

The British East India Company 1600-1858

A model of transition management for the modern global corporation

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Abstract *This paper focuses on the challenges facing global corporations which operate in a variety of environments with increasing multicultural managements and sophisticated understanding of how information technologies and organizational astuteness promote success. Compares this environment with that of the British East India Company. Suggests that corporations operating in the unpredictable environments at the start of the 21st century, in the absence of predictable government and military assistance, of necessity, will be compelled to rethink their transition strategies. Concludes that corporations will assume greater responsibility for functions – including intelligence acquisition, law enforcement, and military projection – normally provided by traditional nation-states, following the pattern of the British East India Company.*

Challenges facing global corporations

The triad countries composing the US, the European Union, and Japan are home to about 87 percent of the top transnational corporations (TNCs) and account for 88 percent of their total foreign assets (World Investment Report, 1997). These companies operate in a variety of environments with increasing multicultural managements and sophisticated understanding of how information technologies and organizational astuteness promote success. Corporate identity takes precedence over national attachments, which appear paradoxical, when large portions of the world are involved in brutal ethnic, religious, and nationalistic conflicts.

At the same time, economic and trade barriers are being systematically limited, ignored or eliminated, creating in effect a borderless world. The nation-state as defined by 20th-century standards is undergoing transformation, and the corporation is emerging as a major global player. An 12 August 2002 press release by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) underscores this transition and the significant place of corporations in the world market place.

A number of TNCs, at least when sales are compared to aggregate GDP, are wealthier than a large number of nation-states and rank within the world's top 100 economic entities.

Exxon ranked 45th on the list, comparable in size to the economies of Chile or Pakistan, while Philip Morris was ranked with Tunisia, Guatemala, and Slovakia. Companies that were listed in the top 100 entities included General Motors, Ford Motor Company, General Electric, Toyota, Royal Dutch/Shell, British Petroleum, Daimler Chrysler, IBM and Wal-Mart. But these giant corporations are only a portion of the total number of developed country corporations. According to the World Investment Report 1997, developed country corporations totaled 36,380 with 93,628 foreign



affiliates. These are not, of course, rigid numbers, since corporations undergo continuous reorganizations. They do indicate the dimension of corporate power.

It is expected that foreign sales will grow as a proportion of total sales, despite the 2001-2003 global economic slowdown. In fact, production by affiliates will also expand as a proportion of TNCs' total production. Accessing foreign markets via Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) will continue to be the main source of entry with pronounced emphasis on production for local markets. This creates a production chain connecting inter-related phases of production in several countries (World Investment Report, 1997). It also creates threat vulnerabilities.

For example:

- The International Labor Organization announced on 24 January 2003 that 1 billion new jobs will be needed worldwide by 2015.
- The 2003 Arab Human Development Report projects a 30 percent population increase by 2015, skewing a Middle East population distribution toward younger age cohorts.
- Approximately 1 billion people are illiterate and lack access to safe-drinking water. The amount of fresh water presently available is about 2.6 percent of the total of water on earth. If population trends continue, and in areas where water supply is diminishing, such as the hot spots of water disputes – the Aral Sea, Ganges River, Nile River, Jordan River and Tigris-Euphrates River, the impact on human life would be devastating. Add another 2.5 billion people to the world's population by 2025, and the probability of conflict increases. Another trend that has possible downside consequences is the privatization of water supplies. Two French TNCs, Suez and Vivendi, have established controlling interests in water facilities in more than 130 countries (Maude and Clarke, 2002).
- The AIDS epidemic has reached crisis proportions in sub-Saharan Africa and is spreading worldwide, including India, Russia and China. This poses problems for prime age workers. If the projection of AIDS cases by the UN is correct, the effects could materially change the economic and military posture of these Eurasian states (Eberstadt, 2002).
- Twenty percent of the world's population accounts for about 86 percent of total private consumption expenditures, compared to 1.3 percent for the lowest 20 percent.
- The number of people living in cities is expected to reach 3.9 billion by 2020. This is a net increase of 2.4 billion, when added to the 1990 figure of 1.5 billion (Cohen, 1996). If geopolitical considerations are added to the mix, the problems appear unmanageable.

The occupation, democratization and development of Iraq and Afghanistan are long-term, costly efforts. The fight against global terrorism has no specific end point. Organized crime has become global and adept in the use of information technologies and trafficking in weapons, human cargo, and drugs.

The number of failed states will increase, particularly in Africa, where civil wars and reduced prices for raw materials and commodities have impoverished economies. Religious conflicts will increase in such countries as Nigeria, Sudan, the Philippines and Indonesia, where significant numbers of Muslims and Christians reside.

Christianity is the fastest growing religion today and will represent 2.6 billion people by 2025, thus becoming the world's largest faith. Most of this growth will occur in Latin America, Africa and Asia, and within impoverished mega-cities.

Since Islam is also a growing proselytizing faith, religion will replace ideology in the 21st century. Unlike the more liberal version of Christianity practiced in Europe and North America, the churches in the Southern tier countries preach an earlier idealized form of Christianity emphasizing communal orthodoxy, Puritanism, and mysticism (Jenkins, 2002).

For corporations operating in these unpredictable environments, and in the absence of predictable government and military assistance, corporate managements, of necessity, will be compelled to rethink their transition strategies. This will not be an easy task. Smaller organizations invariably lack the resources to form effective coping strategies or the political astuteness to minimize or resolve conflicts with local governments or competitive private interests. Larger corporations have the resources to meet complicated problems, and if need be, to retain the services of private intelligence, security or military organizations. Corporations are increasingly assuming these security functions, heretofore performed by nation-states.

This does not mean a powerful country like the US will not play a prominent role on the global scene; its intervention role will be more selective.

Currently, the area of greatest conflict extends from North Africa to the Philippines, particularly the energy resource regions of the Middle East, Central Asia, and the South China Sea. This entails naval protection of the major seaborne checkpoints such as the Strait of Gibraltar, Suez Canal, Bab el Mandeb Strait, Arabian Sea and Malacca Strait to ensure the flow of oil. The bulk of the ground territory within these water bodies contains a large number of impoverished and angry people.

This region is the epicenter of international terrorism, whose organizational structure is decentralized and diffused across the globe with linkages to organized crime or sympathetic intelligence services. The most familiar of these global terrorist organizations is Al Qaeda. The threats posed by these shadowy groups are not always effectively addressed by traditional military interventions and are better managed by well-trained law enforcement agencies. Surveillance and informers are more effective tools in the war against terrorism and crime (Mitroff, 2002). Private research organizations frequently issue timely reports depicting probable terrorist attacks. The World Markets Research Center compiles listings of countries with terror risks. Examination of the criteria employed to determine risk underscores the need for informed flexible law enforcement capabilities.

Changing state paradigm

In an interesting book, titled *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*, the author develops a strongly documented depiction of the emerging global order. His analysis has immediate relevance to corporate managements, since the changes he foresees have profound impact on business operations. He sees the nation-state form of organization withering away, replaced by the emergence of a new state, which he calls the market state. This represents a new paradigm. Under the traditional nation-state form of governance, the social-welfare contract was an integral part of the democratic relationship, particularly during the Cold War era. With the emergence of the market-state, the emphasis, at least within countries like the US, is on

maximizing citizen opportunities. This presupposes increased privatization, which by extension, places greater reliance on private sources for both private and collective security (Bobbitt, 2003). He notes the powerful influence of the press and mass media on public opinion, motivated by the need to satisfy corporate sponsors and the impact international telecommunications has on national governments. Specifically, he says out this formidable confluence of private power frequently compels states to obey laws enacted by other countries. The recent war crimes trials of Pinochet and Milosevic are prime illustrations.

Further, Bobbitt contends that the emergence of the market-state depends on unfettered global capital markets, flexible labor markets (costs) and to a lesser extent, on business networks to maintain stability. Legitimacy is gained by providing opportunities.

He does not rule out military interventions by great powers in conflict situations involving proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, mass refugee migration, ethnic cleansing or environmental disasters, but he asserts such interventions will be selective regarding timing, coalitions of the willing, and methods of execution. He believes that 21st century security problems will be more about “managing cooperation than managing conflict”. Thus the emphasis of market-states is on global relations, not traditional international relations. This is a distinction with a significant operational difference.

Bobbitt is mindful that the bureaucratic machinery of traditional nation-states is not always capable of handling multiple global threats, and he predicts that multinational corporations will rely on privatized military and security forces to deal with threats, including low-intensity conflicts (Bobbitt, 2003).

This latter observation echoes, in part, the position of Martin Van Creveld, who observes that the burden of defending society from low intensity conflict will shift to the growing private security business. Van Creveld says that future wars will not be waged by armies but by groups such as terrorists, guerrillas and bandits. He makes a valid point when he indicates that any attempt to defeat an enemy that requires intelligence and deception must first be preceded by an understanding of the enemy (Van Creveld, 1991).

The British East India Company – a model of privatized security

The idea of corporations possessing security forces and actively carrying out military operations is best exemplified by the history of the British East India Company. The Company existed for approximately 258 years (1600-1858), notwithstanding periodic reorganizations, mergers, and regulatory restrictions imposed by the British government, and was led by a line of outstanding officials. It dealt with a variety of challenges, including military conflict with Portugal, Holland, and France over territorial acquisitions in the East Indies and the Indian subcontinent, and deftly managed to position itself successfully within the frequent Hindu-Muslim conflicts. This in itself was a masterly example of crisis management. It vigorously addressed global piracy, the global terrorism issue of the 16th and 17th centuries, and successfully suppressed the much feared Thuggee organization (1830-1837). The Special Commission for the suppression of Thuggee and Dacoity was instrumental in destroying this terrorist menace. The company administered an effective information

gathering system, ran spies, conducted diplomacy and understood the importance of informers in rooting out the Thuggee terrorists (Gardner, 1972).

If some of the predictions previously set forth in this article prove accurate, then the lessons of the British East India Company will have relevance. The company showed a remarkable ability to formulate successful transition strategies over a long time period and in response to complicated threatening events. The company was initially chartered by Queen Elizabeth I on 31 December 1600. It was one of the most powerful commercial companies of its day. It was a globalized company in a globalized trading world, and it faced formidable competitors in the areas of the Indian subcontinent where it first sought to develop and import spices. The Portuguese with the aid of Jesuit missionaries had established a presence on the Indian Malabar coast, while the Dutch established settlements and commercial activities on several of the islands of the East Indies Archipelago (modern-day Indonesia). The British were newcomers to the spice trade, and were unwelcomed by the other Europeans. The Dutch East India Company was backed by its government and was determined to preclude British trade activities.

Its stated policy was “the commerce of the Muluccas, Amboyna and the Bandas should belong to the company and no other nation in the world should be allowed to have the port” (Wilbur, 1945 (1970)). It was perhaps an early form of a US Monroe Doctrine.

The rivalry between the British and the Dutch tragically resulted in the torture and murder of British East India Company employees (factors) at Amboyna in 1623, and the incident was not resolved until Lord Oliver Cromwell in 1654 forced the Dutch to make restitution. The company over time established a commercial presence on both the Indian Coromandel and Malabar Coasts and obtained trading concessions from the Muslim Mughal, who controlled large parts of the sub-continent. It also confronted intense religious conflict between Hindus and Muslims and witnessed devastating famines and plagues. The scorching of crops in 1647 to prevent the spread of disease impacted on both the British and Indian economies (Wilbur, 1945 (1970)). This early form of globalization showed the ramifications of cross border trade.

During the 17th century, the company established strongholds in Surat, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, and this presence was acknowledged as vital for British global trade interests.

The British could not deploy regular military forces to the subcontinent because of events at home and on the European continent, and thus saw that self-reliant company employees, capable of self-defense in case of war and financially independent, was the sine qua non of success. This became the operational foundation of the company. Several important lessons were stressed. First, “trade must be protected by soldiers, guns and armed fleets (private forces). Second, settlements must be enlarged and strengthened. Third, settlements and colonists must be numerous. Fourth, where rival competitive groups, a strong amalgamated company might succeed” (Wilbur, 1945 (1970)).

The company’s organizational evolution warrants a brief historical review. James I granted the company’s petition for a new charter in 1609, in perpetuity, though revocable upon three years’ notice if the company/heirs or successors found business unsuccessful. Charles II granted a new charter in 1661, affirming the grant of 1609 with the provisions that the company had the right to seize British competitors (Interlopers),

wage war, and make peace with non-Christian rulers, appoint governors, and exercise civil and criminal judicial authority in the company's settlement. He later granted the company letters patent for admiralty, which allowed for the confiscation of the goods and ships of rivals (Wilbur, 1945 (1970)).

Meanwhile, the contentious issue of whether the king or Parliament determined British policies was decided with the accession of King William of Orange (Holland) in 1688. The prerogatives of Parliament began to take precedence.

The dispute between the company and prospective private British competitors (Interlopers) continued when King William granted the competitors a charter for a new company. The dissension caused by the presence of two companies compelled the British government to force a merger of the two organizations in 1702. This merged company was officially known as the United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies. It was ratified by the Godolphin Award in 1708, and ushered in a new trade era. In 1711 Parliament extended the charter to 1733, which was subsequently extended to 1769. The company was organized into a court of 24 directors, and elected yearly by a court of proprietors/shareholders. The subsequent decades were prosperous for the company that made its survival possible. Exports increased to more than £1 million, and dividends varied between 6 and 12 percent.

The company extended its control on the Indian subcontinent, particularly after Sir Robert Clive's famous victory at the Battle of Plassey (1757) and acquired control over the rich province of Bengal. Clive was acting for the benefit of shareholders. He also eliminated pirate activities at Severndroog and at Vijayadroog and established the principle that drastic laws were needed to protect English lives and bring justice to pirates attacking British interests in India and the North American colonies. The company secured permission from the Mughals to collect land revenue from Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and the East Coast in return for annual tribute, and the maintenance of order and peace (Wilbur, 1945 (1970)). This arrangement enriched company shareholders, though it aroused the concerns of the financially pressed British government. The Seven Years War fought in North America and Europe was costly and a subsequent *casus belli* of the American War of Independence. The government imposed control over the company via the enactment of the Regulatory Act of 1773, and the India Act of 1784.

These measures established administration of Indian political policy through a regulatory board responsible to Parliament and parliamentary appointment of a Governor-General. Warren Hastings was the first appointed Governor-General answerable to the British government. He served from 1773 to 1784. He was followed in turn by a succession of famous governor-generals, including Lord Charles Cornwallis (1786-1794 and again in 1805), Lord William Cavendish Bentinck (1827-1833) and Lord James Ramsay Dalhousie (1848-1856) (Gardner, 1972). Meanwhile the military forces of the company, which continued to remain private, extended their control over other parts of the subcontinent.

The trade monopoly of the company was ended in 1813 and 1833 by parliamentary acts, and it became the British government's agent for the administration of India. It was a tool of imperial policy.

The benevolent policies of Warren Hastings, which placed emphasis on the relevance of Indian institution to Indian needs, were giving way to the viewpoint that the Indians were ignorant and backwards. Thus policies were introduced to use

English as the official language, promote and ensure property rights, base law upon scientific principles, and allow Christian missionaries the opportunity to convert the indigenous populations. This eventually proved baneful to Great Britain. Many company employees became administrators under the new British rule while the military composed largely of Indian Sepoys, was expanded and tasked to defend company territories and contain potential resistance. By 1820, the army of the British East India Company fielded over a quarter of a million troops and deployed a formidable naval force that patrolled the waters surrounding India and the Persian Gulf. It established two colleges in England to train military officers and civil servants for company service, and during a period of 52 years, graduated 3,600 cadets who were assigned to the armies stationed in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Economist Thomas Robert Malthus taught at The College of Civil Service for nearly 30 years, and intellectual luminaries such as Charles Lamb and John Stuart Mill were associated with the East India House (Gardner, 1972). The company extended its rule via military conquest in Nepal (1814-1816), Sind (1843), the Punjab (1848-1849), the entire Burmese Coast (1852-1853) and experienced a major military disaster in Afghanistan when it attempted to check Russian expansion (first Afghan War, 1839-1842).

In the 1820s, the company expanded its profitable opium trade, placing increased pressure on China to allow for greater importation. There was strong British demand for Chinese tea. The company was granted a license to grow opium in India for sale in China. Its earnings grew from £728,577 in 1824-1825 to £3,309,637 by 1849-1850. Chinese opposition precipitated the First Opium War (1840), which China lost, and Hong Kong, as part of the peace settlement, became a British possession. Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo and Shanghai were opened to British ships and an indemnity of \$21 million was paid to England (Wilbur, 1945 (1970)). The opium trade continued with its devastating effects upon the Chinese.

A second war broke out in 1857, again to China's detriment, and England obtained new prerogatives, including unrestricted travel in China and the right to preach Christianity. The West was opening up China.

The Industrial Revolution, which was restructuring the British economy, was spreading to India, bringing material benefits, and unexpected losses. Four thousand miles of telegraph were completed by the mid-1850s, and railroads crossed parts of India that were previously inaccessible. By 1854 it took two hours to travel by train from Calcutta to Bombay, compared to several months in previous years. On the other hand, Indian textile artisans lost their jobs, as the work was now more efficiently performed in industrial England.

Several developments encouraged by the company were beginning to arouse Indian opposition. The castes were forced to mix, Christian missionaries intensified their preaching, and traditional cultural practices were dismissed as backwards. Unlike the former Mughal rulers, the company attempted to remake society. This proved to be a mistake. The company possessed a large army, but it was now mainly filled by Indian mercenaries.

On 7 May 1857, a military parade was held at Meerut, primarily to discipline 85 Indian Cavalry soldiers who refused to use cartridges, which they believed to contain beef fat. The company had begun to replace the old Brown Bes rifle with the new Enfeld model. The next day three Indian regiments mutined (at this time they still had the old rifle), and the revolt of 1857 began. The company's army – one of the world's

largest at the time—mutined (Gardner, 1972). The attempt to suppress the mutiny produced thousands of casualties on both sides, and an intense feeling of mutual dislike that lasted for decades.

The army's official historian wrote, "What had begun as mutiny to be suppressed had become a war of much hatred as any in human history with all the terror and horror holy wars induce" (Gardner, 1972).

This event was the coup de grace for the company. The India Act of 1858 ended its existence and the Court of Directors of the East India Company held its last meeting on 1 September 1858. It issued a farewell statement referenced in part: "The Company has the great privilege of transferring to the service of her Majesty such a body of civil and military officers as the world has never seen before" (Gardner, 1972). Thus, ended the history of a great company.

Dynamics of transition management

In the globalized trading society that existed in the 17th century, we see the emergence of a private company that was forced to assume the duties and powers of a sovereign state. The lack of instantaneous, real-time communications, unlike today, required the British East India Company to make on-the-spot decisions, and form short and long objectives within an ever-changing environment. It had to have information regarding the intentions of its competitors and competent understanding of the religious distinctions and sensitivities of surrounding indigenous populations.

It needed an on-site defense capability to meet unexpected challenges, and a maritime capability to transport goods and support land military operations. It expanded its presence on the Indian subcontinent and enriched its stockholders, particularly before the British government began to exercise tighter supervisory control in the 1770s and 1780s. It existed at a time when major European developments were affecting the world and reshaping the politics of European states.

The company was in business during the time of eight major wars – English Civil War, The Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Thirty Year War, the War of the Spanish Succession, the Seven Years War, the American Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean War, among many other conflicts between 1600 and 1858. More important, the company's actions were responsive to unforeseen events and reflected a keen understanding of transitional dynamics. It understood that having strong private military forces contiguous to commercial trade was essential for protection and profits and was adept at playing off potential enemies and competitors. It possessed a competent information gathering capability to avoid surprises, where possible, and a concomitant ability to influence events. Its officials and governor-generals were intimately familiar with the details of the markets where the company conducted business and mindful that the basic purpose of the company was to serve shareholders. Its continuous expansion and acquisition of territory provided it with raw materials and opened new markets. It also reflected in its latter years, when it became an instrument of imperial policy, an inability to empathize with the concerns of its subject people. By attempting to remake Indian society, a mirror image of England, it unleashed a deep-seated hatred that lasted for generations. The transition strategy to use the company's military forces to advance British imperial interests, while initially successful, eventually led to the company's demise.

If the company is examined in the context of today's management theory, it is reasonable to conclude that its organizational and operational assumptions were predicated upon the recognition that core competence and environmental fit were needed for success. It understood the importance of qualified personnel, operational closeness to supply sources and trade points, knowledge of the target customers, and the necessity of force protection to address immediate threats. It did not have time for esoteric contemplation. It operated alone in a far away location, uncertain of its long term prospects, against determined enemies, and at a time when its home country was undergoing a decades-long political revolution.

It realized the importance of forward planning, decentralized operations, and the need to form strategic partnerships with foreign groups who could bring particular specialties to the company. In our day an eminent management authority as Peter Drucker would perhaps characterize the company's liaison with other organizations as strategic alliances, and perhaps conclude that the British East India Company had its focus on the future. The company's activities were not carried out through a rigid hierarchical organizational structure, but rather through a number of decentralized factories, known as factors, which were capable of taking independent action consistent with the exigencies of the moment. It operated on a global basis, oftentimes in dangerous places, and understood the importance of embedding the management of change in its system (Drucker, 1995). It responded superbly to threats such as piracy and terrorism with private military forces and saw the importance of creating special commissions with broad authority to deal decisively with these dangers. In many respects, though with modifications, these approaches are being observed today, albeit primarily under government direction. If corporations are forced to undertake their own defense against terrorists, criminals, warlords, and armed antagonistic political and religious groups, the experiences of the British East India Company are worth studying.

Moreover, corporations operating in a real-time communications environment must also acquire and act promptly on information regarding inter-country factor cost differences, specific environmental threats and opportunities, and the motives and moves of competitors (Porter, 1980). This entails a corporate intelligence system that not only provides accurate, timely information on these vital topics, but also requires an ability to take prompt, preventive action. If a corporation is multinational with operations scattered in dozens of countries, the question of who is the home government can be problematical. Thus, devolution of decisional authority to the corporate officials at the situs of the dispute makes sense.

Security options for corporations

The multinational corporations, at present, which operate across borders have advantages over the slower paced East India Company. Threats and vulnerability assessments can be managed promptly. Information plays a major role in the formation of organizational alignments, transition strategies, and the discernment of threats. It is possible to track global sales via specially designed software and to monitor foreign radio and television broadcasts. Databases are available to identify locations where particular groups or individuals congregate, with accompanying investigative background profiles on suspected individuals (Toffler and Toffler, 1993).

Since this capability is available to corporate management, and given the unreliability of government assistance, especially where corporations have multiple

national identities, and interests which do not always coincide with state national security, it becomes practical for organizations to acquire these informational and operational resources.

If this is the emerging world of the 21st century, where a premium is placed on timely information and where networks and media are driving forces in the transformation of organizations and society, then corporations will assume greater responsibility for functions normally provided by traditional nation-states. These functions include intelligence acquisition, law enforcement, and military projection.

Corporations have the option of developing their own security forces following the pattern of the British East India Company or they can retain the services of private military firms. In recent years, these privatized security companies have played a major role in several notable conflicts with impressive results. During the Croatian-Serbian conflict, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), located in Alexandria, Virginia, reorganized the Croatian army into a formidable fighting force, which led to Serbian defeat. Brown & Root Services, a construction and engineering firm based in Texas, provided for the maintenance of weapon systems for US forces in the Balkans during the Kosovo war (Singer, 2003). Several firms are involved in anti-narcotics and counter insurgency operations in Colombia. These firms are profit motivated, compete on a global basis, and provide a comprehensive menu of military and supportive services. According to P.W. Singer, the number of failed and dysfunctional states following the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the rise and intensification of religious and ethnic conflicts have created power vacuums, which are readily filled by criminal organizations and warlords. The proliferation of inexpensive and light weapons, coupled with the inability of governments to enforce laws, provide these groups with the opportunity to impose their will on the local populations (Singer, 2003).

Moreover, since the major powers, specifically the US, cannot devote combat resources for every local conflict that does not unambiguously bear upon national security, the responsibility for managing these conflicts will increasingly devolve upon the organizations directly threatened.

As mentioned before, the large number of multinational corporations operating in a borderless world with a multicultural identity, have business interests in places of minor security concern for the US or for that matter, other triad countries. The growing instability in developing countries and the transition states of the former Soviet Union, namely Central Asia, will necessitate intelligence assessments, on-site protection, and occasional armed intervention. The need for prompt action requires real-time information, maximum organizational flexibility, and intervention resources carefully tailored to the dimensions of the local threat. These requirements can be met by either a corporation having its own intelligence and military forces, like the British East India Company, or a corporation retaining the services of private military firms. Either way, corporations will utilize these services in a dangerous, fragmented world.

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