



POPULAR BRITISH INTERPRETATIONS OF
'THE MUTINY'
Politics and Polemics

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THE causes, nature and meaning of the Indian Uprising of 1857 have long been the subject of controversy, with the opposition between British imperialist and Indian nationalist interpretations often dominating the debate. The ideological agendas behind these conflicting historiographies has led to a degree of internal homogeneity, with the British imperialist historians tending to see 'The Indian Mutiny' as limited in scope and meaning,¹ while Indian nationalists presented 'The First War of Indian Independence'² as a proto-nationalist conflict with wider socio-political significance within the history of India's transition to independence. Such divisions along racial/national lines are the retrospective impositions of defined imperial and national political projects, the homogenising tendency of which has obscured the heterogeneity of immediate reactions to the events as they unfolded, both in Britain and India. More recently, the emergence of subalternist perspectives in Indian historiographical method has led to the recognition of the multiplicity of identities, motivations and meanings that insurrection and resistance could have, depending on the various social, economic, religious, regional and circumstantial situations of the participants.³ Moreover, developments in postcolonial theory, and the emergence of more critical approaches to the study of colonialism, have helped to reinterpret the British response in terms of its relationship to the practical, ideological and discursive expediencies of the imperial project.⁴ Far from immediately coalescing in an organised and unified national response to the crisis, British reactions to and interpretations of events varied considerably, both over time and between groups from different political and ideological backgrounds. Indeed, as Gautam Chakravarty has pointed

out, divisions within the initial British response foreshadow later dichotomies in the imperialist/nationalist debate, as some sections of the British polity downplayed the insurrection as a limited military mutiny, while others read into it wider social, political and even national significance.⁵ The debates about its causes, origins, instigators, scope and potential ‘national’ or ‘nationalist’ meanings that have become so dominant in more recent historiography, were thus present within a multifaceted and often conflicted British response in 1857–1858 itself. This chapter explores three of the most prominent British interpretations of the uprising that emerged at the time, although, of course, there were others. These can loosely be categorised as the ‘military mutiny’ explanation, the ‘civil uprising’ interpretation and the ‘Muslim conspiracy/rebellion’ theory. By exploring each in turn, the chapter will seek to elucidate both the political and ideological assumptions and expediencies that actuated the adherents of each interpretation and their wider significance for our understanding of British perceptions about the nature and future of empire.

A Military Mutiny

The outbreak of rebellion in May 1857 was initially taken relatively lightly in both Calcutta and London. It took Governor General Lord Canning several days to realise the serious challenge his government was facing, while in Britain it was weeks before Palmerston fully grasped the gravity of the situation. Both hoped that the next mail, or the mail thereafter, would bring news that the ‘mutineers’ had been crushed and the region completely pacified. Canning even rejected the governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone’s offer to send news of the revolt to England by a special steamer, in order to speed the arrival of British help.⁶ In London, Palmerston ignored his parliamentary colleagues’ advice to dispatch immediate military assistance via the Mediterranean and Red Sea, instead downplaying the extent of the revolt and finally sending reinforcements late, and by the longer Cape of Good Hope route. The intensity of the insurrection and the tenacity of the rebels were initially incomprehensible to the British authorities, whose immediate reaction was to present it as a limited military mutiny. Such an event was not unprecedented; the British were used to receiving periodic reports of military uprisings in India. The mutiny at Vellore in 1806 was perhaps the most serious previous military insurrection, but was certainly not unique: the 47th Regiment had been disbanded in 1824 for refusing to serve in Burma, as had the 38th Bengal Native Infantry in 1852, four Bengal regiments had refused to serve in Sind in 1844, and the 66th Native Infantry at Govindgarh had mutinied in 1849. Understood in this wider context, the news of the outbreak at Meerut was neither exceptional, nor a cause

for serious alarm. Palmerston's government minimised the threat, hoping the British forces already in India would quickly suppress the mutiny. V.A. Smith, president of the Board of Control for India, speaking in the Commons on 29 June 1857, pinned his hopes on the 'gallantry and quick action of [his] friend', General George Anson, the commander-in-chief of India. As the mail left India on 18 May, he felt sorry he could not inform the House that the insurgent headquarters at Delhi was already 'razed to the ground', but was confident that the next mail would certainly bring the news of its reduction.⁷ The popular press initially took a similarly confident view. *The Scotsman*,⁸ *Manchester Guardian*⁹ and *Illustrated London News*,¹⁰ among others, had no doubt that the 'mutiny' would be immediately suppressed, while *The Times* felt confident that the revolt at Meerut and Delhi was already crushed.¹¹

The determination of the government to represent the uprising as a military mutiny reflected both the political expediencies of the moment and wider British interpretations of their role in India. Many Britons were psychologically unprepared to admit that the revolt was a civil rebellion, as this would challenge the legitimacy, popularity and success of colonialism. The need to secure the renewal of its Charter at regular intervals throughout the early nineteenth century had led the East India Company (EIC) to cultivate an image of slow but steady progress in India, and many Britons had positive ideas about the beneficial nature of British rule. Utilitarians and Benthamites saw India as a *tabula rasa* for social improvement,¹² whilst evangelicals saw EIC control—though flawed by its secularism—as a divinely given opportunity to promote Christian light in a land that was awash in idolatry, inequity and 'Islamism'. Ideas of divine sanction and secular imperial destiny both relied on the assumption that Indians would willingly accept social and religious 'progress' and would ultimately be grateful for the benefits colonial rule bestowed. Government pronouncements, media descriptions and missionary assertions, combined with a lack of first hand knowledge of India,¹³ were enough to convince most Britons that their rule was a boon to their Indian subjects. Excepting the Muslim population, whose rule they had replaced, the majority of Indians were thought to be content with the British takeover of India. To admit that the uprising was a civil rebellion based on widespread disaffection would negate Britain's self-image as a benevolent ruler by demonstrating that the civilian population was resentful of colonial control. Ideologically, it was easier to dismiss the revolt as a military mutiny.

Before long, news of the uprising brought by the Indian mail spread throughout Britain. The first delivery alone brought more than 20,000 letters.¹⁴ These British 'correspondents' from India provided varied views of the events at Meerut and Delhi. Many letters provided ample evidence of civilian participation and of an astonishing degree of discipline and organisation within the rebel ranks.¹⁵ British failure to reduce Delhi promptly led to a greater acceptance of the situation's seriousness and to a virulent debate over the causes of and responsibility for the rebellion. The House of Commons, which earlier could hardly produce

a quorum on Indian issues, not only attracted a full house, but also began crisis sessions. Even the debates on the Persian War, the situation in China and the financial crisis at home tended to become debates on India.¹⁶ Similarly, the press took up the issue with enthusiasm, providing not only reports of events in India and coverage of Parliamentary debates on the issue, but editorials and opinion pieces espousing different interpretations of the uprising. Some emphasised military grievances; from the greased cartridges to the administration of the army, the ratio of Indian to British troops and the quality of the British officer class. Others blamed the Whig Party for its expansionist policies in India, or the administration of Lord Dalhousie for its controversial doctrine of annexation and lapse.¹⁷ Missionaries were accused of creating a religious panic by aggressively promoting Christianity without regard for Hindu and Muslim religious sensibilities, whilst evangelicals hit back by suggesting that the uprising was in fact an act of divine retribution for the EIC's support of 'idolatry' and failure to propagate the Gospel in India.¹⁸ The Anglicists were accused of privileging English language and culture, to the detriment of indigenous languages and cultures,¹⁹ and 'progressive' reforms that had once been lauded as British successes were presented as provoking social and religious paranoia in a reactionary Indian population. Many believed that the uprising was primarily a Muslim revolt, aimed at the restoration of their lost glory on the subcontinent²⁰ and embodying a clash of civilisations between Islam and Christianity.²¹ It was even suggested that it might be a carefully crafted Russian intrigue to find a warm water seaport via Afghanistan and north-west India on the Arabian Sea.²² The proponents of all these explanations were producing 'facts' as they saw them, gleaned from field accounts by civil and military officials in India, missionary correspondence with their home offices, letters to various newspapers, magazine articles, reports by business interest groups, diaries, pamphlets, and Parliamentary debates, but their interpretation of these 'facts' depended heavily on their social, political and ideological backgrounds.

The Whig government and its liberal allies largely championed the 'mutiny' interpretation of the uprising, focusing on the composition, disposition and administration of the native army. This position was upheld by: the party press; the independent, but (insofar as the mutiny was concerned) invariably pro-government newspaper, *The Times*; many EIC shareholders; its Courts of Proprietors and Directors; many civil servants and some ardent evangelicals like Lord Shaftesbury. It was not in the interest of any of these groups to describe the outbreak as a national rebellion caused by widespread discontent in India. The Whigs had been in government for long periods between 1830 and 1857 and had been deeply involved in the British imperial and foreign policy issues, especially in India where they had advocated both intervention in Indian social reform and the expansion of British territorial control. All the directives advocating the annexation of Awadh, for example, proceeded from Whig administrations. Earl Grey's administration suggested the occupation of Awadh in 1831, while

Viscount Melbourne's government gave the same instructions to Lord Auckland in 1835. When Lord Dalhousie finally annexed Awadh in 1856, it was during Palmerston's prime ministership. Indeed, Palmerston was the foreign secretary in the two aforementioned administrations, indicating the continuity in Whig policy. The liberal and independent press, such as *The Times*, *Manchester Guardian* and *Saturday Review*, had similarly supported a 'forward' policy in India, both in political and social terms. As suggestions emerged that the revolt was a reaction against the speed of Anglicisation and modernisation in India, these newspapers resisted acknowledging that it was caused by popular disaffection towards the British, fearing, perhaps, that the 'reforms' they themselves had advocated might be held responsible. Similarly, the EIC administration could not admit widespread civil disaffection in India, as would certainly raise questions about their own responsibility for the tumult.

Those ascribing to the 'mutiny' theory had to resist any suggestion that the revolt was actuated by political grievance or 'nationalist' sentiment. Consequently, they contended that India did not contain one nation, but rather 'a good score of native populations, far more distinct from each other in language, customs and religion than the nations of Europe'.²³ The *Saturday Review* regarded India as a mere 'geographical expression', an 'untempered assemblage of tribes, races, classes, and sects bound into a whole by obedience to some strong master', adding, 'Even if there were an India, there would be, we repeat, no people of India. The word is a foolish misnomer for a collection of stratified castes.'²⁴ 'From the Himalayas to Cape Comorin', argued a writer in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, 'the use of the term national is in India a mockery, a delusion and a snare'. India was not a nation, it was not even a confederacy of nations, and fusion among Indians did not exist, even at village level.²⁵ As Indians were not a nation, there was no question of 'national discontent' or a 'national insurrection'.²⁶ Indians were spiritually 'heathens', socially stratified and politically immature and incapable of unified action. Rev. Henry S. Polehampton, an Anglican priest at Lucknow, even suggested that it was Hindu-Muslim disunity of the acutest kind, combined with Shi'a-Sunni differences, that had originally enabled a small band of Britons to establish themselves as the rulers of the land.²⁷

Disregarding evidence of widespread civilian participation, those supporting the 'mutiny' interpretation focused their attention upon the native Indian army: its composition, ethnic and religious divisions and the harmful effects of the 'monopoly of caste' on military discipline.²⁸ The privileges and potential grievances of the sepoy were discussed in detail, as were their failings as a fighting force. Some argued that the sepoy had been unnecessarily pampered,²⁹ being coaxed and cajoled to duty by unmerited rewards,³⁰ and had divided loyalties between native rule and British authority. Moreover, it was argued, respect for British authority had been damaged by the policies of Lord Cumbermere, commander-in-chief of India,³¹ as well as by various other measures such as

Bentinck's abolition of corporeal punishment for native troops (it was retained for Europeans),³² permitting appeals against the decisions of European officers,³³ commissioning sepoys to spy on their officers³⁴ and giving court-martial authority to native officers.³⁵ Others listed the sepoys' supposed grievances. The disproportionately low wages of native soldiers vis-à-vis their European counterparts;³⁶ changed pension rules for disabled soldiers;³⁷ the erosion of the authority of native subahdars and jamadars by appointment of 'raw lads fresh from England' to fill military vacancies;³⁸ and the racist attitudes of these new recruits toward native soldiers, who they referred to as *soor* (pig), or 'nigger',³⁹ were all cited as potential causes for discontent, as were recent reforms such as the suspension of free mailing privileges⁴⁰ and the General Service Enlistment Act, which mandated foreign service for new recruits.⁴¹ For those prepared to delve a little deeper, structural problems in the army included a visible imbalance between the strength of Europeans soldiers stationed in India and the size of the native army, exacerbated by the withdrawal of European troops for service in the Crimea, Persia and China;⁴² the transfer of experienced army officers to meet acute shortages in the civil service;⁴³ and the 1854 Charter Act's centralising of power in the hands of the governor-general.⁴⁴ Moreover, growing sepoy fears for the integrity of caste and religion were exacerbated, it was argued, by the evangelical zeal of 'missionary Colonels and Padre Lieutenants'.⁴⁵ The greased cartridge issue was just the spark that set the whole ablaze. Blaming an army whose loyalty and superior service had received multiple plaudits from the British and which was the backbone of British rule in India was problematic, however, and this argument soon began to break down under the weight of its own internal inconsistencies and contradictions. Moreover, as the full scale of the uprising became apparent, it became harder to maintain that it was confined to the military and a few civilian malcontents.

A Civil Uprising

The 'civil uprising' interpretation of the revolt was accepted by a much wider segment of British society, including the Tories, led by Disraeli. Also supporting this interpretation was the party press; British military servants such as General Sir Robert William Gardiner; many missionaries, including Alexander Duff; journalists 'on the ground', most notably William Howard Russell of *The Times*; the Irish nationalists and their publication *The Nation*; the Chartists, led by Ernest Charles Jones; the Positivists, led by Richard Congreve; and various poets, philosophers and intellectuals, including Lord Byron. Most of those ascribing to this theory were critical of the government and EIC, although the nature of their critique of colonial rule varied. Some demonstrated considerable sympathy with the cause of the rebels. Having

visited Delhi and Bareilly in the 1830s, one George Canning, nephew of the former prime minister, observed:

There needs but some surpassing act of wrong
 To break the patience that has bent so long;
 There needs but some short sudden burst of ire
 May chance to get the general thought on fire;
 There needs but some fair prospect of relief
 Enough to seize the general belief,
 Some holy juggle, some absurd caprice
 To raise ONE COMMON STRUGGLE for release

Think not that prodigies must rule a state,
 That great revulsions spring from something great;
 Outbreaks at once the far resounding cry,
 The standard of revolt is raised on high;
 The murky cloud has glided from the sun
 The tale of English tyranny is done,
 And torturing vengeance grinds as she destroys,
 Till Sicil's vespers seem the game of boys.⁴⁶

More radical still was the poem *The Revolt of Hindostan* by Chartist leader Ernest Jones, which was published in 1857 to garner popular support for the Indian cause. This seemingly prophetic poem, originally titled *The New World*, was written while Jones was in prison in 1848–1850 and sympathised with the suffering of Indians under the barbarous rule of the British and forecasted a bloody revolt.⁴⁷

If the socialist Chartists felt solidarity with the oppressed masses of Hindustan and supported the uprising, others turned the revolt to party political ends, criticising Whig policies and EIC rule without challenging the fundamental legitimacy of British imperialism. The Tory leader Benjamin Disraeli epitomised this position. The Tory Party had long been concerned about India, attempting, when in government, to control the long-arm policies of the EIC and opposing territorial expansion. Their wars were usually followed by partial or full restoration of territories to the vanquished Indian rulers, a policy which both safeguarded a semblance of Indian authority and kept the princes interested in the continuance of British rule. The Tories believed that Whig encouragement of progressive, liberal reforms and unbridled territorial expansion was the root cause of Indian unrest. As if by premonition, more than five weeks before the news from India arrived, former governor general, Lord Ellenborough had warned the government about the deteriorating military situation there.⁴⁸ Three days later, on 21 May 1857, he wrote to the secretary of the war department, inquiring again about the Indian situation and the steps taken by the government.⁴⁹ Despite this, however, the Tories did not jump to conclusions, adopting instead a

'wait and see' attitude until, on 27 July 1857, exactly one month after news of the revolt arrived, Disraeli made his famous speech to the House of Commons, observing, 'The decline and fall of empires are not the affairs of greased cartridges. Such results are occasioned by adequate causes and the accumulation of adequate causes.'⁵⁰ Citing the street riots in Boston and Paris that had ushered in the two greatest revolutions of modern times, he remarked that significant events always started in an insignificant manner and that this might well be the case in India.⁵¹ It was essential, therefore, that they make realistic assessment of full scale of the revolt and face the challenge effectively.⁵²

Disraeli's speech quickened the pace of public debate. While many criticised it as unpatriotic, many more found in it food for thought, and it initiated a searching public exploration of what Disraeli called 'adequate causes'. All those reports, books, pamphlets, memoirs, observations and warnings that had earlier gone unnoticed were now carefully analysed and appraised. People like John Malcolm,⁵³ Sir Henry Russell,⁵⁴ Sir Charles Metcalfe,⁵⁵ Lord Ellenborough,⁵⁶ Sir Thomas Monroe,⁵⁷ Charles Napier,⁵⁸ Mountstuart Elphinstone,⁵⁹ Bishop Reginald Heber,⁶⁰ Sir Henry Lawrence,⁶¹ the Duke of Wellington⁶² and many other British Indian celebrities became frequently cited figures. The diagnosis reached was that it was more than an army mutiny, with the cartridge affair as its immediate cause. Various national, social, political, religious and territorial grievances were discussed and the sepoys even portrayed as pawns of the civilian rebels. Dr Edward Henry Nolan asserted that to call the outbreak a 'disturbance created by a pampered sepoy and some of the vagabond population of the cities' would be deliberate denial of evident realities.⁶³ Likewise, *Eclectic Review* called the greased cartridge a 'diagnosis of the disease and not the disease itself'.⁶⁴ Disraeli himself carried his convictions into office in February 1858, where, as chancellor of the exchequer and leader of the Commons in Lord Derby's administration, he passed the India Act transferring control of the subcontinent from the EIC to the Crown.

Proponents of the 'civil rebellion' interpretation had to explain Indian discontent without undermining Britain's supposed right to rule. Some, like the Chartists, did challenge the ultimate legitimacy of British imperialism in India, but most sidestepped this problem by criticising the specific failings of the EIC's administration. The EIC's rule in India has been called an anomaly of history; as rulers they were bad traders, and as traders they were bad sovereigns. It was hard for Indians to accept a small band of traders as rulers of India. Referring to the imperative necessity of the transfer of power to the Crown, the author of the 'Crisis of the Sepoy Rebellion' argued:

Fancy the efforts of a native to get an idea what the Company is! 'Is it a King?' 'No.' 'An army?' 'No.' 'A Religion?' 'No.' 'It is a sabe [sic].' 'Ah a society?' 'Yes.' 'Of Padres (i.e., parsons)?' 'No.' 'Of Kings?' 'No.' 'Of officers?' 'No.' 'Of Pundits (i.e., learned Doctors)?' 'No.' 'Of merchants!' 'Of merchants! Ah a society of Merchants! And does the society of merchants do the sirkar business

(the government) of England?' 'No, the Queen does that!' 'And Does the Queen do the sirkar business of Ceylon?' 'Yes.' 'Not the Company! And who is the highest, Queen or Company?'⁶⁵

This kind of confusion, it was argued, lowered British prestige in the eyes of the Indian princes,⁶⁶ while profits and dividends rather than the welfare of India motivated its merchant rulers.⁶⁷ Tory M.P. Henry Drummond, addressing the Committee on the Government of India on 7 June 1858, forcefully observed: 'If we are going to look upon India as we had looked upon it hitherto, as a mere place of plunder for English officials, we should surely lose it, and we deserve to lose it.'⁶⁸ The outbreak was ascribed to various economic, social, political, religious and administrative grievances. The 'de-Indianisation' of the services excluded educated Indians from many jobs and positions of authority and consequently, it was contended, widened the distance between rulers and ruled.⁶⁹ *Westminster Review* angrily observed that this exclusion of Indians never happened 'in the Mussulman kingdom of India. Under Mogul kings, Hindoos have frequently been prime ministers, and from every rank persons have risen into high office.'⁷⁰ Even Sir Benjamin Colin Brodie, a strong adherent of the 'mutiny' theory, agreed that this policy galled the feelings of both Hindus and Muslims.⁷¹ The liberalisation effected by the 1833 Charter Act was negated by the introduction of English as necessary for government employment, while the inclusion of exam questions in Greek and Latin, or on Christian theology, further damaged the job prospects of Indians. On this issue, Malcolm Lewin, Second Judge of the Sadar Court of Madras, angrily observed: 'Our rule has been that of the robber and the bandit and we are suffering from the natural result—insurrection.'⁷² The land revenue system of the EIC was also found to be oppressive and extortionist, including the use of torture and the forced sale of zamindars' property to collect assessments.⁷³ Henry Mead, an experienced British-Indian journalist, stressed that rebellion alone could wake the British people to the Indians' plight,⁷⁴ while Charles Napier, British 'hero' of Sind, called all aspects of British-Indian administration oppressive beyond belief.⁷⁵ The administration of justice was also criticised—'a little better than lottery' and a 'system of justice falsely so-called'.⁷⁶ Examples of fabricated cases,⁷⁷ the sacrifice of female honour for a favourable judgement and the abduction and seduction of women for the pleasure of British officers⁷⁸ were all reported. Rev. James Bradbury, an LMS missionary in Lower Bengal, dubbed the courts 'sinks of inequity', where justice was 'bought and sold like any marketable commodity'.⁷⁹ The system of taxation was equally unbearable—L.E. Ruutz Rees lamented: 'There was a duty on stamps, on petitions, on food, on houses, on éatables, on ferries. There was an opium contractor, a contractor for the supply of corn and provisions, a salt and spirit contractor....'⁸⁰—as was the new policy of 'land grab' by the British under various pretexts. Inquiries instituted into the titles of rent-free tenures ended in the confiscation of 'thousands of estates'.⁸¹ A writer in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* bemoaned: 'At last

resumption became a passion; hundreds of decisions in favor of government were passed in a single day; and the principle was broadly proclaimed, that the very existence of a rent-free tenure was a nuisance and ought to be abated.⁸² William Edwards, the Collector of Budaun, publicly warned the government on this issue but was considered an alarmist.⁸³ Asserting that 'vengeance sleeps long but never dies', Henry Drummond told the Commons that there were grounds for Indians to hate the British and enough causes for half a dozen rebellions.⁸⁴

In addition to economic and political grievances, the EIC was also criticised for its imposition of Anglicist reforms and its interference with social and religious practices. The abolition of female infanticide, prohibition of Sati, legalisation of widow remarriage, undermining of Hindu adoption, Religious Disabilities Act and ending of the Kali, Durga and Charkh Pujas were all represented as attacks on Hindu sentiment that created a sense of religious unease and quickened the pace of anti-British feeling. The Religious Disabilities Act, for example, led to separate memorials by the people of Madras and those of Bengal. Calling it an 'act of tyranny', the Madras memorial virulently attacked the government:

On their first arrival the British behaved kindly, securing to the natives of the Carnatic, by Proclamation under date of 31 July 1801, the immunity of their religion, laws and privileges: for this the Hindoos willingly engaged in the Military Service of the Honourable Company; and wherever the British Standard has been victorious in India, down to the last perilous engagement, on the banks of Sutlej, their Hindoo blood has freely flowed to secure the East India Company's dominion over their native land; because they have preferred it to Mohammedan; and now that the British government has become consolidated by the assistance of the Hindoos, the country is inundated with missionaries, who bring their creed in the one hand and the sword of persecution in the other—bidding the Hindoo to take their choice between conversion and extermination. British and Christian policy thus delineated, is far more oppressive and unjustifiable than that of the Mohammedans, for it adds ingratitude to partiality and injustice, and creates a belief that in weakness they are friends to the oppressed, and in power the perpetrators of oppression and wrong.⁸⁵

Concurrent with these 'liberal' reforms had developed what a Madras judge Malcolm Lewin called 'missionary mania' in the chief departments of the government.⁸⁶ Many high-ranking civil and military officers took an interest in missionary activity in India,⁸⁷ and even the courts of justice were reported to have shown partiality to Christian converts.⁸⁸ This supposed zeal to convert Indians became so worrying to the EIC, which had always had an ambivalent relationship with missionary activity,⁸⁹ that the Court of Directors issued a dispatch to Government of India forbidding such activities for government employees, an order that, V.A. Smith complained, failed to take hold.⁹⁰ Likewise, the Anglicisation of education, including missionary involvement in public schools and the withdrawal of government support from Hindu and Muslim

institutions, were viewed as a threat to Indian culture and Indian pride.⁹¹ *Fraser's Magazine* termed these policies, which were strongly resented by the people of India, a triple-edged sword against the British.⁹²

A further cause of unrest pinpointed by those who blamed EIC mismanagement was the controversial policy of Annexation and Lapse. The British annexation of various Hindu states, including Jhansi, and abolition of Nana Sahib's pension were thought to have alarmed the Hindus, while their occupation of Awadh struck at the Muslims. Such policies, it was argued, brought Hindus and Muslims together, giving them shared grievances, to the extent that their disaffection was said to have a national character.⁹³ Norton cited the angry harangue of a Satara conspirator from the gallows on 19 June 1857:

Listen all! As the English people hurled the Raja [of Satara] from his throne, in the like manner do you drive them out of the country. This is murder. I am illegally condemned.... This example is made to frighten you, but be not alarmed. Sons of Brahmins, Mahrattas and Mussulmen revolt. Sons of Christians look to yourself.⁹⁴

From the perspective of the 'civil uprising' theorists, there were sufficient problems in the British administration of India to account for discontent among all sections of the Indian population. These were, however, largely seen as the failings of the EIC and Whig governments and their policies, rather than intrinsic flaws in the whole system of British rule and must be understood in the context of a British discourse that sought to challenge the existing structure of British rule in India for party political reasons, rather than undermine the overall legitimacy of British imperialism.

A Muslim Conspiracy/Rebellion

As the revolt progressed, it engulfed large sections of the subcontinent. Parts of Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Awadh, Rohilkhand, North-western Provinces and Punjab⁹⁵ were all reported to be up in arms. Parts of the Bombay and Madras presidencies were also affected; Sawunt rebels along the Goa frontier remained in the field until November 1858 and were only suppressed with the active cooperation of Portuguese government in Goa.⁹⁶ In Hyderabad the situation was only saved by the individual loyalty of the prime minister, Salar Jang.⁹⁷ In short, although this was actually far from the case, the British increasingly thought of all India as in revolt against them. Many native officials, contractors and domestic servants of longstanding fled from their posts or joined the rebels,⁹⁸ and the fealty even of loyal princes was considered suspect, as many were accused of trying to keep all sides happy.⁹⁹ Men like Havelock and Hudson, among

others, often referred to India as 'a nation in arms',¹⁰⁰ 'a continent in arms'¹⁰¹ or complained that 'all India is up in arms against us'¹⁰² and 'every cottage has turned into a place of arms and defended by villagers with resolution'.¹⁰³ Scottish missionary Alexander Duff ruefully observed:

No sooner is one city taken or another relieved, then some other one is threatened. No sooner is one district pronounced safe through influx of British troops, than another is disturbed and convulsed. No sooner is a highway re-opened between places of importance, then it is closed again, and all communication for a season cut off.¹⁰⁴

If *The Press* complained of the inexhaustible number of rebels,¹⁰⁵ *Quarterly Review* lamented that 'like a field of corn stricken by the wind, the population bends as we pass but to rise again'.¹⁰⁶

The undeniable extent of the revolt bolstered the 'civil rebellion' argument, and many who had originally written it off as a military mutiny began to make exceptions to their case, undermining their overall position. The scale of events and apparent organisation of the mutineers seemed to go beyond a spontaneous outpouring of discontent and required a more structured explanation. As a result, arguments of civil unrest and military mutiny were increasingly coupled with discussions of pre-existing plans and conspiracies. Rumours of the impending revolt, it was now argued, had been afoot for some time. It was reported, for example, that in January–February 1857 General Hearsey had repeatedly written to the government that emissaries of Delhi and Awadh were corrupting the 19th Regiment.¹⁰⁷ 'We have at Barrackpore', he declared, 'been dwelling upon a mine ready for explosion'.¹⁰⁸ Concomitant with this, all kinds of devices had supposedly been employed to corrupt the civil and military populations. Chapattis had travelled from village to village, far and wide, for a whole year,¹⁰⁹ while several prophecies proclaiming the imminent end of the British rule were also abroad.¹¹⁰ All these portents were presented as indicating a premeditated plot for the overthrow of the British. The speed with which power was transferred to Bahadur Shah on 11 May 1857 was considered by some to be proof that he and King of Awadh, Wajid Ali Shah, had conspired to cause the rebellion.¹¹¹ Bahadur Shah issued coins, sent proclamations, wrote letters to various rulers requiring submission, attempted to bring Hindus and Muslims together, dated decrees in the Hindu calendar and forbade slaughter of cows on the Muslim festival of sacrifice, all of which were considered signs that he had embraced his renewed authority.¹¹² *The Times* Ambala correspondent was surprised at sepoy unity, organisation and loyalty to Bahadur Shah. He observed:

It is to be remarked throughout the rebellion that all mutinous troops within several hundred miles of Delhi seem to have made for that place as the center

and nucleus of the rebellion. They have established no local posts, indulged in none of the cares of districts on their own, but have marched to the point where a common stand was to be made against the common enemy—the Feringhee. Still more strange, they have generally not divided the plundered treasure, no man has been permitted to act for himself.... They have, almost all in the regular order, marched to Delhi with the treasure, as public treasure. Indeed, the quiet, orderly and peculiar character of the sepoy has been throughout the rebellion our greatest difficulty.¹¹³

Such organisation could only be the result of a calculated plot. Similarly, Nana Sahib's actions in quietly withdrawing from his government securities, until the amount dwindled from 500,000 pounds to just 30,000 pounds,¹¹⁴ were considered a sign of premeditation. All these leaders, it was believed, had tampered with the native regiments at different stations and Hindu–Muslim unity was quite noticeable. Nana Sahib was said to have declared for the King of Delhi, flew his flag, and issued his proclamation in the Muslim calendar. The *Morning Herald* ruefully observed: 'The Hindoos and Mohammedans have at last coalesced. The priests acted upon the minds both of soldiery and civilians, and the three classes animated by the fiercest hatred and foulest passions are leagued in opposition to our rule.'¹¹⁵ Hence, the *People's Paper* editorially described the revolt to be a 'national rebellion' with Delhi 'as capital of the patriotic power'.¹¹⁶

Although in the wake of Cawnpore, the British clearly recognised a Hindu dimension to the uprising,¹¹⁷ most assumed that it was primarily a Muslim rebellion intended to overthrow the British and restore Mughal authority. The Muslims of India, it was argued, had never accepted the British as their rulers. From Tipu Sultan onwards, British Indian history was marked by Muslim conspiracies and rebellions aimed at the eventual restoration of Mughal authority in India. Muslim involvement, it was argued, was apparent in the Vellore Mutiny of 1806.¹¹⁸ William Taylor, the chief commissioner of the Patna Division, stressed that the Patna conspiracy of 1846 was aimed at the restoration of the Muslim rule.¹¹⁹ A writer in *Westminster Review* referred to a plot to murder all Europeans in January 1857 and maintained that the royal houses of Awadh and Delhi were involved in it,¹²⁰ while *Dublin University Magazine* discussed Mawlawi Skandar Shah, who, with his followers, publicly preached a holy war against the British in Awadh on 17 February 1857.¹²¹ Similarly, Capt. G. Hutchinson pointed to the revolt of Mawlawi Ahmad 'Ullah Shah at Faizabad in January 1857. The Shah, of Arcot in the Madras Presidency, was said to have visited a 'vast number of cities and stations' under the British, established his disciples everywhere and preached jihad against the Europeans.¹²² Having already travelled to England to assess British power and plan his strategy, he led an 18-month campaign against the British, January 1857–June 1858, which included some notable successes and only

ended when he was betrayed by Raja Jagan Nath Singh of Powain, for a British prize of ₹50,000. Col. George Bruce Malleson paid him the following tribute:

If a patriot is a man who plots and fights for the independence, wrongfully destroyed, of his native country, then certainly the Maulvi was a true patriot. He had not stained his sword by assassination, he had connived at no murders; he had fought manfully, honourably, and stubbornly in the field against the strangers who had seized his country and his memory is entitled to the respect of the brave and true hearted of all nations.¹²³

In addition to active Muslim resistance, it was argued that from the dawn of the British rule, prayers had been going up in mosques all over India invoking Allah's mercies and help 'for the restoration of ancient Mahomettan princes ... and for the final expulsion of the stranger from the land'.¹²⁴ If this was so of public prayers, it was no less true of private ones and was said to have become the beat of the Muslim pulse, their hourly wish and permanent longing. *Missionary Magazine* thus reported the conclusions of Maj. Gen. W.H. Sleeman, late British Resident at Lucknow:

The Muslims in India sigh for the restoration of the old Mohamedan regime. 'We pray', said they, 'every night for the emperor and his family, because our forefathers ate the salt of their forefathers.' As a result of personal inquiry, I am enabled to state positively that for nearly the last hundred years daily prayers have been offered in the mosques throughout India for the House of Timur and the re-establishment of the King of Delhi on the throne of his ancestors—a fact probably, which at this moment is wholly unknown to the British rulers of this land.¹²⁵

Prophecies promising the end of the British rule and the restoration of Muslim ascendancy around the centenary of Plassey were said to have supplemented Muslim prayers and kept their minds in a state of excitement and expectation.

Unlike the Hindus, whose discontent was ascribed to immediate social and religious grievances, for Muslims the rebellion was deemed a national struggle, based on a consciousness of their history, faith and culture. Islam was considered an 'ambitious' and 'bloodthirsty' religion that bore an active religio-political hostility to Christianity.¹²⁶ Every Muslim, however much he might pretend otherwise, it was boldly asserted, was an enemy of Christianity whose antagonism was so ingrained that no amount of affection, kindness or benefit could change it. Even British/European converts to Islam, and Muslim women, demonstrated this 'nationalist' zeal. A number of converts fought against the British at Lucknow,¹²⁷ while H.H. Greathed, commissioner at Delhi, discussed an Indian 'Joan of Arc'; a Muslim lady who, dressed in male attire, led a sortie out of Delhi and fought like 'satan' until she was captured.¹²⁸ This widespread

hostility to British rule, combined with Muslim history in India, produced a combustible mixture. One year before the outbreak at Meerut, *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* quoted from the First Punjab Report: 'They [Muslims] look upon the empire as their heritage and consider themselves as foreigners settled in the land for the purpose of ruling it. They hate every dynasty except their own and regard the British as the worst because 'the most powerful of usurpers.'¹²⁹ At heart, the Muslims of India had always looked to the king of Delhi as their real sovereign.¹³⁰ Moreover, political hostility was bolstered by the longstanding religious antagonism between the 'crescent and the cross'. The Church Missionary Society argued that Muslims had chafed 'under the British dynasty, not merely on religious grounds, but also as conquered conquerors, whose rule has been immediately suppressed by Nazarenes from the west'.¹³¹ A writer in *Quarterly Review* pointed out that no 'Moslem people, before our conquest of India, were ever long subject to the Christian yoke, while their whole history is full of their triumphs over the sons of Nazareth'.¹³² This, it was argued, gave the Muslims a feeling of pride and the Muslims of India, who had long ruled over the subcontinent, could not be expected to willingly accept the yoke of an alien people. Their Indian past and its glories were too recent, and the glimmers of it were still alive.¹³³ This was viewed to be a dangerous phenomenon because it combined religious hatred and political pride¹³⁴ and resulted in either fanatical hatred of, or a sullen animosity towards, the British.¹³⁵ The Resident of North-western Provinces of India held that 'Muslim hostility to the conquerors of India is deadly. It is a fire always burning. Proud, vengeful, and fanatical, they look upon the British as a lawful prey, to be slaughtered and exterminated by every means that cunning and cruelty could devise,'¹³⁶ while the editor of the *Delhi Gazette* wrote in his 'Indian Mutiny to the Fall of Delhi':

Instead of being the dominant race, the friends and kinsmen of the mighty emperors of Hindustan, they found themselves reduced to the miserable alternative of engaging in trade and agriculture, or accepting subordinate situations in our law courts.... The unwonted humiliation rankled sorely in their hearts, but they felt their impotence and were constrained to abide their time.¹³⁷

Even the *Manchester Guardian*, a newspaper wedded to the 'mutiny' theory, editorially remarked: '[That] the Mohammedans should be ill disposed is natural enough. When the English first landed in India, they were the rulers of the country; they have been dispossessed, and they have not yet forgotten or forgiven.'¹³⁸ Ever brooding upon their political, social and economic losses, *Edinburgh Review* contended, it 'was a necessity that the descendants of Mahomedan conquerors of India should hate us, and that mingled with this hatred there should be an undying hope of recovering the supremacy they had lost'.¹³⁹

Muslim antipathy towards British rule was bolstered by their failure to 'make good' under the British colonial system. Their hostility to Christianity led them to boycott western education,¹⁴⁰ and the number of Muslim children attending British schools—public and missionary—was very small. Even native initiatives or the presence of a Muslim teacher associated with the British failed to achieve results.¹⁴¹ Referring to the new generation of Indian teachers and students educated in the western tradition, *Chambers' Journal* bitterly commented:

Not one Mussulman, not a single follower of the Prophet of Mecca is to be found in their ranks. Those stiff-necked, stubborn disciples of the Koran remain as they were a thousand years ago, and they will be found a thousand years hence. They never change or progress; they are neither softened or civilized; they have still the same undying hate for every 'dog of a Christian', for every 'unbelieving' Feringhee, as of old....¹⁴²

The lack of Western education among Muslims meant that Hindus supplanted them in most fields of employment, meaning they were unable to turn the colonial system to their advantage.¹⁴³ Muslim antipathy to Christian missionary activity was equally strong and missionaries seldom made any headway in Muslim districts.¹⁴⁴ Rev. John Mackay frankly admitted the difficulty 'of converting Muslims to Christianity'. Admitting the 'superiority' of their race, intelligence, valour, civilisation and knowledge of Christianity, but blaming them for their bigotry, this Baptist missionary complained of the challenges posed by Muslims to Christian evangelism.¹⁴⁵ *The London Journal and Weekly Record of Literature, Science and Arts* called it fruitless even to think of Christianisation of the subcontinent, unless 'Mohamedan passion for rule in India was tamed and broken'.¹⁴⁶ R.H.W. Dunlop, the deputy commissioner of Meerut, added that like a conquered nation, Muslims discussed the ways to achieve their independence; naturally, they were always 'engaged in plotting our destruction'.¹⁴⁷

As a result of the above-mentioned assumptions, Muslim submission to the British was viewed as perfunctory, whereas that of the Hindus was considered sincere. While Hindus had collaborated in the British rise to power, Muslims tendered their fealty because there was no other alternative and did so 'with a painful recollection of their fallen greatness and with the hope of restoration of their power'.¹⁴⁸ Such assumptions predated the uprising and, as E.I. Brodtkin points out, informed the tactics of British forces when dealing with 'loyal' Hindus and 'rebel' Muslims. While Alexander Padamsee has questioned the existence of a general Muslim conspiracy to overthrow the British,¹⁴⁹ field reports from all over India suggest that the rebellion was led by Muslims to a significant extent, whilst there is ample evidence that Muslims across India shared a common dislike of British rule. Thus, although it would be far-fetched to call 1857 a clash of civilisations, or part of a worldwide jihad (an idea discussed in some circles in 1857–1858, and which has been resurrected by some modern day writers¹⁵⁰),

British interpretations of the Muslim dimension of the revolt, together with their assessment of it as a civil as well as military uprising, reflected both political expediencies of the colonial state and the realities of the conflict as it unfolded in India.¹⁵¹

Notes and References

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8. 29 June and 1 July 1857.
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10. 4 July 1857.
11. 29 June, 4 July and 16 July 1857.
12. See Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).
13. Travel between Britain and India in the 1850s took three months, and the cost was prohibitive for the average Briton.
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15. 'Crisis in India' *Athenaeum*, 29 August 1857. See also *Annual Report of the Baptist Missionary Society*, 1858, (London: Haddan Brothers, 1858), p. 43; *Manchester Guardian* [MG], 31 October 1857.
16. Hansard 3, CXLVIII, 1360, 2097 and 2206, and CL, 1690.
17. *Free Press* [FP], 16 December 1857; Hansard 3, CXLVI, 525, CXLVII, 448–461, CXLVIII, 1482 and CLI, 339–340; 'Prospects of the Indian Empire', *Edinburgh Review* [ER], CVII (1858),

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 19. Henry Care Tucker, *A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Lord Stanley, M.P. Secretary of State for India* (London: W.H. Dalton, 1857), pp. 5–6; J.W. Kaye, *Christianity in India, An Historical Narrative* (London: Smith Elder, 1859), pp. 471–473; John Bruce Norton, *Rebellion in India. How to Prevent Another* (London: Richardson Bros, 1857), p. 199.
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 23. 'The Bengal Mutiny', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* [BEM], LXXXII (1857), p. 374; 'The Indian Mutinies: The Mutiny in Bombay', MG, 25 September 1857.
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 42. *Investigation*; Brodie, *English Tenure of India*, pp. 4–5; Wallace, *The Revolt in India*, pp. 17–18; Gubbins, *An Account of the Mutinies*, p. 99. Advocates of the mutiny theory and others almost universally held this view, but Disraeli and his followers refused to admit this as a cause of the outbreak, pointing to Meerut where there was no deficiency of European troops. Hansard 3, CXLVII, p. 495.
 43. *Examiner*, 3 October 1857. 1,215 officers were absent from their regiments. Of these, 416 were either on sick or private leave. For other similar views, also read: 'India, the Revolt and the Native Troops', *Missionary Magazine and Chronicle* [MMC] XXI (1857), p. 182; 'Article 4', MG, 29 September 1857; 'The English in India', WR, New Series, XIII (1858), p. 199; Maj. Tucker, 'The Indian Army', *Times*, 24 June 1857; *Spectator*, 25 July 1857; 'The Indian Mutiny', *Eclectic Review*, II, 1857; Hansard 3, CXLVI, 1591 and CXLVIII, 426; Leopold Von Olrich, *Military Mutiny in India; Its Origin and Its Results* (London: T and W. Boone, 1859), p. 8; Gubbins, *An Account of the Mutinies*, p. 97; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 24; *The Mutiny in the Bengal Army* (London: John Chapman, 1857), p. 18; 'The Sepoy Rebellion', *London Quarterly Review* [LQR] IX, (1857–1858), p. 233; Scrutator [Sir Benjamin C. Brodie], *The Indian Mutiny* (London: W. Kent and Co., 1857), pp. 25–26; Henry Mead, *The Sepoy Revolt* (London: John Murray, 1857), p. 29; J.L. Archer, *Indian Mutinies Accounted For* (London: Ward & Co., 1857), pp. 4–6.
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47. Ernest Jones, *The Revolt of Hindustan or the New World* (London: Effingham Wilson, 1857). Jones was so passionate about the plight of the Indians that he penned this poem in his blood, the facility of pen and ink being denied to him.
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49. Hansard 3, CXLVIII, 67. Later on the Tories criticised the government for not heeding Ellenborough's warnings, 42–43 and 570.
50. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 475.
51. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 440.
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53. Rev. Alexander Duff, *The Indian Rebellion: Its Causes and Results* (London: James Nisbet, 1858), p. 268; Hansard 3, CXLVI, 525; FP, 11 November 1857; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, pp. 85–86.
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61. Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 68. Sir Henry's own essays, written and contributed to various periodicals and magazines long before the outbreak, were also republished by W. N. Allen of London in 1859, under the title: *Essays: Military and Political*.
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63. Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, II, pp. 712–713.
64. 'The Indian Mutiny', *Eclectic Review*, New Series, IV, 1858, p. 338.
65. 'Crisis of the Sepoy Rebellion', LQR, IX, 1857–58, p. 567. For a similar view, see: George Dodd, *The History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expeditions to Persia, China and Japan, 1856–7–8* (London: W. and R. Chambers, 1859), p. 561. Cf.: Wilson Beekles, *The Ledger and the Sword or the Honourable Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies* (London: Longman's Green, 1903).
66. 'Crisis of the Sepoy Rebellion', LQR, IX, 1857–1858, p. 567.
67. Gardiner, *Military Analysis*, p. 65; *Investigation*, pp. 53–54; The Rev. Charles Stovel, *India: Its Crimes and Claims* (London: Jackson and Walford, 1857), p. 27; Hansard 3, CL, 1652; G.B. Malleon, *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army* (London: Bosworth and Harrison, 1858), pt. I, p. 29.
68. Hansard 3, CL, 1652.
69. 'British India', QR, CIV, 1858, p. 232. The article pointed out that while the average salary of an Englishman was 1,750 pounds a year, only six Indians received between 840 and 960 pounds a year, 1,370 received between 120 and 240 pounds a year, and 850 received less than 120 pounds a year. It should be further added that the sepoy, the mainstay of British rule in India, received only fourteen shillings a month.
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75. *The Press*, 22 August 1857.
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78. *The Press*, 22 August 1857; *The Tablet*, 22 August 1857.
79. *Investigation*, p. 32; Hansard 3, CL, 1652.
80. L.E. Ruutz Rees, 'Review of a Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow', *Athenaeum*, 6 March 1858.
81. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 458. See also FP, 3 March 1858; Thomas Frost, ed., *Complete Narrative of the Mutiny in India* (London: Read & Co., n.d.), p. 4. Disraeli regarded this 'disturbance of the settlement of property' as one among the three major causes of the outbreak, the other two being 'forcible destruction of native authority', and interference in the religion of the natives. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 448.
82. 'Indian Mutiny and the Land Settlement', BEM, LXXXIV, 1858, p. 704. See also William Edwards *Personal Adventures during the Indian Rebellion in Rochilcund, Futtehghur, and Oude* (London: Smith, Elder, 1859).
83. Edwards, *Personal Adventures*, p. 14; 'Indian Mutiny and the Land Settlement', BEM, LXXXIV, 1858, p. 707.
84. Hansard 3, CL, 1650–52. See also: Norton, *Rebellion in India*, pp. 6–7; 'Has the Preservation of Caste ... Negative Article III', *British Controversialist*, 1858, p. 126.
85. FP, 2 September 1857.
86. FP, 2 September 1857.
87. Lewin, *The Way to Lose India*, p. 18; see also Brodie, *English Tenure*, p. 8; FP, 3 March 1858; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 487 and CXLVIII, 1155–1156; Kaye, *Christianity in India*, p. 448; Rev. Baptist Wriothsley Noel, *England and India* (London: James Nisbet, 1859), p. 16. Noel had no hesitation in recognising the 'earnest and constant' help given by the officers in facilitating the task of the missionaries. Polehampton, a missionary at Delhi, happily wrote to his mother in August 1856 and informed her about the successful efforts of Dr Nai Smith of the 17th Native Infantry to convert his servants. (Polehampton, *A Memoir*, pp. 118–119). *The Press*, 11 July 1857, also criticised the administration of India, complaining that the Cannings had made their missionary zeal quite conspicuous, the members of the Indian Legislative Council presided at missionary meetings, and their daughters preached in the Bazars 'in defiance of oriental propriety'.
88. Lewin, *The Way to Lose India*, p. 16. See also: FP, 2 September 1857.
89. See Ian Copland, 'Christianity As An Arm Of Empire: The Ambiguous Case Of India Under The Company, c.-1813 –1858', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 49, no. 4 (2006), pp. 1025–1054.
90. Kaye, *Christianity in India*, p. 449n; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 487.
91. Tucker, *A Letter*, pp. 5–6; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 199.
92. 'The Indian Army', FM, LVI, 1857, p. 166. See also, Hansard 3, CXLVII, 823; Lewin, *The Way to Lose India*, p. 16; 'The Proselytising Danger in India', *The Scotsman*, 1 and 12 September 1857.

93. 'Has the Preservation of Caste...', loc. cit.; FP, 5 August 1857; *Morning Herald* quoted by the *People's Paper*, 26 September 1857; *Investigation*, pp. 2–4. See also 'The Sepoy Rebellion', LQR, IX, 1857–58, p. 255; Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History*, p. 256; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 444.
94. Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 97. Also see, Ludlow, *Thoughts*, pp. 28–29.
95. See Salahuddin Malik, 'The Punjab and the Indian Mutiny', *Journal of Indian History* (Silver Jubilee Number) and *Islamic Studies* and '1857 Gogira Rebellion in Southeastern Panjab: A Forgotten Chapter of Muslim Response to British Rule in India', *Islamic Studies*, vol. XVI, no. 2, (1977), pp. 65–95.
96. Sir G. Le G. Jacob, *Western India before and during the Mutinies* (London: King and Co., 1871), pp. 232–236. Jacob himself was sent to the Portuguese Governor-General, the Visconde de Novas Torres, at Goa to invoke the help of his government.
97. MG, 9 September 1857; *The Press*, 8 August 1857; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 288; SR, 19 December 1857; Olrich, *Military Mutiny*, pp. 26–27.
98. Edwards, *Personal Adventures*, p. 142; Malcolm Lewin, *The Way to Regain India*, pp. 9–10; Maj. Gen. Sir James Outram, *Outram's Campaign in India, 1857–58* (London: Smith, Elder, 1860), pp. 40–41; K.H. Bartrum, *A Widow's Reminiscences of the Siege of Lucknow* (London: James Nisbet, 1858) p. 22; 'The Defence of Lucknow – Martial Incidents in Oude', *Dublin University Magazine*, LI, 1858, pp. 488–89; Rev. M.A. Sherring, *The Indian Church During the Great Rebellion* (London: James Nisbet, 1859), p. 80; Rev. W.H. Carey, ed., *The Mahomedan Rebellion* (Roorkee: Directory Press, 1857) pp. 130–131.
99. Plain Speaker [John Henry Temple] *Justice for India. A Letter to Lord Palmerston* (London: Robert Hardwick, 1858), pp. 19–20; Hansard 3, LI, 1858, 508; Volunteer [Maj. Gen. W.G. Swanston] *My Journal; or What I Did and Saw between the 9th June and 25th November, 1857* (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1858), p. 12; Lieut.-Col. Sir Jas Travers, *The Evacuation of Indore in 1857* (London: Henry S. King, 1876), pp. 5–6; *Crisis in India*, pp. 24–27. The author of the *Crisis in India*, a military officer of thirty-two years' experience in India, reported how a Hindu Raja near Delhi played a three-fold game; he saved some European lives, kept some of them as hostages and 'secretly attended the installation of the Delhi usurper'.
100. Hodson, p. 181.
101. Hodson, p. 245.
102. Brock, *A Biographical Sketch*, pp. 190–191.
103. Plain Speaker [Temple], op. cit., p. 18.
104. Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 223.
105. 5 September 1857.
106. 'The British India', QR, CIV, 1858, p. 226. See also: *People's Paper*, 2 and 16 January, 10 April and 19 June 1858; Hansard 3, CLI, 2041.
107. Hansard 3, CXLVIII, 39.
108. Hansard 3, CXLVIII, 39. See also *Spectator*, 8 August 1857; Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History*, p. 558; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 1417.
109. Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, p. 712; Rev. A.C. Ainslie, *A Few Words about India and the Indian Mutinies* (3rd. ed.; Tauton: Frederick May, 1857), pp. 12–13; 'The Poorbeah Mutiny', BEM, LXXXIII, 1858, p. 96; *Annual Register*, 1857, p. 245; ILN, 28 November 1857; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 467–71; 'Pancakes', *Notes and Querries*, Second Series, IV, 1857, p. 161; 'The Indian Mutinies', FM, LVI, 1857, p. 238; 'Lotus Leaves and Pancakes. The Indian Mystery', *Leisure Hour*, 14 January 1858; 'Sepoy Symbols of Mutiny', *Household Words*, XVI, 1857, p. 231. Sir Colin Campbell called these signs 'the first appearance of the Mutiny', displaying them as a frontispiece in his book *Narrative of the Indian Revolt* (London: Geog. Vickers, 1858).
110. Brock, *A Biographical Sketch*, p. 130; Capt. Mowbray Thomson, *The Story of Cawnpore* (London: Richard Bentley, 1859), p. 124; The Rev. J.E.W. Rotton, *The Chaplain's Narrative of the Siege of Delhi* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1858) The Rev. James Charles, *The Lord's*

- Voice to Britain from the Far East* (Edinburgh: Paton and Ritche, 1857), p. 8; Rev. J.C. Miller, 'The Fast-Day Sermons No. VI', *The Fast-Day Sermons. The Indian Mutiny Twelve Sermons*, p. 81; Rev. W.J. Newman, 'Our Mercies in the Past and Our Prospects for the Future', *The Pulpit*, LXXV, 1859, p. 441; *The Indian Mutiny Thoughts and Facts* (London: Seeley, Jackson and Halliday, 1857), pp. 5–6; Col. George Bouchier, *Eight Months Campaign against the Bengal Sepoys during the Mutiny* (London: Smith, Elder, 1858), pp. 1–2.
111. Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, II, p. 722. See also 'Our Relations to the Princes of India', WR, New Series, XIII, 1858, pp. 468–469; 'The Poorbeah Mutiny', BEM, LXXXIII, 1858, p. 94; 'The Indian Mutinies', FM, LVI, 1857, p. 628; Brock, *A Biographical Sketch*, pp. 131–132.
 112. *People's Paper*, 1 August 1857; *Annual Register*, 1857, p. 305n; 'The Poorbeah Mutiny, No. III', BEM, LXXXIII, 1858, pp. 600–602; Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, p. 740 and p. 757; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 47; SR, 7 November 1857; Rees, 'Review of a Personal Narrative' pp. 261–262; MG, 31 October 1857.
 113. MG, 31 October 1857; 'Crisis in India: Its Causes and Proposed Remedies', *Athenaeum*, 29 August 1857; *Sixty-sixth Annual Report of the Baptist Missionary Society*, p. 43.
 114. William Howard Russell, *My Diary in India* (London: Routledge, Warne and Co., 1860), p. 168; Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, p. 726; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 53.
 115. *Morning Herald* quoted in the *People's Paper*, 26 September 1857; Rotton, *The Chaplain's Narrative*, pp. 100–102; Brock, *A Biographical Sketch*, p. 129; 'Glance at Public Occurrences', *Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine*, Fifth Series, III, 1857, p. 929; *England's Troubles in India* (Tauton: T. Hiscock, 1857), p. 31.
 116. 3 October, 1857.
 117. See Randall, 'Autumn 1857', p. 9.
 118. Mackenzie, 'Review of Delhi, the City of the Great Mogul', *Literary Gazette and Journal of Archeology, Science and Arts*, pp. 804–805; Indophilus [Trevelyan, Sir Charles Edward] *The Letters of Indophilus on the Mutiny of Vellore* (Calcutta: Sanders, Cones and Co. 1857), pp. 4–7.
 119. William Taylor, *The Patna Crisis* (London: W.H. Allen, 1857), pp. 21–22.
 120. 'The English in India', WR, New Series, XIII, 1858, p. 196.
 121. 'The Revolt of the Bengal Army', *Dublin University Magazine*, L, 1857, p. 392.
 122. Capt. G. Hutchinson, *Narrative of the Mutinies in Oude* (London: Smith Elder, 1859), pp. 35–36. See also MG, 15 April 1857; M. Wylie, *The English Captives in Oudh* (London: W.H. Dalton, 1858), pp. 30–31.
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 126. 'India in 1807 and 1857', CEM, XLIV, 1858, p. 151; *What Shall We do to the Mussulmans* (Calcutta: Sanders, Cones and Co., 1858), p. 3; Dr A. Christian, Letter to *The Scotsman*, 2 September, 1857; 'The Crisis in India', *The Scotsman*, 9 September 1857; 'The Sane and the Insane', Letter to the FP, 21 October 1857; *The Examiner*, 8 August 1857; 'The Revolt of the Bengal Army', *Dublin University Magazine*, L, 1857, pp. 385–386.
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130. Rev. William Beynon (letter from), MM, XXI, 1857, p. 245.
131. *Religious Neutrality in India—Delusive and Impracticable* (Church Missionary Society, 1858), p. 16. See also: 'India in 1807 and 1857', CEM, XLIV, 1858.
132. 'Our Indian Empire', QR, CIII, 1858, p. 257.
133. Beynon, MM, XXI, 1857, p. 245; Brodie, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 19; Russell, *My Diary in India* II, pp. 77–78; 'The Christianization of India', LJWRLSA, XXVI, 1857, p. 109; 'India in 1807 and 1857', CEM, XLIV, 1858; *Walayat Ali of Delhi. A Martyr's Narrative of the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857* (London: T. Pewtress and Co., 1858), p. 8; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, pp. 176–177; R.C. Mather, *Christian Missions in India* (London: John Snow, 1858), p. 6.
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137. *Indian Mutinies to the Fall of Delhi* (London: G. Routledge and Co., 1857), p. 7. See also Brodie *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 19; 'India in 1807 and 1857', CEM, XLIV, 1858.
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144. Russell, *My Diary in India*, II, p. 78; John Mackay (letter from), MH, XLIX, 1857, p. 583; Culross, *The Missionary Martyr*, p. 121; Sherring, *The Indian Church*, p. 266; Mather, *Christian Missions*, p. 6; Beynon, MM, XXI, 1857.
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146. 'The Christianization of India', XXVI, 1857, p. 109.
147. Dunlop, *Service and Adventure*, p. 152. See also, *India and its Future* (London: L. Booth, 1858), p. 47; *The Indian Mutiny – Thoughts and Facts* (London: Seeley, Jackson, and Halliday, 1857), p. 20; Mackenzie, 'Review of Delhi, the City of the Great Mogul', *Literary Gazette and Journal of Archeology, Science and Arts*, 1857, pp. 804–805; Frederick H. Cooper, *The Crisis in the Punjab from 10th of May until the Fall of Delhi* (London: E. Wilson, 1858), pp. 133–134; Rev. J. Trafford (letter from), MH, XLIX, 1857, p. 514 and also 'Foreign Intelligence – India', p. 649 and p. 717;

- Rev. Dr Boaz (letter from), MMC XXI, 1857, p. 222; *Investigation*, pp. 7–8; *India. The Revolt and the Home Government*, pp. 80–81.
148. Wallace, *The Revolt in India*, p. 9.
149. Alex Padamsee, *Representations of Indian Muslims in British Colonial Discourse* (Hampshire, 2005), p. 49.
150. See, for example, William Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi, 1857* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), and also recent documentary on the BBC entitled 'Clash of the Worlds' which propounded the same view.
151. See Salahuddin Malik, *1857. War of Independence or Clash of Civilizations?* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2008, Chapters 7, 8 and 9).