



THE RELATIONS OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE WITH THE AHMADNAGAR KINGDOM (1526-1636)

ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT

During the first quarter of the sixteenth century the relations between the power ruling over North India, namely, the Lodi Empire and the Deccan kingdoms were generally at a very low key. But it is, of course, true that the Deccani kingdoms were not indifferent to the situation in the North. The sending of congratulatory letters to Babur by the rulers of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Berar, on his success in 1526, goes to testify their eagerness to win favour with any ruler who appeared to gaining an upper hand in North India. Among them Ahmadnagar seemed to be particularly responsive to the developing political scenario in the North. The short term consideration of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom in cultivating friendly ties with the Mughals from the very beginning of their rule down to the end of Humayun's reign, and also with the Surs during their short lived rule over North India, was possibly that their military pressure on Malwa and Gujarat would render the latter two states less belligerent towards Ahmadnagar. But at the same time it should not be overlooked that from 1535 onwards Humayun appeared to be interested in extending his influence, if not actual rule, over Khandesh and Ahmadnagar which is borne out by his correspondence with Burhan Nizam Shah I as well as his making, while returning to Mandu from Ahmadabad, a detour across Khandesh. It was, however, only after the annexations of Malwa and Gujarat in 1562 and 1572 respectively to the Mughal Empire that a situation was created where Mughals were gradually sucked

into the power politics in the Deccan.

In this thesis an attempt is made to focus on the history of Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations from 1526 down to 1636 when a major part of Ahmadnagar was finally absorbed into the Mughal Empire.

The **Introductory Chapter** of this thesis traces the history of the emergence of Ahmadnagar as a powerful and independent Kingdom by the time Mughal rule was established in North India. In this chapter special attention is paid to Ahmadnagar's relations with the neighbouring kingdoms with particular emphasis on those with northern powers, namely, Gujarat, Khandesh and Malwa.

The Khandesh state played an important role in shaping the Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations. It was sought to be used by Akbar to further the strategic aims of the Mughals in the Deccan, particularly, for not allowing the consolidation of Ahmadnagar's hold over Berar after it was annexed by that Kingdom in 1574. A brief survey of these diplomatic and military moves of the Mughals involving Khandesh down to its annexation to the Mughal Empire forms the central theme of the **Chapter I** of this thesis.

Chapter II deals with Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations between 1526-72. In this chapter, after noticing early

diplomatic contacts between Nizam Shahi rulers and Humayun, Sher Shah and Islam Shah, the attention is mainly focused on the developments of the period following the annexation of Malwa to the Mughal Empire, for tracing the stages through which Mughal Empire started getting involved in the power equations of the Deccan.

It was only during 1572-95, that the Mughals started openly endeavouring to intervene in the affairs of Ahmadnagar. But these attempts at intervention always stopped short of a full fledged invasion. On several occasions large scale military mobilization was made with the declared aim of intervening militarily but every time these were used for pressurising the Deccan rulers to agree to Akbar's two fold demands that (i) Khandesh should remain aligned with the Mughals and (ii) the nobles of Berar be helped by Khandesh to continue their struggle against Ahmadnagar's occupation of their Kingdom. The only occasion when such a mobilization led to an actual armed conflict was the disastrous advance of Aziz Koka into Berar in 1586. This story is briefly narrated in Chapter III here.

The crucial developments of the period 1595-1600, leading to the advance of the Mughal forces into Berar and northern parts of Ahmadnagar Kingdom, are discussed in Chapter IV. During this period, despite the settlement of 1596, the struggle between the Mughals and the section of the

Nizam Shahi nobility, who were not prepared to handover to the Mughals the ceded territories, had continued unabated. The Mughals carried out vigorous operations culminating in the second seige of the fort of Ahmadnagar and its capture by the Mughals in 1600. Later, the capture of Asirgarh in 1601 and resulting annexation of Khandesh placed the Mughals in a firm position to face the continuing resistance by remnants of the Nizam Shahi nobility which, as is well known, tended to become more fierce and well organized with the coming of Malik Ambar on the scene.

Malik Ambar's role in reorganizing the Ahmadnagar administration, both civil as well as military, for successfully resisting the Mughal advance into Ahmadnagar forms the main theme of **Chapter V**. In this context Malik Ambar's military campaigns and his over all contribution to the struggle against the Mughal occupation forces during 1601-16 are also noticed.

Chapter VI covers the second phase of Malik Ambar's struggle for ending the Mughal occupation of the parts of Ahmadnagar territory during 1617-26. In this chapter on the one hand, Prince Khurram's military successes against the Nizam Shahis are critically assessed. But, on the other hand, the negative impact of his revolt on the position of the Mughals in the Deccan is also discussed. The military successes of Malik Ambar during his last days as well as his achievements in recovering a large portion of Ahmadnagar's

territory, earlier conquered by the Mughals, are also highlighted in this discussion.

The last and decisive phase of Mughals' aggression during 1627-36 against Ahmadnagar ultimately leading to the annexation of a major part of Ahmadnagar Kingdom to the Mughal Empire is discussed in **Chapter VII**. The unstable political conditions, particularly factional tussles among the nobles and the weak regimes of the successive *peshwas*, are also noticed here as the factors contributing to final collapse of Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 1636.

Chapter VIII is devoted to analysing the peace settlements of 1636. In this discussion an attempt is made to answer the question whether the settlements of 1636 could be interpreted as termination of the Mughal military offensive against the Deccani kingdoms.

The Safawid rulers of Persia were maintaining close diplomatic relations with the rulers of the Deccan kingdoms since very beginning. Therefore it is very important to examine as to what was the Safawids' response to the Mughal expansionist drive in the Deccan. This is attempted in the **Chapter IX**.

The main conclusions of the thesis are briefly restated in a separate section which is placed after the Chapter IX.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis, **The Relations of the Mughal Empire with the Ahmadnagar Kingdom (1526-1636)**, is the original research work of **Mr Mohd. Siraj Anwar** carried out under my supervision. He is allowed to submit the thesis for assessment.

Dated: 25th April, 1994


(~~Iqbalur Rahman Khan~~)

Professor of History

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
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(MOHD. SIRAJ ANWAR)

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

Emergence of Ahmadnagar Kingdom and its
Relations with the Neighbouring Powers
Down to 1535.

During the last quarter of the fifteenth century the Bahmani Kingdom had began to weaken. The Bahmani Sultan had become ineffective vis a vis his nobles administering different territories in the Deccan. The powerful nobles had started working at cross purposes with each other. The reckless party strife at the court led to the murder of the efficient Bahmani wazir, Khwaja Mahmud Gawan, in 1481,¹ which precipitated the break up of the Kingdom. Subsequently the Bahmani Kingdom gradually disintegrated giving rise to five independent kingdoms, namely, the Adil Shahi Kingdom of Bijapur, the Qutb Shahi Kingdom of Golkonda, the Barid Shahi Kingdom of Bidar, the Imad Shahi Kingdom of Berar and the Nizam Shahi Kingdom of Ahmadnagar. Since there were no clearly defined boundaries of these newly independent kingdoms, their rulers were constantly at war with each other over territorial disputes reinforced by other controversies.

Malik Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, declared his independence in 1490, adopting the sovereign title Ahmad Nizam Shah Bahri. He was the son of a prominent Bahmani noble, Malik Hasan, who, after the murder of Mahmud Gawan, had become *Wakil-us Saltanate*.² According to Ferishta, Malik Hasan was a convert to Islam; his original name being Timma Bhatt. He was the son of a Brahmin of Pathri in

1. Muhammad Qasim Ferishta, *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, Munshi Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow 1864, vol.I, p-357.

2. *Ibid*, vol. II, p-93

Vijaynagar Kingdom. Timma Bhatt as a young boy, alongwith many other inhabitants, was made captive by *Sultan* Ahmad Shah Bahmani during one of his campaigns against Vijaynagar.³ Being impressed by the qualities of Timma Bhatt, the *Sultan* raised him from the position of a slave to that of a noble. In the process he was converted to Islam assuming the name Malik Hasan. He was imparted education and training in the company of Prince Humayun. Later on, during the reign of Muhammad Shah Bahmani, he received gradual promotions and was entitled *Ashraf-i Humayun Nizam-ul Mulk Bahri*. The *Wakil* of the Bahmani Kingdom, Mahmud Gawan, appointed him *tarafdar* of the territory of Tilangana while assigning the *iqta* of Rajahmundry.⁴ He excelled himself in the military as well civil administration and was subsequently given the positions, *Malik Naib* and *Sar-i Lashkar*.⁵

In 1482, Muhammad Shah Bahmani had died and was succeeded by his son Mahmud Shah. Earlier in 1481, Mahmud Gawan was murdered. Malik Hasan Nizam-ul Mulk was suspected of complicity in the assassination of Mahmud Gawan. The new *Sultan*, Mahmud Shah, raised Malik Hasan to the position of *Wakil-us Saltanate*, and some more territories, including the

3. *Ibid*

4. Rajahmundry (17°N, 81°E), located in Telingana.

5. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-93

Sarkars of Bir⁶ and Junnar⁷ were added to his *iqta*.⁸ The removal of Mahmud Gawan had, thus left the field open for Malik Hasan Nizam-ul Mulk to fulfil his ambitions. He began to promote his own men in the administration. He particularly paved the ground for his son, Malik Ahmad, in the nobility. Malik Ahmad was assigned Bir, Dharur and Junnar as his *iqta*. A well equipped army was deputed to serve under him. To ensure the safety and future prospects of his son, Malik Hasan appointed Malik Wajihuddin as the *subedar* of Daulatabad on a promise of firm support to Malik Ahmad.⁹ A similar promise of support was exacted from Fakhruddin Dakhni after his appointment as *subedar* of Parenda and Sholapur.¹⁰ Being patronized and encouraged by his father, Malik Ahmad thus emerged as a powerful and accomplished military commander and administrator. He carried many raids in the Konkan region capturing several forts and exacting heavy *peshkash* from the petty Maratha *sardars*. For carrying out these raids he had raised a strong army. Particularly during the period of four years, i.e.

6. Bir (19° N, 75° E).

7. Junnar (19°N, 73°E). The fort commanding Junnar was known as Shivner.

8. *Ibid.* For the description of the murder of Mahmud Gawan, see *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-357.

9. See *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-93-94.

10. *Ibid.* Sholapur (17° N, 75° E), was in the Nizam Shahi kingdom but after its capture by Bijapur in 1511, it remained a bone of contention between Ahmadnagar and Bijapur until it was ceded to the latter by the Mughals in 1636.

1482-86, his position had become very strong on account of his successes against the Maratha sardars of Konkan.¹¹

In the meantime, while running the Bahmani administration as *Wakil-us Saltanate*, Malik Hasan Nizam-ul Mulk antagonised a powerful section of the nobility. Prominent among his opponents was Yusuf Adil Khan, who, later on, carved out Bijapur as an independent Kingdom for himself. The *Sultan*, Mahmud shah Bahmani, too, was dissatisfied and obsessed with the behaviour of Malik Hasan. Consequently, a conspiracy was hatched against Malik Hasan at the instance of the *Sultan*. He was murdered by his opponents in 1486.¹² His father's murder was a severe blow to Malik Ahmad but he was not dismayed by the changed situation at the Bahmani court. The new *Wakil-us Saltanate*, Qasim Barid, was a bitter enemy of Malik Hasan. Now he began to work on a plan to curtail Malik Ahmad's authority. Malik Ahmad, on his part, was, however, not much perturbed by these developments, which in fact provided him pretext to work for carving out an independent principality for himself.

11. For Malik Ahmad's appointment and his subsequent military exploits, see Saiyid Ali Tabataba, *Burhan-i Maasir*, Hyderabad, 1936, pp-176-88. See also *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-94.

The Konkan is described as a tract along the coast including the ports of Chaul and Dabhol, and containing in part hills, passes, rocky wastes, and forests. Part of it lay within the Adil Shahi kingdom but most of it belonged the Nizam Shahi kingdom. The Konkan was taken to contain the entire Western Ghat. See Irfan Habib, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, New Delhi (reprint) 1986, p-55

12. *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-190-91; See also *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-94.

Immediately after his father's murder, he adopted Malik Hasan's title of *Nizam-ul Mulk*.¹³ Although, at this time, he did not assume the sovereign title 'Shah', but for all practical purposes henceforth he began to act like an independent ruler.

At the Bahmani court, Qasim Barid was very apprehensive of the growing power of Malik Ahmad Nizam-ul Mulk. He persuaded *Sultan* Mahmud Shah Bahmani to send a force towards Junnar for putting down Malik Ahmad. A *farman* was sent to Yusuf Adil Khan, then quartered at Bijapur, to join the army sent against Malik Ahmad.¹⁴ But, by this time, the equations at the court had changed. Yusuf Adil Khan, who was a rival of Malik Hasan, now refused to comply with the *farman* to join expedition against Malik Ahmad; instead he warned Malik Ahmad about the military preparations of the *Sultan* and Qasim Barid.¹⁵ Thus, despite utmost exertions of the *Sultan* and Qasim Barid, the rising power of Malik Ahmad could not be checked. At this stage Yusuf Adil Shah started encouraging

13. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-94. While referring to this occurrence Saiyid Ali Tabataba says that after Malik Hasan's murder the *Sultan* himself conferred the title of *Ashraf-i Humayun Nizam-ul Mulk Bahri* on his son, Malik Ahmad. See *Burhan-i Maasir* p-190.

14. *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-199-200; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-94.

15. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-94.

Malik Ahmad to proclaim his independence.¹⁶ Malik Ahmad, who had already acquired a large army and established his control over a considerable territory, was himself inclined towards setting himself up as an independent ruler.

In 1490, Malik Ahmad replaced Bahmani *Sultan's* name by his own in the Friday *khutba* and raised white canopy (*chatar safedi*) over his head, which signified declaring himself a sovereign ruler. As king of Ahmadnager he assumed the title Ahmad Nizam Shah Bahri.¹⁷ In the beginning, some of his close associates, including Khwaja Jahan Deccani, objected to his declaring himself a sovereign ruler. In the face of this opposition Malik Ahmad had to defer, for sometime, (about two months), the reciting of *khutba* in his name. But he continued to raise the canopy over his head on the absurd excuse that this was meant for protection from the sunrays.¹⁸ Around May, 1490, he again started to have the *khutba* recited in his name. This time it was done after boldly declaring himself free of allegiance to the Bahmani *Sultan*.¹⁹ Malik Ahmad was encouraged to take this decisive

16. Saiyid Ali Tabataba says that during the reign of Mahmud Shah Bahmani many powerful *amirs* had begun acting independently. Yusuf Adil Khan had declared himself independent in Bijapur. Following his example Ahmad Nizam-ul-Mulk Bahri and Fatehullah Imad-ul-Mulk also asserted their independence. cf. *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-204.

17. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-96; See also *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-204.

18. See *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-96.

19. *Ibid*

step by senior *amirs*, particularly Makhdum Jahan and Khan-i Azam. After declaring himself independent Ahmad Nizam Shah embarked on a campaign to subjugate the smaller chieftains of the Marathwara region with the aim of expanding the territory of his newly founded Kingdom. In this process he moved from his headquarter, Junnar, westward and within a very short period succeeded in capturing Danda Rajpuri,²⁰ the sea-port of Chaul and many other forts in the Konkan region.²¹ To north of Junnar, he carried out raids into the territory of Daulatabad, then ruled by Malik Ashraf. Earlier in 1482, Daulatabad was granted to Malik Wajihuddin by Malik Hasan Nizam-ul Mulk after he had pledged to co-operate with Malik Ahmad. After Malik Wajihuddin's death his brother, Malik Ashraf, however, took control of Daulatabad. Not being close to Ahmad Nizam Shah, he began to assert his independent authority over the region. To capture Daulatabad, therefore, became one of the main aims of Ahmad Nizam Shah after assuming kingship. He carried repeated raids into that territory but was not successful in achieving his goal. In 1494, Ahmad Nizam Shah founded the city of Ahmadnagar and shifted his capital there so as to be able to make annual raids into Daulatabad territory.²² Finally in 1500, he succeeded in

20. Danda Rajpuri (18°N, 72°E). The 'castle' of this port was situated in an island, now known as Janjira. See Irfan Habib' *Atlas, op.cit.*, p-55.

21. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-97.

22. See *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-212-13; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-97.

capturing Daulatabad.²³

Side by side, with his efforts to expand his Kingdom, Ahmad Nizam Shah also continued to take interest in the affairs of the Bahmani court. In 1493, Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur had besieged the Bahmani Sultan in Bidar. In desperation, Sultan Mahmud Shah and Qasim Barid sent *farmans* to Ahmad Nizam Shah and Fatehullah Imad Shah of Berar to come to the rescue of the Sultan. In response of this appeal Ahmad Nizam Shah promptly marched out towards Bidar for assisting the Sultan. In making this move he did not show any consideration for Yusuf Adil Shah's helping attitude towards him earlier in 1490.²⁴ The reason behind this attitude of Ahmad Nizam Shah seems to be that he, perhaps, by this time, came to look upon Yusuf Adil Shah as his potential rival in the Deccan. Moreover, he would also have remembered that Yusuf Adil Shah was believed to be one of the conspirators responsible for his father's assassination. In any case, while he was still on the way to Bidar, he received the news of Yusuf Adil Shah's success in defeating a Bahmani army. He, thereupon, thought it prudent to return to Junnar without involving himself in an open contest with

23. *Burhan-i Maasir* p-218; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-99.

24. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-97. At this time Ahmad Nizam Shah was proceeding to invade Daulatabad, but on Sultan's call, he put-off his march, instead marched to relieve Bidar. See *Ibid*.

Yusuf Adil Shah.²⁵

Subsequently, he resumed raids into regions surrounding Junnar. His intrusions into the territory of Daulatabad becoming more frequent. Malik Ashraf, the ruler of Daulatabad, was compelled in 1499 to seek military assistance from Sultan Mahmud Begadah of Gujarat, on a promise of reciting the *khutba* in his name at Daulatabad and also of paying annual *peshkash* to him. Responding favourably, Mahmud Begadah marched to Daulatabad for forcing Ahmad Nizam Shah to lift his seige. According to Ferishta, Mahmud Begadah had come to Daulatabad, on this occasion, for two purposes; first, to help Malik Ashraf and second, to realize the annual *peshkash* from Adil Khan Faruqi II of Khandesh.²⁶ In the battle that took place at the bank of Tapti near Burhanpur, Mahmud Begadah was defeated by the combined armies of Khandesh, Ahmadnagar and Berar. In 1500, Mahmud Begadah returned with a well-equipped army. This second time he succeeded in exacting a heavy *peshkash* from the ruler of Khandesh and in forcing Ahmad Nizam Shah to lift the seige of Daulatabad. Malik Ashraf fulfilled his promise by paying *peshkash* and having the *khutba* recited in Mahmud Begadah's

25. *Ibid.*

26. See *Ibid.*, p-98. Nizamuddin Ahmad says that Mahmud Begadah invaded Khandesh in 1499 because Adil Khan II had not sent *peshkash* for sometime past. See *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, ed. B.De and M. Hidayat Husain, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1935, vol. III, p-165.

name at Daulatabad.²⁷

However, as soon as, Mahmud Begadah withdrew to Gujarat, Ahmad Nizam Shah again besieged Daulatabad and this time succeeded in capturing it.²⁸ On this occasion, he was also able to pacify adjoining territories of Galna and Baglana forcing the local rajas to submit and agree to pay *peshkash*. These new acquisitions strengthened his position considerably. The frontiers of his Kingdom now extended up to the confines of Gujarat and Khandesh in the north and north-west.

Having, thus, consolidated his position Ahmad Nizam Shah now began to meddle in the affairs of the neighbouring kingdoms. Apart from the on-going disputes with his immediate rivals in Bijapur and Bidar, he also began interfering in the affairs of Khandesh. In Khandesh, after Adil Khan II's death in 1501, his younger brother, Dawud Khan, occupied the throne by setting aside the claims of the deceased ruler's heir. Those of Khandesh nobles, who were opposed to Dawud Khan's accession, requested Ahmad Nizam Shah to help them in securing the throne for Alam Khan, whom they declared as the legitimate heir. Ahmad Nizam Shah marched to Burhanpur in 1503-04 on the request of the Khandesh nobles. In the meantime, Dawud Khan had sought the

27. *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-216-18; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-99

28. *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-218; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-99.

help of Malwa ruler, Sultan Nasiruddin Khilji, against Ahmad Nizam Shah's impending invasion. In the face of a formidable Malwa army, Ahmad Nizam Shah had to eventually withdraw from Khandesh on this occasion.²⁹ In the subsequent years Ahmad Nizam Shah again tried to interfere in the affairs of Khandesh over the issue of succession, and this time came into a clash with Mahmud Begadah of Gujarat, who was keen to place his own protege (another Alam Khan) on the throne of Khandesh. In 1508, after Dawud Khan's death, Mahmud Begadash's protege succeeded in occupying the throne. In desperation Ahmad Nizam Shah demanded from Mahmud Begadah, at least, a part of the Khandesh territory to be assigned to his protege. But Mahmud Begadah did not entertain his request, refusing even to recognise him as a sovereign ruler. He accused Ahmad Nizam Shah of usurping the Bahmani domains.³⁰ In 1510-11, Khandesh ruler, Alam Khan entitled Adil Khan III, assisted by a Gujarat army, invaded Ahmadnagar, forcing the local *raja* of Galna (till then a tributary of Ahmadnagar) to pay *peshkash* and be subservient to the Khandesh Kingdom.³¹ From this time onwards, till 1559-60, Galna remained a tributary of Khandesh. In 1559-60, Ahmadnagar forces

29. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-372; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-282.

30. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, pp-170-71; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-283.

31. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, pp-170-71; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-283. See also Haji-ud Dabir's *Zafar-ul-Waleh bi Muzaffar Wa Alihi*, ed. by Dennison Ross, translated by M.F. Lokhandwala, Baroda, 1970, p-55.

succeeded in capturing this territory again.

On his south-eastern frontiers, Ahmad Nizam Shah was constantly involved in the struggle for supremacy with his main rivals, Qasim Barid and Yusuf Adil Shah. In 1504, he was drawn into a conflict between Qasim Barid and Yusuf Adil Shah. They were fighting for the possession of the territory of Gulbarga, till then occupied by Dastur Dinar, a Bahmani governor. Both of them were eager to annex that territory. Being more powerful and resourceful, in 1504, Yusuf Adil Shah succeeded in capturing Gulbarga inspite of Qasim Barid's trying to help Dastur Dinar.³² Later, during the same year (i.e. 1504) Qasim Barid died and was succeeded by his son, Amir Ali Barid, as the wazir of the defunct Bahmani Kingdom. Amir Ali Barid continued his father's policy. In the name of the nominal Bahmani ruler, Mahmud Shah, Amir Ali Barid organized an offensive against Yusuf Adil Shah for avenging his father's humiliation over Gulbarga. He raised the religious plank for uniting the mutually rival rulers of Ahmadnagar, Berar and Golkonda. In fact, in 1502-03, Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur had adopted Shi'ism as the state religion.³³ Since, till this time, the other rulers of the Deccan were staunch Sunnis, they readily agreed with Mahmud Shah Bahmani and Amir Ali Barid to invade Bijapur for

32. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-8-10; vol. I, p-372.

33. *Ibid*, vol. II, p-11. See also Mirza Ibrahim Zubairi, *Basatin-us-Salatin*, Hyderabad, Deccan, pp-18-20.

punishing Yusuf Adil Shah for his "heresy". Alauddin Imad Shah, being friendly towards Yusuf Adil Shah, refused to join this coalition against him.³⁴ It is obvious that Ahmad Nizam Shah's joining of this coalition was more influenced by political considerations rather than by his religious zeal. It must be viewed in the perspective of his ongoing dispute with Yusuf Adil Shah over the territories of Sholapur and Naldurg. On this occasion he, actually, demanded from Yusuf Adil Shah the surrender of Naldurg as the price of his neutrality.³⁵ It was only on his refusal to surrender Naldurg that Ahmad Nizam Shah finally decided to march with the forces of Amir Ali Barid. But, before the actual invasion could take place, this coalition broke up. This was brought about by Yusuf Adil Shah's tactful diplomacy. He had solicited Alauddin Imad Shah's mediation in stalling the march of the allied forces. Also, on the suggestion of Imad Shah, he agreed to temporarily cease to follow the Shia practices. Ahmad Nizam Shah was also prevailed upon by Alauddin Imad Shah to give up his demand of Naldurg. But, as soon as, Ahmad Nizam Shah and Quli Qutb-ul Mulk, agreeing to suspend military operations, returned to their respective capitals, Adil Shahi forces attacked and plundered Ali Barid's camp forcing him and the Sultan to retire to Bidar.³⁶

34. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, P-12.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid*; See also *Basatin-us-Salatn*, pp-21-22.

Subsequently, Yusuf Adil Shah again started observing the Shia practices in his dominion and his adversaries were not able to do anything about it.

In the last few years of his reign, Ahmad Nizam Shah had, no doubt, suffered a number of serious reverses. Apart from the unsuccessful campaign against Adil Shah (1505) and the setbacks suffered by him in the Khandesh affairs, he also lost in the western part, the important sea-port of Chaul to the Portuguese (1507) and had to agree to pay them tribute.³⁷ He died in 1510, leaving behind his minor son, Burhan, as the successor, who was called upon to hold together the newly established Nizam Shahi Kingdom already under pressure of its adversaries in the north as well as south.³⁸

During the minority of Burhan, Mukammal Khan, the *peshwa*, and his son Aziz-ul Mulk, the *sar-i naubat*, controlled the administration. Their harsh and dictatorial attitude alienated a section of the Nizam Shahi nobility. Some of these nobles solicited Alauddin Imad Shah's help in their efforts to place one of Burhan's brothers on the throne. But Mukammal Khan foiled their attempt forcing them

37. Chaul was an important port and trading centre situated in 18°N, 70°E. For the Portuguese operations in the coastal region, see F.C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, London (reprint), 1966, p-129; pp-141-42.

38. *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-233-34; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-102.

to seek shelter in Berar.³⁹

Around the same time, a similar situation developed in Bijapur. Yusuf Adil Shah died in 1510. He was succeeded by his son Ismail Adil Shah under whom the wazir, Kamal Khan, had concentrated all the powers in his own hands. In 1511, he attacked Sholapur, then held by Zain Khan on behalf of the Nizam Shahi ruler. Before any help could reach there, the Bijapuri army captured Sholapur,⁴⁰ which remained a bone of contention between the two kingdoms ever after. Owing to factional divisions amongst the Nizam Shahi nobles, no immediate steps could be taken to recover Sholapur, but, later on, frequent clashes took place between the Adil Shahis and Nizam Shahis for the possession of this stronghold. Even a matrimonial alliance between the two ruling families could not help in resolving the dispute over Sholapur. In 1524, when Burhan Nizam Shah's marriage was solemnised with Ismail Adil Shah's sister through the mediation of Shah Tahir, the former expected that Sholapur would be returned to him as a part of dowry. But Ismail Adil Shah's flat refusal made this "matrimonial alliance" an occasion for generating more bitterness between the two kingdoms.⁴¹ Burhan Nizam Shah

39. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-102.

40. *Ibid*, pp-14-15.

41. For Burhan Nizam Shah's meeting with Ismail Adil Shah at Sholapur and the subsequent matrimonial relationship, see *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-20-21.

invaded Sholapur in the very next year (i.e. 1525). In this invasion he was assisted by Alauddin Imad Shah of Berar. But the allied had to beat a hasty retreat when faced with a well-equipped Adil Shahi army.⁴²

On the whole, with his eastern neighbours, Alauddin Imad Shah of Berar, Burhan Nizam Shah maintained a sort of love-hate relationship. If on one occasion, he was soliciting Imad Shah's assistance in his struggle against Adil Shahi ruler of Bijapur, on other occasions, one finds him making incursions into the Berar territory. He, for instance, wrested the *wilayat* of Pathri from Berar in 1518-19. As stated by Ferishta, Pathri being the ancestral place of Malik Hasan Nizam-ul Mulk, the Nizam Shahi rulers felt an emotional attachment with that town. They always coveted that place. Sometime in 1518-19, the populace of Pathri invited Burhan Nizam Shah to take possession of that *wilayat*.⁴³ Thereupon, Mukammal Khan, the *peshwa*, on behalf of Burhan Nizam Shah, urged the ruler of Berar to surrender Pathri to Ahmadnagar. Alauddin Imad Shah naturally turned down this outrageous proposal. On his refusal, the Ahmadnagar forces led by Mukammal Khan invaded Pathri and brought it under their control.⁴⁴

42. *Ibid*

43. *Ibid*, vol. II, p-103.

44. *Ibid*. For detailed discussion of the capture of Pathri by the Ahmadnagar forces, see *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-249-50.

The occupation of Pathri increased the prestige of Burhan Nizam Shah I enormously. Henceforth, he asserted himself in the administration freeing himself from the influence of Mukammal Khan. The arrival of Shah Tahir, sometime in 1521-22, brought about drastic changes in the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. He became the *peshwa* as well as political and religious guide of Burhan Nizam Shah.⁴⁵ Under his influence Burhan Nizam Shah I converted to Shi'ism. Shah Tahir came to wield great influence in the affairs of Ahmadnagar Kingdom. He was instrumental in arranging a meeting between Burhan Nizam Shah I and Ismail Adil Shah at Sholapur (1524), which resulted in the marriage of Burhan Nizam Shah I with Ismail Adil Shah's sister. On this occasion, he persuaded Burhan Nizam Shah not to press for the surrender of Sholapur, thus averting a military clash between the two kingdoms. Again it was Shah Tahir, who negotiated a resettlement with Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, when the latter had come to assist Alauddin Imad Shah and Muhammad Shah Faruqi I of Khandesh against the Nizam Shah (1529-30). Shah Tahir, on that occasion, managed to secure the title 'Shah' for Burhan Nizam Shah from the Gujarat ruler (1531).⁴⁶

According to Ferishta, on this occasion, Bahadur Shah gave to

45. *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-251-52; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-104.

46. *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, pp-274-75; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-107-08. See also *Tabaqat-i akbari*, vol. III, p-217. Sikandar bin Manjhu, *Mirat-i Sikandari*, ed. by Satish Chandra Misra and Lutfur Rahman, Baroda, 1961, p-279.

Burhan the title of 'Shah' because he hoped that Burhan Nizam Shah I would help him in the war with Humayun, which he intended to carry on. But in reality its outcome was just opposite. Burhan Nizam Shah I is reported to have sent an emissary to Humayun urging him to come and attack Gujarat.⁴⁷

Ahmadnagar's relations with its northern neighbour, Khandesh, appear to have been largely dictated by its anxiety to prevent Khandesh from aligning itself with the more powerful *Sultanates* of Malwa and Gujarat situated on its northern and western flanks respectively. The rulers of Ahmadnagar tried, as far as possible, to prevent both these *Sultanates* from establishing their sway over Khandesh. As it would be discussed at some length in the next chapter, till 1535, being not very powerful, Khandesh Kingdom, thus, often found itself caught in the midst of a struggle among Ahmadnagar, Gujarat and Malwa for extending their influence over the valley of Tapti. In reality the Ahmadnagar Kingdom was always keen to have Khandesh Kingdom as a friendly buffer in the north providing easy access to Gujarat and Malwa. That is why, in early, fifteen thirties, Burhan Nizam Shah I was not averse in persuading Humayun to invade Gujarat. This was possibly aimed at having Gujarat's military clout curbed which had come to pose a serious threat to Ahmadnagar owing to Khandesh's passing almost totally under the

47. cf. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-219.

domination of Gujarat. This struggle between Ahmadnagar, Gujarat and Malwa over Khandesh, during the first half of the sixteenth century seem to have disappeared after the Mughals came closer to the Deccan as a consequence of their annexing Malwa and Gujarat in 1562 and 1572 respectively. However, on establishing themselves in Malwa and Gujarat the Mughals seem to have also inherited the problems that the *Sultanates* of Malwa and Gujarat had *vis a vis* Ahmadnagar. Exactly as was the attitude of the *Sultanates* of Malwa and Gujarat, the Mughals, after they were established in Malwa and Gujarat began to pressurise Khandesh to become a pawn in their diplomatic and military manoeuvres against Ahmadnagar. After Berar was annexed by Ahmadnagar in 1574, Akbar was always pressurising Khandesh rulers, Muhammad Shah II and after him Raja Ali Khan, down to 1586, to help the ousted nobles of Berar in their struggle against Ahmadnagar's occupation forces.

In the ensuing chapters the history of the Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations is discussed in its different aspects some of which are highlighted above in the context of Ahmadnagar's emergence as a powerful state in the Deccan plateau during the first half of the sixteenth century.

APPENDIX-I

Description of the Boundaries of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 1526-

For preparing a tentative map of the boundaries of Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 1526, information has been taken from different places from the chronicles. These places are depicted on the map with the help of Irfan Habib's *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*. If the name of a place mentioned by the chronicle is identified as being included in Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 1526, then the whole *sarkar* or *pargana* area of that particular place is treated as a part of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. In the map, the boundaries of the *sarkars* are the same as depicted in Irfan Habib's *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, where these are drawn along the natural confines of individual units running along the rivers and hills with the help of 1:2 million map.¹

Ahmad Nizam Shah, after declaring himself independent in 1490, had made Junnar (19°N, 73°E) his capital. Later, in 1494, he laid foundation of the town of Ahmadnagar (19°N, 73°E) and shifted his capital there.² In the north, he

1. See Irfan Habib, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, New Delhi (Reprint), 1986, p-X, sheets 7-A; 9-A, 14-A.

2. *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-212-13; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-46-47.

succeeded in capturing Daulatabad (19°N, 75°E) in 1499.³ Towards south, he took control of Parenda (18°N, 75°E). However, in the west, the Portuguese had occupied Chaul (18°N, 72°E), an important sea-port in 1507.

After Ahmad Nizam Shah's death (1510), the Adil Shahi forces attacked and captured Sholapur (17°N, 75°E) in 1511.⁴ Henceforth, Sholapur remained a part of Bijapur and was always a bone of contention between the two kingdoms. However, Burhan Nizam Shah had succeeded in capturing Pathri (15°N, 76°E) in 1519-20,⁵ from Berar, thus, extending his boundaries in the eastern direction.

Thus, in 1526, the boundaries of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom extended from sarkar Pathri in the east upto sarkar Kalyan in the Konkan region in the west excluding the Chaul sea-port. In the north, it extended from sarkar Daulatabad, bordering Khandesh, upto sarkar of Parenda in the south bordering Bijapur.⁶

3. *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-216-18; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-98-99.


4. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-14-15; *Sasatin-us Salatin*, pp-33-34.

5. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-103.

6. See the appended Map-A.

THE KINGDOM OF AHMADNAGAR, 1526

Map A



CHAPTER - I

Mughal - Khandesh Relations, 1526-1601. Prelude
to the Mughal Advance into Ahmadnagar.

The Mughal advance towards Ahmadnagar frontier was facilitated by the entry of the Mughals into Malwa and Gujarat regions in 1562 and 1572 respectively. After the annexation of these two kingdoms to the Mughal Empire Akbar was continuously trying to use the rulers of Khandesh for furthering his policy aims with regard to Ahmadnagar. In this context a detailed examination of Mughal relations with Khandesh, particularly from 1562 onwards, becomes very significant which is attempted in this chapter.

Since its inception as an independent state in 1400,¹ the Kingdom of Khandesh had territorial or other disputes with its neighbouring powers namely Gujarat, Malwa and Bahmani Kingdom. Entangled between these three powerful states Khandesh had to occasionally ally itself with one or the other of these powers to ward-off the threat from the rest of them. This course had become necessary for Khandesh's survival in the face of the territorial ambitions of its immediate neighbours. It may, therefore, be noted that throughout this period Khandesh had maintained a peculiar type of love-hate relationship with the neighbouring states which was aimed at ensuring its own survival as a small regional state.

Khandesh's relations with Gujarat were throughout effected by a running dispute between the two states over the

1. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp. 277-78.

control of the territories of Nandurbar² and Sultanpur.³ It seems to have originated when Malik Raja as the *hakim* of Khandesh [appointed by Firoz Tughlaq] tried but failed to capture these territories from the governor of Gujarat in 1394-95.⁴ This was the starting point of the long drawn out tussle between the rulers of Gujarat and Khandesh for the possession of the territories of Nandurbar and Sultanpur. Subsequently, in 1417, Khandesh ruler, Malik Nasir, made an alliance with Hoshang Shah of Malwa to capture Nandurbar and Sultanpur, which again failed miserably. Subsequently, Malik Nasir was compelled to pay *peshkash* to Sultan Ahmad Shah I of Gujarat and the latter reciprocated by giving Malik Nasir a robe of honour and the title of 'Khan'.⁵

This conferment of title reduced the status of Malik Nasir to a protege of the ruler of Gujarat which humiliated him greatly. He was also disappointed with Hoshang Shah as he had separated the Malwa forces in the midst of the campaign against Nandurbar (1417). He now resolved to

2. Nandurbar (21°N, 74°E).

3. Sultanpur (21°N, 74°E).

4. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III p-86. *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. II, p. 277. Sikandar bin Manjhu, in this context, mention the name of Malik Nasir, who was the son and successor of Malik Raja. This appears to be a confusion because till 1394-95 Khandesh was still governed by Malik Raja as the *hakim*. See *Mirat-i Sikandari* p-17.

5. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-104; *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. II, p-280; *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp-47-48; See also *Zafer-ul-Waleh Bi Muzaffar Wa Alihi*, (tr), vol. I, p-49.

establish close relations with the Bahmanis reinforced by matrimonial ties. This was, apparently, aimed at getting Ahmad Shah Bahmani's help in his struggle to shake - off the Gujarati dominance. Such an opportunity presented itself in 1429, when Malik Nasir, alongwith Ahmad Shah Bahmani, extended military assistance to Raja Kanha of Jhalawar, a tributary Chief of Gujarat, on his falling out with Ahmad Shah I. But they were not very successful. The combined forces of the Bahmanis and Khandesh were compelled to withdraw from Jhalawar in the face of strong military response of Gujarat.⁶ Now the Khandesh ruler Malik Nasir was left with no alternative but to improve his relations with Gujarat. By 1436-37, his relations with Gujarat had become cordial which is borne out by a subsequent event. In 1436, Malik Nasir was provoked to invade the Bahamani Kingdom due to the strained relations between his daughter and her husband, Alauddin Bahmani. But prior to invading the Bahmani territory he sought approval of Ahmad Shah I of Gujarat.⁷ However, against the Bahmanis as well, he was not able to gain an advantage, Ahmad Shah I's "approval" notwithstanding.⁸

6. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, pp. 115-17; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p.280.

7. "*basawabdid Sultan Ahmad Shah Gujarati*". cf. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-280. Ferishta's statement suggest that Ahmad Shah I gave only moral support to Malik Nasir and not military support.

8. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-280; Also vol. I, p-332.

It might be conjectured that, perhaps, from this time (1437) onwards, the rulers of Khandesh started paying an annual *peshkash* to the *Sultan* of Gujarat once again. This practice seems to have continued down to the end of fifteenth century. This is suggested by Mahmud Begadah's invading Khandesh in 1499 purported for realizing the *peshkash* which were not paid by Adil Khan II for sometime past.⁹

An understanding reached between Mahmud Begadah and Adil Khan II in 1501, was further strengthened when Alam Khan, a Khandesh prince and a grandson of Mahmud Begadah, succeeded to the throne of Khandesh in 1509 with the title Adil Khan III.¹⁰ In between 1501-09, as aftermath of success of Dawud Khan in the tussle for successor of Adil Khan II with the help of the *Sultan* of Malwa, the relations of Khandesh with Gujarat and Ahmadnagar (successor state of the Bahmani Kingdom in the region to the south of Khandesh) became distant.¹¹ However, after Dawud Khan's death, Adil Khan III once again established close relations reinforced by kinship ties with the *Sultan* of Gujarat. This situation continued after the death of Mahmud Begadah (1511). Adil Khan III even accompanied his uncle and father-in-law,

9. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-165.

10. *Ibid*, p-166; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-282; *Mirat-i Sikandari*, p-149.

11. For details, see *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-372; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-281-82.

Muzaffar Shah II, in his expedition to Malwa in 1517-18, when the latter went there to support Mahmud Khalji against Medini Rai of Chanderi. Adil Khan III also accompanied him against Rana Sanga of Chittor who had made a common cause with Medini Rai.¹² After Adil Khan III's death in 1520, Muhammad Khan I, who succeeded him, also continued cordial relations with Gujarat.

II

Under Muhammad Khan I, from 1526 onwards, Khandesh got involved first in a conflict between Burhan Nizam Shah I of Ahmadnagar and Alauddin Imad Shah of Berar, which forced him to seek help from Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. Later, he also got involved, though to a lesser extent, in a conflict between Gujarat and the Mughals.

In 1527-28, Burhan Nizam Shah I of Ahmadnagar and Amir Ali Barid of Bidar jointly attacked Berar. Alauddin Imad Shah sought help from Muhammad Khan I. On this occasion, on Muhammad Khan I's appeal, Bahadur Shah, the ruler of Gujarat (1526-37), came to the rescue of the rulers of Khandesh and Berar eventually forcing Burhan Nizam Shah I to retire to Daulatabad. On the advance of the combined forces of Gujarat, Khandesh and Berar upto the confines of Ahmadnagar,

12. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, pp. 180-82; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-207; *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr), vol. I, pp-94-95.

Burhan Nizam Shah I was forced to acknowledge the overlordship of Bahadur Shah by allowing the inclusion of his name in the *khutba* within Ahmadnagar territory.¹³

Bahadur Shah again marched with a large army against Ahmadnagar in 1529. Muhammad Khan I and Imad Shah also joined him. Their combined forces marched into Ahmadnagar territory by way of Baglana, where Raja Bharji agreed to attach himself to Bahadur Shah.¹⁴ These invading forces gained a victory over the army mobilized by Ahmadnagar and Bidar at Bir.

On receiving an appeal from Imad Shah in 1530, Bahadur Shah was again inclined to attack Ahmadnagar once more, but Muhammad Khan I, who in the meanwhile appears to have somewhat softened towards Ahmadnagar ruler. At this occasion, he played the role of an intermediary and peacemaker. His good offices were accepted by both Bahadur Shah and Burhan Nizam Shah I.¹⁵ Muhammad Khan I helped in restoring amicable relations between Bahadur Shah and Burhan Nizam Shah I by arranging friendly meetings between them. It

13. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-212; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-284; *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp.268-69.

14. *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp-271-72; see also Ali Muhammad Khan, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, ed. by Saiyid Nawab Ali, Calcutta, 1928, p-70.

15. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-217; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-219; *Mirat-i Sikandari*, p-279.

was at one of these meetings at Burhanpur that Bahadur Shah had bestowed the title of 'Shah' on Muhammad Khan I.¹⁶ He also conferred the title 'Shah' on Burhan Nizam, thus recognizing Nizam Shahi ruler, who had earlier (1528) accepted his overlordship as his equal.¹⁷ Ferishta says that Bahadur Shah gave to Burhan the title of 'Shah' in the hope of Burhan Nizam Shah I's help in the war with the Mughals that he anticipated and planned, though what actually happened, later on, was the opposite of Bahadur Shah's hopes. Burhan Nizam Shah went out of his way to send an emissary to Humayun for urging him to invade Gujarat.¹⁸ At another place, Ferishta explains this attitude of Burhan Nizam Shah with reference to his conversion to Shi'ite beliefs (1533-34) and promotion of Shi'ism in Ahmadnagar which created a sharp Sunni reaction in the neighbouring states of Gujarat, Khandesh, Berar and Bijapur; their rulers forming an alliance with the declared aim of overthrowing Burhan Nizam Shah for his "heresy". It was to ward-off this serious threat to his position that, according to Ferishta, Burhan Nizam Shah decided to seek Humayun's protection by sending to him Rasti Khan with a request that he should invade Gujarat.¹⁹

As already related, Muhammad Shah I, being closely

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

18. See *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-219.

19. *Ibid.* vol. II, p-116.

allied with Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, always accompanied him in his expeditions. In 1531, he accompanied Bahadur Shah during his Malwa campaign,²⁰ and later also assisted him in the seige of Chittor.²¹ This made him a party to Bahadur Shah's military moves directed primarily at weakening the Mughal authority in Eastern Rajputana. This was the time when relations between Bahadur Shah and Humayun had become generally strained, as the former had given refuge to some of the Lodi *amirs*, and also to Muhammad Zaman Mirza, who were in revolt against Humayun.²² As is well-known, Bahadur Shah's refusal to comply with Humayun's demand for the handing over of Muhammad Zaman Mirza to the Mughals had precipitated the war between the two in 1535.²³ During Bahadur Shah's flight from Mandasor to Mandu on 25th April, 1535, Muhammad Shah I of Khandesh and Mallu Qadir Shah of Malwa are reported to have accompanied him.²⁴ It seems Muhammad Shah I retired to

20. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p-284; Also *Mirat-i sikandari*, p-229.

21. *Tabaqat-i Akbari* vol. III, pp-222-23; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-285 *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp-285-86.

22. Abul Fazl's *Akbarnama*, ed. by Maulvi Agha Ahmad Ali and Abdur Rahim, Bibliotheca India, Calcutta, 1876-86, vol. I, p-127. See also *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-227; *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp-295-96. For details of the revolt, see Ishwari Prasad, *The Life and Times of Humayun*, Calcutta, 1955, pp-64-65.

23. *Akbarnama*, vol. I, p-127; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-228. For details, see R.P. Tripathi, *Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Allahabad, 1956 (reprint), 1981, p-74.

24. *Akbarnama*, vol. I, p-132; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, pp-229-30; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-285; *Mirat-i sikandari*, pp-296-97.

Burhanpur after the fort of Mandu was abandoned by Bahadur Shah (1535) without a fight.

After expelling Bahadur Shah from Gujarat, and having made over the government of Gujarat to Mirza Askari and other Mughal officers, Humayun decided to return to Mandu by way of Burhanpur. Humayun had taken this decision of going to Khandesh, apparently, to punish Muhammad Shah I for his siding, till then, with Bahadur Shah against the Mughals. During this march Humayun ransacked Burhanpur.²⁵ On Humayun's advance against Burhanpur, on this occasion, it was vacated by Muhammad Shah I, who had taken shelter in the fort of Asirgarh. This severe punishment inflicted on the ruler of Khandesh alarmed and frightened other rulers of the Deccan. Burhan Nizam Shah I of Ahmadnagar and Alauddin Imad Shah of Berar promptly wrote submissive letters to the Mughal Emperor.²⁶ At this occasion, Muhammad Shah I is reported to have written a letter to Burhan Nizam Shah I requesting him to intercede on his behalf with Humayun.²⁷ In a rather longer letter reproduced in *Insha-i Tahir Husaini*, Burhan Nizam Shah offered to Humayun his submission. He also

25. *Akbarnama*, vol. I, p-142; *Tabaqat-i Akbari* vol. III, p-232; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-285; *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr), vol. I, p-201.

26. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-215.

27. *Ibid*, vol. II, p-285.

pleaded with the Mughal Emperor on Muhammad Shah's behalf.²⁸ However, it seems, the ransacking of Burhanpur by Humayun further embittered Muhammad Shah I against him. He, subsequently, remained firmly allied with Bahadur Shah. After Humayun's withdrawal to Agra in 1536, he again co-operated with Bahadur Shah in latter's drive to expel the Mughals from the territories of Gujarat and Malwa.²⁹

On Bahadur Shah's death in February 1537, Muhammad Shah I was declared the *Sultan* of Gujarat by the deceased *Sultan's* ex-followers. *Khutba* was recited and coins were struck in Muhammad Shah's name in the territories of Gujarat.³⁰ Before Muhammad Shah I could make any move to take charge of Gujarat *Sultanate*, he died in March 1537. Muhammad Shah I's successor and his younger brother, Mubarak Shah II, hoped that he too would be invited by Gujarati nobles to occupy the throne of Gujarat *Sultanate*, but his hopes were dashed when the Gujarati nobles chose to place prince Mahmud, till then imprisoned in the fort of Asirgarh, on the throne of Gujarat. Under pressure from the Gujarati nobles, Mubarak Shah II had to release Prince Mahmud, who was declared the *Sultan* of

28. For text of the letter, see *Insha-i Tahir Husaini*, British Museum MS, HARL-499, vol. I, ff-15-17.

29. *Akbarnama*, vol. I, pp-143-44; *Tarikh-i Ferishta* vol. II, p-285; *Mirat-i Sikandari*, p-318; *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-215.

30. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, pp-234-35; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-286; *Mirat-i Sikandari*, p-326.

Gujarat with the title Sultan Mahmud Shah III.³¹

In 1537, taking advantage of Humayun's march to Bihar and Bengal, Mubarak Shah II invaded Malwa and annexed the territories of Bijagarh and Handia.³² This boosted his prestige as well as military potential. In the meanwhile, there began a power struggle in Gujarat. Two powerful Gujarati nobles, Darya Khan and Imad-ul Mulk, fell out with each other. From this conflict Darya Khan emerged victorious, forcing Imad-ul Mulk to take refuge in Khandesh. Mubarak Shah II seized this opportunity for intervening in Gujarat by coming forward to assist Imad-ul Mulk. But faced with a large Gujarat army under Darya Khan and Sultan Mahmud, Mubarak Shah II had to retire to Asirgarh, while Imad-ul Mulk fled to Mandu. As the Gujarat forces advanced into Khandesh, on this occasion, Mubarak Shah II was obliged to agree to pay *peshkash* to the Sultan of Gujarat.³³ At the end of this campaign, Mahmud Shah III gave away Nandurbar and Sultanpur to Mubarak Shah. This was, purportedly, done to fulfill a promise which he had given to Mubarak Shah II during the time

31. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, pp-235-36; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-286; *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp-326-27.

32. *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-57.

33. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, pp-236-37; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-286; *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-57. Sikandar bin Manjhu mentions that *khutba* was also recited and coins were struck in Burhanpur in the name of Mahmud Shah III. *vide*, *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp-331-32. But it seems to be an exaggeration just to highlight the prestige of the Sultan of Gujarat.

when both of them were confined in the fort of Asirgarh.³⁴ The move was obviously aimed at cementing newly established ties between the two rulers by meeting one of the standing territorial claims of the ruler of Khandesh.

Although Mubarak Shah II had agreed to pay *peshkash* to the *Sultan* of Gujarat but even after this unequal agreement he remained powerful ruler in his own rights. As a matter of fact, he benefitted more substantially from this agreement, in so far, as he was successful in regaining the territories of Nandurbar and Sultanpur which were bones of contention between Gujarat and Khandesh for long. In transferring these territories to Khandesh, Mahmud Shah III was obviously aiming at placating Mubarak Shah II, who had strengthened his position by invading Malwa in the previous year. Mahmud Shah III, apparently, wanted to ensure that Mubarak Shah II would desist from intervening in the affairs of Gujarat in future.

The next phase of tensions in Khandesh's relations with Gujarat commenced in 1543, when Mubarak Shah II decided to give shelter to Darya Khan, the powerful *wazir* of Gujarat

34. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-286.

Sultanate, after he had fallen out with his master.³⁵ It seems, around this time, Mahmud Shah III was making preparations for invading Khandesh. This can be inferred from the contents of a letter written by one of the Ahmadnagar nobles to Khudawand Khan, the *diwan-i kul* of Gujarat, who was, apparently, very influential in the affairs of Gujarat Sultanate at that time. In this letter, the writer (Ahmadnagar noble) specifically asks Khudawand Khan to dissuade the Sultan of Gujarat from attacking Mubarak Shah II.³⁶ The same letter also tends to give the impression that during this time the relations between Khandesh and Ahmadnagar had improved somewhat. This is suggested by Mubarak Shah II's sending *khatib* Burhanuddin as his envoy to the Ahmadnagar court. Apparently, Mubarak Shah II himself

 35. Sikandar bin Manjhu does not mention clearly whether Mubarak Shah II assisted Darya Khan or not. But it is referred that the Sultan issued a *farman* and recalled Imad-ul-Mulk from Mandu, whom Darya Khan had expelled from Gujarat during their struggle for power. See *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp-343-45.

36. Anonymous Insha collection (Miscellaneous MS), MS Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris Supplement, 1352, Paris, ff-22-23 (margin). An English summarised translation of the text of this letter is as follows:

"Its is to be reported that *khatib* Burhanuddin has come to this place, and through him Mir Miran Mubarak Shah intend to appeal for mercy and that he (Mubarak Shah) counts himself among those who are pledged to be loyal".

"The arrival of the above mentioned (Burhanuddin) could start a correspondence between the two states. Your (an *hazrat*) intervention will help him (Mubarak Shah) to reach his goal. As it is against a thoughtful mind to attack his fellow religionist (*ahl-i Islam*), and also against *mansab-i khilafat*. So you should intervene to dissuade His Majesty (*huzoor nawab kibriya*) from attacking".

was also anxious to revive cordial relations with Ahmadnagar. This, he hoped, would help in overcoming the difficulties that had lately arisen in his relations with the *Sultan* of Gujarat. As, one may infer from the above cited letter, Mubarak Shah II had requested one of the Ahmadnagar nobles to intercede with the *Sultan* of Gujarat on his behalf.³⁷

For the next ten years the relations between Khandesh and Gujarat were largely cordial. There was no attempt by either side to intervene in each others affairs. Mubarak Shah II next tried to intervene in the affairs of Gujarat only in 1553. In this year, following the death of Mahmud Shah III, factional fight flared up among the nobles of Gujarat on the issue of succession. He decided to take advantage of this situation, but was opposed by a strong Gujarat army raised by the faction of the nobles, who had installed Ahmad Shah II as the new *Sultan*.³⁸ This confrontation did not lead to actual hostilities. A settlement was arrived at between the two sides following which the two armies withdrew to their respective regions.³⁹

The chroniclers do not clearly spell out the terms of the settlement arrived at by Mubarak Shah II with the faction of Gujarati nobles led by Nasir-ul Mulk. It may, however, be -----

37. See *Ibid*.

38. *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp-390-91.

39. *Ibid*.

inferred that Mubarak Shah II's march to Gujarat frontier, at this time, was largely in the nature of a show of force aimed at forcing the new Sultan of Gujarat to reiterate and confirm the special ties uniting the two ruling dynasties. It seems, once an acknowledgement of these ties was forthcoming from the new ruler of Gujarat, Mubarak Shah II was no longer interested in putting further military pressure on him.

III

Akbar's earliest move towards Khandesh began with the annexation of Malwa (1562). With this annexation, the Mughals also came to have a common frontier with Khandesh. A Mughal army under Adham Khan, and later under Pir Muhammad Khan, had occupied Malwa. In pursuit of Baz Bahadur, Pir Muhammad Khan also invaded the territory of Khandesh.⁴⁰ He suspected that the treasure of Bahadur Shah of Gujarat was hidden in the fort of Asirgarh, and had written to Akbar for more reinforcement to besiege that fort.⁴¹ He ransacked and burnt down the city of Burhanpur ordering a general massacre

40. *Akbarnama*, vol. II, pp-134-35; see also Abdul Qadir Badaoni's *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, ed. by Maulvi Ahmad Ali and Kabiruddin Ahmad, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1868, vol. II, pp-47-48; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, pp-250-51.

41. Rafiuddin Ibrahim Shirazi, *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, British Museum MS, Add. 23, 888, f-204.

of the inhabitants.⁴² In this destruction carried out by the Mughals at Burhanpur a large library containing many precious books and manuscripts was also burnt down.⁴³ Later, on hearing about the advance of a combined army under Baz Bahadur and Mubarak Shah II, he retreated towards Mandu, but was drowned while crossing Narbada.⁴⁴ In the subsequent fighting Baz Bahadur appear to have regained temporarily some of the territories including those of Bijapur and Handia,⁴⁵ which he, apparently, agreed to hand over to the Khandesh ruler, Mubarak Shah II in recognition of help received in his struggle against the Mughals.

Akbar was naturally unhappy over Mubarak Shah II's role in this respect. He was also not reconciled to the transfer of Bijagarh and Handia to Khandesh. In 1564, when Akbar came

42. *Akbarnama*, vol. II, p-166; Badaoni gave a detailed account of the atrocities committed by Pir Muhammad Khan in Burhanpur. He says that Pir Muhammad Khan behaved like Changez [*Changezi ra kar farmuda*] massacring or taking prisoners the inhabitants of Burhanpur and Asir. *Vide Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp-50-51.

43. *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, f-204.

44. *Akbarnama*, vol. II, pp-167-68. Badaoni gave a chronogram yielding the year AH. 969 (AD. 1562) of Pir Muhammad Khan's death by drowning which reads as follows: *az rah-i ab ba atish raft* [He went by water to fire (i.e. hell)]. *Vide Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp-50-51. See also *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, pp-156-57; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, pp-251-52.

45. *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp-51-52; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, pp-251-52.

to Malwa to suppress the rebellion of Abdullah Khan Uzbek,⁴⁶ the Mughal army also entered into Khandesh territory and captured Bijagarh.⁴⁷ This annexation alarmed Mubarak Shah II who, apparently, to avoid further confrontation with the Mughals, entered into a matrimonial alliance with Akbar.⁴⁸ He also transferred some more territories belonging to sarkar Bijagarh and Handia to the Mughals in the form of "dowry",⁴⁹ thus providing the Mughals an important foothold south of Narbada.

It is not clear whether any formal treaty was concluded between Mubarak Shah II and Akbar on this occasion.⁵⁰ In any case, Akbar was satisfied with what he had achieved and, apparently, did not press for a formal recognition of his

46. Abdullah Khan Uzbek was one of the officers of Humayun. In the conquest of Malwa he had assisted Adham Khan. After Pir Muhammad Khan was drowned, Akbar appointed him to Malwa with the *mansab* of five thousand, with an aim to chastize Baz Bahadur. In the year 1563-64 he rebelled against Akbar. For Abdullah Khan Uzbek's biography and his rebellion see Samsamuddaulah Shah Nawaz Khan, *Masir-ul-Umara*, ed. by Abdur Rahim and Mirza Ashraf Ali, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1890, vol. II, pp-764-69.

47. *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, 0-60.

48. *Akbarnama*, vol. II, p-30. Abul Fazl says that Mubarak Shah II requested the Emperor that his daughter should be included into the His Majesty's *harem*, while Haji-ud-Dabir says that Mubarak Shah II gave his daughter to Akbar on "demand". See *Zafar-ul-Waleh*, (tr.) vol. I, p-60.

49. *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-60.

50. T.W. Haig, 'The Faruqi Dynasty of Khandesh' *Indian Antiquary*, 1918, p-141, does maintain that on this occasion Mubarak Shah II had agreed to have Friday *khutba* recited in Akbar's name, but the source of this information could not be traced.

overlordship or a regular payment of *peshkash*. Following this alliance Khandesh's relations with other neighbouring states appears to have become strained. These powers, particularly Ahmadnagar and Gujarat, did not approve Mubarak Shah II's close alliance with Akbar as they, perhaps, feared that extension of Mughal hegemony over Khandesh was a prelude to the conquest of Gujarat and the Deccan plateau.

This apprehension of Mughals' advance towards the Deccan was confirmed with the annexation of Gujarat in 1572. With this annexation the seemingly cordial relations between the Mughals and Khandesh continuing since 1564 became somewhat strained once again. This was caused by the Mughal action in unilaterally annexing the territories of Nandurbar and Sultanpur. The annexation of these territories by the Mughals is borne out by Abul Fazl's statement suggesting that in 1577, when Todarmal went to Gujarat for setting the revenues of that region, he started his work from Sultanpur and Nandurbar.⁵¹

Muhammad Shah II of Khandesh sent his brother Raja Ali Khan to meet Akbar in Gujarat in 1573,⁵² but probably the real mission of Raja Ali Khan's visit, at this occasion, was to dissuade Akbar from depriving Khandesh of the territories

51. cf. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-30.

52. *Ibid*, p-30; 33.

of Nandurbar and Sultanpur. Apparently, his mission was not very successful which made the Khandesh ruler bitter and resentful towards the Mughals. One might suggest that the lukewarm attitude of the ruler of Khandesh, after 1574 towards Mughal efforts to prevent Murtaza Nizam Shah I from strengthening his hold over the newly annexed territory of Berar, was partly an outcome of the distrust that was created between them in 1572.⁵³ Although at the time of the annexation of Berar to Ahmadnagar in 1574, Muhammad Shah II had actively sided with the ruler of Berar but subsequently in 1575, an agreement was concluded between Murtaza Nizam Shah I and Muhammad Shah II, under which the latter scrupulously refrained from helping the nobles of Berar against Ahmadnagar authorities.⁵⁴

Muhammad Shah II continued to abide by this understanding with the ruler of Ahmadnagar, but he took care to proceed in such a manner that the Mughals should not be provoked to attack him. In a way he tried to appease Akbar by not agreeing to Murtaza Nizam Shah I's proposal that the nobles of Berar, then staying in Khandesh, be handed over to the Ahmadnagar authorities. It is, in any case, significant that he also did not accede to Mughal's proposal that either he himself should undertake to help the nobles of Berar

53. cf. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p.136. *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-466.

54. See *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-488.

against Ahmadnagar or allow them to cross over to Malwa for receiving military assistance from the Mughals. In not allowing the nobles of Berar to proceed to Malwa, Muhammad Shah II was not only motivated by his anxiety not to provoke Murtaza Nizam Shah but he did so also because he feared that if they were allowed to proceed to Malwa and afterwards they were equipped by the Mughals there, then there would be further pressure by the Mughals on him to allow a passage to this force through his territory for attacking the Ahmadnagar forces in Berar.

After his accession in 1576, initially Raja Ali Khan was anxious not to give offence to Akbar by not assuming the title 'Shah', he instead made it a point to send *peshkash* to the Mughal Emperor.⁵⁵ But, later on, he became reluctant to continue to pay *peshkash*. Getting annoyed by this, a Mughal army was sent by Akbar in 1577 to punish him.⁵⁶ This army besieged Raja Ali Khan for sometime in the fort of Asingarn. But before this expedition could achieve its objective, it had to be diverted towards Gujarat, where Muzaffar Husain Mirza had started a rebellion against Akbar.⁵⁷ Thus on this occasion the Mughal officers had to agree to receive from Raja Ali Khan whatever amount of *peshkash*, he was then in a

55. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-288.

56. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-333; *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-197-98; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-244.

57. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-333; *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-206; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-250.

position to pay.⁵⁸

After Muzaffar Husain Mirza was chased out from Gujarat by the Mughals, he, enroute to Ahmadnagar, entered Khandesh and was captured by Raja Ali Khan. Thereupon, Akbar sent another ultimatum to Raja Ali Khan demanding the surrender of Muzaffar Husain Mirza as well as payment of *peshkash*.⁵⁹ Raja Ali Khan considered this to be a favourable opportunity for defusing the tension in his relations with the Mughals, promptly complied with Akbar's demand.⁶⁰ However, it seems, the Khandesh ruler was not happy at this course of events. This signify his conceding that he was no longer an independent ruler. This unhappiness of Raja Ali Khan is borne out by his subsequent behaviour.

Subsequently, Raja Ali Khan persisted in his attitude of not sending regular *peshkash* which caused friction leading to an armed clash between him and Shah Budagh Khan, the Mughal governor of Malwa, in 1579.⁶¹ In this particular

58. *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*-vol. II, p-250.

59. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-336; *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-261-62; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-253.

60. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-340; *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-261-62; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-256.

61. This event is not mentioned in any of the Mughal chronicles, neither does Ferishta make any reference to this occurrence. But Haji-ud-Dabir, the author of *Zafar-ul-Waleh Bi Muzaffar Wa Alihi*, describes it at length. See *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-63.

clash the Mughal forces were humiliated which caused Shah Budagh Khan's death due to shame.⁶²

The decision of Akbar to give shelter to Burhan-ul Mulk in 1583 was a part of his forward policy with regard to the Deccan states in general and Ahmadnagar in particular. Around the same time, embassies were sent to the Deccan states demanding their submission.⁶³ The outbreak of dissension among the nobles of Ahmadnagar in 1584 came as a much coveted opportunity for Akbar to intervene in the affairs of Ahmadnagar militarily. In 1585, an expedition was sent under Mirza Aziz Koka to help one of the warring factions of the nobles of Ahmadnagar.⁶⁴ Simultaneously, Mir Fatehullah Shirazi was sent to advise Raja Ali Khan to assist the Mughal army in its operations in the Ahmadnagar territory. At this time, instead of assisting the Mughals, Raja Ali Khan, who was nursing a secret grudge against the Mughals, sought an alliance with Murtaza Nizam Shah I of Ahmadnagar.⁶⁵ While outwardly pretending to be supporting the Mughal cause, Raja Ali Khan did not co-operate with the Mughal envoy, Fatehullah Shirazi, and ensured his departure

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-266-67; 280.

64. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, pp-383-84; *Akbarnama* vol. III, p-489.

65. *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, pp-63-64.

from Burhanpur without completing his mission.⁶⁶

Now the Mughal army headed by Mirza Aziz Koka proceeded towards Khandesh from the side of Berar. But soon dissension broke out in the Mughal camp. There also cropped up differences between Aziz Koka and Fatehullah Shirazi. The latter, in disgust, left Aziz Koka's camp and proceeded towards Gujarat.⁶⁷ Then started large scale desertion from the Mughal camp making Aziz Koka's position in Berar desperate. In a valiant bid to save the situation Aziz Koka advanced against Ellichpur and Balapur in Berar.⁶⁸ Faced with this situation, an alliance was formed between Khandesh and Ahmadnagar. Raja Ali Khan and Mirza Muhammad Taqi, the Nizam Shahi commander, led a combined force against the Mughals.⁶⁹ The arrival of the Deccani forces in Berar panicked Aziz Koka. Being convinced of his disadvantageous position against this combined force, Aziz Koka escaped into Gujarat in the hope of getting help from Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan, the Mughal governor of Gujarat. As the rainy season was approaching, the Deccani forces led by Raja Ali Khan also

66. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, pp-383-84; *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-489; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp-360-62; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-265; *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-550.

67. *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp-360-62; *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, p-550.

68. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-489; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-265.

69. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-489; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp-360-62, *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-265; *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-549.

played safe; they returned to their respective regions,⁷⁰ allowing Aziz Koka to retreat to Gujarat unmolested.

After this humiliating experience, the Mughals desisted from intervening in the affairs of the Deccan for sometime. But in 1588, the dramatic turn of events in Ahmadnagar provided a pretext to Akbar to intervene. In 1588, Murtaza Nizam Shah I was murdered by his son, Husain, who in turn was also murdered a few months later. These developments in Ahmadnagar encouraged Akbar to try to extend his sway over Ahmadnagar by helping Burhan-ul Mulk, one of the brothers of Murtaza Nizam Shah I, who, till then was a fugitive at his court. Accordingly, Burhan was sent to Burhanpur. While, at the same time, Akbar asked Raja Ali Khan to assist Burhan militarily in his efforts to establish himself as the ruler of Ahmadnagar.⁷¹ However, in his first attempt Burhan failed. In 1591, Burhan again sought Raja Ali Khan's help for another attempt to enter Ahmadnagar and establish himself there. The willing help extended to Burhan by Raja Ali Khan, who by now had started co-operating with the Mughals, went much beyond the limit of complying with Akbar's directions. It is obvious that Raja Ali Khan regarded the installation of a competent ruler at Ahmadnagar as the safest guarantee of

70. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-385; *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-66; *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-551.

71. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-75; *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-538-39; *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. II, p-151; *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-66.

his protection against possible Mughal designs on his principality. He was perhaps convinced that Burhan, once established at Ahmadnagar, would, contrary to Akbar's expectations, refuse to act as an stooge of Mughal policy in the Deccan. For ensuring Burhan's success in Ahmadnagar, Raja Ali Khan also tried to secure the co-operation of the ruler of Bijapur. He entered into a correspondence with Ibrahim Adil Shah II and eventually succeeded in securing the latter's co-operation in his efforts to instal Burhan on the throne of Ahmadnagar.⁷² It was a combined force consisting of Raja Ali Khan's troops as its major component but also including Burhan's personal contingent as well as a small body of Mughal cavalry that defeated the Ahmadnagar troops commanded by Jamal Khan at Rohankhed. In this battle the Khandesh troops led by Raja Ali Khan did most of the fighting. As a matter of fact Raja Ali Khan was chiefly instrumental in installing Burhan on the throne of Ahmadnagar.⁷³

It may be noticed at this point that by co-operating with the Mughals and assisting Burhan in his efforts, Raja Ali Khan had temporarily made his position quite unassailable. Thus, by becoming a willing ally of Akbar, on this occasion, Raja Ali Khan, on the one hand, managed to

72. See *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-587.

73. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-75; *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-587; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-151.

save his small Kingdom from being overrun by a Mughal army that would have certainly come to help Burhan. On the other hand, he was also able to strengthen his position *vis-a-vis* the other Deccani states, particularly Ahmadnagar.

Akbar, however, was greatly disappointed by the subsequent behaviour of Burhan, for his acting in the manner of an independent ruler and refusal to send *peshkash* that he had agreed to pay before occupying the Nizam Shahi throne.⁷⁴ It may be argued that Burhan Nizam Shah II was quite justified in not acknowledging Akbar's overlordship and not fulfilling other commitments made by him before setting from Akbar's court, as he had occupied the Nizam Shahi throne without using the Mughal forces placed at his disposal. By contrast his attitude towards Raja Ali Khan during the same period was particularly warm and friendly. He fully recognized that without Raja Ali Khan's assistance it could have been very difficult for him to come to power at Ahmadnagar.

In 1591, Sheikh Faizi was sent to Khandesh for asking Raja Ali Khan to give proper advice to Burhan Nizam Shah II and to persuade him to acknowledge Akbar's overlordship. Simultaneously, three other ambassadors, namely, Khwaja Amiruddin, Mir Muhammad Amin and Mir Munir were sent to the

74. cf. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-596-97.

rulers of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkonda respectively.⁷⁵ In his messages to these rulers Akbar demanded their submission, and in case of their refusal to do so, threatened to dislodge them from their territories.⁷⁶ It seems, from this time onwards, Akbar was giving more and more importance to the task of achieving his aims in the Deccan. He began preparations for invading Ahmadnagar. Prince Murad was appointed governor of Malwa with the order that, in case there was no positive response to the four embassies sent to the Deccan kingdoms, he (Murad) should be prepared to advance into the Deccan at a short notice.⁷⁷

The four ambassadors returned from the Deccan in 1593 without achieving anything worthwhile. Faizi's mission to Khandesh proved successful to a limited extent, where Raja Ali Khan had paid *peshkash* and promised to remain subservient. But, in Ahmadnagar, Burhan Nizam Shah II refused to pay *peshkash*, neither did he agree to formally submit to Akbar.⁷⁸ This attitude of Burhan greatly annoyed Akbar, who decided to make a show of strength against

75. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-412; *Akbarnama* vol. III, pp-596-97; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-377; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-267.

76. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-597-98.

77. "His Majesty's idea was that if the rulers of the Deccan were not impressed by the good advises, punishment should be prepared for them." cf. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-597-98.

78. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-639; see also *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-389.

Ahmadnagar by ordering a large scale mobilization of forces in Malwa. These forces, however, did not move towards the Deccan until 1595. The actual march began only after a struggle for succession had begun at Ahmadnagar following Burhan Nizam Shah II's death in 1595. On the issue of succession the nobles of Ahmadnagar came to be divided into four factions led by Chand Bibi, Miyan Manjhu, Ikhlas Khan and Abhang Khan respectively. Each one of these factions put up their own protege as the candidate for the throne. Failing to gain an upper hand in this struggle, Miyan Manjhu, leader of one of the factions, in despair, invited Prince Murad to help him.⁷⁹ The Mughals, who apparently, waiting for such an opportunity, promptly marched to Ahmadnagar.

In the meanwhile, to ensure Raja Ali Khan's willing co-operation in the planned military operations in Ahmadnagar, Akbar returned the territory of Nandurbar to him.⁸⁰ Already by this time Raja Ali Khan had joined the Mughals in their campaign in Ahmadnagar.⁸¹ Returning of Nandurbar to Khandesh should have further cemented these ties.

The Mughal army besieged Ahmadnagar in December, 1595.

79. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-159.

80. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-697; *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-71.

81. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-698-99; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-269; vol. II, p-289; *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-71.

Their siege operations did not progress satisfactorily due to the dissensions in the Mughal camp, of which the hostility between Prince Murad and Adbur Rahim Khan-i Khana was the most conspicuous aspect. Taking full advantage of these dissensions, Chand Bibi, who acted as the regent of the infant contender for throne, Bahadur, defended the fort of Ahmadnagar most stubbornly.⁸² Raja Ali Khan, despite his close ties with the Mughals at this time, was not reconciled to the idea of the total destruction of Ahmadnagar Kingdom, tried to help the garrison of the fort to hold on to their position in various ways. When it was discovered that he was helping the garrison, he was removed by Prince Murad's order from the position that he commanded.⁸³

The garrison of the fort under Chand Bibi were, surely, not in a position to continue to resist the Mughal pressure indefinitely. Ultimately on 23rd February, 1596, they made a proposal for peace, which was promptly accepted by Murad. The terms of the settlement were: (a) Bahadur shall be

82. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-699-700.

83. "Traditions of old friendship of Raja Ali Khan, ruler of Khandesh, still remained and he maintained an uninterrupted intercourse with those within the fort, so that they were enabled by his means, to introduce any supplies that they might require, and occasionally when a body of gunners came from the other forts in the kingdom to reinforce those in Ahmadnagar they were able to enter the fortress by the connivance of Raja Ali Khan and greatly strengthened the defence". cf. *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, p-612.

recognized as the ruler of Ahmadnagar,⁸⁴ (b) he would accept Akbar's overlordship, (c) the territory of Berar shall be ceded to the Mughals, and (d) the Ahmadnagar authorities shall also give other valuable gifts to Akbar.⁸⁵ Murad promptly accepted the proposal because he was inclined to end the operations as early as possible, in view of the persisting dissensions in his camp and the threat posed by the forces advancing from the side of Bijapur.⁸⁶ There is no mention in the sources of Raja Ali Khan playing a role in arranging the peace between Ahmadnagar and the Mughals on this occasion. Perhaps he was not included in the negotiations because both the Mughals and Nizam Shahis were suspicious about him.

Even after the peace settlement of 1596, the struggle between the Mughals and Nizam Shahi officers for the control of the territory, over run by the former, continued. Many of the Nizam Shahi officers, apparently, were not happy on ceding of Berar to the Mughals. They appeared to be determined not to let the Mughals occupy particularly the territory of Berar. A major clash took place between the

84. Abul Fazl writes that "the territory of Ahmadnagar would be given as *iqta* to Bahadur and he would be made a servant of the Mughal court". See *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-699-700. Abul Fazl's statement indicate that as if the territory of Ahmadnagar was a part of the Mughal Empire.

85. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-699-700; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-162.

86. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-162; See also *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-625.

Mughals and dissenting Nizam shahi officers near Pathri in 1597. In this clash Raja Ali Khan was killed fighting on the Mughals' side.⁸⁷ At the end of the clash, when the Mughals did not find any trace of Raja Ali Khan, they jumped to the conclusion that he had either fled from the field or had deserted the Mughal army to join the Deccanis. Suspecting his loyalty, they plundered Raja Ali Khan's camp.⁸⁸ Next day, in any case, his body was found amongst the dead, which proved to be a great embarrassment for the Mughals. They promptly restored to the Khandesh detachment his banners, kettle drums and other property that were taken away as plunder on a day earlier.⁸⁹ To pacify the feelings of Khandesh officers, Raja Ali Khan's body was buried with full honours. Despite these steps the Mughal-Khandesh relations came under a serious strain by this incident. Bahadur Shah, who succeeded Raja Ali Khan, found it difficult to offer support to Akbar's moves in the Deccan. He, in fact, adopted a defiant attitude towards the Mughals. This was reflected in his not sending customary *peshkash* to the Mughal Emperor at the time of his ascending the throne.⁹⁰ But the Mughals, on their part, appeared to be very anxious to

87. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-717-20; *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. II, p-163; *Zafar-ul-Haleh* (tr.), vol. I, pp-72-73.

88. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-717-20.

89. *Ibid.*

90. See Faizi Sirhindi, *Akbarnama*, in Elliot and Dowson (ed.), *History of India as told by its own Historians*, vol. VI, pp-134-35.

continue their alliance with Khandesh. Murad sent a formal message of condolences to Bahadur Shah on the death of his father. He also sent congratulations to him on his accession to the throne of Khandesh and invited him to visit the Mughal camp.⁹¹ But Bahadur Shah remained aloof and unfriendly. On each occasion, that he received an invitation from Murad to visit the Mughal camp, he evaded accepting it on one pretext or the other.⁹²

On 2nd May, 1599, Prince Murad died at Shahpur in Berar. In his place, Prince Daniyal was appointed as the overall commander of the Mughal forces in the Deccan. At the time of his appointment to the Deccan, Daniyal was directed to continue the ongoing campaign against the dissenting officers of Ahmadnagar.⁹³ Around this time having been relieved from his pre-occupations in the North-West, Akbar personally came to the Deccan. He was still hopeful of pacifying Bahadur Shah through personal contacts which he planned to establish after reaching Burhanpur. Akbar arrived at Burhanpur at a time when there was no consensus amongst the Khandesh nobles on their future line of action. Instead of welcoming Akbar, Bahadur Shah promptly retired to the fort of Asirgarh and began preparations for facing a prolonged

91. *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-73.

92. *Ibid.*

93. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-756; *Tarikh-i Ferishta* vol. II, p-290.

siege.⁹⁴ Despite desertions by some of his followers, he remained stubborn in his decision not to submit to Akbar and also not to co-operate with him in his campaigns against Ahmadnagar officers.

Initially Akbar tried to defuse the prevailing tension in his relations with the Khandesh ruler, Bahadur Shah, through negotiations. He sent envoys inside the fort to persuade Bahadur Shah to submit to the Mughals. But these efforts were not successful. The futility of his peaceful overtures greatly angered Akbar, who finally decided to capture the fort by use of force.⁹⁵

Abul Fazl was entrusted with the task of occupying Khandesh territory. He sent troops in different directions and within a short time almost whole of Khandesh, with the exception of the fort of Asirgarh, was under the Mughal occupation. As is well known, after a prolonged siege the fort of Asirgarh was surrendered by its garrison to Akbar in 1601. Bahadur Shah was taken prisoner and was sent with his family to Gwalior fort. With this the Faruqi dynasty of Khandesh came to an end, and the territory of Khandesh, called Dandesh later, came to be annexed to the Mughal Empire as one of its *subas* in the Deccan.

94. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-290.

95. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-766-67.

IV

While concluding this chapter one may, thus, say that from the very beginning of its establishment as an independent state, Khandesh was involved in a complex pattern of relationship with the neighbouring kingdoms. Particularly with the *Sultan* of Gujarat its relations were of the nature of a tributary state; Gujarat exercising a dominating position vis a vis Khandesh. Later this relationship was strengthened through matrimonial ties and the Khandesh ruler actively co-operated with the *Sultan* of Gujarat in his military exploits. Khandesh's alliance with Gujarat against Humayun's invasion in 1535 invited the wrath of the Mughal Emperor.

The occupation of Malwa by Akbar in 1562 changed the entire situation. Now the Mughals began to play crucial role in shaping the relations of Khandesh with the neighbouring kingdoms. The annexation of Gujarat to the Mughal Empire gave a new dimension to the inter-state relations. The Khandesh ruler resented the annexation of Nandurbar and Sultanpur refusing to play the Mughal game against Ahmadnagar, who had captured Berar (1574). Raja Ali Khan never reconciled to becoming a vassal of the Mughal Emperor. Throughout his reign he seems to have played a dubious policy. On the one hand, he tried to form an alliance of the

Mughals, on the other, he often also entered into an alliance with them. Dramatic turn at the Ahmadnagar court compelled him to ally with the Mughals in 1595. Yet his true sympathies were always with the Deccani states. It was this dubious attitude that made him a suspect in both the camps. Though he allied with the Mughals in 1597, but the military alliance with the Mughals did not help in promoting friendly feelings and cordiality between them. Deep rooted suspicions continued to mark the Mughal-Khandesh relations. With the death of Raja Ali Khan and accession of Bahadur Shah, began the final phase of Mughal-Khandesh relations which culminated in the extinction of the latter in 1601. Bahadur shah was determined not to succumb to the Mughal pressure. He refrained from allying with them in the military operations against Ahmadnagar. Bahadur Shah, in fact, failed in diplomacy by opposing the Mughals openly, thus, provided them pretext for justifying their virtual occupation of large tracts of the Khandesh territory. The annexation of Khandesh paved the way for the full-scale offensive by the Mughals against the Deccani states during ensuing four decades, finally leading to the dismantling of Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 1636.

CHAPTER II

The Relations of Mughal Empire with the
Ahmadnagar Kingdom, 1526-72. Circumstances
Leading to the Dispute Over Berar.

The year 1526 witnessed the extinction of the two powerful kingdoms, the Bahamani in the Deccan and the Lodi in North India. Babur's victory at Panipat had far reaching consequences in the Deccan also. Earlier throughout the fifteenth century as well as the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the relations between the Deccani kingdoms and the northern states were always at a very low key. But with the establishment of the Mughal Empire this isolation seems to have ended. The Deccani rulers namely, Ismail Adil Shah of Bijapur, Burhan Nizam Shah I of Ahmadnagar and Sultan Quli Qutb Shah of Golkonda, sent congratulatory letters to Babur on his victory. On hearing the news of the despatch of these messages, the last Bahamani ruler, Shah Kalimullah, who was only a pawn in the hands of his *wazir*, Amir Ali Barid, also sent one of his confidants with a letter to Babur complaining against the "old servants of his Kingdom (i.e. Adil Shah, Nizam Shah and Qutb Shah)". He also requested Babur to secure his release from virtual captivity in the hands of Amir Ali Barid. In return for this help Shah Kalimullah promised to cede to the Mughals the domains (*mumlikat*) of Berar and Daulatabad,¹ which he incidentally no longer controlled as an effective ruler. When this news leaked out, apparently, in sheer fright of his *wazir*, Ali Barid, Kalimullah fled to Bijapur. Disappointed over not

1. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-376.

being welcomed there, he finally took refuge at Ahmadnagar.²

Owing to his preoccupations in the North, Babur seems to have paid no heed to the communications from the Deccani rulers. Moreover, as it comes out from Babur's brief notice of the Bahmanis in his memoirs, he was aware that "no independent authority is left them".³ So far as Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkonda rulers were concerned, he, apparently, did not recognize them as sovereign rulers and refers to them only as the "great *begs*" of the Bahmani Kingdom.⁴ This should explain why Babur decided to ignore their congratulatory letters.

Perhaps it was the tendency of the Deccani rulers to placate the powerful rulers invading North India. On an earlier occasion also, in similar circumstances, when Taimur had captured Delhi in 1398-99, the Bahmani ruler, Sultan Firoz Shah, had sent him *peshkash* and acknowledged his overlordship.⁵ According to Ferishta, Taimur was pleased by the gesture and had issued a "*farman*" conferring on the Bahmani Sultan, Malwa and Gujarat with permission to use all

2. *Ibid.*

3. Zahiruddin Babur's *Baburnama*, translated from the original Turkish text by A.S. Beveridge, (reprint), London, 1969, p-631.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Tarikh-i-Ferishta*, vol. I, p-312.

the insignia of royalty.⁶ By conferring the territories of Malwa and Gujarat on Firoz Shah Bahmani, Taimur was behaving in a manner, as if these territories were parts of his Empire. At the time of Babur's invasion the same ritual of sending congratulatory letters was repeated. As a matter of fact, after the Battle of Khanwah (1527) Babur appeared inclined towards advancing into northern Malwa controlled by the Rajput chieftains, who had co-operated with Rana Sanga. This can be conjectured from his occupation of Chanderi in 1528, which placed him in a commanding position on the northern confines of Malwa.⁷ Babur's advance into Malwa in 1528 could also be interpreted as revealing his long term plans to extend influence towards the Deccan. Thus one could justifiably conjecture that Babur might have played, for sometime, with the idea of moving southwards in response to the letters received from the Deccani rulers. But his preoccupations in the North obviously would not have allowed him to make any such move.

Subsequently, Humayun's invasion of Gujarat (1535-36) brought the Mughals into a direct contact with Khandesh as well as Ahmadnagar. When Humayun started his operations against Bahadur Shah, the latter hotly chased by the Mughals, fled from Mandisor to Mandu and then to Champaner and -----

6. *Ibid.*

7. See *Baburnama*, (tr.), p-598. Babur also planned to annex Raisin, Bhilsa and Sarangpur but was prevented from doing so by the news of renewed Afghan rebellion in Awadh.

Ahmadabad. Eventually he was forced to take refuge at Diu on the Kathiawar coast. Thus, the whole of Gujarat came under the Mughal control.⁸ While Humayun was still in Gujarat, he received submissive letters from Burhan Nizam Shah I of Ahmadnagar, Alauddin Imad Shah of Berar and "other Deccani rulers (*digar hukkam-i dakan*)".⁹ According to Ferishta, during this time, Humayun sent a certain Asaf Khan to Ahmadnagar to demand *peshkash* (*talib-i peshkash shud*) from Burhan Nizam Shah.¹⁰ It may be conjectured that Asaf Khan was sent to reciprocate the embassy of Rasti Khan sent earlier by Burhan Nizam Shah to persuade Humayun to invade Gujarat.¹¹ The despatch of Asaf Khan to Ahmadnagar is also corroborated by a subsequent letter of Burhan Nizam Shah I, which he sent after Humayun's invasion of Khandesh. In this letter, which, according to Ferishta, was drafted by Shah Tahir Junaidi, acknowledging the receipt of imperial *farman* (*farman-i humayun misal*) sent through Asaf Khan, he states that, "..... letters have been received from Muhammad Khan Faruqi, the ruler (*kabir mutasaddi-i iyalat*) of Burhanpur and Asir" seeking protection for his small Kingdom

8. *Akbarnama*, vol. I, pp-132-33. For details of Humayun's war with Bahadur Shah, see Ishwari Prasad's *Life and Times of Humayun*, Calcutta, 1955, pp-68-77.

9. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-215; See also Khafi Khan, *Muntakhals-ul Lubab*, ed. by Kabiruddin Ahmad, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1869, vol. I, p-79.

10. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-285.

11. *Ibid*, p-116; pp-9-10.

from Mughal invasion. Burhan Nizam Shah requested Humayun to pardon Muhammad Khan Faruqui's "errors" and pleaded that the Mughals should not occupy Khandesh.¹²

After Humayun's withdrawal from Khandesh (1536) and his subsequent discomfiture at the hands of Sher Shah (1540), the correspondence between him and the Nizam Shahis was discontinued. But these contacts are reported to have been revived around September-October, 1550, which shall be noticed in some detail after having surveyed the Nizam Shahi-Sur relations during 1537-50.

After the Mughals were displaced from North India, Burhan Nizam Shah I established diplomatic relations with the Sur Empire in order to secure their help in his struggle against his neighbours. Although hardly any information is furnished by the chronicles regarding Burhan Nizam Shah's contacts with the Sur rulers, but an anonymous *Insha* collection contains letters (*maktubat*) written by Burhan Nizam Shah I to Sher Shah and after him to Islam Shah as

12. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-285. For the letter of Burhan Nizam Shah I to Humayun, see *Insha-i Tahir Husaini*, British Museum MS, HARL-499, ff-179-199. From the contents of the letter it appears that, at this time, Humayun was in Khandesh and the letter was despatched in August-September, 1536.

well.¹³ Later, with the decline of Sur fortunes, Burhan Nizam Shah again opened correspondence with Humayun. In one of the letters, sent sometime in 1550 (by this time Humayun had established himself at Kabul after defeating Kamran), he recalls his earlier relations with the Mughals and apologizes for not keeping in touch. He further writes that ".....the present communication is aimed at renewal of allegiance (*tajdid-i marasim-i ita'at*)", and expresses gratitude and pleasure on receiving Humayun's *farman* brought by the companions of the late Rasti Khan. In this letter Burhan Nizam Shah also conveys that "he expects that Humayun will launch a campaign to liberate territories still held by rebels (possibly a reference to Surs) and assures all assistance in the campaign". "Having broken-off relations with the enemies of the imperial power (i.e. the Surs)", the letter goes on to say, "this writer is now awaiting the launching of the campaign, success of which is assured".¹⁴

13. Iqtidar Alam Khan in his article 'Ahmadnagar and the Sur Empire, 1537-53; A study of contemporary Documents', *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, Burdwan, 1983, pp-176-88, has used an anonymous *insha* collection preserved in Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, which contains Burhan Nizam Shah's correspondence with the contemporary rulers and other related documents. See MS Bibliotheque Nationale, Persian Supplement, 1352.

14. For full text of the letter, see Anonymous *insha* collection, Persian supplement, 1352, ff-19b-21b (margin). Same letter is also included in *Insha-i Tahir Husaini*, ff-9b-13b. Riazul Islam has given a summarised translation, but he wrongly gives the date of despatch of above letter as AH. 937/AD. 1530. See Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, Tehran and Karachi, 1979, vol. II, p-120.

The contents of this letter indicate that, for some reason, the relations between the Nizam Shah and the Surs had become strained during this time (1550), which was partly responsible for Burhan Nizam Shah's re-establishing relations with the Mughals. This correspondence was resumed at a time when Islam Shah was reigning and was still powerful ruler. Already by this time Islam Shah had succeeded in crushing the disaffected nobles, including Isa Khan Niazi, Khawas Khan and Shuja'at Khan Sur, the *hakim* of Malwa,¹⁵ and appeared to be in a position to intervene in the Deccan. One might conjecture that it was, possibly, in the hope of persuading Humayun to create a diversion for Islam Shah in the North-West, that Burhan Nizam Shah thought it politic to approach Humayun with this kind of letter. This is borne out by the contents of the letters that are reproduced in the anonymous *insha* collection. In this context Iqtidar Alam Khan rightly suggests that "during the period 1537-53, Burhan Nizam Shah I appears to be trying to cultivate alternately the Mughals and their Sur rivals depending on who seems to be gaining an upper hand at any particular point of time".¹⁶

15. For details of suppression of the disaffected nobles by Islam Shah, See Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui, *Some Aspects of Afghan Despotism in India*, Aligarh, 1969, pp-73-74.

16. See Iqtidar Alam Khan's article 'Ahmadnagar and the Sur Empire, 1537-53: A study of Contemporary Documents', *op. cit.*, pp-176-88.

Another letter (*ariza*) of Nizam Shah addressed to Humayun go to highlight his keenness to establish close relations with the Mughals after 1550. The statement in this letter that "(the writer) was overjoyed to receive the confirmation of the news of His Majesty's (i.e. Humayun's) setting out for the conquest of Delhi (*betaskhir-i dar-ul mulk Delhi*)"¹⁷ suggests that it was written sometime after November, 1554, when Humayun had left Kabul for re-establishing his rule in North India. It is noteworthy that by this time Burhan Nizam Shah had already died (December, 1553).¹⁸ This letter was possibly sent on behalf of Husain Nizam Shah, the successor of Burhan Nizam Shah. There is yet another letter (*ariza*) from the Nizam Shahi ruler to Humayun, which also seems to have been written on behalf of Husain Nizam Shah. The contents of this letter indicate that it was written sometime after Humayun had already conquered Delhi.¹⁹

It may, thus, be noticed that during the period 1537-55, the rulers of Ahmadnagar Kingdom, Burhan Nizam Shah I and later Husain Nizam Shah, were cautiously keeping an eye on the developments taking place in North India leading to the establishment of a powerful state in Gangetic plains

17. For full text of the letter, see Anonymous *Insha Collection*, Persian Supplement, 1352, f-18b (written on margin).

18. *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-356.

19. Anonymous *Insha Collection*, *op. cit.*, f-36b (written on margin).

capable of expanding towards the Deccan. Thus, Ahmadnagar rulers were always anxious to remain on the right side of the powers that seemed gaining authority in the North. The shift of Ahmadnagar's allegiance from Mughals to Surs and then *vice versa* during 1535-55 is borne out by their correspondence with the Sur as well as the Mughal rulers during this period.²⁰

Under Akbar no information regarding his relations with Ahmadnagar is found in the sources till one comes to the account of Akbar's march to Malwa for suppressing Abdullah Khan Uzbek in 1564. One of the Nizam Shahi officers, Mugarrib Khan, came by way of Berar and waited upon Akbar in Malwa. He was received in the Mughal service and was assigned as *jagir*, *sarkar* Handia, which was taken from Khandesh only a shortwhile earlier.²¹

Thus, during the period 1535-55 the attitude of Burhan Nizam Shah I was of a shifting nature. He shifted his allegiance according to the demands of the situation. He maintained correspondence with either Humayun or the Sur rulers depending on the general impression as to which one of them seemed to be gaining an upper hand in establishing his authority over North India. He was particularly apprehensive

20. For the detailed analysis of Nizam Shah's correspondence with the Surs and the Mughals, see Iqtidar Alam Khan's article 'Ahmadnagar and the Sur Empire', *op. cit*, pp-176-88.

21. *Akbarnama*, vol. II, p-30.

of the *Sultan* of Gujarat. His main concern during this period was to keep away the Gujarati *Sultan* from intervening in Ahmadnagar. To a lesser extent the Nizam Shahi ruler also regarded the Khalji Kingdom of Malwa as his potential rival in the affairs of Khandesh. He, therefore, was keen that Humayun, Sher Shah and, still later, Islam Shah, in short, everyone of these rulers controlling North India at different points of time during 1535-55, should keep up military pressure on Gujarat as well as Malwa to restrain them from interfering in Ahmadnagar or from competing with it in cultivating the friendship with Khandesh.

CHAPTER - III

Mughal Relations with Ahmadnagar, 1572-95.
Circumstances Inducing Akbar to Resort to the Use
of Force Against Ahmadnagar.

It was only after consolidating his Empire in the North that in 1595 Akbar was seemingly prompted to extend the boundaries of his Empire in the Deccan. Modern writers have ascribed different motives to Akbar for adopting this policy. Three specific suggestions have been made that "he cherished hopes of destroying the Portuguese dominion on the Western coast";¹ or that he desired "to safeguard the trade route to the Gujarat sea ports and to dominate "Surat hinterland",² or finally that in the Deccan "he was seeking larger revenues",³ all of these are undoubtedly relevant. But as Satish Chandra states, "a critical assessment of Akbar's objectives in the Deccan is yet to be made"⁴ In this regard, it may be suggested that, partly at least, Akbar's drive beginning in 1595 to annex territories in the Deccan may be explained with reference to the difficulties that arose in Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations from 1572 onwards. It is to bring out the circumstances and factors which gave rise to these difficulties that the Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations of the period 1572-95, are examined here.

1. V.A. Smith, *Akbar the Great Mogul*, New Delhi, 1958, p-263.

2. Satish Chandra, 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals-A Reappraisal', *Indian Historical Review*, vol. IV, No.-1 1977-78, pp-326-27.

3. Shireen Moosvi, 'The Mughal Empire and the Deccan-Economic Factors and Consequences', *PIHC*, Kurukshetra, 1982, pp-365-66.

4. Satish Chandra, *op. cit.* p-326.

It was only after the conquest of Gujarat in 1572 that it became possible for Akbar to intervene in the affairs of the Deccan. The annexation of Gujarat had brought about a situation where the Mughal Empire came to have a common frontier with the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. Moreover, Muhammad Husain Mirza,⁵ a Mughal rebel, who was staying in Gujarat till 1572, had taken shelter in Ahmadnagar following the conquest of Gujarat by Akbar.⁶ This naturally made Akbar anxious regarding Murtaza Nizam Shah I's attitude towards the Mughals. If he could give shelter to Mughal rebels escaping from Gujarat, he could also use them to encourage and help the remnants of Gujarat nobility still not reconciled to the Mughal conquest, to continue their resistance. It was to forestal any such development that Akbar appears to have decided to bring about diplomatic pressure on Murtaza Nizam Shah for persuading him to desist from giving protection to

5. Muhammad Husain Mirza was one of the sons of Muhammad Sultan Mirza, who was a grandson of Sultan Husain Baiqara, the Timurid ruler of Khurasan. Muhammad Sultan Mirza came to India alongwith Humayun in 1555 and was assigned the *jagir* of Sambhal. At the time Akbar proceeded towards Kabul to repel the attack of Mirza Hakim in 1566, Muhammad Sultan Mirza also revolted at Sambhal. But his rebellion was crushed and he had to flee towards Malwa alongwith his three sons Muhammad Husain Mirza, Ibrahim Husain Mirza and Masood Husain Mirza. But later on, Muhammad Sultan Mirza was captured and imprisoned at Bayana. However, his sons succeeded in reaching Gujarat. Following the first invasion of Gujarat by Akbar in 1572, Muhammad Husain Mirza took shelter in Ahmadnagar, while Ibrahim Husian Mirza fled towards Multan, where he was killed by Makhsoos Khan, the governor of Multan. For details see Ferishta's *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I. pp-259-61.

6. Abul Fazl, *Akbarnama*, ed. by Agha Ahmad Ali and Abdur Rahim, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1886, vol. III, pp-77-78; *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-464.

Muhammad Husain Mirza and his followers.

In 1573, Mir Muhsin Rizvi, a Mughal envoy returned from Ahmadnagar while Akbar was still in Gujarat. He had gone there earlier at the time of the first expedition (October, 1572) to demand the surrender of Muhammad Husain Mirza and also to advise Murtaza Nizam Shah I to follow, in Abul Fazl's words, the "path of obedience".⁷ It seems that Murtaza Nizam Shah I was greatly perturbed by Akbar's conquest of Gujarat. He, apparently, feared that an invasion of Ahmadnagar by Akbar from the side of Gujarat was a distinct possibility. In this situation Murtaza Nizam Shah I's response to the message carried by Mir Muhsin Rizvi was a contradictory one. On the one hand, he was anxious not to give any further provocation to Akbar. He, thus, promptly directed Muhammad Husain Mirza and his followers to leave Ahmadnagar territory and also send an offering (*peshkash*) to Akbar. But on the other hand, he also did not want to sever his links with this determined band of Mughal rebels and the elements of Gujarati nobility supporting them, possibly with a view to keeping open his option of using these potential allies against the Mughals in Gujarat. It was, perhaps, out of these contradictory considerations that Murtaza Nizam Shah I neither imprisoned Muhammad Husain Mirza nor handed him over to the Mughals.

As the events of 1573 showed Murtaza Nizam Shah I, on his part, continued to be apprehensive of Mughal designs even after Akbar had returned to Agra in May, 1573. Despite his conciliatory gestures in response to demands conveyed through Mir Muhsin Rizvi, he continued to sympathise with the anti Mughal elements in Gujarat. As is well known they made a determined attempt to expel the Mughals from Gujarat in August, 1573. In this attempt the Gujarati noble, Ikhtiyar-ul Mulk, was actively supported by Muhammad Husain Mirza, who was, apparently, allowed by the Ahmadnagar authorities to cross back into Gujarat after the outbreak of insurgency.

Akbar made his famous lightening march to Gujarat in September, 1573 which foiled the attempt to oust the Mughals from there; both Muhammad Husain Mirza and Ikhtiyar-ul Mulk were killed in the fighting.⁸ Subsequently, some of the relations of Muhammad Husain Mirza were given shelter by Murtaza Nizam Shah I. This showed again his anxiety to retain allies among the anti Mughal elements for using them to destabilize the Mughal authority in Gujarat.⁹

8. For details of Muhammad Husain Mirza's revolt and his subsequent killing, see *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-56-57; 60-61. See also *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, pp. 259-61.

9. Gulrukh Begum, daughter of Kamran Mirza and wife of Ibrahim Husain Mirza, who was at Surat during this time, on advance of the Mughal forces fled towards Deccan, carrying her son Muzaffar Husain Mirza alongwith her. See *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-260; See also *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-206.

It is in this background that one should view Murtaza Nizam Shah I's decision to annex Berar in 1574. Apparently, he was guided in taking this step not only by territorial ambition but also by an anxiety to check Mughal advance into the region. That, Murtaza Nizam Shah I's apprehensions regarding Mughal designs were not entirely baseless, is suggested by the history of Akbar's relations with Khandesh since 1562. As already noticed in Chapter I, after annexing Malwa in 1562, Akbar not only brought under his firm control *sarkar* Handia that extended beyond the Narbada and bordered upon the North-Eastern parts of Berar,¹⁰ but had also gained possession of *sarkar* Bijagarh by force.¹¹ This suggested Akbar's plans to advance into the trans-Narbada tract which placed him not only in a commanding position *vis à vis* Khandesh Kingdom but also brought him very close to the Northern frontier of Berar. Akbar's subsequent attitude, in pressing the ruler of Khandesh to help the nobles of Berar in expelling the Ahmadnagar occupation forces from there, does go to suggest that Murtaza Nizam Shah's apprehensions were not far from wrong. There is, thus, strong basis for imagining that during this time (1574) Akbar was planning to gain a foothold in Berar which would have made Nizam Shah still more exposed to the threat of military

10. The southern boundary of *sarkar* Handia ran along the north-eastern confines of the territory of Berar. See Irfan Habib, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, *op. cit.* Sheet 14-A.

11. For capture of Bijagarh by the Mughal forces, See *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, p-60.

intervention by the Mughals. Before he moved into Berar, Murtaza Nizam Shah I had taken the precaution of trying to ensure that the ruler of Khandesh should not come to the support of the ruler of Berar. It was, apparently, with this aim that he sent a letter to Muhammad Shah II of Khandesh seeking his help and co-operation in his plans to annex Berar.¹² This attempt to secure the co-operation of the Khandesh ruler was not very successful in the beginning. Initially, Muhammad Shah II was very reluctant to help him. As a matter of fact, Muhammad Shah II went to the extent of siding with the ruler of Berar in his resistance to the Nizam Shahi invading forces. Later in 1575, however, an understanding was arrived at between Khandesh and Ahmadnagar under which Muhammad Shah II agreed not to help the ousted nobles of Berar.¹³

The annexation of Berar and alliance with Khandesh emboldened Murtaza Nizam Shah I to assume a more defiant posture towards Akbar. He is even accused by Abul Fazl of instigating the new ruler of Khandesh, Raja Ali Khan (accession 1576), to withhold the payment of *peshkash* to Akbar.¹⁴ Towards the end of 1576, a Mughal army under the command of Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan, Qutbuddin Muhammad Khan

12. *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-475-76.

13. *Ibid.*

14. cf. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-197-98.

and others was sent to punish Raja Ali Khan.¹⁵ But, due to the dissension in the Mughal camp, and also due to the rebellion of Muzaffar Husain Mirza in Gujarat, this army had to be withdrawn from the banks of the Narbada.¹⁶ On this occasion, according to Badauni, the Mughal officers had no option but to be content with receiving from Raja Ali Khan whatever amount he was then in a position to pay as *peshkash*.¹⁷

At this time a Mughal envoy, Baqi Khan, was sent to Ahmadnagar to give "good counsels" to Murtaza Nizam Shah I. Baqi Khan returned from there in 1577 accompanied by one of Nizam Shah's trusted officers, Wafa Khan, who brought with him a letter and precious gifts sent by his master.¹⁸ However, it appears that, this response of Nizam Shahi ruler did not contribute to removing the prevailing hostility for him at Akbar's Court. Akbar's decision in 1581 to give shelter to an imposter pretending to be Burhan, one of the younger brothers of Murtaza Nizam Shah I and his rival for the throne of Ahmadnagar, goes to suggest that, by 1579-80,

15. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-197-98. See also *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-333; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-244.

16. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-206.

17. *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-250.

18. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, 205.

Another Mughal envoy returning from Bijapur in 1579, was also similarly accompanied by an Adil Shahi envoy alongwith a letter and *peshkash* from Ali Adil Shah. See *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-266-67.

he had made up his mind on a policy of obtaining the submission of the Nizam Shahis as well as other rulers of the Deccan, by exerting pressure upon them in a variety of ways, granting of shelter to the person pretending to be Burhan was one such attempt. From this time onwards he also began to write to the Deccani rulers to accept his overlordship or be ready to face Mughal military might.¹⁹ This attitude of Akbar is further highlighted by his sending in 1579, two envoys, Peshrau Khan and Hakim Ali Gilani, to Ahmadnagar and Bijapur respectively asking the rulers of these states to accept Akbar's overlordship.²⁰ Abul Fazl goes on to add that the envoy to Ahmadnagar succeeded in his mission since Murtaza Nizam Shah I promptly responded to Akbar's message by sending one of his trusted officer, Asaf Khan, along with precious gifts.²¹

These diplomatic moves of Akbar were, apparently, aimed at, all the time, impressing the Nizam Shahi ruler that he was being watched closely, so that he does not resort to further anti Mughal intrigues in Khandesh. The opportunity to intervene in the affairs of Ahmadnagar presented itself

19. "The sole idea of the *Shahinshah* was to clear the territory of Ahmadnagar of the weeds and rubbish of rebellion, and then to prevail over Bijapur, Golkonda and Bidar, so that the rulers of these places should make binding treaties of obedience". cf. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-789.

20. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-266-67; p-280.

21. *Ibid*, p-280.

to Akbar when real Burhan-ul Mulk, a younger brother of Murtaza Nizam Shah I and his competitor for the Nizam Shahi throne, came to take refuge at the Mughal court in 1583. Burhan-ul Mulk is reported to have described to the Mughal authorities the chaotic condition then prevailing in Ahmadnagar.²² Around this time a virtual civil war had started among the Nizam Shahi *amirs* for controlling the administration. In 1584, after being defeated by Salabat Khan, the *wakil* of Ahmadnagar, Saiyid Murtaza, the Nizam Shahi governor of Berar, and Khudawand Khan arrived in Khandesh with the hope of getting help from Raja Ali Khan.²³ But he, instead of helping them, captured their paraphernalia. In desperation, they asked for help from Akbar urging him to recover their baggage from Raja Ali Khan and to restore order in Ahmadnagar.²⁴ They were sent to Khan-i Azam Mirza Aziz Koka, the Mughal *subedar* of Malwa, with the order to help them.²⁵ An order was also issued to Raja Ali Khan to restore the plundered goods.²⁶ Simultaneously, Mir Fatehullah Shirazi was deputed to advise Raja Ali Khan to assist the Mughal army in its operations

22. *Ibid*, p-407.

23. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-288.

24. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-393; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-343.

25. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-489; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, pp-383-84.

26. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-265.

against Ahmadnagar.²⁷ This indicates Akbar's eagerness, around this time, to use all the means to subjugate the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. However, in the military operations launched by Akbar, Raja Ali Khan was supporting the Mughals only outwardly;²⁸ in reality his sympathies lay with Ahmadnagar as he realized that a Mughal advance into Berar and Ahmadnagar would be preceded by an entry of Mughal forces into Khandesh. Eventually due to sharp dissension in the Mughal camp, but mainly because of an alliance between Khandesh and Ahmadnagar, no substantial advance could be made by the Mughal forces sent under Aziz Koka.²⁹

After a humiliating withdrawal by Aziz Koka from Berar in 1586, no military demonstration was staged by the Mughals against Ahmadnagar during the next two years. In 1588, following the death of Murtaza Nizam Shah I, a virtual civil war began in the Ahmadnagar Kingdom over the issue of succession. This was a good opportunity for Akbar to intervene in its affairs. He recalled Burhan-ul Mulk from Tirah, where he was serving against the Afghan rebels and asked him to proceed to the Deccan for making a bid for Ahmadnagar's throne. At the same time, Akbar also asked Raja Ali Khan to assist Burhan in his efforts to establish himself

27. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-464; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, pp. 383-84; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-288.

28. *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-550.

29. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-489; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp-360-62; *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-550.

as king of Ahmadnagar.³⁰ However, Burhan, while leaving Burhanpur for Ahmadnagar by the way of Berar, left behind the Mughal forces deputed by Akbar to assist him. He took this precaution as he was aware that Ahmadnagar nobility would resent his going there with a Mughal contingent. He, therefore, made his first attempt to enter Ahmadnagar and capture the throne with the help of his followers hailing from Ahmadnagar itself, but was unsuccessful. In his second attempt he preferred to take help from Raja Ali Khan. In the second attempt he succeeded in seizing the throne. He assumed the title of Burhan Nizam shah II.³¹

Akbar's long cherished wishes with regard to Ahmadnagar Kingdom could not be realized even after Burhan's occupying the Nizam Shahi throne. Regarding the Mughals, Burhan too began to pursue the same policy as had been adopted by his predecessor, namely, a policy of rejecting Akbar's suggestion of accepting his overlordship and continued to defy the Mughal pressure on the question of Berar. This greatly offended Akbar, who viewed this attitude of Burhan as bordering upon ingratitude. On the other hand, Burhan perceived no moral obligation towards Akbar since he

30. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp.538-39; p-587; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p.75; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p.151; *Zafar-ul-Waleh*, (tr.), vol. I, p-66.

31. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-587; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. III, p-75; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-151.

had occupied the throne with the help extended to him by Raja Ali Khan. The Mughal troops did not play an important role in his success. After his accession, he did not send any customary *peshkash* to the Mughal court making Akbar still more resentful towards Burhan.³² It is, therefore, understandable that subsequently Akbar resumed his earlier policy of persuasion combined with threats of the use of force to bring round Burhan Nizam as well as other Deccani rulers to accept his overlordship. In 1591, he sent four envoys to the four Deccan kingdoms, namely, Shaikh Faizi to Khandesh, Aminuddin to Ahmadnagar, Mir Muhammad Rizvi to Bijapur and Mir Munir to Golkonda "warning" them that if they did not accept his overlordship, an imperial army would be despatched against them.³³ At this time, Faizi was deputed to proceed to Ahmadnagar after finishing his mission in Khandesh, though another Mughal envoy was already present there. Faizi's special mission was to use his personal influence with Burhan Nizam Shah II to make him agree to accept Akbar's overlordship.³⁴ From Abul Fazl's notice of these diplomatic missions to Deccan it is obvious that Akbar's foremost aim in the Deccan in early 1590s was to extend his sway over Ahmadnagar Kingdom. Around this time a

32. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-596-97.

33. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-596-97; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, pp-412-13; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, 377; *Tarikh-i Ferishta* vol. I, p-267.

34. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-596-97; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. I, p-267.

farman was sent to Raja Ali Khan, in which he was praised for his services to the Mughal cause.³⁵ A report is given in this *farman* of Akbar's military successes in the region of Kabul, Qandahar etc. perhaps, to impress upon Raja Ali Khan that Akbar's current pre-occupations in the North-West were almost over and soon he would be free to march towards the Deccan. The *farman* ends by urging Raja Ali Khan to assist Faizi in his mission of persuading the rulers of the Deccan, especially Burhan Nizam Shah II to accept Akbar's overlordship. Sometime later, another *hasb-ul hukm* was despatched to Raja Ali Khan, directing him to advise Burhan Nizam to accept Mughal overlordship.³⁶ In a *farman*, sent to Burhan-ul Mulk through Aminuddin, the demand for submitting to Akbar was reiterated,³⁷ and information, that similar *farmans* were being sent to Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah and Ibrahim Adil Shah II, was conveyed.³⁸

Akbar appears to have formulated a strategy for the invasion of the Deccan as early as 1591. As a part of this strategy Prince Murad was appointed the governor of Malwa, with the instructions that "if the rulers of the Deccan were

35. For Akbar's *farman* to Raja Ali Khan, see Abul Fazl, *Har Seh Daftar Abul Fazl*, ed. by Amir Husain Rizvi, Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow, 1863, pp-68-75.

36. *Ibid*, pp-188-89.

37. *Ibid*, pp-75-77.

38. *Ibid*. For Akbar's *farman* to Qutb-ul-Mulk, see *Har Seh Daftar*, pp-186-87.

not impressed by the good advices (sent to them), punishment should be prepared for them".³⁹ From this it may be conjectured that in 1591 Akbar, anticipating the failure of embassies sent to Ahmadnagar and other Deccan rulers in that year, was making contingency plans for an invasion of Ahmadnagar by a Mughal army formally headed by his son Murad.

In 1593, the envoys returned from the Deccan. Faizi's embassy to Khandesh was successful to some extent. But so far as Ahmadnagar was concerned, Burhan Nizam Shah II did not send respectable amount as *peshkash* and also ignored the demand to acknowledge Akbar as his overlord.⁴⁰ Akbar was naturally greatly annoyed over this defiant attitude of Burhan Nizam Shah II. A large scale mobilization of Mughal forces in Malwa for invading Ahmadnagar under the command of Prince Daniyal and Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan was commenced.⁴¹ After sometime, Daniyal was recalled and Khan-i Khanan was appointed the overall commander of army that was mobilized in Malwa. At this time Prince Murad and Raja Man Singh were also ordered to be prepared for joining the army mobilized to invade Ahmadnagar.⁴² This Mughal force, however, did not actually invade Ahmadnagar until 1595. The Mughal commanders

39. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-597-98.

40. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-639; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-423; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-389.

41. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-646-47; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, vol. II, p-423; *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p-389.

42. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-646-47.

carefully watched the developments taking place in Ahmadnagar. They were apparently waiting for an appropriate opportunity to open the campaign. Perhaps they were apprehensive that Burhan Nizam Shah II could mobilize the other Deccani rulers and form a powerful Deccani alliance. Although, at this time, Raja Ali Khan was co-operating with the Mughals, Akbar was not sure of his fidelity and felt that in case an alliance of the Deccani rulers materialized, he might also join that alliance. Therefore, to pacify Raja Ali Khan and win his whole hearted support in the impending invasion of Ahmadnagar, the territory of Nandurbar, which had been annexed by the Mughals at the time of the conquest of Gujarat, was returned to Khandesh around this time (1595).⁴³

The death of Burhan Nizam Shah II in 1595 provided the Mughals with a long awaited opportunity to invade Ahmadnagar. He was succeeded by his son, Ibrahim, who was killed a few months later in a battle with the Bijapur forces. Subsequent to Ibrahim's death there started a vicious struggle among the various factions of Nizam Shahi nobles, each of whom was struggling to place their protege on the throne. The subsequent events relating to the Nizam Shahi nobles' mutual rivalry as well as the siege of Ahmadnagar by the Mughals (1595) leading to the peace settlement of 1596 is discussed

43. *Ibid*, p-697. See also *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.). vol. I, p-71.

in the ensuing Chapter (Chapter IV).

From the above narrative it seems that, right from the time of annexation of Gujarat, Akbar was perhaps inclined to move into Berar and Northern parts of Ahmadnagar. To pursue this expansionist drive towards the Deccan, he initially adopted diplomatic means. As it is indicated by his diplomatic correspondence, from early 1580s onwards, Akbar was apparently all set to use force against Ahmadnagar. However, due to his preoccupation in the eastern and Northern regions he had to delay a full fledged offensive in the Deccan upto 1595.

CHAPTER - IV

Mughal invasion of Ahmadnagar, 1595-1600.

The Mughal forces on the Deccan frontier, which had begun to be mobilized under Prince Murad and Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan as early as 1593, did not actually move into Ahmadnagar down to 1595. The Mughal commanders were seemingly waiting for an appropriate pretext and opportunity to start the invasion. As long as Burhan Nizam Shah II was reigning at Ahmadnagar the Mughals seem to have avoided precipitating a conflict with the Nizam Shah. This caution on the part of the Mughals might be attributed to the fact of Ahmadnagar Kingdom being quite formidable as long as its nobility was firmly united behind Burhan Nizam Shah II. After the death of Burhan in 1595 this situation was altered providing the Mughals a convenient opportunity to intervene in the affairs of Ahmadnagar. Following Burhan's death a virtual civil war had broken out over succession issue splitting the Nizam Shahi nobles into a number of warring factions. Initially Burhan was succeeded by his son, Ibrahim, who in his arrogance and at the instigation of the Abyssinian noble, Ikhlas Khan, invited a conflict with Bijapur.¹ In the ensuing conflict Ibrahim Nizam Shah was killed in the battle field and his army fled to Ahmadnagar.² After Ibrahim Nizam Shah's elimination, Ikhlas Khan took full control of the fort of Ahmadnagar and treasure present there.

1. Fuzuni Astarabadi, *Futuhāt-i Adil Shahi*, British Museum MS, Add. 27,251, f-223. Also *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp. 156-57.

2. *Ibid.* See also *Basatin-us-Salatin*, pp-228-29.

He called a meeting of the Abyssinian nobles to select a successor of Ibrahim. Finally they all agreed to support Chand Bibi,³ who was espousing the cause of Bahadur, the infant son of Burhan Nizam Shah II.⁴ Another prominent Nizam Shahi noble, Miyan Manjhu, who was a rival of Ikhlas Khan, decided to oppose Bahadur. He produced a boy named Ahmad, of doubtful lineage and began espousing his claim to the throne.⁵ But Ikhlas Khan, on the other hand, continued his efforts to consolidate his position. He released Abhang Khan and Habsh Khan, who were detained in the fort of Daulatabad since the time of Murtaza Nizam Shah I. They together wanted to proclaim Bahadur as the new Nizam Shahi ruler. But the commander of the fort of Jonda, where Bahadur was quartered, refused to hand over his custody to them. Ikhlas Khan and his supporting nobles were, thus, forced to seize yet another boy and began to strike coins and recite *Khutba* in his name, declaring him as the new Nizam Shah.⁶ In the meanwhile, Miyan Manjhu finding his position weak in this struggle,

3. Chand Bibi was the sister of Murtaza Nizam Shah I, married to Ali Adil Shah of Bijapur. After Ali Adil Shah's death in 1580, the widowed Chand Bibi came back to Ahmadnagar. When Ibrahim was killed in 1595 there started a struggle for his successor. On this occasion Chand Bibi espoused the cause Burhan's infant son, Bahadur, and acted as his Regent. See *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-162.

4. See *Ibid.* Also *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-699-700 *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-223.

5. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-157; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-224; See also *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-670.

6. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-158; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-225.

appealed to Prince Murad, then stationed at Shahpur in Berar, for assistance. Murad promptly responded his call by marching towards Ahmadnagar alongwith Khan-i Khanan, Sadiq Khan, Shahbaz Khan Kambu and other senior nobles. On Akbar's order Raja Ali Khan of Khandesh also joined this Mughal force.⁷

While this Mughal army was still on the way Miyan Manjhu succeeded in somewhat improving his position by gaining an upper hand against his Abyssinian rivals. Now he realized the folly of inviting the Mughals. Repenting this, he decided to join the garrison of Ahmadnagar against the invading Mughal army.⁸ Chand Bibi, who commanded the garrison of Ahmadnagar had already made a firm resolve to defend the fort. The arrival of a strong Bijapuri army with seven thousand sawars to reinforce the garrison further emboldened her.⁹

As Murad and Khan-i Khanan advanced to besiege the fort, the town of Ahmadnagar was sacked by the contingent of

7. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-699; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-159.

8. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-159; *futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-226.

9. *Ibid.* See also *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-613.

Shahbaz Khan Kambu.¹⁰ They burnt down the city and killed many of the inhabitants mercilessly.¹¹ When Murad heard of this savagery he punished many of the subordinates of Shahbaz Khan. But this could not earn him the confidence of the populace of Ahmadnagar who deserted the town *en masse*.¹²

Ikhlas Khan, who was still determined to place his protege on the Ahmadnagar throne and, at the same time, was also determined to oppose the Mughal advance, went towards Daulatabad alongwith his contingent of ten thousand *sawars*. On hearing this news, Khan-i Khanan sent Daulat Khan Lodi to pursue him. In a severely contested battle at Paithan Ikhlas Khan was defeated and fled.¹³

During this time Murad and Sadiq Khan were supervising

10. Shahbaz Khan Kambu belonged to the family of ascetics. In 1571, Akbar appointed him Chief *Bakhshi*. In 1589, he was made *Kotwal*. When Prince Murad was deputed to the Deccan in 1593, Shahbaz Khan accompanied him. During the siege of Ahmadnagar in 1595, Shahbaz Khan's troops sacked the town, earning Murad's displeasure. Also Shahbaz Khan was not on good terms with Sadiq Khan, *ataliq* of Murad, therefore he left the camp for Malwa without Murad's permission. When Akbar commissioned Prince Salim to invade Mewar in 1598-99, Shahbaz Khan was present with Salim at Allahabad. In 1599, he died due to illness. For his biography. See Farid Bhakhari, *Zakhirat-ul-Khawanin* Ed. by Moin-ul-Haq, Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi, 1961, vol. I, pp-148-60. See also Samsamuddaula Shahnawaz Khan, *Maasir-ul-Umara*, ed. by Abdur Rahim and Mirza Ashraf Ali, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1890, vol. II, pp-590-601.

11. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-159; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-227.

12. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-159.

13. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-700; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-228; *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-612.

the siege operations. The Mughal artillery started bombarding the fort heavily causing the walls of the fort on one side to be damaged badly. The Ahmadnagar garrison, however, defended the fort under the command of Chand Bibi, who clad in full armour would often appear in the midst of the Nizam Shahi troops defending the fort. She personally supervised the repair of the damaged portion of the rampart.¹⁴

While the Mughals were besieging the fort, Chand Bibi was busy in mustering support among the Nizam Shahi nobles. She tried to unite the rival factions led by Miyan Manjhu, Ikhlās Khan and Abhang Khan for facing the Mughals unitedly. She appealed to them to forget their differences and urged them for a rapprochement.¹⁵ Simultaneously, she also sent a petition to Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur asking for help. The Bijapuri ruler promptly responded to her appeal by sending to the rescue of Ahmadnagar thirty thousand cavalry and very large number of infantry troops under the command of Suhail Khan.¹⁶ The ruler of Golkonda, Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, also sent an army comprising ten thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry to support the besieged

14. *Futuhāt-i Adil Shahi; Burhān-i Maasir*, p-Muntakhab-ul-Lubab, vol. I, pp-204-07.

15. *Futuhāt-i Adil Shahi*, ff-229-30.

16. *Ibid*; Also *Burhān-i Maasir*, p-625.

garrison of Ahmadnagar.¹⁷

Unhesitating and quick response by the rulers of Bijapur and Golkonda to Chand Bibi's appeal for help indicate that these rulers perceived the Mughal advance into Ahmadnagar as posing a threat to their own positions. They perhaps, anticipated that after the successful completion of the campaign in Ahmadnagar, the Mughals could attack Bijapur and Golkonda as well. The Khandesh ruler, Raja Ali Khan, despite his close ties with the Mughals at this time, was also not reconciled to the idea of the total destruction of Ahmadnagar Kingdom. He tried to help the garrison of the fort to hold on to their position secretly. When it was discovered by the Mughal officers that he was secretly helping the garrison, Raja Ali Khan was removed, by Prince Murad's order, from the position that he commanded in the siege operation. This incident is highlighted by the chronicler of Ahmadnagar, Saiyid Ali Tabataba.¹⁸

After a prolonged siege, the garrison commanded by Chand Bibi realized that they could no longer withstand the

17. *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-625.

18. cf. *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-612. "Traditions of old friendship of Raja Ali Khan, ruler of Khandesh, still remained and he maintained an uninterrupted intercourse with those within the fort, so that they were enabled by his means, to introduce any supplies that they might require, and occasionally when a body of gunners came from the other forts in the kingdom to reinforce those in Ahmadnagar, they were able to enter the fortress by the connivance of Raja Ali Khan, and greatly strengthened the defence".

mounting Mughal pressure. Although the Deccani armies had cut-off the supply line of the Mughals but the garrison, on its part, was also facing hardships due to the shortage of provisions inside the fort.¹⁹ Ultimately Chand Bibi decided to open negotiations. She wrote letters to Khan-i Khanan and Sadiq Khan proposing a peace settlement.²⁰ It seems that, by this time; Prince Murad had also grown anxious about his position. The news of the arrival of Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi armies made Murad nervous. He immediately called a council of war of the senior nobles to discuss the future course of action.²¹ It appears that the Mughals had also realized that an early capitulation of the fort was not in sight. For this reason they were also inclined to arrive at a negotiated settlement with Chand Bibi. Chand Bibi's proposal reached the Mughal camp on 23rd February, 1596. The offer of a negotiated settlement was promptly accepted by Prince Murad.²²

19. cf. *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, vol. I, pp-207-08.

20. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-699-700; *Futuh-at-i Adilshahi*, ff-232-33.

21. *Futuh-at-i Adilshahi*, ff-229-30; *Burhani-i Maasir*, p-625; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-162.

22. Abul Fazl and Fuzuni Astarabi say that the initiative for opening peace settlement was taken by Chand Bibi. See *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-699-700, and *Futuh-at-i Adilshahi*, ff-232-33. But Saiyid Ali Tabataba and Ferishta give the credit of opening the negotiations to Prince Murad. See *Burhan-i Maasir*, pp-625-26, and *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-162.

Negotiations for the peace settlement were conducted by Saiyid Murtaza, an old Nizam Shahi officer and a deserter, on behalf of the Mughals, while Afzal Khan, the *wakil* of Ahmadnagar, represented the Nizam Shahis. The terms of the treaty (*Sulh*) agreed on 23rd February, 1596 were: (a) Bahadur shall be recognized as the ruler of Ahmadnagar,²³ (b) he would accept Akbar's overlordship; (c) the territory of Berar shall be ceded to the Mughals, and (d) the Ahmadnagar authorities shall give valuable gifts to Akbar. Under the terms of the treaty the Mughals also agreed to withdraw to Berar.²⁴

It is obvious that even after the conclusion of this settlement Nizam Shahis and the Mughals were still suspicious and resentful towards each other. This became evident even during the negotiations that preceded the settlement. Afzal Khan, who was conducting negotiations on behalf of the Nizam Shahis, getting provoked over the insistence of the Mughal officers that the territory of Ahmadnagar be treated

23. Abul Fazl writes that "the territory of Ahmadnagar would be given as *iqta* to Bahadur and he would be made a servant of the Mughal court". See *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-700. Abul Fazl's statement here indicates the meaning attached to the terms of the treaty by the Mughals were quite different from those of the Nizam Shahi authorities. The Mughal perception seems to be that by this settlement Ahmadnagar had become a part of the Mughal Empire. One might note that it was this conflicting perception of the treaty that contributed to disputes and conflicts between the Mughals and the Nizam Shahi officers that continued between 1596 to 1600.

24. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-699-700; *Futuhat-i AdilShahi*, ff-232-33; *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-625; *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. II, p-162.

as annexed to the Mughal Empire, is reported to have sarcastically remarked: "I had heard that Emperor Akbar claims divinity. I now find that his nobles claim to be prophets. Is it a divine revelation (*wahi*) to you that you shall succeed in conquering this country and the Almighty God have no say in this matter?"²⁵ His remark does give an impression that the terms of the treaty were dictated by the Mughals.

However, the settlement arrived at in 1596 between the Mughals and the Nizam Shahis did not stay for long. Even after the settlement the struggle between them continued, each side accusing the other of a breach of agreement. While the Ahmadnagar authorities accused that the Mughal forces had occupied more territories than stipulated in the terms of the treaty,²⁶ the Mughals, on the other hand alleged that the Nizam Shahi troops in Berar were reluctant to leave the region. They actually tended to organize themselves in a force determined to harass the Mughals.

25. cf. *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-629.

26. Fuzuni Astarabadi, the author of *Futuhāt-i Adil Shahi*, ff-235-36, claims that the Mughal forces had occupied Pathri and a few other places beyond the confines of Berar. See also *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-701-02; p-751, where Abul Fazl boasts of occupying the areas, belonging to the Ahmadnagar kingdom. However, T.W. Haig says that the responsibility of breaking peace and renewal of hostilities lay with the Ahmadnagar authorities, who, after receiving help from Bijapur and Golkonda, had decided to make an attempt to expel the Mughal troops from Berar. See 'The Faruqi Dynasty of Khandesh', *Indian Antiquary*, 1918, p-178.

In the meanwhile, the dissension in the Mughal camp had become sharper. Shahbaz Khan Kambu, who had differences with Sadiq Khan left for Malwa without Prince Murad's permission. The political situation in Ahmadnagar started improving following the withdrawal of the Mughal forces from there. Miyan Manjhu, who had invited the Mughals to intervene in Ahmadnagar went away to join service at the Bijapur court. In this situation, Muhammad Khan, who was appointed *wakil* by Chand Bibi, began to concentrate more and more powers in his own hands. This alarmed Chand Bibi. She again appealed to the Adil Shahi ruler, Ibrahim Adil Shah II, for help. The latter once again sent Suhail Khan to assist Chand Bibi, this time in getting rid of Muhammad Khan. When Muhammad Khan heard about the arrival of a Bijapuri army, he, in retaliation, appealed to the Mughals for help offering to surrender the fort of Ahmadnagar to them, but his communication to Khan-i Khanan was intercepted in Ahmadnagar and he was put under arrest.²⁷ Subsequent to Muhammad Khan's dismissal and arrest, Abhang Khan replaced him as *wakil* and *peshwa* of the Nizam Shahi ruler.

After Abhang Khan's rise to the position of *wakil* and *peshwa*, he jointly with the commander of Bijapuri forces, Suhail Khan, started mobilizing a combined Deccani army to

27. *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. II, p-1c2; *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, vol. II. n-256.

oppose the Mughal occupation forces in Berar. The Golkonda ruler, Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, also sent an army of ten thousand *sawar* under Mehdi Quli Sultan Talish to reinforce the combined Deccani forces in Ahmadnagar.²⁸ The Deccani army marched towards Sonepat,²⁹ on the bank of Godvari, about fifteen miles to the South of Pathri. On the Mughal side, Khan-i Khanan and Mirza Shahrukh commanded the force that advanced to check the Deccanis. Murad himself stayed back at Shahpur in Berar. The Khandesh ruler, Raja Ali Khan, also accompanied the Mughal army that came to oppose the joint Deccani forces.³⁰ At this time the Mughal army was not in a very strong position. The strength of the Mughal army was much less than that of the Deccani army. Additionally, there were sharp dissensions in the Mughal camp, as a result of which Shahbaz Khan Kambu had already left for Malwa without taking the permission of Murad. Khan-i Khanan and Mirza Shahrukh also differed with each other regarding the strategy for opposing the Deccanis. They had left Murad behind and the entire responsibility of directing the operations against the Deccanis was to be shouldered by them jointly, their

28. *Futuhāt-i Adil Shahi*, ff-235-36.

29. Sonepat (19°N, 75°E), a small town located fifteen miles south of Pathri. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, sheet, 14-A.

30. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-717-20. See also Rafiuddin Ibrahim Shirazi, *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, British Museum MS, Add. 23883, ff-220-21;

differences not with standing.³¹

In the battle fought on 8th February, 1597 at Ashti (a town near Pathri) on the northern bank of Godavari, at first the Deccani army achieved some success, but later on, the Deccani artillery was destroyed and Suhail Khan, who was commanding the Deccani forces, was injured. He could escape from the battlefield with difficulty. The contingents of Ahmadnagar and Golkonda also fled to their respective territories.³² The Mughals, thus, achieved a significant victory which restored their prestige tarnished by their earlier failures against Ahmadnagar.

Raja Ali Khan of Khandesh, who fought at Ashti on the Mughals' side, was killed in the battle.³³ When the Mughals did not find any trace of Raja Ali Khan at the end of the battle, they concluded that either he had fled from the field or deserted to join the Deccanis. Suspecting his loyalty to the Mughals, they plundered Raja Ali Khan's camp. Next day when Raja Ali Khan's body was found amongst the dead, the

31. T.W. Haig, *Indian Antiquary*, 1918, p-178, says that, on this occasion, "the prince wished to take the field in person but Khan-i Khanan, whether from selfish motives or in the interest of the imperial cause, dissuaded him from this course and himself assumed command of the field forces with Shahrukh Mirza".

32. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-717-20; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-238; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-163;289.

33. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-717-20; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-163; *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, ff-220-21; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-239.

Mughals realizing their mistake restored his banners, kettle-drums etc. to the Khandesh army.³⁴ The body of Raja Ali Khan was taken to Burhanpur and buried there with full honour.³⁵

In the meantime the rift between Khan-i Khanan and Murad widened. Khan-i Khanan had come forward to engage the Deccanis leaving Murad behind at Shahpur (in Berar). His convincing victory over the Deccanis at this occasion was, naturally, not viewed by Murad with favour. He conveyed the news of this victory to Akbar in a distorted version giving credit for it to Daulat Khan Lodi,³⁶ and also recommended a rise in his *mansab* as a reward.³⁷ Akbar, on his part, was perturbed over the strained relations between Murad and Khan-i Khanan. To remedy the situation he decided to change the command in the Deccan. Prince Daniyal was appointed in

34. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-717-20; *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. II, -163; *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, ff-220-21; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shah*, f-239.

35. *Zafar-ul-Waleh* (tr.), vol. I, pp-72-73.

36. Daulat Khan Lodi, an Afghan, was earlier in the service of Mirza Aziz Koka. Later he served under Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan and assisted him in the campaigns against Gujarat as well as Deccan. Under Khan-i Khanan he received the *mansab* of one thousand. *zat* and *sawar*. After sometime Daniyal took him under his service and raised his *mansab* to two thousand. In 1601, Daulat Khan Lodi died of colic at Burhanpur. See his biography in Abdul Baqi Nihawandi, *Maasir-i Rahimi*, ed. by M. Hidayat Husain, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1931, vol. III, pp-1627-31. See also *Maasir-ul-Umara*, vol. II, pp-5-8.

37. See *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-240.

place of Murad and Abul Fazl replaced Khan-i Khanan. Khan-i Khanan, however, was allowed to remain in the Deccan. In 1600 he assisted Prince Daniyal in capturing the fort of Ahmadnagar.³⁸

On being deputed to the Deccan, Abul Fazl arrived at Burhanpur in May, 1599. He was on his way to Shahpur to join Murad. Abul Fazl halted at Burhanpur briefly to meet and pacify Bahadur Shah, the son and successor of Raja Ali Khan, for securing his co-operation in the impending Mughal invasion of Ahmadnagar. Although Bahadur Shah received Abul Fazl respectfully but evaded to join the Mughal forces personally. Instead, he deputed a contingent of two thousand troops under his son to accompany Abul Fazl.³⁹ It is obvious that Bahadur Shah avoided joining the Mughal army on this occasion, as he was still resentful over the plundering of the Khandesh camp by the Mughal troops, after Raja Ali Khan was killed in the Battle of Ashti. He, apparently, no longer trusted the Mughals. It was, in fact, obvious that there was no guarantee of the Mughals leaving Khandesh alone after they occupied Ahmadnagar. It is, therefore, understandable that, like his father, Bahadur Shah should also have not viewed with favour the Mughal expansionist drive in the Deccan. This should explain his

38. See *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, f-222; See also *Basatin-us-Salatin*, pp-253-54.

39. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-751-52.

refraining from joining the expedition against Ahmadnagar. At the same time, he also realized that, on his own, he was not in a position to resist the Mughal army. In this situation, he had no option but to placate the Mughals by sending a token force of two thousand troops under his son to accompany Abul Fazl.

Before Abul Fazl could reach the Mughal camp at Shahpur, Murad died due to excessive drinking on 2nd May, 1599.⁴⁰ Shortly afterwards Daniyal was appointed to the formal command of the Mughal forces in the Deccan with the direction to continue the ongoing campaign against Ahmadnagar.⁴¹ On Daniyal's arrival in the Deccan, Bahadur Shah of Khandesh neither sent him a condolence message on the death of Murad nor came down from the fort of Asirgarh to welcome him.⁴² This stubborn attitude of Bahadur Shah angered Daniyal. Though he was on his way to besiege

40. The Persian chronicles attribute the cause of Murad's death to excessive drinking. But, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, quoting from contemporary Portuguese accounts, argues that Murad was poisoned to death at the instigation of Prince Salim. In this context he refers to a letter written by Dom Francisco da Gama, Count of Vidigueira (the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa from 1597-1600) to the Portugues King Philip III. In this letter the viceroy claims credit for having Murad poisoned. For details, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'The Portuguese, Mughals and Deccan Politics c. 1600: Elements for a Conspiracy Theory' paper presented at the Seminar on 'Akbar and his age', I.C.H.R., New Delhi, 15-17 October, 1992 (Mimeographed).

41. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-756; *Tarikh-i Ferishta* vol. II, p-290.

42. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-766-67; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-290.

Ahmadnagar, he halted at Burhanpur with an intention to punish Bahadur Shah by besieging him in the fort of Asirgarh.⁴³ In the meanwhile, Akbar, who having become free of his pre-occupations in the North-West had set out for the Deccan in 1599 and had already reached Malwa.⁴⁴ On coming to know about Daniyal's plans to invest Asirgarh, Akbar ordered him to refrain from such a course and concentrate on the invasion of Ahmadnagar.⁴⁵ The reason for Akbar's advise to Daniyal not to waste his time in Khandesh was obvious. On noticing that Mughals were delaying their march against Ahmadnagar, the Nizam Shahi troops regaining their confidence to some extent, had started making night raids on Daniyal's camp. They also succeeded in recapturing some of the lost territories including the important stronghold of Nasik.⁴⁶ These developments tended to make the Mughal military position rather uncomfortable.

When Akbar started marching towards Burhanpur with the

43. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-766-67; *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. II, p-290.

44. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-766-67. See also *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, f-222. Abdullah Khan Uzbek of Turan had died in 1598, relieving the pressure from the north-west frontier of the Mughal Empire, Thus Akbar, having free from the affairs of the North-West, marched towards the Deccan in 1599.

45. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-766-67; See also *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. I, p-271.

46. The Nizam Shahi troops had recaptured Nasik from asked for some reinforcements from Abul Fazl to check the movement of Nizam Shahi troops. See *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-773-74..

declared aim of subjugating the Deccan, he, perhaps, also gave the impression that he also planned to drive out the Portuguese from places they were controlling on the western coast of India⁴⁷ This, at least, was the impression of the Jesuit Fathers then staying at Akbar's court. This impression could have naturally led the Portuguese authorities at Goa to sympathise with Bahadur Shah of Khandesh, who was preparing to resist the Mughal thrust towards the Deccan. The Portuguese are also reported to have helped the Ahmadnagar forces as early as 1597, when in the Battle of Ashti, the Mughals suffered serious losses at the

47. In one of the letters written sometime in 1587, Akbar informs to Abdullah Khan Uzbek that "he plans to take an expedition against the seditious European unbelievers (*kuffar ashraf firang*)"; an explicit reference to Portuguese, positioned at the coast of Gujarat. See Munshi Bhag Chand, *Jami'-ul-Insha*, British Museum MS, Rieu, iii/984, or. 1702, ff-196 b-99a. The contemporary Portuguese accounts give the same impression regarding Akbar's intention against them. cf. Father Pierre Du Jarrics *Historic des choses plus memorables* ----- en. I. Translated into English with introduction by C.H. Payne as *Akbar and the Jesuits*, Ed. by E. Dennison Ross and E. Power, New Delhi, 1979, p-102. Du Jarric's account is based on the unpublished letters of Father Xavier and Father Goes, who had accompanied the Emperor in his expedition to the Deccan. He writes that "----- he (Akbar) wishes to take first the kingdoms of the Deccan and afterwards those of Goa, Malabara and Bishnaga. See also V.A. Smith *Akbar the Great Mogul op. cit.* p-190, who basing on Portuguese records observes: "He (Akbar) regarded the existence of all the Portuguese settlements on the western coast, and especially that of Diu and Daman in province of Gujarat as an offense and always cherished hopes of destroying the Portuguese dominion". M.N. Pearson, however, disagrees. He writes: "----- contact between the two sides (the Mughals and the Portuguese) was minimal, the Mughal attitude especially being one of neglect and indifference". cf. 'The Portuguese in India', *The New Cambridge History of India*, New Delhi, (Reprint), 1190, p-53.

hands of the Deccanis.⁴⁸

In pursuance of Akbar's order, Daniyal abandoned his plan of besieging the fort of Asirgarh. He continued his march towards Ahmadnagar accompanied by Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan.⁴⁹ Around the time Akbar despatched Daniyal and Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan towards Ahmadnagar, he also despatched one of his confidant, Sharif Sarmadi, to Bijapur to demand *peshkash* from Ibrahim Adil Shah II.⁵⁰ The Bijapuri ruler at this time, was, apparently, eager to avoid any confrontation with the Mughals. He promptly sent *peshkash* and gave one of his daughters in marriage to Daniyal.⁵¹ Before Daniyal and Khan-i Khanan could take charge of the operations in Ahmadnagar, Abul Fazl was already successful in pacifying some of the tracts in the Nizam Shahi territory. He occupied Bir, a Nizam Shahi stronghold to the east of Ahmadnagar, after forcing the Nizam Shahi troops to evacuate it.⁵²

48. Pierre Du Jarric incorporates the information reproduced by V.A. Smith from one of the Portuguese account to the effect that already by the time Akbar decided to besiege Bahadur Shah inside Asirgarh, there existed an understanding between the Khandesh ruler and the Portuguese authorities under which the latter were committed to help the former in case of Mughal attack on him.

49. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-766-67; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff 245-46.

50. See *Basatin-us-Salatin*, pp-252-53.

51. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-277. See also *Basatin-us-Salatin*, pp-253-54; *Muntekhab-ul-Lubab*, vol. I, p-215.

52. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-761.

During this time the Nizam Shahi officers had broken into two factions. Practically two parallel governments were existing in the Nizam Shahi camp; one inside the fort of Ahmadnagar led by Chand Bibi, who acted on behalf of her nephew, Bahadur, and the other outside the fort in the town, which was led by Abhang Khan, the leader of the Abyssinian party. Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur had tried to bring about a reconciliation by sending Rafiuddin Shirazi to mediate between the two warring factions but this attempt of his was not successful. Chand Bibi, remained firm in her attitude of refusing to admit Abhang Khan in the fort.⁵³ Instead she opened communications with Abul Fazl offering to surrender the keys of the fort to the Mughals provided that Abhang Khan was punished and she was assigned a jagir in Bir.⁵⁴

On the other hand, failing to gain an upper hand, Abhang Khan laid siege to the fort. But on Daniyal's arrival near Ahmadnagar, Abhang Khan had to raise the siege and withdraw towards Junnar.⁵⁵

53. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-163-64. Also *Tazhirat-ul-Muluk*, f-222.

54. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-764-65. Abul Fazl in his *ariza* to Akbar has referred about the arrival of Chand Bibi's envoys in the Mughal camp. See *Har Seh Daftar*, p-79.

55. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-774-75; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-164.

By April, 1600 Akbar had already occupied Burhanpur and was besieging Asirgarh. He decided to supervise the siege operations at Asirgarh personally. Abul Fazl was recalled from Ahmadnagar and was asked to supervise the operations in Khandesh. Side by side Akbar ordered the Mughal army at Ahmadnagar to exert more vigorously to secure the early capture of the fort. At this time he appeared to be anxious to finish his work in the Deccan as early as possible. In view of Prince Salim's activities in the North, he wanted to return to Agra without much delay. Akbar's presence at Burhanpur enthused the Mughal forces under Daniyal besieging Ahmadnagar to press vigorously. This also made Chand Bibi anxious about the fate of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom. She renewed her offer of surrendering the fort to the Mughals on the condition of Bahadur being granted a *mansab* of five thousand and equivalent *jagir*, and of herself being allowed to remain his guardian. Another condition was the safe passage to the garrison after the surrender of the fort. These proposals were carried by Mirza Ataullah Shirazi to Prince Daniyal.⁵⁶

To further encourage Chand Bibi, Daniyal and Khan-i Khanan sent some precious gifts and a *khi'l'at* for Bahadur.⁵⁷ However inside the fort the proposal to surrender the fort was not acceptable to many nobles. There was a section of

56. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-247.

57. *Ibid*, ff-248-49.

the nobles amongst the garrison including Abhang Khan (the patron of Malik Ambar) and Chita Khan, who were particularly provoked by the proposal. At this turn Chand Bibi summoned Chita Khan, an old officer of Murtaza Nizam Shah I for persuading him to support her proposals.⁵⁸ During their conversation Chita Khan became excited, ran out shouting that Chand Bibi was in league with the Mughals and that she intended to hand over the fort to them. He, subsequently, entered into Chand Bibi's private apartment alongwith an excited group of soldiers and murdered her.⁵⁹

After Chand Bibi's murder, Abhang Khan and Chita Khan, alongwith some other Nizam Shahi nobles continued the defence of the fort. The Mughal forces had laid mines in the walls of the fort which were blown up on 16th August, 1600, creating a breach. The besiegers stormed into the fort through this breach and the fort was captured by the

58. *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, f-222.

59. *Ibid.* See also *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-774-75; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-248-49; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-164.

A.R. Kulkarni has introduced a Marathi document, *Fatehnama*, in his paper, 'Akbar and the Conquest of Ahmadnagar', presented at the Seminar on 'Akbar and His Age', I.C.H.R. New Delhi, 15-17 October, 1992. (Mimeographed). *Fatehnama* gives a different version of Chand Bibi's death. It says that while fighting against the Mughal forces, at one stage, she realized that she had fallen out of grace of the *Pir Auliya*, abandoned fighting and accompanied by her companions went to the *kupit mahal* (secret chamber of the fort). She did not return afterwards.

Mughals.⁶⁰ Bahadur Nizam Shah was sent as prisoner to Gwalior. In the fort, besides other precious articles, an excellent library of rare books also came into the hands of the Mughals.⁶¹

The capture of Ahmadnagar did not lead to the annexation of the entire Nizam Shahi territory to the Mughal Empire. The territories annexed at this time consisted of the Ahmadnagar fort and the surrounding areas. A large part of the Ahmadnagar territory continued to be controlled by some of the Nizam Shahi officers, who latter on formed the core of resistance organized by Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani which would be noticed in the next chapter.

The conquests of the forts of Ahmadnagar (1600) and Asirgarh (1601) established Mughals in the Deccan on a firm footing. Superficially it would appear that this was a

60. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-774-75.

61. *Ibid.* Regarding the capture of Ahmadnagar, the document, *Fatehnama*, records the traditions surviving in Marathwara region during the eighteenth century. According to this *Fatehnama*, Mughal's success was facilitated by Prince Daniyal's showing proper respect to a certain *Pir Auliya*, known as *Saiyid Bag-i Nizam*, whose *dargah* was located close to the gate of the fort. On the other hand, Chand Bibi, who was reportedly fighting with all her might and in spite of many odds, suddenly had to stop the fighting and started negotiations as she was not favoured by the *Pir Auliya* of the *dargah*. *Fatehnama* further says that, at one stage, during the fighting when the magazine on the fort was completely exhausted, Chand Bibi broke open her treasure, made cannon balls of gold and silver and bombarded them on the besieging army. cf. A.R. Kulkarni, 'Akbar and the Conquest of Ahmadnagar', *op. cit.*

prelude to the Mughal advance towards Bijapur and Golkonda. But in reality, at this time, the Mughals were only interested in holding on to the parts of the Deccan already annexed. It was only in the course of their endeavours to put down the Nizam Shahi nobility's resistance led by Malik Ambar, that they gradually developed further territorial ambitions in the Deccan. This aspect will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER - V

Ahmadnagar's Struggle for Survival, 1601-16.
Role of Malik Ambar and His Reorganization of
Ahmadnagar State.

The Mughals had captured the fort of Ahmadnagar in 1600, but the whole of the Kingdom could not be annexed to the Mughal Empire. The Nizam Shahi nobles, though divided among themselves, continued their resistance against the Mughal occupation forces. They defied the Mughal authority by raising to the throne a certain Prince Ali, purportedly a grandson of Burhan Nizam Shah I, with the title Murtaza Nizam Shah II and continued their struggle in his name.¹ Although the Mughal forces under Prince Daniyal and Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan continued to put pressure, but the two prominent Nizam Shahi nobles, Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani, offered stiff resistance to the Mughals.

As far as the personal lives and careers of Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani are concerned, both of them are reported to have began their career from very humble positions. Ambar Jiu,² as he is often called by the contemporary Persian sources, was an Abyssinian, purchased in the slave market of Baghdad by Khwaja Mir Baghdadi. He brought him to the Deccan and again sold to Mirak Dabir, better known as Changez Khan,

1. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-783-84; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-249-50; *Basatin-us Salatin*, pp-260-61.

2. According to D.R. Seth, Malik Ambar's original name was Shambhu. See his article 'The life and times of Malik Ambar', *Islamic Culture*, 1957, p-142. But, since no contemporary or later source is cited in support of this suggestion, one can not be very certain about this rather Indian name of young Malik Ambar who was known to be an Abyssinian.

the *wakil* of Murtaza Nizam Shah I.³ Under his patronage Ambar learnt about the military and civil administration of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. After his death Malik Ambar migrated to Bijapur joining service there as a junior officer. He, alongwith some other Abyssinian *amirs*, returned to Ahmadnagar in 1595-96.⁴ This was the time when the Mughals under Prince Murad and Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan were besieging the Ahmadnagar fort. It was the period of civil strife in Ahmadnagar over the issue of succession. At this juncture, Malik Ambar joined Abhang Khan,⁵ who was opposing the candidature of Chand Bibi's protege. On Abhang Khan's coming to terms with Chand Bibi, Malik Ambar managed to enter the fort with the former. During the siege of the fort by the Mughals, Malik Ambar displayed his ability as a military officer, earning notice for harassing the besieging Mughal army by cutting their line of communications and disrupting their supplies.⁶

After the capture of the Ahmadnagar fort by the Mughals (1600), Malik Ambar became determined to resist the Mughals' further advance into the Nizam Shahi territory. He tried to revive the fallen Nizam Shahi dynasty by declaring Ali, a

3. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-267 b-68 a; *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, ff-234-35.

4. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-262 a.

5. *Ibid*, ff-267 b-68 a.

6. *Ibid*. See also *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, ff-234-35.

grandson of Burhan Nizam Shah I as the new Nizam Shahi ruler with the title Murtaza Nizam Shah II.⁷ In a similar manner another Nizam Shahi noble, Raju Deccani, who operated independently in the northern part of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, professing loyalty to the new Nizam Shahi ruler, Murtaza Nizam Shah II, resisted the Mughal occupation. There existed a rivalry between Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani on the issue of controlling administration and the new ruler. In 1602, Malik Ambar had arrived at an understanding with Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan leading to the suspension of the operations against him so he could concentrate his energies against his rival, Raju Deccani.

Like Malik Ambar, little is known about the early life and career of Raju Deccani.⁸ He too, is reported to have began his career from a very humble position. He served under Sa'adat Khan, a prominent Nizam Shahi amir, and soon, by virtue of his qualities, became a chief personal servant (*Khwas*) of Sa'adat Khan.⁹ After the death of Burhan Nizam Shah II (1595), when there was political chaos in the Nizam Shahi Kingdom and the Mughals were besieging the fort of -----

7. See *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-783-84; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-249-50; *Basatin-us Salatin*, pp-260-61.

8. Abdul Baqi Nihawandi says that Raju Deccani was the son of Munna Deccani, a Hindu slave and *mahaldar* of Sa'adat Khan. See *Ma'asir-i Rahimi*, vol. II, p-501.

9. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-268 a-b. While Abdul Baqi Nihawandi, the author of *Ma'asir-i Rahimi*, vol. II, p-501, says that Raju Deccani succeeded his father and became chief of *mahaldars*.

Ahmadnagar, Raju Deccani, alongwith his master Sa'adat Khan, moved to the hilly tracts and roamed there for five or six years.¹⁰ In the meanwhile, Sa'adat Khan had joined Mughal service under Prince Daniyal handing over his *jagir* and forts to his trusted servant Raju Deccani.¹¹

Just after Sa'adat Khan's departure, Abhang Khan, an Abyssinian *amir*, wrote a letter to Raju Deccani persuading him to join Nizam Shahi service offering a high post (*Sahib-i Shaukat*) at the court. He asked him to seize the territories of his master and oppose the invading Mughals. He wrote: ".....Sa'adat Khan was only a slave of Nizam Shah. He has turned to be a traitor and gone over to the Mughals. But you should act bravely because the reward of loyalty to salt is greatness. Guard carefully the territory and forts in your hands and try to add to them".¹² Raju Deccani acted as suggested by Abhang Khan, soon gathering a force of one thousand troops around him. Now from one side Malik Ambar and from the other Raju Deccani engaged in harassing and devastating the Mughal territories by their surprise raids.¹³ After sometime Sa'adat Khan request Prince Daniyal to allow him to recover his former *jagir* and the areas adjacent to it

10. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-268 b.

11. *Ibid*, See also *Ma'asir-i Rahimi*, vol. II, p-501.

12. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-268 b-69.

13. *Ibid*.

which were now in the possession of Raju Deccani and other Nizam Shahi nobles. The Prince granted the permission ordering Khwajgi Fatehullah to accompany Sa'adat Khan with a body of Mughal troops. But Sa'adat Khan's attempt was frustrated by same Raju Deccani whom he had entrusted the task of looking after his *jagir* and forts.¹⁴

In 1601, Akbar returned to Agra from Burhanpur after having conferred the territories of Khandesh, Berar and the fort of Ahmadnagar on Prince Daniyal. Subsequently the two Nizam Shahi nobles Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani came forward to stoutly oppose the Mughal forces stationed in Ahmadnagar. Although they were envious of each other and had divided the Ahmadnagar territory into their own respective areas of influence, but both of them continued to pay allegiance to Murtaza Nizam Shah II. They were relentless in their opposition to the Mughals. Malik Ambar had established his effective control on the Telingana region, bordering upon Bijapur and Golkonda, upto four *kos* south of Ahmadnagar town, and from twenty *kos* west of Daulatabad upto the port of Chaul in the west. Raju Deccani, on the other hand, controlled the territory in the north which consisted of *sarkars* of Nasik and Daulatabad upto the frontier of Gujarat.¹⁵ The new Nizam Shahi ruler Murtaza Nizam Shah II was placed in the fort of

14. *Ma'asir-i Rahimi*, vol. II, pp-502-03.

15. See *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-165. For reference, see the appended Map-B.

Ausa. Revenues of a few villages were reserved for his expenses.¹⁶

To meet the challenge posed by the Ahmadnagar nobles, particularly by Malik Ambar and Raju Deccan, a new campaign was planned by the Mughal commanders in the Deccan. The Mughal army was divided into two commands, one headed by Abul Fazl proceeded towards Nasik for conducting operations against Raju. While the other force under Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan, was stationed at Ahmadnagar with the aim to conduct operations against Malik Ambar in the Telingana region.¹⁷ While Malik Ambar was harassing the Mughals in one part of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, his rival Raju Deccani was creating disturbances for the Mughals in another part. A number of Mughal expeditionary forces were sent to suppress the activities of Raju Deccani. Initially the expeditions succeeded in occupying some more Nizam Shahi territory.¹⁸ But Raju eventually mobilized large force and struck back at the Mughal army. He succeeded in recovering some of the territories earlier lost to the Mughals. After Abul Fazl was deputed by Prince Daniyal to deal with Raju Deccani, the latter withdrew to Daulatabad most of the territories controlled by him being occupied by the Mughals again.¹⁹ In

16. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-165.

17. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-783-84.

18. *Ibid*, p-788; p-790.

19. *Ibid*, p-790; 793-94; 797.

short, Raju Deccani was defeated and the territories controlled by him occupied by the Mughals on several occasions, but his activities could not be fully contained. On the whole, the efforts of the Mughal commanders to put him down were not fully successful. Whenever an army was sent against him, he would withdraw to the hilly tracts, but would reappear in the plains soon after the moving away of that army to some other region. Raju also failed to respond favourably to the moves by the Mughal authorities to persuade him to join the Mughal service. Even Prince Daniyal's messages asking Raju to join the Mughal service met with the same indifference.²⁰ Later on Prince Daniyal wrote to him a reprimanding letter challenging him to come into the open to face the Mughal army. Raju Deccani replied in a similar vein.²¹ Thus, Raju's activities against the Mughals continued till he was suppressed in 1605 by his rival, Malik Ambar.

While the Mughal operations were being conducted against Raju Deccani in the northern parts of what was originally Ahmadnagar Kingdom, Malik Ambar was gaining ground in Telingana, the southern part of the Kingdom. He continuously harassed the Mughals inflicting defeats on them

 20. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-165-66.

21. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-269 b.

on several occasions.²² In May, 1601, when the situation was becoming rather bad from the Mughal point of view, an army under Abdur Rahman, son of Abul Fazl, was sent to Telingana for checking Malik Ambar. Mughal officers, Sher Khwaja and others accompanied him. Malik Ambar alongwith Farhad Khan and Mansur Khan Habshi with the combined forces of the Abyssinians and Deccanis came forward to oppose the Mughals. The rival armies met near Nander at the bank of river Manjira on 16th May 1601. After a sharp contest Malik Ambar was defeated. He fled the battlefield leaving behind many elephants and large quantities of provisions.²³ After this humiliating defeat Malik Ambar sued for peace. Mughals, on their part, were also eager to conclude peace with Malik Ambar. It was agreed that if he should send back Ali Mardan Bahadur alongwith the son of Mirza Yusuf (whom Malik Ambar had made prisoner in an earlier battle), and "execute a treaty of service" then the territories of Ausa, Dharur and part of Bir would be left to him.²⁴

After Abdur Rahman retired from Telingana with his contingent, Malik Ambar again raised a large force and -----

22. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-267 b-68 a.

23. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-791.

24. *Ibid*, vol. III, p-793. Satish Chandra in his article 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals - A Reappraisal, says that "..... after defeating Malik Ambar at Nander in 1601, Khan-i Khanan adopted a conciliatory approach towards him, since the main opponent of the Mughals at that time was not Malik Ambar but Raju Deccani". See *Indian Historical review* op.cit. p-329.

attacked the Mughal outpost practically driving the Mughals out of the Telingana region. Two of the Mughal officers stationed in the region Hamid Khan and Baz Bahadur were taken prisoners by Malik Ambar.²⁵ Emboldened by this success Malik Ambar, subsequently, marched into Bidar with the aim to extract a large sum from its ruler, Malik Barid. The latter was obliged to make peace with him by paying a huge amount. Malik Ambar also attacked the ruler of Golkonda, Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, forcing him to give twenty war elephants.²⁶ Having achieved these successes, Malik Ambar once again directed his energies to fight the Mughals.

Around this time (1602), differences seems to have cropped up amongst the Mughal officers stationed in the Deccan in the context of Mughal military operations against Malik Ambar. Although Abul Fazl has not made it clear as to exactly what were these differences but his remark that, "he (i.e. Abul Fazl himself) marched to help Khan-i Khanan after the latter apologized for not looking after the administration properly",²⁷ suggests that owing to their mutual disagreements the Mughal officers were not able to make concerted moves against the Deccanis. Malik Ambar appears to have taken advantage of this situation. In the

25. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-796; See also *Tarikh-i Firishta*, vol. II, p-165.

26. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, -p-805.

27. cf. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-797.

meanwhile, Abul Fazl joined Khan-i Khanan at Parnur. The Mughal officers such as Sher Khwaja, Mirza Yusuf, Yaqub Beg and many others also assembled at Pathri. Malik Ambar alongwith Farhad Khan attacked the outposts but had to retire unsuccessful.

However, it appears that Malik Ambar continued to retain his hold on the southern parts of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. He did not sit idle and reorganized his army attacking several Mughal *thanas* in the Telingana region. The Mughal commander, Khan-i Khanan, was also determined to contain the activities of Malik Ambar. In 1602, he sent his son, Mirza Iraj, with a large army into Telingana. Several prominent officers were sent with Mirza Iraj, among them were included Mir Murtaza and Sher Khwaja, who were already posted in the region. On hearing about the advance of a large Mughal force, Malik Ambar immediately left for Damtur. From there he moved on to Kandahar. Around this time Farhad Khan Habshi joined Malik Ambar with three thousand horsemen. The Mughals continued the pursuit of Malik Ambar upto Nander where the rival armies clashed with each other. In this battle the Deccanis were beaten badly. Malik Ambar himself was seriously wounded. He would have fallen into the hands of the Mughals but for the timely action of some of his attendants in taking him away from the battle field. Twenty elephants and considerable provisions were captured by the

Mughals.²⁸

When Malik Ambar recovered from his injuries (1602), he, once again made overtures to the Mughals for a settlement. Khan-i Khanan, on his part, was also eager to end the conflict with Malik Ambar. The two sides agreed not to attack each other in future.²⁹ The specific terms of the settlement are not mentioned but these must have been, more or less, the same as on the earlier occasion. During the next six years following this settlement there was, by and large, a continuous peace in the Ahmadnagar territory, so much so that the agriculture in the region, greatly ruined by the continuous warfare of the preceding years, once again started prospering.³⁰ It is reported that after the settlement of 1602, Malik Ambar had agreed to pay a visit to Emperor Akbar and take up service under him.³¹

28. *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p-807; *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-165.

29. Abul Fazl does not give other details regarding this peace settlement of 1602, but he does say that after receiving the document of the "treaty" the Mughal troops withdrew from the region round Pathri. See *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-800-01. In the context of the settlement, Ferishta says that the proposal for peace settlement was made by Khan-i Khanan and Malik Ambar accepted the terms since he had to deal with his rival Raju Deccani. See *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-165. See also *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, ff-234-35; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi* ff-268 b-69 a.

30. *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, ff-234-35; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-268 b-69 a.

31. *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, ff-234-35; *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-269 a.

After the Mughals had made a settlement with Malik Ambar (1602), Raju Deccani, commanding seven or eight thousand horsemen in the region to the north of Ahmadnagar, continued to attack the Mughal posts frequently.³² In 1604, Prince Daniyal came to Ahmadnagar for celebrating his marriage with the daughter of Ibrahim Adil Shah II. While passing through Nasik and Daulatabad, he sent a message to Raju, challenging him to face the Mughals in the open battlefield. But Raju sticking to his tactics of hit and run, refused to oblige the Mughals. Subsequently, after much persuasion, Raju Deccani made an agreement with the Mughals providing that he would let the country be cultivated and the revenues would be shared equally between him and the Mughal occupation authorities.³³

After Prince Daniyal's death (1604) Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan assumed the overall charge of all the three subas of the Deccan. Now, that the Mughals had made settlements both with Malik Ambar as well as Raju Deccani, the mutual rivalry of the two leaders of Deccani resistance once again came into the open. Clashes started taking place between the followers of the two. Khan-i Khanan shrewdly fanned these clashes. Initially Raju emerged victorious forcing Malik Ambar to seek help from the Mughals. Khan-i Khanan promptly responded by

32. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-269 b; See also *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, pp-165-66.

33. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, f-269 a.

despatching a Mughal force under Mirza Husain Beg, the governor of Bir, to help Malik Ambar. With the Mughals' assistance Malik Ambar defeated Raju Deccani forcing him to withdraw to Daulatabad.³⁴ At this turn Raju's followers began to desert him accusing him of bad behaviour and high-handedness. Malik Ambar immediately took all of them in his own service giving them salaries and assignments according to their status. He pressed his advantage by invading the territory held by Raju. Malik Ambar besieged and captured the fort of Patan where the treasures of Sa'adat Khan were stored.³⁵

In 1607, after Malik Ambar had augmented his strength, he led another army against Junnar till then controlled by Raju Deccani. After its capture, Junnar was made the Nizam Shahi capital once again. From there Malik Ambar then sent an army to oust Raju Deccani from Daulatabad. In the fighting that ensued Raju Deccani was defeated and taken prisoner; his territory was included in the Nizam Shahi Kingdom, reorganized under Malik Ambar's leadership.³⁶ Malik Ambar, thus, emerged fully victorious over his local rival.

34. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-166.

35. *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-270 a-b.

36. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-166. Fuzuni Astarabadi says that "when taking assurances Raju came to meet Murtaza Nizam Shah II, Ambar seized and imprisoned him, confiscating his horses, elephants and other property". See *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-270 b-71 a.

Subsequently he, once again, concentrated his energies and resources to oppose the Mughal forces occupying parts of Nizam Shahi territory. The removal of Raju Deccani from the scene increased Malik Ambar's influence in the Nizam Shahi Kingdom. This had also increased the area controlled by him which now came to include the important fort of Daulatabad.

Besides carrying on successful military campaigns against the Mughals, Malik Ambar also reorganized the revenue as well as general administration of the territories of Ahmadnagar controlled by him. He is believed to have introduced a new revenue system in Ahmadnagar. Although he was a staunch adversary of the Mughals in the Deccan, the Mughal court chroniclers sometimes do praise him for his military and administrative achievements. "In warfare, in command, in sound judgment and in administration", according to Mu'tamad Khan, "he had no rival or equal. He well understood that predatory (*qazzaqi*) warfare, which in the language of the Dakhin is called *bargigiri*".³⁷ Malik Ambar organized a well disciplined army mainly consisting of light Maratha cavalry. He was the first to perceive the importance of Maratha cavalymen. He recruited them in the Nizam Shahi army in large numbers and trained them in guerrilla

37. cf. *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, p-271.

See also Bhimsen, *Tarikh-i Dilkusha* (tr.), Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar Commemoration Volume, ed. and introduction by V.G. Ghobrekar, Bombay, 1972, part. I, pp-9-10.

warfare.³⁸

When Akbar died (1605), Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan was the *sipahsalar* in the Deccan. After his accession, Jahangir confirmed him in the same position,³⁹ implying that he wished to continue the military operations then being carried on by Khan-i Khanan against the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. By the time Jahangir ascended the throne, Malik Ambar had succeeded in mobilizing a strong army to face the Mughals. The rebellion of Prince Khusrau (1606) and the Safawid attack on Qandahar (1606), to begin with, did not allow Jahangir to take any bold initiative in the Deccan. Taking advantage of this situation, Malik Ambar was able to reconquer some of the Nizam Shahi territories lost to the Mughals earlier. At this time the dissensions among the Mughal nobles stationed in the Deccan had become sharp which seems to have indirectly helped Malik Ambar. He at this time was able to advance quite close to Burhanpur.

In 1608, Khan-i Khanan was summoned by Jahangir to the

38. cf. *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, p-271-72.

39. Jahangir's *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, ed. Saiyid Ahmad Khan, Ghazipur and Aligarh, 1863-64, p-9; Abdul Baqi Nihawandi gives many details about the confirmation of Khan-i Khanan as *sipahsalar* of the Mughal forces in the Deccan. See *Ma'asir-i Rahimi* vol. II, pp-512-13.

court at Agra,⁴⁰ seemingly to explain the failure of the Mughal forces in suppressing Malik Ambar. On this occasion, Khan-i Khanan succeeded in persuading Jahangir to send him to the Deccan again with the promise of subjugating the whole of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom within a period of two years. For this purpose he requested "an additional force of twelve thousand *sawars* with ten lakh rupees" which was granted by Jahangir.⁴¹ Mukhlis Khan, the *Bakhshi* of the *ahadis* was appointed *Bakhshi* of the *suba* Deccan, with the object of assisting Khan-i Khanan in his campaign.⁴²

To meet the renewed Mughal offensive under Khan-i Khanan in 1608, Malik Ambar not only advanced towards the Mughal frontier with 20 thousand *sawars* but also sent letters asking for reinforcement to Ibrahim Adil Shah II, who, at this time, was inclined to help Malik Ambar in his endeavours to resist the Mughal advance. Ibrahim Adil Shah II was, apparently, apprehensive that once the Mughals gained a firm foothold in Ahmadnagar, they were bound to advance towards Bijapur. He was, therefore, generally, always agreeable to help Malik Ambar against the Mughals. In response to Malik Ambar's appeal the Adil Shahi ruler promptly sent a -----

40. cf. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-70; Mirza Ibrahim Zubairi writes in an explicit language that Khan-i Khanan was summoned from the Deccan and again sent there on an expedition on the advice of his (Khan-i Khanan's) mother. See *Basatin-us Salatin*, pp-261-63.

41. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-71, *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-119-20.

42. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-71.

contingent of ten thousand *sawars* to reinforce him.⁴³ He also transferred to Malik Ambar the fort of Kandahar,⁴⁴ for quartering his family and treasures.⁴⁵ Malik Ambar reserved the revenues of a whole *wilayat* amounting to three lakh *huns* per *annum* for the maintenance of Adil Shahi army.⁴⁶ To further strengthen this alliance Malik Ambar proposed the marriage of his son, Aziz-ul Mulk alias Fateh Khan, with the daughter of Yaqut Khan, an influential and powerful Adil Shahi noble.⁴⁷ This marriage was solemnized with Ibrahim Adil Shah's permission in 1609. Thus Malik Ambar succeeded in securing Adil Shahi support in his struggle with the Mughals that ensued on Khan-i Khanan's coming to the Deccan in 1609.

After Khan-i Khanan's arrival in the Deccan, initially, Malik Ambar suffered some reverses but soon he succeeded in checking the Mughal advance. Khan-i Khanan was eventually

43. For the view that Ibrahim Adil Shah II was ready to help Malik Ambar out of a spirit of chivalry, and for the description of the battles he had fought with the Mughals, see *Futuhāt-i Adil Shahi*, f-271 a.

44. Kandahar (18°N, 77°E), an important and strong fort in the *sarkar* Nander, bordering with Golkonda. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, sheet 14-a.

45. *Futuhāt-i Adil Shahi*, ff-271 a-b. See also *Basatin-us Salatin*, pp-263-64.

46. *Basatin-us Salatin*, pp-263-64.

47. *Futuhāt-i Adil Shahi*, f-272 a. Ibrahim Adil Shah II was so much pleased with this alliance that he gave bride's dowry out of his own treasury. See *Ibid.*

forced to withdraw to Burhanpur requesting the Emperor for more reinforcement.⁴⁸ The disheartening news from the Deccan disturbed Jahangir. To restore the Mughal prestige, he decided to send to Deccan Prince Parvez, in 1609, accompanied by Asaf Khan as his *ataliq*. Raja Man Singh and *amir-ul umara*, Sharif Khan, also accompanied them.⁴⁹

Reinforced by Prince Parvez and other leading nobles, Khan-i Khanan again set out for the conquest of Ahmadnagar. Malik Ambar, as was his usual tactics, avoided a pitched battle. By adopting their customary guerrilla warfare the Deccanis harassed the Mughals to the point that they were obliged to retire to Burhanpur.⁵⁰ Subsequently, Malik Ambar, helped and encouraged by Ibrahim Adil Shah II, became very powerful in Ahmadnagar Kingdom. In his desperate bid to suppress Malik Ambar, in 1611, Jahangir despatched another large army to Deccan which included Khan-i Jahan Lodi, Fida'i Khan, Saif Khan Barha, Mo'tamad Khan (the author of *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*) and other senior *amirs*. Muhanmadi Beg was appointed *Bakhshi* of this army.⁵¹ Besides this, Abdullah Khan, the *subedar* of Gujarat, was also ordered to proceed

48. *Ma'asir-i Rahimi*, vol. II, p-516. But Jahangir in his memoirs, and Mo'tamad Khan do not give details about this failure of the Mughal forces in the Deccan.

49. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-74-75; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-122; *Ma'asir-i Rahimi*, vol. II, p-516.

50. *Futihat-i Adil Shahi*, ff-274 b-75 a; see also *Basatin-us Salatin*, pp-266-67.

51. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-77-78.

towards Deccan after his *mansab* was raised to five thousand *zat* and *sawar* and the title of Firoz Jung was conferred on him.⁵²

On the advice of Asaf Khan, Jahangir was inclined to proceed to Deccan at the head of this army, but some other nobles at the court prevailed upon him not to march to Deccan personally. Jahangir was persuaded to agree to Khan-i Jahan Lodi's proposal that he should be allowed to lead this army on the understanding that he would subjugate not only Ahmadnagar but the *wilayat* of Bijapur too, within a period of two years, "failing of which he should not be allowed to offer *kornish* at the court".⁵³

With the arrival of the army sent under Khan-i Jahan at Burhanpur in 1611, there cropped up differences amongst the Mughal commanders over the issue as to how to conduct operations against Malik Ambar which prevented them from making a move for some time.⁵⁴ Taking advantage of the delay in the starting of operations by the Mughals, Malik Ambar, already reinforced by an Adil Shahi army, besieged and

52. *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-123-24.

For Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung's biography, see *Zakhirat-ul Khawanin*, vol. II, pp-173-82.

53. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, -86; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri* pp-132-33.

54. cf. *Basatin-us Salatin*, pp-268-70.

captured the fort of Ahmadnagar (1611).⁵⁵ The Mughal *qiledar* of the fort, Khwaja Beg Safawi, tried to prolong the defence of the fort in the hope of reinforcement from Burhanpur, which did not arrive due to disagreements among the Mughal nobles.⁵⁶ Ultimately he had to surrender the fort to Malik Ambar. This victory achieved by Malik Ambar over a strong Mughal garrison greatly enhanced his prestige.

Following the fall of Ahmadnagar to Malik Ambar (1611), the differences between Khan-i Khanan, on the one hand, and Farvez and Khan-i Jahan Lodi, on the other, became sharp. The last two charged Khan-i Khanan of conspiring with Malik Ambar and of receiving from the latter one third of the *hasil* of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom.⁵⁷ On the suggestion of Farvez and Khan-i Jahan Lodi, Jahangir recalled Khan-i Khanan from Burhanpur replacing him there by Khan-i Jahan Lodi as the *sipahsalar*. Additional reinforcements of ten thousand *sawars* and two thousand *ahadis* under Khan-i Azam Mirza Aziz Koka, Khan-i Alam Faridun Khan Barlas and other leading nobles were sent to Deccan. At this time, Mahabat Khan, after his *mansab* was raised to four thousand *zat* and three thousand *sawar*, was sent with Khan-i Azam for the

55. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-87; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-132-33; *Basatin-us Salatin*, pp-268-70.

56. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-87.

57. See *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-86; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri* pp-133-34. For the charge of Khan-i Khanan receiving *hasil* from the Nizam Shah, see *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, p-275 b.

purpose of escorting Khan-i Khanan to the court.⁵⁸

This massive concentration of the Mughal forces at Burhanpur did not improve the situation in the Deccan. A grand offensive against Malik Ambar planned in 1611, proved abortive due to Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung's rashness in not co-ordinating his moves with those of other nobles. This enabled Malik Ambar to defeat the Mughal contingent commanded by Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung near Khirki forcing him to beat a hasty retreat to Ahmadabad.⁵⁹ Subsequently, Malik Ambar took possession of the fort of Khirki as well.

After the loss of Khirki and Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung's discomfiture, Jahangir, acceding to Khwaja Abdul Hasan's advise, re-appointed Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan (in 1612) as the *sipahsalar* of the Deccan after raising his *mansab* to six thousand *zat* and *sawar*.⁶⁰

Around this time (1612) a policy of enticing the Deccani and Maratha *sardars* to leave Malik Ambar's company and join Mughal service began to take shape. Many leading Nizam Shahi *amirs* like Yaqut Khan, Adam Khan and the maratha

58. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp-88-89; Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, pp-133-34.

59. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp-107-08; Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, p-156; Also Basatin-us Salatin pp-271-72.

60. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp-107-08; Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, pp-157-58.

sardars such as Jadu Rai, Babuji Kantiya, Udaji Ram and others deserted Malik Ambar and were persuaded to join Mughal service. They are reported to have come to Balapur after deserting Malik Ambar's company. There they were welcomed by Shahnwaz Khan, the commander of the Mughal garrison. These nobles were welcomed in the royal service and were rewarded with cash and jagirs suiting to their status.⁶¹ Malik Ambar must have perceived development this as a serious threat to his position. Desertions by a large number of his followers had actually weakened his position.

However, efforts were also renewed by the Mughals to dissuade Adil Shahi ruler of Bijapur from helping Malik Ambar. A collection of letters, *Gulshan-i Balaghat*, contains four letters of Khan-i Azam Mirza Aziz Koka addressed to Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur, which were written around this time.⁶² In these letters he has advised Adil Shah to desist from extending any assistance to Malik Ambar. On Ibrahim Adil Shah II's showing his inclination to come to terms with the Mughals, Mir Jamaluddin Husain Anju was sent as Mughal envoy to Bijapur.⁶³ On the whole, however, these parleys were not very fruitful from the point of view of the

61. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-153; p-197, *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-212-13; Also *Futuh-at-i Adil Shahi*, ff-276 b-77 b.

62. *Gulshan-i Balghat*, India Office MS, 1895, Ethe, 288. For an analysis of the four letters, See K.N. Hasan and Mansura Haidar's article 'Letters of Aziz Koka to Ibrahim Adil Shah II', *PIHC*, Allahabad, 1965, pp-161-67.

63. *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-204.

Mughals. Although Ibrahim Adil Shah II responded by sending a submissive letter (*ariza*),⁶⁴ but being still apprehensive of Mughal designs in the Deccan, he appears to have continued to help Malik Ambar.

On assuming command for the second time in the Deccan (1612), Khan-i Khanan found the Mughal camp somewhat free from the internal differences and mutual jealousies. By this time, many of the senior nobles, earlier involved in mutual disagreements, had been either transferred from there or had died. Prince Parvez was the supreme commander only in name, the actual authority was in the hands of Khan-i Khanan himself.⁶⁵ Thus having a free hand for conducting military operations, he began a systematic drive of enticing the Nizam Shahi nobles to join the Mughals. Since, desertions had already weakened Malik Ambar, he, appealed to Ibrahim Adil Shah II for help. In 1614, Ibrahim Adil Shah II sent Mulla Muhammad Lari at the head of a large army to help Malik Ambar for facing the Mughal offensive.⁶⁶ Malik Ambar, perhaps, had also asked for help from Abdullah Qutb Shah of Golkonda which also arrived. Arrival of reinforcements from

64. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-114.

65. Thomas Roe says that, "the Prince (Parvez) has the name and state, but the Chan (Khan-i Khanan governs all". cf. *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India (1615-19)*, ed. by William Foster (new and revised edition), Asian Publishers, Jalandhar, pp-69-70.

66. *Futihat-i Adil shahi*, ff-276 b-77 b; see also *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-153-54.

Bijapur and Golkonda appears to have encouraged him to advance upto Khirki to check the invading Mughal forces. But on account of differences that cropped up between him and Mulla Muhammad Lari and other Bijapuri nobles, Malik Ambar again became unsure of his position. He, therefore, again appealed to Ibrahim Adil Shah II to recall Mullah Muhammad Lari accusing him of colluding with the Mughals.⁶⁷ The Mughals under Shahnawaz Khan, on the other hand, encouraged by the desertion from Malik Ambar's camp, marched towards Khirki to attack Malik Ambar. In a well contested battle Malik Ambar was defeated near Khirki. He took refuge in the fort of Daulatabad (1616). The Mughals captured his artillery and a large number of horses, elephants and other provisions. The town of Khirki was burnt down by the Mughals.⁶⁸ The Bijapur and Golkonda forces, till then accompanying Malik Ambar, withdrew to their respective regions after making a settlement with the Mughals. They jointly offered to pay twelve lakh *huns* to Prince Parvez, Shahnawaz Khan and other officers.⁶⁹ After this victory Shahnawaz Khan returned to Burhanpur with his contingent. Other Mughal officers also dispersed to their respective *jagirs*.

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri* pp-153-54; *Maasir-i Jahangiri*, pp-212-13. Fuzuni Astarabadi writes, "So many horses, elephants and other kinds of property fell into the hands of the Mughal troops that they became rich". cf. *Futihat-i Adil Shahi*, ff-279 ab; 280 a.

69. *Futihat-i Adil Shahi*, f-280 a.

The main points of above discussion may be summarised as follows: During the period 1601-16, on several occasions the Mughals made attempts to overrun the Ahmadnagar territories still held by the Nizam Shahi nobles but, on the whole, they were not able to achieve much headway. Following the capture of Ahmadnagar fort (1600), the Nizam Shahi nobility had reorganised itself to resist further advance by the Mughals. In the beginning Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani created problems for the Mughals and successfully prevented them in capturing more territories. Later during the period 1601-05, due to growing rivalry between Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani, the Mughals did succeed in making some inroads, but after Raju Deccani's elimination in 1605, Malik Ambar, having reorganized the Ahmadnagar army in very short time, was successful in stemming the Mughal advance. He even succeeded in recapturing the areas lost earlier. Henceforth, there were two main planks of Malik Ambar's strategy; to strengthen his military position by obtaining military support of the Adil Shahis, and increasing use of Maratha *bargi* soldiers. The dissidence among the Mughal officers, posted in the Deccan, also greatly helped him. Malik Ambar started losing to the Mughals only after Khan-i Khanan returned to Deccan in 1612, when pursued a systematic policy of isolating Malik Ambar from Ibrahim Adil Shah II, and of enticing his Maratha and Deccani officers to desert him. It was this policy which resulted in Malik Ambar's defeat in the Battle of

APPENDIX-II

Description of the Boundaries of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom during 1601-04.

In 1600, the Mughals had captured the fort of Ahmadnagar, but the core of the Kingdom was still controlled by the Nizam Shahi nobles namely, Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani. They had divided the Nizam Shahi Kingdom between themselves in the southern and northern portions respectively. The Mughals controlled, besides the fort of Ahmadnagar, the sarkars of Paithan (19°N, 75°E) and Jalnapur (20°±N, 76°±E), from where they were conducting military operations against Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani. These territories, therefore, are shown in the appended map as the area occupied by the Mughals.¹

Regarding the areas controlled by Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani during 1601-04, Ferishta has given specific information. According to Ferishta, in the southern part of the Kingdom, Malik Ambar held sway from the Telingana region bordering Golkonda and Bijapur upto one *farsakh* (about 5km.) south of the town of Bir (19°N, 75°E) and 4 *kroh* (about 16 km.) south of Ahmadnagar. In the western side, he controlled the area from 20 *kroh* (about 80 km.) west of sarkar


1. See Map. B.

Daulatabad ($20^{\circ}\pm N$, $75^{\circ}+E$) upto the port of Chaul.² While the port of Chaul ($18^{\circ}N$, $72^{\circ}E$) and some part of the coastal area was under the Portuguese occupation.

On the other hand, Raju Deccani controlled the northern part of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom, which consisted of the *sarkars* of Daulatabad and Nasik ($20^{\circ}-N$, $73^{\circ}+E$) bordering Gujarat. His control towards south was extended upto 6 *kroh* (about 24 km.) north of Ahmadnagar.³

2. cf. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II. p-165. Also, for the area controlled by Malik Ambar, see Map. B.

3. cf. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-165. See also Map. B.



CHAPTER - VI

Mughal Relations with Ahmadnagar, 1617-26.
Khurram's Campaigns and the Impact His Revolt.

After the Battle of Khirki (1616) the Mughals under Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan's leadership had somewhat retrieved their military position. But there were no territorial gains. Malik Ambar could not be fully crushed. Immediately after the battle, he withdrew to Daulatabad and from there started reorganizing his army. He also resumed raids into the Mughal territories which were in the nature of guerrilla warfare. On coming to know that the situation in the Deccan was not progressing satisfactorily, Jahangir was first inclined to march to Deccan personally, but on further thought he decided to send Prince Khurram replacing Prince Parvez, as the nominal commander in the Deccan, while retaining Khan-i Khanan as the *sipahsalar*, the officer wielding real powers.¹ Khurram had recently distinguished himself in the campaigns against Mewar. Before his departure to the Deccan, Khurram's *mansab* was raised to an unprecedented 20 thousand *zat* and 10 thousand *sawar*, besides some other favours.² Khurram left Ajmer for the Deccan on 6th October, 1616. He was accompanied by such leading *amirs*, Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung, Raja Suraj Singh, Dayanat Khan besides Mo'tamad Khan, who was appointed *Bakhshi* of the army.³ Simultaneously Jahangir also moved his camp from Ajmer to Mandu in order to boost the morale of the Mughal

1. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-161; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-225-26.

2. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-166-77; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-225-27.

3. *Ibid.*

soldiers in the Deccan.⁴

Thomas Roe, who, by this time, had arrived at Ajmer, has stated that the appointment of Prince Khurram to the Deccan command was opposed by the commanders posted there, particularly by Khan-i Khanan, Mahabat Khan and Khan-i Jahan Lodi. He even suggests that these nobles had refused to serve under Khurram.⁵ But this seems to be an exaggeration on the part of Thomas Roe. No other contemporary writer has mentioned the disagreement of the Mughal commanders in the Deccan, on this occasion, with Khurram's appointment. Moreover, Thomas Roe has also suggested that the differences between Khurram and Khan-i Khanan grew because the former earlier wanted Khan-i Khanan to be recalled from the Deccan as he "was a practiser with the Deccan, from whom he received pension".⁶ This testimony of Thomas Roe is not corroborated by other records. On the other hand it is known that after achieving victory over Malik Ambar in 1617, Prince Khurram recommended Khan-i Khanan for appointment as *subedar* of the Deccan.⁷ It might be imagined that on this point Thomas Roe

4.cf. *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-227. See also *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-166.

5. "All the cappatayens as Chan Chana, Mahobet Chan, Chah John refuse to stay if this tyrant (i.e. Prince Khurram) come to command". See William Foster (ed.), *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, 1615-17* (new and revised edition), Asia Publishers, Jalandhar, 1993, p-171.

6. *Ibid*, pp-242-43.

7. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-194.

is actually reproducing the rumours circulating at the court, on this occasion, reflecting the hostility of certain sections for Khurram.

On his arrival in the Deccan., Khurram was welcomed by Khan-i Khanan, Mahabat Khan and Khan-i Jahan at the bank of Narbada. He arrived at Burhanpur in March, 1617. From there he promptly opened negotiations with the rulers of the Deccan states, in which, contacts with Bijapur were given greater importance. By neutralizing Ibrahim Adil Shah II, Khurram was actually anxious to isolate Malik Ambar. He sent his reliable men, Afzal Khan and Raja Bikramajit, to Adil Shah offering Mughals' friendship and protection in return for acknowledging Mughal overlordship, promise of regular *peshkash* and above all, for pressurising Malik Ambar to return the territories he had captured from the Mughals.⁸ Ibrahim Adil Shah II, on his part, is reported to have welcomed the Mughal envoys by coming out upto 7 kos to receive the *farman* and *nishan* of the Prince they were carrying, and indicated his acceptance of the demands put forward by Khurram. One might infer that the arrival of Khurram with such a large force at Burhanpur, and the presence of the Mughal Emperor at Mandu, so close to Burhanpur, appear to have unnerved Ibrahim Adil Shah II as well as the Golkonda ruler, Muhammad Qutb shah. They,

8. See *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-182; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-229-30.

apparently, felt that in the given situation, their interests would be better served if they made a settlement with the Mughals by accepting Khurram's demands. The Mughal envoys returned from Bijapur with costly gifts alongwith Ibrahim Adil Shah II's message amounting to an acknowledgement of the Mughal "suzerainty" and promising the return of the territories taken away by Malik Ambar.⁹ Around the same time, a Golkonda envoy also arrived at the Mughal court near Mandu. He was accompanied by Husain Beg Tabrezi, the envoy of the Safawid ruler, Shah Abbas I. The Golkonda envoy also brought with him precious gifts.¹⁰

Subsequently, under the pressure of Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur, Malik Ambar had to surrender to the Mughals the fort of Ahmadnagar and the territory around Balaghat, which he had captured from them earlier.¹¹ So far Malik Ambar was concerned, this was not the end of his fight. He cleverly retained the fort of Daulatabad and the area around it, in the hope of reviving his struggle at an opportune time.

After the surrender of Ahmadnagar and Balaghat by Malik Ambar, in July 1617, on Khurram's recommendation, Jahangir

9. *Tazuk-i Jahangiri*, p-182; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-235-36.

10. *Tazuk-i Jahangiri*, p-184.

11. *Ibid*, p-188. See also *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-242-43.

appointed Khan-i Khanan as *subedar* of Berar, Khandesh and Ahmadnagar which together constituted the Mughal territories in the Deccan. His son Shanawaz Khan was deputed with twelve thousand *sawars* to control the territories around Balaghat.¹² It was, again, on Khurram's request that Ibrahim Adil Shah II was entitled *farzand* (son),¹³ which was clearly a gesture acknowledging the key role played by the Bijapuri ruler in persuading Malik Ambar to return the Mughal territories. Ibrahim Adil Shah II could, thus, also be used to keep a watch on Malik Ambar's aggressive activities. It would appear that this move paid off from the Mughal point of view. Subsequently a rift between the Bijapuri ruler and Malik Ambar appeared which prevented the latter from getting any help from Bijapur during his struggle with the Mughals renewed towards the end of 1617.

It was, apparently, at the time of this settlement (1617) that the important role of the Maratha *sardars* and their *bargi* soldiers in the Deccan was recognised by Jahangir by initiating a policy of recruiting them in the Mughal service. Some of the Maratha *sardars*, who accompanied Khurram in July 1617 to the imperial camp at Mandu, including Udaji Ram, Jadav Rai and Babaji Kantiya were rewarded with

12. See *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-194; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-247. See also *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, vol. I, pp-291-92.

13. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-191-92; p-244.

"suitable" *mansabs* and *jagirs*.¹⁴ Jahangir specifically mentions the conferment of a *mansab* of 3000 *zat* and 1500 *sawar* on Udaji Ram.¹⁵

It may, in nutshell, be stated that Khurram's success in the Deccan in 1617 gave the impression of the Mughal positions in the Deccan being secured considerably. Subsequently, the Emperor accompanied by Khurram returned to the North. But for a restless and ambitious person like Malik Ambar, the war was never over. He remained busy throughout in reorganising his army and waited for an opportunity to hit back with renewed vigour.

Two years after the 1617 settlement, at a time when the Emperor was away in Kashmir, Prince Khurram (now entitled Shahjahan) was preoccupied in besieging Kangra, and dissensions among the Mughal officers in the Deccan had resurfaced, Malik Ambar resumed his attacks on the Mughal outposts. In these attacks he used the recently recruited Maratha *bargi* soldiers, on a large scale. Though in the initial two or three engagements, the Mughals were able to gain an upper hand but soon Malik Ambar's forces started harassing the Mughals from different sides. He succeeded in

14. See *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-194-95; 197.

15. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-197. For the biographies of the Maratha *sardars*, namely, Kheloji Bhonsle, Maloji, Udaji Ram and Jadav Rai, See *Zakhirat-ul Khawanin*, vol. III, pp-132-33; 139-41.

cutting off their lines of communication as well as supply of provisions which forced the Mughals to withdraw from Balaghat. Hotly pursued by Malik Ambar, the Mughal forces, withdrawing from Balaghat, fell back to Balapur where Darab Khan, the younger son of Khan-i Khanan was encamped.¹⁶ At this point the Mughal forces made a stand. Raja Bir Singh Deo succeeded in repelling a contingent of the Deccanis. During this action, Mansur, a Deccani officer of Abyssinian origin, was killed.¹⁷ But this setback did not deter Malik Ambar from continuing his constant guerrilla raids on the Mughals entrenched at Balapur. This eventually forced, Mughal forces led by Darab Khan to vacate Balapur. They retreated towards Burhanpur. In this manner Malik Ambar succeeded in taking back from the Mughals the whole of Balaghat as well as sizable territories in Ahmadnagar and Berar regions.¹⁸ Subsequently by 1620 the only places still held by the Mughals were Burhanpur and the fort of Ahmadnagar which were also being closely invested by the Deccanis.

Khan-i Khanan, who found himself in a difficult situation at Burhanpur, sent repeated appeals, one after another, to the court for help against the Deccanis who were

16. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-305; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-305.

17. *Ibid*.

18. *Ibid*, pp-321-22.

on the offensive.¹⁹ The Emperor sent to Khan-i Khanan rupees twenty lakhs with some reinforcements, but the situation did not improve. Malik Ambar even besieged Burhanpur. He also occupied areas in Berar and Khandesh from where his agents began collecting revenue.²⁰ As Prince Shah Jahan, alongwith many leading officers, was busy in besieging Kangra, no significant assistance could be sent to help Khan-i Khanan in the Deccan. After Shahjahan's success in reducing Kangra, Jahangir again sent him to the Deccan. But the Prince delayed his departure to the Deccan possibly owing to his anxiety that in his absence from the camp Nur Jahan might enter into an alliance with Khusrau, who, although a prisoner, had again come to be treated mildly.²¹ He practically refused to march out until Khusrau's custody was transferred to him.²²

19. In one of the letter sent to the court, Khan-i Khanan is reported to have written that if timely help was not sent, he would commit *jouhar* after sacrificing his men. cf. Mirza Muhammad Amin Qazvini, *Badshahnama*, British Museum MS, Or. 173, Rieu, i/258 b, f-88.

20. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-321-22; See also Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-88.

21. For an assessment of Shah Jahan's attitude on this issue, see Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir*, Allahabad (reprint) 1973, p-305. B.P. Saksena, *History of Shah Jahan of Dilli*, Allahabad, (reprint), 1976, p-26. See also Nurul Hasan, 'The Theory of Nur Jahan Junta' - A Critical Examination', *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1958, pp-324-35.

22. Mirza Kamgar Husaini, however, says that Khusrau was given in the safe custody of Shah Jahan since the personnel guarding Khusrau were negligent in performing their duties. cf. *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-321-22. Qazvini gives a detailed account of the handing over of Khusrau to Shahjahan. See *Badshahnama*, ff-88-89.

After his misgivings were removed, Shah Jahan, at the head of a large army including one thousand *ahadis* and a train of heavy artillery, came to Burhanpur in early 1621. Shah Jahan's arrival compelled the Deccanis to lift the siege of Burhanpur. At a council held by Shah Jahan at Burhanpur, he was advised by Khan-i Khanan to adopt dilatory tactics. It was suggested by him to postpone the military operations for the recovery of Balaghat till the rainy season was over. This proposal supported by nobles like Abul Hasan, Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung and Darab Khan was outrightly rejected by Shah Jahan.²³ He was in favour of attacking the Deccanis without giving them time to prepare themselves for facing the Mughal counter offensive. Shah Jahan divided his army into five contingents, two of which were commanded by the Prince himself, while the other three were put under Darab Khan, Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung and Khwaja Abul Hasan respectively. These forces advanced towards Ahmadnagar slowly all the time keeping their alert eyes against the likely guerrilla attacks by the *bargi* soldiers of Malik Ambar. The Deccanis led by Yaqut Khan attacked Abul Hasan's contingent from the rear, but were defeated. Hotly pursued by the Mughal troops they fled towards Khirki, (then capital of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom), which was occupied by the Mughals without much fighting.²⁴ Malik Ambar had got the news of Mughal advance

23. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-93-94.

24. *Ibid*, f-94.

in time to vacate the fort of Khirki alongwith Burhan Nizam Shah III and his family.²⁵ On entering Khirki the Mughals burnt down the whole of the town.²⁶

After occupying Khirki, the Mughal forces proceeded to help the garrison of Ahmadnagar fort, which was still being besieged by the Deccani forces. When the Mughals reached Paithan, Malik Ambar, who had earlier withdrew to Daulatabad, opened negotiations with Shah Jahan offering to surrender the territories, once held by the Mughals in the Deccan, and an additional fourteen kos wide strip adjoining the sarkar of Ahmadnagar.²⁷ He also agreed to pay fifty lakhs rupees as *peskhash* collected from the Deccani rulers (*duniyadaran-i dakan*), out of which eighteen lakhs were to be paid by the ruler of Bijapur, twelve lakhs by the ruler of Ahmadnagar and twenty lakhs by the ruler of Golkonda.²⁸ Shah Jahan, being anxious to return to the North as early as possible, promptly accepted Malik Ambar's proposal and concluded a peace in May, 1621. It seems that as a result of

25. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-330-31; See also *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-332.

26. Jahangir himself writes in his memoirs that "the generals of the victorious army, with their revenge seeking soldiers (*sipah kina khwah*), halted three days in the town of Khirki and destroyed the city which had taken twenty years to build". cf. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-330-31; See also *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-332.

27. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-330-31.

28. *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-334.

this peace, the Mughal position in the Deccan was at last greatly secured, but Shah Jahan's rebellion, which broke soon after, disturbed everything that he had achieved in the Deccan during his last campaign.

In April-May, 1622, Shah Abbas I, besieged Qandahar,²⁹ which was a bone of contention between the two, the Safawids and the Mughals, since long. Jahangir ordered large scale preparations for relieving the fort. An order was sent to Shah Jahan to come to the North as soon as possible and proceed immediately to Qandahar.³⁰ Shah Jahan, suspicious of the moves of his rivals at the court, decided to use this opportunity for dictating his terms. Though he did not openly refuse to march but put forward some conditions before proceeding to the rescue of the Qandahar.

After sometime these anxieties of Shah Jahan induced him to take steps which amounted to rebellion. In 1622, he sent his men to occupy Dholpur, which was assigned in jagir to Prince Shahariyar. Subsequently, taking advantage of the Emperor's absence, he also made an abortive attempt to capture Agra.³¹ Failing to occupy Agra, Shah Jahan, pursued

29. Qandahar (31°N, 65°E), was an important and strategic fort to the west of Lahore, bordering with the Safawid Empire. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, op. cit., sheet - 2 A-B.

30. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-343; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-346-47; Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-103-04.

31. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-353; *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, p-200.

by an army under Parvez and Mahabat Khan, retreated towards the Deccan. He crossed the river Tapti in September 1623. In Deccan, Shah Jahan ordered confining of Khan-i Khanan, who was suspected of secretly corresponding with Mahabat Khan. Many of Shah Jahan's supporters had also deserted him by this time.³²

Being driven to extremity, Shah Jahan, now appeared in the Deccan as a rebel beseeching the co-operation and support of the Deccani rulers. He sent his confidant Afzal Khan to Malik Ambar and Ibrahim Adil Shah II with presents seeking their assistance. Malik Ambar politely refused to help. He is reported to have told Afzal Khan that he was "simply a follower of Adil Khan (*tabi'-i 'Adil Khan*), who was at present the head of all the Deccani powers (*umada-i duniyadaran dakan*), so, first he should go there and explain his desire".³³ Malik Ambar's refusal to assist Shah Jahan at this juncture, may be explained with reference to his hostility towards the person of the rebel prince for being humbled by him twice in the past. Malik Ambar's attitude on this occasion could also be explained in terms of his not being ready to get embroiled in the affairs of a rebel prince hotly pursued by a powerful Mughal army. Afzal Khan's

32. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-369; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-377-78; see also biography of Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan in *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. I, p-706. For the desertion from Shah Jahan's camp, see *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, pp-239; 248-49.

33. cf. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-378.

reception at Bijapur was still more disappointing. Ibrahim Adil Shah II detained him outside the city for a long time. He had accepted the gifts sent by Shah Jahan but declined to help him.³⁴ As a last recourse, Shah Jahan went towards Golkonda. Muhammad Qutb Shah assisted him by supplying cash and provisions, but did not allow him to stay inside his Kingdom. Shah Jahan, thus, proceeded towards Orissa and Bengal.³⁵

At the time of the outbreak of Shah Jahan's rebellion (1623-26), Ahmadnagar and Bijapur were having disputes over the possession of the fertile tract of Sholapur.³⁶ When Parvez and Mahabat Khan arrived in the Deccan for suppressing Shah Jahan's rebellion, both Ahmadnagar and Bijapur tried to seek their assistance against each other. In 1624, Malik Ambar sent his confidant, Ali Sher, to Mahabat Khan offering to wait upon him personally and also to send his eldest son for the Mughal service.³⁷ Likewise, Ibrahim Adil Shah II offered to send a force of five thousand sawars under Mulla

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*

36. Sholapur (17°N, 75°E). In the beginning, Sholapur was included in the Nizam Shahi kingdom, but Bijapur had captured it in 1510-11. Since then there was going a dispute over this region. See for details Introductory Chapter.

37. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-381; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-389-90.

Muhammad Lari to assist the Mughals.³⁸ This move was aimed at getting Mahabat Khan's help against Malik Ambar. Being an astute politician, Mahabat Khan did not respond immediately to these overtures of Malik Ambar and Ibrahim Adil Shah II. He kept both of them in suspense until Shah Jahan had left the Deccan, as it was feared that, if Mahabat Khan would favour one of the parties, the other one would certainly have gone to assist the rebel prince. In this manner Mahabat Khan succeeded in keeping Shah Jahan isolated and eventually in compelling him to leave the Deccan. Once Shah Jahan had left the Deccan, Parvez and Mahabat Khan decided to support Ibrahim Adil Shah II in his dispute with Malik Ambar. Jahangir approved this decision by issuing a *farman* in Adil Shah's favour.³⁹ Mahabat Khan's decision to support Ibrahim Adil Shah was obviously designed to use him in suppressing Malik Ambar, who was perceived as the immediate and most formidable adversary of the Mughals in the Deccan.

In compliance with the terms of the above alliance, Ibrahim Adil Shah II sent a force of five thousand *sawars* under Mulla Muhammad Lari to assist the Mughal army against Malik Ambar. Mahabat Khan, now, despatched a force into the

38. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-385-86; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-397-98.

39. See *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-377.

Balaghat territory,⁴⁰ for protecting the Mughal military outposts there. The Mughal-Adil Shahi alliance and the movement of their forces worried Malik Ambar greatly. He vacated Khirki, the temporary Nizam Shahi capital, removing the family of Nizam Shah and his own establishment as well to the fort of Daulatabad. He himself marched towards the fort of Kandahar,⁴¹ on the frontier of Golkonda.⁴² Malik Ambar's declared aim in marching towards the frontier of Golkonda, at this juncture, was to realize the arrears of *peshkash* for the last two years, from Sultan Muhammad Qutb Shah.⁴³ But in reality, he appears to have moved closer to the Golkonda frontier in the hope of securing Muhammad Qutb Shah's protection in case of his being overtaken by the Mughal-Adil Shahi forces pursuing him.

In 1624, from the frontier of Golkonda Malik Ambar marched rapidly towards the city of Bidar where he defeated, in a surprise attack the Bijapuri contingent garrisoning the fort. From there he marched rapidly to Bijapur devastating and plundering the territory on the way. Ibrahim Adil Shan

40. Balaghat region (20°±N, 75°-78°E) was spread into Ahmadnagar, Khandesh and Berar. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, Sheet - 14-A.

41. Kandahar (18°N, 77°E) was an important for in the sarkar Nander situated to the south-east of the Ahmadnagar kingdom bordering with Golkonda. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, *op. cit.*, Sheet 14-A.

42. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-385-86; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-397-98.

43. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-391.

II shut himself up in the fort of Bijapur, and wrote to the Mughals to send Mulla Muhammad Lari, who was then quartered at Burhanpur. In addition to this force, a Mughal force consisting of the contingents of leading nobles like Lashkar Khan, Khanjar Khan, Jadav Rai, Udaji Ram, etc. also set out from Burhanpur to rescue Ibrahim Adil Shah II.⁴⁴ The advance of this army alarmed Malik Ambar. He wrote to the Mughal authorities at Burhanpur that the Deccani powers should be left to settle their disputes among themselves and that the Mughals should not interfere in their mutual relations.⁴⁵ But the Mughal officers paid no heed to his protestations. They continued their march towards Bijapur which compelled Malik Ambar to raise the siege and withdraw into the Ahmadnagar territory. The combined armies of the Mughals and Adil Shahis kept on pursuing the retreating Nizam Shahi army under Malik Ambar.

Being hotly pursued by the Mughals and Adil Shahi troops, Malik Ambar finally took a decision to make a stand against the allied army. He positioned his army at Bhatodi,⁴⁶ about ten miles south of Ahmadnagar. Here the

44. *Ibid*, pp-391-92. See also *Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri*, pp-234-36.

45. *Ibid*. See also *Ma'asir-i-Jahangiri*, p-412.

46. Bhatodi (19°N, 74°E). The name of this place has been spelt either as 'Bhaturi' or 'Bhatvadi' by the modern writers. But Irfan Habib has given this name as Bhatodi. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, op. cit. Sheet 14-A, p-56.

rival armies fought a well contested battle (1625), in which Malik Ambar inflicted a crushing defeat on the allies.⁴⁷ He, thus, was able to save the Nizam Shahi Kingdom from extinction on this occasion. During the contest, Mulla Muhammad Lari, the Adil Shahi commander, was killed, while many other Mughal and Adil Shahi officers were either captured or fled from the field.⁴⁸

This was the last major battle which Malik Ambar fought against the Mughals. By this time he had achieved considerable success and had managed to regain most of the Nizam Shahi territory from the Mughals, except the fort of Ahmadnagar and adjoining area, including a stretch upto the Mughal posts in Jalnapur.

After the Battle of Bhatodi (1625), Malik Ambar started a counter offensive against the retreating Mughal and Adil Shahi armies. He laid siege to the fort of Ahmadnagar which was defended energetically by the Mughal *qiledar*, Khanjar Khan.⁴⁹ Leaving some of his officers to continue the siege, Malik Ambar himself proceeded towards Balaghat region where he succeeded in capturing most of the territory. Thereafter he once again moved towards Bijapur and wrested the coveted

47. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-392.

48. *Ibid.* See also *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri* pp-236-37. Also *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, vol. I, pp-347-49.

49. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-392.

territory of Sholapur from Bijapur (June, 1625).⁵⁰ He, then, sent Yaqut Khan for investing Burhanpur. By now Malik Ambar had succeeded in recapturing most of the territories which earlier belonged to the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, thus, making himself master of the entire Nizam Shahi Kingdom excluding the fort of Ahmadnagar.

While Malik Ambar was busy in his above operations against the Mughals, Shah Jahan, pursued by Farvez and Mahabat Khan, arrived in the Deccan (1625). Although, by this time, Shah Jahan was a spent force even then Malik Ambar welcomed him,⁵¹ deciding to help him against the pursuing forces, apparently, with an aim to use his troops in the ongoing operations against the Mughals in the Deccan. Shah Jahan readily agreed to help Malik Ambar's officer, Yaqut Khan, in besieging Burhanpur.⁵² But, on the arrival of Farvez and Mahabat Khan near Burhanpur, Shah Jahan and Yaqut Khan were forced to raise the siege. They withdrew towards Ahmadnagar.⁵³

Some time afterwards, being ill and tired, Shah Jahan sent a petition to the Emperor apologizing for his "crimes

50. *Ibid.* Also *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, pp-237-38.

51. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-394; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-417-18.

52. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-394; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-417-18.

53. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-395; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-419.

committed in the past (*jara'im mazi*)"⁵⁴ It seems that, by this time, he had realized that he could not hope to regain his lost ground even with the help of Malik Ambar. Shah Jahan's real aim was to strengthen his position at the court for ensuring his accession in the eventuality of Jahangir's death in which Malik Ambar's support could not be of much use. Moreover, Ibrahim Adil Shah II, who was in alliance with Jahangir, was not expected even to give him asylum. Nor his earlier experience made him hopeful of securing help from the ruler of Golkonda. It was under these circumstances that he, despite friendly attitude of Malik Ambar towards him, at this juncture, decided to submit to Jahangir.

By the time of Shah Jahan's submission (1626), Malik Ambar had succeeded in recovering most of the Nizam Shahi territory. He, therefore, thought it prudent to stop hostilities against the Mughals. Soon after this he died (14th May, 1626).⁵⁵

Although Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan had somewhat succeeded in retrieving the Mughal position in the Deccan by 1616. But, in fact, the gains made were not very significant. Later, Prince Shah Jahan, did succeed in isolating Malik Ambar from Ibrahim Adil Shah II and creating

54. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-397.

55. *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, p-271.

a rift between them. Shah Jahan's major success was the settlement with Malik Ambar in 1617. Another important dateline of Shah Jahan's success in the Deccan was the settlement with Malik Ambar in 1621. Inspite of these settlements Malik Ambar was never subdued fully. He was soon able to revive his resistance with the help of Maratha *bargi* soldiers. The outbreak of Shah Jahan's rebellion (1623-26) presented Malik Ambar with an opportunity of regaining territories from the Mughals. The victory in the Battle of Bhatodi (1625) was in itself a great achievement of Malik Ambar. By 1625, Malik Ambar, thus, was able to recover most of the Nizam Shahi territories from the Mughals and Adil Shahis. These successes of Malik Ambar delayed the extinction of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom for the next ten years.

CHPATER - VII

Mughal-Ahmadnagar Relations, 1627-36.
Extinction of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom.

After the death of Malik Ambar (1626), the struggle between the Mughals and the Nizam Shahi nobles had ceased for sometime. It is possible that during his last days Jahangir was not much interested in continuing the military campaigns in the Deccan. His main aim, perhaps, was to consolidate and preserve the gains that Akbar had made in the Deccan by 1600. On the other hand, the cessation of hostilities against the Mughals by Malik Ambar towards his last days, perhaps, stemmed from the fact that, by then, he had already succeeded in recapturing the entire territory of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom except Ahmadnagar and the adjoining areas including the stretch from here upto the Mughal outposts in Jalnapur.¹ The surrender of Balaghat and adjoining territories by Khan-i Jahan Lodi in 1627 to the Nizam Shahi nobles, had further strengthened their position *vis a vis* the Mughals.²

However, the hostilities between the Mughals and Nizam Shahi authorities were rekindled with the outbreak of Khan-i Jahan Lodi's rebellion. These were precipitated by Burhan

1. Jalnapur (19°N, 75°E), located to the north-east of Ahmadnagar (19°N, 74°E) bordering Berar. Control of this place was important for retaining the Mughals' hold on Ahmadnagar.

2. The authors of *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-415; *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, pp-283-84 and *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-480, specifically say that Khan-i Jahan Lodi accepted a bribe of three lakhs of *huns* (about twelve lakh rupees) from Nizam Shah and surrendered to his officers Balaghat and adjoining area. Muhammad Amin bin Daulat-al Husaini not mentioning the amount simply says: "Khan-i Jahan, in order to extinguish the thirst of his greed, surrendered Balaghat to Nizam-ul Mulk". cf. *Anfa-ul Akbar*, British Museum MS, Or. 1761, V, Rieu iii/10229, f-222a

Nizam Shah III's decision to give shelter to Khan-i Jahan Lodi. In this renewed struggle, the Nizam Shahis were hampered by a division among the nobles. As it appears from the subsequent events, while one section of the nobility was in favour of reconciliation with the Mughals, the other section was firmly in favour of continuing the resistance. The section advocating reconciliation was led by *sipahsalar* Yaqut Khan and Fateh Khan, the son and successor of Malik Ambar, who also occupied the position of *peshwa*.

Earlier, following Malik Ambar's death, Yaqut Khan, on behalf of Fateh Khan and some other nobles, had written to Sarbuland Rai at Burhanpur, expressing their wish to join the Mughal service. Khan-i Jahan Lodi, the then *subedar* of the Deccan, promptly accepting their offer invited them to visit Burhanpur. Eventually, only Yaqut Khan and his followers joined the Mughals. Fateh Khan remained with Burhan Nizam Shah III.³ When Burhan Nizam Shah III revived the struggle against the Mughals in 1627, he is reported to have sent a force under Fateh Khan to molest the Mughal territory. The Mughal forces under Khan-i Jahan Lodi and Lashkar Khan, however, succeeded in repulsing him.⁴ Fateh Khan, on this occasion, was suspected of not carrying out the raids whole

3. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-413; *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri* p-280; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p-463. cf. *Anfa-ul Akhbar*, f-240a.

4. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-414; *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, pp-282-83; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-466-67.

heartedly. He was even accused of colluding with the Mughals. Burhan Nizam Shah III also came to distrust him. On his return from this unsuccessful campaign Fateh Khan was imprisoned on the orders of Burhan Nizam Shah III.⁵ Burhan Nizam Shah, at this time, was under the influence of nobles hostile to the Mughals. Two of them, Hameed Khan, the Abyssinian, and Muqarrab Khan were now appointed as *peshwa* and *sipahsalar* respectively.⁶ Both these influential nobles endeavoured to muster support for Burhan Nizam Shah III among the Maratha *sardars*. They also sought assistance, time and again, from the ruler of Bijapur for thwarting the Mughal military pressure.

When Shah Jahan ascended the throne on 29th January, 1628, his first concern as Emperor was to recover the territories lost to the Nizam Shah which included Balaghat and adjoining territories surrendered to the Nizam Shahi authorities by Khan-i Jahan Lodi towards the last days of Jahangir's reign. Khan-i Jahan Lodi's rebellion and subsequently, his being given shelter by Burhan Nizam Shah

5. *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, pp-283-84.

6. *Ibid.* The authors of both *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp-466-67; and *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. I, pp-721-22, say that after Fateh Khan's imprisonment Hameed Khan became the centre of power (*madar-ul mahamm*).

III was an additional set back for the Mughals.⁷ Apart from helping to Khan-i Jahan Lodi against the pursuing Mughal army, Burhan Nizam Shah III also procured military assistance from the rulers of Bijapur and Golkonda. From these developments, Shah Jahan appears to have perceived that as long as Nizam shahi Kingdom survived there could be no peace for the Mughals in the Deccan. On coming to throne he, therefore, began his diplomatic manoeuvres to isolate Nizam Shahis from the other two Deccani kingdoms. He sent two brothers, Sheikh Muinuddin and Sheikh Mohiuddin, as envoys to Bijapur and Golkonda respectively.⁸ Besides this, he also affected necessary changes in the Mughal setup in the Deccan, appointing Iradat Khan, entitled Azam Khan, as the new *subedar*. He deputed a well equipped army to pursue Khan-i Jahan Lodi.⁹

To begin with, the Mughal forces could not make much headway in their operations against the Nizam Shahi forces. The rebellion of Khan-i Jahan Lodi could also be crushed only after Burhan Nizam Shah III compelled him to leave the

7. For a detailed discussion of Khan-i Jahan Lodi's rebellion, See Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, British Museum MS, Or 173; Rieu i/258b, f-184 a. Also Abdul Hamid Lahori's *Badshahnama*, ed. by Kabirudding Ahmad and Abdur Rahim, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1966, vol. I, pt. i, p-289.

8. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-214 ab.

9. *Ibid*, f-175b; 182a. See also Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, p-257.

territory of Ahmadnagar Kingdom.¹⁰ After much pursuit Khan-i Jahan was killed in a skirmish at Sihonda,¹¹ on 26th January, 1631.¹² The rebellion of Khan-i Jahan Lodi thus came to an end, but his earlier action of fleeing towards Ahmadnagar and Burhan Nizam Shah III's miscalculation of providing him shelter, had directed the wrath of the Mughals towards Nizam Shahis. Subsequently, the Mughals concentrated all their energies in uprooting the Nizam Shahis.

During this time Shah Jahan's diplomatic mission to Bijapur proved to be a futile exercise. The offer sent in 1628, to Muhammad Adil Shah for an offensive and defensive alliance against the Nizam Shahis was, perhaps, not responded to by the Adil Shahi court. Shah Jahan's envoy, Sheikh Muinuddin, returned from Bijapur disappointed. One may presume that the Adil Shahi nobility had prevailed upon their ruler to decline the offer. At this time, Muhammad Adil Shah, was not an effective ruler; the actual power being in the hands of Khawas Khan, the *peshwa*, and his supporters, particularly, Murari Pandit and a few others.¹³ This section

10. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-207b-8a; Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, pp-334-35.

11. Sihonda (25°N, 80°E), lies in *sarkar* Kalinjar of *suba* Agra. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, sheet 8-A, p-29. Presently this place is situated in District Banda of Uttar Pradesh.

12. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-216b-17b; Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, pp-348-50. See also *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. I, p-729.

13. See Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, pp-359-60.

of the Adil Shahi nobility was strongly opposed to the idea of Ahmadnagar being annexed to the Mughal Empire. They had made a common cause with the Nizam Shahi nobles.¹⁴ The Nizam Shahi noble Muqarrab Khan, the *sipahsalar*, was in constant touch with the Adil Shahi *sipahsalar*, Randaula Khan, both of whom were determined to stem the Mughal advance. It seems, the Mughals were not fully aware of the understanding prevailing between the Adil Shahis and the Nizam Shahis at this time. While holding parleys with the Adil Shahi commanders, Azam Khan also continued military operations against Ahmadnagar and, in 1629, he succeeded in capturing Dharur¹⁵ and Parenda.¹⁶ Throughout the time these operations were on, Azam Khan was hopeful of an understanding with Bijapur and was waiting for a positive response from that quarter. The Adil Shahi commander, Randaula Khan, on his part, did not reveal his strategy and plans to Azam Khan. It was only after the capture of Dharur by the Mughals (1629) that he opened negotiations with Azam Khan demanding the transfer of this stronghold to Bijapur as a token of Mughal goodwill. It seems that the Mughals becoming distrustful of

14. *Ibid.*

15. Dharur (18°N, 76°E), located to the south-east of Parenda. During Shah Jahan's reign it was renamed as Fatehabad. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, Sheet 14-A, p-56.

16. Parenda (18°N, 75°E) was an important fort on the border of Bijapur. See *Ibid.*

For a detailed description of the Mughal military operations and capture of Dharur and Parenda, See Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-212 ab; 214 b.

Randaula Khan declined to give Dharur to Bijapur which resulted in the failure of negotiations initiated by the Mughal envoy, Sheikh Muinuddin. Soon after, Khawas Khan, the Bijapuri *peshwa*, sent a force for helping Muqarrab Khan, the Nizam Shahi *sipahsalar*, then facing the Mughals. They together forced Azam Khan to vacate Parenda and retreat towards Dharur.¹⁷

The failure of the Mughal forces to gain any significant victory disturbed Shah Jahan. It was evident that Asaf Khan, the *wakil*, sent in 1629 to co-ordinate military operations in the Deccan, was not able to improve the situation. He, therefore, decided to proceed to Deccan personally. Shah Jahan reached Burhanpur in February, 1630.¹⁸ Immediately on arriving in the Deccan, Shah Jahan began directing military operations personally. In these operations the Maratha sardars as well as the Deccani nobles were used on a noticeable scale. These Maratha sardars and Deccani nobles, most of whom had joined the Mughal service during Jahangir's reign, were presented before Shah Jahan for the first time after he arrived in the Deccan on this occasion. Each one of them was rewarded by Shah Jahan by giving *mansab* suiting their status.¹⁹ The prominent Maratha

17. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-216 a.

18. Ibid, f-189 b.

19. cf. Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, p-293; 310. Also Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-189 b-90 a.

sardars mentioned in this context included Shahji Bhonsle, who was assigned the *pargana* of Poona and the *sarkar* of Junnar as *jagirs*.²⁰ This step aimed at further promoting the recruitment of the Maratha *sardars* and the discontented Deccani nobles into the Mughal service was a significant development from the Mughal point of view. In the subsequent campaign leading to annexation of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom to the Mughal Empire, these Deccani nobles proved to be of crucial importance, assisting Mughals to a great extent.

With Shah Jahan's arrival on the scene, military as well as diplomatic moves of the Mughals became more vigorous. Militarily, many more territories were captured in the eastern and northern parts of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, which included Kandahar,²¹ Sangamnir²² and Nasik.²³ The territory of Nasik was handed over to Shahji Bhonsle as his *jagir*. This step was taken, perhaps, to further consolidate and secure Marathas' support in the ongoing offensive against the

20. Grant Duff says that Shahji Bhonsle was one of the supporters of Khan-i Jahan Lodi. On his flight, Shahji, probably fearing the loss of his *jagir* made submission to the Mughal Emperor. He was awarded a *mansab* and confirmed in his *jagir*. See Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, first published 1863, (reprint) 1990, vol. I, p-75.

21. Kandahar (18°N, 77°E), situated in the eastern part of the kingdom bordering Golkonda. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, Sheet 14-A.

22. Sangamnir (19°N, 74°E), situated in the northern part bordering Gujarat. See *Ibid*.

23. Nasik (20°N, 73°E), was an important *pargana* in *sarkar* Sangamnir. See *Ibid*.

Nizam Shahi nobles opposing the Mughals. Around this time, apparently, the anti-Mughal faction at the Nizam Shahi court was gradually getting weakened and the elements advocating submission to the Mughal Emperor were getting an upper hand. The arrival of Shah Jahan in the Deccan further intensified this process. In the same year, i.e. 1630, Burhan Nizam Shah III released Fateh Khan from the prison and raised him once more to the dignity of *wakil*.²⁴ This was a set-back for his arch rival Muqarrab Khan, who was heading the faction advocating resistance to the Mughals. From the Mughal point of view, it was a major diplomatic victory since, from the very beginning, Fateh Khan was known for his pro-Mughal attitude. Another morale booster for the Mughals was Muqarrab Khan's joining them. Being let down by his master, he thought it prudent to leave Nizam Shahi service and join the service of the Mughal Emperor, where he was entitled Rustam Khan and treated cordially.²⁵

The appointment of Fateh Khan created a controversy at the Nizam Shahi court. Those nobles, who, till this time, were opposing the Mughals bitterly, naturally resented this move. Despite desertion by Muqarrab Khan they continued to oppose Fateh Khan and also sought assistance from Bijapur in their efforts to resist the Mughals. Being alarmed by this

24. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-229b.

25. *Ibid.* See also Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, pp-378-79.

militant posture of the anti-Mughal faction, Fateh Khan opened secret negotiations with Asaf Khan, who tried to encourage him to follow this course. In fact, the Mughals, at this time, were rather uncertain regarding Fateh Khan's plans. They were apprehensive that he might enter into a deal with Bijapur. While apparently asking him to prove his sincerity, they were, all the time, pressurising Fateh Khan to depose Burhan Nizam Shah III. Succumbing to this pressure, Fateh Khan, in February, 1632, deposed and then killed Burhan Nizam Shah III replacing him on the throne by his ten year old son, Husain.²⁶ Besides Mughal pressure, Fateh Khan also seems to have acted in this manner out of a personal grudge for Burhan Nizam Shah III's keeping him in prison for two years (1628-30). The Mughals rewarded Fateh Khan by granting him *jagirs* till then held by Shahji Bhonsle. This obviously offended Shahji, who, leaving the Mughal service proceeded to Bijapur.²⁷

In granting Shahji's *jagirs* to Fateh Khan, the Mughals seem to have indicated that in the changed circumstances Shahji's support was no longer crucial for them. The

26. Both Qazvini and Lahori say that after removing Burhan Nizam Shah III, Fateh Khan placed his son, Husain, on the throne and later gave an impression that Burhan had died a natural death. See Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-239 ab; Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, p-402. But Mirza Ibrahim Zubairi explicitly writes that Fateh Khan compelled Burhan Nizam to drink poison. See *Basatin-us Salatin*, p-296.
 27. Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, p-442.

immediate threat to their authority in the Deccan, Burhan Nizam Shah III, was no longer there. The Ahmadnagar Kingdom was being controlled by Fateh Khan, who had been following a pro-Mughal policy from the very beginning. It appears that, during this time, the Adil Shahi help to the Nizam Shahi nobles had also been discontinued. There was no prominent officer ready to lead the Nizam Shahi forces against the Mughals. The Mughals, therefore, did not perceive any further resistance from the Nizam Shahi nobility. In this situation Shahji and other Maratha sardars were perceived by them as a force which had no role to play. In other words, Shahji and other Maratha sardars were considered useful by the Mughals in so far as they could be used for putting down that section of the Nizam Shahi nobility who were not prepared to submit to the Mughals.

From the Mughals' point of view, Fateh Khan's rise to power at the Nizam Shahi court was only a step towards the fulfillment of their plan to dismantle the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. They continued to put pressure on Fateh Khan demanding surrender of elephants and jewellery of Burhan Nizam Shah III, which were kept in the fort of Daulatabad.²⁸ In case of his refusal to comply with this demand, a well-equipped army was kept ready to besiege Daulatabad.²⁹ On hearing about the mobilization of the Mughal forces for this

28. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-239 ab.

29. *Ibid*, ff-244 ab.

purpose, Fateh Khan was obliged to send to Burhanpur elephants and jewellery that was demanded. He was also forced to send one of his sons with these presents.³⁰ Further, he also agreed to have the *khutba* recited and coins struck in Shah Jahan's name in the Nizam Shahi territories.³¹ This proved to be a virtual break up of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom. Some of the remaining Maratha *sardars* and Deccani nobles joined the Mughals, while others went to join service in Bijapur.³²

In March, 1632, Shah Jahan returned back to Agra.³³ It appears that, at this time, he was, perhaps, satisfied with Fateh Khan's formally accepting his overlordship. Shah Jahan's immediate aim in the Deccan was the subjugation of Ahmadnagar which, in his perception, was fulfilled to a great extent. Hence his decision to return to Agra in March, 1632. Though some other circumstances, such as the death of Mumtaz Mahal (7th June, 1631) and famine of 1630-32, might also have contributed to Shah Jahan's early return to Agra, but the basic reason was the one stated above. This is borne by Lahori's testimony who states that after Nizam Shah had

30. *Ibid.*

31. Nizamuddin Ahmad Shirazi, *Hadiqat-us Salatin*, ed. by Saiyid Asghar Ali Bilgrami, Hyderabad, 1933, vol. I, p-91.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-247 b; Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, p-422.

accepted the Mughal overlordship and the ruler of Bijapur was confirmed in his position, the Emperor decided to return to Agra.³⁴

However, the affairs in the Deccan were not yet settled finally. Following Shah Jahan's return to the North (March, 1632), the Adil Shahi nobles again began to create troubles for the Mughals by helping Shahji Bhonsle in recovering his *jagirs* transferred by the Mughal authorities to Fateh Khan. This recurrence of fighting in the Deccan perturbed Shah Jahan. He recalled Asaf Khan and Azam Khan, appointing Mahabat Khan, Khan-i Khanan, as the *subedar* of the Deccan. Mahabat Khan having earlier served in the Deccan possessed a considerable experience of conducting military operations in the Deccan. On his arrival in the Deccan in December, 1632, Mahabat Khan was approached by Fateh Khan for help against Shahji Bhonsle and the Adil Shahi forces assisting him.³⁵ Mahabat Khan promptly responded to this appeal by sending an army under his son, Khan-i Zaman, towards Daulatabad.³⁶

The prospects of a Mughal army getting stationed at Daulatabad alarmed the Adil Shahi commander, Randaula Khan, who, perhaps rightly felt that once the Mughals establish

34. Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt i, p-422. For the understanding between Asaf Khan and the pro-Mughal Adil Shahi nobles under Mustafa Khan, See *Ibid*, pp-414-15.

35. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-278b-79a.

36. *Ibid*.

themselves at Daulatabad, their next target would be Bijapur. He, therefore, opened negotiations with Fateh Khan urging him not to invite the Mughals; instead should join the Bijapur forces in stemming their advance. He argued that submission to the Mughals, at that stage, would be fatal for the interests of the Nizam Shahis as well as for the other kingdoms of the Deccan. Randaula Khan tried to induce Fateh Khan to take up arms against the Mughals by promising to give him three lakh *huns* in cash as well as liberal supplies of provisions and the determined support of the Adil Shahi army in his struggle against the Mughals. He made it a point to impress upon Fateh Khan that the Mughals were more eager to capture the fort of Daulatabad for themselves than to really help him.³⁷

The arrival of the Mughal forces from one side and Adil Shahi overtures from the other, seem to have left Fateh Khan totally baffled. In face of this dilemma he could not take any resolute decision for sometime. Eventually, it turned out that he was, perhaps, apprehensive of the Mughal moves. Yielding to the persuasions of the Adil Shahi commander, he decided not to let the Mughals enter into the fort of Daulatabad.³⁸ Mahabat Khan seems to have anticipated such a development and had already made extensive preparations for

37. For details of Randaula Khan's overtures to Fateh Khan, see Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-280b.

38. *Ibid.*

besieging Daulatabad.

After besieging Daulatabad for quite a long time Mahabat Khan succeeded in forcing the garrison of Daulatabad in October 1633, to surrender the fort to the Mughals.³⁹ Fateh Khan seems to have realized that resisting the Mughal pressure for a long period was quite difficult. To save the lives of Nizam Shah and his family he opened negotiations with Mahabat Khan offering to surrender the fort on the condition that their lives be spared. Mahabat Khan graciously accepted the offer. After the removal of Nizam Shah's and Fateh Khan's families from Daulatabad, Mahabat Khan entered the fort. On this occasion *khutba* was formally recited at Daulatabad in Shah Jahan's name.⁴⁰ After sometime, Fateh Khan and the young Husain Nizam Shah II were presented before the Emperor. While Husain Nizam Shah was imprisoned in the Gwalior fort, Fateh Khan was admitted into the Mughal service. A *khil'at* and a cash reward of two lakh rupees was conferred on him. His property was also restored to him.⁴¹

With the occupation of Daulatabad and submission of

39. Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, pp-512-13. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-297b.

40. For a detailed description of the capture of Daulatabad, see Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, pp-518-30. Also Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-297b.

41. Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. i, pp-540-41. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-303a.

Fateh Khan and imprisonment of Husain Nizam Shah II, the Ahmadnagar Kingdom ceased to exist. But the process of annexation of the territory of Ahmadnagar Kingdom to the Mughal Empire was not yet complete. Most of the northern parts of the Kingdom had already been occupied by the Mughals. But, in the eastern and southern parts, the Maratha *sardars* assisted by the Adil Shahis, were still holding on to the territories assigned to them by the Nizam Shahi authorities. By forgiving Fateh Khan and restoring his property, Shah Jahan, perhaps, hoped to win over the nobles sympathetic to Fateh Khan, who were still resisting the Mughals. Simultaneously, by sending the young Husain Nizam Shah to prison, Shah Jahan also did not want to leave out any legitimate claimant to the throne of Ahmadnagar. The task of annexing the entire Ahmadnagar Kingdom was, therefore, no longer very difficult provided the Maratha *sardars*, who were stubbornly keeping the resistance alive, were tackled tactfully.

Meanwhile, Mahabat Khan conducted vigorous military operations against the Maratha *sardars* and the disaffected Deccani nobles defying the Mughals in the southern and eastern parts of the Ahmadnagar territory. He despatched forces to capture the strategically situated forts of Ausa and Udgir situated in the east and Parenda in the south, on

the frontier of Bijapur.⁴² For the Mughals the capturing of these forts was important. This was the only way of preventing the Adil Shahi nobles from creating trouble inside the Ahmadnagar territory. The fort of Parenda had already been captured by the Adil Shahis, which posed a serious threat to the Mughal position at Ahmadnagar.⁴³ The most alarming occurrence, at this time, from the Mughal point of view, was the installation of a young boy as the new Nizam Shah by Shahji Bhonsle and some other nobles.⁴⁴ Shahji even started collecting revenues from some areas in the name of this puppet Nizam Shah.⁴⁵

The Maratha *sardars* supported by the Adil Shahi forces, thus, continued to resist the Mughals. Mahabat Khan was not very successful to contain their activities. His death in October, 1634, left the field wide open for the Deccanis. After him no competent Mughal commander was left there to deal with the Deccanis. Appreciating the gravity of the situation, Shah Jahan decided to come to Deccan personally. He set out on his second visit to the Deccan after accession on 21st September 1635. This time he was aiming at settling

42. See Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-33-34. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-320b.

43. The fort of Parenda was earlier held by the Nizam Shahi officers, but after the submission of Fateh Khan and Husain Nizam Shah to the Mughals, the Adil Shahi forces had occupied it. See Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-319 b.

44. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-336 b.

45. *Ibid.*

the affairs of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom finally. He sent *farmans* to the rulers of Bijapur and Golkonda making stringent demands upon them. Muhammad Adil Shah of Bijapur was asked to desist from helping Shahji Bhonsle and to surrender the Nizam Shahi territories he had captured. He was also asked to pay regular *peshkash* to the Mughal Emperor.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the ruler of Golkonda, Abdullah Qutb Shah, was asked to refrain from reciting the name of the Safawid ruler (*Wali-i Iran*) in the *khutba*. He was also asked to stop the practice cursing the first three Caliphs. Besides reciting *khutba*, he was also required to mint coins in Shah Jahan's name and also pay a regular *peshkash*.⁴⁷ These *farmans* were, perhaps, intended to warn Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi authorities against creating obstruction in the way of a complete annexation of the Ahmadnagar territory to the Mughal Empire. Simultaneously, vigorous military operations against the Maratha *sardars* and the recalcitrant Nizam Shahi nobles were started. Shah Jahan also despatched forces towards the frontiers of Golkonda and Bijapur for preventing these kingdoms from sending help to the Nizam Shahi nobles.⁴⁸ Well - equipped armies were sent

46. Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-125-26. For the copy of the *farman*, see *Ibid*, pp-126-30.

47. For Shah Jahan's *farman* to Abdullah Qutb Shah, see Lahori's *Badshahnama*, pp-130-33. For the summarised translation of the *farman*, see Riazul Islam's *calendar of Documents*, *op.cit*, vol. II, p-149.

48. Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-135-37. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-364a - 65a.

to capture the strongholds controlled by Shahji Bhonsle.⁴⁹

Shah Jahan's well planned and well executed military operations soon had the desired effect on the rulers of Golkonda and Bijapur. They realized that it was not within their power to resist the mighty Mughal armies for long. First Abdullah Qutb Shah complied with the dictates of Shah Jahan in April, 1636.⁵⁰ Soon after him, Muhammad Adil Shah of Bijapur also followed suit by agreeing to a formal settlement with the Mughals in May, 1636.⁵¹ Rulers of both the states agreed to the conditions put forward by Shah Jahan in the *farmans* earlier addressed to them. They also sent to Shah Jahan suitable *peshkash* besides other gifts.⁵²

The settlement with the two remaining powerful kingdoms of the Deccan stabilized Mughal position in the region. The Maratha sardar, Shahji Bhonsle, who aspired to revive the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, was left completely isolated. The Adil Shahi forces also joined the Mughals in pursuing him. Shahji Bhonsle was chased from one place to another. The Mughal forces captured the forts in his possession, one after

49. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-3649-65a.

50. Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I. pt. ii. pp-178-80. See also Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-389a. For a detailed discussion of the settlements of 1636, see chapter VIII.

51. See Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-167-74.

52. *Ibid.*

the other. Having been totally cornered by the combined armies, he, ultimately agreed to surrender the puppet Nizam Shah to the Mughals in September-October, 1636, but himself joined the service of the ruler of Bijapur.⁵³ By the settlement of 1636, the territory of Ahmadnagar Kingdom was partitioned between Bijapur and the Mughals,⁵⁴ a major share going to the latter.

Thus came to an end the Nizam Shahi Kingdom, which at one stage had emerged as the most powerful successor state after the disintegration of the Bahmani Kingdom. By 1601, Akbar had annexed Khandesh and had also subdued some parts of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. But it took the Mughals, inspite of their superior forces and vast resources, almost four decades to annex the whole of the Kingdom. This speaks volumes for the firm roots that the Ahmadnagar Kingdom had struck among the local ruling groups including the Maratha sardars during its existence as an independent state for one hundred and forty six years (1490-1636).

Following this annexation the boundaries of the Mughal Empire in the Deccan came to be clearly defined and were

53. For detailed description of the military operations against Shahji, see Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-370a-72a: 378a; 395a-97b. Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-148, 151, 160, 165. Later, Muhammad Adil Shah assigned the jagirs of Poona and Supa to Shahji. See Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-397b.

54. See Chapter VIII and the appended Map-C.

firmly established. Theoretically speaking, the settlements with Bijapur and Golkonda had extended the Mughal overlordship over these two remaining Deccan states as well. After 1636, peace continued in the Deccan for the next twenty years. During this period the two Deccani states improved their positions politically as well as economically. The detailed outlines and consequences of the settlements of 1636 are going to be discussed in the next chapter.

APPENDIX-III

Description of the Areas of the Ahmadnagar Territory Divided Between the Mughals and Bijapur in 1636-

By 1636, the Kingdom of Ahmadnagar had become extinct. In this year, a peace settlement was concluded between the Mughals and Bijapur under which the Mughals had agreed to give the southern parts of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom to Bijapur. The rest of the territory of the Kingdom was annexed to the Mughal Empire. The map depicting this situation is based on the following specific information.

The territories, which were transferred to Bijapur in May-June, 1636, have been specifically mentioned in the *farman* sent by Shah Jahan to Muhammad Adil Shah.¹ According to this *farman*, these territories towards south and east included the Wangi *mahal* (18°N, 75°E) and the forts situated therein, the *sarkar* of Sholapur (17°N, 75°E), with the *mahals* connected with it, the *sarkar* of Parenda (19°+N, 75°+E), with the *mahals* connected with it and the *parganas* of Bhalki (18°N, 77°E) and Chitguppa (17°N, 77°E) in the east. Towards west, the whole of the region of Konkan, which was previously under the sway of Nizam Shah, and the forts situated therein including the *parganas* of Poona (18°N, 73°E) and Chakan

1. For the *farman*, see Lahori's *Badshahanama*, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-167-74. See also copy of the agreement (*sawad 'ahdnama*), *Ibid*, pp-203-04.

(18°N, 73°E) were also given to Bijapur. This entire western area comprised fifty *parganas* and yielded an income of about 20 lakh of *huns* per annum.² The remaining territory which was about two-third of the whole of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom was annexed to the Mughal Empire.³

Apart from the above mentioned territories, at the time of the settlement (May-June, 1636) the forts of Ausa (18°N, 76°E) and Udgir (18°N, 77°E) were still in the possession of the Nizam Shahi troops. But, later in September-October, 1636, these forts and the adjoining areas were also annexed to the Mughal Empire, after it was run over by the Mughal and Adil Shahi army.⁴


2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.* See also Map C.

4. See Map C. For the detailed discussion of the combined Mughal and Adil Shahi military operations, see corresponding text in chapter-VII.

AND BIJAPUR IN 1636

Map C



CHAPTER - VIII

Settlements of 1636: Significance of the Mughals'
Treaties with Bijapur and Golkonda.

The extensive military campaigns by the Mughal forces in the Deccan had resulted in establishing their military superiority over the Deccan kingdoms. The powerful kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda had to agree to a settlement with the Mughals in 1636. The ruler of Bijapur, Muhammad Adil Shah, also agreed to co-operate with the Mughals in suppressing the Maratha sardar, Shahji Bhonsle. After the activities of Shahji were finally crushed and Murtaza Nizam Shah III, a minor declared as ruler by Shahji, was handed over to the Mughals, the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, at last, became totally extinct. The position of the Mughals in the Deccan subsequently became unchallengeable. The Mughal Emperor's overlordship came to be formally accepted by Bijapur as well as Golkonda rulers.

It was hoped that the conclusion of the "treaties" could bring a prolonged period of peace and tranquility in the Deccan. The "treaties" had brought the military operations by the Mughals in the Deccan virtually to an end. Lahori, commenting on this situation, remarks: "the struggle for the wilayat of the Deccan, which had been going on since the time of Akbar, and which could not be terminated till then was brought to a successful close and shed lustre on the glorious Kingdom".¹

1. See Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I. pt. ii, p-81. English translation cited from Satish Chandra, 'Deccan Policy of the Mughals', *op.cit.*, pp-232-33. Satish Chandra referring to this passage says that, "the treaties served to stabilize the position in the Deccan and held out hopes of a stable peace between the Deccan states and the Mughals, and of limiting

The settlement between the Mughals and Bijapur could become possible only after 1635, when Murari Pandit and his patron, Khawas Khan, the *peshwa*, who were heading an anti-Mughal faction at the Adil Shahi court, were murdered. After their murder, the new *peshwa*, Mustafa Khan, adopting a pro-Mughal policy readily accepted the terms offered by the Mughal Emperor. As stated in the preceding chapter, a *farman* of Shah Jahan demanding acknowledgement of overlordship, payment of twenty lakh rupees as *peshkash* and to restrain from helping Shahji Bhonsle, was received at Adil Shahi court in January, 1636. In return Muhammad Adil Shah was offered southern parts of the Ahamadnagar territory. He was also threatened that if he did not accept these proposals then his Kingdom would be invaded by the Mughal forces.²

In January, 1636, Shah Jahan had also sent a similar *farman* to Abdullah Qutb Shah. Apart from the usual demands of acknowledgement of overlordship and payment of *peshkash*, the Golkonda ruler was severely reprimanded for allowing, in his Kingdom, the cursing of first three Caliphs. He was asked to immediately stop this practice and also desist from

...Continued...

further Mughal advance in the Deccan". See *Ibid*.

2. See Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-125-26. For the copy of Shah Jahan's *farman* sent through Mukarramat Khan, see *Ibid*, pp-126-30. For the proposal and threats to Adil Shah, see also Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff-380b-81a.

reciting the name of the Safavid ruler (*Wali-i Iran*) in the *khutba*.³ In case of non-compliance, he was threatened with an invasion of his Kingdom by the Mughal forces.

While the military operations against the Nizam Shahi nobles were still on, the ruler of Bijapur showed his inclination to accept the demands made by the Mughal Emperor. Thereupon Shah Jahan sent him another *farman* in May, 1636. It was carried to Bijapur by Saiyid Abul Hasan and Qazi Abu Saeed.⁴ This *farman* termed by Lahori as '*ahdnama* (deed of agreement) contained, more or less, the same demands as were contained in the previous communication. The additional demand was that Muhammad Adil Shah should sign a statement conceding these demands. In this *farman*, the territories to be transferred to Bijapur out of the territory of the erstwhile Ahmadnagar Kingdom were specified. These included, Sholapur and the *mahals* attached to it, Parenda and the adjoining *mahals* in the south, and the *parganas* of Bhalki and Chitguppa in the east. In the west, the entire territory of Konkan including the *parganas* of Poona and Chakan were transferred to Bijapur.⁵ On the other hand, the forts and territories, which were in Shahji's possession, and the forts

3. For Shah Jahan's *farman* to Abdullah Qutb Shah sent through Abdul Latif Gujarati, See Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I pt.ii, pp-130-33. For summarised translation of the *farman*, see Riazul Islam's *Calendar of Documents*, *op.cit*, vol. II, p-149.

4. See Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-167-74.

5. *Ibid*. See the appended Map-C.

of Ausa and Udgir, still then held by some of the Nizam Shahi nobles were to be surrendered to the Mughals.⁶

As stated earlier, the *peshwa*, Mustafa Khan, the leading Bijapuri noble known for his pro-Mughal attitude, promptly responded to Shah Jahan's above *farman*. He had an *arzasht* despatched to Shah Jahan, acknowledging Muhammad Adil Shah's receiving the royal *farman*.⁷ This *arzasht* was couched in a very submissive language; Adil Shah comparing himself to a particle, said, he felt proud to receive the royal *farman*. He gratefully accepted the proposals put forward by Shah Jahan.⁸

As is evident from Shah Jahan's *farman*, termed as '*ahdnama* (deed of agreement), it was in the form of a document addressed by a superior ruler to his understudy, who is addressed merely as Adil Khan, not as Adil Shah.⁹ The settlement of 1636, between the Mughals and Bijapur, thus, can not be regarded as a "treaty" (*sulh*) as such between two sovereigns. In this settlement harsh terms were imposed on the ruler of Bijapur requiring him to sign the '*ahdnama*, without objecting to the language or the contents of the

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*, pp-174-75.

8. *Ibid.*

9. See *Ibid.*, pp-167-74. See also *sawad 'ahdnama*, *Ibid.*, pp-203-04.

document. There was no question of his proposing terms suiting his own interests.

Similarly, the *farman* addressed to Abdullah Qutb Shah, termed as *inqiuyadnama* (deed of submission) was also conceived as a document addressed by a superior ruler to an understudy. The ruler of Golkonda was required to sign it without protesting over the terms imposed upon him¹⁰ As stated above, besides other demands which were same as those made on Muhammad Adil Shah, many religious restrictions were also imposed on Abdullah Qutb Shah. He was reminded of "the contradiction" in his position of recognising the sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor and reciting *khutba* in the name of the Safawid ruler, and was asked to immediately stop this practice, instead, he was asked to include the name of Shah Jahan in the *khutba*.¹¹

The terms imposed on Golkonda were harsher in comparison to those dictated to Bijapur. The ruler of Golkonda was required to pay an annual *peshkash* of two lakh

10. H.K. Sherwani, in this context, says that, "it was not a treaty between two independent sovereigns at all. For one of the parties was *murid-i maurusi* or hereditary disciple, Abdullah Qutb-ul Mulk, and the other was "the preceptor", the Emperor. cf. *History of the Qutb Shahi Dynasty*, New Delhi, 1974, p-436. Jadu Nath sarkar also expresses similar opinion. He observes: "the Qutb Shahi ruler agreed to become a vassal of the Mughal Empire". cf. *History of Aurangzeb*, New Delhi, (reprint), 1973, vol. I, p-19.

11. For the copy of the *farman* to Abdullah Qutb Shah, See Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. I, pt. ii, p-130-33.

huns. No annual *peshkash* was demanded from Bijapur. Moreover, the Shia religious practices were restricted in Golkonda and the name of Safawid ruler was replaced in the *khutba* by that of Shah Jahan. The name of the Safawid ruler was recited in the *khutba* in Bijapur as well. But in the case of Bijapur no restriction on this count was imposed. The reason behind this different treatment could be that the ruler of Golkonda was militarily weak and not in a position to resist the Mughal advance, if made. The ruler of Golkonda promptly accepted the demands of Shah Jahan. He indicated his readiness to abide by these demands by signing the *inqiyadnama* (deed of submission).¹² In case of his "disloyalty", Abdullah Qutb Shah was warned, his Kingdom would be annexed to the Mughal Empire. The Mughals in return took the responsibility of protecting Golkonda from its neighbours particularly Marathas and Bijapur. The Mughals also promised to compensate Golkonda for the losses it might suffer owing to the Bijapur's and Marathas' aggression against it.¹³

In treating the Adil Shahi ruler less harshly than Qutb Shah, Shah Jahan was, perhaps, motivated by the consideration of not to offend the most powerful of the

12. For the copy of the *inqiyadnama*, see *Ibid*, pp-178-80.

13. Regarding the terms and conditions imposed on Golkonda, R.P. Tripathi says that the whole arrangement was a sort of "subsidiary system". cf. *Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire*, p-452.

remaining rulers of the Deccan so as not getting involved in another prolonged war in the region which he wanted to avoid. Shah Jahan appears to have calculated that the Mughal interests in the Deccan would be better served if, after the settlement of 1636, the remaining two Deccan kingdoms, particularly Bijapur, the more powerful of the two, were kept busy in a conflict with their southern neighbours, the Hindu chieftains controlling Mysore and the Karnataka region in general. In the years, subsequent to the settlement of 1636, Shah Jahan, by and large, not only maintained a benevolent neutrality between the Adil Shahi and the Qutb Shahi rulers, but also encouraged them diplomatically to expand their dominions southwards.

One of the changes, brought about by the settlement of 1636 in Golkonda, was that the gold and silver coins came to be minted in the name of Shah Jahan which was one of the conditions put forward in the *farman*. As pointed by W.H. Moreland, J.F. Richards and some other modern scholars, prior to this settlement the Golkonda Kingdom did not issue any distinctive coins. The coin in circulation in Golkonda till 1636 were the south India *pagoda* or *hun*, stamped with the image of Vishnu.¹⁴ In Bijapur, on the other hand, the Adil

14. W.H. Moreland (ed.), *Relations of Golkonda in the Early Seventeenth Century*, London, 1931, p-91. Also, J.F. Richards says that, "The standard coin (in Golkonda) was that used by the indigenous pre-Muslim kingdoms: the *padoda* or *hun* stamped with the image of Vishnu", See *Mughal Administration in Golkonda*, Oxford, 1975, p-135. See also Om Prakash's article 'Foreign Merchants and Indian Mints in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century', in J.F. Richards (ed.). *The*

Shahi rulers had a coinage system of their own but, there as well, the pre-Muslim south Indian *pagoda* or *huns* were also in vogue. Shah Jahan in his *farman* to Muhammad Adil Shah had not specified the issuance of coins in his name.

The prolonged peace that followed the settlement of 1636 in the Deccan seems to have favoured the rise of Maratha *sardars* to power. The involvement of the Mughals with the affairs of the North-West frontier during 1638-53, provided an opportunity to the Maratha *sardars* to widen their area of influence. After 1636, Shahji Bhonsle had joined the service of the Adil Shahi ruler. He was assigned *jagirs* at the *parganas* of Poona¹⁵ and Supa¹⁶ and certain tracts in the western part of the Konkan region by Muhammad Adil Shah. Since there was no molestation by the Mughals after 1636, Shahji's clansmen and later his son, Shivaji, succeeded in establishing a strong base in that region. In the subsequent years, Marathas under Shivaji gradually augmented their power and territories, so much so that, by the time of Aurangzeb's accession (1658) it had become difficult for the Mughals to suppress the unrestrained activities of Shivaji.

...Continued...

Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India, Delhi, 1987, pp-171-92. See also H.K. sherwani, *History of the Qutb Shahi Dynasty*, Delhi, 1974, p-179.

15. Poona (18°N, 73°E) was a very large *pargana* in the Sarkar Jannar. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, sheet, 14-A.

16. Supa (18°N, 74°E), was a *pargana* in the *sarkar* Jannar, see *Ibid*.

It was this process, which ultimately resulted in Shivaji's establishing an independent Maratha Kingdom in 1674.

After the settlement of 1636, Aurangzeb was appointed *subedar* of the Deccan. This was the time when Shah Jahan began to concentrate his energies on the North-West frontier in so far as he was engrossed in the Qandahar problem down to 1653.¹⁷ In the Deccan, thus, the state of peace between the Mughals and the Deccan states resulting from the settlement of 1636 continued for about twenty years. This respite was used by the rulers of Bijapur and Golkonda to strengthen their positions *vis-a-vis* the local chiefs in the south and east. Being free from the fear of Mughal intervention these two states used their armies to conquer territories in the south and east. These were the territories of numerous small principalities that were constantly fighting among themselves. The Adil Shahi army began its operations in 1636-37, in southern India, under *sipahsalar* Randaula Khan, who succeeded in capturing Bednur, Mysore, eastern Karnataka

17. The Persian commander, Ali Mardan Khan, had surrendered Qandahar to the Mughals in 1638. Subsequently, to ensure the safety of his frontier from a possible attack of the Safawids, Shah Jahan concentrated his forces in the North-West, himself visiting Kabul in 1639-40. For detailed military operations of the Mughals in the North-West, see Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. II, pt. ii, pp-24-54. For the surrender of Qandahar by Ali Mardan Khan in 1638, See *Ibid*, p-35.

upto Vellore, Jinji and Tanjore.¹⁸ A Qutb Shahi army commanded by Saeed Muhammad, entitled Mir Jumla, also seized southern and south-eastern principalities beyond the river Krishna.¹⁹ In this manner, the Bijapur and Golkonda armies annexed the vast, rich and prosperous tracts across the Krishna and Tungabhadra rivers within a short time. Following these campaigns the rulers of Bijapur and Golkonda exacted heavy tributes from the subdued chieftains which compensated them for payment of large amounts as *peshkash* to the Mughal Emperor.

In so far as the Mughals were concerned, no substantial improvement was registered in their position in the Deccan after 1636. No attempt was made by the Mughals to reform the administration for making it effective throughout Aurangzeb's first term as the *subedar* of Deccan. It was the period when bulk of the Mughal armies were deployed on the North-West frontier.²⁰ Hence no forceful military demonstrations were held on the Mughal frontier in the Deccan during 1636-56. The Mughal authorities were, thus, not able to counter the territorial expansion of Bijapur and Golkonda towards the

18. *Basatin-us Salatin*, pp-316-20, For details, see Jadu Nath sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, Calcutta, 1948, pp-47-48; 53-59; 69-74. Also Jadu Nath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, *op.cit*, vol. I, pp-118-119.

19. For details of Mir Jumla's campaigns in the south and Karnataka, see Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, *The Life of Mir Jumla*, New Delhi, 2nd edn., 1979, pp-27-58.

20. For Mughal military operations in the North-West, see Lahori's *Badshahnama*, vol. II, pp-24-54.

south. H.K. Sherwani, however, argues that the Mughals were not able to make any further military move for checking the southward expansion of Bijapur and Golkonda as there were frequent changes of "viceroys", particularly after 1644. As many as five "viceroys" were successively appointed between 1644 and 1652. According to him, owing to administrative uncertainty caused by the frequent transfers of the "viceroys" the Mughals were not able to effectively intervene in the affairs of South India.²¹ He further suggests that the rapid changes of the "viceroys" also worsened the economy of the Deccan provinces. It was only after 1652, when Aurangzeb was appointed "viceroy" of the Deccan for the second time, that steps were taken to improve the Mughal position in the Deccan.²²

In any case, it is apparent, particularly after 1648, that inspite of the settlements of 1636, the relations of the Mughals with Bijapur and Golkonda were not always cordial. From both sides there were constant complaints and counter-complaints over one issue or the other. Although Shah Jahan did not take any steps to counter the expansion of the Bijapur and Golkonda kingdoms towards the South during 1636-48, but he appeared to be quite impatient over this development. It were only his pre-occupations in the North-

21. cf. H.K. Sherwani, *History of the Qutb Shahi Dynasty*, op.cit, p-439.

22. *Ibid.*

West, which deterred him from taking any action against these states. Otherwise he was, all the time, contemplating intervention in the Deccan to stop Bijapur and Golkonda from becoming too powerful. In this light one may suggest that the settlements of 1636 were not contemplated by the Mughals as a long term arrangement. These were only meant to allow a breathing space to them so that they could deploy their armies on the North-West frontier. As soon as the North-Western frontier was secured, Shah Jahan is reported to have directed Aurangzeb, in 1656, to intervene in Bijapur and Golkonda.²³ In this context the perceptive remark of Satish Chandra is worth quoting: "Mughal decision to intervene in Golkonda and Bijapur in 1656-57 was not a sudden one; events in the preceding decade had gradually prepared the ground for it".²⁴ Indeed, the basic instinct of the Mughals with regard to the Deccan states in the post - 1636 period was always that of intervention as and when the situation permitted such an attitude. It was this interventionist instinct, which after 1656-57, gradually developed into a drive aimed at extinguishing the two kingdoms and annexing their territories to the Mughal Empire in 1686-87.

23. For details, See Jadu Nath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, *op.cit*, vol. I, pp-127, 129, 131, 147, 148, 155.

24. cf. Satish Chandra, 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals - A Reappraisal', *op.cit*, p-334.

CHAPTER - IX

The Safawids' Response to the Mughal
Expansionist Drive in the Deccan, 1605-22.

During the sixteenth century a precarious balance of forces seems to have existed between the three Asian Empires, namely, the Safawids, the Uzbeks and the Mughals, which had common frontiers and overlapping territorial claims and ambitions in the region represented by modern Afghanistan. In the three cornered tussle that was going on among these powers, the Safawids and the Mughals were comparatively closer to each other politically as well as culturally, the rivalry between them over Qandahar not withstanding. This state of Mughal-Safawids relations continued, by and large, into the first half of the 17th century down to 1648, when Qandahar was finally taken by the Safawids. Throughout this time, the two powers were each other's rivals over Qandahar. But, on the whole, this rivalry was not allowed by both of them to take the form of a general military conflict or of a tussle arising from religious differences. As pointed out by Abdur Rahim, even at the time Shah Jahan was planning to regain Qandahar after Shah Abbas I's death in January, 1629, though he appeared to be inclined "to form an anti-Persian league of Sunni powers", in reality he was not averse to making a deal with the Safawids behind the back of the Sunni powers, the Uzbeks and the Ottomans.¹

In view of the above nature of the Mughal-Safawids relations, a suggestion by some modern scholars that there

1. Abdur Rahim, 'Mughal Relations with Persia', *Islamic Culture*, vol. IX, 1935, pp-113-30.

was an "intrigue" between the Shi'ite Deccan states and the Safawids to thwart the Mughal advance towards the Deccan is difficult to accept.² It is sometimes assumed by these scholars that this "intrigue" was basically rooted in the Deccan rulers' Shi'ite leanings. For them (i.e. the Deccan rulers), according to this view, the Safawids were their "natural allies". They purportedly looked upon the Safawids as their preceptors and overlords and wanted the Safawid rulers to protect them from Mughal aggression. The Safawids, according to this view, were not averse to playing this role to the extent it was within their power to do so.

In this chapter an attempt is made to examine the validity of this view regarding the role of the Safawid Empire as the "natural ally" and "protector" of the Deccan states against "Mughal aggression". This is going to be tested with particular reference to the evidence that has survived on this theme in the form of diplomatic correspondence of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A similar re-examination was attempted earlier by S.M. Raza Naqvi³ in the limited context of the question of the Safawid occupation of Qandahar in 1622. The question sought to be -----

2. See Abdur Rahim, *op.cit.* Also S.H. Askari, 'Indo-Persian Relations with special Reference to the Deccan', *Studies in Asian History*, New Delhi, 1961.

3. S.M. Raza Naqvi, 'Shah Abbas and the Conflict between Jahangir and the Deccan States', *Medieval India - A Miscellany*, vol. I, Aligarh, 1969, pp-272-79.

answered by him was as to what extent Safawid occupation of Qandahar in 1622 was aimed at helping the Deccan states. At the time S.M. Raza Naqvi wrote his above paper in 1969, a number of documents published since then were not before him. In the present study, which attempts a general reappraisal of the Safawids' attitude towards the Deccan states, these lately published documents are used extensively to answer the general question as to what extent the Safawids were inclined to help the Deccan states against the Mughals and also whether the Safawids sympathy for the Deccan states stemmed, as suggested by S.H. Askari and Abdur Rahim, from their anxiety to protect these rulers who claimed to be staunch Shi'ites.

Diplomatic contacts between the Deccan states and the Safawids dated back to the early years of the reign of Shah Ismail Safawi, i.e. much before the establishment of the Mughal Empire in Hindustan. It is worth noting that even in their letters of this early period, the Deccan rulers were proclaiming their adherence to *asna-i ashri* faith (i.e. Shi'ism) and their having the *khutba* read in the name of the Shah. The earliest such contact was established in 1508, when Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur sent a letter to Shah Ismail Safawi through Saiyid Ahmad Harvi.⁴ The court historian of Shah Abbas I, Iskandar Beg Munshi, referring to those early

⁴. *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-12.

contacts, says that the Deccani rulers, including Nizam Shah, and Adil Shah as well as Qutb Shah, were always sending embassies to the Safawid court asserting that they professed Shi'ite faith and were having the *khutba* recited within their dominions in the Shah's name.⁵

A closer examination of the political developments in the contemporary Deccan, however, goes to reveal that during the first decade of the sixteenth century a sharp rivalry existed among the states of Bijapur, Golkonda, Ahmadnagar, Berar and Bidar which had only recently emerged as independent kingdoms after the disintegration of the Bahmani Kingdom. In this situation some of the Deccan rulers, having Shi'ite leanings, were prone to seek Safawid moral support in their struggle against the rest of them. Yusuf Adil Shah's despatch of the above embassy to Shah Ismail in 1508 is one such case. It is noteworthy that Yusuf Adil Shah's conversion to Shi'ism and his decision to seek Shah Ismail's moral support coincides with the beginning of his quarrel with Qasim Barid, Fatehullah Imad Shah and Ahmad Nizam Shah. In making these moves he was, apparently, trying to

5. Iskandar Beg Munshi, *Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Abbasi*, Tehran, A.H. 1350 (AD. 1932), vol. I, p-116.

strengthen his position *vis-a-vis* his local rival.⁶ This goes to show that his decision to establish close contacts with the Safawid court was taken not so much out of a desire to make a common cause with a superior Shi'ite ruler but, apparently, it was prompted by the more mundane design of strengthening his position against his rivals in the Deccan by coming close to a newly risen powerful ruler in the Islamic world. The attitude of Sultan Quli Qutb Shah during this time goes to strengthen this inference. Although the Golkonda ruler of this period, Quli Qutb Shah had Shi'ite leanings (he was eventually converted to Shi'ism in 1509-10), there is no specific reference to any one of his embassies to Shah Ismail's court making the same kind of professions as were made on behalf of Yusuf Adil Shah.⁷ The apparent explanation for his not sending an embassy to Shah Ismail seems to be that Quli Qutb Shah, during this time, unlike Yusuf Adil Shah, was not having any ongoing dispute with his -----

6. Qasim Barid, the wazir of Bahmani Kingdom did not like the independent authority exercised by Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur. He made a coalition with Fatenullah Imad Shah and Ahmad Nizam Shah against him. Ahmad Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar had demanded the territory of Naldurg from Bijapur. On Yusuf Adil Shah's refusal to surrender that territory, he joined the alliance of Barid Shah and Imad Shah. The joint forces of these allies marched against Bijapur in 1504-05. For details see *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-5. M.A. Nayeem has given detailed description of this invasion see, *External Relations of Bijapur Kingdom (1489-1686)*, Hyderabad, 1974, p-20.

7. The author of *Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Abbasi*, writing in 1616-17, does mention the arrival of embassies at Shah Ismail Safawi's court from Adil Shah, Nizam Shah as well as Qutb Shah but, in the case of last two he does not mention the recitation of *khutba* in Shah Ismail's name. See vol. I, p-116.

neighbours and hence he was, apparently, not particularly keen to ingratiate with Shah Ismail or seek his moral support. There is, in any case, no evidence to suggest Shah Ismail's responding to Yusuf Adil Shah's above embassy by extending any help or even moral support to him against his rivals in the Deccan.

The Ahmadnagar Kingdom's close contacts with the Safawid court seem to have begun only after Burhan Nizam Shah I converted to Shi'ism under the influence of Shah Tahir in 1537-38.⁸ Although Burhan Nizam Shah I was involved in a territorial dispute with the rulers of Bijapur and Berar since 1504-05, on no occasion before 1544-45, he is reported to have established direct contact with the Safawids for winning their favour and support. It was only after Shah Tahir became his political and religious guide that he was persuaded to use the influence of this Shi'ite divine for gaining favour with the Safawid ruler. Shah Tahir's letter written sometime during 1535-40, reproduced in *Nuskha-i Jami'-ul Murasilat*, goes to show that he was trying to impress the Safawid ruler with the spread of Shi'ite faith in the Ahmadnagar kin⁹. It seems that he became instrumental in

8. For Burhan Nizam Shah's conversion to Shi'ism under the influence of Shah Tahir, see *Burhan-i Maasir*, p-251; See also *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, vol. II, p-104.

9. See Abul Qasim Haider Aiwaghuli, *Nuskha-i Jami-ul Murasilat*, British Museum MS, Add. 7688, fol. 824a-b. Cited from Riazul Islam's *Calendar of Documents*, op.cit., vol. II, p-122.

bringing Burhan Nizam Shah I and Shah Tahmasp closer after the former was converted to Shi'ism. This is borne by Shah Tahmasp's letter to Burhan Nizam Shah I of the year 1545-46, where the Shah, while referring to Shah Tahir's (Shah Tahir had already died by this time) services as a religious divine and to the personal qualities and wide learning of his son, urges Burhan Nizam Shah I to maintain regular friendly contacts with the Safawid court and also invites him to convey his "desires" (*mud'a*) without any hesitation.¹⁰ As it is well known, around this time, Burhan Nizam Shah I was having a dispute with Ibrahim Adil Shah I (who also claimed to be a Shi'ite and close adherent of the Safawid ruler) over the territories of Sholapur and Naldurg. The above cryptic message of Shah Tahmasp to Burhan Nizam, in this light, could only be interpreted as a signal to the effect that he was not entirely on Adil Shah's side and was prepared to consider Burhan Nizam Shah I's claims or viewpoints on the current dispute between them.

After the Mughal Empire was firmly established in North India, it began a drive of territorial expansion towards the Deccan, which became particularly pronounced in the later years of Akbar's reign (siege of Ahmadnagar in 1595). This

10. For Shah Tahmasp's letter to Burhan Nizam Shah I, See Khwar Shah bin Qubad-ul Husaini, *Tarikh-i Qutbi*, ed. by Syed M.H. Zaidi, New Delhi, 1960, pp-95-96. The British Museum manuscript of this book is entitled as *Tarikh-i Elchi-i Nizam Shah*, British Museum MS, 23513.

growing involvement of the Mughals made the Deccani rulers, including Ibrahim Adil Shah II and Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, panicky. They started seeking Safawids' help against the Mughal expansionism. While doing so they were often induced to emphasise their adherence to Shi'ism and their special ties of allegiance to the Shah. They tended to give an impression that they were being harassed by the Sunni (*ahl-i khilafat*) Chaghatais on account of their being close to the Safawids. They even went to the extent of attributing religious motives to the Mughals for their aggressive policy in the Deccan. In their letters to the Shah, written during the first quarter of the seventeenth century, they appear particularly keen at inciting his religious feelings. The contents of some of these letters which have become known during the last twenty years are examined in the following pages.

In a collection of letters, entitled *Makatib-i Zamana-i Salatin-i Safawiya*, Nazir Ahmad has identified a number of letters of the rulers of Bijapur, Golkonda and Ahmadnagar addressed to the Safawid ruler Shah Abbas I. These letters were written between 1609-10 to 1626-27.¹¹ Each one of these letters is bitterly denunciatory of the Mughals who sometimes are also referred as *ahl-i khilafat*, an obviously discreet

11. *Makatib-i Zamana-i Salatin-i Safawiya*, Asafiya Library, Hyderabad, MS, No. 1214, fol. 404. Nazir Ahmad has published six letters in *Medieval India-A Miscellany*, Aligarh, 1969, vol. I, pp-280-300.

allusion to their being Sunni "heretics".

The earliest letter of this collection is the one sent by Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur through Mir Khalil *Khushnawis* in 1609-10.¹² In this letter Ibrahim Adil Shah II proceeds to assure Shah Abbas I that "..... The Deccan territories form as much a part of the Safawid Empire as the provinces of Iraq, Faras, Khurasan and Azerbaijan". He further assures him that "the names of the Safawid monarchs have been recited in the *khutba* and will continue to be recited in future", and describes his own position as an old servant of the Shah who is administering and protecting the region under his control as a Safawid governor. Further, he tries to instigate the Shah to come to his rescue by invading the Mughal Empire from the North-West in the following words: "Although we, on our part, are fully determined to defend our countries and would not allow the Mughal ruler to occupy an inch of them, it is necessary that His Majesty should unhesitatingly come forward to help us in this vital matter. Further, as the inhabitants of these region (i.e. the Deccan) had peaceful life under the protection of His Majesty's ancestors, our request is that His Majesty should not leave us undefended. It becomes even more pertinent in the light of treatment meted out to His Majesty's (Safawid) envoy at the Mughal court. The Mughal

12. Iskandar Beg Munshi gives the date of Mir Khalil's arrival at the Safawid court around 1612-13, vide *Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Abbasi*, vol. II, p-866.

ruler sat on the *jharokha* called him to wait on him but dismissed him without taking the trouble of reading the letter brought by him, where as an insignificant envoy from Rum (Constantinople) received reception and honour more than was due to him.¹³ This is quite an opportune moment. A well-equipped army from the side of Qandahar be sent and it is most probable that two to three lakh Afghan warriors, who had intercepted the Mughal ruler on his way to Kabul in his recent visit, would join the victorious army. Thus, it would be fully capable of taking possession of the invaluable Mughal treasures fit to be kept in His Majesty's coffers. So far as we are concerned, I myself alongwith other brothers (reference to the rulers of Golkonda and Ahmadnagar) are ready to join the victorious army and it would not be too much to desire the occupation of the whole of India in no time. I refrain from adding some other points lest they should be source of inconvenience to His Majesty. These would be explained to Your Majesty at the proper moment by my trusted envoy, Shah Khalilullah, who had sometime been in His Majesty's service. We hope to receive favourable reply soon".¹⁴

13. The reference of Jahangir's treatment of the Safawid envoy and the undue welcome accorded to the ambassador of Rum is nowhere mentioned in the Mughal sources nor in *Tarikh-i Alam-i Ara-i Abbasi*.

14. *Makatib-i Zamana-i Salatin-i Safawiya*, f-404. For text of the letter, see *Medieval India-A Miscellany*, vol.I, pp-280-85. For translation of the letter, see M.A. Nayeem, *External Relations of Bijapur Kingdom*, Appendix-I, pp-275-76. Also Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents*, vol.II, pp-131-33.

In another letter sent after sometime through the same envoy, Ibrahim Adil Shah II describes himself as a governor of the Safawid Empire (*in subedar*) and asks the Shah to send his victory letters (*fatehnamas*) to him in the same manner as were sent to the other provincial governors.¹⁵

The contents of the above two letters are to be seen in the context of Ibrahim Adil Shah II's alliance with Malik Ambar. This made him a party to Malik Ambar's struggle against the Mughals. As, around this time, the Mughal pressure on Malik Ambar and his Bijapuri allies was increasing, the latter appeared eager to persuade Shah Abbas I to create a diversion for the Mughals in the North-West. Thus, we find Ibrahim Adil Shah II instigating Shah Abbas I against Jahangir by referring to the alleged discourtesy shown to his envoy by the Mughal Emperor. Although Shah Abbas I did reciprocate the embassy of Shah Khalilullah by sending his envoy Talib Beg in 1619-20,¹⁶ there is no evidence to suggest that he had paid serious attention to Adil Shah's urgings to invade the Mughal territories. While reporting this embassy, Iskandar Beg Munshi does not make any reference to the Shah's planning to move against Qandahar around this time. As is known, Shah Abbas I eventually

15. *Medieval India-A Miscellany*, vol.I, pp-285-87. For translation, see *Calendar of Documents*, vol.II, p-136.

16. *Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Abbasi*, vol. III, p-951.

attacked Quandahar two years later i.e. in 1622.¹⁷ It would, therefore, be not very correct to imagine that the above letters of Ibrahim Adil Shah II were aimed at co-ordinating the moves of the Deccan states with Shah Abbas I's plan to attack Qandahar. However, it is interesting to note that, side by side, with writing letters to Shah Abbas I full of such malice and ill will for the Mughals, Ibrahim Adil Shah II was also addressing petitions to Jahangir pledging his loyalty to the Mughal Emperor.¹⁸ This goes to show that, at this time, Ibrahim Adil Shah II's real concern was to dissuade the Mughals from making further annexations in the Deccan. Thus, side by side, with inciting the Safawids to invade the Mughal Empire, he was, apparently, also not averse to trying to achieve the same goal by placating the Mughals.

Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, the ruler of Golkonda, also sent a letter to Shah Abbas I, through an envoy Qazi Mustafa in 1609-10. In this letter he emphasised his religious and political ties with the Safawid dynasty and sought the Shah's protection against Mughal aggression. He writes: "The Kingdom has been incessantly harassed and disturbed by the *ahl-i fasad-o tughyan* (the men of villainy and wickedness). The main reason for this harassment are the religious and political ties (*nisbat-i diniya was dunnyawiyya*) which this

17. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-344-45. Also *Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Abbasi*, vol. III, p-970.

18. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p-142.

dominion has maintained with that dynasty, (i.e. the Safawids)". Quli Qutb Shah requests the Safawid protection on the plea of his firmly believing in their "*wilayat and imamat*".¹⁹

There is no indication that, at that occasion, Shah Abbas I made any move or sent any assurance in response to this letter. But it seems that his usual response to such letters, written by the Deccan rulers, would be to use his friendly contacts with the Mughal court for persuading Jahangir not to be very harsh with them. A letter that he sent to Jahangir in 1613, asking him to forgive the Deccan rulers, particularly Sultan Muhammad Qutb Shah testify to this effect.²⁰ A similar letter that the Shah wrote in 1616-17, is of particular significance, because here he assures that if after Jahangir's condoning "the faults" of the Deccan rulers, "they do anything contrary" to the Mughal Emporor's wishes, then the Shah himself would take the responsibility of chastising them.²¹

19. *Medieval India-A Miscellany*, vol. I, pp-291-94. For translation of the letter, see *Calendar of Documents*, vol. II, pp-146-47.

20. Abdul Husain Nasiri al-Tusi, *Munshaat-i Tusi* Blochet, 2338, ff-165 b-66 b. Cited from *Calendar of Documents*, vol. II, p-171.

21. Muhammad Salih, *Majmua-i Makatib-i Mukhtalifa*, Majlis Library, (Tehran), MS, 2247, (Catalogue X, 3349), ff(p)33-34. Cited from *Calendar of Documents*, vol. II, p-182.

It seems that Shah Abbas I's attitude in regard to the Deccan states continued on the above lines down to 1620, when he seems to have finally decided to use force against Qandahar. The last letter that the Shah wrote, recommending the case of a Deccan ruler to Jahangir in the same friendly language as in the above two letters, dated back to 1620 itself. This was a letter brought back by Qasim Beg to Jahangir in which the Shah refers to the arrival of the Mughal envoy, Khan Alam, and requests Jahangir to allow Qasim Beg to proceed to the Deccan, so that he is able to deliver the message that the Shah had sent to the Deccan ruler without much delay.²²

It is significant that in the same year (1620), perhaps sometime after sending Qasim Beg to the Mughal court, Shah Abbas I attacked Kej and Mukran (then ruled by chiefs who paid allegiance to the Mughal ruler) and occupied these two places.²³ Annexation of these territories adjacent to Qandahar was obviously a part of Shah Abbas I's plan to wrest Qandahar from the Mughals by force. In one of his subsequent communications addressed to Muhammad Qutb Shah, Shah Abbas I not only reports his annexation of Kej and Mukran but goes on to say that this would eventually pave the way for easier

22. Anonymous *Jahangirnama*, MS, R.A.S. See also Nasrullah Falsafi, *Zindagani-i Shah Abbas Awwal*, Tehran, 1955, vol. IV, pp-302-03. For the translation of the letter, see *Calendar of Documents*, vol. I, p-194.

23. *Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Abbasi*, vol. III, p-958.

communication between Iran and the Deccan states.²⁴ This appears to be turning point in the attitude of the Safawids towards the Mughals. Perhaps Shah Abbas I adopted this attitude because he thought that it was an opportune moment for snatching Qandahar from the Mughals. As we know from Abdur Rahim's study of the Mughal relations with Persia, till this time the Shah was pressing Jahangir to return Qandahar to the Safawids in a friendly manner. But it seems that, sometime in 1620, a final decision was taken to use force for achieving the same goal. From this time onwards Shah Abbas I started talking in a totally different language in his communications with the Deccan rulers. The tenor of his letter to Muhammad Qutb Shah illustrates this change.

From a letter of Burhan Nizam Shah III to Shah Abbas I that he sent in 1620-21 through Habsh Khan,²⁵ we come to know that prior to this date, Shah Abbas I had sent a communication to the Nizam Shah through Muhammadi Beg.²⁶ Although the contents of the communication are not known, we can assume that as, by this time, the Shah had already adopted a militant attitude towards the Mughals, the contents of this letter would have been similar to those of the Shah's above letter to Muhammad Qutb Shah. It is

24. See anonymous, *Tarikh-i Qutb Shahi*, India Office, MS, 179, Ethe, 456, i/176, ff-239 b-41 a.

25. *Medieval India-A Miscellany*, vol. I, pp-294-95.

26. For Muhammadi Beg's embassy to Ahmadnagar, See *Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Abbasi* vol. III, p-951.

significant that the Nizam Shahi envoy, Habsh Khan, who carried the letters to the Safawid court in 1620, stayed on there. This is an indication of the fact that the two courts were maintaining close contacts with each other throughout 1621 and early part of 1622, when Qandahar was finally taken by the Safawids. It is noteworthy that Habsh Khan accompanied Shah Abbas I during the siege of Qandahar. Habsh Khan's presence with the Safawid army during their attack on Qandahar was surely symptomatic of the active collaboration between the Safawids and the Nizam Shahis against the Mughals on this occasion.

We know from Abdur Rahim's study that after Qandahar was occupied by Shah Abbas I, he adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Mughals. Now he was no longer interested in giving an impression to the Deccan states, as he did since the time of his letters to the Qutb Shah and the Nizam Shah in 1620, that he was prepared to fight the Mughals and even extend military help to them. Subsequently, he was all the time trying to explain to Jahangir his action on Qandahar, and to ensure that this episode should not rupture Safawid-Mughal relations and lead to a prolonged conflict and tension between them.²⁷

27. For Shah Abbas I's letter justifying the occupation of Qandahar and assuaging and requesting Jahangir to maintain cordial relations, see *Jami-ul Insha* fol. 272b-74a. For Jahangir's reply, see *Ibid*, fol. 274b-75a. Also *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp-348, 350-52.

From the above discussion based on the letters exchanged between the Deccan rulers and the Safawids, it is apparent that the rulers of the Deccan states did try to use the influence of the Shah for furthering their own interests. The assertion of Abdur Rahim and S.H. Askari, that there was an intrigue between the rulers of the Deccan states and the Safawids against their common adversary on the basis of religious affinity, however, does not seem tenable. On the other hand, the contention of S.M. Raza Naqvi that there was no such intrigue has been substantiated, to some extent, by the argument developed in the above narration. However, an understanding between the Deccan rulers and the Safawids on some particular occasions can not entirely be ruled out. It is obvious from the tenor of the letters despatched by the rulers of the Deccan states, that they (i.e. the Deccanis) tried to incite the religious feelings of the Safawids against the Mughals. But the Safawids themselves were engaged in a relationship with the Mughals which was very delicate in nature. Notwithstanding their differences over faith, the only bone of contention between them was the possession of Qandahar. However, until 1648, when a sort of regular war between the Mughals and the Safawids did commence, none of them declared a full-fledged war for occupying Qandahar. On the other hand, the Safawid rulers were exchanging embassies with the Deccani rulers from a very early period, but on their part, they never responded

rulers in their letters. Although Shah Abbas I did take over the territories of Kej and Mukran, previously under nominal allegiance to the Mughals, this was not done until he had finally decided to use force against Qandahar. Shah Abbas I certainly had no intention of creating diversion for the Mughals in Qandahar for the benefit of the Deccan rulers, he only wanted to occupy it for himself.

CONCLUSION

The once powerful Bahmani Kingdom had begun to disintegrate during the last decade of the fifteenth century. Perennial conflicts between the groups of self-seeking and ambitious nobles had resulted in the break-up of Bahmani Kingdom into five smaller independent kingdoms. Since there were no clearly defined boundaries of these newly established kingdoms, from the very beginning, their rulers were continuously involved in internecine wars over one or the other territorial disputes. These disputes were often complicated by factors like intervention by powers located outside Deccan, religious controversies or the support of the local Maratha and other potentates to one or the other Kingdom at different points of time. In the course of this struggle each one of them, but more importantly, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, appear to be struggling to emerge victorious and establish its supremacy over the whole of Deccan.

In the initial years, Ahmadnagar's struggle of supremacy was mainly directed against Bijapur and to a lesser extent against the parent Bahmani Kingdom located in Bidar. The *de facto* ruler at Bidar, Qasim Barid, being averse to the idea of Ahmad Nizam Shah, the founder of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, becoming too powerful, was keen, from the very beginning, to contain his rising power. On the other hand, as early as 1493, Ahmad Nizam Shah developed a dispute with Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur over the territory of Sholapur and its dependencies. In the subsequent years, in the repeated

precipitated, on one pretext or the other, the disputed territory of Sholapur changed hands several times. But the dispute over Sholapur between them remained unresolved down to 1636 when it was finally transferred to Bijapur by the Mughals under the settlement of 1636. Similarly, with the Imad Shahi rulers of Berar, the Nizam Shahi dynasty was throughout having a love-hate relationship which appear to have been partly moulded by their conflicting claims over Pathri. This situation came to an end only in 1574, with the annexation of Berar by Ahmadnagar. The Qutb Shahi rulers of Golkonda, on their part, generally tried to protect their interests by allying with whichever power, among Bijapur, Bidar and Ahmadnagar, seemed gaining an upper hand at a particular point of time.

It was during first half of the sixteenth century, the period of growing mutual rivalry among the Deccan kingdoms, that the Portuguese extended their sway on the western coast by establishing their control over Chaul (1507), Goa (1510), Diu (1535) and Daman (1546).¹ Thus, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese had emerged in the coastal region as the formidable rivals of the littoral states of Deccan, namely Ahmadnagar and Bijapur. The two states were a party to an attempt by a joint naval force of the Sultanate of Gujarat and the Mamluks of Egypt to dislodge the

1. See F.C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, London (reprint), 1966, vol. I, pp-126, 129, 210, 420.

Portuguese, in 1507, from Chaul.²

Regarding the Nizam Shahi ruler it is noteworthy that, during the first half of the sixteenth century, they had to fight on a number of fronts for maintaining their strong presence in the Deccan. Apart from facing the intense rivalry of the other neighbouring post-Bahmani Deccan kingdoms, the Nizam Shahi rulers also growingly became involved in the affairs of Khandesh and Gujarat in the north.

There are indications that with the establishment of the Mughal Empire in North India, the political equations in the Deccan began to change. The despatch of congratulatory letters by the Deccan rulers to Babur on his triumph at Panipat (1526) was not, apparently, a formal exercise. They, perhaps, feared the Mughal advance into Malwa and Gujarat in a foreseeable future which should have placed the latter in a position to intervene directly in the affairs of Ahmadnagar and Berar through the instrumentality of Khandesh. Such a scenario appear to have made all the Deccan kingdoms eager to enlist Babur's support in the ongoing mutual warfare among them. Ahmadnagar, which had a long standing rivalry with the Sultanate of Gujarat, would in the short term perspective also have preferred to support any possible move by the Mughals directed towards weakening the position of the Sultan

2. *Ibid.*

of Gujarat. It was, possibly, due to his preoccupation in consolidating his position in North India, that Babur did not pay much attention to the situation in the Deccan. He did not respond to above letters of the Deccan rulers. Babur's not taking interests in the affairs of the Deccan and his not making any move towards Malwa and Gujarat must have been viewed at the Ahmadnagar court with mixed feelings. While the Ahmadnagar authorities must have felt relieved to see that an immediate advance into Malwa and Gujarat was not on Babur's agenda. At the same time they would have certainly been disappointed to know that Ahmadnagar's arch rival in the north, the Sultan of Gujarat, was not going to come under the Mughal military pressure in the foreseeable further.

Humayun, after his accession on 30th December 1530, however, adopted a different attitude towards the Deccan states, particularly Ahmadnagar. He was, apparently, for establishing lively diplomatic contacts with them which, till 1535, appear to be aimed at preventing Ahmadnagar and Khandesh from aligning with Bahadur Shah in an alliance against the Mughals. Humayun was, perhaps, aware that Bahadur Shah had conferred the title of 'Shah' on Burhan Nizam after humbling him militarily in 1531 with an aim to secure Ahmadnagar Kingdom's support in the eventuality of a Mughal invasion of Gujarat. This should explain why, following his campaign in Gujarat, Humayun also demanded *peshkash* from Burhan Nizam Shah. The ruthless invasion of Khandesh by him on the same occasion (i.e. 1535) was his yet

another strategic move to deter the Faruqi ruler of that Kingdom as well from helping Bahadur Shah.

Subsequently, Burhan Nizam Shah's attitude towards the Mughals as well as Surs was essentially a cautious one. He maintained correspondence with Humayun and, later on, with Sher Shah Sur as well as Islam Shah. His primary aim in adopting this policy was to maintain cordial relations with whichever power that might seem establishing its sway over a major part of North India. Burhan Nizam Shah I's main concern was the situation in Gujarat. He felt apprehensive when it was ruled by a strong *Sultan*, but was not averse to take advantage of its weakness in times of internal strife. After Humayun's coming to Gujarat in 1535, down to 1540, he appeared to look to Humayun for preventing Bahadur Shah and after latter's death in February, 1537, his successor, Mahmud Shah III, from attacking Ahmadnagar again. His letters to Humayun of the period, 1537-40, suggest this. Following Humayun's discomfiture at the hands of Sher Shah (1540), he started correspondence with the latter possibly with the same aim, namely, for keeping the successor of Bahadur Shah, *Sultan* Mahmud Shah III, under military pressure. As the affairs of the Sur Empire tended to be disturbed towards the close of Islam Shah's reign, Burhan Nizam Shah I revived correspondence with Humayun while he was still at Kabul. After Burhan's death in 1553, his successor, Husain Nizam Shah, also maintained correspondence with Humayun till as

late as 1555.

After consolidating his conquests in North India, Akbar annexed, one after another, Malwa (1562), Mewar (1568) and Gujarat (1572). These moves of Akbar were viewed by Murtaza Nizam Shah I with concern. He, apparently, perceived these moves as a part of Akbar's grand design to threaten Ahmadnagar from two sides, from the side of Gujarat and from across Khandesh and Berar. To obstruct the one possible line of Mughal advance towards Ahmadnagar, Murtaza Nizam Shah I annexed Berar in 1574. This brought him in a situation of direct confrontation with the Mughals. The Mughals, subsequently, decided to use the displaced nobles of Berar for preventing the Ahmadnagar authorities from consolidating their hold over Berar. Akbar tried to pressurise the Khandesh ruler to become an instrument of this policy. The Khandesh rulers, Muhammad Shah II and after him Raja Ali Khan, were forced to occasionally co-operate with the Mughals in furthering this policy, but their real sympathies always lay with Ahmadnagar. Whenever possible they connived to help them.

Akbar's policy with regard to Ahmadnagar tended to become more openly interventionist in the 1580s. His decision to give shelter to Burhan-ul Mulk (1581) and the public declaration, in 1583, of his intention to invade Deccan, if the rulers of the region did not agree to formally submit to him, followed by an attempt to militarily intervene

in Berar in 1586, were the important manifestations of this policy. Akbar's decision in 1589 to allow Burhan-ul Mulk to proceed to Burhanpur and make a bid for occupying the Ahmadnagar throne, at a time, when he himself was still bogged down in the North-West, goes to indicate that the Mughal policy with regard to Ahmadnagar, developing since 1581, was becoming more and more pronouncedly interventionist.

However, Akbar's plans of establishing Mughal sway over Ahmadnagar by helping Burhan-ul Mulk came to a naught when the latter, after establishing himself there in 1591, defiantly refused to comply with his dictates. Burhan Nizam Shah II, being a capable ruler, had succeeded in reuniting the Ahmadnagar nobility under him. Moreover, he was capable of organising an alliance of the Deccan states in a situation of Mughal invasion of Ahmadnagar. It was, perhaps, this perception of ground realities in the Deccan that Akbar did not order the Mughal forces, mobilized in Malwa in 1591, to advance into Ahmadnagar forthwith. At that time, Akbar preferred to postpone the military intervention in Ahmadnagar possibly in the hope of taking such a decisive step after the situation there had become more favourable for the Mughals. Such a moment came in 1595, when Burhan Nizam Shah II's death led to a multifacet factional fight among the Nizam Shahi nobles over the issue of succession. As is well known, in 1596, despite Chand Bibi's desperate efforts to resist the

Mughal attack, the Ahmadnagar authorities were forced to cede to the Mughals the territory of Berar.

From this time onwards (i.e. after 1596), the Mughals became involved in continuous military operations against the Nizam Shahi nobles, who resisted stubbornly the establishment of the Mughal authority in the ceded territory. These military operations continued unabated culminating in the capture of Ahmadnagar in 1600 and the annexation of Khandesh after the fall of Asirgarh in 1601. Thus, by 1601, in addition to the territory of Khandesh, Akbar succeeded in annexing to his empire the whole of Berar and a major part of Ahmadnagar territory including Bir, Jalnapur and the fort of Ahmadnagar itself. These territories forming the three Mughal *subas* of Deccan under Akbar, namely, Dandesh, Ahmadnagar and Berar, served as the base for the Mughals' military operations in the Deccan during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan. These operations were aimed at firmly retaining the Khandesh, Berar and northern part of Ahmadnagar Kingdom as the imperial territories by putting down reorganized Nizam Shahi nobility led by Malik Ambar, either by overwhelming it militarily or by undermining its strength by engineering rifts between different sections of the nobility, particularly Malik Ambar's Maratha followers and the Deccani *amirs*.

At this point it is pertinent to briefly comment on the objectives which Akbar wished to gain by adopting an

annexationist policy in the Deccan from 1595 onwards. Modern scholars have put forward many suggestions, some are mutually contradictory, for explaining Akbar's objectives in the Deccan. V.A. Smith suggests that Akbar's objective in the Deccan was to contain the growing power of the Portuguese, who were already established on the western coast.³ This suggestion is obviously made on the strength of a passing reference in one of Akbar's letters to Abdullah Khan Uzbek (1586) to his desire to remove the Portuguese from the coastal region of India after he was free of his pre-occupations in the North-West.⁴ But the fact that after the occupation of Gujarat in 1572, Akbar did not initiate any steps to remove the Portuguese from Daman and Diu, go to show that Akbar was not serious about his plans to uproot the Portuguese. An abortive attempt by Qutb-ud din Khan, the Mughal governor of Gujarat, in 1580, to expel the Portuguese from Daman was not followed up by a systematic military pressure against the Portuguese enclave at Daman.⁵ It is obvious that, during this time, the Mughals did not possess required naval power and expertise in firearms for putting down the Portuguese in the coastal regions. Akbar's pious wish in this regard expressed in his letter to Abdullah Khan

3. V.A. Smith, *Akbar the Great Mogul*, op.cit., pp-263-64.

4. For Akbar's letter to Abdullah Khan, see *Jami-ul Insha*, op.cit., ff-196b-99a. See also *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-211-12.

5. For the attack on Daman by the Mughals, See *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp-280-81. Abul Fazl does not mention anything further about this expedition.

can not be considered a sufficient basis for accepting V.A. Smith's suggestion.

More recently, Satish Chandra, in his path-breaking study of the Deccan Policy of the Mughals, has highlighted an economic motivation of this policy under Akbar, which is very persuasive.⁶ He is of the view that, apart from Akbar's desire to safeguard the trade route to the Gujarat sea-ports and to dominate "Surat hinterland", Akbar's objectives in Ahmadnagar were limited. According to him, Akbar had no desire to annex the entire Ahmadnagar state. His territorial ambitions were limited to acquiring Berar and the Nizam Shahi Balaghat, which together with Khandesh formed the economic hinterland of Surat. In this debate, Shireen Moosvi has pointed to yet another important aspect, namely, the annexations in the Deccan being aimed at "seeking larger revenues and enlarging imperial resources". According to her, this quest for more revenues was bound to drive the Mughal ruling class to expand the empire towards the Deccan.⁷

Jahangir, after his accession (1605), tried to follow his father's policy of limited expansionism in the Deccan. But, to his utter dismay, he discovered that the Mughal

6.Satish Chandra, 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals-A Reappraisal', *op.cit*, pp-326-27.

7.Shiren Moosvi, 'The Mughal Empire and the Deccan-Economic Factors and Consequences, *op.cit*, pp-365-66.

endeavours to consolidate the gains they had already made in the Deccan were being effectively thwarted by the indomitable Malik Ambar. Despite large scale mobilization of the forces in the Deccan, down to 1621, the Mughals could not make any significant territorial gains in the region. Malik Ambar offered the Mughals stiff resistance with the help of the Maratha *bargi* soldiers. He reorganized the *bargis* and utilized their services effectively not only for checking the further spoilation of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom by the Mughals, but also for preventing them from establishing their firm control in the territories conquered under Akbar. From this time onwards, the Marathas came to play an important role in the history of Ahmadnagar as well as of Bijapur. Jahangir too seems to have fully recognized the important role they had come to play in the Deccan. It is borne by his recruiting a number of Maratha *sardars* in the Mughal service. It was only after the inclusion of many Maratha *sardars* as well as some other disaffected Deccani nobles in the Mughal service in 1616-17, that the Mughals could launch a full scale offensive against Ahmadnagar forces led by Malik Ambar.

The way for the second successful Mughal thrust against the Ahmadnagar nobility led by Malik Ambar, in 1621, was paved by their hectic diplomacy in isolating Malik Ambar from Golkonda and Bijapur. It was a signal achievement of the Mughal diplomacy that, in 1621, Ibrahim Adil Shah II was persuaded to co-operate with them in their military operations against Malik Ambar and his followers. After this

final assault the backbone of resistance in Ahmadnagar had largely been broken.

Shah Jahan appeared to be determined, from the very beginning of his reign, to extend the Mughal sway over the whole of Ahmadnagar. The act of giving shelter to rebellious Khan-i Jahan Lodi by Nizam Shah seems to have convinced Shah Jahan that there could be no peace for the Mughals in the Deccan as long as the remnants of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom were not swept away. He, therefore, adopted a manifestly aggressive policy towards Ahmadnagar from the very beginning. Winning over of a large number of Nizam Shahi nobles through diplomatic manipulations was one effective plank of his policy. A generally pro-Mughal attitude adopted by Fateh Khan, one of the foremost Nizam Shahi nobles of the period 1626-33, goes to reveal that, during this time, many such men were conniving with the Mughal authorities in their renewed military operations against the remnants of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom.

Following Fateh Khan's surrender to the Mughals in 1633, Shahji Bhonsle tried to mobilize the Nizam Shahi nobles and the Maratha sardars for continuing the resistance. But, in the face of desertion by a majority of the Deccani and Abyssinian nobles and active hostility of the Adil Shahis, he was not able to make much headway. Although he had put up a Nizam Shahi prince as the puppet ruler in whose name he

tried to carry on the resistance but it was of no avail. He was forced to surrender the puppet Nizam Shah to the Mughals, himself joining service in Bijapur court.

By reaching a settlement with Bijapur in 1636 on the sharing of the Ahmadnagar territory, Shah Jahan was able to convince Muhammad Adil Shah that after this the Mughal expansion in the Deccan would come to a halt. But the revival of armed clashes between the Mughals, on the one hand, and Bijapur and Golkonda, on the other, after 1656, go to show that, so far as Mughals were concerned, the settlement of 1636 was only a ploy to gain time for temporarily diverting the Mughal forces from Deccan to the North-Western frontier, where a conflict with the Safawids over Qandahar was brewing. In the short term perspective, the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda stood to gain, both politically as well as economically, from the settlements of 1636. But the most significant outcome of the settlement of 1636 was, no doubt, the extinction of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom which left the field open for the Mughals to prepare ground for the eventual annexation of Bijapur and Golkonda.

Lastly, it may also be noted that, although, Ahmadnagar as well as other Deccani states maintained close contacts with the Safawid rulers of Iran, but there does not exist any evidence suggesting that the Safawids' moves with regard to Qandahar were, at any time, dictated by their desire to help Ahmadnagar or any other Deccani kingdoms, who, otherwise,

were so close to them. The Safawids obviously did not favour a military confrontation with the Mughals over any issue other than Qandahar. However, Shah Abbas I's appeal to Jahangir, in 1617, to be generous towards the Deccan kingdoms does point to his feeling of concern for them. He was, apparently, keen to ensure the preservation of Deccan kingdoms, but for achieving that goal he was certainly not prepared to bring about a rupture in the relations with Jahangir. Such a rupture he was prepared to risk, as he did in 1622, only for Qandahar.

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