



SIR GEORGE GREY AND THE INDIAN REBELLION

The Unmaking and Making of an Imperial Career*

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THROUGHOUT his professional life, Sir George Grey's livelihood was interwoven with the British Empire. He served with the eighty-third Infantry Regiment in Ireland, led two exploratory expeditions to Western Australia, acted as colonial governor in New Zealand and the Cape Colony, and enjoyed a career in New Zealand politics. His actions during the 1857 Indian Rebellion, however, generated the most lasting discussion and public debate. As governor of the Cape Colony and high commissioner of South Africa in 1857, Grey contributed regiments, horses and artillery to British efforts in India. Additionally, he reportedly redirected troops bound for China and mobilised volunteers from the German Legion stationed in South Africa to fight in India—all without waiting for the consent of officials in London. He has been both highly praised and heavily criticised for his actions. From his first dispatch during the revolt until well after his death in 1898, Grey's contemporaries sought to understand and explain his role in the suppression of the uprising.

Grey's decisions have continued to spark similar discussion among historians. As Leigh Dale has recently noted, 'Grey's reputation – and debates about it – span the English speaking world.'¹ Much of the scholarship examining Grey's response to the Indian Rebellion has judged his actions, either favourably or critically, in an effort to understand them. In 1961, J. Rutherford argued that Grey, when left to his own discretion, acted admirably and offered considerable assistance to the British in India. However, the eventual intervention of London officials put Grey on the defensive. As a result, according to Rutherford, when orders from London did not suit Grey's own ambitions, he was much less cooperative and did

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not hesitate to be purposefully misleading in his communication with imperial administrators.² In a critique of Rutherford's work, Donovan Williams argued that the inconsistencies in Grey's actions stemmed from the difficulty of facing a tight situation in the colonies, while also attempting to follow distant orders from London. Given the circumstances, Williams asserted, Grey's mistakes were excusable, and his 'eagerness to help India and protect the Cape Colony' was motivated by a genuine loyalty to the Empire that deserves 'more prominence than it has received in the annals of the British Empire'.³

Both studies recognise Grey's role in the suppression of the rebellion, and highlight the ways that nineteenth century methods of communication could complicate imperial control. Their reliance on official documents, however, leaves the impression that Grey's actions were of interest to colonial officials only.⁴ Even Williams, who explores the influence of the Indian 'Mutiny' on the Cape Colony, examines Grey's efforts to contribute troops and horses to India without exploring the impact of these contributions on the Cape settlers. In Part II of his article, Williams argues that the uprising shaped notions of 'black consciousness'.⁵ His dependence on official sources, however, raises the question whether it was 'black consciousness' that the Indian Mutiny influenced, or simply British fears of native cohesion. This article argues that Grey's response to the Indian revolt generated interest both inside and outside official circles, raising lasting questions of appropriate methods of imperial governance.

In recent years, scholars of imperial history have encouraged a 'networked' conception of the nineteenth century British Empire, emphasising the colonial connections that linked the disparate colonies to England and to each other.⁶ This article draws upon that literature, incorporating newspapers to examine reactions to the uprising and to Grey's response as they surfaced in London, South Africa and New Zealand. This is not to suggest that official documents should be cast aside. Rather, widening the lens allows us to move away from questioning whether Grey was 'an ambitious self-seeker' or 'a genuine humanitarian'⁷ and to examine the ways in which the role of mid-nineteenth century colonial governors was perceived in times of imperial crisis. As self government became an increasingly popular idea, imperial administrators and settlers alike questioned the best methods to unify and administer the various components of the British Empire. The 1857 Indian Rebellion highlighted the importance of these questions, providing an opportunity for the Cape Colony both to support the greater empire and to improve its own economic position. The uprising did not simply expose the need to revisit and reform British rule in India, but, as an event that required empire-wide assistance to suppress, it also generated empire-wide discussion regarding methods of imperial governance.

The Cape Colony and the 1857 Indian Rebellion

When the sepoys of the eleventh native cavalry mutinied the night of 10 May 1857, news of the rebellion traveled quickly by mid-nineteenth century standards. In addition to following more traditional press routes (being reported to London first and then disseminated throughout the empire), news of the uprising also spread along communication lines connecting the disparate colonies. Within weeks of the rebellion's outbreak, the governor of Bombay sent a dispatch directly to the governor of the Cape Colony, requesting an urgent transfer of regiments.⁸ As a result, reports of the rebellion reached the Cape in an unprecedented twenty-six days, arriving nearly three weeks before the London intelligence.⁹ Thus from the start colonial connections shaped the impact of the Indian revolt on the Cape Colony and ensured that South Africa would be affected with or without mediation from London.

Residents of the Cape Colony immediately recognised their association with India, commenting that 'the Indian connection of so many years duration has linked many a Cape family with the distant East'.¹⁰ By the time the first news from London reached the Cape on 26 August, the names of friends and relatives had begun to appear on the lists of missing and killed arriving from India, and the Cape Colony was consumed by 'consternation'. According to the *Cape Argus*, it was these familial connections that initially alarmed the Cape colonists and 'enlist[ed] their sympathies on the part of our suffering fellow-countrymen'.¹¹ In response, the colonists immediately rallied behind the British cause in India.

The colony's governor, Sir George Grey, seemingly wasted little time in providing the requested assistance. Without waiting for instructions from London, Grey immediately deployed the eighty-ninth garrison and members of the Royal Artillery, and also diverted troops *en route* to China to meet the growing disaster in India. Further, he initiated plans to contribute additional troops as soon as possible.¹² Initially, Grey's actions received widespread support and encouragement throughout the colony. The *Cape Argus* urged the governor to send regiments immediately, reminding its readers 'in such cases time is everything'.¹³ The *Grahamstown Journal* reported that, given the current peace existing in the Cape Colony, no troops that could possibly be sent to India 'would be detained here by a single colonist'.¹⁴ Further, should indigenous threats surface at the Cape, the colonists 'most nobly offered' to perform their own garrison duty, in order to spare all imperial troops for service in India.¹⁵

The denuding of troops from South Africa wrought more difficulties than reduced security; it also ensured a personal connection between those fighting in India and those left at home at the Cape. As a result, in addition to military support, the Cape colonists also contributed funds to assist those touched by the violence in India. In an opening address delivered at a public meeting to organise relief efforts, Grey recognised that the rebellion had placed the families

of soldiers in the 'utmost unfortunate circumstances'. Many regiments, rather than going home, were rushed off to India, leaving their wives and families 'scattered all over the face of the earth'.¹⁶ Furthermore, Grey noted, many of these men would not return, '[f]or the loss of life amongst our soldiery in India will necessarily be very great'.¹⁷ While precedent existed for the families of soldiers to receive relief while their loved ones were away fighting, no system was in place to assist the family should the soldier be killed in action. Given the large number of troops originating in South Africa, and the grave situation in India, Cape Colony officials proposed establishing a relief fund for widows and orphans with the hopes that 'the claims of this class of sufferers, here and elsewhere, will attract the notice of the charitable and humane throughout the empire'.¹⁸ The meeting proved to be a success. The following day, the governor forwarded £1,000 to the Government of India, reporting, 'this Colony is not a very wealthy one, but such is the horror felt for the crimes the Mutineers committed, and such the admiration of the greatness of conduct which our countrymen have shown, that the deepest sympathy has been excited here.' He promised that the £1,000 was simply a 'first installment' and the colony hoped to contribute more soon.¹⁹

Despite the seemingly generous Cape donations to the Indian Sufferers Relief Fund, assistance did not always stretch to the far reaches of the empire. In January 1858, when reporting the deaths of members of the Royal Artillery, the *Cape Argus* assumed that the soldiers' wives, who lived at the Cape, would receive compensation. According to the newspaper, the widows' 'claims on the Fund are certainly as good as any of those who have suffered in India; and the application of the money to this object cannot but be regarded as perfectly legitimate'.²⁰ Weeks later, when relief still had not been provided, the Cape colonists formed a subcommittee to inquire into the matter. Local relief fund members announced the decision 'to forego sending any more money to Calcutta till it be seen whether any portion of the funds should be required by widows and orphans in this city'.²¹ Withholding donations proved to be effective, and, by March, the *Cape Argus* reported that the widows had begun to receive weekly assistance from the Fund.²²

In the meantime, however, other frustrations had materialised. As the rebellion crept on, Cape officials had received orders from the War Office to discontinue assistance to the families of soldiers still alive and fighting in India. In response, many of the absent soldiers had forwarded money home to their families. To the annoyance of the *Cape Argus* (and, most likely, the intended recipients), 'circumlocution' required that the money be sent to England first, 'to pass through the hands of the officials of the War-office' before being returned to the Cape and distributed to the 'rightful owners'.²³ Not only did such a show of bureaucracy slow the distribution of much-needed relief, but it also provided a reminder of the central role that London officials continued to play in the

administration of the empire. Grey had managed to provide assistance to India without first consulting the Colonial Office; it was the immediate nature of the crisis, however, that made his actions acceptable. Assistance did not always flow seamlessly from one colony to the next.

According to Grey, it was a desire to strengthen these colonial connections and unify the larger empire that had motivated him to assist India in the first place. Describing the empire as 'a great body corporate', Grey explained to the Colonial Office that in moments of imperial crisis, all parts of the empire needed, 'without communicating with the center', to 'simultaneously stir themselves to meet the emergency'. Such a response would generate 'a common pride in the greatness of the Empire,' which could only 'increase its strength, unity, and stability'.²⁴ According to W.P. Morrell, Grey's explanation implied a rejection of the idea that a centralised bureaucracy was necessary to administer the empire.²⁵ More recently, however, Zoë Laidlaw has argued that the information revolution of the late 1830s and early 1840s resulted in a conception of the British empire as a unified entity that could be 'governed (at least theoretically) as a whole'.²⁶ This notion of an empire with a potentially unified method of governance was comforting to metropolitan authorities in the age of increasing self-government in the settler colonies. Maintaining control over statistical information permitted London officials to retain a sense of 'imperial influence, if not imperial power'.²⁷ Grey, thus, may have been tapping into this insecurity to generate metropolitan support for his governorship, reassuring London officials that his autonomous actions had not been an attempt to supersede their authority. He had simply acted with the empire's best interests at heart.

The year 1857 provided an opportunity not only to unify the empire, but also to strengthen the individual colonies. In particular, India's desperate need for horse remounts promised to stimulate economic development at the Cape. The Cape Colony had procured horses for India in the past. The practice had been rare, however, and the number of horses limited.²⁸ No system existed to furnish cavalry and artillery horses annually or in large numbers. While Grey set to work addressing India's immediate need for horses, colonial officials also began to discuss the long-term economic prospects of encouraging horse breeding at the Cape. The head of the Remount Agency, Colonel Apperley wrote a letter outlining the demand for horses in India, which was translated into Dutch and 'circulated throughout the country, both by the Government and the Cape of Good Hope Agricultural Society'.²⁹ In December 1857, the auditor-general, Major Hope, drafted a memorandum on the subject. According to Hope, 'the great question now is, both for the interests of this colony and of the Indian Government, can the Cape supply a sufficient number of horses annually, and will it be for the interest of the Indian Government to obtain this supply?'³⁰ Hope answered his own questions affirmatively, asserting that not only could the Cape provide an increasing number of horses each year, but also they could do so at

a decreasing cost. Further, he argued that the Cape's resources were crucial to British success in India, now and in the future:

The Cape may be regarded as the connecting point between England and India, and the turning of the tide in the affairs of India. If in this crisis proper advantages are taken of the position of the Cape, as a *depôt* for troops, as a source from which to draw horses, and other supplies, India may be vastly benefited, ... as well as calling out the resources of this colony, to the advantage of both countries and governments.³¹

Grey forwarded Hope's memorandum to London officials, and the pamphlet was also the subject of a lead article in the *Cape Argus* in January 1858. The Indian Mutiny was the Cape's moment to shine. The violence provided the colony with an opportunity to play an integral role in protecting the empire. And, in doing so, the colony could mobilise and encourage the development of its own economic resources.

The matter of horse remounts for India became a widely discussed topic in the colony and the subject of two blue books, both published in 1858. Following the publication of the blue books, the subject was also taken up in a series of articles printed in the *Cape Monthly Magazine*.³² In particular, in September 1858, T.B. Bayley published an article entitled 'Cape Horses for Indian Remounts'. Similar to Major Hope, Bayley enthusiastically supported horse breeding in the Cape in order to meet the Indian demand. Bayley encouraged the Cape colonists to look beyond the current crisis in India and to plan for long-term economic development. He argued that the opportunity could extend 'far beyond the mere amount of money' generated by the sale of horses to create a demand for 'forage' and stimulate further agricultural production. The development of horse breeding offered lasting economic potential for the Cape Colony. With this in mind, Bayley asserted that, rather than simply taking advantage of the inflated prices stemming from the crisis in India, the Cape's horse breeders needed to request fair prices and focus on developing a regular and lasting market.³³ The long-term potential of horse breeding aside, Grey scrambled to meet the short-term demand and managed to ship 4,014 horses to India within two months of hearing of the rebellion.³⁴ When horses were not available, Grey sent 100 draft mules as an 'experiment', commenting that the animals would 'be found very valuable as Teams for the Artillery ammunition wagons'.³⁵

Grey's prompt contribution of regiments and remounts was a source of pride in the Cape Colony, and drew attention throughout the empire. In London, the *Times* ran a lead article praising the response of various colonies to the uprising in India. In particular, the article emphasised that 'it is at the Cape ... as might be expected from the magnitude and resources of the colony, that the zeal and energy of the Governor and people have been most signally expressed'.³⁶ Similarly, newspapers in New Zealand, where Grey had formerly served as

governor, kept tabs on the activities of the colonial administrator. In April 1858, the *Taranaki Herald* commented on the prompt response of the Cape colonists, reporting that, 'When it was known that assistance was required in India, every soldier in the western districts of the Cape was ready for 'marching orders' within 24 hours.'³⁷ According to the newspaper, the event filled Grey with pride in his colony, reminding him of the worth of his appointment—'a thing which he had before very often doubted'.³⁸

According to both the *Times* and the *Taranaki Herald*, the Cape colonists' support exemplified the magnitude of the emergency in India, as previous efforts to exercise imperial policy at the Cape had fallen short. Only a decade earlier, when the colonial secretary, the third Earl Grey, had proposed that the Cape Colony be used as a penal settlement, he was met with strong opposition. Forming an Anti-Convict Association, Cape colonists had pressured then governor, Sir Harry Smith, into refusing to allow the convict ship, the *Neptune*, to land and had later organised a boycott to block the supply of provisions to the ship once it had anchored off the coast. The event had demonstrated the ability of the colonists to organise and act as an effective pressure group, and the lesson was not forgotten by officials. According to the *Taranaki Herald*, in 1858, the same 'energies' that once had been used 'during the memorable and never-to-be-forgotten "stand" against Lord Grey's plot' to introduce British prisoners to the colony were now being directed toward assisting India.³⁹ Similarly, the *Times* also recognised the ability of the colonists to support or obstruct official policies, noting that the 'ranklings' heard earlier against the Home government had 'utterly vanished before the demands of this painful conjuncture'.⁴⁰

Critiques of Sir George Grey

While events in India provided Grey with an opportunity to increase his popularity, support for the governor was not offered unconditionally or without question. Many of Grey's suggestions in the wake of the uprising failed to come to any fruition. He considered transporting sepoys and their families to South Africa to take the place of British regiments, offered to organise the 'Fingos, Hottentots, and Kafirs' for service in India, and discussed the possibility that the King of Delhi be exiled to the Cape.⁴¹ Those plans that were adopted often raised questions as to whether Grey had the Empire's interests at heart, the Cape Colony's interests at heart, or simply his own ambitions for power at heart. Grey's response to the violence in India became so interwoven with his efforts in South Africa that the 1857 Indian Rebellion became a means to debate his governorship at the Cape. In particular, Grey's 'native' policy drew significant attention, positive and negative, in London and the colonies.

Throughout the 1850s, Sir George Grey and the Cape colonists had experienced strained relations with the indigenous people of southern Africa.⁴² Just months before Grey received word of the uprising in India, the Xhosa had suffered a famine following the widespread slaughter of their cattle.⁴³ The 'cattle-killing' tragedy of 1856–1857 occurred when a young girl, Nongqawuse, prophesied that the Xhosa should kill their cattle and destroy their crops in preparation for an ancestral resurrection. According to British interviews with Nongqawuse, the risen ancestors had promised her that, should their requests be followed, more Xhosa ancestors would appear to provide food and to 'drive the English out of the country'.⁴⁴ The Xhosa adhered to Nongqawuse's prophesy and the outcome was widespread starvation.⁴⁵

The history of the cattle-killing has been explained as part of a Xhosa conspiracy to initiate war with the Cape Colony, the result of 'a trick by Sir George Grey to deceive the Xhosa into destroying themselves' and a millenarian movement driven by economic and political pressures.⁴⁶ Regardless of what sparked the disturbing events, for many colonists the cattle-killing and the Indian Rebellion, together, demonstrated the unreliable nature of colonised peoples and the need to tighten methods of imperial control. For Grey, the two events facilitated the implementation of his frontier policy. Since his arrival to the Cape Colony in 1854, he had sought to 'civilise' the Xhosa by integrating settlers and natives on the frontier, thus introducing the Africans to British cultural and political norms.⁴⁷ The cattle-killing allowed him to continue to advocate integration, while also introducing methods of direct rule. Following the tragedy, the Xhosa were moved onto sites selected by special magistrates, consolidated into villages 'not exceeding 200 huts' and required to pay taxes.⁴⁸

As the Xhosa were being relocated, rumours that the Africans had received word of the rebellion in India and were planning a similar uprising flooded the Cape Colony.⁴⁹ In response, Grey held the Gcaleka Xhosa chief, Sarhili, responsible.⁵⁰ He accused Sarhili of using Nongqawuse's prophesy as a political tool to unite the Xhosa chiefs, before spreading stories of the Indian Uprising to incite rebellion.⁵¹ Further, Grey argued that Sarhili's strength needed to be destroyed to protect the larger empire, commenting, 'I cannot aid India, as I ought to do, if such a thorn is left in my side here, I am therefore, going to settle the thing, once for all.'⁵² He directed the Frontier Police, under the leadership of Walter Currie, to drive Sarhili and his people from British Kaffraria, and seized the territory for British settlement.⁵³ The 1856–1857 cattle-killing provided the opportunity to bring the Xhosa and their land under British control; the 1857–1858 Indian Rebellion provided the justification.

Just as Grey used the 1857 Indian Uprising to validate his policies, others pointed to the violence in India to criticise the governor's actions. Not everyone was convinced by the magnitude of the threat in Kaffraria, or the sincerity of Grey's response to the crisis in India. Rather, some accused the governor of

exaggerating the problems in the Cape Colony to avoid sending troops to India. In a letter to the editor, published on 26 August 1857, C.B. Adderley admonished the *Times* for understating the importance that the Cape Colony provided troops for India. As an MP for Staffordshire North, Adderley had a longstanding interest in colonial affairs. He frequently advocated colonial self-government as a means to unify the larger empire, and encouraged all parts of the empire to provide assistance in times of imperial crisis.⁵⁴ In 1857, Adderley argued that the Cape Colony had plenty of soldiers to spare and reminded readers that, in addition to British regiments, German settlers had been encouraged to immigrate to the region and were being employed as soldiers in southern Africa, at the expense of British taxpayers. Further, he asserted that there was no need for any troops to be kept at the colony, the mere possibility of a 'Caffre' war being 'absurd'.⁵⁵

The *Times* followed up with a lead article criticising Grey's use of troops in the Cape Colony. According to the newspaper, troops were maintained in the colony not for protection, but to encourage economic prosperity.

The produce of the Cape, consisting of hides, of good wool, and of bad wine, may serve to pay for hardware and cotton goods which are required for consumption; but the most profitable import consists in remittances for the service of the army.... Wherever an English force is stationed all markets rise, and it is not unlikely that even Cape Madeira may find a ready sale among the soldiers.⁵⁶

The presence of troops in the colony allowed the Cape to draw funds from the imperial treasury and guaranteed a ready supply of consumers for Cape products. They were not needed for defence. As a result, the article encouraged London officials to draw regiments from the Cape for assistance in India. The newspaper also warned that 'no unnecessary discretion ought to be vested in Colonial Governors, who may exaggerate their own local wants' and fail to provide the resources and troops necessary for the imperial crisis.⁵⁷

Imperial administrators were not alone in their frustrations with Grey's colonial policy. The Cape colonists, too, questioned the governor's actions, expressing doubt that he always had the colony's best interests at heart. In September 1857, the *Cape Argus* printed a letter to the editor by J.H. van Renen, the late captain of the Bengal army. Van Renen recommended that the 'least guilty' sepoys be transported to the Cape Colony to be employed 'on the public works, such as the harbour of refuge'.⁵⁸ Similar proposals had surfaced in correspondence between Cape officials and the Government of India, and, although Grey briefly entertained the suggestions, the stories coming out of India discouraged him from putting any into practice.⁵⁹ In October 1857, he notified the Colonial Office that 'the accounts, which have since been received of the revolting atrocities committed by the mutineers in India, have created such

a feeling in this colony that no sepoy regiments could now be received here'; at least, until he could consult the Cape Parliament.⁶⁰

The very fact that Grey had even entertained the proposal, however, generated attention. The governor's initial belief that the colonists would 'gladly receive' and employ the sepoys proved incorrect. Not only did the colonists oppose the idea of transporting 'mutineers' to the Cape, but their opposition highlighted additional grievances with government policy. For those settlers located near the frontier, the introduction of sepoys would not solve the colony's labour shortage, but instead would discourage the immigration of more 'desirable' settlers. According to the *Grahamstown Journal*, the colonists were willing to see the 'Kaffirs' employed throughout the colony because 'honest labour' provided a means to bring the Africans 'within the pale of civilization'. The number of unskilled African labourers, however, needed to be offset by skilled labourers of European descent. The introduction of sepoys would discourage this much-needed 'white' or 'European' immigration by increasing competition and keeping the 'rate of wages low'.⁶¹ For colonists in Cape Town, on the other hand, the issue was not so much that Grey had entertained the possibility of offering employment to 'ten thousand Sepoy cut-throats' (although that, too, concerned them). The real problem lay in the fact that Grey had originally ignored the role of the Cape Parliament in making the decision. His initial interest in the proposal had destroyed his 'reputation as a wise man' and exposed the need to reexamine the relationship between the governor and Parliament as well as the existing power structure in the colony.⁶²

In April 1858, concern regarding Grey's use of colonial power was taken up by the Cape Parliament, and the *Cape Argus* later reprinted the debates in a special supplement. Discussion was sparked by the introduction of a motion to limit the use of the Frontier Police to conflicts within the colony's borders. In seconding the motion, Cape legislative member, Dr Tancred, argued that Grey's use of the police to expel Sarhili and suppress disputes in Kaffraria had been expansionist, aggressive, and had abused colonial resources. 'If you want to make an acquisition, you must send British troops there, and not the Frontier Police.'⁶³ In reality, Tancred did not agree with British acquisition of the region at all, asserting that the British had 'no right' to seize African land and that doing so would stretch British power thin and, consequently, threaten the strength of the larger empire. Although he focused on the governor's native policy, Tancred also pointed in passing to Grey's use of troops in India and argued, 'I don't want to go into that Indian affair, but you had no more right to conquer India than I had to take this book out of the hon. Member for Cape Town's hands.'⁶⁴ In opposing Grey's policies, Tancred not only raised questions about the Cape Colony, but also generated discussion of imperial policy. India, he suggested, represented one more example of British colonial exploitation.

The Cape Colony enjoyed representative institutions in the 1850s, but not full responsible government. While both the House of Assembly and the Legislative

Council consisted of elected members, crown officials were also permitted to participate in parliamentary debates (although they could not vote).⁶⁵ It was these crown-appointed officials that came to Grey's assistance, asserting that his ability to balance the crisis in India with the potential conflict at the Cape exemplified his strengths as colonial governor. The colonial secretary argued that once reports from India had reached the Cape, Sarhili had eagerly spread the news that 'there were difficulties in India' and encouraged Xhosa chiefs to 'unite with him, and to renew their attempts against the British'.⁶⁶ The governor, recognising the possibility that the natives might attack during the colony's hour of weakness, simply attacked first. Similarly, the auditor-general argued that Grey had contributed as many troops as possible to India. To send more troops would have been unwise, adding to the 'confusion' in India and placing the Cape in danger by giving the 'Kafirs an idea that there was nothing left to oppose them'.⁶⁷ Further, he defended Grey's native policy, asserting that the governor had done all he could to assist Sarhili and had only fought when necessary. His decision to remove the chief from the colony 'was an act of pure defense, and not for aggression, or the acquisition of British territory'.⁶⁸ For many, thus, the 1857 Indian Rebellion exemplified the potential danger posed by colonised natives, be they Indians or Africans. Following debate, the Cape Parliament ruled that Grey had wielded his gubernatorial power responsibly and dismissed the motion to restrict the use of the Frontier Police.

Although the Parliament's decision was nearly unanimous, support was not entirely uniform among the colonists. The *Cape Argus* expressed frustration with the legislative decision, arguing that the support for Grey's native policy simply reflected his unrestrained political power in the colony.⁶⁹ The *Grahamstown Journal*, however, was pleased with the decision 'that the Kaffir tribes, "like the Indian mutineers, have drawn down swift destruction upon their own heads. That they are the aggressors, and the colonists have acted on the defensive."' According to the newspaper, for the past forty years, settlers on the frontier had been accused of provoking the Africans and had been held responsible for any unrest in the region. The recent 'judgment of Parliament' provided a much-desired 'final verdict' in favour of the colonists.⁷⁰

Although Grey's frontier policy and treatment of Sarhili had received a stamp of approval from the Cape Parliament, his use of troops continued to face criticism from officials in London. From the outbreak of the Indian Rebellion in 1857 to June 1859, Grey and the Colonial Office consistently butted heads. In January 1858, the government published the official correspondence regarding the dispatch of troops to India. In a review of the blue book, the *Times* concluded, 'it appears from the papers before us that, although so much dependence was placed on him [Grey], the supply of reinforcements to India by him afforded was really very insignificant'.⁷¹ A select committee of the House of Commons came to a similar conclusion. In its draft report, the committee praised the contributions of Lord Elgin (the British envoy to China), Sir Henry Ward (the governor of

Ceylon) and Sir James Higginson (the governor of Mauritius), but found Grey's efforts severely lacking.⁷² In addition to Grey's decisions regarding troops for India, London officials criticised his use of British regiments in the Cape Colony and opposed his proposal to federate the colonies of South Africa. In June 1859, citing Grey's tendency to disobey, his policy toward German immigration and his excessive expenditure of imperial funds, Colonial Secretary E. Bulwer Lytton announced Grey's formal recall.⁷³

News of Grey's recall was met with indignation and considerable opposition by many Cape colonists. Petitions were submitted to the colonial government expressing support for Grey, and meetings were held throughout the colony, 'deploring his recall and in many cases asking for his reinstatement'.⁷⁴ The South African press closely covered the event, and the reports were reprinted in New Zealand. In October 1859, the *Taranaki Herald* reprinted an article from the *Eastern Province Herald* questioning Grey's removal as governor:

Is it because Sir George Grey, when Governor of New Zealand, once postponed the promulgation of a constitution of Conservative origin, for which the Colony was not ripe...? Or is it because his Excellency ... introduced a number of German immigrants upon a guarantee of Kaffrarian debentures? Or is it because Sir George Grey had the hardihood to defend himself when his conduct was impugned in the matter of troops for India? In a word, is it because his Excellency dared to be independent – dared to sacrifice the good opinion of a Prime Minister to the interests of his charge – strong in the consciousness of his own integrity, and the ultimate justice and sovereignty of the English people?⁷⁵

The *Eastern Province Herald* determined that, in reality, Grey had been recalled simply for doing his job and fulfilling his duty to the colony and the empire. While the newspaper was quick to note that it did not endorse all of Grey's actions as governor, it emphasised that he had proven to be the 'best qualified Governor' the colony had seen.⁷⁶ Similarly, at the time of his departure, the *Cape Argus* noted that the 'recall of Sir George Grey is deeply regretted by the whole colony'.⁷⁷ Despite the momentary frustration with his frontier policy and treatment of Sarhili, the colony supported Grey to the very end of his governorship and deemed his performance to have been far beyond satisfactory.

When notified of his recall, Grey defended himself by pointing to his actions during the Indian Rebellion, as members of the Cape Parliament had done earlier. Grey argued that he had warned the Imperial government that an increase in expenditure would be necessary if he was expected to both maintain peace in the Cape Colony and contribute troops to India. His actions should not have been unexpected. Further, Grey argued:

In taking this course, I acted to the best of my judgment for the good of the service, and I still think I acted rightly; whilst the Indian authorities have

gratefully acknowledged the importance of the assistance rendered. What would have been thought of me if, neglecting to act as I did, I had allowed a Kaffir war to break out here whilst the mutinies still raged in India; and if, consequently, instead of being able so largely to aid that possession of the Crown, I had called for increased assistance, and I had placed this country in jeopardy, whilst Great Britain required to put forth all her energies elsewhere, would it have been held a sufficient excuse to say that I could only have furnished the aid I did to India, and have prevented a Kaffir war, by spending 10,000 *l.*, or 15,000 *l.*, and that I feared to take the responsibility of doing so?⁷⁸

Had he not acted in this manner, the British Empire may have faced much greater problems than an overextended bank account. Further, he argued, when ruling a colony, the occasional need for additional funds should be anticipated. 'In affairs, of such magnitude, and in finding suddenly such large re-enforcements for an empire in peril, the expenditure of some thousands of pounds cannot be sometimes avoided.'⁷⁹ If imperial crises such as the 1857 Indian Rebellion could not always be predicted, nor could the expense and difficulties involved in their suppression.

Grey was an ambitious and headstrong colonial administrator, whose policies both generated nods of approval and eyebrows raised in opposition. Although his actions during the Indian Rebellion certainly fuelled discussion, at times, even Grey seemed a pawn in debates regarding the appropriate colonial response to large-scale imperial crises. Within weeks of Grey's recall, the Derby-Disraeli Ministry fell to a second Palmerston administration, and Lytton was succeeded as colonial secretary by the fifth Duke of Newcastle. Despite his disapproval of the governor's conduct, Newcastle recognised Grey's potential to establish 'peaceful relations' between the settlers and the natives.⁸⁰ As a result, after requesting Grey's assurance that he would adhere to the new government's policies, Newcastle reinstated him as governor of the Cape Colony.⁸¹ Newcastle's dispatch notifying Grey of his reappointment arrived in Cape Town only days after the recalled governor had sailed for England. He was notified of the situation upon landing, and shortly after accepted Newcastle's offer.⁸²

Sir George Grey and New Zealand

To defend his actions in South Africa, Grey had tapped into a British fear of 'restless natives'. In the wake of the sepoy rebellion, this fear was not limited to the British in London, South Africa or India. Rather it resonated with settlers throughout the British colonies, and granted Grey's 'native policy' a degree of

admiration. In New Zealand, where Grey had served as colonial governor from 1845 to 1853, fears surfaced that the Indian uprising might find sympathy among the Maori and reports of another 'Cawnpore' circulated among British troops sent to suppress Maori resistance.⁸³ As a result, when Grey expressed interest in returning to office in New Zealand, his reappointment appeared a hopeful solution to the burgeoning crisis.

In reality, strained relations between the British colonists and New Zealand Maori had existed prior to 1857. Since 1840, relations between British settlers and the Maori had been loosely regulated by the Treaty of Waitangi.⁸⁴ Although colonial administrators and native chiefs alike had signed the document, British settlers and courts frequently ignored the Treaty's authority.⁸⁵ During Grey's first administration, the number of British settlers in the colony had doubled, increasing Maori resentment of European settlement and bringing the question of land sovereignty to the forefront of colonial concerns. The tension in the colony only escalated after Grey's departure, and during the late 1850s, the Maori chiefs unified under the King Movement, creating a social and political organisation to reassert native control over the land.⁸⁶ The situation came to a head in 1860, when the Maori resisted Governor Thomas Gore Browne's efforts to occupy land in Waitara. Fighting took place in the region for nearly a year, reaching a stalemate by April 1861. Having lost the trust of the Maori chiefs, Browne was unable to establish peace in the colony and was recalled by London officials, opening the door for Grey's return.⁸⁷

Although not everyone had approved of Grey's previous New Zealand record, for many, his reappointment seemed to signal that the imperial government recognised the serious threat posed by the Maori.⁸⁸ The *Taranaki Herald* expressed hope that London officials would put their 'full trust' in Grey to act appropriately and would not send him 'merely to retrace their steps for them'. In the past, the imperial government had intervened too heavily, and what was needed was a governor who would 'exchange the politician for the statesman' and simply get the job done without catering to every wish expressed by those in London. According to the newspaper, Grey, with the support of the imperial government, would provide 'every sort of means for an effectual settlement of the native question'. Additionally, the newspaper went on to predict, 'He will probably have *carte blanche* for all his demands. His policy may be sharp at first, or it may be conciliatory; but we may reasonably expect it will not be weak, or weakly backed.'⁸⁹ Grey's work was cut out for him, but his recent success in balancing the needs of the empire in India with the local threat faced in the Cape Colony suggested that he was more than capable. London officials were equally optimistic. During his previous term, Grey had been noted for his strong working relationship with the Maori chiefs, and, in 1861, colonial officials were hopeful that he might re-establish this rapport to ease the present tension. The realisation that force might be required, however, was duly noted, and

Newcastle instructed Grey that, should his peace efforts fail, he was encouraged 'to wage war resolutely'.⁹⁰

Grey's second term as New Zealand's colonial governor proved to be less successful than his first. James Belich has argued that Grey's conduct during the New Zealand wars 'is as confusing to historians as it was to his superiors at the Colonial Office'. Despite the confusion, Belich asserts that two strands are evident in his actions: a 'peace policy' and a 'war policy'.⁹¹ The 'peace policy' seemingly failed, and war broke out in Waikato in 1863. The New Zealand wars of 1863–1864 coincided with the Colonial Office efforts to withdraw British troops from the empire and place questions of defence and policymaking into the hands of the colonial governments. In the case of New Zealand, as long as the threat from the Maori persisted, the Imperial government agreed to provide troops and financial assistance to defend the settlers. The arrangement, however, resulted in disagreement regarding the necessary and appropriate role of British troops in the colony.⁹² Throughout his second administration, Grey's methods of governance elicited significant official criticism, similar to that expressed during his South African governorship. London administrators accused Grey of failing to keep the Colonial Office informed, of continuing to draw on the commissariat to pay imperial troops, and of neglecting to return regiments to England when requested.⁹³ As a result, when his term came to an end in early 1868, Grey was not reappointed. With no Indian uprising to justify his decisions, Grey had little choice but to retire from Britain's imperial service.

Although Grey's career as a colonial official had come to an end, he did not disappear entirely. He briefly attempted a career in British politics, running unsuccessfully for a seat at Westminster, before returning to New Zealand. In 1874, he entered New Zealand politics, and served as premier from 1877 to 1879. Even after his death in 1898, Grey continued to be a subject of interest. In an obituary published on 20 September 1898, the *Times* remembered Grey as an independent and often controversial colonial administrator, who was not much liked by the ministers. Among the article's more positive recollections of Grey was his response to the Indian Uprising. The newspaper reported that it was Grey 'who really took the initiative in the generous course of action for which Lord Elgin has received deserved commendation ... he sent everything he could spare from the scarcely pacified Cape—troops, guns, specie, & c., down to his own carriage horses'.⁹⁴ The comment elicited significant response from readers. Throughout October 1898, the *Times* published a number of letters to the editor—some argued that Elgin had been responsible for diverting troops to India, others agreed with the *Times* version of events, and one correspondent diplomatically asserted that 'both Elgin and Sir George Grey acted independently in sending troops to Calcutta'.⁹⁵

With a career as long and as checkered as Grey's imperial service, why was it his efforts during the 1857 Indian Rebellion that generated such lasting debate?

The question surrounding his use of troops was never entirely about Grey as an individual. His actions during the uprising, and the responses they elicited, prove to tell us more than whether he should be remembered as the empire's greatest hero or its greatest villain. The crisis in India called into question the strength of the future empire and the role of colonial governors in administering it. The debate regarding Grey's part in the suppression of the uprising in India, and any potential uprising in South Africa, suggest that the appropriate role of colonial governors was not entirely defined in an age of increasing self-government. Grey's recognition of the Indian Uprising as an opportunity for the Cape Colony to assist the empire and to economically prosper generated significant support in the colonies. Even the Colonial Office, caught in the aftermath of the initial uprising in India, determined Grey to be a capable and efficient administrator and chose to overlook his faults. His use of troops to assist British efforts in India and to seize land following the defeat of Sarhili appeared necessary for the defence of the empire. The autonomy he exercised when making these decisions, however, threatened to compromise the position of the Colonial Office, the Cape Parliament, or both. In the immediate wake of the uprising, British officials and settlers alike were willing to back Grey's brand of governance. Once fears of an empire-wide rebellion had faded and threats appeared localised, however, his actions seemed to London officials to be less a defence of the empire and more a threat to imperial unity. The debate regarding Grey's response to events in India did not end with his recall or even his death. As late as 1933, the author of an article in the *Mirror* pointed to Grey's actions in order to criticise those of interwar imperial administrators. Praising Grey, Arthur Field questioned whether anything could 'form a greater contrast to the pusillanimous courses to-day being pursued by men in authority in the British Empire than the prompt and fearless response by Sir George Grey to what he conceived, and rightly conceived, to be his duty to his country?'⁹⁶ Seventy-five years after the Indian Rebellion, thus, the debate concerning Grey's response to the uprising continued to provide a means to comment on methods of imperial administration.

Notes and References

1. Leigh Dale, 'George Grey in Ireland: Narrative and Network' in David Lambert and Alan Lester, eds, *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 147. Many of the early biographies of Grey are very complimentary of the colonial governor. For a more critical view of Grey's role in South African history, see J.B. Peires, 'The Late Great Plot: The Official Delusion concerning the Xhosa Cattle Killing 1856–1857', *History in Africa*, vol. 12 (Piscataway, New Jersey: Published by African Studies Association, 1985), pp. 253–279; Peires, *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-killing Movement of 1856–7* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989).

2. J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812–1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961).
3. Donovan Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I: Sir George Grey (A reassessment); Troops and Horses', *Historia*, vol. 32, no. 1, (May 1987), p. 64.
4. This is a frequent criticism of biographies of colonial governors written during the mid-twentieth century. For more recent works that incorporate the private correspondence of colonial governors; see Mark Francis, *Governors and Settlers: Images of Authority in the British Colonies, 1820–60* (London: MacMillan Academic Press, 1992); Barbara Messamore, *Canada's Governors General, 1847–1878: Biography and Constitutional Evolution* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).
5. Williams, The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I; 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part II: The emergence of black consciousness in Caffraria', *Historia*, vol. 32, no. 2, (September 1987), pp. 56–67.
6. See Simon J. Potter, 'Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Empire', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 46 (July 2007), pp. 621–646; David Lambert and Alan Lester, eds, *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Zoë Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections, 1815–45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002).
7. These are Rutherford's terms. See Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. v.
8. Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I', p. 57.
9. Peter Putnis, 'The Indian Uprising of 1857 as a Global Media Event', unpublished paper given at the International Association for Media and Communication Research, Cairo, July 2006.
10. *Cape Argus*, 8 August 1857.
11. *Cape Argus*, 8 August 1857.
12. The National Archives, Colonial Archives (henceforth TNA CO) 48/383 Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 7 August 1857.
13. *Cape Argus*, 26 August 1857.
14. *Grahamstown Journal*, 8 August 1857.
15. INA CO 48/383 Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 7 August 1857.
16. *Cape Argus*, 11 November 1857.
17. *Cape Argus*, 11 November 1857.
18. *Cape Argus*, 11 November 1857.
19. P/188/49 Proceedings 15 January 1858, No. 102 Sir George Grey to Governor General of India, 11 November 1857.
20. *Cape Argus*, 30 January 1858.
21. *Cape Argus*, 6 February 1858.
22. *Cape Argus*, 27 March 1858.
23. *Cape Argus*, 27 March 1858.
24. TNA CO 48/383 Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 7 August 1857.
25. W.P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 87, 93.
26. Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections*, p. 195.
27. Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections*, p. 195.
28. According to Williams, the Cape Colony had not provided horses to India in the past because the system of obtaining horses was expensive and often failed to provide more than a moderate supply. Additionally, unrealistic expectations on the part of authorities in India, administrative problems and a seeming 'lack of enterprise on the part of local farmers' discouraged horse trade between the colonies. Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I', p. 65.

29. T.B. Bayley, 'Cape Horses for Indian Remounts', *The Cape Monthly Magazine* IV, no. 21 (September 1858), p. 130.
30. TNA CO 48/385 *Cape of Good Hope. Papers Relating to the Purchase of Horses at the Cape of Good Hope, for Cavalry and Artillery, for Service in the Colony or in India*, p. 7.
31. *Cape Argus*, 30 January 1858. Also cited in Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I', p. 69.
32. See 'Cape Horses for India', *The Cape Monthly Magazine*, vol. IV, no. 19 (July 1858), pp. 1–10; Bayley, 'Cape Horses for Indian Remounts', pp. 129–138.
33. Bayley, 'Cape Horses for Indian Remounts', p. 138.
34. Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I', p. 67.
35. TNA CO 48/384 Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 30 November 1857.
36. 'Editorial/Leader', *Times*, 20 October 1857.
37. *Taranaki Herald* (as communicated to the *Adelaide Register*), 17 April 1858.
38. *Taranaki Herald* (as communicated to the *Adelaide Register*), 17 April 1858.
39. *Taranaki Herald* (as communicated to the *Adelaide Register*), 17 April 1858.
40. *Times*, 20 October 1857, p. 6.
41. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, 374–375. For a detailed discussion of Grey's proposal to banish the king of Delhi to the Cape see Donovan Williams, 'An Echo of the Indian Mutiny: the proposed banishment of Bahadur Shah II to the Cape Colony, 1857', *Historia*, vol. 17, no. 4, (1972), pp. 265–268.
42. For a recent study of the British encounter with the Xhosa during the mid-nineteenth century, see Richard Price, *Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
43. The Xhosa represented a politically distinct 'tribal cluster'. Division among the Xhosa people often occurred, however, and independent chiefdoms were established. The Gcaleka Xhosa were a prime example. T.R.H. Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 5th ed. (Great Britain: MacMillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 62–63.
44. Examination of Nonqause before the Chief Commissioner (9 April 1858), *British Kaffraria Government Gazette*, reprinted in *Grahamstown Journal*, 1 May 1858; quoted in Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age*, pp. 71–72.
45. Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa*, 141–143; Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the mid-Victorian Age*, pp. 71–72.
46. See Peires, *The Dead will Arise*; Peires, 'The Late Great Plot'.
47. Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa*, p. 141.
48. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age*, p. 87; Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 380.
49. European settlers occasionally used the term 'kafir' to refer to the Xhosa specifically. More often, however, 'kafir, kaffir, and caffre' were used interchangeably to refer to all Africans.
50. The British referred to Sarhili as Kreli in colonial documents.
51. TNA CO 48/388, Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 11 February 1858. See also, Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part II'.
52. Hertfordshire Archives and Local Studies, Lytton Papers, D/DE/O15/21, Sir George Grey to [General Peel], 19 February 1858.
53. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age*, pp. 88–89; Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, pp. 385–389.
54. J.E.G. de Montmorency, 'Adderley, Charles Bowyer, first Baron Norton (1814–1905)', Rev. H.C.G. Matthew, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds, (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2006, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30341> (accessed 28 January 2008).
55. C.B. Adderley, 'The Troops For India', *Times*, 26 August 1857, p. 9.

56. 'Leader/Editorial', *Times*, 27 August 1857, p. 6.
57. 'Leader/Editorial', *Times*, 27 August 1857, p. 6.
58. *Cape Argus*, 9 September 1857.
59. Similar ideas were also entertained with regards to other colonies. See Marina Carter and Crispin Bates, 'Empire and Locality: A Global Dimension to the 1857 Indian Uprising', *Journal of Global History* (2010), pp. 51–73.
60. TNA CO 48/384, Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 3 October 1857.
61. *Grahamstown Journal*, 22 September 1857.
62. *Cape Argus*, 24 March 1858.
63. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
64. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
65. J.L. McCracken, *The Cape Parliament 1854–1910* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 20.
66. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
67. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
68. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
69. *Cape Argus*, 1 May 1858.
70. *Grahamstown Journal*, 22 May 1858.
71. *Times*, 15 January 1858.
72. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 400.
73. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, pp. 422–423.
74. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age*, p. 119. Grey submitted numerous petitions to the Colonial Office, showing support for him among colonists as well as Africans. See *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence regarding the establishment of Responsible Government, the Annexation of Griqualand West, and other affairs of the Cape Colony, 1857–73*, vol. 26, *Colonies Africa* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), pp. 96–99. As official documents sent by Grey, however, the petitions must be viewed with skepticism. As Peires has noted, the Xhosa, 'the Thembu, the Mpondo and all other Xhosa-speaking peoples rejoiced at his departure "to a man".' See Peires, *The dead will arise*, pp. 325–326.
75. *Eastern Province Herald*, 16 August 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, 29 October 1959.
76. *Eastern Province Herald*, 16 August 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, 29 October 1959.
77. *Cape Argus*, 23 August 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, 17 December 1859.
78. 'Copy of a Dispatch from Governor Sir George Grey, K.C.B., to the Right Honorable Sir E.B. Lytton, Bart. M.P., 31 July 1859' *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 115–116.
79. 'Copy of a Dispatch from Governor Sir George Grey, K.C.B., to the Right Honorable Sir E.B. Lytton, 31 July 1859' *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers*, p. 116.
80. 'Copy of a Dispatch from the Duke of Newcastle to Governor Sir George Grey, K.C. B., 4 June 1859' *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers*, p. 106.
81. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age*, 119; Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 427.
82. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 427.
83. Julie Evans, *Edward Eyre, Race and Colonial Governance* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2005), pp. 80–81.
84. The treaty established three basic tenets: the Maori chiefs would consent to British rule, in return the British Crown would guarantee Maori land possession and would purchase any land the Maori wished to sell, and the Maori were granted the rights of British subjects. See Raewyn Dalziel, 'Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia', *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century*, Andrew Porter, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 573–596.

85. Dalziel, 'Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia', p. 579.
86. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 447.
87. James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1986), p. 76.
88. According to the *Taranaki Herald*, while news of Grey's reappointment was 'not regarded unfavourably at Auckland', reports that it had 'restored confidence and hope' among the Maori were not true. *Taranaki Herald*, 10 August 1861; 28 September 1861.
89. *Taranaki Herald*, 17 August 1861.
90. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 451.
91. Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 119.
92. Dalziel, 'Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia', p. 586.
93. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, pp. 555–556.
94. *Times*, 20 September 1898.
95. *Times*, 25 October 1898. See also *Times*, 4, 6, 18, 31 October 1898. Rutherford also refers to the *Times* debate, concluding that Elgin and Grey redirected troops to India independently. See Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, (footnote 374), p. 312.
96. Arthur N. Field, 'Did Sir George Grey Save India?' *The Mirror* (1 October 1933).

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