached by means of iron hooks. It is conveniently adapted for sitting in, lying at full length or sleeping during travel. As a protection against sun and rain they provide a commodious covering which is removable at pleasure' (A'in, I, 389; tr. > II, 122). See also Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, 522.

(9) *Dakhili* foot-soldiers.

A number of these, though paid by the state, were handed over to the *umara*. Though really infantry, they were classed as *nima-suwaran* (half cavalry), and their descriptive rolls kept.

One-quarter of the number were matchlock-bearers, and, the rest mainly bow-men—the odd proportion being made up by such miscellany as carpenters, blacksmiths, water-carriers, and pioneers'—useful camp-followers.

A non-commissioned officer (*sar-guroh*) of the matchlock-men drew 160 *d.*, and the common matchlock-men only 140 *d.* The *mir-dahas* of the archers got from 120 to 180 *dams*, and the common archers from 100 to 120.

Irvine tells us (*Army*, 160) that these *dakhili* troops 'are not heard of from Aurangzeb's reign on.

IV. Artillery

Artillery was not an important branch of the army prior to Aurangzeb's time.

Humayun's artillery at the battle of Kanauj (1540 A.C.) is thus described :—

*Among the equipments which were in the train

¹ The duty of these *beldars* was to sink wells for the royal camp and to dig trenches, etc. In hilly tracts the *beldars* were sent in advance of the rest of the army to make the way.

of the Emperor were 700 carriages (*gardun*), each drawn by four pairs of bullocks, and carrying a swivel (*zarb-zan*), which discharged a ball (*kalola*) of 500 *mithkdls* weight. I, myself, saw several times that from the top of an eminence they unfailingly (*bi-khata*) struck horsemen who slightly and unsuspectingly exposed themselves. And there were twenty-one carriages, each drawn by eight¹ pairs of bullocks. Stone balls were of no use in these, but the shots were of molten brass weighing 5,000 *mithkdls*, and the cost of each was 200 *mithkdls* of silver. They would strike anything that was visible at the distance of a *parasang'* (*Tarikh-i-Rashidi* of Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, E. D. Ross and N. Elias, London, 1895, p. 474).

In Akbar's time this arm of the service was so unimportant that Abn'l-Fazl has not much to say about it in the *A'in*. The scholar-minister talks rather grandiloquently of large pieces of ordnance, which took several elephants and thousands of bullocks to transport, and the balls of which weighed twelve maunds; and speaks thus of certain inventions of Akbar: 'He made a gun which, on marches, can easily be taken to pieces, and properly put together again when required. By another invention, His Majesty joins seventeen guns in such a manner as to

¹ Irvine reads 60 for 8.

be able to fire them simultaneously with one match.¹ Again, he made another kind of gun, which can easily be carried by a single elephant; such guns have the name *Gajnals*. Guns which a single man may carry are called *Narnals* ' ² (Text, I, 124; Blochmann, 119). 'His Majesty has made special guns,' continues the author, 'for the siege of fortresses and for naval engagements; while those fit for the imperial camp accompany the Emperor' ³ (Text, I, 125).

The personnel of the artillery is briefly disposed of thus: 'Amirs and Ahadis are on staff employ in this branch. The pay of the foot varies from 100 to 400 d.' (Text, 125; Blochmann, 119).

It strikes one as strange, however, that the artillery and its personnel, which obviously formed part of the army, finds no place in Book II of the *A'in*, which deals with the Army. The artillery and some matchlock-men are included in Book I, while such unmilitary classes as porters, valets (footmen), runners, gladiators, wrestlers, slaves and litter-

¹ Apparently a precursor of the *Arghan* or *Arghun* * which is composed of about 36 gun barrels so joined as to fire at once' (Irvine, *Army*, 138), cognate with the *mitrailleuse* (Horn, 30).

¹ Dr. Horn is presumably quite right in holding that the *Narnals* * waren wohl keine Kanonen sondern nur eine Art schwerer Musketen' (p. 28).

• For this sentence I am preferring my own translation to Blochmann's, which seems to me inaccurate.

bearers, who never served in, or even behind, the fighting-line, are grouped together under *Piadagan* in Book II.

Irvine's explanation (*Army*, 155 and 160-1) that all officers and men borne on the books of the imperial household are included in Book I, while Book II comprises only the part of the army which was not paid direct from the imperial treasury, but through the intervention of the *mansabdar*, is insufficient; since *Ahadls* and all the *Piadagan* were paid direct by the Emperor and yet figure in Book II. On Irvine's hypothesis only *mansabdars* and their followers should be in Book II, while *Ahadls*, artillery and *Piadagan* should all be included in Book I.¹

Irvine's position that 'the artillery was much more perfect and numerous in 'Alamgir's reign, than it was under his great-grandfather, Akbar' (p. 116), is unassailable. There is no doubt that the development of artillery in the Mughul army, which began in Aurangzeb's reign, was due in the main to contact with the European armies and the service of Portuguese gunners.

In Jahangir's reign, we are told,² Patr Das was

¹ It has been suggested to me as a possible explanation that artillery was not yet recognized as a separate arm.

² *Tuzuk*, 9-10. R. & B.'s translation (1, 22-23) is defective, and Blochmann's (p. 524) no better.

appointed *Mir Atash* (Master of Ordnance), and ordered to have in the Artillery of the Stirrup always ready 3,000 pieces of ordnance, with 50,000 gunners—a large number, one would think, for the Stirrup Artillery, but not impossible, since it seems to have been a special measure, and for the maintenance of it, as Shah Nawaz Khan tells us (*M.U.*, II, 140), the revenue of 15 *parganas* was assigned.

The number of guns with which Humayun and Jahangir are credited would suggest that the Mughul artillery was in a high state of efficiency, and furnished a formidable weapon. This, however, was not the case. 'Of this arm of the service,' says Irvine, 'it is doubtful whether the Moghuls knew much before they descended into the plains of India under Babar. What they did know was probably borrowed from the Turks and from Constantinople. Nor could the art and science of gunnery have been very advanced in India itself, when the Moghuls arrived in that country in the first half of the 16th century. In the earlier Moghul period, at any rate, the emperors were dependent for their artillery on the help and instruction of Rumis, that is, Mahomedans from Constantinople, or of Farangis, principally run-away sailors from Surat, or Portuguese half-castes' (*Army*, 152).

Considerable bodies of the Portuguese continued

to be enlisted up to the middle of the eighteenth century.

Dr. Horn thus in similar strain : ‘ Das Artilleriewesen (*Tupchane*), war unter Baber durchaus nach turkischem Muster eingerichtet, wie denn die Turken hierin im muhammedanischen Orient überhaupt die Lehrmeister gewesen sind Noch unter Akbar ward das Geschutzwesen mit Vorliebe Turken anvertraut, bis an deren Stelle dann allmahlich Europaer traten ’ (p. 29).

The artillerymen, says Bernier, ‘ receive great pay, particularly all the *Franguis* or Christians,—*Portuguese, English, Dutch, Germans, and French*; fugitives from *Goa*, and from the *Dutch and English* companies. Formerly, when the *Mogols* were little skilled in the management of artillery, the pay of the *Europeans* was more liberal, and there are still spine remaining who receive two hundred *roupies* a month : but now the King admits them with difficulty into the service, and limits their pay to thirty-two *roupies* ’ (p. 217).

AbU’l-Fazl speaks respectfully of Turkey’s artillery¹; and we hear a great deal of Portuguese and other European gunners in state employ throughout Mughul history.

¹ A’in, I, 124 ; Bluchmann, 119.

The artillery consisted of the 'heavy' and the 'light'.

The heavy artillery, early in Aurangzeb's reign, consisted, according to Bernier, of 'seventy pieces of cannon, mostly of brass' (p. 217). Under heavy artillery were also included 'from two to three hundred light camels, each of which carried a small field-piece of the size of a double musket, attached on the back of the animal, much in the same manner as swivels are fixed in our barks' (pp. 217-18). These were *Shutarnals*. So 'heavy artillery' was only a technical term, and was not confined to the larger pieces.

'The Moghuls,' says Irvine, 'were very fond of large ordnance, but such pieces were really more for show than use; and as Fitzclarence truly says, 243, the oriental idea seems to have been "to render this destructive engine from its size more powerful than those of the Western world." In this direction they proceeded even to extravagant lengths. These huge guns made more noise than they did harm; they could not be fired many times in a day, and were very liable to burst and destroy the men in charge' (*Army*, 118).

The large pieces had often high-sounding, mouth-filling names, and usually bore on them inscriptions, giving the name of the founder and place and date

of manufacture. See the long list of names of the principal cannon at Mughul court in Aurangzeb's time in *Storia* (II, 365-66). For an inscription on the gun, *Jahankusha*, made at Dacca in the reign of Shah Jahap, see 'Translation of an Inscription on a Gun at Moorshedabad with Remarks,' by Major St. G. D. Showers in *J.A.S.B.*, XVI, 589-92.

Field-pieces were, generally speaking, heavier than fort- and siege-guns.

The Light Artillery, otherwise called *Topkhana-i-rikab* or Artillery of the Stirrup, is thus described by Bernier : 'The artillery of the stirrup, which also accompanied the *Mogol* in the journey to *Lahor* and *Kachemire*, appeared to me extremely well appointed. It consisted of fifty or sixty small field-pieces, all of brass; each piece mounted on a well-made and handsomely painted carriage, containing two ammunition chests, one behind and another in front, and ornamented with a variety of small red streamers. The carriage, with the driver, was drawn by two fine horses, and attended by a third horse, led by an assistant driver as a relay. The heavy artillery did not always follow the King, who was in the habit of diverging from the highroad, in search of hunting ground, or for the purpose of keeping near the rivers and other waters. It could not move along difficult passes, or cross the bridges of boats thrown

over the rivers. But the light artillery is always intended to be near the King's person and on that account takes the name of Artillery of the Stirrup. When he resumes his journey in the morning, and is disposed to shoot or hunt in game preserves, the avenues to which are guarded, it moves straight forward, and reaches with all possible speed the next place of encampment, where the royal tents and those of the principal *Omrahs* have been pitched since the preceding day. The guns are then ranged in front of the King's quarters, and by way of signal to the army, fire a volley the moment he arrives' (p. 218).

What has happened, one might ask, to the 3,000 pieces of light ordnance, which Patr Das had placed on a permanent footing in obedience to Jahangir's orders early in his reign? Was the number cut down later?

We have already noted that all the pieces included under 'heavy' artillery were not heavy. Irvine's remark, therefore, that the Artillery of the Stirrup was rather a subdivision of the light artillery than identical with it (*Army*, 133) is fully justified.

The artillery was one of the imperial workshops, and, as the workshops formed part of the imperial household (which was controlled by the *Khansaman*), the head of the artillery, *i.e.*, the *Darogha-i-*

*7*opkhana* or *Mir Ātash*, was under the *Khdnsamdn*. It is to be noted, however, that this applied only to the manufacturing department and the magazine or ordnance department. In case of the field artillery in actual use and of guns in use in fortresses the *Mir Atash* held independent charge (*Army*, 113). Again, 'all reserve artillery and stores were kept in certain great fortresses, such as Agrah, Dihli and Labor, in the charge of the special commandant (*qila'hdar*), who was an officer appointed direct from court and in no way connected with or subordinate to the provincial governor (*nazim* or *subahdar*)' (*Ibid.*, 156-7).

V. *War Elephants*

It will not be out of place if we say something here about what may be called the Elephant arm.

The elephant was a distinguishing feature of the Mughul Indian army, and was used for several purposes in field and siege warfare. Nor was the practice confined to the Mughuls, for we find it current from ancient times, throughout the Hindu and Muslim periods.

In' war the elephant was used in various ways. In the battle line he took part in offence and defence. Thus Monserrate: 'The Indians train elephants to fight. There are indeed extraordinary numbers of elephants in the royal camps and cities. They

are taught to carry baggage as well as to fight, though the baggage is mainly carried by the females. Most of the males are trained for battle and are furnished with defensive armour, which they also use for offensive purposes, though indeed they are quite as dangerous without this armour. For they catch up the enemy's soldiers with their trunks, dash them down under their feet, and trample upon them. They do not cease from crushing their wretched victims till they are ground and smashed to pieces. Others they toss up into mid-air, so that they are killed by the fall; others they split in twain by placing a foot on one of their victim's legs, seizing the other leg with their trunk and tearing it forcibly upwards. The males go so violently mad for about three months of every year that sometimes they kill even their keepers; they are most useful for fighting during this period. When the time of madness is past, if they have to be enraged again on account of an impending battle, this is effected by giving them cat's flesh to eat mixed with their other food Some are trained to carry guns on their backs. When the black powder is ignited and the gun is discharged with a thunderous roar, the elephant does not become in the slightest terrified or unmanageable.'¹

■ <*. ^x *Commentary*, 84-85.

But the use of elephants in the fighting line involved serious disadvantages and risks. Just as an advancing line of elephants belonging to a victorious army could trample upon the retreating foe and work havoc, similarly the elephants of a defeated army would often turn round and, in a headlong, disorderly flight, crush their own soldiery. This contingency was foreseen, and partly provided against, by placing the elephants at the back.¹

Generals and commanders were often mounted on elephants in the battle field by way of distinction. On the back of an elephant they could be easily seen by the rank and file; their presence inspired confidence, and was a source of strength to the troops, who fought more often for persons than for causes.

As we have seen in the last section,² guns called *gajnals* were mounted on elephants. Irvine cites a case from late Mughul history where each *gajnal* elephant carried two soldiers and two pieces.³

Elephants were used in peace and war for displaying standards and ensigns—in marches and processions, and on the battle field.

Behind the fighting line the elephant was used

¹ See the passage quoted from Monserrate's *Commentary* on p. 225 below.

• P. 214 above.

³ *Army*, 175.

for purposes of transport, and especially for hauling heavy pieces of ordnance. We often find treasure and women loaded on elephants, kept behind the army under escort for safety.

Where the wives, daughters, and concubines accompany a prince in battle, they 'travel generally in the rear of the army, riding on the greatest elephants, which are followed by others bearing the gold coin and precious stones that these princes carry also with them, to be made use of in case of disgrace or misfortune' (*Storia*, II, 390).

'Elephants were also used to batter in the gates of fortified places. It is for this reason that such gates are generally found protected by metal plates and spikes. To counteract these, the elephant was again, in its turn, provided with a frontlet of steel.'¹

SECT II: ORDER OF BATTLE

This subject as well as the cognate one, Conduct of a Battle, has been treated of at sufficient length by Irvine, who follows up the account with the details of certain actual battles.² It will serve no useful purpose to repeat what has been well done already. The reader who is interested in the subject will find much useful information and graphic detail in *Army*, Chapters XX-XXII.

¹ *Army*, 177.

³ *Army*, 223-59.

A quotation or two from Monserrate's *Commentary* may be given as a supplement to Irvine's elaborate account :

‘The Mongol [*i.e.*, Mughul Indian] armies are arrayed for battle as follows :—The squadrons of cavalry are drawn up in the form of a half moon and are arranged in three divisions, one on the left wing, one in the centre, and one on the right. Behind the cavalry is the infantry, and behind the infantry the elephants, which are never allowed in advance of the other troops, both in order to prevent their catching sight of the enemy, and to obviate the danger of their being wounded and flying in panic : for in this case they madly attack their own troops, throwing them into confusion, and crushing many to death. On advancing to the attack Mongol generals extend one or both wings in the endeavour to outflank and encircle the enemy. The elephants terrify rather than harm the enemy : and are more useful as a spectacle than as a real agency of victory. When hurt they attack any one who comes in their path, without distinction between friend and enemy. They are easily driven off by means of fire-arms, and retreat headlong if stabbed in the trunk. If horses have been accustomed to elephants they pay no attention to them. There is a camel-corps of Balochii among the King's cavalry. If there are enough of them to form

a compact body, they are grouped closely together in some special part of the battle-line. Camels are as nimble and skilful in a battle, if I may say so, as horses. Nor are they less fierce. They fight with teeth and feet. If they catch hold of any one, they kneel upon him so hard and long, pounding and crushing him, that their wretched victim is destroyed.’¹

Again, in another place he says, ‘the Mongols never fight a pitched battle with the whole of their forces. If they invite battle with six thousand troops, they are sure to have twenty thousand hiding in ambush; and in the rear of these again several thousands more are held in reserve, that they may support the advance-guard in case of a reverse, or rally them, if routed. Such reserves often turn defeat into sudden victory by checking the pursuit, by restoring the fight through their freshness and unimpaired vigour, and by compelling the weary enemy to retire.’³

SECT. III : ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMY

Having surveyed the various departments constituting the Mughul army, we naturally feel inclined to ask what was the total strength of the military organization. The question has been examined by

> *Commentary*, 139-40.

• *Ibid.*, 125.

various writers such as Blochmann (pp. 254-58 and pp. 596-606), Paul Horn (pp. 39-45), and Irvine (*Army*, pp. 59-61).

Blochmann's conclusions about Akbar's army (pp. 256 and 258), on which both Horn and Irvine rely, are vitiated by certain fundamental misapprehensions, and seem arbitrary.

As we have said before,¹ neither Blochmann nor later writers seem to have noticed that the *Ā'in* list refers only to the *sat* rank, and is therefore utterly useless for any calculation of the strength of the army; and the same remark applies to the list in the *fabaqat*.

De Last's list, although it stands on a different footing, is equally useless for the same reason, and Hawkins' figures are, besides, both fragmentary and unsatisfactory.

Since we have not sufficient data to arrive at even tolerably satisfactory results regarding the reign of Akbar or of Jahangir, we propose to concentrate our attention on an estimate of the army during Shah Jahan's reign.

Mulls 'Abdu'l-Hamld Lahori, surveying the Imperial army at the end of the twentieth regnal year, informs us with business-like succinctness and precision so usual with him, that the army (excluding

^x Pp. 5-6 above.

the numbers appointed with *faujdar*s, *karorls* and *'amil*s to administer the *parganas*) amounts, under the one-fourth rule, to 200,000 horse, which comprise 8,000 *Mansabdars*, 7,000 *Ahadis* and *Barq-andaz* horsemen, 1,85,000 horsemen (followers of Princes, *Umara* and *Mansabdars*), and 40,000 infantry (*tufangchi*, *top-andaz*, *gola-andaz*, and *ban-dar*), out of which 10,000 were at court, and the rest are in the provinces and in forts (*B.N.*, II, 715).

The carefully-prepared list of the *Mansabdars* at the end of twentieth regnal year given on pp. 717-52 of *B.N.*, II, practically constitutes the Army List of the empire for that date, and is an invaluable document. This list includes names of all officers of the rank of 500 and above, whether dead or alive at the time of its preparation, showing in each case whether the officer is alive. The list, as usual, is arranged in the order of the *sat* rank; but the *suwar* rank is carefully given in all cases where that rank is enjoyed.

From such a list it is possible to construct the total strength of the cavalry; while it enables us to check the totals of the war effective given by 'Abdu'l-Hamld Lahorl himself in the passage quoted above.

For the purpose of estimating the cavalry we ignore the *sat* rank, and add up the *suwar* ranks of all the officers living at the time, excluding for the moment the *du aspa si aspa suwar* rank. We find

that the total of *yak aspa* horse rank amounts to 3,70,825.—Next we take the *du aspa si aspa* figures. These total 76,000. As we know, this figure has to be doubled ; so that it means 1,52,000 'horse.'

The sum total of the *yak aspa* and *du aspa si aspa* ranks, therefore, is $3,70,825 + 1,52,000 = 5,22,825$ 'horse.' The reader knows well that this figure does not represent the number of cavalry actually entertained, but only the sum total of the horse rank. The actual number can be obtained by the one-third, one-fourth and one-fifth rule. The one-fifth rule was probably a concessionary measure ; while the one-third rule applied to a small number. Calculating by the one-fourth rule, therefore, we arrive at 1,30,706 as the number of horsemen. Making allowance for the few who held appointments in the provinces where their *jagirs* lay, and who were governed by the one-third rule, 1,35,000 would be a safe figure for the total cavalry.

We should not forget that this is the total following of the *mansabdars* of 500 and above only. Counting up the names of those reported as alive in the list, we find that this following belonged to 445 officers. 'Abdu'l-Hamld Lahorl has already informed us that the total number of *mansabdars* was 8,000, while their total *tabins* numbered 1,85,000. We know, therefore, that the *mansabdars* under the rank

of 500 totalled 7,555, and their following approximately 50,000.

The results can now also be stated in a tabular form :—

STATEMENT SHOWING TOTAL STRENGTH OF MANSABD&RS
AND THEIR FOLLOWERS AT END OF XX R.Y. OF
SHAH JAHAN.

<i>Zat</i> rank	Total number of <i>Mansabd&rs</i> (including Princes)	Total rank			Actual number of horsemen entertained
		<i>Yak aspa</i>	<i>Du aspa si aspa</i>	Total with <i>du aspa si aspa</i> rank doubled	
500 and above	445	3,70,825	76,000	5.22,825	1,35,000 (approximately)
Below 500	7.555	50,000 (approximately)
Total	8,000	1.85,000

We find that the total figures quoted from *B.N.* above fit in beautifully with the deductions from the *Mansabdari* list. * WAB SALA ? JUNG PAHADUR

These results, again, are on all fours with the following statement in Bernier : *Leaving out of our present calculation the infantry, which is of small amount, and the number of horses, which is merely

nominal, and is apt to deceive a superficial observer, I should think, with many persons well conversant with this matter, that the effective cavalry, commonly about the King's person, including that of the *Rajas* and *Patans*, amount to thirty-five or forty thousand ; which, added to those in the provinces, forms a total of more than two hundred' thousand horse' (219).

Again, talking of infantry, the author continues : 'I do not think that in the army immediately about the King, the number can exceed fifteen thousand, including musketeers, foot artillery, and generally, every person connected with that artillery. From this, an estimate may be formed of the number of infantry in the provinces. I cannot account for the prodigious amount of infantry with which some people swell the armies of the *Great Mogol*, other wise than by supposing that with the fighting men, they confound servants, sutlers, tradesmen, and all those individuals belonging to *bazars*, or markets, who accompany the troops. Including these followers, I can well conceive that the army immediately about the King's person, particularly when it is known that he intends to absent himself for some time from his capital, may amount to two, or even three hundred thousand infantry. This will not be deemed an extravagant computation, if we bear in mind the

immense quantity of tents, kitchens, baggage, furniture, and even women, usually attendant on the army. For the conveyance of all these are again required many elephants, camels, oxen, horses, and porters' (219-20).

Another way of forming an idea of the military strength of an empire is to take measure of an effort put forth by it on an occasion sufficiently important to be considered typical. We can take Shah Jahan's reign, as it was the period of the greatest prosperity and power. Luckily figures for several expeditions are available :

In 1630 (= 1039) Shah Jahan led an expedition in person to the Deccan. Mandelslo says, the whole army numbered 1,44,500 horse, including 15,000 *ahadis* and *barq-andaz*, and gives a long list of *mansabdars* with their respective contingents, which constituted that number.¹ On the other hand 'Abdu'l-Hamld tells us that this force consisted of three armies commanded by Iradat Khan, Raja Gaj Singh and Sha'ista Khan, numbering respectively 20,000, 15,000 and 15,000—total, 50,000, including *ahadis* and *barq-andaz*.³ The names of the generals are correctly given by Mandelslo too ; but he mentions a fourth army under the direct command of the Emperor, which 'Abdu'l-Idamld ignores, presumably

¹ Mandelslo, 39.

* *B.N.*, I, i, 294-95.

because it took no part in the fighting, and remained at Burhanpur all the time. Mandelslo's figures for the three armies are far in excess of those given in *B.N.* In spite of the former's elaborate show of detail it will not be safe to accept his estimate in view of the definite statement in *B.N.* and the serious disparity between the two.

In the last decade three well-equipped expeditions were sent to Kandahar. In the following table we give the details of the army (cavalry, infantry and artillery) and its equipment sent for the purpose of laying siege to that stronghold.

ARMY AND EQUIPMENT SENT TO BESIEGE

Period	MansabdUrs and their followers	Ahadis	Tufangchis, Ban-dars and gunners
First expedition (1059 A.H.—1649 A.C.)	50,000 cavalry	5,000 (<i>Tir-andaz</i> and <i>Barq-andaz</i>) ¹	10,000
Second expedition (1062 a.H.=1652 A.C.)	56,000 "	7,000 (<i>Tir-andaz</i> , 4,000 ; <i>Barq-andaz</i> , 3,000)	10,000
Third expedition (1063 A.H.=1653 A.C.)	57,000 "	5,000 (<i>Tir-andaz</i> , 2,500 ; <i>Barq-andaz</i> , 2,500)	10,000

¹ According to B.N., the *Ahadis* are included in the 50,000 cavalry.

* A kind of ordnance apparently mounted on a tree or other eminence,

KANDAHAR (1059-1063 A.H.=1649-1653 A.C.)

Artillery	i Transport	Authorities
...	...	BJV., III, 236-24a; A.S., III, 71; <i>Mulakjikas</i> (my MS.), Book III, 186.
8 big siege guns. 20 smaller ordnance (which took balls weighing 2 or 2½ seers). 20 <i>hathndls.</i> 100 <i>shutarnals.</i>	3,000 camels. } 500 carrying treasure 500 carrying arms 2,000 carrying ammunition.	B.N., III, 616-64a; A.S., III, 139 and 141.
7 big siege guns, some of which took balls of 2 maunds : (1) 'Kishwar-kusha' (ball : 1 m. 8 s. Akbari). (2) 'Gajrh-bhajan' (ball: 1 m. 8 s. A kbari). (3) A big gun (ball : 1 m. 16s. Akbari).—rThese three cast by Dara Shukoh's orders. (4) ⁴ Qal- ⁴ a-kusha. (5) ⁴ Maryam ⁴ —and two others sent from court.	3,000 camels for loading treasure, ammunition and arms.	B.N., III, 73a-i; A.S., III, 157-58; <i>Mulakh-khas</i> (my MS.) Book III, 65a-6.
7 <i>top-i-hawai</i> * made to Dara Shukoh's order. 30 smaller ordnance. 25 <i>gajndls.</i> 100 <i>shutarndls.</i> 3,000 cannon-balls (large and small). 5,000 maunds of gun-powder. } 1,500 maunds of lead (imperial measure). } I prepared by Dara Shukoh.		
14,000 <i>bdns.</i> In addition to these the artillery which had been used at Kandahar in the second siege had remained at Kabul. At least five of those big guns joined the 'besieging army at Kandahar, reaching there under GJairat Khan. Total number of cannon-balls discharged during the sieges 27,000.		z

and then fired. See *M.L.*, 11, 226.

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SOME SELECTED OPINIONS

Dr. Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, *Late High Commissioner for India in South Africa*

My attention to Mr. Abdul Aziz's work was drawn by his excellent articles in the Journal of Indian History, Madras, in, I think, 1932 or 1933. I followed these articles with the greatest interest, as they dealt with an exceedingly difficult period in a style of striking lucidity and scientific precision. They contained none of the vague, obscure and inaccurate theories and facts which has sometimes impelled me to ask the author, why do you mumble? I am glad to find that Mr. Abdul Aziz has collected together these articles and intends to publish them in a book form. I think it is a wise decision, and will be welcomed by all students of Mughul India.

Mr. Abdul Aziz's monograph on "The Imperial Treasury of the Greater Mughuls" is a work of solid research, sound judgment and great industry, and he has laid all students of the period under a deep debt of gratitude by his researches. Only those who have been through the novitiate of a trained historical scholar can appreciate the wealth and variety of the material he has collected together. His introductory chapter on the Imperial Household is excellent, and he has discussed the material with discrimination and tact. It does not pretend to be an exhaustive account, and he had perforce to content himself with the chief offices and departments...

Mr. Aziz then discusses the sources of revenue in the time of/greater Mughuls and calculates their value, with his customary caution, detachment and precision.

The other articles deal with precious stones, and discuss the nature and quality of various kinds of stones, and trace the history of the Koh-i-Nur diamond...The section on Rubies is excellent while other sections that will appeal to readers are those on Ivory and Ivory Work in India.....The chapter headed Actual Contents of Jewel Treasury from the invasion of Babur to that of Nadir Shah is a work of rare power, and should be read by all.....

This brief analysis of a brilliant work will show at a glance how solid is Mr. Abdul Aziz's contribution to the knowledge of the Mughul India. Mr. Abdul Aziz's account of the Thrones, Chairs and Seats of the Great Mughuls makes fascinating reading, and there is a very fine account of the Peacock Throne.....

Mr. Abdul Aziz has also published articles on the Mansabdarl System and the Mughul Army. In these articles Mr. Aziz deals with a subject which has been the focus of acute controversy, and discusses the theories of Dr. Paul Horn, Blochmann, and others on the nature and origin of Mansabdarl.

The subject bristles with difficulties, and no writer can claim infallibility. I am, however, inclined to agree with the author that Dr. Paul Horn's whole account of the Mansabdarl System suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding. The author's explanation of the significance of Zat and Sawar ranks is plausible, as it represents a very dispassionate and thorough analysis of the works of previous writers on the subject. The reader will find Mr. Abdul Aziz's account of Mughul aristocracy as a social phenomenon interesting." *

In conclusion, I may add that few works published during the last twenty years have dealt so thoroughly and ably with an extremely important aspect of Mughul administration. Mr. Abdul Aziz's work is a pioneer undertaking and he has brought to his task all the qualities which are indispensable in a historian—sound judgment, care and caution in the handling of material, thorough study of the data and a lucid style. I am sure that the work will be welcomed by all students of this period with enthusiasm.

J. F. Brace, Esq., *University Professor of History, Punjab University, Lahore.*

I have been rather closely aware, during the past eight years, of the studies of Mr. Abdul Aziz in Mughul history; and have read the published results with much interest. He is well equipped for the enquiries to which he has devoted himself for a good many years past, as he possesses not only an exact knowledge of Persian, but also a very wide and critical knowledge of the original contemporary sources from which alone a genuine understanding of that period can be derived. He has also a command of the language of French and German scholars of the subject.

Mr. Abdul Aziz is a very meticulous student, who insists upon a precise examination of the *minutiae* of his subject, which gives his reader confidence in the originality and authenticity of his work. If he can give us a reflective summary of the result of his years of patient scholarship, he will make a valuable contribution to Indian history. He has, too, a clear and pleasant English style.

K. B. M. Afzal Husain, *Vice-Chancellor, Punjab University.*

Mr. Abdul Aziz has sent me for opinion reprints of his

articles on various subjects connected with the history of the Mughul period. I have read these entertaining articles with great interest. Scientific precision regarding the authenticity of facts is the characteristic of these valuable contributions. The style is lucid and elegant. I have been struck by the extensive amount of labour which this study must have entailed and the thorough mastery of the subject which the author possesses.

So far history has been dealt with as the story of kings. Mr. Abdul Aziz has rendered valuable service to our country in dealing with the history of the people of the Mughul period. A king may be good or he may be bad, and to base the entire conception of the evolution of society on the personality of the king cannot historically yield important results. The common people are the real material of which history is built, and I congratulate Mr. Abdul Aziz that he has constructed his history from such material.

Dewan Bahadur Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, Editor,
" Journal of Indian History" Madras.*

Mr. Abdul Aziz, Bar.-at-Law, Batala, Punjab, began rather a large scale history of perhaps the most brilliant period of the Mughul Empire in India, the empire under Shah Jahan. He contributed a series of articles as a preliminary to his work on the MansabdSri System of the Mughuls, and the Treasury and the Jewels of the Mughuls. In both of these subjects, he made a most thorough-going study of the topics he chose for treatment. Had he had the chance of completing the work without interruption, he should have succeeded in publishing a magnificent work on the Mughul EmpireI may say that Mr. Abdul Aziz's work as a **student of history deserves all commendation. I only hope**

that he will have, for this part of the work, such an encouraging reception as would stimulate him to go forward and complete the work, notwithstanding all the inconveniences, which his professional work as well as the other calls upon his time might interpose. I wish him all success in his enterprise.

The Hon'ble. Sir Azizul Huque, Commerce Member, Government of India.

I have gone through the reprints of your articles on the "Imperial Treasury and the Mughul Army" and I congratulate you on your careful collection of materials available in scattered works- I wish there were similar studies on the Mughul administration in India by other research workers.

S. H. Hodivala, Esq., Principal and Professor of History (.retired), Bahauddin College, Junagadh, author of "Historical Studies in Mughul Numismatics," "Studies in Indo-Muslim History."

I am very greatly obliged to you for letting me see an advance copy of the Table of Contents of the Series of Monographs which you have projected on the Court and Institutions of the Indian Mughuls. Your plan is an ambitious one and may take some years to complete, but it is a task well worth performing, and I devoutly hope that you will be able to complete it and get the extra treatises published, as you hope to do, during the next three years. To judge from the (wo dissertations which have been already printed, it is sure to be of great value for the intensive study of the subject. No one who has read those Essays on the Mansabdarl System and the Imperial Treasury can fail to be most favourably impressed by your patient industry, wide know-

ledge of the original authorities, meticulous zeal and avidity for facts and the judgment and good sense you have brought to bear on the interpretation of the crabbed and frequently cryptic phraseology of the contemporary chroniclers. This is specially true of the disquisition on the Mansabdari System—a subject which has been greatly perplexed by the guesses and theories of previous writers. It is possible that we shall never be able to understand it completely, but your elucidations of some of the obscure and controversial points may be justly described as honest and intelligent attempts to arrive at the truth and they deserve to be carefully considered by all earnest students of the subject.

Muhammad Shafi, Esq., *Principal, University Oriental College, Lahore.*

For many years Prof. Abdul Aziz has been devoting himself almost entirely to a critical study of the problems connected with the history of Mughul India. His extensive reading of the original authorities of the first rank, with a judicious use of contemporary paintings and other illustrative materials has enabled him to give us a vivid and life like picture of the Mughul times. His abundant sympathy with his subject, controlled by his critical capacity, has given his narrative the rare quality which is found only in the very best histories of the period. Students of the period will thank him for his deep researches into the period.

The late Mr. W.H. Moreland *of the I.C.S., author of "Jahangir's India," "Agrarian System of Moslem India," etc.*

It gave me great satisfaction to see that you had changed from the conventional style, which merely produces more "chronicles", and were trying to make history out of the

chronicles and the other material available.....With all good wishes for the success of your work (Letter dated 31st January,1933).

It is always pleasant to hear from anyone who is trying to find facts in Indian history, where so many people are content to make guesses (Letter dated 4th April, 1933).

MORE RECENT REVIEWS

ON

“ THE IMPERIAL TREASURY OF THE INDIAN MUGHULS ”

Mr. ‘Abdul-*Aziz is a practising lawyer of Lahore and it is very creditable on his part to have devoted his valuable time in deep researches into the social structure of the Mughal empireThe very contents [of the Series] show the sweep of the author’s learning and his researches, and to some extent, unfold to us the grandeur that was the Mughal empire.....Some of the chapters of this book are very interesting and instructive.....The whole book makes an interesting reading even to the extent of the section on jewellers’ weights which the author says is more or less dry and technical.....The great educative and cultural value of the work. —*Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad-Deccan.

Mr. Abdul Aziz, who had already established his reputation as a successful interpreter of the history of the Mughal times, has now presented the result of his researches in a volume which forms one of a series on Indo-Mughal Court and its Institutions, and which will interest students of Mughal administration, as also the general reader. The book consists of a detailed survey of the resources of the Indo Mughal rulers over two centuries, in which their treasure accounts are carefully analysedMr. Aziz’s work thus presents a vivid life-like picture of the Indo-Mughal house-

hold, its cash treasury, its jewel treasury, and of the role played by gems and gem-stones in our history. The work, which is well-documented, indicates the author's wide knowledge, and spirit of research. We unhesitatingly recommend its careful study to all interested in the life and manners of the Indo-Mughal times. We shall also watch with a sympathetic interest the author's progress towards the completion of his series.—*The Hindustan Review*, Patna.

For a number of years past Mr. Abdul Aziz has devoted himself to a thorough and detailed study of Mughal Court life and the Mughal system of administration ; and his series of monographs, the result of laborious, patient research, promise to be a valuable record of Mughal Indian civilization, better and more comprehensive than the attempts hitherto made. The labour and industry that has gone into the making of this series must indeed have been tremendous. Original sources and authorities have been examined by the author critically and with a discriminating eye. Mr. Abdul Aziz's work is indeed of the first rank and on the basis of his achievement he amply deserves the status of a leading authority on Mughal institutions.

Mr. Abdul Aziz has the advantage of a simple, lucid style, free from verbiage. His work is of great value, especially to students and teachers of history. Even the casual reader will find the publication of much interest.—*The Tribune*, Lahore.

Mr. Abdul Aziz's monograph on "The Imperial Treasury of the Indian Moguls" is a monumental work of solid research, sound judgment, and a thorough knowledge of the people of the Mogul period.....This book achieves remarkable success in being on the one hand scholarly and carefully documented, and on the other, retaining a fresh and

essentially readable style. It may be recommended alike to the student of history and to the layman.—*The Illustrated Weekly of India*, Bombay.

This very curious and interesting book.....A treatise of fascinating interest.—*The Hindu*.

Mr. Abdul Aziz has already well-established his reputation as a close student of the history of Mughal times The work is well-documented, his judgment controlled, and his sympathy abundant. It indicates his wide knowledge, meticulous industry, and deep researches. The book can be unhesitatingly recommended to all those interested in the life and manners of the Mughul times. —*Amrita Bazar Patriha*, Calcutta.

Mr. Abdul Aziz, though a lawyer by profession, has earned a name for solid research in the history and institutions of the Indian Mughuls.....The accounts of European travellers and indigenious historians have been collated carefully, even to the most detailed *minutix*. The treatmenthas a genuine value as bearing on an important, much-vaunted, but little-studied, aspect of Mughul history. We eagerly await the succeeding volumes in the series —*The Educational Review*, Madras.