

# **MUGHAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE DECCAN UNDER AURANGZEB [1659-1707]**

*Thesis submitted to Indira Gandhi National Open University  
for the award of the Degree of*

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

in  
**HISTORY**

by  
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New Delhi  
2015

**CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the thesis entitled “**Mughal Administration of the Deccan under Aurangzeb [1659-1707]**”, submitted by **Zakir Husain** for the award of **Doctor of Philosophy** in History is a bona fide work carried out by her under my supervision and guidance. This thesis has not been submitted previously in part or in full to any other university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma.

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## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that the research embodied in this dissertation entitled **“Mughal Administration of the Deccan under Aurangzeb [1659-1707]”**, is an original research work carried out by me under the supervision of **Prof. Abha Singh**, Department of History, School of Social Sciences, **Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi**, for the purpose of completion of **Doctor of Philosophy** in History from the **Indira Gandhi National Open University**. I also declare that it has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this University or any other Institution for the award of any degree or diploma.

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## PREFACE

The Deccan has been an extremely crucial part of the Mughal Empire which began to be annexed and incorporated into Mughal imperial dominions from Akbar in 1601 and completed by Aurangzeb in 1706-7 after his last battle against Wakinkira. Aurangzeb held the Viceroyalty of the Deccan twice since December 1635 to August 1644 and 1652 to 1659 ending with his accession as Emperor both of which have been carefully analysed and commented.

However, when Aurangzeb became the Emperor of Mughal India in 1659 then the Deccan began to be dealt with like other provinces almost till the first half of his reign from 1659 to 1682 for a period of 24 years as Prince Muḥammad Mu‘azzam remained the Viceroy during 1<sup>st</sup> to 2<sup>nd</sup> R.Y., 6<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> R.Y. and 10<sup>th</sup> to 13<sup>th</sup> R.Y.; Shāista Khān from 3<sup>rd</sup> to 5<sup>th</sup> R.Y., Mirza Rājā Jai Singh from 8<sup>th</sup> to 9<sup>th</sup> R.Y., Bahadur Khān Koka from 14<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> R.Y., Diler Khān in 20<sup>th</sup> R.Y. and Prince Shāh ‘Ālam from 21<sup>st</sup> to 23<sup>rd</sup> R.Y. of the four provinces of the Deccan namely Khandesh, Berar, Aurangabad and Bidar. The Deccan viceroyalty in the last years of Shahjahan, the Deccan provinces, 1659-1682, army organization and deployment in the Deccan, revenue and financial administration have also been carefully dealt with. But the situation dramatically changed when Aurangzeb following the conclusion of the Rajput campaign moved south with his entire court, house hold and the large imperial army to Aurangabad in pursuit of Prince Akbar, who had taken refuge at the court of Shambhājī, son of Shivājī, which served the headquarters for the Mughal Viceroy. Aurangzeb’s march to south for expansion is very much obvious as he had annexed Bijapur and Golconda in 1686-87 and Maratha Kingdom by 1689 besides conquering the major Maratha strong hold of Jinji in 1698 during the late seventeenth century.

The purpose of this thesis is an understanding and comprehension of the ‘Mughal Administration of the Deccan under Aurangzeb [1659-1707]’ which has been divided into two parts from 1652 to 1681 and 1682 to 1707 till his death including expansion in the Deccan as it does cover provincial administration, land revenue & *jizya*, problems of the *zamīndārs*, question of *jāgīr* crisis, the great famine and Mughal administration including banditry in the Mughal

Deccan since the late seventeenth century along with four appendices preface, glossary and bibliography.

I am highly thankful of my supervisor the late Prof. M. Athar Ali, who was kind enough in explaining numerous difficult passages in my research work. My special thanks are due to my revered teacher Prof. Irfan Habib, Professor Emeritus of History at Aligarh Muslim University, who has rigorously scrutinised most of the chapters. He has been generous enough with his precious time as and when I approached him. I am extremely grateful to my supervisor Prof. Abha Singh of IGNOU, New Delhi who has helped me in many ways specially by offering constructive criticism of my work. My friend Prof. S.Z.H. Jafari, Department of History, University of Delhi, has been instrumental in pursuing my research for which I am highly thankful to him. I am also thankful to my colleague Ms N.S. Alam for her help in several ways. My thanks are due to Mr. Zahid of the National Archives, New Delhi who has excellently typed the draft.

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Zakir Husain  
New Delhi

## I

### THE DECCAN VICEROYALTY IN THE LAST YEARS OF SHĀHJAHĀN

As a prelude to the administration of the Deccan under Aurangzeb, we may consider it during the second Viceroyalty of the Deccan from 1652 to 1659 ending with his accession as Emperor.

This period is well illumined due to the availability of extensive documentation contained in the *Ādāb-i 'Ālāmgīrī* – a collection of letters mainly written on behalf of Aurangzeb before his accession by Munshi Qābil Khān<sup>1</sup>. This is supplemented by the documents preserved in A.P. State Archives, Hyderabad and the histories of the period [see map of Mughal India 1652-58 A.D.].

#### [I] LIMITS AND TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES

By the end of Aurangzeb's Viceroyalty, the Deccan comprised four provinces of Khandesh, Berār, Aurangābād and Bidar<sup>2</sup>, comparatively detached from the core of the Mughal Empire making them its periphery experiencing conquest and administrative consolidation relatively late [see map of four Mughal Provinces 1652-58 A.D.].

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<sup>1</sup> Aurangzeb, *Ādāb-i 'Ālāmgīrī*, compiled by Muḥammad Ṣādiq [together with his letters written on behalf of Prince Akbar] in 1703-4, Br. Mus. Or. 177, ed 'Abdul Ghāfur Chaudhūrī, Lahore, Pakistan, 1971, 2 vols. I have made a selection of documents on the administration of Deccan during Aurangzeb's second tenure as Viceroy from *Ādāb-i 'Ālāmgīrī* for my M. Phil Dissertation entitled *Calendar, of Administrative Documents in Ādāb-i 'Ālāmgīrī*, submitted at A.M.U., Aligarh, 1991 [hereafter cited as *Calendar*]. Curiously in *Ādāb* Aurangzeb makes frequent references to his first Viceroyalty of the Deccan essentially for purpose of comparison with his second term as Viceroy.

<sup>2</sup> A *farmān* of Shāhjahān of 1636 to Hakīm Masīh-uz-Zamān proclaims that this *vilāyat* [i.e. Deccan] comprises five *ṣūbas* i.e. *ṣūba* Daulatabad, *ṣūba* Aḥmadnagar, *ṣūba* Berar, *ṣūba* Khandesh and Telingana. *Bib. Nat. Paris, Blochet. Suppl. Pers.* 482, f. 67 [a]. However, a *parwāna* of Islām Khān of 1645 refers to four *ṣūbas* of the Deccan *ibid*, f. 134 [b]. Anyhow there is a plausible explanation that Telingana did not have the status of the *ṣūba*. It was later merged with Bidar to form the *ṣūba* of Bidar.

*Ṣūba* Khandesh, conquered by Akbar in 1601, with its capital at Burhanpur<sup>1</sup> which became the *sarkār* of Asir at a later stage was enlarged in 1634 by transferring the *sarkār* of Nandurbar, Bijagārh and portions of *sarkār* Handia in the south of the Narbada R. from *ṣūba* Malwa<sup>2</sup>, as well as attaching forthwith *sarkār* Galna after its occupation in 1632. Baglana was added to it in 1658 twenty years after its annexation<sup>3</sup> to the Mughal Empire in 1638<sup>4</sup> [APPENDIX – A]. The boundaries of *ṣūba* Berar largely remained unchanged from Akbar’s time except for inclusion in the north of the entire principality of Deograh as a *sarkār* transferred from *ṣūba* Malwa and the southern boundaries were affected due to the creation of *ṣūba* Telingana which was in subsequent period merged into *ṣūba* Bidar.

In 8<sup>th</sup> regnal year Shāhjahān introduced grouping of the *sarkārs* of *ṣūba* Berar into two new administrative jurisdictions, by the creation of two new provinces, Pāinghāt and Bālāghāt<sup>5</sup>, which between them comprised the whole of the Mughal Deccan. This arrangement was subsequently discarded except for the geographical nomenclature. Pāinghāt constituted five *sarkārs* of Narnala, Kherla, Gavil, Punar and Kalam whereas Bālāghāt comprised *sarkār* of Baitala, Mehkar, Basim and Mahur.

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<sup>1</sup> Burhanpur served as headquarters not only of Khandesh out of the entire Deccan until its replacement by Aurangabad in 1636. [Cf., Irfan Habib, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, [hereafter *Atlas*] O.U.P., Delhi, 1982, p. 36].

<sup>2</sup> Lahori, *Pādshāhnāma*, II, pp. 62-3, [Cf., *Atlas*, pp. 23, 34]. These were erroneously shown transferred to *ṣūba* Khandesh in 1636 instead of 1634 as shown by J.F. Richards [ed.] *Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India*, O.U.P., Delhi, 1987, p. 194 on the strength of R.A. Alvi’s ‘Mughal Geographical Accounts of Khandesh’, *Medieval India - A Miscellany*, vol. III, pp. 127-8.


<sup>3</sup> Lahori, II, p. 105-7.

<sup>4</sup> It was treated as a separate territory [*wilāyat*], but without the status of a *ṣūba* is also recorded as a separate unit in *Dastūru-l ‘Amal-i ‘Ālāmgīrī* c. 1659. MS, Br. Mus. Add. 6598 f. 120 [a], whose statistics belong to 1656. But it was later on joined to *ṣūba* Khandesh as one of its *sarkārs*. Its annexation to the Mughal Empire is attested by two *farmāns* of Shāhjahān of 1638 and 1645 [Blochet. *Suppl. Pers.* 482, ff. 14 [a-b], 24 [a-b]]. But thenceforward it remained under the charge of the Viceroy of the Deccan. [Cf., *ibid*, f. 150].


<sup>5</sup> Cf., Bloch. *Suppl. Pers.* 482, f. 23 [b], which contains a *farmān* of Shāhjahān of 1647 in regard to their protection by directing Shāh Nawāz Khān to proceed from Malwa to Burhanpur to look after Pāinghāt and Rashid Khān to march from Nander to Aurangabad to control Bālāghāt.


# THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

## UNDER SHĀH JAHĀN 1658



(after M. Athar Ali, *The Apparatus of Empire*, Delhi, 1985)





*Ṣūba* Aurangabad largely comprised the former kingdom of Aḥmadnagar annexed by Akbar in 1595-6 but its real annexation<sup>1</sup> with the seizure of Daulatabad was effected in 1633. In 1636 the *ṣūba* contained the *sarkārs* of Daulatabad, Aḥmadnagar, Paithan, Bir, Jalnapur<sup>2</sup>, Junnar [Junair], Sangamner and Fatehabad [Dharur<sup>3</sup>] whereas the *sarkār* of Junnar, Talkokan, Parenda and Sholapur which were in possession of Bijapur Kingdom by the settlement of 1636 were subsequently ceded to it in 1657<sup>4</sup>.

Shāhjahān in his early years [i.e. 1635] created a separate region of Telingana by incorporating certain annexations from the Nizāmshahi Kingdom and portions of *sarkār* Pathri<sup>5</sup>. However this dispensation did not last long because consequent upon the annexation of Bidar and Kalyan from Bijapur Kingdom in 1657, the newly created *ṣūba* of Telingana comprising the single *sarkār* of Nander was merged with the recent acquisitions so as to create the new *ṣūba* of Bidar. The *ṣūba* of Bidar comprised *sarkārs* of Nander, Kalyan, Bidar, Akalkot, Malkhaid, Yadgir [Firuzgarh], whereas *sarkār* Ramgir ceded by Quṭbshah to the Mughal Empire in 1656 was subsequently made a *sarkār* of the *ṣūba*<sup>6</sup>.

## [II] MAIN OFFICIALS

When Aurangzeb was appointed as Viceroy of the Deccan for the second term in 1652 A.D., he again ratified that the Mughal imperial administration acknowledged the distinctiveness of the four Deccan provinces by stationing a Viceroy of the Deccan at Aurangabad who

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<sup>1</sup> Fateh Khān s/o Malik Ambar, who joined the Mughal service, killed Nizāmu-l Mulk, recited *Khutba* [Friday sermon], struck coins in Shāhjahān's name, sent *peshkash* [tribute] consisting of elephants, horses, diamonds, studded weapons, through his son 'Abdur Rasūl, was favoured with the rank of 7,000/7,000 for strengthening the Mughal control [which does not incidentally find any mention in Athar Ali's *Apparatus, of Empire*, Delhi, 1985, hereafter *Apparatus*] and the *jama* ' of fifty crore *dāms* yielding one crore rupees was assigned in *jāgīr* of the imperial officials together with 21 strong forts of Qandahar [Kandahar] and Mahur and the areas along with fort equivalent to his *jāgīr* was given to him and the remaining portions of Nizāmu-l Mulk were annexed [Blochet. *Suppl. Pers.* 482, ff. 9 [a-b], 65 [a], 67 [b].

<sup>2</sup> Before the capture of Daulatabad in 1633 control of Jalnapur was important for the Mughals, which was regained only in 1616, [Cf., *Atlas*, p. 55].

<sup>3</sup> Lahori, I, ii, p. 62.

<sup>4</sup> Muḥammad Sālih, '*Amal-i Sālih*, [ed.] Ghulam Yazdani, Bib. Ind. Calcutta, 1912-46, vol. III, p. 262.

<sup>5</sup> Lahori, I, ii, p. 62, p. 711.

<sup>6</sup> Lachmi Narayan Shafiq, *Khulāṣatu-l Hind*, transcript, Department of History, A.M.U., Aligarh, p. 151.

exercised control over the provincial administration by appointing their governors because according to his own estimation he had high officials under him during his first Viceroyalty of the Deccan while none such except for the Deccanis were available to him during his second term. The problems were complicated further by the demand of the officials posted in the Deccan as *faujdhārs* and *qila'dārs* etc for their promotions<sup>1</sup>.

Aurangzeb as Viceroy appointed Mirzā Khān as the *nāzim* [governor] of *ṣūba* Berar in 1654 with the rank of 3,000/3,000<sup>2</sup>, before which 'Abdullāh, s/o Rashīd Khān Anṣārī with the rank of 1,500/1,500 held the office<sup>3</sup>. Similarly Hādi Dād Khān, 1,000/300 was made the *nāzim* of Telingana in 1655, which position he enjoyed till his death in 1655<sup>4</sup>. Mīr Muḥammad Sai'd or Mīr Jumla with a rank of 6,000/6,000 was made the *ṣūbedār* [Governor] of Burhanpur [Khandesh]<sup>5</sup>. Aurangabad was the seat of Viceroy himself. These appointments presumably needed confirmation by the Emperor.

In addition, other important officials were there, Diyānat Khān<sup>6</sup> had remained the *Dīwān* of Bālāghāt till he was replaced by Murshid Quli Khān<sup>7</sup>. Multafat Khān held the *Dīwānī* of Painghat till 1656 when it was handed over to Murshid Quli Khān on the recommendations of Aurangzeb<sup>8</sup>. Practically this reform was largely carried out by Murshid Quli Khān, assisted for some time by Multāfat Khān as it began with the classic expedient of crop sharing and Aurangzeb's letters make it crystal clear that this applied to the entire territory, including the *jāgīrs*. Interestingly the particular form of sharing which was used is said to have been the innovation of Murshid Quli Khān himself. Actually the proportions to which the revenue was to be collected were based on a different scale. Practically speaking half of the

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<sup>1</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.17, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 155.

<sup>2</sup>Muḥammad Wāris, *Pādshāhnāma*, I.O., Ethe, 329, f. 22 [b].

<sup>3</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.10, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p146, Wāris, 184 [b], 198 [b].

<sup>4</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.29, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p181, Wāris, 222 [b], 248 [a], 261 [a].

<sup>5</sup>*Ādāb*, Br. Mus. Or. 177, f. 116 [a] as cited in *Apparatus*, 6586.

<sup>6</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.4, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p119, Lahori, II, 728.

<sup>7</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.5, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p122. Khāfi Khān, I, 733, n, who otherwise follows Ṣādiq Khān in this passage here reads differently. He says that Murshid Quli Khān, appointed new *muqāddams* in villages which had no *muqāddams*, the heirs of the former *muqāddams* of these places having been disappeared through the adversity of fate.

<sup>8</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.15, 1.16, 1.17, 1.43, *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 139, 142, 154, 206-8 and 237-8.

produce was to be taken from crops raised on rainfall; and a third from crops irrigated from well, but in the case of sugarcane, fruits and spices, the share was to range from one-third to one-fourth, keeping in view the cost of irrigation and with respect of fruits the years the trees to bear fruits. Furthermore, different rates were also promulgated for crops irrigated from streams and canals. Ṣādiq Khān definitely says that the old system of assessing the revenue by the number of ploughs was still retained in certain areas, while the practice of measurement was introduced in others. Naturally for the purpose of the latter, Murshid Quli Khān is said to have determined the *rai* for every crop and to have fixed the *dastūrs* per *bighā* after taking account of the prices. Though Aurangzeb did not say anything about the measurement yet since he declares that crop sharing had proved an expensive method he could hardly have anticipated its permanent fixture. Ṣādiq Khān actually says that Murshid Quli Khān measured the area of most of the *parganas*. Though the revenue records of *pargana* Papal [Berar], C. 1679, give detailed particulars concerning its measured area yet the decisive evidence is furnished by the village and area statistics of Aurangzeb's reign as these show that nearly nine-tenths of the villages of Berar and Aurangabad had been measured and nearly a half of those of Khandesh. It would naturally seem, therefore, that the major result of Murshid Quli Khān's reforms was the introduction of measurement, and that crop-sharing was only employed at the beginning to help in fixing workable *rai*'s for the different crops<sup>1</sup>. Murshid Quli Khān is credited to have devoted so much attention to formulating the *rai*'s that in order to prevent any inaccuracy he would himself pick up one end of the measuring rope [after Murshid Quli Khān's reforms] in Mughal Deccan. In Mughal Deccan, the payment of revenue in cash, based upon a very summary assessment, is described as an old practice, but after the brief interval of crop-sharing introduced by Murshid Quli Khān, payment in cash was re-established though it was founded on assessment by measurement. Interestingly enough the distribution of *taqāvi* for similar purposes of cultivation also formed an important part of Murshid Quli Khān's reforms in the Deccan for the purchase of bullocks, buffaloes and other necessaries. We are given to understand that his colleague Multafat Khān was the author of an ambitious proposal to advance Rs. 40,000 to 50,000 "as *taqāvi*" from the imperial treasury for financing the construction of dams [*bānds*] in the provinces of Khandesh and Berar [Pāinghāt region], to be disbursed in the *jāgīrs* and also, presumably, in the *Khālīṣā*. Multafat Khān had promised that, if his scheme of financing bunds was accepted, the whole

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<sup>1</sup> Ṣādiq Khān, Or.174, +f 185[b]-186[a], Or.1671, f. 91 [a]; Khāfi Khān, vol. I, pp. 733-4.

amount advanced could be realized within two years. However, collection in annual installments was also sanctioned. Murshid Quli Khān is said to have asked for repayment at the time of harvest, but in two installments.

Aurangzeb appointed Ziauddin Ḥusain as his *Dīwān* in 1653<sup>1</sup>, who was promoted as the *Dīwān* of the Deccan in 1656 after the death of Murshid Quli Khān<sup>2</sup>. In 1652 Muḥammad Ṣafī was appointed *Bakhshi* and *Wāqi‘a Nawīs* of the Deccan<sup>3</sup>, which was held by Mīr Ja‘far Astarabadi in 1655<sup>4</sup>. In 1656 it was transferred to Qazi Nizāmā Karharodi<sup>5</sup>. Aurangzeb secured the post of *Dārogha-i Top Khāna-iDeccan* [Superintendent of the Artillery of the Deccan] for Hoshdar Khān<sup>6</sup>, which was previously held by Mīr Khalīlullāh<sup>7</sup> [1650-52]. From 1654 to 1656 it was held by Shamsuddīn<sup>8</sup>.

Since the administration of the *sarkārs* of these four provinces was carried out through numerous important officials to whom we find frequent references in our sources *viz.*, Muḥammad Shāh Qadīmī<sup>9</sup> was appointed the *qila‘dār* of Qandahar fort after the death of Amān Baig. *Ṣūba* Khandesh where Aurangzeb stayed in the first instance during his first Viceroyalty had several high Mughal officials. Saiyid ‘Abdul Wahab, who was credited for the excellent administration of Baglana as its *faujdār* [military commandant] was succeeded by ‘Umar Tarīn<sup>10</sup>, who was censured by Shāhjahān, and then by Asadullāh s/o Faizullah<sup>11</sup>. ‘Usman Afghān, *faujdār* of *Bijagārh* in 1653 was replaced by Muḥammad Beg Khāishgī, an official of Aurangzeb

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<sup>1</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.10, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 147.

<sup>2</sup>*Selected Documents of Shahjahan’s Reign*, [SDSR] ed. Yusuf Husain Khān, *Daftar-i Dīwānī*, Deccan, Hyderabad, 1950, p. 202.

<sup>3</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.11, *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 136-7, *Wāriṣ*, f. 229 [b].

<sup>4</sup>*Wāriṣ*, ff. 229 [b], 249 [b].

<sup>5</sup>*Wāriṣ*, ff. 249 [b].

<sup>6</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.11, 1.12, *Ādāb*, 136-7, 153, *Wāriṣ*, f. 164[a].

<sup>7</sup>*Wāriṣ*, f. 169 [a].

<sup>8</sup>*Wāriṣ*, ff. 185 [a], 205 [b].

<sup>9</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.3, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 114-117.

<sup>10</sup>Saiyid ‘Abdul Wahāb s/o Saiyid ‘Abdur Rahmān was appointed the *qila‘dār* of Bāglānā in 1644, *SDSR*, p141. His appointment was also confirmed through a *farmān* of Shāhjahān and *parwāna* of Islām Khān of 1645. *Bloch. Suppl. Pers.* 482, ff. 22 [a], 134 [b] and 140 [b].

<sup>11</sup>*Wāriṣ*, 415 [b] *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.5, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 121.

and the former was pacified by grant of the *faujdārī* of Sulṭanpur and Nandurbar<sup>1</sup>. Manohar Das held the *qila 'dārī* of Asir on the eve of Aurangzeb's second Viceroyalty<sup>2</sup>. Fathullāh s/o Zakariya was the *faujdār* of Chopda [*sarkār* Asir]<sup>3</sup> while Mir Muḥammad 'Ali was the *qila 'dār* of Galna<sup>4</sup>. Mīr Aḥmad<sup>5</sup> appointed as *faujdār* of Nasirabad [*sarkār* Asir] in 1652-3 was succeeded by Jalāl Khān Kākar in 1656<sup>6</sup>. Pratap Singh was appointed in 1652-3 as the *qila 'dār* of Dhurb [*sarkār* Galna]<sup>7</sup>. Muḥammad 'Inayat s/o Islām Khān was the *bakhshi* and *wāqīa 'nawīs* of Burhanpur in 1654<sup>8</sup>. Mir Ja'far was the *faujdār* of Chainpur [*sarkār* Handia]<sup>9</sup>. Roshan Beg Khawāfi Khān was the *faujdār* of Sulṭanpur and Nandurbar<sup>10</sup>.

Initially Aurangzeb was directed to stay at Burhanpur to administer Pāinghāt where after he was bound to proceed to Daulatabad to improve the administration of Bālāghāt as he was advised to consider both of them under him<sup>11</sup>. Names of some important officials of *ṣūba* Berar occur in contemporary accounts. Fath Rohila [Afghan] was the *faujdār* of Nandapur Bālāghāt [*sarkār* Mahur] in 1653<sup>12</sup> whereas 'Ināyat Khān s/o Islām Khān was recommended for the *faujdārī* of [*sarkār*] Mahur<sup>13</sup> and Hoshdār for that of [*sarkār*] Kalam<sup>14</sup>. Bindraban was reported

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<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 145 [b].

<sup>3</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 205 [b]; *Apparatus*, S-6178.

<sup>4</sup> A.P. State Archives, Hyderabad [henceforth Hyd. 4037].

<sup>5</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 157 [a], *Apparatus*, S-5737.

<sup>6</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 248 [a] Shāh Nawāz Khān, *Maasiru-l Umara*.

<sup>7</sup> Hyd. 3842, p473 of Jammun was *faujdār*.

<sup>8</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 212 [a], *Apparatus*, S-6202.

<sup>9</sup> Sāliḥ, vol. III, p. 245.

<sup>10</sup> *Calendar*, Doc No. 6.5, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 473. There are several other examples *viz.*, Raja Sangrām Singh, *Zamīndār* Jammun was the *faujdār* of Manjrud with the rank of 700/500 in 1653, [Wāriṣ 194 [a], who was succeeded by his g/son Sārang Dhar in the same year after his death [*Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 151]. Similarly Pahārū Nauhanī was the *thānādār* of Bahādurpur in 1654 [Sāliḥ, vol. III, p. 206] and Bakhtiyar Khān was the *thānādār* of Salher [*sarkār* Baglana] [Hyd. 3705]. Imāmuddin Muḥammad and Nizāmuddin Muḥammad served as *Mīr-i 'Adl* and *Ṣadr* of Burhanpur respectively, [*SDSR*, p191] and Muḥammad Sāliḥ served as its *wāqīa 'nawīs* [*SDSR*, p185].

<sup>11</sup> *Calendar*, Doc No. 1.44, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 187.

<sup>12</sup> *Calendar*, Doc No. 1.45, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p180.

<sup>13</sup> Wāriṣ, 148 [b]. Nandapur has been recorded as Taundapur in the source, *Apparatus*, S-6609.

<sup>14</sup> Wāriṣ f. 217 [b], *Apparatus*, S-6336.

to be the *amīn* of *parganas* of Bālāghāt<sup>1</sup>. Imām Quli Turkomān was the *qila'dār* of Zafarnagar [*sarkār* Mehkar] in 1655<sup>2</sup> which post was subsequently retained by Mīr Aḥmad Khwāfi<sup>3</sup>. Aurangzeb also recommended the grant of *faujdāri* of Mahur to Murshid Quli Khān<sup>4</sup>. Shāhjahān favoured Multafat Khān for Ellichpur for which subsequently Jalāl Khān's name was approved by the Emperor. But Jalāl Khān was made the *faujdār* of Punar due to his inexperience<sup>5</sup>, vacating Ellichpur in 1653 in favour of 'Abdullah<sup>6</sup>. It was next year placed under the *faujdāri* of Mirza Khān<sup>7</sup>.

*Ṣūba* Aurangabad had also several important officials as is known from our sources. Mirzā Khān, grandson of 'Abdur Raḥim Khān-i Khānān, who was appointed as the *qila'dār* of Aḥmadnagar in 1650, was replaced in 1653 by Shāh Beg Khān, who retained it till 1655<sup>8</sup>.

There after Multafat Khān was assigned the *qiladāri* of Aḥmadnagar in 1656<sup>9</sup> where after Nasīr Khān<sup>10</sup> received its castellanship for whom Aurangzeb had endeavored through Sa'dullah Khān.

Derwesh Beg Qāqshāl, *qila'dār* of Tirambak [*sarkār* Sangamner] was replaced by Shafqatullāh s/o Sazāwār Khān<sup>11</sup> in 1654 which was, however, subsequently held by Mirzā 'Alī s/o 'Arab Khān<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Izzat Khān held the *qila'dāri* of Fathabad and Dharur in 1652<sup>13</sup>. Raja Debi Singh Bundela was made the *faujdār* of Bir<sup>14</sup>. In 1653 the castellanship of Junair was

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<sup>1</sup> Hyd. 4079.

<sup>2</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 217 [b], *Apparatus*, S-6336.

<sup>3</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 248 [a], *Apparatus*, S-6609.

<sup>4</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.20; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 217.

<sup>5</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.9; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 141-2.

<sup>6</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.10; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 146.

<sup>7</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.16, or Wāriṣ, f. 198 [b], *Apparatus*, S-6133. Ināmullah was appointed as *thānādār* of *sarkār* Kalam.

<sup>8</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.8, 1.9, *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 141, 145.

<sup>9</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.43; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 274; Wāriṣ, f. 224 [a], *Apparatus*, S-6377.

<sup>10</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 15.1; *Ādāb*, vol. II, pp. 727-8.

<sup>11</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.22, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 151, Hyd. 4155; Wāriṣ, f. 194 [b], *Apparatus*, S-6043.

<sup>12</sup> Wāriṣ 212 [b], *Apparatus*, S-6206.

<sup>13</sup> *SDSR*, p. 180.

<sup>14</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 198 [a].

in-charge of Narsingh Das s/o Raja Dwārka Dās<sup>1</sup> and its *thānādāri* was in assignment of Nazar<sup>2</sup>. In 1655 it was in-charge of Muḥammad Ṭāhir Ṣaf Shikan Khān, who was succeeded by Nūrul Ḥasan Khān<sup>3</sup>. Mumrez Khān was appointed the *faujdār* of Junair<sup>4</sup>, Abul Faḥal Ma‘muri held the *faujdāri* of Onkapur<sup>5</sup>.

In 1657 Hoshdār received the *faujdāri* of Chamargonda Kada and Bust [*sarkār* Aḥmad Nagar]<sup>6</sup>. ‘Abdul Nabī held the *faujdārī* of Rāherī [Raigarh] in 1656<sup>7</sup> and Rashīd Khān Anṣārī was entrusted with the military commandantship [*faujdāri*] of Dindori [*sarkār* Sangamner]<sup>8</sup>.

The separate *sarkār* of Telingana which was merged in *sarkār* Nander later in *ṣūba* Bidar in 1657, had some high officials. Consequent upon the death of Amān Beg, the *qila‘dār* of Qandahar fort, Muḥammad Shāh Qadīmī was appointed its castellan<sup>9</sup>; it was subsequently assigned to Muḥammad Beg<sup>10</sup>. In 1657 Ḥusāmuddin Khān was the *faujdār* of Telingana<sup>11</sup> before which he held the *qila‘dārī* of Ūdgir [*sarkār* Nander<sup>12</sup>].

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<sup>1</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 168 [a], *Apparatus*, S-5745.

<sup>2</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 177 [b], *Apparatus*, S-5936.

<sup>3</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 230 [a], *Apparatus*, S-6414, S-6415.

<sup>4</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 12.2; *Ādāb*, vol. II, p. 744. These examples can be multiplied *viz.*, Dildost was the *thānādār* of Bījāpur, [*sarkār* Pattan or Paithān], [Wāriṣ, f. 195 [b], *Apparatus*, S-6045], Muḥammad Beg was appointed the *kotwāl* of Aurangabad [Hyd. 4277] and La‘l Beg was the *darogha* [superintendent] of the stores of Daulatābād fort in 1658. [*SDSR*, p. 218].

<sup>5</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 11.6; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 606. He was granted *thānādārī* of Lādsangwi [*sarkār* Jālnāpur] by removing Sai‘d Khāndesi etc, *Calendar*, Doc. No. 11.5, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 599.

<sup>6</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 15, *Ādāb*, vol. II, p. 729.

<sup>7</sup> Wāriṣ, 274 [b]; *Apparatus*, S-6603.

<sup>8</sup> Wāriṣ 169 [b], *Apparatus*, S-5765. Aurangzeb’s original *nishān* of 10 *Rajab* 17<sup>th</sup> regnal year [1644 A.D.] to Rashīd Khān Ansari, probably a relative of Sai‘d Khān Chaghtā in response to his representation stating that his solicitation could not be acceded to recall him from the border due to Aurangzeb’s summoning to the imperial court, also assuring him of the princely favours with instructions to make his representations. [Photocopy of original is with me for which I am thankful to the owner Mr. Kabir of Bhopal [M.P.].

<sup>9</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.3, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 117.

<sup>10</sup> Wāriṣ 148 [b], *Apparatus*, S-5660.

<sup>11</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 92 [b]; *Apparatus*, S-5222. He was appointed to this post after the death of Karamullāh with an increase of 500/400 enhancing his rank to 2,000/2,000 with the instructions to reach there immediately after the receipt of the imperial *farmān*, protect the fort with utmost care, look after the welfare of the artillerymen as well as stores and other responsibilities of castellanship. *Bloch. Suppl. Pers.* 482, ff. 23 [b] - 24 [a].

<sup>12</sup> Wāriṣ, f. 92[b], *Apparatus*, S-5222.

In 1653 Uzbek Khān was replaced by Khawāja Barkhurdar as *faujdār* of Ausa<sup>1</sup>. During the same period Ilhāmullāh s/o Rashīd Khān enjoyed the *thānādāri* of Nander<sup>2</sup>.

Aurangzeb maintained cordial relations with his main officials including *Dīwāns* and *Bakhshis*, *Nāzims* and *Hājibs*, as well as with other officials ranging from *Dārogha-i Top Khanā-i Deccan* to the *thānādārs* by not only remaining in regular contact observing their conduct through surveillance but also pleading their case either for promotion or for posting in view of the expediency of the situation with the Emperor. The *Ādāb-i Ālāmḡīrī* is replete with numerous such instances [as shall be revealed from the next two sections]. Aurangzeb's frequent and loud protestation against undue dismissals and transfers of his officials reflect his deep attachment with his men whom he had gathered during the past two decades<sup>3</sup>. His spirited defense and bold and frequent pleading for the promotion and posting of his officials which were either turned down or modified or delayed or reluctantly accepted demonstrated Aurangzeb's sincerity in streamlining the Deccan administration.

### [III] THE *JĀGĪR* ASSIGNMENTS – PROBLEMS OF LOW MONTHLY *JĀGĪRS*

It was but natural that the *manṣabdars* were assigned *jāḡīrs*, which were of varying categories, to meet the pay claim [*talab*] according to the *manṣab*. While the evolution of Mughal *manṣab* system ascribed to Akbar<sup>4</sup>, its basic elements were retained by his successors with certain new features specially emerging under Shāhjahān, *viz.*, new scales of pay, month ratio, conditional rank and new regulations fixing the strength of contingent under different

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<sup>1</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 204, *Ādāb*, vol. II, pp. 628-31.

<sup>2</sup>Wāriṣ, f. 184[b], *Appratus*, S-5991.

<sup>3</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 2.4, *Ādāb*, vol. II, pp. 628-31.

<sup>4</sup>For *manṣab* system see, W.H. Moreland, 'Rank [*Manṣab*] in the Mogul State Service, *JRAS*, London, 1936, pp. 641-65; A.J. Qaisar, 'Note on the Date of Institution of *Manṣab* under Akbar, *Proc. Ind. Hist. Cong. [PIHC]* 24<sup>th</sup> Session, Delhi, 1961, pp. 55-7, Irfan Habib, *The Manṣab System, 1596-1637, PIHC*, 29<sup>th</sup> Session, Patiala, 1967, 221-42, *idem* 'Salary and Pay Scales Under Jahangir and Shahjahan, *Islamic Culture*, 1985; Shireen Moosvi. *The Evolution of Manṣab System under Akbar until 1596-7, JRAS*, London, No. 2, 1981, pp. 173-85.

*sawār* ranks<sup>1</sup>, with which we are mainly concerned in regard to Deccan Viceroyalty during the last years of Shāhjahān<sup>2</sup>.

*Jāgīrs* were of different categories based on the ratio of their actual income [*hāṣil*] to their normal income [*jama'*, *jama'dāmi*] which was expressed in terms of month i.e. if its income was one-third of the *jama'* the *jāgīr* would be *chahārmāhā* or four monthly<sup>3</sup>. The month ratio of the *jāgīrdārs* changed from year to year and under Shāhjahān the military obligations of *amanṣabdār* fixed according to the month ratio of his *jāgīr*<sup>4</sup>.

Although the conditions of *jāgīrs* in the Deccan were deteriorating yet these were to be assigned to the *jāgīrdārs* to meet their pay claims in view of the scarcity of *pāibāqi* and extra – Deccan *jāgīrs*. Towards the close of Shāhjahān's reign the revenue realization in the Deccan was only one-third or one-fourth of the *jama'* due to desolation of peasantry<sup>5</sup> and the practice of deduction of one-fourth or one-fifth or one-sixth portion of the Deccan *amanṣabdārs'* pay claim had already become prevalent under Shāhjahān<sup>6</sup>, as the practice of reducing the pay claims of the Deccani nobles by a fourth was established in 1634.

Such a phenomenon had excessively disturbing effect on the income from the *jāgīrs* as there were no factors inhibiting expansion of fertile *jāgīrs* and the availability of full revenue-yielding *jāgīrs*, which naturally had an overwhelming impact on the working of *jāgīr* administration causing wide spread discontent. Diyānat Khān, who was assigned *pargana* Phulambari by the imperial *Dīwāns* wanted to visit the court to plead his case due to its low yield

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<sup>1</sup> M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, Bombay, 1966, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Even during Aurangzeb's first Viceroyalty Shāhjahān issued a detailed *farmān* to Aurangzeb in 1641-42 for branding regulations in the Deccan, Zakir Husain, *Aurangzeb's First Viceroyalty of the Deccan: A Reappraisal*, PIHC, Delhi, 2010, pp. 310-17.

<sup>3</sup> Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*; Bombay, 1963, p. 264.

<sup>4</sup> Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility*, pp. 26-30, 54-8. There is enough evidence in contemporary historical literature to prove this phenomenon. Even Shāhjahān's previously referred to *farmān* of 14<sup>th</sup> R.Y. was issued on the report of Prince Muḥammad Dārā Shukoh as well as that of Islām Khān and Afzal Khān. *Bloch. Supp. Pers.* 482, ff. 46 [a] - 47 [a].

<sup>5</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.24; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 166.

<sup>6</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.36, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 149; *SDSR*, pp. 1-23, 88.

[*kam-hāṣili*]. However, Aurangzeb endeavoured to retain him due to his knowledge of the Deccan by exchange of his *jāgīr*<sup>1</sup>.

Such a low income was reflected in month-ratio showing corresponding decline in the *jāgīrs* of most *mansabdārs* in the Deccan which were not more than four-monthly' and often even less<sup>2</sup>. In the later years of Shāhjahān transfer from Northern India to the Deccan entailed assignment of a low monthly *jagīr*<sup>3</sup>.

Aurangzeb correctly opined that grant of two offices of *Bakhshi* and *Dārogha-i Top Khana* to Şafi Khān was a burden on the *jāgīrs* of the Deccan in view of their desolation<sup>4</sup>. Murshid Quli Khān was assigned *pargana* Posad with abatement in *jama* ' which was, however, low-revenue paying. Accordingly Aurangzeb ordered assignment of three lakh *dāms* from it and the rest to the equal to 5-6 was to be paid from elsewhere like Diyānat Khān<sup>5</sup>. It was brought to the imperial notice that Murshid Quli Khān held '10-monthly' *jāgīrs* in Hindustan [North India] whereas notwithstanding increase in rank assignment of *Dīwānī* of Bālāghāt and expenses of *sih-bandī* [auxiliary troops] his *jāgīr* in the Deccan was '5-monthly' whereas he required much to equal his income and expenditure which was further disbalanced by the introduction of branding regulations compelling him for maintaining 70% more contingent<sup>6</sup>. Curiously enough Aurangzeb also noticed that Murshid Quli Khān used to receive '12-monthly' *jāgīr* in Hindustan whereas his total *jāgīr* in the Deccan equaled to '6-monthly' which had caused inconvenience to the recipient. Since, Aurangzeb expressed his inability either to assign any *jāgīr* or recommend enhancement in rank with Shāhjahān's approbation, he pleaded his increase in his *mansābor* grant of '8-monthly' *jāgīr*<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.4, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 118, *SDSR*, pp. 1-2, 13 and passing.

<sup>2</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.35, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 149.

<sup>3</sup>Saiyid Najib Ashraf Nadvi [ed.] *Ruqa 't-i Ālamgīr*, Azamgarh, 1930, p. 88.

<sup>4</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.11, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 137.

<sup>5</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.5, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 122.

<sup>6</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 6.4, 11.1, *Ādāb*, p. 466-7, 600-601.

<sup>7</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.20, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 217.

The above is an index of the sharp decline in month ratio which was reduced to 50% by transfer to Deccan from North India. Shamsuddīn, Superintendent of the Artillery of the Deccan as he held '7-monthly' *jāgīr* in Bihar which was, however, compensated by assigning '7-monthly' *jāgīr*<sup>1</sup> in the Deccan to him. But the conditions had worsened to such an extent that Aurangzeb used to report them to the Emperor or the Central Ministers for taking corrective measures, for example, he asked Fāzil Khān to recommend the case of Rūḥullāh Khān due to deteriorating condition of the Deccan *jāgīrs*.<sup>2</sup>

Aurangzeb conveyed to Shāhjahān that 'Ināyat Khān, s/o Islām Khān held '8-monthly' *jāgīr* in Hindustan whereas his *jāgīr* in the Deccan was '5-monthly' he was granted the *faujdāri* of *sarkār* Mehkar with an increase in *mansāb* based on '5-monthly' ratio<sup>3</sup>. It was the natural corollary of the low yielding *jāgīrs*. In view of the declining revenues Aurangzeb strongly recommended assignment of Ankot etc to Shāh Beg Khān by fixing its *jama* at one crore and sixty lakh *dāms* instead of two crore *dāms*, whereas, like Shāista Khān, he could be granted *jāgīr* worth forty lakh *dāms* from elsewhere.<sup>4</sup>

There is no need of multiplication of such examples. But it is an irony of fate that Aurangzeb, as Viceroy of the Deccan encountered this problem of low income *jāgīrs*, which one cannot overlook. Aurangzeb pleaded that the income from his *jāgīrs* in Deccan was greatly low, and that the problem for him was further complicated by the transfer of his *jāgīrs* in Multan and Bhakkar and a reduction of Rs 17,00,000 where he needed better *jāgīrs* to keep his head high before the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda.<sup>5</sup>

Shāhjahān, however, laid emphasize upon proper administration of the Deccan especially that of his *jāgīrs* whereas Aurangzeb strove for securing better *jāgīr* assignments to himself and his officials outside the Deccan.<sup>6</sup> He even granted Baglana, which was originally in his *inā'm*

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<sup>1</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.21, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 198.

<sup>2</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 13.2, *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 642-3.

<sup>3</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.44, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 187.

<sup>4</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.16, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 140.

<sup>5</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.1, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 96.

<sup>6</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.6, *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 116-7 and several other documents in *Ādāb-i 'Ālāmgīrī*.

grant without obtaining any alternative *jāgīr* in exchange. The Emperor asked him to send Shāh Beg Khān to the Imperial Court and suggested either to take his *jāgīr* or assign it to someone else. In consequence of Aurangzeb's failure in convincing Shāhjahān in regard to this move he expressed his willingness to accept it in '10-monthly' *naqdi* without loss [*āfat*]<sup>1</sup>. The Prince again faced censure on the ground that since he had sought Ellichpur without abatement he was now soliciting reduction in *jama*', in response to which Aurangzeb's own commitment that whatever he would obtain from other *jāgīrdārs* its *jama*' would be fixed suitably which led him to his consent for Ellichpur. But in the event of refusal of reduction in *jama*' in this *jāgīr*, which he received in lieu of his *naqdi* he would suffer a loss of ten lakh rupees<sup>2</sup>. Aurangzeb's surrender of Ellichpur was interpreted as his failure in administering the Deccan which the Prince refuted on the ground that since the *pargana* had declined in revenue for the last twenty years how could it be brought to prosperity within one and two harvest<sup>3</sup>.

Aurangzeb's remark proves that he used to minutely observe the position of each and every *pargana* of the Deccan on the basis of records of several decades \_\_\_\_ which is further proved by his detailed description of the state of revenues of various *parganas* under *jāgīr orkhāliṣa* as shall be discussed in the next section in regard to Chananeri *Deshmukh* episode as he was the Chief of Indur in Telingana. Despite his being a keen observer one fails to reconcile his other statement that Ellichpur merely required *jāgīr* administration and improvement in agriculture<sup>4</sup>, a task which could not be accomplished within two decades by his own admission!

Aurangzeb had never remained negligent in commending the endeavours of the improvers as is evident from his appreciation for Mūr Khālīlullāh and Murshid Quli Khān enhancing income of *jāgīrs* of *parganas* of Daryapur and Bir respectively<sup>5</sup>.

Shāhjahān in disregard of ground realities offered some unrealistic option to the Prince *viz.* his allowing Aurangzeb for exchange of more revenue paying *jāgīrs* of other *jāgīrdārs* to

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<sup>1</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.9, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 141.

<sup>2</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.8, *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 144-5.

<sup>3</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.9, *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 141-3.

<sup>4</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.9, *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 141-3.

<sup>5</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.12, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 153.

which he showed his disinclination. Even when he resumed low revenue yielding *jāgīrs* worth, 1,27,00,000 *dāms* of some incompetent officials it did not meet Imperial approbation. When abatement in the *jama* of some low revenue paying *parganas* was sanctioned Aurangzeb pleaded for ‘8 monthly *naqdi* in lieu of his disputed ‘9-monthly’ *jāgīr*<sup>1</sup>.

Since Aurangzeb’s such cryptic remarks, perhaps could not dispel the cobweb of suspicion he suggested for procuring Imperial orders regarding *jāgīr* affairs of other *jāgīrdārs* in context with Multafat *Khān*’s request for loan, which during his first Viceroyalty he could advance on his surety<sup>2</sup>.

In view of the deteriorating conditions of *jāgīr* in the Deccan Shāhjahān ordered the resumption of Bir *tokhāliṣa* and in lieu assignment of ‘10-monthly’ *naqdi* to Aurangzeb<sup>3</sup>. In regard to a suggestion of Emperor for resuming Rs. 20,36,000/- in his *jāgīr* from other *jāgīrdārs* Aurangzeb unequivocally explained that in the event of its implementation all of them would become *jāgīrless* resulting in their dispatch to the Imperial court diminishing the strength of the army by 1/3<sup>rd</sup> which was, however, needed owing to the military position of the Deccan. To resolve this *jāgīr* crisis he pleaded for assignment of extra-Deccan *jāgīrs* and cash [*naqdi*] from Malwa as was prevalent during his first Viceroyalty<sup>4</sup>.

Shāhjahān often criticized Aurangzeb and fixing upon him the responsibility of the mal-administration of the Deccan with the sarcasm that to avoid any loss to him all his *jāgīrs* were granted in the Deccan and he was granted ten crore *dāms* in ‘10 monthly *naqdi*’ from Malwa with the authorization to resume *jāgīrs* of his choice equal to two crore *dāms* from the *jāgīrdārs* including *pargana* Nandurbar. Aurangzeb politely declined the offer on the ground that such a policy would lead to the exodus of the *jāgīrdārs* to the imperial court due to non-availability of *jāgīrs* or if they were assigned *jāgīrs* elsewhere there was not enough, failing which *pāibāqi* lending to be low-income *maḥāls* would have to be assigned in lieu of their higher income

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<sup>1</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.13, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 126.

<sup>2</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.15, *Ādāb*, pp. 207-8.

<sup>3</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.16, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 139.

<sup>4</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.23, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 157.

*mahāls*, demoralizing them beyond redemption. Anyhow, Aurangzeb, in compliance with Imperial instructions, selected some areas from the *khāliṣa* and *jāgīrs* reports of which were sent to the court with the hope that in exchange of his previous ‘10-monthly’ *naqdi* and for expenses and calamities accompanying with *jāgīrdārī* he would be granted *jāgīr* worth two crore *dāms*, with rebate in income, making it ‘6-monthly’. Aurangzeb was however, honest enough to state that since income from Nandurbar did not suffer any loss he accepted the same for sixty lakh *dāms* like Prince Murād Bakhsh, who had previously held it<sup>1</sup>.

In order to effect economy in government expenditure he suggested that in lieu of Rs. 1,90,000/- assigned to Jahān Āra Begum from *mandvi* [market] Jahānābād, Burhānpur, Shāista Khān should collect and dispatch to her the *naqdi* granted to Aurangzeb from Malwa to save the double transportation charges<sup>2</sup>. Aurangzeb was also rebuked on account of *pargana* Sulṭanpur held in *inā‘m* grant of Prince Muḥammad Sulṭan and Nandurbar in *naqdi jāgīr* of Aurangzeb, subsequently excluded from their *dual-i jāgīr* and included in *khāliṣa*, which due to the carelessness of previous *jāgīrdārs* became desolate yielding 92,000 *dāms*. He pleaded that since the *Dīwāns* had ignored ten-yearly papers of the same they had designated the *parganas* as excellent and prosperous and Aurangzeb had no choice, if Shāhjahān assigned him ‘5-monthly’ in lieu of his ‘10-monthly’ *jāgīr*<sup>3</sup>.

Such persistent humiliations and adverse criticisms dejected Aurangzeb, who wrote to Jahān Āra Begum that if such a reduction was enforced then Baglana, which was assigned in *inā‘m-i altamgha*, during his first term as Viceroy, would suffice. However, Jahān Āra, pacified him by communicating news of the grant of Baglana as his *ina‘m*, 2/3<sup>rd</sup> as *jāgīr* and 1/3<sup>rd</sup> as *naqdi*. But ultimately the tyranny of the circumstances compelled him to remind his previous decision for retiring from administration, which he was not allowed to stick because under new dispensation his trusted officials, were being allowed, enticed and summoned to the court like Malik Ḥusain by inducement of assignment of high rank during the last twenty years<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.24, *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 165-8.

<sup>2</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.25; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 201.

<sup>3</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.27, *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 191-2.

<sup>4</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 9.2, 12.1; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 408-9; vol. II, p. 746.

Aurangzeb favoured the *jāgīrdārs* to such an unprecedented degree that he even declined his *jāgīr* of Bir, yielding one crore *dāms*, whose revenues were increasing annually, instead preferred Madhuji Bhonsla's '6-monthly' just for fulfilling his commitment of assigning Bir to Shah Beg Khān to accommodate his scattered *jāgīrs* worth, 3,50,00,000 *dāms* on the eve of the latter's summoning from Aḥmadnagar to Golconda expedition<sup>1</sup>. In addition to presenting cases of individual *manṣabdārs* he also made representations to the court procuring orders for release of salaries of the petty *jāgīrdar* through his *wakil*<sup>2</sup>.

Aurangzeb who held *naqdi jāgīr* worth '10 crore *dāms* sought the intercession of Sa'dullah Khān to get the draft of his salary released, after getting deducted the imperial claims against him<sup>3</sup>. In a similar fashion Aurangzeb approached Shāista Khān for securing his withheld payments from 'Umar Tārin<sup>4</sup> as well as his *naqdi jāgīrs*<sup>5</sup> because he stressed his dependence on *naqdi*<sup>6</sup>.

Since Deccan was a deficit area an increase of 5,000 *sawār* [2x3h] could not move Aurangzeb to accept charge of ten forts otherwise his enhancement in rank would become nullified and he would even suffer further loss on account of extra-expenses on their maintenance<sup>7</sup>; he could only accept the fort of Asir entailing no expenditure and he also held the fort of Junnair<sup>8</sup>.

His endeavour for recurring appointment of intelligent and honest *karorīs* and '*āmils* for his *jāgīr* till his arrival in the Deccan to realize not only the land revenue but also to see to it that the *jāgīrdārs* and *karorīs* could not harass the peasantry and his offer to administer the Deccan either with *naqdi* and *jāgīr* is illustrative of his devotion to duty<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.29, 1.30; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 161-2, 199-200.

<sup>2</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 11.2; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 579-8.

<sup>3</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 6.7; 1.30; *Ādāb*, vol. I, 461.

<sup>4</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 8.3; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 485.

<sup>5</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 8.4; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 494.

<sup>6</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 8.8; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 506.

<sup>7</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 8.5; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 500.

<sup>8</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 8.7; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 505.

<sup>9</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 14.1, 14.2; *Ādāb*, vol. I, II, pp. 675-7.

One of the great problems of the *jāgīr* administration was posed by the promulgation as well as the implementation of new branding regulation of the 27<sup>th</sup> regnal year of Shāhjahān which was directly related to the low revenue yield of *jāgīrs*. The availability of a *farmān* of Shāhjahān of the 14<sup>th</sup> regnal year to Aurangzeb during his first term of Viceroyalty also referred to by Aurangzeb during his second tenure unfolds background of this device in the Deccan, which was in tune with the situation.

*Farmān* to Aurangzeb [titles omitted]. “It was brought to the most sublime, most holy and most august notice of His Majesty from the *wāqia* ‘ of the province of the Deccan that due to the low-yield of *jāgīr* [*kam hāṣili-i jāgīr*] of that province during this period the pay claim after branding [*ṭalab-i dāgh*], from the time of his arrival he too got branded the contingent by free will and inclination and obtained one fourth, as salary. When this fact was brought to the notice of that illustrious son through Luṭfullāh, *Bakhshī* and *Wāqia* ‘*Nawīs*<sup>1</sup>, that fortunate son asked him to record the true fact in the *wāqia* ‘ so as obtain the reply. Accordingly the said person brought it to the most holy and sublime notice of [His Majesty] that the Regulations of Branding and Verification [*zabita-i dāgh-o taṣḥiḥa*] is not prevalent in this province; if *dastūru-l* ‘*amal* [administrative or fiscal regulations, administrative manual] is issued from the sky high [imperial] court then the Brand on horse for identification at inspection [*ṭalab-i dāgh-o taṣḥiḥa*] can be made according to it. The august imperial order is issued that we send the Regulation of Branding and Verification with the exalted *farmān* [Imperial order]. From the officials whose entire *jāgīrs* are in Hindustan [North India], one is Rāi Satar Sāl, who most probably, has been himself maintaining a contingent larger than required under the Regulation and in this situation let that fortunate son assure that Rāi Satar Sāl and some others who maintain contingents according to Regulations to make claims [accordingly] and from rest of the persons who would not have cared for this whosoever has his entire *jāgīr* in Hindustan, an increase or decrease in his *jāgīr*, as per schedule, shall be effected in Hindustan and the rest shall be received in the Deccan. Let the *jāgīr* of Hindustan be governed according to the Regulation of Hindustan and the share of *jāgīr* in accordance with the income thereof be brought under stipulated Branding Regulation.

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<sup>1</sup> Luṭfullāh *Khān* s/o Lashkar *Khān* [Irani] holding the *manṣab* of 1,000/800 was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqia* ‘ *Nawīs* of Bālāghāt, [Lahori, II, p. 191 in 1049/1639-40] which was raised to 1,000/1,000 in 1052/1642-3, [Lahori, II, 290] in which year he died, [Lahori, II, 746].

Whosoever has his entire *jāgīr* there the current income [*hal-i ḥāṣil*] of his *jāgīr* be inspected and pay claim of branding [*ṭalab-i dāgh*] be made accordingly and consider this Regulation perpetual and verify it year to year and consider His Majesty's favours increasing day by day. Written on 2<sup>nd</sup> *Sha'bān* 14<sup>th</sup> regnal year. Written on the report of Prince Muḥammad Dara Shukoh, Islām Khān and Afzal Khān [titles omitted]<sup>1</sup>”.

However, after 1641 another *farmān* of Shāhjahān was issued in his 27<sup>th</sup> regnal year which had general applicability declaring that it has been represented to the Court that for the nobles and *manṣabdārs*, who receive cash instead of *jāgīrs* are paid for each horse branded [*asp dāghī*] ... cash salaries were never to be fixed above ‘eight-monthly’ or ‘four-monthly’<sup>2</sup>.

He equally laid emphasize upon the amelioration of the conditions of the peasantry which was groaning under the oppression of the former Governors<sup>3</sup>. He was also vigilant that no loss should occur in revenue-collection without any oppression of the peasantry by the *jāgīrdārs* and *karorīs*<sup>4</sup>. Aurangzeb also took precautionary measures to save the peasantry from the enemy, punish the oppressors realizing beyond assessed revenue notwithstanding Dara Shukoh's success in getting resumed Berar from Aurangzeb's *jāgīr* and unsuccessful bid for snatching the Deccan Viceroyalty from him<sup>5</sup>.

Interestingly enough Tavernier depicts the country of Golkunda as being “fully” of tanks, which are said to have been made by building dams, which were “sometimes half a league long”, so as to stock the water in natural depressions and use it after the rains for fields<sup>6</sup>. Similarly there was a great Kamthana tank of Bidar, made by dam built to its north, that was “verily” a “Tigris” and which freed the cultivators of the surrounding country from all dependence upon the rain<sup>7</sup>. Furthermore in the later years of Shāhjahān we also find the Mughal administration planning to

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<sup>1</sup> Bloch. *Supp. Pers.* 482, ff. 46[a] - 47[a].

<sup>2</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.1; 14.1; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 96, vol. II, 675-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 14.1; *Ādāb*, vol. II, pp. 675-6.

<sup>4</sup> *Calendar*, Doc. No. 15.1, 15.4, *Ādāb* 737.

<sup>5</sup> *Wāqī 'āt-i 'Ālāmīrī*, p. 39.

<sup>6</sup> Tavernier I, 121-2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālāmīrī*, 308-9, *Epigraphis Indo-Moslemica*, 1937-8, 1-2.

advance nearly Rs. 40,-to 50,000 to cultivators in Khandesh and the Painghat portion of Berar, for the purpose of erecting bunds or dams. In Banglore “They have brought into every town and village thousands of canals, cut from river for the benefit of cultivation<sup>1</sup> as these were most probably managed to the co-operative phad system, which still is continuing in the area<sup>2</sup>.

In nutshell Aurangzeb succeeded in streamlining and improving revenue and financial administration, augmenting revenue resources and implementing revenue reforms of Murshid Quli Khān in the Deccan.

#### **[IV] REVENUE & FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION**

Consequent upon the annexations of 1636 during Aurangzeb’s first Viceroyalty of the Deccan<sup>3</sup> it contributed over one-fifth of the total *jama* ‘ [assessed revenue] of the Mughal Empire [1646-7], in contrast to its area which was even less than one-tenth of the total area. Surprisingly enough the *jama* ‘ of the Mughal Deccan remained at par in 1650 as well. This level of *jama* ‘ remained even less than 21% in 1656 during Aurangzeb’s second term as Viceroy of the Deccan during which phase he made frequent complaints concerning the enormous difference between the estimated and actual income [*hāṣil*]. Aurangzeb stressed that the actual realization of the

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<sup>1</sup> Ṣādiq Khān, Or 174, ff. 60[b]-61[a], Or 1671, f. 34[a].

<sup>2</sup> *Royal Commission on Agriculture Report* 325.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., Zahoor Ali Khān ‘The Mughal Campaign Against Bijapur, 1636, Geographical Interpretation, *Aligarh Papers on Indian History*, presented in *Ind. Hist. Cong.*, Dharwar, 1988, pp. 231-35. However, during the very period of nine months such imminent conquests [in 1635-6] became possible, Shāhjahān succeeded in eliminating Jujhār Singh Bundela by a multi-pronged attack upon him, who had resorted to flight towards Deccan *via.*, Sholāpur, under the command of ‘Abdullah Khān Firoz Jung, Saiyid Khān Jahān Bārha , Khān-i Dauran, as Prince Aurangzeb was given the nominal charge of the command with Shāista Khān as his advisor. Cf., Abha Singh, Jujhar Singh’s Rebellion: A Reappraisal, *PIHC*, 1990, pp. 230-40. Shāhjahān received in both cash and kind a huge amount as tribute from the rulers of the Deccan [*Duniyādārān-i Deccan*], *Zamīndār* of Gondwana and the booty of Jujhar Singh usurped by him from Chaurūgarh amounting *in toto* to two crore rupees as that much amount would have hardly ever been accumulated by the monarchs of the world which was equal to the income of Tranxoiana. Cf., *Bloch. Supp. Pers.* 482, ff. 63[b] - 64[b], 65[b] - 67[a]. In 1632 Fath Khān s/o Malik ‘Amber who joined the Mughal service with the rank of 7,000/7,000 contingent upon the execution of Nizāmu-I Mulk also helped in conquering Nizāmu-I Mulk’s territory in 1633 having a *jama* ‘ of fifty crore *dams* yielding one crore rupees as well as some of his strong forts was allowed certain favours inspite of his misdeeds. Cf., *Bloch. Supplement Persian*, ff. 9[a-b], *The Shāhjahān Nama of Inayat Khān*, Delhi, 1990, pp. 67, 73, 77-78, 82-83, 97-99, 103, 107, 109, 112-116, 118-119.

Mughal Deccan was Rs. 88,00,000/- which was below even ‘3-monthly’ [*sih-māhā*] or 24.3%. The civil and military expenditure of the Deccan, of course, excluding the salaries of the Officials from the *jāgīrs* arrived at Rs. 31,76,000/- of which Rs. 25,43,000 were spent on the cash allowances of Aurangzeb and his sons whereas the expenses incurred on Artillery and other related expenditure required Rs. 6,30,000/- which could be provided by *khālīṣa sharīfa*, tribute of Golconda and Deogarh amounting to Rs. 1,43,000/- and the deficit of Rs. 20,36,000 was made good with the reserve accumulated in the Deccan treasuries<sup>1</sup>. Aurangzeb also faced Shāhjahān’s strictures without any fault on his part<sup>2</sup>.

To Aurangzeb’s utter dismay the short fall in the revenues continued in 1652-53. The decline in agriculture prompted Shāhjahān to appoint Aurangzeb as Viceroy of the Mughal Deccan with the specific instructions for improving cultivation and resettling villages. Aurangzeb himself blamed the prevalence of miscellaneous forms of revenue assessment and collection [*zawābiṭ-i gūnāgūn*]. Murshid Quli Khān’s appointment as *Dīwān* for improving the agrarian conditions resulted into crop-sharing<sup>3</sup> as *taqāvi* [agricultural loans] were advanced to the peasants<sup>4</sup>. Even Shāhjahān rebuked Aurangzeb for not sanctioning himself 40,000 to 50,000 rupees, as *taqāvi* for raising the irrigation bunds in the provinces of Khandesh and Berar<sup>5</sup>.

Interestingly enough the financial obligations of Chananeri *Deshmukh*, whose descendent, all called Chananeri *Deshmukhs*, have been recorded in a letter from Aurangzeb during his second term of viceroyalty of the Deccan<sup>6</sup>. We are also informed that when the *jama*‘ imposed upon him was enhanced substantially, Chananeri *Deshmukh* sought permission to be allowed to pay the increase separately as tribute [*peshkash*] and not as part of the *jama*‘ to be paid annually to whomsoever it is earmarked in *jāgīr orkhālīṣa* as Aurangzeb naturally required Chananeri, to pay both, one amount as *jama*‘ [assessed revenue] as it was totally different from

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<sup>1</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.23; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 156-8.

<sup>2</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.24; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 165-8.

<sup>3</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.18; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 134-5.

<sup>4</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.16; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 138-40.

<sup>5</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.15; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 206-8.

<sup>6</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 13.1; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 636-39, Cf., Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, second revised edition, Delhi, 1999, pp. 233 and 225.

*peshkash* which was deposited into the imperial treasury and an additional amount as *peshkash*. Thus Aurangzeb endeavoured to reconcile realities of revenue administration with the formal law of *shari'at*.

In order to cope with the financial difficulties Aurangzeb used to augment the revenue resources<sup>1</sup> from all possible means of income including tribute from the *Zamīndār* of Deogarh<sup>2</sup>, *Zamīndār* of Jawar<sup>3</sup>, conquest of Deogarh<sup>4</sup> and *peshkash* [tribute] from there as well as from Golconda<sup>5</sup>. Aurangzeb was cautious enough in protesting over the new rates of the troopers which were too low to maintain a suitable horse, which ultimately led to its revocation. The problems of enforcement of Branding Regulations<sup>6</sup> also became the subject of Aurangzeb's objections as these were included not in the Realization of *muṭāliba* [State dues] from Rāo Karan. The Branding Regulations again became a cause of consternation in the Deccan<sup>7</sup> which was against the interest of the *manṣabdārs*<sup>8</sup>.

We come to know about measures for realizing the tribute from Quṭbu-l Mulk, side by side the threat for attack on Golconda<sup>9</sup>. Notwithstanding Aurangzeb's endeavours for realizing the tributes he was strived to recommend release of Inderman, *Zamīndār* of Dhandhera<sup>10</sup>. Aurangzeb also evinced much interest in improving the conditions of the Deccan<sup>11</sup>. Aurangzeb however simultaneously, settled the exchange rate of *hūn* of Quṭbu-l Mulk's *peshkash*,<sup>12</sup> which helped in realization of the settled amount of Quṭbul Mulk's tribute<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.26; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 163-4.

<sup>2</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.28; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 211-3.

<sup>3</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.29; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 161-2.

<sup>4</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.31; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 214-15.

<sup>5</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.32; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 218-19.

<sup>6</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.35; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 178-9.

<sup>7</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.36; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 148-50.

<sup>8</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.38, 1.40; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 158-9, 230-2.

<sup>9</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.42; *Ādāb*, vol. I, p. 219.

<sup>10</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 1.44; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 186-7.

<sup>11</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 12.4; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 828-31.

<sup>12</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 4.4; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 276-8.

<sup>13</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 4.5, 4.6; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 305-308.

The Ā‘īn does not provide us with any relevant information about the Mughal Deccan beyond saying that Berar was under *nasaq*<sup>1</sup>.

Ṣādiq Khān, however, does tell us that in the Deccan province neither measurement nor crop-sharing had been followed “since ancient times”. “On the contrary the established practice was that each of the villagers and a pair of oxen, grew what crop he liked, whether food grain or port-herbs and paid to the authorities [*sarkār*] a little money on each plough varying with the territory and the *parganas*; and there was no [further] enquiry about, or regard paid to the quality of crops”<sup>2</sup>. It seems that this might have been the general practice, but from a document prepared in 1642-43 it appears that in some *parganas* at least a kind of *nasaq* based upon measurement was applied. Moreover writing from the Deccan in 1653 Aurangzeb concurred with Shāhjahān’s view that the “different methods” [*zawābit-i gūnāngūn*] followed by the revenue authorities were a cause of the ruin of the country<sup>3</sup>. This might have been the general practice but from a document prepared in 1642-43 under Aurangzeb’s first Viceroyalty of the Deccan it appears that in some *parganas* at least a kind of *nasaq* based upon measurement was being applied. However, 1679 Papel document does show that nearly nine-tenth of the villages of Berar and Aurangabad had been measured and nearly a half of those of Khandesh.

Though Murshid Quli Khān introduced crop sharing, yet it was an expensive method as Aurangzeb himself declared that when it was introduced in the Deccan the cost of revenue collection doubled simply from the necessity of organizing a watch and ward on the crops<sup>4</sup>.

We come to know about measures for realizing the tribute from Quṭbu-l Mulk, side by side the threat for attack on Golconda<sup>5</sup>. Notwithstanding Aurangzeb’s endeavours for realizing the tributes he was strived to recommend release of Inderman, *Zamīndār* of Dhandhera<sup>6</sup>. Aurangzeb

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<sup>1</sup>Ā‘īn I, 478.

<sup>2</sup>Ṣādiq Khān, Or 174. F. 185 [a-b] 1671, f. 90[b]- Khāfi Khān, 1732n.

<sup>3</sup>Ādāb-i ‘Ālāmgīrī, f. 36[a] ed. I, 139.

<sup>4</sup>Ādāb-i ‘Ālāmgīrī, Or 170, f. 118[a], this letter is missing in the printed ed.

<sup>5</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.42; Ādāb, vol. I, p. 219.

<sup>6</sup>Calendar, Doc. No. 1.44; Ādāb, vol. I, pp. 186-7.

also evinced much interest in improving the conditions of the Deccan<sup>1</sup>. Aurangzeb however simultaneously, settled the exchange rate of *hūn* of Quṭbu-l Mulk's *peshkash*,<sup>2</sup> which helped in realization of the settled amount of Quṭbul Mulk's tribute<sup>3</sup>.

We are well aware of the fact of the problem of difference between paper *jama'* and actual realization persisted as neither Murshid Quli Khān's reform nor Aurangzeb's claims of doubling the revenues in certain fiscal units nor the Shāhjahāni manipulations of salary rates for cavalry could be of much significance.

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<sup>1</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 12.4; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 828-31.

<sup>2</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 4.4; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 276-8.

<sup>3</sup>*Calendar*, Doc. No. 4.5, 4.6; *Ādāb*, vol. I, pp. 305-308.

## II

### THE DECCAN PROVINCES

[1659-1682]

#### [I] VICEROYS:

There is no denying the fact that the office of the Governor of a province was an extremely important one in the Mughal Empire which was divided into numerous provinces each of which was under the administration of the Governor who was designated as *nāzim*, *ṣāhib-i ṣūba*, *ṣubedār*, *faujdar-i ṣūba*. The provincial Governors, like the principal minister at the centre were normally appointed from amongst officers holding highest *manṣab* [rank], forming the hard core of the ruling class<sup>1</sup>.

Since the Deccan provinces enjoyed a special status because these were four in number, they had a Viceroy, which policy could not be abandoned even by Aurangzeb as Emperor. Furthermore the four older Deccan provinces Aurangabad, Berar, Bedar and Khōndesh experienced conquest and administrative consolidation relatively late the Imperial administration recognized the uniqueness of the Deccan provinces by stationing a Viceroy of the four Deccan provinces at Aurangabad who exercised authority over the provincial administrations. Aurangzeb, like other provincial Governors, appointed Governors to the four Deccan provinces, together with a Viceroy. Whenever we find occasional blanks in respect of some Deccan provinces it may be presumed that no Governor was appointed, the province was assumed as part of the superior Viceroyalty of the Deccan, which was generally held either by a prince or a high noble. The following table is illustrative of the position of the Governors of the Deccan who along with the Viceroy served the four provinces at different times and who were sometimes also transferred from one province to another province of the Deccan or altogether shifted to elsewhere. Initially most of Governors were those who had loyally served Aurangzeb during his second Viceroyalty.

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<sup>1</sup> For details see P. Saran, *Provincial Government of Mughals*.

TABLE – 1

GOVERNORS OF DECCAN PROVINCES [1659-1682]

R.Y.	DECCAN	BEDAR	KHĀNDESH	BERAR	AURANGABAD
1.	Prince Mu'azzam	<u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I]	Wazir <u>Khān</u> [I] Mir Jumla [I]	Saiyid Ṣalābat <u>Khān</u> Ikhtīṣāṣ <u>Khān</u> [Ind.] Saiyid Salabat <u>Khān</u> Ikhtīṣāṣ <u>Khān</u> [Ind.] Shāh Beg <u>Khān</u> [I] Shāh Beg <u>Khān</u> [I]	
2.	Prince Mu'azzam				Wazir <u>Khān</u> [I]
3.	Shāista <u>Khān</u>				
4.	Shāista <u>Khān</u>	<u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I]			
5.	Shāista <u>Khān</u>	<u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I]			
6.	Prince Mu'azzam	<u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I]			
7.	Prince Mu'azzam	<u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I]	Wazir <u>Khān</u> [I] Daūd <u>Khān</u> Qureshi [Ind.] Wazir <u>Khān</u> [I] Daūd <u>Khān</u> Qureshi [Ind.]		
8.	Mīrzā Raja Jai Singh [R]				
9.	Mīrzā Raja Jai Singh [R] Diler <u>Khān</u> [Af]		<u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I] <u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I]	Iraj <u>Khān</u> [I] Mir <u>Khalil</u> [I]	<u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I]
10.	Prince Mu'azzam		Mukhtār <u>Khān</u>	Daūd <u>Khān</u> Qureshi [Ind.]	
11.	Prince Mu'azzam		Mir Shamsuddin [I]		
12.	Prince Mu'azzam		Daūd <u>Khān</u> Qureshi [Ind.]		
13.	Prince Mu'azzam		Daūd <u>Khān</u> Qureshi [Ind.]		
14.	Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Koka [I]	Mukhtār <u>Khān</u>	Daūd <u>Khān</u> Qureshi [Ind.] Hoshdār <u>Khān</u> [I] Hoshdār <u>Khān</u> [I]		
15.	Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Koka [I]	Mir Shamsuddin [I]			
16.	Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Koka [I]	Qalandar <u>Khān</u> [I]	Mukhtār <u>Khān</u> Mir Shamsuddin [I]		
17.	Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Koka [I]		Mukhtār <u>Khān</u> Mir Shamsuddin [I]		
18.	Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Koka [I]		Mukhtār <u>Khān</u> Mir Shamsuddin [I]		
19.	Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Koka [I]		Mukhtār <u>Khān</u> Mir Shamsuddin [I]	<u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I]	
20.	Diler <u>Khān</u> [AF]  Asad <u>Khān</u> [F]	<u>Khān-i Zamān</u> Mīr <u>Khalil</u> [I]	Mukhtār <u>Khān</u> Mir Shamsuddin [I]		

- |     |  |   |
|-----|--|---|
| 21. | Prince Shah ‘Ālam                                    |   |
| 22. | Prince Shah ‘Ālam                                    | Bahādur <u>Khān</u><br>Koka [I]                       |
| 23. | Prince Shah ‘Ālam<br>Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Koka<br>[I] |   |
| 24. | Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Koka<br>[I]                      | Iraj <u>Khān</u><br>Mīr Zamān<br>Mīr <u>Khālū</u> [I] |

Sources: Muḥammad Kāzim, ‘*Ālamgīrnāma*, ed. Khādim Ḥusain and ‘Abdu Hai, Bib. Ind. Calcutta, 1865-73, pp. 129, 191, 198, 219, 233, 338, 416, 426, 439-40, 462, 476, 485, 564, 578, 592, 624, 627, 634, 741, 761, 818, 854, 869, 874, 903, 904, 907, 913, 919, 924, 970-72, 988, 1000, 1022, 1029-30, 1032, 1036 and 1037, Saqī Mustai‘d Khān, *Maasir-i ‘Ālamgīrī*, Bid. Ind. Calcutta, 1871, pp. 45, 49, 60, 110, 114, 124, 144, 158, 161, 189, 205 and 206; *Akhbarat-i Darbar-i Mu‘allā*, 14RY, 15RY, 18RY and 20RY, *Ādāb-i ‘Ālamgīrī*, compiler, Abul Fateh Qabil Khān, ed. Abdul Ghafur Chaudhari, Lahore, 1971, vol. II, pp. 997, 1043, 1054 and 1105-8, Bhim Sen, *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, Br. Mus. Or 23, ff. 67[b]-68[a], Shahnawaz Khān, *Maasirul Umara*, ed. Maulvi Abdur Rahim, Bib. Ind. Calcutta, 188, vol. I, p 768, vol. III, pp. 620-23.

The nature and tenure of appointments and the kind of officials appointed as Viceroys and Governors in the Deccan provinces are reflected in the above table which shows one Prince, four Iranis, one Afghan and one Rajput each as Viceroys of the Deccan and yields an average tenure of two years and one month. Similarly the Iranis enjoyed predominant position as provincial Governors because 7 are Iranis, 2 are Turanis and 2 are Indian Muslims during Aurangzeb’s first phase as the Emperor.

A further analysis of the table indicated that the Imperial court discouraged long tenures for Governors and generally transferred or recalled them within 2-3 years which practice was also followed by Aurangzeb especially in view of maintaining their efficiency in administering the Deccan.

When Aurangzeb marched from the Deccan in January 1658, he appointed his son Prince Muḥammad Mu‘azzam, as Viceroy, to manage the Deccan affairs due to his vast experience of its administration. Beginning from January 1658 till Aurangzeb’s final return in March 1682, a

period of 24 years intervened during which duration six Viceroy were appointed to the Mughal Deccan, among whom Prince Mu‘azzam [later Prince Shah ‘Ālam], held the office for 11 years, Bahādur Khān for 6 years, Shāista Khān for 4 years, Jai Singh for 2 years, Diler Khān for one year and Asad Khān for a few months.

Although these Viceroy often remained busy in meeting the Maratha menace who were devastating the Imperial dominions, yet they carefully managed the Mughal administration of the Deccan. Aurangzeb due to his sagacity and political dexterity saw to it that maximum help and cooperation was extended to the Viceroy. Accordingly even on the eve of the fratricidal wars of succession he directed Aṣālat Khān, to proceed to the Deccan with Prince Muḥammad Akbar during the Prince’s sojourn from Daulatabad to Aurangabad<sup>1</sup>. Aurangzeb issued orders to Muḥammad Ṭahir Khurasani, entitled Wazir Khān, to administer the affairs of Daulatabad and serve Prince Mu‘azzam staying at Burhanpur<sup>2</sup>.

Keeping in view the problems of administering Deccan, encountered by Prince Muḥammad Mu‘azzam, Aurangzeb through his *Mīr Bakḥshī* Muḥammad Amin Khān issued orders on 5 January 1659 to Sarfaraz Khān [5,000/4,000], Randola Khān [4,000/4,000], Jadu Rai [4,000/2,500], Rustam Rai [2,500/1,200] and Dattaji, the imperial officers, who were deputed for the Deccan by the Emperor, that whosoever would not have marched from Buhampur to Balaghat would remain there without proceeding ahead. Similarly those who would come subsequently would also act accordingly. If, however, all of them considered dispatch of contingent necessary to their *jagīrs* they were allowed to do so whereas they were asked to stay there accompanied with another corps without yearning for further injunction in the matter<sup>3</sup>.

Aurangzeb in order to have an eye over the Viceroy and to monitor their activities used to summon them to the Imperial court, *viz.*, he asked Prince Mu‘azzam to hand over the administration of *ṣūba* Khāndesh to one of his trusted associates to proceed to the Mughal court<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>*Ādāb*, vol. II, p. 1032.

<sup>2</sup>*Ādāb*, vol. II, p. 1052.

<sup>3</sup>*SDAR*, AR no. 4956.

<sup>4</sup>*Ādāb*, vol. II, p. 1058.

It was the well established practice that all the instructions regarding the affairs of the *ṣūba* were sent by Aurangzeb to the Viceroy/ Governor, who subsequently conveyed them according to the orders<sup>1</sup>. It was incumbent upon him to maintain peace and tranquility as the executive head in addition to protecting the *ṣūba* and deciding the criminal cases<sup>2</sup>. The Viceroy used to play an important role in recommending promotions and demotions in *manṣab*, the Viceroy of the Deccan was bound to protect the four *ṣūbas* of the Deccan as well as was held responsible<sup>3</sup> for its management and mal-administration. The Imperial officials serving in that *ṣūba* [i.e. four Mughal provinces of the Deccan] were asked not only to accept the Viceroy as their leader but also to obey him and act in accordance with his instructions and he was supposed to exert his utmost in discharging the Imperial assignments<sup>4</sup>.

It was but natural that side by side the appointment of Viceroy and the Governors other provincial officials were posted by Aurangzeb in the Deccan following his accession to the Mughal throne.

### ***DĪWĀN:***

The *Dīwān* or the chief provincial fiscal officer entertained same predominant position or level of authority as the Viceroy used to enjoy. He was the principal executive in the revenue administration as he was primarily responsible for ensuring proper assessment and collection of the land revenue. He was not only responsible for encouraging the extension of cultivation by advancing agricultural loans [*taqāvi*] but tax concessions to persons bringing virgin lands under plough<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., *Akhbārāt-i Darbar-i Mu'alla*, Sitamau transcript, p. 339.

<sup>2</sup> Abul Fazl, *Ain-i Akbari*, tr; Jarrett, Calcutta, 1949, vol. II, pp. 37-41.

<sup>3</sup> *SDAR*, pp. 49, 52-4, 60, 111-12. These promotions and demotions in rank were effected on the recommendations of Mirza Raja Jai Singh and Bahadur *Khān*.

<sup>4</sup> Cf., *Blochot Supplement Persian*, Bib. Nat. Paris, Ms no. 482, ff. 21[a]-22[a] concerning appointment order of Mirza Raja Jai Singh as the Viceroy of the Deccan instructing them not to deviate from his advice and remain submissive as well as obedient to him.

<sup>5</sup> Parmatama Saran, 'Provincial Government of the Mughals', Allahabad, 1941, p. 189; J.F. Richards, Document Forms of Official Orders of Appointments in the Mughal Empire, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 18, 32-5. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, p. 222 and

The *Dīwān* of the province had control over treasury through *darogha* [superintendent] *sazāwal* [transmittal officer] and *qabz nawis-i mansabdārān* [receipt writer of the *mansabdārs*], administered mint through *darogha-o-amīn* [superintendent and head], *ṣāhib-i 'iyār* [assay-master] and *chauksi-o-wazan kash* [assayer and weigh master], controlled finance by *baramad nawīs* [auditor of accounts] and *istifa* [claims, settlements] and checked army through *dīwān-i fauj* [finance officer of the army] and *peshkār* [secretary to the finance officer], to smoothly run the financial administration. It also shows the Imperial administration's care to control expenditures and transfers of funds. Consequent upon Aurangzeb's victory over Jaswant Singh and Qasim *Khān*'s combined forces, he confirmed Multafat *Khān*<sup>1</sup> as *Dīwān* of the Deccan bestowed the title of 'Azam *Khān* with the rank of 4,000/2,500 which office was held by Amant *Khān*<sup>2</sup> in 1662 and Makramat *Khān*<sup>3</sup> in 1667 and 'Askar *Khān*<sup>4</sup> in 1678-80. Not only each province in the Deccan had its own *Dīwān* but even each *sarkār* had a separate post of *Dīwān*, viz. Mir Zainul 'Abidin was the *Dīwān* of *ṣūba Khāndesh*<sup>5</sup>, whereas *Khawaja Muḥammad* 'Usmān held the *Dīwānī* and *Bakshigiri* of *ṣūba Bedar*<sup>6</sup>. Muḥammad Shafī was the *Dīwān* of *ṣūba Berar*<sup>7</sup>, Lal Chand was the *Dīwān* of *sarkār Ramgir* which was once held by Nasrullah<sup>8</sup> and the *Dīwānī* of *sarkār Baglana* was assigned to Tirkam Das<sup>9</sup> whereas Sanjar Beg was appointed as the *Dīwān* of *sarkār Parenda*<sup>10</sup>.

Thus in pre-1682 Mughal Deccan there was one *Dīwān* of the Deccan, four provincial *Dīwāns* and 37 *sarkār* level *Dīwāns*. The memorandum of actual revenue realization of *jagīr* and numerous other papers used to bear the seal of the *Dīwān* and in cases of detailed revenue

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Shireen Moosvi, Aurangzeb's *Farmān* to Rasikdar on Problems of Revenue Administration, 1665, in *Medieval India*, [ed.] Irfan Habib, Delhi 1992, pp. 197-208.

<sup>1</sup> Abul Fazl Ma'muri, *Tarikh-i Aurangzeb*, Ms, Br. M. Or 1671, f. 98[b]; Bhimsen, *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, Ms, Br. M., Add. 23 884, f. 14[b]; '*Ālamgīr Nāma*, pp. 51, 75, 92; *Ādāb*, II, p. 1006.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>*Selected Waqai' of the Deccan [1660-71] [SWD]* [ed.], Yusuf Husain *Khān* [ed.], Hyderabad, 1953, pp. 94-5, SWD, pp. 94-5.

<sup>4</sup>SDAR, 62.

<sup>5</sup>SWD, pp. 23, 126-7, 132-4.

<sup>6</sup>SDAR, pp. 60-61.

<sup>7</sup>SDAR, pp. 89-90.

<sup>8</sup>SWD, pp. 73-4, 78.

<sup>9</sup>SWD, pp. 68-9, 133-4.

<sup>10</sup>SDAR, p. 32.

statistical data the seal of the *Dīwān* was affixed<sup>1</sup>. The most able and successful technical-cum-professional officers serving as *Dīwāns* of provinces might hold ranks as low as 300 to 500 *zāt* and *sawār*. Sometimes the office of the *Dīwān* was coupled with other offices. Khwaja Todar Mal was *Dīwān-i Buyūtāt*<sup>2</sup> of Deccan. There were separate *Dīwāns* in the army<sup>3</sup> as well as in the provincial flotilla<sup>4</sup>.

### **BAKSHĪ:**

On the executive side, the provincial *Bakhshī* or chief military inspection officer in-charge of certifying *manṣabdārs* for receipt of *naqdi* or *jagīr* assignments occupied a significant position. He made arrangement for military and provincial news-collection. As military in-charge he made inspection of horses, review of soldiers of the *manṣabdār* and issue of orders for their payments. ‘Askar Khān was the *Bakhshī* of the Deccan<sup>5</sup> who was also assigned additional charge of *wāqia‘ nawisi*<sup>6</sup> in view of his responsibilities. It was the duty of the *Bakhshī* to confirm the antecedents of a claimant for the *manṣab*. We are informed that when BahādurKhān Koka recommended the name of one Imāmuddin Ḥusaini from amongst the great Saiyids renowned in Gujarat and Khāndesh, in 1676 great Aurangzeb got verified his credentials by the *Dīwān* of the Deccan including the applicant’s capacity for *manṣab*<sup>7</sup>. Kamyab Khān was also made *Bakhshī* of the Deccan<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> M.A. Nayeem, *Mughal Documents: Catalogue of Aurangzeb’s Reign*, Andhra Pradesh State Archives, A.P. 1981, vol. I, part ii facsimiles of Doc. Nos. H/I/1, H/I/2, H/I/82, H/I/99, H/I/114, H/I/131 etc Cf., J.F. Richards ‘Official Revenues and Money Flows in a Mughal Province, in [ed.] J.F. Richards, *The Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India*, OUP, 1987, p. 229.

<sup>2</sup>SWD, pp. 94-95, 137-8.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, pp. 60-61.

<sup>4</sup>SDAR, pp. 10-12.

<sup>5</sup>SDAR, p. 120.

<sup>6</sup>SDAR, pp. 125-7.

<sup>7</sup>SDAR, pp. 109-110.

<sup>8</sup>SWD, p. 170; we are also informed that Muḥammad Hadi was *Bakhshī* of *ṣūbaKh*āndesh in 1662; SWD, pp. 140-141; SDAR, pp. 135-6.

Likewise there were four provincial *bakhshīs* in the Deccan provinces of pre-1682 era, viz., Mir ‘Abdul Hadi was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqia‘Nāwis* of Burhanpur / *Khāndesh*<sup>1</sup>. *Ghiyasuddin*, son of Islam *Khān* was made the *Bakhshī* of *ṣūba* Aurangabad by transferring Mir Abul Ḥasan<sup>2</sup>.

### **FAUJDĀR:**

The *faujdār* and *thānadār* were among the important posts in the provinces. The *faujdārs* in the Deccan provinces played a prominent role in streamlining the administration of military and civil affairs where territorial jurisdiction was designated as *faujdāri* which had no uniform size, as such a form of intermediate administration of cutting across the *sarkār* boundaries [but never across *ṣūba* or *pargana* lines] because it might consist of a *pargana*, or a group of *parganas* or of a *sarkār*, or more than a *sarkār*. The *faujdāri* jurisdiction not necessarily coincided with the territorial boundaries of the *parganas* or *sarkārs* which, however, invariably reflected imperial need for intensive control and surveillance and the various levels of cooperation or antagonism among the local *zamīndārs* or variation in terrain helped to determine the extent of territory assigned to a *faujdār* which was the *faujdāri* or territorial jurisdiction in administrative domain of a *faujdār*. The *faujdārs* used to supervise the *thānadārs*, commandants of military checkpoints and numerous commanders of road petrol [*rāhdārs*]. Due to his commanding several hundred armed heavy cavalry, the *faujdār* was a visible and formidable reminder of Imperial authority in the countries<sup>3</sup>. Insofar as the appointment, the *faujdār* was concerned, generally *manṣabdārs* ranging from 500 to 5000 were appointed because the charges of *faujdār* varied considerably in importance. In Deccan there was the *faujdāri* of Karnatak<sup>4</sup> and Baglana<sup>5</sup> to which nobles of very high rank were appointed. The approximation of duties of the *faujdār* can be gauged from following actual appointment orders of 7 February 1663: “Presently, the position of the *faujdāri* of Karnatak *ṣūba* Daruz Zafar Bijapur, upon the transfer of Dargāh

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 148-150.

<sup>2</sup>*Ādāb*, vol. II, p. 1115.

<sup>3</sup>Noman Ahmad Siddiqi, ‘The *Faujdār* and *Faujdarī* Under the Mughals; *Medieval India Quarterly*, 4, [1961] pp. 22-35.

<sup>4</sup>Abu‘Ālam Ḥaidarabadi, *faujdar* of Carnatic held the rank of 2000/500. Cf., SWD, p. 5, *Akh* 8 Zilqada 39 R.Y.

<sup>5</sup>Saiyid Mausur Barha, *faujdar* of Baglana held the rank of 3000/1500 ‘*Ālamgir Nāma*, pp. 140, 337; Masirul *Umara*, II pp. 449-52; SWD, pp. 126-7, 137-8, 172.

Quli Khān, as per the back endorsements is conferred upon Ṭahir Muḥammad Khān. Let him fulfill diligently the duties and customary obligations with rectitude and propriety. He must not permit the slightest matter to escape his vigilance and care. He must exert to punish the malefactors and rebels, to demolish the strongholds of such group, to protect and succor the subjects and revenue payers and to prevent iron-smiths from manufacturing matchlock. He must order all those who in all the *thānas* of the *faujdāri maḥal* are appointed to keep order, not to exact any of the forbidden taxes and none should become unruly and seditious. He must guard the highways so that travellers and wayfarers may move back and forth with composed minds and nowhere theft and highway robbery should occur. If the property of any person is stolen or plundered he must recover it from the thieves and highwaymen, and return such goods to the rightful owner and punish that ill-fated group. Let the *deshmukhs*, *deshpandiyas*, *muqaddams* peasants and cultivators recognize him as the permanent *faujdār* and consider the office belonging to the said Khān. They should know full injunction in the matter and act accordingly<sup>1</sup>”.

Saiyid Maṣṣūr was assigned the *faujdāri* of Baglana which was previously held by Saiyid Ḥasan whereas Sharza Khān was granted the *faujdāri* of Sulṭānpur and Nandurbar<sup>2</sup>. Shah Beg Khān was entrusted the *faujdāri* of the environs of Aurangabad<sup>3</sup>. Suhrab Khān, held the *faujdāri* of Balapur<sup>4</sup>. Likewise Ḥusamuddin Khān was made the *faujdār* of *sarkār* Bijagarh<sup>5</sup>. Isma‘il Khān received the *faujdāri* of Jalnapur<sup>6</sup>.

Although the *faujdār* as an active interventionist occupant was a formidable reminder of the Imperial authority throughout the countryside, yet he was also bound to ask the other officials to follow the dictates. We are told that Diyanand Ray, wrote to Khawaja Beg, *faujdār* of *sarkār* Ramgir intimating him, that Lal Chand, *Dīwān* of *sarkār* Ramgir was performing duties

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<sup>1</sup>*SDAR*; p. 41.

<sup>2</sup>*Ādāb*, II, 1100.

<sup>3</sup>*Ādāb*, II, pp. 56-71.

<sup>4</sup>*Ādāb*, II, p. 885.

<sup>5</sup>*Alamgir Nāma*, p. 199.

<sup>6</sup>*Alamgir Nāma*, p. 454.

whimsically, with the instructions that if Lal Chand was acting in collaboration with Khwaja Beg that was commendable failing which he would be dismissed and replaced by someone else<sup>1</sup>.

*Faujdāri* was so important an office that notwithstanding representation it could be denied to the heirs of the deceased as was the case of the *faujdāri* of Erandol. Despite all exhibitions of improvements of the heirs of the deceased *faujdār*, Aurangzeb declined the assignment of *faujdāri* paving way to their submission for posting at Burhanpur so as to save them from starvation<sup>2</sup>.

Due to their extraordinary importance the *faujdārs* never hesitated in misusing their authority or misappropriating money through fraudulent means whenever they got an opportunity. The *deshunkh* and other local officials made a representation against the high handedness of Nuṣrat s/o Fateḥ Jang, the *faujdār* of *Sarkār* Basim, *Ṣūba* Berar Balaghat, who plundered with impurity the household items, horses, five thousand rupees and extracted money from the daughters and widows of the *maqaddam*, which resulted into the appointment of another *faujdār*<sup>3</sup>. It was but natural that the Emperor censured the *faujdārs* in 1681 for their failure to check river crossing and highways of the Deccan which led to supply of provisions and war equipments to the Marathas, Bijapur and Hyderabad<sup>4</sup>.

### ***QIL'ADĀR AND THĀNADĀR:***

The post of the *qil'adār* was quite important because several strategic forts commanded by independently commissioned officers known as *qila'dārs* were substantially garrisoned by the imperial troops. Even appointment orders for the *qila'dārs* of major fortresses were assigned under a direct and independent authorization from the Emperor. Since there were numerous important ones in the Deccan the articulation of royal authority can be seen from the following table because the Emperor himself directly appointed most reliable *manṣabdārs* as *qil'adārs* or fortress commanders some of whom to hold petty ranks.

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, p. 67.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, pp. 89-90.

<sup>4</sup>SDAR, pp. 131-2.

**TABLE - 2**

S. No.	Name of the <i>qil'adār</i>	Name of the fort	Rank	Unconditional	Conditional
1.	Bakhtiyar <u>Khān</u> <sup>1</sup>	Zafarabad	3000/2500	3000/1500	1000 <i>sawār</i>
2.	Iraj <u>Khān</u> <sup>2</sup>	Sholapur	2500/2300	2500/1800	500 <i>sawār</i>
				[300, 2-3h]	[300, 2-3h]
3.	Barkhurdar <u>Khān</u> <sup>3</sup>	Usa	2000/2000		
4.	Saiyid Muhammad <u>Khān</u> <sup>4</sup>	Parenda	1500/1000	1500/1000	500 <i>sawār</i>
5.	Qalandar <u>Khān</u> <sup>5</sup>	Aḥmadnagar	1500/1000	1000/700	500/300
			[200, 2-3h]		[200, 2-3h]
6.	Abdul Aziz <sup>6</sup>	Sunnair	1500/700	1000/500	500/200
7.	Suhrab <u>Khān</u> <sup>7</sup>	Udgir	1500/900	1500/800	100 <i>sawār</i>
8.	Mas'ud <u>Khān</u> <sup>8</sup>	Chandor	1500/700		
9.	Rustam <u>Khān</u> <sup>9</sup>	Bhaipur	1500/900	700/500	400/400
10.	Mirza 'Alī <sup>10</sup>	Fatehabad Dharur	1500/600	1000/400	200 <i>sawār</i>
11.	Ihtimam <u>Khān</u> <sup>11</sup>	Udgir	1500/		
12.	Mu'nim <u>Khān</u> <sup>12</sup>	Aḥmadnagar	2500/1000		
13.	Saiyid Husain <sup>13</sup>	Ramgir			
14.	Jansipar <u>Khān</u> <sup>14</sup>	Zafarabad	1000/500		
15.	Iraj <u>Khān</u> <sup>15</sup>	Sholapur	2500/2000		
16.	Qalandar <u>Khān</u> <sup>16</sup>	Nandgaon	1500/1000		
17.	M'utaqid <u>Khān</u> <sup>17</sup>	2000/2000	2000/2000		

The above table, though not an exhaustive inventory clearly, shows the status of the *qila'dārs* by indicating the names of the castellans and the forts, and their ranks including unconditional and conditioned. The *qila'dārs* were responsible for the maintenance of forts and

<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>4</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>5</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>6</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>7</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>8</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>9</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>10</sup>SDAR, pp. 73-5.

<sup>11</sup>SWD, p. 157.

<sup>12</sup> 'Ālamgīr Nāma 45, 454 SWD, p. 99, *Maasitul Umara*, III, p. 589.

<sup>13</sup>SWD, pp. 63-4, 70.

<sup>14</sup>SDAR, pp. 29-30.

<sup>15</sup>SDAR, p. 65, 'Ālamgīr Nāma 1030, *Maasirul Umara*, I, pp. 268-72.

<sup>16</sup> 'Ālamgīr Nāma 18; H.K. Sherwani & P.M. Joshi, *History of the Medieval Deccan*, plate no. LXXXV, SDAR, p. 119.

<sup>17</sup> 'Ālamgīr Nāma, p. 964, *Maasirul Umara*, II, 870-71, SDAR, pp. 127-8.

procurement of war equipments and provisions. They were also liable to be promoted, demoted or transferred.

Since the *jagīrdars* were not merely satisfied with their *qila‘dari* they also used to solicit the *faujdāri* of their *qila‘dari* jurisdiction viz., Rehman Quli Beg, *qila‘dār* of Gahra was also granted its *faujdāri* with an increase of 50 *sawār*<sup>1</sup>. Saiyid Mustafa, *qila‘dār* of Hathgarh solicited the *faujdāri* of 2-3 *parganas* from security point of view of communication and to check Murathy<sup>2</sup>.

Ūdājī Ram who held the *qila‘dāri* and *faujdāri* of Mahur for three generations solicited the restoration of *faujdāri* which was transferred to ‘Abdullah Khān Shirazi<sup>3</sup>.

Although next to *faujdār* and *qila‘dār* was the post of *thānedār*, yet the precise nature and the duties of the *thānedārs*, and the degree of control exercised over them by local *faujdārs* is not quite clear. ‘Abdur Rasul 800/300 was appointed to the *thānedāri* of *pargana* Jamkheda<sup>4</sup>. Qādir Dād Khān 1000/800 [600x2-3h], who previously was assigned the *thānedāri* of *pargana* Bir, which *pargana* was given in the *jagīr* of Bahādur due to which the former’s conditional rank was resumed and he was posted in the army of Prince Muḥammad‘Azam Shāh in 1682 by The Emperor<sup>5</sup> with the rank of 1000/500<sup>6</sup>.

Interestingly some of the *thānedāris* were so much important that nobles of high rank were appointed to them viz., the *thānedāri* of Gulshanabad, which was granted to Jadaun Rai Deccani, 3000/- was appointed.

Hence it is difficult to imagine that control over these *thānedārs* was ever exercised by local *faujdārs* in the Deccan. Contrary to it there were numerous small *thānedārs* to which only

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, p. 169.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 82-3.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, pp. 80-81.

<sup>4</sup>SDAR, p. 136.

<sup>5</sup>SDAR, p. 135-6.

<sup>6</sup>SDAR, pp. 114-5.

petty *manṣabdār* were appointed. In nutshell it seems that *manṣabdārs* from the rank of 200 upwards were generally appointed *thānedārs*. The *thānedārs* and *qila'dārs* were bound not to allow the flow of provisions to the enemy as specifically mentioned in a *dehsāla* of 1689 to 14 *thānedārs* and 5 *qila'dārs* to block the passage of provisions to Bijapur and a bond to this effect was also obtained from them as well<sup>1</sup>.

### **QĀZI, ṢADR, MUḤTASIB**

Under the Mughals the judiciary was a separate but not an independent institution which, however, required specialized academic training due to which *qāzis* and *ṣadrs* could expect careers in one branch only. The *qāzis* were rarely assigned executive and financial duties, probably for avoiding their administrative interest. They could partially put a check on the tyranny of the executive. Even the high Mughal officials and administrators could prefer the interference by the judiciary in the administration. Even Mahabat Khān protested to Aurangzeb against the increase in the power of the *qāzis* of the Empire. He wrote in his letter that the Empire depends now on the *qāzis*; and a *qāzi* is only satisfied with bribes<sup>2</sup>.

The Mughals employed provincial *qāzis* drawn from the ranks of the *ulema'* for every *sarkār*, city and *qaṣba* who used to decide the civil cases, settle disputes, restrain people from indulging in evil deeds, enforce the laws of Islam, and arrange for marriage. The *qāzis* were also appointed when the need arose due to conversion of the chief of a territory. The *qāzis* of the *sarkār* even used to appoint the deputy *qāzis*. We are told by Jalal Khān Kakar that since *parganas* of Seoni and Timurani *sarkār* Handia were in the *zamīndār's* charge who had embraced Islam which had made the presence of a *qāzi* extremely necessary so as induce the Muslims to follow the Islamic laws and settle the matters according to Islamic laws. Accordingly the *qāzi* of the *sarkār* i.e. Qazi Shahābuddin, was directed to appoint his deputy as *qāzi* thereat with conditional *madad- ma'āsh*<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 127-8.

<sup>2</sup>Cf., *Mughal Nobility*, p. 146.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, pp. 15-16.

It is an established fact that in 1659 Aurangzeb revived the office of *muhtasib* and placed these officers under the control of the *qāzis* throughout the Empire to enforce prohibition against wine drinking, apostasy and blasphemy and to help in the regulation of markets and commerce<sup>1</sup>. However there are instances of assigning this office to the *qāzi*, as in case of above Qāzi Shahabuddin, who was also granted the office of *ihtisab* and even *khitābat* of two *Eids* in 1661 A.D.

There are instances of the appointment of new *qāzis* following the transfer of the previous *qāzis* through the imperial order as was the case of Mulla Aḥmad Sherwani, who was appointed in February 1662 A.D. upon the transfer of Qāzi ‘Abdul Wāsi’ for which he also received conditional and unconditional allowances, treasuries of the cities from Aḥmadabad, Aurangabad and Burhanpur<sup>2</sup>, which shows their appointment and transfer by the Emperor.

The provincial *ṣādr* was responsible for regulating state grants to worthy, generally religious recipients. The imperial *ṣādr* and the chief *qāzi* assigned men well-versed in the Islamic law to vacancies for judges and *muhtasibs* etc

#### **OTHER PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS:**

Although there used to serve several other provincial officials in Mughal provinces of the Deccan in addition to the above yet only some other important officials can be mentioned here fleetingly. As far as the higher officers are concerned the act of their authorization and approval emanated directly from the central administration in the offices of the *wazīr* or head *Dīwān* of the Empire, whereas appointing authority issuing the orders was probably, the provincial *dīwāns* in respect of subordinate offices. The imperial inspector general, or *Bakhshī-i Mamalik*, sent his own subordinates to the provincial military contingent known as *Bakhshī-i fauj*<sup>3</sup> or *dīwān-i fauj*.

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<sup>1</sup>*Cf.*, M.Z. Siddiqi ‘The Muhtasib Under Aurangzeb’, *Medieval India Quarterly*, 5; 1963, p. 113-9.

<sup>2</sup>*SDAR*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>3</sup>*SDAR*, pp. 113-4.

The Mughal administration assigned the gathering and reporting of public events and secret intelligence and reporting of public events and secret intelligence both to the news writer posted in the *pargana* at the *pargana* headquarters and to the superintendents of the posts. The *wāqia' nāwis* was supposed to be official in every matter including administration and protection of his *jagīr*. Throughout each expedition, this specially appointed fiscal officer and his staff maintained minute details of all transfers including extraordinary expenditures incurred by the commander or any of his subordinates. However, all these accounts were adjusted by the treasury after the return of the army.<sup>1</sup>

However, it could be transferred and his rank reduced as happened in case of the *wāqia' nāwis* of Chandor<sup>2</sup>. It was the duty of the *wāqia' nāwisto* make utmost endeavours in discharging his responsibilities as well to send *roznāmcha-i wāqia'* every week to the imperial record office as is evident from the appointment orders to Mir 'Azizuddin, the *wāqia' nāwis* of Islamgarh<sup>3</sup>. At provincial level was so important an office that even it be assigned to provincial *Bakhshī*. Furthermore, 'Askar *Khān*, *Bakhshī* of the Deccan was also burdened with this responsibility. The Mughal espionage system was so strong that when the *wāqia' nāwis* came to know of arrival of the ship of Shāista *Khān* from Rakhang [Arakan] port to Ishaq Pattan port near Cicacol he sent cause one on 17 August 1661 so as to confirm the news of the death of Shuja' [na-Shuja'] from the captain of the ship to get it entered in the news report<sup>4</sup>. Even another news report from Hyderabad city on 30 August 1661 as per the written statement of Mir Qasim, an employee of *sarkār khaṣṣa sharīfa* at Muchhli Pattan port confirmed that the ship of Chauliya, who was previously a servant of Shāista *Khān*, had come from Rakhang port and reported that Shuja' was killed, and the sons together with their sisters were imprisoned by the *zamīndār* of Rakhang, and the sons had their sons and previously Muḥammad Amin *Khān*, *Bakhshīul Mamalik* was also apprised<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> J.R Richards, Mughal State Finance and the World Economy, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1981, p. 294.

<sup>2</sup> *SDAR*, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> *SDAR*, p. 100.

<sup>4</sup> *SWD*, p. 3. *SDAR*, pp. 125-7.

<sup>5</sup> *SWD*, p. 7.

Postal communication in the Mughal Empire served an extremely crucial purpose through which network the news could be conveyed. Its administration was entrusted to a *manṣabdār* when Saiyid Tajuddin was given the charge of *dāk chauki* or postal communication of the army, Bahādur Khān Koka by the Imperial order, was directed to instruct the Meoras and other staff of the *dāk chauki* to secure bond from them for not interfering with the peasants and inhabitants of towns and villages and wayfaries situated therein, not bringing anyone's paper/letter along with the *nalwas* [post containers] and delivering the *farmāns* and letters issued from the Imperial court to the officials [*mutaṣaddis*] thereat and sending the petitions and news reports [*‘arāiz-o-waqāi’*] which the officials posted in the said army under his imitation as per rule. He has also to ask the Meoras [i.e. messengers] to send the *nalwas* every month otherwise any delay by them would be penalized [by deductions] from their payments by the clerks of the Imperial record offices. He was bound to write true facts without any partisanship and jealousy<sup>1</sup>.

### [III] LOCAL ADMINISTRATION:

Side by side provincial administration of the four provinces of the Deccan, the imperial court laid an equal emphasis on the local administration. Since the *Dīwān* seems to have made the great majority of appointments it is but natural that he also recruited, appointed and monitored the occupants of the semi-official or intermediary posts found in the four Deccan provinces.

### **CHAUDHURĪ:**

It is but natural that the Imperial *Dīwān* and the *Dīwān-i Khālīṣa* also appointed or confirmed the appointment of a *chaudhurī*, who was firmly identified with the Imperial regime and he was obviously supposed to assist all imperial officers sent to his locality for collecting revenues, and sometimes, he could, however, find himself under tremendous pressure to make up any accumulated arrears. In return for these services a part of land revenue through remissions, concessions and commissions annually up to 5% of the revenues collected. The *chaudhurī* was designated differently in the Mughal Deccan, as *deshmukhs* who was basically a *zamīndār*.

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 47-48; For details see Irfan Habib, Postal Communication in Medieval India, *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1985.

## **MAJMUA‘DĀR:**

In every *sarkār* there used to be a *majmua‘dār*, who used to play an important role in revenue collection. However sometimes he appeared to have indulged in misappropriation or suppression of facts of embezzlement together with other officials. We are told about such an episode in three news reports of 3 May, 10 May and 9 June 1661 in which the *majmua‘dār* suppressed the facts of misappropriation of land revenue by the *Dīwān* of *sarkār* Ramgir, for whom they severely punished financially as well<sup>1</sup>.

## **KOTWĀL**

The central figure for general urban administration was the *kotwāl* or the city magistrate, who acted with the *qāzi* and the *qila‘dār* of the city in assuring the entire responsibility for maintenance of peace, order and security of the city, *qaṣba* and its immediate neighborhood. Significantly, the duties of the *kotwāl* and his stature were somewhat reduced at the provincial capitals serving as the seats of the provincial governors. However, elsewhere, in every important town, he was the most prominent figure, whose city guards and watchmen and various other bodies of armed footmen, were the urban police. Compared to any other officer, he was more responsible for controlling the urban crowd and for mitigating and controlling the sectarian violence, which could break out in any of the Deccan provinces as is convincingly proved by a report from Aurangabad of March 1663. It was reported that Maṣūr, a beggar, resident of Begumpur, Aurangabad represented to that Rajab had killed his son by dagger. Furthermore Man, Dadu and Sahu had brought embroidered cloth etc to the market for sale. Peemji, a butcher brought three of them to the *kotwāl* complaining that they had stolen these goods. Accordingly a thorough investigation revealed that they along with others had plundered a *carvan* of Gujarat at village Parchi, situated in *pargana* Nandurbar, and whatever share they had obtained, which they had brought for sale. Therefore the *kotwāl* imprisoned three of them<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>SWD pp 65-8, 71-2

<sup>2</sup> SDW, p 51

## **SHIQDĀR:**

The imperial administration strictly checked the activities of the *shiqdār* and *kotwāl*. When a lady reported the matter of kidnapping her grandson by Sikandar and ‘Alaul, *shiqdār* and *kotwāl* of *pargana* Dangiri. Accordingly the Prince’s order was communicated to Ghiyasuddin Khān on 6 November 1674 asking him to depute ten *ahdis* [gentleman trooper] so as to escort them along with the grandson. When Saiyid Muḥammad, *shiqdār* and *thānedār* brought the information under *qāzi*’s seal to the effect that due to Maratha invasion ‘Alaul and Sikandar who were dismissed had gone from there, it is strictly ordered to produce three of them otherwise a harsh sequence could follow<sup>1</sup>.

The *shiqdār* played same role of maintenance of law in rural areas. A *shiqdār* was ordered to hang over a thief, who had killed a peasant, in *pargana* Ūdgir<sup>2</sup>.

The *dīwān* of the Mughal Empire also recognised the local power and resources of numerous local magnates by formally designating them as *zamīndārs*. It is an established fact that those *zamīndārs* whose domains were situated within the zone of direct imperial administration maintained a relationship with the imperial administration quite similar to that of *chaudhurīs*, in coordinating between the state and rural and town society. Since the post of *chaudhurī* was very significant in the local administration loyal and influential *zamīndārs* were appointed as *chaudhurīs*.

## **QĀNŪNGO:**

In every *pargana* there was a local record keeper and accountant or *qānūngo* who used to work in tandem with the *chaudhurī*. The office of the *qānūngo* was hereditary because on his death, his legal successor was appointed to the post and he was confirmed in his office by an imperial *sanad*<sup>3</sup>. Generally, holders of these offices were recruited from the literate secretariat castes like Khatri or Brahmins. The *qānūngos* by controlling the data on the revenue

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, p 105

<sup>2</sup>SWD, pp 45-6

<sup>3</sup>Ahkam-i Ālamgiri, f. 216[b].

administration, and by accumulating wealth overtime, became quite important local figures under Aurangzeb<sup>1</sup>. Their terms of service and tenure were similar to those of *chaudhurīs*; they received tax free grants on the revenue proceeds and other perquisites.

It was the part of the duty of the *qānūngo* to dispatch, year by year, the record of revenue and area taxed for the last ten years [*mawāzino-i dah sāla*], the records of the cash revenue rates for each crop [*dasturu-l 'amal*] and other papers from the accounts for the collections and assessment of the current year for the perusal of the provincial *dīwān*. The *qānūngo* was also informed about the appointment of the *Dīwān* of his *sarkār*<sup>2</sup> as well as other officials.

### **MUQADDAM:**

The village headmen or *muqaddam* played a crucial role in streamlining the local administration. He was not only informed about the important appointments of officials concerning the revenue and other matters but was also bound to recognize them, as such his condemnation and appreciation was given weightage. We come across a representation submitted by the notables and peasantry of Tajalka Chahār Thāna, *sarkār* Basim, *ṣūba* Berar, Balaghat to the Viceroy of the Deccan on 21 January 1671 complaining against the high handedness and plunder of a *faujdār*, who had even imprisoned the daughters and widows of a *muqaddam*. This was taken seriously because of the truthfulness of the matter as a result of the inquiry and another *faujdār* was appointed<sup>3</sup>.

### **CHAUDHARĪ-I SĀI'R**

The headmen of the *sai'r* revenues or the *chaudhurī-i sāi'r* assumed responsibility for proper administration and taxation of town and urban markets. He had to pay a fixed fee. Majority of these *sāi'r* headmen were either bankers [*mahājans*] money changers [*ṣarraḥ*] or leading merchants of the town or the city of the area. They provided an important link between

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<sup>1</sup> For details see. S.Z.H. Jafri, *Sarkār Qanungos: 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> Century Documents*, PIHC, 1985.

<sup>2</sup>SWD, pp. 133-4.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, pp. 89-90.

the local and central administrations and a medium of controlling urban commerce for the Empire.

There are some other officials dealing with the local administration like *patwārī* or village accountant etc whose role can never be under estimated.

The above discussion not only clearly establishes the increasingly effective, efficient and internally differentiated bureaucracy but also the integration of the administration of the four provinces of the Mughal Deccan with the rest of the country because like centre, primary administrative appointments were made within the four provinces as well in view of the fact that the Deccan was always relatively detached from the core area of the Empire in North India.

### III

#### ARMY ORGANISATION AND DEPLOYMENT IN THE DECCAN

##### [I] MANŞABAND JĀGĪR ASSIGNMENTS:

*Manşab* [rank] indicated the position of its holder [*manşabdār*] in the official hierarchy under the Mughals because they owed direct subordination to the Emperor irrespective of their *manşab*. The *manşab*-holders of the Mughal Empire were assigned dual numerical ranks; the first number representing his *zāt* [‘personal’] and the second *sawār* [cavalry]. According to the sanctioned schedule, the *zāt* rank determined the personal pay of the *manşabdār* and the *sawār* rank, the size of cavalry contingent maintained by him for the Emperor’s service as well as the pay he was to receive to meet his expenses for maintaining it. His pay claim [*ṭalab*] consisted of the total amount sanctioned for both *zāt* and *sawār*, and this could be met either by payment in cash from the Imperial treasury or by assigning to him territories in his *jāgīr* as official estimated [*jama*’, *jama*’*dami*] of court had exactly to equal the pay due to him<sup>1</sup>. The conditional rank assigned in view of the services required of a particular officer at a particular post was normally cancelled and the additional *jāgīr* resumed in the event of the *manşabdār*’s transfer from the post. This fact is amply proved by a *dastak* of the Prince. Muḥammad Azam Shah on 28 July 1682 issued to Kamyab Khān, *Bakhshi* of the Deccan provinces that consequent upon the transfer of Qādir Dād Khān from the *thānadārī* of *pargana* Bir, which was assigned in the *jāgīr* of Bahādur Khān, the Emperor ordered for cancellation of his conditional *manşab* as per the following specifications:

1000 [*zāt*]

800 *sawār*

*do-aspabarāwurdī*

200[*sawār*] 600[*sawār*]

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<sup>1</sup> For details see, W.H. Moreland, “Rank [*Manşab*] in the Mughal State Service”, *JRAS*, London 1936, pp. 641-65, A.J. Qaisar, ‘Note on the Date of Institution of *Manşab* under Akbar’, *PIHC*, Delhi, 1961, Irfān Habib, ‘The *Manşab* System, 1596-1637’, *PHIC*, Patiala, 1967, *idem* *Manşab* and Pay-Scales under Jahangir and Shahjahan, *Islamic Culture*. Hyderabad 1985, Shireen Moosvi, ‘The Evolution of *Manşab* System under Akbar until 1596-97’, *JRAS*, London, No 2, 1981.

According to *barāwurdī*

1000 [*zāt*]

1000 *sawār*

500 [*sawār*] conditional was reduced

1000 [*zāt*]

500 *sawār*<sup>1</sup>

Conditional ranks were normally added to the previous *zāt* and *sawār* ranks, viz., Muḥammad Ayyub who was assigned 250/20 and *sawārs* conditional to his posting in the Deccan as he was granted the duties of *bakhshigiri*, *wāqia* ‘-nigāri and *amīnī-i dāgho-taṣḥiḥa* of the army of Shaikh Minhaj posted to administer Gulbarga and other *parganas* of Bijapur in December 1676 A.D. He was recommended an increase of 50 *zāt* by Bahōdur Zafar Jang Kokatash<sup>2</sup>.

From the statistical information in respect of 1000/800 [200x2-3h] it can be deduced that it can be stated 1000/800+200 which means that 200 were *duaspa sih aspa*, whereas the rest of the rank was termed *barāwurdī*. From the point of view of pay and military obligation, the rank of 800, of whom 200 were *du-aspa sih aspa*, really meant 1000 *sawārs*.

In making out the pay certificates, against pay claim [*ṭalab*] for dual ranks the pay on *zāt* [maintenance of self, family and personal establishment] account was termed *kasab* [personal] and the *sawār*, *tabinān* [contingent]<sup>3</sup>. It is an established fact that the pay for both *zāt* and *sawār* gradually divided from Akbar to Shāhjahān and the scales fixed by Shāhjahān were continued by Aurangzeb without any modification as is amply demonstrated by the *Dastūru-l ‘Amals* of Aurangzeb’s reign.

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 135-6. It further orders for his posting in the army accompanying the Prince and excluding his name from the list of appointees thereat.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 113-4. This is clearly stated here that 50 *zāt* and 20 *sawār* were conditional.

<sup>3</sup> See *Mughal Documents, ‘Catalogue of Aurangzeb’s Reign’*; see A.P. State Archives, Hyderabad, 1981, vol. I, part ii, facsimiles XV-XIX, Doc Nos H/I, H/I/1; H/I/2, H/I/6, H/I/82; H/I/99; H/I/114; H/I/131.

Theoretically speaking all *manṣabdārs* were directly appointed by the Emperor. Another method of recruitment was based on the recommendations of the prominent nobles, especially governors and commanders which were normally accepted<sup>1</sup>. Recommendations by the Princes were generally accepted. Even increase in rank was recommended by high officials<sup>2</sup>.

There are instances of demotions in rank on the recommendations of the high nobles *viz.*, Mirza Raja Jai Singh due to the failure of Sarafroz Khān 5000/4000 [1000x2-3h] in accompaniment with him had reduced 1000/1000 from his rank which was accepted by Aurangzeb on 1 May 1665 demoting him to 4000/3000 [1000x2-3h]<sup>3</sup>. Yaswant Rao's 200 *sawār* rank was reduced due to his killing of a Brahmin<sup>4</sup>. Khān-i Zamān who originally held 5000/2000 [300x2-3h] was reinstated to 4000/2000 unconditional while 1000/300 [2x3-h] as conditional<sup>5</sup>.

Similarly Abdur Reḥmān Bijāpurī previously entitled Sharza Khān held the rank of 3500/2000 out of which 1000/1000 were reduced. However, he was reinstated to 2500/1500 by curtailing 1000/500 in March 1670<sup>6</sup>.

Interestingly enough we come across incidences of the dismissal from *manṣab* and reinstatement of the same *manṣab* on a fresh *tazwījanāma* [recommendation] *viz.*, Vaisaji s/o Madhiy Ghorapara's [holding 300/60<sup>7</sup>] and his removal and reinstatement. Proceeding to anywhere without permission could even result into dismissal from service as Seru Beg s/o Ilaḥwardi Khān b/o 'Abdur Rasul faced removal from service due to visit to Shah Aurangabad without consent<sup>8</sup>. The intervening period between dismissal and reinstatement was excluded

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<sup>1</sup> On the recommendation of Mirza Raja Jai Singh Mulla Aḥmad Naitha the leading noble of Bijapur was given the rank of 6000/6000 'Ālamgir Nāma, 919-920; Futuhāt-i 'Ālamgirī, ff 103 [b], 116 [c], 117 [c] 165 [b]; Akhbarat 8<sup>th</sup> RY; SDAR, pp. 116-7.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 52-4, 107, 124-5, 140, 148-150.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, p. 49.

<sup>4</sup>SDAR, pp. 63-4.

<sup>5</sup>SDAR, p. 111-2.

<sup>6</sup>SDAR, p.70.

<sup>7</sup>SDAR, p. 71-2.

<sup>8</sup>SWD, p. 103.

from payment<sup>1</sup>. Efforts were made to get entered promotions and demotions in rank in the *wāqia*<sup>2</sup>.

The month scales probably arose due to variation between the official assessment of revenue [*jama*'] of *jāgīr* and the actual revenue collections [*hāšils*] due to which the *jāgīrs* were declared 1 monthly to 3 monthly. In the reign of Aurangzeb a transfer from Northern India to the Deccan meant a *jāgīr* on a lower month scale<sup>3</sup>. Although Aurangzeb as Viceroy of the Deccan sought relief for 2-3 monthly *manṣabdārs* which as Emperor, he seems to have forgotten because he continued Shāhjahān's scales even in the Deccan<sup>4</sup>.

The Rajputs received 8 to 6 monthly *jāgīr*'s even in the Deccan a curtailment which led to representations<sup>5</sup>.

There used to be a number of deductions against sanctioned claim [*muqarrara ṭalab*] largest number of which was made in case of the Deccanis comprising Bījapurī, Haidarabadi and Maratha *manṣabdārs* who served under the Mughals<sup>6</sup>. This deduction of 1/4<sup>th</sup> known as *waza '-i dām-ichunthāi*, which was continued under Aurangzeb from the total *dāms* of both the ranks.

However, Aurangzeb ordered that if however, one had come direct from Iran and it was proved that he had served none of these government then 1/4<sup>th</sup> deduction was not allowed<sup>7</sup>.

*Khaurāk-i dawwāb* [fodder for beasts] or *rasad-i khurāk* was deducted from the *ṭalab* [pay claim], which was not, however obligatory on all the *manṣabdārs*<sup>8</sup>. *Irmas* was another

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 108-109.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 76-8.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, p. 84.

<sup>4</sup> For details see, Mughal Nobility, pp. 46-9.

<sup>5</sup>SDAR, p. 84 which contains petition of Mahraja Jaswant Singh's father-in-law.

<sup>6</sup>SDAR, pp. 63-4 contains an imperial order of 11 Rabi, 10 RY for the deduction of 1/4<sup>th</sup> from the Deccans if they served under Bijapur and Haiderabad states, even if they had originally come from Iran. In case of some it was exempted as well Cf., SDAR, pp. 71-2, 80-81] [Cf., Mamuri, *Tarikh-i Aurangzeb*, f. 156 [b]].

<sup>7</sup>SDAR, pp. 63-4.

<sup>8</sup>SDAR, pp. 32-3 recording exemption of *khurāk-i dawwāb* to Maulko Bilal.

deduction for demand for supplies. *Du-dāmī* or 5% was another deduction. *Jurmana* or fine for deficiencies was another deduction. We are informed that in 1677 the Deccanis had been exempted from paying the expenses of *khurōk-i filan-i ḥalqa* [feeding of elephants of the imperial stables] due to ‘their distressed circumstances and the low income of their *jāgīr*<sup>1</sup>. The *muṭalibi* was a type of recovery of government claims against the *manṣabdār*<sup>2</sup>.

A general order was issued in 1662 A.D. for the dismissal of *sawārs* in respect of those holding the rank upto 250 *zāt* as we find in case of Muḥammad Taqī [who was made the superintendent of the *Dīwān*’s court with the rank of 100/10 and Muḥammad Iḥsan holding 100/15 as his rank<sup>3</sup>. However, in less of his *sawār* rank 50 *zāt* were enhanced as per the request of Amānat Khān in September 1662. This is further proved by the following table of *manṣabdārs* posted to administer Talkokan<sup>4</sup>. However this seems to have been cancelled as subsequently in 1672, [SDAR, p. 102].

**TABLE - 1**

S.No.	Name of <i>manṣabdār</i>	Rank
1.	Lodi <u>Khān</u>	2500/1500
2.	Mehmud <u>Khān</u>	300/80
3.	Lal s/o Jalal	250/
4.	Ḥusain s/o Jalal	200/
5.	Shahbaz s/o Jalal	250/
6.	Qaim s/o Nizam Lodi	150/
7.	Daulat s/o Salim	100/
8.	‘Alāul	100/
9.	‘Alaul s/o ‘Abdur Razzāq	80/
10.	Maternal grandson of Jalāl Ḥusain	150/
11.	Bahar s/o Ni‘mat	150/
12.	‘Abdullah s/o Fida	100/
13.	Shaikh Faizullah s/o Saiyid Muḥammad	80/
14.	Shaikh ‘Abdur Rahim	80/
15.	Sarwar s/o Darya	80/

<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 114.

<sup>2</sup>SWD, pp. 233, 84-5, 80-81.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup>SDAR, pp. 4-9.

The Mughal *manṣabdārs* were assigned *naqdi* or *jāgīr*, the payment of *naqdimanṣabdārs* was made from the *khālīṣa* where *jāgīrdārs* were assigned *jāgīrs*. *Jāgīrs* assigned in lieu of salary due to *manṣabdārs* were known as *jāgīr-i tankhwāh* or *tankhwāh-i jāgīr*<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore a *jāgīr* assigned to a *manṣabdār* contingent upon his appointment to a particular post was known as *mashruṭ* or conditional. *Jāgīrs*, independent of rank, involving no obligation of service, were known as *inā‘m*. The *jāgīr* assignments were calculated in *dāms* on the basis of *jama‘dāmī* of the areas of the assignments, which was worked out by the revenue statements of ten years [*mawāzana-i dah sala*] of the provinces of the Empire. During Aurangzeb’s second Viceroyalty of the Deccan the actual *hāṣil* came to an average of these monthly or 1/4<sup>th</sup> of the *jama‘*. Accordingly adjustment was allowed which was designated as *takhfīf-i dāmi* so as to keep the *jama‘dāmī* equal to *jāgīrdār’s* pay and the balance was adjusted by the payment in cash or assignment of additional *jāgīr*. If, however, the actual collection exceeded the *jama‘dāmī* or ‘month ratio’ the difference was either recovered or the *sawār* rank was increased. Asad Khān, conveyed to Aurangzeb that Mukarram Khān had informed him that the actual income of his *jāgīr* in the Deccan exceeded the ‘month ratio’ sanctioned to him. The Emperor ordered for an increase of 100 *sawārs* in the rank of Mukarram Khān to adjust the excess of his income<sup>2</sup>.

Transfer of *jāgīrs* was a permanent feature of the Mughal administration which is well documented by the contemporary chronicles, collection of letters and documents. *Ādab-i ‘Ālāmgīrī* is replete with such details.

Only *waṭan jāgīr* were exempted from transfer. In a representation to Aurangzeb it was stated by Raja Inder Singh that it was the established practice that after the death of the holder of *waṭan*, *manṣabs* were granted to their heirs as per the assessed revenues of their *waṭans*<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, 27-8; *Dilkushā* f. 139 [a].

<sup>2</sup>*Akḥbārāt*, Sitamu Transcript [12<sup>th</sup> R.Y. of Aurangzeb, p. 233].

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, p. 121. Since the *jama‘dāmī* of Raja Inder Singh’s *waṭan jāgīr* exceeded the pay due to his rank he solicited that either his rank be increased to equal the *jama‘dāmī* or *jama‘dāmī* be decreased to equal the pay for his existing rank because in either case none would be assigned a share in his *waṭan-jagīr*. Accordingly his *manṣab* was increased. *Ruqaat-i ‘Ālāmgīr*, p. 167, Lahori, I, p. 161.

## [II] CONTROL OVER *MANṢABDĀRS*' CONTINGENTS:

Since *manṣab* was dual in nature which included both *zāt* and *sawār*, the *manṣabdārs* were assigned either *jāgīrs* or paid in cash to meet out expenses on both accounts. Insofar as the imperial control over *manṣabdārs* is concerned it began from the time of assignment of *sawār* rank from the second half of Akbar's reign to force every *manṣabdār* to actually maintain the exact number of horses and cavalymen expected of him for the imperial service. However, due to inherent dishonesty among most of the nobles it was not possible to eradicate it through an imperial command. In order to check all evasions of military obligation, the introduction of *dāgh* [branding] for the horses and *chehra* [descriptive roll] for the men was an important innovation of Akbar<sup>1</sup>.

During Akbar's reign each *manṣabdār* was bound to bring to muster the number of men indicated by his *sawār* rank, penalty was imposed for any default. Probably a *manṣabdār* of 100 *sawār* had to bring at the maximum 50 horsemen under Akbar<sup>2</sup>. During Jahangir's reign slackness was shown in checking the contingents maintained by the *manṣabdārs*<sup>3</sup> which was apparently reorganized by Shāhjahān. Shāhjahān gave formal status to the actual position in respect of contingents maintained by the *manṣabdārs* and his modifications with regard to *dāgh* are known from a passage in the *Padshahnama* of Abdul Ḥamid Lahori. It is stated there that it was the law of the Empire that these *manṣabdārs*, who had *jāgīrs* in any of the *ṣūbas* of Hindustan [North India] and were posted in the same province in which their *jāgīrs* were situated, were to bring to the muster horsemen equal in number to one-third of their *sawār* rank. But if posted outside the *ṣūbas* of their *jāgīrs*, they were only obliged to one-fourth and if in Balkh and Badakhshān, one fifth. This one-fifth rule was applied to all those posted in *ṣūba* Kābul<sup>4</sup>. The *manṣabdārs*, holding *naqdijāgīrs* who were paid in cash were required to muster their contingents according to one-fifth rule which is clearly mentioned in a *dasturu-l 'amal* of

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<sup>1</sup>*Ain-i Akbari*, vol. I, pp. 135, 266-7.

<sup>2</sup>*Ain-i Akbari*, vol I, pp. 123-4.

<sup>3</sup>Moreland, JRAS, 1936, pp. 641-65.

<sup>4</sup>Lahori, II, pp. 505-7.

Shōhjahān of 27<sup>th</sup> R.Y.<sup>1</sup>, which are confirmed from *Khulaṣatus Siyaq*, written during late Aurangzeb period<sup>2</sup>.

Since the rule of one-fourth was applied in the Deccan, the *dāghof taṣḥiḥa* was made accordingly under Shōhjahān and Aurangzeb as is evident from a *farmān* of Shōhjahān of 2 *Shaban* 14<sup>th</sup> R.Y. [1641-2 A.D.] to Prince Aurangzeb, during his first Viceroyalty of the Deccan which announces:

“Let it be known to Prince Aurangzeb [titles omitted] that meanwhile it was brought to His Majesty’s notice, from the contents of the news reports of the Deccan, that during this period, due to less yield of the *jāgīrs* of *thaṣūba* [i.e. Deccan] from the beginning of his [i.e. Aurangzeb’s] arrival in *thaṣūba* they [i.e. *manṣabdārs*] of their own free will and inclination, have brought their contingents [*tabinān*] for *daghi* payment [*ṭalab-i dāgh*] and have received salary under one-fourth rule [*chauthāi*]. When this was known to him [i.e. Aurangzeb] from Lutfullah, *Bakhshī* and *Wāqia’ Nawīs*, he asked him to enter it into the news report [*wāqia’*] so as to seek its clarification. Accordingly he represented to His Majesty that since *dāgh o taṣḥiḥa* [branding and verification] regulation is not [available] in this province, if *dasturu-l ‘amal* [regulation] is sent from the Imperial Court, the branding and verification shall be done accordingly. His Majesty’s orders are issued that we are sending the *dāgh-o-taṣḥiḥa*, regulations along with this *farmān*. It is most probable that among the officers [*bandaha*] whose entire *jāgīr* is in Hindustan [i.e. North India] one Rai Satar Sal<sup>3</sup> used to keep and [still] retains contingents more than the regulation; and in this situation, the Prince should be sure about Rai Satar Sal and some others who maintain contingent [as per rule] make pay claims accordingly and from the rest of the people who would not have cared for it, whosoever has his entire *jāgīr* in Hindustan, then according to regulation, his *jāgīr* whether small or big would be in Hindustan and the remainder [would be] in the Deccan; the *jāgīr* of Hindustan [should be] as per the regulation of Hindustan and share of *jāgīr*, according to its actual realization [*ḥāṣil*] should be brought to *dāgh* in accordance with the stipulated schedule. Whosoever has his entire *jāgīr* there [i.e. North India]

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<sup>1</sup> Ali Muḥammad *Khān*, *Mirāt-i Ahmadi*, Baroda 1928, vol. I, p. 228.

<sup>2</sup> *Khulaṣatus Siyaq* MS; S.S. Coll 410/143 NAL AMU, Aligarh, f. 54 [c].

<sup>3</sup> Rai Satar Sal s/o Rao Ratan [R] held the rank of 3000/3000 during 14 RY of Shahjahan, [corr. 1641-8], Lahori I [b], 297.

then by inspecting actual realization of his *jāgīr* make *dāghi* payment according to it and he should consider this regulation as permanent and verify it year after year<sup>1</sup>.

The significance of this *farmān* can become more clear if we refer to the schedule issued in 14<sup>th</sup> R.Y. of Shāhjahān, by Islam Khān because the present *farmān* refers to that schedule<sup>2</sup>.

Yet another method of control over *manṣabdārs*' contingent was the fixation of month rates under the heading *tabinān* [contingent] especially in regard to 2-3 months which according to Aurangzeb's letter of 29<sup>th</sup> R.Y. of Shāhjahān quoting an imperial order to convey that the pay for '3-months' for which Rs 17/8 and Rs 15 have respectively been sanctioned [elsewhere] has been fixed [in the case of the Deccan] from the beginning of the month of Mihr Kharif Yunt II, at Rs 20/- per head per month or at the same rate as for 4 months<sup>3</sup>.

The pay calculated from rates previous to Shāhjahān's 27<sup>th</sup> R.Y. in respect of the Deccan which was better for the lower categories than those continued in the Deccan subsequently [3-2 months]. That is why Aurangzeb as Viceroy of the Deccan had so strongly solicited modification of this order which was a harsh one and become so grateful when Shāhjahān made an exemption in the case of the Deccan for those placed in the 2 and 3 months-scales<sup>4</sup>.

Although many of the detailed regulations prescribed for branding and checking the contingents of the *manṣabdārs* have come down to us especially in the *Zawābit-i-Ālamgīrī* and *Khulaṣatus Siyaq*<sup>5</sup> yet original documents help us in understanding the ground realities of this regulation. A *dastak* of 21 July 1660 issued to Shaikh Muḥammad, *Bakhshi* of the ships in favour of Yaqūt Khānfaujdār of ships holding the rank of 2000/700 [100x2-3h] instructs for branding through verification and replacement, which indicates the number of men and horses each 149 out of which 132 men and horses each were alive whereas 2 each had died. In regard to

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<sup>1</sup> Bib. Nat. Paris, Ms No. 482 Persian, ff. 46[a]-47[a].

<sup>2</sup>SDSR, pp. 79-84 and *Dasturu-l 'Amal 'Ālamgīrī*, MS, Br. M. Add. 65, 99, ff. 121-3.

<sup>3</sup> 'Adab-i 'Ālamgīrī, Lahori, 1971, vol. I, p. 178, Cf. *Calendar*.

<sup>4</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>*Zawābit-i 'Ālamgīrī*, ff. 38[a] – 40[6].

remaining each 15 men and horses a list of deceased absconders is given there along with the horses<sup>1</sup>.

Shāhjahān's *farmān* of 1652 stress for completing or ignoring fraction of horses required under branding *viz.*, one horseman was to be considered adequate for branding purposes under the one-fourth rule because the extra fraction of 1/4<sup>th</sup> 'horseman' was disregarded. *Tāzi*' horses were also branded in the Deccan<sup>2</sup>.

Aurangzeb in his 25<sup>th</sup> R.Y. issued an order that all the *manṣabdārs* serving in the Deccan up to the *zāt* rank of 5000 should bring their horses [required against the *zāt* rank] for branding<sup>3</sup>. That is why Jadun Rai Deccani like 'Abdul Aziz Khān and his tribe solicited exemption from branding<sup>4</sup>.

### [III] FORTS:

The forts in the Deccan played a very significant role not only in defending the surrounding areas but also acted as a catalyst in running the administration, serving as ordinance depots and granaries, stationing the armies and their training centres, housing treasuries and accommodating other important provincial officials. As nucleus of defense Aurangzeb saw to it that besides appointing high officials as the *qila'dārs* of strategic forts none of the forts was to be left defenseless or without a castellan for a moment.

There were numerous forts of military importance in addition to a cluster of countless small forts as these safeguards of fortified strongholds were distributed throughout the Mughal Deccan. The position of some forts of crucial significance, the status of the *qila'dārs* and the number of the contingents maintained by them in 1670 A.D. can be gauged from the following table:

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<sup>1</sup>*SDAR*, pp.10-12

<sup>2</sup>*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, vol. I, pp. 228-9.

<sup>3</sup>*Akḥbārāt*, 21<sup>st</sup> *Shawwal* 25<sup>th</sup> R.Y.

<sup>4</sup>*SDAR*, pp. 114-5.

**TABLE- 2**

S.No	Name of the <i>qila'dār</i> and the fort	<i>Manṣab</i>	Unconditional	Contingent	No. of Contingent
1.	Bakhtiyar <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila'dār</i> of Zafarabad	3000/2500	3000/1500	1000 <i>sawār</i>	
2.	Irij <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila'dār</i> of Sholapur	2500/2000	2500/1800 [300x2-3h]	500 <i>sawār</i> [300x2-3h]	969
3.	Barkhurdār <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila'dār</i> of Ausa	2000/2000			668
4.	Saiyid Muḥammad <u>Khān</u> <i>qila'dār</i> of Parenda	1500/1500	1500/1000	500 <i>sawār</i>	500
5.	Qalandar <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila'dār</i> of Aḥmad Nagar	1500/1000 [200x2-3h]	1000/700	300 [200x2-3h]	
6.	'Abdul Aziz <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila'dār</i> of Sunnair	1500/700	1000/500	500/200	
7.	Suhrab <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila'dār</i> of Udgir	1500/900	1500/800	100	300
8.	Masu'd <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila'dār</i> of Chandor	1500/700			234
9.	Rustam <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila'dār</i> of Bhalipur [Nagpur]	1000/900	700/500	200/400	
10.	Miraz <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila'dār</i> of Fatehabad Dharur	1000/600	1000/400	200 <i>sawār</i>	166

Source: *SDAR*, pp. 73-5.

The above table indicates the *manṣabs* both conditional and unconditional, except in two instances and the number of contingents maintained by them except for '4 four *qila'dārs* which were lost due to wear. The conditional *manṣabs* were contingent upon their holding the *qila'dārs* of the forts in question.

The forts indicated above were held by the *umara* whose ranks ranged from 3000 to 1000. It was compulsory for every *qila'dār* to remain inside the fort, failing which any punishment like reduction in rank or transfer could be imposed. When it was conveyed to Aurangzeb in April 1676 that Lashkari Beg, *qila'dar* of Galna fort leaving behind his son had emerged from the fort to welcome, Mir Nurullah, the *faujdār* of Thaner and Ner, not only he earned the imperial wrath by suffering reduction of 20 *sawārs* in his rank but also censorious remarks of the Emperor that in future he would not come out of the fort, otherwise he would stand transferred<sup>1</sup>. Similar penalty for coming out of the fort for hunting was imposed on Jan Sipar Khān, *qila'dār* of Zafarabad fort<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>SWD, p. 83.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 29-30.

Since the *qila dārs* maintained land and order as well as trained the army in archery and connding we find detailed description of such practices. For example, Saiyid Ḥusian, castellan of the Ramgir fort in consultation with the *Dīwān* and Saiyid Jamal *sawār*, who was appointed *amīn* of archery of the army posted atop the fort by Naṣrullah, [*Dīwān* of *sarkār*Ramgir] observed the archery of Sadi Sadiwal, and he in accordance with the regulation of the Deccan forts marked first, second and third as per the following details and some were weak in archery and he especially noted the absence of Ghiyasuddin, *dārogha* [superintendent] of the said fort:

- |      |                       |              |
|------|-----------------------|--------------|
| i.   | [Total] =             | 97 persons   |
|      | First                 | = 54 persons |
|      | Second                | = 35 persons |
|      | Third                 | = 7 persons  |
|      | Week [ <i>zabun</i> ] | = 1 person   |
|      | [Total = 97]          |              |
| ii.  | Sadi Somri            | = 47 persons |
|      | First                 | = 26 persons |
|      | Second                | = 18 persons |
|      | Third                 | = 3 persons  |
|      | [Total = 47]          |              |
| iii. | Sadi Ghanshiyam       | = 49 persons |
|      | First                 | = 27 persons |
|      | Second                | = 17 persons |
|      | Third                 | = 4 persons  |
|      | Weak                  | = 1 person   |
|      | [Total = 49]          |              |
| iv.  | Sadi Bhikari          | = Dismissed  |
|      | First                 | = 1person    |

Furthermore Saiyid Jamāl also inspected the 500 Baksariyas posted thereat, who were categorized first, second and third except for a few who were found weak. But out of them 91 persons, who were dismissed from the archery of Bhikhari Hazari, were bent upon fomenting

trouble because they did not possess their *taṣhīḥa* [verification] and archery [certificates] with their *sadiwals*<sup>1</sup>.

Under such rigorous training and strict vigilance it was but natural to take strict disciplinary action against the malefactors for streamlining the administration and maintaining high standard of military discipline. Accordingly an imperial order issued through Ṣafī Khān, the *Bakhshiu-l Mamalik* [chief pay master general] was received by Saiyid Ḥusain, the *qila'dār* to the effect that let Mir 'Abdul Ma'bud, be appointed as *Hazari* in place of Bhikhari and those mischief mongers who were accompanying him were to be expelled and replaced, which was handed over to Ghiyasuddin to be conveyed expeditiously to Mir [Bhikhari] for compliance.

In regard to the previous and present strength of the matchlockmen and the extraordinary size of the fort, Aurangzeb remarked that forts bigger than the fort under discussion did not possess so huge an army and large army would be fixed for that fort due to which the contingents were to be stationed for its protection<sup>2</sup>.

The above does reflect the measures introduced for training the armies as well as endeavors for maintaining peace and tranquility in the forts. It was also obligatory on the part of the *qila'dār* to procure the provisions as lack of provision was intolerable and it was essential to arrange for six months all types of provisions taking into consideration the strength of army and other dwellers of the fort. The *dīwān* or *naibdīwān-i buyūtat* was kept well informed about the actual position of the provisions. The *qila'dār* was duty bound to make arrangements for procurement of provisions inside the fort<sup>3</sup>.

There used to be abundant provisions in the forts as is known from the report of the Parendā fort where there was no space left in the granary for stocking additional provisions, which were adjusted in the salary of contingents posted thereat<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, pp. 63-4.

<sup>2</sup>SWD, pp. 68-9.

<sup>3</sup>SWD, pp. 137-8, *SDAR*, pp. 82-3.

<sup>4</sup>SWD, pp. 94-5.

As established by the *dastak* of Todar Mal, *Dīwān-i Buyūtāt* of *ṣūbas* of the Deccan to Khwājā Badri Das, *NaibDīwān-i Buyūtāt*'s of *sarkār-i Khaṣṣa Sharīfa* to look after the purchase and sale of grains from graineries, undertake the repairing work of the buildings of the forts and *sarais* [inns]<sup>1</sup>. The highhandedness of the *qila* 'dārs used to become the subject of representation. A *mahzar* under the seal/signature of Saiyid Maṣṣūr, *faujdār* of Baglana, Mani Ram *hazari*, Gurdas and Man Singh, *sadiwal* of 21<sup>st</sup> December 1662 posted at Aurang Garh fort complained that Sulṭān Quli Beg, the *qila* 'dār was demanding Rs 1900 as three month salary of the entire contingent for himself, failing which was threatening the complaints' for the transfer, who had not received 15 months' salaries<sup>2</sup>.

Even carelessness in arranging the war equipment was treated a cognizable offence which was punished. A complaint in respect of Jan Sipar Khān, *alias* Mir Bahādur Dil was, from the *waqi* 'a of *ṣūba* Zafarabad [Bidar] was brought to the Emperor's notice in February 1662 in regard to his negligence in procuring iron rockets and his coming out of the fort for deer hunting led to a reduction of his conditional 200 *sawār* out of 1000/600 from his rank and his dismissal from the *qila* 'dāri of small-citadel of Zafarabad as the deputy of Khān-i Zamān except for his appointment under him<sup>3</sup>.

The position of the forts used to be ascertained. It was reported on 18 April 1662 that Malik Ḥusain Muḥammad had come to note down the position of the provisions, contingents and the length and width of the cannon of the forts of Baglana as per the *dastak* of Muḥammad Hadi, *Bakhshī* of *ṣūba* Khāndesh.

The *dastak* of the abovementioned *Bakhshī* clearly stipulated that in accordance with the imperial order written by Ṣafi Khān, *Bakhshīul Mamallik*, the details of the length and width of the cannons, weight of the cannon-balls, lead, gun-powder and iron rockets available in the entire

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, pp. 139-140.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 39-40.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, pp. 29-30.

forts of *ṣūba* Khandesh was sought in addition to position of contingents, matchlockmen, cannondiers and staff of the forts<sup>1</sup>.

This type of information definitely shows the extraordinary interest which Aurangzeb evinced in strengthening the defense potentialities of the forts of the Deccan which is further proved by the memorandum of the imperial orders concerning postings and campaigns in the Deccan *viz.*, Irij Khān, castellan of Sholapur sent documents describing the conditions of the said fort stating that 13 cannons of three types as well as soliciting 20 more cannons and 500 additional matchlockmen as 1000 matchlockmen were insufficient<sup>2</sup>.

In January 1671 Barkhurdār Khān, the *qila 'dār* of Ausa, requisitioned provisions for the fort including the iron cannon-balls and the services of *sadiwals* etc which was partially fulfilled<sup>3</sup>. Interestingly enough details of cannondiers both European and Mughal posted in the forts of Sholapur and Kalyan, their monthly salaries and other related matters: in 1682 A.D. are found<sup>4</sup>.

Special attention was paid to European cannondiers as we come to know from a news report that five European cannondiers were posted at the fort of Parenda from the imperial court, out of whom two of the Europeans had run away one of which was traced and brought to the fort. The presence of the European cannondiers was ensured as is clear from the attendance record of Duke Ferdin and other cannodies at Sunnair fort<sup>5</sup>, which became possible in an age when European gunners were a common sight in many parts of Mughal India. The *qila 'dārs* used to test the potentiality of the cannons<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, pp. 140-141, SWD, p. 170 contains similar instructions concerning Galna and Baitala forts.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, p.65.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, pp. 138-40.

<sup>4</sup>SWD, p. 92.

<sup>5</sup>SDAR, pp.134-5.

<sup>6</sup>SWD, p. 70

The forts used to serve as treasure houses as we come to know that the Baridi coins of the Deccanis used to be weighed according to the copper<sup>1</sup> by the *tahvildar* [treasurer]. Even during the course of transportation of the imperial treasury the treasure was deposited in the forts as was conveyed by Khān-i Zamān that the treasury was kept inside the Zafarabad fort till the end of the rainy season whereafter it would be transferred to the treasury of Shah Aurangabad.

The forts became the centres of Mughal resistance against the Marathas. Sometimes the *qila 'dārs* also lost their lives due to assassin's dagger or any other reasons as we know about the assassination of Iḥtishām, *qila 'dār* of Udgir which was done in October 1662<sup>2</sup>.

#### [IV] **BARGĪS:**

Malik 'Amber is credited for having trained the Marathas as the *bargīs* in the gurrilla warfare [*jang-i qazzāqi*]. If Marathas were a nation then Malik 'Amber was the father of the nation. Consequent upon Malik 'Amber's utilization of the Maratha chiefs and their followers known as the *bargīs* [hit and run] in popular parlance the Mughals had begun to realize the importance of the Marathas in the Deccan campaigns because, Maratha turn-coat played a pivotal role in inflicting a crushing defeat on Malik 'Amber in 1616 by Shāhnawāz Khān. Beginning from Shāhjāhān down to Aurangzeb the rise of Maratha power manifested in the establishment of an independent Maratha kingdom in the Deccan by Shivajī<sup>3</sup>.

The difference in Maratha armies with those of the armies of the Mughal Empire or the Deccan Sulṭānate lay in the *bargīs*, the ill-clad, ill-armed, marauding Maratha soldier, having his advantage solely in numbers and the ability for dispersed warfare<sup>4</sup>. This fact is clearly recorded in 1675-6 by Fryer who described troops of Shivajī, 'all Naked Starved Rascals, 'but fitter for any Martial Exploit having been accustomed to Fare Hard, Journey Fast and take little Pleasure<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, p. 155, SWD, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup>SWD, pp. 153, 157.

<sup>3</sup>*Cf.*, *Mughal Nobility*, p. 29.

<sup>4</sup>Irfan Habib, 'Essays in Indian History - Towards a Marxist Perception', Delhi, 1995, p 250.

<sup>5</sup>John Fryer, *A New Account of East India and Persia being Nine Years' Travels, 1672-81*, II, edited by William Crooke, London, 1912, pp. 66-8.

Manucci recalled that the early Maratha troops had only lances and long swords two inches wide<sup>1</sup>. Obviously such equipment did not require large resources. It is evident that the *bargīs* were essentially lance-wielding peasants riding on country ponies, which receives further corroboration from a contemporary account:

“It came to be represented [to the Emperor Aurangzeb] that Marathas obtained collaboration from the peasants [*muzari ‘ān*] of the Imperial dominions. It was thereupon ordered that the horses and weapons found in every village should be confiscated. When this happened in many villages, the peasants, providing themselves with horses and arms, joined the Marathas<sup>2</sup>”.

Since Shāhjahān’s time Mughals came in further contact with the Marathas as is evident from *Ādāb-i ‘Ālamgīrī* and other sources, *viz.*, we came to know about the crushing defeats inflicted on Shivajī and other Maratha chiefs during last years of Shāhjahān by Multafat Khān<sup>3</sup>. Aurangzeb’s involvement in the fratricidal wars of succession at a time when he was required to turn on Shivajī so as to crush him forever, paved the way for his initial successes<sup>4</sup>. We came to know that before he set out to win his throne in 1658, Aurangzeb urged his officials to make out capital punishment to “peasents, *deshmukhs*, and *patels* of the *parganās* of the imperial territories; who have gone over to the side of the enemy [Shivajī] and his associates and have exerted themselves in guiding or abetting those ill-destined ones”<sup>5</sup>.

Aurangzeb made utmost endeavours in annexing the Maratha territories especially of Shivajī and he even assigned *jāgīrs* in the country of Shivajī [*mulk-Siva*] *viz.*, Antaji Khandakata, 3000/2000; and five other *manṣabdārs* were recommended *jāgīrs* in Shivajī’s territory which

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<sup>1</sup> Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, III, p. 505.

<sup>2</sup> *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, f. 139[a-b], translation done by Irfan Habib in *Essays in Indian History*, p. 253.

<sup>3</sup> *Ādāb*, II, p. 680.

<sup>4</sup> Cf., M.N. Pearson, Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire; *Journal of Asian Studies*, No XXXV, Vol 2, Feb. 1976, 226.

<sup>5</sup> *Ādāb-i ‘Ālamgīrī*, f. 175 [a-b]. It will be a mistake to consider Shivaji and the Maratha Chiefs as the leaders of a peasant uprising as the fiscal and political practices of the Marathas bore the deepest imprints of the *zamīndārī* origins. However, it is interesting to read in the English records of “a very great report of peace settled between the Mogull and Sevageo” in 1665, under which Shivajī was “to deliver up all the castles and country which he has taken from the Mogul” and in return “to the Kirge Besy [*Deshmukh, Desai*] of all the country of the Deccan. *English Records on Shivajī*, 11, 575.

were approved as well<sup>1</sup>. Similarly numerous *manṣabdārs* including previous officials of Shivajī were assigned *jāgīrs* for administering the Talkokan country [*mulk-i* Talkokan] which was a narrow costal tract, in May 1660 [which Mughals had claimed in 1657]<sup>2</sup> and again in 1660, when Aurangzeb instructed Shāista Khān to enter it and suppress the activities of Shivajī<sup>3</sup>. Even some of them were granted conditional *sawār* rank during second campaign<sup>4</sup>. The lists of the imperial officials serving in Talkokan for the second time unambiguously designate Talkokan as country of Shivajī<sup>5</sup>. Although it is interesting to note that the Mughal news-reporters were so much vigilant that they used to report even the movement of Maratha armies.

Yet it is equally curious that while one hundred *sawārs* from the contingent of Jadu Rao proceeded from the town [*Qaṣba*] of Junnair towards the imperial army it was reported that 2000 infantry of Shivajī [*Siva-i maqhūr*] entered *tappa* Parah of *pargana* Junnair on 30 November 1661<sup>6</sup>. Previously on 19 November 1661, 1000 infantry of Shivajī had indulged in revenue realization from the said place etc<sup>7</sup>. Such plunders with impunity evoked spontaneous but harsh Mughal reactions as is evident from the following:

“In 1661 Aurangzeb ordered multi-pronged attack on the country of Shivajī. He ordered Namdar Khān to march against Shivajī with 4000 *sawārs* under his command while Rao Bahādur, would be the vanguard of that army whereas another 4000 *sawārs* would be dispatched under whomsoever Maharaja Jaswant Singh would recommend. Aurangzeb ordered Sarbuland Khān to attack Shivajī’s country from another direction over the head of 4000 *sawārs* appointing Rao Amar Singh Chandrawat as vanguard of the army whereas another 4000 *sawār* would be deputed under the commander of Maharaja Jaswant Singh. Lodi Khān was bound to remain in *thana* Talkokan where ever Maharaja

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, p. 13. The other *manṣabdārs*, naming Sanbhaji, Jānuji and Muḥammad Sharif, were granted *jāgīrs* in July 1662 in the country of Shivaji or Talkokan, SDAR, pp. 34-5.

<sup>2</sup>Amal-i Sālih, III, 1262; SDAR, p. 107, gives names of former officials of Shivaji who were favoured thus: Raghuji, 1000/500, Ambaji with 4-monthly *jāgīrs* and 1/4<sup>th</sup> deductions.

<sup>3</sup>Alamgīr Nama, pp. 574-8.

<sup>4</sup>SDAR, pp. 4-9.

<sup>5</sup>SDAR, pp. 16-7.

<sup>6</sup>SWD, p. 161.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

would depute him in accompaniment with 3000 *sawārs* and another 3000 *sawārs* would be deployed under Maharaja's recommended commander. Furthermore Mukhtār Khān would command 2000 *sawārs* as per Maharaja's recommendations<sup>1</sup>".

Thus an army of 24,000 was sent against Shivajī. If the rest like Nāmdar Khān would have been sincere then Shivajī would have been crushed. But the conditions were so unfavourable that when Nāmdar Khān urged Shāista Khān to make a direct attack on Shivajī, the shrewd noble retorted that if the Deccan campaign was so quickly concluded, an invasion on Qandhar would be ordered; and if that too succeeded, the contingents would be disbanded<sup>2</sup>.

Marathas were so much dready that they sometimes used to take away the wounded Mughal *manṣabdārs*<sup>3</sup>. Even sometimes merchants had the same fate is store. One Ḥājī Ibrāhīm<sup>4</sup> who was interned by Shivajī was released in March 1663.

Aurangzeb due to the advisability of the situation had to open the gates wide to admit the Marathas in his service with succeeding years<sup>5</sup> notwithstanding their marauding activities.

There were instances and suspicion of collusion between the Mughal commanders and the Marathas. Jaswant Singh was even suspected of having a hand in Shivajī's night attack on Shāista Khān's camp in 1663<sup>6</sup>. During the same year Aurangzeb charged Prince Shāh 'Alām with culpable negligence in crushing the Marathas and he was replaced by Jai Singh as Viceroy of the Deccan. After the discomfiture of Shāista Khān, Jai Singh first concentrated his fire

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, p. 19. In accordance with an English report of 1675, the hardships suffered by the peasants were so severe there that all people pray that the Moors may regain the country, *English Fadories in India*, N.S. I, 332. Moreover, they had to live by plunder only, for Shivajī's reputed maxim was, "No Plunder No Pay" ed. Fryer, p. 341.

<sup>2</sup>*Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, f. 123[a].

<sup>3</sup>SWD, p. 47 which narrates the case of one Muḥammadi.

<sup>4</sup>SWD, pp. 53-4.

<sup>5</sup>Even non- Marathas previously serving under the Marathas were admitted to Mughal service SDAR, p. 35; M.A. Nayeem, *Mughal Documents*, vol. I, II, III, IV/100, IV/126, V/832.

<sup>6</sup>*Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, f. 24 [a-b], Mamuri, f. 131 [a], *Khāfi Khān*, II, p. 175.

against Shivajī, compelling him to seek terms at Purandhar, so as to take the Marathas into a subordinate partnership so as to crush Bijapur, with their help<sup>1</sup>.

It may be specifically emphasized that since the time of Aurangzeb's first Viceroyalty of the Deccan in 1636, Shivajī's father Shahji was being patronized by 'Ādilshāh against the Mughals. Mahabat Khān accompanied with the Mughal army defeated the Marathas. Multafat Khān, Aurangzeb's castellan of Aḥmad Nagar expelled Minaji from the Mughal dominions while 3000 Mughal troopers were posted against them. Aurangzeb's bid to conquer the twin Saltanates of Golkunda and Bijapur in 1656 created further dissensions with Shivajī who began to indulge in nefarious activities since 1657 onwards against the Mughal Empire. We also come to know, as stated above, that from the beginning of Aurangzeb's reign, even Marathas occasionally used to join the Mughal service. Notwithstanding Aurangzeb's policy of alertness concerning Shivajī and the Marathas towards the end of the second term of his Viceroyalty of the Deccan in 1659 we encounter with several letters of Aurangzeb to ShāistaKhān on the disturbances created by Shivajī, Minaji and other Maratha leaders and their pleaders and supporters<sup>2</sup>. However Aurangzeb's monumental *farmān* of 4<sup>th</sup> August 1665<sup>3</sup>, issued to Mirza Raja Jai Singh, who was then at Purandar fort, of course, after the submission of Shivajī, which proved a turning point in the Mughal-Maratha relations, almost for a quarter century which thoroughly highlights his policies about Purandar and Bijapur campaigns simultaneously involving annexation of Shivajī's 23 forts, issuance of a *farmān* to him with Aurangzeb's palm impression, approval of the terms of the treaty of Purandar, made by Jai Singh with Shivajī and numerous other matters of utmost historical significance *viz.*., military administration,

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<sup>1</sup> 'Ālāmgir Nāma, p. 913; *Nuska-i Dilkushā*, f. 31 [b], Khafi Khān, II, p. 184.

<sup>2</sup> Aurangzeb, 'Ādāb-i 'Ālāmgiri, collection of letters written on behalf of Prince and or Emperor Aurangzeb by his *Munshi*, Abul Fateḥ Qābil Khān, [ed.] Abdul Ghafur Chaudhuri, Lahore 1971, vol. I, pp. 512-21, Andra Pradesh State Archives, Doc. No. V/2003[6] which tells us that Gobind Rao, s/o Chandra Rao, came from the country of Shivaji to join the Mughal service. He was recommended *jagīrdārī* of his territory [*mulk*] with 1/6<sup>th</sup> portion in the old country [*mulk-i-qadim*] with the *Manṣab* of 500/50.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., G.T. Kulkarni, A Note on Mirza Raja Jai Singh's Purandar and Bijapur Campaigns An unpublished *Farman* of Aurangzeb [1665 A.D.], *PIHC*, Kolkata, 2011, pp. 274-83. I have obtained a copy of this *farman* through the kindness of Dr. G.T. Kulkarni who has critically examined its historical significance. Since the translation of the *farman* is not exhaustive it needs a fresh rendering because it is not crowded with Arabic diction as these are the titles of Prince and some nobles whose credentials have been identified in the footnotes [see Appendix - B]. Cf., Mirza Raja Jai Singh's correspondence entitled *Haft Anjuman*, Ms of Munshi Udairaj and Jagdish Naryan Sarkar's English translation, *The Military Dispatches of a Seventeenth Century General*.

diplomacy, arrears of *peshkash*, cession of Sholapur etc, etc A *farmān* was also issued to Shivajī's son on the solicitation of Mirza Raja Jai Singh about the approval of the treaty of Purandar in 1665 A.D. as mentioned in Jai Singh's military dispatches published in *Haft Anjuman* in 1969 by Jagdish Narayan Sarkar. The *farmān* does prove that ending Shivajī in his submission Aurangzeb sincerely endeavoured to get Shivajī engaged actively against the Bijapuri forces of 'Ali 'Ādil Shah II in accompaniment with Jai Singh in the Mughal administration's war efforts by positively utilizing Shivajī in ultimately annexing Bijapur and the events of May-August 1665 as it was received and acknowledged on 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1665. We are also well-informed about the Mughal military organization *viz.*, numerical strength of infantry, mounted musketeers, gunners, arms and equipments, military administration, espionage, logistics and discipline. Military administration in reducing Shivajī to submission which Aurangzeb was also desirous of using against Bijapur in the event of the failure of diplomacy. Though along with the positioning of guns, supplies of *rahakalas*, cannon balls, lead, gun powder and other war equipments like short spears were procured in adequate quantity to various army contingents and forts. Deficiency in the stipulated number of 1000, men was made good through fresh recruitments from other tribes. The recruitments through *manṣab* policy regarding three grades of *manṣab* has been highlighted. Aurangzeb's policy to encouraging competent Rajputs and the experienced men to carry out demolition work is superb. Aurangzeb got maintained continuously adequate supply of 1000 mounds of grains on every fort and area.

In regard to diplomacy concerning 'Ali 'Ādil Shah II Aurangzeb sought Mulla Aḥmad's visit to settle issue of *peshkash*, cession of the fort of Sholapur and other *mahals* of Nizamul Mulk through negotiation as Aurangzeb preferred policy to force and expediency to might as he even covered Shivajī through diploma as well owing to which he allowed territories both in Konkan and Bijapuri Balaghat yielding nine lakh *hūns* to Shivajī. Aurangzeb wanted settlement of Bijapuri problem failing which there would be clash of armies. The *farmān* contains well thought out arrangements - the strategy tactics, preparations of war with Bijapur and Shivajī as Aurangzeb was not only an emperor but a great military strategist.

We are informed that on the recommendations of Prince Shah 'Alam and Jaswant Singh, Shivajī was pardoned, following his flight from Agra, and his son Shambhaji was given the rank

of 5000/5000. Furthermore Shivajī was also allowed to annex as much of the Bijapur territory, as his resources permitted, or else he was to confine himself to his territory in accordance with the advice of the Viceroy of the Deccan<sup>1</sup> as the rise of the Maratha power manifested in the establishment of a Maratha state in the Deccan which could become possible due to ultimate failure of Mirza Raja Jai Singh's successful campaign of 1665 resulting into the conclusion of the treaty of Purandar yet the fruits of his military victory were snatched away too great extent by Shivajī's flight from Agra in 1666.

Interestingly enough Mirza Raja Jai Singh was one of the leading exponents of a forward policy in the Deccan as he was dispatched as Viceroy to retrieve the situation in the Deccan after the failure of ShāistaKhān who was also ordered by Aurangzeb to enter into Konkan in 1660 to suppress the activities of Shivajī as it was ceded to Bijapur during Aurangzeb's first Viceroyalty of the Deccan under 1636 settlement and reclaimed only in 1657 during Aurangzeb's second Viceroyalty of the Deccan. Jai Singh naturally concentrated his ire against Shivajī, compelling him to seek terms of treaty of Purandar. Fundamentally his scheme was aimed at bringing the position of the Marathas into a subordinate ally for making an attempt with their help upon the kingdom of Bijapur. It seems that Aurangzeb was not willing to commit such a large force to Deccan as Jai Singh requisitioned nor did Aurangzeb approve of the recruitment and promotion of the Deccanis which Jai Singh proposed for sowing dissension among the Adilshahis as is also proved from the contents of Aurangzeb's *farmān* of 1665 A.D. Dispatch of this *farmān* was the victory of Jai Singh's aggressive policy. Ultimately, neither Jai Singh's policy nor that of his critics succeeded. But owing to compulsion of circumstances the emperor gradually began to indulge in the last two decades of the seventeenth century against all the three Deccan powers, the 'Ādilshāhis, the Quṭbshāhis and the Marathas. But notwithstanding opposition to Jai Singh's forward policy or its support Aurangzeb remained undecided to such an extent that Shivajī could neither be crushed nor reconciled as he began to send messages demanding *chauth* from the Mughal officers and in the event of any default he used to threaten to lay waste the country<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Bhismen, *nuskha-i-Dilkushā*, Br. M. Or 23, f 35 [a-b]. A document is found in Yusuf Hussain Khān [ed.], *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign* issuing warrant for search and arrest of Shivaji immediately following his flight from Agra.

<sup>2</sup>*Cf.*, *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign* [ed.], Yusuf Hussain Khān, Daftar-i-Diwan-o-Mali-o-Mulki, Hyderabad 1959, AR No. 30 19<sup>th</sup> Ramazan 14<sup>th</sup> RY [20<sup>th</sup> June 1671].

As mentioned elsewhere that at the 71<sup>st</sup> session of the Indian History Congress, Dr. G.T. Kulkarni, presented a paper on a unique *farmān* of Aurangzeb to Mirza Raja Jai Singh, then the Viceroy of the Deccan, dated 4 August 1665. Since this long *farmān* contains a large amount of details regarding military and administrative matters yet there is need for a full translation as there are points where one may also suggest alternative rendering, which has been attempted in the Appendix - B in view of his excellent commentary. But despite all trials and turbulations this *farmān* of Aurangzeb remained the arch-stone or guiding principle of the Mughal-Maratha relations for almost a quarter century [see AppendixB]. We are aware of various developments between 1656 to 1665 A.D.<sup>1</sup> about the successive Viceroys of the Deccan like Prince Mua‘zzam, ShāistaKhān and again Prince Mua‘zzam and the changes that occurred from 1665 to 1689 that gradually began to change the entire scenario. Diler Khān also served actively as Viceroy of the Deccan whereafter Shah ‘Alam who succeeded him in 1668 [till 1672] showed slackness in pushing the Marathas along with Raja Jaswant Singh<sup>2</sup>. BahādurKhān, who was the Viceroy of the Deccan from 1672 to 1676, was repeatedly suspected of being friendly with the three Deccan powers of Golkunda, Bijapur and the Marathas. Diler Khān again became Viceroy of the Deccan and he was again replaced by Prince Shāh ‘Ālam as Viceroy of the Deccan and he was alleged for secret alliance with the ruler of Bijapur in 1682-83. The crisis became so much deep that in 1685 Shāh ‘Ālam was imprisoned on the charge of being in secret alliance with Quṭb Shah and being friendly to Shambhaji.

*Manṣabs* began to be granted to the Marathas from Jahangir’s time but to seek Shivajī’s cooperation who had his own political centre and ambitions was a totally different matter. ShāistaKhān, was so hostile to the Marathas that he never recruited them as cavalymen or foot-troopers<sup>3</sup>. The Maratha policy of Jai Singh came to be tested when Shivajī appeared at Agra for grant of a suitable *manṣab*. Numerous nobles led by Jaswant Singh, who dismissed Shivajī as a “petty *bumia*”, Ja‘far Khān and Ra‘d Andaz Khān deadly opposed to any concessions to Shivajī, whereas Jai Singh’s cause was espoused by Amin Khān, Saiyid Murtaza Khān and ‘Āqil Khān,

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<sup>1</sup>Cf., Zakir Hussain, An Opening To Rajaram? A *Farmān* of Aurangzeb of 1689, *PIHC*, Delhi, 2012, pp.319-23.

<sup>2</sup> Mamuri, f. 130 [a].

<sup>3</sup>*Mughal Nobility*; p. 106.

Aurangzeb, however, remained undecided and he had failed to win over Shivajī with a grant of 5000/5000, with the result that he was neither crushed nor conciliated, instead the Maratha leader had fled from his court which resulted merely into the issuance of *dastaks* like that issued to Mir Muḥammad Shafi *thanedar* of Baitala and numerous officials to this effect:

Since the wretched and miserable Siva along with his son, fled away from His Majesty's presence and the most sublime and the holy order was promulgated from the Imperial court in regard to his arrest together with his son, *aḥdis*[gentlemen troopers] have been deputed from here accordingly. Consequent upon the receipt of the *dastak* [order] he should also direct his agents that they in collaboration with each other, must remain alert and consider injunction in the matter<sup>1</sup>.

The result of the entire exercise was this that in 1667 [as mentioned elsewhere] on the recommendations of Shāh 'Ālam and Maharaja Jaswant Singh, Shivajī was pardoned and his son Shambhaji was given the rank of 5000/5000; Shivajī was also allowed to annex as much territory of Bijapur as his sources permitted, or else, he was to confine himself to his own territory and bound to act in accordance with the advice of the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan<sup>2</sup>. Due to slackness in punishing the Marathas in 1668 by Prince Shāh 'Ālam and Jaswant Singh, Diler Khān expressed his displeasure and difference.

The situation had reached to such an extent that according to a memorandum [*yāddāshī*] dated 9<sup>th</sup> September 1668 to Partap Rao, chief of the contingent army of Sambhaji, son of Shivaja [Raja Shivajī]<sup>3</sup> that *nisar* [gift of a noble] of Rs 500 was offered. It further stated that the *manṣab* of Sambhaji was 5000/5000 [2x3h] '6 monthly' one fourth deduction [*chauthāi*] was exempted.

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 54-5.

<sup>2</sup>*Nasukha-i Dilkushā*, ff. 35 [a] 36 [b].

*Nasukha-i Dilkushā*, ff. 34-6, 35 [o]; *Futūhāt-i 'Ālamgīrī*, f. 59 [o].

<sup>3</sup> Aurangzeb recognized Shivajī's title of Raja early in 1668 as well as *manṣab* for Shambhaji and the peace which had lasted for two years only. Sarkar, *Short History*, p. 206.

However, such favour did not yield expected dividends, instead Shivajī's men unabatedly remain engaged in realizing the revenues of the *jāgīrs* of Mughal *jāgīrdārs*. Even the Marathas used to plunder the Mughal *jāgīrs* to such an extent that not a single *dam* was left to be realized by the *jāgīrdār*, which, sometimes, left the *qila 'dār* in the fort high and dry<sup>1</sup> even compelled him to seek financial assistance.

The Marathas had basically *zamīndār* leaders and peasant armies. However, under the Marathas peasant resistance was completely submerged because the potential peasant rebel become a *bargi* trooper of the Marathas where there was no pay, only the risk of death and the chances of plunder<sup>2</sup>. Though Shivajī also maintained conventionally paid, better equipped cavalry and artillery, yet the combined endeavours of the *bargīs* and Marathas were aimed at loot and plunder.

In order to save the Mughal territories from Maratha devastation or their unwelcome presence or any corresponding obligation to guard it Shivajī demanded *chauth* [or *chauthāī*] without rendering any yeoman service, which befittingly suited to the founder of a brigandage state where no plunder no payment was the cardinal principle. In 1671 Ūdājī Ram's plenipotentiary represented that the army of Shivajī had reached *sarkār* Mahur and plundered *pargana* Amarkher, *jāgīr* of Ūdājī Ram. Furthermore the enemy was encamped in the surrounding areas and was demanding *chauth* from every *pargana*, due to which the entire *jāgīr* of Ūdājī Ram was ruined. Accordingly he solicited Imperial orders for 'Abdullāh Shirāzi for exerting a bond to the effect that in the event of collecting a single *dām* by the Marathas on account of *chauth* he would be held responsible otherwise Ūdājī Ram was ready to give thing in writing to face the ire, if a single *dam* was collected from the *parganas* by the army of Shivajī, contingent upon his reinstatement to its *faujdarī* as well<sup>3</sup>.

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*SDAR*, pp. 71, 90-91.

<sup>1</sup>*SDAR*, p. 177.

<sup>2</sup> Frayer, A new Account, I, p. 310.

<sup>3</sup>*SDAR*, pp. 80-81.

Surprisingly enough the Mughal officials did not hesitate in attributing the devastation of Mughal territories by the Mughal armies as well as is evident from the written communication of Suhrab Khān, [the castellan of Ūdgīr] who alleged the desolation of *pargana* Ūdgīr by the imperial armies and the accursed Marathas owing to which the entire peasantry had run away to such an extent that for the last two years neither any revenue was accruing nor any loan was forthcoming, which was, however, vehemently refuted by Prince Mua‘zzam, the Viceroy. When Suhrab Khān reported that the accursed [i.e. Shivajī] had sent the message to remit 1/4<sup>th</sup> of the revenue [i.e. *chauth*] otherwise they would run over it, and merchandise of those merchants who due to fear had stayed at Tilanga[na] was lifted away by the Marathas.

Accordingly he was assured of the arrival of the army. The *qila‘dār* further reported arrival of 60-70,000 cavalryman and a few thousand foot-troopers towards the close of night, near the fort, which was encountered through the cannon balls and muskets due to which they turned towards Tilanga[na], and the spy brought the news that the accursed Shivajī[*Siva maqhūr*] was verily at these places. He was, assured of rewards. The said *qila‘dār* complained against the desolation of his *jāgīrs*, which had made the maintenance of his contingent of 200 *sawārs* and 400 gunners difficult whereas he had also sought additional 400 gunners by way of assistance till the disturbance of Shivajī was over<sup>1</sup>. Shivajī plundered 51 villages of Aḥmadnager, Junair and Parendā in 1670.

Since the relations with Shivajī had strained to such an extent that on 19 March 1671, Partap Rao s/o Gannuji was summoned from Baglana by Prince Mua‘zzam, Viceroy of the Deccan on the charge of writing a letter to Shivajī. When the matter was referred to Nekkām Khān, the *faujdar* of Baglana he recommended internment in the event of his committing such a crime, side by side showing his ignorance of the entire episode. Ultimately Partap Rao was dismissed<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 86-8.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 92-3.

Shivajī was himself not a liberator of the peasants<sup>1</sup>, as is evident from numerous events viz., Muḥammad Taj s/o Fateḥ Jang Khān, on 18 March, 1671 accompanied with a contingent of 500 *sawārs* attacked 30 *kurohs* away from Nander and fought with the army of Shivajī. Consequently he brought heads of 40 Marathas and 20 horses as well as got liberated 50 *muqaddams* of the villages of the country of Telingana<sup>2</sup>.

The Marathas used to take full advantage of the absence of the *jāgīrdārs* from their *jāgīr parganas* as is confirmed from an anonymous complaint of June 1671 of seizing all his *jāgīr parganas* seeking permission to proceed there which was, however, denied<sup>3</sup>. However, the Mughal *manṣabdārs* who successfully fought against the Marathas were rewarded. It was reported to Prince Mu‘azzam on 10 January, 1672, that the Marathas, numbering about 10,000 cavalymen and 3-4,000 foot-troopers had surrounded *qasba* Nander from all sides for 3 days and nights. But Yashwant Rao with Shaikh Aiyub, agent of Diler Khān by strengthening the entrenchment killed most of the enemies, wounded several of them and inflicted a crushing defeat on them to such an unprecedented degree that when as soon as one of their *sardārs* [chiefs] was killed they fled away with utter shame towards Telingana and *sarkār* Mahur. Thenceforward he was rewarded an increase of 50 *zāt* raising his *manṣab* to 300/140<sup>4</sup>.

The conditions of peasants became equally intolerable in the Mughal held territories because, as stated above the Marathas imposed their own tribute in addition to Mughal land revenue demand. Bhim Sen noted that ‘the troops of the Marathas who come in for the sack of plundering the country, extort money from every *pargana*, in accordance with their desire and let [their horses] graze on and trample upon the cultivated fields<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Satish Chandra, ‘Social Background to the Rise of the Maratha Movement during the Seventeenth Century’, [ESHR, 3, 1973, pp. 207-17; *idem*, Shivaji and Maratha Landed Elements, in Medieval India, Society, the *Jagirdari* Crisis and the Village, Delhi 1983, pp. 128-38, P.V. Ranade, ‘Feudal Content of Maharashtra Dharma, *IHR*, I, 1974, Delhi, 44-50; *AgrarianSystem*, pp. 349-50.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 93-4.

<sup>3</sup>SDAR, pp. 97-8.

<sup>4</sup>SDAR, p. 102.

<sup>5</sup>*Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, f. 139 [b]; SDAR, pp. 108.

As soon as war began between the Marathas and the Mughals, the conditions of the peasantry could only worsen beyond redemption. The conduct of the Mughal army in the Maratha territories is thus described in a news report of Aurangabad of 26 January, 1662:

When the news was received that towards Lohgarh fort etc which would be about 20 *kurohs* from *qaşba* Pune majority of villages of the accursed enemy [i.e. Marathas] are inhabited. Thereupon Shāista Khān, deputed Nāmdar Khān and other *manşabdārs* on 23 January, 1662. The said Khān went there and set ablaze about 70-80 villages on the way on the very day and plundered the grain etc and stayed near the fort of Tarkan adjacent to aforesaid fort. Since the inhabitants of the said villages had taken away the animals and goods on the mountains the said Khān encamped there for the second day accompanying him for searching out the live stock and undertaking enslavement on the mountains, and they reached there seized over, 1,000 animals and enslaved 300 men and women approximately. On the third day marched ahead, set fire and plundered the village near the forts of Tarkan, Lohgarh, Awsapur and Longi and returned<sup>1</sup>.

The position remained unchanged even in 1675 as recorded by a contemporary observer:

‘Laying waste all in their road, both villages, fodder, and corn; for their castle they drive them along with them, and take them, their wives and children for slaves; so none escape except those can fly fastest, or hide themselves in the woods, which they also set on fire, to leave them destitute of those recesses<sup>2</sup>’.

Even Shivajī’s own administration was equally repressive because he ‘left the Tiller hardly as much as will keep Life and Soul together, in the core of his own kingdom<sup>3</sup>. Notwithstanding such unbearable conditions a large number of peasants were compelled to turn to him, by force of circumstances, to serve him as *bargīs*. Such a vicious circle of oppression and depredations on both sides resulted into swelling number of *bargīs* on the Maratha side and the Mughal Empire splintering irretrievably.

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, pp. 27-8.

<sup>2</sup>Frayer, *A New Account*, p. 310.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 311-12.

## IV

### REVENUE AND FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION

#### [I] KHĀLIṢA & PĀIBĀQI

#### [A] KHĀLIṢA

Lands not assigned in *jāgīr* whose revenues were reserved for the imperial treasury were known as *Khāliṣa Sharīfa* or *Khāliṣa*. *Khāliṣa* seems to have been fluctuated from 5 to 25 per cent of the total *jama* [estimated revenue incurred] of the Mughal empire. However, it appears to have consisted of shifting territories scattered throughout the empire. The total extent of the *Khāliṣa* varied considerably under *Karori* Experiment of [1575-6, 1579-8], *jāgīrs* of the nobles having been resumed by Akbar [1556-1605], practically placing the whole of the empire in the *Khāliṣa*, large amounts of cash payments had to be made to them by the imperial treasury<sup>1</sup>. Later in his reign, of course, after the dismantling of the *Karorī* Experiment in 1580, *Khāliṣa* appears to have been accorded for one-fourth of the total *jama*'. Under Jahangir [1605-27] *Khāliṣa*'s *jama*' fell less than 5 per cent of the total *jama*' of the empire which shrank to 28 crores of *dāms*<sup>2</sup>. The *jama*' of *Khāliṣa* was gradually expanded under Shāhjahān so that it rose to one-seventh or 120 crore of the total *jama*' of 880 crores in 1647<sup>3</sup> which accounted for 13.6% approximately. In Aurangzeb's 10<sup>th</sup> R.Y. the *jama*' of the *Khāliṣa* reached to nearly one-fifth of the total of the empire<sup>4</sup>. The proceeds [*haṣil*] of the *Khāliṣa* prior to the Deccan annexations were approximately 26.1 million rupees<sup>5</sup>.

The emperor's share mainly consisting of the cash income out of the revenues of *Khāliṣa* and tribute from the feudatories, out of which he paid a large number of *naqdī manṣabdārs* and

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<sup>1</sup> *Agrarian System*, p. 271 and n.

<sup>2</sup> Qazwini, *PādshāhNāma*, transcript of Riza Library in Deptt. of History, p. 423; Muḥammad Sharif Najafi, *Majalis-us-Salatin*, Ms. Br. M, or, 1903, ff. 115 [a-b].

<sup>3</sup> Lahori, II, pp. 710-13, *Agrarian System*, 271-3.

<sup>4</sup> *Miratul 'Ālam*, f. 214 [b].

<sup>5</sup> *Agrarian System* p 273 n.

other high officials and maintained his own personal troops [*aḥdis*], artillery and the whole palace establishment besides meeting expenditure in the provinces.

It is an established fact that since the imperial treasury had to disburse salaries to the *naqdī manṣabdārs* and others in cash, the tendency in the *Khālīṣa* too [like *jāgīrs*] must have been overwhelmingly towards collection in cash. A large chunk of the income assigned to emperor's own establishment from the *Khālīṣa*, less salaries paid out to *manṣabdārs*, was expanded on the royal establishment which under Akbar amounted to 6 percent of the total estimated revenue<sup>1</sup>, which position was perhaps equally true under Aurangzeb.

The above data show that the *Khālīṣa* covered a very large portion of the empire, but the emperor was also in command of a considerable income collected directly by his treasury.

As stated above that the *Khālīṣa* also tended to collect revenues in cash. However, in actual incidences, we find commutation of kind into cash as is established from four documents entitled *āwārja-i muṭālibāt-i Khālīṣa Sharīfa mutafarriqat* [miscellaneous balance of the claims of the crown lands] of 1081 AH/ 1671 AD<sup>2</sup> in *pargana* 'Ādilabad *sarkār* Asīr, *ṣūba* Khandesh.

The replenishment of *Khālīṣa Sharīfa* was always taken care of. In view of its special significance the second imperial *dīwān*, the *Dīwān-i Khālīṣa Sharīfa* was appointed, who was in-charge of the reserved or the centrally administered lands of the empire and of all the revenues coming directly to the current treasury. When Aurangzeb, as Viceroy of the Deccan, for the second time encountered difficulties in obtaining sufficient *jāgīrs* against his *manṣab* pay claim in the Deccan he was suggested by Shāhjahān to resume requisite *jāgīrs* of the *manṣabdārs* into the *Khālīṣa*, which suggestion was, however, politely declined by Aurangzeb, due to some administrative reasons<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ām*, I, edited by Blochmann, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Inayat Jang Collection, National Archives, New Delhi [hereafter IJC] IJCI/ 13/ 0-14, IJCI/ 13/ 0-32, IJC/ 13/ 0-43, IJCI/ 13/ 0-63.

<sup>3</sup> *Ādāb*, p. 157; *Calender*, p. 44.

Aurangzeb also claimed for the *Khālīṣa* the land revenue from varying proportions of villages and *parganas* of the four provinces of the Deccan. Agents of the *Khālīṣa* transferred these collections directly to provincial treasuries immediately after receipts. Funds thus gathered could be stored or transported elsewhere for imperial purposes. However, unfortunately we do not possess synoptic statement of the *Khālīṣa* for the older Deccan provinces in the first half of Aurangzeb's reign. Imperial *Khālīṣa* officers in the Deccan used to receive perhaps 42 percent of the total established collections of revenue.

More significant were the sums received by the *Khālīṣa* accounts of the Deccan treasury because all *sāṭr* revenues, custom duties, and other miscellaneous collections went to provincial treasuries under this heading [as the headings found on all related documents] of four Deccan provinces testify.

Furthermore all tribute [*peshkash*] payments made by local officers went to the *sāliyāna* because surviving documents, after ample evidence prove, that the Mughal imperial fiscal officials in the Deccan recorded and collections of these *peshkash* payments from the local aristocracy of the Deccan provinces, as these were not mere formalities, but represented a source of considerable funds for the imperial administration.

There is no denying the fact that the Deccan treasury endeavoured to locate agreements and to enforce collections in all the *sarkārs* of the Deccan provinces. Special messengers used to carry sums of the *peshkash* owed to the *Khālīṣa Sharīfa* to the Deccan treasury at Aurangabad. Although *Khālīṣa* consisted of shifting territories scattered all over the empire yet the imperial administration in the Deccan maintained details of the same as is evident from a memorandum of the villages of the *Khālīṣa* from *tappa* Raheri, *pargana* Islamabad [mod. Bhivandi] *sarkār* Talkokan-i Nizamu-l Mulki, *ṣūba* Aurangabad of 34 RY/ 1690 A.D. which contains data for the year 1657. It gives the number of villages as five which had a *jama* of 2,10,931 *dāms* yielding Rs. 1,111/ 14½ out of which 1,40,847 *dāms* were earmarked for *Khālīṣa Sharīfa*. Thereafter village-wise break up of *Khālīṣa Sharīfa* together with *madad-i ma'āsh* assignment is given<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> IJCI/ 34/ 0-17 and IJCI/ 34/ 0-18.

Interestingly enough even the *jizya* was included in the *Khāliṣa Sharīfa* stipulating that Shaikh Najmuddin, *Qaṣi* of *pargana* ‘Ādilabād [*sarkār* Aīsr, *ṣūba* Khandesh] had to pay Rs. 283½ *in toto* according to the *nuskha* of Muḥammad Mehdi, *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Khandesh as per the following: Rs. 150 for the *jizya* of *pargana* ‘Ādilabād and Rs. 133½ as per the *nuskha* of Khwaja Muḥammad ‘Usmān, *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Khandesh from the *jizya* till 1090A/ 1680 AD, which, he could not pay till 1681 AD<sup>1</sup>. However, we have no information about the total *Khāliṣa Sharīfa* position during Aurangzeb’s first phase of the Deccan.

In 1636 Shāhjahān under the active leadership of Aurangzeb, then Viceroy in the Deccan, achieved his strategic goals in the Deccan because Bijapur and Goloconda were made tributary states in a new formal settlement. Although it, however, brought some stability to the Deccan frontier for the first time, yet it was a temporary phase in the nature of a cease-fire. Shāhjahān was content to have Bijapur and Golconda as tributary states, but the court faction was obviously in favour of annexation, attracted by their great wealth, which inevitably prevailed<sup>2</sup>. Formal invasions against Bijapur and Golconda were sanctioned in 1656-7, which again proved abortive because another peace treaties were made with the two states which lasted for next 30 years contingent upon the payment of *peshkash* by them, which invariably formed part of the *Khāliṣa Sharīfa*.

On 23 August, 1661 Fateḥ Jung Khān, *faujdār* of Nander sent messages through his *harkāra* to Muliya, Quṭbul Mulk’s *harkāra* for Saiyid Muzaffar, Mulla ‘Abdus Ṣamad and I’tmād Rao and verbally summoned the *harkāra* through his *bakhshi* telling him to remit to him whatever was paid per annum to the late Rashid Khān failing which threatened attack on frontier villages. Accordingly Ḥakim Nizāmuddin Aḥmad asked whether he should strive for collecting the amount of stipulated *peshkash* or endeavour for *faujdār*’s goodwill<sup>3</sup>. Till 25 August 1661, Rs. 50,000 and 1,20,000 *hūns* were released on account of *peshkash*. Previously Rs. 1,00,000 were received from the total *hūns* and deposited in the central treasury at Aurangabad, whereas 10,000 *hūns* and Rs. 50,000 were given to Khān Muḥammad, an official of Shāista Khān to be remitted

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<sup>1</sup> IJCI/ 23/ 11-28 and IJCI/ 23/ 11-30.

<sup>2</sup> For details of tribute see, Introduction to *Calendar*, pp. XXXV-XXXX.

<sup>3</sup>SWD, p. 5.

as it is in the imperial treasury of Aurangabad, while both Quṭbul Mulk and ‘Ādil Shāh promised to pay the freshly stipulated *peshkash* regularly. However, due to the outbreak of the wars of succession the arrears of *peshkash* and other related claims could not be fully materialized to the satisfaction of Aurangzeb. But since 1661 we find numerous instances of the payments or promises or problems of payments especially by Quṭbul Mulk, who had to remit ten lakh rupees annually as *peshkash*, which may be summarized chronologically to give an idea of the magnitude of the demand:

On 17 August, 1661 one diamond belonging to Mohan Das was sent by Quṭbul Mulk to Khān-i Zamān to Zafarabad to be delivered to Amanat Khān for onward transmission to the Imperial court where it would be assessed and adjusted against *peshkash*, if it would meet Aurangzeb’s approbation otherwise it would be returned back<sup>1</sup>. Remainder of *hūns* would be sent to the Imperial treasury of Aurangabad after 26<sup>th</sup> August, 1661. As far the amount of tribute which was imposed on the *ḥavaldārs* on the current year’s revenue that would be collected from Quṭbul Mulk’s men accordingly<sup>2</sup>.

It was reported on 31<sup>st</sup> August, 1661 that 75011½ *hūns* on account of *peshkash* from Quṭbul Mulk was deposited in the central treasury at Aurangabad through Khān-i Zamān<sup>3</sup>.

Mullah ‘Abdus Ṣamad made an agreement with Muḥammad Naṣir, the Mughal *ḥajib* on 16<sup>th</sup> September, 1661 to remit 2,00,000 *hūns* [as *peshkash*] from October, 1661 to July 1662 in following five installments:

- |       |  |                                    |
|-------|--|------------------------------------|
| [i]   | From 1 <i>Rabi‘</i> I to end <i>Rabi‘</i> II   | : 44444½ <i>hūns</i> .             |
| [ii]  | From 1 <i>Jumada</i> I to end <i>Jumada</i> II | : 44444½ <i>hūns</i> .             |
| [iii] | From 1 <i>Rajab</i> to end <i>Shahaban</i>     | : 44444½ <i>hūns</i> .             |
| [iv]  | From 1 <i>Ramazan</i> to end <i>Shawwal</i>    | : 44444½ <i>hūns</i> .             |
| [v]   | From 1 <i>Ziqada</i> to end <i>Ziqada</i>      | : 22222 <i>hūns</i> <sup>4</sup> . |

<sup>1</sup>SWD, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>SWD, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>SWD, pp. 7-8.

<sup>4</sup>SWD, p. 11.

It was communicated on 30<sup>th</sup> September, 1661 A.D. that Mir Qasim ‘Ali, of the imperial treasury, received and remitted 5000 *hūns* out of the total *peshkash* from the *havaladār* of Machhlipattan port<sup>1</sup>.

It was known on 19 January 1662 that Rs 5000 as *nisār* to the imperial *farmān* were offered in front of Muaḥammad Ḥusain, *mutaṣaddi* at Machhlipattan by Muḥammad Nabi, an official of Ḥakeem Nizamuddin Aḥmad.

It was complained that they were responsible for remitting Rs 10,00,000 as the fixed tribute, for payment of which Mulla ‘Abduṣ Ṣamad had stood surety as per the installments and agreement, as they were offering lame excuses. Accordingly the matter was discussed with Quṭubl Mulk on 19<sup>th</sup> February 1662 and the *hājib* / [envoy] demanded amount from Mulla ‘Abduṣ Ṣamad according to installment and agreement. It was pleaded that the amount was not received from the *havaladārs* which proved unconvincing; hence 4000 new *hūns* were exchanged through *ṣarraf*s[money-changers] into [Mughal] rupees and the remainder were paid in ‘Ālamgūrī coins for which money receipts of Rs 1,00,000 were given. Mulla’ ‘Abduṣ Ṣamad executed a bond to remit the amount in accordance with the installment and agreement<sup>2</sup>.

It was ordered on 9 April 1662 that a sum of Rs 1,25,987 ½ [‘Ālamgūrī coins] out of the stipulated *peshkash* of Rs 10,00,000 per annum be sent through *hundwi*[bill of exchange] of the *ṣarraf*s to the central treasury of Aurangabad and dispatch the paper of *hundwi* to Amānat Khān, enabling him to obtain money from the money changers and remit it in the imperial treasury<sup>3</sup>.

On 13<sup>th</sup> May 1662 Rs 69,811¾ out of the fixed *peshkash* of Rs 10,00,000 for which ‘Abduṣ Ṣamad stood surety was paid.

It was conveyed on 16 May 1662 that a sum of 2444 *hūns* and 6½ *annas* from the amount of *peshkash* and Rs 3,259 as ‘*ulfa*[salary] of Mir Muḥammad Ḥusain Ṭabaṭaba was obtained

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, p. 12; SWD, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>SWD, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup>SWD, p. 17.

from *peshkash* as per Aurangzeb's *farmān*. It was ordered that 2044 *hūns* and 6½ *annas* and Rs 3,259 be given to Muḥammad Ḥusain, *mataṣaddis* of Machhlipattan Port and the remaining 400 *hūns* be allowed to Mūr Muḥamamd Ḥusain Ṭabaṭaba and Rs 34,000 as amount for procuring imperial requirements was given to Muḥammad Ḥusain, *mustaṣaddi* of the port<sup>1</sup>.

The above mentioned details give us a peep into the real state of tribute affairs of Quṭbul Mulk, who was, however, with some lapses was, punctiliously busy in making matters easy in regard to *peshkash* as compared to 'Adil Shūh whose valuation of *peshkash* is known only from a *siyaha* document of 24<sup>th</sup> December 1661, which were merely 10 rings as per following specifications of quality and price tabulated hereunder<sup>2</sup>.

**TABLE – 1**

List of the valuation of the tribute of 'Adil Khān

S.No.	Kind of ring	Quantity	Quality	Weight	Price/without deduction
1.	Ordinary gold ring with diamond bezel	one	diamond	10 <i>surkh</i> [10 masha ? gold]	<u>Rs. 810</u> Rs. 648
2.	Ordinary silver ring with lotus ...	one	diamond	7¼ <i>surkh</i>	<u>Rs. 3500</u> Rs 2800
3.	Silver ring engrossed with ruby bezel	one	ruby	3 <i>surkh</i>	<u>Rs. 250</u> Rs. 200 As per Jahan Ara's order Rs. 280
4.	Gold enamel ring with ruby bezel	one	ruby	8 <i>surkh</i>	<u>Rs. 250</u> Rs. 200
5.	Ordinary gold ring with ruby bezel	one	ruby	5 <i>surkh</i>	<u>Rs. 900</u> Rs. 800
6.	Gold enamel ring with ruby bezel	one	ruby	3½ <i>surkh</i>	<u>Rs. 200</u> Rs. 160
7.	Ordinary gold ring with ruby bezel	one	ruby	3 <i>surkh</i>	<u>Rs. 50</u> Rs. 40
8.	Gold enamel ring with ruby bezel	one	ruby	5 <i>surkh</i>	<u>Rs. 102</u> Rs. 80
9.	Ordinary gold ring with ruby bezel	one	ruby	?	<u>Rs. 102</u> Rs. 80
10.	Jewel studded gold ring with ruby bezel	one	ruby	3½ <i>surkh</i>	<u>Rs. 80</u> Rs. 64

<sup>1</sup>SWD, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 23-4. The imperial administration also appointed Mūr 'Abdul M'abud as *hājib* at Bijapur in January 1671 by Muḥammad Niṣir to look after his duties as envoy, who was found to send weekly news report of Bijapur to the Imperial court probably to command obedience, [SDAR, p. 83].

The above table shows the real worth of the *peshkash* received from ‘Ādil Khān price of which has been calculated Rs 6,244 or Rs. 6,274, if we take into consideration the increase of Rs. 30 in respect of item No 3 by Princess Jahan Ara and it arrives at Rs. 5,072 without deduction. It also brings home the point that the *peshkash* drawn from Bijapur was a token one merely recognizing Mughal overlordship whereas tribute to a tune of ten lakh rupees per annum was imposed and extracted from Golconda in the real sense of the difference. The annual tribute in the settlement of 1636 and 1656-7 remained the same i.e. 2 *lakhhūns* annually from Quṭbul Mulk and the only difference remained in the exchange value of *hūns* which rose from Rs 4 to Rs 4½ and finally Rs 5 in 1654 and the arrears accruing on account of variations in exchange rates of *hūn* becāme a matter of dispute. However, tribute from Golconda remained an enormous source of income of the KhālīṣaSharīfa in the Deccan in Aurangzeb’s first phase of the Deccan.

### **[B] PĀIBĀQI:**

Lands which were those *parganas* temporarily in charge of the imperial officials pending reassignment of pay salaries of *manṣabdār /jagirdārs* were known as *pāibāqī*<sup>1</sup>. These unassigned and unclaimed revenues [*pāibāqī*] that were temporarily collected by the agents of the imperial administration were placed in the provincial treasury. Under ordinary circumstances these *pāibāqī* lands would have comprised but a small proportion, certainly under five percent of the total provincial revenues of the Deccan.

It is a well-established fact that the Deccan had always been a deficient area especially from the closing years of Shāhjahān’s reign as its actual *ḥaṣil* was hardly 25% of the *jama’* or *jama’dami*[estimated revenue] by which *jāgīrs* were assigned in lieu of pay] which was due to the desolation of the Deccan peasantry as revenue collection in the Deccan had declined enormously. Even during his second Viceroyalty of the Deccan, Aurangzeb was advised to resume *jāgīrs* of nobles yielding Rs 20,36,000 to Khālīṣa so as to make good of his *jāgīr* income, which Aurangzeb, however, suitably refused to accept as such dispossessed *manṣabdārs*

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<sup>1</sup>KhūlaṣatusSiyāq, f. 24 [b]; Waqāi ‘Ajmer, pp. 74, 375-6; Ma‘muri, ff. 156 [b]-157[a]; Cf., M. Athar Ali’s Review on J.F. Richard’s *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, OUP, 1975, in *Journal of Asian Studies*, 1976, p. 159; *Agarian System*, pp. 259-

whose *jāgīrs* thus resumed would become *jāgīr*-less and they would have to be sent to the imperial court<sup>1</sup>. This implies the scarcity of *paibāqī* towards the end of Shāhjahān's reign, a phenomenon which Richards even could not discern during the last phase of Aurangzeb's reign.

We have, however, no evidence to suggest that the situation had improved tremendously only in Aurangzeb's reign.

In view of the extraordinary importance of *pāibāqī* the *amīn* of *pāibāqī* was appointed, who together with his staff and the *amīn* of other lands set the current assessment for the villages and *parganas* in the provinces based upon the rolling ten year average yield and market figures for production of annual yield per crop and per unit of area [*mawāzana-i deh sāla*]. It was his duty to administer the *pāibāqīmahāls* properly.

Due to scarcity of *jāgīr* there used to be a mad rush for assignment of *jāgīr* from *pāibāqī*. When due to the transfer of Muḥammad Momin, son of Shāh Beg Khān the amount of *khurak-i dawwāb*[animal fodder] in *pargana* Thaner, *ṣūba* Khandesh, which was resumed to *pāibāqī* in 1663 was subsequently assigned to Muḥammad Amān, son of Muḥammad Amīn, maternal grandson of Shāh Beg Khān<sup>2</sup>. A *parwāna*[order] of Shāista Khān of 13<sup>th</sup> December 1661 entrusted, 1,37,90,000 *dāms* accruing from the *pāibāqīmahāl* of Jadu Rai and 3 others in *pargana* Poona, *sarkār* Junnar, *ṣūba* Aurangabad to Raziuddin Muḥammad<sup>3</sup>.

During the first phase of Aurangzeb's Deccan policy we rarely find any mention of the *pāibāqī* which *interalia* establishes its extreme scarcity. It is no more astonishing that even *pāibāqī* worth one *lakhdāms* was recommended by Shāista Khān in January 1662 for a Maratha official with the instructions to recognize him as holder of that much *dāms*<sup>4</sup>, which shows the immense significance which the *pāibāqī* had acquired in Aurangzeb's early reign.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ādāb*, I, p. 157; Richards, *Mughal Administration*, pp. 199-200. For an opposite view see Zakir Husain, 'The Working of the *jagir* System in the Deccan During the Later years of Aurangzeb, *Journal of Objective Studies*, Delhi, 1990, Vol. II, No. 1.

<sup>2</sup> M.A. Nayeem, *Mughal Documents*, Vol I, part II, A.R. No V/2/09.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 72-3 Another document [*ibid*, p. 1014] entrusted Randola Khān, 95,40,000 *dams* due to shortage of *pāibāqī*.

<sup>4</sup> *SDAR*, pp. 25-6.

In view of the scattered evidence which does suggest that claims made by the *Khālīṣa* in Aurangzeb's reign were relatively high. We can also add the unmarked and unclaimed revenues whose revenues were temporarily collected by the agents of the central administration to this as yet undetermined amount. Thus both types of revenues probably formed ¼ of the total revenues of the Deccan amounts to 2,96,70,00,000 *dāms*<sup>1</sup>.

## [II] LAND REVENUE ASSESSMENT AND REALIZATION

Since the Deccan was always relatively detached from the core area of the empire in Hindustan or North India, the four Mughal Deccan provinces of Aurangabad, Berar, Bidar and Khandesh definitely experienced conquest and administrative consolidation comparatively late in the centralized imperial administration of the seventeenth century. The people of the Deccan had suffered considerably between predatory armies and frequent draughts leading to famine. With the settlement of 1636, the imperial administration began making endeavours to reform and systematize the revenue assessment and realization of the Deccan.

Interestingly enough, the Deccan administration reached a definitive stage of consolidation as late as 1652. The renowned *dīwān* of the Deccan, Murshid Quli *Khān*, through an imperial order, carried out the sweeping series of reforms in the agrarian administration. His aim was to bring the four Deccan provinces fully into the classical *zabt* or regulation revenue system of the North India. It needs no recital as major extension of the *zabt* system occurred in the Deccan by Murshid Quli *Khān*. Murshid Quli *Khān* made a three pronged effort by recruiting new, reliable revenue assessors and collectors, providing incentives for the extension of cultivation, and reorganizing assessment and collection of land tax by the *zabt* system of Hindustan because the greater part of the Mughal Empire was administered directly under the *zabt* system. One can argue that the essence of his measure lay in, first, establishing crop-sharing or more specifically *kankūt*, for some time, in order to establish the *rai*'s [harvest yield crop-rate] for various crops in different districts, such as food grains, vegetables, high-grade crops, varying the government share according to crop and natural or artificial factors, by taking into consideration the prices fixing the value of the out-turn of cultivation, enabling to collect the

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<sup>1</sup>*Miratul 'Alam*, ff 214[b]-215[b]; *Zawābit-i 'Ālamgīrī*, ff. 3 [a], 5 [b].

revenue rates, according to the crop, after measuring the land. Thereafter he worked out the cash rates or *dastūru-l 'amals*. The chief characteristic of his system was an ongoing systematic cadastral survey of agricultural lands for establishing field-by-field tenures and cropping patterns within each village and *pargana*. It was but natural that armed with this detailed statistical data, Murshid Quli Khān could fix the land revenue on a field by field basis of a maximal level of cultivated area for each village and the kinds of crops / groups, with reduced rates for cash crops like sugarcane and records of previous market rates over the previous ten years. The state claim was for cash payment of revenue while the *dīwān* also improved the system of *taqāvi*[i.e. advances or loans] made to peasants to encourage expansion of arable land. Obviously over a large part of the Deccan the older system of imposing land revenue based on the number of ploughs was now replaced by a system of measurement<sup>1</sup>.

Under the *zabt* system, the allowance for crop failure was made by excluding from revenue assessment the areas denoted *nābūd* [crop-less] which could not exceed 12½ percent of the sown area. The loans designated *taqāvi* ‘strength giving’ were sanctioned under the *zabt* regulations which were normally to be repaid at harvest. Furthermore grant of tax concessions or whenever revenue rates were allowed to encourage land cleaning and colonization, which were, however, gradually enhanced every year until the full rates were fixed in the fifth year<sup>2</sup>. The revenue demand was stated primarily in cash in the *zabt* system and this system of assessment, could be replaced by another, such as assessment in kind or crop-sharing, and vice-versa. Generally it appears that the share of produce taken as revenue ranged from one-third to half in most parts of northern India and Deccan<sup>3</sup>.

Consequent upon these changes measurement of villages *viz.*, 2,832 villages in *śūba* Khandesh constituting 45 per cent of the total were assessed and surveyed under the *zabt* system<sup>4</sup>, whereas the remaining 3,507 villages were brought under less exacting assessment, involving crop sharing in fixed proportion at the time of harvest. Another system of revenue

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<sup>1</sup>*Agrarian System*, pp. 227-8; R.A., ‘Murshid Quli Khān in Deccan’, PIHC, 33<sup>rd</sup> Session, 1972, p 207.

<sup>2</sup>*Agrarian System*, pp. 212 & n., 249-256

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 190-230.

<sup>4</sup>*Agrarian System*, p. 4.

assessment was the old Khandeshi plough tax lump sum per plough [*sarbasta tashkhīs*] which was imposed in the case of the more remote areas. It was the customary calculation that a peasant with a pair of oxen could cultivate an area of one *aut* or 80 *bighas* and would be taxed accordingly. It can be safely assumed that the *zabt* system was more intrusive into the fabric of local society as compared to other methods of assessment.

The total area of the four older provinces of Deccan was approximately 1,23,221 miles [i.e. Aurangabad=38518 Bidar 17552, Berar 44147 and Khandesh 23004] which equaled 3,17,660 sq. km<sup>1</sup>. Murshid Quli Khān's meticulous reorganization of the agrarian administration of the Deccan provinces determined the mode and level of imperial revenue collection for the next century<sup>2</sup>. We presume that later adjustments were made in the total revenue demand. However, the actual collections varied. Ultimately the resources of the provinces were undoubtedly established in the imperial records and the official mind. The same system became so deeply entrenched in the Mughal revenue administration that any deviation from it could not be tolerated as is evident from the following statement probably made in late 1670's or early 1680's:

“Ruḥullah Khān convened the imperial order that in the records office of the Deccan *Hindwi* is not written on the *chitthi-i deh ba dehi* [village to village statements]. The fact remains that since the very inception of the conquest of the country [i.e. Deccan] the *chitthi* is obligatory because there are *Hindwi* knowing *deshmukhs* and *deshpāndiyas* in the *parganas* and it is essential that the *sarrishtas* [records] of the central and provincial *qānūngos* [*qānūngoyān-i ḥuzūr o ṣubajāt*] should be in conformity and no difference should be allowed. If order is issued then the *chitthi* in *Hindwi* script of the *qānūngos* or without seal and signature of the *Dīwān* with the symbol [*nishān*] may be sent regularly to Hindustan [North India] according to the *dastūr-i ‘amal* [practice/ revenue schedule] of Murshid Quli Khān<sup>3</sup>”.

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<sup>1</sup> The approximate area for the seventeenth century is taken from area tables for Khandesh and Malwa, Aurangabad, Berar and Bidar. It is not certain that the total includes Baglana because it has not been specifically mentioned. *An Atlas*, pp. VII-VIII.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., an *āwārāja* of *Khālisa Sharifa* of 1722 of *ṣūba* Berar Bālāghāt stating that the revenue administration or ‘*amal*-i Murshid Quli Khān was still valid, IJC VIII/89/607.

<sup>3</sup> IJCI/ 0/ 0-580.

As stated earlier that Murshid Quli Khān, the *Dīwān* commissioned by Aurangzeb during his second term as the Viceroy of the Deccan in 1652 and the *Dīwān* was given a royal mandate to introduce large scale revenue reforms. He proved so able an improver and revenue administrator<sup>1</sup> that he enhanced the revenues by 25% in a large area as compared to Diyānat Khān, who was the *Dīwān* of Bālāghāt before Murshid Quli Khān.

Shāhjahān considered the implementation of miscellaneous regulations [*zawābit-i gūnāgon*] as the chief cause of the ruin of the Deccan, which according to Aurangzeb was further deteriorated by the mismanagement of the former Viceroys appointed between the interregnum of his first and second Viceroyalty i.e. from 1644 to 1652 because he claimed that he had streamlined the revenue administration during his first term as Viceroy of the Deccan from 1636 to 1644. This was true to some extent because in the interviewing 8 years the agriculture had ruined and the peasantry had fled away due to the oppression of Viceroys and *jāgirdārs*<sup>2</sup>.

Side by side the *zabt* system, the '*amal-i batāi*' was considered equally helpful in improving the revenue affairs of the Deccan, which represented a claim on behalf of the state to a share of the actual crop. Khāfi Khān has drawn our attention to a third method of assessment which was the *batāi* system or sharing of the crop between the government and the cultivator. Murshid Quli Khān introduced three kinds of sharing: [i] the producer of land only depended on rain and the crop was to be shared equally between the peasants and the government.[ii] the crops of *rabi* ' and *khariif* obtained from well-water were to be divided between the producer and the government so that one-third of it was taken by the government and two-thirds were to be received by the peasants.[iii] However, for the crops like grapes, sugarcane, plantain, opium, poppy, sandal wood, turmeric, mango, cumin seed, etc one ninth to one-fourth was to go to the government and the rest was to be left to the peasant<sup>3</sup>. This is generally opined that it was a temporary measure adopted for evolving a reliable crop rate [*rai* ' ] as both the *Dīwān* of the

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<sup>1</sup> For details see Šādiq Khān, *Shahjahan Nāma*, Or 174; ff. 90; Khāfi Khān, II, 735; *Ādāb*, p.134-5, 138-140, 148; *Calendar*, pp. XXXI-XXXV, 33-5, 37-8, 62.

<sup>2</sup> For details see, *Ādāb*, I, pp. 100-138-40, *Calendar*, pp2, 33-35, J.N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, Vol I, Delhi, [reprint] pp. 99-100, S.Moinul Haq, *Prince Awrang zeb : A Study*, Karachi 1962, pp 38-39, Najib Ashraf Nadwi, *Muqaddama-i Ruqa'at-i Alamgir*, Azamgarh, 1981, [reprint], pp 195-6.

<sup>3</sup> A.J. Syed, *Aurangzeb in Muntakhabul-Lubab*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1977, p. 59.

Deccan i.e. Murshid Quli Khān and Multafat Khān were engaged in introducing *ghallabakhshī* or *batāī* in Pāīnghāt and Bālāghāt. It, however, seems to have been a permanent measure of the revenue assessment where a simple sharing of the harvested grain took place, one share being left to the revenue payer whereas the other set apart for the state or its assignee because in regard to the officials posted in the Deccan we find an imperial order of 7<sup>th</sup> August 1664 taking strict action for failure in proper implementation of crop sharing which reads:

In regard to Riā'yat Khān it was represented to His Majesty that he did not make proper effort in realizing the revenue of Surat Port and it also occurred in some other *parganas* where he had enforced crop-sharing [*'amal-i batāī*]. The world commanding and world obeying order was issued that 100/50 be reduced from his unconditional *manṣab*.

Accordingly his unconditional 800/100 was reduced to 700/50 leaving 700/250 in which 200 *sawār* rank was contingent upon serving as castellan of Zafar Nagar<sup>1</sup>.

According to a contemporary estimate the *jama'dāmi* of [estimated revenue figures by which *jāgirs* were assigned in lieu of pay] of the provinces of the Deccan of 1667 was 2,96,70,00,000 *dāms*<sup>2</sup> which was 32.1 per cent of the total *jama'* of the Empire. From 1667 to 1691 the share of the Deccan in the *jama'dami* of the Empire was 35.5 percent<sup>3</sup>, which was 9,24,17,16082 *dāms* that was not a substantial rise. We can conclude that the *jama'dāmi* of the Deccan was one-third of the total *jama'* of the Empire.

When any *manṣabdār* was assigned the *jāgir* he got it assessed. We find that Saiyid Ḥaji and Shahabuddin, sons of Muḥammad Sai'd, *qila'dār* of Sultangarh had gone towards Bhargaon for fixation of *jama'* [*tashkhis-i jama'bandi*] of their father<sup>4</sup>. Similarly Nūr Khān Lodi, *manṣabdar* from *pargana* Laling came to Khawāja Burhāni, *amīn* for revenue assessment

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<sup>1</sup>SDAR, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup>Miratu-l 'Alam, ff. 214 [b]-215.

<sup>3</sup>Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri, ff. 3 [a] – 5 [b].

<sup>4</sup>SWD, p. 128.

[*jama 'bandi*] and returned back after fixation<sup>1</sup>. This fact is also confirmed from innumerable *jāgīr* assignments [*daul-i jāgīr*] and *āwāraja* documents. Even it was obligatory upon the *dīwānto* know the assessment of *jama'* of the *parganas* etc as is known from an appointment order of the *Dīwān* of *sarkār* Baglana *ṣūba* Khandesh of 1<sup>st</sup> December 1661 which *ipso facto* reads thus:

The incumbent [i.e. Khwaja Trikam Das] should know the true facts of the assessment of *jama'* of the *parganas* like Khwaja La'l Chand, the ex-*dīwān*. He should obtain the *Sarrishta-i kāghaz* [register of papers] properly under signatures of the *desāis* and *qānūngos* so as to send it to the imperial record office. He should not allow that any one of the *jāgirdārs* could oppress the peasantry. Let the peasantry make endeavour in cultivating waste land and irrigated lands [*bardāshtan-i zamīn o baghat*]<sup>2</sup>.

We find that in early 1650's the Mughal administration on the solicitation of Multafat Khān, proposed to advance [*taqāvi*] of Rs 40,000 to 50,000 to cultivators in Khandesh and a portion of Berar, for the purpose of erecting *bands*[dams] for impounding water for providing irrigation<sup>3</sup>. Surprisingly we find several series of connected documents especially during the second phase of Aurangzeb's Deccan administration as the Emperor, indicating the source of irrigation, if any, which mainly relate to *parganas* of 'Ādilābād, Laling and other areas of *ṣūba* Khandesh<sup>4</sup> as the officials were duty bound to look after the irrigation facilities as we come to know that that Saiyid Manṣur, *faujadār* of Baglāna had been to see the irrigation canal<sup>5</sup>. Although it is impossible to estimate the total area irrigated by the lakes and tanks, small or magnification of ordinary reservoirs, yet it may be safely assumed that it was quite considerable because tanks or reservoirs played an important role as source of irrigation in the Deccan.

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, p. 168.

<sup>2</sup>SWD, pp. 133-4.

<sup>3</sup>*Ādāb*, I, pp. 207-8.

<sup>4</sup>JJ 1/11/432, 1/11/492, I/11/569; I/11/571.

<sup>5</sup>SWD, p. 128.

The *jama*‘ of the Deccan in 1654 was estimated by as 1,44,90,00,000 *dāms* which rose to<sup>1</sup>, 2,96,70,00,000 *dāms* in 1667. It became more than double in a span of 13 years, which further increased to 9,24,17,16082 *dāms* between 1667 to 1691.

However, the question does arise that whether this increase in *jama*‘ ever commensurate with the actual *ḥaṣil*? What was the actual yield? What was the nature of the problems faced in revenue collection? What were the effects of the Maratha fiscal demands upon the Deccan in a number of forms? And so on and so forth.

The actual revenue realization in 1654 was one crore rupees excluding 12 lakh rupees on account of natural calamities such a low *hasil* had a deep connexion with the deteriorating agrarian conditions in the Deccan.

Furthermore *jama*‘ was a long way from *ḥaṣil*. Aurangzeb during his second term as Viceroy of the Deccan represented to Shāhjahān that “the *jama* ‘*dāmi* of these provinces after the reduction is 1,44,90,00,000 *dāms*. The actual *maḥṣul* [revenue] thereof, including the deduction of Rs 12,00,000 which the *dīwāns* had not written off but shown as due to *āfat* [natural calamity], arrives at one crore rupees, which does not cause to average to 3-monthly of the *jama* ‘*dāmi*”<sup>2</sup>.

Although low revenue yield, accompanied with war plunder, tribute and massive agrarian tax collections combined to generate resources for the Mughal Deccan, yet due to revenue embezzlements from the liquid reserved stored in the provincial treasuries the picture became astoundingly grimy even before the crisis of the Deccan wars<sup>3</sup>. Even, *dīwān*, *faujdār* and *amīn* etc were charged for embezzlement of 26, 839½ *hūns* in June 1661<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>*Ādāb*, Vol. I, pp. 156-8, *Calendar*, pp. 43-5.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid*; This position was equally true during Aurangzeb’s reign as clearly stated in a document of February 1660 that all the Deccan was getting 3 monthly *ḥaṣils*. MA Nayeem, *Mughal Documents*, I, ii, pp. 96-7.

<sup>3</sup> M.A. Nayeem, *Mughal Documents*, I, ii, pp. 8, 61.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid*, p. 24.

However, leaving aside such occasional aberrations, endeavours were always made for the extension of cultivation for the maximization of land revenue. Thus, for instance on 24 June 1661, Saiyid Maṣūr, *faujdār* of Baglāna, appointed Ankus Rao, son of Jankha Behal, to bring 25 *ghair‘amali*[uncultivated] and 2 *‘amali* villages under plough by giving him presents<sup>1</sup>.

The extraction of *chauth* by Shivajī from 1670 onwards, was, however, a great factor in draining the land revenue resources of the Deccan because it was based upon a claimed 25% share of the imperial tax assessment and established collections. The *chauth*, when fully collected equaled to 8 million rupees which was exacted from Mughal or so called foreign territories<sup>2</sup>. In nutshell the problems of the revenue administration and diminishing returns were the chief characteristics of the Mughal Deccan in pre-1681 era.

### **[III] THE DESHMUKHS / DESAĪS, DESHPĀNDES AND OTHER ZAMĪNDĀRS**

The imperial authority for realizing the revenues rested on the services of the *zamīndārs* of the country side in the Deccan provinces, without whom any order was impossible within this group of *zamīndārs*, the leading figures were the *deshmukhs*, who were semi-hereditary, officially recognized, intermediary officers<sup>3</sup>, who acquired dominant power and high status in each *pargana*. *Land Control and Social Structure in History*, ed. [R.E. Frykenberg, ed., in S. Nurul Ḥasan, *Aspects of Zamīndāri System in the Deccan, 1695-1707*, pp. 17-21, *PHIC*, 1969].

Although *deshmukhs*[and *zamīndārs*] were autochothonous lords of the land, most of the *deshmukhs*, as a result of generations of transmitted experience became collaborators of the imperial administration in the Deccan under Aurangzeb as well. The Mughal provincial *dīwāns* used to make contracts, and negotiate continued terms of service with these intermediaries for creating a formal link between the state and the *deshmukhs* where after the *deshmukhs* received a

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, p. 125.

<sup>2</sup>A.R. Kulkarni *‘Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji’*, Poona 1969.

<sup>3</sup> If we go by the classification imposed by Nurul Ḥasan [*Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History* making an important and necessary distinction between the intermediary, more powerful *zamīndārs* and primary or smaller village level ones followed by Muzaffar Alam; “The *Zamīndārs* and the Mughal Power in the Deccan”, *Indian Economic and Social History Review* [IESHR], XI. [March 1974], pp 74-91. However, most Mughal documents from the Deccan provinces do not distinguish between the two levels of *zamīndārs* whereas primary *zamīndārs* were nothing more than peasants [*ri‘āya*].

patent of office or *sanad*, couched in Persian, providing up to 5% allowance on tax-collected, retention of tax- free lands, and protection for *deshmukhs* of the local position and status. They also used to execute bonds promising to pay in installment, stipulated appointment fee, to collect taxes in collaboration with the agents of the *jāgīrdārs* or *Karorīs*[of the *Khālīṣa*], to submit required periodic reports, and to encourage extension of cultivation<sup>1</sup>.

The *deshmukhs* or *desāis* were hereditary chiefs or *zamīndārs* of a *pargana*. Furthermore in the Deccan provinces *zamīndārs* usually meant regional [*pargana*] aristocrats, *nāyāks*, *muniwārs*, *deshmukhs*, *desāis*, *deshpāndes* and so on. Any how the so called primary *zamīndārī* system of north India type was generally absent in the Deccan<sup>2</sup>. They were usually peasant by caste. The importance of such local magnates in the local administration of the Mughal Deccan was well established as they had to be maintained and created throughout due to political and social necessities. *Deshpande* the hereditary accountant was a Brahmin, because of his literacy.

The myth of the invincibility of the Mughal might was so important a factor that it had made the *zamīndārs* submissive and subservient in the Mughal Deccan. When Marathas under Shivajī appeared to have challenged the Mughal might the *zamīndārs* in the Deccan became recalcitrant and tumultuous. A contemporary observer criticized the Maratha-Mughal conflict even at the very beginning as recorded here under:

“Most of the villages, in the *ṣūbas* of the Deccan are in control of the *deshmukhs* and the *deshpāndes* of the *parganas*. In the country which is under the possession of our men, a number of *deshmukhs* and without [acquiring] the *sanad* they are misappropriating the *rusum* and *inā‘m*<sup>3</sup>.

Bhimsen opined that the *zamīndārs*’ support to Shivajī emboldened him to challenge the Mughal power in the Deccan; however, after Shivajī’s death they became the active collaborators of the Mughals in oppressing the peasantry<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>*Cf.*, J.F. Richards, ‘The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan’. *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXV, No. 2, Feb, 1976, pp. 252-3.

<sup>2</sup>*Cf.*, *CEHI*, I, p 254.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, Nos 259-260 as stated in M.Alam, *The zamīndārs* p. 75.

<sup>4</sup>*Dilkushā*, ff 130, [a] 140 [a].

The *deshmukhs*, sometimes, connived with the mischievous elements; a daily news report of October 1661 brings to light such connivance of the *deshmukh* of *pargana* Lohnair, who used to keep Bhils for committing theft according to the statement of the *muqaddams* of the area<sup>1</sup>. Even, Chait Singh, the *zamīndār* of village Mansul, of the said *pargana*, was alleged to be a villain as he used to indulge in highway robbery, probably in invitation of the *deshmukh*<sup>2</sup>. The *deshmukhs* of the Mughal Deccan, occasionally remained in collusion with the *deshmukhs* of the Deccan kingdoms, viz. Dawal, *deshmukh* of *pargana* Varval, in *sarkār* Nanded who was in league with Subhāni, *deshmukh* of *pargana* Kaulas with Quṭbul Mulk's territory was ordered to be arrested by ShāistaKhān, in May 1662<sup>3</sup>.

However, such stray incidents never posed a threat to the Mughal endeavours of systemization of imperial administration in the Mughal Deccan, which was also aimed at restoring internal peace and security.

Since *deshmukhs* and *deshpāndes* were generally hereditary, they invariably held their appointments on the basis of a *sanad* or imperial order and they could also be removed from their posts by the Emperor. That is why we find a daily news report of the city of Ellichpur in *ṣūba* Berar conveying that Kishna, *deshpāndia*, dismissed from the office had filed a suit with the *mutaṣaddi* of the city of Aurangabad claiming his hereditary rights.

But the appointment of *deshmukhs* and *deshpāndes* was, as a rule, for life and so while *jāgirdārs* came and went, they stayed on permanently.

The *gumāshtha*[agent] of every *jāgīrdār*, had to rely utmost on the help of these two officials in assessing and realizing the revenue. They were bound to assist him, but they were equally responsible to check the accounts of collections and to see that no irregular exactions were made from the peasantry<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> M.A. Nayeem, *Mughal Documents*, I, ii, p. 527; SWD, p. 193.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 89-90.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 128; SWD, p. 127; *Ibid*, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Cf., *Mughal Nobility*, p. 87; *SDAR*, pp. 21-22; 25-6;

The *Desāis* played a crucial role in financial administration of the Deccan provinces, as they used to be clubbed with *qānūngos* and *muqaddams*<sup>1</sup>.

In addition to intermediary *zamīndārs*, there were also other *zamīndārs* who used to pay the stipulated *peshkash*, which was, totally distinct from *mal*<sup>2</sup>, that is again confirmed from a document of June 1659 of the Deccan that [a rolling of ten year average on crop returns and market prices] and *peshkash* of the *zamīndārs* from all the *parganas* of the Deccan was collected. [*The Mughal Documents*[I, ii, fassimile. role of Doc. No. V/210 *mawāzana*]<sup>3</sup>].

The above-mentioned categories of intermediaries [*zamīndārs*] held prescriptive rights of controlling the peasantry over a specified area were allowed to retain a minor share of the formal revenue-demand, revenue-free lands, and enjoy their local positions of power in lieu of enforcement of the revenue realization and order in the countryside.

The *peshkash* was also collected from the big *zamīndārs* as well, who occasionally pleaded for its exemption *viz.*, the *zamīndār* of Rāmnaḡar, sought the same, by offering some gift, through Saiyid, Maṡṡur, *faujdār* of Baḡlōna<sup>4</sup>, in view of the fact that a fresh imposition of tribute on this principality was negotiated in 1638<sup>5</sup>.

The brother of ‘Abdul Hadi, *zamīndār* of Yaḡḡarp held the rank of 150/100, who was granted *jāḡīr* from the said *pargana*, *sarkār* Nander, *ṡūba* Zafarabad *alias* Telingāna in 1659<sup>6</sup>. The *zamīndār*, in his capacity helped the imperial administration. We have learnt from a daily news report of *sarkār* Ramgir about the visit of the above said ‘Abdul Bari, *zamīndār* for his

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<sup>1</sup>SWD, pp. 133-47.

<sup>2</sup>*Cf.*, *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, f. 140 [a].

<sup>3</sup> Ac. No. 4958 of AP State Archives.

<sup>4</sup>SWD, p. 134.

<sup>5</sup> Lahori, II, p. 109. The *zamīndār* of Ramnaḡar solicited the permission to visit the imperial court which was granted and a *farmān* was promised to be issued. *Blochett Suppl. Persian*, No. 482, f. 97 [a].

<sup>6</sup> M.A. Nayeem *Mughal Documents*, I, ii, facsimile Doc No. H/1/2. Telingāna was no more a *ṡūba* after 1657 and its reference is curious *Cf.*, *Atlas*, Sheet 15/Notes; *ibid*, p. 90; *ibid*, p. 91; M.A. Nayeem, *Mughal Documents*, I, ii, p. 21.

meeting with the *faujdār* thereat as they were so much hand in glove that they jointly used to go for hunting.

But notwithstanding this mutual understanding the *jāgīrdārs* were many a time compelled to subdue the rebellious *zamīndārs*. Jalāl Khān Kākar, in a similar incident of crushing a defiant *zamīndār* marched towards Hoshangabad, [in *sarkār* Handia].

Sometimes the officials of big *zamīndārs* indulged in burning the villages as we come to know from a daily news report of Ellichpur city that the *deshpānde* of *pargana* Karamandgaon represented about the burning and devastation of three villages of the said *pargana* by the men of the *zamīndār* of Chanda, which illicited serious action by the Mughal administration by seeking the *zamīndār's* explanation in the first instance. Strict action was also initiated against Durga, son of Bābū, *ḥawaladār* of *pargana* Sarpur, belonging to Chanda [principality], for lifting away the goods and cattle from the *parganas* of *sarkār* Ramgir<sup>1</sup>.

The *zamīndārs*, sometimes, possessed *manṣab*, viz., ‘Abdul Bari, *alias* Allu, neo-Muslim, had besieged Udairāj, *zamīndār* of *pargana* Sibalgaon, holding the rank of 100 *zat*. A battle was fought between them leading to casualties on both sides. Ultimately the said *zamīndār* concluded a peace, gave Rs. 1,000 in cash and one horse and Jalāl Khān reciprocated it by gifting a horse and returning from there in May 1662<sup>2</sup>.

Similar incident was reported on 16<sup>th</sup> May 1662 about the chastisement of Donger, *zamīndār* of Mahagaon, [*sarkār* Mahur, *ṣūba* Berar] by Sarfarāz Khān [Deccani], *jāgīrdār*. The *zamīndār* who became recalcitrant was chased from the mountain where he had taken shelter to another mountain<sup>3</sup>. Jalāl Khān also planned to admonish the same *zamīndār* by his own troops without any help from Sarfarāz Khān, Deccani [otherwise the country would have been destroyed by excessive marching of armies]<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> SWD, p. 297.

<sup>2</sup> SWD, p. 86.

<sup>3</sup> SWD, p. 88.

<sup>4</sup> M.A. Nayeem, *Mughal Documents*, I, ii, p. 19.

The local collaborators of the Marathas including the *Deshmukhs*, if we take into consideration the statement of Bhinsen, who accuses that the *zamīndārs* and the *deshmukhs* supported Shivajī<sup>1</sup>. But the evidence adduced by us, during the first phase of Aurangzeb's Deccan policy does not fully corroborate this assumption, because Shivajī himself suppressed many a *deshmukhs* to hide his *swaraja* and he ruthlessly exterminated some of the *deshmukh-zamīndārs*<sup>2</sup> which was their home country or due to which many of them joined service either under 'Ādil Shāhi or Mughal governments. Shivajī even tried to convert *peshkashizamīndārs* into *khiraji* ones. Furthermore, the importance of the Deccan and the Maratha revolts increased only when Aurangzeb himself moved south in 1681<sup>3</sup>.

It is no more than an intractable problem to assess the strength of imperial authority in the Deccan countryside because the imperial administration successfully assimilated, armed, militant local chiefs and notables into the imperial state as *zamīndārs*. It is therefore, more appropriate to call the *zamīndārs* of all hues as Mughal collaborators in the Deccan till 1681.

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<sup>1</sup>*Nuskha-iDilkushā*, f 140 [a].

<sup>2</sup>*CEHI*, I, p. 197.

<sup>3</sup> Satish Chandra, 'The Maratha Policy and its Agrarian Consequences', in B. Parsad [ed.] *Ideas in History*, Delhi.

## V

### SECTION – B [1682 - 1707]

#### EXPANSION OF MUGHAL POWER IN THE DECCAN

##### [I] TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND CREATION OF NEW *ṢŪBĀS*

From the imperial viewpoint, the revolt of Prince Akbar, during the war in Rajputana in 1681 finally brought a crisis situation in the Deccan, where he sought refuge at Sambhaji's court<sup>1</sup>, which was, to the utter disliking of Aurangzeb. Consequent upon the conclusion of the Rajput campaign Aurangzeb moved south, with his entire court and a large imperial army, to Aurangabad, which served as the headquarters for the Mughal Viceroy.

There is no denying the fact that in Aurangzeb's move south, the usual motive for expansion was very much present in order to obtain more and more resources to maintain the alligence of the nobility. Furthermore, failure of Bijapur to control the Maratha menace and the support of Golconda to the Marathas compelled Aurangzeb to dispense fully of the Marathas and stabilize the southern frontiers of the Mughal Empire permanently by annexing Bijapur and Golconda. Thus Aurangzeb ultimately decided on the solution which he on the scene had argued for thirty years before: complete elimination of the last troublesome tributary states of Bijapur and Golconda by their outright annexation<sup>2</sup>.

Thus consequent upon the march of Aurangzeb to the Deccan in 1681-2 accompanied with his house hold, court and grand army began an era of continuous conquests which began to change geographical contours of South India. It may be convincingly argued that recurring wars and incessant diplomatic pressure had a sense of inevitability on an irreversible sequence of events, which ended with the final victories over Bijapur and Golconda in 1686-87. Aurangzeb had conquered and annexed the Sulṭānats of Bijapur, Golconda and the Maratha Kingdom by 1689, whereafter his armies launched a protracted saga of the Maratha stronghold of Jinji, the far

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<sup>1</sup>*History of Aurangzeb*, IV, B. 35, ff.

<sup>2</sup> Richards, *Mughal Administration*, pp. 45-46; M.N. Pearson, 'Shivāji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire, Symposium: Decline of the Mughal Empire, *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol XXXV, [February 1976] p. 231.

southern refuge of Raja Ram, the new Maratha leader and conquered it in 1698. Thus the Mughal Empire expanded confidently in the Deccan during the late 17<sup>th</sup> century [see map of six Mughal Deccan Provinces in late seventeenth century].

It is in this backdrop that one should see the expansion of the Mughal Empire in the Deccan, which in penultimate analysis resulted into the territorial expansion and creation of new *ṣūbās*.

In 1685 the Mughal army moved into Bijapur, and staying outside the capital began investment and massive siege and in September 1686 after a costly military engagement, Sikandar ‘Ādil Shāh was capitulated and Bijapur became a Mughal province. Thus the *ṣūba* of Bijapur was finally created upon the annexation of the ‘Ādilshāhi Kingdom of Bijapur, which constituted the entire former Kingdom with its boundaries existed on the eve of annexation, of course, with the exception of Naldrug and Gulbarga, which, however, had been annexed some years earlier<sup>1</sup>. The Mughal *ṣūba* of Bijapur comprised the following *sarkārs* and 2 principalities:

*sarkār* Dabhol, *sarkār* Parendā, *sarkār* Raybagh, *sarkār* Miraj, *sarkār* Akluj, *sarkār* Bijapur, *sarkār* Naldrug, *sarkār* Gulbarga, *sarkār* Nuṣratābad-Sagar, *sarkār* Belguam, *sarkār* Torgul, *sarkār* Mudgal, *sarkār* Adoni, *sarkār* Raichur, *sarkār* Nadyal, *sarkār* Bankapur, *sarkār* Hanigeri and two tributary principalities of Bednur or Kanara and Mysore<sup>2</sup>.

During the siege of Bijapur the Mughals intercepted a message of sending reinforcement comprising an army of 40,000 by Abul Ḥasan, King of Golconda attacking from the east on the Mughal army while Marathas attacking from the west, that led to temporary conquest of Hyderabad in 1685 by the Mughals, which they vacated after a truce. In fact, Aurangzeb waited till the completion of the siege of Bijapur before directing his energies to the final conquest of Golconda. On 14 January 1687 Aurangzeb began his final assault on Golconda because he considered Golconda and Maratha nexus a challenge to the Mughal authority in the Deccan.


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<sup>1</sup>*Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, ff. 68[a], 69[b].

<sup>2</sup>*Atlas*, Sheets 14[A] and 16[A]. Notes pp. 56-7, 63-4.

# THE DECAN (EAST) POLITICA 1596 & 1707


15 A



All boundaries true for 1596, except those of suba  
Haidarabad & its sarkars which are true for 1707.

# SOUTH INDIA POLITICAL 1707

16 A



Besides leveling charges of favouring Hinduism and Shi'ism over orthodox Islam and financing Sambhaji's attacks on the Mughal dominions while keeping Golconda free from the Maratha entourage Abul Hasan was found guilty of withholding Rs. 1,62,22,278 as arrears in tribute in 1687<sup>1</sup>.

After protracted siege of Golconda fort by treachery and night escalade Aurangzeb simultaneously issued a proclamation formally annexing the entire Kingdom of Golconda which became the Mughal province of Hyderabad as Golconda was renamed as Hyderabad with official epithet *Darul-i Jihad* [land of war] which comprised 20 *sarkār* of Golconda proper, located north of the Krishna R. that, however, remained literally true during the early phase.

The Mughal province of Hyderabad also contained the territory of Golconda upon its annexation in 1687 with the exception of Ramgir which in 1656 was ceded by the Quṭb Shāh, being made later a *sarkār* of *ṣūba* Bedar<sup>2</sup>. The *ṣūba* of Hyderabad comprised the following *sarkārs*:

*sarkār* Kolas, *sarkār* Elgandal, *sarkār* Koilconda, *sarkār* Golconda, *sarkār* Bhūngir, *sarkār* Nalgonda, *sarkār* Khammam-mett, *sarkār* Elluru, *sarkār* Rajamundry, *sarkār* Sikakol, *sarkār* Pangal, *sarkār* Ghanpur, *sarkār* Devarkonda, *sarkār* Guntur, *sarkār* Kondapalle, *sarkār* Machhlipatan and *sarkār* Nizampattan.

Aurangzeb made few drastic modifications in the boundaries of the former Kingdom of Golconda. A far-reaching decision was made in this initial stage, that radically disputed from the previous practice, which was concerned with Aurangzeb's detachment of the Karnatak, previously administered as a single *ṣūba* under Golconda, from administrative jurisdiction of Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, a former Golconda general, who had suddenly defected to the Mughals, the Mughal governor of Hyderabad province. We also come to know that in 1688, the 12 *sarkārs* south of Gundlekamma and Krishna river were designated the Hyderabad Karnatak by the

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<sup>1</sup> IJCI/2/1 as cited in Richards *Mughal Administration* p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Shafiq, p. 153; Thākur La'1, f. 89[a].

Mughals so as to distinguish them from the *sarkārs* conquered by Bijapur further south. The Karnatak *sarkārs* of Hyderabad were divided into Bālāghāt [uplands] and Pāinghāt [lowlands]. The Bālāghāt included *sarkār* Siddharat, *sarkār* Ganjikota, *sarkār* Gooty, *sarkār* Cumbum and *sarkār* Kanchi [seat of administration of Karnatak Pāinghāt], *sarkār* Chandragiri, *sarkār* Survepalli, *sarkār* Ūdgūr, *sarkār* Tiruvottiyur and *sarkār* Chingleput. The above *sarkārs* of Karnatak of Hyderabad were acquired by the Golconda Kingdom in 1655.

In addition, the following *sarkārs* were also the part of Hyderabad: *sarkār* Wandiwash, *sarkār* Jinji, *sarkār* Palaiyamkottai, *sarkār* Vellore, *sarkār* Jagdev, *sarkār* Valikandapur and *sarkār* Varadavur. The Mughal province of Hyderabad was further augmented by the annexation of two principalities of Tanjavur and Trichnapalli [the Kingdom of Madura] which were submitted to the Mughals in 1694.

The three distinct largest administrative divisions of Hyderabad i.e. Hyderabad, Golconda and Karnatak resembled the Mughal provinces because Aurangzeb himself remained in Hyderabad for approximately four month so as to make *in situ* supervision of the assimilation of the newly conquered territories into the Mughal Empire.

It is quite interesting to note that the Karnatak of Hyderabad, only totally conquered by Golconda by 1650's was, as a matter of fact, formed a sub-consolidation, was not as much advanced as was in Golconda.

Keeping in view the typical conditions prevailing in the Karnatak, the Emperor brought this entire vast region under a single administrator, with his seat at Kanchi [Conjeevaram]. Separation of the Karnatak from Golconda or Hyderabad and its recognition as a distinct administrative and political unit has two important consequence, *viz.*, maintenance of the administrative boundary and the requirements of the Mughal administration formed a new political entity in the Deccan. The *faujdār* of Karnatak, who was at par with the Governor of Hyderabad was directly answerable to the Emperor which decorated the status of Hyderabad as a political and economic centre because he sent his tax and tribute collections to Aurangzeb.

Thus the gradual culmination of the long drawn imperial endeavour to conquer the Muslim Kingdoms of the Deccan resulted in the territorial expansion and the creation of two new *ṣūbās* of Bijapur and Golconda under the centralized imperial administration. However, administrative and political consolidation in Bijapur and Golconda was incomplete after 1686-87. The Mughal commitment of the best military and administrative resources of the empire to continued expansion led to further territorial expansion by the unceasing draining of wars against the Marathas in the Deccan in an eagerness for further expansion up to the sea-shores.

## [II] ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF THE NEWLY CONQUERED AREAS

The newly conquered areas posed a many administrative problems for Aurangzeb. When Aurangzeb first considered the problems of administration in the newly annexed areas he detached the Karnatak from Hyderabad province, which was previously administered as a single province, under Golconda, from the administrative jurisdiction of the Mughal governor of *ṣūba* Ḥaidarabad, which by any standard had far reaching administrative significance. To distinguish it from Karnatak-i Bijapur it was designated as Karnatak-i Hyderabad, which was annexed by Golconda in late 1650's wherein political and administrative consolidation was less advanced.

In view of its peculiar prevailing conditions the Mughal emperor appointed a single administrator to this region with his seat up Kanchi<sup>1</sup>. It was factually a sub-kingdom whose administration was in reality a provincial headquarters at Hyderabad. The *faujdār*; if he did not combine his office with the *Dīwān*; had a *dīwān* and other provincial officials. The central administration of Golconda/ Hyderabad no longer controlled the tax revenues from Karnatak.

The former Golconda Kingdom had enlisted the support of some *zamīndārs* by appointing them as commanders [*sardārs*] of locally raised horsemen or *sihbandīs*. Aurangzeb also induced *sardārs* to shift their allegiance to him. Accordingly he ordered to 'Ali 'Askar Khān, the Golconda officer, who was appointed as governor of the Karnatak in early 1688 to remove those of his subordinates sent by Abul Ḥasan Quṭb Shāh along with resumption of their *jāgīrs*, except for making an exemption in regard to the *jāgīrs* of Ismā'īl Khān and Yacham Nair

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<sup>1</sup> See for details: see J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, London, 1975.

[or Achpat Nayar] etc who were *zamīndārs* [i.e. *sardārs*] as well<sup>1</sup>. Thus conciliatory endeavour was temporarily successful because Aurangzeb's orders had a soothing effect as they contained plundering attacks on the Governor of Karnatak for two years up to January 1690 because Ismā'īl Khān Makha, Yacham Nair and other Golconda *sardārs* joined the Mughal service<sup>2</sup>. Both of them probably did not become *manṣabdārs*<sup>3</sup>. However, the Marathas at Jinji in December 1687 attacked and occupied Kanchi, the capital of the Hyderabad Karnatak, which began a ten-year war in the Karnatak. The above mentioned one together with two *sardārs* helped the Mughal imperial administration in expelling the Marathas out of Kanchi, the seat of administration, up to Wandiwash.

But the imperial administration had always a problem of shifting loyalties of the *sardārs*, who occasionally used to engage in collaboration with the Marathas especially in 1689 when Raja Ram, brother of Sambhaji became the Maratha King. Upon the execution of Sambhaji Aurangzeb divulged his future plans to his third son Muḥammad A'zam Shāh in a *farmān*, dated 27-8 March 1689.

“... there are two alternatives namely that either Raja Rām must make his submission to the Emperor through the mediation of this Prince or that his fort [Raigarh] must be strictly besieged. The first clause concerns with the surrender of the fort, which after the capture of faithless Sambha, belongs to the Mughals and was seized by him [Raja Rām] at the instigation of some fools. He should be brought to the second clause i.e. siege should be made vigorously and discontinue this useless talk, establish *thānas* [military check posts] and administer the territory and forts ... before the commencement of the rainy season ... He should proceed to Ghat [Range] on the pretext of a hunting excursion so as to acquaint with the position of Kamahi pass ... Yāqut Khān due to the foolery of

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<sup>1</sup> Bhimsen, *Nuskha-i Dikushā*, f. 95 [a], Cf., *History of Aurangzeb*, vol. II, pp. 567., J.F. Richards, The Hyderabad Karnatak: 1687-1707, *Modern Asian Studies*, IX, 1975, p. 243-4.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Ismai'īl Khān Makha or Makka is frequently mentioned as *manṣabdār* in 'Inayat Jang Collection viz., I/ 41/ 8-102; I/ 42/ 1-32; I/ 42/ 6-120; I/ 42/ 7-30; I/ 42/ 8-18. But he received *manṣab* in 1691-2, Cf., IJC, I/ 34/ 4-20, whereas Yacham Nair or Achpat Nayar held the rank of 6000, *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, f. 112 [b].

Nāhir Khān sent the representation of Raja Ram to the Imperial Court through his son, who did not turn up<sup>1</sup> ...”.

However, all these plans proved futile because Raja Ram moved towards Jinji from Maharashtra. The new Maratha king conceived of retaking Golconda and Bijapur Kingdoms so as to put the Mughals on the defensive in the Deccan. Aurangzeb’s alleged religious policy of destruction contemplating the temples of Karnatak alienated Yacham Nair<sup>2</sup>, who joined Raja Rām and marched towards Karnatak. Hyderabad, joined by Ismāi‘l Khān Makka along with former Golconda officers and local *zamīndārs* outnumbering and isolating the Mughal detachment resulting into the flight of the *faujdār* of Karnatak-i Hyderabad<sup>3</sup>.

However, the imperial administration had overcome this problem because by October 1690 the Mughals under Zulfiqar Khān, once more fully controlled all the key points in the Hyderabad Karnatak. Ismāi‘l, sensing his chance for recovery from this debacle rejoined the Mughal service. We find that not only Ismāi‘l Khān Makka but his son Parwarish Khān also joined the imperial service. Ismāi‘l Khān held the rank of 5,000/ 4,000, six-monthly, in 1698-9 for which he was assigned a sum of 4,17,00,000 *dāms* whereas his son enjoyed the *manṣab* of 1,500/ 500, four-monthly. When he complained to Aurangzeb that ‘I am unable to work, if contingent is provided from the government and something is granted for the livelihood than I can proceed to my posting’ the emperor ordered for total payment of his *jāgīr-i zāt* and that of his son as per rule while after obtaining the bond for the contingent [*tabinān*]the remaining half be granted wherefrom he like<sup>4</sup>. Later Aurangzeb transferred him to Maharashtra as *faujdār* of Raheri with the rank of 6,000/ 5,000 in place of ‘Abdur Razzāq Lari. Thus the former rebel, detached from his holdings in the Hyderabad Karnatak was profitably re-employed outside Golconda by the imperial administration to avoid any problem<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> National Archives of India, Acquired Documents NAI – 1697.

<sup>2</sup>This has become a subject of unnecessary contention Cf., J.F. Richards, op. cit., pp. 245-6.

<sup>3</sup>*History of Aurangzeb*, vol. V, p. 68.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 12-39.

<sup>5</sup>*Ma’āsirul Umara*, vol. I, p. 291; *Ma’asir-i ‘Ālamgīrī*, pp. 357, 369, 387, 550.

Contrary to Ismā'īl Khān Makka, Yacham Nair began a series of raids from his home territories against the neighbouring Mughal *sarkārs*, while Zulfiqār Khān lured him back into Mughal fold by a high rank of 6,000 *zat* and an enormous *jāgīr* yielding revenues worth 9,00,000 rupees and subsequently on Aurangzeb's orders executed him in 1694 for treason<sup>1</sup>, whereafter his eldest son Kumaru Yachama Naidu was allowed to succeed with a rank of 6,000/ 6,000 with all titles and honours of his father. Thus the Mughal administration succeeded in controlling the evidently troublesome area<sup>2</sup>.

Similarly Mughal administration successfully dealt with another important Telugu, Sāyapanair Kumār Venkatadari [or Sauyapanid], a *muniār* and the Kumma chief of the northern districts of Karnatak as 'Ali Mardān Khān, *faujdar* of Hyderabad Karnatak confirmed his local position with all privileges and perquisites enjoyed under Quṭb Shāhs<sup>3</sup>. The Mughals followed the Quṭb Shāhi tradition of allowing local peace keeping operations to *muniwārs* or *kāwalis* for policing the major roads and markets over large trade of Hyderabad Karnatak to resolve such administrative problems<sup>4</sup>.

There remained instability and political uncertainty during the last decade of 17<sup>th</sup> century in the Hyderabad Karnatak region as compared to other *ṣūbās* of the Deccan because war with the Marathas became the main concern for the Mughal administration. Therefore, no real effort, like that of Golconda, was made for assimilating the Hyderabad Karnatak to the *zabt* or standard administration; instead the *faujdar* thereat and his *qila'dārs* and *thānadārs* scattered throughout the region merely endeavoured to hold on in difficult times. That is why that during intervals between Maratha depredations, these isolated officials collected whatever revenues could be gathered, but did little else, due to unfavourable circumstances.

Aurangzeb had established a semblance of a provincial administration by placing the establishment of Karnatak under 'Ali Mardān Khān, who, from 1690 to 1692, acted as both

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<sup>1</sup> *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, fol. 116[a]; Manucci, *Storia do Mogor III*, 271, 2; *History of Aurangzeb*, V, pp. 95-6.

<sup>2</sup> T. Rama Row, *Biographical Sketches of the Rajas of Venkatagiri*, Madras, 1875, pp. 44-7.

<sup>3</sup> J.F. Richards, op. cit., pp. 249-50.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 250.

*faujdār* and *dīwān*. The Karnatak *faujdār* succeeded in establishing and maintaining his authority because he was even able to assert his right to complete control over all revenue agents in the Karnatak including salaried agents of the *dīwān* and those serving under Babu Pandit, head *qānūngo* of *ṣūba* Hyderabad, because Aurangzeb ordered that they report to ‘Ali Mardān Khān, not to his adversary Zulfiqār Khān. Even he did not show his willingness to accept Rs. 13,70,000 of all the *maḥals* of *sihbandī* which was granted to former *faujdārs* of Karnatak due to which it was resumed to *pāibāqī*, instead he insisted that after assigning the *maḥal* recommended by Zulfiqār Khān, the balance of pay claim paid from the [imperial]Khālīṣa and got it sanctioned as well and that too in *hūn* amounting to 7,70,000 *hūns* [Rs. 25,02,500] without getting deducted the difference in exchange rate<sup>1</sup>.

Due to capture of ‘Ali Mardān Khān by the Marathas from 1692 to 1694 the entire Karnatak came purely under military administration as Aurangzeb gave full administrative powers to Zulfiqār Khān, who suffered severe setbacks and the region was so steadily battered by the Mughal-Maratha movements that a contemporary participants of these campaigns observed that “under previous regimes [i.e. Golconda and Bijapur], the Karnatak had been extensively cultivated, now a many places had been converted into wastes due to the passage of armies who oppressed the people”<sup>2</sup>.

Consequent upon the final capitulation of Jinji in 1698 the position had changed considerably because of the appointment of Dāūd Khān Pannī, as deputy *faujdār* of Hyderabad Karnatak and subsequently of the seven *sarkārs* of recently conquered Bijapur Karnatak. Dāūd Khān Panni streamlined the administration of the Karnatak. But he had to concede to Maratha extortions which, however, could not ultimately restore order to the confused administration of the region as per the expectations of the central imperial administration.

But the immediate problem in 1690s was the financing of a large, locally raised, military force in the Karnatak Hyderabad and the Karnatak *dīwān* had to finance over a dozen big fortresses seized from the Quṭb Shāh. Furthermore, the *dīwān* was also bound to find funds so as

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 34/ 4-20 to I/ 34/ 4-28 containing complete details of ‘Ali Mardān Khān’s assignments etc

<sup>2</sup> *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, fol. 114[a].

to make payments to 37,000 *sihbandīs*. Finally the central treasury assumed complete responsibility for pay and supplies of the fortresses from the *Khāliṣa parganas* of the Karnatak including payment of the 37,000 *sihbandīs* under the command of ‘Ali Mardān Khān<sup>1</sup>. Almost the entire formal revenues amounting to Rs. 82,00,223 of Karnatak went to internal administration and military defense and the Emperor could draw profit, if any, only from the production of the diamond mines in the Karnatak because Aurangzeb used whatever revenues could be extracted from the Karnatak to finance 8 years long struggle against the Marathas at Jinji. Upon the capture of Jinji by the Mughals in 1698 they assumed control of the additional seven districts designated as the Bijapur Karnatak yielding Rs. 65,00,000. However, Aurangzeb’s military engagements and the tremendously deteriorating condition in the Deccan precluded any concerted endeavour at administrative consolidation. In the last decade of his reign Aurangzeb was content to have a military occupation of the Karnatak, to such an extent that even the entire income was expended in meeting out the pay claims of the *sihbandīs* and the contingents of the forts. In order to reduce expenditure of the Hyderabad Karnatak in 1703 an excellent *faujdār* was recommended by removing numerous *thānadārs* and *faujdārs* because one fort commandant was sufficient in each fort and Rs. 15,00,000 of *sihbandi* paid to him and the contingent of each fort was to remain in the *morchal* [the watch at the door of a fortress] of every fortress paying way for saving Rs. 30,00,000 to be included in the *khāliṣa*. Aurangzeb approved saving but declined appointment of a new *faujdār* or any deputy of Nuṣrat Jung as it would become counter-productive while appreciating savings in *sihbandi* the same was ordered to be handed over to Dāūd Khān. Since even half of the revenues were not accruing to the government which position could be averted by removing *thānadārs* and assigning *pāibāqī* in the salary of *sihbandi* transferring some excellent *maḥals* in entirety to *Khāliṣa* in lieu of savings in *sihbandi* so as to achieve visible economy [in government expenditure]. The implementation of this scheme was possible in consultation with Khān Nuṣrat Jung which was also corroborated by the said Khān’s letter. When the Emperor’s orders were solicited for submitting a self-contained note either in response to his letter for His Majesty’s perusal, then Aurangzeb replied that ‘since it was the work of the *dīwān* let it be submitted to Asad Khān<sup>2</sup>’.

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 34/ 4-20 to I/ 34/ 4-28.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/ 45/ 5-86.

The savings, affected in this way were utilized for defraying the salaries of the troops engaged in wasteful sieges of Maratha fortresses in the western Deccan due to Aurangzeb's policy of *qilāgīrī*[conquering the forts] versus *mulkgīrī* [conquering the country]. By 1703 the economic profile of the entire Deccan was as tabulated hereunder<sup>1</sup>:

TABLE - 1

S.No.	Classification of Revenue	Annual Receipts in Rupees and Annas	Percent of Total
1.	<i>Khāliṣa</i>	2,03,893.1	1.30%
2.	<i>Jāgīrs</i> [Assigned to other <i>manṣabdārs</i> ]	35,06,959.3½	22.30%
3.	<i>Jāgīrs</i> [Assigned to Fort Commanders and others i.e. troops]	11,21,037.11	7.13%
4.	<i>Sih-bandī</i> [under Nuṣrat Jang <i>Qiladārs</i> and <i>Thānadārs</i> in Karnatak]	70,30,641.4	44.71%
5.	<i>Maḥal-i</i> Kaveripattan etc under the control of the <i>Zamīndārs</i>	13,72,402.8	8.73%
6.	<i>Pāibāqī</i> [including under control of Pāligārs, <i>peshkash</i> at Rs. 3,79,530 rupees]	7,09,542.5	4.51%
7.	<i>Pāibāqī</i> [including under control of Pāligars, <i>peshkash</i> at 8,30,650 rupees]	17,79,966.13½	11.32%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,57,24,443</b>	100%

The above table demonstrates some financial advantages to the Mughal administration as a sequel of the Maratha capitulation. The central revenue administration attempted to alleviate the *jāgīr* crisis by allocating lands worth 3.5 million rupees to *manṣabdārs* who were not holding official positions in the *ṣūba*. We also find similar details about the economic position of the entire Karnatak in 1706 where the value of the *Khāliṣa* lands jumped fivefold to nearly one million rupees per annum as compared to 1703 position. Tribute from Pāligārs added over .7 million rupees as compared to 1.2 million rupees of 1703 under this head. As far as allocation under *sih-bandis* is concerned it declined to 5.25 million rupees in 1706 in comparison to over 7 million rupees, which suggests that some improvements were made in this respect in the light of the above mentioned suggestions<sup>2</sup>. But the central question which remains to be answered as yet relates is the extent to which the actual collections approached above figures. It may be presumed that Dāūd Khān's vigorous efforts brought the collections reasonably close to the actual demand and agricultural position also began to improve considerably. The Mughal occupation of the Karnatak failed to achieve administrative unity and consolidation and even it could not be brought under the *zabt* system; instead the Mughals used whatever administrative

<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 45/ 5-85.

<sup>2</sup>SDAR, pp. 233-5.

machinery was left by the Quṭb Shāhs due to wars with Marathas. Notwithstanding the administrative failure the Mughal officers defended this enormous region against the determined internal and external opposition. It is equally important from administrative and political point of view that the Mughals eventually expelled the Marathas completely out of the Bijapur Karnatak below Madras.

The administrative problems in newly conquered areas had its various manifestations because the Mughal control failed to carry with it increased political and administrative consolidation. For example extension of the imperial boundaries led to a perceptible decline in Mughal state power as exercised from Hyderabad, whereas the Telgu warriors, who in previous regime, served as troop commanders [*sardārs*] and local administrative intermediaries emerged self-sufficient *rajas* especially in Godavari region of costal Andhra or the district of SriKakulam [Persian: Sikakul], Rajamundry, and Elluru as a result of Mughal conquest of the area. We find the Quṭb Shāh could not introduce the system of *parganas* systematically. The more productive narrow costal plans were subject to direct military control of Mughal imperial administrators. Furthermore, both Rajamundry and Elluru districts had more systematic administrative arrangement where *deshmukhs* of Razu caste helped in tax-collection because they were also collaborators and intermediaries under the Mughals as the imperial administration at Hyderabad negotiated terms with these intermediaries and auxiliaries comprising *deshmukhs*, *muniwārs* and *sardārs*.

In order to avoid further administrative problems, Aurangzeb left untouched the administrative arrangements and old personnel in more remote parts of the newly conquered *ṣūbās* including Godavari region side by side attempting to establish, a formal administrative structure in uniformity with other Mughal provinces.

True to his reputation, Aurangzeb diplomatically continued the old officials temporarily, because Saiyid ‘Abdullāh *sar-i lashkar* of Quṭb Shāh served under the administrative control of ‘Ali Mardān Khān, Governor of Rajamundry and later *faujdār* of Hyderabad Karnatak and helped the imperial administration till his death in post 1694. Thereafter Muṣṭafā Quli Khān was appointed *faujdār* of SriKakulam, Elluru, Kondapalli and Kondavidu districts and the parts of

Machhliptnam and Nizāmpattan. By doubling his administrative responsibilities Aurangzeb did not increase the *faujdār*'s military and administrative establishments<sup>1</sup>.

During his tenure of administration he strived hard to collect maximum revenues most ruthlessly even from his Razu and Valama *sardārs*, putting into disarray the equilibrium of political and administrative system.

Even his rapacious avarice disgusted Sitarama Pasupati, a Razu *sardār*[commander] who for the first few years of Mughal administration remained a faithful auxiliary. Such administrative problems were further accentuated by the continuous expropriation of the Telgu chief culminating into the rebellion of Sitarama Pasupati in September 1694 and the *faujdār*'s efforts at pacification and settlement miserably failed. The prevailing draught and partial failure encouraged dissidence by smaller chiefs as well. In 1695 the rebels dictated terms to the *faujdār*, who delegated all administrative authority to his nephew accordingly.

Taking advantage of this humiliating agreement Jan Sipār Khān, sought his son's appointment as *faujdār* to restore Mughal prestige which was lost due to his total disregard for the proper conduct of administration. However, Aurangzeb directed each *faujdār* in Hyderabad to send the reinforcements to Muṣṭafā Quli Khān<sup>2</sup>, which saved the situation. But during temporary halt in 1696 the *faujdār* was unable to give any meaningful consolidation to his area of control, instead in 1697 the rebellion was again broke out making rebel coalition overwhelmingly victorious leading to the defeat of imperialists and the death of Muṣṭafā Quli Khān. Jān Sipār Khān's desire was temporarily fulfilled due to the appointment of his son as *faujdār*, which he had to vacate subsequently in favour of Faqīrullāh Khān, son of the deceased *faujdār*. but he also lost the coveted post which was assigned to Mehdi Khān Bek, who in 1700 faced rebellion of nearly all Razu *sardārs*, again paying why for the succession of Faqīrullāh Khān as *faujdār* of SriKakulam in 1702. But the failure of local administration was detrimental to the Mughal interests. The lack luster of Mughal administration of costal Andhra gave much autonomy to this region as state within state began to emerge there.

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<sup>1</sup>Cf., J.F. Richards, 'Mughal Retreat from Costal Andhra', *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1978, p. 54.

<sup>2</sup> Akhbārūt, Sitamau transcript, 39 [6 Zilhijja], p. 45.

Riza Khān, former Mughal officer turned bandit chief and Pidiyah Nayak, started their attacks on Andhra coast, in 1703. Rustam Dil Khān, started tax collection with utmost brutality in this region, that was harmful to the Mughal administration which provided a Mughal retreat from direct administration over SriKakulam, Rajamundry and Elluru districts and thereby making Mughal officials in effectual figureheads, which gradually diminished Mughal administrative and political control there.

Since the Mughal administration encountered troubles in conquering Bijapur due to the buffer kingdom of Pam Nayak, the Bedar ruler, strategically located between Bijapur and Golconda as Sakar, the heavily fortified capital, was his seat of administration, where from he sent all available contingents and provisions during the siege of Bijapur and subsequently of Golconda. Aurangzeb reattributed him by occupying Sakar through negotiations and renaming it Nuṣratabad and Pam Nayak and his family etc were brought to Aurangzeb, who granted him the *manṣab* of 5,000/ 4,000<sup>1</sup>. His sons Jagna<sup>2</sup> and Nand<sup>3</sup> became *amirs* like members of Pam Nayak's entourage *viz.*, Pidiya Nayak<sup>4</sup>, all of whom are designated as Deccani *zamīndārs* in our sources. Aurangzeb utilized their services<sup>5</sup> side by side completing Mughal conquest of Bedar territories by also ceding Raichūr controlled by another Bedar chief. But the Bedars still continued raising problems for the local administration especially by Pidiya Nayak, [a Mughal *manṣabdār*] nephew and adopted son of Pām Nāyak. He slipped from the Mughal camp on the pretext of getting new recruits and fresh supplies and equipments and silently moved to Wakinkira with his family and followers where he fortified the town, emplaced the guns and collected more troops. Therefore he created administrative problems by collecting the taxes from villages near Wakinkira and blocking the major roads. Furthermore the Bedar troops detained and plundered all caravans passing through the region, and raising his strength to 14-15,000 Bedar archers and musketeers and 4-5,000 cavalry. Pidiya Nayak delayed serious Mughal attention from 1688 to

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<sup>1</sup>*Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, f. 95[b], I.A. Arshi [ed.] *Tārīkh-i Muḥammadi*, 1099 AH.

<sup>2</sup> Jagna Nayak held the rank of 5,000 / 5,000, *SDAR*, p. 205, Manuir, f. 205[b].

<sup>3</sup> Nand Nayak held the *manṣab* of 1,500 / 700, *SDAR*, p. 205.

<sup>4</sup> Paraya Nayak or Pidiya Nayak was granted the *manṣab* of 5,000/ 5,000.

<sup>5</sup>*Muntaḥhabul Lubāb*, II, p. 370. *Cf.*, *History of Aurangzeb*, V, pp. 214-5.

1691 notwithstanding the fact that the revenue realization in Nuṣratabad [Sakar] came to a standstill in 1691 due to the commotion of Bedars<sup>1</sup>.

Pidiya Nayak, the leader of the Bedars claimed a legitimate right to rule, which predated the Mughal invasion of Pam Nayak's Kingdom. Aurangzeb was right in ignoring his claim by recognizing Jugna Nayak holding *manṣab* of 2,500/ 1,500 one of Pam Nayak's natural sons as "legitimate heir to that country<sup>2</sup>". He also became *deshmukh*<sup>3</sup> of Nuṣratabad *sarkār*.

The Mughal expedition against Wakinkira in 1691 proved abortive as Pidiya Nayak paid 9,00,000 rupees for undisturbed possession of Wakinkira; however till 1696 his raids into the newly conquered Mughal territories grew more and more damaging to the east in *ṣūba* Hyderabad and to the west of Gulbarga *sarkār* of Bijapur to the extent that Aurangzeb himself took notice of that the men of Pidiya Nayak were realizing revenues of *parganas* near Bijpur and ordered Khwāṣ Khān to enquire from Rudra and report to him<sup>4</sup>.

It appears that temporary reconciliation between Pidiya Nayak and the Mughal administration took place because we are informed that in 1698-99 he had made a representation for grant of *jāgīr*, which automatically entailed *manṣab*. However, due to some unforeseen eventuality he could not visit the Emperor thereby depriving himself of any *jāgīr* assignment<sup>5</sup>.

In 1700 Khān Firuz Jung pleaded *sardeshmukhī* etc of *pargana*. Kankūrtī Koki and Talikola etc *maḥal* of *ṣūba* Bijapur and the *rusūm* [pequists], *in'ām* lands and villages of Nuṣratabad [Sakar] etc for Pidiya Naik, which was acceded to by the Emperor, who remarked that "whatever Pam Nayak enjoyed during the reign of Sulṭān Muḥammad 'Adil Khān as per the authentic *sanad* was approved and a portion from 'Ali 'Ādil Khān's government would also be

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 33/ 7-46, I/ 34/ 3-9.

<sup>2</sup> Khafī Khān, II, pp. 526-528.

<sup>3</sup> Jugna *deshmukh* received enhancement in rank. *Mā'asir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 305.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/ 38/ 2-10; I/ 38/ 3-10.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 10 - 84.

granted he should demand the *sanads* and inspect”. Firuz Jung tried to obtain *sanads* but failed to procure them, which perhaps closed this chapter forever<sup>1</sup>.

Firuz Jung, who also organized an expedition to eliminate the troublesome Bedar leader who dissuaded from doing so through his diplomatic maneuvering and promise to pay 9,00,000 rupees, which was never fulfilled as Aurangzeb himself personally led last campaign against Wakinkira. But the Mughal administration failed to contain his scope of activities west into Bijapur and east deep into Hyderabad province. The Bedars used to plunder newly annexed provinces with utmost impunity either independently or in association with Maratha bands, which was difficult to stop.

To suggest that Aurangzeb failed to assimilate the most capable and important Bedar leader into the imperial administration, as tributary chief, *deshmukh* or *manṣabdār*<sup>2</sup> is half truth because the Emperor made a sincere effort not only to grant him *jāgīr* but also to offer *sardeshmukhī* of his former Kingdom. Actually it was the failure on the part of Pidiyah Nayak himself to report to the Emperor and to produce proper documentation in favour of his claim for *sardeshmukhī*.

Such elements always created administrative problems of unmanageable magnitude in the newly conquered territories in 1680s and 1690s when marauding rebellious *zamīndārs* and the local chieftains, Bedars, Gonds and Telgu warriors raided deep into the imperial provinces, which also caused precipitous decline in revenue collections. One such extremely notorious bandit of Hyderabad was Pap Rai, who in late 1690s indulged in organized highway robbery in one of the interior districts of Hyderabad<sup>3</sup>. When the local *faujdārs* and *zamīndārs* threatened him he became a military retainer of Venkat Rao, the Telgu *zamīndār* of Kaulas wherefrom he drank up the blood of his new master by extorting money from his subjects, which posed an explicit challenge to the imperial authority.

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 43/ 1-51.

<sup>2</sup> J.F. Richard, ‘The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan, *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXV, [Feb], 1976, p. 248.

<sup>3</sup> J.F. Richards and Velcheru Narayana Rao, ‘Banditry in Mughal India: Historical and Folklore Perceptions, *IESHR*, XVII, 1980.

Incomplete political and administrative consolidation in Bijapur and Golconda after 1686-87 and Aurangzeb's purpose behind his fiscal policies in Bijapur and Hyderabad for further aggressive expansion and his general approach in these newly annexed provinces resulted into under administration and over-exploitation which created serious administrative problems of far reaching consequences. Such a situation further confounded the confusion in tackling the administrative problems to an unprecedented degree by dispassionate administration of the empire which was, however, not completely free from ignoble desire for aggrandizement and plunder.

It can be summed up in nutshell that for mitigating administrative problems Aurangzeb made Hyderabad proper as the object of sustained administrative reorganization during the years 1687-1700 while endeavours at a similar administrative consolidation in the Hyderabad Karnatak were frustrated by the 1689 rebellion of the Telugu *nāyaks* and the sudden flight of Raja Rām, the Maratha king to Jinji in 1690, which compelled Aurangzeb to devote to a prolonged war with the Marathas. These protracted, arduous and bitter campaigns gave respite to other mischief mongers to foment troubles as they turned to predatory raids in the newly annexed territories to give vent to their pent up feelings for the fulfillment of their ambitions, thereby offsetting Mughal designs of forceful expansion and administrative assimilation.

### **III. ASSIGNMENTS IN THE NEWLY CONQUERED AREAS**

The conquest of Bijapur, Golconda and the Maratha Kingdom from 1686 to 1689 led to the specific policy decision in respect of the assignments in the newly conquered areas. Initially assignments in extremely rare cases were made from Bijapur and Golconda. However, theoretically speaking, the annexation of these two former kingdoms could have generated additional revenue resources sufficient to offset the influx of Deccani nobles coming from Bijapur, Golconda and the Maratha kingdom. It may also be argued that if Aurangzeb had successfully secured and stabilized his new southern frontiers, he could well have utilized the resources of Bijapur and Golconda to meet his additional costs as well. It may be opined that the most obvious choice would have been for Aurangzeb to assign all the productive lands in the

newly conquered provinces to meet the increased annual demand for the *jāgīrs*<sup>1</sup> because a contemporary revenue manual stated that land tax collection should have enhanced annual imperial revenue by 23% or 53 million rupees over the previous empire wide collections of 252 million rupees<sup>2</sup>.

These new provinces and their resources could have been used to provide *jāgīr*[salary assignment] to any *manṣabdārs*, new or old, who required them. But Aurangzeb, as a deliberate policy decision; instead retained the bulk of revenues from the greater part of most productive and fertile lands in Hyderabad and Golconda to meet strategic objectives in the south. Instead in the often complex pattern of revenue payment detailed in the *āwārja* or balance documents, we find detailed *pargana* wise *āwārjas*<sup>3</sup> of numerous *sarkārs* of the *ṣūbās* of Aurangabad, Khandesh, Berar and Bedar, which furnish statistical information about the assignment of *jāgīrs* to a number of officials, serving in Hyderabad or Bijapur, whose *jāgīrs* were assigned in the above said four provinces. Furthermore, countless officials, holding *jāgīr* assignments in old Deccan provinces have been shown posted with the armies of the high nobles, serving in the newly conquered former kingdoms of Golconda and Bijapur. Except for a few *āwārjas* from Hyderabad and Bijapur, the rest relates to four old Deccani *ṣūbās*, which again confirms Aurangzeb's policy of placing the choicest areas as *Khālīṣa* and *Pāibāqī* in the newly conquered provinces as is especially evident from the tabular information furnished about Hyderabad<sup>4</sup>:

TABLE – 2

S.No.	% of Classification of Land	Revenues Collected in Rupees
1.	44% <i>Khālīṣa</i>	Rs. 67,00,000 Annual Collections
2.	56% <i>Pāibāqī</i>	Rs. 88,00,000 Annual Collections
3.	100% Total	Rs. 1,55,00,000 Annual Collections

Contrary to above we do not come across references in a few *āwārja* papers of Hyderabad and Bijapur showing a reciprocal tendency of corresponding assignments from these

<sup>1</sup>Cf., J.F. Richards: 'The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan', *loc cit*, pp. 238-9.

<sup>2</sup>*Zawābit-i 'Ālamgīrī*, as cited in I. Habib, *Agrarian System*, p. 409.

<sup>3</sup> These lists individual *jāgīr* assignments within each *pargana* for a particular point in time as we find several *āwārjas* of different years of a single *pargana* as well. These documents were usually drawn up in order to ascertain the available revenues open for reassignment to *manṣabdārs*. Cf., J.F. Richards, 'Official Revenues and Money Flows in a Mughal Province', *Loc. cit.* p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/ 32/ 0-95 to I/ 32/ 0-128.

two newly annexed provinces serving in older Deccani *ṣūbās*. The following table clearly depicts this phenomenon in late 17<sup>th</sup> century:

TABLE - 3

S.No.	Name of <i>manṣabdār/ jāgīrdār</i>	Place of Posting	<i>Jama'dāmi</i> in <i>Dāms</i>	<i>Hāṣil</i> in Rupees	Place of Assignment	Reference
1.	Peet Singh s/o Jagat Singh	<i>qila'dār</i> of Karnatak	3,18,500	3234	<i>sarkār</i> Sangamner <i>ṣūba</i> Aurangabad	IJC I/41/4-17
2.	Mehdī Quli s/o Hāji Muḥammad	<i>Amīn-iPāibāqī</i> of Nuṣratābad, Bijapur	1,99,000	1660	<i>sarkār</i> Sangamner <i>ṣūba</i> Aurangabad	IJC I/41/4-17
3.	<u>Kh</u> wāja Suhail s/o Mīr 'Abdul Jabbar	<i>Dārogha-i</i> Jawahiri Bazar, Bijapur	80,000	833/6	<i>sarkār</i> Daulatabad	I/46/12-46
4.	Mīr Muḥammad Qāsīm s/o Mīr 'Abdul Mu'ālī	Buyūtāt-i Hyderabad	26,25,000	3263	<i>pargana</i> Kanher <i>sarkār</i> Daulatabad [Aurangabad]	I/45/1-160
5.	Saiyid Nuṣrat s/o Saiyid Koka 'Ali 'Ādil <u>Kh</u> hān	Posted at Bijapur	6,50,755	4203	<i>sarkār</i> Aḥmadanagar <i>ṣūba</i> Aurangabad	I/45/5-4
6.	<u>Gh</u> ulām 'Ali <u>Kh</u> hān	Posted at Karnatak-i Hyderabad	4,49,370	4069/7	<i>sarkār</i> Aḥmadanagar <i>ṣūba</i> Aurangabad	I/0/0-645
7.	Dāūd <u>Kh</u> hān deputy of <u>Kh</u> hān Nuṣrat Jung	<i>Faujdar</i> of Bālā & Pāīnghāt Karnatak-i Hyderabad	2,00,21,479	2,29,297	<i>pargana&amp;sarkār</i> Bir, Aurangabad	I/45/82-21
8.	Muḥammad Ja'far s/o Iftikhār <u>Kh</u> hān	<i>Bakhshi &amp; Waqianigār</i> of Hyderabad	11,89,688	14,866	<i>pargana&amp;sarkār</i> Bir, Aurangabad	I/45/8-50
9.	Hāji Jamāl s/o Iran	Posted at Hyderabad	1,54,000	1,954	<i>sarkār</i> Pathri <i>ṣūba</i> Berar	I/44/10-124
10.	Ya'qub Beg s/o Chirāgh Beg	Posted at Bijapur	75,000	948	Partapur, Kalyan <i>ṣūba</i> Berar	I/0/0-540
11.	Muḥammad Murād s/o Jamāl	Posted at Bijapur	65,500	916	Partapur, Kalyan <i>ṣūba</i> Berar	I/0/0-540
12.	Amānullāh Beg s/o Muḥammad Beg <u>Kh</u> hān	<i>qila'dār</i> of Elgundal	2,10,000	2,496	Partapur, Kalyan <i>ṣūba</i> Berar	I/46/7-16, I/0/0-764
13.	Gopal Chand s/o Bindraban	<i>Mushrif</i> of stores of the forts of Hyderabad	1,06,000	1,202	<i>pargana</i> Parangaon <i>sarkār&amp;ṣūba</i> Khandesh	I/0/0-2008
14.	Muḥammad Sai'd s/o Muḥammad 'Ali	<i>Dīwān</i> of Karnatak	1,15,000	903	<i>pargana</i> 'Ādilābād <i>sarkār&amp;ṣūba</i>	I/0/0-2008

15.	Saiyid Tājuddīn s/o Fathūddīn	Posted at <i>Chabūra-i Kotwāli</i> , Khandesh	1,25,000	837	Khandesh <i>pargana</i> 'Ādilābād <i>sarkār&amp;ṣūba</i> Khandesh	I/0/0-2008
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The above table which does not aim at cataloguing the exhausted data is illustrative of the fact that assignments were made from older *ṣūbās* for those officials posted in the two erstwhile kingdoms. However, we do not come across details of *jāgīr* assignments from Bijapur and Golconda during the early phase of their annexation. Even the *pāibāqī* lands especially in Hyderabad remained as it is without re-assignment for extended periods of time.

But there were certain exceptions to this rule. It was reported that *pargana* Medak included in *Khālīṣa* in *ṣūba* Hyderabad having *jama* 'dāmi of 1,28,51,000 yielded Rs. 3,10,365 was partially assigned in *jāgīr* in 1698 notwithstanding the fact that the *maḥal* of *Khālīṣa* could not be assigned in *jāgīr* without the imperial order on the plea that it could be assigned in need<sup>1</sup>.

Interestingly enough the revenue figures of the 20 *sarkārs* of *ṣūba* Hyderabad support the assertion of practical exclusion of *ṣūba* Hyderabad from *jāgīr* assignments. It is related that within two years after the annexation of Hyderabad i.e. in 1689, the chief fiscal officer of the province designated as *dīwān*, had in fact completed a reassessment of the provincial revenues. In his revised revenue assessment he imposed as selective enhancement by *pargana* of 13% which raised the Mughal demand to 15.5 million rupees per year. During the course of this revenue settlement, the *Dīwān* under direct imperial instructions classified each *pargana* as either *Khālīṣa* or as *pāibāqī* lands<sup>2</sup>, suitable for *jāgīr* assignments, which, however remained under imperial control without reassignment for longer periods of time.

We are aware of the fact that Aurangzeb set aside nearly half of Hyderabad revenues for the central treasury in 1689. But Rs. 88,00,000 in *pāibāqī* lands also remained unallocated out of which only Rs. 20,00,000 were selected by *Dīwān* of the Deccan to meet the needs of the

<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 8-38.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/ 32/ 0-95 to I/ 32/ 0-128.

provincial governor, the *dīwān, faujdār* and fort commanders and their garrison and for the ongoing expenses of Hyderabad. Similar arrangements, of course, took effect in Bijapur.

Notwithstanding these deductions, areas having revenues of six million rupees annually should have been open for general assignment in 1689 while another unknown amount would also have been available in Bijapur. In view of the tremendous clamour for *jāgīrs* these lands would have been expeditiously allocated to the *manṣabdars*. In contrast, Aurangzeb imposed significant restrictions on the assignment of these tracks<sup>1</sup>. Even in 1702 Aurangzeb himself conceded that, “presently there is approximately eight million rupees of *pāibāqī* under the administration of the *Dīwān* in Bijapur and Hyderabad excluding the Karnatak little of which has proved beneficial to the state”.

Before proceeding further one should be tempted to know the real state of assignments of *jāgīrs* vis-a-vis the *Khālīṣa* in the newly annexed provinces. Wizārat *Khān*’s detailed report<sup>2</sup> of 1699 brings to light the hopeless state of *Khālīṣa* in Bijapur:

“The expenses of pay claim [*ṭalab*] and salary of the garrison of the forts, *manṣabdars*, *aḥdis* [gentlemen trooper] and *barqandāz* posted in Darūzzafar [i.e. Bijapur] and the procurement of the provisions of the forts etc stipulated expenses, use of *bān* and *barut* [gun-powder] and the equipments of artillery etc which are required for the forts and the army and the repairs of the forts the entire revenues of the *khālīṣa* do not suffice and the claimants always complain, and sometimes, the arrangement of the *kārkhāna* is kept suspended. If *pargana* Okhli etc 12 *parganas* are reverted to the *khālīṣa* than the maintenance of prospective increase in revenue and supply of [provisions of] *kārkhānas* is possible, otherwise expenses of this province is difficult<sup>3</sup>”.

Such an alarming situation had already alerted the Emperor, whose cryptical remarks on the income and expenditure of this *ṣūba* previously submitted by *Kār Ṭalab Khān* during his tenure of *dīwāni* show the imperial contention for improving the economy of the *ṣūba*: “The

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., Richards, *Mughal Administration*, pp. 105-107; IJC, I/ 46/ 12-167, I/ 46/ 12-178.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 10-19 to I/ 41/ 10-59.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 10-49.

income and expenditure should be equal and every possible effort should be made that *khāliṣa* and *peshkash* be maintained according to the term of administration of ‘Ali ‘Ādil Khān and expenditure should be minimized<sup>1</sup>”.

The situation on the economic front was found so disturbing that when the income and expenditure of *ṣūba* Bijapur were perused by His Majesty that “Rs. 25,000 were in assignment of Kār Ṭalab Khān as *sih-bandī* [auxilliary troopers] of *pargana* Almala, [the Emperor observed] that *sih-bandī* was excessive, which should be given in the *jāgīr* of the Governor<sup>2</sup>”.

In order to remove anomalies in income and expenditure of *ṣūba* Bijapur, Aurangzeb after his initial reaction observed that: “Much difference is shown [in income and expenditure] from the writing of the Governor and the *Dīwān*, what is wrong if they [i.e. *jāgīrdārs*] are given in lieu of this *maḥal* [i.e. 12 *maḥals* recommended for inclusion into the *Khāliṣa* in Bijapur] except for *aimma*, otherwise since all are posted and united then how the *maḥals* be resumed: Order that, “income and expenditure should be equalled and they [i.e. *jāgīrdārs*] should be given from *pāibāqī* with abatement in lieu thereof<sup>3</sup>”.

However, in a subsequent order the Emperor adopted a different posture that: “As of now any transfer and change cannot be affected; so long as the royal standard is in this vicinity, only whatever is possible can be given. As soon as His Majesty returns, the Almighty God willing, the *sanad* of transfer and change shall be issued<sup>4</sup>”.

Since there were some restrictions on the allotment even *naqdī jāgīrs* in the newly annexed kingdoms it was but natural that Aurangzeb, after one year discontinued *naqdī* to Rustam Dil Khān, Governor of Hyderabad in 1694 for maintaining 4,000 infantry, notwithstanding the Governor’s engagement in warfare incapacitating any one to accept *jāgīr*[except for *naqdī jāgīr*]. Accordingly he was ordered to consider the said infantrymen as

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 40/ 10-49.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/ 40/ 9-13.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 10-49.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/ 42/ 12-51.

disbanded<sup>1</sup>. In contrast, special favour was shown to those officials posted in Bijapur and Hyderabad who were generally immune from payment of *muṭāliba* [state demand] except for *musāi'da* [financial assistance] and *taṣarruf*<sup>2</sup>.

Aurangzeb obviously had no intention of placating the *manṣabdārs* demanding pay at the expense of the imperial treasury because nearly Rs. 70,00,000 in annual revenues from Hyderabad provided a substantial increase to the extent of 26% to the *Khālīṣa* of the entire Mughal empire. Furthermore any land similarly allocated in Bijapur would have raised the figure. Demonstratively such collections from Hyderabad obviously helped easier administration and transmission for military operations in the Deccan than those revenues collected in the Northern provinces.

Similarly an escalation in demand for *jāgīr* assignment in the last decade of the 17<sup>th</sup> century would have reflected in a reduction of the Hyderabad *khālīṣa* while the reverse occurred. Aurangzeb granted no *jāgīr* in *Khālīṣa* territories [barring exceptions], instead, he enlarged Hyderabad *Khālīṣa* considerably in 1695 and 1697 by transferring two *sarkārs* from *pāibāqī* status to *Khālīṣa*, which automatically removed from possible assignment as *jāgīr* lands with potential revenues of 1.7 million rupees.

However, a considerable reduction in the Hyderabad *khālīṣa* lands took place in 1700, when Aurangzeb shifted 24 *parganas* – worth revenues of 1.2 million rupees to his youngest son Prince Muḥammad Kām Bakhsh, who received these *parganas* and some in Bijapur<sup>3</sup> as well in order to enable him to strengthen his power base in the Deccan enabling the Prince to use Bijapur and Hyderabad as a refuge in ensuring war of succession after Aurangzeb's death.

When the Prince showed his inability to collect the revenues worth Rs. 30,000 out of Rs. 1,33,420 the Emperor immediately retorted that “When the Governor and Prince do not realize

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 36/ 1-4.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/ 36/ 4-1, I/ 36/ 4-2.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/ 44/ 5-56.

the revenue than what others shall procure and administer”. The Emperor further observed that “Loss [in revenue] is due to poor revenue administration<sup>1</sup>”.

Aurangzeb, true to his reputation of gathering sources of funds to meet the wage bills for his field armies operating in the Deccan against the Marathas set aside the choicest areas as *Khāliṣa*; viz., he ordered for resumption of full revenue yielding *peinths* of Hyderabad belonging to *jāgīrdārs*<sup>2</sup>, in 1696. Even the *jāgīrdārs*, interfering with the *bāghāt*[irrigated lands] of Hyderabad, suffered the resumption of their *jāgīrs* into the *khāliṣa*<sup>3</sup>. Similarly majority of the *faujdar*s and *thānadār*s who seized the revenues without getting the verification faced the resumption of their *jāgīrs* by the *Dīwān* in collaboration with the Governor<sup>4</sup> in 1704.

Due to the perpetual increase in *khāliṣa sarkār* Elluru was included in the *khāliṣa* in 1700, the *jāgīrdārs* from their lucrative assignments, who had to remain content with scattered *pāibāqī*<sup>5</sup> because the Emperor observed that “There is plenty of *pāibāqī* in Karnatak, whether Karnatak-i Bijapur or Karnatak-i Hyderabad. Assignment can even be made from the *pāibāqī* of Golconda<sup>6</sup>”. Contrary to the above the imperial injunction disallowed assignment to anyone from the *khāliṣa*<sup>7</sup> while transfer of *jāgīr* was naturally tantamount to dismissal from service<sup>8</sup>. A *pargana* in As‘adnagar [Akluj] *ṣūba* Bijapur held by the Maratha *jāgīrdārs* alleged to have yielded 12 monthly income was recommended for inclusion in the *khāliṣa*<sup>9</sup>.

Such recommendations generally flowed from the pen of the revenue officials, viz., some *parganas* of *sarkār* Medak, *ṣūba* Hyderabad, which were destined to be full revenue – paying became the part of *Khāliṣa*, in lieu *jāgīrs* were recommended from the *pāibāqī*<sup>10</sup> on the strength

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 45/ 7-41.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/ 38/ 6-5.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/38/9-10.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/ 46/ 12-180.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/ 42/ 6-120.

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/ 42/ 6-30.

<sup>7</sup> IJC, I/ 39/ 11-70.

<sup>8</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 6-122.

<sup>9</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 8-122.

<sup>10</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 1-102; IJC, I/ 41/ 8-209.

of such representations that “sufficient *pāibāqī* was lying unassigned in *ṣūba* Bijapur; neither it was assigned nor it was useful for the state, while the Deccani pay claimants were becoming numerous, unruly and useless<sup>1</sup>”.

Surprisingly *jāgīrs* could be assigned from low yielding *khāliṣa*<sup>2</sup> of Hyderabad and Bijapur. When Sher Khān Jamand, *faujdar* of Gadag represented that *pargana* of his newly assigned *jāgīrs* across the Kishna [river] was for his advanced *taqāvi*[agricultural loan] to the peasants and he made it populated which was recently included in *khāliṣa*, in lieu of which he was offered *jāgīr* from Gadag which was desolate as it was infested with the Marathas. Consequently he was assigned from *pāibāqī* to mitigate his problem, notwithstanding clear order for non-transfer of *jāgīrs* of serving officials<sup>3</sup>.

In view of the paucity of funds the imperial *Dīwāns* clearly stated that there was ban on the *naqdī*[*jāgīr*]<sup>4</sup> which, however, was not unchangeable because when in lieu of the salary of 2,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry the ground realities were not in consonance with Khān Firoz Jung, cash [*naqdī*] was ordered that it was got commuted into *jāgīr*, which was a temporary imperial dispensation<sup>5</sup>.

Ostensibly Aurangzeb formulated the rule that whether from Bijapur Karnatak or [Hyderabad Karnatak] ... *Khāliṣa* and the salary of the *jāgīrdārs* was to be fixed according to rules and regulations<sup>6</sup>. However, the above formulations were evolved because when Mīr ‘Abdullāh etc one thousand *sawārs* were granted *manṣab* ranging from 20 to 250 and they were sanctioned pay claim from the *pāibāqī* of *pargana* Bhaknur etcta ‘*alluqa* Islamgarh, Hyderabad they were conferred the orders for the assignment of the *maḥals* in their salaries on the production of branding certificates subject to verification and memorandum. However, from the very date of grant, no cultivation took place and over two years no cultivation was done in the

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 42/ 1-69.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 10-178, I/ 42/ 12-18.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/ 43/ 1-29; I/ 43/ 1-30; I/ 43/ 1-31.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/ 43/ 1-78.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/ 43/ 5-37.

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/ 45/ 5-86.

*maḥals* of Hyderabad<sup>1</sup>. Such was the state of *jāgīrs* in Hyderabad and Bijapur because in piquant situations even *maḥal-i gḥair ‘amli* [uncultivated *maḥals*] from Bijapur were recommended<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore keeping in view the unfavourable position of income and expenditure of the *maḥal* of Bijapur Karnatak it was ordained that income and expenditure should be equal notwithstanding the temporary arrangement for the cash payment of the garrison and stores<sup>3</sup>.

The problems of *jāgīrs* in newly annexed regions were enormous. Even Diler Khān 7,000 / 7,000 complained against the resumption of his three *jāgīrmaḥals* including *pargana* Rattihalli, *ṣūba* Bijapur, allocated in salary of the contingent, which led to their mutiny<sup>4</sup>. When Chin Qilīch was granted *faudārī* of Bijapur Karnatak following Ma‘mur Khān’s transfer then Aurangzeb remarked about the position of *pāibāqī* meant for the *jāgīr* of new incumbent that “the income of *pāibāqī* is neither useful for the state not for the peasantry, as it is not received. Unlimited *pāibāqī* shall not be available in *maḥal-i gḥair ‘amli* [uncultivated tract]<sup>5</sup>”.

The problems, sometimes, cropped up due to the administrative technicalities *viz.*, the *Dīwān* of Bijapur Karnatak reported about the complaint of the garrison who solicited the *jāgīrs* of *jāgīrdārs* adjacent to the fort. Similarly when 2545 men of Wani s/o Gautam, posted at Nuṣratgarh fort who received in cash and *jāgīr* since the very beginning suffered resumption of *jāgīr* by the *dīwān* of Bijapur Karnatak, the imperial order maintained the *status quo ante*<sup>6</sup> in 1705.

When Sarfrāz Khān’s *jāgīr* affairs were brought to the Emperor’s notice then he observed:

“Although the said Khān has contingent yet, perhaps it does not correspond with his *jāgīr* until the receipt of written communication of the Prince, *Bakhshī* and the

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 46/ 0-101.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/ 44/ 12-51.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/ 44/ 11-112.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/ 45/ 7-65.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/ 45/ 9-38.

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/ 50/ 11-5.

*dārogha-i dāgh-o-taṣḥīṭha* [superintendent of branding and verification] about the availability of the contingent commensurating the *tankhwāh* it [remainder pay-claim] cannot be given from the Old Country. If he want, then it can be granted from Bijapur and Hyderabad, from the uncultivated country<sup>1</sup>”.

The above shatters the myth built up so cautiously by Richards about the extraordinary revenue resources of the new provinces. Even abatement in New Country was purely discretionary as it was refused to Dāūd Khān<sup>2</sup>.

In the event of resumption of *jāgīr* to *khāliṣa*, alternatives were there, either it could be granted from *pāibāqī* or by transferring someone elsewhere. However, a new device was pressed into service, when *pargana* Satara [*ṣūba* Bijapur], *jāgīr* of Muḥammad Akram, which was reverted to *khāliṣa*, was ordered to be delivered in cash, whatever was accruing to Muḥammad Akram, through the *dīwān* in 1704.

Remedial measures were taken for the proper administration of *jāgīrs* especially in the newly conquered territories *viz.*, to remedy the overvalued *jāgīrs* where collections did not come close to the nominal revenue assessment. Aurangzeb granted a standard 1/3<sup>rd</sup> reduction on the nominal valuation of all *jāgīrs* assigned in Hyderabad<sup>3</sup>. It was also ordered that as far as the Deccanis were concerned they were granted 3/4<sup>th</sup> from the *Mulk-i Qadīm*[Old country] and 1/4<sup>th</sup> from the *Mulk-i Jadīd*[Newly conquered country]<sup>4</sup>. In so far as the old Deccanis were concerned they covered the Deccani *manṣabdārs* of Shāhjahān’s reign upto his 31<sup>st</sup> R.Y. [1657 AD]<sup>5</sup>. In regard to the *takhfīf* [reduction] it was clearly stipulated that no abatement was allowed in the event of conforming the *ḥāl-i ḥāṣil* [actual realization] with the month ratio as happened in *pargana* Mangal Badiya [*ṣūba* Bijapur]<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/ 45/ 7-10.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/ 45/ 7-78.

<sup>3</sup> Richards, ‘The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan’, *loc. cit.*, p. 241.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/ 41/ 10-127.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/ 46/ 12-167.

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/ 46/ 5-73. For details of *jāgīr* administration see my paper ‘The Working of the *Jāgīr* System in the Deccan During the Last Years of Aurangzeb’, *Journal of Objective Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2, July 1990, pp. 72-80.

Richard's contention that many *manṣabdārs* refused unproductive *jāgīrs* does not stand scrutiny, instead they endeavoured for *jāgīrs*<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore contrary to above, numerous absentee *manṣabdārs* in Hyderabad and Bijapur suffered due to lack of adequate help from the provincial administration except for influential and powerful nobles who had direct access to their *jāgīrs* while the petty salary claimants lacking sufficient resources to protect their *jāgīrs* suffered accordingly.

The *jāgīr* assignment in the newly conquered areas was not so much beneficial as it appears to be, because the annexation could not mitigate the problems of *jāgīr* assignees, who were normally assigned *jāgīrs* outside their serving *ṣūbās* or less productive ones.

The above does provide a peep into the position of *jāgīr* assignments in the two newly annexed Kingdoms towards the close of 17<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries as shortage of *jāgīrs* in 1690s was not an artificial one.

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<sup>1</sup> Richards, *Mughal Administration*, p. 202, Athar Ali, Review on Richards, *Mughal Administration*, *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXV, February, 1976, p. 162.

## VI PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

### [I] EMPEROR AS VICEROY?

The great biographer of Aurangzeb, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, attributed his ultimate failure to his Deccan adventure; according to Sarkar, the decline of Aurangzeb's administration began when he let himself get bogged down in the Deccan from 1682 to his death in February 1707<sup>1</sup>. Satish Chandra, Irfan Habib and M. Athar Ali have linked the 'crisis in *jāgīrs*' to the stress of military campaigns in the Deccan during the emperor's last years<sup>2</sup>. It is, therefore, all the more surprising that there has been no large scale study yet of the Mughal administration, of the Deccan, except for J.F. Richards' pioneering work, *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, Oxford, 1975. Richards tended, as pioneers often do, to cast doubt on the "Deccan-ulcer" theories of his predecessors, by citing documents from both the A.P. State Archives and the Inayat Jang Collection, which they had sparingly used, if, indeed, at all<sup>3</sup>. Those scholars had essentially relied on the contemporary chronicles, Aurangzeb's own letters and the *Akhbārāt-i- darbār-i- mu'alla*. Their generalizātions thus tended to rest largely on contemporary generalizātions rather than on precise or primary evidence from archival documentation.

What is offered here is a selection of precisely such documents drawn from the Inayat Jang Collection relating to the last ten years of Aurangzeb's reign. This collection was first described at length by A.I. Tirmizi,<sup>4</sup> and there is a brief description by J.F. Richards<sup>5</sup>. These divest me of the obligation to describe again this massive collection of Mughal archives in the Deccan, covering the period 1658-1774 and comprising some 136,000 documents.

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<sup>1</sup> Jadunath Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzeb*, 2nd ed. [revised], Calcutta, 1954, pp. 424 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, Aligarh, 1959, pp. v/vi-x/vii; Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, revised ed., Delhi, 1999, pp. 312, 316; M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, revised ed., Delhi, 1997, pp. xx-xxii, 92-94.

<sup>3</sup> To take one example, Irfan Habib notes that he has not been able to explore the "rich material" in the Inayat Jung Collection [*Agrarian System*], revised ed., pp. 478-9, and his use of A.P. State Archives material is obviously restricted to the published volumes of documents. Of course, much of this material is tangential to his main concerns.

<sup>4</sup> *Studies in Islam*, Delhi, 1[3], 1964, pp. 174-84.

<sup>5</sup> *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, pp. 317-19.

I should rather explain the nature of documents that are here studied. I have picked out a number of such documents as contain Aurangzeb's own personal orders [preceded by words such as *naql-i khatt-i anwar*, 'copy of the luminous hand-written note [of the Emperor]', etc, on the assumption that such a selection would tell us what kinds of matters went up to the Emperor for decision, and what kinds of decisions were thereupon taken. What one gets here, then, are the threads leading to the top of the pyramid and then downwards. It is not the whole story: the peasants are largely out of the picture, though the Inayat Jang Collection has numerous other documents where they are very much 'in'. But the selection nevertheless meets my narrow object of inquiry: What was the nature of the problems Aurangzeb was facing in the Deccan, as viewed by himself and his administration, and how did he and his officials tackle them.

I begin below with no prior assumptions, but simply present the picture as we have it from these documents that number about fifty-five in all. The National Archives numbers which they carry are invariably given, and so too the dates wherever we have them. The archives numbers also include the regnal year of Aurangzeb, which began with 1 Ramazan; the first regnal year was deemed to have begun with Ramazan 1068 [2 June 1658]. All Hijri dates have here been furnished with their Christian-era equivalents.

Some other matters need also to be borne in mind. When the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkunda were annexed in 1686 and 1687, the Deccan had the following provinces: [1] Khandesh; [2] DaulataDād with its capital at Aurangabad; [3] Berar; [4] Bidar; [5] Bijapur; and [6] Haidarabad. The whole of South India excluding Kerala was called Karnatak, and this was divided into two sets of *Sarkārs*, one belonging to the *ṣūba* of Bijapur, the '*Karnatak-i Bijapuri*', and the other to Haidarabad, the '*Karnatak-i Haidarabadi*'. Before 1682, there used to be a *Nāzim* or Governor in each province, but the *Nāzim* of the *ṣūba* of Daulatabad, with headquarters at Aurangabad used to exercise some amount of control over them, and is, therefore, aptly called Viceroy of the Deccan in modern texts. When Aurangzeb himself arrived in the Deccan, it ceased to be a viceroyalty and Aurangzeb himself supervised the individual *Nāzims*.

The Deccan territories were also divided into two categories. The 'Old Territory' [*mulk-i-*

*qadīm*], which had come into Mughal possession by the end of Shāhjahān's reign and the 'New Territory' [*mulk-i-jadīd*], which had come into Mughal possession in Aurangzeb's reign. The latter comprised the whole of Bijapur and Haidarabad provinces and parts of Daulatabad and Bidar provinces.

We can now proceed to what our documents tell us.

## FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES

The financial drain on the Empire that the Deccan presented is shown by [the statement of the annual] income and expenditure of the *Khālīṣa* in the province of Daulatabad, submitted on 7 Ziqa'd 45 Regnal Year [16 April, 1701]:

<i>INCOME</i>	<i>EXPENDITURE</i>	<i>EXCESS OF EXPENDITURE</i>
Rs. 8, 71,542	Rs. 19,03,596	Rs. 10, 32,054

The document draws attention to this excess of expenditure. It is stated that despite receipt of "bill [*hundīs*] from Hindustan, which took place previously", the hue and cry of unpaid claimants always used to take place. Now, apparently, such transfers from North Indian treasuries had ceased. The Emperor had ordered "Let *Khālīṣa* be expanded to meet the expenditure, but not the expense of [*jāgīrs* assigned for meeting] pay-claims of the army which are considerable." The caveat left the matter unresolved. The final orders as now given were equally weak:

At this time, people cannot be transferred [to yield *jāgīrs* for *Khālīṣa*].

Perhaps, after death [or transfer], land can be given to *pāibāqī*.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See IJC, I/46/12-167 & 178; The *Pāibāqī*, one should perhaps explain, comprised lands that were available for assignment in *jāgīr* and were in Imperial officials' hands [often on paper only in the Deccan] pending such, assignment. See Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, revised ed., pp. 308n. 312-13, 324, 325 & n.

A similar situation is indicated by Inayat Jang Collection document<sup>1</sup> in the case of the province of Bijapur in 1080 [?1108 AH = A.D. 1696-97], the *Khālīṣa* had a *jama* ' of Rs.13,04,910, as. 6, and *ḥāṣil* of Rs.6,83,187, as 11,1/2. The total annual income 'in various years', meaning perhaps the average annual income, including that of *pāibāqī*, was put at Rs.9,78,577, and the annual expenditure at Rs.15,04,396 as. 15, 1/4. The deficit thus exceeded Rs.5,25,000. The report pointed out that the expenditure was incurred because of pressure of military needs, salaries of *manṣabdārs*, horsemen, musketeers, stores of forts, rockets, gunpowder, repairs of forts, etc The deficit had caused delays in salary payments, generating protests from claimants. Aurangzeb characteristically contented himself with an impossible piece of advice, namely, economy;

The income and expenditure should be kept equal. They [pay-claimants] should be paid out of *pāibāqī* by way of *jāgīrs*]with reductions [in *jama* ' presumably].

The income from *Khālīṣa* was, however, often sought to be increased. Thus on 29 Rabi II, Regnal Year 38, it was ordered that all profitable market places [*paitha-ha-i sair-ḥāṣil*]in the province of Haidarabad were to be taken into the *Khālīṣa*.<sup>2</sup>

### **PRESSURE ON RESOURCES: SITUATION OF THE PĀIBĀQĪ**

In 1975 J.F. Richards raised doubts over the alleged phenomenon of 'crisis of *jāgīrs*' in the later years of Aurangzeb, which figures in the writings of Satish Chandra, Irfan Habib and M. Athar Ali. Richards' doubts rested mainly on a document giving a high amount of *pāibāqī* [land available for assignment in *jāgīr*]in *ṣūba* Haiderabad upon its annexation.<sup>3</sup> Athar Ali responded by setting out a statement of distribution of assignable lands in *Karanata-i Haidarabadi*, 1706, which broadly brought out the small size of *Khālīṣa* and *pāibāqī* in that area.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [IJC, I/41/10-48].

<sup>2</sup> [IJC, I/38/6-5].

<sup>3</sup> J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, Oxford, 1975, pp. 158,308-9.

<sup>4</sup> M. Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, revised ed., Delhi, 1997, pp. xx-xxii.

Much of the dispute can be settled [perhaps, against J.F. Richards!] by IJC-I/0/0-486 [Old No. I/14/129], which unfortunately lacks date but obviously belongs to Aurangzeb's late years. It contains the following statement submitted to the Emperor:

The Emperor observed that it is repeatedly said that there is no *pāibāqī* left, and that I should take a *muchalka* [bond] from the Chief *Bakhshī*, Mukhlīṣ *Khān*, that there should be no more [demands on] *pāibāqī* except on necessity<sup>1</sup>. The situation is that in the Old Country [*mulk-i qadīm*], the *pāibāqī* is being assigned away in [*jāgīr* in lieu of] pay, upon orders of the Emperor and the pleas of the representatives of pay-claimants, except for Pune and Tilkokan, etc, which is really of the character of new country. In the New Country [*mulk-i jadīd*], viz., Bijapur and Haidarabad, the *pāibāqī* is considerable, since, owing to its low income, the [claimants'] representatives do not accept [*jāgīrs* from it] in accordance with the *jama'* and plead for reduction [in *jama'*, keeping in view the low receipts, on the ground that according to the prescribed *jama'* for pay-assignment [*jama' - i tankhwāhi*]they would have to bring to brand contingents according to rule, and this obligation they would not be able to meet owing to low receipts, whereupon with the brand-report [*daghānāma*]not reaching the office, the *jāgīr'* would be transferred. Should concession be granted in the branding of contingents, they can bring the brand-reports in time. [It is] submitted for orders.

The statement goes on to give the *pāibāqī*, in terms of estimated income [*jama'*]and the actual[*hāsil*]:the former was 1, 62, 58, 93, 576 *dāms* and the latter Rs. 1, 85, 58,618, as. 14, 3/4, but the significance of the figures is weakened by the fact that they appear to apply to the whole Empire, still even for the Empire as a whole, the receipts are on the low side, some “five-and-a-half monthly” in official Mughal parlance. The ratio would have been much lower in the newly conquered territories of the Deccan.

Aurangzeb's response to all this is brief:

First, the *jāgīrs* should be assigned out of the *pāibāqī* in the well-ordered Old Territories,

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<sup>1</sup> Text not clearly decipherable.

along with those assignable against *manṣab* promotions. The disorderly, useless Deccanis should be confined to the New Territory, and to the Old [only] with reduction [of *manṣab*-claim]; and only thereafter, other places.

This was in line with the general distrust shown towards Deccani elements in the nobility and with the desire to retain the plums of Empire for the older nobility. But the decision did not resolve the real problem, *viz.*, the contraction of *pāibāqī* in the settled territories.

Aurangzeb continued to be irritated by *manṣabdārs'* refusal to accept *jāgīrs* out of *pāibāqī* in disturbed territory. On one document dealing with assignment in *ghair-'amālī* [unsubjugated territory], Aurangzeb wrote:

Pune and Chakna and *pāibāqī* of Junair and Bara Maval, etc, *maḥals* that no one accepts and wishes for, are many. They can be given to all.

Another document<sup>1</sup>, shows that the pressure for *jāgīrs* upon the 'Old Territory' [in the Deccan] was intense. Dated 14 Zi'qad, Regnal Year 42, it contains a statement of the claims of 'Abdu'r Raḥmān Khān, 1500 *zāt*, 900 *sawār*, and Farjām Khān, 900l, 3005, for *jāgīrs* in *pargana* Raipur, Baglana, Aurangzeb rejected the proposed arrangement, saying:

[that it] cannot be given, since both claimants are not permanently posted to the Deccan. There are so many claimants from the Deccan. At present Ṣafshikan Khān is without *jāgīr* it is better it is given to him.

This shows that *jāgīrs* in the Deccan were primarily reserved for those regularly serving them, in order to ease the pressure upon them.

On the other hand, there were hardly any takers for *pāibāqī* in the 'new territory' where little revenue could be collected. The Mughal chancery seems to have invented the term *gosht o istikhwān* ['flesh and bone'] to indicate that the pay-claimant should be satisfied with getting both

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<sup>1</sup> There is much *Pāibāqī* in [*śūba*] Haiderabad. Let them assign [*Jāgīrs*] from those *maḥals* after usual reduction. IJC 1/45/11-12.

meaty and unattractive *jāgīrs*, the latter being given from the *pāibāqī* in *ghair-'amalī* areas. This is the burden of IJC, I/42/1-32. It relates to the *jāgīr*-claims of Ismā'il Khān Makka whose *vakīl* did not agree to the transfer of his *jāgīr* in 1101 AH [? 1110 AH=AD 1698-99] to *pargana* Kalpkor with a reduction of the *jama* ' to two-thirds. Aurangzeb rejected Ismā'il Khān's protest and ordered:

Even Princes wished to relinquish *jāgīrs* which did not yield enough income. Upon his transfer, Jānsipar Khān's *jāgīrs* in *pargana* Kaulas, *ṣūba* Haidarabad, with revenue receipts of Rs. 1, 34,000 was assigned to Prince Kām Bakhsh. The Prince argued that he would have to empty troops [500 horse and 1000 infantry] costing him over Rs. one lakh a year, so that in three years he would not be able to recover a single year's salary for himself. He thus pleaded for *jāgīr* somewhere else. Aurangzeb reacted to the plea [9 *Jumada-1* Regnal Year 45=12 October, 1701] with the following caustic comment:

If the Governor and Prince cannot administer it, how can anyone else do so? If reduction [of *jama* ] is desired, let it be given.

In IJC, I/42/1-78, dated 15 Ziqa'd 42 Regnal Year, [24 June 1698] it is stipulated by the Emperor that newly recruited Deccanis are to be given *jāgīrs* out of the *pāibāqī* of Imtiyazash [Adoni, Karnatak-i-Bijapuri], "which has not till now been given in pay-assignment or made over to the *Khāliṣa*", i.e. revenue had simply not been collected there. In territories where order had been established and so were '*amali*', they were not entitled to hold *jāgīrs*; these were to be resumed and converted into *Khāliṣa*. We can, again, see here that the large *pāibāqī* shown on paper, immediately after the conquest, had no reality since it yielded no revenue, being still *ghair-'amalī*.

## **PRESSURE ON JĀGĪRS**

Aurangzeb was troubled by the extensive exactions of illegal cesses called *sibtī* [lit. 'written, recorded'], [vide IJC, 1/47/1-17], he recorded not only his anxiety on the score, but also indicated why these were occurring [IJC, 1/46/6-26]:

It has been reported that the *sibtī* has become very extensive in the Deccan provinces because of the transfers of *jāgīrs* and reductions of *manṣabs*. The news-recorders [*wāqi‘a-nigārān*] and intelligence reporters [*sawānih-navīsān*] should report who is responsible. In our period what has not happened that will not now happen -forbidden things, illegal innovations are causes of devastation of the country!..

Clearly, Aurangzeb was aware that the *jāgīr* transfers pressed the *jāgīrdārs* to be oppressive during the short periods they held *jāgīrs*; they would act similarly when their *manṣabs*, and, therefore, salaries were reduced. This was written 4 Rabi‘ll, R.Y. 46 [28 August, 1702].

The pressure upon *jāgīrdārs* is indicated also by IJC, 1/45/5-207. Mu‘izzuddin ‘Umar, deputy of *Qila‘dār* of Salher [Sulṭāngarh] in Baglana pleaded that his brother and cousin posted with him had 'not received their *jāgīrs*. In the meantime his own *jāgīr* had been reduced by the reduction in his *mashrūṭ* rank. Could this reduction be adjusted against the *jāgīrs* due against his brother's and cousin's claim? The answer was No, Aurangzeb noted:

Transfer and exchange cannot be sanctioned. Let the due claims be met out of the *pāibāqī*. There is no end to such pleas.

A report on the situation in Karnatak-i Bijapuri dated 10 Rabi‘ I, 45 Regnal Year [31.August 1700], in IJC, 1/45/5-86 brings out very well why the *mashrūṭ* ranks [from which local levies or *sihbandīs* were usually maintained] had to be reduced:

The situation is that the entire conquered territory has been assigned to meet expense on on *sihbandīs*, etc, and even half of it is not secured to the government. If the *thānadārs* are not so numerous, there is reduction in the *sihbandīs*, and the *sihbandīs* can be paid out of the *pāibāqī*; and so as a result of economy in the expenditure on *sihbandīs*, some entire good *maḥals* can be reserved for the Imperial *Khālīṣa*, whereby a visible improvement in the financial situation can take place.

In this particular case, Aurangzeb apparently declined to take the recommended measures, merely demanding that everything should be done “according to rules and regulations” [*zabita-wa-dastūr*].

## LOW INCOME FROM *JĀGĪRS*

How much the actual income [*ḥāṣil*] of *jāgīrs* as against the estimated [*jama*] had fallen in the Deccan becomes clear from Aurangzeb's response to information about *pargana* Kanti, contained in Inayat Jang Collection<sup>1</sup>. He had inquired if the whole of this *pargana* could be given in *jāgīr* to officers of his great noble Khān Bahādur. When the details of revenues and current assignments in the *pargana* were collected, it transpired that at 5002,411 *dāms* of *jama* and Rs. 71,000/- *annas* 12, in *ḥāṣil*, it was “7- monthly”. This made Aurangzeb change his mind and think highly of its *deshmukh*. He wrote:

The *ḥāṣil* is highly in excess. Let a good revenue collector [*āmil*][of the *Khālīṣa*] be appointed. The *deshmukh* should be enrolled in service and the *faujdarī* jurisdiction be assigned to him. Let the *jāgīrdārs* be given in exchange their pay-assignments in the Deccan or Hindustan.

The document is dated 23 Jumada I, R.Y. 41 [27 November 1697].

IJC, 1/40/10-27, [dated 25 Sha'ban 40 R.Y. 19 March 1697] is concerned with *pargana* Narsi[?], whose *ḥāṣil* at Rs. 40,000/- is said previously to have been 2 monthly. Then it was granted against a pay claim of 1, 42, 00,000 *dāms*, to accord with which the *jama* had been increased [*taufīr*] by a fourth [*sawāī*]. In other words the *ḥāṣil* of the *jāgīr* was now less than ‘one-and-a-half monthly’! Aurangzeb thereupon seems to have rather unwillingly agreed to a reduction in the *jama* of *jāgīrs* which yielded low *ḥāṣil*, presumably even below 2-monthly.

But this was for ordinary assignees. For princes the *jama* was kept exceptionally low.

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<sup>1</sup> ICJ/41/8-19.

Thus it was transpired that *pargana* Muštufābād had been assigned to Prince [A‘zam] in 1102 AH [AD 1690-91] on the basis of the *ḥāṣil* of 1098 AH [AD 1686-87]. The revenue receipts in 1105 AH [? 1110 AH = 1698-99] despite natural calamities amounted to ‘15-monthly’, i.e. they are in excess of the *jama‘* by 25 percent. The rule was that the *jama‘* in such cases should be raised to equal the *ḥāṣil*, so as to make the *jāgīr* 12-monthly. This was naturally opposed by the Prince who wanted that the increase in *jama‘* should be waived. IJC, 1/43/10-7 records Aurangzeb's orders hereon thus:

In future the *jama‘* should be so increased as to make it 12-monthly. The past is exempt. The Prince thus got away with the excess collections of the previous years.

### **JĀGĪR ASSIGNMENT**

It was held to be a rule that as far as possible *jāgīrs* should not be assigned in fragments. Aurangzeb noted in one document<sup>1</sup> dated 12 Zilhij Regnal Year 41, = 2 July, 1697] that he had repeatedly observed that Baglana should not be held in partnership [*shirka na-darad*] [APPENDIX - A].

Elsewhere when of *pargana* Parner, *sarkār* Junnair, it was reported that after Ismā‘īl Khān Makka had been assigned *jāgīr* out of the Khāliṣa there, there were still small claims of *manṣabdārs* accompanying him to be met, which it was proposed should be given out of the same *pargana* by carving them out of the Khāliṣa, Aurangzeb concurred. He was recording his observations as follows:

Why does Ḥamīduddīn Khān [*Dīwān*], once he has abandoned [part of Khāliṣa] in exchange [for *jāgīr*], not give up the whole? To have scattered territories [in Khāliṣa] is bad, and so is such *jāgīr* bad.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [IJC, I/41/2-3] He further recorded that it [Baglana] used to be assigned to one individual. It has been conquered during the term of our [first] Viceroyalty. As far as possible it should not be assigned in fragments and seeking it under Khāliṣa and posting a *karori* and place it in charge of the *Dīwān* of Khandesh.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/42/10-114.

Aurangzeb seems to have kept in mind the families of those who died fighting for him. When Qādirdād Khān died in action, he had a large state demand [*muṭālabā*] against him. His son ‘Ināyatullah protested that it should not be deducted from his *manṣab*-pay, but from that of his brothers who were in actual possession of the *jāgīr*. When this report, dated 8 Ziqā‘d Regnal Year 45 [16 April, 1701] was placed before Aurangzeb, he wrote:

The demand [*muṭālabā*] against Qādirdād Khān, who died in action, is waived, except for whatever has been so far realised. It should not be taken from the heirs.<sup>1</sup>

On Muftakhar Khān’s death in battle, his son ‘Azizullah sought a *jāgīr* in the Deccan, but was unable to obtain it. A *jāgīr* was proposed for him in *pargana* Ner, Khandesh. Aurangzeb wrote on the proposal:

*Jāgīr* should be given. Why is it not given? Why is it not given in Hindustan among those posted with Yar Muḥammad Khān? His father too had died in action. He does not have the capacity to bear the hardship of the campaign.

As for Ner, Nūr Khān’s *jāgīr* these had been resumed upon his dismissal for some cause. His brother Jalaluddin Khān had been called to the court. Aurangzeb was now inclined to favour the brothers since their father [unnamed] too had died in the battle. So Aurangzeb added to the above note:

The *maḥal of waṭan* [home-*jāgīr*] is to be treated as loan [not property]. Jalāluddīn Khān has prior claim on it [*pargana* Ner?]. If not, then Nūr Khān by restoring him to an annual pay of two lakh [*dāms*], for his father has died in action.<sup>2</sup>

We may suppose that the Emperor was here thinking of *waṭan* in giving the same *jāgīr* to Jalāluddīn Khān or Nūr Khān as his father had held. But he had then ruled out any parity with his inherited *jāgīr* [*waṭan*], by saying that the grant of *waṭan* too was a loan not a property

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/45/11-52.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/47/12-30.

transfer, and so it would be always subject to recall.

The wheels of Mughal administration normally moved very slowly and its bureaucratic structure could thwart imperial orders. Two Maratha *thānadārs* of Shikarpur, Santa and Hanho petitioned that the Emperor had granted two villages out of *pāibāqī*, which they had not received, although *pāibāqī* in the *pargana* was available. Aurangzeb wrote in irritation:<sup>1</sup>

In these petty matters, which belong to the *Dīwanī*'s jurisdiction, why keep delaying [till the Emperor's approval]. When *pāibāqī* is available, and pay-assignment out of it has been ordered, such insistence [on fresh imperial sanction] is improper.

The report on the case was submitted to the Emperor on 18 Muharram 47 Regnal Year [3 June, 1703].

A similar sense of irritation as shown when a plea of Ma'mur Khān for a *jāgīr* in *ṣūba* Bijapur was submitted with the report that the expense on *sihbandīs* in Bijapur province had already been judged excessive by the Emperor. Aurangzeb observed:

The matter need not be given such length and width. Ma'mūr Khān does not want a *jāgīr* in Bir, but in Bijapur. He may be given [*jāgīr*] in Bijapur and those who are transferred as a result be given [*jāgīr*] in Bir.

When a report showed that after Ya'qut Khān's transfer, *pargana* Patur was not given over either to *khāliṣa* or in *jāgīr*, awaiting perhaps its assignment on reduced *jama'* to Prince Kām Bakhsh, Aurangzeb wrote:

Let them issue the *sanad* [for the Prince]. Hereafter let not such negligence occur, for it will not have good consequences. Why so much delay? It was transferred from Ya'qut Khān; but not given to *khāliṣa* nor in pay-assignment.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, 1/47/11-113.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, 1/42/3-46.

The date of the document is 2-Muharram42 Regnal Year [11 July, 1698].

Aurangzeb's anger at the territory remaining un-assigned and so in *pāibāqī* during the intervening period is explained by his comments in another case, where he said of a balance remaining unassigned that-

It be given to whoever wants it. The income on *pāibāqī* belongs neither to government nor to peasants; it is just being lost.<sup>1</sup>

Obviously temporary lapses of *jāgīr* into *pāibāqī* brought no or little revenue to the government.

## **FAUJDĀRĪ RIGHTS AND JURISDICTIONS**

The office of *faujdārī* could be a very lucrative office if its holder used force to get what he wanted. It was reported in the *Waqā'i* of Prince Bedar Bakht, 10 Sha‘ban Regnal Year 46 [30 December, 1702] that Ranchhor, *mahajan*, and inhabitants of the township [*qaṣba*]of Patan, then in the *khālīṣa*, had complained that *faujdār*, Imām Bakhsh, had seized Rs. 20,000 from them, and added-then with an eye, perhaps, to the Emperor's religious zeal-that Imām Bakhsh did not conform to the *shari‘at*, carefully attaching a statement of the *Qāzī* and *wāqia‘-nigār* to this effect. The Emperor thereupon recorded his orders, 4 *Ramazan* 46 [2 February, 1702] as follows:

Patan is assigned [in *jāgīr*]to that son [Bedar Bakht]. A soldierly man, of good behavior, helpful for prosperity, should be sent. The township and fort are given to him. Wizārat Khān be told to send the record [*fard*]. The *manṣab*of the dismissed man [Imām Bakhsh, *faujdār*]should be reported to us by the *Bakhshī*.<sup>2</sup>

Imām Bakhsh's *manṣab*was in fact reduced by 50 *zāt*, 20 *sawār*.

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, 1/46/11-103&104.

<sup>2</sup> IJC-I/47/11-34.

It seems that the *faujdārs* and *thānadārs* had to obtain *parwāna-i sibtī* or official licenses to permit them to collect tolls and dues. These were apparently given for particular seasons and presumably against some payments to the treasury, which thus could have a share in their collections. But these officials used to give undertakings to produce the *sibtī* certificates within forty days, and then would go on season after season collecting the dues without obtaining the certificates. If they were warned against it, they did not listen. Aurangzeb confirmed the previous order that such officials' *jāgīrs* were to be resumed:

The *Dīwān* with the help of the Governor is to resume [the *jāgīr*], willy nilly. Here, if there is delay [in the officials' applying for it], the *parwāna-i sibtī* is not to be issued.<sup>1</sup>

In Mughal administration, *jāgīr* and *faujdārī* were different jurisdictions, but big *jāgīrdārs* were often granted *faujdārī* jurisdictions over their *jāgīrs*.<sup>2</sup> When this did not happen, there could be conflict between a *jāgīrdār* and the *faujdār*. The case came before Aurangzeb of *pargana Sopa, sarkār Junnair*, where the *jāgīrdār* Yāsīn Khān held *faujdārī* over part of his *jāgīr*, but not in that part which lay in *patta Barahti*, of which Badal Singh was the *faujdār*; and ‘Abdu'r Raūf then made allegations of illegal exactions against Badal Singh, and armed clash between his men and those of Badal Singh occurred. Aurangzeb wrote thereon:

Why is someone else *faujdār* within the *jāgīr* of Yāsīn Khān? The *thāna* of Sopa is in his charge. So also [this] *thāna* should be in the charge of Yāsīn Khān. The Second *Bakhshī* should understand [the facts] and report.<sup>3</sup>

*Thāna* here means obviously a police post of *faujdārī* jurisdiction. This was written apparently in Zīqa‘d 47 Regnal Year [March-April, 1703].

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, 1/46/12-180, dated 27 Shawwal, Regnal Year 46, 27 March, 1702].

<sup>2</sup> IJC 1/47/1-71.

<sup>3</sup> Irfan Habib, *Agrarian system of Mughal India*, rev. ed., p. 339 n, where that is said to have been “the general practice” under Aurangzeb.

## LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

W.H. Moreland had studied the position of *pargana* Headman [*Chaudhurī*] of the Mughal Empire' largely on the basis of certain documents relating to the Deccan.<sup>1</sup> The term *chaudhurī* of Northern India corresponded to *desāi* or *deshmukh* in the Deccan, and *qānūngoto deshpāndiyas*<sup>2</sup>. Moreland had seen no particular differences in the nature of the duties of the two offices of *chaudhurī* and *qānūngo*, while Irfan Habib has tended to stress the differences fairly heavily.<sup>3</sup> From document of Inayat Jang<sup>4</sup> Collection it transpires that under the Nizāmshāhī regime the office established in the *pargana* of Daulatabad was of *deshmukh* only. It is, reported that a claimant to the office of *deshpāndia* possessed a *farmān* of Shōhjahān confirming Bahādurji in the office of *deshmukh*, as originally given through a *sanad* of Malik 'Ambar ["Siddi 'Ambar"]; "The office of *deshpāndia* was not included therein." Subsequently, another *farmān* gave both offices to Dataji, son of Bahādurji. In Aurangzeb's 31 Regnal Year both offices were confirmed jointly to Dataji's sons, Raghoji and Jadon. This was contested by Kaneri, son of Meghrani, who claimed to hold *sanads* of the Nizāmshāh ["Be-nizām"] and Malik 'Ambar in favour of his ancestors for the office of *Deshpāndia* of the same *pargana*. His claim was, however rejected: 2 Sha'ban Regnal Year 41 [13 February 1698].

From this case it is obvious that the two offices were not really well differentiated in the Deccan and could be held by the same person. Obviously, Kaneri's claim that the office of *Deshpāndia* was originally separate in the *pargana* and belonged to his family did not carry conviction.

One more factor appears from this document. Although family inheritance was respected, conditions could be added with each confirmation. When the brothers Raghoji and Jadon obtained the office in Aurangzeb's Regnal Year 31 [AD 1687-88], they were obliged to pay Rs. 3,00,800 as *peshkash* and get 7,00,000 *bīghas* of waste cultivated [in order to pay revenue].

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<sup>1</sup> *JRAS*, 1938, pp. 511-21.

<sup>2</sup> Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, rev. ed., pp. 331-335.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 331-38.

<sup>4</sup> *IJC*, I/41/10-142.

These were thus offices that carried a large income.

Such income probably attracted professional bankers and financiers as well. An incumbent of the office of *Deshpāndia* of *pargana* Murtazabad complained that Mahda, a *sahūkar* of the Imperial camp, was aspiring to get the office transferred to himself and was getting support in this from the *faujdār* and *qila 'dār*, Muḥammad Ashraf<sup>1</sup>.

## MAINTENANCE OF MILITARY CONTINGENTS

It was a long-standing complaint in the Mughal Empire that commanders were not maintaining their contingents according to their *manṣabs*. Interestingly enough one IJC document contains the complaint of Sazāwār Khān that he and his kinsmen were the principal *jāgīrdārs* in *pargana* Nasik [Gulshanabad]. A balance of pay [*ṭalab*] was still due against which *jāgīrs* needed to be assigned. He pointed out that the adjoining *parganas* of Wan and Dindauri “are assigned in pay to different Maratha people who do not at all possess contingents”, and pleaded that he be given *jāgīrs* at their expense. Aurangzeb first called for a report on the *jāgīrs* held by Sarfarāz Khān and his kinsmen which were spread over seven *parganas* in the Deccan, the pay-claim being 7, 30, 37,000 *dāms*, while the *jāgīrs* assigned had the *jama'*, of 5, 82, 39,55, *dāms* only. Despite this shortfall, Aurangzeb turned down the plea, recording the following observation:

Though the said Khān does maintain a contingent, it is not perhaps as much as he can maintain from the *jāgīrs* he has. Unless there is a certificate from the Prince, the *Bakhshī*, and the Superintendent of Brand and Muster-roll about the presence of his contingent in accordance with his [*manṣab*]-salary, a *jāgīr* cannot be given in the Old Territories. If he wishes, the *jāgīrs* can be given in Bijapur and Haidarabad from unsubdued territory [*ghair-'amal*].<sup>2</sup>

IJC, 1/45/11-12, which bears Mun'im Khān's seal, enlarges upon the Maratha

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/38/0-14.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/45/7-10.

*manṣabdārs* as especially failing to maintain troops:

Most Marathas, despite their not maintaining their contingents are in possession of their *jāgīrs* on the basis of brand-reports [*dāgh-nāma-hā*] submitted many years ago to the office of the *Dīwān*, and they would receive their pay-assignments in future as well. They do not bring their contingents for inspection-certificate [*taṣḥīḥa*]...

Aurangzeb recorded on this the following orders:

They should give *taṣḥīḥas*. Whoever does not have any contingents or has less [than the standard], his *jāgīr* should be resumed.

Another device used was to deny good *jāgīrs* to those suspected of being without contingents. It was noticed in a statement of 27 Shawwal Regnal Year 46 [27 March 1702] that Takoji, etc, had been assigned “good *jāgīrs*” in *pargana* Shivgaon, within 'Old Territory', and received *jāgīrs* in Raibagh in 'New Territory' with 50 percent reductions of *jama* ' whereas it had been laid down that “newly enrolled Deccanis, without contingents, should receive most of their *zāt* pay-claim in the New Territory without any, [*jama* ' – reduction”. Aurangzeb reaffirmed this position, noting that -

‘Old’ means [territory acquired] up till 31st Regnal Year of His Majesty [Shōhjahān]; and from [our] accession to-date, all [acquisitions] are ‘New’. Seeing the [state of] contingents from the reports of the Superintendent of the [Brand] Certificate [*Taṣḥīḥa*], and the Imperial Brand [*Dagh-i-Huzūr*] and Mun‘im Khān, all [of these] are without contingents. Their *zāt* is however] retained. If they have anything in the 'Old Territory" it should be resumed<sup>1</sup>.

A different case was that of Khwāja Muḥammad Naqshbandi. This religious divine had been deprived of his *manṣab* of 600 *zāt*, 100 *sawār*, and later restored to 500 *zāt*, 50 *sawār*. But he maintained no contingent and so lost 30 *sawār* in rank. But a report of Rabi' I Regnal Year 45

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/46/12-167 & copy, I/46.12-178.

[10 August 1701] stated that he had produced no brand-certificate [*dāghnāma*] and so got no *jāgīr* against his *sawār* rank. He, on his part, had made this the reason to demand that the resumed 30-*sawār* rank be restored. Aurangzeb now judged this man right and wrote:

For the *Khwāja* it will be better that he joins the Army of Prayer and get an annual pension without calamity or suffering, since he does not have the capacity to bear hardship of the journey here.<sup>1</sup>

The *Khwāja* in his representation thereafter also quoted this observation approvingly, pointing to his own great age [a mere 46 years]. He noted that Aurangzeb had fixed his pension at Rs. 3000 a year, large amount those days. But the *Khwāja* still wanted more, for he had a family and was in debt. Obviously, he was not to be lightly shaken off.

Aurangzeb also used to encounter numerous embarrassing situations. We are required with a statement of Muḥammad Saifullāh, *Naib Dīwān* of Aurangabad referring to the communication of Muḥammad Ja‘far, *wāqī‘a nigār* [news reporter] to appoint someone recommended by him to the office of *Karorī* by transferring Muḥammad Sharīf, *Karorī* of Bir which he refused to entertain without any fault of him. Similarly when he also refused to act according to *Wāqī‘a Nigār’s* advice to appoint his candidate to a vacant post which he denied as well. Consequently he threatened him of misleading entry in the diary of event to which Aurangzeb reacted them:

“It is not acceptable without any investigation. Since *Bakhshī* and *Wāqī‘a Nigār* have been transferred no representation has been received. Behavioural pattern of the *khānazads* [sons of nobles] etc is devoid of devotion, honesty, and compassionate attachment with this Government, and the interested ones whose intensions are not accomplished, indulge in enmity to the extent of suspicion and in just imputation throwing him [His Majesty] in perturbation and consternation due to which persistence of imperial assignments is lost, hence consider it obligations to represent minutely.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I/45/5-44.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/45/4-70 & I/45/4-7.

## CONCLUSION

These documents make it clear that by Aurangzeb's last year the pressures of financial crisis in the Deccan were manifest. By its own resources it could not support the Mughal effort against the Marathas and the imperial budgets in the Daulatabad and Bijapur provinces. This meant that the deficits had to be met by treasure transfers from North India and by assignments of *jāgīrs* in North India to *manṣabdārs* posted in Deccan. In other words, there would have to be a constant drain on North Indian resources. This must be remembered as a possible justification of the policy of detachment from the Deccan which Aurangzeb's successors pursued.

As a component of this financial drain, one can find that the 'crisis of *jāgīrs*' in the Deccan is well illustrated by a number of documents. The apparent *pāibāqī* reserve in Ḥaidarabad and Bijapur provinces is deceptive since it largely comprised territory claimed on paper and not actually subjugated. These were hardly territories that any *manṣabdār* would care to hold to obtain his pay. *Jāgīrs* in the 'Old Territory', on the other hand, were hard to obtain, and the documents show how many *manṣabdārs* were just left without *jāgīrs*.

At the same time, while creaky and slow, we see the Mughal administration nevertheless functioning. The bureaucratic structure was intact; records were compiled and maintained; reports and accounts were sought and given. Finally, like modern files, the papers come before the Emperor for his orders. Generally, we find that Aurangzeb read the papers and gave, in most cases, alert and sensible responses. He becomes vague and general, only when matters like financial deficits could not be resolved by a few precise instructions. Still, we can see some kind of strategy being pursued to curtail malexpenditure and secure better military efficiency. The strategy was not adequate, as events were duly to disclose. But one cannot say that none was tried.

## [II] NĀZIMS & FAUJDĀRS

It is but natural that the post of the governor [*nāzim*] in the Mughal imperial administration was a very significant one. The Mughal Empire was divided into a number of

provinces [*ṣūbās*], each of which had been variously known as *nāzim*, *ṣāhib-i ṣūba*, *ṣūbedār*, *faujdar-i ṣūba* etc. On the pattern of two principal ministers at the centre, the *dīwān* and the *mīr bakhshī*, the provincial governors were normally appointed from among officers holding the highest ranks or *manṣabs*. One can assume that they always formed the hard core of the provincial bureaucracy.

It is an established fact that the jurisdiction and powers of the governors have been analysed often enough.<sup>1</sup> An attempt is made here to examine the nature and procedure of appointments and the kind of persons, appointed as governors from a study of the actual appointments in the six Mughal Deccan provinces as this section is based on an investigation of such appointments during the second half of the reign of Aurangzeb from 1682 to 1707 A.D. Though this period is a long one yet may be considered sufficiently long to draw significant inferences from our historical records with some confidence.

This is a well established fact that only first decade of Aurangzeb's reign is covered by the detailed official chronicle, the '*Ālamgīr Nāma* of Muḥammad Kāzīm whereas for the remaining nearly four decades we have to procure our information from such sources which are by no means as easily accessible or, alternatively, as reliable. The list has been compiled principally from the *Akhbārāt-i Darbār Mu'alla*, supplemented by the numerous chronicles, memoirs and epistolary collections for which detailed references have been searched out to substantiate the arrangements. Through the main table of the six provinces of the Mughal Deccan containing a list of its governors, with the complete duration of their terms of office reference to the regnal years of Aurangzeb is not an exhaustive one. However, the information is virtually complete for all the six Mughal Deccan provinces. Furthermore it is also possible in regard to some Deccan provinces, where there is a blank, it can be explained by the fact that no governor was appointed on the province was being regarded as sent of the superior viceroyalty of the Deccan.

Certain assumptions have been found necessary *viz.*, a distinction has been made between deputies of princes, who served as governors. However, on an average, each single term of a

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<sup>1</sup> For a comprehensive study of the subject, see P. Saran *Provincial Government of the Mughals* [1526-1658], Allahabad, 1941

governor lasted only a slightly more than 2½ years while on an average again each governor was appointed to about two terms. The Mughal court did not approve of long terms for governors as they were generally transferred or recalled after two or three years. For the Mughal Deccan provinces there are only 40 years for which appointments are known in which 19 actual appointments as governors remained which yields the duration of 2 years and 1 month.

**TABLE - 1**

Regnal Year	Deccan	Bedar	Khandesh	Berar	Aurangabad	Bijapur	Golkunda
25.	Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Kokā [Īrānī]		Mughal <u>Khān</u> [Tūrānī], Lashkar <u>Khān</u> , Saiyid Munawwar <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]				
26.	Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Kokā [Īrānī]	Mīr Shamsuddin Mukhtār <u>Khān</u> Sabzwāri [Ī]					
27.	Ṣāfī <u>Khān</u> [Ī]		<u>Khān</u> -I Zamān	Īrij <u>Khān</u> [Ī]			
28.	Amānat <u>Khān</u> Mīr Muinuddīn [Ī] [d]		Mīr <u>Khalīl</u> [Ī]				
29.	Hājī Shafī‘ Sabzwāri [Ī]	Qulīch <u>Khān</u> [T]	Prince A‘zam/ Mīr <u>Khān</u> [Ind.] [Dy]	Īrij <u>Khān</u> [d] [Ī] Ḥasan ‘Ali <u>Khān</u> Bahādur [Ī] [d]			
30.	Hājī Shafī‘ Sabzwāri [Ī]			Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, Mahābat <u>Khān</u> [Ī, Dy] Prince Kām Bakhsh		Mīr Muḥammad Ḥasan Rūhullāh <u>Khān</u> II [Ī] ‘Abdullah <u>Khān</u> [Ī] Lashkar <u>Khān</u> Munawwar <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]	
31.							
32.							
33.							
34.							
35.							Jān Sipāar

36.		‘Abdullāh <u>Khān</u> [Ind.] Lashkar <u>Khān</u>	‘Ināyat Khān II [Ī]	Nawāzish <u>Khān</u> Rūmi [T]		<u>Khān</u> [Ī] Jān Sipāar <u>Khān</u> [Ī]
37.		Munawwar <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]	Maraḥmat <u>Khān</u> , Dūndār <u>Khān</u> [Ī]	Nawāzish <u>Khān</u> Rūmi [T]		Jān Nisār <u>Khān</u> ‘Abul Makārim [Ī]
38.	Diyānat <u>Khān</u> , Mīr ‘Abdul Qādir [Ī]	‘Abdullāh <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]	Maraḥmat <u>Khān</u> , Dūndār <u>Khān</u> [Ī]	‘Ali Mardān <u>Khān</u> [Deccani]	Lashkar Khān Munawwar <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]	Jān Nisār <u>Khān</u> ‘Abul Makārim [Ī]
39.		<u>Khānazād</u> <u>Khān</u> Rūhlullāh <u>Khān</u> [Ī]	‘Ināyat <u>Khān</u> II [Ī]	‘Ali Mardān <u>Khān</u> [Deccani]	Lashkar <u>Khān</u> Munawwar <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]	Jān Nisār <u>Khān</u> ‘Abul Makārim [Ī]
40.		Rūhlullāh <u>Khān</u> [Ī] Najābat <u>Khān</u> Bahrawar <u>Khān</u> [Ī]	‘Ināyat <u>Khān</u> II [Ī]		Lashkar <u>Khān</u> Munawwar <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]	Rustam Dil <u>Khān</u> [Ī]
41.		Bahrawar <u>Khān</u>		Prince Kām Bakhsh		
42.	Ḥasan ‘Ali <u>Khān</u> Bārha [Ind.]	‘Ali Mardān <u>Khān</u> [Dec.]	Najābat <u>Khān</u> Bahrawar <u>Khān</u> [T]	‘Askar <u>Khān</u> [I – Dec.]	Ma‘mūr <u>Khān</u> [Af]	Jān Sipāar <u>Khān</u> [Ī]
43.	Najābat <u>Khān</u> , Bahrawar <u>Khān</u> [T]	‘Ali Mardān <u>Khān</u> [Dec.]	Mu‘tqad <u>Khān</u> , Muḥammad Qulī [T]	‘Askar <u>Khān</u> [Ī - Dec.]	Ma‘mūr <u>Khān</u> [Af], Lutfullah <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]	Jān Sipāar <u>Khān</u> [Ī]
44.	Najābat <u>Khān</u> , Bahrawar <u>Khān</u> [T]	<u>Khuda</u> Banda <u>Khān</u> [Ī]	Mu‘tqad <u>Khān</u> , Muḥammad Qulī [T]	<u>Khuda</u> Banda <u>Khān</u> [Ī] ‘Ali Mardān <u>Khān</u>		Jān Sipāar <u>Khān</u> [d]
45.	Najābat <u>Khān</u> , Bahrawar <u>Khān</u> [T] Lutfullāh <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]	<u>Khuda</u> Banda <u>Khān</u> [Ī]	Najābat <u>Khān</u> , Bahrawar <u>Khān</u> [T]	Firoz Jung [T]	Lutfullah <u>Khān</u> [Ind.] Chin Qilīch <u>Khān</u> [T]	Prince Kām Bakhsh Rustam Dil <u>Khān</u> [Ī] [Dy]
46.	Prince Kām Bakhsh	<u>Khuda</u> Banda <u>Khān</u> [Ī]	Najābat <u>Khān</u> , Bahrawar <u>Khān</u> [T]	Firoz Jung [T]	Chin Qilīch <u>Khān</u> [T]	Saiyid Muzaffar <u>Khān</u> [Ind.]
47.	Prince Kām Bakhsh	<u>Khuda</u> Banda <u>Khān</u> [Ī]	Prince Bedar Bakhsh	Firoz Jung [T], Tūr Andāz	Chin Qilīch <u>Khān</u> [T]	Prince Kām Bakhsh

48.	Prince Kām Bakhsh	Mīr Aḥmad Khān [T] Dy Prince Azam	Firoz Jung [T]	Chin Qilīch Khān [T]	Dāūd Khān Panni [Dy] [Af]
49.	Prince Azam	Najābat Khān	Firoz Jung [T]	Chin Qilīch Khān [T]	Rustam Dil Khān [Ī] [Dy]
50.		Bahrawar Khān Chin Qilīch Khān [T]	Firoz Jung [T]	Chin Qilīch Khān [T]	
51.		Bahrawar Khān Chin Qilīch Khān [T]	Firoz Jung [T]	Prince Kām Bakhsh	

**Source: Deccan:**

R.Y. *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, pp. 180, 205; 27 R.Y. *Akḥbārāt* [27 R.Y.]; *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p 243; 28 R.Y. *Akḥbārāt*, [28 R.Y.]; 29-31 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* 28 R.Y., 30 R.Y.; [38 R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* 38 R.Y.; 42 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* 42 R.Y.; 43-5 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt*, 43 R.Y., 44 R.Y., 45 R.Y., *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 441; 46-8, *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 461, 476, 483, *Akḥbārāt* 46 R.Y., 49 *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p 496.

**Bedar [Zafarabad]:**

29 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* 29 R.Y.; *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 263; [36 R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* [36 R.Y.], [37 R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* [37 R.Y.] 38 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* [38 R.Y.]; [39-40 R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt*, 39 R.Y., 40 R.Y.; *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 384-5, [2-3 R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* 42, 43 R.Y.; [44-7 R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt*, 44 R.Y., 45 R.Y. 46 R.Y.; *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 432. Khandesh 25-26 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt*, 25, R.Y., *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 220; [28 R.Y.], *Akḥbārāt*, 28 R.Y., 29 [R.Y.] *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p 262; 36 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt*, 36 R.Y.; 37-8 R.Y., *Akḥbārāt*, 37 R.Y., 38 R.Y., 39 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* 39 [R.Y.]; 40-42 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt* 40 R.Y.; 41 R.Y.; 43 [R.Y.]; *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 470, 47-8 R.Y. *Akḥbārāt*, 47 R.Y., 48 R.Y.; *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, pp. 470-480; *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 496; 50 R.Y. *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 161 [6].

**Berar:**

28 R.Y. *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 262; 29-30 *Akḥbārāt* 30 R.Y., *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, pp. 278-281; [31 R.Y.] *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 302; 36 R.Y. *Akḥbārāt* 36 R.Y.; 37-9 R.Y. *Akḥbārāt* 37 R.Y., 38 R.Y., 39 R.Y., 41 R.Y. *Ma 'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, pp. 390, 396; 42-3 [R.Y.] *Akḥbārāt*, 42 R.Y., 43

R.Y., *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 396, 44-5 [R.Y.] *Akhbārāt* 44 R.Y., 45 R.Y., *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 432

### **Bijapur [Daruzafar]:**

30 R.Y. *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 282, 299, 36 R.Y. *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p 327, 32 R.Y., *Akhbārāt* 32 R.Y., *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p 329, 38-40 [R.Y.] *Akhbārāt* 38 R.Y., 39 R.Y., 40 R.Y., 40-3 [R.Y.], *Akhbārāt* 42 [R.Y.], 43 R.Y., *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 412, 44 [R.Y.] *Akhbārāt*, 44 R.Y., 415 R.Y., 46 R.Y. *Akhbārāt* 410 [R.Y.], 47 49 R.Y. *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, pp. 441-471; 474, 479, 480, 494, 496, 498, 518, *Dilkhushā*, 157 [6]; 51 R.Y. *Dilkhushā*, 1589, *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 520.

### **Golkunda:**

36-7 R.Y. *Akhbārāt*, 36 R.Y., 37 R.Y.; 384 [R.Y.] *Akhbārāt* 38 R.Y., 39 R.Y., 40 R.Y., 4245 R.Y. *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 439; *Akhbārāt* 42 R.Y., 45 R.Y., 47 [R.Y.], *Akhbārāt* 47 R.Y., 48-9 R.Y., *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, pp. 483, 494, 496, 497.

### **[III] OTHER *ṢŪBA* OFFICIALS**

Though often complex pattern of revenue payments detailed in the '*awārja*'<sup>1</sup> or balance documents yet these list individual *jāgīr* holdings within each *pargana* numerous imperial, political-military elite, *amīrs* [holding 1,000 *zāt* or above which was – personal decimal rank] and predominant technical administrators for a particular point of time of almost 120 *parganas* ranging from 34<sup>th</sup> to 51<sup>st</sup> regnal years of Aurangzeb [1690-1707 AD] due to the availability of 240 *awārja* documents<sup>2</sup> depicting non-military role as well. We find them often serving as *faujdārs* [military commandants] *qila'dārs* [castellan or fort commanders] or sub-ordinate field commanders in prominent and responsible positions with ranks as low as 300 to 500 *zāt*.

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<sup>1</sup> As defined in f. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Inayat Jung Collection contains these *awārja* papers which were generally drawn up in order to ascertain the available revenues open for reassignment to *mansabdārs*; Cf., J.F. Richards, [ed.] 'Official Revenues and Money Flows in a Mughal Province', in *Imperial Monetary System of the Mughal Empire*, OUP, Delhi, 1987, p. 209.

## [A]DĪWĀN

In the second phase of Aurangzeb's reign [1682-1707 AD] the most competent and successful technical professionals serving as *Dīwāns* [minister or in-charge of revenue and finance of a province], Deputy *Dīwāns* of the Mughal provinces might hold similar rank and possess similar prominence and visibility who could well be known personally to the emperor and have been recognised by him in the court or in the imperial camp.

Since the political and administrative assimilation into the imperial order proceeded the imperial administration that also recognised the distinctiveness of the old Deccan provinces of Aḥmadnagar, Berar, Bidar and Khandesh which experienced conquest and administrative consolidation relatively late also relatively detached from the core area of the Mughal Empire in North India by stationing a Viceroy of the four [later six] Deccan provinces at Aurangabad, who held authority over the provincial administrations as the *Dīwān* of the Deccan provinces possessed the same level of authority.

Aurangabad became the capital of the Mughal Deccan, home of the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan, *Dīwān* of the Deccan regulation administrative structure. We frequently encounter with Diyānat Khān and Mu'tamid Khān *Dīwāns* of the Deccan<sup>1</sup> in our documents. Kifayat Khān was the *Dīwān* of Daulatabad.<sup>2</sup> Similarly Abul Makarim, *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Bijapur.<sup>3</sup> Saiyid Ḥusain, was the *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Khandesh.<sup>4</sup> Mīr Muḥammad Ja'far, *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Muḥammadabad Bidar succeeded in getting approved through Emeror Aurangzeb charge of the collection of the *peshkash* [tribute and withholding] the perquisites of the *zamīndārs* of *parganas* Neola, *sarkār* Nander *ṣūba* Bidar. Accordingly he excluded Mīr Ghulam J'afar's *gumāshṭa* from revenue collection.

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/32/010-202. These documents also indicate their *jama'* and *ḥāṣil* figures assigned as *jāgīr* from different areas.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/30/9-1.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/32/8-1.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/33/7-1. This position is confirmed from the statement of the *dehmukhs* and *deshpandiyas* of the area Muḥammad Shafi *Dīwān* of Ḥaidarabad also implemented the imperial order for the grant of cash of [*naqdī tankḥwāh*] to the *barq-andāzān* posted at the forts.

Similarly Mīr ‘Ali Naqī, Deputy *Dīwān* of Aurangabad was directed to submit the receipt papers of the revenue collectors under signatures of the *zamīndārs*, seal impression of *Qāzī* and the receipt register under the seal of the clerks of the treasury w.e.f. 29<sup>th</sup> R.Y. till date along with his verification enabling him to ascertain the deposition and remission in *peshkash* to the *chaudhurīs*.<sup>1</sup> Muḥammad Shafī *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Khandesh was informed that except for *Chaila* and *Khawājasara* no one should be paid in cash which was also allowed to *barqandāzān*.<sup>2</sup> Since *Khawāṣ Khān* was the *Deshmukh* of headquarters [*haveli*] Bijapur as well as the *jāgīrdār* Aurangzeb ordered that “Let it be communicated to the *Dīwān* that after the realization of Rs 5,000/- they should not interfere in the *jāgīr* and *rusūm* [perquisites of *deshmukhī*] in future as per *Khawāṣ Khān*’s *muchalka* that they should deduct ten lakh *dāms* in lieu of the installment.”<sup>3</sup>

When ‘Abdur Rahīm, *Deshmukh* of *pargana* Varval was imprisoned it was communicated by ‘Ali Akbar, *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Muḥammadabad Bidar that the *rusūm* and *in‘ām* of the said *Deshmukh* shall remain suspended as his *gumāshṭa* [agent] shall not be permitted to seize anything<sup>4</sup>. Similarly ‘Ali Naqī, Deputy *Dīwān* received the *parwana* of Sibghatullāh that waved off the cash perquisites to the peasantry. However, the measured land was unculturable, which was totally unproductive as the peasantry due to epidemics and famine has died and absconded owing to which cultivation of land was suspended. The *deshmukhī* and *deshpāndgī* of 27 *maḥals* of Daulatabad etc along with Baizāpur was assigned contingent upon the *peshkash* of Rs3,08,000/ and bringing under plough seven lakh *bīghas* of uncultivable land.

The *dastūr-i desh mukhī* in 1054 A.H. [1644 A.D.] was resumed by way of trust whereafter Murshid Qulī *Khān* waved off the cash perquisites to the peasantry.

Since *Dīwān* used to play a crucial role in the issuance of the *farmān* it was but natural that in order to require a *farmān* a *parwana* of the *Dīwān* was essential as the petitioner could receive the *farmān* after the surrender of the fort.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/35/2-3.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/34/8-5. It seems to be a general order as its copy was also addressed to Muḥammad Ja‘far, *Dīwān*. Cf IJC, I/34/8-4.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/34/7-3. *Khawāṣ Khān* pleaded that since in view of loss even 1/10<sup>th</sup> of the perquisites of *zamīndārī* is not received the *Dīwān* should make deduction of all *jāgīr*.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/36/9-19. Mirak Ḥussain, was also the former *Dīwān* in 1095 AH [1685 AD] of *ṣūba* Berar, IJC I/40/5-9.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/CI/36/10-1.

We are informed that ‘Alī Akbar, *Dīwān* communicated that since ‘Abdur Raḥīm, *Deshmukh* of *pargana* Varval had been imprisoned the perquisites and *in‘ām* of the *Deshmukh* would be properly seized without allowing anything in charge of his agent [*gumāshṭa*].<sup>1</sup>

When there occurred confrontationist approach between *zamīndārs* as Saiyid Ghazanfar, *Amīn* and *Faujdar* expelled Yādwar, *Deshmukh* from *ṣūba* Bijapur notwithstanding his authority as the peasantry and the businessmen were in agreement with him. Their confrontationist approach had ruined the peasantry of the *pargana* owing to which the high road was closed as *pargana* Yādwar was *ser ḥāṣil* [full revenue paying] for which *Dīwān* was to be communicated.<sup>2</sup> When five *chāwars* of land was usurped by the *zamīndārs* of Mangal Baidiyah, Abul Ḥasan *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Khandesh was suggested to be approached so as to serve it again.<sup>3</sup>

We are informed that Shaikh ‘Abul Ḥasan was suspended *Dīwān* of Khandesh and Ḥaji ‘Abdullāh was the present *Dīwān* thereat. Recommendations were made to approach 100 villages for which *Diyānat* Khān was directed to write to the provincial *Dīwān*.

*Diyānat* Khān, *Dīwān* of the Deccan saw to it that the *peshkash* of the state for 190 villages following the transfer of Jamāluddin *Deshmukh* of *pargana* Balapur, *ṣūba* Berar which the *mutaṣaddis* of the villages of *pargana* accepted was to be realized without depositing it in the royal treasury for which he had been directed to write to the *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Berar.<sup>4</sup>

Srīniwās, *Deshmukh* of *pargana* Aland *sarkār* Naldurg *ṣūba* Aurangabad represented that when Khān Muḥammad and Gobind Pandit dispatched by ‘Abdur Reḥmān, the dismissed *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Muḥammadabad [Bidar], were deputed to collect the stipulated *peshkash* and they collected Rs. 1,050/- without giving its acknowledgement receipt absconded in the night by listening to the news of the dismissal of *Dīwān*. Since they were staying in *ṣūba* Bijapur he solicited order for Ma‘mūr Khān, Governor of *ṣūba* Bijapur which was acceded to in order to

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/CI/36/9-14. <sup>6a</sup> IJC, I/CI/41/1-6.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/CI/41/2-10.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/CI/41/4-5.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/CI/41/4-25.

investigate the facts.<sup>1</sup>

Bashārat Khān, *Dīwān* of Berar commented upon the signatures of the *Deshmukh* and the *Deshpāndiya*<sup>2</sup>, which however had become the bone of contention.<sup>3</sup> The matter of realization of the installments of *peshkash* outstanding against the *Deshmukhs* were so serious that even in regard to Devdas and Baijnath, *Deshmukhs* of *pargana* Ellichpur, that when late Mūsawī Khān fixed their installments from 34<sup>th</sup> to 39<sup>th</sup> regnal year then Aurangzeb himself thus remarked about the realization of the arrears of *peshkash* from the two incumbents that:

“Let them write to the *Dīwān* for the recovery [of *peshkash*] in accordance with the firm imperial orders and the assessments of late Mūsawī Khān [*Khān-i Maghfirat Nishān*]”<sup>4</sup>.

Thus the *Dīwān*'s calculations were treated as the correct one to realize the *peshkash* of arrears. The *Dīwān* of the *shūba* was bound to recommend the names of those who were known for extension of cultivation [*ābādānkār*] and the payment of the revenue [*mālguzār*] as such specific instructions were also issued to Bashārāt Khān, *Dīwān* of *shūba* Berar wherein the *Deshmukhs* had promised the cultivation of 1000 *netans* [unit of area in Berar equal to 80 *bighas* i.e. 80x1000=80000 *bighas*] yielding 9,000 *tankcha*, even which was not considered a fit case for recommending the names of Bir Bhan and Rajma etc, *Deshmukhs* of *pargana* in *sarkār* Narala *shūba* Berar.<sup>5</sup>

In view of the extension of cultivation and prosperity of the ruined villages Arshad Khān, *Dīwān* of *KhāliṣaSharīfa* had attained special significance as he was ordered for arbitration in matters of dispute as well as remain a liaison officer in regard to financial matters of the *KhāliṣaSharīfa*.<sup>6</sup> This was a common feature of the Mughal agrarian system that stress was laid on the extension of cultivation and the *zamīndārs* were also bound to execute this policy because

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/CI/41/4-31.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/CI/41/7-7.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/CI/41/8-94.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/CI/40/8-9.

<sup>5</sup> I/42/7-53.

<sup>6</sup> I45/11-173, I/46/2-71.

the *Dīwāns* were responsible in such matters as well. Through such recommendations that their *sanads* were prepared thus since we come to know Muḥammad Rafi‘ *Dīwān* of Talkokan-i ‘Ādil Khāni had written that the *sanad* that was granted to Muḥammad Ḥasan was in the office of the Deccan which was to be prepared and sent to the *Dīwān* as per the imperial orders which was acceded to<sup>1</sup>.

The *Dīwān* were responsible for revenue administration. Ḥājī ‘Abdullāh, the dismissed *Dīwān* of Berar complained that when he deputed Ṣafī ‘Ali, *Aḥdi* [gentleman trooper] to collect the papers of the *parganas* of *sarkār* Gavil as requisitioned by the Emperor he issued *parwanas* enjoining the *zamīndārs* and letters to help the *aḥdi* by the military commandants [*faujdārān*]. But some of the *zamīndārs* due to the support of the *faujdārs* and the agents of *jāgīrdārs* and some owing to their arrogance did not respond to the *aḥdi*, instead replied to Ḥājī ‘Abdullāh that he need not interfere in their matter which was to his utter dismay. Aurangzeb ordered to bring the requisite papers while others had not immediately written about the help of the present *Nāẓim* [Governor] and the *Dīwān*<sup>2</sup>.

*Dīwāns* also used to report the refractory attitude of the *zamīndārs* viz., Bashārat Khān, *Dīwān* of Berar sent Saiyid Yusuf, *manṣabdār* to collect the revenue papers of *sarkārs* Mahur and Basim yet *zamīndārs* of the majority of the *maḥals* [fiscal units] did not respond owing to the support of the agents of the *faujdārs* and *jāgīrdārs* as the refractoriness of the *zamīndārs* of Bālāghāt was well known. Since he also commended Saiyid Yusuf’s behaviour as he had collected and sent from some of the *maḥals* of Ausa without any force or oppression as he had made utmost endeavours because he was quite intelligent, deserving imperial favours which was approved by the Emperor.<sup>3</sup>

The *Dīwān* was responsible for ascertaining the causes of loss in revenue, names of the *deshmukhs*, *deshpāndiyas*, distance of *parganas* from the surrounding townships and their direction which were to be recorded in the *mawāzana* papers as we come to know from a

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/38/4-4.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/38/5-8.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/41/5-9.

communication of Bashārat Khān, *Dīwān* of Berar.<sup>1</sup>

Aurangzeb himself relied on the potentialities of the *dīwāns* as the Emperor commented upon the details furnished for position of *pargana* Basant Nagar's *deshmukhi* claims for seeking the imperial orders. He observed that:

“All these explanations and footnotes cannot be perused. Since he is the *Dīwān* and the confidante he should appoint taking into consideration the prosperity of the *pargana* and the consent of the peasantry”.<sup>2</sup>

Bashārat Khān, *Dīwān* of *śūba* Berar also used to issue necessary instructions in regard to recording loss [*āfat*] as majority of the revenue collections of the fiscal units of the *jāgīrdārs* did not show any profit or loss to the Government.<sup>3</sup>

The *Dīwān* of the *śūba* was also approached for shifting the *zamīndārīviz.*, Baṣālat Khān *qila'dār* [castellan] of A'zamnagar represented that the *Dīwān* of *śūba* Berar may kindly be ordered that *zamīndārī* of *pargana* Alsingh adjoining his *jāgīr* that belonged to refractory Bhar Karan which was to be assigned to Chandi Anthur as the *zamīndārī* of Mursi, Tenmi and Suryui situated near the said *pargana* so as to exterminate the mischief mongers which also met the imperial approbation.<sup>4</sup>

Aurangzeb refused to make any change in the *zamīndārī* of 'Abdul Karim, *zamīndār* of Baglāna etc because there were no such allegations. The emperor categorically recorded:

“This is meant that neither the *maḥal-i zamīndārī* nor the *jāgīr-i ghair waṭan* could be granted [to anyone else]”.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/41/7-8.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/41/8-120 & I/41/8-126.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/41/9-4.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/42/1-34.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/42/5-13 & I/42/5-14.

The *Dīwān* was also responsible for bringing the waste land under plough. We are informed that during the *Dīwānī* of Makramat Khān, *Dīwān* of Berar that *pargana* Devalgaon was slightly cultivated as the rest of the area was jungle and desert where even grass did not grow that constituted almost 48,000 of *bīghas* of barren land. The *zamīndārs* thereof were summoned to the *Dīwānī* court contingent upon bringing to cultivation 2,000 *bīghas* of land. Consequent upon the completion of this process by assigning 3000 *bīghas* of barren land they would have to be granted 100 *bīghas* of barren land by way of *in 'ām* to help them financially.

Though it was stipulated to bring the land under cultivation till 41<sup>st</sup> R.Y., yet by 39<sup>th</sup> R.Y. of Aurangzeb the Marathas [*Ghanīm-i laīm*] attached *pargana* Sandgli and extinguished all the *asnād* [certificates]. Since it was proved that *pargana* Devalgaon from the time of revenue administration of the Deccanis had been the abode of the miscreants, yet not a single piece of land has remained uncultivated. Accordingly they should be granted 150 *nītans* of land [120,000 *bīghas*] under cultivation as per the recommendation of Makramat Khān, the *Dīwān* by way of *jāgīr* side by side allocating some land to them by way of *in 'ām* [to enthuse them].<sup>1</sup>

When Raja Nekkām Singh s/o late Raja Kishan Singh *zamīndār* of Chanda solicited imperial orders instructing Mu'tamid Khān, *Dīwān* of the Deccan to grant him his full *jāgīr* in *pargana* Parner as he was suffering heavily due to *be-jāgīrī*, which received the royal sanction as well.<sup>2</sup>

The *Dīwān* of the Deccan [in this case Muḥammad Khān to 'Ināyat Khān, the former *Naib Dīwān*] wrote that Satwā, *zamīndār* of *mauza* Faqirābād *pargana* Baizōpur *ṣūba* Aurangabad that since he had purchased 250 *bīghas* from village Ladsangwi, that could be entered in his adjoining village which however, required imperial approbation.<sup>3</sup> 'Ali Naqi, s/o *Diyānat* Khān was the *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Muḥammadabad [Bidar] in 1704 AD. *Wizarat* Khān was the *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Muḥammadabad [Bidar] in 45<sup>th</sup> R.Y. [IJC/45/1-162]. The Mughals had a

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/42/9-11.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/46/4-4.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/48/8-1, in 1704 'Ali Akbar was dismissed from the *Dīwānī* of Hyderabad. IJC, I/47/4-43

66 a IJC, I/47/4-43.

separate *Dīwān-I khāliṣa sharifa* which was held by Arshad Khān. [IJC/45/4-188]. Muḥammad Naṣeer was the *Dīwān* of Berār in 1702 [IJC/44/6-13].

## **BAKSHĪ**

The *Bakhshīs*, ministers or officials supervised maintenance of military contingents and postings of commanders<sup>1</sup>. *Bakhshūl Mulk Mukhlīsh Khān* was the *Bakhshī* while Mīr Ni‘matullāh was one of the *Bakhshīs*.<sup>2</sup> Muḥammad Riza, s/o Ḥasan Qulī Bakhsh was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigar* of *ṣūba* Bidar [IJC/40/3-109 & I/46/3-113]. When the matter of a handicapped *manṣabdār* was brought before Aurangzeb the Emperor ordered his dismissal and the second *Bakhshī* was ordered to represent as some other dispensation was made to accommodate him.<sup>3</sup>

In the Mughal administration the *Bakhshīs* were also appointed at *ṣūba* level as well as Saiyid Muḥammad Ja‘far s/o Saiyid Iftikhār Khān was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a-Nigār* of *Khujista-buniyad* [Aurangabad].<sup>4</sup>

When the matter of Imāmuddin was presented to Aurangzeb through Saiyid Iftikhār Khān *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of *ṣūba* Aurangabad, he had received *jāgīr* from the *pāibāqī* of Bir. While he had evinced his interest in getting *jāgīr* from Ausa Fateḥābād Bir, Aurangzeb remarked that:

“It was perused by His Majesty; it was ordered that since *jāgīr* could not be transferred for a single individual the *āwārāja* need not be submitted”.<sup>5</sup>

Imām Qulī s/o Murshid Qulī was dismissed *Bakhshī* and the *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Tirambak

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<sup>1</sup>Cf., Irfan Habib, *Afrarian System*, second revised edition Delhi, 1999, p. 327. There was a *Bakhshī* of the entire Deccan [IJC, I/0/0-2021]

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/41/8-98.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/46/12-171 & I/46/12-179.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/46/2-114 & I/0/0-645.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/45/2-51.

as he was summoned by the Emperor.<sup>1</sup> In 46<sup>th</sup> R.Y. of Aurangzeb Saiyid Qulī Hāshim Beg was also the *Bakhshī*, *Wāqi‘a Nigār* and *Darogha-iDagh-o taṣṣiḥa* [Superintendent of the Branding Regulations].<sup>2</sup>

Muḥamamd Amān *Khān* was the second *Bakhshī* of the gentleman troopers.<sup>3</sup> Mīr Muḥammad Ḥusain s/o Mīr Muḥammad Shakir was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Bir in 1697 A.D.<sup>4</sup> Muḥammad Ashraf s/o Muḥammad Musharraf was the *Bakhshi* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Sulṭānpur, *sarkār* Nandurbar *ṣūba*Khandesh.<sup>5</sup> Muḥamamd Hāshim s/o Yusuf Beg was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Baglāna.<sup>6</sup>

Mīr Ibrāhīm, s/o Mīr Nizāmuddīn was the *Bakhshī-i Fauj-i Rāhdari*, [IJC/47/3-42]. Later he became *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Bir [IJC/47/4-42]. Similarly Multafat *Khān alias* Muḥammad ‘Alī, s/o Muḥamamd Ḥabib was the *Bakhshī* of the army of Prince Bedar *Bakht*, [Cf., IJC/47/3-42].

*BakhshīulMulk* Behramand *Khān* succeeded Mukhlīṣ *Khān* in 1703-4 A.D.<sup>7</sup> ShaikhGhulām Muḥammad, s/o Quṭbullah, was the *peshdasht* of the *TanBakhshī* of Aḥdis.<sup>8</sup> Muḥammad Ḥusain s/o Ziauddīn Ḥusain was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Patan.<sup>9</sup> We are informed that Muḥammad Ja‘far s/o Iftikhar *Khān* was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of the army of *Khān* Firuz Jung.<sup>10</sup> ‘Ali Qulī Beg s/o Muḥammad Riza Beg was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Imtiyazgarh. Ja‘far Beg s/o Tarsun Beg was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/45/1-162.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/46/1-100 & I/46/1-171.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/0/0/0-202.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/39/11-142. He was dismissed and summoned to the court in 1701 A.D. [IJC, I/45/8-50].

<sup>5</sup> IJCI, I/42/6-14, I/41/0-17, ‘Abdul Qayyūm, s/o Ḥusāmuddin *Khān* was the *Bakhshī and Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Parendā, [Cf., IJC, I/010-494].

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/44/6-14, IJC, I/45/2-52.

<sup>7</sup> IJC, I/46/2-213. Jām Qulī was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Islamgarh Raheerī [IJC, I/40/12-165].

<sup>8</sup> IJC, I/47/3-42.

<sup>9</sup> IJC, I/47/3-42. In 1699 he held the same post in Inderpat which was held by him in the army of Firuz Jung. He was also transferred in the same capacity to Mulher [IJC, I/45/1-16]. IJC, I/45/5-50. IJC, I/45/2-52.

<sup>10</sup> IJC, I/47/3-42. <sup>7a</sup> IJC, I/45/12-62.

Bahādurgarh.<sup>1</sup> Muḥammad Shafī s/o Muḥammad Momin was the dismissed *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Machhlibandar who was summonsd to the imperial court.<sup>2</sup> Shamsuddīn s/o Muḥammad Zamān, was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Kherla etc *ṣūba* Berar, Bālāghāt<sup>3</sup>.

We are informed that Ibrāhīm Beg s/o Ismā‘īl was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Aḥmadnagar.<sup>4</sup> Muḥammad Ḥusain, s/o Muḥammad Shafī‘ was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Suner. He later became *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Bir Sheogaon.<sup>5</sup> In the penultimate analysis we find him holding the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Sheogaon.<sup>6</sup>

Muḥammad Hashim s/o Yūsuf Beg was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Baglāna.<sup>7</sup> While Mīr Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, s/o Mīr Nizām was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nawīs* in 1703 AD<sup>8</sup>, Ilahwardi Beg s/o Muḥammad Beg was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Kokan-i ‘Adil *Khāni*.<sup>9</sup> Ja‘far Beg, s/o Tarsūn Beg was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Bahādurgarh. Ibrāhīm Beg s/o Ismā‘īl Beg was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Aḥmadnagar. [IJCI/45/9-4].

In 1699 A.D. he held the same post as in Indapur which position was held by him in army of Firuz Jung. He was later transferred in the same capacity to Mulher. [IJCI/45/1-16].

The Mughal administration also took care of the relatives of the deceased *khānazads* as Zīāuddīn, maternal grandson of late Fāzil *Khān* was appointed as the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of Karnatak-i Hyderabad.<sup>10</sup> Mīr *Bakhshī* s/o Mīr Nizāmuddīn was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqi‘a Nigār* of [*sarkār*] Bir, *ṣūba* Aurangabad.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/43/6-40.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/43/6-40.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/42/8-38, IJC, I/45/2-36.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/47/11-105.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/45/2-52; I/0/0-576.

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/0/0-645.

<sup>7</sup> IJC, I/45/8-51.

<sup>8</sup> IJC, I/45/8-51.

<sup>9</sup> IJC, I/45/5-54. <sup>6a</sup> IJC, I/43/6-40.

<sup>10</sup> IJC, I/0/0-640.

<sup>11</sup> IJC, I/0/0-715.

In 1703 A.D. Neknām Khān was the first *Bakhshī* of *Ahdīs* and he received 3223230 *dāms* yielding Rs. 39,274/- from Badnera Bibi.<sup>1</sup> Muḥammad Ashraf s/o Muḥammad Ṣaleḥ, *Bakhshī* and *Wāqī‘a Nigār’s* payment of Sulṭānpur [Nandurbar] was cancelled from there.<sup>2</sup> Muḥammad Sai‘d, s’o Muḥammad Qulī was the *Dīwān* of Karnatak-i Hyderabad.<sup>3</sup>

Muḥammad Muḥsin, s/o Abul Ḥasan Shujā‘ī was the *Dīwān* of Talkokan-i ‘Adil<sup>4</sup> In 1702 A.D. Muḥammad Riza s/o Ḥasan Qulī was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqī‘a Nigār* of Muḥammadabad [Bidar]<sup>5</sup>. Ḥusain Khān, s/o late Himmat Khān was the *Bakhshī* of the army of the Prince Bedar Bakht. Ilaḥwardi Baig, s/o Muḥammad Beg was *Bakhshī* and *Wāqī‘a Nigār* of Kokan-i ‘Adil Khāni<sup>6</sup>. Muḥammad Baqir, served as the *Dīwān-i Khālīṣa, pāibāqī* of the Mulk-i Deccan<sup>7</sup> and Nizāmul Mulk.

## **FAUJDĀRS**

*Faujdar* was the commandent in charge of peace and order usually in a group of *parganas*. The *faujdar* was usually a responsible person who used to maintain law and order. In the Deccan the *faujdar* was equally important. We are informed that Dāūd Khān was appointed to the *faujdarī* of Bālāghāt and Pāīnghāt Karnatak-i Hyderabad<sup>8</sup>. Similarly Ḥasan Qulī Khān, was the *faujdar* of the Talkokan-i ‘Ādil Khāni.<sup>9</sup>

We come to know that in exceptional cases the deputy military commandent was also

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/45/7-84.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/45/7-84.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/45/2-52.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/45/1-160. Imām Qulī, s/o Murshid Qulī Khān, who was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqī‘a Nigār* of Tirambak was dismissed and summoned to the court. IJC, I/45/1-162.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/45/5-2. In 1692 A.D. ‘Abdullāh s/o Saiyid ‘Ali was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqī‘a Nigār* of Islāmgarh Raḥeri [IJC, I/34/7-2]; Mīr Ḥusain, s/o Mīr Nizām was the second *Bakhshī* of *Ahdīs* [IJC, I/45/1-162].

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/46/3-109. Ibrahīm Beg, s/o Ismā‘īl Beg was the *Bakhshī* and *Wāqī‘a Nigār* of Aḥmadnagar IJC, I/47/11-105.

<sup>7</sup> IJC, I/46/3-113, I/45/5-139, I/45/5-54, I/47/5-41.

<sup>8</sup> IJC, I/45/2-51.

<sup>9</sup> IJC, I/46/7-20.

appointed, viz., Muḥammad Ṣādiq, served as *Naib-i faujdār* of Mu‘tabār Khān,<sup>1</sup> an influential *faujdar* like him could have two or more deputies.<sup>2</sup> Similarly Sazāwār Khān was the *qila‘dār* of Muḥammadabad [Bidar] and Aḥmad Khān *faujdar* of *pargana* Baiḏāpur, holding the rank of 1500/200 and 1000/1000 respectively or anyone else could suffer transfer as a routine matter,<sup>3</sup> was the case in regard to Naṣirullah Khān, *qila‘dār* and *faujdar* of Junnar.<sup>4</sup> Such examples could be numerous.

**TABLE- 2**

S.No.	Name of <i>faujdar</i> / <i>qila‘dār</i>	Name of <i>Pargana</i>	Name of <i>sarkār</i>	Name of <i>ṣūba</i>	Source: Inayat Jung [IJC]
1.	<u>Khīrad</u> , <i>qila‘dār</i> / <i>faujdar</i>	Dhawera	Baitalwari	Berar	I/39/11-143
2.	Shamsuddin <i>faujdar</i>	Dhawera	Baitalwari	Berar	I/41/6-49
3.	Muḥkam Singh, <i>qila‘dār</i> / <i>faujdar</i>	Selgarh			I/41/6-49
4.	Khajaji, <i>faujdar</i>	Nangli/ Patur			I/45/1-31
5.	Najīb <u>Khān</u> <i>alias</i> <i>Qāzī</i> Muḥammad Najib, <i>faujdar</i>	Dehari	Jalnapur	Aurangabad	I/39/11-142 I/41/10-16 I/45/1-162
6.	<u>Khawāja</u> Zafrullah	Shahgarh	[He was latter made] <i>faujdar</i> of Khargaon		I/42/2-52
7.	Muḥammad ‘Alī <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdar</i>	Pepari	Jalnapur	Aurangabad	I/0/0-200
8.	Zainuddin ‘Alī <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdar</i>	Gulshanābād [Nasik]	He became <i>faujdar</i> of Baizapur <i>pargana</i> / <i>sarkār</i> Bir		I/41/0-16
9.	Muḥammad Ṣādiq, <i>faujdar</i> / <i>qila‘dār</i>				I/0/0-201
10.	Mu‘taqid <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdar</i>	Shāhgarh			I/0/0-201
11.	Purdil <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdar</i>	Junnar			I/41/0-16
12.	Irādat <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdar</i>	Bir	Bir	Aurangabad	I/41/0-12 I/46/2-213
13.	Sulemān <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdar</i>	Balam Koban			I/45/2-51
14.	Mirza Muḥammad, <i>faujdar</i> / <i>qila‘dār</i>	Sira	He was transferred to Badami		I/46/2-214 I/45/2-52
15.	Wahiduddin <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdar</i>	Bir	Bir	Aurangabad	I/45/2-52
16.	Dāūd <u>Khān</u> , <i>nāib</i> <i>faujdar</i>	Bālāghāt, Pāyānghāt	Karnatak Hyderabad		I/46/2-213
17.	Saiyid ‘Ali, <i>faujdar</i>	Chalisgaon			I/45/3-54 I/46/9-83

<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/45/8-15, I/0/0-616.

<sup>2</sup> I/45/8-15.

<sup>3</sup> I/43/1-45.

<sup>4</sup> I/44/10-80.

18.	Nasiruddin <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>faujdār</i>	Debalgaon			I/45/12-62 I/46/12-46
19.	‘Abdul Qādir, <i>faujdār</i> <i>/qila ‘dār</i>				I/43/6-39
20.	Kūchak <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>faujdār</i> / <i>qila ‘dār</i>	Satunda/ Baitala	Previously he was the <i>faujdār</i> of Mahagaon		I/44/8-4 I/46/12-46
21.	Shaikh Ḥabībullah, <i>faujdār</i>	Kanhar	He was dismissed in the same year		I/45/1-16 I/45/4-79
22.	Riza Ṭalab <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>amīn</i> / <i>faujdār</i>	Sangamner			I/42/6-9 I/45/1-163 I/45/5-203
23.	Amanullah, <i>kotwal</i> / <i>faujdār</i>	Aurangabad	[ <i>kotwal</i> / <i>faujdār</i> ] of Valuj		I/42/6-3 I/0/0-617
24.	Aḥmad Sai‘d <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>faujdār</i>	Sangamner		Aurangabad	I/49/8-19
25.	Burhanullah, <i>faujdār</i> / <i>qila ‘dār</i>				I/41/12/12- 128 I/45/11-86 I/45/5-122
26.	Uzbek <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>faujdār</i> / <i>qila ‘dār</i>	Faṭḥābād			I/45/5-122
27.	Iftikhār <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>qila ‘dār</i> / <i>faujdār</i>	Naldurg		Bijapur	I/47/1-33
28.	Mughal <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>qila ‘dār</i> / <i>faujdār</i>	Bahādurgarh [Pedgaon]		Aurangabad	I/45/11-188 I/47/4-44
29.	‘Ali <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>faujdār</i> of Chitapur [was replaced by Khandala]	Khandala		Aurangabad	
30.	Abul Fath, <i>faujdār</i>	Sundarwar			I/46/8-24
31.	‘Azzāmullāh, <i>faujdār</i>	Naugar/ Bayawar			I/44/8-18
32.	Muḥammad Bāqir, <i>faujdār</i>	Hoshangabad	[was transferred and summoned to imperial court]		I/39/11-76
33.	Saiyid Ismā‘īl, <i>faujdār</i>	Jalnapur	[In 1702 he was <i>faujdār</i> of Raver I/44/10-85, I/45/2-37]		I/42/6-9
34.	Saiyid Ḥusain, <i>qila ‘dār</i> / <i>faujdār</i>	Kalyan			I/42/6-9 I/42/8-38 I/46/1-20
35.	Nuruddin Muḥammad, <i>faujdār</i>	Danmarni			I/42/6-9 I/0/0-627
36.	Saiyid Ḥusain, <i>qila ‘dār</i> / <i>faujdār</i>	Raver			
37.	Saiyid Ghulām Nuruddin, <i>faujdār</i>	Bayawal	[He also served in this capacity in Nasirābād]		I/44/2-87 I/46/1-20
38.	Saifuddin <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>qila ‘dār</i> / <i>faujdār</i>	Sholapur			I/44/10-85
39.	Muḥammad Afzal, <i>faujdār</i>	‘Adilābād	Asir	Khandesh	I/42/8-38 I/45/4-35 I/45/0-4
40.	Bakhtmand <u>Kh</u> ān, <i>faujdār</i>	Punar		Berār	I/45/8-38

41.	Yāsīn <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdār</i>	Sitara Azam Tara		Bijagarh	I/45/12-37 I/45/12-34
42.	Muḥammad Mansur, <i>faujdār</i>	Parangaon			I/45/12-37
43.	Saiyid Ḥasan ‘Ali <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdār</i>	Sultānpur	Nandurbar	Khandesh	I/43/6-5
44.	Karamullāh, <i>faujdār</i>	Songūr			I/46/2-114 I/46/2-134 I/0/0-734
45.	Abūl Qāsim, <i>qila ‘dār/ faujdār</i>	Gama			I/45/11-154 I/45/11-106 I/46/2-125
46.	Muḥammad Farrukh, <i>faujdār</i>	Zainpur	Asūr	Khandesh	
47.	Yaqt <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdār</i>	Dandori			I/43/2-35 I/45/9-45 I/46/10-18 I/0/0-766
48.	Shamsuddin, <i>faujdār</i>	Zainpur	Asūr	Khandesh	I/45/4-35 I/46/5-50
49.	Kāmyāb, <i>faujdār</i>	Burhānpur	Asūr	Khandesh	I/46/5-50
50.	Fazlullāh, <i>qila ‘dār/ faujdār</i>	Anjari	Bijagarh	Khandesh	I/43/2-35
51.	Zafar <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdār</i>	Paipadol			I/45/2-104
52.	Saiyid Nurullāh <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila ‘dār/ faujdār</i>	Bahādurpur			I/45/12-34
53.	Muḥammad Jamāl, <i>faujdār</i>	Miftahul Futūh			I/46/9-104
54.	Muḥammad Saleem, <i>faujdār</i>	Parangaon			I/0/0-200
55.	Saiyid Abdul Wahab, <i>faujdār</i>	‘Ādilabad	Asūr	Khandesh	I/0/0-200
56.	Saiyid ‘Ali <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdār</i>	Jalud			I/45/4-36
57.	Saiyid Manjhle, <i>faujdār</i>	Ja‘farābād <i>alias</i> Chandaur			
58.	Mu‘tabir <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdār</i>	Gulashanabad, Kalyan Bhimri			I/45/1-163 I/0/0-533 I/0/0-615
59.	Sarbarah <u>Khān</u> , <i>kotwal</i> and <i>faujdār</i>	[surrounding of the imperial armies]			I/47/1-8
60.	Amānat <u>Khān</u> <i>alias</i> <u>Kh</u> wāja Muḥammad, <i>faujdār</i>	Sangamner			I/47/5-23 I/47/10-25
61.	Lodi <u>Khān</u> <i>alias</i> Walībād <i>qila ‘dār/ faujdār</i>				I/47/10-12
62.	<u>Ghulām</u> ‘Āli <u>Khān</u>	Rajdhir			I/47/10-25
63.	Hāji Muḥammad Ma‘sum, <i>faujdār/ qila ‘dār</i>	Dandūri			I/0/0-534 I/0/0-715
64.	Salim Beg, <i>qila ‘dār/ faujdār</i>	Tirambak			I/46/1-19
65.	Rozbhani Jānbāz <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdār</i>	Hoshangabad [two <i>maḥals</i> ]			I/46/12-166
66.	Sheo Singh, <i>qila ‘dār / faujdār</i>	Islamgarh			I/44/12-110

67.	Sazāwār <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila 'dār/ faujdār</i>			Bidar	I/44/12-110
68.	Mui'n <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila 'dār/ faujdār</i>	Ausa	Nander	Bidar	
69.	Sarfrūz <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila 'dār/ faujdār</i>				I/44/8-27
70.	Harchand Rao, <i>faujdar</i>	Rājdhir			I/44/6-28
71.	Muḥammad Yūsuf, <i>faujdar</i>	Ankalkot			I/44/6-28
72.	Imāji, <i>faujdar</i>	Talilkot			I/44/10-65
73.	Sazāwār <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila 'dār/ faujdār</i>			Muahmmada bad [Bidar]	I/41/6-158
74.	Dargah Qulī <u>Khān</u> , <i>faujdar/ qila 'dār</i>	Sira			I/41/6-158
75.	Izzat <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila 'dār, faujdar</i>	Qandahar	Nander	Bidar	I/45/5-38 I/45/5-39
76.	Mehdi <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila 'dār/ faujdar</i>	Naldurg			I/0/0-540
77.	Saiyid Ḥusain, <i>qila 'dār/ faujdar</i>	Kalyan			I/0/0-540
78.	Muftakhir <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila 'dār/ faujdar</i>	Firozgarh			I/46/7-16 I/0/0-769
79.	'Abbas <u>Khān</u> , <i>qila 'dār/ faujdar</i>				I/46/7-11
80.	Saibūh <u>Khān</u> , <i>kotwal/ faujdar</i>	Bijapur [Daruzzafar]		Bijapur	I/41/11-40
81.	Kartalab <u>Khān</u> , <i>Dīwān/ faujdar</i>				I/41/11-40
82.	Allah Qulī, <i>qila 'dār/ faujdar</i>	Ankola			I/46/1-58
83.	Udāji Rām, <i>faujdar</i>	Mōhūr			I/37/4-7

#### [IV] QILA 'DĀRS AND THĀNADĀRS

Though *qila 'dārs* have already been highlighted it would not be out of context, if we take into account 23 *thānas* surrounding the province of Daruzzafar out of which 20 *thānas* have been shown as fixed as one *thānadār* Yadgar Beg is having 500 *zāt* /100 *sawār*. Six *thānas* were under the command of Arshad Khān, while two *thānas* fell under the jurisdiction of Gajpat, *faujdar* and *amīn*. Similarly 8 *thānas* fell under the command of Sarbrāh Khān while four *thānas* were situated to the west of Kishna and Ganpat rivers. There appears 214 papers out of 331 documents which demonstrate the significance of *Maḥal-i Khālīṣa* in *sarkār* Baglāna in 39<sup>th</sup> in regnal year [i.e. 1697 AD]<sup>1</sup>

We are given to understand that the *sanawāt* [years] pending against the *parganas* of *sarkār* Fateḥabad Dhūrur begin from 1077 AH/1667 A.D. on account of the realization of the

<sup>1</sup> I/40/0-70, I/40/0-71.

account of Balchand, *Karorī* of the *pāibāqī* of *ṣūba* Aurangabad which continued with certain interruptions in 1079AH/1669 AD; 1087 AH/1677 AD; 1091 AH/1680 AD, 1102 AH/1691 AD, 1109 AH/1699 A.D. Similar type of data does emerge from *sarkār* Pattan, *ṣūba* Aurangabad commencing from 1078/1079 AH/ 1668/1669 A.D. up to 1689 A.D. during which period Balchand *Karorī* and Imām Qulī<sup>1</sup>*Karorī of Muḥāsibat* continued to operate till 1107 AH/1697 A.D.

Similar instances can be multiplied as we are given to understand that such types of arrears were pending payment in *sarkār* and *ṣūba* Aurangabad from the year 1099 AH to 1108AD/1689-1698 A.D.<sup>2</sup>

However, without delving deep into the crux of the problem one has to turn back to the usual discussion which rotates round the role of the *thānadārs* and the *qīla'dārs*. It would not be out of context to draw our attention to the fact that it has been an established fact that from the time of possession of this country it is obligatory on the *Chitthi* of *deh-ba dehi* that since in the *parganas* *Deshmukhs* and *Deshpāndiyas* are those who write in Hindi and it is also must that the register of *qānūngos* of His Majesty and the *ṣūbās* would have to be uniform. If, however, it is ordered that as per the term of revenue administration of late Murshid Qulī Khān, *Chitthi* in Hindi script of the *qānūngos* issued with stamp and signature of the *Dīwāns* is sent under their *signatures*.<sup>3</sup>

The income and expenditure of *sarkār* Talkokan-i Niṣāmūl Mulki, *ṣūba* Auragabad from Ist *Shaban* 40<sup>th</sup> R.Y. to 18 *Rabi* II 45<sup>th</sup> regnal year arrives at Rs 93411/11¾. There after expenses have been shown as Rs 68960/12½. Out of 21 villages of *pargana* As'adnagar *alias* Akluj, *sarkār* Akluj, *ṣūba* Bijapur on account of *Kharif* crop of *Lui* II and *Rabi* II is owing to 1110 *faṣṭī*. Details of every necessary item are given as well.

We also come across *mawāzna-i yak ḥarfī*, *sarkār* Sangamner, *ṣūba* Aurangabad 1105

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<sup>1</sup> I/38/0-366, I/38/0-368.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/41/0-1 to I/41/0-4.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/0/0-580.

*faṣli* from the beginning of *Kharif* crop of *Tunguz II* and *RabiSichqān II* 1105 *faṣli*, which is the *jāgīr* of ‘Abdul Wāḥid Beg, *qila ‘dār* and *faujdār* comprising 23 villages. Similarly Aurangzeb also ordered that ‘Let it be sent to Mu‘tamid *Khān* as it won’t be paid in accordance with the *zābita* and routine [*m‘amūl*] though they have taken away the *bhurtī* [ears of corn] by leaving behind the grass.<sup>1</sup>

A *parwāngī* under the seal of *Sibghatullāh* was received that *Amānullah* etc, the *ṣaraffs* and *muqaddāms* of *qaṣba* Nandurbar represented that since the said *qaṣba* is on the way to Surat Port owing to which the men plead for water supply. Accordingly *Behroz Khān*, *faujdār* thereat recommended three hundred rupees and above as *in‘ām* to the *Desāī* of that *mauza* ‘ while the *Desāī* of *pargana* Nandurbar due to dearth of water left village *Dudhala’s Darra-i koh* [pass], dig the pond so as to bring the *nadi* in the *qaṣba*. Recommends the said village for digging the *band*, pond and dam of the *nadi* by way of *in‘ām* then there would become abundance of water in that *zila* ‘ as for four years Rs 4,000/ shall suffice which has been agreed by Emperor Aurangzeb.<sup>2</sup>

Aurangzeb also ordered that in addition to *amīnship* the duty of looking after the devastation from *Bangah* to *Mangal Bhera* is assigned to *Shaikh Ghulām Muḥammad* as the devastation of crop by the servants of His Majesty together with the army from *Bangah* to *Mangal Bhera* should be assessed and presented to His Majesty. Written on 2<sup>nd</sup> *Rabi II*, 41<sup>st</sup> regnal year of Aurangzeb.<sup>3</sup>

In view of the acute necessity a *dastak* was issued on 22<sup>nd</sup> *Jumada II*, 48<sup>th</sup> R.Y. of Aurangzeb [1704-5 A.D. to *Shaikh* ‘*Ināyatullāh*, *Aḥdi* [gentleman trooper] posted at the *Kachehri-i Dīwānī-iṣūbaāt-i* Deccan to the effect that since the *mawāzna-i mufaṣṣaliwa yakḥarfī*, *pargana* and *sarkār* *Junnar*, *ṣūba* *Aurangabad* from 1091 AH to 1112 *faṣli* [1682-1703 AD] in case of the measured area surrounding, south, north, east and west, distance of area, names of *deshmukhs*, *deshpāndiyasmuqaddams*, *patwaris*, *aimmadārs*, *rusūm*, *naqd-o-arāzi* and

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/45/7-31.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/43/1-72.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/41/6-1, I/41/6-2.

*in 'ām* of that group and the *bāghāt-i āmadnī-wa chāh wa ghalla* in accordance with the *zabita* is required in the office so that the requisite paper is corrected and made worthy of deliverance in the Court.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the excess in revenue it was settled that from the excess in the *parganas* of *Daruzzafar* [Bijapur] and *Khujistabuniyad* [Aurangabad] it should be realized in the *sarkār* without giving it to the *jāgīrdārs* enabling the *riā'ya* to remove their grievances which was done accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

In view of the acute crisis Aurangzeb often used to take disciplinary action against the wrong doings. It was brought to the notice that the *rasm-iṣabti* in the *ṣūbaāt-i Deccan* has spread in abundance, owing to the transfer of *jāgīrs* and the loss in *manṣabs* the *Wāqia' Nigārs* and *Sawāniḥ-nigārs* report to His Majesty that it is his charge to which Aurangzeb responded that: “In our time whatever has not been done has become possible like, *Haram* and *Bid'at* as it shall damage the country”. [IJC/46/2-26].

Though the *ḥaqīqat-iḥāl-iḥāṣil* of the ten yearly *jāgīr* of Parshotam Dās, *mushrif-i quikhāna-irikāb-isa'adat* of the *dehāt-ipargana* Kanher, *sarkār* Daulatabad from the end of 1092 AH/ till 1103 AH was shown in accordance with the *tūmār* under the seal of Qazi Fateḥ Muḥammad of the said 32 *jāgīrs* which were also held by some other *jāgīrdārs* in the *pargana* in question.<sup>3</sup> However, the imperial order was also issued that it was intimated to all the *dīwāns* of the *ṣūbajāt* that none should be given rent farming since 29 *Ramzan* 37<sup>th</sup> regnal year [1694 AD] especially to the *karorī*, *karkun*, *fotadar*, *mir deh* and the *piyadas* of *Dīwānī* and the *quzzāt* otherwise they would have to suffer the imperial wrath.<sup>4</sup>

When the matter of the *ta'ahhud* [agreement] of Saiyidi Ayyub was approved by His Majesty then the *siyāha-i tappa* was to be issued; if however after the receipt of the *deh-ba-dehi* additional amount is shown then it should be re-charged. The details of the *raqimāna* of Malik

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/48/8-4.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/43/2-127.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/35/4-7 to IJC, I/35/1-44.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/37/11-3.

‘Amber are also given therein for 85 villages.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore *raqimāna* of *pargana* Indapur *sarkār* Junnar *ṣūba* Aurangabad of the year 1704 A.D. is also furnished herewith excluding 14 villages.<sup>2</sup>

### **QĀZĪ, ṢADR MUḤTASIB**

Almost in every *pargana* we find the appointment of a *qāzī*. But as far as *ṣadr* is concerned it was at *ṣūba* level whereas the *ṣadr-ijuzv* exercised a limited sway. As far as the *muḥtasib* is concerned he however had sway over a large area. Though examples can be searched out yet we would like to draw our attention to the fact that Akram Khān was the *QāzīulQazzāt* and Muḥammad Amīn Khān was the *Ṣadrus Ṣudur*,<sup>3</sup> while ‘Abdul Qaddus was the *Ṣāhib-i Iḥtisāb* of Aurangabad.<sup>4</sup>

### **LOCAL ADMINISTRATION**

Though we find several examples of the *Kotwal* yet we can comprehend the capacity of such posts like *Qānūngo*, *Muqaddam* and *Chaudhuri*[counterpart of *deshmukh* and *desāī*] including *patwari*. However, if we take into consideration the details of the various significant posts available in different *ṣūbās* of the Deccan then we can easily visualize the real import of these offices. Sarbarōh Khān was the *Faujdar* and *Kotwal* of Daruzzalfar Bijapur.<sup>5</sup>

The Mughal administration used to take much care about the local administration. When the matter of Rudra *Qānūngo* of *ṣūba* Bijapur was approved by His Majesty in the light of his order that “Let him personally come in the night so as to represent” which was granted with the order to report it. Accordingly from the time of the conquest of the *ṣūba* the register was submitted to the imperial record office. Since the *sanad* of *qānūngoi* without any co-sharer was ready Fateḥ Daulat *qaul* required to order to deliver it enabling him to deposit the installment of *peshkash* in the treasury. Tama, the designated son of Jagan Nath and the nephew of Deva,

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/47/8-32.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/0/0-861 to IJC, I/0/0-941, excluding 14 documents not found in the collection.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/44/10-85.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/45/8-50 & IJC, I/46/2-214.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/41/11-39

*gumashta* of Jaganath and Kanha, the designated son of late Rama who was the *qānūngo* of three provinces of Aurangabad, Berar and Muḥammadabad Bidar had an *inā'm* village yielding Rs. 5,000/ wanted not only the *manṣab* but also to interfere in the *qānūngoi* of *Daruzzafar* Bijapur that was required to be rejected as per Rudra's request.

Although Jaganath, s/o Kanha, designated son of the late Rama, and Sunder the *qānūngos* of the old country have the register to take up the job yet Rudra brought *sanad* under the seal of Sikander Khān and has the register in the office. Since 31<sup>st</sup> R.Y. [1688-89] half of the *Qānūngoi* of Bijapur is in possession of Rudra while the other half is in-charge of Jagnath and Sunder contingent upon the payment of Rs. 50,0000/ as *peshkash* and *rusūm* Re. 1% per Rs. 100. They paid Rs. 7,700/ in cash and took the *asnad*. When in 33<sup>rd</sup> R.Y. [1689-90] Jagnath died and his designated son Rama submitted the *asnad* with Rudra which finally assigned Rudra conditional upon payment of Rs. 12,500/ as the *rusūm* of *peshkash*. However it was transferred to Bābu Pandit *qānūngo* of Hyerabad and the matter became confused<sup>1</sup>. But another document of IJC does clarify that Rudra was the *qānūngo* of Bijapur since 35<sup>th</sup> RY<sup>2</sup>.

*Muqaddams* used to play a quite significant role in the local administration of the Deccan provinces. There are a number of examples of their active participation. However participation in the civil administration in the event of the any encroachment upon the right of *maqaddami* a thorough investigation used to be made as Saiyid Muḥammad and Saiyid 'Abdul Qādir, sons of Saiyid Imām *muqaddam* of village Malsangi *sarkār* Sholapur, *ṣūba* Aurangabad whose father was killed and burnt. Since a thorough search revealed the true facts by Diyanat Khān as per the imperial order and the right was restored<sup>3</sup>. Similarly 100 *nitin* [8000 *bighas* of land] were also made subject of the resumption from the *muqaddam* of Sheogaon, *pargana* Bulapur without the *sanad*<sup>4</sup>.

Even reports about the imprisonment and death of the *maqaddam* were also reported,

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/41/8-30, 31 and 32.

<sup>2</sup> I/45/7-138.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/45/9-14 & I/41/10-144.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/42/3-25.

viz., we come to know about the imprisonment and death of Nakuji, *muqaddam* in the term of administration of Nizamuddin in the fort of Sholapur on 21 *Jumada* II 38 R.Y. during the term of administration of Mehdi Khān as *qila 'dār*<sup>1</sup>.

We find instances of the agreement in connection with a dispute of Rs. 1,00,000/- between Sakhuji and Raghuji, *muqaddams* of the villages of *pargana* Khandapur *sarkār* Daulatabad. There are signatures of a number of willingsnesses including that of the *patwari*<sup>2</sup>. Similarly in the event of the abscondance of the *muqaddam* a new *muqaddam* was appointed as we come to know that in accordance with the representation of the *Desmukh* and *Deshpāndiya*, of *pargana* Neusa, *sarkār* Ahmadabad *ṣūba* Aurangabad the *muqaddam* of Ramji Bari has resorted to flight 25 years ago owing to which the village has become desolated and ruined as without the *muqaddam* the village can not prosper. The Prince's order was issued for appointing a new *muqaddam*<sup>3</sup>.

The *muqaddams* used to take responsibility for getting cultivated the *banjar* [uncultivated land] of *qaṣba* Bailgaon, belonging to *pargana* Ja'frabad as per the statement of Nahir Khān for which order was issued to Sanbhaji who ordered the same for a revenue of Rs. 1000/ by the *muqaddam* of the newly brought to cultivation *qaṣba* in favour of Ghulam Muḥiuddin s/o Sangram Khān<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> I/42/1-88.

<sup>2</sup> I/42/8-24 & I/42/8-25.

<sup>3</sup> I/42/4-13.

<sup>4</sup> I/43/11-13.

## VII LAND REVENUE & TAXES

### [I] PROBLEM OF REVENUE COLLECTION

This is an established fact that the *manṣabdārs* of the Mughal Empire used to receive their pay either in cash [*naqdi*] or in the form of assignments of areas of land from which they were entitled to collect the land revenue and all other taxes imposed by the Mughal Empire. Since the assignments were known as *jāgīr* and *tuyūl*, though sometimes the term *iqta* ‘ used in the time of the Delhi Sultāns, was also employed. It need not be emphasized that the officers, when paid in cash were known as *naqdi*, and were holding assignments, as *jāgīrdārs* and *tuyūldārs*. Interestingly enough, author of *Mirat-ūl-Istilah* suggests that as the term *tuyūl* was originally used for assignments held by the Princes of royal blood, but at least in the time of Aurangzeb, the term was indifferently used for all assignments.<sup>1</sup> It may, however, be stated that the land which was served for the income of crown was called the *Khālīṣa* or *Khālīṣa Sharīfa*<sup>2</sup> and such areas which were to be assigned, but were for the time being managed by imperial officers were known as *pāibāqī*.<sup>3</sup>

Generally speaking by far larger part of the Empire was assigned in *jāgīr*, viz. in the 10<sup>th</sup> reginal year of Aurangzeb, out of the total estimated revenue [*jama* ‘*dāmi*] of 924 crores of *dāms* for the whole Empire, 725 crore *dāms* were assigned to *jāgīrdārs* or placed in *pāibāqī*.<sup>4</sup> It may be stated that nothing like the *karorī* experiment of Akbar, when practically the whole Empire had been placed in the *Khālīṣa* was repeated in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, practically in the last years of Jahangir’s reign the *Khālīṣa* shrank to 28 crores of *dāms*<sup>5</sup> or less than 1/20<sup>th</sup> of the total *jama* ‘. But afterwards especially in the reign of Shāhjahān, an expansion of the *Khālīṣa* had taken place. We are given to understand that its *jama* ‘ stood at 120 crores out of the total *jama* ‘ of 660

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<sup>1</sup> We are given to understand that the *jāgīr* of the Princes are usually indicated by such phrases as *jāgīr-i* or *Ināyat-Wukala-i sarkār-i Daulatmadar*.

<sup>2</sup> *Miratu-l Istilah*, 15 [a].

<sup>3</sup> *Khulāṣatus Siyāq*, f. 24 [b] *Waqāi-Ajmer*, p 7-4, 375-6, f 156-157 [a].

<sup>4</sup> *Miratu-l ‘Alam*, f. 214[b].

<sup>5</sup> Qazwini, p. 423, for the *jama* ‘ of the Empire see *Majālis-i Salaṭin*, ff. 115 [a-b].

crores i.e. it was over 1/7<sup>th</sup> of the whole empire in Shāhjahān's 20<sup>th</sup> years. Thus in Aurangzeb's 10<sup>th</sup> year; it amounted to almost one fifth of the total *jama*.<sup>1</sup> However, no later information about the precise extent of the *Khālīṣa* is available.

Thus these data show that the *Khālīṣa* covered a very large portion of the empire, but the Emperor was also in command of a commendable income collected directly by his treasury. Out of this he paid own troops, artillery men, attendants, etc and the *naqdimanṣabdārs*. However, the fact remains that no less than 4/5<sup>th</sup> of the revenue of the Empire had been alienated to the *jāgīrdārs* in Aurangzeb's tenth regnal year and the *Khālīṣa* amounted to one-fifth of the total *jama*.<sup>2</sup>

Although much emphasize has been laid on the land revenue and taxes yet problems of revenue collection have to be solicited in one go. Fortunately the land revenue administration in the six *ṣūbās* of the Deccan gradually began to be altered in a more systematic way especially after 1687 AD, when the whole of the Deccan came to at the high rise of conclusion. Much emphasize has been laid down on the potentialities of the capitalistic development in the economy of the Mughal empire; but equal attention on this however, has not been paid. Undoubtedly the supply of the *āwārja* of *Khālīṣa Sharīfa* and the *āwārja* of the *jāgīrdārs* of *ṣūbās*, of Khandesh, Hyderabad, Berar, Aurangaabd, Bijapur and Bidar had already established the position of these provinces. However, in the last years of Aurangzeb the expenses were increasing day by day while the income was reducing gradually. It was also clarified that expenses of Aurangabad, Bijapur, Berar, Khandesh were used to be met out from the *Hundwis* of Hindustan which Aurangzeb also continued including 30,000 rupees of the *piyadas* of Mawaliya etc<sup>3</sup>

Rūḥullāh *Khān* communicated the imperial order that in the office of the Deccan the *Chiththi-Deh-ba-Dehi* is not written in Hindwi whereas the fact remains that this practice of writing in Hindwi is from the beginning of the control of the country. Since in the *pargana* the

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<sup>1</sup> Lahori, *Padshahnāmā*, II, pp. 710-13.

<sup>2</sup> *Miratu-l 'Alam*, *op. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/46/10-65.

*Deshmukhs* and *Deshpandiyas* are Hindi writing ones and it is must that the register of *Qānūngos* of the emperor and the *ṣūba* be in consonance with each other without any differentiation. If orders be issued that action should be taken in accordance with late Murshid Quḷī Khān's order in the Hindwi so that the *Qānūngos* should write in Hindwi without any stamp and signature of *Dīwān*.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately we come to know that a crisis in the assignment system developed in the last years of Aurangzeb carried on an unending war in the Deccan, in which the concentration of the entire military power of the Deccan failed to give him ultimate success. However, during these years there was an enormous influx into the ranks of the *manṣabdārs* of the Deccan or officers from the Deccan kingdoms and the Marathas. We also come to know that the number of the *manṣabdārs*, as a result, increased to such an extent that the existing *jāgīrs* could no longer suffice for their pay.<sup>2</sup>

Interestingly in one of the letters, Aurangzeb himself refers to “the scarcity of *pāibāqī* and the crowds of men claiming pay” and declares that everything “flesh and bones”, had been assigned no further demands for assignments could be entertained by the court.<sup>3</sup> We also come to acquaint ourselves with the fact that Ma‘mūri and Khāfi Khān make similar statements. “Large numbers [literally a world]” we are informed “had become *jāgīr*-less [*be-jāgīr*]” Moreover, persons appointed to *manṣabs* could not obtain *jāgīrs* for years, and if a *jāgīr* was transferred from the hands of anyone, he might not get another.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore the older nobility [or the so-called *khāna-zādān*] were extremely indigent at the way their claims were disregarded to provide for the Deccanis.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately the real victims of the crisis were the small *manṣabdārs*, who

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/0/10-580.

<sup>2</sup> Ma‘mūri, ff. 156 [b]-157 [a], Khāfi Khān, Add. 6574, ff. 101 [b]-107[a]. Unfortunately the striking passage, inveighing against the influx of Deccanis, is omitted in the Bib. Ind. Text of Khāfi Khān. Moreover on the influx of the Deccanis see M. Athar Ali's *Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, 26-30.

<sup>3</sup> *Dasturu-l 'Amal Agahi*, 1-31, Add 6574, ff. 17 [b]-18 [a].

<sup>4</sup> Ma‘mūri, f. 157 [a], Khāfi Khān, Add 6574, f. 107 [a].

<sup>5</sup> Ma‘mūri, f. 182 [b]- Khāfi Khān, II, 379, 396-7.

possessed neither money nor the influence to induce the officers of the court to assign them *jāgīrs*.<sup>1</sup>

Much interest has been displayed in recent years in the study of Mughal revenue statistics found in contemporary records. There is abundance of such information in *arhasattha* and *ḥaqīqat-bahi* documents relating to Eastern Rajasthan, preserved in the Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, which provide considerable agricultural data, like crops, plough-oxen, items of taxation, village-wise revenue collections, prices of agricultural products, etc

Attention in an equal measure is yet to be paid to the massive Mughal period records particularly ‘Inayat Jang Collection’ reposing in the National Archives, New Delhi.<sup>2</sup> This collection furnishes statistical and geographical information about various *parganas* of the *ṣūbās* of the Deccan and provides a fascinating account of the way the Mughal revenue administration was organized. Illustrative of its richness are two contemporary series of documents coming from the *parganas* ‘Ādilābād<sup>3</sup> and Fathābād [Laling], *sarkār* of Burhanpur in the *ṣūba* of Khandesh both belonging to the year *faṣli* 1104/AD 1696.

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<sup>1</sup> Ma‘mūri, ff. 156 [b]-157 [a]; *Kḥāfi Kḥān*, 6574, 106[b]-107[a], Aurangzeb himself admitted in this condition ‘great injustice is done to the small men [*reza-ha*], *Dasturul ‘Amal-i Āgahi* 1-31 [a]-Add 6574, f. 107[a]. J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, 158-62. 308-9, expresses some reserve in regard to the pressure on *jagirs* developing in the late years of Aurangzeb, But however, as Athar ‘Ali, *Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, rev., edn. xxxii, has demonstrated, Richards has read too much in a document containing what he assumed to be “the 1689-90 settlement” of the conquered Kingdom, and over looked a document of 1706 [printed in *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb’s Reign*, 233-5] which furnishes an entirely contrary picture, at least for the 19 Karnatak *sarkārs* of *ṣūba* Haiderabad.

<sup>2</sup> M. Athar Ali, Review of J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration in Golconda* [OUP, 1975], *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXV February, 1976, p.159. There are yet another incomplete series of 39 documents of Ādilābād, 1693-4 A.D.

<sup>3</sup> I am thankful to my colleagues Miss Nighat Shigufa National Archives who has helped me in preparing a brief but comprehensive chart of the information gleaned from these documents [Appendix - C] as well as to Dr. Muḥammad Irfan for helping me in checking the relevant information from the huge plethora of over 15, 000 of records of Aurangzeb’s reign in the Inayat Jung Collection of the National Archives.

We here take for scrutiny the documents of *pargana* ‘Ādilābād.<sup>1</sup> These furnish a village-wise report on the revenue status of the *pargana* for the closing years of the seventeenth century sent by ‘Abdullāh, *dīwān* of Khandesh to the Mughal *Dīwān* of the Deccan.<sup>2</sup>

Like the *arthasattha* documents the face sheet summarises the information from the report. It gives the total number for sheets as 63 and the number of villages as 135, of which 124 are classified as *aṣṭī* and 11 as *dakhilī*. The revenue figures of the *aṣṭī* villages are alone given, because the *dakhilī* villages were newly settled whose revenues were incorporated in those of older [*aṣṭī*] villages.<sup>3</sup> The summary sheet gives the total measured area of *ai‘mma* [lands alienated in revenue grants], *uftāda* [waste] and *mazrūa* [cultivated]. The total revenues are given systematically in two units; rupees and Khandeshi *tankas* as the names of officials have also been recorded. The papers give information on a set proforma for each of 124 villages in the *pargana*, the name of the villages; its location defined in *kurohs* from the *pargana* headquarters with compass direction; the name of the principle *jāgīrdārs*, the name of the *muqaddams*, *patels*, *chaudhurīs* and the *patwārīs*; land cultivated, land fallen out of cultivation, land reserved for revenue grants, all measured in *aut* [80 *bighas*], *partan* [4 *bighas*], and *biswās*<sup>4</sup>; the resources of irrigation, the fixed *ḥāṣil* for the entire village; revenue collected and the balance of tax due to natural calamity [*āfat*].

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/40/0-1 to I/40/0-63.

<sup>2</sup> Stewart Gordon and J.F. Richards have also analysed these documents in a joint paper 'Kinship and *Pargana* in Eighteenth Century Khandesh, *IESHR*, 22, 4[1985] pp.371-3. They err, however, in treating it as a unique report coming from the Deccan during 17th century because another series of documents, though, incomplete, of the same *sarkār* and *ṣūba* of the year 1696 is to be found in the Inayat Jang Collection [IJC, I/36/0-24-45 to I/36/0-63-70]. Moreover, the 63 page report stamped with the seal of ‘Abdullāh, 32/1099, which they consider to be the date of his appointment is contradicted by another seal of the same *Dīwān* which bears the date 34/1102. This series of documents supplemented by other documents cited in this chapter gives an intimate picture of ‘Ādilābād’s agricultural and administrative set up obtaining in the seventeenth century. Interestingly the authors have either conveniently overlooked this important piece of corroborating evidence or they had no access to such documents.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., Irfan Habib; *Agrarian Systems of Mughal India*, Bombay, 1963, p.252n. The Mughal administration also maintained an account of the newly settled villages [*dehat-i nāuabād*] in various *parganas*. Z.A. Shakeeb [ed.] *Mughal Archives*, A.P. State Archives, 1977, vol. I, p. 295.

<sup>4</sup> Khāfi Khān informs us that although in the *ṣūbas* of the Deccan the *bigha* was in use, yet most often the *aut* was used in the office [records] so that in Khandesh four *bigha-i-ra* [‘*iyatī*] made a *partan* and 20 *partans* or 80 *bighas* constituted an *aut*. [*Muntakhabul Lubab*, Bibliothica Indica, Calcutta, 1869, I, p. 735. Ṣādiq Khān also makes a passing reference to this measure. *Tawārīkh-i Shāhjahān* Br. Mu. Or. 174 f.183 [a].

## GEOGRAPHICAL SURVEY

The distance and compass directions, indicating for each village, [except for five], help us locate over 90% of the villages with the help of modern census data and one-inch maps. I have been able to plot 114 villages out of 124 villages or 92% [see map]<sup>1</sup>. In order to re-establish the villages names, I have collated them with *Deh ba dehi*, an eighteenth century anonymous compilation and the *District Census Handbook*<sup>2</sup>. The specification in *kurohs* from the *pargana* headquarters in each village sheet is fairly accurate. There is still the possibility of the existence of some more villages of the seventeenth century whose survival is obtained by changes of name or merger with other villages<sup>3</sup>. The accompanying map indicates that *pargana* ‘Ādilābād was a rather small administrative unit [*qaṣba*] in *sarkār* Burhānpur[Asūr], *ṣūba* Khandesh, whose limits coincided with those of the modern Edalabad Maḥal and part of Bhuswal Taluka in district Jalgaon [previously known as East Khandesh]. ‘Ādilābād itself stood south-east of Burhānpur at a distance of 12 *kurohs*<sup>4</sup>. River Tapti formed the northern boundary of the *pargana* for a distance of about 30 miles. A tributary of Purna river constituted the southern boundary of the *pargana* and to the west it comprised only the river-irrigated villages. It was thirty *kurohs* from east to west and 10 *kurohs* from north to south. Vaghur river joined the Tapti near the village of Bhangora in the north-east. Purna river itself flowed almost through the centre of the *pargana*.

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<sup>1</sup> I am thankful to M/s Zahoor Ali Khān and Faiz Habib who have kindly drawn the map. Survey measurement of *pargana* ‘Ādilābād was begun in 1862-3 and classification in 1863-4 both finished in 1869-70, according to which, of the 114 villages 111 paid tax to Government and three alienated in revenue free grants [James, Campbell *Khandesh District Gazetteer*, 1880 p.449. This suggests the disappearance or amalgamation of 10 villages over two centuries as 114 villages existed in 1862, which have been shown on modern maps and plotted in our map. Of the remaining 10 villages recorded in our documents six were situated in the east and two each in west and south. In 1951 another 11 villages were marked as deserted out of 75 villages of *pargana* ‘Ādilābād [*East Khandesh District Census Handbook*, 1951, Bombay, pp.250-58] while in 1961 two villages were mentioned as deserted out of 85 villages [*Jalgaon District Census Handbook*, 1961, Bombay, p. 1].


<sup>2</sup> *Kitāb-i Deh-ba Dahi-i Ṣūbajāt-i Deccan*, A.P. State Archives Ms.373, ff 9/4 [a] 95 [b]. This work contains village-wise revenue statistics of the *parganas* of the Deccan provinces. I have used it essentially for comparative purpose and village names missing in our documents [i.e. Bahadurpur [mod. Bahadurgarh] and Nachangaon [mod. Naragaon] have been located with its help.

<sup>3</sup> Shafiq and Thākur Lal do not, provide the distance of *pargana* ‘Ādilābād from the headquarters. Lachmi Narain Shafiq’ *Khulāṣatu-l Hind*, Transcript Department of History, Aligarh, 1096, Thakur Lal. Ms. Br. Mu. Add. 22, 831 f. 45 [a].

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/40/0-1; Abū-l Faḥl, *Ā’in-i Akbarī* Nawal Kishor, 1297 AH, Lucknow, Vol. II, 108, Irfan Habib, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, OUP, Delhi 1982 Map 14 A&B, Stewart Gordon, ‘Burhanpur; Entrepot and Hinterland, 1650-1750’. *IESHR* Vol. XXV, No.4, p.432 wherein he records his observations about *pargana* ‘Ādilābād.

# VILLAGES PARGANA ADILABAD

Modern taluka boundary - - -



The settlement pattern shows that the villages were concentrated along the bank of the rivers or laid out of this zone spread over roughly at three-quarters of a mile from another. Four villages have been specifically recorded standing on the banks of river Tapti<sup>1</sup>. ‘Ādilābād was situated on the well-travelled route from Aurangabad to Burhānpur. The *pargana* had three towns, viz., ‘Ādilābād, Charthane and Wadhoda<sup>2</sup>.

Since almost all the villages survived modern maps are traceable [see map], Gordon and Richards are in error in saying that ‘there is considerable disparity in [Mughal and Maratha] village names due to which less than half the village names co-relate, even when using the additional data of geographical co-ordinates’. They consider ‘Ādilābād’s extensive periods of adversity responsible for this so-called disparity. A plausible explanation of this error is that their description of the village names is not often based on a direct examination of the original documents.<sup>3</sup> The situation in ‘Ādilābād actually mirrors that of Mawar, where the names of villages in Nainsi’s record are traceable in modern toposheets up to a surprisingly high rate of 90%.<sup>4</sup>

## MEANS OF IRRIGATION

In its description of ‘Ādilābād, the *Ā’in-i Akbarī* refers to the existence of an important irrigation tank:

‘Ādilābād is a fine [*gazīn*] town near which is tank [*golabi*] a famous place of worship as the sin of Raja Jasrath [Dashrath] was atoned here. It is full throughout the year and irrigates a large agricultural tract<sup>5</sup>’.

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<sup>1</sup> These villages were Belaswadi, Belkhede Bhankhede and Bhokri. IJC, I/40/1-27-29.

<sup>2</sup> Gordon and Richards have assumed ‘Ādilābād and Bodva as towns while these were in fact three, and Bodva was - a village and not a town, *op.cit.*, p. 370.

<sup>3</sup> J.F. Richards' *Mughal Administration in Golconda* [Preface] wherein he refers to his caring for his inaccuracies in deciphering and transcribing the documents. [see Appendix – C for further illucidation].

<sup>4</sup> The north-eastern boundaries of *pargana* ‘Ādilābād shown by Gordon and Richards cover a larger area than the Mughal period boundaries of 1696. The plotting of Daulatpur [represented by them Daulatpur] is also erroneous, Daulatpur is located within the modern Edalabad Maḥal.

<sup>5</sup> *Ā’in-i-Akbarī*, p. 107.

Almost the entire *pargana* had access to various sources of irrigation. Except for eight villages, fields in almost every village were watered from rivers, streams, watercourses [*nālas*], tanks and wells. The chief rivers were the tributaries of the Tapti, viz., the Purna and Vaghur. Forty-nine villages were watered by rivers out of which 24 received irrigation directly from Tapti and 18 from Purna. Seven villages were drained by other perennial rivers. A small river Ganga was used for irrigating ‘Ādilābād town [also supplied by wells]. The Kalinj river supplied water for villages Kothe, Kalwade and Dhabe, the Sivri irrigated Suzali, and the Vaghur, the villages of Jogukhori. Nine villages obtained water from *nullahs*. No canals are recorded.

Fifty villages have irrigation wells recorded. In 1879 the number of wells<sup>1</sup> was put in the vicinity of 1000 in the ‘Ādilābād section of Bhuswal subdivision. Gordon and Richards argue that if the same figure held true for the 50 villages of the Mughal statistics recording wells, there must have been approximately 20 wells in each such village, meaning that 50 to 100 *bighas* could be irrigated by them in each.

The tank mentioned in the *Ā’in* has also been recorded in village Hartale as *talab* in our documents and called Hartala Talab in the lists of Shafīq and *Miscellaneous Deccan Records & C.*<sup>2</sup> It appears on modern maps.

Out of the total number of villages, 54.5% took water for irrigation from rivers and reservoirs and 40% from wells. For 5.5% we have no information as to irrigation.

## TAXATION AND SETTLEMENT

*Pargana* ‘Ādilābād was subjected to survey and brought under *zabt* system as a result of the revenue reforms of Murshid Qulī Khān in the middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the area of cultivated *raqba*, and the total measured area [*muqarrara raqaba-i arāzi*]. Our documents give totals of the

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<sup>1</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 144 of Gordon and Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 381; Charthane is said to have once had 700 wells and to have been a large thriving town. Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

<sup>2</sup> Anonymous, *Miscellaneous Deccan Records & C. Br. Mu.*

area, with further specification of revenue-free [*ai'mma*], wastes and cultivated land. The figures are given below together with totals counted by us from the individual village figures:

**TABLE 1**

	<i>Aimma</i> [Land Grants]	<i>Uftada</i> [Waste Land]	<i>Mazrua'</i> [Cultivated Land]	Total
Total <i>bighas</i> [original]	14511-16	180707	1,75,283-10=	2,87,865-134
Percent	5	34	61=	100
Total <i>bighas</i> [calculated]	15987-4	95326	1,53,136=	2,63,450
Percent	5.7	36.18	58.75	100

The originals are given in *auts*, *partans*, *bighas* and *biswas*. I have converted them into *bighas*, taking one *aut* = 80 *bighas* and one *partan* = 4 *bighas*. The figures derived from totaling up village figures vary from the total as recorded for the whole *pargana*. Probably this arose because results of new village surveys were not correspondingly reflected in the *pargana* total. If the *ai'mma* land is added to the cultivated land as it too was normally under cultivation, the total cultivated areas comes to 63.83% of the total measured land. In contrast 36.17% was waste<sup>1</sup>. The *ai'mma* lands [5.7% of the total area] have been indicated in 40 villages out of which four villages [in entirety] were designated, as *madad-i ma'āsh*, one of which was for the upkeep of the mausoleum of Shāhnawāz Khān. Two of the *ai'mma* villages show *uftada* and *mazrua'* alongside *ai'mma* land, which suggests that some area was not assigned to the grantee here. Complete information was also called for about cropping within *ai'mma* lands.

Equally rich information about revenue is furnished in respect of all the villages. The formal assessed revenue [*jama'dāmi*] of 122 villages of *pargana* has been shown as 1,48,14,547 *dāms*.<sup>2</sup> The *jama'* did not indicate the exact expected revenues in a given year, and it was therefore, revised at protracted intervals [say ten years] as shown in the following table in respect of our *pargana*.

<sup>1</sup> In view of our calculations, it is difficult to agree with Gordon and Richards contention that just over one-quarter of land was actually cultivated out of the entire measured land. I have come across a single reference in a complaint of a *jāgīrdār* that the area: under cultivation in the *jāgīr* villages in 'Ādilābād was one third of the total surveyed land [IJC, I/45/0-2].

<sup>2</sup> The summary sheet does not indicate the total *dām* except for mentioning the head *muqarrara dam-i tankhwāhī* [fixed salary]. I have, therefore, totaled the *dāms* from the individual village sheets.

**TABLE 2**

S.No.	Name of the Source	Total villages	<i>aşli</i>	<i>dakhilī</i>	<i>jama‘dāmi</i>	<i>ḥāşil</i> with year
1.	<i>A‘in-i Akbarī</i> <sup>1</sup>	-	-	-	5,27,223	1601
2.	Inayat Jung Collection <sup>2</sup>	135	124	11	1,48,1457 [for 122 villages]	Rs. 1,68,539/1696 A.D. 1,71,000/1702 A.D.
3.	Inayat Jung Collection <sup>3</sup>	-	-	-	1,55,54,539	11,71,000/1702-13 A.D.
4.	Inayat Jung Collection <sup>4</sup>	-	-	-	-	Rs. 1,90144/31706 A.D.
5.	Inayat Jung Collection <sup>5</sup>	-	-	-	-	Rs. 1,59,514/3 1715 A.D.
6.	<i>Dasturu-l Amal-i Shahanshahi</i> <sup>6</sup>	135	124	11	-	Rs. 1,76,560/9
7.	<i>Khulasatu-l Hind</i> <sup>7</sup>	135	124	11	-	Rs. 1,76,560/9
8.	<i>Dah ba Dehi-i Şubājat-i Deccan</i> <sup>8</sup>	135	124	11	-	Rs. 1,76,560/1697 A.D.
9.	<i>Miscellaneous Deccan Records</i> <sup>9</sup>	135	124	11	-	Rs. 1,76,560/9

*Ā‘in* furnishes the earliest *jama‘* figures given in *tanka* for *pargana* ‘Ādilābād. The *jama‘* persisted till Aurangzeb’s reign with slight modification like the introduction of Mughal *dām*.

In the above table, 1-2 mark a revision in the *jama‘dāmi*. In sharp contrast serial numbers 6-7 give the same *jama‘dāmi* figures for an unspecified period, which were, most probably compiled in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The *jama‘* figures of individual villages also varied, as a comparison of our 1696 documents with some other documents in Inayat Jang Collection enable us to establish. The following Table may be considered as illustrative:

<sup>1</sup> Abū-l Fazl *op cit.* p.108.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., Shireen Moosvi: *Economy of the Mughal Empire*, OUP, 1995, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/40/0-1.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/45/4-35.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/45-4-35.

<sup>6</sup> Thākur La‘l, Br. Mu. Add. 22831 f 45 a.

<sup>7</sup> Lachhmi Narūin Shafīq *Khulōşatul Hind* [transcript Deptt. Of History A.M.U. Aligarh] p.96.

<sup>8</sup> Anonymous, *op. cit.*, folios 94b-95a.

<sup>9</sup> Anonymous *Miscellaneous Deccan Records & C* [microfilm Dept. of History A.M.U. Aligarh].

**TABLE 3<sup>1</sup>**

S.NO.	Name of village	<i>jama'dāmi</i>	<i>ḥāṣil</i>	Year
1 [a]	Bodvad	76,074	Rs. 874	1696, 1702
[b]	“	76,074	Rs. 875	1704
[c]	“	72,335		1705
2 [a]	Khamani	1,32,880	Rs. 429	1696
[b]	“	6,80,300	Rs. 425	1703
3 [a]	Bhor	37,000	Rs. 425	1696
[b]	“	28,350	Rs. 648	1703
4 [a]	Pimpri Bhoja	1,76,500	Rs. 1487	1696
[b]	“	1,76,000	Rs. 1241	1698
5 [a]	Naigaon	87,000	Rs. 1110	1696
[b]	“	1,60,000	Rs. 2000	1701
6 [a]	Ghorasgaon	5,50,000	Rs. 4710	1696
[b]	“	6,40,000	Rs. 4720	1701
7 [a]	Panjana	85,500	Rs.849	1696
[b]	“	99,150	Rs.892	1701
8 [a]	Wadhod	-	Rs.7667	1696
[b]	“	7,69,000	Rs.7804	1698
9 [a]	Sakegaon	4,77,450	Rs.7746	1696
[b]	“	7,52,047	-	1703
10 [a]	Itwa	3,75,000	Rs.1790	1696
[b]	“	1,00,000	Rs.1702	1707
11 [a]	Belaswadi	1,40,000	Rs.1794	1696
[b]	“	1,70,000	Rs.1761	1707
12 [a]	Dhabe	25,500	Rs.516	1696, 1698
13 [a]	Manegaon	1,30,000	Rs.1421	1696
[b]	“	99,000	Rs.1110	1704
14 [a]	Saroba	76,000	Rs.843	1696
[b]	“	-	Rs.945	1704
15 [a]	Khubkhera	70,000	Rs.562	1696
[b]	“	55,350	Rs.571	1699
16 [a]	Dhikhi	2,67,000	Rs.322	1696
[b]	“	23,616	Rs.322	1702
17 [a]	Badgaon	1,82,000	Rs.1348	1696
[b]	“	1,84,000	Rs.1348	1707
18 [a]	Pimprala	1,49,900	Rs.1976	1696
[b]	“	1,61,000	Rs.2164	1702

In order to determine the magnitude of land revenue demand with exactitude the Mughal administration worked out the anticipated collection of figure known as *muqarrara ḥāṣil* which

<sup>1</sup> Sources = IJC, I/40/0-4, I/40/0-11, I/40/0-12, I/40/0-13, I/40/0-20, I/40/0-21, I/40/0-23, I/40/0-24, I/40/0-27, I/40/0-32, I/40/0-37, I/40/0-38, I/40/0-42, I/40/0-47, I/40/0-55, I/40/0-58, I/40/0-60, I/40/0-62, I/42/1-90, I/42/8-53, I/43/1-28, I/43/2-126, I/44/2-43, I/44/11-59, I/44/12-133, I/45/2-60, I/45/3-4, I/45/7-30, I/45/7-91, I/45/7-142, I/46/2-172, I/46/7-79, I/46/8-29, I/46/8-66, I/47/7-59, I/47/12-28, I/51/11-33, I/51/12-195.

was more meaningful. The established collection of the entire *pargana* has been given both in Khandeshtanka [*tanka-i Dandeshi*] and Mughal silver rupee in our documents. The total amounts to 2,52,809 Dandeshi Coins and 1,68,539/11 rupees/respectively. The loss [*āfat*]<sup>1</sup> and balance [*tatimma*] have also been recorded in the two units of money<sup>2</sup>. The fixed revenue collection is 45.78% of the *jama*‘, the actual realization is 32.3% or roughly one third of it. But it is 74% of the established collections [Rs.1,19,648/-] as a loss of 26% has been expressly entered.

Within *pargana* ‘Ādilābād there were two kinds of black soils, first the rich alluvial clay found north of the town which yielded finest crops, and secondly the poorer one in the north-east<sup>3</sup>. Our documents do not furnish details of crops, as given in similar documents of Bijapur<sup>4</sup>. Irfan Habib has noted cotton and sugarcane as the economic products of *sarkār* Burhanpur and its vicinity<sup>5</sup>. The demand per *bigha* under cultivation in 1696 was Rs.1.40. But this relatively high imposition of taxation suggests that cash crops, including food grains of superior kind were being cultivated.

A checking of 14 villages out of 24 irrigated by the Tapti yields varying ratios of the actual to the standard [the income for 10 villages has not been recorded]. The actual was 73% of the established. Seventeen out of 18 villages irrigated by Purna show the percentage as 59.5%, Similarly 46 out of 50 villages irrigated from wells show the actual realization as 54.15% of the standard. However, in several villages served by wells and the Tapti the ratio is in the vicinity of 100%. Six out of 7 villages watered from perennial rivers and the tributaries of Tapti give a low

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<sup>1</sup> It gives an average of Rs. 1369 per year for each village or town and not 1359 as calculated by Richards, ‘Official Revenues and Money Flows in a Mughal Province’ in *Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India*, OUP, 1987. p. 216.

<sup>2</sup> Gordon and Richards erroneously designate the figure for loss [*āfat*] as receipts [*wuṣūli*], *wuṣūli* being their own term, not that of the documents. Their calculations imply 100 per cent income [both receipts and arrears] which in our *pargana* seems to be next to impossible. The revenue did not even reach the established collection [*muqarrara ḥāṣil*] due to loss of revenues on account of bad harvests, destruction of cultivation owing to Maratha depredations, Mughal expeditions, passage of the *banjārās* and attack of the locusts etc See my article: ‘Maratha-Mughal Conflicts --- Seen Through the Documents of the Later Years of Aurangzeb’s Reign’. Cyclostyled volume of Aligarh Papers 1988, pp. 137-54]. For each year the returns were categorized thus: the fixed collections, the loss in revenues due to calamities [*āfat*] and the balance of tax [*tatimma*] or actual collection. The *āfat* and *tatimma* were equal to fixed revenues [*muqarrar-ḥāṣil*]

<sup>3</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p.349.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/46/0-1 to I/46/0-46.

<sup>5</sup> *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire* OUP, Delhi, 1982, Sheet 14, B.

ratio of 50% but 6 villages out of 9 watered from the nullahs show the very high realization of 77%. There seems from these and other cases to be no certain correlation between access to irrigation and the realization.

Information on *jama*<sup>6</sup> and *hāṣilis* provided for the four *aimma* villages and 36 other villages which also contained revenue free grants. This raises the question whether the information about the tax income was obtained from the *patwārīs* of these villages, though this was not of any immediate use to the administration at least in the four *aimma* villages where the tax income in its entirety belonged to the grantees.

The *hāṣil* like *jama*<sup>6</sup> is given first in *Khandeshtanka* and then in Mughal silver rupee. The deduction [*āfat*] and then the net revenue [*tatimma*] are also given in these two money units. The universality of money/ tax suggest that Murshid Qulī *Khān* had succeeded in converting tax demand in money terms at least in this area.<sup>1</sup>

### ADMINISTRATION OF JĀGĪRS

The ‘*Ādilābād*’ documents give us considerable information about the administrative set up since they give the names of the *jāgīrdārs* in whose assignments each village lay and the names of the village official. The summary sheet mentions four important officials, one of whom was Muḥammad Afzal, the Imperial *faujdar* [commandant] of the *pargana*. In 1700 he held the rank of 500 *zāt* 5-monthly had 250 *sawars*<sup>2</sup> of which 100 *zāt* 5-monthly and 250 *sawars* of which 200 *sawars* were conditional<sup>3</sup>. Though he made Zainpur to the Imperial Court, this does not necessarily mean that his jurisdiction extended to that *pargana* as well.<sup>4</sup> He remained *faujdar* of ‘*Ādilābād*’ till 1702,<sup>5</sup> when he was transferred. He was dismissed subsequently and ‘*Abdul*

<sup>1</sup> Šādiq *Khān*, *Shāhjahān Nāma*, Ms.Br.Mus.Or. 174.

<sup>2</sup> I/42/1-90

<sup>3</sup> I/46/6-12, I/46/6-17.

<sup>4</sup> We are told he represented the case of one ‘*Abdullāh*, a tax-exempt grant holder of village Melgaon whose 20 *bighas* of land were being withheld by Nek Muḥammad Afghān, the newly appointed *jāgīrdār* of Zainpur. Muḥammad Afzal, solicited the assignment of that village himself to meet the balance [*tatimma ṭalab*] of his salary so that he could transfer the disputed land to the *aimmadār* as *waqf* [IJC, I/42/1-33.].

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/45/4-35.

Wahab' was made the *faujdār* of 'Ādilābād,<sup>1</sup> Muḥammad Afzal died in 1704.<sup>2</sup> Since 'Ādilābād town was his seat of residence, one of his relatives represented after Afzal's death that, the fifty years old *jāgīr* is like *waṭan* [*jāgīr*]' and solicited its restoration to him.<sup>3</sup> He was an influential *faujdār* who firmly entrenched in the locality.<sup>4</sup>

Qāzi Najmuddin and Bhakkaji Badhu [sic] held the judicial office of *qāzi*, the former was attached to 'Ādilābād town, and 101 surrounding villages lay within his jurisdiction, while the latter's jurisdiction extended over the remaining 23 villages. Qāzi Najmuddin had been appointed in 1681 or even earlier<sup>5</sup>. Muḥammad Dost was the Imperial intelligencer [*wāqia* ' *nigār*] who submitted regular reports of the public events and official news directly to his superior in Aurangabad for transmission to the Court. Mahadev Nāyak held the offices of *deshmukh*, *deshpāndiya* and *qānūngo* who had to look after the collection of revenues and the maintenance of accurate records concerning revenue assessment and realization. The combination of the twin offices of *deshmukh* and *deshpāndiya/qānūngo* is of some interest though it was not unique in Mughal administration. These four officials appointed by the Imperial administration attended to the executive, judicial, revenue and communication duties in *pargana* 'Ādilābād.

The village documents give us the names of the *muqaddams*, *patels*,<sup>6</sup> *chaudhurīs* and the *patwārīs* these officials being in a sense, subordinate to the *deshmukh*, *deshpāndiya*<sup>7</sup> and *qānūngo* in maintaining order and collecting revenue. In some villages the number of the *chaudhurīs* and the *patels* was astonishingly high ranging rising to as many as six in exceptional

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/45/2-60.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/46/1-12, I/46/1-17.

<sup>3</sup> I/47/6-34.

<sup>4</sup> Muḥammad Afzal did not enjoy this office for 50 years, however the *jagīr* was probably held for a long time by him as Badi'uzzamān was appointed the *faujdār* of 'Ādilābād on 18 January 1660. M.A. Nayeem [ed.] *Catalogue of Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign* A.P. State Archives, Hyderabad 1980, Vol. I, p. 213.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/23/11-2, 3.

<sup>6</sup> The *patels* were also responsible for depositing the lost goods in the treasury, as Babu, *patel* of village Mehun, *pargana* 'Ādilābād who had fetched variety of garments from the Purna sent them to the *Dīwān* in June 1644 Y.H. Khān *Selected Documents of Shahjahan's Reign, Daftar-i Dīwānī*, Hyderabad, 1950, p. 134.

<sup>7</sup> The verification of the *deshpāndiya* was required, as has been referred to in a document of *pargana* 'Ādilābād on the current realization of a *jāgīrdār*. M.A. Nayeem Facsimile of document, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

cases; and there were only a few villages having only one or two *chaudhurīs*. The names of the *patels* and *chaudhurīs* are given under the heading *muqaddam*, so that both represented village headmen [compare *chaudhurī* in north India where he was a *pargana level* official, corresponding to *deshmukh*]. In 15 villages the names of the *patels* have been mentioned and not of *chaudhurīs*. Two villages had the same *patel* but no *chaudhurī* or *patwārī*, which meant presumably that the *patel* here performed the *patwārī*'s functions. However, the office of the *patwārī* was equally important as there were ten *patwārīs* who looked after 11 villages. Nine villages have been recorded under the jurisdiction of a single *patwārī*.

The village officials obviously belonged to *zamīndār* class but no information has been forthcoming regarding their caste affiliations. Gordon and Richards consider them as belonging to Maratha caste because their names most often end with the honorific *ji* [Kishnaji, Timaji]. One Sarangdhar, *zamīndār* of the *pargana* also held *jāgīr* [revenue assignment] there.

The document indicates 119 villages as assigned in *jāgīr* to more than 70 *jāgīrdārs*. This tends to suggest that due to proximity of the *pargana* to Burhanpur, the *ṣūba* headquarters, the small *jāgīrs* placed in it. Some of the *jāgīrdārs* held revenue assignments in contiguous villages. But there are instances to the contrary in that some *jāgīrdārs* had more than one village in *jāgīrs* and yet these are at some distance from each other. Ten villages have been assigned to more than one *jāgīrdar* which means that even portions of a village could also be assigned to petty *manṣabdārs*. Even some *jāgīrdārs* holding several villages have, sometimes been allotted parts of villages like Muḥammad Afzal, the *faujdar* and Dost Muḥammad, the *wāqia'-nigār* who held 14 and 7 villages respectively. The *jāgīrdārs* did not normally reside in the assigned villages and their agents collected the revenue. They were, however, expected to make endeavour for the extension of cultivation by terms of orders of assignment.<sup>1</sup> They also helped the peasantry in numerous ways. We are told of a complaint of a *jāgīrdar* of *pargana* 'Ādilābād who was transferred elsewhere. He represented to the Imperial Court that since he had advanced *taqāvi*/

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<sup>1</sup> See appointment order of a *jāgīrdar* in 'Ādilābād, M.A. Nayeem, *op. cit.* p. 60.

*taccavi* to the peasants and made the *jāgīr* villages prosperous and moreover had also made his *jāgīr* his seat of residence, he should not be transferred.<sup>1</sup>

The *āwārja* documents of *pargana* ‘Ādilābād of 1702 indicate the total *jama’dāmi* and *ḥāṣil* figures for more than 70 *jāgīrdārs* and *ai’mmadārs* with their designations and postings.<sup>2</sup> Since transfers were an integral part of the Mughal administration, of the 70 *jāgīrdārs* listed in the *Dīwān’s* report of 1696 only one-third had continued to hold their assignments by 1702. Only *ai’mma* grants remained undisturbed throughout the period [1696-1702].

Richards has prepared a table of collections by 17 *jāgīrdārs* posted outside the *ṣūba* who were drawing 20% or above of the total estimated income in our *pargana* and suggests that the same ratio was applicable to entire Khandesh.<sup>3</sup> However, his observations require scrutiny because he has altogether ignored the other side of the picture i.e. the collections being made by various officials from other provinces of the Deccan who were posted in Khandesh which can be substantiated with the help of similar documents of other *parganas* of the Deccan provinces. The *manṣabdārs* recorded in our *pargana* include the *nāzims*, *dīwāns*, *qāzis*, *qila’dārs*, *thānadārs*, *wāqia’ nigārs* and many petty officials.

Muḥammad Afzal, son of Ja’far Beg Birloj, was the largest single *jāgīrdar* who held 14 larger villages including *qaṣba* was accommodated within ‘Ādilābād annually yielding Rs. 29,792 [17.8% of the total/estimated income of the *pargana*].<sup>4</sup> The remaining *jāgīrdārs* were accommodated within 93 villages because four villages were entirely *ai’mma* and one was exclusively reserved for the Imperial *khāliṣa*. Gordon and Richards could count only 50 *jāgīrdārs* and resorted to the inadequate decipherment of some names. They refer to the tendency of the compilers to use the various forms of the same *jāgīrdar’s* name, which, however, is not corroborated by a careful study of the documents for three villages the names of *jāgīrdārs*

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/42/8-59.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/45/4/4-35, 36.

<sup>3</sup> J.F. Richards/Revenue Flows & C. pp.193-231.

<sup>4</sup> He also received Rs.644 from *pargana* Zainpur in 1701 A.D., IJC, I/46/2-47, I/46/2-101.

are not provided by our papers [APPENDIX-C]<sup>1</sup>. Since the compliers had to maintain strict protocol only one form of name has been used throughout the documents because there could be no variations in official designations.

The actual *ḥāṣil* at the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century was about one third to the *jama*'. In the beginning of Aurangzeb's reign several villages of our *pargana* were transferred to *khāliṣa*.<sup>2</sup> These were probably high-yielding whereas only one village was earmarked for *khāliṣa* in 1696 which suggests a decline in the productivity of the villages previously held in *khāliṣa*. Two documents show that the conditions of *khāliṣa* villages were somewhat better than the *jāgīr* villages. Mulla Muḥammad Momin [holding the rank of 500/1 00] and others represented to the Emperor that they had to refund a large amount of loan, maintain numerous dependents and meet the cost of the contingent. Some *dāms* were allocated to them from *pargana* 'Ādilābād. But revenue realization records of ten years *ḥāṣil-i deh sala* indicate that their *jāgīr* villages were extremely low-revenue yielding and deserted and in the best year [*sāl-i 'alā*] only one third was cultivated. They therefore, solicited the assignment of one *khāliṣa* and three selected *jāgīr* villages which was acceded to.<sup>3</sup> Aurangzeb also ordered the transfer of the Deccanis not commanding any contingents in the Old Country, [*mulk-i qadīm*] in order to allow for payment of balance of salary [*tatimma-i-ṭalab*] of the above mentioned *jāgīrdārs*. There are at least 40 documents containing petitions of many *manṣabdārs* for assigning villages included in *pāibāqī* [lands temporarily in the charge of the Imperial officials pending assignment to *jāgīrdar*] in *pargana* 'Ādilābād, either due to the transfer or death or dismissal of the *jāgīrdārs* or the resumption of *ai'mma* grants<sup>4</sup>. This shows an unmistakable pressure upon *pāibāqī*. Gordon and

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<sup>1</sup> The Appendix to this chapter gives the names of principal *jāgīrdārs*, the separate area of three categories of land [*ai'mma*, *uṭṭada* and *mazrua*] and the amount assessed in *tanka* and *dāms*, the established collection and the actual realization, the number of the village officials, the distance in *Kurohs* [3.80 kms.] and the means of irrigation. These details demonstrate the labour and precision taken in collecting and entering the data against each village. The same format adopted by the Mughal administration was strictly followed in regard to other *parganas* of *sarkār* Burhānpur *ṣūba* *Khāndesh*, viz., the incomplete series of *pargana* Fateḥābād [Laling].

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/11/0-2, I/13/0-3, I/13/10-10, I/13/0-12, I/13/0-14, I/13/0-32, I/13/0-36, I/13/0-42-43.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/15/0-1, *passim*.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/42/1-90, I/42/6-56, I/42/8-53, I/43/2-84, I/43/2-126, I/43/5-6, I/44/2-43, I/44/2-133, I/44/11-54, I/45/1-106, I/45/2-60, I/45/3-4, I/45/3-43, I/45/7-30, I/45/7-91, I/45/10-33, I/45/10-52, I/45/11-42, I/45/0-2, I/46/2-35-36, I/46/2-172, I/46/6-12, I/46/7-79, I/46/8-25, I/46/8-66, I/46/8-75, I/46/11-119, I/47/7-59, I/47/7-65, I/47/7-83, I/47/12-28, I/50/8-15, I/51/11-33, I/51/12-195, I/51/12-205 *Passim*.

Richards do not take any notice of this evidence of pressure on *paiqabi*, which Richards has elsewhere disputed.<sup>1</sup>

## Conclusion

The ‘Ādilābād *pargana* survey shows that the Mughal administration collected considerable information about the local agrarian conditions and fiscal claims. It gives us valuable insight into the extent and nature of irrigation, variations in agrarian productivity, land revenue assessment and collection, nature of the offices of the headmen and accountants, position of *zamīndārs*, pattern of *jāgīr* assignments, state and internal administration of *ai‘mma* lands etc This basic information needs to be collated with two kinds of other materials such as of the same locality also may make possible a meaningful comparison of the extent of cultivation and irrigation across two centuries. It is very likely that ‘Ādilābād surely fairly well represents the pattern of Mughal administration in the Deccan though it may have had some specific features of its own.

## [II] JIZYA

Aurangzeb reimposed *jizya* in 1679<sup>2</sup> after its final revocation by Akbar in 1580, which became a controversial issue generating considerable debate among the historians of medieval India as Rana Raj Singh of Mewar was assured of no intention to change the religious policy of his predecessors through one of his *nishāns*<sup>3</sup>. Though Aurangzeb imposed it after twenty one

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<sup>1</sup>*Mughal Administration in Golconda*, pp.104. See my article, The Working of the *Jāgīr* in the Deccan During the Last Years of Aurangzeb's Reign, *Journal of Objective Studies Delhi*, No. 2, Vol. 2, July, 1990, 71-80. In A.D. 1696 the *Dīwān* of the Deccan received a large village report on the position of ‘Ādilābād *pargana*. Interestingly for each of 124 villages in the *pargana* a separate page supplied the following data: The name of the village, its location [in *Kuroh* from the *pargana* town and headquarters in cardinal directions]; the name of the principal *jāgīrdār*, the names of the headman [or headmen and the village accountant[s]; land cultivated; land fallen out of cultivation; land in tax free grants then measured in *āut*, *bighas* and *biswas*], the source of irrigation, if any, the established *hāşil* for the entire village, revenue collected [*wusūli*] and the balance or arrears [*tatimmat*]. Surprisingly, the Mughal administration had penetrated into the village to obtain precise information on well power and sources. Similarly the names of the village officers were known and listed.

<sup>2</sup> Sāqī Musta‘id *Khān Ma‘āsir-i ‘Ālamgīrī*, [Calcutta, 1871, p. 174].

<sup>3</sup> Shyamaldas, *Vir Vinod*, vol. II, pp 419-20, Cf., M.Athar Ali, *Mughal India: Studies in Polity, Ideas, Society and Culture*, Delhi 2006, pp. 245-6.

years of his ascending the throne he continued it until the end of his reign with certain exemptions. It may be specifically stated that the collection of *jizya* was a tax levied on *zimmīs* [non-Muslims] expressly as the price of protection of their lives and property in lieu of military service where women, children, beggars, monks, the elderly, the invalid, the insane, the incurably ill, retired teachers, and poor workers were exempted from its payments. A *qaulnama* under the seal of Nūr Khān s/o Kale Khān to Siwai Venkat Reddy, *Mīnwār maḥalat* [fiscal units that the matters of the collection of the *jizya* of the specified *pargana* of *sarkār* Maḥammadnagar *ṣūba Darul jihād* Hyderabad amounting to Rs 1500- ‘*Ālamgīrī* coins of full weight in *lumpsum* for 48<sup>th</sup> and 49<sup>th</sup> R.Ys. through him concerning Shaikh Muḥammad ‘Āsim, *amīn* for realizing the *jizya* of Hyderabad was formed out which was to be paid in stipulated installments in the *bait [ul mal-i] jizya*<sup>1</sup>.

It was however, made obligatory that the revenue contractor had to keep the people happy with his considerate behavior. To crown this the *zimmīs* in service of the government and the peasantry having no means of subsistence except for agriculture were exempted from *jizya*. It was to be collected from the prosperous villages because in 1704 A.D. almost all the *parganas* had been devastated by the Marathas it was to be collected from the inhabited villages in 1705 A.D. [which however, could not become possible since 1704 onwards].

It may be taken into consideration that the peasantry having no other source of livelihood except for agriculture was also exempted from its payment due to natural calamity. One can trace references to *jizya* in Aurangzeb’s *tauqīāt*,<sup>2</sup> *raqāim*<sup>3</sup>, *kalim ‘at*<sup>4</sup>, *aḥkām*<sup>5</sup> and other documents of Aurangzeb’s reign like the Inayat Jung Collection<sup>6</sup> specially of Aurangzeb’s reign itself.

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<sup>1</sup>*Sumasthan Documents.*

<sup>2</sup>*Ruq ‘at-i ‘Ālamgīrī*, Delhi, 1972.

<sup>3</sup> Saiyid Ashraf Khān, *Raqāim-i Karāim*, ed S.M. Azizuddin Hussain, Delhi, 1990.

<sup>4</sup> ‘Ināyat Khān, *Kalimāt-i Taiyibāt*, ed S.M. Azizuddin Hussain, Delhi, 1982.

<sup>5</sup>*Aḥkām-i ‘Ālamgīrī*, Lahore, 1963.

<sup>6</sup> Inayat Jung Collection, National Archives of India, New Delhi Prof SM. Azizuddin Husain has cited a document of Farrukh Siyar from Inayat Jung Collection Nov/6/183 instead of Aurangzeb himself. Cf., S.M. Azizuddin Husain ‘*Jizya- Its imposition during the Reign of Aurangzeb - An Examination*, *The Indian Historical Review*, Vol XXVI, No. x; July 2000, p 119, n.

Though J.N. Sarkar<sup>1</sup>, S.R. Sharma<sup>2</sup>, Zahiruddin Faruki<sup>3</sup>, R.P.Tirpathi<sup>4</sup>, Nomani<sup>5</sup>, Lane Poole<sup>6</sup>, Satish Chandra<sup>7</sup>, Irfan Habib<sup>8</sup>, S.A.A. Rizwi<sup>9</sup>, M. Athar Ali<sup>10</sup>, Muzaffar Alam<sup>11</sup>, G.C. Dwivedi<sup>12</sup>, J.F. Richards<sup>13</sup>, R.C. Majūmdār<sup>14</sup> and H.K. Naqvi<sup>15</sup> have commented on Aurangzeb's religious policy including *jizya* yet Ishtiyāq Ḥusain Qureshi<sup>16</sup>, Shaikh Muḥammad Ikrām<sup>17</sup>, Iftikhar Aḥmad Ghori<sup>18</sup> and Muḥammad Aslam<sup>19</sup> have also expressed their views.

Aurangzeb's own inclination is duly reflected in *Aḥkam-i 'Ālamgīrī* where he has quoted the Quranic injunction about *jizya*<sup>20</sup>. Aurangzeb issued a *farman* to the *dīwāns* of the provinces to collect the *jizya* from *zimmīs*.<sup>21</sup> Isardas [Ishwardas] Nagar refers to the appointment of 'Ināyatullāh Khān to supervise the collection of *jizya*.<sup>22</sup> It was further endorsed by *Khulāṣṭus Siyāq*<sup>23</sup>, Khāfī Khān does highlight imposition of *jizya*.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>1</sup> J.N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, Delhi 1973, *Mughal Administration*, Calcutta, 1963.

<sup>2</sup> *Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, Delhi, 1988, *Mughal Empire in India*, Bombay 1940, *The Crescent in India*, Bombay, 1966.

<sup>3</sup> Zahiruddin Faruki, *Aurangzeb and His Times*, Delhi, 1972.

<sup>4</sup> R.P. Tirpathi, *Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Allahabad, 1987, *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, Allahabad.

<sup>5</sup> Shibii Nomani, *Aurangzeb 'Ālamgīrī per ek Nazar*, [in Urdu], Azamgarh, n.d.

<sup>6</sup> Lane Poole, *Rulers of India-Aurangzeb and the Decay of the Mughal Empire*, Oxford, 1901 [1707-1748].

<sup>7</sup> Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, Delhi, 2002, *Mughal Religious Policies. The Rajputs and the Deccan*, 'Jizya and the State in India during the Seventeenth Century, *JESHO*, Vol. XII, part IV, 1959.

<sup>8</sup> Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, Delhi, 2014.

<sup>9</sup> S.A.A Rizvi, *Muslim Revivalist Movements in North India in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century*, Agra, 1965.

<sup>10</sup> M.Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, Delhi, 1996, *Mughal India: Studies in Polity, Ideas, Society and Culture*, Delhi 2006.

<sup>11</sup> Muzaffar Alam, *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India*, Delhi, 1993.

<sup>12</sup> G.C. Divedi, *The Jats: Their Rule in the Mughal Empire*, Delhi, 1989.

<sup>13</sup> J.F. Richards, *The New Cambridge History of India, 1.5, The Mughal Empire*, Cambridge, 1993.

<sup>14</sup> R.C. Majumdar, *The Mughal Empire*, Bombay, 1974.

<sup>15</sup> H.K. Naqvi, *History of Mughal Government and Administration*, Delhi, 1970.

<sup>16</sup> Ishtiyāq Husain Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics, The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, Delhi, n.d.

<sup>17</sup> Shaikh Muḥammad Ikrām, *The Muslim Community of India-Pak Sub-continent*, Delhi, 1985.

<sup>18</sup> Iftikhar Ahmad Ghori 'Ideological Factor in the Mughal War of Succession, *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*, 1960.

<sup>19</sup> Muḥammad Aslam, *Aurangzeb Ki Takht Nashini mein Ulama Ka Kirdar*, Lahore, 1991.

<sup>20</sup> *Aḥkām-i 'Ālamgīrī*, Lahore, 1963.

<sup>21</sup> *Ma'āsir-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 174.

<sup>22</sup> Ishwardas Naqar, *Futūḥat-i 'Ālamgīrī*, Delhi, 1978, P 117.

<sup>23</sup> MS, Centre of Advanced Study in History AMU, Aligarh, ff . 3[a] 9[b].

<sup>24</sup> Khāfī Khān *Muhtaḥabul Lubab*, Karachi, 1963, Vol. II, pp. 234-5.

Bhim Sen's report that "jizya levied and collected by force in the Deccan"<sup>1</sup> does not stand scrutiny in the light of the above-cited *qaulnama* and the Inayat Jung Collection Documents. When the word Hindu does not occur in *Fatāwā-i 'Ālamgīrī* then why Prof. Azizuddin Ḥusain is bent upon being unhistorical [viz., in case of his reference to Bernier] in the garb of his criticism of Aurangzeb<sup>2</sup>. To his utter chagrin there is no discussion in Moinuddin Maḥmud Naqshbandi's *Al-Fatāwā-i Naqshbandiy'* or Mufti Abul Barkat bin Ḥusamuddin Dehlavi's *Fatāwā-i Majma'ul Barkat* [1698 AD], about the position and status of the Hindus or the *Masail-i jizya*,<sup>3</sup> nor is this question discussed by historians, contemporary or modern. As stated elsewhere owing to continuous wars against the Marathas the devastation of crops or their failure led to the temporary suspension of *jizya* which was apparently realized from a limited number of the villagers as neither the employees nor the peasantry having any source of income except for agriculture nor the semi-hereditary officials at village and *pargana* level were supposed to pay the *jizya*. However, Manucci's allegation of popularizing Islam through the reimposition of *jizya* and fill his empty treasury is counter-productive<sup>4</sup>, as according to Aurangzeb's estimation *jizya* was to go to *baitulmal*. Fryer does record: "Early in his reign, the puritan Emperor had reimposed the hated *jizya* on unbeliever. The impost was responsible for most of Aurangzeb's reign".<sup>5</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> Bhim Sen, *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, Br. Lib., f. 139 [b].

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *jizya - Its Real Position & C.*, p. 97.

<sup>3</sup> Shaikh Nūr Muḥammad Lahori, M.A. Lib., AMU, p. 175.

<sup>4</sup> N. Manucci, *Storia Do Mogor*, London, 1907, vol. II, pp. 273, 75. A document in Inayat Jung Collection bearing accession number I/45/7-9 does indicate that any entreaty made by a neo-Muslim could partially meet the imperial approbation as given hereunder which does show that terms and conditions apply as recorded thus: Representation of meekest of the *Khānazāds* [born in the house of a noble] contains orders of Aurangzeb soliciting the Holy Quran, rosary, for himself which were approved except for exemption from circumcision. He further pleaded for appointment as auditor of the imperial claims outstanding against the *manṣabdar's* [*muṭālabā*] under Bhopal Rai, father-in-law of the applicant which Aurangzeb marked to Asad *Khān*. Though the penalty for absence from duty was imposed yet the previous absence was waved off. When the solicitor sought imperial favours for his posting in Aurangabad it was marked to Asad *Khān* to make a recommendation. In view of his embracing the religion of Islam he pleaded for the grant of the rank so as to save him from any ignominy in the eyes of his peers leading to the conferment of 100 [*zāt* rank] on I *Jumada* II, 42 R.Y. He was granted five *parwāngis* for the grant of copy of the Holy Quran, military armament, exemption from penalty and the assignment of *manṣab* [rank] etc, while two documents were issued for paying the penalty as well as to the office of the *bakhshī* [for payment of salary].

<sup>5</sup> J.F. Fryer, *A New Account of East India being Nine years Travel*, London, 1915, vol. II, p. 114.

same view has been expressed by Thomas Rolt, President of the English Factory at Surat.<sup>1</sup> Contrary to the European assumption of running the poor from villages owing to payment of *jizya* Aurangzeb himself exempted them as stated initially:<sup>2</sup>

Contemporary and modern historians of medieval India except for Azizuddin Husain call Aurangzeb as puritan which is firmly established from the impartial observation coupled with his corresponding actions. Though Aurangzeb appointed Hurjan, S/o Mansingh as *sadīwal* of his wife Rabitadud Durrani's mausoleum, situated in Aurangabad on the basis of a competitive bid accepting the posting of Mohan's *peshkash* [tribute] of Rs 5,000/- for Begumpur equally accepted by the former contingent upon maintaining a contingent of 500, i.e. 250 for the city wall near Begumpura, 50 for the masoluem and 200 for the fort of Begumpura yet he again made a quite different dispensation<sup>3</sup>. He strictly ordered only the honest Muslim *mutawallī* in accordance with his orders that:

“If any incompetent one is appointed contrary to the Islamic Law and the established usage such carelessness should not be allowed, then replace him by any other efficient Muslim [caretaker] as no Hindu can be a *mutawallī* [receiver] and the death is much close to the shoe-lace”.<sup>4</sup>

Irfan Habib opines that, “As a tax, the *jizya* was extremely regressive and, above all, hardest on the poor”. However, even poor *zimmīs* were entitled to receiving financial help from

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Charles Fawcett, *The English Factories in India: Bombay Surat and Malabar Coast*, Oxford, 1904, vol. III, p. 241, wherein he alleges of ‘forcing the poorer section of the population to become Muslims. Even the collection of *jizya* had become extremely difficult in Bālāghāt [IJC, I/40/1-3].

<sup>2</sup> In accordance with Francis Bernier as misstated by Prof Azizuddin Husain the *Nāzim* of Hyderabad reported that, on account of their poverty they were unable to pay *jizya* and whenever they have to pay, they fled. He also expressed his readiness to follow the instructions issued by him. There upon the emperor orders that *jizya* of year be not collected from them and they be asked to remain in their villages and *maḥals* and engage themselves in cultivation and their profession. *Travels in the Mughal Empire*, A.D. 1656-1668, tr. By Archibld Constable, Delhi, 1972, P 184.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/42/9-29.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/45/1-41. For security purposes of the mausoleum of his wife Aurangzeb appointed a Hindu with 500 men where as he also did not like a corrupt Muslim as *mutawalli*, instead he had appointed an unblemished Muslim as per the Islamic Law. Cf., IJC, I/43/1-22.

*baitulmal*. Ishwardas Nagar confirms that after the conquest of Hyderabad its *jizya* was remitted<sup>1</sup>. It is also mentioned in *Akḥbārāt-i Durbār-i Mua‘lla* that the realization of *jizya* was stopped throughout the Mughal provinces of the Deccan on account of the difficulties caused by the Maratha raids and active famines.<sup>2</sup> It is also mentioned in the *Akḥbārāt* that the collection of *jizya* was suspended in Devalghat for three years.<sup>3</sup>

There is no evidence to the theory of abandonment of *jizya* as suggested by Satish Chandra, as we do not come across any such reference either in Aurangzeb’s *ruq‘at, tauqi‘at, ahkam, raqaim, farāmīnshuqqajāt, akḥbārāt*, Inayat Jung Collection or in any contemporary Persian chronicle or European travellers accounts, instead Aurangzeb insisted on the collection of *jizya* as Bhim Sen records that “*jizya* was imposed and collected by force in the Deccan”.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore Khāfi Khān confirms that Amānat Khān, *Dīwān-i Deccan*, was granting remission in the arrears of *jizya* while Rashīd Khān communicated the Emperor that he had granted the *sanads* of exemption to the Hindu population liable to pay *jizya* owing to which Aurangzeb admonished Amānat Khān for not remitting *jizya* which he had succeeded in reimposing after so many difficulties where after Amānat Khān never granted exemptions.<sup>5</sup>

Prof. S.M. Azizuddin Ḥusain has wrongly quoted Bernier that the *Nāzim* of Hyderabad reported to the Emperor that the people on account of their poverty were unable to pay *jizya* and whenever they were to pay, they fled as Aurangzeb also expressed his readiness to follow the instructions issued by him. Thereupon the Emperor ordered that *jizya* of a year be not collected from them and they be assured by remaining in their villages and *maḥals* and engage themselves in cultivation and their profession<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Ishwardas Nagar, *Futūḥat-i ‘Ālamgīrī*, f. 111 [b].

<sup>2</sup> *Akḥbārāt-i Durbār-i Mua‘lla*, 19 February, 1704.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, 12 November 1704.

<sup>4</sup> Bhim Sen, *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, Br. Lib. F 139 [b].

<sup>5</sup> Khāfi Khān, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 377-78.

<sup>6</sup> *Travels in the Mughal Empire*, A.D. 1656-1668, translated by Archibald Constable, Delhi, 1972, [first published by OUP, 1891], p. 184. In fact there is no such quotation on this page.

There are such instances of the personal deposition of *jizyaviz.*, a personal assistant to the *bakhshi*, pleaded that his Muslim officer was seriously ill and that on an account of his being busy with the affairs he would not be able to pay *jizya* personally and would like to send it through a deputy. His request was turned down. He was reminded that paying the *jizya* was a privilege and payment must, therefore, be made in person, The official came and paid *jizya* in person as ordered.<sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding Azizuddin Husain's citations from other sources he has not quoted any document of Inayat Jung collection of Aurangzeb's reign itself which is not devoid of such references. Shaikh Amānullāh S/o 'Abdur Rauf, posted at the *Dīwān* of *ṣūbajāt-i Deccan*, an experienced and religious minded official well versed in financial and legal intricacies as he has excellently extracted legal *jizya* from *pargana* Rajpura as deputy *Dīwān* of *Mandavi* Begumpura etc<sup>2</sup>

There are instances of their killing those who came to collect *jizya* and themselves being killed by the Mughal soldiers as is also recorded in a document.

“*Parwangi* under the seal of Yār 'Alī Beg was received that it was learnt from the communication of Saiyid 'Abdur Raḥīm, *amīn-i jizya* of Berar that Saiyid Muḥammad Qasim, his deputy in *pargana* Tilangaon, to collect the *jizya* of Chin Qilīch Khān Bahādur had gone for house tax [*Khāna-shumari*] and count of livestock. 'Abdul Ghafūr, agent of Khān Bahādur attacked the deputy and two horsemen killed Saiyid and his brother together with fifteen infantrymen, plundered all goods and the amount of *jizya*, killed six security staff of the treasury and the deputy [i.e. Saiyid Muḥammad Qasim] who could only save his life. The Emperor ordered for the transfer of *pargana* Tilangaon, *sarkār* Kalam, *ṣūba* Berar”.<sup>3</sup>

Though it was assigned to Sheo Singh, *qila'dār* [castellan] of Islamgarh, *alias* Raheri owing to the complaint of Saiyid 'Abdur Raḥīm, *amin-i jizya*, as the revenue collector [ '*āmil*]

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<sup>1</sup> *Akhbārāt-i Durbār-i Mu'allā*, 8 May 1694.

<sup>2</sup> Inayat Jung Collection [IJC] IJC, I/41/12-148. He has realized *jizya* from 38 RY till 41 R.Y.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/42/7-73.

[i.e. ‘Abdul Ghafūr] killed his deputy with some persons. However, consequent upon the submission of the reinstatement order by Chin Qilīch Khān’s plenipotentiary under the seal of *Bakhshiul Mulk Mukhlīsh Khān*, then Aurangzeb, subject to his reinstatement, in favour of Sheo Singh along with order of payment of the remainder from North India [Hindustan] and the Deccan.<sup>1</sup>

Consequent upon the seriousness of the matter Saiyid ‘Abdur Raḥīm, *amin-i jizya* of *ṣūba* Berar wrote: Yār ‘Ali to represent it to the Emperor that when Saiyid Muḥammad Qāsim, his deputy, had gone to *pargana* Telangaon, *jizya* of Chin Qilīch Khān Bahādur for house tax and head count of the live-stock. ‘Abdul Ghafūr, agent of Khān Bahādur delayed him for 12 days to recall him inside the *qaṣba* [township] and communicated that it would be advisable to undertake *lumpsum* revenue-farming otherwise he would not allow. Thenceforward, when the deputy did not accept this suggestion, he instantaneously consulted with Muḥammad Siddique, the news-reporter [*wāqia’ nigār*] thereat and dispatched him for one day towards Kalam in accompaniment with the *qāzi* thereof. The next day the aforesaid deputy was communicated to settle the matter as per the imperial order where after the said person leaving behind the [amount of] *jizya*, sent his luggage, came inside the *qaṣba* with twenty infantrymen. The said agent shut the gate, killed two Saiyid cavalrymen, his brothers along with 15 infantrymen and the said deputy, plundered the entire commodity and killed six security personnel of the treasury as the deputy ran away for life so that the issue be brought to His Majesty’s notice who ordered transfer of this *pargana* to be assigned to the castellan of Islāmgarh [*alias Rāheri*].<sup>2</sup>

In 1702 A.D. the expenses of the Deccan provinces were gradually increasing Even the financial position was so much alarming that all the *Khāliṣa mahals* of *ṣūba* Aurangabad could not yield sufficient income including the revenue of the *jizya* that the expenses of the provinces exceeded the income. Previously majority of the expenses of the *ṣūba* were being met out of the bills of exchange from North India [*hundwiyat-i Hindustan*] and the income from Indor Nimkal and the province [s] of Berar, Khandesh, tribute from the *zamīndārs* of Chanda and Islamgarh was deposited in the treasury whereas only revenue realization from Sangamner etc there was no

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/42/9-25, I/42/10-55.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/42/7-51.

other source of income as out of eight *khālīṣamahals* three were reserved for the men of *Khān-i Jahān* and Qaular Hyderabad etc while the *Khālīṣa* of Aurangabad was in charge of the *Dīwān-i Deccan*. The income of *ṣūba* including that of *jizya* arrived at Rs 9,10,922/9½ and the stipulated income was fixed at Rs 9,61,859/12 while the expenditure of Rs. 28,12,298/2, out of which the stipulated expenditure was Rs 9,61,859/2 while non-planned expenditure as per the previous year was Rs 850,439/8½ and the excess expenses were Rs 9,01,575/8½. Aurangzeb therefore observed that Parner and Sangamner are not the old *Khālīṣa* [lands]. Now, as per the previous practice the old *khālīṣa* are four provinces that shall be initially fixed for the expenses of the aforesaid *ṣūbās* and the loss [*āfat*] and the non-receipt of the tribute of Chanda and Islamgarh shall, Almighty God willing, be compensated.<sup>1</sup>

Though Aurangzeb does not refer to the income from *jizya* yet it is being taken into consideration for computation. There is a set of 23 documents which is the income and expenditure sheet of the treasury of *bait-i jizya* of *Darul Fateh* Muḥammadabad *alias* Zafarabad/Bidar under the seal of Kifāyat *Khān* and other officials for the years 1702-3 A.D. amounting to Rs 81,285/15¾.

It may be incidentally pointed out that the income from *jizya* was deposited in the imperial treasury by way of *dastgardan* for which receipt was obtained out of which salary of the crops posted at Firozgarh Fort was paid subject to its return. Similar dispensation was made in regard to the salary of soldiers of Ramgir Fort, Muzaffarnagar Fort, Kalyan Forts etc<sup>2</sup>

The availability of some thirty documents of *jizya* collection of Aurangzeb's reign in the Inayat Jung Collection not only depicts the problems and prospects of *jizya* collection but also its use on loan basis for the payment of soldiers posted in the forts of *ṣūba* Bidar. Notwithstanding the limited financial resources even by making use of the *jizya* collection on loan basis the funding was most often done from the resources of North India [Hindustan].

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/45/8-6, I/45/8-7.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/45/10-83 to I/45/10-105 while IJC, I/45/0-94 to I/45/0-104 refer to the deposition of the *jizya* by way of *dastgardan* amounting to Rs 67290 approximately for 12 different dates of 1702 A.D.

Even Aurangzeb's extraordinary exertion for getting the *jizya* amount collected he did not take any punitive measure to bring the culprits to book while as per the cannons of law and justice except for transferring the offenders to any other place because even in one case cited above no *shari'* punishment was given to the real culprit who got assassinated twenty-one infantrymen and security guards for getting the *jizya* collected as per rule and not in *lumpsum*. It does show that contrary to the much orchestrated propaganda Aurangzeb could initiate no punitive proceedings to streamline the machinery of the *jizya* collection, that need a second reconnaissance of Aurangzeb's position of *jizya* policy and its suspension since 1704 onwards as their killing those who came to collect *jizya* by the Mughal soldiers and revenue collectors [*'āmils*]. Though there was a separate sheet, in accordance with Aurangzeb's declaration the income derived through *jizya* was to go to *baitul mal*, viz., as per *jama' o kharaj-i jizya Darul Fateh* Muḥammadabad [income and expenditure of the province of Bidar] according to one of the series of 23 documents of Inayat Jung Collection as mentioned above. It was not meant for the employment of Muslims as both Muslims and non-Muslims used to serve in *bait-i jizya* because one Rup Chand was the treasure in Bidar of *jizya* in the *ṣūba*.

Apparently the imposition of the *jizya*, or the pool tax on non-Muslims, by Aurangzeb in 1679 meant an important increase in the magnitude of rural taxation as a separate organization of collectors [*umāna'*] was created for this purpose. Interestingly, this tax was directly collected from the individual subjects in the cities. For the villages it was first decreed that a flat rate of Rs 100 upon 1,00,000 *dāms* i.e. 4% of the *jama' dāmi*, was to be paid by the officials of the *Khālīṣa* and the holders of the *jāgīrs*, who were then to collect the tax at the authorised rates from the peasants. A manual compiled in the later years of Aurangzeb shows, however, that detailed censuses of men liable to pay this tax were prepared in both towns and villages. The specimen accounts reproduced in it shows also the incidence was not light by any means. Out of the 280 males in a village, 185 were held assessable and of these 137 paid minimum rates of Rs 3, as 2, per annum as this at the time would have meant a month's wages for an unskilled urban labourer. According to Irfan Habib, as a tax, the *jizya* was extremely regressive and bore the hardest of the poorest. However, a specimen copy of a *sanad* shows that peasants of a particular area could be granted exemption in cases of acute distress. Interestingly in 1704, in view of the famine and the

Maratha war, Aurangzeb remitted *jizya* throughout the Deccan for the duration of war.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless his general policy was to discourage *jizya* remissions. Moreover other authorities emphasize that the<sup>2</sup> collections were accompanied with the greatest oppression and most of the amount actually collected was embezzled by the officials, so that only a very small part of it is used nothing to reach the imperial treasury.<sup>3</sup> Even there is an instance that a Hindu *jāgīrdār* extorting *jizya*, the theoretical purpose of which was to show the superiority of the faithful over the infidels [*Ayen yu 'til jizyata ayen yadūhum sāghirūn*] in accordance with Holy Qurān.

### [III] OTHER TAXES:

Since the Mughal administration used to look after the affairs of all classes it was but natural that Mūr Muḥammad Ja'far was asked about the complaint of the traders of *sarkār* Gavil *ṣūba* Berar that Khanna and Madhu etc traders of *Qaṣba* Karinja, complained that their clients questioned about the *jins-i abresham*, opium etc, which they have purchased from *balda* Akbarabad, Ujjain, Surat Port and Burhanpur and bring to sell them to Hyderabad. The *mutaṣaddis* thereat, notwithstanding collect Re. 1/- per Rs. 100/- as the forbidden imposts. Thus instructions were issued in 1694-5 A.D. that no such forbidden imposts be collected otherwise write the fact.<sup>4</sup> Similar complaint was also made to Shaikh Abul Ḥusain, *Dīwān* of *ṣūba* Khandesh, which was rectified as well.<sup>5</sup>

The *muqaddams*, namely Ramji etc village Eingaon, belonging to *pargana* Virval, *sarkār* Nander, *ṣūba* Muḥammadabad [Bidar] complained against the highhandedness of 'Abdur Raḥīm,

<sup>1</sup> *Akḥbārāt-i Durbār-i Mua'llā* 48/36 and A 245. Cf., *Akḥbārāt* 47/323.

<sup>2</sup> Ma'mūri, f 179 [a]. *Khāfi Khān*, II 377-78.

<sup>3</sup> *Dilkushā*, f. 139 [b]; Manucci, II, 291. *Nigārnāma-i Munshī*, ed. 139, does contain a document which was published by Saiyid Suleman Nadvi in *Ma'arif* XXI [1937] no. 5, 294-6, having been extracted from a latter collection, the *Nigārnāma* of *Munshī* La'l Chand. There is a serious error in the first few lines of the *Ma'arif* text, where it reads *zamīndārān* in place of *zimmī-i nādār*, 'the indignant non-Muslim' of the original. The *sanad* is addressed to a *dīwān* and recited that the *jizya* should not be imposed upon destitute persons. Since the poor peasants [*rezā-ri 'āya*] who had to engage in cultivation were found to be in debt even for their seeds and cattle [the *Ma'arif* text reads differently here, the cultivators were to be exempted from paying the *jizya*; but it was nevertheless, to be realized from the *ta'alluqadārs*, *chandhurīs*, *qānūngos*, *ṭarafdārs* and other inhabitants of the towns and villages.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/36/3-4.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/36/2-6.

*alias* Nanaji *Deshmukh*, who not only arrested them but also expelled them from their home town. It contains the seal of Yar ‘Ali, *murīd* [disciple] of Shāh ‘Ālamgīr 14/1082 A.H.<sup>1</sup>. Similar instance can also be gauged from a representation to Muḥammad Shafī‘, *Dīwān* that Saiyid ‘Ali, *Saudagar* complained to His Majesty about the collection of Re. 1/- *annas* 2 on every hundred which was however, rectified<sup>2</sup>. We also find such an example that Nayak etc residents of *pargana* Chimargonada that four *Chāwars* of land of Badda and Sevla contingent upon the issuance and *NalwaDak Chauki* and *Dali* etc belong to them which should be restricted accordingly.<sup>3</sup>

Though we are quite aware of the atrocities of the Marathas yet we find complaints about the atrocities being perpetuated on the *muqaddams* and *riā‘ya* of Ranjini, *sarkār* Jalnapur, *ṣūba* Aurangabad due to the oppression of Zainuddin ‘Ali Khān, *jāgīrdar* and *faujdar* and the crossing and staying of the Marathas and devastating the villages. Accordingly plead for the grant of *jāgīr* to Rao Man Singh s/o Jadun Rao who is an *ābādānkār*<sup>4</sup>. The situation had become so much topsy turvy that Aurangzeb had himself observed that:

“It was brought to the notice that *sābti* in the *ṣūbās* of the Deccan has become abundant which can be controlled by transferring the *jāgīr* and reduction in *manṣab* so long as the *wāqia‘ nigārs* and *sawānih navīs* report which is their duty. What has not happened despite our presence that shall happen. Crimes and innovations are causing the ruin of the country.”<sup>5</sup>

Aurangzeb also saw to it that any other land which had been in grant of the old Deccani families should be continued unabatedly *viz.*, one *chawar* of land with seven mango and *imli* trees in the *madad-i ma‘āsh* of Saiyid Nūr Muḥammad, servant of Mua‘zzam Khān Deccani be continued from village Mandukan belonging to *pargana* Pandiya Bedgaon and ½ seer of oil

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/36/4-10.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/35/6-15.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/47/3-86.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/0/0-703.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/0/0-735.

expanded on the light of the mosque be allowed which Aurangzeb allowed as heretofore.<sup>1</sup> Aurangzeb also ordered that the excess in the *parganas* of Bijapur and Aurangabad *ṣūbās* should be realized in the *sarkār* and not be given to *jāgīrdārs* so that the *riā'ya* could become satisfied.<sup>2</sup>

Aurangzeb ordered that ‘let it be represented to Mu‘tamid Khān as it shall be paid as per rule and regulation. But they have taken away the *khoshas* and left behind the *Karbi*<sup>3</sup>’. It was but natural that anything could be borne out by the administration as we come to know through a *dastak* to Shaikh ‘Ināyatullāh Aḥdi, posted in the *Dīwānī* of *ṣūbajāt-i* Deccan that the loss of *muwāzana-i mufaṣṣali* and *yakḥarfi* could be demanded of *pargana*, *sarkār* Junnar from 1091 to 1113 *faṣlī* in *naqd jama‘dam-i*, *raqba* and directions of south, north, east, west, distance of way, name of *deshmukhs*, *deshpāndiyas*, *muqaddams*, *patwārīs*, *pattas*, *aimmadārs*, *rusūm-i naqd*, *arāzi*, *inā‘m* of that group, *bāghāt-i āmadnī*, *chah-khāna* etc as requisitioned which was to be deposited.<sup>4</sup>

Fortunately we come across *āwārjas* of *muwazanas* of different provinces like one of *ṣūba* Khandesh, five *sarkār* of *ṣūba* Aurangabad, some *sarkār* of *ṣūba* Berar all of which are of the *Khāliṣa Sharifa*. Thus we come across a number of *sarkārs* which were shown included in *Khāliṣa Sharifa*.

Interestingly, the fees and perquisites of the revenue official were numerous. These perquisites [*rusūm*] are audited village account under the heading *ikhrājāt*. Besides *salāmī*, *qunalgha* was another prohibited tax forbidden by Akbar. Similarly *bhaint* and *bālādasti* were also the forbidden taxes. *Pattadari*, *balkati*, *tahsīldāri* and finally *kharij-i sadir o warid*. Such forbidden *abwāb* were prevalent in the Mughal administration. Unfortunately *begār* and *shikar* were also counted among such cases.

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<sup>1</sup> 26 *Ziqada*, 1<sup>st</sup> R.Y. 1069 AH/IJC, I/47/1-99.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/43/2/27.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/45/7-139.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/48/8-4.

## VIII PROBLEMS OF THE ZAMĪNDĀRS

### [I] THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF ZAMĪNDĀRS, DESHMUKHS

The *Deshmukh* used to be the counterpart of *Chaudhuri* [ & *desāi* ] in the Deccan. He used to be the *pargana* level semi-hereditary official who was concerned with revenue collection in Gujarat and Deccan.

Several studies of the position of *zamīndārs* in the Deccan have been made by the historians of Medieval India.<sup>1</sup> However, there is still ample justification for undertaking a similar venture concerning the status of *zamīndārs* in the six provinces of the Mughal Deccan under Aurangzeb in the light of the vast available documentation, especially the Inayat Jung Collection, preserved in the National Archives, New Delhi, which has long lain in wait for a critical study.<sup>2</sup> The studies so far have been concerned rightly with the problem of assessing the strength of imperial authority in the countryside, and the ways in which local chiefs and notables were assimilated into the Mughal administration as *zamīndārs*. It is generally admitted that the Mughal imperial administration leaned heavily on the cooperation of the *zamīndārs* for revenue administration, military service and maintenance of law and order.<sup>3</sup>

The present chapter aims to study the attitude of the *zamīndārs* towards the Mughal Empire in Deccan under Aurangzeb, and conversely the policy pursued by the Mughal administration towards integrating them in the highly centralized bureaucratic system.<sup>4</sup> The latter they did either by appointing them as *deshmukhs*, *deshpāndiyas*, *qānūngos*, *desāīs*,

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<sup>1</sup> Irfan Habib, *The Zamīndārs in the Āi'n*, *Proc. Ind. Hist. Cong.* [PIHC], 1958, pp. 320-23; S. Nurul Hasan, *Aspects of the Zamīndāri System in the Deccan [1695-1707]*, *PIHC*, 1969, pp. 262-66; Muzaffar Alam, 'The *Zamīndārs* and Mughal Power in the Deccan', *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* [IESHR] XI, March 1974, pp. 74-91; J.F. Richards, 'The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan', *Journal of Asian Studies* [JAS], vol. XXXV, February, 1976, pp. 237-56.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., M. Athar Ali's, Review on J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, *JAS*, Nov. 1976, p. 160.

<sup>3</sup> M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, Bombay, 1966, pp. 84-86; Zakir Husain, 'A *Zamīndār* Family of *Sarkār Mandu*, *Śūba Malwa-Archival Evidence*', *PIHC*. Warangal, 1992-93, pp. 311-20.

<sup>4</sup> For an opposite view see, Stephen P. Blake, 'The Patrimonial Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals', in H. Kulke, [ed.] *The State in India 1000-1700*, Delhi, 1999, pp. 278-303.

*sardeshmukhs, sardeshkhats, sardesāīs, muqaddams, patels, etc, or confirming their old position in similar capacities, or even incorporating them as jāgīrdārs.*

When Aurangzeb became Viceroy of the Deccan for the second term under Shāhjahān, he endeavoured to win over the prominent *zamīndārs* as active allies of the imperial administration,<sup>1</sup> which policy was continued by him in his position as emperor as well.

It is an established dictum that an equilibrium among the emperor, *manṣabdārs, zamīndārs* and peasants created order and stability whereas its absence resulted in disorder and anarchy as happened in the case of the Marathas, who resisted the Mughal might, because mere ‘belief of the invincibility of the Mughal power’ could not strike terror in their hearts in the same way as had made the *zamīndārs* submissive’, as Muzaffar Alam suggests.<sup>2</sup> Instead, their own interests compelled the *zamīndārs* to come to terms either with the Mughals or side with the Marathas, as expediency dictated.

The Mughals since long, used to extract *peshkash* from the *zamīndārs*, without which any formal alignment with the imperial administration was unthinkable to them. The *peshkash* was normally realized in full or in instalments as is evident from the surviving records attesting to the clearance of arrears by the *zamīndārs*. Thus Jalu Raghunath, *Patwar*, deposited Rs. 50/- out of the total Rs.100 lying in arrears in 1662,<sup>3</sup> whereas Rs. 2000 of the *peshkash* remained unrealized from the *zamīndār* of *pargana* Batlawal etc in 1670.<sup>4</sup>

We find detailed information about the arrears of *peshkash* outstanding against the *zamīndārs* [i.e. *mīnwars* and *deshmukhs*]of Hyderabad running into millions of rupees in early 1690. These were supposed to be realized subsequently.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Zakir Husain, *Calendar of Administrative Documents in Ādāb-i Ālamgīrī*, M.Phil Dissertation submitted at AMU, Aligarh, 1991, pp. XXXXI–XXXXV.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Hardy, ‘Commentary and Critique’, JAS, XXXV NO.2 [February, 1976], p.234: Zakir Husain, ‘The Mughal Maratha Conflict seen Through the Official Documents of Later Years of Aurangzeb’, Aligarh Papers on Indian History’, Dharwar, 1988, pp. 137-154.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/5/3-1.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/13/0-1.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/16/1-4 to I/16/1-10.

Since Aurangzeb paid special attention to secure the loyalties of the big *zamīndārs* to serve imperial interests, he conferred the *zamīndārī* of Ram Tek on Bhupat Singh, contingent upon his payment of Rs.50,000 as *peshkash*, out of which Rs. 35,000 were paid through bankers [*sāhūkārs*], while, the remainder was recovered in unequal monthly instalments. Aurangzeb also confirmed the grant of *zamīndārī* through his *farmān* issued on his solicitation in 1674.<sup>1</sup>

The *peshkash* was accepted by the *zamīndārs* conditional upon the grant of the office. Rūdrājī, son of Debi Das, resident of *sarkār* Baglana received the *deshmukhi* of the *sarkār* in 1666 for which he agreed to pay Rs. 15,000/- by way of *peshkash*, in annual instalments of Rs. 1,500, meaning thereby that the entire payment was to be made within a decade, while he was allowed perquisites [*rusūm*] at the rate of 1.5% of the revenue.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Bhānji, the *deshmukh* of *pargana* Aurangabad [Karzmandgāon] was granted *deshmukhī* of villages Nurkara etc in *pargana* Kothli in 1669 for which he accepted to pay Rs. 100/- as *peshkash* over a period of five years.<sup>3</sup>

The *peshkash* was imposed on every *zamīndār* either big or small; Jiu Chaudhurī of *pargana* Nurbar agreed to pay Rs.75 as *peshkash*.<sup>4</sup> The payment of *peshkash* apparently followed a flexible pattern. Some of the *zamīndārs* used to promise the remittance of *peshkash* within three years whereas others assured its payment in stipulated instalments and no specific date of its full remittance was fixed.<sup>5</sup>

However, the appointment of *zamīndārs* as *deshmukh* or *deshpāndiya* etc was not made without enquiry. An effort was made to establish their antecedents before their confirmation. Kishnaji Bithal held the *deshmukhi* of *pargana* Aland together with 2 *chāwars* [240 *bighas*] as *in‘ām* since the time of ‘Alī ‘Ādil Shāh allegedly through his *farmān* of 1070 AH/1660

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/32/2-2; I/32/3-1; I/33/3-4.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/9/8-1.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/11/1-1; I/11/1-2.

<sup>4</sup> There are plenty of documents concerning the *peshkash* of a number of *zamīndārs* which do not only help in explaining the procedure of *peshkash* but also in understanding a many problems encountered by the *zamīndārs*.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/33/7-2.

A.D.<sup>1</sup> Since the Imperial administration used to scrutinise closely the claims of the *zamīndārs*, it came to light that no one named Kodi Koma as *zamīndār* was appointed in any *maḥal* during the regime of the ‘Ādil Shāhs.<sup>2</sup> This is illustrative of the fact that the Mughals had maintained the archives of the ‘Ādil Shāhi government. The *zamīndārs* were not entitled to appropriate the *rusūm* [perquisites] without securing the *sanads* [certificates] of the *Dīwānī* which were also confirmed by the *Dīwāns* of the Deccan in 1665.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the *rusūm* were co-terminus with the *peshkash*, and any laxity in remitting the *peshkash* could lead to severe punishment.<sup>4</sup> Thus Shaikh Mukhdūm, the *manṣabdār* had to stand surety for payment of Rs.15,000 as *peshkash* by Naprasti [sic], *deshmukh* of *pargana* Aland, *sarkār* Naldurg, *ṣūba* Aurangabad in order to get him released.<sup>5</sup>

The amount of *peshkash* differed from person to person. Ūdājī Rām, *alias* Bābū Rāi, *deshmukh* of the *parganas* [23 *maḥals*] of *sarkār* Mahur, etc, had to pay Rs.2,50,000 as *peshkash* from the time of Shāhjahān as per his father’s bond of 1635-6, which again proves that *peshkash* in the Deccan was an old phenomenon.<sup>6</sup> The *sardeshmukh*, was also responsible for getting the individual *deshmukhi* of the entire *sarkār* or area of his jurisdiction, as was the case with Ūdājī Rām.<sup>7</sup>

Dues, which were to be collected by the state from the *zamīndār* were termed as ‘*muṭāliba*’. ‘Abdul Fattāḥ and other *deshmukhs* of *paragana* Ūtrān, *ṣūba* Khandesh, had a *muṭāliba* of Rs. 2716 which was ordered to be recovered from their *inā‘m* in 1670.

There are numerous instances of the *peshkash* and *muṭāliba* due from the *zamīndārs*. There is a series of 41 documents of 1702-3 containing details of unrealized *peshkash* etc due from the *zamīndārs* of *ṣūba* Khandesh [amounting to Rs.1,54,925]. These contain the demand

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/0/0-53.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/20/10-1.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/7/7-1.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/26/0-12.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/30/10-1.

<sup>6</sup>IJC I/30/9-1.

<sup>7</sup>IJC I/11/5-2.

that whosoever had executed the bond of *peshkash* was liable to pay it whereas those who did not execute the same were not to be harassed.<sup>1</sup>

There was a general official complaint that the *zamīndārs* used to adopt a dilatory attitude in meeting demands of the imperial government.

“All the *deshmukhs* and *deshpāndiyas* of the *parganas* [overwhelmingly dominated by the Marathas] in the *ṣūbā* of the Deccan, from the beginning of the control of this country [i.e. Deccan] by the mighty empire, do not pay the state dues, and without [acquiring] the *sanads* anew, they are misappropriating the *rusūm* and *inā‘m*”.<sup>2</sup>

Only a fresh settlement with the *deshmukhs* and *deshpāndiyas* was naturally felt to be a precondition to any lasting solution to the Deccan problem.<sup>3</sup> These terms of agreement also involved the grant of *rusūm* and *inā‘m* to the *zamīndārs*. We find a detailed 121 sheet document containing a list of the *rusūm* and *inā‘m* of the *deshmukhs* and *deshpāndiyas* of the *parganas* of *ṣūba* Aurangabad of 1694 A.D., comprising 10 *sarkārs* and 115 *maḥāls*.<sup>4</sup> Similarly another series of 95 documents from *pargana* Indapur, *sarkār* Junnar, *ṣūba* Aurangabad, furnishes detailed information in regard to perquisites of the *zamīndārs* together with the land revenue originally fixed during the term of administration of Malik ‘Ambar,<sup>5</sup> which means that detailed *ṣūba*-wise and *pargana*-wise statistical data about the *zamīndārs* and their perquisites used to be prepared. This is in fact attested by the surviving series of *mawāzana-i-yak ḥarfi*<sup>6</sup> of various *parganas* which specifically mention the revenue demand of each village over a period of years as well as the names of *zamīndārs* and also give series of the *Yaddasht-i ism nawīsī-i zamīndārān* [memorandums of the names of the *zamīndārs*].<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/46/0-44 to I/46/0-84.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/0/0-38. This complaint did not go in vain as Asad Khān ordered for resumption of all their perquisites till the settlement of the *peshkash*.

<sup>3</sup> For details of these terms of agreement see ‘Alam, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/36/0-7/ to I/36/0-127.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/0/0-86 to I/0/0/194.

<sup>6</sup> IJC I/32/10-81 to I/32/10-94, I/35/10-71 to I/35/10-116; I/37/0-151 to I/37/0-171, I/39/0-3 to I/39/0-14; I/41/0-33 to I/41/0-48.

<sup>7</sup> IJC I/34/0-63 to I/34/0-87; I/35/0-1 to I/35/0-5; I/37/0-20 to I/37/0-31; I/38/0-307 to I/37/0-378. Such extensive documentation was crucial for detecting any concealment or misstatement of facts. IJC I/41/1-13.

The *zamīndārs* who were anxious to secure the offices of *deshmukh* or *deshpāndiya* were required to submit written bonds conveying their consent to the *peshkash* in lieu of these offices.<sup>1</sup>

The rural aristocracy, having been reduced to the status of *zamīndārs*,<sup>2</sup> was thus not totally left unprovided for as the perquisites of their offices came to be guarded zealously as recorded in all the appointment orders of *deshmukhs* and *deshpāndiyas*. It was also stipulated that the acceptance letters of *peshkash* by the *zamīndārs* of each *maḥal* were to be verified by the *dīwāns* of the respective *ṣūbās* of the Deccan.

The payment of the *rusūm* of the *zamīndārs* used to be withheld till the issue of an authoritative certificate or *sanad* and those who willingly accepted the *peshkash* were required to remit one-fourth of it in cash, whereas half of their *rusūm* were to be resumed till the adjustment of arrears of *peshkash*.<sup>3</sup>

The Mughal administration even maintained minute details of the entire *ṣūbās* as is clear from the following data of 1695 of the actual collections and arrears of *peshkash* of *zamīndārs* of *ṣūba* Bījāpur.<sup>4</sup>

**TABLE-1**

S.No.	Details of <i>peshkash</i>	Amount
1.	According to the register of former <i>dīwān</i>	Rs.6,12,232/4
2.	Arrears remitted by Appājī etc	Rs.30,000
3.	Arrears exempted from Hindu Rao <i>deshmukh</i> of Qamar Nagar as per reverse endorsement of the <i>farmān</i> .	Rs.30,000
4.	Balance	Rs.5,57,232/4
5.	Realisation by Amānat <i>Khān</i> , the former <i>dīwān</i>	Rs.41,932/8
6.	Balance	Rs.5,15,299/12
7.	Amount of <i>peshkash</i> remitted i] In charge of Mehdi Quli treasurer of Bījāpur. ii] In charge of <i>Khawāja</i> Ya‘qub treasurer of <i>pargana</i> Almala. iii] In charge of ‘Abdullāh, the treasurer of...	Rs.44,484/4 Rs.1 0,723 Rs.19,000 Rs.14,761/4
8.	Total Arrears.	Rs.4,70,815/8

<sup>1</sup> IJC I/34/11-2.

<sup>2</sup> Cf M. Athar Ali, ‘Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire’, *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society* [JRAS], 1978, p.270.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/34/10-6; I/0/0-169.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/36/2-1.

But as far as arrears of *peshkash* pending payment by the big *zamīndārs* were concerned, they were always given preferential treatment as compared to the intermediary *zamīndārs* even to such an extent that the *zamīndār* of Chanda paid Rs. 40,65, 337, whereas 1040 *asharfīs* and Rs. 64,01,925 remained unpaid from 1685 to 1698.<sup>1</sup>

We find further details of accumulated arrears of *peshkash* etc of the *zamīndārs* of Chanda and Shāh Islāmgarh in our documents.<sup>2</sup> An amount of Rs. 18,00,000 per annum as *peshkash* was paid by the *zamīndār* of Chanda<sup>3</sup> and Srirangapatam.<sup>4</sup> Surprisingly enough, notwithstanding the extreme step of removing Jamāluddin, *deshmukh* of 190 villages of *pargana* Balapur, *ṣūba* Berar, in 1698 and replacing him by the *mutaṣaddis* of that *pargana* by fixing one lakh *tanka-i-Berari* as *peshkash*, the *rusūm* of *deshmukhī* was still realized by the *zamīndārs* without making any payment of the *peshkash*.<sup>5</sup>

The imperial administration was fully aware of the *zamīndārs*' ability to help in the extension of cultivation. During the *dīwānī* of Makramat Khān, *pargana* Devalgāon was only partly cultivated because the entire area was forest and waste infested by rebels. Makramat Khān invented the device of getting the entire *pargana* cultivated by asking the *zamīndārs* to undertake to bring under cultivation 2000 *bighas* per annum, thus bringing their entire *pargana* under cultivation comprising 48,000 *bighas* within the stipulated period [1675 to 1699], and yielding *jama'-kāmīl* [maximum revenue] contingent upon granting 4800 *bighas* as incentive and 12,000 *bighas* as *rusūm*. Thus a *pargana* which had remained desolate since the annexation became fully cultivated.<sup>6</sup> The *deshmukhi* of half of *pargana* Bawanbūr in *sarkār* Narnāla, *ṣūba* Berar, was given to Shankrājī conditional upon the cultivation of 1000 *nitans* or 80,000 *bighas* in 1698.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/40/4-8.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/42/11-74; I/42/11-75.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/41/12-45; I/44/1-29.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/41/7-13 Jagdev Raj, *zamīndār* of Sri Rang Pattan paid 40,000 *hūns* as *peshkash* per annum.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/41/4-25.

<sup>6</sup> IJC I/42/9-11.

<sup>7</sup> IJC I/41/6-11, I/41/6-12.

The *zamīndārs* were also required to ascertain the devastation of crops on any natural calamity occurring.<sup>1</sup>

The *zamīndārs*' cooperation in extension of cultivation could not, however, be taken for granted. Jadun Rai, *alias* Jagdev, promised a *peshkash* of Rs.3,00,800 and cultivation of 7,00,000 *bighas* of land as *deshpāndiya* and *deshmukh* of 27 *maḥals* of Daulatabad, etc He did not fulfil the promise giving the excuse that it was uncultivable because the entire land was brackish, mountainous and full of nullahs, and the peasantry, due to epidemic, famine and the oppression of Marathas, had either died or run away.<sup>2</sup>

The *zamīndārs* were often allowed to take land on *ijāra* [or farm], which was apparently not legally forbidden. Many areas were leased out to them, e.g. the *tappas* of Supa, etc, belonging to *pargana* Goa, *sarkār* Muṣṭafābād or Talkokan-i-‘Ādil Khāni were in the *ijāra* of the *zamīndār* of Sondha, from 1698 for Rs. 60,000/- only [yielding him one lakh of rupees].<sup>3</sup> The area comprised 19 *tappas*, which was confirmed in favour of Sad Shiv Nayak, actually yielding *jama raqmana* [i.e. *jama* ‘*raqmī*] of 1,20,000 *hūns* in lieu of an annual *peshkah* of Rs. 25,000/-.<sup>4</sup> The services of the *zamīndārs* were indispensable for the revenue administration. *Zamīndārs* commonly sought to suppress the actual yield, was pointed out in Aurangzeb's order of 1701 concerning the *zamīndārs* of *ṣūbās* of the Deccan, including 12 *parganas* each of Khandesh and Aurangabad and 3 *parganas* of Berar.<sup>5</sup> An official [probably *teḥṣīldār*] alleged that the *zamīndārs* were in the habit of usurping the land revenue.<sup>6</sup> Even 11 villages of the *inā'm* of ‘Ālam *zamīndār*, which were not shown in the *mawāzna* of 1685, had simply to be left in the possession of the *zamīndār*.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/40/6-11.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/0/0-377.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/44/5-90, I/45/8-45; for- the *zamīndārs* of Goa see, S.Z.H.Jafri ‘Mughal Relations with the Portuguese Administration in Goa, 1700-1701- Evidence of Persian Records in Lisbon Archives, *PIHC*, 1987, pp. 302-311.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/44/12-48.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/44/2-85. The *zamīndārs* of many regions, like Karnatak-i Hyderabad were creating problems. IJC I/38/2-3

<sup>6</sup> IJC VIII/87/422 [Inadvertently shown as the document of Muḥammad Shāh's reign].

<sup>7</sup> IJC I/35/10-6.

Instances of the harassment of the *jāgīrdārs* by the *zamīndārs* are numerous in our records. The ‘*āmil* in collusion with the *zamīndārs* usurped Rs. 10,000 of the revenue of Muḥammad Khān,<sup>1</sup> *jāgīrdār* of Parendā. The *zamīndār* of Daruzzafar [Bījāpur] abducted and poisoned a *qila’dār* [castellan].<sup>2</sup> Several *jāgīrdārs* failed to collect the revenues due to the defiance of the *zamīndārs*.<sup>3</sup> The *zamīndārs* did not even spare the *Khāliṣa* lands due to which stringent measures had to be taken.<sup>4</sup> However, the nature, pattern and extent of the partnership between the Mughal Empire and *zamīndārs* requires fuller investigation as it has many implications and aspects, one of which, of course, relates to the assignment of *manṣaband* grant of military duties to the *zamīndārs*.

Thus ‘Alī, a *zamīndār*, was ordered to raise 100 matchlockmen for protecting the fort of Khandark, for which he was given a ‘12-monthly’ *jāgīr* with abatement in 1695.<sup>5</sup> Narsingh, son of Neem Rao, joined Imperial service in 1696 on the condition of grant of *manṣaband* office of *deshpāndiya* of *pargana* Karkatpur, contingent upon the deduction of *peshkash* from the *zāt* salary,<sup>6</sup> holding the rank of 3000/1300 with a *waṭan jāgīr*. Sripat, *zamīndār* of Juwār, who was granted *jāgīr* of Gulshanabad [Nasik], his ancestral *zamīndārī*, however, found it quite unproductive; and he was reported to be in extremely distressed condition due to the expenses of maintaining the five forts in his charge.<sup>7</sup>

The *zamīndārs*, as *jāgīrdārs*, anxiously yearned for actual possession of *jāgīrs*. Īsar Das, son of Rāhūjī, *zamīndār* of Hathgarh sought the balance of pay claims through assignment of a *jāgīr* vacated by another *jāgīrdār*.<sup>8</sup> Special significance was attached to the *zamīndārs* whose *jāgīrs* could not be easily transferred.<sup>9</sup> Bhim Rāo, son of Kishan Rao, *deshmukh* was granted the rank of 300/150 in 1699 A.D.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/49/7-4.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/48/5-4.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/45/3-16.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/0/0-380.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/37/6-2.

<sup>6</sup> IJCI/38/9-13.

<sup>7</sup> IJC I/41/6-107 It was mischievously transferred but subsequently restored to him. IJC I/44/11-48.

<sup>8</sup> IJC I/41/6-50.

<sup>9</sup> IJC I/41/8-84.

<sup>10</sup> IJC I/41/8-97, I/41/8-98.

Sa'adatmand Khān *alias* Khandu, *zamīndār* of Bara Bawal was previously ordered to maintain 1000 *sawār* and 5,000 *piyādas* [infantry]. This project was abandoned subsequently because he was told by Aurangzeb that “since he is a neo-Muslim he would remain with the Imperial stirrup as he would be of no use there. Almighty God willing as soon as that territory is brought under control he would be granted its *zamīndārī*”.<sup>1</sup> In 1702 the same *zamīndār* held the rank of 2500/1000 with the royal order for grant of *zāt* and 500 *sawār* salary after he obtained a branding certificate.<sup>2</sup>

Sachcha Rāo, *zamīndār* was assigned a large territory conditional upon the protection of the fort.<sup>3</sup> Mādhū Rāo, *zamīndār* of Pair, was granted the rank of 300/100 [50x2-3h].<sup>4</sup>

The Imperial administration maintained the separate identity of *zamīndārs* when they became *jāgīrdārs*. Their being *zamīndārs* was specifically recorded in *āwārja* documents, and even separate sheets containing the names of the *zamīndārs* in each *ṣūba* were maintained, as is evident from the following table.<sup>5</sup>

**TABLE 2**  
***Zamīndārs Holding Rank***

S.No.	Name of <i>Zamīndārs</i>	Designation	No. of <i>Maḥals</i>	Name of <i>Ṣūba</i>
1.	Rāo Jagdeo	<i>Deshmukh</i> and <i>Deshpandiaya</i> of <i>parganas</i> of <i>sarkār</i> Daulatabad	23	Aurangabad
2.	Nāhar <u>Khān</u>	<i>Deshmukh</i> of <i>pargana</i> Ashti, <i>sarkār</i> Aḥmadnagar	1	-do-
3.	Muḥammad Sai'd	<i>Deshmukh</i> of <i>sarkār</i> Talkokan-i 'Ādil <u>Khāni</u>	-	-do-
4.	Bhoji	<i>Deshmukh</i> of <i>pargana</i> Basi	-	-do-
5.	Ūdājī Rām	<i>Deshmukh</i> of <i>sarkār</i> Mahur, etc	23	Berar
6.	Muḥammad Ḥasan S/o Muḥammad 'Alī, grandson of Kōrtalab <u>Khān</u>	<i>Deshmukh</i> of <i>pargana</i> Pornar; <i>sarkār</i> Gavil	1	-do-
7.	<i>Burhānnullāh</i> <u>Khān</u> S/o late Sarfraz <u>Khān</u>	<i>Sardeshmukh</i> of <i>pargana</i> Lohgaon, <i>sarkār</i> Nānder	-	-do-

<sup>1</sup> IJC I/45/2-87.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/45/12-27.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/42/2-5; I/42/3-44.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/43/2-106; I/43/12-77.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/0/0-824.

8.	Rūdrājī	<i>Qānūngo</i> of half of <i>ṣūba</i> Bījāpur	-	Bijapur
9.	<u>Kh</u> wāṣ <i>Khān</i>	<i>Deshmukhof ḥaveli</i> [headquarters]	19	-do-
10.	Maddaji	Kulkarni of the <i>ṣūba</i> .	-	-do-
11.	Murai S/o Venkat	<i>Sardeshmukh</i> of Imtiāzgarh.	-	-do-
12.	Prithi Raj S/o Bhagwat	<i>Deshmukh</i> of <i>pargana</i> Rathihalli.	-	-do-
13.	Shyām Rāj	<i>Nargonda</i> of <i>parganas</i> of Bījāpur.	-	-do-
14.	Babuji Pandit	<i>Qānūngo</i>	-	Hyderabad

‘Abdul Hai S/o late ‘Abdul Bāri, *zamīndār* of Yalgharp, was granted *manṣab* with *zamīndārī* and *faujdārī* thereof.<sup>1</sup> *Zamīndārs* also received other favours. On the strong recommendations of Ghairat *Khān*, the castellan and commandant of Parenda, Bharti, the *zamīndār* of *pargana* Kanti, who was the *deshmukh* of the *pargana*, was entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining 100 *sawārs* and directed to guard the highway and assist the *faujdār* of Parenda in escorting caravans<sup>2</sup> with an *inā‘m* of 100 *chāwars* of land, which example was cited by Arjun g/s of Bāwā together with that of Rāno Nārū, for similar favour on similar conditions.<sup>3</sup>

The *zamīndārs* as *jāgīrdārs* had to fulfill all the necessary formalities like inspection of contingents: the contingent of Paddaji Jujhār Rāo, holding the rank of 2000/1000 [500x2-3h], and the *zamīndārī* of *thāna* Badda Manchgāon and Maliwāri, were found to be in full strength upon inspection.<sup>4</sup>

The *zamīndārs* as *jāgīrdārs* were called upon to extend maximum military cooperation in various expeditions like Rūdrā, *qānūngo* of Bījāpur who had previously helped ‘Ādil *Khān*, was directed to raise infantry for the Talkokan campaign, etc, and orders were issued to *zamīndārs* of 11 *parganas* to send 13000 *piyadas* from their *maḥals*:<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> IJC I/42/0-59; for similar instances see I/47/4-56.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/42/1-39; I/42/3-16.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/47/4-99.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/45/3-29. The *zamīndār* claimed to hold it since the time of Bījāpuris and sought its permanent *deshmukhī*, *jāgīrdārī* and *faujdārī*.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/45/9-68.

Shaikh Ibrāhīm holding the rank of 300/100 and the *zamīndāri* of Talkokan, assisted Nuṣrat Jung in the conquest of Islāmgarh [Rāherī]; his sons were also favoured with rank after his death in 1703.<sup>1</sup>

The *zamīndārs* and *jāgīrdārs* had tussles over the assignment of *jāgīrs*. ‘Abdur Raḥīm, the *zamīndār* of Painth Mehja, complained against Sripat, *zamīndār* of Juwar, who had secured the former’s *waṭan jāgīr*, notwithstanding his military assistance to Zainuddin ‘Ali Khān in conquering Futūḥul Ḥusan fort as well as his current endeavour for capturing the fort of Lohgarh with him.<sup>2</sup>

The *zamīndārs* as *jāgīrdārs* served the Imperial administration in numerous ways. But their main role related to their support to the Mughal government or their antagonism against the Mughals or Marathas to suit their vested interests. A contemporary observer opined that the *zamīndārs* extended support to Shivajī enabling him to challenge Mughal power.<sup>3</sup> However, in the post-Shivajī era, the *zamīndārs* and the *deshmukhs* occasionally emerged as the main allies of the Mughal *faujdārs*, who were equally responsible for the oppression of the peasantry as well as usurping the land revenue. But the descriptive accounts of events in the Deccan for the period 1690-1707 indicate that the end result was the migration or flight of the peasants, followed by armed resistance, where *zamīndārs* used the distress of the peasants to augment their own armed strength.<sup>4</sup>

However to suppose Shivajī to be the liberator of the peasants or friend of the *zamīndārs* is equally erroneous, because peasants merely became *bargīs* or irregular cavalry of the Maratha *sardārs*,<sup>5</sup> whereas Shivajī denied *inā‘m* to the *deshmukhs*, and attempted to convert *peshkashi*

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/47/2-18.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/51/11-157.

<sup>3</sup> Bhim Sen, *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, Ms. Br. Mus. Or 23, [Rotograph], Department of History, AMU, Aligarh, ff. 139[a]-40[b].

<sup>4</sup> Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*. Bombay, 1963, pp. 269-271. Irfan Habib even sees the Maratha resistance primarily one from the *zamīndār* class. Cf., J.F. Richards, *The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan*. JAS. Vol. XXXV, No.2 [Feb. 1976], p. 237.

<sup>5</sup> Irfan Habib, *Essays in Indian History - Towards a Marxist Perception*, Delhi, 1995, p.254. Irfan Habib even sees the Maratha resistance as primarily from the *zamīndār* class.

*zamīndārs* into full revenue-paying ones. He thus sought to create a new class of faithful *zamīndār*, thereby hastening the flight of the older *zamīndārs* either to ‘Ādil Shāhis or the Mughals. In contrast to Shivajī the Mughal administration offered much greater privileges to the *peshkashi zamīndārs* by also granting them *rusūm* and *inā‘m* lands.

In 1689 Muḥammad Ḥasan and other *zamīndārs* of Dabhol sent by Ghāziuddīn Khān Bahādur Firuz Jung, accompanied by Saiyid Luṭf, made a representation to Aurangzeb that obliged them to maintain 5000 infantrymen they had been deputed to conquer Maratha forts: now they solicited the *sanad* of *deshmukhi* as per the *sanad* of Zulfiqār Khān,<sup>1</sup> which was promptly accorded imperial approval.<sup>2</sup> However, the above *sanad* did not mitigate the problems of Muḥammad Ḥasan, serving under ‘Abdur Razzāq Lāri, who pleaded for the grant of *sanad* to him according to the imperial order without which the *zamīndār* was totally crippled from aiding the Imperial cause. Previously the *zamīndār* had supported the Mughals in the conquest of Islāmgarh, etc, and was well acquainted with that land.<sup>3</sup> Notwithstanding the *zamīndār’s* strenuous endeavour in bringing 5000 *piyadas* without any remuneration from the Imperial administration and capturing the forts of the Marathas including the assistance rendered in seizing Islāmgarh, the grant of a *sanad* of *zamīndārī* was kept pending till production of a guarantor [*zāmin*] and fixation of *peshkash*. It was issued only when the surety bond of Rs.10,000/- which was one fourth of the *peshkash* in cash was executed, half to be paid at the time of the receipt of the *farmān*, and the remaining half was to be deposited within the next five months. Furthermore Rs.30,000/-, the balance of *peshkash* was to be remitted within six years. Zulfiqār Khān recommended 2% *rusūm* as per the rates of the Konkan-i-Nizāmul Mulki together with four *inā‘m* villages. Ultimately the requisite *sanad* was issued to Muḥammad Ḥasan concerning the *zamīndārī* of *sarkār* Dabhol.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Zulfiqār Khān attested to the assistance given by Muḥammad Ḥasan and Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, *Adhikar* and *Chaudhurī* respectively of *pargana* Ja‘farābād, *Sarkār* Dabhol, in conquering the forts of Risālgarh and Mahipatgarh and confirmed their *zamīndārī* with an addition of two *inā‘m* villages. IJC I/33/12-1.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/31/11-1.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/32/0-59 [A].

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/38/4-4.

Similar obligations were imposed on the other four *deshmukhs* of the region. Of these, Muḥammad Sai‘d promised to seize the forts if [financial] assistance was given to him. He further promised to bring the *maḥal* to maximum revenue within three years and agreed to pay Rs. 10,000 in *peshkash*.<sup>1</sup> He was also granted a *manṣab* of 500/100 in 1698.<sup>2</sup>

The above was not a case in isolation as we come to know that Datta and Surya, etc, who were posted with Zulfīqār Khān for conquering Islāmgarh or Raheerī solicited the *sanad* of the offices of *deshmukh* and *deshpāndaya* through his intercession on the strength of Sikander Khān’s *sanad* and obtained orders for delay in payment of *peshkash* till the re-peopling and cultivation of the *pargana* Patan, *ṣūba* Bījāpur.<sup>3</sup>

In the hope of securing a *farmān* for *sardeskat* of *pargana* Jatapur, Ram Gonda, *desāī* stood guarantee for the conquest of Bhīmgarh fort in 1693-4; and his object was granted to him accordingly.<sup>4</sup> After the conquest of the fort of Khandark, ‘Alī, a *zamīndār* was appointed to protect the fort with 100 matchlockmen, and nine villages were given as *inā‘m* to him from *pargana* and *sarkār* Torgul, *ṣūba* Bījāpur.<sup>5</sup> Shambhū Dās, *deshmukh* of Nandurbar, inflicted crushing defeats on the Marathas and got released the people from the Marathas for which he was also favoured with a *manṣab* of 250/50.<sup>6</sup>

When Aurangzeb was busy in procuring funds to meet the wage bills for his field armies, help from *zamīndārs* came as a special mean of support. They not only served the imperial cause but also mustered armies at their own cost to assist the Mughals in reducing Maratha forts. This mutual cooperation between the Mughals and the *zamīndārs* came in several ways. Such *zamīndārs* as suffered at the hands of the Marathas vehemently opposed them. When Shivajī seized the fort of Satara he expelled the *deshmukhs*, one of whom subsequently held the rank of 3000/2000 from the Mughals, along with the *deshmukhī*, when Babujī and Govind Rāi,

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/35/11-1 & I/35/11-2.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/40/4-2.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/33/7-2, I/33/7-25.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/36/10-1.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/37/5-2.

<sup>6</sup> IJC I/37/10-180.

*deshmukhs* of *pargana* Kalgi, *sarkār* Daulatabad, bordering the Maratha territory, were expelled by Sambhaji, they naturally showed resentment against him on the eve of Aurangzeb's attack upon and destruction of his power: [APPENDIX - D], they pleaded with Aurangzeb for restoration of their *deshmukhi* through an imperial *farmān* in 1689.<sup>1</sup>

The *deshmukhs* willingly sided with the Mughals, though the Maratha menace created numerous problems to them.<sup>2</sup> Despite many hurdles they exerted themselves fully in extension of cultivation.<sup>3</sup> Even sometimes small *zamīndārs* were engaged in self-cultivation due to flight of peasantry. The elimination of Pratap Rao, a Maratha *sardār*, by Rānū Narū, *zamīndār* of Ondargāonsarkār, Parenda *ṣūba*, Aurangabad, conveniently earned him a *manṣab* of 1000/700 contingent upon his maintaining 100 *sawārs* for which 100 *chāwars* of land were given as *inā* 'm.<sup>4</sup> However contrary to such mutual understanding between the *zamīndārs* and the Mughals, there are numerous instances as well of the *zamīndārs*' active connivance with the Marathas against the Mughals which cannot be dismissed out of hand. It was probably due to Aurangzeb's unceasing campaigns in the Deccan against the Marathas, which gave so much respite to the *zamīndārs* as to enable them to promote their vested interests by siding with their enemies, seizing the revenues and conniving with the Marathas in realizing the *chauth* and plundering with impunity the country around.

Chin Qilich Khān, the Governor of Bījāpur, complained against the Bedaris, who, in collaboration with the Marathas and the *zamīndārs*, were determined to rise after the departure of Aurangzeb. Since his entire army accompanied the Emperor he sought requisite reinforcements to deal with the *zamīndārs* [1694]<sup>5</sup>.

'Abdullāh, a refractory *zamīndār* connived with the Marathas in establishing their military camps every year in *pargana* Narsi, *sarkār* Basim, *ṣūba* Berar, due to which the *jāgīrdārs* failed to receive a single *dām* in revenue. Kishna, *deshpāndiya* of *sarkār* Murtazābād

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/39/11-121, I/39/11-172.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/42/12-2.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/43/4-4.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/45/5-46.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/36/8-6, I/51/12-123.

[Miraj], could obtain reinstatement to his ancestral office on the plea that the new incumbent was not only a Maratha but also a patron of the Marathas.<sup>1</sup>

Even the agent of Chin Qilīch Khān was alleged to have connived with six *deshmukhs* of *pargana* and *sarkār* Pathri, *ṣūba* Berar, in seizing Rs.70,000/- from the small *zamīndārs* and peasants. Together with 1000 *sawārs* he collaborated with the Maratha *sardārs* in devastating the *pargana* and even paid *chauth* to them in 1700.<sup>2</sup> Conflict among the *zamīndārs* was a recurring feature and they even sought the intervention of the Marathas in settling their scores. It is related that Gorkhoji, *deshmukh*, posted at Jinjī with Zulfīqār Khān served the Mughals with a rank of 1000/900, with *waṭan-jāgīr*. But due to the dirty machinations of some co-sharers like Madhu, who sided with the Marathas, his agent was dismissed and imprisoned.<sup>3</sup>

The *zamīndārs* even plundered the *parganas* in collaboration with the Marathas.<sup>4</sup> The Marathas by consent of the *zamīndārs* of Ankola had become so much emboldened that they penetrated into Kalyani hills in 1701.<sup>5</sup> The *zamīndārs* of some villages of *pargana* Dehari, due to the support of the *jāgīrdārs*, had established a rapport with the Marathas. Furthermore, the fortress of the *deshpāndiya* of *pargana* Bhokran became the abode of the Marathas where from they attacked that *pargana*.<sup>6</sup> It was reported that the Marathas had established the military camps in *pargana* Malwari, *ṣūba* Bījāpur, because of Tolajī, brother of Maddajī, *deshmukh*, who was a Maratha *sardār*: Mada seized the revenues in 1702.<sup>7</sup>

The Marathas even killed the men of loyal *zamīndārs*.<sup>8</sup> The men of Maratha *jāgīrdārs* and of the Marathas used to become indistinguishable from each other due to their racial affinity.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/42/3-26

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/43/4-1, I/46/1-105.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/41/4-2.

<sup>4</sup> IJCI/41/8-126.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/44/4-73.

<sup>6</sup> IJC I/45/6-11.

<sup>7</sup> IJCI/45/7-116.

<sup>8</sup> IJC I/45/7-46.

<sup>9</sup> IJC I/45/12-142.

The *zamīndārs* who endeavoured to promote cultivation, were unable to provide safety to the peasantry against the Maratha onslaught. Occasionally, due to the Maratha devastation and mischievousness of the *deshmukhs*, the *parganas* became ruined.<sup>1</sup> Nay, even the agents of the *deshpāndiyas* and *kulkarnis* used to indulge in conspiracy as they even seized 1230 *hūns* which they delivered to the Marathas in 1702.<sup>2</sup>

In view of the damage caused by the Marathas in weakening Mughal hold over the *zamīndārs* and other sections of agrarian society, Aurangzeb strictly opined that “to show pity to the Marathas was wrong”.<sup>3</sup>

The *zamīndārs* were frequently reported to assist the Marathas.<sup>4</sup> They had become so subservient to them that even the *zamīndārs* of *pargana* Peinth Pala had fixed Rs. 1000/- as *sabti* of the Marathas and whatever was realized was given to them.<sup>5</sup>

The *zamīndārī* rights were saleable: half of the *deshmukhī* of *pargana* Oepari [sic] was sold, though the proceeds might be from the connivance of a relative in 1706.<sup>6</sup> The *deshmukh* of *pargana* Naldurg seized the stores of the fort in collaboration with the Marathas in 1706.<sup>7</sup> The situation had worsened to such an extent that the *zamīndārs* became active allies of the Marathas. It was reported that Rājmal, *deshmukh* of *pargana* Kalgi, had been collaborating with the Marathas since long. As and when the Maratha army came there, the *deshmukh* sent his contingent under his nephew’s command, which already had an enviable record. Still the *deshmukh*’s plenipotentiary sought full *deshmukhī* instead of half of the *deshmukhī* of *pargana*, as a result, manipulation and mis-statement denying his client’s involvement in any conspiracy with the Marathas.<sup>8</sup> To crown all, “they no longer fulfilled their obligations but assumed strength,

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/46/5-52, I/46/5-53.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/46/9-91.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/46/11-64.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/47/4-89.

<sup>5</sup> IJC I/50/8-5.

<sup>6</sup> IJC I/50/11-173.

<sup>7</sup> IJC I/51/11-36.

<sup>8</sup> IJC I/0/0-522.

joined the Marathas, enlisted in the armies, and laid the hand of oppression on the country.”<sup>1</sup> This had become a totally changed situation because the very intermediaries who [*zamīndārs*] were allowed to retain a minor share of formal revenue demand, became the potential rivals of the empire.

In the light of the above Muzaffar Alam’s assertion about the role of the *zamīndārs* as the Mughal collaborators<sup>2</sup> is quite untenable because only a few of them did not refrain from supporting the Mughal cause. But the majority of them emerged as the potential opponents of the Mughals in the Deccan. The position of the *zamīndārs* in the Deccan under Aurangzeb remained quite strong. There were *zamīndārs*, who were loyal to the Mughals, whereas there were disloyal ones too, who harmed the Imperial interests beyond redemption. Furthermore, the *zamīndārs* promoted agriculture and assisted in revenue collection, while they also placed hurdles in proper realization of revenues. There were also *zamīndārs* on whom were conferred higher ranks. The presence of loyal *zamīndārs* who supported the Mughals and received *jāgīrs* and those who opposed them bitterly, demonstrate a unique phenomenon of the *zamīndāri* system in the Deccan, viz., the multiple support the people of Berar were to give to the Marathas.

## [II] PĀLĪGĀRS AND MARATHAS

Notwithstanding a cursory study these documents demonstrate numerous complaints about the dearth of *pāibāqī* and that owing to *be-jāgīri* [lack of *jāgīrs*] people were dying gradually. Unfortunately these complaints seem to be particularly numerous after 1696-7,<sup>3</sup> Fortunately M. Athar Ali has also drawn our attention to a document of the year 1117/ 1706 relating to Hyderabad/Karnatak, included in *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb’s Reign* [ed. Yusuf Husain Khān] showing that the area under the *Khāliṣa* accounted for only 6 per cent of the *jama*; the *pāibāqī* accounted for 20 per cent of which 16 per cent was in the hands of Pālīgārs,

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<sup>1</sup> Bhim Sen, *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, 139 [b].

<sup>2</sup> Alam, op.cit, p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> S.M. Azizuddin Husain, Scarcity of *Pāibāqī* Lands During Aurangzeb’s Reign in the Light of Inayat Jung Collection Documents, *PIHC*, XXXIX, 1978, 426-30.

thus leaving very small areas for assignment, amounting to a little above 4 per cent as we have good testimony for the intense pleasure for *jāgīr*, which contemporaries were speaking of.

Dāūd Khān Panni, the new *faujdar* campaigned actively against the various Pālīgārs and the *rajas* of the area in a firm effort to compel them to recognize the imperial authority of Aurangzeb. Before it neither ‘Ali ‘Askar, *faujdar* and *dīwān* of the Karnatak from 1687 to 1688 nor Bashārat Khān, *dīwān* [1688-1690] succeeded in prying satisfactory collections out of the Pālīgārs in the area. However, in 1706 much of the remainder *pāibāqī* nominally under the central treasury, was of uncertain status recorded as under the control of Pālīgārs [9 percent]. However, *peshkash* from Pālīgārs added another seven hundred thousand rupees. Moreover Dāūd Khā Panni’s vigorous campaigns against the Pālīgārs probably brought collections close to the normative demand.

Anyhow even this does not provide us is a clear picture of the situation because a recent study of the Inayat Jung Collection documents shows that there was a large amount of *pāibāqī* in the Hyderabad and Bījāpur areas which was called *mulk-i jadīd* or new areas.<sup>1</sup> In a statement addressed to Aurangzeb it is stated that in the *mulk-i jadīd* Bījāpur and Haidarabad the *pāibāqī* is considerable, since owing to its low income the [claimants] representatives with the *jama*‘ are also in abundance.

Fortunately the background to this situation is clear from the documents. The *mulk-i qadīm* or the country was the area in the Deccan conquered upto the time of Shāhjahān i.e. Khandesh, Aḥmadnagar, and Berar while *mulk-i jadīd* or the new country contained Bījāpur and Haidarabad including the Karnataka and parts of Daulatabad and Bider provinces.<sup>2</sup> Large parts of the *mulk-i jadīd* were disturbed and unsettled, and were called *ghair-‘amli*. This was particularly so in the Karnataka where the Pālīgārs were very powerful, and no settlement had

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<sup>1</sup> Zakir Husain, ‘Problems of the Deccan Administration in the Last Decade of Aurangzeb’s Reign- based on Explorations in the Inayat Jung Collection of the National Archives, mimeographed paper presented to the 61<sup>th</sup> Session of Indian History Congress Calcutta’, 2000-2001, in *Papers from the Aligarh Historians Society*.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/46/12-167 & I/46/12-178.

been made with them so that position was better in the old Hyderabad state, but in Bījāpur had deteriorated due to Maratha depredation.<sup>1</sup>

The Inayat Jung Collection at the National Archives, New Delhi, has over 15,000 official Mughal documents relating to Aurangzeb's reign. All of them are concerned with Deccan, and arranged in connected series, from the 28th regnal year of Aurangzeb. These documents have not been utilised for various aspects of the political and administrative history of Deccan. Prof S Nurul Hasan, J F Richards, Muzaffar Alam and this writer have used these documents to clarify matters regarding relations of the Mughal administration with *zamīndārs* and problems of the *jāgīr* system in Deccan.<sup>2</sup> But, despite showing keen interest in the contemporary Maratha history, there has been no earnest effort to use this enormously rich documentary material for establishing facts and elucidating the factors behind them.

This chapter is also an effort to exhibit the kind of information on Mughal Maratha relations that these documents contain. Since the documents were composed with the official Mughal point of view, it has been thought best to proceed by examining how the Mughals looked at Marathas. That perception might have been partly self-serving and incorrect; but this is always the case; when too hostile sides leave behind different evidences for the same events. The information from both sides has to be subject to critical scrutiny to arrive at the truth.

Before we begin, we may note that by an officially sanctioned usage, the Marathas opposed to the Mughals, appear concealed under opprobrious terms, like robbers, rebels etc<sup>3</sup> Satish Chandra in his essay on 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals has convincingly argued in

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<sup>1</sup> J.F Richards, *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, *op. cit.*, 111-34.

<sup>2</sup> S.N. Hasan, 'Aspects of the *Zamīndāri* System in the Deccan' [1696-1707] *PIHC*, 1969 pp. 265-70; J F Richards. *Mughal Administration in Golconda OUP*, 1975; Muzaffar Alam, 'The *Zamīndārs* and the Mughal Power in the Deccan - 1685-1712', *IESHR*, Vol. 11 No. 1, 1974, pp. 74-91; Zakir Husain, 'The Working of the *jāgīr* system in the Deccan during the Last Years of Aurangzeb, *Aligarh Vol. of Papers on Indian History*'.

<sup>3</sup> According to an imperial '*farmān*' orders, were issued for calling refractory Marathas '*ashqiya*' and '*nasardārān*'. But we come across some generic terms analogous, to official terminology like '*nasardaran-i ghanīm-i-lām*, *maqūr*; *dudān muḥṣidān*, *maḥzīl*, *ṭabqa-i-wajibut tafarqa*, *firqai-zalla*, *kafra fajra*, *jahannumi*' etc [Cf., Muzaffar Alam "The *Zamīndārs* and the Mughal Power in the Deccan, *IESHR* 1974, P. 741. Other refractory elements have been mentioned by their caste names, *viz.*, Gond, Bhil, Afghān, Jat and Koli etc

detail the salient features of the Mughal Deccan Policy is quite significant as it is a new breeze which had opened new vistas of research in this field<sup>1</sup> as he has made refreshing departure when he argued that there were complex factors responsible for the Deccan policy of the Mughals.

However, it would not be out of context if we take into consideration a brief account of the other points of views about the Marathas and Shivajī and his successors activities till Aurangzeb's death. Although a cursory view of the Deccan policy of the Mughals from Akbar to Shāhjahān has been taken taking into account that if the Marathas were a nation than Malik Amber was the father of the nation as he taught them the hit and run tactics yet we have taken into account the Deccan policy of the Mughals under Aurangzeb taking into account the Mughal civil war, Shivajī conquered Purandar, seized north Konkan, including Kalyan and Bhiwandi, defeated Afzal Khān and captured Panhala.

There was a tussle of Aurangzeb with Shivajī as is borne by the advice Aurangzeb gave to his deputies, Naṣīrī Khān and to the 'Ādil Shāh on the eve of his departure to north India to fight in the civil war. He therefore, asked Naṣīrī Khān to watch the imperial territories, 'as the son of a dog [Shiva] is waiting for his opportunity'. He wrote to 'Ādil Shāh, 'Expel Shiva who has sneaked into the possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him *jāgīrs* in Karnataka far away from imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them.'<sup>2</sup> It was like Shāhjahān's peace treaty of 1636 with Bijapur which he adopted towards Shāhji.

Shivajī's night attack on Shāista Khān's camp in 1660, and the discredit it brought on Mughal arms, led to the appointment of Mirza Rāja Jai Singh who decided a policy of divide and rule. In 1665 Jai Singh in his forward policy of Shivajī to surrender his 23 forts out of his 35 forts in the Deccan and attached territory worth four crore *hūns*. In exchange, equivalent territory was awarded to him at the expenses of Bijapur as well as Jai Singh visualized a joint Mughal-

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<sup>1</sup> Satish Chandra, *Essays on Medieval Indian History*, OUP, Delhi, 5<sup>th</sup> reprint, 2008, pp. 446-84, Moreover it is also recorded in *Tarikh-i Meo Mehr*, publisher, Mewat Development Agency, Nuh, 2009, pp. 404-5, that Shivajī was secretly freed by the 35 Muslim Meo Community from Mughal Agra prison of Aurangzeb silently taken to Maharashtra in 1666 A.D.

<sup>2</sup> *Ādāb-i 'Ālamgīrī*, MS, Abdus Salam Collection, 326/96, Azad Library, AMUL, Aligarh, ff. 92 [a] 163 [a]. Jadunath Sarkar, *Shivajī and His Times*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Calcutta, 1948, pp. 53-4.

Maratha campaign against Bijapur. He wrote to Aurangzeb, ‘The conquest of Bijapur is the preface to the conquest of all the Deccan and Karnataka.’<sup>1</sup>

Although Aurangzeb reluctantly agreed to campaign against Bijapur yet he rejected to come personally to the Deccan in order to take charge of the operations there and carry them to completion.<sup>2</sup> However, in 1664 Shivajī had accomplished the sack of Surat. Consequent upon the death of Mīr Jumla, Karnataka was allowed to be absorbed into the Golconda Kingdom.<sup>3</sup> Aurangzeb also succeeded in realizing his early objective in the Deccan when in 1668 he obtained Sholapur, the last Nizamshāhi outpost, in Bijapur.

To conquer Bijapur and subdue Shivajī was an impossible task in 1672 for BahādurKhān. Aurangzeb was however, dissatisfied with these limited successes and replaced BahādurKhān by his lieutenant, Diler Khān, who replaced former’s policy who listened to Bahlol Khān’s grandiloquent plea for a joint expedition against Golconda and then jointly crushing Shivajī. However, his invasion failed ignominiously in 1677 A.D. and furthered the policy of Madanna and Akanna in building the united front of the Deccani powers against the Mughals. However this particular diplomatic struggle of Maddana and Akanna in the Deccan politics and their efforts to build an alliance of the Deccani states including Shivajī had far reaching consequences. It was also agreed that Shivajī would be confined to the Konkan.<sup>4</sup> In 1676 Aurangzeb neither succeeded in repeating Jai Singh nor was able to win over the Deccani states to an alliance against the Marathas.

Consequently the arrival of Aurangzeb in pursuit of Prince Akbar in 1681-82 did not lead to any immediate change in the Mughal policy towards the Deccani states. We are given to understand that by 1684 prince Akbar had been virtually bottled up in Shivajī’s *swarajya* and even the scale of Maratha depredations in Mughal territories had declined.<sup>5</sup> Aurangzeb in his

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<sup>1</sup>*Haft Anjuman*, compiled by Udairaj, secretary of Rustam Dil Khān and Mirza Rāja Singh, Bib. Nat. Paras, No. 37, a fragment, f. 90 [a], Satish Chandra, Deccan Policy of Mirza Rāja Jai Singh, *Pros. Raj. His. Conq.*; [Jodhpur, 1966], pp. 76-84.

<sup>2</sup>*Haft Anjuman*, ff 179 [b], 194 [a]

<sup>3</sup>‘*Ādāb-i Ālamgīrī*’, ff. 66 [b]-67 [a], Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, *The Life of Mīr Jumla*, Calcutta, 1951, pp. 110-13.

<sup>4</sup>*Basātinus Salātīn*, litho, p. 456, *History of Aurangzeb*, IV, pp. 172-3, *Shivajī and His Times*, p. 302.

<sup>5</sup>*History of Aurangzeb*, IV, 335-58.

*farmān* to Quṭb Shāh alleged handing over the entire control of affairs of the kingdom to infidels, the brothers Madanna and Akanna.<sup>1</sup> In 1683 Aurangzeb wanted to return north India after the rain and wanted to leave prince Shah ‘Ālam who refused to budge.<sup>2</sup>

Instead of about a quarter Aurangzeb had decided about 20 years later than the treaty of Purandhur the annexation of the two Deccani states of Bijapur and Golconda in which he succeeded. The capture and execution of Shambhaji on 11<sup>th</sup> March 1689 appeared to be a coping stone to his success. In 1686 the *ṣūbadārs* of Golconda and Bijapur had been instructed to bring together a train of transport animals for the emperor’s return to Agra where preparations were set afoot for welcoming the emperor.<sup>3</sup> However Aurangzeb’s inflexibility and the turn of events made the emperor’s return to north India an ever receding mirage.

Aurangzeb suffered many problems after the annexation of the Deccani states and in Karnataka in and around Shivajī’s old *swarajya* after 1693.<sup>4</sup> Aurangzeb failed to understand the nature of the Maratha movement by his surprise raid and execution of Shambhaji in 1689, his failure to come to terms with Tara Bai widow of Rājārām in 1700 and with Shahu in 1703.<sup>5</sup>

The Marathas had intimate relations with other non-Maratha *zamīndār* caste like Reddis, the Berads, the Velamas etc. The Mughal attempt to introduce into the Deccan the system of administration from their north Indian Mughal system which implied a reduction of their perquisites of the *deshmukhs*, *zamīndārs*, *munīwārs*, *muqaddams* etc also weakening of the administrative control over the countryside. The distribution of the revenue and administrative duties between the *jāgīrdārs* and *faujdar*s weakened the ability of the former to realize their allocated dues from the *jāgīrs*, to maintain even the reduced quota of *sawārs* prescribed in the month scale.

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<sup>1</sup> Khāfi Khān, *Muntaḥhabu-l Lubāb*, II, p. 328.

<sup>2</sup> ‘*Arzdāsh*t of Kanwal Sen, dated 18 *Rajab*, 1094/14 July 1683 [Jaipur Records, *Wakil’s* Reports, p. 4615].

<sup>3</sup> Amber *wakil’s* report dated *Ramazan*, RY 32/23 June 1688 [Akbarabad].

<sup>4</sup> *Akhabārāt*, 27 *Zil*, RY 36/30 July 1693.

<sup>5</sup> Aurangzeb could have become successful if he would not have attached so much importance to Jinji till its conquest in 1698 A.D.

Aurangzeb however, recklessly extended the Mughal line of communication to jinji, without first winning over the Marathas, or dealing with the Maratha roving bands which regularly gained strength and striking capacity taking advantage of local disgruntled elements and absorbing many disbanded [Muslim] soldiers of the erstwhile Deccani states. However, it was only in 1703 that Aurangzeb offered to treat with the Marathas by restoring to Shivajī's *swarajya* to the captive prince Shahu and the grant of *sardeshmukhī* of the Deccan to him. But these efforts collapsed, largely due to unacceptable Maratha demand of *chauth* for the six provinces of the Deccan and Aurangzeb's lack of sense in the Marathas.

Such are the results of Henry Grant Duff's *History of the Marathas*, [2 vols.] M.N. Pearson,<sup>1</sup> Peter Hardy,<sup>2</sup> Jadunath Sarkar's *Shivajī and His Times, History of Aurangzeb*, 5 vols, J.F. Richards,<sup>3</sup> Satish Chandra,<sup>4</sup> Muzaffar 'Ālam<sup>5</sup> and several other staunch critics who have carefully studied the Mughal-Maratha conflict from their point of view. But it would also be outside the purview of the historiography of Mughal India if we take into account the Mughal point of view which seems to be somewhat different as given here under because before his death in 1680 A.D. Shivajī had, according to Pearson controlled an area of about 50,000 square miles or 4.1% of the area of the whole subcontinent. His revenue was one-fifth and one-sixth of that of Aurangzeb. Moreover in his territory he had set up comparatively elaborate administrative apparatus.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover Shivajī's second and most astounding attack was his first seizure and sack of Surat in January 1664. After this two more attacks of 1670 and 1677 were more ferocious and dangerous. In 1666 the Shōh Abbas of Iran taunted of Shivajī not to be suppressed by Aurangzeb.

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<sup>1</sup> M.N Pearson, 'Shivajī and the Decline of the Mughal Empire' in Symposium; *Decline of the Mughal Empire, Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXV, No. 2, pp. 220-36.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Hardy, Commentary and Critique, Symposium: *Decline of the Mughal Empire*, op. cit, pp. 257-63.

<sup>3</sup> JF Richards, The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan, Symposium: 'Decline of the Mughal Empire', JAS, XXXV, No. 2, pp. 237-56.

<sup>4</sup> Satish Chandra, The Deccan Policy of the Mughals under Aurangzeb, op. cit., pp. 461-84; *idem*, Religious Policy of Aurangzeb during the Later Part of His Reign- Some Considerations, Essays in Medieval Indian History, OUP, Delhi 2008 [5<sup>th</sup> ed.] pp. 324-45.

<sup>5</sup> Muzaffar 'Ālam, The *Zamīndārs* and the Mughal Power in the Deccan 1685-1712, *IESHR*, vol. XI, No.1.

<sup>6</sup> A.R. Kulami, *Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji*, Poona, 1969.

By the end of Aurangzeb's reign, the Marathas were spread over the entire Deccan, The *parganas* of the three *ṣūbās* of Berar, Aurangabad and Bidar became especially vulnerable to the Maratha inroads.<sup>1</sup>

Najābat Khān, a 17th century Mughal official, claimed that, "The hell traversing robbers [*ashqiyā-i-jahannum paimā*] scattered everywhere in groups, have attacked, destroyed, sacked, ravaged and depopulated the entire country; except a few towns having strong fortifications [*qila 'jāt-i-mustahkam*], they have left no signs of habitation. They have forcibly seized from the [Mughal] tax-collectors the revenues of both the crops in the Prince's [name not mentioned] 'conditional' *jāgīr*, six months need now to pass before the revenue realization can be undertaken again, The accursed [*maqhūrān*] want to establish military camps [*chhāonīs*] in Khandesh like the previous year..."<sup>2</sup>

The Marathas oppressed the peasantry and demanded one-fourth of the revenue known as *chauth*. It had begun to be demanded in the early phase of Aurangzeb's reign. In 42nd regnal year [RY], it was reported that Nigon Bakht, [in collusion with the Marathas], collected Rs 31,000 as *chauth* from *pargana* Nandgaon, *ṣūba* Berar and posted his men at Malkapur and Mehkar.<sup>3</sup>

In 42nd R.Y., *muqaddams* and the peasantry of 135 villages of *pargana* and *sarkār* Pathri, *ṣūba* Berar Bālāghāt reported that six *deshmukhs* of the *pargana* collected more than the stipulated *rusūm* [perquisites] with the support of the *gumāshṭa* [agent] of Chin Qilīch Khān, exacted, Rs 70,000 unlawfully, constructed fortresses in their assigned villages, maintained the retainers, indulged in robbery and during the time of the Maratha raids 1,000 of their men joined hands with them and attacked and ravaged the villages and delivered *chauth* to them. They did not allow the revenue paying peasantry to undertake cultivation peacefully.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/47/5-56.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/50/5-15.

<sup>3</sup> In 1671, Shivaji demanded 'chauth' from Suhrab Khān, commandant of Udgir fort. *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 87.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/42/10-36 & I/42/10-81.

In 45<sup>th</sup> R.Y., Naqī Khān reported that the peasantry of *pargana* Baizāpur and Komhōri, *sarkār* Daulatabad, complained against the *faujdār* of the area, who failed to chastise the Marathas [*kāfir*]. Instead, he collected money from the *pargana* and paid it to them [*makkār*] as *chauth*, while he retained some with him.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, instead of getting support of the peasantry in their bid to oppose the Mughal armies, the Marathas started plundering and impoverishing them by demanding one-fourth of their revenue, They wrought awe and terror in the hearts of the peasantry that it had no option against the Maratha onslaught, except to run away-a fact frequently recorded in the documents. These phenomena further accentuated the crisis in the *jāgīr* system, because the Mughal *jāgīrdārs* found it difficult to realise the revenue due to non-cultivation and flight of the peasantry.

‘Iwaz Khān, *qila’dār* of Biswapatan represented that the peasantry of *pargana* Dhar Dharwah, which lay in his *jāgīr*, fled away due to Maratha attacks so that his *jāgīr* had become desolated.<sup>2</sup>

The *deshmukh* and the peasantry of *pargana* Thalner petitioned the court that the Marathas [*mufsidān*] tortured the revenue paying peasantry.<sup>3</sup> Raghujī received the *deshpāndiya* rights of 27 *maḥals* of *sarkār* Daulatabad on the condition of bringing seven lakh *bighas* of virgin land under the plough and deposit its revenues. Subsequently, he wrote to Sibghatullāh that the said land was not worth cultivation as it was barren [*shor*] and due to epidemic and famine the peasantry had taken to flight. However, orders were issued for investigation and it was revealed that due to the unprecedented Maratha activities, the peasantry of the said *parganashad* scattered. It was hoped that when the rainy season commenced, the peasantry would be safe from the enemy and return to their native places.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/45/1-127.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/41/10-150, I/41/10-/151, I/43/2-79, I/47/8-13. Village Kokara, *pargana* Sultānpur, *ṣūba* Khandesh, situated in the foot-hills could not prosper due to the ravages of the Marathas, [I/42/4-5]. The peasantry and the *zamīndārs* of *pargana* Burdapur, *sarkār* Fatehūbād, *ṣūba* Aurangabad, petitioned that they had become tired of the Maratha raids], [I/47/4-41].

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/41/11-12.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/42/12-77.

Similarly, in 51 R.Y., Muṣāḥib Khān reported that he had been granted *jāgīr* in *pargana* Phulambari. But, the peasantry of most of his *jāgīr* villages ran away to village Malungaon due to Maratha disturbances and became *pāhīkāsht* [non-resident cultivators].<sup>1</sup>

An interesting case has been recorded in a document of 45<sup>th</sup> R.Y. One ‘Abdur Reḥmān, *muqaddam* of village Balor, *pargana* Qandahar, *ṣūba* Bidar, reported that he had one hundred dependents. The peasantry ran away due to Maratha disturbances and as such his dependents were compelled to cultivate the land themselves for their maintenance.<sup>2</sup>

The Marathas were also responsible for the destruction of the standing crops. We find recurring incidents of the destruction of crops, non-cultivation of the agricultural land and plunder of grain<sup>3</sup> for making the peasantry destitute. Nāhir Khān wrote to Asad Khān [43<sup>rd</sup> RY] that 1,500 *bighas* of land of his *jāgīr* in *pargana* Ja‘farābād [Chandor], *sarkār* Sangamner, *ṣūba* Aurangabad, remained uncultivated due to the turmoil of the Marathas and the Bhils.<sup>4</sup> Ḥāji Suhail reported about the destruction of the standing crops of his *jāgīr* in *pargana* Parner due to the passage of the Marathas and the Banjaras.<sup>5</sup> Village Norgi, *pargana* Almala, *ṣūba* Bījāpur, yielding Rs 2,200/- was deserted due to the perpetual disturbances of the Maratha armies.<sup>6</sup>

Occasionally, the Mughal officers destroyed the crops on the pretext of chastising the Marathas. This was alleged against Uzbek Khān, due to whose action 13 villages remained uncultivated and the peasantry fled away.<sup>7</sup>

Mehda, *gumashta* [agent] of *deshmukh* and Manku *deshpāndiya* of *pargana* Baramati, *jāgīr* territory of Suleman Khān, disappeared on the pretext of *lāwani* due to arrears of two

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/51/11-40 & I/51/11-41.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/45/5-46.

<sup>3</sup>Khandu and other Marathas were reported to have plundered of a *jāgīrdar* holding *jāgīr* in *qaṣba* Ankola. Moreover, the deputy of the *faujdar* of the area forcibly collected Rs 13,000 from the peasantry. [IJC I/50/2-8].

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/43/4-4.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/47/8-2.

<sup>6</sup>IJC I/43/2-64.

<sup>7</sup>IJC I/44/11-19. *Pargana* Kadak was ruined due to the march of the Marathas and the Imperial armies [I/43/1-32].

years, scarcity of rains and the destruction of standing crops due to the passage of the imperial armies.<sup>1</sup>

The statement of revenues of various areas duly records the loss of revenues due to the disturbance of the Marathas [*ba sabab-i futūr-i ghanīm-i laīm*].<sup>2</sup>

The Marathas, sometimes incited the peasantry of certain villagers to rebel. Neknām Khān submitted that due to the turmoil of the Marathas and the rebellion [*chirāghi*] of the peasantry, little amount was received in *pargana* Dhongi.<sup>3</sup>

In view of the mounting pressure of the Marathas on the peasantry, the latter generally sought imperial help. Aurangzeb wrote on the *āwārja* of *pargana* Muḥābād [Poona] that since the said town was to be assigned to the Prince [unnamed], efforts should be made for its settlement, by constructing fortresses, advance of *taqāvi* [loan] and the appointment of the *faujdār*, *deshmukh* and *deshpāndiya*. The peasantry also petitioned for the settlement of the entire *pargana* by the following means:

1. Fortresses should be built in five deserted villages, so that the peasantry of the adjoining villages could take shelter in the event of Maratha raids and the *faujdār* should post a reliable deputy in the *thāna*.
2. *Jizya* should be remitted for five years.
3. Promise was made to bring *jama*<sup>4</sup> of the *pargana* up to the maximum assessed [*jama* 'kamāl] within five years and it should be assessed according to *hast-o būd* [actuals] every year.
4. The *jāgīrs* of Shaikh Jamāl and others be transferred, since they were oppressive. All these demands were approved by the Emperor.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/49/10-12.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/44/11-63 & I/48/0-78. Towards the closing years of Aurangzeb's reign, there is a massive amount of evidence relating to the Marathas in all kinds of official Mughal records because they occupied a central position for the Mughal policy. The Inayat Jung Collection containing as it does, a very large amount of material from Mughal official archives of the Deccan furnishes wealth of information about the Maratha devastation. I am grateful to my colleague Miss Nighat Shagufa, at the National Archives, for letting me use copies of some documents made by her.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/50/8-7.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/47/2-90.

The peasantry of *pargana* Ankalkot, [Akalkot / Akot] *sarkār* Naldurg, petitioned that the *faujdārī* e of the said *pargana* was attached with the *faujdār* of Naldurg, who should depute his *nāib* for chastising the Marathas and the miscreants who come there and seized the money and cattle. The *gumāshṭa* [agent] of Ṣadruddīn Khān was suitable for the purpose in question.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Najābat Khān stated that Jagdīsh Rāo was an efficient servant and aware of the qualities of the region and the peasantry and the *zamīndārs* were happy with his considerate behaviour as he had properly chastised the enemy and was aware of the customary crossing places of the Marathas [*ghāthāi-‘ubūr-i ashqiyā*]. As such, he posted him at *thāna* Pipla and Dang.<sup>2</sup>

An interesting incident has been described about village Karanjkhēra, *pargana* Antur, *jāgīr* of one ‘Abdur Razzāq Khān, which happened to be adjacent to settlements of the Bhils and Marathas [*duzdān*]. Its *faujdār* had made no arrangements to protect the peasantry. It was stated that in the absence of any fortification [*iḥāta*], the peasantry could not settle and without Imperial orders such fortification was not possible. Accordingly, he solicited permission for erecting the fortification, so that it could protect the way and the poor peasantry, which was acceded to.<sup>3</sup> Ghīyāsuddīn Khān had established the fort and mart of Rasūlpur at village Bhondi, *pargana* Raver, which was now in *Khāliṣa*. The peasants kept their belongings [*asbāb-o ashīyā*] during the disturbances caused by the Marathas. But, now Ghīyāsuddīn Khān’s nephews were refusing to permit the peasants to do this and such action would ruin village Bhondi.<sup>4</sup>

The peasantry suffered badly at the hands of the *zamīndārs* due to the active connivance of the Marathas. Naval Singh, *zamīndār* of *sarkār* Kalam extremely tortured the peasantry in collusion with the Marathas.<sup>5</sup> The peasantry of Tirambak fort, *sarkār* Sangamner, *ṣūba* Aurangabad, complained that the *deshmukhs* of the area were in league with the Marathas and so the former *qila‘dārs* had to imprison them. However, Salīm Beg the present *qila‘dār* released

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/47/12-129.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/51/12-3.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/51/11-162.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/50/10-11, I/50/10-12 & I/50/10-13.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/42/5-21.

them. But, their internment was helpful in encouraging the peasantry, while their release was the cause of their ruin.<sup>1</sup>

The above incidents do not mean that the *zamīndārs* all the time harassed the peasantry and did not protect them. They could also join hands with the peasantry in redressing their grievances against the Marathas as we see often in our documents. They also cooperated with the Mughal administration in resisting the Marathas and seizing their strongholds. The last years of Aurangzeb's reign witnessed both the unprecedented concentration of Mughal might in Deccan and yet the ever-increasing Maratha raids. We find that due to considerable concessions given to the *zamīndārs*, the Mughals were able to muster their support against the victorious Marathas.

The myth of the invincibility of the Mughal power was the most important factor, which made the peasantry submissive to Mughals, and which led the majority of the big *zamīndārs* into joining Mughal service. But, as Mughal power seemed more and more vulnerable to Maratha onslaught, the *zamīndārs* developed a peculiar tendency of vacillating between the Mughals and the Marathas and utilised their position to serve their own interest.

Muḥammad Ḥasan and other *zamīndārs* of *sarkār* Dabhol were sent by Ghāziuddin Khān Firūz Jung to the court with Saiyid Luṭf and posted for the conquest of the forts of the Marathas on the condition of maintaining 5,000 infantry. They asked for *sanad* of *deshmukhi* according to the terms of the *sanad* of Zulfiqār Khān.<sup>2</sup> He obtained the requisite *parwāna*, but without 'arz [Imperial confirmation], he remained idle. 'Abdul Razzāq Khān Lāri, therefore, recommended his case that he was an efficient person, who did a lot [*maṣdar-i-taraddudāt*] at the time of the conquest of Islāmgarh fort. He, therefore, hoped for an early grant of *saranjam* [pay] so that he could perform his assigned duties efficiently and strive for the welfare of the government.<sup>3</sup> According to the *parwāna* of Zulfiqār Khān [6 *Shwwal* 33<sup>rd</sup> RY], Ḥasan Muḥammad and Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, *adhikar* and *chaudhurī* of *pargana* Ja'farabad, *sarkār* Dabhol helped in the

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/47/11-83. Under the corrupting influence of the Marathas even the *zamīndārs* of *sarkār* Raichūr used to demand *chauth* from the peasants with the active connivance of Gonds.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/31/11-1.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/32/0-59 A.

conquest of Rasālgarhand Mahipatgarhforts and hence the *zamīndāri* of the said *pargana* with the *rusūm* [perquisites] of two villages amounting to Rs 2,000 was granted as *inā‘m*.<sup>1</sup> It was also recorded that the said *zamīndār* was present in the army with 5,000 unpaid infantry and captured the forts of the Marathas and many Maratha leaders [*nāsardārān-i ‘umda-i-maqhūr*] of Udai Singh. Therefore, in view of his meritorious services and the habitation of the area, the *deshmukhī/zamīndāri* was recommended for him on the condition of bringing the revenues to the maximum.<sup>2</sup>

Shambhu Das, *deshmukh* of Nandurbar, was assigned [rank of] 200/50 on account of his repulsing the Marathas and releasing his men.<sup>3</sup> At the time of the conquest of Khandrug fort, Saiyid ‘Abdullāh Khān assigned nine villages, including Badnekoi, *pargana* and *sarkār* Torgul, *ṣūba* Bījāpur as *inā‘m* to ‘Alī, *zamīndār* on the condition of maintaining 100 matchlockmen for the protection of the said fort.<sup>4</sup> Twenty *sawārs* were added to the rank of Rāo s/o Mehdaji for establishing *thāna* at Mahur, *pargana* Bir, the main passage of the Marathas.<sup>5</sup>

Ranū Narū, *zamīndār* of *pargana* Undargaon, *sarkār* Parenda, killed Pratap Rāo, Maratha in 39<sup>th</sup> R.Y. and for this reason he was recommended a *manṣabof* 1000/700 by Muṭālib Khān. He requested that 100 *chāwars* of land held by him at village Maligaon could be granted to him as *inā‘m*, enabling him to serve with Manṣur Khān with 100 *sawārs*, establish the *thāna* and contain the Marathas. This too was sanctioned.<sup>6</sup> Since he fulfilled the obligations, he continued to enjoy the concession even after five years [i.e. 44<sup>th</sup> RY].<sup>7</sup> But in the same year, a complaint was lodged by Mun‘im Khān that Ranū did not maintain the contingent, but retained the said *inā‘m*.<sup>8</sup> However, the Emperor declined saying that, “There could be some possibility [*gunjāish*] which should be explored.”<sup>9</sup> His example was imitated by Phar, *deshmukh* of *pargana*

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/33/12-1.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/35/11-1, I/35/11-7 & I/36/9-9.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/37/15-4.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/371/5-2.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/42/3-34.

<sup>6</sup>IJC I/39/11-121 & I/39/11-122.

<sup>7</sup>IJC I/44/2-88.

<sup>8</sup>IJC I/47/11-63.

<sup>9</sup>IJC I/47/3-72.

Kānti, who requested that since he was unaware of the Imperial regulations [*zawābit-i bādshāhi*], he also expected the grant of village Kothli, *pargana* Wāluj, yielding revenues of Rs 5,000 [his *zamīndāri* area] on the condition of establishing *thāna* and serving the *faujdār* with 100 *sawār*, which was accepted *in-toto*. He fought against the Marathas with the *faujdār* and many of his men were killed or wounded in the warfare and even his son was captured by the Marathas.<sup>1</sup>

Since the *deshmukhs* also maintained peace and were supposed to guard the peasantry against Maratha encroachments, the Mughal administration took a lenient view of their shortcomings. The *wakīls* of Ghaziuddīn Khān Firūz Jung and other *jāgīrdārs* of *pargana* Varval represented that since ‘Abdur Raḥim *alias* Subhānji was interned for the last 1½ years, the ‘*āmils* of *pargana* wrote again that the said *pargana* was completely ruined and the Marathas ravaged the entire *pargana*, established *thānas* everywhere and nothing was received by the *jāgīrdārs* and no settlement was visible. They, therefore, solicited his release so that he could increase local prosperity and chastise the Marathas.<sup>2</sup>

The *zamīndārs* and the peasantry of *pargana* Burdapur, *sarkār* Fateḥābād, *ṣūba* Aurangabad, joined in pleading that they were distressed due to the Maratha attacks and requested the assignment of *faujdārī* to the *jāgīrdār* thereof, so that they could be no more in trouble.<sup>3</sup>

Despite these exhibitions of loyalty to the Mughals, the *zamīndārs* were a disgruntled class who also fomented troubles in unison with the Marathas. It was communicated that in view of the vastness of *ṣūba* Bījāpur, known to the Emperor, the Bedarshaving evil designs, were determined to rise into full rebellion [*bahujūm-i-tamām shorish numāyand*] with the cooperation of the Marathas and the *zamīndārs* just after the departure of the Emperor from there.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/41/10-186, I/41/10-187, I/44/9-15 &I/45/4-34.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/0/0-218.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/47/4-103.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/36/8-6.

‘Abdur Rasūl Khān complained that the Marathas encamped in *pargana* Narsi, [his *jāgīr*] every year due to the cooperation of ‘Abdullāh, the recalcitrant *zamīndār* of the area and nothing was procured from there. Any carelessness would result into his annihilation [*kār bajān wa kārad ba istikhwān rasīda*].<sup>1</sup>

Reports of the ravages of the *jāgīrs* by the *zamīndārs* in cooperation with the Marathas were made on several occasions. Shāh Muḥammad *qila‘dār* of Rai Huwalli complained of the complete ruin of his *jāgīr* due to Maratha raids and the tumult of the *zamīndārs*.<sup>2</sup> The Marathas were reported to have reached Kalyāni hills due to the support of the *zamīndārs*.<sup>3</sup>

The Mughal officials, sometimes, also encouraged the *zamīndārs* in their activities in league with the Marathas. The *zamīndārs* of some villages in *pargana* Dehari used to cooperate with the Marathas due to the support of the *jāgīrdār*. Moreover, the fortress [*gadhi*] of the *deshpāndiya* of *pargana* Bhokran was atop the Imperial fortress [*qila‘cha*] and the Marathas due to its shelter used to ravage the said town. It was, therefore, suggested either to demolish it or establish an Imperial *thāna* there, for maintaining peace.<sup>4</sup>

The Maratha *zamīndārs/deshmukhs* also created lawlessness in the areas of other *jāgīrdārs*. Qādir Dād Khān reported that Baddā deputed his agent for collecting *rāhdārī* [road toll] in *pargana* Melwari. Since the said *pargana* was held in *jāgīr* and *faujdārī* by him, he sought the grant of the *sanad* of *jāgīr* and *faujdārī* in order to expel the *deshmukh* thereof, a brother of Baddājī, Maratha [*nasardār-i ashqiyā*]. This proposal was further supported by Yāsīn Khān, who reported that the Marathas [*duzdān*], encamped at *pargana* Melwari and Tolaji, *deshmukh* of the area was the brother of Baddājī, Maratha, who captured the revenues of the town and the villages of Melwari, which were included in *pāibāqī* and adjoined to Baddā Machangaon. He also recommended grant of favours to Qādir Dād Khān, who would not allow a single *sawār* of Baddaji to remain there.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/37/0-180.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/43/11-7.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/44/4-73.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/45/6-11. The Marathas also blocked the passage IJC 5/42/12-2.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/45/7-116.

The Marathas even instigated the agents of the *zamīndārs* to defy imperial orders. Khandu and other agents of Amrit Rao, *deshpāndiya* and *kulkarni* of Nauras Tara fort *alias* Parli, hatched a conspiracy against him in complicity with the Marathas and claiming to be the *deshpāndiya* themselves allowed the Marathas to capture their master's *waṭan* [*jāgīr*] did not pay him the revenues and forcibly collected 1,230 *hūns*. Furthermore, Shivajī Nirmal and Nimajī Narsu, his agents, also sold 15 of his villages to the Marathas and received Rs 1,700. Therefore, official intervention was solicited for recovering the amount from the imposters and expelling them for the habitation of the *pargana* and eradication of their oppression.<sup>1</sup>

‘Alī Naqī Khān reported that *pargana* Partur, *sarkār* Jalnapur, was included in *pāibāqī* and the *zamīndārs* of the area, at the instigation of the agents of the *faujdār*, [the Maratha Achlūjī] who was in league with the Marathas [*ashqiyā*] did not pay the revenues. Since the *faujdārī* of the area was assigned to the Marathas, the enemy could encamp there and disturbance was created. Hence, the transfer of the *pargana* from its Maratha assignees was recommended. It was also learnt from the reports of Aurangabad that the agent of Achlu supplied lead [*sarab*], gunpowder [*bārūt*] and iron rockets [*bān*] to the Marathas.<sup>2</sup> Dhanna Jadav and other Marathas were reported to have requisitioned lead and gunpowder from the agents of Achlu, the Maratha *jāgīrdār*, who had contacts with the notorious Marathas, who sent him the following items.

Lead [ <i>sarab</i> ]	gunpowder [ <i>bārūt</i> ]	iron-rocket [ <i>bān</i> ]
2 <i>mans</i>	5 <i>mans</i>	100

The *harkāra* of *sarkār* Pāthri also reported that formerly he held *jāgīr* in *pargana* of Koneri. Since he allowed the Marathas to establish the cantonment there that *maḥal* was transferred from him. Subsequently, he obtained *jāgīr* in *pargana* Partur but he maintained contacts with them [*duzdān*].<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/46/11-37.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/50/5-13.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/50/2-12.

The *zamīndārs*, sometimes, paid lumpsums to the Marathas. The *zamīndārs* of Penth Pala were reported by the *harkāra* posted at Chandor fort on 12 *Jumada II*, 50<sup>th</sup> R.Y. to have fixed Rs 1,000 as *rātib* [provisions] of the Marathas [*ashqiā*] and whatever was collected was delivered to them [*maqāhīr*].<sup>1</sup> Kāmyāb Khān reported that the *deshmukh* of Naldrug having seized upon the stores of the fort [*ijnās-i zakhīra-i qila'mutaşarrif shuda*] joined hands with the Marathas and indulged in uncalled-for-acts unworthy of him; and the *deshmukh* seized control of the fort and the area from Muḥtashim Khān.<sup>2</sup>

Muzaffar Alam could trace in these documents only two instances of the defiance by the *deshmukhs* of the Mughal authority during the last two years of Aurangzeb's reign whereas the incidents of such defiance are quite numerous, during this very period, often pointing to the connivance of the Marathas.<sup>3</sup> Rival claimants sought the help of the Marathas for usurping the *deshmukhī/muqaddamī* rights.<sup>4</sup>

The Maratha deprivations resulted in large-scale devastation of the imperial territories, considerable loss to the standing crops and failure of the administrative set-up. They received encouragement and active support, even from the Mughal officers, particularly the Maratha *manşabdārs*, who most often tried to frustrate the efforts of the administration to dislodge the Marathas.

Khudāyār Khān reported that Dakni Rām held *jāgīr* in village Chaundi, *pargana* Chimargonda, his *faujdarī* area, which became the abode of Maratha tribe due to the support of Dakni's agents. Whenever any effort was made to expel them, they created disturbances.<sup>5</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/50/8-5.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/51/11-36.

<sup>3</sup>The *maqaddam* of Maligaon claimed the *muqaddami* of *qaşba* Nander; *pargana* Chandor due to the support of the Marathas and collected Rs 10,000 from the inhabitants. [I/47/4-102]. *Deshmukhs* of Tirambak also supported the Marathas [I/47/11-83], also see I/50/11-2. M. Alam, p. 79 n.

<sup>4</sup>Dharma *deshmukh* of *pargana* Dehāri, petitioned that he had purchased half *deshmukhi* of *pargana* Dehāri and *muqaddamī* of *qaşba* Ḥasanābād and Chinkhili. However, Ankoji, his nephew, had cooperated with the Marathas and ravaged Dehāri. Dharma and his father fought and killed some Marathas. But Ankoji managed to have him arrested in league with Zābita Khān, plundered his house and obtained *lādāwā-i-deshmukhī* [I/50/11-173].

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/41/10-138, I/41/10-139.

*qila 'dār* complained of the failure in his getting a *jāgīr* in the foothills of the fort according to established rule, since these territories were assigned to the Deccanis who were difficult to distinguish from the turbulent Marathas on account of their belonging to the same caste.<sup>1</sup>

Firūz Jung reported to the Emperor that Darko and other Marathas held *jāgīr* in village Rāmraī etc in *pargana* Wāluj, *sarkār* Daulatabad, situated on the highway and the [tumultuous] Marathas stayed there with their fellow-Maratha [*jāgīrdār*] and plundered the traders.<sup>2</sup> Qāsim Khān *qila 'dār* of Naldurg also stated that Īma Nibālkar, a Maratha was granted the *faujdarī* of that territory and he provided shelter to the Maratha hostiles.<sup>3</sup> A similar complaint was made about Dattājī and other Marathas, who received *jāgīr* assignment in *pargana* Shivgaon which became refuge of the Marathas [*duzdān*] due to their having the same caste and the names [*ba dastāwez ism-i jāgīr-i Marhataha tafriq namī tawānad kard*] due to which the peasantry and travellers suffered and no prosperity was possible.<sup>4</sup>

Their presence in the Imperial dominions created many problems, some of which were recounted by one Ḥusāmuddin, *qila 'dār* of Ūdgir. The Marathas [*mufsidān*] created disturbances just two *kurohs* from the fort. Since the majority of the villages in the vicinity of the fort were held by the Deccanis and its *faujdarī* was assigned to them, the Marathas slipped into these villages as and when they were chastised. After the departure of the army, they returned to their own places due to which they could not be banished, Even an Afghān also created disturbance and joining hands with the Marathas blocked the highway.<sup>5</sup>

The Maratha *jāgīrdārs* promoted insurgency of their rebellious compatriots. One Santājī, Maratha, was granted village Karkanjī [as *jāgīr*], in *pargana* Aḥsanābād, who gathered a group of the Marathas and their men [*mardum-i ashqiyā*], visited there and during the disturbances they

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/45/2-56, I/45/12-42.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/47/12-54.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/48/8-6.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/46/9-62.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/46/10-1, see also IJC I/42/12-12. The Marathas even killed the messenger of Shankra, *deshpāndiya* of Ellichpur, IJC I/45/7-46.

kept the property [*amta* ] of the Imperial territory with the miscreant Marathas in the said village and shared it with them as well in addition to committing other oppressions.<sup>1</sup>

The Marathas often concealed their presence in the royal territories even in the guise of the peasantry owing to the support of the Mughal officials and it was impossible to flush them out from villages assigned to neighbouring *jāgīrdārs*. They freely committed robbery and even plundered the cattle of the villages held by other *jāgīrdārs*.<sup>2</sup> They also caused loss to revenues of [non-Maratha] *jāgīrdārs* by taking undue advantage of their presence in a Maratha *jāgīr*.<sup>3</sup> The retainers of Nayyā Rōo, Maratha *faujdār* of *pargana* Manglor, joined hands with the Marathas [*maqhūrān*] who lived in the said *qaṣba* and plundered the adjoining villages.<sup>4</sup>

The religious centres also became the halting places of the Marathas. They were reported to take shelter in *thāna* Nema Devhra, situated in the middle of Sangamner, Parner and Neusa wherein a temple sprang up. The Emperor, therefore, remarked that “Nema Devhra was named after an idol and the temple was demolished as it was made the place of worship by the chief [*rais* ] thereof due to the ignorance of the ‘*āmils*’.<sup>5</sup>

The bands of the Marathas were found spread like ‘ants and locusts’ in the imperial territories. We find much information about their presence in different regions *viz.*, 1,000 *sawār* and infantry stayed in village Donga, *pargana* Ūdgīr.<sup>6</sup> They [*ashqiyā*] came out from the *katl* [pass] of *pargana* Un, Gulshanābād [Nasik] with the cooperation of the Kolis and fomented trouble in Khandesh. Kannad and other mountains and hilly districts proved a bone to them as they frequently attacked and plundered the adjoining *jāgīrs* and rushed to their dwellings in the hilly areas.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/46/6-97; I/46/6/99; I/47/3-101; I/47/3-102.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/47/6-71. They were also found involved in highway robbery in *pargana* Komhāri, *sarkār* Daulatābād in a Maratha *jāgīr*. [I/47/10-54].

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/47/7-90.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/47/8-44.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/48/10-11.

<sup>6</sup>IJC I/47/6-36.

<sup>7</sup>The Marathas were reported to have entered from Vargi Ghat 12 *kurohs* away from Komhāri and plundered the Imperial dominions. [I/45/1-127].

The pressure of the Marathas compelled many Mughal officials to surrender their forts to them. The news sent from Gulshanābād by Saiyid Jān Muḥammad on 8 *Safar* 49<sup>th</sup> R.Y. was related to the capture of the fort of Raj Manji by the Marathas [*duzdan*]. Meanwhile, news was received on 5 *Shawwal* 49<sup>th</sup> R.Y. that Saiyidi Aḥmad, deputy of Zainuddin ‘Alī Khān had negotiated with the Marathas [*az duzdān qaul girifta*], surrendered the fort to them and came out with the infantry.<sup>1</sup>

The above incidents make us believe that even Aurangzeb’s famous policy of *qila ‘giri* vs *mulkgiri* was foiled by his own officials, who settled terms for surrendering the forts. Therefore, the ambitious claims made by some officials regarding the conquest of certain forts appear to be exaggerated. Moreover, these were often conditional. Mutmin Khān, *mutaṣaddi* of *Bandar* [Port] Chaul wrote that Tājuddīn ‘Alī, *qila ‘dār* of Madangarh, who had been his deputy in the *dīwānī* of Talkokan-i ‘Ādil Khāni, was sent either to conquer the said fort or die in this effort. Moreover, the contingent of ‘Abdur Reḥmān also arrived which circumscribed the Marathas and it was hoped that the fort would be conquered and its *qila ‘dāri* could be restored to him, as before.<sup>2</sup>

There is no dearth of examples of Maratha marauding activities and the cooperation they sometimes received from the official quarters. However, we are mainly concerned with the attitude of the Mughal Court towards their rebellion and the punitive measures initiated to curb their activities. The administration encouraged the *manṣabdārs* to lead punitive expeditions and granted promotions in rank, enhancement of the *manṣab* and the assignment of conditional *manṣab* land grants etc

Uzbek Khān was awarded the rank of 100/500 [sic] on the condition of dislodging the Marathas from the frontiers of *sarkār* Fateḥābād etc<sup>3</sup> Miftāḥ Khān requested that Manak Dona was ten *kurohs* from Aḥmadnagar in the hills and the Marathas lived there. He promised to expel them from there, if he was granted the said area as pay of 100 *zāt*.<sup>4</sup> A similar offer was made by

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/49/4-1.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/151/11-81.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/140/9-10.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/50/6-11.

‘Abdul Ghafūr, who pleaded that since a large army was demoralised without any commander, he could crush the Marathas with half of the army.<sup>1</sup> Ikhilāṣ Khān was sanctioned *jāgīr* and *faujdārī* of *pargana* Neusa foreterminating the Marathas.<sup>2</sup> Likewise Randola Khān received *faujdārī* rights over his *jāgīr* for not allowing notorious Marathas to stay there.<sup>3</sup>

The Marathas also fully benefited from the difficulties encountered by the Mughal officers on account of distance. Mu‘taqid Khān submitted that the villages in the environs of Shāhgarh *pargana* Bir, were neglected by the *faujdārs* thereof, due to long distance and the Marathas [*ashqiyā*] engaged in plundering with impunity. He suggested precautionary measures for protecting the said *qaṣba*, so that the news of the arrival of the Marathas could reach there in time.<sup>4</sup>

The Marathas caused great loss of revenues to the Mughal *jāgīrdārs*. Numerous instances have been recorded of the loss in revenues due to which the *jāgīrdārs* invariably demanded *faujdārī* rights over their *jāgīr* for combating the Maratha depredations.<sup>5</sup>

Khudāyār Khān stated that he incurred loss in his *jāgīr* due to the raids of Santa as tabulated below:

#### *Hāṣil*

1097 A.H. according to salary	1105 A.H. according to <i>ṭūmārof</i> Āatish Khān	1106 A.H. [in accordance with Āatish Khān’s <i>ṭūmār</i> ]
Rs 31,562	Rs 31,548 Loss=Rs 12,300 Remainder = Rs 19,154/8	Rs 31, 248 Loss=Rs 14,101/8 Remainder = Rs 17,147/8 <sup>6</sup>

Tarbiyat Khān had the common grievance of not receiving half of the revenues. He was sanctioned Rs. 44,041/- out of which he could realise Rs. 22,364/5. He had incurred a net loss of

<sup>1</sup>IJC I/43/1-113, I/43/1-114.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/47/1-52 Mohan Singhqila ‘dār of Tirankalwari who served in Bālāghāt, a frontier also received grant of *faujdārī* to curb the Maratha uprising [IJC I/44/11-4].

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/45/12-54.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/50/9-11.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/47/10-33, I/48/10-3, I/50/7-9, I/51/12-63.

<sup>6</sup>IJC I/42/10-50.

Rs. 21,676/12 due to Maratha raids.<sup>1</sup> Such circumstances led the *jāgīrdārs* frequently to request abatement in *jama* and the grant of *taufīr* [addition to their pay].<sup>2</sup>

The kind of activity that was expected of Mughal officials in dealing with the Marathas is illustrated by the commendatory report made about Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, *faujdār* of Kannad [Kanhār]:

“He undertook regular patrolling in the mountains and killed many [hostiles]. Firstly, he expelled ‘Umar Afghān. Subsequently, he caught alive Chāuji at the gate of Wakla on 9 *Zulqada* 41 R.Y. and sent him to Aurangabad to Muḥtashim Khān, the *nāzim*. Meanwhile, the Marathas arrived and he killed some of them. Four Maratha leaders [*nāsardārān*] from amongst them were captured and despatched to Aurangabad to the *nāzim*, he hanged the rest of them on the road to Surat. Then, he sought Gondiya Bhīl and combed the entire valley from Kalili to Rajdhir; spies brought the news that Gondiya had fled the said mountains with some followers. There remained no miscreant in the hills and the administration of Khandesh was streamlined as the inhabitants submitted an agreement [*rāzīnā ‘ma*] regarding the extermination of the miscreants.”<sup>3</sup>

Similar expeditions were led by various Mughal officers who made claims of having routed the enemy. One Nasīruddīn Khān, *faujdār* of Devalghat, chastised Sankarū Rām who had plundered certain [revenue free] villages of Shāh Burhānuddīn, killed many of the Marathas and did not pay a single *dām* as *chauth* to them.<sup>4</sup>

Mughal officers, placed in critical positions sometimes abetted the Marathas. Village Sirki, *pargana* Gulbarga, was attacked by Rāno, Hanwant and Hindu Rāo, Marathas and Yashwant Rāo, *thānadār*, fought against them. The Marathas, however, cornered him, and captured the fort in addition to plundering elephants, horses etc It was reported that since he

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/46/6-109, I/48/0-3, I/50/6-17.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/45/4-46, I/47/6-33.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/41/4-15, Chāuji was sent to the court with Uchap his accomplice [IJC I/41/6-19].

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/42/1-34.

became helpless, he sought for mercy through Hanwant Rāo and joined the Marathas. Finally, this news was confirmed.<sup>1</sup>

The inactivity of many Mughal *manṣabdārs* also resulted in the worsening of the situation. We are told that Amānat Khān drove off 1,500 Marathas 15 *kurohs* from *pargana* Kandapur. But, the *faujdārs* of the surrounding areas did not move at all and the deputy of Ikhilāṣ Khān, *faujdār* of Neusa, surrendered the entire *pargana* to the Marathas who resided into the foothills. They slipped into Kandapur and even the *faujdār* came to their assistance.<sup>2</sup>

Our documents are replete with descriptions of military expeditions against the Marathas and the problems created by them, including *Pāibāqī* / *Khālīṣa*.<sup>3</sup> The Mughal administration was compelled to recognise that a large area had passed under Maratha control by designating it *pāibāqī* i.e. not assignable in *jāgīr*. Thus, when the fort of Rāj Mānḡi was captured it was marked as *pāibāqī*<sup>4</sup> and a *maḡal-i ghair* 'amli [non-tax-paying territory] in *pargana* Mandan also fell into the same category.

The most daring bid of the Marathas was the plunder of Imperial treasury and the royal *kārkhānās* while these were being shifted from one place to another.<sup>5</sup> Khān Firūz Jung reported that the treasury and the *kārkhānās* of Prince Muḡammad Kām Bakhsh were being moved to Murtazābād. It was reported by the *harkāras* that Mādhu Rāo and other Marathas numbering 3,000 intercepted them 17 *kurohs* from Murtazābād. He [Mu'tamid Khān] rushed there with Khān [Firūz Jung] killed many of them, seized 200 horses and 500 bullocks.

Some Marathas willing to join the Mughals received extraordinary favours from the Mughal court. The moves initiated from time to time by Aurangzeb to persuade Shivajī, Sambhājī, Sahuḡi and Rāja Rām to join the imperial service are too well-known to be repeated. Many of the Maratha officers controlled *jāgīrs* without maintaining the contingent on the basis

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/4517-26.

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/45/0-77.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/43/4-7, I/43/7-7, I/43/10-6, I/43/11-27, IJC I/44/6-140, I/46/10-9.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/50/12-6.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/46/1-105, Aurangzeb, therefore, condemned to show any leniency to such Marathas [I/46/11-64].

of several years old *dāghnāmas* [branding certificates] and received their salary without inspection of *maujudāt* [present troops], which caused loss to the government. Therefore, orders were issued for transfer of such men.<sup>1</sup>

In view of their changing loyalties, some strict measures were also adopted in assigning or transferring their *jāgīrs*. Aurangzeb granted *jāgīrs* to the wife of Shivajī's brother [in all ten Deccanis and Marathas]. However, they did not maintain the contingents and received the stipulated salary for the *tābīnān* [contingents]. Therefore, their *jāgīrs* were transferred as a remedial measures.<sup>2</sup>

Specific orders were issued banning the grant of *jāgīr* to the Marathas in the 'Old Country' [pre-1686 Mughal Deccan] and until the Muslims had any claims [to *jāgīr*] the Marathas [*kāfīrs*] should not be assigned the same.<sup>3</sup> However, the *jāgīrs* of old Marathas were not generally transferred probably to save them from any disillusionment.<sup>4</sup> Imperial orders were promulgated denying them assignment of *jāgīrs* in Khandesh because they created much disturbance there.<sup>5</sup>

Loyal Marathas were looked at with suspicion.<sup>6</sup> Mu'tabir Khān wrote that *pargana* Ankola, which had 10 forts, had been assigned to Satwa Daflea. It was possible that the Marathas might harm the forts in the guise of Satwa Daflea's retainers. He, therefore, should be granted *jāgīr* in a *pargana* having no forts.<sup>7</sup> Since Satwa Daflea's son joined the service of Rama [Rājā Rām] his credentials were not so good. However, he again joined the Imperialists and it was observed that he could be granted *jāgīr* on the other side of the fort of *pargana* Bagwāri, *śūba* Bījāpur.<sup>8</sup> Both father and son [Babaji] were allowed to rejoin the Mughal service.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>IJC I/45/11-127. These branding certificates were 10-12 years old [I/46/3-81].

<sup>2</sup>IJC I/0/0-2029.

<sup>3</sup>IJC I/47/5-54.

<sup>4</sup>IJC I/47/5-70.

<sup>5</sup>IJC I/47/12-89.

<sup>6</sup>Forged letters were written in the names of loyal Marathas and allegations were also made about their matrimonial relation and Babū Pandit and Rūdra *qānūngos* of *śūbas* Hyderabad and Bījāpur were suspected of having secret correspondence with the Marathas, IJC I/43/9-5, IJC I/45/4-21, IJC I/45/7-138.

<sup>7</sup>IJC I/147/11-43.

<sup>8</sup>IJC I/42/5-17, I/42/7-46.

<sup>9</sup>IJC I/42/6-29, *Akhbārāt*, 10 *Zilqada*, 43 RY, 11 *Zilqada*, 43 R.Y.

The *jāgīrs* of the Marathas were often transferred owing to such suspicion. Nizām Rāo wrote that on the representation of Lodi Khān's *wakīl* orders for transfer of his *jāgīr* had been issued in view of his being a Maratha. He pleaded that since Tikona fort was conquered before schedule his *jāgīr* should not be transferred which was acceded to.<sup>1</sup> Nizām Rāo enjoined some influence at the Mughal Court because we are informed that 18 persons suspected of being in league with the Marathas were released at his surety.<sup>2</sup>

The above constitute illustrative material from the Inayat Jung documents. Obviously, they do not lend themselves to a single consistent interpretation. There were, from the Mughal point of view, loyal as well as disloyal Marathas, territories to protect as well as turbulent areas to sack, a pressure for revenue in a situation of erosion of revenues, in a word, the dilemma of a crisis. It is this critical situation, which our documents portray, along with the varying reactions of many classes that mattered *zamīndārs*, local chieftains, notables and, not the least, the peasantry.

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/47/5-67.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/41/12-38.

### [III] OTHERS

As far as the others are concerned their number is large in number. However if we go through the Inayat Jung Collection and other sources than their number can be taken into active consideration because so far we have restricted our treatment to those *zamīndārs* who survived within the territories under the direct Imperial administration. But he had certain lines which he had in common with men of greater power, with chiefs, and kinglets, the so called *rājas*, *rānās*, *rāos*, *rāwats* etc Fortunately, like them, he held some territory which could be designated his own, like them he was no creature, generally, of the Imperial government; and like them he had armed retainers to defend his possessions as occasionally lines between the two could not be rigidly drawn. Normally we encounter a person calling himself a *rāja* selling his right to a village like any other *zamīndār*. In the Deccan a *deshmukh* [equivalent to North Indian *chaudhurī*] could develop into a chief as happened in case of Chananeri *Deshmukh*, Chief of Indor in Telangana, [referred to in the A'in, I, 477] as one of the chiefs of Indor.<sup>1</sup> The descendents of a powerful chief might be curtailed into *deshmukhs* as happened to the descendent of Ūdājī Rām the chief of Mahur.<sup>2</sup>

Abū-l Fazl does not speak of any contemporary Indian ruler as “king, but generally as *marzbān*, “chief over a territory” as the Mughals insisted on calling “‘Ādil Shāh”, ‘Ādil Khān, and Quṭb Shāh “Quṭbul Mulk”. From Akbar’s time onwards both of them were styled *duniyadaran*, [men of the world suggesting them as only glorified *zamīndārs* who had not firm in faith, being worldly men].

Interestingly enough the Imperial territories in the provinces of Malwa and Sorath [Saurashtra] in Gujarat were ringed by a belt of states which included in the South the chieftaincy of Baglana, which was annexed in 1638 to the Mughal Empire. Moreover there was a large block of states down to Indur in Telangana. From the available records of Shājahān’s reign we can judge that western Berar, Khandesh and Aurangabad provinces did not contain any large or significant tributary states.

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<sup>1</sup> The financial obligations of his decedents, all called Chananeri *Deshmukhs* constitute the subject of a letter from Aurangzeb when he was viceroy of the Deccan during his second Viceroyalty. *Ādāb-i ‘Ālamgīrī* Vol. I, pp. 630-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Maāsiru-l Umarā* I, 42-45.

## IX THE QUESTION OF *JĀGĪR* CRISIS

### [I] *PĀIBĀQĪ* & *KHĀLIṢA*

#### *PĀIBĀQĪ*:

Interestingly enough the *pāibāqī* comprising the lands earmarked for re-assignment to *jāgīrdars*, was fundamentally a part of the *khāliṣa*, though for administrative convenience was kept a separate charge as its administration follow the same pattern as that of the *khāliṣa*. Fortunately the same three principal officials, *amīn*, *karorī* and *foṭadār*, were appointed and the regulations of the *khāliṣa* were followed in preparing all records and accounts. Furthermore, the entire administration of the *pāibāqī* was under the control of the central *diwan-ikhāliṣa*. Fortunately areas due for assignment, but not yet assigned in *jāgīr*, were called *pāibāqī* because *pāibāqī* is an accountant's word for the balance at the bottom of the account. Accordingly from this, apparently, it derived the peculiar sense of territory held in reserve for assignment defined in an administrative manual of "a *jāgīr*", which has been taken from a person and whose revenues; till its assignment to another person are appropriated by the imperial government.<sup>1</sup>

#### *KHĀLIṢA*:

We are given to understand that in the last years of Shāhjahān a reform was introduced in the revenue administration of the Deccan, the change-over to crop-sharing was enforced not only in the *khāliṣa*, but also in the assignment of *jāgīrdārs*.<sup>2</sup> Surprisingly no *khāliṣa* figures are provided for the six Deccan provinces; but there exists a summary statement of the assignment in the 19 *sarkārs* of the Karnataka [*ṣūba* Ḥaidarabad] in 1706 [*Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, 233-35]. This does naturally show that the *Khāliṣa Sharīfa* accounted for just 6.3% of the

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<sup>1</sup> *Khulāṣtus Siyāq*, f. 89 [a]-90 [a]; Or 2026, f. 51 [a]-52 [b]. See *Waqāi' Ajmer*, 74, 375-6, *Akhbārāt-i Durbār Mua'illa* 47/107, *Dastūru-l 'Amal-i Āgahi*, f. 31[a], and Ma'mūri, ff. 156[b]-157[a], 182 [b], and *Khāfi Khān*, Add. 6574, f. 107[a], Bib. Ind. ed. II 396-7 for use of term in this sense.

<sup>2</sup> *Ādāb-i Ālamgīrī*, f. 118 [a], [letter not published in the printed text].

total *jama' kāmīl*, and the *pāibāqī*, after deducting the share of the *Pālīgārs*, accounted for another 4.2%. So in this area, *khāliṣa* was by no means much extensive. Fortunately in the early years of Aurangzeb [1667-8] its *jama'* rose to almost one fifth of total empire<sup>1</sup> for this up to the 10<sup>th</sup> R.Y.

There was the scarcity of *pāibāqī* and the crowds of men claiming pay, in Aurangzeb's words, who declares that everything, "flesh and bones had been assigned and no further demand could be entertained by the court".

In accordance with the standard formula employed in the assignment orders, the *chandhurīs* [or *deshmukhs*], the *qānūngos* [or *deshpāndiās*] and *muqaddams* [or *patels*] and the peasants and cultivators were answerable also for the whole of the *māl-iwājib* [revenue] and *huqūq-idīwānī* [fiscal demands].<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, it seems to have been an accepted policy to keep for the *khāliṣa* the most fertile and conveniently administered territories.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, certain *parganas* were, therefore, kept almost permanently attached to it. Since the extent of the *khāliṣa* differed from time to time in 1574-5. Akbar brought the whole of his Empire, with the exception of Bengal Bihar and Gujarat, under the *khāliṣa* for five years which however again reached to one-fifth in 10<sup>th</sup> R.Y. of Aurangzeb [1667-68 A.D.]. Under Shāhjahān it was nearly one-seventh by the 20<sup>th</sup> year [1646-47].

The statistical tables of data belonged from 1701-02. Though no *Khāliṣa* figures are provided in these tables for the six Deccan provinces, but there exists summary statement of the assignments in 19 *sarkārs* of Karnatak *ṣūba* Ḥaidarabad in 1705-6.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*Miratu-l 'Ālam*, Add. 7657, f. 445[b].

<sup>2</sup> See Harkaran, 53, 54. *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, 4, 5, 17, 18, 21, 23, 147, 151, 158, 171, 175-6; *NigārnāmaMunshī*, ed. 91-2, Aurangzeb's *farmān*, 37<sup>th</sup> RY, in *Nāma-iMuzaffarī*, I, 288. The state tax and other documents are classified into *māl-o-jihāt* [land tax and related taxes] and *sāir-jihāt* [transit and other taxes].

<sup>3</sup>*KhūlasatusSiyāq*; 89 [a-b], or 2026, ff. 51 [a-b], *Waqā'i 'Ajmer*, 35-6.

<sup>4</sup> This naturally shows that the *khāliṣasharīfa* accounted for first 6.3% of the total *jama' kāmīl*, and the *paibaqī*, after deducting the share of *Pālīgārs*, accounted for another 4.2% Thus in this area, too, the *khāliṣasharīfa* was by no means extensive.

We are given to understand that in the late years of Shāhjahān a reform was introduced in the revenue system of the *Khālīṣa*, as well as in the assignments of *jāgīrdārs*.<sup>1</sup> Moreover we find detailed information in respect of officials of *Khālīṣa*.<sup>2</sup>

## [II] INCOME FROM *JĀGĪR* ASSIGNMENTS

The Inayat Jung Collection<sup>3</sup> in the National Archives, New Delhi, contains a large number of documents from Aurangzeb's reign which throw much light on the problems of Mughal administration in the Deccan. These also tell us how the Mughal administrative system functioned in the Deccan. The core of this system may be said to be the mode of assignment of *jāgīr* or territorial revenue-charges.

At the time of the assignment of *jāgīr* care was taken for so limiting it that the *jama' dāmi* [or *jama' raqmī*] fixed on it in the imperial registers equalled the net pay claim due to the assignee. Where it seemed that the *jama'* had been understated [where, i.e., the *jāgīr* would be *sair ḥāṣil*, bearing high ratio of revenue-income to *jama'*, in this case the territory was 8-monthly] the *jama' raqmī* was ordered to be increased. Orders were enforced by increasing the *dāms* according to the *māhwār* [ratio of *ḥāṣil* to *jama'* in terms of months of the year] of the *manṣabdārs*, who were on the 5 and 6 monthly scales. It is stated that “in the Deccan provinces it is customary that the *jama'* is increased or diminished according to the *māhwār* of the person concerned [assignee], but there cannot be any pay above the 12 monthly scale”.<sup>4</sup>

Another document shows that some *jāgīrs* of princes [e.g., Kām Bakhshin this case] and high nobles [Asad Khān] could be treated as “12 monthly” and the *jama'*, fixed accordingly.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This is found in '*Ādāb-i Ālamgīrī*', f 108 [a], letter not published in printed text.

<sup>2</sup> See Irfan Habib, *Agrarian Sytem*, Delhi 2014 pp 318.24.

<sup>3</sup> National Archives of India, New Delhi. Thus in IJC, I/47/11-43, 'I' indicates Aurangzeb, '47' the 47<sup>th</sup> regnal year, 'II' the 11<sup>th</sup> regnal month, and '43', serial No. 43 among documents belonging to the particular month. Documents from this collection are cited by the abbreviation IJC, followed by the serial number assigned by the National Archives.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/47/12-16.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/37/1-4.

In Deccan *manṣabdārs* with ordinary [*barāwardi*]ranks [or rather in respect of pay claims on ordinary *sawār* ranks] were placed on a ‘6-monthly’ scale. This had been reduced to “5-monthly”; but on a plea of Saiyid Ḥasan Khān, Governor of *ṣūba* Muḥammadabad [Bidar], the “6-monthly” scale was restored in his case.<sup>1</sup> Likewise, the *manṣabdārs* serving under Prince Muḥammad Mua’zzam and Faḏāil Khān were granted five monthly *jāgīrs* in the Deccan. However, some of them obtained six-monthly *jāgīrs* under the seal of the Imperial *bakhshīs* [*bakhshiyān-i ‘uzzām*].<sup>2</sup>

As the salary was stated in terms of month scales [*māhwār*]the *bakhshīs* did not check the cavalry without the fixation of *māhwār*.<sup>3</sup>

The *jama‘* of the *jāgīrs* were generally subject either to deduction [*takhṭif*]or increase [*izāfa*]and certain rules were formulated for the purpose. It was proclaimed by the Emperor that the newly appointed *manṣabdārs* should obtain *jāgīr* with the abatements of ‘10-20’ as usual, otherwise they will be dismissed. But this did not solve the problem because no one was ready to accept it on account of its being *ghair‘ amlī*. Therefore, fresh orders were issued that the grant of *manṣab* of 80 may be made from old *pāibāqī* but from 100 to 150 half each from the *pāibāqī* of the old and new [country] may be granted.<sup>4</sup>

*Jama‘* could be reduced or increased but there were some routine limits to reduction. The reduction could be granted generally ‘10-15’ but no more than ‘10-20’ and if more than that was required it had to be submitted to the royal perusal. Muḥtashim Khān represented that he had been assigned *jāgīr* in *pargana* Mahindri, *sarkār* Naldurg apparently with a reduction in *jama‘* of ‘ten-to-twenty’, i.e., by 50% to accord with his high month-scale. But the ‘clerks of the office’ did not issue the certificate [*sanad*]on the ground that a reduction of more than ‘ten-to-fifteen, i.e., by 33.3%, was not permissible. He, therefore, solicited special Imperial dispensation. The following actual figures are furnished:

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/40/10-28.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/45/1-183.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/45/1-135.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/50/2-4.

Total *jama ḥāṣil* 51,50,000 [*dāms*]<sup>1</sup>

*ḥāṣil* 49,583 [rupees]

Reduction according to *māhwār* 25,50,000 [*dāms*]

Reduction as per ‘10-15’ rule 17,00,000 [*dāms*]

Excess over ‘10-15’ reduction 8,50,000 [*dāms*]

The *jama* ‘fixed on his *jāgīr* according to ‘10-15’ rule. 34,00,000 [*dāms*]<sup>2</sup>

It was also ordained that no more abatement could be given after abatement [*takhfif dartaḥfif*].<sup>3</sup> If *ḥal-i ḥāṣil* was equal to *māhwār* it was given without reduction.<sup>4</sup> It was also not must that reduction was given to everyone. Yaḥya Khān, *faujdar* and *amīn* of Mangal requested [through his *wakīl*] that *pargana* Sawai assigned to him was previously held by Khuda Banda Khān, Multafat Khān and Nekkām Khān with abatements so he should also be granted the same *takhfif* [reduction in *jama*]. But his request was turned down.<sup>5</sup> It was ordered that Firuz Jung may be granted 8-10 monthly *jāgīr* in lieu of the *naqdī jāgīr* and no abatement should be given.<sup>6</sup>

The actual *jama dāmi* of *pargana* Ankot was one crore *dāms* when it was held by Aurangzeb during his Viceroyalty but with the passage of time it rose to 1,52,55,000 *dāms* in his 42nd R.Y. He issued orders that the abatement of 20 lakh could be given but not more than.<sup>7</sup>

If anyone's *jāgīr* was transferred, he could not be placed on a month-scale double his previous one.<sup>8</sup> If anyone surrendered his *jāgīr*, he was to be granted *jāgīr* elsewhere according to his original *māhwār*, but if he was transferred by the Imperial Government on its own, he

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<sup>1</sup> This figure has been recorded as 59,50,000 *dāms* in the original document, but this is apparently a transcriptional mistake because this does not conform to other details [as per the rules discussed above].

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/45/4-26.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/44/2-2.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/45/5-73.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, We are told that a new incumbent sought on three occasions assignment with abatement of land previously held by Siyam Raj without any *takhfif*. It was ordered that if he submits again without demanding the abatement, the request may be acceded. [IJC, I/0/0-499].

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/46/12-49 & IJC, I/0/0-707.

<sup>7</sup> IJC, I/42/1-124.

<sup>8</sup> IJC, I/39/3-9.

received the new *jāgīr* on the previous ratio of its *hāṣil* [to *jama*].<sup>1</sup> If anyone realised revenue [*hāṣil*] in his *jāgīr* by his own endeavour beyond the *hāṣil* fixed by his month-scale, it was to be left with him so long as it did not exceed ‘10-months’, otherwise resumed.<sup>2</sup>

The *jāgīrdārs* were subjected to certain deductions under items like the *muṭāliba*, *taṣarruf*, *chaharrum-ḥiṣṣa*, *muḥāsiba-i-jāgīrdārī*, etc. The documents contain an interesting exchange between two officials recorded on 16 *Shawwal*, 42nd R.Y. of Aurangzeb, regarding the implementation of such deductions:

“From the reports of the *kachehri*, it has been conveyed to His Majesty that Arshad Khān told Mihr Chand that when the Imperial claims upon the *jama* ‘*dāmi* [“*dāms*”] have to be realised on account of *taṣarruf* [recovery] of wrongful appropriation by *jāgīrdār* and *muṭāliba* [Imperial claims], the territory to be resumed should be good-and-bad [‘meat-and-bone’] and not simply the territory [*maḥal*] that the *manṣabdār* of his own wishes to part with. Mihr Chand replied that Diyānat Khān had so fixed that one may accept whatever the *manṣabdār* surrendered. Arshad Khān [however] maintained that it is proper that good-and-bad should be taken [and not the bad territory only]. His Majesty has ordered that good-and-bad [‘meat and bone’] should be taken”.<sup>3</sup>

The transfer of *jāgīr* was an essential feature of the *manṣabdārī* / *jāgīrdārī* systems, it was fairly rigorously enforced in the Deccan as well. However, *jāgīrdārs* who had entrenched themselves in particular regions did not like their transfer. They were only interested in transfers when either the land assignment was not *sai’r-hāṣil* or he could not realise the revenues or the *jāgīr* was scattered.<sup>4</sup> Transfers, however, did not come smoothly. One officer Muḥammad Muqīm complained to the court that he surrendered his earlier waste [*kharāba*] *jāgīr*, but could

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/40/11-31 & IJC, I/45/5-138.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/42/10-138 & IJC, I/45/5-138.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/42/3-27.

<sup>4</sup> Hāziq Khān wanted transfer of his *sai’r-hāṣil jāgīr* as it was granted in six-*maḥals*, while he wanted *jāgīr* in a single *maḥal*. [IJC, I/46/7-21A].

not take charge of the new one in Jawar, *sarkār* Pathri, because Muḥammad Taqī, *faujdar* of that area expelled his men and seized the revenues.<sup>1</sup>

Sometimes, as a favour and for other reasons, particular *jāgīrs* were exempted from transfer. Aurangzeb issued orders for retaining the old *jāgīr* of Muḥammad Jawān Bakht who had accompanied Prince Muḥammad Mu'azzam with the remark that “transfer of *jāgīr* is the cause of ruin of the *jāgīrdār* and the peasantry [*ri'āya*] and should be avoided, so far as possible”.<sup>2</sup> In another document, a *jāgīr* in *pargana* Asīrgarh was restored after its transfer, on the ground that the assignee had held it for 17 years, and a transfer would cause him distress. In the same document it is also observed that “Transfers should not be made ‘without need,’ or they should be fewer, two or three times... [illegible]. The peasants are ruined and there are short-sighted expectant ones who repeatedly petition for transfers”.<sup>3</sup> Sometimes the transfers of the *jāgīrdārs* was sought by other *manṣabdārs* in their own interest. The transfer orders were also solicited due to certain grievances. A complaint was made by ‘Amber *dārogha* of *baghāt-i-Hyderabad*, against the encroachment by ‘Ālam and Mūran, *manṣabdārs*, upon the lands of the gardeners and the Imperial gardens adjacent to their *jāgīrs*. Orders were issued for the transfer of their *jāgīr* villages into the *khālīṣa* in the charge of ‘Amber on the condition of realising maximum *jama* ‘ [*jama* ‘-*kāmīl*].<sup>4</sup>

The peasantry of *qaṣba* Tirambak, *sarkār* Sangamner, protested against the atrocities of Sulaiman Beg, *qila'dār* and *jāgīrdār* of the said *qaṣba*, like exaction of Rs. 4000 from the peasantry [*ri'āya*], unlawful detention and the murder of a Brahmin and demanded that either the said *qaṣba* should be transferred to another *qila'* of that *ta'alluqa* or they be permitted to reside elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> Some of the *jāgīrdārs* were that transferred without any fault on their part. Aḥmad Khān, *qila'dār* of Miftāḥul Futūḥ resigned in protest against the unjust [*be-taqṣīr*] transfer of his conditional *jāgīr*. However, his *jāgīr* was restored subsequently.<sup>6</sup> If anyone's *jāgīr* was

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<sup>1</sup>IJC, I/26/0-11.

<sup>2</sup>IJC, I/45/5-63.

<sup>3</sup>IJC, I/45/7-9.

<sup>4</sup>IJC, I/38/9-10.

<sup>5</sup>IJC, I/46/8-33.

<sup>6</sup>IJC, I/46/1-86.

transferred but the new assignee could obtain the *parwāna*, the orders for the restoration of the *jāgīr* of the former *jāgīrdār* were issued, so that it remained in his [former *jāgīrdār*'s] possession.<sup>1</sup>

It was common that the majority of the *faujdārs* and *thānadārs* obtained *jāgīrs* on the submission of undertaking [*muchalka*] for procuring the *parwāna-i-sabti*, but they did not submit the same. It was, not therefore, ordered, that their *jāgīrs* should be resumed [contrary to the practice in north India].<sup>2</sup> However, it was necessary to obtain orders for transferring *jāgīr* in lieu of the *muṭāliba* due from the [*ahl-i-khidmat*].<sup>3</sup> Likewise, many of the Marathas occupied *jāgīrs* without the contingents [*jami'at*] on the strength of several years old *dāghnāmās*, hence, orders were issued for their transfer.<sup>4</sup>

It is also interesting to note that many of the *manṣabdārs* took advantage of the activities of the Marathas. A *manṣabdār* who possessed no *jāgīr* complained that a *jāgīr* held by Māyājī in *pargana* Komhari, *sarkār* Daulatabad, had become the abode of thieves who committed highway robbery there. He, therefore, requested the transfer of the *jāgīr* in his favour which was acceded to.<sup>5</sup> Achla son-in-law of Shivajī was transferred from *pargana* Partur on the charge of providing shelter to robbers and inciting them to commit robbery.<sup>6</sup>

Transfer orders were obtained for Satwa, a Maratha, who held a *jāgīr* in *pargana* Ankola with ten *qila*'s to *maḥal-i-ghair-amlī* [*maḥals* not paying revenue] in the *pāibāqī* [unassigned *maḥals*] on the pretext that the infidels [Marathas] may raid the fort in the guise of his Maratha retainers [*naukarān*].<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>IJC, I/42/2-54.

<sup>2</sup>IJC, I/46/12-180.

<sup>3</sup>IJC, I/42/10-138.

<sup>4</sup>IJC, I/45/1-127.

<sup>5</sup>IJC, I/47/10-54.

<sup>6</sup>IJC, I/50/3-11.

<sup>7</sup>IJC, I/47/11-43.

Mahābat Jung *sawāniḥ-nigār* of *sarkār* Firuzgarh and Muzaffarnagar reported that village Basantpur, *pargana* Firuzgarh was held in assignment by Kanhuji Maratha and as the Marathas have been ordered to be granted assignment in *mulk-i-jadīd*, he petitioned that the said village should be granted to Muftakḥar Khān with prescribed abatement [of the *jama* ].<sup>1</sup>

Since the Deccanis were not allowed to hold *jāgīrs* in Khandesh, Fazlullāh succeeded in getting back his *jāgīr* in *pargana* Bir which was transferred inadvertently to Bharji.<sup>2</sup>

The exchange or transfer of some portions of *jāgīrs* could, sometimes, be done by mutual agreement among the *jāgīrdārs*.<sup>3</sup> But this, of course, had to be put into writing for official use. Sometimes again, transfer of a particular village was sought to eliminate confusion from a ‘mixed’ *jāgīr* [i.e. where the *jāgīrs* of two officials were found intermixed].<sup>4</sup> If a *manṣabdār* held *jāgīr* in a distant area he tried to surrender it in favour of another adjacent *jāgīr*. Shahabuddin who was posted in Deccan held *jāgīr* in Punjab which he surrendered on the ground of delay in receipt of *hundis* [bills] therefrom.<sup>5</sup>

Many of the *jāgīrdārs* were unable to maintain the requisite contingents so their *jāgīrs* were transferred.<sup>6</sup> A general order seems to have been issued that Hindu *manṣabdārs* were not to be given *jāgīrs* relinquished by the Muslims,<sup>7</sup> but, if necessary, assigned *jāgīrs* out of *pāibāqī*. But our own documents contain an exception; though there the transfer was cancelled.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/50/1-1.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/46/9-28.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/45/1-39 & IJC, I/45/1-41.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/45/1-60.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/44/10-90. An interesting situation arose when Mu‘taqid Khān, *nāzim* of Burhanpur was dismissed and Ṣadruddin was appointed in his place. According to the rule, the *jāgīr* of the previous *manṣabdār* was resumed from the date of issue of the order and the conditional rank attached to *ṣūbadāri* continued for the duration of the performance of the duties of the said office. Accordingly, Mu‘taqid Khān's *wakīl* requested that said office should remain with him till the new incumbent assumed his duties and the *jāgīr* for the *zāt* and *sawār* rank should also be retained till that date. [IJC, I/44/10-117].

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/46/11-4.

<sup>7</sup> IJC, I/44/6-9.

<sup>8</sup> IJC, I/51/11-82.

The *pāibāqī* constituted the reserve territory from which *jāgīrs* could be assigned. So long as fair, revenue-yielding lands were available in *pāibāqī*, the *jāgīr* system could function fairly smoothly. But during the later years of Aurangzeb there seem to have been developed a severe restriction of *pāibāqī* in many regions of the Deccan and the Inayat Jung Collection is replete with complaints of non-availability of suitable *pāibāqī*. It may be recalled that J.F.Richards has argued that there was an abundance of *pāibāqī* lands in the *ṣūbās* of the Deccan, but in this argument he seems to over-look the kind of *pāibāqī* lands that were available; though on the basis of his ‘discovery’ he has contested the theory of the ‘crisis in *jāgīr*.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, he builds up his theory on the basis of such statements as there is much *pāibāqī* land in the *ṣūbās*,<sup>2</sup> or ‘there is abundance of *pāibāqī* land in *ṣūba* Bijapur which has neither been granted to anyone nor anything has been realised by the government, so the *pāibāqī* should be cared for.’<sup>3</sup> But the real issue was that these *pāibāqī* territories existed more or less in theory only, being often territories not yet fully subjugated with little prospect of revenue collection, so that *manṣabdārs* could not be brought to accept them in *jāgīr*. The *manṣabdārs* were always anxious to acquire *sai’r-ḥāṣil jāgīrs*. Aurangzeb in view of this issued orders that due to holding of *manṣab* undue desires could not be fulfilled. They may be granted in *pāibāqī* of old and new country with necessary abatements [in *jama* ]<sup>4</sup>.

We find many reports, complaints, petitions, indicating since the *pāibāqī* lands were more or less low revenue yielding [*kam-ḥāṣil*], the assignee did not show willingness to accept *pāibāqī* in Deccan even with abatement.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, sometimes, a mixed grant [from *khālīṣa* and *pāibāqī*] was made; the *khālīṣa* territory being usually high revenue-yielding. The newly recruited Deccanis were ordered for the grant of *jāgīr* from the *pāibāqī* of *mulk-i jadīd* with abatement or as *inā’im* and not from the *mulk-i qadīm*. They generally held assignment for *zāt* in *mulk-i qadīm* [Old country] while for that of *sawār* in *mulk-i-jadīd* [newly Conquered Territory]

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<sup>1</sup> J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, Oxford, 1975, p. 158.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/42/6-30 & IJC, I/46/6-60.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/47/7-73.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/42/1-69.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/45/11-47.

and some of them also succeeded in getting salary for contingents in *mulk-i qadīm*. They were also not ready to accept salary from *mulk-i jadīd* in lieu of *mulk-i qadīm*.<sup>1</sup>

This was, of course, due to the paucity of revenues in *pāibāqī* of *mulk-i jadīd*. Transfer from *mulk-i qadīm* was not accepted easily. Not a single *dām* could be realised from some of the *maḥals* which were included in *pāibāqī*.<sup>2</sup> The crisis in *jāgīr* in the Deccan had become so acute that in *ṣūbā* of Bijapur and Hyderabad though there was a theoretical abundance of *pāibāqī* the *manṣabdārs* were not ready to accept assignment on the basis of original *jama* ' as it was *kam-ḥāṣil*. Therefore, orders were issued that they should be granted from the *pāibāqī* of the subjugated Old Country [*mulk-i qadīm-i ' amlī*] or from the *khāliṣa-i ḡhair-muqarrarī* [land not permanently reserved for *Khāliṣa*?].<sup>3</sup>

The grant of *jāgīr* from the *ḡhair- ' amlī* territory was constantly declined.<sup>4</sup> In order to induce acceptance the Emperor even granted exemption from the '1/4th Part'- Deduction in some areas.<sup>5</sup> A petition of *Khān ' Alam*'s *wakīl* states that *Bakht Buland* collected Rs. 31,000 from *pargana* Nandgaon and posted his supporters at Malkapur and Mehkar. Therefore his client was disturbed on account of non-payment of *tankhwah* and ruin [*khārāba*] of his *jāgīr*. Hence, orders were issued for grant of *jāgīr* from *khāliṣa-i ḡhair-muqarrarī*, or *pāibāqī* within the Old Country; but even neither kind of lands was available.<sup>6</sup>

The *manṣabdārs* appointed on the recommendations of *Firūz Jung* and *Nuṣrat Jung* could only be granted *jāgīrs* from the *ḡhair- ' amlī* land of *mulk-i jadīd*.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, many of the *manṣabdārs* whose *jāgīrs* were transferred were unable to get *jāgīrs* anywhere due to the non-availability of suitable *pāibāqī* land.<sup>8</sup> *Saiyid Ḥaidar* and *Saiyid*

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<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/0/0-505.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/42/8-115 & IJC, I/0/0-486.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/42/3-35.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/0/0-597.

<sup>6</sup> IJC, I/42/10-36.

<sup>7</sup> IJC, I/48/2-1 & IJC, I/48/12-3.

<sup>8</sup> IJC, I/47/7-124.

Mīrān, *manṣabdārs* petitioned that they had got their horses branded two years earlier, but without the *jāgīr* for their *sawār* rank [*tabīnān*]they were in debt, so they requested grant of *pāibāqī* made available by Shakir Khān's transfer.<sup>1</sup> The old horses of Badiuzzamān died because he had been assigned no *jāgīrs* [*be-jāgīrī*].<sup>2</sup>The crisis was so deep-rooted that Mūr Muḥammad did not occupy his *jāgīr* and his contingents attacked his son to press their demand for salary. He, therefore, requested immediate grant of *jāgīr*, otherwise he would be killed.<sup>3</sup> This problem of *be-jāgīrī* was so acute that many of the assignees complained about it.<sup>4</sup>

Due to the scarcity of *pāibāqī*, care was taken that no land should remain *pāibāqī*,instead it should be assigned to the Deccanis or the *qila'dārs* and *thānadārs* of the area.<sup>5</sup>

In contrast, Richards believes that there was much *pāibāqī* land and even the *jāgīrdārs* had a right to refuse assignments of their disliking. In support of this assumption he cites a document<sup>6</sup> from Inayat Jung Collection. The document under reference states that despite the abatements on the scale of '10-15' or '10-20' no one was willing [*raghbat*]to accept assignment from the *pāibāqī*. This shows that a *manṣabdār* could complain against the assignment of any territory which was not likely to give him much net income. But he could not refuse the grant as such. He could, however, explain his problems in order to convince the Emperor.<sup>7</sup> But refusal might mean that one could be deprived from holding any assignment for ever. Moreover, we find numerous examples of how the *manṣabdārs* kept an eye on the *pāibāqī* land, and got it allotted. The *wakīls* of Anil Singh Bajgoti, *qila'dār* and *faujdar* of Lohgarh, Ibrāhīm, *faujdar* of Kanehar and 'Abdul Karīm sought the assignment of land in *pargana* Dhanda which had become *pāibāqī* due to the transfer of Abū Tūrab.<sup>8</sup> Such heavy pressure was there on the *pāibāqī* that the same area might be demanded by three *manṣabdārs* simultaneously; the *jāgīr* was

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/42/12-104.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/45/4-91.

<sup>3</sup> IJC, I/46/11-36.

<sup>4</sup> IJC, I/45/1-18 & IJC, I/46/6-9.

<sup>5</sup> IJC, I/41/6-59.

<sup>6</sup> J.F. Richards; *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, p. 202.

<sup>7</sup> IJC, I/46/12-178.

<sup>8</sup> IJC, I/36/2-7.

granted in proportion to their claims [the actual amount held in *jāgīr* by Abu Turab is not mentioned].<sup>1</sup>

A *manṣabdār* petitioned that he had been assigned *jāgīr* from the *pāibāqī* of *ṣūba* Muḥammadabad [Bidar], but since the *pāibāqī* in the said *ṣūba* was so much waste [*khārāba*] that no one was willing to accept it. There was alleged to be no land in *pāibāqī* left except wasteland.<sup>2</sup>

It is, therefore, clear that [A] there was a shortage of real *pāibāqī* in the Deccan, i.e., reserved territory out of which *jāgīrs* could be assigned; and [B] such *pāibāqī* as there really was available contained so much unsubjected and low revenue-yielding territory that it was *pāibāqī* only in name; in other words, it was practically unassignable.

We are given to understand that J .F. Richards in his important book *Mughal Administration in Golconda*, Oxford, 1975, pp. 158, 160, 61, 308-9; argues that the theory of *jāgīr*-crisis had been greatly overstated with regard to the Deccan, and especially *ṣūba* of Golkunda/ Haiderabad. He particularly based his case on a document from the Inayat Jung Collection, which showed that after annexation there was a large area of *pāibāqī* [land held by treasury but assignable in *jāgīr*] available in the province of Golkunda, and since this could have been given away in *jāgīrs*, if there was really, a pressure for them, no such pressure in fact existed.

What Richards seems to have overlooked is that the *manṣabdārs* wanted income; they had little use for areas formally claimed, but really *ghair ‘amlī* [not under administration] from which little revenue could be hoped to be obtained.

I accordingly present below excerpts from some documents from the Inayat Jung Collection [IJC], which might be taken to indicate the actual situation.

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<sup>1</sup> IJC, I/41/4-12, IJC, I/41/4-13 & IJC, I/41/4-14.

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/38/10-13.

IJC, I/41/8-102; Note from the *Daftar-i Khālīṣa*: letter from Brindaban [*amīn* of *Khālīṣa*, Haidarabad] received to the effect that some of the *maḥals* of the *Khālīṣa* in *sarkār* Medak have been assigned to *jāgīrdārs*, but these produce surplus revenues [*sair-ḥāṣil*]. These should not be assigned to *jāgīrdārs*. In *pāibāqī* of this *ṣūba*, there is great deficit in the *jama' tankhwāhi* [officially assumed income], let these be assigned in *jāgīr* with a small reduction in *jama'* ”Dated 10 *Jumāda*, I 41 R.Y.

IJC I/48/2-1: “Paper [*fard*] received with seal of Muḥammad Ikhilāṣ. It had been ordered on the proposals of *Khān* Firūz Jung and *Khān* Bahādur Nuṣrat Jung, that in the Deccan, the *tankhwāh* [*jāgīrs*] should be assigned in the New Territory is still not administered [*mulk-i jadīd-ighair 'amlī*]. But a set of persons who are *khānazāds* [old nobility] or Deccanis whose fathers were in service have been newly appointed. What are the orders about them. ‘Ināyatullāh secretary, wrote on it: let it be recorded in the *Wāqī'a kacheri*. The Emperor ordered thereupon: the same orders [as for others] issued on 3 *Zihijj* 48 R.Y.” Dated 4 *Zihijj* 48 R.Y.

IJC I/49/6-4: “Imperial order has been issued: As to the persons for whom have come from *Khān* Nuṣrat and Firūz Jung, let *tankhwāh* be assigned out of New Territories not yet administered. Most of these persons have been officers for a long time and received *jāgīrs*. Now they come for *jāgīrs* to meet the balance due to them and for addition becoming due on promotion. Orders had been sought as to where their *tankhwāh* should be assigned: Old territories, New Territories or those not yet administered. Now that the candidates are to be assigned *tankhwāh* from New territories not yet administered from which date is to be done? Order from the date of the order. Let them implement the order to assign *tankhwāh* in the New Territories not yet administered. As for what was assigned before the issue of this order on the proposals of the above two nobles, let these remain unchanged; nor should they change [orders for] the *khānazāds*. Let the *khānazāds* not be put to trouble. Dated: 5 *Rabi'* II. R.Y. 49.

IJC I/50/11-4: “Petition of Muḥammad Mahdi with Emperor's endorsement: It is four years since this *khānazād* and his sons have not received one *dām* in *jāgīr*. For this reason distress has reached its acme. I have many dependants, and have no place to keep them. These

days, even without any *jāgīr* [*be-jāgīrī*], I have kept a large contingent and kept order in a frontier. If I do not have *jāgīr* now, I will be totally undone..” Dated *Ramazan* R.Y. 50.

IJC I/50/2-9: “It has been ordered that the new appointees [*nau-sar afrāz*] shall receive *jāgīr* against half their pay-claims [*talab*] in the Old Territory and half in the New Territory. Otherwise, they shall be dismissed..” Dated 22 *Zihijj* R.Y. 50.

These documents show that the *jāgīr* crisis was, in fact, quite grave and many *jāgīr*-assignments were in effect being given in tracts not yet subdued. Richards ‘refutation’ of the earlier scholars’ inference about the growing crisis of *jāgīrs* needs therefore, to be itself reviewed.

## X

### THE GREAT FAMINE AND MUGHAL ADMINISTRATION

Although terrible famines began at the tail end of 1554-55 and 1555-56 yet the great famine of 1630-32 which affected Gujarat and most of the Deccan as in the Deccan draught seems to have continued. Qazwīnī records that though there was a deficiency of rain in 1630 in “most of the *maḥals* of Bālāghāt, especially the region around Daulatābād” the draught was much wide spread in 1631. Both Qazwīnī and Ṣādiq Khān had personal experience only of conditions in the Deccan where it is possible that the famine continued there in 1631 owing to the cause directly opposite to Gujarat. In the third year Ṣādiq Khān adds, mice and locusts caused great damage to the crops. However, the transportation of grain by the *banjārās* to Gujarat from Malwa and beyond was hampered in 1630 by the assignment of feeding Shāhjahān’s army encamped at Burhānpur. But the prices remained prohibitive in the next year. Interestingly enough unprecedented gains accrued to the imperial treasury in Malwa by the sale of grain for supply to the Deccan. Unfortunately the villages could hardly have fared much better as Ṣādiq Khān declares that the *parganas* of Sultānpur, Nandur, Māndu, Aḥmadabad and indeed the [entire] province of Khandesh and some *parganas* of Bālāghāt were rendered utterly desolate. ‘Abdul Ḥamīd Lahori, II, 711-2 writing in 1646-47 declares that Gujarat and the Deccan provinces were adversely affected by the famine.

Moreover, in 1665 the *Khariḥ* crops in parts of Bālāghāt region of Mughal Deccan was damaged by late and heavy rains.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately draught was also experienced in the Deccan, where plague began to rage in the towns from 1682 A.D.<sup>2</sup> Similarly draught was also experienced in the Deccan, where plague began to rage in the town from this year. Surprisingly the draught extended to the whole of the Deccan in 1686. So that what happened to the poor and indigent cannot be recorded.”<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Ādāb-i ‘Ālamgīrī*, II 54 [b]-55 [a], ed; II, 213, 217.

<sup>2</sup> Ma‘murī, ff. 155[b]-156[a], *Khāfi Khān*, Add. 6574, f. 105[a-b].

<sup>3</sup> *Khāfi Khān*, II, 236-7. Qani, *Tahfatu-l Kiram*, III, p. 97.

However, this is an established fact that a great famine began in the Deccan in 1702 A.D. Surprisingly enough in February 1702 it was brought to His Majesty's notice from Sangamner [Aurangabad Province] that due to draught "most of the villages" had been desolated,<sup>1</sup> as in the whole year" in the entire Deccan no rain fell that was in keeping with the interests of cultivation.<sup>2</sup> Practically the rains were so prodigious as to devastate the *kharīf* harvest. Great scarcity spread everywhere south of the Narmada, and people were compelled to migrate from their ancestral homes.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately the next year brought no relief, as owing to the excessive winter rains the *Rabī* crop was also damaged, wheat suffering from plight.<sup>4</sup> Naturally a historian speaks of it as the year for Maharashtra, of "famine and scarcity owing to draught, morality of the poor and the wail of the weak."<sup>5</sup> Furthermore draught with its close companion, plague continued into 1704.<sup>6</sup> Unluckily within two years i.e. from 1702 to 1704 in the Deccan there expired over millions of souls, fathers compelled by hunger, offering to sell their children for a quarter or a half of a rupee, and yet forced to go without food, finding no one to buy them."<sup>7</sup>

During the last years of Aurangzeb's reign the situation had become so much topsy turvy that corruption had become rampant especially in judiciary system as shall be evident from the content of a letter written by a person of Sandila family of *qāzīs* from the Deccan to Sandila in Awadh. Furthermore it shall explain the scarcity of the food grains and other food items and rampant corruption which had made the life difficult in the Deccan.

Şāḥeb [sir] of courteous orientation, beneficent, a great lord, Ḥazrat Şāḥeb, [a title by which great men are addressed], may the Almighty God keep him with peace. After giving precedence to the particulars of humble submission and supplication, represents that great certificate in writing and the excellent letter from a superior to an inferior [*muq'āwama-i-girāmī*], which was issued in response to earnest supplication, was received in the most happy

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<sup>1</sup>*Akhābār-i Durbar-i Muā'illa*, 46/12.

<sup>2</sup>*Dilkushā*, f 146 [a].

<sup>3</sup> Mannu chī, p. 423; Abul Fazl Ma'murī, f. 202 [b], *Khāfi Khān*, II, p. 510.

<sup>4</sup> Ma'murī, f 202 [b], *Khāfi Khān*, 510-11.

<sup>5</sup>*Ma'asir-i Ālamgīrī*, p. 477.

<sup>6</sup>*Akhbārāt A*, 245 [July 1, 1704] for reference to scarcity of grain and lack of rain throughout the Deccan.

<sup>7</sup> Manucci, IV, 97.

change of time, which made [the writer] dignified and eminent. When the news about the current occurrences of the good ending circumstances of that dignified great lord was learnt, it gave tremendous satisfaction. Years that till the time of attainment of the visit, marked with auspiciousness, the addressee would remember him. Whatever was uttered is that Shaikh Naẓrullāh, *Ṣadr-e Juzv* [ecclesiastical officer] has enmity with the writer. If the revered one writes any complaint to the officials *Ṣadr -i* [*Mutaṣaddiyān*] that officials pay heed to this servant, then by his writing they would issue order for looking into the result of the affair and by forbidding the disorderly affairs, effort should be made that certificate is procured from His Majesty. May the dignified great lord remain in peace. The supplicant with his maximum possible limit is attentive with the chief ecclesiastical office [*daftar ṣadāratu-l ‘āliya*] and the matter of *Ṣadr-eJuzv* was divulged to Khwaja Mūsa and Mehta Ishar Das. Since owing to the refuge of sublimity, Qaẓi Shaikh ‘Abdur Raḥīm, who is now posted to the office of *qaẓiship* of Burhanpur, [the writer] has abundance of servitude with the chief ecclesiastical officer [*Ṣadrus Ṣudūr*] and Khwaja Mūsa. Due to the grace of God he is extremely hopeful, that the writing of the *Ṣadr-eJuzv* unjustly recommended an order concerning that dignified of orientation [point]. But it is incumbent on that courteous one to follow the rule, so as to endeavour that whatever is written from there, should not be written except for describing elegance and considerate treatment because the behavior of the addressee is quite clear to that person which does not require any entreaty and in order to forbidding disorderly conduct without any document which is a newly produced one, except for offering a thing to the *Ṣadrus Ṣudūr*. Procurement of certification is impossible. Until I had communicated through Mehta Ishar Das that how much 200 rupees would suffice for the staff [*‘amla-o-fa‘ila*] so as to say anything according to requital so that it should be accomplished by them. Accordingly I cannot dare to say without any information to that dignified one and they also want documentary proof. If any written recommendation is issued from there and the expenses is amount if communicated in writing, then Almighty God willing by considering auspicious the assignment of the addressee, the official should make an endeavour and the *farmān* of the land grant which accompanied with a paper was dispatched as due to inaction he could not prepare the *farmān* at that time. Now that *farmān* owing to lack of signature is not being issued and the writers of another *shiqq* [part/clause] also utter that as soon as the certificate [*sanad*] of the duty of *qaẓiship* is prepared afresh by the *Daftar-i-Dīwānī* [Finance / Revenue Department] etc where after another *farmān* is

written that is passed through the offices. This *farmān* would not be issued from the offices. Accordingly copy of the stipulated *farmān* was sent to the addressee. If the land grant of the aforesaid *farmān* would be in possession of that orientation point [Ṣōḥib-o-Qibla] then what is the need of the *farmān* except that whatever would be your orders that would be compiled with.

The servants of His Majesty by decamping from the places of village Kāras for subduing the stronghold of Wakinkira are attentive in travelling one after another. Although the group of the accursed [*Maqāḥir* / vanquished ones i.e. Marathas] on the way indulge in imprudence on *pesh-khana* [imperial tent of the state sent in advance when travelling] and also plundered the goods of the attendants of the royal army who had accompanied the tent equipage and the month of *Ramazan* of 49<sup>th</sup> regnal year [1117 AH/December 1705 – January 1706], commenced on the way. Despite suffocation, His Majesty used to observe the fast. But he did not halt anywhere since the time of the [march of the army] till the day of writing of the representation of the supplicant three months have passed away that they are marching to Almela. In another month they would reach to the foothills of the aforesaid fort, from here that an order [*ḥukm-i-farmān*] has been issued that practically the camp of the victorious army has arrived at Almela.<sup>1</sup> Chin Qilīch Khān<sup>2</sup>, the *Nāzim* [governor] of Bijapur has forwarded to the fort of Wakinkira and has inspected the place of an entrenchment for besieging the fortified place [*jāi morchāl*] and the place of the Imperial camp [*makān-i daulat khāna-i bādshāhi*] and has recommended to arrive at Almela so as to serve there from here as His Majesty would stay here. From Almela to Wakinkira there is a distance of 12 *Kuroh-i jaribi* [about 46 kms]. There is abundance of contingents in the fort. It is related that four of infantrymen would accompany the fort commandant [*qila'dār*]. Let it should be observed that what should be done that owing to travelling one after another the army men are not being hard and strong. The daily rent of camel is up to Rs.5/- and that of the oxen is procured up to Rs. 2/-. It should be imagined that how much costly is daily *kirāya* [price paid for the labour of conveyance]. In this army and in this expedition there is nothing except for worry and the dearness of food stuff and straw/hay for the last two years which the polite, civilized men are suffering. He who used to spend five rupees

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<sup>1</sup> Almel [spelt Almala] in our sources Cf., *An Atlas of Mughal Empire*, 1983, Sheet 14-A.

<sup>2</sup> Chin Qilīch Khān, son of Ghāziuddīn Khān Firūz Jung held the rank of 5000/5000. Mir Qamruddīn, *Maasir-i-Ālamgīrī*, p. 506.

*per diem* is unable to sustain even in Rs. 10/-. Let the Almighty show His favour so that the creatures of God should overcome the embarrassment [*kashāla* rectified *kasala*] so that servants of His Majesty may turn towards North India [Hindustan]. What else should be written as the empire may prosper. He should be excused for writing this letter in a hurry. Let greetings and servitude [*salām-obandgi*] be accepted by courteous Miyan Moi‘nuddin Jiv, Miyan Muḥammad Zakariya<sup>1</sup>.

Under such circumstances Bhimsen turns to the second reason and finds a connection between the rise of the Maratha power and the oppression of the peasants in the Imperial territories because the Mughal commanders were not maintaining their contingents up to the standard required by the regulations. Accordingly the Maratha “malefactors” did not entertain any fear of the Mughal *faujdārs* and so “those regions that have been assigned in pay to the *mansabdārs* cannot be compelled to pay the revenue”. “The *zamīndārs* also having obtained power, have allied themselves with the Marathas”. Until the crisis of Deccan wars, the empire was self financing which did not depend upon the private sector for capital. Moreover, nearly after two decades of uneasy drain on the liquid reserve necessary to support the Maratha campaigns in the south the Mughals were far from entirely depleted.

Unfortunately as the country has been divided into the *khālīṣa* and pay-assignments of the *jāgīrdārs*, so the Marathas too have distributed the very same country among their own “pseudo-chiefs”.<sup>2</sup> Naturally they had to live by plunder only for Shivajī’s reputed maxim was “No plunder, No pay”.

When Dāūd Khān Panni an Afghān *amīr* on Zulfiqār Khān’s staff, became deputy *faujdār* of Hyderabad Karnatak and subsequently of recently conquered Bijapur Karnatak then Dāūd Khān began the first phase of imperial pressure on the Karnatak as the new *faujdār* between 1700-104 campaigned actively against the various *Pālīgārs* and *rājās* of the area in a determined effort to force them to acknowledge the emperor’s authority.

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<sup>1</sup> He also served as *Qāzi* of *pargana* Sandila [1734-1754 AD]. Cf., Zakir Husain, ‘Some Original Tughluq Documents and Their Significance’, *Proc. Ind. Hist. Cong.*, 1989, p. 221 [Genealogical table].

<sup>2</sup>*Na-Sardārān*. This is also the official term used for the Maratha commanders in Mughal documents.

When there occurred famine in 46<sup>th</sup> R.Y. of Aurangzeb then AmānatKhān, *amin* and *faujdār* of *pargana* Kandapur, *sarkār* Sangamner etc wrote to Mu‘tamid Khān so as to convey it to His Majesty, who has fixed Rs 2,10, 000/ as the *jama‘ bandi*. However he has also collected signatures of 270 *muqaddams* whereas the rest have turned away elsewhere. On this Emperor has naturally asked from the dismissed officials [*nā-sardārān*] where after he has ordered Shaikh Sa‘dullāh Khān to investigate about the dismissed ones and has also ordered for the collection accordingly.

When there began to occur dearth then Aurangzeb first asked to meet out the expenses from the *Khālīṣa* especially due to famine. However, it was finally ordered that since reserve source from *parganas* of Aurangabad do not suffice Aurangzeb ordered that. “Now these cannot be transferred from the people but it can be given by transfer to the *pāibāqī* so that expenditure should reach regularly. The *peshkash* of Chāndā, Islāmgarh and Ḥaiderabad, which were in the income as these, has not been received till date.”<sup>1</sup>

Under such adverse circumstances of the great famine the transfer application of the *qila‘dar* of an area was denied by Aurangzeb as he himself ordered that “no transfer could be effected without any need and without any statecraft.”<sup>2</sup> It was settled on the orders of Aurangzeb that ten lakh *huns* from the date of fixation till the next two years be fixed as they should not insist for one year for the *dāgh* and *chehra* should be accomplished in collaboration of the *mutaṣaddis* for the *sehbandi* of Ḥaiderabad.<sup>3</sup> However, nothing could be given out of which the total amount of 10, 00,000 *hūns* was refixed for the next two years.<sup>4</sup>

Aurangzeb confessed in his last year that “there is no province or district where the infidels have raised a tumult and since they are not chastised, they have established themselves everywhere. Most of the country has been rendered desolate and if any place is inhabited, the

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<sup>1</sup> IJC I/45/1-44.

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/37/11-15.

<sup>3</sup> IJC I/39/11-74.

<sup>4</sup> IJC I/47/12-55.

peasants there have come to terms with the ‘Robbers’ [*Ashiqa*, official Mughal name for the Marathas].<sup>1</sup>

When, in view of the famine, a matter of undisputed nature came to light then it was reported that on 4<sup>th</sup> *Ramazan* 47<sup>th</sup> R.Y. Aurangzeb wrote that Paithan became *jāgīr* of that son who should send the men known as excellent and *ābādānkār* as *qaṣba* and *qita* ‘be given. Wizārat Khān be told that let him send in the *fard* with *manṣab* as no more the *Bakhshī* should report.<sup>2</sup>

What had been happening in the period of great famine and the Mughal administration’s responsibilities towards it is a deep rooted question as Aurangzeb had himself admitted and wrote to Bidār Bakht that since his departure from Ajmer he had spent twenty-five years, shake the holy wars in the Deccan,<sup>3</sup> the result of which proved devastating in the long run”.

Even in the year 1700, Bhimsen, while writing his memoirs, set himself to explain the reasons for the success of these “malefactors and Marathas”. Unfortunately the Mughal commanders were not maintaining their contingent up to standards required by the regulations. Not only the “malactors did entertain any fear of the Mughal *faujdar*s but “the *zamīndār*s also, having obtained power, have allied themselves with the Marathas”. It came to be represented [at the imperial court] that the Marathas obtain collaboration from the peasants of imperial dominions. It was, thereupon, ordered that the horses and weapons found in every village should be confiscated. When this happened in most villages, the peasantry providing themselves with horses and arms joined the Marathas.

Unfortunately “the troops of the [Maratha] leaders who come in for the sake of plundering the country, export money from every *pargana* and all places, in accordance with their desire, and let [their horses] graze and trample upon the cultivated field. Order has

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<sup>1</sup> *Aḥkām-i-Ālamgīrī*, f. 61 [b].

<sup>2</sup> IJC I/47/11-34.

<sup>3</sup> M. Athar Ali, *Mughal India: Studies in Polity, Ideas, Society and Culture*, OUP, Delhi, 2006, p. 390.

disappeared. Now things have gone beyond limit. The produce and the field does not reach the granary. They [the peasants] are totally ruined.

In view of the famine and the Maratha War in 1704, Aurangzeb naturally remitted the *jizya* throughout the Deccan for the duration of War.<sup>1</sup> In spite of this his general policy was to discourage *jizya* remissions.<sup>2</sup>

Unfortunately a crisis in the assignment system developed in the last years of Aurangzeb. Surprisingly enough from 1682 to his death in 1707 Aurangzeb carried on unending war in the Deccan in which the concentration of the entire military power of the Deccan failed to give him ultimate success. During these last years there was an enormous influx into the ranks of the *manṣabdārs* of the Deccanis or officials of the Deccan Kingdoms and the Marathas. However, the number of Marathas, as a result, increased to such an extent that the existing *jāgīrs* could no longer suffice for their pay.<sup>3</sup>

Aurangzeb himself, in one of his letters refers to the “scarcity of *pāibāqī* and the crowds of men claiming pay” and unequivocally declares that everything “flesh and bone” had been assigned and no further demands for assignment could be entertained by the court. Similar statements are made by Ma‘murī and Khāfi Khān. We are told that “large numbers [lit a world] had become *jāgīr* less [*be-jāgīr*]” as persons appointed to *manṣab* could not obtain *jāgīr* for years and if a *jāgīr* was transferred from the hands of any one, he might not get another. Unfortunately the older nobility or the so called *Khānazādān* were extremely indigent at the way their claims were disregarded to provide for the Deccanis. However, the real victims of the crisis were the small *manṣabdārs* who possessed neither money nor the influence to induce the officer of the court to assign them *jāgīrs*.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*Akhbārāt* 48/36 and A 245, cf also *Akhbārāt* 47/323.

<sup>2</sup>Cf., Ma‘murī, f. 179 [a] Khāfi Khān, II, 377-78.

<sup>3</sup>Ma‘murī, ff. 156 [b]-157 [a]; Khāfi Khān, Add 6574, ff. 106[b] - 107[a]. Unluckily this striking passage, inveighing against the influx of the Deccanis, is omitted in the Bib. Ind. Text of Khāfi Khān. On such an influx of Deccanis, see M. Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, rev. edn, 26-30.

<sup>4</sup>Ma‘murī, ff. 156 [b]-157 [a], Khāfi Khān, Add.6574, ff 106[b]-107[b]. Aurangzeb himself naturally admitted that “great injustice is done to the small men [*reza-hā*], *Dastūrul ‘Amal-i Āgahī*, f 31 [a] Add, 6574, 107[a].

Though J.F Richards, *Mughal Administration in Golconda* 158-02, 308-9 expresses some reserve in regard to the pressure on *jāgīr* developing in the late years of Aurangzeb, yet Athar Ali has demonstrated in *Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, rev. edn. XX-XXII, that Richards has read too much in a document consisting what he assumed to be “the 1689-90 settlement” of the conquered kingdom, and totally ignoring a document of 1706 [printed in *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb’s Reign* [233-35] which gives an entirely different picture at least for the 19 Karnatak *sarkārs* of *ṣūba* Ḥaidderabad.

We take into consideration those commanded by Maratha or Bedar nobles were staffed solely Marathas or Bedar *manṣabdārs* and subordinate commanders, many being specifically identified as brothers or sons of the leaders in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century because in the last quarter of this century, larger number of Deccanis like former Golconda, Bijaur and Maratha officers were enrolled in the Mughal service for political reasons.

Bhimsen’s account also becomes much more sober as he describes the steady demoralization, the general devastation and disarray of the imperial territories in the Deccan as the endless wars against the rebellious Marathas dragged on. Intensified imperial military responses increased the burden on the Deccan military administration. In 1706 food grain became scare in the Deccan. The Marathas, as well as lawless men of all sorts had rebelled and plundered the country side, *zamīndārs* no longer kept their obligations but assumed strength, joined the Marathas, enlisted armies, and laid the hands of oppression on the country “The peasants themselves procured horses and arms and joined the Marathas”.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in Aurangzeb’s last year the entire *pargana* of Ellichpur became desolated due to famine.<sup>2</sup>

The Emperor seized with a passion for capturing first [*qila* ‘*gīrī* v/s *mulkgīrī*] has not attending to the happiness of the subjects<sup>3</sup>. The Mughal India continued to decline and display those symptoms of a general crisis noticed as early as the Deccan famines of 1702-4. It is also likely that funds from the Karnatak did support many of the troops which Aurangzeb threw into

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<sup>1</sup> Bhimsen *Nuskha-i Dilkushā*, p. 230, text f. 139[b].

<sup>2</sup> IJC, I/51/1-26.

<sup>3</sup> Bhilmsen, p. 240, text fol. 146[b].

the siege of Wakinkira in 1706 against the Bedar Chief Pidiyah Nayak. Before him in February 1703 Riza Khān, a former Mughal officer, turned bandit chief, came right to the gates of Machilipatnam with a force of 9,000 or 10,000 men as his plundering and burning virtually closed the Machilipatnam --- Hyderabad trade route<sup>1</sup>.

The *Khānazāds* naturally blamed the new comers from the Deccan Kingdoms for their troubles, the ensuing widespread conflict and demoralization among the Mughal nobility was thus an unanticipated effect of the Deccan/ conquests. Moreover the resulting increased demand for *jāgīrs* [salary assignments] exhausted the reserve [*pāibāqī*] lands usually available for that purpose, owing to which many *Khanazads* lost heavily.

Pidiyah Nayak who began to control Wakinkira from 1688 to 1691 was little more than a bandit or robber chief who solely rose through illegitimate and indiscriminate force. Between 1696 and 1706 Pidiyah Nayak was free to develop his various enterprises, until Aurangzeb himself directed his last personally led campaign against Wakinkira which has been referred to in detail as stated in the beginning of this chapter.

In the late 1690s the Deccan came under steady increasing military pressure as the Marathas, Bedars, Gonds and others raided deep into the imperial provinces of the Deccan while the bandit whose power and number had swollen also raided and looted freely. Unfortunately dislocation caused by these events was enhanced by a disastrous drought, famine and epidemic affecting nearly the entire Deccan between the years 1700 and 1704. Moreover agricultural and industrial production dwindled. Similarly in unfortified cities, the expectation or the actuality of the raids disturbed the urban population. However, in the country side, peasants starvation and disease frequently lost their livestock, tools and sometimes their lives to raiders. Unfortunately peasants who survived often migrated in search of safety, or joined one of the bands of raiders or bandits.

Precipitous declines in collections from even the most productive *jāgīrs* must have contributed to the troubles of the Mughal officers serving in the Deccan under such prevalent

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<sup>1</sup> K.A., 1570 [10.10.1703], Second Part + 28.

conditions. Furthermore, after 1700 the Emperor sent reinforcements only under the most desperate circumstances.

When these circumstances were prevailing then Rustam Dil Khān without resisting 50,000 Maratha cavalry stayed in Golconda fort allowing undisputed plunder for three full days which he however succeeded in stopping by offering 7,00,000 silver rupees by illegally taking it from the treasury. Although Dāūd Khān Panni replaced Rustam Dil Khān for less than one year he was called back by Aurangzeb to assist the Emperor in his siege of the Bedar fort at Wakinkira in 1706. Though Dāūd Khān Panni's vigorous campaigns against the Pālīgārs probably brought the collections reasonably close to the normative demand yet it is also likely that funds from the Karnatak supported many of the troops which Aurangzeb threw into the siege of Wakinkira in 1706 against the Bedar chief Pidiyah Nayak. Thereafter assisted by the intervention of Asad Khān, the imperial *wazīr* Rustam Dil Khān returned to the deputy Governorship of Hyderabad which came to an end in 1708 by his execution through Prince Kām Baksh.

However, of equal importance was the precipitous loss of confidence on the part of these groups whose support and cooperation was equally essential for the imperial system. Furthermore, Muslim urban notables, Telgu and Maratha *deshmukhs* and *zamīndārs* and tributary chiefs of all descriptions, not fully integrated by Aurangzeb into the empire, in effect declared a moratorium on participation in the empire which was equally dangerous as the droughts and famines in the Deccan.

During Aurangzeb's closing years after 1700 A.D. an analysis of contemporary Mughal official documents and news reports from both Bijapur and Hyderabad supports the view that the *deshmukhs* did not engage in widespread sustained revolts. Moreover they did not supply willing assistance to raiders attacking from outside the provincial boundaries notwithstanding the fact that in Hyderabad, bandits like Rizā Khān whose forces were augmented by deserted soldiers and uprooted peasants, had begun to challenge the local power of the *deshmukhs* and *zamīndārs* [whose outright defiance were not common] seriously threatened their security.

Whether a similar explanation of the Deccan provinces hold for the remaining territories of the vast empire is a billion dollar question as we can apparently suggest some indices of decline found in the Deccan provinces also existed in other provinces as incomplete administrative and political consideration in Bijapur and Golconda after 1686-87 and commitment of best military and administrative resources of the Empire to continued expansion in the Deccan brought about a crisis of public order and public confidence. But as far as Mughal decline is concerned there are several theories which need to be discussed and analysed here as these do not fall outside the preview of our discussion, though it was also enhanced by a disastrous draught and famine, and epidemic affecting the entire Deccan.

Furthermore, in the debate on the fall of the Mughal Empire and the role of the 'Deccan Factor', the economic significance of the Mughal expansion has largely escaped notice. Moreover the fall of the Mughal Empire came close at the heels upon the annexation of the Deccan by Aurangzeb gave further impetus to the criticism of the Mughal Deccan Policy. Under Aurangzeb the *jama* of the Mughal Empire rose from less than 21% in 1640 and 1656 to over 32% of the Empire in 1667 A.D. as this 'artificial inflation, raised by Akbar in a single stroke of pen to 50% seems to have continued throughout the seventeenth century.

The increase in the Deccan nobility was thus even disproportionate to the rise in the *jama* of the Deccan i.e. 20.3% as compared to 290% which automatically created the crisis of *jāgīr* among the Mughal nobility thereby weakening the very basis of the empire as the Mughals thus met with political failure along with their military difficulties. Consequent upon Aurangzeb's reaching the Deccan with large armies, the compulsion towards aggrandizement increased with still large strain on the resources. Undoubtedly the presence of the Marathas was a factor in the further expansion into the Deccan, but it seems to be secondary to the economic considerations.

The drain of resources were caused by the burden of continuous Deccan campaigns almost till the end of Aurangzeb's reign. Moreover Bhimsen's famous passage brings out the unending cycle of agrarian depredations, fall in revenues, increase in revenue pressure, internal

disturbances and further agrarian depredation of which the Maratha *sardars* were the main beneficiaries, with the peasant *bargīs* as their instruments.

More substantial amounts of revenues were required in the Deccan for the imperial due to the prolonged stay of Aurangzeb and the need to finance his own *khāṣṣā* troops and artillery which had to be paid out of the revenues collected for the imperial treasury for which large areas of the Deccan needed to be kept unassigned as revenues from the *pāibāqī* were practically no different from those of the *Khāliṣā* being collected for the imperial administration.

## GLOSSARY

ABWĀB:	Exaction of officials in addition to the <i>jama</i> ‘Agrarian System, pp. 175, 284 & n. 288.
AFRĀD-I DEHSĀLA:	Comparative revenue statements of past ten years giving the <i>jama</i> ‘ [assessed revenue] and area or estimation of net revenue yielding capacity of different territories on the basis of which these were assigned in <i>jāgīr</i> . Irfan Habib, ‘A System of Trimetallism & C’, in J.F. Richards’ [ed.] <i>The Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India</i> , 144.
‘AHDNĀMA:	Treaty, for detail see Momin, <i>Epistolography and Chancellory under the Mughals</i> , Calcutta, 53.
AUT:	Measure of Area [Deccan].
‘AMAL:	Revenue collection to the period when a person has been revenue collector so that an event may be described as happening during the ‘ <i>amal</i> of a particular official. Irfan Habib, ‘Evidence for Sixteenth Century Agrarian Conditions in Guru Granth Sahib’, <i>IESHR</i> , Vol. I, No. 3, 1964, 72n.
‘AMAL GUZĀR:	Revenue collector = ‘ <i>amil</i> , ‘ <i>amal-i jarīb</i> , revenue assessment by measurement <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 240 & n.
‘ĀMIL:	Official in-charge of both the assessment and collection of the revenue. Goswami & Grewal, <i>The Mughal and the Jogis of Jakhbar</i> , 1967, 63.
AMĪN:	Revenue collector = <i>munsif</i> , head of measuring party, imperial officer concerning conformity in the <i>Khālīṣa</i> and <i>jāgīr</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , 2014, pp. 212, 218n, 262n, 295, 318-20 & nn, 321, 323 & nn, 324, 325n, 327 & n, 333, 334, n, 338 & n, 339.
‘ARZDĀSHT:	Supplication, a petition or an official communication addressed by a subordinate to his superiors. N.A. Siddiqi, <i>Land Revenue C.</i> , 5n.
ASHRAFI:	[I] Mughal gold coin [ <i>muhr</i> ].
ĀWĀRJA:	Balance document listing individual <i>jāgīr</i> holdings within each <i>pargana</i> for a particular point in time. These documents were usually drawn up in order to ascertain the available revenues open for reassignment to <i>manṣabdārs</i> . J.F. Richards ‘Official Revenues and Money Flows in a Mughal Provinces’, ed. <i>The Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India</i> , 1983, 209.
BĀLĀDASTI:	“High-handedness”, fines and bribes exacted by the officials.
BALKATI:	Exaction for granting permission to have the crop & cut. <i>Agrarian System</i> , 288, & n.,
BĀGHĀT:	Fields, irrigated by wells [Deccan].
BAITULMĀL:	Public treasury.
BAKḤSHIUL MAMĀLIK/ MĪR BAKḤSHĪ:	In charge of awarding <i>manṣab</i> and checking <i>manṣabdārs</i> ’ contingents through the <i>dāgh</i> system; and controller of intelligence, <i>Apparatus of Empire</i> , XXV.
BĀJ:	Impost trade, <i>zakat</i> , p. 72.
BAKSARIYA:	Infantry soldiers and “Clumbmen of <i>Zamīndārs</i> ” Cf. William Irvince, <i>The Army of the Indian Mughals</i> , 1907, 168.

BARĀWARDI:	Ordinary <i>sawār</i> rank, I. Habib, 'Manṣab System'. IHC, 1967.
BATAĪ:	Crop sharing = <i>ghalla bakhshi</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , 237, 238 b, 265.
BHENT:	Customary or compulsory gift to superior [Cf., <i>salāmi</i> ].
BIGHA:	Measure of area, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 2, 233, 249-250 & nn.
BI-L MAQTA':	[Revenue etc.] fixed at the same figure rate indefinitely or for fixed period, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 215, 274 & n.  Lumpsum, at the same figure permanently, <i>Agarian System</i> , 175.
BISWA:	One-twentieth of <i>bigha</i> , 407n, one-twentieth share of <i>zamīndār</i> or other rights [e.g. <i>muqaddami</i> ] of village, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 165-6, 174 & A, 191 n.
CHĀCHER:	Land kept fallow for previous three or four years, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 261, 293 n.
CHAKLA:	Territorial unit between <i>ṣūba</i> and <i>pargana</i> but not necessarily identical with <i>sarkār</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 320 & n.
CHAUDHURĪ:	The hereditary <i>zamīndār</i> held responsible for the collection of revenue in each <i>pargana</i> , <i>CEHI</i> , I, 58.
CHAUDHURĪ:	Officer or area of Jurisdiction or perquisites of <i>chaudhurī</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 336 n.
CHHINT:	Chhint [Hindi] Chit [Pers]. Any cotton cloth [usually calico] with floral or other patterns printed [by block-stamping of resists or mordents and subsequent dyeing or painted [by brush or pencil called <i>qalam</i> ] <i>Atlas</i> , 69.
CHAUKI:	Toll and guard post. <i>Agrarian System</i> , 74 n
CHAUTH:	One fourth revenue, claimed by chief of <i>zamīndās</i> [Maharashtra]. <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 335.
CHAVAR:	Measure of area [Deccan], <i>Agrarian System</i> , 345 n].
DĀGH:	Branding of horses for checking the contingents of <i>manṣabdārs</i> at muster or identification as inspector, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 381 & n.
DĀK CHAUKI:	The official postal organization, <i>dak</i> being the word for post and <i>chauki</i> signifying relay stations for runner and horses, I. Habib 'Postal Communication in Mughal India, <i>Cyclostyled Volume of Aligarh Papers on Indian History</i> , 1985, p. 54.
DAKHILI:	New village still shown under on [ <i>aṣli</i> village for revenue purpose, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 295 n].
DAROGHA:	Superintendent of any department, Steigass, <i>A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary</i> , 497.
DAROGHA-I PESHKASH:	Officer in charge of receiving <i>peshkash</i> [gift] made to the Emperor. The <i>peshkash</i> included ceremonial offerings as well as the levy or annual tribute paid by the chiefs and subordinate rulers. Cf., <i>Apparatus</i> , XXV.
DAROGHA-I TOPKHANA:	Corresponding to <i>Mīr-i Ātish</i> , Chief of the Artillery, <i>Apparatus</i> , XXV.
DASTURU-L 'AMAL:	Schedule of cash revenue rates. Shireen Moosvi, 'The <i>Zamīndārs</i> ' Share in the Peasants' Surplus & C', <i>IESHR</i> , Vol. XV, No. 3, 1978, 359; <i>idem</i> : 'The Evolution of the <i>Manṣab</i> ', <i>JARS</i> , 1981, 173.

DECCANI:	Nobles and officers recruited from the Deccan, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 312 & n.
DESĀĪ:	<i>Pargana</i> level Semi-hereditary official concerned with revenue collection [Gujarat & Deccan], <i>Chaudhuri, Agrarian System</i> , pp. 87, 40, 161n, 175, 223n, 306n, 332 D, 33 A, 337 n, 386, 401n 402 n.
DAUL-I JĀGĪR:	<i>Jama</i> ‘ of <i>jāgīr</i> , Cf., <i>Agrarian System</i> , 222n.
DAUL:	Papers containing revenue assessment for season or year, <i>Agrarian System</i> .
DESHMUKH:	A hereditary revenue village officer. He was to maintain an armed body of retainers and assist in the collection of land-tax. Richards’ <i>Mughal Administration</i> , 27. Counter part of <i>chaudhuri</i> [& <i>desāī</i> ] in the Deccan, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 186, n, 295, 335 & n, 402.
DEHNĪMĪ [DAHĪM]	‘Five percent charge on revenue [process equal to it] divided between the <i>muqaddam</i> and <i>chaudhuri</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> pp 162 & n, 163n.
DESKULKARNI:	<i>Pargana</i> -level accountant = <i>deshpāndiya</i> <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 85.
DESHMUKHI:	It was a kind of <i>in‘ām</i> which was hereditary in character and peculiar to Maharashtra and Deccan only and it was made in terms of the <i>dāms</i> of the income of certain <i>parganas</i> in consideration of a stipulated <i>peshkash</i> presented to the Emperor. The right implied a share in the revenue amounting to 9 to 10 percent. <i>Mughal Chancellery</i> , 99; <i>Agrarian System</i> , 349n.
DESHPĀNDIYA:	Counter of <i>qanūngo</i> in the Deccan, see also <i>Deshkulkarnī</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , 33.
DĪWĀN or WAZIR:	<i>Wazir-i Kul</i> or <i>Diwan-i Kul</i> . Minister in charge of Imperial finance, <i>jāgīr</i> assignment and revenue collection. <i>Apparatus</i> , XXV.
DIWANIAN’-I ‘UZZAM:	Imperial finance ministry, its official, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 326n.
DU_ASPA SIH_ASPA:	A trooper with two horses receiving higher pay than the ordinary [ <i>barawardī</i> ]. This additional <i>do-aspa sih-aspa</i> came into use under Jahangir for the first time and theoretically it was a part of the sawar rank. <i>Apparatus</i> , XIII.
DUNIYADĀR:	‘Men of the World’. The Mughals always insisted on calling “Ādil Shāh” “Ādil Khān” and Quṭb Shāh “Quṭbūl Mulk” and from Akbar’s time onwards both of them were styled <i>duniya-dars</i> , being worldly men, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 183.
FARMĀN:	This term is applied to every royal missive that issued from the sovereign on the chancellery bearing the Imperial <i>tughra</i> and seal. S.A.I. Tirmizi, <i>Medieval Indian Diplomacy</i> , IHC, 1982, 3-4.
FAUJDĀR:	Commandant of a territory. In-charge of law and order. <i>Apparatus</i> , XXI, XXV. Commandant in charge of peace and order usually in a group as <i>parganas</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , 320 & n, 334, 337.
FOṬADĀR:	Treasurer = <i>Khizānadār faujdārī</i> jurisdiction of or cess levied by a <i>faujdar</i> .
FAUJDĀRĪ:	Military command, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 181.
GAU SHUMARI:	Tax on cattle, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 284 & n.
GIRASYA:	Originally he had been servant of the state, holding a revenue assignment similar to the <i>jāgīrs</i> of the Mughal period, but later indistinguishable from that of the <i>bhūmia</i> [allodial proprietor]. <i>Agrarian System</i> , 143.
GUMĀSHTAS:	Agents of revenue officials, revenue collectors of <i>jāgīrdārs</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 326.

ḤĀL-I ḤĀṢIL:	The actual realization of the revenues. Shireen Moosvi, <i>IESHR</i> No. 3, 1980, 331. <i>Agrarian System</i> , 178n.
ḤĀṢIL- SANN-I KĀMIL:	Revenue realized in year of maximum collection, <i>Agrarian System</i> , pp. 306, 465 & n, 466n.
HANGĀM-I KHĀM:	Case or occasion when revenue was assessed on, or collected directly from, peasants [& not through intermediaries], <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 183.
ḤAOQ-I MILKIYAT:	Claim to share of produce based on ownership [of superior or rights], <i>Agrarian System</i> , p 179.
HARKARA:	Spy; an attendant upon men of rank, also employed to go on errands; a messenger, Steingass, 1496.
ḤASBŪL AMR:	Order issued on behalf of the princes, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 282; <i>Cf.</i> , Momin, <i>Chancellery and Epistolography Under the Mughals</i> . 98.
HASBŪL ḤUKM:	Imperial orders issued through court officials or Minister's order on oral instructions of the Emperor, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 282n. ḤĀṢIL [plural <i>ḥaṣilāt</i> , revenue, actually collected]. <i>Cf.</i> , <i>Jama</i> '.
ḤĀṢIL-I KĀMIL or ḤĀṢIL SAN-I KĀMIL:	Revenue realized in year of maximum collection, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 306, 465 & n 466n.
HAST-O-BUD:	Summary assessment upon casual inspection of state of harvest <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 238 & n.
ḤUBŪBĀT:	Exaction of officials, <i>zamīndārs</i> , etc, in addition to the <i>jama</i> ' = <i>abwab</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 284.
ḤUQŪQ-I DĪWĀNĪ:	Fiscal claims of government. <i>Agrarian System</i> , pp. 300 n 343.
ḤUQŪQ-I ZAMĪNDĀRĪ:	<i>Zamīndārs</i> claim on produce of land, <i>Agrarian System</i> , p 179.
IĀRADĀR/ MUSTĀJIR:	Revenue farmer/contractor, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 235.
IKHRĀJAT:	Extortion of officials professedly to meet their "expenses" [ <i>Cf.</i> , <i>malba</i> ] <i>Agrarian System</i> , pp. 288 n, 343.
IN'ĀM:	When a <i>jāgīr</i> is assigned not against a rank, but as in'ām, free bestowal, without placing the assignee under any obligation. I. Habib, 'The Social Distribution of Landed Property in Medieval India', 124.
IN'ĀM-I ALTAMGHĀ:	Land assigned as <i>altamgha</i> , in addition to <i>jāgīr</i> assigned against <i>Manṣab</i> pay or without grantee holding any <i>manṣab</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , p 358 n.
JĀGĪR:	Transferrable territorial revenue assignment to the <i>manṣabdār</i> . A tract of land which the king grants to <i>manṣabdārs</i> and persons of that kind, they might take its revenue [ <i>maḥṣul</i> ] from cultivation, whatever it be, <i>Bahar-i 'Ajam</i> ', Nawal Kishore, 283, as cited in <i>Agrarian System</i> , 257; cf. Shireen Moosvi, <i>The Economy of the Mughal Empire &amp; c.</i> , 196.
JAMA':	Literally meaning 'gathered together, aggregate, total The estimation of tax income or the expected net revenue, i.e. the gross realization less charges of collection and other allowances for subordinate right holders. Shireen Moosvi, 'Share of the Nobility in the Revenue of Akbar's Empire' 1595-6, <i>IESHR</i> , No. 3, 331.
JAMA' BANDĪ:	The work of determining <i>jama</i> ' [1], <i>Agrarian System</i> , p 261 n

JAMA‘-I RAQAMI:	Term for <i>Jama‘</i> [2] under Akbar’s predecessors and during his early years <i>Agrarian System</i> pp 243, 302 n, 303-4 nn, 345.
JIHAT:	Cesses, taxes on certain trades, <i>Agrarian System</i> pp 283 n.
KANKŪT:	Assessment of revenue by applying a crop rate [ <i>rai</i> ] to area measured before hand, <i>Agrarian System</i> , pp. 214, 232, 236, 255, n, 260 n, 276-77, 290.
KALĀNTARĀN:	Literally “big ones”; members belonging to dominant elements, <i>CEHI</i> , 248.
KĀRKHĀNA:	Workshop and store establishment. S.M. Jaffar, <i>Some Cultural Aspects of Muslim Rule in India</i> , 88; <i>Economy of the Mughal Empire</i> , 262.
KARORĪ:	Revenue-collector of the <i>Khālīṣa</i> , the Imperial revenue to establishment, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 275-83.
KHĀLIṢA-I SHARĪFA:	Territories and sources of revenue, reserved to yield revenue the Imperial treasury, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 259.
KHĀNAZĀD:	Lit: those born of persons already slaves of the Emperor, a primary claim on a <i>manṣab</i> was thought to vest in the sons and close kinsman [ <i>khānazād</i> ] of those already in service, <i>Apparatus</i> , XXI.
KHĀSRAT-I ZABT:	Paper giving details of area measurement in order to assess revenue thereon, <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 253 & n.
KHARJ-I SADĪR O WĀRID:	Expenses on touring officials or on hospitality to travellers, <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 288.
KHAṢA SHARĪFA:	Emperor’s own establishment, <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 328.
KULKARNI:	Counter part of <i>Patwari</i> in the Deccan. <i>Agrarian System</i> p. 166 n.
KOTWAL:	Police and head of town, <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 75 n.
KHURĀK-I DAWWĀB:	Supplies for animals of imperial stables, demanded from <i>manṣabdārs</i> , money levy in lieu of such supplies; <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 311 n.
KUROH:	The Perisan form of Sanskrit <i>Krosa</i> . The standard imperial Kuroh often called Kuroh-i Padshahi represented a length of a little over 2½ miles, <i>Atlas</i> , XIII.
MAHĀJAN:	Merchant-usurers, professional money-lender. Irfan Habib, ‘Usury in Medieval India’, <i>Comparative Studies in Society and History</i> , VI, No.4, July 1964, 394.
MAḤAL/PARGANA:	The two terms being practically synonymous ordinarily stand for the territorial division within the Mughal empire, [ <i>Atlas</i> , IX]. <i>Pargana</i> is essentially territorial division; <i>maḥal</i> , a revenue unit. All <i>parganas</i> were <i>maḥals</i> , but the word <i>maḥal</i> was also applied to certain specified sources of revenue such as port or market taxes, <i>Economy of the Mughal Empire &amp; c.</i> , 10.
MAḤAL-I TAN:	Territories from which salary is to be paid by <i>jāgīr</i> .
MĀL-I WĀJIBĪ:	The authorised land-revenue, <i>CEHI</i> , I, 242.
MALBA:	Payment from village fund on items other than land revenue, officials exactions from villages, 154n, 244 n, land revenue due, see <i>mal</i> [land revenue] <i>Kharaj</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 153, 209-10, 300n 380n, 400.
MANDAVI:	Trade centre, market. Richards’ <i>Mughal Administration in Golconda</i> , 186.

MANŞAB:	Numerical rank, the number assigned to a man during the Mughal period; basic unit for determining status, pay, and military obligations. <i>Cf.</i> , Shireen Moosvi, ‘ <i>The Evaluation of Mansab</i> ’, <i>JRAS</i> , No. 2, 1981, 173; M. Athar Ali, ‘Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire’, <i>JRAS</i> , No. 1978, 40.
MANSHŪR:	A royal receipt and a mandate, Momin, 54.
MAHR:	Wife’s dower in Muslim law, <i>Agrarian System</i> p. 192n.
MAWĀS:	MAWAS, Rebellious area, 30, <i>talab</i> [rebel [s]], <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 379 & 399.
MĪR ĀB:	Official in charge of irrigation, from canals and channels, <i>Agrarian System</i> , pp. 36, & 96.
MIR BAKHSHI / BAKHSHI-I MAMĀLIK:	In charge of the awarding <i>mansabs</i> and checking <i>mansabdārs</i> contingents through the <i>dagh</i> system and controller of intelligence. <i>Apparatus</i> , XXV.
MUCHALKA:	Bond, written undertaking, <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 164 n, 179.
MUSA‘ĀDAT:	Loan advance made to a <i>mansabdār</i> , loan, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 269; <i>Mughal Nobility</i> , 52; ‘Usury in Medieval India’, 410.
MUTAFARRIQA ‘AMAL:	Assignment of several <i>jāgīrs</i> within a single <i>pargana</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , pp. 326, 32-7n.
MUṬĀLIBA:	Claim of the Imperial exchequer for amounts owed to it by the <i>jāgīrdārs</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , 267, 269.
MUTAŞADDI:	General designation for official. But specially applied to the customer of the Ports of Cambay and Surat. <i>Apparatus</i> , XXV.
MUWĀZNA-I DAH SALA:	DAH SALA, Papers giving details of area and revenue of per ten years [or more or less] <i>Agrarian System</i> pp5n, 213, 246n, 259, 305, 306 n, 307, 338 n.
NIŞĀR:	Gifts offered by the nobles to the Emperor, <i>Mughal Nobility</i> , 144.
NETAN:	Unit of area [Berar], <i>Agrarian System</i> , 6n.
PĀIBĀQĪ:	Lands temporarily in charge of the Imperial officials pending assignment to <i>jāgīrdārs</i> , Athar ‘Ali, Review of J.F. Richards’ <i>Mughal Administration</i> , 1975, 159; <i>cf.</i> <i>Agrarian System</i> , 285-9.
PARGANA:	Territory delimited by Mughal administration for revenue and administrative purposes [ <i>Cf.</i> , <i>maḥal</i> ], <i>Agrarian System</i> , pp. 2; 300, 332 & 336.
PESHKASH:	Fixed annual tribute; large present or a cash offering, additional to any revenues which the chief might have to pay the court, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 181, 184-5, 289.
PHAD:	System of cooperative management of irrigation from canals and streams [Baḡlana], <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 33.
RĀHDĀRI:	Tolls and cesses exacted by the various authorities controlling the routes, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 67.
SADRŪŞ ŞUDŪR:	Central minister in charge of revenue grants, <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 343.
SARDESHMUKHĪ:	Claim to 9 [or 10] percent or revenue.
SALĀMI:	Gift offered on salutation by inferior visiting his superior, <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 176, 288 & n.

SARKĀR:	Administration of government, establishment of a prince or a noble; sub-division of a province, <i>Agrarian System</i> , 267, 325 & n.
SARKHAT:	Receipt or memorandum given by a <i>muqaddam</i> and <i>patwari</i> to peasants, <i>Agrarian System</i> , pp. 107, 272,
SATARAHI:	Synonym of <i>zamīndārī</i> , from claim of one-seventeenth of the produce. <i>Agrarian System</i> . 166. 172 & n, 179-80, 187 & n, 200, 345 n.
SAZĀWAL:	Persons deputed by the central government for the execution of the orders, Z.U. Malik, <i>Reign of Muḥammad Shāh</i> , 293.
SELA:	Shella, selaes. High priced cotton stuff, <i>A'in-i Akbari</i> , I, 108.
SIHBANDI:	Troops employed by the nobles for a temporary period for collection of land revenue and police duties, <i>Nigār Nāma-i Munshī</i> , 93.
SHIKĀR:	Hunt, levy of money or labour to help organize hunt; <i>Agrarian System</i> , p. 289, 289-90 n.
SHIQDĀR:	[Originally officer in charge of <i>shiqq</i> , large territorial division [14 <sup>th</sup> century] <i>pargana</i> level officer in charge of revenue collection under the Surs, subsequently petty revenue official.
ṢUBEDĀR:	This and other designations such as <i>nāzim</i> , <i>hākīm</i> , <i>sipahsālār</i> and <i>ṣāhib-i ṣūba</i> were used for the Governor of <i>ṣūba</i> , <i>Apparatus</i> , XXVI.
TAFAWAT-I DĀGH:	Deduction from pay claim, I. Habib, 'Manṣab Salary Scales Under Jahangir and Shahjahan', <i>Islamic Culture</i> , July 1985.
TA'AHHUD:	A pledge given by a prospective official about the amount he would assess to collect.
TAN, TANKHWAH, TANKHWAH-I JĀGĪR:	A <i>jāgīr</i> assigned in lieu of the salary due to <i>manṣabdār</i> , <i>Mughal Nobility</i> , 75.
ṬALAB:	The annual total pay claim, I. Habib, 'Manṣab and salary scales under Jahangir and Shahjahan', <i>Islamic Culture</i> , July, 1985.
TAKHFĪF:	Abatement in revenue, <i>Mughal Nobility</i> , 77.
TAPPA:	A combination of few villages named after the largest of the villages under its jurisdiction; sub <i>maḥal</i> , Yasin's Glossary Br. Mus. Add. 6603 f. 55 [b]; B.R. Grover, 'Raḳba Bandi Documents Under Akbar', <i>IHRC</i> , XXVI, Pt. II, 59.
TAQĀVI:	[Literally, strength giving], loans made by the government to cultivators, a term used in the Mughal administration for advance for the cattle and for sinking wells, I. Habib in <i>CEHI</i> , 65; <i>The Mughals and the Jogis of Jakhbar</i> , 97n.
TAQSĪM:	Papers containing records of area and revenue of past years, <i>Agrarian System</i> pp 243 & n 244n, 246n.
TASHIḤA:	The minister's certificate verifying the horses, arms and armours maintained by a <i>manṣabdār</i> bore the signatures of the <i>Dīwān</i> and the <i>Bakhshī</i> , Momin, 93-9.
TAUFIR:	Excess on specified area of revenue grant, <i>Agrarian System</i> , P 346.
THĀNA:	A military or a police post. A.J. Qaisar, <i>Medieval India-A Miscellany</i> , II, 72.
THĀNADĀR:	Officer-in-charge of military or police post, <i>CEHI</i> , 244.

TOPKHANA:	The artillery department which included all fire arms not only but also muskets and rockets whether handled by horsemen or infantry, <i>Ma'āsir-i 'Ālam-gīrī</i> , tr. J.N. Sarkar, 329.
WAQĀI':	The news reports of the <i>waqāi' nigār</i> , I. Habib, <i>Postal Communication in Mughal India</i> , 65.
WAQĀI' NAWĪS:	News-writer or official entrusted with sending reports of all public business and other news. Usually the office was a subordinate of the <i>Mīr Bak̄shī</i> . He appointed his own agents [ <i>gumashtas</i> ], <i>Appartatus</i> , XXVI.
WAṬAN JĀGĪR:	The chiefs who obtained <i>manṣab</i> , their old dominions were known as their <i>waṭan</i> , <i>Mughal Nobility</i> , 79.
WUJŪHĀT:	Taxes other than the land revenue, comprised under <i>jihāt</i> and <i>sair jihāt</i> , <i>Agrarian System</i> , 283.
YADDĀSHT:	A note, memorandum, memorial [Wilson, <i>Glossary</i> , 800].
ZAMĪNDĀR:	Persian compound meaning holder of land used for any person with any hereditary claim to a direct share in the peasants' produce, <i>CEHI</i> , 244.
ZORTALAB:	[Usually of territory] "force demanding, seditions, not paying revenue unless forcibly compelled to do so = <i>mawās</i> ", <i>Agrarian System</i> , pp. 327n, 379 &n.

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