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# Helpless Representatives of the Great Powers? Western Consuls in Jeddah, 1830s to 1914

Ulrike Freitag



*This article investigates the roles of European consuls in the Ottoman port city of Jeddah which served as an important centre for trade and as the main entry point for pilgrims en route for Mecca during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The article argues that the relative power and local influence of European consuls, found elsewhere in the struggling Ottoman Empire in reflection of the international balance of power, could not be easily established in Jeddah. This was due to the special role of Jeddah for the Islamic legitimation of the empire, as well as the local awareness of its location in the vicinity of the holiest city of Islam, both of which in turn prevented the settlement of significant Christian communities. While Muslims formally under the protection of different European empires lived in Jeddah, they did not serve as a constituency on which the consuls would and could rely. The political scene in Jeddah was further complicated by the rivalries between the local rulers (*sharifs*) and the governors sent from Istanbul, while the situation of the foreign consuls was aggravated by their distance from European centres of power. In providing a case study of how Muslim solidarity, both real and imagined, between rulers, local and foreign residents could counteract European imperial influence, the article critically reflects upon the notion of the Ottoman Empire's power, or lack thereof, in relation to its European competitors, and makes a case for a more differentiated perspective on 'Ottoman decline'.*

> Finally I would remark that those who want an absolutely safe place to live in should avoid Jeddah, but it would be somewhat safer and very much more respectable if nine tenths of the Europeans were to leave it.[1]

## Introduction

The nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire was both an empire in its own right, albeit a shrinking one, and the coveted object of other powers' imperial ambitions. This was

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exemplified in the so-called 'Eastern Question', which, according to German historian Alexander Schölch, was the 'vexed question how much of the Ottoman Empire had to be preserved in which form to serve the interests of the European powers'.[2] Beside the actual conquest of Ottoman territories, notably on the Balkans and in North Africa, European powers also increasingly penetrated the Ottoman economy through their insistence on low Ottoman customs (notably after the Treaty of Balta Liman in 1838) and through infrastructural investments paid for by credits which were major causes of the Ottoman state bankruptcy in 1875. Treaties with European powers granting them trading privileges (capitulations) had, since the eighteenth century, turned into an instrument which allowed European powers far-ranging rights, from the protection of religious minorities to the installation of consular and mixed courts. The latter were created in the course of the nineteenth century as a consequence of the growing European expansion which saw the Red Sea and its shores become a central passageway to India and Southeast Asia as well as Eastern Africa.[3]

Albert Hourani has argued that European consuls in Ottoman provincial towns of the Fertile Crescent, whose contacts with various sections of society grew increasingly intimate, became important intermediaries between certain societal groups and the government in trying to influence the process of modernisation. While local notables based their influence on local support and good contacts in Constantinople, the foreign consuls could ally themselves with local groups by invoking their own government's pressure in their favour, particularly if such groups could claim 'protection'. The consuls thus themselves became party to the local political game.[4] Hourani argues that this development spurred the wrath of competing notables, and thus was one of the factors leading to a series of riots between 1850 and 1860. Among the incidents he quotes in this context is the massacre of European consuls in Jeddah in 1858, thereby implying that the events Jeddah followed a logic similar to that in the Fertile Crescent.[5] In addition, Juan Cole has drawn attention to the role of crowds in these urban riots, although noting some differences with regard to crowd involvement in Jeddah.[6] For notables and crowds alike, the conflict was framed as an expression of increasing Christian–Muslim antagonism. In the case of Jeddah, which had no local Christian community to speak of, the antagonism differed slightly. It applied to Ottoman Christians from elsewhere, as well as to Christian and potentially also to Muslim protégés of the Western powers, notably of Britain.[7]

The role of the European consuls, the unequal trade agreements, the increasing Ottoman loss of territory and the fact that the empire became a major target for Western investment have all led to an assessment of the empire as moribund. Recently, however, historians of the Ottoman Empire have emphasised the modernising measures this 'semi-colonial' empire took to reform itself, and the at least partial success of Ottoman attempts to reassert authority and legitimacy in an imperial contest where Western empires clearly had the upper hand.[8] This article, by investigating the position of European consuls in a remote but important province, contributes to this debate by demonstrating the obstacles encountered by the European consuls, mostly in their interaction with the Ottoman authorities, but also *vis-à-vis* the local population.

The city of Jeddah was remote from the Ottoman centre but carried a special importance for the empire's Islamic legitimacy due to its function as a port through which sometimes tens of thousands of pilgrims reached the holy city of Mecca annually. The article questions the applicability of some of Hourani's more general observations with regard to the particular case study and describes the representation of European empires in a remote province. It focuses on the establishment of two consulates, the British and the French, the conditions under which the consuls worked, their tasks and the problems they encountered. It then examines the options available to the consuls in dealing with these problems. I argue that the consuls, in spite of being representatives of the strongest imperial powers of their day in an empire that was being hollowed out by their own governments, often felt extremely vulnerable and that their fears were sometimes well grounded. I will show in this article that it was their isolation from society—and their lack of engagement with and even representation of parts of it—which caused this vulnerability. This was exacerbated by their relative isolation from the centres of imperial power in Europe, but also from their own representatives at the Ottoman court in Constantinople. Although there existed (relatively brief) periods of fairly close cooperation with individual governors (*wali*) who were themselves often outsiders to the context of the Arabian region of Hijaz and in need of allies against the powerful *sharif*s of Mecca, these periods were rare exceptions.[9] Nevertheless, it should be clear from the outset that the notion of weakness is a relative one and applies only to the local situation. Furthermore, individual predispositions also influenced the perceptions of the different consuls, so that the emerging picture remains somewhat murky. Structurally, the consuls could and did have recourse to the apparatus of empires which, once set in motion, could offer powerful support. Whether or not this support always helped the individuals in question and contributed to making Jeddah a safer place for them is a separate question which this article will also address.

## The Founding of the Consulates

The port of Jeddah was the first Arabian destination for thousands of Muslims en route to the holy city of Mecca and an important entrepôt in the trade between the Indian Ocean and Egypt until the late nineteenth century. After being threatened by the Wahhabi expansion of the early nineteenth century and having been re-conquered by the son of Muhammad Ali, governor of Egypt, it reverted to more direct Ottoman control in 1840.[10] Given the importance of the 'route to India' for Britain, it is not surprising that the East India Company (EIC) maintained contacts with Jeddah. By 1806, Viscount Valentia had encountered a certain Hammed Nasser as British agent and suggested his replacement by another wealthy merchant, Jilany.[11] Later, the commercial agent of the ruler of Egypt seems to have fulfilled this role, but little is known about the details.[12] Although evidence is scarce, it seems that in 1832 an Armenian of Baghdadi origin, Maalim Yusof, was appointed EIC agent in Jeddah 'on the part of the Government' and shortly thereafter demanded and was granted a regular salary.[13] At some point in time he obtained the insignia of a (vice-)consul, as his successor, A. C. Ogilvie,

noted when taking possession of them against Yusof's wishes in 1838.[14] How remote Jeddah was at that time from Cairo, not to mention London, becomes obvious when one considers that Ogilvie had accepted the position in the belief that his predecessor was deceased.[15] With this the British tradition of sending European consuls, emulated by the French, started.[16] Muslims were henceforth recruited only to represent the Europeans in Mecca, where non-Muslims were not allowed to venture.

The French consular agency (later variously consulate and vice-consulate) started in a similar manner: Although it was officially founded in 1839, the local representative, another Armenian by the name of Georges Sarkiz,[17] had to argue with the Ottoman authorities until his French superior, Fulgence de Fresnel, was allowed to come to Jeddah in person in early 1843. The Ottomans delayed his coming as French trade, the most accepted reason for foreign representation, was considered insignificant.[18] The European powers, however, were not only interested in trade and in the demonstration of their presence in order to impress each other (and the Ottomans) in their race to control international trade routes, they increasingly also regarded a consulate in Jeddah as necessity in order to keep an eye on Muslims living in their ever-expanding empires, to protect them from Ottoman rule and to control potentially dissident Muslims. The Dutch, building on long trade relations, but also concerned about the large numbers of Southeast Asian pilgrims, followed suit in 1869 or 1872.[19] On 28 January 1876, the Swedish king appointed a consul for Sweden and Norway and authorised him to collect certain taxes from Swedish merchants in accordance with the consular regulations.[20] Austria opened its consulate in 1880, succeeded by the Russians who dealt with rising numbers of Central Asian pilgrims in 1891.[21] Before the end of the century, Greece and Austria also maintained consulates in Jeddah, in addition to Persia as the only Muslim power.[22]

The following discussion will focus on the British and French consuls, who after 1858—in contrast to their Dutch colleague—were barred from trading by their governments. This is important because the example of the Dutch consuls, as well as the one British exception, Consul Beyts, who filled the post after a vacancy of several years between 1874 and 1878 and who was a trading consul, clearly show that trading forced the consuls to integrate more directly with local society. This was viewed with great misgivings by the salaried consuls and caused repeated conflicts.[23]

## The Consuls and their Social and Political Environment

Jeddah was infamous among the consuls for its unhealthy climate, and many consuls asked for leave or removal on health grounds.[24] Two fell victim to disease: the French consul, Rochet d'Héricourt, died after a long illness in 1854 and, in 1892, the newly appointed Dutch consul, Van der Houven Van Cordt, contracted a fever and died within a few days of arrival.[25] Apart from the poor health conditions, Jeddah also provided few distractions. Moreover, movement of Christians in general and of the consuls in particular was often restricted due to fears that they might approach or even enter the holy city of Mecca. In 1765, the traveller Carsten Niebuhr noted that

Christians were not allowed anywhere near the Mecca gate.[26] During lengthy periods, and notably after incidences of violence, consuls were ordered not to leave the city, even along the coastline, for security reasons. At times, they were even required to stay in their houses during the night.[27] Although the Ottoman authorities had good reason for this demand, as will be shown, it certainly contributed to the negative image of Jeddah among aspiring diplomats.

Perhaps the very limited social environment proved even more difficult for the consuls than disease and physical restrictions, although relatively little can be learnt about personal reactions to the city.[28] The official reports naturally vary greatly depending on the personalities of the consuls as well as of travellers who provide additional information. Nevertheless, it emerges that, while Hijazi society was cosmopolitan, as far as the presence of Muslims from all over the world was concerned, many people harboured reservations or resentment again the presence of Christians in what was considered the most sacred part of the Muslim world.

The following report by Vice-Consul Ogilvie from 1838 gives an impression of the more extreme reactions which Europeans occasionally encountered:

> On the 2nd day of this Month, while passing through the Bazaar on my way to my house, I observed two soldiers coming in the contrary direction, and heard one of them say that I was a dog of a Christian. I walked on till I passed by the side of them, when one of them exclaimed in my face: You dog, You son of a dog. You Christian. I instantly seized him, in order to carry him before the Governor, but many people coming up, he escaped in the Crowd.[29]

Perhaps even more worryingly for the official representatives of the great powers, such popular sentiment against Christians and foreign protected subjects was at times shared by Ottoman officials. In 1879, i.e. long after the Ottoman authorities had abolished older rules which symbolically distinguished between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, such as the dress code, British Consul Zohrab reported an attack on two British and French subjects to his superior in Constantinople. The subsequent investigation, authorised by a local pasha,[30] came to the following conclusion:

> The evidence placed beyond doubt the fact, that the guards at the gates had at different times received orders to oblige every Christian who came up to the gates on the back of an animal to dismount and pass through the gate on foot, and that this order had been given by the Caimakam [local governor] directly to the guards, and not through their officers.[31]

Conflicts surrounding the Christian cemetery, and the often less than helpful attitude which the Ottoman authorities took in cases of its violation or when the issue of its enlargement or relocation was discussed, are a further indication of resistance. It remains difficult to judge whether this was directed against Christians in general, or against Western Christians or the consuls more specifically.[32] The consuls were certainly sceptical with regard to the Ottoman capacity to guarantee security, as Ottoman soldiers were suspected of conspicuous absence whenever the situation became particularly dangerous for foreigners.[33]

The small group of non-Muslims, usually no more than a few dozen even on the threshold of World War I, by no way formed a coherent community: Ottoman Greeks, Armenians and Italians, who had come to Jeddah as merchants and often subsisted on petty trade or kept taverns, were considered by the European consuls as little more than rabble. Pondering on the possibility of pressing for mixed courts, as would have been the right of European consuls for certain cases, British Consul Stanley mused in 1861: 'A mixed tribunal at Jedda is, I would submit, impossible. The European residents are not of a class to whom could be confided the functions of judges—They are for the most part petty traders, or tavern keepers, and have neither the required station nor character.'[34] This dim view of resident Christians was shared by the French consul, who in 1875 commented sourly on 'notre misérable colonie européenne'.[35] This perspective clearly reflected inter-European as well as social hierarchies. Thus, the consuls were in their social interaction pretty much reduced to the small group of co-consuls and a few expatriates who were deemed to be socially compatible. In addition, they regularly entertained captains of passing merchants ships.

The other group for whose sake the consuls were present in Jeddah, namely the pilgrims and merchants from the European empires, were also not normally perceived as allies. Although quite a number of these actively sought Western protection, this was usually done in order to obtain more favourable legal or commercial arrangements. The consular files contain a number of cases where Ottoman protection was sought by formerly Western-protected individuals, usually, but not exclusively for political reasons.[36] More often than not, colonial subjects were suspected of complicity with the Ottomans or even treachery and pan-Islamic conspiracies.[37] On a number of occasions, Indians insulted Christians, possibly transporting their anti-imperial sentiments from India to the Hijaz.[38] In these cases, the British consul sought punitive action. Finally, it is noteworthy that race and religion seem to have played a major role in the perception of the consuls' environment. Indian Muslim Dr Abdur Razzaq (vice-consul, acting consul and consul 1882–95) seems a clear indicator of the difference which race and religion could make. He maintained significantly better relations with his surroundings than the majority of his colleagues, and it is therefore ironic that he was murdered for his implication in the British imperial endeavour.

While the consuls were thus relatively isolated with regard to local society, they also had to operate in a political environment that was potentially more complicated than in most other Ottoman cities. This was due to the duality of rule between the Ottoman governor, resident in Jeddah or Mecca, and the *sharif*s of Mecca.[39] While, in theory, each fulfilled a specified function, in practice governors and *sharif*s were often locked in a bitter struggle for influence and power. Given the distance of the Hijaz from the imperial centre, the often good connections of the *sharif*s to the imperial court and their strong influence over the Bedouins, the governors more often than not found themselves in the weaker position. Thus, the *sharif*s were sometimes successful in obtaining the removal of governors who attempted to curb their influence, while the governors in turn tried to convince Constantinople to remove obstinate *sharif*s from power. One period during which this rivalry culminated in various mutual conspiracies was the 1880s.[40]

Although the *sharif*s were by no means universally popular, the Ottoman authorities enjoyed even less general acclaim, and the consuls often judged their rule to be 'precarious', notably from the 1870s.[41] When, in 1880, Sharif Husayn was stabbed by an Afghan assassin in Jeddah and died soon thereafter, popular anger erupted against the Ottoman authorities (who had nothing to do with the affair). This reached the extent that the murdered sharif's brother 'had to request the Governor-General and all the Turkish Authorities to retire to their homes till the first paroxysm of grief had passed'.[42] While the Ottomans were thus occasionally seen to be under threat from the urban population, their military was still deemed by consuls and the urban population crucial for the defence of Jeddah against the Bedouin.[43] Finally, even Ottoman soldiers could not always be relied on to secure the position of the Ottoman government, as they were often paid badly or not at all, and thus were prone to mutiny.[44]

European consuls often expressed their exasperation at the implicit and explicit obstacles they faced in their daily work. After commenting on the negative effects of the decision of the newly appointed governor, Mahmud Pasha, to take Mecca as his seat of government, the French consul La Valette de Montbrun summarised:

> Pour lui [the governor], en effet, les traités n'existent pas n'ont jamais existé car il est d'une ignorance antique. Il n'est donc pas surprenant qu'il soit peu disposé à les exécuter. Aussi considère-t-il comme ses enemis naturels des agents dont la mission est de veiller à la stricte application des conventions internationales et de lui en rappeler les prescriptions lorsqu'il viendrait à s'en écarter.[45]

The question, I would argue, goes beyond the 'ignorance antique' of the governor. Apart from the fact that the Ottoman Empire was changing rapidly in this period and one cannot automatically assume full agreement with the Ottoman reforms (known as *tanzimat*) among each and every official, the policies of avoidance, prevarication and obstruction were among the ways in which Ottoman officials could and did reduce the pressure of the Western consulates towards them. One may assume that this was even, more often than not, in accordance with the interests, if not the explicit wishes, of their government.

Finally, it might be worth mentioning that the Jeddah consuls were not exactly at the top of the hierarchies of their respective foreign services. Thus, a number of British consuls seem to have had problems in meeting their expenses from the rather low reimbursements or salaries they received.[46] When, in a situation of extreme duress, namely after the murder and wounding of Western consular staff in 1895, including the French consulate's chancellor, the French consul tried urgently to organise transport from Jeddah to Suez and therefore communicated directly with Paris, his superior in Constantinople, instead of expressing regret for the events, sent the following telegraph: 'Renseignez-moi d'urgence sur le grave incident d'hier dont j'ai connaissance par les télègr. de vos collègues—votre silence s'il n'est explique, mériterait un blâme sevère.'[47] Such display of insensitivity certainly must have added to the feeling of working in an altogether hostile environment, and may well have contributed to a feeling of general insecurity.

## Problems Encountered by the Consuls

### *Communication*

As outlined above, the consuls were faced with a complicated and often impenetrable local situation. Most consuls tried to establish good relations with both the governors, as their official counterparts, and the *sharif*s, although this was mostly done by letters or through the visits of Muslim employees of the consulates, given the sharif's residence in Mecca. Even before Mecca became the official seat of the governor during the provincial reform of 1872, some governors had preferred to take up residence in the Holy City. This might have been done partly in order to counter the sharifian influence, partly to avoid pressure by the foreign consuls in periods of conflict.[48] At times, the consuls were apparently required to communicate with the governors of the Hijaz (*wali*) via the *qa'immaqam*s (the administrators of Jeddah, often confusingly also termed *wali*). This could become difficult due to the frequent rivalries between governor and *qa'immaqam*.[49] At other times, the *qa'immaqam* needed authorisation from Constantinople if he wished to communicate with the consuls, presumably for the same reason.[50] The opening of the telegraph connection between Jeddah, Mecca and Suakin on the Sudanese coast in 1882 somewhat ameliorated this situation as it speeded up communication both within the Hijaz as well as with Constantinople, unless the Bedouin interrupted the cable connection.[51]

Communication was also an issue between the (vice-)consuls and their superiors in Cairo respectively Constantinople. Although a regular steamer route was opened between Bombay and Suez in 1837, it took some time for Jeddah to become a regular port of call.[52] In 1838, Vice-Consul Ogilvie, whose own voyage from Cairo to Jeddah had taken sixteen days,[53] complained that a ship bound for Suez had not called at Jeddah, 'by which means I should have been able to have forwarded this packet, twenty days sooner'.[54] Before the onset of steamshipping, letters from Jeddah to Cairo took six weeks and more, if they arrived at all.[55] Although this situation improved with the increase in trade, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 as well as the above-mentioned connection to the telegraph, Jeddah still remained a relatively remote post in a potentially hostile environment.

### *Representation and Protection: Consular Functions and Frustrations*

The representation and protection of both Western and imperial subjects *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman authorities was, as mentioned before, one of the main tasks of the consuls, and the source of a variety of conflicts with the Ottoman authorities. One underlying issue was the question of who was entitled to foreign protection and who would represent particular foreign nationals. This was fairly complicated, given that rules and nationality laws changed and new rights for foreigners could also change rules about which law applied.[56]

With regard to Western Europeans, recognition of protection by the Ottomans seems to have been fairly easy to obtain and rather a matter of agreement between the European powers and the Ottoman Empire. Given the aforementioned perception

of hierarchies, it is perhaps not surprising that the consuls were not always enthusiastic in their support for fellow Europeans. This, together with the fear of potentially embarrassing occasions, might have prompted both British and French consuls repeatedly to reject the granting of protection to Italians and Greeks who had hoped to open wine shops in Jeddah.[57] If protected Europeans were found guilty of fraudulent behaviour, the consuls could withdraw their protection.[58]

Far more controversial were European claims to the protection of Muslims, be they from Algeria, India or Russia. Thus, in 1877, the governor of the Hijaz still claimed that all pilgrims came under Ottoman jurisdiction and that the consuls consequently had no right to represent them.[59] The Europeans were, on the contrary, quite keen to spread protection widely, as the British offer of protection to all Afghans in 1890 illustrates.[60] Similarly, in 1908, the British vice-consul in Hodeida (interestingly enough, however, not the consul in Jeddah who was his superior) claimed to represent people of Hadhrami origin, who since the 1880s came under a loose protectorate, much to the irritation of the Ottoman officials.[61] Thus, the question of who was allowed to protect which foreigners was seen by the Ottomans partly as one of the recognition of foreign rule over territories formerly ruled or claimed by the Ottoman Empire, partly as one of their own prestige in the wider Muslim world.[62]

Of particular concern to the Ottomans was the claim by Western powers to protect Central Asian Muslims, notably before, but even after the opening of the Russian consulate. The French consul stated categorically in a letter to the *qa'immaqam* in response to an answer about the Russian pilgrims' right of protection, that this was none of the *qa'immaqam*'s business: 'L'autorité locale ottomane n'a rien à voir dans les affaires du Consulat avec des sujets où des protégés.'[63] As will be shown below, court cases were one of the arenas in which such disputes came to the fore and were fought out.

If Western protection of Muslims in Jeddah was a sensitive issue, its extension to Mecca was even more so. Consul Stanley in 1861 thought that it would be useful to have a trustworthy agent in Mecca, but considered it problematic as Christians were not admitted to the city. As regards the possible appointment of a Muslim, he mused that 'it would be difficult to find an Oriental who would not in all probability abuse the power conferred on him', and thus concluded that 'such a remedy is impracticable'.[64] The British view on this matter changed a few years later, but the Ottomans had clear reservations. When the British formally asked for the accreditation of Indian medical doctor Abdur Razzaq as vice-consul in 1882, ostensibly to care for the pilgrims but also to keep an eye on Muslims in the Hijaz, the Ottoman response was muted: 'There is an evident objection on the part of the Vali, civilly + indirectly but plainly expressed, to see the Jeddah Consulate supplemented by an officer who with a Mussalman's right of visiting Mecca has the opportunity of obtaining some increased influence there for Her Majesty's Government.'[65] Apparently, this was initially linked to an explicit mention of the vice-consul's right to protect British subjects. In order to dissipate Ottoman concerns and secure the general agreement, the consul then suggested glossing over the issue of protection in the official documents.

Until the mid-1870s, the Jeddah consulates repeatedly had only the status of vice-consulates in the hierarchy of the Western powers' foreign services.[66] This meant that Vice-Consul Stanley faced problems when dealing with legal cases concerning British subjects, as he was meant to refer them to the embassy in Constantinople. In a somewhat exasperated letter of 1860, he complained of his 'want of power as Vice-Consul to deal with cases that might constantly be brought before me' and asked that 'His Majesty's Commission should be granted to me, conferring on me the power to decide summarily cases, and to inflict punishment without waiting for instructions from my superintending Consul'.[67] His supporting argument is also pertinent to the problem of communications detailed above:

> In support of my request, I have the honor to submit for Your Lordships consideration the great delay in, and almost defeat of, justice that exists at this Vice-Consulate owing to my want of power.
>
> In all other cases I believe where there is merely a Vice-Consul his superintending Consul is within a moderate distance, and mutual communication is easy, so that justice does not suffer through the delay in bringing any case which requires his decision before him, but in this case my superintending Consul is the Consul General at Constantinople and several months may elapse before I can obtain an answer to any communication made to him.
>
> Numerous cases are brought before me for which a few days imprisonment would be a suitable punishment, but which I have not power to inflict.[68]

He bolstered his argument by referring to the large number (500) of British resident subjects and the many thousand pilgrims from territories under British rule. It was, he argued, necessary to be able to react quickly and imprison offenders, notably in the cases of offending pilgrims. Otherwise, these might escape punishment through a speedy departure. His arguments convinced his superiors to extend his judicial powers.[69]

Consular legislation was also a cause for concern in cases involving both Ottoman and Western subjects. After 1847, mixed courts for commercial and criminal cases had been established in many provincial towns of the Ottoman Empire. Consul Stanley reported in 1861 about a dispute in which the governor apparently had tried a British subject in a case in which the consul felt that a mixed (i.e. British-Ottoman) tribunal should have been convened. Somewhat resigned, he concluded 'that I had no power to prevent his so trying cases, but that I should certainly take no part in such trials, and would protest against him for thus acting'.[70] The objection was not just a matter of principle, as Stanley was concerned that neither Christians nor (Muslim) Indians received fair trials in the courts and that flogging and torture were regular means to obtain confessions. However, he had to recognise in the same context that a mixed tribunal could not be established due to the want of suitable European judges.

A particularly revealing conflict is the following: in 1861, two British subjects were tried in the British consulate. One of them, a certain Abdul Bokeen, decided that he would be better served by seeking protection elsewhere and fled to the Persian consul, who granted him protection. Consul Stanley intervened with the *qa'immaqam*

whom he eventually convinced that he had good evidence for his claim that Abdul Bokeen was a British subject. When the penalty payment was due, Abdul Bokeen once again sought protection in the Persian consulate. The *qa'immaqam*, at that moment acting Persian consul, referred the case to the governor, who instructed him to await the return of the Persian ambassador (probably referring to the consul) from Constantinople. When Stanley's protests were ignored, a conflict erupted, and he claimed that the *qa'immaqam* 'chose then, rather than possibly offend the Persian Ambassador, to neglect his duty, to insult me publicly, and to despise and set at nought my just claims and rights'. Stanley thereupon demonstratively closed the consulate and asked the French acting consul to represent British interests. He pleaded with his superiors to intervene in Constantinople so that the *pasha* (i.e. the governor) be 'reprimanded and ordered to make me an apology, that the Caimakam be entrusted with more power, and that the Persian Consul be dismissed, and his son punished'.[71] His following statement is so expressive of the feelings and frustrations of the representative of a great power that it merits quotation:

> As to my first demand I am aware that the Governor of Jedda, and the British Consul at Jedda are in very different positions, but as I am here to protect British interests, appointed by Her Majesty, and recommended to him by his own Sovereign, he is bound to aid me to the best of his power, and I am entitled to resent any neglect or refusal on his part to give me such aid. Naturally also in my intercourse with him, I am on terms of equality with him, and he is bound to treat me with proper respect, whereas I consider that in this instance as no others he has knowingly and with premeditation insulted me. I trust therefore that Your Excellency will consider that I am entitled to an apology not only personal to me, but on account of the affront publicly offered to me made publicly and formally with the customary recognition of the Flag, when again shown from the Consulate. I am quite aware that had the Ambassador not been expected, he would have given me up this man, as the whole correspondence shows that he knew I was making a just demand ... Had he done so, I know not whether the Persian Ambassador would have resented it—I however must decidedly consider that I have a right to resent his treatment of me. As to my second demand, it is only in the interests of British subjects, numbering nearly ten thousand, and representing the greater portion of the wealth of Jedda and Mecca that I make it.[72]

While Stanley's superiors had been somewhat reluctant about such drastic actions as the lowering of the British flag in an earlier case, they seem to have fully supported him this time. The affair was only rectified some six months later. On 15 December 1861, Stanley could finally report that the British flag was once again flying over the consulate.[73] Nevertheless, squabbles about the legal representation, especially that of Muslims, and other legal differences continued from time to time, not just between the Ottomans and the British, but also between the French and the Ottomans.[74]

### *Violence*

The most dramatic problem faced by the consuls and other people perceived as representatives of Western powers was doubtlessly not public humiliation, as mentioned

above, but outright violence. Jeddah was generally a fairly peaceful city, although crime rose considerably during the pilgrimage seasons. In 1909, the British consul commented that there was so little crime that the police was hardly needed.[75] Thus, most criminal cases documented by the consulates pertain to fraud and other commercial disputes. Nevertheless, occasional theft, robbery and attacks on individuals did occur with Europeans, Christians and European protected persons figuring as both victims and perpetrators.[76] The repeated attacks on the foreign consuls fall clearly outside the category of ordinary and petty crime, and it is not surprising that they tended to take place at times of heightened tension in the Hijaz, notably in the mid-1850s and the 1890s.[77] During the first period, British economic competition, in addition to pressure to abolish slavery, caused widespread unrest, during the second, hygiene and quarantine measures caused much local grievance.

On 4 June 1856, an Albanian soldier entered the British consulate. While the servant was looking for his master, the soldier attacked a visitor sitting in a chair with his back to the door, mistaking him for the consul.[78] The background to this attack remained unclear. Both British and French consuls speculated whether it was really, as the perpetrator claimed and the governor propounded to believe, only the individual act of a drunken soldier trying to escape maltreatment, punishment for the unauthorised leaving of his garrison or for another criminal act. An alternative explanation was that tensions between the *qa'immaqam* and the British formed the real background of the attack. Such tensions arose from different views on the Ottoman monopoly on the salt trade, which was held by the chief of police (*muhtasib*) of Jeddah. In addition, the wider context of the attack was ominous: in Mecca, a revolt had broken out in 1855 as a result of local rivalries as much as of the attempt to abolish slavery at the behest of the British. Furthermore, the rising economic role of British-protected Indians in Jeddah worried local merchants and sailors.[79] Thus, the attack could also be interpreted in a far more sinister way, although the consuls avoided any explicit allegations.

There existed an obvious parallel to an earlier attempt on the life of the first French consul, Fulgence de Fresnel, in 1848.[80] In his case, the *muhtasib* was also suspected to have been implicated. This was not, as the British vice-consul reasoned, because of religious zeal but because of his fear 'that with the establishment of Consuls he is unable to extort such sums as he pleases from the subjects or protégés of those powers, and therefore uses his influence with the fanatical portion of the residents chiefly the Mahamoots to promote hatred against us, he is known too clever to appear openly'.[81] The same *muhtasib*, Abdallah, reappears in the context of the best-known attack on the Western consulates and other Europeans, the massacre of June 1858.[82] In a dispute about which flag a certain ship had to fly (and thus which legislation it came under), the British consul allegedly trampled on the Ottoman flag which the (Indian) owner had chosen to fly in order to obtain immunity from British (Indian) claims and attempts at confiscating the vessel. This seems to have been the spark which ignited grudges that had built up over time. On the evening of 15 June, a mob attacked first the British consulate, murdering the vice-consul, and then turned on the French consulate, killing the consul and his wife. Then, other

non-Muslims and their properties were assaulted. Altogether 22 persons were murdered, among them seven Turkish subjects.[83] In addition, huge damage was inflicted on a number of often Cairo-based firms.[84]

In 1895, another major attack occurred on a group of foreign consuls and officials who had gone for a walk along the beach.[85] The most plausible theory that emerged afterwards in the consular milieu was that the attack was mainly aimed at Dr Abdur Razzaq, who died while the British consul, the chancellor of the French consulate and the acting Russian consul were wounded. In his role as British vice-consul and doctor as well as a prominent member of the British-Indian community, Abdur Razzaq had played a major role in pressing the Ottomans to improve the sanitary conditions in Jeddah and Mecca, causing much popular discontent. Was it really a mere coincidence that on the day of the attack, the disinfecting machine in Mecca was destroyed and shortly afterwards a clinic attacked?[86]

Obviously, such attacks were a disaster on many counts, and Ottoman reactions did not do much to remedy the situation. In 1856, the *qa'immaqam* refused a joint meeting with the British and French consuls to discuss the attempted murder of the consul. At least, the culprit was immediately apprehended and punished. In 1858, the *qa'immaqam* intervened shortly after the riot broke out and managed to protect some of the victims of the attack. He maintained, however, that the British had made a mistake in confiscating the ship, and had thus triggered the whole affair.[87] He also rejected the offer of help in putting down the riot, made by William Pullen, captain of a British ship which happened to be at Jeddah in preparation of the laying of submarine cables.

The governor of the Hijaz had been in Mecca when the unrest occurred in 1858. He immediately sent troops and a letter to Jeddah, asking for the instant restoration of order. During a council in Mecca, however, the assembled notables expressed their clear support for the riot and suggested that the European powers be defied. Only by arguing with the threat of a European attack against Ottoman towns could the governor convince them to support his policy of appeasement. Torn between popular anti-Christian sentiment and the need to calm Captain Pullen and the European powers, the governor managed to keep the disputed ship under temporary Ottoman control.

The British foreign secretary threatened the use of force should the Ottomans not react promptly to the incident and punish the murderers. For that reason, he ordered Pullen, who had taken the wounded and reports of the incident to Suez from where they were sent to Constantinople, to return to Jeddah. The Ottomans, under threat of military action, immediately decided to send troops and have the culprits punished. Thereupon, the British decided that they should leave the action to the Ottomans, in order not to excite further anti-Christian sentiment.[88] This, however, was not communicated to Pullen's superiors at the Admiralty until 7 August 1858. Unaware of these decisions in London and Constantinople, Pullen had returned to Jeddah. Not accepting the governor's argument about the need for confirmation of the death penalty by Constantinople and mindful of the order to obtain speedy punishment for the culprits, he issued an ultimatum on July 23: unless the murderers were

executed within 36 hours, he would bombard Jeddah. And this he did. It took the governor, who was in Mecca on the pilgrimage, a few days to negotiate a temporary ceasefire with Pullen. The arrival of the first Ottoman envoy from Constantinople on 5 August set the path for the execution of a first group of culprits and the restoration of the consulates. A series of international investigations into the affair followed, once again obtained by the Europeans through threat with renewed force. During these, the prominent role of Abdallah, the *muhtasib*, a close ally of the grand sharif, in inciting the massacre was one of the remarkable findings.[89] Although it is clear that it was partly the aforementioned problem of communications which contributed to the escalation of the affair, Pullen's misgivings about Ottoman prevarication were shared by many of the diplomats in Constantinople, Cairo and Jeddah, who became involved in the affair.[90]

If anything, such feelings were even more pronounced after the murder of the consuls in 1895. While the reports demonstrate clearly that the Ottoman authorities were themselves afraid of the wrath of a population clearly enraged by the sanitary measures, and feared attacks on their position in Mecca and Jeddah, they also show exasperation about what the consuls felt was Ottoman prevarication.[91] It emerged rather quickly that the assailants, black slaves presumably belonging to the Harb tribe, had been merely acting on orders given by somebody else. However, the person(s) behind the attack were not found or named, nor were the governor or indeed the grand sharif, whom many suspected of inciting the incident, removed from office.[92]



## The Limited Effect of Consular Responses

The feelings of helplessness expressed by many of the imperial powers' agents in Jeddah resulted from their very limited range of possible actions, given their diplomatic position, their ethnic and political background and the complicated political setting in an environment which was usually perceived as hostile. The following discussion of possible options considers the period between the 1830s and 1914 as a whole, although obvious variations existed, both in the international context and in the local political setting. However, even such a generalised consideration shows that, while many of the options were similar to those of consuls elsewhere, their effects in the Hijazi context differed considerably from that of the same measures elsewhere.[93] So how could consuls react in an official way, and what results did they achieve?[94]

In cases of local disputes regarding, for example, legal matters or the treatment of foreign protected subjects, consuls could and did address the local authorities directly, usually the *qa'immaqam* of Jeddah and/or the governor of the Hijaz, in certain cases also the grand sharif of Mecca. After Consul Ogilvie had been accosted in the streets of Jeddah, he complained to the governor (presumably the *qa'immaqam*) and a statement was recorded in his *diwan*. The affair was then transmitted to the governor in Mecca (presumably the *wali*) and no more heard of. Ogilvie consequently wrote to his superiors: 'I therefore trust you will deem it necessary to seek an explanation

from a higher quarter, in order to protect not only myself but all other Englishmen who may visit Juddah from the insults of the rabble of the Pasha.'[95] In a number of cases, consuls attempted to coordinate and form consular delegations to the *qa'immaqam* or *wali*, for instance after the attempt on the British consul's life in 1856. It is impossible to comment on how successful such a strategy was in general, but, given the aforementioned restrictions on such communication at certain times as well as the frequent tensions between *qa'immaqam*, governor and *sharif*, one may assume that it worked only during the rare times of favourable personal constellation.

In more serious cases, the consuls could try to influence the Ottoman authorities by asking their own embassies to intervene either directly or via the respective ministry of foreign affairs. One example was Ogilvie's quest for intervention. This, however, was a lengthy and usually inconsequential process, with the partial exception of imperial intervention in the cases of serious violence. There are a few documented cases in which the reverse process also occurred, i.e. the consuls were asked by the embassies to explain their behaviour after an intervention by the Turkish Foreign Ministry based on a complaint by the governor or *qa'immaqam*.[96]

If the consuls wanted to show their displeasure publicly on the local level, they had to revert to symbolic politics: to fly their consular flags on Sundays and on special occasions or to refrain from it, to close the consulate altogether and hand over the consular insignia to a colleague or not to visit the Ottoman authorities on certain festive occasions.[97] For example, when the investigations into the murders of 1895 did not advance, the consuls asked their embassies whether they should—as was customary—raise their flags in greeting and send a congratulatory card to the governor who had not visited the consuls on the occasion of the breaking of the fast at the end of Ramadan.[98]

The aforementioned case of the dispute about a British subject seeking the protection of the Persian consulate combines a number of these symbolical acts, and the consul expected a public apology combined with 'the customary recognition of the Flag, when again shown from the Consulate'.[99] Apparently, the governor had also asked his superiors for support, so that Stanley had to justify himself.[100] Once such a level of confrontation had been reached, reconciliation also required instructions from the superiors at both ends: on 13 November 1861, Stanley reported that he had 'proposed to re-hoist the Flag this Day, and have received to-day an answer that he [i.e. the wali] has received no instructions from Constantinople, and therefore cannot order a salute, or the official visits, so I have of course delayed hoisting the flag.'[101] Presumably due to the slow speed of communications, it took almost another month until the affair could be settled with the customary ceremonial: 'On the 10th instant I rehoisted the Flat at this Consulate . . . After the flag had been hoisted and I duly saluted, the acting Caimakam called on me, and I returned his visit a few hours afterwards . . . The Caimakam received me with all the honour accorded to a Consul here on his first arrival.' Incidentally, the Persian Consul also used the occasion for a reconciliation which the Embassy had not foreseen:

> The Persian Consul also called on me the same day, notwithstanding the order to the contrary as transmitted with Your Excellency's Despatch . . . He said he had received instructions to call on me the day the Flag was hoisted. Such being the case, and as I could not refuse to receive him, not knowing of his intention to call on me until he was at the door, I thought I should best carry out Your Excellency's intention by calling on him the next day.[102]

Such ceremonial politics went a long way in re-establishing the local interpretation of legitimate power relationships.[103] The complaint of Consul Stanley to the British Foreign Ministry in 1861 quoted above demonstrates the exceptional position of the European consuls. On the international scene, the recognition of the Ottoman Empire as an equal partner in the European system of powers had long been disputed, and it acquired this rank officially only in 1818 or even 1856.[104] In addition, it came to be regarded by the British after 1853 as the 'sick man of Europe'. The British consul's complaint about the breach of the 'natural hierarchy', which granted him equality with the governor in their intercourse, demonstrates that this was not always a perception shared by the Ottomans. The ceremonial display was thus needed to reconfirm his position not only *vis-à-vis* the Ottomans, but also *vis-à-vis* the wider population.

The public celebration of the British coronation in 1902 demonstrates the increased British confidence. Thus, the British consul could report proudly 'a full dress reception on the morning with many expressions for the King's health and prosperity and long reign both by His Excellency the Governor General and others, and this Consulate was decorated by day and illuminated at night'.[105]

In many cases, however, such public ceremonial did not really help or could even prove counterproductive, because the Ottomans themselves had to walk a tight rope between local and Sharifian interests and pressures and those coming from the Western powers. As becomes evident in the cases of the attempted and perpetrated killings, it sometimes was not even entirely clear who the real opponent of the consuls was. Neither the Sharif nor potentially fanatical elements within the population of Jeddah could, after all, be impressed by symbolical gestures of the Ottomans towards the Western powers—quite to the contrary. Thus, there was a strong feeling among the consuls, notably in times of crisis, that a real show of force was needed.

While originally British and French ships were called upon to secure regular shipping, this changed with the 1858 outbreak of violence, as shown above. Captain Pullen, who had ordered the shelling of Jeddah, certainly felt he was fulfilling his orders. The governor, whose forces had not responded to the bombardment, complained of the violence and abuse of power. A French official reasoned that, although the governor's views might have been justified, the bombardment had made 'un effet de plus salutaires' on him and on the population of Jeddah.[106] Presumably, the public execution of the culprits added to this effect.[107] The great powers, in order to obtain first the execution of further prime suspects and later a proper investigation, used the renewed threat of bombardment, enforced by the presence of a number of armed vessels, to 'encourage' a thorough investigation of the case.[108]

The memory of the bombardment, which had caused a number of deaths and much damage to the city, remained vivid in people's minds. Thus, in 1863, Consul Stanley

argued in favour of regular visits by British men of war to Jeddah 'on account of the fanatical disposition of the people, whose fanaticism however is easily held in check by the still stronger feeling with them, fear—they now being aware of the power of a man of war'.[109]

Given this precedent, it is not surprising that the consuls demanded a quick deployment of military vessels in 1895. The French consul urged his ambassador that it was not sufficient for the British to send a ship. In addition, he suggested that Jeddah needed to be occupied provisionally by foreign troops in order to secure the implementation of the sanitary measures against the imposition of which the attack was ostensibly directed.[110] When within one month not much progress was made in finding the culprits, the consul mused that it would be useful to jail a number of leading notables and Bedouin shaykhs in Jeddah in order to exert pressure. As the Ottoman government was not likely to resort to such measures, he suggested that a Franco-British occupation of the Ottoman barracks might be a way to achieve the desired end.[111] When, yet another month later, no progress was visible, the consul suggested that when the French man of war was to leave a few days later, the consulate ought to be closed and he and his staff leave as well. He suggested underlining this demonstration by halting the Algerian pilgrimage in an attempt to hurt Ottoman and Muslim feelings.[112]

Both the French and the British consuls sent repeated demands to their governments for the continued presence of foreign warships.[113] When, a few months later, an agreement about compensation for the dead had been reached, the French consul continued to demand the execution of the perpetrators: 'les populations encore à demi-barbares de ce pays ne comprendraient pas que nous ayons pu accepter une autre solution ou du main l'interprèteraient comme une preuve de notre faiblesse et partout du peu de considération que nous méritons.'[114] Merely a year later, the situation became once again instable. Demands for a Western military presence offshore were immediately tabled.[115] Similarly, in the context of the Young Turk revolt in 1908, the British consul demanded that a man of war 'not further off than Aden should be available for Jeddah'.[116]

Not all consuls, it should be added, supported the use of force. In a rather unusual intervention, Acting Consul Moncrieff, interestingly somebody with a military background, argued strongly against the presence of a British warship in the context of the uprising by the Harb Bedouins in 1883. Not only would this insult the Ottomans but, even worse, it might alienate the tribesmen who were currently inclined towards the British. Furthermore, a poor British performance, which he expected 'in a strange town with narrow streets and no knowledge of the inhabitants', might result in the British losing face.[117] His line of argument underlines that personalities played a major role in how situations were perceived and handled.

## Conclusions

This paper has shown not only some of the problems faced by the consuls of Western powers in a far-off Ottoman province, but also how they, at least at times, felt exposed

and helpless, particularly in their roles as representatives of great imperial powers. As has been demonstrated, they often sensed that they could hold their position only with the aid of military support from their governments, as the Ottoman governors were either unwilling and/or unable to protect them.

This contrasts significantly with the situation of European consuls in other Ottoman cities closer to Constantinople. As Hourani has argued, and as has been shown for the case of Beirut and, to some extent, for other Syrian towns, consuls there were able to assume the role of notables and enter the local power games. This was due to their ability to ally themselves to the local Christian communities for which the respective European powers had assumed protection. Although the Ottoman authorities obviously disapproved of such behaviour and attempted to restrict it as much as possible, these consuls could still at times exert considerable influence through their triple link to the local population, the imperial embassies in Constantinople and, if the need arose, the threat of direct military support from France and Britain.[118] In Jeddah, by contrast, there was no sufficiently large and economically influential Christian community which actively sought European backing. The (Muslim) imperial subjects living in Jeddah, most notably the Indians as the largest community of imperial subjects settled in Jeddah, were divided in their political and religious loyalties, and, if settled in Jeddah for a sufficient period, could choose their nationality according to their best interest. From the consular perspective, it was problematic to invest too much in such an unreliable clientele. Thus, the consuls usually had no substantial local allies. In addition, the distance from Constantinople (and of course Europe), and the therefore comparatively tenuous possibility of obtaining support from the imperial powers they represented further weakened the position of the Jeddah consuls.

As mentioned before, the situation presented itself differently in the few cases where Muslims, such as Dr Abdur Razzaq, acted as consuls or their representatives. In spite of his eventual death, he seems to have been better able to communicate and mediate the different interests. This is in line with the experience of the British in the Gulf, where the agency system was at its most successful as long as 'native agents', mostly Muslim merchants, were employed.[119]

Beside the evident need to distinguish between European consuls in different parts of the Ottoman Empire, which to some extent qualifies Hourani's perspective, are there other general conclusions which can be drawn? An obvious point might be the temptation to use more force. While, in times of crisis, the consuls certainly urged their governments to consider such an option, there is little evidence to show that this was translated into practice beyond what was 'usual' in the period. Thus, while it is true that the gunboat became, to quote a British colonel active in Burma, a '"political persuader", with fearful instruments of speech, in an age of progress', in other words, a more or less normal 'tool of imperialism', it is not evident that it was used in Jeddah more than elsewhere.[120] After all, the consuls did not themselves dispose of any direct access to military force, and their rather protracted indirect communication with Europe via Constantinople meant that their own gut reactions were thoroughly mediated before even reaching the centre of decision-making in London or

Paris. Even the 1858 incident, where military force was used, illustrates this point: the captain of the ship which bombarded Jeddah, Pullen, was a representative of the British Empire who happened to be *in situ* at the time of conflict. He acted more or less impulsively and in ignorance of the protracted process of imperial decision-making. Thus, 1858 seems a case of typical gunboat diplomacy by a man who happened to be on the spot in a moment of crisis. Consequently, the bombardment of Jeddah reflects neither direct consular action nor a response by the European empires to a particularly precarious consular position.

Given the overall perception of the Ottomans as the 'sick man of Europe', it is interesting to see how the European presence could be circumscribed in an outlying, albeit centrally important province. As this aim united the local population and the rulers, the Europeans could make little inroads in building local alliances. Consequently, the seemingly all-powerful representatives of the Western empires became anything but all-powerful once posted in the Ottoman outpost of Jeddah, even though their influence and public presence increased significantly at the very end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries, as is exemplified by the increasingly public display of their presence.[121]



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**Notes**

[1] Acting British Consul Moncrieff to Foreign Minister, 28 July 1883 (FO 195/1451, PRO).
[2] Schölch, 'Der arabische Osten im neunzehnten Jahrhundert 1800–1914', 383.
[3] For a history of the courts, see Heidborn, *Manuel de droit public*, 217–24; Eichmann, *Die Reformen*, 219–24, 427; Peters, *Crime and Punishment*, 128–29.
[4] Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform', 105–08.
[5] Ibid., 108.
[6] Cole, 'Of Crowds and Empires', 129. This merits separate discussion on the relationship between notables and crowds.
[7] Masters, *Christians and Jews*, 165; cf. Schlicht, 'Role of Foreign Powers', 122–23.
[8] Reinkowski, 'Das Osmanische Reich', para. 6.; cf. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*; Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*.
[9] One such exception was Grand-Sharif Husayn (murdered in 1880), whom the British apparently hoped to cultivate as a potentially pro-British local ruler. See Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 247.
[10] For the political developments in the Hijaz in the period under discussion, see Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State*; Al-Amr, 'The Hijaz under Ottoman Rule'.
[11] Viscount Valentia, *Voyages and Travels to India*, 332.
[12] According to Onley, *Arabian Frontier*, 18, 64, this goes back to about 1802.

[13] Pol. Dept. Bombay to Court of Directors, 14 May 1833, F/4/1440, 56916, India Office Records, London (IOR); 'History of British Representation in Jedda up to 1930' by Sir Andrew Ryan, 22 March 1936, FO 905/37, PRO.

[14] Vice-Consul Ogilvie to Col. Campbell, 21 March 1838, R/19/1, IOR. The East India Register and Directory mentions only an agent and vice consul since Ogilvie's appointment (2nd edn, May 1838), and this is reflected in the introduction to the R19 series, which mentions 1837 as the starting date of the Packet Agency at Jeddah.

[15] Ogilvie to Agent and Consul-General, 1 May 1838, The Memorial of A. C. Ogilvie, Packet Agent at Juddah, R/19/1, IOR.

[16] A possible exception is the purportedly Armenian and certainly Levantine background of Consul Zohrab who was, however, thoroughly British in education and culture (cf. 'Descendants'). The Swedish appointed the British vice-consul and Indian Muslim Abdur Razzaq as their representative.

[17] Spelt alternatively Giorgio Sarkis, probably Jurji Sarkis.

[18] A.-S. Cras, 'Répertoire numérique détaillé', 1; letter by Sarkiz, 30 Oct. 1842, Constantinople Ambassade (Amb.) D-Djeddah 1, 1841–57, Ministère des Affaires Étrangers: Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN); cf. Sabatier to M.A.E., 29 Nov. 1858, Corresp. départ avec le M.A.E. et l'ambassade de France à Constantinople 1858–1864, CADN.

[19] The embassy website gives 1869 as a date. Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, 148, dates the opening of the consulate to 1872; cf. Roff, 'Sanitation and Security', 149.

[20] Kongl. Utrikes Departementet to W. Hanegraaf, 3 March 1876, SE/RA/231/231059, National Archives of Sweden, Konsulatarkiv Jeddah, Stockholm. I would like to thank the archivist, Ulf Berggren, for providing me with this document.

[21] Ambassade Impériale de Russe, Const., to French Consul, 14 May 1891, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 35, CADN.

[22] Consul Wood to Ambassador, Constantinople, 9 May 1889, FO 195/1653, PRO; Sabban, 'Jidda', 29.

[23] Memorandum respecting State of Affairs connected with the Jeddah Consulate, 7 Nov. 1877, FO 881/3801, Confidential Print 3801, PRO; cf. Vice-Consul Wylde to Foreign Secretary, 29 Jan. 1878, FO 78/2870, PRO, and the passing remarks in Affaires contentieuses, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 73, CADN.

[24] For example, Consul Watbled to Amb., Const., 29 Oct. 1888, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 4, CADN.

[25] Dequié to Amb., Const., 11 March 1854, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 1, CADN; British Vice-Consul Abdur Razzaq to Ambassador, Const., 20 Aug. 1892, FO 197/1767, PRO.

[26] Niebuhr, *Reisebeschreibung*, 271f.

[27] Acting Consul Hussain to Ambassador, Const., 18 Sep. 1899, FO 195/2061, PRO; Sabban, 'Jidda', 30f.; Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, 165.

[28] Clear exceptions are British consul Raby (1865–71) and French consul Buez (1873–78), whose letters abound with complaints about the unpleasant social, physical and political environment, Raby also taking prolonged periods of leave on health grounds, FO 78/1874, 2151, 2194, PRO, and Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 4, CADN.

[29] Ogilvie to Consul-General, Cairo, 31 Oct. 1838, R/19/1, IOR. For similar incidents, cf. Queen vs. Mohamed Rafiat Khan, 29 April 1878, FO 78/2870, PRO, and Wylde to Elliot (Consul, Cairo), 26 March 1876, FO 195/1103, PRO.

[30] It seems that Husayn Pasha might have been the commander of the local troops.

[31] Consul Zohrab to Ambassador, Const., 21 March 1879, FO 685/2, PRO.

[32] Consul Zohrab to Ambassador, Const., 28 April 1880, FO 195/1313, PRO; Johur to Layard, 9 June 1880, FO 195/1313, PRO.

[33] Descoutures to Ambassador, Const., 7 Nov. 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 6, CADN, with reference to events in 1883 and 1891 as well as 1895.

[34] Consul Stanley to Consul-General, Cairo, 8 Jan. 1861, FO 685/1, PRO.
[35] Consul Buez to French Ambassador, Const., 12 March 1875, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 4, CADN.
[36] Consul Beyts to Embassy (Emb.), Const., 3 Nov. 1876, FO 195/1104, PRO; Consul Moncrieff to British Ambassador, Const., 7 May 1882, FO 195/1415, PRO; no. 25 to Caimacam, no date, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 37, CADN; no. 122 of 19 Nov. 1890, Wali to Consul, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 37, CADN.
[37] Consul Stanley to Consul-General, Cairo, 8 Jan. 1861, FO 685/1, PRO; cf. Const. Amb. série D-1, 1847, CADN. A change of nationality was also at the root of the conflict leading to the massacre of Christians in 1858, see Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State*, 143–51; for further accounts on changes of nationality, Isma'il, *Jidda*, 35–39, 183–90.
[38] Governor of Jeddah to British Consul, 30 April 1878, FO 2870, PRO; Richard Jorelle, Acting French Vice-Consul, to Consul Beyts, 6 May 1878, FO 2870, PRO, and related documents.
[39] Consul Outrey to Amb., Const., 30 June 1855, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 1, CADN.
[40] Cf. Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State*, 186-90; Isma'il, *Jidda*, 13-18; Acting Consul Moncrieff to Ambassador, Const., 1 Aug. 1881, FO 195/1375, PRO; Consul Jago to Emb., Const., 5 March 1885, FO 195/1514, PRO; Consul Richards to Ambassador, Const., 16 Dec. 1892, FO 195/1767, PRO.
[41] Vice-Consul Wylde to Ambassador, Const., 8 April 1878, FO 78/2849, PRO.
[42] Consul Zohrab to Ambassador, Const., 16 March 1880, FO 195/1313, PRO.
[43] Acting Consul Moncrieff to Vali, 6 Aug. 1883, FO 195/1451, PRO; cf. letters Moncrieff to Ambassador, Const., 6 July 1883, 27 July 1883, ibid.
[44] Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State*, 140–41; Consul Zohrab to Emb., Const., 11 Jan. 1881, FO 195/1375, PRO; various reports in FO 195/2169, 2174, PRO; 7 June 1904, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 15, CADN.
[45] Consul La Valette de Montbrun to Amb., Const., 19 Jan. 1857, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 1, CADN.
[46] Vice-Consul Ogilvie to Agent and Consul-General, 1 May 1838, The Memorial of A. C. Ogilvie, Packet Agent at Juddah, R/19/1, IOR; Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department to HM Secretary of State for India, 21 May 1895, L/PS/7/80, IOR.
[47] Telegram from Cambron, Amb. Const., to French Consul, Jeddah, 31 May 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN; cf. Cambron to French Consul, 1 June 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN; Consul Descoutures to Amb., Const., 2 June 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN.
[48] Consul La Valette de Montbrun to Amb., Const., 19 Jan. 1857, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 1, CADN; Isma'il, *Jidda*, 13–14.
[49] Acting Consul Lostalot to Amb., Const., 15 Oct. 1885, Amb. Const. D-Djeddah 4, CADN.
[50] Isma'il, *Jidda*, 184, documents this for 1887–88.
[51] Acting Consul Moncrieff to Ambassador, Const., 4 April 1882, 18 May 1882, 29 Aug. 1882, FO 195/1415, PRO.
[52] Ochsenwald, 'Commercial History', 71.
[53] Vice-Consul Ogilvie to Agent and Consul-General, Cairo, 21 March 1838, R/19/1, IOR.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid. and Vice-Consul Ogilvie to Agent and Consul-General, Cairo, 18 Aug. 1883, R/19/1, IOR.
[56] Status des protégés français, no date, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 44, CADN.
[57] Stanley to Judge of Her Majesty's Supreme Consular Court, Const., 2 July 1861, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[58] Consul Zohrab to Emb., Const., 3 Feb. 1880 [1881], FO 195/1375, PRO.
[59] Consul Beyts to Elliot (Amb. Cairo), 13 Jan. 1877, FO 195/1147, PRO.
[60] Consul Wood to Ambassador, Const., 28 Feb. 1890, FO 195/1689, PRO.

[61] Vice-Consul Richardson to Ambassador, Const., 15 Feb. 1908, FO 195/2286, PRO; cf. Vice-Consul Richardson to Ambassador, Const., 10 May 1910, FO 195/2350, PRO.
[62] For further examples, see Isma'il, *Jidda*, 185–86.
[63] No. 38, letter to Caimmacam of 26. Dhu 'l-hijja 1305 h.; no. 50, letter of 21 June 1890; no. 51, Wali to Consul, 14 June 1890 and no. 52, draft response to no. 51, no date, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 37, CADN.
[64] Consul Stanley to Ambassador, Const., 20 June 1861, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[65] Acting Consul Moncrieff to Ambassador, Const., 9 Nov. 1882, FO 195/1415, PRO; further on Abdur Razzaq's tasks Foreign Dept., Gvt of India to HM Secretary of State for India, 18 Aug. 1882, L/PS/7/33, IOR, with enclosures; cf. Roff, 'Sanitation and Security'; Low, 'Empire and the Hajj', 280–85.
[66] For surveys of status and consular representatives, see Al-Amr, 'The Hijaz', 254–55; Cras, 'Répertoire numérique détaillé', 25–26.
[67] Vice-Consul Stanley to Foreign Secretary, 13 March 1860, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[68] Ibid.
[69] In his letter of 17 Aug. 1860, he thanked the Consul-General, Cairo, for the grant of commission as Her Majesty's Consul, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[70] Vice-Consul Stanley to Consul-General, Cairo, 8 Jan. 1860, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[71] Consul Stanley to Ambassador, Const., 20 June 1861, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Consul Stanley to Ambassador, Const., 16 Aug. 1861, 6 Sept. 1861, 4 Oct. 1861, 13 Nov. 1861, 15 Dec. 1861, FO 685/1-I, PRO; for the earlier case, see Stanley to Amb., Const., 8 Jan. 1861, and related documents, FO 195/681, PRO.
[74] Consul Stanley to Ambassador, Const., 26 April 1864, FO 195/879, PRO; cf. Consul Beyts to Foreign Office, 30 Jan. 1877, 13 Jan. 1877 and enclosures, FO 78/2649, PRO; for French cases, cf. nos 8, 10, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 37, CADN.
[75] Draft Confidential Report, Brit. Consul to Ambassador, Const., 12 March 1909, FO 685/3-VII, PRO.
[76] For the murder of an Ottoman Armenian subject, see Acting Consul Johur to Amb., Const., 4 June 1880, FO 195/1313, PRO; for the public disorderly behaviour of a Greek (of unspecified nationality) nos 31–32, letter to the French Vice-Consul, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 37, CADN; nos 317–22, theft from Algerian pilgrim by his landladies, Consulat à Djeddah, art. 73, CADN.
[77] Unfortunately, I have only very little information on the attempt on the life of Fulgence Fresnel, so that only the incidents of 1856, 1858 and 1895 will be discussed in the following.
[78] Lavalette de Montbrun to Amb., Const., 8 June 1856, 30 June 1856, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 1, CADN, and Acting Vice-Consul Page to Ambassador, Const., 9 June 1856 and 25 June 1856, FO 195/375, PRO.
[79] For the context, see Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State*, 137–39 and the notes on the muhtasib, 142–43.
[80] Lavalette de Montbrun to Amb., Const., 8 June 1856, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 1, CADN.
[81] Vice-Consul Sage to Ambassador, Const., 24 Oct. 1856, FO 195/375, PRO.
[82] On this, see Ochsenwald, 'Jidda Massacre'; Freitag, 'Handelsmetropole und Pilgerstation', 72–73. Probably the most comprehensive treatment of 1858, including a thorough discussion of the sources, albeit with some mistakes, is Pétriat, '"Fitna Djeddah"'.
[83] Captain Pullen to Secretary of the Admiralty, 25 June 1858, enclosure 12A, FO 195/579, PRO.
[84] FO 195/580, 581, PRO.
[85] In detail, Richards to Ambassador, Const., 17 June 1895, FO 195/1894, PRO; Vice-Consul Alban to Ambassador, Const., 17 Sep. 1895, FO 195/1894, PRO; Dossier: Incident de Djeddah. Cambon: Massacre des Consuls de France et d'Angleterre à Djeddah, le 15 juin 1858, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN.

[86] Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State*, 196–97.
[87] Captain Pullen to Sec. of the Admiralty, 25 June 1858, FO 195/579, PRO. The following is based on Ochsenwald, 'Jidda Massacre', 318–21; FO 881/848, PRO; Dossier: Incident de Djeddah. Cambon: Massacre des Consuls de France et d'Angleterre à Djeddah, le 15 juin 1858, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN.
[88] Bulwer, Ambassador Const., to Foreign Secretary, 26 July 1858, and Earl of Malmesbury, Foreign Secretary, to Amb., Const., 27 July 1858, FO 881/848, PRO. A similar argument was made by the French with regard to the intervention after the Syrian massacre in 1860, see Schlicht, *Frankreich*, 72.
[89] Ochsenwald, 'Jidda Massacre', 321–23.
[90] Cf. nos 1–6, Consulat à Djeddah 1, CADN.
[91] Letter dated Djeddah, 1 June 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN; Consul Descoutures to Amb., Const., 3 June, 8 June, 13 June 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN; Political Report from Jeddah Consulate to Emb., Const., 18 Aug.1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN; Descoutures to Ambassador, Const. 16 March and 30 March 1896, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN; Acting Consul Alban to Ambassador, Const., 19 Aug., 18 Aug., 23 Aug., 17 Sep., 11 Nov. 1895, 16 March and 2 April 1896, FO 195/1943, PRO.
[92] Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State*, 197–200.
[93] On this phenomenon, and the different factors influencing agency, see Emirbayer and Mische, 'What is Agency?'.
[94] This matter is discussed by Al-Amr, 'The Hijaz', 183–88.
[95] Acting Consul and Agent Ogilvie to Consul, Cairo, 31 Oct. 1838, R/19/1, IOR.
[96] For example, Sublime Porte, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, note verbale sent to French Ambassador, 11 Nov. 1888 and telegram by Amb., Const., to Consul Watbled, 12 Nov. 1888, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 4, CADN.
[97] On the hoisting of flags, for example Vice-Consul Buez to Ambassador, Const., 14 March 1875, 11 April 1875, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 4, CADN.
[98] Consul Descoutures to Amb., Const., 16 March 1896, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN; Acting Consul Alban to Ambassador, Const., 16 March 1896, FO 195/1896, PRO. For an earlier case in less dramatic circumstances, Vice-Consul Page to Ambassador, Const., 16 April 1857, FO 195/375, PRO.
[99] Consul Stanley to Amb., Const., 20 June 1861, FO 685/1-I, PRO; cf. Vice-Consul Cole to Ambassador, Const., 17 April 1854, FO 195/375, PRO.
[100] Consul Stanley to Ambassador, Const., 4 Oct. 1861, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[101] Consul Stanley to Ambassador, Const., 13 Nov. 1861, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[102] Consul Stanley to Ambassador, Const., 15 Dec. 1861, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[103] On the topic of symbolical politics in international relations, see Windler, 'Diplomatic History'; Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik*; Krischer, 'Souveränität'; cf. Mergel, 'Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte'.
[104] Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik*, 76; Komatsu, 'Die Türkei'.
[105] Consul Devey to Ambassador, Const., 24 June 1902 and 11 Aug. 1902, FO 195/2161, PRO. The coronation of Edward VII, initially scheduled for 24 June, had to be postponed due to an illness of the Heir Apparent, which news seem to have reached Jeddah too late.
[106] No. 4 by Sabatier, 22 Oct. 1859, Documents du Consulat Djeddah 1, CADN.
[107] Vice-Consul Calvert to Acting Consul-General Green, 8 Aug. 1858, 97, FO 881/848, PRO.
[108] Ochsenwald, 'Jidda Massacre', 322; no. 4 by Sabatier, 22 Oct. 1859, Documents du Consulat Djeddah 1, CADN.
[109] Consul Stanley to Colquhoun, 14 Jan. 1863, FO 685/1-I, PRO.
[110] Consul Descoutures to Amb., Const., 3 June 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN; cf. his letter of 15 June 1895.
[111] Consul Descoutures to Amb., Const., 20 July 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN.

[112] Consul Descoutures to Amb., Const., 27 Aug. 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN.
[113] Consul Descoutures to Amb., Const., 28 Aug. 1895, 31 Aug. 1895, 16 Sep. 1895, 14 Oct. 1895, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN; Acting Consul Alban to Amb., Const., 18 Aug. 1895, FO195/1894, PRO.
[114] Consul Descoutures to Amb., Const., 29 Feb. 1896, Const. Amb. D-Djeddah 7, CADN.
[115] Consul Devey to Emb., Const., 18 April 1897 and 25 April 1897, FO 195/1987, PRO.
[116] Cypher telegram Consul Monahan, 3 Nov. 1908, FO 195/2286, PRO.
[117] Acting Consul Moncrieff to Earl Granville, 28 July 1883, FO 195/1451, PRO.
[118] Schlicht, *Frankreich*, 265, 271.
[119] Onley, *Arabian Frontier*, 80–103, 200–15.
[120] Col. W. F. B. Laurie, *Our Burmese Wars and Relations with Burma: Being an Abstract of Military and Political Operations, 1824–25–26, and 1852–53*, London 1880, 109, quoted after Headrick, 'Tools of Imperialism', 244. On gunboat diplomacy, notably in the informal empire, see Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus*, 25.
[121] On the tone of a French consul in his conversation with the Ottoman Foreign Minister, see ibid., 97.



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