THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND MYSORE
(1831-1867)



NIKHILES GUHA

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CONTENTS

FRONTISPIECE

'Sketch Map of Mysore'

Source: L. Bowring, Eastern Experiences (London, 1911).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

R.A.M. - Report On The Administration of Mysore.

Cons. - Consultations.

Deptt. - Department.

Progs. - Proceedings.

For.Pol.- Foreign Political.

For.Sec.- Foreign Secret.

Sec. and Pol. - Secret and Political.


Sketch Map
of
MYSORE
English Miles
10 20 30 40 80
BELLARY
DHARWAR
N. CANARA
CHITALDROOG
KADDAPA
KÓLÁR
TOOMKOOR
BANGALORE
N. ARCOT
SALEM
KOIMBATORE
NILGIRI
WAINÁD
COORG
S. CANARA
HASAN
MYSORE
SHIMOGA
KADUR
Vijayanagar
Molakalmuru
Harihar
Davangere
Chitaldrug
Hiriur
Sira
Madagiri
Nidikal
Gummanaikpaliam
Chikka Balapur
Chintamanipett
Kolár
Hosakote
Dévanhalli
Bangalore
Nellamangalam
Toomkoor
Koratagere
Chikkanaikanhalli
Tarikere
Shimoga
Bednor
Anantpur
Honali
Sagar
Ikkeri
Gaursoppa Falls
Chandragutti
Lakhwalli
Sukharaipatan
Chikkamugalur
Hosdrug
Haranhalli
Hasan
Belur
Chenrayapatan
Melkote
Narsipur
Salagram
Yedatore
Periapatam
SERINGAPATAM
Mysore
Nanjangud
Yelandur
Chamrajnagar
Gundalpett
Malavalli
Sosilla
Kanakanhalli
Ramagiri
Closepett
Anekal
Sarjapur
Maddur
Hulurdrug
Magadi
Kunigal
Turivekere
R. Kávéri
Arkavati R.
Shimsha
Hemavati R.
Tunga R.
Bhadra R.
Vedavati R.
Tungabhadra R.
RAILWAY
Edwd. Weller

INTRODUCTION

What is referred to in the following pages as the kingdom of Mysore does not exist on the political map of India today. Since 1973 the name has been replaced by that of Karnataka. The change is more than that of a name. Princely Mysore consisted of only nine south - eastern districts of Karnataka, - viz. Bangalore, Mandya, Mysore, Kolar, Tumkur, Hassan, Shimoga, Chickmagalur and Chitaldrug (present Chitradurga). The efforts for the unification of all Kannadigas that had been going on since the end of World War I bore fruit in the first decade following India's independence. In 1953 the Bellary district of the Madras Presidency was joined to Mysore. Further additions were made after the states' reorganisation in November 1956. The gains to Mysore were Dakshina Canara from the Madras Presidency; Bidar, Gulbarga and Raichur from Hyderabad, and Uttara Canara, Bijapur, Dharwar and Belgaon (except the Chandragad taluk) from Bombay. Altogether this meant a spatial increase from 76,245 sq.km., the area of princely Mysore, to 1,92,204 sq.km., the size of Karnataka at present. In the Indian Republic, Karnataka is the second largest province in the south after Andhra Pradesh. The fortunes of these contiguous states run almost parallel to each other. Coming into prominence in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries following the decline of the Mughul empire, they served later as two of

the most important princely states of India till the time of their incorporation into the Indian Republic, since when their voting behaviour in parliamentary politics has for long been similar.

The present discussion is devoted to a study of the conditions in Mysore during the nineteenth century under British administration. The period chosen is from 1831, when the British took over the task of administering the kingdom on behalf of the Maharaja, to 1867, when they finally recognised his right of adoption. The latter date was also the last year in the life of Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, who had been on the throne of Mysore since 1799. He died in February 1868. Sir John Lawrence, Governor General in India from 1864, and Sir Lewin Bentham Bowring, Resident in Mysore from 1862 onwards, left their posts respectively in 1869 and 1870. A chapter seemed to have come to a close with their departure. The famine that broke out in Mysore in the 1870's was an unfortunate visitation. The Rendition of the kingdom in 1881 was a continuation of the principles behind the Adoption Despatch. The closing stages of the drama described here are, thus, more-or-less clear-cut. But the same cannot be said of the earlier phase. For reconstructing this period it is necessary to go back in point of time, since initially it was an a vowed aim of the British not to

interfere with the local institutions. Bowring was the first to contemplate of changes in this situation. But though providing the impetus, he did not stay long enough to see his policies completely executed. Local spheres of influence were not sharply curtailed at the village level. The Brahmins maintained their hold over society. In fact, the period from the death of Haidar in 1782 to the Rendition of Mysore in 1881 may be taken as an unit in itself. It would leave out of account both the earlier saga of military exploits under Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan and the more recent economic growth under the dewans beginning from Sheshadri Iyer (1883-1901). The importance of the intervening century lies in its being the stage of intermediate development between the old and the new. We thus get a chance to ascertain the traditional elements that continued and new ones that impinged on them all the while. Out of the interplay of these various factors was set the block on which the future history of Mysore was to be written. We have a modest aim, that of exploring this phase of transition.

First, however, it is necessary to describe the stage on which the drama was to be enacted. The physical extent of the kingdom was not the same down the ages. The process of territorial expansion begun by Chikka Deva Raja received its first decisive check in 1793, and subsequently in 1800, after the Third and Fourth Anglo - Mysore Wars respectively.

Mysore did not get back its coast-line till 1956. But, the basic features of the province have continued to resemble a triangle, having the Western and Eastern Ghats for its two arms and the point where they merge into the Nilgiris as the apex. It is an undulating table-land with a general altitude of about 2000 feet above sea level along the borders in the north and south. The highest elevation as also the central area of the state is the watershed separating the river Krishna in the north from the Cavery in the south. The Western Ghats are taller than the Eastern and the plateau generally slopes from the west to the east. There is another difference between the two ranges as those to the west do not present the naked, sun-burnt, rocky exterior of those to the east. The stones of the Western Ghats are buried in a rich mould, leading to dense forests and a lush vegetation dotted with plantations of pepper, areca and coffee, items that have exercised a great influence in the economic life of the country. The importance of this area is all the more as it forms the hinterland to the Canara coastline. The districts of Shimoga, Hassan and Chickmagalur rest on these heights. Taken together, the region known as the malnad offers a sharp contrast to the maidan or the plains that occupy the rest of the province. During the nineteenth century, the kingdom was surrounded on all sides by territories directly under the British administration.

The first critical account in recent times of Tipu's administration was presented by Surath Charan Sen Gupta in two volumes of the Journal of the Department of Letters (Vol. XIX, 1929 and Vol. XXI, 1931), published by the Arts Faculty of the Calcutta University. There are indications that he had a fuller exposition in view, but the articles in their present form do not cover the whole ground. Sengupta's work, to which two later scholars working on the same field have expressed gratitude[1], was based only on published material, which however he explored thoroughly. His was a pioneering effort. With limited resources at his disposal,

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1. See Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan (Calcutta, 1971 edn.), p. 332 f.n. and Asok Sen, 'A Pre-British Economic Formation in India of the late Eighteenth Century : Tipu Sultan's Mysore' in Barun De (ed.), Perspectives In Social Sciences I : Historical 'Dimensions (Calcutta, 1977), p. 46 f.n.

he presented an orderly, connected account, the quality of which is still commendable half a century later. Shortly after the publication of his two articles, Narendra Krishna Sinha, then a young lecturer at the University of Calcutta, devoted himself to the study of Haidar Ali as a subject of research. Meticulousness, always the most sterling quality of Professor Sinha, shines out even in so early a work. But he was still to find his true bearings. Military and diplomatic history engaged him (as it did scholars of this time) more than administration, specially revenue administration, a field in which he was to distinguish himself later. His single chapter on Haidar Ali's civil administration is not as elaborately written as one might have wished for. To take an instance, while aware of the value of the Baramahal Records as a source of information for Haidar Ali's administration, Sinha did not devote himself at length to an examination of the evidence contained in it. Nor did he depict in detail the strong network through which Haidar imposed his iron rule over his kingdom.

Three scholars deserve particular mention for their contributions to the present field of study. Sustained devotion to work over a long period of time characterises the work of each, --- Hayavadana Rao, Mohibbul Hasan and M.H. Gopal. Theirs is the basis on which should be constructed

all future research into Mysore history for the period prior to 1831. Hayavadana Rao, first among them in point of time, organised his narrative on the understanding that Mysore history derived from a continuous evolution of South Indian polity since the days of Vijaynagar. His position is best summed up in his own words :

'The attempt of Chikkadevaraja and Nanjaraja, the Dalavai, is better appreciated when we remember the connection of Mysore with the Vijaynagar Empire and the Empire that Haidar dreamt of was but an inverted picture of the Hindu attempt at continuity of existence in the south of India, which in his son's hands became a veritable attempt at the establishment, if possible, of a Muslim Sultanate with all the paraphernelia of a foreign hierarchy of officials, which offended the practical good sense of even the Persian annalists of the period.'[2]

The last part of this statement, viz. that Tipu was trying to set up an Islamic state, is open to challenge. Writing under the patronage of the Wodeyars, the same royal dynasty

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2. C. Hayavadana Rao, History of Mysore, Vol.I (Bangalore, 1943), Preface, p.XVII , Vol.II, App.III No.2, pp.745-748.

that Tipu sent behind the bars, Rao was not likely to show much sympathy for the Sultan and we may well understand the reasons. Besides, we must remember that Brahmins dominated the administrative machinery of this predominantly Hindu kingdom before the time of Tipu. Seen in this light the Sultan's attempts to reduce their importance appear as part of the steps taken by him against cliques and coteries in his kingdom. Apart from this possible lapse of judgement, the third volume of Hayavadana Rao's History of Mysore (Bangalore, 1946), dealing with the latter half of the career of Haidar Ali and the whole of Tipu, has come in for criticism on grounds of style. Objection is raised against the writer's tendency to repeat himself in parts. A distinguished Kannadiga scholar, for instance, has this to say : 'By proper editing the third volume could easily be reduced to half its present size of 1376 pages without any loss of sense or relevance.'[3] There is some point in this. The book lacks in compactness and needs to be pruned and trimmed. But included within this sprawling narrative are portions of considerable significance.

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3. G.S. Dikshit, "Studies in the History of Mysore" in S.P. Sen (ed.), Studies In Modern Indian History, A Regional Survey (Calcutta, 1969), p. 148.

Hayavadana Rao's interest in Haidar Ali the man, for instance, has led to his incorporating a greater amount of information on this point than is to be met with in any other account. Administration in pre-British Mysore being highly personalised in nature, the importance of such information cannot be gainsaid. The bulk of Hayavadana Rao's work grew out of the material amassed by him in writing the historical portions of the Mysore Gazetteer in the 1930's (see especially Vol.II in four Parts - bringing the story from the earliest times down to 1927). An important feature of these researches is the concern shown for local sources, where and when available. Thus, discussion takes place on a chronicle of the Parakala Swamy Math, a Vaishnava temple to which the Wodeyars extended their patronage. [Sri - Parakala - Charitra - Sangraha, personally compiled from the Matha records by Pandit Tiruvallur Srinivasa Raghavachariar.]4 A detailed list is also given of the religious grants of Krishnaraja Wodeyar III. The basis for this is the Kannada work, Annals of the Mysore Royal Family, by B. Ramakrishna Row, a senior contemporary of his who has not received his meed of houour from later scholars. This is unfortunate, for besides two volumes of the aforesaid book, Ramakrishna Rao

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4. Hayavadana Rao, Ibid, Vol.II, pp.748-751. For the sources on which Hayavadana Rao based his work see also Ibid, Vol.I, pp.XXI-XXXII (General Bibliography) and Vol.II, App.4, No.2, pp.785-91 (Sources of Mysore History of the Usurpation Period 1961-99).

was also the editor of two important collections of documents, Mysore State Papers : Selections (Mysore Government Press, 1922) and Selections from The Records of the Sringeri Mutt (Mysore Government Press, 1927). It is time that our respects be paid to him as one of the path-finders in the writing of the history of modern Karnataka.

Mohibbul Hasan and M.H. Gopal bring us to the most recent phase of scholarship, of which Ramakrishna Rao is the precursor. The former continued the tradition of research on Mysore history at the Calcutta University when the first edition of his History of Tipu Sultan was published in 1951. Like Sinha before him, with whom he was in close touch (a fact acknowledged in the preface to the book), Hasan adopts the biographical method and places major emphasis on diplomatic and military history.

The bibliography to the History of Tipu Sultan is the most complete to date. Command over English and French, plus a smattering of Portugese, has been called upon to produce the text. Record rooms in India (at Calcutta, Delhi and Madras) and abroad (specially in France and U.K.) have been pressed into service. In following the trail of the Mysore ruler, Hasan has been led to enquire into the conditions of the Persian Gulf regions with which Tipu was desirous of developing commercial relations. His edition of the diary of

Tipu's embassy to Constantinople in 1786, the Waqaii Manazil-i Rum (Aligarh Muslim University 1968), is particularly valuable in this regard. The full implications of Tipu's trade regulations, however, escaped him. He noted that the Tellicherry Consultations and French records abounded with references to the grievances of private merchants against the Sultan, but failed to utilise them[5]. Consequently, the prospects of breaking into new ground with a discussion on the Sultan's economic measures and motives eluded him. This has not only deprived us of a fuller knowledge of the connections between the Middle East and the western coast of India, it has also prevented us from delving into the root causes of the Third Anglo-Mysore War at greater length. Bombay was separated by the Marathas from coming into proximity with Mysore and it was not till trading interests were threatened that the Bombay merchants joined the Cochin Jews, the Raja of Travancore and the Dutch East India Company in a common front against Tipu. The outcome was to upset the balance of forces in south-west India with the scales heavily weighed against Mysore. In the event, it was left for Wellesley to deliver the coup de grace.

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5. Mohibbul Hasan, Waqai-i-Manazil i Rum (Bombay, 1968) p. 22 f.n. 11.

The inadequate attention to economic factors that we find in Mohibbul Hasan is a characteristic shared in common [redacted] by all writers of Mysore history, with one exception. M.H. Gopal began his investigations into the historical dimensions of public finance with a book on the Mauryas in ancient India[6]. In the decade since 1960 he has laid before us the results of much painstaking research on the economic conditions of Mysore between 1782 - 1831. The trend of his specialisation is evident from the nature of the topics chosen for discussion. Thus, Tipu Sultan's Mysore, An Economic Study (Bombay, 1971) is a collection of five essays on the probable revenue of the kingdom, commercial policy, military expenditure, financial administration and a general discussion on the overall financial position. The scope of the preceding book, The Finances of the Mysore State, 1799 - 1831 (Mysore, 1960), is thought out on similar lines. As a student of public finance, his emphasis in either case falls heavily on quantification, though it has to be admitted that the figures for

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6. M.H. Gopal, Mauryan Public Finance (London, 1927). The work was done under the supervision of Dr. Gilbert Slater of London University, whose own work on Some South Indian Villages (Oxford University Press, 1918) was an early example of sociological research demanding, Gopal says, 'an extensive and intensive knowledge of the village'. See Gopal, An Introduction to Research Procedure In Social Sciences (Bombay, 1964), p. 36.

the unstable times of which he is the narrator are likely to be of doubtful varacity. Gopal's work is vigorously confined to a narrow, but important, aspect of the problem. It is typical of the works of this genre in bringing up the question as to whether historical problems can be studied in closely defined categories.

Approaching as he does the problem of public finance from an administrative standpoint, Gopal fails to place sufficient emphasis on a host of co-related factors,-ex. the system of values influencing the courtly pattern of behaviour, the role of the dominant caste (expectedly that of the Brahmins) and the opposition engendered by it. Working entirely on the basis of documents in England, he was unable to comprehend the Indian scene in all its complexities though, in fairness to him, it must be added that he was conscious of his limitations. The point is admitted in the preface to the Finances of The Mysore State, 1799 - 1831, where he says : 'possibly, there is another side to the story told in this book, but attempts to get at other records in India have proved futile'. It is in helping to obviate such difficulties that the Karnataka State Archives, opened recently, has an important role to play. For the first time, documents pertaining exclusively to the history of the province, particularly for the last two hundred years, are being sought to be stored and arranged in one single place. While far from

being organised by now, there is still much of importance to reward the diligent. To take one instance, it is now possible to reconstruct in greater detail the incidents of the insurrection in north-west Mysore during the early years of the 1830's with the help of the Minutes of Proceedings of The Mysore Commission, manuscripts of which are available in the Karnataka State Archives in six bound volumes. At the time of writing Gopal had only the Insurrection Committee's Report and the proceedings of the Committee of Enquiry, on the basis of which the Report was drawn up, before him.

Two books deserve to be studied together. The Administration of Mysore Under Sir Mark Cubbon by K.N.V. Sastri (London, 1932) was written with the avowed intention of carrying on the story from where Wilks had left it. (This is stated in the very first sentence of the preface to the book). Sastri's open idolatry of Wilks makes it necessary to incorporate some comments on the nature of work he chose to base himself on. It was a common characteristic of British administrators writing on India between 1764 to 1813, says Bernard Cohn, to project the history of this country in terms of Oriental despotism and warring village republics. The intention was to justify the imposition of British rule on India as an attempt to bring order out of chaos. The expositor had an eye to explain and legitimize the British conquest to the officials and owners of the East India Company and more

importantly to Parliament and the politically aware public in England'[7]. Similar traits were discovered by Eric Stokes in the works of succeeding generations of British administrators, who set down their Indian experiences in the twilight of their careers in a state of retirement in England: 'It was usually bluff, vigorous writing, meant only for home consumption, and avowedly intended to arouse public interest in Britain's Indian Empire or defend it against the misrepresentations of sentimental liberalism'.[8]

Basing himself on such work, and Wilks is indicative of the lot, Sastri showers praise on Cubbon. As in the writings of these British administrators, it is the character of the

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7. Bernard Cohn, 'African Models and Indian Histories' in Richard G. Fox, Realm and Region in Traditional India (New Delhi, 1977), p. 102. For similarities in the description of the Indian village as portrayed by Wilks and his contemporaries see Louis Dumonto, 'The "Village Community" from Munro to Maine in Religion, politics And History in India (Paris, 1970).

8. E.T. Stokes, 'The Administrators And Historical Writing On India' in C.H. Philips (ed.), Historians of India, Pakistan And Ceylon (London, 1961), p. 385.

hero that strides over his world. A votary of the Munro school of administration, he finds its qualities reflected in Mysore under Wilks and his cousin. Cubbon[9]. 'But the secret of success', he avows, 'lay neither in the wisdom of a treaty nor in the energy of the government of India. It lurked in the character of the ruler[10]. Such an attitude confuses the perspective. It tends to impose the individual on his times rather than seek an interaction between his character and the objective conditions round him. Sastri's method, moreover, tends to fragmentation. In separate sections of the book we are told of a series of departmental reforms under Cubbon, but do not see what changes, if any, occurred in his general policies. The result produces the impression of a series of pictures, succeeding each other slowly on a small screen. This is not to deny the measure of Cubbon's achievement. He brought peace to a province long suffering from the effects of war and, more recently, laxity in administration. The reforms of his period were meant to remove deficiencies in the existing structure rather than

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9. K.N.V. Sastri, The Munro School of British Statesmanship in India (Mysore, 1939), pp.325-26 f.n.

10. K.N.V. Sastri, The Administration of Mysore Under Sir Mark Cubbon, 1834-1861 (London, 1932), p. 210.

initiate any process of change. The Augean stables had to be cleared before further progress could be made. And yet we cannot minimise the importance of bearing in mind what is obvious, -that Mysore was a part of the Indian polity and as such subject to the pressure of British rule to a degree that individual powers, even if willing, could not mitigate. The truth of this may be tested in the passage where Sastri himself describes the industry and commerce of Mysore during this period. Competition from Manchester ruined the cotton weavers; the establishment of a railroad between Bangalore and Madras diverted the coffee trade to the east and, at the same time, made it possible for the duty-free import of sea-salt from Madras to Mysore, thus jeopardising the interests of those engaged in the traditional practice of producing earth salt and reducing the importance of Mangalore as an alternative supplier of the commodity to Mysore[11]. While these changes took place on one level, the continuation of amildars,- though on a much reduced scale of pay and under greater control, at least on paper,- maintained the local hierarchy of power. Brahmin dominance at the level of village administration continued very much as before in Mysore till the famine of 1876. The superintendents, one in charge of each of the four divisions into which Mysore was divided till 1861 (Bangalore, Chitaldrug, Ashtagram and Nagar) were asked to supervise over administrative units, too big for any one

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11. Ibid, pp. 119 - 121.

individual to manage, and had to depend on the amildars for help. The personalised nature of the administration could not cope with the increasing load of work and so departments had to be introduced from the time of the next Commissioner, Lewin Bentham Bowring. The administration of Cubbon, by providing a period of much-needed stability, did more to prepare the ground for change rather than be an agent of change itself. This is a picture that does not emerge with sufficient clarity from Sastri's account.

A world removed from Sastri is James Manor, Political Change In An Indian State : Mysore 1917-1955 (Delhi, 1977 edn.). The period covered by this book is, strictly speaking not included within our time limits. But since it seeks to explain Mysore politics largely in terms of differences of caste and sect running well back in time, there are points at which it touches on the present discussion. Manor's is an exercise in the sociology of politics and deserves to be considered on such terms. Ironically this is where it comes off weakest. For the roots of the conflict have not been traced to their origin in either the world of ideas or of action. It is interesting to note in this connection that Wilks had as early as the opening years of the nineteenth century, realised that Veerasaivism, or the faith of the Lingayets, constituted an anti-monarchist trend by virtue of its opposition to the rules of caste and

Brahmin priesthood on which the king depended[12]. In his description of the emergency of the non-Brahmin movement in Mysore, Manor does not similarly take into account the religious ties of the Lingayets, transcending local limits, such as participation by all important votaries of the faith in the election of their religious chief, the head of the Chinmuladri Brhan Math at Chitaldrug or his itineraries or the decisions of achara cases among the Lingayets. The work of H.M. Sadasivaiah illuminating such aspects of the Lingayet faith is absent from Manor's bibliography. Nor is there any reference to Parvathamma's study of Kshatriya-Lingayet rivalry, as evinced, for instance, in the Bellary district[13]. Manor's is the latest indication of two self-limiting tendencies in the study of Mysore history. First, there is the complaint about the paucity of sources, made in the preface itself, a deficiency which is sought to be removed by relying on oral history. There is, of course, here the snag that the interviewee may not be as knowledgeable as we might wish for.

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12. Mark Wilks, Historical Sketches of the South of India in an attempt to trace the History of Mysore, Vol.I (Mysore, 1930), ed. by Murray Hamnick. p.214.

13. H.M. Sadasivaiah, A Comparative Study of Two Virasaiva Manasteries : A Study In Sociology of Religion (Mysore University, 1967) and C. Parvathamna, Politics and Religion (New Delhi, 1971).

Secondly, there is the attempt to analyse developments in Mysore from the standpoint of a viewer in Madras. This creates problems of prespective for it was western Karnataka that first entered the national movement, largely as a result of Maratha influence. In fact, this prevents Manor from reaching the origins of the process of political change to which he refers. In proceeding from Madras, his focus does not point the right way.

Having provided this brief survey of the more important works on the history of Mysore and the period immediately before, we may now indicate the approach adopted in the present study. The half century following the year 1831 in the history of the kingdom may best be understood in the perspective of the potentialities of development under Haidar and Tipu and the decline that had set in during the three decades after them. We have, therefore, delineated in some detail the internal conditions of the kingdom, particularly as regards the agrarian structure and commercial policy. Regarding this latter issue, there is some difference of opinion among historians. Wilks among the earlier writers and Ashin Dasgupta at a more recent date have criticised Tipu's trade embargo against the English as negative to all practical purposes, selfdestructive and implemented with an eye to filling the state coffers. In contradistinction to this stands the contention of Holden Furber and Pamela

Nightingale : the English private merchants acting in league with the Dutch, the Cochin Jews and the Raja of Travancore plotted for Tipu's downfall to save themselves from the crushing effects of his trade regulations. What is amazing is the absence of reference to each other in the writings of these distinguished scholars on the above point[14]. It is as if each is bent on adumbrating his own views to the exclusion of the rest. The confusion is not made less by the fact that, while describing the commercial policy of Tipu Sultan, neither Mohibbul Hasan nor M.H. Gopal are able to relate their facts to a general perspective. The problem has been taken up here and the discussion widened to include an account of the social conditions in Malabar at this time, a task also not attempted before.

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14. For earlier discussions of the problem see Wilks, Report on the Interior Administration, Resources And Expenditure of The Government of Mysore (Calcutta, 1804), paras 164/65 and also his History of Mysore, Vol.II (Mysore, 1932 edn.) ~~pp~~ pp.567-572, Holden Furber, John Company At Work (Harvard, 1948), pp.244-255; Ashin Dasgupta, Malabar In Asian Trade, 1740-1800 (Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp.111-114 and his article 'Trade And Politics In Eighteenth Century India' in D.S. Richards (ed.), Islam And The Trade of Asia, A Colloquium (Oxford, 1970), p.198; Pamela Nightingale, Trade And Empire In Western India; 1784-1806 (Cambridge, 1970), pp.36-56. J.Van Lohuizen, The Dutch East India Company And Mysore, 1762-1790 (S. Gravenhage-Martinius Nijhoff, 1961), does not go into the problem.

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The considerations that led to the restoration of the monarchy in Mysore and the sympathy and consideration showed by Malcolm and Wilks as Residents to this court, lead us to the second chapter. From the second decade of the nineteenth century, however, the state entered into difficulties. Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, though genial in person, did not have the strength of character to be a successful administrator. The favourites of both the Resident and the Maharaja held the reins of government. At the local level, the amildars, whom even Haidar and Tipu had not been able to restrain fully, grew more powerful. The various levels of authority and influence in Mysore at this period have been described at some length. The distribution of patronage and the accumulation of power in various grades bore down ultimately upon the villages and it was their headmen who assumed the lead in organising a rebellion in north-west Mysore in the early 1830's. The third chapter describes this rebellion in detail and narrates the course of British policy with regard to Mysore from the time that Lord William Bentinck took over the administration of this kingdom in 1831 to the time that Lord Dalhousie became the Governor General of India in 1847.

Chapters IV and V are devoted to a study of the later phase of this relationship when the office of the Governor General was held successively by Dalhousie, Canning and Lawrence. Sir Charles Wood was the Secretary of State

during most of this period and the aim most in mind was the direct addition of Mysore to the British dominions in India. This was a reversal of the line of policy pursued in the earlier years of the century, but the earlier tradition was not entirely eliminated. It was heard again in the changed Indian context after 1857 and frustrated the expansianist tendencies with regard to Mysore. The debates round the fate of the kingdom in the 1860's carry a significance that must be understood in the light of British policy to India as a whole. The terms of reference included issues that were not limited to the considerations of a single policy maker like Sir Charles Wood or his critic, Sir George Russell Clerk. Political opinion in Bombay was being mobilised to thwart any attempt on the part of the British government to incorporate Mysore into the Raj. Chapter IV of the present treatise, therefore, widens the scope of discussion beyond mere preoccupation with the attitude of Sir Charles Wood on the Mysore question as evinced, for instance, in Robin Moore's book under the title Sir Charles Wood's Indian Policy, 1853-66 (Manchester University Press, 1962) or the equally heavy emphasis on the role of Sir George Russell Clerk as depicted by Donovan Williams in his article on 'The Adoption Despatch of 16 April 1867: Its Origins And Significance in a book edited jointly by him with Eli Daniel Potts, Essays In Indian History, In Honour of Cuthbert Collin Davies (Bombay, 1973). Also, in our discussion of the attitude of the early

nineteenth century British administrators in India, we have faced by the question : is it justifiable to call members of this generation, - particularly Elphinstone, Malcolm, Munro and Metcalfe, - representatives of the 'Romantic' school ? We have suggested that this view be modified in view of the very practical difficulties in which they found themselves and the pragmatic course they tried to chalk out.

The reluctance to disturb existing institutions, so characteristic of British relations with Mysore on the state level, also manifested itself in internal administration of the province till 1861. The polygars were pensioned off; the land system was not altered; and English education was neither encouraged nor made much headway. The avowed policy of the Directors till 1847 was to return the state back to the Maharaja, after the necessary reforms had been implemented. They, thus, did not want to introduce any change to which he could have difficulty in adjustment. Nonetheless, the construction of communication lines and the abolition of internal trade duties did serve to integrate the province. This process was further extended by the spread of English education and the land surveys that were introduced by Sir Levin Bentham Bowring as the Commissioner from 1861-68. The famine of the early 1870's, however, served as a cruel interlude and also a landmark in effecting far-reaching changes.

terminating point to the period of the Commissioner's rule.

The focus of attention in the present dissertation has rested on the elements of continuity and change at a regional level. Conflict between individual administrators, as between the Junior and Senior Commissioners at the beginning of the 1830's or differences of opinion between the members of the India office and the Council of State, - to which latter aspect attention had been confined by Robin Moore and Donovan Williams - have entered the discussion only in so far as their results had a bearing on the course of events in the kingdom. If closely examined, local traits may, we believe, be illustrative of the general tendencies prevailing in the country at the time. We have striven to this effect.

CHAPTER - I

THE PRE-BRITISH STATE

The year 1793 marked a turning point in the history of Mysore. After two inconclusive encounters with the English East India Company during 1767-1769 and 1780-1784, the kingdom had accepted for the first time terms not as before of equality but decidedly of a reduced status. The military might of Mysore, which had been a source of terror to her neighbours, had been decisively checked. Within six years it was to be entirely eliminated.

In its aspirations for supremacy in South India, the kingdom of Mysore was following the political tradition of Vijaynagar, that had been the bastion of Hinduism for two centuries (1336-1565). The ascent of Mysore may be dated from the year 1610, when Raja Wodeyar I (1578-1617) expelled the viceroy of the Vijaynagar king from Seringapatam and made that city his capital. The whole of south Mysore and some regions to its north comprised the territorial limits of his kingdom. Mysore was definitely put on the political map of India by Chikka Deva Raja (1672-1704), the greatest among the early Wodeyars. His dominions stretched in the north up to Bangalore and parts of the Tumkur district contiguous to Sira (the headquarters of the Mughul Deccan); in the west and the north-west they extended upto Hassan and Kadur districts, as far as Chikmagalur and Sakrepatna, on the borders of the kingdom of Ikkeri (another state to have ceded from Vijaynagar, that was finally conquered by Mysore in 1762); and in the east and south,

up to and inclusive of parts of the hilly country of Salem, Baramahal and Coimbatore. As the royal progeny began to decline in strength however, power passed into the hands of the army commander (Dalavai), a position which was the exclusive monopoly of the Kalale chiefs for the entire period from 1610 to 1761. They were related by matrimonial ties with the Wodeyars and hailed from the same place of origin,- Dwarka in Gujrat. They held the reins of government from 1720 to 1760 when Haidar came to the fore, by virtue of his prowess and skilful exploitation of divisions within the Kalale family. They were the first of a series of strong personalities to carry on effectively the task of government when the Crown was weak[1].

Contemporary accounts provide a glimpse into the centralised administration under Haidar and Tipu. The Frenchman, De La Tour, for instance, who served in Haidar's army, has left the following description. Official work commenced as soon as Haidar rose from sleep at daybreak. Orders were sent by him to officials and ministers through his bodyguards and couriers. Between eight

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1. Twentieth century research on the gradual rise of Mysore before the time of Haidar, on which the above synoptic statement rests, is based on M.H. Krishna, "The Dalavai Family of Mysore" in Bharata-Kaumudi [Studies In Indology In Honour of Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji, Allahabad, 1945, Part I, pp.347-67] and Hayavadana Rao, History of Mysore (Vols.1,2). For an earlier account see M.Wilks, History of Mysore, Vol.I.

to nine in the morning he directed his secretaries as to the answers relative to the despatches received. During this time only his sons, relatives and the more important nobles could have access to him. From half past ten in the morning to three in the afternoon, Haidar attended the hall of audience. Here he listened to the petitions of the people. Officials could deny access only at the risk of incurring punishment. Thus, De La Tour narrates the story of one Hyder Sha, chief usher, who was subjected to two hundred strokes for not having placed before his master the complaints of an old woman against one of Haidar's officers. It was also during this part of the day that Haidar finished answering despatches and dictated several private orders. Instructions carried seals of the respective ministers issuing them as well as those [illegible] of their departments. Haidar's own replies were attested with the royal seal and, in special cases, with a seal that he wore on his fingers. To ensure the communication of all serious deliberation, a piece of paper was attached noting the time of despatch and requiring subsequent stations to mark the time when they received it. It was also in this hall of audience that Haidar supervised the purchase of horses, elephants and cannons for the state. Consultations during evenings were restricted to nobles and other important officials of state who were seldom summoned to the hall of audience during the day[2].

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2. M.M.D (e). L (a). T (our). The History of Hyder Shah (Calcutta, 1848 ed.) pp. 25-36.

The above account may be verified in part with reference to contemporary Persian annals, ---the Nishan-i-Haidari by Kirmani and the Ahwal-i-Haidar-Naik by Mirza Ikbal,-- and the account of his experiences in India left behind by Schwartz, the envoy from the English to Haidar during 1779-1780. Thus, Mirza Ikbal says too that Haidar's day began with his listening to reports from his hurkaras at dawn[3], and Schwartz pays witness to the fact that the task of answering messages went on at night. The latter was an eye-witness of the caution with which Haidar, who could neither read or write himself, ensured that the proper answers were recorded. 'He (Haidar) orders one man to write a letter and read it to him; then he calls another to read it again. If the writer has in the least deviated from his orders, his head pays for it'[4]. The picture of Haidar that emerges from

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3. Mirza Ikbal, "Ahwal-i-Haidar Naik"; included as Supplementary Note to The History of Hydur Naik, by Kirmani, Translated by Col.W.Miles (London, 1842) p.505.

4. The account of Schwartz is particularly valuable in that it presents a straight-forward representation of the observations not of an artful man of the world but of a missionary, committed to the cause of truth who could only with difficulty be persuaded in 1779 to undertake a mission to Haidar's court on the assurance of being rewarded with assistance for raising a church on his return. Schwartz had gathered before this an experience of thirty years stay in India. See Wilks, History of Mysore, Vol.I, Appendix VIII, pp.844-850 .

these descriptions is that of a man industrious, secretive, reticent, attentive to minute details and ever watchful. As Kirmani writes: 'Whatever he desired to be done he himself ordered, and the rest of the assembly had no choice but to give their assent'. To emphasise the point, the same author adds that Haidar also personally inspected all additions to his stores in the form of leather, the lining of bullock-bags, or tent-walls and strands of ropes[5]. He was specially generous to horse dealers, who provided him with a vital part of his army. In addition to the value of the horses purchased, he provided them with presents of gold and raiment. On their part, they were bound to bring their horses once within Mysore first to his notice for sale. If, any horse died by chance while on the road, half of its price was paid by the state after its mane and tail had been submitted with a certificate from the civil officers of the district[6].

An elaborate system of espionage held the country in check. Kirmani informs that Haidar had nearly two thousand able spies and newswriters in all parts of his kingdom and even in other parts of the country like Hyderabad, Poona, Madras, Delhi, Bengal, Iran, Turan and Kabul. Spies were especially numerous in the territories of the dependent polygars. Their duty was to keep him daily furnished with news of the happenings within his kingdom. Besides, there were also a class of informers who kept an eye out on the streets at night. Nobles could not send out invitations for social functions without obtaining permission from Haidar, and even then secret reporters peeked in. People vied

5. Kirmani, Hydur Naik, pp.473-75.
6. Mirza Ikbal in Ibid. pp.502-3. Also p.475.

with one another to please, the messengers, who obliged by combining true news with false[7]. Local chieftains were held in submission by Haidar either by retaining them personally or by establishing a strong detachment in their respective territories. These measures continued in force till 1793, after which following the decline in administrative strengths many of them sneaked their way back[8]. The system as well as the speed through which the news passed has been most graphically described by Abraham Parsons, an English private merchant, who visited the west coast of India in course of his voyages in the Arabian Sea during the years 1772-78. The passage deserves to be quoted in full, being unknown till now : Hydur Naik

'There are few countries where papers belonging to the state are dispatched with such celerity as in the dominions of Hyder Ally. From the capital to every part of the sea coast they receive letters in thirty or thirty four hours, which is at the rate of ten or twelve miles in an hour, as the nearest part of the coast is more than three hundred miles from the capital.

The mode of conveyance is the following. At the distance of every ten or twelve miles (according to situation) is built a watch tower of stone, in which are placed five or six men, two or

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7. Ibid., pp.125, 474, 476. For Mirza Ikbal's corroborative statement, see pp.495-96, 510.

8. C.F. Brackenbury, Cuddapah (Madras District Gazetter Madras, 1915), p.45.

three of whom are remarkable for running very fast. The first man who sets off as a courier, as soon as he gets in sight of the first tower, displays a white handkerchief at the end of his stick, if by day; if by night, fires off a pistol; when immediately another man is made ready which is done by oiling his joints with cocoanut oil, as he is naked (excepting a cloth about his waist). This man takes the packet from the first and thus it is handed on in succession at each stage. They run from stage to stage within the hour'[9].

Tipu applied himself to governmental tasks with the same assiduity as Haidar. Their daily routine followed almost the same pattern. Up early in the morning, he listened to reports about happenings in various countries, before proceeding to inspect for half an hour the Jamadar khana, or treasury, containing his jewels, gold and silver ornaments and utensils, curious arms and new mechanical inventions in which he took a keen interest. At breakfast, if occasion demanded, he was closeted with his principal counsellors. On other days, he spent his time with his

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9. Abraham Parsons, Travels In Asia And Africa including a Journey from Scanderoon to Aleppo, and over the desert to Bombay, and along the western coast of India; Voyage from Bombay to Mocha and Suez in the Red Sea; A Journey from Suez to Cairo and Rosetta in Egypt (London, 1808), p.225. Scanderoon is modern Alexandria.

munshi and three youngest sons. From one to five in the afternoon, he gave public audidence and sometimes administered justice, reviewed the troops, hunted with the cheeta or superintended the arsenal. Evenings were passed by Tipu in the company of his three eldest sons, one or two of the principal officers of each administrative department, a kazi and his principal munshi. Dinner over, the daily routine came to an end for Tipu with his listening to reports received during the day and dictating answers to them[10]. The personal supervision exercised by Tipu, like Haidar before him, over the administrative machinery kept its efficiency unimpaired till the time that it was put out of gear by military reverses suffered during the third Anglo-Mysore war.

The last statement requires some justification in view of the various estimates formed at different times of Tipu Sultan. In fact, it is possible to see how he sinks in the eyes of the British following the losses suffered on the battlefield. Wilks, the first volume of whose history of Mysore appeared in 1810 and the second in 1817, represents the generally derisive terms in which the Sultan was spoken of in the period following the fall of Seringapatam. The awesome image of the 'Tiger of Mysore' is replaced by scurrilous remarks about the personality of a

10. Asiatic Annual Register (Vol.1 - 1799) pp.1-6; A. Beatson, A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultan (London, 1800), pp.156-161; James Forbes Oriental Memoirs (London, 1813) Vol.IV, p.194. Also compare Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan (Calcutta, 1971 edn.), pp.370-71.

ruler represented as a 'modern Minos', keen on innovation but not on improvement, garrulous and raucous in tone, of 'a feeble and unsteady intellect' and no judge of human beings. But, in spite of this derogatory tone, even Wilks does not find it possible to run down Tipu completely. In fact, at times he seems to be strangely divided in his opinions. For instance, he saw the Marathas grow slow-footed in trying to change their reliance in war from cavalry to infantry, and proceeded to criticise Tipu for adopting similar tactics. At the same time, he admitted that Tipu's army was superior to that of any other Indian ruler, with the possible exception of Mahadji Sindhia. The battle formation and musketry of the Mysore troops elicited the admiration of the Englishman[11]. Representative of the Conservative outlook that prevailed over England after the fall of Napoleon, Wilks had further cause for being repelled by Tipu's sympathies with revolutionary France. Altogether his writing shows evidence of too much spleen and could not be accepted without opposition by even his countrymen. Mill, for instance, found in his estimate of Tipu an expression of the Englishman's 'epidemical frenzy' in abusing powerful enemies of the national interest like Napoleon and Louis XIV[12].

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11. Wilks, History of Mysore, pp. 565-67, 763.

12. Mill, History of India (London, 1826), Vol.V pp.377-380.

The estimate of Tipu formed by Wilks may have been the result of pent up feelings against the power of Mysore, - the same that, story goes, secured for Malcolm a job in the East India Company's service upon expressing a desire to chop off Haidar's head if recruited for duty in India[13]. For there is no doubt that in the second half of the eighteenth century it was not the Marathas as much as Mysore that was considered to be the real threat by the British. Robert Clive, whose feat of arms paved the way for British success in eastern India, was aware of this new danger even before the outbreak of the First Anglo-Mysore War : 'the chief strength of the Marathas is horse, he said, 'the chief strength of Haidar Ali is infantry, cannon and small arms; from the one you have nothing to apprehend but ravage, plundering and loss in revenue; from the other, extirpation'.[14]

The comparison was carried to an even greater length by Munro :

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13. Kaye, Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm (London, 1856), Vol.I, p.8. Also Kaye, Lives of Indian Officers (London, 1873) Vol.II, p.189. Mohibbul Hasan, Tipu Sultan, p.265, is inclined to question the truth of another story, - that of Gen.Medows, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Madras, having shot himself through the head out of frustration at Cornwallis' refusal to crush Tipu completely after the Third Anglo-Mysore War. The action, in Hasan's opinion, was more the result of the disappointment felt by the General in view of his unsuccessful performance during the war.
14. Clive to Palk, 17 October, 1766, Cited in B.Sheik Ali, British Relations with Haidar Ali (Mysore, - 1963), p.61.

'The one, [that of Mysore] the most simple and despotic monarchy in the world, in which every department, civil and military, possesses the regularity and system communicated to it by the genius of Hyder, and in which all pretensions revived from high birth being discouraged, all independent chiefs and zemindars subjected or extirpated, justice severely and impartially administered to every class of people, a numerous and well-disciplined army kept up, and almost every employment of trust or consequence conferred on men raised from obscurity, gives to the government a vigour hitherto unexampled in India. The other [that of the Marathas], composed of a confederacy of independent chiefs, possessing extensive dominions, and numerous armies, now acting in concert, now jealous of each other, and acting only for their own advantage, and at all times liable to be detached from the public cause, by the most distant prospect of private gain, can never be a very dangerous enemy to the English. The first is a government of conquest; the last, merely of plunder and depredation. The character of vigour has been so strongly impressed on the Mysore government by the abilities of its founders, that it may retain it, even under the reign of a weak prince, or a minor. But the strength of the supreme Maharatta government is continually varying, according to the disposition of its different members, who sometimes strengthen it by union, and sometimes weaken it by defection, or by dividing their terriroties among their

children"[15]

In another passage Munro sums up his experience during the Third Anglo - Mysore War thus :

'The well-regulated, vigorous Government of Hyder has, under his son, become more systematic and more strong; the European discipline has been more rigidly enforced, and all kinds of fire-arms, which were formerly imported by strangers, are now made by his own subjects under the direction of foreign workmen. He has by various regulations and institutions, infused so much of the spirit of vigilance, order and obedience, into every class of men, that he has experienced none of the accidents which always attend unsuccessful wars in Asia, the revolt of his chiefs, or the desertion of his men. Whatever he has lost, has been owing to the superior power of his enemies, never to the defection of his officers; and even when forced to shut himself up in his capital, his authority continued so firm in the distant provinces, that the Maharattas could not by any means convey information of their approach to Lord Cornwallis, or advise him

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15. Munro to his father, 17 June 1790, in Gleig, Life of Major General Sir Thomas Munro, Vol.I (London, 1831), pp.96-97. The efficiency of the Mysore administration was also attested in the report sent by Hafiz Farid-ud-din Khan and Saiyid Daud Ali Khan, the Nizam's envoys to Seringapatam in 1788. They testified to the regular pay of the state servants there and the alacrity with which they carried out their order. The country was fertile and the revenue was collected regularly. The store of jewels was always full. The infantry was more numerous than the cavalry - Calendar of Persian Correspondence Vol.VIII, 1788-1789, ed.by B.A. Saletore, (National Archives of India, New Delhi, 1957), Document No.459, 28 May, 1778, [illegible], p.184.

that they had left Dharwar, till they joined him at Seringapatam. He conducts the operations of war on regular principles, taking the forts, and securing the country as he advances; and add to all that by destroying or expelling all the Rajahs and Poligars, by not permitting his great officers to keep any independent bodies of troops, and by paying all the military himself, he has adopted the wisest measures for securing to his descendants the undisturbed possession of his dominions'.

Munro wanted the English to crush Tipu precisely because he was so strong. As he said in the same letter : 'it is only the presence of such an enemy that can render any combination of other States formidable, because they require some ally more regular and more vigorous than themselves, to hold them together and give spirit to their proceedings'[16]. Fearing that the influences of Tipu might spread in the territories of the Nizam and the Marathas, Munro was led to argue in favour of an extension of the British dominions to the river Krishna; for as he said : 'while his power remains unimpaired so far from being able to extend our territory, we shall be perpetually in danger of losing what we have'[17].

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16. Munro to George Brown of Leith, 10 Aug. 1791, in Gleig, Munro, Vol.1, pp. 132-133.

17. Ibid, p. 139.

To understand the organisation of the kingdom under Haidar and Tipu it is necessary to direct our attention to the devolution of power and the allocation of resources. Haidar seized power at a time when the country had been been left confused, defenceless and weak by repeated Maratha invasions, on the one hand, and lack of leadership, on the other. To restore credibility to the government, he had first to devote himself to the financial problem. To the king and the Dalavai were allotted Rs.3 lakhs each for their household expenses. One-tenth of the landed property was sold (Krayagong) against bills issued under the royal seal to purchase terms of peace against the Marathas in 1760.

The kingdom had been extended by conquests from 84 Gulies (districts) to 144. The whole area was divided into 16 subadaries of very unequal extent. Most of the former officials being discarded and their records considered undependable, a gross estimate of the revenue raised during the previous five years was first prepared. Revenue assignments were given to the highest bidders. The subadars had full powers, military and civil, to direct the affairs of their respective provinces. In every district they were assisted by an amil and subadar. A subadar could not increase his percentage of profit in the collection of revenue during a favourable season, since it was understood that he would not be able to pay his dues fully if the crop failed. Haidar, thus, sought to limit the subadar's share of collection in any season.

Pressure from the top, however, passed in successive stages to the lowest level. The subadars maintained two sets of records,-- a public one (jumma) and a private one (Khassgut), valued at one-tenth of the former. The Khassgut was first made, so that a subadar could always know of the defalcations in payment and enter them into his jumma. At the end of the year, he submitted his accounts, which were compared with those presented by the sheristadar. In practice, however, the latter usually copied out his figures from what had been earlier prepared by the subadar. All parties to the profit shared the gains between them and prevented any other information from reaching Haidar's ears. These peculations were carried on for a long time with impunity, because the accounts classified as sagvaly (i.e. register of ryot's ploughs at work) and hattavaly (i.e. register of actual produce), which with the Jama wasul baki (account of the settlements, receipts and disbursements), might have provided the means of detecting the actual state of affairs, were never examined. Districts being assessed at 15%-20% more than before, the ryots fell into great arrears and had no other means of collecting the money than take loans from the soucars (money-lenders). The latter, in turn, issued teeps or bills of exchange, which the amildars could make good at Seringapatam. The profits of the soucars were 3% as mannuwurty (premium), 3% as nanawutta (allowance for deficiencies on light coins) and 2% interest per month. Thus the loan was 8% for one month, 12% for three, 18% for six and 30% per annum.

About half the revenue from collectors reached Serinagapatam in this manner. This resulted in a considerable loss both to the government and the ryots. To assist them in their work, the subadars rented villages to the highest bidders. Rivalship among the patels or village heads raised the razeraram or governmental share of the produce to about a quarter of what it was before, so that the burden fell chiefly on the small peasants and continued to be increased till they were forced by oppression and distress- to quit their ploughs,-- an unfortunate occurrence also to be met with in various parts of Mughul India[18]. The sibbandi or collection costs of revenue were increased to about 10% of the total collection, i.e. an enhancement of 27% on the previous administration. The subadar's atvani or percentage on the revenue collected was almost doubled and the kandachar or militia peon were granted monthly pay in addition to their service lands.

In quantitative terms, the above statements may be represented by means of the table alongside. The basic trends may be assessed as follows. The amount remitted at Seringapatam was always less than the assessment made; though, on the other hand, the collections far exceeded the stipulated sum due to an illegal increase of the teerwa (money rent) and warum (government's share of the rent) above the rates which had been

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18. See in this connection Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System Of Mughal India (1556-1707), (Aligarh Muslim University, 1963), pp. 324-329.

maintained uniformly to that date. Thus, though the beriz showed an increase of 6% for the first three years as compared with the settlement of 1760, collections showed a steady rise on account of two factors. First, Haidar ensured the elimination of wastage due to lawlessness and disorder. Secondly, the extert of land in rent under the patels showed an increase some of them became too ambitious to be satisfied with single villages and rented whole nads or Hublies (i.e. divisions of districts) by which they became rich because the inferior patels could secrete nothing from them while they deceived the amildars. Haidar himself was not in a position to devote attention to revenue administration, being engaged in war against the Marathas. In 1764 amildars and sheristadars were called to Nagar as Haidar for the first time found an opportunity to enquire into the condition of his accounts. Collusion between the revenue officials and their submission of only the jama-wasal-baki, or settlement receipts and disbursements, prevented an accurate knowledge of affairs. Yet even the insufficient knowledge yielded by the documents and the reports of the pattiwaris afforded sufficient indications for Haidar to enable him to raise the beriz to 112,000. But war broke out again, first with the Marathas and then with the English. It was not possible, therefore, to examine the accounts of the amildars or enter into fresh stipulations with them. Also, because the size of the subadaries was reduced, they were left in charge of their individual districts with few checks upon them. The importance of the subadars declined gradually in matters of revenue collection.

Revenue Realised by Haidar Ali
(In terms of Canterâyi Pagodas)

A.D.	A Sirkar beriz or settlement	B Subadars' beriz or total collection	C Sibbandi or expense of collection	D Sirkar powaty or remittances	E Payaly of subsequent demands	F Total pavaty or remittances and demands	G Total pavaty and sibbandi	H Baki or total balance	I Dust baki peculated by amildars	K Sist baki or patel balan.
1,760	100,000	106,000	10,000	90,000	...	90,000	100,000	6,000	5,000	1,000
1,761	106,000	111,000	10,600	94,000	1,500	95,500	106,100	4,900	4,000	9000
1,762	106,000	112,000	10,600	94,000	2,000	96,000	106,600	5,400	4,000	1,400
1,763	106,000	112,000	10,600	94,000	2,000	96,000	106,600	5,400	4,000	1,400
1,764	112,000	115,000	11,200	97,000	2,000	99,000	110,200	4,800	3,000	1,800
1,765	112,000	112,000	11,200	94,000	2,000	96,000	107,200	4,800	2,000	2,800
1,766	112,000	112,000	10,000	80,000	...	80,000	90,000	10,000	10,000	2,000
1,767	...	100,000	10,000	80,000	5,000	85,000	95,000	5,000	5,000	...
1,768	...	70,000	10,000	50,000	...	50,000	60,000	10,000	10,000	...
1,769	...	70,000	10,000	50,000	5,000	55,000	65,000	5,000	5,000	...
1,770	...	70,000	10,000	50,000	...	50,000	60,000	10,000	10,000	...
1,771	90,000	94,000	9,000	81,000	3,000	84,000	93,000	1,000	1,000	...
1,772	90,000	97,000	9,000	80,000	3,000	83,000	92,000	5,000	4,500	500
1,773	90,000	97,000	9,000	79,000	3,000	82,000	91,000	6,000	8,000	1,000
1,774	90,000	98,000	9,000	78,000	3,000	81,000	90,000	8,000	7,000	1,000
1,775	95,000	100,000	9,000	77,000	6,000	83,300	92,000	8,000	6,700	1,300
1,776	95,000	107,600	9,500	80,000	7,600	87,600	97,100	10,100	5,900	4,500
1,777	95,000	109,200	9,500	79,000	9,200	88,200	97,700	11,500	7,300	4,200
1,778	95,000	110,000	9,500	78,500	8,800	87,300	97,800	12,200	7,200	5,000
1,779	95,000	111,000	9,500	77,500	9,760	87,260	96,760	14,240	9,440	4,800
1,780	100,000	115,600	10,000	84,000	19,000	103,000	113,000	2,600	...	2,600

Taking advantage of the confusion in the situation, the amildars profited greatly, remitting only what they pleased. For the year 1769, Haidar made the devastanum or church lands contribute half of their produce to defray the cost of war. The first decade of his administration concluded with the termination of the First Anglo-Mysore War.

In 1771 Haidar summoned all his amildars to Seringapatam. In view of the ravages caused by war, the beriz was reduced to 90,000. Three years later he secured from the new Peshwa, Raghunath Rao, a promise to have the Maratha-occupied areas of his dominions in the Krishna-Tungabhadra region restored to him. Within four years he consolidated his hold over the region. Enquiries were made into the functions as well as immunities and benefits enjoyed by the Zemindars. Inams were the only privileges they were allowed to retain and their role as intermediate renters was ruled out. In 1776 Purnaiya, the principal financier during the later years of Haidar, advised him to ascertain the condition of his finances more thoroughly. Officials of the revenue department, up to the level of patels and village karnams, were summoned to Seringapatam. For the first time since gaining power, Haidar had the figures of the jama-wasal-baki compared with those of the sagvaly and hattavally; the results went into the making of a kham wasul or exact statement of conditions in each village. Various interests and the corruptness of the revenue officials, however, prevented the scheme from being worked out with accuracy.

The patels and karnams concealed as much as possible by false accounts, and the amildars did their utmost to suppress all information by briding the sheristadars. So, although the subadars had collected a sum of Rs.100,000 the previous year, the beriz was fixed at 95,000, or 5% less than what it should have been. What the amildars and patels retained was not, however, wholely their gain. For, the amildar had to bribe a host of officials at Seringapatam to retain his office and be favoured in the auditing of his accounts. The patels, on the other hand, were deprived of much of their profits as the indebtedness of the ryots to the soucars, with all the attendant charges, continued to increase. In 1780 Haidar raised the rate of settlement and brought it back to the level where he found it on assuming power, i.e. the sum of Rs.100,000. The amils and patels continued as before to collect more, but it is not known whether Haidar expected a rise in revenue since remittances exceeded the rate of assessment[19].

In his policy towards the revenue collectors, Haidar had, therefore, every reason to be watchful from the first. He suspected them, but could not always detect their guilt. If apprehended in the act of embezzlement, however, they were mercilessly beaten up. The following description left behind by Schwartz may be taken to be typical :

'Once of an evening, I went into the palace, and saw a

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19. Alexander Read, 'Sketch of revenue management in countries north of the Caveri under the Gentu, the Moorish and the Honble Company's Government', 15 NOV. 1792, in Baramahal Records, Sec. I. Management (Madras, 1907), pp.140-145.

number of men of rank sitting round about; their faces betrayed a conscious terror, Hyder's personal secretary told me, they were collectors of districts. To me they appeared as criminals expecting death. But few could give a satisfactory account; consequently the most dreadful punishments were daily inflicted. I hardly know whether I shall mention how one of these gentlemen was punished. Many who read it, may think the account exaggerated, but the poor man was tied up; two men came with their whips and cut him dreadfully; with sharp nails was his flesh torn asunder, and then scourged afresh; his shrieks rent the air.

But although the punishments are so dreadful, yet there are people enough who seek such employments, and out-bid each other. The Brahmins are by far the worst in this traffic. When they have obtained a district, they flay the people with unrelenting and inhuman cruelty, and with the most philosophical sang froid. At last they pretend to be poor, receive Hyder's chastisement and return into their district'[20].

The account of Mirza Ikbal though in basic agreement is even more detailed and gruesome. On default of payment by a collector, says the Persian annalist,

'he was seized and tied with ropes, like a horse, before and behind, and, having been stripped naked, an order was given to flog him with a whip, and a number of Jowal Doze (sewers of

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20. Wilks, Historical Sketches, Vol.1, App.VIII, p.847.

leathern bags etc.), beat him cruelly over the back and loins, after which salt was thrown upon his wounds. If he complained, he was beaten on the mouth with a shoe; and if he cried, red pepper, dried and pounded, was thrown in his eyes; and he was tortured in this way every day for a month, if he did not agree to pay the money. Besides this, every two or three days, iron spits or rods were made red hot, and he was burned or branded all over with them. This was in addition to imprisonment, starvation and chains. As soon, however, as Hydur's rage was softened, he presented him with shawls, and golden chains, and again offered the same office to the poor man who had just escaped death. But, if he refused to take, the fire of Hyder's wrath was rekindled'[21].

To bring the amildars more firmly under state control, Tipu issued a body of regulations at the beginning of his reign. Patels were asked to plough their own lands. If any of them continued to employ cultivators to till his plot of land, his produce was to be seized by the government. An unfit patel was to be replaced by another from among the ryots and the former return to their ranks. The lands of all patels, taajkaurs (collectors of customs) and others were to be measured and assessed like those of other ryots. The lands taken up by karnams for cultivation were to be resumed and distributed among the ryots for tillage. The karnams could receive, if they wished, waste lands instead of their wages or

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21. Mirza Ikbal in Kirmani Hydur Naik, pp.511-12. For Kirmani's supporting statement see p.476.

payment in money according to the established rate. Karnams and patels were not to visit each other in their houses. Public officers were not to transact business in their own houses, but only at the cutcherry. In case of complaint against a revenue official, both parties were to be summoned and money recovered from them. On the occasion of a dispute between the parties, the matter was to be referred both to the Sultan and the amil's cutcherry and the decision taken there obeyed. If the amildar concealed charges, he would be made to disgorge the money in question and pay a fine, should the allegation be proved. Amildars were also to be answerable if the karnams of the palace, whose sole duty was to keep accounts, were employed either in charge of their affairs or given to farm the revenues of villages. Also the amils and other revenue officials were debarred from trade; if found engaged in the same, they were to forfeit double the amount of the concern in which they were engaged. Harkaras were forbidden to maltreat workmen or take money from them. Workers could be pressed only into government service. Naikwars (matchlock peons of the amildars) were not to stand as security for the patels in future, since they had used their position to raise money forcibly from the peasants. Instead, persons belonging to the amil's troops were to receive passes for the collection of revenue at the time of their entrance and exit from a village. Their wages were to be paid not by leases upon villages but in ready money. An amildar's messenger (oolky) or anyone else who went to collect money from the ryots was not to gather

fuel from them. Diet money was not to be raised from the villages. If an amildar's oppression led to the flight of peasants from land, he was required to pay twenty pagodas for every plough abandoned in the case of a rich ryot and ten in those of poor ones.

Revenue farming by the district officials was strictly forbidden. All lands held by them were to be distributed among the ryots for cultivation. Killedars were debarred from keeping villages and plantations under their control. A person could hold only one mauza (village) in farm. But before this was done, an accurate list of all the old and new inhabitants, and an account of the gross receipts, was to be prepared. The lease was to be granted accordingly and a mouchlika (security bond) taken. Collectors guilty of imposing heavy fines on the ryots were to be made to disgorge the money and subject to fines themselves.

Tipu was also careful to lay down rules for the task of surveying his kingdom to ascertain the annual increase or decrease of agriculture and population. The shanbogues at the village level gathered the requisite data at the basic level of administration (the hubli or simpt). The information was then passed on to the amildars. Thus, an account was sought to be prepared of all the houses of ryots of different castes throughout the area in charge under an amil, specifying the names of the villages, the number of ploughs, the quantity of seeds sown, and of lands tilled, the number of workmen, their families and children with their various castes and occupations. In preparing these accounts care was to be

taken to see that the ryots were not alarmed. They were to be assured that the enquiries had the object of finding out whether their expenditure exceeded their means and to grant taqavi to the more indigent. Amildars were required to undertake circuits through all villages under their authority. Agreeably to a moochlika (engagement), they were to distribute the assessment among the ryots according to the quantity produced. Every 500 pagodas collected in a district paying a revenue of 10,000 was to be deposited at the amildar's cutcherry. At the beginning of a year, the amil was to give a cowl (security) to all the ryots and respectable inhabitants of the district and encourage them to cultivate their lands. The more affluent among them were to be made to increase their ploughs. To enable poorer ryots to purchase ploughs and cultivate the lands, the amil was to give them taqavi at the rate of three or four pagodas for every plough after taking security for repayment. The money thus lent was to be recovered in one or two years. Similarly, revenue officials were to prepare accounts for each village at the end of the year showing the various kinds of land under cultivation and their yield according to the quantity of seed sown. The amount of lands held by the Brahmins and devasthanams, along with the tanks, rivers, roads and gardens in an area were also to be taken note of. Ryots had to be present in the preparation of such accounts. Any revenue official who instigated them to revolt in order to prevent defalcations from coming to knowledge would, if detected, be apprehended and fined.

Rich ryots were to be made to pay their arrears immediately, while the poorer ones were allowed to clear their dues by instalments. Ryots who had fled the country were to be encouraged to return and the balances recovered from them 'by gentle means'. Balances from dead ryots were to be recovered from their heirs, if any; if not, the amildar was to take a moochlika from the patels and ryots and write them off in his accounts. A kist was to be collected once in four months; the first being at the end of Bhadra (August-September). The accounts of the ryots were to be adjusted at the beginning of this same month. The jamabandy and jama wasul baki accounts of every district were to reach the amildar's cutcherry in the previous month, Sravan (July-August), in an orderly form. The month of Ramzan was fixed by the Sultan for the final inspection of accounts. Should the revenue fall short, the amil could try to realise the deficit by bringing in new ryots, whom he could grant taqavi and new ploughs to complete the cultivation. But, if the amil tried to make good the deficiency through fines and undue exactions, the money raised from these sources was not to be allowed to go towards the discharge of his engagement and he was to be compelled to meet the balance. If the shortage was due to the want of attention on the part of the patels in revenue collection, the amildars could inflict physical punishment on them. An amildar, who had farmed out villages to patels, would, however, have to bear the responsibility in case there was a deficiency in collection. Mokuddums and ryots who used to secure tax reliefs by bribing amils and

revenue farmers to the extent of fifty or hundred pagodas a year were to be made to refund the money and repay the amount back to the government. If ryots offered to pay their revenue in gold, silver, copper or brass, the amildars were to purchase them at the market price and enter them in their accounts. On the other hand, they were warned not to sell these commodities to merchants.

Tipu also envisaged a number of measures for the promotion of agriculture in his kingdom. Lands which had been follow for ten years were to be delivered to ryots for cultivation under cowl. They were to be tax-free the first year and assessed at half the usual rate in the second. But from the third, the full amount was to be collected from them. Similarly, land lying barren, mountainous and rocky was to be given to the ryots for tax-free cultivation in the first year. In the second and third years they were to be assessed at one-fourth and one-half of their value respectively. But from the fourth year, assessment was to be at the usual rate. The same was true of barren lands given to hissa (i.e. the produce of which was to be shared between the ryot and the state.) Lands both dry and wet, hissa and ijara (i.e. leased at fixed rent), were to be distributed equally among the old and new ryots for cultivation. For every candy of seed in a given quantity of ijara land, a ryot was to sow one candy and eight kuros in the same extent of hissa land. An account of the increase and decrease of the produce was to be prepared annually and the amount collected. The amil was to see personally that the hissa lands were well

manured, their produce increased and no land of this category left uncultivated. He was to witness personally the threshing of the grain of the hissa lands and carry the half share of the government. Ryots who cultivated a greater share of such land than was required, were to be allowed to do so; but those cultivating less, were to be made to till the required amount. Ryots who avoided paying the whole revenue of the ijara lands, in collusion with the shanboques, were to be made to pay the full amount. A ryot who on an annually increasing rate offered to farm a mauza, which existed in a deplorable condition though capable of being raised to prosperity, would be given a cowl of three years. The terms of the lease would be fixed from the fourth year according to the produce of the lands.

Steps were also taken to encourage certain kinds of planting. Thus, the cultivation of pulse was to be encouraged and a cowl given to the ryots for that purpose. Villages that grew wheat and barley, available only in small quantities in the kingdom, were to be encouraged to do the same. Village lands that took newly to cultivating them were to be assessed for the first three years at a pagoda less; only from the fourth year were they to be assessed at the usual rate. The growth of pulse of all kinds was also to be encouraged. Ryots who developed new plantations of betel-nut trees were to be exempt from the payment of any tax during the first five years; from the sixth they were to be assessed at half the established rate till the time that the trees bore fruit, at which stage only would they be required to pay the

whole tax or share the produce, as the case might be. Ryots who developed new plantations of betel-leaf were exempt from half the usual tax during the first three years before being assessed at the standard rate from the fourth. For developing new plantations of coco-nut-trees, ryots were to be exempt from the payment of any tax for the first four years; in the fifth year they were to pay one-half of the established tax; only from the sixth year, would they be brought under the normal rates of assessment. The government had the power to sequester any plantation that the ryots developed from an abandoned state, without paying the revenues to the state. The dispossessed ryots were to be assessed like ordinary ones, while the government tried to increase the number of trees by engaging workers to cultivate them. Ryots were also to be encouraged to grow sugar cane, wherever possible. Patels and shanbogues, who failed to encourage such activity, were to be subject to a double tax, calculated upon the quantity of sugar cane which might have been produced in a similar village. Two hundred trees of mangoes and other choice fruits were to be planted on the best ground in every village and carefully attended to. Annual reports of their growth were to be sent to the Sultan. To prevent the preparation of intoxicants, the planting of bhang was forbidden. On the other hand, the Government encouraged the planting of sandal wood wherever the ground was found to be suitable. The government reserved the right of cutting them, when an account being prepared, their weight was to be assessed and they were to be sent to Seringapatam. All the tamarind trees

available in plantations or wood lands were to be collected but those in the lands of the ryots were not to be touched. Revenue officials and ordinary subjects who dug tanks and wells, erected ramparts or small forts and caused settlement of a village were to be granted land as Inam Kutcodukee, subject to the condition of carrying out repairs. They were also to be responsible for the raising of embankments at the side of tanks. If an inamdar did not have the means to repair a tank which had gone to ruin, the government would carry out the task after charging the inamdar for a year according to the expenditure entailed. The Tumgha (hereditary jagir) lands of forts and castles and the borders of villages protected by enclosure were to be clearly demarcated. A detailed account of the measurement of the work repaired by established standards was to be kept in the office of the Mutsuddies and Shanbogues of the village. Workers were to receive wages against receipts for the same. Buffaloes were to be used for carrying mud to raise these embankments every year. Shanbogues were to keep accounts of the mud thrown everyday round a tank.

Tipu had to be concerned not only with the development of agriculture in his domains, but also prepare for a state of war. The Treaty of Mangalore (1784) had been no more than a truce between him and the English, both sides being aware of the inevitability of the outbreak of further hostilities. Several of Tipu's revenue regulations show his concern for organising the defences of Mysore. Thus, an amildar was required to ascertain the exact

distance between every town and village throughout his kingdom, as also all landmarks on the way (ex.thickets, streams, plains, hills and wells, both dry and containing water, etc.) with a list of resting places. All the resin, aloeswood, lac, wax and dammar produced in the district were to be reserved with great care and carried to the magazines of Seringapatam. No improper consumption of these articles was to be allowed. Two thousand pine and sal trees were to be planted in proper spots in every village and tended with utmost care. If there were any such trees on grounds belonging to ryots, a price was to be fixed upon their produce and the sum paid to the ryot either in cash or set off against his rent. Trees of teakwood and acacia, the wood of which was required by the government for making the wheels of gun carriages, were not to be felled. When required, they could be cut down only on the Sultan's order. The seed of the teak tree was to be obtained, wherever possible. During the rainy season, it was to be sown on river banks and at the bottom of hills, so that the quantity of timber might increase.

A section of Tipu's revenue regulations also took note of pack animals, so necessary in times of war. A fine of twenty pagodas was to be levied on anyone who put the government's cattle to yoke. Five hundred rupees were to be charged to a person who dared to use the government's horse. Any person who detained a stray horse or bullock bearing the government's mark was to be subject to punishment. The government's provisions were to be carried on bullocks,

each of which was to carry a load of ninety seers (deks). Two bullocks were to be requisitioned for every thousand pagodas of jummabundy. One Canteroy Pagoda per month was to be allowed for the hire of every bullock. The bullocks were to be provided with pads and saddles. One man was to be placed in charge of every two bullocks. These were never to be kept unemployed, but were constantly to bring goods to Seringapatam. If any of these bullocks was of a small size, its load was not to be diminished. The proprietor was to bear the load himself or find bullocks to carry them. If the administration needed goods more than could be carried by the bullocks with an amildar, others were to be hired on receipt. Each hired bullock was to be despatched with 105 seers of grain. Such hires were not to be made often. The bullocks of the Sultan were to be supplied with grain immediately on asking for it. An amildar who failed to do so, was required to collect the grain, in bags, within five or six days, taking a receipt for it. In case of a single day's delay, he was to hold himself responsible for the hire of the cattle. At the time of dispatching the bullocks, the amildar was to provide a written statement of the distance at which the army might be from the district. The government's bullocks had to travel at the rate of four Sultanee Kurohs per day and at the rate of six Kurohs when returning unloaded. The hired bullocks were to be paid one fanam for every four Sultan Kurohs they travelled. [The distances were measured thus in Tipu's reign : 48 nirangusths (i.e. thumb breadths) = 1 military pace; 3000 military paces = 1 Gurrie; 2 Gurries = 1 kuroh].

In every district paying 1000 pagodas, the ryots were to keep four brood mares. The government was to send two stallions to every district; with these only were such mares to be crossed. An amildar was to give a sum of Rs.100 in advance to every individual who owned a foal for feeding the animal. Alternately, a ryot could sell his horse only after informing him. A ryot could sell his horse at more, but never less, than Rs.200. Out of this sum, he was to repay the Government the money he had taken as advance. Amils who maintained more than the required number of horses were to be encouraged. All colts below two years of age were to be sent with their masters to the Sultan, who was to fix their price. Amildars were required to collect 3½ derras of straw (1 derra = 10 seers) for every pagoda of land tax. Sillahdar horse had to buy straw from the ryots at fair price and were expressly asked not to collect the same by force. Whatever amount of it remained as surplus at the end of the year, was to be sold and the money paid to the Government.

Tipu's revenue regulations did not exclude the sphere of trade and industry. Efforts were to be made to increase the number of labourers by pressing even orphans and those who were physically disabled into service. The number of iron foundries in each district was to be doubled. Iron dubas (shells) and steel kuhutties (a sort of cutlass or sword) were to be sent to Seringapatam, according to the Sultan's instructions. They were to be supplied immediately on the Government's asking. Ironmongers were free to make any iron implement they chose but all shots were to be sent to Seringapatam.

It was their duty to locate spots that contained iron and steel mines and to extract the utmost quantity from each. The name of the district was to be stamped on all iron implements and shot made within its boundaries. Trade with Madras was stopped. If any merchant visited the place privately, his goods and property were to be confiscated. Moreover, he was to be fined and warned not to do so in future. Salt, which used to come from Madras to Mysore, was to be procured by merchants from the foot of the Western Ghats and the dependencies of Calicut. Merchants coming from Madras to Mysore were to be arrested, their goods seized and the matter reported to Tipu. Only in the case of shearing wool from cattle did Tipu find it necessary to have resort to Madras. Deviating from the practice of entering customs as a separate source of revenue, Tipu included them in his jumabundy. In pursuance of his suspicion of Europeans, Tipu ordered that all Christians in Mysore were to be sent to him in capitivity along with their families. The lands of a Christian were to be handed over to other ryots for cultivation.

The English translator of Tipu's revenue procedure, even while commenting on its significance when the Sultan was at the head of a formidable enemy state, could not withhold his appreciation of the instructions as 'the most accurate delineation of the modern Mahomedan government that has appeared.'[22] How far were the revenue regulations of Tipu a continuation of the practices of Hyder's time ? Did they result from the Sultan's restless experiment with

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22. Burrish Crisp, The Mysorean Revenue Regulations. Translated From the Persian Original under the seal of Tipu Sultan (Calcutta, 1792), p. iii. The above rules of Tipu's revenue system are summarised from the same.

change as alleged by his English critics ? How far were they carried out in practice ? Did they survive the death of the Sultan ? Questions of this kind need to be analysed at some length. A large part of the revenue regulations had been drawn up by the need to remedy the abuses of Haidar's time. Field survey was the basis of Tipu's land revenue system. The work that he did in this respect was similar to the earlier practices under the Mughuls and the Marathas, and that performed by Alexander Read and his associates in some of these districts later. The more important aspects of Tipu's land revenue regulations offer a close resemblance to the proclamations of Aurangzeb and the Maratha governors of Gujrat issued under similar heads[23]. Indeed, it is possible to work back further in point of time and see how the emphasis laid by Tipu on irrigation facilities and land reclamation had its precedence in the South Indian kingdoms from the tenth century onwards[24]. Horticulture and the emulation of the planting of one region in another received patronage from the Mughul government as much as from Tipu[25]. What Surendranath Sen considered to be the most remarkable feature of the land revenue policy of the Peshwas, -- their attempt

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23. Surendranath Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas (Calcutta University, 1925), pp.279-282; J.N. Sarkar, Mughul Administration (Calcutta, 1935), Chap. XI.
24. See in this connection Kirhori Mohan Gupta, Land System In South India between circa 800 to 1200 A.D. (Lahore, 1933), G.R. Kuppuswamy, Economic Conditions In Karnataka, A.D. 973-1336 (Dharwar, 1975), pp. 66-70; A. Appadorai, Economic Conditions in Southern India, 1000-1500 A.D. (University of Madras, 1936) Vol. I, pp. 187-229.
25. Habib, Agrarian System of Mughal India (Bombay, 1963), pp.48-49.

to secure the long term interest of the cultivators by forbidding the sale and mortgage of land and giving leases of five to seven years, -- was also not absent from the considerations of the Sultan. Tipu's encouragement to the growth of plantations may also be compared to the tax remissions granted by the Peshwas to coconut and betel-nut trees, - for the first eighteen to twenty years, in the former case, and fifteen in the latter respectively[26]. In two respects, -- employment of the disabled in state service and the raising of embankments, -- Tipu's instructions showed a continuation of the practices of Haidar's time. Mirza Ikbal is our source of knowledge for the information that blind men were employed by Haidar for blowing bellows at the blacksmith's forge[27]. Schwartz stands as witness to the fact that after each rain the local administrators required the people, on Haidar's instruction, to make good any erosion of the embankments. He is also testimony to Haidar's raising of a battalion of orphans, whom he fed, clothed and trained in arms at his own expense. Neither practice was in vogue in the Madras Presidency. Wilks would have us believe that these boys were being brought up as chela battalions, i.e. a regular military establishment of captive converts in imitation of the Turkish Janissaries. Tipu is

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26. Sen, Op. cit. p. 291.

27. Mirza Ikbal in Kirmani, Hydur Naik, pp.498-499.

said to have increased their number[28].

But if the principles behind Tipu's land revenue policy were not new, there can be equally no doubt of greater attempts to impose state control over the process of collection. The provisions requiring collectors to deposit money at Seringapatam aimed at the elimination of soucars, who had profited much at the expense of the state in the time of Haidar. Revenue Officers were paid liberally to inculcate in them the spirit of state service. Thus the assof or civil governor of a province and his cutcherry was paid at the following rate (in terms of rupees) :

1st assof		1000
2nd ,,		300
6	sheristadars	2160
3	munshi·n	70
3	askadars or intelligencers	100
15	harkaras	100
40	poliga peons	270
100	tahsil peons	500
	Sadarvarad (Maintenance Cost)	100
	Total :	4700

The assof's cutcherry was thus reckoned to account for about eight per cent of the total revenue. In addition to this, the amildar's

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28. Schwartz in Wilks, Historical Sketches, pp. 846, 848-49. Also Wilks, p. 743.

establishment consumed five or six per cent more. Thus calculated, the whole expense of revenue provincial servants and contingent charges of collection amounted, in Alexander Read's opinion, to about ten per cent on the gross land assessments and about eighteen per cent on the net revenue[29]. That Tipu followed a policy of flogging erring mutsuddies, while ensuring that sheikhdars received their proper payment is also evident from his correspondence. Bailiffs were employed at the cost of the creditors to raise the money due from them[30].

To meet the revenue demands, village officials assigned to each cultivator a larger plot of land than he could properly tend. This naturally led to complaints by the ryots and attempts to reduce the assessment, causing much tension at the time of village settlements. How far did the state appropriate the produce of the peasants in the time of Tipu ? A precise answer is hard to come by; both because of the lack of data and their unreliable nature, when available. Tipu, it has to be remembered, presented inflated figures of revenue yield for the districts he ceded after 1793, while grossly underestimating the value of territories retained by him. The

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29. Read, 'Sketch of Revenue Management' in Baramahal Records, Sec. 1, p. 152.

30. Kirkpatrick, Select Letters of Tipu Sultan to various Public Functionaries (London, 1811), No.1, p.2; No. XLVII, pp.65-66 No.CCXXVII, pp. 259-260.

English accounts are also speculative and contradictory on this point. Yet there is reason to view with caution the charge that Tipu was guilty of over-assessment. The figures supplied by M.H. Gopal are most instructive. For instance, the highest collection from the Ceded districts under Tipu was 1953 lakhs of pagodas in 1787, while Munro's expected realisation from the same area in 1801 was 20,37,549 pagodas. To give another example, the actual collection from the fifteen districts retained by Tipu was, according to Read, 14.99 lakhs in 1798; ten years earlier at a time when his administrative efficiency was at its highest the yield had been only six per cent more[32]. Again as regards the village of Pollachi, in Coimbatore, we should remember that in 1825 Sullivan as the Collector of Coimbatore regretted that the district which had been, he said, "the most fertile and best cultivated district in Coimbatore" had been ruined by over-assessment under the British. No complaint had been made by the ryots nor had they brought the matter before the revenue servants. They simply migrated to villages less assessed. What baffled Tipu and the British administration in South India, at least in the earlier stages, was the extent of authority and influence exercised by the local officials. They worked, as Frykenberg states, like white ants on a wooden structure, making a 'hollow mockery' of the administrative frame work. Referring to Dykes whose manual of the Salem district was published

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32. M.H. Gopal, Tipu Sultan's Mysore, pp.67, 74.

in the mid-nineteenth century, Frykenberg observes what we have already noticed with regard to Pollachi; that is, the desasthas or Maratha Brahmins of the inland regions found as many ways of satisfying their avarice under the British as under Tipu[34].

For a proper understanding of the provincial administration it is necessary to take account of the various graduations within it. Each taluk was divided into smaller subdivisions called, the hubly, paying from four to nine thousand pagodas under an officer called the sheikhdar or parputty. He had to visit every village under him to see the state of cultivation and the condition of the tanks. He settled disputes above the gauda's jurisdiction but could not inflict severe corporal punishments without the amildar's consent. He received revenues from the gaudas and deposited them in the amildar's cutcherry. The hublis themselves were required to pay between four to nine thousand pagodas. Besides, the sheikhdars had also to protect the inamdars and note such property as were left without heirs, reporting the particulars of the case to the amildar. In places having towns and bazars, the sheikhdar had also to procure returns of the current prices and supply provisions to military detachments, according to the amildar's instructions. To assist the sheikhdar there were two accountants called sherestadars or guddy shanbogues. For every thousand pagodas paid by a hubly, there was also a messenger called the Tahasildar or Munigar. The whole of the hubly establishment was paid by monthly wages.

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34. Robert Eric Frykenberg, Guntur District, 1788-1848 : A History of Local Influence and Central Authority in South India (Oxford, 1965), pp.231-236. Also Sullivan's Report of 1825 as cited in R. Ratnam, Agricultural Development In Madras State Prior to 1900 (Madras, 1956), p.78.

At the village level, the traditional organisation of the twelve ayagars (bara baluti) still conducted affairs. These consisted of the following officials. The gauda or patel was the head of the village administration. The post was originally hereditary, but had come to be filled in course of time by officials appointed by the amildar. They continued in office so long as collections were maintained at their supposed value; or until someone undertook, by bringing a greater number of farmers, to make the revenue more productive. All disputes were settled by the panchayet, consisting of the gauda and his council of four village elders. In case of any delinquency in the village, the gauda and his council instructed the shanbogue to write out an account of the case and to transmit it to the amildar for his information and decision. He frequently advanced money for the other farmers, to enable them to pay their rents and held the whole of their crops as his security. His only remuneration was his share in the division of the wet crops of the village. The accounts of the village were in the possession of the shanbogue or karanam. He wrote down all the letters dictated to him by the village head. The shanbogue and the gauda were intended to act as checks on each other.

The other village officials belonged to a lesser category. The duty of the watchmen of the village was performed by the Toti and the Taliari. They were specifically charged with the task of ascertaining the boundaries of each field and of each farmer's possessions. They watched the crops during the day and helped the farmers to do so during the night. They were sent as carriers of

messages and as guides for persons travelling on public business. The Toti was also required to keep the ryots ready near the sheikhdar's cutcherry for the purpose of collecting candayem from them. The Taliari went with the shanbogues to the amildar's cutcherry, watching over the remittance from the village and carrying letters to and from the village. The Nirgunty divided the water of the tank or the canal and conveyed the proper share to each man's field. He was also in charge of the sluice and bunds and of the small canals and drains for watering the fields. He also assisted in watching the crops. The barber and washerman did the work of their calling. Each paid an annual tax of one-fourth fanams which was included in the government's account of the land tax; besides they also paid a professional tax called the Moneebaub. The Chuckler watched over the crops of the wet lands, which were cultivated under the warum system till the time that they were reaped, thrashed and the corn separated from the husk. He prepared some leather equipments for cattle belonging to the ryots and carried correspondence from one village to another.

The agricultural implements of the cultivators were repaired by the iron smith free of charge. He paid a small tax from one-fourth to 2¼ fanams besides the professional tax. This extra payment was included in the land revenue under the head Goddee. If required, the iron smith also fulfilled the functions of the carpenter. The potter supplied free of cost the vessels required by the village. Together with the iron smith, he received a small price at the village market by selling the products of his labours called the maira. The Joshee or Jotishee performed the astrologer's

duty of announcing the seasons of seed-time and harvest, and those that he deemed to be the auspicious and inauspicious hours and days for carrying out the operations of farming. The Cavelgar was seldom to be met with in Mysore. His sole task was to take care of the produce of various kinds of trees. He enjoyed inams for the performance of his task. Besides, we also hear of the Aduca or village beadle, whose task was to see that the farmers did their work. There was also an Alitigara or public measurer for every eight to ten villages. The office was not hereditary and fell often vacant[35].

Let us now revert to our discussion of the role of the Brahmins within this structure. While one section of them served in the capacity of the local priesthood, another held all posts concerned with the maintenance of accounts (amildars, sheikhdars and shanbogues) as their exclusive preserve. In his later days, Tipu tried to destroy this Brahmin stronghold by appointing Muslims to the office of amildars. He also dispensed with the services of the two hircarrahs or intelligencers attached to every taluk who, we have seen, carried tales both true and false to the central administration at Seringapatam[36]. Tipu also tried to augment the revenues of his kingdom by resuming the lands of the Hindu temples. Yet, in spite of all his efforts, the amount of Brahmin stranglehold over the administration may be seen from the fact that none of these aims were realised. That the

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35. Buchanan, Journey, Vol.1, pp.268-270; Wilks, Historical Sketches Vol.1, pp. 136-137; Morison, 'Notes on Mysore' (1831), pp.25-36 in Mysore Reports, (Bangalore, 1864).
36. Buchanan, Journey, Vol.II, p.91.

policy of excluding
Muslims was, like any other policy of Tipu, carried out quite thoroughly in implementation is evident from the figures given by M.H. Gopal :

'Of the diwans or provincial revenue heads in 1792 only one was a Hindu. Of 65 asofs and deputy asofs in 1797-98 not one was a non-Muslim and almost all the principal Mutsaddies even were Muslims, while of the 26 civil and military officers captured by the British in 1792 and demanded back by Tipu. 6 only were Hindus and even they were petty clerks'[37].

Still, the end was not realised. Indolent by nature and ignorant of the practices of the revenue department, the Mussalman assofs tried to make good their sudden elevation by enhancing the demands. Pressure applied at the top passed to the bottom. The amildars, under various pretexts of unavoidable emergency, reported prodigious outstanding balances; while they received, as bribes from the cultivators, a part of the deductions so made. Although the taxes actually paid by the people to government were thus much higher than they had been during the administration of Hyder, the industrious cultivator was by no means in as good a condition as previously. Criminal prosecution was started against any ryot, suspected to be rich, on the most slender grounds and nothing but a bribe could save him. Cultivators, therefore, tended to neglect their work, while increasing the area under tillage; for even by producing more with greater labour on a smaller plot, they would have to pay an equal, if not

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37. Gopal, Tipu Sultan's Mysore, p. 11.

enhanced, rate of assessment. The valuator of land at the time of survey also fixed his estimate on the assumption that the ryots would take much more land than their stock could fully cultivate. Explaining the reasons behind the cheapness of land in Salem, Munro enumerated the following.

'It is occasioned by the manners of the farmers, whom a long experience of the violence of their rulers has made distrustful, and who therefore either squander or bury their gains, instead of employing them in the cultivation and improvement of their lands. It is occasioned by the high interest of money, which induces those who have it, to employ it in other channels which they think safer than farming. It is occasioned by the want of confidence in Government, which deters those who might be disposed to lay out their money in improving land, from doing so, from the apprehension that rent may be raised : and it is occasioned by the great tracts of arable land which, for want of cultivation, remain in the hands of Government, ready to be given to whoever will take them'. (Munro to Read, 5 Sept. 1797).

The Brahmin revenue officials themselves had to bribe the revenue inspectors, who were members of the same caste. There was no tendency to accumulate savings on the part of either the wealthier Hindus or Muslims, as nobody was sure of holding on to his substance. The Muslims spent the money that reached them immediately on dress, equippage and amusement. The Brahmin revenue officials dallied in the company of dancing girls, when not bestowing

gifts on the avowedly holy. At the same time, they felt no compunction in depriving the people under them of their dues. The Sultan, for instance, had arranged that labourers on public works receive wages adequate for the work done. In reality, however, they got not more than a pittance as that was what the superintendants allowed, the remainder being appropriated. The distance of the Sultan from the scene of everyday activities gave courage to such offenders. Tipu himself was full of sympathies when approached by an aggrieved subject but in dealing with such a case Mir Saduk, the chief dewan, did no better than imprison the distressed, while recovering the money from the officer in question[38].

The religious sentiments of the Brahmins and their weakness for bribes also led them to evade the instructions about the resumption of rent-free tenures whether in individual possession or existing as agraharams. In neither case were the state's claims thoroughly pressed. Agraharams paid an annual fee to the amildar and sheristadar and made sure that they did not have to pay any more than this amount in future[39]. In his attempts to extend state control over the local

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38. Buchanan, Journey, Vol.II, pp.231, 236. For Munro's observations on the revenue settlement of Salem in 1797 see Sir Alexander Arbuthnot (ed.), Major General Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras : Selections from his Minutes and other Official Writings (Madras, 1886), pp.13, 15-16, 31-44.

39. Report of Kolar district in Baramahal Records, Sec.1 No.III, p.4 and Macleod to Read, 23 May 1794, Sec. V No. XVIII, p.32.

officials, Tipu did not succeed more than the British administrators in the initial stages of their administration in South India. Too much should not be made of these differences in religious terms, - a Muslim Sultan arrayed against his Hindu subordinates; for Tipu did not only extend support to the Sringeri Math after it had been partly destroyed by Parashuram Bhao, he also bestowed inams on the Brahmins of the Malabar coast and retained the support of prominent Hindu officials like purnaiya.[40] In resuming the rent-free lands of Brah - mins, Tipu was following the age-old practices of Hindu rulers, ren - dered almost inevitable by the fact that 'as almost every prince gave away, had none resumed, the whole country would in a very short time have been converted into inam'[41].

To continue with the discussion, we have to face two questions basic to any understanding of the rural situation : What was the nature of the village organisation ? Who owned land ? As regards the first, our description tends to conform with the broad pattern of the medieval South Indian village as suggested by Burton Stein : 'Essentially it was a residential site for peasant families and their various service groups with easy access to fields

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40. Surendranath Sen, 'The Shringeri Letters of Tipu Sultan' in Studies In Indian History (University of Calcutta, 1930), pp. 155-169. See also the list of 'Rent free land Donated by Tipu Sultan to the temples, mosques and religious institutions of Malabar and Cochin' in C.K. Kareem, Kerala Under Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan (Cochin, 1973), pp. 200-209 and A. Subbaaraya Chetty 'New Light on Tipu Sultan' in Journal of the Ardhra Historical Research Society (Rajahmundry), Vol. VI July 1931, pp. 49-50, Vol. VIII, July 1933, pp. 15-24.

41. Munro to Read, 28 July, 1798; Baramahal Records, Sec. V, No. L VIII, p. 101.

served by local irrigation system'[42]. There was no provision for extensive and integrated storage of water that required hydraulic management, as in the case of Mesopotamia and China. Encouragement was rather lent to the construction of tanks by individuals. Thus, we hear Buchanan say that the irrigated land round Colar was watered entirely by means of reservoirs. A person who built one of these was granted in hereditary succession one-tenth of the land watered by the reservoir besides dry land (Ragy) worth six seers of sowing capacity for every Candaca of land irrigated. So long as he enjoyed these he was bound to keep the tank in repair. If the reservoir be very large and extensive, the man who built it and his heirs were granted one-fourth of the land which it watered but were given no dry-field. When the family of the original builder became extinct, the government reassumed the free lands and maintained the tank in repair. Very great tanks were, however, seldom built by private persons; and those which cost 20,000 pagodas or upwards, were almost all made at the immediate expense of the government. The farmers contributed nothing toward building or repairing them but had to work at clearing the sluice (Cody) and other outlets of water, if its level threatened to break the dams. They also dug channels for conveying the water to their fields; and from their share of the crop were paid the Nirgunties, by whom it was distributed. Six such men could manage 150 candacas of

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40. Burton Stein. 'The State and the Agrarian Order in Medieval South India' in Essays on South India, ed. B.Stein (New Delhi, 1975 edn.), p. 72.

land, i.e. about one hundred acres for each peasant[4]. The division of the grain heap was the basis of society, the village officials and servants having their respective shares. The process of reciprocity of labour and redistribution of grain that Walter Neale observed as basic to the village set-up in Uttar Pradesh before the arrival of the British[4] is clearly to be noticed in Mysore also. Buchanan supplies particular detail about the region round Bangalore.

The manner of dividing the crops between the Government and the cultivator here was generally typical of what prevailed in several other parts. Taking 20 kandagas as the average quantity of a heap, the division was :-

1. For the priests who worshipped the images - in the temple ... 5 seers.
2. For charity, i.e., for Brahmins, Jungums - and other medicants ... 5 ,,

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43. Buchanan, Journey, Vol. I, p. 279.

44. Walter C. Neale, Economic Change in Rural India : Land Tenure and Reform in Uttar Pradesh (Yale University, 1962), pp.20-27. Also Neale, 'Reciprocity and Redistribution in the Indian Village : Sequel to Some Notable Discussions' in Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arsenberg and Harry W.Pearson (eds.) Trade and Markets in the Early Empires (Illinois, 1957), pp.218-236.

3.	For the astrologer or Panchangi	... 1 Seer.
4.	For the poor Brahmin of the village whose office was hereditary	... 1 ,,
5.	For the Nainda or barber	... 2 Seers.
6.	For the Kumbar or pot-maker	... 2 ,,
7.	For the Vasaradava who was both a carpenter - and blacksmith	... 2 ,,
8.	For the Agasa or washerman	... 2 ,,
9.	For the Alathegara or measurer	... 4 ,,
10.	For the Terugara or Adduka who watched the heaps	... 7 ,,
11.	For the Gauda or the village headman	... 8 ,,
12.	For the Shanbogue or accountant	... 10 ,,

The heap was then measured and for every Kandaga that it contained the Gauda and the Shanbogue further received 45 seers, each at 2½ seers a kandaga. The Toti and the Talwar received together 1/2 a seer on each Kandaga or 10 seers for both. The Nirgunti who regulated the supply of water then took the bottom of the heap which was about an inch thick and which gave him about 20 seers. The Shanbogue was also given for every Kandaga of seed sown two men's loads of straw with the grain in them.

The above division of a heap of 20 kandagas or 160 seers each generally amounted to a little over 5 per cent of the gross produce. Of the remainder the Government took first 10 per cent and then a half, so that it received 55 per cent of the net produce and the farmer received 45 per cent. The reason for this difference was that formerly the country was managed by officers who were called Deshmukhs

or Zamindars receiving 10 per cent from the heap before division. When these offices were abolished by Haider, he took the ten per cent and paid the salaries of the new officers appointed in their places. In dividing jaggery a kind of scramble took place among the same persons who shared in the heap of paddy and in this the farmer also partook. During this scramble, about a fourth part of the jaggery was taken away in handfuls and the remainder was divided equally between the Government and the farmer.

All the dry fields were let for a money rent. But besides this rent the farmer had also to pay the following dues :-

1. To the barber, 30 seers for every heap or grain.
2. To the pot-maker for pots from 20 to 30 seers.
3. To the ironsmith, 20 seers for every plough.

While the farmer supplied all the materials, the smith made all the implements of husbandry and assisted in building and repairing the farmer's house. To the washerman for a family consisting of two men and two women or under that number were paid 50 seers; for a family of 4 men and 4 women, 100 seers; and for a larger family, 15 seers.

Then for every heap of ragi which upon an average contained 10 kandagas the farmer gave :-

1.	To the Gods	... 10 seers.
2.	To the mendicant Brahmin	... 20 ,,
3.	To the hereditary poor Brahmin of the village	... 10 ,,
4.	To the astrologer	... 10 ,,

5. To the Shanbogue (per plough) ... 20 seers.

6. To the watchman ... 10 ,,

Other grains paid one-half of these deductions[45].

If the internal affairs of Mysore continued on traditional lines at the grass-root level, a change, was nevertheless perceptible in foreign policy. This was the result of Tipu's attempt to establish state monopoly over the thriving trade of the west coast of India, particularly in pepper, cardamoms and sandal wood. European attempts to penetrate into the region had started with the coming of the Portugese in the sixteenth century but their power was confined to Goa, Cochin and Quilon. The English and the Dutch entered the area a century later but Dutch attempts to monopolise Malabar trade met with no better success for, as Charles Boxer points out, their 'factories on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, whether fortified or not, were liable to the risks of reprisals by powerful Indian rulers whose inland capitals were not exposed to Dutch sea-power as were those of the coastal sultanates in Indonesia'[46]. The English too had limited power though the activities of their private merchants and ability to cooperate with Indian agencies was greater. From 1670 the annual export of pepper from Malabar to England was 400 to 500 tons. The amount rose accasionally even to 1000 tons[47].

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45. Buchanan, Journey, Vol. I, pp. 265-268.

46. Charles Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London, 1965), pp.196-197.

47. Bal Krishna, Commercial Relations between India and England, 1601-1757 (London, 1924), p. 149.

In 1736 the Directors of the Dutch Company noted that the English imported as much pepper to Europe as Batavia annually received from all its pepper districts in the archipelago[48]. In trying to further their interests, the English like other European traders followed a policy of diplomacy and force, the actual choice being determined by considerations of expediency. In June 1761 John Stracey, the Resident at Honavar, had, thus tried to conclude a treaty with the Queen of Bidnur for the grant of a monopoly in the pepper trade within her dominions. In January 1765 the Bombay Government, taking advantage of the fight between Mysore and the Marathas, had even tried to seize Honavar with its adjoining areas but failed. Haidar Ali, however, as Sheikh Ali puts it, 'knew that Bombay needed the products of his dominions, and that they could not afford to break with him'. Upon his assuming supremacy of the Western coasts, the Bombay Government realised the need for peace with him. As Crommelin, the chief of the English factory there, said in 1766 : 'In short the Hon'ble company and Individuals must be injured to the last Degree if deprived of the Mallabar trade.'[49] Haidar also sold to them all his sandalwood. The quantity then brought annually to Honawar was from two to three hundred candies of 600 lb. All the betel-nut exported from Honawar was the produce of the two country between Bhatkal and Mirzee and amounted annually to 1000 candies of 560 lb. worth 10,000 pagodas (£4034, 19 Sh, 7d),

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48. Kristof Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740 (Copenhagen/ Hague, 1958), p.90.

49. B. Sheikh Ali, English Relations with Haidar Ali (Mysore, 1963), pp. 8, 33, 38, 46-47.

Of this the Company took a considerable quantity, both raw and boiled; and, for whatever they wanted, they had always a preference. The trade in cocoanuts, both whole, and in the state called Copra, or dried kernels, was carried on by individuals in like manner. The value annually exported was about Rs.1200[50].

This was the trade that Tipu sought to control. In 1785 he declared an embargo at his ports on the export of pepper, sandalwood and cardamoms. The measure was not novel. The contemporary traveller John Henry Grose thus testified in his account published in 1772 to blockades being placed by the princes of Malabar to bring the European traders to book, when necessary. Grose was also responsible for the comment that hostilities on the Malabar coast usually began with the local 'European governors and chiefs, whom private passions, prejudices and interests mislead into engaging their employers into expensive and detrimental feuds or wars which they represent as honourable and necessary; or under such plausible, though false colours, as to obtain their approbation and sanction, whilst at such a distance it is hard for the misinterpretation to be discovered'[51].

Tipu did not conceal his intentions. He made his aims clear in a letter to the Foujdar of Calicut dated 2 February 1788. After forbidding the inhabitants of that place to enter into any sort of commerce with the English, he asked : 'How long (in this case) will the

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50. Buchanan, Journey, Vol.II, pp.150-151.

51. John Henry Grose, A Voyage To The East Indies, Vol.1 (London, 1792), p. 248.

above-named (the English) remain ? He will, in the end, despair of making either sales or purchases, and depart from thence'[52]. Lest the English hold his goods while passing through the Carnatic, he did not send these to Pondichery to obtain vermilion in barter[53]. That it was not an idle fear is apparent from the fact that his Vakeels passing through the Nawab of Arcot's territories to Pondicherry in February 1787 were asked to hide their goods and travel by night in order to avoid detection by the English[54]. There are letters, on the other hand, to show that it was Tipu's policy to stop the sale of rice to the English, Portugese etc. and intercept any one who came from that quarter disguised in the role of a merchant from Muscat. The Imam of Muscat was requested to inform merchants of his place that only those equipped with passports, to be given free of cost by the Mysorean factories there, would have the right to trade in Mysore[55]. In a letter to the Governor of Pondicherry on 9 April 1785 Tipu also asked him to provide his agents with a letter to the talukdar of the place written either in Urdu or Telegu on receipt of which only the goods would be allowed to pass. 'The reason of the orders which we have issued on the subject is,' 'Tipu explained, 'that of late certain strangers have come into our dominions; where borrowing money of the

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52. Kirkpatrick, Select Letters. No. CCCCXXXII, p.471.
53. Ibid. Letter No. CCCCXXXIV, p. 473.
54. Ibid. Letter No. XIX, pp. 32-33.
55. Ibid. Letter No. XXI, p. 35.

Ryots and others they have been guilty of various unwarrantable practices'[56].

While declaring an embargo against the English, Tipu was eager to promote trade with friendly countries. The merchants of Oman depended for their subsistence on rice from Mangalore. Teakwood from Malabar (specially Calicut) was used for constructing boats in the Persian Gulf. The Imam, therefore, decided to give preferential treatment to Tipu's subjects at Masqat, the chief trade mart in the area. Thus, while the Europeans had to pay a duty of 5%, the Indians 8%, and the Arabs and Persians 6½%, merchants belonging to the Mysore kingdom paid only 4%[57]. Tipu, on his part, encouraged the Imam to send ships and dows of merchandise to his dominions and remitted half of the duties heretofore paid by them[58]. He conceded the request of Mao Saith, Dullelat of Musqat, for the remission of anchorage duty and also of four-tenths of the ancient duties at the port of Calicut. Ships from China not being armed, the Sultan was ready to provide escorts both ways for their freight[59]. The merchants of Cutch were assured that the import of mares by them would be made duty free[60]. To another

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56. Ibid. Letter No. CC VII pp. 241-242, Letter No. CCCCXII p.457.

57. Mohibbul Hasan, Tipu Sultan, p. 345.

58. Kirkpatrick, Select Letters, No.CCVII, pp.241-242.

59. Ibid, Appendix E, p.XXXVII.

A Persian manuscript found after the fall of Tipu among his papers at Seringapatam and containing an account of some of his dreams in his own handwriting, mentions that one night in Malabar he saw an ambassador from the Chinese king approach him in sleep. The Dreams of Tipu Sultan, Translated from the original Persian with an introduction and notes by Mahmud Husain (Pakistan Historical Society Publications (No.7, n.d., pp. 52-56).

60. Ibid. No. LXXXIII, p. 111.

foreign merchant, Shaikh Ahmad, Tipu promised to allot a proper place for the establishment of a factory, grant advances of money and lift duties from the passage of merchandise for two years so that during that time all profits could go to the trader. To Armenian merchants in 1787, Tipu promised exemption from the payment of import duties for bringing silk and other products to his kingdom. He also assured them that he would arrange suitable places of residence and provide workmen or labourers on hire, if necessary[61]. To the Raja of Pegu a deputation was carried by Muhammad Qasim and Muhammad Ibrahim from Tipu[62]. All the sulphur available at Muscat was shipped to Mysore. The Sultan also took measures for the promotion of silk industry in his kingdom. Pearl divers from Bahrein and Ormuz were also encouraged to come[63].

Quotations from the Koran were used to give a religious sanction to state policy[64]. 'His subjects, he may possibly think', Moor says of Tipu, 'will with more reverence listen to his mandates when sanctioned by the authority of religion; and his armies will, with more awe, contemplate the power and dignity of their sovereign and general, when the abilities they admire are annexed to the spiritual sanctity of his character'[65]. In sending envoys to fellow Muslim rulers, Tipu

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61. Ibid, No. CCCCCCV p.467 Letter No. LXXVI, pp.103-104.
62. Ibid, Letter No. CCXI pp. 245-246.
63. Ibid, Letter No. CCLVIII pp. 282-283.
64. Ibid, Appendix E, p.XXXIII.
65. Edward Moor, A Narrative of the operations of Captain Little's Detachment And of The Mahratta Army Commanded by Purseram Bhow During the Late Confederacy In India Against the Nawab Tipu Sultan Bahadur (London, 1794), p.203.

was careful to cultivate their religious sentiments. Thus, in 1796 his ambassadors to Cutch were asked to request for mares for 'prosecuting holy wars'; at Karachi and Kabul they were similarly to press for union of all Islamic forces.[66] Nearer home, the Bibi of Cannanore was a staunch ally as the head of the Moplahs. Cannanore had been noted to be a 'large, noble and important' port of Tome Pires, the portugese traveller in the early sixteenth century[67]. At the time under discussion the Bibi of Cannanore annually exported a considerable quantity of popper in vessels of her own and sold it at different ports of India on her own account[68].

The English Company always made its purchases by a contract entered with a few native merchants, or in fact for many years with almost one, - Chakra Mousa of Tellicherry. Eleven others also had dealings with them; one of them was his own brother and the others depended on him largely. Between December and January every year, when the crops were so far advanced that some idea could be formed of the quantity of pepper likely to be obtainable, the Commercial Resident

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66. 'Translation of Instructions from Tippoo Sultana to Meer Hubbeeb Oollah and Meer Mohummud Rezza, sent on an embassy from Zemaun Shah', March 1796 in M. Wood, A Review of the Origin, Progress And Result of The Late Decisive War in Mysore (London, 1800), Appendix, Paper A No. 21, p. 213.
67. Tome Pires, Summa Oriental (London, 1944), Vol.1, p. 77.
68. Buchanan, Journey Vol. II, pp.407-408, 420, 531, 533.

of the English factory at Tellicherry assembled the contractors and entered into a written agreement with them, settling the price and quantity that each was to deliver. At this time, sometimes the whole, and in general at least half of the money was advanced to the contractors. The price varied from Rs.110-120 per candy of 520 lb. The merchants, in turn, gave a certain sum to some respectable gauda or chief, who agreed to deliver a certain amount of pepper at Honavar, from where the Company chiefly derived the product on the west coast of India, at two rupees a candy less than the Company's price. The investment was safe as the pepper merchants were men of wealth. All the pepper procured from the southern districts was obtained by means of small traders. A part of the produce was bought directly from the cultivators in the regions near Tellicherry. The traders dealing with the Company enjoyed a special profit for while a candy of pepper was weighed at 600 lbs. at the time of procurement, its weight was raised by 40 lbs. more at the time of delivery. It was naturally to the interest of these traders, therefore, that the British stay. After the fall of Tipu, leadership among the Moplahs passed from the hands of the Bibi of Cannanore to Chokra. Mousa, whose influence extended all the way from Cavai to Mangalore. The Moplah traders acted as agents for him[69]. Reduced to economic distress under Tipu, they did not take up their stand against the English as they had done against the Portugese in the sixteenth century. On the contrary, they

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69. Buchanan, Journey Vol.II pp.407-8, 420, 531, 533.

formed a possible source of conspiracy against the Sultan[70].

As in the case of pepper, the Company purchased cardamoms by contract to the merchants on the sea coast. The article was grown on private plantations in the hills of north Malabar. Most of the sandalwood was grown east of the Western Ghats. Those raised near the source of the Cavery were of the best quality and called Pattas (or of the city) from being grown near Seringapatam. Due to the unsettled conditions in Malabar, these used to be diverted east in the time of Haidar. After the declaration of state monopoly by Tipu, most of this was smuggled to Coorg and Wynaad. Thus, of a total of 17,000 to 22,000 candies of 560 lbs. brought to Malabar, 12,000 came from Coorg[71]. Betelnut plantations were mostly found in the Western Ghats from Belur to Sira. As soon as a garden began to produce, the proprietor had to pay half of the nut as rent to the government. Besides, he had to bear the expense of rearing the plantations and of forming the wells and tanks by which these were watered. In return for the construction of a tank, a ryot received one-fourth of the government's share in kind or a deduction of the same amount in monetary terms. The government had no other claim to any share of the produce, which consisted of plantains and betel leaf. A man could sell his garden; but if he let it

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70. Tellicherry Cons. 23 Oct. 1785 Sec. and Poll. Deptt. Diary, No. 32 Part II, p. 465. Also Mohibbul Hasan, Tipu Sultan, p. 325.

71. Buchanan, Journey, Vol. II, pp. 521, 536, 539.

turn waste, the soil became public property. A plantation was never allowed to die out; when one tree decayed, a new one was planted in its stead[72]. The imposition of state monopoly by Tipu stopped the flow of trade in sandalwoods, cardanoms and betel-nut. The Haiga Brahmins, who owned the plantations producing these articles, managed to smuggle a part of the yield[73].

The vigilant imposition of state monopoly did not produce an adverse effect on the people of Mysore as such, though some sections of the inhabitants along the coast did suffer. The central warehouse was situated in a wing of the Sultan's palace at Seringapatam, that was in the shape of a square[72]. State warehouses were set up. Tipu was not dismayed by reports that big traders were consequently deserting the towns where they had carried on extensive business and only the poorer classes of the people with their very limited purchasing capacity (up to six or seven fanams) had resort to these. He rested assured in the belief that the big traders would also ultimately be forced to come to the state warehouses[75]. Corporal punishments were sometimes inflicted in implementation of state policy. Weavers, for instance, were at one time directed to be drawn from the field to be

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72. Buchanan, Journey Vol.III, pp. 270, 403.
73. H. Stokes, 'Report On The Nugur Division of Mysore' (1838) pp. 59-60 in Mysore Reports.
74. Buchanan, Journey Vol.I, p.63; Lord Valentia, Voyages And Travels to India, Ceylon and the Red Sea, Abyssinia and Egypt, 1802-1806 (London, 1809) Vol.I, p.414.
75. Kirkpatrick, Select Letters, No. XCVIII, p. 129.

forced to weave eighty pieces of cloth under pain of flegellation. Orders were sent at another time to enroll (or impress) all such Piadehs and coolies as might be found concealed in the dress of peasants. On another occassion, eighty smiths were drawn from their fields at the time of cultivation to serve in the musket manufactury[76]. But, we should remember that Buchanan heard the iron-smelters say the Sultan gave them a high price for their iron, and by his great demand afforded them constant employment. The court demand also maintained the incentive that kept the weavers continuously engaged[75]. At the same time, the government under him also took over the entire exchange mechanism in the kingdom. Shops were erected at all the kasbas and cash advanced to them for exchanging money and buying bullion at established rates of purchase and sale, which are said to have been altered only three or four times in the course of ten or twelve years. Merchants who did not hold licence from the state were debarred from following their trade. This monopoly is said to have brought in a net revenue almost equal to the expense of the establishment. Orders were issued to form such establishments throughout the provinces, but in remote areas the shroffs still continued their practice in collusion with the amildars[78].

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76. Kirkpatrick, Select Letters, No.XXXV, p.47, No. CCXCIV p.316., No. CCCLXXXVIII, p. 438.
75. Buchanan, Journey, Vol.I, pp. 119, 221-222.
78. Read to Graham, 15 October 1797, Baramahal Records Sec. VII (Madras, 1920) No. LXXIII, p.106.

The principal factory (cotay) of Tipu's time was situated at Barragurry. Besides, there were other subordinate ones at different parts of the coast like Mahé, Calicut etc. The factors purchased pepper at the rate of Rs.100 a candy and sold the same for Rs.150-170 to any person who chose to export them, subject to the restrictions mentioned already. The state under Tipu did not pay the cultivators of pepper less than the standard price of the time, but it did certainly eliminate the role of the middlemen[79]. The average price of pepper during this period may be ascertained from the following rates.

It was Rs.100 a candy of 520 lbs. English in December 1740, Rs.104 a little later, Rs.98 in April 1741, Rs.116 in March 1742, Rs.95 for a supply of 410 candies obtained from Ezechiel Rabbi in Cochin in December 1743, and in general the price seems to have been never much less than Rs.100 during the next 40 years. On the 28 February 1780 the Tellicherry factors shipped a cargo of 939 candies odd of the invoice of Rs.1,14,000 odd (Rs.121 per candy). In the same year out of a total of 1,065,249 lbs. collected by Governor Moens at Cochin, 1,001,999 lbs. were supplied by Travancore at Rs.65 per candy. The Anjengo factors were getting pepper from Travancore at the same time at Rs.82 a candy, but that was under a special contract, and they supplied him with arms in return. In 1793 the English company contracted with Travancore for

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79. Buchanan, Jorney, Vol. II, p. 515.

3000 candies of 560 lbs. at Rs.115 per candy and with Cochin for candies of 500 Dutch lbs. or 540 English lbs. at the same price, in 1795 with Travancore for 300 candies of 560 lbs. at Rs.130'[80].

The vigorous imposition of the boockade hit the English hard. The largest billets of sandalwood were sent to China and the middle-sized ones were used in India. The chips and fragments with the smallest assortment of billets, from which the essential oil was distilled, answered best the Arabian market[81]. Cardamoms were in great demand at the Dutch breweries and distilleries while on the Arabic coast their demand always exceeded supply[82]. But the chief concern was with the embargo on pepper. The article enjoyed not only a large and lucrative market in Europe, but in China also its export by the British obviated the necessity of having to send bullion to purchase tea. Thus, the pepper trade was vital for the East India Company's interests in the eighteenth century. The effect of Tipu's embargo was aggravated by the fact that the alternative source of supply for the article in Fort Marlborough, the British headquarters in West Sumatra, showed a declining yield in spite of exhortations from the Directors for 'extending as much as possible your pepper investment, which,

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80. A. Galletti, A.J. Van der Burg and P. Groot, The Dutch In Malabar (Madras, 1911) p. 208.

81. Buchanan, Journey, Vol.II, p. 132; Valentia, Voyages, Vol.I, p. 45.

82. J. Van Lohuizen, The Dutch East India Company And Mysore (Amsterdam, 1961), p. 142, f.n.

altho' at all times desirous, is more essertially so at the present as the price of the article on the Malabar coast is so high as to leave no profit thereon, either at the English or China markets'[83]. The embargo placed by Tipu on the products of his dominion had the effect of raising prises all along the coast-line. Thus the prince of Cherikal issued orders that all the pepper produced at Randaterra was to be gathered in his name, for he was also determined to monopolise the sale of the article.[84] The local merchants could thereafter purchase pepper only at the rate of Rs. 160 a candy and even this with difficulty.[85] The Raja of Travancore could not make up for this deficit of supply though the English were eager to buy 550 candies of pepper from him in 1787 at not less than Rs. 105 a candy[86]. James Thomas, a local Bombay merchant, was in 1789 willing to supply 160 Lbs. of pepper to the English at Rs. 155 per candy. He had purchased the same at Cochin for Rs. 145, and charged the ten rupees extra as transport cost.[87] The supply of cardamoms, an article that sold at a rate between 3sh.-2 d. to 12 sh.-8 d. per lb. in the London market, also stopped reaching the English from Calicut. An inferior quality of cardamoms grown near Catiote was all that the contractors could now provide. They could assure 560 lbs. of candy at Rs. 1400 a candy. (12 lbs. was taken in these deals to be the value of 140 candies)[88]. To add to the difficulties of the English factory at Tellicherry, vessels of Tipu hovered in the neighbouring

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83. John Bastin, The British In West Sumatra (Kuala Lampur, 1967), Document No. 67, pp. 85-86.
84. Tellicherry to Bombay, 11 Nov. 1786, Commercial Deptt. Diary, Vol. III, p. 333.
85. Same to same, 6 Oct. 1786, ibid, pp. 19-20.
86. Anjengo to Bombay, 27 Nov. 1787, ibid, Vol. II p. 270. See also same to same, 30 April 1788, ibid, p. 54.
87. James Thomas to Bombay govt., 17 Dec. 1789, ibid, Vol. IV, p. 249.
88. Tellicherry Consultation, 21-22 Oct. 1788, ibid, Vol. III, p.54.

waters as all through 1789 the Sultan tried to starve them to submission by depriving them of their supply of rice [89]. The french at Mahe were strongly discouraged from shipping rice to the English station [90].

Tipu's activities were now of concern to the Dutch. Their territorial ambitions had ended by this time. They, therefore, wanted only freedom to trade without having much to spend on establishment cost. But while the British could procure a candy of Anjengo pepper at the rate of Rs. 130 a candy, the other European Companies were having to pay ten to twenty rupees more for the same amount [90]. It was to the interest of the Dutch to resist Tipu though they could only hope to do so by utilising the strength of the Kingdom of Travancore and the English. Adriaan Moens, the governor on the Malabar coast from 1771 - 1781, had in the report drawn up at the end of his term advised the sale of the Dutch landholdings on the coast since they were in the shape of small, scattered areas rather than a solid mass. The authorities had sanctioned the sale of these strips to Travancore for a sum about proportionate to the annual revenue which could be calculated as interest. From 1785 to 1789 Travancore had thus purchased Dutch plots [91]. The sale of Cranganore and Ayicottah was a part of the process. The interests of the pepper merchants found play in their promise to make the payment on behalf of Travancore, - to a greater extent Van Lohuizen thinks than had been earlier assumed by Furber [92]. The

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89. Bombay to Tellicherry, 6 May 1789, Sec. and Poll. Deptt. Diary, No. 39, pp. 216-17; Malet, Resident at Poona, to Bombay, 25 July, 1789, p. 368; and same to same, 17 Aug. 1789, p. 378.
90. Commercial Deptt. Diary, Vol. III, p. 334.
91. 'Memoir Written In The Year 1781 A.D.' by Adriaan Moens in The Dutch In Malabar, ed. by Galletti and others, p. 208.
92. Holder Furber, John Company At Work (Harvard University Press, 1948) p. 246. Van Lohuizen, Dutch And Mysore, pp. 151-155.

attack on the 'Travancore lines' by Tipu, which signalled the beginning of the Third Anglo-Mysore War, was not one in which John Holland, the governor of Madras, would by himself have liked to participate. As a principal crediter of the Nawab of Arcot's debts he knew he would suffer as the debts were to be written off. In fact, at the time he was under trial for corruption [93]. Bombay, however, could not let go the chance of a war against Tipu and it ended as they wanted by securing important commercial advantages.

The war might have had grave psychological repercussions on the Sultan. Both Munro and Buchanan inform of a drooping of his spirit. The revenue collectors found a greater scope for exploitation in the prevailing confusion. For instance, though Tipu had asked the assofs to raise a sum of Rs. 3 million in order to help him meet the demands of the Allies, the collectors raised 7 million more; of this a considerable sum was paid as bribes to their superiors [94]. Also, while it had been Tipu's policy to increase the government's share of land uptil now, he was forced to resort to payment by jagirs in future [95]. By the terms of the Treaty of Seringapatam, finally ratified on the 13 March 1792, Tipu agreed to surrender to his allies over half of his dominions and pay an indemnity of three crores and thirty lakhs of Sicca Rupees, half to be paid immediately, while the rest was to be paid in three instalments, the interval between the two not being more than four months. The Marathas extended their territory upto the Tungabhadra by gaining the Northern Districts of Basavapatam, Chitaldurg, Raidurg and Haripanpalli. The Nizam advanced his dominions between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra besides acquiring Gurramkonda, Cuddapah, Ganjikotah, Khambham and Bellary. The English obtained Baramahal, Salem, Dindigal, Calicut, Karur, Dharapuram and Coorg [96].

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93. H.D. Love, Vestiges of Old Madras (Indian Records, London, 1923) Vol. III, p. 402.
94. Buchanan Journey, Vol.III, pp.348-349, Gleig, Munro, Vol.I, p. 144.
95. Malcolm, 'An Abstract of The Present State of Tippoo Sultan', M.Martin (ed.) The Despatches Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley during his Administration in India, Vol. I, p.655.

The Bombay government, seeing their long cherished desire of securing ascendancy on the Malabar Coast come true, summed up the nature of benefits to follow. 'The territory from Goa to Cochin, from the sea coast to the Ghauts', they pointed out, 'includes a country valuable in every respect of situation, produce, revenue and commerce; by fortifying the passes in the mountains it may be defanded with a small body of troops and by our having possession of the forts. Tipoo will be cut off from all communication with the French and other European Powers who have hitherto supplied him with military stores, and he will thereby be effectually excluded from a very essential resource for carrying on future wars'[97]. Cornwallis himself in a letter to Dundas highlighted the importance of gaining the Malabar coast. It was inaccessible to an enemy that did not come by the sea except on the northern frontier and there again it was intersected by rivers and creeks. The possession of Coorg and Palaghat deprived Tipu of the only two passes by which he could invade the Company's dominion. The Rajahs of the coast were subjects of the English and their produce of pepper, spices etc. were extremely profitable. The nett revenue amounted to about Rs. 25 lakhs which would be of great financial help to Bombay; and Cannanore would be a much better and safer place of arms than Tellicherry. Contiguity to the latter station had been acquired, in any case, by the addition of Coorg. Baramahal, Salem and Dindigul formed a strong barrier to the Carnatic which were invincible[98]. Indeed, Cornwallis could claim as he did; 'We have effectually crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable'[99].

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97. Note submitted by the Bombay Govt., March 1792, N.B. Ray (ed.), The Allies War With Tipu Sultan (Bombay, 1937), Vol. III, No. 448, p. 585.
98. Cornwallis to Dundas, March 17, 1792 in Charles Ross (ed.), Correspondence of Charles, first Marquess Cornwallis, (London, 1859 edn.), Vol. II, pp. 158-159.
99. Same to same, March 4, 1792, ibid, p. 154.

CHAPTER - II

THE MAHARAJA'S ADMINISTRATION

From 1800 to 1831 Mysore was under the direct administration of Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar III (popularly known as Mummadi, the Kannada word meaning 'Third'). As he was a minor, the administration was carried on in his name during the first decade by dewan Purnaiya. The boy king roused the affections of the English. Arthur Wellesley, who remained in charge of the province till 1804, credited him with being possessed of 'more simplicity, and apparently more sincerity in his manners as well as in what he says, than any Native I have seen'[1]. Buchanan, during his survey work in Mysore, was impressed by the 'great propriety and decorum' with which the prince received him[2]. Lord Valentia, the nephew of Governor General Wellesley, who visited Mysore in 1802 had occasion to speak of the Maharaja's 'intelligent countenance'[3]. Wilks, the Resident of Mysore from 1806-9, is on record as having said that 'he had never known a finer youth, European or Indian'. Col. James Welsh of the Madras army, to whom we owe this piece of information, added in agreement

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1. Wellington to Close 31 March, 1800, in The Mysore Letters And Despatches of the Duke of Wellington, Printed Verbatim from THE Original Manuscripts (Bangalore, Mysore Government Press, 1862), p.52.
2. Buchanan, Journey, Vol.I, p.68.
3. Valentia, Voyages, Vol.I, p.427.

that he had 'never felt such a predilection for any native as for this young Rajah'[4]. Such favourable opinion gave way in course of time to others expressing grave doubts about the capabilities of the ruler. Before trying to assess the success of the administration in terms of personal achievements, a standard likely to vary with individual preferences, it is necessary to realise the problems confronting the kingdom.

The Hindu dynasty had been restored after much deliberation. There had been difference among the British as to the wisdom of the Treaty of 1793. Shore, for instance, had praised Cornwallis for refraining from pushing on with the siege of Seringapatam. The fall of his capital would, Shore feared, have driven Tipu to the mountain fastnesses and protracted the war indefinitely. A substitute, if raised by the British, would have to depend on them for his existence. To maintain watch over him would have cost the British more than might have been compensated for in the nature of additional revenues. Besides, there was the probler of settling the claims of the Allies. The Marathas would, in particular, have grown too powerful if they gained any more territories. What the British needed was, according to Shore, 'an independent sovereign, over the Mysorean state, possessed of power sufficient to serve as a barrier, but inadequate to

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4. Col. James Welsh, Military Reminiscences Extracted from A Journal of Nearly Forty years Active Service In The East Indies (London, 1830), Vol II, pp. 267-269.

the object of a successful invasion'[5]. That the apprehensions were not unfounded is proved by the fact that Wellesley could not entirely ignore these, though the death of Tipu had decisively altered the situation. At the time of signing the Treaty of Mangalore, however, the policy of Cornwallis caused much resentment among his subordinates like Munro[6]. Wellesley, while defending his policy of expansion later, himself had occasion to reflect thus : 'The growth of the hostile power of Mysore from the year 1792 to 1798, might probably have been controlled, or even converted to the purposes of our security, had it been possible to induce Tippoo Sultan to enter into a subsidiary alliance with the Company at the close of the war in 1792'[7]. That there was not much resistance from Mysore after the fall of Seringapatam was due, in the first place, to the submission of Fath Haidar, Tipu's eldest son , shortly after. He hoped that the English would restore him to his paternal dominions though many assofs and Dhoondia Waugh advised him to prolong the fight.[8] Dhoondia himself proceeded to give battle single-handed. Another detachment of Tipu's troops under the generalship of a commander

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5. Shore, 'Political Reflections on the State of Hindustan written about March 25th, 1793' in Holden Furber (ed.), The Private Record of an Indian Governor General ... with Henry Dundas, President of the Board of Control, 1793-1798 (Harvard, 1953), pp.145-146.
6. Gleig, Munro, Vol.1, p. 152.
7. Wellesley to Secret Committee 13 July, 1804, in Martin, Despatches, Vol. IV No. XXXIII, p. 160.
8. Kirmani, History of Tipu Sultan, Translated by Col. W. Miles (Calcutta, 1958 edn.), pp. 129-30.

named Qamar-ud-din also laid down their arms. Arthur Wellesley's relief at the last development is illustrated by his own words :

'If he had remained in arms, we never could have settled this country unless we incurred the enormous expense of keeping our army in the field and even then the operations to be carried on would be liable to all the hazards of protracted military operations. He has saved us this at least, and has thereby rendered us a service almost as great as any of those rendered by His Highness the Nizam'[9].

The British had two alternatives before them while effecting the political settlement of Mysore in 1800. On the one hand, they could decide on direct annexation. Alternately, they could install a descendant of Tipu or a scion of the Hindu Raj. Purnaiya, one of Tipu's leading officers and Mutsaddi of the Toshekhana under Haidar, was the first to make a move. A week after the fall of Seringapatam, he proposed to Harris that the charge of the revenue administration of the country be left to him while Fath Haidar be made the next king. The soldiers of Mysore, who had not still been disbanded, could not otherwise be expected to remain quiet. The

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9. Arthur Wellesley to Mornington, 13 May 1799, Supplementary Despatches of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, India 1797-1805, edited by his son, Vol.I (London, 1859), p.217.

most powerful elements within the kingdom would not also be reconciled to the restoration of the former Hindu dynasty. Harris promised to carry the message to the Governor General. Meantime, he asked Fath Haidar to repair to Seringapatam and order the troops to disperse[10]. Arthur Wellesley was critical of the plan. He thought that it was framed by Purnaiya with a view to gather the future management of the revenue of the province in his own hands[11]. The plan was scotched.

Dundas was in favour of annexation. In a letter to Wellesley dated 9 October 1799 he expressed himself against the proposal to install a minor prince on the throne of Mysore, should any such be living. The maladministration of Oudh, Carnatic and Tanjore had clearly showed the evil consequences of having a titular head on the throne, while the British held effective power. On the other hand, the acquisition of Mysore would give the British possession of the whole territory from coast to coast. With safety ensured after the fall of Tipu, the Bengal Government would be free from having to send money to the other presidencies. Seringapatam was to serve as the seat of central government in peninsular India with

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10. Harris to Wellesley, 13 May, Vol.II. M. Martin (ed.), Despatches, p. 79.

11. Arthur Wellesley to Richard Wellesley, 23 May 1799, Supplementary Despatches And Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, Vol.I [redacted], p. 221.

all other English settlements on both coasts (including Madras and Ceylon) in a subordinate position. A great part of the forces of the area was to be stationed there with power to strike against the dominions of the Nizam and the Marathas and capacity to fall back in defence of the Company's dominion in Malabar[12].

Outright annexation was not, however, possible. To have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and the Nizam would have uncontrollably increased the power of the latter, while the English would have too great an additional burden to administer with their limited resources. The Marathas, having taken no part in the hazards and expenses of war, could not in fairness to the Allies be granted an equal share and be made unduly powerful. 'The establishment, therefore, of a central and separate power in the ancient territories of Mysore', Wellesley concluded, 'appeared to be the best expedient for reconciling the interests of all parties'. A descendant of the family of Tipu might have persisted with the attempt to recover his lost fortunes and entered into an alliance with the French. Loyalty to the British cause could only be expected from a representative of the Wodeyars, who would have to be rescued from oblivion first. Both his weakness and gratitude would keep him under the British tutelage. Seringapatam had to be retained as a tower of strength from which, Wellesley proclaimed, 'we may at any time shake Hindustan to its centre, if any combination should ever be formed against our interests'.

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12. Dundas to Wellesley, 9 October 1799, in Edward Ingram, Two views of British India. The Private Correspondence of Dundas and Lord Wellesley, 1798-1801 (Bath, 1970), p.182.

The settlement in Wellesley's opinion was to be based on the right of conquest. The Raja was to obtain his dominions from the English. The proceeding was, therefore, to commence with a treaty between the Nizam and the Company, to which the Peshwa was expected to accede under certain conditions. The next agreement was to be with the Raja, defining all his relationships with the Company and his internal government[13]. The Company signed two treaties accordingly, the Partition Treaty of Mysore with the Nizam on 22 June, and the Subsidiary Treaty with the Raja of Mysore on 8 July, 1799[14]. By the Partition Treaty the Company secured areas yielding Rs.69 lakhs annually. These consisted of Malabar, Coimbatore, Dharapuram and all the heads and passes, together with the forts and ports between the company's eastern and western coasts, including the fort of Seringapatam and the district of Wynaad. To the Nizam's share fell the territories of Gooty, Gurramkonda, the Jerimulla Taluk in Chitaldurg, Nandidurg and Kolar. Since the Marathas refused to be a party to the treaty, two-thirds of the territories ear-marked for them, were apportioned to the Nizam and the Company took the rest. The truncated state of Mysore was restored to the Maharaja.

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13. Wellesley to Dundas, 5th and 7th June 1799; Martin, Vol.II. Despatches, pp.35-39.
14. C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.IX (Calcutta, 1909) pp.56-66, 220-225, provides the full text of the treaties, the main points of which are summarised here.

The subsidiary Treaty between the Company and the Raja of Mysore consisted of sixteen Articles in all. By its terms the Maharaja was to maintain peace with the Company and its allies. He was not to interfere in the affairs of any other state whatsoever. All his foreign relations were to be conducted with the prior knowledge and sanction of the Company (Art.VI). The Company was to be the sole judge to decide which forts and strongholds were to be dismantled or destroyed and which to be strengthened and repaired. The requisite expenses were to be borne and defrayed equally by the contracting parties (Articles VIII-IX). No European was to be allowed to reside for even twenty-four hours in Mysore without passport from the English Company (Art.VII). The friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties were to be considered as friends and enemies of both (Art.I). But, if the Maharaja applied for the Company's troops to maintain his authority and government, the Company was to decide how they were to be employed. In no case were the troops to be employed in ordinary revenue matters (Art.X). On the other hand, goods required by the garrison at Seringapatam were to be allowed to enter the place from every quarter of the Majaraja's dominions, free from duty (Art.XII). In short, the advice of the Company was to be binding on the Maharaja in all state affairs. Rectification of frontier was to be made possible by exchange of territory or otherwise (Articles XIV-XV).

The real problem lay in the enforcement of provisions regarding payment. Article II provided for the Maharaja's payment of an annual subsidy of 7 lakhs of Star pagodas for the maintenance of the Company's troops for the defence of security of his dominions. The

payment was to be in twelve equal monthly instalments commencing from July 1, 1799. The disposal of the amount, together with the arrangement and employment of the troops maintained by it, was to be left entirely at the discretion of the Company. By Article III the Maharaja was to bear increased expenses whenever hostilities or preparations for such were to be made to protect and defend the territories of either of the contracting parties. The exact amount to be paid in this case also was to be fixed by the Governor General at a rate bearing 'just and reasonable' proportion to the actual net revenues of the State. Should the Governor General apprehend failure in the funds to meet the provisions under Articles II and III of the Treaty, he was empowered by Article IV to have 'full power and right either to introduce such regulations and ordinances' as he thought necessary for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for administrative reform in any branch of the government. He could also assume and bring under the direct management of the Company such part or parts of the territorial possessions of Mysore as he considered necessary to render the said funds efficient and available, either in time of peace or war. If the Maharaja, after being intimated of the necessity to implement Article IV, failed to instruct his officers to execute the provision within ten days, the Governor General had by Article V the power to execute his decision. The Maharaja was to be furnished with a true and faithful account of the revenue and produce of his territories, so long as the Company held exclusive authority of any part or parts of the same. In no

case, however, was the Maharaja's actual income to fall short of one lakh of Star pagodas, together with one-fifth of the net revenues of the territories ceded to him by the fifth Article of the Partition Treaty, under the guarantee of the Company's Government.

By the Subsidiary Treaty, Wellesley intended to remove the evils which had attended the workings of the double government in Tanjore, Oudh and the Carnatic. 'I resolved to reserve to the Company', said Wellesley, 'the most extensive and indisputable powers of interposition in the internal affairs of Mysore, as well as an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the country (whenever such a step might appear necessary for the security of the funds destined to the subsidy), and of requiring extraordinary aid beyond the amount of the fixed subsidy, either in time of war, or of preparations for hostility'[15]. The clause regarding apprehension of a failure in the funds, on the basis of which the Company was vested with so much power for arbitration in the internal affairs of Mysore, was however capable of being loosely interpreted. At the same time, the Treaty did not specifically state who was to judge when the administration would be restored to the Maharaja in case of a take-over by the British with the avowed intention of reform. Nor was anything said as to how long the territories would, in such case, remain sequestrated. Mill, therefore, was justified in saying 'this Raja was a species of screen, put up to hide, at once from Indian and from European eyes,

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15. Wellesley to the Directors 3 August, 1799. Martin, Vol.II, Despatches, No. XXVI, pp.72-101.

the extent of aggrandizement which the British territory had received'[16].

Released from the dungeon where he had been thrown by Tipu and raised to the throne by the English, the Maharaja had neither the traditional sanction of a long-established ruling dynasty nor the strength of arms to uphold him in his position. He owed his rise to the British. What they had bestowed on him, they could at another moment take away. The political upheaval had upset the normal professions of the people. The Brahmins in the revenue department were distressed as their numbers were reduced and stricter departmental control was exerted over the officials. The Muslims, accustomed to a military life, could not readily adjust themselves to a civil occupation nor were they willing to join the service of their enemies. Gradually the wealthier of them took to trade in grain as the state ceased to exercise a monopoly of it. The poorer classes hired themselves out to the wealthier farmers as day-labourers. In addition to this, Mysore at the beginning of the nineteenth century was exhausted by the long wars in which she had been long engaged. The destruction had been particularly wide and indiscriminate during the Third Anglo-Mysore War when Parashuram Bhao, the Maratha general, had plundered the western districts, without even sparing the wheeled chariot of the temple of Meilkote that had a great reputation for sanctity. Mysore had also suffered from the depredations of the soldiers following Lord Cornwallis; the Lumbadies or dealers in grain,

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16. James Mill, The History of British India, Vol.VI (London, 1840), p. 164.

who supplied provisions to the British camp, indulged in occasional acts of looting (ex. at Satteggala and Singanaluru) and the Sultan followed a scorched earth policy, laying waste the whole territory from Belur to Seringapatam besides compelling the people of Bangalore to desert their homes in the face of the invaders. Thus, a scene of holocaust faced Buchanan, whichever way he turned his steps. To give one example, two-thirds of the country beyond the Nandi hills lay unoccupied since the time of Lord Cornwallis' invasion, while the stretch of land between Chikballapur and Doddaballapur was entirely depopulated. The vast extent of uncultivated land was, however, beginning to attract cultivators from the Nizam's dominion[18].

Arthur Wellesley realised the precarious nature of the restored monarchy from the very first. He did not believe that the Madras government would be long able to restrain the temptation of plucking a plum when it was to be had for the asking. He thus pointed out the loopholes in the Subsidiary Treaty with Mysore : 'As it now stands,

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17. Buchanan, Journey, Vol.I, pp.36,63,67,83,165,174-175,180,192, 353; Vol.II, pp.33,47,88,90-92. In a letter to his elder brother, the Governor General, Arthur Wellesley remarked at this time (14 June, 1799) that not a single house was standing in old Mysore, while the few that did exist in the newer portions of the city were already in a dilapidated state - [illegible] Supplementary Destratches. Vol.I, p.245.
18. Dharma Kumar, Land And Caste In South India (Cambridge, 1965), p.110.

he said, 'it will give ground for the belief that we give the Rajah the country at the present moment with the intention of taking it away again when it will suit our convenience'[19]. Charges of corruption or calumny would be brought to bear upon the state and, Arthur Wellesley confided to Close, 'I know no person either civil or military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the first evil, or who has strength of character or talents to defend the Government against the second'[20]. The very different pace at which an Indian durbar moved compared to the English style could constitute a source of misunderstanding and embarrassment.

'We have never been hitherto accustomed to a native government, we can't readily bear the disappointments and delays which are usual in all their transactions, prejudices are entertained against them, and all their actions are misconstrued, and we mistrust them. I see instances of this daily in the best of our officers, and I cannot but acknowledge that from the delays of the natives they have sometimes reason to complain. But they have none to ill use any man'[21].

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19. Arthur Wellesley to Mornington, 14 June 1799, Supplementary Despatches, Vol.I, pp.244,245.
20. Wellington to Governor General, 14 January 1804, in Gurwood (ed.), The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington (London, 1937), Vol.II, p.35.
21. Wellington to Close, 18 June 1800, Mysore Letters And despatches of the Duke of Wellington, pp.96,97.
22. [illegible]

The importance of working in co-operation with the local officials had to be realised by the British in all stations. There was a general sense of insecurity among the inhabitants of the province, irrespective of their rank. The Maharaja had to be assured that any report against him would not be promptly credited[22]. Purnaiya also wanted to keep the British at an arm's length. This was natural, Arthur Wellesley thought, because of the tendency among the Company's officials to cast aspersions on an Indian underling by calling him a fool or a knave. 'If he is so fortunate as that it is impossible to give him the former appellation, it is certain that he will be accused of Knavery'[23]. As instance of the irresponsibility of British officers may be mentioned the case of Captain Macaulay, who left Bangalore having converted it into an English fort (which was never intended by Arthur Wellesley) with orders to the havildar to maintain the place as such against the amildar. The latter's moderation prevented the outbreak of a major conflict. Arthur Wellesley had strictly to ask his men to mind their own business[24]. The officer in charge of

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22. Wellington to Close, 31 March 1800, Mysore Letters and Despatches of Wellington, pp.51-52.
23. Wellington to Close, 10 October 1800, Ibid., p.167.
24. Wellington to Captain Macaulay, 3 April 1804, Ibid., pp.200-201.

Nagar was specifically instructed not to interfere in the administration of justice or police in the area under his command or of adjacent districts, except when his aid was invoked by an amil or some other officer of the Raja's civil government[25]. A local farmer of the revenue, who instead of depositing his collection with the amildar was submitting the same to the English directly, was told not to do so[26]. When two persons (Bistnopah and Govinda Rao) were rewarded by the English in 1804 for their service, the grant was made to depend to a large extent on the favour of the dewan, and was to be channelised through the Maharaja's administration[27]. Troops of the Raja of Mysore were restricted to the task of defending his kingdom and were not to cross his frontiers unless so directed. They were not to interfere in the work of administration[28].

Arthur Wellesley was conscious at the same time of the problem caused by the acute scarcity of money in the kingdom. By the Subsidiary Treaty, Mysore had become land-locked. It was without any navigable river. The land revenue was realised in kind and the

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25. Instruction signed by R.Barclay, Deputy Adjutant in Mysore, 19 May 1804, Ibid., p.202.
26. Wellington to Piele 3 December 1802, Ibid., p.198.
27. Wellington to Wilks, 9 September 1804, in Gurwood (ed.), Despatches of Wellington, Vol.III, pp.451-453.
28. Wellington to Wilks, 14 March 1804, Mysore Letters And Despatches of Wellington, pp.199-200.

system of exchange was barter. The presence of the Company's troops at first kept up the demand. But even then the administration had to look out for other sources of revenue in addition to land. So, in 1801 Purnaiya imposed duties on all goods reaching Seringapatam except some varieties of grain. Arthur Wellesley could not but object to this violation of the provisions of the Treaty. He also spoke against the Raja's continuing to impose a duty on tobacco and betelnut, because the Company had obtained the right to farm them. The revenue thus raised by the English went to meet the expenses of the separate court of justice that they had established at Seringapatam. If the Maharaja was allowed to levy duties on these articles, the inhabitants would have to pay two masters - the Company and the state. Ultimately, it was arranged that no duties were to be levied upon goods coming to Seringapatam from places nearer than thirty or forty miles. The duties at the chowkeys beyond that distance were to continue at the existing rate. This was done to restrict the privileges of duty-free trade to those dealing directly with Seringapatam and also to prevent dealers from taking advantage of facilities beyond the specified area. The issue of these passports was not entrusted to the care of the Commanding Officer or the Collector who might be tempted to indulge in farming the duties on other commodities[29].

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29. Wellington to Close, 13 June 1801. Mysore Letters and Despatches of Wellington, pp.192-194.

Wellesley retained the army and police system of Mysore on traditional lines. For the maintenance of public authority Haidar and Tipu had raised a small but selected band of peons (Candachar) from the well-bodied cultivators of the soil and armed them chiefly with matchlocks and pikes. Purnaiya continued with this system, having promised to respect the ancient usages of the several districts. At least one individual from each family of the military class was engaged to serve in this capacity. Their local duties consisted in taking tours of guards in the little forts or walled villeges to which they were attached and in being ready at all times to attend to the calls of the police Officer. One half of their pay was assigned in waste lands, wherever possible, according to ancient custom and the other half in cash. The sum varied from two to three rupees per month with a batta of three and a half, if called out from their respective districts, at which time frequent reliefs according to their domestic convenience were always allowed. The number of peons thus enrolled, exclusive of those in constant pay, Wilks says, amounted during the first two years to 20,027 persons, and their annual pay to 2,25,862 Canteroy Pagodas. Better information and improved arrangements enabled the dewan in the third year to reduce the number to 17,726, and the expense to 1,84,718 Canteroy Pagodas. In the fourth and fifth years, they were reduced to 15,247 persons, and the expense to 48,478 Canteroy Pagodas. This last sum was considered by the dewan to be nearly as low as could with prudence be reduced. During the Second Anglo-Maratha War 1000 of these peons enrolled as dooly-bearers and 450 served the Company's army without a single diversion.

817 performed as runners to the post office of Mysore. Thus, simultaneously the Peons served to maintain internal peace in Mysore while providing a body of men from whom the Company could enlist 20,000 on any emergency at a few days notice[30].

By a revision of Article III of the Subsidiary Treaty in 1807 the Maharaja was relieved from the fixed pecuniary contribution. Instead, he agreed to maintain at all times, fit for service and subject to muster, a body of four thousand effective horse, about five hundred of which were to be bargis and the rest sillahdar.

Besides, such portion of the four thousand horse as the British Government considered to be more than necessary for the internal protection of Mysore was to be ready at all times to accompany and assist the Company's army. Till the expiration of one month from the date of their crossing the frontier, the Company was to regularly pay the extra expenses of their maintenance or batta at the rate of four star pagodas per month for each man and horse. The extra expense of any casual service beyond the frontier, not exceeding one month, was to be borne by the Government of Mysore. If it was found expedient to augment the cavalry of Mysore beyond the number of four thousand, on intimation to that effect from the British Government, the Maharaja was to use his utmost endeavours for that purpose. But the whole expense of such augmentation and of

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30. Wilks, Report On The Interior Administration, Resources And Expenditure of the Government of Mysore, paras 19-24.

the maintenance of the additional numbers, at the rate of eight star pagodas for each effective man and horse while within the territory of Mysore, and of an additional sum or batta at the rate of four Star Pagodas a month after the expiration of one month from the period of their passing the frontier as described in the second Article of the Subsidiary Treaty, was to be provided by the Company[31].

This revision of Clause III of the Subsidiary Treaty was the result of the gallantry and steadfastness on the part of the Mysore troops in the Company's service during the Third Anglo-Maratha War (1800-1802). Malcolm, who commanded these forces then, thus paid a tribute to the military organisation of the state.

'one of the most evil consequences which has attended on our alliance in other parts was here in a great degree avoided; I mean the destruction of the chiefs and the aristocracy of the country by our abstaining from any very minute interference, and by the prince maintaining, according to the stipulations of the treaty, a body of 4000 irregular horse under the same chiefs and officers or their sons, who had distinguished themselves in the war of Hyder Ally and Tipu against the British Government and who have evinced for 30 years as much zeal, fidelity and courage in contributing to the success of every subsequent war, in which they have served in association with our troops'[32]. Malcolm was pleased with what he saw of Mysore when

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31. Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements And Sanads, Vol.IX, pp.228-230.
32. Evidence of Malcolm before the Parliamentary Committee, 12 April 1832, Reports from Committee 1831-32 (HC) Vol.14, pp.28-29.

he first came to take up the post of the Resident in that kingdom. In his policy of benevolent guardianship of the people, Malcolm was but following the policy of Arthur Wellesley who, along with Cole, had recommended his appointment as the Resident in Mysore. In Malcolm's opinion, the government of the Kingdom served as the best model of Britain's Asiatic connections[33].

Similar concern for the kingdom of Mysore was shown by Wilks, who acted as the Resident in the Maharaja's durbar from 1803-9. The spirit of the alliance, he thought, required no less 'a discreet forbearance in the ordinary routine of the Government, than the firm and efficacious exercise of this right when the occasion shall demand it'. The awareness that such a power did exist and could exert itself if necessary for the protection of the people, Wilks thought, was sufficient by itself to prevent any frequent or urgent necessity for its exercise. 'If therefore the Resident shall employ the proper precautions for being easily accessible without the intervention of a third person and if to temper and probity, he joins an ordinary degree of vigilance, it does not seem to be probable, that oppression of any magnitude can long exist in Mysore without detection and redress'. The need for vigilance was enhanced by the fact that a large number of revenue officials had been dismissed on the charge of peculation. Thus, a number of able, unprincipled and disappointed

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33. J.W. Kaye, The Life And Correspondence of Major-General Sir John Malcolm, Vol.I, (London, 1856), p.381.

men were dispersed all over the country and proved to be the source of intrigue from the very first[34].

Anglo-Mysore relations underwent a sharp change after the first decade of the nineteenth century. The Maharaja had come of age and would not allow Purnaiya to dominate him as before. The deterioration in their relations was said to have started from the close of the period when Wilks was the Resident. Maharani Lakshmi Ammani was said to have rejected her son's appeal to be vested with real power since the dewan was performing effeciently. Matters came to a head when Purnaiya refused to comply with the Maharaja's request for a financial statement, on the ground that he was responsible to the English only as he had been made the dewan by them. He also turned down another request for the submission of the letters which he had received as the Maharaja's regent, since he said they were valuable to him. The Maharaja suspected the English to be instigating Purnaiya secretly. To clear the suspicion, Cole (who had been acting as the Resident since 1809) informed the dewan that the payment of the balance to the Maharaja's treasury would be considered as being made to the English themselves. But Purnaiya's aspirations continued to grow. He wanted the post of the dewan to be made hereditary in his family. Naturally Cole could not accept this. Selection, he said, was to be made on the basis of merit.

Being cornered, Purnaiya turned defiant. He rejected the Resident's proposal for an interview and complained of guards

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34. Wilks, Report, paras 126, 128, 133, 139.

being placed on his house. The watch placed on him had been necessary because two of his family members had removed jewels from the palace treasury to the amount of 1 lakh and 14 thousand pagodas. The Resident and the Maharaja had been away from the capital at the time. Later the culprits offered to make good the loss. There was also an attempt to take out some government property from the house of Purnaiya, which had always been situated in the heart of the public treasury and formed the principal part of it. The dewan's relatives also carried messages to Rama Rao and Himmat Rao, the commanders of the Mysore cavalry and infantry respectively, that the Maharaja might replace them by his relatives, who would gradually fill all the high government offices now that he had come of age. In fact, the Resident thought that it was the dewan's family that instigated him 'to treat the Rajah and his relations with studied contempt and open insult in order either to convince the public mind that he himself is intended by the British Government to be the chief authority in Mysore, or to throw the Rajah's government into contempt, or to create confusion in the state'. (Underlines as in the original).

But Purnaiya was at the end of his tether. Comparison between the cutcherry records and the dewan's private documents revealed that he had made far greater endowments to the Brahmins than the instructions laid down by the British government would have allowed. Purnaiya tried to defend himself by saying first, that the expenditure incurred by him had the approval of Rani Lakshmi Ammani and, then, of the Resident at Poona. But, he did not have any evidence

to prove his point. Also Purnaiya's argument that he had not consulted the Maharaja in view of his being a 'foolish child' did not hold good. Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar had come of age for four years. The dewan now threw himself at the Resident's mercy, hoping to be excused for his previous insubordination. On examination it was found that a sum of 3,89,600-4-4/16 in donation to the Brahmins and 2,42,398-9-10/4/76 in private expense was still outstanding against his name. On the Resident's request, the Maharaja pardoned Purnaiya and assured him a monthly salary of 500 Canterdy pagodas to the end of his life[35]. It was an unfortunate end to the career of an official who had helped in a large way to the healing of the country after almost half-a-century's war. As for the total impact of Purnaiya on the administration of the kingdom we shall have occasion to refer to it later in the course of our discussion.

The agreement between the Resident and the Maharaja broke down shortly after. In 1813 Krishnaraja Wodeyar sent a representation to Madras, thus bypassing the authority of the Resident. Cole informed John Abercronby, the Governor of Madras (1813-14), that Srinivasa Rao, who carried the Maharaja's message, had been accused of charges of fraud, bribery and peculation, some of which had been definitely proved[36]. The Governor accordingly refused to give the

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35. Evidence of Babu Rao before the Insurrection Committee, For Misc. No.308 Qs.Nos. 2163-2165. The total control exercised by Purnaiya over the administration in his later days may be seen from the fact that a killadar refused to entertain the Maharaja's request for the supply of some ropes, fifteen to twenty days before the date of his accession, since the dewan had not left instructions to that effect - Cole to Madras 14 July 1811 and 18 Sept. 1811, For Pol.Cons., 8 Nov. 1811, Nos.4-5.

36. Cole to Madras 18 Dec. 1813, For Sec.Cons. 21 Jan. 181, Nos.1-3.

delegation a hearing on the ground that the Resident was the only established channel of communication between the Government and the Maharaja.

This, however, was the period when Lord Hastings as the Governor General (1813-1823) was pursuing a policy of non-intervention. He admonished both the Resident and the Maharaja, the former for having sent a secret mission to Madras and the latter for having complained in an intemperate fashion about it. An improvement in the relationship between the Resident and the Maharaja was desired. With this end in view, Cole was advised to follow a conciliatory policy. In a letter dated 3 June 1814 to Close, the Governor General conceded the existence of abuses in the Mysore administration but said that similar conditions were to be met with in every Asian Court. His advice to the Resident to follow a policy of co-operation and firm guidance was much in the spirit of administrators of a previous decade. Difficulties if not eliminated, he said, 'will be at least weakened and kept in check by your strict adherence to the principles of the alliance, and by the continuous temperate application of good counsel conveyed in a firm, benevolent and confidential manner. Open interference in his affairs, and public reproof or admonition cannot fail to produce in the mind of a prince of any independence of spirit, aversion for the advice. It would be vain and remantic to attempt to eradicate entirely the vices which must in a greater or less degree exist in a court constituted like that of Mysore but there is nothing to discourage the hope that by able, temperate and skilful management, such an approximation to the

principles of good government may be obtained, as did for many years form the regular distinction of that state among the native courts of India'[37].

Cole's objections to Srinivasa Rao's deputation had been based more on his resentment at having been bypassed than any grounding of facts. For, Srinivasa Rao was indeed a senior official of the state. He had served as a sheristadar in the cavalry under Tipu and held a similar post in the infantry under Qamar-ud-din. Purnaiya had employed him as a risaldar (squadron leader) of the cavalry, in which capacity he had escorted grain to the Ajanta Ghat during the Second Anglo-Mysore War. His elder brother, Govinda Rao, had similarly acquitted himself with credit during this war. Soon afterwards, Srinivasa Rao had been promoted to the position of a bakshi in the Cutta or sandal cutcherry. Cole himself had recommended Srinivasa Rao, along with Bakshi Rama Rao and another, for service in the dewan cutcherry. Srinivasa Rao had, therefore, a long list of creditable performance in the service of the state, when sent by the Maharaja as envoy to Madras. He fell out of favour with the Resident for leading this deputation, but later Cole revised his opinion. He called back Srinivasa Rao to Mysore from Seringapatam, where he had taken refuge, and gave employment to his nephews, Rama Rao and Kishen Rao. In his later life, Srinivasa Rao

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37. Madras to Calcutta, 11 Feb. 1814, For.Sec.Cons. 18 March 1814 No.1. Also For.Misc. No.127, correspondence between Cole and the Madras Government, 1813-15. The similarities between Lord Hastings' policies towards Mysore and Oudh have been noticed by M.H. Mehta, Lord Hastings And the Indian States (Bombay, 1930) pp.173-174.

rose to the rank of the Chief Judge in the Adalat Court and the Department of Complaints[38].

But, these were future developments. Coming back to where we were, Cole replied with a note that the Maharaja suffered from the effects of the bad education that had beer imparted to him by the dewan, who had raised him up among the palace menials. This was the first time that the responsibility for the maladministration of Mysore had been attributed to defeciencies in the Maharaja's character. Cole's version is however, riddled with contradictions. Thus, at one and the same time, Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar is said to have been well-bred and fond of low company. Also, Cole calls him 'totally indolent and unenterprising', at one moment, and 'very quick', the next instant. Another instance of Cole's habit of blowing alternately hot and cold is seen in the fact that he praises the Maharaja for being liberal, accommodating and completely obliging to the English in one place and ... charges him with systematic want of good faith in another. Cole was more consistent in his criticism of the Maharaja's administration. Krishnaraja Wodeyar was represented as a ruler trying to concentrate all authority in his hands, without being able to accept criticism or delegate power to anyone. Dewan Rama Rao (1811-15), who had succeeded Purnaiya, had proved oppressive as the faujdar of Nagar. Besides, he was totally incompetent as a civil administrator. He feared that he might be

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38. Representation of Srinivasa Rao, April 1832, Proceedings of The Mysore Commission, (29 February 1832- 15 June 1832).

punished should his past record in Nagar be detected. Rama Rao was, therefore, content to remain a stooge in the hands of the Maharaja. The king's relatives (the Rajbindes), who had been placed in obscurity and kept on a pittance during the time of Purnaiya, took the lion's share of the profits in the new set up. They displaced the older revenue servants. The Brahmins also succeeded in influencing the Maharaja through a policy of flattery and exploitation of religious sentiments. Out of a total number of 132 amildars, 68 in Cole's estimate were those in service from the days of Purnaiya when sherishtadars alone were considered fit to fill these posts. 32 of the others had never been associated with revenue matters, 10 being recruited from the lowest class of officials attached to the palace.

Cole saw a chain of bribery and corruption. To win favour a newly appointed amildar had to bribe several officers in the dewan's cutcherry and the men surrounding the king. The total amount of these bribes, usually considerable, was to be realised by extorting money from the peasants over and above the just quota of taxes and rent due to the government. Whole villages were thus rented to individuals who forced the ryots to provide several of their daily wants, ex. grass, straw, firewood and even occasional labour at their farms. Mutilation of the taluc accounts made it impossible to detect fraud. The officers of the sillahdar horse were the principal beneficiaries of this system till at the Resident's remonstrance they were dismissed, only to be succeeded by the Rajbindes and the petty officers at the court. 'Oppression, extortion and injustice', Cole said,

'seldom fail to accompany a newly appointed amildar to his seat of authority'. Such evils had not been absent in the time of Tipu but existed in a much reduced form due to the vigilance and watchfulness of an efficient and active administration.

The Maharaja himself, in Cole's opinion, was a party to the corruption. He often received nazar or presents on new appointments and even allowed the incumberts to reimburse themselves. His differences with the Maharaja resulted, according to Cole, from his request to be introduced to all new amildars before they took charge, with the intention of screening inefficiency or corruption. It was only when the ryots complained to him, Cole said, that their complaints could be heard. But even this path was full of difficulties. Each amildar had his Vakil at the court well supplied with resources to prevent complaints from reaching the Rajah and, if the cause at all procured a hearing, to bribe those appointed to investigate it. The Maharaja himself secretly threatened to punish those who complained to the Resident and shielded those who defrauded him instead of submitting to British interference. For instance, Sooraia, a Brahmin who had played a leading part in the overthrow of Purnaiya, was allowed to escape when found guilty of having wrongfully amassed 1534 Canteroy Pagodas. Later, the Resident had him intercepted at Nagar.

In view of this gross maladministration, Cole proposed that Rama Rao, who was willing to resign, be replaced by Bakhir Sahib, the Chief Justice, who had actually beer performing the duties of the dewan at the Maharaja's behest, without assuming the official

designation since he said that, as the Maharaja's servant he would serve in any capacity required[39].

The Maharaja in self-defence put the blame on the dewan, Rama Rao, for the loss of revenue. He admitted that encroachments had been made upon the treasures accumulated by Purnaiya but added that the former dewan had taxed the people without any consideration for their capacities. Large remissions had therefore to be made from arrears in collection. Some defalcation of revenue was admitted to have taken place in the process of removing persons who had been serving in the collectorate during the time of Purnaiya. The Rajbindes had to be paid more liberally than the pittance alloted to them by Purnaiya. This together with the general increase of disbursement on his coming to the throne, explained the great additional expense of his administration. The country being generally under the amini, collections tended to vary with seasonal fluctuations. The decline in collection was said to have been a result of the failure of crops for the previous two-and-half years. The Maharaja did not approve of the proposal to appoint Bakhir Sahib as the dewan[40]. But in 1815 Rama Rao was disgraced and made to resign[41].

The arguments bandied between Cole and the Maharaja reflect the points causing difference of opinion between the durbar and the

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39. Resident to Madras, 19 Feb. 1814, For.Sec.Cons. 18 March 1814 No. 3.
40. For. Sec. Cons. 8 Dec. 1814, No. 49.
41. Resident to Madras 17 January 1815, For.Sec.Cons. 30 May 1815, No. 68.

Residency. We have seen the internal inconsistency in Cole's description of the king. In truth, Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, like many other Indian kings, was given more to sexual pleasures than the tasks of administration. He was not devoid of intelligence but lacked the firmness to cope with his problems. He let the reins of government slip too easily from his hands. His statement that tax remissions had to be made due to the over-assessment of land in the time of Purnaiya was to find support later in the Report of the Enquiry Committee that had been established to ascertain the causes of the rebellion in Mysore in 1831. The peasants seem to have felt the burden from the first. Buchanan, during his survey of Mysore, heard the people of Bethmangala complain that the amildars took more money than in the time of Tipu[42]. Not all the money raised thus however reached the state. The amildars were in charge of the collection and distribution of the state's share of grain. In the wet rice-producing lands (warum or battai), half of the yield was apportioned as the state's share. Here the amildars found much scope for peculation, as the output tended to vary with seasonal fluctuations. On the other hand, in dry lands producing bajra, juaree, wheat and ragi (this last being the staple food of the people), collection was usually made in cash (candayem) at the rate of one-third of the valuation of the crop. Here the amildars made much profit by showing as dead, absconding or unable to pay many people who actually paid due taxes in their respective villages. In both cases the amildars profited at the expenses of the state[43]. The money-lenders

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42. Buchanan, Journey, Vol.I, p. 189.
43. Cole to Madras, 19 Feb. 1814, For.Sec.Pro. 18 March 1814, No.3.

(soucâr) made their profit from the fact that peasants were required to pay money to the state before the grain was in the ground or at stated periods before it was cut down. This made the tiller approach the money-lender who, on a man's known honesty, advanced money at the rate of two per cent per month and five per cent upon the advance. For the second and third kists when the crops were well advanced, an immediate interest was not demanded; but when the fourth was to be paid the crops were compulsorily to be mortgaged. Most lenders insisted upon immediate sale, and became themselves the purchasers at the bazar price, which at that time of the year was five or ten per cent lower than at any other period of the year. The great distress of the cultivators as a result was thus represented for every thousand Kanteroy pagodas worth of land.

Estimate in Kenterâyi Pagodas :

The first Kist 250 at 2% per month for 6 months	30
Present of 5%	12½
For the second Kist, interest for 4½ months	22½
For the third kist, interest for 2 months	10
For the fourth kist, interest for 1 month	5
Loss on immediate sale of grain 10%	100
	180 [44]

44. Benjamin Heyne, Tracts, Historical and Statistical on India (London, 1814), pp.85-86. For Heyne's service as a surveyor see Col.R.H. Phillimore, Historical Records of the Survey of India, Vol.II (Dehra Dun, 1950), pp.113-14.

After the assumption of the Government in 1831, a fresh set of figures was presented by Col. Morison with the aid of sheristadar Venkata Rao, formerly the dewan of Travancore.

FAUJDARIES	Pw Centage of the Govt. share to the total amount of gross produce	Pw Centage of the agricultural charges to the total amount of the gross produce	Pw Centage of the income of the ryots to the amount of gross produce.
Bangalore Mudgherry	33 5/16	32 1/16	34 5/8
Chittledurg	41 9/16	23	35 7/16
Ashtagram	31 1/2	31 13/16	36 11/16
Munzerabad	38 1/16	34 3/4	27 3/16
Nagar	30 9/16	45 9/16	23 7/8

Morison also presented the following figures to show how much of the produce of lands under candayem and warum respectively were apportioned to the village officials, the barabaluti, in each faujdari.

FAUJDARIES	Centage of the contributions to the Bara-baluti out of the gross produce in lands under candayem.	Centage of the contributions to the Bara-baluti out of the gross produce in lands under warum.
Bangalore and Mudgherry	5	5
Chittledurg	1 1/2	20
Ashtagram	8 1/4	8 1/4
Munzerabad	6 1/4	3
Nagar	12 1/2	

The rate of produce in each faujdari was thus mentioned by Morison.

FAUJDARIES	Dry Land			Wet Land			Sugar-cane Land			Cocoa-nut trees			Betel-nut trees		
	Highest	Medium	Lowest	Highest	Medium	Lowest	Highest	Medium	Lowest	Highest	Medium	Lowest	Highest	Medium	Lowest
	Candies			Candies			Maunds			No.	No.	No.	Maunds		
Bangalore and Mudgherry	40	30	20	20	25	10	300	250	150	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chittledurg	50	35	20	40	20	10	250	200	150	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ashtagram	60	30	10	40	20	8	400	300	150	2000	1	5000	75	50	25
Munzerabad	40	30	20	30	20	15	250	200	150	2500	15	75	40	30	10
Nagar	50	30	20	20	15	10	150	100	70	0	0	0	30	50	30

The rates of candayem varied in different parts of Mysore. In Ashtagram the highest assessment of wet-lands was eighteen pagodas per candy. In Banavar, a taluk of Munzerabad, it was twenty pagodas the candy. But as these rates prevailed in only a few villages in these districts, their amount could not be adopted in forming an average revenue. The general average candayem was usually about one-third of the gross produce. This was the least in Bangalore, Mudgherry and Ashtagram.

FAUJDARIES	Highest Candayem	Medium Candayem	Lowest Candayem
Bangalore and Mudgherry	50	10	3
Chittledurg	100	50	3
Ashtagram	200	150	2
Munzerabad	100	50	3
Nagar (including betel-nut)	300	150	10

In terms of Canterdyi Pagodas.

In Chittledrug, however, the candayem was about 8% more than one-third but as labour was cheaper than elsewhere, the condition of the ryot was almost the same. In Munzerabad the assessment was 5% and agricultural charges about 2% more, rendering the surplus to the ryot nearly 7%. In Nagar, the agricultural charges were higher than elsewhere, so that the candayem fell off by 3% and the surplus to the ryot 9% less than the proportionate rate of Bangalore, Mudgherry and Ashtagram. The table serves to show the different rates of candayem in the five faujdaries of Mysore.

Some further details may be furnished here about land in the principal revenue paying capacities, candayem and warum, and the maladministration of the local officals. Cultivators of candayem lands held their plots in some instances from generation to generation, paying a fixed money rent. They could only be dispossessed if they failed to meet the Government demand. Owners of candayem lands paying less than the fixed assessment, or original candayem, could be dispossessed in favour of ryots offering an increase. The original incumbents, however, had the preference if they were ready to pay the full assessment. Shraia lands were lands that paid the full amount after a reduced rate of candayem for the first three or four years. Owners of betelnut gardens enjoyed these privileges in the early stages of their cultivation. Such proprietors could sell or mortgage their property, if they failed to meet the Government dues, when the purchaser had the same rights in the soil as were possessed by his predecessor. Some land grants also came in the category of candayem. Kodaghee lands were originally inams from the sovereigns to the villagers, but subsequently being assumed by the state an unchangeable rent was fixed them. Some Kodaghee lands were originally inams granted by the state for the payment of a sum of money as Nuzzur, Lands of both descriptions were to be found in the Munzerabad district. Lands in some villages of Nagar were under an assessment called Joddee, which could be equal to one fifth, one fourth, one third or even one half of the shist of the neighbouring villages. These lands were formerly inam or survamaunyum given to Brahmins who long enjoyed them as such.

They were resumed by Tipu, and made to pay bear the full assessment. But Purnaiya granted them a small remission and taxed them in the manner stated. The descendants of the original holders, or those who might have purchased the lands from them, enjoyed them for the payment of the fixed shist. These lands could also be put up for sale and mortgage, the transfer being fully recognized by the officers of government. In only a few instances did some lands continue in 'Joddee' as given in ancient times. Nagar Raikanust were a distinct variety of tenure in the Nagar district. Under the Vijaynagar empire they were subject to an assessment called Rairaika; but having subsequently been overgrown by forests, no Rairaika or assessment was levied thereon. They were then called Raikanust, which means without assessment, nor was any shist put upon them by Shivappah Naick (the Keladi King (1645-60) who had settled the land revenue of the area,) because they were not cultivated. When reclaimed, however, they were liable to assessment at the average rate of the neighbouring lands, still retaining the same names.

Ryots cultivating lands under the Warum or Buttayee system whether in the same or other villages, were nothing more than hired labourers. They cultivated the land and received in return a share of the produce. The people of villages with such lands received preference before others; nor could they be refused work, if they had tilled the lands for a number of years, that is, if they still chose to cultivate the same. In some cases the ryots of the same village and even those from other villages were forced to undertake the cultivation of the Warum lands which belonged, to the government. Lands under tanks called 'Amanee Talowe' not

belonging to any particular village were cultivated by ryots of neighbouring villages. They received their due share of the produce, under the superintendence of the public servants. In the taluks of Ikkery, Sagar, Muŏguddy, Coppa and Caveledroog ryots cultivating lands called Guddee Butta paid rent in kind.

The defects of the Mysore revenue system resulted from the fact that the government did not have any information about the quantity of candayem land in cultivation nor about the actual state of produce of those under warum. There was no account of the amount of kists to be collected in the course of the year, nor any idea about the demand on any single taluk, until the time that the figures were submitted at the year ending. Consequently, the settlement of accounts did not take place for several months after this period. The jumma-bundy accounts of villages did not exhibit the extent of the lands rented but only the revenue under each head. Village accounts, wherein this basic information was contained, were not received at the dewan cutcherry. The foujdars did not care to inspect the taluks under them nor to ascertain the state of things on the spot. They generally remained in their cutcherry, most of their time being occupied by their magisterial duties. No account was taken of the great expenditure in the districts on public works. The serishtadars at the fouj cutcherries prepared the estimate of current expenses (Jummakurch) and account of the taluks for every month; but as these were not sent to the court, the accounts there had to be prepared from the talukwari accounts, for which reason the business

was doubled without any advantage. Two of the measures which Tipu had adopted to check corruption in the collection of revenue by local officials were also lost sight of. In the first place, there was no regularity in the payment of the district servants. They reimbursed themselves as they pleased, without intimating the government or sending the detailed pay abstract to the cutcherry. Secondly, the regulation forbidding the revenue servants from holding lands in their own taluks was avoided by entering such possessions in the names of others. This could be easily done as the highest officers of the state were themselves implicated. The public servants such as sherishtadars, gomastahs etc. were frequently land-holders and the candayem of such lands was invariably reduced by frauds.

Amildars, taking advantage of the confusion in land revenue, usually made profits far in excess of what was their legitimate due. They concluded the jummabundy to their advantage and reductions were sometimes made to the extent of one fourth below what had been the jummabundy in the preceeding year. They were at liberty to dismiss the inferior revenue servants, and to appoint their own relations in their place. Besides there existed a practice of receiving into the public treasury sums of money called 'Dust Bakee', which the amildar appropriated for his private use, subject to future account. The ancient rates of candayem assessment in the country were frequently altered by the inferior servants, without authority. Lands yielding full produce were liable to be given for a reduced candayem, lower than even what could be

obtained from them as warum. Not that candayem lands were not frequently transferred to the other category which left the government with no other alternative than to receive a share of the produce, subject to numerous abuses, instead of a fixed money rent. These transfers were not only effected without any authority from above, but frequently for the most corrupt reasons. Again, in villages where arrangements had been made early in the year to cultivate the warum lands, wet and dry, under government superintendence and from the produce of which the government was entitled to a share, it was found at almost the time of harvest that the patels and shanbogues had taken them in candayem with the connivance of the district officials. This rent was often given even after the crops had been cut.

The candayem being included in the general rent of the village, the person who rented the warum lands became also the sole renter of the whole; so that the candayem which ought to come direct into the public coffers was paid to the renter by the ryots. In some instances, the arrears of candayem due by the ryots were recovered by the renter by distraint and sale of their property. In other instances the renter had his own property taken and sold by the administration. The different forms of village rent and connected details may now be represented by a table.[45]

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45. The above discussion and the following table are derived from Morison, Notes On Mysore, pp. 15-25, 46-51.

Name or title of the village rent	District where it exists	principles of the rent	By whom rented	Result
The ordinary or Grama Goota	Bangalore, Mudgherry, Chittledrug, Ashtagram and Munzerabad	The produce of the battai lands either estimated in heap, or ascertained by measurement, was charged with the current price of the day, and the fixed candayem payable by each ryot was rented together.	Patels in each village but occasionally others.	The ryots paying candayem were already renters of the land which they held; so that by giving their rent to another person without releasing them from the control of the public servants, they were subject to two sets of authorities - viz. the renters and the public servants.
	Nagar	The amount of 'shist' payable by each ryot in the village was rented out in like manner.		The patel under this mode of management exercised his powers as the renter during two or three months of the year when he collected the government's share of the grain and sold it on his own account. For the rest of the year the patel performed the usual tasks of his office as the head ryot, that is, he looked after the cultivation of lands and the reaping of crops. This mode of village rent was unfavourable both to the government and the ryots.

Name of title of the village rent	District where it exists.	Principles of the rent	By whom rented	Result
Praja Goota	In Chamrajnagar and ten taluks of the Ashtagram foujdari	A certain sum of rent was fixed for the whole village either at the beginning of the year or at the usual period of renting the other villages. If the product fell below what had been determined as rent, the deficit was to be shared by all the renters according to their individual capacities.	All the inhabitants of the village.	This mode of village rent was unfavourable to both the government and the ryots. Economically villages under this system were the most hard hit If there was any exception to this, the villagers would on examination be found to have fraudulently reduced the rent
Woontee Goota	In certain taluks of the Ashtagram faujdari.	The whole of the village was rented out to one or more men belonging to the same village or of a greater number. The renter was responsible for the whole rent, which was determined after a consideration of the various sources of revenue. There was to be no over-assessment and cause of complaint on the part of the ryots.	Three or four men whether of the same village or not.	The rent was bound to be low because its principal characteristic was to afford no cause of complaint to the ryots, who would not have maintained silence otherwise.

Name or title of the village rent	District where its exists	Principles of the rent	By whom rented	Result
Coolgar Gootta	The taluks of Maharajadrug, Belur and Sakraypattan	This rent was first given to one of the principal land-holders called Coolgar who divided the same among other Coolgars. Together they entered into a settlement with the ryots under them. The Coolgars divided all profit or loss among themselves and also shared responsibility for the claims of any ryot, who might have died or deserted his lands.	One of the principal men of the village.	It was not clear as to whether the cultivators or Coolgars were the real proprietors of the soil. The influence of the Coolgars made it difficult to ascertain the state of cultivation or produce or, indeed of any details of village administration. The shanbogues prepared the account from such information only as the Coolgars gave them.
Chegar Cuttlay or Blah Gootta	Hassan taluk in the Munzerabad faujdari.	The whole village was divided into twelve or eighteen portions called chegars, each of which was assessed at at three to five pagodas. Each chegar was in the possession of one head ryot, under whom there were several lesser ryots. The whole village was rented by one of those head ryots. If any of the lesser ryots died or deserted, it was the government's responsibility to replace him.	One of the principal men in the village.	Ryots suffered from the exploitation of the chegars.

CHAPTER - III

CHANGE OF ROLES

Resistance to extortion by the local revenue officials broke out in the form of a rebellion in north - west Mysore in 1830. The area had enjoyed independence and prosperity till Haidar had put an end to the independence of the Keladi kingdom (embracing western Karnataka) in 1763 and of the Chitaldrug polygars in 1779. The Bullum Raja had maintained his independence in Aigoor till the fall of Tipu, whereupon Krishnappa Naik, the last of the line, had raised the standard of revolt. Dhoondia Waugh, another soldier of fortune, carried out lightning raids in the Bombay Karnataka[1]. The topographical features of the land helped the cause of the insurgents. Arthur Wellesley, who led the British troops to victory in the war against the insurgents, had this to say about the physical barriers he had to surmount.

'I don't think I ever saw a country naturally so strong as this is and to the strength of which so many additions have been made by the natives themselves. Every village is a strong fortification, of which it would require good troops to get possession; and in some cases ten or a dozen of these villages are connected by natural or made defences of great strength. Within these defences the inhabitants have all that they want; and here they would

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1. For a recent account of these rebellions see K. Rajayyan, South Indian Rebellion : The First War of Independence, 1800-1801 (Mysore, 1971).

hold out for ever against the troops which the amildar might bring to force them to pay the revenue'[2].

A more detailed description of the base of rebel power is contained in the military intelligence supplied to Arthur Wellesley.

"Arrekerry is a strong Polygar post, 3 miles S.E. by E. of Minserabad, and about 2 miles to the westward of the Hemavutty river. It consists of 6 villages bounded on every side with heights and forest of large trees intermixed with bamboo, to the extent of between 2 and 3 miles round them. The principal roads leading to it are extremely narrow, and difficult to pass from the steepness of the heights. They are in some places cut for 6 or 8 feet into the hills, and but just broad enough for two men to advance in front. Where they are cut in this manner, it is done with a number of turnings, in a manner of a sortie. All these roads are defended by strong stockades of cocoanut trees and stone walls, with a trench in the rear, over which planks or trees are laid for the more ready communication to defend the wall, and can be withdrawn at pleasure. In most places the forest is impenetrable, but where the smallest opening occurs, it is defended in the manner above mentioned. There are numbers of straggling villages within the forest, the inhabitants of which are all attached to the Polygar, Kistnapah Naik. These they desert on the approach of a force, but all assemble on the defence of the barriers on the roads leading to Arrekerry, in which their families, grain and cattle are said to be collected. ... These barriers (it is said) must be carried before the village can be

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2. Arthur Wellesley to Webbe, 2 February 1802, Supplementary Despatches of Wellington Vol.III (London, 1859), p.61, See also page 87.

gained.

"By Goor, although nearly encompassed with hills and forest, cannot be compared with Arrekerry in point of strength. The principal entrance is to the eastward, and is defended by a slight mud wall, pierced with loopholes, and has a thick bamboo hedge, the entrance through which, if stockaded, would preclude the possibility of entering by that side. There are, however, two more entrances, one from the Munserabad side, and one from Hissulocrpet. These are only foor-paths, which present no great obstacle to one or two men passing abreast, but are not penetrable for guns. By the road to the eastward, guns, with some difficulty, might be got up; the ascent is, however, rather steep, and the road cut into the hill 6 or 8 feet, and in many places scarcely broad enough. The village stands on an eminence, but is commanded by another to the southward, within about 300 yards. This is tolerably easy of access, but was defended by a small mud battery with one gun.

"Malully, situated on the E. bank of the Hemavutty, 3 miles E. by S. of Munserabad, is another strong Polygar combie, but the inhabitants are attached to the Rajah's Government. It is surrounded with an impenetrable bamboo hedge, of 30 or 40 feet high, and about 20 broad. It is also nearly encompassed by a thick forest, and a ditch of 8 feet wide and 7 deep. The only entrance is to the northward, and is defended by a strong gateway, in form of a house, with a strong wooden door wide enough to admit carts.

"After entering the gateway, a variety of small footpaths branch off to the houses, which are scattered about within the

space enclosed by the bamboo hedge. Within this space the forest and bamboo are so intermixed with the houses, that not more than two or three can be seen at a time. The inner barrier of Arrekeery is said to be the same kind of bamboo hedge, and in every respect much stronger"[3].

Adding to the insecurities of the largely wooded, wild and relatively unsubdued portions of north-west Mysore was the insufficient strength of the police in Shimoga and the sparse population of Nagar. Tipu built a small fort at Munzerabad, about 10 or 12 miles north of the Coorg boundary and about 4 or 5 west of the Hemavati. It was meant to defend the country from the depredations of the Coorg Raja and to guard the way to Mangalore via the Subramania or Bissolee Ghat. After the fall of Tipu, the fort passed into the hands of the English. Besides this outpost, the task of patrolling the area was carried on by the local police[4]. In the forests of Nagar, individual villages were made up of farms consisting of a few houses and barns. Slaves, either bought or born on the estate, tilled the lands of their owners and performed police duties in combination with a low class of people known as the Hullia Pyke, who served as farming servants on the estates. These farm houses were usually remote from the high road and from market towns. They were linked by bridle roads, which Arthur

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3. J. Colebrooke, Captail Guides, to Arthur Wellesley, April 1800, cited in Supplementary Despatches of Wellington, Vol.1, pp.530-531.
4. Arthur Wellesley to Stuart, 31 October 1801, Ibid., pp.607-608.

Wellesley considered to be the only possible means by which the area could be opened up. From an early period it had been the practice to stop all strangers at the various stations along these high roads, to demand their passports. A traveller who failed to produce such a document had to attend at the nearest market town, where he was subject to an examination by the Magistrate or Public Police Officer of the place. The same rule held good in the by-ways of the forests where the Hulla Pyke were constantly employed in procuring produce like honey, teak, pepper and sandal wood.

The police of Shimoga, an administrative division lying more in the plains with less of a jungle, was controlled by the patels of the village and bargirs or hereditary heads of the districts. Each farmer contributed to its maintenance by the payment of eight seers of the lowest description of grain and each householder paid from half a gold fanam to one fanam per annum. These contributions were realised through the agency of the patels and were regularly paid to the kandachar. In many taluks the functions of the police suffered from the fact that the villages did not have the required number of officials among the bara baluti (ex. the Toti, Talidri, Nirgunty and Chukler) to perform duty of a similar nature. Rarely, however, could one come across a taluk in which some member of this class did not exist, though their emoluments had been usurped and they themselves were not very mindful of their tasks. The police were bound to trace thefts and robberies, in the detection of which they seldom failed. If they failed to recover the property, the farmer of the customs was expected to make some deductions for the loss in the collection of duty.

Sometimes the whole amount of a loss of this kind was compensated by a relinquishment of the duties payable by the same merchant in two or three successive years.[5]

The kandachar lent protection to the taluk in which they were stationed, but were not free from the guilt of carrying depredations into neighbouring areas. One instance of this kind occured in 1813 when a band of kandachars descended the Ghats and committed an extensive robbery in the Buntwal District in the Zillah of Mangalore, but the leaders of the gang were seized, and carried to Mysore. Since then all confidence towards this class ceased on the part of the Rajah's government. In 1818 no fewer than 213 persons were seized and confined on suspicion of robberies but against most of them there was no definite proof. In July that same year, Gonda Kandachar, then in confinement at Mysore, promised on payment of a sum of 5 Pagodas a month to restrain the people of his caste from committing robberies in future. Twenty four persons of his tribe, formerly imprisoned at Seringapatam, were sent on the same occasion to Shimoga which made the total number 247. Of these 42 were released on paying a fine of about 3 Pagodas each, 132 others (including in that number old men, women and children) were released without fine, and 83 were retained till they could find security or pay fines before being set free. In July 1819 these prisoners rose upon their guards and overpowering, without killing any of them, made their escape. Their leader Gonda having received only two months' pay and finding it in vain to apply for more, had already left. The Report of the Enquiry

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5. Minute by Briggs, 2 September 1832, Proceedings of the Mysore Commission, 4 July - 31 December, 1832.

Committee appointed to ascertain the causes of the rebellion noted that both Sarvottum Rao and Kishen Rao, relatives of the dewan Rama Rao and themselves foujdars of Nagar, were believed to have been secretly in league with him. Sarvottum Rao denied the charge and reported that Gonda enjoyed the protection of some very influential persons at the court including Rama Rao himself, for which reason no action could be taken against him. It was through the exertions of these same persons, it was said, that Gonda was twice released from the jail at Nagar and sent to the capital city of Mysore, where he received asylum. Subsequently he was presented with a turban and a dress of honour in the name of the Raja, who engaged him for the suppression of the very work in which he had been engaged till then. Lawlessness, thus, was not punished but rewarded on this occasion. This could not but have its impact on the popular mind[6].

While north-west Mysore remained in a state of sullen separation from the rest of the province, the general administration of the kingdom continued to decline. A parallel source of authority had come to be vested in the persons centering round the Resident. Leading them was Ramaswamy Moodeliar. He had started his career under Wilks and later became a butler to Cole, a position from which he became his dubash. In course of time, he succeeded to the office of Post Master General in the Mysore Post Office. Soon after this, the Company conferred on him a jagir of three villages, estimated at a sum of Rs.30,000 annually. Sevasamoodrum, the most

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6. 'Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the causes of the Mysore insurrection' (1831), For Pol.Cons., 5 June, 1834, No. 9.

important among these, was situated on the scenic splendours of the Cavery Falla and abounded in sport. Here, Ramaswamy Moodeliar built and furnished a stately bungalow, well stocked with the best of provisions and manned with a small staff of servants. This was his investment for the future, the golden thread by which he could secure himself to the affections of the English. His fortunes took an even better turn after 1825 when James Casamaijor became the Resident of Mysore after having spent eighteen years in the kingdom, - the first nine in Seringapatam (1809-1818) and the later half as assistant to Cole. Moodeliar's recommendation secured for Chowdiah, his nominee, a post in the Resident's cutcherry. Also Chowdiah became the Resident's Agent and served as his messenger to the Maharaja. So great was Ramaswamy Moodeliar's power and influence at this time that Krishnaraja Wodeyar visited him at his garden house, whenever called for, and complied with all his wishes.

Ramaswamy Moodeliar was a creation of the English; there were others who basked in the Maharaja's favour. Together they made up the ruling clique. Prominent among the Maharaja's favourites were his own brothers, Dasappaji and his elder brother, Venkataraj Urs, dewan from 1827-1830; Manjupah of the Toshekhana (Treasury department), to whose daughter the Maharaja gave one of his sons in marriage; Anoo Rama Rao, munshi in the Maharaja's cutcherry, and Krishna Rao, his clerk; and the court fiddler, Veene Venkata Soobiah. They amassed a fortune each by providing mistresses for the king and jobs for the fortune seekers, besides

winning jagirs and rewards. It was their opposition, Sunnoo Rao (bakshi of the Anche cutcherry) said in his testimony before the Enquiry Committee, that prevented the Maharaja from pushing on with his plan of reform after 1825. Replies to important messages from the Resident were sent by the Maharaja in consultation with them. Sometimes, he also delivered to Veere Venkata Soobiah the notes received from the Resident and the decision arrived at by the coterie was despatched by the Maharaja as his own. Venkata Soobiah had been expelled by Cole from the palace in the past but had been brought back by the Maharaja after a few months. Ramaswamy Moodeliar had used his influence with the Resident at the time on Soobiah's behalf. The two were excellent friends since then. Neither of them held any office in person but no rank in the state could be had without their recommendation. In a memorandum to Elphinstone in 1833, Briggs (the first Chief Commissioner of Mysore, 1831-32) informed that all the foujdars and about thirty to forty of the amils owed their appointment to Chowrappa (as Chowdiah was referred to in this letter), who had made an enormous profit in the process. The superior offices were sold for Rs.5000 a faujdari and Rs.1000 for each mamlut. If the Maharaja showed disinclination to appoint anyone recommended by this ruling clique, the latter obtained their aim by appealing to the Resident. It was beyond Krishnaraja Wodeyar's power to check them. Any such attempt was foiled by the threat of the Resident's displeasure. As instance may be cited the case of Veeraraj Urs, who was appointed as the faujdar of Nagar though the Maharaja did not think that he possessed the requisite qualifications.

The beginning of the insurrection took place shortly after his arrival and the dewan's policy was held to be largely responsible for this.

Amildars were quick to profit from the situation. Before proceeding to join their duties in the time of Purnaiya, they were required to submit a written document to the effect that they would extend the cultivation of land. But the state did not impose any additional demand, if the charge failed to materialise. On the contrary, complaints from ryots protesting that they had to pay more than their legitimate share of the dues was enquired into and the money returned, if the charges proved true. Balances due from persons in a state of insolvency were also remitted. Venkatakrishniah, the fouzdar of Munzerabad, in his deposition before the Enquiry Committee stated that the written agreements given by amildars before taking up task entailed the raising of stipulated amounts from imposts and other duties but not from land. The state of affairs underwent a change as the demand for money to meet the Maharaja's financial crisis increased within three or four years after his ascending the throne. The system of shirti muchilka (written contract) by which an amildari was rented to the highest bidder came in vogue from this time. The amount laid down had to be paid, irrespective of profit or loss. The increased revenue was realised by an increase in the extent of warum cultivation and by any deficiency being assessed on the ryots of the village generally with their concurrence. For instance, if a village was rented for 100 pagodas and its actual revenue did not exceed 80, the deficiency was met by an assessment on the ryots in proportion to the rents

they paid. If at the end of the year, there was any deficit in the payment of village rent, the balance was sought to be realised in turn from the patel, the sub-renter of the bubly, the renter and the shirti amildars who could, in the absence of any alternative, be forced to sale their property. Thus many of them were reduced to the rank of labourers.

To realise their dues amildars, therefore, forced patels to sign bonds, fixing the amount they were to pay. If the latter refused to be a party to the agreement voluntarily, they were refused the privilege of sheep grazing (munday) and forbidden to collect the manure of their villages, to which they alone had been privileged. They were also charged with paying less for the land they held than was due. The rate of assessment was enhanced by including waste lands in the calculation. The gaudas had to meet the charges out of their own resources or by borrowing. For, if they failed to realise the amount, the shanbogues seized their cattle until they were able to free them by collecting the sum. To avoid such ignominy, many of the patels fled from their charge. Ryots, in lapse of payment, had their crops seized in the first instance. If there was no stock to confiscate, physical punishment was inflicted by placing stones on their head or by flaying them with the whip or cane. The tanks and water courses were also not kept in repair by the Maharaja after the time of Purnaiya, with the result that lands which should have come under irrigation were not watered. For instance, not one-eighth of the paddy land was believed to be cultivated in

1831 as compared to the extent tilled in the time of Purnaiya. The price of grain showed a decline as the standing army that had kept up the demand in the time of Tipu had been considerably reduced. Betel-nuts also fell in value from the great increase of gardens for their growth in other parts of the country. Besides, a blight in the trees of Nagar also destroyed the fruit. The value of cardamoms exported from Nagar also showed a reduction as alternative sources of supply were found in Coorg and the Carnatic. To add to their difficulties, ryots were forced to cultivate warm lands and were discouraged from being owners of candayem lands, that would have enabled them to pay the taxes at a determined rate. Also, this gave the renters an opportunity to sell the grain when the market price was favourable. The renters could moreover force the ryots to work free on their lands for two days - one for ploughing and the other for reaping. The renters received a liberal allowance (Ayaswamium) and an abatement in their field rent[8].

The general picture of exploitation by the amildars may be specified with reference to cases in the area of insurrection.

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8. For the memorandum of 1833 by Briggs see Major Evans Bell, Memoir of General John Briggs of the Madras Army; with comments on some of his words and work (London, 1885), pp.144-149. Also evidence of Chenna Gouda of the Hornalli taluk, articles 480-481; Venkatakristniah, faujdar of Munzerabad, articles 492, 500-501, 524-531, 567-568; Nundygoca Venkatakistniah, former amil of Dodda Bauapur, articles 664-665; Soorlee Soobiah, a soucar, articles 1311-1312; Soobiah, former sheristadar in the dewan' taluk, articles 2004-2006, 2018, and Babu Rao, dewan of Mysore (from November, 1817- April 1818 and December, 1820 - November, 1825) articles 2155-2156, before the Committee of Enquiry on Mysore, For. Misc. 1833, Vol. 1, Serial No. 306-309.

For instance, in 1824-25 Ventakakrishniah, the fauzdar of Bullum, took charge of the taluk under an engagement to increase the revenue by Rs.10,000 after the jumabandi had been arranged by the amildar Venkataraj Urs. He sent for all the patels and forcibly obliged them to add the above sum to the amount already paid. The local heads, seeking redress, approached the Maharaja but their complaints were not heeded. Instead, three or four of the leading patels and shanbogues were placed under guard and sent back to the taluk. The rest were told that if they did not return, they would be placed in irons and sent away by force. The patels had, therefore, no option but to comply. Still, the amildar's demands showed no sign of relaxation. Instead, the revenue demand increased in subsequent years by Rs.12,000. The enhancement was realised by an arbitrary raising of contributions from the amildars. The pressure was all the more acutely felt because the amildars forced the patels to buy grain from them at ten or eleven fanams per candy, while the market price for the same ranged from five to six fanams. Many patels had their inam and hereditary lands sold for the liquidation of their arrears for rent. The amounts thus exorbitantly raised did not always find their way to the state coffer nor was the Maharaja averse to condoning excesses, if detected. Thus in 1825 Venkataraj Urs as the fauzdar of Nagar detected improprieties on the part of his precursor, Saryottum Rao. A few of the charges being proved, the latter feared that he would be convicted of the whole and decided to make good the sum of Rs.70,000 which was called for. He paid Rs.60,000 only and got out of the mess. This payment had been on account of the embezzlements

and bribes received during his tenure of office. Venkataraj Urs left his charge shortly after and, following a few changes, the faujdari of the area passed into the hands of another of the king's relatives, Veera Raj Urs. He forced the patels to execute moochlikas, promising to pay Shriya Bhurtee or increased estimates for the tenure of waste lands. The amil of Chandgherry also laid increased demands on the ryots and extorted the payment by humiliating and imprisoning all defaulters. Moreover, a Toty of this taluk, who was sent into a village to collect the rent, set fire to the houses of the ryots. In protest, the ryots of Chandgherry assembled in cobtum and secured the release of their brethren by marching to the fort of Chandgherry. In this incident, it is possible to see the nature of oppression that led to the outbreak of the revolt of 1831. The insurgents were strengthened by the assistance they received from the candachar peons who were recruited from among the peasants and had an added grievance, - being ten to eighteen months in arrears of pay[9].

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9. Evidence of Veera Raj Urs, article 743; Ranga Rao, amil of Honally; Article 1318; Chikka Nagay, gauda of Mudgerry taluk, articles 1683-1684, 1699-1705; Lakshmana Rao, former amil of Annawutty, article 1748; Soobiah, sheristadar in dewan cutcherry, article 1848; and of Sunnoo Rao, former bakshi of the Anche cutcherry, articles 1977-1985, Ibid.

An estrangement thus developed between the amildars as representatives of the state and the village headmen. The gandas of these areas had a tradition of resisting state oppression even in the past[10] and were, as we have seen, independent in outlook. The relatively remote areas of their seat of power also added to their strength; for while it made it difficult for the outer world to impinge on them, the people of the place had no alternative but to look up to them for guidance. Thus, Major Montgomery, the Acting Superintendent of Ashtagram in 1839 observed :

'None but the village servants can possibly know, or even find out by inspection, the numerous little valleys which, sometimes, at a distance from any habitation, and far apart from each other, form in the aggregate the lands included in the accounts; and however anxious an amildar may be to make himself personally acquainted with the country, the fatigue of traversing the mountains, and the wet and cold to which he is subjected, are generally sufficient to damp his ardour, especially if he be a Brahmin from the plains; for, to him, the labour and the climate would alike be insupportable'[11].

A similar observation was made by M. Stokes in charge of Nagar in 1838 to the effect that amildars seldom ventured south of Sringeri.[12]

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10. See R.N. Nandi, 'Origin of the Vivasaiva Movement' in Indian Historical Review (New Delhi), Vol. II, No. 1, July 1975.

11. Major Montgomery, 'Memorandum on the Maluaad of the Ashtagram Division (1842), p.16 in Mysore Reports.

12. H. Stokes, 'Report on the Nugur Division of Mysore' (1838), p.62 in ibid.

Religious differences further contributed to the alienation of the gaudas from the amildars. The former were mostly Lingayets by faith, while the latter were usually recruited from among the Brahmins. Many of the heggadays, as the village chiefs were called in the malnaad, and gaudas in the eastern taluks held their land on condition of military service. So they were equipped with arms. In the village of Cheltenhully in the Honnali taluk, moreover, some families of armed bands known as the Phasigary had been settled for several generations. A great number more came and joined them from the south Maratha country about 1820. Another still more numerous gang from north Arcot and the neighbourhood of Bangalore located themselves about Luckwally and Serikere. In 1831 they moved to Holehonnur and Shimoga. Thus the stage was set for an armed uprising[13].

Meantime, the financial crisis in Mysore became so acute that Sri Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras, had personally to visit the kingdom in 1825 to enquire into its conditions. He met the Maharaja, Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, on 25 November of that year and stressed upon him the need to curtail expenditure at a rate lower than the annual revenue. A sum of ten or twelve lakhs of canteroy pagodas was fixed as an initial target. It would provide both a reserve fund for emergencies like war and help to meet the reparation costs of forts etc., which was his responsibility under the terms of the Subsidiary Treaty. Munro advised the king to place before the government through the Resident accounts of his annual

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13. ibid. pp.3-4. See also K.N. Chitnis, Keladi Polity (Dharwar, 1974), pp. 112, 115.

receipts and disbursements. The British Government would thus be able to ascertain the true state of affairs and be able to provide for such difficulty and loss as might arise. Otherwise the British, would be guided by rumours. Unless reform was immediately begun, direct interference would be unavoidable. Such a measure, Munro pointed out, would be the last step. For, it 'could not be undertaken without lessening the dignity of His Highness, and shaking his authority in such a manner that it would be impracticable ever to reestablish it'.

From the abstract of the arrears due to every department, civil and military, presented by the Raja to the Resident before the coming of Munro, it was seen that a large amount of dues had lately been discharged. Munro believed that this was due to the Raja's apprehension that he would either make some enquiry or receive some representation concerning arrears from the several departments and specially from the sillahdar. Although orders had been issued for the payment of three months arrears to the sillahdars, Munro believed that these would take several months to be discharged. Also, he observed that the very hasty mode of payment was creating the unfortunate impression that intervention by the British was necessary for the clearing of arrears.

The Maharaja attributed the decline of his revenue to the effects of cholera, unfavourable seasons and the financial mismanagement of the dewan. He also complained of the disrespect shown to him by the servants of the Resident. Cole was said to have reduced royal prestige and authority by sending written orders to the cutchery.

Asked by the Resident to substantiate his charge, the Maharaja failed to cite any specific instance but continued complaining that Kishan Rao, an attendant of, Cole, had carried to his master tales of the extravagance and wastage of money on ... favourites at the court. But, Cole asserted that the said official had never entered the cutcherry except in the company of the servants placed to attend the Resident by the Maharaja himself. The representations, he explained, had been merely to enquire whether the accounts called for by the Government were ready or not. So far as the dewan Linga Raj, (1821-22) was concerned, Munro pointed out that the appointment had been made by the Maharaja, though it had proved to be a bad choice. But the Maharaja's belief that it would be possible for him to recover much of the balances left outstanding by the dewan and restore revenues to their former state was not given credence. Munro precluded the possibility of his finding much more time in a state of the size of Mysore than to excercise a general superintendence over the conduct of higher officials. The Raja however announced that within two or three months time he would dispense with the services of such an official.

From the meeting Munro was convinced of the Maharaja's incapacity to rule, 'A weaker one', he said, 'would be more easily guided. An abler one would act more prudently for his own sake'. In his bid for economy, Munro feared that the king would reduce the establishment costs of those very departments that were absolutely essential, keep others in arrears and dissipate his treasure in idle amusements. Low and unworthy persons would continue to be appointed in public offices, though there was no possibility of the position of the dewan

going to anyone not favoured by the English. Since the Resident's protests would not be heeded by the Maharaja, such complaints were not to be lodged unless the very resources of the state were endangered. In future, the Maharaja was to rule according to the following principles :-

1st. : To reduce his expenditure.

2nd. : To collect gradually, and keep in reserve, a moderate treasure, in order to meet the contingencies of war and had seasons, and the repairs of fortresses, half the expense of which he was bound to pay by treaty.

3rd. : To pay his departments regularly, and to cause the Sillahdar horse to be mustered according to treaty when required by the Resident.

4th. : To furnish statements of his revenue and expenditure according to such forms as were to be submitted to him by the Resident[14].

Opinions may differ as to how far the causes mentioned by the Maharaja as jeopardising the state of his finances were really operative. The official enquiry instituted by the Madras Government on the nature, causes and extent of the [illegible], though unable to supply exact figures of the mortality rate caused by this disease in Mysore, admitted that 'if common reports are entitled to any

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14. Letters of Munro dated 23 August and 8 Nov. 1825 on the 'Mal-Administration of Mysore in Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, Major General Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, Selections from his Minutes and other official Writings. (Madras, 1886), pp.340-349.

credit, the mortality must have been much greater here than in any other past of the country[15]. It is also to be noted that the Maharaja's complaint against the dewan to Munro was preceded by the Resident's report to Madras on 25 June, 1825 to the effect that the dewan was lamentably deficient in common honesty and integrity having participated in the prevalent fraud and corruption and was even said to have opposed the introduction of reforms desired by the Maharaja. After the dismissal of the dewan Linga Raj towards the end of 1825, the Maharaja did carry out some reforms till he fell temporarily ill in October 1826 whereupon the work of financial reform was carried on by Venkat Raj, appointed the chief foujdar (sar - fonjdar) of Mysore[16]. Major Montgomery, mentioned a different set of factors as responsible for the reduction of the extent of land under cultivation. The effects of the cholera, he thought, had roughly eliminated the portion of population that might otherwise have showed an increase through the return of normalcy and conditions of peace after the wars of the eighteenth century. The basic reasons, Montgomery thought, could be traced to the operation of the following factors :

1st. The change that has taken place in the seasons, which

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15. Report on the Epidemic Cholera as it has appeared in the territories subject to the presidency of fort St.George (Madras, 1824) page 7.

16. For a detailed description see Gopal, Finances, chap. VI, pp.102-142.

has rendered the wet crop uncertain.

2ndly, The custom which has heretofore been in force, of obliging a ryot, who is induced in a good season to take an extra field, to keep it and pay for it in perpetvity, and of continuing in a ryot's Puttah so long as he can possibly pay, every field that at different times, he may have either taken of his own accord, or had forced upon him in consequence of the death of a relation. or neighbour.

3rdly, The temptation which late bad seasons have offered to the ryot, to cultivate the uplands with dry grain, on which according to the custom of the country there is as assessment, and the consequent withdrawal of agricultural stock from the wet cultivation. In this description of labour all is gain, and there is no risk but the loss of seed.

4thly, An inclination on the part of the people, of a degree of freedom they never before enjoyed. but a few years ago and the Potails adjudged their annual task. The Amildars, in conjunction with the Potails, made the highest possible Mogum settlement. The gowdahs forced the people to cultivate, to meet this demand, and to repay themselves for their trouble'[17].

The insurrection began when some ryots refused to pay their usual taxes and compelled the amildars to restore money fraudulently obtained. They corresponded among themselves and punished those who refused to join. Large bodies (cootums) were formed of ryots, numbering two to three thousands, under the head patels. Venkatraja Urs was deputed by the Maharaja to enquire into the conditions of the disaffected areas. He was authorised to investigate and decide

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17. Montgomery, 'Ashtagram', pp. 17-18, in Mysore Reports.

on the spot on the measures that would restore order and satisfy the inhabitants. He was also empowered to remove officials who had proved oppressive to the people and punish them. With the dewan went a small force of one thousand of the Maharaja's infantry and some sillahdar horse. Cdsamaijor did not accept the Maharaja's request for the presence of a portion of the British subsidiary force since he did not think there was any necessity for their movement so long as the insurrection did not break out in open violence. The Resident however advised the Maharaja to visit the spot directly.[18]

Within a month violence increased. Merchants and travellers were arrested by the gangs and money forcibly levied from them. Patels looted the government treasuries. Amildars were generally placed in restraint, their seals of office taken from them, beat and ill used. The Maharaja took every possible method to conciliate the insurgents. He personally investigated into the complaints of several taluks - Ikkeri, Chennarayapatana, Gramun, Hole Narsipur, Honnavally, Nuggehalli, Gubbi, Tumkur, Banavar, Toorakerra and Haruhully. The requests of taluks to remove obnoxious amildars and other persons in authority were granted. Ammesty, investigation and redress were offered to those who quietly returned to their homes or attended the durbar for inquiry into and adjustment of their grievances. Capital punishment was reserved to cases of extreme guilt and audacious resistance to authority. Proclamations from the Maharaja to the headmen induced some to disperse. The ryots admitted to

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18. Resident to Madras 8 Dec., 1830. For Misc. No. 274 Part I Jan. - July 1831.

have joined the insurgents out of fear of robbery and ill usage. In spite of some cases of resistance, the rebellion gradually subsided in all parts of Mysore except Nagar. The ryots in the cootums returned to their homes and revenue collections began. The chief insurgents were placed under restraint and there were fifteen executions. The rebellion, Casamaijor said, had taken place not because of any increase in assessment or exaction on the people. The demand on land had been higher during the time of Purnaiya, when also there had been disturbances. The insurrection had been able to proceed to this length because of the Maharaja's procrastination and lack of firmness.[19]

Nagar proved to be the cockpit of trouble. The patels there were wealthy and respected by the people of Mysore. They corresponded with the patels of other taluks and resisted any attempt to return to the former assessment. Two or three polygars, moving about from droog to droog in the dense forests of Nagar, kept up the flames of insurrection. They excited the inhabitants to revolt and sometimes maimed those who refused to follow. Since the Company's troops did not take the field the people were encouraged to believe that the British did not support the Maharaja in taking action against them. The duty of investigating and restoring order in Nagar had fallen solely on Venkataraja Urs. A force consisting of one thousand of the king's infantry and an equal portion of sillahdar cavalry with

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19. Resident to Madras, 5 Jan. 1831, Ibid.

three small field pieces was sent with him. But Nagar being a mountainous area, the cavalry was of no use and the infantry behaved in an almost apathetic and discreditable manner. The fault was believed by Casamaijor to lie with the dewan, since the troops were adequate in number to deal with the task at hand and had moreover received payment. The qualities of Venkataraja Urs were more of a civil than military nature. Although Casamaijor realised this he refused to disperse with his services till the differences in revenue matters were made up between the government and the ryot. But Venkataraja Urs failed in spite of the Maharaja's constant support. He had been struck by terror. Although Casamaijor wanted him to be replaced, the Maharaja being a friend and close relative of the dewan would not listen to the proposal at first. In the end, however, Venkataraja Urs had to be replaced by Bakshi Balaji Rao, an intelligent and creditable officer, who was much employed by Purnaiya and was accepted by all to be a competent person. Under the new dewan, troops received large payments of arrears. Measures were taken to see that in future they received periodical payments from collections in the taluks where they were stationed. The Resident hoped that the disturbances would cease when the posting of troops in all the taluks was completed. The performances of the Mysore infantry, artillery and sillahdar came in for praise from Col. Rochfort, who comanded the Company's troops. The people were returning to the taluks where the troops were stationed and the season of ploughing and cultivation was about to commence. All the corrupt amildars had been removed and

others substituted. Casamaijor was senguine that order would be restored. In June 1831 the Resident and the dewan entered Nagar and proclaimed that the insurrection was over.

The insurrection of 1830 raised in the minds of the British the question whether Articles IV and V of the Subsidiary Treaty were to be applied to Mysore ? Casamaijor's opinion on this point differed from that of S. R, Lushington, the Governor of Madras (1827-32). He hoped that the Maharaja would govern his kingdom in such a way that intervention by the British would not be necessary. He would however see that no extensive alienation of land, acts of oppression or internal misrule took place. But in case intervention was necessary, Casamaijor said that the Maharaja was to authorise him access and the right to examine the taluk records. For the proper fulfilment of the Treaty, it was absolutely essential for the Resident to gather more knowledge of the internal administration of the taluks. Such enquiry would not begin unless there was necessity for it and reports would be sent to the government. The Maharaja's authority and personal feelings would be less impaired by this preliminary enquiry than otherwise. On 8 March 1831 Casamaijor further informed the Madras Government that the Maharaja would be able to meet shortly the establishment arrears by a large payment, if he could continue to devote himself to state affairs and unless there was any impediment to collection in Nagar.

But Lushington had already by 24 Februery 1831 arrived at the conclusion that the British should intervene in Mysore under

the terms of the Subsidiary Treaty, since the Maharaja would not listen to advice. He wanted to annex Nagar to the Company's dominions. The polygars and inhabitants of the place had no traditional attachment to the Maharaja. From Nagar the rebellion had spread to Canara, formerly under the Bednore King who did not owe allegiance to the Mysore Raj. Thus, the outbreak of violence in Nagar, Lushington said, had endangered the very aim of the Partition Treaty which sought to provide for permanent security and genuine tranquillity throughout the area. Now that the rainy season was about to commence, Lushington apprehended that the people would be strengthened in their resolution to continue the fight, expecting the health of the Company's soldiers to deteriorate. Only the assumption of Nagar would in his opinion satisfy the grievances of the people and ensure full credit for the Maharaja's subsidy, including the whole of the additional revenues as provided for in the Treaty.[26]

To prove his point Lushington produced a petition signed by twenty ryots of Nagar complaining that the Maharaja confined himself only to Mysore and neglected them. Krishna Rao, the

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26. The above account of the Mysore insurrection is based on Casamaijor's letters to Madras describing the progress of the insurrection in 1831 dated 24 Feb. 8 March and 9 April and Col. Rochfort's testimony about the conduct of the Mysore troops dated 28 March 1831 in For. Sec. Cons. 8 July 1931 Nos. 3-4 and Lushington's letter to Madras on 24 Feb. 1831 in For. Misc. No. 274 Part I Jan-July 1831.

Faujdar of the area, was only interested in making a profit for himself. Ignorant of revenue affaits, he forced the people to sign an agreement for payment of government dues, before proceeding to collect them. If the date of payment lapsed by a day or two, he used to extort bribes by torture. Besides, he obliged those who remained in the villages to pay for waste lands and on behalf of those who were indebted to the state or had run away. From September to the end of 1830 the people had submitted petitions to the Maharaja. But the only result was that the Faujdar had killed five hundred ryots in the fort and caused others to be drowned, although all of them had been assured safety of person. Somasvera Naik, decendant of the Rajahs of Keladi Nagar who had formerly governed the area, informed the local inhabitants at this stage that he would return to his kingdom and produced documents from the Company to that effect. The ryots came to live with him. But Krishna Rao and his son-in-law Srinivasa Rao having gethered some cavalry and sepoys in Anantapur had come to Nagar, seized and hung the ryots, ravished their women, inflicted physical punishments along with those on their children and burnt down all their houses. Such oppressions led the signatories to declare 'we cannot in any way remain as subjects of the Rajah of Mysore.'[7]

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7. Minute by S. R. Lushington, 12 April 1831 For. Sec. Cons. 8 July 1831 Nos. 1 - 2.

The administration could decide on one of the three steps. First, there was Lushington's proposal to annex Nagar. But, Casamaijor questioned the validity of the document of protest submitted by the Governor of Madras in support of his statement. Such allegations, the Resident said, needed to be examined carefully, as these would be freely made since the administration was being overhauled. Casamaijor was convinced that two-thirds of the people of Mysore could be found to be loyal to the Maharaja. The administration till 1831 had not been oppressive; nor was the conduce of the rebels marked by violence. The excesses that had been committed were chiefly the work of the Mysore sibbundee or armed revenue peons who had all joined hands with the polygars. Not more than twenty of the King's followers had suffered at the hands of the rebellious polygars and members of the cootum by the end of 1830. Instances of the polygars having seized the Brahmins and their women were few and far between. The price of grain had come down after 1830 and there had been an abundant crop. In contrast to Lushington proposal, therefore, Casamaijor suggested a return to the conditions after 1799, that is to say, appointment of a dewan who would function under instructions from the British. Under such a system, he hoped, Mysore would in five years have a surplus Treasury without infinging on the Rajah's authority. On the other hand, the assumption of part of the country would only in the Resident's opinion weaken authority and impair the allegiance of the people to the native government, while the assumption of the whole as a temporary experiment would originate many difficulties to the Raja on retransfer. The British Government would gain no additional security or advantage

by such a measure. Casamaijor urged the British to view sympathetically the causes of the revolt in Mysore and desist from taking over the administration of the kingdom. Pointing to the disadvantages that could result otherwise, he said : 'The Mysore family might remonstrate that their claims to succession, apparently so secured to them by Treaty, should be lost and forfeited by the weakness of character of the present Rajah and it must further be remembered that the present financial difficulties have been much precipitated into embarrassment by the late insurrection, that discontent among the cultivating class of inhabitants have not been confined to Mysore alone, that the causes of insubordination and complaint in the Hon'ble Company's contiguous country of Canara and that of Mysore have generally had reference to the same cause of discontent viz. the decrease in market price of produce, and consequently a reduction in the rate of assessment demanded'[22].

Bentinck had, however, arrived at a very different decision. The same grounds on which Lushington had advised the annexation of Nagar was taken by him to be sufficient reason for enforcing Articles IV and V of the subsidiary Treaty with Mysore by which the British could take over the administration of the kingdom[23]. Refuting Casamaijor's view, he added further that from his experience at the Indian courts he was

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22. Resident to Madras 20 July, 1831, For Sec. Cons. 7 Oct. 1831. Nos. 2-3.

23. Bentinck to Lushington, 8 June, 1831, For Sec.Cons. 8, July, 1831, Nos. 5-6.

led to the belief that the combination of talent, energy, zeal and virtue necessary for carrying out the functions of the dewan was rare among Indian officials. He could not, therefore, share the Resident's hope that men as capable as Purnaiya could be found again. Besides, the appointment of a dewan, who in concert with the Resident, was to conduct all affairs appeared to Bentinck to be precisely the form of double government from which Lord Wellesley had anticipated so much mischief and from which so much evil had actually resulted in the Carnatic and Oudh. If the dewan and the Resident worked in agreement under such a system, unlimited power was obtained by both, without defined or effective responsibility in either. They could, if they so wished, conceal the actual state of events, however prejudicial these might be to the interests of the state. In the case of Mysore, Bentinck argued, the Resident and the dewan, who had already been reported to be incapable in several respects, had been too involved in the proceedings against the insurgents to enjoy much confidence. What was needed, Bentinck said, was a complete change of officials serving the kingdom. At the same time, he insisted that there was to be no radical change in the administrative set-up. The government of Satara as constituted by Elphinstone was to serve as the model. Briggs, who had served as Commissioner of Khandesh under him was to perform as the Senior Commissioner; the task of a Junior Commissioner was entrusted to the Madras Government. The revenue, judicial and police administration of Madras was to be followed in the case of Mysore. A duplicate copy of all correspondence was to be placed before the Supreme Government at Calcutta. The Resident was to look

after the political relations of the Maharaja and his family with the British[24]. In accordance with this plan, Bentinck conveyed to the Maharaja the government's decision to assure charge of the kingdom due to arrears in the monthly payment of the subsidy[25].

Still, Lushington did not abandon hopes of implementing his earlier suggestion. Thus, he pointed out the need of changing the phase in Bentinck's despatch to the Maharaja, viz. that 'the subsidy due to the British Government is several months in arrear', to 'the subsidy due to the British Government has not been paid monthly according to the Treaty of 6th July 1799'.* The Maharaja's finances, Lushington believed, had fallen into confusion from the time that the Company's pecuniary claims on the kingdom had been commuted for the maintenance of a permanent force. This had caused confusion in drawing up accounts. A section of the Company's officials were of the view that the Mysore sillahdar horse, in spite of a distinguished record of military service in the past, presented difficulties in the movements of a disciplined army through their indiscriminate destruction of the forage. On this ground, Lushington once again advised the annexation of Nagar instead of a monetary payment for the maintenance of the subsidiary troops under the Treaty of 1799. It would, he pointed out, be advantageous for two reasons. First, the profits would

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24. Bentinck to Lushington, 6 Sept. 1831, For Sec.Cons. 7 Oct. 1831, Nos. 3-4.

25. Bentinck to Maharaja, 7 Sept. 1831, For.Sec.Cons. 7 Oct. 1831, Nos. 2-3.

* Gopal, Finances, p.170 informs that only half the subsidy for August, 1831 was in arrears.

be greater than what the British could receive as subsidy if they took charge of the administration of the kingdom, for, according to the terms of the Treaty, a true and faithful account of the remainder of the revenue would in that case have to be submitted to the Maharaja. On the other hand, though Nagar had been valued at only 2,02,417 Canteroy pagodas when handed over to the Maharaja, he had raised more than six lakhs as average revenue of the area. The Company, after making reasonable concession to the inhabitants, would receive an annual revenue which would roughly be about four lakhs of Canteroy pagodas. Justification for holding part of Mysore permanently without the Nizam's consent could, in Lushington's opinion, be found in Article XV of the Subsidiary Treaty itself which recognized the re-adjustment of territories originally ceded. The Maharaja would, after surrendering Nagar in lieu of a pecuniary payment, still have an annual net collection of at least twenty one lakhs of Canteroy pagodas (exclusive of any surplus of net revenue from Nagar beyond the four lakhs at which it would be received by the Company), which was seven lakhs more than the value of the provinces as enumerated in the Partition Treaty. The Maharaja, on his part, would be absolved of all pecuniary claims by the Company except the fixed subsidy of 8 lakhs and 40 thousand Canteroy pagodas. He would, therefore, be in possession of an annual revenue of 38 lakhs of rupees for his personal expenses and the charges of the internal administration, in return for the protection granted by the Company's arms from all external enemies. The projected arrangement, Lushington pointed out, had the further advantage of being within the framework of the Subsidiary Treaty; any change in it, on the other hand, might have incurred

protest from the Nizam, who was a party to it[26].

Citing the case of Tanjore as a state where the king's authority had been acknowledged within prescribed limits of territory after the Company had taken over its administration, the Maharaja at about the same time expressed a hope that his authority would be recognised over Mysore Ashtagram (the area included being the city of Mysore and its environs for about seven to fifteen miles), subject to any restrictions or deductions from his fifth share of the revenue as the British Government might prescribe. He hoped that the acts of his government under his own immediate observation and charge could not be reproached. Casamaijor, who conveyed the information, recommended that the request be granted as moderate. Of the 37,626 square miles that constituted the kingdom of Mysore with a population of 24,00,000, the Mysore Ashtagram division had 1,50,000 inhabitants with an area of 12 Square miles and yielded on an average 69,940 Canteroy pagodas per annum during the years 1825-29. The Maharaja's benevolence was also said to have ingratiated him with the people of the area[27].

A change took place in Bentinck's view soon after. The Maharaja in a letter to the Governor-General dated 5 November 1831 explained the causes of the Nagar insurrection in some detail. He attributed the outbreak of disturbances to the activities of two persons, Rangappa Naik and Budi Basavappa. They had persuaded the people to

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26. Lushington to Bentinck, 4 Oct. 1831, For.Sec.Cons. 16 Dec. 1831. Nos. 10-21.

27. Resident to Madras, 11 Oct. 1831, For.Sec.Cons., 4 Nov. 1831, No. 14.

believe that, with the help of the Kandachar from places like Dharwar, they would expel the Maharaja and permanently settle the revenue at one-half of the existing rates. Their followers blamed the state officials for the violence they themselves committed. The Company's troops had been summoned, the Maharaja explained, not because his own forces could not have stamped out the uprising but to show that his rule was backed by the English. In fact, the Company's forces had been relieved in a short time and without any serious engagement. Peace and order had been restored. The ryots of Nagar were quietly cultivating their lands and paying revenues to the Govt.

The Raja explained the delay in the payment of monthly salaries by difficulties in revenue collection and the extraordinary expenses in putting down the rebellion. But the subsidy to the Company, he pointed out, had been regularly paid every month without fail. The instructions of the Resident had been punctiliously carried out. In fact, he had asked for three months time in which to carry out the instructions laid down by Lushington in a previous memorandum asking him to reduce the expenditure, discharge arrears of salaries and arrange for regular payment in future. More specifically, the Maharaja had been informed of the necessity to repay the debts of the soucars and gather a surplus, dismiss guilty officials and promote the prosperity of the country and the ryots. The Raja claimed to have executed three-fourths of the necessary reform, and to have arranged for the settlement of the rest, with one month of the stipulated period pending, at the time when he had received Bentinck's instruction to relinquish administration of the kingdom. The order had, however, been promptly

carried out[28].

An enquiry committee on the causes, course and effects of the Nagar insurrection submitted its report on 12 December, 1831. It offered the most detailed discussion of the subject and its findings require to be summarised at some length. The revolt was said to have been primarily due to the discontent of the local leaders who had been deprived of their authority and brought under surveillance by Haidar and Tipu. In fact, it could have been easily suppressed if it had not been joined by the Tarikere polygars and the Nagar pretender with their personal energy and hereditary influence. The employment by the state of outsiders of the military class recruited in the Nizam's dominions and in the Company's territories also helped the rebellion to continue. At the same time the economic malaise of the province was reported to be the result of the withdrawal of the patronage of a powerful and wealthy court after 1799. The presence of British troops in Mysore during the time of Purnaiya had maintained the demand and the long-term effects of the changed political situation of Mysore had not been realised. After the withdrawal of the subsidiary troops, the impression gradually spread that the Maharaja's rule was not supported by the British. At the same time, the prices of agricultural commodities, and consequently the revenue realised from them, fell with the spread of cultivation in the return to normalcy ensured by the British. The purchasing capacity was curtailed in the dislocation of services following the defeat of Tipu in 1799. Besides the diminution in the quantity of the precious metals in India

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28. Madras to Calcutta, 25 Nov. 1831, For. Sec.Cons. 6 Feb. 1832. Nos. 5-6.

and the depression of the economy of south India during this period also left their impact. The revenues of the Bellary and Cuddapah districts in the Madras presidency bordering on Mysore and resembling it more than any other part of the Company's territories also registered a decline during the same period. The report, like the submission of Casamaijor previously, stated that the grievances of the ryots in cootum did not by itself mean that the amildars were too oppressive. Investigation of similar disturbances at about the same time in Canara had revealed the public demand there to be very moderate, lighter than anywhere in the Madras presidency. The committee deplored the fact that the instructions that had been sent to the Resident in 1814 to abstain from public affairs in Mysore were misleading.

The Committee held the family of bakshi Rama Rao responsible for the commencement of hostilities. They were alleged to have participated in organising the plunder of the people and in sharing the booty. More than seven lakhs of ruppees were said to have been improperly remitted out of a total of more than 13 lakhs that had fallen in arrears in the province. When one of the Raja's own relatives was sent to supersede a relation of Rama Rao, some of the latter's followers instigated the ryots to rebel with a view to expelling the new foujdar. Budi Basavappa was encouraged by these followers to set himself up as the unauthorised ruler of the province. Thus the members of the bakshi's party were said to have tried to avoid the disgrace and punishment that would have been brought on

them by an enquiry'[29].

Bentinck took in haste what he was to repent at leisure. After a personal visit to Mysore in April 1834, he wrote two letters, - one to the Directors and the other to the Secret Committee, - on the 14th of that very month. In the first letter, after summarising the observations of the Enquiry Committee, Bentinck doubted whether the provisions of the Subsidiary Treaty justified the assumption of the country. By the terms of the Subsidiary Treaty, Lord Wellesley intended to carry on the administration of the country in the name of the Raja even after the assumption of his kingdom. Since the Treaty still held, the Maharaja as one of the contracting parties was entitled, the Governor General thought, to all the privileges of the station, except those of which he had been deprived by Articles IV and V. If set aside, Bentinck feared that he would probably be inclined to frustrate British intentions with all the means in his power[30].

In his letter to the Secret Committee of the same date Bentinck expressed further doubts regarding the validity of the assumption of the whole country. The subsidy did not appear to have been in immediate jeopardy and, in any case, the assumption of a part of the country would have certainly sufficed to render the claims on the funds efficient and available, as required by the

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29. For. Pol.Cons. 5 June 1854 No.9. The Committee's observations on the causes of depression in Mysore have been corroborated by P.J. Thomas and B. Natarajan in their article "Economic Depression. In the Madras Presidency (1825-54)' in The Economic History Review Vol.VII, 1936-37 (New York reprint 1957), pp.67-75.

30. For. Pol.Cons. 14 April 1834, No. 1.

Treaty. A more distinct and positive warning should have been given to the Maharaja before taking over the administration of the country. These doubts as to the validity of his conduct led Bentinck to propose that the Company retain the full sovereignty of Bangalore and its adjacent territory, since from its central and commanding position as well as the salubrity of its climate, it place was the most fitted to be the capital of South India. Under the Company's management the territories would yield more, Bentinck hoped, than they had yet averaged. The Irregular Horse at their command could be employed in any part of their dominions. Such an arrangement would at once increase the power and influence of the Company, while raising the Maharaja by virtue of his possession of the rest of his dominions from the position of a pensioner to one in control of a territory sufficiently extensive to preserve for him a high rank among the princes of India. In the Governor-General's opinion, the Maharaja by virtue of his devotion to the British cause deserved such a recognition. Also he would be better able to administer a small state than a large one, for he was not devoid of abilities. Bentinck said : 'It is admitted by every one who has had an opportunity of observing the character of the Raja, that he is in the highest degree intelligent and sensible. His disposition is described as being the reverse of tyrannical or cruel, and I can have little doubt from the manner in which he has conducted himself in his present adverse circumstances, that he would not neglect the opportunity to bring his good qualities into active operation and to allow that he had not failed to benefit by the

lessons of experience'[31].

But, the Directors were not inclined to view the Maharaja's character sympathetically. They feared that he would mismanage a small area just as he had done a big. They, therefore, decided to retain the management of the country until the establishment of such a system as would afford security against misgovernment. That done, the Directors said, the causes on which restoration of a part of the Kingdom could be made, recommended the restoration of the whole. With respect to the Maharaja's unwavering loyalty and sentiments, the Directors did not object to Bentinck's proposal of calling the Commission as 'The Commission for the Government of the Territories of Mysore'[32].

The reply of the Directors was conveyed to the Maharaja by R.D. Stokes, the Resident in Mysore from 1836 to 1842. The Maharaja was, naturally, crest-fallen. He said that he would never have agreed to the methods suggested by Bentinck if he were not told that he could not expect to recover any portion of his dominions if he acted otherwise. On the other hand, he admitted that he had never expected the Directors to limit themselves to restore only one-third of his dominions, if they decided to restore his kingdom to him; for the whole of Mysore had been conferred on him gratuitously in 1799. The Maharaja also raised the question as to who was to judge when the period of restoration had come ? The British

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31. For. Sec. Cons. 14 April 1834, No. 1.

32. For. Pol. Cons. 25 September 1835, No. 45.

officers in Mysore would be shorn of much of their authority once they declared that the reforms had been effected. The Maharaja also could not suppress doubts as to whether his debts would be cleared by the English. He wished to ensure that no large remission of revenue or expenditure took place, without his knowledge or soliciting such information as he had to offer on the subject. Stokes wanted to relieve the king of his anxieties by pointing out that the British administration could not be expected to incur loss of revenue merely to keep his kigndom in their possession. The officials had, in fact, to accomplish the reforms quickly to maintain a clear record. The debts of the Mysore state, including that of the Maharaja, were less than when the Commission had assumed charge of the Mysore country. To seek the Maharaja's opinion on the question of remissions of revenue would not, however, be possible as it would mean, (in a way) setting up dual authority in the kingdom[33].

Discussions now tended to centre round the question of state debts. In a letter to the Governor General shortly after, the Maharaja claimed that the arrears had already been paid to his servants. His debts were also in the process of being paid[34]. The Directors in their despatch of 30 Oct. 1839 agreed with this opinion by stating that the Raja's private debts had been almost liquidated. The principal exceptions were said to be those crediters who had refused to accept the

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33. Redident to Calcutta, 5 May 1836. For. Pol.Cons. 4 June, 1836. No. 115.

34. For. Pol. Cons., 5 Dec. 1836, No. 122.

terms suggested by the Commissioner. They were left to settle their accounts with the Raja. The half of the Raja's fifth share of revenue which had been held in deposit for the payment of his debts was to be rendered available for his own use. The amount was not however needed by the Raja for practical purpose, Stokes said. Instead, he recommended its being made over to the Commission to pay off some of the public debts of the Mysore state. The Raja was to obtain the interest on the sum in addition to his permanent income. The proposal was accepted by the Directors[35]. This encouraged the Raja to plead that the sum of Rs.24,75,969 that had accumulated in the state treasury be at once applied to liquidate the debts of the state. He was prepared to make good the payment of Rs.7,47,261 that would still be pending over and above this from the funds he held in the form of India Government Loans. He thought it strange that the money should be lying idle in the Treasury, while the interest was being paid by the British Government to him[36]. The Maharaja's attempt now was to prove that the debts of his kingdom were not much more than one-third of its annual revenue. The funds in the Treasury were, he thought, sufficient to meet the outstanding payments while his private funds were more than enough to pay for his personal debts. Should the British Government still consider their subsidy in danger, he was prepared to accept Bentinck's proposal that the Company retain such portions of the territory as would guarantee its payment. The Maharaja was careful, however, to

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35. For. Pol. Cons. 30 Oct. 1839, No. 20.
36. No. 90 Resident to Calcutta, 3 March 1840, For.Pol.Cons., 30 March 1840, No. 90.

remind at the same time that the payments had never fallen in arrears under his own officers. The scrupulousness with which he had observed the Treaty rendered similar action on the part of the British necessary, he thought. By Art.IV of the Subsidiary Treaty he was not required to relinquish such part or parts of his kingdom as were necessary to secure the Company's subsidy. The Maharaja also maintained that if the administration of the country had remained in his hands, all debts would have been cleared long ago, though the British officials could not administer the kingdom at a lower cost. Cubbon tried to meet this argument by contending that if the funds in deposit were expended in reducing the debt, an equal sum would almost have to be borrowed to meet current expenses[37].

Cubbon's comment on the letter shows that the problem was reaching a new dimension. The Maharaja was said to have expressed his intention to employ an Agent in England who would have disposal of the ten lakhs of rupees from his funded property to campaign for the restoration of his country. The agitation that already existed over this issue was said to have been mounted with a view to influencing the investigations into the Maharaja's debts and was alleged to have effected suppression of some documents. The Maharaja in the Commissioner's opinion was exerting personal influence to continue the campaign in his favour[38].

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37. Maharaja's Khureta dated 7 Sept. 1844 and Cubbon's comment thereon 11 Sept. 1844. For.Pol.Cons. 26 Oct. 1844, Nos.118-120.
38. For.Pol.Cons. 20 Dec. 1845, No. 65.

While the Maharaja thus struggled for the restoration of the country to himself, Cubbon's despatch to Calcutta on 4 November 1847 showed a hardening of attitude to prevent accomplishment of the same. Though the right of assumption had been clearly ennuciated, there was no reference, the Commissioner pointed out, to any obligation to restore. Bentinck had been unable to accede to the request of restoring the whole of the Maharaja's dominions and Auckland had stated incapacity to restore even a part. If administrative reforms had been introduced in place of assuming the country, they would not have been abrogated the moment there was no reason to fear a failure in the subsidy. On like grounds, Cubbon defended retaining the kingdom in the hands of the British. The very fact that the kingdom had been so long in their charge was shown for the first time as being reason enough for not handing it back to the Maharaja. 'It would be difficult', the Commissioner said, 'for a Prince of higher moral qualities than the Rajah of Mysore to recover his authority so as to govern efficiently, after the shock which it has sustained by his seclusion from power for 15 years. But with a person of His Highness's character and disposition it is impossible'[39]. The stage was thus set for the dispute as to whether Mysore was to be restored to the Maharaja or not.

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39. Same to same, 4 Nov. 1847, For.Pol.Cons. 28, April 1848, No. 181.

CHAPTER - IV

LIMITS TO BRITISH EXPANSION

In the decade after 1857 there was a strong possibility of Mysore's being made to share the fate of several other princely states, that had been annexed by the British through application of the Doctrine of Lapse. The idea was, of course, Dalhousie's; it had strong support while Sir John Lawrence was the Governor General (1864-69) and Sir Charles Wood the Secretary of State (1859-64).

For Dalhousie the Subsidiary Treaty concluded in 1799 between Wellesley and the Maharaja was 'exclusively a personal one' with no provision as to heirs and successors. It did not matter to him that both the Directors of the Company and their representatives in India had till 1847 admitted that they were administering the kingdom on behalf of the Maharaja, to whom his dominions were to be returned after the reforms had been effected and a smooth working of the administration ensured. Dalhousie based his interpretation on the General Memorandum On Mysore that had been submitted by Cubbon on 24 November 1855 as an expose on the state of the kingdom since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The memorandum was the result of a request by Sir Henry Lawrence, the Governor General's Agent in Rajputana (1853-58), to J.P. Grant, Secretary to the Government of India (1854-59), for information on Mysore which he could draw upon in his projected account of the relations between the British Government and the Indian states. The report ran through the usual list of charges. The revenue administration of Purnaiya was [illegible]n critised for being oppressive and the Maharaja blamed for having wasted the money

accumulated through extortion on sycophants and on the foreign userers and dealers in shawls and jewels who were said to have 'flocked to Mysore as to an assured prey'. The Maharaja's administration was painted in dark colours : the highest offices were auctioned, district officers left without control, valuable lands alienated to propitiate Brahmins and new taxes and monopolies 'invented to be bestowed like pensions on pimps and parasites'. The British Commission was said to have assumed office with a burden of more than 47 lakhs of debt. At the time of writing, Cubbon said, only 7 lakhs were outstanding. If the seasons were moderately favourable, he hoped that the whole would be discharged within the next two years. Meantime, the population was said to have increased from 30, 50, 713 in 1840 to 34, 26, 458 in 1851, registering an increase of 3, 75, 745. Bangalore was most populous with 1, 34, 995 inhabitants; Mysore city, having lost its former importance, held only 53, 277. Dalhousie argued that he could not allow the 'gratuitous liberality' of leaving the administration in Indian hands once the Maharaja was dead. The Governor General did not expect the realisation of his aims to be far away. The Maharaja was sixty-two and no member of his line had lived beyond sixty. Cubbon stood witness to the fact that the Maharaja had confided to him the desire of being the last of his line to sit on the throne[1]. The pre-

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1. For Cubbon's 'General Memorandum on Mysore' see For. Pol.Cons. 19 May, 1854 and 22 February 1856, Nos. 118-119. For Dalhousie's Minute of 10 January 1856, For. Pcl.Cons. 22 February 1856, No.121.

-conditions for the application of the Doctrine of Lapse seemed to be fully present.

The Revolt of 1857, however, threw Dalhousie's annexationist policy into disrepute. Queen Victoria by her Proclamation of 1858 declared that the Crown in which the Indian administration was to be vested in future abjured the path of conquest and promised to respect the 'rights, dignity and honour' of Indian princes. Promises, however, are easier made than kept in practice. A section of the British administrators concerned with India did not see the necessity of abandoning imperial designs. Sir Charles Wood and Sir John Lawrence served as proponents of this school of thought. Pressure on an Indian state could no longer be exerted through force of arms; but those seeking an increase of British territories, in the case of Mysore, sought to gain their ends by bending the subsidiary treaty to suit their intentions. They were opposed both in England and India by those who saw in such arguments a return to the kind of diplomacy that had largely caused the Revolt of 1857. The memories of that year were still fresh in the minds of the participants. A new generation of nationalist leaders was emerging from among the Indians and any arbitrary act on the part of the British government was bound to be criticised. In the conflict between the different lines of thought was shaped the Mysore policy of the British government in the 1860's.

The first flutter of apprehension was caused by Wood's letter to Canning, the Viceroy (1856-62), proposing to transfer the responsibility of superintendence over Mysore from Calcutta to Madras; allegedly because of the increasing work load in the Foreign

Department at the former station, already encumbered with responsibilities as the capital of British India, and the advantage enjoyed by the latter city due to its contiguity to Mysore and lesser burden of official duties. Mysore, we have seen, was subordinate to Madras in the first quarter of the nineteenth century and the fact that it had been brought under the Supreme Government at Calcutta was explained by Wood as being 'of a temporary and accidental, rather than general character'. Cubbon tendered his resignation when he heard of the proposal. A petition was presented on behalf of the inhabitants of Bangalore, Mysore city and Tumkur, pleading that his services be retained since they had proved beneficial to the state. Both the Maharaja and the Resident reminded Canning of the services rendered by the Mysore sillahdar horse during the rebellion of 1857. Several parts of the Deccan had come under the influence of insurrectionary activities but Mysore had remained firm in loyalty. If Wood's proposal was carried through, it would be a 'crowning indignity' for him, the Maharaja said. He saw sinister designs behind the plan to bring him from under the supervision of the Supreme to a subordinate government. He feared that the step had been taken to create difficulties for the rule of his dynasty as the Madras government would prove meddlesome.

Cubbon warned Canning that the Maharaja's khureeta, whether it made any impression on the Government of India and the India Board or not, was almost sure to cause a sensation if read in the House of Commons. Local opinion viewed the proposal as a gross violation of public faith. Indeed, it was regarded as the first step towards the final exinction of the state of Mysore and its incorporation into

Madras. Consequently, all confidence in the sincerity of the Queen's Proclamation was about to be destroyed. This would negate the very confidence that the British were trying to secure for their Indian administration.

Canning accepted the truth of what Cubbon and the Maharaja said. In a letter to Wood, he mentioned an additional reason against implementing the decision. It would make the Maharaja recoil from his desire of bequeathing the state voluntarily to the British after his death. Like Dalhousie before him, Canning said that such desire had been conveyed to him, by the Maharaja 'through an entirely private channel' in 1858. Although British policy in India was in general against expansion, Mysore formed a 'quite exceptional' case being joined to the British in a way which, he said, 'is not convenient or satisfactory'. It lay in the midst of British dominions with which its incorporation was desirable. In view of all these protests, Wood withdraw his proposal. In apology so for ever having given vent to the idea, Canning told the Maharaja that no administrative change had been contemplated; the supervision of Madras over Mysore would have been subject to the general authority and control of the Calcutta Council[2].

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2. For.Pol.Cons. June 1860, Part A, Nos. 162-180.
For the distinction with which the Mysore sillahdar horse acquitted themselves in the ceded distincts and the lower Maratha country during the Revolt of 1857 see the account by Major General A. Macleod, Military Assistant to the Commissioner, On India (London, 1872), pp. 154-166. For the spread of insurrectionary activities in the Deccan see The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad Vol.II (Hyderabad, 1956).

Having foiled the British intentions in one respect, the Maharaja sought to win another - the bigger - goal of having the administration restored to him. On the eve of Cubbon's retirement from office in 1861, he submitted a Khureeta stating the claims on which he based his arguments to be restored to effective authority. He promised to follow the line laid down by the Commissioner and agreed to run the state as a 'superintended native administration'. The British would by fulfilling his prayer secure greater loyalty and esteem from all Indian rulers. As the Maharaja said, 'the Indian princes and chiefs, bound to your Government by a double tie of gratitude and self-interest, will present a bulwark which neither the wave of foreign invasion nor the tide of internal dissatisfaction may throw down'. The Maharaja substantiated his claim with reference to Article IV of the Subsidiary Treaty that stipulated a return of the kingdom, in case of an administrative takeover, after the establishment of law and order.

The Maharaja's claim was immediately disputed by H.B. Devereux, the Judicial Commissioner of Mysore, on two points. First, the assumption of the state by Bentinck was said to be not only justifiable but absolutely necessary. Second, the personal character of the Maharaja was such as to prevent any reasonable expectation of his governing well, if restored. At sixty-seven years of age, the Maharaja could not perform much better, it was argued, that he had done earlier. His court would again attract idle favourites and the Brahmins regain their grip over the administration. The result would be another upheaval.

The Maharaja's restoration, Devereux argued, would moreover affect two sets of interests. One of the residents of Bangalore and the other of the coffee planters, both Indians and English by birth. The city of Mysore had seen a rapid fall in population after the British had assumed the administration of the country for it had ceased to be the seat of power and patronage. Bangalore had been rapidly increasing over the years. In Devereux's opinion the cantonment at the place contained about 1,60,000 inhabitants, besides the city proper where dwelt 40,000 local people. This showed a greater number than what had been estimated by Cubbon in his General Memorandum of 1854, - 1, 34, 925. The number of British soldiers formed a small part of those residing in the cantonment. The increase in the inhabitation was due to the importance of Bangalore as a trading centre. It enjoyed a strategic position, had a telegraph office and lay at the centre of good roads in every direction. Devereux held a bleak prospect for Bangalore if the Maharaja was restored. All this rising prosperity, he warned, would be drastically checked, if not wholly destroyed, in case of a transfer of power to the Maharaja. The establishment would shift back to Mysore and Bangalore would, in turn, be probably deserted. Public works like the construction and repairs of tanks, roads and bridges etc. would be neglected and the mal-administration create problems for the planters.

Though seeking to justify his position on the ground that ultimate authority had been retained by Lord Wellesley in the hands of the Company, Devereux was aware of the weakness of his resoning. Articles IV and V of the subsidiary treaty mentioned the Company's

right to assume 'such part or parts of the territorial possessions of Mysore' as were necessary for securing the military funds and providing for the protection of the country and the welfare of the people. But this did not justify the claims of the British government to hold on to their territorial possession in Mysore. Again, Article XIV did not authorise the assumption of territory if the Maharaja violated the provision 'to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occassionally judge it necessary to offer to him'. If the Maharaja adopted an heir there would be a further problem, that of recognition. The British would in that case have to determine whether they would return the whole country or retain permanently the territory necessary to secure the realization of the subsidy. In Devereux's opinion the latter course was justified by the terms of the subsidiary treaty. He, however, favoured the recognition of the Maharaja's right of adoption as that would give a chance to eliminate corruption and train the prince properly in the duties of the state by the time he came to manhood.

A different line was suggested by Col. Henry Durand, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India (1861-65), and Sir Bartle Frere, Member of the Supreme Council (1859-62). They admitted his right of restoration but denied that of the adoption of an heir on the ground that the Maharaja had received his kingdom as a conditional grant from the British. Durand suggested the precedent of Nagpur where the Maharaja had been restored after having promised not to tamper with the administration as organised by the British. In fact, as Canning admitted in a private letter to Wood, the Maharaja's

appeal could not be rejected without straining the terms of the treaty[3]. Still the Maharaja's name did not still find a place in the list of princes whose independence was ensured[4]. On the other hand, in his letter to the Maharaja on 10 March 1862, a day before leaving India, Canning argued that Lord Wellesley had reserved the right of conquest for the British in three distinct stages; - first, prior to the completion of the political settlement; then, in the terms and conditions of the treaty itself; and, finally, in making the grant conditional. More plainly, the Maharaja was said to have derived his accession from the force of British arms and not from any right of patrimony, as the royal line had been held in custody from the time of Haidar. The settlement had been arrived at between the British and the Nizam, in the first place, and the Maharaja was only the notified future receipient of a portion of the territories. He had not been of the smallest value to merit this free gift of a kingdom. On the contrary, since his authority followed from the British right of conquest, even his private possession rested upon their favour and was a personal right, not a heritable one. Even a natural-born heir could not succeed to it. Under Art.V of the Subsidiary Treaty, the Company had reserved the power to prevent the evils of double government as in the Carnatic, Tanjore and Oudh. This right had been exercised and the Maharaja relieved of the burden of administration only after his subjects had risen in rebellion, itself a

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3. P.K. Chatterjee, The Making Of India Policy, 1853-65. (University of Burdwan, 1975) p. 159.

4. P. P. (HL), 1960, Volume 15.

manifestation of his inability to reform the administration though the British had advised him for twenty years to do so. Even then ample provisions had been made for the Maharaja's comfort and security before he was stripped of power. There was no gurantee that maladministration would not follow his restoration to authority. 'Your Highness seems to forget the material fact', Canning observed, 'that the paramount authority of British Officers is the safeguard, and the very essence of the good which is manifest in the present administration. Your Highness fails to offer any security upon a point not inferior in importance to the restoration of order and solvency, namely the future maintenance of good government in Mysore'. Thus, Canning upheld the official policy. He expressed sympathy with the Maharaja's desire to free himself from the disrepute which attached to his name for being shut out of power, but added that the despatch had to be framed, 'to refute grounds of assumed ancestral and hereditary rights which had no existence and of admissions and promises which were never made'[5].

In his reply of 20 April 1862 the Maharaja refuted Canning's argument point by point. He said that he had never disputed the point that he owed his rank to the British right of conquest, but added that the circumstances antecedent to the signing of the Treaty had been superseded the moment the Treaty had come into being. 'The rights of conquest', he said, 'are swallowed up in its

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5. For Pol.Cons. March 1862 Pol. A. Nos. 145-158.

self-imposed obligations'. He denied that he had not the smallest political value at the time of the settlement. Lord Wellesley had in his despatches referred frequently to the justice of his claims by virtue of his high birth and the antiquity of his legitimate title. Even Haidar had to select a new head to the Mysore Raj when the direct line had failed for want of a natural heir. His accession had also been due, the Maharaja reminded, to Lord Wellesley's desire to avoid any other engagement that would have aggrandised the Nizam's power beyond all bounds of discretion and afforded strong grounds of jealousy to the Marathas, besides increasing their means and resources of mischief. The settlement under the circumstances had secured to the Company a less invidious and more efficient share of revenue, resource, commercial advantage and military strength, than could be obtained under any other distribution of territory or power. In fact, Lord Wellesley had in his letter of 5 June 1799 expressed the intention that, by the Treaty as originally drafted the whole of the conquered territory was to have been handed to the Maharaja in the first place, the Allies afterwards accepting as a cession under his authority such districts as were to be retained by them. This was cited as sufficient proof that the British shared with others in the rights of conquest. The Nizam's signature of the subsidiary Treaty, was regarded by the Maharaja as for instance, being as ncesssary as that of Lord Wellesley himself. The integrity of the kingdom had been moreover provided in the Partition Treaty. The Maharaja admitted that the dominions of his ancestors had been no less extensive than those of his own, though Lord Canning was right in saying that

they had not rules over many areas which the Allies had assigned to him. By the first Supplementary Treaty of 1803, the British had taken certain taluks to the north of Chittledurg in exchange for strong positions about Wynaad'; 'is it too much to say', the Maharaja asked, 'that the anxiety displayed in those days to make the Mysore territory powerless against the British is a proof that they regarded the distinct position of my country as a permanent fact?'

The Maharaja further questioned the validity of the charge that his administration suffered in contrast to that of Purnaiya. Both the Insurection Committee and Sir Mark Cubbon had been of the view that the exactions of the dewan had exhausted the real resources of the state. Collections had been swelled to an inflated amount by the sale of sandalwood etc. which had accumulated under Tipu. Moreover, the maintenance of a very large military force, particularly strong in European regiments, had kept up the price of grain. Great sums of money drawn from Madras had been in circulation. The land - locked boundaries of the kingdom had prevented trade by the deas; roads had not been laid in the Madras Presidency till long after 1831. The land revenue in Mysore based on battai, i.e. equal crop-division among the government and cultivators, had only increased after the rise in prices following the improvement in transport. The Maharaja also regretted to say that he had not received effective instructions from the Madras government in the period before 1831. The insurrection in Nagar had occured at the same time as that in the Company's dominions of Canara and the south Maratha country. The people of this belt were of the same stock and the insurrections perhaps owed their

origin to identical causes. The Maharaja also referred to the finding of the Insurrection Committee that the ryots shared the belief that opposition to the Raja's government would be viewed with complacency by the authorities at Madras. It was not strange, the Maharaja argued, that troops who had quartered freely in a country for thirty years were being asked to suppress rebellions in it. Insurrections were compared to the outbreak of cholera in that they did not spare even the best organised body politic. The findings of the Torture Committee of 1855 had revealed how maladministration could take place without the knowledge of the authorities. For the future, the Maharaja assured that he had no intention of making any change in the administration, superintended and controlled as it was in every branch by Englishmen. In case any important change had to be made the Resident would be first consulted. There was no cause to apprehend a reversal to the conditions before 1831. Much time had elapsed since the British had assumed the task of administering his kingdom. The older generation of officials had passed away while new men had appeared, adept in both the form and principles of the British administration. The Maharaja also regretted the fact that his appeal had been answered after a delay of about a year and had then been couched in a language that was studiously cold and bitter. He was alarmed by the change in expressions : his own title as the 'Maharaja of Mysore' and the designation of the 'Commissioner for the Government of the Territories of the Raja of Mysore' had been altered in Canning's reply respectively to 'Maharaja residing in Mysore' and 'Commissioner of Mysore'. After the Maharaja's objection, the previous designations

were revived[6].

The problem which the Maharaja's insistence created for Wood has already been discussed by Robin Moore. Stanley, the previous Secretary of State, wanted to annex Mysore by any possible method and Elgin, the Governor General in India from March 1862 to November 1863, advised that the right of adoption be refused to the Maharaja on the ground of maladministration. But with the instance of Dalhousie's Oudh policy before them, British administrators after 1857 were reluctant to override the considerations of Indian states as before. Wood wanted to keep the issue open till the time of the Maharaja's death and then present a decision[7]. But his negative reply to the Maharaja was something for which the Maharaja was quite prepared. Discussions entered the next level when he sought permission to be able to adopt a son and heir to his kingdom so that, as he said, 'the river of my country should not be carried into that of the ocean of the British'. Also he applied for the appointment of a Resident to administer the kingdom on his behalf and the possession of the Commissioner's Treasury and the net revenues of the state after the ordinary costs of administration had been met. For the

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6. PP (HC), 1866, Vol. 52 pp. 494-498.

7. R.J. Moore, Sir Charles Wood's Indian Policy, 1853-66 (Manchester University Press, 1966), pp. 166-171 offers a detailed description of Wood's policy in the case of Mysore.

future, the Maharaja desired to be vested with the power to conduct all important affairs.

Bowring, who succeeded Cubbon as the Resident (1862-70), and Sir John Lawrence, the Governor General (1864-69), opposed the Maharaja's claims jointly. There was to be no change in the existing form of administration, the government being carried on in the name of the 'Commissioner for the Government of the Territories of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore'. The Maharaja had also expressed in conversation, Bowring said, the desire to call the chief English official in his court as 'minister' but this request was rejected outright. The Maharaja was also informed that he had a right to adopt with regard to succession to his private property but the right of inheritance had not even been sanctioned nor could be conceded so far as his kingdom was concerned. As for the Maharaja's debts, the amount came in Bowring's opinion to not much more than 45 lakhs, while the Maharaja's assets as invested in government securities had come down from eighteen to eleven lakhs as a result of the expenses incurred in the campaign for restoration to his throne. Besides, there was a surplus of Rs.102/- in the Treasury which, Bowring observed, had been accumulated entirely through the thrift and watchfulness of the previous holder of the office - Cubbon. The Maharaja had in oral communication expressed a desire for Rs.20 lakhs to meet his arrears. Bowring was, however, opposed to a grant of more than Rs.5 or 6 lakhs because, he argued, that the money would not, in the first place, be used exclusively to meet the demands' of the creditors and because Cubbon had already in

1844 separated the debts of the State from those of the Maharaja as an individual and disposed of the former. The demands of the creditors would increase the moment they heard that the kingdom was not to be restored to the Maharaja. Lawrence sanctioned the appointment of an officer to receive and scrutinize all such claims, and to enquire into the arrangement for the commutation of the whole and the early liquidation of the commuted amount. Parties not agreeing to the terms were to get nothing. No debts incurred after this date would under any pretence receive any consideration from the Supreme Government. The scrutiny and liquidation of the debts was to take place at Bangalore. The Commissioner proposed issuing at once a Notification with the widest publicity that all claims had to be preferred and filed within three months, from 1st May, in the Court of the Officer who was to be selected to examine the accounts. Bowring also said that all these claims would, after being submitted to him and upon analysis, be forwarded monthly for the information of the Government. Due precautions were to be taken to effect the prescribed commutation on reasonable terms. The Maharaja was told that it would be desirable for him to withhold the payment of any demand or interest on all back accounts from 1st May and confine payment only to those of a current nature payable out of his income for 1863-64. All claimants were to be distinctly directed to apply to the Officer above mentioned. After the adjustment of the Maharaja's debts out of the surplus money in deposit, the balance was to be invested in Government Paper, to form a fund for the support of his relatives and dependents. The annual surplus would be applied to the same

purpose, and swell the resources from which this provision was to be made. Such provision for the payment of stipends from the interest on sums invested in the Company's loans had earlier given the Residents of Oudh an opportunity to interfere in the affairs of the kingdom. Bowring's proposal might have been made with some such motive. One cannot be definite on matters like this but the possibility of identical results following from similar practices cannot be ruled out[8].

The Maharaja in reply sought to justify his stand by comparing his position to that of Louis XVIII who had been placed upon the throne of France by the Allies after the downfall of Napoleon. He also found a similarity between the powers given to the British over his kingdom with those afforded to them over the Ionian Islands in 1815. It was never supposed in respect of those islands that the British would convert any period of protection and government into sovereignty. Under Articles IV and V of the Subsidiary Treaty, the power of assumption was only to be exercised to secure a specific object, - the due payment of the subsidy and the troops. As such the provision had been in the nature of a mortgage and carried the

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8. Bowring to Durand 18 February 1964, For. Pol. Cons. March 1864 Nos. 268 - 171A. Also Bowring to Maharaja 14 April 1864 in For. Pol.Cons. June 1864 Nos. 33 - 36A. For the situation in Oudh see John Pemble. The Raj, The Indian Mutiny And the Kingdom of Ouch, 1801 - 1856 (Sussex, 1977), pp. 37 - 38.

essence of every mortgage, viz., it was to cease whenever the object for which it had been guaranteed was fulfilled. The Nizam would not have put his signature if he had any intimation at the time that whereas in an open partition the British could only claim half of Mysore, he was giving over to them the sovereignty of the whole, to fall into possession the first year there was a defalcation in the subsidy or reason to apprehend one. The Maharaja doubted whether the Nizam would quietly suffer the entire absorption by the British of that which had been jointly acquired and jointly given away by himself. Had he died in 1800 without an heir, the Maharaja said, the Treaty of 1799 would not have been considered to have failed. 'Length of time can work no changes in obligations', the Maharaja said, 'I claim for my heirs the same rights as I shall' have died possessed of; and should I have no heirs, then, for the first time, those who gave me my dominions will become absolutely entitled to them'.

On the question of adoption the Maharaja admitted that it had been customary for vassals to apply in such cases to the Mughal emperor, whose assent was acknowledged by the payment of a nazar. But never had the permission been denied to any native monarch nor had the permission ever been restricted to imply that the son should be partially disinherited, - that is, debarred from succeeding to his father's dominions. The Maharaja reaffirmed his earlier promise to retain the existing administrative system in which native officials were superintended and controlled in every branch by English officers. But even without his promise, it was possible for the

British under the terms of the treaty to introduce any regulations and ordinances which they thought proper. 'If, then', the Maharaja concluded, 'the only object of the Government is the prosperity of the people of Mysore, and if that prosperity can be guaranteed in the continuance of the present system, then my restoration can in no way clash with the truest interests of the country'[9].

Lawrence's reply to this was that the subsidiary Treaty had left two alternatives for the administration of Mysore : either the issue of regulations and ordinances to be worked out by the Maharaja and his machinery of government, or the supersession of the Maharaja and the substitution of the direct and exclusive authority of the British Government and its own officers. There was no idea of a third course combining the two as the Maharaja contemplated, viz., an establishment of British officers with the Maharaja at the head of the administration in the exercise of power. Besides, what benefit could be derived from a change of government, Lawrence asked, if the same administrative set-up was to be continued after restoration? The interests of the coffee planters also merited consideration. The imprisonment of the Raja's family in the time of Tipu was shown to be an example of the scant regard with which rulers were treated in the pre-British days. Had the Maharaja's administration proved successful, it would have been an open question

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9. Maharaja to Lawrence 25 January 1865, For. Pol. Cons. May 1865, Part A.

whether, after his death, the kingdom was to be continued to his heir or not. Had the Maharaja died in boyhood, it would have rested with the British to decide whether a separate government was to be continued in Mysore by the nomination of some other person as the successor, or whether the British were themselves to govern the country. The Treaty with the Nizam was, Lawrence asserted, unaffected by any such contigency as the Maharaja's early death and its validity would have remained intact, even if the Maharaja had died in 1800. The Nizam was in a state of subordinate alliance with the British and had passed from being an independent to a purely dependent ruler by 1799. The subsidiary force which Hyderabad had contributed during the fourth Anglo-Mysore War and the portion of the Nizam's own army which accompanied it was under British officers. This whole force was commanded by Arthur Wellesley, the superintendence of Mir Alam being nominal. The conquest of Mysore was therefore, in Lawrence's opinion, really a British one. There was no reference to the Nizam in the Subsidiary Treaty. Only the English were in a position to reward the Nizam, restore the Maharaja and place such limitations on the exercise of their powers of protection or of Government as they thought advisable. Thus Lawrence denied that there could be any comparison between the protectorate of Great Britain over the Ionian Islands and the sovereign supremacy of the British Government over Mysore. The position of a dependent ruler like the Nizam could not be held to be analogous to that of the European powers who gave Britain charge over the Ionian Islands at the Congress of Vienna.

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10. Lawrence to Maharaja, 21 August 1865, For.Pol.Cons., August 1865 Nos. 106-107.

Opposition to the application of the doctrine of lapse had, however, been growing from the moment that Dalhousie had begun to enforce it. Colebrooke, who was one of the main protagonists of the cause of the Maharaja of Mysore, said that he had never seen Elphinstone so shaken as on receiving news of the annexation of Satara. 'Even granting that he is dependent', Elphinstone said, 'it does not necessarily follow that his territory, on default of heirs, is to escheat to the power on which he depends, or that power has a right to regulate the succession to his possessions. To complete the argument, it is necessary to prove that such has been the available practice of India, and must have been understood by the parties to the treaty'[15]. The observation of Elphinstone in this case has a marked resemblance to many of the statements that were to be made in the dispute on Mysore.

The Revolt of 1857 showed amply, the Conservatives thought, the dangerous consequences of a policy of change. Disraeli, as the leader of the party in the House of Commons spoke of the annexation of Native States as the first cause of this wide-spread disturbance. In his famous speech of 27 July 1857, he was extremely critical of Dalhousie's policy of annexation. There were, he said, at least 200 Indian princes, governing a population of at least 60,000,000 inhabitants. The British Government was bound by a treaty with each kingdom, whereby the ruler with his heirs was secure on the throne so long as he

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15. T.E. Colebrooke, Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone, Vol.II (London, 1884), p. 389.

observed the provisions of the agreement. Disraeli was convinced that adoption was for the Hindus 'not only a civil right, but a religious privilege; the whole framework of Indian society is established upon that principle'. The advantages to be derived from the Princely States were many. 'The turbulent spirits of the country were enrolled in their armies. Their mode of life offered a career which our more regulated and ordinary habits would not have furnished to the fiery youths of India. A strict observance of our treaties, the rigid maintenance of the laws and customs of the people, and, above all, a faithful respect for our guarantees of their land and a scrupulous adhesion to our engagements not to tamper with their religion - these were the sources of our strength, and upon these our great Indian statesmen have insisted'. The British supremacy in India, Disraeli thought, had been made possible by the divisions among the people of the country. Attempt to impose a uniform rule by destroying the local privileges had drawn the forces of opposition together and made British rule in India insecure. Thus, Dalhousie's imperial policy was, according to Disvaeli, injurious to the cause of the Empire itself.[12]

Over the Mysore question in the decade after 1857 persisted the dispute as to whether the British were entitled to take over a kingdom on the failure of a natural heir or whether the Maharaja had the right to adopt or not. Critics of Wood's policy were conscious of the issue at stake. If the decision went against the Maharaja so soon after the announcement of the Queen's Proclamation, the promises made

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12. Speech of Disraeli in the Commons, 27 July 1857, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (3rd Series) No. 147, pp. 440-450.

in that statement would look fatuous. In the India Council dissents against Wood's despatch were first submitted by Sir Henry Montgomery, Sir Frederick Currie and Sir John Willoughby in July-August 1863. Currie thought that both Wood and Canning had avoided answering the basic questions, - viz., what was the relative position of the Maharaja and the British under the Subsidiary Treaty of Mysore after the assumption of the kingdom by Bentinck in 1831? Was the assumption of the country intended to be temporary or permanent in nature ? Reference was also made to Lord Wellesley's letter of 1803 in which he wrote to the Directors that 'the Partition Treaty of 1799 has not yet been quoted to prove the existence of a systematic plan of territorial acquisition inconsistent with the policy of 1793'. From Bentinck to Canning no Governor-General had expressed doubts about the Maharaja's right to adopt and the Insurrection Committee had noted that his kingdom was not as badly administered as had been alleged at first. Willoughby and Currie also exposed the hypocricy behind the argument that considerations of the people's welfare prevented the restoration of the kingdom to the Maharaja. The changes made in the political map of India after 1857 had been motivated by British self-interest. For instance, in July 1860 the Hindu state of Shoraput had been unconditionally returned to the Nizam, as a reward for his allegiance to the British during the year 1857 as also to facilitate the settlement of the Company's frontier with Nagpur. Similarly the Nawab of Rampur had obtained the Hindu district of Kashipur, which had been a part of the Regulation Provinces of India since 1805. 'When circumstances render it expedient', Willoughby remarked, 'we do not hesitate to transfer from British to native rule, those who have enjoyed the benefits of

our Government, not only unconditionally, but heedless of the remonstrances of the parties concerned'.

At the same time, an important part of their argument was devoted by Willoughby and Currie to the alarm that would be produced in the minds of the people of Mysore and the Indian princes by withholding the kingdom from the Maharaja. Already the people of Mysore had, as Cubbon testified, expressed their sympathies for the insurgents during the uprising of 1857. In two other dissents on Wood's policy in 1864, Currie and Willoughby specially emphasised this point. The question of the Maharaja's right to adopt was the first occasion on which it would be seen whether the British would act according to the promises held out by the Queen's Proclamation. If the decision went against the Maharaja, Currie asked, 'Will not the chiefs of India believe that the promise of the Viceroy was made in an hour of weakness and danger, to be disregarded when power should be restored, and the danger had passed away?'[13]

In July 1865 Sir George Clerk, who had been the Governot of Bombay from 1859 to 1863, joined Eastwick and Currie in presenting a memorandum in support of the Maharaja of Mysore. The points that had been made in the previous dissents were amplified. Eastwick drew attention to Metealfe's minute of 28 October 1837 which, while upholding the right of adoption, categorically said : 'the British Government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it be regular, and not in violation of Hindoo law'. Currie expressed surprise at the fact that the adoption sanad was being referred to as the origin and basis

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13. P.P. (HC) 1866 Vol. 52, pp. 504-520.

of the adoption right. Indian rulers had not distinguished between the rights of an adopted and a natural heir.

Mention of 'heirs and successors' had not been made in the Treaty of Surji Arjangaon concluded by the Company with Danlat Rao Sindhia in 1803. If Mysore was not restored to the Maharaja, a precedent would be set that might be applied in the case of other Indian princes. Their assistance had helped the British to expand their dominion in India; their grievances had been largely responsible for the Revolt of 1857. The Maharaja, Eastwick said, had been justified in comparing the position of his kingdom with that of the Ionian Islands. In neither case could the British justly annex what they held as a protectorate. Such affront as would be caused to the Indian princes by withholding the kingdom of Mysore from the Maharaja was not, therefore, considered advisable. Regard for the people's opinion was an important reason for considering the reinstalment of the Maharaja. Violation of justice would imperil the very basis of the British rule in India. Still if the British were determined to annex Mysore or a part of it, Currie thought that a straight forward declaration of their intention, with compensation being made to all parties who might have just claims under treaty engagements, would be more honest and less disreputable than any roundabout argument to justify the same[14].

While Willoughby, Currie and Eastwick thus criticised Wood's policy, the Secretary of State's action in the Council was justified by Mangles and Prinsep in two minutes dated 22 July and 1 August

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14. Ibid., pp. 557-569.

1865 respectively. In his tract, The India Question In 1853 (London, 1853), Prinsep had already showed himself to be critical of the Indian princes and their supporters who, he said, mistook advice for interference in internal administration. With regard to Mysore, both Mangles and Prinsep were of the opinion that the Maharaja's claim was not supported by Treaty. The settlement was completely the making of the British; to place a successor on the throne would now be wasteful. A son could, of course, be adopted by the Maharaja for the performance of his last rites and inheritance of property but there could be no question of succession to the kingdom. The Maharaja's position was compared by Prinsep with that of the Nawab of the Carnatic, the Treaty with whom also contained no reference to heirs and successors. On this ground, although three successions had occurred without question since the Treaty had been signed, Dalhousie had discontinued the nominal title and authority of the Nawab. On the other hand, Mangles said, no comparison could validly be drawn with the case of Kerauli in which the Directors had disapproved of the annexation of the kingdom on the ground that the Rajput dynasty there was of long standing and the Maharaja of the kingdom had an undoubted right of adoption.

Mangles and Prinsep gave little weight to the value of public opinion. Had popular sentiments been regarded, Mangles said, the union of England and Scotland would never have taken place. He also voiced the fears of the coffee planters that their interest would suffer if the kingdom was handed back to the Maharaja. A ruler of the Maharaja's standing, Prinsep pointed out, should have been able to muster 10,000 signatures in his favour from the capital and its

environs and not just 7,347 as had been the case when the petition in favour of the Maharaja's restoration had been submitted in 1864. Mangles quoted the opinion of Macaulay to the effect that the Government of India was probably the only Government in the world which was better qualified to think and act for the prople than the people for themselves[15].

Meantime, the Maharaja's cause was receiving support from both Indians and Englishmen. The people of Mysore had sent in a petition on 16 June 1864. They said that the announcements made by the British in 1831, had led them to expect that the direct and actual, as well as the virtual, government of the country would be vested in and conducted by the hereditary and titular sovereign, the Maharaja, after the necessary reforms had been effected. The justice of the Maharaja's request was said to be 'palpable and undeniable' on the basis of the Subsidiary Treaty with Mysore. The generous treatment which the British had accorded to the Maharaja initially after 1831 and the assurance given by the Queen in her Proclamation of 1857 had encouraged this hope. The applicants said : 'We, in the first place, beg to be provided by your Excellency when we state that we do not understand how a distinction could properly or legally be made in regard to the right of our Maharaja to adopt, according as such adoption may be for himself, or for his Raj. If he adopts, the adopted son becomes at once his heir, and the heir of the Raj too. Even the Maharaja himself, with his own consent, or by any act of his, cannot, we submit, divest such an heir of his indefeasible and hereditary right bestowed upon the heir by God and the shastras. If the Maharaja had a son

15. Ibid, pp. 569-576.

begotten, and he wished to disinherit him of his Raj, would he be justified or permitted to do so ? And much less would any other be justified in preventing the heir from the enjoyment of his right. What distinction, then, can be drawn between a begotten son and an adopted son of a Hindu sovereign ?

'In the next place we humbly, but emphatically, beg to affirm that we never entertained any doubt as to the right of our Maharaja to adopt; neither did the world entertain any such doubt and if were already positive as to the right of our Maharaja, we were much more so after the issue of the fracious proclamation of, Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and the Indies'.

Bowring tried to minimise the importance of this document by saying that the signatures were chiefly those of the Maharaja's retainers and traders in Mysore who had dealings with the palace[16]. There were 7,347 signatures to this document[17]. Another copy of this same petition dated 4 October 1864 was sent to Lawrence by the inhabitants of the districts of Mysore, Hasan, Shimoga, Kadur and Tumkur. While sending this document to the Foreign Office in Calcutta, Bowing said that it was strange that a Parsi called Nanabhoy Nusservanjee should act as the representative of the people. Moreover, Nanabhoy was not said to be locally well-known. At the same time, however, even Bowring had to admit. 'The feeling of all Hindoos, whether in Mysore or in any other part of India, on the subject of

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16. For.Pol.Cons. Jan. 1865, Part A, Nos. 81-93.
17. Pol. Letter from Sec. of State, 17 July 1965, No. 57.

adoption, is deeply-rooted and that it would have been a matter of no difficulty to obtain signatures to a bonafide petition of similar purport, and this simply on the abstract question cf right'. Only the ryots, who had suffered from the various taxes in the time of the Maharaja, would in Bowring's opinion hesitate to sign such a petition[18].

The roots of opposition to British expansionism in India were, however, extended within the ruling circle from the begining of the nineteenth century. Typical was this letter from Arthur Wellesley to Munro.

In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo, and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, and particularly if we aggandize ourselves at the expense of the Marhattas, we increase this evil. We [illegible] out of employment and of means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies, at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our Government, and of defending ourselves, are proportionately decreased'[19].

Faced by hostilities in a strange country, the British administrators in India in the early nineteenth century were understandably reluctant to disturb the existing institutions. Munro regarded the Company as the successor to Tipu in its policing activities and the maintenance of law and order in the area. The ryotwari settlement, Frykenberg informs in a recent essay, was carried out more in reality with

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18. Bowring to Durand 7 Oct. 1964, PP (HC) 1866 Vol. 52, pp. 537-538.
19. Wellington to Munro, 20 Aug. 1800, in Gurwood, Wellington Despatches, Vol. I, p. 209.

the headmen of the locality than with the ordinary ryots[20]. In the Peshwa's dominions Elphinstone found the chieftains and soldiers, thrown lately out of profession, opposed to the Company's rule in almost every village. The Brahmins could not alsc be pleased with this break in traditional order[21]. Practical difficulties placed considerable constraints on the British administrators in India in the opening decades of the nineteenth century. There was the task of laying the foundations on which the imperial edifice was to be raised in future. It is necessary to recount their difficulties, before proceeding, to label them as Eric Stokes does as the 'Romantic generation' in contrast to the 'Utilitarians' who followed them in after years.[22] Placed as they were, they were (not unexpectedly) diffident in disturbing the status quo and wished to avoid doing so as far as possible. Intimate ties bound them. Arthur Wellesley was the guiding spirit. Malcolm regarded him as the beau-man and owed his post of Resident of Mysore to his influence[23]. Wilks, to whom Munro paid his respects, was the uncle of Cubbon. Elphinstone had great regard for Munro[24]. Their discussions as contained in the state papers formed a valuable body of opinion to those who raised their voice against the policy of annexation and to the Indian rulers so threatened.

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20. 'State of the Country and Conditions of the People', Minute by Munro, 31 Dec. 1824, Appendix No. 105 in P.P. (H.C.) 1831-32. Also . Frykenberg 'Company Circari in the Carnatic, c. 1799-1859' in Fox (ed.), Realm and Region, pp. 117-164.
21. R.D. Choksey, The Aftermath 1818-26 (Bombay, 1950), pp. 154-155.
22. Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians And India, (Oxford, 1959), pp. 8-25.
23. J.W. Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir John Malcolm, (London, 1856), Vol. I, p. 381.
24. Evans Bell, The Memoir of General John Briggs (London,1885), p. 6; K. Ballhatchet, Social Policy and Change In Western India (London,1957), p. 32; K.N.V. Sastri, Munro School of British Statesmanship in India , (Mysore, 1939), p. 324.

'And It must not be supposed', Canning wrote to Wood, 'that because these documents are published in Blue Books and in English, they are beyond the knowledge of Native Courts. They are, on the contrary, sought for and studied by those whose dearest prospects they so closely affect. It is not many months since I was informed by the Governor General's Agent in Central India, that a Native Court had received from England the Parliamentary Papers on Dhar before they had reached my own hands'[25].

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25. Canning to Wood, 30 April, 1860, Calcutta Gazette of 15 Dec. 1860, p. 8.

following the above tradition,
Critism of Wood's policy also appeared in the English press. Major Evans Bell of the Madras army, a relentless critic of British expansion, saw in the Mysore question another case of aggrandisement. The first edition of his book, The Mysore Reversion, An Exceptional Case, published in 1865, was exhausted within a year and the next edition appeared in 1866. He analysed at great length the development of the problem in its historical perspective and weighed the arguments both for and against. He concluded that the British could not in justice retain Mysore in their own hands. This was in keeping with his belief that as a general rule the administration of India could be more properly conducted by the Native States, organised on British principles and under British supervision, but governed and administered entirely by their princes and officials. On the other hand, British administration of India could be criticised, according to him on the following grounds, viz., that it lowers the moral influence of the Paramount Power, that it deprives of political privileges those among the natives who with a little help and guidance are fit to use them, while it does not educate for political life those who are as yet unfit'. As a consequence, the conquered people would be reduced either to stagnation or incited to conspiracy'[26].

Bell's book was representative of the broad criticisms against withholding Mysore from the Maharaja. But his was not a lone voice. Goldwin Smith, Professor of Modern History at Oxford and another anti-annexationist, pointed to the value of Native States as the 'only

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26. Evans Bell, The Mysore Reversion, An Exceptional Case (London, 1866), p.232.

mediating links' between the Indian people and the British, besides being useful allies or dangerous enemies[27]. Attention was also drawn to the question of economy. If the Indian rulers could be conciliated, the Sunday Times said in its issue dated 23 September, 1866, one-third of the British garrison in India could be reduced[28]. In case the British seized Mysore, the Daily News of 2 August 1866 noted, they would not be able to interfere in the administration of Native States any longer, even if necessary, without being suspected of having trumped up an excuse for annexation. 'If the Mysore Rajah's rights were purely imaginary instead of being a matter of written treaty', the paper commented, 'it would still be a wise imperial policy to recognise them'[29]. The Morning Star that very day warned : 'Should the annexation of Mysore be accomplished, it will prove as fruitful of disaffection as the greased cartridges or the annexation of Oudh'[30]. The official British policy with regard to Mysore was thus coming under increasing criticism. A forthright statement of British aims was demanded. The Spectator of 6 October 1866 advised : 'Let us plead Imperial reasons, and not annex a province on a construction of a treaty so lawyer-like, that it would barely cover our claim to simple estate'[31]. In the Commons a petition on the Mysore question

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27. Goldwin Smith in the Daily News, 8 August 1866, in Opinions of the Press on the Annexation of Mysore (London, 1866), p.14-16.
28. Ibid., p. 79.
29. Ibid., p. 60.
30. Ibid., p. 64.
31. Ibid., p. 94.

was presented by John Stuart Mill on 10 August 1866. Bell was one of the signatories to the petition. The belief in the administration of India by reformed Native states found a place in the document. Overhead policies like taxation, legislation, commerce and currency and the relationships between various states could be left in the hands of the British, while the Indian princes concerned themselves with local administration. Mysore, reformed by the Commission and with the right of advice in matters of administration in the hands of the British, had the possibility of playing the role of a model Native state. This was another reason against its annexation. The petition was signed among others by experienced British administrators with direct experience in Mysore as Briggs and Fraser; propagandists like John Dickinson, J.M. Ludlow, Evans Bell and academics like Goldwin Smith and Max Muller. Sidney Owen, the editor of the Wellesley despatches, was also a signatory[32]. Mill, though he did not think that the Maharaja of Mysore had the right to adopt being a creation of the English, presented the petition because, to use his own words, 'it came from people who were entitled to be heard, and on the last day of the session they could not find any other member whom they thought suitable'[33].

Consternation at the handling of the Mysore question by Wood and Lawrence was also to be noticed in the conduct of the Indian rulers.

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32. Ibid., pp. 1-13.

33. Hugh S.R. Elliot (ed.), The Letters of John Stuart Mill, Vol. II (London, 1910), pp. 64-66.

In October 1866 Sir Salar Jang, Co-regent of Hyderabad, raised claims to a share of Mysore under the terms of the Treaty of 1799. He drew attention to the fact that under Article V of the Partition Treaty, the British and the Nizam had agreed mutually and severally to the cession of parts of his dominion to the Maharaja of Mysore, subject to certain conditions. By Article III of the Treaty of 1800 the Nizam was entitled to participate equally with other contracting parties in the division of every territory which could be acquired jointly. The Nizam had accordingly received in 1804 his part of the share of conquests from the Raja of Beyar and Sindhia. In 1822 he had similarly gained after the fall of the Peshwa. But once again it was seen that the various comments made by Lord Wellesley on the Subsidiary Treaty and the Partition Treaty with Mysore offered scope for divergent interpretations. Thus, the letter of 30 June 1799 written by Lord Wellesley which Salar Jang advanced in support of his claims[34] contained, as Lawrence was quick to point out, a statement to the effect that the Nizam's rights were not founded upon justice or reason. In his letter of 3 August 1799 to the Directors, Wellesley had moreover observed that the Subsidiary Treaty had been entered into exclusively between the Company and the Maharaja and that whatever benefits might be derived from the political settlemtnt with that kingdom would be enjoyed by the British alone. The Nizam had at any rate surrendered what he had gained from Mysore by the Treaty of 1800 with the

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34. For. Pol. A. Feb. 1867, No. 82.

Company[35]. The case of the Maharaja of Mysore was receiving notice from all the rulers of India. A well-known stipendiary of Holkar in England had declared and sought the support of other representatives of native princes in supporting him in the statement that refusal to recognise the claims of the Maharaja of Mysore would involve a violation of the adoption despach by Lord Canning[36]. A section of the Indian intellectuals also rallied to the support of the Maharaja. That the right of adoption was sanctioned by the Hindu shastras was clearly established by the famous Bombay jurist V.N. Mandlik in his tract, Adoption versus Annexation With Remarks On The Mysore Question. It was published from London in 1866 during the thick of the battle and was welcomed by the Daily News in its edition of 17 September 1866 as a affording a view of the Indian mind[37].

The Mysore question was raised in Parliament by Sir Henry Rawlinson on 22 February 1867. There was no arrears in the payment of subsidy, the only ground on which the kingdom could be brought under British administration - he alleged, - in 1831. If the Government continued to hold on to its possession, it would make permanent what by Treaty could only be temporary. Refusal to recognise the Maharaja's right to adopt would alarm all those Indian chiefs, provision for whose heirs and successors was not ensured in engagements with the English. The British could only rule India with the co-operation of the people. Canning had realised this in granting the right

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35. For. Pol. Cons. 13 Feb. 1867, No. 145.
36. Maine to Cranborne, 5 Jan. 1867, Salisbury Papers.
37. Opinions, p. 95.

of adoption to the Indian rulers. If Mysore was now occupied by the British, it would be clear that they were motivated by a desire to annex large revenues (£ 1,000,000)[38].

Lord Cranborne, the Tory Secretary of State, was not prepared to admit that the Maharaja had any right to will his kingdom to a successor since there was no provision by Treaty on this point. Nor had Canning included the Maharaja's name in the list of those ruling chiefs who had a right to adopt. The agreement with the Maharaja was therefore, in Cranborne's opinion, to cease with his lifetime. Besides it would bring back maladministration. At the same time, Cranborne could not deny that the maintenance of a well-governed Native state would both satisfy the self-respect of the people and lend stability to the British rule. So Mysore was not to be annexed. The question boiled down Cranborne said, to ultimately 'how far will you go in giving to this young man a share in the Throne and Government of the territory that his father possess'? This question could not be immediately answered. All that the British could do was to train the prince in European administration and so prepare him for future responsibilities. But only a period of twenty years would show whether he was capable or not[39].

The Mysore question was finally brought to a close by Sir Stafford Northcote who succeeded Cranborne as the Secretary of State. Princely states were to be encouraged as a general rule,

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38. Speech by Sir Henry Rawlinson, 22 Feb. 1867, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (3rd series), No. 185, pp. 828-832.

39. Speech by Cranborne 22 Feb. 1867, Ibid. pp.835-841.

he said in his despatch of 16 April 1867. Accordingly, the Maharaja's son was to succeed him to the kingdom of Mysore both in keeping with terms of the Treaty of 1799 and in recognition of the antiquity of the Maharaja's family, its long connection with Mysore and the personal loyalty and attachment shown to the British Government by the Maharaja, Krishnaraja Wodeyar III. The prince was to be trained up in matters of administration. His education was to be in the hands of the British, without separating him more than was necessary from his subjects. If the Maharaja died before the prince came to maturity, the territory was to be governed in his name upon the existing principles and under the existing regulations. The British Government was to enter into a fresh agreement with him for the maintenance of the system for the benefit of the people. In view of the general rise in prices, the subsidy was to be enhanced[40].

Northcote had reached this decision without informing his Council. Though the Secretary of State was not bound to abide by its advice, members of that body considered this to be an affront to them; particularly because the proclamation had reversed all earlier opinions on the subject. So they attacked him to a man, with the sole exception of Sir Frederick Currie[41]. It was a different picture in the Parliament, where only a few members, - Lord William Hay and Henry Seymour, - voiced their disagteement. Thus they

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40 Poltl. Letter from Sec. of State, 16 April 1867, No. 69.

41 P.P. (H.C.), Vol.50, 1867, pp. 574-587.

complained of ambiguity in the text of the Despatch. Northcote had not specifically stated whether he regarded the Subsidiary Treaty as hereditary or personal in character. Hay also criticised the Despatch because it did not mention the rights of the Nizam under the Partition Treaty, which in his opinion could not be overlooked, specially on the assumption being made that the treaty was a personal one, and that the country would, on the Maharaja's death, revert to those who had ceded it. The Nizam had not 'ceded' his reversionary rights under the Mysore treaties, it was argued when in 1800 he had yielded certain territories south of the Tungabhadra to the British in return for the support of a subsidiary force. The question of the Nizam's claim had not so far emerged because the problem of the Rajah's death had not come up. Hay also criticised the Adoption Despatch for not stating clearly what was meant by saying that the kingdom was to be governed in the name of the Maharaja on the same principles and under the same regulations as at the present time. For, while his predecessors in office had thought of annexation, Northcote was deviating from them in proposing the restoration of the country to the Maharaja's successor. At the same time, Hay did not fail to point out that the very system of administration would have to be changed in restoring the kingdom to the Maharaja. But the number of Englishmen in the administration had increased in the time of Bowring. Both Hay and Seymour were united in their opinion that this tendency was to be checked and the number of native officials increased. Neither Hay nor Seymour admitted the Maharaja's right to adopt. The words that the Subsidiary Treaty would last 'as long as the sum and moon shall endure'

had been set down, Hay thought, as merely 'matters of form'. He attached no importance to the statement that the Maharaja had expressed to Lord Canning a desire to bequeath the state to the English. This, Hay said, was a mere Oriental device for securing from Lord Canning the recognition of a right which the Rajah knew very well he did not possess. Another speaker was opposed to the restoration of Mysore to the Maharaja on the ground that the people were better off under the British rule than under a Native state.

Most of the participants in the Parliamentary debate on the Adoption Despatch, however, supported Northcote. Thus, Sir Henry Rawlinson pointed out that the assumption that the Subsidiary Treaty was personal in character and provided for kingship for a life term was monstrous and anomalous, and without parallel in our rule or in the history of the East. The fact that the Hindu ruling dynasty of Mysore had been placed in confinement by Tipu did not mean that it had lost its right to the throne. As one speaker commented, "We merely stole the territory from the robber who had stolen it from the Rajah's family, and we had no more right to it than that robber had'. Northcote himself answered his critics by saying that in spite of objections by the majority of the India Council, nobody had disputed the legality of the course he had adopted. Instead of referring to the mere technical construction of the Subsidiary Treaty, he had endeavoured, as far as possible, to ascertain the spirit of the arrangement which had been made originally by Lord Wellesley, and, if possible, to execute it without reference to the terms of the Treaty. Supporting him Cranborne said that the opinion

of the India Council was subordinate to that of the Parliament where the Secretary of State enjoyed the support of the majority. The decision declared in the Despatch had to be made without loss of time, Northcote said, for he could not prolong a period of uncertainty. Native administration had the benefit of reconciling the governors and the governed, though the British rule might ensure better discipline. But with the spread of eduction Northcote expected the native administration to improve. On the other hand, if intervention on the ground of maladministration was employed as a pretext for annexation, the confidence of the native states would be greatly shaken. These were the reasons on which Northcote said he had drawn up the Adoption Despatch.[42]

The debate over Mysore in the 1860's was the prelude to that on Baroda around 1875. With the memory of Oudh 'Still green' in his mind, Northbrook refrained at the latter date from assuming that province in Western India[43]. Dadabhai Naoroji, who was to take up the cause of the Gackwar in Baroda, defended the position of the Maharaja of Mysore in a speech supporting Northcote at London in 1867[44]. Lawrence was not still reconciled. The Indian chiefs were too busy in personal aggrandisement to unite in their efforts on a common issue, while the benefits conferred during the period of the Commissioners' rule would be lost. But his was an abandoned cause[45].

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42. Hansard (3rd Series), 24 May 1867, No. 187, pp. 827-841.
43. Uma Dasgupta, Rise of An Indian Public(Calcutta,1977) p.217.
44. Speech read before a meeting of the East India Association, London, 5 July 1867 in Speeches And Writings of Dadabhai Naoroji (Madras n.d., pp. 623-640)
45. Lawrence to Northcote, 2 May 1867 in Lawrence Collection.

CHAPTER - V

COMMISSIONERS' RULE

The British took over the administration of Mysore in 1831 with the intention, as noted earsier, of effecting necessary reforms while preserving the local institutions as far as they could. The first year's work was hampered by continuous quarrels between the Junior and Senior Commissioner, C. R. Lushington and Major General John Briggs respectively. Soon they were recalled and the administration of the kingdom entrusted to a single commissioner, Mark Cubbon. He retained his post till 1861. From 1842 his importance within the kingdom was unparalleled for the Residency was dispensed with in that year. Developments were undertaken in the sphere of public works ; internal trade barriers removed ; and changes introduced in the administration of justice and education.

Internal trade had reached a flourishing stage under Haidar and Tipu. Merchants from Mysore visited the neighbouring areas like Salem, Baramahal, Arcot in the east and Calicut in the west. They had also relationship with the territories of the Nizam and the Marathas. Money was used widely in these transactions. Buchanan has left a detailed description of this flow of merchandise. The importance of trade in betel-nut, pepper and cardamoms to the people of Nagar and Chitaldurg has already been mentioned in earlier chapters of the present

dissertation. The weavers of Bangalore catered to the demands of a cloth market. A caste of people called the Carubaru were almost exclusively engaged in trading in black blankets, or cumblies, woven mostly in Chitaldrug; while another, the Pancham Banijaguru, were equally assiduous in importing cotton cloth from the dominions of the Marathas and the Nizam to Mysore. These latter class of people had the best kind of bullocks, that were mostly used as beasts of burden in this area. Each bullock carried about twelve to fifteen maunds of cotton and travelled daily for about 3 cosses (i.e. twelve miles) in about three hours. Their charge ranged between fifteen to twenty-five pagodas. Betel-nut, pepper and other goods were conveyed by oxen. They could carry a much lesser load, about eight maunds only, and were, therefore, charged at only four or five pagodas a day though they travelled as fast as the bullocks. Before the imposition of restrictions by Tipu on trade with Madras, salt used to be brought from the lower Carnatic on asses, because that produced locally was only consumed by the poorest people in Mysore. Each ass carried about forty to fifty seers and covered about six miles a day. They were hired at one-and half to two pagodas a day[1].

Besides keeping the roads secure for trade, Tipu had also an eye on the construction of irrigation works in keeping with the traditional practices of the land. Purnaiya, who was an old-school administrator, devoted nearly 3-4% of the average annual revenue of his kingdom (estimated at Rs.84,34,800), though public communications were less provided for. Thus, while the outlay on irrigation works

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1. Buchanan, Journey, Vol. 1, pp. 138-144.

is estimated to have been Rs.31,47,694 for the years 1799/1800 to 1810/11, roads and public communications accounted for Rs.67,762 during the same period . After the fall of Purnaiya, public works suffered from the general neglect of administration. In 1831 there were only three roads deserving the name :- First, from Naikenary to Mysore via Bangalore; second, from Seringapatam to Sirah and Bellary; and, finally, from Bangalore to Hurryhur. The condition of all these roads was very deplorable. In some parts they were overgrown by jungles and at others they were washed away by neighbouring rivers. Even where their condition was relatively better, the absence of bridges constituted a serious disadvantage; for, the rivers were not navigable and the south-west monsoons swept over the area for six months a year. It was a common sight, therefore, to find a Regiment or a postal runner detained at a nullah sixteen miles near Bangalore for many days. Several other impediments of a similar nature occurred on all three roads. In 1831 there was, thus, not a single pass through the Western Ghats practicable for cattle with loads. At the Agumbe pass in the Nagar division, which was the most frequented of all, goods were carried by coolies at the rate of half-a-rupee per bullock load. Should the sales exceed the number of porters or the men be absent, a merchant could be detained for ten to fourteen days before his turn came or before he could find an alternative means of transport. The approach to the head of the pass was marked by cattle hobbling along in pain, badly bruised by their attempts to scale the pass, while the air smelt foul of the carcasses of those beasts that had dropped down by the way.

After the transfer of the country to British management, an extensive scheme of repairing the old roads and constructing new ones was taken up in earnest. The chief credit for this is to be attributed to Col. Charles Green. From 1836 to 1854 he was the Chief Engineer in Mysore. In 1854, after the creation of the Public Works Department, he was put in charge of it and retained his post till 1856, when he retired. Green's chief stress was on the road building project. This is not to say that funds were not allotted for irrigation works. Thus, while a total of Rs.30,20,334 was set apart for this purpose between the years 1834-56 (Rs.19,97,291) for tanks + Rs.10,23,043 for channels), the amount spent on communication lines during the same period amounted to Rs.23,76,761 only. But, although some improvements were introduced in irrigation works, such as the construction of brick facings to some of the anicuts under repair, most of the basic defects of these structures remained unaltered. But in directing the building of roads, Green showed much greater enterprise. One of the most important new roads to have been laid at this time was that which connected Bangalore to Shimoga. It branched off from the earlier road between Bangalore to Hurryhur at Tumkur, the headquarters of the Chittledrug decision. It ran through Gubi, the central place for trade in betelnuts and coffee, where the produce of Nagar and the western taluks in Chittledrug was purchased by merchants from the lower Carnatic. It also passed within seven miles of Chiknaikenhully, the chief city of another larger taluk in Western Chittledrug, famous for its plantations of coconut and betelnut and also for its hills abounding in iron ore. The line met the former thoroughfare between Bangalore

and Harihar at another important commercial centre called Tippatoor.

During the Commissionership of Bowring a greater emphasis was placed on the construction of irrigation works. In 1863 revenue officers were empowered to sanction all expenses with regard to tanks, leaving the Department of Public Works with only the responsibility of supervising the maintenance of such works. A separate Channel Conservancy Establishment was, therefore, set up in 1864 under the direction of the revenue officers. In 1870, at the end of Bowring's Commissionership, the work of this Department was entrusted to the care of a Superintending Engineer for Irrigation. The greater stringency of arrangements under the new system caused some resentment among the ryots, though the government's concern to improve the irrigation system was unmistakable. A significant advance made after 1856 was the substitution of solid water-tight anicuts for those that had been raised in earlier times by packing stones without any uniformity amongst them. The former structures thus ran the risk of disintegration, while water seeped through them during the summer months. It was also during the time of Bowring that tanks first began to be laid according to a co-ordinated plan, whereby the area between them was equally watered. The Administration Report of 1872-73, therefore claimed: 'The application of sound methods of construction to these works and to the regulation of channels below them, as also the distribution of water for irrigation, may be said to have created, quite a new era in the channel system of Mysore'. Among important works of this period were the Sriramadeva dam on the Hemavati river in the Hassan district. The Harihar bridge

over the Tungabhadra river opened in 1868 served as a connecting point for traffic from both the Bombay and Madras Presidencies. The Sakleshpur bridge at Nagar came to the assistance of the coffee planters. The Doddaballapur-Goribednore road was an important highway constructed during this period. Besides the more important roads of the province, works was also undertaken on small local roads with small sums of money raised from the peasants (the plough tax).

Scarcity of labour was a serious problem for the Public Works Department. The population in the western and southern parts of the kingdom was specially sparse. The majority among them, being cultivators, had to work on their own fields during the rainy season when the Departmental schemes were generally executed. Besides, the development of coffee plantations in the malnaad and the opportunities opened up with the coming of the railways (the first Madras-Bangalore rail-line was opened in 1864), also served to draw a large portion of the labourers away. Thus, while the price of unskilled labour doubled between 1870 to 1872-73, that of skilled labour increased more than three times during the same period. The administration did not want to solve the problem with recourse to forced labour. Instead, it released from deligation those who had received lands in earlier times for maintaining bullocks for carrying earth to places where tank embankments were to be raised. Such men, known as the kare bandes, were however allowed to retain their landholdings on payment of a small quit-rent. Under the earlier Indian administrations there were also certain people called the Komatis, who enjoyed some privileges for carrying out repairs in the irrigation works in their taluks. The Khalihats were organised for general service in all parts of the

province on road and irrigation. The two classes were amalgated in 1860 to form one single crops of ten companies, hundred strong each, with an establishment of jamedars, duffadars and mutsuddies. The annual expenses of this corps amounted to Rs.67,000 a year. Though reduced in numbers, this corps thus performed useful service in the west and north-west of the province. Their utility was all the more as coolies were hard to control and did not reader equal service. On the ghat roads, moplahs and other coastal people were of much assistance in raising stone revements but in other places they were reluctant to for work[2].

The period of the Commissioners' rule was marked not only by reconstruction and opening of routes of communication, but also the elimination of customs duties (sayer). At the time of the British assumption of the administration of the kingdom, these duties numbering 537 in all were of three kinds :- (i) Bharamarg, that is, transit duty, (ii) Stull Bhurty or duty on produce and manufacture and (iii) Khurgpudy, that is to say, sales tax. The enormous loss to traders caused by the Bharamarg may be guessed from the fact that in 1831-32 the whole country was dotted with Sayer Cuttahs to the number of 689; they were to be found not only all round the frontier, but at distances which never exceeded 15 miles, on every

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2. R.A.M. for 1872-73; Part IV, Production and Distribution, pp.115-132 and 'Memorandum On Public Works' In Mysore (1846)' by Col.Charles Green in Mysore Reports.

country road throughout the country. Some time before 1810 Puranaiya issued a set of tables for the guidance of these Cuttahs, but they had fallen into utter disuse in 1831. A uniform rate, even on any one item, was not to be found. Every Chowkey on the road had its own rate; in some places the charge was made on the quantity according to one standard, in others according to another far different. Some Cuttahs made the merchant pay a certain high rate per cooly load, whether carried by a cooly or not, and others by the bullock load in the same manner; that is to say, without any reference whatever to the usual mode of conveying the article. The Stull Bhurty and Khurgpudy covered all articles between them and proved extremely detrimental to production and trade. For instance, every ryot who wished to sell tobacco in Kadur had to send for government gomastahs by the requirements of the Stull Bhurty and give them 1/3 of each maund ('Malai') as the government's due before the heap was weighed, besides 1/4 per maund called 'Kai Malai'. After weighing, the crop was subject to further assessments before proceeding through the Cuttahs, at each of which it had to pay a toll. By the working of the Khurgpudy similarly it was found cheaper to import products like jaggery, oil, silk and tobacco than to produce or sell those that were produced locally. Coconuts again had to pay in one place 50 per cent, and 30 per cent on retail duty. In another place only 30 per cent under each head; in others again they were subject to retail duty if they paid the higher rate but not if they paid the lower. Some articles again were exempt from retail duty if they paid excise but not transit duty. Thus, an enormous confusion prevailed in the collection of the sayer. The total collection

from them amounted to Rs.6,59,557 in 1831-32. The increase in the realisation of revenue from this source was rendered difficult by the opposition of the sayer contractors. They were, at one and the same time oppressive to the people and an obstacle to the free flow of merchandise.

The taxes that made up the sayer were abolished very gradually. In 1832 all duties, except those of transit, on every kind of grain were withdrawn. Two years later the transit duties on the commodity were also struck off. Several further changes were introduced in 1836. Government officials, who had so long been exempt from payment of sayer, were subjected to it. All articles of European manufacture, that had previously paid very heavily, were, however, relieved from any further imposts and declared free throughout the province. All petty and vexations duties of vegetables and labour in the form of coolies were revoked in 1836-37. Iron, steel and cattle were made duty-free. As a result, the number of cattle exported rose from 3,000 to 12,000 in a few years. The use of iron for domestic purpose and the export of steel increased in a still greater proportion. Adekas, or a form of duty levied on articles brought to a fair for sale, were scrapped in 1841. All transit duties on pepper, betel-nut and cardamoms were discontinued from the next year. Various vexations duties on sundry items, - like eggs, fowls, bamboos, sheep-wool and blankets, - were dispensed with in 1845.

The duty on tobacco was brought under amani in 1845. All vexations duties on the commodity that had so long been imposed by contractors of revenue were abolished. A uniform tax rate was

fixed. Re.1/- for all tobacco meant for the local market and Re.1/-4 as. on the quality selected for export. The revenue under the head of tobacco rose immediately by by 30%. Producers could henceforth sell their stock at Rs.3-8 as per maund instead of Rs.1-8 as. which was all that the contractors, enjoying a monopoly, gave in the past. Every ryot was from now permitted to retain any amount of tobacco he wished for his own consumption, free of duty and was not subject to any payment on the article until he brought it for sale to the market. The government's policy of not taxing on the acreage was also wise as the article was grown on small strips of land and the ryots, therefore, had no occasion of complaining about the tax being oppressive. The retail price of tobacco in the market also fell sharply as the contractors had enjoyed profits up to 300%. The cultivation of tobacco throughout the province increased and in some good seasons the revenue realised from this source approximated Rs.1½ lakhs. Thus, the consumer, the producer and the government all benefited from the new measure. Betel-nut, pepper and cardamoms, - the produce of the malnaad, - profited from the government's policy of removing transit duties on them in 1848. The rates imposed on the three articles differed. Betel-nut of the first kind was charged at Re.1-4 as., that of the second at 12 as.-4 pice; 6 as. was levied on the lowest variety. Rs.4 was changed on cardamoms per maund, in 1848 and 8 as. on pepper of the same amount. The levies were abolished in 1866 but reimposed at half the value on each respectively from 1 September 1868.

The Nikalee Hasil, or duty charged on the removal of a commodity from one place to another irrespective of the fact whether it had paid any previous duty or not, was abolished in 1846-47. The bold step of removing the renting system in the sayer department produce, including sugar and jaggery, were first struck off in the Nagar and Chitaldrug Divisions in 1848. Later the principle was extended to the whole of the kingdom. Articles that had paid not more than 25 pagodas in previous years were also made duty-free. This was a great relief as most of the profits of the revenue contractors were made through imports on these commodities. The duty on the export of cotton was abolished in 1861 and the extra town duties or octroi levied on them in the town and contonment of Bangalore and Mysore were set apart as municipal funds. Besides, the perquisites enjoyed by holy men and religious institutions were also abolished (1839). All title deeds were examined, and whoever could establish a just claim was allowed a certain amount of compensation, generally a life allowance commonly known as Vurshasun. All religious establishments were for the first time brought under sayer in 1842.

All the above-mentioned taxes were not struck off at one and the same time in the different Divisions. In many cases the abolition was sanctioned as an experiment in one Division before being extended to the others. Thus, there remained in 1851, 233 articles which paid Sayer duty in all the Divisions, but many of these which had been removed in the two thinly populated districts of Nagar and Chitaldrug were still retained in Ashtagram and Bangalore. Within the next two years, however, they were also cancelled, without much loss of Revenue. From January 1860 taxes, numbering 30 in all, on production,

export and the wholesale and retail sale of goods, were discontinued. A simple ad valorem excise (Bhurty) was instead levied at a fixed percentage upon 20 articles, to be paid only once at the place of sale or export, when a pass for the stated quantity was to be given and the merchant was relieved from further annoyance, detention, or extortion. The taxes abolished were mostly trifling, yielding hardly more than Rs.40 lakhs from all over the kingdom. Principal among the abolished taxes were the duties on oil produced from the seeds that continued to pay duty, and also those levied on the products of saccharine that were retained in the Divisions of Bangalore and Ashtagram even after they had been struck off elsewhere. Opium and ganjah were the only products on which the percentage was increased. On all the others the rates were less than what they had to pay under the previous system. Betel leaves paid 12% against 12½ in previous years. Cocoanuts, dry and fresh, paid only 12 and 8 per cent. Before 1831 the ad valorem duty on them had been 30 to 60 per cent. The other items, with the exception of the coarse cumblies used by the lower classes of people in Mysore were charged at an uniform rate of 5 per cent. In some cases this was less, but in others it was slightly higher than the rates which those articles paid during the period immediately preceding the revision. In no case, however, was any new tax levied. On manufactured timber, trade in which had become lucrative with the rapid increase of public works, taxes were for some time levied under various heads. On examination these were found to have come to 17% on the value of the articles. This was reduced to 14% to be levied only once at the place of manufacture. The profits of this trade in which the city of

Mysore took the lead were large, and this rate was not considered least prohibitory.

The reductions in transit duty did not affect the revenue adversely. Each reduction seemed to give increased elasticity to the remaining items, and the loss which occurred on each occasion of the abolition of taxes was more than made up by the development of production and traffic in the case of those that remained. The Revenue under 537 heads (Halut inclusive) in 1831-32 being a little more than 6½ lacs of Rupees against 8½ lacs of Rupees from 233 general heads in 1850[3]. The duties of collecting the excise were imposed on the subordinate revenue officials, whose remuneration consisted of 5% of the collections made within their jurisdictions. In Shimoga and Kadur a special agency was required for the collection of excise from betel-nut in those districts was too large to be entrusted to the revenue servants. A similar course was followed in the Chicknaikenhully Taluk of the Tumkur district and the Pudihal taluk of the Chitaldrug District. A small preventive establishment was also maintained along the frontier to guard against smuggling[4]. In spite of these precautions, the administration under Bowring had to admit that 'the facilities for defaunding the government are much increased, and the risk of detection is very small'[4]. Reliable trade returns for the province could not be prepared, at least till 1874, in the

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3. 'Memorandum on Halut' in R.A.M. for 186C-61, pp.20-34; R.A.M. for 1968-69, p. 98.

4. R.A.M. for 1866-67, Sec. II, p.8.

absence of a special establishment and suitable machinery to do so for, even if the registers kept in the headquarters of the hoblis and taluks afforded a rough picture at any given point of time, there was no reliable source of information for imports and exports at the village level[5]. Nor did the disadvantages of the Mysore ryots disappear with the abolition of the sayer. For instance, while the betel-nut of the province had still to pay an excise duty, that of Bombay was completely exempt from it. Again, while one-third of the government demand was paid by money-lenders (sutigidars), they could control the cultivators by lending money in advance or paying for them. The season in which the tax on betel-nut was collected in Mysore was also extremely unfavourable, as it came before the cultivators could know what price the article would fetch at alternative centers of supply like Arcot and Wallajapet. The producers of betel-nut in Mysore were at a further disadvantage due to transport difficulties. Only the big merchants of the malnaad could afford the means of conveying the article to the market. With the opening up of routes of communication to the Western Ghats, the monopoly exercised by the big cultivators was, however, considerably curtailed. Increasing competition brought down the interest rate in the area to half of what it had been formerly (i.e. 24%). The government also allowed the ryots to pay their taxes later in the year[6]. Major R.H. Elliot, who represented himself to be the only owner of a cardamom plantation in 1871, also complained of being over-taxed[7].

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5. R.A.M. for 1873-74, p. 81.
6. L.Bowring, Eastern Experiences (London, 1911), pp.126-27, 146. Also R.A.M. for 1872-73, p.114.
7. R.H.Elliot, The Experiences of A.Planter in the Jungles of Mysore, Vol.I (London, 1871), pp. 216-218.

Bowring also began the regularisation of accounts. Previously amildars used to remit their revenue receipts at the Superintendent's Treasury, sending a monthly cash account in the vernacular as an accompanying statement. Only local officials could make out the meaning of this. No disbursements were allowed except under the direct authority of the Superintendent of the Audit and Account Departments, which sent returns to the local daftar attached to the Commissioner's office, to be compiled these in the vernacular for the whole province. Much, therefore, was left to the discretion of the individual disbursing officers of all grades, and the final audit in the Commissioner's daftar, which took place several months after the close of the year, when the expenditure had long previously been incurred, was only of a general nature. In point of fact, while the responsibility for the correctness of the financial details of each division was nominally vested in the Superintendent, the real control lay with his native accountants, who, however, rendered accounts more or less accurately and in time.

The first important step in modernising the finances of Mysore was effected by Cubbon when in 1854 he introduced the rupee rate in place of the older monetary measure determined by the canteroy pagoda. But the department of accounts was really overhauled in the time of Bowring. The budget system in Mysore came into operation from 1863-64.

For its preparation the following forms in Canarese were printed, and supplied for observance from May 1863 :-

1. A Daily Account or Waste Book, showing receipts and disbursements as they occurred.

2. A Monthly Ledger, for classifying the daily transctions under the usual Budget heads.

3. A Monthly Abstract of the Ledger.

The punctual submission of daily accounts was insisted on as being of primary importance, not merely as presenting the speediest means of information and check, but as precluding in a measure any tampering with the entries. The accounts were then ledgered and compiled in English at the Treasury established at the Head Quarters of the eight districts, under the superintendence of a deputy or an assistant superintendent, aided by a special Establishment of accountants. The district accounts were then rendered in a printed English form supported with audited and other customary vouchers to the Accountant's Office at Bangalore. In the absence of trained officials, it was difficult at first to obtain these accounts within the prescribed period but gradually the difficulty was overcome. Measures were also taken for securing the specie, currency, notes, stamps etc. Double locks were placed on all the Treasuries, one key being kept by the Treasury Officer and the other by the Native Treasurer in the principal Treasuries of each District. Similarly in the Talooks one key was kept by the amildar and the other by the head shroff, the guard consisting of

Bar Sepoys or Local Infantry being no longer entrusted with the key of the Treasury. The Native treasurer of each division was required to give a tangible security in Government Promissory Notes, or landed property, for the due discharge of his own duties as well as those of the Treasuries of the minor districts comprised in the same Division. [redacted] All public money was to be kept not only in the Treasury, but entered in its accounts. For the future talukdars were asked to remit such money in the district treasury as they would no longer consider necessary for their own expense. Great difficulty was experienced in keeping accounts of disbursements and unadjusted sums of money in order for under the Indian rulers this was in a state of disarray. With the introduction of the system of audit, Mysore became the only Indian province where a purely local office of audit was instituted. Currency notes brought from Madras were also introduced in Mysore during the year 1862-63[8].

The land revenue of Mysore had been in utter confusion at the time that Bowring took up office. The following passage shows the ararchy prevailing them.

'In one talook of the late Bangalore Division there were reported to be 596 rates of assessment on dry land per 'Koodoo' which is 3,200 square miles or about 2/3rds of an acre, these rates being fixed on a progressive scale ranging from 1 cross = 1 anna 9 pie to 3 pagodas 2 fanams = 10 Rs. 1 anna per koodoo, or from 3½ d. to £ 1-6-10 per acre, distributed over 26 classes of land. For wet and garden land the results, though less striking, were also

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8. R.A.M. for 1862-63, pp.55-60.

remarkable, in one case the number of rates being 81 and in the other 451 on the Koodoo of 500 square yards.

'In Chittledroog the assessments were nearly as complicated. The Koodoo is generally of the same extent as in other parts of the province, viz., 3000 square yards on dry lands, and upon it the rates were 465 in number, with a minimum of 1 as and a maximum of Rs.9-4-11.

"In parts of Ashtagram the assessment is theoretically based on Poorniah's survey, but in fact few traces are left of this, and its principles are unknown, the practical consequence being that people pay generally what their forefathers did, without much interference in time-honoured abuses.

"In the Naggur Division, owing to the hilly nature of the country, and to its having been ruled for centuries by quasi-independent chiefs, the character of the landed tenures presents a notable contrast to that which prevails in the rest of the province. The kandy is 100 square yards instead of 500 on wet land, the system of assessment is different, and the mode of assessment peculiar, but scarcely more uniformity is to be found in the rates of assessment or in the classification of the soil, than in the other Divisions, as in one Hill taluk taken at random apparently, there were 147 rates on wet land, varying in rentals of from nearly Rs.34 to a little more than one Rupee per kandy, i.e. from about Rs.16½ to 7 2/3rds annas per acre. In the plain taluks of the district, less discrepancy exists in the rates of assessment, but some of them are enormously high, and in numerous instances, the Returns show great deviations from the rates which formerly existed.

"In consequence of this capricious and intricate system of assessment all real power had passed into the hands of the Sharbogues or hereditary village accountants, the recognized custidians of the records relating to the measurements and assessments of lands, and as no permanent boundary marks had ever been erected, it rested with them to regulate at will every ryot's payments. In the better classes of land, the rates in some cases are so preporterously high that it is certain that, unless a man so assessed hold considerably more land than is entered against him, he could not possibly pay the Government demand, while, on the other hand, much land capable of being profitably cultivated under a moderate assessment has been thrown up, because the lighter rates have been fraudulently shifted to superior lands held by the public servants, and others who could afford to bribe the shanbogues."[9]

The village shanbogues of Mysore were, therefore, deeply interested in the maintenance of the battai system and placed every difficulty in their conversion to assessed lands. Though the crop was divided by the terms of the battai settlement into equal halves between the government and the ryot, in practice it was found that while one-third' was left to the ryots, the same amount went to the government, while the remainder was appropriated by the village, taluk and other public officials. In Nagar and Chitaldrug it was possible to check the amount of embezzlement for steps had been taken accordingly after 1831; but in the Ashtagram, and more specially in Bangalore, a great proportion of the revenue had been

9. R.A.M. for 1863-64, pp. 72-73

held under battai. As these were the two richest divisions of Mysore, a considerable loss of revenue would for a year or two be the result of any sudden change. But, the need for a revenue survey was felt most in the malnaad where the coffee plantations were situated. In 1861 the amount of the coffee halut was more than Rs.68,000, which represented a decline of nearly Rs.9,000 from the revenue of the previous year. As the number of coffee plantations in Mysore approximated 10,000 and, taking the quantity that they paid as the basis of calculation, the average produce of each garden was calculated to be 25 maunds, or rather less than the quantity which could be obtained from one well-cultivated acre. Struggling was evidently on the increase for the number of coffee plantations was on the increase and sufficient to offset the shortness of the crop in a few taluks.

After the coming of Bowring ryotwari pattahs began to be granted for a period of five years instead of being renewed annually. Encouragement was given to the repair of tanks by prescribing low rates of assessment of dry lands converted into wet as a result of such activities. Persons constructing new works, such as tanks or wells at their own expense continued to be assessed on the former rates for these lands when dry[10].

Lands granted for coffee cultivation were held on pottahs, the chief feature of which was that an average minimum number of 500 coffee trees, had to be planted in every acre within the stated period of five years. Failing this, the Government had the

10. R.A.M. for 1861-62, pp. 13-14.

right to resume summarily the whole, or any uncultivated portion, of the land; but this part of the provision was much relaxed by subsequent orders. The halut, or government demand, fixed originally at Re.1 per maund but afterwards reduced to four annas was declared to have been imposed in substitution of the ancient Warum, or government share of the produce, and could be subject to revision, while any evasion of it was visited with penalties. To facilitate the interests of the coffee planters, communication between the coffee districts and the taluks in the plain country was made regular and frequent; new markets for grain and other agricultural produce were opened by the location of bodies of coolies on the estates, and the [redacted] value of labour increased from three and three half rupees to four and five rupees per month, (and in some cases even more). The condition of 'Jeetgars' or aboriginal agricultural labourers, whom the once powerful patels were able to retain at merely nominal wages as their hereditary bondsmer, consequently showed some improvements. Attention was also paid to the interests of the coffee planters by arrangements for postal communication. They were exempted from the visits of toddy-drawers and other petty jungle contractors, and measures were undertaken for opening up the coffee districts by construction of ghats and roads. The coffee planters also profited from the revision of currency mentioned above[11]. Their interests constituted, as we have seen, a formidable

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11. R.A.M. for 1862-63, p. 50

obstacle to the restoration of the Maharaja's rule as they tended to argue that the country would lapse into maladministration following such a change. Their objection to the payment of the halut was not, however, heeded by Bowring. It was not in his power to yield to their pressure, he argued, because all land in Mysore belonged to the Maharaja and the Commission was not in a position to make any grant of it. Moreover, since the selling price of a maund of coffee was about 10 shillings, Bowring refused to call the tax that constituted only 5% of it oppressive on any count. Besides the excise duty did not press upon them as heavily as an unalterable land tax would of the whole excise paid in Mysore about 9/10 were paid in the Kadur and Shimoga districts and about 3/4 in the plains district by the local people. The produce of a European estate varied from 140 to 280 lbs. per cultivated acre, i.e. 210 lbs on an average, whereas that of a native holder, who was unwilling to lay out large sums in improving his estate was rarely more than 42 lbs. The former, therefore, paid on 210 lbs. at 6 d. per maund of 28 lbs., 3 Sh-9 d. per acre, i.e., about the highest acreage in Coorg on the whole cultivation; whereas the local planter under the excise system paid only 9 d. on his produce of 42 lbs. per acre. A heavy acreage would, therefore, have a most adverse effect. Indeed, as the local planters in Hassan contributed yearly to the excise about £ 2,300 and the European planters only £ 600, an acreage would have probably proved deterimental both to the govt. revenue and local industry.[12]

12. Bowring, Eastern Experiences, pp. 97-101.

Bowring also reorganised the departmental administration of Mysore. The former vast divisions, averaging 7000 square miles, were broken up into two, each with a supervising officer and an Assistant, European or Indian, according to circumstance. Three such districts were placed under the superintendence of a divisional officer. The number of underpaid officials at the taluk level was reduced and the pay of the higher grades increased. The divisional, district and taluk establishments were reorganized by the Superintendents personally. Such of the old officials as were found efficient were confirmed in their service. In many cases the sons of old and worn-out men were given the jobs of their fathers; where this arrangement could not be made, gratuities on the graduated scale followed in the British provinces were allowed. Superannuation pensions were recommended, to a limited extent, for those men the nature and length of whose service deserved special consideration. The changes brought about in the pay scale may thus be represented by a table.

Establishment [13]

Office	Former			Revised		
	No.	Average Pay Rs.	as pice	No.	Average Pay Rs.	as pice
Amildars	86	77		84	161	
Peshkars	95	21	12	86	40	
Sherishtadars	86	21	7	84	36	2
Killedars	93	18	6	84	38	6
Sheikhdars	846	6	10	500	14	
Total	1206			838		

13. A.R.M. for 1862-63, pp. 2, 41.

The establishment of an efficient judicial system in Mysore was out of the prime concerns of Cubbon when he became the Commissioner in 1834. The dispensation of justice had suffered much from the workings of the patron-clientage system during the time of the Maharaja's administration. The proper organisation of the judicature had formed the subject of a long dispute between John Briggs and C.R. Lushington in the first year of the Commissioners' rule. The former wanted to exercise a greater control over the administration than his Junior, who had the support of the Madras government being the younger brother of the Governor of the Presidency[14]. Nothing could be settled owing to their difference of opinion and it was left to Cubbon to restructure the judicial administration.

The principal courts and their number in Cubbon's time may thus be shown by a table in ascending order.

Taluk or Amil's Courts	...	85
Town Munsif's (at Bangalore and Mysore)	...	2
Principal Sadar Munsif's Courts	...	8
European Superintendent's Courts		
Huzur Adalat, a court with 3 Judges for Indians attached to the Commissioner's Office		
Commissioner's Court.		

14. Bell, Briggs, Chaps. 8-81, pp. 171-208; also For. Sec. Cons 2 April 1832, Nos. 18-20.

The Courts of the Amil and the Town Munsif chiefly served purposes of original jurisdiction. The Amils had the power to decide without record all claims not exceeding Rs.20; with a record of proceedings, suits not in excess of Rs.100; and, when assisted by a Punchayet, all suits not exceeding Rs.500. An appeal would be filed in the Sadar Munsif's Courts in cases of the second and third description, but not of the first, unless when corruption or gross partiality was alleged, or when the claim involved landed property, under which circumstances the higher courts, and eventually the Commissioner, could be appealed to. The Mysore Town Moonsiff had nearly identical powers as those of an Amil in all suits regarding real or personal property, which were connected with, or might have originated within the limits of, the town of Mysore. The Bangalore Town Moonsiff had in addition authority to decide, with a record or proceedings, all suits for real property not exceeding Rs.500 and for a personal property not exceeding Rs.1,000. An appeal from his decisions could be sent up to the Superintendent of the Division. A written decision had to be sent to the Principal Sadar Munsif's Courts, and the Courts of the European Superintendents, whether the proceedings were recorded or not.

The Principal Sadar Munsifs, of whom there were two in each Division, decided all suits in appeal from the animals. Their decision was accepted as final, except in cases of landed property or under circumstances of corruption or gross partiality when appeals from their decisions went up to the Superintendents of Divisions, or to the Huzoor Adalat, at the option of the suitor.

They also decided all original suits for real property above Rs.100 and not exceeding Rs.1,000, and for personal property above Rs.100 and not exceeding Rs.5,000. The Moonsiffs kept a record of all proceedings, and issued to both the plaintiff and defendant in a suit copies of the decree issued in the case. The Sadar Munsifs had further the authority to try all cases which were referred to them by the Superintendents of their respective Divisions.

The Superintendents were empowered to investigate all appeals from the Lower Courts of their divisions as also all original suits involving real property, in value above Rs.1,000 or personal property above Rs.5,000. They exercised control over the Munsifs and all subordinate Judicial authorities, within the limits of their Divisions. The judges of the Huzur Adalat were convened by the Commissioner, the highest judicial authority, within the province to act as assessors to him. The structure of criminal judicature resembled that of the Civil Imprisonments and fines were the usual forms of punishment. Institution fees were abolished in 1834 but the number of litigations increased immediately to such great proportions that they were reimposed in 1839[15]. In 1867 during the Commissionership of Bowring two further changes were introduced. First, that no decrees were to be passed without giving the parties an opportunity of appearing on an appointed day. Secondly, the decisions were always to be written by the judges. Thus, were the modern foundations of judicial administration laid in Mysore.

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15. 'Memorandum showing the system of judicature in Mysore' by Cubbon in Selections from the Records of the Government of India, foreign Department, No. XI (Calcutta, 1856).

16. R.A.M. for 1867-68, pp.15-18.

The education system of Mysore continued on traditional lines till the coming of the British. At the age of seven or eight a boy usually went to school. He seldom stayed there for more than three or four years. Only in the case of boys of vaidika Brahmins, that is those who performed religious rites, was there a possibility of the education being continued. They were concerned with the memorisation of slokas and mantras necessary for worship. The usual tution fee for each pupil varied from 1 fanam to half-a-rupee. If this fell in arrears, the teacher called at the defaulter's house and, in the absence of money, accepted payment in kind. Besides, pupils had to supply daily two to three bundles of betel leaf every day though it was not specifically asked. Manuscripts being generally used, there was rarely any expenditure incurred for books. The study of grammar, history and geography did not find much favour since they did not help in getting government employment or in transacting business.

The missionaries played a specially conspicuous role at the beginning of the nineteenth century in educating the people of Mysore. The London Missionary Society was the first to set up a school (1813) for the local population. The site chosen was Bellary. The best scholars in the Telegu and Canarese schools were appointed for the purpose of teaching. William Reevee one of its founders, was responsible for the first English to Canarese dictionary. It was published in 1824. In 1836 the Wesleyans established a school in Bangalore under the guidance of J. Garrett.

Education was imparted in English. The British government which had assumed the administration of Mysore after 1831 gave the school a monthly allowance of Rs.350[17]. The Maharaja himself established a free English school in 1840. The superintendent of this school was a Wesleyan missionary, Reverend T. Hodson. Within a year the number of students totalled 85. The Maharaja granted Rs.1000 for printing 250 copies of a little elementary book[18]. The first school leaving examination was held in 1841. Eleven local boys appeared as examinees. Their handwriting in English, Canarese and Hindustani was beautiful. They showed thorough acquaintance with the geography of Europe and Asia. The Maharaja himself showed an accurate knowledge of Mysore history of detecting at once the slightest error in dates or order of events[19].

The promotion of education by the Commissioner in Mysore was taken up after Wood's despatch of 1854. In 1856 H.B. Devereux, the judicial Commissioner of Mysore, submitted the following scheme for the development of education. A Central College was to be established at Bangalore. With it were to be connected by means of scholarships four Superior Anglo-Vernacular Schools, one at the head quarters of each of the Civil Divisions into which the Province (including Coorg)

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17. Joseph Mullens, Missions In South India : Visited And Described (London, 1954) pp. 21,22.
18. Resident to Calcutta, 10 July 1841, For.Pol.Cons. 2 Aug. 1841 No. 65.
19. For. Pol.Cons. 1 Nov. 1841 Nos. 93-94.

was at that time divided. A vernacular school was provided for the kasaba or chief station of each taluk. It was also to be endowed with scholarships leading up to the Divisional schools. Village schools were in course of time to be included in the scheme. A Sub-Deputy Inspector for every unit of four taluks, a Deputy Inspector for each division and two Inspectors over all provided a superintending force. A portion of the funds allotted to Government education, equivalent to five per cent of the annual expenditure, was to be set apart for grants-in-aid to private schools. Besides, an annual sum of one lakh and a quarter was assigned from the revenues of the state. This was exclusive of the cost of the Central College, but included the expenditure on education in Coorg, as well as a sum of Rs.4,000 for village schools throughout the territory. The amount available for grants-in-aid in Mysore was Rs.5,624. Any surplus which might remain unexpended from the annual assignment of a lakh and a quarter was to be carried forward to the credit of the Educational Department and was to be utilised for the erection of buildings, publication of a series of school books through payment of premiums on translations or adaptations, and other objects not specially provided for.

Whether the imposition of fees should be compulsory was a question which arose at the very outset. If fees were not accepted, Devereux said, the impression would spread among the people that it it was they who were conferring a boon and not receiving advantages. Moreover, localities given upto private initiative in education would be distinctly

placed at a disadvantage compared with those where Govt. institutions were established in as much as the conception of a grant-in-aid depended upon the payment of a schooling fee. In the case of applications for a grant-in-aid to a school where the pupils could not pay anything but where the applicant or a charitable society offered to make up the required sum, it was decided that though the society might assist, the pupils must pay a portion (one fourth) of the tution fee themselves.

When this scheme was under preparation, there already existed several schools receiving aid from the state to the extent of more than Rs.17,000 a year. The Government allowances constituted, for most of them the whole of their money income. The allowance were, in fact, subsidies and not grants-in-aid, the rules for which they isolated in various ways. Foremost of these was the Native Educational Institution established at Bangalore by the Wesleyan Mission in 1851, and receiving a Government grant of Rs.800 a month. The same body also had Anglo-vernacular schools at Tumkur, Shimoga and Hassan, aided to the amount of about Rs.500 a month and provided with premises erected at the cost of Government. At Mysore, the Maharaja maintained an English free school. Besides these there were two schools at Bangalore of a special character, the Mutuchari school for children of pensioned European soldiers and the Tamil Hindu Female School[20]. The outstation schools at Toomkoor, Shimoga, and Hassan were converted into Government Schools and formed the basis of Divisional Schools; the Maharaja's School at Mysore taking the place of a fourth. The grants to the

20. Devereux to Commissioner, 15 Nov. 1856, For. (Public) Cons. 7 Feb. 1857 Nos. 84-91 and K.W.

other two schools remained unaltered as a mark of special favour to the cause of women's education and the interests of those who had served the state in the past.

The initial implementation of Devereux's scheme was impeded by the Revolt of 1857. Since the changes brought about by the British were believed to be the chief cause behind the uprising, Cubbon was extremely cautions in taking measures for the spread of education. At the close of 1958 the grant to the Native Educational Institution was stopped and work taken up at the Government High School by Garrett. During 1859 the School was affiliated to the University of Madras, and the central portion of the premises erected. During 1859-60 fifteen applications for the establishment of schools came in from different taluks. The aim of the curricula drawn up for these institutions was to train the students for the professions, though more abstract lessons were not altogether neglected.

The Normal School was opened at Bangalore, with English and Kanarese branches, in 1861. Most of the taluk masters received some training here. In 1862 an Engineering School was established on the recommendation of Colonel Lawford, the Chief Engineer, with the view of supplying trained subordinates for the Public Works Department. In 1866 the school system was reorganised. Hitherto there had been an entire want of uniformity or system in the course of study pursued in the various schools. Each Head-Master pursued his own method of classification of standards and used whatever course he pleased that had not been formally objected to by the Judicial Commissioner, and changed either at will. The first thing done was to select certain

lesson books, and to restrict the Government schools to the use of these. The classification and course of study for each grade of schools were also fixed. For Anglo-vernacular schools six classes were appointed, rising to the Matriculation standard. The pupils of Kanarese and Hindustani schools were divided into four classes. The lessons to be studied in each class were laid down, and promotions could only be made by the inspector after examination. Boys, moving from one station to another, could thus continue their studies without the difficulty of having to adjust to various standards. Most private schools adopted the grades laid down.

Attention was also given to the need of testing the qualifications of candidates for teacherships. It had been the practice previously to appoint students of the Normal School as masters, on the mere recommendation of the Head Master of that institution. There was no guarantee that a proper course of training had been completed. The Normal Master felt bound, for his own credit, to provide teachers whenever they were applied for, and men were sometimes appointed on the ground of general intelligence without receiving much training for their work. Under the changed system the normal students both English and Kanarese, were required to pass a final examination before being granted certificates of qualification as teachers. In conjunction with these regulations an entrance examination was also arranged to prevent the admission of such men, whose training would probably occupy a long time. Two circles of inspection were arranged : One comprising the Ashtagram division, the Bangalore and Colar districts of the

Nundidroog Division and Coorg; and the other, the Nagar Division and the Tumkur district of the Nandidroog Division.

In 1868, a scheme of education was drawn up for the masses. It was calculated that at least 200,000 boys of school-going age had no ostensible means of instruction. The system proposed was to establish a school for boys and girls in each hobli or taluk sub-division; the estimated number of hoblis being 645, with an average area of 41 square miles, and a population of 6,040 persons. The masters were to be selected from among the teachers of existing indigenous schools and trained for their work in normal schools, of which one was provided for each of the three divisions. While under training, every man was to receive a maintenance allowance of Rs.5 a month, and on appointment to the charge of a school his salary was to be Rs.7 with prospects of promotion. The Schools were to be examined three times a year by Sub-Deputy Inspectors. No fees were to be levied in the schools, but the education would be paid for by a cess. The people however were expected to build or provide premises as n expression of their desire for the same. Night classes were to be held for the benefit of those who were unable to attend school during the ordinary hours of labour. Students in these classes were to pay a fee to defray the expenses of lights[21].

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21. A.R.M. for 1859-60, p. 7; ibid for 1861-62, p. 7-9; ibid for 1866-67, pp.12-13.

B.

EDUCATION 2.

General Statement of Educational Institutions in the Province of Mysore for the year 1870-1871.

	PART I.			GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS.									
				Teachers .			Income.				Number of Persons instructed in—		
	Number.	Number of Students on the Roll.	Average Attendance daily.	Average Age.	Christian.	Others.	Public Funds.	Fees.	Total.	English.	Vernacular.	General.
COLLEGES.-												
Arts . . .												
Professional												
SCHOOLS.-												
Higher . . .	7	1,159	895	...	12	44	41,814	6,895	48,709	1,159	1,113	. . .
Middle . . .	10	314	289	...	2	26	10,327	809	11,136	314	314	. . .
Lower . . .	435	12,980	11947	...	1	456	50,234	1,992	52,226	...	12,980	. . .
GIRLS' SCHOOLS.-												
Higher . . .	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	. . .
Middle . . .	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	. . .
Lower . . .	5	154	124	...	...	5	1,824	6	1,830	...	118	. . .
NORMAL SCHOOLS.-												
For Masters	4	142	137	...	1	5	11,846	...	11,846	7	135	. . .
For Mistresses	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	. . .
SPECIAL SCHOOLS. . .	3	474	474	...	2	...	5,043	157	5,200	16	458	. . .
Total . . .	464	15,223	13,866	...	18	536	1,11,088	9,859	1,30,947	1,496	15,118	. . .

Source ; Statistics of Instruction B, in R.M. for 1870-71.
Educational Institution in Mysore during the years 1870-71.

PART - II. PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS AIDED AND UNAIDED.

	Class.						Income.		Number of Persons instructed in—					Grand Total of Average Attendance.	Proportion of Attendance to Population.
	General.	Hindu.	Mahomedan.	Christian.	Total.	Average Attendance daily.	From Endowments.	From Fees.	From Government Grant.	English.	Vernacular.	General.	Grand Total of Schools.		
COLLEGES.-															
Arts															
Professional															
SCHOOLS.-															
Higher	. . . . .			5	5	703	15,396	15,332	10,356	842	659	. . .	12	1,598	
Middle	. . . . .			9	9	526	12,409	1,245	5,970	557	210	. . .	19	815	
Lower	. .	1,843	55	29	1,927	26,119	6,917	1,321	7,032	213	26,470	. . .	2,362	38,066	
GIRLS' SCHOOLS.-															
Higher	. . . . .			3	3	146	2,822	10,930	2,444	186	. . .	. . .	3	146	
Middle	. . . . .			5	5	318	12,315	2,268	3,360	323	112	. . .	5	318	
Lower	. .	3	3	19	25	1,629	25,481	204	5,430	35	1,660	. . .	30	1,753	
NORMAL SCHOOLS.-															
For Masters	. . . . .												4	137	
For Mistresses	. . . . .														
SPECIAL SCHOOLS.	. . . . .												3	474	
Total. . .	. .	1,846	58	70	1,974	29,441	75,340	31,300	34,592	2,156	29,111	. . .	2,438	43,307	1 in 94

Inspite of the government encouragement to education, it was the Brahmins who took most advantage of the new learning. Among the Lingayets education was still entrusted to the Ayyagalu, or domestic teachers, who continued in the old ways. By 1870-71 only one Lingayet accepted the position of a school master in Chitaldrug, the area where they were mostly concentrated[22]. Girls of the families of the Brahmins and Jains were mostly sent to schools. But they were soon withdrawn to attend to the domestic chore[23].

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22. Report on Public Instruction in Mysore for 1870-71, p. 156.

23. Ibid for 1872-73, p. 56.

Having come to the end of our narrative, we may now try to note some characteristics arising out of the discussion. The first to step out of these pages is Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar III ('Kurmadi'). He began by raising high hopes at the time of his accession, most of which, however, remained unfulfilled in the end. He lacked the vigour of an able administrator, though it should not be forgotten that it was largely due to his single-minded zeal in the latter half of his career that Mysore did not merge into the British dominions in India. The Maharaja's lenience was a cause of considerable weakness, one that in the prevailing type of administration in a princely state was hard to rectify. For, as Satish Chandra concludes from his analysis of political trends during the twilight of the Mughul Empire.

'a monarchical despotism such as that of the Mughul empire was not capable of developing into a limited monarchy in which the king might only reign and be a symbol of unity, while the wazir ruled as the hub of power ... The social forces which made the growth of a constitutional monarchy possible in England were far too weak and undeveloped in seventeenth century India, allowing full play to the forces of disintegration that were strong in a feudal society.' [1]

With the instance of the Peshwas before him, Purnaiya tried to hold the reins of power in his hands till differences with the Maharaja led to his fall in 1811. But, his exit did not make it any easier for Krishnaraja Wodeyar III to steer an effective policy, for he could neither trust any official with the apportionment of authority nor had the strength of character to disregard the influence of his courtiers. In the absence of any adequate control from above, corruption had a chance to thrive in every grade of the administration. Complications were increased by the fact that the tasks of administration rested mostly in the hands of a single caste, the Brahmins. Their members contributed not a little to the dissensions between the two Commissioner placed over the administration of the Kingdom in 1831-32.It was only after the appointment of a single Commissioner in their place in 1834 that the British could formulate their policy in Mysore with some amount of consistency. In the period of the Commissioners' Rule, the Brahmins continued to maintain their superiority. They were among the

1. Satish Chandra, Parties And Politics At The Mughul Court (Aligarh Muslim University, 1959) p. 633.

first to take to Western education and consolidate their services in the administration. At the same time, being the chief landowners in the Kingdom, they were more affluent than other sections of the community. Naturally, they stood forth as the chief bastions of the existing order.

In the economic sphere, too, the period of the Commissioners' Rule did not produce much change. The Mysore economy had been geared by Tipu to a war-level. But his elaborate revenue regulations, justified though they might have been by the force of circumstances, were not planned to achieve more than immediate ends. Centralisation and secrecy were the watchwords of his administrative policy. There was no room for technological improvement more than the Sultan envisaged. Of course, there were trading castes (ex. banijigas) carrying on their wares within various parts of Mysore and even outside the frontiers of the Kingdom. The relative amount of monetization in the economy may also be seen from the government's preference to collect its taxes in cash and in the hiring of labour both by the state for the construction of public works and by owners of plantations like pepper and sugarcane. But the work was only of seasonal duration; the artisan being a labourer in his fields for the rest of the year. The economy of Mysore before the coming of the British was basically similar to that of Mughal India, enumerating the characteristics of which Irfan Habib says; "practically no rural market existed for urban crafts; rural monetization was thus almost entirely the result of the need to transfer surplus agricultural produce to the towns."[2]

This trend continued in the period of the Commissioners' Rule, though a greater integration of the provice was achieved through departmental reforms, abolition of vexatious excise duties and the extension of public works. Thus, Col. William Campbell Onslow, who spent eight years in charge of the civil administration of Nagar, testified to the fact that with the opening of roads 'people who for centuries had never left their own villages, or who had never gone a distance of more than 10 miles from them, were in the habit of rambling about the country."[3] Peasants were drawn to the market and during the famine of 1876-77 Lewis Rice observed : "the great network of roads groaned under the endless trains of travelling carts and every grain of ragi and rice, seen alike in the largest and the remotest market, was either carried from the railway terminus, or brought up the Western Ghats, and distrubuted throughout the province by the unaided efforts of local enterprice."[4] This integration of a princely state within the British territories of India was the principal contribution of the period 1831-1.

2. Irfan Habib, "Potentialities of Capitalistic Development in the Economy of Mughal India" in The Journal of Economic History (New York University), Vol. XIX, No. 1, p. 77, March 1969.
3. Evidence of Col. William Campbell Onslow 1.7.1858 in P.P.(HC), Reports from Committees, Vol.7, Part I, 1857-58, P.114.
4. Rice, Report on the Mysore Census of 1871 (Bangalore, 1874), P. 35.

APPENDIX

EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE REVOLT OF 1831.

(Evidence of Ramaiah in Proceedings of the Mysore Commission in For. Misc. 1833 Vol. 1 No. 306, pp. 31-68, 74).

Qs. 484. Did you fill the situation of Anche Kachari at Nagar when the disturbances broke out ?

Ans. I was then at the seat of Government on supernumerary pay, in the Anche Kacheri, and received orders from Government to go and quell the disturbances of the ryots in Nuggur.

Qs. 485. After reaching Nagar what did you do there ?

Ans. On reaching Shimoga I pacified the ryots that had assembled in different directions and took them to the fauzdar Veera Raj Urs. On his asking them why they had assembled themselves together, they told him, their reasons were, having had an assessment put on their waste lands and having been taxed in excess with import duties. I told the fauzdar I had brought the ryots to him with the promise that I would get all these things rightly adjusted for them. The fauzdar repeated his assurances to them to the same effect. (After this, contrary to those assurances) the amildar Timmapah caused Mussuriah of Hole Honoor, the gaunda of all these ryots, to be beaten, in order to compel him to pay the assessment on the waste lands, respecting which an adjustment had been promised. On seeing this, the ryots, remonstrated, saying, "you invited us to come with you and get our wrongs redressed, did you not ? and yet the assessment on these waste land is still demanded from our gauda ".

The ryots then took their gauda and assembled for insurrection. On this occasion, the amildar Simmiah went to the fauzdar and reported to him, that all the ryots had united together in a conspiracy, and that on peremptory means being resorted to with the gauda, in order to insist upon his immediate payment of the assessment, the ryots repulsed the public Officer sent for this purpose, and took their gauda and went off. The amildar further remarked 'if such be the state of things what respect can there be for the public functionaries ?' On receiving this information, the fauzdar sent off about thirty armed peons, and had some of the ryots and the Swarna gauda apprehended and caused them to be whipped, and to be put in the stocks. He also made the gauda find security for the payment of the money due from him. After the lapse of three or four days, I and several gaudas having made intercession, the Swarna gauda was released from the stocks and the ryots, having been fined according to their abilities, were set at liberty. The ryots gave a written promise to the government that they would not hereafter unite together for insurrection. Still the assessments were not collected in a manner approved by the ryots. The fauzdar, and the amildars united together and made the ryots pay an assessment which included a rent on the waste lands. The ryots were discontented. About this time, an individual named Timappah came from the polygar, and, having collected some people, encamped under the trees near Anantapur with a view of taking that place and establishing a garrison in it.

The amildar and the Arche Mootsuddee wrote to the fauzdar information of this circumstance. The fauzdar, on receiving this intelligence, proceeded in the month of Shravan to Anantapur taking with him some regular Infantry, armed Peons and Cavalry. At first, the ryots of the two districts, Shimoga and Hole Honoor united in the conspiracy, and afterwards those of two other Districts, Kumsi and Honalli, joined them. In the month Bhadrupuddu, when the Chennageri amildar, Venkata Ramiah, in order to collect the first instalment of the assessment asked the ryots through the Sheikdar for their money, they said to him, "are we to pay the instalment to the king of Mysore or to the King of Nagar ?' It was the ryots of Basavarhalli in the Chennagiri District, who asked the sheikhdar this question. The amildar, having received information of the same, and perceiving that they had spoken thus from insolence (or from want of due respect) went to Basavanhalli where these ryots were. The ryots shut their outer gate and would not allow the amildar to enter. The ryots then assembled themselves together and beat the Parputty (or Sheikhdar) who was inside. The Parputty, unable to endure the blows which were served out, vociferated lustily, beating his hand on his mouth. Then the amildar, having heard the cry outside, obliged the armed Peons to force their way through the fort (or a kind of stockade) and to open the outer gate. These Peons then went and carried off the Párputty and, with him, they took some of the ryots prisoners, in consequence of which the ryots assembled together in a great mass. Therefore, the amildar (out of regard to his own safety) took the aforenamed ryots and went and secured himself in the fort of

Chennagiri; for the ryots, having collected in large numbers, beat the armed Peons, the amildars, and others (before they had effected their escape to the fort). The ryots of the surrounding villages likewise assembled, and with the others, went in pursuit of the fugitives. They came to the Pettah of Chennagiri and beat all the public functionaries there. Then they took a ladder and scaled the fort walls, and liberated all the ryots whom the amildar had taken thither as prisoners. They moreover united together and formed a siege round the place. The amildar then sent a soldier to the fauzdar's Kacheri, at Shimoga to communicate intelligence of this position of affairs. At that time, I was in the Kacheri, by which means I obtained this information. The soldier communicated the message with which he was charged to Krishna Rao, the Peshkar of the Kacheri, who then dispatched one troop of horse. I forwarded information of these matters to the Government, to the Anche Kacheri of my own department, and to the fauzdar. The Peshkar likewise communicated with the fauzdar on the subject. At this crisis the ryots of the four districts of Shikarpur, Mandagadde, Anavatti and Sorab likewise rose and united themselves in the insurrection of the abovementioned ryots. I received information likewise of the ryots of the following districts having also rebelled, namely Channagiri, Basavapatna, Anjanapura, Tarikere, Kadur and Harihar. The fauzdar, having received accounts of the state of affairs in the aforenamed District of Chennagiri, came to Shimoga. In reference to the letter which I had addressed to the Government, containing a statement of the transactions which had taken place at Chennagiri, the Government replied informing me that they had sent

Anaji Rao from the Sawar Kacheri to inquire into the matter, directing me to place myself under his orders, and requesting me to transmit, from time to time, an account of the state of things. Therefore, I went to Chennagiri in order to place myself under the orders of Anaji Rao. On coming thither, I found he had previously arrived. Anaji Rao caused a cowl to be addressed to the ryots (in order that an opportunity might thus be afforded them of coming and laying before him their complaints, with a view to an adjustment of the disturbances). He also inquired of the amildar what acts of violence the ryots had been guilty of. The amildar wrote out an account of all the circumstances which had occured there. In consequence of the cowl issued by Anaji Rao, the ryots were coming in to capitulate and for this purpose, advanced as far as Hosaaloor, where they halted; but when I and Anaji Rao were expecting their approach, instead of coming in they went off again for the purposes of insurrection. Of the particulars of this circumstances I wrote to Government. In reply to this communication I received an order from Government to despatch to the rebels some clever person from our party, in order to ascertain who had excited the ryots to return to their revolt when they were coming in for capitulation. I made inquiries accordingly and forwarded the particulars to Government. When Colonel Briggs came to Shimoga, I gave to Krishna Rao in charge at Dharwar copies of this correspondence, including the statement of the ryots, the order of Government, and my own representation.

After this Anaji Rao and the fauzdar went together to Honnali and there halted, at which time the whole of the Districts united in

one general insurrection. Anaji Rao and the fauzdar sent several from their party to the ryots in order to effect a pacification, but none of the ryots would come in, in consequence of which an order came from the government, directing me to go and try to pacify the ryots and to forward to the Government a statement of what the ryots said to me. Therefore, I and Seshagiri Rao, the Killedar of Honnali, went to Bettahully in the Company's territory, where all the ryots had collected and inquired into their circumstances; when they related to us a great many grievances, and hardships, under which they had laboured of which the following is the substance.

'Instead of taking from us the former fixed rate of assessment, and the additional rate, as settled by Shivappah Naik, for these ten or twenty years past. We had been taxed to the amount of a pagoda for the original fixed rate of assessment and one pagoda for the additional rate (or extra tax said to have been levied in the first instance as a tribute to some Mahratta invader, and since merged in the aggregate or general revenue). We are become insolvent. Moreover for four or five years they have assessed us for our waste lands. They also exact more than is due for impost duties. The amildars and others forced from us "unpaid labour". Though we have made these and similar complaints to the fauzdar's Kacheri and at the Dewan's Kacheri, yet they are not enquired into. Though we address Government on these subjects, our letters are never received. It is through the interest of persons filling high situations at the seat of Government such as Moosahibs, Moonshees, etc. that persons of their party are allowed to occupy all the stations in the districts from the fauzdar down to the

Peshkar. Therefore, though we draw up statements of our grievances, how can be get them forwarded to Government ? Seeing ourselves thus situated, and having no other resources left to us, we were driven to rebellion'.

Having heard these complaints, I entered into the following stipulations with the ryots, namely, that I would forward an account of their grievances, and have things properly arranged to their satisfaction, by getting the Government to order these modifications in the regulations, - that their fixed assessment and extra assessment should be after the usage established by Shivappah Naik; the assessment on waste land reduced; the revenue due from the ryots hereafter to be collected equitably and violence and oppression to cease. These are the stipulations into whoch I entered with the ryots by word of month. The ryots said they would again enter into the Mysore territory and wait till an answer was received from Government respecting the terms of pacification which I had proposed; and after the order arrived would conduct themselves accordingly.

Prior to this conversation which I had with the ryots, on the subject of capitulation, the Nagar Polygar had been with them, giving them bad advice and telling them that the whole of the country was his and that they must become his allies. This information I learned from another quarter. The Polygar was aware of the stipulations into which I had entered with the ryots and he went to them subsequently and persuaded them not to listen to my proposal and not to accompany me as they had agreed to do. Therefore, when I went next

morning to invite the ryots to come with me into the Mysore territory, they refused saying, 'if an order comes to us from the Government here, we will return, otherwise we will not.' In the meantime, I learned that the Polygar came to the ryots in the night time, had conversation with them, and then went off again. Seeing such to be the position of affairs, I separated from the mass a few of the principal people in whom I had confidence and taking them aside into the fort, I gave them the following advice. 'You see', said I, 'seventy years have passed away since Nagar ceased to exist as a distinct kingdom; and there are no tidings of any of that dynasty being at present alive. Since you have risen up in rebellion and taken up with some mendicant (Jungum) or other, who has affirmed himself to be the king of Nagar, I tell you that if you listen to these words, and do not come with me, you are all completely deceived. The country, you are to remember, does not belong to the Rajah Sahib; it is the Company's, and they may even here (where you now are) inflict punishment upon you. Do not listen to this ill adviser who is only fit to be considered as a mendicant. Confide in what I have said to you, and follow me. I will get done for you what shall please you.' Having thus inspired the people with confidence, I persuaded them to accompany me, and all the ryots came with me to Dodderi in the District of Honnali, belonging to the Mysore Government. On that very day the ryots heard that the fouzdar Krishna Rao had fallen with the sword upon the rebels assembled in Hole Honoor. Therefore, they then seized me as their Prisoner, and went off with me to Essur. When they reached this place, they said to me. "After you had entered into stipulations, you led us away with you to get

our heads knocked off; well, what does it matter? . . . We, at any rate, will not let you go', so saying they kept me a prisoner in their company. The day following Seshagiri Rao, the killedar, made his escape and fled. In consequence of his having run off, they kept me in very close confinement. I then said to them, 'you are Government ryots and I am a Government servant. Though you detain me a prisoner, I am not at all alarmed. I have a master as well as you; I was not going, by deceiving you, to get you killed. The fauzdar who has oppressed you, the king may punish. Do you address a letter to Government on the subject of the circumstances which have taken place upto the present time, and I will write one likewise, and forward them, and then let us wait and see what answer will be received, and till such time I will remain with you'. So I declared to them upon oath. They thus having confidence in me restored to them, kept me in their charge, without permitting me to suffer any molestation from them. They wrote a letter and I too, and both of them I transmitted by tappal. I moreover addressed a letter to Krishna Rao, the fauzdar, in which I mentioned to him that I had pacified the ryots, and was bringing them away with me (back again into the Rajah's country). 'But when they heard that you had attacked the ryots in the neighbourhood of Hole Honoor, they forcibly detained me, and they are still keeping me a prisoner among their party. I now send this letter to you unknown to the ryots, that you may, at any rate, come forthwith and enter into stipulations with them, pacify them, and release me from my captivity'. About this time Krishna Rao, the fouzdar, had reached the Village Nyamati in the Honnalli Talook where he received my letter. The fauzdar then sent Cudapa Srinivas Rao,

a Regimentdar of the Sawar Kacheri, with some horse to the collected rebels in order that he might pacify the ryots and get me set at liberty. These men succeeded in their object, and having come bound for me, I obtained my freedom. I and Srinivas Rao then joined ourselves to the fouzdar at Nyamati whence we all proceeded together to Honnalli. The next day, Krishna Rao, the fouzdar, sent Srinivas Rao, the Regimentdar, with some horse to the rendezvous of the rebels; and they attacked the rebels, and took ten or twenty of the gaudas and ryots prisoners, all of whom were wounded. These prisoners they kept at night in custody. After a lapse of a day or two, a ringleader among them named Kurreyanna of Agaradahalli in the District of Honnoor, was hanged. The fauzdar Krishna Rao gave orders to Srinivas Rao, the Regimentdar, to cut the noses and ears of the rest. On this occasion, I observed to the authorities, 'if you inflict punishment upon the ryots, they will become disaffected, and will not enter into any stipulations of peace, but hereafter do as you please.' To this Krishna Rao, the fauzdar, and Srinivas Rao, the Regimentadar, replied, 'we will do it, for it is necessary that the people should be a little intimidated'. Therefore, they had the noses and ears of the aforesaid ryots cut off.

Just about this time the Tarikere polygar came and joined himself to the rebels who had collected in the vicinity of Kannurinam. An order was received from the Government, in reference to the letters written by myself and the ryots, and regarding also the terms of pacification which I in the name of the ryots, had proposed. This

order went to the Cazy that Government had taken into consideration the particulars of the representations made, and that if a few of the leading people of each of the Talooks, would come with Ramiah(me) to Chandragutti negotiations should be entered into for an amicable arrangement of matters, which would prove satisfactory to the minds of all the people. To my letter Government said, "We have received the address of the ryots and we are acquainted with the particulars which you have laid before us.

We have written to the ryots on the subject of capitulation for peace. Do you deliver our letter to them, and bring with you a few of the people.' I, therefore, took the two letters, and went again to the rendezvous of the rebels and, having shewn to them the letter which I had received, I gave them the paper containing the proposition of Government in reference to the mode of entering into a treaty. Having done so, I said to them, 'Let several from among you, for each of the Districts, come with me, and I will lay the whole of your circumstances before Government, and get things arranged for, you in a manner which shall be agreeable to your wishes.'

To this proposal the ryots replied, 'You have already once taken us back into the Rajah's territory, after having entered into stipulations with us, and then the fauzdar fell upon our people; had one hanged and the ears and noses of others cut. We are aware also that the King and the Resident having come to Chandragutti have lung all the ryots assembled there. While things are thus, we know not what they will do to us if we go there. We have no confidence in the Government, and we positively will not accompany you. We advise you not to come and talk to us any more about peace. You have taken much

pains on our account; therefore, we have, this time, let you off with your life". Those among the ryots with whom I wan more particularly intimate said to me. 'Henceforth cease your interference. The Polygar entertains a serious grudge against you, in consequence of your having drawn away and carried off the ryots who had attached themselves to him in the neighbourhood of Bettahully. The Tarikere Polygar has now joined himself to the conspiracy. The whole of the ryots in all the Districts have risen. No one will listen to the advice of another. They may break your head somewhare or other; therefore leave other people's affairs, and go and take care of your own life'. In consequence of this statement, I took my departure and wrote to the Government an account of all the things which had taken place here, and told them that the ryots positively refused to come.

Immediately after this the rebellion of the Polygars commenced. The Terikere Polygar and the Nagar Polygar uniting together, they first arrived and garrisoned Kumsi and ther Anantapur. And thus having commenced to garrison all the forts, they proceeded cutting the noses and ears of the servants of Government, and rifling the houses and, in some placed, I have heard that they ravished the women. Thus the rebellion extended and was carried to very serious lengths. Government, having become acquainted with this state of things, dispatched Annapah, of the Sawar Kacheri, with some troops, and gave me directions to place myself under his orders, and I did so accordingly. Thus, Annapah, Krishna Rao the fauzdar, and Srinivas Rao the Regimentdar went together, and raised the hostile garrison of Kumsi. The rebels, taking up their position in Veeranna-Kanave, fired upon the Government troops and there was, in consequence, a

battle between the two forces, and the rebels being worsted, took to their heels. The Government troops having burnt down the fortification (or barricade) which the rebels had constructed in this pass, they went forward and pursued them to the Balikoppa pass; here another battle ensured, and the rebels again decamped; burning the fortifications which had been put up here. Our troops followed the enemy to Anantapur (dispossessed the rebels of the fort there) and placed a force of their own in it to garrison it. All this was the business of one day. The next day they marched to Shikarpur, where another engagement took place, and having routed the rebels they garrisoned the fort here likewise. Krishna Rao, having about this time been dissmissed from his situation as fauzdar, orders came to Annapah at Shikarpur to take upon him his duties, and so Krishna Row retired. Annapah now went forth chastising the rebels in every direction and restoring things to order and again returned to Anantapur, where he took up his station for a time, tracing out the rebels that were about there, and arranging in due order the Public affairs.

The Dewan Venkata Urs, wishing to dispossess the gnemy of the two hillforts of Hosadurg and Kaveladurg, sent, to Anapah for a Battalion of the Infantry, out of the troops under his command, and also for the great guns belonging to the Bargi Kacheri. In consequence of this arrangement, the force under Annapah became less than those which the enemy could muster. The Polygar and rebels became aware of this circumstance, and did not await to avail themselves of such an advantage. Having collected an immense mass of people, they laid a seige around Anantapur, by taking up their lodgement in the clumps of trees by which it is environed, and to prevent any of the

servants of Government from making an egress, they stopped up the roads; and when any did try to make their way, they shot them. In the same way they stopped up the roads at the Adur Pass. Therefore, the Troops under Annapah being without grain, and for a month and a half without salt, acid, and rice and the horses without grain and straw, they were reduced to great extremities. The fauzdar wrote accounts of these things both to the Dewan and to the Government. Assistance came from no quarter. The army became greatly spent. The rebels had augmented themselves into a formidable host. In this situation Annapah called his troops and inspired them with confidence by the following address. "You see", says he, "We are & closely beseiged by a hostile army. No help is come to us. The troops we had here the Dewan has taken, those which remain are few in number and for them there are not the necessaries of life remaining. Therefore, rather than die in this way by starvation, let us go and fight, and die like soldiers". This address had the desired effect, all were pleased with it. Therefore, they sallied forth on the Shikarpur road; and fought their way stoutly for fifteen miles, till they reached Hosur, in the Company's territory.

There the troops got their pay and became inspired with fresh courage; from thence they want round by Harihar and proceeding onwards reached Honalli.

When the enemy understood that Annapah had left Anantapur for Shikarpur, they came again to Anantapur and placed a garrison there, and the same night came to Kumsi and fired upon us several vollies.

The following morning the Government troops set out and went to Shimoga. I became apprised of this and being afraid to remain here after all the troops had taken their departure, I went for them with a view of going to Shimoga. But finding the road waylaid by the enemy, I related my circumstance to the ryots of the country, and asked them for their advice as to what I was to do. They told me not to be alarmed and took me away with them into the jungle. In the meantime the Nagar Polygar made his appearance at Kumsi. Hearing of my flight and having entertained an old grudge against me for having persuaded and carried off the ryots from Bettahalli, he despatched Manupah to seize Seshagiri the Killedar of Honnali; and, to apprehend me, he sent three hundred men.

While these things were in progress Lieutenant Rochfort came and took Nagar and garrisoned it. After which Venkata Rao, the Dewan, Annapah, and Chourappa's relation Venkata Ramaiah, the new fouzdar, received orders from Government to cause search to be made for me, wherever I might be. The fouzdar, therefore, having ascertained the point from my son, dispatched twenty peons to the place when I was staying With these I came to Nagar. At that time Mr. Cassamaijor, and the Dewan came to Nagar. I waited upon them, upon which occasion the Dewan presented me with two hundred rupees. I apprized the Government by letter of my arrival, to which I received a very satisfactory answer. I was directed to place myself, under Annapah's orders and did so accordingly. Mr. Cassamaijor and the Dewan gave directions to Annapah to settle the affairs of the Nagar country and then having appointed new amildars, and Sheristadars, they took their departure.

GLOSSARY

Local terms, wherever used in the thesis, have been immediately explained afterwards. The standards of measurement in Mysore before the time of the Commissioners' Rule lacked any uniformity. The monetary standard ran as 16 Cash = 1 fanam, 10 fanams = 1 Kantirayi Pagoda. The Bahaduri pagoda and the Madras and Surat rupees also were in circulation at different rates of exchange. One Kantirayi pagoda was equivalent to Rs. 2-14-8, and a Bahaduri pagoda about Rs. 4. But the former was a nominal gold coin, while the latter was in circulation, though in a small quantity.

Kharita has been thus described by Wilks ;'a long slip of cotton cloth, from eight inches tc a foot wide, and from twelve to eighteen feet long, skinfully covered on each side with a compost of paste and powdered charcoal. When perfectly dry, it is neatly folded up, without cutting, in leaves of equal dimensions; to the two end folds are fixed ornamental plates of wood, painted and varnished, resembling the sides of a book, and the whole is put into a case of silk or cotton, or tied with a tape or a ribbon; those in use with the lower classes are destitute of these ornaments and are tied up by a common string; the book, of course, opens at either side and if unfolded and drawn out, is still a long slip of the original length of the cloth. The writing is similar to that on a slate, and may be in like manner rubbed out and renewed. It is performed by a pencil of the balapum, or lapis ollaris; ..... but although liable to be expunged, and affording facility to fraudulent entries, it is a much more durable material and record than the best writing on the best paper or any other substance used in India, copper and stone alone excepted.'

(Preface to History of Mysore, Vol. I, pp. XXii-XXiii).

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Scholars investigating the nineteenth century history of Mysore have moaned over the paucity of sources. The only two scholars who have not joined in this general wail, K.N.V. Sastri and Hayaradana Rao in his Gazetteer, have culled information mostly from administrative reports without making much affort to assess the overall significance of government policy. In the present discussion we have tried to cover this deficiency with reference to a variety of sources, both published and unpublished. For the earlier period of Tipu Sultan, Mohibbul Hasan offers the most complete bibliography. We mentione only such titles as have been most useful to us. All the existing private papers of British officials in India are not still available at the National Archives of India. Thus, the Wood papers which have been worked upon by Robin Moore and Donovan Williams could not be used in preparing the present dissertation.

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