

KHALĪL SULTĀN AND THE “WESTERNERS” (1405-1407)*

Khalīl Sulṭān b. Mīrānshāh b. Temūr (r. 1405-9) is a neglected figure. If he is recalled at all, it is as a rather foolish individual, reputed to have depleted Temūr’s treasury and ruined the core provinces of his grandfather’s Empire because of his inordinate passion for his wife Shād Mulk.¹ The present paper is not meant as an attempt at rehabilitating Khalīl Sulṭān.² Khalīl’s fate will instead be analyzed as a case study to illustrate some of the central problems of any nomadic army, namely the questions of loyalty and efficiency.³

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¹ See the standard accounts by Hans Robert Roemer (ROEMER 1989) and the English version of this work (ROEMER 1986).

² The role of Khalīl in the succession struggles after Temūr’s death has been described in some detail and without comments of the Roemer type by Beatrice F. Manz in MANZ 1989: 128-37, and also in MANZ 2007: 16-27.

³ This is a reference to TILLY 1990.

The paper will proceed in four steps. The first section will outline the situation of Temür's army in February 1405, and will briefly address Khalīl's situation at Samarqand together with his struggles against other contenders for the throne; the time frame will here extend to the point when the last Westerners left him, at some time in 1407. The second section will deal with these "Westerners" — in large part displaced tribes — and will trace the fate of the two groups about whom we know most, the Qarātātārs and the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī. It will also offer a brief account of the third such party, the 'Irāqīs, about whom there is less information but who were probably the most important group of all. The third section will be devoted to ascertaining the differences and commonalities between the three groups, addressing the question of when and why each group chose to leave Khalīl. The fourth and concluding section will discuss the relationship between ruler and army, leading to the problem why Khalīl did not succeed in his bid for power.

I

Temür died in February 1405 in Utrār, close to the Syr Darya, having made the first moves in what was planned to be the Great China Campaign. The army had set out very early in the year, without waiting for the weather (and, by the same token, the fodder situation) to become more appropriate. The large army he had brought together was composed of a wide variety of men coming from all parts of the Empire, one source giving the overall number of 200 000 mounted and foot warriors.⁴ Numbers, of course, are always subject to caution, but there can be no doubt that this was one of the greatest armies Temür ever fielded.

These people were grouped into the habitual three corps, right and left wing and centre. Temür's own camp at Utrār was in the centre, and with him were his most favored senior emirs, Shaikh Nūr ad-dīn⁵ and Shāh Malik.⁶

The left wing had taken up quarters at some distance further downstream the Syr Darya, around Yası and Şairān.⁷ In charge here was one

⁴ ZNY II: 450; SH: 23/25a.

⁵ On Nūr ad-dīn, see MANZ 1989: 134. He was the leader of the Jalāyır group and had strong ties to emir Khudādād.

⁶ Shāh Malik had been one of Temür's closest followers and had risen to the position of keeper of the seal in the 1380s; see MANZ 1989: 110.

⁷ ZNY II: 451.

of Temür’s grandsons (descended from Temür albeit only through his mother), one Amīr or Sulṭān Ḥusain. When Ḥusain learnt that Temür had died, he immediately hurried to Samarqand to press his suit, accompanied by a small retinue of just one thousand selected followers; the rest of this army corps was left to its own devices, and there was even some looting among the troops, perpetrated by Ḥusain’s detachment.⁸ The left wing did not play any role after this premature attempt; indeed, it may simply have dissolved, and one may assume that many of the warriors simply went home. Evidently there was little agreement between Ḥusain and the other leaders of this corps. To try to get onto the throne aided by only a small group of personal followers or adventurers is called “the robbers’ method”.⁹ Ḥusain resurfaces several times after that, but we have to leave out most of his story; only his dealings with Khalīl will be mentioned below.¹⁰

The right wing, under Khalīl’s command, was based further South and upstream, in the Tashkent area. Originally, the commanders of the right wing included prince Aḥmad b. ‘Umar Shaikh (who was not to play any role afterwards), and the great emirs Khudādād¹¹ and Shamsaddīn-i ‘Abbās.¹²

Khalīl entered Samarqand before any of the other contenders was able to do so, in Ramaḍān 807 / March 1405. He was admitted into the city by its commander, Arghūnshāh, who had refused to open the city gates for the two *amīrs* from the centre, Shāh Malik and Shaikh Nūr ad-dīn, who were thus forced to continue further to the west, to Bukhara and closer to the Amu Darya, where they hoped to join forces with Shāhrukh.

Khalīl now had to build up a power base of his own. The right wing of the “Chinese” army was of mixed composition, with a majority apparently coming from Western regions. Khalīl himself, as a son of Mīrānshāh, had no well-established roots in Transoxiana (he had received the northernmost part of the Western part of the Empire, including

⁸ SH: 32f/44a.

⁹ “*ṭarīq-i quṭṭā’ al-ṭarīq*” (*ibid.*). Salmānī is outstanding in his pro-Shāhrukh bias, his hostility to Khalīl being the main difference in this respect to Ḥāfīz-i Abrū and the sources depending on him. These sources suggest that Shāhrukh, in the first years after Temür’s death, was mostly interested in having a responsible partner or vicegerent in Transoxiana, and in this period, an agreement with Khalīl seemed altogether possible. Salmānī, on the other hand, apparently was unable or unwilling to imagine such a solution.

¹⁰ See MANZ 1989: 132.

¹¹ On him, see MANZ 1989: 134-6.

¹² ZNY II: 451; ANDO 1992: 100.

Bailaqān, Arrān, Armenia, and Georgia¹³); he had been appointed to the region no earlier than in 1402.

The senior emirs seem initially to have favoured a succession according to Temür's testament in which he had appointed Pīr Muḥammad b. Jahāngīr as successor; later on, most of them (but by no means all) moved slowly into Shāhrukh's following, in particular after Pīr Muḥammad had been murdered in February 1407.

Of course, there were those who were unwilling to accept Khalīl as ruler in Samarqand. In the sources, four major opponents are visible. The first of these was the afore-mentioned Sulṭān Ḥusain, the commander of what had been Temür's left wing for the China campaign; he was soon eliminated, with his second, equally intemperate, bid for power doomed, as we shall see, to failure.

Second, and much more important, there was Khudādād al-Ḥusainī, a Barlas by tribal affiliation, who had a hereditary claim to territories and pastures East of the Syr Darya. He quickly struck an alliance with Shaikh Nūr ad-dīn, a Jalāyır leader, who succeeded in establishing himself around Utrār. Both had left their corps of the "Chinese" army: Khudādād left Khalīl and Shaikh Nūr ad-dīn broke company with the other leader of the centre, emir Shāh Malik. Khudādād started military actions against Khalīl as soon as spring 1405, and he ultimately proved instrumental in Khalīl's downfall: it was an army under Khudādād which, in March 1409, won the final victory over Khalīl at Qaṭwān near Samarqand.¹⁴ After Shāhrukh established himself on the throne in Samarqand, Khalīl had a kind of second career in Western Iran, closer to his father's original realm. In 1410 he was sent by Shāhrukh to impose order in 'Irāq-i 'ajam (Western Iran)¹⁵, where numerous descendants of Mīrānshāh were engaged in internecine conflict;¹⁶ he died at Rayy shortly thereafter, in 1411.¹⁷

The third figure of significance was Pīr Muḥammad b. Jahāngīr, whom Temür had appointed as his successor. Upon his arrival from Kābul, where he was staying at the time of Temür's death, Pīr Muḥammad claimed that, as a senior member of the ruling family, he deserved to accede, and that Khalīl, as his junior, should thus stand aside.¹⁸ In his

¹³ MANZ 1989: 87; ZNY II: 386f.

¹⁴ SH: 123/168b. Exact date: Dhīlqa'da 13, 811 according to ZT: 279.

¹⁵ MANZ 2007: 139 (note 120).

¹⁶ ZT: 396f.

¹⁷ ROEMER 1989: 124f; ZT: 436.

¹⁸ ZT: 98. Pīr Muḥammad argued that Khalīl was his *ini*, a younger member of the family, referring not to biological age so much as to the fact that he himself was descended

ill-fated campaign against Khalīl, Pīr Muḥammad had the support, even if a fallacious one, of at least some of the Suldus leaders¹⁹, as well as certain contingents sent by Shāhrukh, led by the senior emir Shāh Malik. This campaign culminated in a battle, fought in Ramaḍān 808 (beg. February 20, 1406) in the region of Nasaf/Qarshī, in which Khalīl Sulṭān was victorious.²⁰

The fourth opponent was Shāhrukh. During the period under discussion, Shāhrukh was the least active rival claimant of the four. At one point Khalīl appears to have made overtures towards Shāhrukh, proposing that he serve as Shāhrukh’s vicegerent in Transoxiana; Khalīl presumably hoped over time to capitalise upon such a position, whether under Shāhrukh’s continued regnal authority or otherwise.²¹ But Shāhrukh was heavily engaged in fighting provincial “uprisings”, the first of these being a movement to resurrect the defunct Sarbadār polity in Western Khurāsān, and a later one a bid towards establishing independent rule in Astarābād under the pretender Pīr Pādishāh.²² Confronted with these and other challenges, Shāhrukh may have thought it as well to leave Pīr Muḥammad and Khalīl to their mutual hostilities. For the time being, at least, he was certainly not in a position to move into Transoxiana in order to wrest Samarqand from Khalīl.

This list of major opponents makes it clear where Khalīl’s basic weakness was. He never succeeded in winning over any of the senior *amirs*, Temūr’s immediate followers or their sons.²³ Nor thus did he enjoy the support of any of the major tribal groups within the Ulus Chaghatay. Indeed, as Beatrice Manz has shown, these tribal groups seem to have aspired towards a restoration of the pre-Temūr *status quo*: towards a more regionalised environment, that is, with a much more fragmented alignment of political power. In particular, the two emirs to the East and North-East of Khalīl’s territory, Khudādād and Shaikh Nūr ad-dīn, were clearly striving to establish regional rule between the

from Temūr’s eldest son. Khalīl, in turn, had accepted being *ini* to Shāhrukh (*ibid.*: 20), this time because Shāhrukh really was older and above all, as Temūr’s son, belonged to the elder generation.

¹⁹ See the complex debate on Suldus politics in this period, MANZ 1989: 132-4.

²⁰ SH: 67, 72; ZT: 101-4 (exact date: Ramaḍān 2 – February 21, 1406).

²¹ SH: 45/63a, and the passage in ZT quoted above.

²² Pīr Pādishāh is a completely unstudied figure. He was a descendant of Tughay Temūr, the Chinggisid pretender in Khurāsān in the mid-14th century, and evidently continued the efforts of his father Luqmān to establish a Chinggisid polity somewhere between Khwārazm and Māzandarān.

²³ This is stated explicitly in SH: 122/167b.

Chaghatay realm of Mogholistān, the so-called Jete Ulus²⁴, and the Timurid domains.

II

Khalīl's military basis was primarily made up from the right wing of Temür's Chinese army, and many of these troops came from outside the Ulus Chaghatay. A large number of these groups were "displaced tribes". Of these, we have most information on the Qarātatārs and the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī; other groups were comprised of Turkmens, Turks and Kurds from Western Iran and Azerbaijan, and even indeed from Anatolia, with a contingent of Jalāyır explicitly mentioned.²⁵ The next section of the paper therefore is devoted to the history of these "displaced tribes".

The Qarātatārs

The Qarātatārs were a group of Turks whom Temür displaced from central Anatolia. Their story is told in a number of sources. We start with the *Zāfar-nāma* by Niẓām ad-dīn Shāmī.²⁶ For some unmentioned reason, we read, Temür decided to remove the Qarātatārs from their dwelling-place. Temür's troops encircled their camps in the steppe region around Amasya in a swift raid (*ilghār*). The source stresses that Temür was explicit in his orders: the Qarātatārs were to be treated well, and no plundering or killing was to take place. In an interview with two of their chiefs, Tabarruk and Muruwat, Temür once more underlined that he wanted the Qarātatārs to prosper and that he in fact intended to bring them back home, since their forefathers had been brought to Anatolia by earlier rulers, and he was glad to be able to restore them to their homelands. Upon hearing that, their chiefs joyfully promised that they would be happy to serve:

"We will return to our homeland together with our wives and children, our families, followers and herds and belongings".²⁷

²⁴ People in the southwestern Ulus Chaghatay called the northeastern people *jete*, i.e. "robbers".

²⁵ The question of the relationship of these Jalāyır to their Central Asian namesakes cannot be addressed in this paper.

²⁶ ZNS: 275.

²⁷ "*bā zan wa farzand wa khwīsh wa paywand wa mawāshī wa aḥmāl ba-mulk-i khūd bāz gardīm*" (*ibid.*).

A number of emirs were appointed to lead them, and at the end, they were given good water and pasture. Around one thousand tents were re-conducted into their original homelands together with their flocks (here itemised as camels, cattle and sheep, with no mention of horses). The above number is much lower than those given in all the other sources and probably is due to some mistake. However large the group may have been, we can be sure it was substantial.

The *Zaḡfar-nāma* by Sharafaddīn ʿAlī Yazdī adds a number of elements to this story.²⁸ Yazdī is more explicit about who brought the Qarātātārs to Anatolia. They had formed part of Hülägü’s army, Yazdī writes, and when Hülägü had established himself as ruler in Tabrīz, he sent them on to Anatolia because of their bad character; nonetheless, he provided them with pasture (*yūrt*). After the end of effective Ilkhanid rule, they flourished and branched out into many tribal groups (*firqa* — the number is 52), and every group acted freely as they wished. It is not stated what status they enjoyed in the time of Burhānaddīn, cadī and sultan of Sivas²⁹, but after his death (in 1398), they came under Ottoman suzerainty: Bayezit (Yıldırım, r. 1389-1402) integrated them into his Anatolian army and allocated pastures to them within his realm. Under Ottoman rule, they continued to prosper because they were taxed only lightly. After his resounding victory over Bayezit (at Ankara, July 28, 1402), Temür decided that he would give them a place (pasture) on the eastern fringes of his Empire, or more exactly beyond its borders, in the Ulus Jete (Mogholistān).³⁰

The action against the Qarātātārs is described in ZNY as a major undertaking. The work relates that they counted 30-40000 tents: a striking difference from the ZNS, but an order of magnitude which is corroborated by other sources. They were captured between Amasya and Kayseri. After that, this source likewise stresses that they were not to be treated as prisoners, and they were dispatched eastbound together with their herds. There was an order that nobody should take away their animals nor buy them, because they were to serve as their livelihood, and they should not be given any reason to take to flight.

²⁸ ZNY II: 357-9.

²⁹ I have been unable to identify them in ASTARĀBĀDĪ 1928. There certainly are a lot of nomadic groups around in that source, and some of them probably are the Qarātātārs, but no group is explicitly named thus. Burhānaddīn had a very hard time fighting the emirs in Amasya, who for a time appear as his major opponents, and there also were unruly elements between Kayseri and Amasya, where some time later the Qarātātārs were captured by Temür’s troops.

³⁰ ZNY II: 358. Temür wanted to give them a place “*miyān-i ulūs-i Jete*”.

The author relates, however, that in the vicinity of Dāmghān one party rebelled.³¹ Other Qarātatār groups also were ready to flee, there was some fighting, and at the end, the emirs in charge of conducting them had many of them killed, some in vengeance, some in persecution; others were taken prisoner and brought to Samarqand.³² The deportation of the group as well as their revolt near Dāmghān is confirmed by Clavijo, who saw the skull towers (two or four of them) in July 1404; he estimates the number of victims at 60 000.³³ This gives a *terminus ante quem* for their presence in Western Khurāsān.

The first action against the Qarātatārs, still in Anatolia, was probably directed against their winter camps. Their summer pastures were generally located higher up in the mountains, and pursuing nomads at a high altitude in Anatolia is a difficult task; in winter, by contrast, nomads come together and can be spotted more easily. With winter raids somewhat uncommon, any such action would also have benefited from a valuable element of surprise.³⁴ The most probable moment for the action thus is some time during the winter of 1402-3.

The Qarātatārs affair is presented as a typical case for Temür's treachery by Ibn ʿArabshāh, who, as is well known, takes every opportunity to drive home his anti-Temürid message. At the battle of Ankara, Ibn ʿArabshāh writes, Temür secured the defection from the Ottoman side of the Qarātatār party, which had been the mainstay of the Eretna³⁵ state in central Anatolia; this defection was decisive for the outcome, and thus for Temür's victory.³⁶ Temür then promised his new Qarātatār allies that, since he would leave the country, they would profit from joining him because they would be able to take over after his departure. But after-

³¹ ZNY II: 409-11.

³² This is explicitly stated in ZNY II: 417. Roemer is therefore mistaken when he says (albeit in brackets): "[...] (von einer Umsiedlung nach Samarqand ist in den Quellen allerdings nicht die Rede)", SH: 97, note 2. But this statement does not mean that they were meant to stay on in Samarqand.

³³ CLAVIJO 1999: 184, 219-220. The deported group is called *tártaros blancos* in this source, but it is quite evident that the Qarātatārs must be meant. The moment when they were first displaced from their Anatolian homes is placed somewhere after the conquest of Damascus. Clavijo makes the *tártaros blancos* come from a region between Syria and Turkey, and be captured somewhere near Sivas. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider why Clavijo has the wrong colour.

³⁴ Numerous examples in ASTARĀBĀDĪ 1928.

³⁵ The Eretna state (Eretnaoğulları) was one of the successor states of Ilkhanid rule in Anatolia, centered on Sivas and Kayseri; the dynasty ruled 1336-1380.

³⁶ IA: 194, 199 (Arabic)/ 182, 186 (Persian translation).

wards, he made them come East, and thus did not keep his promise, instead compelling them to settle in the Kashghar area and around the Issyk Kōl. The exact details here probably should not be taken at face value — at any rate, this means that they were placed on the frontier between Temür’s realm and the Jete.³⁷ Some of them also seem to have been relocated at the northern fringe of the Empire, in Khwārazm.³⁸

Naṭanzī also dates the Qarātatār deportation after the battle of Ankara, but does not establish a causal link. He reports that the Tātār (he uses this name) numbered about “*dah tūmān-i khānawār*” which would yield 100 000 tents, and that they were translocated from the region of Akşehir to Azerbaijan; he does not specify whether they were meant to stay there or to move on farther East. The revolt in Dāmghān is told in the course of events relating to spring 806 (1404), meaning that the Qarātatārs probably spent the winter of 1403-4 in one of the *qishlaqs* in Azerbaijan to continue their migration eastward in the following spring. This also would mean that they — which is to say, those who survived the massacre at Dāmghān — arrived in Transoxiana not earlier than in summer 1404, less than one year before Temür’s death.³⁹

Thus, the chronology of the Qarātatār migration to the eastern borders of Temür’s realm may be outlined as follows: (1) July 1402: Qarātatārs join Temür in the battle at Ankara. (2) Winter 1402-1403: Temür “invites” the Qarātatārs to come to Central Asia (or, according to other versions, he takes them captive and makes them move East). (3) Winter 1403-1404 (?): Possible winter camp somewhere in Azerbaijan. (4) Spring or summer 1404: Qarātatār “revolt” near Dāmghān, “revolt” quelled, many killed, skull towers erected. *Terminus ante quem*: July 1404. (5) Qarātatārs are taken on to Samarqand and later given pasture in the far East of the realm, perhaps even beyond the border of firm Temürid control.

Some of Temür’s reasons for displacing these people are fairly clear. Apparently, he wanted them to serve as a kind of border guard against the Jete, the former eastern part of the Ulus Chaghatai, whom he had never been able to subdue. Clavijo, who thinks that Dāmghān was their final destination, reports that they were resettled there because that region

³⁷ IA: 231 (Arabic)/ 214 (Persian translation).

³⁸ SH: 97 (note 2) simply states that they were transferred to Kashghar and Khwārazm, without taking into account that Ibn ‘Arabshāh possibly uses the toponyms as indicative for “border regions with hostile people”.

³⁹ NATANZI/AUBIN 1957: 391, 396.

was under-populated.⁴⁰ Beatrice Manz has argued that the relocation of larger groups was designed to make up for the movement of so many warriors out of the Ulus Chaghatay.⁴¹ If the final destination, however, was to be on the eastern frontier, the pasture grounds Temür had chosen for his new subjects had yet to be conquered, at least in part, or secured for Temür's rule. It is also possible that he wanted to weaken Ottoman rule in Anatolia by depriving any future sultan or governor of a major military resource. If there were any economic reasons behind the move, they can only be guessed at: perhaps a general lack of population in the East, but this lack of population probably was thought of in military rather than economic terms.

These Qarātatārs were part of the “Chinese” army and came within the right wing.

The Jā'ūnī Qurbānī

The Jā'ūnī Qurbānī were a Mongol group, originating from a “lesser *hazāra*”. Their pastures were to be found in Western Khurāsān and Māzandarān, between Ṭūs and Astarābād. This was the region where, in the middle of the 14th century, the Chinggisid prince Ṭughāy Temür (d. 1353) had tried to establish himself as ruler, and it seems that they were among his most loyal followers.⁴² It is reported that they were the inveterate enemies of the Sarbadārs (based at Sabzavār) who, on the other hand, “never spared one of the Mongol warriors”.⁴³ The Sarbadārs also were held responsible for the killing of Ṭughay Temür and large numbers of his followers.⁴⁴ The Jā'ūnī Qurbānī, on the other hand, supported the attempt by Amīr Walī in the 770s/1370s to build a regional state centered on Astarābād, as an effective continuation of the “Ilkhanid” state of Ṭughay Temür. One of the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī major emirs was married to Amīr Walī's sister.⁴⁵ Amīr Walī claimed at least nominally to rule in the name of Luqmān b. Ṭughay Temür, who was active as a pretender from his father's death in 1353 until 1388; in the end, however, he decided to rid himself of Luqmān, who then joined Temür.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ CLAVIJO 1999. See above, note 33.

⁴¹ MANZ 1989: 132.

⁴² CİNQ OPUSCULES (text 2): 9-13; AUBIN 1974; AUBIN 1976; ROEMER 1989: 20.

⁴³ CİNQ OPUSCULES: 10.

⁴⁴ ROEMER 1989: 46.

⁴⁵ CİNQ OPUSCULES: 9.

⁴⁶ NAGEL 1993: 165f.

The Jāʿūnī Qurbānī and the followers of Ṭughay Temür are linked in the sources. One story worth retelling concerns how they succeeded in taking Astarābād from the Sarbadārs and defending the town against them. When a large group of Sarbadār warriors appeared before Astarābād where Amīr Walī and his troops — these including Jāʿūnī Qurbānī warriors — had taken up their quarters, Amīr Walī made everybody come out of the city. Since they had few weapons, he made them take up sticks and wrap stones into felt and rags and tie them to the sticks to use them as weapons. Women also took part in the fighting. Upon this sight, the Sarbadār troops hesitated, and at the end, the Turkic warriors exclaimed: “The Tajiks have fled”.⁴⁷ This is one of the not very numerous examples where there is no doubt that we have a “nomadic army” in the original understanding of the term: with no evident difference between the able-bodied population (in this case even including women) and the fighting group, they really are a people in arms. While the all-out mobilisation of a city population in case of emergency is hardly rare, of course, what is particularly striking here is that the fighting is planned to take place *outside* the city walls.⁴⁸

The Jāʿūnī Qurbānī and the Sarbadār thus were rivals for power in Western Khurāsān and Māzandarān, each side looking for allies in the larger region, the Jāʿūnī Qurbānī at times forming an alliance with the Kart rulers of Herat; at all times, however, the Jāʿūnī Qurbānī seem to have been staunch supporters of Chinggisid legitimacy and rule in the region — if it is correct, that is, to view the family and descendants of Ṭughay Temür as parts of the Chinggisid dispensation.⁴⁹

The relationship which the Jāʿūnī Qurbānī had with Temür was strained from the start. Timurid sources report that it was one of their chiefs who captured both Amīr Ḥusain and Temür and kept them prisoner in a disagreeable place.⁵⁰ When later on Temür conquered Khurāsān, he first came as an ally of the Sarbadārs in their struggle against Amīr Walī.⁵¹ It is therefore no wonder that the Jāʿūnī Qurbānī leader ʿAlī Beg apparently tried to save some independence. All these efforts, however, only led to increasing repression; in a campaign against Western Khurāsān (spring/

⁴⁷ Cinq Opuscules: 10.

⁴⁸ PAUL 2004a: 1079. For cities defending themselves, see PAUL 2004b.

⁴⁹ Ṭughay Temür was descended from Chinggis Khan’s brother Jochi Qasar. There are more cases where this degree of kinship was sufficient to be eligible as member of the Chinggisid clan, e.g. the Khoshut rulers of Tibet in the late 17th – early 18th century.

⁵⁰ ZNS: 20, 21.

early summer 784/1382), Temür's army got hold of a good portion of the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī herds⁵², and the ensuing fighting around the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī stronghold at Kalāt (in the region of Ṭūs) was fierce. At the end, the Temürid troops took the fortress, seized 'Alī Beg and brought him to Samarqand where he was eventually put to death. Temür gave a part of the surviving Jā'ūnī Qurbānī to a number of emirs, and elements of the population were then taken first to Transoxiana and later the Tashkent region.⁵³

The remainder of the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī rebelled at Ṭūs in 1388 under the leadership of a relative of 'Alī Beg called Ḥājji Beg. (In so doing, they were exploiting the difficult position in which Temür found himself at that juncture: Toqtamish, the Khan of the Golden Horde, was approaching Samarqand,⁵⁴ and a confrontation was expected.) The Ṭūs rebellion had reached dangerous proportions when in Jumādā I, 791 (beg. April 28, 1389), an army under Mirānshāh set out to take Ṭūs again. Events culminated in large-scale slaughter (we are told that around 10 000 men were killed), but apparently no deportation took place.⁵⁵ In the following year, Ḥājji Beg was tried in a *yarghū*⁵⁶ and sentenced to death; the man whom Temür had appointed as judge was emir Saif ad-dīn Nukūz.⁵⁷ In a follow-up action, another Jā'ūnī Qurbānī leader, Yūnus Beg, was killed together with his family and followers.⁵⁸ Skull towers loom large in the long narrative of Mirānshāh's fighting against the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī; it should be kept in mind that Khalīl Sulṭān was Mirānshāh's son.

All in all, the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī had no reason to love Temür, and even less to love Mirānshāh. Besides the wish for revenge, which certainly was strong among them, some of them may have considered Temür an usurper; there is no mention of such feelings in the sources, but the pro-Chinggisid record of the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī is clear enough to venture such an assumption.

⁵¹ In the year 783/1381. See ROEMER 1989: 51.

⁵² ZNS-DHAIL: 46. Temür's troops are approaching Kalāt in a surprise attack. "*majmū'-i chahārpāyān-i ulūs-i Jā'ūnī Qurbānī dar ān ḥudūd ba-nazdik-i Kalāt burda būdand jumla-rā ba-ghārat burdand* (all the herds of the Jā'ūnī Qurbānī in this region had been taken to the vicinity of Kalāt, and they all were driven away)".

⁵³ NAGEL 1993: 160f.

⁵⁴ NAGEL 1993: 193; MANZ 1989: 95. Sources: ZNS-DHAIL: 75-92 (Manz quotes this source as ZNS II). For Toqtamish, see DEWEESE 2000.

⁵⁵ ZNS-DHAIL: 89.

⁵⁶ This is a Mongol-style court which handled cases of high treason and the like under Temür and the Temürids. See SUBTELNY 2007: 24f.

⁵⁷ ANDO 1992: 93; ZNS-DHAIL: 89.

⁵⁸ ZNS-DHAIL: 89-90.

The ‘Irāqīs

Another component of the right wing were people from the West that are presented as the “‘Irāqīs”. They probably included a large group of Jalāyır, some of whom had been taken prisoner and brought to Transoxiana after the conquest of Baghdad in 1393. In his entry for this year, Faṣīḥī explicitly mentions that Temür’s soldiers took captive ‘Alā’ ad-daula. ‘Alā’ ad-daula was son of the head of the Jalāyırīd dynasty, Aḥmad Jalāyır (r. 1382-1410) who, together with the Qara Qoyunlu ruler Qara Yūsuf (r. 1380-1420), was one of the most persistent opponents Temür had to face in Western Iran.⁵⁹ We do not know where these Jalāyır were given pasture or whether they had any herds at all. It is interesting to note that within the narration that also includes the report about the deportation of the Qarātatārs, Naṭanzī mentions what can be interpreted as the large-scale taking of hostages from ‘Irāqī noble families; this was an ongoing activity, but it must have reached a particularly large scale towards 1403.⁶⁰

These three groups, then, together formed a large part of Temür’s “Chinese” army on its right wing, and by the same token, a central element in Khalīl’s military might. They had much in common: in addition to having been displaced by Temür, the Qarātatārs and the Jā’ūnī Qurbānī at least had suffered large-scale killings on the occasion of what the sources report as revolts; some of the ‘Irāqīs held other but no less important grudges. The Jā’ūnī Qurbānī, moreover, had a long history of opposition to Temür and his house, having supported Chinggisid claims. They also could look back to a certain prominence in their region, in this respect on par with the most important tribal groups within the Ulus Chaghatay. The ‘Irāqīs included a scion of the Western Iranian Jalāyırīd dynasty who had fought Temür since the inception of his conquests in the region; the leader of the dynasty, Aḥmad-i Jalāyır, was still alive,

⁵⁹ MF: 136/ 115f (Russian translation). “*khawātīn-i ū wa pīsar-i ū ‘Alā’ ad-daula wa amwāl-i ū-rā girifta pīsh-i amīr Ṣāḥīb-qirān āwardand* (they took his wives and his son ‘Alā’ ad-daula prisoner, took his treasure and brought all this to Temür)”. See also SH: 96.

⁶⁰ NAṬANZĪ/AUBIN: 396. “*sardārān-i ‘irāq-rā firmān-i ‘ālī ba-nafādh paywast tā har kasī barādārī yā pīsarī [...] hamrāh-i urdū bāshand*”. The same report on taking hostages from Azerbaijan and Arab Iraq in ZNY II: 399, dated to late summer 1403: “A decree was issued that all the emirs and commanders of the Ulus of Hülāgū Khan living in Azerbaijan and Arab Iraq should send a son or a brother with their households (*kūch*) to Samarqand”.

and it should not come as a surprise that his son would try to make good his escape at the very first opportunity. Besides ‘Alā’ ad-daula, who had stayed more than ten or eleven years in Temür’s camp at the time of the China campaign, there must have been numerous younger members of noble and even ruling families among the ‘Irāqīs, and a certain number of their personal retainers as well. This group thus differed from the other two in that it probably was not made up from nomadic pastoralists, or that it at least included a larger portion of people who perhaps had nomadic pastoralist roots but would long have been professional warriors. All this makes the ‘Irāqīs seem much more “aristocratic” than the other two groups. The periods of time they had spent in the East varied, ranging from lengthy stays of ten years or more to shorter ones lasting less than one year.

We do not know much about the situation of all three groups in the period between their displacement and the beginning of the Chinese campaign. We do not know whether the ‘Irāqī groups were interested in pasture and livestock on a practical basis. For the Qarātātārs in turn, we are looking at no more than one year of presence in the East, or even less, summer 1404 — February 1405. We do not know whether they had flocks and pasture; at any rate, their position must have been difficult. The Jā’ūnī Qurbānī, at last, had been staying in the region for more than 15 or even 20 years, and therefore, we can presume that they had taken up “normal” nomadising cycles. Both groups had been relocated to the eastern border of Temür’s Empire, facing the Moghol Chaghatayids or Jete. Thus, at least in the case of the Jā’ūnī Qurbānī, the dislocation area of the right wing of Temür’s “Chinese” army must have coincided partly or entirely with their habitual winter quarters. There are no reports of any restlessness on the part of the Jā’ūnī Qurbānī for the period preceding Temür’s death; Salmānī even states that they had been loyal to Temür — or at least, had not rebelled during his life-time.⁶¹

Significant parties, among them Yādgarshāh Arlāt⁶², left the right wing and the command of Khalīl Sulṭān very early. They apparently did so in a bid to secure their regional holdings, thus displaying the general tendency of the most powerful leaders of Temür’s time to return “to the system of the Ulus Chaghatay, in which loyalty was voluntary and alli-

⁶¹ SH: 100/138b. See note 103 below.

⁶² ANDO 1992: 169.

ances could be switched at will”.⁶³ The position of figures such as Burunduq Barlās, for example, was ambiguous. He and his followers had likewise been part of the right wing, but were operating separately practically from the first days after Temür’s death.⁶⁴ However, later on, Burunduq joined Khalīl again, and we find him in Khalīl’s army in the battle against Pīr Muḥammad.⁶⁵ We can therefore surmise that the importance of “old” groups in the right wing of the “Chinese” army — those coming from the “old” Ulus Chaghatay — which had been small from the start, diminished significantly during the first weeks and even days after Temür’s death, thus leaving Khalīl with an army in which the “new” elements dominated, among them the ‘Irāqīs, the Qarātātārs and the Jā’ūnī Qurbānī.⁶⁶ Why Khalīl did not succeed in winning the support of any of the central emirs (in particular those in charge of the central army group) is another question.

III

It is well known that the ‘Irāqīs, the Qarātātārs and the Jā’ūnī Qurbānī all left Khalīl at some point, and it has been surmised that this was instrumental in his downfall. Manz writes as follows :

“To keep the loyalty of such an army even to the extent that Khalīl Sulṭān succeeded in doing so required large amounts of money. Khalīl Sulṭān is noted in the histories for his extraordinary generosity. Before important campaigns he handed out lavish gifts to all members of the army, regardless of their ranks or their legitimate claims. After a year or two of such activity he had used up not only the contents of the treasury but also the private wealth of members of the dynasty.”⁶⁷

In this section, we will first look at when and how each individual group left Khalīl, trying to decide which battles they fought for him, if any, and thus how serious a blow their departure was for Khalīl’s power basis. Then, the more general subject of loyalty and efficiency will be

⁶³ MANZ 1989: 135.

⁶⁴ ZT: 11.

⁶⁵ ZT: 101.

⁶⁶ The composition of Khalīl’s army is given as “*turk wa tājik wa ‘irāqī wa rūmī*” in ZNY II: 484. “Turks and Tajiks, ‘Iraqis and Anatolians”, with an understanding that this was a hodge-podge of warriors who came from all quarters, difficult to organise. This was at a moment when the issue still was the first movement of Sulṭān Ḥusain, that is, before Khalīl had done any fighting.

⁶⁷ MANZ 1989: 136.

addressed. The question then is why all these groups left Khalīl, and whether he could have made them stay. Regarding the payments, we will look at who got which kind of payment on which occasion.

It is not easy to tell when and for what reason each of the three groups under study left Khalīl. During the first two years of his reign at Samarqand, Khalīl went on campaign several times; the chronology cannot be established with certitude, since the sources contradict one another and are in part inconsistent internally. Rough datings can be provided, though, for at least some of the campaigns.

The first campaign (after some skirmishing against what cannot have been more than a reconnoitring party under Shāh Malik on the banks of the Amu Darya) most probably was a southbound move against Sulṭān Ḥusain, whom Khalīl had sent against Pīr Muḥammad b. Jahāngīr, only to discover that Sulṭān Ḥusain, still nurturing ambitions to ascend the throne himself, had turned around and was marching on Samarqand. This move is dated June-July 1405⁶⁸, and the decisive battle took place in the vicinity of Shahrisabz.⁶⁹ It was an easy victory for Khalīl because most of the troops and leaders had not chosen Sulṭān Ḥusain and did not support his claim, and thus availed themselves of the first opportunity to leave him.

The next enemy Khalīl had to confront was Pīr Muḥammad whom Shāhrukh supported at this juncture. This was far more serious because Pīr Muḥammad was the man whom Temür had singled out as his heir. Again, the battle is dated, around February 21st, 1406, it was fought near Qarshī, and again Khalīl was victorious.⁷⁰ This victory was not so easy, but it was all the more important.

There is no such certainty about the dates for the campaigns on the eastern front, that is to say in Khalīl's dealings with the two regionally dominant emirs, Khudādād and Shaykh Nūr ad-dīn, and his fights against

⁶⁸ Exact date : Muḥarram 8, 808 (July 5, 1405), MS II : 50.

⁶⁹ IA : 264 (Persian translation); ZT : 83-4; MF : 159. There is another exact date for the battle : June 20, 1405; MF has "in the last days of Dhīlḥijja, 807" (ended June 28, 1405). The dating in SH is inconclusive, 55f, and there is a conflict with the dating of the first major campaign against Khudāyād which is likewise dated to the beginning of 808 (beg. June 29, 1405).

⁷⁰ IA : 290 (Arabic) / 280 (Persian translation) (one day earlier); ZT : 103; SH : 94/132b (two days late); MF : 167. Thus, all sources agree that this battle took place in the first days of Ramaḍān 808, in the last decade of February, 1406. There is no need to opt for one of the proposed dates in our context.

Pīr ‘Alī Tāz⁷¹ and Pīr Muḥammad in Ḥiṣār (present-day South-Eastern Uzbekistan and parts of Tajikistan).

For the final decisive fights against Khudādād and Shaikh Nūr ad-dīn, one source is ZT. Besides, we have basically two accounts: IA and SH. In both IA and SH, there is a report about a raid led by Khudādād into the Samarqand region (Khalīl was absent from the capital), and about Khalīl’s response advance over the Syr Daryā. This campaign is dated in SH to the “beginning of 808” (early summer, 1405)⁷², which is exactly the same time when all other sources have Khalīl fight Sulṭān Ḥusain. The most probable solution is that Salmānī has the wrong year, and that in fact 809/1406 has to be understood.

The report in IA is placed in such a way that we can surmise that Khudādād profited from Khalīl’s absence from Samarqand when he was fighting Pīr Muḥammad in February, 1406, and Khalīl’s response would consequently have to be dated to summer 1406.⁷³ This, however, then has to be harmonized with Khalīl’s operation against Ḥiṣār, which probably took place in summer 1406 as well.⁷⁴

Even earlier, Khudādād and Shaykh Nūr ad-dīn had succeeded in taking control over much of the eastern parts of Temūr’s Central Asian possessions: the whole Syr Darya region, from Sairām to Khujand and further into the Ferghana valley, was lost for Khalīl, and even though he tried several times to win these regions back, he was never able to do so.

There are two reports about Khalīl’s efforts to establish control over Ḥiṣār, both in SH. The first attempt to conquer the region and its famous fortress (near present-day Dushanbe) comes immediately after the departure of the ‘Irāqīs and, in this source, the Qarātātārs. According to this account, Khalīl reached Ḥiṣār in 809 (beg. June 16, 1406), probably some time in summer. The faction around Pīr Muḥammad, whom he had defeated at Qarshī in February of the same year, had taken refuge

⁷¹ He was the leading figure among the Suldus at this moment. In Ramaḍān 809/February 1407, he was among those who murdered Pīr Muḥammad. On him, see MANZ 1989: 132-4, and see also note 20 above.

⁷² SH: 93/131a, and the source even stresses that this was before the campaign against Pīr Muḥammad: “*pīsh az muḥāraba bā amīrzāda Pīr Muḥammad*”, but since there are two campaigns against this prince in SH, this is not conclusive. The second campaign is dated to the year 809 (beg. June 18, 1406).

⁷³ IA places the Qarātātārs’ desperate march on foot over the frozen Amu at the same time when Khudādād was looting the Samarqand region; the first event should have taken place early in 1406, February being not unlikely. IA: 296 (Arabic) / 286 (Persian translation).

⁷⁴ SH: 97/135b.

there.⁷⁵ Khalīl laid siege to the fortress, but could not take it quickly ; in the meanwhile, the region of Samarqand was again raided by Khudādād and his men. It is not easy to propose a date for this, though one possibility is late summer/fall 1406, given the likely duration of each of the reported actions.⁷⁶

With due caution, the following chronology for Khalīl's battles can therefore be suggested : (1) March 1405 : Khalīl enters Samarqand without having to do battle. (2) June-July 1405 : Victory over Sulṭān Ḥusain, in the region of Shahrisabz. (3) February 1406 : Victory over Pīr Muḥammad and his Khurāsānī supporters at Qarshī. (4) Early summer (?) 1406 : Response raid against Khudādād, inconclusive. Syr Darya region. Khudādād had raided the Samarqand region in February or March 1406. (5) Summer/fall (?) 1406 : Campaign against Pīr Muḥammad, siege of Ḥiṣār. Inconclusive. During Khalīl's absence, again Khudādād raided the Samarqand region.

Thus, on the whole, Khalīl at first was winning on his southern frontiers, but losing in the East ; he could not prevent Khudādād from launching raids, and was unable to defeat him in battle. His actions against Ḥiṣār likewise did not produce any substantial gains. He was losing also in the North. There, in Khwārazm, he was not fighting in person, but his governor, Mūsākā, was driven out by Edige in Rajab, 808 (beg. December 23, 1405).⁷⁷ He was therefore able just to stabilise his rule in central Māwarānnahr, but could not expand neither beyond the Amu Darya — this he did not even try — nor beyond the Syr Darya, and he lost Khwārazm.

Which of the battles was fought with the support of one or several of the displaced groups ? Did Khalīl lose much when they left him ?

The Qarātātār must have left the dislocation area of the right wing of Temūr's Chinese army very soon after Temūr's death. They probably did not fight in any of the battles mentioned, at least not on Khalīl's side ; and if there were any Qarātātār warriors left in Khalīl's army, they certainly were no longer very numerous.

⁷⁵ This order of events : battle at Qarshī, 'Irāqīs leaving Khalīl, Pīr Muḥammad moving to Ḥiṣār – is to be found also in IA.

⁷⁶ The reports in ZT under the year 809 leave out Transoxiana almost completely since Shāhrukh was busy fighting his enemies in Māzandarān and Western Khurāsān.

⁷⁷ ZT : 473. Edige was a Tatar (Noghay) leader for whose career see DEWEESE 1994 : especially 336-9. Edige held Khwārazm from 1405 to 1412.

There is a direct indication for this in ZT: when Edige conquered Khwārazm in December 1405-January 1406, the Qarātātārs were already there. According to this source, they had not been there for long: they had come after Temür’s death, and they were looting the outskirts of the city.⁷⁸ The report adopts a regional Khwārazmian perspective, and may indeed have been taken from a regional source. Khwāfī (who probably builds on ZT) has a similar version, dated to 808, saying that the Qarātātār Turkmens had fled from Samarqand and reached Khurāsān, and he identifies the emirs who, on Shāhrukh’s orders, were charged with sending them away.⁷⁹ Indirectly, in another report from ZT, this time within the central narrative focussed on Shāhrukh and his movements, the flight of the Qarātātārs is announced to Shāhrukh during his campaign in Western Khurāsān; Shāhrukh returned from there to Herat in Jumādā I, 808 (beg. October 25, 1405). This second report from ZT is thus consistent with the Khwārazmian one,⁸⁰ and it would imply that the Qarātātārs arrived in Khwārazm earlier than late summer. Taking into consideration that the deserts surrounding Khwārazm cannot easily be crossed by large numbers of people and animals during the hot summer season, an even earlier moment would recommend itself. A dating to spring 1405 for the Qarātātārs’ departure from the “Chinese army” and consequently from Khalīl is echoed in IA as well: the Qarātātārs are shown together with Edige, but they had arrived in Khwārazm in their flight from Māwarānnahr some time before, and they then joined Edige in a raid against Bukhara (all this unfortunately is not dated).⁸¹ Even earlier, Ibn ‘Arabshāh mentions that the Moghols had gone to the Issyk Kōl. This was where he had placed the Qarātātārs before, and we may presume that their winter quarters were situated there. After having reached the Issyk Kōl, the Moghols joined Khudādād.⁸² There is no answer to the question whether the Moghols had driven the Qarātātārs away from their winter pastures or whether they had simply taken over the place they had left.

All this leads to the conclusion that the Qarātātārs did not fight for Khalīl in any of the campaigns mentioned, at least not in large numbers.

⁷⁸ ZT: 473. The source explicitly mentions that they had fled from Māwarānnahr “during the reign of Khalīl Sulṭān”, that is, after Ramaḍān, 807 (March, 1405), when Khalīl ascended the throne in Samarqand. The route they took to Khwārazm is not stated.

⁷⁹ MF: 166.

⁸⁰ ZT: 92, 94.

⁸¹ IA: 280 (Arabic)/ 261 (Persian translation).

⁸² *Ibid.*

They are, however, mentioned in IA in the list of groups Khalīl could muster against Pīr Muḥammad, but then, practically all the groups from the old right wing of Temūr's "Chinese" army are mentioned there.⁸³ If this is not just a mistake on the part of the author or a literary figure, they cannot have been very numerous.

SH has another story. Tāj as-Salmānī places his report about the Tatārs very close to the one he devotes to the flight of the ʿIrāqīs and explicitly mentions that the two movements took place at roughly the same time, that is, around Shawwāl 1, 808 (Naurūz, 1406). This is probably mistaken, and I suggest that these events are probably also accorded an incorrect year. What makes Tāj as-Salmānī nevertheless a precious source is that he shows the Tatār escaping from Khalīl's camp together with their belongings, and he makes them take a route to Khwārazm via Nūr.⁸⁴ In SH, they were pursued and broke through the lines of their enemies in battle. Their advance to Khwārazm would thus have taken place in April, and this is indeed a time when a substantial number of nomads could use this route to Khwārazm. Together, we might conclude that the Qarātātārs left Khalīl around Naurūz 1405 and travelled to Khwārazm along the route mentioned in SH.

Sources differ about their subsequent fate. ZT and MS have them come (from Khwārazm or elsewhere: the source says, from Māwarānnahr) to the Marw region (Mākhān) where Shāhrukh's emirs fought them, took much booty and prisoners.⁸⁵ IA has them cross the frozen Amu on foot (probably in the first months of 1406?) on their way "home" from Khwārazm, but they did not get far: exactly as the ʿIrāqīs whose flight Ibn ʿArabshāh had described earlier, they had no leadership and were not united but dispersed so that they did not get "home".⁸⁶

⁸³ IA: 289 (Arabic)/ 269 (Persian translation). The list has: warriors from the Chaghatay and Jete and from Turkistan, horsemen from Fārs, ʿIrāq and Rustamdār, Khurāsān, India and from the Tatār, and the Jān-Qurbānīya which Temūr had deported from Khurāsān.

⁸⁴ SH: 97/135b. "*köchmāl bā māl wa manāl bar rāh-i Nūr rawāna-yi Khwārazm shudand*". The term *köchmāl* is not found in this form. Doerfer has one reference for *köchman* appearing as *köchmal*, and thus, one is tempted to read the passage that way; that would yield "they broke camp and nomadised away, taking their belongings with them, and went to Khwārazm via Nūr [Nūrata North of Bukhara]". Roemer has "Sie zogen mit Hab und Gut über Nūr nach Ḥōrizm". See TMEN n° 1667.

⁸⁵ ZT: 92; MS: 55.

⁸⁶ IA: 296 (Arabic)/ 276 (Persian translation).

If the Qarātatārs probably did not fight in any of Khalīl’s battles, the ‘Irāqīs certainly did. Khalīl’s army is consistently called the “‘Irāqīs” in Ḥusainī’s *Ta’rīkh-i kabīr*.⁸⁷ Their participation in the battle at Qarshī in February, 1406, is explicitly mentioned in ZT where they fought in the right wing of Khalīl’s army together with Khalīl himself, Burunduq, and the Khurāsānīs.⁸⁸ The charge of the right wing against Pīr Muḥammad’s centre apparently decided the day.⁸⁹ Ibn ‘Arabshāh enumerates the components of Khalīl’s army and also mentions the ‘Irāqīs.⁹⁰ However the battle against Pīr Muḥammad may have been lost and won, it seems certain that the ‘Irāqīs were an important factor and that they did not take the opportunity to change sides, but forcefully exerted themselves on Khalīl’s behalf.

There is no information on other engagements of the ‘Irāqī components in Khalīl’s army, neither in the move against Sulṭān Ḥusain nor in the dealings with Khudādād nor in the ill-fated siege of Ḥiṣār.

The ‘Irāqīs left Khalīl a few weeks after the victory over Pīr Muḥammad. The most circumstantial report on their flight is the one by Tāj as-Salmānī who, as already mentioned, dates it to Naurūz, 1406. The decisive point in this report is that they had been promised large rewards in the case of any victory. But there were important emirs in Khalīl’s retinue who did not like the idea of once more having to share the booty and what remained of Temūr’s treasure with “those ‘Irāqīs”⁹¹; such promises were thus not kept, and the emirs even proposed that the ‘Irāqīs be fettered in chains. The source identifies as spokesman of the anti-‘Irāqī-faction a certain emir Allāhdād, one of the emirs from the “old” Ulus Chaghatay who had joined Khalīl.⁹² But dissatisfaction among

⁸⁷ JA’FARĪ 1960: 40.

⁸⁸ I am uncertain whether these “Khurāsānīs” are Jā’ūnī Qurbānī.

⁸⁹ ZT: 101; MS: 58. Tāj as-Salmānī (writing on behalf of Shāh Malik, who participated in this battle before fleeing the battlefield) does not impute Khalīl’s victory to any strength on the winning side, but to treason — the Suldus emirs fled when victory was near. SH: 72-73/97a.

⁹⁰ IA: 280 (Arabic)/ 269 (Persian translation). See above, note 84.

⁹¹ SH: 95/113a. “*chirā nuqūd-i khazāyin wa nafāyis ṣarf-i īn ‘Irāqiyān bāyad kard? ḥalā ba-hamānki bīshṭar az hama pīshṭar giriftand iktifā numāyand ba’d az īn ki dar muhimmī dīgar jānsipārī kunand dar khūr-i khidmatkārī iḥsān wa in’ām-i shahriyārī yāband* (Why must the monies of the treasury and all the valuables be given to those ‘Irāqīs? They should now be satisfied with what they have received earlier, and that was more than the others got. Later, when they have sacrificed [risked] their lives in another important matter [battle], let them find royal benefit and favour in the sun of loyal service).”

⁹² This Allāhdād was a Nukūz by tribal affiliation, brother of emir Saif ad-dīn mentioned above, the one who presided over the execution of Ḥājji Beg Jā’ūnī Qurbānī.

emirs with what they viewed as unjust favours extended by Khalīl to “foreigners” must have been widespread; and it is probable that the ʿIrāqīs were the most important group of “foreigners” in the army of Samarqand at that moment.⁹³

According to Salmānī, the ʿIrāqīs fled during the night of Shawwal 1st, 808 (March 22, 1406) — a well-chosen date since this was a double holiday: the last day of Ramaḍān was over, and it was Naurūz. The ʿIrāqīs are depicted wearing armour, and they seem to have been strong enough to pose a threat to the *ordu* (which at the end, they refrained from plundering). They chose ʿAlāʿ ad-daula b. Aḥmad Jalāyır⁹⁴ as their leader, and they rode off to Khwārazm.⁹⁵ Khalīl had them pursued, but the detachments he sent after them proved unable to find their trace.⁹⁶

The date of their flight and their destination, Khwārazm, is confirmed in ZT.⁹⁷

The ʿIrāqīs were thus no longer available in the subsequent actions against Khudādād in summer 1406, and their departure may have seriously weakened Khalīl’s position. Their being armoured indicates that they probably were no simple nomads as the Qarātātārs were, and the fact that they had among their number ʿAlāʿ ad-daula b. Aḥmad Jalāyır, who had been held as a hostage at Temür’s court for twelve years, possibly

ANDO 1992: 94. Salmānī has a clear tendency to blacken Allāhdād’s face even more than Khalīl’s.

⁹³ ZNY II: 516.

⁹⁴ See above. The date of their flight and the name of their leader is confirmed in IA: 291 (Arabic) / 281-2 (Persian translation). The name is given as ʿAlāʿ ad-daula b. Aḥmad al-Baghdādī. He is said to have been a prisoner and a hostage at Temür’s camp, and Khalīl is said to have raised him to a position of dignity.

⁹⁵ That they had fled from Māwarānnahr to Khwārazm is the only information we get in ZT; they are lumped together with other fugitives who joined Pīr Pādīshāh in his bid for power in Western Khurāsān. Another group who is mentioned in this context are the Jāʿunī Qurbānī. The passage in question is embedded into a report sent by Ulugh Beg to his father and datable by its circumstances to Šafar 810 (July 1407). This may mean that the groups in question still were in Khwārazm at that moment. At the same time, the date provides a *terminus ante quem* for the arrival of the Jāʿunī Qurbānī in Khwārazm. The dating is more or less secure in this case because the report is placed after the murder of Pīr Muḥammad which took place in Ramaḍān 809 (February, 1407).

⁹⁶ SH: 96/134a-135a.

⁹⁷ ZT: 473-4. They are said to have left Khalīl in the vicinity of Samarqand *rūz-i ʿīd-i ramaḍān* (of 808) and to have arrived in Khwārazm some time after the Qarātātārs. Pīr Pādīshāh acted as their protector (*ḥāmī*) against Edige. At the end, they were amongst those who swore fealty to Pīr Pādīshāh. The ʿIrāqīs are said to have received much gold from Khalīl (and to have engaged in commerce in Khwārazm), they in turn contributed to Pīr Pādīshāh’s treasure (in return for the *ḥimāyat* he offered them).

means that there were quite a few hostages among them, scions of noble families.⁹⁸ It is therefore not improbable that the numerous hostages Temür’s troops had been taking in Azerbaijan and Western Iran as well as the Arab ʿIrāq were part of this group. But besides hostages, the fugitives must have included numerous retainers and other warriors, otherwise their quantity could not be explained.

It would be interesting to follow their further fate, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.⁹⁹ Let it only be said that many of the people who left Khalīl then chose to join Pīr Pādīshāh; this choice of a Chinggisid in a way is an extension of pro-Chinggisid loyalties for a number of groups, but may also have been a sort of supra-tribal compromise.¹⁰⁰

The reason why the ʿIrāqīs left is fairly clear. They were given promises which later on were not kept, and they could not hope to improve their position by further staying with Khalīl who apparently had exhausted his resources. This is stated quite explicitly in SH. IA does not really give reasons for their departure, a longing for one’s homeland is presented as incentive for all parting groups alike. Another motive, in particular for the ʿIrāqīs, is that they had made enough booty and could not really expect more.¹⁰¹

The case of the Jāʿunī Qurbānī is difficult because the sources do not permit us to give any precise date for their departure; the best solution might be some time in spring 1407, after the Ḥiṣār siege of summer/fall 1406 and before their recorded presence in Khwārazm in summer 1407. They are shown participating in the battle against Pīr Muḥammad in February, 1406¹⁰²; and SH has them participate in the campaign against

⁹⁸ SH: 95/133a. The expression that these warriors (*bahādurān wa sardārān*) were “*har yak az mamlakaʿi ba-mawjib-i farmān-i [Temür] mulāzim-i rāyāt-i [Temür] būdand* (every one of them was following Temür’s banner on Temür’s orders on behalf of his region)” may point to their quality as hostages.

⁹⁹ This would involve a complex story about events in Khwārazm and Western Khurāsān. — IA, again, states that because they could not agree on what course to take, they dispersed before they got very far. — ʿAlāʿ ad-daula made it “home”, he is shown in conflict with his father in 811 (1408-9), ZT: 294-5.

¹⁰⁰ JAʿFARĪ 1960: 37, 43.

¹⁰¹ JAʿFARĪ 1960: 41.

¹⁰² IA: 289 (Arabic) / 269 (Persian translation). They are called Jān-Qurbāniyya Khurāsān; but this source also has the Qarātātārs fight in this battle since it gives, at the end of the list, “*wa-jān-qurbāniyya khurāsān wal-hunūd wat-tatār * wa-man kāna taimūr * aʿaddahū li-maḍāyiq al-umūr* (and the Jāʿunī Qurbānī from Khurāsān, the Indians and the Tatars, and whom Temür had prepared for the dire straits of life)”.

Hişār as well and leave only after the siege was lifted. They, too, followed the example of the ʿIrāqīs, the source even speaks of a “ʿIrāqī disease” *marāḍ-i ʿirāqiyān*.¹⁰³ They are reported to have left for Bukhara and then Khwārazm. It cannot be ascertained when they arrived there, so the question of which further battles they possibly fought for Khalīl has to be left open.

A report in ZT has the Jāʿunī Qurbānī in Khwārazm by Ṣafar 810 (beg. July 8, 1407) and then in the vicinity of Ray later that year, in Jumādā II (beg. November 3, 1407).¹⁰⁴ It was then that Abā Bakr (who had spent the winter of 809/1406-7 in Kurdistān) heard of their arrival and tried to win them over. They were 5 000 tents, a sizable group.¹⁰⁵ Abā Bakr offered them horses, garments and other gifts, and they agreed to join him. But their attachment seems to have been lukewarm: in a common campaign against Yūsuf Qarā Qoyunlu in the end of 810 (battle joined on Dhīl-qaʿda 24; April 21, 1408), a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Jāʿunī Qurbānī contributed towards defeat by the Turkmen forces.¹⁰⁶ As is well known, prince Mīrānshāh b. Temūr found his death as a result of this battle.

During their alliance with Pīr Pādīshāh, the Jāʿunī Qurbānī had proved difficult to control. Shāhrukh heard a report (later than Jumādā II, perhaps in Dai, that is, December/January 1407-8) to the effect that a part of the Jāʿunī Qurbānī had fallen out with Pīr Pādīshāh and had left him.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ The source, SH: 138a/b, deserves being quoted to some extent. “*jamʿ az jāʿunī-qurbāniyān ki ba-ḥukm-i ḥaḍrat sultān-i [138b] maghfūr mulāzim-i rāyāt-i humāyūn-i khāqānī būdand wa dar muddat-i ḥayāt-i ān ḥaḍrat jān-rā qurbān-i farmān wājib al-idhʿān sākhta wa baʿd az wafāt-i ān ḥaḍrat bī ikhtiyār dar māwarānnahr mānda wa az qillat-i māya-yi ʿināyat wa kathrat-i mādda-yi adhiyyat ba-marāḍ-i ʿirāqiyān kamā sharahnā min qabli mubtalā wa giriftār gashta ham ba-muʿālaja-yi firār qirār dādand* (a group of the Jāʿunī Qurbānī who were integrated into the Temürid army by Temūr’s orders and who, as long as Temūr was alive, had sacrificed their lives to the royal order which must be obeyed; after the demise of that majesty, they remained helpless in Māwarānnahr, and, because they had but little favour but much reason to complain, they fell victim to the ʿIrāqī disease, as we have explained before, and decided to seek healing in flight)”. It could be doubted whether the first part of the sentence really means that they had been “loyal” to Temūr — the name of the group in fact provokes a pun on *jān* “life” and *qurbān* “sacrifice” which Salmānī, a very “literary” author as is evident already from so small a sample, could not resist making. It also could be understood that it was only Temūr’s majesty which held them back — during the conqueror’s lifetime — from whatever they may have felt like doing.

¹⁰⁴ ZT: 195, 226.

¹⁰⁵ MS II: 114; ZT: 226.

¹⁰⁶ ZT: 227.

¹⁰⁷ ZT: 200.

This is confirmed in Ḥusainī: instead of participating in the siege of Dāmghān together with Pīr Pādishāh, they entered the scene after the town had surrendered, and started looting in spite of the ransom money the townspeople had paid.¹⁰⁸

No leadership is ever mentioned for the Jāʿunī Qurbānī in the context of their presence in Central Asia; no leaders are mentioned for the Qarātātār, either. The behaviour of both groups does not speak in favour of strong leaders among them. A possible explanation is that Temür had taken care to completely exterminate the leading families of both groups in the massacres that accompanied their deportation.

As for reasons why the Jāʿunī Qurbānī left, “longing for their homeland” is adduced for them as well as for the other two. Other reasons might be found in the history of their dealings with Temür and his house, but this is not explicitly stated. The other explanation given, however, concerns “the lack of *ʿināyat* (favor in both a material and a honorific understanding)” and “the surplus of hardship”.¹⁰⁹

The routes which the three groups are reported to have taken all touch upon Khwārazm. This is no coincidence. All three groups wanted to make it to Khurāsān, the Jāʿunī Qurbānī to their ancient pastures in Māzandarān and Western Khurāsān, and the other two groups thence to destinations farther West. But for all three, the direct route was closed since it would have led through territory which Shāhrukh had under firm control; it seemed much wiser to try to make use of the instability in Western Khurāsān. That region, in turn, is linked to Khwārazm by good routes. Moreover, all three groups allied themselves to Pīr Pādishāh whose aim no doubt was to re-establish the rule of his family in the Astarābād region: the Jāʿunī Qurbānī had long-standing friendly relations with that family. At the same time, there was no established rule in Khwārazm at that moment. As we have seen, the Noghay-Tatar leader Edige had taken over there late in 1405 or January 1406, but this did not prevent Pīr Pādishāh from going there after Shāhrukh had defeated him at Astarābād in Rabīʿ II, 809 (beg. September 14, 1406).¹¹⁰ Thus, Khwārazm was well-suited as a rallying point and a provisional basis for

¹⁰⁸ JAʿFARĪ 1960: 44. This source also mentions that these people had fled from the Samarqand region and that they traditionally were linked to the family Pīr Pādishāh came from.

¹⁰⁹ See above, note 103.

¹¹⁰ ZT: 135-6.

all those who wanted to escape from Transoxiana and/or who wanted to carve out a chiefdom of their own out of the Timurid domains in Māzandarān and Western Khurāsān. In 810, Pīr Pādishāh apparently had gathered a large number of dissatisfied or otherwise dislodged groups around him in Khwārazm who all had sworn fealty to him as their sultan: a party of Jā`ūnī-Qurbānī, part of the `Irāqīs who had fled from Māwarān-nahr, some of the Tawakkuliyān and part of the *hazāra* (one thousand) of an emir called Najm ad-dīn, and they all set out again for Astarābād.¹¹¹

To summarise: The Qarātātārs probably were the first to leave, and it can be assumed that they never participated in a battle fighting for Khalīl because their departure should be dated to around March 1405. They had been newcomers to Central Asia, the memories of their march East were fresh, and they probably had had no time to establish themselves in new pasture grounds. The `Irāqīs came second, leaving in March 1406 after the victory against Pīr Muḥammad. They appear to have had a larger proportion of professional and well equipped warriors among them, and their group included hostages Temūr had taken in the west, so that they convey a more “aristocratic” picture. Their departure may have been the most serious blow to Khalīl’s power base. The Jā`ūnī Qurbānī probably left significantly later, and possibly participated in one more campaign, namely that against Ḥiṣār; their departure can provisionally be dated to some time between winter 1406-7 and late spring 1407. After they had left, Khalīl lost control over much of what he had claimed as his territory, he was reduced to the lands between Kish (Shahrisabz) in the South and Dīzak (Jizzax) to the East, what could be called the larger Samarqand region. This was only a core of the area where he had succeeded in establishing his rule over the previous two years, and now even this was shrinking fast. What he really controlled was not enough to provide fodder for his horses.¹¹²

The performance of the Western troops was not too bad. They had won the victory over Pīr Muḥammad. But they are not shown fighting Khudādād and the Moghols who, after all, proved to be the decisive enemy; details on these campaigns are scarce. We see the Jā`ūnī Qurbānī again before Ḥiṣār. Altogether, the “Westerners” (bar the Qarātātār) were an important part of Khalīl’s military following: Khalīl was clearly on the defensive after the last of them had left, and his ensuing campaigns against Khudādād were conducted on a much smaller scale.

¹¹¹ ZT: 195. I have no idea who the last two groups might be.

¹¹² SH: 122/167b.

IV

Whatever Khalīl had in mind — a complete take-over of all his grandfather’s realm or just a vice-regency as deputy for Shāhrukh in Transoxiana — he needed troops. The only way for him to attain any stability in his power was to establish himself as the master of something which he later would have to transform into an army of conquest. It seems that he came to the conclusion early on that he would not succeed in winning over a sufficient number of Temür’s main emirs and comrades-in-arms (or any substantial following within the Temürid family, for that matter), possibly precisely for the reasons evoked by Beatrice Manz: the leading emirs in the Ulus Chaghatay showed a tendency to revert to the state of things before Temür, or else to maintain a bystander’s position.¹¹³ Nevertheless, some of these emirs did join Khalīl, though not in large numbers. Khalīl thus had to look elsewhere for military support. And evidently, the “foreign” groups were a logical choice. These were largely constituted of pastoral nomads, as well as hostages from Western provinces. They had been part of the right wing of the “Grand Chinese Army” and consequently were under Khalīl’s command. However, their support had to be negotiated, and since they neither had any interest of their own in the power struggle which now erupted, nor — to put it mildly — were friends of the Temürid family, these negotiations meant that even formal loyalty, let alone active support, had to be bought at a high price. This price had to be even higher if Khalīl was to prove unable to provide pasture for those of his followers who still had their flocks. For all these reasons, Khalīl was not only dissipating the treasure which Temür had accumulated during so many years of victorious campaigns: it is difficult to see how he could have acted otherwise.

How did Khalīl try to win the support he needed? A number of situations are on record.

Immediately after Temür’s death and still before he had entered Samarqand, he distributed animals: horses, mules and camels which had belonged to Temür personally but also to some of his emirs, as well as weapons, armour and so on. Apparently, it was the ‘Irāqīs who principally profited on this occasion.¹¹⁴ We also may suppose that some of the emirs who swore fealty to Khalīl did so on the assumption that upon the capture of Samarqand he would lavishly hand out wealth to them.

¹¹³ MANZ 1989: 136.

¹¹⁴ ZNY II: 492.

When he had taken control of Samarqand, its citadel and the treasures, Khalīl could indeed use largesse more freely. Preparing his first major campaign, directed against Sulṭān Ḥusain in June–July 1405, he mobilised troops and he gave them much money; the term for such payments before campaign is *ögälgä*¹¹⁵. It is not quite clear who received this money, some of the main emirs who had sided with Khalīl were with Sulṭān Ḥusain at that moment (albeit involuntarily). The text names Turkish soldiers as recipients of these *ögälgä* distributions; but most of the warriors in Khalīl’s army must have been Turkic-speaking, although there is no information on the Jā’ūnī Qurbānī who still may have used Mongolian. Thus, it is uncertain whether any of the three (or two, if we do not count the Qarātātār) displaced groups could benefit from this particular distribution of *ögälgä*. The fact that the troops had to be mobilised could be indicative that the ʿIrāqīs did not profit so much on this occasion since they probably were not dispersed in the way nomadic warriors are.¹¹⁶ It is not unlikely that much of these payments went to other contingents, possibly including groups from the “old” Ulus Chaghatay.

However this may be, it is very clear who were the main beneficiaries in the next instance of *ögälgä* being paid. This was before the campaign against Pīr Muḥammad which led to the battle at Qarshī in February, 1406. The ʿIrāqīs are explicitly mentioned as having received more than others, and this was one of the reasons why the Chaghatay emirs in Khalīl’s following spoke against them. As a consequence, Khalīl apparently did not keep what he had promised them before the campaign.¹¹⁷

In the reports on later campaigns, payment of *ögälgä* is not mentioned, so that we are perhaps justified to presume that Temür’s treasure had been emptied within one year or one year and a half.

Both ZT and SH comment on the extremes Khalīl went to in distributing riches. Both sources also agree that Khalīl gave money without con-

¹¹⁵ See TMEN No. 23; ZT: 83; SH: 57/79a-b. Salmānī has a very detailed description of what went on.

¹¹⁶ The term used in the source (ZT) for “mobilising the army” is *iḥḍār-i lashkariyān*. In Temürīd historiography, this kind of *iḥḍār* denotes mobilisation of what I have called the “tribal host” elsewhere. Khalīl was in a precarious situation: he had sent an army — the troops he had at hand in Samarqand — under Sulṭān Ḥusain’s command to fight Pīr Muḥammad and Pīr ʿAlī Tāz, but then, Sulṭān Ḥusain had managed to get control of this army and led it on Samarqand, including some of Khalīl’s most prominent emirs. Khalīl thus must have been desperate to get another fighting force, and he had no choice but to call on the nomads in the region who had dispersed to their summer camps — this was in June, 1405. See PAUL 2003: 25–68.

trol and — most importantly — to undeserving people. Could this refer to the likes of rank-and-file warriors and petty chiefs among the Jāʿūnī Qurbānī, or to inveterate enemies of the Timurid dynasty such as the Jalāyirid leader?

Besides the treasure, there also was booty to be distributed, on at least two occasions: the victory over Sulṭān Ḥusain and the one over Pīr Muḥammad. It is not clear how much booty there was in the first case. But on the second occasion, it seems that the ʿIrāqīs felt that they had been cheated exactly in this respect and that this was the incentive that made them leave Khalīl.

Apart from payment before campaigns and booty after victory, there is another important aspect. A would-be ruler could also try to win the loyalty of emirs and tribal leaders by bestowing honours on them, such as promotions and positions, or, in this particular case, by giving women to them in marriage. Among the emirs whose names we know there are no ʿIrāqīs, Qarātatārs or Jāʿūnī Qurbānī, but we are told that ʿAlāʾ ad-daula b. Aḥmad-i Jalāyir had received a respectable position in Khalīl’s entourage.¹¹⁸ No other leaders are mentioned in this manner.

Thus, the reasons the “Westerners” had for leaving Khalīl were not entirely material. When Salmānī states that the Jāʿūnī Qurbānī suffered from “lack of favour”, both material and honorific favours are probably meant.¹¹⁹

To sum up: The “Westerners” — in this context, the ʿIrāqīs and the Jāʿūnī Qurbānī — soon had the impression that they were not being treated as they deserved. Their competitors from the “old” Ulus Chaghatay, and above all Khalīl’s vizier Allāhdād, seem to have prevailed in the struggle for resources. Khalīl may have wished to use the “Westerners”, above all the ʿIrāqīs, to counter-balance those Chaghatay emirs (not too many of those had joined him, in the first place, and that may have made their bargaining power stronger) who had thrown in their lot with him. But if so, he clearly failed, and this failure became apparent after his victory over Pīr Muḥammad. This in turn made it clear to the ʿIrāqīs that they had no brilliant future at the Transoxanian court, whatever their military value might be.

Why, given that he had so many important assets on his side, did Khalīl not succeed in the power struggle after Temür’s death? His mili-

¹¹⁷ SH: 95f/133a-134a; ZT: 100.

¹¹⁸ IA: 291 (Arabic) / 271 (Persian translation).

¹¹⁹ The term is *ināyat*, see above note 103.

tary following was heterogeneous — but so was Temür’s, and Shāhrukh probably had to rely on no less heterogeneous an army. The decisive difference between Temür’s first field of activity and Khalīl’s was that Temür acted within the Ulus Chaghatay, which formed a political and military reference system of its own, whereas Khalīl had to cope with fragments from different systems: this was one reason why he could not refer to a common political culture. He had to act within what remained of the Ulus Chaghatay in terms of territory and also of people, but the Ulus as a political and military reference system was largely extinct, and therefore could not provide a framework for his undertakings, not even with regard to those to whose fathers and grandfathers the Ulus was meaningful as a concept. What remained from the “old” Ulus was a memory of better times, where emirs were much freer to choose their overlords. But this was exactly a reference Khalīl did not want, on the contrary: his aim must have been to continue in his grandfather’s footsteps.

The differences in outlook and background between the two factions Khalīl had to unite were so great that whatever he did in favour of the one had to be viewed as injustice, and indeed an outrage, by the other group. This is reflected in the discussion in ZNY of the reasons for Khalīl’s failure: after a general statement that no one can succeed where God has decreed otherwise, more practical issues are also addressed. Khalīl was not qualified as Temür’s successor because he favoured “foreigners” and base people, and it is stated that he squandered the treasure on those people who later on brought about his downfall.¹²⁰ This should be referred to the ‘Irāqīs, of course, but also probably the Jā’ūnī Qurbānī — and it must be remembered that both groups left Khalīl because they thought they were given too little “favours”. This was a serious dilemma. Khalīl tried to get support and loyal service (*khidma*) by extending whatever he could as benefits (*ni’ma*) to those he wanted to win to his cause. But since many of these recipients of his *ni’ma* were not interested in his project, and since he could not point to a common reference system, the

¹²⁰ ZNY II: 515-6. He spent the treasure “*bar jam’ī ki dar ākhir kharābī-yi mulk-ash az īshān shud*” (515); a little later we read “*jam’ī mardum-i bīgāna-yi past-pāya-rā bamazyad-i ‘ināyat wa tarbiyat ikhtiṣāṣ bakhshīd wa har yak-rā qārūnī sākhṭa ba-martabai imārat wa sarwarī risānīd* (of a group of people who at the end were instrumental in his downfall, he singled out a group of foreigners and base people by an excess of favour and fostering; and, having made a Qārūn [a quranic figure, fabulously rich] out of everyone, he promoted him to a position of military leadership)”. This made the majority of emirs and other leaders turn away from him (516).

price went up. The situation got even more uncontrollable because there were at least two competing groups among the potential “servants”, jealously watching over who got what. Arguably, Khalīl could not hope to meet the expectations of either group, even less of both, not even if he had won an uninterrupted series of victories with much booty to distribute: even in that case, the “servants” would have considered the booty they got as less than their fair share.

Moreover, and perhaps this is the most important point, we observe that he did not succeed — if he ever tried in earnest — to build a group of personally loyal followers whom he could have trusted. Apparently, he did not have any substantial group of personal retainers (*nökers*) — at least they do not come to the fore in the sources. There must be weighty reasons for that, because a band of *nökers* was what every pretender in the Turko-Mongolian world needed first and foremost.

There were two major ways to acquire such a retinue. The first one was the way that led Shāhrukh to success: his continuous and undisputed reign in a major province, Khurāsān, certainly was instrumental for the final outcome of the succession wars. In this process, Shāhrukh was able to forge personal relationships with a number of emirs who served him loyally for the rest of their lives. For this, Khalīl was not well placed. He was too young to have such a record of administrative practice (he was born before 1387, but not by many years), and he had to act far from the region where he may have had personal attachments. The second one had been Temür’s own: the period of *qazaqlıq*, petty warring, raids and retreats, largely without a home territory, until he was accepted at last as the only political and military leader within the Ulus Chaghatay.¹²¹ In these times of hardship, Temür attracted the men who later on became pillars of his Empire. But at this particular juncture, after Temür’s death, there apparently was no room for *qazaqlıq*, and therefore, Khalīl went for what seemed to be a shortcut. He tried a third path: he thought he could win support and loyalty from a heterogeneous group of men who acted as spokesmen of their own followings by showering largesse on them; he tried to establish bonds of mutual loyalty with them, bonds which would be as strong as were those between Temür and his early companions. According to the sources, there were “deserving” and “undeserving” men among those he wanted to attract, and probably the “deserving” men were high-ranking emirs: just those who would not have been the ones to join Khalīl (or anybody else) as personal retainers in a *qazaqlıq* enterprise. It was just these men whose power he would have

to reduce like Temür had done with the tribal chiefs, and this was exactly what he could not achieve because he lacked the personal retinue, the enlarged war band with which he might have overcome their opposition. He could only try to play off one faction against the other. And we must remember that it took Temür many years to come to grips with the tribal leaders within the Ulus — Khalīl certainly had no time to lose. So his attempt at collapsing his grandfather's career into just one or two years apparently was doomed to failure.

Khalīl failed even though he was not, at the beginning, entirely without success. It is not enough to state that he did not win often enough to impose himself¹²² — the disintegration process started before any significant military setbacks are on record, namely after the victory over Pīr Muḥammad. Since his inner circle was not of the same kind as Shāh-rukḥ's was or as Temür's had been, he lacked one of the central tools to transform the groups who together formed his military support into an army of conquest, and thus, his support broke down before conquest could begin.

¹²¹ See HOLZWARTH 2002: 152-156 on *qazaqlıq*.

¹²² See SH: 100/138b.

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- ZNS, see SHĀMĪ.
- ZNY, see YAZDĪ.
- ZT, see ḤĀFĪZ-I ABRŪ.

Jürgen PAUL, *Khalīl Sulṭān and the “Westerners” (1405-1407)*

Khalīl Sulṭān ruled at Samarqand from 1405 to 1409. During the first two years of his rule, he had remnants of the right wing of Temūr’s Grand Chinese Army at his disposal, basically three groups collectively known as the “Westerners”: the Qarātatārs, the Jā`ūnī-Qurbānīs and the `Irāqīs. They all left him at various points.

The paper retraces the chronology of these departures and asks whether these losses were instrumental in weakening Khalīl and thus contributed to his downfall. Besides, it looks at the history of the three groups in order to identify the motives behind their behaviour. Finally, it reexamines the question of how and why Khalīl depleted his grandfather’s treasure in so short a period of time.

The concluding section gives reasons why Khalīl’s bid for power was doomed to failure.

Jürgen PAUL, *Khalīl Sulṭān et les « Occidentaux » (1405-1407)*

Khalīl Sulṭān régna à Samarcande de 1405 à 1409. Pendant les deux premières années de son règne, il avait à sa disposition les troupes qui lui restaient de l’aile droite de la Grande Armée de Chine de Temūr, essentiellement trois groupes connus dans leur ensemble comme les « Occidentaux » : les Qarātatārs, les Jā`ūnī-Qurbānīs et les `Irāqīs. Tous le quittèrent à des moments différents.

L’article réexamine la chronologie de ces défections et tente de déterminer si ces pertes affaiblirent Khalīl de façon décisive et contribuèrent à sa chute. En outre, cette étude reprend l’histoire des trois groupes en question afin de saisir les motifs de leur conduite. Enfin, il reprend la question de savoir comment et pourquoi Khalīl vida le trésor de son grand-père en si peu de temps.

La partie finale de l’article s’attache à cerner les raisons qui firent que la tentative de ce prince pour s’établir sur le trône était vouée à l’échec.